

Profiling the ‘Triple Crusade’, c.1233-c.1241

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A thesis presented to the

History Faculty of Oxford University

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Supervisor: Professor Christopher Tyerman

2022

Word Count:

100,000 (excluding appendix)

120,922 (including appendix)

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Abstract as required for all Oxford DPhil theses

During the late 1230s, the Mediterranean saw crusades launched across its full breadth. From Muslim Valencia in the West, through Frankish Greece to the Holy Land, the Mediterranean saw redemptive war waged by Latin Christendom upon its neighbours, whether those neighbours be Muslims, as in Iberian or the Levant, or schismatics and heretics, as in the Balkans. Despite the success all three of these campaigns attained, they are often overlooked by crusade historians, perhaps due to the comparatively small sizes of the Greek and Outremer campaigns. This thesis contends all three campaigns warrant further investigation, both in order to reveal more about the campaigns themselves, and as exemplars from which to ground points of general resonance about crusading history. In undertaking this investigation, this thesis takes a broad approach to the expeditions using a wide range of sources, both chronicle and documentary, both Eastern and Western.

Tracing the expeditions thus from their inception in 1233 until their conclusion in 1241 achieves several distinct things. For one, given the special status of these three expeditions within the plethora of crusades called by Pope Gregory IX and the overlap in recruitment and participation witnessed between the three crusades, the connectivity between them is revealed. These were not simply coincidentally simultaneous events, but three equal parts of the same movement. That is why when approaching events, this thesis proposes the title “Triple Crusade”, replacing the heading of “Barons’ Crusade”. Secondly, taking a broad approach that includes oversight of all three campaigns allows fresh analysis of their preaching, financing and recruitment drives, advancing current knowledge on the subjects both in a specific and a general sense. Thirdly, taking a broad approach shows the actual expeditions took place within a much wider world than historians have previously allowed, with the influence of non-Latin agents key.

Abstract as required by the History Faculty

In many ways the Mediterranean Crusades initiated by Gregory IX in the 1230s to Valencia, the Latin Empire of Greece and the Holy Land are among the most undervalued expeditions in crusading history. Undervalued because these crusades unleashed conflict across the frontiers of Christendom, and yet traditionally, these expeditions have attracted scant historical attention, perhaps due to their comparatively small size when compared to the numbered crusades, the absence of large engagements or dramatic crises, and the apparent lack of charismatic or obviously complex figures. It is this gap in current historical literature that this thesis hopes to fill.

In achieving this aim, this thesis is divided into two overarching sections. The first, section A, explores the preparations made for these crusades from their calling in 1233/4, as without knowledge of such preparations, a full understanding of the campaigns is impossible. This undertaken, section B discusses the actual conduct of the expeditions. Throughout both halves, these investigations will be undertaken by presenting the preparations for, and the events of, the campaigns within a broad perspective which places them in the widest possible context. There are several reasons underpinning this decision. Firstly, taking this perspective, and reading the evidence accordingly suggests that the Mediterranean Crusades of the 1230s were more connected than has previously been understood. Although historians have viewed the expeditions to Greece and the Holy Land together under the heading ‘Barons’ Crusade’, (albeit with a heavy bias towards the Holy Land Crusade given its greater size, its more obvious success and the greater emotional cachet of crusading in Jerusalem vs Constantinople), they have studied the Valencian crusade only in the context of the Reconquista. In light both of the apparent papal conceptions of the expeditions and the popular responses to those appeals, this view appears untenable, and it appears that all three

Mediterranean crusades were understood as equal parts of the same crusading movement, which was itself distinct from the other crusades of the 1230s. This much is apparent both from the disconnect between the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s and the crusades elsewhere in Northern and Eastern Europe, and also the evidently 'special' status the Valencian crusade enjoyed compared to contemporary Iberian crusades. Consequently, this thesis proposes the new title of 'Triple Crusade' for these expeditions, that being a label which more accurately captures the nature of the campaigns, the 'Barons' Crusade' always being something of a flawed label given the presence of European monarchs in all three expeditions.

Secondly, taking a broad perspective upon these crusades allows much more interesting questions to be asked of them, in such a way as to draw points of broader relevance to the history of the crusades. Hence, the thesis contributes towards an understanding of the expeditions as specific historical events, and towards a general understanding of crusading history in the thirteenth century. For example, in the first substantive chapter of the thesis, the investigation into the preaching campaign, by questioning the novelty of Gregory IX's decision to entrust preaching to the mendicant orders, the thesis recasts the decision as one based upon previous practice, showing Gregory's decision to be grounded upon a principle of evolution, not revolution. This challenges previous historiographical opinion which sees this decision as among the most radical innovations of his papacy. Similarly, by reassessing why Gregory chose to turn to the mendicants when he did, by considering the advantages provided by the mendicant orders' institutional flexibility and malleability to the crusades, the threat posed to potential crusade preaching and the general decline of monasticism outside the new mendicant orders, this thesis intersects with wider debates, regarding Gregory IX himself, and thirteenth century religious life in general. Furthermore, by drawing in documentary evidence from the mendicant orders, the thesis is able to make tentative statements about who actually preached the cross in the 1230s. Something previously unattempted

due to the paucity of primary material, these contentions increase understanding of these crusades specifically, while also suggesting the importance of universities to thirteenth century intellectual life.

The advantage of taking a broad-based approach to the crusades is reinforced by the following chapter, which assesses the funding for the three expeditions. Thanks to the relatively abundant documentary evidence, in this section it is possible to identify continuities between the expeditions. For example, it is clear that royal support was present across the board. Not only does this raise the profile of these three expeditions, but it has ramifications for how far Louis IX, and Henry III in particular should be seen as crusade patrons, even when not *crucesignati* themselves. However, it is also possible to locate the balance between locally distinct facets of crusading and those aspects which were common across Europe. Whatever might be implied by "pluralist" historians, not all crusades were the same in all things, and historians should not be reticent to accept this fact. After all, a diversity in specifics does not invalidate the overarching historical category of 'crusading'. Furthermore, such differences are useful as they make it possible to draw inferences about the political processes going on in all of the main theatres of recruitment for the expeditions, allowing both comparison between the expeditions of the Triple Crusade, and the making of broader points. For example, the fact that the widespread secular taxation present in the Valencian crusade was not repeated in the Outremer and Greek crusades, combined with the extensive use of ecclesiastical taxation and vow redemption in the latter two campaigns but not in Aragon allows a tentative 'hierarchy' of funding methods to be generated, with Gregory IX perhaps envisioning ecclesiastical finance as a method of last resort, to be used where secular taxation was unavailable. Furthermore, if vow redemption could match the contributions usually made to warfare by secular taxation, then one has grounds to suggest that it was deeply effective, a conclusion that in the absence of numerical data has never been made before. Finally, the sheer variety of funding methods present

within these crusades, with older, more ‘traditional’ forms of revenue-raising such as loans from religious institutions enduing alongside more novel equivalents like vow redemption makes it possible to form conclusions about how crusade funding evolved, as well as the Triple Crusade’s specific place within this process.

If anything, the benefit of a broad-based approach to these crusades is even more evident in the final chapter of section A, the assessment of who took the cross in the 1230s. From the interconnectivity of the participants in the Triple Crusade, why this deserves to be seen as a distinct event in crusading history, as opposed merely to three expeditions which occurred coincidentally simultaneously, is most forcefully expressed. For example, that Italians, Germans, French and English crusaders participated in both the Holy Land and Valencian campaigns speaks volumes towards the reception of these movements being equal. Additionally, knowing who took the cross shows how international the response to Gregory’s call to arms was, undermining the perception of these expeditions as “minor” crusades, and highlighting the limitations of previous accounts of these expeditions, which for example fail to mention the existence of Welsh, or Southern French crusaders. Furthermore, by taking the wide view, it is possible to assess both the absolute and relative sizes of all three crusades. Based on the first, the idea that these expeditions were ‘minor’ crusades seems untenable, with the expeditions the largest crusade mobilisations between the Fifth Crusade and St Louis’s first expedition. Based on the second, and in particular the smaller size of the Greek crusade, interesting questions as to why this was so can be asked. Above all, this shines a light on the inadvertent role of Achaea and its links to the French heartlands of crusading, in limiting crusade recruitment for Greece. This established, the idea that Greece constituted an inherently inferior theatre of crusading comes under attack. Meanwhile, the sense of Greece as a smaller expedition sheds light on the importance of the perception of crisis in generating a successful crusade response. Finally, turning from an international to a national level, by

investigating the patterns of recruitment within the crusade's heartlands, it becomes possible to appreciate how the main bodies of men participating in each crusade were constructed, with chains of family, and lordship (whether royal, noble, civic or ecclesiastical) paramount.

In the three chapters which investigate successively the actual events of the three crusades themselves by contrast, the broad perspective taken on events works in a subtly different way. In all three cases, what happened on the expeditions in general is not seriously contested, but by taking a wider perspective which incorporates an oversight of the neighbours of the three "crusader states" being studied, a far fuller understanding of why the expeditions unfolded as they did is made possible. In the case of the Holy Land expedition, this has involved working with the Arabic sources for the expedition to trace developments within the Islamic world, and to most satisfyingly chart why the crusade (one of the strangest in crusading history due to the disconnect between its battlefield failure and its diplomatic success) unfolded in the way it did. For example, it is only through study of such material that the key role the Khwarazmians, both as an agent in their own right and as the basis of threats by al-Salih Ayyub, had upon the politics of Islamic Syria. Given such politics intimately affected the Levantine Crusade, by for example breaking the friendly relations between Egypt and Damascus, creating the situation in which, from a Damascene perspective, the Franks changed from being enemies to potentially useful allies, or explaining why the Templars might be so keen to reject the Egyptian alliance, to continue to study this expedition without full reference to events in the Islamic world is to accept only a partial picture of events. Similarly, it appears that events in the Arabian and Egyptian deserts exerted a powerful pull on events within Egypt in particular. The heartland of the thirteenth century Near East, and a central player in the politics of the crusade, this therefore presents influences upon the shape of that expedition as far wider than previously assumed. Given the opacity with which events are described

in the European sources, as well as the strictly limited horizons of these authors, such a full understanding would not otherwise be possible.

Similarly, at the other end of the Mediterranean, although the Arabic language sources are not as individually enlightening as their Levantine equivalents, with no contemporary sources extant, by studying such material as exists alongside the Christian sources for James of Aragon's crusade, it becomes possible to clarify and reassess various aspects of the expedition which have not fully been understood. For example, why specifically the campaign started when it did is hard to convincingly account for without knowledge of Muslim Valencia's isolation within al-Andalus and the wider North African world which presented James and Gregory with a unique opportunity to incorporate the kingdom into Aragon. Similarly, why the campaign successfully progressed first and foremost down the coast rather than systematically across a broad front, and why the campaign was defined by scorched earth warfare to the extent it was (something ostensibly illogical given the wealth of Valencia and the fact James stood to become ruler of these exact territories in the event of a Christian victory) are only fully explicable when incorporating a North African and Andalusian dimension to James of Aragon's strategic and tactical planning. In particular, given the isolation of Valencia with al-Andalus, the kingdom was dependent on North African aid. By undertaking a campaign of widespread devastation, such dependence was thus heightened, meaning that a severance of that aid, provoked by the conquest of the littoral would make a crusader victory much more likely, and at a lower cost in men and *matériel.* Likewise, the care taken by James to create a powerful navy, ready to fight at a moment's notice, something illogical given the nature of the crusade as dominated by land-based sieges, only makes sense if an eye permanently rested upon North Africa, and decisions made accordingly. In sum, taken together, these two chapters overwhelmingly suggest that crusading did not occur in a vacuum, cut off from the crusaders'

Arabic-speaking neighbours. In this light, so should crusade scholarship never fail to value the evidence and potential for advances that Arabic sources can bring.

Regarding the Greek crusade, while obviously the neighbours to the Latin Empire did not speak Arabic, nor leave such extensive records behind them, their actions in terms of shaping the course of events were similarly pronounced. For instance, the role of the Cuman nomads and their alliance to the Latin Empire appears to have been decisive both in the outcome of the whole campaign itself, and in determining why events unfolded as they did. Not least, assigning a greater agency to the Cumans than has previously been done fully explains Asen II's decision to forsake his Nicaean alliance and permit the crusaders to pass through his lands as well as accounting for the apparent overreaction by Vatazes to the arriving crusader force. Likewise, giving agency to the Cumans makes it possible to account for the success of the undeniably small crusader force in the 1240 siege of Tzurulum, exactly where a larger Latin force had failed in 1237. By the same token, the influence of Frederick II and the Italian Wars upon the campaign appears pronounced. Beyond the current presentation of Frederick as ambivalent towards the Greek crusades, due to the Latin Empire representing a rival to an imperial title, and John of Brienne being a close associate of Gregory IX, he actively worked against the Greek branch of the Triple Crusade, because of the way it threatened to overturn the situation in Northern Italy, hence his obstruction of the expedition led by John of Béthune. Similarly, why Baldwin II made the decisions he did when he departed Melun at the head of his army, and why he chose the overland route despite the existence of a shorter, cheaper sea passage to Greece is best explained as a reaction to Frederick's actions in 1237. In this case, Frederick has long been perceived as a historical agent of the first rank, but his influence over the crusade in the 1230s to Greece has yet to be fully grasped, demonstrating why a broad scale approach to the expeditions is essential.

In sum, the world of the ‘Triple Crusade’ was far wider than has previously been understood, with more processes and actors involved than the expeditions are traditionally given credit for. Only by assessing the events, both in the lead up to and during the actual expeditions, in the broadest sense is such an understanding possible. In this way, not only will the events of these intriguing campaigns be better understood, but questions of broader importance can be asked, and potential pathways for future research be revealed, so fulfilling the ideal purpose of any monograph.

Acknowledgements

As anyone who has ever written a doctoral thesis or book will know, the process of working from initial idea through to completion is a long and arduous road. In the case of this thesis, measuring from the moment when I first had the idea to write on the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s as the topic of my MA dissertation in autumn 2017, it has been nearly five years, or put another way, a greater period of time than elapsed between Gregory IX announcing a crusade to Greece and the completion of that crusade with the capture of Tzurulum. During that time, I have had the good fortune to meet, and discuss my work with many brilliant and inspirational individuals, all of whom have helped to mould the final shape of this thesis. I shall try to thank them here.

Firstly, my thanks must go to the inspirational teaching I received in Oxford as an undergraduate, which has shaped my outlook as a historian. Particular thanks must go to Rowena Archer, who first taught me about the madcap but exciting world of the Crusades, and who instilled an enthusiasm in me for the subject that has never faded.

Similarly, I am grateful for the teaching I received in my MA year at KCL, during which time the groundwork for this project started to take shape. Through many fascinating conversations about thirteenth century Europe, both in college and in the Knights Templar pub with David Carpenter, the exciting world of the thirteenth century was brought to life. Similarly, Vicky Manolopoulou deserves much thanks as my MA dissertation supervisor on the ‘Barons’ Crusade’.

Returning to Oxford for the DPhil, I could not have been in better hands. Throughout my time here Hannah Skoda has been a constant source of support and advice in her capacity as my college

advisor. In every regard, Christopher Tyerman has been to my eyes the model DPhil supervisor. From my first arrival in his college room, he has been a supportive and encouraging supervisor, yet never without holding me to the highest standards of academic rigour, even through all the disruptions and uncertainty that come with being a researcher in the Covid-19 world. It goes without saying that without his exceptionally generous gifts of his time, effort and brain, this thesis would not be possible.

Away from the classroom, I have been lucky enough to share in the company of so many wonderful people who have brought me happiness, comforted me, and made sure I never made the mistake of ever taking myself too seriously. To Matthew Ford, Sally Hayward, Jennifer Lord, Robyndra Allen, Alexandros Wilkinson, Sam Lane, Peter Sutton and many others, I owe more than I can ever say.

At every stage, my family have been my strength and stay. Not once have they ever questioned my strange decision to throw myself into the medieval, rather than real world, and on the contrary, have fully thrown their weight behind helping to make my academic aspirations a reality. I hope this will be ample compensation for putting up with years of one-sided conversation from me about knights, castles, crusaders and muslim princes.

Finally, I must thank Elenor Vockins, without whose love and support I may never have got this thesis over the line. I can't imagine a better person to have been sat opposite in the Bodleian as I submitted this thesis, nor anyone whom I could feel happier to see immediately following my Viva. While I know her own musical and linguistic genius will take her to places far greater than Oxford, I hope she will be able to find a space on her bookshelf for this thesis, as I dedicate it to her.


Maps



Map 1: The Crusader States in the period of the Triple Crusade



Map 2: The Conquest of Valencia



Map 3: The Latin Empire and its neighbours during the Triple Crusade

List of Abbreviations

Abu al-Fida	Abu al-Fida, *Kitab taqwīn al-buldān*, ed. J. Reinaud and W. MacGuckin, baron de Slade (Paris, 1840).
AfL	H. Denifle and F. Ehrle (eds.), *Archiv für Litteratur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* (7 vols., Berlin, 1885-1900), i.
Akropolites	George Akropolites, *Opera* ed. A. Heisenberg (2 vols., Leipzig, 1903), i.
al-‘Adim	Ibn al-‘Adim, *Zubdat al-Halab min ta’rikh Halab*, ed. S. Dahan (3 vols. Damascus, 1951-1968), iii.
al-‘Amid	Bodleian Library MS Bodl. Or. 316 (*al-Majmu` al-Mubarak*).
Alberic	‘Chronica Albrici Monachi Trium Fontium’, ed. P. Scheffer-Boichorst, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores* (39 vols., Hanover, 1826-2009), xxiii, pp. 631-950.
al-Himyari	al-Himyari, *La péninsule Ibérique au moyen-âge d'après le Kitāb al-Rawḍ al miʿṭār fī ḫabar al-aḳṭār d’Ibn ʿAbd al Munʿim al-Ḥimyarī*, ed. and trans E. Levi-Provençal (Leiden, 1938).
al-Khatib	Ibn al-Khatib, *Histoire de l'Espagne Musulmane (Kitab A’mal al-A’lam)*, ed. E. Levi-Provençal (Beirut, 1956).
al-Maqqari	al-Maqqari, *Analectes sur l'histoire et la littérature des Arabes d’Espagne* ed. M. Dozy *et al.* (2 vols., Leiden, 1855-61), ii.
al-Maqrizi	*Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma‘rifat Duwal al-Mulūk*, ed. M. Ziada (4 vols., Cairo, 1934), i.
al-Nuwayri	al-Nuwayri, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, ed. S. Ashour (31 vols., Cairo, 1923).
al-Zarkashi	Ibn Ibrahim al-Zarkashi, *Tārīkh al-dawlatayn al-Muwaḥḥidīyah wa-al-Ḥafṣīyah*, ed. M. Madur (Tunis, 1966).

Berend	N. Berend, *At the Gates of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary c.1000-c.1300* (Cambridge, 2001).
Bishko	C. Bishko, 'The Spanish and Portuguese Reconquest, 1095-1492' in K. Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), iii, pp. 396-456.
BF	*Bullarium Franciscanum Romanorum Pontificum*, ed. J. H. Sbaralea (4 vols., Rome, 1759-68), i.
BP	*Bullarium Ordinis ff. Praedicatorum*, ed. T. Ripoll and A. Bremen (8 vols., Rome 1729-40), i.
Bryce	W. Bryce, *The Scottish Grey Friars* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1909), i.
Cazel	F. Cazel Jr., 'Financing the Crusades' in Kenneth Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), vi, pp. 116-49.
CFR	*Calendar of the Fine Rolls of the Reign of Henry III preserved in The National Archives*, ed. P. Dryburgh and B. Hartland (3 vols., London and Woodbridge, 2007-), …
CLR	*Calendar of the Liberate Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office: Henry III*, (6 vols., London, 1916-64).
Cluny	*Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Cluny*, ed. A. Bernard and A. Brunel (6 vols., Paris, 1876-1903), vi.
CM	Matthew Paris, *Chronica Maiora* ed. H. R. Luard, (7 vols., London, 1872-83).
CPR	*Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1232-1307*, (8 vols., London, 1898-1908), iii.
CR	*Close Rolls of the Reign of Henry III Preserved in the Public Record Office, 1227-72*, (14 vols., London, 1902-38).
CRR	*Curia Regis Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Richard I-1250*, (20 vols., London, 1922-2006).

Desclot	*Crónica de Bernat Desclot*, ed. M. Coll i Alentorn (5 vols., Barcelona, 1949-51), ii.
DJI	*Documentos de Jaime I de Aragon*, ed. C. Pecourt, M. Desamparados and A. Huici Miranda (5 vols., Valencia, 1976-88).
Du Cange	C. Du Cange, *Histoire de l'empire de Constantinople sous les empereurs français jusqu'à la conquête des Turcs*, nouv. edn. (2 vols., Paris, 1826), i.
ES	*Epistolae Saeculi XIII e Regestis Pontificum Romanorum, selectae per G. H. Pertz*, ed. C. Rodenberg *et al.* (3 vols., Berlin,
Gaztambide	J. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la Bula de la Cruzada en España* (Vitoria, 1958).
Giebfried	J. Giebfried, 'The Imagined Empire of Baldwin II, the Last Crusader Emperor of Constantinople (1217-1273)' (Univ. of St Louis Ph.D. thesis, 2015).
Gilles	E. Gilles, '"Nova Francia"?: Kinship and identity among the Frankish aristocracy in conquered Byzantium, 1204–1282 Volume 1' (Princetown Univ. PhD. thesis, 2010).
HdDB	*Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la race capétienne*, ed. E. Petit (9 vols., Paris, 1885-1905).
HdDC	*Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne*, ed. H. d'Artois de Jubainville (7 vols., Paris and Troyes, 1859-69).
HPEC	*History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church: Known as the History of the Holy Church*, ed. and trans. A. Khater and O. Khs-Burmester (4 vols., Cairo, 1974).
Humphreys	R. Stephen Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols. The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260* (Albany, 1977).
Ibn Duqmaq	Ibn Duqmaq, *Nuzhat al-anām fī tārīkh al-Islām, 628 H/1230 M-659 H/1261 M*, ed. S. Ṭabbārah (Sidon, 1999).

Ibn ‘Idhari	Ibn ‘Idhari, *Kitāb al-bayān al-mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa-al-Maghrib*, ed. B. Marouf and M. Awad (4 vols., Tunis, 2013), iii.
Ibn Khaldun	Ibn Khaldun, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar* (7 vols., Cairo, 1867).
Ibn Wasil	Ibn Wasil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār banī Ayyūb*, ed. G. Shayyāl *et al.* (5 vols., Cairo, 1953-77), v.
‘Itinera’	‘Itinera, Dona et Hernesia AD M.CC.XXXIX, inter Ascensionem et Omnes Sanctos’ in *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de La France*, ed. M. Bouquet et al. nouvelle édition (24 vols., Paris, 1840-1904), xxii, pp. 583-615.
Jackson	P. Jackson, ‘The Crusades of 1239-41 and Their Aftermath’, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 50 (1987), pp. 32-62.
Joinville	N. de Wailly (ed.), *Histoire de Saint-Louis: texte original, ramené à l'orthographe des chartes, précédé de notions sur la langue et la grammaire de Joinville* (Paris, 1883).
Layettes	*Layettes du Trésor des Chartes*, ed. A. Teulet *et al.* (5 vols., Paris, 1863-1909), ii.
LdF	*Llibre dels Fets del rei en Jaume*, ed. J. Bruguera (2 vols., Barcelona, 1991), ii.
LdR	*Llibre del Repartiment del Regne de Valencia*, ed. M. Desamparados, C. Pecourt and R. Ferrer Navarro (3 vols., Zaragoza, 1979-80).
LGdC	*Les Gestes des Chiprois: Recueil de chroniques françaises écrites en Orient aux XIII^{e} et XIV^{e} Siècles*, ed. G. Raynaud (Geneva,
Lloyd	S. Lloyd, *English Society and the Crusade* (Oxford, 1988).
Lock	P. Lock, *The Franks in the Aegean 1204-1500* (Harlow, 1995).
Longnon	J. Longnon, *L’empire Latin de Constantinople et la principauté de Morée* (Paris, 1949).

Lower	M. Lower, *The Barons' Crusade: A Call to Arms and its Consequences* (Philadelphia, 2005).
Maier	C. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant friars and the Cross in the thirteenth century* (Cambridge, 1994).
MGH-SS	*Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores* (39 vols., Hannover, 1826-2009).
HFO	J. Moorman, *A History of the Franciscan Order from its Origins to the Year 1517* (Oxford, 1968).
Morea	J. Longnon (ed.), *Livre de la Conqueste de la Princée de l'Amorée* (Paris, 1911).
Mouskes	*Chronique rimée de Philippe Mouskes*, ed. F. Reiffenburg (2 vols., Brussels, 1836-8), ii.
Muntaner	*Crónica d'en Ramon Muntaner*, ed. J. Coroleu (Barcelona, 1886).
O'Callaghan	J. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia, 2003).
Painter	S. Painter, 'The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall', in K. Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, pp. 463-85.
Powell	J. Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade 1213-1221* (Philadelphia, 1986).
Registres	*Les registres de Grégoire IX. Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d'après les manuscrits originaux du Vatican*, ed. L. Auvray (4 vols., Paris,
RHC-Oc	*Recueil des Historiens des Croisades-Historiens Occidentaux* (5 vols., Paris, 1844-95).
RHGF	*Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de La France*, ed. M. Bouquet et al. nouvelle édition (24 vols., Paris, 1840-1904).
Saphet	*De constructione castri Saphet*, ed. R. Huygens (Amsterdam, 1981).

Sibt	Sibt Ibn al-Jawsī, *Mir'āt al-zaman fi ta'rikh al-ā'yān*, ed. H. Ābād al-Dakn (2 vols., Hyderabad, 1951-2), ii.
Tyerman, *EaC*	C. Tyerman, *England and the Crusades* (Chicago, 1988).
Tyerman, *HPC*	C. Tyerman, *How to Plan a Crusade: Reason and Religious War in the High Middle Ages* (London, 2015).
Vásáry	I. Vásáry, *Cumans and Tartars: Oriental Military in the Pre-Ottoman Balkans 1185-1365* (Cambridge, 2005).
Wolff	R. Wolff, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204-61' in K. Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, pp. 187-233.
Zurita	J. Zurita, *Anales de la Corona de Aragón*, ed. A. Canalles López (9 vols., Zaragoza, 1967-86), i.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Of all the various labels given to the Crusades, whether named according to leader, location, date, numerical place in a succession of massive, exceptional expeditions, or by the happenstance of historiography, few are as unhelpful as the label "the Barons' Crusade" for the crusades of the 1230s. First used by an anonymous fourteenth century author to identify the Holy Land crusade of 1239-41, the label has come to be used as a catch-all term for the crusading expeditions resulting from the November 1234 papal bull *Rachel Suum Videns*.[1] Summoned in anticipation of the expiry in 1239 of the 1229 truce negotiated in Outremer by Frederick II, thereby allowing for the longest build-up of any crusade, this appeal supposedly failed to capture the imagination of contemporary Europe on a grand scale, perhaps due to the absence of perceived immediate crisis, the failure of Europe's leading monarchs to personally participate in the expeditions, and Frederick II's excommunication in 1239, which reignited his conflict with the papacy.[2] Consequently, instead of creating a great international host, akin to the numbered crusades, the appeal instead provoked several small, independently-conducted expeditions centred largely on England and France. The former involved expeditions led by Richard of Cornwall, Simon de Montfort and William of Forz, while the latter was nominally led by Thibaut, Count of Champagne and King of Navarre, although his leadership was initially contested.[3] Nevertheless, despite this inauspicious start and the disunity exhibited by the crusade's commanders in the Levant, the expedition was successful, effectively engaging with the Islamic world through diplomacy, despite battlefield failure at Gaza in November

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[1] *LGdC*, p. 118. For *Rachel Suum Videns* see *ES*, pp. 491–5. Translated in J. Bird, E. Peters and J. Powell (eds.), *Crusade and Christendom: Annotated Documents in Translation from Innocent III to the Siege of Acre, 1187-1291* (Philadelphia, 2013), pp. 270-5.
[2] For 1229 agreement see F. Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades* trans. E. Costello (Berkeley, 1984), pp. 269-70.
[3] For the disputed leadership of the French crusade see *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 538-9.

1239.[4] Consequently, the Kingdom of Jerusalem reached its largest territorial extent since 1187, although the gains would prove short-lived, with the disastrous Latin-Damascene defeat at La Forbie, October 1244 at the hands of an Egyptian-Khwarazmians force undoing all the progress achieved since the Third Crusade.[5]

Alongside this Levantine crusade, the label "Barons' Crusade" has come to encompass the expedition to Frankish Greece, called in parallel to the Levantine expedition by Pope Gregory IX from December 1235.[6] The subject of controversial efforts by Gregory to persuade people to take crusading vows for Greece, instead of the Holy Land, this crusade too failed to generate a huge response, with many *crucesignati* refusing to commute their vows, even when placed under significant papal pressure.[7] The result was an expedition even smaller than those in the Levant.[8] However, despite its small size, this campaign too was successful, as crusader forces led by Baldwin II, Latin Emperor of Constantinople, succeeded in capturing the strategically-important fortress of Tzurulum in 1240, consolidating the Latin Empire for the immediate future, despite some territorial losses in Asia Minor, principally the towns of Dakivya and Nikitiaton.[9]

Numerous criticisms can be levelled at the label "Barons' Crusade", and its currently interpretation, but among its most significant downfalls is its diminishing effect upon the expeditions it encompasses. The "Barons' Crusade" is already unappealing to historians, given its small size compared to the numbered crusades, the absence of significant engagements, the lack of

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[4] Lower, pp. 158-77, Painter, pp. 463-85.
[5] See e.g. S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades, Volume 3: The Kingdom of Acre* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 224-9, C. Tyerman, *God's War: A New History of the Crusades* (London, 2006), pp. 770-1, Jackson, pp. 48-60.
[6] *Registres*, ii, nos. 2872-8.
[7] E.g. Thibaut of Champagne and Peter of Brittany, for which see Lower, pp. 93-148.
[8] Alberic, pp. 946-8.
[9] Lower, pp. 149-57, Wolff, p. 222, N. Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece: A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204-1282* (Turnhout, 2012), pp. 99-126.

charismatic or complex figures such Tancred of Lecce, *Coeur-De-Lion* or St Louis, and the weirdness of the affair, following the mismatch between the expeditions' territorial successes and the disappointing recruitment drive and tactical performance. However, its label compounds these issues, by explicitly advertising the non-participation of the great monarchs of Europe in the expeditions, emphasising their apparent unimportance. This is particularly marked given they sit between Frederick II's crusade, 1227-9, and St Louis's first crusade, 1244-50, fascinating figures indisputably of the first historical rank, who therefore command attention.[10] The unsurprising result is the low profile possessed by the 1230s crusades in current historiography, thereby creating a gap for a detailed analysis of the creation, composition and conduct of the expeditions. This is the gap this thesis proposes to fill, by taking a broad approach which illuminates the expeditions from many different angles, thereby allowing the fullest understanding possible.

Indeed, beginning with the Levantine crusade, besides general histories of the Crusades, which generally treat the expedition very briefly, if at all, only five published works take the expeditions as their sole focus.[11] None of these aim to give a detailed explanation of the mechanisms behind the expedition, both in terms of preparation and execution, as this thesis proposes. Of these, the oldest is the article by Röhricht.[12] Based solely on the principal western chronicles, while obviously limited by only considering one subset of the existing evidence, this article established a basic framework for understanding the crusade, and remains the fundamental underpinning of all

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[10] E.g. R. Bressler, *Frederick II: Wonder of the World* (Yardley, 2010), D. Abulafia, *Frederick II: A Medieval Emperor* (London, 1988), J. Le Goff, *Saint Louis* (Paris, 1996), W. Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership* (Princetown, 1979).

[11] E.g. A. Jotischky, *Crusading and the Crusader States* (Harlow, 2004), p. 230, T. Asbridge, *The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land* (London, 2010), p. 573, H. Mayer, *The Crusades* trans. J. Gillingham (Oxford, 1972), pp. 248-9 skim briefly over the "Barons' Crusade", while *inter alia* P. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517* (Harlow, 1986), J. Riley-Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades* (Oxford, 1995) overlook it entirely.

[12] R. Röhricht, 'Die Kreuzzüge der Grafen Theobald von Navarra und Richard von Cornwallis nach dem Heiligen Lande', *Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte*, 26 (1886), pp. 67-102.

subsequent scholarship. Nowhere demonstrates this better than the second work, Painter's chapter in Setton's *History of the Crusades*.[13] Developing Röhricht, whom he specifically acknowledged, Painter enumerated the expedition's background, and attempted to establish a chronological narrative for the expedition, using Western European and Levantine Frankish chronicles. However, such a source base is problematic. By using almost exclusively Latin sources, the sole exception being Blochet's unreliable French translation of the Mamluk historian al-Maqrizi, the work has a somewhat lopsided feel, with many of the most important parts of the crusade, like Richard of Cornwall's negotiations with Egypt, only briefly touched upon, being opaque in the chosen source base.[14] To a degree, these issues were addressed in the next work, Jackson's 1980 article.[15] Based on a close re-analysis of the primary sources, including extensive use of Arabic material for the first time, Jackson endeavoured to re-date and clarify the more unclear aspects of Painter's article.[16] In this he was largely successful, convincingly reframing the 1240-1 negotiations between the Franks and Damascus, and proposing the more logical start date of September 1239, rather than early 1240, for the discussions with Hama.[17] Indeed, nothing shows Jackson's success more than the fourth piece on the "Barons' Crusade", the chapter by Balard.[18] Focused exclusively on the French branch of the crusade, meaning the wider context was neglected (including the English expeditions), in this Balard essentially repeated Jackson's findings, with only small caveats occasionally raised. Yet Jackson's work is still fundamentally focused on fixing the expedition's chronology, rather than in-depth analysis of the expedition itself, meaning numerous angles remained undeveloped. However, the only such angle hitherto pursued is the papalist angle taken up by Lower in his book, which

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[13] Painter.
[14] *Histoire d'Égypte de Makrizi,* ed. and trans. E. Blochet (Paris, 1908), Painter, pp. 484-5.
[15] Jackson.
[16] *Ibid.* pp. 33-5.
[17] *Ibid.* pp. 40, 43.
[18] M. Balard, 'La Croisade de Thibaud IV de Champagne (1239-40)', in Y. Bellenger and D. Quéruel (eds.), *Les Champenois et la croisade*, (Paris, 1989), pp. 85-95.

remains the "final word" on the crusade.[19] Working explicitly off the innovative parts of *Rachel Suum Videns* which theoretically made crusading universal through vow redemptions, Lower used the appeal to assess how far Gregory IX succeeded in creating a unified Christendom, centred on the papacy. To that end, he undertook what he labelled 'comparative local history', investigating the repercussions of Gregory's calls to arms, for prospective *crucesignati* and for ethnic and social minorities in Hungary, Champagne, Brittany and England.[20] An understandable approach given the book's objectives, and the fact it grew out of his papally-orientated Ph.D. thesis, the close focus on the expedition itself present in the previous works was therefore lost, creating an opportunity for future research.[21] Indeed, his description of the Levantine crusade essentially synthesises Painter and Jackson's works and their sources.[22]

The historiography of the Greek branch of the "Barons' Crusade" is thinner still. Even more than the Levantine crusade, the Greek crusade is conventionally quickly passed over by general histories of the Crusades, due to its size and, and apparently secondary importance.[23] Consequently, most accounts of the expedition are brief statements of the events found in works giving general accounts of the Latin Empire, 1204-1261, which restrict the expedition's profile, and divorce it from its wider, non-Greek context.[24] Moreover, like the Levantine crusade, the only avenue onto the Greek crusade explored in depth is the papal one, which has almost become divorced from discussion of the expedition's military performance. First broached by Spense in his 1979 article, in this he evaluated Gregory IX's various attempts to elicit crusading fervour for an expedition to Latin

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[19] Lower, *passim*.
[20] *Ibid.* pp. 10, 74-148.
[21] M. Lower, 'Papal Authority and the 'Barons' Crusade' of 1239' (Cambridge Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1999).
[22] Lower, pp. 158-77.
[23] E.g. J. Phillips, *Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades* (London, 2009), p. 238, J. France, *The Crusades and the expansion of Latin Christendom: 1000-1714* (Abingdon, 2005), p. 191, J. Richard, *The Crusades c.1071-c.1291* trans J. Birrell (Cambridge, 1999), p. 320.
[24] E.g. Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 120-6, Wolff, pp. 221-2, Longnon, pp. 178-83.

Greece, by presenting its enemies, whether Bulgarian or Byzantine, as heretics and schismatics successively.[25] Hence, the actual crusade is of secondary importance, and indeed was not mentioned. Lower developed this approach further. Discussing Gregory IX's intentions for a crusade to the Latin Empire in the context of negotiations with Bela IV of Hungary, Lower explored the ramifications of the crusading appeal for minorities in Hungary, work which underpinned the Hungarian chapter of his book.[26] Thus although in this latter work, he included the fullest discussion of the expedition proper in English, and certainly the fullest discussion which acknowledges the campaign as part of a wider crusading movement, the papal angle was maintained.[27] Such an approach has continued to hold sway following the publication of Lower's book, indicating how far it dominates current historiographic understanding of these crusades. One sees this for example in the *oeuvre* of Chrissis pertaining to the expedition. In his 2010 article, he directly engaged with Lower's work, reassessing papal correspondence to demonstrate Lower overstated how far Gregory intended to "divert" the Holy Land crusade to Greece, and that instead he always planned two parallel expeditions.[28] Given this article's scope, the actual expedition itself therefore drifts out of focus. Furthermore, this approach was maintained in his recent work, and as his investigations have broadened beyond the "Barons' Crusade" to look at attitudes towards crusading in Greece as a whole, the papal angle has remained pre-eminent.[29] This is particularly

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[25] R. Spense, 'Gregory IX's attempted expeditions to the Latin Empire of Constantinople', *Journal of Medieval History*, 5 (4), (December, 1979), pp. 163-79.
[26] M. Lower, 'Negotiating Interfaith Relations in Eastern Christendom: Pope Gregory IX, Bela IV of Hungary, and the Latin Empire', *Essays in Medieval Studies*, 21 (2004), pp. 49-62, Idem, *The Barons' Crusade*, pp. 74-92.
[27] Lower, pp. 149-57.
[28] N. Chrissis, 'A diversion that never was: Thibaut IV of Champagne, Richard of Cornwall and Gregory IX's crusading plans for Constantinople, 1235-1239', *Crusades*, 9 (2010), pp. 123-45. A. Forey, 'The Papacy and the commutation of crusading vows from one area of conflict to another (1095-c.1300)', *Traditio*, 73 (2018), pp. 65-6 repeats this point.
[29] E.g. N. Chrissis, 'New Frontiers in Frankish Greece and the development of crusading in the early 13th century' in N. Chrissis and M. Carr (eds.), *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204-1453: Crusade, Religion and Trade between Latins, Greeks and Turks* (Farnham, 2014), pp. 17-41 and Idem, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*.

evident in *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, where he discusses above all the nature of the papal call to arms, rather than the detail of the expedition itself, whether its course, recruitment or financing.[30] Indeed, his discussion of the actual campaign comprises one short paragraph. Therefore, following this development of the papalist angle alone, to the detriment of the expedition proper, there is a real gap in the historiography for a detailed investigation of the make-up, financing and conduct of the expedition, particularly in its wider, pan-Mediterranean context, as this thesis proposes.

Yet the biggest problem with the label "Barons' Crusade" is not the inherent reduction in status it gives to the expeditions it describes, but the fact it limits the scope of investigations into the crusades of the 1230s, with an excessive focus on the Levantine crusade. This stems from label's origins; the source that first uses the name, *Les Gestes des Chiprois*, discusses the Levantine crusade alone.[31] In this light, small wonder the Levantine expedition is the most-studied of the expeditions of the 1230s, with the surprise being that the label is elastic enough to incorporate the Greek crusade. However, by taking a broad approach to the crusades of the 1230s, it becomes clear that the Mediterranean crusades initiated by Gregory IX in the 1230s surpassed these two, and featured a third branch in Eastern Iberia, which saw Ibiza captured in 1235 and then Valencia, the expedition's stated aim, in September/October 1238.[32] First called in August 1233, with recruitment occurring over several years alongside the Middle Eastern and Greek crusades, this expedition must be considered a crusade of equal status. The debate on what specifically constitutes a "crusade" is well-worn and essentially insoluble given the word is a modern invention, but there is no reason to

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[30] Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 99-133.
[31] *LGdC*, pp. 118-24.
[32] For general accounts see e.g. O'Callaghan, pp. 99-105, Idem, *A History of Medieval Spain* (Ithaca and London, 1975), pp. 345-7, D. Lomax, *The Reconquest of Spain* (London, 1978), p. 148, B. Reilly, *The Medieval Spains* (Cambridge, 1993), p. 138 or H. Chaytor, *A History of Aragon and Catalonia* (London, 1933), pp. 85-7.

deny this expedition full crusading status.[33] The sources often mention indulgences equal to those of the Holy Land for campaigning in Valencia, while all the machinery associated with crusading, including the taking of vows, and the assumption of the sign of the cross by participants are present in the campaign. Gregory IX's correspondence illustrates this point well. For example, in a letter written May 1237 instructing the citizens of Marseilles to cease resisting the Count of Toulouse, Gregory stated that James of Aragon assumed the sign of the cross for Valencia, indicating its status as a genuine crusade, backed by explicit papal approval.[34] Similarly in his August 1233 letter to the Archbishops of Bordeaux and Auch ordering recruitment for the Valencian crusade to begin, he affirmed that service there merited the same indulgence of sins granted to those aiding the Holy Land.[35] Moreover, he described how indulgences could be granted for the redemption of Iberian crusading vows for money, just as he enumerated at length in *Rachel Suum Videns*.[36] Moreover, medieval historians repeatedly emphasised the "crusading" dimension to Valencia's conquest. For example, describing the speech given by Guillem d'Aguiló prior to the battle of El Puig, August 1237, the later thirteenth century Catalan historian Bernat Desclot explicitly framed the war against Valencia as a Holy War, fought for the cross.[37] Developing such ideas, the fourteenth century *Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña* ascribed the Christian victory at El Puig to divine inspiration, through the apparition of St George at the head of an army of celestial knights.[38] That this so closely echoes the description of the famous crusader victory on 28 June 1098 outside Antioch on the First Crusade as given by Raymond of Aguilers and the *Gesta Francorum* surely is no accident.[39]

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[33] For a summary of the debate over the label "crusade" see G. Constable, 'The Historiography of the Crusades' in A. Laiou and R. Parviz Mottahedeh (eds.), *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World* (Washington, 2001), pp. 1-22.
[34] *Layettes*, no. 2514.
[35] *Registres*, i, no 1490-1.
[36] *Ibid*, ii, no. 3488.
[37] Desclot, pp. 141-2.
[38] *Crónica de San Juan de la Peña*, ed. A. Ubieto Arteta (Valencia, 1961), p. 154.
[39] Raymond of Aguilers, *Le 'Liber' de Raymond d'Aguilers*, ed. J. Hill and L. Hill (Paris, 1969), p. 82, *RHC-Oc*, iii, p. 151.

Likewise, it is no coincidence that when describing James on his deathbed, the *Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña* had him singing "Veni Creator Spiritus", a hymn specifically associated with the crusades.[40] On such grounds, the Iberian crusade must be considered an equal part of the 1230s crusades alongside the Greek and Levantine expeditions; all three were equals, both in the eyes of papal law and in contemporary perception, contemporaneous, and international in participation. This thesis acknowledges this reality, and when assessing the crusades of the 1230s, grants an equal part to the Iberian crusade.

This acknowledgement of the parity of the Iberian crusade with its Greek and Levantine counterparts and the acceptance that all are equal parts of the same crusading movement is, however, unprecedented. Despite the coverage given by historians to the Levantine and Greek expeditions, no account mentions the Valencian crusade alongside them. This failure of historians to appreciate the full breadth of the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s is also mirrored in the literature on the Valencian crusade. Unlike the Levantine expedition, there is no monograph of the campaign, in contrast to the extensive scholarship on the period following Valencia's conquest spearheaded by Robert Burns.[41] Therefore all accounts of the expedition necessarily broach it as part of broader investigations. Yet none of these acknowledge Gregory's appeals as the immediate context. On the contrary, whenever these works do acknowledge parallel crusades, they are presented as a firm "other", with ramifications in Iberia, due to the attempted recruitment there, and the participation of Thibaut of Navarre, but always fundamentally different.[42]

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[40] *Crónica de San Juan de la Peña*, ed. Arteta, p. 157. For the hymn being sung across the crusades, see e.g. Joinville, p. 54.
[41] R. Burns, *The Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Reconstruction on a Thirteenth Century Frontier* (2 vols., Cambridge Massachusetts, 1967), Idem, *Islam under the Crusaders: Colonial Survival in the Thirteenth-Century Kingdom of Valencia* (Princetown, 1973), Idem, *Medieval Colonialism: Postcrusade Exploitation of Islamic Valencia* (Princetown, 1975) and Idem, *Muslims, Christians and Jews in the Crusader Kingdom of Valencia: Societies in Symbiosis* (Cambridge, 1984).
[42] O'Callaghan, pp. 101-2, calls the Levantine crusade a 'distraction'. Gaztambide, pp. 170-8 separates discussion of Thibaut of Navarre's crusade from the Valencian campaign.

Such marginalisation of the Valencian crusade is moreover unjustified when considering the special place the expedition held *vis-à-vis* the Holy Land and Greek expeditions amongst the crusades Gregory IX unleashed during the 1230s: rather than just being coincidentally coexisting crusades, there is a firm case that the Mediterranean crusades constituted a distinct "set" of events. Firmly dedicated to crusading, over his papacy Gregory called an unprecedented number of crusades, with the 1230s representing a zenith, with crusades summoned against Baltic pagans, Bosnian heretics, and perceived heretics in the Empire, alongside the Mediterranean expeditions. Given the defining characteristics of crusading, such as the granting of a Holy Land indulgence or the potential for vow redemption, were often applied to these other crusades, it is difficult to deny them full crusading status, despite their prosecution being generally more tentative and halting than that of the Mediterranean crusades.[43] After all, Conrad of Marburg was authorised in June and October 1233 to grant full Holy Land indulgences for those taking the cross against heretics, while in July 1231 those *crucesignati* for the Baltic who were too infirm to fulfil their vows in person were permitted to redeem them for money.[44]

However, in contrast to these crusades elsewhere in Europe, the Mediterranean crusades represents a distinctive and separate sphere of crusading, which should be recognised in accounts of the expeditions. That the Mediterranean crusades were a distinct set is demonstrable on several levels. Firstly, it is apparent in the expeditions' overlapping spheres of recruitment, something not shared with the other crusades. For instance, it is possible to identify participants in the Valencian crusade from England, France, the Empire, Italy and Hungary, all countries where the crusades to

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[43] R. Rist, *The Papacy and Crusading in Europe, 1198-1245* (London, 2009), pp. 125-58.
[44] E.g. *ES*, nos. 533, 561. *Preussisches Urkundenbuch, Politische Abteilung*, ed. A. Seraphim *et al.* (6 vols., 1882-1986), i part i, no. 85.

the Holy Land and the Latin Empire were preached.[45] Conversely, there is evidence that Gregory IX tried to rally support for the Holy Land crusade in Iberia, most noticeably his letters of 27 November 1234 and 2 January 1239. In the first, addressed to the monarchs and bishops of Spain, he declared those giving three months' service to Frederick II in the Holy Land would receive a crusading indulgence.[46] In the second, he encouraged Iberia's prelates to support the cause of the Holy Land.[47] Taken together, this evidence suggests Gregory was prepared to allow parallel and overlapping recruitment to occur, indicating he saw these three crusades as equivalent, parallel expeditions. This is particularly significant in comparison to the other crusades where recruitment was specifically kept local and exclusive, framing them as distinct local enterprises. For example recruitment for the Baltic Crusade in 1230 was to occur solely in the provinces of Magdeburg, Bremen, Poland, Pomerania, Moravia, Suravia, Holstein and Gotland, none of which received *Rachel Suum Videns*.[48] Only in 1237 was recruitment expanded, and even then, it was limited to Sweden, another realm not targeted by the appeals precipitating the Mediterranean crusades.[49] Similarly, according to the bull authorising a crusade in 1232, those taking the cross against the Stedinger were to be drawn exclusively from the dioceses of Paderborn, Verden, Hildesheim, Minden, Münster, Osnabrück and Bremen, areas not targeted by the other crusading appeals of the 1230s.[50] That this ambition translated into reality is then suggested by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, whose list of *crucesignati* against the Stedinger were all drawn from these regions.[51] Finally, the

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[45] E.g. *LdR*, i, nos. 175, 513, 551, 631, 680, 792, 853, 922, 1069, 1290. For preaching of the Holy Land crusade see *Registres*, i, nos. 2203-10 which authorised preaching across France, the Empire and Lombardy. *ES*, nos. 693, 699, 704 show Gregory's concern for the crusade in Italy. *CM*, iii, pp. 280-7 includes a copy of *Rachel Suum Videns* as sent to England. *Registres*, ii, no. 2872 demands Andrew II of Hungary aid the Latin Empire.
[46] *Registres*, i, nos. 2360-72.
[47] *Ibid*. no. 4722.
[48] *ES*, no. 417.
[49] *Diplomatarium Suecarum*, ed. J. Liljegren (2 vols., Holm, 1829-37), i, no. 298.
[50] *ES*, no. 489.
[51] Alberic, p. 935.

1234 crusade against Bosnian heretics was to be recruited solely in Croatia, Istria, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and other parts of Sclavonia, again places not targeted by *Rachel Suum Videns*.[52]

Furthermore, there appears a degree of connectivity between the Valencian, Holy Land and Greek crusades absent from these other expeditions. For example, it is notable that Gregory explicitly allowed, and occasionally ordered, Holy Land vows to be redeemed in Valencia. For example, in his letters on 5 February 1237, developing thoughts laid out two days before, Gregory ordered the bishop of Barcelona, the archbishops of Narbonne, Arles and Aix, and the procurator of Tarragona to urge *crucesignati* in the dioceses of Tarragona, Pamplona, Calahorra, Narbonne, Arles and Aix to commute their vows from the Holy Land to Valencia, indicating the parity of the expeditions in his eyes and the fact that he saw both expeditions as part of the same movement.[53] That the city of Marseilles, a key embarkation point for Outremer was exempted from this directive, only further reinforces the sense that these were equivalent undertakings. Contrastingly, it is interesting that Gregory ordered those who had molested the territory of James of Aragon in his capacity as Count of Montpellier to serve their penance not on the Valencian Crusade, but in Outremer, indicating the connectivity between the expeditions.[54] Outside of papal directive, contemporary practice supports this view of the Mediterranean crusades being equally valid and interchangeable. An excellent example is from Narbonne in March 1237. Here, in the context of a peace accord between the inhabitants of the *cité* and *bourg*, five members of the city were to be punished for murder through forced participation for a year in the Valencian crusade, while four others accused of a separate murder were to serve in the Holy Land, also for a year.[55] This clearly emphasises the equivalency of the two crusades to contemporaries - they are both being used the

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[52] *ES*, no. 574. See also no. 601 where these crusaders are officially taken under papal protection.
[53] *Registres*, ii, no. 3483-4, 3489-90.
[54] *Ibid*. no. 3980.
[55] *Histoire Générale de Languedoc avec des notes et les pièces justificatives*, ed. Dom. C. Devic and Dom. J. Vaissete (16 vols., Toulouse, 1872-93), viii, cols. 1004-7.

same way - and indicates they must have been seen as part of the same movement. Similarly, it is notable that in his gifts to avowed *crucesignati*, Louis IX rewarded crusaders to Valencia just as he rewarded crusaders to the Holy Land and Constantinople, and described them in exactly identical terms.[56] By contrast, it is impossible to find examples of vow commutations between theatres of crusading for the other expeditions of the 1230s postdating the calling of the Mediterranean expeditions.[57] This creates a sense of separation between the Mediterranean crusades, and those occurring elsewhere.

Additionally, there is an intellectual coherence to viewing crusades in the Mediterranean as a whole, as unlike the other crusades, they were all variously presented as part of the same ultimate struggle in defence of the Holy Land. For example, in a letter to the Latin Emperor Henry I rebuking his failure to contribute to the defence of Outremer, Innocent III asserted that the whole purpose behind the creation of the Empire was to facilitate bring aid thither.[58] Similarly, in 1229 Gregory IX appealed for a crusade to Latin Greece on the grounds that Frederick II's truce made it impossible to send direct military assistance to Outremer, and therefore the best way to support Jerusalem was to strengthen the Latin Emperor, who could later furnish aid to Outremer.[59] Despite the dubious interpretation of geography implied, the Iberian crusades were similarly described as ultimately benefiting the Holy Land - a kind of 'new road' to Jerusalem. Amongst various cases, one sees this in Archbishop Gelmírez of Santiago's (r. 1100-40) speech given at Santiago in 1125 and recorded in the *Historia Compostellana*, a contemporary history of his episcopacy. Developing

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[56] 'Itinera', xxii, p. 596.
[57] *Registres*, ii, no. 2959 ordered William of Cordelle, the papal legate, to commute the vows of poor *crucesignati* in Northern Germany to the Baltic, but makes no mention of a Holy Land indulgence.
[58] *Patrologiae Latinae cursus completus*, ed. J.-P. Migne (221 vols., Paris, 1844-55), ccxv, cols. 636-7.
[59] J. Van den Gheyn, 'Lettre de Grégoire IX concernant l'empire latin de Constantinople', *Revue de l'Orient Latin*, 9 (1902), pp. 230-4.

Pope Calixtus II's offer of a crusading indulgence to those fighting Iberian Muslims, in this Gelmírez stated that the end goal of fighting in Iberia was to open a new, easily-accessible route to the Holy Sepulchre.[60] Similarly, when describing Alfonso I of Aragon's campaign against Zaragoza, the anonymous but contemporary *Chronicus Maileacensus* claimed Alfonso, with various French, Navarrese, and Aragonese prelates gathered at Toulouse in January 1118, encouraged the Iberian and Southern French nobility to take the cross by explicitly describing this campaign as a 'via de Hispania' to Jerusalem.[61] Given this enterprise then received a full Holy Land indulgence on these grounds, the idea that Iberian crusades were perceived by contemporaries as intimately connected to the Outremer campaigns gathers validity.[62] In short, besides contemporary theory and practice suggesting the crusades of the 1230s should be seen together, there is intellectual justification behind this approach, underscoring the validity of the exercise proposed.

Given the above, when investigating the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s, this thesis proposes a new label: "The Triple Crusade, 1233-41". This label has been chosen for three reasons. Firstly, given the failure of historians working on "Barons' Crusade" to study the Valencian crusade, a new label for the expeditions is essential in order to outline a new historical framework which includes the Iberian crusade as an equal part. The word "Triple" has been chosen as it is non-pejorative and accurately captures the tripartite nature of the movement unleashed by Gregory IX. Secondly, all of these crusades were led by European royalty, namely Thibaut of Navarre and Richard of Cornwall for the French and English contingents of the Levantine crusade, Baldwin II,

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[60] 'Historia Compostellana', in *España Sagrada* ed. H. Florez *et al.* (52 vols., Madrid, 1754-1918), xx, p. 428. P. O'Banion, 'What has Iberia to do with Jerusalem? Crusade and the Spanish route to the Holy Land in the twelfth century', *Journal of Medieval History*, 34 (2008), pp. 383-95 discusses in depth this idea of Spain as a 'new road' to Jerusalem.
[61] G. Mansi (ed.), *Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio*, (54 vols., Paris, 1901–27), xxii, pp. 183-4, *La Chronique de Saint-Maixent, 751–1140*, ed. and trans. J. Verdon (Paris, 1979), pp. 186-7.
[62] Bishko, pp. 403-4.

Emperor of Constantinople for the Greek crusade, and James I of Aragon for the Valencian crusade. Continued use of the term "baron" therefore makes little sense; after all no crusade exists without the participation of men of "baronial" rank, and there are certainly expeditions, such as the Fourth Crusade, which involved no Western European monarchs, yet are not derided for it. Finally, the date range 1233-41 has been chosen to clarify what this study's parameters are. The start date, 1233, is easily identified, being the date of Gregory IX's first confirmed appeal for the Triple Crusade. Despite the claim by the sixteenth century writer Jeronimo Zurita that James possessed a crusading bull for Valencia in March 1232, there is no positive evidence this was the case, and the circumstantial evidence in the form of a papal letter dated 10 March 1232, in which Gregory IX apologises to James for failing to fulfil what James desired of him, likely a plea for a full-blown crusade, actively suggests the opposite.[63] However, the end point is less clear, especially as the "Reconquista", a process deserving of "crusade" status, and of which the Valencian crusade is part, was a process continuing until at least 1492.[64] Obviously, a span of 259 years for the Iberian crusade is nonsensical, given the tight chronological definition applied to the Greek and Levantine expeditions. Thus, the Valencian crusade will be investigated from 1233 until the first substantial pause in the campaign, July 1239, when James I halted expansion into Valencia in order to pursue his personal interests north of the Pyrenees.[65] Consequently, the later expeditions in Valencia and Murcia, including the suppression of al-Azraq's revolt from 1245, lie outside this thesis's scope. The closing date of the Triple Crusade is therefore outside Iberia, and is found in 1241 when

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[63] Zurita, pp. 478-9. For Gregory's letter see Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, Bulas pontificias, legajo 5, no. 10 (10 March 1232).
[64] For a summary of the contrasting views over the relationship between "Crusade" and "Reconquista", see O'Callaghan, pp. 17-22.
[65] *LdF*, p. 237. See also *Layettes*, no. 2845 in which the Bishop of Maguelone transferred control of Montpellier from James to Raymond of Toulouse, likely the immediate reason for James's departure.

Richard of Cornwall departed the Holy Land, marking the end of operations there, events in the Latin Empire having ceased in 1240.[66]

This thesis contends that a close analysis of the creation, course and conduct of the Triple Crusade, which places the events of the crusades within a broad framework encompassing the length of the Mediterranean is an ideal way to write the first "inclusive" history of the movement for several reasons. Besides the obvious reason that no such history yet exists, such a focus on the specific conduct of the expeditions is worthwhile as it fills a clear gap in current historiography, as no close study of the mechanisms of any branch of the Triple Crusade exists. The current trend in crusade historiography is to move away from monographs of individual expeditions, assessing instead continuities between crusades, or pursuing broad themes across the crusading movement, but there remains value in studying individual crusades using a wide-ranging framework of analysis, both for their own sake and in order to illuminate wider debates.[67] For example, understanding the Triple Crusade can inform numerous debates, including those over the extent of innovation within the preaching campaign, the popularity of crusading, the power of the papacy, the place of the expeditions in Near Eastern, Aegean and Iberian history and whether one can meaningfully talk of "Mediterranean history". This latter is a particularly pertinent point for the Triple Crusade as the scope of Gregory IX's appeal was the widest of any crusade, with it not just unleashing warfare on three fronts, but also being a theoretically-universal undertaking due to the vow redemptions stipulated in *Rachel Suum Videns*.[68] The fact the expeditions did not realise these grand aims is thus especially interesting, and they warrant further study than the current

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[66] *CM*, iv, p. 145.
[67] E.g. N. Paul, *To Follow in their Footsteps: The Crusades and Family Memory in the High Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 2012) assessed how far crusaders were aware of previous expeditions, through collective memory. Tyerman, *EaC*, pp. 152-200, 215-21 identified common themes in crusading, a process culminating in Idem, *HPC*.
[68] *ES*, pp. 491-5.

overwhelmingly papalist approach taken to the Greek and Levantine crusades, and the generally-cursory treatment given to the Valencian expedition. Additionally, the expeditions are fascinating in their own right, and their execution throws open many unanswered questions. To name but one, given the existence of three simultaneous crusades all over the Mediterranean, oversight of which is only possible using a broad-based approach, does the Triple Crusade support the 'pluralist' view of the crusades, or, given the vastly differing sizes of the expeditions, and with the Holy Land crusade paramount in the language for all three expeditions, does it support a 'traditionalist' interpretation of crusading?

Moreover, the Triple Crusade is a rewarding subject for a wide-ranging monograph given how closely integrated the "Crusading States", in their broadest, Mediterranean-wide sense, were into their local political systems. As Christie commented based on the Levantine expedition, the crusades of the 1230s mark the point of greatest engagement by the Franks with their non-Latin neighbours, but this point applies to all three expeditions.[69] Indeed, engagement with the world beyond Latin Christendom occurred on many levels, from the crusaders on campaign up to Gregory IX himself.[70] Thus, close study of the Triple Crusade offers an opportunity to engage with the non-Western sources for its component expeditions. The historiographical significance of this point is immense. It has been common to use Byzantine sources for the Crusades, reflecting perhaps the onetime dominance of Classics in Western university curricula, but other non-Western sources, and particularly Arabic authors of the Crusades, have been scarcely tapped. An excellent illustration of this is the fact *The Alexiad* exists in three translations, while no full translation exists of Ibn Wasil's

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[69] N. Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders: Christianity's Wars in the Middle East 1095-1382, from the Islamic Sources* (Abingdon, 2006), pp. 94-5.

[70] E.g. In February 1233 Gregory contacted the sultan of Damascus, imploring him to convert to Christianity, and to receive the Franciscans Gregory was sending to him to that end: *BF*, pp. 93-6. Undaunted by failure here, *Registres*, i, nos. 2473-4 show Gregory contacting the Sultan of Iconium in March 1235 over a potential alliance. In *Ibid*., ii, nos. 3789-91 Gregory contacted the Jacobite patriarch, the Coptic Pope and the Nestorian Archbishop over possible Church unity in 1237.

Mufarrij, a work of paramount importance. Beyond translations of primary material, one sees this historiographic marginalisation of Arabic material in the fact that modern Arab historians of the Crusades remain largely-unknown in Western history faculties.[71] Similarly works incorporating Arabic sources for the Crusades, although slowly multiplying, remain few.[72] Consequently, despite marking a high point of Medieval European engagement with the Levantine Islamic world, the Triple Crusade hardly features in current historiography incorporating Arabic material.[73] Hence, a close analysis of the conduct of the Triple Crusade including Arabic material will illuminate the aspects of the crusade most opaque in the Western sources, due to the close engagement across linguistic and cultural divides seen on the expedition, and develop current historiographical trends. This point also holds for the Arabic sources on Valencia. Unlike the sources for the Levantine expedition, few of the Arabic sources for the Iberian crusades remain untranslated, but this itself begets problems, above all the paucity of works using the sources in the original.[74] In the study of Levantine crusades, it has long been acknowledged that to work solely in translation is problematic, as meaning is inevitably lost, yet the process has not been enforced as rigidly in the history-writing of the Iberian crusades.[75] Hence, an investigation which uses Arabic material in the original, as

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[71] E.g. despite writing 22 books on the Crusades from 1946-2009, and being regarded as a leading light of Islamic approaches to the Crusades, none of Said Ashour's works exists in a European translation.

[72] For works incorporating Arabic sources for the Crusades in the original see e.g. P. Cobb, *The Race for Paradise: An Islamic History of the Crusades* (Oxford, 2014), A. Maalouf, *The Crusades through Arab eyes*, trans. J. Rothschild (London, 1984), C. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (Edinburgh, 1999).

[73] E.g. Humphreys, pp. 239-69 only treats the Triple Crusade proper in passing, reflecting the sources used, which only discuss the Western crusaders when they upset the Islamic *status quo*.

[74] E.g. O'Callaghanuses several Arabic sources, but all in translation.

[75] E.g. H. Gibb, 'Notes on the Arabic Materials for the History of the Early Crusades' in G. Hawting (ed.), *Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders: An anthology of articles published in The Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* (London., 2005), p. 11 is highly critical of W. Stevenson, *The crusaders in the East: A brief history of the wars of Islam with the Latins in Syria during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries* (Cambridge, 1907)'s utility precisely because his use of Arabic material is limited solely to various problematic translations. By contrast, no review of O'Callaghan objected to his use solely of translated Arabic sources.

proposed, will develop current historiographical practice regarding the Valencian crusade, alongside providing an angle on the expedition rarely explored.

In accomplishing this overall aim of a close investigation of the Triple Crusade, using a broad-based geographical and theoretical approach to cast new light upon the expeditions, this thesis takes the following structure. Overall, the body of the thesis is divided into two overarching sections. The first, Section A, investigates the preparations for the campaign, and is subdivided into three chapters, which investigate successively the preaching campaign which generated the response to Gregory's appeals, the financial preparations which made that response a reality, and who exactly was taking the cross respectively following those preparations. Though aside from the actual military progress of the three expeditions, this task is essential as no crusade can be properly understood without knowing the world it existed in, and the preparations it necessitated. While none of these categories are unprecedented avenues of historical investigation, in each case, a comprehensive assessment of the specifics of the Triple Crusade does not yet exist. Hence, the thesis will contribute to a specific understanding of the expeditions themselves. Moreover by taking a broad approach, not only is the validity of seeing the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s as a single historical unit confirmed, but questions of broader importance are answerable.

For example, in the case of preaching, in line with the centrality of preaching both to the crusades, and to wider medieval life, historical writing on the topic is extensive.[76] However, despite this, the literature on crusade preaching, particularly in the second century of crusading, has been

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[76] E.g. D. d'Avray, *The Preaching of the Friars. Sermons diffused from Paris before 1300* (Oxford, 1985), L.-J. Bataillon, *La prédication au xiii siècle en France et Italie. Études et documents* (Aldershot, 1993), B. Kienzle (ed.), *The Sermon* (Turnhout, 2000), H. Spenser, *English Preaching in the Late Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1993) or J. Longère, *La prédication médiévale* (Paris, 1983).

more limited, although there has been something of a recent flourishing.[77] As might be expected given their slight profile in crusade scholarship, this growth of interest in crusade preaching has not yet extended to the Mediterranean Crusades of the 1230s, besides Maier's coverage in his *Preaching the Crusades*, which assessed the crusade preaching of the mendicant orders. This is despite its potential to be a subject of interest, given the Triple Crusade coincided with the mendicants being properly incorporated into the crusading movement, a fact embodied by the October 1234 bull *Pium et Sanctum*, which instructed the provincial ministers of the Franciscans and the provincial priors of the Dominicans to appoint two preachers in their provinces to preach on *Rachel Suum Videns*.[78] There is therefore historiographical space to interrogate the preaching of the Triple Crusade, and despite the somewhat limited evidence base, sufficient surviving documentary evidence exists to ask why the mendicants were chosen, and how "revolutionary" that decision was. In answering the first question, by drawing in evidence from across Europe, and expanding the frame of reference to monastic and ecclesiastical history, current understanding of the processes surrounding the creation of the Triple Crusade will be advanced. Similarly by answering the second question, the uncertainty in current historical knowledge over who actually undertook the preaching is filled. Finally, by arguing that the preaching campaign for the Triple Crusade logically extended previous practice, and tentatively suggesting that universities were central to contemporary intellectual life, contributions towards wider discussions in crusade and ecclesiastical history are possible.

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[77] E.g J. Bird, 'Medicine for Body and Soul: Jacques de Vitry's Sermons to Hospitallers and their Charges' in P. Biller and J. Ziegler (eds.), *Religion and Medicine in the Middle Ages* (York, 2001), pp. 91-108 and Idem, 'Preaching and Narrating the Fifth Crusade: Bible, Sermons and the History of a Campaign' in E. Lapina and N. Morton (eds.), *The Uses of the Bible in Crusader Sources* (Leiden, 2017), pp. 316-40.

[78] For surviving copies of this letter see *BP*, p. 70 and *BF*, p. 139.

Similarly, although rising from a low base, perhaps due to the perception that the crusades were the products of superstition and ignorance and thus represented the worst of everything "medieval", and so could not be approached rationally, crusade funding and logistics are topics which now garner substantial historical attention.[79] However, as with the preaching for the Triple Crusade, studies into the funding for Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s are lacking, with there no systematic analysis of the funding methods specifically employed by the crusaders, outside of Lower's cursory treatment into the revenues generated by vow redemptions.[80] With relatively abundant documentary evidence, there is therefore room for further advances, both regarding the specific knowledge of the expeditions, and regarding the general questions which can be asked, using the Triple Crusade as a starting point. In particular, by taking a pan-Mediterranean, comparative approach, this chapter assesses the continuity between crusades, and thus where to locate the balance between local, distinct aspects of crusading financing and those methods which traversed Europe. Likewise, through close study, these expeditions' place in the evolution of crusade funding can be understood. Finally, evaluating the evidence from all three theatres of crusading together enables conclusions about the political processes occurring in these places. Thus, the evidence presented by these expeditions could contribute towards an assessment of, *inter alia*, the theory that the Crusades contributed towards medieval state formation.[81]

Lastly in this first section of the thesis, is a prosopographical investigation into the three crusades. Although prosopography is a growing field within crusade studies, exemplified by the

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[79] For this view of the crusades see e.g. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades, Volume 3*, p. 478, E. Barker, *The Crusades* (London, 1923), p. 104. For works on crusade funding see e.g. see Cazel, pp. 116-49, Tyerman, *HPC*, pp. 181-230.
[80] Lower, pp. 1-2, 14-7, 27-32, 35-6, 54-7, 69-72.
[81] See e.g. L. Blaydes and C. Paik, 'The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation: War Mobilization, Trade Integration, and Political Development in Medieval Europe', *International Organization*, 70 (3) (2016), pp. 551-86, V. Burke, *The Clash of Civilisations: War-Making and State Formation in Europe* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 88.

prosopographies of the First and Fifth Crusades, and the database of *crucesignati* for the period 1095-1149, this task has not yet been systematically undertaken in the Triple Crusade.[82] From such study, several points are deductible. Foremost, knowledge of who exactly took the cross in the 1230s illuminates the connectivity between the concurrent Mediterranean crusades, and the necessity of placing all three expeditions together in order to achieve full understanding. Secondly, while canon law specified crusading vows had to made freely, many people's freedom of action was severely circumscribed, with bonds of lordship or kinship informing an individual's reaction to the crusade message.[83] Therefore an analysis of the Triple Crusade's participants reveals the forces behind its creation, by allowing tentative conclusions about the context within which individuals took the cross. Thirdly, knowing the relative sizes of the expeditions allows speculation about why that is the case, something relevant to the study of crusades as a whole, and especially the place of Greece within it. Finally, understanding who participated in the Triple Crusade creates an evidence basis from which to answer broader questions about the wider context to the crusades of the 1230s. Above all, through its international dimension, one possesses evidence of ties of trans-European connections. Hence, this thesis can inform discussions over the validity of the idea of "Mediterranean history" in this period, as understood in framework constructed by Braudel.[84]

With this first section completed, the second part of the thesis, Section B, addresses the actual conduct of the three crusades following the departures of the crusading armies. Although in this latter section, the nature of each chapter will be slightly different, with each crusade assessed individually, rather than collectively, the overall approach of the thesis remains unchanged, as in

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[82] J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095-1131* (Cambridge, 1997), Powell, Appendices 2-4. For the database of crusaders see J. Riley-Smith, J. Phillips, A. Murray, G. Perry and N. Morton (eds.), *A Database of Crusaders to the Holy Land | 1095 - 1149* accessed 4 April 2019 at https://www.dhi.ac.uk/crusaders/.

[83] Powell, pp. 78-83, Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, pp. 84-5 make this point.

[84] F. Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen a l'époque de Philippe II*, (Paris, 1949).

each case, the expeditions will be assessed using a broad approach. As before, this will allow for the fullest possible understanding, while also meaning the Triple Crusade can be used to suggest points of wider resonance.

For example, chapter five uses this broad-based approach to assess how far events occurring in the Islamic World shaped the direction of the Holy Land Crusade. Unlike the case with the Valencian and Greek Crusades, this process has been partly undertaken before, following Jackson's efforts.[85] However, he does not go far enough when assessing the causes of events in the Islamic world. For example, while convincingly explaining why al-Salih Isma'il, ruler of Damascus 1237 and 1239-45, suddenly turned to the Franks when he did, his analysis is restricted to the immediate cause of events (i.e. his nephew al-Salih's release from prison by al-Nasir of Kerak) rather than explore the potential broader reasons behind why that event occurred, as this thesis will.[86] From such exploration, the important role of the Khwarazmians, both active and passive, in shaping the political landscape, and its knock-on effects for the conduct of the crusade becomes apparent. Similarly, politics in Egypt, the heartland of the Islamic Middle East and the crux of the crusade cannot be properly understood without reference to events occurring in Arabia and the Egyptian deserts. That this could be the case is nothing *per se* unprecedented: for example Arabia's importance to Ayyubid politics is clear from Saladin's sensitivity towards Crusader initiatives against the Red Sea, and the holy sites of Islam, most famously Raynald of Châtillon's raid in 1182-3.[87] However, it seems that generally crusade historians have not particularly studied events geographically removed from the crusades themselves. In that sense, the chapter marks a potential

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[85] Jackson, pp. 33-5.
[86] *Ibid*. p. 41.
[87] For this campaign see *La Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. L. de Mas-Latrie (Paris, 1871), p. 90, Abu Sharma in *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades-Historiens Orientaux* (5 vols., 1872-1906), iv, pp. 230-5.

path down which future developments could occur, creating a more "integrated" history of the Middle East during the crusades, with a proportionate role for both Christian and Muslim actors.

Turning to the Valencian crusade, in this instance, the broad perspective works by placing the crusade in the context of Muslim al-Andalus and the North African coast. Something made easier by the absence of any monograph studies of the expedition, this approach enables a rounded understanding of James I's strategies. For example, why the campaign started when it did, why it took the form it did, and why the campaign was so marked by scorched-earth warfare are only fully explicable when incorporating a North Africa dimension to James's strategic and tactical planning. All this suggests that crusading did not occur in a vacuum, cut off from the crusaders' Arabic-speaking neighbours. Therefore, so should crusade scholarship never undervalue the evidence and potential advances that a broad approach to the material under investigation can bring. After all, the adaptability of crusading armies is what makes the Crusades such a fascinating topic of study, and anything which indicates how current understanding of crusader strategy can be advanced must constitute a worthwhile contribution to medieval history as a whole.[88]

Finally, the same task is undertaken for the Greek crusade. Here, although the crusaders' neighbours obviously did not speak Arabic, studying the events of the expedition with reference to the Latin Empire's neighbours, both Christian and pagan similarly adds much to our understanding. Unlike the Arabic dimension to the Valencian crusade, a basic understanding of these bordering powers is not entirely unknown, witnessed in the several works on the Cuman nomads and

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[88] S. Tibble, *The Crusader Armies 1099-1187* (New Haven and London, 2018), pp. 49-50 makes this point.

Hungarian kingdom to the north of Constantinople, and the Latin states of southern Greece.[89] However, there is no detailed study which appreciates how far these neighbours influenced the events of the Greek crusade. This creates a gap in historical knowledge which this thesis, by seeking to placing events within a wider framework, is well placed to fill. Furthermore, placing the Greek crusade in the broadest context illustrates the important role of Frederick II and the Italian Wars in determining the crusade's direction. The literature on the Italian wars is vast, testament to Frederick II's profile as a giant of medieval history, and the endless capacity of the papal-imperial conflict to fascinate, but the avenues for these events to shape the Greek crusade are poorly understood.[90] There is a general awareness that Frederick II was ambivalent towards Greece following his preoccupation with Italy, as contemporaries complained that the conflict hindered recruitment for the Triple Crusade, but never before has the extent to which that conflict determined the outcome of crusading thither been realised.[91] In that sense, the potential for advances to be made by taking a wide view that incorporates events across Europe becomes even clearer.

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[89] On the nomadic tribesmen to the north of the Balkans see e.g. R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia*, trans. N. Walford (New Brunswick, 1970), G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the European Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991). On Hungary see e.g. P. Engel, *The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895–1526* (London, 2001), Berend. On southern Greece see e.g. B. Slot, 'The Frankish Archipelago', *Byzantinische Forschungen* 19 (1991), pp. 195-203, A. Bon, *La Morée franque: Recherches historiques, topographiques et archéologiques sur la Principauté d'Archie (1205-1430)* (2 vols., Paris, 1969).

[90] On the Italian Wars see e.g. M. Busk, *Mediæval Popes, Emperors, Kings, and Crusaders; or Germany, Italy and Palestine from A.D. 1125-A.D. 1268* (4 vols., London, 1854-6), iii, pp. 411-62, and iv, pp. 1-27, E. Kantorowicz, *Frederick the Second: 1194-1250* trans. E. Lorimer (London, 1931), pp. 416-40, 459-518, 539-50.

[91] Lower, pp. 40-1. For contemporary complaints see *CM*, iii, pp. 552-62, *Historia diplomatic Frederici Secundi*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles (6 vols., Paris, 1852-61), iv, p. 249, *ES*, no. 648.

Principal Sources

Before progressing further, it is worth pausing to discuss the principal sources this thesis uses in order to meet its objectives. While this thesis approaches the Triple Crusade at a practical level, it cannot be forgotten that crusading, especially following its formal codification within canon law under Innocent III, was a multi-faceted and complicated ideological concept which united ideas of sin and redemption with the defence of Christ's patrimony, alongside eschatological and material motivators.[92] What Urban II said at Clermont in 1095 is unclear, the five surviving accounts all postdating the event, and containing subtly different emphases, but what is certain are the historiographical consequences of the appeal, and subsequent military expeditions.[93] Indeed, the Crusades are perhaps the phenomenon most discussed by contemporaries, or near-contemporaries, in medieval history. This is as true for the crusades of 1233-41 as for their better-known and better-studied counterparts. Thus despite the material for the 1230s varying depending on specific focus, with sources for the preaching far less numerous than, for example, funding, the relative marginalisation of the Triple Crusade in current historiography cannot be solely attributed to a dearth of source material. In turn this helps justify the contention that more can be said on the expeditions beyond the papalist angle currently pre-eminent.

Of these sources, despite their undoubted limitations, the most fundamental are the Latin and vernacular chronicle histories. Supplying a basic outline of events, chronicles 'underlie all our

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[92] C. Tyerman, 'Were there any Crusades in the Twelfth Century?', *English Historical Review*, 110 (1995), pp. 553-577 argues this increased regularisation of crusading is central to the definition of crusading itself. L. and J. Riley-Smith (eds.), *The Crusades: Idea and Reality, 1095-1274* (London, 1981), p. 7 discusses the different ideological strands of thought unified in crusading.
[93] For versions of Urban II's speech see *RHC-Oc*, iii, pp. 121 [*Gesta Francorum*], 323-4 [Fulcher of Chartres], 727-8 [Robert the Monk] and iv, pp. 137-40 [Guibert de Nogent], and S. Biddlecombe, 'The *Historia Ierosolimitana* of Baldric of Bourgueil - A New Edition in Latin and an Analysis' (Bristol Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 2010), pp. 133-9.

fundamental knowledge of the Crusades', something which includes the Triple Crusade, with all three expeditions described by European historians to varying extents.[94] In the case of the Levantine crusade, the most important are the two thirteenth century continuations of William of Tyre, the 'Rothelin' and 'Eracles' texts.[95] Focused primarily on the French branch of the Levantine expedition, these texts provide a narrative of events, while possessing individual strengths. For example, the 'Rothelin' text's description of the Battle of Gaza gives the historian access to a crusader battle in unparalleled detail.[96] Similarly, the author of the 'Eracles' text seems well-informed on the discussions that occurred among the Frankish leaders at various points.[97] His account therefore underpins any attempt to understand what the crusaders' strategy was. Moreover, the two continuations complement each other through their contrasting origins; the 'Eracles' text is from Outremer, while the 'Rothelin' text was composed in Champagne.[98] That said, neither is perfect; both occasionally lack important details, and above all, both are exceptionally unclear over how exactly the contact with the Islamic powers that in many ways defined this crusade was conducted. Nevertheless, by creating a broad timeline, and for their insights into the French expedition, both are indispensable.

Also vitally important for understanding the Levantine crusade are the works of the contemporary English historian Matthew Paris, namely his *Cronica Maiora* and *Historia Anglorum*.[99] Especially insightful regarding the English branch of the campaign, Paris is a crucial source due to his close relations to the English monarchy; his works display evidence of personal

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[94] J. Brundage (ed.), *The Crusades: A Documentary Survey* (Milwaukee, 1962), preface.
[95] *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 1-639. The sections pertaining to this period in both are translated in J. Shirley, *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century: The* Rothelin *Continuation of William of Tyre with part of the* Eracles *or* Acre *text* (Aldershot, 1999).
[96] *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 541-6.
[97] *Ibid.* pp. 413-4, 416, 418, 419-20.
[98] Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, p. 2.
[99] *CM*, iii and iv and Paris, *Historia Anglorum, sive ut vulgo dicitur Historia Minor* ed. F. Madden (3 vols., London, 1869), ii.

communication with Richard of Cornwall.[100] While allowing the historian privileged access into the movement, this can, however, be something of double-edged sword, leading him for example to unfairly denigrate Thibaut of Navarre's role in securing the treaties that ended the crusade, by following Richard of Cornwall's description of his own inflated importance.[101] Nevertheless, where verifiable, such as in his description of Ascalon's refortification, Paris can usually be shown to be accurate, notwithstanding his geographic distance from events.[102] Furthermore, as an inquisitive writer, with broad interests, Paris is a useful corroborator of various other sources, something true for all three expeditions. Thus, his work takes centre stage in any investigation of the Triple Crusade.

Alongside these chronicles, this thesis incorporates the fourteenth century *Les Gestes des Chiprois* and William of Nangis's writings.[103] Though neither is as detailed as those aforementioned, both have value by presenting how the Levantine expedition was received by later-medieval historians, and can add useful details not found elsewhere, exemplified by the description of the Battle of Gaza, November 1239, given by *Les Gestes des Chiprois*.[104] Principal among numerous other smaller chronicles, in the case of the Levantine crusade, this thesis makes use of the *De Constructione Castri Saphet*.[105] A source generally used only in specialist histories of crusader fortifications, it recounts the Bishop of Marseille's time in the East, including an unparalleled account of the refortification of Safed Castle, the origin of the text's name. A key and often-

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[100] Paris, *Historia Anglorum* ed. Madden, iii, p. xxviii [preface].
[101] *CM*, iv, pp. 79-80.
[102] The description given in *CM*, iv, p. 102 is corroborated by archaeological investigation of the site; D. Pringle, 'Richard I and the Walls of Ascalon', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, 116 (2) (1985), pp. 133-147.
[103] *LGdC*, William of Nangis, 'Gesta Sanctae Memoriae Ludovici', in *RHGF*, xx, pp. 309-465, and Idem, 'Chronicon', in *RHGF*, xx, pp. 543-82.
[104] *LGdC*, pp. 119-20.
[105] *Saphet*.

overlooked part of what the expedition achieved, this gives the account value, despite its obvious limitations.

Regarding the Greece-bound expedition again several chroniclers can be cited as vital sources, with the Byzantine historian George Akropolites foremost.[106] Though interested primarily in the deeds of the Nicaean emperors, rather than the Greek crusades *per se*, as a contemporary writing close to the events, he provides various insights into the expedition, especially valuable given the geographic distance of the primary Western European chroniclers from the events they describe.[107] For example, when assessing the capture of Tzurulum in 1240, the central event of the Greek crusade, the historian has to rely on Akropolites, his being by far the fullest extant account.[108] When combined with his fastidious attention to detail, Akropolites therefore emerges as the key source for the expedition, forcing his inclusion in this thesis's source base. Turning to Western European historians, it is worth highlighting two in particular, Alberic of Trois-Fontaines and Philip Mouskes, although neither are exclusively historians of Frankish Greece.[109] Alberic, author of a universal history from Creation down to 1241, is one of the most intriguing sources for the expedition. Combining moments of lucidity with moments of complete fantasy, he is a problematic writer, but is vital for the space he gives the expedition, and particularly its build-up. Moreover, he may be considered reliable for the immediate context of the Greek crusade given his close proximity to Baldwin of Courtenay's holdings in Namur as a monk writing in Trois-Fontaines Abbey, near Châlons. Regarding Philip Mouskes, he wrote a rhymed chronicle of the Kings of France until 1242. Though sometimes hard to use due to its structure, and occasionally opaque over specific dates, it is nevertheless useful in illuminating the preparations for the Greek crusade. Like Alberic,

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[106] Akropolites. English translation available as George Akropolites, *The History*, ed. and trans. R. Macrides (Oxford, 2007).
[107] Akropolites, *History*, ed. and trans. Macrides, pp. 31-4.
[108] Akropolites, pp. 57-60
[109] Alberic, pp. 631-950, Mouskes.

this is likely the product of his close proximity to events, being based in Tournai, near Baldwin of Courtenay's western holdings.

Besides these, given this thesis's intention to approach all three expeditions of the Triple Crusade in the broadest sense possible, there is also narrative material written predominantly about the Latin Empire's neighbours which can usefully provide context for Baldwin II's crusade. This applies equally to the Latin Empire's northern and southern borders. From the north, the preeminent examples are Roger of Apulia's *Carmen Miserabile*, and the *Relatio fratris ricardi*.[110] Though neither touches directly on the crusade itself, with the first describing the Mongol invasion of Hungary, written by a contemporary prelate active there from 1232, and the latter recounting the journey of some Dominicans into the Balkans on a mission to convert its pagans, both provide details about the Latin Empire's nearest neighbours. Given the important role the pagan Cumans played in the crusade, this is no small thing. Similarly, though not as extensive, there are several smaller Hungarian sources which prove occasionally useful.[111] If anything, the sources for the Latin Empire's southern neighbours in Frankish Greece are even more extensive, something perhaps unsurprising given the Latin states of Southern Greece, and especially the Principality of Achaea possessed a stability and vitality far surpassing the Latin Empire proper. Chief of these is the 14th century *Chronicle of Morea*.[112] A text which survives in subtly different versions in several languages, this narrates the story of the Frankish states in Greece, albeit (as the name implies) with a focus upon Southern Greece. Additionally, Frankish Greece is described in Marino Sanudo

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[110] 'Relatio fratris ricardi (de facto ungarie magne a fratre ricardo invento tempore domini gregorii pape noni', ed. J. Deér and Roger of Apulia, 'Carmen miserabile super destructione regni Hungariae per Tartaros', ed. L. Juhász in E. Szentpétery (ed.), *Scriptores rerum hungaricarum* (2 vols., Budapest, 1937-8), ii, pp. 531-42, 545-88.
[111] For these see E. Szentpétery (ed.), *Scriptores rerum hungaricarum* (2 vols., Budapest, 1937-8).
[112] *Morea* [Old French text], J. Schmitt (ed.), *The Chronicle of Morea* (London, 1904) [Greek text].

Torsello's *Istoria del regno di Romania*, an account primarily of the reconquest of Constantinople, but which also mentions earlier events.[113]

Lastly, turning to the Valencian crusade, certainly the most important chronicle is the *Llibre dels Fets*, composed by James I of Aragon.[114] Unparalleled among Western European sources for the Triple Crusade for being written by a participant, this account grants the historian first-person access to the campaign. It is therefore the central account when reconstruction the crusade's events, and its logistical planning, alongside providing information on the expedition's leaders, and how the army was constructed. That said, care must be taken regarding the events James did not personally witness, with the account an 'eye of the storm' viewpoint, and those events inserted to make political points; after all it was partially intended as a guide for James's successors on how to rule.[115] Nevertheless, alongside the rich Iberian documentary material, which often validates the story James tells, it is invaluable. Also among the leading chronicle histories for the expedition, is the later thirteenth century Catalan *Crónica* by Bernat Desclot.[116] Further from events than James, Desclot is nevertheless useful, and while of especial interest for the events of his lifetime, seems generally exact in his description of previous events, the result of careful study on his part. Indeed, he can be a useful counterpart to James, most obviously in his description of the Battle of El Puig, August 1237, which is fuller than James's, who was personally absent.[117] However, the time difference between him and the 1230s means the historian must treat with suspicion his descriptions of events not corroborated elsewhere. Also noteworthy in a land poor in literary histories is the

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[113] Marino Sanudo Torsello, 'Istoria del regno di Romania' in C. Hopf (ed.), *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes Inédits ou Peu Connues* (Berlin, 1873), pp. 99-170.
[114] *LdF*. Translated as *The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon*, ed. and trans. D. Smith and H. Buffery (Aldershot, 2003).
[115] *Book of Deeds* ed. and trans. Smith and Buffery, p. 7.
[116] Desclot.
[117] *Ibid.*, ii, ch. 49.

Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña.[118] Compiled under the auspices of Pedro IV (r. 1336-87), and intending to use the history of Aragon to catalogue its monarch's growing privileges, this chronicle incorporates numerous earlier oral and written sources.[119] Thus, notwithstanding its explicit political overtones, which occasionally undermine the work's historical value, causing it for example to omit the repeated discord between James I and his nobles, the work is valuable, especially as it contains some unique material.[120] Less original is the fourteenth century *Crónica* of Ramon Muntaner.[121] Primarily a history of the Catalan Company in Latin Greece, a body the author participated in, the text includes sections on Aragonese kings from James I onwards. The text is thus a valuable corroborator to the events presented elsewhere, and reflects how events were later interpreted. However, caution is necessary given Muntaner's primary purpose is to glorify Aragon's kings, and the effect the time difference between him and James I had on his presentation of events.[122] Finally, mention should be made of the semi-official *Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium*.[123] Compiled at Ripoll Abbey, a place with close links to the Counts of Barcelona, witnessed in the many counts buried there, it is the earliest extant history of Catalonia, spanning through various redactions the years 850-1299.[124] Predictably for a general history covering over four centuries, its treatment of James's conquest of Valencia is brief, but nevertheless, it can be used in conjunction with the other sources to further our understanding of the expedition.

