

AN EXPERIMENTAL AND CONCEPTUAL EXPLORATION
OF THE UTILITY OF
THE DRAMATURGICAL ANALOGY.


by

Marylin J. Williams

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St. Anne's College,
Oxford.



ABSTRACT

In Chapter One, the dramaturgical analogy, whereby theatre is compared with social life, is described and its relevance to the study of social interaction processes asserted. The analogy may be used simply as an analytic tool or as a possible representation of the phenomenology of social interaction. In this thesis the former approach is defended, but the defence itself requires acknowledgement that people may on occasion view their behaviour in terms which apparently draw on dramaturgical principles and conceptions.

The analogy assumes that people behave according to known social forms, embodied in their own and others' expectations ("scripts"), that they modify their behaviour in accordance with what they perceive in the behaviour of others (as "fellow-performers" and "audience"), and that individual differences in performance are expressed within the constraints imposed by the expectations and behaviour of others. Many proponents of the analogy have emphasised the scripted nature of much social action and have ignored the mutually contingent relationships between social performances, while misinterpreting the implications of the analogy for individual performance and "self-expression". Role Theorists' emphasis on social behaviour as "conformity" to "scripts" is rejected; "scripts" for the performance of formal Roles in social life constitute only the frameworks within which social behaviour is improvised.

It is difficult to analyse and discuss the phenomenon of "process" succinctly, but an improvisational view of social (dyadic) interaction is proposed as a conceptual tool which may allow the study of interaction processes. The notion of "improvised" or "informal" role is defined; an informal role performance is characterised by relative coherence

(in comparison with other performances), where this coherence arises from the goals or "lines of action" of a performer, and from the interdependence between his performance and that of his interactive partner. The informal role relationship may be constrained by dyadic members' recognition of their formal Role relationship, but the informal role relationship emerging by improvisation in any encounter may be viewed as relatively unique.

A brief review of non-dramaturgical models of interaction demonstrates the compatibility between the Exchange Theory, Argylian, and improvisational views and offers support for the contention that, whatever performers' specific goals for the outcomes of an encounter, a "superordinate" goal for each is the achievement of a flexible role relationship (which may be modified and elaborated during the encounter). The relative dominance of partners, and the degree of intimacy between them, may be important features of the emergent role relationship. Dyadic interaction is viewed as the exercise of a skill, involving complex interpretative and decision-making processes. The probable nature of these processes is discussed by reference to the dramaturgical views of McCall and Simmons (1966).

McCall and Simmons' model of the "working agreement" refers to the agreement achieved between the members of a dyad when the framework to a role relationship has been negotiated. In contrast, the improvisational view described here emphasises the emergent nature of role relationships and the continuous operation of the cognitive and expressive processes involved in this emergence. Borrowing from McCall and Simmons' (1966) analysis, the covert cognitive processes of improvisation of role, and of attribution of role to other, are posited, and the overt expressive processes involved in performance, which may be

viewed both as role performance, and (by implication) as "casting" the other in the complementary role, are distinguished and discussed.

Improvisation of performance is not viewed simply as a manipulative or pragmatic device. Employing the concept of "role-identity" (McCall and Simmons, 1966), it is argued that people's performances are restricted by their desire to express themselves, and to have their views of themselves confirmed by their recognizing the recognition of their role-identities from the performances of their partners and thus having these identities legitimated. The ways in which interactants may identify each other as individuals are discussed briefly in terms of "personal" and "social" identities, "character" and "persona".

Stylistic (adverbial) features of behaviour are proposed as a means by which performances achieve the impression of coherence, the content of such coherence itself being informative as to the informal role and the performer's view of himself as an individual. It is argued that the effective improvisation and performance of roles in encounters requires the capacity to monitor the effects of one's own behaviour, but that the successful "management" of performances, and of encounters as a whole, by stylistic means (whereby behaviour may be viewed as individually and socially "meaningful") requires the capacity to "monitor the monitoring" postulated by Harré and Secord (1972).

The constraints within which performances are improvised are summarised, and the notion of "definition of the situation" discussed. Such "definitions" are argued to be equivalent to the notions of formal and informal role, especially in terms of the cognitive and expressive processes which would be required for their identification and negotiation within an encounter. Finally, the improvisational view is summarised by application to the problem of the relationship between

personality and social behaviour.

Prior to the examination, in later chapters, of the processes of attribution, improvisation, performance, and altercasting, Chapter Two focusses on the dyad as a "feedback system". It is argued that each member of a dyad, in providing continuous feedback to the other about his performance, functions as "audience" to the other; feedback is provided by performance, so that each is both performer and audience to the other simultaneously. This reversible perspective is also represented in the "self" which has both performer and audience aspects. People are able not only to monitor performances but also to "monitor the monitoring". This higher order control of performance, whereby a dyad, too, may collaborate to present a coherent performance to a third party audience, may be exerted in the absence of a "live" audience, since criteria for the evaluation of performance may be adopted by the audience aspect of the self and employed in the present control, anticipatory rehearsal, and retrospective review, of performances.

When empirical studies supporting the view that feedback is provided by the performance of a dyadic partner are reviewed, it seems to be the case that the majority of encounters may be imbalanced to some degree in performer-audience terms. One member may be relatively more dependent on feedback as an aid to improvisation than the other, and the degree of imbalance may be an important and negotiable feature of role relationships. Constraints on improvisation may include specification of the performer-audience balance appropriate to an encounter, and it is argued that there might be rules regarding performer-audience standpoints appropriate to encounters between people according to their ages, sex, formal Roles, and so on.

Establishment of such standpoints would probably be related to,

but not equivalent to, the relative dominance of partners in guiding the course of an encounter. Experience of such imbalance, given the importance of gaze behaviour in providing both feedback and information about feedback availability, is expected to be phenomenally represented in terms of "feeling observed" or of "feeling (predominantly) the observer". That people may be aware of such imbalance is illustrated by reference to Goffman's (1957) work on "alienation from interaction".

In Chapter Three, the nature of the attribution process is explored, and McCall and Simmons' (1966) "clues", that attribution involves role-taking and is based in consensus, are followed. Attribution is viewed as a continual cognitive process involving the interpretation of alter's early behaviour as role performance, and the subsequent modification of this interpretation during an encounter. Attribution of role includes interpretation of particular acts, since these will be viewed in the context of the attributed role, and their interpretation serves to confirm or modify the attribution itself. The continual refinement of the attribution allows the past behaviour of alter and ego to be summarised in such a way that alter's immediately future behaviour (given ego's intended actions) may be anticipated, this summarising function being comparable to that achieved by employing a "focussing strategy" in the formation of a conjunctive concept; at any point in time, an attribution serves as a "working hypothesis".

In attributing a role to alter, ego must "seek" what is coherent in alter's past behaviour and must attend to the ways in which this "coherence" was contingent on his own behaviour (which must therefore also be viewed as role performance). Such a process would involve understanding alter's attribution of role to ego, or "taking the role of the other toward the self". Since Mead's (1970) description of this

process, the term "role-taking" has been used misleadingly, especially where the process has been equated with "empathy", which is viewed as one way of applying the information gained by role-taking. Feffer's (1959) analysis confronts the problem of analysing the Meadian concept of role-taking, by reference to Piaget's (1950) notions of sequential and simultaneous decentering, and allows the assertion that effective attribution would involve a sophisticated degree of role-taking ability.

The initial interpretation of alter's behaviour by reference to the shared or "conventional" meanings attributable to his acts may require a minimal degree of role-taking (from the standpoint of the "generalised other"), but effective role-taking should permit more accurate interpretations where the conventional interpretation is not "accurate". Empirical studies in the areas of "person-perception" and "Role-perception" are criticised where they have equated conventional judgements (shared by a majority of judges) with accurate judgements. It is argued that valid role attributions would not be expected to be independent of attributions made by a majority of judges (where "modal", and valid attributions were not equivalent), but that (in such a case) valid attributions would be expected of judges skilled in role-taking.

It is proposed that the hypothesised skill to attribute roles be investigated by asking judges to attribute roles to absent egos with whom an actor is witnessed conversing. Attributions would be expected to be accurate where judges took the role of the alter toward the imagined ego. If such a skill were demonstrated, and found to be related to role-taking ability, the view of the attribution process described in this chapter would be supported.

The process of improvisation is discussed in Chapter 4, as less "accessible" (via verbal report) than attribution, since, in inferring the quality and nature of improvisation from overt performance, factors inhibiting performance (rather than improvisation per se) may be ignored. Discussion of enactment skills by Role Theorists and others is reviewed, and the problem of the degree to which individual characteristics (apart from those of skill) may affect performance is mentioned. Sarbin and Jones' (1956) "as-if" measure of role-taking ability, which they found to be positively related to the quality of enactment of the Role of "daughter", is described.

The relationship between improvisation and attribution according to the improvisational view is then discussed. If attribution is effective, then anticipation of alter's behaviour in the light of ego's intended actions, by role-taking, should "follow", and ego's improvisational task then involves selection from possible actions, that which is most appropriate, in maintaining ego's lines of action and the coherence of the role relationship.

Empirical support can be found for the introduction of the notion of self-presentation (or "appropriate performance") but little conceptual or empirical study of this aspect of "social skill" has been conducted. Simple hypotheses are derived which suggest positive relationships between performance skill in "improvisation" settings, and measures of social skill and role-taking ability. Assessments by peers of popularity, social skill and improvisational skill, are also proposed as correlates of the former "objective" measures.

In the subsequent three chapters, experimental and survey studies are reported in which hypotheses derived in Chapters Two, Three and Four were investigated. The six studies reported in Chapter Five deal with

"performer-audience" ("observer-observed") imbalance. Studies One and Two involved dyadic encounters between strangers who were asked to report their subjective experiences. A rating scale representing "observer-observed" was used appropriately and seemed meaningful to respondents. Differential illumination of dyadic partners failed to affect their degrees of "feeling observed" although feedback was reported to be better where the other was "lit". People performing the Role of interviewer felt less observed than those performing interviewee Roles. In Study Two, females were found to feel more observed than males in these encounters. In both studies it was noted that more dyads evidenced complementarity in performer-audience terms than would be expected by chance, but it is argued that more sophisticated methods are required in the analysis of such complementarity.

In Study Three, a questionnaire (the "O-O questionnaire") was administered to sixth-formers, asking whether they tended to feel observer or observed with strangers who were older, younger, or of similar age to themselves, and of the same or opposite sex. In general, males felt no less observed than females, but females reported feeling more observed with male than with female partners of the same age. All respondents felt more observed with older, than with younger, partners.

The relationship between feeling observed and a dyadic partner's gaze duration was examined in Study Four. Interactants felt no more observed when their (confederate) partner looked at them for most of the time than when he looked infrequently. Females were, in general, less comfortable in the encounters than males; males judged the confederate to be looking more when she was, whereas females showed the opposite, paradoxical, effect. Several subsidiary hypotheses were investigated. Males who felt more observed gave relatively high estimates

of their partner's gaze. There was no relationship between dyadic members' gaze durations, nor did different confederates induce different degrees of "feeling observed".

Finally, in this study it was found that the more people stated feeling observed in everyday encounters with strangers comparable to the confederate (in response to the O-O questionnaire), the more they felt observed in the experimental encounters, and the less they looked at the confederate. The explanation of this is probably that no informal role relationship emerged in these encounters, and that the use of confederates in such studies is of dubious value. It may also be the case that males look at females in a more challenging and intimacy-forcing way than females look at males or other females.

Studies Five and Six involved further administrations of the O-O questionnaire. In Study Five, it was found that the questionnaire was reasonably reliable over time, and that most respondents treated the scales as representing single dimensions (whereby "feeling observed" excluded "feeling the observer" also). The case where the other is of the same age and opposite sex may be an exception. The degree to which respondents' scale use was unreliable was positively related to the degree to which they used the scales in a non-unidimensional manner, suggesting that some respondents demonstrate a general variability in response to "observer-observed" measures.

In Study Six, the responses given by eight groups of respondents (of different ages and nationalities) to the O-O questionnaire are reviewed. The patterns of responses to scales were similar, suggesting that the "rules" regarding appropriate performer-audience standpoints with older and younger strangers are fairly general.

In Chapter Six, five studies are described which report skill

demonstrated on a test of role-attribution accuracy. The test, (the A.T) requires judges to attribute roles to a series of absent "alters" with whom an actor is witnessed conversing about the same event. The hypotheses derived in Chapter Three were investigated. In Study Seven, the predicted ability to attribute roles accurately was demonstrated, and found to be normally distributed among the judges. Free response judgements indicated "agreement" about the relative difficulty of the eleven performances; judges showed greater agreement about, and offered fewer different identifications for, performances which were relatively "easy".

Modal accuracy (assessed according to the frequency with which judge's attribution was offered by other judges) was positively related to "objectively valid" accuracy (assessed according to the criterion of the experimenters' instructions and the actor's intentions), when the latter was scored in such a way as to allow partially correct identifications to be taken into account, but not where a simple "number correct" score was employed as the measure of accuracy. No accuracy measure was positively associated with role-taking ability (Feffer's measure, 1959).

Study Eight involved an attempt to replicate the results of Study Seven in demonstrating attributive skill, and to compare free response (FR) accuracy with accuracy measures obtained by a "forced choice" (FC) procedure, where the alternative alters were specified. Under FR, attributive skill was demonstrated as before, and performance difficulty levels were similar. FC accuracy measures were positively related to those obtained under FR, but the relative difficulty levels of performances were different under FC.

In order to discover whether this difference arose as a result

of second exposure of the films, or the specification of alternative alters, assessments were made in Study Nine, of attributions made under FC on the first presentation of performances. Mean accuracy scores were comparable to those obtained previously under FC, and performance difficulty levels were similar to those found under FC in Study Eight. It may be that the FC procedure, that is, the specification of alternative alters, "changed" the relative difficulty levels of performances, and that the FR measure involves a measure of "appropriate naming" as well as of attributive skill per se.

The FC procedure was consequently employed in Studies Ten and Eleven, which sought crudely to establish the sources of cues on which judges based their sophisticated attributions. In Study Ten, different groups of judges performed the A.F. One group heard the soundtrack (sc) of performances, another read typescripts of verbal content (c), another viewed the silent film (v), another viewed the film and the verbal content (vc) and a further group witnessed the film as in previous studies (vsc). The rank order of mean accuracy scores in each condition was as predicted, vsc achieving greatest accuracy, then sc, vc, v, and c. Unfortunately, accuracy scores were not of a significantly different order. Comparison between performance difficulty levels in each condition suggested that the information carried by verbal content and by visual cues is distinctive.

In Study Eleven, the possibility that different sources carry different kinds of information (about alter's role) was examined. Judges were asked to identify alter's age, sex, status, and the closeness of the relationship between actor and alter in each performance, on the basis of sc and c presentations. Mean accuracy for age and status on the basis of c, and that for age where sc was presented, did not exceed chance level. The sex of alters and the closeness of their relationships with the actor

were better judged under sc than c presentation.

In discussion, it is noted that all studies were based on the performance of one actor, and that generality of these findings should be sought.

In Chapter Seven, two exploratory studies of improvisation skill and its correlates are reported. Both studies employed groups of students attending "dramatic improvisation" classes. In Study Twelve, a questionnaire was administered to past members of a group, in which they were asked to rank order their peers in terms of acting ability, popularity, intelligence, social skill, and according to how well they knew them. Respondents also performed Sarbin and Jones' (1956) "as-if" test of role-taking aptitude, and the group teacher rated members according to their acting ability. Members agreed about the relative abilities of their peers, and comparison of the ranks of the means of members rankings suggested that acting ability was positively associated with social skill and popularity. Members' ranking of their peers' acting abilities corresponded well with the teacher's ranking, but the as-if measure was unrelated to any other measures.

The questionnaire was administered to a further group in Study Thirteen, and the results of Study Twelve were replicated. Further measures, of role-taking ability (Feffer's test, 1959), of overt performance ability (where performances improvised with a "standard" partner were filmed and later rated by judges), and of "social skill" (Armistead's test, 1970), were obtained. Rank orders of members according to their acting ability (peers' assessment), the ratings of their filmed performances, and degree of role-taking ability (according to Feffer's test) were all positively interrelated.

As-if test scores were related neither to Feffer's test scores, nor to any measures of acting ability or social skill. An attempt to replicate Sarbin and Jones' (1956) validation study of the as-if test was unsuccessful. The validity of this test as a measure of role-taking ability (as defined here) is dubious.

A brief discussion in Chapter Eight suggests that, in spite of the contingent relationships between people's social behaviour in encounters, a person's social behaviour, his strategies and his experience of social events, may be influenced by his consistent characteristics or "personality". The latter may thereby influence the development and exhibition of his attributional and improvisational skills, and his adoption of predominantly performer or audience standpoints in encounters. Dimensions of individual difference concerned with experience and strategy in encounters in general, or which refer to factors exerting pervasive effects on behaviour, are discussed, and the relationships between such measures and the skills and preferences discussed in the previous chapters are reviewed.

In various studies described in the previous three chapters, the individual difference measures of social and behavioural extraversion (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1963), belief in an "internal versus external locus of control" (Rotter, 1966), security-insecurity (Maslow et al, 1945), "control wanted and control expressed" (Schutz, 1958), "performance style" (Ring and Wallston 1968), and audience sensitivity and exhibitionism (Paivio and Lambert, 1959), were administered. People's scores on these tests failed to demonstrate reliable relationships between the dimensions referred to and the skill variables or performer-audience standpoints discussed. The O-O questionnaire was also administered in some of the studies reported in Chapters Six and Seven, and a measure of individual

proclivity to adopt performer or audience standpoints was obtained. This too was unrelated to skills of attribution and improvisation.

Chapter Nine includes a summary of the results of the studies reported in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven. It is noted that only few of the hypotheses implied by the improvisational view were examined in these chapters. In order to illustrate the range of empirical studies feasible in exploration of the framework, further studies conducted within its compass are mentioned.

A study of the degree to which the self-concept may govern preferences for performances (Silver 1969), illustrates the possible application of Kelly's (1955) Personal Construct Theory methodology in studying McCall and Simmons' (1966) proposals about the relationship between role-identities and performance. An unsuccessful field study attempting to demonstrate the value of enactment and improvisation techniques in the improvement of "social skill" is described. More careful studies in this area are regarded as an important future venture.

Feffer's (1959) discussion of role-taking behaviour invokes the developmental emphasis of Piaget (1950); a crude study of conservation of "role" and "person" by children (McHenry and Williams; in press) is described; this demonstrates the possibility of examining the development of attribution and improvisation skills in children.

The studies described here focused on the processes whereby people interact socially, and on the capacities which must be imputed to people who participate in such processes. In contrast, the form and content of encounters, of attributions and of improvisations, have received relatively little attention. Form and content are central features of social behaviour, and when these features are more closely examined, some modification of the improvisational view may turn out to be necessary.

There may, for example, be dimensions of informal role relationships in terms of which encounters are, subsequent to an initial "negotiation", relatively stable.

The value of the dramaturgical approach is assessed in Chapter Ten. A tendency to interpret the dramaturgical analogy as implying an equivalence, rather than a similarity, between theatre and social life may constitute the basis for the rejection of the analogy by its critics. However, some dramaturgical analysts have indeed implied such an equivalence, and rejection of this view often centres around the mistaken assumption that social behaviour as viewed dramaturgically is (at worst) necessarily "deceptive" or (at best) "alienated" from the actor. The analogy allows understanding of the manner in which performances may be deceptive but it is implicit in the improvisational view that the majority of performances are unlikely to be so.

Discussion of the dramaturgical analogy is of practical importance, as exemplified by Nixon's (1972) claims supporting "role-playing" as an alternative to "experimental" techniques in the study of social behaviour.

The implications of the view that social actors share the dramaturgic analysts' perspective, and Harré and Secord's (1972) formalisation of this proposition are briefly considered. Finally, the relationship between the dramaturgical and "conventional" approaches to the study of social behaviour is discussed. The improvisational view has extensive integrative power; the view allows a number of diverse approaches to be seen, not as offering alternative "explanations" but as converging toward the same propositions in accounting for the nature of social interaction processes.

In conclusion it is asserted that the improvisational view might be extended to encounters between larger groups of people, and it is noted that exploration of social behaviour within the framework of the view may be conducted while focussing on the individual person.

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Appendices

CHAPTER ONE

The Improvisational View of Dyadic Interaction

1. Introduction

Shakespeare's comparison between life and theatre, referred to as "the dramaturgical analogy", has been adopted by theorists in a number of disciplines, notably sociology and social psychology. The analogy suggests parallels between actors portraying characters and individuals occupying social positions. Thus the actor's role performance as determined by script, directors, performances of fellow-actors, reactions of audience and talents of the actor, is compared to the individual's social behaviour, as determined by norms, demands and rules, the social behaviour of others in relation to the individual, those observing and reacting to the performance, and by the individual's capabilities and personality.

If these parallels have any substance, there follow a number of implications for the study of social behaviour, since they suggest a degree of potential self-awareness and self-control, that in extreme cases makes possible deliberate manipulation and construction of the self.

The dramaturgical model attempts to confront the problem, central to social psychology, of "...establishing the necessary conceptual links between individual behaviour and the social structure" (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1964, p.451). This problem involves the investigation of the processes whereby people communicate with each other, come to "know" each other, and cooperate in behaviour which is to their mutual advantage, commonly referred to as "social interaction". A further aspect of the problem is the search for the bases of individual differences in social behaviour.

In attempting to defend the value of the dramaturgical view, it seems important to propose a model which is compatible with other views of social interaction, for which empirical support is already offered. Ideally, support of the dramaturgical approach should involve some demonstration that empirical findings are better integrated under its aegis than under any alternative system, and that the approach constitutes an advance in comparison with these alternatives and enables one to develop a criterion for rejecting certain empirical "findings" as artifacts of the "experimental situation". As do the major non-dramaturgical views of social interaction, but as is appropriate to a psychological orientation, attention will be given primarily to the capacities of individuals which would be required for participation in such a process.

The dramaturgical analogy has already been employed by analysts of social behaviour focusing on a variety of problems. Role Theory represents a body of hypothesis and empirical study attending to the manner in which behaviour is constrained by reference to general (within a social group) expectations as to appropriate behaviour for occupants of specified social positions. In contrast to Role Theory's emphasis on social structure, Mead's (1970) theorising about the relationship between a person's views of himself as an individual and as a social actor is concerned with communication between persons and the nature of social meaning.

An important difference between these two approaches has been the point of application of the dramaturgical analogy itself. Role Theorists propose that the analogy serves as a useful analytic tool for social scientists, but do not require the assumption that people in general represent their experience of social behaviour in dramaturgic terms. Mead's (1970) views, on the other hand, would seem to require that social actors themselves interpret their own and others' behaviour

in terms akin, or of the same level of complexity, at least, to dramaturgic principles.

Since this account will incorporate concepts deriving from both approaches, both applications of the analogy must be acknowledged. It is intended here primarily, however, to focus on the usefulness of the analogy as a means of analysis of the processes involved in dyadic interaction. While it will be apparent that to invest social actors with a dramaturgical-like phenomenology for social action is convenient on conceptual and empirical grounds, no attempt will be made to justify this investiture as more than a possible representation of "fact".

In this chapter, the three main assumptions involved in the dramaturgical analogy will be stated and the failure of Role Theory to attend to the implications of these for processes of social behaviour, rather than for simply structural features of social relationships, will be noted. The difficulty of analysing "process" will be discussed, and the proposal that a focus on the improvised (rather than scripted) features of social behaviour leads to an emphasis on process, will be offered. The model of social behaviour as improvised drama will be introduced by defining the concept of "informal role". The features of dyadic interaction established by empirical work, based on non-dramaturgical models, will be summarised and shown to be incorporated within the improvisational view as so far described. This view then will be elaborated by reference to the dramaturgical views of Weinstein and Deutschberger (1963, 1964) and McCall and Simmons (1966), and it will be argued that social behaviour involves the processes of interpretation and improvisation of performance within constraints determined by the negotiated nature of the informal role relationship. The implications of this argument for the nature of the relationship between "personality" and social behaviour will then

be noted.

2. The dramaturgical analogy

Three fundamental assumptions are embedded in the dramaturgical analogy: "...the role perspective assumes, as does the theater, that performance results from the social prescriptions (1) and behavior (2) of others, and that individual variations in performance, to the extent that they do occur, are expressed within the framework created by these factors (3)" (Biddle and Thomas, 1966, p.4.). Proponents of the analogy have tended to emphasise the first assumption, to the virtual exclusion of discussion of the second, and this has led to misinterpretation of the third.

A. The first assumption

Role Theory, a prime example of this preoccupation with the first assumption emphasises: "...that performance results from the social prescriptions...of others" (Biddle and Thomas, loc.cit.). In this view, an individual's social behaviour has been seen as more or less "scripted", and empirical analyses have tended to involve the specification of the "scripts" for Role performance within the various interlocking social positions which are seen as comprising social structure. To the extent that Role behaviour is defined as that behaviour performed by the majority of persons occupying a recognised social position, be it a kinship, group membership, or category position (see Argyle, 1952), then the characteristic activities involved in performing a particular Role may be specified. Where the audience (those in the community recognising that position) holds particular expectations, these comprise a script and may be specified objectively by empirical study.

Emphasis on this first assumption leads to a view of social behaviour as essentially a process of conformity to norms, demands and rules: "role theory...reifies social structure in a way that does not logically

permit the range of variations actually to be observed in role performances, and...yields a view of social interaction as being something much more rigid and schematic than it is intuitively known to be" (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1964, p.452). For McCall and Simmons (1966) also, social behaviour is scripted only to the extent that occupancy of specific social positions sets "boundaries" to the range of behaviour appropriate for the interactants involved. Such constraints may well be extensive, and their delineation important, but these rarely constitute exhaustive prescriptions for behaviour.

B. The second assumption

Following the Role Theory interpretation of the first assumption, described above, the second assumption, that: "performance results from the...behavior of others", has been interpreted as suggesting that "others" tend merely to sanction an individual's adherence or non-adherence to the "script": "Role-performance then consists of conforming behaviourally to those expectations, with the goal of attaining positive sanctions from those holding the expectations or of avoiding their negative sanctions" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, pp. 6-7). Here the parallel involved is that between the relationship of actor to audience, and the individual to society at large. While the discussion of conformity and reference group behaviour fits well within the scope of the dramaturgical analogy, it would hardly seem to require it.

The value of the dramaturgical analogy to Role Theorists such as Parsons (1951) and Merton (1957) is clearer when "others" are compared with "other actors". Their view of social structure is of a system of interlocking social positions, so that a Role may only be performed with others performing complementary Roles. However, with a view of social behaviour as exhaustively scripted, the interdependence of two individuals

performing complementary Roles is reduced considerably. Each may contribute a necessary part of the action, but may not truly be said to be in interaction unless some features of their contributions to the action are not predetermined, but are improvised with regard to the behaviour of each other.

For example, in a scripted drama, if one actor deviates from the script, forgetting his "lines" but retaining a rough idea of the information which he is supposed to impart during a particular utterance, he may improvise on the general theme of the scripted utterance and thus maintain a coherent presentation of the character he is portraying. If the audience remains unperturbed by this deviation, however, the actor's fellow-performers may well be uncertain as to how to react, since their scripted response may no longer be entirely appropriate; they, also, may have to improvise.

Even within a perfectly scripted drama, there is much that is "improvised"; scripts may be "interpreted" in a variety of ways. The importance of interpretation here is that the quality of the performance as a whole depends, not on each actor's interpretation of his own role, but on the extent to which each actor's interpretation of his role fits with those, of their roles, by the other actors. Similarly, "...for the great majority of relationships...the individuals involved must somehow improvise their roles within very broad limits" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.7). These "broad limits" are those Role prescriptions attached to social positions with which Role Theory deals. Within these constraints social behaviour is not determined by the whims of the actors as independent entities, but emerges as a jointly improvised, interdependent series of actions. For example, the "fit" between a father's expectations for his father role and his son's expectation for that role would be required to be closer, and the constraints imposed on behaviour by this mutual script,

more severe, than the "fit" required, and constraints imposed, by the more general expectations for the father Role held by society at large. The interactive nature of social behaviour is thus recognised by the Role Theory interpretation of the second assumption, but powerfully emphasised when social life is compared with more improvised forms of drama.

If Role Theory's interpretation of the dramaturgical analogy has facilitated the description of the limits for behaviour within particular encounters, then the adoption of a model of social behaviour as improvised drama is more obviously applicable to the analysis of the course of an encounter. Thus the emphasis shifts from a structural analysis of social relationships to a focus on the processes whereby people interact with each other.

C. The problem of analysing "process" and "interaction"

Stone and Farberman (1970) have noted that: "...the phenomenon of process, given our language and the crudity of our research techniques, is terribly difficult to apprehend, designate, and analyze" (p.17). In speaking of "our language", they refer to their earlier assertion that the English language and our "conventional logic" based on Greek grammar, leads to a view of "...the world as an outcome of things acting upon other things" (p.7) and forces enquiry to be limited to a framework whereby: "...we look to things (independent variables) as acting upon other things (dependent variables) to bring about our observations (associations, correlations, etc.). We miss the processes that may well alter the very identity of things we have observed" (Stone and Farberman, 1970, p.7). The difficulty of enquiring into social psychological processes may rest also in attempts to emulate the supposed approaches of the physical sciences, as Harré and Secord (1972) suggest.

Experimental psychology has research techniques at its disposal

which have been used to advance understanding of many important behavioural processes, such as learning, perception, attention and cognition. An understanding or, at least, a working model, for structure may well be necessary as a foundation for the understanding of process. Preliminary understanding of process may alter the view of structure, and so on, so that the relationship between conceptualisation of structure and understanding of process is intimate. For social behaviour, it would seem often to be the case that models of structure have been interpreted as models of process, so that, for example, presented with a structural analysis of a particular Role relationship, an observer would believe that he understood how the performers interacted with each other.

A similar point has been made by von Cranach (1970) with regard to the study of nonverbal communication. He claims that structuralists use a concept of structure which: "...is characterised by the negation of the possibility of probabilistic relations between structural elements...", and argues that: "Strictly determined connections...can generally only be observed if there exist factors that inhibit deviations from the rule. Free-flowing behaviour...can only be steered by rules which have been developed by the organism in the phylogenesis or in individual experience...". (von Cranach, 1970, p.18). In a footnote, he adds: "...it seems to be a general principle that information which determines the structure of a system in general only dictates the limits of a range of variation" (von Cranach, 1970, p.19). Here von Cranach is contrasting structure with function rather than process, but his discussion is most reminiscent of the argument above which contrasted a Role theory analysis of interaction (as conformity) with an improvisational view (as elaboration within set limits).

Another important factor inhibiting the understanding of social

interaction may be a tendency to seek simple causal relationships:

"...in human affairs we have a long cultural tradition that pre-disposes us to think in terms of causation rather than of interaction" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.48). To understand the process of social interaction, an approach seeking simple causal relationships is to these authors blatantly inappropriate. Analysis of interaction requires the use of relational constructs, such as that of role. In Role Theory, the dramaturgical analogy has been applied mainly to the structural aspects of social relationships rather than to the processes by which those relationships are formed and maintained: "...the contrasts of role and role performance have seldom been explicated" (Stone and Farberman, 1970, p.19). Similarly, Weinstein and Deutschberger (1964) comment: "Rather than having made any real progress toward solving the Meadian problem, social psychology has merely turned it upside down, emphasizing the structural elements in social interaction while ignoring or falsifying both the psychological and processual elements" (p.452).

It must be admitted that some attention has been given, within discussion of Role Theory, to the behaviour involved in "performing" and "taking" roles. Most of this work, however, dealing with scripted rather than improvised performance, is vulnerable to the general criticisms made above, as will be noted in Chapters 3 and 4.

D. Summary of Discussion of first and second assumptions

So far, the dramaturgical analogy to social life has been argued in two ways. Firstly, to the extent that social expectations for behaviour appropriate to occupants of particular social positions constitute the broad framework of a script, then individuals may be viewed as constrained to improvise their behaviour within the limits allowed by this framework. Secondly, in any encounter, further con-

straints may be assumed to limit the behaviour of each participant, by virtue of each having to adapt to the way in which the other improvises his performance.

The expectations which each has for the other's improvised performance might be viewed as constituting a detailed, but implicit and probabilistic script. If "Role" designates the culturally scripted behaviour appropriate for an occupant of a social position to perform toward the occupant of the complementary position, then the concept "informal role" might be introduced to describe the improvised behaviour of an interactant toward his fellow interactant.

E. Third Assumption

The lack of attention to this interdependence between the improvised performances of actors (the second assumption) has allowed misinterpretation of the third assumption. This latter assumption: that: "...individual variations in performance, to the extent that they do occur, are expressed within the framework created by these factors" (Biddle and Thomas, 1966, p.4), has been interpreted as suggesting that the majority of individual variation in performance of the same Role is potentially explicable in terms of consistent (or temporary) characteristics of individuals, without reference to the particular dyadic (or larger groupings) relationships in which the individuals perform the Roles.

The problem posed by the dramaturgical analogy, that of determining how much of individual behaviour in social interaction may be ascribed to characteristics of the individual rather than to mere reiteration of a pre-determined script, has tended to be solved by reference to the way in which an individual plays a Role, this "way" being determined by his "personality". With a revised analogy between social life and improvised drama, however, it appears that the way in which an individual plays a Role vis à vis a particular other

performing the complementary Role, will be to a great extent governed by the other's way of playing his Role. The "framework" within which individuals interact is not supplied simply by the norms, rules and demands of society, but must be seen as mutually adopted (and improvised) by interactants for a particular encounter. Consequently, the degrees of freedom for individual variation in any particular Role performance are further limited.

This third assumption clearly refers to the problem of the relationship between personality and social behaviour. By stressing interdependence between performances, a view of social interaction as improvised renders precise prediction of one (or both) interactant's behaviour (or the outcome of an interaction) by consideration only of the personalities of the partners improbable. Within experimental social psychology, such attempts at prediction have been unsuccessful. Apparently, there are as many ways for an individual to present his personality in interaction, as there are for different individuals to perform the same Role.

A survey of non-dramaturgical models of dyadic interaction (to be given below) is sufficient to allow the assertion that a dyad is qualitatively different from a simple combination or permutation of the personalities of the participants. These models, however, do not on their own permit specification of the rules by which prediction from personality to social behaviour may be derived. Some mediating process, such as "performance of informal role" must be postulated to permit prediction of a person's social behaviour from knowledge of his individual characteristics.

Dramatic improvisation stresses not only mutuality between actors, but also the creative contributions which each must make. With no formal script, but only a rough specification of situation, character, and goal, the performance depends on the individual actors to a great

extent. In the original statement of the dramaturgical analogy, the source of individual variation was given as the "actor's talents". In improvisation, the talents (the perceptual, imaginative, decision-making, and expressive abilities) of the actors are far more important in determining the effectiveness of the performances than where repetition of a script might suffice. Similarly, in social interaction, the social skills of perception, anticipation, decision-making, and expression of the individual might be emphasised in arriving at a model by which his social behaviour might be predicted and understood. An "abilities conception of personality" has been argued for by Wallace (1966), and Argyle (1969) has proposed "skill" variables as sources of individual differences in social behaviour. Such potentially important intra-individual consistencies have yet to be effectively delineated.

An individual's improvisational abilities may well be consistent for him over time, but need not necessarily be exhibited in all encounters. Individual characteristics which might determine to what extent these abilities are expressed in interaction may include those motivational factors involved in the description of "personality". Motivational factors become far more prominent where improvisation, rather than adherence to script, is taken as a model for social behaviour, and these have been discussed by non-dramaturgical analysts of interaction within social psychology. These models must be described, and examined for their compatibility with the dramaturgical view. However, since the notion "informal role" (together with an emphasis on performance skills) has been suggested as the basis for the analysis of a process mediating between personality and social behaviour, this notion will first be elaborated.

F. Informal Role

If informal role behaviour constitutes the behaviour of an individual during a particular encounter or series of encounters, then

the major determinants of this role behaviour have been suggested as: social prescription (Formal Role pertaining); personality, talents and goals of the individual; improvised informal role of other.

It is proposed that, for any dyad, the same informal roles might be maintained over a series of encounters, if the members agree that they are the same two people, in the same kind of situation, meeting for the same general purpose. Thus informal role relationships are viewed as deriving from the same source as Formal Role relationships, that is, from consensus. Whereas for formal Role relationships, the consensus as to appropriate behaviour is shared by a large number of individuals, in informal role relationships, only the two members comprising the dyad need agree. The difference between "formal Role" and "informal role" is therefore relative rather than discrete. The difference in emphasis entailed by the two concepts has, it is hoped, sufficient implications to justify the use of a new term.

In the course of interacting with a series of different partners (B, C and D), an individual (A) might be described as performing a variety of informal roles, if a certain number of conditions were satisfied:

1. During a number of encounters with different others (B, C and D) a certain degree of consistency in behaviour was demonstrated within each encounter by A.
2. Between these encounters (with B, C and D), a certain degree of inconsistency in A's behaviour was demonstrated (compared with internal consistency (1)).
3. The inconsistencies (2) could not be explained solely in terms of differences in formal Role relationships between A and B, A and C, and A and D), or in terms of culturally specified differences in the situations obtaining.

These conditions alone, if satisfied, might be explicable in terms of variations in the temporary state of A. For example, his fatigue, hunger, mood and so on, might change from one encounter to the next. In order to justify the use of the notion "informal role" two further conditions would have to be satisfied:

4. Given that the relationship between A and B had not changed over time, then A would be expected to show greater behavioural consistency between a series of encounters with the same person, B, than between encounters with different people, C and D.

The crucial condition (for the use of any role concept) to be satisfied is:

5. The intra-encounter consistency (relative to inter-encounter inconsistency) in A's behaviour toward B, must bear some complementary relationship to the intra-encounter consistency displayed by B toward A.

The inter-relationship between A's and B's informal role performances might be displayed either in terms of symmetry or asymmetry. For example, using the dimensions of relationship of intimacy and dominance, asserted by Brown (1965) to be primary and universal, A's informal role vis à vis that of B would be expected to match in terms of intimacy, and complement in terms of dominance.

A diagrammatic representation of the five conditions for informal role specified above, may be offered. If it were possible to represent the amount of dominance displayed in an encounter by recourse to quantification of some aspects of behaviour reliably expressing dominance, and to specify the relative dominance of each member of the dyad during any part of the encounter as a fraction of 1 (1 being the maximum dominance for one member vis à vis the other member displaying the minimum of 0), then an approximation to the scheme shown in Figure 1 would satisfy the five conditions.

A meets B, C, D and then B again. Each encounter lasts for 15 minutes, and is divided into three 5 minute periods to allow the assessment of intra-encounter consistency. Within each period, the "sum of dominance" displayed by the members of the dyad is represented as unity, so that the relative dominance displayed by one member vis à vis the other is represented as a proportion of unity; the other displays the complementary degree of dominance.

ENCOUNTER	DYAD	0	5	TIME	10	15
		5 mins	5 mins	5 mins	5 mins	5 mins
1						
	B	0.09	0.13		0.10	
	↕					
	A	0.91	0.87		0.90	
2						
	C	0.30	0.28		0.33	
	↕					
	A	0.70	0.72		0.67	
3						
	D	0.40	0.37		0.38	
	↕					
	A	0.60	0.63		0.62	
4						
	B	0.08	0.12		0.11	
	↕					
	A	0.92	0.88		0.89	

Dom. A + dom. B (per 5 min. period) = 1

Figure 1:1

Diagram illustrating necessary conditions for the demonstration of "informal role" performance.

This diagrammed model is very much idealised. Apart from the problem of specifying and measuring elements of behaviour which might indicate "dominance" to an objective observer, the effectiveness of these actions as signifying dominance within the interaction (that is, to the intended receivers of the signals) would have to be established for each encounter. The model is presented for purposes of explication, rather than as a set of testable hypotheses.

The view of interaction given above is not simple, but anticipates the more complex dramaturgical views to be discussed. If a dramaturgical model of "improvised" behaviour is to be useful within experimental social psychology, it must be shown that such a model is compatible with other models already supported by empirical data. Further, the addition of dramaturgical model to those already in use must be shown to lead to an integration or a reinterpretation of views, facilitating not only the description, but also the empirical investigation of interaction processes.

In the subsequent sections, empirically supported models of dyadic interaction will be discussed briefly. The essential characteristics of interaction emerging from these models will be summarised. The dramaturgical views of Weinstein and Deuschberger (1963, 1964) and of McCall and Simmons (1966) will then be described.

3. Non-dramaturgical models of dyadic interaction

A. Simple Model

In a comprehensive review of models of dyadic interaction, Argyle (1969) refers to an early "S-R" model: "Interaction is seen as a series of alternating responses on the part of those involved" (Argyle, 1969, p.166). This simple model may be a useful tool for analysing certain phenomena, such as verbal operant conditioning, imitation, modelling, and some forms of reciprocity. However, its main contribution may be the establishment of the complete utterance of one member as a useful

unit of analysis in the prediction of subsequent utterances. While an S-R model presents interactants as "zombie"-like creatures, reacting spontaneously to the most recent behaviour of the other as a discrete event (and rendering the model unacceptable as a representation of all interaction processes), nevertheless it has been established that the immediately prior act of one interactant is an important determinant of certain characteristics of the other's subsequent act.


B. Extension of simple model

Argyle suggests that the S-R model may be simply transformed into a representation of interaction as a more extended stochastic process, becoming an S-S-S-R model. Here, for example, one interactant (A) is seen as taking account of all the previous acts of the other interactant (B) in assessing the meaning of B's most recent act. This slightly more elaborate model is intuitively more valid, and also allows A's acts to be seen as more "adaptive" within the context of the total encounter, than the simpler S-R model. For example, if all B's previous acts had been hostile toward A, then an utterance of B which would usually (that is, when expressed by other interactive partners) be interpreted as neutral is likely to be seen by A as friendly.

In Information Theory terms, the stochastic nature of B's "response" sequence allows A to establish the nature of the "transitional probabilities" linking B's "responses" so that the information transmitted by any one of B's responses (and thereby the amount of information which A must deal with in order to decide on his own response) is less than would be predicted under the simple S-R model.

This S-S-S-R model represents only a preliminary stage in realising the potential of a view of interaction as involving stochastic processes. B may of course similarly view A's responses as stochastically linked. The emphasis of the S-R model was on the relationship between any

response (a) of A and the prior or subsequent response (b) of B, so that the sequence a-b-a-b-a-b-... may also be regarded as stochastic in nature. Having identified three candidates for stochastic sequence within interaction: a-a-a..., b-b-b..., a-b-a-b-a-b-..., combination of the three yields the following model:



This model suggests that, in evaluating any b, A must take account of all previous bs, while recognising that these were partially contingent on his own as, which must therefore also be taken into account. A also has to decide what response he is to make to this b, anticipating that B will interpret the new a in the light of all previous as, seen by B as partially contingent on previous bs. This view of the necessary cognitive processes for participants in effective interaction, readily allows interaction to be viewed as a complex task, rather than in terms of spontaneous "mechanical" reaction. Indeed, as delineated above, the task would seem to be insurmountably difficult. Hypotheses have been offered to account for the ways in which such a complex task might be simplified so that information may be processed and decisions made in the short time between the "ending" of one person's utterance and the "beginning" of that of the other. Before describing these, some applications of the above model will be discussed, since, by reference to the motivations of interactants, these make explicit the manner in which the three response sequences acquire their stochastic nature.

Jones and Gerard (1967) have used the stochastic model in order to distinguish between different kinds of dyadic interaction, depending on the relative power of each member in determining the responses of the other. They begin their discussion of "interaction contingencies" by asking: "...what proportion of a given social response (or a

collection of them) was contingent on preceding responses of the other person" (Jones and Gerard, 1967, p.505). The "pure" case, where each member has equal power to improvise his own responses to the responses of the other, follows the model illustrated above, and has been termed "mutual contingency".


The "limiting case" on the other hand, is that where: "Each individual's responses are...largely determined by his pre-established plan, but a semblance of interaction is maintained in that responses are alternated and the timing of the alternation requires that each read certain signs emitted by the other" (Jones and Gerard, 1967, pp. 506-507). This class of interaction is termed "pseudocontingency", and the authors give as examples: rituals, and the scripted performance of two actors in a stage play. Herein lies the fate of the classical Role Theory interpretation of the dramaturgical analogy as applied to informal dyadic encounters; its application is only suited to the limiting case of interaction, where, Jones and Gerard assert, there is some doubt as to whether such an interaction is "social" at all.

However, they point out that: "...we have only to stretch the notion of ritual into that of social role to make the pseudocontingency class much more interesting and significant" (Ibid., pp. 507-508). While "minute details of behaviour" are not specified as closely in "role determined behaviour" as in ritual behaviour: "...there are many role-based interchanges in which the general plan involved in each role meshes with the general plan involved in the other role, with the result that self-produced stimulation...encompasses or predominates over social stimulation" (Ibid., p.508). In the pseudocontingency, then, two of the three stochastic sequences delineated above predominate: the a-a-a... and the b-b-b... sequences.

The early S-R model, predicting the stochastic sequence a-b-a-b-a-b..., is according to Jones and Gerard, "at least logically possible", and

might be expected to be displayed by animals and children. They describe this class of interaction as "reactive contingency" and as the only class implying: "...the absence of internal plans or at least their abandonment once the interaction begins" (Ibid., p.510), and failing to find convincing exemplars in the observed behaviour of people in social situations. At this point it becomes clear that what allows an a-a-a... sequence or a b-b-b... sequence to be characterised as "stochastic", is the assumption that each interactant has a plan for the course of the encounter, which in turn involves the assumption that he has a goal for its ultimate outcome. No satisfactory scheme has yet been developed for describing all the possible goals that may be achieved as a direct or indirect result of social interaction; such a scheme would probably exhaust all possible motives that man has ever recognised and named. There are two important points, however, that may be made regarding goals in interaction. The first is that, for any dyad, the goals of each member may be complementary or not. Secondly, whatever the ultimate outcome desired by each participant, there is what may be termed a "superordinate" goal for each, which is that the encounter should proceed satisfactorily.

The class of interactions which is probably the most frequent in occurrence, is that where there is some imbalance in the power of each member to determine the responses of the other. For example, if A is in a situation which gives him greater power over B than B has over A, then A may be in a better position to determine (partially) the responses of B, than vice versa. The extreme case of power imbalance is termed by Jones and Gerard the "asymmetrical contingency" illustrated thus:



Here B's position is seen to be reduced to that of responding discretely to A's planned (and thus, stochastic) sequence of responses.

Such an extreme case, of course, is unlikely to find many exemplars in everyday life, but the majority of encounters may be viewed as departing from the "pure case" of mutual contingency, and moving toward the asymmetrical case. In this situation, then, both A and B respond sequentially according to some "internal plan", but one member tends to have more power in improvising his response according to his plan, and in preventing the other diverting him from carrying through this plan, than does the other. The other, less powerful member, in this instance, must adapt his plan, and improvise his responses, in accordance with the opportunities given to him by the more powerful members' responses.

To refer to differential power within a dyad is not to imply that the plans of each member are in direct conflict, but rather that where there is some discrepancy between plans there is likely also to be some power differential; it does not follow that power differential implies discrepancy between plans. This differential need not favour one member throughout an encounter, but might allow or require alternation, so that one leads for the first part of an encounter, the next for the second part and so on. Indeed, if interaction is viewed as comprising only an alternation of verbal utterances, then each member may be seen as in a position of relative power while he is uttering, the other being "powerless" while inactive. As soon as nonverbal behaviour during interaction is taken into account however, this simple view cannot be maintained, as will be shown when Argyle's (1967, 1969) model, deriving from an ethological approach, is considered.

It has been shown above that a model of dyadic interaction as a combination of three theoretically distinguishable stochastic processes can be derived without explicit recourse to motivational constructs. It could be argued that characterisation of a sequence of verbal

utterances as stochastic does not require discussion of motivation. For example, as mentioned above, it can be shown empirically that certain kinds of utterance are more likely to follow a particular utterance than others, both within the sequence of either dyadic member's utterances, or within the sequence a-b-a-b-... .

In Jones and Gerard's (1967) account of the classes of interaction which can be delineated using this model as the basis, however, they explicitly propose plans towards goals as the basis for coherence and integrity in any set of utterance sequences. Their models are derived from a view of dyadic interaction proposed by the Exchange Theorists which involves the application of reinforcement theory to social interaction, to social behaviour in general by Homans (1958) and more specifically to dyadic systems by Thibaut and Kelley (1959). The latter authors emphasise the interdependent nature of rewards and costs in the dyad, the central notion being that outcomes for either member are contingent on the responses of the other member.

Thibaut and Kelley (1959) view any interacting individual as trying to maximise his outcomes by maximising rewards and minimising costs. Since the rewards and costs experienced by each dyadic member during interaction are mutually interdependent, they hypothesise that each member will "explore the outcome matrix" during the initial stages of any encounter, the "outcome matrix" being a representation of all possible contingencies arising as a result of mutual activities (or a-b-a-b-... response sequences). Thibaut and Kelley (1959) make no suggestions as to how people do manage to "explore the outcome matrix", in situations where there are an enormous range of possible activities and outcomes. In order to make predictive use of the propositions involved in Exchange Theory, an "experimenter" would require more knowledge of a person's value hierarchy at a

particular time than is likely to be available to the person himself, especially where new activities were involved. Further, the assessment of the nature of an outcome matrix in an everyday situation would require assumptions to be made about the comparability of particular quantities of any valued outcome for different dyadic members, dangerous even where an objectively "common currency" was involved.

The approach has, however, allowed valuable empirical investigation demonstrating that motivation is a central factor in determining the course of encounters and allowing the proposition that "exploration of the outcome matrix" may be important as a "goal" general to all interactants. A person is presumed to strive to understand his partner's particular intentions for the outcomes of an encounter, the attempt at such understanding being to some degree a "precondition" for the emergence of interactive behaviour.

Exchange Theory has not made any direct contribution to our understanding of how people make such attempts at "matrix exploration", nor of how, in the light of their understanding of such matrices, they realise their plans in interaction. Indirectly, the theory, and the empirical work deriving from it, supports the view of dyadic interaction as involving at least three interdependent stochastic sequences, emphasises individual outcomes and activities as mutually contingent, and requires the contention that interactive behaviour resembles the performance of a complex task. Interaction is, however, still viewed as a series of discrete responses, so that at any one time, one member of a dyad is seen as responding to the other's prior response(s).

C. Social Skill Model

A model of dyadic interaction which explicitly views interactive behaviour as the performance of a complex task is the "social skill model" of Argyle (1967, 1969). The model compares "social skill"

to the skill required to perform a complex motor task, and represents the responses produced by each member of a dyad. The "minimum" internal processes by which each interactant can be expected to perform the interactive task in a meaningful way include the perception of the other's response, "translation" of the perception and decision as to the appropriate response. The model acknowledges the pervasive influence on all these processes of the goals of the interactants.

There are important senses in which a skilled social performance does not resemble a skilled motor performance. People are not machines, even though they may be treated as such in extreme cases. That complex and unreliable machines may be addressed as persons when their "behaviour" challenges their operators' control, points to the essential difference between interacting with people and employing machines. However, the Argyle model emphasises two important ways in which social skill resembles motor skill: skilled performance depends on the reception and use of "feedback information", and involves the (frequently novel) combination of "automatised" or "precoded" patterns of the "elements" of verbal and nonverbal behaviour.

The model represents an interacting dyad as a "system" and includes "feedback loops" by which each interactant monitors the production of his own responses and their effects. The feedback which each receives about his own performance is thus derived from, and a product of, his perceptions of his own behaviour and his interpretation of the other's response as commentary. Thus, while A is actively responding to B's previous response, he is simultaneously perceiving the effects of his own response. Argyle, Lalljee and Cook (1968) have demonstrated that when these "feedback loops" are disturbed, the smoothness and effectiveness of the interaction decreases, and the interactants express feelings of discomfort.

A further implication of the analogy between social behaviour and

skilled motor performance, is that within a response, the "elements" of verbal and non-verbal behaviour may be, or become, "automatised" into grosser units as in the development of "subroutines" (Bruner, 1969). Observational analyses of dyadic encounters, stimulated by the social skill model, have shown a considerable degree of organisation within the more minute nonverbal aspects of interaction. Gaze behaviour, for example, has been shown to convey specific meanings comparable to verbal utterances, to be the means by which "feedback" from the other, not only about how the last response was interpreted by the other but about reactions to the present response also, and to convey signals governing the course of the encounter. Such functions are not simply served by gazing or not gazing; gaze may be mutual or not, and varies in frequency and duration. If gaze, —just one of the available sources of nonverbal communication, may be shown to serve this variety of function in accompaniment to verbal utterances, then the complexity of the actions performed and interpreted during interaction must be acknowledged, and the adaptation engendered by automatisisation of some within-response sequences of action, recognised.

As noted above, even if it is not possible to specify the variety of motives with which individuals approach encounters, some "super-ordinate" goals governing all interactions might be identified. The attainment of smooth and effective interaction may be assumed to be general for all interactants (the Argyle model suggesting some of the ways in which this might be achieved); "exploration of the outcome matrix" has been suggested as necessary for all encounters. Work on the social skill model has introduced a further candidate as a super-ordinate goal, the achievement of "equilibrium"; in order for two people to interact successfully, they should agree about certain aspects of their relationship. Argyle and Dean (1965) have obtained

evidence which strongly suggests that an equilibrium in intimacy level in a dyad is achieved nonverbally and tends to be maintained during an encounter.

Argyle (1969) refers to intimacy as one of the dimensions of relationship requiring agreement; two others referred to are relative dominance (discussed by Jones and Gerard 1967) and the "role relationship", where "role" refers to culturally specified Role. It is difficult to think of a formal Role relationship which does not include in its specification the level of intimacy appropriate between the performers, and also their relative dominance. Where no formal Role relationship is explicit in an encounter, the dimensions of intimacy and dominance would be expected to figure importantly in the "content" of the emerging informal role relationship. It follows that agreement about the informal roles to be performed (improvised) by dyadic members, would include agreement about intimacy and relative dominance. From this agreement would follow the opportunity to explore the outcome matrix, the nature of which would be comparatively easy to estimate, given the limitations for possible outcomes implied by the major agreement. Such agreement would greatly enhance the likelihood of smooth and effective interaction. The establishment of the informal role relationship in the initial stages of an encounter, as "superordinate" goal for both members of any dyad, therefore encompasses those goals suggested by the Exchange Theory and Argyle models.

The models of dyadic interaction so far reviewed, have found some support in empirical findings. Models representing interaction as a set of interdependent stochastic sequences invest each participant with the ability to perform a complex task; the Argyle model delineates the kinds of "internal" processes which would be required for such a performance. It is inherent in all models that the activities and outcomes of each member are contingent on those of the other. Each individual

is seen as attempting to realise his plans in the course of an encounter. It is proposed that these plans give coherence to the individual's sequence of responses, which thereby attain a stochastic quality.

Both members are seen as having the mutual intention of establishing the preconditions for effective interaction. Preconditions which have been isolated so far include agreement about the level of intimacy between the two and about the relative dominance of each. Where a formal Role relationship pertains as framework to the encounter, the intimacy level and dominance relationship is likely to be explicit. Where a formal Role relationship does not exist, or the expectations comprising the Role are "vague" as regards these two relationship dimensions, then the dyad will, by predominantly nonverbal means, establish their own agreement about intimacy and dominance. There are likely to be other, as yet unspecified, preconditions for effective interaction, which, when the relationship has been further specified in satisfaction of these, will constitute additional constraints on the possible activities to be engaged in and the likely outcomes to be achieved. Such "constraints" might be seen as prohibiting an interactant's "spontaneous" behaviour or, alternatively, as necessary and adaptive in reducing the potential complexity of the interactive task.

Both the Exchange Theory and Argyle models allow for the possibility of change in a particular dyadic relationship, either within an encounter or from one encounter to the next. Where change occurs, it is seen as mutually contingent on both partners. The Argyle (1969) notion of "equilibrium", does not suggest that, once "set", a particular level of, for example, intimacy, must be maintained, but rather, that when a particular equilibrium is disturbed by changes in the behaviour of one party to the encounter, the other party will tend either to change his behaviour so as to restore the original equilibrium system

(as in Argyle and Dean's (1965) study), or will negotiate with the other until a new equilibrium is achieved.

D. Summary

To recapitulate, the view of dyadic interaction which emerged from consideration of non-dramaturgical models included the following points:

1. Some features of dyadic interaction are interpretable as simple sequences of more-or-less discrete response pairs, a-b.
2. If the response sequence is extended, then an a-b-a-b... stochastic model is representative of the demonstrable relationship between the discrete responses of A and B ("reactive contingency").
3. If A and B are viewed as having a plan toward desired outcomes for the interaction, then each of their response sequences (a-a-a..., and b-b-b...) may be seen as independent stochastic sequences also. Where their responses are indeed independent, there cannot be said to be interaction between A and B; where A's and B's sequences are independent, except insofar as A's responses have a cue function for those of B and vice-versa, there is minimal interaction ("pseudocontingency").
4. Where the three stochastic sequences are combined, A's and B's outcomes are seen as mutually contingent on some combination of their responses ("symmetrical" or "mutual contingency"). Most interactions are unlikely to be completely symmetrical and move toward the class of "asymmetrical contingency", where the responses of one member are more contingent on those of the other than vice-versa. Here there is imbalance in the relative power of each in determining outcomes, while the interdependent nature of outcomes achieved through interaction is stressed.
5. In the most prevalent class of interactions, including both symmetrical and asymmetrical contingencies, the view of the

interpretive and decision processes which must be employed by each participant emerged as: "In evaluating B's last response, A must take account of B's previous responses while recognising that these were partially contingent on his (A's) own previous responses. In deciding on his response to B's last response, A must anticipate B's interpretation of it as governed by B's interpretation of A's previous responses as partially contingent on his (B's) own previous responses to A"!

6. Dyadic interaction must thus be viewed as a complex task, both at the intellectual (interpretation and decision) and at the motor (performance) level .

7. The plans and outcomes of each dyadic member are stressed, and it is assumed to be these that give the response sequences a-a-a... and b-b-b... their stochastic nature. These individual plans are difficult to specify and compare. It is implicit in the models that where individual goals may be achieved only via interaction, there are shared or superordinate goals directed toward the achievement of successful interaction. These goals are assumed to contribute to the stochastic nature of the a-b-a-b-a-b-... sequence. Further, the Exchange Theory model involves a further superordinate goal, the "exploration" of the likely outcome of the interaction by participants prior to embarking on the interaction itself.

8. Argyle (1967, 1969) explicitly views interaction as performance of a skilled task, and distinguishes the necessary intra-individual processes as perceptual, interpretive, and decision-making, while acknowledging that the individual's specific interactive goals exert a pervasive influence on his performance. Argyle thus makes explicit the implications (5) and (6) of the

Exchange Theory model , but in identifying the above individual processes, slips from a "motor-skills" model to an "intellectual-skills" model.

9. Argyle's model views dyadic interaction as a "system" and includes feed-back loops by which each member monitors his own ongoing behaviour and also the reactions of his partner to this, and his past behaviour. Thus interaction may no longer be viewed as a series of discrete (however powerfully interrelated) responses but rather as comprising sets of simultaneous events. Even when single "communication channels" are considered, A's and B's responses cannot be considered discrete, as demonstrated by the number of functions which one act of gaze behaviour may perform simultaneously.

10. Further, feedback loops allow certain sequences of individual and mutual elements to "by-pass" the cognitive processes of the interactants and to become, to some extent, "automatised", in this sense social behaviour resembling motor-skill performance.

11. The Argyle model includes the notion that some characteristics of the dyadic relationship must be agreed about before interaction can proceed satisfactorily. The "superordinate" goal of smooth interaction is referred to in terms of "meshing", and has been studied empirically. The achievement of meshing is represented by inclusion of an "equilibrium system" in the social skill model.

E. Application of the informal role concept to these points

In each of the non-dramaturgical models there is an abstraction from content in seeking the structure of the interaction. The definition of the informal role concept involved a similar abstraction. The use of a role concept incorporates points 1,2,3,4 and 7. If a person has a plan for an encounter, and if his plan lends coherence to his behaviour (7) then he may be said to be performing a role. A role concept also implies some degree of interrelationship between

the acts constituting the role performance and a coherent series of acts performed by another person, the complementary role (1,2,3 and 4).

It is these two sources of coherence in individual behaviour, goal-directedness and interrelatedness with another's coherent "lines of action" (Weinstein and Deutschberger 1964, p.452), that allow (and would seem to require) description of social behaviour as "role performance". To the extent that social behaviour is unpredictable on the basis of Formal Role prescriptions applicable to an encounter the performances may be said to be "improvised" by the participants, and the role relationship may be viewed as "emergent" rather than as predetermined. Emphasising the nature of much of social behaviour as "improvised", both Weinstein and Deutschberger (1964) and McCall and Simmons (1966) acknowledge Exchange Theory's contribution to their argument, stressing those points mentioned above.

These theorists note, however, that the Exchange Theory view does not permit discussion of the "modus vivendi" of the process whereby role relationships emerge, and the way in which these facilitate the complex task which interaction appears to be (6 and 8). Both the Argyle and Exchange Theory views propose some framework ("equilibrium" or "outcome matrix") to an encounter, the achievement and maintenance of which is viewed as an essential feature of interaction. This might simply be equated with "role relationship" were it not that a view of social behaviour as improvised demands that such a framework is always amenable to some degree of modification.

Goffman's (1971) dramaturgical concept of the "working consensus" corresponds to some extent with the "framework" notion embodied in points 7 and 11 of the non-dramaturgical models, and he advances a view of the way in which such consensus is achieved: "Goffman sees...the "encounter", as a process in which each participant actively attempts to shape the response of the others by projecting a representation

of self...which...must be accepted and accommodated to by the other... The mutual acknowledgment of such claims constitutes what Goffman calls the working consensus" (Weinstein and Deuschberger, 1964, p.454). Even Goffman's (1971) account, however, implies that, once established, the working consensus determines the course of an encounter; for Goffman: "...the encounter will play itself out fatefully, subject only to minor man^oeuverings by the participants" (Weinstein and Deuschberger, 1964, p.454). Like Argyle, these authors suggest that: "...each participant must adjust his lines of action in terms of what he can expect to attain under the circumstances and in accord with the way in which the others are developing their lines of action...the encounter may be...seen as... an extended sequence of agreements, each controlling the next with decreasing degrees of freedom" (Weinstein and Deuschberger, 1964, p.454). Argyle's model similarly allows for change in the "equilibrium" of a dyad during an encounter and his emphasis on the simultaneity of the active and perceptual interactive behaviour for both interactants (points 9 and 10) are paralleled by Weinstein and Deuschberger's assertion that "The consequent asymmetry of the active and responsive aspects of the participant's encounteral behaviour may force modifications in his interpersonal task with implications for every element in the interaction" (Weinstein and Deuschberger, 1964, p.455).

Returning briefly to the initial analogy between social behaviour and improvised, rather than scripted, drama, it may be noted that in all dramatic improvisations, certain features of the "action" will be specified at the outset. Degree and object of specification may vary but, commonly, goals to be attained and broad outlines of "characters" to be adopted are "given", and features of the physical context, described. The performances themselves, however, must be created by

the actors in such a way as to pursue their respective "lines of action", to maintain and to elaborate their "characters", and to fit with the performances of their partners.

Similarly, in a dyadic interaction, whatever "determination" is entailed by recognition of constraints "given" by the formal Role relationship, and whatever the extent of the initial "working consensus" arrived at by the dyad, the performances which constitute the encounter itself must be viewed as improvised and the role relationship as elaborated and emergent during the encounter.

Where interactants consciously attend to the nature of the role relationship within which they are encountering another it seems likely that this is more probable at the beginning of an encounter; the improvisational model does not demand that, in order for a role relationship to be viewed as "emergent", interactants need consciously attend to this relationship throughout an encounter. The Argyle (1969) model (points 8, 9 and 10) proposes the means by which relationship features of an encounter may be negotiated at a nonverbal, and in many instances virtually "automatic", level.

Further, if interactants do attend consciously to the nature of the framework of their role relationship at the beginning of an encounter, then it may be that assessments are made, not in "role relationship" terms, but in terms of "who" the other is and "the self" that they themselves are to present. In this sense Goffman's (1971) emphasis on the working consensus may be justified, and McCall and Simmons' (1966) view of this consensus as involving the establishment of the "social identities" of each, supportable. The function of "person percepts" is, according to Bruner (1958), to allow prediction of a person's future behaviour. Since the future behaviour of alter in which ego is likely to be most interested is that in the subsequent encounter, then assignment of "character", or "personality", to alter

may involve emphasis on alter vis à vis ego, that is on the probable nature of alter's informal role.

The view that certain features of the role relationship are more or less established in the initial stages of an encounter is therefore supported, but it is emphasised that these features may be modified during the encounter, and "determine" the course of the encounter only to a certain extent. The processes by which ego and alter arrive at some kind of "working consensus" may therefore be regarded as operative throughout an encounter. Proposals as to the nature of these processes have been offered by Weinstein and Deuschberger (1963, 1964) and McCall and Simmons (1966).

The non-dramaturgical models require interactants to be capable of interpreting the other's behaviour and of making decisions as to appropriate actions toward the other. Similarly, McCall and Simmons (1966) argue that the "imputation" of a role to alter and the "improvisation" of a role by ego are central cognitive processes in the achievement of the "working consensus". If the nature of the informal role relationship is emergent (at any point in the encounter) then, as argued above, interpretative and decision processes must remain in operation in order that alter's behaviour be surveyed and judged as development of, or deviation from, performance of the role which ego presently imputes to him; in the light of such judgements, ego must decide how to modify his behaviour in order to correct, or adapt to, alter's "deviation" or "elaboration".

The non-dramaturgical models required interpretation and decision processes, not solely in order that the "equilibrium system" be maintained, but in order that particular acts constituting part of the interactive sequence be effectively interpreted and improvised. According to the dramaturgical view, specific acts are best interpreted and improvised within the context of a role imputed to the actor.

Thus the "necessary decision and interpretative activities" delineated under point 5 become, in dramaturgical terms: "In evaluating B's last response, A must take account of B's role. In deciding on his response to B's last response, A must anticipate B's interpretation of it as governed by B's taking account of A's role". In ongoing interaction, interpretation serves to aid improvisation, and cannot be regarded as an independent process; it will be proposed in Chapter Three that this complex system of interpretation and improvisation constitute what has been referred to by Mead (1970) as "taking the role of the other toward the self". Such a process, while analytically complex, will be shown to achieve, with great economy, an ongoing summary of another's interactive behaviour, qualified in the light of its relationship with the self's behaviour in that encounter.

4. The improvisational view of dyadic interaction

A. Cognitive and expressive processes.

McCall and Simmons (1966) have offered a model of the "working consensus" (which they call the "working agreement") in which the interpretative ("imputation") and improvisational aspects of cognitive activity in social behaviour are viewed as having their own expressive counterparts. Their diagrammatic representation of the model is shown in Figure Two.

McCall and Simmons say little about the nature of the cognitive processes of improvisation and imputation. The latter is not equivalent to the "person perception" process: "...one is not trying to see through to a person's true self...one is merely trying to discover the contours of the role the other is currently projecting...One is trying to see through the other's specific acts to discover the line of action that gives them direction, coherence, and meaning" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.131). As noted above, when people are aware of "imputing a role to alter" they may well represent that activity as "judging




Figure 1:2
The "Working Agreement" model of McCall and Simmons (1966, p. 143).

personality" but, insofar as their judgement is directed toward anticipation of alter's behaviour in interaction with themselves, and given the nature of the information on which they may base their judgement (social behaviour directed toward them), they are effectively imputing an informal role to alter.

Similarly, in improvising a role for himself, ego can only express this role, via "self-presentation", by performance. It is on the basis of ego's performance that alter imputes a role to ego. Beyond noting that imputation probably involves "anticipatory categorization" (Bruner, 1965) of the other, and may require "role-taking", McCall and Simmons do not elaborate on the nature of the cognitive process.

An interesting feature of the model is the notion that imputation has an overt expressive counterpart, "altercasting". Altercasting is not a different expressive activity from "self-presentation". Self-presentation (performance of informal role) implies the role (by principles of complementarity) which ego wishes alter to perform (or which he believes alter to be performing). Thus ego's expressive behaviour may be viewed as "self-presentation" and as casting alter into the role complementary to that expressed via self-presentation. The expressive actions involved are the same, the other side of the coin as it were, as those employed in self-presentation.

In a situation where the role relationship is fairly stable, or where one dyadic member has relatively more power to determine the course of the encounter than the other, the model diagrammed in Figure Two may be appropriate. Ego's role is correctly imputed to him by alter, who improvises the complementary role; alter views ego's behaviour as casting him into the complementary role and improvises accordingly. In the initial stages of an encounter or in later stages, however, the role complementary to that imputed to ego may not "match" that which alter prefers to perform. Alter

may be mistaken in his imputation (may misinterpret ego's altercasting behaviour), or may impute correctly but reject the role into which he is being cast. Alter may then present himself in such a way as to perform his preferred role, thereby casting ego into a new role.

Such a process may continue until negotiation to some level of agreement is complete and may result in a modification of preferred role performance for each party, or simply a clarification of their respective roles (where incorrect imputation gave rise to the "conflict"). In such situations, ego's altercasting does not directly express the role imputed to alter, but rather the role ego wishes alter to take. There are often occasions in interaction when one member of a dyad becomes strongly aware of his own cognitive processes of imputation and improvisation, usually where some kind of conflict develops over the definition of the informal role relationship. For example, where an interviewee begins to dominate the interview, an interviewer may consciously and intentionally increase his expression of dominance, thus "casting" the interviewee as subordinate.