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[118] *Crónica de San Juan de la Peña*, ed. Arteta. English version available as *The Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña: A Fourteenth Century Official History of the Crown of Aragon*, ed. and trans. L. Nelson (Philadelphia, 1991).
[119] *Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña*, ed. and trans. Nelson, pp. xiv-xvi [introduction].
[120] E.g. it contains the fullest description of the conquest of Ibiza, 1235: *Crónica de San Juan de la Peña*, ed. Arteta, pp. 151-2.
[121] Muntaner.
[122] J-P. Rubiés, 'Rhetoric and ideology in the *Book of Ramon Muntaner*', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 26 (2011), p. 19 calls the work 'dynastic propaganda' given its idyllic presentation of Aragonese domestic politics but is on balance positive about the work's historical value. See *Ibid.* p. 4
[123] *Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium*, ed. L. Barrau-Dihigo and J. Massó Torrents (Barcelona, 1925).
[124] See *Les* Gesta Comitum Barchinonsium *(Versió Primitiva), la* Brevis Historia *i altres textos de Ripoll*, ed. S. Maria Cingolani (Valencia, 2012), pp. 237-40 for the Counts interred there.

However, while chronicles are important, not least in their capacity to describe a crusade's overall passage, they are imperfect. Often written years after the events, chronicles never offer a neutral viewpoint, often revealing their author's intentions as much as the events they cover. Moreover, due to this distance from events, whether chronological, geographic or both, chronicles are often bad at revealing participation, being focused usually on the 'great men' or those of particular importance to the author. Given this thesis's aim of undertaking a prosopographic investigation of the Triple Crusade, and a study of the finances underpinning it, additional sources are necessary, which can partially be found in the official documentary records for the period. Although uneven in coverage, these sources contain much information, and while not recording every participant or financial decision, collectively grant enough evidence to provide a firm basis for conclusions. Such records are particularly strong in England, where the processes of state centralisation and the movement from oral to written record-keeping from the eleventh century onwards culminated in the rolls currently stored in the National Archives.[125] Covering a wide range of governmental transactions, these rolls bring non-noble names to light, vital for mapping participation in the expeditions. Moreover, given the liberate and fine rolls record financial transactions, alongside the patent rolls which also contain some financial details, they can be used to postulate conclusions about the crusade's finances.

Detailed documentary records are also available from Aragon.[126] Indeed, in some ways the Aragonese records surpass England's records as, due to the policy of repopulating Valencia after its

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[125] This thesis uses the full range of the available rolls in its investigations, including close, patent, liberate, curia regis, fine, and charter rolls. Cf. M. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307* (London, 1979) for the expansion of the bureaucracy in medieval England.
[126] E.g. *Los Fueros de Aragón según el manuscrito 458 de la Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid*, ed. G. Tilander (Lund, 1937), *Vidal mayor: Traducción aragonesa de la obra* In excelsis Dei thesauris *de Vidal de Canellas*, ed. G. Tillander (3 vols., Lund, 1956).

conquest, detailed records of land-transfers, known as the *Llibre del Repartiment* were created by James I's administration, which survive to this day.[127] By limiting the chronological scope to 1233-9, such records therefore inadvertently create a list of the participants in the expedition, both Iberian and foreign. Alongside these records, many of James's charters have survived.[128] Vital sources for indicating who accompanied James at any given moment, and who enjoyed his confidence, besides being useful records of the participants in the crusade, these charters are an integral part in mapping the structure of the whole expedition prior to the fall of Valencia. In combination, these two types of source enable the prosopographic investigation of the Valencian crusade this thesis proposes.

By contrast, French documentary records are more scattered. Less centralised than England or Aragon, French documentary records were not kept systematically until the fourteenth century and are thus discontinuous and widely dispersed for the period of the Triple Crusade. To properly understand French crusade recruitment and financing, the historian must therefore study regional archives alongside French court records. Given that recruitment within France was heavily dependent upon the leading regional magnate taking the cross, the most useful regional archives are those of Champagne and Burgundy, both of whose counts participated in the Levantine crusade.[129] Furthermore, unlike the archival records in England, the French archives have suffered greatly in the years since their creation, with many records lost during the religious wars in the sixteenth century and during the revolutionary period. Nevertheless, enough material survives in the central French archives, both in terms of the charters issued by Louis IX's government and the records of

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[127] *LdR*, i and ii.
[128] *DJI*, i and ii.
[129] *HdDB*, iv, *HdDC*, v.

court expenditure, that in combination with other smaller records, a plausible picture of French financial and personal participation in the Triple Crusade is possible.[130]

Despite the breath of these archival records, the variety of documentary evidence is broader still, something this thesis reflects. Consequently, other documentary sources are used, including contracts, which formed the basic framework for transactions and investments throughout the medieval period.[131] Though the earliest explicitly 'crusading' contract survives from 1239, contracts likely played an important role throughout the crusading period, testified by legal evidence, and deducible through chronicle evidence, meaning their content can be recreated.[132] Moreover, given strong anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that the expeditions of the Triple Crusade were organised in a contractual manner, recreated contracts can help explain the expeditions' structures.[133] Alongside the organisation of land armies, contracts can illuminate the organisation of shipping. Control of the sea constituted a vital part of all three campaigns, as it was for all crusades, and thus to some degree must be investigated, given this thesis' aim to understand these expeditions in detail.[134] Given the surviving documentary evidence, this is most obviously the case with the Valencian expedition, where commercial contracts help foster an understanding of the world the crusade occurred within.[135]

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[130] Principal sources used include *Layettes*, and the court records in *RHGF*, xxii.
[131] On the central place of contracts in the medieval world see R. Lopez and I. Raymond (eds.), *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative documents translated with notes* (New York, 1955), p. 156.
[132] For this contract see Lloyd, Appendix 5, translated in H. Reddish, 'Did the crusaders consciously emulate? Assessing the evidence using the case study of the Barons' Crusade' (KCL M.A. thesis, 2018), Appendix 3. Cf. Tyerman, *HPC*, pp. 84-5.
[133] E.g. *CM*, iv, p. 44 implies Richard of Cornwall created a host contractually bound to himself.
[134] On the importance of crusader shipping see e.g. U. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Âge* (2 vols. Paris, 1885), i, 131-2, Hillenbrand, *The Crusades*, p. 575.
[135] e,g. L. Blancard (ed.), *Documents inédits sur le commerce de Marseilles au Moyen Âge* (2 vols., Marseilles, 1884-5), i, nos. 54-92, R. Della Rocca and A. Lombardo (eds.), *Documenti del commercio Veneziano nei secoli xi-xiii* (2 vols., Rome, 1940), ii, nos. 691-742.

Non-national documentary sources are also invaluable for this thesis' investigation of the Triple Crusade's preaching campaign. The preaching for these expeditions is perhaps the hardest part of the whole Triple Crusade to broach in detail, given no sermons survive from the 1230s and the elusive place of preachers in the chronicles. However, the involvement of the centrally organised mendicant orders in the preaching campaign has some positive ramifications. As international entities, both the Dominicans and Franciscans kept their own records, many of which have survived.[136] Through these records it is just possible to determine who was involved in the preaching campaign, from which the questions this thesis asks about the preaching campaign can be answered, thus determining another piece of the Triple Crusade's place in the canon of crusading.

Finally with regard to documentary material, it is worth mentioning monastic cartularies - records of donations to religious communities. In the course of investigating the participants in the Triple Crusade, and their fundraising efforts, many of these documents were consulted, although few yielded meaningful details. This relative silence raises interesting questions about the financing of these expeditions, given how prominent monasteries were in financing the earlier crusades. Such questions shall be addressed in chapter three.

Besides documentary material, this thesis also incorporates the numerous letters pertaining to the Crusades. Though, like chronicles, letters are products of literary artifice to varying extents, they are often the closest the historian can get into protagonists' mindsets.[137] Moreover, as letters survive from a number of different authors, from varying backgrounds, they can be useful checks on the

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[136] *BF* and *BP*.

[137] For the literary aspect of medieval letter-writing see *Letters from the East: Crusaders, Pilgrims and Settlers in the 12th-13th Centuries* ed. and trans. M. Barber and K. Bate (Farnham, 2010), p. 2. For a defence of the historical value of letters see P. Riant (ed.), 'Inventaire critique des lettres historiques des Croisades' in Idem (ed.), *Archives de L'Orient Latin publiées sous le patronage de la société de l'Orient Latin* (2 vols., Paris, 1881-4), i, p. 3.

chroniclers' presentation of events. However, of all the correspondence studied, particular mention should be made of Gregory IX's letters and bulls.[138] A voracious writer, a substantial portion of his correspondence has survived in the papal registers, making it a key source for this period.[139] Indeed, it is this material's survival which enabled the dominant papalist approach to the "Barons' Crusade". While papal letters are best understood as statements of intent, rather than necessarily what occurred, something occasionally forgotten, nevertheless these papal records can be used alongside other materials to better understand participation in the crusade, and its preaching campaign, given participants are often mentioned by name. Additionally, these papal letters reveal something of the funding mechanisms available, not least the new and widely used policy of vow redemption. Hence, while using the same material that underpinned the papalist approach to the Triple Crusade, this thesis will develop current historiographic practice by asking questions not yet asked of its sources. Papal evidence is extremely rich and there is more it can reveal about the crusades of the 1230s than simply what Gregory IX's intentions were. Put simply, the use of papal evidence does not have to entail a papalist approach to the whole topic.

When considering this thesis's sources, the last type worth mentioning is the Arabic material. As discussed, these expeditions provide an ideal opportunity to incorporate Arabic sources alongside their European counterparts, something particularly the case given the many Arabic sources pertaining to the expeditions. Beginning with the sources for the Levantine crusade, preeminent is Ibn Wasil's *Mufarrij*.[140] An annalistic history of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, which becomes truly independent only from the 1220s, this work is of tantamount importance for the history of the

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[138] *Registres,* i-iii.
[139] Maier, p. 7 estimates a fifth of the papal letters were recorded thus. Note historians have not always understood exactly how or why the registers were made; see R. van Caenegem, *Guide to the Sources of Medieval History* (Amsterdam and New York, 1978), pp. 212-7.
[140] Ibn Wasil.

Ayyubid dynasty, and thus for the Levantine branch of the Triple Crusade.[141] A contemporary and close observer of events, based in Hama during the 1230s, an important player in the politics of the Holy Land, he possesses a particular interest in diplomacy, something significant given the importance of diplomacy in shaping this crusade. This interest is particularly important given the opacity in the Western European chronicles over the interactions between the Franks and the Muslims. The second major Islamic author of this period is Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi, the Damascene author of a universal history from Creation until 1257.[142] Close to the ruling classes, his work is valuable for describing the political situation inside Damascus, a city in which he was directly involved in political matters during the 1230s and 40s, thereby granting him insider knowledge.[143] However, despite their strengths, both writers have shortcomings, not least that the Franks only infrequently enter their narratives when they disrupt the *status quo*, their tendency to overlook events on the Damascene-Egyptian border, and their uncertainty over who possessed what territory when.[144] These concerns are only partially met by later Mamluk historians who, while occasionally adding material, are often vague and generally do little more than recycle Ibn Wasil.[145] Moreover, al-Maqrizi's idiosyncratic arrangement of his material makes his work hard to use with certainty, undermining his reliability as an authority on this period. Similarly, while an important witness to the crucial and understudied events of Northern Syria, the Aleppan historian Ibn al-'Adim shares the opacity over the specific events in Palestine during the period of the Triple Crusade, despite personally serving as ambassador to Egypt and Damascus during this time.[146]

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[141] K. Hirschler, 'Ibn Wasil: an Ayyub perspective on Frankish Lordship and Crusades' in A. Mallett (ed.), *Medieval Muslim Historians and the Franks in the Levant* (Leiden, 2014), p. 148.
[142] Sibt.
[143] A. Mallet, 'Sibt Ibn al-Jawsī' in Mallett, *Medieval Muslim Historians*, pp. 84-92.
[144] Jackson, pp. 32-3.
[145] Most significantly al-Nuwayri, al-Maqrizi, and Ibn Duqmaq.
[146] al-'Adim. French translation available as Ibn al-'Adim, *Histoire d'Alep*, trans. E. Blochet (Paris, 1900). For al-'Adim's movements see Ibn Wasil, pp. 253, 267-8 [Egypt], 288 [Damascus].

Thus, in order to understand how, when and why this crusade unfolded as it did, especial significance must be attached to two contemporary Christian Arabic sources; George Elmacin/Ibn al-'Amid and the anonymous *Siyar al-aba' al-batarika*.[147] The first of these is a contemporaneous Coptic Christian writer, who wrote a universal history from Adam down to the Sultan Baibars, divided into two parts, of which the second is of interest to crusade historians. Displaying a nuanced awareness of the political situation in the 1230s and 40s, stemming from him being ديوان الجيش [lit. minister of the army] in Cairo, he reveals much about the Islamic backdrop to the crusade, and deepens our understanding of the choices facing the crusaders. Hence, while there is currently neither a critical edition of his work, nor any meaningful modern translation of it, he is vital in evaluating the traditionally much-maligned crusader strategy of fortifying Ascalon before assaulting Damascus, which seemingly antagonising both Damascus and Egypt.[148] Regarding the *Siyar*, though the author is unknown, it is clear he was a contemporary, who as a Christian took a greater interest in the negotiations across religious lines which defined this crusade than other authors, rendering his account invaluable.[149]

At the other extreme of the Mediterranean, Arabic sources are also available for the Valencian expedition, although unlike in the Levant, contemporary and indeed detailed, accounts are lacking. Forced therefore to rely on later sources, the most notorious is the *Rawd al-Qirtas* by the Moroccan writer Ibn Abi Zar (died c.1315).[150] Employed by the Marinid dynasty to write a history of Morocco and its empire, Abi Zar over-exaggerates the failures of the Almohads, following his belief that they were heretics whose overthrow by his employers was justified. Furthermore, his account contains

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147 The manuscripts consulted for Ibn al-'Amid are British Library Or. 7564 (*al-Majmu` al-Mubarak*), Al-'Amid, and MS. Laud Or. 161. For the *Siyar* see *HPEC*, iv.
148 E.g. R. Grousset, *Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem* (3 vols. Paris, 1934-6), iii, p. 378, J. Prawer, *Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem* trans. G. Nahon, 2nd edn. (2 Vols., Paris, 2001), ii, pp. 271-2.
149 Jackson, p. 33.
150 Ibn Abi Zar, *Rawd al-Qirtas*, ed. C. Tornburg (2 vols., Uppsala, 1843-6).

several errors and omissions, making him a problematic source.[151] That said, by using Fez as the focal point around which all the dynasties he describes wheel, he provides an interesting perspective into the connections linking al-Andalus and the Maghreb. Moreover as the basis for numerous later Arabic historians, such as Ibn Khaldun, whose history of North Africa and al-Andalus is the fullest description of these times available, his work must be engaged with.[152] Not in the same league as Ibn Khaldun, but still significant is *al-Bayan al-Mughrib*, the chronicle written by the Marrakeshi historian Ibn ‘Idhari outlining the history of North Africa and al-Andalus from the capture of Egypt in 640/1 until 1312/3.[153] Completed soon afterwards, the third part of this treats the Almoravids and Almohads, where Ibn ‘Idhārī displays sound historic technique, based on careful analysis of earlier sources. Furthermore he seems genuinely interested in the Iberian Christians, meaning he presents their activities in depth.[154] This, combined with the fact his account possesses unique details, even in his generally-unremarkable treatment of Valencia, makes him a valuable source.

Alongside Ibn Khaldun and Ibn ‘Idhari, information on thirteenth century Iberia may be derived from the histories of Ibn Khaldun’s near-contemporaries in Andalusia and Egypt respectively, Ibn al-Khatib (1313-1374), and al-Zarkashi (1344–1392).[155] Though neither work is as detailed as Ibn Khaldun’s for 1230s, both occasionally provide small details which deepen the general narrative he presents. Most significantly, it is only through Ibn al-Khatib, perhaps benefitting here from being Andalusian himself, that the extent of the isolation of Zayyan ibn Mardanish, ruler of Valencia, from the rest of al-Andalus and the surviving Almohad dominions in North Africa is revealed.[156]

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[151] Idem, *Rawd al-Qirtas*, tr. A. Huici Miranda (2 vols., Valencia, 1964), i, pp. 17-20.
[152] Ibn Khaldun, vi and vii.
[153] Ibn ‘Idhari. Available in Spanish translation as A. Huici Miranda, *Colección de crónicas árabes de la Reconquista* (4 vols., Tétuan, 1951-5), iii.
[154] O'Callaghan, p. xiii [preface], Lomax, *The Reconquest of* Spain, p. 8.
[155] al-Khatib, al-Zarkashi. Latter translated as Ibn Ibrahim al-Zarkashi, *Chronique des Almohades et des Hafçides, attribué a Zerkechi*, ed. and trans. E. Fagnan (Constantine, 1895).
[156] al-Khatib, p. 272.

Briefer still for the 1230s is Ibn Sammak's history, finished 1381.[157] Essentially a summary of events under the Almoravids and Almohads, following the death of the Almohad caliph al-Mansur in 1232, it becomes increasingly succinct, with each caliph's reign given briefly. Nevertheless, given the absence of major sources for this period, it warrants some consideration. Lastly, in terms of narrative histories, mention should be made of the Algerian al-Maqqari (c.1578–1632).[158] Though writing even further after events, his work compiles many earlier authors, several of which are now lost. Indeed, the majority of this work comprises transcriptions or abridgements of other authors, with al-Maqqari only rarely speaking in his own words. Thus, despite living almost as close to the present as the 13th century, his work nevertheless occasionally casts a unique light upon events. A good example of this is his description of the political events preceding the fall of Valencia, where he gave a detailed account of the political discord within Valencia that offered James I his opportunity to conquer the city, and the failure of Ifriqiya to come to its aid.[159] Thus, while his description of the siege of Valencia itself is brief, and cannot be used without reference to other sources, he remains an author capable of making distinctive contributions to the study of this crusade.

A slightly different perspective is provided by Abu al-Fida and al-Himyari, writing in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries respectively.[160] Authors of geographical works, these number among the main sources for Muslim Iberia, due to both authors' tendency to add relevant historical information on the places described. An example is al-Himyari's section on Valencia, where besides describing the city and its environs, he enriches his account by including several letters about its fall

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[157] Huici Miranda, *Colección de crónicas árabes*, i.
[158] al-Maqqari. See also al-Maqqarī, *A History of the Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain*, tr. P. de Gayangos (2 vols., London, 1840-3).
[159] al-Maqqari, pp. 755, 759.
[160] Abu al-Fida, al-Himyari [Bilingual text]. See also Abu al-Fida, *Geographie d'Abulféda*, ed. and trans. J. Reinaud and S. Guyard (2 vols., Paris, 1848-83), ii.

in 1238 composed by the eyewitness Ibn al-Abbar.[161] To that end, both texts enable a different perspective on events to that described by James I and constitutes new tools with which to assess the motives behind, and the efficacy of, his strategy.

[161] al-Himyari, pp. ٤٧-٥٥.

Section A: Preparations

Chapter 2: The Preachers of the Triple Crusade

In undertaking this close study of the Triple Crusade, investigating its preaching campaign is the most logical place to start. A vital method of communication for medieval society at large, enabling as it did papal and ecclesiastical messages to cut across geographic and social divisions to reach the widest possible audience, in the case of the Triple Crusade preaching was the tool through which the call to action embodied by *Rachel Suum Videns* and other papal missives was translated into tangible recruitment and money.[162] In short, without it, no crusade. In this, the Triple Crusade was no different to any other.

However, while, as mentioned previously, the field of preaching studies is broad, the literature specifically pertaining to the study of crusade preaching, particularly in the second century of crusading, is more limited, and amongst the progress being made, understanding of the preaching of the Triple Crusade remains somewhat underdeveloped. In part, this may result from Maier's study of the mendicant preaching for the expeditions, the scale of which perhaps discouraged future historians from undertaking research covering the same ground.[163] This is something particularly notable in Lower's book on the "Barons' Crusade", which despite containing the most comprehensive treatment of the expeditions to date, and despite its strong papalist outlook, treats their preaching campaign only briefly.[164] This missed opportunity is then compounded by the fact

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[162] S. Menache, *The Vox Dei: Communication in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1990), p. 77 claims the ability of the papacy to convey its message across Europe underpinned the success of the Gregorian Reform programme.
[163] Maier, pp. 32-69 especially. Cf. Tyerman, *HPC*, pp. 71-2.
[164] Lower, pp. 17-24.

the book is fundamentally inaccurate in its claim that Gregory IX's use of mendicants as propagandists for these expeditions was the first time mendicants had been used as crusade preachers, and thus constituted a 'signal innovation'.[165] Given a Dominican Brother Gualla preached the cross in Italy for Frederick II's crusade in March 1228, and the papal authorisation granted to the Dominicans on 13 September 1230 to preach holy war against Prussian heretics, such a view cannot hold.[166]

However, there is a second factor working alongside the continued dominance of Maier's work to dissuade historians from discussing the preaching of the Triple Crusade: the paucity of evidence relating to it. This is most evident in the almost-total absence of chronicle evidence. Unlike the campaigns themselves, the chronicle evidence for the Triple Crusade's preaching is thin. Neither the 'Eracles' continuation nor *Les Gestes des Chiprois* mentions the propaganda campaign which begat the Holy Land crusade, while the 'Rothelin' text comments solely that Gregory ordered the clergy in general in Europe to preach the cross.[167] Hence, the only major chronicle to describe the preaching of this crusade in detail is Matthew Paris's *Chronica Maiora*, which at various points mentions, and violently criticises, the crusade preaching in England by the mendicants and others.[168] A result of this absence of information is the difficulty in reconstructing the preaching campaign's progress. For sure, it is possible to "read back" papal correspondence concerning crusade preaching and from that infer how the crusade message was disseminated. For example, based on the sending of *Quantum Nos Urgeat* to the provincial prior of the Dominicans in Germany on 15 May 1235, which increased the power of Dominicans to compel their audience to attend crusade sermons, combined with his granting Conrad II, bishop of Hildesheim the power to preach

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[165] *Ibid.* pp. 17, 23.
[166] *BP*, pp. 26, 32-3.
[167] *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.
[168] E.g. *CM*, iii, pp. 279-87, 309-13, 373-4 and iv, pp. 9, 35.

the cross in September, it seems plausible that parts of the Empire saw a recruitment from summer 1235.[169] However, the evidence is not continuous across Europe, while given the nature of papal evidence as a statement of intent, rather than evidence of activity, it cannot be properly relied on.

This absence of evidence extends to the material actually preached. In contrast to the Fifth Crusade, for which some of James of Vitry's sermons survive, or St Louis's first crusade, for which there is the evidence of Odo of Châteauroux's preaching, there are no surviving crusade sermons from the 1230s.[170] Indeed, it is only possible to reconstruct the crusade propaganda as far as saying it was based on *Rachel Suum Videns*, according to both Matthew Paris, and the resending of a copy of the bull to the papal plenipotentiary William of Cordelle in May 1237, which was presumably used as a basis for future preaching.[171] For example, it is likely that the novel image of the Mother Church, personified by Rachel, calling for aid to free her from the pollution of Islam and the call for the faithful to contribute towards the Holy Land's defence in person or with money, were repeated by numerous crusade preachers.[172] However, without firm evidence, the type of study undertaken by Maier in *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, in which he made available several *ad status* crusade sermons to a wider audience is simply not possible for the 1230s.[173] This doubtless further makes the Triple Crusade an unpromising target for study.

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[169] *BP*, p. 75, *Registres*, ii, no. 2790.
[170] For the text of two sermons by James of Vitry and five by Odo of Châteauroux see C. Maier, Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology: Model Sermons for the Preaching of the Cross* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 82-175, J. Schneyer, *Repertorium der lateinischen Sermones des Mittelalters für die Zeit von 1150-1350* (11 vols., Munich, 1969-90), iii, nos. 413-4, and iv, nos. 562, 602-4, 700.
[171] *CM*, iii, pp. 280, 309, *BF*, pp. 220-3.
[172] *ES*, pp. 492-3.
[173] Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology.* For a description of *ad status* sermons see e.g. C. Muessig, 'Audience and Preacher: ad Status Sermons and Social Classification' in Idem (ed.), *Preacher, Sermon and Audience*, p. 255.

Furthermore, the task of reconstructing the preaching of the Triple Crusade is made ostensibly less-appealing by the few named crusade propagandists discernible in the primary material. Unlike the many named participants who have come down through history only the following mendicant preachers can be identified: John of Wildeshausen, Raymond of Penyafort, William of Cordelle, William of Oléron, Roger of Lewes, and the Franciscans Renier and Peter of Philisthiim.[174] Given *Pium et Sanctum* called for a team of mendicants led by two preachers in every mendicant province, obviously this list does not constitute the sum of the Triple Crusade's propagandists. Nevertheless, for all the evident limitations of this small number, there are still several notable shared characteristics across much of this group; for example John of Wildeshausen, Raymond of Peñyafort and William of Cordelle at least were all university-educated, either at Bologna or Paris.[175] Similarly, all preached the cross solely in areas whose language they were familiar with. As will be demonstrated, both of these characteristics align with the general conclusions around who was actually involved in preaching the cross derived from other evidence. Thus this list, while not revealing in and of itself about who was disseminating the crusade message in the 1230s, does serve to reinforce the general inferences drawn, and makes possible an assessment of aspects of the 1230s preaching campaign, beyond what might have first appeared possible.

Therefore, despite the paucity of direct evidence, this thesis contends there is both historiographical scope and, thanks to the documentary records of the mendicant orders, sufficient

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[174] Maier, pp. 33-4, 42. On John of Wildeshausen see *BP*, pp. 70, 104 and A. Rother, 'Johannes Teutonicus (von Wildeshausen). Vieter General des Dominikanerordens', *Römische Quartalschrift für Christliche Alterthumskunde und für Kirchengeschichte*, 9 (1895), pp. 152-4. On Raymond of Penyafort see *Registres*, ii, no. 3480. For William of Cordelle see *Registres*, i, no. 1816 and ii, nos. 2879, 2909, 3632-3, 3903, 3923, 4105, 4519, 4585, 4627, 4640. For William of Oléron see *Ibid*. nos. 3945, 4266. For Roger of Lewes see *CM*, iii, pp. 312-3. For Brothers Renier and Peter of Philisthiim see *BF*, pp. 229-30, 256.

[175] A. Touron, *Hommes Illustres de l'Ordre de Saint Dominique* (6 vols., Paris, 1743-9), i, pp. 3-4, 96, A. Van den Wyngaert, 'Frère Guillaume de Cordelle O.F.M.', *La France Franciscaine*, 4 (1921), p. 58.

grounds to support a study into aspects of the Triple Crusade's preaching. Although knowledge of every crusade propagandist, what they preached, and where they preached it is impossible, certain questions can nevertheless be answered. For example, it is apparent that the preaching was undertaken in large part (although not exclusively) by the mendicant orders. From such orders' documentary evidence, it is possible to infer the types of men who preached the cross, which in turn can be profitably interrogated. Therefore, this section adopts the following structure. In the first instance, this chapter will reassess the great question surrounding the preaching of the Triple Crusade: why exactly Gregory chose the mendicant orders as preachers. As the field currently stands, answers to this question generally occupy quite a small range, usually emphasising Gregory's personal links to the Franciscans predating his papacy, the fact that as continent-wide itinerant city-dwelling preachers, the mendicant orders were well-placed to reach the intended audience, or the fact they answered the problem inherent in the 1215 conciliar decree *Ad liberandum*, which created an explicit link between the papacy and the christian chaplaincy within crusading armies.[176] None of these suggestions are implausible, but as a set they fail to fully explain why the choice to adopt the mendicants was made. That completed, the latter part of this chapter assesses how "novel" the mendicants were as preachers. In large part, this comprises a study of who these preachers were, and what the implications might be. Given the paucity of confirmed names for crusade propagandists at this time, this task is yet to be undertaken. However, by extrapolating from the evidence there is regarding the types of people who were entrusted with preaching the cross, there is sufficient evidence from which to ground claims as to who the preachers for the Triple Crusade were. It is therefore possible to properly evaluate the consequences of their involvement in the crusading movement.

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[176] E.g. Maier, *Preaching the Cross*, pp. 20-31, Lloyd, pp. 19-20, Tyerman, *EaC*, p. 162, Idem, *HPC*, pp. 71-2.

To this structure the following addendum should be given. While the mendicants friars were prominent throughout the propaganda campaign and expeditions of the 1230s, the evidence is clear they did not do so alone, with contributions being made by the secular clergy, led by the bishops. To see this, look no further than the papal registers, which reveal that of the 64 letters Gregory IX dispatched between 9 August 1233 (the start of the Valencian expedition) and May 1241 (the departure of Richard of Cornwall from the Holy Land) concerning crusade preaching or preaching against heretics within Europe, some 44 were to Europe's prelates, without whose oversight of preaching and revenue-raising in their dioceses, any effort towards the activation of the crusade was futile.[177] Turning to evidence outside the papal registers, papal letters being better understood as statements of intent, rather than a guide to actual events, Matthew Paris is quite explicit that the preaching of the crusade in England was undertaken most prominently by the mendicants, but that they were supported in this by a range of others, who were not members of those orders.[178] However, the activity of such figures in crusade preaching is entirely expected and is entirely consistent with previous practice. Nothing epitomises this better than Conrad II of Reisenberg, Bishop of Hildesheim who was authorised to preach the cross in September 1235.[179] Educated in Paris University before become Dean at Speyer in 1209 and Cathedral Scholastic at Mainz in 1216, Conrad had preached the cross against the Cathars in 1209, and was appointed by Honorius as overseer of all crusade recruitment activities in the Empire in 1220.[180] Thus, come the 1230s, he was well-versed in crusade preaching, as many other bishops were. Consequently such preaching is historiographically unremarkable, beyond strengthening the view the Triple Crusade was firmly

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[177] *Registres*, i, nos. 1490-1, 1504, 1534-5, 1539, 1798, 1814, 1816, 1957, 2040-4, 2200-2, 2322 and ii, nos. 2511, 2586, 2790, 2879, 2909-11, 2959, 3179-80, 3509-10, 3644, 3689, 3726, 3730, 3903, 3929-30, 3936-7, 3944-5, 4058-64, 4153, 4206, 4209-17, 4482, 4484-5, 4619-20.
[178] *CM*, iii, p. 312.
[179] *Registres*, ii, no. 2790.
[180] P. Pixton, *The German Episcopacy and the Implementation of the Decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1216-1245: Watchmen on the Tower* (Leiden, 1995), p. 203, Idem, 'Konrad von Reifenberg, eine talentierte Persönlichkeit der deutschen Kirche des 13. Jahrhunderts', *Archiv für mittelrheinische Kirchengeschichte*, 34 (1982), pp. 43-81.

located within crusade mainstream. Hence while acknowledging that mendicant preachers were not the only crusade preachers active during the 1230s, they form the basis of the discussion undertaken here.

Why were the mendicants chosen at this juncture?

In assessing why the mendicants were selected to preach the Triple Crusade, the obvious place to start is by interrogating the best-established reason given to explain why that choice was made: the fact the mendicants were the institution most able to reach the crusade propaganda's prospective audience. When explaining why the mendicant orders were uniquely capable of spreading the word of the cross, crusade historians have often identified the reason as the mendicant imperative to preach and their itinerant lifestyle, which brought them into close contact with their audience, far more effectively than others.[181] On one level, this is incontrovertible, but it is not the whole story, and obscures the role the mendicants' organisational structures played in making them favourable crusading agents. Principally, it neglects the potentially vital role exercised by how the mendicants had divided up Europe as they expanded. For unlike the established ecclesiastical divisions, consolidated and fixed at the Fourth Lateran Council, 1215, the mendicants deliberately offered the papacy a world-view of Europe in which territorial units aligned with political and linguistic reality, rather than cutting across them by being a supposedly divinely-ordained mirror of the celestial hierarchy.[182] That this was deliberately so is reflected in the emphasis by both orders on the importance of preachers knowing the language of where they were preaching. For example,

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[181] E.g. Bird, Peters and Powell (eds.), *Crusade and Christendom*, p. 276, Maier, pp. 4-5, Lloyd, pp. 19-20.

[182] On the fixing of diocesan boundaries in 1215 see A. Garcia y Garcia (ed.), *Constitutiones concilii quarti Lateranensis una cum commenatriis glossatori* (Rome, 1981), pp. 57-8. The idea that the diocesan structure of Europe mirrored the celestial hierarchy comes from the Pseudo-Dionysius. On this see R. Roques, *L'univers dionysion: Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le Pseudo-Deny* (Paris, 1954), P. Sheldon-Williams, 'The Ecclesiastical Hierachy of Pseudo-Dionysius', *The Downside Review*, 82 (1964), pp. 293-302.

Humbert of Romans (a Dominican from 1224) emphasised the importance of knowing the language of the audience in his *Treatise on Preaching*, while several of the miracles recalled in Gerard of Fracheto's *Lives of the Brethren*, a collection of stories about illustrious early Dominicans, demonstrate how correct language allowed several miracles to happen.[183] Likewise, the Dominican General Chapter of 1236 had commanded the friars to learn the languages of their neighbourhoods.[184] Furthermore, unlike the diocesan structure, mendicants offered a high degree of flexibility towards changing local circumstances, offering effective coverage of Europe's urban centres without an overlap of preaching responsibilities between two or more houses, something enshrined in constitutions of the Dominican Order.[185] Obviously, this helps explain why the mendicants spread generally, but it potentially played a crucial part in why Gregory embraced the mendicants as his crusade propagandists in the 1230s.[186] This is a theory crusade historians have not yet fully endorsed.

In suggesting this was the case, in the absence of explanations directly from Gregory himself, an instructive approach is to compare the locations of the mendicant houses, which served as bases for the teams of mendicant preachers active within each province, with the concentration of crusade recruitment. Based on the information for France and England, the areas for which the best documentation exists, by 1240 some 103 mendicant houses existed in France and 50 in England.[187]

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[183] Humbert of Romans, *De eruditione religiosarum prædicatorum*, ed. J. Catalani (Rome, 1739), pp. 21-2. Gerard of Fracheto, *Vitae Fratrum Ordinis Praedicatorum: necnon Cronica Ordinis ab anno MCCIII usque ad MCCLIV*, ed. B. Reichert (Rome, 1897), pp. 151-2, 160-1, 178.
[184] R. Bennett, *The Early Dominicans: Studies in Thirteenth Century Dominican History* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 91.
[185] G. Galbraith (ed.), *The Constitutions of the Dominican Order* (Manchester, 1925), pp. 79-82.
[186] For the swift rise of the mendicant orders see C. Lawrence, *The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society* (London, 1994), pp. 166-80, D. Bachrach, 'The friars go to war: mendicant military chaplains, 1216-ca.1300', *Catholic Historical Review*, 90 (2004), pp. 628-30.
[187] D. Knowles and R. Haycock, *Medieval Religious Houses: England and Wales* (London, 1971), pp. 213-4, 222, R. Emery, *The Friars in Medieval France: A Catalogue of French Mendicant Convents 1200-1550* (London and New York, 1962), pp. 24-123.

By any measure, this is an impressive spread, and suggests the papal letters recommending the friars to Europe's prelates were effective.[188] However, it is particularly striking that these houses' dispersal closely overlaps with the areas of crusade recruitment, suggesting it played a role in Gregory's decision to favour the mendicants as preachers for the Triple Crusade. In England, only 13 houses (26%) are located in places apparently removed from the call of the Triple Crusade, with 26 found in towns from which at least one named *crucesignatus* can be identified. It is remarkably similar in France: of the 103 houses, 66 are located in areas explicitly targeted by the crusade recruitment drive, and only 26 houses (25.2%) are located in areas divorced from the crusading appeals of the 1230s. Significantly this overlap holds true for all three branches of the Triple Crusade. For example, regarding the Holy Land expedition, see the Dominican house in Clermont, founded c.1227, a town which provided the crusading leader Simon of Clermont or the Franciscan house at Vendôme, founded before 1233, and the home of the *crucesignatus* John, Count of Vendôme.[189] Similarly, for the Constantinopolitan expedition, there are the Dominican and Franciscan houses in Valenciennes, home to John of Valenciennes, whom the mendicants were to support because he had expended all his goods on preparing for the journey to Greece.[190] Finally for the Valencian Crusade, note the Franciscan and Dominican houses in Avignon, which provided at least 2 named crusaders for the campaign against Valencia.[191] Such an extensive overlap cannot be accidental, and suggests that Gregory turned to the mendicants specifically because they were well-established where he hoped to draw recruits. Additionally, it is likely that by embracing the

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[188] *BP*, pp. 7-8, 11-2, 14, 19, 29, 63, 73, *BF*, pp. 5, 65-6, 73-6, 214-5, 218.
[189] For the Dominicans at Clermont in 1227 see M.-D. Chapotin, *Histoire des Dominicains de la province de France* (Rouen, 1898), p. 108. For the Franciscans at Vendôme before 1233 see L. Delisle, *Rouleaux des Morts* (Paris, 1866), p. 415. For Simon of Clermont and John of Vendôme see *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.
[190] 'E notitia provinciarum et domorum ordinis Praedicatorum', ed. H. Welter, in *RHGF*, xxiii, p. 189 and 'Documenta', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 10 (1917), p. 297. For John see *BF*, pp. 284-5.
[191] For these houses see *Gallia Christiana Nova*, ed. A. de Rancé *et al*. (16 vols., Paris, 1715-1865), i, p. 101, and L.-H. Labande, *Avignon aux XIII siècle* (Paris, 1908), p. 231. For the Valencian crusaders from Avignon see *LdR*, i, nos. 679-80.

mendicants, Gregory ensured the crusade took the shape it did. The specific dispersal of the mendicants throughout Western Europe therefore explains why exactly those who took the cross in response to crusade preaching had the opportunity to do so.

Regarding the potential advantages the mendicants offered to Gregory by their provinces' flexibility, an instructive example is provided by the Franciscan province for Scotland. First brought within the Franciscan orbit in 1231 when the Tweed was crossed at Berwick, the first Franciscan house there was founded at Roxburgh in 1233, although it appears the isolated Scottish Franciscans had been requesting to be organised into a province from 1232.[192] Partly because of the untimely death of Henry of Reresby, the man selected to lead the independent Scottish province in 1232, this process was slow, but was likely complete by 1233, and certainly so before 1235.[193] However, always tenuous given the few friars housed there, the province was not long-lasting, being dissolved in 1239.[194] Despite this brevity, the timings of the province's first burst of life might give the crusade historian pause, and serve as circumstantial evidence behind why Gregory selected the mendicants as preachers for the Triple Crusade. Papal correspondence is clear that Gregory envisioned some recruitment in Scotland, exemplified by his instruction to Otto, the cardinal legate in March 1238 to redeem the vows of Scottish *crucesignati* unable to fulfil their pledges in person.[195] Hence, it was natural that a Scottish province be created in the early 1230s, as a new province would facilitate crusade recruitment thither, bringing the kingdom within mainstream

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[192] For crossing of the Friars into Scotland in 1231 see A. Anderson *et al.* (eds.), *The Chronicle of Melrose: From the Cottonian manuscript, Faustina B. IX in the British Museum* (London, 1936), p. 81, W. Turnbull (ed.), *Extracta e variis cronicis scocie; From the Ancient Manuscript in the Advocates Library at Edinburgh, now first printed* (Edinburgh, 1842), p. 93. For the foundation of the Franciscan house at Roxburgh see A. Callebaut, 'A props du Bx Jean Duns Scot de Littledean. Notes et recherches historiques de 1265 à 1292', *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 24 (1931), p. 313 For the request for a separate province for Scotland in 1232 see *Monumenta Franciscana*, ed. J. Brewer and R. Howlett (2 vols., London, 1858-82), i, pp. 31-2.
[193] For the grant of a province by 1235 see Bryce, pp. 7-8.
[194] *Ibid*. p. 9.
[195] *Registres*, ii, no. 4220.

European currents, in a more effective way than relying on existing diocesan channels. That Gregory was thinking along these lines is implied in his March 1233 letter (as preparations for the Valencian Crusade commenced) reissuing his July 1227 proclamation *Ita Vobis*, the document granting the Franciscans the right to free burial, on behalf of the Franciscans in Scotland, in order to help put the province on a more secure footing.[196] Contrastingly, come 1239 it would have been obvious that widespread recruitment in Scotland was unlikely, following the death of the most high-profile Scottish landholding *crucesignatus*, John le Scot, earl of Chester and Huntingdon, on 6 June 1237.[197] With crusaders already embarking, there was thus no immediate need for the small Scottish province, meaning it could be dissolved and integrated into England. A decision taken at the Chapter General at Rome in 1239 as part of the attacks on Elias of Cartona and the superabundance of Franciscan provinces resulting from his desire to have 72 provinces (one for each of Christ's disciples), this decision likely involved Gregory IX himself, given his close involvement in this Chapter, which had been summoned on his own authority.[198] Thus, it is plausible the whole province lived and died by its potential utility to the Triple Crusade. At least, with the crusade imperative removed, there was no longer any reason why the Scottish province should not be a casualty of the slimming-down of the Franciscan organisation of Europe sought by the 1239 Chapter General. Moreover, Gregory and other Franciscans had evidently expended substantial efforts to create a Scottish Franciscan province. If those efforts were intended towards a crusade which failed to generate widespread interest, this explain why Gregory was prepared to cut his losses and abandon the province, reversing his previous policy. In short, when taken alongside other evidence, the life and death of the Franciscan province of Scotland suggests the mendicants appealed to Gregory, exactly because their institutional set-up could be moulded directly to the contours of the Triple Crusade.

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[196] Bryce, pp. 6, 416. *BF*, p. 31
[197] *CM*, iii, p. 394.
[198] *HFO*, pp. 97-101.

Besides the organisation of the Franciscan and Dominican orders helping account for why Gregory turned to them *en masse* in the 1230s as crusade agents, the lifestyle of the mendicant friar recommended him as a crusade preacher. In particular, the dedication of the friars to a lifestyle of evangelisation and apostolic poverty meant that they fulfilled an ideal requirement for the crusade preacher from the papacy's point of view; they completely undercut charismatic, unlicensed preachers.[199] As with the previous discussion regarding why and how the locations of the mendicant orders made them ideal vessels for disseminating crusade propaganda, the idea that the friar's personality and lifestyle made him an attractive crusade preacher is not *per se* new. After all, almost every historian discussing mendicant involvement in the Triple Crusade suggests their commitment to the *vita apostolica* helped inspire crusading fervour, by representing a Christian ideal that chimed with that of the model *crucesignatus*.[200] However, that the mendicant lifestyle commended them as crusade preachers because it undermined wandering, unlicensed crusade preachers has not hitherto been emphasised, despite the fact it is widely-accepted the Dominicans were the ideal organisation to combat the outwardly-similar Cathar *perfecti* for this very reason.[201] Given the wandering preacher often resembled the Cathar in his lifestyle, and given the massive threat unlicensed charismatic preachers posed to the efforts of the established Catholic hierarchy, it therefore seems unlikely this would not have weighed upon Gregory's mind. This seems especially so given Gregory was among the popes most dedicated to the crusading movement, who took the greatest

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[199] For the Dominican imperative toward these characteristics see P. Festa (ed.), *Summarium constitutionum declarationum et ordinationum, pro regimine sacri Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Paris, 1619), pp. 30-3, 126-9 [poverty] and 189-99 [preaching].
[200] E.g. Lower, p. 21, Maier, pp. 4-5, Tyerman, *HPC*, pp. 71-2.
[201] E.g. Tyerman, *God's War*, p. 581, M. Pegg, *A Most Holy War: The Albigensian Crusade and the battle for Christendom* (Oxford, 2008), p. 184.

effort to place his crusade on the most secure footing possible, an effort appreciated by both contemporary and modern authors.[202]

For the challenge posed to the successful operation of the crusade by "unofficial" charismatic preachers in the 1230s was pressing, a fact made nowhere in the current literature. For all the increasing centralisation of crusading, papal authority remained limited, a fact witnessed by the endurance of local variation in the rites for taking the cross.[203] In seeing this, note a passage from the *Vita Gregorii* IX, and its claim that Gregory's first sermon preaching the crusade in Rome in 1234 was attended by many from beyond the Alps.[204] Besides indicating the international dimension to the crusade from its earliest inception, control over these men and those they reached would necessarily be difficult, given the conflict between Gregory and Frederick II, and Frederick's general hostility towards men preaching papally-sponsored crusades.[205] However, by appointing mendicants, the prospect of rogue elements taking over the crusade message was diminished, the "market" for the inspirational preacher being filled. The real possibility of losing control of crusade recruitment was therefore reduced.

Moreover, the potential threat represented by unlicensed preachers was particularly acute during the 1230s specifically because of the financial structures Gregory employed. In particular, by

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[202] Among medieval writers, *CM*, iii, p. 309 presents Gregory as heavily involved in preparations for his crusade, as does 'Vita Gregorii IX' in *Le Liber Censuum de l'église romaine*, ed. P. Fabre and L. Duchesne (2 vols., Paris, 1889-1905), ii, p. 26. For modern commentators who reach the same view see e.g. R. Spense, 'Pope Gregory IX and the Crusade' (Syracuse Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1978), B. Weiler, 'Gregory IX, Frederick II, and the Liberation of the Holy Land, 1230-9', *Studies in Church History*, 30 (2000), pp. 192-206.

[203] Contrast J. Brundage, 'Cruce Signari: The Rite for Taking The Cross in England', *Traditio*, 22 (1966), pp. 289-310, K. Pennington, 'The Rite for Taking The Cross in the Twelfth Century', *Traditio*, 30 (1974), pp. 429-35, M. Gaposchkin, 'The Pilgrimage and Cross-blessings in the Roman Pontificals of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries' *Medieval Studies*, 73 (2011), pp. 261-86.

[204] 'Vita Gregorii IX', p. 26.

[205] *Ibid*. pp. 27-8, 31-6. For Frederick's hostility towards crusade preachers see *CM*, iv, p. 4.

expanding the concept of vow redemptions first mentioned in *Quia Maior* to include all Christians, Gregory made it essential that all preaching be licensed by due Church authority, and that all crusade preaching be executed exclusively through "official" channels.[206] Not only were preachers now entrusted with generating armed recruits for the crusade, but they also handled one of the primary sources of crusade funding.[207] Hence the kind of chaos in the 1220s alluded to by Oliver of Paderborn, with unauthorised preachers fraudulently redeeming crusading vows, would imperil both the papacy's reputation and perhaps the entire crusade itself, by jeopardising one of its main sources of finance.[208] Significantly, there is positive evidence this actually happened during the 1230s. In particular Matthew Paris, while lamenting England's condition in the late 1230s, stated there were some itinerants, ostensibly living the life of poverty, traversing England mendaciously redeeming crusading vows, and passing sentences of excommunication on those who refused to listen, backed supposedly by papal authority.[209] Given Paris labels these 'most base persons and illiterate', this must refer to wandering, unlicensed preachers, rather than the mendicant orders, whose knowledge of Latin renders the charge of illiteracy untenable.[210] This seems particularly so given when later attacking the mendicants, the distress they caused by instantly redeeming crusading vows, and the general absurdity of men dedicated to poverty handling money, Paris numbers them among 'literate men, and especially theologians'.[211] The attack on those falsely redeeming crusade vows cannot therefore number amongst Paris's usual anti-mendicant slanders. Similarly, there is evidence from Brittany suggesting that unauthorised crusade preachers were

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[206] For *Quia Maior* see G. Tangl, *Studien zum Register Innocenz III* (Weimar, 1929), pp. 88-97. For the expansion of vow redemptions in *Rachel Suum Videns* see *ES*, p. 494.
[207] Maier, pp. 138-40. See also *HdDB*, iv, no. 2310 and *Registres*, ii, nos. 3633, 3903, 3923, 4105, 4519-22, 4585, 4627, 4640 which enumerate various cases of William of Cordelle (a Franciscan) being ordered to manage the money raised through vow redemptions.
[208] H. Hoogeweg (ed.), *Die Schriften des Kölner Domscholasters, späteren Bischofs von Paderborn und Kardinal-Bischofs von S. Sabina* (Tübingen, 1894), p. 316.
[209] *CM*, iii, p. 389.
[210] 'vilissimae personae et illiteratae', *Ibid*. p. 389.
[211] 'alii viri literati, praecipue theologi', *CM*, iv, p. 9.

collecting money raised from vow redemption.[212] As Richard of San Germano makes clear, Gregory was a man prepared to take action in response to this kind of chaos, a fact testified by the measures he enacted to prevent the revenues from redeemed vows from falling into Frederick II's hands.[213] Therefore, it would be logical and characteristic for Gregory that when selecting crusading agents, he would institute a system whereby the bishops and regular clergy would fulfil their age-old role, supported by charismatic mendicant preachers, who from experience he knew could be trusted to ensure that the finances underpinning the crusade would not be lost. After all, their loyalty to Rome and institutional structures were well-suited to collecting, storing, accounting and transmitting money. The result was the situation excoriated by Matthew Paris, who exposed the perennial institutional difficulty of the poverty-sworn friars handling money.[214] However, the alternative to Gregory, of a preaching and fundraising campaign undermined by unlicensed preachers ostensibly embodying the *vita apostolica*, was far worse. Small wonder therefore that when offered the chance to use the mendicant orders to guarantee his own benefit and retain control of the crusade's message and finances, Gregory embraced the opportunity.

Alongside the mendicants' capacity to neutralise the threat posed by unlicensed preachers, their ability to fulfil the intellectual requirements of the currents flowing within Europe during the 1230s also helps to explain their adoption *en masse* as crusade propagandists. In historical writing on monasticism, there is the sense that shifts in devotional practice reflected the needs of wider society. When combined with the history of joining crusading to prevailing religious currents, it was therefore natural that Gregory would turn to the mendicants as crusade preachers during the 1230s. This idea of the mendicants as representing a naturally "better" choice of crusade preacher is reinforced by James I of Aragon, who described the Dominicans as more effective preachers and

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[212] *Registres*, ii, no. 3945, Lower, p. 123 and notes.
[213] Richard of San Germano, 'Chronica', ed. G. Pertz in *MGH-SS*, xix, p. 349.
[214] *CM*, iii, p. 287 and iv, p. 9.

confessors than any other type of cleric.[215] However, despite the broad-brush awareness of the intellectual contours of thirteenth century Europe, the necessity this phenomenon carried has not been incorporated into the studies of the mendicants as crusade preachers. Indeed, the fullest appreciation of the moral and intellectual impetus behind the mendicants is generally found in works which do not directly treat the Triple Crusade.[216]

In demonstrating this intellectual vitality of the mendicants, several possible routes exist, but perhaps the most effective is to show how by the 1230s the mendicants were already usurping the parts previously played by the monastic establishment. As early as July 1227, Gregory IX freed the Franciscans from all authority except his, bringing them into direct competitors with the older monastic orders for recruits, donations, rights, fees etc., and cutting across both the established monastic order and the secular clergy, who were the missive's primary intended audience.[217] This much is evident from his letter of 3 July 1233, where Gregory decisively ruled in favour of the Franciscans against the monks of Vézelay, even passing a sentence of excommunication against the Benedictine monks on 8 June 1233 in order to pressurise them.[218] Ultimately, this process of effective papal-sponsored replacement of the older orders with the mendicants peaked in May 1235, when the Cistercians were barred from recruiting mendicants without express papal permission, with no such ban imposed the other way.[219] This far surpassed existing prohibitions on leaving a monastic order, which merely stated that one could forsake the religious life with the consent of one's superior.[220] From this position, it is only a small step to have the mendicants replace the Cistercians as crusade propagandists. Thus, the arrival of the mendicants could mark a kind of

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[215] *LdF*, pp. 194, 202-3
[216] E.g. M. Mulchahey, *"First the Bow is Bent in Study": Dominican Education before 1350* (Toronto, 1998), pp. 50-1, Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, p. 7.
[217] *BF*, p. 31.
[218] *Ibid*. pp. 110-2.
[219] *Ibid.* pp. 159-60.
[220] S. Olson, *Daily Life in a Medieval Monastery* (Santa Barbara, 2013), pp. 59-60 and notes.

fulfilment of the underlying currents already present within crusading. For although the Cistercian role in preaching the Holy Land crusade endured into the thirteenth century, witnessed by the important part several Cistercians played on the Fourth Crusade, their role had naturally declined, in favour of a focus on the Baltic, where they proved an ideal match for the "colonial" mission being undertaken there by the Teutonic Order, and Languedoc, where they were well-established.[221] Similarly, despite their long history in Iberia, dating back to the foundation of Moreruela Abbey in 1133, there is not a single mention of the Cistercian in James's *Llibre dels Fets*, unlike the mendicants, who appear throughout, particularly at prominent moments.[222] This replacement of the Cistercians was particularly evident from the Fifth Crusade onwards, in which Paris university-trained *magistri* such as Oliver of Paderborn or James of Vitry took a prominent role in the preaching of the cross.[223] Given the mendicant orders' focus on education, above and beyond the monastic orders, they therefore offered a way to "unify" the two previous types of crusade preacher, combining a formidable university education with a monastic dedication to the ideal Christian life. Small wonder therefore that Gregory would turn to them, while also suggesting they were ideal candidates for the job. Certainly, as the mendicants replaced the Cistercians across much of Europe,

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[221] Geoffrey of Villehardouin, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. and trans. E. Faral (2 vols., Paris, 1938-9), i, pp. 82-5, 94-9 [Old French text facing translation]. On the Cistercians in the Baltic see e.g. I. Fonnesberg-Smhmidt, *The Popes and the Baltic Crusade 1147-1254* (Leiden, 2007), pp. 42, 162-4, N. Bourgeois, 'The Cistercians and the Livonia Crusade', *Revue Historique*, 635 (2005), pp. 521-60. On the Baltic Crusades in general see E. Christiansen, *The Northern Crusades* (London, 1997). On the Cistercians in Languedoc see e.g. E. Fachinger, 'Les cisterciens de Languedoc aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles, d'après les documents ponticaux', *Cahiers de Fanjeaux*, 21 (1986), pp. 45-69, B. Kienzle, 'Defending the Lord's Vineyard: Hildegard of Bingen's Preaching against the Cathars', in C. Muessig (ed.), *Medieval Monastic Preaching* (Leiden, 1998), pp. 163-81, Idem, *Cistercians, Heresy and Crusade in Occitania, 1145-1229: Preaching in the Lord's Vineyard* (Woodbridge, 2001).

[222] On Moreruela Abbey see A. de la Granja, 'El Monasterio de Moreruela: La primera fundación cisterciense en España', *Cistercium*, 50 (1998), pp. 313-33. For the mendicants in the Valencian campaign see *LdF*, pp. 194, 203.

[223] James states in one of his sermons that he studied in Paris; see A. Lecoy de la Marche, *La chaire française au money âge, spécialement au XIIIe siècle, d'après les manuscrits contemporains* (Paris, 1886), pp. 53-4. Oliver's presence in Paris is attested by a document issued in 1207; R. Hiestand, 'Oliver Scholasticus und die Pariser Schulen zu Beginn des 13. Jahrhunderts: Zu einem neuen Textfund', *Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins*, 58 (1987), p. 15.

there was no cause to reverse the trend away from using the Cistercians as crusade propagandists, a trend begun by the universities whose alumni extended to the papacy itself.[224]

Moreover, strengthening this idea that the mendicants, like the university-educated *magistri*, constituted a 'natural' successor to previous monastic preachers, it appears the idea of supplanting them with the mendicants extended beyond the papacy. For example, Gerard of Fracheto in his account of Jordan of Saxony's life specifically had him preach the superior virtues of his order to a group of Cistercians he was staying with, a pointed anecdote reflecting Gerard's own feelings about the supremacy of his order.[225] This idea is not unique to Gerard amongst Dominican authors. In his *Treatise on Preaching*, Humbert appropriated the association of military language with faith that once defined the Cistercians, and applied them to his ideal preacher, which given his claim that preachers must live in apostolic poverty, must refer to his own order.[226] Humbert then reinforces this usurpation of the Cistercians through his profession that preaching is far superior to prayer alone, mortification of the flesh or the study of scripture.[227] Warming to his theme, Humbert criticised the spiritual uselessness of those who remain cloistered indefinitely, before finishing his criticism of the other monastic orders by stating that the ideal Dominican would upbraid any cleric or monk he meets on his preaching circuit for being spiritually lax, and encourage them to lead a better life.[228] Beyond indicating the mentality of leading Dominicans, these criticisms matter given the mendicants were as much products of the thirteenth century's reforming tendencies as they were agents of reform, and thus represent broader perspectives.[229] When combined with the existing momentum in crusade preaching, and the favour shown towards the mendicants in papal circles and

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[224] E.g. Popes Adrian IV and Innocent III were Paris alumni.
[225] Gerard of Fracheto, *Vitae Fratrum*, ed. Reichert, pp. 139-40.
[226] Humbert of Romans, *De eruditione*, ed. Catalani, pp. 7, 8-11.
[227] *Ibid.* pp. 41-2.
[228] *Ibid*. pp. 55, 62.
[229] Maier, *Crusade Propaganda and Ideology*, p. 7.

beyond, it would therefore be odd for Gregory not to have selected them as preachers. In this, the Triple Crusade follows established practice in the flexible ideological category that is crusading: joining it at the hilt to the religious organisation which best represented the *zeitgeist* of the times.[230]

Yet if the contemporary intellectual atmosphere prejudiced Gregory in favour of choosing the mendicants as crusade preachers, then the same also goes for the practical state of monasticism. It was well-established by the 1230s that monks would help preach the cross, testified by the Fifth Crusade, which had witnessed the involvement of numerous religious clergy alongside the Paris-trained theology graduates, exemplified by the Cistercian abbots Eberhard of Salem, Peter of Neuenberg and Friedrich of Sichem who all received commissions from Innocent III as crusade procurators, or Caesar of Heisterbach, a Cistercian whose abbey participated in the preaching of the Fifth Crusade, and who recorded several crusade *exempla* current within the preaching campaign.[231] It was natural therefore that monks would participate in the upcoming campaign, for all that crusade preaching was increasingly dominated by university graduates. Yet at this time "traditional" monasticism was entering a period of stagnation, or more likely, decline. This is demonstrable in several ways. For example by the mid-thirteenth century new monastic houses were being established with strict limits on the number of monks resident in them, typified by Hailes Abbey, which despite supposedly costing Richard of Cornwall 10,000 marks, was not to house more than 20 monks, far below the manpower of comparable institutions, which generally housed c.35-100 monks.[232] Such limits had only rarely been imposed before 1200, but were increasingly commonplace by the mid-13th century, as concerns to securely endow monastic properties grew

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[230] On this see e.g. W. Purkis, *Crusading spirituality in the Holy Land and Iberia, c.1095-c.1187* (Woodbridge, 2008), pp. 56-7.
[231] For the abbots see Powell, p. 24. For the Caesar of Heisterbach's *exempla* see R. Röhricht (ed.), *Testimonia minora de quinto bello sacro* (Geneva, 1882), pp. 162-79.
[232] *CM*, v, p. 262, C. Morris, *The Papal Monarchy: The Western Church from 1050-1250* (Oxford, 1989), p. 542.

and the supply of monastic recruits declined.[233] Similarly, by the 1230s, the link between older monastic orders and the learning essential for effective crusade preaching was increasingly frayed. Nowhere captures this better than Robert Grosseteste's warning that the friars must persist in their studies or face the ignorance of other orders.[234] This was besides many houses' rising debts, which while not critical by the 1230s, combined with other political pressures, and economic change to create a "perfect storm" against traditional monasticism.[235] Hence, even putting aside intellectual concerns, besides the forces of precedent and institutional inertia, there was little reason for the energetic Gregory IX to fight recent trends in monasticism. This was especially so considering the mendicant orders' vitality, which had seen them found some 103 houses in France, and 50 in England by 1240, many in major population centres.[236]

Furthermore, the association of both mendicant orders with the universities made them even more attractive, particularly following the decline of the older monastic orders' links to Europe's educational powerhouses. From the outset, the Dominican order had emphasised the importance of learning, shown by its 1228 Constitutions, which mentioned the education of friars first in the introduction, before devoting an entire chapter to provisions for students.[237] Nor were these empty words: St Dominic had sent the largest group of his brethren to Paris upon the dispersal of the friars in 1217, as the first step toward establishing a pan-European Order.[238] Similarly, the Dominicans' actions in general, such as their decision to hold their chapter-generals in the period of the Triple

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[233] Constrast e.g. the foundation document of Merton College Oxford in 1264, a smaller establishment than Hailes Abbey, still envisaged being a place of theological learning for twenty masters of arts. For this see J. Heywood and J. Halliwell (eds.), *The foundation documents of Merton College, Oxford* (London, 1843), p. 6.
[234] Thomas of Ecclestone, *Fratris Thomae vulgo dicti de Eccleston Tractatus de adventu fratrum minorum in Angliam*, ed. A. Little (Manchester, 1951), p. 91.
[235] This process is outlined in Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, pp. 543-4.
[236] Emery, *The Friars in Medieval France*, pp. 24-123, Knowles and Haycock, *Medieval Religious Houses*, pp. 213-4, 222.
[237] *AfL*, pp. 194, 223.
[238] T. Mamachi, *Annalium Ordinis Praedicatorum libri duo* (Rome, 1756), p. 283.

Crusade in either Paris or Bologna, the great centres of European learning, testify to a determination to put this dedication to learning into practice.[239] Not always as emphatic about the value of education, the Franciscans nevertheless followed closely behind; for all Francis's indifference towards learning, the Franciscans were quickly established in the centres of European scholarship, epitomised in their foundation of a house in Oxford soon after their arrival in England in 1224, and the letters written by Gregory to the Bishop of Paris in Summer 1225 asking him to protect the Franciscans settling thither, and to maintain their privileged state.[240] With the declining intellectual state of traditional monasticism, all this naturally helps account for Gregory's adoption of the mendicants, with a greater depth of understanding that previously attainable. None of this information is unknown *per se*; mendicant education is a broad topic of historical inquiry, and its knock-on effects for the crusades appreciated to a degree, but the significance of the mendicant move towards education for the crusades, and the wider context of monastic decline it occurred within, have not yet been appreciated.[241]

The identity of the mendicant crusade preachers

The friars' educational background and their dedication to learning in order to improve their preaching is moreover important beyond spurring Gregory to delegate much of the Triple Crusade's preaching to the mendicants. Though its role here seems indubitable, the fact of the mendicants' strict rules around education and in particular who was entitled to preach, and the educational qualifications necessary, also allows assessment of the people actually involved in crusade

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[239] Galvagno de la Flamma, *Cronica Ordinis Praedicatorum ab anno 1170 usque ad 1333*, ed. B. Reichert (Rome, 1897), pp. 90-2.
[240] *HFO*, p. 123, Knowles and Haycock, *Medieval Religious Houses*, p. 227, *BF*, pp. 21-3.
[241] On mendicant education see e.g. B. Roest, 'The Franciscan School System: Reassessing the early evidence (ca. 1220-1260)' in M. Robson and J. Röhrkasten (eds.), *Franciscan Organisation in the Mendicant Context* (Berlin, 2010), pp. 253-79, Mulchahey, *"First the Bow is Bent in Study"*. Tyerman, *HPC*, pp. 72-3 makes this point.

preaching in the 1230s. This strictness is something suggested by Humbert of Romans who claimed that, besides leading an exemplary life, the ideal preacher must be well-educated in scripture, canon law, the sciences and natural world, Latin and vernacular languages, and be of a suitable age and disposition to endure hardship.[242] To these general qualifications, Hugh of St. Cher (a noted biblical commentator who became prior provincial of France following his consecration in the Order in 1225), added the necessity of obedience to the Dominican hierarchy, by stating Dominicans should only preach with their superiors' permission.[243] Adding greater specificity about the preacher's age, the 1228 Constitutions stated he had to be at least 25 years old, in order to have studied sufficiently to properly execute his office.[244] Indeed, such was the mendicants' tight control over who could preach, that historians have commented that in itself, it explains why the mendicants were adopted as crusade preachers.[245]

However, in terms of understanding who preached the cross in the 1230s, the key passages from the 1228 Constitutions are not those regulating a preacher's age, but those defining his eligibility for different types of preaching. In particular, the two key provisions are those stating that no-one was to preach publicly without completing at least a four-year course of theological study, and that the only type of preacher permitted to travel within his province was the preacher-general, who must have completed a similar course of study.[246] Starting with the latter, it is meaningful because of *Pium et Sanctum*, the October 1234 document entrusting the preaching of the crusade to the mendicant orders. In particular, by dividing the preaching into provinces, and ordering such preaching to be carried out by two men appointed by the provincial head of each order, under the

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[242] Humbert of Romans, *De eruditione*, ed. Catalani, pp. 19-21, 24.
[243] Hugh of St Cher, *Opera omnia in universum vetus et novum testamentum*, ed. J. Haguetan and W. Barbier (7 vols., Venice, 1669-1700), i, pp. 114, 138, 223-4.
[244] *AfL*, p. 224.
[245] Lower, p. 21, Lloyd, p. 19,
[246] *AfL*, p. 223.

terms of the 1228 Constitutions, Gregory limited the choice of potential preachers to preachers-general and direct papal appointees, as only they possessed the liberty to wander throughout their province.[247] Turning to the former, its significance lies in the extent of schooling now required by crusade preachers; a four-year course of study meant all preachers necessarily required a university-standard education. However, this was possible given that by the mid-1230s the Franciscans, for example, had established houses attached to the universities of Paris, Oxford, Cambridge, Bologna, Padua, Naples, Toulouse, Montpellier, Valladolid and Salamanca, and where universities were not yet properly constituted (as in the Empire), they established houses which could teach to an appropriate standard, as at Erfurt or Cologne.[248]

Given the overlap between these two directives, the type of mendicant crusade preacher for the Triple Crusade is revealed; the university graduate with a religious calling. This insight is significant for two principal reasons. For one, it fills in the gap in current historical knowledge about who preached the Triple Crusade. There is no evidence relating to the preaching of the Triple Crusade from the level below *Pium et Sanctum* (i.e. what was going on within each mendicant province), making individual mendicant preachers hard to identify. Thus for all his study into the mendicants as crusade preachers in the thirteenth century, Maier names only four preachers: John of Wildeshausen, who was sent into Hungary in October 1234 and helped to organise the crusade in defence of the Latin Empire, Raymond of Penyafort, the compiler of Gregory IX's *Decretals* in 1230 and head of the Dominican Order 1238-1240, who was ordered by Gregory IX in 1237 to help oversee Ramon Folch of Cardona's preparations for his crusade to Valencia, William of Cordelle, the papal representative in France who oversaw the preaching and financing campaigns there, and William of Oléron, who was sent to Poitou in April 1238 to preach and to persuade Peter of Brittany

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[247] *BP*, p. 70, *BF*, p. 139.
[248] *HFO*, pp. 125-39.

to fulfil his Holy Land vow in Greece.[249] To these may be added other names, such as Roger of Lewes, a man famous for the miracles which accompanied his sermons, the Franciscan brother Renier who obliged Rudolph of Greifenstein to crusade as penance for his murder of Berthold, a canon of Konstanz cathedral, and the Franciscan Peter of Philisthiim, who helped William of Cordelle in his preaching campaign, and handling of the money raised through vow redemptions.[250] Even so, collectively these names are too few to allow firm conclusions to be drawn, meaning historians do not pass judgement on who preached the cross in the 1230s. Indeed the closest judgement made in this regard was by Tyerman, who argued that over the thirteenth century, preaching passed from university-educated clerics to university-educated mendicants, using the examples of Humbert of Romans and Albert the Great.[251] However, given the evidence of the 1228 Constitutions, one can be certain about who preached the cross in the 1230s (university-level graduates), even with few of the c.88 preachers involved in preaching campaign known by name.[252] Thus, it is therefore possible to "bring forward" with confidence the conclusions Tyerman reached and apply them to the crusade propaganda of the 1230s.

Yet the greatest significance of this certainty over who preached Triple Crusade stems from the remarkable similarity of the mendicant crusade preacher to previous crusade propagandists. Because it is certain the crusade preachers in the 1230s were university-educated, one can state they were exactly like then men who had previously disseminated the crusade: for all the apparent disruption and sudden change the arrival of the mendicants promised, on an individual level, change

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[249] See footnote 174.
[250] *CM*, iii, pp. 312-3, *BF*, pp. 229-30, 256.
[251] Tyerman, *HPC*, p. 73.
[252] By 1239 there were 32 Franciscan Provinces in Europe, for which see J. Moorman, *Medieval Franciscan Houses* (New York, 1983), p. 691. According to a 1277 catalogue of priories, there were 12 Dominican provinces by that date, which can be taken as an upper limit for the 1230s. For this see W. Hinnebusch, *The Dominicans: A Short History* (Dublin, 1985), p. 19. Given *Pium et Sanctum* requested two preachers in every province from each order, this suggests a rough total of around 88 mendicant preachers overall.

was minimal. One instructive way to illustrate this is to compare the mendicant preachers of the 1230s with those who had preached previous crusades. For example, amongst the preachers of the Fifth Crusade, the most illustrious, Oliver of Paderborn and James of Vitry both studied at Paris.[253] Similarly amongst university-standard educated men were many of the other preachers on this campaign, such as Robert of Courçon or Caesar of Heisterbach.[254] Likewise, among the preachers for the Fourth Crusade, Fulk of Neuilly attended Paris University, while the papal legate to France, Peter of Capua, had taught at Paris.[255] Thus, the Triple Crusade represents continuity, sitting well within mainstream crusade practice. The idea it constituted a "minor" crusade, distinctive for its oddness, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, the association of the educated friars with crusade preaching survived the 1230s. For example, the mendicants remained Gregory IX's spearhead in his crusade against Frederick II from 1239 onwards, testified by Matthew Paris who, continuing his previous criticisms, attacked the mendicants' extortion of money from England for the war against Frederick.[256] Likewise, the Franciscan author Salimbene di Adam recorded in his *Chronicle* that Louis IX retained close connections with the Franciscan friars preaching the cross for his first crusade, even personally seeking their prayers and counsel, and allowed them to eat from his table.[257] Thus, the personnel behind the preaching for the Triple Crusade undercut the idea that the mendicant involvement in the crusades represented a novelty. Rather than overseeing a revolution in crusade practice, it seems Gregory undertook a natural evolution of the crusade message and how

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[253] See footnote 221.
[254] Robert studied at Oxford, Paris and Rome before becoming Chancellor of Paris University in 1211; N. Schofield and G. Skinner, *The English Cardinals* (Oxford, 2007), p. 27. Caesar of Heisterbach was educated at the Cathedral School in Cologne by one Rudolf, a Paris lecturer; Caesar of Heisterbach, *The Dialogue on Miracles*, ed. and trans. H. von Scott and C. Bland, with an introduction by G. Coulton (New York, 1929), p. xiv and references [introduction].
[255] For Fulk in Paris see D. Queller, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople* (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 2. For Peter see W. Maleczek, *Petrus Capuanus: Kardinal, Legat am vierten Kreuzzug, Theologe (†1214)* (Vienna, 1988), pp. 69-71.
[256] *CM*, iv, pp. 133-4, 137.
[257] 'Cronica Fratris Salimbene de Adam ordinis minorum', ed. O. Holder-Egger in *MGH-SS*, xxxii, pp. 222-5.

it reached its audience. So the Cistercians, and then Paris-trained *magistri* had dominated, so now would the mendicants, who by combining university institutions with a religious order's zeal, constituted the logical fulfilment of both impulses.

Conclusions

Thus for all that the preaching of the Triple Crusade presents a radically different picture to previous expeditions *prima facie*, detailed study of that preaching campaign actually suggests the opposite. Regardless of period, place or specialism, historians like seeing "revolutionary" change in their subjects, perhaps because the idea of sudden and drastic change helps justify why scholars should take an interest in a particular subject.[258] Though not explicitly talked of in such terms, these instincts have dominated the study of crusade preaching in the 1230s. Hence, the presentation of mendicant involvement in crusade preaching as a radical, root-and-branch change, arising from the extraordinary spread of the mendicant orders, and fanned by the energetic Gregory IX, the "great man" at the centre of the crusades, who continued the paternalistic, supportive role he had adopted when merely Cardinal Hugolino of Ostia. However, unlike these interpretations, this investigation suggests a much more prosaic situation: given the intellectual currents dominant by the 1230s, the rise of the mendicant orders and the decline of traditional monasticism, it was always likely that Gregory would turn to them when he did. Thus, the application of mendicants to crusade propaganda represents the latest stage of wedding crusading ideology to prevailing currents within religious life. Moreover, by maximising the efficacy of the crusade's preaching and revenue-collection by marginalising "unofficial" preachers, and by offering a method of dividing up Europe

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[258] For a succinct evaluation of what the category "revolution" entails see D. Krishna, 'The Concept of Revolution: An Analysis', *Philosophy East and West*, 23 (3), (July 1973), pp. 291-7.

so as to ease dissemination of the crusade message, the mendicants were natural vehicles to disseminate the cross.

This overall conservatism of the preaching campaign gains even greater momentum when considering the typology of the preachers themselves. Regardless of the institutional change resulting from the movement towards the mendicants, the kind of person actually conducting the preaching campaign changed very little. Thus, just as historians are aware that little of what the mendicants offered as institutions was new, so they should be aware that the mendicant crusade preachers were drawn from identical intellectual *milieux* to their previous counterparts.[259] In this sense, what becomes clear is the importance of the universities within Europe to crusading, as they provided the intellectual hothouses to nourish the movement as it underwent the changes associated with its second century. This is true both for the many unnamed preachers, and for the select known individuals. Equally, the Triple Crusade's place within crusading mainstream seems assured, continuing as it did previous patterns and establishing a practice followed by successive expeditions. In short, just as the specific activities of the mendicant crusade preachers, for example the idea of preaching campaigns being led by a pair, furthered previous practice, so too were the people entrusted with the *negotium crucis*.[260] Whatever happened on the expeditions themselves, in inception they were products of evolution, not revolution.

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[259] E.g. E. Davison, *Forerunners of St Francis* (New York, 1927) claims the mendicants marked the culmination of previous developments in monasticism.

[260] E.g. teams of mendicants headed by two leaders appear in the May 1228 Franciscan mission sent to Frederick II, the February 1232 Dominican mission sent to the Duke of Brabant and the May 1233 joint mission to Greece to seek Church unity: see *Bullarii Franciscani epitome sive Summa bullarum in eiusdem Bullarii quattuor prioribus tomis relatarum addito supplemento*, ed. C. Eubel (Quaracchi, 1908), no. 44, and *BP*, pp. 37, 50-1.

Chapter 3: Funding the Triple Crusade

Yet while the Triple Crusade cannot be fully understood without knowing its preaching campaign, the picture painted is obviously only partial as it alone cannot explain how the armies that undertook the expeditions were constructed. In order to begin to appreciate this, study of the funding methods used must be undertaken, as without sufficient revenue no crusade, regardless of intention, can exist. This is a fact well-understood by contemporary commentators, later medieval planners of hypothetical future crusades, and increasingly by modern historians of the crusades.[261]

However, while crusade finance in general is relatively well-understood, such cannot be said for the Triple Crusade, as there no close analysis of the funding methods specifically employed in any expedition. For example, given their concern to fix a chronology for the campaign, crusade finance featured in neither the Painter, Röhricht or Jackson articles, nor the Balard chapter on the Levantine crusade. Similarly, as the expedition has never been the subject of a monograph, any mentions of the funding methods used during the Valencian crusade are subsumed within wider analyses of the financial strategies used across the Reconquista.[262] Likewise, given the paucity of evidence, treatment of the funding mechanisms underpinning Baldwin II's crusade is often ephemeral.[263] Thus, Lower's book provides the fullest extant account of the funding for the Triple Crusade. However, this cannot be labelled a definitive study for several reasons. Firstly, by primarily

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[261] E.g. In 1149 Louis commented to Abbot Suger that crusading was impossible without great expense; 'Epistolae Sugerii Abbatis S. Dionysii' in *RHGF*, xv, pp. 508-9, while Marino Sanudo Torcello stated no crusade could succeed without pre-planned financing; Marino Sanudo Torsello, *The Book of the Secrets of the Faithful of the Cross: Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis*, ed. and trans. P. Lock (London, 2016), pp. 61-2. Amongst others J. France, *Western Warfare in the age of the Crusades, 1000–1300* (London, 1999), ch. 10, A. Murray, 'Money and Logistics in the First Crusade', in J. Pryor (ed.), *Geography, Technology and War: Studies in the maritime history of the Mediterranean 649-1571* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 229-50 discuss crusade finances and logistics.
[262] O'Callaghan, pp. 164-5, 169, 172.
[263] E.g. Gilles, pp. 176-7, 184-8, 194-7, Giebfried, pp. 257-9, 272-3.

assessing Gregory IX's attempt to generate a unified Christendom, the overwhelming majority of the material pertaining to crusade finance relates to Gregory's development of the idea of vow redemptions for cash.[264] Indeed besides vow redemptions, Lower's treatment of funding is sporadic. For example, while alluding to sources of cash beyond vow redemptions in his analysis of the reception to crusade preaching in England, his treatment thereof is unsystematic, being intended to show Gregory's limited control over potential crusaders' pursestrings.[265] Secondly, Lower's treatment of the funding employed in France is cursory. Tracing specific responses to the crusade appeal, rather than general patterns, the only French *crucesignatus* whose finances are treated in detail is Thibaut of Champagne, with even Peter of Dreux's finances passed over without comment, despite his response to the papal call comprising a full chapter.[266]

Hence, more can be said about the funding methods used by the crusaders in the 1230s. For example, by taking a comprehensive approach to the funding sources for the Triple Crusade as a topic in their own right, it will be possible to properly understand what they were. While the label "crusades" applied to the series of redemptive holy wars instituted by the medieval papacy does imply a somewhat monolithic nature, as might be expected given the phenomenon took place across a wide geographic spread, over nearly 700 years when taken in its broadest sense, the nature of crusading evolved over time.[267] This crusade historians freely admit.[268] Consequently, studying the Triple Crusade's funding allows one to place the expeditions in the overall narrative of crusading. Secondly, through the international approach to the expeditions proposed, regional continuities and variations in how the crusade was financed become clear. This enables conclusions about the

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[264] Lower, pp. 1-2, 14-7, 27-32, 35-6, 54-7, 69-72.
[265] *Ibid*. pp. 136-9, 141-4.
[266] *Ibid.* pp. 103-5, 111-2.
[267] C. Tyerman, *The World of the Crusades: an illustrated history* (New Haven, 2019), p. 422.
[268] E.g. D. Jones, *Crusaders: An Epic History of the Wars for the Holy Lands* (London, 2019), pp. 4-5, C. Tyerman, 'The Holy Land and the Crusades of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries', in P. Edbury (ed.), *Crusade and Settlement* (Cardiff, 1985), p. 105.

political processes occurring in these places. Similarly, by looking at the crusades of the 1230s through a broad lens, the degree of continuity between crusades, and thus where to locate the balance between locally-distinct aspects of crusading financing and those methods which overrode national territorial divisions, can be assessed.

Support provided by royalty

Of all the funding used to assemble the forces responding to Gregory's appeals, perhaps the most striking is how far Europe's crowned heads invested in the campaign, despite only James of Aragon and Thibaut of Navarre personally taking the cross. An involvement which further undermines the label "Barons' Crusade" for these expeditions, how far these crusades depended on investment from contemporary monarchs has not yet been sufficiently appreciated. For example, when evaluating the funding methods available to English crusaders in this expedition, Lloyd suggested that Henry III could influence crusades, but only when he himself was a *crucesignatus*, something not the case in the 1230s.[269] Similarly, Lower presented Henry III and Louis IX as somewhat passive agents in the process of crusade recruitment, allowing events to take their course, and only intervening to lend funds in a small, delusory fashion.[270]

However, the sources suggest both monarchs were more active than that. Starting in England, Henry III proved an active supporter for many taking the cross for Outremer, ranging from the great lords down to those who numbered among the 'common people' who accompanied Richard of Cornwall on campaign.[271] For example, he patronised the Military Orders extensively, lending

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[269] Lloyd, p. 91.
[270] Lower, pp. 41-2, 142.
[271] Chronicon vulgo dictum chronicon Thomae Wykes', in *Annales Monastici*, ed. H. Luard (5 vols., London, 1864-9), iv, pp. 86-7, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 527-8.

£1,000 to Theodoric, prior of the Hospitallers in England, gifting £30 to Robert, master of the Templars in England, and granting an annual payment of 40 marks to the Hospitallers, Teutonics or the Order of St Lazarus, and of 50 marks to the Templars in this period.[272] Similarly, Henry's generosity towards *crucesignati* saw him grant various sums to those of lower social status. Thus, amongst others receiving the King's gift, Robert of Musters received advanced payment on his yearly fee of 20*l*. for 3 years, like Giles of Clifford, who was offered a 2-year advance on his annual fee of 15*l*.[273] Besides advances in yearly fees, there are examples such as Robert of Govyz who received £60 to use as an imprest, and Roland of Bray who was granted a one-off gift of 20 marks to support his journey overseas.[274] Likewise, a larger gift was given to Amalric of Saint Amand, who received 50 marks from the king.[275] Taken together, this evidence presents Henry as much more than a passive observer of events.

If anything, Louis IX exceeded Henry's support for the Levantine expedition. Among the nobility, Thibaut of Champagne, a man Louis had every reason to distrust given his history of insurrection against the crown and who was hardly lacking in wealth, received 45*l*. to support his army, Radulf of Tourgeville was gifted 48*l*. to buy a horse, while Richard of Cornwall, already fantastically wealthy and not even Louis's subject, obtained extensive financial support upon his arrival in France *en route* overseas.[276] Further down the social scale, Louis appears equally forthcoming. To list only some, Gerard, 'a poor knight', received 100*s*., Henry of Pissiaco 32*l*., William of Saint Benedict 20*s*., and Peter of Marly 50*l*.[277] Furthermore, Louis's support extended below knightly rank. For some, such as the royal hatter who received 100*s*., the unnamed valet who

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[272] *CPR*, p. 209, *CLR*, i, pp. 244, 265, 297, 323, 333, 347, 375, 422, 475, 499-500 and ii, p. 46
[273] *CLR*, i, p. 379, and ii, p. 29
[274] *Ibid*, i, pp. 373, 380.
[275] *Ibid*, p. 471.
[276] 'Itinera', pp. 589, 597, *CM*, iv, p. 45.
[277] 'Itinera', pp. 593, 595, 596 [bis].

used to guard the palfrey of Louis's sister Isabelle who received 20*s*., or a Rousellus from the queen's stables who also received 100*s*., a royal connection and thus motive to provide finance is obvious, all these cases being personal for Louis.[278] However, there are many for which this was not the case. By way of exempla, the links between Louis and people like Roterus the crossbowman, Durandus, a man from the bakery of the Count of Arras, the ferreter Stephanulus of Loraine, or Perrinus, a companion of John the chicken-keeper, all of whom received royal gifts, remain unknown.[279] One plausible answer to this conundrum is however available if Louis is presented as an ardent supporter of this crusade, beyond what previous interpretations have allowed, a decade before he took the cross himself.

Yet the extent of Louis's personal dedication towards this crusade shines through clearest in his support for Amalric of Montfort. Close to Louis as Constable of France, Amalric epitomises Louis's close personal support, witnessed in gifts supposedly totalling 32,000*l*. according to Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, and less speculatively, an outright donation of 333*l.* 6*s.* 8*d*., and later 32*l*. for an coat of mail and shoes and 60*s*. for a horse's saddle and bits.[280] However, perhaps most telling is Louis's concession of the right to bear the royal arms of the Fleur-de-Lys on crusade, which made him almost Louis's personal representative on the expedition, the embodiment of his commitment to it.[281] Thus although neither Louis IX nor Henry III personally took the cross, the picture of them that emerges is of two men deeply involved in the expedition, and prepared to put their money where their mouth was, notwithstanding the other calls for their time, attention and money, with

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[278] *Ibid*. pp. 592, 595, 597.
[279] *Ibid*. pp. 594 [bis], 595, 596.
[280] Alberic, p. 946, 'Magna Recepta et Magna Expensa de Termino Ascensionis M.CC. XXXVIII', in *RHGF*, xxi, p. 260, 'Itinera', p. 597.
[281] Alberic, p. 946, Le Goff, *Saint Louis*, p. 215.

neither completely master of his nobility.[282] The money available from vow redemption may have been the newest and most immediately-striking funds available, but to focus on it exclusively is to neglect the backing given by the English and French crowns. Moreover, their injection of money is perhaps especially significant given the lack of clarity over what the funds raised through vow redemptions actually were.

Regarding the Constantinopolitan crusade, the evidence pointing towards intense royal involvement is similarly striking. For example, despite the preaching campaign initiated by Gregory in England in October 1237 under Peter of Roches, Bishop of Winchester for the Latin Empire yielding no known recruits, suggesting the limited hold over the crusading imagination Constantinople possessed compared to Jerusalem, Henry III gave relatively generously to Baldwin II upon his coming to England.[283] Indeed, Baldwin left the country with a gift of 500 or 700 marks, depending on source cited.[284] That Henry did this despite the considerations against the Greek expedition, and additionally when considering the expedition constituted a direct competitor to the Holy Land campaign his brother and many of his subjects were involved in, deepening its emotional resonance, only further indicates his commitment to crusading.[285]

In France, perhaps unsurprisingly given their familial connections, Louis appears even more generous to Baldwin than Henry. Indeed, lacking certainty over the revenues generated from papal sources, it seems reasonable to say the existence of the campaign depended upon his support, even

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[282] E.g. Henry faced the revolt of the *crucesignati* Gilbert Marshal and his brother in 1238, while Louis confronted the revolt of Peter of Dreux (another *crucesignatus*) in 1236. For these revolts see R. Stacey, *Politics, Policy and Finance under Henry III, 1216-45* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 118-31 and S. Painter, *The Scourge of the Clergy: Peter of Dreux, Duke of Brittany* (Baltimore, 1937), pp. 92-4.
[283] For Peter of Roches's preaching campaign, see *Registres*, ii, no. 3944.
[284] *CM*, iii, pp. 481, 486, *Registres*, ii, nos. 4608-9.
[285] Lower, pp. 130, 133-40 describes how the Constantinople crusade operated against the Holy Land in England.

without considering the huge sums Louis pumped into the expedition through his purchase of many Constantinopolitan relics, the sale of which constituted the Latin Empire's principal source of money. For instance, substantial gifts to Baldwin recur in the surviving evidence; at least 4,800*l.*, of which 3,000*l.* remained outstanding at the feast of the Ascension in 1238, 100*l.* towards his expenses on Pentecost 1239, 60*l.* for a warhorse, and lastly 21*l.* for a palfrey.[286] By any reckoning, the picture presented by these is of a man deeply invested in Baldwin's crusade, beyond the cynical interpretation of Louis's aid presented by Gilles.[287] Yet any expectation that Louis might back his cousin notwithstanding, his commitment to the Greek crusade far surpasses reasonable expectations, as Louis apparently supported many taking the cross for Constantinople. Moreover, like his support for the Outremer expedition, his personal links to the recipients are not always obvious; while his connections to 6 named servants of the court heading to Constantinople, or Thomas, valet of William lord of Beaumont (a man extremely close to Louis) are clear, his connection to others is not.[288] For example, there is no easy explanation for why John the valet, Bigotus of Porta, John the Scot of Calabria, Walter the Englishman, Thomas of scutellatia and Colin of Calla each received 1*l.* towards their expenses from Louis, especially given several were foreigners.[289] Even more intriguing are the gifts to figures like John of Burgundy, the cleric Bartholomew, and an unnamed valet, who are explicitly described as being associated with Baldwin II, as if that were reason enough to explain why they received funds.[290] Such behaviour surpasses what could reasonably be expected of Louis as a Christian and relation, but aligns with the idea he was a central player in the crusade's formation. Hence, it would seem right to place Baldwin II's crusade alongside campaigns such as the Third Crusade or St Louis's crusades, as expeditions dependent upon the support, organisation, and direction of a reigning monarch.

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[286] 'Magna Recepta', p. 260, 'Itinera', pp. 589, 611.
[287] Gilles, pp. 194-6.
[288] 'Itinera', p. 593.
[289] *Ibid*. p. 593.
[290] *Ibid*. pp. 593, 596, 604.

Regarding the Valencian expedition, royal backing (mostly by James I) again appears central to the campaign's finances, cementing the view that all three expeditions number amongst royally-backed crusades.[291] Due to James actually taking the cross himself, his personal involvement in funding the crusade is visible throughout, and his commitment surpasses even Louis's. In a sense, this reflects both his central position within the expedition, and the surviving evidence, which through his *Llibre dels Fets* places him at the eye of the storm. For example, at several points James apparently gave his own money to maintain the crusading army. Not only was the siege at Borriana supposedly initiated in 1233 by provisions bought by James, but when James decided at the siege that war galleys were required to see off any potential naval strike from Valencia or Tunis, he used his own funds to secure them.[292] Such behaviour became something of a pattern. Hence, when planning to advance the crusade to El Puig in 1237, James instructed his uncle Bernat Guillem to occupy the site, backed by royal supplies.[293] That this actually occurred is corroborated by later passages detailing James's efforts to meet the shortfall caused by Guillem's failure to adequate resupply his force.[294] Even without considering James's role as a retainer of troops, which will be assessed in due course, this expedition evidently depended in no small part on the crown.

Hence, the overall picture of the three expeditions as hinging on royal backing appears the same. In Valencia, this is perhaps expected, given Gregory's claim that he was following James's lead when calling for volunteers to crusade there.[295] However, how far Henry III and Louis IX engaged with the Levantine and Greek expeditions is hitherto-unappreciated in modern scholarship. It is thus

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[291] Louis IX made at least one gift to a crusader heading to Spain (a Godfrey of Verbria), though evidence of extensive support for the expedition is unavailable; *Ibid.* p. 596.
[292] *LdF*, pp. 130, 153.
[293] *Ibid*. pp. 181-2.
[294] *Ibid*. pp. 186-8.
[295] *Registres*, i, nos. 1490-1.

striking that despite huge papal investment, and concomitant attempts to retain control, the expeditions of the Triple Crusade mirror the crusades of the later thirteenth century, testament to the increasing role played by monarchs in managing crusading within their realms, rather than as examples of the reformed papacy's control of Christendom.

Secular revenue streams

Support from royalty was, however, only one way the Triple Crusade received funds from secular government, with secular taxation, whether royally-endorsed or locally-raised, also part of the expeditions' financial basis. An aspect of crusade funding dating to 1096, when taxation was used in England to raise the 10,000 marks offered by William Rufus to his brother Robert Curthose as a mortgage on the Duchy of Normandy to support the latter's crusade, lay taxation increasingly became central to crusade revenue-raising.[296] A process aided by the papacy's language which under Innocent III repeatedly equated the obligations due to Christ for the Holy Land with service to a secular lord, in many senses it reached its apogee in 1188 with the 'Saladin Tithe', a tax of 10% on moveable goods, which according to Roger of Howden raised c.100,000 marks, and set the precedent for future taxation within the realm.[297] Indeed, large-scale secular taxation would be repeated in future crusades, most obviously in St Louis's first crusade, where urban taxation yielded c.274,000 *livres tournois*.[298]

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[296] F. Barlow, *William Rufus* (London, 1983), pp. 246-7, 362-4, C. David, *Robert Curthose, Duke of Normandy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1920), pp. 91-2 and notes.
[297] On papal language, see Innocent III's *Post Miserabile* or *Quia Maior*: Bird *et al.* (eds.), *Crusade and Christendom*, pp. 34, 108. For the 'Saladin Tithe', see W. Stubbs (ed.), *Select Charters and other illustrations of English constitutional history* 9th edn. rev. H. W. C. Davis (Oxford, 1913), p. 189. Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs (4 vols., London, 1868-71), iii, p. 8.
[298] Jordan, *Louis IX*, pp. 94-9.

Given this general trend, and the close support given by the crowns of Europe, it is therefore interesting that secular taxation for the Holy Land was not particularly widespread in the 1230s. For example, there was a great tallage of London instituted on 27 April 1235, which echoed the 'Saladin Tithe' in terms such as the exemption for *crucesignati*, but there is no evidence that it was extended across the country, nor are there firm figures available for the revenues raised.[299] Given previous tallages of London in 1223, 1227, and 1230 raised £1,000, £2,747 and 1,000 marks respectively, and future tallages in 1241, 1245 and 1249 £1,000, 2,000 marks and £1,000, it seems plausible that c.£1,000 were raised on this occasion.[300] This is not inconsiderable; several hundred marks bought Richard I 140 cheeses from Essex and Hertfordshire, 100 measures of beans from Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, and 800 bacon carcasses, 100 cheeses and 20 measures of beans from Hampshire in 1190.[301] Similarly, in two examples of the funds demanded by the papacy under the aegis of the crusades which Matthew Paris so resented, Henry funnelled part of England's general taxes towards the crusade, giving 1,000 marks from the quinzaine of Michaelmas to brother Hugh of Stockton, Master Peter of Supino and Brother Robert, treasurer of the Templars for Gregory's use in August 1239, a gift repeated in February 1240.[302] Yet in terms of what Henry could have provided, these seem to be towards the lower end: in this crusade, the tallage of the Jews, and his gift to Theodoric, prior of the Hospitallers in England potentially exceed the sum. Similarly, Henry could have funnelled the secular thirtieth granted in 1237 towards the crusade had he wished, which there is no evidence of him doing.[303] Nevertheless, that Henry was willing to supplement his own personal gifts to the crusade with the proceeds of English taxation at all, given Richard's wealth and

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[299] *CR*, iii, p. 82.
[300] R. Cassidy, 'The Barons of London and Royal Taxation After Magna Carta', *The London Journal*, 42 (2) (May 2017), p. 124.
[301] *The Great Roll of the Pipe for the second year of the reign of King Richard I: Michaelmas 1190 (Pipe Roll 36)* ed. D. Stenton (London, 1925), pp. 104, 112, 131-2.
[302] *CLR*, i, pp. 408, 452. For Matthew Paris's criticism of the papacy taking money using the smokescreen of the Crusades see *CM*, iii, p. 374.
[303] *CM*, iii, pp. 383, 410-1.

the fact Henry was not participating is still significant, and cements his position as an important backer for the crusade.

At least the case of taxation in England shows some signs of royal engagement; in France secular taxation was seemingly restricted solely to noble taxing their own tenants, whether great or small. Hence, in December 1237 Manassès of Rethel, lord of Saulce au Bois, extracted 20*l.* from the inhabitants of Sevricourt and Bertincourt in the event of him going on crusade, while there is evidence that by November 1238 Thibaut of Champagne had successfully levied money from those dwelling in his territories.[304] In none of these cases is the hand of Louis IX evident, surprising following his apparent willingness to dispense personal gifts to *crucesignati*.

In accounting for this discrepancy between royal enthusiasm for the crusade and the absence of widespread royal taxation, several potential explanations can be posited. First is the nature of the men leading the Levantine crusade. Numbering among Europe's wealthiest men, Richard of Cornwall may not have needed a national taxation drive, especially given the hostility such taxation could generate, even in England.[305] The position in France was similar, as in Thibaut of Champagne, Henry of Burgundy and Peter of Dreux, the crusade possessed leaders in the first rank of wealth and prestige, capable of raising taxes within their lands, rendering royal taxation unnecessary. Second, several crusading leaders were not on best terms with their monarchs. For example, by naming Henry as security for a debt to Thomas, Count of Flanders and Peter of Brittany without consent in 1239, exactly when crusading taxes might be collected, Simon de

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[304] *Trésor des chartes du comté de Rethel publié par l'ordre de S. A. S. le Prince Albert Ier*, ed. G. Saige et al. (4 vols., Monaco, 1902-16), i, no. 79, *Registres*, ii, no. 4601, *HdDC*, v, no. 2481

[305] E.g. negotiations over a crusade subsidy for Prince Edward's crusade lasted nearly 2 years. See J. Maddicott, 'The Crusade Taxation of 1268-70 and the development of Parliament', in P. Coss and S. Lloyd (eds.), *Thirteenth Century England, 2, Proceedings of the Newcastle upon Tyne Conference, 1987* (Woodbridge, 1988), pp. 93-117 and Idem, *The Origins of the English Parliament 924-1327* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 266-72.

Montfort squandered the royal favour which had received throughout 1238, when Henry approved his marriage to his sister Eleanor, putting him in no position to seek a large tax.[306] Similarly, Louis IX was likely disinclined to undergo the rigours of collecting taxation on behalf of Thibaut of Champagne, Hugh of Burgundy or Peter of Dreux, given their recent history of conflict, and the difficulties the French king had in collecting taxation outside his crown lands prior to the reforms of the 1240s.[307] Third, the relative absence of secular taxation for the Levantine crusade may suggest that ecclesiastical revenues did successfully raise large sums, rendering taxation unnecessary. After all, if large revenues were available through voluntary vow redemption, why should Louis or Henry undergo the rigmarole of seeking consent from their often-uncooperative subjects? Finally, it is possible that the crusades were simply too small to warrant the effort of large-scale taxation. The sizes of the various crusading forces will be discussed later, but suffice to say that the expeditions, for all the breadth of their appeals, did not match the numbers generated by the numbered crusades.[308] Consequently, the fights needed to raise taxation simply may not have been worth it. This is itself interesting, suggesting that for all the centralisation of political and financial power the crusades precipitated (particularly in England), even by the 1230s taxation could not be sought and attained without substantial difficulties. Thus, the evidence of limited secular funding for these crusades complements the picture of the English crown's difficulties with collecting taxation presented by Maddicott when discussing the 1268-70 crusade subsidy.[309] In particular, it suggests

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[306] For Montfort's fall, see M. Labarge, *Simon de Montfort* (London, 1962), pp. 54-5, S. Ambler, *The song of Simon de Montfort: England's first revolutionary and the death of chivalry* (London, 2019), pp. 73-5. For Simon receiving Henry's favour upon his marriage, see D. Carpenter, *Henry III: The Rise to Power and Personal Rule, 1207-1258* (New Haven, 2020), pp. 200-2, J. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 44-51.
[307] For these reforms see e.g. Le Goff, *Saint Louis*, pp. 35-6.
[308] *Vide Infra* ch. 4c.
[309] Maddicott, 'The Crusade Taxation of 1268-70', pp. 93-117.

that its problems were not just an immediate result of Henry's lack of credit and the dire state of crown revenues, but the result of deeper difficulties in extracting money.[310]

Yet while secular taxation within England and France appears limited, and regional, the same cannot be said for Aragon. Here, secular taxation was widespread, and followed traditional methods of revenue-raising. For example, among James's most important financial decisions was to seek a *monetaticum*, a tax levied in exchange for a royal pledge not to debase the currency. Coming at the Monzón *curia generalis* in October 1236, here James pledged to maintain the currency of Jaca in exchange for a tax of 1 *maravedí* on every household valued at 10 *maravedís* or higher, a rate of c.3.33%.[311] Significantly, there are exact parallels for such action: Peter II had sought a tax at Huesca in 1205 in exchange for a promise not to manipulate the currency, an action James himself repeated thrice prior to the Valencia campaign, having previously sought (and received) *monetatica* at the *curias* of Lleida, 1218, Huesca, 1221, and Daroca, 1223.[312] Similar was James's collection of the *bovatge*, a tax imposed in Catalonia on livestock. Granted in December 1232 and again at the *curia generalis* at Monzón in 1236, this too followed previous practice, James having commissioned a *bovatge* before his invasion of Majorca in 1228.[313] Yet not only did the taxation sought by James follow recent precedent, but its collection appears lucrative. For example, in late

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[310] On Henry III's lack of credit in 1270 see L. Ehrlich, (ed.), 'Exchequer and Wardrobe in 1270', *English Historical Review*, *English Historical* Review, 36 (144) (Oct., 1921), pp. 553-4. On the dire state of royal finance in general see E. Jacob, *Studies in the Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion, 1258-1267* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 248-75.

[311] *DJI*, ii, no. 238. Zurita, p. 509 implies that the tax was a 1/7th. For the figure of 3.33% see O'Callaghan, p. 165.

[312] T. Bisson, 'An 'Unknown Charter' for Catalonia (A. D. 1205)' in E. Mályusz (ed.), *Album Elemér Mályusz: Székesfehérvár, Budapest, 1972* (Brussels, 1976), pp. 61-76, and Idem, *Conservation of coinage: Monetary exploitation and its restraint in France, Catalonia, and Aragon (c.A.D.1000-c.1225)* (Oxford, 1979), pp. 88-91, Zurita, pp. 313-4. *DJI*, i, nos. 13, 41-2, A. Canellas López, *Colección diplomática del Concejo de Zaragoza 1119-1276* (2 vols., Zaragoza, 1972), i, no. 49.

[313] Zurita, pp. 478-9, F. Soldevila, 'A propòsit del serve del bovatge', *Anuario de Estudios Medievales*, 1 (1964), pp. 580-1, *LdF*, pp. 60-1.

1237, as James tightened the noose around Valencia, he stated that he authorised a collection of taxes from the cities.[314] Given this measure greatly contributed towards funding the assembly of the Aragonese army at Zaragoza in December, the sums must have been reasonably large. Similarly, the breath of these taxes' collection appears through James's description of his departure from Valencia for Montpellier in June 1239, where he claimed (in a partial version of the truth) that he travelled thither to collect the taxes owed by the city with regard to Valencia's conquest.[315] Thus, while all the crusades of the 1230s featured secular taxation, the picture in Valencia contrasts with its counterparts, through being more widespread.

From this, several inferences are plausible. The first is to say that the Valencian crusade supports conclusions drawn elsewhere based on the Levantine crusade which suggests that *crucesignati* during the Triple Crusade drew heavily on the crusading past, here extending those conclusions to include the assembling of finances.[316] Indeed, at every stage of his preparations, James seemingly followed crusading precedent, encapsulated in his preamble to the *curia generalis* at Tarragona in March 1235, where besides proclaiming the Peace and Truce of God, he explicitly stated his desire to follow his ancestors' example, and his own actions prior to the conquest of Majorca.[317] Similarly, lacking a tradition of national taxation in England or France to support a crusade (the 'Saladin Tithe' was not repeated for the Fourth or Fifth Crusades), there was little motivation to make that innovation in the 1230s. Secondly, the discrepancy in secular taxation demonstrates the variety between the various campaigns encapsulated within the label of 'crusades'. By any measure, the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s were legally-equivalent, and were perceived as equivalent by contemporaries. Nevertheless, each occasionally marched to its own beat. The "national" character

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[314] *LdF*, p. 198.
[315] *Ibid*. p. 237.
[316] Reddish, 'Did the crusaders consciously emulate?'.
[317] *DJI*, i, no. 217.

of the Valencian expedition, for all that the campaign witnessed international participation, cannot be forgotten. Finally, given the apparent absence of revenues from vow redemptions in the Valencian expedition, the presence of greater secular taxation may be suggestive of vow redemptions' efficacy. This will be discussed in greater depth below.

Besides direct taxation, within the secular sphere is a more minor funding source; proceeds from the execution of justice. Although not apparently a large source of income, its presence among the fundraising methods for the Triple Crusade has been hitherto unrecognised, making it worth noting. In a sense, however, its presence is no surprise; by the thirteenth century, based on English records, the only detailed and continuous financial records available, profits from the proceeds of justice represented an important part of the finances of the realm. Indeed, even excluding the funds raised through 'feudal' incidents such as relief, marriage, etc., sales from the proceeds of justice never dipped below 15% of royal income in the decade of John's reign up to 1209, peaking in his early years at c.25% of all royal income.[318] Though the period up to the 1230s witnessed significant inflation, there is no reason to suspect that the proceeds of justice ceased to be an important part of the "normal" financing of the realm.[319] Given crusading relied on stablished methods of revenue-raising for waging war, its presence among the financial expedients used to support the crusade is therefore unexceptional. For following the practice established in 1225 when Richard was created Earl of Cornwall, in June 1238 he received the proceeds from the amercements of William of York's

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[318] N. Barratt, 'The Revenues of King John', *English Historical Review*, 111 (443) (Sept. 1996), pp. 846-50.

[319] P. Harvey, 'The English Inflation of 1180-1220', *Past and Present*, vol. 61 (Nov. 1973), pp. 3-30, J. Bolton, 'Inflation, Economics and Politics in Thirteenth Century England' in P. Coss and S. Lloyd (eds.), *Thirteenth Century England, 4, Proceedings of the Newcastle upon Tyne Conference, 1991* (Woodbridge, 1992), pp. 4-14, P. Latimer, 'The English Inflation of 1180-1220 Reconsidered', *Past and Present*, 171 (May 2001), pp. 3-29. For the revenue potentially available though the proceeds of justice see e.g. Carpenter, *Henry III*, p. 661.

eyre in Cornwall.[320] The overall amount raised thus remains unknown, but its enactment is noteworthy for two reasons.[321] Firstly, occurring only 5 years after the previous eyre of Cornwall, an eyre which according to the Dunstable Annals supposedly provoked many Cornish to flee to the forests for fear of the royal justices, it indicates how far Richard squeezed every financial expedient for his crusade.[322] Secondly, it was established practice that eyres should occur no more than once every seven years.[323] The picture therefore returns of Henry III as an important backer of the Triple Crusade, prepared to risk localised disturbance, and to overturn past practice in order to aid his brother. Conversely, turning to Richard, his willingness to permit his brother to take these risks for him testifies to his determination to be financially independent on his crusade, and that it was England which provided the 'pecuniam innumerabilem' he carried with him.[324]

Turning to Aragon, suggestive evidence that the proceeds of justice helped support the Valencian expedition comes in a papal letter addressed to the procurator of Tarragona, dated 5 February 1237. In this, Gregory stated he was excommunicating a group of Christians who had travelled between Tarragona and Ibiza and who had sold victuals and arms to the Saracens, before commanding that the goods they sold be recaptured and put to the defence of Ibiza.[325] Unlike the Cornish eyre, the interest here lies not in internal state mechanisms, but upon Gregory himself, and his ambitions. Although most papal correspondence was reactive, with papal letters often aspirational, this letter is significant as, in its specificity, it is a unique case in thirteenth century crusading. In it, Gregory

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[320] For precedent of proceeds from Cornish eyres going to Richard see D. Crook, *Records of the general eyre* (London, 1982), p. 89 and note 2. *CR*, iv, p. 58.
[321] For the surviving feet of fines from this eyre, see J. Rowe (ed.), *Cornwall Feet of Fines* (2 vols., Exeter, 1914-50), i, nos. 64-7, 69-71, 74.
[322] 'Annales de Dunstaplia' in *Annales Monastici*, ed. H. Luard (5 vols., London, 1864-9), iii, p. 135.
[323] W. Bolland, *The General Eyre: Lectures delivered in the University of London at the request of the Faculty of Laws* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 23.
[324] 'Chronicon Thomae Wykes', ed. Luard, iv, p. 86
[325] *Registres*, ii, no. 3491.

apparently realised the longstanding papal aspiration to enforce a trade embargo with Islam. First formulated in canon 24 of the Third Lateran Council, 1179, which banned the exports of timber and iron, the papal prohibition on trade with the Muslim world was a trope in crusade bulls, with bans on the sale of military hardware likewise appearing in *Quia Maior*, *Ad Liberandam*, and *Rachel Suum Videns*.[326] However, before this letter there is no evidence the embargo was ever effective, and indeed what evidence there is suggests the opposite; that aside from the period 1323-44, papal embargoes failed to disrupt trade with the Muslim world.[327] Thus, it is telling that at this juncture Gregory was demanding action. Usually numbered among the most dedicated papal supporters of crusading, in this letter he goes further than any of his predecessors, and directs his efforts in new ways, attempting to intervene in the crusade on a basic, practical level. The letter therefore indicates how Gregory sought papal involvement in the crusades, alongside suggesting the variety of crusade funding available.

Vow redemptions and ecclesiastical taxation

However, Gregory's attempt to exercise papal control over the crusade by enforcing an embargo on the trade with the Islamic world comprised only part of his attempts to make the papacy central to the Triple Crusade. Far more important were his attempts to establish funding sources over which theoretical papal control could be maintained, especially as the collection and distribution of funding usually occurred locally; vow redemptions and ecclesiastical taxation. Neither of these were new by the 1230s: ecclesiastical taxation for the crusades dated to Innocent III's letter of 31

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[326] For 1179 prohibition see N. Tanner (ed.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* (2 vols., Washington, 1990), i, p. 223. Tangl, *Studien*, pp. 88-97, Tanner, *Decrees*, i, pp. 267-71, *ES*, p. 494.
[327] S. Stantchev, 'Embargo: The origins of an idea and the implications of a policy in Europe and the Mediterranean, ca. 1100-ca. 1500', (University of Michigan Ph.D. thesis, 2009), p. 35, Idem, *Spiritual Rationality: Papal Embargo as Cultural Practice* (Oxford, 2014), p. 22.

December 1199 to the Archbishop of Magdeburg and his suffragans, while vow redemptions were first floated in *Quia Maior*.[328] Nevertheless, both played major roles in financing the Triple Crusade. This was particularly so for vow redemptions, whose exploitation by Gregory IX was on a hitherto-unprecedented scale, meaning it has drawn much historical attention, with a consensus emerging that the shift towards vow redemption numbered among the defining features of thirteenth century crusading.[329] In no way can this be denied. From the greatest lords like Richard of Cornwall or Peter of Dreux, who received the revenues from vow redemption in England, and the dioceses of Rouen and Poitiers respectively, to nobles such as Stephen Count of Burgundy and his son, who acquired the revenues from the vow redemption of the infirm in the provinces of Vienne, Lausanne, Belly-Ars and Basel, many *crucesignati* were ceded the right to acquire these new revenues.[330] Most expansive of all was the grant given to Baldwin II, who in December 1239 was ceded 1/4 of the revenues from vow redemptions of various dioceses in France, England and even Ireland.[331]

This fact of Ireland being part of the fundraising campaign is itself significant, as it suggests the world of the Triple Crusade was wider than previously appreciated.[332] Besides this grant to Baldwin, tying Ireland to Greece, it is clear Gregory envisaged Ireland as within the remit of the financing and preaching campaign for the wider Triple Crusade from its inception. This he made clear in his October 1234 letter to the Minister Provincial of the Irish Franciscans where he

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[328] O. Hageneder *et al*. (eds.), *Die Register Innocenz' III* (5 vols., Graz, 1964-), ii, no. 258, Tangl, *Studien*, pp. 88-97. For the failure of the 1199 clerical tax see *Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade*, ed. and trans. A. Andrea (Leiden, 2000), p. 25.
[329] E.g. M. Evans, 'Commutation of Crusade Vows: Some examples from the English Midlands' in A. Murray (ed.), *From Clermont to Jerusalem: The Crusades and Crusader Societies, 1095-1500* (Turnhout, 1998), pp. 221-2, M. Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy: The Chief Instruments of Papal Crusading Policy and Crusade to the Holy Land from the Loss of Jerusalem to the Fall of Acre, 1244-1291* (Leiden, 1975), pp. 119-32, Mayer, *The Crusades*, trans. Gillingham, pp. 217-8
[330] *Calendar of entries in the Papal registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters*, ed. W. Bliss *et al*. (23 vols., London, 1893-1960), i, p. 170, *Registres*, ii, nos. 4266, 4369, 4527.
[331] *Registres*, ii, nos. 4762-87.
[332] E.g. Lower, p. 49 labelled the idea of Irish participation in the crusade problematic.

requested he nominate two members of his order to collect the subsidy raised for the benefit of the Holy Land.[333] Similarly on 13 July 1235, Gregory wrote again, granting the full rights enjoyed by crusade preachers to all Franciscans who preached the cross, including the rights to offer indulgences to those hearing sermons, to commute crusading vows or redeem them for money and to full ecclesiastical protection from molestation.[334] That such a preaching campaign existed, and potentially raised funds is indicated in further correspondence from Gregory in December 1238 and November 1239, where the archbishop of Dublin was named alongside other prelates as a recipient of orders concerning what to do with the revenues of vow redemptions and clerical taxation in their provinces.[335] Moreover on 6 November 1240, Gregory ordered Cardinal Otto, the Papal Legate in England to use funds generated from crusade preaching in England, Scotland and Ireland to satisfy his creditors, supporting the view that money had been raised on both sides of the Irish Sea.[336] At least, Gregory IX had received no indication that a collection campaign had not occurred in Ireland. Furthermore, there is evidence outside papal correspondence suggesting this fundraising campaign actually happened; Matthew Paris claimed that papal agents, using the excuse of the crusade, extracted 1,400 marks from Irish prelates.[337] Thus although most of the evidence is based upon papal sources, and not necessarily a sure indicator of actual events, the idea that Ireland contributed nothing towards the Triple Crusade becomes harder to maintain.

Yet besides Ireland's participation in the drive to raise funds through vow redemptions, there is one angle involving them yet to be studied; the instructive contrast between the Levantine and Constantinopolitan crusades, and the Valencian expedition. Widespread as the offer of vow

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[333] M. Sheehy (ed.), *Pontificia Hibernica: Medieval Papal Chancery documents concerning Ireland, 640-1261* (2 vols., Dublin 1962-5), ii, no. 214.
[334] *Ibid*. no. 228.
[335] *Ibid.* nos. 240, 242
[336] *Calendar*, ed. Bliss *et al.*, i, p. 195.
[337] *CM*, iv, p. 137, 160.

redemption was, there has always been one fundamental problem in assessing its efficacy: that besides the receipts kept by Richard of Cornwall listing the funds raised through legacies, vow redemption and crusading taxes in the dioceses of Chichester and Salisbury, and the archdeaconry of St Albans, and Gregory's April 1241 letter to the Bishop of Oloron, claiming William of Oléron raised 30,000*s. moralix* through vow redemptions, there are no records indicating the money vow redemptions yielded.[338] This is a significant historical problem, as it means there is no firm evidence as to the actual funds raised. After all, just because Gregory stated something was so, does not mean it happened. Moreover, based upon the surviving grants of vow redemptions, it is impossible to know whether the flaws in the system, such as the promising of revenues from the same areas to multiple *crucesignati*, actually mattered.[339] While not directly answering this problem, the Valencian crusade nevertheless enables an assessment of vow redemptions's overall efficiency. Unlike the Holy Land and Constantinopolitan crusades, widespread vow redemptions were not authorised for Valencia. Revenues were raised through vow redemption for Ibiza's conquest in 1235, but such was not apparently repeated during the main expedition.[340] Indeed, in terms of ecclesiastical revenues, only two pieces of evidence survive, both dating from February 1237, and neither particularly sweeping. In the first, Gregory ordered the procurator of Tarragona to grant apostolic benediction to those accused of arson, assaulting a priest or selling arms to the Saracens if they personally defended Ibiza or paid for somebody to do it.[341] This was matched by his instruction to the Bishop of Barcelona and the procurator of Tarragona, who were instructed to

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[338] *BF*, p. 294, Lower, p. 56, n. 93 citing W. Lunt, *Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages* (2 vols., New York, 1934), ii, no. 533, *CM*, vi, p. 138, and Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, *Report on Manuscripts in Various Collections* (London, 1901-14), i, p. 190.

[339] E.g. Gregory's order that the funds raised from vow redemption by the infirm of the dioceses and cities of Lyons, Mâcon and Chalons be given to the Count of Mâcon was contradicted the following day in his statement that the revenues from vow redemptions in the cities and dioceses of Autun, Beaune and Langres (all within the archdiocese of Lyons) belonged to the Duke of Burgundy. See *Registres*, ii, nos. 3907, 3916.

[340] Gaztambide, p. 163.

[341] *Registres*, ii, no. 3487.

raise revenues from those contributing to the building of defences or ditches for the army attacking Valencia in person or by proxy, in exchange for a relaxation of 31 days' penance.[342]

Because not all papal correspondence entered the registers, this does not necessarily mean no vow redemption occurred in Iberia. Nevertheless, the contrast to France and England remains striking. The implications of this are mirrored by the other differences in funding. As demonstrated, the Valencian crusade witnessed more central taxation than the Levantine or Greek campaigns. Given the equivalency of the expeditions, and the international participation in all three, this funding difference does not undercut this thesis's central contention that the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s were cut from the same cloth, but instead suggests vow redemptions filled this difference. Consequently, among other insights, vow redemption likely raised substantial sums. Similarly, as will be demonstrated below, borrowing appears much widespread in James's crusade than the others. Again, one way to explain this difference could be found in vow redemptions which, if extensive, rendered this financial expedient of last resort unnecessary outside Aragon. Hence, it is possible that with regards to crusade funding, Gregory envisaged an order of priority, with vow redemptions deployed when complete royal support was absent. Thus in France and England, where the monarch had not taken the cross, vow redemptions were widely disseminated, whereas in Aragon, with James a *crucesignatus*, the need for such revenues was not so pressing.[343] This is a point not yet made in crusade historiography. Moreover, that vow redemptions could be effective suggests that the system's inefficiencies did not undermine the overall value of the financial package. Additionally, the apparent need for vow redemption indicates the relative costs and prestiges of crusading in the Eastern vs Western Mediterranean. That vow redemption was more imperative for the Levantine and Greek crusades suggests the greater per capita costs of the

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[342] *Ibid*. no. 3488.
[343] *Layettes*, no. 2514 and *DJI*, ii, no. 239 state James took the cross.

expeditions, and yet the reality that so many made the journey eastward, despite the presence of a much cheaper alternative undermines the 'pluralist' view that all crusades were equal in all things. Regardless, the evidence of vow redemptions reinforces the historiographical value in studying the Valencian expedition alongside the Greek and Levantine crusades, here illuminating anew a well-researched part of crusade historiography.

By contrast, the proceeds of ecclesiastical taxation have escaped close historical attention. Perhaps because the initial drive behind the Levantine crusade in late 1234 featured no demand for ecclesiastical revenues, ecclesiastical taxation has not featured prominently in accounts of the Triple Crusade. For example, Lower acknowledged only that English and French clergy were asked in 1237 and on 25 November 1238 to contribute a thirtieth towards Baldwin II's crusade, and even then, given the apparent silence of the surviving sources on the subject, mentioned this only to follow Lunt's argument that the subsidy was never paid.[344] Lloyd took a similar line.[345] As any argument based on silence, this claim that no significant ecclesiastical taxation existed during the 1230s is unconvincing, not least given the evidence which suggests there was ecclesiastical taxation, beyond the limitations these authors suggest. Starting with England, the Cluniac order conceded a thirtieth on all moveable goods within Henry III's realms to support the crusade in November 1237.[346] Whether under royal pressure or not is unknowable, as is the ultimate sum conceded, but nevertheless, this thirtieth's existence warrants mention, beyond the current complete silence. Furthermore, the assertion that the thirtieth levied in England was never paid is problematic because in May 1238 Henry III transferred 6,000 marks to the Templars in Paris for his brother's use, in line with the papal concession of all English revenues to him, a grant revoked on 19

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[344] Lower, pp. 34, 137, 147, *Registres*, ii, nos. 4605-7, W. Lunt, *Financial relations of the papacy with England* (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), pp. 194-6.
[345] Lloyd, p. 17.
[346] *Cluny*, no. 4721.

December 1238 and regranted on 23 November 1239.[347] The money's source? The ecclesiastical 'thirtieth collected in divers counties' within England.[348] It thus become harder to argue ecclesiastical taxation was never collected, whatever the total sum actually raised.

Though the case is less clear-cut, suggestive evidence of ecclesiastical taxation benefitting the crusade exists on the continent. For example, Navarre's clergy were ordered in September 1238 to contribute towards the Holy Land expedition, with full crusading indulgences offered.[349] Though not hard evidence, this indicates hitherto-unappreciated papal efforts to secure ecclesiastical funding for the crusade, as does the February 1238 papal instruction that Godfrey of Argentan receive the revenues from ecclesiastical taxes and vow redemption in Picardy.[350] A similar picture is presented regarding the Constantinople crusade, with Gregory demanding on 22 November 1236 that Morea's clergy contribute funds towards the war against the schismatic Greeks.[351] This call was, however, likely unsuccessful, given on 18 January 1238 and 23 January 1239 Gregory asked those same clergy for another levy, this time demanding a third of their income.[352] By contrast, Richard of Thony departed on crusade in June 1238 with the clerical taxation from the bishopric of Angers.[353] Regardless of whether he had consent for this move, this case demonstrates that ecclesiastical taxation occurred on some level during this period, despite current statements in modern historiography to the contrary. Hence, while Gregory's flagship policy on ecclesiastical taxation, his February 1235 call to the Archbishop of Rheims and his suffragans to pay 1*d.* a week to support the crusading army was a failure due to the exceptionally large sums requested, that did not constitute

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[347] *CPR*, p. 222, *Registres*, ii, no. 4672, and iii, no. 4965.
[348] *CPR*, p. 222.
[349] Gaztambide, p. 644.
[350] *Registres*, ii, no. 4107.
[351] *Ibid*. no. 3382.
[352] *Ibid*. no. 4035, 4711.
[353] *Ibid*. no. 4450.

the sum of attempts to get the clergy to contribute towards the expedition.[354] Evidently there is more to be discovered about these expeditions than first assumed.

Sales and pledges of assets

Yet for all the funds available from centrally organised sources, whether crown gifts, secular taxation, justice, or ecclesiastical revenues, realisation of private assets remained key to the financial basis for these expeditions. The most common method of securing the funds to realise a vow at crusading's inception, historiographical consensus reckons that as crusading became increasingly centralised, the role played by the liquidation of assets diminished, with the Church emerging by the thirteenth century as a universal creditor.[355] Nevertheless, evidence from the 1230s suggests that sales of assets remained integral to crusader fund-raising strategies. Obviously, this was particularly so for those without royal gifts or papal funding. Thus, Simon de Montfort needed to sell private assets to finance his expedition. Indeed without selling his woods at Leicester for £1,000 or his pasturage rights to the burgesses of Leicester, it is impossible to see how Simon could have dominated his expedition as Paris claimed.[356] Similarly, lacking external funding, nor being obviously attached to any of the English expeditions, and therefore a step removed from any potential largesse, may explain why on 14 November 1236 Bertram of Gartlip mortgaged the manor of Geinch for 3 years, why in summer 1238 Nicholas Malesmeyns pledged his entire inheritance for 4 years, why Ralph of Ringstone sold of his land at Clopton to his brother Hugh in 1240, and why in Easter Term 1241 Radulf of Touny handed Welcomestowe manor to John of Gisors.[357] However,

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[354] *ES*, no. 646.
[355] Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, pp. 109-35. Tyerman, *HPC*, pp. 208, 211, Cazel, pp. 132-9, 141-2
[356] *CM*, iv, pp. 7, 44, Lloyd, *English society*, p. 181.
[357] *CR*, iii, p. 391, *CPR*, p. 231, *A Northamptonshire Miscellany* ed. E. King (Northampton, 1938), p. 45, *CRR*, xvi, no. 1625.

while these men fit the theory that liquidating assets was important only to those without central funding, there are several cases against this theory. This is particularly notable amongst the high-ranking French Holy Land crusaders. For example, despite possessing the revenues raised from the vow redemption by the infirm of the dioceses and cities of Lyons, Mâcon and Chalons, John Count of Mâcon still elected in February 1238 to alienate large tracts of land to finance his crusade, selling his possessions in Mâcon to Louis IX in perpetuity for 11,000*l*. and selling another, unnamed castle for 8,000*l*.[358] Similarly, despite all the papal support granted him, Thibaut of Champagne deemed it necessary in July 1239 to sell his forest rights to Isabelle of Braiselve.[359] Nor was such decision-making unusual. Amongst Thibaut's counterparts, Hugh of Burgundy, recipient of vow redemption funds in the dioceses Autun, Beaune and Langres, mortgaged fiefs at Charleroi and Mont Saint Vincent to the crown in June 1239 for the duration of his crusade while Peter of Dreux mortgaged either Champtocé or Champtoceaux to Louis IX for the time he was abroad, and 1 year after.[360] Such cases imply that the costs of leading a retinue to Outremer in the 1230s must have been extraordinary, alongside suggesting that any centralisation of crusade funding remained incomplete by the 1230s.

Putting all in the shade however is Baldwin II. As discussed, Baldwin benefitted greatly from Louis IX's largesse, while his promised papal support was even more extensive. Nevertheless, Baldwin continued to seek other sources of revenue for his crusade, to provide some form of lifeline to his beleaguered empire, revenue realised only through by selling assets. To that end, Baldwin's holdings in Namur were sold to Louis IX, supposedly for 50,000 *livres parisis*.[361] Also in this category are some of the most famous sales ever made in the name of crusading; Baldwin's sales of

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[358] *Registres*, ii, nos. 3907, 4204, *Layettes*, no. 2776.
[359] *Layettes*, no. 2828.
[360] *Registres*, ii, nos. 3916 [Hugh], 4265-6, 4527 [Peter], *Layettes*, nos. 2819, 2844.
[361] Mouskes, p. 663, Alberic, p. 947.

Constantinople's highest-powered relics to France. While because of its fame historical interest in Louis's relic acquisition has been dominated by the Crown of Thorns, which was supposedly sold for 10,000*l*., he also purchased many other relics from Baldwin in 1241 including, *inter alia*, the blood of Christ, a piece of the Holy Cross, a tablet which touched Christ's face as they took him down from the cross, a great piece of rock from Christ's tomb, the Holy Lance, and the sponge which washed Christ's face.[362] Costing up to 135,000*l*., a figure Kovac is surely correct in attacking for being implausibly high, there is nevertheless no doubt these relics generated large sums with even the lowest estimate of 2,000*l*. substantial.[363] Moreover, Baldwin was not the only figure part-financing his crusade by selling Constantinople's relics, with Warin, the titular Archbishop of Thessalonica who accompanied Baldwin to Greece, also raising funds thus.[364] Yet for all these, the Constantinople-bound crusade apparently remained chronically short of funds, something most forcefully expressed by Akropolites.[365] The truth of this was indicated in 1244 when the penniless Baldwin returned to the west seeking further aid.[366] Besides serving to highlight the Latin Empire's bankruptcy and emphasising the costs of crusading, Baldwin and Warin's cases, alongside those crusaders who alienated property, demonstrate the caution historians should take when claiming the new system of financing through vow redemptions had instituted a new method of financing the crusades, substantially different from previous practice. While not the almost-exclusive source of income as in the twelfth century, the sale of assets clearly endured during the 1230s, and may possess even greater importance than the raw data might suggest, being among the most reliable source of income.

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362 Alberic, p. 947, 'Récit du 13e siècle sur les translations faites en 1239 et en 1241', *Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes*, no. 39 (1878), pp. 410-4, *CM*, iii, p. 518, and iv, p. 92.
363 P. Kovac, 'The Crown of Thorns and Sainte-Chapelle in Paris, The True Price of the Crown of Thorns, the Date of the Chapel's Consecration, and the Ceremonial Lighting of Sainte-Chapelle', *Umní / Art,* 59 (6) (Jan. 2011), pp. 462-79, *CM*, iv, p. 75.
364 P. Riant (ed.), *Exuviae Sacrae Constantinopolitanae* (2 vols., Geneva, 1877-8), ii, no. 67.
365 Akropolites, p. 58.
366 Longnon, p. 185

Likewise, the sale of assets appears in the Valencia crusade, testament both to its general applicability, and through the differences in how those assets were sold, making clear the variety possible between crusades, and how far crusades were financed by "normal" methods of revenue-raising. For example, James and other nobles certainly made various uses of the expedient throughout the campaign. Hence, under pressure to repay the debts incurred at Borriana, James sold 100 Muslim captives to the inhabitants of Albentosa for 17,000 bezants in 1236.[367] Similarly, lacking funds to support the retinue he assembled for the host gathering at El Puig in July 1237, James's uncle Bernat Guillem sold the 300 *cafizes* of supplies and 50 pigs he possessed at Tortosa for 1,500 sous.[368] Furthermore, even after Valencia's capture, the sale of assets continued. Thus, on 21 December 1238 James conceded the exclusive right to sell meat within Valencia upon payment of 6*s*. *jaccenses* to various individuals, and granted the exclusive right to hawk fish for 20 *morabatinos* to one Octavian.[369] Similarly, on 29 December 1239, James ceded 29 Valencian workshops and 29 fanechatas of land in Rayosa to numerous individuals, for an annual rent of 5 *morabatinos*.[370] When assessing these cases, it should be noted that of all the land transfers recorded in the Aragonese records, these are merely the ones for which payment was recorded. Thus, James's sale of assets likely surpassed even what is visible here. For this, several points are possible. First, the conclusion that sale of assets remained a key source of crusade financing into the 1230s becomes strengthened. Second, the nature of the sale of assets in Valencia also reveals differences between the crusades. Here, it emphasises how far James, unlike say Thibaut of Champagne, had almost total mastery of his expedition, witnessed in his capacity to distribute lands

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[367] *LdF*, pp. 164-5, 181.
[368] *Ibid*. pp. 185-6. As each *cafiz* equated to 8 bushels or c.179.3 litres, this sum constituted 53,790 litres, or enough supplies to sustain c.134 men for a year according to the terms negotiated between Venice and the Fourth Crusade in 1201. Given his supply issues, small wonder this sale enraged James.
[369] *DJI*, ii, nos. 287, 288.
[370] *Ibid*. no. 304.

at his pleasure. In that, his constant effort to ensure that it was royal and not noble power which benefitted from Valencia's fall, appears a success.

The sale of private assets, however, varied beyond what the previous evidence suggests. Alongside the sale of assets amongst the laity, crusaders in the 1230s also apparently mortgaged assets to religious houses. A significant, although perhaps overstated part of revenue-raising at the crusades' inception, the sale and mortgaging/vifgaging of assets to religious institutions appears nevertheless widespread during the early crusades, partly because they possessed comparatively large amount of liquid assets.[371] Typifying this is the will of the First Crusader Fortun Sanchez and his wife, who sold freeholds to the canons of Huesca because no-one else of their acquaintance, had the funds needed to support the journey to Jerusalem.[372] Yet following the theory that Gregory IX oversaw a massive centralisation of ecclesiastical funding, evidence for similar pledges to religious houses should not be forthcoming for the Triple Crusade. However, contrary evidence exists. For example, in 1240 Isabelle of Bashley sold land to Carisbrook Priory for 4 marks to help support her son Geoffrey Hacard's crusade.[373] Also in 1240, William of Cley pledged his land at Gateley for 3 years for 6 marks before the canons of Norwich Cathedral Priory.[374] In France, a similar picture emerges. In April 1238 Betrand, brother of John the Bastard, secured 30*l.* towards his journey to Jerusalem from Châlons Abbey in exchange for the abbey possessing his lands and 'prés sis' at Tournai for 5 years, while in July 1236 Guy of Doix sold his possessions in Brethenay to the Templars of Beaune to support his crossing to Outremer.[375] Moreover, like the sales of assets to secular sources, financial deals with religious orders were practiced even by the crusade leadership,

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[371] Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, p. 129.
[372] *Colección diplomática de la catedral de Huesca*, ed. A. Duran Gudiol (2 vols., Zaragoza, 1965-9), i, p. 106.
[373] Tyerman, *EaC*, p. 200.
[374] *Charters of Norwich Cathedral Priory*, ed. B. Dodwell (2 vols., London, 1974-85), ii, no. 140.
[375] *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Notre-Dame de Cheminon*, ed. E. Barthélemy (Paris, 1883), p. 140, *HdDB*, iv, no. 2235.

notwithstanding their alternative sources of income. For example, in June 1239, indicating again that papal resources failed to adequately support him, Thibaut of Navarre sold his forest rights to religious houses at Reclus, Châtrices, Rebais, Jouy, and to the Hôtel-Dieu of Meaux[376] Similarly, Hugh of Burgundy engaged the Abbey of Saint-Seine, securing an advance worth 600 *livres dijonnaises* in April 1238.[377] Finally, on 4 July 1239, Baldwin II sold 100 bonniers of wood (c.40,000ft^2) near Floreffe to the Abbey of Floreffe, echoing his previous sale of forests at Tettefolz and Rovroit to various monasteries in April 1239.[378] From this, for all the changes within and without of ecclesiastical funding, room must be found for the sale of assets to religious houses into the 1240s.

And yet, although monastic houses endured as crusade financiers, some caution must be taken. Though clearly used by some, there was nevertheless a marked decline in these expeditions from crusading's earlier days. Indeed for every monastic cartulary which yielded information about a crusader's financial preparations, there were several displaying a yawning absence of *crucesignati*. Indeed, it is instructive that many of the houses most involved in financing the First Crusade, recruitment from which occurred in similar lands to those responding to *Rachel Suum Videns*, show no sign of being used thus in the 1230s. In his study of the early crusaders, Riley-Smith identified three monastic houses as especially prominent as crusade financiers and beneficiaries; Marmoutier, St Jean d'Angély and St Vincent du Mans.[379] Investigation of the cartularies for all three reveals not

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[376] *Layettes*, nos. 2812-7, 2831.
[377] *HdDB*, iv, no. 2293.
[378] *Analectes pour servir a l'Histoire Ecclésiastique de la Belgique*, (40 vols., Louvain, 1864-1914), xvii, no. 112. For size of the *bonnier* see P. Kidson, 'A Metrological Investigation', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 53 (1990), p. 84. Lock, p. 183.
[379] Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, p. 127.

a single sale involving a crusader in the 1230s.[380] Nor were these three particularly unusual. For example, the Abbey of Saint-Martin-des-Champs, a house entwined in local politics and closely associated with the Count of Bar, contains no evidence of payment featuring a crusader while the Triple Crusade unfolded.[381] Similarly, amongst others, the records from Saint Paul de Mausole, and the Abbeys of Saint Martin de Tournai, Notre-Dame de la Trappe, and Tiron, all show these houses as busy players in the period of the Triple Crusade, yet without any evidence of engagement with *crucesignati*.[382] Hence, one must conclude that while funds from religious institutions in exchange for lands and rights remained part of crusading in the 1230s, as before, that part was not unchanging. Clearly centralised funding, for all its limitations, had some effect in altering the landscape of funding choices available.

Remuneration on Crusade

Similarly common amongst the funding methods of the Triple Crusade, as it was amongst every crusade, was the imperative to seek remuneration overseas. While revenues could be planned and raised in advance, it was inconceivable that the revenues raised before departure would cover the

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[380] For these see *Marmoutier. Cartulaire blésois*, ed. C. Metais (Blois, 1889–91), *Cartulaire de Marmoutier pour le Dunois*, ed. E. Mabille (Châteaudun, 1874), *Cartulaire Manceau de Marmoutier*, ed. E. T. Laurain, 2 vols. (Laval, 1911–45), *Marmoutier. Cartulaire tourangeau*, ed. L. P. Piolin and C. Chantelou (Tours, 1879), *Cartulaire de Marmoutier pour le Vendômois,* ed. M. de Trémault (Paris and Vendôme, 1893), *Cartulaire de Saint-Jean d'Angély*, ed. P. Musset, (2 vols., Saintes, 1901–3) and *Liber controversiarum sancti Vincentii cenomannensis, ou Second Cartulaire de l'abbaye de Saint-Vincent du Mans*, ed. A. Chédeville (Paris, 1968).
[381] For association with the Count of Bar see *Recueil des chartes et documents de Saint-Martin-des-Champs*, ed. J. Depoin (5 vols., Paris, 1912-21), iv, p. 125. For documents dating to the Triple Crusade see *Ibid*. pp. 100-55.
[382] *Cartulaire de Saint Paul de Mausole*, ed. E. Leroy (3 vols., Saint-Rémy-de-Provence, 1961-4), i, pp. 105-10, *Chartes de l'Abbaye de Saint-Martin de Tournai*, ed. A. d'Herbomez (2 vols., 1898-1901), i, pp. 428-543, *Cartulaire de l'Abbaye de Notre-Dame de la Trappe*, ed. M. Le Comte de Charencey (Alençon, 1889), *passim*, *Cartulaire de l'Abbaye de Tiron*, ed. L. Merlet (2 vols., Chartres, 1883), ii, pp. 364-72.

duration of the expedition, forcing crusaders to seek funds while on campaign.[383] This was something as true for great men such as Stephen of Blois on the First Crusade, who wrote from Antioch that he was now richer than when he left France, as it was for the rank-and-file of the Fourth Crusade, who despite the plans made to divide the spoils of war after the capture of Constantinople on 13 April 1204, by necessity took much of the plunder.[384] Though such vast sums were not involved in the Triple Crusade, nevertheless the imperative towards resupply on campaign recurs in many sources. Starting with the Levantine expedition, the crusade clearly relied on being repeatedly resupplied by the *poulains*. For example, despite ignoring the advice given by the notables of Outremer's October 1238 letter to resupply in Cyprus before advancing to the Holy Land, Thibaut and his army were thoroughly re-equipped in Acre between August and November 1239.[385] Such resupplying is particularly prominent in the 'Rothelin' continuation, which twice mentioned how the westerners refreshed themselves in Acre after their difficult eastward voyage, before detailing the logistical equipment given them.[386] This situation was then repeated almost exactly in October 1240 for Richard of Cornwall, despite his great wealth, with the 'Eracles' continuation describing how Richard resupplied his army in Acre before departing to Jaffa, alongside circumstantial supporting evidence from *Les Gestes des Chiprois* and the 'Rothelin' text.[387] Moreover, the aid offered by the *poulains* extended across the crusade, with Bohemund V of Antioch's support at Tripoli during the abortive negotiations with Hama apparently especially generous.[388] Notable from this aid is the extent of the eastern Franks' support, which suggests much

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[383] Cazel, pp. 117-9.
[384] H. Hagenmayer (ed.), *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100 mit Erlaüterungen* (Innsbruck, 1901), p. 149, Villehardouin, *La conquête*, ed. and trans. Faral, ii, pp. 52-61.
[385] *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ed. E. Martene and U. Durand (5 vols., Paris, 1717), i, pp. 1012-3.
[386] *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 529, 531.
[387] *Ibid*. pp. 421, 555, *LGdC*, p. 123.
[388] *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 551-2, *LGdC*, p. 121.

about the continued vitality of Outremer, grounded upon the economic strength of its port cities.[389] On such grounds, the presentation of the thirteenth century kingdom of Jerusalem by Prawer, as being essentially reactive and constantly afraid of destruction, cannot hold.[390]

Though not repeated to the same extent in the sources, a quietness befitting the generally low historiographical profile of the campaign, Baldwin's crusaders were also part-financed by allied forces. In his case, this support was provided by Asen, Tsar of Bulgaria, and his Cuman allies, who even provided men to bolster the force.[391] Here, it is most interesting to note this support came despite Asen's supposed alliance with Vatatzes, the ruler of Nicaea, and despite Gregory having specifically attempted to raise a crusade against him in in the bull *Supremus opifex*, sent to Hungary on 27 January 1238.[392] This evidence thus illustrates the complexities of Balkan diplomacy in the 1230s. Small wonder no future pope would dedicate such energies to intervening there as Gregory IX.

Outside of receiving support from the Eastern Franks or Bulgarian Tsar, the capacity of the crusaders of the 1230s and early 1240s to be remunerated on campaign also possessed an active side: by raiding their non-Catholic opposition. Again, an important aspect of every crusade ever undertaken, this side of crusading has been under-appreciated in the historiography of the Levantine crusade, with the raid carried out by Peter of Dreux on 4 November 1239 usually seen as the sum total of the crusade's raiding activities.[393] In part, this is understandable: this is the only raid

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[389] Matthew Paris, 'Itinéraire de Londres à Jerusalem', in H. Michelant and G. Raynaud (eds.), *Itinéraires à Jerusalem: Et Descriptions De La Terre Sainte Rédigés En Français Aux Xie, Xiie & Xiiie Siècles* (Geneva, 1882), p. 137 optimistically estimated Acre's wealth at £50,000 p.a.
[390] Prawer, *Histoire*, trans. Nahon, ii, p. 109.
[391] Alberic, p. 947, Akropolites, p. 58.
[392] Lower, pp. 85-6, 156. For *Supremus opifex* see *Vetera monumenta historica Hungariam sacram illustrantia*, ed. A. Thiener (2 vols., Rome, 1859-60), i, no. 283.
[393] E.g. Painter, p. 481.

mentioned in the expedition's Latin sources, which also emphasise that it was well-planned and successful.[394] Yet this partial view neglects the expeditions's most widespread action; its raid in July 1240 to Nablus, the Jordan Valley and Gaza, undertaken while reestablishing Frankish control over Jerusalem, and beginning the refortification of Ascalon.[395] First brought to historical attention by Jackson, the significance of the action has been missed, with Lower passing over it in order to discuss the diplomacy Thibaut undertook with Isma'il and al-Nasir.[396]

While this type of common action is of little historiographical significance in itself, it is nevertheless noteworthy, due to the positive light it portrays Thibaut of Navarre in.[397] Through this action, not only does he appear as leader of a vigorously-executed crusade which navigated the complexities of contemporary Islamic politics, but for all the leadership problems which bedevilled the campaign's start, he ostensibly organised action over a wide front.[398] After all, from Ascalon to the Jordan Valley via Jerusalem is some 50 miles, to say nothing of the fact this territory had proven difficult for the Franks to hold since 1229.[399] Thus, the speed Thibaut took command of the host under his nominal command impresses. In November 1239, he had been incapable of preventing Amalric of Montfort, Henry of Bar and Hugh of Burgundy (all of whom were Thibaut's explicit rivals for the expedition's leadership) and the influential *poulains* Walter of Brienne, Balian of

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394 *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 533, 535-6, William of Nangis, 'Gesta Ludovici', p. 328, Alberic, p. 946, *CM*, iv, p. 25

395 *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ١٠٥. al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 269 speaks of a raid around Nablus. *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 554 mentions Thibaut going to Jerusalem and overseeing the rebuilding of Ascalon.

396 Jackson, p. 42, Lower, pp. 174-5.

397 For the omnipresence of raiding in Levantine crusading see C. Marshall, *Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 183-209.

398 For the contested leadership of the French expedition c.f. Reddish, 'Did the crusaders consciously emulate?', pp. 38-40.

399 Tyerman, *God's War*, p. 755 notes that the gains of Frederick II's expedition were fully exploited. T. Van Cleve, 'The Crusade of Frederick II' in Kenneth Setton et al. (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, p. 456-7 stated Frederick's agreement with al-Kamil undermined the scope of the crusader states for further conquests beyond the agreed boundaries.

Sidon, John of Arsuf, and Odo of Montbéliard, all of whom had sworn oaths to him in Acre, from splitting from the main crusading force.[400] Yet, barely 8 months later he was leading coordinated, widespread and effective raiding. Besides indicating how well-equipped this crusade was, reinforcing the *poulains'* importance in keeping the expedition well-supplied, the scale of this raiding must raise historical appreciation of Thibaut's character. A positive picture of Thibaut has been expressed before by Taittinger, who praised his intelligence and diplomatic sense, but even he stopped short of what seems reasonable.[401] Furthermore, that Thibaut took this action despite his own previous leadership issues and despite the defeat at Gaza indicates the imperative of all crusades to actively seek renumeration. Following the huge investment made in them, both from Western Europe and Outremer, this is no surprise, but it certainly raises questions over how far crusades really differed from other medieval wars. In turn, this undermines the views that the crusades were a category apart from the other conflicts of their times, including other types of 'just war'.[402]

Yet if the Holy Land expedition shows the crusaders seeking remuneration while on campaign, the evidence from the Valencian expedition is more extensive still. A key part of James's strategy, as will be discussed later, at this juncture it is worth emphasising how much it occurred. Given the wealth of Muslim Valencia, that the crusaders made use of this expedient is unsurprising, but the scale upon which such methods were used remains noteworthy.[403] Sticking to episodes for which

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[400] For Thibaut failing to enforce his authority over the host that departed for Gaza see *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 539-40. The evidence that Thibaut secured oaths from the other crusaders to follow him as leader is strong. Thibaut explicitly mentioned such oaths when attempting to prevent the army's split before the Battle of Gaza, while during disputes over whether to pursue a Damascene or Egyptian alliance, Thibaut was enraged by the *poulains'* failure to honour their previous promise to obey him; *Ibid*. pp. 540, 554. Additionally, Richard of Cornwall described Thibaut as 'dux et caput tunc exercitus'; *CM*, iv, p. 140.

[401] C. Taittinger, *Thibaut le Chansonnier, comte de Champagne* (Paris, 1987), pp. 241-268.

[402] L. Walters, 'The Just War and the Crusade: Antitheses or Analogies', *The Monist*, 57 (4) (Oct. 1973), pp. 584-94, R. Potter, *War and Moral Discourse* (Richmond, 1969), pp. 51-4.

[403] On Valencia's wealth see al-Himyari, p. ٤٧.

specific evidence is available, the crusaders attained remuneration in various activities during the siege of Borriana in October 1233, when 200 men from the mule train plundered Alcàssar, despite the presence of a local garrison, while James himself led several successful excursions around Albahat.[404] Similarly, typifying the massive funds available, James's capture of Montcada on 3 July 1235 proved extremely profitable, witnessed in the rhetorical figure of over 100,000 bezants supplied by James when describing the profits accrued following its fall.[405] Moreover, financial remuneration through aggressive military action remained a feature of the campaign. Demonstrating also how the campaign didn't depend on James's will alone (whatever the *Llibre* implies), in late 1238 a force comprising Ramon Folc of Cardona, Artal of Alágon, 50 knights and some infantrymen successfully raided Villena and Sax, while in early 1239, as James turned to his interests in the Midi, Guillem of Aguiló conquered Rebollet with a mixed force of knights, footmen and almogavars, to great profit.[406] All this is besides the riches available from the conquest of Valencia proper, wealth James sought to prevent his nobles acquiring.[407] Given the Valencian crusade differed from the other campaigns by being a war of (re)conquest with a national flavour (neither of which aspects invalidates the label 'crusade') and occurring in a far wealthier region, perhaps the prominence this aspect of remuneration acquired is understandable, given the crusaders stood to own the land gained on a more permanent basis.[408] Yet regardless, it is worth emphasising the extent of that financial technique, both to show how no campaign, crusade or not, was complete without it.

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[404] *LdF*, p. 170.
[405] *Ibid*. p. 179-80.
[406] *Ibid*. pp. 235, 237.
[407] *Ibid*. p. 229.
[408] R. Burns, 'The Many Crusades of Valencia's Conquest (1225-1280): An Historiographical Labyrinth' in D. Kagay and T. Vann (eds.), *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in honour of Joseph F. O'Callaghan* (Leiden and Boston, 1998), pp. 169-71.

Funds from non-Christians

Besides raiding, the crusades of the 1230s also extracted funds from non-Christians through alternative methods. Chief was tribute from Muslim powers. Long a feature of Muslim-Christian relations, despite the Islamic legal difficulties around giving tribute to infidels, such payments were particularly prominent in Iberia, where the Christian kingdoms extract tribute, *parias*, whenever central Andalusi power waned.[409] Likewise, financial submission by the Islamic world was a familiar, albeit less frequent, source of income in the Levant.[410] Thus, the presence of such funding during both campaigns of the Triple Crusade testifies further that both expeditions occurred within crusading mainstream. Turning first to the Holy Land, the evidence suggests that tribute was received in the initial phase of negotiations between the crusaders and the Islamic world.[411] Although the giver is not specified, as these gifts predated the arrangements made with Damascus and Kerak in 1240, it likely was al-Muzaffar of Hama, with whom the crusaders were in contact before and after the Gaza campaign, and whose potential for conversion had been known since summer 1239.[412] Although the contact came to nothing, that gifts of money were received seems incontestable, being referenced both in the 'Rothelin' continuation proper, and a song supposedly written by the crusade rank-and-file criticising the leaders preserved in the 'Rothelin' account.[413] Besides showing how far al-Muzaffar was prepared to go in his failed ruse of dealing with the

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[409] On the legal difficulties of Muslims paying tribute to Christian powers see M. Lower, 'Tribute, Islamic Law, and Diplomacy: the Legal Background to the Tunis Crusade of 1270' in J. Bird (ed.), *Papacy, Crusade, and Christian-Muslim Relations* (Amsterdam, 2018), pp. 227-39. For Iberian tribute, see O'Callaghan, pp. 165-71.

[410] An example of Muslim tribute in the Holy Land is Damascus in the 1140s, which paid the Kingdom of Jerusalem perhaps 20,000 dinars a month for protection from the Zengids. For this see S. Heidemann, 'Financing the Tribute to the Kingdom of Jerusalem: an urban tax in Damascus', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 70 (2007), p. 126.

[411] *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 550.

[412] On al-Muzaffar's contact with the Franks see *Ibid*. pp. 415-6, Ibn Wasil, pp. 223-5. On knowledge of his potential to convert see Alberic, p. 945.

[413] *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 550-1.

Franks in order to infiltrate Damascus and secure it on al-Salih Ayyub's behalf, such support consolidates the idea this crusade witnessed a high degree of exchange across religious and political lines.[414] This is especially so given the Christians also received tribute following agreement with Damascus in summer 1240. As part of this treaty, following al-Nuwayri and Ibn Duqmaq, the Franks could enter Damascus and trade therein, even in weapons, a fact supposedly shocking, despite trade in weapons across religious lines having a long history that was certainly active in recent times.[415] Hence, not only were the Levantine crusade's shape and outcome determined by its diplomatic contacts with the Ayyubid princes, but that contact also part-financed the expedition itself. Combined with the extensive raid in 1240 on al-Nasir's lands, this must reinforce the idea this crusade marked the point of Outremer's greatest integration into Levantine politics.[416] By summer 1240 not only were the Franks waging war on Kerak allied to Isma'il, but they were actively being paid to do so.[417]

Regarding the Valencian crusade, beyond the funds extracted upon the conquest of various settlements, Muslim financial support appeared in tribute resulting from James's previous activity in the Balearics. In particular, James received tribute from the Muslim population of Minorca, who had submitted and begun to pay tribute in June 1231, rather than face invasion.[418] A decision which may have secured greater freedom for the Muslim Minorcans than they had previously enjoyed under Islamic rule, the terms of this treaty have survived, and despite some variation between the sources, it appears the tribute comprised largely agricultural produce, the island's principal

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[414] Ibn Wasil, pp. 222-8.
[415] al-Nuwayri, xxix, pp. 278-9, Ibn Duqmaq, pp. 135-6. Highlighting the trade in weapons across religious lines, *HPEC*, iv, part i, p. ٧٠, describes al-Kamil taking Harran and Edessa in 1236 with the aid of a 'Western Mangonel'.
[416] Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders*, pp. 94-5.
[417] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, pp. ١٠٤-٥, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 553-4, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 269.
[418] *LdF*, pp. 121-6.

industry.[419] That this tribute was paid annually throughout the Valencian crusade is explicitly stated by the *Llibre dels Fets*.[420] However, and importantly when considering crusade finance, there is suggestive evidence this tribute was turned into hard currency rather than delivered as goods; the tribute was farmed out to the highest bidder in the 1270s and 1280s for £180-£250 of Valencia.[421] Given such practice also marked the sale of positions in Aragonese North African consulates throughout the early thirteenth century (though those offices went for far greater sums), there are thus strong grounds to suggest this was how the tribute was received during the 1230s. Clearly the amount raised was not staggeringly large, but given this fact is yet to be realised by historians of the expedition, it warrants consideration. Aside from the Minorcan tribute, James also likely received funds from Abu Zayd, the previous ruler of Valencia. Certainly, this is the implication given in the *Llibre* when as part of his negotiations with Zayyan Ibn Mardanish, ruler of Valencia in 1238, James demanded Zayyan make up any shortcomings in tribute which Abu Zayd had conceded.[422] However, outside the *Llibre* there is no evidence that after his deposition in 1229 that Abu Zayd gave James more than any Aragonese lord, a status he had definitely accepted by 1236, although his conversion to Christianity had likely not yet occurred.[423] Thus, it is probable that while the Muslim Abu Zayd gave James some funds as his liege-man, the sums were not large. Nevertheless, alongside the Minorcan tribute, it reinforces the idea that the Valencia crusade, albeit in a smaller way than the Levantine, was part-financed by funds extracted from Muslims.

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[419] D. Abulafia, *A Mediterranean Emporium: the Catalan kingdom of Majorca* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 65, *LdF*, pp. 124-5 and *DJI*, i, no. 153.
[420] *LdF*, p. 126.
[421] R. Roselló Vaquer, *Aportació a la història medieval de Menorca: el segle XIII* (Minorca, 1980), pp. 8-9.
[422] *LdF*, pp. 226-7.
[423] R. Burns, 'Almohad Prince and Mudejar Convert: New Documentation on Abu Zayd' in D. Kagay and J. Snow (eds.), *Medieval Iberia: Essays on the History and Literature of Medieval Spain* (New York, 1997), pp. 171-7.

Alongside the Muslims of the Levant and Iberia, Europe's Jews were obliged to provide funds towards the crusade in the 1230s. A controversial source of crusading funding, it had been general papal policy since Innocent III to incite rulers to force Jews to contribute towards funding crusades, a fact regularised at the First Council of Lyons, 1245, which encouraged rulers to assume the profits of Jewish usury.[424] Hence, it is unsurprising that there is widespread evidence the Jews contributed towards the Triple Crusade. Starting with England, there are cases, despite the various central funding streams available, of *crucesignati* taking out loans from Jews, typifying the survival of older, "traditional" forms of crusade revenue-raising. Thus it was for Robert of Fraxineto, who cleared all his debts before departing on crusade, as it was for Robert of Glovernia, his brothers William and Philip, and a Robert of Gloucester, all *crucesignati* who complained about the excessive rates of interest charged by the Jews.[425] In themselves, such complains are interesting, demonstrating how the moratorium on payment of interest for loans by crusaders were waived when circumstances required.

On a different level, exercising his royal prerogative as previous English monarchs had, Henry III tallaged the Jews in January 1237, raising 3,000 marks for his brother, subsequently bolstered by 1,000 marks in 1240 taken from the general tax of a third imposed on the Jews instituted 22 June 1239.[426] A substantial sum, it is plausible that this sum of 4,000 marks may have become a "model" amount for English Jews to be tallaged in order to support the crusades, given an identical tallage was made in 1269-70 to support Prince Edward's crusade.[427] The expeditions of the Triple Crusade may therefore have cast a longer shadow than previously credited, here serving as the non-

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[424] *CM*, iv, p. 459. See also *Registres*, ii, no. 3899 in which Gregory IX encouraged Louis IX, worried that the money had acquired from the Jews was the profit from usury, to put the money obtained towards the Constantinople crusade
[425] *CR*, iv, p. 489, *Calendar*, ed. Bliss *et al*., i, p. 159, S. Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews in the XIII century*, rev. edn. (New York, 1966), no. 89.
[426] *CPR*, p. 173, *CR*, iv, p. 197. For the 1239 tax see *CM*, iii, p. 543.
[427] Tyerman, *EaC*, p. 193.

monarchical exemplar of how to tax the Jews before a crusade, the counterpart to the Third Crusade in England, whose tallage of the Jews for 10,000 marks in 1188 (when Henry II assumed the cross) was repeated in 1251 by Henry III, having taken the cross the previous year.[428] Nevertheless, the 4,000 marks taken from the Jews was not overly-onerous, being far lower than the 20,000 marks which Henry III extracted for his Poitevin war in 1241.[429] In that sense, Henry's importance to the 1240-1 crusade in England returns to focus. Here, contrasting with what was concluded regarding his personal gifts to the expedition, his role illustrates how he could put limits on the crusade's finances: the Jews would be tallaged only as he allowed.

Outside of loans and royal tallages, there is circumstantial evidence that some English crusaders acquired Jewish money through violence. For sure, the pogrom of 1190 was not repeated, but nevertheless Lower's claim that this crusade was launched without attacks on the Jews appears false.[430] In particular, note the *Chronica Maiora*'s description of the Jews' taxation in June 1239.[431] In this, Paris describes the tax of a third as being accompanied by 'exterminium magnum et destructionem', before describing the lynching of four Jews by the population of Norwich, exemplifying the violence that could occur around the collection.[432] Given part of this tax supported the crusade, directly or indirectly Jewish funds taken through violence ended in crusader pockets. This is especially plausible given the known crusader recruitment in Norwich. This unsavoury aspect of the crusade therefore shows the Triple Crusade as part of crusade mainstream in terms of the pent-up feelings against the Jews it could unleash, alongside the numbered expeditions.

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[428] For 1188 tallage see *The Great Rolls of the Pipe of the third and fourth years of the reign of King Richard the First: Michaelmas 1191 and Michaelmas 1192 (Pipe Rolls 37 and 38)*, ed. D. Stenton (London, 1926), p. 50. For 1251 tallage see Tyerman, *EaC*, p. 193.
[429] *CR*, iv, pp. 312, 334.
[430] Lower, p. 147.
[431] *CM*, iii, p. 543.
[432] *Ibid*. p. 543.

Nevertheless, whatever violence was meted out to English Jews, the extortion of money from European Jews appears more widespread and forceful. In France, unlike England, there is direct evidence of violence against the Jews by those inspired by crusade preaching. Most obviously, there is the 1236 pogrom in Brittany and elsewhere.[433] A subject which ostensibly shocked Gregory IX, in September 1236 he wrote on the subject to various prelates spanning Western France and Normandy, demanding the Jews be granted restitution for their losses, thereby inadvertently revealing the profits that could be raised through violence.[434] That crusaders raised funds through violence is reinforced by the chronicle evidence, both Christian and Jewish, as well as by a canon of the synod held June 1236 in Tours, which all describe attacks on Jewish goods and lives occurring in at least Brittany, Anjou and Poitou in 1236.[435] While not as obviously violent, Thibaut of Champagne also exploited the Jewish inhabitants of his lands. Something to which he was habituated, having placed demands totalling 70,000*l*. on the Jews in 1222, Thibaut again turned to this financial expedient before 29 November 1238.[436] The amount raised is unquantifiable, but Gregory's letter to the Abbot of Jouy-le-Moutier suggests the sums were substantial.[437] However, none of this information is new, with Lower using contrasting Jewish experiences to demonstrate how papal attempts to create a unified Christendom failed.[438] Hence, it is perhaps best to add here some brief conclusions. Firstly, the Jewish experience illustrates the diversity of financial expedients used, even for the same crusade, in different national contexts, indicating that generalised conclusions are difficult. Secondly, the exploitation of the Jews shows both the

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[433] For this pogrom see R. Chazan, *Medieval Jewry in Northern France: A political and Social History* (Baltimore, 1973), p. 135, W. Jordan, *The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians* (Philadelphia, 1989), pp. 71-2.
[434] *Registres*, ii, nos. 3308-12.
[435] See the *Chronicon Britanniae* contained in H. Morice, *Mémoires pour servir de preuves à l'histoire ecclésiastique et civile de Bretagne* (3 vols., Paris, 1742-6), i, col. 111 and Rabbi Yehiel's account of the so-called "trial of the Talmud"; H. Maccoby, *Judaism of Trial: Jewish-Christian Disputations in the Middle Ages* (East Brunswick, 1982), p. 161.
[436] Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews*, no. 9.
[437] *Registres*, ii, no. 4601, *HdDC*, no. 2481.
[438] Lower, pp. 115, 127-8.

endurance of older financial techniques, and how the Triple Crusade was received in the same way as other crusades, here raising the prospect of violent anti-Semitism. Finally, that Thibaut was involved in the process suggests the limits of the funding granted by vow redemptions. The sums available were large, but did not provide everything a *crucesignatus*, especially one of Thibaut's status, needed.

Loans

Besides borrowing from the Jews, several *crucesignati* also financed their vow through loans from Christians. A potentially difficult method of acquiring cash, given the crusader moratorium on repayment of debts, first espoused in *Audita Tremendi* in 1187, made *crucesignati* unattractive targets for creditors, nevertheless exigency and circumstance combined to mean some loans were issued.[439] This is despite the moratorium of payment of crusaders' debts being reconfirmed on 13 April 1235 and again on 27 May 1237, indicating that crusaders readily traded in their privileges when faced with hard reality.[440] For example, in the Holy Land crusade, there was Guy of Beine, who in his will, dated April 1240, ceded a rent of 40 *sols* on his revenues of Beine to the Abbey of Saint-Germain of Auxerre before he departed on crusade, in order to repay the loans he had contracted.[441] Similarly, papal records show Gregory intervening on behalf of several French *crucesignati* who had run up extensive debts with Florentine merchants.[442] However, far more extensive were the loans taken by James of Aragon, which at various times supplied the lifeblood of

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[439] For *Audita Tremendi* see Bird, Peters, and Powell, (eds.), *Crusade and Christendom*, pp. 5-9. Tyerman, *EaC*, pp. 196-7 and R. Brundage, *Medieval Canon Law and the crusader* (Madison, 1969), p. 183 highlight the crusader exemption on paying interest on loans which risked destroying their credit.
[440] *Registres*, ii, nos. 2512-7, 3723-5.
[441] *HdDB*, iv, no. 2391.
[442] *Registres*, ii, nos. 4180, 4264.

the Valencian crusade. Across the campaign, James apparently borrowed from whoever would lend; the *Llibre* freely concedes the whole crusading army was sustained for two months at the siege of Borriana by borrowing from merchants in and around Tortosa.[443] Nor was such borrowing an isolated incident, with James's crushing debts to various merchants necessitating him selling 100 Muslim captives for 17,000 bezants in 1235.[444] Moreover, James also accrued debts both to town notables, such as those of Lleida, from whom he borrowed 60,000 sous in August 1237 in order to purchase 3 months worth of flour, 6 months worth of wine and 2 months worth of salted meat and barley for the army at El Puig, and to leading ecclesiastics such as the Bishop of Barcelona, whose loans to James were repaid through proceeds taken upon Valencia's capture.[445] In explaining why such loans were more prevalent in the Valencia campaign, perhaps the answer lies partly in the nature of the campaign, with the potential acquisition of Muslim territory giving James the collateral, and thus credit, to enter into such deals. Moreover, given the relative absence of vow redemptions in Valencia, the necessity of greater borrowing undertaken may suggest vow redemptions contributed much towards the solvency of the other campaigns. Lastly, like those crusaders who took out loans with Jewish bankers, the existence of widespread borrowing, and the urgency with which James was evidently required to repay, shows how the crusader moratorium on repayment of debts could not survive contact with reality. In that sense, it highlights the limitations of seeing crusading from the papal outlook. Just because a pope said something was so, does not mean it occurred.

Additionally, common to both expeditions were the loans supplied by the Military Orders. Usually the beneficiaries of payments given their primary function dovetailed with the crusades' aims, and such donations conferred spiritual credit, during the Triple Crusade, financial support

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[443] *LdF*, p. 164.
[444] *Ibid*. p. 181.
[445] *Ibid*. p. 188, *DJI*, ii, no. 292.

apparently cut both ways.[446] For example, in December 1235 Gregory subjected both military orders to a forced loan of 2,000*l*. to support the Holy Land.[447] Likewise, outside Borriana in 1233 it was the Hospitallers who stood as surety for the debt of 60,000 sous which James incurred to Bernat of Sangaeugènia and Pere Martell for 3 war galleys.[448] Based on such evidence, the Triple Crusade complements existing views over the importance of the Military Orders to crusading finance. The experience of the Second Crusade, when the Templars took over the funding and organisation of the French army when it was in crisis, or Frederick II's decision in 1225 to entrust his crusade's funds to the master of the Teutonic Order, were not outliers, but exemplars of the potential extent of the Military Orders' involvement in funding.[449] Thus, the money provided by the Military Orders resembles the financing sought from other, long-established financial expedients, typifying how, despite the innovations in crusade funding, 'traditional' forms of revenue-raising endured.

Payment by the leaders of the crusade

Lastly, when considering the Triple Crusade's funding, the main source of funding for its "rank-and-file" participants must be assessed. Little visible in the source material, such figures constituted the overwhelming majority of the expeditions' participants, meaning any comprehensive analysis of how the Triple Crusade was funded must include their perspective. Above all, most "ordinary"

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[446] For gifts of land, money or privileges to the Hospitallers during the period 1233-41 see *Cartulaire Général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem*, ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx (4 vols., Paris, 1894-1906), ii, pp. 478-80, 483-5, 491-6, 501-3, 505-12, 514, 516-21, 525-9, 531-3, 536, 561-4, 567-71, 574-87, 589-93.
[447] *Ibid*. no. 2130.
[448] *LdF*, pp. 154-5.
[449] 'Epistolae Sugerii Abbatis S. Dionysii', pp. 501-2, 'Frederici II. Constiutiones' in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum*, ed. L. Weiland *et al.* (12 Volumes, Hanover, 1893-2013), ii, no. 102.

participants received their funding in the form of payments from the leaders of each individual expedition. The best evidence for this process is the contract negotiated between John of Neville and Philip Basset in November 1239.[450] Neither Philip Basset, Justiciar of England, nor John of Neville, the royal forester, constitute "ordinary" crusaders, but the contract is an instructive survival, demonstrating explicitly how crusaders' pay could work. In this case, Philip would serve John in Outremer together with two other knights, at John's expense, although (indicating these were rich men) should John find himself in financial difficulties, Philip would provide up to 700 marks. Given Philip, John, and the two other knights would themselves be accompanied by numerous support staff, all of whom would themselves require paying (their wages being the thing most likely to leave John of Neville in financial difficulties), this helps indicate how 'ordinary' crusaders were supported. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose this arrangement was particularly unusual, with similar processes likely repeated numerous times across the Triple Crusade, given the widespread evidence of crusaders receiving pay from their leaders. For example, upon arriving in Acre, Richard of Cornwall offered to meet the expenses of all remaining crusaders, in exchange for their service, rather than have them quit the expedition early, necessitating the creation of similar contracts.[451] Similarly, Paris states Richard campaigned with a household of retained knights and followers, a potent statement given their proximity.[452]

Outside of Richard's expedition, evidence of crusaders paying followers appears in the will drawn up by the dying *crucesignatus* Guy, Count of Nevers in Apulia on 10 August 1240.[453] In this Guy listed the men of his household accompanying him, many of whom received gifts, including his chaplain William of Vitry, his cleric Stephen and his chamberlain Betrand. Only if such men

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[450] Lloyd, Appendix 5.
[451] *CM*, iv, p. 71.
[452] *Ibid.* p. 44.
[453] *Titres de la Maison ducale de Bourbon*, ed. J. Huillard-Bréholles, (2 vols., Paris, 1867-74), i, no. 221.

were being financially supported by him would they be with him, a fact highlighted by the will emphasising their close connection to Guy himself. Elsewhere, retained men are apparent in Godfrey of Argentan's company, who Gregory described on 25 February 1237, and 23 February 1238, as commanding 20 men to the succour of the Holy Land.[454] That such men were being paid is explicitly mentioned, as Gregory stated Godfrey lacked the funds to support the company, leading him (in another indication that Gregory had a hierarchy of funding methods with vow redemptions the last resort) to grant Godfrey the revenues raised through vow redemption in Poitiers and Picardy. On a grander scale, the Count of Bar campaigned with many paid men. Described in May 1237 as leading 'several nobles and powerful men', by February 1238, he commanded c.100 fighting men, an undertaking expensive enough to supposedly require the concession of 10% of all vow redemptions in France.[455] Only if he were paying such troops, is such expense accountable. Similarly, paid troops recur in the conquest of Valencia. Besides the many references to James's household in the *Llibre dels Fets*, in the *Llibre del Repartiment* numerous followers of lords received gifts in Valencia.[456] Retaining paid men was thus not unique to James, but a central aspect of the expedition.

Such widespread evidence for paid participants is noteworthy on several levels. Firstly, it presents the Triple Crusade as within the mainstream of previous crusade practice. As Tyerman has demonstrated, paid men, who may not actually have taken the cross were a feature of crusading, from its earliest inception, to the extent that contemporaries did not much comment upon them, such was their ubiquity.[457] Evidence for this point is plentiful. For example, Oliver of Paderborn

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[454] *Registres*, ii, nos. 3529, 4107.
[455] *Ibid*. nos. 3633, 4105.
[456] *LdF*, pp. 146, 155, 159, 183, 202, 215, *LdR*, i, nos. 247, 281, 406, 658, 776, 923, 1143, 1173, 1414.
[457] C. Tyerman, 'Paid Crusaders: 'Pro honoris vel pecunie'; 'stipendarii contra pagaos'; money and incentives on crusade' in C. Tyerman, *Practices of Crusading* (Farnham, 2013), Part XIV, pp. 1-40.

described Pelagius attempting to assert his leadership over the Fifth Crusade at Damietta by buying soldiers, while in 1228-9 Frederick II himself supported a retinue of 1,000 knights, and subsidised the costs of several others.[458] Hence, the Triple Crusade supplies further, and outside of the contract between Philip Basset and John of Neville, overlooked evidence to cement the view that payment of participants constituted a central part in how crusading was financed, alongside demonstrating the campaigns' continuity with previous practice. Moreover, the payment of crusaders remained central to crusading after the 1230s. For example, Prince Edward's crusade in 1268-72 was defined by contracts similar to that negotiated by Basset and Neville, one example being the contract made by Adam of Jesmond with Edward on 20 July 1270 in which he promised to serve for a year alongside 4 other knights, and all the attendant camp followers, at Edward's expense.[459] There are several ramifications of this point. Firstly, sitting in the middle of the crusading period, the Triple Crusade reinforces previous arguments that payment was key to understanding why people went on crusade, many of which focus on the earlier crusades.[460] In turn, this questions the view that crusaders were solely motivated by faith, or bound by what have been unconvincingly called 'emotional ties', which while not mutually exclusive with the concept of service-for-pay, do minimise its importance.[461] This is a fact tacitly acknowledged even by the great defender of the crusades as driven by faith, Riley-Smith, in his obfuscation of the pecuniary meaning behind the 'stipendia' of Innocent III's 1199 call for a crusade tax.[462] Thus, the payment of 'ordinary' crusaders within the

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458 Hoogeweg (ed.), *Schriften*, p. 260, Richard of San Germano, 'Chronica', ed. Pertz, pp. 343-4, 347-9.
459 H. Richardson and G. Sayles, *The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta* (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 464-5.
460 See e.g. C. Kostick, *The Social Structure of the First Crusade* (Leiden, 2008), J. France, 'Patronage and the appeal of the First Crusade' in J. Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact* (Manchester, 1997), pp. 5-20.
461 E.g. J. Riley-Smith, 'Crusading as an act of love', *History*, 65 (1980), pp. 177-92, Idem, 'The Motives of the earliest crusaders and the settlement of Latin Palestine 1095-1100', *English Historical Review*, 97 (389) (Oct. 1983), p. 734.
462 Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith, *Crusades: Idea and Reality*, p. 147.

funding structure of the Triple Crusade typifies how assessment of financial specifics, can effectively make points of wider validity.

However, besides showing the Triple Crusade as part of a broad heritage encompassing all crusades, the payment of the rank-and-file presents it as kindred with all medieval wars. Besides being a feature of crusading, the construction of medieval armies through paid soldiers was universal, and the era of the crusades supplies numerous examples of this fact. For example in 1158, Count Amalric of Jaffa and Ascalon, not yet King of Jerusalem, made reference in a charter to 'paid troops', indicating the Kingdom of Jerusalem's army was not wholly constructed on "feudal" lines.[463] At the other end of Europe, Richard FitzNeal's *Dialogue of the Exchequer* stated in 1179 that English kings often paid knights for their service, this being why payment from crown estates had surpassed payment in kind soon after the Norman Conquest.[464] Cutting across national lines, paid troops were central to the Military Orders, providing most obviously their crossbowmen and turcopoles.[465] This is worth emphasising because of how problematic it makes the common assertion that crusading constituted something truly distinct from other forms of warfare: Housley claimed that prior to the fourteenth century, the paid basis of crusading differed from other wars, a difference Morris dated to the twelfth century.[466] Yet, the evidence of paid crusaders in the Triple Crusade undermines this view: once in action, the crusades were like any other war. For all they constituted a 'new path to salvation', and a theoretically new category of warfare, the crusades' uniqueness can be over-exaggerated.[467] In this, the funding for the Triple Crusade serves as

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[463] *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani, MXCVIII-MCCXCI*, ed. R. Röricht (Innsbruck, 1893), p. 86.
[464] Richard FitzNeale, *The course of the Exchequer*, ed. and trans. C. Johnson (London, 1950), pp. 40, 52 [text facing translation].
[465] A. Forey, 'Paid troops in the service of the Military Orders in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries' in A. Boas (ed.), *The Crusader World* (London, 2016), pp. 84-97.
[466] N. Housley, *Fighting for the Cross: Crusading to the Holy Land* (New Haven and London, 2008) p. 110, Morris, *Papal Monarchy*, pp. 277-80.
[467] Guibert of Nogent, 'Gesta Dei per Francos', in *RHC-Oc*, iv, p. 124.

practical evidence to support Tyerman's view already raised on theoretical grounds that historians should not overstate how "special" the crusades were.[468]

Conclusions

Thus, it seems this study of the funding for the Triple Crusade returns a similar conclusion to that already reached by historians studying other aspects of crusading, namely that to study the crusades is to illuminate many aspects of medieval society, such was their importance.[469] In the specific case of the Triple Crusade, this is manifested in the many different types of conclusion that can be drawn, stemming from the great variety of funding streams employed, all of which fall within the oversight of a broad approach to the expeditions. For example, beginning with aspects true for all expeditions, it appears that, given the evidence for extensive royal support, the conclusion that the expeditions would have been stillborn without royal patronage is unavoidable. This is something always evident for James I and the Valencian crusade, but far less so for Henry III, whose support for the Holy Land crusade took many forms, and for Louis IX, whose dedication to crusading prior to his own crusade is often overlooked. Indeed, it possible that without his support, there would have been no Constantinople crusade at all. Evidently in isolation, Gregory's efforts were insufficient, a significant blow to the 'pluralist' school, which views the whole crusading movement through papal eyes. Similarly, Henry III appears to have controlled much of the crusade's ultimate financing, with on the one hand, the Jews and the wider realm tallaged only as far as he was prepared to consent, while on the other, extensive proceeds of justice were funnelled towards his

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[468] Tyerman, 'Were there any Crusades in the Twelfth Century?', pp. 553-77, Idem, 'Paid Crusaders' pp. 5, 12.
[469] E.g. Blaydes and Paik, 'The Impact of Holy Land Crusades on State Formation', T. Alkopher, 'The Social (And Religious) Meanings That Constitute War: The Crusades as Realpolitik vs. Socialpolitik', *International Studies Quarterly*, 49 (4) (Dec. 2005), pp. 715-37.

brother's campaign. This side of Henry's policies is something not yet fully realised, and shows how studying the Triple Crusade can raise points of wider resonance.[470] Likewise, the sale of assets appears, albeit with local variation, a feature of the crusades in the 1230s, as much for the great and good, with access to central funding, both ecclesiastical and secular, as for the lesser *crucesignati* without. However, while the endurance of this funding mechanism, beyond previous historical explanations is indisputable, the specific forms this sale of assets took indicates some of the evolving changes occurring within crusading in this period. Similarly common as the realisation of assets was the importance of securing remuneration on campaign. For all the planning and financing prior to departure, it is clear that no crusade occurred without seeking substantial sums abroad. As this study indicates, this fact allows further points to be made, with reassessment of Thibaut's leadership, the state of contemporary Outremer, or indications how far the relative wealth of a region like Valencia affected the shape a crusade took, only some ways in which the information could be used. Finally, all three expeditions featured crusaders serving for pay. A facet of funding which puts the Triple Crusade squarely within crusading mainstream, this funding is suggestive about the kinds of motivators that drove people to crusade, alongside indicating that continued emphasis upon the "specialness" of the crusades *vis-à-vis* other wars is potentially problematic. Furthermore, thanks to the financial assessment undertaken, other hitherto-unappreciated insights can be adduced, such as the realisation that clerical taxation was a feature of these crusades' funding, or, through the acquisition of tribute from Christendom's non-Catholic neighbours, appreciating how much contact occurred across religious and political lines on Europe's frontiers, a fact as true for Aragon, as for Outremer or Latin Greece.

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[470] E.g. D. Carpenter, *The Reign of Henry III* (London, 1996) contains nothing on him as a crusade patron in the 1230s and early 1240s. Idem, *Henry III*, pp. 202-3, 214 acknowledges only the major donations to his brother.

Yet just as the continuities between the funding for the three expeditions say much, so too do the differences. For example, the differences in the Jews' treatment in England vs France indicates some of the different ways in which these campaigns sat within normal crusading practice. Hence in England, the precedent for future tallages of the Jews for Holy Land crusades was set, while in France the widespread attacks on the Jews present the Triple Crusade as heir to longstanding traditions of anti-Semitic violence during times of heightened religious fervour. Additionally, that Gregory IX was unable to stop this occurring testifies to how limited papal authority was in practical terms. Similarly, the evidence suggests far greater recourse to borrowing and centralised secular taxation was made in the Valencian than in the Levantine or Constantinopolitan crusades. By contrast, when it comes to vow redemptions, the position was inverted, with vow redemptions apparently not a major part of James's crusade. Beyond specific national conclusions, such as determining the extent of royal control exercised by James, or demonstrating the difficulties in securing taxation in England and France, indicating the limits of royal power, such differences allow assessment of the financial efficacy of vow redemptions, something not possible otherwise. Moreover, this difference over vow redemption implies Gregory envisaged an order of priority for funding mechanisms, with 'normal', established funding methods top, and vow redemptions meeting any shortfall.

What therefore does this information mean for an assessment of the Triple Crusade in the history of the crusades, and medieval warfare in general? On the first point, the picture is remarkably mixed. For all its innovations, particularly the successful attempts to make vow redemptions pay, there remained several remarkably conservative funding methods. Not only were established funding streams, such as the sale of assets and various borrowing maintained, but even some substantial advances in crusade funding, such as the secular taxation behind the Third Crusade, were not repeated, a fact which suggests size did matter when considering how to fund a crusade.

And yet, the Triple Crusade predicted future patterns of crusading too. Aside from vow redemptions, which became a feature of future crusading, it shows how important the crowns of Europe would become. All this reinforces an original contention of this thesis; that the Triple Crusade constitutes a good set of exemplars through which to view crusading *à la ronde*. Besides displaying evidence of how far crusaders engaged with their non-Christian neighbours, an engagement which garners ever greater historical attention, through their funding methods, they captured a distinct moment of evolution in the movement, as older forms of financing endured alongside the new.[471] Regarding the second point, the evidence suggests the crusades were no separate category of medieval conflict. Whether seen in the leaders raising funds through taxation, or being given royal gifts, or from the rank-and-file participants being supported through payment from their leaders, or the imperative for all crusaders to seek remuneration while on campaign, many aspects of the Triple Crusade's financing were common to all medieval warfare. As discussed, this has ramifications for how the Crusades should be considered. Perhaps, this also explains why vow redemptions have attracted so much historical attention, being the principal source of crusading financing without a parallel in non-crusading warfare. Thus, investigating the Triple Crusades illustrates the danger of distortion when presented by what seems new, causing one to miss broader continuities.