The term "altercasting" was employed by Weinstein and Deutschberger (1963) to denote: "The process by which ego attempts to provide alter with an identity" (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1964, p.455). They proposed that there were six important dimensions of the role into which alter could be cast, and carried out an empirical study in order to test the "distinctness" of these dimensions. Two of the dimensions are comparable to those emerging above as likely to be of importance in the definition of any relationship. These are "structural distance" (dominance/power imbalance), and "emotional distance" (intimacy). The other dimensions proposed are: "evaluative distance" ("...the relative evaluative status of Ego and Alter as presented selves, independent of the structural distance involved"): support versus support-seeking; interdependence versus autonomy; degree of freedom allowed alter

("...the range of behaviour Ego allows Alter within the encounter") (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1964, pp.457, 458). The results of their study led to doubt as to the distinctiveness of the structural distance and the evaluative distance dimensions; these two also seem difficult to distinguish conceptually.

Altercasting and improvisation are appropriate labels for continual cognitive and expressive behaviour during an encounter, but "imputation" and "self-presentation" seem less so. In order to extend the application of McCall and Simmons' view of the inter-relationship between interpretation, decision and overt expression, to the course of an encounter, the term "attribution" will be used in place of "imputation", and the term "performance (of informal role)", instead of "self-presentation".

The degree of agreement between non-dramaturgical models and the improvisational view of social behaviour forwarded, has been indicated. If successful dyadic encounters require agreement by their participants as to their informal role relationship, then the Argyle (1967, 1969) model and consequent empirical work suggests the media of such agreements (nonverbal acts). The Exchange Theory view, on the other hand, provides a means (potentially) of distinguishing between encounters in terms of the relative powers of each member in "casting" alter into the appropriate role. It may be argued therefore that a dramaturgical viewpoint embodying the concept "informal role" may enhance understanding of interaction processes.

Dramatic improvisation usually takes place within a framework specified in terms of goals, physical context and "characters". It has been argued above that the informal role relationship constitutes an important set of constraints within which behaviour is improvised and that the framework within which that relationship is elaborated is itself determined in part by recognition by interactants of various social expectations "attached" to their formal social positions. An initial

attribution of role to alter by ego may well be directed toward identifying "who" alter is in general terms so that his possible informal roles vis à vis ego may be anticipated.

The main constraints on a person's "repertoire" of potential informal role performances must include, as well as his goals and his skills, his view of himself. Many theorists, including McCall and Simmons (1966) have argued that a person seeks to confirm his view of himself by recognising in the behaviour of those in interaction with him, a "recognition" of his identity, and that this "search" is a central goal for indulging in social behaviour. Employing, for the main part, the conceptual scheme proposed by McCall and Simmons (1966), the relationship between the dramaturgical view of social interaction and the way in which a person maintains a view of himself as a unique individual (despite dramaturgical demands for adaptive performance) will be briefly discussed.

B. The "Who" of social encounters

In moving from the discussion, from an "objective" viewpoint, of structures and processes necessary for smooth dyadic interaction, to consider the ways in which interactants themselves experience and represent the performances of themselves and of their partners, it is noted that McCall and Simmons (1966), like Goffman (1971), invest people with a mode of analysis akin to that which dramaturgical analysts apply to social behaviour. As suggested earlier, the "terminology" need not be borrowed from the theatre, but the position argued by such an investiture is that people are themselves behaving as if presenting a dramatic performance, with or without conscious awareness of the processes by which they may do so. Whether a dramaturgical analogy is appropriate and productive as a tool for "objective" analysts of social behaviour is a question at present more open to empirical study, and better suited to the integrative task attempted here, than the question of whether people themselves operate in their social

lives according to principles developed by the objective analyst.

The main difference between the "objective" and "naive" analyst which may be noted here is that the former must attempt to devise a model which will cope with all possible encounters and relationships, whereas the latter must simply devise ways of behaving and modes of interpretation which, for him, "work".

This "higher level" application of the dramaturgical analogy must be introduced at this stage, however, in order that McCall and Simmons' proposals as to the ways in which a person's view of himself is related to his interactive behaviour and experience may be described.

Firstly, alter and ego may locate each other in terms of their "personal identities", personal identity being "...derived by identifying...in terms of a set of categories referring to unique individuals...", such as name: "Personal identities serve as the pegs upon which social identities and personal biographies can be hung" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, pp. 64-65). "Social identity" may include formal Role categories and also categories such as: "...Irishman, a Cabot,...'young man of great promise...' " (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.66), and so on. The latter categories differ from Role categories in that placement in such terms does not necessarily require complementary behaviour in the interactive partner. However, like Role categories irrelevant to a particular encounter, identification of self and alter in such terms may serve as the basis for stereotypic predictions of behaviour: "...identification...serves to release or inhibit certain acts toward things" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.65). In the initial stages of an encounter then, ego and alter establish their "social identities" and may negotiate about the relevance to their role relationship of the various categories involved. The range of probable behaviour to be expected of a person with a particular (negotiated) personal and social

identity comprises his "character" for that encounter, and where such a "character" is repeatedly assumed in a given interpersonal relationship, the term "persona" is appropriate as a summary of the coherence exhibited overall.

"Character" and "persona" thus correspond to inferences made about a person's general predispositions on the basis of his informal role performance. The terms carry the assumption, however, that these inferences may be appropriate only within the context of that relationship. It is also the case, according to McCall and Simmons (1966) that "character" and "persona" are not simply modes of describing the phenomenal representation of "who" alter is as far as ego is concerned, but also as far as alter himself is concerned. That is, it is proposed that alter responds to others' demands that he give the impression of behaving coherently, by selecting for expression those aspects of himself (according to his view) which confer upon his behaviour the impression of having derived from some "distinctive organisation".

It has been argued that there are already three sources of coherence for an informal role performance: lines of action of ego and alter and the interrelationship between the two performances. At the same time, it is implicit in the improvisational view that a performance, as a series of acts, is as much a matter of "evocation" as of "intention" or planning. The behaviour of one member of a dyad in isolation might not appear coherent unless the partner's behaviour (whether available to an observer, or imagined) were taken into account. What may well allow the attribution of coherence to another's acts in the first place, that is, before lines of action underlying the performances are sought, are the adverbial aspects of performance, the ways in which the acts are performed.

In order to convey the impression that performance has derived

from some "distinctive organisation", and to provide information about the nature of that organisation which may be employed as a source of qualification (in addition to that provided by the role attribution) of the meaning of particular acts, stylistic devices may be employed. The adoption of a coherent "way" or "style" of performing a variety of acts may both give the impression of coherence (of being a "character") and provide information to the interactive partner as to the range of behaviour to be expected (of the "nature" of the character).

Harré and Secord (1972) point out that style reflects the way in which "certain appearances" are presented. The "...social actor can control the presentation of himself to others" by virtue of his "...capacity for the higher order control of performance that derives from the specifically human power of monitoring the monitoring of performance" (Harré and Secord, 1972, p.215). The non-dramaturgical models of interaction, described earlier, and the view of social interaction as involving the emergence of informal role relationships, posit the power to monitor one's own behaviour, both directly and via the responses of the other as audience to one's behaviour. In proposing that people have also the power to "monitor the monitoring", Harré and Secord (1972) explicitly invest people with a degree of awareness of the complexities of social behaviour suggested by a dramaturgical model, which would indeed allow impressions of self gained by others to be "managed".

Such a proposal is supported by Goffman's analysis of social behaviour and has already been referred to here as implicit in McCall and Simmons' (1966) notions of "character" and "persona". It was noted here, in discussing the processes of attribution, altercasting, self-presentation, and improvisation, that while these may operate at a "sub-aware" and virtually automatic level for the most part, at

certain points in encounters (at beginnings and terminations, or where there is some severe deviation from an established role by one member of a dyad), interactants may become aware of altercasting and presenting self in a conscious and intentional manner. In such instances, the encounter may be viewed as "drama" by one or both interactants, although their view need not be formulated in "dramatic" terms. It was argued that self-monitoring is a continual process which may only become "conscious" at certain points in an encounter; "monitoring the monitoring" may be viewed in the same light, whereby ego comes to view himself not simply as "interactant", but as "performing interactant".

Consciously "monitoring the monitoring" throughout an encounter would probably require a high degree of cognitive and expressive effort. While there may be many instances during an encounter where such awareness is present, as evidenced by Goffman's accounts and his presentation of reports by interactants (and as would be expected given this "power"), such instances may not be "the rule". It is rather in anticipation (rehearsal) of future social activity and in the review of past encounters, that conscious monitoring of the monitoring is likely to be more evident.

McCall and Simmons (1966) view the self-concept as involving such anticipation or rehearsal, and give an account of the self-concept which suggests how selection of those aspects of the self to be exhibited in a particular encounter may be achieved easily and virtually "automatically". This account is based on the familiar and important premise that a person's view of himself or "sense of identity" is very precious to him. This view may be confirmed only via information derived from the behaviour of others, either directly, or indirectly (for example by "social comparison" processes (Festinger, 1954)).

McCall and Simmons' refer to Mead's concept of the "reflexive self": when an individual "...first begins to act toward himself in more or less the same fashion in which he acts toward other people...he is said to be "taking the role of the other toward himself"" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.54). This process is not thought of as consisting of "utterances" exchanged by the "performer" and "audience" aspects of the self alternately. Rather: "One monitors oneself throughout the process and from a multiplicity of perspectives and contexts" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.55). Such reflexivity permits the formation of a self-concept, which thereby derives not only from a person's experience of his own behaviour, but from his interpretation of others' reactions to his behaviour.

Further, an individual anticipates his future behaviour; a person's view of himself in a particular social position, situation, and often, with ^{particular} others, constitutes, for McCall and Simmons (1966) a "role-identity". This imaginative view of self (or rather those aspects of self which are to be expressed in the imagined instance), it is suggested, runs: "...heavily toward vicarious performances of the role in question" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.68), and such covert rehearsal involves the anticipated reactions of others to the performance. When a person performs in such a way as to express a particular role-identity, therefore, he has two bases for evaluating his own performance. Firstly, he can compare the actual reactions of others to those which he has anticipated, and secondly, he can compare his performance with that which he had imagined himself giving.

Role-identities thus constitute prepared selections of self-characteristics, and their preparation involves the recognition of the constraints implied by the fact that the self-characteristics to be exhibited must constitute a "coherent" character and must allow a coherent and complementary (to that of the partner) performance.

Such recognition, McCall and Simmons argue, will invest role-identities with a "conventional" aspect deriving from the standards and expectations constituting the relevant social Role.

At the same time, since it is proposed that in social interaction people seek confirmation of their views of themselves as individuals, role-identities must include an idiosyncratic aspect, the content of their version of the Role. Not only is the individual's desire to legitimate his view of himself an important reason for his role-identities having substantial idiosyncratic aspects, but further, others demand that we identify ourselves to them. Others support an individual's conception of himself in interaction (his role-identities) not simply by applauding his performance (as an audience), but also by themselves giving complementary performances, which in "informal role" terms must exhibit a degree of complementarity beyond that specified in the formal Role expectations, or "script". Thus, for ego to receive confirmation of aspects of himself qua individual which he expresses to alter, he demands that alter must also exhibit aspects of himself in performance, rather than simply give a performance in accordance with his social identity.

"Role-support" is thus: "...a set of reactions and performances by others the expressive implications of which tend to confirm one's detailed and imaginative view of himself" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.73). Such support is not necessarily objectively evaluated by the performer, "...but is rather a matter of interpretation and construction" (McCall and Simmons, Ibid.). While a person's view of himself in a particular encounter must be expressed as relatively coherent, that is, as of a "character", the role-identities which are expressed within the context of a "character" are selected from a number, not all of which are necessarily compatible or equally legitimate. Role-identities are viewed as: "...organized into a more or less systematically

interrelated whole. This...corresponds to what many theorists have called the "ideal self" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.76).

People differ according to the degree to which the organisation of their role-identities is "cohesive", that is, the degree to which separate role-identities are "tightly" or "loosely" interrelated. It is argued that if several role-identities involve similar skills and refer to the same alters, they may cluster together, the resultant clusters being linked more or less closely with each other. Role-identities are seen as: "...loosely patterned in a somewhat plastic hierarchy of prominence" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.77), the prominence of a role-identity depending on the amount of support previously given to it and the investment of important self-characteristics and perhaps of material resources in its content.

A person will prefer to give performances implying prominent role-identities, but prominence may be overridden by the salience of a role-identity, the latter being governed by situational demands. The actual performance of an informal role in an encounter is "multiply relevant" to a number of role-identities, and the choice of those to be expressed will depend on their prominence and salience at that time, and on the anticipation of whether alter's performance is likely to legitimate or disconfirm them.

If style refers to mode or manner of performance during an encounter, it may be proposed that style is characteristic of the individual in his informal role performances but need not be subject to the same degree of modification vis à vis alter's behaviour, as those expressive activities which reflect the particular informal role which ego is performing. Style may be more or less variable over performances but, as a comparatively consistent feature of a person's social activity, might reflect his general modes of dealing with social encounters and contribute to his being identifiable over

numerous encounters. Stylistic aspects of behaviour may, however, be ascribed meaning, probably on the basis of consensus and stereotypy; a person may employ stylistic devices in order to convey that he wishes to be treated as a particular kind of person and will behave in a manner appropriate to his identification with such a "type" (in the conventional sense).

Thus, while stylistic devices may be employed in order to convey the impression that the performer is a coherent "character", they may also allow the performer to express the conventional aspects of important role-identities which are not entirely salient to the informal role relationship emerging in a particular encounter, and thereby to offer these for legitimation. Furthermore, where the role-identity "set" which a person must display, by virtue of alter's behaviour (informal role), or the behaviour of a general (group) audience to an encounter (social Role), represents some distortion of his view of himself qua individual, then he may employ stylistic aspects of his behaviour in order to correct this distortion and to assure that his audience is aware that, although he must behave in such a way in order to satisfy Role requirements, such behaviour is not implicative of his nature as an individual. This is the phenomenon which Goffman (1972a) has called "Role-distance".

At the same time, it must be noted that style is not a feature of social behaviour which is entirely open to the individual to determine for himself. Many Role-expectations include stylistic prescription, and formal (culturally labelled and agreed) definitions of situations may particularly pertain to appropriate modes of behaviour, with little attention to the detail of what the behavioural acts themselves should be.

As performer, an interactant must achieve a performance which is interpretable by his partner (and by an "objective" audience) as

coherent, which expresses those role-identities which he wishes to legitimate, which offers legitimation to the other's view of himself as expressed, which allows him to maintain his lines of action, and, importantly, which bears considerable relation to the performance given by his partner. Thus, Weinstein and Deuschberger (1964) distinguish between the bargain ego strikes with alter and that which he strikes with himself. As interpreter of a partner's performance, the interactant must distinguish between those stylistic aspects of the other's behaviour which are concerned with character maintenance, satisfaction of Role or Situational demands, identification with social category or type, and so on. Such distinctions may be more important where a person wishes to predict his partner's behaviour beyond the particular encounter in which he meets him, that is, when he seeks to "know" his partner more fully.

"Character", as viewed above, constitutes some kind of compromise between the view of himself which a person wishes to confirm, and the constraints imposed by the social identities relevant to an encounter and the nature of the informal role relationship. While the demand that ego present, and perform within the confines of, a unitary and coherent character may be alter's, it is to ego's advantage to view his own behaviour in the context of a presented "character", since this will limit the range of behaviour to be performed and the role-identities which may be expressed, and will thus guide selection and improvisation of appropriate behaviour. To the extent that elaboration of performance so as to "maintain character" is achieved stylistically, the dyadic partner's behaviour during an encounter need not seriously challenge the performer's character.

The establishment of "who" ego and alter are (in a particular encounter or relationship) contributes to the framework constraining their social behaviour. These constraints will now be summarised and

an alternative mode of describing the framework to an encounter, the "definition of the situation", briefly discussed.

C. Constraints on Social Behaviour

The constraints on social behaviour implied by performance within the framework of formal Role and "character" have been described by McCall and Simmons (1966) as "social boundaries". While these limits may be defined "objectively" without reference to the particular Role performer or character portrayer, they operate to affect behaviour only where the performer and his audience together acknowledge their relevance to their informal role relationship. The informal role relationship, as defined here, is viewed as further constraining ego and alter in their behaviour, such constraints not necessarily being predetermined, but emergent. Indeed, it may be argued that the emergent role relationship may in some instances be characterised by a progressive "relaxation" of constraints initially recognised and agreed as entailed by ego's and alter's identification and categorisation of each other's social and personal identities.

At any stage in an encounter, ego's present attribution of role to alter, insofar as it serves as a frame of reference for his interpretation of alter's present acts, operates to limit the number of interpretations possible, even if such interpretations themselves lead to a modification of this role attribution. Similarly, ego's present attribution of role to alter limits the number of acts which he can at that point anticipate alter performing in the future. If ego can only consider possible acts for himself to perform, to which he has some basis for anticipating alter's response, then ego's own improvisation is limited. The further source of limitation for his behaviour which must also be taken into account at that point, is his conception of alter's view of his (ego's) role, so that, if he wishes to act in order that this view be elaborated or modified, he must take care not to endanger other hoped-for goal achievements by performing "out of character".

It is the limits imposed by the interdependence between ego's and alter's emergent performances which are of central importance here. Less "permeable" constraints include limitations imposed by geography, time, logical possibility, the physical characteristics of locations and ascribed characteristics of interactants such as age and sex. "Cultural" boundaries refer to prescriptions governing what behaviour is appropriate, acceptable and deviant for people, an important example of these being the requirement that a native language be used within a given cultural group. In addition to these constraints, McCall and Simmons (1966) refer to "social boundaries", which are those, already discussed, imposed by occupancy of social positions and performances of Formal Roles, and "personal boundaries", which include physical characteristics and ailments and predispositions referred to grossly as "personality".

The cultural and social boundaries constraining behaviour have frequently been referred to as involved in the "definition of the situation". While some attempts have been made to derive a taxonomy of the "psychological analysis of the situation", Miller (1963) notes the lack of success achieved. It has been assumed that a culture specifies "situations" and rules for behaviour appropriate to these, and that the cues whereby people may identify such situations are unambiguous. Many such situations are indeed specified and named in a particular culture but, as with Formal Role expectations, adherence to the rules is by no means inevitable, and where rules are "kept" the specification for the behaviour of participants is rarely exhaustive.

Where cultural specification of behaviour is not explicit, the "definition of the situation", like the definition of the informal role relationship, has been viewed as emergent. As noted earlier, Goffman (1971) refers to the definition of the situation as the agreement between alter and ego as to their respective lines of action.

Following Weinstein and Deutschberger (1964), and McCall and Simmons (1966), this "definition" has been referred to here as "agreement about the informal role relationship".

Ball (1972) cites Thomas' (1928) view of the "definition of the situation": "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences", and suggests that: "...in order to understand social conduct we must look to existential causality, that is to the meanings of situations and the situated meanings within them as they are phenomenologically experienced by the actors located within them" (Ball, 1972, p.62).

Ball acknowledges that social actors derive their definitions on the basis of their selective response to the "multiplicities of available cues", but emphasises that they construct their own definitions, whether or not this involves acceptance of the definition provided by the culture. Included in the cues presented to the actor are the expressive acts of his partner, whose definition is perhaps the most important one to be construed by him. As well as identifying a situation as generally identified, by responding to the available cues in a "conventional" manner, and even where such a definition is approved by the actor, he must ascertain the definition given by his partner, in order to check that their definitions "match", and so that the more detailed definition of that particular dyadic situation may be elaborated within the encounter.

The "definition of the situation" is, in this view: "...the sum of all recognized information, from the point-of-view of the actor, which is relevant to his locating himself and others, so that he can engage in self-determined lines of action and interaction. It includes objects of both the physical and social environment; his own internal states both mental and physical; historical data, e.g. biographies, knowledge of similar prior occurrences, and the like; and predictions and expectations about the character of events to follow. The situation

and its definition are, then, from the actor's point-of-view, coterminous; it is not merely the arena "where the interaction is", it is a "piece of the action" itself...a fundamental feature of the micro-organization of social encounters" (Ball, 1972, p.63). The definition of the situation, like the nature of an informal role relationship, is thus seen as emergent, and similarly, concern with the definition: "...well may be most important at the initiations and terminations of interaction" (Ball, 1972, p.64).

Ball discusses also the ways in which actors may achieve shared definitions: either actors may: "...try to discover the meanings held by their partners", or they may "...construct a definition which will be acceptable to those partners, either through the imposition of power and influence, or through mutual, collaborative efforts" (Ball, 1972, pp. 73-74). In informal role terms, ego may attribute a role to alter and himself perform the complementary role, or he may perform his preferred role and thereby cast alter into the complementary role, which, if ego is "dominant", alter will probably perform. Alternatively, ego and alter may continue to negotiate until a relationship which is mutually satisfactory is achieved.

The parallel between Ball's (1972) analysis of the definition of the situation and the improvisational model proposed here is close. In Chapter Three the attribution process will be described as analogous to hypothesis-testing; it is interesting that Ball construes the process of discovering the situational definition held by an interactive partner as involving the forming and modification of hypotheses. These may be tested, he suggests, not only by the reception of new information, but by active manipulation of behaviour. Further, Ball maintains that: "Intersubjectivity is empirically grounded in the reading of cues, cognitions, and consequences; it does not involve reading other men's minds telepathically, but rather their communications" (Ball, 1972, p.75), and cites literature dealing with "person perception" and "nonverbal

communication", which will also be discussed in relation to attribution in Chapter Three.

The implications of the "situational definition" approach are already incorporated in the dramaturgical model, and the latter view is preferred. Where the construction of a situational definition is required, that is, where a cultural prescription is absent, rejected, or insufficiently detailed, the definition to be achieved must simply be "shared". The view of an informal role relationship must not simply be shared by dyadic members; the behaviour implied by the role attributions must be to some extent complementary. Cues as to the definition of the situation have traditionally been viewed as located in the setting external to the interactants: the dramaturgical view also notes the degree to which contextual (both social and physical) features may serve to aid precision in the interpretation of expressive behaviour, and that these may be manipulated by interactants to this end, as Goffman (1971) has suggested. Such cue sources, frequently referred to as constituting the "situation", are therefore deemed sufficiently pertinent to the attribution and improvisation of roles in interaction to be incorporated into the dramaturgical view.

It is admitted that culturally specified "situations" may be viewed as conceptually more "distinct" from their participants than formal Roles from their performers. The stylistic features of a person's expressive behaviour may similarly be regarded as distinguishable from those aspects of his activity which are more clearly concerned with his particular role performance. These aspects of behaviour may be more likely to be restricted by cultural and social boundaries entailed in prescriptions about behaviour appropriate to the conventional class of "Situation" applicable to an encounter than the more interactive features of social performance. In this sense Goffman's (1971) assertion that the situation is defined initially (and this definition maintained throughout an encounter) may be justified, Ball's (1972) insistence

on the definition of the situation as emergent applying to the refinement and elaboration of the definition for the interactants as individuals within the Situation as generally defined in the culture.

It seems somewhat irrelevant to argue as to whether interactants' negotiations about their interactive behaviour are construed in terms of "emergent informal role relationships" or "emergent definitions of the situation". The cognitive and expressive processes which must be concerned in conducting such negotiation must be essentially of the same level of complexity.

Interaction processes are more conveniently focussed upon by employing the term "informal role" as inclusive of the "who" and the "what" distinguished by McCall and Simmons (1966). In everyday usage, referring to a person as of a particular kind almost invariably involves implications about how he characteristically behaves. Whenever such descriptions of a person involve specification of "situation," or other people with whom he is that kind of person, the behaviour prediction entailed approximates to the definition given here of "informal role". While emphasising that social behaviour is likely to be variable across encounters, the improvisational view argues also that an individual's social behaviour is likely to be strongly implicative of his nature as an individual. Having outlined the improvisational view, a brief discussion of the relationship between personality and social behaviour in improvisational terms may serve as summary.

D. Personality and Social Behaviour

The improvisational model permits, potentially, extensive discussion of the relationship between an individual's "permanent" dispositions, or "personality", and his social behaviour. Formal Role Theory implies that behaviour within the constraints afforded by Role prescriptions, that is, the "way" in which a Role is performed, depends on the performer's personality. The improvisational model emphasises the interrelatedness of the improvised aspects of ego's and alter's performances, so that the

"degrees of freedom" for social behaviour within the constraints implied by social identity and character are more limited than the Role Theory view would demand.

It would follow from the definition of informal role that a person would evidence relatively more "inconsistency" between performances with different partners than within any one performance, and it may be this prediction of personal "inconsistency" which has perturbed critics of the dramaturgical and "situational definition" views. It must be noted here that "assumptions of personal consistency" refer to a number of different kinds of judgement which might be made of a person's behaviour, and that discussions of "consistency" have tended not to distinguish these.

For example, a person may be consistent if he does the same thing on one occasion as he did on a previous one. Alternatively, a person might be judged "consistent" if his behaviour on one occasion carried the same implications for his "nature" as a person as did his (objectively different) behaviour on another. Further, consistency may be judged with regard to the person's usual degree of evidenced consistency, or with regard to that of other people, and so on. Consistency is clearly a relative matter and tends to concern social scientists where its consideration interferes with the success of empirical predictions, and the generality with ^{which} these may be stated.

It might be of interest to discover what social interactants themselves regard as "inconsistent" behaviour, what characterises, for them, "inconsistency" as against "information", and in what conditions "inconsistency" is welcomed or abhorred. The "dissonance-reduction versus novelty" controversy in the field of "attitudes" (Maddi, 1968) might have bearing on such an issue. For the purposes of dyadic interaction, it is probable that the criterion of "consistency" as applied by ego to alter's behaviour may be concerned with the degree

to which alter's behaviour "makes sense"; alter's interactive behaviour may be more likely to "make sense" when viewed within the context of an informal role performed vis à vis that of ego himself.

McCall and Simmons' (1966) role-identity notion suggests that, while a person's performances may vary by virtue of the performer's selection and expression of different role-identity "sets", abstraction from performances to the content of these role-identities would reveal a high degree of consistency in social behaviour. That is, any social performance (except where the performer intends to deceive) will imply a person's view of himself: "A role...is the characteristic and plausible line of action truly expressive of the personality..." (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.58). While the content, relative prominence, and salience of role-identities may change over time, certain aspects of the content of role-identities will be persistently displayed, evoked, and legitimated.

For any individual, the way in which his role-identities tend to be organised, the ways in which he interprets others' reactions to them, and so on, may be relatively consistent. In this way the consistent aspects of the self (or selves) may be regarded as pervasive influences on the way in which an individual behaves socially, and might fruitfully be examined for status as "personality characteristics" by use of appropriate methods, for example those of Kelly (1955).

The notion of informal role emphasises that the requirements of interaction inhibit the individual from exhibiting his "truest, deepest self": "Particular interactions are also less than satisfying in the respect that only a few of one's many role-identities can be worked into a given encounter. Large segments of one's self-structure are forced to go unhonoured in any particular gathering, because they would not be particularly compatible with one's emerging role in the encounter as shaped by the negotiation process" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.164).

The same might be said of the majority of personality questionnaires.

When a person is found to have a consistent preference for exhibiting a certain content of a number of his role-identities in interaction, such as the expression of dominance, then he may be likely to exhibit this, given suitable opportunities (willingly submissive interactive partners). Personality "dimensions" dealing with social behaviour preferences may thus be successful in predicting relevant social behaviour. On the other hand, personality dimensions dealing either with "problems" encountered in social interaction, or with "basic" individual difference dimensions (such as extraversion-introversion), may only be successful in predicting social behaviour where the individual has been unable either to avoid situations where his ineptitude will be apparent (see Goffman, 1970) or where he has learnt no means of "coping" with his incapacities.

In the improvisational view, in order to get to "know" a person, a perceiver would have to interact with him in a number of social contexts where different role relationships pertained, and also to observe him in interaction with numerous others. From such experience, the perceiver might be able to infer the contents of some of the person's complement of role-identities. Noting those aspects of content which seemed common to a number of role-identities and those which seemed Situation-, Role-, or other-specific, the perceiver might then be able to infer both those aspects of the person's self which seemed pervasive (from the former), and also (from the latter) the person's strategies and abilities in dealing with social situations.

For the psychologist interested in the prediction of social behaviour or in discovering dimensions of individual difference in interaction, this approach would be an arduous one. It has been argued, for example by Alker (1972), that prediction of behaviour from measures of single traits not immediately implying the predicted behaviour is

unreasonable, and that there should be a focus on the person by study of the interrelatedness and patterning of various characteristics before such predictions are made. It would follow that, for the prediction of social behaviour, there should be a focus on the persons (from a multidimensional approach also) involved in interaction with each other, as well as on the boundaries of their interaction.

In summary, to account for "inconsistency" in behaviour over different encounters by reference to Role- or Situation-demands as has been customary, implies that when a person is not behaving with reference to such normative demands, then he is simply behaving in accordance with the dictates of his personality. The improvisational view counters this in suggesting, firstly, that where a person does or does not behave in accordance with such demands, his choice in the matter may be associated with his nature as an individual, and secondly, that the more important sources of "consistency" or "inconsistency" in behaviour with different alters are the informal role relationships (each implying both ego's and alter's lines of action and their personalities) emerging.

Thus, nothing that a person does can be regarded as "divorced" from his personality (given that he can conceive of alternative modes of behaviour) but at the same time, little of his social behaviour (except where it is egocentric or asocial) will be directly implied by his personality. Indeed, while the improvisational view stresses the degree to which a person is limited in expressing himself in interaction with others by the nature of the informal roles which he has the opportunity to perform, at the same time the view allows the proposal that any person is capable of giving a vast variety of performances, none of which would necessarily be "deceptive" in expressing his individuality.

E. Competence and Performance

The improvisational view implies that dyadic interaction may be an extremely complex and difficult endeavour, requiring a high degree of careful attention to the behaviour of a dyadic partner throughout an encounter and, at the same time, scrupulous self-awareness. Information about the actions of both parties to an encounter, it seems, must be interpreted, remembered, and frequently reinterpreted as the encounter proceeds. Added to this, decisions must be made and actions performed appropriately. Such an "intellectualised" view of dyadic interaction, it might be argued, may apply to few people, and to a minority of encounters.

It is agreed that it would be extremely difficult, but not impossible, for an interactant to engage in social behaviour while consciously attending to the encounter as a whole, and to his own and to his partner's performance, in terms of "attribution", "improvisation", "self-presentation", and "altercasting". The improvisational view, if approximating to the view which people may in general have of encounters, may perhaps only be employed consciously with regard to past encounters (toward "understanding") or to anticipated encounters (as a basis for "rehearsal").

Were such a view to be present in the awareness of an interactant while he was interacting, some breakdown in the coherence and effectiveness of his performance would seem likely; instances of alienation from interaction, Goffman (1957) suggests, occur in conjunction with an "improper" focus of attention on the part of one or more interactants. That is, when interactants do attend to the detail of their own behaviour, to the other's behaviour, or to the progress of the encounter as a whole, at a conscious or "aware" level, then the encounter is unlikely to be experienced as "successful" by the participants. Similarly, too much attention to the "grammaticality" of one's verbal utterances

may lead to breakdown in the verbal flow; if one were to speak quite ungrammatically on the other hand, one would soon become aware of this, either as a result of "slightly-less-than-aware" self-monitoring, or of some verbal or nonverbal action performed by one's partner as commentary, or simply as a result of inferring from one's partner's actions that the intended message had not been effectively communicated.

Conscious monitoring of performance seems more likely to occur, as Argyle's view (1969) suggests, at an "error-sensitivity" level. That is, interactants may be monitoring or checking their behaviour at a virtually "automatic", sub-aware level, such that occurs in their performance or in their interpretations of their partner's performance are noted, and some corrective action (or hypothesis-amendment) is made. The Argylian analogy between social behaviour and motor skills may have full impact where the complexity of the cognitive processes necessary for effective social behaviour (his "perception, translation and decision processes") is delineated, as it has been in elaborating the improvisational view.

Thus it is proposed that the processes of attribution, improvisation, self-presentation and altercasting frequently operate at a level of complexity implicit in the improvisational view, but that rarely do interactants plan and monitor their own and other's behaviour in such terms while they are interacting. The improvisational view presents the "ideal" state of interaction, where both individuals are operating at an optimal level of competence, so that their actions constitute coherent sequences which are fully integrated with each other.

For many encounters, such sophistication in performance need not be achieved for satisfactory "outcomes" to be experienced. As noted earlier, much social interaction may take place at a more-or-less "stereotyped" level, where a classical Role Theory interpretation of encounters might suffice, or where an initial negotiation process

calling briefly upon the cognitive and expressive processes noted by McCall and Simmons (1966) established some kind of "definition" of the situation or relationship.

However, the improvisational view would not necessarily be irrelevant to such cases. The more complex processes of interpretation and decision required by the improvisational view must always (according to that view) be "on call" to deal with unforeseen contingencies, and it may be argued that the less easily available such processes are for an interactant to apply (or the less willing he is to employ them) in an encounter, then the less an encounter will constitute a true case of interaction between two people.

Empirical assessment of the validity of the improvisational view may best be achieved by focussing on the cognitive and expressive competencies which the view ascribes to interactants. The view implies that people should be able to engage in the activities of improvisation, attribution and performance (and thereby, of altercasting), and that these competences are fully exercised in some encounters and are potentially available for "use" in all. Performance in a particular encounter may draw little upon such skills, and for a variety of reasons: the degree to which people may be characterised by such social competences may be assumed to vary, and similarly, the degree to which they may be willing to draw upon such skills as they have need not be constant.

Thus the improvisational view is proposed as permitting description of the most complex dyadic encounters where the cognitive and expressive competences proposed are highly developed and fully employed, and also the simplest "stereotyped" encounters where such skills, even if available, are hardly drawn upon. To evaluate the view, however, the degree to which people can behave as the view suggests must be examined, before enquiring as to the instances when they might.

5. Summary and Review

In this chapter the dramaturgical analogy, that comparing theatre

to social life, was described and its relevance to social psychology asserted. Three assumptions implied by the analogy were stated, and the attention paid to these assumptions by Role Theory was discussed. It was proposed that this approach leads to the view of social behaviour as "conformity" to expectations, embodied in the use of Role as a structural concept. It was argued that the dramaturgical analogy is appropriate to the study of informal social interaction processes when the behaviour is viewed as "improvised" within certain constraints. Such constraints include those implied by Formal Role expectations and, importantly, by the interdependence between the social behaviour of participants to all informal encounters where "interaction" may truly be said to occur. The view of social behaviour as improvised potentially provides a basis for the study of the relationships between "consistent characteristics" of people and the ways in which they behave with others; the notion of informal role was defined as a means of elaborating this view.

Views of dyadic interaction stemming from non-dramaturgical frameworks were reviewed, and the improvisational model was seen to incorporate the main propositions of these approaches. The improvisational view was elaborated and McCall and Simmons' (1966) model of the interrelationship between the cognitive processes of imputation and improvisation, and the expressive processes of self-presentation and altercasting, described. It was argued that this model may be used to refer to continual processes during an encounter, the terms "attribution" and "performance" being substituted for "imputation" and "self-presentation", respectively.

The ways in which dyadic members identify each other as individuals during an encounter was discussed in McCall and Simmons' terms of "personal identity", "social identity", "character" and "persona", and stylistic devices were proposed as a means by which performances are

given the impression of coherence, such coherence itself being informative as to the informal role and the performer's view of himself as an individual. Employing the notion of "role-identity", it was argued that social behaviour is constrained by people's desire to express their views of themselves and to have these views confirmed by recognising in their partner's complementary performances, "recognition" of their identities.

The constraints within which performances are improvised were summarised, and the notion of the "definition of the situation" discussed. Such definitions, if viewed as (partially) emergent, and the means by which they may be achieved, were deemed equivalent to the notion of informal role and its negotiation. Finally, the improvisational view was summarised by asserting its application to the problem of the relationship between personality and social behaviour.

The improvisational view described here refers specifically to dyadic interaction, and while in some ways less complex than McCall and Simmons' (1966) account, allows discussion of the central processes of interaction. Interactants are invested with the power to improvise their social behaviour within the limits agreed by each other, such that their role relationship is emergent, and to monitor the effectiveness of their performances in achieving their lines of action. Further, the capacity to "monitor the monitoring" allows the presentation of a performance which would appear coherent to an objective audience as well as to themselves, and allows that interactants may offer for confirmation their views of themselves as implied by their performances. If social behaviour is improvised within certain constraints, then decisions as to appropriate behaviour involve the interpretation of the interactive partner's behaviour as role performance. The processes of attribution and improvisation will be further discussed in Chapters Three and Four.

The capacity to effectively improvise performances and to manage the

impressions which others receive of them should also allow dyadic members to view encounters in which they participate in "objective" terms. That is, in order to view their own and their dyadic partner's behaviour as interrelated, people may be expected to be able to view their encounters in terms of the role relationship pertaining. The simplest approach which may be taken initially in discussing this proposal is taken in the next chapter, which examines the relationship between dyadic members as both performers and as audiences to their own, the other's, and the dyad's, performance. As in this chapter, subsequent discussions will attempt to incorporate approaches taken by non-dramaturgical analysts of social behaviour to dyadic encounters.

CHAPTER TWO

The Dyad as Performer and Audience

1. Introduction

In this chapter the dyad is viewed as a "feedback system" with the implication that each member is both performer and audience to the other. It is proposed that many encounters, however, may be characterised by a certain degree of imbalance in terms of who is audience to the other as (predominantly) performer. Reference is made to empirical study of the effects of audiences on performance, and of the effects of modification of audience behaviour on the nature of performances. Probable sources of performer-audience imbalance are discussed and it is noted that neither a performer nor an audience "standpoint" should be equated with a position of relative "power". It is suggested that an awareness of such "imbalance" might be phenomenally represented in terms of "feeling the observer" or "feeling the observed", and that empirical study of this hypothesis is possible. If such a dimension of interpersonal interaction is meaningful to people, then a number of further hypotheses about the determinants of such "imbalance", derived in this chapter, may also be open to empirical study.

The improvisational view of dyadic interaction has been presented as compatible with, but more sophisticated than, the approaches taken by non-dramaturgical theorists. The latter differ from the improvisational view in that empirical studies have afforded some validation of hypotheses generated within them. If an improvisational view is to be adopted within "conventional" social psychology, it is important that some attempt be made to assess the validity of its proposals. In later chapters, the focus will be upon the cognitive processes of attribution and improvisation, and the expressive processes of altercasting and performance. This discussion will inevitably lead to an emphasis on the individual person. While many contributors to the development of social psychology, for example, Asch (1952), have maintained that emphasis

on the psychological processes of the individual is appropriate to the discipline, others, for example Miller (1963), have proposed that the basic "unit of analysis" should be the dyad.

From the non-dramaturgical as well as the improvisational viewpoint, the dyad is conceptualised as a system involving interacting and complementary "elements" of behaviour. The Exchange Theory view is of the modification of his intended behaviour by ego, in the light of alter's response to his previous behaviour. Argyle's (1967, 1969) model makes this modification function explicit by reference to "feedback" principles. The improvisational view depends also on this notion of feedback, whereby ego construes alter's performance as "casting" him (ego) in a certain manner. The dramaturgical terms of "performer" and "audience" would seem appropriate in referring to this aspect of dyadic behaviour. This view of the dyad as "performer and audience" will be considered in this chapter.

Empirical work on the effects of an audience on performance will be reviewed, and it will be proposed that the view of the dyad as performer and audience suggested by the improvisational model is an appropriate framework for empirical work investigating certain general hypotheses about dyadic performance. These hypotheses will refer to the sensitivity of interactants to physical and social features of the environment and to aspects of their partner's social behaviour.

2. The analogy between performance and social life

A. The appropriateness of the analogy

Before discussing the implications of viewing the dyad as performer and audience, the appropriateness of the analogy must be considered. The "performer-audience" dichotomy in classical drama would initially seem to bear little relationship to the nature of the informal dyad. Indeed, the proposed parallel between drama and social life might seem least persuasive when the social equivalent of the theatrical audience is sought. Yet in the theatre, the audience serves as the primary

"raison d'être" for the performance and enters into a relationship with the performers in the important sense of attending to the performance. While the interaction between performers and the audience appears limited, anecdotal evidence would suggest that audience behaviour may have considerable impact, not only on the confidence of actors in the effectiveness of their performance, but on the nature of those performances also.

Since no script is exhaustive in terms of stylistic or adverbial features, dramatic performances are (more or less, depending on the degree of specificity of the script) potentially modifiable in the light of "audience reaction". Where performances are so modified, actors must also attend to their fellow performers as "audiences" to their individual interpretations, so that the performances as a whole may appear "convincing" to the "non-participant" audience. As suggested in the previous chapter, stylistic features of performance may lend the impression of coherence to one performer's series of acts, but some of these features may be relevant to the relationship between the performer and his partner.

Similarly, in a dyadic encounter, each member serves as audience to the other as performer, as audience to the self as performer, and importantly (by virtue of the capacity to "monitor the monitoring" discussed previously), as audience to the performance of the dyad as a whole. Each dyadic member thus adopts the standpoint of a third-party or non-participant audience toward the encounter, whether or not such an audience is physically present.

Non-participant audiences are present in the theatre and in many everyday encounters. Goffman (1971), for example, has indicated how groups of people may cooperate to "perform" for a further group of people who constitute an important but essentially non-participant (in the sense that they are not directly involved in shaping the substantive contents of the performer's behaviour) audience. Thus waiters,

shop assistants and hospital staff, for example, behave with each other in such a way as to satisfy the expectations and needs of their audience, the diners, customers, and patients.

Similarly, Sarbin and Allen (1968) refer to the "functions of an audience for role enactment" as including the establishment of "... consensual reality for the role. By accepting role enactment as appropriate, the audience provides validation for the enactment and serves as public confirmation of the reality of the role" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p.534). Goffman (1971) gives many examples of the ways in which relatively non-participant audiences may perform this function. His description of behaviour designed to preserve "body-gloss" (Goffman, 1972b, p.31) illustrates the ways in which people behave in public as if others might be observing, or acting as audience toward, them. When performing "individual" acts, and when others happen to be present, as in walking along the street, a person will behave in such a way as to make his actions coherent, meaningful and acceptable, in case somebody were observing him. Thus, even the potential of others to act as audiences, that is, to give social approval, or simply recognition, to one's behaviour (however "non-directive" such "feedback" might be to the specific contents of one's actions), is constantly recognised and serves to determine in a gross manner, much of one's behaviour.

"Audiences", whether they be non-participant, participant, or intra-individual, are viewed as justifying social performance in themselves, and as providing "feedback" about the effectiveness of performance. Where commentary is sought from a physically present audience, it must be inferred from the audience's behaviour, and the performance itself will be given in anticipation of the likely nature of the interpretation given to the performance by the audience. Empirical work cited by Flavell et al (1968) has demonstrated, at a crude level, that communications intended for others differ from those addressed to oneself (Werner and Kaplan, 1963), and that communications are improvised in

accordance with the nature of the potential audience (Ratner, Darling and Jackman, 1957). Recall is affected by anticipation of repetition before an audience (Burri, 1931), and the nature of material remembered, by the expected characteristics of the audience (Grace, 1951; Zimmerman and Bauer, 1956).

Empirical work purporting to investigate the effects of "audiences" on behaviour has dealt mainly with non-participant audiences, and where these audiences have been "participant" this participation has, effectively, only involved the provision of "knowledge of results" achieved by "performers". The presence of others during the performance of motor and intellectual tasks has been found to affect performance. This phenomenon, labelled "social facilitation", has been studied extensively, for example, by Zajonc (1965). In most studies, the likelihood that the meaning of the situation is changed radically by the presence of others, rather than that their mere presence exerts some direct effect on behaviour, seems not to have been taken into account. In some situations, "others" may not constitute "audiences" in the sense described here, since the minimal requirement of attention to the performer is not (by virtue of the experimenter's instructions) fulfilled. Many interpretations might be made by "subjects" of the reason for the presence of others, and it seems probable that where "subjects" in experimental situations such as these feel that they are "performers", they are as likely to attribute the role of "audience" to the experimenter (whether present or not) as to the presumed "facilitator".

If an audience is viewed as giving feedback to the actor about his performance, that is, as providing: "...discriminative responses that guide the performer's role enactment" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p.534), then the kind of feedback which is important to the improvising performer (rather than to the reiterator of a script) is continuous feedback. Continuous response to, and evaluation of, performance would be such as

to allow modification of the performance at any time, rather than at some terminal point in an encounter. It is this kind of audience function which is particularly relevant to the view of the dyad as improvising a social performance.

Even non-participant audiences, be they large or small groups of people, may be viewed as providing relatively continuous feedback to an individual's social performance, insofar as their standards for effective performance are adopted by him as criteria by which he judges his own behaviour, and are viewed by him as relevant audiences. This notion of "internalisation" of the standards of those significant to one has a considerable history outside the dramaturgical framework, both in psychodynamic theories of personality functioning, and in the more recent attempts to describe the development of the child's behaviour in terms of "modelling" and "imitation", for example by Bandura and Walters (1963). Although some authors, for example Mischel (1968), contrast the latter notions with those of "internalisation", both approaches propose that the "internaliser", "imitator" or "modeller" responds to others as audiences to his behaviour, and "stores" criteria abstracted from this audience evaluation to be applied to his later, and often independent, behaviour.

This proposal depends on two capacities discussed in the previous chapter. Firstly, it must be assumed that people are capable of monitoring their own behaviour. Secondly, it was proposed that people may employ the responses of others to them as constituting information about their own behaviour. The standards by which people then evaluate this feedback information, so that they may modify their performance if necessary, are presumed to be derived from the particular "audiences" to which the person responds as "qualified" evaluators in the first instance.

The notion of "reference-group", a group whose values and customs an individual approves and whose approval he seeks, has been discussed

in "unseen audience" terms. Reference groups have been described as: "...special kinds of symbolic audiences used to evaluate and compare role performances" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p.532). Such "audiences" are presumed to have a broadly "directive" effect on behaviour, insofar as the imagined approval or disapproval of the reference group is an important basis for the modification of behaviour, and the individual is presumed to plan and evolve his future behaviour by reference to what is likely to be approved by such an "audience".

Mead (1970) has employed the dramaturgical analogy in order to explicate his ideas about the relationship between the "self" and society. A central proposition in his account is that the self be viewed as comprising a "performer aspect", and an "audience aspect" which continuously monitors the former. His conceptualisation of this "performer-audience" dichotomy within the self has been followed by Sarbin and Allen (1968) and McCall and Simmons (1966), who compare the reflexivity suggested by Mead's notion of the "me" and the "I" to James' (1890) distinction between the self as subject and the self as object.

McCall and Simmons note a dissimilarity between Mead's and James' notions, in that James meant by the "me": "...those aspects of the personality that the "I" knows and cares about", whereas Mead meant by the "me": "...all those perspectives on oneself that the individual has learned from others..." (McCall and Simmons, 1966, pp. 54-55). The "me" is here seen as audience to the performing "I". That is: "The "me" is merely the organized cognitive frames of reference in terms of which the mind appraises and evaluates and monitors the ongoing thought and action of its own person, the "I"" (McCall and Simmons, 1968, p.56). The "organized cognitive frames of reference" are susceptible to social influence and, it is suggested, derive from learning the standards of judgement used by people important to one.

In the Meadian view: "The individual achieves selfhood at that point at which he first begins to act toward himself in more or less the same fashion in which he acts toward other people" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.54). This is called "taking the role of the other toward the self". The "self" is here the performer, and the "other" is audience; "other" may represent a person or group physically present, or "performing criteria" abstracted from previous encounters or relationships.

Mead (1970) distinguishes between "taking the role of a particular other" toward the self, and "taking the role of the generalised other", where the "generalised other" refers to the social group, as a whole, to which the individual belongs. These notions of "taking the role of the other" or of the "generalised other" will be discussed fully in the next chapter. The notion that the self involves an audience aspect which derives from the past responses of the actor to physically present audiences, allows the assertion that apparently non-participant audiences may provide continuous feedback to, and evaluation of, performance, insofar as they have been attended to, and their criteria recognised in the past.

McCall and Simmons' (1966) discussion of Mead's ideas prefaces their description of their own notions of "role-identity", "character", and "persona", referred to in the last chapter. As suggested above, an individual's ability to appraise his own role-identities, personae, and so on, and thus the development of these in the first instance, relies on the postulation of a relatively "objective" self-monitoring, or "audience", capacity. The audience aspect of the self operates not only at the end of a performance but continually monitors the performance, thus giving the interaction between the performance self and the audience self the characteristics of a cybernetic system with feedback, and in order that the performance may be compared with that intended, must also operate as a mechanism which is aware of the plans, intended actions and

strategies which the performer aspect is trying to achieve.

The characteristics of the audience aspect of the self may thus be viewed as deriving from the adoption of criteria from a variety of audiences. While the evaluations of non-participating groups may be presumed to be influential in this way, and while certain gross features of social behaviour, for example, the awareness of "being in public" (and all that this entails) may be explained by reference to such a process, the more important features of the audience aspect of the self are likely to derive from the continuous feedback experienced in dyadic relationships. The dyadic partner as audience may be viewed as important in providing the source of future reactions to one's own behaviour. Since the interacting dyad is of central concern here, the view of the dyad as "performer and audience" will now be discussed.

3. Dyadic partners as "performer" and "audience"

A. Feedback in interaction

In their extensive discussion of the "audience" which deals mainly with the formal Role Theory orientation, Sarbin and Allen (1968) suggest that: "The smallest audience is that present in the dyadic relationship of the role enactment...one of the more important aspects of complementary roles may be their audience effect on the role performer" (Sarbin and Allen, 1958, p.528); "occupants" of these complementary roles are well placed to provide immediate feedback about each other's behaviour. The view of the dyad seems similar to Argyle's (1969), as long as "immediate feedback" implies "continuous feedback".

The term "feedback" has been used here in discussing the dramaturgical view; similarly, Sarbin and Allen (1968) use the term in the general sense of providing information to the performer about his performance. Since the notion of feedback, emphasised by Argyle (1969) as central to an understanding of the way in which people interact with each other, constitutes the main justification for the description of the dyad in dramaturgical terms as "performer and audience", the notion, and

empirical work on the relevance of feedback to communication, will be discussed here.

B. Argyle's (1967, 1969) use of the feedback concept

In Argyle's model, feedback involves the monitoring by one member of a dyad (A) of the responses of the other (B) to his (A's) social behaviour, so that he may modify his performance if B's responses suggest it to be necessary, in pursuance of his (A's), goals for the outcome of the encounter: "Feedback provides information for corrective action, which makes allowances for variation in the conditions or materials and for error in the initial plan of response" (Argyle, 1969, p.186).

Many findings of research, stimulated by the model, about the fairly predictable patterns of motor behaviour occurring during interactions, can be understood by reference to the feedback notion. Empirical work outside the Argylean framework may also be cited in support of his emphasis on the importance of feedback. Leavitt and Mueller (1951) varied the amount and kind of feedback available to communicators, finding that length and effectiveness of communications increase with amount of feedback, but that with "free feedback" (interaction) between communicator and interpreter, experience leads to increasing economy in the time taken to communicate.

Their suggestion that there is: "...a kind of personal feedback in which the instructor's own words are utilized to help him to increase his own effectiveness in the future" (Leavitt and Mueller, 1951, p.409), supports the notion, discussed in the previous section, that past audience response may be employed as a source for the derivation of criteria for the self-monitoring of performance. In Leavitt and Mueller's (1951) study it seems that the communicator engaged in a role relationship with his audience, and his "attribution" of role to them served to aid improvisation of his own role performance.

Flavell et al (1968) cite a number of similar studies demonstrating the importance of continuous feedback in aiding communication. For example, Maclay and Newman (1960) asked people to describe a picture to a listener, seated behind a screen, who had to identify that picture from a number of alternatives. Shorter communications were necessary for successful identification in the "positive" than in the "negative" or "zero", feedback conditions.

Kendon's (1967) extensive studies indicate that, in dyadic interaction, regular patterns of visual behaviour tend to emerge, and suggest the importance of visual feedback in encounters. Gaze behaviour seems to serve at least two functions: making sure the partner is still oriented toward the looker, and gathering information from the partner's nonverbal behaviour about his reactions to the looker's performance. Looking at another is thus proposed as one of the main means of obtaining feedback about one's performance. Gaze behaviour in itself symbolises audience activity, signifying attention to what the other is doing and saying.

Listening behaviour, also, is a source of continuous feedback about one's own performance and constitutes audience activity vis à vis the other's utterances. It is looking behaviour, however, that signifies attention to, and appraisal of, the other; looking is to some extent more "optional" than listening, and is more easily "detected" by a partner. If looking is an important means of obtaining feedback, the interesting question concerns why people do not look at each other all the time during an encounter.

Unlike "listening", which is not an easily observable, detectable behaviour in humans, "looking" has the status of a nonverbal signal. Not only may "looking" function as a "regulator" (Ekman and Friesen, 1969a) of the interaction (in the sense of timing and determination of who speaks when), but looking may serve as an important cue in the

negotiation of certain features of an informal role relationship. Looking may signify intimacy, or desire for increased intimacy in the relationship (when not mutual). On the other hand, looking may signify dominance and aggression. Given this ambiguity, it is apparent that other nonverbal cues and the complementarity of the behaviour patterns emerging in a particular encounter are important in determining the exact significance of looking behaviour at any point in time.

It has been proposed that the "mutual look" may be physiologically "arousing". Such "arousal" may or may not be associated with the aggressive or intimacy-seeking "meanings" attributable to gaze behaviour. Pupil dilation itself may be used as an index of arousal, and Coss (1970) has shown that people's pupils dilate more when they see a pattern of a pair of eye-spots, horizontally arranged, than when they see a vertically arranged pair, a single eye-spot, or three eye-spots together. Hutt and Ounsted (1966) have suggested that autistic children's characteristic gaze-aversion is associated with their high level of arousal.

Armistead (1970) notes that a high level of arousal would interfere with the complex information-processing necessary for skillful social behaviour, particularly where a person was formulating and expressing an utterance, that is, where he was temporarily the "performer". Thus, gaze aversion, which tends to occur as an interactant begins to speak (Kendon, 1967), may be necessary in order to reduce arousal level to the optimal for effective performance.

The variety of functions and meanings attributable to "looking" behaviour is impressive, and it is to be noted that "looking" best approximates a behavioural description of "audience" activity. Just as "a look" may signify either a desire for dominance or a desire for intimacy, so may an audience be viewed as appraising and evaluating, and, at the same time, as showing interest in the performance and a desire for increased

knowledge of the performer.

Argyle, Lalljee and Cook (1968) explored the importance of visual feedback for effective social interaction, manipulating the degree to which one interactant (A) was visible to another (B) by the use of dark glasses, masks, and a one-way screen. They found that: "...perception of the other and comfort decline sharply with invisibility of the other" (Argyle, Lalljee and Cook, 1968, pp. 6-7). When A and B were completely invisible to each other, comfort was not as low for B as in the three conditions of partial visibility. There were also sex differences in experienced discomfort, females seeming to be more dependent on feedback than males; females talked relatively less than males in male-female encounters when visibility was reduced. The authors hypothesised that the sex differences might be due to males seeking dominance, and that the less visible interactant was the more dominant of the pair. This study will be referred to below, when certain hypotheses concerning the performer-audience view of the dyad are offered.

While the dyad is described in terms of one member being the performer to the other as audience, the prevalent manner in which the concept of feedback is qualified (as positive or negative) serves adequately. If it is allowed that, at one stage in an encounter, A may be audience to B's performance, and at another, B audience to A's performance, a certain reversibility (over time) is implied, and the use of the feedback notion is still effective. It is also implied however, that at any one time, A or B only can be audience and give feedback to the other. How can the "audience" give feedback unless it "performs" to some extent? In answer to this it might be suggested that part of each performance constitutes audience reaction (feedback) to the previous performance. Stylistic (adverbial) features of performance have previously been distinguished as reflecting the "monitoring of the monitoring" behaviour of interactants, and may thereby provide a commentary (feedback) about performance (one's

own as well as the partner's) and role relationship, while the action continues.

Without such a conception there is the danger of simply transforming positive and negative feedback into "positive and negative reinforcement" to a response, such that the view of dyadic interaction reverts to a description of a series of response sequences, the "S-R model" rejected in the last chapter as neglecting the complementary and goal-oriented nature of social behaviour. Since stylistic features of behaviour may be distinguished from the content of utterances, the use of feedback provided via such features may be regarded as involving continuous monitoring of behaviour.

The interacting dyad should therefore be regarded as involving two people who are continuously providing feedback to each other, who are each performer and audience simultaneously, who are audiences both to each other and to themselves and of themselves as audience of the other. The improvisational view makes this evident. If altercasting behaviour is regarded as "audience" activity, and self-presentation (or "performance of informal role") as performer activity, then, since altercasting and performance are not different expressive behaviours, but simply different ways of viewing the same activities (in terms either of their implications for ego, or of those for alter), it is apparent that the same activity may be viewed as audience or as performer activity. In an abstract sense the performer-audience dichotomy represents a truly "reversible perspective".

C. Other views of the dyad as a feedback system

Argyle (1967, 1969) has used the feedback notion in a rather general way and, as with other applications of this notion to social behaviour, such general usage tends to allow the term to be employed as an alternative to "reinforcement". The importance of the concept of feedback to dyadic interaction has been expressed in more detail by Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968). They note that: "The realisation that

information about an effect, if properly fed back to the effector, will ensure the latter's stability and its adaptation to environmental change",/a ^{constitutes} "...conceptual shift from energy to information" (Watzlawick et al, 1968, pp. 29-30). The latter remark is by way of demonstrating the contrast between a focus on communication and information and the earlier, for example psychoanalytic, view that behaviour was largely an outcome of "intrapsychic forces". The contrast is one of emphasis, rather than content, the emphasis in psychodynamic approaches being on intrapersonal rather than interpersonal feedback systems. Similarly, Kelly (1955) asserts that we should regard man as active and discuss the direction of his movement, rather than seek for the source of his action ("motivation") and assume the direction to be implied by the source.

Watzlawick et al (1968) have examined the applicability of the feedback notion to social interaction in detail and have employed the concept as originally used in cybernetics. There is a difference between the original use of the term and its application by most social scientists which, so far, does not seem to have led to difficulties beyond infuriating those physical scientists who use the concept "correctly". The difference lies in what constitutes "positive" as against "negative" feedback. Watzlawick et al give the following definitions: negative feedback "...characterizes homeostasis (steady state) and therefore plays an important role in achieving and maintaining the stability of relationships"; positive feedback "...leads to change, i.e., the loss of stability or equilibrium". In both, "...part of a system's output is reintroduced into the system as information about the output". In the negative case, feedback information "...is used to decrease the output deviation from a set norm or bias..."; in the positive case, "...the same information acts as a measure for amplification of the output deviation, and is thus positive in relation to the already existing trend toward a standstill or disruption" (Watzlawick et al, 1968, p.31).

In the use of the feedback concept in the discussion of social behaviour there has been a tendency to imply that "positive feedback" has an equilibrium-maintenance function, and that "negative feedback" leads to change. This tendency has not included an assumption that the interaction system has an "...already existing trend toward standstill or disruption" (Watzlawick et al, op.cit.). The alternative assumption, that communication systems are in equilibrium until disrupted has not been explicitly stated either. Argyle's and McCall and Simmons' models, in emphasising that equilibrium has to be achieved and maintained by dyadic members, would imply the former assumption.

It might be objected that in a dyadic situation, information from A to B about B's performance is not the reintroduction of information "emitted" by B into the system, but the introduction of new information. This new information may, however, be regarded as contingent on the original information in B's "emitted" behaviour, and therefore as a kind of reintroduction by reflection, as Cooley's (1970) "looking-glass self" concept suggests. Thus: "...interpersonal systems...may be viewed as feedback loops, since the behaviour of each person affects and is affected by the behaviour of each other person" (Watzlawick et al, 1968, p.31).

As suggested earlier, the confusion in terminology may rest in the empirically established importance of feedback in providing positive reinforcement to various aspects of behaviour during interaction. For example, work on verbal operant conditioning by Verplanck (1955) and Rosenfeld (1967) has demonstrated that in an encounter people are sensitive to the other's responses as encouragement to their own behaviour. While there now seems considerable doubt (Spielberger 1972) as to whether this phenomenon should truly be described as demonstrating "operant conditioning" or not, the demonstration of the effects of such verbal and nonverbal "encouragements" is important. Thus "positive reinforcement"

has been shown to affect various aspects of the "content" of encounters; here, positive reinforcement is acting as negative feedback. It is generally assumed that positive reinforcement from a theatrical audience, positive reinforcement from a dyadic partner in an encounter, and positive reinforcement from the audience aspect of the self, will tend to maintain the stability of the behaviour of the performer. It is on this well-grounded assumption of the power of one member of a dyad (as audience) to maintain or change the performance of the other that McCall and Simmons' (1966) and Argyle's (1967, 1969) models depend.

Before leaving discussion of the feedback notion and examining further the performer-audience dichotomy which has been presented as its corollary, it should be admitted that perhaps the most coherent attempt to apply a cybernetic approach, with its attendant concepts of "feedback" and "information", to the social communication process has been that of von Cranach (1970). Here the "correct" use of the notions of positive and negative feedback is made.

4. Imbalance of performer-audience activity in the dyad

In comparing dyadic interaction to a feedback system, the contingent and complementary nature of social behaviour is seen as governed by the continual availability of information by which an interactant may modify his intended behaviour. By making this comparison, the emergence of an informal role relationship and its maintenance or modification may be more easily understood. Such mutuality, where each member of a dyad is viewed as both performer and audience to the other, would allow the performer-audience dichotomy the status only of a source of analogy in support of a "systems" approach. However, it is to be argued that the "balance of power" in this respect is rarely equivalent. That is, while each dyadic member is both performer and audience to the other, it is maintained that, in many encounters, one member is likely to be predominantly "audience" to the other as predominantly "performer".

Imbalance in performer-audience terms is most clearly found, as has been mentioned above, in situations resembling the original source of the analogy, the theatre, but here the power of the audience in modifying the content of the actor's performance is arguable, since social convention demands that the feedback is not continuous.

Stanislavsky's (1966) (apparent) self-contradictions in this respect are instructive: "The more the actor wishes to amuse his audience, the more the audience will sit back in comfort waiting to be amused;...but as soon as the actor stops being concerned with his audience, the latter begins to watch the actor...", and yet, "To act without an audience is the same as singing in a room without any resonance...To act before a full and responsive audience is like singing in a hall with excellent acoustics. ...The audience provides...our spiritual acoustics, ...like a sounding board returning to us living, human emotions. ...Thus the audience is a creative participant in the performance of a play" (Stanislavsky, 1966, pp. 27-28).

The "contradiction" here is explicable when it is remembered that reference is being made, not to one performer facing an audience, but to actors presenting not only their own Roles, but also their role-identities vis à vis each other: "If actors really mean to hold the attention of a large audience they must make every effort to maintain an uninterrupted exchange of feelings, thought and actions among themselves, and the inner material for this exchange should be sufficiently interesting to hold spectators" (Stanislavsky, 1966, p.38). Performer-audience relationships within a dyad might be more usefully compared, not to relationships between actors and audiences, but to those between the actors themselves, where continuous feedback would operate.

The more usual view of the performer-audience relationship is of the performer being "a-t the mercy of" the feedback that the audience chooses to give. That a degree of such imbalance is present in the majority of dyadic encounters was argued in Chapter One when Jones and

Gerard's (1967) four "classes of dyadic interaction" were described. Their "pseudocontingency" type of encounter involves little interaction between the behaviour of the participants and refers to the case where a "partner", as non-participant "audience", justifies by his mere presence, a person behaving in a way that is usually permitted (by social convention) only within an interactive encounter, for example, talking.

The class of "asymmetrical contingency" is probably the most common in occurrence. Although Jones and Gerard (1967) state the extreme instance, where: "...the responses of one person are largely determined by self-produced stimuli or plans, whereas the responses of the other are largely determined by social stimuli produced by the first" (Jones and Gerard, 1967, p.509), there are many situations where the "power" differential in these terms is very small. For this kind of situation the more powerful member may be viewed as "audience" to the other, who is "at the mercy of" the directions afforded by this "audience".

In a "reactive contingency" type of encounter, a person's behaviour is represented as directly contingent on the prior actions of the other, where neither has a general plan for the outcome of the encounter. This would seem to be a situation of equal "powerlessness" and, with respect to the performer-audience relationship, is similar to the "ideal" case of social interaction, "mutual contingency". This is the case where: "...each response is partially determined by the preceding responses of the other and partly by the individual's own planned or internal stimulation" (Jones and Gerard, 1967, p.51). In this case members have equal power and they may both be viewed as fulfilling equally a performer and an audience "function".

As suggested above, in the majority of dyadic encounters, one person would be expected to emerge as predominantly audience to the other as performer. This emergence of the "performer-audience" balance is pro-

posed as an important dimension of the informal role relationship, and as characterising particular "equilibrium" or "establishment" states. Such a feature of an informal role relationship may be associated, not necessarily with the relative "dominance" of the individual members, but rather with their dominance over the course which the encounter is to take, (that is, "dominance" in terms of altercasting). This might well be related to the perceived dominance of each member per se, but is not to be equated with it at this point; while the "audience" has the power to evaluate and direct the performance, the "performer" has the power to interpret, innovate and improvise in such a way as to permit himself, possibly, more substantial information about the "legitimacy" of his role-identities than does the audience member.

While the performer-audience balance in the dyad may frequently be emergent, and in some instances may be suitably viewed as a summary of a series of reversals (in performer-audience terms) that have taken place during an encounter, some of the constraints within which encounters are improvised may have performer-audience implications. If the performer-audience balance is to any extent predetermined by the nature of such constraints (and the recognition of these as pertinent to the encounter by the dyad), or if it is established in the initial stages of the encounter, then, like the dimensions of intimacy and dominance discussed in Chapter One, such a balance may have pervasive effects on the subsequent contents of the encounter.

If it were initially established that one person was very much audience to the other, then his power in "casting" the other in the role complementary to that expressed in his own "self-presentation" would probably be such as to lead to the establishment of most of the aspects of the informal role relationship in the first stages of the encounter without elaborate negotiation being possible, or necessary. Indeed, for encounters where the goals of each member are neither

exactly complementary nor in extensive conflict, establishment of the "performer-audience" balance in the early stages might obviate unnecessary haggling, given that such a balance, as with other aspects of the informal role relationship, would be open to subsequent modification.

Having suggested that some "predetermination" of the performer-audience balance in an encounter may derive from certain factors constraining behaviour within that encounter, the possible nature of such factors will now be examined.

5. Sources of performer-audience imbalance

Referring to the "constraints on social behaviour" discussed in the last chapter, possible predeterminants of performer-audience imbalance may be sought in physical features of the situation, in Formal Role prescriptions, and in characteristics of individuals.

Traditionally, in Western society (and until recently), the male has been viewed as "evaluator" of the female, and older as evaluator of younger, except where other (contrary) Role expectations predominate (as in the class-teacher relationship). Similarly, age and sex differences may be more important for certain groups of people (for example, adolescents) and during encounters between strangers, where little information about each other is available and where age and sex may be the only characteristics of the interactants which are unambiguously "defined". It is proposed therefore that, in encounters between strangers, the older will tend to act as audience to the younger as performer, and male as audience to female.

If this proposal, based upon normative expectations, were valid, then such asymmetry might be expected to be represented in the awareness of interactors, if not for specific encounters, at least for encounters in general. Such asymmetry would not necessarily be expected to be represented in the dramaturgical terms of "performer" and "audience". It was noted, following the parallel between the performer-audience

dichotomy and the concept of feedback, that audience behaviour is likely to be associated symbolically with visual feedback, and thus with looking behaviour. If people are aware of performer-audience asymmetry in social interaction, this seems likely to be represented phenomenologically in terms of "feeling" the "observer" or "the observed".

It would be expected that asymmetry in feedback availability would affect "audiences" and "performers" differentially, the performers being more dependent on feedback. This effect was demonstrated indirectly by the experiment of Argyle, Lalljee and Cook (1968) described above; where one member of a dyad could see the other, but not vice-versa, it was found that females were more uncomfortable when no visual feedback was available to them, than males. If women are more "used" to feeling the "observed" rather than the "observer", then they would be expected to be relatively dependent on information from another about the effectiveness of their social performance, and thus be uncomfortable when such feedback were removed.

Apart from these hypothesised sex and age effects, there are other factors which might reasonably be expected to affect whether one individual rather than his interactive partner feels observed rather than observer in a dyadic encounter. Some Formal Role expectations, for example those concerning behaviour appropriate to interviewees, involve appraisal and observation. Thus an interviewee would be expected to feel that he is observed (a performer) during an interview.

Further, physical characteristics of a situation might be expected to influence such subjective feelings. Unequal visibility of dyadic partners, due to the presence of a one-way screen (as in Argyle et al's (1968) experiment), or unequal illumination, for example, might affect whether or not people feel observed.

Feeling observed or observer might well be affected by the feedback-providing behaviour of the other member of a dyad. Alternatively, once

the initial establishment of the informal role relationship has been achieved, the broad standpoints of "performer" and "audience" might be maintained regardless of specific behaviour during the encounter, unless the informal role relationship were re-established and modified for other reasons.