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[471] E.g. M. Lower, *The Tunis Crusade of 1270: A Mediterranean History* (Oxford, 2018), Cobb, *The Race for Paradise* analyse Muslim-Christian contacts during crusades.

Chapter 4: The People of the Triple Crusade

Preaching and funding do not, however, a crusade make. For all their importance, without studying the people who heard the preaching campaign, took the cross, and made the necessary financial preparations, there is no route to the full understanding this thesis seeks. Therefore, a prosopographical investigation of the Triple Crusade will now be undertaken, which will enable certainty about who took the cross, and how the crusades of the 1230s were constructed, as webs of connections between participants become apparent. Hence, not only will understanding of the Triple Crusade as a specific event be advanced, but it will also be possible to understand how the three expeditions relate to each other, and how the movement fits into the history of thirteenth century crusading.

How far this task has been previously been attempted varies between the three expeditions. For example, for the Levantine crusade, Lower discussed those who took the cross thither, as it supports his goal of assessing how far Gregory IX created a unified Christian society, centred upon the papacy.[472] However, while a firm basis, Lower's work cannot be regarded as the subject's final word. For one, his analysis focuses almost-exclusively on the major lords, with only cursory attention given to those of lesser rank. Secondly, the scope of his investigations was not universal, witnessed by the fact he never attempted a complete list of known *crucesignati*. Thirdly, elements of his analysis are contradicted by the existing evidence.

Similarly, Giebfried investigated the participants of the Greek crusade in his doctoral thesis, which took as its subject Emperor Baldwin II, and his efforts to secure his patrimony.[473] However,

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[472] Lower, pp. 39-54.
[473] Giebfried, pp. 264-75.

although effective at the task it sets itself, namely mapping some of the ties of lordship that underpinned the crusade response, this collection of names cannot be taken as definitive, given several notable participants were overlooked, most notably Geoffrey II of Villehardouin. Furthermore, given this study took Latin Greece as its sole focus, the chance to knit the findings from this expedition into its wider context was missed, meaning he undervalued the extent of recruitment for the Greek crusade.

Contrastingly, no study into the participants of the Valencian crusade yet exists, meaning the most detailed current assessment of that campaign's participants is the material deployed by O'Callaghan in his book on Iberian crusading.[474] As this section's intention is to make points generally relevant to Iberian crusading, this means there is historiographical room for a detailed study into the composition of the expedition. Moreover, given the Valencian crusade has never been studied in a Mediterranean context, there is obviously scope to break new ground, and apply the findings alongside those drawn from the Triple Crusade's other branches.

It cannot, however, be claimed that understanding the composition of the three expeditions of the Triple Crusade is equally easy. Although indubitably legal equals, and understood as equals, as shall become clear, the expeditions are not equals in the evidence they generated, something reflected in the disparity in the number of named participants identifiable for each campaign. For example, despite the *Llibre del Repartiment* only listing those who survived the expedition, who came to James's attention and who could therefore claim a share of the captured property, and the fact that papal letters, royal charters and chronicle evidence mostly indicate the participation of social élites, some 1,108 participants in the Valencian crusade can be named.[475] And that excludes the 785

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[474] O'Callaghan, pp. 125-9.
[475] Appendix, section 1 lists the confirmed crusaders to Valencia.

confirmed *crucesignati* whose origins are unclear. By comparison, once those whose participation is doubtful are removed, "only" 1,076 crusaders are known to have participated in the Fifth Crusade, the longest-running crusade, which has long been of interest to genealogists and crusade historians.[476] By any metric, while not definitive, this list is therefore a firm basis upon which to draw analyses.

Similarly, thanks to the detailed archival material from England and the survivals from various French sources, it has been possible to compile a list of some 246 individuals for the Holy Land crusade.[477] As with Valencia, this list is not equally comprehensive for all levels of participants, favouring those who encountered the crowns at the centre of government, and so generated most of the records, or those who attracted the attention of the chroniclers or the papacy. Nevertheless, although smaller, the list is varied, and covers a wide geographical and social sweep, allowing plausible conclusions to be drawn.

Contrastingly, such numbers cannot be identified for the Greek crusade. None of the Latin Empire's archives have survived, while the type of detailed record typified by the *Llibre del Repartiment* is simply non-existent for the Greek crusade. Similarly, the failure of the Constantinople crusade to generate significant interest in England, means the detailed English documentary records yield little information about the expedition. Consequently, only 39 named individuals and several unnamed but confirmed *crucesignati* can be identified for the expedition, based mostly upon the chronicles and French court records.[478] Thus, this thesis will integrate the

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[476] Powell, Appendices 2 and 4 contains a list of participants in the Fifth crusade. Among the most significant studies into the participation in the Fifth Crusade are D. Rüdebusch, *Der Anteil Niedersachsens an der Kreuzzügen und Heidenfahrten* (Hildesheim, 1972), D. Wojtecki, *Studien zur Personengeschichte des deutschen Ordens in 13. Jahrhundert* (Weisbaden, 1971).
[477] Appendix, section 3 lists the confirmed crusaders to the Holy Land.
[478] Appendix, section 2 lists the confirmed crusaders to Constantinople.

Greek evidence where possible, although this will be with the proviso that as full an understanding as is possible for the other two expeditions is impossible. Nevertheless, useful points can still be made, particularly when discussing the importance of kings to the construction of all three expeditions, the importance of ties of lordship in determining participation, or the international nature of participation.

Chapter 4a: International reach of the crusades

Recruitment in France and England for the Valencian crusade

Looking at who participated in the Triple Crusade, perhaps most striking is the international recruitment outside the heartlands of recruitment in all three expeditions: Aragon for Valencia, France for Greece and France and England for the Holy Land. In all cases, the scope of the crusade was broader than has previously been allowed, suggesting that while the Triple Crusade's expeditions were smaller than the numbered expeditions, its propaganda campaign was no complete failure. Starting with the Valencian expedition, it is notable that numerous participants from beyond the Pyrenees can be identified. Of these, the largest body are the French crusaders, of whom 79 can be named.[479] On one level this is unsurprising, as many hailed from the regions of the *Langue d'Oc*, areas explicitly targeted by Gregory IX in his initial appeal, and with whose bishops he maintained a regular correspondence on crusading matters.[480] Moreover, given the Levantine crusade was

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[479] For French crusaders to Valencia see *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaisette, viii, cols. 1004-7, *RHGF*, xxi, p. 596, *DJI*, ii, nos. 245-6, 268, 273, 281, 283, 287, *LdR*, i, nos. 15, 28, 36, 52, 69, 92, 103, 174, 176, 202, 218, 220, 227, 233, 242, 275, 284-5, 292, 295, 301, 337, 438, 461, 464, 582, 613, 630-1, 650, 679-80, 684, 716, 726, 735, 797, 828, 854, 858, 868, 874-5, 904, 908, 909, 924, 1022, 1092, 1095, 1104, 1156, 1164, 1195, 1312, 1421, 1446, 1448, 1451, 1454, 1795, 1813, and ii, nos. 67, 75, 139.

[480] *Registres,* i, nos. 1490-1, ii, nos. 3484-5, 3490, 4287, 4703.

firmly centred in the *Langue d'Oil*, and in Thibaut of Champagne and Amalric of Montfort was led by participants in the Albigensian crusades, whose disruptive after-effects retained their power to elicit powerful reactions, there were firm reasons for would-be southern French *crucesignati* to redeem their vows in Valencia, rather than the Holy Land.[481] Only the most obvious potential cases of this motivation are P. of Carcassonne and R. Enege of Carcassonne, who if indigenous (and their age renders this an open question), hailed from a city subjected to a bloody siege by Amalric's father Simon and a Northern French army in 1209.[482] Furthermore, geography and commercial links favoured the involvement of the southern French in the Valencian crusade, a fact demonstrated in the commercial records of Marseilles from this period, which abound with references of voyages by the city's merchants to Iberia and the wider western Mediterranean.[483]

Nevertheless the participation of the Southern French is significant, for what it suggests about the overlapping spheres of recruitment between the campaigns of the Triple Crusade and the Valencian expedition's place as an equal part of this event. Gregory's December 1237 letter to the archbishop of Narbonne, the bishop of Agen and the Abbot of Granselve demanding they absolve those unable to fulfil their crusading vows to the Holy Land due to physical impairment, indicates the region was targeted by preachers of the Levantine crusade alongside that to Valencia.[484] Similarly, his September 1238 letter to the archbishop of Bordeaux and bishop of Saintes detailing what to do with the money raised from the redemption of Holy Land vows, suggests this campaign

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[481] On Thibaut's participation in the Albigensian crusades in 1226 see *Récits d'un ménestrel de Reims au treizième siècle*, ed. N. de Wailly (Paris, 1876), pp. 176-7. Amalric was heavily involved in the campaigns until the 1229 Peace of Paris, where he confirmed the 1224 surrender of his family interest in the south to the French crown. See *Layettes*, no. 2000. On the unrest in Languedoc after 1229 see e.g. Z. Oldenbourg, *Massacre at Montségur: A History of the Albigensian Crusade* (New edn., London, 2000), pp. 310-39.

[482] For these 2 see *LdR*, i, nos. 275, 975. For the 1209 siege of Carcassonne see *Petri Vallium Sarnaii monachi Hystoria albigensis*, ed. P. Guébin and E. Lyon (3 vols., Paris, 1926-39), i, pp. 93-100.

[483] Blancard (ed.), *Documents inédits*, i, nos. 58, 63, 67.

[484] *Registres,* ii, no. 3965.

met with some success.[485] The fact the Occitans were able to participate in the Valencia and Holy Land crusades therefore suggests contemporaries viewed both expeditions as parallel, whether they were the people who took vows to either, or the papacy, which created this situation. The idea of a Triple Crusade as a better way to understand crusading in this period is thus further justified. By way of emphasising this point's significance, compare the conclusion this evidence forces to the conclusion drawn by Lower in his work on the 'Barons' Crusade'. In this, due to an exclusive focus on the Levantine and Constantinopolitan crusades, he overlooked Southern French crusading activity, and therefore could write that Occitans 'stayed home' rather than take the cross.[486] Given their participation in the Valencia crusade, this is simply untrue.

More significant yet though are the northern French participants in the expedition. Though a small minority, evidence exists for *crucesignati* from Mâcon, Angers, Chartres and Condamine amongst others in the Valencian crusade.[487] These figures are particularly striking in the case of Mâcon and Condamine, as in both cases the local magnate, the Count of Mâcon and the Duke of Burgundy respectively, had enthusiastically embraced the Levantine crusade, with their intentions declared before 1237 when both men received revenues from vow redemptions to support their crusade.[488] Their private reasons for not following their lords are lost, but their participation raises interesting questions about the Valencian expedition. Besides furthering the idea of an equivalency between this crusade and the Levantine campaign, it raises questions about how they successfully took a vow to Iberia. No papal correspondence survives authorising the preaching of the Valencian crusade in the *Langue d'Oil* yet self-evidently there was knowledge of the planned expedition. Either therefore preaching was authorised in northern France with the evidence now lost, hardly

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[485] *Ibid*. no. 4519.
[486] Lower, p. 49.
[487] *LdR*, i, nos. 176, 227, 582, 1448.
[488] *Registres*, ii, nos. 3727, 3907, 3916.

impossible given only c.20% of papal correspondence entered the registers, or there was general knowledge of, and enthusiasm for, James crusade.[489] Either way, the idea of denying the Valencian crusade a place in the first rank of crusading in the 1230s, fully equal to the Holy Land expedition, is untenable.

Alongside French crusaders, 13 crusaders from England and its continental territories participated in the Valencian crusade.[490] For this group, many of the same conclusions can be applied as given to the French crusaders: most hailed from Angevin southern France, and so shared the same close trans-Pyrenean geographic, cultural and commercial connections. Additionally, the archbishop of Bordeaux, whose diocese covered much of English Aquitaine, numbered among the original recipients of the Valencian crusading appeal, meaning a degree of participation from England's French territories is unsurprising.[491] However, there remain 2 crusaders, a Domingo, and a doctor G., who being given the epithet 'of England' in the *Llibre del Repartiment* likely travelled to Aragon directly from England.[492] Several interpretations can be posited for their involvement, alongside the reasons posited for the involvement of northern French crusaders. For one, English participation in Iberian crusades had a long history, with English crusaders involved in Iberia on the Second Crusade, activity that would have a long afterlife.[493] It is not impossible this memory fired the participation of some in the 1230s, especially given the popularity of Henry of Huntingdon's *Historia*, which even today is fully preserved in over 30 manuscripts and partly in many more.[494]

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[489] Maier, p. 7.
[490] *DJI*, ii, nos. 250-1, 253-5, 257, 259, 268, *LdR*, i, nos. 175, 682, 715, 796, 853, 1124, 1186, 1215, 1305,1316, 1393.
[491] *Registres,* i, no. 1490.
[492] *LdR*, i, nos. 175, 853.
[493] The most notable English involvement in the Iberian crusades was the 1147 conquest of Lisbon, which was celebrated by Henry of Huntingdon. For this see *Henry, Archdeacon of Huntingdon:* Historia Anglorum = *The History of the English People*, ed. and trans D. Greenway (Oxford 1996), pp. 752-3 [Latin text facing translation].
[494] *Historia Anglorum*, ed. and trans. Greenway, pp. lxi-lxvi [introduction] discusses the popularity and broad dissemination of this history.

This raises interesting thoughts about the power of collective memory. Contrastingly, it is possible that those English motivated to campaign in Valencia possessed specific links to the Aragonese court: after all, James I's first wife Eleanor of Castile was a granddaughter of Henry II through his daughter Eleanor.[495] It is therefore possible these, and other English figures, were already well-established in Aragon. Similarly, Henry III's wide-ranging international diplomacy created links to Iberia, enabling personal connections to be made.[496] Nevertheless, regardless of which narrative one chooses to explain the presence of these English crusaders, the international scope of the Valencian expedition, and the Aragonese court at its heart, is undeniable. Furthermore, as with the case of the Northern French, the recruitment of these English testifies how far the crusades of this period must be seen as a single, overlapping set. To focus solely on the recruitment for the Holy Land crusade in England, as has previously been the case, is to overlook part of what occurred.

Recruitment in the Empire

Northern European support for the Valencian crusade was not limited to France and England. While fewer in number, at least 7 crusaders from the Empire participated in the expedition.[497] For some, their participation is easily explainable; Garcia, the King of Arles's home town possessed strong links to Aragon, testified to by the charters of the Porcelet family, which talk of engagement across the Pyrenees around this time.[498] Clearly, such links may have helped draw crusaders to Aragon. Furthermore, the archbishop of Arles occasionally received communication from Gregory IX demanding he incite recruitment for the Valencian crusade, further explaining the participation

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[495] On her origins see *LdF*, p. 21. James and Eleanor divorced in 1230. For this see *Gesta Comitum Barchinonsium*, ed. Cingolani, p. 157.
[496] Carpenter, *Henry III*, pp. 578-82.
[497] *LdR*, i, nos. 174, 513, 551, 1051, 1070, 1076, 1085, 1100, 1124, 1355
[498] *Actes de la Famille Porcelet d'Arles (972-1320)*, ed. M. Aurell (Paris, 2001), nos. 176, 485-91, 504, 543.

of men from the area.[499] Similarly, the involvement of Ferrer and G. de Minorissa of Verdun is explicable on the grounds of crusade preaching. As Gregory's bull assigning the office of preacher in the diocese of Mainz to Conrad II of Reisenberg, bishop of Hildesheim makes clear, preaching for the Holy Land crusade was extended to the Rhineland.[500] Given the equivalency of the Valencian and Outremer crusades, it is possible it too was preached thither. Yet for the remainder, their participation cannot be easily accounted for on grounds of proximity or papal encouragement. For example G. of Na Sança and Martin of Grades hailed from the eastern border of the Empire, in modern northern Slovenia and central Austria, while G. de Porza can be identified with a town c.40 miles north of Milan.[501] Without further evidence, it is difficult to make firm assertions besides those already made over the international fame and material draw of the Valencian crusade, beyond suggesting that Valencia potentially represented a non-partisan alternative to crusading in Outremer, which had become heavily politicised since Frederick II's controversial expedition in 1227-9. The importance of Frederick to crusade recruitment in this period is well-established, making it unlikely these crusaders' departure went unnoticed, particularly as papal-imperial relations deteriorated in the late 1230s.[502] Thus, it is possible that Valencia represented an opportunity to crusade in person, without participating in an expedition about which Frederick was personally lukewarm at best and which threatened his authority in lands he claimed.[503] In this light, crusading to Valencia was a phenomenon with potentially pan-European consequences, some of which related to the politics of the Holy Land crusade, cementing the view that to treat the expeditions separately is to miss the potentially-unexpected connections betwixt them.

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[499] *Registres*, ii, nos. 3484, 3490, 4703.
[500] *Ibid*. no. 2790.
[501] *LdR*, i, nos. 174, 551, 1100.
[502] Lower, pp. 38-41, Powell, pp. 74-7.
[503] Several of the leading *Poulains* involved in the Holy Land expedition, such as Balian of Beirut, headed up the anti-imperial faction in Jerusalem. On Balian's opposition to Frederick II see Marshall, *Warfare*, pp. 86, 90-1, 153, 166.

This is especially so given the Empire provided recruitment for the Levantine crusade. Although Gregory commanded the Dominicans to begin preaching the cross thither in May 1235, preaching for the Holy Land crusade really began in earnest in September following Henry of Swabia's submission to Frederick II, testified by a letter from Gregory authorising the bishop of Hildesheim to assume the office of preacher in the province of Mainz.[504] An experienced preacher, whether Conrad generated a significant response is unclear, although given his previous experience, it would be strange if his appeals fell entirely on deaf ears.[505] Similarly, it would be odd if the Dominican friars' preaching yielded nothing. However, while the idea of large-scale crusade participation in the Empire is problematic, there is nevertheless suggestive evidence that the preaching found a receptive audience. For example, on 26 July 1235, a certain Hugh, a 'dominus' in Ulm afflicted by bodily infirmity, was permitted to redeem his crusading vow, with all the associated remissions of his sins, by paying for 10 soldiers to travel to the Holy Land on his behalf.[506] On a slightly different note, on 28 July 1235, in a letter to the Bishop of Cumae, Gregory signalled the killers of the Bishop of Chur would be forgiven if they served in person in the Holy Land, under sentence of excommunication.[507] Similarly on 23 December 1237, Gregory indicated to the Bishop of Cumania that Rudolph of Greifenstein was to atone for the murder of Berthold, a canon of Konstanz cathedral, by going on crusade by 24 June 1238, under pain of excommunication.[508] These latter two case therefore indicates how recruits for the Holy Land crusade could be found in the Empire outside of organised preaching. Although none of these cases explicitly guarantee Imperial participation in the Holy Land crusade (papal letters being statements of intent rather than a recollection of facts), together they suggest there was involvement in the expedition there, despite

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[504] *Registres,* ii, nos. 2586, 2790.
[505] P. Pixton, *The German Episcopacy and the Implementation of the Decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, 1216–1245* (Leiden, 1995), pp. 203-4.
[506] *Registres*, ii, no. 2696.
[507] *Ibid*. no. 2699.
[508] *BF*, pp. 229-30.

the non-participation of the great German nobles. To say the Empire played 'no part in the Holy Land crusade', therefore goes too far.[509] Evidently the movement had resonances outside the main centres of recruitment.

Moreover, the Empire was part of the world of Constantinopolitan crusade, reinforcing the view that the Triple Crusade's constituent expeditions must be seen as parts of a single whole. While there is no evidence that the Greek crusade was preached in the Empire, there is nevertheless the case of John of Valenciennes. Described as working to benefit the Latin Empire across France, in a letter dated 20 November 1240, Gregory instructed the provincial priors of the mendicant orders to render him funds from wills and vow redemptions in the County of Mark, notwithstanding the funds pledged elsewhere.[510] Although working within the heartlands of recruitment, John's participation shows that the scope of the Greek crusade was wider than previously understood. Likely closely personally-connected to Baldwin II, who before the sale of his lands around Namur was a land-holder in the area, thereby consolidating Giebfried's conclusion that personal connections to Baldwin played a central part assembling his crusade, the fact the County of Mark's revenues were assigned to Greece is nevertheless significant.[511] Principally, it shows the west of the Empire as within the expedition's orbit, and that a preaching and fundraising campaign was planned thither, despite papal-imperial conflict. After all, there is no particular reason to assume the County of Mark was unique among Imperial territories at this time-it is simply the one whose name has survived for posterity. Thus, the case of John of Valenciennes has ramifications for understanding the reach of papal authority, as well as for understanding the true extent of the preparations for the Greek crusade.

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[509] Lower, p. 41.
[510] *BF*, p. 285.
[511] Giebfried, pp. 269-72. For sale of Namur see Mouskes, p. 663, Alberic, p. 947.

Recruitment in Italy for Valencia and the Levant

Besides generating recruitment in Northern Europe, the scope of the Valencian and Holy Land expeditions was broader still, and echoed across the Mediterranean. Alongside participants from northern Europe, and despite the Lombard war, evidence has survived for 17 crusaders from the Italian peninsular and Venice's territories who redeemed crusading vows in Valencia.[512] In many ways, these cases resemble the southern French crusaders. Like southern France, Italy was part of the Mediterranean-wide network of trade connections, with strong links joining the peninsular to eastern Iberia. Indeed, where specific destinations are given, Iberian ports appear in 9.6% of Genoese commercial contracts in the period 1155-1200, rising to 28.7% by 1290, albeit with a dip in the period 1200-1249, likely because of the Reconquista's short-term disruptive effects.[513] Such connections are particularly evident in Barcelona, where by the thirteenth century Genoese merchants were central to the city's commercial life.[514] It is therefore unsurprising that when a crusading endeavour was planned in Aragon, Italian merchants were among those receptive to the message. As discussed below, Aragon's urban centres played a major part in the region's political life, and recruitment for the crusade, so given their significant role in the commercial life of these towns, Italian participants in Valencia's conquest are to be expected. Nevertheless, their presence is interesting in revealing how far the Aragonese crusade extended, and by the participants' origins, which range from a Martin of Sicily in the far south to one Simon Balicho of Genoa, from the north, the extent of Aragon's connections to the rest of the western Mediterranean are revealed.[515] Indeed, from studying the Valencian crusade's participants, it seems fair to talk of a western Mediterranean

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[512] *LdR*, i, nos. 2, 11, 29, 70, 286, 323, 448, 577, 600, 667, 707, 917, 922, 1118, 1210, 1400.
[513] G. Jehel, *Les Génois en Méditerranée Occidentale (fin XI^{ème}-début XIV^{ème} siècle): Ebauche d'une stratégie pour un empire* (Paris, 1993), pp. 334-5.
[514] See C. Verlinden, 'La place de la Catalogne dans l'histoire commerciale du monde méditerranéen médiéval', *Revue des cours et conférences*, 1 (1937-8), pp. 592-5.
[515] *LdR*, i, nos. 11, 1081.

world, stretching from Aragon via Southern France to Italy. This is of relevance beyond study of the Triple Crusade.

Similarly, Italian participation is detectable in the Outremer expedition. Following the recommencement of the Lombard Wars in summer 1236 with Frederick II's march towards Verona following the passing of his September 1235 ultimatum demanding a peace settlement by Christmas, there is little doubt the conflict hindered recruitment, a fact witnessed in Gregory's repeated complaints that this war prevented much-needed men and material from reaching Outremer.[516] However, the claim it prevented any uptake is too extreme. For one, there was clearly a serious crusade mission established there, witnessed in Gregory's letter dated 10 June 1236 to the clergy and nobility of Lombardy, the Marchia Tervisina and the Romagna, which asked them to support the papal legate James, Bishop of Palestrina, amongst whose stated tasks was to oversee the *negotium crucis* in Northern Italy.[517] That this campaign actually generated recruits is supported by a January 1238 letter in the papal registers concerning R. de Supino, a *crucesignatus* and commander of the rector of Spoleto.[518] Described as coming to Viterbo in defence of the Church, he and his companions received plenary indulgences, in recognition of their assistance. It may be that thereafter Supino had no desire to fulfil his vow in the Holy Land, but the fact of his existence as a *crucesignatus* testifies to the possibility of an Italian response to *Rachel Suum Videns*. If he could assume the cross, why not others? Taking a slightly different tack, that the Triple Crusade enjoyed some Italian support seems likely following the events immediately after the crusade, when in June 1242 Alice of Cyprus, accepted as regent for Conradin in Acre following his declaration of majority,

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[516] For Frederick II's departure see T. Van Cleve, *The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: immutator mundi* (Oxford, 1972), p. 398 and footnotes. For September 1235 ultimatum see *Historia diplomatica*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, iv, pp. 876-7. For Gregory's complains see *ES*, no. 648, *CM*, iii, pp. 552-62.
[517] *Registres,* ii, nos. 3179-80.
[518] *Ibid*, no. 4032.

seized Tyre from its Hohenstaufen garrison with extensive Venetian and Genoese support.[519] Given the date, only 13 months after Richard of Cornwall's departure, to deny that some of these Italians were active in the 1230s, that some travelled to the Holy Land during what constituted the largest movement of people to Outremer in a generation, and that certain individuals may have been motivated by the well-publicised call for aid issued by Gregory IX seems implausible. Moreover given the great stake the Italian mercantile republics had in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, witnessed by their vast quarters in Acre, that none amongst these figures aided the Triple Crusade seems improbable.[520]

Non-Aragonese Iberian participation in the Conquest of Valencia

Outside of Italy, the wider Mediterranean world contributed towards the Triple Crusade through the non-Aragonese Iberian participants the Valencian crusade. Although obviously not as numerous as the Aragonese, their involvement was nevertheless significant, both in terms of numbers, and for the inferences discernible from it. In his chronicle, Desclot talks of the fame of James's Valencian campaign spreading across Iberia, something which the number of non-Aragonese Iberians participating in the expedition confirms as more than mere rhetoric.[521] Some 80 *crucesignati* are identifiable as Castilian, of whom only 6 - F. Garcia of Roda, Gauzberto of Pereiro, Peter Garcez of Roda, Peter of Orega, William of Portela and Pero Ferrández d'Açagra, who had been central to Aragonese politics since James's minority - can be personally associated with him as recipients or

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[519] *LGdC*, pp. 129-36. P. Jackson, 'The End of Hohenstaufen Rule in Syria', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 59 (1986), pp. 20-36 and D. Jacoby, 'The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Collapse of Hohenstaufen Power in the Levant', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 40 (1986), pp. 83-101 discuss this episode.

[520] M. Benvenisti, *The Crusaders in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem, 1970), pp. 98-104 discusses the medieval Italian quarters of Acre

[521] Desclot, p. 140

witnesses to his charters.[522] Similarly, it is possible to identify 29 Navarrese participants, of whom only 4, Don Fortunii Aznariz, John of Pamplona, Peter of Torres and Bernard Guilleumes, son of Sancho of Navarre, can be directly linked to James I.[523] Alongside these, 6 Portuguese can be confirmed as participating in the expedition, of whom only Nichonao d'Algueirãois, who witnessed a charter dated 29 December 1239 granting workshops in Valencia and land in Rayosa to several individuals, was obviously connected to the king.[524] Additionally, the *Llibre del Repartiment* twice mentions the Navarrese as a collective body, one stating that property was granted to 1,000 Navarrese and another to reward an unspecified number.[525] Given the number 1,000 likely represents a rhetorically-large number, non-Aragonese Iberians therefore constituted a massive part of the expedition's manpower, begging the question why, in the absence of papal evidence extending the crusading call in Iberia beyond Aragon.

For the Navarrese, this participation is easily explicable. Given Navarre had reached its maximum possible territorial extent short of war, and would not directly benefit from the crusade as Aragon would, the Valencian crusade therefore mirrored the Holy Land expedition; both required foreign travel, and earned the same spiritual indulgence. Given this direct parity, why campaign in the eastern Mediterranean when opportunities for spiritually-meritorious war without an arduous sea voyage were available?[526] Additionally, although there was some Navarrese engagement with the Levantine crusade, witnessed by Gregory IX ordering their clergy in September 1238 to help

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[522] For Castilian *crucesignati* see *LdR*, i, nos. 82, 96, 116, 118, 122, 128, 174, 176, 183, 200, 254, 307, 313, 357, 362, 371, 380, 393, 466, 478, 524, 558, 566, 585-6, 597-8, 615, 671, 676, 706, 741, 748, 823, 847, 877, 898, 937, 965, 994, 1001, 1018-9, 1026, 1030, 1043, 1050, 1054, 1152, 1168, 1193, 1218-9, 1231, 1253, 1289, 1387, 1436-7, 1451, 1469, 1722, and, ii, no. 76, *DJI*, ii, nos. 244, 258, 266, 287, 297, 304.

[523] Navarrese crusaders appear in *LdR*, i, nos. 4, 108, 254, 366, 373, 502, 560, 563, 656-7, 670, 755, 762, 1123, 1150, 1178, 1304, 1446, *DJI*, ii, nos. 244, 273, 287, 304.

[524] Portuguese crusaders appear in *LdR*, i, nos. 334, 390, 1080, 1142, *DJI*, ii, no. 304.

[525] *LdR*, i, nos. 622, 1304

[526] This point carries extra weight given many *crucesignati's* severe fear of the sea. Joinville typifies this fear; see Joinville, pp. 54-5.

fund the expedition, it is evident that expedition was not popular, a fact which questions the innate "specialness" of the Outremer crusade, and cements its equivalency to the Valencian expedition.[527] This fact is testified by Gregory's letters dated 5 December 1235 and 23 April 1238.[528] In the first, he instructed the Abbot of Irantio, and the priors of Tudela and Roncesvalles Pass to compel the nobles gathering in confederation against Thibaut's crusade to dissolve, and in the second upheld the sentence of excommunication promulgated by the recipients of the previous letter. Furthermore, Navarre had recently been the site of potential conflict between James of Aragon and Ferdinand III of Castile stemming from the February 1231 treaty between James and Sancho VII of Navarre which threatened to fulfil the Aragonese dream of re-incorporating Navarre into Aragon.[529] Although the agreement collapsed, allowing Thibaut of Champagne to successfully occupy the kingdom, external interest in the kingdom still threatened it with violence, a risk witnessed in Gregory's letters first in 1234 against the Aragonese and in 1237 against the Castilians which forbade violent action in the kingdom.[530] There is thus every reason for the Navarrese crusaders to not travel far, and to participate in this local, spiritually-meritorious war.

Yet if Navarrese participation raises few eyebrows, the participation of Castilian and Portuguese crusaders is more interesting. Unlike Navarre, both kingdoms bordered al-Andalus, meaning lucrative opportunities at the expense of the Islamic world existed on would-be crusaders' doorsteps, and did not require temporary allegiance to a foreign monarch to obtain. Additionally, both kingdoms contained ongoing crusading enterprises. In Castile, following the conquest of Córdoba in June 1236, which marked a temporary pause in Ferdinand III's drive against al-Andalus due to the immense costs of maintaining the city, crusading privileges were issued in April 1238 to

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[527] Gaztambide, p. 644.
[528] *Registres,* ii, nos. 2856, 4287.
[529] *LdF*, pp. 135-9. For the terms of the agreement see *DJI*, i, no. 147.
[530] *LdF*, pp. 143-6. *Registres,* i, no. 2078, and ii, no. 3475.

those accompanying the Order of Alcántara into battle, replacing the earlier indulgences granted in April and June 1231.[531] Similarly, in Portugal indulgences had been granted for four years in October 1234 to those fighting al-Andalus.[532] Ostensibly, there was therefore no need to travel to abroad to wage spiritually-meritorious war. This is especially confusing when considering the distances some crusaders travelled to reach Valencia. For example, Berenguer of Espiel was ideally-placed to participate in the war near Seville, but was 265 miles as the crow flies from Valencia.[533] Even more extreme was A. of Cascais, who was based 120 miles from Mértola, a city which fell to Portugal in 1238, but 488 miles from Valencia.[534]

In resolving this conundrum over the participation of Castilian and Portuguese crusaders in the Valencian crusade, two answers - one ideological and one material - can be posited. The first is that the Valencian crusade held special status amongst these expeditions. In the case of the Castilian expedition, one sees this in the fact the 1238 crusading bull specified that indulgences were only applicable to those who died in battle alongside the knights of Alcántara, in contrast to the bulls authorising the Valencian crusade, which offered full Holy Land indulgences for taking the cross.[535] Although casualty rates in the Valencian crusade were likely lower than the Holy Land crusades, which placed *crucesignati* into unfamiliar germ-pools and climates, casualty rates in medieval

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[531] On fall of Córdoba see 'Annales Compostellani', in *España Sagrada* ed. H. Florez *et al.* (52 vols., Madrid, 1754-1918), xxiii, p. 325, 'Annales Toledanos, vol. 2' in *Ibid*. p. 409, and 'Annales Toledanos, vol. 3' in *Ibid*. p. 413. For the April 1238 indulgence see *Bullarium Ordinis Militiae de Alcantara*, ed. I. Ortega y Cotes *et al.* (Madrid, 1759), p. 49. For the 1231 bulls see *Registres,* i, nos. 606, 671.
[532] *Registres,* i, no. 2145.
[533] *LdR*, i, no. 307.
[534] For A. of Cascais see *Ibid.* no. 334. For fall of Mértola see *Bullarium Equestris Ordinis Militiae Sancti Iacobi de Spatha*, ed. J. Agurleta (Madrid, 1719), no. 21.
[535] Contrast *Bullarium Ordinis Militiae de Alcantara*, ed. Ortega y Cotes *et al.*, p. 49, and *Registres*, i, nos. 1490-1.

warfare were often high, a fact contemporaries knew.[536] However, to suggest a crusade only offering indulgences for those who fell in battle was as appealing as a crusade proffering full indulgences for participation, whatever personal outcome, defies logic: arguing such would present the crusaders as irrational and effectively-suicidal. Meanwhile in Portugal, crusading was almost entirely in the hands of the Military Orders, especially that of Santiago, who had overseen the conquests of Moura, Serpa Beja, Aljustrel, Mértola and Alfajar de Pena in the period 1232-8.[537] Indeed, only in 1239-40 was Sancho II, King of Portugal actively involved in the crusade, attending the falls of Ayamonte and Cacela.[538] Thus, at the time of the Valencian crusade, the crusade in Portugal may have seemed like the private mission of the Military Orders, which given their successes, did not require extensive support. Thus, it is logical that some Portuguese perceived the Valencian crusade as more pressing and appealing. The effect of the participation of these Iberians in the Valencian crusade is therefore to present it as apart from contemporaneous Iberian crusades: only Valencia offered a full remission of sins to all, and did not require deference to the Military Orders. Such further supports the contention of this thesis that this expedition should be treated apart from the other contemporary crusades in Iberia, and rather at the same level as the legally-identical Holy Land and Greek crusades.

The second potential explanation for the participation non-Aragonese *crucesignati* in the Valencian expedition is less theoretical, and can be simply expressed as the profit motive. Though the role the expectation of material reward played in crusade motivation has been hotly-contested, current historiographical consensus holds that profit complemented and intersected with other

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536 P. Mitchell, *Medicine in the Crusades: Warfare, Wounds and the Medieval Surgeon* (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 143-5, 176-7 estimates casualty rates of 25-35% for knights and higher for lower ranks, with higher rates for longer expeditions. Paul, *To follow in their footsteps*, pp. 202-3 explicitly states the Counts of Flanders knew the fates, good and ill, their ancestors met on crusade.
537 *Bullarium Ordinis Militiae Sancti Iacobi*, ed. Agurleta, nos. 8, 19-21.
538 Antonio Brandão, *Crónicas de d. Sancho II e d. Afonso III*, ed. A. de Magalhâes Basto (Porto, 1945), pp. 356-7.

spiritual and ideological drivers, a position pithily summarised by the *Gesta Francorum* which stated that faith in God will be rewarded with the gaining of spoils, whether earthly, spiritual or both.[539] Despite first appearances, it is wrong to consider faith and profit as mutually exclusive motivators, making it wrong to ignore the potential of profit to pull recruits to Valencia. This is particularly so when considering the wealth potentially available through Valencia's conquest. In his description of Valencia, al-Himyari numbered it among the grandest cities of al-Andalus, a densely-populated land which benefitted from its terrestrial and maritime geography and which had grown rich on the profits of trade and agriculture.[540] Likewise James I estimated Valencia as among the richest and strongly-fortified places in the world.[541] Thus, it is easily conceivable that some *crucesignati*, including non-Aragonese foreigners, participated in the campaign because of the prospect for rewards. This seems particularly likely given the wealth of the alternative theatres of contemporary crusading. None of the Portuguese cities targeted by the Military Orders were major settlements, capable of giving reward like Valencia. Similarly on the Castilian front, while great riches would follow Seville's capture in 1248, its fall lay in the future during the Triple Crusade, with the reality of crusading at this time was that it represented a drain of resources, witnessed by Córdoba's depopulation following its capture.[542] Indeed this drain was so pronounced that Ferdinand III appealed to Gregory IX in 1236 for financial aid, prompting Gregory to request an annual subsidy of 20,000 gold pieces for three years for the king from the Castilian Church.[543] Likewise, Valencia's relative wealth was apparent compared to the non-Iberian crusading options.

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[539] For *Gesta Francorum* see *RHC-Oc*, iii, p. 128. C. Marshall, 'The crusading motivation of the Italian city republics in the Latin East, 1096-1104', in M. Bull and N. Housley (eds.), *The Experience of Crusading* (2 vols., Cambridge, 2003), i, pp. 61-2 summarises the position of seeing spoils and faith as complementary.
[540] al-Himyari, p. ٤٧.
[541] *LdF*, pp. 128-9.
[542] On the wealth accrued after the fall of Seville, see Pero da Ponte's poem preserved in *Cancioneiro de Biblioteca antiga Colucci-Brancuti*, ed. E. Paxeco Machado and J. Machado (8 vols., Lisbon, 1949-64), v, no. 928. On the effects of the fall of Córdoba see O'Callaghan, pp. 95-6.
[543] J. Gorosterratzu, *Don Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada, Gran Estadista, Escritor y Prelado* (Pamplona, 1925), p. 449, doc. no. 128.

For example, the Latin Empire's poverty was notorious, witnessed in the desperate actions Baldwin II took to fund his crusade, which included pawning his lands in Namur to Louis IX for a loan of 50,000 *livres parisis*, and the continued sale of relics, which constituted perhaps his only sustainable source of income.[544] Similarly, the Holy Land offered little obvious material rewards. Built on marginal land, bounded by hostile powers, mountains and the sea, and possessing an unstable, unpredictable climate, the Kingdom of Jerusalem could offer little profit to foreigners.[545] Thus, there was every reason for potential *crucesignati* to look favourably upon Valencia, and to travel great distances thither, even if more local opportunities were available, raising the expedition's status.

Involvement of the British Border Lands in the Holy Land crusade

Just as Aragon's neighbours were significant contributors towards the Valencian crusade's total manpower, it seems England's fringes and neighbours contributed towards the recruitment for the Holy Land crusade, in contrast to Lower's judgement that Wales and Scotland contributed nothing to the expedition, although his judgement that Ireland did nothing seems defensible.[546] Consequently, the Holy Land crusade appears a major, international crusade, whose current status amongst the "minor" expeditions seems unjustified. Beginning with Wales and the Marcher lands, it seems previous oversight of such crusaders stems from the limited source material, especially as Welsh literary sources were produced in far fewer locations than in England or France, and so more

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[544] Alberic, p. 947, 'Récit du 13e siècle', pp. 410-15.
[545] G. Smith, *The historical geography of the Holy Land* (London, 1894), *passim.*
[546] Lower, p. 49. For studies of the crusades in Wales and Scotland see e.g. K. Hurlock, *Wales and the Crusades, c.1095-1291* (Cardiff, 2011), pp. 92-132 and A. Macquarrie, *Scotland and the Crusades 1095-1560* (Edinburgh, 1997).

exposed to destruction.[547] However, the limited sources that do survive indicate that Wales was directly targeted by Gregory's preaching campaign. Most explicitly, the *Annales Cambriae*, a composite text compiled by John William ab Ithel in 1860 to form a history of Wales spanning 444-1288, states in its entry for 1236 that a Brother Anianus preached the cross in 'West Wallia'.[548] Given the date, this preaching must have been delivered in the context of the Triple Crusade. Moreover, given Richard of Cornwall was Lord of Abergavenny from 1234, some resonance of the crusade in Wales should be expected.[549] Given this, and the peace agreement reached between Henry III and Llewelyn ap Iowerth in 1237, it is no surprise that 7 named crusaders do emerge from Wales and the Marcher lands, and bring with them the prospect of more, unnamed *crucesignati*.[550] In particular, Giles of Clifford, Philip of Albini, governor of Ludlow and his companions William of Chany and Oliver of Albini, Ralph of Teoni of Painscastle, Ednyfed Fychan the seneschal of Gwynedd and Llywelyn ap Gruffydd emerge as participants in the Levantine crusade.[551] Not all of these figures existed in isolation from the main groupings of the crusade - Ralph of Teoni travelled with the French contingent, suggesting that the formation of crusading hosts did not necessarily follow normal patterns of retinue-building, while Llewelyn ap Gruffudd travelled with Richard of Cornwall - but with every case, the extent of Welsh and Marcher involvement in the crusade becomes clearer.[552]

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[547] D. Howlett, *Cambro-Norman Compositions: Their Competence and Craftsmanship* (Dublin, 1998), p. 155 notes 'a single fire at St David's might have destroyed much, if not most, of the evidence of Cambro-Latin literary activity'.
[548] *Annales Cambriae*, ed. J. Williams ab Ithel (London, 1860), p. 82.
[549] Hurlock, *Wales and the Crusades*, p. 109.
[550] For Llewelyn's 1237 submission to Henry see *CM*, iii, p. 385.
[551] *CLR*, ii, p. 29, *CR*, iii, pp. 101, 385, 390 and *CPR*, pp. 74, 93, 106, 108, *CFR*, p. 292 and *The Beauchamp Cartulary Charters 1100-1268*, ed. E. Mason (London, 1980), nos. 382-3, and, *Chronicon de Lanercost MCCI–MCCCXLVI*, ed. J. Stephenson (Edinburgh, 1839), p. 48.
[552] Hurlock, *Wales and the Crusades*, pp. 109-14.

This is particularly significant in the cases of Ednyfed Fychan and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, who unlike the others hailed from territories outside direct English control. Beginning with Fychan, the sources are quite clear about his independence of action, as both records of his journey in the English documentary sources state he and his retinue travelled in isolation of other crusaders, a fact supported by his decision to depart for the Holy Land in 1235, before most English crusaders.[553] Given Philip of Albini and his companions also departed around this time, a tentative picture emerges of a distinct borderland response to *Rachel Suum Videns*, a facet of the crusading in the 1230s hitherto unknown. Moreover as a result of his importance within Gwynedd, Fychan's companions were likely numerous, a fact testified by the need to seek safe conduct from Henry III.[554] The idea the Welsh did not participate in this expedition is therefore fanciful. Additionally, and here demonstrating how studying the Triple Crusade can beget points of wider importance, the fact Fychan departed on crusade testifies to Gwynedd's internal stability in the mid-1230s and the extent of its engagement in wider European politics. Gwynedd may have been surrounded by English-controlled territory and limited to the Welsh highlands, but evidently that did not engender a cultural introversion. Indeed, Gregory himself confirmed this by including the territory in his attempted pan-European peace in anticipation of the crusade in April 1236.[555]

The presence of Llewelyn on the expedition confirms these points further, despite the identity of the 'Leulinus princeps Walliæ' mentioned by the Lanercost chronicle being debated.[556] Weiler, for example, argued the reference is to Llywelyn ap Gruffydd's uncle, another Llywelyn, although the title given in the Lanercost chronicle heavily suggests Llewelyn ap Gruffudd, given the formulation

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553 *CPR*, p. 108 and *CR*, iii, p. 101.
554 *CPR*, p. 108.
555 *Registres*, ii, no. 3134.
556 *Chronicon de Lanercost* ed. Stephenson, p. 48.

'Prince of Wales' is the Lanercost chronicle's standard form of address for him.[557] Additionally, the circumstances of Llewelyn ap Gruffudd's life before this point suggest he would be a viable candidate for a crusader.[558] In any case, and regardless of the fact that Llewelyn was not the figure he would later become, his participation raises several points, with numerous competing interpretations possible for his participation. Given the inevitable jostling for position following Llywelyn ap Iorwerth's death in 1240, was Llywelyn's absence a matter of political convenience for the major political players in Gwynedd, both within and without of the kingdom, or given the involvement of the other Welsh *crucesignati*, is it testament to a genuine enthusiasm for the crusading movement within Wales in the 1230s? Are the two explanations even incompatible, given cynically removing someone from local politics and genuine personal crusading enthusiasm are not mutually exclusive? On a more specific level, it is implausible that as a prince of Gwynedd he participated alone. Hence, to his name must be added a sizeable following appropriate to his standing. Hence, the idea of general Welsh non-participation seems untenable, with the scope of participation broader than previously allowed.

Although more limited, it similarly appears there was a Scottish response to the Holy Land appeal. The history of Scottish involvement in the Crusades is something that has increasingly come into the historical mainstream, but nevertheless the extent of Scottish involvement in the crusades of the 1230s seems under-appreciated.[559] This seems an especial oversight given crusading was embedded within Scotland by the 1230s, witnessed in the official promulgation of ecclesiastical

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[557] B. Weiler, *Henry III of England and the Staufen Empire, 1216–1272* (Woodbridge, 2006), p. 190, *Chronicon de Lanercost* ed. Stephenson, pp. 103, 111.
[558] The reasons in favour of identifying Llywelyn ap Gruffydd as this crusader is summarised in Hurlock, *Wales and the Crusades*, pp. 112-4.
[559] E.g. through the *oeuvre* of Alan Macquarie. See Idem, 'The Crusades and the Scottish "Gaidhealtachd" in Fact and Legend' in L. MacLean (ed.), *The Middle Ages in the Highlands* (Inverness, 1981), pp. 130-41, Idem, 'The Ideal of the Holy War in Scotland', *Innes Review*, 32 (1981), pp. 83-92 and Idem, *Scotland and the Crusades.*

protection for Scottish *crucesignati* in the mid-1220s in the 'General Statutes of the Scottish Church', and the adoption of a standardised rite for blessing departing Scottish crusaders before the second quarter of the 13th century.[560] Hence, there was almost certainly some recruitment within Scotland, especially following John the Scot, earl of Chester and Huntingdon and Gilbert Marshal's assumption of the cross, both of whom possessed familial links to Scotland.[561] The fact that John the Scot's premature death in 1237 would have disrupted this recruitment and perhaps drastically reduced the extent of Scottish involvement in the crusade should not, however, cause this Scottish involvement to be ignored completely, as has been the case.[562]

Evidence which suggests this was so can be found in the 31 March 1238 papal letter addressed to Otto, the papal legate, which has not hitherto featured in any history of these crusades.[563] In this, Gregory explicitly ordered Otto to redeem the vows of those Scottish *crucesignati* incapable of fulfilling their vows in person. Given vows cannot be redeemed without first being pledged, this suggests there was expectation of some uptake for the cross thither. That this was so is then suggested by Matthew Paris, who when excoriating the financial exactions undertaken by papal agents in Britain under the cover of crusade vow redemptions, talks of money raised from Scotland thus.[564] At least, there is indicative evidence that sufficient effort had been expended in preaching the cross in Scotland to encourage Gregory to anticipate some recruitment there, a fact yet to appear in secondary accounts of the Triple Crusade. In his chronicle, the contemporary historian Thomas Wykes asserted that Richard of Cornwall departed England accompanied by many common

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[560] *Registrum episcopatus aberdonensis: Ecclesie cathedralis aberdonensis regesta que extant in unum collecta*, ed. C. Innes (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1845), ii, p. 15, Brundage 'Cruce Signati', pp. 289-91.
[561] *CM*, iii, p. 368-9, and iv, p. 44, *CFR*, p. 355.
[562] *CM*, iii, p. 394.
[563] *Registres,* ii, no. 4220.
[564] *CM*, iv, p. 160-1.

people.[565] The inference from this papal letter and Matthew Paris is that this group may have included some Scots, given it seems implausible, even after the deaths of John the Scot and Gilbert Marshal, that all Scottish *crucesignati* redeemed their vows. After all, Lower has shown how vow redemption was never universally popular and that was immensely difficult to prevent those determined to fulfil their crusading vows in person from doing so.[566] If this were the case for Thibaut of Champagne or Richard of Cornwall, why not for the unnamed Scottish *crucesignati*?

Finally on Scottish participation, mention should be made of Richard of Thony, the treasurer of Angers, former clerk of the bishop of St Andrew's, and nephew of Alexander II of Scots and Richard of Cornwall.[567] Having assumed the cross in 1238, he was obliged by Gregory IX to resign his benefices, although following Alexander II's intervention he was permitted to finance his crusade from the clerical taxation usually due thereof, indicating that regardless of how geographically removed he was from his homeland, he retained links to it.[568] Thus while a somewhat atypical Scottish crusader, he nevertheless deserves to be considered an example of Scottish participation in the Holy Land expedition, and in turn illustrates on the flexibility of Gregory IX in the face of secular rulers' demands. Furthermore with his presence at the very least confirmed, to imply therefore that Scottish participation in the Holy Land crusade did not occur, is a historical oversight.[569]

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[565] 'Chronicon Thomae Wykes', ed. Luard, iv, pp. 86-7.
[566] Lower, pp. 74-148.
[567] Though perhaps stretching the existing source material too far, K. Hurlock, *Britain, Ireland and the Crusades, c.1000-1300* (Basingstoke, 2013) p. 78 uses Richard of Thony's participation in this crusade as evidence for a particular interest in the Holy Land among the Bishops of St Andrews and their adherents.
[568] *Registres*, ii, nos. 4450-1.
[569] E.g. Lower, p. 49.

By contrast, Irish participation in this crusade is extremely problematic. Although likely a part of the fundraising campaign, as discussed, there is nothing more than circumstantial evidence which indicates Irish enthusiasm for crusading in this general period. For example, King Ulghard O'Ruairc of Breifne is described as setting out for the Holy Land in 1231, although he died before arriving.[570] However, it is extremely difficult to identify any Irish participants in the Triple Crusade: unlike the Third Crusade, not a single Irish name emerges in the English records for the expedition, given the Irish nationality of William Goscelin, a confirmed *crucesignatus,* and servant of Master Odo of Kilkenny cannot be guaranteed.[571] Therefore, one must conclude that while Ireland was part of the world of the Triple Crusade, it did not supply active participants in substantial numbers. Perhaps this is unsurprising; without the obvious support of the leading figures in Ireland, how Irish *crucesignati* would have financed such an expedition is unclear. Nevertheless, even if Ireland was not directly involved in the Triple Crusade, from the financial records, it is clear it was within its orbit, testifying to how detailed investigation of the Triple Crusade can break new historiographical ground.

British participation in the Greek crusade

As with the Holy Land crusade, so also does it appear there was British involvement in the Constantinopolitan crusade. Here including England, given the heartlands of recruitment for Greece lay squarely in France, the participation of such figures has previously been entirely overlooked. Distracted by the grand theatre of the Oath of Northampton, 12 November 1239, where Richard of Cornwall and the other English crusading nobles swore to redeem their vow exclusively in Jerusalem, it has been generally remarked that Britain contributed nothing to the Constantinopolitan

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[570] C. Costello, *Ireland and the Holy Land* (Alcester, 1974), p. 37 and references.
[571] *CR*, iv, p. 95.

campaign.[572] However, such remarks seem wholly unwarranted, because the evidence unequivocally shows that some British *crucesignati* took vows for Greece, in the persons of Alan the Englishman, a servant of the French court, Walter the Englishman and John the Scot. Significantly, all found in the evidence from the French court, consolidating the view that Louis IX was the key player behind the Constantinopolitan crusade, each of these figures received 20*s*. in order to support their travel to Constantinople, a standard financial gift on Louis's part.[573] How far each of these individuals represent "typical" British *crucesignati* is perhaps moot. After all, Alan at least was a servant of the French king, and thus perhaps better considered with the French recruits, something which may also have been true for Walter and John. Yet on the other hand, it is equally possible, given the evidence of a preaching campaign in Scotland and England for Greece, that both Walter and John independently or together travelled to the French court, the one place where support for Baldwin's crusade was liberally distributed. To say the British Isles supplied no recruits to the expedition is thus impossible. When taken with the funding generated for Greece from Britain, and the preaching campaigns undertaken thither, it seems that like the Holy Land and Valencian crusades, the net for Constantinople was spread wide, and met with some success, even in the face of competing appeals for Spain and Outremer. The idea these expeditions constituted a single, overlapping entity, the 'Triple Crusade' is reinforced.

The Hungarian presence in the Valencian crusade

Turning to the other end of Europe, it is possible to identify 6 Hungarian *crucesignati* in the Valencian crusade.[574] The Catholic state closest to the Latin Empire, Hungary was repeatedly targeted by crusading bulls in the 1230s demanding participation in crusades to the Latin Empire,

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[572] *CM*, iii, p. 620. Lower, p. 147, Giebfried, p. 254.
[573] 'Itinera', p. 593.
[574] *LdR*, i, nos. 235, 308-9, 318, 729, 1050, 1290.

appeals which met with very limited success at best, due in large part to the vacillating attitude of Bela IV of Hungary to the proposed expedition.[575] Therefore, while at first glance an unusual place from which to find crusaders to Valencia due to Aragon's distance from Hungary, links had in fact been established for a generation between Hungary and Aragon by the 1230s, making Hungarians no distant recruits from far-off lands, a fact attested by the marriage of Constance of Aragon to Emeric of Hungary in 1198.[576] Moreover, Hungarian participation in Aragon is easily accountable through Yolanda, James I of Aragon's second wife and daughter of Andrew II of Hungary. Continuing the pattern of Hungarian-Aragonese alliances, she had married James in September 1235 following his divorce from Eleanor of Castile, and thereafter numbered among his closest confidants, something as true during the crusade as in peacetime.[577] Indeed, in the *Llibre dels Fets*, Yolanda appeared at numerous points and played an important role in some of the crusade's most significant moments, such as the deliberation over Valencia's terms of surrender.[578] Additionally, her household appears among the largest of the entire crusade.[579] Thus, it is no surprise that Hungarians personally connected to her appeared prominently in the gifts of land distributed after the fall of Valencia, such as I. of Hungary, who is explicitly described as being 'of the [household] of the mistress queen'.[580] Similarly, this personal link to Yolanda explains why the nephew of Bartholomew le Gros, bishop of Pécs participated in the Valencian crusade, Bartholomew having travelled to Aragon in 1229-1230, 1233, and 1234-1235, and having married James and Yolanda on

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[575] For Gregory's letters to Hungary concerning the crusade see *Registres*, ii, nos. 2872-6, 2911, 4482. For Bela's noncommittal response on 13 January 1239 see J. Huillard-Bréholles, *Examen des chartes de l'Eglise romaine contenues dans les rouleaux de Cluny* (Paris, 1865), p. 97.
[576] Simon of Kéza, 'Gesta Hungarorum' in E. Szentpétery (ed.), *Scriptores rerum hungaricarum* (2 vols., Budapest, 1937-8), i, pp. 190-1, 'Chronici Hungarici composition saeculi xiv', ed. A. Domanovszky, in *Ibid*. p. 463.
[577] *Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium*, ed. Barrau-Dihigo and Massó Torrents, p. 59, *LdF*, pp. 129-30.
[578] *LdF*, pp. 224, 227-8.
[579] 10 participants in the expedition rewarded after the fall of Valencia can be linked directly to her household: *LdR*, i, nos. 263, 318, 332, 346, 354, 358, 369, 382-3, 583.
[580] *Ibid.* no. 318.

his last visit.[581] From the participants in the Valencian crusade, one therefore has concrete evidence of the Aragonese court's international web of connections. It is possible to assert that such links existed based on James's marriage, but only through studying this crusade can one sees these links in practical terms. The "Mediterranean" view of medieval European affairs therefore appears strengthened.

Non-crusading forces

The importance of this "Mediterranean" outlook on the Triple Crusade is further reinforced when the participation in all three expeditions by non-crusaders is considered. For all they supplied the backbone of the armies, no crusading force was comprised of vow-taking western *crucesignati* alone. A fact known to previous crusade historians, appreciation of the role played by non-crusading forces during the Triple Crusade is however limited. Given such forces comprised important parts of all three expeditions, any previous understanding of the Triple Crusade therefore cannot be better than partial, with the true breadth of participation overlooked.

For instance, despite their vital role in the campaign, the Franks of Outremer (including Cyprus) have not yet been subject to close investigation, despite the fact that certain leading *poulains* several of whom had firm links to the heartlands of crusade recruitment, played vital roles at pivotal moments in the Triple Crusade.[582] For example, recorded in the 'Rothelin' continuation as offering

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[581] For the participation of the nephew of the bishop of Pécs see *Ibid.* no. 235. On 20 Feb. 1233, he issued a charter in Barcelona, for which see L. Thallóczy, 'Árpádházi Jolánta Aragon királynője', *Századok*, 31 (1897) pp. 578-579. For his officiating at the marriage see L. Koszta, 'Un prélat français de Hongrie: Bertalan, évêque de Pécs (1219–1251)', *Cahiers d'Etudes Hongroises*, 8 (1996), p. 87.

[582] There is evidence that some Cypriots accompanied this crusade: 'Document relatif au service militaire', *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades - Lois* (2 vols., Paris, 1841-3), ii, pp. 428-9, 432.

council to the crusade's leaders at Acre, where the expedition's overall strategy was determined, were Gerold, Patriarch of Jerusalem, a Burgundian whose first recorded ecclesiastical office was Abbot of Molesme, Peter of Sergines, Archbishop of Tyre, Ralph of Tournai, a Frenchman appointed Bishop of Acre in 1231, Count Walter of Jaffa, a Brienne, Armand of Périgord, Grand Commander of the Templars and Conrad of Thuringia, commander of the Teutonics.[583] Collectively these figures represent the top rank of the Latin East's leadership. Similarly, despite Walter of Jaffa's defection from the Christian army just before the Battle of Gaza, the forces under the Count of Bar and Amalric of Montfort were still accompanied by Odo of Montbéliart, Constable of Jerusalem and Lord of Tiberias, John of Ibelin, Lord of Arsuf and Balian of Ibelin, Lord of Sidon.[584] Again these are figures indisputably of the first rank. Unfortunately, detailed knowledge of the extent of the *poulains*' participation in the expedition is obscured by the surviving sources, as the chronicles only confirm the involvement of 11 individuals alongside other, numberless and nameless figures.[585] To these 11 can tentatively be added a further 6 who, while not explicitly appearing in any account of the expedition, are associated with documents contemporaneous to the expedition, relating to certain of its members.[586] Given the importance of ties of association, and the closeness such ties imply, it is therefore likely they participated in the campaign. However, taken together, this evidence of the involvement of Outremer's luminaries, and the forces they undoubtably commanded, suggests the Triple Crusade constituted the biggest mobilisation of manpower by the Latin East in a generation. What the actual numbers of individuals involved were is impossible to reliably calculate, but suffices to say that with the participation of all of Outremer's

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583 *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 531. For Gerold as Abbot of Molesme see *HdDB*, v, p. 390 and W. Jacobs, *Patriarch Gerold von Jerusalem, ein Beitrag zur Kreuzzugsgeschichte Friedrichs II* (Aachen, 1905), p. 7. On Ralph of Tournai see Alberic, p. 923.
584 *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 414, 543-4. *LGdC*, p. 119.
585 E.g. *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 531, 538.
586 E.g. Geoffrey of Estraing, Lord of Haifa signed the act of submission by the *Poulains* requesting Simon de Montfort be named regent: 'Acte de soumission des barons de royaume de Jérusalem à Frédéric II (7 May 1241)' ed. R. Röhricht in Rinnt (ed.), *Archives de l'Orient*, i, p. 403. See *Thesaurus*, ed. Martene and Durand, i, pp. 1012-3 for the other 5 figures identified here.

leading figures in the Triple Crusade, the idea it constituted a "minor" crusade becomes even harder to sustain. Similarly, by witnessing apparently a full mobilisation by the Latin East, the implication is that the force arriving from Europe must itself have been sizeable, in order to warrant such a response. A different reason to assess that force positively thus becomes apparent. Similarly, the fact of Outremer mustering such a force paints the vitality of the Frankish states in a positive light, and combats the narrative that thirteenth century Jerusalem was always fragile, and in fear of extinction.[587]

At the other end of the Mediterranean, the part of non-*crucesignati* forces in Valencia was filled by the *almogavars*, who comprised an elusive but important section of the army. Dufourcq and Gautier-Dalché speak of 'war as an industry' during the thirteenth century, and more than anyone, these figures embody that statement.[588] Described by Desclot as those living on the borders of the Christian and Islamic worlds, for whom raiding supported their existence, and who fought as light infantry armed with javelins and spears, these men were beyond the pale of normal settlement, but nevertheless played a key role in the composition of the army.[589] Most obviously, one sees this in the *Llibre del Repartiment*, in which despite their uncertain social status, their leaders - the 'adalils' - were rewarded with land in Valencia for their services during the crusade.[590]

Nevertheless, their part in the Valencian campaign appears to have been undervalued. Although regarded by historians as valuable skirmishers in the Reconquista and elsewhere, it appears their role, and significance in this campaign surpassed this somewhat secondary status.[591] By way of

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[587] E.g. Prawer, *Histoire*, trans. Nahon, ii, p. 109.
[588] C. Dufourcq and J. Gautier-Dalché, *Historica económica y social de la España cristiana en la edad media* (Barcelona, 1983), p. 97.
[589] Desclot, ch. 79.
[590] *LdR*, i, nos. 79, 203, 254.
[591] E.g. O'Callaghan, p. 134, A. Boya Balet, *La compañía de los almogávares en Grecia* (Madrid, 2014), *passim*.

demonstrating this, *almogavars* occasionally feature prominently in James's *Llibre del Fets*, even if their numbers and status are unclear. For example, it is significant that when carrying out a nighttime raid, James estimated the force at 130 knights, 700 foot soldiers and 150 *almogavars*.[592] Similarly, when describing the vanguard assembled for the siege of Valencia proper, James estimated the force at c.130-140 knights, c.1,000 infantry and 50 *almogavars*.[593] The implication from these two passages is that the *almogavar* continent, while small, operated as a normal part of James's forces, albeit with its own distinct identity, hence why they were categorised differently to the infantry. Moreover, beyond comprising part of the "regular" army during raiding operations, the *almogavars* appear to have operated with a high degree of autonomy. This much is indicated by James when he claimed they captured the suburb of Russafa, close to the city of Valencia, on their own authority.[594] The implication in this passage is that they were a significant force, and exempt from normal leadership channels, indicated in the fact they undertook such independent action, and because unlike Pedro Cornel and Jimeno of Urrea, who attacked the Boatella Gate on their own initiative, James did not castigate them for it.[595] To single-handedly capture a suburb of Valencia requires substantial numbers, while their acting without royal permission is striking. Given the conquest of Russafa presaged Valencia's ultimate fall, it thus appears they played a vital part in the campaign. Moreover, for all they were apparently exempt from direct royal control, the *almogavars* seemingly had direct links to the royal retinue when needed. That this was the case was indicated in September 1237 when James consulted his 'adalils' before sending 50 scouts to assess Valencia's situation.[596] Thus, although the *almogavars*'s historical profile perhaps resembles their military role - elusive, uncertain in number and only fleetingly in view - they were nonetheless highly significant, and had a higher profile than previously assumed. Thus, they show the value of a closer

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[592] O'Callaghan, p. 134.
[593] *LdF*, p. 215.
[594] *Ibid*, p. 216.
[595] *Ibid.* p. 222.
[596] *Ibid*. p. 194.

re-examination of the Triple Crusade, while demonstrating how such study can indicate future avenues of scholarship: after all, if the *almogavar*'s role was larger than previously assumed in the conquest of Valencia, why may that not also be true elsewhere?

In the case of Baldwin's crusade, non-crusading forces were even more prominent, as perhaps because the number of westerners participating in the expedition was relatively small, non-crusading forces appear to have been an even more significant part of the overall crusade than was the case elsewhere. For instance, just as the Holy Land crusade was supported by numerous indigenous Franks, so Baldwin's army of westerners was supported by the full force of the Latin Empire, whatever that may have been, following his arrival into Constantinople and coronation there. This much is apparent in Baldwin's letter to Henry III announcing his success, where he describes his army as mixed, although dominated by Franks (ie. western crusaders).[597] However, more significant by far were the Cumans who reinforced the crusaders as they traversed Bulgaria. Likely originally from the Kazak steppe, following their defeats by the Mongols in the 1220s and 1230s, they were forced westwards where they encountered the Latin Empire, and its northern neighbours.[598] Always difficult to control, it appears during this expedition that they usurped the authority of Tsar Asen II as Baldwin crossed his lands, and joined the crusading army in force.[599] Once part of this army, they subsequently played a crucial role in the expedition, and indeed in some respects hold the key to understanding the whole campaign. As this relates to the events of the expedition proper, this role will be discussed in depth in chapter seven. Therefore, sparing the discussion which occurs there, based on the example of the Cumans, it remains to reinforce the point that in order to fully understand crusading armies, it is essential to embrace a wider view. In all three expeditions, this wider view must surpass assessing avowed *crucesignati* to include

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[597] *CM*, iv, pp. 54-5.
[598] Berend, pp. 68-72.
[599] Mouskes, pp. 663-4, Alberic, p. 947.

oversight of those living in the disputed territories. Here, as with other aspects of the crusade, and whatever "pluralist" historians claim, taking a vow does not a crusade make. Moreover, given the importance of the Cumans, taking a wider view suggests the necessity to look beyond the borders of the crusading states themselves in order to fully understand events, the fundamental tenet underpinning how the expeditions of the Triple Crusade will be assessed in the second part of the thesis.

Conclusions

Therefore, following the idea that every crusade reflects the impulses behind its creation, close study of the international participants in the Triple Crusade allows for numerous strands of thought to be unified, and resolved in a way that hinges upon the concrete reality of real participants, rather than in the abstract. For example, the fact of overlapping recruitment between all three expeditions in Navarre, France, England, Italy and the Empire, alongside the evidence for continued Aragonese participation in the Holy Land at this time, strongly suggests the Valencian crusade was part of the same universe as the expeditions resulting from *Rachel Suum Videns*.[600] Something contrary to the previous historical tendency to view it as a distinct entity, the fact of such obvious international participation strongly suggests that approaching the Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s as three branches of the same phenomenon, rather than three contemporaneous but separate affairs, is a valid way of approaching the subject. Furthermore, given the special place the Valencian crusade enjoyed within Iberia, witnessed by the participation of several Castilian and Portuguese *crucesignati*, the

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[600] The poem of the Genoese troubadour Lanfranc Cigala, although not confirming the participation of Aragonese *crucesignati* in the Holy Land crusade of the 1230s, suggests the expectation that they should campaign thither existed. For this see C. Alvar (ed.), *Textos trovadorescos sobre España y Portugal* (Madrid, 1978), p. 201.

idea it is best understood in a Mediterranean context, rather than an exclusively Iberian one, is furthered. None of this is possible without detailed knowledge of who exactly took the cross.

Similarly, the participation of Welsh, Scottish, German and Italian *crucesignati*, as well as non-Western non-crusaders in all three branches of the Triple Crusade makes it possible to credibly assert that the Triple Crusade's scope was wider than previously credited. Thus, the idea that the Triple Crusade had limited horizons, and was not envisioned as fully equal to the "major", numbered crusades, should be abandoned. Evidently Roger of Wendover and Matthew Paris's claims that the crusading appeal for the Holy Land reached the whole Christian world was not simply rhetorical flourish as might be expected.[601] Moreover, the firm participation of men from these realms enables assertions about the processes occurring in these places. For example, it is striking how widely connected Gwynedd and the wider Christian world were. In his *Description Kambriae*, Gerald of Wales stated the Welsh had a tendency towards inconstancy, and had no regard for ties of peace or Christian friendship.[602] Given the sense of Christian solidarity implied by the taking of crusading vows, this description cannot be applied to thirteenth century Gwynedd. Additionally, the fact Welshmen travelled overseas both as independent, separate bodies, and as part of a contingent mostly composed of English *crucesignati*, sheds an interesting light on Anglo-Welsh relations, and the extent of connections across borders. Similarly, the participation of Northern Europeans in the conquest of Valencia raises questions about the preaching for the Valencian crusade-how is it that such men were able to take the cross for Valencia, given that papal correspondence implies the cross was never ordered to be preached there? And if they participated without hearing an official crusade preacher, what does that suggest about the connections between Aragon and Northern Europe, which are far less obvious than those connecting Aragon to the wider

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[601] Roger of Wendover, *Chronica sive flores historiarum*, ed. H. Cox (5 vols., London, 1841-4), iv, p. 327, *CM*, iii, p. 287.
[602] *Giraldi Cambrensis Opera*, ed. J. Brewer *et al.* (8 vols., London, 1861-91), vi, pp. 206-9.

Mediterranean world? Similarly, given the participation of the western parts of the Empire in Baldwin's crusade, for all the papal-imperial conflict, this study illustrates crusading's enduring popularity. Furthermore, given there is no evidence in the papal registers that the cross was preached there, how far Constantinople exerted a draw across Europe is revealed, alongside indicating the extent of dissemination of the crusade's call, outside the papacy. A solely "papalist" outlook therefore becomes harder to sustain.

Chapter 4b: Networks of connections within the crusade heartlands

Broad and historiographically significant as the international scope of the Triple Crusade was, and important for showing how a broad perspective is necessary to fully understand these crusades, it would nevertheless be misleading to over-egg the pudding with regard to the extent of participation from outside the heartlands of all three expeditions. Although related to the nature of the surviving sources, which prejudice the survival of names for those who interacted with the centres of crusading, it is nevertheless true that an overwhelming majority of confirmed *crucesignati* were drawn from the three core territories of Aragon-Catalonia, France and England. For example, Aragonese *crucesignati* comprised 864 of the 1,105 known participants in the Valencian crusade, c.78.2% of the total.[603] Running at a similar level, French crusaders comprised 30 of the 39 confirmed participants in the Constantinople crusade, c.76.9% of the total, while even more stark was the Holy Land Crusade where French or English crusaders accounted for 207 of the 246 named participants, c.84.15% of the total.[604] As such, when seeking to understand the patterns of recruitment and participation in the Triple Crusade, this thesis must discuss the formative forces working within those key territories.

Importance of the monarchs

In undertaking this aim, what is notable, just as it was in the expeditions' finances, is how central Europe's crowns were to the recruitment of these crusades. As with the extent of their financial

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[603] Appendix section 1.
[604] Appendix sections 2 and 3.

support, this is something not yet properly appreciated in the Holy Land and Constantinopolitan expeditions. For example, when assessing the recruitment for the Levantine crusade, Lower acknowledged 'brisk' recruitment in the Île-de-France, but when giving evidence, listed only 14 of Louis's closest counsellors who took the cross.[605] The importance of these men is undoubted, given several crusaders emerge who would have served in their retinues, such as Totanus and Galterus, men of Robert of Courtenay, the royal butler, but Louis's influence surpassed these 14 nobles.[606] Of the 135 known French crusaders to the Holy Land, no fewer than 53 have survived to posterity solely because they received gifts from Louis IX, ranging from 20*s*-50*l*.[607] Although caution must be taken not to infer too much from this figure, given the destruction of many medieval French records, the fact these crusaders cover the breadth of French society, from Durandus, a baker of the Count of Arras, to Thibaut of Champagne cannot but serve to further cement the importance of Louis IX as a backer.[608] Evidently, his support was sizeable and much sought-after regardless of social status. In this, the Holy Land branch of the Triple Crusade resembles Louis IX's first crusade.

Moreover, besides facilitating other's desires to crusade, there is evidence to suggest that Louis followed the instructions given him by Gregory IX to actively encouraging others to take the cross, even if, in contravention of papal directive, he was personally reticent to do so.[609] One way to see this is to compare the sites of Louis's stays during the late 1230s with the lists of confirmed *crucesignati*, as the overlap is striking. For example, Louis was often resident at Asnières-sur-Seine, being present there in August 1235, February 1236, April 1237 and for a longer time in April-May

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[605] Lower, pp. 43-4.
[606] On Totanus and Galterus see 'Itinera', p. 596
[607] E.g. 11 of the 15 crusaders listed on *Ibid*. p. 594 receive gifts of 20*s*. in order to help finance their travels to the Holy Land. By contrast John, Lord of Bar and Peter of Marly were awarded 50*l* towards their expenses, for which see *Ibid*. pp. 595-6.
[608] *Ibid*. pp. 589 [Thibaut], 594 [Durandus].
[609] Gregory urged Louis to campaign in the Holy Land on 6 November 1234, and on 27 May 1237 implored him to facilitate gathering men and *matériel* for the Levantine and Greek expeditions: *BF*, pp. 141-2, 224-5.

1238.[610] Located among those taking the cross who benefitted from Louis IX's gifts is an unnamed chaplain, who is described only as being 'accustomed to be at Asnières-sur-Seine'.[611] It hardly stretches credibility to suggest that much of this chaplain's motivation to take the cross came from direct contact with Louis, this being the only way to account for his appearance in a document so explicitly connected to the king. Even more obviously in terms of framing Louis as an active crusade recruiter, one can assess his connection to the lords of Beaumont. A family with direct links to the crown (in a charter dated May 1235 John of Beaumont is identified as Louis's chamberlain), during the late 1230s they were occasional hosts of the king, with Louis lodging with the family in April and August 1237.[612] Given several men connected with this family took the cross, the implication is that Louis helped disseminate the message, and encouraged uptake for the expedition. Most notably, a link to Louis explains why Richard of Beaumont participated in the campaign, given he is one of the figures whose participation cannot be easily attributed to ties of feudal allegiance or family.[613] Moreover, a direct link to the crusade through Louis explains why John of Beaumont is listed as witnessing 7 of the gifts to departing crusaders, more than any other single figure, and why several servants of the lords of Beaumont took vows to set out eastwards.[614] Thus, while conclusions over the total manpower of the crusade who benefitted from Louis's personal largesse must be made with caution given the surviving sources, it is nevertheless clear that Louis played a vital role not only as paymaster, but also as recruiter for the expedition.

Yet even this role pales compared to his part in aiding recruitment for Baldwin's crusade. As discussed in the chapter on the expedition's finances, Louis sat at the centre of events, a fact

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610 'Ludovici Noni Mansiones et Itinera', in *RHGF*, xxi, p. 411.
611 'Itinera', p. 597.
612 *Chartes et Documents de Saint-Martin-des-Champs*, ed. Depoin, iv, p. 108. 'Ludovici Noni Mansiones et Itinera', p. 411.
613 *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527
614 Itinera', pp. 593, 595.

witnessed numerically by the fact that 22 of the 39 participants in Baldwin's crusade are known to history solely because of Louis's generosity towards them in terms of funding. Yet, just as with the Levantine crusade, there is suggestive evidence that beyond simply facilitating others' determination to head overseas, Louis was an active recruiter of his cousin's cause. For example, Louis sponsored men to join the army assembling under Baldwin, both to bring messages to Baldwin and to assess the size of the force.[615] Given such evidence, Louis appears almost to have assumed personal responsibility for gathering the army, and was not merely its financial backer, but a key recruiter, in line with papal instructions. And this on top of the concurrent claims of the Holy Land crusade for his attention. In combination with the extent of his financial support, such evidence breathes life into the hitherto-overlooked claim of the thirteenth century Italian Dominican chronicler John of Colonna, who stated Louis IX and Blanche of Castile assisted Baldwin with great amounts of money, and supplied him with numerous paid troops and knights at royal expense.[616] If true, this frames the whole expedition a child of the French crown, a bold claim which perhaps explains why the chronicle features in no modern accounts. While not necessarily stating that the whole force was in Louis's pay, the evidence nevertheless suggests Louis was of greater importance than has hitherto been appreciated, and that Colonna's statement is not inherently implausible.

Moving the scope of investigations to England, like Louis IX, Henry III played a more central part in creating the Levantine expedition than previously credited. Given the participation of Richard of Cornwall, his brother and until the birth of Edward in June 1239, his heir presumptive, Henry was naturally involved in the preparations for the campaign, and plenty of financial evidence survives from England that ties Henry to the crusade, as discussed. Yet like Louis, Henry appears to

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[615] *Ibid*. pp. 592, 596.
[616] John of Colonna, 'E Mari Historiarum', in *RHGF*, xxiii, p. 110.

have been one of the principal backers of the crusade. Lower correctly states that many English crusaders cannot be easily associated with either Richard of Cornwall, Simon de Montfort of William of Forz, the leaders of the three Holy Land-bound expeditions that coalesced in England, but he neglects to state that for several, their appearance in the record is solely down to Henry III's generosity.[617] Indeed of these hard-to-identify English, 13 figures fall within this category, over a third of the total. Given the higher rate of survival for English archival records compared to France, this point is of perhaps even greater significance than royal support in France. Moreover, as in France, these figures occupy a range of social standing. For example, among the top ranks of knights to depart on crusade was Robert of Sabloil, whose annual fee of 200 marks was to be paid in advance for the 23rd and 24th year of Henry III's reign to support his crusade to Outremer.[618] Lesser in standing but still of knightly status are figures like Amaury of Sancto Amando and Reynold of Bernevall, the former of whom was explicitly gifted 50 marks, and the latter 10*l*.[619] Finally, more lowly but nevertheless receiving the king's gift were the royal sergeants Ralph Pagani, Peter de Lungeville, Adam of Beretin and Peter of Bareny. The former benefitted by receiving an advance payment of 10 marks in May 1239 to help cover the expenses of his crusade while the latter three received 58*s.* in arrears of pay from St Stephen's day to Thursday before St. Peter's Chair inclusive in February 1241 to cover their time in Outremer, a rate of 12*d.* daily.[620] Thus while there is not the evidence to suggest Henry played the active recruiting role that Louis may have done, enough material survives to indicate he played an important part in shaping the overall English response to Gregory's Holy Land appeal, beyond the backseat role he is usually given. As a staunch supporter of the crusade, even if his commitment never matched Louis's, this should be no surprise.[621]

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[617] Lower, pp. 46, 54.
[618] *CLR*, i, p. 378
[619] *Ibid*. p. 471.
[620] *Ibid.* p. 384, *CLR*, ii, p. 31.
[621] Lloyd, pp. 207-32.

Yet more committed than either man was James I. As might be expected given unlike Louis or Henry, he was an actually took the cross, and given many of the sources for Valencia's conquest link directly to James, either being written by him, issued by his government, or by later chroniclers for whom he was a revered figure, James and those connected to him appear at the centre of the movement. That he maintained a number of paid knights and troops is obvious; references to his 'household' recur thought the text, appearing for example at Teruel and Borriana in 1233, Teruel in April 1237 and at El Puig throughout 1238.[622] Indeed, through the provision of a number of retained men, a direct result of royal field leadership, James constructed the nucleus around which the crusading army formed. Therefore, while his reasons differ, there being the incentive at Valencia to keep control of the campaign in royal as opposed to noble control, the overall picture of the expedition as hinging on royal backing nevertheless parallels the Levantine and Greek crusades.[623]

Moreover, thanks to the surviving material, it is possible to go beyond stating the existence of a royal retinue, and to explore in detail the membership of this group. In his chronicle, James gives various numbers for the knights who accompanied or were supported by him on the crusade. These numbers range from as low as 17 when travelling from Puig to Borriana in September 1237, to as high as 200, an exceptional group corralled to take the tower guarding the Boatella gate outside Valencia in summer 1238.[624] Any estimate of the size of the royal retinue based on chronicle evidence is therefore dangerous, especially as these figures suggest membership in James's circle was a fairly fluid affair. Therefore, historians of the Iberian crusades have tended to stick to educated guesses when broaching the subject of royal retinues. Hence Reilly asserted that a royal

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[622] *LdF*, pp. 146, 155, 159, 183, 202, 215.
[623] For the conflict between James and the Aragonese Nobility see D. Kagay, 'Structures Of Baronial Dissent And Revolt Under James I (1213-76)', *Mediaevistik*, 1 (1988), pp. 61-85.
[624] *Ibid*. pp. 195, 222.

household consisted of c.150 men composed of 'forty to sixty mounted warriors, each supported by a squire and a groom', without supplying convincing supporting analysis, while O'Callaghan stated that James I's retinue consisted of c.50 knights, based upon James's statement that he went to Puig in January 1238 with the knights of his 'maynada' or 'household', merely one of the more middle numbers James gives.[625] However, this problem can be resolved by studying James's charters issued during the period of the crusade and above all their witness lists.[626] From these, 67 names emerges, a number which sits well within the range of figures given by James for his closest companions in his chronicle. To these 67 might be added 11 other names who witness no charters but whose involvement in the crusade must be attributed to personal connection with James, including Hugh of Forcalquier, master of the Hospitallers, who appears repeatedly in the *Llibre dels Fets* as one of James's closest councillors, the lawyer Bernard Vidal who is twice mentioned as participating in the councils of the Aragonese nobility, and his cousin Garcia Ferrandi.[627] The inference from this is that James therefore had great control over the expedition, as most of these 78 would in turn have led their own retinues. In this light, he surpasses even Louis IX and the Greek crusade, with his personal support for large retinues translating into a high degree of control over the wider army.

Yet beyond just creating this estimate of 78 associates for James's inner circle, one can identify the various levels of proximity to him upon which this group was ordered, based upon the frequency with which people witness his charters. For example, there are 43 figures who witness only one, placing them likely at the fringes of James's circle. By contrast there are 15 men who

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[625] B. Reilly, *The Kingdom of León-Castilla under King Alfonso VII 1126-1157* (Philadelphia, 1998), p. 153, O'Callaghan, p. 126.
[626] *DJI*, i, nos. 217-40, ii, nos. 243-304.
[627] For these 3 see *Cartulaire Général des Hospitaliers*, ed. Le Roulx, ii, no. 2097 and *DJI*, ii, nos. 291, *LdF*, pp. 199, 201-2, and *LdR*, i, no. 849.

witness at least 5 charters, who likely formed the core of James retinue.[628] That this number so closely resembles the numbers recorded by James as personally accompanying him from Puig to Borriana in September 1237, the smallest royal following he identifies during the entire campaign, is surely no accident.[629] Moreover that these men constituted James's inner circle seems confirmed by the *Llibre dels Fets*, in which many of these figures feature prominently.[630] Given this, it appears reasonable to presume that James's personal following was multi-layered and large. It was also international, as the presence of Garcia of Aveyron and William of Aquitaine attests, complementing the conclusions reached about the international ties found within the Aragonese court.[631] Evidently the Aragonese crown had a long arm that drew recruits across borders and created a court with differing levels of access to the king, complementing previous conclusions about the Triple Crusade's international reach.

Ties of Lordship

Royal support, including James's personal following, was however only one level of the overall composition of the three crusades. In all cases, as with wider medieval European society, retained noble followings played a key part in the expeditions' overall structure. In this, the Triple Crusade was like any other military expedition, consolidating the view reached with reference to the funding campaign for the expeditions that is possible to over-emphasise the "otherness" of crusades *vis-à-*

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[628] Namely Prince Ferdinand of Aragon, James' uncle, Pedro Cornel the Majordomo of Aragon, Pero Ferrández d'Açagra, Artal of Luna, Berenguer of Entença, Garcia Romeu, Jimeno of Urrea, Don Ladrón, Fernando Pérez of Pina, William of Aquitaine, Rodrigo of Lizana, Asalito of Gudal, Artal of Alagón, Guillem of Montcada and Nuño Sánchez. At least 1 of these witnesses every charter issued by James in this period, bar 1.
[629] *LdF*, p. 195.
[630] E.g. Rodrigo of Lizana, who witnessed more charters than any other appears in 31 separate chapters.
[631] *DJI*, ii, nos. 245-6, 250-1.

vis more regular forms of warfare. Beginning first with the Valencian crusade, a detailed analysis of how this worked has not yet been undertaken. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that a lack of evidence underpins this silence, thereby showing how close study of the Triple Crusade can shine a new light on the expeditions.

In particular, James's *Llibre del Fets* records numerous instances of noble retinues, indicating their central place. For example, note James's anguish in July 1237 when he discovered that Bernat Guillem of Entença was bringing 140 retained knights to Valencia, anguish which resulted from his fear that the money set aside for provisions had been used to hire them.[632] Similarly, note his castigation of a mounted crossbowman whom he stripped of his arms and horse for his failure to aid his lord in battle, implying the presence of the strict ties of obligations associated with feudal retinues.[633] Evidence for retained retinues also exists outside James's chronicle. For example, it is notable that Gregory IX stipulated that Ramon Folch, Viscount of Cardona and his wife could marry, notwithstanding the fact they were related in the 4th degree, if he led 40 men to the army besieging Valencia and kept them there for a year at his own expense.[634] Similarly, the *Llibre del Repartiment* makes references several men serving in lordly retinues. For example, from the retinue of Peter Petri, the justiciar of Aragon, emerge two of his shield-bearers, Martin Gil and P. of Aynsa.[635] Likewise, the *Llibre del Repartiment* rewards 'The men of Jimeno Perez', indicating the presence of his retinue.[636] Similarly, Pedro Fernández of Azagra possessed a well-documented following, including men like Fernando Díaz, who served as majordomo of the court in 1224, 1229 and 1233, and a certain Muça.[637] Moving down the hierarchies, indicating the different levels upon

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[632] *LdF*, pp. 185-6.
[633] *Ibid.* p. 198.
[634] *Registres,* ii, no. 3480.
[635] *LdR*, i, nos. 406, 1143.
[636] *Ibid.* no. 500.
[637] *Ibid.* no. 1407, *Book of Deeds* ed. and trans. Smith and Buffery, p. 141.

which retinues existed, from the retinue of Fernando Díaz, emerges a certain R. del Soler.[638] The "average" size of a noble retinue is incalculable, as most knights named in the *Llibre del Repartiment* are listed without their immediate ties of lordship and with various figures for lordly retinues being given in James's chronicle, from Berenguer of Entença's 12 knights to the 100 knights commanded by Jimeno of Urrea.[639] However, assuming most of the 107 knights listed in the *Llibre del Repartiment* were associated thus, this places great influence in the nobles' hands. Small wonder then that the threat of noble confederations against James's plans for a complete conquest of Valencia were serious enough to prompt him to repeatedly write to Gregory IX, who obliged by banning such confederations.[640] This expedition therefore appears to be a crusade bound by networks of lordship, akin to any other.

Similarly, the surviving evidence suggests much of the Holy Land crusade's structure was defined by ties of lordship and service. This is so for all of the main forces that went thither, whether English or French. Starting with French examples, within Champagne there are cases such as Henry, Count of Grandpré or William, Count of Joigny, who both held their lands directly from Thibaut of Champagne, and whose decision to take the cross must be understood in the context of that "feudal" structure.[641] Further south in Burgundy, following Duke Hugh's assumption of the cross, ties of lordship and service account for the crusading participation of nobles like John of Barres, John of Paleau, or Guy of Doix.[642] Similarly, the English crusaders were heavily bound by ties of lordship and association. It is this which accounts for the participation of John Fitz-John, Richard of Cornwall's seneschal, or Philip Basset, a long-time and close associate of Richard's, in

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[638] *LdR*, i, no. 923.
[639] *LdF*, pp. 184, 195.
[640] *Registres*, ii, nos. 2527-8, 4070, 4116.
[641] *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 526.
[642] Hugh must have assumed the cross before 1 June 1237, when Gregory IX listed him among the leading *crucesignati*: *Registres*, ii, no. 3727. For the others see *CM*, iv, p. 25, *HdDB*, iv, nos. 2235, 2357.

the crusade he led.[643] Indeed, Matthew Paris described Richard's whole crusade as being structured around his *familia*, or household.[644] Moreover, there is evidence that noble retinues in the Levantine crusade extended below those of knightly rank; Guy, Count of Forez and Nevers was accompanied by William of Vitry, his household chaplain, Stephen his cleric, the knight Hugh of Cicuñ, Bertrand his chamberlain and Renaud Pantiñ, a university master on crusade, as revealed by his will, composed in Apulia on 10 April 1241.[645]

However, it must be said that none of this is unknown, Lower having already explored the role of lordship in detail.[646] That is not to say that nothing can be added to his analysis: as may be expected from a work not primarily focused on the specifics of the expedition, his work lacks a complete list of confirmed *crucesignati*. Hence, further examples can be added to the evidence he gives. For example, Baldwin of Béthune, identified with Richard of Cornwall by Paris and thus by Lower turns out upon further investigation to be a tenant of the Marshals.[647] Similarly, of all the people in Guy of Forez's household, only William of Vitry was mentioned in Lower's book.[648] Yet notwithstanding these additions, there is little merit in listing all the extra feudal ties running through the Triple Crusade, given they will become evident through a cursory glance at the list of the expedition's participants.[649] Moreover, the fundamental points Lower makes remains true regardless of the additional evidence piled up behind them. Indeed, this thesis has no grounds to fundamentally challenge Lower's perspective on the importance of lordship to crusading. In that sense, the Holy Land crusade was defined by many of the same impulses that shaped calls to arms, both in other crusades, and medieval warfare in general.

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643 *CM*, iv, pp. 44, 175.
644 *Ibid*. p. 44.
645 *Titres de la Maison ducale*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, no. 221.
646 Lower, pp. 43-54.
647 *CM*, iv, p. 175
648 Lower, p. 52.
649 Appendix, section 3.

Nevertheless, for all the importance of lordship to the Levantine Crusade, there remains one interesting thing that can be said; its potential limitations. Although clearly a potent motivator, it was not all-powerful in driving recruitment, something Lower does not discuss. In seeing this limitation, perhaps the best case is provided by Thibaut of Champagne, and the effect his taking the cross had within his lands. Although successful in generating some crusading enthusiasm amongst his followers, he was not universally so, and indeed was arguably less successful in crusade recruitment than Louis IX, cementing the argument that Louis should be regarded as central to the expedition. For example, despite Thibaut's personal participation, some of the most prominent crusading dynasties in Champagne, such as the Chappes or Plancy families did not apparently contribute a single member to the expedition.[650] Why the weight of family history failed to move these families in this instance is impossible to tell, but nevertheless some suppositions can be advanced. For one, perhaps the ever-increasing cost of crusading, which saw Louis IX pay 850-7,000*l.* for a ship and its crew for a year for his crossing to the Holy Land, a journey which had cost Richard I 400-500*l.* for the same service barely 50 years before, dissuaded these families from taking the cross, given there was no particular emotive crisis to draw them to Outremer.[651] In that sense, the necessity of perceived crisis to crusading appears critical.

Or perhaps, given others accepted such costs, the answer lies in these families' strained relationship with Thibaut. In typifying this, the Plancy family provides a most obvious cause of potential rupture, although resentment of Thibaut, and a reticence to accompany him on crusade needed no specific incident. After all, his reign marked the end of any pretence of champenois

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[650] For these families' genealogies see T. Evergates, *Feudal Society in the Baillage of Troyes under the Counts of Champagne, 1152-1284* (Baltimore, 1975), pp. 168-9, 191-2.
[651] On costs of ships see *Pipe Roll 2 Richard I*, ed. Stenton, pp. 8-9 and M. Champollion-Figeac (ed.), *Documents historiques inédits tirés des collections manuscrites de la Bibliothèque royale et des archives ou des bibliothèques des départements* (4 vols., Paris, 1841-48), i, pp. 517-615.

collegial government, a fact embodied by the *De homagiis nobis factis*, a collection of oaths sworn directly to the count of Champagne by the all his major barons, which fatally undermined the great nobles' previous independence.[652] Returning to the Plancy family, unlike every other prelate in Champagne barring the bishops of Langres, and Auxerre, who had direct family connections to the rebels, Hervé, bishop of Troyes and a Plancy, refused to back Thibaut against Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt in the late 1210s and early 1220s, refusing to endorse the papal excommunication of the rebel Simon of Joinville, seneschal of Champagne.[653] Given Hervé continued to hold office, the potential for such conflict to foster potentially-lingering resentment on both sides is clear. Likewise Hervé had been disputing with Blanche of Navarre the concurrent seigneurial rights enjoyed by the counts of Champagne and bishops of Troyes at Méry-sur-Seine, a disagreement which festered, even involving Honorius III on several occasions.[654] Moreover, outside Hervé's person, this conflict had seen the Plancy castle seized in 1218 on Blanche's orders by Clarembaud VI de Chappes as a guarantee of their cooperation.[655] Regardless of the time elapsed, and the official resolution of conflict, this sort of humiliation is never easily forgotten. Thus while the resonance of such a dispute between the Planchy family and the rulers of Champagne in the early thirteenth century during the 1230s is unknowable, it is plausible the Plancy family felt little sympathy for a crusade so obviously tied to Blanche's son Thibaut, and so took the easier option; non-participation. If that is so, then questions about how far thirteenth century crusading retained its emotive power, so important in explaining its initial success, start to be raised.[656]

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652 T. Evergates, *The Aristocracy in the County of Champagne, 1100-1300* (Philadelphia, 2007), p. 42. For the charters which attracted this name see Idem (ed.), *The Cartulary of Countess Blanche of Champagne* (Toronto, 2010), nos. 134, 155, 226, 250.
653 *HdDC*, iv, p. 146 and v, no. 1098, Evergates, *Aristocracy in the County of Champagne*, p. 41.
654 *HdDC*, v, nos. 1235-7, 1243.
655 *Ibid.* iv, pp. 163-4.
656 On the emotive power of crusading during the First Crusade see e.g. J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (London, 1986), pp. 34-8, Mayer, *Crusades*, trans. Gillingham, p. 11.

Turning to the Constantinopolitan crusade, similar ties of lordship are again discernible. Above all, and as Giebfried outlined, such ties explain why many of Peter of Brittany's associates took the cross for Constantinople, including Thomas of Coucy, Gilles of Beaumetz and Josseran of Brancion.[657] Across the gestation for this crusade, Peter's position was extremely complex. Initially intended to play a major role, witnessed in the papal claim that he had asked to lead an army of 2,000 knights and 10,000 infantry to Greece, due to a combination of rising costs, his failure to secure ecclesiastical funding, and faced with ever-mounting uncertainty about the prospects of successfully crossing to Greece, Peter withdrew from the campaign, choosing to fulfil his vow in the Holy Land.[658] However, this was not an option for many of his noble followers, who could not afford the loss of papal revenue which would accompany their abandonment of their Greek crusading vow.[659] As such, they were obliged to follow Baldwin *en masse* to Greece, the loss of their leading light notwithstanding. Hence, while knowledge of it is nothing new, the importance of lordship also sheds light on the potential value of papal subsidies, which apparently seemed for all but the richest to be essential.

Yet ties of lordship permeated Baldwin's crusade on the level below the great nobility, something not yet discussed. In particular, that noble retinues operated on all levels is evident in the brief descriptions of the individuals given royal financial gifts prior to their departure. For example, alongside the usual suspects such as Baldwin himself, the evidence records gifts to individuals such as Bartholomew, a cleric of Baldwin II, Robin, valet of Hugh Marshal or Bernard, minstrel of Hubert of Beaujeu.[660] How Louis encountered these individuals has been lost, but it is clear in all cases from their descriptions that their involvement in the Greek crusade occurred within the

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[657] Giebfried, p. 275. Mouskes, p. 664, Alberic, p. 946.
[658] *Registres,* ii, no. 4027, Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, pp. 105-6, Giebfried, pp. 273-5.
[659] Giebfried, p. 275.
[660] 'Itinera', pp. 589, 593, 596.

households of other, more powerful *crucesignati.* Hence, one can state with confidence that on all levels, noble retinues defined every expedition of the Triple Crusade. The logical case for taking them together, rather than apart, further gathers pace.

Ecclesiastical retinues

Noble retinues were, however, only one type of retinue identifiable during the Triple Crusade. Although the most obvious, and the one which attracts the most historical attention, alongside these noble retinues it is possible to discern several retinues led by bishops. What the role of bishops was in medieval warfare, and within that, the crusades, was deeply controversial, as the fierce medieval debates over whether a bishop could shed blood, defend himself or participate in military campaigns testify.[661] However, it is clear bishops could play a leading role in crusades, into the thirteenth century, as the controversial role of Pelagius during the Fifth Crusade epitomised.[662] However, that bishops provided retinues in the Triple Crusade has been entirely overlooked, despite what the evidence suggests, with none of the expeditions' major authors giving them a military role. In a way, this parodies the discussion of bishops' role in crusading warfare from the mid-thirteenth century onwards, which is negligible.[663] Thus, close study of the Triple Crusade demonstrates again how it can contribute towards broader understanding, here showing how prelates remained

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[661] For a discussion of medieval bishops' role in war see K. Jensen, 'Bishops on crusade', in A. Lappin and E. Balzamo (eds.), *Dominus Episcopus: Medieval bishops between diocese and court* (Stockholm, 2018), pp. 83-99.
[662] For criticism of Pelagius's role see e.g. Throop, *Criticism of the crusade*, p. 31, Idem, 'Criticism of Papal Crusade Policy in Old French and Provençal', *Speculum*, 13 (Oct. 1938), p. 387.
[663] For an overview of the scholarship of medieval clerics and warfare see R. Kotecki, J. Maciejewski and J. Ott 'The Medieval Clergy and War: A Historiographical Introduction' in R. Kotecki, J. Maciejewski and J. Ott (eds.), *Between Sword and Prayer: Warfare and Medieval Clergy in Cultural Perspective* (Leiden, 2017), pp. 1-23.

important building blocks within medieval armies. Similarly, given the broad sweep of this study, these theories can be tentatively applied across Medieval Europe.

Starting with Aragon, here the bishops' involvement reflects the nature of the Aragonese state that underpinned much of the crusade recruitment. Besides being significant landowners, Aragonese bishops played an important part in governing the realm, a fact the *Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium* reflects by consistently presenting the prelates as James's key advisors across his reign, including during his minority, and at the decisions to campaign against Majorca and Valencia.[664] Moreover, the bishops had past form as suppliers of armed men; Desclot claims the archbishop of Tarragona, the bishops of Barcelona and Girona, the abbot of San Feliu de Guixols, the archdeacon of Barcelona and the sacristans of Barcelona and Girona collectively pledged 269 knights and 2,500 sergeants to the Majorcan campaign in December 1228, with other prelates pledging indeterminate numbers of men and supplies.[665] The failure of historians to appreciate this was also so for the Valencian crusade is therefore particularly surprising, as similar ecclesiastical support was certainly present, even if not spelled out so explicitly. As much is suggested by the close proximity of the bishops to James throughout the campaign, in the person of the bishop of Lleida at Borriana in June 1235, the bishop of Huesca in August 1237 following the battle of El Puig, and most notably, the numerous prelates present among the nobles when James announced Valencia's surrender in September 1238.[666] This high status of the bishops is also indicated in the *Llibre del Repartiment*, where prelates figure prominently.[667] It is inconceivable all were present simply as individual private citizens, given bishops' servants, such as Arnald, secretary of the bishop of Barcelona or

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[664] *Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium*, ed. Barrau-Dihigo and Massó Torrents, p. 58, *Gesta Comitum Barchinonsium*, ed. Cingolani, pp. 156-8.
[665] Desclot, pp. 70-5. See also *LdF*, pp. 62-4 and *DJI*, i, no. 113.
[666] *LdF*, pp. 172, 190, 230.
[667] *LdR*, i, nos. 55, 57, 296, 313, 325, 348, 405, 419, 908, 950, 954, 1136, 1380, 1433 and ii, nos. 27, 36, 44, 52, 69, 92, 96.

Berenguer of Canalis, chaplain of the bishop of Barcelona, appear in the *Llibre del Repartiment* and that James apparently consulted with the bishops as the equals of the major nobles, who, as discussed, led large numbers of men.[668] Furthermore, James explicitly recorded that the Archbishop of Narbonne led 40 knights and 600 infantry to the siege of Valencia, following the direct papal instruction he and his suffragans received in 1237 to rally support for the Valencian crusade.[669] Thus, while the overall ecclesiastical manpower contribution to the expedition is unquantifiable, it was likely substantial, given the number of prelates (9) recorded as participants. This remains so even if assuming most clerical contributions were smaller than the Archbishop of Narbonne's, which appears to be the only following large enough to provoke comment. Perhaps it is possible that ecclesiastically-sponsored contingents were so common in Iberian warfare by the 1230s that there was no need to explicitly describe them, precipitating this relative absence of description of such warriors. Regardless, this is not a silence permissible for the crusade historian.

Turning to the Levantine crusade, while clerical retinues are not as prominent as in Valencia, reflective perhaps of the fact that unlike in Valencia, only two prelates, Raoul of Beauvais, Bishop of Nevers and Benedict, Bishop of Marseilles can be identified as *crucesignati* for the expedition, clerical retinues nevertheless appear part of the campaign's composition.[670] In the former's case, the evidence is only suggestive, being a papal letter dated 5 November 1238. In this, Gregory instructs William of Cordelle that the revenues of vow redemptions in two French dioceses not yet assigned are to go to the Bishop of Nevers after he departs for the Holy Land, 'with an honourable number of warriors'.[671] That Raoul was leading these men himself is not certain, but the formulation of the

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[668] *Ibid*, i, nos. 1247, 1255, 1295.
[669] *LdF*, p. 218, *Registres,* ii, nos. 3484, 3490.
[670] For Raoul see *Registres*, ii, nos. 4379, 4385, 4585, *HdDB*, iv, no. 2310. For Benedict see H. de Belsunce de Castelmoron, *L'antiquité de l'Eglise de Marseille, et la succession de ses évêques* (3 vols., Marseilles, 1747-51), ii, pp. 155-68.
[671] *Registres*, ii, no. 4585.

Latin, which puts him at the centre of these men's preparations ('qui cum honorabili bellatorum numero transfretare disposuerat'), alongside the fact he was responsible for supporting the expenses of those travelling with him, suggests a leading role for him.[672] Given financial support formed a central part of the construction of retinues for secular lords, as the aforementioned contract between Philip Basset and John of Neville epitomises, there is no reason to assume that similar process were not underway here. Thus, the idea that clerical leadership played no part in the Triple Crusade seems hard to maintain.

This is especially so given the *De constructione* states that Benedict, Bishop of Marseilles arrived in Outremer leading a sizeable following. Although probably created to commemorate the bishop's endeavours, and intended to be used as the basis for sermons and other fund-raising activities, the fact this text was written in Outremer (most likely Acre) by a contemporary means its message should carry weight.[673] From this, it is clear that despite Benedict's protestations to several leading Templars that he was lacking money, and therefore unable to build a castle at Safed himself, he was leading a substantial following to the Holy Land.[674] This much is suggested by the stir his company made upon his arrival in Damascus; for all that he enjoyed Isma'il's personal protection, he didn't make his pilgrimage alone.[675] However, more explicit evidence he commanded a retinue comes from the description of the castle-building itself. Not only did Benedict supposedly come from Acre to Safed 'with those pilgrims he could [bring]', but as work commenced, he took the workmen into his pay.[676] Thus, just as Richard of Cornwall constructed a retinue while on crusade

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[672] *Ibid*. no. 4585.
[673] H. Kennedy, *Crusader Castles* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 190, D. Pringle, 'Review Article: Reconstructing the Castle of Safad', *Palestine Exploration Quarterly*, 117 (2) (Jul. 1985), p. 139, J. Rubin, *Learning in a Crusader City: Intellectual Activity and Intercultural Exchanges in Acre, 1191–1291* (Cambridge, 2018), p. 193.
[674] *Saphet*, pp. 37-8.
[675] *Ibid*. p. 35
[676] 'venit cum quibus potuit peregrinis', *Ibid*. pp. 38-9.

using his funds, so too had Benedict. Moreover, besides the references in this text to the bishop's servants, further indicating his leadership, the *De constructione* highlights an episode where a Saracen showed Benedict a spring in exchange for a tunic from the bishop.[677] By so doing, he appears as a lord dispensing patronage through clothing, an important aspect of the construction of a retinue.[678] Thus Benedict exhibited all the signs of typical lordly behaviour during his time overseas. In turn, this suggests bishops played an important role the Levantine crusade, like in Valencia. In the context of this thesis, this point is significant as it both advances current understanding of the Outremer crusade, and strengthens the idea that the crusades of the 1230s should be seen together, given their shared characteristics.

By contrast, evidence for clerical retinues is harder to definitively identify in the Greek expedition, although tentative suggestions can be made in that direction. For one, there is Hughes II, Bishop of Séez. Described in a papal letter dated 10 May 1237, as having initially pledged to defend the Holy Land, Hughes was instructed to commute his vow to the defence of Constantinople.[679] This Hughes apparently did, following the letter dated 17 December 1237, where his goods and person were placed under the protection of the Church given his impending departure to the Latin Empire, almost certainly as part of John of Béthune's ill-fated expedition.[680] Like Raoul of Beauvais, Hughes seems to have been at the centre of a body of crusade recruits, witnessed in Gregory's wish that Hughes commute 'your vow and the vows of the *crucesignati* of your diocese who want to set out with you' to Greece.[681] Clearly, as with bishops' participation in previous crusades, Hughes's personal assumption of the cross had been central to crusade recruitment.

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[677] *Ibid.* p. 39.
[678] For a discussion of the granting of clothes as a sign of lordship see F. Lachaud, 'Liveries of Robes in England, c.1200–c.1330', *English Historical Review*, 111/441 (Apr. 1996), pp. 279-98.
[679] *Registres*, ii, no. 3638.
[680] *Ibid*. no. 4010.
[681] 'votum tuum et crucesignatorum tue diocesis qui tecum proficisci voluerint'; *Ibid*. no. 3638.

However, unlike Raoul, there is no sense here that Hughes was personally retaining the crusaders accompanying him, while the crucial language expecting him to pay such crusaders' expenses is missing. Thus, while it is possible that he may led a retinue abroad, it is not certain.

Even more tentatively, this is the case for the other bishops accompanying Baldwin II; Warin, former Archbishop of Thessalonica, and Baldwin, Archbishop of Verissa.[682] Listed by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines alongside the leading lords who took the cross to Greece, it is possible these two ecclesiastics were leading retinues of armed men, like the secular lords they were numbered with. Similarly, following Warin's prominent role in the Latin Empire's politics, witnessed in his donation of a hospital in his possession to the order of St Sampson which would ultimately become the order's headquarters in Western Europe, it is just possible that he used his influence to recruit a body of crusaders.[683] However, such cannot be said with certainty, and indeed, given the surviving evidence, to state with confidence that there were ecclesiastical retinues to Greece exceeds reasonable credulity. Nevertheless, that bishops remained central at the very least to the recruitment of the campaign, and acted as lightning-rods for other crusaders to follow is significant. Alongside the firmer evidence from the other expeditions that they acted as military leaders, it therefore seems that bishops' political role remained undimmed during this period, for all that they were encouraged to refrain from military activities.

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[682] Alberic, p. 946.
[683] D. Stathakopoulos, 'Discovering a Military Order of the Crusades: The Hospital of St. Sampson of Constantinople', *Viator*, 37 (2006), p. 258.

The Military Orders

Significant as ecclesiastical retinues were to the Triple Crusade, they were not the only type of religiously-led troops in the expeditions. Alongside these, and likely in greater numbers, were the contributions made by the various Military Orders, whether local or international. The Military Orders' importance to crusading is well-known, and will not be repeated here, only to state that many of the reasons behind the popularity of the Military Orders in general, including the availability of a disciplined and well-funded force, with an ideological mission to defend Christendom, apply for all three theatres of the Triple Crusade, as all required near-constant reinforcement in the face of external threats, and all shared a land border with non-Catholics, whether they be Muslim as in Valencia and Outremer, or heretics and schismatics, as in Greece.[684]

Nevertheless, close examination of the Military Orders can still usefully illuminate the Triple Crusade. For example, in the Valencian expedition, it is notable just how close the leaders of the Military Orders were to James, with the Military Orders occupying a prominent position within the army.[685] Indeed Desclot even describes the Templars and Hospitallers as commanding half the army that won the Battle of El Puig, alongside Guillem d'Aguiló.[686] The Valencian campaign therefore perhaps warrants greater attention than is usually granted it in histories of the Orders. Moreover this

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[684] The literature on the Military Orders is vast. For only a selection see e.g. M. Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge, 1994), on the Templars, J. Riley-Smith, *Hospitallers: The History of the Order of St John* (London and Hambledon, 1999) on the Hospitallers, C. Savona-Ventura, *The History of the Order of Saint Lazarus of Jerusalem* (New York, 2014) on the Order of St Lazarus, D. Lomax 'The Order of Santiago (1170-1275)' (Oxford Univ. DPhil. thesis, 1961) on the Order of Santiago, J. O'Callaghan, *The Spanish military order of Calatrava and its affiliates* (London, 1975) on the Order of Calatrava, and Stathakopoulos, 'Discovering a Military Order of the Crusades' on the Order of St Sampson.
[685] *LdF*, pp. 172, 190, 202, 237. Desclot, p. 139 places the Templars in the vanguard of the initial force sent to El Puig.
[686] Desclot, p. 143.

idea the Military Orders were central to the Valencian crusade complements the Levantine evidence, where the Military Orders operated in a similarly prominent position. For example, upon learning that part of the crusading host had quit the main army to go raiding, the 'Rothelin' continuation talks of Thibaut of Navarre attempting to stop the split alongside the leaders of the Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonics, indicating their prominence.[687] This prominence was matched on the battlefield, with the Teutonics comprising the vanguard of the army which attempted to rescue the crusaders at Gaza.[688] Similarly the Orders' political clout shines through during the disagreements over which Muslim potentate to ally with in 1240-1.[689] Ditto, though the evidence is thinner for Baldwin's crusade, the idea that the Military Orders remained near its centre is tenable. For example, it is notable that upon arriving in England in 1238, Baldwin had three companions, one of whom was a certain Thomas, a brother of the order of St Sampson, a military order founded to defend the Latin Empire, suggesting its prominent place near the centre of Baldwin's regime.[690] Furthermore, that the Order of St Sampson was vital to the defence of the Latin Empire is implied in the gift granted it by Margaret of Flanders, where she pointedly linked the Order to her cousin Baldwin II.[691] Following this cumulative evidence, and for all that the Military Orders have been well-studied, they provide another common theme uniting the three Mediterranean crusades of the 1230s, and one that has not yet been fully grasped, providing further intellectual justification for the approach proposed.

Moreover, in the case of Valencia, thanks to the extensive documentary evidence, which means more individual names have survived to posterity, it is possible to assess the origins of those who

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687 *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 539.
688 *Ibid*. p. 547.
689 *Ibid*. pp. 419-21, 553-4.
690 *CPR*, p. 237.
691 R. de Walque (ed.), *Documents relatifs à l'histoire des princes de Courtenay, comtes et marquis de Namur (1193-1269)* (Brussels, 1995), no. 189.

fought with the Military Orders. Unsurprisingly, most members mentioned in the documents are Aragonese, including Lupus Martin, comendator of Alcañiz, P. of Exea, a hospitaller, Matthew, commander to the Master of the Order of Calatrava, Lupus Ronçidevallium, commander of Borriana, and Brother Michael, hospitaller of the hospital of the poor of Borriana.[692] Even more parochial are the three members of the order of Saint Eulalia of Barcelona, a local military order, who were awarded land after Valencia's capture.[693] However, besides attracting local figures, the Valencian crusade attracted men hailing from outside Aragon. For example Gerald of Prato, commander of Alfama appears to be of Italian origin, and commander of a fortress in Portugal, but still participated in the expedition to Valencia.[694] Similarly, Hugh of Forcalquier, commander of the Hospital in Aragon was Occitan.[695] This mix of largely Aragonese members of the Military Orders with some foreigners furthers the contention that the Valencian crusade should be seen in a wider Mediterranean context. Not only does the presence of foreign-born knights demonstrate the transnational existence of the Military Orders, but it reinforces the point that the Valencian crusade had an international draw, as the other Mediterranean crusades did. To continue viewing the Valencian expedition solely in a local context, is therefore untenable.

Family Ties

Looking in a different way at how the Triple Crusade was assembled, beyond groupings of association or lordship, there is another web of connection encompassing many participants; ties of blood. The importance of family to crusading is something historians have increasingly highlighted, and it is certain that family was an essential dynamic on these expeditions, providing its participants

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[692] *LdR*, i, nos. 6, 214, 287, 1006, 1147.
[693] *Ibid.* nos. 479, 835.
[694] *Ibid.* no. 707.
[695] *Book of Deeds* ed. and trans. Smith and Buffery, p. 114.

with a support network and sense of solidarity that no ties of lordship or nationality could possibly equal.[696] However, as with ties of lordship, how far these links have been explored in the context of the Triple Crusade varies. For example, in the case of the Holy Land expedition, the extent of family connections has already been explored by Lower, although not in a comprehensive fashion.[697] Thus, to his list of familial connections one can add the examples of Stephen, Count of Burgundy and his son John in the case of patrilineal relations or Gaucher Bridaine, lord of Méry and his brother Geoffrey when identifying filial links.[698] Thus, while there is no reason to doubt Lower's conclusions, it may be that family ties were even more ubiquitous than his analysis suggested. In its small way, this typifies how it remains possible to undertake detailed study of the Triple Crusade and reveal more about the expeditions' specifics.

It is a similar picture regarding the Constantinopolitan expedition, where some family connections among the great nobility were enumerated by Giebfried, though again not comprehensively.[699] While clear about the connections between most of Baldwin II's companions named by Philippe Mouskes and Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Giebfried overlooked some evidence from the papal registers. In particular, perhaps because he never intended to make a complete list of all the participants in this crusade, he overlooked the cases of Erard of Châtenay, who supposedly aided the Latin Empire supported by several relatives of Baldwin II, and a certain Humbert, who according to papal instructions sent to the Bishops of Tours and Cambrai, had taken a vow alongside roughly 20 relatives and friends.[700] Like in the Holy Land expedition, this does not

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[696] See e.g. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, pp. 93-103, J. Longnon, *Les companions de Villehardouin: Recherches sur les croisés de la quatrième croisade* (Geneva, 1978), p. 3, Powell, *Anatomy of a Crusade*, pp. 82-3 and Paul, *To Follow in their Footsteps*, *passim*.
[697] Lower, pp. 43-54.
[698] *Registres*, ii, no. 4369, Alberic, p. 940, A. Prévost, 'Les Champenois aux croisades', *Mémoires de la société académique d'agriculture, des sciences, arts et belles-lettres du département de l'Aube*, 85 (1921), p. 161.
[699] Giebfried, pp. 271-2.
[700] *Registres,* ii, nos. 2877, 4626.

challenge previous interpretations about the role of family ties within the Triple Crusade, but it does extend the findings and shows that just as the crusade's leaders were bound by blood, so too were those operating on the next social level down.

Contrastingly, the place of family within the Valencian crusade has not been properly assessed. However, it is clear that the same points about the importance of relatives to the overall composition of the other two branches of the Triple Crusade are just as true in this instance, with the importance of family visible at every level. For example, James's uncle Ferdinand was a vital player, appearing repeatedly in James's chronicle among his principle advisors, and witnessing 22 of the 55 charters issued in the period July 1237-May 1239, the time of greatest intensity during the siege of Valencia.[701] Yet perhaps more significant than the mere presence of his family is the evident importance James attached to it. This was most obviously evinced when he used their presence to explicitly demonstrate to his nobles the depth of his commitment to the campaign.[702] Given this action was effective and resonated with the intended noble audience, this importance of families within the host cannot have been unique to James. That this was so is consolidated by the frequency with which family connections recur in the documentary evidence. For example, filial links peppered the whole expedition's fabric; besides the 6 brothers recorded as beneficiaries of James's charters, there are numerous references to brothers or groups of brothers, encompassing 43 individuals, in the *Llibre del Repartiment*.[703] Moreover, these individuals' status traversed Aragonese society, from the tanners Domingo, John and B. Johannes of Lleida to the knights Donaya of Épila, and Michael Lopiç, to G., P., and Matthew, brothers of the king's chaplain.[704]

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[701] *LdF*, pp. 172-8, 198-9, 201, 205-8, 235-7, *DJI*, ii, nos. 244, 262-4, 266, 268-73, 275-6, 279-82, 285, 287-8, 290-1.
[702] *LdF*, pp. 204-5.
[703] *DJI*, ii, nos. 254, 261, 287, *LdR*, i, nos. 5, 74, 153, 185-6, 195, 312, 327, 355, 399, 761, 783, 793, 1074-5, 1222, 1285, 1402-3, 1423 and ii, no. 46.
[704] *LdR*, i, nos. 5, 153, 185-6.

Even the great prelates were drawn into this network, as P. de Monteacuto, brother of the Bishop of Tarragona, attests.[705] Furthermore family links extended beyond fraternal connections, with the documentary evidence identifying 6 crusaders joined by uncle-nephew relationships, 36 crusaders joined in father-son relationships, 6 crusading cousins, and 41 crusaders united as 'relatives'.[706] Like fraternal connections, these links span Aragonese society; P. of Huesca, the son of the Lord Jacome is found with Garcia Ferrandi, son of Ferdinand of Aragon (who is thus James I's cousin), who is numbered alongside G. Cadena and his sons B., P. and G, all butchers from Vic.[707] Hence, family appears as important a factor in connecting the participants of the Valencian crusade as it was in the better-studied "major" crusades.

Based on his extensive studies of those who took crusading vows between 1095 and 1131, Riley-Smith concluded that crusade recruitment along familial lines was a feature of crusading 'until at least the middle of the twelfth century'.[708] Given the evidence from all three expeditions of the Triple Crusade, there are clearly grounds to support the conclusions he drew, and to extend them forward in time and say that families were central to crusading into the mid-thirteenth century at least. Indeed, in the case of Aragon, the crusade for which the most documentary evidence exists, including the women who can be linked into a family network, there are at least 201 participants who can be immediately identified with at least 1 relative. Despite the extensive source material, this number is itself almost certainly a large understatement. Regardless, if considered as a whole, these 201 crusaders would be the largest contingent on the crusade other than the crusaders from Aragon. The importance of blood links was therefore something which cut across borders and social

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[705] *Ibid.* no. 327.
[706] *Ibid.* nos. 73, 170, 235, 267-8, 326, 370, 510-1, 526, 553, 597-8, 617, 626, 719-20, 747, 757, 802, 849, 859, 894, 969, 1008, 1015, 1193, 1212, 1223, 1242-3, 1301, 1333-4, 1404, 1446, 1451, 1476, 1796 and ii, no. 113. *DJI*, ii, no. 287.
[707] *LdR*, i, nos. 617, 849, 859.
[708] Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders*, p. 93.

class. Given this overlap between all three crusades, the argument in favour of seeing them as a unified whole seems only further strengthened.

Civic Bodies

However, while the expeditions shared much in their organisation, they were not identical in all things, a fact made most apparent by the presence of civic bodies uniquely in the Valencian crusade. Given city-based communities played a vital role in the governance of Aragon, testified by their wide-ranging privileges, this is perhaps unsurprising.[709] Nevertheless, how far civic organisations underpinned the crusade is striking. For example, it is significant that alongside Aragon's nobility, the terms of the Peace and Truce of God resulting from the *Cortes* held at Tarragona in March 1235 and reconfirmed at the *curia generalis* held at Monzón in October 1236, which established a stable base from which to begin the campaign, were explicitly witnessed by representatives of the leading cities of the realm, namely Lleida, Zaragoza, Teruel, Daroca, Calataiú, Tarazona, Jaca, and Barbastro.[710] Moreover, these terms partly reflected the concerns of the cities. Most notably, James promised to confirm the Aragonese coinage for at least 14 years, to appoint two men and one cleric in every city to ensure each city's *fueros* were not overturned under the pressures of war, and to fix the price of grain for at least three years.[711] Given how obviously these relate to the cities, and the fact that it was only after these concessions were granted that James received an annual subsidy of 1 maravedí from every household assessed at 10 maravedís or more for 7 years, the political importance of the cities is clear.[712]

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[709] See e.g. *El fuero de Jaca: edición crítica*, ed. M. Molho (Zaragoza, 1964), *El fuero latino de Teruel*, ed. J. Gómez de Barreda (Teruel, 1974).
[710] *Los Fueros de Aragón según el manuscrito 458*, ed. Tilander, nos. 262-6.
[711] *Ibid*. no. 262-6, *DJI*, i, nos. 217, 238-9.
[712] *Los Fueros de Aragón según el manuscrito 458*, ed. Tilander, no. 266.

From this start, it is unsurprising that civic bodies featured prominently in the Valencian crusade. For example, when demanding his army assemble by Easter 1237, all the chronicles claim James appealed to the cities, alongside making demands of his nobles.[713] Thereafter, civic bodies played a central role. For instance, when describing the fortification of El Puig until June 1237, which occurred against the backdrop of the gradually-assembling crusader army, James explicitly mentions the arrival of the militias of Zaragoza, Daroca and Teruel, alongside various noble retinues.[714] Similarly, the army's composite nature, divided into noble retinues and civic forces is evident throughout the siege with each "group", whether noble- or city-based, occupying a different sector of the siege.[715] Moreover, the documentary evidence suggests civic bodies occupied a prominent position in the army's composition. Throughout the *Llibre del Repartiment* there are numerous references to the rewards granted to members of collective civic bodies, whether from Jaca, Tortosa, Teruel, Montpellier, Barcelona, Montalbán, Lleida, Almenar, Huesca, Daroca, Cervaria, Tarragona or Perpignan.[716] There are themselves aside from the many references to individuals listed as hailing from Aragon's cities, who may have participated in these civic bodies, given those of knightly rank or affiliated to nobles tend to be listed alongside their titles and ties of affiliation. Among many, take for example I., of Huesca, a 'tapiador', or 'mud-wall builder'.[717] Whether his motivation may be found in an individual desire to answer the papal request to contribute either in person or with money to the building of ditches and fortifications for the army besieging Valencia or not, given his place of origin is explicitly recorded in the *Llibre del Repartiment*, it seems likely that once on crusade he associated with his urban counterparts, whom James explicitly records as being responsible for the building of the fortifications at El Puig.[718]

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[713] *LdF*, p. 183, Desclot, p. 146.
[714] *LdF*, pp. 184-5.
[715] *Ibid*, p. 218, Desclot, p. 146.
[716] *LdR*, i, nos. 74, 161, 254, 359, 376, 414, 542, 803, 1275, 1301, 1391, 1436, 1439, 1446, 1476.
[717] *Ibid.* i, no. 259.
[718] *Registres*, ii, no. 3488, *LdF*, pp. 184-5.

Following the absence of similar bodies in the other two expeditions of the Triple Crusade, the presence of these civic bodies allows several judgements to be made. First, as the Valencian crusade as more geographically immediate than the other campaigns of the Triple Crusade, it clearly was possible to activate all the “conventional" channels of raising a host, unlike in the other branches of the Triple Crusade, which took place far from the heartlands of recruitment. This raises questions over whether a general type of 'crusading' army, without making allowances for its specific context, ever existed. Additionally, the composition of the armies of the 1230s requires historians to remember that while the crusades were ideologically similar, all were fought in different ways. Nor necessarily, for all that “crusading” constituted a special ideological category of medieval warfare, were the methods of putting an army into the field *per se* different from the usual methods of raising a host. Finally, the absence of civic bodies in the Holy Land and Greek crusades, and their presence in the Valencian crusade helps consolidates the conclusions that will be reached below regarding the expeditions’ relative sizes. As shown by, for example, the civic bodies from London in the Second Crusade, Pisa in the Third Crusade, or Châteaudun on St Louis’s first crusade, urban groupings were an important part of the larger Holy Land mobilisations, regardless of date or location, with their absence generally denoting smaller expeditions.[719] Thus, the presence of civic bodies in Valencia, and not in the other two campaigns suggests it was a paradigm larger.

Conclusions

Therefore, just as the participation of *crucesignati* from outside the heartlands of the expeditions raises various points, so too does assessment of how the crusading armies were constructed within

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[719] Tyerman, *HPC*, p. 153, *Les registres de Innocent IV. Recueil des bulles de ce pape publiées ou analysées d’après les manuscrits originaux du Vatican*, ed. E. Berger *et al.* (4 vols., Paris, 1884-1921), ii, no. 2644.

their core territories. For instance, mirroring their financial role, it is evident that the crowns of Europe were central to these three campaigns, something not yet fully realised. In the case of Aragon, the flexibility of James's personal following is striking, as is its total size, which at its fullest extent granted him real control over the larger army. Zurita commented in his *Anales* that the King of Aragon could do nothing in times of peace or war without the assent of his magnates.[720] While perhaps true to an extent, the size of James's personal following means that claim should be interrogated more vigorously than before.[721] This centrality of James is paralleled by Louis IX and Henry III, who were key players in determining the shape of the Levantine and Greek expeditions. Indeed, in Louis's case there are glimpses that played an active part in encouraging his subjects to take the cross, rather than passively consenting to it, and even personally providing much of the Greek expedition's military strength. If this contention is true, then the full depth of Louis's commitment to crusading becomes even more apparent than before. Furthermore, parallels between the branches of the Triple Crusade extend beyond the monarchs' roles. In every case, ties of lordship and family appear essential, as were the Military Orders. For the Holy Land and Greek crusades, this complements existing theories, but in the case of Valencia, it breaks new ground, testifying that the motivations and impulses behind the expeditions to Greece and the Levant existed there too. In that sense, this chapter reinforces the idea that in many ways, the construction of a "crusading" army differed little to other medieval hosts. Yet besides these, investigation of the internal forces within the Triple Crusade can break new historiographical ground, most obviously in the case of the ecclesiastical retinues that were certainly present in Aragon and Outremer, and possibly in Greece. Most prominent in Aragon, perhaps because the crusade thither most resembled a full mobilisation of a state's resources, by tracing their existence elsewhere, suggestions can be made over their general role in warfare. By being grounded in actual men, any contentions arising

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[720] Zurita, p. 28.
[721] E.g. Bernat Desclot, *Chronicle of the Reign of King Pedro*, ed. and trans. F. Critchlow (2 vols., Princetown, 1934), i, pp. 136-7 accepts Zurita unhesitatingly here.

for this point are therefore more sound than those based on theory. Moreover, the repetition of these ecclesiastical retinues, even in unexpected places, and across Europe, epitomises how taking a Mediterranean perspective upon medieval Europe can enable new insights about the connections traversing that world.

Chapter 4c: The sizes of the expeditions

With this knowledge of who exactly participated in the Triple Crusade, and how those armies were assembled, it is also possible to assess the numbers involved. As with any estimate of the sizes of medieval armies, any resultant figures must be taken as only estimates. Nevertheless, it is a worthwhile exercise. If nothing else though, it illustrates the relative size of the expeditions, both in comparison to each other, and to other crusades in the three theatres of war, from which various conclusions are possible.

The Valencian crusade

Of these expeditions, clearly the largest was the Valencian crusade. At the eye of the storm, in his chronicle James twice emphasised that he rewarded 380 knights with lands taken from Valencia.[722] This figure far exceeds the 107 knights named in the *Llibre del Repartiment*, but is not necessarily implausible, given there are hundreds of individuals who receive no title. Given each must have been significant enough to attract James's attention, it is definitely plausible that 273 others may have been of knightly rank. Surviving documentation for the clerical contribution towards the Aragonese army which captured Mallorca in 1229-31, suggests that the ratio of foot sergeants to knights in Aragonese armies was c.9:1.[723] Given how comparable in time, place and purpose this expedition was to the conquest of Valencia, a similar ratio for the Valencian expedition seems reasonable, and therefore c.3,420 foot sergeants for the units grouped by ties of lordship can be added to those of knightly rank. To these must be added the 1,000 Navarrese listed in the *Llibre del Repartiment* and c.7,800 men from the towns, following O'Callaghan's assessment that each town

[722] *LdF*, ch. 292.
[723] Desclot, pp. 70-5.

could offer c.600 men for military service, and the fact the *Llibre del Repartiment* mentions 13 civic militias by name.[724] The approximate total for the involvement in the campaign resulting from these calculations is therefore c.12,600 individuals, to which must be added several hundred brothers and sergeants from the Military Orders and many, uncountable *almughavars*.

Furthermore, the Valencian crusade contained a large naval component, whose intervention was occasionally vital, most notably during the Battle of El Puig, where disembarking naval forces tipped the battle in the crusaders' favour.[725] In terms of numbers, much more useful though is the fleet mustered against the arriving Hafsid fleet off the Valencian coast in summer 1238, which James describes as numbering 24 vessels, of which 10 were first-rate fighting ships.[726] Likely constituting the bulk of the campaign's fighting fleet, this being the moment of greatest naval crisis, this fleet contained perhaps 1,000 sailors and soldiers, a figure arrived at by working on a basis of halving the number of crew deduced by Pryor for the large, rounded cogs of the thirteenth century, which far exceeded mediterranean galleys in size.[727] Thus, the fighting strength of the expedition over the campaign was c.15,000 men. To this must be added at least that number again of camp-followers, servants, etc. whose presence in medieval armies is attested by many sources. Although not all served simultaneously, and caution must be taken over this figure given minute changes in ratios can have huge effects on total numbers, by any account this constitutes a large force. Indeed, this army bears comparison with any of the other major engagements of the Reconquista around this time. For example, the Castilian forces assembled at the Battle of Alarcos, 1195, have been recently estimated at c.25,000 men.[728] Given Castile's greater size, that Aragon, supported by international

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[724] *LdR*, i, no. 622, O'Callaghan, p. 128.
[725] Desclot, p. 143.
[726] *LdF*, p. 220.
[727] J. Pryor, 'The Mediterranean Round ship' in R. Gardiner (ed.), *Cogs, Caravels and Galleons: The Sailing Ship 1000-1650* (London, 1994), p. 63.
[728] J. Kaufmann, H. Kaufmann and R. Jurga, *The Medieval Fortress: Castles, Forts and Walled Cities of the Middle Ages* (London, 2001), p. 101.

allies (a fact not true for the Castilians at Alarcos) could put c.15,000 into the field is therefore definitely possible. Similarly, at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, 16 July 1212, the allied Christian army has been convincingly argued to have numbered c.12,000 men, on the grounds that the *Mesa del Rey*, the location of the main Christian camp prior to the battle, only had space for that many.[729] As the allied army in this engagement lacked most of its international allies, who had quit the force on 3 or 4 July 1212, that the crusading army attacking Valencia, backed by international aid, numbered c.15,000 men is completely plausible.[730]

Given this comparability between the crusading force assembled before Valencia and the other armies mustered in near-contemporary Iberia, while the number is large, it is not unrealistic, especially given the campaign's extended 5-year duration. Even if many of the above calculations are based on supposition, the comparative figures suggest the Valencian crusade was one of the largest mounted by medieval Spain, and thus an expedition of real significance, both within the history of the Iberian crusades, and crusading in general. For too long the Valencian crusade has been historiographically marginalised, especially given its special status among the expeditions of the 1230s, its capacity to shed light on several issues, and its ability to open up new and profitable historiographical debate. Contemporary chroniclers acknowledged the significance of Valencia's conquest, exemplified by Matthew Paris, who glorified in James's achievements, calling him a 'most Christian king, magnificent and most strong in arms'.[731] Similarly, Alberic of Trois-Fontaines rejoiced at the capture of Valencia.[732] The numbers arrived at by this thesis's calculations therefore

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[729] F. García Fitz, *Las Navas de Tolosa* (Barcelona, 2005), p. 259, M. Alvira Cabrer, 'Guerra e ideología en la España medieval: cultura y actitudes históricas ente el giro de principios del siglo XIII' (Universidad Complutense de Madrid Ph.D. thesis, 2000), pp. 182-3, M. López Payer and M. Rosado Llamas, *La Batalla de Las Navas de Tolosa* (Jaen, 2001), p. 115.
[730] M. Gomez, 'The Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa: The Culture and Practice of Crusading in Medieval Iberia' (Tennessee Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 2011), pp. 153-8.
[731] *CM*, iii, p. 517.
[732] Alberic, p. 944.

combine with these perspectives to suggest that the relative marginalisation of James's Valencian crusade should end and that a reevaluation of the events of the 1230s must occur, which acknowledges the significant the campaign and when assessing the crusades of the period, grants the Valencian expedition a full part.

The Holy Land crusade

Contrastingly, without such comprehensive documentary data, it is harder to generate reliable figures for the total numbers involved in the Outremer crusade. Hence, any assessment of the size of the expedition is necessarily comparative, with the place of the expedition in Levantine history made apparent through comparison to other Holy Land crusades. From such comparison, while likely much smaller than the Valencian crusade, reflective perhaps of the higher costs involved in crusading over great distances, the Holy Land crusade similarly appears as a significant mobilisation of force.

In assessing the size of this army, it is easiest to start by estimating the manpower available within Outremer, a force which by definition was available to support the crusaders. According to the *Livre des Assises*, written by John of Jaffa in the 1260s and based on original texts dating c.1170-1187, in the event of him calling an *arrière ban*, the King of Jerusalem could expect the services of c.677 knights and 5,175 sergeants, excluding the turcopoles or the c.750 knights available to the Military Orders.[733] Notwithstanding the depredations suffered by Latin Jerusalem since Hattin, which had so devastated the kingdom as to render Bethgibelin and Belvoir, some of

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[733] '*Le Livre des Assises* by John of Jaffa' ed. P. Edbury in P. Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 122, 125, 129-31. For the best estimate of the forces of the Military Orders see Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St. John*, pp. 326-7.

the more notable territorial concessions of the treaties which ended the Triple Crusade uninhabitable, there seems little reason to break with historical practice and reject this estimate as intrinsically untrue for the 1230s.[734] While some of the territorial losses were substantial and never-regained, most notably Kerak and Montréal, the wealth of Acre generated by trade allowed for the creation of numerous "money fiefs" where feudal service was rewarded with regular pay rather than land.[735] These would likely have been numerous enough to offset the lost "feudal" fiefs linked to territory. For example, the highly-believable numbers given for the Christian forces at the Battle of La Forbie, October 1244, of 1,000 nights and 6,000 infantry, only three years after the Triple Crusade, suggest that in an emergency, these numbers were attainable.[736]

However, these numbers are extremely problematic when considering the narrative sources for the Triple Crusade. In the 'Rothelin' text, the force Thibaut led to Gaza was estimated at 4,000 knights, excluding other combatants such as infantry, turcopoles etc., of which c.2,500 were provided by the Latin East, given Alberic and the *De constructione* estimate Thibaut's host at 1,500 European knights.[737] According to the numbers from the feudal levy and the estimates of the force fielded at La Forbie, the provision of such large numbers was far beyond the capacity of Outremer, even in a time of existential crisis, which was clearly not something the Triple Crusade represented.

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[734] On Bethgibelin see Marshall, *Warfare*, p. 21. On Belvoir see Benvenisti, *Crusaders in the Holy Land*, pp. 299-300. Marshall, *Warfare*, p. 51 accepts these figures as true for the 1230s.
[735] On money fiefs see A. Murray, 'The origin of money-fiefs in the latin kingdom of Jerusalem' in J. France (ed.), *Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages* (Leiden, 2008), pp. 275-86, C. Cahen, *La Syrie du nord a l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche* (Paris, 1940), pp. 528-9 and J. LaMonte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291* (Cambridge, Mass., 1932), pp. 139-63.
[736] For the Christian force at La Forbie see Ibn al-Furat, *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders*, ed. and part trans. U. and M. Lyons (2 vols., Cambridge, 1971), ii, pp. 173, note 2 and 174-5, note 9. 'Cronica Fratris Salimbene de Adam', p. 177 states the Jerusalemite forces were also accompanied by 300 knights from Antioch and 300 from Cyprus
[737] *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 532, Alberic, p. 946 and *Saphet*, p. 34.

Hence, more reasonable would be to suggest these estimates of the number of the knights involved with the expedition actually refer to the expedition's total size. After all, the 'Rothelin' continuator was based in Soissons, and so relying on relayed accounts of events, meaning this kind of mistake could easily occur.[738] If this premise is accepted, then other evidence, which states that the numbers captured at Gaza were fairly small, falls into place. For example Matthew Paris recorded that 70 notables from Western Europe and Outremer, were captured following defeat at Gaza, a number roughly corroborated by al-Maqrizi and al-Nuwayri, who claim 80 knights and 250 foot soldiers were taken.[739] From a force containing c.4,000 men, of which c.2,500 came from the Latin East, such numbers would constitute a grievous threat to Thibaut's authority, and explains why he went as far as he did in trying to enforce his authority over the force.[740] It also explains how a force of 1,050-2,000 men inflicted such a devastating defeat on the army, and why the remainder of the Christians withdrew following the defeat.[741] Assuming Richard of Cornwall's host was composed of a similar ratio of Westerners to *Poulains*, and that the chroniclers' assertions that Richard's expedition was slightly over half of the size of the French crusade are correct, the total contribution of the Latin East was therefore c.4,000 men.[742] Given Jerusalem had a theoretical maximum strength of c.5,852 men, this constitutes a large force, given the absence of immediate crisis, and implies the Triple Crusade stimulated Outremer's largest military mobilisation in a generation.

Regarding the western crusaders, unfortunately precise and accurate estimations are impossible to deduce as when discussing numbers, the chronicles are extremely unclear. Alberic provides the

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[738] Shirley, *Crusader Syria*, p. 2.
[739] *CM*, iv, p. 26, al-Maqrizi, p. 292, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 253.
[740] *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 540.
[741] *Ibid*. p. 414 and *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p.٩٥. Retreat of the Christian army recorded *LGdC*, p. 120 and *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 415, 548.
[742] E.g. Alberic, pp. 946, 948.

most clear-cut numbers - 1,500 knights and 40,000 sergeants in the expedition led by Thibaut and 800 knights for Richard's expedition - but his figures patently cannot be trusted, while several chroniclers simply state many took the cross.[743] As such, any estimate of the size of the Outremer-bound armies is fraught with danger. Thus, perhaps the most valid way to quantify the Levantine branch of the Triple Crusade is to compare it to other Holy Land crusades. By doing so, it becomes clear that while the Levantine crusade was sizeable, it nevertheless was a paradigm smaller than the "major", numbered crusades.

For example, according to Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Richard I's crusading army comprised 300,000 men, including 30,000 were knights.[744] Though a ridiculous total, the fact that Alberic described the Levantine branch of the Triple Crusade as comprising 1,500 Western knights with Thibaut of Navarre and 800 knights with Richard of Cornwall is useful, as it suggests the Third Crusade was seen as a much larger undertaking, even if the suggested relative sizes cannot be trusted.[745] Similarly, during the Fifth Crusade, Alberic talks of 100,000 people crossing the sea from Frisia alone.[746] His decision to attribute smaller numbers to the Triple Crusade thus become even more significant. Furthermore, if the Triple Crusade was smaller than the "major" crusades proceeding it, so too was it smaller than what followed it: St Louis's first crusade. Discussing this army, three contemporary estimates, by Joinville, Guy Mauvoisin and Jean Sarracin, placed the number of knights at c.2,500-2,800 men, nearly double the French force on the Triple Crusade.[747]

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[743] *Ibid.* pp. 946, 948, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 421, 527-8, *CM*, iii, pp. 368-9 and iv, pp. 44-5
[744] Alberic, p. 867
[745] *Ibid*. pp. 946, 948.
[746] *Ibid*. p. 907.
[747] Joinville, chs. 32, 83, 'The Letter of Jean Sarrasin' in John of Joinville, *The Life of Saint Louis*, trans. R. Hague (London, 1955), p. 243. The best modern estimate places Louis's army at c.15,000 men; J. Strayer, 'The Crusades of Louis IX' in J. Benton and T. Bisson (eds.), *Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History* (Princetown, 1971), pp. 166-7.

Thus regardless of overall numbers, which are essentially unknowable, it is clear the Levantine crusade cannot number among the first rank of expeditions to Outremer, for all the effort put into it.

However, a completely pessimistic view of the Levantine crusade's size is unwarranted. Although perhaps not equal to these massive crusade mobilisations, the crusade nevertheless represented a significant mobilisation, and exceeds many "minor" crusades in size. For example, amidst the preparations for his crusade, Emperor Henry VI stated in April 1195 that he was prepared to campaign with a force of 3,000 mounted men, of whom half were knights, at his own expense.[748] Although excluding infantry, this figure suggests this crusade and the Levantine branch of the Triple Crusade are comparable in size, with the latter likely the greater, when the English knights are factored in. Given the successes of Henry's expedition, which saw Beirut and Sidon recaptured, this expedition has attracted a fair deal of historical interest.[749] As a larger expedition, equally resulting in success, why the crusade of 1239-41 has not raises interesting questions. Furthermore, if the crusade of 1239-41 surpassed Henry VI's crusade, it also surpassed that of his successor, Frederick II. Though perhaps expected given the absence of military engagements in the Levant, Frederick's force was still substantial enough to threaten al-Kamil with a decisive intervention in the Ayyubid civil war.[750] It is therefore notable that Frederick II himself supposedly supported a retinue of 1,000 knights, and subsidised the costs of several others.[751] This is directly comparable to the crusade of 1239-41. If Frederick's army was capable of shaping Islamic politics to the extent it did, then so too

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[748] 'Chronica Regia Coloniensis', ed. G. Waitz in *Monumenta Germania Historica: Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi* (81 Vols., Various, 1871-2016), xviii, p. 157.
[749] E.g. J. Haller, 'Kaiser Heinrich VI', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 113 (1914), pp. 473-504, E. Johnson, 'The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI' in K. Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, pp. 117-122, G. Loud, 'The German Crusade of 1197-1198', *Crusades*, 13 (2014), pp. 143-71.
[750] H. Gibb, 'The Aiyūbids', in K. Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, pp. 700-3.
[751] Richard of San Germano, 'Chronica', ed. Pertz, pp. 343-4, 347-9.

must Thibaut's army, giving it substantial influence. In this way, it is possible to understand why the crusaders believed they had an army capable of fighting on two fronts, by fortifying Ascalon before threatening Damascus.[752] Finally, the last substantial expedition to the Holy Land prior to Acre's fall, Prince Edward's expedition, comprised just 350 knights from across the Plantagenet realms.[753] Less than half the size of Richard of Cornwall's army according to the chronicles, that this force was in actuality much smaller is suggested by the fact that it was deemed too small to directly oppose the Mamluks, unlike the English force under Richard, which felt able to march head-on against Egypt and refortify Ascalon.[754] It is therefore impossible to say the crusades of 1239-41 were insignificant forces.

Therefore, when assessing the Levantine crusade, a balanced conclusion is required. Clearly larger than most other non-numbered expeditions, the crusade also generated substantial interest among the *Poulains*, indicating the size of the Western component. Similarly, the aggressive action undertaken prior to Gaza testifies to a confidence that must have come from a substantial army. This was no minor expedition, and the idea it constituted the largest mobilisation for Outremer in a generation appears reasonable. However, notes of caution must be added. Not only were the expeditions of 1239-41 smaller than the "major" crusades, but such forces as did arrive served in waves, meaning they never gathered at full strength. With patrons as enthusiastic as Gregory IX, Henry III and Louis IX, and with over 5 years of preparation time, more might have been expected. Consequently, tentative conclusions such as the importance of a perceived crisis for generating a large crusade response come into focus.

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[752] *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 532.
[753] Lloyd, pp. 116-7 and appendix 4.
[754] For Edward I's crusade see Tyerman, *God's War*, pp. 813-4, Idem, *EaC*, pp. 125-6. For Richard's movement to Ascalon see *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 421, 556.

Furthermore, the smaller response to the Holy Land appeal vis-à-vis Valencia, an expedition which stands comparison with any of the major campaigns of the Reconquista, suggests how reliant thirteenth century crusading was upon personal royal engagement in order to generate large responses. As discussed, the Levantine crusade was the child of royal support, but nevertheless lacked the numbers participating in, for example, St Louis's crusade, when he personally accompanied his forces. Given the Valencian expedition, headed up by James apparently succeeded in a far larger mobilisation, the evidence points in the direction of monarchs, and not the papacy as the key players in determining the success of a crusade recruitment campaign. Indeed, it appears that the largest-scale crusade recruitment was impossible without monarchs personally taking the cross. The limits of the 'papalist' approach to crusading, the approach that has hitherto dominated perceptions of the Triple Crusade, could not therefore be more stark.

The Constantinopolitan crusade

Yet if the Holy Land crusade disappointed expectations, such was even more true for the Greece-bound expedition, where despite Gregory's intense efforts, the resultant force was pitifully small. However, perhaps due to the Constantinople crusade's slight profile in contemporary sources and its moderate, if nevertheless significant, territorial impact, the truly small size of Baldwin's crusade often goes unremarked. Indeed, many accounts of the expedition blindly accept the fantastical estimates for the army's size made by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines or George Akropolites, and therefore attribute unrealistically large numbers to the force, ranging from 30,000-60,000 men.[755]

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[755] Alberic, p. 946 and Akropolites, p. 58. Lock, p. 64, Wolff, p. 222, Longnon, p. 181, Gilles, p. 198, Giebfried, p. 264.

Yet even a cursory glance at the sources for the expedition renders these figures completely implausible. Only 9 men of lordly rank, John of Valenciennes, Thomas of Marle, William Cayeaux, the castellan of Beaumetz, Watins of La Haverie, Humbert of Beaujeu and Josseran of Brancion, Erard of Châtenay, Narjot of Toucy and 3 leading clergymen, Warin the former bishop of Thessalonica, Baldwin the archbishop of Verissa and the Bishop of Sées, are confirmed participants in the expedition, and none of these, even with the others, could have raised a force approaching 30,000 men.[756] Moreover Holy Land *crucesignati* were generally more prominent and prosperous than those who went to Greece, and so able to raise larger retinues, a fact compounding the difficulty of trying to envisage a force of that size.[757] Furthermore, even if the 59 witnesses to a charter issued by William of Cayeaux in July 1239 did participate in Baldwin's crusade, a supposition Giebfried makes despite no firm evidence, one is still far short of both 700 knights and 30,000 men.[758] How far short, is impossible to tell, but if a guess were to made, it is worth noting the *Annals of Erfurt*, a city near the centre of recruitment for the Greek crusade, which claimed that Gregory's calls for *crucesignati* to commute their vows from Outremer to Greece created an army 2,000 strong.[759] Regardless of whether this figure is accurate or not (if so, it suggests Baldwin's crusade was dramatically smaller than its Valencian and Levantine counterparts), it is worth noting that even Alberic's generous estimation of 700 knights makes the Greek crusade 3.3 times smaller than the Outremer crusade, with its 1,500 French and 800 English knights. Similarly, while the Cuman contribution to the force was likely substantial, as Alberic and Akropolites suggest, it defies belief to suggest they contributed tens of thousands of men, when the Latins themselves only mustered a small force.[760] To use a comparator for which plausible numbers are available, in the

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[756] For these figures see *BF*, p. 285, *Registres*, ii, nos. 3638, 4010, 4219, 4627, 4632-3, 4662, Alberic, p. 946 and Mouskes, pp. 663-4.
[757] Lower, p. 155.
[758] J. le Carpentier, *Histoire Genealogique Des Païs-Bas, Ou Histoire De Cambray, Et Du Cambresis* (4 vols., Leide, 1664-8), iv, p. 28, Giebfried, p. 266.
[759] 'Annales Erphordenses', ed. G. Pertz, in *MGH-SS*, xvi, p. 33.
[760] Alberic, p. 947, Akropolites, p. 58.

Battle of Pelagonia, 1259, Cuman mercenaries, this time allied to Nicaea, constituted 2,000 men out of a force of 8,000.[761] Thus while no doubt substantial, the Cuman contribution cannot turn the Greek crusade into a force equal to the "major" crusades.

That is not to say the army is insignificant: by any estimation this was the largest army ever sent to the Latin Empire. For example, Peter of Courtenay attempted to assert his right to the throne in 1217 with only 160 knights, a force smaller even than Baldwin's.[762] Baldwin's crusade therefore constitutes hitherto-unappreciated tangible evidence as to how the image of Constantinople still retained some emotional power, and was capable of inspiring people to take the cross, even after the devastation wrought in 1204.[763] Thus, while Richard's view that the expedition constituted a 'notable part of French chivalry' perhaps oversells the point, a gathering of several hundred French knights and other troops is not insignificant: no wonder Paris called the army a 'not very small militia'.[764] Rather it is time to abandon the chroniclers' numerical fantasies, and to see the Constantinople crusade as an altogether smaller undertaking.

The status of the Greek crusade and the role of Achaea

Given the 1230s mark the time of greatest aid to the Latin Empire, this therefore begs the obvious question of why this was so. After all, the Greek crusade had been planned since December

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761 For this Cuman force see Vásáry, p. 114. Overall judgement on the Nicaean army size in W. Treadgold, *A History of the Byzantine State and Society* (Stanford, 1997), pp. 818-9.
762 Lock, p. 60
763 N. Chrissis, 'The City and the Cross: the image of Constantinople and the Latin Empire in thirteenth-century papal crusading rhetoric', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 36 (2012), pp. 20-37 discusses the image of Constantinople in papal rhetoric without assessing how effective that propaganda was.
764 J. Richard, *Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la Terre Sainte* (Paris, 1983), p. 165, *CM*, iii, p. 518.

1235, meaning that like the two larger expeditions, it enjoyed a long gestation, alongside firm royal and papal support.[765] Similarly, like its counterparts, firm ties of family, trade etc. connected Frankish Constantinople to Western Europe. Therefore, why the expedition was so much smaller requires explanation. In part, this is a simple task. For example, that the planned Holy Land crusade drew recruits away from the Latin Empire seems certain. As historians have discussed, crusading to Jerusalem carried greater emotional weight than Constantinople, a fact doubtless compounded in the 1230s by the decisions of several great French landowners to crusade thither.[766] This combination of the Holy Land's innate allure and the participation of such noblemen may have proved decisive for many potential *crucesignati* in say Champagne or Burgundy wavering between theatres of crusading.

Similarly, the answer may partially lie in the specific relations between the Greek crusade's potential leaders, and Latin Greece's prominent families. For example, it is plausible that relations between Thibaut of Champagne and the ruling family of the Latin Empire never recovered from the War of the Succession of Champagne, 1216-22.[767] Stemming from the marriage of Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt, the leading scion of the Brienne family in the West following the accession of John of Brienne (his cousin) to the throne of Jerusalem in 1210, to Philippa the youngest daughter of Henry II of Champagne, this conflict saw Erard assert his wife's rights to the County of Champagne, to the detriment of the young Thibaut, still a minor under his mother's regency. Though the conflict was ultimately resolved in Thibaut's favour, and though several of John of Brienne's surviving acts after his return from Outremer show him attempting to restore peace to

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[765] *Registres*, ii, nos. 2872-8.
[766] On the relative unpopularity of crusading in Greece compared to Outremer see Lock, pp. 62-3, 65.
[767] For this conflict see G. Perry, *The Briennes: The Rise and Fall of a Champenois Dynasty in the Age of the Crusades, c.950-1356* (Cambridge, 2018), pp. 56-64, Evergates, *Aristocracy in the County of Champagne*, pp. 39-42. This summary of events derives from these sources.

Champagne, the prospect for resentment on Thibaut's part towards the Brienne family and their associates is clear.[768] Certainly, one can easily imagine Thibaut being reticent to enthusiastically endorse a crusade mounted initially to John of Brienne's benefit. Given Thibaut's influence, such reticence would thereby contribute to the poor response to the proposed expedition amongst the champenois nobility.

Yet besides these factors, there remains the part played by the Principality of Achaea. At first glance, such an argument seems counter-intuitive, Achaea being generally deemed the strongest of the Frankish successor states to the Byzantine Empire which emerged following the Fourth Crusade.[769] Nor can Achaea's strength be denied, as the evidence for its prosperity in the first half of the thirteenth century is overwhelming.[770] Thus, Achaea logically should have been a source of help for the Latin Empire during Baldwin's crusade, particularly as it was already supporting the Latin Emperor with an annual tribute supposedly totalling 22,000 *hyperpyra*, and had played a crucial part in prolonging the empire's existence in the face of Nicaean sieges in 1236 and 1238.[771]

Nevertheless, for all the crucial aid that Achaea generally furnished to the Latin Empire, in the specific case of Baldwin II's crusade, the principality can be linked to the recruitment campaign's relative failure in the West. While Achaea cultivated its links to France in general, witnessed in Geoffrey of Villehardouin's conquest of the Morea's ports to allow the resupply of men and *matériel* from France, the state had particularly strong links to Champagne and Burgundy due to the family

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[768] Evergates, *Aristocracy in the County of Champagne*, p. 42, G. Perry, *John of Brienne: King of Jerusalem, Emperor of Constantinople, c.1175-1237* (Cambridge, 2013), appendix 1, items 8 and 11.
[769] E.g. D. Jacoby, 'The Latin Empire of Constantinople and the Frankish States' in J. Shephard, *The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire c.500–1492* (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 759-78, J. Longnon, 'The Frankish States in Greece, 1204-1311' in K. Setton *et al*. (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, pp. 235-76.
[770] *Morea*, pp. 60, 65-6, 81, Torsello, 'Istoria', pp. 100-3.
[771] Alberic, p. 939, Mouskes, pp. 620-1, 633-4.

links between those regions and Achaea's new leadership.[772] Following the modern historical inclination to view the events of this period as underpinned by great aristocratic families, whose international interests, cemented by blood and marriage, determined the way events unfolded, and shaped the evolution of the nascent European state system, these links must be deemed especially significant.[773] Therefore despite papal evidence presenting these parts of France as among the areas most forcefully targeted by Holy Land appeals, there should have been substantial recruitment for Greece thither, an expectation largely disappointed.[774] It is by accounting for this apparent failure of family links which gives the Principality of Achaea its prominent part in shaping the participation in the Greek Crusade.

For notwithstanding the difficult gestation of a coherent idea of "crusading", crusade theory by the thirteenth century was clear that while crusades partly depended on powerful motivating ideas like vengeance, they could be most fully justified as "holy" wars, and were therefore essentially defensive.[775] As defensive wars, an extra spur would always be given to crusading when there was a sense the threatened regions were in crisis. However, as the links between Achaea and the Champenois and Burgundian nobility testifies, most holdings of the relatives of the leading families in those regions were in Southern, not Northern Greece. Thus the element of direct familial crisis did not apply to the leading Champenois or Burgundian magnates: whatever the dire straits of

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[772] *Morea*, pp. 35-6.
[773] E.g. R. Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950-1350* (London, 1994), pp. 5-59, D. Crouch, *The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy in England and France, 900-1300* (Harlow, 2005), Perry, *The Briennes*, p. 191.
[774] *Registres*, ii, nos. 2511, 2513, 2805, 3704, 3632-3, 3916, 4082, 4105, 4204, 4315, 4369, 4379, 4631-2. No champenois can be definitively identified as going to Greece, although John of Burgundy and Josseran of Brancion, Burgundians, crusaded in Greece. See 'Itinera', p. 593, *HdDB*, no. 2363.
[775] For discussion of the evolution of crusading theories of justification see F. Russell, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 86-126, J. Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers and Infidels* (Liverpool, 1979), pp. 1-71. For vengeance as a motivating factor behind the Crusades see e.g. S. Throop, *Crusading as an Act of Vengeance 1095-1216* (Farnham, 2011).

Constantinople, the Latin holdings in Southern Greece were secure. This is a fact reflected both in William of Villehardouin, Prince of Achaea's ability to participate in St Louis's first crusade, and Joinville's belief, expressed at Acre in 1250 that Achaea constituted a potential source of recruits for future Holy Land crusades.[776] The "emergency" of the 1230s therefore only constituted an existential crisis for the region around Constantinople, land directly under the control of the Latin Emperor.[777] In a sense, it bears repeating that to label the Triple Crusade an expedition to "Frankish Greece" is to somewhat mislabel it, given only the Latin Empire proper, and not the majority of Latin holdings in Greece, stood to benefit from it. Moreover, the lack of urgency within Achaea was compounded by Geoffrey II of Achaea himself. Unlike in 1236 and 1238, Geoffrey himself did not go to Constantinople's aid in 1239, and had sought to accompany the crusaders to the Levant, with only papal instruction on the 9th February 1240 dissuading him from doing so.[778] Regardless of whether Geoffrey was reassured by the size of the army Baldwin had accompanying him, or another reason, following his previous willingness to intervene in the Empire's affairs, his action testifies as to how far, from an Achaean perspective, there was no immediate crisis. No wonder therefore that when faced with the choice, many French nobles privileged the Holy Land over Greece: if the great champion of the Latin Empire was uninterested in events in Northern Greece, why should they be? Consequently, recruitment for the Constantinopolitan crusade would necessarily overwhelmingly comprise those with direct links to Baldwin II and the Imperial family, such as William of Cayeaux a relative of Anselm of Cayeaux, regent of the Latin Empire or Baldwin II's relatives led by Erard of Châtenay, rather than those with connections to the less-threatened lands further south, despite all contrary efforts.[779]

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[776] Joinville, pp. 63, 178. Lock, pp. 35-6 argued the northern Latin States shielded those in Southern Greece.

[777] G. Tefel and G. Thomas (eds.), *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig, mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante: Vom neunten bis zum Ausgang des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts* (3 vols., Vienna, 1856-7), i, pp. 473-4.

[778] *Registres*, iii, no. 4983.

[779] Perry, *John of Brienne*, p. 164, *Registres*, ii, no. 2877.

Furthermore, beyond helping explain why the uptake for the Constantinopolitan crusade took the form it did, giving Achaea this inadvertent role in limiting recruitment impinges upon arguments over Greece's place within crusading as a whole. Lacking a massive crusade mobilisation on the Latin Empire's behalf, Baldwin's crusade being the largest ever assembled, there is a strand of crusade historiography which assigns crusading to Greece a lesser status, inferior to Jerusalem, Iberia or the Baltic, which all witnessed periodic large-scale international interventions.[780] This has prompted a reaction, grounded upon papal evidence, which argues that crusade ideology applied equally to Greece as to elsewhere.[781] Although apparently irreconcilable positions, Achaea's role in the recruitment for the Triple Crusade enables this debate to be advanced. Like its Levantine or Iberian counterparts, the Greek crusades stemmed directly from the papacy, and possessed all the legal and spiritual paraphernalia associated with Holy Land crusades.[782] To label it a lesser form of crusading thus seems unwarranted. Indeed, this view is reinforced by non-papal evidence, where the validity of the exercise *per se* was only rarely questioned, and then generally only by figures with personal pre-existing reasons to dislike the papacy, such as Matthew Paris, or the troubadours Guilhem Figueira or Calega Panza, for whom the plight of the Greeks was additional, incidental ammunition.[783] Yet given the lack of any large crusade, to argue the Greek crusades were not a disappointment simply because of papal involvement, and their legal basis, without regard for their

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[780] E.g. M. Barber, 'Western Attitudes to Frankish Greece in the Thirteenth Century', in B. Arbel, B. Hamilton and D. Jacoby (eds.), *Latins and Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean after 1204* (London, 1989), pp. 121-2, 125-6, Lock, pp. 12, 17, 65, Giebfried, p. 243.
[781] E.g. Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 251-6, idem, 'Crusades and Crusaders in Medieval Greece' in N. Tsougarakis and P. Lock (eds.), *A Companion to Latin Greece* (Leiden, 2015), pp. 51, 61.
[782] E.g. *Registres*, ii, nos. 2909, 4626 offer full Holy Land indulgences for those going to Greece.
[783] *CM*, iii, p. 620, Guilhem Figueira, 'D'un sirventes far', in A. de Bartholomaeis (ed.), *Poesie provenzali storiche relative all'Italia*, (2 vols., Rome, 1931), ii, pp. 98–99, Calega Panza, 'Un Sirventés contre Charles d'Anjou (1268)', ed. A. Jeanroy, *Annales du Midi*, 15 (1903), p. 148.

ultimate failure to secure the Latin Empire's long-term survival, as Chrissis does, obfuscates the discussion in an obtuse way.[784]

However, by emphasising the part played by Achaea, and the absence of crisis thither in limiting the number of *crucesignati*, this debate can be resolved. As the papal evidence for Baldwin's crusade portrays it as the legal equal of the Levantine expedition beyond contestation, seeing the absence of crisis in Southern Greece as the principal reason for the lack of recruitment eliminates the weaknesses inherent in the papal-based arguments. To take only one instance where this reading seems appropriate, by framing Greece as theoretically equal to Jerusalem, but nevertheless less appealing due to the absence of crisis in the lands where western nobles' relatives had established themselves, one can explain the behaviour of men like Henry, Count of Bar. Like Peter of Brittany, Henry initially took the cross for Constantinople but ultimately fulfilled his crusading vow in Outremer.[785] However, where Peter's ultimate decision has been extensively discussed, the Count of Bar's has so far escaped historical attention. While the men were similar, there are reasons to suspect that what applied to Peter did not apply to Henry. Unlike Peter, Henry was never expected to raise a large army, recruitment for which evidently strained Peter's finances.[786] Moreover, Gregory's letter of 9 May 1237 acknowledging Henry's taking of the cross is unusual, with him apparently unsure about whether Henry would campaign in Outremer or Greece.[787] It thus seems plausible that Henry was himself unsure about where to fulfil his vow, ultimately settling on the Holy Land due to the greater need there, which outweighed his general familial links to Greece. Given there is no reason to suggest the Count of Bar was particularly abnormal, his case therefore

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[784] Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 259-60, idem, 'New Frontiers', pp. 23-33, 35-7.
[785] For Peter's vacillations see Lower, pp. 116-24. For Henry as a prospective crusader to Greece see Mouskes, pp. 630-1, and as a participant in the Holy Land crusade see *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 527, 539-46, 548, 555.
[786] *Registres*, ii, no. 4027.
[787] *Ibid*. no. 3633.

strengthens the view that Greece and the Holy Land were truly equal crusading targets in the 1230s, and that specific circumstances in each theatre were the key determiners in the expeditions' relative sizes, rather than an inherent failing in the idea of crusading in Greece.

Conclusions

Therefore, estimates of how large the expeditions were can form the basis for historical judgement. For example, in the case of the Holy Land, it is clear that despite possessing every ostensible advantage - a long-established and emotive crusading target, the support of some of Europe's leading monarchs and a wide recruitment campaign - unlike the Valencian expedition, the Levantine crusade remained comparatively small, although it greatly surpassed the Constantinople crusade. From this disconnect between the breadth of recruiting effort and the expedition's uptake, several points can be posited. Firstly, in terms of driving recruitment, in order to generate the largest expeditions, kings' personal involvement seems nigh-essential. Royal support is helpful, but in order to create a great host, the monarch's personal participation is needed, as the comparison to Valencia suggests. Secondly, crusading was more effective when there was a clear goal. In Iberia, Valencia fulfils this role, having long been an enticing target for Christian reconquest, whose conquest was deeply significant.[788] By contrast, there was no particular emotive draw for the other two crusades; at the outset Jerusalem and Constantinople both remained in Christian hands, albeit neither securely, and Tzurulum, while significant, was hardly ideologically potent. It is therefore perhaps natural that the expeditions were smaller. In the case of Greece, this is particularly marked given Achaea, the Latin state with the firmest links to Western Europe was not only unthreatened, but was extremely stable. Thus, the element of crisis, essential for a large-scale response to a crusading call was absent, part-accounting for the small scale of the response. This is a point of

[788] *LdF*, chs. 127-31.

historiographical significance as it resolves the problem of why crusading to Greece was never as popular as elsewhere, without unnecessarily downgrading the status of crusades thither, following the legal equivalency of crusading in Greece with crusading in Outremer, and the absence of contemporary attacks on the idea. Thirdly, crusading was most effective when it tapped into already-existing local concerns. The emotional resonance of special places like the Holy Land and, to a lesser degree, Constantinople certainly helped stimulate recruitment, but the far greater size of the Valencian crusade, alongside the fact that more Italian and Southern French *crucesignati* campaigned in Iberia than the Holy Land, despite both crusades being preached in these areas, suggests that factors such as profit, proximity and the personal or familial resonance of certain crusade appeals played a vital part in determining whether and wither one took the cross.

Section B: Action

Chapter 5: The 'Eastern' Dimension to the 'Barons' Crusade', c.1238-41

Though essential for understanding how the Triple Crusade took the shape it did, in isolation the preparations undertaken for preaching, financing and recruitment of the Triple Crusade do not tell the full story of the movement. In order to understand that, and to allow the full historiographical significance of the Triple Crusade to be realised, any wide-ranging analysis must also include the actual conduct of the expeditions themselves. In undertaking this, it is perhaps most logical to begin with the "flagship" of the movement; the Holy Land expedition. Amongst historians of the Levantine crusades, it has become something of a clichéd question to ask how far they had a lasting impact upon the Islamic world they encountered. Consequently, in western historiographical approaches to the crusades, works discussing the impact of the Crusades on the Muslim world are plentiful, whereas those discussing the effect of shifts in the Islamic world upon the course and outcome of the Crusades are far fewer, and often focus on exceptional events or people such as the First Crusade and its aftermath or Nur al-Din and Saladin.[789] Well-established as this tradition is, this approach cannot hold for any study of the Levantine branch of the 'Triple Crusade', given the events of this crusade only truly make sense when information contained within the Arabic sources

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[789] For works discussing the impact of the crusades upon the Islamic world see e.g. A. Mallett, *Popular Muslim reactions to the Franks in the Levant, 1097-1291* (Farnham, 2014), Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders*. For works assessing the impact of the Islamic world upon the Crusades in the context of the First Crusade see e.g. M. Brett, 'The Near East on the Eve of the Crusades' in L. Ramos (ed.), *La Primera Cruzada, Novecientos Años después* (Madrid, 1997), pp. 119-36. For biographies of the two great champions of *jihad* see E. Altan, 'Nur al-din Mahmud B. Zangi (1147-1174): One of the prominent leaders of the struggle agains the crusaders', *Tarih Dergisi*, 59 (2014), pp. 57-78, J. Philips, *The Life and Legend of the Sultan Saladin* (London, 2019).

is considered alongside, rather than in isolation from, the usual Latin and Old French sources. In this way, this study complements the broad approach to the material taken in the earlier chapters. To better understand this fact, a brief overview of the expedition and previous interpretations thereof will clarify the contributions this chapter seeks to make.

Following the arrival of the host nominally led by Thibaut of Navarre in Acre on 1 September 1239, this crusade has traditionally been depicted by historians as defined by a series of distinct turning points, which mark the start of different phases of the campaign.[790] In particular, the expedition is usually divided up into the following sections.[791] First is the period between the crusaders' arrival in Acre and their departure for Ascalon on 1 November 1239, having agreed on a plan to refortify that castle before attacking on Damascus. Second is the most militarily active part of the campaign, which saw Peter of Brittany quit the main host and successfully raid a Muslim caravan travelling to Damascus. Thanks to divisions of leadership, this action precipitated a further division in the crusading host as a body led by the Count of Bar, Amalric of Montfort, and the Duke of Burgundy sought their own glory, a body which was decisively defeated by an Egyptian army at the Battle of Gaza on 13 November 1239. This was then followed by a period of negotiation and consolidation, culminating in a treaty reached with Damascus and Kerak in summer 1240, which despite ceding potentially expensive territories to the Franks provoked dissension within the crusader ranks. His authority waning, and undermined by the prospective arrival of Richard of Cornwall, Thibaut of Navarre departed as Richard arrived Autumn 1240, precipitating the final stages of the crusade, wherein Richard negotiated another treaty with Egypt in April 1241, securing the prisoners taken at Gaza's release. As part of this typical assessment, historians naturally mention the major political events within the Islamic world, such as the conquest of Jerusalem by al-Nasir in

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[790] For date of arrival see *LGdC*, p. 118

[791] See e.g. Painter, pp. 472-85, Prawer, *Histoire*, ii, pp. 270-87 for accounts which follow the following outline.

winter 1239, or Isma'il's establishment in Damascus, those being the events most clearly elucidated in the western sources.[792] Indeed, given the disconnect between the expedition's military failure, and its diplomatic success, it is essential to consider events occurring beyond Outremer's borders, even if the full complexities of Ayyubid politics in this period are rarely fully addressed.[793]

However, due perhaps to linguistic difficulties, and as has been previously discussed, events occurring in the Arabic world have often have been little considered. Consequently, given the limitations of the contemporary or near-contemporary western authors, most of whom were based far from the events they describe, parts of the expedition always remained somewhat opaque. A clear example of this is the dating of events occurring at this time in Jerusalem, the sources for which Painter labelled 'impossible to reconcile'.[794] Ultimately, as interest in the Arabic side of the crusades grew, this situation proved intolerable, with the expedition the subject of Jackson's 1980 article, where he successfully incorporated information contained within the Arabic chronicle sources for the expedition to clarify and re-date certain aspects thereof.

However, it may be argued that Jackson does not go far enough when assessing the causes of events in the Islamic world. Through my new translations of many of the Arabic chronicle histories, the extent of the effects of shifts in the wider Islamic world upon this expedition will be fully elucidated, beyond the parameters Jackson set himself. Hence, contemporary authors such as Ibn Wasil are used alongside historians writing during the Mamluk period, as their slightly differing emphases provide fertile ground to generate new interpretations. Similarly, the authors cited by this thesis deliberately cover a broad geographic basis, in order to provide the fullest possible context to events outside Palestine itself and to show that the influences shaping the crusade are wider-ranging

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[792] For these events as described in the western sources see *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 416-20, 531-2.
[793] For full outline of Ayyubid family politics see e.g. Humphreys, pp. 239-65.
[794] Painter, p. 473.

than crusade historians have previously realised. At the same time, orientalists have been able to illuminate certain of the irruptions which shook the Middle East in this period, such as the campaigns of the Khwarazmians against Aleppo and its allies in 1240 and again in 1241, but have not linked them directly to the events of the concurrent Levantine crusade.[795] By integrating study of the wider Islamic world into the study of the Levantine crusade of the late 1230s and early 1240s, the events of this time can therefore be analysed in a holistic manner. This advances knowledge both of the specific events of Gregory IX's Levantine crusade, as well as suggesting potential avenues for future crusade historians to investigate when assessing other Holy Land expeditions.

Influences originating in Syria

Of all the channels through which the wider Islamic world potentially influenced the events of this crusade, the most obvious was provided by the Khwarazmians. Most famous in crusading history for their role in the Battle of La Forbie, 1244 which sounded the death knell for the reconstituted post-1229 Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Khwarazmian dynasty proper can be traced back to Anushtigin, a Turkish slave installed as ruler of Khwarazm by the Seljuk sultan Malikshah in 1077.[796] Waxing in power as the Seljuk state collapsed, especially after the defeat of the sultan Sanjar by the Kara-Kitai Mongols in 1141, the successive shahs of Khwarazm carved out an extensive independent empire in Persia and Central Asia, to the point of briefly threatening the

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[795] Eg. C. Cahen, 'The Turks in Iran and Anatolia before the Mongol Invasions' in K. Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, p. 674, R. Stephen Humphreys, *Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age* (Berkeley, 1999), pp. 269-71.

[796] C. Bosworth, 'Khwarazmshahs i: Descendants of the line of Anuštigin', *Encyclopædia Iranica* (online edition, 2009), https://iranicaonline.org/articles/khwarazmshahs-i (2 Dec. 2020).

Abbasid caliph in Baghdad.[797] This they did on the back of extensive recruitment from the nomadic Turks to the northwest of Khwarazm proper, soldiers whose depredations proved intolerable for the population of Persia and elsewhere in the empire.[798] Consequently, the Khwarazmian Empire was never universally popular and never successfully established an efficient administrative system. Thus when decisively defeated by the expanding Mongols in 1220, the Khwarazmian state as a formal empire quickly collapsed, its final shah Jalal al-Din dying in 1231 in Diyarbakir.[799] In an unexpected turn of fate, this defeat of the Khwarazmians by the Mongols may have meant they had exerted a sizeable influence on the Crusades before the 1230s, as the news of this defeat likely played a part in encouraging the Fifth Crusade to advance from its base in Damietta to ultimate defeat by seeming to fulfil a prophecy circulating throughout the expedition that Islam would be crushed between the attacks of a Western and an Eastern king.[800] Regardless, this was not the end of "Khwarazmian" history as while thereafter lacking a formally-constituted empire, the Khwarazmians (hereafter being used as a broad label encompassing both natives of Khwarazm and their Turkish allies) appear repeatedly throughout the Arabic sources, as a large, well-equipped and unpredictable band of nomadic warriors, sometimes available for hire but seemingly often fighting solely for their own benefit.[801] Hence, they could influence the events of the 1230s crusade through several different avenues. The current historiographical tendency to pass over the Khwarazmians when discussing the 'Barons' Crusade' therefore seems unwarranted.

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[797] For the reigns of the successive Khwarazmian shahs see C. Bosworth, 'The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (A.D. 1000-1217)' in W. Fisher *et al.* (eds.), *Cambridge History of Iran* (5 vols., Cambridge, 1968-89), v, pp. 120, 139-40, 143-6, 150, 181-95.
[798] Cahen, 'The Turks in Iran and Anatolia', pp. 670-2.
[799] *Ibid*. pp. 671-3, *Histoire du sultan Djelal-ed-Din Mankobirti, prince du Kharezm par Mohammed-en-Nesawi*, ed. and trans. O. Houdas (Paris, 1895), pp. 60-95.
[800] Hoogeweg (ed.), *Schriften*, pp. 258-9.
[801] Cahen, 'The Turks in Iran and Anatolia', p. 672 claims the nomadic Khwarazmians provoked 'an era of savagery comparable to that of the Italian or German condottieri, or the Grand Companies of the Hundred Years War'.

Amongst the ways the Khwarazmians could alter events further west, perhaps the most direct is through their connection to al-Salih Ayyub, eldest son of the Egyptian Sultan al-Kamil, who at the start of the crusade was deputy of the Ayyubid lands in the Jezira, lands allocated to him after the death of his uncle al-Ashraf Musa on 27 August 1237.[802] Having first entered into an alliance with the Khwarazmians in AH 634 [4 September 1236-23 August 1237] following their defection from the sultan of Rum, al-Salih quickly became dependent on them, witnessed both in the marriage alliances he instituted the following year binding himself to Barkakhan, the Khwarazmian leader, and the extent of his weakness upon the loss of that alliance in February 1238, a weakness only solved by the cession of Sinjar, Harran and Edessa, which bound the Khwarazmians tighter than ever to events in Syria.[803] However, while the alliance was precarious, it also offered al-Salih numerous opportunities, opportunities he exploited to the full. For example, it seems likely the Khwarazmian link greatly assisted his accession to Damascus in January 1239.[804] A critical event in the unfolding of the crusade which introduced the disruptive Ayyubid family dynamic into the Levant, it is probable that this event directly helped to spur the whole crusade into motion, and helped consolidate the decision on the part of the Franks to campaign in the Holy land, rather than Egypt.[805] In particular, by giving al-Salih a base from which to make his abortive attempt at Egypt, ruled at this time by his younger brother al-‘Adil II, the accession of al-Salih to Damascus helped precipitate events leading to the sack of Jerusalem in June, an event which according to the

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[802] For date of al-Ashraf’s death see al-Maqrizi, p. 256**,** al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 228, al-‘Amid, p. 380. For al-Salih assuming control of his lands in the east, see *Ibid.* p. 382.
[803] Al-'Amid, pp. 386, 390-1, al-‘Adim, p. 242, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 232-3, Ibn Duqmaq, p. 109.
[804] al-Maqrizi, p. 279, gives December 1238 but the other sources agree he acceded in January 1239.
[805] This theory is based on the 1239 letter of the Master of the Templars recorded by Alberic of Trois-Fontaines. A widely-disseminated document, by alluding to separate sultans ruling in Damascus and Egypt, it plausibly helped persuade the crusaders to come to Acre, rather than going to Egypt, there being little benefit if its sultan did not control the Holy Land. See Alberic, p. 945.

'Rothelin' continuation helped spur the leaders of the crusade into military action.[806] Yet the Khwarazmian dimension to this action has been hitherto-overlooked. In its place is the narrative that al-Jawwad of Damascus, a minor Ayyubid prince of the blood installed as ruler of Damascus in 1238, when threatened by increasingly aggressive actions by al-'Adil from Egypt, which in part resulted from his own movements (encouraged by his ally al-Mujahid of Homs) towards independence, ceded control of Damascus to al-Salih in exchange for his apparently more secure territories further east.[807] Indeed this is the exact narrative presented in secondary accounts of these events.[808] However, this reading seems overly simplistic, and neglects a passage from the unedited chronicle of the contemporary Egyptian Christian writer Ibn al-'Amid dated to late 1238, a passage which then recurs in al-Nuwayri and Ibn Duqmaq (here differing from their main sources of Ibn Wasil and Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi), which paints al-Salih Ayyub as establishing contact between himself and al-Jawwad.[809] In this version of events, al-Salih, spying the opportunity to ultimately seize power in Egypt wrote to al-Jawwad, and used the threat of a Khwarazmian invasion to persuade him to agree to exchange territories.

This reading is preferable for several reasons. For one, it explains more convincingly why al-Jawwad was so keen to rid himself of Damascus, a state which he had expended considerable resources and energy to hold by military force when threatened by al-Nasir, ruler of Kerak, upon his accession in 1238.[810] To defeat one Ayyubid prince backed by the resources of Transjordan is one proposition; to defend it in the face of 15,000 battle-hardened nomadic horsemen is quite another.[811]

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[806] For fall of Jerusalem to al-Salih in summer 1239 see 'Annales Mellicenses Continuatio Lambacensis', ed. W. Wattenbach in *MGH-SS*, ix, p. 559, 'Annales Sancti Rudberti Salisburgensis', ed. W. Wattenbach in *MGH-SS*, ix, p. 787. For this event provoking action see *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 532.
[807] For this narrative see Ibn Wasil, pp. 199-204, al-'Adim, p. 244, Sibt, pp. 718-9.
[808] E.g. Jackson, p. 37, Gibb, 'The Aiyūbids', p. 706, Lower, p. 165.
[809] al-'Amid, p. 392, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 242, Ibn Duqmaq, p. 108.
[810] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٨٤, al-'Amid, p. 384.
[811] For Khwarazmian numbers see al-'Amid, p. 391.

Secondly, framing al-Salih as initiating events and presenting his offer as an iron fist in a velvet glove explains why al-Jawwad was so ready to abandon al-Mujahid of Homs, already known to be *persona non grata* for al-Salih and his close ally al-Muzaffar of Hama. Previously extremely close to al-Jawwad, witnessed in their shared plot to murder al-Adil's envoy ‘Umar al-Din, if following the usual narrative of events his abandonment by al-Jawwad jars significantly with the previous dynamic of their relationship, in which he consistently appears the driving force.[812] However, such behaviour on al-Jawwad’s part is explicable given the prospect of Damascus being threatened by overwhelming force from the East.