That "feeling observed" is a dimension of an individual's subjective experience of social behaviour is demonstrated by spontaneous reference to such feelings. Argyle and the present author (1969), in introducing some of the experiments to be described in Chapter Five cite reports by Sartre (1943), and Laing (1960) who refers to people who always feel excessively observed. Over the majority of encounters in which they participate, people may find themselves adopting a relatively performer or audience standpoint, so that they might characterise themselves as, in general, "performers" or "audiences". Such a tendency would be expected, since, as "performer" or "audience" might be woven into the content of many role-identities, then (in spite of the relative temporal variation in the salience and predominance of different role-identities), individuals would not be expected to have "performer role-identities" and "audience role-identities" in equal number.

The performer-audience aspect of a role-identity might be viewed as "superordinate" to other aspects of specific content, and might be implicated in the vulnerability and, possibly, the predominance of a role-identity. A role-identity would be expected to acquire its "audience" or "performer" characteristic from the nature of the informal role relationships in which its contents were initially arranged; the formation of a role-identity itself is described by McCall and Simmons (1966) as the outcome of the performer aspect of the self being monitored by the audience aspect, so that a role-identity, as part of the self-system, is derived from, and concerned with, performance.

To summarise, subjective feelings of being the "observer" or the "observed" in a dyadic encounter may depend on the age and sex of the

other, relative to those of the person experiencing such feelings. The constraints on behaviour implied by formal Role categories and features of the physical context of the encounter may, similarly, affect whether or not people feel "observed". It must be ascertained whether such "observer-observed" feelings are based on a realistic appraisal of the "feedback-giving" behaviour of a dyadic partner or not, and whether individuals differ in terms of their tendency to feel the observer or the observed in the majority of encounters.

While little empirical work has examined directly the performer-audience nature of dyadic encounters, some discussion has been offered which may be relevant to this conceptualisation. Turner (1956) has described six "standpoints" which one member of a dyad may adopt toward the other and which may bear some relation to the degree to which an interactant may be viewed as performer or audience. Goffman (1957) describes ways in which the "ideal state" for dyadic interaction, called by him "conjoint spontaneous involvement", may commonly fail to be achieved. Conjoint spontaneous involvement occurs when full attention is given, by all participants in an encounter, to the topic of the conversation. An individual may become "alienated" from the interaction in various ways.

"External preoccupation" occurs when a person attends to something external to the encounter instead of to topic or partner, such failure to behave as an "audience" being resented. Alternatively, the interactant may be "self-conscious", attending primarily to himself as performer. This is likely to occur when "definition of self" is threatened and may be expressed as embarrassment. "Interaction consciousness" concerns the case where the person becomes "...consciously concerned... with the way in which the interaction, qua interaction, is proceeding..." (Goffman, 1957, p.50), that is, where an individual is too much an audience to the whole "performer-audience" scenario. Here Goffman's discussion provides some support for the hypothesis that people may be aware of

performer-audience imbalance at certain points in encounters, and accords with Harré and Secord's (1972) view that people are indeed able to "monitor their monitoring".

The last form of "alienation" which Goffman (1957) refers to, is "other-consciousness", where another's behaviour may distract the interactant from the topic, and "affectation and insincerity" may be imputed to the distractant, since the latter seems overly concerned with the impression he is making on the perceiver; the perceiver might be viewed as being "cast" into the audience position by the distractant's self-presentation behaviour. A further source of such "other-consciousness" may be some vocal impediment or facial disfigurement of the distractant; the listener must attend to the speech and facial area of the other and may be distracted from the content of communication by "peculiarities" of the medium.

It was noted earlier that one of the reasons why people do not look at each other continually during an encounter, may be that looking might be distracting to the task of performing. The distraction described by Goffman might indeed be expected to interfere also with the perceiver's performance capacity, insofar as attention to the medium may interfere with reception of visual feedback at points in the encounter when the distractant is in a relatively audience position.

Goffman's (1957) account of "alienation in interaction" is interesting in that he refers to instances where either the interactant is aware that he is "distracted" from the content of the encounter (and this awareness disturbs his interactive behaviour), or his distraction is noticed by others and they behave in such a way as to return him to his "proper" focus of attention. His examples indicate that people may become conscious of their interactive behaviour (qua interactants) and of the interaction (qua interaction). It seems that "alienation" in general is often experienced as either being "manipulated" by others,

"manipulating" others, or feeling very "objective" toward others,

and that this experience is frequently phenomenally represented in terms of feeling the "observed" or the "observer", respectively. Since Goffman notes that, with the exception of self-consciousness, "...we do not have common-sense words to refer to these other kinds of improper involvement" (Goffman, 1957, p.50); it may be appropriate to begin investigation of such experiences of "alienation from interaction" in "observer-observed" terms.

It should perhaps be noted here that Goffman's (1957) distinction between focus on content and focus on self, other, or interaction, is not quite in accord with the improvisational view described in Chapter One. It was argued that "content", and "structural" (informal role relationship) features of an encounter, far from being distinct, are powerfully interdependent. Rather than, as Goffman's view suggests, "alienation" occurring in interaction as a result of a change in focus, it is more sensible to view the alienated interactant becoming aware of foci of attention (such as the self, the other, or the interaction) which he does not usually have to monitor at an entirely conscious level. If the dyad is viewed as a feedback system, then "equilibrium" is tenable by virtue of the cues (predominantly nonverbal) exchanged by dyadic partners at a relatively "automatic" level, as the description of Argyle's (1967, 1969) model in Chapter One suggested. Awareness of these usually "automatic" processes and its representation in subjective feelings such as "discomfort", "alienation", or being overly "observer" or "observed", may be viewed as an extreme form of positive feedback into the system.

6. Summary

The implications of viewing the dyad as a feedback system comparable to a performer-audience pair were discussed in this chapter. The analogy between a theatrical performance before an audience and social life was found to be satisfactory in application to some features of social behaviour.

Perceived coherence in the social behaviour of an individual was proposed as being based on his awareness or anticipation of audience appraisal. Non-participant audiences may come to exert a directive effect on performance by virtue of their "internalisation" by social actors. "Internalisation" was discussed in relation to both the notion of reference groups, and the proposal that an individual's "self" comprises both a performer aspect and an audience aspect which continually monitors the behaviour of the performer aspect. It was suggested that standards embodied in the audience aspect of the self were most importantly derived from continuous feedback experienced in dyadic encounters.

Justification for viewing dyadic interaction as a performer-audience relationship was proposed as lying in the capacity for ego to employ information from alter's behaviour as "feedback" about the effectiveness of his own behaviour. Argyle's (1967, 1969) use of the feedback concept and empirical studies supporting his view were described. The variety of feedback and other functions of gaze behaviour were discussed. Viewing the dyad as performer and audience may imply a "reversible perspective"; at any point in time one member is likely to be performing (uttering) while the other is audience (listening and looking), but the improvisational view, that each is simultaneously performer and audience to the other, was preferred and Watzlawick et al's (1968) sophisticated application of the feedback concept to social interaction was cited in illustration of this view.

It was proposed that the majority of encounters evidence a "division of labour" in terms of performer or audience activity ("averaged" over all behaviour within an encounter), and that this may be an important dimension of informal role relationships, and as such, open to negotiation throughout an encounter. Sources of performer-audience imbalance within the constraints governing encounters were proposed. These included cultural norms specifying behaviour appropriate

to people of different ages and sex vis à vis each other, physical characteristics of the situation, formal Role prescriptions pertinent to the informal role relationship and feedback-providing behaviour of the interactants. It was suggested that the experience of such performer-audience imbalance was likely to be phenomenologically represented in terms of feeling "observer" or "observed", and that some people may tend to feel predominantly more observed (performer) or observer (audience) over the majority of encounters. Finally, it was noted that awareness of performer-audience imbalance was exemplified by instances of "alienation from interaction" described by Goffman (1957).

Corollaries to the theatrical distinction between performer and audience have been noted at various levels of social life. Relationships between the individual and the group, between the individual and his dyadic partners, and between the two aspects of the self, may be described in "performer-audience" terms. While performer-audience imbalance in encounters may emerge as an aspect of the informal role relationship, and be susceptible to prior specification (recognised as pertinent by interactants) in terms of formal Role prescriptions and ascribed characteristics of individuals, people may evidence tendencies to feel in general the observer or the observed.

To propose a performer-audience dimension as characteristic of role relationships and as a dimension of individual difference has the advantage that here the focus may be shifted to differences between people, as individuals, which are conceptually related to the differences which might be expected to be shown between people in their social behaviour.

The distinction between performer and audience aspects of the social behaviour of an individual parallels discussion of attribution and alter-casting behaviour of people (qua audiences) and of improvisation and performance behaviour of people (qua performers) which follows in Chapters Three and Four.

CHAPTER THREE

The Attribution of Informal Role

1. Introduction

The "audience" activity of a member of an interacting dyad may be viewed as directed toward the behaviour of his partner, toward his own behaviour and toward the interaction as a whole, and judgements involved in such activity, as directed toward modification in these "objects" of attention, via performance. The cognitive process of "imputation", proposed by McCall and Simmons (1966) is immediately identifiable as audience activity directed by ego toward alter's behaviour, and insofar as alter's behaviour (viewed by ego as a source of altercasting cues) reflects alter's interpretation of ego's behaviour, ego's imputation of a role to alter allows inference about the effectiveness of his own performance.

Similarly, since the role relationship must achieve some degree of complementarity, imputation of role to alter implies also the "definition of the situation" for the dyad as a whole. The latter case is distinguished as being at the "monitoring of the monitoring" level of audience activity discussed in the previous chapter. The distinction between audience activity involved in imputing a role to alter, and that required for the monitoring of the effectiveness of one's own behaviour is incomplete; according to McCall and Simmons' (1966) model and the improvisational view adopted here, the relationship between ego's imputation of a role to alter and his improvisation of his own role is intimate; imputation is viewed as being not an end in itself, but as a necessary process by which ego's behaviour is rendered "interactive" rather than simply "reactive". Ego improvises his performance according to his anticipation of alter's reactions to it, that is, he performs not simply as directed by his own lines of action, but according to how he believes that he may best achieve these in interaction with this alter.

A distinction may of course be made between the covert cognitive processes involved in imputation, and the overt expression of the "products" of these processes in performance. Role Theorists have similarly contrasted Role perception and Role performance, but just as their interpretation of the dramaturgical analogy views Role performance as conformity to a script, so Role perception is seen as simply a matter of identifying alter's Role according to the "shared meanings" of a number of salient cues. Such identification then allows ego to "locate" himself in the complementary social position, and performance consists in performing the behaviour appropriate to occupancy of that position.

The notion of improvisation, as allowing creativity, choice, and the attainment of both members' particular goals in interactive behaviour is absent in the Formal Role Theory view. In the latter, the interpretation of alter's behaviour need not proceed beyond an initial identification of Role sufficient for ego to locate himself.

In this chapter, some proposals will be ventured concerning the likely nature of the imputation (or "attribution") process. In Chapter One, it was asserted that interpreting activity directed toward alter's behaviour by ego was continuous throughout an encounter, and that "attribution" was a more appropriate term for such activity. This argument will be elaborated here, and then the three "clues" offered by McCall and Simmons (1966) with regard to these interpretative activities, that they involve "anticipatory categorization" and "role-taking", and that judgements are likely to be "based in consensus" will be followed. Reference to empirical work in the areas of "person perception" and the "interpretation of emotional expression" will be referred to, as well as that purportedly concerned with "Role perception".

2. Attribution as continuous interpretative activity

As noted in Chapter One, it has been argued, for example by Weinstein and Deuschberger (1964) and Ball (1972), that the informal

role relationship (or the "definition of the situation") must be viewed as emergent rather than as determined by an initial and finite stage of an encounter. At the same time it was admitted, with regard to the cognitive and expressive processes delineated by McCall and Simmons, that it is likely that the early stages of an encounter may be distinguished from later stages on a variety of grounds.

If interactants are ever consciously aware of their improvisation and attributive activities, this seems more likely to be the case during the early stages of an encounter. The parallel demonstrated in Chapter One between the Exchange Theory notion of "exploration of the outcome matrix", Argyle's (1967, 1969) "equilibrium" concept, and McCall and Simmons' "working agreement" model, demands acknowledgement of the assumption that early stages of encounters involve recognition of, and negotiation about, the constraints within which the role relationship is to emerge. Such constraints are open to redefinition during an encounter, but, in general, constitute a framework within which the role relationship may be elaborated.

This initial setting of a framework for interaction must involve the judgement by ego of alter's early performance of his preferred informal role ("self-presentation"), and it might be argued that while such a judgement may recur at points during an encounter, it is unnecessary to propose attribution as a continual process. This view may be examined by reference to the presumed functions of attribution and the possible objects of attention to which ego's interpretative activities may be directed.

In the improvisational view, ego must initially make some judgement of the lines of action of alter and of the means by which alter hopes to achieve these, that is, he must interpret alter's initial self-presentation as predictive of the informal role relationship which alter hopes will be achieved. If alter's preferred informal role "suits" ego, ego may improvise and perform the informal role complementary to that attri-

buted to alter. Alter may then attribute to ego the role complementary to that which he (alter) has performed and the role relationship may be viewed as temporarily "fixed".

There are at least three alternatives to this "ideal" development. Ego may reject the role complementary to that which he (accurately) attributes to alter, and perform either his preferred informal role or a role constituting some compromise between this and that complementary to alter's. Secondly, ego may perform the role complementary to that attributed to alter, but be mistaken in his attribution. Alternatively, ego may lack confidence in his initial attribution and may improvise his own role in an informatively (to alter) tentative fashion.

In these cases alter's response to ego's performance must depend upon his interpretation of ego's deviation from the role which he (alter) prefers him to perform; is alter to construe ego's performance as rejection or as misinterpretation, and in the latter case, is it ego's attributive powers or alter's expressive abilities that are at fault? While only a certain degree of complementarity (or matching) between informal roles performed by dyadic partners may be required for the effective conduct of an encounter, still it must be acknowledged that for the majority of interactions, initial "imputation" is a tentative and preliminary activity rather than an arrival at a final "definition" of the relationship.

What may be less tentative than the initial attribution of informal role, with its attendant prediction of behaviour during the encounter, is the initial attribution or imputation of "character" to alter. As noted in Chapter One, a distinction may be made between the "definition" of alter qua "character" and the "definition" of alter vis à vis ego, that is, of alter as performer of an informal role. The stylistic features of alter's behaviour, the adverbs which are likely to qualify all his behaviour in an encounter, were regarded as lending coherence to a role performance, and to be less negotiable and to have fewer

implications for the emergent role relationship than those features of behaviour which were truly interactive.

Insofar as such stylistic features constitute broad constraints on the likely activities which the character portrayed by alter will perform, then imputation of character would be important in the early stages of an encounter. "Character" still constitutes a "set" of "qualifiers", to be distinguished from other "sets" which may be included in a person's repertoire, so that the assertion that "perception of personality" should be demanded of a perceiver only after experience of the perceived person in a variety of informal role relationships, is maintained. Imputation of character and maintenance of character by stylistic coherence throughout an encounter neither excludes a considerable degree of variation in the performance of that character, nor in the quality, and refinement, of early attributions of informal role, during subsequent interaction.

At this point it is worth considering what ego and alter may view as the object of their inferential activity with regard to the behaviour of the other. So far, imputation of "character" and tentative attribution of informal role, that is, "who" each other is and who each other is vis à vis the self, have been identified as foci of attention, and judgements of each, reflected in the expressive behaviour of the "judge" toward the "judged", may thereby serve to legitimate those social- and role-identities which the "judged" incorporates into his performance. These "dramaturgical" foci of attention may well be phenomenally represented for ego and alter as "personality", but this is an assumption rather than an empirically supported assertion.

The improvisational view implies that social behaviour is modified for the most part in accordance with other people's behaviour toward one; this view may be common amongst "naive" social actors. Phrases such as: "I speak as I find", are often given in qualification of "judgements" of others, and "assumptions of personal consistency", which Gergen (1968)

maintains are prevalent in our culture, may reflect experience of internally consistent informal role performances from others (which would be expected in the dramaturgical view). Turner (1962) notes that when people judge another's behaviour as "consistent", they: "...often violate logical criteria for consistency...the folk basis for these judgements is the subsumability of a person's behaviour under a single role" (Turner, 1962, p.24).

Empirical studies undertaken in order to assess the way in which people make judgements of each other often require generalisations about the future behaviour of a person on the basis of absurdly little information about him, thus belying the function which such judgements are presumed to serve; the prediction of the person's behaviour toward the perceiver. Such predictions require attribution of the perceived person's informal role vis à vis the perceiver. It is argued here that while a person may say that he is judging the other's "personality" he is actually attempting a role attribution, that this is what he needs to do in order to anticipate the other's behaviour, and that "perception of personality" properly requires experience of a person's behaviour in a number of role relationships, whereby predictions of behaviour beyond the context of the present relationship between perceiver and perceived may reasonably be attempted.

This point, made frequently in discussion of the "person perception" process, for example by Tagiuri (1969), has failed to be recognised in empirical studies in this area, and also in that concerning the judgement of emotional expression. Judges have been asked to interpret another's behaviour in terms of what it means when performed by people in general or by that person in particular, rather than what it means when expressed toward the judge by people in general, or expressed toward the judge performing an informal role by a particular person performing the complementary role. Taking into account some of these objections to the traditional "person perception" study, McHenry (1971) has proposed the task

appropriate for assessing people's skills in interpreting the behaviour of others, and it is hardly surprising that such a task involves essentially what is being described here as judgements made on the basis of the attribution of informal role.

3. Attribution as hypothesis-testing

The notion that attribution of an informal role to alter by ego constitutes a framework within which alter's particular acts may be interpreted, and that these interpretations may then serve to qualify the attribution, is compatible with the analogy frequently drawn between "person perception processes" and hypothesis-testing activity in general. McCall and Simmons (1966) themselves introduce this analogy by citing Bruner, Goodnow and Austin's (1965) notion of "anticipatory categorization" as descriptive of the initial imputation of character and role to alter.

Bruner et al's (1965) analysis of the ways in which "conjunctive concepts" (concepts which are defined by the joint presence of several attributes) are formed, involves the proposal of one kind of effective strategy in the reception of new information so as to refine the initial hypothesis about the concept, which is comparable to the view of attribution of role as a continual cognitive process.

This "focussing strategy" requires that each new instance of the concept (activity of alter) be assessed in terms of its compatibility with the hypothesis already formed (attribution of role); where the instance is compatible with the hypothesis it serves to support it, but where it is not, then the hypothesis must be modified with regard to that particular attribute to which the instance pertains. The hypothesis thus acts as a coherent summary of all previous instances, and this strategy: "...reduces strain on the subject's powers of memory and inferences to a minimum" (Thomson, 1964, p.75).

Kelly's (1955), view of human behaviour as directed toward the validation or evaluation of hypotheses in an active sense, rather than in the passive "reception of information" sense described above, would allow the

proposition that in social interaction, some behaviour may well involve active exploration, via expressive behaviour, intended to allow closer definition of the lines of action of interactive partners.

The kinds of concept formation investigated by Bruner et al (1965) are in many ways simpler than the attributive process would demand, but the analogy does allow the assertion that storage of information about alter's previous behaviour, such that some degree of prediction about his future behaviour may be made, would be best achieved by attributing a role to alter, this role hypothesis serving to summarise all that was coherent (of a stochastic nature) in alter's behaviour, and further, how the attribution itself might be modified when necessary, without loss of all past useful information. The role attribution as summary serves as a "standard" for the evaluation of specific acts, and at the same time is open to modification when the interpretation of a particular act so demands.

There is an important sense here in which the attribution of role does not correspond to the formation of a concept; in the latter case, there is presumed to be a "correct" concept which may be achieved, whereas in role attribution, the role itself may change during the course of an encounter. The further and important inadequacy of the "concept formation by hypothesis-testing" analogy with the attribution process is that, in interaction, alter's behaviour is partially contingent on ego's, and this aspect of role concepts is not dealt with in the simple hypothesis-testing model.

If the hypothesis-testing analogy were to be pursued, a distinction should perhaps be made between "validation" and "evaluation" of hypotheses. Validation, directed toward the confirmation of views, might be characteristic of efforts in attribution (expressed as altercasting) to maintain the informal role relationship. In contrast, evaluation, an exploratory assessment of possible interpretations of alter's behaviour, might be characteristic of a desire to elaborate and modify the relationship.

Weinstein and Deuschberger (1963) propose that the "degrees of freedom" which ego allows alter (the range of behaviour made available to alter) may be one dimension of altercasting; these "degrees" might be related to whether ego is employing validational or evaluational strategies.

That, at any point in time, the past behaviour of alter and ego may be conveniently construed as (tentative) concepts by ego, and that role concepts are the most convenient framework for the interpretation of present acts, has been argued by Turner (1962), who describes the processes necessary for such interpretation as "role-taking". Turner's (1962) analysis of the role-taking process is that alluded to by McCall and Simmons (1966) in offering "role-taking" as the second "clue" to the attributive activity of interacting partners.

4. Attribution and role-taking

Concise definitions of role-taking behaviour, or rather the "cognitive process of role-taking" are not available in the literature employing this term; the process referred to is complex, and may best be defined at this stage by discussion of what the process must achieve. Considerable difficulties have arisen in the past use of the term; "taking the role of the other" was viewed by Mead (1970) as a "core process" in interaction, but with the abbreviation of the term to "role-taking" has been associated a curtailment of the value of the concept designated.

Some accounts (for example those of Sarbin (1943) and McClelland (1951), use "role-taking" to refer both to covert processes involved in the interpretation of behaviour and to overt performance, and, in spite of Coutu's (1951) argument that "role-taking" should refer only to the way in which a person is able to understand another's "point of view", the term has still been used in association with enactment (for example, by Mann and Mann, 1959). Following an undefended assumption that role-taking allows accurate prediction of another's behaviour, even where no interaction between "perceiver" and "perceived" occurs, the term is frequently employed to refer to the presumed "product" of "role-taking",

"person perception ability" or "insight", for example by Helfand (1956).

Since Turner (1962) is responsible for stating that what must be "taken" in order to effectively interpret and anticipate the behaviour of an interactive partner in his "role", it would be convenient to adopt Turner's analysis of the role-taking process here. However, while asserting that: "Role-taking involves selective perception of the actions of another..., organized about some purpose or sentiment attributed to the other" (Turner, 1962, p.28), and "...shifts emphasis away from the simple process of enacting a prescribed role to devising a performance on the basis of an imputed other-role" (Turner, 1962, p.23), no formal definition is given in terms of what, in detail, such a process should achieve.

Rather, six different kinds of role-taking are proposed (Turner, 1956), which are better viewed as different applications of the basic process rather than as essentially different processes in themselves. Turner "assumes" attribution of role to have taken place and regards role-taking as the means by which particular acts are interpreted within the framework of the attributed role. This follows the argument given in the previous section, with the proviso that role-taking may be viewed as intimately involved in the attribution process (as continual process) once an initial categorisation or imputation of alter's role has been given; the interpretation of acts within a role context which this role-taking process affords, serves to qualify the attribution itself. Turner's (1956, 1962) view of role-taking does emphasise the purpose to which interpretations of a person's interactive behaviour are presumed to be put; the anticipation of the person's future behaviour so that an appropriate performance may be improvised by his interactive partner.

The delineation of the cognitive processes of interpretation and decision necessary for effective social interaction given in Chapter One involved four essential features. Firstly, ego must interpret alter's present behaviour in the light of all alter's previous behaviour; as suggested above, viewing alter's behaviour in the context of a role attri-

buted to him, in a manner resembling hypothesis-testing toward concept formation, would achieve this end. Secondly, ego must take account of the fact that alter's previous actions were contingent on those performed by himself; again, the attributed role as framework for particular acts incorporates this aspect of the process, since the attribution of role will involve the relational features of alter's previous acts in a general way.

Thirdly, in order to elaborate the relational features of alter's behaviour just mentioned, ego must take account of the detail of his own past behaviour; in attributing a role to himself, ego is aided by the knowledge of what his lines of action are, but he must monitor his means of achieving them, since these, whatever his initial intentions might have been, are likely to be modified by alter's behaviour towards him during the past stages of the encounter. It is perhaps wise, for this reason, to note the full Meadian term of "taking the role of the other toward the self"; it is alter's behaviour vis à vis ego that is important for ego to interpret correctly, and he is likely to be able to do so only if he takes account of alter's interpretation of his (ego's) behaviour.

It is on the basis of such recognition of alter's "point of view" that the final requirement for interaction, of employing the information, so gained, in order to anticipate alter's likely interpretation of a number of alternative acts which it would be possible for ego to perform, that ego decides which act to perform. In this sense Turner (1962) remarks that role-taking also constitutes "role-making".

Where Turner's (1956) view differs from that proposed here, is in asserting that role-taking may be achieved by the adoption of different kinds of standpoint toward alter. In essence, the different standpoints proposed are different ways in which interpretations of alter's behaviour may be related to ego's improvised performance. For example, where ego adopts alter's viewpoint "as his own" his interpretation of alter's behaviour will directly determine his improvisation; he will disregard his

own lines of action and follow the "casting" of alter.

This use of the general role-taking process is interesting in that it corresponds broadly to the behaviour involved in "empathy", a term frequently equated with "role-taking", for example by Dymond (1948). "Empathy", defined as: "...the imaginative transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling, and acting of another" (Dymond, 1950, p.343), is particularly associated with the experience of "feeling" the emotions expressed by another. It seems likely that such experience depends on the general process of taking the role of the other toward oneself, but is further characterised by distinctive features involving affective responses, such as the definition of one's own emotional experience by reference to the expressions of others (see Schachter and Singer, 1962), or of one's beliefs by reference to the "rational" meaning of one's evoked actions (see Bem, 1967).

Thus the role-taking process does not, as Coutu (1951) suggests, have to be "suspended" where ego wishes to pursue his own lines of action, since "the product" of role-taking, the effective anticipation of alter's response to ego's intended actions, only involves the adoption of alter's standpoint as directive of his own behaviour in certain instances; anticipation of the enemy's strategy subsequent to an intended strategy by an ally, hardly necessitates the adoption of the enemy's strategy toward the ally. On the other hand, strategies which fail to consider the enemy's likely response are unlikely to be effective.

To summarise, following an initial imputation of character and tentative attribution of role to alter, each of alter's acts is interpreted by ego within the context of the attributed role. Since the role relationship is emergent, each interpretation of an act (or series of acts) may lead to modification of the role attribution itself, so that the attribution serves as a summary of all that is coherent in the past behaviour of alter. Since alter's behaviour is coherent, not only in that it evolves around some lines of action, but also in that it is interrelated

with another coherent system (ego's role performance), the attribution serves as a summary of ego's performance also. If the role attribution is modified as the encounter proceeds, then, at any point, the present attribution serves as the best possible context for the interpretation of the present acts of alter.

The analogy between concept formation and attribution of role serves to demonstrate how the attribution may serve both a summarising and a predictive function, and thereby, how attribution is linked to improvisation. Effective attribution thus satisfies the requirements for processes of interpretation necessary for effective dyadic interaction, those of interpreting alter's behaviour as contingent on ego's own performance; attribution of role to alter implies attribution of role relationship to the dyad.

Since ego's attributions may be inferred by alter when he views ego's performance as "altercasting", they may serve not only as predictors of alter's behaviour to aid ego in his improvisation, but may partially determine alter's reception of ego's performance also. The role-taking process as described above similarly involves attribution as directed toward improvisation, and it is proposed that, to the extent that ego takes alter's role toward himself in interaction, the more effective will be his attribution of role to alter and his improvisation of his own performance vis à vis alter.

The test of this proposal demands a measure of role-taking ability which is independent of its implications for attribution and improvisation in interaction. Such a measure has been offered by Feffer (1959) who has arrived at a conceptualisation of the role-taking process compatible with that described above, and has empirically demonstrated that this ability is associated with effective "interactive" behaviour.

Interpreting Mead (1970) as asserting that: "...taking the role of the other constitutes the very fabric of formal logical thought" (Feffer and Gourevitch, 1960, p.393), Feffer (1959) regards role-taking as a

process involving the interpretation of another's behaviour so as to anticipate his future reactions, and treats role-taking as an essentially cognitive activity. Feffer refers extensively to Piaget's (1950) framework for the discussion of cognitive development: "...cognitive processes are viewed as reflecting greater maturity and adaptiveness to the degree that immediate sense impressions are subordinated to thought in organizing experience. In particular, Piaget sharply contrasts perception and thought in terms of decentering activity. He advances the notion that distortion is inherent in the act of focusing or centering upon a given aspect of the perceptual field. Although the successive distortions involved in decentering (shifting focus from one part of the perceptual field to another) serve to correct or balance each other, the correction of distortion is only partial due to the sequential nature of the centrations. Mature ideation or thought, however, allows for a much more thorough correction of the distortion inherent in any given focus by enabling the individual to consider a number of aspects of a situation in relation to each other at the same time, that is, simultaneous decentering." (Feffer and Suchotliff, 1966, p.415).

Feffer (1959) illustrates Piaget's (1950) use of the decentering concept by describing a typical "conservation" experiment, "conservation" requiring the integration of more than one principle relating physical appearances (for example height and width) to an abstract quality (such as volume). He extends the decentering notion to social interaction as follows: "The dovetailing of responses involved in effective social interaction requires that each participating individual modify his intended behavior in the light of his anticipation of the other's reaction to this behavior. In order to accurately anticipate this reaction, one must be able to view his intended behavior from the perspective of the other. Modifying one's behavior in the light of this anticipation further requires that one must also view the intended action from his own perspective at the same time. The cognitive organization of the individual capable of

effective social interaction can, accordingly, be interpreted as one in which different viewpoints are considered simultaneously in relation to each other such that the distortion engendered by a given perspective or centering is equilibrated or corrected by another perspective. In contrast, individuals who are only able to focus sequentially upon their behavior from a single viewpoint at a time should have difficulty in appropriately modifying their responses in such a situation" (Feffer and Suchotliff, 1966, pp. 415-416).

Feffer's description of the role-taking process has been quoted extensively since it corresponds so well with the view of role-taking as a cognitive process essential to effective interactive behaviour, proposed above. That Piaget's view of the relationship between "perception" and "cognition" may be more appropriately regarded as illuminating rather than strictly descriptive of perceptual mechanisms, need not affect the value of accepting here the links provided by Feffer's (1959) analysis of the role-taking process with a body of theory and research about the development of cognition in general.

Feffer's view is particularly compatible with that derived here, in that he views role-taking as a continuous process, not, as Coutu (1951) and Turner (1956) suggest at some points in their discussion, a "temporary hold-up" in the interaction process, nor as requiring a rapid alternation between consideration of various aspects of the process. An individual whose role-taking did proceed in an alternating fashion would, in Feffer's view, be sequentially decentering. What, in temporal terms, constitutes simultaneous as against sequential activity, is axiomatic, but Feffer's emphasis is important in that, as he proposes later (1970), there is considerable parallel between Piagetian theory and Ash^C's (1952) Gestalt view of social behaviour as based in complementary relations between people, a view also essential to the notion of role-taking developed here.

Following his description of role-taking, Feffer (1959) designed a projective task (the "RTT") in order to measure an individual's role-taking ability. The test involves presentation of TAT cards showing ambiguous interpersonal scenes; a person is asked to describe the action occurring in a particular scene and, then, to retell his story from the point of view of each of the characters illustrated, in turn. The various accounts are compared in order to assess the person's "structuring of interpersonal content", and his performance is evaluated in terms of the degree to which he can refocus on his initial story from the point of view of the various characters, and at the same time maintain continuity between the different versions. The categories used to score the stories are ordered with regard to the number and subtlety of attributes coordinated from different viewpoints.

Feffer (1959) evaluated the RTT as a means of assessing level of cognitive development (in terms of degree of balanced decentering manifested), by comparing RTT performance with independent evaluations of level of cognitive development shown in Rorschach responses (employing the method of Phillips, Kaden and Waldman, 1959); the two measures were found to be positively associated. Feffer and Gourevitch (1966) found that children's RTT performance was positively related to their achievement in four Piaget tasks (where age and verbal intelligence quotient were controlled). Wolfe (1963) also reports the increasing predominance of mature decentering in the structuring of interpersonal content as a function of chronological age.

Feffer's most important hypothesis was that effective social interaction is a function of each participant's ability to consider his behaviour from more than one perspective simultaneously. Feffer and Suchotliff (1966) paired 36 adults into "good" and "bad" role-taking dyads on the basis of member's RTT performances. A task described as a simile to social interaction was performed by each dyad; each member of the dyad was required to communicate test words via one-word association clues to

his partner (who did not know the words).

The "good" dyads performed the task more quickly and effectively than the bad dyads, when free verbal interchange was allowed, but not when, in a "silent" condition, the donor of the clues did not receive information about the nature of the recipient's response but only about whether it was correct or not. Later studies showed that the degree of success attained in the password task was not established by the first clue given, that is, that anticipation of the other's response must be based on previous information embodied in his past responses (Phillips and Feffer, 1966). Also, the organisation of the initial TAT story in the RTT was found to manifest a similar level of decentering as that of later stories (Feffer and Jahelka, 1968).

Feffer (1959) "assumes" attribution of the role of alter, that is, he focuses on the process whereby information contained in alter's present behaviour is integrated with that derived from actions performed previously by alter and ego vis à vis each other, rather than on the interpretation of alter's behaviour in the first place. However, his view of this role-taking process, and his development of a measure of the degree to which a person may exhibit the ability involved, is appropriate to the investigation of the hypothesised relationship between role-taking ability and effective attribution of role to alter.

The RTT does not involve attribution of role to an alter who is presently interacting with ego but, rather, the attribution of role to an alter who is viewed as interacting with a performer to whom a complementary role has been assigned by ego, and whose role ego is also "taking" vis à vis alter. It seems likely that the interpretation of an alter's social behaviour, where alter is interacting with someone other than ego, may depend on ego taking the role of alter toward his interactive partner "X". That is, in this situation ego must attribute a role to alter, interpret alter's behaviour in the context of that attributed role, and interpret X's behaviour in the context of the complementary attributed role.

This task might appear more complex than that involved in taking the role of an alter in interaction with ego. However, while more complex in the sense that X's lines of action, as well as alter's, must be inferred rather than simply monitored, an "objective" ego need not be involved in improvising and enacting his own performance, but simply in anticipating the behaviour of alter and X and checking his anticipations by observation of their behaviour.

In the improvisational view, it should be possible to take alter's role vis à vis that of X in order to anticipate X's behaviour the more readily, since alter's behaviour serves not only to express his own role but, viewed as altercasting behaviour, his attribution of role to X also. While the content of X's performance need not be expected to be directly inferrable from observation of alter's behaviour, characteristic features of the role relationship between alter and X should be. It is therefore proposed that alter's or X's role might be attributed effectively on the basis of observation of either alter's or X's performance alone, if the observing ego takes the role of alter toward the absent X (or vice-versa).

There might of course be points in encounters when alter's behaviour (viewed as altercasting X) did not reflect alter's attribution of role to X but rather, the role alter wished X to perform. Few encounters would be expected to be characterised entirely by such disjuncture between attribution and performance, so that an observer should usually, by continuous role-taking, be able to "make sense" of such instances.

The description of attribution and the role-taking process has been of an "ideal" achievement by ego and alter, wherein both accurately attribute roles to each other, modifying their attributions in accordance with the development of the relationship, and maintaining an "accurate" conceptualisation of each other's perspectives vis à vis their mutual behaviour, so as to effectively anticipate each other's behaviour and improvise their performances. Since role-taking ability is proposed to vary amongst people, and a variety of circumstances might render the application of a

sophisticated level of role-taking ability more or less effective in allowing accurate attribution and appropriate improvisation, it is likely that the majority of everyday encounters will not resemble the "ideal state" of interaction.

Kelly (1970) has described an extreme instance of failure to attribute and improvise appropriately: "I have seen a person play a role, and do it most effectively - even in a manner quite acceptable to his colleagues - when he grossly misperceived their outlooks, and they knew it. But because he did what he did on the basis of what he thought they understood, not merely on the basis of their overt acts, he was able to play a collaborative role in a social process whose experiential cycle led them all somewhere" (Kelly, 1970, p.24).

If this minimal effort to take the roles of others is not made, Kelly (1970) suggests, all that is possible is simple observation of the others' behaviour. This minimal degree of role-taking may involve simply the adoption of the standpoint vis à vis the other (or the self) termed by Mead that of the "generalised other". This standpoint is best interpreted here as involving viewing one's own behaviour or that of alter from the perspective of others in general, that is, according to conventional modes of expression and interpretation, rather than those appropriate to the behaviour of self or other as performers of particular roles vis à vis each other.

In the initial stages of an encounter, the attribution of a role to alter cannot depend on reference to alter's or ego's past behaviour, so that some basis for the interpretation of alter's early performance must be posited. Further, it has been argued here that, during an encounter, ego interprets alter's behaviour in the context of the role attributed to him; if attribution serves to qualify the meanings of particular acts, some basis for this initial assignment of unqualified meaning must be proposed. Taking Mead's (1970) "generalised other" standpoint literally,

McCall and Simmons' (1966) suggestion that attribution is based in "consensus" may be discussed.

5. Attribution and consensus

In order to attribute a role to alter, and bearing in mind that such attribution serves as context for the interpretation of particular acts (or series of acts), such that alter's behaviour vis à vis ego may be anticipated, ego must focus on those aspects of alter's expressive behaviour which carry information about the role relationship as viewed from alter's perspective. While aspects of the content of alter's utterances (such as choice of words) may be informative in this sense, it has been suggested, for example by Argyle (1969), Ekman and Friesen (1968), and Watzlawick et al (1968), that "the relationship language" is predominantly nonverbal, which category includes paralinguistic features of speech.

If, in the early stages of an encounter, when initial attributions of character and role to alter are being made, no past or contextual information is available to ego, then his interpretation of alter's appearance and initial acts may be presumed to be based on his knowledge of what such cues mean when expressed by people in general, and this knowledge is likely to be shared by other members of ego's group. Since interpretation of alter's behaviour, insofar as it may be predictive of alter's future interactive behaviour, demands a minimal degree of role-taking, as suggested above, then by taking the role of the generalised other toward alter, ego may achieve interpretation of alter's behaviour by reference to shared or "consensual" meanings.

The later interpretation of alter's interactive behaviour, and the consequent modification of the initial attribution, was described above as involving qualification of simple interpretations of specific acts by reference to the role attribution (as summary of previous behaviour), and it is this process of qualification, such that this alter's behaviour vis à vis this ego in this encounter may be anticipated, which is achieved

by taking the role of alter toward his performance by ego. What is qualified by the "application" of this cognitive process, is the consensual, or general, meaning attributable to alter's acts, without reference to the particular interactive context in which they are expressed.

Thus attribution is viewed as based in consensus in two senses; firstly, judgements about alter's initial self-presentation behaviour may be made from the "generalised other" standpoint, and secondly, interpretations of alter's behaviour at later stages in an encounter may represent qualifications of consensual judgements, by reference to the role attributed to alter on the basis of his past behaviour in the encounter.

In encounters where the relationship between ego and alter serves primarily as a vehicle for some social contract, such that the legitimization of role-identities is not a primary concern of either party (for example a transaction between a customer and a shop-assistant), then the interpretation of alter's behaviour by ego on the basis of the consensual meanings attributable to his acts is likely to be sufficiently informative for an effective encounter to take place. Similarly, there are many encounters where crude (rather than mistaken) attribution of role will suffice, and where "taking the role of the generalised other", or fairly inefficient taking the role of the particular other, would allow a satisfactory degree of anticipation of alter's behaviour to be achieved. It seems likely that if alter is "cast" by ego into the role of a "generalised other", then unless he rejects this casting, he may well reciprocate, and the whole encounter might be regarded as to some extent "stereotyped".

For some nonverbal acts, for example facial expressions, there is considerable evidence that a majority of observers will assign the same "meaning", in terms of emotion or interpersonal attitude expressed. Ekman, Sorenson and Friesen (1969) have shown consensus across different cultural groups for expressions of "primary" emotions, and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1970, 1971) has presented evidence of similarity in expression of particular

emotions between members of different cultural groups. Whereas the facial expressions associated with particular emotions may be general across cultures, the "display rules" (Ekman, 1970) governing the appropriateness of their expression may well be culturally variable; within cultural groups different display rules may apply to different role relationships, and may prove an important feature of the way in which role attributions serve to qualify the meaning of acts.

"Naive" observers as well as researchers may interpret nonverbal behaviour by the "indicative" method (Ekman, 1968), that is, by referring to concurrent meaningful activity (Ekman, 1968), to the physical context of the acts (Frijda, 1958), or to the Formal Role applying to alter (Jones, Davis and Gergen, 1961). However, empirical studies have tended to assume the use of a "communicative" method, where reference is made to the (presumably conventional) "meanings" of isolated acts, and only a few studies (for example those of Cline, 1955 and 1964, Gollin, 1958, Argyle et al, 1970, Kelley, 1950, Warr and Knapper, 1968) have even given observers the opportunity (by presenting information about a series of alter's acts) to do otherwise. That this opportunity may be taken, such that "stereotypic" judgements are no longer made when adequate information is available, has been shown by Argyle and McHenry (1971).

Of course, where such research strategies are directed toward discovering the conventional meaning attributable to isolated acts (regardless of expressor, perceiver, or their relationship), then they may be regarded as appropriate (Davitz, 1964). If, however, the object of study is the process whereby people customarily confer meaning on nonverbal behaviour, and the correlates of their "accuracy" in so doing, research designs which render reference only to the conventional meaning of acts, the most appropriate mode of response for observers, are unlikely to be productive.

It must be admitted that the judgement of a majority of observers, as criterion for "accuracy", has tended to be adopted where no alternative

and "objective" criterion is available, and that attempts to measure predictive accuracy (where the prediction may be objectively verified) have been prone to a variety of complex methodological artifacts. These artifacts themselves have suggested a number of interpretative strategies which may be employed by judges.

Of interest here is the tendency to judge particular alters by reference to the attributes of the group of which the alters are members; if a judge is "correct" about the group attributes, and alter is a "typical" member, then the judge displays "stereotype accuracy" (Gage and Cronbach, 1955). Judges have been found to "assume similarity" with the observed alter (Cronbach, 1955), so that where they are in fact similar to alter, their judgement, by projection, will appear "accurate".

In many encounters such strategies might be effective as bases for predicting alter's behaviour, since alter might respond to ego's "casting" of him by behaving as if he were "typical" or "similar to ego". Given the frequent lack, and irrelevance, of information provided, the majority of "predictive accuracy" studies may be viewed as forcing judges to adopt such judgmental strategies, since taking the role of the (particular) other would not be feasible. Even with regard to Dymond's (1950) study of "empathy", Lindgren and Robinson (1953) note that a tendency to assume similarity would allow some judges to gain superior "insight" scores; Cook (1971) has reviewed evidence in favour of the proposition that such a tendency is characteristic of people who are themselves "conforming" in behaviour.

In empirical work on "Role perception", it is hardly surprising that a tendency to confuse conventional (majority) with "veridical" judgements has been prevalent, given the Role Theory emphasis on conformity in enactment and expression. Brown (1965) has argued that, for many encounters, person perception need only achieve the correct categorisation of alter's Role, since knowledge of the Role expectations permits prediction of alter's interactive behaviour. As argued above, this may well be the

case for some encounters, but certainly not for all. "Role perception" studies are for the most part indistinguishable from studies of the interpretation of behaviour as "emotion" or "personality"; rarely have observers been asked to suggest a role (neither on a Formal nor on an informal level) for alter.

For example, Sarbin and Hardyck's (1955) study of the interpretations ascribed to "stick figures" representing static postures (minimal information) required observers to select a label for each figure from five alternatives, four of which (given their mode of derivation) were improbable anyway, and found the distribution of responses to be "J-shaped". Since such judgements hardly constitute a "telic" or an "empirical" continuum (unlike Woodworth's, 1938, dimension of emotions expressed facially), Allport's "J-curve hypothesis" (1934, 1962) is inapplicable here, and Sarbin and Hardyck's assertions of lack of "conformance" in schizophrenic's responses to the "stick-figures test" is not defensible.

A further problem with this kind of comparative study is suggested by Krasner, Ullman and Weiss' (1964) finding that schizophrenics who score high on the paranoia scale of the MMPI tend to employ "threatening" adjectives to describe stick-figures, implying that such Person- or Role-perception tasks may be treated as projective tests by people used to such measures. Helfand (1956) conducted a similarly dubious study, comparing schizophrenic observers with "normals", which was interesting in that the former group were found to be less "conformant" in their responses than the latter, but at the same time more accurate in their prediction of the behaviour of the person being judged.

In work on the interpretation of nonverbal behaviour, little attention has been given to the relationship between "conventional" or "modal" judgement and "accurate" judgement. It would be expected, on the basis of the preceding discussion, that where alter's performance was "conventional" in expressive terms, then a valid interpretation of his behaviour (based on the attribution of role) might be arrived at by taking the role of the

generalised other toward alter. As the conventionality of performance decreases, and its degree of interdependence with ego's performance increases, the more "taking the role of alter in particular" would be necessary for effective anticipation of his behaviour and modification of the initial role attribution.

In the former case, if a majority of observers agreed in their judgments, this might be because they were all taking the role of the generalised other toward alter and interpreting his acts according to their conventional meaning. As the need for effective "taking the role of the particular other" increases in the second case, then only those observers who possessed, and applied, a sufficiently sophisticated degree of role-taking ability would arrive at effective interpretations, and such judges need not be expected to be in the majority. In such a case it would still be possible to interpret alter's behaviour from a generalised other standpoint, albeit less effectively (in terms of appropriate attribution and valid anticipation) than from a "particular other" perspective.

Since it has been suggested that for many encounters the behaviour of alters tends to be interpreted from the "generalised other" standpoint then, where some judges give effective interpretations but a majority agree in making a less effective judgement, the basis for the agreement of the latter group may be viewed as resting in reference to conventional meanings and inadequate role-taking. Even if only one judge arrives at an effective attribution and anticipation vis à vis alter (and this cannot be accounted for by chance), it seems reasonable to assign to him a superior degree of interpretative skill and to expect this to be associated with a sophisticated degree of role-taking ability.

Typically (for example, Sarbin and Williams, 1953), it is assumed that where few are "accurate" and many agree but are "inaccurate", there is something at fault with the expressive abilities of the person judged, and that the majority are in fact "accurate"; it is the experimenter's objective criterion which needs modification. It is, of course, precisely

where the person being judged departs from conventional expressive modes (which true "interaction" may be expected, to some extent, to demand), that the judge must take the role of the other in order to arrive at an effective judgement of his behaviour. Milgram (1960) found degree of "mental set shifting" to be positively associated with the ability to predict the behaviour of categories (according to group membership) of people, suggesting that judgements made according to "conventional frames of reference" do require some degree of role-taking, albeit from the "generalised other" standpoint. With this exception, no empirical work has been undertaken in test of the hypothesis that attribution of role, and interpretation of behaviour within the context of role, is related to the ability to "take the role of the other".

6. Problems of empirical study of attribution

If the function of effective attribution of role, and interpretation of particular acts, is the anticipation of alter's behaviour in order to improvise a performance vis à vis alter in an appropriate manner, then there would seem good reason for this lack of empirical study. Egos may only be compared with each other in terms of attributive ability, where they observe the same behaviour on the part of alter. The hypothesis that, in order to attribute and improvise effectively, ego must view his own behaviour from the perspective of the presently attributed role of alter, would seem difficult to test empirically; interaction between one ego and alter is, according to the improvisational view, likely to evoke different behaviour and a different role performance from alter, from that evoked by a second ego in interaction with that alter. A different degree of role-taking ability might be required with regard to the different sets of behaviour observed.

It was suggested above, however, that role-taking ability would be as necessary in interpreting the behaviour of an alter vis à vis a third party, as in an encounter where ego were actively in interaction

with alter himself. It was further argued that observation of alter's behaviour alone should be sufficient to allow interpretation of his behaviour and effective attribution of roles to alter and the third party, since alter's behaviour (viewed as altercasting) should serve to define (given sufficient information) the informal role of the person with whom he was interacting.

The advantage of requiring a number of judges to attribute roles to absent egos, with whom an observed alter interacts, is that the problem of inferring effective attribution from the verbal responses of observers would be, to a great extent, resolved. Since verbal language provides few precise and unambiguous labels descriptive of relationships at an informal level, verbal attribution of informal role would be difficult. Labels are available for certain dimensions of relationship such as intimacy and dominance, and also for characteristics of people such as those proposed in the previous chapter which, to the extent that they are recognised as such by the interactants, have powerful implications for the role relationship. There is, of course, no point in asking observers to designate such characteristics of alter's interactive partner if the partner is observable.

It is proposed that the effective performance of such a task, the attribution of role to an absent ego with whom an alter was observed interacting, would demand "taking the role of the other" ability. While initially attributing a role to alter (and reciprocally to ego) on the basis of a "generalised other" perspective, such that alter's initial acts be interpreted, subsequent interpretations and modifications of attribution would be achieved by taking alter's role vis à vis that attributed to ego. The observer following such a strategy should be able to check his attribution of roles by taking alter's role toward that of the imagined ego, and noting whether his anticipation of alter's behaviour (based on these attributions) is fulfilled during the encounter. Where his anticipations

were disconfirmed, the observer might modify his attribution accordingly.

In applying a minimal degree of role-taking, and viewing alter's behaviour from the perspective of the generalised other, observers should arrive at some degree of effective attribution of role to the imagined ego. Where alter's performance is sufficiently "conventional", such a strategy might allow the most effective attribution possible (given the constraints imposed by the means of eliciting the observer's judgement) to be made.

Demonstration that people are capable of making effective role attributions in such a task would support the view of attribution offered in this chapter, especially if more effective attributions were found to be characteristic of people with higher levels of role-taking ability. Further, the assumption that a person's performance is implicative of the role of his partner, if his expressive behaviour is viewed as "altercasting", would also be supported.

7. Summary

Attribution was described as a continuous cognitive process involving the initial interpretation of alter's self-presentation as role-performance, and the subsequent modification of this interpretation during an encounter. Ego's interpretation of alter's particular acts during interaction is included within the compass of the attribution process, since this takes place by reference to the role presently attributed to alter, and, as pertinent to alter's view of the role relationship, may lead ego to modify the attribution itself. In this way, ego's attribution of role to alter may be refined as the role relationship develops, this development involving elaboration, change, or both. That the refinement of an initial attribution during interaction allows the past behaviour of ego and alter to be summarised, so that alter's future behaviour may be anticipated by ego, was argued by comparing the role attribution to a "working hypothesis" employed in concept-formation.

McCall and Simmons' (1966) proposal that attribution involves "role-taking" was discussed by reference to the interpretative processes deemed necessary (in Chapter One) for effective interaction. The role-taking process, as conceptualised by Feffer (1959) seemed to satisfy these requirements, and Feffer's "objective" means of measuring role-taking skill was described.

McCall and Simmons' (1966) further suggestion that attribution is based in "consensus" was viewed as referring to the interpretation of alter's behaviour by taking the role of the "generalised other" toward alter. Thus, even simple reference to the shared or "conventional" meanings attributable to alter's acts involves a minimal degree of role-taking activity. It was argued that the interpretation of alter's initial self-presentation, and the initial interpretation of alter's later acts, probably involves reference to conventional meanings which are then qualified by, in the first instance, reference to later acts, and in the second, by reference to the attributed role as context to the particular acts.

It was asserted that a confusion between the "validity" of interpretation of the behaviour of another and the "conventionality" of such interpretation, has marred the empirical study of skill in making such interpretations. At the same time, it is probable that (objectively) valid interpretations are not independent of "conventional" interpretations. Valid interpretations should be reflected in valid attribution of roles (as overall summary of alter's and ego's behaviour in an encounter), and the ability to arrive at such attributions would be expected to require role-taking ability, except where alter's behaviour were sufficiently "conventional" to allow "taking the role of the generalised other" to suffice.

This hypothesis might be evaluated by asking judges to take the role of an observed alter vis à vis that of an absent ego, in order to attribute a role to the imagined ego. Defense of the view of the attribution

process described in this chapter would require demonstration that people possess such interpretative skill, that superior skill is associated with role-taking ability, and that valid attribution may be given by a minority of "judges" even where a majority agree on an alternative attribution.

CHAPTER FOUR

The improvisation of informal roles.

1. Introduction.

The manner in which individuals may improvise their informal role performances such that they be appropriate to the performances of their interactive partners and, at the same time, in accord with their own lines of action, will be discussed in this chapter. The contribution of the Formal Role Theory view in proposing the possible correlates of enactment ability will be reviewed, together with the approaches of nondramaturgical analysts to the understanding of the ways in which people may give "skilled performances". It will be noted that it would be difficult to make direct inferences from performance about the quality of improvisation, but that study of the relationship between factors, such as role-taking ability, which would be expected to allow effective improvisation, and the quality of performance, may be feasible.

In making a distinction between the "performer" and "audience" activities of dyadic interaction in Chapter Two, attention was drawn to the covert "cognitive" activities appropriate to each standpoint, rather than to the overt expressive processes which, as McCall and Simmons (1966) note, may be viewed as implying both attributional ("audience") and improvisation ("performer") activity at the same time. It was possible, in the last Chapter, to discuss attributional activity as inferable, not only from the overt behaviour of interactants (viewed as "altercasting" behaviour), but also from the verbal reports made by people about the roles they ascribed to those with whom they were interacting or those whose interactive behaviour they witnessed as "non-participant" audiences. The bodies of empirical research conducted both within Role Theory and non-dramaturgical frameworks which examine the "perception" or interpretation of the behaviour of others as indicating

their Roles, emotions or "personalities" was referred to in making predictions about the presence and nature of an ability to infer the informal role of another person accurately.

Improvisational activity is far less accessible. Inferences about such covert activity from the overt performance of interactants would be difficult, and verbal reports describing an "improvisation" would be equally difficult to give. The "function" of attribution is to guide improvisation; the expression of attribution via altercasting behaviour may be viewed as contributing to the development of the informal role relationship, and as guiding the interactive partner in his attributions and consequent improvisations. The "function" of improvisation, on the other hand, is not the cognitive formulation of an intended action, but the performance of that action itself.

To make direct inferences about the nature of the cognitive activity of improvisation from observation of performances would be unwise, given the probable number of factors intervening between intention and execution. Nevertheless, it might be possible to make some simple predictions about improvisation processes and to assess the viability of the notion that social performance is indeed comparable to dramatic improvisation.

In the last chapter, the term "attribution" was used to describe the interpretation of alter's performance as implicative of his role, and at the same time, the interpretation of particular acts within the context of that role. These are aspects of the process rather than different processes, since interpretation of an act may lead to modification of the role improvised; (improvisation of menu and improvisation of dishes are not independent, especially were a guest's preferences and allergies to be discovered by experiment).

"Improvisation" tends not to be discussed within the framework of formal Role Theory, since the analogy there is between social behaviour and the performance of a Role in accordance with a culturally-provided script, and Role enactment involves simply conforming with this "script". It has been pointed out that such scripts tend to specify only the bare outlines for behaviour and are rarely exhaustive; in recognition of this lack of specificity in formal Role expectations, Sarbin and Allen (1968) have discussed the ways in which role enactments may fail to be satisfactory, have suggested means by which some general characteristics of Role performances may be delineated, and have considered the nature of "Role skills". Since their discussion may be relevant to the interest here in the improvisation of performances in social encounters, reference will be made to their views in the first section of this chapter.

The formal Role Theory view poses a problem concerning the degree to which characteristics of the individual, apart from skill or ability factors, may affect his performance of Formal Roles. While this problem is not a "necessary" one when an improvisational view is applied, it does arise as a potential problem in developing methods by which the quality of improvised performances may be appraised, and will therefore be discussed briefly.

The view of improvisation processes which may be derived from McCall and Simmons' (1966) analysis of social behaviour will then be discussed, and the nature of the relationship between attribution and improvisation considered. Non-dramaturgical approaches toward an understanding of what constitutes "social skill" will be briefly described. It will be proposed that effective improvisation is essential to a skillful social performance, and hypotheses about relationships between various skill indices and the quality of improvised performances will be forwarded.

2. The Role Theory View.

A. Enactment.

Role enactment has been viewed as the "... termination of the social sequence" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p. 574) which "begins" with perception or "location" of the other's Role, and the "activation" of the expectations appropriate to the complementary Role. This view differs, as stated in Chapter One, with that adopted here, both in terms of the degree to which social behaviour is viewed as "conformity", and in terms of the notion that enactment is a "termination" of a sequence. The improvisational view of the role relationship as emergent implies that to view social encounters as passing through a predictable series of "stages" is not useful given the present state of knowledge about the processes involved ⁱⁿ interaction, and also, that the negotiation of the role relationship may begin only where dyadic members perform some overt actions which may be described as "self-presentation" or "performance of preferred informal role".

In referring to the overt performance of Roles, Sarbin and Allen (1968) prefer the term "enactment" to that of "role-playing", since the latter has connotations of "sham" and "pretence". As noted in the previous chapter, the term "role-playing" has often been used synonymously with that of "role-taking", for example by McClelland (1951). There might be a case to be made in favour of such usage where, for example, measures of "role-taking" ability as a cognitive ability require people to perform various actions, such as completing questionnaire items, as if they were someone else. If completion of a questionnaire is regarded as a role enactment, then it may be justified to refer to such enactment as "role-playing" behaviour. In view of such, and similar, ambiguities however, the term enactment does seem preferable when overt performance within the context of a Role is being discussed.

B. Criterion for evaluation of enactments.

Sarbin and Allen (1968) suggest that a person's role enactment may be evaluated in terms of its "appropriateness" to the social position attributed to the actor, its "propriety", that is, the extent to which the performance meets "normative standards" (which serve as the "valuational criteria" for an observer), and in terms of its "convincingness", the degree to which the person's performance suggests that he occupies his position legitimately (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p. 490). These criteria are somewhat difficult to distinguish, but are presumably concerned with the "actor's" selection of the right script, the conventionality of his performance of the script, and the coherence of his performance, respectively.

The latter criterion of "good performance" has already been proposed (in Chapter 3) as applicable to improvised performances, and concerns the degree to which a coherent line of action may be attributed to the performer by his partner, which coherence, it was suggested, might be greatly enhanced by stylistic features of behaviour. It was also proposed that stylistic aspects of behaviour lend an impression of "internal consistency" to a sequence of improvised social behaviour, so that the role-identities implied by the performance are not seen to be in gross conflict with each other. Here, however, decisions as to what constitutes "gross conflict" must be assumed to be importantly determined by the phenomenologies of the performer and his audience.

A more important basis for the evaluation of an improvised performance might be the degree to which the behaviour was appropriate to the informal role being improvised by the dyadic partner (both when the lines of action of ego and alter are competitive and when they are complementary in the cooperative sense). Such a criterion

might be more appropriately applied to the mutual performance of a dyad rather than to the behaviour of one member; it might be difficult to determine whether ego, alter, or both, were responsible for any lack of integrity in a dyadic performance. In Feffer and Suchotliff's (1966) study of dyadic performance in a "password task", designed as a simile to social interaction, it was dyads composed of high role-taking ability members who were superior, in task performance, to pairs of lower role-taking ability; predictions and measures were not made for dyads of "mixed" ability levels.

In spite of the ambiguity surrounding Sarbin and Allen's (1968) notions of what constitutes a "good enactment", they admit that performance is ultimately dependent on the capacity of the audience to provide appropriate feedback: "... the actor must maintain a semblance of flexibility and be ready to take into account the probabilistic nature of interaction" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p. 491). The improvisational view would argue that more than a "semblance" of flexibility would be required for an effective social performer.

C. Dimensions of enactment.

Sarbin and Allen (1968, p. 491), do make some interesting suggestions about dimensions of role-enactment "... that appear to have conceptual or practical utility". These concern the number of Roles which a person performs (over all encounters), the pre-emptiveness of his Roles, that is, the amount of time he spends performing them, and the amount of effort, or "organismic involvement", which is involved in an enactment. These dimensions may be comparable to McCall and Simmons' (1966) discussion of the prominence and salience of role-identities.

Sarbin's (1954) "organismic involvement" dimension deserves discussion here, since it refers to a feature of social behaviour which

has not yet received much attention. Referring to the "intensity" of enactments, "organismic involvement" ranges from minimal effort to maximal involvement (characterised by "histrionic neurosis" or "ecstasy"). Sarbin and Allen (1968) compare this involvement concept with Goffman's (1972a) "engrossment" notion; Goffman's (1957) discussion of departure from appropriate "involvement" foci was compared, in Chapter Two, with the "performer-audience" view of encounters. In these terms, the performer might be viewed as relatively more "involved" than the relatively audience member in an "imbalanced" dyad.

This "involvement" dimension may be comparable to a general "activity" factor revealed as important in the determination of people's reactions to the social behaviour of others. For example, discussion group members agree about amounts of verbal activity appropriate to each, such activity being related to informal roles (involving leadership functions) performed (Bales and Slater, 1969). Mann (1956) cites studies by Borgatta (1955) demonstrating that the total "rate of interaction" initiated and received in "actual" situations was positively related to that in "role-playing" situations.

Mehrabian (1972) proposes that: "... the major referents of implicit messages are positiveness (including liking and preference), potency (including dominance-submissiveness and status), and responsiveness" (Mehrabian, 1972, p. 133). Responsiveness comprises facial and vocal activity, speech rate and volume, and may be associated with the salience of the audience. Recalling the discussion of dominance and intimacy dimensions, in Chapters One and Two, as essential features of informal role relationships to be agreed about by interactants, it may be noted that these are similar to two of the central dimensions of "meaning" described by Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957), the third of their

dimensions being "activity". Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) found that degree of emotional empathy (demonstrated via their questionnaire) was positively related to degree of self-reported responsiveness. Such evidence can only be suggestive in muting a relationship between role-taking ability and "activity" but the activity dimension of informal role performances might deserve further study.

D. Enactment skills.

Sarbin and Allen (1968, p. 514) define "skill" as: " ... a physical and psychological readiness to perform some task to some given level of competence", and propose that most "role skills", comprising "aptitude, appropriate experience and specific training", are probably learned. Discussions of the use of Role-enactments as training, therapeutic and assessment methods, for example by Mann 1956, have noted the failure to focus on the nature of the processes involved in enactment itself. While "role-playing" studies have demonstrated behavioural and attitudinal change as a result of such methods, and reliability over enactments of some personality characteristics", (Rotter and Wickers, 1948), studies have also indicated differences between behaviour evidenced in "role-playing" and "actual" situations. Brown (1952), for example, found Role portrayals better in situations which were relatively unfamiliar to performers.

Experimental "Role enactments" have been characterised by fairly close specification of Roles and task, whereas "actual" situations (such as discussion groups) in the laboratory are frequently ambiguous in these terms. The improvisational view would maintain that all social behaviour constitutes "performance-giving" (or role-playing). However, "actual" behaviour in the laboratory may be particularly unusual behaviour, in that people are unable to attend to the explicit Role instructions given

in "role-playing sessions", nor to their own goals and role-identities (and those which they attribute to their partners), but must infer the goals and expectations of the experimenters and observers; these, being unstated and ambiguous, might well be expected to lead to less effective "enactments". The problem of the "set" with which people embark upon laboratory encounters and improvisations will be discussed, following a brief summary of studies, employing "enactment" situations, which focus on "enactment skills".

Following Mann's (1956) comments on the paucity of evidence concerning the value of role-playing techniques for training and assessment purposes, Mann and Mann (1959) demonstrated that enactment of a role improves future performance of that role, performance of a number of roles in a series of role-playing sessions improves performance in future sessions, and that performance of a number of roles in a number of sessions improves the effectiveness of role-performance outside the context of an experimental session. They concluded that role-playing experience led to improvement in the performance of that role, but that there seemed to be a "generalised ability" to perform roles, which might be improved through specific training.

Sarbin and Allen (1968) agree that there may be both general and specific skills associated with effective enactment, and broadly distinguish between "cognitive" and "motoric" skills. "Motoric" skills involve the ability to express feelings and involvement nonverbally, while cognitive abilities include the ability to accurately infer the social positions of self and other, variously referred to as "role-taking", "empathy", and "social sensitivity". In the previous chapter it was argued that role-taking, as conceptualised by Feffer (1959) should not be equated with (although likely to be related to) the

accurate inference of alter's role. Improvisational ability is not discussed as such by Sarbin and Allen (1968), but they assume some kind of general cognitive ability associated with performance effectiveness, "role-aptitude", which is described as associated with the ability of a person to "put himself in another role" or to behave "as if" he were in another role.

Behaviour under hypnosis has been regarded as a form of role-enactment by Sarbin (1950), and two experimental studies purport to show a relationship between enactment effectiveness in hypnosis and in "dramatic" situations. Coe and Sarbin (1966) found drama students to be hypnotically more responsive than science students, whom they presumed to be relatively poor in dramatic enactments. Sarbin and Lim (1963) conducted a rather more elaborate study of the relationship between hypnotic susceptibility and enactment ability, where people were asked to mime a situation on stage a week after they had performed a test whereby their degree of hypnotic susceptibility might be assessed; enactment ability was found to be positively associated with susceptibility in the hypnosis test.

The importance of both overt and covert "rehearsal" in the development of general and specific role skills has been noted, especially the games of children which involve "playing at" roles. Bowers and London (1965) examined the relationships between two kinds of role enactment ability and various developmental measures in children between the ages of 5 and 11 years. They assessed the children's ability to portray themselves in an unfamiliar situation, by asking them to "pretend" to be hypnotised in the presence of an experimenter who took the "hypnotist" role and who gave no hypnotic induction or relaxation suggestions. Their performance was rated by judges according to the degree to which

the children carried out the instructions for behaviour given by the "hypnotist" and the degree of "subjective involvement" apparent in their overt actions.

The second kind of enactment ability assessed concerned the children's ability to portray others. This "dramatic acting test" consisted of 6 one-minute "playlets" during which a child performed the roles of mother, father, friend, bully, teacher, and sheriff. An experimenter performed complementary roles, and spoke three scripted "lines" in each play; the children's improvised responses to these three lines were rated according to the degree that they demonstrated the "... adoption of an attitude consistent with the cultural stereotype of the role, and a logical sequence of lines which incorporate this attitude with the specific situation of the play, especially the preceding stimulus line of E (the experimenter) " (Bowers and London, 1965, p. 502).

Children's scores on these two enactment tests were compared with their chronological age, with their verbal and motor intelligence, and with their degree of "perceptual development" (measured by a test requiring discrimination of the point at which a stimulus figure represented pictorially was no longer the "same" as the initial representation of the figure). The "Vineland social maturity scale" was administered to the children's parents, in order to assess their children's level of maturity. Both measures of enactment were significantly and positively associated with age, verbal and motor intelligence, perceptual discrimination, and "social maturity".

The two enactment measures were also positively associated with each other, but further analysis suggested that this relationship might be accounted for in terms of their common dependence on intelligence; the assessment of both these forms of enactment relied heavily on the

children's verbal responses. Bowers and London (1965) conclude that "role-playing ability" represents the effect of appropriate combinations of several basic abilities rather than an independently developing skill, and that the ability involved in the dramatic acting test performance represents the more complex skill, since it is less accountable for in terms of verbal intelligence. The authors also discuss the "sets" with which children approached the two enactment tasks; their proposals will be noted later in this section.

Bowers and London's (1965) enactment tasks seem to have been more carefully contrived than other enactment measures employing global ratings of performance in "role-playing sessions"; such measures do, however, suffer from their lack of generalisability to behaviour in other settings that may be ascribed to the abilities which they "tap". Sarbin and Allen (1969, p. 520) note that: "The number of instruments designed to assess skills is small", and describe one test, the "as-if test", designed by Sarbin and Jones (1956) to assess the "general cognitive component" which they assume to be important to effective enactment.

In the "as-if" test which: " ... measures the ability of a person imaginatively to put himself in another role" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p. 521), a person is asked to answer two questions: firstly: "How would your life have been different if you had been born a member of the opposite sex?"; and secondly: "How would your life have been different if you had been born a Russian?" (Sarbin and Jones, 1956, p. 237). Either a simple count of the number of words used (which are relevant to answering each question), or a content analysis procedure, may be adopted in scoring. Sarbin and Allen (1968) report that correlation between scores deriving from the two questions is high under both scoring methods.

Sarbin and Jones (1956) administered the as-if test to a group

of female students, who had previously checked adjectives on provided lists which they thought were characteristic of themselves. Further adjective lists were checked by the students in describing their view of expectations for the Roles of "daughter in American Society" and "father". On the basis of responses to the latter check lists, students received scores according to the "validity" of their Role concepts, that is, the degree to which their notions of the Roles of daughter and father accorded with those of the group as a whole. Students equated for validity of expectations, and for age, were compared in terms of their scores on the "as-if" test, and six students with divergent as-if scores were asked to enact the Role of daughter toward a "standard" father (a confederate of the experimenters) before the whole group of students as audience.

In the enactment situation, the students were instructed to play the Role of a daughter who is about to tell her father that she has failed to reach high enough grades to remain in university; the father performed similarly in each enactment. After each enactment, the "audience" completed adjective check lists describing the characteristics of the "daughter" portrayed and after all six performances, ranked the performers in terms of their "adequacy" of enactment.

Sarbin and Jones (1956) found a perfect rank-order correlation between the average audience ranking of the adequacy of performances, and the ranking of performers in terms of their "role-aptitude" (as measured by the as-if test). These rankings were also exactly the same as the ranking of performances in terms of "conformance", which had been assessed by comparing the audience adjective descriptions of the performances with those reflecting the "valid" expectations for the daughter Role. This study would seem to defend Sarbin and Jones' (1956) assertion

that the as-if test does measure some kind of general cognitive ability associated with the effectiveness of enactment.