Thirdly, seeing events thus explains the presence in Syria at this time of the many troops in alliance with al-Salih (a fact remarked on in the Latin sources), who the Arabic sources confirm to be Khwarazmians.[813] Moreover, that they solely attacked al-Salih’s enemies, and Homs in particular, can only further suggest that they entered Syria upon his invitation, a fact which must have overshadowed negotiations with al-Jawwad.[814] Finally, the idea al-Salih manoeuvred al-Jawwad into agreement with him backed by the threat of force allows for al-Jawwad’s mysterious wavering about the deal he had struck, immediately after al-Salih’s occupation of Damascus. On this point, several sources agree, but none convincingly explains why it occurred-after all everything had ostensibly been set up perfectly, with al-Jawwad ridding himself of Damascus and taking ownership of al-Salih’s holdings in Mesopotamia.[815] However, if al-Jawwad had surrendered Damascus under the prospect of force, and that force transpired to not be as potent as threatened, al-Jawwad would have every reason to regret his decision. Significantly, this may have been exactly the case as, for example, the Khwarazmian forces attacking Homs swiftly abandoned their

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[812] al-Nuwayri, xxix, pp. 239-42, Sibt, pp. 718-9, Ibn Wasil, pp. 200-2, al-‘Amid, p. 385.
[813] *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 417, *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ١٠٩, al-'Adim, p. 245.
[814] Ibn Wasil, pp. 205-6, al-Maqrizi, p. 280.
[815] Ibn Wasil, p. 204, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 244, al-Maqrizi, p. 279.

campaign after receiving a bribe, minimising the overall threat they posed.[816] In any case, in isolation or combination, these analyses strongly suggests a role for the Khwarazmians in shaping the world occupied by the Levantine branch of the Triple Crusade.

Similarly, the shadow of the Khwarazmians can be seen in one of the other turning points of the crusade; al-Salih Ayyub's release by al-Nasir from Kerak in April 1240, and his subsequent alliance with him.[817] A moment of great importance, this decision by al-Nasir helped precipitate the chain of events whereby al-Salih succeeded his brother as Sultan of Egypt, and thereby helped to create the set of conditions whereby Isma'il would regard the Franks as useful allies, notwithstanding their defeat at Gaza.[818] From this stem the territorial concessions for which this crusade is most famous. However, as with al-Salih's takeover of Damascus, there is no room allocated for the Khwarazmians within the narrative in most western histories of this period, with the straightforward explanation given that al-Nasir was in contact with the emirs of Egypt, and that either their deposition of al-'Adil, or their plan to depose al-'Adil was key to explaining why al-Nasir freed his valuable captive.[819] What is indubitable it that this was the case - the sources agree on this point, and it makes logical sense - but it is not the whole story. Not least, to accept it as such overlooks the existence of the implied or direct threat presented in the alliance offer by al-Salih to al-Nasir as he was incarcerated in Kerak. Delivered by al-Salih's representative to the Khwarazmians Ibn Matruh according to al-Nuwayri, and by al-Muzaffar of Hama according to al-Maqrizi, these two sources are clear al-Salih's offer contained an intoxicating mixture of carrot and stick. For on the one hand al-Nasir was directly warned that, despite the loss of Damascus and its army to Isma'il, al-Salih still retained his Khwarazmian alliance, troops who remained free in Syria and therefore liable to sweep

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[816] Ibn Wasil, pp. 205-6, al-Maqrizi, p. 280.
[817] E.g. Ibn Wasil, p. 258, al-'Amid, p. 395. Sibt, p. 728 claims al-Salih was freed in March 1240.
[818] For the Battle of Gaza see *LGdC*, pp. 119-20, *CM*, iv, pp. 25-6, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 414-5, 544-6.
[819] E.g. Humphreys, p. 264.

down via Damascus and directly threaten Kerak. However, if al-Nasir were to ally with his captive, such an invasion might offer him the opportunity to secure his longstanding ambition of recovering Damascus.[820] Indeed, the allocation of Damascus to al-Nasir appears in all sources as a key part of what was agreed, something which carries the Khwarazmians by implication, they being the only force at this time capable of making this a reality.[821]

Putting aside for a moment the audacity to make such a wide-ranging offer/threat in the moment of greatest weakness, the existence of such a statement on al-Salih's part furthers our understanding of why events unfolded for several reasons. For one, the threat element of this statement justifies why al-Nasir specifically decided then to suddenly ally with al-Salih rather than when he first quit Egypt in September 1239, which he did in the company of several leadings Egyptian emirs, and which would also be logical given al-Salih commanded a large army at the time.[822] Furthermore, the idea al-Nasir released al-Salih under the combination of the threat of the Khwarazmians and the promise that they would liberate Damascus for him explains the dynamic between the two princes after his release, and the speed with which relations soured. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi claims al-Salih said to him (in a passage quoted verbatim by al-Nuwayri), that the alliance with al-Nasir was never smooth, with both princes highly suspicious of the other, something apparently exacerbated by al-Nasir's continued contact with al-'Adil, now his brother's captive.[823] Clearly a powerful external agent had overcome the mutual suspicion between the two men, a void the Khwarazmian promise/ threat would fill. Less speculatively, if al-Nasir released al-Salih under the threat of force but with the promise that that force would secure him Damascus, there is an easy explanation for why they fell out; namely that as with al-Jawwad, al-Salih had over-inflated the threat the Khwarazmians

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[820] al-Maqrizi, p. 293, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 265.
[821] al-Maqrizi, pp. 293-4, Ibn Wasil, p. 259, Ibn Duqmaq, p. 119, al-'Amid, p. 395.
[822] al-'Amid, p. 388, Sibt, p. 720, Ibn Wasil, p. 239, al-Maqrizi, p. 284.
[823] Sibt, p. 729, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 270.

posed, and through that had achieved his aims, albeit to the detriment of the prince he was supposedly allied to. This seems especially likely when considering the situation when al-Nasir quit al-Salih's service in summer 1240.[824] At this moment, not only had the promised Khwarazmian attack not materialised (although as will be discussed below it was in the final steps of preparation), either to threaten his lands or Damascus, but Isma'il had already come to terms that summer with the Franks, and had in fact invaded al-Nasir's own lands alongside them.[825] Small wonder therefore that al-Nasir plotted to reestablish al-'Adil (a prince who possessed consistently good relations with Isma'il) in Egypt, and when that failed, felt he had no option but to quit Egypt and make his own fate, frustrated again by the vagaries of destiny.[826] After all, it is worth recalling that al-Nasir had turned down generous offers from Isma'il and al-'Adil in his release of al-Salih.[827] Thus although here the 'Khwarazmian' dimension to Levantine events did not act in isolation of other factors driving the processes of the crusade forward, it does complement them in such a way as to give a more convincing explanation which can incorporate material taken from all, rather than merely a subsection of, the sources.

Moreover, the influence of the Khwarazmians upon Levantine affairs at this time extended beyond being used simply as threats by al-Salih, to include significant action on their part. In particular, this can be seen in the effect their invasion of Northern Syria in summer/autumn 1240 apparently had on Isma'il, now established as ruler in Damascus. Though possibly simply another

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[824] See for example al-'Amid, pp. 396-7, Ibn Wasil, p. 271, Sibt, p. 729.
[825] For the Frankish-Damascene alliance see *CM*, iv, p. 65, Ibn Shaddad, *al-Aʿlāq al-khaṭīrah dhikr umarā' al-Shām wa-al-Jazīrah*, ed. S. Dahān (Damascus, 1963), pp. 134, 155, 159. For the invasion of al-Nasir's lands see *HPEC*, iv, part ii, pp. ١٠٤-٥, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 553-4, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 269.
[826] For al-Nasir's plotting to restore al-'Adil see Ibn Wasil, p. 272, al-Maqrizi, p. 297, Sibt, p. 729. For the good relations between al-'Adil and Isma'il see e.g. al-'Adim, p. 246, Ibn Wasil, p. 229.
[827] Ibn al-'Amid and al-Maqrizi claim al-'Adil offered 400,000 dinars and Damascus to al-Nasir for possession of al-Salih: al-'Amid, p. 388, al-Maqrizi, p. 290. Sibt, p. 728 places the offer at 100,000 dinars.

of the Khwarazmians' migrations, this movement much more likely resulted from their alliance with al-Salih, and plausibly constituted the actual working-out of the threat he made to al-Nasir while in captivity. The force behind this reasoning lies both in the various sources which claim the operation was executed at al-Salih's behest, and also in al-'Adim, who explicitly states the Khwarazmians planned the operation while al-Salih was imprisoned by al-Nasir, tying the events together.[828] And, as al-Salih claimed in the threat/offer he made in captivity to al-Nasir, this motion directly left Isma'il in a highly precarious position. In keeping with usual Damascene policy, Isma'il had carefully cultivated diplomatic relations with the princes of Northern Syria like Aleppo and Rum, deepening them across his reign, witnessed by his insertion of the name of the sultan of Rum into the *Khutbah* of Damascus.[829] Consequently any invasion of Syria by the Khwarazmians left him and his allies highly vulnerable to a war on two fronts, given the establishment of al-Salih in Egypt would rob him of a crucial ally. Thus it was essential that Isma'il consolidate his position. Indeed this was especially so given the size of the Khwarazmian invasion force, estimated at perhaps 12,000 men and camp followers by al-'Adim and Ibn Wasil.[830] Moreover, indicating the connectivity of Levantine politics to affairs further east, this Khwarazmian invasion posed a direct political challenge to al-Salih Isma'il and his allies given the Khwarazmians were accompanied by rival claimants to Qal'at Ja'abar (recently annexed by Aleppo) and Homs, the possessor of Mardin, and al-Jawwad erstwhile possessor of Damascus.[831] Therefore, as this invasion thus potentially struck directly at his throne, and that of his closest ally, al-Mansur of Homs, Isma'il consolidated his position by renegotiating alliances with his neighbouring powers, most prominent among which were the Franks. As these negotiations ultimately saw Isma'il commit to substantial territorial

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[828] Ibn Wasil, pp. 248-9, 251, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 262, al-Maqrizi, p. 303, al-'Adim, p. 248.
[829] An example of the Damascene concern for Northern Syria is the joint Damascus-Rum response to the 1230 Khwarazmian invasion of Syria; al-Nuwayri, xxvii, p. 104. For Isma'il's insertion of the sultan of Rum into the *Khutbah* see Idem, xxix, p. 271, Ibn Duqmaq, p. 118.
[830] Ibn Wasil, p. 282 and al-'Adim, p. 250.
[831] al-'Adim, pp. 249-50, al-Nuwayri, xxix, pp. 246, 279-80, Sibt, p. 735.

concessions, which were soon agreed by al-Nasir as possessor of most of the lands transferred, the potential of events occurring east of the crusaders to influence the events pertaining to them looms large.[832] Although this connection has not been made before by crusade historians, there are several reasons to believe that it helped inform Isma'il's policy.

Most obviously, this point is explicitly made by al-Maqrizi. Having claimed the Khwarazmians were openly proclaiming that their invasion was undertaken in al-Salih's name, al-Maqrizi immediately states that al-Salih Isma'il made a treaty with a Franks because he feared al-Salih's forces.[833] With the Egyptian army not in the field in force at the time, this statement must therefore refer to the Khwarazmians. Although doubt must be expressed about al-Maqrizi's accuracy for this episode, given he conflates the Khwarazmian invasion of 1240 with their defeat at the hands of the combined armies of Aleppo, Damascus and Homs led by al-Mansur of Homs in 1241, the placement of these events together is striking, and his explanation for Isma'il's behaviour highly persuasive, especially given the other evidence, much of which supports this reading.[834] For example, the conclusion of the treaty with the Franks in July/August 1240 perfectly aligns with Isma'il's attempts to form a defensive alliance with Aleppo on 25 July 1240.[835] Though this overture was unsuccessful, perhaps due to lingering resentment by the regent of Aleppo for Isma'il's abandonment of their alliance against al-Kamil in 1237 to save his own skin, thereby leaving Aleppo exposed, that Isma'il made the approach at this exact moment is notable.[836] If Isma'il was concerned solely about the danger al-Salih posed from Egypt, he had no particular reason to seek an accommodation with Aleppo, as al-Salih's sole ally in Syria, al-Muzaffar of Hama, was effectively

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[832] The fullest description of territories ceded is Ibn Shaddad, *al-Aʿlāq al-khaṭīrah* ed. Dahān, pp. 100, 134, 147, 153, 155, 159. A full, although slightly different list is found in *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ١٠٧.
[833] al-Maqrizi, p. 303.
[834] *Ibid*. p. 303.
[835] al-'Adim, pp. 247-8. Ibn Wasil, pp. 268-9.
[836] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٧٨.

contained by Isma'il's ally al-Mansur of Homs.[837] However, if he was threatened by the Khwarazmians from the east alongside the resurgent al-Salih, he had every reason to seek such an alliance, at exactly the moment when he was already engaged in diplomacy with the crusader states. Moreover, given the Aleppans were at this point preparing to take Qal'at Ja'abar in the face of the Khwarazmians, this alliance, alongside an agreement with the Franks, was the perfect way to shield Damascus from danger from that quarter.[838]

Similarly, the dates of events in the 1240 Khwarazmian invasion support the narrative that Isma'il looked both south and east, and acting accordingly. Though this movement is not perfectly understood by the primary sources for the period due to problems of distance in geography or time, with several authors conflating the events of 1240 and 1241 when the Khwarazmians again invaded northern Syria, a narrative can be constructed using Ibn Wasil alongside Ibn al-'Adim.[839] With the former writing on events that occurred in his lifetime which he was well-placed to observe from his home city of Hama, and the latter a native of Aleppo showing especial care for the affairs of northern Syria, they are certainly the best-placed authors at this juncture available to modern historians. In particular, it is worth noting the date of Aleppo's grievous defeat by the Khwarazmians at al-Bira. Dated to 15 November 1240 by al-'Adim, this seems too late in the year given his later claim that al-Mansur of Homs was already marching to the aid of Aleppo by 9 November 1240, by which point the defeat was already well-known.[840] Instead, although more vague, Ibn Wasil's date of Rabi al-Awwal [ie. late September/early October 1240] is preferable, as unlike al-'Adim's date it aligns with later events.[841] Furthermore, there are several ready

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[837] For the long-standing alliance between al-Salih Ayyub and al-Muzaffar of Hama see al-'Amid, p. 386, Ibn Wasil, p. 290. For the continued alliance of Homs with Damascus after al-Mujahid's death see al-'Amid, pp. 395-6, Ibn Wasil, p. 257.
[838] al-'Adim, pp. 248-9, Ibn Wasil, p. 279.
[839] Sibt, pp. 734-7, Ibn Duqmaq, pp. 130-2, al-Maqrizi, p. 303.
[840] al-'Adim, pp. 250, 253.
[841] Ibn Wasil, p. 283.

explanations for inverting the normal preference for al-‘Adim over all other sources when referring to events in Northern Syria in this instance. For one, al-‘Adim was at this moment in Damascus on a diplomatic mission, and so for once was relying on hearsay when writing his account.[842] Similarly, it is a common scribal error in the copying of Arabic texts to miscopy ربيع الآخر when reading ربيع الأول, thereby throwing events back one Islamic month. The decisive defeat of the Aleppan army thus likely occurred on 2 October 1240, assuming al-‘Adim’s claim that the engagement occurred on the fourteenth of the month was correct. If so, then the idea that al-Salih Isma’il made his alliance with the Franks with one eye on his northern border gains credence. By late summer 1240, it would have been obvious that a Khwarazmian strike was incoming, especially given the Khwarazmians’ established presence as the largest and most mobile army in Syria.[843] Hence, it was logical for him to pacify the Franks, and to be willing to give as much land as required in order to achieve peace, helping to explain a decision which has occasionally attracted scorn from crusade historians.[844] At least, it seems improbable that Isma’il would have dealt with the Franks, and with Egypt, without one eye on the events of northern Syria.

Yet significant as the Khwarazmian invasions of Syria in the early 1240s were, they were not the sole way by which events in Northern Syria during this period helped shape the course of the contemporary crusade. For besides accounting for Isma’il’s willingness to establish friendly relations with the Franks, Northern Syrian affairs help explain how and why the diplomatic camps among the crusaders themselves were established. In particular, the Khwarazmian invasion can be firmly linked to the Templars’ strongly pro-Damascene stance, in opposition to the pro-Egyptian

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[842] al-‘Adim, p. 247.
[843] *Ibid*. p. 245, *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ١٠٩.
[844] Eg. Humphreys, p. 266 calls it ‘one of the most humiliating offers which any Ayyubid prince had yet been forced to make to the Franks’.

one taken by the Hospitallers and others.[845] In his account of affairs in Northern Syria, al-'Adim amongst other things is clear on one point; that in Jumada al-Thani AH 638 [17 December 1240-14 January 1241] as part of their raising of an army to counter the second Khwarazmian irruption in quick succession, the rulers of Aleppo and Damascus agreed to liberate all the Templar prisoners held in Aleppo.[846] Given this statement can be relied on, al-'Adim himself being the ambassador to Damascus which secured the deal, this raises several points.[847] Firstly, it supports the argument made in the previous paragraph that when threatened from the North East, it was a reflex action on the part of the rulers of Damascus and Aleppo to make peace with the Franks to avoid a two-front war. Indeed, it should be noted that the initiative behind this action was Isma'il, supporting Jackson's claims that he made two separate treaties with the Franks.[848] But more significantly, it helps explain why the Templars clung so viscerally to the Damascene alliance, even as the weight of opinion swung behind agreement with Egypt.[849] It has long been established that the foundation of the Egyptian alliance was care for the prisoners taken at Gaza, but nowhere in the literature is the reverse suggestion made, namely that a pro-Damascene alliance was favoured because of care for Frankish prisoners.[850] This would seem wrong given the Templars cared hardly less for the prisoners in Aleppo than the crusaders cared for their colleagues in Egypt. Additionally, these prisoners appear to have been well-known across Europe, even up to Gregory IX himself, witnessed in his explicit dispensation on 7 June 1238 that they could receive absolution from Jacobite priests, following the apparent success in 1237 of the Dominican mission to convert the Jacobite patriarch

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[845] The clearest expression of crusader disunity is the 'Eracles' continuation; *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 419-20. The reasons behind the Hospitaller support for an Egyptian alliance are unclear although M. Bulst, 'Zur Geschichte der Ritterorder und des Königreichs Jerusalem im 13. Jahrhundert bis zur Schlacht bei La Vorbei am 17. Okt. 1244', *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 22 (1966), pp. 197-226 suggests it may have been to curry favour with Frederick II.
[846] al-'Adim, p. 254. The Templar prisoners in Aleppo also appear in *Registres*, ii, nos. 4403-4, and *BF*, p. 245.
[847] al-'Adim, p. 254.
[848] Jackson, pp. 43-8.
[849] *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 420, 554, *CM*, iv, p. 141, *LGdC*, p. 122.
[850] E.g. Painter, p. 480.

to obedience to Rome.[851] Given the fame of these captives, a strong dedication to ensuring their welfare on the Templars' part is thus plausible. Furthermore, outside of these specific prisoners, given al-'Adim talks of Templar sergeants and crossbowmen present as deep into Muslim Syria as Ras al-'Ayn, indicating the extent of Templar commitment to engagement with the Muslim powers of Syria, that the Templars were deeply aware of, and influenced by affairs in Northern Syria should come as no surprise.[852] Thus once again, the matters of Muslim Syria can be seen to influence the events of the Barons' Crusade, here being located at only one degree of removal from the crusaders themselves.

Influences originating in Arabia

The shadow cast upon the Holy Land crusade by events happening further east did not, however, stem solely from Syria and the Jezira. Though such evidence is the most plentiful, there are firm grounds to suggest that events in Egypt, and particularly the deposition of al-'Adil II in May/June 1240, were shaped by events whose origins lay deep within Arabia.[853] A key turning point of Levantine politics in this period, alongside the alliance of al-Nasir and al-Salih Ayyub, this deposition completely reversed of the balance of power in the Islamic Middle East by shattering the previous friendly relations between Egypt and Damascus: with his erstwhile ally deposed and a Khwarazmian threat brewing on his northern border al-Salih Isma'il was left doubly-exposed. Hence, the Franks became attractive allies to him, thereby emphasising how far the events of the 'Barons' Crusade' should be studied alongside the wider Islamic world.

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[851] For Gregory's dispensation see *BF*, p. 245. For the reported conversion of the Jacobite Patriarch see *CM*, iii, pp. 396-9.
[852] For the Frankish prisoners in Egypt see Ibn Wasil, p. 268, *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p.٩٦.
[853] The date of al-'Adil's deposition is disputed: the *Siyar* dates his capture to 13th June 1240, *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p.١٠٣, Ibn al-'Amid gives the 3rd May; al-'Amid, p. 389, while Ibn Wasil and Ibn al-'Adim give 1st June; Ibn Wasil, p. 266 and al-'Adim, p. 247.

Not least, it seems that events in the Arabian peninsular played a central role in enabling al-Adil's deposition to occur. Al-'Adil's removal from his throne after only a short reign is usually attributed in the sources to his love of pleasure and his partiality towards a small coterie of favourites, which together supposedly led him to neglect the affairs of state and to lose the support of the leading Egyptian emirs, a line consequently taken by those historians who have judged him.[854] However, this does not sit well upon closer investigation. For one, while al-'Adil certainly spent great sums, it is equally clear that the treasury bequeathed to him by al-Kamil, bolstered by funds sent directly by the 'Abbasid caliph, was burgeoning, and able to sustain an increase in expenses.[855] Indeed, it is likely that after the frugality of al-Kamil, a loosening of the state's purse-strings was both expected and welcomed. Similarly, the image of al-'Adil as an indolent slubberdegullion does not fit the man who prior to his deposition was astute enough to secure his elevation to Egyptian sultanate through the targeted giving of patronage, was able to successfully navigate his way through several plots, and active enough to repeatedly send armies from Egypt against his various opponents.[856] Here, it is worth noting that, while not blind to al-'Adil's faults, the contemporary Egyptian Christian al-'Amid emphasised his positive characteristics when assessing him following his deposition, and despite previous criticisms, even claimed he was attentive to state affairs.[857] This, besides the fact that close control of patronage was an essential and universal facet of medieval kingship. Another explanation is therefore needed to adequately explain

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[854] E.g. Ibn Wasil, p. 262, al-'Amid, pp. 384, 389, al-Maqrizi, pp. 275, 294-5 and Humphreys, p. 264, Gibb, 'The Aiyūbids', p. 706.
[855] al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 228, estimates the treasury surplus at 1,000 irdebs of gold or 150 tons. al-'Amid, p. 390 estimates the treasury as over 6,000,000 dinars. For the caliph's funds see *Ibid.* p. 381. These funds were intended for an army to assist the caliph against the Mongols, but this force never assembled due to al-Kamil's death, and there is no evidence the funds were returned.
[856] For al-'Adil managing his rise to the Egyptian throne see *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٨٠, al-'Amid, p. 384. For his putting-down of plots see e.g. al-Nuwayri, xxix, pp. 249-50, 252-3, al-Maqrizi, p. 284. For him dispatching armies see e.g. *HPEC*, iv, part ii, pp. ٨٩-٩٠, ٩٢, ٩٥ [bis], ١٠٣.
[857] al-'Amid, p. 390.

why al-‘Adil was so consistently unpopular amongst him emirs, an explanation part-found in Southern Arabia.

Above all, attention must be drawn to Mecca, the nexus of the Muslim religious world, and jewel in the Ayyubid family crown. Consolidated for the Ayyubid dynasty by Saladin’s elder brother Shams al-Din Turanshah in 1174/5 who shattered the Kharijite rulers of Zabid, control of Mecca quickly became essential for the self-constructed image of the Ayyubids, above all their claims to be devoted leaders of *jihad*.[858] Thus any reverse in Arabia would have tremendous knock-on effects for the political stability of Egypt. Crucially, this appears exactly what occurred during al-‘Adil’s reign. Unsurprisingly, the attention paid to Arabia in the Arabic sources varies, but it appears the ruler of Yemen, al-Mansur ‘Umar, drove towards Ayyubid-held Mecca in late February 1238, and successfully routed the Ayyubid forces defending the city, entering it a couple of days after the start of the offensive.[859] Therefore, the defeated Ayyubid forces began to re-enter Egypt in groups in late March/early April 1238, just as al-‘Adil’s reign began, al-Kamil having died in early March.[860] It cannot simply be coincidence that the first concerted conspiracy against al-‘Adil seeking to replace him with his brother al-Salih, a prince who did not feature in the initial discussions over who should inherit al-Kamil’s empire, was fully formed before 14 May 1238.[861] Given this time frame, al-Salih’s distance from Egypt and the fact there was no guarantee al-Salih would prove less narrow in his patronage, especially given his evident dependency upon the Khwarazmians which went so deep as to see him reassign the wages of his father’s Arab emirs to the Khwarazmians, this suggests a

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[858] For the Ayyubid conquest of Yemen, and the consolidation of Mecca see M. Houtsma and A. Wensinck, *Brill's First Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1913-1936* (Leiden, 1993), p. 884.
[859] al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 236.
[860] *Ibid.* p. 236. al-Kamil’s death is dated 10 April 1238 in *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٧٩, 9 March in al-Maqrizi, p. 258**,** 14 March in al-‘Amid, p. 382 and 10 March in al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 227. Given the council of emirs which settled on al-‘Adil as Egyptian Sultan was in session by 11 March, [al-‘Amid, p. 383] only a death date of 9/10 March is plausible.
[861] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, pp. ٨٩-٩١.

role for the fall of Mecca.[862] Moreover, the loss of Mecca and its environs accounts for ‘Azz al-Din Tilban al-Mujahidi’s and ‘Alam al-Din Sahr al-Yemeni’s involvement in this plot on religious and geographical grounds.[863] At least, such an explanation seems likely in the absence of convincing arguments for any other causes. After all, al-Salih’s credentials as a defender of the faith were not in question in the way al-‘Adil’s now were.

Moreover, al-‘Adil failed to right the loss of Mecca across his reign. Later Ayyubid patronage of the *jihad* marked a change from the direct holy war of Saladin’s latter years, with the emphasis switching to wider support of the Islamic faith.[864] Though both types of *jihad* were compatible and doctrinally valid, the Ayyubid reticence to wage war for the faith always provoked an undercurrent of opposition, opposition which could normally be managed.[865] However, the failure to contest the loss of Mecca likely destroyed al-‘Adil’s credibility as a monarch of devout faith. This seems particularly the case given nominal lordship of Mecca and Arabia apparently remained a key tenet of his self-presentation. This is testified by al-‘Adil's receipt of the symbols of power from the Caliph’s representatives on 13 April 1240, which included swords representing his power over Yemen and Southern Arabia.[866] By 1240, this was evidently a hollow claim. Moreover, the fact that al-‘Adil’s continued flaunting of these symbols thereafter supposedly ‘split the land’ serves to emphasise with how little respect he was held in this specific regard by his emirs by his reign’s conclusion.[867] In this light, it is noteworthy how much attention al-Salih showed to Yemen upon

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[862] al-‘Amid, pp. 390-2.
[863] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٩٠.
[864] The fruits of Ayyub patronage of *jihad* in this period is testified by the huge numbers of madrasas dating to this period, for which see R. Stephen Humphreys, ‘Politics and architectural patronage in Ayyubid Damascus’ in C. Bosworth *et al.* (eds.), *The Islamic World from Classical to Modern Times* (Princetown 1989), pp. 151-74.
[865] For criticism of later Ayyubid patronage of *jihad* see e.g. Ibn al-Athir, *al-Kamil fi’l-tarikh*, ed. C. Tornberg (12 vols., Leiden and Uppsala, 1851-76), xii, p. 497, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, *al-Rawd al-Zahir*, ed. A. al-Khuwaytir (Riyadh, 1976), p. 46.
[866] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ١٠٠, al-Nuwayri, xxix, pp. 255-6.
[867] ‘شقّ البلد’, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 256.

attaining the throne. Despite only establishing himself as sultan in June 1240, and despite facing myriad internal and external threats, by August/September 1240 he had assembled an army to reassert Ayyubid control over Mecca numbering perhaps 1,000 horsemen, indicating the importance he attached to the expedition.[868] Moreover, that al-Salih saw this expedition through to a successful conclusion within a year, despite a simultaneous uprising against him amongst the influential al-Ashrafi mamluks who favoured his uncle Isma'il testifies to the preeminent status of this expedition.[869] None of this behaviour makes any sense unless direct control of Mecca was important for successful Ayyubid rule in Egypt. Thus while not direct evidence, this seemingly illogical behaviour by al-Salih strongly implies that failure to take similar action helped precipitate the al-'Adil's ultimate failure as sultan. Moreover, it does so in a way which adds nuance to the usual interpretation that al-'Adil's failures were failures of personality: if that had been the case, then how he secured the throne of Egypt with near-unanimous noble support in the first place is impossible to answer.

The influence of the bedouin

Lastly, the ability of foreign Islamic powers to directly shape the world the 'Barons' Crusade' existed within can be seen in the effect the nomadic bedouin had upon Egypt. Intersecting with the effect of the loss of Mecca, which undermined al-'Adil on an intellectual level, the bedouin played a vital part in undercutting al-'Adil on a practical level. Thus, they contributed towards his deposition and replacement by al-Salih which, as discussed, was perhaps the defining event of the whole crusade. However, their influence has hitherto been overlooked by historians of the crusades

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[868] For his entry into Egypt see Ibn Wasil, p. 266, Sibt, p. 728. For assembly of the army to Yemen see al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 275, Ibn Duqmaq, p. 134, *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p.١٠٦.
[869] al-Maqrizi, pp. 300-2, al-Nuwayri, xxix, pp. 275-6, Ibn Duqmaq, pp. 134-5.

of the 1230s. None of Lower, Painter, or Jackson mention the bedouins' influence on affairs once, an oversight which aligns neither with the importance accorded them in sources, nor the generally significant role the bedouin play in Levantine affairs.[870] As has been commented elsewhere, it is a great irony of "Arab" history that the nomads among whom Islam originated became quickly othered as Islam transformed into the creed of sedentary peoples, while still retaining their capacity to inspire awe, as the original "owners" of Islam, and the means of its spread; the Arabic tongue.[871] This complicated attitude is certainly the one taken by the Muslim authors of this period. No better example of this exists than how all the chroniclers framed their eulogies for al-Mujahid of Homs after his death in 1240, in which he is consistently described as the defender of his people equally from the Franks and the bedouin, both of which seemingly do him equal credit.[872] In practical terms however, the effect of this dynamic was to see the bedouin line up to take their place in the great struggle between nomadic and sedentary peoples, a theory Steven Tibble espoused at length.[873] In this sense, the crusades of the 1230s can be seen as simply another chapter in this overarching narrative, albeit one where the influence of the nomadic bedouin would have dramatic consequences on the separate conflict between the Crusader States and their Muslim neighbours.

In providing the evidence underpinning this narrative, by far the best source is the anonymous author of the *Siyar*. Situated within Cairo, thereby providing something of a window into contemporary perceptions of al-'Adil's rule, his account abounds with instances where the bedouin interrupt the narrative, and through him, the bedouin can be easily linked to factors which

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[870] Knowledge of the Bedouin's importance was not limited to the Arabic sources. E.g. *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani*, ed. Röricht, nos. 174, 355, 366, 562, 567, 593 states the importance of the Bedouin as Frankish revenue sources.

[871] For the complex relationship between the nomadic and sedentary "Arabs" see T. Mackintosh-Smith, *Arabs: A 3,000 Year History of Peoples, Tribes and Empires* (New Haven, 2019), pp. xvi-xxiii [Foreword]

[872] Ibn Wasil, p. 255, Sibt, pp. 731-2, Ibn Duqmaq, p. 119, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 255.

[873] For the 'Tibble thesis', see Tibble, *Crusader Armies*, pp. 12-4.

ultimately led to al-‘Adil being overthrown. Firstly, it is clear from this author that authority over the bedouin represented an important part of Ayyubid kingship, just as control over the bedouin had formed a key part of Fatamid military preparations.[874] Such is apparent from how the set-piece extraction of tribute and reciprocal demonstration of fealty from c.2,000 bedouin horsemen formed a central part in the public establishment of al-‘Adil’s regime in 1238.[875] Thus it is definitely plausible that losing control of such men, who even then held the inhabitants of Cairo ‘in fear of them’ could prove fatal to al-‘Adil’s authority.[876] Crucially, this appears exactly what occurred. As soon as August 1238, the bedouin were reportedly active in southern Egypt, an area which would remain in their hands across al-‘Adil’s reign.[877] However, far from being confined to the fringes of Egypt, the bedouin are described as striking right at the political centre of the country, raiding the al-Sharqia province of the Eastern Nile Delta, and the Gharbia province, comprising the area around Tanta.[878] However, rather than successfully meet this challenge, al-‘Adil consistently failed. Merely the most spectacular failure was his attempt to silence the bedouin raiding in Gharbia, where his combined large army and fleet failed to pin the bedouin down in a fixed engagement, and were obliged to raid the region’s inhabitants themselves in a desperate attempt to seek restitution for their expenses, the perennial problem of medieval armies.[879]

In themselves these failures would provide broad grounds to explain al-‘Adil's deposition, with each raid being linked by the *Siyar* to rising costs and dearth among the people of Egypt.[880]

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[874] On importance of bedouin to the Fatamids, see Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, p. 511, M. Brett, ‘The Battles of Ramla (1099-1105)’ in U. Vermeulen and D. de Smets (eds.), *Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta: Egypt and Syria in the Fatamid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras* (Leuven, 1995), p. 19.
[875] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٨٠.
[876] ‘خشى الناس منهم’, *Ibid.* p. ٨٠.
[877] *Ibid.* pp. ٨٤, ٩٦.
[878] *Ibid.* pp. ٩٢, ٩٤, al-Maqrizi, p. 283.
[879] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٩٤.
[880] *Ibid.* pp. ٨٤, ٩٣-٩٤, ٩٦.

However, even more significant for the thesis that the course of the 'Barons' Crusade' was shaped by actors outside the conception of the Western sources is the fact these failures are consistently linked to uprisings of the emirs against al-'Adil, suggesting they contributed towards his unusually swift deposition. For example, it is striking that part of the army rose up against al-'Adil immediately after his attempt to eliminate the bedouin raiding the Gharbia, prompting numerous arrests, and that 17 members of his bodyguard took this specific opportunity to defect to al-Salih.[881] Similarly, it was upon moving to Bilbeis in August in another failed attempt to see off the bedouin ravaging al-Sharqia province that a group of emirs within the army attempted to capture al-'Adil.[882] Continuing the pattern, the whole tyranny of the military in Egypt, with the resultant concentration of power in the hands of the emirs to the detriment of al-'Adil stemmed for his panicked reactions to the bedouin raids which followed his elevation to the throne.[883] This alignment of events seems too great a coincidence to ignore, forcing the bedouin to enter any consideration of why the events of this period unfolded they did.

Similarly, the leading emirs in the deposition of al-'Adil can be closely tied to the Egyptian armies' failures against the bedouin. The most obvious case of this is the emir al-Safi Juhar the al-Nubi (the Nubian) whose epithet suggests he was likely personally affected by al-'Adil's failure to subdue the bedouin devastating southern Egypt.[884] As for the other emirs, they are consistently described as coming from the innermost circles of the Egyptian court, with personal contact with the sultan.[885] They thus would have been personal witnesses to the damage the bedouin caused, a fact which must have turned them against al-'Adil, particularly if al-'Adil was a spendthrift for

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[881] *Ibid*. pp. ٩٣-٩٤, al-'Amid, p. 387. Ibn Duqmaq, pp. 109-10 claims 27 emirs and their followers defected.
[882] al-Maqrizi, p. 283.
[883] *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٨٤.
[884] For his involvement in al-'Adil's deposition see *Ibid.* p. ١٠٣, Ibn Wasil, p. 263, al-'Amid, p. 389.
[885] Ibn Wasil, p. 263, Ibn Duqmaq, pp. 115-6. al-Nuwayri describes those plotting against al-'Adil as members of 'الحلقة' or 'the court circle'; al-Nuwayri, xxix, pp. 249-50, 256.

pleasure but yet unable to effectively defend his subjects.[886] Thus, it is plausible that the failure to control the bedouin undercut al-‘Adil on a tangible level, just as the failure to hold Mecca undermined him on the intellectual level, with the intersection of these two proving fatal, with all the resultant effects on the wider Levant. Small wonder therefore that immediately following his accession, al-Salih made a concerted effort to defeat the bedouin, notwithstanding the other crises demanding his attention, money and forces.[887]

Finally, when considering the influence exercised by the bedouin, it is interesting that the author of the *Siyar* links the initial defection of al-Nasir from al-‘Adil to his failure to bring the bedouin to battle and the collapse of the Egyptian army.[888] This defection is poorly-explained in most Islamic sources, especially given al-Nasir had every reason to cling close to al-‘Adil following the invasion of his lands by al-Salih.[889] However, if al-Nasir had recently witnessed the failure of the Egyptian army to defeat the bedouin, then his breach with al-‘Adil is entirely justified, as his faith in his ability to restore him to Damascus, the pursuit of which was always a cornerstones of his alliances, would understandably have been shattered.[890] In this light, the seed of al-Nasir’s defection to al-Salih, while relying in the immediate term on the interplay between the two, was potentially planted by the bedouin. They therefore return to the forefront of events.

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[886] Note al-‘Adil's bodyguards defected to al-Salih after al-‘Adil and the court reached al-Abaseya, in the devastated Gharbia region; *HPEC*, iv, part ii, p. ٩٤.
[887] *Ibid.* pp. ١٠٤,١٠٨, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 268.
[888] *HPEC*, iv, part ii pp. ٩٤-٩٥.
[889] Sibt, p. 720. Ibn Wasil, p. 239, al-‘Amid, p. 388, give no reason for al-Nasir’s defection.
[890] E.g the promise of being restored to Damascus was central to the alliance al-Nasir made with al-Salih Ayyub. See al-Maqrizi, pp. 293-4, Ibn Wasil, p. 259, Ibn Duqmaq, p. 119, al-‘Amid, p. 395.

Conclusions

Thus, close study of the Holy Land crusade of the 1230s and 1240s and the Middle Eastern world it existed within presents almost the exact picture that might be expected. Handicapped first by their failure to take any of the major Islamic capitals at their height in the twelfth century, the conquest of at least one of which was essential were the Crusader States to expand beyond the Levantine coast, and second by the precarious state of the Kingdom of Jerusalem's restoration by Frederick II, it is only logical that Outremer by this date operated on a stage set by the wider Islamic world.[891] The surprise, such as it is, is rather how far the crusades were blown in the wind generated by external shifts. Whether originating in Syria, Arabia or the Egyptian deserts, it seems the impulses which truly determined the shape of the expedition, such as the installation of al-Salih Ayyub in Damascus and then in Egypt, or the decision of al-Salih Isma'il to negotiate with the Franks, all had their origins outside of the crusade itself. Thus the whole story of the crusade is how, and with what success, the protagonists of the expedition reacted to them. That said, these findings are not intended to completely remove agency from the Franks. On the contrary, it is certainly to Thibaut of Champagne's credit that he was able to navigate these complicated waters with any degree of success, while there is reason to suggest the extent of the lands ceded by Isma'il owed something to the Franks' ability to drive a hard bargain. After all, there seems little reason for Isma'il to have ceded lands to the extent he did, thereby attracting the ire he did, were the Franks not exploiting his weak position.[892] Rather what should be emphasised is just how far the world those operations occurred in was determined by external powers and events. Being confused and

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[891] For the thesis emphasising the importance of the conquest of at least one of Aleppo, Damascus or Cairo, see T. Asbridge, 'How the Crusades Could Have Been Won: King Baldwin II's Campaigns against Aleppo (1124-5) and Damascus (1129)', *Journal of Medieval Military History*, 11 (2013), pp. 73-4.

[892] For denunciations of Isma'il's treaty see Sibt, pp. 732-3, al-Nuwayri, xxix, p. 279, Ibn Duqmaq, pp. 135-6.

opaque, it is essential to look beyond the western sources to truly understand the situation in the Holy Land at this time, a movement yet to be fully embraced by crusade historians. After all, the world of the crusades is more complex but more explicable if the Arabic material can be studied alongside, rather than separately from, the traditional western authors. In this sense, what this chapter does is try to show the new understandings possible through such an approach.

Chapter 6: The Valencian Crusade in action, c.1233-9

Turning from the Holy Land to the Valencian crusade initiated by Gregory IX in 1233, it is striking how far past scholarship leaves a blank canvas upon which to work. For many of the elements present in, for example, the First Crusade which make it such an attractive subject to historians, including being led by complex charismatic leaders, being well-documented and possessing long-term significance, are ostensibly present in this expedition. Firstly, James I, one of the great conquerors in Iberian history, indisputably ranks among the greatest kings of the High Middle Ages, a fact reflected in the number of works written about various aspect of his life and reign.[893] Secondly, while medieval Aragon is not awash with chronicle histories, the combination of contemporary accounts such as James's *Llibre del Fets* or the *Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium* with later chronicles means the historian has access to a relatively rich and varied set of materials from which to draw conclusions. These materials are themselves complemented by the Arabic texts pertaining to the expedition, which while not in the same rank as the Christian texts (and none contemporary), still bring an interesting perspective upon events. Thirdly, the effect of Valencia's fall was indubitably dramatic. By taking control of first the northern parts of the Muslim kingdom of Valencia and eventually Valencia itself in October 1238, not only did Aragon attain its fullest extent under the terms of the Treaty of Cazola, 20 March 1179, giving it the basis from which to spread its wings into the Western Mediterranean as a European power of the first rank, but in itself it brought great wealth and prestige to the kings of Aragon, praise of whom resounded across Christendom, from Gregory IX in Rome, to Matthew Paris in St Albans, to Alberic of Trois-

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[893] E.g. E. Belenguer*, Jaume I a través de la història* (2 vols., Valencia, 1984), R. Burns, 'The Spiritual Life of James the Conqueror, King of Arago-Catalonia, 1208-1276: Portrait and Self-Portrait', *Catholic Historical Review,* 62 (1976), pp. 1-35, J.-D. Garrido, *Jaume I i el regne de Múrcia* (Barcelona, 1997), F. Soldevila, *Vida de Jaume I el Conqueridor* (Barcelona, 1969).

Fontaines in Northern France.[894] Similarly the Arabic geographies of Iberia written by the Syrian Abu al-Fida and the Tunisian al-Himyari in the fourteenth and fifteenth century respectively, both eulogised the wealth of Valencia, now in James's possession, while Arab historians often lamented the grievous wound struck against Islam by the fall of the city.[895] In sum, the crusade struck a powerful blow in Mediterranean politics, a feat that should have stimulated the imaginations of historians, down to the present.

Yet despite these attributes, historical interest in the Valencia crusade has been muted, with the expedition itself never the subject of a monograph. Hence, whenever the expedition is broached, it is never a particular subject of interest in itself, but rather an episode in a broader narrative, whether that narrative be the growth of Aragon as an international power, the story of Aragon's medieval monarchy or the general progress of the Reconquista.[896] Consequently, the episode is rarely treated in depth, with the single longest treatment of the Valencian crusade still Swift's biography of James I, now 128 years old.[897] Yet besides the brevity with which the 1238 conquest is treated, the overwhelming similarity and unoriginality of many accounts is striking. Understandably, given it was the first word on the subject in English, Swift's account is based almost-exclusively upon the *Llibre*, complemented by the work of Zurita regarding the Aragonese archives, and a few other

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[894] For the Treaty of Cazola see J. González, *El Reino de Castilla en la época de Alfonso VIII, 2: Documentos 1145-1190* (3 vols., Madrid, 1960), no. 319 and A. Sánchez Casabón (ed.), *Alfonso II rey de Aragón, conde de Barcelona y marqués de Provenza: documentos (1162-1196)*, (Zaragoza, 1995), no. 280. For the international praise of James see *Registres*, ii, no. 4703, *CM*, iii, pp. 384-5, 517, Alberic, p. 944.

[895] On the natural wealth of Valencia see al-Himyari, p. ٤٧, Abu al-Fida, pp. 178-9. For despair at its fall see e.g. Ibn 'Idhari, p. 481, al-Khatib, p. 273.

[896] E.g. D. Abulafia, *The Western Mediterranean Kingdoms 1200-1500: The struggle for Dominion* (London, 1997), pp. 42-3, T. Bisson, *The Medieval Crown of Aragon: A Short History* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 65-7, Bishko, pp. 430-1.

[897] F. Swift, *The Lives and Times of James the First, the Conqueror, King of Aragon, Valencia and Majorca, Count of Barcelona and Urgel, Lord of Montpellier* (Oxford, 1894), pp. 55-69.

accounts brought in briefly, to round out the picture James presents.[898] However, rather than be challenged and developed, this perspective remains largely unaltered, with accounts of Valencia often little more than résumés of the *Llibre*.[899] Indeed, the sole major development of scholarship regarding the Valencian campaign appears to have been the incorporation of papal materials into histories of the expedition.[900] This has meant that the "crusading" nature of the expedition, something long-contested, is now beyond doubt. Yet despite the significance of this scholarship, this shift towards a "papal" angle has diverted attention from the campaign proper, with the usual narrative left essentially unchallenged, with Valencia's place within the wider Mediterranean crusades Gregory envisaged also overlooked.

However, such a perspective on the conquest of Valencia can and should be contested, and there is certainly more to be said on the subject than merely parroting what James himself tells us, with minor emendations here and there. While the *Llibre* is truly exceptional, it is not the only source that can illuminate events, as detailed study of the Arabic material for the expedition makes plain. Hence, and as with the previous sections of this thesis, this chapter will take a wide angle upon the expedition, incorporating as much of the surviving source material as possible, in order to get the fullest sense of the events surrounding the fall of Valencia. Indeed, it is clear that by studying the conquest of Valencia in its own right, and placing it within a broad geographical context including the North African littoral, an area which certainly fell within the crusade horizons envisaged by Gregory IX, new insights into the expedition and the decisions which shaped it are possible, thereby illuminate an area of medieval Mediterranean history which has remained hitherto-opaque.[901]

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[898] E.g. Desclot is used only to complements James for the battle of El Puig, 15 August 1237. See Swift, *James the First*, p. 63.
[899] Bishko, pp. 430-1 is particularly guilty of this.
[900] E.g. R. Burns, 'The Many Crusades', pp. 167-77, O'Callaghan, pp. 99-105.
[901] See e.g. *BP*, pp. 16-7, *BF*, pp. 24, 26, 106-7, 225-6 and *ES*, nos. 528, 639 for letters from Gregory on various subjects pertaining to North Africa.

The Timing of the Campaign

Starting at a most fundamental level, a renewed focus on the Islamic backdrop and the Arabic sources for the Valencian crusade enables new arguments about why the campaign commenced when it did. Following the sense conveyed in the *Llibre*, historians have often taken the line that James was "bounced" into a piecemeal campaign against Valencia in 1232/3 by Don Blasco of Alagón, major-domo of Aragon.[902] Granted a charter in 1226 in return for his support while James remained underage which allowed him to keep all the settlements he could conquer from al-Andalus, the argument runs that by his conquest of the strategic fortress of Morella, he threatened to unacceptably increase his power at James's expense, forcing his involvement in a campaign against Valencia in a desperate attempt to maintain royal authority.[903] Likewise, also following a suggestion contained within the *Llibre*, a second motivation has been attributed to James by historians who claim that with Majorca settled, James was persuaded by the Aragonese nobility to campaign against Valencia.[904] As a target which would benefit his entire kingdom, as opposed to the Catalan interests served by the submission of the Balearics, this was supposedly close to their hearts and an interest James could ill-afford to ignore, especially following his difficulties with the nobility during his minority.[905] However, without doubting the accuracy of these arguments, even together they feel inadequate to fully explain James's actions. For one, neither completely explains why James felt unable to resist noble demands for a campaign against Valencia specifically in 1233, given he had

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[902] *LdF*, pp. 131-5, J. Fort Ruis, 'La Conquesta: Un Procés Històric', *En torn al 750 aniversario: Antecedentes y consecuencias de la conquesta de Valencia*, 1 (1989), p. 255, Swift, *James the First*, p. 56, Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, p. 65.
[903] For this charter see *DJI*, i, no. 85.
[904] *LdF*, pp. 128-131, Bishko, p. 430, O'Callaghan, p. 100, Abulafia, *Western Mediterranean Kingdoms*, pp. 41-2.
[905] On his difficult regency see F. Soldevila, *Els Primers Temps de Jaume I* (Barcelona, 1968).

successfully previously neutralised this demand.[906] Furthermore, James had every reason not to wage an expensive and intense campaign against Valencia in 1233. Not only was Aragonese control of the Balearics tenuous, witnessed by James's repeated travels to Majorca after its conquest in 1231-2, but James was fully involved with negotiations with Sancho VII of Navarre over the Navarrese succession.[907] Indeed, if the *Llibre* is accepted at face value, James was even preparing for war with Castile over the Navarrese question. James thus had many reasons to seek a period of consolidation, rather than risk a new war. Similarly, he continued to dispute Thibaut's succession to Navarre upon Sancho's death in 1234, even after the campaign against Borriana had started, ultimately forcing Gregory IX to intervene.[908] Such a preoccupation naturally mitigated against a commitment to Valencia. However, by including the Muslim perspective, a perspective naturally absent in the *Llibre* which is necessarily limited to what James himself saw, it is possible to round out the picture of why James, despite these considerations, in conjunction with Gregory IX, was prepared to commit to operations when he did.

In particular, assessment of such material presents the Kingdom of Valencia as perhaps uniquely vulnerable to Aragon by the mid-1230s. From the 1220s onwards, central power in Muslim Andalusia had collapsed, and in such a way which left Valencia isolated. Initially ruled by the Almohad prince of the blood Zayd Abu Zayd, brother to one Almohad Caliph and another assassinated claimant to that title, Valencia constituted one of the last holdouts of Almohad rule in Iberia, with Abu Zayd remaining loyal to the dynasty which put him in power.[909] However, with the

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[906] E.g. James overruled such demands prior to the conquest of Majorca. See R. Burns, 'El Rei Jaume i València: perfil d'un conqueridor', in E. Belenguer Cebrià, *Història del país valencià* (5 vols., Barcelona, 1988-90), ii, p. 48.
[907] Ubieto Arteta, *Orígines*, i, p. 58 suggests James visited the Balearics in March 1231 and again in June-July 1231, whereas *Book of Deeds*, ed. and trans. Smith and Buffery p. 152 places James in the Balearics in May-July 1231 and May-July 1232, which Bishko, p. 430 supports. For discussions with Navarre see *LdF*, pp. 135-46.
[908] H. Chaytor, *History of Aragon*, p. 84. *Registres*, i, no. 2078.
[909] Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, p. 32.

rise of the charismatic and violently anti-Almohad Ibn Hud in Murcia in 1228, who after the departure of Caliph Idris al-Ma'mun from Seville to Marrakesh in October 1228 became briefly master of much of the wreckage of Muslim Andalusia, Abu Zayd became increasingly isolated, having failed in his armed opposition to Ibn Hud's rise to power.[910] Faced with growing domestic resistance to his rule inspired by Ibn Hud, Abu Zayd was forced by the aristocratic rebel Zayyan Ibn Mardanish to flee Valencia in January 1229 to the north of the country where he retained some support.[911] Ultimately Abu Zayd came to Aragon, where, in a series of agreements, he gradually ceded his rights in Valencia to James, culminating in his conversion to Christianity in 1236, and becoming a lord of Aragon.[912] Thus rather than face a country united against him and for which he would have to fight for every square foot of ground, the situation that James failed to overcome in 1225 during his abortive invasion of Peniscola, there was an unprecedented window of opportunity for an invasion of Valencia open by the early 1230s. Furthermore, the situation was made especially attractive by the continued isolation of Abu Zayd's successor Ibn Mardanish within Andalusia. No more successful that Abu Zayd in controlling the centrifugal forces tearing Andalusia apart, Ibn Mardanish had lost control of the important population centres of Denia, Alzira and Xativa which all declared for Ibn Hud, who continued to oppose Ibn Mardanish, even to the point of subjecting Valencia to a siege until interrupted by a Castilian threat.[913] Thus the Valencia that faced James in the 1230s was divided against itself, and isolated from its Muslim neighbours. Small wonder then

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[910] *Ibid*. pp. 30-3, H. Kennedy, *Muslim Spain and Portugal: A Political History of al-Andalus* (London, 1996), p. 265, 267-8. On Ibn Hud see e.g. J. Torres Fontes, *La Reconquista de Murcia en 1266 par Jaime I de Aragón* (Murcia, 1967), ch. 1, A. Huici Miranda, *La Historia Musulmana de Valencia* (3 vols., Valencia, 1969-70), iii, pp. 227-49.

[911] Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, p. 34.

[912] Burns, 'Almohad Prince and Mudejar Convert', p. 171. For agreements signed between Abu Zayd and James see R. Chabás y Llorens, 'Çeid Abu Çeid', *El Archivo*, 5 (1891), pp. 143-66, *DJI*, i, no. 236.

[913] al-Maqqari, *History* tr. de Gayangos, ii, pp. 327-8. Denia and Alzira feature in al-Himyari's guide to the Iberian peninsular, with the former described as the main dockyard of Muslim Andalusia: al-Himyari, pp. ٧٦ [Denia], ١٠٣-١٠٤ [Alzira]. Abu al-Fida, p. 168 depicts Xativa as one of Andalusia's great fortresses.

that when given the slightest opportunity James and Gregory leapt at the chance to initiate an expedition against it, the arguments in favour of consolidating the Christian position notwithstanding. With the only potential source of aid available to Valencia Muslim North Africa, there was every reason for as swift a campaign as possible by the 1230s, a fact not sufficiently realised in current historiography, dominated by Aragon-centric perspectives grounded upon the *Llibre*.

However, even in their hour of greatest need, the Muslims of North Africa were in no position to aid their co-religionists in Valencia, with the territory riven by conflict between the Almohad, Zayyanid and Marinid dynasties. This further explains why James might begin his campaign when he did. Such internecine conflict is something all the Muslim historians of North Africa emphasise. For example, writing in the 14th century from Marrakesh, the erstwhile Almohad capital, Ibn ‘Idhari explicitly linked Muslim civil strife and the Christian conquest, claiming only the degeneration of Almohad rule into civil strife in Iberia and Africa allowed James the opportunity to besiege Valencia.[914] Similarly, Ibn al-Khatib repeatedly lamented what he called the 'civil war’ (‘فتنة’) which tore the ruling families apart and offered the Christian forces the chance to conquer the centres of Muslim Andalusia.[915] However, the grievous extent of the conflict was perhaps best captured by Ibn Khaldun. Born in Tunis in 1332 to an Arab family of Andalusian descent, something which may help explain his interest in the links joining Andalusia to the Maghreb, he divided his history into chapters on the main dynasties of North Africa, thereby capturing a real sense of the extent of conflict. Through him, one learns that during the Valencian crusade the Marinid dynasty, centred around the Rif region of Northern Morocco, was locked in conflict with both the Almohad remnant based in Marrakesh and the Zayyanid berber kingdom of

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[914] Ibn ‘Idhari, pp. 479-80.
[915] al-Khatib, pp. 272, 293.

Tlemcen led by Yaghmurasen Ibn Zayyan, which was also fighting the Hafsid rulers of Ifriqiya (the area roughly between Constantine in Eastern Algeria and Western Libya).[916] Indeed, Ibn Khaldun's account is particularly useful, as it captures how the Muslims of Andalusia habitually appealed for aid from Africa, but also how such aid was essentially unobtainable.[917] Given the close contacts between Aragon and the North African littoral generated by trade, privateering and even direct military action (such as the aborted Catalan expedition against Ceuta in 1234), this collapse of Muslim unity, and its resultant effects, are things James would have known when planning his expedition against Valencia.[918]

Furthermore, Ibn Mardanish had himself effectively alienated most of the North African powers. As Ibn al-Khatib noted, upon taking control of Valencia in January 1229 and demanding oaths to himself, Ibn Mardanish had removed the name of the Almohad Caliph from the *khutbah* in Valencia, replacing it with the name of the 'Abbasid caliph in Baghdad.[919] In a single stroke, Ibn Mardanish was isolated from any potential aid from North Africa, other than from Abu Zakariya, the Hafsid king of Ifriqiya, who similarly acknowledged 'Abbasid authority. Again this is something James would have known, as Abu Zayd could personally pass him the information given their close relationship.[920] Moreover, of all the African powers, Ifriqiya was the most geographically distant from Andalusia, allowing James time to act in the event of it intervening in Iberian affairs. The picture thus facing James was of a Valencia isolated from its land-based neighbours and cut off by misfortune and design from most of its maritime neighbours too. Small wonder therefore that when

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916 Ibn Khaldun, vi, pp. 254-6, 286-8, and vii, pp. 79-81, 171, 191. See al-Zarkashi, p. 28 for conflict between the Hafsids and the Zayyanids.
917 Ibn Khaldun, pp. 190-1.
918 *CM*, iii, pp. 366-7, S. Bensch, *Barcelona and its rulers, 1096-1291* (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 290-2. For the Catalan trade with North Africa see A. Garcia i Sanz, and J. Madurell i Marimon (eds.), *Comandas comerciales barcelonesas de la baja edad media* (Barcelona, 1973), nos. 4, 7, 18, 26, 28, 31-34, 38, 40.
919 al-Khatib, p. 272.
920 For Abu Zayd's proximity to James see *LdF*, pp. 30-1, 134-5.

asked by Gregory to put aside concern for his northern territories and to campaign southwards, James did.

The Conduct of the Campaign

The isolation of Ibn Mardanish from his Iberian and North African neighbours besides Abu Zakariya is however significant beyond simply explaining why James struck against Valencia when he did. For it also seems probable that knowledge that Ifriqiya was Valencia's only possible succour informed James's strategy and conduct across the entire campaign. A dimension to James's thinking not expressed in the *Llibre*, concerned as it is to write a handbook for future kings of Aragon and to show what was possible through divine assistance, such a perspective is yet to be proffered as a explanation for James's behaviour.[921] However, it likely factored into his planning for the expedition, as it resonated with his previous experience in the Balearics, when the spectre of aid from Tunis had him hastening back to the islands.[922] As discussed, James would have known of Ibn Mardanish's declaration for the Hafsids, so is unlikely to have missed the widespread declarations of support for Abu Zakariya throughout much of Andalusia at exactly this time, including the important centres of Seville and Murcia.[923] Furthermore, even if this was somehow unknown to James at the outset of the campaign, it is something he would quickly have realised as his forces encountered their Islamic opponents. To demonstrate this, a good example is the entry for Alzira in al-Himyari, which contains an extract from the poet Abu al-Mutarrif Ibn 'Amira (lived 1186-1258) eulogising Abu Zakariya, stating the land stood in his service, and imploring him to drive away the

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[921] *Book of Deeds* ed. and trans. Smith and Buffery, pp. 6-7.
[922] *LdF*, pp. 114-9.
[923] Ibn Khaldun, vi, pp. 288- 90, Ibn 'Idhari, p. 480.

blue-eyed Christians who occupied the other side of the river.[924] Given Alzira's fall in 1242 to Aragon, this must refer to the Northern European contingents in the Valencian Crusade, who would have appeared particularly striking. Yet beyond the circumstantial evidence underpinning common sense assertion, reassessment of the *Llibre* and the other materials for the Valencian crusade, reveals numerous facets to the campaign that lead inescapably back to the conclusion that James acted in order to best neutralise any potential aid from Ifriqiya, giving North Africa a role in the campaign that has not yet been properly realised.

For example, the idea James conducted the whole campaign so as to reduce the risk Ifriqiya posed helps to explain why James focused so much attention upon conquering towns dominating the Valencian sea shore. When the expedition is described by modern historians, it is often presented as a slow-moving campaign of ever-tightening nooses, logically closing in on Valencia.[925] On a grand scheme, this is true, but it neglects the fact that James's drive towards Valencia was not over a broad front, but was rather a push down the coast, with the initial conquests of Peniscola and Borriana, through Almenara, and Murviedro to El Puig falling like a string of pearls along the coast.[926] Similarly, a concern to specifically cut Valencia off from aid from Ifriqiya explains one of the most apparently illogical episodes in the campaign; James's abortive strike against Cullera in June 1235.[927] A break with James's usual strategy of incremental movements down the coast, Cullera is over 23 miles south of Valencia, and thus any attack in that quarter was deeply exposed to harassment from Muslim territory. Indeed, this is a point so obvious that in the *Llibre* James allows his uncle Ferdinand, who is often used as a literary device to articulate opposing views which James

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[924] al-Himyari, p. ١٠٤. For life of Ibn 'Amira see T. Garulo, 'Ibn ʿAmīra al-Makhzūmī', *Encyclopædia of Islam* (3rd edn., Leiden, 2007-), p. 104, https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/ibn-amira-al-makhzumi-COM_30692 (21 Jan. 2021).
[925] Bisson, *The Medieval Crown*, p. 65, Bishko, p. 430.
[926] Muntaner, p. 35, *CM*, iii, pp. 384-5.
[927] *LdF*, pp. 172-5.

shuts down, to make it.[928] Moreover James made this thrust without adequate supplies or siege equipment, a fact he laments when it became impossible to source ammunition for the fenèvols (a type of traction trebuchet) he brought with him.[929] Given James's long experience as a general, this therefore apparently constitutes a huge strategic blunder. However, in the context of a specific drive to cut Valencia off from the sea, this move was logical. If James had taken Cullera in a swift strike, then access to Valencia by sea would have been interrupted both from the northern and southern approaches, making any potential Hafsid attempts to relieve Valencia much more difficult. In this light, rather than present James as committing a dangerous and inexplicable bungle, the operation to take Cullera "out of turn" in fact indicates the value he placed on control of the coast, and the gambles he was prepared to take in order to make it happen.

Furthermore, the theory that James undertook a strategy based around alienating Muslim Valencia from its potential sources of aid in North Africa appears born out by the success of that strategy, and how such success was achieved. For instance, it is remarkable that many of the territorial gains James made through the surrender of Muslim-held settlements occurred specifically after they were isolated from the sea, and thus (given Valencia's political isolation within Andalusia) from their only source of aid. For example, according to the *Llibre*, after the fall of Borriana in July 1233, a town James specifically has Dan Blasco of Alagón describe as an attractive first target because of its maritime aspect, the Aragonese forces were able to secure Borriol, les Coves de Vinromà, Alcalatén and Vilafamés.[930] As all of these lie inland from Borriana and depended upon it for maritime access, this episode therefore indicates the extent of the dependence

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[928] *Ibid.* p. 174 For Ferdinand being used as a straw man see *Ibid.* pp. 156-7, 201, 206-7.
[929] *Ibid*. p. 173. On the fenèvol see P. Chevedden, 'The Artillery of King James I the Conqueror', in L. Simon *et al*. (eds.), *Iberia and the Mediterranean world of the Middle Ages: studies in honor of Robert I. Burns* (2 vols., Leiden, 1995-6), ii, pp. 68-71 and Idem, Z. Shiller, S. Gilbert and D. Kagay, 'The Traction Trebuchet: A triumph of Four Civilizations', *Viator*, 33 (2000), pp. 433-51.
[930] *LdF*, pp. 128-9, 169.

of Muslim Valencia upon the sea: the speed with which the garrisons surrendered when the hope of that aid was extinguished manifests the fact. Moreover, such action is not unique to Borriana. In a significant parallel, following the capture of Almenara in March 1238, an identical process occurred, with Almenara's surrender being accompanied swiftly afterwards by those of Castro, Uixó, Nules and Alfàndec, the last on the very next day.[931] Ditto, the capture of Paterna in April 1238 was followed immediately by the surrender of Bétera and Bufilla, both territories dependent on the former for their access to the sea.[932] One occasion may be a coincidence, but the repetition here suggests a deliberate ploy on James's part. This seems even more plausible given that by including these specific episodes in the *Llibre* at length, James drew particular attention to them. Furthermore, how quickly the Muslim position collapsed once future aid from the sea was impossible, suggests the dependence placed upon it by the Muslim defenders of Valencia. In this light, what appears clear is the presentation of the Valencia campaign as a drive to conquer strategic settlements in order to gain the surrender of surrounding castles is not specific enough, and that what instead occurred was a deliberate policy to secure the surrender of inland areas after the capture of essential coastal centres.[933] Thus, like the Levantine Crusade, the world of the Valencian crusade was wider than has previously been credited.

On this point, it is also worth recalling the events that occurred around the arrival of the relieving fleet of 18 ships from Tunis outside Valencia in 1238.[934] For like the fall of Borriana and Almenara, the arrival of this fleet bears out the success of James's strategy. This is testified to by those Arabic sources which are aware that fleet arrived outside Valencia before the fall of the city, who state the fleet had to leave without achieving anything besides dumping much of their cargo at Denia due to

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[931] *Ibid*. pp. 211-4.
[932] *Ibid*. pp. 214-5
[933] P. López Elum, *La Conquista y repoblación Valenciana durante el reinado de Jaime I* (Valencia, 1995), p. 61.
[934] *LdF*, pp. 219-20.

the coast being held against them.[935] Though differing in detail, this version of events essentially complements the *Llibre*'s account which has the fleet attempting to land near Peniscola but failing to make any progress due to the castle being held against them, with much of their cargo lost in the process.[936] Such failure demonstrates that James had taken prudent steps against the Tunis fleet, consciously or otherwise. However, that such steps were consciously taken, is confirmed by the words James puts in Ibn Mardanish's mouth upon his offer of surrender, where he labels the failure of the Tunis fleet as the first key reason why further defence of Muslim Valencia was impossible.[937] Here through Ibn Mardanish, James emphasises his strategy to the reader, as clearly as he does earlier in the piece where, using Don Blasco and his own response, he details what his strategy to take Valencia will be.[938] With such prominence afforded to the naval aspect, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that James prudently framed the entire campaign around removing the possibility of Valencia receiving aid from Ifriqiya, its only source of potential succour for a land already cut off and isolated from its neighbours, Christian and Muslim.

The idea that James undertook this strategy also explains his absolute focus upon maintaining control of the sea. While obviously something desirable in any instance, given control of the seas would allow for more effective provisioning of the crusading armies, apparently a recurrent concern for James, the maritime aspect of the campaign is something which features repeatedly in the *Llibre*, and in many and more varied ways than might be expected for a campaign based around

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[935] Ibn Khaldun, vi, p. 285, Ibn 'Idhari, p. 480, al-Maqqari, p. 759. al-Khatib, p. 273 and al-Zarkashi, p. 28 claim Valencia fell before the fleet arrived.
[936] *LdF*, pp. 220-1. When considering this discrepancy between the *Llibre* and the Arabic sources, given the time difference, it seems likely that the Arab authors are at fault, and have substituted Denia for Peniscola because of its reputation as the great dockyard of Andalusia and the usual starting point for contact between Andalusia and the Maghreb: al-Himyari, p. ٧٦ .
[937] *LdF*, p. 223.
[938] *Ibid*. pp. 128- 30.

sieges conducted primarily from land.[939] Similarly it is telling that when assessing the Valencian crusade, Muntaner claimed that James waged war by both land and sea.[940] However, were James to be pursuing control of the sea so as to specifically isolate Valencia, then this maritime focus is easily explicable. For example, it explains why James was so keen to gather a fleet of war galleys, from the outset of the campaign before the walls of Borriana.[941] As the basis of Mediterranean naval warfare throughout the medieval period, the securing of these well-equipped battleships shows James taking concern for more than just defence of supplies, whatever he says in the *Llibre*. After all, with piracy and privateering big business among the Catalans, something made obvious by the 1250 royal decree which attempted to license and control profiteering, the defence of the supply ships from efforts Muslim raiding efforts could have been "outsourced" to merchants and contractors.[942] No, what James was creating was a battle-ready war fleet, ready to intercept whatever organised relief attempts might be mounted. Strong evidence this was the case is his response to the Hafsid fleet's arrival, when James could immediately scramble a scratch fleet of 24 sails, including 10 war galleys to confront the 12 warships and 6 other vessels ranged against them.[943] Significantly, this fleet includes the three galleys which James requisitioned at Borriana, whose state of readiness (idle but prepared to fight at short notice) indicates what their true purpose was. James, in short, was not simply fortunate that he had the resources to counter this fleet, but rather had planned extensively for its arrival, and taken steps across the campaign to ensure it would not catch him unawares.

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[939] On James's concern for supplies during the Valencia campaign see *Ibid*. pp. 136-7, 164, 166-7, 185- 8, 220-1.
[940] Muntaner, p. 34.
[941] *LdF*, pp. 153-4.
[942] For this decree see *DJI*, iii, no. 538, Burns, *Muslims, Christians, and Jews*, pp. 109-25, Bensch, *Barcelona and its rulers*, p. 328.
[943] *LdF*, p. 220.

In addition, concern to minimise the threat Ifriqiya posed helps account for the presence of a war fleet throughout the crusade, and it being kept in a state of battle-preparedness at all times. Throughout the campaign, there are references to a powerful seaborne presence, with well-equipped men from the fleet occasionally making key interventions in the land campaign.[944] The most significant instance of these came at the Battle of El Puig, 15 August 1237, universally regarded by the Muslim commentators as the turning point of the campaign, after which defeat was inevitable.[945] In this, following Desclot's account, the Christian position was rescued following intervention by the armed men of the fleet, who were numerous enough to tip the battle in favour of the crusaders.[946] In the context of a campaign marked by supply issues, the presence of such men in such numbers is telling. Besides the sheer quantities required to sustain such an army, the cost of keeping these men in the field through wages, expenses etc. would have been extremely high.[947] Given James repeatedly emphasises that finances were limited for the crusaders, the question therefore arises as to why the decision was repeatedly made to sustain such expense.[948] This is even more the case given Ibn Mardanish did not oppose James with a substantial naval campaign of his own, judging by the complete absence of any naval engagement in any of account of the crusade. In this light, such a force would better serve the crusade on land, particularly after the Battle of Puig showed its fighting potential. However, allowing for the possibility that this force was being kept in reserve in the event of Hafsid aid arriving for Valencia, means the crusader strategic calculation swung towards continuing to maintain this seaborne force. Indeed, particularly after El Puig, the specific catalyst for Ibn Mardanish to explicitly request aid from Ifriqiya, this naval force fully

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944 E.g. *Ibid*. p. 218 where the besieging force of Boatella is replenished by reinforcements from the navy

945 E.g. al-Himyari, pp. ٣٢-٣, ٤٨-٥٠, al-Khatib, p. 272, al-Zarkashi, p. 27, Ibn Khaldun, vi, p. 283.

946 Desclot, p. 143.

947 Tyerman, *HPC*, pp. 185-203 investigates the expenses incurred in keeping a crusading army in the field.

948 E.g. James at points had to turn to the Military Orders as guarantors for a debt, and borrowed from merchants, while the nobility often complained the cost of the expedition were too great. *LdF*, pp. 154-5, 165, 188, 201, 206-7.

justified its expense with a naval strike from Tunis seemingly that much more imminent.[949] The continued presence of the navy thus demonstrates how a North African shadow hung over the Valencian crusade.

Lastly, the image of James executing his strategy against Valencia with an eye on Ifriqiya helps account for perhaps the most salient feature of the whole campaign; James's "scorched earth" policy to devastate Muslim Valencia. A common technique in crusading warfare, as it was in medieval warfare in general, the destruction it unleashed could have devastating impacts upon the raided, ranging from short-term loss of a harvest to long-term devastation of land.[950] However, while the technique was common, the prominence afforded to the destruction of Valencia's resources in both the Muslim and Christian chronicles is not, and contrasts with the usual interests of medieval military historians, great battles or sieges.[951] On the Muslim side, this is readily explicable because of the immense natural wealth and attractive aspect of pre-conquest Valencia, rendering the destruction a great shock, but is harder to explain on the Christian side.[952] For, the destruction of Valencia's material wealth recurs throughout the *Llibre*, framed as a central part of James's strategy, and was prominent enough in actuality to feature in Bernat Desclot's summary of the campaign.[953] Given the *Llibre*'s purpose as a handbook on how to rule for James's successors, and as a piece of propaganda presenting James as an epic, divinely-inspired hero, this prominence is initially difficult to explain. For example, it seemingly contradicts his earlier statements; James himself explicitly promised at the *curia generalis* at Monzon on 28 October 1236 that the Valencia campaign would not be excessively violent.[954] Moreover, and perhaps more pressingly,

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[949] For Ibn Mardanish's appeal following El Puig see Ibn Khaldun, vi, pp. 283-5, al-Khatib, pp. 272-3, al-Zarkashi, p. 27.
[950] Marshall, *Warfare*, pp. 207-8.
[951] *Ibid*. p. 184.
[952] al-Himyari, p. ٤٧, Abu al-Fida, pp. 178-9 describe Valencia's immense productivity.
[953] *LdF*, pp. 147-8, 181-2, 183-4, 207-8, 227, Desclot, pp. 146-7.
[954] *DJI*, i, no. 239.

foregrounding the destruction meted out by the crusading army undercuts James's claims that, as a chivalric king, he sought not to inflict violence on people soon to be his subjects besides highlighting the ugliest side of medieval conflict.[955] This latter point is particular pertinent given the presence within the campaign of several successful sieges, and in El Puig, one large set-piece battle, any number of which could have been used as foci around which to weave a chivalric narrative.

However, through a strategy of isolating Valencia, making it dependent upon Ifriqiya, and then cutting it of from that source of potential help, the foregrounding of this tactic makes sense. By devastating Valencian territory, James removed the ability of Muslim Valencia to fend for itself, and heightened its dependence on its only viable ally. By then undertaking to cut off that aid, the aim of his naval campaign, James thus ensured Valencia's capitulation. That James undertook this strategy and wished to emphasise it for posterity is evidenced by the several references in the *Llibre* to absence of supplies from Ifriqiya being central to his victory. For example in the speech James makes for Ibn Mardanish, the failure of the Tunisian fleet to resupply Valencia is one of the central reasons why continued defence was impossible.[956] Similarly, in his supposed speech to Ibn Mardanish's ambassador Abulhamelet in which he accepted Valencia's surrender, James again made allusion to the success and hardship effected by his policy of isolating Valencia from all sources of resupply.[957] Yet perhaps even more significant when theorising about the motivations behind James's conduct is the fact the Islamic authors paint an almost identical picture in this regard. Through them, we have the grounds to say that what James presented as a "masterplan" was actually what occurred. For example, Ibn Khaldun is clear that upon receipt of the plea for aid, the Hafsid monarch Abu Zakariya immediately equipped a relief fleet with large amounts of provisions

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[955] E.g. in *LdF*, pp. 209-20, 211-3, 214, 228.
[956] *Ibid*. p. 223.
[957] *Ibid*. p. 227.

(valued at a rhetorical 100,000 pieces of gold), testament to Valencia's plight.[958] Crucially he then states that the failure of that fleet to make land in the face of Christian opposition, and thus its failure to resupply Valencia, was a key factor in the city's capitulation.[959] Similarly, al-Zarkashi gives an almost-identical account, including the claim that the value of the supplies reached 100,000 dinars.[960] Continuing the theme, al-Khatib portrays the fleet's failure to break the Christian blockade as a central part of why the hardships in Valencia became unbearable, and why surrender was unavoidable, a narrative Ibn 'Idhari corroborates almost-identically.[961] In combination, and with the evidence contained in the *Llibre*, this weight of evidence puts beyond doubt the idea that James's prevention of African relief was a central part of the Valencian crusade.

Conclusions

Therefore, it appears that study of the Valencian crusade returns a similar fundamental conclusion to that reached when studying the Holy Land crusade, namely that the horizons within which the crusade occurred were broader than has previously been appreciated. Turning first to the motivations behind why the crusade occurred when it did, it appears the state of the Muslim world, and the isolation of Valencia within it, both in terms of Iberia and North Africa, played a part in why James consented to Gregory's calls for a major expedition when he did. This does not invalidate previous explanations based around events within Aragon, but does complement the picture provided. After all, medieval Aragon did not exist within a vacuum, cut off from its Muslim neighbours, so neither should historical explanations concerning why events unfolded when they did. Similarly, the whole execution of the campaign unfolded with a focus constantly upon the

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[958] Ibn Khaldun, vi, p. 285.
[959] *Ibid.* p. 285.
[960] al-Zarkashi, p. 28.
[961] al-Khatib, p. 273, Ibn 'Idhari, p. 480.

North African littoral, and Hafsid Ifriqiya above all. A dimension to the campaign hitherto unrecognised, the concept that the crusade was undertaken in this light helps explain several aspects of the campaign. For example, previously unexplained aspects of the campaign, such as the decision to maintain a large and expensive war fleet even in the absence of any meaningful Valencian opposition, or the rash decision to go beyond established lines of supply and try and capture Cullera can be convincingly explained. Likewise, casting the net wider allows a fresh perspective upon the aspects of the crusade most taken for granted by modern historians. For example, the violence of the scorched earth tactic, so prominent in all accounts of the expedition, really did have a purpose besides generally inconveniencing Valencia's defenders, while the drive to isolate strategic fortresses was conducted with a view of the sea, and thus had a more specific purpose than is usually realised. That said, in many ways these conclusions are unsurprising. Historians of medieval Aragon have long been aware of the Mediterranean and Africa dimensions to Aragonese politics, witnessed by the awareness of the close links established by James with North Africa, and Ifriqiya in particular, where a consulate was firmly established by the 1250s.[962] Furthermore, given the translations of the Arabic histories of Iberia which exist, there must be some awareness of the persistent flow of Spanish Muslims to North Africa, that being a feature of these sources.[963] What simply remains therefore is to apply knowledge of the links between Iberia and Africa to the crusading impulses encompassed by the "Reconquista", as this chapter has attempted to do for the Valencian crusade.

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[962] E.g. A. Hibbert, 'Catalan Consulates in the Thirteenth Century', *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, 9 (3) (1949), pp. 352-358, C-E. Defourcq, 'Les consulats catalans de Tunis et de Bougie au temps de Jacques le Conquérant', *Anuario de estudios medievales*, 3 (1966), pp. 469-79.
[963] E.g. Ibn 'Idhari, p. 480, al-Khatib, p. 274, Ibn Khaldun, vi, pp. 285, 296.

Chapter 7: The Constantinopolitan Crusade in action, c.1237-40

Lastly among the branches of the Triple Crusade, it remains to discuss the crusade which sought to consolidate the Latin Empire in Greece in the face of real and potential threats from all sides, whether Greek or Bulgarian. The last of the three expeditions to be discussed in this thesis, it has also traditionally been seen by historians as the least of the three campaigns. And indeed there is some merit in this view. For despite the campaign's long gestation and the energy expended on it, not only was it smaller than the contemporaneous crusades to Valencia and the Holy Land, it was also less obviously successful. In part, this resulted from circumstances beyond Baldwin or Gregory's immediate control. For example, in 1237, news arrived that John of Brienne, Baldwin II's father-in-law and erstwhile co-emperor in Constantinople had died, leaving the empire in crisis. In response, the crusading force assembling under Baldwin was split, with part of the army departing in early 1238 under the command of John of Béthune, a leading figure in the Latin Empire who had accompanied Baldwin westward as a counsellor, seeking to reach Greece by the sea route from Venice.[964] However, this force aroused Frederick II's opposition, occupied with prosecuting his unsuccessful siege of Milan at this very moment. For reasons generally attributed to his previous enmity towards John of Brienne, the papal champion, as well as his at-best indifference to the Latin Empire, Frederick refused to allow this crusading force free passage, demanding John give himself up as a hostage in exchange for safe conduct to Italy.[965] Such was done, only for John to die of illness shortly afterwards, following which, devoid of inspiration, the army disintegrated, with some

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[964] Mouskes ii, pp. 626, 630.
[965] *Ibid*. p. 627.

erstwhile *crucesignati* heading to Rome, others elsewhere in Italy, and only a tiny rump travelling to Greece on Venetian galleys.[966]

Faced with this significant setback Baldwin II therefore took the decision, despite the dire straits of Constantinople which remained menaced by Nicaea and Bulgaria, to delay his planned August 1238 departure in order to rebuild his force, backed by theoretical promises of substantial financial assistance from Gregory IX, and large amounts of material aid by Louis IX.[967] With such support, despite the unpromising circumstances, by Pentecost 1239 Baldwin succeeded in gathering a force around himself, mustering it at Melun, where he personally received Louis IX's blessing.[968] Nonetheless, for all the effort that went into creating this army, and despite the chroniclers' assertions that it constituted a vast force, numbers remained down on expectations, especially compared to the forces crusading in Iberia and Outremer.[969] Nevertheless, the lessons of John of Béthune's expedition were learned, with Baldwin establishing friendly relations with Frederick II, thereby enabling free passage through his territories as he took the land route to Constantinople. Even more beneficially, further help came from an unexpected quarter in Bulgaria. There, despite a difficult journey, Baldwin's army was welcomed by the Bulgarian Tsar John Asen, who not only granted it passage through his lands, but even permitted many Cuman nomads to join the force.[970] Thus reinforced, and after overwintering in Constantinople, the crusading army successfully prosecuted a siege of the Thracian fortress-city of Tzurulum in 1240, a victory accompanied by a

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[966] For this episode see e.g. Lower, pp. 150-1, Longnon, pp. 179-80, Du Cange, pp. 251-6.
[967] For Gregory's many orders in this period that financial aid be given to the Latin Empire see *Registres*, ii, nos. 3903, 3936, 3941, 4206, 4209-17, 4605-21, 4631, 4633, 4635, 4672-87 and iii, 5296, 5305. For Louis's support *vide supra*, ch. 3.
[968] Mouskes, p. 663.
[969] E.g. Alberic, p. 946 and Akropolites, p. 58.
[970] Mouskes, pp. 663-4, Alberic, p. 947.

significant naval victory over Nicaea outside the walls of Constantinople the following year.[971] However, such success cannot mask the fact the expedition achieved the least of the three branches of the Triple Crusade. Though evidently no complete failure, whereas the Valencian crusade delivered one of the richest and most prosperous cities of al-Andalus to Aragon, and the Holy Land crusade restored the Kingdom of Jerusalem to its greatest extent since 1187, the Constantinopolitan crusade succeeded only in conquering one fortress-city, which while significant in avenging the defeat suffered by the Franks at its walls in 1237, and for bringing a measure of security to Latin Constantinople, did not fundamentally alter the strategic situation in Greece, with the Latin Empire as dependent as ever upon Western aid for its continued survival.[972] Moreover even this victory was not unmarred, given the simultaneous loss of the Frankish towns of Dakivya and Nikitiaton on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus to Nicaea.[973] Such returns hardly match the enormous effort expended in the long gestation of the campaign.

Following this equivocal success, it is therefore perhaps unsurprising that scholarship on the expedition has been relatively limited, especially compared to the other Mediterranean crusades. Moreover, the expedition was probably always unlikely to garner much historical attention given the short life-span of the Latin empire as a whole, whose demise only 57 years after its creation colours many general accounts of it.[974] Thus, the expedition stood little chance of escaping the twin

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[971] *CM*, iv, pp. 54-5, Akropolites, pp. 57-60. For the naval victory see Martin da Canal, 'La chronicle des Veneciens de maistre Martin da Canal', ed. F.-L. Polidori and G. Galvani, *Archivio storico italiano*, 8 (1845), p. 366, 'Andreae Danduli ducis Venetiarum Chronica per extensum descripta: aa. 46-1280 AD', *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, 2nd series (34 vols., Bologna, 1900-75), xii, p. 298

[972] For the 1237 siege see Akropolites, pp. 55-7. For the effects of Tzurulum's capture see *CM*, iv, pp. 54-5.

[973] Akropolites, p. 59.

[974] eg. N. Tsougarakis, 'The Latins in Greece: A Brief Introduction' in N. Tsougarakis and P. Lock (eds.), *A Companion to Latin Greece* (Leiden, 2015), p. 4 claims Frankish Greece was doomed to failure, while T. Fuller, *The Holy War*, new edn. (London, 1840), p. 145 is scathing about the Latin Empire.

long-established historical binds which work against scholarship on Latin Greece: the legacy of 1204 which often acts as a cut-off point for scholars of Byzantium and the wider Balkans, and the pre-eminent historical focus on the struggle for Church union, which together deflect attention away from the Greek crusades themselves.[975]

Compounding this issue, many of the surviving sources point the historian away from the Latin Empire proper during the period of the Triple Crusade, further lessening the likelihood it would become a subject of especial historical interest. After all, the Latin Empire generated no surviving archival material, while none of the major chronicles written by individuals involved with the Latin Empire draw a particular attention to it in this period. Similarly, the treatment of the Latin Empire during this period in the chronicles written by the Byzantine authors George Akropolites and Nikephoros Gregoras is brief, and naturally privileges the post-1204 Byzantine successor states. On a different note, but having the same effect, direct Venetian territorial interest in the Aegean outside of Crete, Negroponte, Coron and Modon (as opposed to private initiatives by leading Venetian families) was limited during the thirteenth century, as a glance at the records of office-holders in the colonies of the Venetian Empire makes apparent.[976] The Venetian records therefore yield little useful material pertaining to Baldwin II's crusade. Finally, questions about the Latin Empire are hard to answer based off the records of its nearest Catholic neighbour, Hungary, which following the successive Mongol invasions from 1239 had more pressing concerns than the fate of Frankish Greece.

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[975] Works which take 1204 as a terminus point, regardless of whether it is actually the best cut-off date include e.g. J. Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades* (London, 2003), and M. Whitby (ed.), *Byzantines and Crusaders in non-Greek Sources 1025-1204* (Oxford, 2007). For works privileging the search for Church Union see e.g. W. Norder, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz* (Berlin,1903), K. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571)* (4 vols., Philadelphia, 1976).

[976] 'Catalogues des Gouverneurs Vénitiens de la Grèce et des Îles Grecques' in C. Hopf (ed.), *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes Inédits ou Peu Connues* (Berlin, 1873), pp. 371-413.

Following these overlapping factors, the list of available source material for the historian of the Greek component of the Triple Crusade at first glance appears relatively thin. Indeed this ostensibly limited range of primary source material may help explain why secondary accounts of the crusade appear relatively unchanging, and seem to essentially follow Mouskes's version of events, tempered with a changing selection and weighting of other sources. By way of demonstration, Du Cange's description of the campaign is an excellent example, as despite being written in 1657-8, it remains one of the fullest treatments available.[977]

Nevertheless, despite this unpromising historiographical landscape, there remains scope for further study, with the potential to draw new conclusions certain. Like Gregory's two larger Mediterranean expeditions, the Greek Crusade shares the characteristic that new advances can be made by adopting a broad perspective and reassessing the role and influence of agents and phenomena external to the crusaders themselves. For the Greek crusade, this part is filled by the Cumans, and Frederick II's wars with the Lombard League. Like the other branches of the Triple Crusade cannot be properly understood without understanding such external agents, so the Greek expedition cannot be understood without them either. Unlike the Middle Eastern, Andalusian and North African potentates, neither of these are unknown as historical actors: the nomadic Cumans have long been appreciated as agents on the steppes, and then Eastern Europe following their flight before the advancing Mongols, while the literature on the Italian Wars is extensive.[978] Nevertheless, despite general historical awareness of these actors, and their most obvious actions up to 1241, references to them in the literature pertaining to the Triple Crusade are generally passing, and do not fully appreciate their importance to Baldwin's crusade once on campaign, perhaps yet another effect

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[977] Du Cange, pp. 246-79.
[978] On Cumans see e.g. Vásáry, pp. 4-12, Grousset, *Empire of the Steppes*, pp. 185-6, Berend, *passim*. On the Italian Wars see Busk, *Mediæval Popes, Emperors, Kings, and Crusaders*, iii, pp. 411-62, and iv, pp. 1-27, Kantorowicz, *Frederick the Second* trans. Lorimer, pp. 416-40, 459-518, 539-50.

of the expedition not garnering much prior historical attention. Therefore an analysis of the effects of these agents upon the Triple Crusade, whether positive or negative, comprises the body of this chapter.

The Cuman influence

Of these external factors affecting the course of the Greek crusade, the most powerful direct influence was exercised by the Cumans. A diverse collection of nomads, like many nomadic peoples, their origins are hard to trace. Nevertheless by the later eleventh century, although their heartlands lay between the Don and the Volga (following the testimony of the Franciscan William of Rubruck who travelled to the East in 1253-5), the Cumans had likely established a confederacy in the vast area between the Lower Danube and the Irtysh.[979] Certainly this is the point they begin to enter European history, with their first raids on Hungary dated by a later author to 1068, and their first contacts with the Byzantine Empire being recorded by Anna Comnena from the 1070s.[980] Moreover given the size of the territory occupied by the Cumans, their influence extended far beyond Europe. For example Gregoras talks of the Cumans (whom in typical archaising fashion he labels 'Scythians') raiding India, Persia, and the Taurus mountains, besides their involvement in Eastern Europe.[981] Nevertheless, despite their influence, the lack of a central power meant there was no Cuman "state", with Cuman influence on the steppes progressively defeated by the Mongols in

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[979] William of Rubruck, 'Itinerarium' in A. van der Wyngaert *et al.* (eds.), *Sinica franciscana* (9 vols., Quaracchi, 1929-95), i, pp. 194-5, 200, Vásáry, p. 7.
[980] 'Chronici Hungarici composition saeculi xiv', pp. 366-9, *The Alexiad of Anna Comnena*, ed. and trans. E. Sewter (London, 1969), pp. 222, 228-9, 253-61, 262, 300, 305, 449, 462-7.
[981] *Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina historia: Graece et Latine*, ed. L. Schopenus *et al.* (3 vols., Bonn, 1829-55), i, pp. 30-40.

the 1220s and 1230s, forcing them further westwards.[982] Thus they came more decisively into the orbit of the Balkan powers, including the Latin Empire. Followers of an animistic-shamanistic religion, the Cumans were subject to various attempts to convert them to Christianity.[983] However, to judge from the distinctly-pagan burial of the Cuman king Köten in 1241 which involved the sacrifice of 8 arms-bearers and 26 horses, as well as Joinville's description of the Cumans and the Greek Franks sealing their agreement in 1239 by mixing and drinking blood from each of their rulers, and then releasing a dog with both sides hacking at it with swords in order to demonstrate the consequences of breaking the agreement, such efforts could only have been partially successful come the Triple Crusade.[984] Such literary evidence is complemented by the archaeological, with just 16% of all goods found in thirteenth century solitary Cuman graves Western Christian in origin, indicative of the Cumans' non-integration into Christian society.[985] Moreover even those goods with explicitly Christian connotations cannot be taken as firm evidence of conversion, given how deathbed baptisms (often taken as a form of magical protection) of otherwise lifelong pagans could see them buried with Christian symbols.[986]

Nevertheless, despite retaining their paganism, firm links were established with the Cumans by the Latin Empire across the 1230s, suggesting the desperate willingness of the Franks to seek aid

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[982] P. Golden, 'The Quipčaqs of Medieval Eurasia: An Example of a Stateless Adaptation in the Steppes', in G. Seaman and D. Marks (eds.), *Rulers from the Steppe: State Formation on the European Periphery* (Los Angeles, 1991), pp. 132-57, Berend, p. 70.
[983] E.g. 'Relatio fratris ricardi', ed. Deér, pp. 531-42 recounts the Dominican mission sent by Gregory IX to convert the Cumans, while Roger of Apulia claimed Bela IV welcomed the Cumans into Hungary in 1239 in order to christianise them; Roger of Apulia, 'Carmen miserabile', ed. Juhász, pp. 552-3.
[984]Alberic, p. 949, Joinville, pp. 208-9.
[985] Berend, p. 251, A. Pálóczi Horváth, *Hagyományok, kapcsolatok és hatások a kunok régészeti kulturájában* (Karcag, 1994), pp. 160-75.
[986] L. Musset, 'La pénétration chrétienne dans l'Europe du Nord et son influence sur la civilisation Scandinave' in *La conversione al Cristianesimo nell'Europa dell'alto Medioevo* (2 vols., Spoleto, 1967), i, pp. 276-7, 286-7.

from any quarter possible.[987] The most obvious of these links came during the campaigns of 1237. Against a backdrop of rising fear of Nicaea, and under pressure from Gregory IX, who was threatening a crusade against him, the Bulgarian Tsar John Asen decided to quit his previous alliance with John Vatazes, ruler of Byzantine Nicaea and allied himself with the Franks, precipitating a joint attack on the Nicaean-held fortress of Tzurulum in 1237.[988] However, the attack was unsuccessful, as Asen's withdrawal from the alliance following the deaths in quick succession of his wife Anna Maria of Hungary, his young son, and the Bulgarian Patriarch Joachim I, which Akropolites claims Asen interpreted as divine retribution for abandoning his previous Nicaean alliance, meant the Franks and their Italian allies were left with insufficient numbers to carry the town.[989] Nevertheless, despite this failure, the agreement between Asen and the Latin Empire was significant for the involvement of numerous Cuman warriors, who allied with the Latin Empire either through Asen, in whose lands they were exceptionally numerous, or directly themselves.[990] Moreover following this first alliance, links between the Latin Empire and the Cuman leadership were extensively cultivated in the years preceding Baldwin's crusade, witnessed by several marriage alliances undertaken by leading figures in the Empire. Most notable are the marriages of Narjot of Toucy, bailiff of Romania, and regent 1228-31 and 1238-9 to one Liverna, a daughter of the Cuman King Köten following the death of his first wife in 1239 or 1240, the marriage of William of Méry son of the Constable of Romania to a daughter of the Cuman King Saronius, and the marriage of Baldwin of Hainaut to Saronius's other daughter.[991] Following these direct links between the

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[987] Giebfried, pp. 299-300, 322-4.
[988] Akropolites, pp. 50-2, 55, *Registres*, ii, nos. 3156, 3694. Note V. Gjuzelev, 'Bulgarien und das Kaiserreich von Nikaia (1204-1261)', *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*, 26 (1977), p. 150 argues Asen's move was a cynical one, aimed at curbing Nicaean power when at a low ebb due to the disruption caused by the Cumans.
[989] Akropolites, pp. 55-6.
[990] *Ibid*. p. 55, 'Relatio fratris ricardi', ed. Deér, p. 539.
[991] Alberic, pp. 947, 949. For Narjot as bailiff of the empire see letter dated 11 December 1228 to the Venetian Podestá Giovanni Querini in Thiriet (ed.), *Délibérations*, i, p. 30 and the letter dated December 1238 concerning the transfer of the Crown of Thorns to Venice in Riant (ed.), *Exuviae*, ii, no. 61. The Constable of Romania, Geoffrey of Méry is another author of this letter.

leadership of the Latin Empire and two of the Cuman monarchs, it is thus unsurprising that upon Baldwin's return to Greece in 1239 and across the campaign, Cumans accompanied the crusader army, playing an substantial role in the second siege of Tzurulum.[992] It can therefore be said with confidence that Frankish-Cuman links were well-established come the Triple Crusade.

At this juncture, it must be said that this is not *per se* unknown to historians of the Latin Empire in this period; after all Akropolites talks of the Latins being accompanied on crusade by 'an infinite number' of the Cumans.[993] Hence, mentions of the Cuman alliances and the marriage pacts feature in several modern accounts of the expedition.[994] However, despite this general awareness, not one of these authors devotes much space to discussing the Cuman alliance itself and its potential consequences for the Triple Crusade. Indeed, the fullest discussions of the Frankish-Cuman alliance are those which, following Akropolites's lead, present the 1239 Cuman alliance as simply a continuation of the 1237 agreement, supplemented by some extra marriage pacts.[995] While commensurate with the level of general interest in the expedition, this limited analysis fails to do justice to the potential scale of the Cumans' role in determining the shape, course, and outcome of the expedition. Therefore by investigating the extent of the Cumans' influence at various points, the expedition appears in a new light.

For example, focusing on the Cuman alliance can properly answer one of the most basic questions around the campaign, even though it is one that is never explicitly asked: why the Latin Empire took Tzurulum in 1240, given it had failed to take the city in 1237. For at first glance, the force undertaking the first attack was the superior one. Not only did Asen himself attend the 1237

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[992] Alberic, pp. 947, 949, Akropolites, p. 58-9.
[993] Akropolites, *The History*, ed. and trans. Macrides, p. 201
[994] E.g. Lower, p. 156, Wolff, p. 222, Gilles, pp. 200-2, Longnon, pp. 182-3, Du Cange, pp. 271-4.
[995] Akropolites, p. 58, Du Cange, pp. 271-4, Gilles, pp. 200-2.

siege, and presumably with him a sizeable component of the Bulgarian army, but the forces raised for this siege by Latin Greece themselves were likely stronger in 1237 than those collected in 1239/40, given the short duration between the assault on Tzurulum in 1237, and the breaking of the 1235-6 joint Nicaean-Bulgar siege of Constantinople.[996] For in their description of the city's relief, multiple sources are clear the beleaguered Franks were assisted by a sizeable allied force from Achaea. For example, Alberic claims that Geoffrey II of Villehardouin aided the city with a fleet numbering 120 war vessels, and carrying 100 knights, 300 crossbowmen and 500 archers.[997] A similar story appears in Philip Mouskes, who while naming John of Béthune the fleet's commander, states Geoffrey led an army to Constantinople, featuring contributions from all three major Italian mercantile republics.[998] It seems implausible these forces would not have accompanied the armies of the Latin Empire for the Tzurulum campaign. Indeed, it is likely their continued presence provided the manpower stimulus for the Franks to change from a defensive to an offensive mindset. By contrast, large-scale Achaean aid was not forthcoming in 1240 (although Achaean forces had been active around Constantinople in 1238), a weakness compounded by the fact that the crusading army led by Baldwin II constituted a disappointment when compared to the efforts that went into its creation.[999] In that sense there is almost an equivalency between Baldwin and his predecessor John of Brienne, whom Mouskes described as failing to meet the high hopes surrounding his arrival.[1000]

Furthermore, the first siege of Tzurulum occurred at a time when Vatazes was unable to intervene, as Akropolites stated he was fully occupied in defending his eastern territories from the

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[996] Akropolites, p. 55. For a discussion of this siege see J. Langdon, 'The forgotten Byzantino-Bulgar siege of Constantinople, 1235-6, and the breakup of the *entente cordiale* between John III Ducas Vatazes and John Asen II in 1236 as background to the genesis of the Hohenstaufen-Vatazes alliance of 1242', *Byzantina kai metabyzantina*, 4 (1985), pp. 105-33.
[997] Alberic, pp. 938-9.
[998] Mouskes, pp. 615-6, 620-1.
[999] For negative judgements on Baldwin's army see e.g. Lower, pp. 156-7, Lock, p. 62, Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 124-5.
[1000] Mouskes, p. 613.

Seljuks in 1237, again a contrast to 1240 where he was able to undertake diversionary attacks on Frankish territory in Asia Minor.[1001] Thus answers to why the second siege was the successful one are ostensibly hard to find, especially given no other account of the conquest corroborates Akropolites's theory that the town was betrayed by the Italian component within it, a component which in any case would have been equally pressing in 1237, if not more so, given the many Italians involved in that siege.[1002] However, this discrepancy is resolvable by assigning greater weight to the Cuman component of the army. Following the firmer links established with the Latin Empire through the aforementioned marriage alliances, the Cuman force was likely substantially larger in 1240 than the force which accompanied the Franks in 1237. Thus despite the official withdrawal of Asen from the war, reinforcements from this quarter were potentially more numerous in 1240 than in 1237, despite the lack of a direct Bulgarian alliance, meaning the city could be successfully invested. In this light, the crucial factor in the success of the siege was not the Western European army brought by Baldwin, but the nomadic component provided by the Cumans. Indeed, given the weaknesses of the Frankish position in 1240 compared to 1237, Cuman aid must have been substantial indeed. Thus like the Levantine crusade, and despite the silence on this point of historians studying this expedition, the events of the Greek crusade can be seen as partially resulting of the actions of external influences, which here account for the greatest success of the Latin Empire's latter days.[1003]

Likewise, besides explaining why Baldwin's crusade ended as it did, the Cuman influence can be seen to have also exerted a powerful pull on the prior events of the crusade, helping to properly explain many of the odder parts of the expedition which historians have yet to fully untangle.

[1001] Akropolites, pp. 56, 59.
[1002] *Ibid*. pp. 58-9. The other full account of Tzurulum's capture, the letter of Baldwin II to Henry III contained in the *Chronica Maiora*, does not mention a betrayal: *CM*, iv, pp. 54-5.
[1003] *CM*, iv, pp. 54 talks of Frankish rule being restored over an area three day's ride in width due to the victory.

Foremost amongst these moments, giving the Cumans a larger agency, and seeing their contribution as extensive and decisive, helps explain why Asen confounded expectations and quickly aided Baldwin's expedition upon its arrival in his lands, despite the reasons mitigating against such a friendly reception. That Asen received Baldwin generously is incontestable: every source describing Baldwin's passage through Bulgaria is clear he gave them material and military aid.[1004] However, Asen ostensibly had every reason not to favour this army. Aside from being rather small, it was likely further depleted following a difficult passage eastwards, with the well-informed Alberic outlining the loss of several ships within Bulgaria, besides claiming their journey was accomplished only with 'the greatest difficulty'.[1005] Although Mouskes paints a different picture, claiming Baldwin's army crossed the Balkans 'easily and haughtily', Alberic's reading is preferable given the difficulties crusading armies generally had in crossing the Balkans, something typified by the problems encountered by Raymond of Toulouse during the First Crusade or Frederick Barbarossa on the Third Crusade.[1006] Additionally, Mouskes's account lacks detail here making it plausible that his description of an easy trip includes the aid granted by Asen, and so glosses over previous difficulties. Asen therefore was well within his rights, and military capacity, to block the passage of Baldwin's army. Even more pertinently, Asen's relations with the West immediately prior to the crusade were in tatters. Although in spring 1237 Asen had reached out to Rome, offering to enter into communion with it as part of a wider alliance with the West, he reversed this position after he abandoned his alliance with the Latin Empire.[1007] This volte-face subsequently prompted a violent reaction from an enraged Gregory IX, who in January 1238 called upon Bela IV of Hungary to

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[1004] Akropolites, p. 58, Alberic, p. 947. A Bulgar alliance is implied in Mouskes, p. 673.
[1005] Alberic, pp. 946-7.
[1006] Mouskes, p. 664. For Raymond's difficulties see Raymond of Aguilers, *Le 'Liber'*, ed. Hill and Hill, pp. 36-8. For Frederick's difficulties see e.g. 'Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I', ed. A. Chroust in *Monumenta Germania Historica: Scriptores rerum Germanicarum, Nova Series* (25 Vols., Berlin, 1922-2010), v, pp. 28, 30-1, 35-7, 40-5, 53-4.
[1007] *Registres*, ii, no. 3694.

campaign against Asen.[1008] It is therefore easy to see how from Asen's standpoint, Baldwin's force could constitute an enemy army, prompting a hostile reaction, rather than the friendly one actually granted.

Given this situation, historical writing appears somewhat confused, with modern commentators generally discussing Baldwin's reception in Bulgaria only in passing and couching their evaluation of the situation in the language of surprise, without further discussion.[1009] However, by allowing the Cumans a greater role, Asen's behaviour is explicable. Due to the close links between the Latin Empire and the Cumans, he would have known Baldwin stood to be assisted by many of them. After all, Asen had contacted Narjot of Toucy in December 1228 over him potentially inheriting the regency of Constantinople on Baldwin II's behalf, and so it is highly plausible that news of Narjot's marriage and those of the other Frankish lords would have reached him.[1010] Thus irrespective of the size of Baldwin's crusading army, Asen would have been aware that to oppose it was to risk incurring the wrath of the Cumans resident within his lands, whom the report of the Dominican Brother Julian states were numerous, and powerful in war.[1011] Indeed, following the irruption of the Cumans into the Balkans in 1237 ahead of the advancing Mongols, their numbers may have been particularly swollen.[1012] On a related note, as the example of the Cumans in the Kingdom of Hungary shows, whatever nominal sovereignty was asserted over the Cumans, and regardless of the legal privileges extended, ultimate control was difficult. This is witnessed by their attacks on

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[1008] J. Fine, *The late medieval Balkans: a critical survey from the late twelfth century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor, 1987), p. 131.
[1009] E.g. Lower, p. 156, Longnon, p. 182, Rist, *Papacy and Crusading*, p. 133.
[1010] Thiriet (ed.), *Délibérations des assemblées Vénitiennes*, i, p. 30.
[1011] 'Relatio fratris ricardi', ed. Deér, pp. 539-40.
[1012] Akropolites, pp. 53-4. Writing on Hungary, Roger of Apulia, 'Carmen miserabile', ed. Juhász, p. 554 put the number of Cumans entering the land as 40,000 households excluding servants. Note the number 40,000 was a rhetorical devise among late antique authors to indicate great numbers of "barbarians", whom Roger is likely echoing here; see W. Goffart, *Barbarians and Romans A.D. 418-584: The Techniques of Accommodation* (Princetown, 1980), pp. 231-4.

Hungarian goods and women in 1239 (something Asen might have observed closely prior to Baldwin's arrival in late 1239), and their devastation of Hungarian villages in 1241 following the execution of their king Köten for supposedly aiding the Mongol invasion.[1013] Small wonder therefore that faced with this prospect, and irrespective of whether the Cumans had already joined their crusader allies or not, (and given the Cuman alliance is often described as initiated by Asen, the Cumans likely only rendezvoused with Baldwin's army after its arrival in Bulgaria), Asen bowed to the threat hanging over him, and granted Baldwin's army safe passage, despite its reduced status.[1014] Moreover, by so doing he thus appeared to gave explicit consent for the Cumans to join the crusaders, explaining the picture of his actions presented in the source material. Hence, such behaviour by Asen is not disproportionate to the risk posed to him by the crusaders, but entirely logical; after all, as their behaviour in response to Köten's execution shows, the Cumans could undertake military action as a revenge mission, further discouraging him from hindering Baldwin's passage. Thus by assigning the Cumans a role hitherto denied them, one of the most opaque episodes of the crusade can be logically explained, thereby advancing current understanding of the expedition.

Furthermore, the part played by the threat of a Cuman army acting alongside Baldwin II, whether real or imagined, helps to clarify another odd action on Asen's part; his apparent willingness to break his alliance with Vatazes. As Akropolites makes clear, Asen was allied to Nicaea upon Baldwin's arrival, having explicitly renewed the terms of his previous alliance in late 1237 after he had broken with the Latin Empire.[1015] Thus by granting Baldwin aid and consenting to his passage, Asen violated the terms of that agreement, which had included a pledge of mutual

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[1013] Roger of Apulia, 'Carmen miserabile', ed. Juhász, pp. 554, 567-8.
[1014] Wolff, p. 222, Du Cange, p. 270, Longnon, p. 182, Lower, p. 156.
[1015] Akropolites, p. 57.

cooperation.[1016] Without an appreciation of what the Cuman part might be, persuasive explanations of why Asen acted thus have been few: Gilles argued that Asen was breaking the spirit, not the letter, of the agreement by aiding Baldwin, while Fine and Lower attributed Asen's behaviour to him being a political animal, ready to exploit any situation to his advantage, and Wolff claimed Asen never properly returned to his Nicaean alliance, and maintained it only in name.[1017] Yet even on their own terms these explanations are unconvincing. For example all, besides Wolff, fail to answer why Asen was so willing to forsake Vatazes when the territorial situation, changes in which were the spur for him to regret his Nicaean alliance, was the same in 1239 as when the alliance was remade in 1237.[1018] Likewise, Wolff's argument falls down when considering Asen's behaviour in 1237. If he quit the alliance for fear of divine retribution, which seemingly caused three deaths at the centre of Bulgarian power, and two in his own family, why would he risk similar punishment again in 1239? Similarly, if he wanted a looser partnership with Nicaea, why renew the terms of the 1234 agreement in full rather than negotiate a new treaty?

However, by affording the Cumans a separate agency, why Asen acted as he did is fully explicable, and complies with Akropolites's descriptions. If Asen acted for fear of losing control of the Cumans within Bulgaria, many of whom were either allied or potentially allied to Baldwin, his actions could be presented to Vatazes as being acted out under duress, and therefore not necessarily in violation of their agreement. Significantly, this is exactly how Akropolites presented Asen's actions.[1019] In particular Akropolites's use of the words 'supposedly forced by them [the crusaders] to let them past' when explaining Asen's actions is especially interesting, given it suggests such was exactly how Asen justified his actions to Nicaea, as well as the skepticism that the crusaders on

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[1016] *Ibid.* pp. 50-1.
[1017] Gilles, p. 200, Lower, p. 90, Fine, *Late Medieval Balkans*, p. 132, Wolff, p. 221.
[1018] Akropolites, pp. 54-5.
[1019] *Ibid.* p. 58.

their own warranted such actions.[1020] Add the Cuman element however, and such a justification for his actions becomes more believable. Furthermore, if Asen presented his actions as being taken only under the threat of Cuman retribution, why Akropolites described Asen in his obituary as generally-loyal and friendly to Nicaea, a description hard to apply to a man who made and broke a firm alliance on two separate occasions, is explicable.[1021] Finally if Asen's actions in 1239 were taken under duress, a blip in his long-held alliance with Vatatzes to which he immediately reverted after the crisis passed, why Alberic is so scathing when assessing him, and why he described him as a consistent enemy of Latin Greece is explicable.[1022] For following previous historical explanations of Asen's actions which do not allow the Cumans or the threat they posed agency, and following his apparent willingness to ally with the Latin Empire when it suited him, his relationship with the Franks must be considered more equivocal than Alberic allows. Thus, in conjunction with the other considerations outlined, it therefore is right to acknowledge that the Cumans played a vital role in the campaign, as they did in Balkan diplomacy in general. Here, they explain from a second angle why Asen's friendly reception of the crusaders, perhaps the key turning point of the campaign, occurred as it did.

Furthermore, the effects of the Cuman connection to Baldwin's crusaders were not limited to Asen. Though given his immediate proximity to large numbers of Cumans he was the figure most affected by them, it also appears that some of Vatazes's actions over the course of this crusade are best explained with reference to the Cumans. In particular, Vatatzes's apparent fear at the approach of Baldwin's army, and his desperate quest for an alliance with Hungary, which would entail his submission to the Roman Church, are hard to explain without reference to the Cumans.[1023] This is

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[1020] How Akropolites, *The History*, ed. and trans. Macrides, p. 203 rendered 'τω δοκειν υπ αυτων βιασθεντες την εκβολην' found in Akropolites, p. 58.
[1021] Akropolites, p. 60.
[1022] Alberic, p. 949.
[1023] Du Cange, p. 270, note 4.

not because feigned offers of submission by Vatatzes to Rome were unprecedented, with Mouskes recording the story that he wrote to Frederick II on this topic in order to disrupt the passage of Baldwin's crusade, but because the situation in late 1239 would not seem warrant such a response, unless it were taken with one eye on the Cumans.[1024] Prior to Baldwin's arrival, Vatazes had adopted a bullish attitude towards the Latins. Nothing demonstrates this better than his response to Gregory's threatening letter of May 1237. In this, Gregory had written to Vatazes in no uncertain terms informing him that he was now the prime target of an upcoming crusade, a crusade which would be mounted by many powerful individuals, whose numbers could be bolstered by Holy Land *crucesignati* if needed.[1025] In response Vatatzes refused to take a backward step, with his reply refuting the legitimacy of the Latin Empire, and establishing his own divinely-ordained mission to recapture Constantinople, as the only legitimate successor to the Byzantine emperors.[1026] Why Vatatzes would then seek to row back from this position upon Baldwin's arrival is therefore not entirely clear. For sure, he had suffered another reverse outside Constantinople in 1238, where, in a repeat of the events of 1235-6, his siege had been shattered by a relieving Achaean force, but such a defeat was hardly critical, as his ability to mount offensive operations by land and sea in 1240 demonstrates.[1027] Moreover, not only were Vatazes's eastern territories secure, giving him complete freedom of action in 1240, and placing him in a good position to respond to the crusaders, but Baldwin's army was itself hardly overwhelming. A cowed attitude on Vatatzes's part is thus misaligned with the situation on the ground. In resolving this confusion, the timing of Vatazes's letter is key. Written in late 1239, it dates from after the point when Baldwin had passed through Bulgaria, meaning Vatazes would have known he was now facing a force numbering not only westerners, but one supported by significant numbers of Cumans too, even if he was not aware of

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[1024] Mouskes, pp. 642-3.
[1025] *Registres*, ii, no. 3693.
[1026] V. Grumel, 'L'authenticité de la letter de Jean Vatatzès, empereur de Nicée au pape Grégoire IX', *Échos d'Orient*, 29 (1930), pp. 450-8.
[1027] Mouskes, pp. 633-4, Akropolites, pp. 59-60.

exact numbers. Surely remembering the devastation done by previous Cuman incursions into Nicaean territory, it is therefore no surprise that Vatatzes made this peace offer, and went as far as he did.[1028] Although nothing came of this gambit, preparations for the crusade being far too far advanced to allow for anything other than an assault on Nicaean territory, this episode nevertheless reveals the extent to which the Cumans' shadow hung over the campaign. Able to exercise an influence over both Asen and Vatazes alike, in addition to the fact that they made successful large-scale crusader offensive action possible, it therefore seems that to continue to approach the expedition without reference to the Cumans is to overlook one of the leading actors in events.

The complex role of Frederick II and the choice of route

Large as the influence exercised by the Cumans was, they were not the only external player whose actions directly shaped the course of the Triple Crusade in Greece. Although not personally involved in the campaign, Frederick II likewise played a major part in the campaign. As with the Cumans, in and of itself, this is hardly unexpected. After all, through his notorious obstruction of the relief force sent to Greece under the command of John of Béthune, whose death shortly after leaving imperial captivity caused his army to disintegrate, Frederick helped mould the crusade as a whole, by putting the full focus squarely upon Baldwin II, and what he could achieve with the forces he assembled.[1029] Thus, it is no surprise that much ink has been expended on Frederick II's relationship with the Latin Empire, and why he might be prepared to oppose expeditions sent to aid it. For example, much has been made of the fact the Greek crusade was summoned by Gregory IX, with whom Frederick was in near-constant conflict, and initially benefitted John of Brienne, Latin

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[1028] *Nicephori Gregorae Byzantina historia*, ed. Schopenus *et al.*, i, pp. 36-7, Akropolites, p. 53-4.
[1029] Mouskes, pp. 626-7, 632-3, 643.

co-Emperor until his death in 1237, a notorious papal champion and Frederick's enemy.[1030] This personal hostility towards John was in turn compounded by the fact that as Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick naturally was threatened to some degree by another claimant to an imperial title based in Constantinople, a fear validated at the First Council of Lyons, 1245, where Frederick II was declared deposed, and Baldwin II raised up in his place at the Pope's right hand.[1031] Finally, Frederick's attitude towards the Triple Crusade has been seen as ambivalent due to the ongoing Lombard wars in Northern Italy, which commanded his attention, the attention of the German nobility, and the Lombard people.[1032]

However, it appears that upon closer inspection of the events that these explanations, even in combination, cannot tell the full story of Frederick's involvement with the Greek crusade. Above all, there is the problem that while Frederick blocked John of Béthune's progress, similar hindrance was not offered to Baldwin II, who passed freely through his lands on his way to Constantinople.[1033] This undermines current evaluations of Frederick's attitude to Frankish Greece. In particular, all the explanations given to explain why he was reluctant to aid the Latin Empire were as applicable in 1239 as they had been the previous year, and perhaps even more so given Frederick was now aiding Baldwin II directly, a figure anathema to him as a papal champion, son-in-law of John of Brienne, and rival Emperor in the West. Furthermore, Frederick's cooperation with the crusade was even less likely when Baldwin arrived in 1239 than the previous year, given Frederick was under sentence of excommunication from late March 1239.[1034] In resolving this bind,

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[1030] E.g. Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, pp. 85, 89, 117. For John of Brienne as a papal champion see Perry, *John of Brienne*, pp. 141-9 and 'Lettre de Grégoire IX', ed. van den Gheyn, pp. 231-2, where he is called an 'athlete of Christ'. Gregory described James of Aragon thus too.
[1031] Lock, pp. 172-3, Chrissis, *Crusading in Frankish Greece*, p. 88, Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant*, i, p. 44. See Wolff, pp. 224-5 for the Council of Lyons.
[1032] Lower, pp. 40-1.
[1033] Alberic, pp. 946-7, Mouskes, pp. 663-4, Akropolites, p. 58.
[1034] *CM*, iii, pp. 533-6.

historians have generally followed Mouskes's explanation, who states that Baldwin departed armed with a letter from his cousin Louis IX threatening reprisals against Frederick if he opposed him, something Frederick supposedly dared not risk.[1035] While just possible, there are several reasons to doubt that this explanation tells the whole truth. For one, despite having been forced to raise the siege of Brescia in October 1238, Frederick II remained near the height of his powers in 1239, with Milan under siege, its army shattered following the Battle of Cortenuova, November 1237.[1036] What Louis was proposing to do in the event of his non-cooperation, and what Frederick therefore had to fear, is thus unclear. For all their family relations, it seems most unlikely that Louis would have risked war with the most powerful monarch in Europe over his cousin's small crusade. Secondly, Louis IX was still only 25 in 1239 and, having only begun to emerge from his mother's shadow as king in his own right in 1234, was therefore hardly the powerful and respected monarch he would later become. Indeed, from an Imperial vantage point, Louis might have appeared to barely have been king in his own lands. After all, his kingdom had been wracked by noble conflict during the so-called "Wars of Champagne" for the best part of a decade, a conflict whose embers retained they ability to spark to life across the 1230s, witnessed by Peter of Dreux's rebellion in 1236.[1037] The idea that a mere threat was enough to overcome Frederick II's many valid objections to the Latin Empire therefore seems unlikely. Overall, the idea that Louis IX in isolation, possessed sufficient personal and international authority to oblige Frederick II to consent to Baldwin's passage seems to

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[1035] Mouskes, pp. 663-4, and hence Du Cange, p. 266, Longnon, p. 182 and Lower, pp. 155-6.
[1036] For the Siege of Brescia see 'Annales Placentini Gibellini', ed. G.Pertz, in *MGH-SS*, xviii, pp. 479-80. For Cortenuova see *CM*, iii, pp. 407-10, 442-4.
[1037] For the fullest descriptions of the "Wars of Champagne" see E. Berger, *Histoire de Blanche de Castille: reine de France* (Paris, 1895), pp. 145-97, Richard, *Saint Louis*, pp. 88-96 and Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, pp. 55-88. For the 1236 rising see Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, pp. 92-4.

play more to the French national historiographical tradition of Louis as a saint-king, than to the actual limits of his power in the 1230s.[1038]

Thus, there must be another factor behind Frederick's ever-changing policy towards the Greek branch of the Triple Crusade, and why Baldwin II was permitted to pass and not John of Béthune. In answer to this riddle, is just possible that like Asen and Vatatzes, Frederick was swayed by the threat of Cuman reprisals in the event of him molesting Baldwin II. After all, the Latin Empire's links with them were more firmly established in 1239 than the year before, potentially explaining a shift in Frederick's behaviour. However, given the contemporary sources consistent describe Baldwin as a somewhat meek and humble figure, concerned above all to aid his beleaguered patrimony, that he would potentially jeopardise that mission by making such an outlandish threat against Frederick II, while his carefully cultivated army was vulnerable to imperial attack, seems highly unlikely.[1039]

Hence, another reason is needed to properly explain Frederick's behaviour, a reason which likely was the progress of the Italian Wars, and the way the Greek crusade potentially intersected with them. For far beyond the general blanket statement that the Lombard Wars hindered the Triple Crusade by undermining recruitment in the Empire and Northern Italy, the specific way the Triple Crusade to Greece potentially intersected with them can convincingly explain Frederick's changing behaviour towards the crusading armies. In particular, this can be seen in the different routes the two armies proposed to take to Greece, as this easily explains their contrasting receptions. For

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[1038] For how Louis the saint subsumed Louis the man see e.g. M. Tyvaert, 'L'image du roi: légitimité et moralité royales dans les histoires de France au XVIIe siècle', *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 21 (1974), pp. 521-547, A. Knobler, 'Saint Louis in French Political Culture', in L. Workman and K. Verduin (eds.), *Medievalism in Europe II* (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 156–173, and M. Gaposchkin, *The Making of Saint Louis: Kingship, Sanctity, and Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (Ithaca, 2008).

[1039] *CM*, iii, pp. 480-1, Mouskes, pp. 621, 630, 642-3, 661.

following the offer by Jacopo Tiepolo, Doge of Venice, made before 16 January 1236 to transport all the crusaders to Greece for free, Gregory had instructed William of Cordelle to direct all the *crucesignati* for Greece thither.[1040] Hence, when called upon to send aid to his patrimony as an emergency measure, Baldwin naturally directed the army led by John of Béthune to take that road.[1041] After all, as is clear from Mouskes and Akropolites, for all the funds raised from various sources, Baldwin's crusade was always short of hard cash, so he was hardly going to refuse an offer of free transport.[1042] However, the passage to Venice from France necessitated crossing the Alps, thereby bringing the army close to the scenes of intense fighting in Northern Italy, indeed far too close for Frederick's comfort. This is something Mouskes, who twice links Frederick's reticence to allow the army free passage to the slow progress of the siege of Milan, alludes to.[1043] Moreover, by departing from Venice, which had recently broken its alliance with Frederick II, not only was this crusade now organised by Frederick's nemesis Gregory IX, on behalf of a potentially hostile power, but it also put many armed men on a fleet manned by Frederick's actual enemies, who had just been made an offer by Gregory IX to invade the *Regno* themselves and thereby extend their trading privileges thither.[1044] Hence, small wonder Frederick was suspicious of the expedition, and demanded tough safeguards to allow the expedition's passage.[1045] Nor were Frederick's fears were entirely misplaced; after John of Béthune's death and the collapse of the army not only did many erstwhile *crucesignati* head to Rome to seek financial aid from the pope, but several headed to Milan, where they joined the anti-imperial forces.[1046] Therefore, it seems plausible to claim the principal reason for Frederick's opposition to the crusade in 1238 rested on the risk it posed to his

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[1040] *Registres*, ii, no. 2909.
[1041] Mouskes, pp. 626-7, 630.
[1042] *Ibid*. p. 627, Akropolites, p. 58.
[1043] Mouskes, pp. 626-7, 645.
[1044] For the end of the Imperial-Venetian accord see Abulafia, *Frederick II*, p. 340.
[1045] Mouskes states Frederick required 100 gold marks from John of Béthune in exchange for safe passage: Mouskes, pp. 626-7.
[1046] *Ibid*. pp. 633, 643.

Italian campaigns, granting those campaigns an influence over the course of the Triple Crusade in Greece not yet fully realised.

This seems especially likely when the evidence from the land-based expedition led by Baldwin himself is factored in. Although Akropolites states that Baldwin took the overland route because he lacked the funds to pay for maritime transport, there is no positive evidence for this, given the Venetian offer of free transport was apparently never rescinded.[1047] Indeed, it is plausible that by framing Baldwin's overland expedition thus, Akropolites was deliberately contrasting it with John of Brienne's journey to Constantinople in 1231, which he claimed was undertaken by sea because John was well-funded, but lacked the manpower to force the land passage through Epirus.[1048] Combined with Akropolites's distance from the events described here, which likely meant he never knew of the offer of free transport, there is therefore every reason to seek an alternative reason for Baldwin's choice of route. This reason was surely Baldwin's reticence to take the maritime route through Italy for fear of provoking the same response from Frederick as befell John of Béthune. Although shy and humble, Baldwin was no fool, and as his later career demonstrates, possessed a marked ability to learn from previous mistakes.[1049] For though the overland route still necessitated journeying through Imperial territory, by not entering Italy, Baldwin's army explicitly posed no danger to the Italian Wars, which had reached something of a stalemate by 1239.[1050] Indeed, by gathering at Melun and studiously remaining north of the Alps, passing through imperial territory in Austria, Baldwin could present himself as having deliberately avoided Cisalpine Italy and the conflict there.[1051] Thus for all the reasons for Frederick to opposed Baldwin's passage, because Baldwin posed no possible threat, his safe conduct was assured. Moreover, there were numerous

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[1047] Akropolites, p. 58.
[1048] *Ibid*. p. 45.
[1049] For Baldwin as a monarch see Giebfried, *passim*.
[1050] Abulafia, *Frederick II*, p. 341.
[1051] Mouskes, p. 663, Akropolites, p. 58.

reasons in favour of the maritime route, including though potentially not limited to; the free passage offered by Venice, the greater speed of the journey by sea, the difficulty of passing through the Balkans, and the possibility of picking up aid from Achaea *en route*.[1052] Thus only a powerful force could have persuaded Baldwin to spurn these potential advantages. However, the Italian Wars, and their effect upon John of Béthune's expedition through their influence upon Frederick's behaviour, a repetition of which Baldwin was keen to avoid, potentially fill this role well. Thus just as with the case of the Cumans, one is led back to the view that a full understanding of the Triple Crusade to Greece can only be achieved by taking a wider view, factoring in events external to the crusade proper.

Conclusions

Therefore, just as with its Holy Land and Valencian counterparts, the Triple Crusade in Greece cannot be fully understood without reference to events and actors outside the theatre of crusading itself. Whether those influences stemmed from the Cumans, or from Frederick II's preoccupation with the Italian wars, Baldwin II's crusade was buffeted by winds outside its strict control, winds whose effects touched Asen and Vatatzes as much as Baldwin and his forces. In particular, the immense Cuman contribution to the enterprise both in itself and through the threat they potentially posed, helps to explain the overall success of the crusade, alongside the apparently illogical stances taken towards the expedition by Asen and Vatazes. Moreover it does so while fully explaining the picture given of the protagonists in the sources. For example, a strong and influential Cuman alliance explains why Mouskes is so complementary about Bulgar horsemen, and why Narjot of

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[1052] This last point is particularly plausible given some of John of Béthune's *crucesignati* travelled to Achaea. See Mouskes, pp. 633-4.

Toucy was so sorely grieved at Asen's death in 1241, despite the previous wars against Bulgaria.[1053] Similarly it accounts for why Alberic in his entry for 1241 related the tale of a prophecy made in Constantinople by a university master that 'rex inimicos, Perdet iniquos, Non per amicos', a prophecy realised by Baldwin on the Triple Crusade, as the hostile kings Asen and Vatatzes were subdued not with the help of friends, but with Cuman aid, who as pagan were therefore not friends of Christ.[1054] Simultaneously, giving a role to the Italian Wars helps explain why Frederick allowed Baldwin to pass unopposed where he hindered John of Béthune, and why Baldwin rejected all the potential advantages seemingly offered by a sea passage to Greece, in favour of the overland route. Therefore, this analysis of the Greek branch of the Triple Crusade, may even argue for a broad, perhaps even "global" approach to crusade scholarship, going above and beyond the Mediterranean-centric view taken of the other expeditions of the Triple Crusade, given the extent of Cuman influence, a people who in no way can be regarded as truly "Mediterranean".[1055] All of this would be missed, were the parameters of historical study strictly restricted to the horizons of the expedition itself.

[1053] Mouskes, p. 674.
[1054] Alberic, p. 949.
[1055] For the "global" approach to medieval history see P. Frankopan, 'Why We Need to Think About the Global Middle Ages', *Journal of Medieval Worlds*, 1 (1) (March 2019), pp. 5-10.

Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks

In the end, for all the effort invested in all three campaigns, the Triple Crusade's successes proved short-lived. Most dramatic was the case of Latin Greece. Although the capture of Tzurulum granted a measure of short-term security, the Latin Empire remained extremely vulnerable, reliant on foreign support, a fact reflected in Baldwin's repeated trips westward after 1241.[1056] Essentially, it remained only one serious defeat away from collapse, a blow dealt in 1259, following the destruction of the Sicilian-Achaean force by Nicaea and its Cuman allies at the Battle of Pelagonia, which saw many of Achaea's nobles killed or imprisoned, including Prince William.[1057] Shorn of its only realistic defender, the Latin Empire quickly folded, ending not with a bang, but a whimper, as Constantinople fell without a fight to opportunistic Nicaean troops under Alexius Strategopoulos on 25 July 1261.[1058] Thereafter, despite the efforts of the next two decades, and the long afterlife of the title "Emperor of Constantinople", never again would a Latin rule there.[1059] Though the end was not so swift, the situation was similar in Outremer. Restored to its fullest size since 1187, its revival was ephemeral, with its Damascene alliance leading it to calamitous defeat at the hands of an Egyptian-Khwarazmian force at the Battle of La Forbie in October 1244, from which Outremer suffered grievous losses, both in manpower and territory.[1060] Reeling, Outremer's pitiful state provoked a significant response in the West, centred around Louis IX, whose subsequent crusade was perhaps the largest and the best-organised ever. Nevertheless, the crusade was a catastrophic failure, whose

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[1056] For Baldwin's trips to the West after 1241 see Giebried, pp. 10-1, 259-61, 289-96.
[1057] D. Geanakoplos, 'Greco-Latin Relations on the Eve of the Byzantine Restoration: The Battle of Pelagonia, 1259', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 7 (1953), pp. 123-34 details the Battle of Pelagonia.
[1058] Akropolites, pp. 182-3.
[1059] The last titular claimant to the Latin Empire was James of Baux (d. 1383). For the descent of this title see Lock, pp. 66-7.
[1060] On La Forbie and its aftermath see e.g. S. Runciman, 'The Crusader States, 1243-1291' in K. Setton *et al.* (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, 2nd edn. (6 Vols., Madison, 1969-89), ii, pp. 562-5, Tyerman, *God's War*, pp. 770-1.

most significant consequence was to enable the rise of the Mamluks, who overthrew the sultan Turanshah in 1250.[1061] Embracing their responsibilities as Egyptian sultan towards *jihad* with the zeal of the neophyte, this dynasty's rise proved fatal to the Crusader states: despite the disruption caused by the Mongol invasions, their territory was reduced until limited to the environs of Acre, which fell in flames in 1291.[1062] Even in Valencia, victory during the Triple Crusade proved no guarantee of ultimate success. Though Valencia never again escaped Aragonese control, the project of pacifying wider Muslim Valencia took decades. A huge acquisition for Aragon, the Kingdom of Valencia never attracted the immigrants from Aragon and Catalonia necessary to secure the territory, and with a Muslim majority and no Mozarabic population to facilitate Valencia's integration, the territory witnessed rebellion in each successive decade until the 1270s.[1063] Indeed, James would not live to see Valencia's final pacification, that deed falling to his son.

Nevertheless, whatever the fleeting positive effects of the Triple Crusade for the Latins, it is right to label the Triple Crusade a "success", on every front. By some way the largest expedition to ever reach Latin Greece, and having captured its objective of Tzurulum, what more Baldwin II could reasonably have achieved is hard to tell. Though Nicaea retook Tzurulum in 1247, and Constantinople fourteen years later, neither failure can be traced back to the Triple Crusade.[1064] For all historians have argued otherwise, Latin Greece's failure was not inevitable, and a situation where Nicaea failed outside Tzurulum in 1247, or the fragile Epirote-Achaean alliance held at Pelagonia in 1259, precipitating the Latin Empire's revival is readily imaginable. Then, the Triple Crusade would constitute the first tentative steps of revival, and not the dying of the light. Similarly, were defeat avoided at La Forbie, it is easy to imagine Outremer's renaissance continuing. After all,

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[1061] Joinville, pp. 145-7 describes Turanshah's deposition and murder.
[1062] R. Crowley, *Accursed Tower: The Crusaders' Last Battle for the Holy Land* (New Haven, 2019), pp. 40-215.
[1063] Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders*, pp. 19, 22, 25, 327-37.
[1064] Akropolites, p. 85 describes the 1247 conquest of Tzurulum.

in their negotiations with Damascus and Aleppo preceding the campaign the Franks secured the right to practice their religion in the *haram al-sharif*, something al-Kamil never conceded, indicating the strength of their position by the early thirteenth century, alongside the rights to various lands in Egypt, meaning there would be a further expansion in Frankish power were Egypt defeated.[1065] Outremer would thus be more able to resist any resurgent Mamluk-dominated Egypt, if they ever came to power. Moreover, fierce in battle as the Khwarazmians were, they were not invincible, as al-Mansur of Homs's shattering victory over them on 18 May 1246 testifies.[1066] Victory at La Forbie is thus plausible. Were that the case, then as in Greece, the Triple Crusade would represent another step in a process of expansion. Likewise, it is difficult to see what else James could have done regarding Valencia, having avoided major setbacks all campaign. As the timeframe for the pacification of Valencia makes apparent, such a campaign far surpassed the initial campaign of (re)conquest, which is what the Triple Crusade constituted. Thus as the Triple Crusade cannot be credited with the future success in Valencia, so too it cannot be tarred by any future failings.

If for no other reason, it is worth emphasising how far the Triple Crusade met its objectives to show how exceptional in one sense it is amongst the campaigns collectively labelled "The Crusades". Indeed, besides the leaders of the Triple Crusade, apart from the leaders of the First Crusade and certain Iberian monarchs, every notable historical figure associated with the crusades failed in their endeavour: Louis VII failed to restore Edessa or take Damascus, *Coeur-de-lion*, Philip Augustus, Frederick Barbarossa, Emperor Henry VI, Andrew II, John of Brienne, the legate Pelagius, and Louis IX all failed to retake Jerusalem, Frederick II failed to secure his authority over a revived Kingdom of Jerusalem, and Edward I merely bought time for the dying Outremer.

[1065] C. Cahen, 'La Chronique des Ayyoubides d'al-Makin ibn al-'Amid', *Bulletin d'études orientales*, 15 (1955), p. 155, Humphreys, p. 274.
[1066] Humphreys, p. 287.

Likewise, besides the Triple Crusade, every Greek crusade launched after 1204 failed to achieve anything of note. Against this litany of failure, the Triple Crusade stands out for having ended in widespread victories, and on this simple basis alone suggests the expeditions merit more interest than they have previously garnered.

Yet the Triple Crusade merits a higher profile in historical study than currently so for reasons beyond its exceptional success. For example, closer study of the expeditions' specifics illuminates many different aspects of the campaigns themselves. To name merely a few areas this thesis has touched upon, a detailed investigation of the Triple Crusade reveals the central part James I, Henry III and Louis IX played in financing and recruitment all three campaigns, the multi-faceted role of the Church both as a supplier of funds and manpower, the involvement of every facet of medieval revenue-raising in crusading, the conception of the crusades of the 1230s as equal parts of a genuinely Europe-wide mobilisation, as well as suggesting a vital role for external agents in determining how and why the all three expeditions unfolded as they did. In every case, this extends previous knowledge. Yet besides revealing the specifics of the Triple Crusade, close study of the movement raises points of interest across a range of historical phenomena. In that sense, to shine a light inwards on the expeditions is to simultaneously shine a light outward upon wider crusade historiography. In this, the Triple Crusade is almost uniquely well-placed. For instance, being located at one of the apparent changing points in how crusade preaching was organised, the Triple Crusade marks an ideal case study from which to interrogate the deeper motivations behind that decision, as well as to assess the radical nature or otherwise of that choice. Similarly, containing within it the huge extension of vow redemptions, alongside established methods of revenue-raising, the Triple Crusade constitutes an interesting study into the nature of historical change in crusade financing. Likewise, the similarities between the armies that assembled in the late 1230s, but also the noticeable differences raises questions over how far crusades can be truly regarded as a separate

category of warfare in reality, alongside questioning whether one can ever talk of a general "typical" crusading army. For what study of it can add to wider scholarship, the Triple Crusade's low profile in crusade historiography therefore seems unwarranted.

In that sense, what this thesis hopes to achieve is to provoke crusade historians into asking new questions of their subject material potentially, but not necessarily, using the wide-angle approach this thesis takes. For example, given a perspective on the crusades which incorporates their non-crusading neighbours suggests that such players played a huge role in the unfolding of these expeditions, are similar actions visible in other crusades? For example, what might the successes of the First Crusade owe to the crusaders' ability to negotiate across religious lines? Ditto the Cumans appear to have remained dominant players in Balkan politics beyond the 1230s. How they did this, in the face of the Mongol invasions which apparently reached the walls of Constantinople itself, is a question worth asking.[1067] Likewise, Valencia was only one front of the Iberian crusades. Given how far James undertook the campaign with an eye on North Africa, it is therefore pertinent to ask whether similar actions are visible in the other, similar campaigns, such as the conquest of Seville, 1248. Similarly, Gregory IX can be seen in the Triple Crusade unleashing warfare on three fronts across the Mediterranean. Demonstrating his capacity to think in a pan-Mediterranean way, this evidence could be used to inform approaches to the great political struggle of the age; his contest with Frederick II. At least, presenting Gregory in this Mediterranean context appears more persuasive than, for example, Lower's portrayal of him as seeking a pan-Christendom monarchy, whose paradigm that such a monarchy was undermined by divergent local reactions to taking the cross fails to convince, diversity in response to the crusade message featuring in all crusades.

[1067] 'Anonymi Chronicon Austriacum' in *Rerum Austriacarum Scriptores*, ed. A. Rauch (3 vols., Vienna 1793-4), ii, p. 245. For the Mongol invasion of Greece in general see J. Giebfried, 'The Mongol invasions and the Aegean world (1241–61)', *Mediterranean Historical Review,* 28 (2013), pp. 129-39.

Applying the general broad perspective outside the actual expeditions themselves, it could be asked whether the process of gradual evolution evident in the choice of crusade preachers recurs at the other changes in those personnel, including, for example, the adoption of the Paris-trained *magistri*. Contrastingly, turning to recruitment, the Triple Crusade exemplifies how the crusade message circulated much more widely than the papal documentation relating specifically to the preaching campaign would suggest, and that participation in the crusade, whether forced or not, could be a key feature of local politics, even on Europe's peripheries. The question of whether this was unique to the 1230s, or more generally applicable is an interesting one regardless of the conclusion reached, and remains unanswered. In sum, old-fashioned as studying the wider political, financial, diplomatic and military contexts of individual crusades is, nevertheless such study can still illuminate anew these fascinating events which occupied the lives so many people, both in themselves, and in the activities associated with them. As new approaches to the crusades proliferate, this is a fact worth recalling.

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Appendix: Lists of participants in the Triple Crusade

The following list of *crucesignati* is arranged firstly by the theatre of crusading in which the individual is known to have participated, and then, each section has been divided by nation. In the section on English *crucesignati*, the lists have been divided also by expedition. Where there is a clear and known modern equivalent, toponyms have been given in their modern forms. There can be no pretence in this thesis that these lists of names are either completely accurate or final, and it seems implausible that as more evidence is discovered and assessed, more names will not also be discovered. It is however hoped that there is a strong evidence basis to the inclusion of all the names in these lists. To that end, after every entry on this list, there is included a very brief guide to some of the clearest primary evidence that has underpinned the inclusion of that individual in this appendix. The exceptions are to certain of the best-known figures who reappear numerous times in much of the source material for the expeditions and about whom there has been extensive secondary writing. In these cases, the references found are to some of the leading secondary literature on that person. On titles, this list follows the forms of address given in the sources. Where no title is given in the sources, no title is provided here.

In terms of what justifies the labelling of an individual a *crucesignatus/a*, there are several potential paths. For example, identification by name in the chronicle evidence has been deemed sufficient evidence to justify inclusion. By the same token in the case of the Valencian crusade, being either a a witness to or beneficiary of one of James I's charters that were issued while on campaign has been seen as enough evidence for inclusion in this list. However, most of the crusaders identified for the Valencian crusade are known solely from the *Libre del Repartiment*, issued after its conquest. At the very least, this document confirms the individuals named were to be

involved in the expansion of Aragon, which given Gregory's letter of 8 January 1239 that all who defended Valencia would earn a full crusading indulgence, equal to that of the Holy Land, seems enough to justify inclusion here.[1068] In any case, the *Llibre del Repartiment* was an opportunity for James to reward those who served with distinction in some capacity during the campaign, making it likely that inclusion in this document implies participation in the crusade. That said, collective bodies, such as monasteries or other religious houses from which no individual figure was mentioned in the *Llibre del Repartiment* have not been included here. Outside of the Valencian campaign, inclusion in this list is based on the taking of a crusading vow, and so it is possible that there are individuals here who did not actually serve in person, regardless of their best intentions. Given the impossibility of separating in many cases a vow from the result of that vow, for this problem I must beg the reader's pardon.

[1068] *Registres*, ii, no. 4703.

1. Participants in the Valencian Crusade

Aragonese *crucesignati*

1. A. Arnaldi of Montalbán: *LdR*, i, no. 1151.
2. A. Arnaldi of Montpellier: *LdR*, i, no. 826.
3. A. Batle from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.
4. Abrahim, son of Vives, alfaquim: *LdR*, i, no. 802.
5. Abu Zayd, former ruler of Valencia [naturalised Aragonese] and his 52 men: *DJI*, no. 236, *LdR*, i, nos. 561-2, 1167.
6. A. d'Àger of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 157.
7. A. d'Altafulla: *LdR*, i, no. 176.
8. A. d'Altet from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.
9. Adam, porter of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 354.
10. A. de Aguiló: *LdR*, i, no. 175.
11. A. de Biosca: *LdR*, i, no. 455.
12. A. de Estiu: *LdR*, i, no. 683.
13. A. de Fabrègues: *LdR*, i, no. 1262.
14. A. de Figueres, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.
15. A. de Fonolleres: *LdR*, i, no. 543.
16. A. de Fontova, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 912.
17. A. de Huescar, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.
18. A. de Hugeto of Bergua: *LdR*, i, no. 336.
19. A. de Lach, provost of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 317.
20. A. de Meitat from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

21. A. de Raimunda, from Empúries: *LdR*, i, no. 518.
22. A. de Sanaüja: *LdR*, i, no. 644.
23. A. de Vernet: *LdR*, i, no. 417.
24. A. Ferrer of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 198.
25. A. G. from Tremp: *LdR*, i, no. 1028.
26. Alaçar, jew, son of Açecri Abiniuçef, of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 1334.
27. Alaçer Albufach, a Jew of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 314.
28. Amat Março from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
29. Anaia ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.
30. Andrew Benecasa of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 379.
31. Andrew of Bolea: *LdR*, i, no. 1053.
32. Andrew of Òdena: *LdR*, i, no. 1002.
33. Andrew of Retascho from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
34. Andrew, son of G. de Monzón: *LdR*, i, no. 1015.
35. A. of Clariana: *LdR*, i, no. 1083.
36. A. of Montcada: *LdR*, i, no. 345.
37. A. of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 175.
38. Aparicio ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
39. A. Pelicer of Lleida: *LdR*, i, nos. 175, 494, 1025.
40. A. Peter de Estiu: *LdR*, i, no. 683.
41. A. Raymundi, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.
42. Arnald of Rocafolio: *DJI*, no. 292.
43. Arnald, secretary of the bishop of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 1247.
44. Arnald Seinoro from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
45. Artal de Alagón: *DJI*, nos. 253-6, 258, 260-1, 277, *LdR*, i, no. 223, *LdF*, pp. 191, 196-7.

46. Artal de Alagón, son of Don Blasco: *LdF*, p. 235.
47. Artal de Luna: *DJI*, nos. 243-4, 249, 264, 266, 269-73, 275, 277, *LdR*, i, nos. 1, 1233, *LdR*, ii, no. 38.
48. Artal of Foces: *LdR*, i, nos. 131, 147, 779, *LdR*, ii, no. 57.
49. Asalito de Gudal: *DJI*, nos. 250, 252-5, 258-60, 273, 275, *LdR*, i, nos. 413, 992, 1360-1, 1422.
50. Assalit de Gúdar: *DJI*, no. 251, *LdF*, pp. 232-4, 237.
51. Astruc of Belmont, Master of the Temple: *LdF*, p. 237.
52. Astruc, 'sartre' of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 771.
53. A. the porter: *LdR*, i, no. 815.
54. A. Tiho of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 201.
55. Aznar Cofiero from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
56. Badia de Laselva, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.
57. Bafiel, *alfaquim* of the Lord King: *LdR*, i, nos. 26, 1471.
58. Bahiel, *alfaquim* of P. Ferrer: *LdR*, i, no. 712.
59. Barcelo of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 1237
60. Bartholomew Aiurol of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 690.
61. Bartholomew of Barbastro: *LdR*, i, no. 591.
62. Bartholomew of Fehet, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.
63. Bartholomew of Figueres: *LdR*, i, no. 1200.
64. Bartholomew of las Cambras: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.
65. Bartholomew of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 161.
66. Bartholomew of Mainar from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
67. Bartholomew of Molins: *LdR,* i, no. 1444.
68. Bartholomew of P. Alcàsser: *LdR*, i, no. 450.
69. Bartholomew Polo from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

70. Baruch, jew, son of Bonet Abenbaruch of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1333.

71. B. Avirer of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 788.

72. B. Baster from Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 193.

73. B. Betrandi from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

74. B. Bosch of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 1470.

75. B. butcher of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 140.

76. B. Cadena, butcher of Vic and son of G. Cadena: *LdR*, i, no. 859

77. B. Carbonel of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, nos. 93, 483-4, 1327, 1398.

78. B. d'Alfoçea from Tortosa, relative of I. d'Alfoçea: *LdR*, i, no. 553.

79. B. de Almenara: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

80. B. de Balaguer of Lleida: *LdR*, i, nos. 163, 543, 637.

81. B. de Barbera: *LdR*, i, no. 1224.

82. B. de Calvera: *LdR*, i, nos. 255, 1382.

83. B. de Castellet: *LdR*, i, no. 1055.

84. B. de Conill: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

85. B. de Cuculels: *LdR*, i, no. 783.

86. B. de Daroca: *LdR*, i, nos. 807, 958.

87. B. Deçtorrens of Fontrubí: *LdR*, i, no. 165.

88. B. de Favars: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

89. B. de Fortanete: *LdR*, i, no. 1281.

90. B. de Gradibus, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

91. B. de Horta: *LdR*, i, no. 689.

92. B. de Labata: *LdR*, i, no. 222.

93. B. de Lizana: *DJI*, no. 259.

94. B. de Manresa: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

95. B. de Rosanes: *LdR*, i, no. 831.

96. B. d'Estruil of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 766

97. B. de Tàrrega: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

98. Benedet, butcher of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 799.

99. Benedet Oler from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

100. Benedet ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

101. Benedict, cleric of the King: *LdR*, i, nos. 1128-9.

102. Benedict Egidii, a man of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 369.

103. Benedict Fazames from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

104. Berenguer Çafareg from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

105. Berenguer de Çespeses of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 31.

106. Berenguer de Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 47.

107. Berenguer de Palou II, bishop of Barcelona: *DJI*, nos. 256, 292, 294, *LdR*, i, no. 296, *LdR*, ii, no. 27, *LdF*, pp. 232-3.

108. Berenguer Espainol: *LdR*, i, no. 21.

109. Berenguer Gauter, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

110. Berenguer of Anglesola: *LdR*, i, nos. 1234, 1252.

111. Berenguer of Bergua: *LdR*, i, no. 1373.

112. Berenguer of Entença: *DJI*, nos. 244, 250-3, 257, 259, 273, *LdR*, i, nos. 72, 192, 249, *LdR*, ii, no. 49, *LdF*, pp. 188, 190-2, 195, 197, 202, 237.

113. Berenguer of Erill: *DJI*, no. 273, *LdF*, pp. 172-3.

114. Berenguer of Callella: *LdR*, i, no. 272.

115. Berenguer of Canalis, chaplain of the bishop of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, nos. 1255, 1295.

116. Berenguer of Canelles: *LdR*, i, no. 1012.

117. Berenguer of Ciutadilla: *LdR*, i, no. 746.

118.Berenguer of Crosius, a knight of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 896.

119.Berenguer of l'Escala: *LdR*, i, no. 1457.

120.Berenguer of Melió: *LdR*, i, no. 1083.

121.Berenguer of Montpao of Tortosa, a knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 142, 781.

122.Berenguer of Narros: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

123.Berenguer of Penedes: *LdR*, i, no. 1268.

124.Berenguer of Sancto Martino, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

125.Berenguer of Santa Eugenia: *LdF*, ch. 125, *LdR*, i, no. 301.

126.Berenguer of Sóller: *LdR*, i, no. 276.

127.Berenguer of Tortosa, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

128.Berenguer of Vilabertran: *LdR*, i, no. 865.

129.Berenguer Palafrugell from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

130.Berenguer Roy of Montpellier: *LdR*, i, nos. 288, 400.

131.Berenguer Selva from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

132.Bernard Archbishop of Zaragoza: *DJI*, no. 273, *LdR*, i, nos. 55, 57.

133.Bernard, Bishop of Vic: *DJI*, no. 273, *LdR*, i, nos. 405, 419, 1136.

134.Bernard de Portella: *DJI*, nos. 256, 267.

135.Bernard of Arán: *LdR*, i, no. 751.

136.Bernard of Oliola: *DJI*, no. 287.

137.Bernard of Rosas: *DJI*, no. 270.

138.Bernard Vidal, the lawyer: *DJI*, no. 257, *LdR*, i, no. 1275, *LdF*, pp. 199, 202.

139.Bernard Vital: *DJI*, nos. 246, 280.

140.Bernard ? of S. Moinoz from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

141.Bernat Guillem of Entença, James I's maternal uncle: *LdF*, pp. 181-2, 185-6, 188-94, 199-202.

142.Bertrand of Pina from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

143.Betran Bou of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 139.

144.Betrand of Aulàs: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

145.Betrand of Canelles: *LdR*, i, no. 403.

146.Betrand of Cornudella: *DJI*, no. 250.

147.Betrand of Deza: *LdR*, i, no. 733.

148.Betrand of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 244.

149.Betrand of Vallat: *LdR*, i, no. 745.

150.B. Gasch, of Lleida, a merchant: *LdR*, i, no. 1183.

151.B. Gilbert of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 59.

152.B. Guillelmi of Monzón: *LdR*, i, no. 916.

153.Blanche de Napoca: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

154.B. Iover of Tàrrega: *LdR*, i, no. 488.

155.B. Johannes, brother of Domingo and John: *LdR*, i, no. 186.

156.Blascho Blasquez from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

157.Blascho de Alcastreles from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

158.Blascho of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 439.

159.Blaschus de Sposa from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

160.Blaschus d'Ordoino from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

161.Blaschus Petri of Exea, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1180.

162.Blaschus Petri of Tarazona: *LdR*, i, no. 572, *LdR*, ii, no. 87.

163.Blasco Johannes from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

164.B. Maradel from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

165.B. Marens of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 1169.

166.B. Mir, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

167.B. of Artés: *LdR*, i, no. 1158.

168.B. of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 144.

169.B. of Barcelona, from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 732.

170.B. of Castellón: *LdR*, i, no. 443.

171.B. of Oliola, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

172.B. of Pallars: *LdR*, i, no. 531.

173.B. of Salavert from Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 193.

174.B. of Sóller: *LdR*, i, no. 279.

175.B. of Solsona, brother of G. of Solsona: *LdR*, i, no. 761.

176.B. of the palace, porter: *LdR*, i, no. 377.

177.Boniface Pelicer from Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 193.

178.Bort ? from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

179.B. Pelicer, from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

180.B. Pukol, from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 766.

181.B. Questri of Castellón: *LdR*, i, no. 206.

182.Bremon of Beders: *LdR*, i, no. 1217.

183.Brother Andrew from Escarpe: *LdR*, i, no. 65.

184.Brother A. of Barberano the Dominican: *DJI*, no. 265.

185.Brother B. from Escarpe: *LdR*, i, no. 65.

186.Brother Gregory the Dominican: *DJI*, no. 265.

187.Brother Gombald of Siscar from the Monastery of Saint Mary of Fonteclaro: *LdR*, i, no. 1038.

188.Brother I. Vendeta, commander of Saint Eulalia of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 833.

189.Brother I. Verdero, of the order of the house of Saint Eulalia of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 479.

190.Brother Lupus Ronçidevallium, commander of Borriana: *LdR*, i, no. 1006.

191.Brother Matthew, commander to the Master of the Order of Calatrava: *LdR*, i, no. 287.

192.Brother Michael, of the order of the hospital of the poor of Borriana: *LdR*, i, no. 1147.

193.Brother P. of Monasch of the order of the house of Saint Eulalia of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 479.

194.Brother Peter of Lleida the Dominican: *DJI*, no. 265, *LdR*, i, no. 211.

195.Brother P. of Exea, a hospitaller: *LdR*, i, no. 214.

196.Brother Roderic the Dominican: *DJI*, no. 265.

197.B. Sala from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

198.B. Scriba from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

199.B. Serrador of Valls: *LdR*, i, no. 574.

200.B. Taverner of Peralada: *LdR*, i, no. 697.

201.B. Torro of Peralada: *LdR*, i, no. 769.

202.Burdus of Timor: *LdR*, i, no. 1135.

203.Calamar of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 169.

204.Calbet ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

205.Catalano of Calataiubensis: *LdR*, i, no. 412.

206.Cebria ? of Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 498.

207.Constantine ?, butcher of G. of Vic and associate of G. Cadena: *LdR*, i, no. 859.

208.Constantine ? from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

209.Corpo ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

210.Cresches, a jew of Belcaire: *LdR*, i, no. 1154.

211.D. Aparici from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

212.David Adnadayan, *alfaquim* of Ferdinand of Aragon: *LdR*, i, nos. 658, 1329.

213.David, *alfaquim* of the king: *LdR*, i, no. 1330.

214.D. de Estada: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

215.D. de La Segarra: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

216.D. de Taderina de Tàrrega: *LdR*, i, no. 1145.

217.D. Eximen from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

218.Diego López de Alberto, brother of Jimeno de Alberto: *DJI*, no. 254, *LdR*, i, no. 252.

219.D. Jimeno from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

220.D. Johannes of Corvalan from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

221.D. Laporta from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

222.D. Manco from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

223.D. Matheus of Huesca: *ldR*, i, no. 1301.

224.D. of Blaschorubio from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

225.D. of the court: *LdR*, i, no. 503.

226.Domenga of Exea: *LdR*, i, no. 928.

227.Domenge de Garrito from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

228.Domenge le Roy from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

229.Domenge Porgaderel from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

230.Domenge Sanchez from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

231.Domenge ? brother of ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

232.Domingo, coppersmith of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 137.

233.Domingo Darbin from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

234.Domingo de la Porta, cleric of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 197.

235.Domingo de Re from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

236.Domingo d'Ul from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

237.Domingo Iacme from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

238.Domingo Johannes, tanner of Lleida, brother of B. and John: *LdR*, i, no. 185.

239.Domingo Loarre, a man of prince Ferdinand: *LdR*, i, no. 1173.

240.Domingo Lupi of Ricla, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 121, *LdR*, ii, no. 55.

241.Domingo of Segarra: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

242.Domingo of Stada of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 164.

243.Dominic Bardaxi of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 791.

244.Dominic Macon, justiciar of Calataiubensis: *LdR*, i, no. 1401.

245.Dominic of Barbastro: *LdR*, i, no. 815.

246.Dominic of Benasque: *DJI*, no. 287.

247.Dominic of Calidis, from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1175.

248.Dominic of Epila, of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 738.

249.Dominic of Estada: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

250.Dominic of Fraga, James I's 'officer': *LdR*, i, no. 239.

251.Dominic of Lacambra: *LdR*, i, no. 56.

252.Dominic of Ripoll: *LdR*, i, no. 1449.

253.Dominic of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 1142.

254.Dominic of the court: *LdR*, i, no. 1789, *LdR*, ii, no. 119.

255.Dominic Petri of Mediñá: *LdR*, i, no. 731.

256.Dominic Terio: *LdR*, i, no. 212.

257.Don Atorella: *DJI*, no. 273.

258.Donaya of Épila, knight and brother of Michael Lopiç: *LdR*, i, no. 153.

259.Don Blasco de Alagón: *LdF*, pp. 198, 200-1, 235.

260.Don Blasco Maza: *DJI*, no. 273, *LdR*, i, no. 913.

261.Don G. heir of Montearagón: *DJI*, no. 277.

262.Don Jimeno Pérez de Terga and his men: *LdF*, p. 189, *LdR*, i, no. 500.

263.Don Ladrón: *DJI*, nos. 249, 251-8, 260-1, 272, *LdR*, i, nos. 182, 184, 217, 1062, 1362, *LdR*, ii, no. 24 *LdF*, pp. 213-4.

264.Don Nuno from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

265.D. P. Alcayat from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

266.D. Seinero from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

267.D. the scribe from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

268.D. Vincent from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

269.Egidius of Luna: *LdR*, i, no. 789.

270.Eimericus of Barbera: *LdR*, i, no. 1226.

271.Elfa, daughter of Eve, lady of Moyá: *LdR*, i, no. 1004.

272.Egidius of Barcelona, judge: *LdR*, i, no. 1391.

273.Emerich ?, a man of Guillem de Montcada: *LdR*, i, no. 251.

274.Enego Blascho from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

275.Enero Vidangoz from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

276.Ermengaudus of Minorissa: *LdR*, i, no. 639.

277.Eva, nurse of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 583.

278.Eve, lady of Moyá: *LdR*, i, no. 1004.

279.Eve, wife of B. of Castellón: *LdR*, i, no. 443.

280.Exemenus of Albero: *LdR*, i, no. 983.

281.F. Claderer of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 483.

282.F. coppersmith of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 135.

283.F. de Blanes: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

284.F. de Cambrils: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

285.F. de Cavit from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

286.F. de Girona: *LdR*, i, nos. 1264-5.

287.F. de Lauro, archdeacon of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 298.

288.F. de Lobregad: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

289.F. de Monzón: *LdR*, i, no. 1146.

290.F. de Olesa: *LdR*, i, nos. 460, 1170.

291.F. de Pomer: *LdR,* i, no. 40.

292.F. de Queralt: *LdR*, i, no. 189.

293.F. de Torrent: *LdR*, i, no. 1201.

294.F. Didaci: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

295.F. d'Olesa, of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 305.

296.Febrer B. of Maçanet: *LdR*, i, no. 202.

297.Ferdinand, prince of Aragon, James' uncle: *DJI*, nos. 244, 262-4, 266, 268-73, 275-6, *LdR*, i, nos. 459, 955, 1071, 1171, *LdR*, ii, no. 82, *LdF*, pp.172, 174-7, 191, 198-9, 201, 205-7, 236.

298.Fernando de Ahones: *LdF*, p. 220.

299.Fernando Diaz: *DJI*, no. 253, *LdF*, pp. 190, 208.

300.Fernando Pérez de Pina: *DJI*, nos. 245-6, 250, 252-4, 257-8, 260, 268, *LdR*, i, nos. 148, 225, 428, 767, *LdR*, ii, no. 30, *LdF*, pp. 188, 195-6, 199, 201, 220.

301.Ferrar of Oblites: *LdR*, i, nos. 160, 447.

302.Ferrer butcher of Burriana: *DJI*, no. 287.

303.Ferrer Duit from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

304.Ferrer Garcia, shield-bearer of Prince Alfonso: *LdR*, i, no. 1414.

305.Ferrer Gil of Quinonero from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

306.Ferrer of Verdu, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

307.Ferrer Petri, judge of Teruel, *LdR*, i, no. 1064.

308.Ferriç of Pitarque: *LdR*, i, no. 1046.

309.F. Johannes of Escrix from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

310.F. of Calella: *LdR*, i, no. 273.

311.F. of Sóller: *LdR*, i, no. 264.

312.Fortius Vascho of Borriana: *LdR*, i, no. 987.

313.Fortunius de Bergua: *DJI*, nos. 246, 251, 253, *LdR*, i, no. 243.

314.F. Petri Moinoz from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

315.Frances ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

316.F. Robert of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 559.

317.Frontinus of the Palace: *LdR*, i, no. 794.

318.F. Sancius of Almacelles: *LdR*, i, no. 231.

319.F. the fat from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

320.Fulk of Clariana: *LdR*, i, no. 202.

321.F. Umberti from Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 193.

322.Furtuni Garcez de Moros, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1032.

323.Furtunius Lupi de Sádaba: *LdR*, i, nos. 1299, 1372.

324.F. Zapata from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

325.G. A. de Pina: *LdR*, i, no. 1149.

326.Garcia Alcoz from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

327.Garcia, Bishop of Tarazona: *DJI*, no. 273.

328.Garcia Ferrandi, son of Ferdinand of Aragon: *LdR,* i, no. 849.

329.Garcia Larbesa from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

330.Garcia Lupi of Daroca: *LdR*, i, no. 434.

331.Garcia of Alquézar: *LdR*, i, no. 1435.

332.Garcia of Canfranc: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

333.Garcia of Huesca, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 910.

334.Garcia of Ladreti, brother to Michael, chamberlain of the church of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 312.

335.Garcia of Uncastillo: *LdR*, i, no. 99.

336.Garcia of Villarquemado from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

337.Garcia Pérez de Pina, knight: *DJI*, no. 261, *LdR*, i, no. 576.

338.Garcia Petri of Figerola: *LdR,* i, no. 30.

339.Garcia Romeu: *DJI*, nos. 244, 249, 262-3, 266, 270-3, 277, *LdR*, i, no. 934.

340.Garcia, scribe of the lord Roderic of Lizana: *LdR*, i, no. 281.

341.Garcia ?, butler of the lord Nuño Sánchez: *LdR*, i, no. 444.

342.Gasch de Cervera from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

343.Gautier, brother of Simon of the court: *LdR*, i, no. 793.

344.Gautier ?, of the queen's buttery: *LdR*, i, no. 383.

345.G. Bernardi, canon of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 879.

346.G. Betran from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

347.G. Bou of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 12.

348.G. brother of the king's chaplain: *LdR*, i, no. 5.

349.G. Cadena, butcher of G. of Vic: *LdR*, nos. 859, 1080.

350.G. Cadena, butcher of G. of Vic and son of G. Cadena: *LdR*, no. 859.

351.G. Calafat from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

352.G. Çavira, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

353.G. Colom from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

354.G. Colomer, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

355.G. d'Aguiló: *LdR*, i, nos. 53, 168.

356.G. Danosaries of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 127.

357.G. de Alfocea: *LdR*, i, no. 652.

358.G. de Barbera, cleric: *LdR*, i, no. 1155.

359.G. de Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 630.

360.G. de Bellavista: *LdR*, i, no. 915.

361.G. de Cabessa of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 1048.

362.G. de Çalsina: *LdR*, no. 555.

363.G. de Çaportela: *LdR*, i, no. 224.

364.G. de Castelnou from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

365.G. de Forès, ‘masallus’: *LdR*, i, no. 759.

366.G. de Girona: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

367.G. de La Bassa: *LdR*, i, no. 487.

368.G. de l’Escala, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 718.

369.G. de Loarre: *LdR*, i, no. 229.

370.G. de Guialmons: *LdR*, i, no. 900.

371.G. de Macotera: *LdR*, i, no. 1436.

372.G. de Masa: *DJI*, no. 246.

373.G. de Melió: *LdR*, i, no. 1083.

374.G. de Montpellier: *LdR*, i, no. 727.

375.G. de Montrava, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

376.G. de Monzón: *LdR*, i, no. 1015.

377.G. de Padinera from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

378.G. de Paguera, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 691.

379.G. de Portella: *LdR*, i, no. 480.

380.G. de Puig Monzón: *LdR*, i, no. 700.

381.G. de Riber: *LdR*, i, no. 749.

382.G. de Rubi: *LdR*, i, no. 207.

383.G. de Sant Ferriol: *LdR*, i, no. 228.

384.G. de Sarrià: *LdR*, i, no. 621.

385.G. de Solsona: *ldR*, i, no. 535.

386.G. de Soria, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

387.G. Destorrent of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 486.

388.G. de Teulet: *LdR*, i, no. 311.

389.G. de Villanova: *LdR*, i, no. 1812.

390.G. Dezpont, porter of the lord king: *LdR*, i, no. 1139.

391.G. Domingo de Santa Cruz from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

392.G. d'Orcau, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

393.Genes ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

394.Gerald de R. Panicer: *LdR*, i, no. 537.

395.G. Gauceran of Vilabertran: *LdR*, i, no. 866.

396.G. Gorg from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

397.Gil d'Altura from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

398.Gil de Linares from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

399.Gil de Sariñena: *LdR*, i, no. 159.

400.Gil Eximen from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

401.Gili de Sposa from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

402.Gil of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

403.Giner de Figueres: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

404.God of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 1428.

405.G. of Alcanó: *LdR*, i, no. 394.

406.G. of Castellón: *LdR*, i, no. 862.

407.G. of Cervelló: *DJI*, no. 273.

408.G. of Clariana: *LdR*, i, no. 1083.

409.G. of Cornel, master: *LdR*, i, no. 811.

410.G. of Espallargas: *LdR*, i, no. 1113.

411.G. of Ferriol: *LdR*, i, no. 270.

412.G. of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 50.

413.G. of Solsona, brother of B. of Solsona: *LdR*, i, no. 761

414.G. of the Palace: *LdR*, i, no. 635.

415.Gombald of Bergua: *LdR*, i, no. 930.

416.Gombald of Entença: *DJI*, no. 251, *LdR*, ii, no. 60.

417.Gomicios Moynoç de Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 9.

418.Gonçalvo Lupi de Pomer: *LdR*, i, no. 964.

419.Gonzalo Yáñez de Novoa, Commander of Calatrava: *LdF*, p. 215.

420.G. Peter de Pina: *LdR*, i, no. 435.

421.G. Petri de Gallur: *LdR*, i, no. 943.

422.G. Petri of the Court: *LdR*, i, no. 1009.

423.G. P. of Perpignan: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

424.G. Serra of La Costera: *LdR*, i, no. 431.

425.G. Sobrinus of Belchite: *LdR*, i, no. 1174.

426.G. the Catalan: *LdR*, i, no. 1235.

427.Guillem de Cardona, master of the Templars: *DJI*, nos. 267, 287.

428.Guillem de Cervelló: *DJI*, no. 267.

429.Guillem de Montcada: *DJI*, nos. 256, 258, 260, 262-4, 267, 269, *LdR*, i, no. 449.

430.Guillem de Montgrí, sacristan of Girona and archbishop-elect of Tarragona: *LdF*, ch. 125.

431.Guillem de Salas, knight: *LdF*, p. 188.

432.Guillem of Sant Vincenç: *DJI*, no. 273.

433.Guillemon the scribe: *DJI*, nos. 245, 246, 249, 252, 254-5, 258-9, 261-3, 266, 270-1, 276, 280, *LdR*, i, nos. 27, 75-6, 83-4, 87-8, 1014, 1726, 1788, 1802, *LdR*, ii, no. 114.

434.Guillem Saguàrdia: *LdF*, p. 180.

435.Guy, doctor of the King: *LdR*, i, nos. 150, 1220, *LdR*, ii, no. 81.

436.G. Vidal, writer: *LdR*, i, no. 152.

437.Hug de Montllor, master of the Templars: *LdF*, p. 172.

438.Huget de Font-Rubí: *LdR*, i, no. 230.

439.I. A. of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 529.

440.I. Carbonel of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, nos. 92, 126.

441.I. Clavero from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

442.I. de Alfajarín: *LdR*, i, no. 999.

443.I. d'Alfoçea from Tortosa, relative of B. d'Alfoçea: *LdR*, i, no. 553.

444.I. de Barbastro: *LdR*, i, no. 573.

445.I. de Bolomet from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

446.I. de Caspe: *LdR*, i, no. 611.

447.I. de Çaydi from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

448.I. de Colera, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

449.I. de Estada, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 790.

450.I. de Fraga: *LdR*, i, no. 742.

451.I. de Francesa from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

452.I. de G. Ros from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

453.I. de Lascellas: *LdR*, i, no. 901.

454.I del Quinonero from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

455.I. de Luna: *LdR*, i, no. 1124.

456.I. de Març from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

457.I. de Monso, chaplain of the Lord King: *LdR*, i, no. 324.

458.I. de Na Pelegrina from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

459.I. de Pegera from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

460.I. de Polinyà: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

461.I. de Ruvielos from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

462.I. de Spori from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

463.I. de Zaragoza: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

464.I. Dominguiz, ‘sartre’ of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 713.

465.I. Dominici from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

466.I. Ferro from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

467.I. Galindo, judge in Daroca from Teruel: *LdR*, i, nos. 254, 653.

468.I. Maioral de Molinos: *LdR*, i, no. 1061.

469.I. of Abiego: *LdR*, i, no. 668.

470.I. of Cornudella: *LdR*, i, no. 260.

471.I. of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 883.

472.I. Pailaranch from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

473.I. Petri of Exea, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 804.

474.I. Petri of Guimero, of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 711.

475.I. Petri of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 962.

476.I. Petri from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

477.I. Petri of Tarazona: *LdR*, i, no. 462.

478.I. Pintor from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

479.I. Porader from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

480.I., prior of the greater church of Mount Aragon, and the canons of the same: *LdR*, i, no. 1297.

481.I. Sancho, adalil from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

482.I. Tacam, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

483.I. the scribe from Teruel: *LdR*, i, nos. 208, 254, 1133.

484.Iuçef Aidax of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 321.

485.Iucef, *alfaquim* of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 844.

486.I. Vidal of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, nos. 136, 483, 1721.

487.I., wall maker of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 259.

488.Jacma, nurse of P. of Huesca, the son of the Lord Jacome: *LdR*, i, nos. 617, 1352.

489.Jacme of Puig, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 620.

490.Jacques Sanç: *LdR*, i, nos. 61, 998.

491.Jafuda, a Jew of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 289.

492.James I of Aragon: *LdF*, *passim.*

493.James of Cervera: *DJI*, no. 256.

494.Januarius Penades: *LdR*, i, no. 574.

495.Jimeno, Bishop of Segorbe: *DJI*, no. 273.

496.Jimeno de Alberto, brother of Diego de Alberto: *DJI*, no. 254, *LdR*, i, no. 253.

497.Jimeno de Foces: *DJI*, nos. 245-6, *LdR*, i, nos. 71, 654, 1089, *LdR*, ii, no. 48, *LdF*, pp. 195-6.

498.Jimeno de Torna: *DJI*, no. 250.

499.Jimeno de Urrea: *DJI*, i, nos. 244, 250, 258-61, 268, 277, *LdF*, pp. 172, 175-7, 183-4, 199, 219, 222, 230, 232-3.

500.Jimeno of Thovia: *DJI*, no. 305.

501.Jimeno Pérez de Pina, knight: *DJI*, no. 261, *LdR*, i, no. 576.

502.Jimeno Peter of Daroca: *DJI*, nos. 245-6, *LdR*, i, nos. 256, 1208.

503.Jimeno P. from Teruel, a man of F. Didaci: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

504.Jimeno Romeu from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

505.Joan Xico from Lleida: *LdF*, ch. 125.

506.Joani ?, from the king's court: *LdR*, i, no. 386.

507.John Calvo, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

508.John Johannes, brother of B. and Domingo: *LdR*, i, no. 186.

509.John of Figueres: *DJI*, no. 304.

510.John of Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 1140.

511.John of Mura: *DJI*, no. 287.

512.John, notary of the lord Nuño Sánchez: *LdR*, i, no. 420.

513.Jordanus, ‘sartre' of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 784.

514.Juan de Estada: *DJI*, no. 269.

515.Lauentius ? from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

516.L. Ferrenc de Llucena: *DJI*, no. 295.

517.Lop ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

518.Lope Jimeno de Luesia: *LdF*, p. 216.

519.Lord Carròs [possibly German origins, but by the 1230s a naturalised Aragonese]: *DJI*, no. 262.

520.Lorenç de Borza from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

521.Lupi de Alagón: *LdR*, i, no. 927.

522.Luppo of Bellcaire: *DJI*, no. 287.

523.Lupus Ferench de Llucena: *LdR*, i, nos. 948, 1209.

524.Lupus of Xiverre: *LdR*, i, no. 1203.

525.Lupus Martin, Comendator of Alcañiz: *LdR*, i, nos. 6, 134.

526.Marchus Monto from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

527.Marcius, adalil: *LdR*, i, no. 203.

528.Maria, wife of Michael of Xiverre: *LdR*, i, no. 619.

529.Maria, wife of Portoles, of the neighbourhood of Daroca: *LdR*, i, no. 1452.

530.Marimundus of Plegamans: *LdR*, i, no. 528.

531.Marti del Pintor from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

532.Marti Dominici de Reyolo from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

533.Martin Adobador, brother of Nadal Adobador from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

534.Martin Crespo of Teruel: *LdR*, i, nos. 154, 254.

535.Martin de Domingo from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

536.Martin Gil, shield-bearer of the justiciar: *LdR*, i, no. 406.

537.Martin Lupi of Morella, of Bolas: *LdR*, i, no. 687.

538.Martin Nuno from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

539.Martin of Aragon: *DJI*, no. 287.

540.Martin of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 49.

541.Martin of Ceilabo from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

542.Martin of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 465.

543.Martin of Lesuaces from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

544.Martin of Montalbán, scribe: *LdR*, i, no. 141.

545.Martin of Sádaba: *LdR*, i, no. 410.

546.Martin of Soria, relative of Matthew: *DJI*, no. 287.

547.Martin Pérez: *LdF*, p. 194.

548.Martin Petri, *alfaquim*, *LdR*, i, no. 1287.

549.Martin Petri de Biel: *LdR*, i, no. 1370.

550.Martin Petri of Banastón: *LdR*, i, nos. 884, 1228, 1412.

551.Martin Petri from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

552.Marti of Ceilalbo from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

553.Matthew, brother of the king's chaplain: *LdR*, i, no. 5.

554.Matthew, cobbler of Betrand of Aulàs: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

555.Matthew of Soria, relative of Martin: *DJI*, no. 287.

556.Matthew, archpriest of Terol: *LdR*, i, no. 149.

557.Mautrez ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

558.Mayo of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 747.

559.Mengot of Lueysia, porter of the king: *LdR*, i, no. 1801.

560.Mengoz ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

561.Michael Calafat from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

562.Michael, chamberlain of the church of Tarragona and brother to Garcia of Ladreti: *LdR*, i, no. 312.

563.Michael d'Aspa from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

564.Michael Deiç de Castelfabib: *LdR*, i, no. 110.

565.Michael de Set Fons from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

566.Michael d'Exea: *LdR*, i, no. 64.

567.Michael Garcia de Fuentes Calientes: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

568.Michael Hom de Deu: *LdR*, i, nos. 97, 1314.

569.Michael Lopiç, knight and brother of Donaya of Épila: *LdR*, i, no. 153.

570.Michael of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

571.Michael of Fenals: *LdR*, i, no. 845.

572.Michael of Savina, *aladil*: *LdR*, i, no. 1390.

573.Michael of Xiverre: *LdR*, i, no. 619.

574.Michael Petri of Vinals, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1031.

575.Michael Stephani, from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1175.

576.Michael ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

577.Miguel Pérez de Híjar: *LdF*, p. 225.

578.Mingot of Boysa, porter of the Lord King: *LdR*, i, no. 304.

579.Montagut ? from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

580.Montainer of Albère: *LdR*, i, no. 1438.

581.Morlana, wife of F. de Monzón: *LdR*, i, no. 1146.

582.Muça a man of P. Ferrer: *LdR*, i, no. 1407.

583.Nadal Adobador, brother of Martin Adobador from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

584.Nicholas ?, knight engineer of the lord King: *LdR*, i, no. 349.

585.Nuño Sánchez: *DJI*, nos. 267, 270, 273, 276, 277, *LdR*, i, nos. 458, 481, 760, 1011, *LdR*, ii, no. 29, *LdF*, pp. 225, 230.

586.Octavian ? from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 803.

587.P. Açagra from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

588.P. A. from Tremp: *LdR*, i, no. 1028.

589.P. Aierp from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

590.Palaçinus of Foces: *LdR*, i, nos. 131, 257, *LdR*, ii, no. 57.

591.Paladat from Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

592.P. Albert, canon of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 372.

593.Paloma Brusch from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

594.P. Andador from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

595.P. Andrew of Uncastillo: *LdR*, i, no. 837.

596.Paschal de Molina from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

597.Paschal Nuno from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

598.Paschal ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

599.Paschasius d'Archos from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

600.Paschasius de Castellón: *LdR*, i, no. 743.

601.Paschasius of Boneta from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

602.Paschasius of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

603.Paschasius Trapete from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

604.P. Badot of Burriana: *LdR*, i, no. 302.

605.P. Blascho from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

606.P. brother of the king's chaplain: *LdR*, i, no. 5.

607.P. Cadena, butcher of P. of Vic and son of G. Cadena: *LdR*, i, no. 859.

608.P. Çagrua from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

609.P. d'Argençola: *LdR*, i, no. 310.

610.P. de Agremont of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 171.

611.P. de Aynsa, shield bearer of the justiciar of Aragon: *LdR*, i, no.1143.

612.P. de Balager of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 430.

613.P. de Barberà: *LdR*, i, nos. 179, 827, 1343.

614.P. de Benavarre, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

615.P. de Blanes: *LdR*, i, no. 36.

616.P. de Cardona: *LdR*, i, no. 630.

617.P. de Cervaria: *LdR*, i, no. 1725.

618.P. de Clariana: *LdR*, i, no. 642.

619.P. de Conesa: *LdR*, i, no. 1131.

620.P. de Contamina: *LdR*, i, no. 988.

621.P. de Cubélls, scribe of the master of the Temple: *LdR*, i, no. 1005, *LdR*, ii, no. 62.

622.P. de Curvera, of Borriana: *LdR*, i, no. 1132.

623.P. de Figuerolles: *LdR*, i, no. 785.

624.P. de Forès: *LdR*, i, nos. 1436, 1439.

625.P. de Galliners, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 68.

626.P. de Girona: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

627.P. de Granollers, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 533, 830, 1369.

628.P. de Guardiola: *LdR*, i, no. 665.

629.P. de Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

630.P. de Lascui from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

631.P. de Llagostera: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

632.P. de Monrava: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

633.P. de Monteacuto, brother of the Bishop of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 327, *LdR*, ii, no. 70.

634.P. de Montraban, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

635.P. de Monzón: *LdR*, i, no. 158.

636.P. de Padinera from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

637.P. de Planès: *ldR*, i, no. 1286.

638.P. de Puig: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

639.P. de Ricla: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

640.P. de Riudoms: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

641.P. Desnoguer of Bergua: *LdR*, i, no. 335.

642.P. de Tàrrega: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

643.P. de Valbona: *LdR*, i, no. 630.

644.P. de Valls: *LdR*, i, no. 177.

645.P. de Viacamp, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 77.

646.P. de Vic: *LdR*, i, no. 699.

647.P. de Vilabertran: *LdR*, i, no. 778.

648.P. d'Exea of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 190.

649.Pedro Cornel the Majordomo of Aragon: *DJI*, nos. 244-5, 249, 262-3, 269, 273, *LdR*, i, nos. 457, 1325, 1332, *LdR*, ii, no. 81, *LdF*, pp. 169, 171-3, 175-6, 178, 191-3, 195- 197, 199, 222, 230.

650.Pedro of Ayera: *DJI*, no. 275.

651.Pedro of Valimaña: *DJI*, no. 271.

652.Pedro Palazín: *LdF*, p. 197.

653.Pelagius the Catalan: *ldR*, i, no. 1328.

654.Pelegrin Çoquer of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 427.

655.Pelegrín of Atrosillo: *DJI*, no. 297, *LdR*, i, no. 238.