Since the as-if test requires verbal responding on the part of respondents, it might be expected that scores on the test would be positively related to intelligence; Sarbin and Allen (1958) report that Kroger (1963) found that scores on the test were not significantly associated with verbal fluency measures. However, Kroger failed to find a relationship between as-if scores and the ability to "fake" on personality tests and to respond: "... in role-appropriate ways to more subtle and implicit cues on personality tests" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p. 521). Sarbin and Allen (1968) suggest that the as-if test refers to the ability to overtly enact Roles, rather than to enact in the ways assessed by Kroger. It must be noted that to effectively "fake" a personality test, a respondent may require some conception of the nature of the "traits" under assessment and the relationship of specific items to these traits. Sarbin and Jones (1956) had scored as-if test responses according to the "number of relevant ideas" expressed in answer to the two questions; Rosenberg, Sutton-Smith and Griffiths (1965) employed a modified content-analysis procedure to score the as-if test, and found support for their hypothesis that first-born boys tend to be superior in "verbal understanding empathy" to second borns.

E. Enactment and self-concept.

A further hypothesis that was supported by Sarbin and Jones (1956) in the study described above, was that effective Role-enactment would be accompanied by a temporary change in self-concept, the direction of the change being congruent with that suggested by the characteristics implied by the Role. The question of "self-role congruence" has been discussed extensively by Sarbin and Allen (1969), and, while the question does not necessarily arise if an improvisational viewpoint is

adopted, it must be discussed here, since a number of the experimental studies described above have employed enactment or "role-playing" situations which vary as to the degree to which the congruence between aspects of the self concept and characteristics regarded as appropriate for the performance of formal and specified Roles, is likely to be an important consideration.

In improvisational terms, informal roles performed in encounters are devised by the performer with regard to the behaviour of the other and the formal aspects of Situation and Role relationship. In Role Theory terms, it is assumed that, where formal Role expectations demand that a person perform in a way which is not implied by any features (role-identities) of his self-concept, he must temporarily modify his view of himself in order to perform the Role effectively, or, if he performs effectively, then a change in his self-concept might be expected. It follows that Roles which imply characteristics which are congruent with the person's view of himself, or with objective views of his consistent characteristics (his "personality"), will be easier to perform well than Roles incongruent with self-concept and personality.

Borgatta (1961) has shown that social behaviour tends to be congruent with the characteristics of the individual, at least in terms of "assertiveness", but that behaviour is also modified in accordance with the roles performed. Rodgers (1957) asked bosses to assess the success of their employees, and found that judged success was positively associated with "role insight" (the degree to which the employee's concept of his Role agreed with that of his boss) and with "flexibility of self-perception", but not with the degree to which his (the employee's) personality was compatible with the demands of his Role.

Where performances apparently not implying an individual's self-

concept are effectively given, it may be argued that the person is literally "being someone else"; in experimental situations requiring role-playing which is incongruent with the self-concept, there is an important reason why good enactments might be achieved. Such enactments do not have implications for the future relationship between the actor and his role-playing partner. The therapeutic value of role-playing techniques may rest in this, in that people may explore their abilities to behave in ways in which they would wish to in everyday life, but in which failure to perform effectively would be costly in the real-life setting. Erikson's (1950) notion of "moratorium", for example, suggests that adolescents may attempt to create situations where they may experiment with new modes of behaviour without being sanctioned for failure to perform effectively in these new ways.

The important question here would seem to concern how people can, in role-playing situations, behave in ways which are considered not to be "characteristic" of them. If they can give effective enactments of roles then the characteristics they portray must, in some sense, be available to them as self-characteristics. The important factors determining the development of people's self-concepts have been proposed to be based in the reactions of others toward them and in their own monitoring of their overt behaviour. As Bem and McConnell (1970) have pointed out, people may well not refer to their "cognitive attitudes" in order to "find out" how they feel about some issue, object, or experience, but to their overt behaviour; when asked whether he likes cheese, for example, a person may consider how he enjoyed eating cheese on previous occasions rather than "search through" his "attitude system" to find that construct labelled "cheese".

If self-concepts do depend on self-monitoring, as well as on the

reactions of others then those characteristics of people, which may indeed be "characteristic" of them, would be expected to exert an influence on overt behaviour and consequently on the self-concept. The assumption that self-concepts are representations of some internal "striving for consistency", and are themselves "consistent" has been challenged by Gergen (1968), who argues that: "A revision of the construct of self seems in order, and such a revision might profitably be directed toward a theory of multiple selves. in lieu of the self-concept, a process of self-conception will ultimately be necessary" (Gergen, 1968, p. 307; emphases in original). McCall and Simmons' (1966) dramaturgical view of the self is essentially such a process model, and provides a reasonable interpretation of how people may give performances which appear to be discrepant with their "consistent characteristics" or with their "self-concepts", especially in situations which are "not for real" as Borgatta (1961) describes experimental "role-playing" sessions. In such situations, role-identities which are infrequently expressed may be offered for legitimation; when the person's self-concept is subsequently assessed, such role-identities might be relatively more prominent and salient than hitherto.

The assumption here is that most people have, potentially, a far more varied repertoire of behaviour and expression than they usually need call upon in everyday life. The measurement of the self-concept, by self-report measures such as questionnaires, rating scales, and adjective lists, in itself demands the exercise of choice as to what, in general, a person feels to be true of himself. If a person were asked to complete, for example, an adjective checklist descriptive of qualities, actions and experiences, which had at some point in time been characteristic of him, it seems unlikely that many adjectives would remain unchecked.

Gergen (1968) has pointed out that little attention has been paid to behavioural inconsistency, probably because researchers have assumed behavioural consistency to be the case. The hypotheses derived in the previous chapter assumed that a person's behaviour varies between encounters, and that accurate judgements may be made about the role performed by an interactive partner by observation of his performance alone. With an assumption of potential variability in social behaviour, the sources of consistency (for example the coherence of social behaviour attributed to an informal role performance in Chapters One and Three), may be examined.

The appearance of "consistency" in social performance may derive from factors including the constraints imposed by the formal aspects of social structure, the behaviour of others with whom the individual interacts, and from limitations imposed on variability by experience and ability. If the enactment of role performances is inhibited by skill and general motivational factors, then the role skills discussed by Sarbin and Allen (1968) require further investigation. Further, it is possible that general dimensions of individual difference might "mediate" between potential performance and actual performance.

F. "Sets" toward enactment.

Insofar as measures of "role aptitude" refer to enactments conducted in settings which are "divorced" from the contingencies of everyday life, and for which the actions and characteristics to be expressed by the performer are specified, they may be inappropriate to the investigation of skills of improvisation in social encounters. Sarbin and Jones' (1956) as-if test requires respondents to maintain their concept of self but at the same time to consider how they might have developed under different social constraints or in a different cultural environment.

There would seem to be a number of "sets" with which respondents might approach such an imaginative task. They might, as implied above, hold their self-concept "constant", and consider the rewards that would be available to them in a different sex-role or culture; different opportunities might have been available to them, interests encouraged, and so on. They might, alternatively, assume that their view of themselves has developed as a result of social and cultural influences, and see themselves as, potentially, completely different, but hold certain aspects of their experience or perceived "nature" (such as their parents or their intelligence) "constant".

It was noted above that Bowers and London (1965) proposed that children might have entered their two role enactment situations with different "sets". They suggested that since the hypnotic simulation task explicitly required "pretence", then in order to enact the hypnotic role effectively, "The role and self must be kept carefully distinct, so that a critical attitude can guide self-conscious modifications in behaviour: "[A child] ... cannot put his whole self into the role because the self of which he is aware is precisely what he must try to hide. To do this, he must scrutinize each act and use his intelligence quite deliberately" (Bowers and London, 1965, p. 507).

The dramatic acting task, on the other hand, " ... by virtue of the necessary spontaneity of lines demanded, the familiarity of each of the roles to the child, and the fact that the acting is shared between E [the experimenter] and S [the child] , exerts a strong pull on the child to enter the role honestly, completely, and without a self-critical set" (Bowers and London, 1968, p. 507). It is agreed here that the two enactment situations are distinguished by the degree to which conscious self-monitoring is necessary; it is not agreed (as would be expected from the discussion in Chapter Two) that enactment in the dramatic

acting task, as in the improvisation of informal roles in everyday life, does not require some degree of self-monitoring, albeit at a relatively "automatic" level.

Whatever the "set" induced by responding to the "as-if" test, it seems likely that the "cognitive" component of role-aptitude which it purports to measure would be associated with performance of improvised roles in "naturalistic" situations, rather than the kind of performance involved in Bowers and London's (1965) hypnotic simulation task. The performance required in Sarbin and Jones' (1956) validation study of the as-if test was that of "daughter", and it was given by people who were in fact "daughters", and who had similar conceptions of expectations for that Role.

This "as-if" measure, together with the proposal that there may be general cognitive processes associated with effective role performance, and the prediction that the perceptual or "audience" skills of interpreting the performance of another may be intimately related to expressive and enactment skills, emerge from Sarbin and Allen's (1968) review of the more formal application of the dramaturgical analogy. The improvisational view of the way in which effective informal role performances may be given will now be discussed.

3. The improvisational view.

The points of contrast between the Role Theory approach, which stresses conformance as essential to effective enactment, and the improvisational view which emphasises that performance must be appropriate to that of the interactive partner, have been noted in describing aspects of the former approach in the previous section of this chapter. In this section, the view of the relationship between the cognitive processes of attribution and improvisation, already discussed in the previous

chapter, will be elaborated, some evidence in favour of the notion of social behaviour as "improvised", referred to, and means of assessing the effectiveness of overt performance, discussed.

A. Attribution and improvisation.

The "products" of the attribution process are presumed to be expressed in overt behaviour where that behaviour is viewed as a source of altercasting cues. The "products" of improvisation are presumed to be expressed in overt behaviour where that behaviour is viewed as "self-presentation", redescribed here as "performance of preferred informal role". Like attribution, improvisation is construed as continuous cognitive activity, rather than as formulation of a simple decision which will be maintained throughout an encounter. A decision about an appropriate utterance may be viewed as constituting both the improvisation of behaviour within the context of a role "made" (to use Turner's (1962) term) for himself by ego and, at the same time, as constituting a refined presentation of that emergent informal role.

In the previous chapter, it was noted that ego may view alter's behaviour as casting him (ego) into the complementary informal role. If this attribution does not correspond to ego's concept of the role he is performing, then he may correct alter's attributive hypothesis by strengthening his expression of his preferred role in his behaviour, for example, by emphasising in his performance those features of his role about which he believes alter to be mistaken.

Presumably there would be points during such an exercise where ego and alter may have to decide whether it is their respective attributions which require modification, or whether each is actively resisting performance of the role complementary to that which each attributes (accurately)

to the other. That is, ego may have to decide whether alter's inappropriate behaviour derives from a mistaken hypothesis about ego's role, or from an intention to resist the role into which ego has cast him. As McCall and Simmons (1966, p. 137) put it: "The chances of crossing one another up are very great, especially in those cases in which one is reluctant to go along with alter's role or with the role alter imputes to one." This problem aside, it is maintained that the expressive acts of ego and alter during an encounter constitute an expression of the informal roles which they have improvised in order to follow through their respective lines of action.

As suggested in the previous section, attributive activity is deemed to be accessible via an interpretation of overt behaviour or via the verbal reports of attributors, whereas improvisational activity is less "accessible" in the latter sense. It is implicit in McCall and Simmons' (1966) account that attribution serves to allow prediction of the other's behaviour, and serves as a summary of his past behaviour. Such summarising and prediction are viewed as necessary for effective improvisation of performance during the encounter. That is, attribution is viewed as constituting aid to the improvisation of performances and, when expressed as "altercasting", as an aid to the development of the role relationship; it would therefore be expected that effective attribution would contribute toward the improvisation of appropriate performances.

The behaviour implied by improvisation, the performance of informal roles, is not presumed to be directed solely toward altercasting, or the presentation of role-identities for legitimation, but also toward the attainment of other desired goals. The cognitive process of improvisation must therefore be viewed as more directly "tied" to action in social encounters, than that of attribution. While improvisation need not necessarily imply overt action, since there are important

instances of covert "rehearsal" of role-performances which contribute toward the development of the role-identity system, improvisation during social encounters would be expected to be directed mainly toward overt performance.

This distinction between attribution and improvisation is important when means of inferring improvisational skill are considered. While ego's attribution may be viewed as more or less "accurate" in comparison with alter's expressive behaviour, ego's improvisation of a role performance must be evaluated in terms of its appropriateness, not only vis à vis alter's previous behaviour, but also in the light of ego's lines of actions and means of achieving them. While the effectiveness of an attribution, inferred from the verbal report of the attributor, may be judged independently, the effectiveness of its expression in performance (qua altercasting) being to some extent a secondary consideration, the same is not the case for improvisation. Even if a person's verbal report of his intended action were regarded as appropriate, such apt improvisation would serve little "function" unless this improvisation were effectively expressed in overt performance.

Before considering the possible bases and correlates of effective improvisation and performance, some evidence that social behaviour may be viewed as comprising "appropriate performance" rather than as "conformity to a script" or as the direct and "spontaneous" expression of "personality", without regard to the features of the dyadic relationship, will be noted.

B. Self-presentation.

The most extensive source of anecdotal evidence that "self-presentation" does occur has been provided by Goffman (1971). His accounts illustrate vividly the variability of a person's social behaviour over

different encounters. Weinstein and Deutschberger's (1963) empirical study demonstrates that a person's expressive behaviour may be successfully interpreted as having altercasting implications, and that observers are able to distinguish effectively between five of the six dimensions along which the authors had predicted that the altercasting behaviour would vary.

A number of empirical studies of "self-presentation" have been conducted by Gergen and his associates. Unfortunately, in most of these, self-presentation was assessed by asking people to describe themselves verbally to others by completion of questionnaires. Such self-descriptions, which, if they constitute "self-presentation" at all, are "special cases" for which special social rules may apply, were found to vary according to the relative status of anticipated task partners and the nature of the task expected (Gergen and Taylor 1969). Such variation was also found for anticipation of an "egotistical" as against a "humble" partner (Gergen and Wishnov, 1965).

Overt expression of self-esteem in interviews increases when encouraged by the interviewer (Gergen 1965). A study by Jones, Gergen and Davis (1962) supports Bowers and London's (1965) remarks about the effects of "set" on role enactment, discussed in the previous section; female interviewees instructed to "make a good impression" did so and, where their behaviour was favourably received by the interviewer, maintained afterwards that they had been "honest". Those disapproved by the interviewer afterwards said that they had "dissimulated".

A further source of evidence supporting the notion of self-presentation is research on embarrassment in social situations. That embarrassment may suggest the need for corrective self-presentation in order that "face" may be maintained was proposed by Goffman (1956, p. 264);

embarrassment " ... occurs whenever an individual is felt to have projected incompatible definitions of himself before those present". Modigliani (1971) created a number of four-person task groups, composed of two "naive" people and two "confederates" who acted as "supervisors" in the task performance. The tasks were performed by people in public and in private and were so designed that they would experience both success and failure. There were two further "task conditions" described as "mitigated failure" and "mitigated success", where people were informed during their performance that their task was particularly difficult, or easy, respectively.

A self-report of experienced embarrassment and two measures of overt behaviour were obtained. Firstly, during consultations prior to, and subsequent to, the task performance, a supervisor (confederate) stared, and recorded the amount his partner gazed at him. Secondly, a measure of "facework" was obtained; observers noted: "any statement by a subject intended to improve his image in the eyes of the confederate" (Modigliani, 1971, p. 20). The six categories provided, into which such statements might fall, were: change of subject; excuse; redeeming information (self-enhancing); derogation of task; denial of failure; "fishing for reassurance". Modigliani (1971) found that eye-contact was reduced after both failure and mitigated failure, and increased slightly, but not significantly, after success. The greatest embarrassment was experienced when failure and mitigated failure had occurred in public, and it was found that the greater the embarrassment experienced, the greater the amount of "facework" observed.

There would seem to be sufficient empirical evidence to allow the assertion that self-presentation does occur, and some support for the notion that expressive behaviour may be interpreted as having altercasting implications.

C. Improvisation skills.

The discussion of the nature of the ability to take the role of the other, in Chapter Three, suggested that this ability was involved, not only in effective attribution, but in appropriate improvisation. As conceptualised by Turner (1956) and by Feffer (1959), ego's role-taking behaviour allows effective attribution of alter's role in order that alter's reactions to ego's intended actions might be anticipated, and so that ego's intentions may be modified if necessary. The "cognitive component" of role enactment aptitude assessed by Sarbin and Jones' (1956) "as-if test" may be related to both effective informal role performance, and to role-taking ability (as conceptualised by Feffer), if the ability to view the self in a different sex-role or cultural context requires the simultaneous decentering activity with regard to different aspects of the self which Feffer proposes as the basis of role-taking in social interaction.

A further important factor which would be expected to be associated with effective role performance in the improvisational view, would be the presence of a responsive audience. The feedback-providing function of dyadic partners as "audiences" has been discussed in Chapter Two, and it has been noted here that a "social interaction" task was performed better by pairs of people with high role-taking ability than by pairs with lower ability in role-taking. (Feffer and Suchotliff, 1966).

Although Feffer and Suchotliff (1966) did not examine the password task ability of dyads composed of people with different levels of role-taking ability, Cowan (1967) conducted a similar study in which he employed both same-ability dyads and mixed-ability dyads of children between the ages of 8 and 10. The cognitive level of each child, in terms of the degree of "egocentricity" manifested, was measured by using a Piagetian

task.

Cowan's "social interaction task" required two children to sit back-to-back, and to communicate to each other the position in which an object was placed on a board in front of them. Each board had squares of two different colours, and was identical for each child. Each child was also given identical sets of sixteen objects, some of the objects being of a different colour for each child. The pairs of children were instructed " ... to place their objects, one at a time, one in each square, so that the boards would wind up with the same objects in the same places" (Cowan, 1967, p. 4). From task performances and tape recordings of the children's verbalisations, measures of egocentric language, communication efficiency, and "descriptions of the properties of the system of communication developed by the two participants" (Cowan, 1967, pp. 4-5) were derived.

For each age group, dyads were selected, so that both members were of high cognitive level (a low degree of egocentricity), of low cognitive level, or so that one was of a high level while the other was of a low level of cognitive development. In arriving at the placement of the first object on the board, "Hi-Hi" pairs were superior in ability to "Lo-Lo" pairs; for 8- and 9-year-olds, "Hi-Lo" pairs were superior to Lo-Lo pairs, but inferior in task performance to Hi-Hi pairs. For ten-year olds, however, Hi-Lo pairs performed as well as Hi-Hi pairs.

Analysis of the complete task performance suggested that the crucial difference between the two age groups was that high cognitive level 8- and 9-years-old children did not employ negative information (failure of a low ability partner to respond appropriately) in order to correct their partner's performance; 10-years-old high cognitive level children did employ negative information in order to provide a

model for their low ability partners, and checked the effectiveness of their partner's understanding before proceeding with the task. Cowan (1967, pp. 14-15) interprets these findings as suggesting that: "There seems to be a developmental lag between the emergence of the formal characteristics of a higher level of verbal communication and the meaningfulness of that communication to both speaker and listener. It appears that differentiation may take place before integration of the new level".

It seems possible, therefore, that an unresponsive audience need not necessarily inhibit effective performance in social interaction; if the audience is not adept at providing information to the performer about his performance, then the performer may have to employ role-taking activity in order to "amplify" what feedback there is. The performer may have to improvise his performances in such a way that he is reasonably confident that his interpretation of alter's behaviour, and alter's interpretation of his (ego's) behaviour, is appropriate. Such strategies are implied in the "hypothesis-testing" nature of the attribution process proposed in the previous chapter.

It has been suggested that effective improvisation is related to role-taking ability, and that the latter should enhance effective attributional activity. If the overt performance of an improvised role is contingent on the quality of the improvisation, then it might be expected that effective attributional activity would be related to interpretable (within the dyadic context) expressive behaviour. Evidence for a positive relationship between the ability to interpret nonverbal behaviour, as emotion or as personality, and expressive ability in the same terms, has been obtained in some empirical studies.

Levy (1964) found that the abilities to encode and decode vocal

communications were positively related to each other; Zaidel and Mehrebian (1969) replicated this finding, but did not find encoding and decoding ability to be positively related where facial expressions were concerned, although Levitt (1964) had found such a relationship for facial expression. These experimental studies are not directly pertinent to the focus of attention here, since the ability to interpret or to express a particular meaning via a particular nonverbal "channel" to no-one in particular need not necessarily reflect a person's ability to interpret and express vis à vis particular others in particular encounters.

D. Social Skill.

The ability to improvise and execute an appropriate and effective role performance seems comparable to the "social skill" described by non-dramaturgical theorists such as Argyle (1969). Argyle (1969, pp. 327-328) notes: "An essential part of social performance appears to be the ability to establish and sustain a smooth and easy pattern of interaction"; such an achievement seems a "dyadic" rather than an individual one. It is, nevertheless, likely that some people may be more "skilled" than others, particularly where skill is discussed in relation to particular kinds of interactive contexts, and particular kinds of informal role relationships. In objective terms, "poor" social performance in a dyad may be indicated by poor "meshing". Close observation of overt behaviour in encounters might lead to one member being seen to be "to blame" for the lack of coherence of the encounter as a whole. However, Cowan's (1967) results might be interpreted as suggesting that a skilled improviser and attributor should ultimately be able to "cope" with a partner's inadequacies in these respects, such that good "meshing" should be evidenced in any encounter in which he participates.

Argyle (1969) points out that the "quality" of an individual's (rather than a dyad's) social performance may also be evaluated (and, it would be maintained here, the effectiveness of his improvisation also inferred) by assessing the appropriateness of his utterances and non-verbal behaviour in terms of their relationship with his own previous behaviour, and with that of his partner. An individual may tend to give "dominant" rather than appropriate responses, that is, he may behave in such a way that his own performance "habits", rather than the other persons actions, are taken into account when formulating an utterance.

Armistead (1970) designed a questionnaire measure in order to obtain reactions to "familiar" and "difficult" contingencies in social encounters; the contingency is stated and people are asked to say what they would do or say in such a situation. The appropriateness of responses may be rated by judges, and if respondents are asked to reply as quickly as possible, the latency of their responses constitute a further measure of "social skill". Armistead (1970) found positive relationships between respondents' demonstrated skill on different items, suggesting that there might be some: "... general factor of competence in everyday situations" (Argyle, 1969; p. 331).

Argyle (1969) suggests that "socially skilled" people are likely to be popular with those with whom skill is exercised. Such skill is, perhaps, not to be equated with power to govern the course of an encounter, for a person might perform in an appropriate way by allowing his partner directive and "casting" power, and demonstrate his skill by following such "direction" closely. Social skill, as defined by Argyle, and as identified here with effective informal role performance, may well allow a person to attain his own outcomes in social encounters, but exhibition of such skill would also facilitate encounters for others,

and such facilitation might well be responded to by others in terms of liking, judgements of "intelligence" and so on.

In considering in this chapter the possible nature of the cognitive process of improvisation, the relationship between the improvisational view in general and previous approaches toward a model of dyadic interaction processes becomes apparent. The previous approaches considered here have been labelled: "formal Role Theory" and "non-dramaturgical views", the latter including Argyle's social skill model, exchange theory, and the simple S-R model.

It should be clear that the "improvisation view" is only an alternative approach to the extent that it represents an attempt to go beyond the previous views in confronting what individual cognitive and expressive processes must be like for dyadic interaction to occur as we experience it. Previous approaches are rejected only insofar as they fail to deal adequately with the "modus vivendi" of interaction itself, a failure which may be attributed to inappropriate emphasis on particular aspects of the interaction process. Thus Role Theory's emphasis on social behaviour as conformity, exchange theory's focus on outcomes, the S-R model's neglect of outcomes, and Argyle's concentration on "feedback" at the nonverbal level, have been criticized for engendering a neglect of insights offered by other views and for failing to provide, in isolation, adequate frameworks for the study of interaction processes both individual and social.

Each of these previous views has certain points of application as their emphases suggest, but could not be said to be adequate even for certain types of encounter; each illuminates different aspects of all encounters. In Chapter One, the non-dramaturgical models were shown to be broadly compatible with each other, and in combination to yield a view

of dyadic interaction which served as a basis for the derivation of the improvisational view. Similarly, in this chapter, empirical work conducted within the aegis of these "alternative" frameworks has been adduced in order to discover what the nature of improvised performance (social behaviour in dyadic contexts) might be, and what conditions a description of the cognitive process of improvisation would have to satisfy. Similarly, as argued in Chapter Three, many encounters do involve formal Role expectations attached to social positions occupied by interactants, and insofar as these are recognised as relevant to the encounter by the participants (such initial recognition requiring the improvisational view) the encounter may be characterized by features proposed by a formal Role Theory view.

Since the improvisational view is presented as an advance on the previous views discussed, it serves to integrate insights gained about social behaviour by empirical workers within these "alternative" frameworks. The latter are not alternatives in the sense that they generate predictions about behaviour which are opposed to predictions which an improvisational view might suggest. However, the improvisational view does differ from the other views in stressing cognitive and expressive competences as fundamental to the conduct of social interaction, and that these deserve study in their own right.

4. Summary.

The hypotheses derived here are simple, but investigation of their validity might provide a basis for further studies of social competence and allow the usefulness of the application of the dramaturgical view to this area of study to be assessed. It has been predicted that effective informal role improvisation would be related to judgements of the performer as social skilled, popular, and possibly, intelligent. Sarbin and Jones' (1956) "as-if" test purports to measure role-taking ability, insofar as a person may elaborate his view of himself as governed by Role and cultural contingencies, and it would be expected that this test might give indices of role-taking ability similar to those provided by Feffer's (1959) measure, at least as far/^{as}overt enactment is concerned.

The assessment of improvisational ability has been discussed, and only one measure has emerged which seeks to evaluate the appropriateness of verbal utterances or reports of actions improvised to deal with some stated social contingencies. Although Armistead's (1970) measure takes account of the demands for immediate appropriate response implied in every-day social situations, the alters specified are necessarily described in general terms, and the improvisational view suggests that it is alter's role, attributed to him by ego on the basis of his behaviour in an encounter, which should form the basis for effective improvisation and performance by ego.

The enactment situations described earlier in this chapter frequently required people to adopt and perform roles which did not necessarily allow the incorporation of their own role-identities nor the application of their past interaction experiences. It was proposed that there would

probably be few informal roles which would not allow some "self-involvement" for performers, but many role-playing experimental situations demand a certain degree of "displacement" of "self" from "role", in order that the purpose of the session (be it "therapeutic" or "educational") might be achieved.

The interest here is in the appropriateness of improvisation and performance of informal roles in everyday social encounters. The form of dramatic improvisation which best resembles everyday requirements is that which involves simply specification of physical context and goals to be achieved. In an experimental situation allowing assessment of individual differences in improvisational and performance skill, such goals would have to be achieved vis à vis a "constant" alter, so that the degree to which different people's performances varied might be viewed as contingent on their own skills, rather than as a mutual effect of their own and alter's abilities in attribution and expression. Such a situation was employed in the studies, described in Chapter Eight, which assess the validity of the hypotheses derived in this chapter.

5. Empirical Assessment of the Improvisational View

The improvisational view described has attempted to delineate the features of cognitive and expressive processes employed by people taking part in dyadic interaction, and to suggest how an understanding of such processes may facilitate our discussion of the relationship between the "individual" and "society". In Chapter One, it was argued that the improvisational view integrates a body of knowledge (somewhat heterogeneous^e) and theory about social interaction, and potentially allows discussion and empirical study of the relationship between social behaviour and "personality", of the relationship between the self-concept and the impact of others' definition of the self in interaction, of the "definition of the situation" notion, and of the nature of extended social relationships as against short-term encounters between acquaintances. These assertions may be open to empirical test but the assessment of the validity of the improvisational view itself must focus on the main features of the model, which involve the complementarity of performances, and the nature of the cognitive and expressive processes by which individuals negotiate a relationship such that this complementarity arises.

The statement of the improvisational view involved a diagrammatic representation of the concept of informal role, but it was stated that such an illustration was not open to empirical test. What, then, is amenable to empirical study, such that support might be found for the improvisational view? Rather than allow the improvisational view to suffer dismissal, as has Role Theory, as merely a system of concepts and labels for describing various phenomena of social interaction, some attempt must be made to assess the validity of the model. Such empirical assessment could take a number of routes, four of which will be mentioned here.

The first empirical approach would involve analysis of accounts (cf. Harré and Secord, 1972) of encounters given by interactants, in an attempt to assess the degree of fit between natural phenomenologies of social behaviour and the improvisational view. The validity of the improvisational view does not, of course, require that all naive interactants should share the view, and proof that they do would not totally validate the view, but would simply suggest that the level of complexity with which social interaction is endowed by the improvisational view was at least appropriate.

Secondly, the "contents" of encounters together, possibly, with accounts of their actions by interactants, could be appraised by employing the improvisational view as an analytic tool, and the degree of understanding provided by the tool assessed. Such a method has already been employed with some success but with a neglect of the question as to the nature of persons such that they may participate in such processes, by, for example, Goffman.

A third strategy might be to provide interactants with elements (concepts regarding social behaviour) from the improvisational approach and to ask them to report on their social experience in such terms. Predictions made on the basis of the view might be assessed by more - or - less conventional means given that interactant and "experimenter" shared this provided set of concepts.

A fourth approach follows from the discussion of social competences in Chapter One. If the improvisational view is valid, people must be, to some degree, capable of behaving in the ways suggested by the view. They must be able to attribute and improvise more or less effectively, and to perform in accordance with these cognitive skills. Some evidence in favour of the possession of such competences has been reviewed, but

more detailed examination of attributive and improvisational skills is required.

In pursuance of the "complementarity of roles" notion, some examination may be made of the fundamental "performer-audience" dichotomy, both by manipulating features of encounters likely to be associated with differential standpoints of dyadic members, and by investigating interactants' experience of such encounters (by partial resort to the third empirical approach) and assessing whether people can construe encounters in performer-audience terms when such concepts are provided. If people can do so, then their accounts may be examined for compatibility with the predicted effects of the manipulations.

The simple approach of distinguishing between "performer" and "audience" activity in the dyad, of proposing that most informal role relationships are characterized by the imbalance in these terms and of examining the nature of cognitive and expressive processes in "performer-audience" terms, has been taken in the last two, and the present, chapters. The experimental work reported in the next three chapters followed the same basic pattern, and the approaches adopted followed mainly the fourth line outlined here.

The performer-audience studies to be described in the next chapter, looked at the simple hypothesis that many encounters are imbalanced in performer-audience terms (active and responsive "sets") as the notion of the establishment of an informal role relationship would suggest, and tested predictions about the effects of manipulation of setting and partner's role, and overt actions, on the establishment of such relationships.

The hypotheses derived in Chapter Three, that people would be able

to attribute roles to an absent alter on the basis of cues derived from the performance of that alter's partners, and that such a skill was related to the ability to take the role of the other were examined in the studies to be reported in Chapter Six. Similarly, hypotheses concerning improvisational and performance skills and their association with other skills (derived in this chapter) were studied experimentally as reported in Chapter Seven.

The possible mediation of the exhibition of these cognitive skills in performance by "superficial" and more deeply-rooted individual difference variables was examined in all studies undertaken, and the results of these examinations are discussed in Chapter Eight.

All the experimental and survey studies undertaken represent attempts to employ a "conventional" methodology to assess the value of the improvisational view, which was generated by paying attention both to models and empirical findings within "conventional" experimental social psychology and to the theories and insights located within the general orientation referred to as "symbolic interaction".

CHAPTER FIVE

Studies investigating performer-audience imbalance

1. Introduction

In Chapter Two, it was suggested that it might be fruitful to view dyadic social encounters as analogous to "performer-audience" systems. The improvisational approach to social interaction stresses that, in the majority of encounters, all participants are simultaneously improvising performances, and assessing the behaviour of themselves and of the other participants, that is, adopting both "performer" and "audience" stand-points continuously. The approach also emphasises that behaviour in encounters is usually constrained by some agreement between members as to the informal roles which they are performing vis à vis each other. These informal roles are presumed to be shaped by the dyadic partners themselves, both by recognition of formal Role expectations (or "formal Situational Definitions") where these are supplied by the culture, and by negotiation during an encounter.

It was proposed that a general feature of many informal role relationships is a degree of imbalance in performer-audience terms. Performer-audience imbalance, as an aspect of the constraints imposed on social behaviour within encounters by the nature of a relevant (recognised by the dyad's members) formal Role relationship, would, for example, obviate a certain degree of negotiation, since the relatively "audience" member would have greater "casting" power than the "performer" member. Performer-audience imbalance was not equated with power differential in general, however, since the relatively "performer" member of a dyad was seen to have certain "advantages" over the "audience"

member, advantages of a different kind to those of the "audience" member.

Support for the notion that the degree of performer-audience imbalance is an important feature of dyadic relationships was found in the recent emphasis on the importance of "feedback" from his partner to a social interactant. A person is presumed to refer to his partner's performance as informative about the effectiveness of his own. While auditory feedback (the partner's vocal behaviour) is available only at certain points in an encounter, visual feedback (the partner's facial and gestural movements), is almost always available and may be sampled "at will" by the interactant. It was suggested that a "performer" would be more dependent on such feedback than a relatively "audience" member of a dyad.

It seemed likely that people would express their subjective experience of what has been described here as a performer or audience standpoint in terms of feeling relatively, the "observer" or the "observed". In the experimental and survey investigations described in this chapter, people were asked to make a variety of judgements concerning "feeling the observer" and "feeling the observed". In Chapter Two it was noted that, at any point in an encounter, a person is likely to feel both "observed" (performer) and "observer" (audience) to his partner, and that at any point he is also likely to feel more "observer" (or "observed") than during a previous phase of the encounter.

Here, the focus was not on transitory stages of encounters, but on performer-audience imbalance, or "observer-observed" differentiation, as a feature both of constraints governing "prototypic" informal role relationships and of informal role relationships emerging in particular encounters. People were asked to review their subjective experience of particular face-to-face encounters, or their general experience of various kinds of encounter, and to make judgements of whether, in these encounters,

they tended to feel mainly the "observer" or the "observed".

The first study sought to establish whether such enquiries are meaningful to people and whether crude manipulation of the physical setting (differential illumination of dyadic members) affects judgements of being the observer or the observed during an encounter. To find out whether "feeling observed" depends on awareness of differential feedback availability, enquiries about the effectiveness of reception of feedback from the partner, and about how well the respondent thought his partner could assess his reactions, were made. The Role relationship of interviewer-interviewee was imposed on interacting dyads, since this involves expectations of appraisal and implies greater dependence on feedback by the interviewee; it was predicted that interviewers would state feeling relatively less observed than interviewees.

The second study involved an attempt to replicate the findings of the first experiment, and to test a further hypothesis derived in Chapter Two, that females would tend to adopt performer (observed) standpoints in encounters with males of the same age as themselves, and that males in this situation would adopt relatively audience (observer) standpoints. It was expected that, in general, females might tend to feel more "observed" than males, and that there might be "rules" specifying appropriate performer-audience standpoints to be taken in encounters with strangers of the opposite sex. In Chapter Two, it was suggested that where no Formal Role expectations applied to an encounter, observable characteristics of the participants might affect performer-audience standpoints adopted, and that these might include the relative ages of the participants as well as their sex. It was hypothesised that people would feel more observed when with someone whom they thought to be "older" than themselves, than with someone whom they thought to be of their age, and more the observer when with younger

dyadic partners. A questionnaire was designed in order to test these hypotheses, and this was distributed to a group of adolescents (who were expected to be sensitive to such "rules" if they existed) in Study Three.

Study Four was an experimental investigation which explored the relationships between "feeling observed" and the gaze behaviour of a dyadic partner. Audience behaviour is conceptually associated with gaze behaviour; gaze orientation toward a dyadic partner indicates attention to him, and appraisal of him as a performer. At the same time, visual feedback may only be obtained from his partner by a performer, if he, in turn, gazes towards his "audience" partner. The simple hypothesis tested was that people feel more the observed, the more their partner gazes at them during an encounter. It was possible that an "ego" might be aware of an "alter's" high level of gaze, and feel the observed accordingly. Alternatively, ego might be aware of alter's high gaze level, but not feel any more the observed; ego might, for example, regard alter's gaze behaviour as feedback-seeking (performer behaviour) rather than as appraising (audience behaviour). A further possibility was that ego might not be directly aware of an alter's gaze behaviour, but nevertheless feel more observed when alter looked more.

It was also proposed that when an opposite sex alter gazed for a large proportion of the time, a female ego, being more used to the implied performer standpoint, would report feeling more comfortable, and greater enjoyment of an encounter, than would males in such a situation.

It was recognised that a person's accuracy in estimating a partner's level of gaze, and perhaps consequently, his degree of feeling observed, might be related to his own amount of looking during an encounter; a person who himself looked for little of the time might be less likely

to regard himself as observer or audience to the other. The amount of time for which dyadic members looked at each other was measured in a second stage of Study Four. Also during this second stage, interactants were asked to complete the "O-O questionnaire" employed in Study Three (enquiring about the degree to which people felt that they were observer or observed in six "prototypic" dyadic situations, defined by describing the age and sex of a dyadic partner relative to those of the respondent). It was expected that there might be positive relationships between the degrees to which respondents stated feeling observed in everyday, and in experimental encounters.

These four studies were carried out with M. Argyle (Argyle and Williams, 1969); Study Two had been conducted by two undergraduates: W.D. Marslem-Wilson and A.R. Woodfield.

The main hypothesis examined in Study Three was that certain "rules" existed with regard to appropriate performer-audience standpoints for encounters between strangers of different sex and age. In order to establish the generality of such rules, further surveys employing the questionnaire introduced in the third study were conducted. In the Fifth Study, the questionnaire was administered to a different group of adolescent respondents, and by a second later administration, the reliability of the questionnaire, assessed.

It was not assumed that "feeling the observer" precludes "feeling observed"; Goffman's (1957) view, for example, would suggest that some encounters may be characterised by heightened awareness of both performer and audience activity by an interactant. People were asked whether they felt mainly the observed or the observer in a variety of encounters, so that they need not assume unidimensionality of "observer-observed" in order to complete the questionnaire. Study Five sought

also to ascertain whether people use the 0-0 scales in a manner suggesting assumed unidimensionality or not, and whether people differed amongst themselves in this respect.

Study Six involved a number of further administrations of the 0-0 questionnaire to people of different ages and backgrounds. It was expected that if "rules" governing appropriate performer-audience standpoints in encounters were evident in the questionnaire responses of the adolescent respondents of Studies Three and Five, then they might not be indicated by the responses of older respondents, for whom the salience of sex differences and age differences might be reduced.

2. Study One

A. Introduction

This exploratory study was conducted in order to discover whether the "Observer-Observed" dimension was meaningful to people, and whether crude manipulation of features of a dyadic encounter would affect dyadic members' judgements of the extent to which they were the "observed". It was predicted that people would feel more observed when in the light than when in the dark, and when performing within the constraints imposed by the expectations for the formal Role of "Interviewee" than when performing the Role of "Interviewer".

These hypotheses had been derived from evidence that feedback about the effectiveness of his performance is important to an interactant; it was expected that interactants would report disequilibrium in terms of feedback availability, if asked how well they could tell how their partners were reacting to them, and how well they thought their partner could assess their reactions to them.

If a performer-audience "balance" is a characteristic of informal role relationships emerging within (experimentally imposed) constraints, it would be expected that this characteristic should be reflected not only in the statements of individuals about their experiences in different experimental encounters, but also in the relationships between the statements of each member of a dyad. That is, if one member feels predominantly the observed (performer) then the other should state feeling that he is predominantly the observer (audience). There is a difference between asserting that one member feels slightly more the observed than the other, and that one member feels that he is predominantly the observer while the other feels predominantly the observed. It is the latter case which would indicate performer-audience imbalance as a characteristic of an informal role relationship.

B. Method.

The experiment was conducted in a laboratory room, visible from another experimenter's room by means of a one-way screen and audible via an "intercom" system. A series of "encounters" were arranged between pairs of male undergraduates from Oxford University; each of the four pairs participated in four separate encounters. For each encounter, two people were brought into the laboratory by an experimenter and asked to sit in two chairs so that they were five feet apart (eye-to-eye). The room was partly darkened, the main light coming from an anglepoise lamp, shining on one person at an angle of forty-five degrees to his line of regard, and arranged so that it was two feet in front of his face, and shining from two feet above. This person was, effectively, in the light (L), the other being in the dark (D), as shown overleaf in Figure 5:1.

Each person took part in four two-minute encounters with the same partner, two as interviewer (Q), two as interviewee (A) two in the light (L), and two in the dark (D). Thus there were four conditions: QL, QD, AL, and AD. During the encounters dyads were asked to discuss the Interviewee's preferences for: books (b), films and theatre (f), hobbies and interests (h), and travel and holidays (t). The order of conditions and topics followed a Graeco-Latin Square design, as shown overleaf in Figure 5:2




Figure 5:1

Arrangement of seating and illumination in Study One.

Order:		1	2	3	4
Persons:	1	Q L	Q D	A L	A D
	2	A D	A L	Q D	Q L
"	3	A D	A L	Q D	Q L
	4	Q L	Q D	A L	A D
"	5	Q D	Q L	A D	A L
	6	A L	A D	Q L	Q D
"	7	A L	A D	Q L	Q D
	8	Q D	Q L	A D	A L

Figure 5:2


Order of experimental conditions in Study One.

Four pairs of males experienced the four encounters with partners unchanged, and were instructed before each as to the topic, and which of them was to take the role of Interviewer (Q). They were also shown the three rating scales on which they would later be asked to note their subjective experience of each encounter. These 18-point rating scales are shown below in Figure 5:3.


Figure 5:3

Rating Scales used in Study One.


-
1. How well could you tell how the other person was reacting to you?



2. How well do you think the other person could tell how you were reacting to him?



3. Which of you was mainly the observer in this situation?



Participants were asked to ensure that they did not discuss the experiment, nor their subjective experience of the encounters, with each other, until otherwise instructed; during all encounters, interactants were under observation from the experimental room. After two minutes, the experimenter interrupted the encounter, and led interactants to

separate rooms, asking them to complete the three rating scales for that encounter by circling the point on each scale which best represented their experience of the conversation.

C. Results

Rating Scale responses were scored from 0 to 18, a high score indicating good feedback reception (Scale 1), good feedback reception for partner (Scale 2), and a tendency to feel the observer (Scale 3), respectively. Mean scores ($\bar{X}$), and standard deviations (s.d.) over the 8 interactants, for each experimental condition, are shown below in Table 5:1

Table 5:1
Means and standard deviations of scale response
in Study One.

Condition		Scale 1	Scale 2	Scale 3
LIGHT	Q	$\bar{X}$	9.125	8.875
		s.d.	(4.61)	(3.66)
	A	$\bar{X}$	10.250	7.875
		s.d.	(2.61)	(4.02)
DARK	Q	$\bar{X}$	12.000	9.750
		s.d.	(3.70)	(2.50)
	A	$\bar{X}$	12.875	7.875
		s.d.	(3.60)	(3.00)
over LIGHT	X	9.688	9.563	9.563
	s.d.	(3.67)	(4.05)	(4.10)
Q&A DARK	X	12.438	11.375	10.625
	s.d.	(3.56)	(3.78)	(4.23)
over Q	X	10.563	9.313	12.313
	s.d.	(4.49)	(4.32)	(3.61)
I&D A	X	11.563	11.625	7.875
	s.d.	(3.33)	(3.30)	(3.42)

for the repeated measures design employed (cf. Winer, 1970)

Analyses of variance (Guilford, 1965) were conducted for each scale: the results of these analyses are shown overleaf in Table 5:2.

Table 5:2

Analyses of variance for Study One on perception of other's reactions (1), perceived accuracy of perception of other (2), and "feeling observed" (3).

		(1)			(2)			(3)		
Source	df	MS	F	p	MS	F	p	MS	F	p
light/ dark (LD)	1	60.50	8.67	.05	26.28	2.96	n.s.	9.03	0.70	n.s.
inter- viewer/ ee (QA)	1	8.00	1.15	n.s.	47.78	4.81	n.s.	157.53	12.25	.01
persons (i)	7	16.55	2.37	n.s.	18.17	2.04	n.s.	14.85	1.16	n.s.
LD x QA	1	0.13	0.02	n.s.	7.03	0.79	n.s.	6.23	0.48	n.s.
LD x i	7	14.50	2.08	n.s.	11.28	1.27	n.s.	9.89	0.77	n.s.
QA x i	7	16.71	2.39	n.s.	20.21	2.27	n.s.	13.25	1.03	n.s.

The hypothesis that people would feel more observed (Scale 3) in the light than when they were in the dark, was not confirmed. As predicted, people did feel more the observed when they were being interviewed than when they were acting as Interviewer ($p < .01$). The manipulation of illumination did affect how well people thought they could tell how their partner was reacting to them, reception of visual

feedback being judged as better when a partner was in the light ($p < .05$). The logical concomitant of this judgement, that the partner could tell how a person was reacting to him better when that person was in the light, was not, however, asserted. The adoption of Interviewee/Interviewer Roles affected neither people's judgements of their own, nor of their partner's, adequacy of feedback reception.

It was predicted that, where one member of a dyad felt predominantly the observed, the other would feel predominantly the observer. A count was made of the number of encounters where this was the case, that is, where one member of a dyad scored below the neutral point (9) on scale 3, and the other member scored above that point. Other cases (both neutral, one neutral, and both above and both below neutral), were also noted. The total number of such cases, for each combination of Role with illumination, are shown in Table 5:3. Table 5:3 also shows the number of cases where the direction of the difference between dyadic member's scores was against that predicted according to the Role manipulation, that is, where the interviewer (Q) felt more observed than the interviewee (A); these are signified (x pred.). The number of cases, in each category, to be expected by chance are also shown.

Table 5:3
Cases of performer-audience complementarity
in Study One.

Condition	Both at 9	One at 9	One > 9 & One < 9	Both < 9 or > 9
QL	0	3(2xpred)	5(1x pred)	0
AD				
QD	0	2	5(1x pred)	1
AL				
Total:	0	5	10	1
No. expected (by chance)	0	2	7	7

It is apparent by inspection of Table 5:3, that more people than would be expected by chance, used the neutral point. In no case did both members of a dyad use the neutral point. Of the people using the neutral point, two were members of dyads where the performer-audience imbalance (taking 9 as a "central" rather than a "neutral" point) was against that predicted in terms of Interviewer-Interviewee relationship. Both of these were in the "ambiguous" condition, where the illumination and Role manipulations were "in conflict", (interviewer in the light). Of the other two cases where the difference in scale scores was against that predicted, only one was in the non-conflict QD/AL condition. That, in more than 25% of encounters, one member used the neutral point, and that no person used the point for more than one encounter, suggests some confusion about the informal role relationship in question, rather than a confusion as to the meaning of the scale. Use of the "neutral" point was not associated with the order of encounters, with either Q or A Roles, nor with either L or D manipulation. For those 11 encounters where the neutral point was not employed by either participant, 10 evidenced the imbalance and complementarity of observer-observed, which had been predicted.

These data, while crude, indicate that dyads agreed, in the majority of cases, as to who was the performer and audience member respectively. In other encounters, there seems to have been uncertainty on the part of one member about the standpoints of each; in only one encounter was disagreement apparent. The fact that so many (in comparison with chance expectation) used the neutral point at some juncture during the experiment, might indicate genuine reflection on their experience of the encounter, rather than a "stating of the obvious" in the light of the experimental manipulations.

Before discussing further the implications of the results of this experiment, a more sophisticated replication will be described.

3. Study Two.

A. Introduction.

This experiment followed the same design as Study One, with minor modifications in procedure. Replication of the findings of Study One was sought, and the hypothesis that females would feel more observed than males in encounters between male and female strangers was tested. This hypothesis was based on Argyle et al's (1968) finding that females were more uncomfortable than males when visual feedback about their partner's reaction to them was not available, and Exline's (1963) suggestion that women value visual feedback in encounters more than men do.

The basis for this sex-difference in dependence on feedback from interactive partners, as suggested in Chapter Two, may be cultural norms about sex-appropriate behaviour. Females, it was suggested, tend to "perform" to males as audiences. Males would be expected by members of western culture to be accustomed to exert dominance over the course of an encounter, and over the negotiation of the informal role relationship; altercasting behaviour would be expected to be anticipated of males by females. This "dominance" in social encounters is likely to be associated with the more general norms applying to male dominance and aggressiveness. Such normative expectations would lead females to be more dependent on visual feedback in encounters, and to their being comparatively more uncomfortable when such feedback is removed, to be more used to taking a performer than an audience standpoint in encounters, and, over all encounters, to feel somewhat more "observed" than males.

More precisely, females would be expected to state feeling more observed than males.

In this experiment, males participated in encounters with four different females in turn.

B. Method.

Two identical experimental sessions were run with four male undergraduates and four female undergraduates participating in each, following a graeco-latin square design which rotated individuals, topics and conditions. The topics as in Study One, the four experimental conditions combining illumination (L and D), Role (Q and A) and Sex (M and F) were: QMD + AFL; QML + AFD; QFD + AML; QFL + AMD. Thus each person participated in a two-minute conversation with each of the four people of opposite sex in random order.

The Interviewee-Interviewer Role manipulation was strengthened by introducing the Interviewee (A) into the laboratory room, when the Interviewer (Q) was already present, seated, and established in his "territory" (Sommer, 1969). In this experiment, interactants were asked to complete only Scale 3 from Study One, since the focus here was solely on the "observer-observed" dimension. Otherwise, the procedure was as in Study One.

C. Results.

The "Observer-Observed" scale was scored from 0 to 18. Mean scores and standard deviations, on this scale, for each condition, are shown in Table 5:4.

Table 5:4

Means and standard deviations for "feeling observed"
in Study Two. (High Score = Observer).

		LIGHT		DARK	
		Q	A	Q	A
Males:	$\bar{X}$	14.500	8.188	14.500	10.175
(N = 8)	s.d.	(3.55)	(4.18)	(2.73)	(4.50)
Females	$\bar{X}$	9.875	6.750	12.750	7.125
(N = 8)	s.d.	(4.60)	(5.04)	(3.32)	(3.73)
Whole sample	$\bar{X}$	9.828		11.138	
(N = 16)	s.d.	(4.60)		(4.46)	

Mean scores and standard deviations on the observer-observed scale for males and females, Interviewees (A) and Interviewers (Q), (including both illumination conditions) are shown in Table 5:5.

TABLE 5:5

Means and standard deviations for "feeling Observed" for males and females, Interviewees and Interviewers.

		Q	A	Q and A
Males (N = 8)	$\bar{X}$	14.500	9.181	11.841
	s.d.	(3.06)	(4.31)	(4.57)
Females (N = 8)	$\bar{X}$	11.313	6.938	9.125
	s.d.	(4.16)	(4.29)	(4.70)
Whole sample (N = 16)	$\bar{X}$	12.906	8.059	
	s.d.	(3.94)	(4.37)	

The data from which these means had been derived were submitted for the repeated measures design employed (cf. Winer, 1970) to an analysis of variance, the results of which are shown in

Table 5:6.

Table 5:6Analysis of variance for Study Two for "feeling observed".

Source	d.f.	MS	F	p
Light/dark (LD)	1	27.56	1.70	n.s.
Interviewer/ee (QA)	1	375.39	23.19	.001
Male/Female (S)	1	115.56	7.12	.01
LD x QA	1	0.57	0.04	n.s.
LD x S	1	1.90	0.12	n.s.
QA x S	1	4.00	0.25	n.s.

These findings replicate those obtained in Study One. Again, the manipulation of illumination did not affect whether people stated feeling observed, although observation of the mean scores in Table 5:4 would suggest that females were slightly more susceptible to the reduction in visual feedback when their partner was in the dark, and especially when he was interviewing them. As in the first experiment, people felt more observed when being interviewed than when interviewing.

Females felt more observed than males, but from the means in Table 5:5 it may be inferred that the Interviewee/Interviewer Role effect overrode this sex difference, that is, female Interviewers felt less observed than male Interviewees. It is noted that in this experiment, where all dyads included one male and one female, the mean "observer" score of male Interviewers was 14.5; in the previous study where all interactants were male, this mean score was 12.3. Even when in an Interviewee role, males in this study felt less observed ($\bar{X} = 9.181$)

than those in a similar position in the previous experiment ($\bar{X} = 7.875$). These observations suggest that encounters with female rather than male strangers may enhance males' tendencies to adopt audience standpoints, and to feel "observers".

As in the previous study, the number of instances where dyadic members' observer-observed scores reflected some agreement about the performer-audience imbalance in the dyad were noted. Total numbers of these instances are shown in Table 5:7.

Table 5:7
Cases of performer-audience complementarity in
Study Two.

Condition	Both at 9	One at 9	One > 9 & One < 9	Both < or > 9
QL	1	4	7(1 x pred)	4(3 x pred)
AD				
QD	1	1	9	5(4 x pred)
AL				
Total	2	5	16	9
No. expected by chance	0	4	14	14

In terms of demonstrating agreement about the informal role relationship, these data are less impressive than those obtained in the last experiment. Here, only slightly more (9:7) of the "deviant" cases occurred in the "conflict" condition (QL/AD), and inspection of the raw data indicates that by no means the majority of such cases occurred where

there was a conflict between sex and Role, that is where the female was acting as Interviewer. Of the cases where there was imbalance against the direction predicted according to Role, however, the majority (7:1) occurred where there seemed to be confusion about performer-audience imbalance anyway, that is, where both members of the dyad scored on the same side of the neutral point. In this study, of the 9 "disagreement" cases, 7 were against the direction predicted, suggesting that the role relationship had not been sufficiently "negotiated" before the encounter was brought to a close. In this study, each person had a different interactive partner in each encounter, whereas in the first experiment, people were aware that they were embarking on a series of four encounters with the same partner, and may therefore have given more attention to the evolvment of some kind of "relationship" with him; against this suggestion, however, is the observation, in describing the results of the previous study, that order of encounters did not seem to be associated with evidence of performer-audience imbalance.

D. Discussion:

The first aim of these experiments was to see whether the "observer-observed" dimension was meaningful to people, that is, whether it could be used appropriately in referring to subjective experience of encounters. The experimental situation was itself likely to induce feelings of being "the observed". People who volunteer to take part in psychology experiments are well aware that their behaviour is to be scrutinised, and being on one side of a one-way screen may enhance such awareness. Further, people were shown beforehand the three scales (only one in the second study), that they were later to complete. They were likely, therefore, to have been highly sensitive to the concepts under investigation (to have been "interaction conscious", in Goffman's

(1957) terms).

It might be argued that by sensitizing subjects thus, they were being "cast" by the experimenters into an "audience" standpoint, which might have "compensated" for the "performer" standpoint probably induced by the experimental situation. The introduction of the rating scales to people, before the experimental sessions began, was deemed necessary by the experimenters. If people had been shown the scales for the first time after the first encounter, they would have been sensitized to the scale dimensions during the last three encounters but not during the first. Asking people to complete four sets of scales, after all four encounters had taken place, would have placed a heavy demand on their memories. In retrospect, the method chosen seems the most appropriate; people were effectively asked to be their own "experimenters", and no deception as to the purpose of the studies and the nature of the experimental manipulations was involved.

That people did not respond to the crudest experimental manipulation, the variation in degree of illumination, was surprising but instructive. If people had been responding only in terms of (the hypothesised) general rules governing statements of being the observer or the observed, then illumination manipulation would have been expected to evoke such statements. It seems likely, therefore, that the manipulation of illumination, being an explicit, and unavoidable, "state of affairs", was rejected by interactants as irrelevant to whether they felt that they were the observer or the observed in the particular encounters in which they were engaged.

Interactants' improvisations of the Roles of Interviewer and Interviewee (Q/A), on the other hand, may be presumed to have genuinely affected their experiences of being the observer or the observed. It

is admitted that there are rules governing appropriate responses in terms of Role, but these are probably less explicit, and more open to negotiation than "light/dark" rules. The failure to confirm the simple hypothesis that people will feel the observer in the dark and the observed when in the light, therefore supports the contention that interactants' use of the observer-observed scale was appropriate to the more important hypotheses with which these two studies were concerned.

This contention is further supported by peoples' use of the other two scales employed in Study One; they reported that they could tell better how their partner was reacting when he was in the light. That people did not say that they thought their partner could tell how they were reacting to him better when they were in the light, suggests again that they were using the scales in the light of their experience of the encounters, rather than in terms of what the "sensible", "logical", or appropriate comment would be.

The sex difference found in Study Two had been predicted, females tending to feel more the observed than males, but was "overridden" by the performance of the Interviewee and Interviewer Roles. It remains to be demonstrated that the obtained sex difference was based on cultural norms whereby females are expected to, and customarily do, occupy performer standpoints, at least in encounters with male strangers.

Perhaps the most interesting hypothesis, from the point of view of the improvisational approach, was that, within dyads, performer-audience imbalance induced by experimental manipulations should be evidenced in interactant's statements about whom they thought was mainly the observer. In the first study the data appeared to support the hypothesis, but that from the second study was disappointing. Two minutes is a short

time in which to expect sufficient agreement about an informal role relationship to emerge, for people to be able to state their relative positions with confidence; frequent (compared with chance level) use of the neutral point suggests that confidence in such judgements was generally fairly low. The second study was more complex in that a different partner was encountered each time, and the evident sex-difference may have added to the general confusion; it must be noted however that there was no more frequent use of the neutral point in the second study, and no "order effect" in the first.

In the second study there were simply more disagreements about who was who, in terms of observer and observed. Closer examination of these "disagreements" in the second study revealed that, in eight of the nine cases, the disagreement was as to who was the observer (audience) member, both members maintaining that they were. Four of these eight involved female Interviewees asserting an audience standpoint, and thus resisting two sources of pressure to "perform"; three of these females were also in the light, so that these were effectively resisting three "casting" sources. The other four of the eight disagreeing dyads involve male Interviewees refusing to be observed by female Interviewers. These disagreements are therefore, almost entirely, about who was dominant in the social sense rather than about who was submissive. The one case where both insisted that they were the observed involved an Interviewing female, apparently rejecting her Interviewer Role in favour of her sex Role as a determinant of observer-observed standpoint.

E. Conclusions.

The disconfirmation of the hypothesis that people would tend to feel the observed when they were in the light was interpreted as lending confidence to the view that their statements in these experiments

reflect their sensitivity to the more subtle features of encounters; a rather silly question had been asked to which people politely refused to reply. It was almost surprising that after enduring an encounter with a lamp bearing down on them, people did not report that they were definitely the observer, and vice versa. It seems as if people agreed not to respond to this experimental manipulation, rather as guests may tacitly agree not to cooperate with an overbearing and officious host.

That people did not evidence an awareness of an association between the availability of visible feedback and their standpoints as observer or observed, may suggest that in such brief encounters, where only the simplest "lines of actions" are involved, feedback may not be too important. The unlit member was reasonably visible to the other. That less information was available from him when he was unlit was indicated by the data in the first study. The extent to which feeling that one is the observer rather than the observed is related to the visual behaviour of one's partner and to the availability of visible feedback from him is examined in a later experiment; it may well be that, while availability of feedback affects "observer-observed" feelings, this availability is not noted by interactants at a conscious level.

The assessment of complementarity in performer-audience terms is difficult to achieve empirically. The results of the first study were a promising indication that such imbalance may be agreed upon by dyadic members; the results of the second study showed agreements but also disagreements. Interestingly enough, the latter could be attributed to four dominant ladies, and four uncooperative males, suggesting that further study of the bases for the obtained sex difference with regard to feeling the observer or the observed, be undertaken.

4. Study Three

A. Introduction.

This study involved a survey designed to find out whether the finding of the previous experiment, that females tended to feel more observed than males, had been induced by the experimental setting, or was the reflection of cultural norms prescribing relatively "performer" activity for females. It was predicted that, in general, women tend to feel more the "observed" in social encounters than males, and that this tendency would apply particularly in encounters with male strangers. Similarly, it was expected that males might feel more the observer in opposite-sex encounters, than in same-sex encounters. Alternatively, only females might be shown to vary their performer-audience standpoint in such encounters, males remaining relatively constant in their orientation.

In Chapter Two, it was predicted that a further source of performer-audience imbalance in dyadic encounters might be differences between the ages of the participants, such that people would tend to feel the observed when with an older person. As with the sex difference proposed above, the reverse, that people feel more the observer when with a younger partner, might be true; alternatively, people may retain their accustomed standpoint, age difference affecting only the standpoint of the younger member. If norms concerning performer-audience imbalance in dyads of different age and/or sex composition, are influential in the manner proposed, as suggested in Chapter Two, such norms may affect interactants' behaviour where age and sex differences are most salient, for example during late adolescence. The "standard" encounter, compared with which mixed-age and mixed-sex encounters would be expected to be "imbalanced" with regard to the performer-audience standpoints of their members, would be encounters between people of the same age and sex.

In order to examine these hypotheses, a questionnaire was designed, asking people whether they felt the observer or the observed in a series of role relationships, specified in terms of the age and sex of the other (relative to those of the person completing the questionnaire). Sex was specified as "same" or "opposite"; age as "older", "younger" or "same". This ambiguous mode of specifying age was adopted, since, from the point of view of informal role relationships, what is important is whether ego attributes "older" or "younger" to alter as a relevant factor in their relationship.

In order to make the specified role relationships "equivalent" for all people completing the questionnaire, it was stated that in all cases the "other" was someone whom the respondent had not met before. In order to give sufficient range for judgements of feeling the "observer" or the "observed", respondents were asked to use 9-point scales applying to each type of encounter. This questionnaire will hereafter be referred to as the "O-O" questionnaire".

B. Method.

The O-O questionnaire, headed "Performer-Audience Study" is shown in Figure 5:4.

Figure 5:4
The "0-0" questionnaire.

Performer-Audience Study

When you meet someone else for the first time (and no-one else is present), do you feel yourself to be mainly the "observed" or the "observer", when the other person is:-


1. of the same age and sex?



2. Younger, and of the same sex?




3. older, and of the same sex?




4. of the same age, and opposite sex?



5. younger, and of the opposite sex?



6. older, and of the opposite sex?



Personal Data

Age: -----

Male or Female: -----

This questionnaire was administered to 58 boys (of average age 17.2 years) and 63 girls (of average ^{age} 17.0 years) at a mixed grammar school in two sittings by two experimenters, after a brief introductory talk. After queries had been answered, respondents independently completed the questionnaires.

C. Results.

Scale responses to the O-O questionnaire were scored from 0 to 8, a high score indicating feeling "observed", with the "neutral point" at 4. Respondents received a score for each of the 6 scales. Two further scores were derived for each respondent from the 6 scale scores. To establish the general effect of the age of alter on feeling observed, scores from scales 2 and 5 (where alter was younger) were summed and subtracted from the sum of scores from scales 3 and 6 (where alter was older). If this score (score 7) were negative, this would show that that respondent felt more observed when with younger than with older people. Secondly, in order to determine the effects of alter's sex on feeling observed, scores from scales 1, 2 and 3 (where alter was of the same sex as the respondent), were summed and subtracted from the sum of scores from scales 4, 5, and 6 (where alter was of the opposite sex). If this score (score 8) were negative it would indicate that that respondent felt more observed with members of the same rather than of the opposite sex. The means and standard deviations of these 8 scores are shown below, for males and females separately, in Table 5:8.

TABLE 5:8

Means and standard deviations of scores from 0-0 questionnaire responses.

Other	Males (N = 58)		Females (N = 63)	
	$\bar{X}$	s.d.	$\bar{X}$	s.d.
1. same age, same sex	3.599	1.735	3.687	3.782
2. younger, same sex	2.565	2.274	2.599	2.862
3. older, same sex	4.854	2.315	5.504	2.594
4. same age, opposite sex	2.871	2.306	5.262	2.509
5. younger, opposite sex	2.866	2.417	2.560	2.329
6. older, opposite sex	4.746	2.386	6.079	2.105
7. effects of age	4.169	5.869	6.424	6.579
8. effects of sex	-0.535	5.250	2.111	4.927

The significance levels of differences between these means (by t-test; Guilford, 1965) for feeling observed are shown in Table 5:9.

Tests for differences between related samples and unrelated samples were used as appropriate.

TABLE 5:9

Significance of differences between means for males
(M) and females (F) shown in Table 5:9.

COMPARISON			t	p<
M : opposite sex	older (6) vs. younger (5)		4.2	.001
M : same sex	" (3) " " (2)		4.9	.001
F : opposite sex	" (6) " " (5)		7.9	.001
F : same sex	" (3) " " (2)		6.3	.001
M : same age	same sex (1) vs. opp. sex (4)		1.9	n.s.
F : " "	" " " " " "		2.8	.01
Same age, same sex (1)	M vs. F		0.17	n.s.
Same age, opp. sex (4)	" " "		5.4	.001
Age effect (7)	" " "		2.2	.05
Sex effect (8)	" " "		4.2	.01

Although there was a slight difference in the predicted direction between the degree to which males and females stated feeling observed with people of the same age and sex, this difference was not statistically significant. With people of the same age and opposite sex however, females did, as predicted, feel more observed than with same-sex partners. Males did not seem to be affected by the sex of another of the same age. This suggests that it is females rather than males who "shift" their standpoint in encounters according to the sex of the other, so that

performer-audience imbalance, if present in a mixed sex encounter, is reflected in a change of orientation by the female rather than the male. The significant difference between males' and females' "sex effect" scores may not be entirely due to females' discrimination between same- and opposite-sex others, however; the mean "sex effect score" for males was negative, suggesting that over all encounters involving females, males do tend to be somewhat more "the observer" than when they are with males.

As predicted, both males and females stated feeling more observed with older than with younger partners, both when partners are of the same sex as themselves and when of the opposite sex. From the means, it appears that this difference, for both same- and opposite-sex partners, was greater for females than for males; the significant difference between the mean age effect scores of males and females suggests that females were indeed more sensitive to the age of alter as a determinant of feeling observed, than were the males.

In order to see if there were any generality of "feeling observed" across encounters, that is, if there were any basis for asserting that there might be relatively consistent individual differences in performer-audience standpoint in all encounters, product-moment coefficients of correlation (r) were computed (Guilford, 1965) as measures of relationships between respondents' scores on the 6 scales of the O-O questionnaire. These coefficients are shown in Table 5:10.

Of the six significant coefficients for males, five were positive, indicating some generality in feeling observed or observer over encounters with different alters. For females, only four coefficients were significant, and only two of these positive, indicating that females, while exhibiting some generality over encounters, tend to modify their standpoint

Table 5:10

Coefficients of correlation (r) between "feeling observed" on different 0-0 scales for 58 males and 63 females in Study Three

Scales:						
1. (same age, same sex)		-0.080	<u>0.293*</u>	<u>0.318*</u>	-0.132	0.172
2. (younger, same sex)	0.058		<u>-0.251*</u>	-0.151	<u>0.569**</u>	-0.045
3. (older, same sex)	0.031	<u>-0.479**</u>		0.063	-0.068	<u>0.369**</u>
4. (same age, opposite sex)	0.182	0.144	-0.164		0.178	<u>0.448**</u>
5. (younger, opposite sex)	0.158	<u>0.267*</u>	-0.217	<u>0.342**</u>		0.201
6. (older, opposite sex)	-0.080	-0.146	0.211	-0.029	<u>-0.372**</u>	
FEMALES						

M
A
L
E
S

* p< .05

** p< .01

vis à vis particular kinds of "alters", more than do males. This was suggested by the previous observation of the differences between the mean scores of females, for different kinds of encounter. Both the males and the females evidenced the effect of the age of the other in modifying their feelings of being observed; the significant ($M : \bar{r} = -0.251; p < .05; F : \bar{r} = -0.479; p < .01$) negative relationships between scale scores for encounters where the other was older and of the same sex, and those for encounters where the other was younger and of the same sex, suggested that the more a person feels observer toward a younger person, the more he will feel observed by an older person. Similarly, both males and females evidenced the effects of the sex of the other, when the other was younger; significant positive relationships ($M : \bar{r} = 0.569; p < .01; F : \bar{r} = 0.267; p < .05$) indicated that the more a person feels observer with a younger person of the opposite sex, the more he will feel observer with a younger person of the same sex.

Given the effective demonstration of the susceptibility of subjective feelings of being observer or observed, to the age and sex of the other in a dyadic encounter, the data in Table 5:10 are deemed evidence of some degree of generality of feeling observed for particular individuals, over encounters; more detailed inspection of the coefficients would suggest over which encounters in particular such generality is evidenced for males and for females.

D. Discussion.

Although the predicted difference between males and females in feeling observed (with a person of the same age and sex) was not obtained, it was found, as expected, that both males and females felt more observed when with an older, than with a younger, dyadic partner. Females felt more observed when with a male than when with a female. It

seems likely that females change their standpoint vis à vis the sex of the other, more than do males, "performing" more with males than with females.

Some evidence in favour of the view that, while performer-audience standpoint in dyadic encounters is predictably governed by norms regarding the age and sex composition of the dyad, individuals bring to encounters a proclivity for feeling the observed or the observer in social encounters, was obtained by inspection of the degrees to which scores on the various O-O scales were related to each other. The significant relationships found were as would be expected, suggesting that such relationships were not due to individual differences in the use of 9-point scales, but rather, to the nature of the O-O "dimension" and its applicability to informal role relationships within dyadic encounters.

E. Conclusions.

This study provided support for the notion that, while individuals may differ in the extent to which they feel observer or observed in encounters in general, they also respond differentially to partners of different ages and sex. While the nature of the O-O questionnaire may be viewed as demanding that people give different judgements of feeling the observer or the observed in each of the six situations specified, that they agree with each other to the extent that significant differences are found between their mean degrees of feeling observed with older and with younger alters and, for females, with same- and opposite-sex alters, suggests that there are "rules" with regard to appropriate performer-audience standpoints in different kinds of encounter.

5. Study Four.

A. Introduction.

This study sought to examine the relationship between "feeling observed" in dyadic encounters and the partner's gaze behaviour. Gaze behaviour is conceptually related to the notion of "feeling observed" and may be regarded as an indication of "audience" activity. The results of the first two studies suggested that feeling observed in an encounter does not depend on recognition by interactants of disequilibrium in the availability of visual "feedback" to each. The feedback manipulation had been crude, and not such as to interfere with awareness of partners' gaze.

In Chapter Two it was noted that gaze may fulfil an "audience" function in providing feedback to a partner, but also that gaze serves as the means by which a "performer" obtains such feedback; performers would be expected to "sample" feedback by gazing at appropriate points, rather than to employ gaze to "appraise" in an "audience" manner. Despite these complexities, two simple hypotheses were derived and were investigated in this study.

It was expected that a person would feel more observed, the more a dyadic partner gazed at him, and that such subjective feelings might be mediated by an awareness of the partner's gaze behaviour. If the partner's gaze did affect feelings of being observed, it was further predicted that, in opposite-sex encounters, females would experience greater enjoyment and comfort than males, when their partner gazed at them for most of the time. The study was conducted in two stages, methodological improvements and further data collection in the second stage allowing subsidiary hypotheses to be investigated.

B. Method.

Both stages of the study involved 3-minute conversations between interactants and confederates of the opposite sex. Confederates (C) were employed so that the extent to which one member of a dyad gazed

at the other during an encounter could be manipulated. Confederates were psychology graduate students who were trained to look at another for more-or-less fixed percentages of time during encounters while following the normal pattern of eye-movements for those who look much or little (Kendon, 1967). During the experimental conversations, both the "naive" interactant and C sat close to a one-way vision screen so that an observer on the other side of the screen could assess the amount of time C actually looked at his partner.

Interactants were non-psychology Oxford undergraduates. They were told that they were to take part in an "experiment on conversation", that they would have two 3-minute conversations with other "naive" participants (actually Cs), and that they would be advised by the experimenters, before each conversation, what topic they were to discuss, being asked to begin the conversation in each case. They were informed that, after the two conversations, they would be asked questions about their experience of them.

In one conversation the confederate looked most of the time (High Gaze), in the other, C looked for little of the time (Low Gaze). Confederates took the low and high gaze conditions in counterbalanced order. Order of topics, (last year's holiday (a) and this year's holiday (b)) was also counterbalanced, as shown in Figure 5:5.

Figure 5:5
Experiment design for Study Four.


Interactants	First Conversation			Second Conversation		
	Confederate	top- ic	Gaze	Confederate	top- ic	Gaze
1. (5, 9, 13, etc.)	1	a	Low	2	b	High
2. (6, 10, 14, etc.)	1	b	High	2	a	Low
3. (7, 11, 15, etc.)	2	b	Low	1	a	High
4. (8, 12, 16, etc.)	2	a	High	1	b	Low

In stage A, 8 males and 8 females had two conversations each with a C who looked for 80% of the time (high gaze) or for 20% of the time (low gaze).

In stage B, 12 males and 12 females had three conversations with a C, the first conversation being intended to allow the interactant (as he was informed) to become accustomed to the experimental situation; C looked for about 60% of the time in this encounter. During this stage, the amount of time during the encounter when an interactant looked at C was assessed by observers on the other side of the screen.

In both stages, rating scales were given to all interactants after the end of the second "experimental" conversation. These rating scales are shown in Figure 5:6.

Figure 5:6
Rating scales for Study Four.



Two sets of these rating scales, one set for each encounter, were given to interactants, who were instructed that Scale 3 referred to their partner's (C's) observation of them, with especial reference to looking behaviour, and that Scale 1 referred to their experience. In Stage B interactants were also asked to complete the O-O questionnaire (as employed in Study Three), after completing, and relinquishing, the rating scales for the two encounters.

C. Results.

The rating scale responses were scored from 0 to 8, as indicated in Figure 5:6, a high score signifying high degrees of feeling observed, high enjoyment, high comfort, and a high percentage of perceived looking

(in terms of time during the encounter). The mean scores and standard deviations, obtained by males and females, and for the whole sample, in high and low gaze encounters, and in encounters with regard to order, for these scales are shown below in Table 5:11.

Table 5:11
Means and standard deviations of scale responses, for
gaze, sex, and order of encounters.

Scale:		1. feeling observed	2. enjoyment	3. perceived looking	4. Com- fort	
GAZE:	HIGH	$\bar{X}$ s.d.	3.8 (1.9)	4.9 (1.4)	51.2% (16.7)	5.2 (1.4)
	LOW	$\bar{X}$ s.d.	3.9 (2.0)	5.5 (1.4)	46.2 % (21.8)	5.4 (1.6)
SEX :	MALE (N = 20)	$\bar{X}$ s.d.	3.9 (2.1)	5.3 (1.2)	48.9% (20.7)	5.7 (1.2)
	FEMALE (N = 20)	$\bar{X}$ s.d.	3.9 (1.7)	5.1 (1.7)	48.6% (18.4)	4.9 (1.7)
ORDER:	1.	$\bar{X}$ s.d.	4.2 (1.8)	5.2 (1.3)	50.6% (18.8)	5.0 (1.4)
	2.	$\bar{X}$ s.d.	3.6 (2.0)	5.2 (1.6)	46.8% (20.2)	5.6 (1.6)

for the repeated measures design employed (cf. Winer, 1970)
Analyses of Variance were carried out for the scores on the four
rating scales; a summary of the results of these analyses is shown in
Table 5:12.

Table 5:12

Summary of analyses of variance for scores on
rating scales (Study Four)

Source	df	feeling observed (1)			enjoyment (2)		
		m. s.	F	p	m. s.	F	p
Hi/Lo. Gaze (G)	1	0.185	0.05	ns	6.133	3.01	ns
Sex (S)	1	0.007	0.00	ns	0.851	0.42	ns
Order (O)	1	7.657	2.03	ns	0.006	0.00	ns
G x S	1	5.751	1.53	ns	2.610	1.28	ns
S x O	1	0.520	0.14	ns	3.220	1.58	ns
G x O	1	7.051	1.87	ns	1.237	0.61	ns
G x S x O	1	0.063	0.17	nc	2.001	0.98	ns

Source	df	perceived looking (3)			comfort (4)		
		m. s.	F	p	m. s.	F	p
Hi/Lo. Gaze (G)	1	500.0	1.56	ns	0.488	0.22	ns
Sex (S)	1	1.8	0.01	ns	14.323	6.43	.05
Order (O)	1	281.2	0.89	ns	6.244	2.80	ns
G x S	1	2928.2	9.19	.01	1.213	0.54	ns
S x O	1	572.5	1.79	ns	3.301	1.48	ns
G x O	1	110.5	0.35	ns	0.167	0.07	ns
G x S x O	1	101.2	0.32	ns	1.526	0.68	ns

With regard to feeling observed in the two encounters, the main finding was that interactants felt no more observed when their partner was looking at them a lot (90% or 80% of the time), than when he was looking at them only a little (10% or 20% of the time).

People's enjoyment of the encounters was unaffected by gaze, sex of interactant, or order of encounters. Comfort in the encounters was affected by the sex of the interactant, males feeling more comfortable than females as indicated by the mean scores in Table 5:11. Although there were no demonstrable effects of gaze manipulation, sex of interactant, or order of encounters, on the degree to which C was believed to be looking at an interactant, there was an "interaction" effect, between sex of interactant and gaze manipulation, such that males perceived C as looking more in the high gaze encounter and females perceived C as looking more in the low gaze encounter. The means demonstrating this interaction effect are shown below in Table 5:13.

Table 5:13

Mean scores for perceived looking by partner.

GAZE:		HIGH		LOW	
SEX OF INTERACTANT:		MALE	FEMALE	MALE	FEMALE
Perceived Looking:					
	$\bar{X}$	57.4%	45.0%	40.3%	52.1%
	s.d.	(17.94)	(12.08)	(19.20)	(22.13)

It would seem that males were to some extent aware of their partner's gaze behaviour but that this did not affect the degree to which they felt observed; no difference between feeling observed in high- and low-gaze encounters was demonstrated by the analysis of variance. It was decided to assess whether, within gaze conditions, there was any association between estimates of partner's gaze and degree of feeling observed. Since the prediction was simply that the more C was estimated to be looking, the more an interactant would feel observed, rank correlation (Guilford, 1965) was deemed suitable. The coefficients (r_s) obtained for interactants in stage B are shown below in Table 5:14; medians and ranges for feeling observed and estimates of C's looking, are shown in Appendix A (Table A:5:1).

Table 5:14

Coefficients of correlation between feeling observed and
estimated looking of C.

Interactants.	GAZE	
	HIGH	LOW
MALES: (N = 12)	0.56*	0.74**
FEMALES: (N = 12)	0.40	0.40

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

There was for males, within gaze conditions, an association between feeling observed, and estimated looking by C (which has been shown to be crudely related to C's actual gaze behaviour).

There may well be a complex relationship between reaction to a partner's gaze behaviour and subsequent feedback-searching by the interactant,

such that, for example, people who look a little might feel more observed (on the basis of past experience). In order to test this proposal, correlation coefficients were obtained for the relationship between the rank order of interactants (stage B) according to the percentage of time they spent looking at C, and that according to their degrees of feeling observed. These coefficients and the medians and ranges for the gaze duration of interactants during the two encounters are shown in Appendix A in Tables A:4:3, and A:4:2, respectively. The coefficients for males and females, in high and low gaze encounters, were all positive, but none were significant.

A further hypothesis was that people who looked less during an encounter might be less "accurate" in estimating C's gaze. "Accuracy" scores for estimates of C's gaze were derived by subtracting a person's estimate from C's actual looking time where C's gaze was high (all estimates being lower than actual), and by subtracting actual from estimate where C's gaze was low (all estimates being higher than actual). Thus for the high and low gaze conditions, relative accuracy was indicated by a relatively low score. The medians and ranges of these accuracy scores are shown in Appendix A in Table A 5:2. The rank order of people according to their accuracy scores was compared with that according to their percentage time spent looking at C. The resulting correlation coefficients are shown below in Table 5:15.

Table 5:15

Coefficients of correlation between amount of looking and accuracy
in estimating C's gaze.

	GAZE	
	HIGH	LOW
MALES (N = 12)	0.36 (n.s.)	-0.15 n.s.
FEMALES (N = 12)	0.40 (n.s.)	-0.69 (p < .05)
WHOLE SAMPLE (N = 24)	0.34 (p < .05)	-0.29 (n.s.)

When C's gaze was high, it seems that the more a person looked at him, the less accurate was his estimate of C's gaze. Perhaps a person who looks infrequently at a frequently-looking C is likely to meet C's gaze each time he looks at him, and therefore estimate C's gaze to be high, whereas a person who looks more in such a situation may be more likely to look at C while his gaze is averted and therefore estimate that C is looking little. A more reasonable interpretation may be given in improvisational terms. A person who looks much in encounters in general, may be accustomed to complementary low gaze in others, and may base judgements of C's gaze on such expectations.

However, it is noted that in the low looking condition, females who looked more were in fact more accurate about C's gaze than those who looked less. In the low gaze condition, females might have found it easier to look at C in order to obtain feedback, and may therefore have arrived at more accurate estimates. Both these arguments suggest some degree of complementarity in the relationship between C's, and his partner's, looking behaviour. This relationship was investigated by

comparing the rank order of interactants according to their gaze duration, with that for interactants according to their partners' (Cs') gaze duration. The medians and ranges for Cs' looking time are shown in Appendix A in Table A:5:4. Correlation coefficients were obtained for males and female interactants, and for the high and low gaze conditions. These coefficients, shown in Appendix A in Table A:4:5, were all statistically insignificant.

Two further "subsidiary hypotheses" were tested. The first was that different confederates might induce different feelings of being the observer or the observed. The previous results suggest that such feelings may have little to do with confederates' gaze behaviour; perhaps features of their behaviour, other than gaze, for example, their appearance, may have led their partners to respond differentially so that experimental manipulations of gaze were negligible in effect, compared with the general behaviour of the confederates. The mean score (of interactants' responses) for feeling observed in encounters with one confederate was compared (by t-test) with that (for those interactants) for the other C with whom they interacted. These means, standard deviations, and the ts for their comparison are shown in Appendix A in Table A:5:6.

The results indicate that none of the confederates induced significantly different feelings of being observed.

The last hypothesis to be tested was that there might be a relationship between the degree to which a person tended to feel observed in everyday encounters, and the degree to which he stated feeling observed in the experimental conversations. The O-O questionnaire had been completed by the 24 people taking part in Stage B, and was scored as before;

the means and standard deviations for "feeling observed" in the six prototypic encounters are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:5:7. Correlation coefficients (r) were computed in order to assess the relationships (for the whole sample) between these scale scores and the degree to which people stated feeling observed in the two experimental conversations. The obtained correlation coefficients are shown below in Table 5:16.

Table 5:16

Relationships between "feeling observed" in the experiment and in everyday situations.

(* = $p < .05$)		Feeling Observed on 0-0 Questionnaire when other is:					
(** = $p < .01$)		same age, younger, same sex	older, same sex	same age, younger, opp. sex	older, opp. sex	same age, younger, opp. sex	older, opp. sex
Feeling Observed in Expts. when Gaze is:	HIGH	0.52**	0.45*	0.04	0.42*	0.47*	0.32
	LOW	0.37	0.48	0.25	0.64**	0.58**	0.38

These results would suggest that the orientations which individuals brought to the experimental situation, in terms of taking performer or audience standpoints in everyday life, bore considerable relationship to their experience of the experimental encounters. This was the case for feeling observed in the experiment where C was of the same age and of the opposite sex, which, whether C was looking a little or a lot, was related to the person's statement about feeling observed in such a situation in general.

In view of these results, it was conjectured that people's looking behaviour in stage B of this study, already shown to be unrelated to the

C's looking behaviour, might be related to the degree to which people felt they were the observed or the observer in everyday situations, especially in those resembling the experimental encounters.

In order to assess these relationships, correlation coefficients were computed, and are shown below in Table 5:17; (mean looking time in the High Gaze condition was 66.1% (s.d. = 17.5) and in the Low Gaze condition, 62.4% (s.d. = 20.5).

Table 5:17

Relationships between amount of looking in the experimental encounters and the degree to which people felt observed in everyday situations.

(* = p < .05) (** = p < .01)		Feeling observed on 0-0 questionnaire when Other is:					
		Same Sex			Opposite Sex		
		Same Age	Younger	Older	Same Age	Younger	Older
Amount of Looking in Expt. When C's Gaze is:	HIGH	-0.40*	-0.26	0.11	-0.45*	-0.31	-0.07
	LOW	-0.38	-0.32	0.11	-0.52**	-0.46*	-0.18

Whether C's gaze was high or low, people who stated feeling more observed in encounters with people of the same age and of opposite sex, were those who looked less in an an experimental encounter. Like those shown in Table 5:16, these results suggest an association between a person's general performer-audience orientation to social encounters, and his behaviour in this experimental setting.

D. Discussion:

The main hypotheses, that the more people were looked at by a dyadic partner, the more they would feel that they were the observed, and that

people would be aware of how much the other looked them, were not supported. Females were no more comfortable than males when their partner looked at them a lot, nor did they find such encounters more enjoyable than did males; in both gaze conditions, comfort was greater for males. Possibly, the nature of the experimental situation was such as to induce "performer" standpoints in both males and females (mean scores for the observer-observed scale being just below the neutral point). Although this might be expected to be a more customary standpoint for females, this would only be the case if it was the dyadic partner who induced the standpoint. If it was the experimenters who induced this standpoint, then females would not be able to find appropriate continuous feedback (since the experimenters were absent during the encounters), and would therefore be expected to feel less comfortable than the males, for whom visible feedback may be less essential.

Although males did judge C as observing them significantly more in the high gaze than the low gaze condition, they did not report feeling significantly more observed in this condition. There was, however, a positive association between feeling observed and the estimate of C's looking within each gaze condition, and further, a positive association between estimated observer behaviour of C and C's actual looking, within each gaze condition.

Females, on the other hand, behaved most paradoxically, estimating that C looked more when he was in fact looking less, and showing no association between feeling observed and estimates of the time C spent observing them.

It had been thought that the amount a person looked at C during an encounter might affect that person's feelings of being observer rather than observed. No significant relationships were found to support this

hypothesis. Secondly, it was proposed that the amount of the time for which a person looked at C might be related to his accuracy in estimating the amount of time during which C looked at him. There was here a surprising relationship indicating that when C looks for most of the time, partners who look less are more accurate in their estimates. When C looks less, females show the more sensible effect of being more accurate when they look at C more. These findings were interpreted in terms of complementarity of looking behaviour, whereby when C looks a lot, his partner is likely to look less; if his partner is "forced" to look less in order to evade eye-contact with C then he might be more aware of C's gaze behaviour, the less he actually looks at C's eyes. However, no significant relationship was found between the amount of time spent looking by C and that spent by his partner in looking at C. A further hypothesis, that different confederates might have induced different degrees of "feeling observed" in their partners, was not confirmed.

Given the ineffectiveness of the experimental manipulations of gaze, it was conjectured that there might be a relationship between feeling observed in the experimental situations and feeling observed in everyday life. This hypothesis was confirmed; there were significant positive relationships between feeling observed in both experimental encounters, and feeling observed in encounters with same-age, opposite-sex partners in general. All correlation coefficients were positive, and the results overall suggest that there is a positive association between the degree to which a person feels observed in everyday encounters, and the degree to which he felt observed in the experimental conversations. There was also a significant negative relationship between the amount of time during which people looked at a C during an encounter, and their stated degree of feeling observed in general in encounters where the other was of the same age as themselves and of the opposite sex, such

that the less they felt observed with a person like the C in everyday life, the more they looked at Cs during the experimental encounters.

These results might be interpreted as suggesting that whether or not people feel observed in encounters has little to do with the particular encounter, and the particular informal role relationship which emerges, and that people take performer or audience standpoints in encounters regardless of the other's behaviour toward them. There are two other ways in which the above results might be interpreted. It may be that interactants could not remember adequately how they had felt during the two encounters, especially since in this study (as against Studies One and Two), people had not been sensitized to the observer-observed scale prior to the experimental encounters. In completing the 0-0 rating scales for their experience of the encounters, interactants may have referred to how they generally felt in such encounters, males sensibly coordinating their estimates of C's looking behaviour accordingly.

A more important interpretation of the results would be to suggest that the experimental encounters were not "encounters" at all, that is, that no informal role relationship of any kind emerged between C and his partner. People, bringing to the encounter their general performer-audience standpoints appropriate to interactions with same-age, opposite-sex partners, might continue to behave in the light of these, rather than modifying their behaviour and their subjective experiences in accordance with the behaviour of the other (C). The "lines of action" of the interactants may have been oriented toward satisfying the experimenters rather than, for example, "getting to know" C. Similarly Cs, though well-trained, must have found it difficult to "interact" with the "subjects," while concentrating on their own gaze behaviour in order to achieve the correct level (which all Cs did, within an error range of about 10%). These

experimental encounters, supposed to represent the "assymetrical contingency" class of encounters described by Jones and Gerard (1967), were probably closer to being members of the "pseudocontingency" class.

Further criticisms of the procedure may be made. Ideally the O-O questionnaire should have been administered at some time other than when people had just completed their ratings of the encounters. The results of the analyses incorporating measures of the amount of time during which people looked at Cs were interesting; ideally the amount of time during which a person looked at C while C was looking at him should have been measured. A measure of "eye-contact" might bear closer relationships to people's assessments of C's percentage time spent observing them, and consequently, perhaps, to their feelings of being observed, than either C's percentage time looking, or his partner's percentage time looking.

Given the failure of the experimental gaze manipulation to affect judgements of feeling observed and of C's looking behaviour, the observation of encounters between "naive" interactants, with no manipulation, but rather, more careful measurement, of mutual and non-mutual gaze, might prove a better procedure for testing the hypotheses under study here. Such situations would be closer to those experienced in everyday life, would allow people to be interviewed by "experimenters" after single encounters (reducing the "adequacy of memory" problem), and would, in general, be more effective in permitting the test of hypotheses deriving from the improvisational view.

E. Conclusions.

While some confirmation of hypotheses was achieved for males, that is, it was indicated that males feel more observed when they estimate that their partner looks more, and that their estimates bear some relation to

their partner's actual looking behaviour, the findings, in general, cast doubt on the adequacy of the design and procedure adopted in this study. The relationships found between O-O questionnaire responses and behaviour and feelings in the experimental situations were interesting, and suggest that more study of the correlates of the questionnaire measures of "feeling observed" in everyday encounters would be appropriate.

6. Study Five.

A. Introduction.

The three main objects of this study were to replicate the results of Study Three, with members of a boy's school as respondents, to assess the reliability of responses to the O-O questionnaire over time, and to investigate the unidimensionality of "observer-observed". The question asked of respondents to the O-O scales is whether they feel mainly the observer or the observed in the specified situations, so that the possibility that feeling "observed" does not exclude feeling also the "observer" is "left open". Here, the proposition that "feeling the observer" and "feeling the observed" represent distinct dimensions was examined by allowing respondents the opportunity to make separate judgements in these terms. The first stage of this study was conducted two months before the second.

B. Method.

Stage A:


Twenty-four pupils, aged between 16 and 19 years, at a boy's secondary school, completed the O-O questionnaire in one sitting, under the direction of two experimenters.

Stage B:


Thirty-two pupils, including twenty-two of those who had taken part in the first stage completed two separate questionnaires for "feeling the

(Observer questionnaire - continued)

5. younger, and of the same sex?



6. older, and of the opposite sex?




(Observed Questionnaire)

PERFORMANCE-AUDIENCE STUDY

When you meet someone else for the first time (and no-one else is present), how much do you feel that you are "observed", when the other person is:-

1. of the same age, and opposite sex?



2. older, and of the same sex?



3. older, and of the opposite sex?



4. younger, and of the same sex?



5. younger, and of the opposite sex?



6. of the same age and sex?



C. Results.

The results concerning each hypothesis will be described in turn.

(i) Replication of Study Three.

The results obtained were compared only with those obtained for the male sample in Study Three. The second administration of the 0-0 questionnaire in this study was chosen for comparison with the results of Study Three, since there were more respondents ($N = 32$). The questionnaire scales were scored from 0 to 8, and age and sex effect scores were derived as in Study Three.

The means (whose standard deviations appear in Table 5:20) of responses to the 6 scales of the 0-0 questionnaire, and of the sex and age effect scores obtained here, are shown in Table 5:18, together with the means obtained in Study Three.

Table 5:18

0-0 questionnaire measures	STUDY THREE	STUDY FIVE
	$\bar{X}$ ($N = 58$)	$\bar{X}$ ($N = 32$)
1. (same age, same sex)	3.599	3.594
2. (younger, same sex)	2.565	3.125
3. (older, same sex)	4.854	4.563
4. (same age, opposite sex)	2.871	2.875
5. (younger, opposite sex)	2.866	3.469
6. (older, opposite sex)	4.746	3.844
Age effect (3+6-2-5)	4.169	1.813
Sex effect (4+5+6-1-2-3)	-0.535	-1.094

The six mean scores from Study Three were ranked in order of the degree to which they reflected feeling observed in the six situations, and this ranking was compared with that of the mean scores obtained in this study. The coefficient of correlation (r_s) between the two ranks of mean scores was 0.829 ($p < .05$), indicating that there was agreement between the males in the two samples as to those "others" with whom they tended to feel the observer or the observed in dyadic encounters, as illustrated in the histogram shown in Figure 5:8.

In Study Three, it had been found that males reported feeling significantly more observed when with an older than a younger person, whether or not that person was male or female. It had been predicted that males might feel more the observer when with a female of the same age as themselves, than when with a male, but the difference between the means had not been statistically significant. The same comparisons between the pertinent mean scores were made here; the results of these comparisons (by t-test) are shown in Table 5:19.


Tests for differences between related samples and unrelated samples were used as appropriate.

Table 5:19

Significance of differences between means shown in

Table 5:18

COMPARISON	STUDY 5		STUDY 3
	t	p	p
opposite sex: older (6) vs. younger (5)	0.719	n.s.	$p < .001$
same sex : older (3) vs. younger (2)	2.948	$p < .01$	$p < .001$
same age : same sex (1) vs. opposite sex(4)	2.339	$p < .05$	n.s.



Scales of 0-0 questionnaire.

Figure 5:8

Histogram illustrating "feeling observed" in six situations for males in Studies Three and Five.

Although males in this study did not evidence feeling significantly more observed with older (than with younger) females, they did so with regard to older and younger males as in Study Three. The difference between the means for feeling observed with males and females of the same age was significant; males in this sample felt significantly more the observer when with females than when with males.

(ii) Reliability of O-O questionnaire.

The scores obtained on the second administration of the O-O questionnaire were compared with those obtained in its first administration. In order to maintain the number in the comparison sample (first administration) as equivalent to that in the second administration of the O-O questionnaire, "substitute" scores derived from the mean scores for that sample were given, so that where a respondent had completed only one questionnaire, scores for the other questionnaire were attributed to him, such that the mean and distribution for that sample of scores were not disturbed; this strategy would not enhance the probability of confirming the hypothesis of reliability for the questionnaire. Coefficients of correlation (r) were computed in order to assess the degree of relationship between the scores obtained in the two administrations of the questionnaire. Comparisons were made between total O-O score, scores on the six O-O scales, and between age- and sex-effect scores on the two questionnaires. The mean scores, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients are shown in Table 5:20.

The mean scores for each of the six specified situations obtained in the first administration were ranked according to the degree of "observed" feelings reported by respondents, and this ranking was compared with that derived in a similar manner from the second administration of the questionnaire. The coefficient of correlation (r_s) between these

Table 5:20

Relationships between measures from first and second
administrations of the 0-0 questionnaire in Study Five

0-0 Measures	$\bar{X}$ (N=32)			s. d.		r
	2nd Admin.	1st Admin	2nd Admin.	1st Admin.		
Total Score	21.53	21.94	(6.50)	(6.41)		<u>0.457**</u>
1. Same age, same sex	3.59	3.88	(0.98)	(1.21)		0.228
2. Younger, same sex	3.13	3.31	(2.08)	(2.06)		0.323
3. Older, same sex	4.56	4.81	(1.76)	(1.51)		<u>0.417*</u>
4. Same age, opposite sex	2.88	2.75	(1.86)	(1.57)		<u>0.553**</u>
5. Younger, opposite sex	3.47	3.13	(2.11)	(1.85)		<u>0.548*</u>
6. Older, opposite sex	3.84	4.09	(2.05)	(1.91)		<u>0.408*</u>
Age Effect	1.81	2.38	(5.37)	(4.34)		<u>0.561**</u>
Sex Effect	-1.22	-2.00	(3.77)	(3.77)		<u>0.598**</u>

* p .05

** p .01

two rankings was 0.94 ($p < .01$) indicating a high degree of association between the two administrations in terms of the ordering of "others" (according to how observed they tended to make respondents feel). Thus, in spite of the insignificant relationships shown in Table 5:20 between a respondent's two assessments of his degree of feeling observed when the "other" is of the same sex and either the same age, or younger, than himself, this variability was not sufficient to disturb overly the rankings of situations overall.

All coefficients in Table 5:20 are positive, and while none are high, the majority reflect a significant association, indicating that the questionnaire is used by respondents, in a meaningful way, to express their general mode of reaction to situations such as those specified, in terms of performer-audience standpoint. That there is a fair degree of agreement between respondents in their mode of responding in such situations suggests the existence of "rules" or "norms" specifying appropriate behaviour. That there is a relationship between the ways in which a person completes it on two occasions, suggests that responses to the questionnaire also reflect fairly consistent individual modes of interpreting the "rules" for those situations.

(iii) Unidimensionality of Observer-Observed.

Responses to the "observer" and to the "observed" questionnaire scales were scored from 0 to 5, so that a low score represented a high degree of feeling the observer, and a high degree of feeling the observed respectively. If "observer-observed" were "unidimensional", that is, if being highly observed implied the obverse of being strongly the observer, then it would be expected that a respondents' scores on the "observed" questionnaire would be negatively related to their scores on the "observer" questionnaire, for the same specified situation. For each

of the six situations and for the total, age-effect and sex-effect scores derived from these scores, coefficients of correlation (r) were obtained in order to assess the relationship between the 32 respondents' scores on the observer scales and those obtained on the observed scales. The means and standard deviations for the scores involved, and the coefficients of correlation between these are shown in Table 5:21.

Table 5:21

Mean scores for feeling "observed" and for feeling the "observer", and their interrelationships.

O-O Measures	Observed		Observer		r	$p <$
	$\bar{X}$	s.d.	$\bar{X}$	s.d.		
Total (T)	15.34	5.856	13.53	4.98	0.161	n.s.
Scale 1	2.72	1.33	2.25	0.88	0.311	n.s.
Scale 2	2.91	1.51	2.38	1.58	-0.350	.05
Scale 3	2.63	1.16	2.25	1.16	0.120	n.s.
Scale 4	2.00	1.22	1.69	1.09	0.558	.01
Scale 5	2.50	1.44	2.34	1.49	0.068	n.s.
Scale 6	2.09	1.17	2.38	1.31	0.039	n.s.
Age Effect (A.e)	-0.97	2.91	-0.22	3.42	-0.400	.05
Sex Effect (S.e)	-1.47	2.78	-0.69	2.71	0.106	n.s.

The correlation coefficients shown (in Table 5:21) are rather difficult to interpret. The predicted inverse relationship between feeling "observed" and feeling the "observer" was evidenced only where the "other" was of the same sex as, and younger than, the respondent. When the other was of the same age and opposite sex, the more a person felt "observed", the more he also reported being the "observer". There was a negative relationship between "age effect" scores on the "observed"

and "observer" scales , but not between the sex effect scores on the two scales. One way of interpreting these results would be to suggest that where dyadic members were of dissimilar age, the "performer-audience" relationship would be complementary, one member being predominantly performer to the other as audience. In contrast, where partners were of the opposite sex, both performer and audience aspects of dyadic activity might be heightened, implying greater "interaction consciousness" (Goffman, 1957) in general; this would account for the positive relationship between feeling "observed" and feeling the "observer" found when the other is of the same age and opposite sex.

Alternatively, it is possible that some people were evidencing more variability than others in their modes of responding to the two questionnaires; significant correlation coefficients would require not only responses to particular scales on the observer and observed questionnaires to be broadly complementary (for a negative relationship), or "matching" (for a positive relationship), but that there should also be numerical complementarity or "matching".

That is, if a person stated feeling very observed in situation (1) on the "observed" scale, then in order to demonstrate use of the 0-0 scale as a unidimensional continuum, he should report feeling not at all the observer in situation (1) on the "observer" scale, and so on. Such a high degree of numerical regularity on the part of respondents should perhaps not be demanded.

In order to test further the hypothesis of complementarity between feeling "observed" and feeling the "observer", it was deemed more appropriate to examine the relationship between the various 0-0 measures for each respondent independently. Each respondent may be assumed to have given statements about the degree he felt observed in one of the six

specified situations, relative to his judgements (already given, or intended) for the other situations. The six situations were ranked in order of the degree to which a respondent stated feeling observed in them, according to his responses to the full 0-0 questionnaire (second administration). From his responses to the "observer" questionnaire and to the "observed" questionnaire, a further measure of his degree of feeling observed in the six situations was derived, by subtracting his score on the "observed" questionnaire for each situation, from that, for the same situation, on the "observer" questionnaire. (For both the "observer" and the "observed" questionnaire, a low score indicated a high degree of feeling the observer, and a high degree of feeling the observed, respectively)

Thus, subtracting the "observed" score from its companion "observer" score yields an index of "feeling observed" whereby a high positive score indicates a relatively high degree of feeling observed overall. The six situations were ranked according to this derived "observed" score. If the respondent were responding to the 0-0 questionnaire, to the "observed" questionnaire, and to the "observer" questionnaire in such a way as to imply that "observer-observed" represented for him, a single dimension, then there should be a positive relationship between the two rank orders **(for whom data for both stages of the study were available)** of the six situations. For each of 23 respondents, the two rank orders of the six situations were derived, and compared (the pertinent medians and ranges being shown in Appendix A in Table A:5:8). The resulting coefficients of correlation (r_s) are shown in Table 5:22.

Table 5:22

Relationships between feeling observed according to 0-0 questionnaire, and according to measure derived from separate "observer" and "observed" questionnaires, for each Respondent (A).

A	r_s	p<	A	r_s	p<	A	r_s	p<
1	0.815	n.s.	9	0.658	n.s.	17	0.958	.01
2	0.872	.05	10	0.058	n.s.	18	0.386	n.s.
3	0.615	n.s.	11	0.345	n.s.	19	0.945	.01
4	0.645	n.s.	12	-0.328	n.s.	20	0.945	.01
5	-0.155	n.s.	13	0.900	.05	21	0.745	n.s.
6	-0.471	n.s.	14	0.900	.05	22	0.729	n.s.
7	0.929	.05	15	0.900	.05	23	0.586	n.s.
8	0.715	n.s.	16	0.915	.05			

Only 3 of the 23 respondents showed a negative (insignificant) degree of relationship between feeling observed according to the 0-0 questionnaire, and according to measure derived from the separate questionnaires. Nine respondents showed significant positive relationships between these two sets of rankings of situations, indicating that their relative degree of feeling observed in the six situations was mirrored in their responses to all three questionnaires.

The correlation coefficients may be regarded as an indication of the consistency with which respondents employed the three questionnaires (assuming unidimensionality of observer-observed). The coefficients were "scored" according to the degree of consistency which they reflected; a respondent evidencing a coefficient between -0.4 and -0.3 received

a "consistency score" of 1, a respondent showing a coefficient between -0.3 and -0.2 received a score of 2, and so on, the maximum "consistency score" of 15 being attributed to a respondent with a coefficient over 0.9; the means and standard deviations of these "consistency scores" are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:8:2.

If inconsistency in the use of the three 0-0 questionnaires reflected general variability in the use of the observer-observed dimension, rather than use of "observer" and "observed" as distinct dimensions, then such variability might be expected to be reflected in the reliability (over time) of 0-0 questionnaire responses also. As an index of "reliability" for each "subject", a "discrepancy score" was derived, being the numerical difference between the total 0-0 scores (over the six situations) obtained in the first and the second administrations of the 0-0 questionnaire; the means and standard deviations of these "discrepancy" scores are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:8:2. The coefficient of correlation between "consistency scores" and "discrepancy scores" was -0.505 ($p < .01$), indicating that the greater the reliability over time of a respondent's 0-0 questionnaire responses, the more consistent was that respondent in his use of the 0-0 questionnaire scales and the separate "observer" and "observed" questionnaire scales as representing single dimensions.

D. Discussion.

Responses to the 0-0 questionnaire showed that there was considerable similarity between the degree to which males from the single-sex school sampled here, and those from the co-educational school sampled in Study Three, felt observed with strangers. The rank order of the six situations derived from the mean 0-0 scores in Study Three corresponded well with the rank order of the same situations derived here. As in Study Three, respondents stated feeling more observed when with an older

(than a younger) male; the significant difference between the degree to which respondents felt observed when with a younger (rather than an older) female, found in Study Three, was not replicated here. A prediction not supported in Study Three, that males would tend to feel more the observer when with females than when with males, was supported here.

The reliability of responses to the O-O questionnaire was fair, given the interval between the two administrations, and the confusion which might have arisen from the completion of the separate "observer" and "observed" questionnaires prior to the second administration of the full O-O questionnaire. Significant positive relationships were found between the total scores from the two administrations, and for the age-effect and sex-effect scores. Similarly, responses to four of the six scales were significantly associated over the two months' interval. The two "unreliable" scales were those referring to encounters where the other person was of the same age and same sex, and of the same sex, and younger.

This was somewhat surprising, since the "same age, same sex" encounter would be expected to be the most "neutral" for respondents, and therefore the situation which would evoke a response reflecting that individual's degree of feeling observed in general, rather than his response to general rules governing appropriate performer-audience standpoints with other persons different from himself. Perhaps, "individual differences" in feeling the observer or the observed in encounters are more prone to variation over time, and more susceptible to immediate past experience, for example, than are statements of feeling observed which involve the individual adapting his proclivities in these terms to the "demands" of the particular type of informal role relationship in which he finds himself.

It must be noted that the coefficients of correlation between the scores from the first and second administrations of the O-O questionnaire were all below a value of 0.6. Although there was some degree of association between responses on the two occasions, there was also a considerable amount of discrepancy; such discrepancy might be general to all respondents or characteristic of some.

The two separate "observer" and "observed" questionnaires had been administered in order to assess the degree to which responses indicated that feeling "observed" excluded the possibility of feeling the "observer". The initial analysis of the data from the two separate scales involved the assessment of the degree of numerical complementarity between scores on the observer scale for one of the six situations and scores on the observed scale for the same situation; similar analysis was conducted for the total scores representing degree of feeling observed overall, and for the age and sex effect scores. The results indicated that the predicted inverse relationship held only for the age effect scores, and for the situation where "alter" was of the same age, and older. For the situation where the other was of the same age and of the opposite sex, there was a significant positive relationship between scores on the separate scales, suggesting that in this situation, the more a person felt that he was observed, the more he also felt that he was the observer. It was suggested that, in such a situation, there might be a high degree of "interaction consciousness", so that respondents would be aware of both performance and audience aspects of their standpoint vis à vis the other.

Since respondents to the O-O questionnaire and to the separate "observer" and "observed" questionnaires may be assumed to be making their judgements for each of the six situations relative to those given (or

intended) for each of the other situations, it was deemed that a more appropriate assessment of the degree to which people were employing "observer" and "observed" as mutually exclusive, would be a comparison between individuals' responses on the separate questionnaires with

responses on the full 0-0 questionnaire. Accordingly, for each respondent, the six situations were ranked in order of the degree to which he stated feeling observed in them on the 0-0 questionnaire. A rank order of the six situations was then obtained (similarly based on the degree to which the respondent stated feeling observed in them), by reference to scores on the separate "observer" and "observed" questionnaires. The coefficient of correlation between the two sets of rankings was obtained for each respondent. The majority of coefficients were positive (20 of the 23), almost half of these being significant, suggesting that the observer-observed dimension was indeed being used as a single dimension by these respondents.

Since there were some individuals for whom this did not appear to be the case, the possibility that these were evidencing general inconsistency in response to the 0-0 scales, rather than employing the "observer" and "observed" scales as representing distinct dimensions, was discussed. Scores reflecting the degree to which respondents had used the "observer" and "observed" scales as if they represented two "ends" of a single dimension were allocated to respondents according to the size and direction of "their" correlation coefficient. These scores, being higher for respondents evidencing greater "consistency" were compared with discrepancy scores reflecting the degree to which individual's responses were reliable over time. The significant relationship obtaining between the "discrepancy" and "consistency" measures, suggested that some people were demonstrating a general variability in response to the observer-observed measure.

E. Conclusions.

This study effectively replicated the main results of Study Three, demonstrated the reliability of the O-O questionnaire over time, and indicated that most respondents to the O-O questionnaire view "observer-observed" as a single dimension. Those respondents who did not seem to use the O-O scales in a unidimensional manner also gave O-O questionnaire responses which were unreliable over time, suggesting either a general variability in response to performer-audience stand-points in encounters, or that "observer-observed" was not meaningful as a representation of their subjective experience of encounters.

7. Study Six.

A. Introduction.

This study involved further examination of the generality of the "rules" governing performer-audience imbalance appropriate to encounters with strangers of different ages and sex, shown by responses to the O-O questionnaire. The main findings of Study Three were replicated, for males, in Study Five. Here, the data from Study Three (Sample 1) were compared with those obtained for males and females attending a "secondary modern" coeducational school (Sample 2), and with those given by undergraduates taking part in stage B of Study Four (Sample 3). As suggested in Chapter Two, the age of respondents might affect their sensitivity to "implicit rules" governing performer-audience imbalance.

Storr (1968) gave three 5-point O-O scales, referring to encounters where the other was of the same age, older, or younger, in relation to respondent, to 59 girls aged between 6 and 12 years. These children felt more observed with an older person, but not less observed with a younger child. In order to see whether there was any cultural variation in the pattern of responses made to the O-O questionnaire, it was administered

to a group of American students (Sample 5); data obtained by Ingham (1972), using a translated form of the questionnaire with Swedish students and adults (Samples 6 and 7), were also used for comparison purposes.

These data had been collected between 1966 and 1968, and some differences were expected between responses given then, and responses, especially amongst undergraduates with modified orientations toward sex-differences, in 1971; a group of students in their first year in 1971 constituted Sample 8.

Two kinds of comparison were made between the responses of the different samples. Firstly, for each sample, the hypothesis that people would feel more observed when with a person older than themselves, than when with a younger person (supported by the results of Studies Three and Five) was tested. The predictions that females would feel more observed with male than with female partners (supported in Study 3), and that males would feel less observed with females, than with males (as found in Study Five), were tested for each sample. The patterns of variation between encounters specified on the questionnaire, according to the degree to which respondents in each sample stated feeling observed within them, were compared; the patterns emerging from Studies Three and Five had been found to be similar, and this was expected to be the case for all samples.

B. Results.

The mean scores (and standard deviations) obtained for males and females in each of the eight samples on each of the six scales of the O-O questionnaire, are shown in Table 5:23; standard deviations are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:5:9.

For each sample, but with the exception of the Swedish samples (6 and 7) for whom full data were not available, comparisons were made (by t-test) between mean scores on various scales, in order to assess

Table 5:23

Means for males' and females' (eight samples)
responses to the 0-0 questionnaire

Sample		0-0 Questionnaire Scales					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Study 3: school age: $\bar{X}=17$	M N=58	3.60	2.57	4.85	2.87	2.87	4.75
	F N=63	3.69	2.60	5.50	5.26	2.56	6.08
2. School Age: 15-18	M N=15	4.00	2.20	5.53	2.27	4.67	4.20
	F N=15	4.80	2.28	6.20	3.93	2.60	5.47
3. Study 4: Students Age: $\bar{X}=21$	M N=12	3.79	3.25	3.29	3.29	3.50	3.67
	F N=12	3.29	3.08	4.82	4.00	3.40	5.13
4. Age: 30-60	M N=40	3.18	2.48	3.20	3.30	3.05	3.68
	F N=40	2.65	2.83	3.95	4.05	2.78	4.20
5. USA Students Age: 19-26	M N=9	2.89	4.22	3.44	4.44	4.56	4.00
	F N=9	4.00	3.00	4.44	3.89	3.11	4.22
6. Swedish Age: under 25	M N=28	3.57	3.39	3.82	2.85	3.03	3.92
	F N=41	2.82	2.73	3.63	4.26	2.65	4.26
7. Swedish Age: over 25	M N=32	3.09	3.15	3.71	3.09	2.84	3.65
	F N=39	3.56	3.20	4.23	4.58	3.28	4.63
8. Students 1971 Age: $\bar{X}=19$	M N=29	3.04	2.62	3.76	3.14	2.72	3.97
	F N=39	3.18	2.64	4.23	3.97	2.97	4.82

the degree to which males and females stated feeling the observer or the observed when with an older, as against a younger, person, and when with a same-as against an opposite-sex, partner. The results of these t-tests are shown in Table 5:24.

Table 5:24 indicates that no significant difference between means was replicated for all samples. Older female respondents did report feeling more observed with males than with females, as did female students in 1971; the latter also felt more observed than comparable males, with partners of the same age and opposite sex. American students were the only group who appeared to be unaffected, in terms of "observer-observed", by the sex and age of dyadic partners. There were more significant differences between the means of scores on different scales for females (12) than for males (7). This "preponderance" was not accounted for by females' greater sensitivity to sex-differences. There were 6 instances where males reported being affected by the age of alter, and 9 where females made similar reports. Sex of alter gave rise to 3 significant differences in scale response amongst females, and 1 amongst males.

In order to test the hypothesis that different groups of people would, in general, agree about the relative degree to which they would feel observer or observed with the six specified "others", the mean scores for each situation and each sample (and for males and females separately), were ranked, such that the situation in which members of a sample stated feeling the least the observed (and the most the observer) received a rank of 1, and so on. For each sample, the rank order of the mean scores derived from females' responses were compared with those from the males' responses. The correlation coefficients (r_s) obtained, are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:5:10. All coefficients were positive

Table 5:24

Differences between "feeling observed" in the six
situations for male and female respondents in
eight samples

COMPARISON	SAMPLE											
	1		2		3		4		5		8	
	t	df	t	df	t	df	t	df	t	df	t	df
M: os; 0(6) v. y(5)	<u>4.2**</u>	57	0.44	14	0.33	11	1.70	39	0.74	8	<u>3.55**</u>	28
M: ss: 0(3) v. y(2)	<u>4.9**</u>	57	<u>2.92*</u>	14	0.00	11	<u>2.17*</u>	39	1.08	8	<u>2.42*</u>	28
M: sa: ss(1) v. os(4)	1.9	57	<u>2.37*</u>	14	0.00	11	0.32	39	1.86	8	0.49	28
F: os: 0(6) v. y(5)	<u>7.9**</u>	62	<u>3.35**</u>	14	2.02	11	<u>2.89**</u>	39	1.47	8	<u>4.80**</u>	38
F: ss: 0(3) v. y (2)	<u>6.3**</u>	62	<u>5.18**</u>	14	<u>2.24*</u>	11	<u>2.21*</u>	39	1.64	8	<u>3.86**</u>	38
F: sa: ss(1) v. os (4)	<u>2.8**</u>	62	0.94	14	1.47	11	<u>4.27**</u>	39	0.16	8	<u>2.57*</u>	38
Sa, ss (1): M v. F	0.2	119	0.99	28	0.61	22	1.41	78	1.75	16	0.322	66
Sa, os (4): M v. F	<u>5.4**</u>	119	1.68	28	0.31	22	1.58	78	0.58	16	<u>2.22*</u>	66

* p .05
** p .01

except that for Sample Five (American students) but none, except that for Sample Eight (students in 1971) were statistically significant.

In order to assess the degree of agreement between males and between females in the 8 samples, coefficients of concordance (Kerlinger, 1970), were obtained. The level of agreement between males was low, but statistically significant ($W = 0.350$; $p < .01$). Females showed a much greater degree of agreement ($W = 0.832$; $p < .01$).

The ranks of the means of ranks for the six "others" specified on the 0-0 questionnaire, for males and for females in the eight samples, are shown in Table 5:25.

Table 5:25
Ranks of 0-0 situations according to responses of males
and females of eight samples.

0-0 scale	Other is:	Males	Females .
1	of the same age & same sex	3	3
2	younger, & of the same sex	1	1
3	older, & of the same sex	5	5
4	of the same age & opposite sex	4	4
5	younger, & of the opposite sex	2	2
6	older, & of the opposite sex	6	6
(Where rank 1 = least observed.)			

There was perfect rank order correlation between the degree to which males and females stated feeling observed in the six specified "situations", when the mean of the ranks for males and females in the separate samples were compared. The order of the situations follows that predicted originally and that which would be expected on the basis of the previous findings reported. That is, people report feeling more observed when with another who is older than themselves and of the opposite sex, and slightly less observed when the other is older and of the same sex.

This "opposite sex" effect is reflected in responses regarding feeling observed when the other is of the same age, where an opposite-sex partner induces a greater "observed" feeling than a same-sex partner. This pattern is again found for "others" younger than the respondent, younger partners of the same sex leading the respondent to feel most the "observer" of all possible (specified) "others". The effect of sex of partner would appear over all samples, which include respondents of a variety of age-groups, and cultural and occupational backgrounds, to be less important in determining the observer-observed or "performer-audience" standpoint in encounters, than the age of the other relative to that of the respondent, since the "sex effect" is apparent in the rankings within each age specification, but in no case does it "cut across" the age distinctions.

This would be expected, on combining males' and females' responses; females were expected to feel more observed with male than with female partners, whereas males were expected to feel either less observed (as in Study Five), or not to be "affected" (as in Study Three) when with females. When all males' responses are combined, it would appear that they tend to feel more observed with females than with males, a result against prediction. Inspection of the means in Table 5:23 allows the assertion that only certain groups of males evidenced this tendency

(adults over thirty, American students, and recent undergraduates), and that the agreement between male samples may have been based on regularity in responses regarding the age of partners.

C. Discussion.

This study demonstrated agreement between groups of respondents of a variety of ages, occupations, and of three nationalities, as to the performer-audience standpoint appropriate to encounters with strangers of different ages and sex. In general, people feel more observed with older, and less with younger, strangers, than with partners of their own age. Females tend to feel more observed with males than with females; males seem more variable (between samples and within some samples), with regard to the degree that the sex of their partner affects their standpoint.

8. Discussion and overview.

The theoretical basis for these studies was described in Chapter Two; it was proposed that many encounters were characterised by some degree of imbalance in terms of who, in the dyad, adopted a "performer" standpoint, relative to that of the other. All the studies described enquired as to the subjective experience of feeling the "observed", since these terms seemed more familiar representations of the standpoints discussed, and did not carry the dramaturgical implications of "performer" and "audience". The survey questionnaires were headed in the latter terms, and instructions to respondents involved a description of the analogy. If respondents had found the "observer-observed" dichotomy meaningless in application to their experience of encounters, the neutral point was available; its use favoured none of the hypotheses tested here.

The demonstration that implicit "rules" seem to apply to performer-audience standpoints in encounters between strangers of different sex

and age (Studies Three, Five and Six) supports the view that performer-audience imbalance may be a feature of the constraints governing encounters; that these constraints may remain determinants of the role relationship for a dyad may be indicated from the effects of the imposition of an Interviewee-Interviewer relationship demonstrated in the first and second studies. Many empirical studies of dyadic interaction involve the measurement of various aspects of the behaviour of strangers in the laboratory; where the strangers differ in age and sex, it might be important to note that, even where no formal Role relationship seems to apply, "rules", such as those demonstrated here, may affect the dyad's behaviour.

It was shown in some studies that, as predicted, females tend to adopt relatively "performer" standpoints vis à vis males. It may be that females and males interpret questions about "feeling observed" differently. No account, in the experiments and surveys reported, was demanded about the "stylistic" aspects of partner's ("real" or "prototypic") "observing" behaviour. Such accounts might provide more evidence for women's role as the "surveyed" (Berger, 1972).

It was expected that performer-audience imbalance might be reflected in, or depend on, an unequal dependence on feedback about performance by one member of a dyad. If this were the case, then such was not demonstrated in the first and second studies, where, although the effects of the illumination manipulation were recognised by interactants as interfering with the degree to which they could "tell how the other was reacting", only the Role manipulation exerted a significant effect on interactants' "observer-observed" standpoint. In the fourth study, people did not seem to have been more than grossly aware of the amount of time their partner looked at them during an encounter, which was surprising in

view of the many important functions attributed to gaze behaviour. Fulfilment of such functions does not demand awareness of the behaviour, but it would be expected that such gross differences in amount of gaze would affect feelings of being observed. It cannot really be asserted however, that interactants in Study Four were unaware of their partners' gaze; gaze estimates may be very difficult to report, and estimates of eye-contact might be better achieved.

It was found that interactants' gaze behaviour and the degree to which they felt observed in the experimental encounters was associated with the degree to which they reported feeling observed in such encounters in general. This may be an instance of expectations being more effective in predicting response than the actual nature of an encounter. Such instances would be expected under the improvisational view only where both partners' expectations were satisfied, or where no negotiation occurred between partners as to their relationship.

This might well have been the case for these experimental encounters, which may have resembled "pseudo-contingent" encounters, rather than the "mutual" or "asymmetrical" types to which the "performer-audience" analogy was originally applied. The attempts to demonstrate "performer-audience complementarity", in Studies One and Two, was crude; it is difficult to design an effective way of doing so. Apart from the problem of different response modes to the scales by dyadic members there is the problem of deciding on a criterion for complementarity. The criterion adopted here was fairly stringent, but some instances of complementarity were found.

The reliability and unidimensionality of the O-O scales were supported to some extent in Study Five, but there was evidence that some respondents

showed both unreliability and non-unidimensional assumptions (or "inconsistency"). Nevertheless, the generality of "rules" applying to performer-audience standpoints in encounters with strangers of different ages and sex was indicated in Study Six.

Many further studies concerning the nature and determinants of degrees of performer-audience imbalance would be possible; closer examination of the degrees to which people are aware of their partner's nonverbal behaviour would seem desirable. It may be that the interpersonal variables suggested by an improvisational view would lead to a better understanding of the "mechanics" of interaction processes, as well as of their symbolic features.

These studies have supported two kinds of predictions generated by the improvisational view. Firstly, people employed the O-O scales as reflecting their experience of social encounters, and some evidence of the complementarity of informal roles in performer-audience terms was obtained, demonstrating that when provided with a dramaturgical phenomenology (at a simple level) interactants may "make sense" of this. Secondly, the broad social categories of age and sex have been shown to be related to the performer-audience standpoints customarily adopted in social encounters between strangers. Neither non-dramaturgical views nor Role Theory would allow such predictions to be made, and the improvisational approach allowed demonstration of the probable bases of the (inexplicable in non-dramaturgical terms) sex differences found in Argyle, Lalljee and Cook's (1968) study. Role Theory might permit prediction of sex differences in terms of particular actions (Role expectations) but not in broadly performer-audience terms, since the latter dichotomy derives from a focus on the cognitive and expressive

processes involved in interaction, regardless of specific actions.

Having demonstrated that, at a simple level, empirical studies of behaviour and subjective experience in dyadic encounters lend some support to the improvisational view of the dyad as a "performer-audience" system, some studies of the performer and audience behaviour of individuals will be described.

CHAPTER SIX

Experimental studies of the ability to attribute informal roles

1. Introduction

In this chapter, studies demonstrating the ability to accurately attribute informal roles to unseen and unheard alters with whom an actor is seen conversing, are described. This ability is shown to be related to, but not accounted for, by, reference to the conventional meanings of actions, but accuracy in attribution was not found associated with the ability to take the role of the other. Evidence that a variety of verbal and nonverbal cues are referred to, in arriving at accurate attributions, is presented.

The probable nature of the process whereby people may effectively attribute an informal role to a person with whom they are interacting, was discussed in Chapter Three. Attribution was viewed as involving an initial "anticipatory categorization" of the other's behaviour, and the subsequent modification of this initial judgement during the encounter. Ego might modify his initial categorization of alter's role by reception of further information embodied in the continuing sequence of actions which express alter's role. Since ego's own expressive behaviour may be viewed by alter as reflecting his (ego's) interpretation of his (alter's) own role, then alter may confirm or disconfirm ego's hypotheses about his (alter's) informal role, via his subsequent behaviour. In the latter sense, ego may actively (although not necessarily "intentionally") test his hypotheses.

Ego's attributional activity was thus viewed as analogous to the formation of a "conjunctive concept", an interpretation compatible with Ball's (1972) proposals about the cognitive processes by which ego and alter may approach a "definition" of their "situation". Ego's and alter's attributional activities were seen as the means by which a definition of their informal role relationship might be achieved and modified during an encounter, their "working hypotheses" providing a framework within which

particular acts, performed by each, might be interpreted. This view of attributional activity is conceptually close to Feffer's (1959) description of the cognitive activity of "taking the role of the other toward the self", and it was predicted that there would be a positive empirical association between measures of effective attributional activity and Feffer's measure of role-taking ability.

McCall and Simmons (1966) had suggested that "imputation" or, as here, "attribution", depends on role-taking and is based in consensus. The relationship between attribution and consensus was discussed in Chapter Three, and the use of "majority" or modal judgements as criteria for "accuracy" in studies of skill in the interpretation of expressive behaviour (as indicating emotion, interpersonal attitude, and "personality") was criticised.

It was suggested that, while there might be "shared meanings" attributable to isolated nonverbal acts (or simple combinations of acts), and while reference to such "meanings" might provide the basis for the initial categorization of expressive behaviour, such initial judgements were likely to be qualified by reference to additional information embodied in the "working hypotheses", already derived, about alter's informal role. Such additional information, available to an interacting ego, would be expected to lead to a qualification of the "conventional" meaning attributable to the particular expressive behaviour under scrutiny; the "refined" interpretation of the expressive behaviour might consequently lead to a modification of the "working hypothesis" about alter's role.

It was predicted that, if attribution involves role-taking ability, and if the latter is distributed normally in a given population, then, where an attributive judgement was relatively "easy", a majority of a group of observers would agree and give an accurate attribution. Where a judgement were more difficult, however, only those members of the group who could exercise a sufficiently subtle degree of role-taking would be expected to achieve an effective, or accurate, attribution. In such a

case, the majority of the group might still agree with each other about the attribution, and this judgement might approximate to the accurate one, since their attribution might depend on reference to the "shared meanings" of the expressive behaviour involved.

An experimental task was proposed, by which it might be possible to assess the abilities of a group of observers to attribute informal roles to others, and to test the hypothesis that such a skill was related to role-taking ability. It was suggested that a group of observers should witness a person interacting with a variety of unseen and unheard "alters", and give identifications of the informal roles of each of these alters. In order to perform such a task effectively, an observer would have to take the roles of the observed person and of the absent alter, simultaneously, and modify his hypothesis about alter's role as he received further information in the course of witnessing the interactive behaviour of the observed person. By such a means, the attributive ability of the observers might be compared, since they would all have access to the same amount and kind of information, and further, a criterion for accuracy of attributive judgements, the nature of the absent alters' informal roles, would be available.

The ability of judges to perform such a task with any degree of skill was itself hypothetical, but would be expected to be shown if the improvisational view were valid, and if, as McCall and Simmons (1966) suggest, expressive behaviour in interaction serves (frequently) not only to define the informal role of the expressor, but also to define (by constituting a set of altercasting cues) that of his partner.

Apart from Weinstein and Deutschberger's (1963) study, only one empirical investigation bears directly on these proposals. Sarbin and Williams (1953) found that people agreed about the Roles of actors and (silent) alters, when they heard the actors speaking briefly; these "modal" judgements were not "veridical" in spite of content clues. Here, the primary concern is with expressive processes involved in performance and

altercasting beyond cues of content and context. To require an "exactly similar" script to be followed by an actor in conversation with unseen others, however, would be unrealistic; selection of appropriate words and phrasing, and other paralinguistic features of speech, may be important aspects of the expressive processes.

It was decided, therefore, that an "actor" would be seen and heard conversing with a variety of unseen alters, about the same event. Such a situation is encountered in everyday life when witnessing a person speaking to a variety of others on the telephone; this situation was chosen for the proposed task. In order to allow for the possibility that discrimination between different alters need not depend on correct identification of those alters, "stimulus material" was designed so that there should be some "repeat" performances, that is, sequences where the actor spoke to an alter to whom he had already spoken in a previous episode. Thereby, if discrimination does not depend on identification, judges would have the opportunity to recognise an informal role as similar to one previously performed.

The studies to be described here were designed to test the proposal that people would be able to discriminate between, and identify, the informal roles of a variety of unseen and unheard alters, with whom (in separate encounters) an actor was seen and heard to converse. The verbalisation of an informal role attribution (either in the "free response" of a judge, or as a "forced choice" category provided by an experimenter) is itself a somewhat difficult task; the language of relationships is presumed to be predominantly nonverbal. Verbal labels exist for the description of various characteristics of an alter which have implications for the nature of informal role relationships. Labels which specify the sex, status, and age of alter (relative to that of ego), the degree of intimacy in a relationship, and the formal features of social and occupational Roles, are examples.

Such characteristics might be regarded as features of the "formal", rather than "informal" role relationship between two people. As argued in Chapter One, where aspects of a formal Role relationship, potentially applicable to a dyadic encounter, are recognised as relevant to the actions to be performed within the encounter, by both members of the dyad, then they may be regarded as features of the emergent informal role relationship. Interactants would be expected to demonstrate their recognition of these characteristics in their expressive behaviour, viewed here as a source of casting cues.

Consequently, in these studies, "judges" were asked to describe the informal roles of the absent alters by reference to, for example, the age and sex of alter, when responding "freely". In later studies, when a "forced-choice" judgmental procedure was adopted, the "alternatives" provided were couched in terms indicative of such characteristics.

The main studies to be described involved the testing of hypotheses derived in Chapters One and Three. Other (exploratory) studies examined the possible sources of cues indicative of the informal roles of the alters with whom the actor conversed.

2. Study Seven

A. Introduction

It was predicted that people witnessing an actor speaking consecutively to a variety of unidentified, unseen, and unheard alters, on the telephone about the same event, would be able to discriminate between the performances, and to identify the informal roles (vis à vis the actor), of the alters. This ability, assessed on the basis of the objective validity of identifications given, may be found to be normally distributed among a group of people. If the experimental task were to effectively measure attributional activity, it would be expected that some "alters" (or rather, some of the actor's performances) would be easier to make accurate judgments about, than others. Different "difficulty levels" of performances

would be established, if "judges" achieved greater accuracy for some performances than others, and the accuracy scores of all judges for the different performances indicated "agreement" about the relative difficulty of judging a particular performance.

If some performances were found to be "easier" than others, it might be expected that these would be the most agreed about (in terms of identification), and would receive fewer different indentifications. For "easy" performances, the "modal" (or "most agreed about") identification would be expected to approximate to the objectively correct identification. However, over all performances (unless all were "easy" and there were no cases of discrepancy between "modal" and "correct" identification), attributions based on "conventional" meanings would not be expected to lead to the greatest level of accuracy. That is, modal accuracy would be expected to be positively associated with, but not equivalent to, objectively valid accuracy.

Individual differences in the ability to identify, accurately, the informal roles of alters were expected to be positively associated with differences in role-taking ability, as reflected in scores on Feffer's (1959) role-taking test (RTT).

B. Attribution test (AT)

A male undergraduate (aged 22) with amateur acting experience, agreed to be the "actor", and to give a series of performances involving the description of the same event to a series of unseen alters over the telephone. He was instructed to perform "naturally" and not to attempt to describe the event with precisely the same words in each conversation, but to improvise on the general theme. After discussion, it was agreed that he should describe an incident in which his car had lost its exhaust-pipe. The choice of alters was discussed with him, and only alters with whom he had had some experience were chosen. A closed telephone link was provided, so that a confederate could speak to him from an extension. Two confederates

were provided, a male (for male alters) and a female (for female alters), and instructed as to the particular alter role for each performance. They were asked to help the actor as much as possible so that his timing of utterances should be appropriate.

After some rehearsal, using video film to give "feedback" to the actor, a final film was made of eleven consecutive performances, each lasting about 4 minutes. The films showed the head and shoulders of the actor, not directly facing the camera, and allowing some variability in head orientation. The alter roles to which performances were directed were in the following order: mother, boss/supervisor, girlfriend, AA man/mechanic, 'close male friend, girlfriend (repeat), tutorial partner/colleague young sister, boss (repeat), male acquaintance, mother (repeat). The "repeat" performances were different conversations, rather than exact replications.

Between each performance was a section of blank film. An answer sheet was designed (a copy of which is shown in Appendix B). Guidance was given as to the form in which identification of alters was to be made: "Please describe in the space provided, whom you think the speaker is addressing, in as many terms as you wish, e.g. age, sex, occupation, relationship with speaker, status, etc. Also indicate whether you think he has spoken to the same person in a previous episode".

C. Procedure

Seventeen male, and twenty-seven female students, of average age 21.4 years, in their first year of teacher-training at Westminster College, Oxford, acted as judges. All tests were administered during a single session.

Initially, Feffer's role-taking test, the "RTT", was administered; judges were asked to write an initial story about a TAT picture, and subsequently wrote new versions of their story from the viewpoints of each of the characters. Following Feffer and Jahelka (1968) a TAT picture portraying a female and a younger male was circulated, and the

class were formally instructed as suggested by Feffer and Suchotliff (1966).

Judges were then instructed about the performances which they were to see on the video-monitor. Before judging the first performance, excerpts from three (randomly selected) performances were shown, in order to give judges a "baseline" for their later judgements. Then, after the first performance had been shown, the tape was stopped and judges gave their first attribution. The second performance was shown, and here, judges were asked to note whether they thought the actor had spoken to the same person in the previous episode. This procedure was followed until all eleven performances had been shown and attribution of all alter's roles attempted.

D. Scoring methods

RTT stories were scored according to the criteria detailed in Schnall and Feffer's (1965) manual, by two evaluators independently. Ranking of judges according to the two sets of scores were positively and significantly correlated ($r_s = 0.844$; $p < .01$; $N=44$). The final RTT scores accorded judges were the means of the scores given by the two evaluators.

From responses to the attribution test (AT), a number of scores were derived pertaining both to the ability of judges, and to the relative difficulty levels of items (performances):

a) Number Correct (N.C.): Attributions were assessed as accurate if they were objectively valid, that is, if they agreed with the intentions of the experimenter and actor with regard to alter's role. Close approximations, such as "garage man" for the "AA man/mechanic" alter, were accepted as correct. Close attributions were scored as 1, and incorrect attributions as 0; the range of possible scores was from 0 to 11.

b) Accuracy Scores (ACC.): A scoring system which allowed for partially correct attributions was designed by referring to the directions for responding given at the head of the answer sheet. Correct identification of alter's status (relative to the actor's) achieved a score of 1, and

similarly, correct identification of alter's age (relative to the actor's), sex, and the closeness of the relationship between actor and alter, each achieved a score of 1. For example, "close older female friend" would receive a score of 4 when "mother" was the valid response. A completely accurate attribution earned a score of 6 in this system, so that possible scores over all 11 performances ranged from 0 to 66. Additionally, if the judge was correct as to whether or not alter had been spoken to in a previous performance, a score of 1 was given; if the identification of the recognised alter was correct too, a further score of 1 was given. Thus, in this section referring to "repeat" performances, scores of 0 or 1 were possible for the "first performances" (except for the very first performance shown), and scores of 0, 1 or 2, were possible for "repeat" performances, giving a total possible score for this section over all performances of 13. Thus, the maximum possible score overall was 79. The maximum possible accuracy scores for correct attributions are shown in Figure 6:1 on a "model" answer sheet.

Figure 6:1

Maximum accuracy scores possible in attribution test:				
Film No.	Alter's Role	Score	Yes/No	Score
1	mother	6	-	-
2	boss	6	no	1
3	girlfriend	6	no	1
4	AA man	6	no	1
5	close male friend	6	no	1
6	girlfriend	6	yes	2
7	colleague	6	no	1
8	young sister	6	no	1
9	boss	6	yes	2
10	male acquaintance	6	no	1
11	mother	6	yes	2
Total score:		66		13

c) Modal Accuracy Score (M.acc.):

In Chapter Three, it was suggested that if the role of alter were "conventionally" expressed by the actor, then the majority of judges should make accurate attributions; the shared, or "modal" attribution should be the correct one. However, the argument also emphasised the subtlety of attributional ability, based, it was proposed, on a normally distributed ability to take the role of the other. The actor's performances were not unnaturally "conventional", and the experimenters themselves found difficulty in identifying alter's roles after several viewings of the performances. In order that the relationship between "modal" accuracy and "valid" accuracy might be assessed, scores were given to judges on the basis of their modal responses. Modal accuracy was assessed by comparing a judge's attribution for each role with the three most commonly given attributions (amongst the total group's responses). Judges giving the most common attribution for any one alter received a score of 3, the next most common, 2, and the third in frequency rank, 1. A judge giving the most popular attribution for all alters would thus receive the maximum possible score for modal accuracy, that of 33.

d) Item Difficulty from Accuracy Scores

A rank order of items (performances) according to their relative difficulty, was derived by ranking the sums for each item of the 44 accuracy scores (b) achieved by the judges for that item. These accuracy scores excluded scores gained vis à vis recognition repeats.

e) Item Difficulty from Number of Correct Attributions

Since the accuracy score allows achievement of a high score, without, necessarily, any correct identifications, a further ranking of difficulty level of items was constructed, based on the number of judges identifying alter's role correctly from each performance.

f) Agreement Ranking of Items

A score representing the number of judges agreeing with the most frequent attribution (whether or not this was objectively valid), was given

for each item. The rank-order of items based on these scores served as a crude measure of the "stereotypy-proneness" of items.

g) Rankings of items in terms of variety of attributions

Items were ranked according to the number of different attributions given for each performance by the group, (order VAR + 1). A further ranking (VAR - 1) was based on the number of different attributions given for items by two or more judges (in case the first ranking included random guesses rather than idiosyncratic judgements, made by one judge).

E. Results

(a) The ability to attribute roles to alters

Means and standard deviations for the relevant scores, for all judges, and for males (M) and females (F) separately, are shown in Table 6:1.

Table 6:1
Medians and ranges of accuracy measures in
attribution test in study seven.

Accuracy	All judges		M (N = 17)		F (N = 27)	
Measure	Median	Range	Median	Range	Median	Range
Acc.	39	15 to 56	39	29 to 52	41	15 to 56
N.C.	3	0 to 6	3	1 to 5	3	0 to 6
M.acc.	21	12 to 28	19	12 to 28	21	13 to 27

The frequency distribution of the accuracy scores for all 44 judges ($\bar{X} = 38.5$; s.d. = 8.916) is shown in Figure 6:2. The hypothesis that this distribution arose by random sampling from a normally distributed population was tested by comparing the obtained frequencies with those expected from a normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation as the obtained distribution, using the chi-square test (Guilford, 1965, p.243); The accuracy scores were normally distributed ($\chi^2 = 1.730$; df=3; $p < .70$).




Figure 6:2

Distribution of accuracy scores obtained in attribution test in Study Seven.

In order to assess the nature of the relationships between accuracy score, number correct score, and modal accuracy score, correlation coefficients were obtained. Rank-correlation was employed, since the latter scores may not be normally distributed. There was a positive relationship between accuracy score and number correct score ($r_s = 0.839$; $N=44$; $p < .01$), which may be partly accounted for by the latter score contributing to the former. The coefficient of correlation between accuracy and modal accuracy scores was smaller, but positive and significant ($r_s = 0.336$; $N=44$; $p < .05$), indicating that "stereotype accuracy", where the "stereotype" agrees with objective criteria, may contribute to attributional skill in this situation, but does not account for it.

(b) Difficulty of performances

For each judge, a rank order of items in terms of difficulty was derived from their accuracy score for each item (disregarding the additional score gained if the alter was correctly designated as a "repeat" or not). Data were incomplete for two of the male judges; the coefficient of concordance between the remaining 42 judges' rankings (W) was 0.125 ($\chi^2 = 52.5$; $p < .001$). Thus judges agreed about relative difficulty levels of performances, as predicted. A rank order of items (performances) in terms of difficulty, based on the means of all judges' rankings, was derived. This rank order, together with the mean accuracy score (less recognition score) gained by all male and female judges for each item, is shown in Table 6:2.

Table 6:2

Difficulty levels of items and mean accuracy scores in Study Seven

No.	Item Alter	Rank of mean of ranks of difficulty (N=42)	Means of accuracy scores	
			M (N=17)	F (N=25)
1	mother	4	2.47	2.48
2	boss	5	3.35	2.40
3	girlfriend	10	3.88	4.88
4	AA man	11	5.06	4.80
5	close male friend	9	3.59	3.68
6	girlfriend (R)	7	3.29	2.48
7	colleague	1	1.29	1.12
8	young sister	6	2.59	2.24
9	boss (R)	2	2.71	2.36
10	male acquaint- tance	3	1.82	2.84
11	mother (R)	8	3.24	2.88
(Rank 1 = most difficult) (R) = Repeat				

By inspection, it may be noted that the three "repeat" performances (signified "R") did not obtain equivalent rankings, suggesting that difficulty level refers to difficulty of attribution in a particular performance, rather than, necessarily, with regard to particular alters.

The rank of the mean of the ranks of item difficulty level derived from accuracy scores of females was compared with that derived from the scores of males, and a significant and positive relationship ($r_s = 0.71$; $p < .01$) was found, indicating that item difficulty was similar for males and females.

Items were also ranked on the basis of the number of correct attributions received (median = 9; range = 0 to 31), and on the basis of consensus (the number of judges agreeing about the "modal" attribution, being

a measure of "stereotypy-proneness"; median = 15; range = 11 to 33). A rank order of items was also based on the number of different attributions made (VAR+1), (median = 8; range = 6 to 15), and on the variety of attributions made by more than one judge (VAR-1), (median = 7; range = 4 to 9). These rank orders are shown in Table 6:3, a rank of 1 indicating low number of correct attributions, low consensus and low variety.

Table 6:3

Rank orders of items according to: number of correct attributions, amount of consensus, and variety of attributions, in Study Seven.

Item No.	Rank, no. corr.	Most common identific ⁿ .	Rank, Consensus	Rank, variety	
				Var+1	Var-1
1	3	father	6	9	6.5
2	8	girlfriend	1	7	9
3	10	girlfriend	10	3.5	1.5
4	11	mechanic	11	1.5	4
5	9	close male friend	8	1.5	4
6	6	girlfriend	2.5	5	9
7	1	father	2.5	8	9
8	2	mother	9	3.5	1.5
9	5	male friend	7	6	6.5
10	4	male friend	5	11	11
11	7	mother	4	10	4

By inspection of the ranks shown in Table 6:3, it may be seen that items 2, 3 and 4, are the most often correctly judged, the most agreed about by judges, and receive fewer different attributions. For these items, "objective" accuracy is paralleled by modal accuracy. In order to assess the validity of this observation, and of the assertion that

consensus is associated with difficulty level of items, correlation coefficients were calculated for the relationships between the various indices of item difficulty, response variety, and consensus, as shown in Table 6:4.

Table 6:4

<u>Rank correlation coefficients for relationships</u>				
<u>between indices of item differences in Study</u>				
<u>Seven.</u>				
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	-0.646*	-0.646*	0.557*	0.827**
				(a) Difficulty level based on accuracy score
		0.591*	-0.641*	-0.536*
				(b) Variety (Var+1)
			-0.741**	-0.286
				(c) Variety (Var-1)
			0.380	
				(d) Consensus
				(e) Difficulty level based on no. correct

* = $p < .05$;

** = $p < .01$

The accuracy score index of difficulty level correlated positively and significantly with that based on number of correct attributions. This would be expected to some extent, owing to the high loading of correct responses (giving a score of 6), in the accuracy score. There was a significant negative relationship between variety of attributions (Var+1) and the two indices of difficulty level, supporting the observation that judges agreed more about easier items, whether or not the modal response was objectively valid. Similarly, the extent of consensus about each item was negatively related to the (Var+1) variety index. Amount of consensus was found positively related to difficulty level of item based on accuracy score, but not significantly so to that based on number correct.

(c) Role-taking ability

Judges' ranking according to scores on Feffer's RTT (median = 14; range = 8.5 to 20; N = 44) was compared with those according to accuracy, number correct and modal accuracy scores, on the attribution test. The resulting coefficients of correlation are shown in Table 6:5.

Table 6:5

Coefficients of correlation between role-taking ability and attribution measures.

Attribution Measures	r_s	p
Total Role Perception Score	0.170	ns
Number Correct	0.209	ns
Modal Role Perception Score	-0.010	ns

It may also be noted that the only measure of attributional ability (using the criterion of objective validity) to approach a significant positive relationship with role-taking ability, was the simple "number correct" measure.

F. Discussion

An ability to discriminate between and to identify the informal roles of an actor, by specifying the alter with whom the actor was interacting, was demonstrated. The scores for these judges fell in the mid-region of possible scores, showing that judges were able to exercise fully their attributive abilities. In comparison with other "tests" used in studies of role perception and person perception, this test assumes a high degree of perceptual sensitivity in judges. If an improvisational view of interaction has any validity, then people would have to be as sensitive as this test demands.

Although the positive relationship between the attribution scores and the similar "number correct" scores might be accounted for by the

fact that the latter may be included in the former, it would be possible to obtain a high "accuracy" score without achieving a single completely correct attribution. It is reasonable to suggest therefore that this positive relationship reflects a relationship between the ability to identify various aspects of alter's role, and that of being totally correct about it. The "accuracy" score was also significantly related to the modal accuracy score; it was argued that some degree of consensus must provide "common denominators" on the basis of which performances may be improvised and interpreted. In this study it may be maintained that role attributive skill was appropriately assessed in terms of the "objective validity" of responses, given the normal distribution of accuracy scores.

It would have been possible for judges to demonstrate attributive skill without agreeing about the relative difficulty of performances; item difficulty might be specific to a particular judge's experience of interacting with particular alters in the past. There was, however, a significant level of agreement between judges as to the difficulty of performances. While sex differences arising from an interaction between sex of judge and sex of actor might have been expected, these were not found. The agreement across all judges supported the hypothesised skill as being independent of specific experience, and allowed a rank order of difficulty level for performances to be derived, and conjectures about this to be ventured. Two rank orders of items in terms of the variety of attributions offered for each were obtained. Items which received most attributions were more difficult to assess accurately, supporting the notion that objective accuracy has its basis in "consensus".

Scoring of Feffer's role-taking test reflects Piaget's "stage" approach, categorising responses into various classes which specify the degree of sophistication achieved in simultaneous decentering. Unfortunately, none of the positive relationships between role-taking ability

(manifested in the RTT) and attributive accuracy measures were significant. That such a relationship seemed most likely to be found for the simple "number correct" measure, would imply that what may allow judges to "go beyond" the partially correct attributions which they may achieve by evaluation of the "conventional" meanings of expressive acts, is the ability to decenter simultaneously with regard to the role of the actor and the imagined role of alter. In the absence of statistically significant findings, however, such a hypothesis remains to be supported.

No judge gave correct attributions for all performances; such a failure may reflect ineffective communication on the part of the actor in some cases, but it must be allowed that many (unassessed) factors must contribute to the ultimate judgement. For example, some degree of skill must be involved in verbalising attributions, that is, in giving verbal responses in the AT.

The scoring method for the AT was somewhat cumbersome, and the "near-success" of the "number correct" score, in demonstrating a predicted relationship between attributive skill and role-taking ability, suggested that a "forced-choice" system of test administration might be feasible. Such a procedure would reduce the possible contamination of measures of attributive skill (per se) by skill in giving verbal descriptions of attributions, mentioned above. A forced-choice method was employed in the study to be described.

3. Study Eight

A. Introduction

This study involved an attempt to replicate the demonstration, achieved in the previous study, of attributive skill. Under the free response (FR) procedure employed in the administration of the AT, judges may vary in their understanding of the extent or nature of the verbal identifications required, and a forced choice (FC) procedure would be preferable, if giving comparable results. In real-life encounters, the range of possible roles

performed by an alter would be limited, and this "expectation" feature of relationships may be as relevant to improvised, informal roles as to the formal Roles discussed by Role Theorists. An FC procedure may thus be viewed as enhancing the "reality" of the experimental situation.

In this study the comparability of attribution test (AT) performance under FR and FC procedures was assessed. With only 11 performances varying in difficulty level, it was not feasible to present "half" to judges under FC procedure, and the other "half" with an FR method. Therefore, judges viewed all performances initially under FR instructions, then repeated the task under FC procedures. If there was any improvement of task performance on the second showing of the film, this was expected to be shown to a similar extent by all judges, and items were expected to achieve a similar order of difficulty level under both response methods.

B. Procedure

Eighty-three first year undergraduates at Reading University acted as judges. The mean age of the 36 males and 47 females was 19.4 years. The Attribution Test (AT) was administered as before and FR attributions were given. The films were then shown again and judges made FC attributions; at the head of the FC answer sheet (shown in Appendix B) were listed the 8 alters. Judges were not told that the actor would be speaking to all the specified alters during the sequence of performances, and were reminded that there would be a number of "repeat" performances.

C. Scoring Methods

Accuracy measures:

FR response sheets were scored as in the previous study except that the "recognition score" was not included in the accuracy score. The three scores and their possible ranges were thus: accuracy score (0-66); number correct (0-11); modal accuracy score (0-33).

Forced Choice responses received a score of 1 if correct, and a score of 0 if incorrect; modal accuracy scores were derived as under the FR

procedure. The ranges of possible scores were as follows: FC Accuracy score (0-11); FC modal accuracy score (0-33).

Item differences:

Three rank orders of item difficulty were derived, based on the FR accuracy score, the FR number correct score, and the FC accuracy score, respectively.

D. Results

(a) Attribution under free response (FR) and forced choice (FC) procedures.

Means and standard deviations for attribution measures for all 83 judges are given in Table 6:6.

Table 6:6

Means and standard deviations for accuracy measures in attribution test in Study Eight.

Measure	$\bar{X}$	s.d.
FR Accuracy score	37.41	6.50
FR Number correct score	3.63	1.47
FR Modal accuracy score	20.29	4.06
FC Accuracy score	4.53	1.51
FC Modal accuracy score	21.95	3.84

Frequency distributions of the scores for accuracy under FC and FR are shown in Figures 6:3 and 6:4. By D'Agostino's (1970) test, $\alpha = 0.810$ for the FR total accuracy distribution, for which $z = 0.961$ ($p < .01$), supporting the hypothesis of normality for this distribution. Similarly the FC total accuracy distribution was found to be normal ($\alpha = 0.840$; $z = 1.766$; $p < .05$).

In order to test hypotheses concerning the replication of previous findings and the nature of the relationship between FR and FC accuracy scores, coefficients of correlation were computed, and are shown in Table 6:7.




Figure 6:3

Distribution of FR accuracy scores obtained in Attribution Test in Study Eight.




Figure 6:4

Distribution of FC accuracy scores obtained
in Attribution Test in Study Eight.

Table 6:7

Relationships between Attribution
measures achieved in Study Eight.

Free Response			Forced Choice		
(a) Acc.	(b) N.C.	(c) M.acc.	(d) Acc.	(e) M.Acc.	
	0.857**	0.696**	0.333**	0.363**	(a)
		0.588**	0.409**	0.360**	(b)
			0.064	0.205	(c)
				0.582**	(d)
					(e)

* = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$

As predicted, FC accuracy scores were positively and significantly correlated with FR number correct, and FR accuracy scores. Under both the FR and FC procedures, modal accuracy was positively related to "objectively valid" accuracy.

(b) Difficulty levels of performances

In order to assess whether judges agreed about item difficulty levels, a rank order of item difficulty levels was derived from the judges' rankings; (W) was 0.2102 ($p < .001$). As previously, the rank order of item difficulty levels for males correlated positively ($r_s = 0.927$; $p < .01$) with that for female judges. Given this agreement, a final rank order of item difficulty was derived from the mean accuracy scores of all judges (FR).

Rank orders of item difficulty levels were also derived from the mean FR number correct scores, and FC accuracy scores. These ranks are shown below in Table 6:8, together with the difficulty ranks derived from the accuracy scores (FR) in the previous study, signified (1).

Table 6:8

Rank orders of items in terms of difficulty

Item		Difficulty levels derived from:				
No.	Alter	FR Acc.	FR No.Corr.	FC Acc.	FR Acc.	FR No.Corr.
					(1)	(1)
1	mother	2	2	2	4	3
2	boss	9	8	10	5	8
3	girlfriend	11	11	8	10	10
4	AA man	8	9	9	11	11
5	close male friend	10	10	7	9	9
6	girlfriend (R)	7	7	1	7	6
7	colleague	1	1	3	1	1
8	young sister	4	3	11	6	2
9	boss (R)	5	5	4	2	5
10	male acquaintance	3	4	5	3	4
11	mother (R)	6	6	6	8	7
Median:		2.4	17	22		
Range:		1.5 to 5.0	0 to 55	6 to 60		
(Where rank 1 = most difficult; (R) = repeat performance)						

By inspection it may be seen that difficulty levels for this group under FR did not follow the same order as those under FC. It may be noted however, that there is reasonable agreement as to which were the three easiest and the three most difficult items. In order to assess the nature of the relationships between orders of item difficulty obtaining here, and between these and those found in the previous study, coefficients of correlation were calculated. These are shown in Table 6:9.

Table 6:9

<u>Relationships between rank-orders of item difficulty</u>					
Comparison			r_s	N	p
FR acc.	with	FR no. corr.	0.982	11	.01
FR acc.	with	FR acc. (1)	0.855	11	.01
FR no. corr.	with	FR no. corr. (1)	0.955	11	.01
FC acc.	with	FR acc.	0.418	11	ns
FC acc.	with	FR. no. corr.	0.482	11	ns

Again, there was a positive relationship between difficulty level based on accuracy score and that based on number correct. However, the positive relationships predicted between the FC order and the two orders based on FR accuracy scores were insignificant. This suggests that the difficulty levels of items had been changed either by the FC procedure, or by the second presentation of the stimulus material to these judges. The degree of similarity between item difficulty ranks obtained in the previous, and in this study, was high.

E. Discussion

As predicted, the FC procedure was found to produce accuracy scores which were normally distributed in the group tested here, and were significantly similar to the FR accuracy scores, which were also normally distributed, a replication of the previous finding. With both FR and FC procedures, modal accuracy was positively related to "objectively valid" accuracy, as before, and FC modal accuracy was positively related to FR "objectively valid" accuracy, as well as that demonstrated under FC, suggesting that provision of alternative alters tends to make "modal" responses more similar to "objectively valid" ones.

Judges again agreed about item difficulty levels, and under the FR procedure, the rank order of items^{in terms} of difficulty, was similar to that found previously. The difficulty levels obtained under the FC procedure

did not, however, parallel those obtained under the FR procedure. Two possible explanations may be offered for this lack of correspondence.

Firstly, with the FC procedure, the film was being viewed for the second time. Secondly, the possible alternative alters were specified. Both explanations concern the "dominance" of certain attributions in judges' "repertoires" of potential "responses". An "unlikely" alter might not be confidently specified on a first viewing of the film, but might be specified with confidence on a second presentation, or where the alter was "named" in a provided list.

4. Study Nine

A. Introduction

The discrepancy found between performances, in terms of their relative difficulty levels, under FR and FC procedures in the previous study might, as was suggested, have been based either in the difference between the FR and FC procedures, or in the fact that the FC system was applied to the second presentation of the film. The first explanation, that the difference arose by virtue of the specification of alternative alters, was investigated here. If specification of alternative "alters" changes the relative difficulty of performances, then participation in the AT under FC procedure only (with no prior presentation of the film) should produce accuracy scores demonstrating a rank order of difficulty levels for performances, similar to that found under FC in the previous study.

B. Procedure

Ten male, and seven female undergraduates in their second year at Reading University acted as judges under FC procedure in the attribution test.

C. Scoring Methods

The FC answer sheets were scored as previously, accuracy scores being obtained for each judge. From these accuracy scores, a rank order of item difficulty levels was derived.

D. Results

The mean and standard deviation for accuracy ($\bar{X} = 4.87$; s.d. = 1.51) for this group of 17 judges, were comparable to those obtained under FC in the previous study ($\bar{X} = 4.53$; s.d. = 1.51). Item difficulty levels were of the following order (according to item): rank 2;11;6;10;4.5;2;2;9;4.5;7.5;7.5 (item 11). (For the accuracy scores, per item, on which this ranking was based, median = 6; range = 3 to 14).

The coefficient of correlation (r_s) between the rank order of item difficulty level obtained here, and that obtained previously, was 0.864 ($p < .01$), indicating that it was the FC procedure itself, rather than the second presentation of the film in the previous study, which had led to the different difficulty levels of items, under FC and FR procedures.

E. Discussion

This study was successful in demonstrating that the difference between rank orders of item difficulty levels obtaining under FR and FC procedures in the previous study was due, not to the fact that the FC procedure was applied when the film was presented, for the second time in succession, but to the fact that the forced choice procedure, involving the specification of alternative alters, generated a new rank order with which that obtained here was similar.

Having established that the FC procedure achieves results in terms of agreement as to item difficulty levels and demonstration of a normally distributed attributional skill, comparable with those obtained where a free response procedure was used, and presuming that provision of alternative alters makes the attribution test "closer" to everyday dyadic situations, it seems feasible to reduce the amount of information presented to judges, and to attempt to identify the sources of "casting" cues and to establish the relative "power" of cue sources in these terms.

5. Study Ten

A. Introduction

The three studies described have demonstrated an ability to attribute roles to unseen alters conversing with an actor. In proposing this skill, it was argued that the information given to judges by presentation of the actor's performances, that is, via his expressive behaviour, was predominantly nonverbal. Argyle (1969) and McCall and Simmons (1966) stress the importance of the nonverbal aspects of social behaviour in the communication of "interpersonal attitudes", and this emphasis on the nonverbal "relationship language" is shared by Ekman and Friesen (1968) and Walzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1968), amongst others.

Although the attribution test (AT) performances were improvised so as to give as little information as possible about alters' roles via verbal content, it has not been established that content carried no information, nor, indeed, that any information was conveyed nonverbally. In this study a crude attempt was made to assess which cue sources carried most information about alter's roles.

The only possible separations of the cue sources available to judges in the AT, given the nature of the material, were into: auditory (verbal content plus paralinguistic features (sc), visual (facial, gestural and postural movements (v), visual plus verbal content as written material (vc) and verbal content as written material only (c). These, together with the full video plus soundtrack presentation (vsc) gave five possible presentation conditions.

The distinctions which can be made here between "sources of information" best approximate to Argyle's (1969) level of analysis in terms of the "elements" of social behaviour, but, just as the nonverbal features of behaviour serve to qualify the meanings of verbal content, so nonverbal elements may qualify each other. By separating cue sources as proposed the "syntactic" features of nonverbal and verbal behaviour may be disturbed.

It might therefore be expected that all sources together (vsc) would give "superior" information about alters' roles. It might also be the case that some information be carried by restricted sources, and these "elements" may be considered as of possible relevance here.

The "elements" of bodily contact, proximity and smell, are deemed irrelevant to this study, since it seems unlikely that a telephone might be treated as an alter in such respects. The relevant visual elements are: physical appearance, posture, gesture, head movements, facial expression and gaze behaviour. None of these are sensibly relevant in the absence of a "seeing" alter, but might be relevant if a combination of nonverbal behaviours signalling, for example, "liking", became "automatised" for the actor.

In this case, the visible aspects of the actor's expressive processes might be exhibited in conjunction with the audible components with which they had become linked; people look "toward" an invisible alter when conversing, for example, (Argyle, Ingham, Alkema and McCallin, 1973). The actor's posture showed some variation, and there is evidence (Goffman, 1961; Mehrabian, 1968) that posture may be relaxed with low status alters. Hand gestures may not only be illustrative, but may act as "leakage" cues (Ekman and Friesen, 1969b). Facial expression, head movements and gaze direction convey interpersonal attitudes well, as shown by a number of studies, for example those of Rosenfeld (1967), Exline and Winters (1965), and Argyle and Dean (1965).

Printed verbal material cannot be entirely isolated from the paralinguistic aspects of speech; in this study, pauses and some speech errors were included in content, in order to lend some coherence to the actor's verbal flow. Printed speech errors included "ah" errors (shown by Kasl and Mahl (1965) to increase in telephone-like situations), and incompletions. All errors, length of pauses, and speech timing, tone and rate, were available to those hearing the soundtrack (sc). Speech

rate has been found to be related to judgements of anger, contempt and love, by Lalljee and the present author (1967).

All three cue sources (v, s, and c) may be assumed to be potential communicators of information about alters' roles, and may also communicate about the "display rules" (Ekman and Friesen, 1971) which require deintensification, neutralisation and masking in the context of particular roles and "situations". von Cranach (1970) also suggests that situations include signs indicating such rules, and that there may also be "metarules" regarding the importance of following the particular rules.

If all three cue sources might be expected to aid judges in their identification of alters' roles, it may be hypothesised that these sources would aid identification in a loosely "additive" fashion, except where information conveyed by one source tended to contradict that conveyed by another. The prediction may be made that the availability of all cue sources simultaneously (vsc), would lead to the most accurate attributions in the AT. It would also be expected that attributions would be more accurate on the basis of the paired cue sources, (vc) and (sc), than on the basis of either of the single sources. In order to predict a rank order of the five "conditions" in terms of the relative accuracy to be expected from presentation of each, three empirical studies may be cited.

With "equated" sentences (c), Argyle et al (1970) found nonverbal sources (vs) to have four and a half times the "power" of the verbal (c) source in communicating "inferior", "neutral", and "superior" attitudes. Nonverbal sources had six times more "power", in communicating "friendly" and "hostile" attitudes, than the verbal source, according to Argyle, Alkema and Gilmour (1971). Finally, Levitt (1964) showed that emotions were communicated better facially than vocally.

On the basis of this evidence, a rank order of conditions was predicted, according to the accuracy in attribution expected: (vsc) would

be expected to permit the greatest accuracy, then (sc), (vc), (v), and then (c). It was also expected that the alter "AA man", would not be so easily recognised in the (v) condition where content (including a "clue" about this alter) was not available. Apart from this instance, it was predicted that item difficulty levels would be similar for all five "conditions".

B. Procedure

Fifty-seven Reading undergraduates, (28 males and 29 females), of mean age 20.3 years, acted as judges, and were randomly assigned to one of the five presentation conditions, for which the procedure was as follows:-

- vsc: The procedure was as employed for previous administration of the A.T.
- vc: Judges viewed the silent film, and were given a typed copy of the verbal content for each performance (as shown in Appendix C) as it was shown, which was available until their identification for that alter had been given.
- v: Judges viewed only the silent film.
- sc: The soundtrack of each performance was presented by tape-recorder.
- c: The typed content sheet for the first performance was presented and judges were asked to give their attribution as soon as they had finished reading it. This sheet was removed, the next presented, and so on, until all eleven attributions had been attempted.

In each condition, samples of performances were presented initially, in order to allow some "baseline" for later judgements to be formed. The forced choice answer sheet was used by judges in making their identifications.

C. Results

The FC answer sheets were scored as previously, the accuracy score for each judge having a possible range of 0 to 11.

The median and range for accuracy in each "condition" are shown in Table 6:10. The rank positions of the medians did not disconfirm the prediction of increased accuracy with increased information, but three values (rank 4) were tied. Although not entirely appropriate to these scores, the means did follow the predicted order, as shown in Table 6:10.

Table 6:10
Median and Mean accuracy scores for each condition in Study Ten

Condition	N	Median	Range	Mean	s.d.	Rank Orders		
						(Median)	(Mean)	Predicted
vsc	12	4	2 to 7	4.25	1.71	4	5	5
sc	9	4	3 to 6	3.89	1.05	4	4	4
vc	7	4	1 to 6	3.43	1.62	4	3	3
v	12	3.5	1 to 5	3.42	1.56	2	2	2
c	17	3	1 to 5	3.29	1.40	1	1	1

In order to assess the significance of differences between accuracy in each condition, Mann-Whitney tests were carried out, for which the obtained (universally insignificant) values are shown in Appendix A in Table A:6:1.

The rank order of item difficulty levels according to the accuracy scores obtained in each of the five conditions are shown below in Table 6:11.

Table 6:11

Rank orders of items in terms of difficulty level, in each condition

Item	Alter	Condition				
		vsc	sc	vc	v	c
1	Mother	1	1	2.5	3	2
2	Boss	7	8.5	5.5	10.5	7
3	Girlfriend	8.5	8.5	9	10.5	8
4	AA Man	10	10.5	9	9	10.5
5	Close male friend	5.5	7	5.5	5.5	3
6	Girlfriend (R)	8.5	3	5.5	7	5
7	Colleague	3	5.5	2.5	8	1
8	Young sister	11	10.5	11	1.5	10.5
9	Boss (R)	3	3	9	5.5	9
10	Male acquaintance	5.5	5.5	1	4	5
11	Mother (R)	3	3	5.5	1.5	5

Where Rank 1 = Most Difficult

Correlation coefficients, calculated in order to assess the degree of relationship between the rank orders (according to difficulty) in the five conditions are shown in Table 6:12.

Table 6:12

Relationships between difficulty levels of items
in each condition in Study Ten.

vsc	sc	vc	v	c	
-	0.523	0.600**	0.107	0.814**	vsc
	-	0.722**	0.393	0.591**	sc
		-	0.300	0.682*	vc
			-	0.130	v
				-	c

* = $p < .05$; ** = $p < .01$

All coefficients (r_s) were positive, indicating some degree of similarity between item difficulty levels in the five conditions. The content rank order (c) was significantly related to all three orders where the sources included content. In contrast, the relationships between the video-only (v) condition and the orders in the two conditions including this source, (vsc and vc), were small and insignificant. Given also the insignificant relationship between the orders for (v) and (c), it seems likely that verbal content is responsible to some extent for the similarity in difficulty level orders between the conditions containing content, and that the difficulty level under only (v) information is distinct. Perhaps information from visual sources tends to be used mainly when no other information is available.

D. Discussion

Given the achievement of the predicted rank order of conditions according to the mean accuracy scores attained in each, the failure to demonstrate significant differences between accuracy in the five conditions was disappointing. An unavoidable methodological problem which may have prejudiced support for the hypothesis was the difficulty of controlling the exposure time of material effectively. In the (c) and (cv) conditions, judges were allowed to read the content sheets until they had "read them once", frequently a period longer than the time necessary for their verbal expression. Accuracy in these conditions might thus have been enhanced relative to that in the (vsc), (sc), and (v) conditions. In the latter, exposure time was constant. However, if all sources carry some relevant information, the time available for processing each "bit" of information would be greatest in the (v) condition, less in (sc), and least in the (vsc) condition. Thus the exposure time "factor" would be such as to push all accuracy levels upward toward the (vsc) level.

The comparison between item difficulty ranks in the five conditions suggested that there might be relative independence between information carried by the visual source and that provided by the audible source. It is perhaps surprising, given that this was a "telephone" situation, that the visual source gave any information at all. The difference between the (v) condition order and all others was not attributable to the "AA man", since this alter received a high rank in the (v) condition, as well as in others.

The study was successful in demonstrating that all sources of verbal and nonverbal information carry cues relevant to alters' roles. The FC procedure did not allow any examination of the kind of information carried by the different sources; it was possible that certain sources relate to certain aspects of alters' roles. The final study to be described involved a simple attempt to examine this possibility.

6. Study Eleven

A. Introduction

In order to explore the sources of "casting cues", this study involved only two presentation conditions, (c) and (sc). It was conjectured that different sources of cues might refer to different aspects of alter's role; judges were therefore asked to specify alter's status (higher or equal to the actor's), age (same or older), sex, and relationship with the actor (close or distant). Such dichotomous choices were to facilitate analysis of data, but necessitated a reduction in the number of performances presented.

B. Procedure

Fifty-eight first-year Reading undergraduates read typescripts (c) of six performances: (boss, girlfriend, close male friend, girlfriend (R), colleagues, boss (R)), the procedure was as before, except that care was taken that each sheet was read only once before a judgement was made.

Sixty-two similar judges heard the soundtracks (sc). A score of 1 was given for correct attribution of each of the four characteristics of each of the alters. The answer sheet used is shown in Appendix B.

C. Results

Mean scores (samples were sufficiently large to allow assumptions of "normality") obtained for each characteristic in the two conditions are shown in Table 6:13.

Table 6:13

Mean Accuracy Scores for each role characteristic in each condition

Source		Age	Sex	Status	Relationship	N
Content	$\bar{X}$	2.914	3.725	3.172	3.517	58
(c)	s.d.	(0.87)	(1.36)	(1.04)	(1.38)	
Sound +	$\bar{X}$	3.242	4.355	3.581	4.194	62
Content	s.d.	(1.03)	(1.20)	(1.10)	(1.08)	
(sc)						

In the (c) condition, the means for age and status did not exceed that to be expected by chance (3.259; $p < .05$), nor did the mean for age in the (sc) condition. There were significant differences between the mean accuracy scores in the (c) and (sc) conditions; for sex ($t = 2.943$; $p < .05$), and for relationship ($t = 2.585$; $p < .05$).

D. Discussion

Although, in the previous study, no significant difference was found between accuracy attained when different sources of information were available, in this study (with improved presentation procedure and a larger "N"), paralinguistic cues were found to aid judges in identifying two aspects of alter's role: alter's sex, and the closeness of the relationship between the actor and alter. This study sought also to examine the aspects of alter's role indicated by information from the two sources considered. Weinstein and Deutschberger (1963) investigated status and "closeness of relationship" as two "dimensions of altercasting". These two aspects had

been inferred in Studies Seven and Eight here, from judges' FR attributions, as contributing to the attribution of alter's role, together with alter's sex and age. While the latter are stable characteristics of an individual, they may be viewed as involved in "altercasting", in that they may be more or less salient to an informal role performance, and thus, subject to varying degrees of emphasis by self-presentation and altercasting. This view was supported here, with regard to sex, but not age. Further, alter's status was only communicated above chance level in the (sc) condition, and not via verbal content.

7. Discussion and overview

The results of each study have been discussed fairly extensively, much of this discussion being concerned with the various measures of attributional skill derived from performance of the experimental task (the AT). The task was successful in demonstrating a normally-distributed range of attributional skill among three groups of people. Some of the actors' performances were more difficult to judge than others; the judges were of heterogeneous background in Study Seven, and would not have been expected to "agree" about difficulty levels if the different experiences of different judges had accounted for the differences in attributional skill demonstrated in the task.

The predicted relationships between reference to the "conventional" meaning of sequences of expressive acts and "objectively valid" judgements of alters' roles were demonstrated in the relationships between judges' scores in "accuracy" and "modal accuracy", and also in the relationships between rank orders of performances in terms of difficulty, variety of identifications offered, and degrees of consensus amongst judges as to the appropriate attribution (even where the latter was "objectively" incorrect).

It had been suggested that where judges attained a high degree of accuracy in the AT, they would be characterised by a high level of the ability to take the role of the other. This hypothesis was not confirmed in the first study although, where the measure of attributional skill was the sum

of the number of correct identifications achieved, the correlation coefficient approached significance. While the "number correct" score was related to the "accuracy" score (which gave judges credit for partially correct attributions), the latter did not approach a significant association with the role-taking measure; it was ventured that good role-taking ability may allow correct attributions to be achieved, rather than partially correct ones, but further empirical study would be required in order to demonstrate this.

It was proposed that a "forced choice" (FC) method of obtaining judgments of alters' roles from observers would be appropriate, and would improve the nature of the task, in that assessment of accuracy might be more "objective", and also in that it would be judges' attributional skill only, rather than their ability to attribute and verbalise their attribution appropriately, that would be under review.

In Studies Eight and Nine, an FC method of identification led to accuracy scores comparable to those obtained under free response. Specification of alternative alters under FC procedure did change the relative difficulty levels of performances.

In the last two studies, attempts were made to explore the sources of the information which judges used in order to make their attributions. It was assumed that, in order to perform the AT effectively, judges viewed the actor's expressive behaviour as a source of altercasting cues, and that such cues were likely to be predominantly nonverbal. These studies were not addressed to discovering how much people employ nonverbal expressive behaviour to make such attributions in everyday life, but to discovering whether nonverbal behaviour alone is sufficient to indicate the role of an alter, that is, to act as a source of "casting cues".

It was predicted, simply, that if nonverbal behaviour constituted the source of casting cues on the basis of which judges might attribute alters' roles, then the more nonverbal behaviour was available to judges, the more

accurate they would be in the AT. In Study Ten, the predicted rank order of "conditions" of information availability was obtained, but the accuracy attained in any one condition was not significantly different from that gained in any other. There were a number of inevitable methodological problems attending this study, all of which augured against support of the hypothesis.

It was possible that different sources of information might convey cues about different aspects of alter's roles. In Study Eleven, an attempt was made to establish whether this might be the case by presenting written verbal content to some judges and the film soundtrack to others. On the basis of this information, judges could not assess alter's age, and verbal content alone was insufficient to allow attribution of alters' statuses.

The paralinguistic cues included in the soundtrack of the performances allowed significantly better judgements to be made about the sex of the alters and about the closeness of their relationships with the actor.

This rather cursory investigation indicated that the more nonverbal information available, the more accurate are attributions of informal role, and, as far as paralinguistic and verbal content cues are concerned, different "sources" may not carry information about different features of alters' roles; this might be true only for performances by this actor. In an ongoing encounter, it is likely that expressive behaviour is interpreted as a pattern, and as a pattern viewed within the context of the pattern of all behaviour in the past, as well as of that of the present. This interdependency of acts in conveying particular meanings would indeed be expected if behaviour were viewed in the context of a role attributed to the performer, as the improvisational view would suggest. The ability to make such attributions has been demonstrated here.

This demonstration of attributive skill (and indirectly, of altercasting behaviour), lends support to the improvisational view which demands that people possess, to some degree, such competence in interpreting others' behaviour. Role Theory requires interpretative skill at the level of identifying, on the basis of simple non-ambiguous cues, the formal Role performed by another, and the non-dramaturgical views described in Chapter One require simple interpretation of cues the meanings of which are "culturally given" in an initial "exploration" process or, as in the case of Argyle's (1969) model, a near-automatic interpretation of elements of the partner's nonverbal behaviour, viewed as "feedback" about performance. From the results of the gaze manipulation study reported in the previous chapter, it would seem from the improvisational view that, to appropriately influence one's partner's behaviour, one's nonverbal behaviour must be interpreted within the context of an attributed role (rather than in isolation) may be required; the gaze manipulations were not related to the "naive" interactant's behaviour, and did not appear to radically affect the latter's behaviour. Thus, the improvisational view seems likely to enhance our understanding of the "feedback" or "audience" function of nonverbal behaviour in interaction.

In conclusion, it must be noted that the main criticism of these studies must be that only one actor was involved, and that he was aware that his behaviour was being filmed. Ideally, such studies should employ a number of "performers", unaware that their "telephone performances" were being observed. Apart from the ethical problems involved in obtaining such records, there is the difficulty of maintaining any degree of constancy in the verbal content of the conversations. An alternative means of establishing the generality of the findings reported here, would be to prepare a number of filmed performances by experienced "actors", conversing with a greater variety of alters, about a different series of events.

It is unfortunate that there is no means of conveying here the skill of the actor whose performances were used in these studies. His performances were unscripted, and, for the most part, unrehearsed; except for the fact that it was not, for example, his mother at the other end of the telephone, he behaved as if it had been. Studies of skills in performance, or rather, in the improvisation of performances, will be described in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Studies of Improvisation

1. Introduction

Two studies are described in this chapter in which the correlates of the ability to enact roles in "dramatic improvisation" settings are investigated. The quality of enactment is found to be related to judgments of actors as "socially skilled" by their associates, and with their ability to take the role of the other. Sarbin and Jones' (1956) measure of "role aptitude" is shown to be unrelated to any of the measures of acting and improvisational ability employed here, and an unsuccessful attempt to replicate Sarbin and Jones' validity study of their measure is mentioned.

These studies were carried out as simple explorations of hypotheses derived in Chapter Four. It was proposed that effective improvisation of informal roles would be positively related to the ability to take the role of the other but that effective improvisation, a covert, cognitive activity, might not necessarily be directly inferable from overt performance of a role. Since the "function" of improvisation might be viewed as primarily concerned with appropriate performance, it would be reasonable to assume that skilful performance reflected effective improvisation and to hypothesise that the former would be related to role-taking ability.

The evaluation of overt social behaviour as "skilful" or "effective", such that this hypothesis could be tested, may only be

achieved by devising a situation where a number of people improvise performances in "standard" social situations. The requirements of such situations would be that performers shared the same goals for the outcome of the encounter, and formulated their plans for performance so as to be closely related to their own previous experience, and implicative of those role-identities which they chose to display (and which they viewed as appropriate to the demands of the emergent role relationship).

Such "standard" situations are often employed as training techniques for dramatic acting. Frequently, the specification for an improvised enactment consists solely of a description of the physical (and sometimes "social") setting and the goals to be achieved. This was the manner whereby improvised performances were given in the studies described here. The quality of performance might be assumed to vary in accordance with the specific nature of the improvisation instructions, and with the abilities of interactive partners.

A preliminary study was conducted in which improvisational ability was assessed on the basis of a large number of performances given over a considerable period of time. In this study, the hypothesis that improvisational ability (or rather, enactment ability) was related to role-taking ability was tested by employing Sarbin and Jones' (1956) "as-if" measure of role aptitude which had been found to be related to enactment ability shown in one performance (where enactment was evaluated in terms of its "adequacy" and "conformance"). Although Sarbin and Jones (1956) found adequacy and conformance of

enactment to be positively associated, the evaluators (the audience to the enactments) may have believed "adequacy" to be equated with "conformance" since they had previously been required to describe the cultural stereotype for the Role. Nevertheless, it would be expected that role-taking ability as (purportedly) measured by the "as-if" test would be positively associated with improvisational and performance skill evidenced in settings less externally structured than Sarbin and Jones', and where effectiveness of performance were evaluated in terms of coherence and appropriateness rather than "conformance".

It was suggested that the notion of "social skill" described by non-dramaturgical theorists was conceptually closely related to the dramaturgical notion of "good performance". Factors assumed to be associated with the exhibition of "social skill" would therefore be expected to be related to effective improvisation and performance. Thus, it was predicted that judgments of a person as a "good" improviser and performer in "standard situations", made by people with whom he was accustomed to interact "informally", might be associated with their judgments of him as socially skilled, intelligent and popular.

Effectiveness of improvisation and performance were hypothesised, in Chapter Four, to be associated with the ability to "take the role of the other" as measured by Feffer's (1959) role-taking test (RTT). The results of Study Nine, where role-taking ability approached a significant association with attributional skill,

lend a little confidence to the view that successful improvisation, which must be based on effective attribution, may require role-taking ability.

Sarbin and Jones' "as-if" test requires respondents to view themselves in cultural contexts and sex-roles different from those in which their views of themselves have developed, whereas Feffer (1959) interprets role-taking ability as requiring simultaneous decentering with regard to "different aspects of the self". Feffer's view is that role-taking involves the interpretation and anticipation of another's reaction to the self vis-à-vis the actions intended by the "performer" self. Feffer's RTTmeasure of this ability, similarly, does not require attention solely to the characteristics of the imagined ego, but to the characteristics of alter, and the nature of his interaction with the ego.

As suggested in Chapter Four, there may be a variety of "sets" with which people might approach responding to the "as-if" test, and different "sets" to respond might require different degrees of "objectivity" about the "self". Some degree of such objectivity should be available to people who are good role-takers in the Fefferian sense, and the flexibility with which a person is able to display and to employ his different role-identities would be expected to be associated both with his ability to take the role of the other in dyadic interaction, and with the ability to view the "self" in alternative contexts, as in the "as-if" test.

In summary, people giving "good" improvised performances were expected to be viewed as socially skilled, intelligent and popular by their peers, to evidence high role-taking aptitude (as measured by the "as-if" test), and to be characterised by a sophisticated level of the ability to take the role of the other toward the self, according to Feffer's RTT measure.

2. Study Twelve

A. Introduction

The hypotheses to be investigated in this preliminary investigation concerned the ability of people to perform informal roles with each other in very loosely specified "improvisation" settings. Such ability was expected to be related to role-taking ability as measured by Sarbin and Jones' (1956) as-if test and to be positively associated with evaluative judgments made about performers' social skill, intelligence, and popularity.

In order to obtain evaluations of a person's popularity, and social skill, it was proposed that the people who were to act as judges should have known the person under evaluation for some time, and have interacted with him on a number of occasions, and in a variety of contexts. Similarly, evaluations of skill in improvising performances in minimally structured "staged" situations would be more reasonably obtained where the evaluators had witnessed the "judged" person in a variety of such staged settings, and performing with a variety of partners.

Consequently, a group of students who met regularly to engage in "dramatic improvisation", as part of a liberal studies

course, were asked to co-operate in this study by completing questionnaires. They were asked to judge the other members of their group in terms of "acting ability", "popularity", "intelligence" and "social skill". Such a means of assessment is liable to be biased in terms of "halo effect" (Thorndike, 1920); people are likely to evaluate others in terms of a general factor of "goodness", so that a person whom they liked they might deem to be popular, intelligent, socially skilled, and so on. There is less reason to expect, however, that different "judges" would agree with each other about these characteristics of a person, especially if their personal relationships with the judged person constituted the source of their evaluative biases.

Objective assessment of a person's behaviour toward others in general (rather than toward themselves in particular) should give rise to some agreement between judges. Evaluations of the above characteristics would only be useful in the investigation of the proposals with which this study was concerned, where judges agreed as to the relative degrees of these characteristics, "possessed" by the people under study. It was suspected that agreement might not be achieved where judges were evaluating people whom they did not know very well. Therefore, judges were asked to state how well they knew the person being judged. A further appraisal of "acting ability" was obtained from the leader of the group (a teacher).

B. Procedure

The respondents to the questionnaire were past members of a "free drama" group which had met once a week for three terms

at Headington Technical College. The questionnaire was administered during the October following these terms. Of the 9 male, and 7 female, group members (of average age 19 years), thirteen (8 males and 5 females) were willing to give evaluations of all members and to complete the questionnaire.

The questionnaire was sent to each member with a covering letter requesting their co-operation and assuring them of the confidentiality of their replies. Some members were contacted personally in order to ensure their co-operation.

C. Questionnaire

A copy of the questionnaire and covering letter is shown in Appendix B. The face sheet carried the respondent's name, and gave instructions for completion of the questionnaire. The subsequent sheets, briefly, comprised the following:

Page 1: The as-if test: Respondents were asked to answer the two questions: "How would you be different if you had been born a Russian?" (a), and "How would you be different if you were of the opposite sex?" (b). Respondents were asked to give their answers "in one go" and not to add to them subsequently.

Page 2: A list of code letters for members of the group; the letters A to P were assigned (randomly) to group members, and were to be used in the ranking procedure.

Page 3: Respondents were asked to rank the other members of the group (excluding themselves) from 1 to 15, with regard to the degree to which they thought that each was intelligent, popular (within

the group), socially skilled ("how well they get on with others, how well they handle awkward situations, etc."), acting ability ("how well they can adopt various roles in improvisation; how well they can project them to an audience; how well they can lose their own personal characteristics when this is necessary, in order to present a very different role"), and the degree to which they knew them. Respondents were asked to rank members in such a way that 1 represented the highest value, and 15, the lowest.

The group leader was asked to complete Page 3 of the questionnaire, ranking the members from 1 to 16.

D. Results

(a) Derivation of Data

Data was derived from the questionnaire, measures as follows:

(i) As-if Test: Answers to each question were typed, duplicated, and distributed to 4 independent raters. Answers to the first question were presented to the raters in a different order to that in which answers to the second question were arranged. The raters were asked to give a score to each answer in terms of the number of "relevant ideas" expressed; this measure represented a compromise between Sarbin and Jones' (1956) measure of "number of relevant words" and the more sophisticated content analysis procedure employed by Rosenberg, Sutton-Smith and Griffiths (1965).

Members were then ranked according to their scores on each question, and according to their mean score on both questions, a separate ranking being obtained from the scores of each of the four raters. Coefficients of concordance were obtained in order to assess

the degree to which the four raters agreed about members' relative role-taking ability (as evidenced in members' as-if test answers). Raters agreed about the relative abilities of members demonstrated in their answers to question (a) ($W = 0.932$; $p < .001$), in their answers to question (b) ($W = 0.976$; $p < .001$), and about their abilities (averaged) over both answers ($W = 0.971$; $p < .001$).

The ranking of members according to their answers to question (a) correlated positively and significantly with that according to their answers to question (b), where all raters scores were combined ($r_s = 0.71$; $p < .01$), and it was considered appropriate that the final rank order of members according to the as-if measure be derived from all raters' assessments of both answers. This ranking, together with the median and range of total as-if scores, is shown in Appendix A, in Table A:7:1.

(ii) Group Ratings

In order to assess the degree to which the thirteen respondents agreed about the relative degree to which the 16 members (excluding themselves) were high in acting ability, intelligence, social skill, and popularity, coefficients of concordance were obtained for each of the four dimensions; the degree to which members were universally "well known" by other members of the group was also assessed in this manner. Agreement was highest for acting ability ($W = 0.57$; $p < .001$), and was significant also for intelligence ($W = 0.46$; $p < .001$), popularity ($W = 0.52$; $p < .001$), social skill ($W = 0.40$; $p < .001$), and, somewhat surprisingly, for how well members were known to the group as a whole ($W = 0.28$; $p < .001$).

With this agreement about the four characteristics, it was possible to employ the mean of members' rankings of each other, to derive a final rank order of members according to the four characteristics. These rank orders (and the pertinent medians and ranges of mean ranks) are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:7:2.

(b) Test of hypotheses

In order to assess the relationships between the ratings of acting ability, intelligence, social skill, and acting ability, received by members from each other, correlation coefficients were obtained, by comparing members' ranks according to the four characteristics. These rank orders were also compared with that of acting ability given by the group leader, and with that obtained for "role-aptitude" (as-if measure). The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 7:1.

Table 7:1

Relationships between rank orders of members according to peers' ratings of intelligence (I), acting ability (AA), social skill (SS), and popularity (P), teacher's rating of acting ability (ATR) and "role-aptitude" (As-if), in Study Twelve

Peers' Assessments						
1. I	2. P	3. SS	4. AA	5. ATR	6. As-if	
	<u>0.60*</u>	<u>0.77**</u>	<u>0.59*</u>	0.49	-0.01	1. I
		<u>0.89**</u>	<u>0.90**</u>	<u>0.84**</u>	0.07	2. P
			<u>0.91**</u>	<u>0.81**</u>	0.04	3. SS
				<u>0.87**</u>	0.16	4. AA
					0.38	5. ATR
						6. As-if

* p<.05
** p<.01

The coefficients in Table 7:1 indicate that, when a person was judged to show good acting ability by the other members of his group, he was judged also as intelligent, popular and socially skilled. As expected, there would seem to be evidence of a "halo effect" with regard to assessments of these characteristics of people, and it was possible that members might simply have shared the hypotheses of the experimenter with regard to positive associations between these characteristics. The fact that members "agreed" about the relative degree to which their fellow-members possessed and evidenced acting ability, as well as about their relative popularity, intelligence, and social skill, gives reason to suppose that their ratings reflected a certain degree of "objectivity" with regard to these characteristics.

The positive relationship between the leader's ranking of members according to their acting ability, and that based on the mean of the members' rankings, supports the contention that the coefficients shown in Table 7:1 need not be dismissed as reflecting simply the agreed level of "goodness" of each member. While the leader's assessment of members' acting abilities was significantly associated with members' judgments of each other's social skill and popularity, it was not significantly related to their judgments of each other's intelligence. If members had been judging each other purely in terms of "goodness", then rated intelligence (the only "non-social" characteristic assessed) would have been expected to be associated with acting ability as rated by the group leader also.

The ranking of members according to "as-if" test scores showed no significant association with any other rankings. Although the as-if test was a paper-and-pencil measure, whereas all other measures were derived from rankings by observers, some degree of significant association was expected between the as-if measure and other measures, since the original validation of the as-if test involved comparison of test scores with evaluations of overt enactments by people acquainted with the actors.

E. Discussion

As predicted, it was found that people who were viewed as popular, intelligent, and socially skilled, were also viewed as demonstrating good acting ability in the context of unstructured "dramatic improvisation" settings, by their associates. The results indicated that, although people agreed about these characteristics of their fellow group members, their ratings demonstrated a "halo effect". A more "objective" ranking of members according to their acting ability, corresponded to that derived from the members' evaluations, and was positively associated with rankings based on members' assessments of each other as socially skilled and popular.

The more objective measure of "role-aptitude" designed by Sarbin and Jones (1956) was not, however, associated with any other measure of acting ability, and it is possible that the teacher's ranking of members according to acting ability was susceptible to the same "halo" as that apparent in peers' judgments. In the next study, further "objective" measures of acting ability and social skill, and a

further measure of role-taking ability, with which the former were expected to be associated, were employed.

3. Study Thirteen

A. Introduction

The previous study succeeded in demonstrating a relationship between performance ability and social skill, as judged by performers' associates. Although there was reason (by virtue of the agreement with the teacher's evaluations) to assume that the assessments of acting ability were based on objective criteria, there was no alternative and objective measure of social skill. Furthermore, there was no evidence that overt performance ability depended on improvisational skill at the covert cognitive level, since the rank-order of performers based on their scores on the as-if test (which purports to measure such skill) was not significantly related to that based on performers' rated acting ability.

The present study sought to replicate the findings of Study Twelve, and to obtain objective measures of overt performance ability in an unstructured improvisational setting. Further measures were also made of social skill (by use of Armistead's, 1970, questionnaire, described in Chapter Four), and of role-taking ability (as assessed by Feffer's role-taking test, the RTT).

It was predicted, as in Study Twelve, that group members would rank each other in terms of intelligence, popularity, social skill, and acting ability, such that these rankings demonstrated agreement between raters, and a positive association between members' rank positions according to the four characteristics.

Acting ability, as assessed by members, was expected to be positively related to acting ability as judged by people witnessing an improvised performance. Similarly, a positive relationship was predicted between members' social skill as assessed by their peers, and as measured by use of Armistead's test. Acting ability was expected to be related to role-taking ability as measured by Feffer's RTT and Sarbin and Jones' as-if test, and an association was predicted between these two measures, and between both of these and social skill.

B. Procedure

Sixteen members of a group which met weekly for "free drama" sessions at Headington Technical College, agreed to take part in this study. The 7 males and 9 females were all students at the College during the year following that in which the respondents in the previous study had attended. This study was conducted in three stages; of the 16 people taking part in the first stage, 13 participated in the second, and 7 in the last.

(i) First stage: The experimenter visited one of the group's meetings, and having described briefly the nature of the study, administered the RTT (role-taking test) as in Study Seven, and Armistead's "Situation Test" of social skill. Only 5 of Armistead's "situations" (shown in Appendix B) were presented, and a time limit was set for completion of the test. Group members were told that they would be receiving a questionnaire by post, in which they would be asked to rank other members according to various characteristics.

(ii) Second stage: Thirteen members completed the questionnaire, which included the "as-if" test (both questions being couched in Sarbin and Jones' (1956) original terms), and a request to rank the fifteen members of the group (excluding themselves) according to the four characteristics, as in the previous study.

(iii) Stage three: Seven of the people who had taken part in the first and second stages of the study, and two other members of the group, visited the laboratory in order to take part in an "improvisation task". Each member was "tested" separately. A typed instruction sheet was given to each performer, which read as follows: "You are to take the part of character X.

X is in an airport waiting room in the late evening. A near relative of X is seriously ill at home, and X is desperate to return, but has no money for the fare. There is only one man, Y, who could lend or give him the money, and Y has so far refused to do so. X cannot seek assistance from any other source.

Try to persuade Y to give or lend you the money (a considerable sum). "

The character Y was performed in as standard a form as possible, by a male undergraduate who had been a professional actor prior to entering University. He was instructed to be as "difficult" as possible, and not to give way to performers' persuasions. Each performance lasted for about four minutes, and was recorded by VTR.

C. Results

(a) Derivation of Data

As in the previous study, all measures obtained were used to derive rank orders of members which were submitted to later analysis in test of the hypotheses.

(i) RTT: The RTT stories were scored as in Study Seven, by three independent judges. The rankings of members, according to the 3 judges, were in significant agreement ($W = 0.863$; $p < .001$) and a ranking of members was derived from the mean of the three sets of ranks.

(ii) Situation Test: The responses given by members were scored by three independent judges, including the test's author. The three rank orders of members according to the three sets of mean scores (per item) were compared, and judges were found to agree ($W = 0.835$; $p < .001$). The rank order of members based on the mean of the three judges' scores (per item) was compared with that based on the number of questions attempted, and an insignificant correlation coefficient ($r_s = 0.382$) was obtained, indicating that the number of questions attempted was not related to the quality of the answers given.

Further, the rank order of members based on the mean scores (over 3 judges) of all items answered, was positively and significantly related to that based on the mean scores for the first two items completed ($r_s = 0.965$; $p < .01$). The former rank order was used in subsequent analysis.

(iii) As-if test: This test was performed by only 12 members.

Six independent judges scored the answers to the two questions in terms of the number of "relevant ideas" embodied, and agreed about the relative abilities demonstrated by members on both the first question ($W = 0.772$; $p < .001$) and on the second ($W = 0.684$; $p < .001$). The means of the scores given by the six judges for the two questions were significantly and positively related ($r_s = 0.572$; $p < .01$). The final rank order for members was based on the means of their scores for both questions.

(iv) Group rankings: Since members of this group had known each other for less time than those of the group studied previously, only 9 members were willing, or felt able, to rank all other members according to the four characteristics. These members agreed with each other about their associates' acting ability ($W = 0.52$; $p < .001$), popularity ($W = 0.61$; $p < .001$), intelligence ($W = 0.46$; $p < .001$), social skill ($W = 0.51$; $p < .001$), and about how "well known" to them their associates were ($W = 0.62$; $p < .001$). Final rank orders of all members were derived from the means of the rankings received from the other members as judges.

(v) Performance measures: Excerpts from the video-tape recordings of the 9 performances were shown to 6 judges, who were then asked to rate each performance (independently) in turn, using 8-point rating scales. The scales referred to the general impression of acting ability given, the effectiveness of the persuasion, "understanding of what was required", involvement, ability to "project"

intentions to the audience, gesture, and language. These scales are shown in Appendix B; the dimensions for the scales were based on the suggestions of a group of observers to the performance, who felt that a global rating of "acting ability" might be difficult to achieve.

Performers were ranked according to the ratings received from each judge for each scale, so that the degree to which judges agreed about the relative merits of the performances might be assessed. Significant agreement was reached between judges for general acting ability ($W = 0.385$; $p < .05$), for involvement ($W = 0.464$; $p < .01$), for "projection" ($W = 0.451$; $p < .01$), for gesture ($W = 0.552$; $p < .01$), and for language ($W = 0.380$; $p < .05$), but not for "effectiveness of persuasion", nor for "understanding". The mean ratings (over the 6 judges) on the first scale (general impression of acting ability) were used to derive a final rank order of the 7 performers, (who had taken part in the first and second stages of the study) in terms of their acting ability, as evidenced in their filmed performances.

All final rank orders, together with the medians and ranges of the scores from which the ranks were derived, are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:7:2.

B. Test of hypotheses

The rank orders of group members according to peers' assessments of their acting ability, intelligence, popularity and social skill, were compared. The resulting correlation coefficients (r_s) are shown in Table 7:2.

Table 7:2

Relationships between rank orders of 16 members
according to peers' assessments of intelligence
(I), social skill (SS), popularity (P), and acting
ability (AA), in Study Thirteen

1 I	2 SS	3 P	4 AA	
	<u>0.490*</u>	<u>0.516*</u>	<u>0.572*</u>	1. I
		<u>0.924**</u>	<u>0.598*</u>	2. SS
			<u>0.718**</u>	3. P
				4. AA

* p < .05
** p < .01

As in the previous study, rankings of all 4 characteristics were found to be positively and significantly associated. In order to assess the degree to which peers' assessments of social skill and acting ability were based on objective criteria rather than biased by a general evaluation of others as relatively "good", the rank orders for social skill and acting ability (peers') were compared with those for social skill as evidenced in the "Situation Test", and acting ability as evidenced in the filmed performances. The hypothesis that role-taking ability was associated positively with social skill and overt performance ability was tested by comparing ranks for RTT and as-if test scores, with the appropriate peers' assessment rankings, and the "Situation Test" and "filmed performance" rankings. The results of these comparisons are shown in Table 7:3.

Table 7:3

Coefficients of correlation (r_s) between rank orders of group members according to measures of performance, role-taking ability, and social skill, in Study Thirteen

3. As-if	4. Sitn.	5. FRM	6. RTT (N=16)		
-0.163	-0.383	0.500	<u>0.645**</u>	1. AA	Peers' assessment (N=16)
-0.212	-0.113	0.370	<u>0.569*</u>	2. SS	
	0.226	0	-0.063	3. As-if (N=12)	
		(N=5)			
		-0.607	-0.229	4. Sitn. (N=16)	
			<u>0.750**</u>	5. FRM (film) (N=7)	
* p<.05					
** p<.01					

Members' evaluations of each other's acting ability were positively related to the assessments of acting ability shown in the improvised performances, and to role-taking ability as measured by the RTT, but only significantly so to the latter. Members' judgements of social skill, however, were not significantly related to social skill evidenced in the "Situation Test" responses. The as-if measure again failed to show significant relationships with any other measures. Given the small number (7) of performers whose overt performance ability could be compared with other measures, it was not surprising that significant relationships failed to be achieved between this measure, social skill, and peer assessments of acting ability, although it is noted that in the former case the coefficient was substantial ($r_s = 0.500$). A predicted relationship was found

between overt enactment ability and role-taking ability as measured by Feffer's RTT, suggesting that there is indeed a relationship between the cognitive activities involved in the covert improvisation of performances and the overt expression of a role in performance.

D. Discussion

This study was successful in demonstrating that appropriate performance is related to the ability (covertly) to take the role of the other, and it may be inferred that this role-taking is involved in effective improvisation, which is expressed in performance.

The predicted association between role-taking, performance skills, and "social skill", was supported only in a tenuous fashion, via the rankings of "social skill" given by performers' associates; these rankings cannot be regarded as objective assessments of social skill, since Armistead's "Situation Test" failed to validate them. It is possible that the administration of Armistead's test is not an effective means of measuring "social skill". It would be expected that assessment of a gross feature of performance, such as "social skill" would require experience of a person's social behaviour over a wide variety of contexts, and over an extended period of time, which experience was characteristic of the group members in both studies. It was established that people agree as to what constitutes "social skill" in their peers, and that agreement may also be reached about a number of features of performance in "dramatic improvisation" settings.

4. Discussion and overview

It may be argued that the enactment of improvised roles in "dramatic" settings, however unstructured the "encounter", involves different behaviour and "approach" from that required for the overt expression of improvised informal roles in everyday encounters. It was in order to counter this argument that relationships between social skill, acting ability and role-taking ability were sought, and it is unfortunate that ^{not} all of these were demonstrated.

The requirements of the enactment task used here, were that actions should be directed toward the attainment of a particular goal, but that the performer's behaviour should be appropriate to the informal role performed by the actor (confederate). The actor, in his turn, had been instructed to respond to the particular expressive acts of his partner, while maintaining his "line of action" (to be reluctant to accommodate the performer). Thus the performers were free to improvise their performances, and to bring their own experiences and role-identities to bear in the situation, to the same extent as they might in an everyday encounter.

Ideally, overt performance ability should be assessed on the basis of a number of such performances with a number of different partners, and in a variety of contexts; this study may only be viewed as implicative of the factors associated with performance and improvisation skills. It has been demonstrated that the study of overt performance in dramaturgical terms is feasible, and that projective measures such as the RTT may be informative as to the cognitive processes underlying performance.

The failure of the "as-if" test to demonstrate associations between "role-aptitude" (in terms of the ability to elaborate about aspects of the self viewed from alternative perspectives), and either overt performance measures, or role-taking ability (Feffer's measure) was disappointing. Since the latter was found to be associated with performance skills, it seems likely that the as-if test is measuring factors other than those involved in improvisation and performance. Yet Sarbin and Jones (1956) successfully demonstrated a relationship between aptitude gauged by this test, and "adequacy" and "validity" of enactments performed in settings similar to those studied here.

A number of criticisms may be made of Sarbin and Jones' (1956) experiment. For example, Wylie (1961) notes that no controls were made for "verbal response output", which might affect as-if test scores and the measures of "validity" of Role-expectations (based on adjective check lists). A replication of Sarbin and Jones' study was attempted, incorporating some methodological "improvements", and is reported in Appendix D. Contrary to Sarbin and Jones' findings, performers' as-if test scores were found to be unrelated either to the "adequacy" or to the "conformance" ("validity") of their enactments. Validity of Role-expectation was found to be positively and significantly related to the number of adjectives offered in description of the Role-expectation, but as-if test scores were apparently independent of this "verbal productivity" measure.

These results suggest that the findings of Study Thirteen may be regarded with greater confidence; the failure to obtain associations between as-if test scores and measures of overt enactment and covert role-taking ability, may be interpreted as indicating a lack of validity of the as-if test (as a measure of role-taking), rather than of the enactment measures or of Feffer's role-taking measure.

In spite of the difficulties of inferring improvisational competence directly from overt performance (involving a further, and related, competence), the results of the two studies reported here lend support to the view that performances may be effectively improvised on the basis of a simple specification of context and lines of action, where a partner is also improvising and performing within stated limits. The associations between effective performance and role-taking ability, and judgements of the actor as popular and socially skilled, support the expectation that improvisational skill is related to performance skill, since the measure of role-taking ability used here was based on the description of role-taking as equivalent to simultaneous decentering with regard to social behaviour. A Role Theory prediction about such performances would have been difficult to generate, given the lack of a script or formal Role expectations pertaining to this improvisation setting. Non-dramaturgical views, similarly, have not confronted the need for discussing the nature of the cognitive skills involved in participation in social interaction, and would have generated no such hypotheses either.

Failure to confirm the predictions made in Chapter Four would not necessarily have invalidated the improvisational view, however, since a variety of factors might intervene between competences associated with improvisation and the exhibition of these in performance. In order to

"insure against" invalidation of hypotheses due to such "interference", various measures of individual difference had been employed in these studies and in those reported previously. The results of these administrations are discussed briefly in the next chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Individual Differences in Attribution and Improvisation

1. Introduction

This chapter includes a brief review of individual difference measures administered to participants in some of the studies reported in the last three chapters, and of the relationship of these measures to performer-audience standpoints, and improvisational and attributional skills. A cursory discussion of the relationship between personality and social behaviour suggests that, while in the improvisational view a person's social behaviour is importantly contingent on that of his interactive partner, dimensions of individual difference which are not in themselves skill measures, may, nevertheless, be associated with people's experience of social encounters, and with their general strategies toward encounters, and may thus come to exert influence on attributional and improvisational activities.

Dimensions of individual difference concerned with factors purported to have pervasive effects on behaviour, or those reflecting experience and strategy in encounters in general, would be especially likely to be associated with the skills and standpoints investigated in the previous three chapters. The measures employed in various of these studies were those of behavioural and social extraversion (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1963), "belief in an internal versus external locus of control" (Rotter, 1966), "security-insecurity" (Maslow et al,

1945), "control wanted" and "control expressed" (Schutz, 1958), "performance style" (Ring and Wallston, 1968), and "audience sensitivity" and "exhibitionism" (Paivio and Lambert, 1959).

The 0-0 questionnaire was also employed as a measure of individual differences in proclivity to adopt performer-or audience-standpoints in encounters. Few significant findings emerged from these explorations, as will be described here.

The argument as to whether a person's social behaviour may best be understood by reference to his "personality", his "role", or the "situation", was viewed in Chapter One as involving numerous over-simple assumptions about the nature of social interaction. Attempts to establish reliable associations between a person's consistent characteristics, assessed in "trait" or "dimensional" terms, and his overt behaviour in (explicitly) social or non-social contexts, have been mainly unsuccessful (Mischel, 1968; Marlowe and Gergen, 1970). It need not be that people show no consistency in their social behaviour, nor that what consistency they show is unrelated to their "characteristics" as individuals. Rather, approaches toward the specification of relationships between such "consistent characteristics" and social behaviour have been inappropriate.

The improvisational view would suggest that it be difficult to establish aspects of social behaviour where consistency might be shown; such difficulty has been experienced, for example, in the area of conformity (Hollander and Willis, 1967). Recent approaches to the "personality-social behaviour" problem have sought to determine the

extent of the variation in behaviour which may be attributed to the individual (and thereby to his temporary or more permanent characteristics), to the situation, and to the interaction between individual and situation.

Argyle and Little (1972) note that the majority have employed "questionnaire" rather than observational assessments of social behaviour, two exceptions being the studies by Raush, Farbman and Llewellyn (1960), and Moos (1968), where "interaction effects" (between individuals and settings) accounted for the majority of "variance" in behaviour. Interestingly, their results suggest that behaviour is the more predictable on the basis of "personality", the more "disturbed" a person is.

Interpretation of the results of the "personality-social behaviour" studies seem to require the improvisational view. For example, people's ratings of others frequently reveal "basic dimensions" such as "warm-cold" and "dominance-submission", which are more recognisable as dimensions of interpersonal relationships, than of "personality".

According to the improvisational approach, it is unlikely that a person's particular "characteristics" would directly "determine" his social behaviour, except where an encounter were of the pseudo-contingent kind, or was asymmetrical to an extreme degree (where the all-powerful member might give relatively more evidence of his "personality" in his behaviour). It is equally unlikely that there is no relationship between an individual's "consistent characteristics" and his social behaviour. Rather, the nature and degree of such a

relationship may be variable over encounters with different dyadic partners; where consistency is sought within a person's social activity, "consistent" features of behaviour may be found to be exhibited in a majority of encounters, rather than in all. However, consistencies might be expected, if not in overt performance, in various abstractions from an individual's social performances.

For example, it was suggested in Chapter Two, that, although people would be expected to adopt different performer or audience standpoints in encounters with different types of interactive partner, there might be differences between individuals in the degree to which, over a majority of encounters, they adopted such standpoints. Such individual differences in "modes of response" to social encounters, if established, might, in turn, be expected to be related to other dimensions of individual difference which reflected either different experiences of encounters, or different and more basic orientations toward social interaction in general.

The improvisational view suggests that "personality characteristics" are likely to influence a person's social behaviour, but that this influence may be mediated by a variety of factors deriving from two main sources. The first source, which, as has been noted, is likely to inhibit a person in expressing his "personality" directly in social encounters, concerns the effects of his partner's performance in modifying the person's view of the role relationship. Even the person's initial self-presentation (or "performance of preferred informal role") will be affected by his initial attribution of role to his partner. Only where a person were grossly insensitive to his partner's

behaviour as implying potential modification of his initial attribution and subsequent improvisation, would his behaviour be likely to be determined by his "personality" alone.

The second source of factors likely to mediate between "personality" and social behaviour (and to "interact" with those from the first source), rests "in" the individual himself. If "personality" is assumed to be associated with the motivations with which a person enters an encounter, and if the social actor is invested with the power to plan, decide about, and monitor the effects of, his social actions, then his planning, decision-making, and monitoring activities constitute "mediating factors". A person may develop relatively habitual modes of responding to a variety of social "situations" with a variety of "others" in such a way that his skills are put to best use, and his incapacities (whether they rest in "personality" or in "ability" factors) are least disturbing to his performance. Such "modes of response", or "social strategies", may be deemed more or less characteristic of him, and may "blur" the "determining" effects of both motivational and skill factors on performance.

The distinction between knowledge, skills, and motivations, is valid only at an analytic level. In action, the three would be expected to show a considerable degree of interdependence. For example, a person might have the knowledge and skills appropriate to a performance, but might not wish to employ these. On the other hand, whatever the extent of a person's desire to perform in a particular way, lack of knowledge and (or) skill may inhibit effective performance.

The skills which have been discussed and demonstrated in previous chapters are those concerned with effective attributional (audience) and improvisational (performer) activity, and the most important "dimension of individual difference" hypothesised to be related to these skills, is role-taking ability (as defined by Feffer, 1959). While not found to be significantly associated with attributional skill in Study Seven, role-taking ability was found to be positively associated with performance skill in Study Thirteen.

Individual difference measures which summarise a person's "social strategies", for example the "Performance Style Test" (Ring, Braginsky and Braginsky, 1966; Ring, Braginsky, Levine and Braginsky, 1967; Ring and Wallston, 1968), or which reflect beliefs about the sources of his outcomes in general, such as Rotter's (1960 ; 1966) "internal versus external locus of control" measure, might be expected to be associated with the degree to which skill and knowledge are exercised in encounters, and the degree to which knowledge and skill are developed.

Individual difference measures which are conceptually related to social performance might be expected to be associated more closely with evolved strategies reflected in accounts of subjective experience in encounters, than with the demonstration of skills available for encounters. For example Schutz' (1958) measures of the "interpersonal orientations" of "control expressed" and "control wanted" are couched in relational terms. Given the conceptual relatedness (not equivalence)

between notions of dominance and submission and those of "observer-observed" suggested in Chapter Two, these measures might be expected to be associated empirically.

Similarly, measures of "audience sensitivity" and "exhibitionism" (Levin and Baldwin, 1958; Paivio and Lambert, 1959; Paivio, Baldwin and Berger 1961; Paivio 1965), while not addressed to standpoints vis-à-vis others in encounters, but rather to subjective experience over encounters, might be expected to be related to individual differences in proclivity to adopt performer and audience standpoints. The degree to which people feel "secure" or "insecure" (Maslow et al, 1945) may be related, also, to preference for being the observer or the observed; Jourard (1964) has suggested that insecure people may feel "observed".

An important personality variable which has received some attention in relation to social performance (Armistead, 1970) is the dimension of "extraversion-introversion" (Eysenck, 1965). This dimension is based on proposals about individual differences in physiological "level of arousal"; questionnaire measures of extraversion enquire about the respondent's experience of a variety of situations including explicitly social ones (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1963). Questionnaire measures have been found predictably associated with differences on overt behaviour, and there is some evidence that extraversion is related to aspects of social behaviour, for example with verbal behaviour (Carment, Miles and Cervin, 1965), gaze

behaviour (Kendon and Cook, 1969), and seating position (Cook, 1970). The relationship of "level of arousal" to social performance is probably extremely complex, as suggested in Chapter Two.

Measures of individual difference, selected from those discussed, were administered to people taking part in some of the studies described in the previous three chapters, and their association with the "performer" and "audience" standpoints and skills, assessed. The results of these explorations will now be summarised.

2. Observer-Observed Studies (Chapter Six)

A. Study Three

In order to see whether there was any relationship between "feeling observed" in dyadic encounters, and the "individual characteristics" of "extraversion", "security" and "dominance", and to ensure that "feeling observed" was not simply a reflection of any of these, respondents completed the "control wanted" and "control expressed" scales from FIRO (Schutz, 1958), 2 pages of Maslow et al's (1945) security-insecurity scale, and the extraversion scale of the Maudsley Personality Inventory (Eysenck, 1959). The questionnaires and their scoring ranges are shown in Appendix B. The means and standard deviations of scores achieved by the 58 male and 63 female respondents are shown in Appendix A, in Table A:8:1 where the coefficients of correlation between these scores and respondent's 0-0 questionnaire scores are also shown.

Only 5 of the 60 coefficients were significant; males felt more observed when they were relatively insecure, with partners of the same age and opposite sex, and relatively secure females felt more observed with younger, opposite-sex partners. Females felt more observed with older, opposite-sex partners when they were relatively behaviourally extraverted. Relatively dominant males felt less observed with younger partners of the same sex, whereas relatively submissive males felt less observed with younger opposite-sex partners. Thus no clear pattern relating feelings of being observed to extraversion, insecurity, or control expressed or wanted, emerged.

B. Study Five

The same individual difference measures as in Study Three were completed by respondents in Stage A. Respondents in Stage B completed the Performance Style Test (PST) (Ring and Wallston, 1968), and Rotter's (1966) IE scale, by which their beliefs about internal and external loci of control might be assessed; both questionnaires are shown in Appendix B. The FIRO and insecurity (only one page) scales were scored as previously. Three behavioural and 13 social-extraversion items were selected as particularly "discriminating" (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1963) and endorsement of these in an extraverted manner received a score of 2. Score ranges were thus 0-6 for behavioural, and 0-26 for social, extraversion.

A high score on the IE scale (range 0-23) indicated a belief in an external locus of control. Ring and Wallston's PST was scored in a revised manner, such that each item referred to one style only (as shown in Appendix B); scores for each style ranged from 0 to 12, a high score indicating adherence to that style. Scores on the R ("performer") scale correlated negatively and significantly ($r = -0.625$; $p < .01$) with those on the P scale; since these were proposed as "antipodal" styles, the revised scoring system was supported.

The means and standard deviations for all these measures are shown in Appendix A, Table A:8:2. Coefficients of correlation between these measures and the 0-0 measures for these 23 respondents are shown in Table A:8:3. Only 7 of the 68 coefficients were significant,

and the relationships found in Study Three were not replicated. It was found that dominant males were more affected by their partner's age, feeling more observed with older partners, an effect shown only on the second administration of the 0-0 questionnaire. PST and IE scores were unrelated to 0-0 scale measures, but some interesting relationships were found between PST and extraversion measures, and the "consistency" and "discrepancy" 0-0 measures.

The more extraverted (both behaviourally and socially) a respondent, the more consistently he used the 0-0 scales and the separate "observer" and "observed" scales; the more socially extraverted, the less the discrepancy between initial and second response to the 0-0 questionnaire. Similarly, people with a tendency to adopt a P performance style showed greater inconsistency in response to the 0-0 "observer" and "observed" scales. This finding is consistent with the definition of the "P" style as characteristic of a person who "... wants merely to 'be himself' and for others to 'be themselves' too ... (the P) ... lacks the social agility required for successful performance-giving and is deficient in his knowledge of the role-demands appropriate to a wide variety of social settings" (Ring and Wallston, 1968, p.147). Finally, it is noted that P scores were negatively and significantly related to social extraversion ($r = -0.66$; $p < .01$) and behavioural extraversion ($r = -0.55$; $p < .01$), as would be expected.

C. Study Six

The 39 female respondents of Sample 8, completed "adult exhibitionism" and "audience sensitivity" questionnaire items (Paivio,

Baldwin and Berger, 1961) which are shown in Appendix B. Responses indicating audience sensitivity and exhibitionism received a score of 1, so that the ranges of possible scores were 0-23 and 0-20 respectively. Neither audience sensitivity ($\bar{X} = 11.7$; s.d.= 5.5) nor exhibitionism ($\bar{X}=8.4$; s.d.= 4.6) was significantly related to total 0-0 score ($\bar{X}=21.1$; s.d.= 7.8). The coefficients of correlation (r) were -0.05. and 0.08, respectively.

3. Attribution Studies

A. Study Seven

The 44 judges in the attribution test (under Free Response Procedure) completed the Performance Style Test: (C : $\bar{X}=6.4$; s.d.= 2.4; R : $\bar{X}=6.4$; s.d.= 3.7; P : $\bar{X}=2.6$; s.d.= 2.6). In order to assess the relationship between performance style and attributional skill, correlation coefficients were computed. Modal accuracy was found to be significantly and positively related to C scale scores ($r=0.26$; $p<.05$), and significantly and negatively to R scale scores ($r=-0.38$; $p<.01$). People with a C style ("chameleons") might be expected to attend to the conventional meanings of cues within performances, and similarly those with R styles ("arch performers") might be expected to be less dependent on these. R style scores were significantly and negatively related to the simple number correct accuracy score ($r=-0.25$; $p<.05$), implying that lack of attention to consensual meanings might lead to ineffective attribution.

B. Study Nine

The 17 judges in the attribution test (under Forced Choice Procedure) completed the Performance Style Test, the 0-0 questionnaire, and Rotter's IE scale. In order to assess the relationship between these measures and measures of attributive skill, correlation coefficients (r) were obtained. None of these coefficients were statistically significant, and the relationships found in Study Seven, between performance style and attributive skill, were not replicated here where the FC procedure was employed.

4. Improvisation Studies

A. Study Twelve

Respondents to the questionnaire also completed the 0-0 questionnaire and two copies of the extraversion scale, one of which they were instructed to complete "as you see yourself" (Y), the other "as you think others see you" (O). Extraversion items were scored as 1 when endorsed in an extraverted manner; score ranges here were from 0-9 for behavioural, and from 0-15 for social, extraversion. Respondents were ranked according to their extraversion scores, a rank of 1 being given (unconventionally) to the recipient of the highest score in each case. Ranks were obtained according to total 0-0 score and to total-, social-, and behavioural-extraversion scores for each completion (Y) and (O).

A further 3 ranks were obtained according to the degree (disregarding direction) of the discrepancy (employed as an index of "flexibility of self-concept") between the scores obtained in each completion of the questionnaire. Of the 30 coefficients of correlation obtained when these rank orders were compared with respondents' acting ability rank orders, only one was statistically significant ($r_s = 0.518$; $p < .05$), and indicated a relationship between total extraversion (Y) (median = 10.5; range = 3 to 15), and peers' assessments of acting ability.

B. Study Thirteen

The questionnaire respondents completed one copy of the extraversion scale under the set to respond "as you see yourself". Respondents were ranked according to their 3 extraversion scores,

and these ranks were compared with those for peer ratings of social skill and acting ability, for situation test performance, as-if test performance, and ratings of performance in the improvisation task (film rating). The relationship between total extraversion (median = 14; range = 6 to 21), and peers' assessments of acting ability, found in Study Twelve, was not replicated here ($r_s = 0.133$; ns).

A relationship was found between social extraversion (median = 4; range = 1 to 8) and role-taking ability (as indexed by Feffer's RTT) ($r_s = 0.610$; $p < .05$), which might be interpreted by suggesting that social interaction experience improves role-taking ability where "arousal" does not render interaction difficult, or that role-taking facilitates interaction, the consequent enjoyment of which is reflected in extraversion questionnaire responses. This single significant correlation coefficient, among so many insignificant coefficients, must not be "taken too seriously" however.

5. Discussion

The results of the administration of individual difference measures during the conduct of the studies described in the last three chapters have been discussed in somewhat cursory fashion. Originally, complex hypotheses had been forwarded and tested in some detail. Often, specific hypotheses were difficult to generate, and were forwarded only tentatively. Where these received some support in one study, attempts at replication failed. As argued in introducing this account, the improvisational view would predict that it would be difficult to find clear relationships between individual difference measures and behaviour in, or subjective report of, particular encounters.

It had been expected, however, that subjective experience over encounters might bear some relationship to those individual difference dimensions which are purported either to have general effects on behaviour, or to reflect strategies toward social behaviour. A multidimensional approach would probably be required, as Alker (1972) has maintained, before definite statements may be made concerning the failure of questionnaire measures of individual proclivities to be related to behaviour and subjective experience.

As far as these studies were concerned, La Rochefoucauld's maxim: "A Man at sometimes, differs as much from himself, as he does from other People", was endorsed.

CHAPTER NINE

Review of Tests of Hypotheses Deriving from the Improvisational Approach

1. Introduction

In the previous four chapters, the findings of the empirical studies reported have already received extensive comment. In this chapter, these findings will be briefly reviewed insofar as they offer general support for the view of social behaviour as improvised drama, described in the first four chapters. Only certain simple hypotheses suggested by the improvisational approach have been investigated here, and these were concerned with the nature of the "performer-audience" relationship in interacting dyads, and with the skills required for audience and performer activity in interaction. Three studies, conducted within the framework described in Chapter One, and examining further the implications of the improvisational model, will be described briefly in this chapter, since they demonstrate, at least, that a great variety of testable hypotheses may be derived from such an approach. In the next, (and last) chapter, the broader implications of the adoption of an improvisational approach to social behaviour will be discussed.

2. Performer-audience relationship

At a simple level, the improvisational view of interaction led to the description of each member of a dyad as indulging in both performer and audience activity vis à vis the other. It was proposed that in many dyads, a feature of the emerging informal role relationship might be a certain degree of "imbalance", such that one might take a predominantly "performer" standpoint toward the other, who, in complementary fashion, would adopt a relatively "audience" standpoint. If this were the case, it was expected that such imbalance might be phenomenally represented for the dyadic members in terms of feeling the "observer" or the "observed". A number of hypotheses were derived regarding factors (such as characteristics of the dyadic members, the formal Roles specified for members, and physical features of the context of an encounter) which might affect

subjective reports of feeling the observer or the observed.

In two experimental studies it was found that differential illumination of dyadic members (a crude manipulation) did not affect statements of feeling observed, but that people performing the Role of interviewer felt more "the observer" than people performing the complementary Role of interviewee. There was some indication that in the experimental situation, females felt more observed than males, and the responses of dyadic members suggested that for many pairs, the predicted "balance" in performer-audience terms was achieved, one member stating that he felt the observer when the other stated that he (or she) felt the observed. A later experiment, Study Four, indicated that reports of feeling observed seem to bear little relation to the amount the respondent is actually being looked at by his partner, while the respondent's feelings of being observed in social encounters in general were more likely to be related to his subjective experiences in the experimental encounter. It was concluded that such findings might have been due to the use of an experimental confederate and a consequent failure for an "informal role relationship" to be established.

Perhaps the more important results to emerge from studies reported in Chapter Six were those concerned with the use of the "O-O questionnaire" to find out whether there were rules indicating appropriate audience and performer standpoints to be adopted in encounters between people of the same, or opposite, sex, and of the same, or different, age. In eight studies, in which the questionnaire was administered to people of a variety of ages, nationalities and occupations, it was found that females tend to feel "observed", that is, to take performer standpoints, when interacting with someone of the opposite sex, and that people feel more observed when interacting with someone who is older than themselves.

The evidence suggested that females tend to be more "sensitive", in performer-audience terms, to the sex of their interactive partner, than males, and it may be inferred that in mixed sex encounters between

strangers, it is the female who takes the relatively performer standpoint. The age of the dyadic partner relative to that of the respondent proved to be the more powerful determinant of the scale response of "observedness", however, possibly because age is more explicitly, and somewhat less equivocally, associated with status, especially insofar as rules for appropriate informal social behaviour are concerned.

The derivation of the hypotheses about performer-audience imbalance, and the design of the O-O questionnaire, did not involve an assumption that "feeling observed" precludes the experience of "feeling the observer" also. From the results of Study Five it appeared that for the majority of situations specified, respondents did regard the two experiences as to some extent mutually exclusive.

Further investigations might investigate the variety of encounters and stages of encounters described, for example, by Goffman (1957), in performer-audience terms, in order to examine the dimensionality of the "performer-audience" notion. Establishment of the nature of the informal role relationship in a dyad in terms of performer-audience balance may be an important "superordinate" goal for interactants, as, it was proposed, is agreement about appropriate intimacy level and dominance relationship (Chapter One). Demonstration of this would be important not only in supporting the value of the improvisational view; experimental studies which ignore this feature of the subjective experience of encounters might fail to achieve predicted results.

The finding that people are not aware of the amount of time another looks at them, even when this "amount" is unusually high or low, also has important implications for empirical work. Such lack of awareness may be partly due to the use of experimental confederates and cannot be asserted with too great confidence, since the giving of such estimates may in itself be a difficult task. Also, the Argyle (1967, 1969) social skill model suggests that there is a certain degree of "automaticity" in response to variation in the nonverbal behaviour of a dyadic partner, an automaticity

which is itself important to the improvisational view forwarded here.

The use of the O-O questionnaire as a measure of hypothesised individual differences in feeling "observer" or "observed", that is, in a proclivity to adopt mainly performer or audience standpoints over a majority of encounters, proved, in general, to be unsuccessful. Given the problems of establishing response differences as reflecting differences in standpoint rather than in scale usage, serious study of individual differences in such proclivities might require the design of a new measure. For example, a wider variety of dyadic partners might be specified, and if rules regarding appropriate performer-audience standpoints with these were discovered by a survey such as that used here, then a Guttman-type scale (Moser, 1965) might be devised. With such a measure, people's responses might be more reasonably compared, and inferences more confidently made about their degrees of "feeling observed", relative to each other. The O-O questionnaire had been designed primarily in order to differentiate between types of dyadic encounter, rather than between individual respondents.

3. Attribution skills

Having found the notion of performer-audience imbalance in dyads meaningful to people, and to be associated in a predictable fashion with sex and age characteristics of dyadic partners, attention was turned to those interaction processes proposed by the improvisational model which might be regarded as "audience" and "performer" activities. Audience activity was deemed to involve the cognitive process of attribution of informal role to alter, which in turn implied the process often expressive of attribution, altercasting. Empirical evidence (Weinstein and Deutschberger, 1963) indicates that overt behaviour in interaction may be successfully interpreted as altercasting, as having implications for the role which ego believes alter to be performing, or wishes him to perform.

Skill in attribution of informal role via the interpretation of expressive behaviour construed as altercasting, was successfully demonstrated in the studies reported here in Chapter Six. However, attribution skill was not found to be significantly and positively associated with the ability to take the role of the other, as conceptualised by Feffer (1959). The evidence suggested that, while based in consensus, valid attributions were attained by "going beyond" the conventional judgement. In Chapter Three, criticisms were made of assumptions of equivalence between "veridicality" of interpretations of nonverbal behaviour as "personality, emotion, or interpersonal attitude" and the consensus of a majority of "judges", made by a number of investigators in the fields of person- and Role-perception. This criticism proved to be justified, and it is likely that further research into the relationship between "valid" and "conventional" interpretations of the behaviour of others might be fruitful.

The level of skill achieved by judges in the difficult experimental task employed here suggests that people have a high degree of perceptual sensitivity vis à vis others, and it is noted that the skill required here was considerably greater than that demonstrated in many previous studies of "empathy" or "understanding others". Unlike many "person-perception" studies, judges were asked to give interpretations of behaviour, which, there was good reason to suppose, could be made, and were given sufficient information on which to base their assessments.

It was found that people are capable of making judgements of the behaviour of others which are at a level of complexity which the improvisational view demands. The proposed nature of the attribution process (Chapter Three) as involving some kind of anticipatory categorization and a subsequent and continuous testing and modification of hypotheses, might be difficult to demonstrate empirically. It was on the basis of this analysis of the process that the relationship between attribution skill and the Fefferian conceptualisation of the role-taking process

was predicted, but this prediction received no confirmation in the first study reported in Chapter Six.

It might be argued that such an empirical relationship would be expected, given the nature of the cognitive process of role-taking as defined by Feffer (1959) and the views of the cognitive processes required for effective inference from the behaviour of others to their "personality" given in non-dramaturgical terms by authors such as Cook (1971), and would not support the employment of a dramaturgical model as such. However, as Turner (1962) has pointed out, it is alter's role that must be taken by ego in order to achieve the understanding of alter's behaviour and subsequent adaptation of his own intended behaviour.

Ego's anticipatory categorization of alter and his subsequent hypotheses, are best viewed as being concerned with alter's role rather than with alter's "personality", since it is alter's role vis à vis ego that must be the basis for the interpretation of alter's behaviour, and for ego's improvisation of his own actions. Ego may conceptualise alter's behaviour as indicative of alter's "personality", or construe alter's behaviour in the light of what he believes (on the basis of prior experience) to be alter's "personality". This is relevant to the present concern with the understanding of interaction processes only insofar as ego's interpretations have import for his decisions as to how to behave toward alter, that is, insofar as he views his own behaviour as contingent on that of alter. It is maintained here, that his interpretation will be the more effective if he also views alter's behaviour as contingent on his own, that is, if he views alter as performing a role complementary to that which he (ego) is performing.

Interpretation of the behaviour of another is viewed as demanding some kind of "coding" of information; where the other is in interaction with ego, such coding is most appropriately achieved by the attribution of an informal role to that other. It was argued in Chapter One that, even where such interpretation of behaviour is directed toward the under-

standing and knowledge of the other as a person (rather than simply toward the prediction of his responses so as to more effectively improvise one's own performance), such understanding may best be achieved via the interpretation of the other's behaviour as role performance, and ideally, by assimilation of information embodied in a wide variety of performances.

In encounters, attribution allows the subtle adjustments to intended action required in effective improvisation; in Feffer's (1959) conceptualisation of the role-taking process, this association between attribution and improvisation is integral. Ego must take the role of alter toward himself in order to anticipate alter's behaviour and to improvise his own. In predicting an empirical relationship between attribution skill and role-taking ability, it was argued that the experimental task would require role-taking ability for effective performance to the same extent as when the judge were in interaction with the actor; this position must remain somewhat contentious.

Extensive investigation would be necessary in order to establish the degree of generality of attribution skill over different expressors; the empirical studies reported would suggest that there is some component of general skill involved, but it seems likely that the variation in the past experience of different judges with different alters would also lend some degree of specificity to the effectiveness of attribution of roles to different alters. In particular, extended acquaintance with a particular person would be expected to lead to improved skill in interpretation of that person's behaviour, especially since the attribution skill demonstrated here did not reach its "ceiling" at the level of "consensus".

Adams (1973) presented six of the AT filmed performances to car workers (managers and apprentices) and to policemen (recruits and inspectors). He attributed the superiority of the police (over the student sample of

Study Nine who were, in turn, superior in performance to the car-workers) to motivational factors including an orientation toward people (Little, 1972) rather than to experience. It does seem likely, however, that even recent recruits may have become accustomed to adopting a relatively "third party standpoint" (Turner, 1956) toward others, which might facilitate performance in such a task.

The studies of attribution indirectly supported an assumption, on which the improvisational view rests, that people behave differently when interacting with different dyadic partners. Gergen (1968) has pointed out the dangerous neglect of such an (obvious) assertion by investigators. It must be admitted that it was implicit in the instructions to the actor that his behaviour should vary between encounters, and in the nature of the experimental task that judges should focus upon variation (as well as similarity) between performances. It was argued, however, that the degree of attributive skill demonstrated by judges was unlikely to have been developed in order to interpret ambiguous "dramatic" performances. Since all judges performed the task with some degree of accuracy, it also seems unlikely that people resist attending to variations and inconsistency in the behaviour of another.

4. Improvisation skills

The studies of attribution provided indirect evidence of the ability to improvise informal roles and to express these in performance; the actor's behaviour was effective in allowing the roles of the alters with whom he was conversing to be identified. It was noted in Chapter Four that the inference of effective improvisation from performance was a difficult task, but it was argued that, where performance was coherent and appropriate, effective covert improvisation might be assumed. Far less empirical work and theoretical discussion was available for review in this area than in the area concerning the interpretation of the behaviour of others.

It was noted, however, that the description of "social skill" offered by Argyle (1967, 1969) and Armistead (1970), suggested that this "characteristic" of individuals might be related to effective improvisation and performance of informal roles in encounters, and that Sarbin and Allen's (1968) notion of "role aptitude" was also conceptually related to the improvisational skill under review here. As suggested earlier, Feffer's (1959) view of the role-taking process assumes effective improvisation as the important "product" of role-taking and is compatible with Turner's (1962) assertion that role-taking also constitutes, for a person who is performing as well as "attributing" in interaction, "role-making".

In the two empirical studies described in Chapter Eight, a rather crude attempt was made to study the nature of improvisational skill, by exploring the correlates of the ability to improvise and enact performances in a "dramatic improvisation" setting. The requirements and constraints in such sessions are comparable to those which would be likely to be encountered in everyday informal encounters, insofar as the specification of behaviour and "situation" are minimal, and there is extensive freedom to incorporate into performance the actors' own experience and role-identities, and negotiated "definitions" of the role relationship. The main difference between such sessions and everyday encounters is that failure to achieve the goals which are explicitly intended to determine the lines of action of the actor or actors does not result in negative outcomes except insofar as a "good performance" has failed to be given. It may be noted that in many everyday encounters, the case is precisely the same.

Nevertheless, the implications of performing, for example, in a violent manner, during an "improvisation session", may be regarded as less serious and more "excusable" than those attendant upon such behaviour in an everyday encounter. Again, it must be noted that, in this sense, the improvisation session is simply another member of a large group of

settings where rules for appropriate behaviour include a general "relaxation" with regard to display and with regard to the "carry-over" of inferences, permissible to spectators, from a person's behaviour (in such settings) to his "nature" as a person in everyday situations.

As predicted, it was found that people who were judged as better "actors" within such sessions, were also judged by their associates to be more socially skilled and popular than less competent actors. The judgements of people as "good actors" by their associates were validated to some extent by comparison with the group teacher's, and by the confirmation of the hypothesis that better performers would excel in the ability to take the role of the other. Assessment of a single improvised performance by judges also supported the validity of these peer ratings.

Unfortunately the objective measure of social skill was not associated with the ratings of this characteristic of performers by their peers; it is suspected that no associations between social skill and other measures of social performance may be successfully demonstrated until more refined measures of the former are designed. It might have been expected that, were improvisation and enactment ability not associated with "social skill", the assumed relationship between these skills (and between these and popularity) demonstrated in the "halo effect" shown in these peer-ratings by every single member of the respondent group in the Study Twelve would not have been found. It must be noted that the stereotype of the actor as "skilled" in social behaviour off-stage might also be expected to involve some degree of suspicion as to the use to which such skills might be put, especially in the eyes of those less skilled. However, the "assumption" of an association between social and acting-skill and popularity was evidenced by the least able actors in the group as well as the most able.

These studies did demonstrate the feasibility of further investigation of improvisational skills via overt enactments in such settings, and Study Thirteen was successful in allowing confirmation of the prediction, important to the improvisational view forwarded here, that effective performance, like effective attributional judgements, might be associated with role-playing ability, as conceptualised in cognitive terms by Feffer (1959). It had been predicted that Sarbin and Jones' (1956) "role-aptitude" measure, the "as-if" test, would similarly index role-taking ability.

The test is presented by the authors as measuring the ability required for the "fine tuning" of performances such that they might be appropriate to the specific performance given by the partner rather than simply conforming with the general expectation for the adequate performance of a Role. This "fine tuning" was expected, vis á vis attribution skills, to be what characterises people demonstrating high degrees of skill in Feffer's (1959) role-taking task, and it was therefore hoped that the two measures might be shown to be "tapping" the same basic ability. This proved not to be the case, as-if test scores being insignificantly related to all measures with which they might have been expected to be associated.

A replication of aspects of Sarbin and Jones' (1956) study indicated that their attempt to validate the test was unsuccessful in that a number of alternative explanations might account for their results. As discussed in Chapters Four and Seven, the "set" with which respondents may approach the as-if test is unclear, since the aspects of the self which are to be "held constant" while the possible differences engendered by the adoption, in imagination, of alternative "roles" are considered, are unspecified.

As with attribution skills, it seems likely that improvisation and performance skills, in contributing to the effectiveness of an encounter as a whole, must be to some extent specific to the particular encounter,

and particularly to the performance of the other. The evidence from the studies of Feffer and Suchotliff (1966) and Cowan (1967) suggests that the effectiveness of communication and performance in encounters may be investigated as a "joint product" of the skills of the participating members, and it would seem feasible that the quality of an improvised performance as a whole might be assessed by objective judges in the same way that the performances of individual actors with the "standard" confederate were evaluated in Study Thirteen.

5. Individual differences

The results of all studies with regard to the predictions made in Chapter Five about individual differences in performance and audience skill, and their correlates, were disappointing. There were some interesting findings in several studies, but none were confirmed where replication was attempted. The problem of making predictions about the social behaviour of a person from knowledge of his consistent characteristics (or "personality") has been discussed at several points during this account. It has been noted that individual difference measures which refer to dimensions of experience not conceptually related to social behaviour will be unlikely to demonstrate associations with behaviour which is, by definition, most likely to be modified with regard to the behaviour of others, as well as "determined" by the consistent characteristics of the individual. It must be admitted that in no case was a multi-dimensional approach adopted, which, as Alker (1972) has argued, might more sensibly be expected to lead to successful prediction from personality characteristics to social behaviour.

It was disappointing that the Ring and Wallston (1968) measure of "performance styles" proved unsuccessful in allowing demonstration of predicted relationships between performance style and attributional skills and performer-audience standpoints. The performance style typology (Ring et al, 1966) may be useful only where people may be shown to adopt, principally, one style of the three, in conducting the majority of their

social relationships. In adopting here a new scoring system for the performance style test, it was noted that there was little evidence of the existence of people who could be "classified" as adopting one style to the exclusion of others. The typology might be more useful if respondents were asked to report about their behaviour within specific informal role relationships of interest to investigators.

The studies reported here of attribution and improvisation skill, while based on an interest in the processes of dyadic interaction and the appropriateness of an improvisational view of social behaviour, were, at the same time, investigations of individual differences in skill which might be expected to exert considerable influence on people's social behaviour.

It is not maintained that a person with a certain degree of skill will exercise this in all his social encounters, but, at the same time, it seems likely that skill factors might impose limits on the effectiveness with which a person may engage in certain activities with some others. Such limits should not be regarded as "absolutes" however, and the more important determinants of: "...who does what, when, and where" (McCall and Simmons, 1966, p.2) may rest in the complex process of self-conceptualisation and legitimation comprising people's systems of role-identities, described in Chapter One. That McCall and Simmons' (1966) hypotheses about these processes are also amenable to empirical investigation will be proposed below.

6. The Role-Identity Model

This model was described in Chapter One as being an integral part of McCall and Simmons' (1966) dramaturgical approach. When improvising an informal role performance, the performer must refer not only to the behaviour of the other but also to his own goals for the encounter. McCall and Simmons (1966) view a person's role-identity system as a source of reference, or as constituting a "repertoire", in the improvisation of his performances, and also as the basis for lines of action

directed toward the legitimation or confirmation of his role-identities, his views of himself as performer. Role-identities were regarded (Chapter One) as not necessarily compatible with each other nor equally legitimate, but as organised into some kind of "interrelated whole". A person is presumed to prefer to perform in such a way that his "prominent role-identities" are employed, but role relationship demands may require that other, less prominent, role-identities become "salient", and therefore embodied in performance.

It was suggested in Chapter One that Kelly's (1955) Personal Construct Theory methodology might be appropriate to the investigation of role-identity systems. Kelly (1955) placed emphasis on the degree to which an individual's mode of construing his experience of the physical and social environment guided his behaviour, and maintained that individuals differed from each other in their modes of construing; such modes were viewed as being derived from past experience, and it was suggested that a "construct system" (representing a person's ways of discriminating between objects, persons and events) is continually liable to modification in the light of experience which does not "fit" with the construction modes presently available in the system. People are presumed to actively test the validity (for them) and usefulness of their "construct systems" by predicting the behaviour of the objects of their experience according to the implications of the discriminations afforded by their systems, and by noting the success of their predictions.

A particular "construct", for an individual, may be described simply as representing a way in which some objects or persons are similar to each other and different from further objects or persons. Constructs may thus be viewed as involving two opposing "characteristics", although these need not be "semantic opposites" in the eyes of others, and need not be amenable to verbal representation. Kelly (1955) proposed that construct systems are unlikely to constitute simple aggregations, but rather that they resemble loosely organised systems, whereby similar constructs cluster

together, related in various ways to other groups of constructs. Constructs may be related in terms of their implications for each other, so that some degree of hierarchical structure may be discovered.

This cursory description of Kelly's (1955) approach must suffice here. It would be interesting to elaborate on the degree of compatibility between Kelly's notions about the way in which people construe the interpersonal world, and the improvisational view of social interaction. The best parallel is evident in the degree of similarity between McCall and Simmons' (1966) notion of the "role-identity system" and Kelly's description of the "construct system". The latter is far more sophisticated, and the elements and interrelationships likely to comprise the structure of such systems are closely defined and discussed. Nevertheless, a "construct system", given that the constructs may be applied to a person's view of himself, would seem a fair re-description of the role-identity system proposed by McCall and Simmons. Both notions refer to some degree of hierarchy in structure, require susceptibility to change in the content and structure of his system as vital for a person's adaptation to changing circumstances, and imply that a person is involved in actively testing his view of himself.

There are clearly many differences between Kelly's (1955) and McCall and Simmons' (1966) views, not least in regard to the focus of attention of the person in applying his system; for Kelly the construct system as a whole embraces all experience, while McCall and Simmons are concerned only with the way in which such a system might be applied by a person toward his experience and anticipation of his behaviour in interaction with others. Both McCall and Simmons' role-identity notion, and the view of the self-concept which a construct theory approach entails are importantly alike, however, in that both allow the "self-concept" to be interpreted as "process" rather than as "state", and see this process as powerfully related to those processes of social interaction with which the studies reported here have been concerned.

Kelly regarded social interaction as facilitated by some degree of overlap between the construct systems of those involved: "To the extent that one person employs a construction of experience which is similar to that employed by another, his processes are psychologically similar to those of the other person" (Kelly, 1970, p.20). It would be interesting to discuss this assertion in relation to the proposals of the improvisational model, but the main concern here is to demonstrate the applicability of Kelly's method for the elicitation of a person's construct system, to the description of people's role-identity structures, and their contents.

The contents and interrelationships of constructs regarding persons may be assessed by use of the "Role Repertory Test". A person is given a series of simple role descriptions (such as "father", "best friend", "yourself") and asked to identify particular people known to him who perform these roles. The person is then presented with the "roles" or role occupants in triads and asked to suggest some way in which two are alike and different from the third. This "way" is regarded as a "construct", and further constructs are elicited in the same manner. When a sufficient number of constructs have been elicited, the person is asked to state whether each construct applies to all role occupants, and which "pole" of the construct pair is applicable to each role occupant. This method may be employed with any objects, persons, or events, in place of the role descriptions, and is a convenient means of establishing the means by which a person discriminates between them. The method might fruitfully be applied to the study of the role-identities incorporated in a person's view of his behaviour with others.

It has further been proposed that a person's constructs may vary in the degree to which, in his view, they are implied by, or imply, each other. Bannister and Mair (1968) describe a "laddering" procedure devised by Hinkle (1965) in order to establish the relative "superordinancy" of different constructs. A superordinate construct is defined as one which has implications for numerous other constructs; a person may be asked, about a particular

construct (A), "why?". A second construct (B), named in response to this question is regarded as "superordinate" to the first (A). A check on the relative superordinacy of B may be achieved by asking, with regard to B, "how do you know?", or "what is your evidence that?"; amongst the answers, the construct A, or a related construct, should appear.

People state greater unwillingness to change their view of themselves when superordinate rather than subordinate constructs are involved. In referring here to "constructs" it must be noted that "change" and the laddering procedure described above, properly refer to a particular pole (of the pair constituting the total configuration of the construct) which the person believes to be characteristic of himself. Hinkle also asked people to specify which pole of a construct pair they would prefer to be applicable to themselves; the preferred pole was not necessarily that which was deemed applicable to the self.

In order to assess the feasibility of employing such methodology within a dramaturgical framework, a study was performed by Silver (1969) under this author's supervision. It was hypothesised that people would state a greater willingness to perform roles which involved behaviour which they believed to be characteristic of themselves (implied by their role-identities), than roles which demanded uncharacteristic behaviour, that they would be more willing to perform in uncharacteristic ways when they were required to modify their behaviour toward preferred rather than non-preferred poles of self-constructs, and that they would be less willing to perform in such a way that they denied "superordinate" rather than "subordinate" aspects of their self-concepts.

Each of twenty undergraduates from North American Universities, provided 30 adjectives or brief phrases descriptive of themselves, and later stated the "opposites" to each of the descriptions. They were then asked to specify, for each construct, which pole they would prefer to be characteristic of themselves. In a revised version of Hinkle's "resistance to change" method for establishing the superordinacy of constructs, the

students were asked to fill out a grid diagram which required them to compare every construct pole with every other pole, stating which of the pair they would be most willing to change their (stated) preference about.

By this means it was possible to establish, for each student, which pole of each of the constructs was applicable to him and which was preferred by him, and the relative superordinacy of each of the constructs offered by him in his self-descriptions. From this information eight "role outlines" were created for each student, which consisted of four characteristics to be embodied in performance. The outlines were devised in such a way as to allow manipulation of preference, applicability to self, and superordinacy. Each student was then asked to imagine himself performing in the ways implied in the role outline, both with friends and acquaintances who were unaware of his "dissimulation", and on stage before an audience of strangers with all the adjuncts of theatrical performance available. He was asked to rank order the eight roles in terms of the degree to which he would feel "comfortable" performing them, and the degree to which he would prefer to perform them, in the two settings.

The hypotheses were, on the whole, confirmed, students stating that they would feel more comfortable, and would prefer, performing roles which embodied characteristics which they believed to be true of themselves, and which they would prefer to be true of themselves (in contrast with their provided "opposites" of these characteristics). There was some indication that performing uncharacteristically when denials of superordinate self-applicable construct poles were involved, was less preferred and was expected to involve more discomfort, than when denials of subordinate self-descriptions were required, but preference and self-applicability proved more important determinants of role preference.

There appeared to be little difference between the rank orders of roles for public performance and those for "private" or informal performance. McCall and Simmons (1966) have noted that there are two sources of legiti-

mation for role-identities: the behaviour of others toward the performer, and the performer's own monitoring of his performance. From the study described above, it might be inferred that where a person is asked to imagine himself performing a role, he, as anticipated audience to his own performance, may exert greater influence on his intention and willingness to perform, than the anticipated audience activity of others.

In future studies of this kind, it would be preferable to employ a method of assessing "superordinacy" of construct poles which does not depend on an initial enquiry as to how willing people are to change their preferences about construct poles applicable to themselves. If it were proved that people are unwilling to perform in ways which deny self-characteristics which they have already admitted they are unwilling to change their preferences about, it would hardly be surprising, since "change" and overt performance contrary to self-concept are closely related conceptually. In the study described above, considerable time elapsed between the initial "resistance to change" assessment of the superordinacy of constructs, and the later covert "performance" of the roles described in terms of these constructs, but an essential tortology remains in the method adopted in the study for the evaluation of the hypothesis with regard to superordinacy.

In order to relate this empirical approach more directly to McCall and Simmons' (1966) role-identity notion, it might be more appropriate in future to gain information about role-identity systems by discussion with people about their informal role relationships and by, for example, asking people to complete repertory tests or grids with regard to what they are like when with a variety of others known to them. Such a procedure might prove more complex than a simple elicitation of "self-descriptions", but would allow that variability and apparent semantic conflict between descriptions of different aspects of the self, which the simpler method might inhibit.

7. Improvement of social skill by improvisation and enactment procedures

The notion of "social skill" requires extensive study. It is unclear,

for example, whether "social skill" describes an individual's effectiveness in social encounters in his own terms, or in the eyes of others, and, in the latter case, whether such skill may be identified according to the outcome achieved by the performer in material terms, in terms of objective measures of the "smoothness" of interaction, or in terms of the judgements of fellow-interactants. There may be components of social skill which are generalisable over encounters and other features which are specific to particular kinds of partners, particular formal Role relationships, and so on.

It has been argued however, for example by Argyle (1969), that there are a number of necessary skills which will lead the performer to relative success in his social encounters, and it has been suggested here that skill in role-taking, if associated with attributional and improvisational activity, may be important in this sense. It has been argued that various aspects of social skill may be improved by appropriate training and experiences; Mann and Mann's (1959) study is one of the few that have demonstrated some generalisability in enactment skill improved through experience of performing specific Roles.

Most therapeutic and training techniques which employ "role-playing" have been concerned with the specific contents of the Roles enacted, or with the products, in terms of increased understanding of other people's "points of view", for example, of less structured sessions where people have been permitted to construct their own scenarios. The manner in which such "improvement" might be achieved has not been attended to. From the studies reported here, there would seem good reason to expect any change in behaviour and reported insight vis à vis other people, to be mediated either by some improvement in role-taking ability, or, and this seems more probable, by a greater flexibility in the use and application of cognitive abilities which may previously have been misapplied.

Such a proposal would be difficult to test empirically; it is intended here simply to point out that procedures directed toward training or therapy

might be more fruitfully designed by reference to the improvisational view. For example, McPhail (1968) has designed a "moral education" curriculum for schoolchildren, based on Feffer's (1959) conceptualisation of the role-taking process, which promises interesting results.

There is an assumption that the improvement of social skills, or "sensitivity to others", is "a good thing", and it is possible that this assumption requires examination, if not amendment. Stryker (1957) has shown that, within family groups, "role-taking" (assessed on the basis of success in predicting the attitudes of others) is not necessarily associated with "interpersonal adjustment". His experimental study may be criticised on various grounds, but his argument may be important. Here, Turner's (1956) delineation of various role-taking standpoints may be relevant. It has been proposed that these "standpoints" should refer, not to the role-taking process itself, but rather to the uses to which understanding gained by role-taking may be put.

In some informal role relationships, where the role-taker has particular lines of action, certain standpoints would be maladaptive. The degree of control which a person has over the standpoints which he adopts (or possibly, is allowed by his interactive partner) may be a further and important focus of negotiation in the emergence of the informal role relationship. The degree to which a person achieves such control, permitted by the capacity to "monitor the monitoring", might be important in his development of social strategies.

An unsuccessful attempt to assess the effects of improvisation sessions, such as those involved in the studies of Chapter Seven, in "improving" or simply changing people's views of themselves and their experience of social life, will be described briefly. On the assumption that opportunities for role enactments and "social games" of various kinds, might be valuable to disadvantaged adolescents, a team directed by Berman in London, called "Interaction", has been involved in encouraging a variety of teenage groups to participate in such exercises. The opportunity for a more-or-less

controlled assessment of the effects of Berman's methods was offered when "Interaction" agreed to conduct regular group sessions at "Hastings House" remand home. Boys generally stayed at the remand home for only about two weeks, but sessions were conducted nightly. Only about ten boys could be included in the "Interaction" sessions, and it was requested that staff should select these randomly from the boys admitted. A further group of boys acted as a control group.

It was predicted that boys taking part in the sessions would show a decrease in exhibitionism and audience sensitivity (Paivio and Lambert, 1959), in "anomia" (Srole, 1956), and an increase in complexity of self-concept (the number of words and phrases offered in description of the self), and self-acceptance (the number of self-descriptive words and phrases which represented preferred poles of constructs). These predictions were somewhat ambitious, and the results of the study, confusing. The main problem in conducting this study, was in the allocation of boys to control and "experimental" groups. It emerged that this had not been conducted randomly, more "difficult" boys being sent to the Interaction sessions.

Although a remand home was regarded as ideal for this kind of investigation, since the members of the "experimental" group were all equally unknown to each other, and the continually changing population might prevent contamination of the effects of the "Interaction" team's techniques by the effects of emergence of group cohesion, and so on, the practical problems involved in conducting a controlled study within this kind of population, without a resident experimenter, were serious.

In spite of the failure of the study itself, it was interesting to note the ways in which the testing procedures used were received by the boys. The majority of respondents, while by no means unintelligent, lacking verbal fluency, or uncooperative, experienced considerable difficulty in offering descriptions of themselves when Kelly's (1955) method of elicitation was employed. When asked to think of ways in which they

were like another person but different from a third, those constructs which were elicited tended to be physicalistic or wildly idiosyncratic. The questionnaire items were administered verbally, in case any of the boys had reading difficulties, and here again many boys expressed unwillingness to commit themselves to Yes/No responses, often sensibly discussing the over-generality of the questions.

While the study itself was unsuccessful, all members of the "experimental" group expressed great enjoyment of the sessions and, from their accounts, it seemed likely that the claim that: "The play gives them a chance to show how they feel about their life and environment" (The Times, August 18th., 1969, p.6) was fair. The failure of this study does not imply that such "improvisation" techniques, as aids to self-expression and the development of interaction skills, are not amenable to empirical study, and it is proposed that future studies should obtain records of behaviour in "sessions", with subsequent evaluation by objective observers, in order that any "changes" registered by measures such as those employed might be more clearly interpreted.

8. Developmental aspects of social behaviour

The improvisation techniques employed by the "Interaction" team, referred to above, involve situations resembling those of childhood play. Little attention has been paid here to the role-playing activity of children, beyond noting the probable importance of overt enactment in play as a precursor of covert rehearsal of social performances in adulthood. The introduction of Feffer's (1959) approach to McCall and Simmons' (1966) improvisational view may facilitate future discussion of the ways in which improvisation and attribution skills are developed during socialisation. Flavell and his associates (1968) have discussed the development of role-taking and communication skills in children, within a Piagetian theoretical framework, but most of their empirical work focusses on the more formal aspects of communication rather than upon the process of role-taking.

Since children enact roles with great facility, and frequently seem to show a sensitive awareness of rules appropriate to social encounters in "play" even where they fail to follow these in "practice" (possibly because these rules are perceived as inapplicable to performers of the role of "child"), it is interesting to consider what their view of adult social behaviour might be. Person-perception studies have suggested that children tend to perceive others in terms of physical characteristics, and it has been assumed that this mode represents a "naive" treatment of others as "objects".

It is possible, however, that for children, demands for "descriptions", and questions such as: "What is X like?" may be interpreted as demanding statements about physical characteristics. Further, "physical" descriptions may be used by children as directly implicative of more psychological characteristics; the opening description of "characters" in Ashford's (1919) "The Young Visitors", written when the author was nine years old, is almost exclusively couched in physically descriptive terms, but is such as to render the subsequent elaboration of the "personalities" of these characters almost redundant.

If children do attend closely to the physical characteristics of others then it might be expected that they should be less sensitive than adults to inconsistencies in the behaviour of others. On the other hand, the behaviour of particular adults toward a child has been presumed to be an important source of cues determining his development of approved and appropriate behaviour. The facility with which children improvise roles in play might be expected to be reflected in their appraisal of the behaviour of others toward them; they need not necessarily consciously appraise the behaviour of others in "dramaturgical" terms in order to react to, and judge, others in accordance with dramaturgical principles. As Feffer (1959) notes, Mead viewed the child's early social relationships as the bases for the differentiation of the "performer" and "audience" aspects of the self.

The emergence of objectivity about the "self" and about his own behaviour as reflected in, or as associated with, the child's development of language has been discussed by many authors, notably Piaget (1950) and Vigotsky (1961). It would be reasonable to suppose that the course of development involves complex interactions between social experience and cognitive and linguistic development; for example, it might be that experience in social interaction leads to cognitive change which is in turn expressed in language, but the linguistic change need not be expected to be ready for use in interaction until further cognitive change has occurred. The nature of such developmental sequences might be extremely difficult to determine, especially if certain features of cognitive development do not generalise to all areas of experience and activity simultaneously.

A simple and preliminary study of the applicability of Piagetian empirical methods to the study of the development of social behaviour within an improvisational framework, was conducted by McHenry and the present author, (McHenry and Williams, in press). Flavell (1963) has reported a number of studies showing that children do not "conserve" over various characteristics of objects in relation to each other. For example, when fluid is poured from a narrow container into a wider one, children may believe that there is a greater quantity of fluid in the second container (where they focus or "centre" on width), or a lesser quantity (where they centre on height). Simultaneous decentering would allow the assertion that there is no change in quantity, that is, would allow conservation with regard to quantity.

In an application of this approach to social behaviour, McHenry and Williams made four short video films, which were shown to children between the ages of three and seven years. In the first film, an actress was shown speaking toward the audience in a friendly manner, and in the second film, the same actress spoke in a hostile way. The third film showed a physically very different actress speaking in a hostile way, and this

actress was then seen in the last film, to be behaving in a friendly manner. After the showing of the second, third and fourth films to small groups of children of particular age-groups, the children were asked to say whether they had seen that lady in any of the previous films.

Children of five years of age and older, discriminated successfully between the two actresses, but children between the ages of 3 and 5 years were unable to integrate the two roles played by each actress; some children reported seeing four different people, while some children focussed solely on the roles performed, and not on the physical characteristics of the actresses at all. Ideally, the children should have been tested individually, and more than one set of four films should have been shown, but the results of the study suggest that young children do attend closely to the behaviour of others and are able to discriminate between performances of different informal roles.

It would be expected that the processes involved in effective role-taking would allow conservation of "person", with regard to different role performances, and this ability has been shown to increase predictably with age, as reported in Chapter Three, by Feffer and Suchotliff (1966). Wolfe (1963) found Feffer's (1959) measure to be associated with that of Gollin (1954, 1958), and both to be related to level of conceptual system (according to an abstract-concrete dimension proposed by Harvey, Hunt and Schroeder, 1961), in children whose age and intelligence were "held constant". Harvey et al's (1961) measure has also been found to be associated with the ability to identify emotion on the basis of vocal expressions (Davitz, 1964).

The results of the studies reported here, and in previous chapters, have offered support for the improvisational view described in Chapter One, and none of the findings have suggested that this view is as yet in need of amendment. Further investigation of the processes of social interaction according to this model, of attribution and improvisation, of the relationships between the structure and contents of role-identities and performance,

and of the way in which role-relationships emerge within dyadic encounters, would seem feasible and likely to be fruitful.

9. Extension of the improvisational view

In presenting a simple view from which hypotheses might easily be derived, a number of distinctions were made between this approach and the views of other theorists who have employed the dramaturgical analogy. For example, the notion that the negotiation of the informal role relationship is simply a preliminary to social interaction was discounted, and it was argued that the role relationship is best viewed as emergent and as subject to continual modification. Ball (1972) comes to similar conclusions regarding the "definition of the situation". It was also proposed that "role relationship" rather than "situation" was a more valuable focus of attention for investigators, since role is a relational concept and emphasises the complementarity of social behaviour as the concept of "situation " does not.

Both these arguments should perhaps be qualified. From the point of view of the delineation of individual processes which allow the phenomenon of social interaction to occur, the position maintained here is regarded as appropriate. For the discovery of the constraints within which encounters occur however, "situation" might be a more effective focus of attention insofar as the study of the phenomenology of interactants for their social behaviour and the explicit statement of rules governing appropriate behaviour may be more readily couched in terms of "situation" rather than "informal role". Such a proposal is, of course, open to empirical study.

During this account it has been suggested that, while the cognitive and expressive processes active during the early and later stages of encounters are not essentially different, the attention of interactants may well be especially likely to be consciously focussed on the nature of the role relationship at the beginning of encounters, and at certain points during an encounter. Various aspects of the relationship may need to

be crudely agreed upon in the early stages of interaction, for example, the status relationship, performer-audience balance, intimacy level, and so on, before the more detailed features of the relationship can emerge during the encounter.

Indeed, it was suggested that the establishment of some degree of agreement about these features of an encounter might constitute "super-ordinate goals" to be achieved jointly by dyadic partners. The degree to which such preliminaries may be "formalised" may itself be an important means of distinguishing between encounters, and the degree of freedom, permitted to participants by each other, to modify such a preliminary plan during an encounter, may constitute a further dimension of the informal role relationship. While evidence that such preliminary stages may be distinguishable from later activities is available in the forms of interactants' accounts and the findings of observational studies of behaviour in dyadic encounters (for example those of Steer and Lake, 1972), it is essential to the improvisational view to argue that role-taking, attributive, and improvisation processes are likely to be active throughout a dyadic encounter. Each member of a dyad is viewed as being potentially at liberty to modify the role relationship by modifying his behaviour.

The degree to which such processes may be active during an encounter has been assumed here to be "constant". It has been noted in passing, however, that "involvement" is viewed by both Goffman (1957) and Sarbin (1954) as an important dimension of social performance, and that variations in "activity" are deemed to be central features of social behaviour by non-dramaturgical theorists also. Variations in social behaviour, according to the degrees of involvement or relative activity demonstrated or reported, might be related to alternative role-taking "standpoints" (Turner, 1956), and empirical study might lead to demonstration of such relationships.

A possible means of describing and distinguishing between the informal roles performed by a person was proposed in Chapter One. It was suggested that "dominance" was an example of behaviour which, if quantifiable, might demonstrate similarities within, and differences between, behaviour in different encounters, such as to allow the notion of "informal role performance" to be supported. This "definition" of informal role was presented for illustrative purposes, but recent work by Meltzer (1972) suggests that this "definition" of informal role might be put to the test. Meltzer (1972) recorded the conversations of triads of friends and strangers, and examined the relationship between vocal behaviour variation (for example, loudness and duration of utterances) within an encounter and between encounters with different alters. He found greater "consistency" within an encounter than between this and other encounters with the same alters, and least between encounters with different alters. Ideally, "indices" of behaviour consistency should include those upon which role attributions may be based; Hayes and Meltzer (1972) found that "talkativeness" influenced judgements made of interactants by non-participant observers. Such studies are open to interpretation in terms of the improvisational view, and their results might profitably be examined in search for support of this view.

Extension of research into the validity and value of the improvisational version of the dramaturgical analogy seems worthwhile, and it is hoped that the studies described here indicate the range of approaches which might be adopted. It has been shown that people are capable of behaving in the ways which the improvisational view would suggest. Whether it is likely that people do behave according to such principles, the value of construing social behaviour in this manner, and the proposal that people themselves may employ such a view of social behaviour in everyday life, will be considered in the final chapter.

10. Summary

In this chapter the results of the studies previously described have

been summarised, and further lines of investigation proposed. Only certain propositions implied by the improvisational view were examined—those concerning performer-audience imbalance, and attribution and performance skill. That studies are feasible in exploration of the "Role-identity model" (McCall and Simmons, 1966) was illustrated by brief description of a study employing Kelly's (1955) Personal Construct Theory methodology.

Study of the nature of "social skill", and the possibility that improvisation and enactment techniques may "improve" such skill, was recommended, and an unsuccessful study of the effects of "improvisation experience" was mentioned. Feffer's (1959) discussion of role-taking ability is pertinent to the development of social behaviour, and the description of a crude study of "conservation" of "role" and "person" by children demonstrated the possibilities of examining the development of skills in attribution and improvisation.

Finally, it was argued that the form and content of encounters and performances requires examination in the context of the improvisational view. There may, in terms of "content", be distinctions between the early and later stages of encounters, and examination of content may allow empirical study of the hypothetical informal role "definition" given in Chapter One. If standpoints vis à vis others in encounters are variable, as Turner (1956) suggests, there may be different relationships between attribution and improvisation depending on standpoint.

CHAPTER TEN

The value of the dramaturgical approach

1. Introduction

A tendency to interpret the dramaturgical analogy as implying an equivalence, rather than a similarity, between theatre and social life may be the basis for the rejection of the analogy by critics. However, some dramaturgical analysts have indeed implied such an equivalence, and rejection of their view often centres around the mistaken assumption that social behaviour as viewed dramaturgically is (at worst) necessarily "deceptive" or (at best) "alienated" from the actor. In this chapter, it will be argued that the analogy allows understanding of the manner in which performances may be deceptive but that it is implicit in the improvisational view that the majority of performances are unlikely to be so.

The practical importance of discussing the dramaturgical analogy will be instanced by reference to the use of role-playing as an alternative to "experimental" methods in studies of social behaviour.

The implications of the view that social actors share the dramaturgical analyst's perspective, and Harré and Secord's (1972) formalisation of this proposition, will be discussed briefly. The relationship between the dramaturgical and "conventional" approaches to the study of social behaviour will be reviewed and it will be argued that the improvisational view has extensive integrative power; the view allows a number of diverse approaches to be seen, not as offering alternative "explanations", but as converging toward the same propositions in accounting for the nature of social interaction processes.

Finally, it will be asserted that the improvisational view might be extended to encounters between larger groups of people, and that exploration of social behaviour within the framework of the view may be conducted while focussing on the individual person.

2. The use of analogy

The improvisational approach represents a re-interpretation of the analogy between theatre and social life. The interpretation of the analogy which is embodied in Role Theory stresses the structural aspects of social relationships rather than the nature of the processes whereby these relationships are achieved, and has been regarded by many, for example, Shaw and Constanzo (1970), as providing merely a set of concepts and verbal labels for the description of social behaviour at a fairly gross level. Even as a source of technical vocabulary, the Role Theory interpretation of the dramaturgical analogy has led to considerable confusion, which a progression of authors, for example, Coutu (1951) and Neiman and Hughes (1951), have sought to remove.

The improvisational view attempts to apply the analogy to the investigation of the process of informal social interaction. Although proponents of this view have presented a parallel between theatre and social life, much of the criticism directed against the view seems to assume an assertion of equivalence or identity, rather than of comparability. The use of analogy and metaphor as a means of discussion and as a source of "inspiration" has a respectable history in the progress of scientific study, not least where the focus of study is human behaviour. It has been argued that: "In certain respects, the controversies that scientists and philosophers wage are exchanges of arguments as to which set of metaphors more nearly represents "truth"" (Sarbin and Allen, 1968, p.489).

It is interesting to consider why, while the majority of analogies employed in the study of behaviour remain clearly interpretable as analogy and metaphor, the dramaturgical analogy, especially the improvisational version implicit in the accounts of Mead and Goffman, has been interpreted as implying that social behaviour is "performance-giving" in the dramaturgical sense. It will later be argued that such confusion may rest in an intuition that the latter may in fact be the case.

3. Criticisms of the dramaturgical perspective

Messinger, Sampson and Towne (1962) accuse (with some justification) "dramaturgic analysts" of not stating their position with sufficient clarity, and maintain that: "In viewing 'life as theatre', the dramaturgic analyst does not present us with a model of the actor's consciousness; he is not suggesting that this is the way his subjects understand the world. Instead, the dramaturgic analyst invokes the theatrical model as a device, a tool, to permit him to focus attention on the consequences of the actor's activities for others' perceptions of the actor. The dramaturgical analyst finds this important because, according to his theory of social stability and change, others' "impressions" determine the ways they will act toward the actor. Thus, whether the actor self-consciously takes account of these "impressions" or not, whether or not he is even aware that he is creating an "impression", such "impressions" are demonstrably relevant to the fate of such interaction as the actor enters" (Messinger et al, 1962, p.105, emphases in original).

It seems to be the case however, that many analyses of social behaviour according to the dramaturgical approach, for example those of Goffman (1971), do imply that social actors share a dramaturgical perspective, particularly where the actor behaves "deceptively", as Gergen (1968) has pointed out. Messinger et al (1962) themselves make such an assumption when they cite examples of cases where social actors become aware of "performing": "All these situations point up the fact that under some circumstances in everyday life the actor becomes, or is made aware of an actual or potential discrepancy between his 'real' and his 'projected' selves, between his 'self' and his 'character'...It may be inferred that it is during such periods, if his projection is a joint enterprise, that the actor experiences the constraints of 'dramaturgic loyalty', 'discipline', and 'circumspection'; although,...it may not be inferred that when the actor fails to experience these constraints they have ceased to operate" (Messinger et al, 1962, p.99, emphases in original). Even in Messinger et al's account, there seems

considerable confusion as to how, if a person sometimes views his behaviour as "performance-giving", he views it the rest of the time.

The position that the interpretation of the dramaturgical analogy embodied in the improvisational view is simply a useful conceptual tool for the social scientist, is acceptable here as far as the accounts of processes of attribution and improvisation, performance and altercasting, are concerned. The value of this aspect of the improvisational view does not demand that these processes be represented in the awareness of social actors in dramaturgical, or similar, terms. McCall and Simmons' (1966) role-identity notion, upon which the postulation of such overt and covert processes to some extent depends, and the discussion of performer-audience balance in Chapters Two and Five, do imply that people view their behaviour in dramaturgical terms, at least at some point during their consideration of their social activity. It could, on the other hand, be argued that the role-identity notion demands simply an ability to conceptualise self in some terms, and that the success of the studies reported in Chapter Five demonstrated only that people are able to adopt a dramaturgical perspective, not that they customarily do.

Accounts which suggest that social actors do, at some points in encounters, share the dramaturgical perspective, often imply that such awareness is noxious, whether it refers to the behaviour of others or of oneself. For example, Messinger et al (1962, p.108), note that: "The dramaturgic analyst does not claim that the actor is aware of the impressive functions of his activities; indeed, he seems to claim that, to the extent that the actor is aware of these functions, he becomes alienated from interaction and, moreover, from himself". According to the views of these authors, the mental patient is virtually always in such a state of awareness of "performing". In their view, there seem to be two kinds of "trigger" leading to an actor's awareness of his behaviour in dramaturgical terms: the need to dissimulate, or some breakdown in the smoothness of the course of an encounter. Both sources would imply that

awareness of "performance-giving" would indeed be unpleasant, by association with the source, if not by the nature of the implications of the "awareness".

It is unfortunate that most authors cite instances of "dramaturgical awareness" which have negative rather than positive associations. If the notion of "self-presentation" and "performance-giving" is disturbing, it is difficult to explain the success of advertising material explicitly aimed at persuading consumers to "adopt a new look", "become a new person", "astound your friends", and so on. The root of the rejection of the dramaturgical analogy, either as a conceptual tool or as a view of the perspective of "naive" social actors, seems to lie in the connotations, which performance-giving has, of deception. Informal social behaviour is customarily viewed as "spontaneous", "natural", "real", "actual", and so on, whereas "performances" may be "artificial", "calculated" (in the perjorative sense), "deceptive", "unreal", and "Machiavellian".

The degree of control over behaviour with which the dramaturgical analogy invests social actors accords them the power to deceive others about their intentions, attitudes, beliefs, sentiments, their views of themselves, their biographies, and so on. It is irrefutable that human beings have such powers. There are two problems to be dealt with in arguing that such an observation augurs in favour of the improvisational view rather than against it. Firstly, where deception occurs by means of the skills accorded by the improvisational view, it must be considered whether such deception is inevitably "harmful". Secondly, the question of whether the improvisational view entails that people be deceptive when they perform, or when they are aware of performing, must be answered.

4. The problem of deception

In many areas of social life, and for a variety of reasons, some form of deception is not only approved but also actively required of actors. Coming under the rubric of "control" or "discipline" or "tact", deception for the "benefit of others", may be regarded as a necessary feature of

effective social interaction, and lack of such "qualities" may be negatively sanctioned by other participating actors. Performance skills may be appropriately regarded as tools which may be used to the advantage of others, the self, or to the advantage of both self and others. Judgement of the effects of dissimulation in social behaviour may, and frequently do, take into account the "intentions" of the actor in planning and executing his deceptive performance. This argument does not seek to applaud the "con-man," but emphasises that the question of whether people can, and do, act according to dramaturgical principles, is quite distinct from questions about the "morality" of deception.

Certainly there are many instances where well-intentioned as well as "selfish" deception may cause chaos in social relationships, as illustrated by Laing (1972). To confuse the discussion of this problem with that of the analysis of the way in which people are capable of behaving, would be tantamount to proposing that the understanding of the development and exercise of skill in the use of language was intimately related to the telling of lies. If language allows the communication of views about, and representations of, "reality", it also allows their misrepresentation.

Verbal representations are in a sense "displaced" from the events and objects which they represent, and may be regarded as themselves composed of metaphor and analogy. Similarly, it might be fruitful to view all social acts as "displaced" from the actor, and it would seem appropriate to view role-taking and role-playing as involving extensive resort to analogy and metaphor. From this point of view a role-performance is only "alienated" from the actor to the same extent that a verbal utterance is "alienated" from the speaker.

The second problem raised by the dramaturgical analogy with regard to deception, the problem of whether the dramaturgical perspective necessarily entails a view of social behaviour as "deceptive", may be resolved by recourse to the previous argument. While dramaturgical skills permit

deception, they do not necessarily entail it. That social behaviour is unlikely, in general, to be "deceptive", may be maintained when factors inhibiting deceptive performance are considered, and such factors are easily discovered by reference to McCall and Simmons' (1966) role-identity model.

A person has views of himself which are precious to him, not only because he may require a "sense of identity", but because he needs a point of reference for the improvisation of performances by which he may attain those outcomes which may only be achieved via social interaction. Both "selfish" and "unselfish" aims require a "sense of self" as a stable point of reference. Given that a person views himself as X, then by performing in such a way as to convince others that he is not X, he runs the risk of being disconfirmed in his initial opinion that he is X. Being aware that he is successful in deception, he might make himself insensitive to the view of himself (as not being X) reflected in the behaviour of his "victims", but in this case he is denying himself a source of legitimation of those role-identities which are incorporated in his performance.

If many of a person's performances were deceptive in this way, then his "sense of self" would be difficult to maintain, unless he had certain reliable sources of legitimation with whom his performances were usually not deceptive, and unless "good performer" were for him a content of his most prominent role-identity. Thus, deception is dangerous, not only in the light of the severe disapproval of those deceived if the deceiver is discovered, but also because of the risk to the performers' role-identity system, if he is not.

Deception may take many forms, not least of which is the exaggeration or inhibition of a display of some expression, for example, of emotion, (Ekman and Friesen, 1969 b). It is possible that some performances, which might be viewed as "deceptive" from an objective viewpoint, might constitute an attempt, by exaggeration, to clarify the nature of the emotion or sentiment experienced. Similarly, in order to convey some meaning, a person

might perform acts which, interpreted "literally", could be regarded as deceptive. Adolescents' mimicry of cult-figures might, for example, be considered in this light.

A number of authors working within the dramaturgical framework have noted that social institutions, and the behaviour of others on an informal level, may require a person to behave in ways which he does not consider to be truly implicative of his "nature as a person" as he sees it. Prevalent demands for greater "spontaneity" in behaviour may be regarded as attempts to redress the balance. In the improvisational view, "spontaneous" or "natural" behaviour must be regarded, if it could be identified, as (effectively) "automatic" and non-social activity, such as characterises neonates and persons under severe stress.

While such activity might be highly informative about the organic state of the "actor", it seems strange that such behaviour should be lauded when most efforts to socialise children and adults are directed toward its suppression. Demands for spontaneity in the behaviour of others by particular individuals deserve study, since they might reflect difficulties in attribution, or ignorance of appropriate rule systems. Further, such demands might arise from an awareness, but a rejection, of a dramaturgical perspective, which rejection might be based on misinterpretations like those demonstrated by "professional" critics of the analogy. Such people, whom Ring et al (1966) describe as "P-types", might be valuable informants as to the contents of dramaturgical principles specific to their particular milieu.

If all social behaviour is viewed as "performance-giving", it is worth considering briefly what might give rise to judgements of particular performances as "staged", "artificial", "unnatural", and so on. Such impressions may be gained where a performance is executed with insufficient skill. Errors in attribution and improvisation might lead to poor performance; a performance might lack coherence and communicate confusion on the performer's part about what lines of action to follow, or it might not

appear coherent by virtue of "stylistic" imperfections. Alternatively, a performance might lack a sufficient degree of "fit" with the performance of the interactive partner; in such a case, a performance may be judged as "frozen", or as "exhibitionistic".

It is probable that, as with skilled motor performance, skilled social performance requires a lack of conscious attention to the detail of attributive and improvisational decision-making; this proposition is supported by the reports that awareness of "performance" tends to occur when performances are imperfect. Anecdotal reports of professional actors suggest that this is the case also of stage performances, but that there is often an "objective" awareness of the fine detail of a performance qua performance when that performance is highly skilled, and when others view the actor as totally "involved" in his part. Such awareness may allow an even greater degree of control, albeit at a conscious level, over the nature of the performance being given.

Having denied the appropriateness of seeking "spontaneity" in truly "social" behaviour, it must be emphasised that the important difference between the improvisational view and both the classical Role Theory and simple S-R models is that true improvisation demands, if not "spontaneity", then "indeterminacy" in a person's behaviour (analytically, at least, distinguishable from the performance given by the dyad as a whole).

Individuals enter encounters with plans, goals, identities, strategies, knowledge of rules, and so on, and importantly with a complement of cognitive and motor skills, or "talents". Yet if an encounter is to be a truly social event, interactants cannot be

completely "prepared" for what is to occur. In this sense much social behaviour may be viewed as "spontaneous", it cannot be predicted on the basis of "total" knowledge about an individual, and only (potentially) in a probabilistic fashion on the basis of "total" knowledge about two people.

The improvisational view implies, however, that social behaviour is likely to be the less spontaneous in the "indeterminate" sense, the more "conventional" or the more "reactive" a person's performance. Skills in improvisation and attribution are therefore likely to enhance the indeterminacy and spontaneity of behaviour.

It is hoped that this discussion has defended the position that neither the adoption of the dramaturgical analogy by social scientists, nor the proposal that such a perspective might be characteristic of social actors, necessarily imparts a flavour of "deception" to social life. Rather, only such a view as that presented here, allows the interpretation of the ways in which social behaviour may be successfully deceptive. The discussion of deception is important not only for the defence of the dramaturgical analogy as an analytic tool, but also in the evaluation of a process implied by the analogy, that of role-playing, as providing a means of enquiry into social behaviour without recourse to the "artificial" techniques often involved in conducting "experiments".

5. Role-playing as a methodological technique

Mixon (1971, 1972) has argued the case for role-playing as a substitute for experimentation in social psychology, pointing out that those critics who regard role-playing as "unreal" are ignoring the bizarre quality which characterises many laboratory studies of social behaviour. The

objections to experimentation are many, but it is interesting to note that one of the major problems is with regard to the methodological and ethical factors involved in the deception of "subjects" by experimenters. Nixon proposes that there are at least four kinds of role-playing which may be used as methods of enquiry in place of experimentation. Where a "scenario" is described to a person, he may be asked to "play", imaginatively, the role of himself/"everyman" or the role of a character described to him. Alternatively, he may be asked to play either of these roles overtly, before the investigator.

Willis and Willis (1970) compared the results of an experimental study of conformity with those of a role-playing replication. In their study, "role-playing" was covert and did not require the actor to anticipate the behaviour of anyone but himself. They found that the main effect of their manipulations was successfully reproduced in the role-playing version of their study, but a "subtle interaction effect" was not, and made sensible comment that a variety of modes of instruction are possible for any role-playing study and that these must be considered carefully before any firm statements regarding the effectiveness of role-playing as a "substitute" for experimentation can be made.

Willis and Willis (1970) also note that the very use of "role-playing" raises important theoretical issues, and that: "The very differences in behaviour elicited under deception and role-playing, which have been considered to be noise, can profitably be considered as signal" (Willis and Willis, 1970, p.476; emphases in original). Similarly, Nixon (1971, p.29) asserts that: "A thorough conceptual analysis of make-believe or pretend situations might do much to clear up whatever confusions and suspicions may linger regarding the place of role-playing in a social science". Subsequently, and in agreement with the argument given above, Nixon (1971, p.29) suggests that: "It may well be time to concede that 'natural man' is a myth or, more conservatively, a creature yet to be discovered (even in the laboratory)." It would be maintained here, in accordance with the

improvisational view, that "natural man" is a role-player.

Critics of the use of role-playing as a substitute for conventional experimental techniques in social psychology, may be justified in their demands that effective demonstration of the equivalence of data obtained under experimental and role-playing conditions is necessary before role-playing becomes acceptable to the methodological repertoire. Where such equivalence is not demonstrated, it need not be the case that the experimental study produces the more "real" results, that is, the results which best resemble the ways in which people behave in everyday life. As suggested in Chapter Four, there are a variety of "sets" with which people may approach studies requiring overt or covert role-playing. Such studies usually involve less ambiguous instructions, and the evocation of more concrete expectations, than "actual" (laboratory) situations, which are frequently bereft of the majority of "cues" to behaviour which would be available to guide the actor in the everyday setting.

Since it is the search for the understanding of "everyday" behaviour which is the rationale for many experimental studies, the assumption that, given conflict between the results of an experimental and a role-playing study, the experimental findings are necessarily closer to those obtaining in an everyday setting, requires critical attention. The increasing interest in the use of role-playing as a methodological technique provides a further justification for the investigation of the validity and value of the dramaturgical view.

The dramaturgical analogy has been employed not only by social scientists, but by novelists, dramatists, educators, psychotherapists, and many others interested in the understanding of social behaviour. Further, the analogy has been used as a means of communication with the "naive" social actors whose behaviour it purports to mirror, for example by Elfick (1968). There seems no good reason to assume that the use of the dramaturgical metaphor should be restricted to the groups of people mentioned above. That many "naive" social actors share this view is

implicit in, for example, the demands for greater "spontaneity" in behaviour referred to above.

6. Harré and Secord's (1972) approach

The view that human beings may organise their actions and experience according to principles at least comparable in degree of complexity, to the dramaturgical concepts employed here, has been made explicit by Harré and Secord (1972). These authors recognise that human beings have the power to monitor their own behaviour and to "monitor the monitoring". Such capacities as are demonstrated in the use of language allow the inference that the "distancing" of "self as actor" from the performances which that actor gives, is possible. Language allows the actor to give "accounts" of his behaviour and subjective experience which the investigator may employ in seeking to understand his behaviour; investigations may include the assessment of the very proposal that something resembling a "dramaturgical analogy" is employed by social actors.

In describing the improvisational view, it has been proposed that the improvisation of performances in dyadic encounters is facilitated by reference to the constraints imposed on behaviour by recognition (by the dyadic members) of rules specifying appropriate behaviour. According to Harré and Secord (1972), the rules themselves may be discovered by recourse to the commentaries of the performers in "explanation" of their behaviour. It may be noted here that despite the copious literature on "conformity" in social behaviour, very few attempts have been made to delineate what the norms or rules, with regard to various actions and actors, are. Investigations of social behaviour, which do not focus on conformity as such, frequently neglect to note whether the behaviour studied may be accounted for in terms of relevant "rules" rather than in terms of various, "drives, needs, and cathexes".

The Harré and Secord (1972) approach allows discussion, as suggested in Chapter One, of aspects of social performance, such as "style", which the view described here does not fully accommodate. To view human beings

as behaving according to dramaturgical principles, but as unaware of this, requires that coherence in performance within an encounter be viewed as a function of the emergent role relationship, and that the coherence of behaviour between encounters be seen as an "incidental" effect of the necessary automaticity of certain minutiae of social behaviour, and as a reflection of the relevance of similar role-identities. If human beings themselves are able to view social behaviour according to a "dramaturgical perspective", however, such coherence becomes interpretable also in terms of creative attempts at portrayal of "more" of themselves than the particular role-identities expressable in a single role performance would allow.

To invest people with such a perspective, source of strategy, and so on, need not require that they be liable to view their behaviour in such complex ways as the improvisational view might suggest; notions of attribution and improvisation, of self-presentation and altercasting, are not required by a simple dramaturgical approach, and such notions may not generally appear in commentaries upon social behaviour.

It must be emphasised that the attribution of this perspective does not require continual "self-conscious" analysis of behaviour in such terms. Indeed, it was noted earlier that "awareness" of performance-giving often accompanies poor performance. Skilled motor performances may similarly be disturbed by conscious attention to details of performance which have previously become integrated, by learning, into more-or-less independent sequences. Continuous monitoring of behaviour at a less-than-possible level of awareness, however, permits the correction of those elements in a sequence which, performed ineptly, may give rise to disturbance of the performance as a whole. Conscious use of a dramaturgical perspective would be expected during the covert rehearsal and preparation of future performances, and in the critical review of previous ones, rather than during active performance itself.

If Harré and Secord's (1972) assumptions and proposals are valid, however, and if the improvisational view espoused here is an appropriate

analysis of the processes by which people interact with each other, it would seem likely that people would be able to construe their own social experiences in dramaturgical terms. When the improvisational view has been described to a variety of "naive" audiences, surprisingly little opposition to its implications has been forthcoming, in surprising contrast to the reactions of "professional" analysts of social behaviour. In an attempt to evaluate the degree to which the improvisational view was acceptable to people, and might be used as a means of describing their own behaviour, a group of students were asked to give examples, from their own experience, of cases of "improvisation", "altercasting", "being altercasted", "attribution", and so on. Their accounts were such as to allow the assertion that the experience of one's social behaviour and that of others may easily be couched in such dramaturgical terms.

As well as proposing that the commentaries of "naive" actors about their behaviour are sources of information from which valid "data" may be inferred, Harré and Secord (1972) make reference to the commentaries available in the discussion of professional dramatic technique. The accounts of actors, dramatists and directors as to the construction and maintenance of performances and scenarios are open to inspection and investigation. It is interesting to note that, while adherence to the dramaturgical approach has not been wide, recourse has frequently been made to drama not only as a source of analogy and illustration (for example by Viddich and Stein, 1960), but also to the accounts of professional actors as sources of anecdotal evidence, for example, by Barron and Rosenberg (1968). Rather than being regarded as a peculiar and anomalous artifact of human society, theatre has been referred to (but not explicitly described) as if, as a phenomenon, it represented a crystallisation of human social experience.

In contrasting the improvisational and Role Theory interpretations of the dramaturgical analogy, the effects of "scripts" on behaviour and

experience were relegated to the status of "constraints" within which behaviour is improvised. However, professional actors seem able to perform scripted Roles and express characters which might often be regarded as discrepant (by themselves and others) with their characteristics as individuals (role-identities) convincingly. This may or may not have an impact upon the actor's view of himself qua individual. Ionesco remarked: "I had learned that each of us is in all the others, that my solitude had not been real and that the actor can, better than anyone else, understand human beings by understanding himself. In learning to act, I have also, in a certain sense, learned to admit that the others are oneself, that you yourself are the others, and that all lonelinesses become identified" (Esslin, 1966, p.108). By entering into informal role relationships with others in everyday life, new aspects of the possible self may similarly be evoked. The capacity to "monitor the monitoring" permits the individual to seek legitimation or disconfirmation of such possibilities, to choose to express in detailed action his essentially incommunicable "identity".

However much Harré and Secord's (1972) formulation of their "anthropomorphic model of man" tends to support the improvisational view, it must be admitted that most of the theoretical review and all the empirical work reported here was conducted without reference to their framework. Harré and Secord's model, in investing social behaviour with an even greater degree of complexity than that demanded previously, may be regarded in this context as a progression beyond the improvisational view.

7. The relationship between the dramaturgical perspective and "conventional" approaches.

It has been the intention here not only to present the improvisational view as a valid and valuable view of social life, but also to demonstrate that, within social psychology, this approach has extensive integrative power. In the derivation of the view, the main source of reference has been McCall and Simmons' (1966) work, and the blending of Exchange Theory

(with its basis in reinforcement theory) with the symbolic interactionist views of Mead is their achievement. McCall and Simmons make passing reference to Turner's (1956) notion of role-taking, and Bruner et al's (1965) accounts of conceptual processing; these "clues" have been followed here, and Feffer's (1959) Piagetian view of role-taking as a cognitive process has been found to facilitate their integration with McCall and Simmons' model.

In Chapter One, it was proposed that the Exchange Theories of interaction were compatible with dramaturgical views if certain principles (for example those of "feedback") embodied in Argyle's (1967, 1969) approach were also adduced. Empirical work stemming from the latter approach and the work of others employing an ethological method in the study of social behaviour was discussed. In developing hypotheses about the nature of improvisation and attribution processes, reference was made to studies of nonverbal communication and of the "naive" interpretation of behaviour referred to as "person perception". In proposing possible association between individual differences in interaction skills (viewed from the dramaturgical perspective), and more conventional individual difference dimensions, further diverse theoretical views were drawn upon.

It was proposed above that language usage represents some kind of "displacement" between experience and expression, and that the use of metaphor and analogy was implicit in the notion of "language". Social acts may similarly be viewed as representing a certain degree of "displacement"; to view social behaviour as "performance-giving" emphasises its basis in "as-if" activity.

The nonverbal and verbal actions which comprise the content of performances occur over time, but at any instant, interpretation depends on processing sequential and simultaneous information in some "simultaneous" manner. Thus the understanding of a sentence requires "reference" to its grammatical structure, of a nonverbal action, to past and simultaneously occurring nonverbal and verbal events, and of a "performance", to the

role relationship as a whole. Although a dyadic encounter has "a serial order" (Lashley, 1961) it has no "integrity" unless the contingent relationships between the activities in which each person is simultaneously engaged, are attended to. The improvisational view stresses this contingent and "indeterminate" aspect of individual behaviour, and Feffer's (1959) view of role-taking emphasizes the importance of simultaneous processing. A simple sequential model of social behaviour is applicable only where encounters are viewed as sets of reactions rather than as interactions.

8. Conclusions

A view of social life as "improvised drama" has been elaborated and discussed in these chapters, and empirical studies which explore hypotheses derived from this view have been reported. It was proposed in Chapters One and Four that the study of skills, as individual qualities, provided a means of investigating the validity of the improvisational approach. Study of such competences, and of the knowledge gained in their past exercise is not simply presented as the most appropriate vehicle for the examination of dyadic behaviour. Such study may also allow a means of conceptualising, and potentially of investigating, the bases of individual development through social experience, and of discovering those features of social structure which aid people in their social behaviour, both where this is primarily "instrumental" and also where directed toward the formation of relationships, and those which inhibit these.

It was emphasized in Chapter Four that the improvisational view represented a competence rather than a performance model of dyadic interaction. The experimental work reported here set out to examine

whether people were competent in the ways implied by the model, and the results of the empirical studies suggests strongly that they are. The investigation of possible association between a variety of "individual difference" dimensions and exhibition of varying degrees of competence in performance was an attempt to study the ways in which potential skill might be inhibited by motivational and "strategic" factors. The failure of these latter enquiries endorses the emphasis given in the improvisational approach to the importance of mutual contingencies and interdependence between performers in true interaction.

How often encounters require for their analysis the full complexity of individual and mutual performance (in cognitive and expressive terms) with which they are endowed by the improvisational model, is an empirical question, and one the resolution of which requires considerable preliminary theoretical analysis. It would be necessary to study carefully the contents of encounters, their meanings as experienced by interactants and analysts (such accounts requiring negotiation between the two sets of "authorities"), and to specify those features of content which are "stylistics" and so on. Further study is required of those variations in levels of awareness of behaviour within encounters to which Goffman has pointed, and it will be necessary to develop means of discriminating between them, and determining their effects on appropriateness of performance.

"Appropriateness" of performance, as has been found where this has been named "social skill" (Argyle, 1969), is, for everyday encounters, extremely difficult to assess. Various sources of criteria for the assessment of "good" performance may be proposed (such as the experience of interactants, objective assessments of performance, and subjective and

objective assessments of outcomes), but it seems likely that these different criteria might yield different evaluations. In the studies reported in Chapter Seven, criteria for the appropriateness of performance were available since the improvisers had been instructed as to the "outcome" to be aimed for. Similarly, in the attribution studies reported in Chapter Six, criteria for appropriateness of attributions were available, by virtue of the construction of the "task". In everyday encounters, of course, there is not simply the problem of finding criteria and means of assessment for "appropriateness" of performance, but the problem of deciding whether encounters and performances should be evaluated as "wholes", and if so, as to what constitutes a "whole" encounter.

In order to resolve these difficulties such that the model might be investigated more thoroughly, preliminary investigation of the views which interactants have of the encounters in which they participate would probably be instructive; objective criteria for determining when an encounter begins and ends would be worthless if they did not take into account, at least, the participants' own views about such junctures.

The improvisational view, as a "competence" model, was elaborated in such a way as to deal with the most complex contingencies likely to be experienced in a dyadic encounter, rather than in such a way as to encompass the majority of encounters. The important limit on the applicability of the model is that it deals only with the smallest interacting unit, the dyad. For the majority of people in the majority of dyadic encounters, some "simpler" version of the improvisational view may be sufficient as a representation of the processes involved. If this were so, such simplification might be found to be the effect of the

reliance of interactants on "conventional meanings" and performance according to more-or-less conventional Role expectations as discussed in Chapter Three. It may also be the case that individuals themselves design personal modes of circumventing the complexity of the cognitive and expressive processes entailed by the improvisational view. For example, people may avoid encounters which might be over-taxing or less than stimulating in improvisational terms, or may operate effectively only in encounters where they are permitted to "cast" their partner extensively, or to submit to virtually total "casting" by their partner. More probably, people are selective in assigning to particular encounters different sets of requirements in attributional and improvisational terms, such selection being based on the salience and the prominence of the role-identity sets likely to be involved. Any individual's choice in such matters is, nevertheless, limited if he is to engage in true (creative) interaction with another.

Despite the complexity and abstractness of the improvisational view described in Chapter One, certain simple and testable hypotheses were derived in Chapters Two, Three and Four. It was shown in Chapter Five that interactants were able and willing to express their experience of actual and typical encounters in observer-observed (or performer-audience) terms, and in accord with the hypotheses derived from the improvisational view. Some evidence of performer-audience complementarity in interacting dyads was found and the prediction that interviewer (as against interviewee) roles would induce feelings of being relatively the observer was confirmed. Similarly, females stated feeling more observed with male than with female partners, and both males and females felt relatively the observed when with older partners.

It has been emphasized that the improvisational view constitutes

a "competence" rather than a "performance" model. That is, people may not always perform at their own optimal level, nor at the level of complexity suggested by the improvisational view. If the model were valid, on the other hand, people should be able to participate in the hypothesised attributional and improvisational processes more or less effectively. Many factors might inhibit effective performance, including general capabilities, and "motivational factors" concerned with willingness to behave in ways implied or not implied by the role-identity system. A multitude of mediators, relating potential skill to actual performance, might be posited.

The studies reported in Chapters Six and Seven showed that people were able to attribute and improvise in the manner suggested by the improvisational approach, and that improvisational skill was associated with other capacities of the same general form, notably role-taking ability. As well as demonstrating that people possess attributional skill, the studies reported in Chapter Six indirectly showed that overt performance could be construed as altercasting. Studies of attributional skill, where the attributor were interacting directly with the "altercaster" would not give such a clear demonstration of attributive skill, since the improvisational view itself would suggest that an attribution might be given simply on the basis of the role actively performed by the attributor (by inference about the appropriate complementary role). Also some evidence was found in support of the argument that attributive skill requires more subtle judgements of the meaning of behaviour than those based simply on the conventional meanings associated with particular acts or performances.

The "attribution" studies thus gave support, indirectly, to the

importance of overt performance as expressive of the improvised role. The studies of overt performance described in Chapter Eight demonstrated that a person's capability was associated with his role-taking ability, from which it may be inferred that role-taking skill is important in permitting an improviser to select from possible actions those which are most appropriate in allowing him to maintain his lines of action while remaining within the informal role relationship, such that his behaviour is viewed as coherent by his partner.

The degree of fit between any particular encounter and the improvisational view of the course of encounters in general might only be established empirically by taking account of the content of the encounter, and of the degree of awareness of the participants about the encounter and about their own and each others performances. Neither taxonomies for "content", nor descriptions of different "levels of awareness" are available, let alone means of identifying and specifying these with regard to particular encounters and actors. In this sense it would seem that empirical investigation of the validity of the improvisational view would be extremely difficult.

However, certain simple and testable hypotheses do emerge from the improvisational view, as demonstrated in the studies reported here. The model seems a viable basis for the investigation of the processes whereby people interact with each other, and whereby they form relationships and come to know each other as individuals. While this view challenges a number of methods employed by non-dramaturgical investigators, by ascribing to people degrees of skill and complexity which often remain unacknowledged, the approach accommodates empirical findings acquired within simpler theoretical orientations. The

improvisational view provides the basis for further integration of "conventional" and more radical approaches in social psychology.

The focus of attention for this improvisational view has been restricted to encounters between two people; McCall and Simmons (1966) elaborate their model to refer to encounters between larger groups of people, and similar extension of the view presented here is feasible. The improvisational approach provides a basis, potentially, for the study of individual differences in social behaviour; the appraisal of the validity of the model for the most part focussed on the skills of individuals, rather than on dyadic performance. Such a focus may be justified by reference to the advances achieved in the study of language use, an "individual" capacity, but, at the same time, an essentially social activity.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A : Tables

Table A:5:1

Medians and ranges of scores for "feeling observed"
(Scale 1) and estimates of C's looking (Scale 3) in
Study Four

Scale		HIGH GAZE		LOW GAZE	
		M (N =12)	F (N =12)	M(N =12)	F (N =12)
1.	Median	3.5	4.0	3.0	4.0
	Range	0.5 to 7.0	1.0 to 6.5	0.5 to 6.0	1.5 to 7.5
3.	Median	50%	50%	40%	45%
	Range	30% to 90%	30% to 65%	10% to 70%	15% to 85%

Table A:5:2

Medians and ranges for percentage time spent
looking at C (% Gaze) and for accuracy (Acc.)
in estimating C's gaze, in Study Four, for
males (M), females (F) and the whole sample (WS)

Source		HIGH GAZE			LOW GAZE		
		M	F	WS(N=24)	M	F	WS(N=24)
%	Median	63%	75%	69%	61%	75%	67%
Gaze	Range	18% to 77%	44% to 96%	18% to 96%	13% to 80%	44% to 98%	13% to 98%
Acc.	Median	40	31	35	32	38	33
	Range	0 to 59	1 to 66	0 to 66	3 to 61	7 to 73	3 to 73

Table A:5:3

Coefficients of correlation between interactants' gaze (% Gaze) and their degrees of "feeling observed" (Scale 1) in Study Four

Interactants	HIGH GAZE		LOW GAZE	
	r _s	p	r _s	p
M (N=12)	-0.27	ns	-0.17	ns
F (N=12)	-0.26	ns	-0.52	ns

Table A:5:4

Medians and ranges for confederates' gaze (C's % Gaze), in Study Four

Condition:		HIGH GAZE		LOW GAZE	
Interactants:		M(N=12)	F(N=12)	M(N=12)	F(N=12)
C's % Gaze	Median	89%	73%	7%	18%
	Range	74% to 97%	63% to 96%	5% to 25%	11% to 53%

Table A:5:5

Coefficients of correlation between percentage time male (M) and female (F) interactants looked at confederates, and percentage time confederates looked at interactants, in Study Four

Interactants	HIGH GAZE		LOW GAZE	
	r _s	p	r _s	p
M(N=12)	0.48	ns	0.21	ns
F(N=12)	0.26	ns	0.03	ns

Table A:5:6

Means and standard deviations for "feeling observed" (Scale 1) in Study Four, with different confederates, and values of t for their comparison

Stage	Interactants		Confeds.		Interactants ¹		t	p
	Sex	N	No.	Sex	scores : Scale 1			
A	F	8	1	M	$\bar{X}$ 3.31 (s. d. 1.56)	1.23	ns	
			2	M	$\bar{X}$ 4.28 (s. d. 1.57)			
	M	8	1	F	$\bar{X}$ 4.94 (s. d. 2.05)	0.41	ns	
			2	F	$\bar{X}$ 4.55 (s. d. 1.98)			
B	F	12	1	M	$\bar{X}$ 3.65 (s. d. 1.92)	1.02	ns	
			2	M	$\bar{X}$ 4.21 (s. d. 1.61)			
	M	12	1	F	$\bar{X}$ 3.48 (s. d. 2.12)	0.64	ns	
			2	F	$\bar{X}$ 3.08 (s. d. 1.66)			

Table A:5:7

Means and Standard deviations for 0-0 questionnaire responses of 24 respondents in Study Four

	0-0 Questionnaire Scales					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
$\bar{X}$	3.54	3.18	4.06	3.65	3.45	4.40
s.d.	1.94	2.40	1.67	1.65	2.17	1.80

Table A:5:8

Medians and ranges (across 6 "situations") for
"feeling observed" according to 0-0 questionnaire,
and according to measures derived from separate
"observer" and "observed" questionnaires, for each
respondent in Study Five

Respondent	0-0 scale scores		"observer" - "observed"	
	Range	Median	Range	Median
1	1 to 7	4.0	0 to 4	1.0
2	0 to 4	3.5	-4 to 1	-1.5
3	0 to 0	0	0 to 1	0.5
4	0 to 6	4.0	-3 to 1	0
5	3 to 6	4.0	-1 to 0	0
6	2 to 4	4.0	0 to 3	0.5
7	1 to 6	3.5	-4 to 2	-2.5
8	0 to 8	3.5	-4 to 2	-0.5
9	2 to 6	4.0	-1 to 2	2.0
10	2 to 7	4.5	-1 to 2	0
11	4 to 8	6.0	-4 to 0	-1.5
12	3 to 6	4.5	-3 to 1	0
13	0 to 5	3.5	-1 to 5	0.5
14	0 to 5	3.5	-1 to 2	0
15	0 to 7	3.0	-2 to 4	1.0
16	1 to 5	4.0	-3 to 0	-1.0
17	0 to 7	3.5	-4 to 3	1.0
18	1 to 5	3.0	-2 to 3	1.0
19	2 to 6	3.5	-1 to 2	-0.5
20	0 to 8	2.0	-3 to 2	-1.0
21	4 to 8	5.5	-1 to 2	1.0
22	2 to 3	2.0	-4 to -2	-3.0
23	3 to 6	5.0	-2 to 3	-0.5

Table A:5:9

Standard Deviations for mean 0-0 scores
(shown in Table 5:23) of eight samples in
Study Six

Sample		0-0 Questionnaire Scales					
		1	2	3	4	5	6
1	M	1.74	2.27	2.32	2.31	2.42	2.39
	F	3.78	2.86	2.59	2.51	2.33	2.11
2	M	2.10	2.29	2.58	2.57	2.27	2.76
	F	2.17	2.49	2.14	2.67	1.25	2.63
3	M	1.74	2.53	1.67	1.83	2.13	1.51
	F	2.10	2.41	1.39	1.34	2.20	1.77
4	M	1.81	2.07	1.73	2.06	2.00	1.89
	F	1.70	2.77	2.53	2.12	2.37	2.44
5	M	1.52	2.39	1.77	2.32	2.17	2.21
	F	0.94	1.49	1.34	1.37	0.99	1.55
6	M	1.5	1.9	1.7	2.3	1.8	2.1
	F	1.9	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2
7	M	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.5	1.6
	F	1.8	1.7	2.9	2.0	1.8	1.8
8	M	1.38	1.79	1.63	1.41	1.57	1.79
	F	1.60	2.03	1.76	1.64	1.42	1.74

Table A:5:10

Relationships between males' and females'
"ordering" of 6 "situations" according to
their degree of "feeling observed", for
eight samples in Study Six

Sample:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
r_s	0.743	0.657	0.171	0.771	-0.657	0.286	0.371	1.000
p	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	.01

Table A:6:1

Results of Mann-Whitney tests for
significance of differences between
accuracy in each condition in
Study Ten

Prediction	u_1	u	p
vsc greater than v	171	129	ns
vsc " " sc	104	94	ns
vsc " " cv	80	60	ns
vsc " " c	139	221	ns
sc " " c	103.5	139.5	ns
cv " " c	185	90	ns
cv " " v	71.5	68.5	ns
sc " " cv	64	55	ns
sc " " v	90	108	ns
v " " c	175	185	ns

Table A:7:1

Rank orders of members according to peers' assessments, As-if test scores, and teacher's ranking of acting ability, in Study Twelve

Member	Peers' Assessments					As-if	ATR
	I	P	SS	AA	Hwk		
1	2	2	2	2	4	3	7
2	9	11	12	13	12	4.5	1
3	5	10	7	8	5	4.5	8
4	6	6	4	7	9	10	9
5	11	13	11	9	11	9	4
6	8	5	5	4	7	11	10
7	10	4	8	5	6	13	11
8	3.5	1	1	1	1	2	12
9	3.5	9	9	11	2	6	3
10	1	3	3	3	3	12	13
11	12	12	13	12	13	7	2
12	13	8	10	10	10	1	5
13	7	7	6	6	8	8	6
Median	7.8	8.3	8.7	8.9	8.2	6.4	
Range	1.8 to 12.9	3.3 to 13.8	1.6 to 12.9	1.2 to 13.5	4.3 to 12.9	0.1 to 14.8	

Where Rank 1 high I (intelligence), P (popularity), SS (social skill), AA (acting ability), HWK (how well known), As-if test performance, and ATR (teacher's ranking of acting ability).

Note: Members' numbers bear no relation to the code letters employed in peer ratings.

Table A:7:2

Rank orders of group members according to peers' assessments, RTT scores, "Situation Test" scores, As-if test scores, and ratings of filmed performances, in Study Thirteen

Member	Peers' Assessments				RTT	Sitn.	As-if	FRM
	AA	SS	P	I				
1	1	1	1	8	4	12.5	4	3
2	10	10	11	6.5	15	6	11	
3	3	3	4	1	5	16	12	3
4	2	4	2	2	2	14		1
5	5	13	14	11	12	7	5	
6	12.5	15	15	16	10	2.5	3	
7	14	8	7	12	11	8	10	
8	12.5	7	9.5	3	7	5	8	3
9	15.5	11.5	13	15	14	1	2	5
10	6	11.5	8	4	13	11		7
11	11	9	9.5	9	8.5	9		
12	4	6	3	10	3	4	7	
13	7	2	5	5	6	2.5	9	6
14	9	5	6	14	8.5	10	1	
15	8	14	12	6.5	1	12.5	6	
16	15.5	16	16	13	16	15		
Median	8.8	8.0	9.7	8.3	8.3	10.3	5.8	5.5
Range	1.8 to 13.0	2.3 to 15.0	1.6 to 14.8	3.2 to 13.1	1.0 to 15.0	2.0 to 14.6	2.0 to 12.0	3.5 to 5.8

Where Rank 1 = high AA (acting ability), SS (social skill), P (popularity), I (intelligence), RTT (role-taking ability), Sitn. (Situation Test skill), As-if performance, and FRM (acting ability in filmed performances).

Note: Members' numbers bear no relation to the code letters employed in peer ratings.

Table A:8:1

Means and standard deviations for individual difference measures obtained for 58 males and 63 females in Study Three, and the relationships between these measures and 0-0 measures

		Individual Difference Measures				
	M/F	S-I	Se	Be	CE	CW
MEAN	M	- 75.6	6.1	4.2	3.1	3.8
	F	-103.8	6.6	3.6	3.0	4.2
s. d.	M	70.2	3.1	1.9	2.1	1.8
	F	79.1	2.8	2.1	1.9	1.8
Comparison (r) with scores on 0-0 scales:						
1. (sa, ss)	M	-0.107	-0.116	-0.187	0.011	0.121
	F	-0.218	-0.145	0.142	-0.003	-0.106
2. (y, ss)	M	-0.083	-0.229	-0.175	<u>-0.323*</u>	0.022
	F	0.072	0.115	0.177	0.038	-0.037
3. (o, ss)	M	0.189	0.154	-0.102	0.038	0.072
	F	-0.135	-0.089	-0.113	-0.039	0.045
4. (sa, os)	M	<u>-0.354**</u>	-0.042	-0.030	0.099	0.025
	F	0.050	0.029	0.060	0.105	-0.144
5. (y, os)	M	-0.144	-0.099	-0.155	-0.120	-0.311*
	F	<u>0.296*</u>	0.056	-0.016	0.005	-0.154
6. (o, ss)	M	-0.074	0.103	-0.227	-0.023	-0.235
	F	-0.117	0.067	0.260*	0.004	0.181

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

KEY: S-I Security-Insecurity; Se Social Extraversion;
Be Behavioural Extraversion; CE Control Expressed;
CW Control Wanted

Table A:8:1

Means and standard deviations for individual difference measures obtained for 58 males and 63 females in Study Three, and the relationships between these measures and 0-0 measures

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2. (y, ss)	M	-0.083	-0.229	-0.175	<u>-0.323*</u>	0.022	
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	F	0.050	0.029	0.060	0.105	-0.144	
5. (y, os)	M	-0.144	-0.099	-0.155	-0.120	-0.311*	
	F	<u>0.296*</u>	0.056	-0.016	0.005	-0.154	
6. (o, ss)	M	-0.074	0.103	-0.227	-0.023	-0.235	
	F	-0.117	0.067	0.260*	0.004	0.181	

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

KEY: S-I Security-Insecurity; Se Social Extraversion;
Be Behavioural Extraversion; CE Control Expressed;
CW Control Wanted

Table A:8:2

Means and standard deviations of individual difference, and 0-0, measures for 22 respondents in Study Five

Measure		$\bar{X}$	s. d.
0-0	(Second Administration: (Total (0-0 Tot.)	21.59	7.83
	((Age Effect (0-0 AE)	1.91	6.50
	((Sex Effect (0-0 SE)	-1.05	4.32
	(		
	((Total	21.41	7.35
	(		
	(First Administration: (Age Effect	2.32	4.19
	((Sex Effect	-2.32	4.20
	(		
	(Discrepancy Score (0-0 Dis.)	5.45	5.23
	(Consistency Score (0-0 Con.)	11.32	3.88
	Security-Insecurity	-16.45	46.29
	(Control Wanted (CW)	3.09	2.51
	FIRO (		
	(Control Expressed (CE)	3.82	2.15
	(Total Extraversion (Tot. e.)	30.14	10.68
	MPI (Social " (Se)	16.68	7.58
	(Behavioural (Be)	4.50	1.71
	(P scale	3.41	3.03
	PST (R scale	5.36	3.17
	(C scale	4.73	1.67
	IE Scale	12.73	4.59

Table A:8:3

Relationships (r) between 0-0 measures (second administration) and individual difference measures employed in Study Five

Observer-Observed Measures					
	0-0 SE	0-0 AE	0-0 Tot.	0-0 Con.	0-0 Dis.
IE	0.141	0.088	0.202	-0.142	0.057
(C	-0.141	0.310	0.111	0.161	0.168
(					
PST (R	0.019	-0.098	0.245	0.230	-0.223
(					
(P	0.318	0.057	0.364	<u>-0.436*</u>	0.351
S-I	-0.316	-0.312	-0.251	0.067	-0.030
Tot. e.	-0.295	-0.298	-0.264	<u>0.555**</u>	<u>-0.433*</u>
Se	-0.321	-0.221	-0.327	<u>0.419*</u>	<u>-0.439*</u>
Be	-0.306	-0.017	-0.307	<u>0.531**</u>	-0.032
CW	0.044	-0.149	-0.309	0.149	-0.280
CE	0.322	<u>0.438*</u>	0.377	0.053	-0.018

* $p < .05$;

** $p < .01$

KEY: See Table A:8:2

APPENDIX B

Answer Sheet (FR) employed in Studies Seven and Eight

Answer Sheet (FC) employed in Studies Eight, Nine and Ten

Answer Sheet employed in Study Eleven

Letter and Questionnaire sent to improvisation group members
in Study Twelve

Armistead's Situation Test items employed in Study Thirteen

Film Rating Sheet employed in Study Thirteen

Name..... Age..... Sex.....

Please describe in the space provided, whom you think the speaker is addressing, in as many terms as you wish e.g. age, sex, occupation, relationship with speaker, status, etc. Also indicate whether you think he has spoken to the person in a previous episode.

Number	The person being spoken to was:	Have you seen him speak to this person before. (YES or NO)
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		
11.		

Answer Sheet (FR) employed in Studies Seven and Eight.

Name..... Age..... Sex.....

Please describe in the space provided, whom you think the speaker is addressing, in as many terms as you wish e.g. age, sex, occupation, relationship with speaker, status, etc. Also indicate whether you think he has spoken to the person in a previous episode.

Number	The person being spoken to was:	Have you seen him speak to this person before. (YES or NO)
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		
11.		

Answer Sheet (FC) employed in Studies Eight, Nine and Ten.

Name:..... Age:..... Sex:.....

Please indicate in the spaces provided whom you think the speaker is addressing, selecting your choice from the following list. Also indicate whether you think he has spoken to the same person in a previous episode.

- supervisor/boss
- colleague
- young sister
- mother
- male acquaintance
- A.A. man
- girl friend
- close male friend

No.	The person being spoken to was:	Have you seen him speak to this person before? (YES/NO)
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
6.		
7.		
8.		
9.		
10.		
11.		

Answer Sheet employed in Study Eleven.

Name.....Age.....Sex.....Condition: S+C or C

Please describe in the space provided the age, sex, status and relationship with speaker, of the person whom you think the speaker is addressing. (The speaker may address a particular other more than once.)

Item No:	The person being spoken to was:			
	<u>Age</u> (same age/ older)	<u>Sex</u> (M/F)	<u>Status</u> (same/ higher)	<u>Relationship</u> (close/distant)
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				

Letter sent to improvisation group members in Study Twelve.

Dear.....,

I do hope you will forgive my writing to you during the vacation. I am a student carrying out research in social psychology, particularly into the operation of small groups. Prior to my major research project next year, I wish to carry out a few pilot surveys within various groups. Mr. Catteral has given me the names and addresses of members of the improvisation group he led last year. I am therefore sending the enclosed questionnaire to all members of the group, and hope very much that you would complete the enclosed forms and return them to me.

It is not necessary to spend much time and effort on their completion, as I am more interested in your immediate response than in a well thought-out answer. Although it looks a lot to get through, it should'nt take more than half-an-hour.

If the members of the group are cooperative, I intend to send you all copies of my results, and also an explanation of the relevance of the various questions. I must emphasise that I shall be analysing the results myself, and that no-one but myself will see the completed questionnaires, so your replies would be quite confidential.

I do hope that you will be willing to help me in this project.

Yours faithfully.....

P.S. If you would rather not complete the questionnaire, I should be grateful if you would return it to me in the enclosed envelope.

Questionnaire sent to improvisation group members in Study Twelve

Notes on completing the questionnaire:

Please answer all questions at one sitting, and please do not discuss your answers with anyone, especially other members of the group. None of the questions are related to tests of intelligence.

Page 1. This should be completed in not more than 5 minutes.

Page 2. This list of code letters is for use on Page 3.

Page 3. Please read the instructions carefully.

PLEASE SEND THE COMPLETED QUESTIONNAIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, TO ME,
USING THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE.

As-if questions. (please use back of previous page if necessary).

How would you be different if :-

a) You had been born a Russian?

b) If you were of the opposite sex?

CODE LETTERS FOR MEMBERS OF GROUP.

<u>Letter.</u>	<u>Name</u>
A.	
B.	
C.	
D.	
E.	
F.	
G.	
H.	
I.	
J.	
K.	
L.	
M.	
N.	
O.	
P.	

(Names are not given here, in order to preserve the anonymity of group members, but were given in the questionnaires sent to members in Studies Twelve and Thirteen).

Using the code letter (see previous page), please assess members of your group (excluding yourself) in order from 1-15 (1 represents the highest value; 15 the lowest) on the following characteristics:- (Your personal opinion is requested).

a) Intelligence:

Please
put code 
letter e.g.
X,Y, here

[illegible]

b) Popularity (within the group)

[illegible]

c) Social Skill (how well they get on with others, how well they handle awkward situations. etc.).

[illegible]

d) Acting Ability (How well they can adopt various roles in improvisation; how well they can project them to an audience; how well they can lose their own personal characteristics when this is necessary, in order to present a very different role).

[illegible]

e) How well do you know them?

[illegible]

Instructions:

We would like to see what you would have to say for yourself in certain situations. Below we describe a few situations to you. Whatever you think of the circumstances and whether or not you would ever find yourself in such a position, we would like you to write down what you would actually say, going on the evidence given. As you will see, it's very important for you to say something appropriate or else you're in trouble.

- 1). You have been late for work several times, using all the usual excuses and your boss is fed up with this. He tells you that you are slack and that any more such transparent excuses are not acceptable. Three days later you oversleep because you have been at a party and you are half-an-hour late. What do you say to the boss?
- 2). At a cocktail party you meet someone you don't like and don't want to be seen with, so you want to get away immediately. What do you say to the person?
- 3). Your parents want you to go on holiday with them, but you have already made plans to go with some friends. Then your parents ask you what date term finishes and where you would like to go. Without hurting their feelings, what do you say to them?
- 4). You go for an interview for a manager's job with the G.P.O. You have carefully prepared to answer the question "Why do you want to work for the G.P.O.?" But the interviewer sits you down and says in a firm voice: "I have just one question to ask you. What do you think is wrong with the G.P.O.?" What do you say to him?
- 5). You are asked at the last minute to introduce the speaker at a seminar, although you don't know anything about him, not even his name and title. What do you say for an introduction?

Film Rating Sheet employed in Study Thirteen.

Name of Rater.....

No. of Sequence.....

Name of Actor.....

General Impression of Acting Ability.

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

BadGood

Effectiveness of Persuasion (Potential)

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

BadGood

Understanding of What required.

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

BadGood

Involvement in Situation.(part).

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

BadGood

Ability to project (i.e. acting proper)

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

BadGood

Gesture.

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

BadGood

Language

--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--

BadGood

APPENDIX C

"Verbal Content" Sheets employed in Studies Ten and Eleven
(Transcripts of filmed performances)

Performance No. 1: alter = mother

..... scraping sound from underneath the car. You know, it happened in London once. There was this ghastly scraping sound from underneath the car, and um, you know, it happened in London once before, and the exhaust dropped out from its socket just underneath the engine.

..... Well, yea, but I, um, um, to replace the whole exhaust system it costs about, you know, £3, £3 or £4 in fact, and you can get this little part which only costs about 14/-, and just fit that to it. I think the clamp must have gone which connects the two bits, you see. You see, there may..... no, well..... since the.....well, it depends. I think I shall probably have it welded this time, if this is going to happen again, it is obviously putting a dreadful strain on the, on the, on the underneath pipe, and it means that.....

Performance No. 2: alter = supervisor/boss

I don't know whether it will cost a great deal to put right.....
um, well no, there were several people involved, and, er, I was taking
them back, and we had just got to Headington roundabout and, um,
there was this almighty scraping underneath the car, and, um, I had
to stop straight away and pull up on to the verge and, um, I
discovered that my exhaust system had fallen out, which meant that,
um, you know, the car could not go any further, which meant I was
a) I was stuck out atwell, yea, you see, um, I had to
completely stop, completely stop, and wait for somebody to come along
and help and, um..... No, there was this large scraping thing
underneath which, um, completely, completely stopped the car.....
Well, yes, I had to, um, I had to, wait, wait, wait for the police
and, um, there was this police car that I had seen cruising around,
and I knew that as soon as, as soon as, he came, came up he would
be able to tell me what to do, but it meant that I was stuck out at
Headington, and, um, all these other people as well they were not
able to get to Wheatley, and, um, and it meant I was very late.....

Performance No. 3: alter = girlfriend

..... to the West of Oxford, I think it is and, um, I was driving quite, quite slowly fortunately, and, um, suddenly there was this god almighty noise from underneath the car, scraping sort of

..... Yea, um, scraping sound so I pulled up on to the verge and I discovered that the, um, the exhaust system had fallen out.

..... Well yes, I mean it, it, had come undone at one point, one of the brackets had broken and, um, so I had to stop. It was so, it was, very late as well. I was, I was so annoyed and, um, I had to pull up on the verge somehow and I tried jacking the car up and getting underneath, which is when I got, got my clothes covered in oil, you know, one thing led to another, and it was really.....

No, it was so late you see. There was, um, it was about 11.30. I was so tired as well.....What, pardon.....um, well, um, I had to, um, take the whole of the exhaust off and got even more dirty in the process because it is, um, quite rusty.....Well, it just makes a noise, you see, all the exhaust does is make it quieter. Yes, its, its not serious, the car will still go, I mean, but it will, you will get..... Well, no, no, I mean I pulled off the, off the roundabout first. The police just saw me on the edge of the roundabout and thought the car was abandoned, you see.

Performance No. 4: alter = AA man

..... my exhaust dropped out, has dropped out of the part underneath the engine. I don't think there was a bracket there originally, and, um, it was, it was sort of a replacement part that had been put in and, um, presumably, um, the clamp that holds it has, has broken away or fallen off or something, and, um, it means that I can't, I can't move the car without being, without scraping along the ground, and, um, leaving death and destruction behind me, so if you could umYea, um, its not, its not, um, its not too serious. I mean, um, there's nothing, there's nothing wrong with the car at all, its, its just that this, that this bit has fallen off and, um, its either got to be put back or presumably I shall.....Oh, yes, yes, certainly, um,..... Well, yes, I'll, I'll have to let you know later because, um, um, I don't, I don't know the, um, exact figures, but.....

Performance No. 5: alter = close male friend

.....its so annoying because it's so, yes, pardon.....it was very late at night.....yes, yes, it happened in London, well I sort of patched it up.....and, um, yes. And I, and I decided that, um, you know, to save getting a whole new system I'd, I'd do a quick job on it myself. Well, anyway, I presume the clamp must have broken, you know and, um..... Yea, there were sparks flying all over the place, and I pulled up on to the verge and, um..... pardon, yea, it was just sort of scrape, scraping along the ground at the front..... Yea, under the engine. That's right. And, um, anyway, it completely stopped me because everybody else in the car was getting annoyed because they were going to be late back and, um, and there were no buses left, and there were no taxis around of course, in fact, there was hardly any other traffic around. It was pretty good actually there was no, um, there was no other traffic at the time, at the time, because I had to stop absolutely dead. You know, I mean, I had to sort of slam on the anchors..... Pardon..... Well, um, I, um, managed to get the whole of the exhaust off.....

Performance No. 6: alter = girlfriend (R)

.....and suddenly there was this, there was this, um, this rumbling sound from underneath the car, and um.....No, no, nothing like that, no, no, its just that the exhaust system had dropped out of the bottom, and..... Yes, and I..... and I had, and I had to pull over on to the verge, and, um, and try and, try, to investigate the problem and, um, sure enough there it was, sort of hanging on to the, down on to the ground at the front, at the front, of the car. It had dropped out from completely underneath the engine, you see, and, um, I had to, um, to take the whole exhaust off, and, um, get back to Oxford as best as possible..... Well, this is it, the police turned up after about 45 seconds, you know, they sort of screeched to a halt. There was some car cruising around No, presumably they thought the car was abandoned. I don't know, and, um, he was quite helpful actually and, um, and, um, said you know, try and get it fixed as soon as possible..... Well I don't know yet. This depends a great deal on garage prices and things.

Performance No. 7: alter = colleague

..... was stuck in Oxford and had to get back to Wheatley, and, um, it meant that I was, I was, I was stuck, stuck at Headington roundabout for about, for about two hours. Well it was not too bad, but the thing is, um, I had just got on to the roundabout when there was this, um, scraping sound from underneath, from underneath the engine

Well, possibly, but you see it meant I had, I had to take off the, to take off the, um Yes, I know, but the thing is, you see..... Well, I'll, I'll have to, well, have to..... have to..... have to..... take it in to, tomorrow..... NoNo.....I mean it completely stopped me and I was, I was delayed for about two hours and, um, people I was taking were quite annoyed as well because there were no taxis around or buses. The bus service or whatever it is up there had stopped, um, ages ago. Well, I, um, I took the exhaust off and, um, and

Performance No. 8: alter = young sister

.....just outside Oxford its a sort of suburb of Oxford, and, um, I was driving along and suddenly there was this.....I was taking some people home, um, it was quite late last night, you see, and, um, I was driving, driving along and suddenly there was this noise from under, underneath the car and, um, a bit had fallen out of the engine..... Well, no, you see it is a bit that runs underneath the car and its, um, held on by a sort of piece of metal underneath the engine normally and, um, this had probably broken you see and No, well I mean you can't, you can't do that permanently, I mean it has, it has to be done properly, um, I mean it, the engine, the engine sends out air which gets so hot that, um, I couldn't touch it, and, so what I did do was to take, to take off the whole of the, the whole of the piece that had, that had dropped out of the engine and, um, carry it home in the car, and I hope the garage man will be able to..... Pardon..... Oh, well, you see.....

Performance No. 9: alter = boss/supervisor (R)

..I was going up to Headington last night, and, um, had a bit of a disaster with the, um, car, um, I was taking some people back because they were, they were stuck in Oxford and I got..... Pardon, well, I was, I got as far as the roundabout and, um..... No, no, no, um, the thing was the exhaust system fell out of the car and I heard this sort of grating sound from underneath the car..... Oh, really,..... Yea, but it, it, it has happened to me before as well..... Yes, I had, I had to wait for at least, um, at least two and a half hours which really sort of held me and the people I was, um, carrying..... Yes, yes, yes that's fine..... Um, oh at any time, I suppose..... It was really so annoying, I mean, the way, the way it held me up I just don't think, I don't think I could have done anything else about it really..... I should think so, yes, I should think so, um.....

Performance No. 10: alter = male acquaintance

....and, um, the exhaust had fallen out. I don't know if this has ever happened to you..... Really, no, anyway, you know, I had to, I had to jam on the brakes, and pull up on to the verge and, um, see what I could do about it. Fortunately, I fortunately, I did, I did manage to do something, I got No, no, no, no, not really, I mean the car's pretty good really. Its just, um, that presumably some sort of clamp had broken, and, um, I had to take the whole thing off. It won't take very much to, um, to put right. I mean..... Oh, I should think so, yes. Yes, its merely a question of getting some small part which, um, I think you can probably get in, um, in any of these cycle shops. No, I should think it would cost a few shillings, and, of course, I could do it myself..... Um, and, um, and.....Oh, quite well, quite well, thank you.....

Performance No. 11: alter = mother (R)

.....its on the ring road, yes, that's right, and um, I had just got there, and, um, there was this noise underneath the car.....

And um, my exhaust had dropped out, so I had to put.....

Yes, it did, well I, I mean I did my, my best with it then and, um tried to fix it up with a new clamp but I presumed that must, must have broken off..... Well, um, I mean, a new system, a new exhaust system all told would have cost, um about £3.10, plus whatever it cost to put on it, so, um, um, there is this small part you can get which would save you doing that. Um, it just needs, it just needs a clamp..... Yes, I mean provided, provided the clamps alright..... It'll, it'll be no trouble at all..... Well, well, that joins, um, the two pieces together, the main, the main pipe, and its just underneath the engine, and you see there's this short bit which you can buy, and..... Yes, I mean its, its, it will be perfectly safe. The, um, the idea is that you just, you just fit this, fit this small piece to the section and its slightly flexible.....

APPENDIX D

Attempt to Replicate Sarbin and Jones
(1956) Study

APPENDIX D

Attempt to replicate Sarbin and Jones' (1956) study

Introduction

This study was an attempt to replicate only that part of Sarbin and Jones' experiment which served to validate the "as-if" test as a measure of "role-aptitude". While there is some discrepancy between features of the method reported in the text and summary of their account, the present study repeated all measures mentioned.

Briefly their procedure was as follows:

They hypothesised that students equated for "validity of role-expectations" for the Role of daughter, for motivation for role enactment, and for "requisite motor and verbal skills" would enact an "experimental role" whose validity would depend on their role-aptitude.

The "validity" of a student's role-expectation constituted "conformance" with the expectation derived from the pooled expectations of the group (all female) of which she was a member. Adjective check lists (ACLs) were used to assess each student's expectations for the Roles of daughter and father; adjectives were given weighted scores according to the number of times they appeared in the "group" (pooled) expectations, and each student's expectations were then scored for "conformance" by summing the scores attributable to the adjectives appearing in their "expectation" lists.

Six female performers were chosen, whose expectations for the Roles of "father" and "daughter" were equally valid, and whose

self-concepts (described on a further ACL) were equally congruent with their expectations for the "daughter" Role. The validity of the 6 performers' enactments was assessed by asking the rest of the group (as audience) to check adjectives on the ACL which described each performance; the more congruent the description (pooled descriptions of audience members) with the valid or "conformant" group expectation for the daughter Role, the greater the "validity" of the enactment.

The audience also ranked the performers in order, according to the "adequacy" of their enactments. Performers had been selected on the basis of divergent "as-if" test scores, and had apparently "similar" motivation for enactment. They enacted the Role of a daughter speaking to her father about her failure in recent University examinations, the Role of "father" being played in standard fashion by a colleague of the experimenters.

Sarbin and Jones (1956) obtained perfect (positive) rank order correlations between the assessments of the 6 performers in terms of the adequacy, and validity, of their enactments, and their role-aptitude (as-if test scores); the student who gave the most adequate enactment, also gave that which was most valid (conformant with the group expectation), and also had the highest as-if score.

Some criticisms of this study are made by Wylie (1961), who was concerned with Sarbin and Jones' hypothesis regarding the degree of change in self-concept consequent on an overt enactment. Wylie (1961) notes that the "... possibilities for change (in the self-concept)

might be artifactually associated with the number of items (adjectives) originally checked (describing the self-concept)" (p. 148), and that as-if test scores, and assessments of enactments, might be similarly affected by verbal response output.

Validity of expectation for daughter and father Roles might also be affected by the number of adjectives checked; a person who checked all adjectives on the list would inevitably achieve the highest possible validity score. Sarbin and Jones report no correction for the total number of adjectives checked, nor any examination of the relationship between as-if test scores and number of adjectives checked on ACLs.

Two further criticisms of Sarbin and Jones' method may be made. Firstly, the ACL used was not published, but selected adjectives comprising the group expectations suggest that most of the words on the list referred to positive characteristics, so that one dimension of potential variation of expectation and enactment would seem to have been removed. Secondly, they make no note as to the extent of agreement between audience members as to the "adequacy" of enactment rankings given.

The present study sought to "correct" some of these apparent inadequacies, and to attempt to replicate Sarbin and Jones' findings.

Procedure

The "conformant" expectations for the Roles of father and daughter were obtained by asking a group of 21 female, and 23 male, undergraduates at Reading University, to check adjectives on a provided list (ACL). This ACL had been compiled on the basis of this group's earlier suggestions of adjectives "descriptive of others", and included

120 positive, and 120 negative, adjectives.

As well as completing ACLs describing the Roles of daughter and of father, group members completed a third, describing themselves. Members then gave answers to the two as-if questions:

"How would your life have been different if you had been born a Russian?" and "How would your life have been different if you had been born a member of the opposite sex?"

The Role expectations held by the majority of the group were then derived, and each member's expectations were evaluated according to the degree to which they were valid in conforming with the majority expectations. Congruence of self-concept with daughter Role expectation was also evaluated for each female member.

Six females, equated for "validity" of expectations for daughter and father Roles, for congruence of their self-concepts with their daughter Role expectations, and whose as-if test scores were divergent, performed the Role of "daughter" as in Sarbin and Jones' study. The audience (the 23 males and 14 of the females) completed ACLs describing the 6 performances, and ranked the 6 performers in terms of the "adequacy" of their enactments.

Results

The as-if test scores for the female group, on each of the two questions, were positively and significantly related ($r_s = 0.563$; $p < .01$), and the 6 performers were ranked according to their mean as-if test scores.

Two rank-orders of performers according to the "validity" of their enactments were derived, one based on males' descriptive ACLs, and the other, on females' ACLs. These two rank orders were not significantly related ($r_s = 0.114$; ns). The males were in agreement about the adequacy of the enactments ($W = 0.2022$; $p < .001$), but the females were not ($W = 0.067$; ns).

The ranks of the means of ranks given by the male and female "audiences" were compared, and found to be positively but insignificantly related ($r_s = 0.571$; ns), but a rank order of enactments as viewed by both males and females (together) was obtained (since Sarbin and Jones had accepted "total audience" assessments, whether the audience agreed with each other or not).

The rank order of performances according to their "validity" (whole audience) was negatively and insignificantly related to the whole audience's ranking of performances in terms of "adequacy" ($r_s = -0.657$; ns). Rankings of performances according to performers' as-if test scores was not significantly related to their rank-order according to "validity", whether validity was based on the descriptions by females ($r_s = -0.143$; ns), by males ($r_s = 0.143$; ns), or on those by the whole audience together ($r_s = 0.143$; ns).

Similarly, "as-if" ranks were not significantly related to "adequacy" ranks, whether these were based on the rankings given by the whole audience ($r_s = 0.200$; ns), or on the rankings given by males ($r_s = 0.200$; ns) or by females ($r_s = 0.486$; ns), alone.

Thus Sarbin and Jones' (1956) results, with regard to the association between as-if measures and adequacy and validity of enactments, were not confirmed here. In deriving the "validity of expectation" scores for members of the group, it was noted that for both males and females the distribution of validity scores was not J-shaped, but approached normality. That is, only a few members gave highly "valid" expectations, while the majority held moderately valid expectations. This observation casts some doubt on Sarbin and Jones' assertion that Role expectations are, by definition, "consensual"; it might be argued that expectations for behaviour appropriate to the performance of a formal Role may only be discussed where the majority agree about them.

It may also be noted that equating congruence of self-concept with Role expectation does not necessarily imply similarity in self-concept for those equated in this respect, and this was not the case here.

With regard to Wylie's (1961) suggestion that "verbal productivity" might affect "validity of role expectations" and as-if test scores, analysis of the relationships between the number of adjectives checked on the various ACLs, the measures of validity of expectation for the two Roles, congruence of self-concept with expectations, and as-if test scores, was conducted. The coefficients of correlation obtained by this analysis, are shown in Table a.

Table a

Relationships between "verbal productivity" measures,
Role-expectation measures, and as-if test scores

COMPARISON (N = 23)			r _s	p
Validity of expn. for father Role	with	No. adjs. checked for father Role	0.434	.05
Validity of expn. for daughter Role	"	No. adjs. checked for daughter Role (R)	0.496	.05
Congruence of expn. for daughter R. with S-C	"	No. adjs. checked for S-C (self-concept)	0.859	.01
Validity of expn. for daughter R.	"	As-if score	0.196	ns
No. adjs. checked for S-C	"	As-if score	0.250	ns
No. adjs. checked for father R.	"	No. adjs. checked for daughter R.	0.714	.01
Validity of expn. for daughter R.	"	Validity of expn. for father R.	0.828	.01

These results give some support for Wylie's comments.

Verbal productivity, as evidenced in the number of adjectives checked on the pertinent ACLs, was significantly and positively related to the degree of "validity" of members' expectations for father and daughter Roles, and to the degree of congruence shown between their expectation for the daughter Role and their self-concept. The as-if test measures were apparently independent of verbal productivity.

Discussion

The results of this study indicated that the as-if test was not a satisfactory predictor either of adequacy or of validity of enactment, even where performers were equated in the ways described. Sarbin and Jones' (1956) method of assessing validity of enactment and congruence of self-concept with Role-expectation leads to contamination of these measures with "verbal productivity". The as-if test does not appear to be contaminated in the same way, but scores on the as-if test were not associated with the quality of overt enactment.

APPENDIX E

Individual Difference Measures

F.I.R.O. (Schutz, 1958) : Control Wanted
Control Expressed

Security-Insecurity (Maslow et al, 1945) : Page 1
Page 3

Social and Behavioural Extraversion Items
(Eysenck 1959;
Eysenck and Eysenck, 1963)

Internal versus External locus of Control (Rotter, 1966)

Performance Style Test (Ring and Wallston, 1968)

Audience Sensitivity and Exhibitionism Items (Paivio and Lambert, 1959)

F.I.R.O., employed in Studies Three and Five .

(Endorsement of any item underlined receives a score of 1; range of possible scores for each scale = 0 to 9.)

Control Wanted

1. I let other people decide what to do.
usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never
2. I let other people decide what to do.
most people many people some people a few people one or two people nobody
3. I let other people take charge of things.
most people many people some people a few people one or two people nobody
4. I let other people strongly influence my actions.
most people many people some people a few people one or two people nobody
5. I let other people strongly influence my actions.
usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never
6. I let other people control my actions.
usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never
7. I am easily led by people.
usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never
8. I let people control my actions.
most people many people some people a few people one or two people nobody
9. I am easily led by people.
most people many people some people a few people one or two people nobody

Control Expressed

1. I try to be the dominant person when I am with people.

usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never

2. I try to take charge of things when I am with people.

most many some a few one or two nobody
people people people people people

3. I try to have other people do things I want done.

usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never

4. I try to influence strongly other people's actions.

usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never

5. I try to influence strongly other people's actions.

most many some a few one or two nobody
people people people people people

6. I try to have other people do things the way I want them done.

usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never

7. I try to have other people do things the way I want them done.

most many some a few one or two nobody
people people people people people

8. I take charge of things when I'm with people.

usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never

9. I try to take charge of things when I'm with people.

usually often sometimes occasionally rarely never

Security - Insecurity Scale with scoring weightings :

Page 1 (range = -205 to 82) and Page 3 (range = -171 to 69)

employed in Study Three; Page 1 employed in Study Five.

<u>Page 1</u>	YES	NO	?
1. Do you ordinarily like to be with people, rather than alone?	2	-6	-6
2. Do you have social ease?	4	-8	-6
3. Do you lack self-confidence?	-9	4	-7
4. Do you feel that you get enough praise?	3	-9	-7
5. Do you often have a feeling of resentment against the world?	-9	3	-7
6. Do you think people like you as much as they do others?	3	-9	-9
7. Do you worry too long over humiliating experiences?	-9	4	-5
8. Can you be comfortable with yourself?	1	-9	-5
9. Are you generally an unselfish person?	2	-6	-6
10. Do you tend to avoid unpleasantness by running away?	-8	3	-8
11. Do you often have a feeling of loneliness, even when you are with people?	-8	4	-3
12. Do you feel that you are getting a square deal in life?	3	-9	-7
13. When your friends criticize you, do you usually take it well?	2	-9	-8
14. Do you get discouraged easily?	-8	4	-4
15. Do you usually feel friendly toward most people?	2	-9	-9
16. Do you often feel that life is not worth living?	-9	2	-8
17. Are you generally optimistic?	3	-7	-5
18. Do you consider yourself a rather nervous person?	-7	3	-7
19. Are you in general a happy person?	4	-9	-7
20. Are you ordinarily quite sure of yourself?	4	-8	-5
21. Are you often self-conscious?	-6	7	-2
22. Do you tend to be dissatisfied with yourself?	-7	6	4
23. Are you frequently in low spirits?	-9	4	-8
24. When you meet people for the first time, do you usually feel they will not like you?	-9	2	-6

	YES	NO	?
25. Do you have enough faith in yourself?	4	-9	-4
51. Are you easily hurt?	-7	4	3
52. Do you feel at home in the world?	3	-8	-7
53. Do you worry about your intelligence?	-6	3	-2
54. Do you generally put others at their ease?	-1	-6	-3
55. Do you have a vague fear of the future?	1	-6	-3
56. Do you behave naturally?	-5	6	1
57. Do you feel you are generally lucky?	2	-8	-6
58. Did you have a happy childhood?	6	-3	0
59. Do you have many real friends?	2	-4	-5
60. Do you feel restless most of the time?	3	-6	-6
61. Do you tend to be afraid of competition?	-7	4	-3
62. Is your home environment happy?	-9	3	-6
63. Do you worry too much about possible misfortunes?	2	-6	-3
64. Do you often become very annoyed with people?	-7	3	-6
65. Do you ordinarily feel contented?	4	-9	-5
66. Do your moods tend to alternate from very happy to very sad?	-6	4	-1
67. Do you feel that you are respected by people in general?	1	-5	-7
68. Are you able to work harmoniously with others?	1	-7	-8
69. Do you feel you can't control your feelings?	-9	1	-8
70. Do you sometimes feel that people laugh at you?	-6	3	-7
71. Are you generally a relaxed person, (rather than tense)?	3	-6	-1
72. On the whole, do you think you are treated right by others?	2	-9	-7
73. Are you ever bothered by a feeling that things are not real?	-6	4	-5
74. Have you often been humiliated?	-9	2	-6
75. Do you think you are often regarded as queer?	-7	1	-6

Extraversion Items employed in Studies Three, Five, Twelve, and Thirteen.

(Responses underlined receive a score of 1; * = behavioural extraversion;
range = 0 to 9; social extraversion: range 0 to 15)

- | | | | |
|------|---|------------|-----------|
| 1.* | Are you inclined to take your work casually, that is, as a matter of course? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 2.* | Are you inclined to be overconscientious? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 3.* | Do you ever take your work as if it were a matter of life and death? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 4. | Would you rate yourself as a talkative individual? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 5. | Do you generally prefer to take the lead in group activities? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 6.* | Do you like work that requires considerable attention to details? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 7.* | Do you prefer action to planning for action? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 8. | Do you nearly always have a "ready answer" for remarks directed at you? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 9.* | Are you inclined to be quick and sure in your actions? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 10.* | Are you happiest when you get involved in some project that calls for rapid action? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 11. | Do other people regard you as a lively individual? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 12.* | Would you rate yourself as a happy-go-lucky individual? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 13. | Would you rate yourself as a lively individual? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 14. | Are you inclined to limit your acquaintances to a select few? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 15. | Do you like to mix socially with people? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 16.* | Are you inclined to be shy in the presence of the opposite sex? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 17. | Do you like to play pranks upon others? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 18. | Can you usually let yourself go and have a hilariously good time at a party? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 19. | Are you inclined to keep quiet when out in a social group? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 20. | Would you be very unhappy if you were prevented from making numerous social contacts? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 21. | Do you like to have many social engagements? | <u>Yes</u> | No |
| 22. | Is it difficult to "lose yourself" even at a lively party? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 23. | Are you inclined to keep in the background on social occasions? | Yes | <u>No</u> |
| 24. | Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends? | <u>Yes</u> | No |

"Internal versus External Locus of Control" (I.E.) Scale

employed in Studies Five and Nine. (Choice of statement underlined receives a score of 1, (signifying belief in external locus); range = 0 to 23)

1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.
2. a. Many of the unhappy things in peoples' lives are partly due to bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.
3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.
4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.
5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to pupils is nonsense.
b. Most pupils don't realise the extent to which their marks are influenced by accidental happenings.
6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.
8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.
b. It is one's experience in life which determine what they're like.

9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
- b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.
10. a. In the case of the well-prepared pupil there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
- b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to the syllabus that studying is really useless.
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
- b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
- b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the ordinary man can do about it.
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
- b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good.
- b. There is some good in everybody.
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
- b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place first.
- b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand, nor control.
- b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can control world events.

18. a. Most people don't realise the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
- b. There is really no such thing as "luck".
19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
- b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
- b. How many friends you have depends on how nice a person you are.
21. a. In the long run, the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
- b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
- b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the marks they give.
- b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the marks I get.
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
- b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
- b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
- b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.

27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in school.
- b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
- b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
- b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level.

Performance Style Test employed in Studies Five, Seven, and Nine.

(Items endorsed as true (T) or false (F), as specified, receive a score of 1, signifying P style, C style, or R style; range for each style = 0 to 10)

-1-

1. I would be uncomfortable in anything other than fairly conventional dress. (CT)
2. If given the chance I would make a good leader of people. (RT)
3. I have skill in influencing others. (RT)
4. I must admit that I enjoy trying to manipulate others for my own purposes.
5. I like to do things that other people regard as unconventional. (CF)
6. I often find it's difficult to get people to do me favours, even when I have a right to expect them. (PT)
7. When in a group of people I have trouble thinking of the right things to talk about. (PT)
8. I find it easy to get along with people. (PF)
9. I dislike having to behave according to rules of etiquette. (CF)
10. In most social situations, I feel tense and constrained. (PT)
11. I can fit in pretty easily with any group of people.
12. It's usually easy for me to persuade others to my point of view. (RT)
13. I like to conform to custom and to avoid doing things that people I respect might consider unconventional. (CT)
14. I think I could be a successful businessman, if I wanted to.
15. I like to avoid situations where I am expected to do things in a conventional way. (CF)
16. I usually find it difficult to change someone else's opinions. (RF)
17. When serving on a committee, I like to be appointed or elected chairman. (RT)
18. I must admit I try to see what others think before I take a stand. (CT)

19. I can easily make other people afraid of me, and sometimes do for the fun of it.
20. A person should adapt his ideas and his behaviour to the group that happens to be with him at the time.
21. I do not mind meeting strangers. (PF)
22. I think I'd enjoy being an actor (or actress).
23. At parties I am more likely to sit by myself or with just one other person than to join in with the crowd. (PT)
24. I can usually get people to do what I want. (RT)
25. I usually have trouble making myself heard in an argument. (PT)
26. I like to be the centre of attention in a group.
27. People can pretty easily change me even though I thought my mind was already made up on a subject. (RF)
28. Even the idea of giving a talk in public makes me afraid. (RF)
29. I think I would enjoy being a salesman.
30. I like to meet new people. (PF)
31. I don't like participating in formal ceremonies. (PT)
32. If I'm with someone I don't like, I usually don't express my real feelings to him.
33. I like to follow instructions and do what is expected of me. (CT)
34. I find it hard to talk when I meet new people. (RF)
35. I frequently feel intense sympathy for others.
36. I enjoy being with people who are suave and sophisticated.
37. I think it's important to learn how to obey. (CT)
38. I think most people would lie to get ahead. (CF)
39. When in a new situation, it's best to watch what others do.
40. I enjoy being the host (or hostess) of a party.

41. I feel I can handle myself pretty well in most social situations. (PF)
42. I sometimes enjoy misleading people just for the fun of it.
43. I can deceive people, if I have to, without feeling guilty about it.
44. I don't mind pretending to like someone when I really don't if there's a good reason to do so.
45. I like people to notice and to comment upon my appearance when I am out in public.
46. I often feel like telling people what I really think of them. (CF)
47. I feel ill at ease with people I don't know. (RF)
48. I have no dread of going into a room by myself where other people have already gathered and are talking. (RT)
49. I am a good mixer. (PF)
50. I like to go to parties. (PF)
51. In general, I find that I dislike non-conformists. (CT)
52. I don't like to be too conspicuous at social gatherings. (RF)
53. I should like to belong to several clubs or lodges.
54. I often find that my wishes conflict with those of others. (CF)
55. I feel guilty whenever I have done something I know is wrong.

Audience Sensitivity (ASI) and Exhibitionism

(Exh.) items, administered to respondents of

Sample 8 in Study Six. (Response "True"

received a score of 1, unless item signified (F)).

A.S.I.

1. I am easily discouraged when the opinions of others differ from my own.
2. I tend to feel self-conscious in the presence of people I consider my superiors.
3. I consider myself a shy person.
4. I often heckle or question a public speaker. (F)
5. I can usually express myself better in writing than in speech.
6. I never get stage fright. (F)
7. I make friends easily. (F)
8. I avoid taking the responsibility of introducing people at a party.
9. I find it difficult to speak before a group.
10. I have been the recognized leader (president, captain, chairman) of a group within the last five years. (F)
11. I feel uncomfortable when I am the centre of attention (e.g. when crossing a dance floor).
12. I tend to keep in the background at social functions.
13. I have difficulty in starting a conversation.
14. I feel self-conscious when I have to present an idea in a discussion group.
15. I am usually active rather than passive in a discussion group. (F)
16. It makes me feel uncomfortable to put on a stunt at a party even when others are doing the same sort of thing.
17. I never take the lead to enliven a dull party.

18. I am more self-conscious than most people.
19. I enjoy telling stories or jokes at a party. (F)
20. I am troubled with feelings of inferiority.
21. I hesitate to enter a room by myself when a group of people are sitting around talking together.
22. I am talkative at social gatherings. (F)
23. If I came late to a meeting, I would rather stand than take a front seat.

Exh.

1. Sometimes when I am in a crowd, I say humorous things which I expect strangers will overhear.
2. I often dramatize a story which I am telling and demonstrate exactly how everything happened.
3. I talk rather freely about myself, even to casual friends.
4. When I am in a group, I try to increase the enjoyment of others by telling amusing stories.
5. I prefer to be looked at than not.
6. I like to have people watch me do the things which I do well.
7. I am apt to show off in some way if I get a chance.
8. I often take the lead in livening up a dull evening.
9. I do a thing sometimes just to watch the effect it will have upon other people.
10. I amuse others by playing the clown when the occasion warrants it.
11. I boast a bit about my achievements from time to time.
12. I feel pleasantly exhilarated when all eyes are upon me.
13. I do quite a bit of talking when I am in mixed company.
14. I act on the principle that a man will never get ahead if he does not blow his own horn from time to time.
15. I am rather successful at entertaining others.
16. I enjoy holding the floor or performing before a group - playing the piano, showing tricks, telling jokes, etc.
17. I am pleased if I am called upon for a story or a speech.
18. I often exaggerate my part in an event in order to make myself appear in a more interesting light.
19. I feel dissatisfied if I remain unnoticed.
20. I love to talk and it's hard for me to keep quiet.