656.Pelegrin of Bolas: *LdR*, i, no. 1013.

657.Pelegrin the squire: *LdR*, i, no. 3.

658.Pelegrin ? from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

659.Pere of Montcada: *DJI*, no. 282, *LdR*, ii, no. 22.

660.Pere de Queralt: *DJI*, nos. 267, 273.

661.Pere de Vilaragut: *LdR*, i, no. 892.

662.Peregrinus of Bolas: *LdR*, i, no. 1181.

663.Pere Ramon of Tortosa: *LdF*, pp. 211-2.

664.Peruix ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

665.Peter, Archbishop of Tarragona: *DJI*, nos. 273, 276, *LdR*, i, nos. 325, 950-2, *LdR*, i, nos. 44, 69.

666.Peter, butler of Ateca: *LdR*, i, no. 645.

667.Peter Martiniz of Bolea, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 931.

668.Peter of Ribelles: *DJI*, no. 304.

669.Peter of Sancho: *DJI*, no. 246.

670.Peter of Sancio, from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1175.

671.Peter of Valmol: *DJI*, no. 283.

672.Peter Petri, Justiciar of Aragon: *DJI*, nos. 251, 254, 260, *LdR*, i, nos. 299, 1800, *LdR*, ii, nos. 111, 142.

673.Peter Raymond of Tortosa: *DJI*, no. 304.

674.Petrixol ? from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

675.P. Eximen from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

676.P. familiar of the king: *LdR*, i, no. 612.

677.P. Ferrer of Albarracín: *LdR*, i, nos. 51, 60, *LdR*, ii, nos. 23, 45.

678.P. Ferrer, notary of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 580.

679.P. Garcez of Deza, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 570.

680.P. Garcez of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 622.

681.P. Garcia from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

682.P. Garcia from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

683.Philip of Boysa, porter of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 382.

684.Philip of Molins: *LdR*, i, no. 833.

685.P. Jimeno of Calanda: *LdR*, i, no. 1358.

686.P. Johannes, notary of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 358.

687.P. Jorda d'Alfambra, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 109.

688.P. Jorda of Exea: *LdR*, i, no. 342.

689.P. Lana from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

690.P. Lopiç from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

691.P. Lupi de Pina: *LdR*, i, no. 729.

692.P. Lupi of Belchite: *LdR*, i, no. 90.

693.P. Matanz of Ricla: LdR, i, no. 655

694.P. Marta, canon of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 468.

695.P. Martinez el Rico from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

696.P. Martini of Mediñá: *LdR*, i, no. 731.

697.P. Martiniz of Agón: *LdR*, i, 1205.

698.P. Menor from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

699.P. Minorelli of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 437.

700.P. Moreilo, scribe of Artal of Alagon: *LdR*, i, no. 247.

701.P. of Altafulla: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

702.P. of Artés: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

703.P. of Eçlor, a man of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 263.

704.P. of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1090.

705.P. of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 614.

706.P. of Tarragona, brother of Sanç of Luna: *LdR*, i, no. 1222.

707.P. of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 883.

708.Ponç, cook of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 1453.

709.Ponç Hug d'Empúries: *DJI*, no. 256.

710.Poncius de Térmens: *LdR*, i, no. 1245.

711.Poncius of Clarisvallibus, a scribe of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 291.

712.Poncius of Comes: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

713.Poncius of Montsoriu, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 666.

714.Poncius of Villafranca: *LdR*, i, no. 857.

715.Pons bishop of Tortosa: *DJI*, no. 273, *LdR*, i, no. 1433.

716.Pons de Coscola: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

717.Pons of Comes: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

718.Pons of Manresa: *LdR*, i, no. 424.

719.Pons of Sóller: *LdR*, i, no. 856.

720.Portales of Castralvo, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 672.

721.Portoles, of the neighbourhood of Daroca: *LdR*, i, no. 1452.

722.P. Parch of Perpignan: *LdR*, i, no. 1059.

723.P. Paschal of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 130.

724.P. Pelliarius de Montalbán: *LdR*, i, no. 1727.

725.P. R. de Cerbère: *LdR*, i, no. 971.

726.P. R. de Fontova, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 115.

727.P. R. of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 86.

728.P. Roiç, majordomo of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 332.

729.P. Royç de Deza: *LdR*, i, no. 246.

730.P. Sanç de Casals: *LdR*, i, no. 1160.

731.P. Tolo, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

732.P. Umbert of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 187.

733.P. Vigoros of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, nos. 588, 737.

734.P. ?, crossbowman of Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 541.

735.P. ? from Teruel, a man of the lady Romea: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

736.P. ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

737.Quentin of Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 694.

738.R. A. de Sanaugia from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 803.

739.R. Amad from Tremp: *LdR*, i, no. 1028.

740.R. Amargos, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

741.Ramon Berenguer d'Àger: *DJI*, nos. 256, 267, 273, *LdR*, i, nos. 911, 914, 1377, *LdR*, ii, nos. 35, 94 *LdF*, pp. 223, 225, 231.

742.Ramon Canella, commander of Aliaga: *LdF*, p. 216.

743.Ramón de Richer: *DJI*, no. 255.

744.Ramon Folch, Viscount of Cardona, and 40 men he leads: *Registres*, ii, no. 3480, *LdF*, p. 234.

745.Ramon Serra, a commander of the Templars, leading 20 knights: *LdF*, p. 215.

746.Raymondetus of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 763.

747.Raymond of Cardona: *DJI*, no. 287.

748.Raymond Guillem of Òdena: *DJI*, no. 273.

749.Raymond ? from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

750.R. Çarriera, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

751.R. Clavel from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 803.

752.R. Dalmau of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 787.

753.R. de Barbera from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

754.R. de Bayneres: *LdR*, i, no. 14.

755.R. de Bestraç from Tremp: *LdR*, i, no. 1028.

756.R. de Blanchafort, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, no. 1275.

757.R. de Blanes: *LdR*, i, no. 46.

758.R. de Bolas, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 818.

759.R. de Calvera: *LdR*, i, no. 1035.

760.R. de Casals: *LdR*, i, no. 274.

761.R. de Figueres: *LdR*, i, no. 1363.

762.R. de Fraga: *LdR*, i, no. 94.

763.R. de Mirambel: *LdR*, i, no. 638.

764.R. de Monrava: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

765.R. de Morella: *LdR*, i, nos. 353, 1068.

766.R. de Renau: *LdR*, i, no. 472.

767.R. de Rosanes: *LdR*, i, no. 878.

768.R. de Rovira: *LdR*, i, no. 1259.

769.R. de Rubi: *LdR*, i, no. 19.

770.R. de Sancto Minato: *LdR*, i, no. 234.

771.R. de Scintillis from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 161.

772.R. de Somons from Tremp: *LdR*, i, no. 1028.

773.R. d'Esparagera of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 146.

774.R. Despuin from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 526.

775.R. de Teulet: *LdR*, ii, no. 63.

776.R. de Tremp: *LdR*, i, no. 825.

777.Remondus of Mirambell: *LdR*, ii, no. 141.

778.R. Ferran from Barcelona: *LdR*, i, no. 193.

779.R. Garidel of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 764.

780.R. Hom de Deu from Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 526.

781.Richard of Barcelona, master: *LdR*, i, no. 378.

782.Rigolf of Sant Martí: *LdR*, i, no. 375.

783.R., leather-worker of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 485.

784.R. Michael of Vilabertran: *LdR*, i, no. 889.

785.R. Molner of Cavalleria: *LdR*, i, no. 1805.

786.Roderic Darrada from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

787.Roderic Didaci, notary of the King: *LdR*, i, no. 415.

788.Roderic of Falset: *LdR*, i, no. 250.

789.Roderic of Figeroles, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 113.

790.Roderic of Tarazona: *LdR*, i, now. 539, 1366, 1375.

791.Roderic Petri de Pina, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 851.

792.Rodrigo Çabata, a knight: *DJI,* no. 246, *LdR*, i, nos. 98, 728.

793.Rodrigo of Lizana: *DJI,* nos. 251-4, 256, 258-61, 263-4, 266-7, 269-73, 275-6, *LdR*, i, nos. 215, 262, 975, 1810, *LdR*, ii, nos. 61, 136, *LdF*, pp. 173, 176, 178, 199, 215.

794.Rodrigo Jiminez of Luesia: *DJI*, no. 244, *LdF*, p. 189.

795.Roderic Moinoz from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

796.R. of Castelnou from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 803.

797.R. of Pulchro Loco: *DJI*, no. 303.

798.Roger, Count of Pallars: *DJI*, no. 273.

799.Romeu de Silvestre from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

800.Romeu of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 181.

801.Romeus of Magallón: *LdR*, i, no. 959.

802.R. Petri of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 953.

803.R. Petri of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1087.

804.R. Raimundi of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 829.

805.R. Sala from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

806.R. Sartre, from Almenar: *LdR*, i, nos. 1275, 1439.

807.R. Soler from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

808.R. ? of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1302.

809.Salamo, alfaquim of the Lord King: *LdR*, i, nos. 162, 1472.

810.Salamo, a jew of Girona: *LdR*, i, no. 1153.

811.Salvador de Cogot from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

812.Salvador of Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 232.

813.Samson of Tortosa, son of Mayo: *LdR*, i, no. 747.

814.Sanç Bacan from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

815.Sanchís Zapata from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

816.Sanchius of Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 351.

817.Sancho de Bolas: *DJI*, no. 252.

818.Sancho de Cortailada from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

819.Sancho Petri from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

820.Sancius Lopiç of Albero: *LdR*, i, nos. 155, 1020, 1312, 1806, *LdR*, ii, no. 118.

821.Sancius Martini of Oblites, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 120.

822.Sancius Moinoz from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

823.Sancius of Bolas: *LdR*, i, no. 213.

824.Sancius of Estada: *LdR*, i, no. 677.

825.Sancius of Fraga: *LdR*, i, no. 1271.

826.Sancius Petri of Noales: *LdR*, i, no. 1251.

827.Sanç of Luna, brother of P. of Tarragona: *LdR*, i, no. 1222.

828.Sanxo de Seinos from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

829.Sebastia de Luecaia from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

830.Sicard, brother of ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

831.Simeon Abenpesat, jew of Alagón: *LdR*, i, no. 1207.

832.Simon Gil: *DJI*, no. 279.

833.Simon of the court, brother of Gautier: *LdR*, i, no. 793.

834.S. of Castelnou from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 803.

835.T. de Huesca: *LdR*, i, no. 927.

836.Terrio, cook of the Queen: *LdR*, i, no. 346.

837.Thomas Garidel of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, nos. 125, 464, 474, 532, 1415.

838.T. Rial of Saint-Cyprien: *LdR*, i, no. 651.

839.Valero of Montalbán: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

840.Valerus, scribe of the Lord King: *LdR*, i, no. 1017.

841.Vidal de Cañellas, bishop of Huesca: *DJI*, nos. 258, 265, 273, *LdR*, i, nos. 348, 954, *LdR*, ii, no. 96, *LdF*, p. 233.

842.Vidal of Tortosa: *LdR*, i , no. 138.

843.Vidal of Vilagrassa: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

844.Vincent ? from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

845.Vitalis of Huyran from Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 254.

846.Vitalis, writer of Tortosa: *LdR*, i, no. 151.

847.Vives de Montoliu from Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 1025.

848.William Dalentorn: *DJI*, no. 255.

849.William of Àger: *LdR*, i, nos. 85, 1446.

850.William of Banyeres: *LdR*, i, no. 1162.

851.William of Manresa: *DJI*, no. 287.

852.William of Montsó: *LdR*, i, no. 841.

853.William of Olesa: *DJI*, no. 287.

854.William of Valmol: *DJI*, no. 283, *LdR*, i, no. 822.

855.William of Vic: *DJI*, no. 287.

856.William Raymond of Bielsa: *LdR*, ii, no. 32.

857.William Raymond of Vila: *DJI*, no. 251.

858.William Seguer of Teruel: *LdR*, i, no. 1397.

859.William the scribe: *DJI*, nos. 244, 250-1, 253, 256-7, 260, 264-5, 267-9, 272, 275.

860.Yolanda, wife of James I: *LdF*, pp. 224, 227-8.

861.Yspanus, archdeacon of Teurel: *LdR*, i, no. 347.

862.?, abbot of Petrés: *LdR*, i, no. 404.

863.? brother of Domenge ? from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

864.? brother of Sicard from Jaca: *LdR*, i, no. 74.

865.? Prior of the house of St Rufus, Lleida: *LdR*, i, no. 634.

866.? wife of Adam, porter of the queen: *LdR*, i, no. 354.

Castilian *crucesignati*

1. A. de Cruxeira: *LdR*, i, no. 176.
2. A. de Grávalos: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.
3. A. de Morera: *LdR*, i, no. 174.
4. Aznarius of Rada: *LdR*, i, no. 200.
5. Aznarius Petri of Alfaro, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 517, 1039, 1289, 1353-4.
6. B. de Torneros: *LdR*, i, no. 1043.
7. Berenguer of Canlís: *LdR*, i, no. 362.
8. Berenguer of Espiel : *LdR*, i, no. 307.

9. Berenguer of Tobía: *LdR*, i, no. 585.
10. Berenguer of Villafría: *LdR*, i, no. 1469.
11. B. Gamarel of Castile: *LdR*, i, no. 176.
12. Bishop of Segovia: *LdR*, i, no. 313
13. B. of Selorio, master: *LdR*, i, nos. 362-3.
14. D. de Roda: *LdR*, i, no. 630.
15. D. of Alfaro: *LdR*, i, no. 847.
16. Dominic, crossbowman from Mora: *LdR*, i, no. 524.
17. Dominic Lupi of Pomar, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1019.
18. Dominic Petri of Bayo: *LdR*, i, no. 1219.
19. Domus of Seseña: *LdR*, i, no. 357.
20. Ferrer of Arnedo: *LdR*, i, no. 1218.
21. F. Garcia of Roda: *DJI*, no. 297.
22. Fortuni Peiç of Roda: *LdR*, i, no. 380.
23. F. Petri de Loris: *LdR*, i, no. 706.
24. Garcia Ferrandiç of Varea: *LdR*, i, nos. 1253, 1357.
25. Garcia of Araotz, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 118.
26. Garcia of Pioz, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 122.
27. Garcia Petri of Saraso: *LdR*, i, no. 748.
28. Gastavi de Castile: *LdR*, i, no. 176.
29. Gauzberto of Pereiro: *DJI*, no. 304.
30. G. de Alcalá: *LdR*, ii, no. 76.
31. G. de Vilastrexe: *LdR*, i, no. 1030.
32. G. de Villafranca: *LdR*, i, no. 373.
33. Gil de Rada, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 128.

34. Gil of Arada: *LdR*, i, no. 965.
35. Gonçalbo Periç de Medina: *LdR*, i, no. 183.
36. Gonçalvo Ruiz of Udalla: *LdR*, i, nos. 371, 1216.
37. I. de Mora: *LdR*, i, nos. 96, 741.
38. I. Gonçalveç d'Eredia, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 116, 597, *LdR*, ii, no. 26.
39. I. Jimeno of Roda: *LdR*, i, no. 601.
40. Jimeno de Tobía: *LdR*, i, no. 1152.
41. Jimeno Garçeç, cousin of the lord Jimeno Petri of Ossa: *LdR*, i, no. 1193.
42. Jimeno Gonzalvez: *LdR*, i, no. 598.
43. Jimeno Petri of Ossa, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 994.
44. Marchus Tobía: *LdR*, i, no. 586.
45. Maria, a mountaineer of Fariza: *LdR*, i, no. 1231.
46. Maria of Castile: *LdR*, i, no. 1001.
47. Maria, sister of Maria, a mountaineer of Fariza: *LdR*, i, no. 1231.
48. Maria, wife of Dominic Petri of Bayo: *LdR*, i, no. 1219.
49. Martin of Cases: *LdR*, i, no. 615.
50. Martin Sancii of Loris, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 671.
51. Matthew of Tolosa: *LdR*, i, no. 676.
52. Michael of Mora: *LdR*, i, no. 937.
53. P. Arceç de Rada: *LdR*, i, no. 82.
54. P. de Burgos: *LdR*, i, no. 1168.
55. P. de Camarada: *LdR*, i, no. 1054.
56. P. de San Emiliano: *LdR*, i, no. 558.
57. P. de Roda: *LdR*, i, no. 968.
58. P. de Salinas: *LdR*, i, no. 1026.

59. Pero Ferrández d'Açagra: *DJI*, nos. 244, 250, 257, 261, 264, 266, 268, 271-2, 275-7, *LdF*, pp. 169, 183, 199, 219, 230, 233, 237.
60. Peter Garcez of Roda: *DJI*, no. 254, *LdR*, i, no. 67.
61. Peter of Orega: *DJI*, no. 287.
62. P. Garcez de Rada: *LdR*, i, no. 898.
63. P. G. de Burgos: *LdR*, i, no. 466.
64. P. Gonçalveç of Ossa: *LdR*, i, no. 877.
65. P. Jimeno of Roda: *LdR*, i, no. 625.
66. P. Lupi de Pomar, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1018.
67. P. Petri de Maior: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
68. R. de Blanca: *LdR*, i, no. 1437.
69. R. Petri de Quintana: *LdR*, i, no. 1387.
70. Sancho de Mora, adalil: *LdR*, i, no. 79.
71. Sancho Lupiç of Alfaro: *LdR*, i, no. 380.
72. Sancho of Castellet: *LdR*, i, no. 91.
73. Sancius Jimeno de Roda, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 590.
74. Sancius Sancii of Loris, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 566, 636.
75. Sancius, son of Sancio de Mora: *LdR*, i, no. 1409.
76. S. de Cascón: *LdR*, i, no. 478.
77. Stacius from Tolosa: *LdR*, i, no. 393.
78. Thomas of Artea: *LdR*, i, no. 823.
79. Vidal de Pomar: *LdR*, i, no. 1722.
80. William of Portela: *DJI*, no. 258.

Navarrese *crucesignati*

1. Alfonset of Peralta: *LdR*, i, no. 656.
2. Bartholomew of Estella: *LdR*, i, no. 762.
3. B. de Falces: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.
4. Bernard Guilleumes, son of Sancho of Navarre: *DJI,* no. 244.
5. Dominic, ‘pistalero’: *LdR*, i, no. 1304.
6. Don Fortunii Aznariz: *DJI*, no. 273.
7. F. de Tudela: *LdR*, i, no. 502.
8. Garcia of Navarre: *LdR*, i, no. 657.
9. I. de Sangüesa: *LdR*, i, no. 563.
10. I. de Viana: *LdR*, i, no. 1178.
11. I. Matiz, scribe: *LdR*, i, no. 1304.
12. Jimeno of Navascués: *LdR*, i, nos. 366, 608.
13. Jimeno de Oteiza: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
14. Jimeno Moniç: *LdR*, i, no. 1304.
15. Jimeno Sancii of Gorráiz: *LdR*, i, no. 560.
16. John of Pamplona: *DJI*, no. 287.
17. Jordan Enego: *LdR*, i, no. 1304.
18. Lop of Esparza: *LdR*, i, no. 1123.
19. Maria of Ablitas, wife of Marti of Ablitas: *LdR*, i, no. 1150.
20. Martin Petri of Acheta: *LdR*, i, no. 1304.
21. Marti of Ablitas: *LdR*, i, no. 1150.
22. Michael Garcés: *LdF*, p. 195.
23. Oxava of Peralta: *LdR*, i, no. 4.
24. Peter of Torres: *DJI*, no. 304.

25. P. of Navascués: *LdR*, i, no. 610.
26. P. Sancii of Marañón: *LdR*, i, no. 755.
27. Roderic of Corella, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 108, 670.
28. Roderic of Sancho-Navarro: *LdR*, i, no. 254.
29. Sancius Michael of Puylina: *LdR*, i, no. 1304.

Portuguese *crucesignati*

1. A. de Cascais: *LdR*, i, no. 334.
2. G. de Vieira, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.
3. Maria of Ermesinde: *LdR*, i, no. 1442.
4. Martin of Novelas: *LdR*, i, no. 390.
5. Nicholas of Frechas: *LdR*, i, no. 1050.
6. Nichonao d'Algueirão: *DJI*, no. 304.
7. Peter, Prince of Portugal: *LdF*, ch. 125.

crucesignati of Iberian origin

1. B. of Spain: *LdR*, i, no. 860
2. Domingo de Calatrava: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.
3. Ninus of Spain: *LdR*, i, no. 1024.
4. P. of Spain: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

French *crucesignati*

1. A. de Montbrun: *LdR*, i, no. 285.
2. A. de Sorèze, abbot of the Holy Cross: *LdR*, i, nos. 461, 650.
3. Amaury de Donas: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.
4. Amaury of Périgueux: *LdR*, i, no. 828.
5. Barcelo of Sainte-Olive: *LdR*, i, no. 1454.
6. B. de Pailars: *LdR*, i, no. 630.
7. Berengaria, wife of Barcelo of Sainte-Olive: *LdR*, i, no. 1454.
8. Berenguer de Mélion: *DJI*, no. 283.
9. Berenguer of Argens: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.
10. Berenguer of Largeres: *LdR*, i, no. 716.
11. Berenguer of Montfalcon: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.
12. Berenguer of Montréal: *LdR*, i, no. 1022.
13. B. Morlan, chaplain of Rocamadour: *LdR*, i, no. 337.
14. B. of Saint-Just, of Lunel: *LdR*, i, no. 292.
15. B. Remon of Béziers: *LdR*, i, no. 1421.
16. Ermengau of Esbans: *LdR*, i, no. 613.
17. Ferrer John of Villefranche, of Beaucastel: *LdR*, i, no. 1164.
18. F. of Saint Michel: *LdR*, i, no. 202.
19. Garcia of Aveyron: *DJI*, nos. 245-6.
20. Garsia the cleric: 'Itinera', p. 596.
21. Gausbert of Espenel: *LdR*, i, no. 631.
22. G. Deacon of Calidis de Montbouy: *LdR*, i, no. 854.
23. G. de Fontès, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 904.
24. G. de Gaillac: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.
25. G. de Linas: *LdR*, i, no. 1156.

26. G. de Mâcon: *LdR*, i, no. 176.
27. G. de Montrouge: *LdR*, i, no. 174.
28. G. de Roudors: *LdR*, i, no. 15.
29. G. de Saint Michel: *LdR*, i, no. 174.
30. Gil de Garches: *LdR*, i, no. 1092.
31. Godfrey of Verbria: 'Itinera', p. 596.
32. G. of Les Seppes: *LdR*, i, no. 242.
33. G. of Vaux: *LdR*, i, no. 716.
34. Gonçalvus Petri of Conques: *LdR*, i, no. 28.
35. G. Pelegri, of Chartres: *LdR*, i, no. 582.
36. G. Petri de Noailles, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 909.
37. G. Seger of Roquefère: *LdR*, i, no. 1104.
38. Herricus of Peyrat: *LdR*, i, no. 858.
39. Hugh of Forcalquier, master of the Hospitallers: *DJI*, nos. 291, *LdR*, i, no. 218, *LdF*, pp. 172, 175-7, 184, 215-6, 237.
40. I. de Ayn: *LdR*, i, no. 797.
41. I. de Borrèze: *LdR*, i, no. 868.
42. I. of Avignon: *LdR*, i, no. 679.
43. I. Provençal: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.
44. John de les Celles: *DJI*, no. 281.
45. John of Paris: *LdR*, i, no. 1308.
46. Maria, wife of Michael de Condom: *LdR*, i, no. 744.
47. Martin of Noailles: *LdR*, ii, no. 75.
48. Matthew of Avignon: *LdR*, i, no. 680.
49. Michael de Condom: *LdR*, i, no. 744.

50. Ortis de Gaillon: *LdR*, i, no. 1813.
51. P. de Carcassonne: *LdR*, i, no. 875.
52. P. de Condamine: *LdR*, i, no. 1448.
53. P de Fons: *LdR*, i, no. 924.
54. P. de Rochabert: *LdR*, i, no. 464.
55. P. de Vaux: *LdR*, i, no. 1795, ii, no. 109.
56. Peter, Archbishop of Narbonne: *DJI*, no. 273, *LdR*, i, nos. 908, *LdR*, ii, nos. 36, 52, 92, *LdF*, p. 218.
57. Peter Dezcoll: *DJI*, no. 283, *LdR*, i, no. 1083.
58. Peter John Ortolanus: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.
59. Poncius de Sejano: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.
60. Prima, wife of I. de Ayn: *LdR*, i, no. 797.
61. Raymond Dezcoll: *DJI*, no. 283, *LdR*, i, no. 1083.
62. Raymond of Saint-Félix: *DJI*, no. 287.
63. R. d'Aigremont: *LdR*, i, no. 220.
64. R. de Riquier: *LdR*, i, nos. 284, 1195.
65. R. de Teillet: *LdR*, i, no. 233.
66. R. de Narbonne: *LdR*, i, no. 874.
67. R. Enege of Carcassonne: *LdR*, i, no. 275.
68. R. Gauçelmi, herald of Lunel: *LdR*, i, no. 295.
69. R. of Angers: *LdR*, i, no. 227.
70. Sanchia Peter of Aguilers: *LdR*, i, no. 438.
71. Sancho P. de Noailles: *LdR*, i, no. 69.
72. Sancius of Vaux, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 103.

73. Stacius of Gaillac: *LdR*, i, no. 684.
74. Stephan of Molac: *LdR*, i, nos. 1095, 1349.
75. William Mazeller de Barre: *LdR*, ii, no. 139.
76. William of Costansanes: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.
77. William of Mélion: *DJI*, no. 283.
78. William of Montguiscard: *DJI*, no. 268.
79. William the Catalan: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.

crucesignati owing allegiance to the English crown

1. A. de Samatan: *LdR*, i, no. 682.
2. A. Gascon: *LdR*, i, no. 1305.
3. Assalit of Vasats, jester: *LdR*, i, no. 796.
4. Domingo of England: *LdR*, i, no. 175.
5. Dominic Petri of Jasses: *LdR*, i, no. 1186.
6. G. of England, a doctor: *LdR*, i, no. 853.
7. I. de Senpere: *LdR*, i, no. 1124.
8. P. de Clérac: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.
9. P. de Saint Mellion: *LdR*, i, no. 1393.
10. P. Espuite: *LdR*, i, no. 715.
11. R. Espuite: *LdR*, i, no. 715.
12. R. de Bérenx: *LdR*, i, no. 1215.
13. William of Aquitaine: *DJI*, i, nos. 250-1, 253-5, 257, 259, 268, *LdR*, ii, nos. 42, 59.

Italian *crucesignati*

1. Abbot of Rippolensis: *LdR*, i, no. 917.
2. A. del Orto: *LdR*, i, no. 1210.
3. A. de Narco: *LdR*, i, no. 448.
4. Andrew of Lignano: *LdR*, i, no. 1400.
5. Aymar of Sant-Egidio: *LdR*, i, no. 577.
6. Brother Gerald of Prato, commander of Alfama, Portugal: *LdR*, i, no. 707.
7. I. Periç de Pavia, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 70.
8. Jimeno de Lusia: *LdR*, i, no. 600.
9. Lupus Jimeno of Lusia, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 286, 986, 1388.
10. Martin Jimeno of Lusia, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 667.
11. Martin of Sicily: *LdR*, i, nos. 11, 1069.
12. P. Abbot of Rassa: *LdR*, i, no. 2.
13. P. de Spigol, from the Palace of Angularia: *LdR*, i, no. 922.
14. Roderic Jimenez of Lusia: *LdR*, i, no. 29.
15. Sancho de Lusia: *LdR*, i, no. 1118.
16. Simon Balicho, from Genoa: *LdR*, i, no. 1081.
17. Steven of Sali: *LdR*, i, no. 323.

Imperial *crucesignati*

1. Ferrer of Verdun: *LdR*, i, no. 1355.
2. Garcia, king of Arles: *LdR*, i, no. 1124.

3. G. de Minorissa, of Verdun: *LdR*, i, nos. 1070, 1076.
4. G. de Na Sança: *LdR*, i, no. 174.
5. G. de Porza: *LdR*, i, no. 551.
6. Martin of Grades: *LdR*, i, no. 1100.
7. Martin of Novalles: *LdR*, i, no. 1085.

Hungarian *crucesignati*

1. Andrew the Hungarian: *LdR*, i, no. 792.
2. B. nephew of the bishop of Pécs: *LdR*, i, no. 235.
3. Gil of Hungary: *LdR*, i, nos. 308-9.
4. I. of Hungary of the Mistress Queen: *LdR*, i, no. 318.
5. Peter den Iagme: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.
6. R. of Hungary: *LdR*, i, no. 1290.

Participants of uncertain origin

1. A. Barreda: *LdR*, i, no. 205.
2. Abbess of Pedragalpe: *LdR*, i, no. 838.
3. Abbot Didaci: *LdR*, i, no. 919.
4. Abbot of Scala Dei: *LdR*, i, no. 734, *LdR*, ii, no. 89.
5. Abenaço ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1037.
6. A. Borreda: *LdR*, i, no. 178.
7. Abrahim Arroti Anaiar: *LdR*, i, no. 1105.
8. Abrahim, Jew: *LdR*, i, no. 628.

9. Abril ?: *DJI*, no. 287.
10. Abrolatz ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1204.
11. Açach Abnadaivan, from the line of Habrahim: *LdR*, i, no. 703.
12. A. Catala: *LdR*, i, no. 686.
13. A. Carcases: *LdR*, i, no. 699.
14. A. Çesplanas: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.
15. Açnar de Verdu: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.
16. A. Cosco: *LdR*, i, no. 472.
17. Adam ?: *LdR*, i, no. 991.
18. Adam ?, judge: *LdR*, i, no. 1391.
19. A. Darlet: *LdR*, i, no. 646.
20. A. de Cafont: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.
21. A. de Capareilada: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.
22. A. de Fonte: *LdR*, i, nos. 1270, 1466.
23. A. de las Ceylas: *LdR*, i, no. 1108.
24. A. de Matax: *LdR*, i, no. 543.
25. A. de Riusech: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.
26. A. de Rivo Sico: *LdR*, i, no. 1381.
27. A. de Rochafolio: *LdR*, i, no. 1374.
28. A. de Saint Peter, skinner: *LdR*, i, no. 887.
29. A. de Villacavals: *LdR*, i, no. 812.
30. A. don Johan Roy: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.
31. A. Emerig: *LdR*, i, no. 42.
32. A. Falconer, relative of R. Falconer: *LdR*, i, no. 619.
33. A. Gros: *LdR*, i, no. 684.

34. A. Jorda: *LdR*, i, no. 18.

35. A. Jordani: *LdR*, i, no. 521.

36. Albaro Diaz: *LdR*, i, no. 1116.

37. Alegre Vitali: *LdR*, i, no. 1257.

38. Alexandre ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

39. Almandina, wife of P. Berach: *LdR*, i, no. 1359.

40. A. Londa, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1036.

41. A. Maçaben: *LdR*, i, no. 277.

42. Amalric ?, brother of Berenguer the doctor: *LdR*, i, no. 783.

43. A., master of Ivannes: *LdR*, i, no. 557.

44. Amat ?: *LdR*, i, nos. 202, 1130.

45. Anaya ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

46. Andraut, grandson or nephew of I. Emerich: *LdR*, i, no. 626.

47. Andrew Bonanatus, cleric: *LdR*, i, no. 567.

48. A. Oler, supplier: *LdR*, i, no. 1457.

49. Aparicius of Boysa: *LdR*, i, no. 446.

50. Arbert d'Archs: *LdR*, i, no. 38.

51. A. Renaldus: *LdR*, i, no. 590.

52. Arnald Bega: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

53. Arnald Ferrer: *LdR*, ii, no. 110.

54. Arnold de Ponte: *DJI*, no. 304.

55. Arnold of Granalosa: *DJI*, no. 304.

56. Arnold of Maian: *DJI*, no. 304.

57. Arrio ?: *LdR*, i, no. 384.

58. A. Tort: *LdR*, i, no. 800.

59. Avengamerro ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1165.

60. A. Vitalis: *LdR*, i, no. 391.

61. Ayalf ?: *LdR*, i, no. 202.

62. Azach Crespi: *LdR*, i, no. 629.

63. Azmet Abenguamerro: *LdR*, i, no. 1042.

64. A. ?: *LdR*, i, no. 602.

65. Baldwin ?: *LdR*, i, no. 213.

66. B. Andree: *LdR*, i, no. 674.

67. Barçelo de Sentoliva: *LdR*, i, no. 1795, *LdR*, i, no. 109.

68. Bartholomew Martin: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

69. Bartholomew of Ponter: *LdR*, i, nos. 1436, 1439.

70. Bartholomew the fat: *LdR*, i, no. 1159.

71. B. Balester: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

72. B. Bou: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

73. B. Çagalea: *LdR*, i, no. 25.

74. B. Çacalza: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

75. B. Catala: *LdR*, i, no. 840.

76. B. Cerda: *LdR*, i, no. 258.

77. B. Çespital: *LdR*, i, no. 35.

78. B. Çolçina, son of A. Çolçina: *LdR*, i, no. 757.

79. B. Corroça: *LdR*, i, no. 538.

80. B. d'Abrafim: *LdR*, i, no. 173.

81. B. de Amalda: *LdR*, i, nos. 1099, 1451.

82. B. de Çagranada: *LdR*, i, no. 1261.

83. B. de Castro Episcopali: *LdR*, i, nos. 723, 848, *LdR*, ii, no. 91.

84. B. de Forno: *LdR*, i, no. 874.

85. B. Dega: *LdR*, i, no. 1122.

86. B. Delcol, relative of F. Delcol: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

87. B. de na Miracle, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

88. B. de Podio Alber, a porter: *LdR*, i, no. 527.

89. B. de Tegores: *LdR*, i, no. 547.

90. B. de Vilar: *LdR*, i, no. 1254.

91. B. de Zaçalada, knight, *LdR*, i, nos. 339-40.

92. B. Dezpi: *LdR*, i, nos. 175, 543.

93. Benedict of Larraç: *LdR*, i, no. 402.

94. Berat ?: *LdR*, i, no. 237.

95. Berenguer Amaldanus: *DJI*, no. 304.

96. Berenguer Burgueti: *LdR*, ii, no. 33.

97. Berenguer Calça: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

98. Berenguer de Caldes: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

99. Berenguer Deçprat: *LdR*, i, no. 271.

100. Berenguer de Riusech: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

101. Berenguer Durfort: *LdR*, i, no. 408.

102. Berenguer Ferrer: *LdR*, i, no. 699.

103. Berenguer Gimera: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

104. Berenguer John: *DJI*, no. 287.

105. Berenguer Lopart: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

106. Berenguer Maçip: *LdR*, i, nos. 1455-6.

107. Berenguer Nicholau, husband of Maria of Soler: *LdR*, i, no. 861.

108. Berenguer of Frexer: *LdR,* i, no. 1267.

109.Berenguer of Solerio: *LdR*, i, no. 708.

110.Berenguer of Solot, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 907.

111.Berenguer of Spiels: *LdR*, i, no. 1434.

112.Berenguer of Targuanova: *LdR*, i, no. 549.

113.Berenguer of Vilafraheri: *LdR*, i, no. 641.

114.Berenguer Palaforger: *LdR*, i, no. 492.

115.Berenguer Reval: *LdR*, i, no. 1056.

116.Berenguer Sen Genes: *LdR*, i, no. 267.

117.Berenguer Tolsa, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

118.Berenguer Tornamira, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 893.

119.Berenguer Zarreira: *LdR*, i, no. 695.

120.Berenguer Zelom: *LdR*, i, no. 762.

121.Berenguer ?, cleric: *LdR*, i, no. 873.

122.Berenguer ?, doctor, brother of Amalric: *LdR*, i, no. 783.

123.Bernard Guasch, relative of Peter: *DJI*, no. 304.

124.Bernard Miro, relative of Peter Miro: *DJI*, no. 283.

125.Bernard of Calidis: *DJI*, no. 304.

126.Bernard Sotale: *DJI*, no. 287.

127.Bernard Tinturer: *DJI*, no. 283.

128.Bernard ?, deacon: *LdR*, i, no. 550.

129.Betrand Jordani: *LdR*, i, no. 978.

130.Betrand Montaina: *LdR*, i, nos. 813-4.

131.Betrand ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

132.Betrand ?, scribe: *LdR*, i, no. 941.

133.Betran of Gotves: *LdR*, i, no. 685.

134.B. Focald, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

135.B. Girbert: *LdR*, i, no. 34.

136.B. Gilabert: *LdR*, i, no. 24.

137.B. Granel: *LdR*, i, no. 739.

138.B. Granera: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

139.B. Guillelmi of Vescompte: *LdR*, i, no. 180.

140.Blascho Orela, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1249.

141.B. Lovito: *LdR*, i, no. 188.

142.B. Maenç: *LdR*, i, no. 1461.

143.B. Mercer: *LdR*, i, no. 701.

144.B. of Balçarein, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 691.

145.B. of Eslor: *LdR*, i, no. 869.

146.B. of Planis: *LdR*, i, no. 554.

147.Bomacip ?: *LdR*, i, no. 699.

148.Bonanad ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

149.Bonanato Guidoni: *DJI*, no. 287.

150.Bonanatus ?: *LdR*, i, nos. 505, 1134.

151.Bonaventura Boquet: *LdR*, i, nos. 976, 1096.

152.Bonayas ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1083.

153.Boniface ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1395.

154.Bonus Filius: *LDR*, i, no. 882.

155.Bonyvas ?: *DJI*, no. 283.

156.B. Pailares: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

157.B. Pesador: *LdR*, i, nos. 842, 956.

158.B. Pezo: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

159.B. Renald: *LdR*, i, no. 1027.

160.B. Renau: *LdR*, i, no. 736.

161.B. Rossel, guide: *LdR*, i, no. 1441.

162.B. Roso: *LdR*, i, no. 762.

163.Brother Albero Ferrandiz: *LdR*, i, no. 418.

164.Brother B. of Bort, commander of Alcalano: *LdR*, i, no. 440.

165.Brother Illuminatus and the Franciscans: *LdR*, i, no. 248.

166.Brother P. of Calsarens: *LdR*, i, no. 473.

167.Brother P. of Pradello of the monastery of Populeti: LdR, i, no. 552.

168.Brother P. Paulus of the monastery of Populeti: LdR, i, no. 552.

169.Brunus of Revidana: *LdR*, i, no. 698.

170.B. Saura: *LdR*, i, no. 39.

171.B. Serra: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

172.B. Suau: *LdR*, i, no. 45.

173.B. Vitalis: *LdR*, i, nos. 306, 782, 972, 1057, 1288, *LdR*, ii, no. 68.

174.B. Zacourt, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 871.

175.Caçador ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1263.

176.Carrocius ?: *LdR*, i, nos. 819, 1344-5.

177.Cicilia, wife of Portolesius ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1063.

178.Cocliure ?: *LdR*, i, no. 762.

179.Coma Jovan: *LdR*, i, no. 675.

180.Constantine ?: *DJI*, no. 287.

181.Costanti ?, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

182.Dalmau Ateçen: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

183.Didacus ?: *LdR*, i, no. 447.

184.D. Morages: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

185.Dolça, wife of Dominic Morera: *LdR*, i, no. 1440.

186.Dolça, wife of P. Boria: *LdR*, i, no. 616.

187.Domenge don Enego: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

188.Domingo Caldero: *LdR*, i, no. 536.

189.Domingo d'Orabuena: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

190.Domingo Felip: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

191.Domingo Gonçalbeç: *LdR*, i, no. 1321.

192.Domingo Mateo: *DJI*, no. 290.

193.Domingo Rosanes: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

194.Domingo Vilalba, judge: *LdR*, i, no. 1391.

195.Dominic Burro: *DJI*, no. 287.

196.Dominic Canametz: *LdR*, i, no. 710.

197.Dominic Montso: *LdR*, i, no. 775.

198.Dominic Morelo: *LdR*, i, nos. 808, 960.

199.Dominic Morera, husband of Dolça: *LdR*, i, no. 1440.

200.Dominic of Algavira: *LdR*, i, no. 411.

201.Dominic of Domno: *DJI*, no. 287.

202.Dominic of Moragues: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

203.Dominic Petri Alfaat, castellan: *LdR*, i, no. 1091.

204.Dominic Petri of Boysa: *LdR*, i, no. 343.

205.Dominic Sancii: *LdR*, i, nos. 548, 1047.

206.Dominic Scolarii: *LdR*, i, no. 1194.

207.Dominicus Boleia: *LdR*, i, no. 199.

208.Dominicus of Sepulcro: *LdR*, i, no. 367.

209.Dominic ?, relative of Philip Lazarus: *DJI*, no. 287.

210.Domna Maior: *LdR*, i, no. 389.

211.Donatus Seradura: *LdR*, i, no. 102.

212.Don Deusdat: *LdR*, i, no. 633.

213.Dulcia, washerwoman: *LdR*, i, no. 1418.

214.Dulcia, wife of P. Burgia: *LdR*, i, no. 1111.

215.Duran Prohet, relative of I. Prohet: *LdR*, i, no. 266.

216.Egidius Garceç, relative of Martin Garceç: *LdR*, i, no. 381.

217.Egidius of Atrossil: *LdR*, i, nos. 10, 1065, 1347, *LdR*, ii, nos. 40, 65.

218.Elvire, wife of I. Violeta: *LdR*, i, no. 451.

219.Emerich Dezprat: *LdR*, i, nos. 464, 476.

220.Emerich of ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1417.

221.Enechus Garcia: *LdR*, i, no. 1383.

222.Entensi ?, crossbowman: *LdR*, i, no. 365.

223.Ermeniardis ?: *LdR*, i, no. 350.

224.Ermengau ?: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

225.Eve, wife of Sir Garcia: *LdR*, i, no. 241.

226.F. A. de Bila: *LdR*, i, no. 926.

227.F. Çavid: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

228.F. Cuch: *LdR*, i, no. 322.

229.F. de Apiaria: *LdR*, i, nos. 717, 824.

230.F. de Cobernalton: *LdR*, i, no. 1083.

231.F. de Col: *LdR*, i, no. 37.

232.F. Deçpont, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

233.F. de Dera: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

234.F. Deiç: *LdR*, i, nos. 100, 261.

235.F. Delcol, relative of B. Delcol: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

236.F. del Soler: *LdR*, i, no. 1348.

237.F. de Montainans: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

238.F. de Nanina: *LdR*, i, no. 13.

239.F. Didaci: *LdR*, i, nos. 107, 1467.

240.Felip Paraylador: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

241.Ferrando Petri: *LdR*, i, no. 1306.

242.Ferrandus Zabata: *LdR*, i, no. 863.

243.Ferran Lopiç: *LdR*, i, no. 1101.

244.Ferran of Assessa: *LdR*, i, no. 1010.

245.Ferrar de Ponte: *DJI*, no. 287.

246.Ferrar, Lord of Barea: *DJI*, no. 290.

247.Ferrar Pugol: *DJI*, no. 287.

248.Ferrar Robert: *DJI*, no. 304.

249.Ferrer Alvariz: *LdR*, i, no. 606.

250.Ferrer Petri: *LdR*, i, no. 515.

251.Ferrer Roiç, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 507, 1248.

252.Ferre, son of G. Ferre: *LdR*, i, no. 370.

253.Ferrer Sancii Asencio: *LdR*, i, no. 1244.

254.F. Garçez: *LdR*, i, nos. 356, 425.

255.F. Gasch: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

256.Figera ?: *LdR*, i, no. 512.

257.F. Lupi of Barea: *LdR*, i, no. 409.

258.F. Maça: *LdR*, i, no. 649.

259.F. Matthew: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

260.Fortun Petri de Sesse, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 117.

261.F. Petri of Casteiares: *LdR*, i, no. 1206.

262.F. Poncii, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 477.

263.F. Rubert: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

264.Furtunius Guerra: *LdR*, i, no. 980.

265.F. Sancho: *LdR*, i, no. 316.

266.Furtado Dalhora: *LdR*, i, no. 111.

267.Furtadus Petriz of Aceyt: *LdR*, i, no. 1141.

268.Furtunius Sancii: *LdR*, i, no. 610.

269.F. ?, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 615.

270.G. Ademar: *LdR*, i, no. 95.

271.Galaubia ?: *LdR*, i, nos. 556, 974, *LdR*, ii, no. 83.

272.G. Alayan Bisaldu: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

273.G. Alegret: *LdR*, i, no. 16.

274.Garcia Arnaldi, banker: *LdR*, i, no. 772.

275.Garcia Cavalo: *LdR*, i, no. 1460.

276.Garcia Daoro: *LdR*, i, no. 338.

277.Garcia Davoro: *LdR*, i, no. 963.

278.Garcia de Sayes: *LdR*, i, no. 1243.

279.Garcia de Vera: *LdR*, i, no. 935.

280.Garcia Periç of Osa, brother of Saxo Periç: *LdR*, i, no. 195.

281.Garcia Petri of Rivoroga, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 571.

282.Garcia Navarro: *LdR*, i, nos. 514, 1307.

283.Garcia Sancii: *LdR*, i, no. 1211.

284.Garcias Puio: *LdR*, i, no. 1148.

285.Garcia Terrer, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1097.

286.Garcia Verdu: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

287.Garcia ?, knight and husband of Eve: *LdR*, i, no. 241.

288.Garcion ?: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

289.G. Assalit: *LdR*, i, no. 891.

290.Gauçbert of Pererio: *LdR*, i, no. 1349.

291.Gaucerandus Iustus: *LdR*, i, no. 864.

292.G. Benet: *LdR*, i, no. 41.

293.G. Berenguer: *LdR*, i, no. 194.

294.G. Betrandi: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

295.G. Bonet: *LdR*, i, nos. 43, 1451.

296.G. Bovis: *LdR*, i, no. 1338.

297.G. Bru: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

298.G. Bru the butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

299.G. Burget: *LdR*, i, no. 705.

300.G. Cabrerach: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

301.G. Canet: *LdR*, i, no. 322.

302.G. Canta: *LdR*, i, no. 740.

303.G. Cax: *LdR*, i, no. 290.

304.G. Cerviner: *LdR*, i, no. 681.

305.G. Çespenes: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

306.G. Cuguilada: *LdR*, i, no. 1196.

307.G. d'Atrossil: *LdR*, i, no. 966.

308.G. de Apiaria: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

309.G. de Benaula, father of Martin de Benaula: *LdR*, i, no. 894.

310.G. de Cabra: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

311.G. de Caçina: *LdR*, i, no. 204.

312.G. de Cafont: *LdR*, i, no. 1109.

313.G. de Campçemeler: *LdR*, i, no. 1260.

314.G. de Caned: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

315.G. de Capçentelles: *LdR*, i, no. 1238.

316.G. de Çaportella: *LdR*, ii, no.

317.G. de Castors: *LdR*, i, no. 599.

318.G. de Espailarges, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 52.

319.G. de Grayllac: *DJI*, no. 304.

320.G. de Irena, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

321.G. de Lacera: *LdR*, i, nos. 401, 471, 499.

322.G. d'Elzor: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

323.G. de Montainagol: *LdR*, i, no. 643.

324.G. de Moraçach: *LdR* i, no. 867.

325.G. de na Ponça: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

326.G. d'en Boxart: *LdR*, i, no. 1102.

327.G. d'en Estevaneta: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

328.G. de Paratge: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

329.G. de Partach: *LdR*, i, no. 1437.

330.G. de Pax, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 895.

331.G. de Plicamanibus: *LdR*, i, no. 696.

332.G. de Pulcroloco: *LdR*, i, no. 467.

333.G. de Riupol: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

334.G. de Sanç: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

335.G. de Seger and the men of the archbishop: *LdR*, i, no. 1040.

336.G. de Selva Bona: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

337.G. Emerich: *LdR*, i, no. 32.

338.Gerald de Porta: *LdR*, i, no. 973.

339.Gerald of Alantorn: *LdR*, i, no. 191.

340.Gerald Scribe: *DJI*, no. 304.

341.Gerald ?, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1033.

342.G. Escola: *LdR*, no. 1160.

343.G. Escriva: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

344.G. Eyç, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

345.G. Franchus: *LdR*, i, no. 925.

346.G. Frexer: *LdR*, i, no. 1266.

347.G. Gamondi: *LdR*, i, no. 490.

348.G. Gasch, relative of P. and R. Gasch: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

349.G. Geraldi: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

350.Gilbert Cocliure: *LdR*, i, no. 202.

351.Gilbert of Alient: *LdR*, i, no. 929.

352.Gil d'Alao: *LdR*, i, nos. 1137, 1465.

353.Gil ?: *LdR*, i, no. 522.

354.G. Jenoves: *LdR*, i, no. 22.

355.G. Lupi of Peracelz, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 820.

356.G. Mailol: *LdR*, i, no. 1283.

357.G. Manich: *LdR*, i, no. 1468.

358.G. Meler: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

359.G. Mercer: *LdR*, i, no. 704.

360.G. Morages: *LdR*, i, no. 786.

361.G. Mud: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

362.G. of Alcabeç: *LdR*, i, no. 1045.

363.G. of Aran, porter: *LdR*, i, no. 344.

364.Gonçalbo Roy: *LdR*, i, no. 1121.

365.Gonçalvus de Vera: *LdR*, i, no. 936.

366.G. Ostia: *LdR*, i, no. 882.

367.G. Petri: *LdR*, i, no. 398.

368.G. Pontii: *LdR*, i, no. 724.

369.G. Preça: *LdR*, i, no. 1246.

370.Gratia, wife of Pelegrin Stephani: *LdR*, i, no. 564.

371.G. Raymond: *DJI*, no. 304.

372.G. Ricard: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

373.G. Saig: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

374.G. Segui: *LdR*, i, no. 1269.

375.G. Solçina: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

376.G. Taylada: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

377.G. the escort: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

378.Guillelma Robiana: *LdR*, i, no. 333.

379.Guillelma ?, daughter of P. I.: 977.

380.Guillelmona ?, daughter of Pilars ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1049.

381.Guillem of Ezlor: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

382.G. Vitalis, the cleric, brother of R. Vitalis: *LdR*, i, nos. 392, 399.

383.G. Zelarn: *LdR*, i, nos. 436, 876.

384.G. ?, the messenger: *LdR*, i, no. 1041.

385.Hahim Almateri, jew: *LdR*, i, no. 1371.

386.Hom de Deu Cigo: *LdR*, i, no. 602.

387.Hugetus Palmaret: *LdR*, i, no. 1294.

388.Hug Palmard: *LdR*, i, no. 114.

389.Iacme de Roials: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

390.I. Barada: *LdR*, i, no. 544.

391.I. Bif, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

392.Ibraym, a jew: *LdR*, i, no. 1191.

393.I. Çamarra: *LdR*, i, no. 1298.

394.I. Cerda: *LdR*, i, no. 1160.

395.I. Dasy: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

396.I. de Almanara, brother to Marie: *LdR*, i, no. 777.

397.I. de Canet: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

398.I. de Colent: *LdR*, i, no. 886.

399.I. de Costa: *LdR*, i, no. 632.

400.I. de Gerget, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 112.

401.I. de las Ceylas, brother of Yspanus: LdR, i, no. 1074

402.I. de Mecina: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

403.I. de Muro, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 210.

404.I. de Palafido: *LdR*, i, no. 618.

405.I. de Solçina: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

406.I. de ?: *LdR*, i, no. 768.

407.I. Domingiç: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

408.I. don Enego: *LdR*,i, no. 1316.

409.I. Emerich: *LdR*, i, nos. 669, 1413.

410.I. Gascho: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

411.I. Gayta: *LdR*, i, no. 33.

412.I. Marti: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

413.I. Martina, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

414.I. Mulerat: *LdR*, i, no. 630.

415.I. of Ezpen: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

416.I. Princeps: *LdR*, i, no. 429.

417.I. Prohet: *LdR*, i, no. 326.

418.I. Puinera, father of Puinera Puinera: *LdR*, i, no. 1212.

419.I. Roderic of Rivocireso: *LdR*, i, no. 469.

420.I. Rosinol: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

421.I. Rostet: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

422.I. Roy: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

423.I. Sanches, brother of Valerius Sanches: *LdR*, i, no. 1285.

424.I. Suiner: *LdR*, i, no. 603.

425.I. Tos: *LdR*, i, no. 534.

426.I. Violeta, husband of Elvire: *LdR*, i, nos. 451, 578.

427.I. Vitalis: *LdR*, i, no. 1732.

428.Jachesio Sans: *DJI*, no. 304, *LdR*, i, no. 1336.

429.Jacme Groyn: *LdR*, i, no. 1432.

430.Jacobeta ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1317.

431.Jacob the chaplain: *LdR*, i, no. 1476.

432.James Jenoves: *LdR*, i, no. 364.

433.Jaufridus of Loaysa: *LdR*, i, no. 1808, *LdR*, ii, no. 138.

434.Jimeno de Pacho: *LdR*, i, no. 80.

435.Jimeno de Sayes: *LdR*, i, no. 1242.

436.Jimeno Garcez: *LdR*, i, no. 622.

437.Jimeno of Navaschos: *LdR*, i, no. 1337.

438.Jimeno of Oleca: *LdR*, i, no. 622.

439.Jimeno of Ropest: *LdR*, i, no. 773.

440.Joanhes of Teuls, husband of Saurina: *LdR*, i, no. 1386.

441.Jofre of Loaissa: *LdR*, i, no. 236.

442.Johan Clavel: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

443.Johannes Blascho: *LdR*, i, no. 1176.

444.Johannes Dominici: *LdR*, i, no. 516.

445.John Bis: *DJI*, no. 287.

446.John Claver: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

447.John Dominguez: *DJI*, no. 304.

448.John of Asin: *DJI*, no. 304.

449.John of Tolta: *DJI*, no. 287.

450.John of Villayoso: *LdR*, i, no. 888.

451.Jorda Benedet: *LdR*, i, no. 717.

452.Jorda Borreda: *LdR*, i, no. 821.

453.Jorda de Pratis: *LdR*, i, no. 1160.

454.Julian of Beaulieu: *LdR*, i, no. 58.

455.Laçareto ?: *LdR*, i, no. 756.

456.Lady Raymunda: *LdR*, i, no. 1277.

457.Lazarus ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1240.

458.Lupus Enegez: *LdR*, i, no. 622.

459.Lupus Ferrench of Lurcenich: *LdR*, i, no. 1114.

460.Lupus Jimeno of Açcots, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1199.

461.Lupus of Liverre: *LdR*, i, no. 1066.

462.Lupus of Sparça: *LdR*, i, no. 587.

463.Macianus Portaioyes: *LdR*, ii, no. 115.

464.Macia Portaioyes: *LdR*, i, nos. 509, 1082, 1723.

465.Marchioness Garnera: *LdR*, i, no. 1303.

466.Maria Cara, washerwoman: *LdR*, i, no. 1419.

467.Maria Egidii: *LdR*, i, no. 1239.

468.Maria Gonçalvez: *LdR*, i, nos. 495, 1273.

469.Maria Maroqui: *LdR*, i, no. 979.

470.Maria of Soler, wife of Berenguer Nicholau: *LdR*, i, no. 861.

471.Maria Petri, mother of Gregory: *LdR*, i, no. 1292.

472.Marie, sister of I. de Almanara: *LdR*, i, no. 777.

473.Marimondus of Plicamanibus: *LdR*, i, nos. 589, 664.

474.Marquello ?: *LdR*, i, no. 721.

475.Marques ?: *LdR*, i, nos. 44, 839.

476.Martholomew, the fisherman: *LdR*, i, no. 1023.

477.Marti del Bosch: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

478.Marti des Tares: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

479.Martin de Benaula, son of G. de Benaula: *LdR*, i, no. 894.

480.Martin Garceç, relative of Egidius Garceç: *LdR*, i, nos. 381, 426.

481.Martin Petri of Asqueta: *LdR*, i, no. 1814.

482.Martin the butler: *LdR*, i, no. 661.

483.Martinus Ruiz, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 939.

484.Mascaros Oler: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

485.Master Angerius: *LdR*, i, no. 506.

486.Master G. of Graseca: *LdR*, i, no. 1274.

487.Master Hugh Desbrulio: *LdR*, i, no. 780.

488.Master I. Nunonis: *LdR*, i, nos. 967, 981.

489.Master Martin: *LdR*, i, nos. 320, 1318.

490.Master Poncius of Sumidric: *LdR*, i, no. 1086.

491.Master Trabuqueti: *LdR*, i, no. 624.

492.Matthew Cobertorer: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

493.Matthew Come: *LdR*, i, no. 995.

494.Matthew Floriz: *LdR*, i, no. 1112.

495.Maymo Nadal: *DJI*, no. 287.

496.Mercader ?: *LdR*, i, no. 278.

497.Michael Aguilo: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

498.Michael d'Enbort: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

499.Michael Didaci, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 596.

500.Michael Domingiz: *LdR*, i, no. 753.

501.Michael Farragut: *LdR*, i, no. 545.

502.Michael Ferraut: *LdR*, i, no. 806.

503.Michael Martiniç: *LdR*, i, no. 280.

504.Michael Martini de Boleya: *LdR*, ii, no. 31.

505.Michael Mores: *LdR*, i, no. 1225.

506.Michael of Garfi: *LdR* i, no. 1446.

507.Michael of Nom de Deu: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

508.Michael Remiriç, brother of P. Remiriç: *LdR*, i, no. 355.

509.Michale Calafat: *LdR*, i, no. 493.

510.Milia ?: *LdR*, i, no. 496.

511.Miret Ciutadia, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 947, 1179.

512.Mirus Ciudadia: *LdR*, i, no. 1378.

513.Mohammed, a saracen ‘seder’: *LdR*, i, no. 396.

514.Montainagol ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1221.

515.Montoliu ?, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 872.

516.Mosse Algostanti: *LdR*, i, no. 592.

517.Naralailach ?: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

518.N. Ariolf: *LdR*, i, no. 762.

519.Nicholas of Algayra: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

520.Octavian ?: *DJI*, no. 288.

521.Ortus ?, relative of Peter: *DJI*, no. 287.

522.Oxoa Alaman, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 73, 933.

523.P. Açnar de Casseda, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 133.

524.P. A. de Ceseiris: *DJI*, no. 250.

525.P. A. de la Rocha: *LdR*, i, no. 1107.

526.P. Albero: *LdR*, i, no. 1226.

527.P. Arbanes: *LdR*, i, no. 957.

528.P. Arçeç, son of P. Arçeç: *LdR*, i, no. 170.

529.P. Armer: *LdR*, i, no. 678.

530.P. Aznariz: *LdR*, i, no. 1189.

531.P. Bastart: *LdR*, i, no. 813.

532.P. Batle: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

533.P. Berach, husband of Almandina: *LdR*, i, no. 1359.

534.P. Berbegal: *LdR*, i, no. 607.

535.P. Biel, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 722.

536.P. Bomacip: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

537.P. Bufil: *LdR*, i, no. 20.

538.P. Burgia, husband of Dulcia: *LdR*, i, no. 1111.

539.P. Buschet: *LdR*, i, no. 265.

540.P. Calafat: *LdR*, i, no. 614.

541.P. Camarada: *LdR*, i, no. 1007.

542.P. Capdebou: *LdR*, i, no. 662.

543.P. Carrio: *LdR*, i, no. 565.

544.P. Cescomes: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

545.P. Cestriles: *LdR*, i, no. 1187.

546.P. Cigo: *LdR*, i, no. 602.

547.P. Civadero: *LdR*, i, no. 1052.

548.P. Coqus: *LdR*, i, no. 1280.

549.P. Correger: *LdR*, i, nos. 48, 1446.

550.P. Danils: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

551.P. Davoro: *LdR*, i, no. 452.

552.P. de Carreio: *LdR*, i, no. 1202.

553.P. de Castroveteri: *LdR*, i, no. 832.

554.P. de Çolivela: *LdR*, i, no. 1120.

555.P. de Conomines: *LdR*, i, nos. 1436, 1439.

556.P. Deçpug: *LdR*, i, no. 245.

557.P. de Episcopali: *LdR*, i, no. 226.

558.P. de Galbert: *LdR*, i, no. 882.

559.P. de Ganales: *LdR*, i, no. 1083.

560.P. Deiç, judge: *LdR*, i, no. 1391.

561.P. de Lacera: *LdR*, i, no. 470.

562.P. de Lacustera: *LdR*, i, no. 725.

563.P. de Montpao: *LdR*, i, no. 329.

564.P. de na Michaela, uncle of Ramon: *LdR*, i, no. 969.

565.P. d'en Jacme: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

566.P. de Ponte: *LdR*, i, no. 750.

567.P. de Robi: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

568.P. de Rochavert: *LdR*, i, no. 1416.

569.P. de Sanaugia: *LdR*, i, nos. 997, 1430, 1447.

570.P. de Servoles: *LdR*, i, no. 970.

571.P. de Spiels: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

572.P. de Teuls: *LdR*, i, no. 1250.

573.P. de Turre, de Pratis: *LdR*, i, no. 1029.

574.P. de Turriles: *LdR*, i, no. 1256.

575.P. de ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

576.P. Didaci: *LdR*, i, no. 1279.

577.P. Duran: *LdR*, i, no. 17.

578.Pedro de Podio Albert, Troubador: *LdR*, i, no. 330.

579.Pedrolo Castelaçol: *LdR*, i, no. 331.

580.Pelegri Ferriol, troubadour: *LdR*, i, no. 330.

581.Pelegrin of Atrossil: *LdR*, i, no. 920.

582.Pelegrin Stephani, husband of the lady Gratia: *LdR*, i, no. 564.

583.P. Elias, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 416, 441.

584.P. Enegez of Saint Mary, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 595.

585.P. Erau: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

586.Peregrinus, son of R. of White Lady: *LdR*, i, no. 1301.

587.Pere Roto: *LdR*, i, no. 1241.

588.Peres ?: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

589.Peret of Vera: *LdR*, i, no. 463.

590.Pereto of Podio Alber: *LdR*, i, no. 798.

591.Pericon of Deu: *DJI*, no. 283.

592.Perpina Romei: *LdR*, i, no. 730.

593.Petrisolus of Jaquesio Sancii: *LdR*, i, no. 776.

594.P. Erillo: *LdR*, i, no. 692.

595.Peter ?, armourer: *LdR*, i, no. 433.

596.Peter Arnaldi: *DJI*, no. 304.

597.Peter Despugol: *DJI*, no. 287.

598.Peter Guasch, relative of Bernard: *DJI*, no. 304.

599.Peter Guillermi: *DJI*, no. 287.

600.Peter Miro, relative of Bernard Miro: *DJI*, no. 283.

601.Peter of Deu: *DJI*, i, no. 283.

602.Peter the Bastard: *DJI*, no. 304.

603.Peter ?, brother of Valery: *DJI*, no. 287.

604.Peter ?, relative of Ortus: *DJI*, no. 287.

605.Petri de Fonte: *LdR*, i, no. 1116.

606.Petronellus ?: *LdR*, i, no. 839.

607.Petrus Mascho: *LdR*, i, no. 699.

608.Petruxa ?, knight, *LdR*, i, no. 546.

609.P. Ferret: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

610.P. Figuera: *LdR*, i, no. 174.

611.P. Gasch, relative of G. and R. Gasch: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

612.P. Gavarda: *LdR*, i, no. 1093.

613.P. Godayl: *LdR*, i, no. 322.

614.P. Grayne: *LdR*, i, no. 1277.

615.P Guidonis: *LdR*, i, nos. 1349, 1399.

616.P. Guillelmi, groom: *LdR*, i, no. 774.

617.Philip Galta Roya, relative of William: *LdR*, no. 1476.

618.Philip Lazarus, relative of Dominic: *DJI*, no. 287.

619.Philip ?: *LdR*, i, no. 702.

620.Philip ?, the barber: *LdR*, i, no. 921.

621.P. Huaca: *LdR*, i, no. 1301.

622.P. Hugonis: *LdR*, i, no. 882.

623.Pilars ?, parent of Guillelmona: *LdR*, i, no. 1049.

624.P. Lay, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 942.

625.P. Lerida: *LdR*, i, no. 1098.

626.P. Lupi Santroma: *LdR*, i, no. 961.

627.P. Maça, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 360, 588.

628.P. Maçot: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

629.P., Majordomo: *LdR*, i, no. 497.

630.P. Marti: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

631.P. Martin: *LdR*, i, no. 1301.

632.P. Martinez of Saint Mary, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 758.

633.P. Mora: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

634.Ponç de Rehes: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

635.P. of B. Dezforn: *LdR*, i, no. 176.

636.P. of Çalavinera: *LdR*, i, no. 397.

637.Paschal of Sangossa: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

638.P. Martorel: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

639.Poncius de Beaulieu: *LdR*, i, no. 945.

640.Poncius de Res: *LdR*, i, no. 1182.

641.Poncius of Solerio: *LdR*, i, no. 1477, *LdR*, i, ii, no. 107.

642.Ponç Saurini: *DJI*, no. 304.

643.Ponç Torner: *DJI*, no. 304.

644.P. Ortella: *LdR*, i, no. 1411.

645.P. Palomar: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

646.P. Perfeita: *LdR*, i, nos. 172, 1188.

647.P. Petri, cobbler: *LdR*, i, no. 66.

648.P. Pomar Dola, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 984.

649.P. Portaioyes: *LdR*, i, nos. 511, 1082.

650.P. Puiol, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

651.Portolesius ?, husband of Cicilia: *LdR*, i, no. 1063.

652.P. Remiriç, brother of Michael Remiriç: *LdR*, i, no. 355.

653.P. Renaldi: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

654.Prima ?: *DJI*, no. 259, *LdR*, i, no. 352.

655.P. Robau: *LdR*, i, no. 1787, *LdR*, ii, no. 117.

656.P. Roda: *LdR*, i, no. 630.

657.P. Rossel: *LdR*, i, no. 23.

658.P. Ruberti of Latis: *LdR*, i, no. 294.

659.P. Ruiz, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 575.

660.P. Sardosa: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

661.P. Sasse: *LdR*, i, no. 1117.

662.P. scribe: *LdR*, i, no. 846.

663.P. Suau: *LdR*, i, no. 805.

664.P. Tena: *LdR*, i, no. 1459.

665.P. the sacristan: *LdR*, i, no. 7.

666.P. Trinca: *LdR*, i, no. 1438.

667.P. Uguerda, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

668.Puinera Puinera, son of I. Puinera: *LdR*, i, no. 1212.

669.P. Vihecho: *LdR*, i, no. 501.

670.P., writer: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

671.P. Xibona: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

672.P. ?: *LdR*, i, no. 674.

673.Rama ?: *LdR*, i, no. 395.

674.Ramon Tolsan: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

675.Ramon ?, nephew of P. de na Michaela: *LdR*, i, no. 969.

676.Ramona, the washer-woman: *LdR*, i, no. 387.

677.Ramonet de Vera: *LdR*, i, no. 754.

678.Raymond Donat: *DJI*, no. 287.

679.Raymund ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1310.

680.R. Brez: *LdR*, i, no. 985.

681.R. Castelan: *LdR*, i, no. 504.

682.R. Conpain: *LdR*, i, no. 741.

683.R. Creuser: *LdR*, i, no. 1067.

684.R. de Beaulieu: *LdR*, i, no. 640.

685.R. de Bestrac: *LdR*, i, no. 303.

686.R. de Calidis: *LdR*, i, no. 445.

687.R. de Çaruvira: *LdR*, i, no. 1034.

688.R. de Cespulga: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

689.R. de Gayo: *LdR*, i, no. 1316.

690.R. de Huget: *LdR*, i, no. 472.

691.R. de Lavencantera: *LdR*, i, no. 1192.

692.R. de Ledonçel: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

693.R. del Soler, a man of Ferrer Dieç: *LdR*, i, no. 923.

694.R. de Luch: *LdR*, i, no. 104.

695.R. d'en Germa: *LdR*, i, no, 174.

696.R. de Rippis: *LdR*, i, no. 374.

697.R. de Santa Cruce: *LdR*, i, nos. 870, 1312.

698.R. de Soresa: *LdR*, i, no. 850.

699.R. Donad, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

700.R. Dunfortis: *LdR*, i, no. 1094.

701.R. Ermengou: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

702.R. Falconer, relative of A. Falconer: *LdR*, i, no. 620.

703.R. Gasch, relative of G. and P. Gasch: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

704.R. Gilaberti: *LdR*, i, no. 809.

705.R. Gombald: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

706.Robert of Belvesy: *LdR*, i, no. 530.

707.Roboaud Boltobarach of the Hospital: *LdR*, i, no. 421.

708.Roderic Bolas: *LdR*, i, no. 817.

709.Roderic Enegez, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 855.

710.Roderic Gambione: *LDR*, i, no. 1319.

711.Roderic Gomicii: *LdR*,i, no. 1324.

712.Roderic Ortiç, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 407, 594.

713.Roderic Sancii, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 852.

714.R. of Vera: *LdR*, i, no. 627.

715.Ros of Gresols: *LdR*, i, no. 319.

716.Rotger Mascarel Munte: *LdR*, i, no. 175.

717.Roto ?: *LdR*, i, no. 918.

718.Rovira ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

719.Roy de Caldes: *LdR*, i, no. 1446.

720.Royz Gomiz de Sasse: *LdR*, i, no. 770.

721.R. Pacmer: *LdR*, i, no. 519.

722.R. Pelegri of Latis: *LdR*, i, no. 293.

723.R. Perpunter: *LdR*, i, no. 1385.

724.R. Portaioyes: *LdR*, i, nos. 510, 1082, 1723.

725.R. Rex: *LdR*, i, no. 543.

726.R. Ross: *LdR*, i, no. 1312.

727.R. Serrador: *LdR*, i, no. 989.

728.R. Sipan: *LdR*, i, no. 903.

729.R. Vitalis, brother of G. Vitalis: *LdR*, i, no. 399.

730.R. ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1451.

731.R. ?, cobbler: *LdR*, i, no. 890.

732.Sabastia ?: *LdR*, i, no. 752.

733.Salamon Bonafos: *LdR*, i, no. 489.

734.Salomon ?: *LdR*, i, no. 592.

735.Salvador ?: *DJI*, no. 287.

736.Sancius Ferrandi: *LdR*, i, no. 1335.

737.Sancia, lady of G. Ortiç: *LdR*, i, no. 508.

738.Sancius Aones: *LdR*, i, no. 520.

739.Sancius de Sasse: *LdR*, i, no. 932.

740.Sancius de Villa: *LdR*, i, no. 1189.

741.Sancius Jorda: *LdR*, i, no. 221.

742.Sancius Maiayo: *LdR*, i, no. 897.

743.Sancius Marques, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 810.

744.Sancius of Vera: *LdR*, i, no. 610.

745.Sancius Roy: *LdR*, i, no. 673.

746.Sanç of Burrue, knight: *LdR*, i, no. 1072.

747.Saurina, wife of Joanhes of Teuls: *LdR*, i, no. 1386.

748.Saxo Periç, brother of Garcia Periç of Osa: *LdR*, i, no. 195.

749.Sebastian ?, butler: *LdR*, i, no. 1003.

750.Segui, porter: *LdR*, i, no. 540.

751.Simon Alamandus: *LdR*, i, no. 1115.

752.Simon Egidii, son of Peter Egidii: *LdR*, i, no. 1008.

753.Simon of Stregonia: *LdR*, i, no. 385.

754.S. Ortiz of Rufes: *LdR*, i, no. 605.

755.S. Sancii, knight: *LdR*, i, nos. 422, 636.

756.Stephan of Aliafaria: *LdR*, i, no. 1379.

757.Stephan of Godayl: *LdR*, i, no. 885.

758.Stephan of Moillach: *DJI*, no. 304.

759.Stephan Petri Sancii: *LdR*, i, no. 795.

760.Stephan ?, baker: 836.

761.Teresa Gil: *LdR*, i, no. 453.

762.Terren ?, the cobbler: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

763.Thibaut ?, vet: *LdR*, i, no.834.

764.Toda Garcez: *LdR*, i, no. 454.

765.Toda Lupi: *LdR*, i, no. 423.

766.Tomas ?, armourer: *LdR*, i, no. 432.

767.Valerius Abril, butcher: *LdR*, i, no. 1080.

768.Valerius Sanches, brother of I. Sanches: *LdR*, i, no. 1285.

769.Valery ?, brother of Peter: *DJI*, no. 287.

770.Valesius of Ançano: *LdR*, i, no. 1103.

771.Venrel Morages: *LdR*, i, no. 322.

772.William Dirrena: *DJI*, no. 287.

773.William Diverra: *DJI*, no. 287.

774.William Galta Roya, relative of Philip: *LdR*, no. 1476.

775.William of Beaulieu: *LdR*, i, no. 1227.

776.William of Çarovira: *DJI*, no. 304.

777.William Richard: *DJI*, no. 304.

778.William Sena: *LdR*, i, no. 1365.

779.William Sen Genes: *LdR*, i, nos. 268-9.

780.Yspanus, brother of I. de las Ceylas: *LdR*, i, no. 1075.

781.Zapatarius ?: *LdR*, i, no. 1051.

782.? brother of I. de las Ceylas and Yspanus: LdR, i, no. 1074

783.?, cousin of Oxoa Alaman: *LdR*, i, no. 73.

784.?, cousin of Oxoa Alaman: *LdR*, i, no. 73.

785.?, cousin of Oxoa Alaman: *LdR*, i, no. 73.

(Total named participants including those of uncertain origin: 1,893)

(Total named participants excluding those of uncertain origin: 1,108)

2. Participants in the Constantinople Crusade

French *crucesignati*

1. Bartholomew, a cleric of Baldwin II, 'Itinera', p. 596.
2. Bartholotus ?: 'Itinera', p. 593.
3. Bigotus of Porta: 'Itinera', p. 593.
4. Chiardus, servant of the French court: 'Itinera', p. 593.
5. Colin of Calla: 'Itinera', p. 593.
6. Drogo of Trubleville: *Registres*, ii, no. 3737.
7. Erard of Châtenay and ‘several other relatives’ of Baldwin of Courtenay: *Registers*, ii, no. 2877.
8. Garnotus, servant of the French court: 'Itinera', p. 593.
9. Gilles, castellan of Beaumetz: *Mouskes*, pp. 664.
10. Guillotus ?: 'Itinera', p. 593.
11. Henry of Saint-Denis and 2 others: 'Itinera', p. 594.
12. Herbert ? and around 20 relatives and friends: *Registers*, ii, no. 4626.
13. Hughes II, bishop of Séez: *Registers*, ii, nos. 3638, 4010.
14. Humbert, Lord of Beaujeu: *Registres*, ii, nos. 4219, 4631, 4644, 4662, *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Cluny*, ed. Bernard and Brunel, vi, nos. 4752, 4754-6.
15. la Soubre, servant of the French court: 'Itinera', p. 593.
16. li Bornes, servant of the French court: 'Itinera', p. 593.
17. Marcel, servant of the French court: 'Itinera', p. 593.
18. Master Odo ?: 'Itinera', p. 596.
19. Odo of Villaribus: 'Itinera', p. 595.

20. John of Béthune: *Mouskes*, pp. 626, 632-3.
21. John of Burgundy: 'Itinera', p. 593.
22. John the valet: 'Itinera', p. 593.
23. Josseran of Brancion: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, no. 2363, Alberic, p. 946, *Mouskes*, p. 664.
24. Philip of Plesseio: 'Itinera', p. 596.
25. Robin, valet of Hugh Marshal: 'Itinera', p. 593.
26. Thomas of Marle: Alberic, p. 946.
27. Thomas of Scutellatia: 'Itinera', p. 593.
28. Thomas, valet of William lord of Beaumont: 'Itinera', p. 593.
29. Unnamed *crucesignati* from the diocese of Paris: *Registres*, ii, no. 3926.
30. Unnamed Franciscans of Paris: *Registres*, ii, nos. 4621-2
31. Watins of la Haverie: *Mouskes*, pp. 664.
32. William Cayeaux: *Mouskes*, pp. 664.

English *crucesignati*

1. Alan the Englishman, servant of the French court: 'Itinera', p. 593.
2. Walter the Englishman: 'Itinera', p. 593.

Scottish *crucesignati*

1. John the Scot of Calabria: 'Itinera', p. 593.

Imperial *crucesignati*

1. John of Valenciennes: *BF*, i, p. 285.

Crucesignati from the Latin Empire

1. Baldwin, archbishop of Verissa: Alberic, p. 946.
2. Baldwin of Courtenay: Giebfried, ‘The Imagined Empire of Baldwin II’.
3. Geoffrey II of Villehardouin: *Registres*, iii, no. 4983.
4. Narjot of Toucy: Alberic, p. 947.
5. Warin, former archbishop of Thessalonica: Alberic, p. 946.

(Total named participants: 39)

3. Participants in the Holy Land Crusade

French *crucesignati*

1. A certain chaplain often at Asnières-sur-Seine: 'Itinera', p. 597.
2. Adeninus of Four Harnesses: 'Itinera', p. 595.
3. Amaury, Count of Montfort: *Registres*, ii, nos. 2517, 2807, 4741, Alberic, pp. 946, 949, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 527, 539, 543, 548, 555.
4. Andrew Contredit: 'Itinera', p. 595.
5. Andrew of Savoisy: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2313.
6. Andrew of Vitry: *Cartulaire Général de l'Ordre des Hospitaliers de S. Jean de Jérusalem*, ed. J Delaville Le Roulx (4 vols., Paris, 1894-1906), ii, no. 2257.
7. Anseau III de l'Île-Adam: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 547.
8. Anselm of Coucy: *Histoire de l'église de Meaux avec des notes ou dissertations at les pièces justificatives*, ed. Dom T. Du Plessis (2 vols., Paris, 1731), ii, no. 329.
9. Anselm IV of Traînel: Alberic, p. 946.
10. Benedict, Bishop of Marseilles: de Belsunce de Castelmoron, *L'antiquité de l'Eglise de Marseille*, ii, pp. 155-68.
11. Bertrand, chamberlain of Guy, Count of Nevers: *Titres de la Maison ducale de Bourbon*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, no. 221.
12. Betrand, brother of John the Bastard: *Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Notre-Dame de Cheminon*, ed. E. Barthélemy (Paris, 1883), p. 105.
13. Boievins, valet to Hugh the chamberlain: 'Itinera', p. 594.
14. Buchard of Marly: 'Itinera', p. 596.
15. Colin Cholez of Paris: 'Itinera', p. 598.

16.Colin of Ligny-le-Châtel: *Recueil de pièces pour faire suite au cartulaire général de l'Yonne* ed. M. Quantin (Auxerre, 1873).

17.Collinus ?: 'Itinera', p. 591.

18.Drew of Mello and an ‘honourable humber of warriors’: *Registres*, ii, nos. 3727, 4578.

19.Durandus, from the bakery of the Count of Arras: 'Itinera', p. 594.

20.Fulk Paynel: Barthélemy, *Les papes et les ducs de Bretagne*, i, p. 120, G. Lobinau, *Histoire de Bretagne, Composée sur les titres et les auteurs originaux* (2 vols., Paris, 1707), i, p. 240.

21.Garnier IV, lord of Marigny-le-Châtel: Ms. Paris, BN, Lat.17098, fol. 68r.

22.Gascus Roquevaris: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.

23.Gascus Textat: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.

24.Gaucher Bridaine, lord of Méry: Prévost, ‘Les Champenois aux croisades’, p. 161.

25.Geoffrey, brother of Gaucher Bridaine: Prévost, ‘Les Champenois aux croisades’, p. 161.

26.Geoffrey IV lord of Preuilly: *Cartulaire Général de l’Ordre des Hospitaliers*, ed. Le Roulx, ii, no. 2258.

27.Geoffrey of Ancenis: Barthélemy, *Les papes et les ducs de Bretagne*, i, p. 120, Lobinau, *Histoire de Bretagne*, i, p. 240.

28.Gerard, a poor knight: 'Itinera', p. 593.

29.Giles of Arsiers: *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 527, 546.

30.Gilla of Stampis a female crusader: 'Itinera', p. 593.

31.Gillebeloz of Furno: 'Itinera', p. 592.

32.Girard of Aubeville: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

33.Giroud, the watchman: 'Itinera', p. 596.

34.Godfrey of Argentan and the 20 soldiers with him: *Registres*, ii, no. 3529.

35.Godfrey, shield-bearer of the Count of Boulogne: 'Itinera', p. 596.

36.Godrey, sommelier of John of Beaumont: 'Itinera', p. 595.

37.Guy, Count of Forez and Nevers: *Layettes*, ii, no. 2768, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2208, *Registres*, ii, nos. 2820, 2822-3, 3727, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 420.

38.Guy Mauvoisin, lord of Rosny: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

39.Guy of Beine: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2391.

40.Guy of Doix: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2235.

41.Guy of Rochefort: *Registres*, iii, no. 5130.

42.Guyomar of Léon: Painter, *The Scourge of the Clergy*, p. 113.

43.Guy, who was with Peter Carnem Porci: 'Itinera', p. 594.

44.Haletus, valet to the lord Charles: 'Itinera', p. 594.

45.Henry, Count of Bar and 100 men with him: *Registres*, ii, nos. 3633, 4105, William of Nangis, ‘Gesta Sancti Ludovici’, p. 328, William of Nangis, ‘Chronicon’, p. 548, ‘Chronique Rimée dire de Saint-Magloire’ in *RHGF*, xxii, p. 83, ‘Ex Chronico Fiscannensis Coenobii’ in *RHGF*, xxiii, p. 430, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 527, 539-46, 548, 555.

46.Henry, Count of Goëlo: Barthélemy, *Les papes et les ducs de Bretagne*, i, p. 120, Lobinau, *Histoire de Bretagne*, i, p. 240.

47.Henry, Count of Grandpré: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

48.Henry of Nogent: Ms. Paris, BN, lat.9904, fol. 238.

49.Henry of Pissiaco: 'Itinera', p. 595.

50.Hoieselez?: 'Itinera', p. 596.

51.Hugh, Duke of Burgundy: *Registres*, ii, no. 4741, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 527, 539, 543, 554.

52.Hugh, lord of Broyes: Prévost, ‘Les Champenois aux croisades’, p. 161.

53.Hugh of Aisne: 'Itinera', p. 593.

54.Hugh of Aquila: 'Itinera', p. 596.

55.Hugh of Arceau: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2395.

56.Hugh of Cicuñ, a knight of the household of Guy, Count of Nevers: *Titres de la Maison ducale de Bourbon*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, no. 221.

57.Hugh the Page: 'Itinera', p. 591.

58.Isembard the marshal: 'Itinera', p. 596.

59.Ivo of Sens: 'Itinera', p. 595.

60.Loobert ?: 'Itinera', p. 594.

61.Johannulus ?: 'Itinera', p. 596.

62.John a crusader who was at Totequeset: 'Itinera', p. 594.

63.John, Count of Chalon-sur-Saône: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

64.John, Count of Mâcon: *Registres*, ii, nos. 3907, 4204, *Layettes*, ii, no. 2776, *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

65.John, Count of Vendôme: *Registres*, ii, no. 4741.

66.John of Barres: 'Itinera', p. 595, *CM*, iv, p. 25.

67.John of Nesle, Count of Soissons: *Registres*, ii, no. 4315, *Mouskes*, p. 630.

68.John of Paleau: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2357.

69.John of Valery: *Chartes et Documents de l'Abbaye Cistercienne de Preuilly*, ed. A. Catel and M. Lecomte (Montereau, 1927), no. 407.

70.John Ragis: 'Itinera', p. 600.

71.John, son of Stephen, Count of Burgundy: *Registres*, ii, no. 4369.

72.Louis, Count of Sancerre: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

73.Martin who was at "Firitarium": 'Itinera', p. 596.

74.Matthew of Marly: *Registres*, ii, no. 2809.

75.Matthias of Four Cooks: 'Itinera', p. 595.

76.Percevel, nephew of Simon of Bestissiaco: 'Itinera', p. 596.

77.Perriaus of Lorraine: 'Itinera', p. 594.

78.Perrinus, formerly with John the chicken-keeper: 'Itinera', p. 596

79.Peter Beraud: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2399.

80.Peter Mauclerc: Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, *passim.*

81.Peter of Marly: 'Itinera', p. 596.

82.Peter of Savoisy: *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2313.

83.Peter of Valeni: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 546.

84.Peter Putemonnoie: Prévost, ‘Les Champenois aux croisades’, p. 161.

85.Philip of Montfort: *Registres*, ii, nos. 2516, 2810.

86.Philip of Nantueil: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

87.Radulf, Lord of Tourgeville: 'Itinera', p. 597.

88.Ralph of Ailli: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

89.Ralph of Fougères: Painter, *Scourge of the Clergy*, p. 113.

90.Ralph of Nesle: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

91.Ralph of Senlis: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

92.Ralph of Soissons: *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 420, 535.

93.Randulf, Lord of Seinz: 'Itinera', p. 595.

94.Raoul de Beauvais, Bishop of Nevers and an ‘honourable number of warriors’: *Registres*, ii, nos. 4379, 4385, 4585, *Histoire des Ducs de Bourgogne*, ed. Petit, iv, no. 2310.

95.Renaud Pantiñ, a university master serving Guy, Count of Nevers: *Titres de la Maison ducale de Bourbon*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, no. 221.

96.Richard of Beaumont: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

97.Richard of Chaumont: William of Nangis, ‘Gesta Sancti Ludovici’, pp. 328-9, John of Columna, ‘E Mari Historiarum’ in *Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de La France*, ed. M. Bouquet et al. nouvelle édition (24 vols., Paris, 1840-1904), xxiii, p. 110.

98.Richard of Compendio: 'Itinera', p. 592.

99.Robert Malet, Lord of Bernai: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

100.Robert of Bove: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

101.Robert of Courtenay: *Registres*, ii, nos. 2808, 3727.

102.Rossellus of Samesio: 'Itinera', p. 594.

103.Roterus the crossbowman: 'Itinera', p. 594.

104.Rousellus ? from Blanche's stables: 'Itinera', p. 597.

105.Rubeus of Novelles: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.

106.Simon of Clermont: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

107.Simon V, lord of Clefmont: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

108.Simon ?: 'Itinera', pp. 595-6.

109.Simon ? who was with Thibaut of Pissiaco: 'Itinera', p. 596.

110.Stephanulus the ferreter: 'Itinera', p. 595.

111.Stephen a cleric of Guy, Count of Nevers: *Titres de la Maison ducale de Bourbon*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, no. 221.

112.Stephen, Count of Burgundy: *Registres*, ii, nos. 3074, 4369.

113.Stephen of Charny: *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 527, 546.

114.Stephen of Seringuehan: 'Itinera', p. 593.

115.Stephen of Sevinghen: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 539.

116.The Royal Hatter: 'Itinera', p. 592.

117.The son of Merotus, a Jew: 'Itinera', p. 600.

118.The valet who used to guard the palfrey of Louis IX's sister Isabelle: 'Itinera', p. 595.

119.Thibaut of Champagne and Navarre: *Histoire des ducs et des comtes de Champagne*, ed. Jubainville, v, no. 2419, *Registres*, ii, no. 2805, *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 413, 419, 527, 531, 539-40, 546, 549, 551-2, *CM*, iv, pp. 79-80, 140.

120.Totanus ?, man of Robert the butler: 'Itinera', p. 596.

121. Unnamed crusaders from Fécamp: 'Itinera', p. 596.

122. Unnamed crusaders from Rueil-Malmaison: 'Itinera', p. 596.

123. Unnamed crusaders from the archdiocese of Toulouse: *Registres*, ii, no. 3965.

124. Walter, man of Robert the butler: 'Itinera', p. 596.

125. William, a crusader who was with Thibaut of Gravia: 'Itinera', p. 596.

126. William, Count of Joigny: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

127. William, minstrel of the Count of Boulogne: 'Itinera', p. 595.

128. William of Chantilly: Painter, 'The Crusade of Theobald of Navarre', p. 469.

129. William of Cordelle, the Papal Legate: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 550.

130. William of Mont-Argus: 'Itinera', p. 594.

131. William of Saint-Benedict: 'Itinera', p. 596.

132. William of Senlis, *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 527.

133. William of Vilaudegut: *Histoire Générale de Languedoc*, ed. Devic and Vaissete, viii, cols. 1004-7.

134. William of Vitry, household chaplain to Guy, Count of Nevers: *Titres de la Maison ducale de Bourbon*, ed. Huillard-Bréholles, i, no. 221.

135. William who was with Henry of Soliaco: 'Itinera', p. 596.

English *crucesignati:* Richard of Cornwall's expedition

1. Baldwin of Béthune: *CM,* iv, p. 175.
2. Baldwin of Redvers, earl of Devon: 'Chronicon vulgo dictum chronicon Thomae Wykes' in *Annales Monastici*, ed. Luard, iv pp. 86-7.
3. Eudo Fitz-Roy, Richard's half-brother: *CM,* iv, p. 175.
4. Eustace of Stuteville: *CM,* iv, p. 174.

5. Geoffrey of Beauchamp of Bedford: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
6. Geoffrey of Lucy: *CM*, iii, p. 369.
7. Gilbert Marshal, Earl of Pembroke: *CM*, iii, p. 368 [Died before departure].
8. Hamo Peche: *CFR*, iii, no. 77, *CR*, iv, p. 394, *CM*, iv, p. 175.
9. Henry of Trubleville, Seneshal of Gascony: *Registres*, ii, no. 3528, *CM*, iii, p. 620.
10. Hugh of Dutton: *CR*, iv, p. 374.
11. John Fitz-John, seneschal to the Earl of Cornwall: *CM,* iv, p. 175.
12. John of Beauchamp: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
13. John of Neville, royal forester : *CM*, iv, p. 44.
14. Philip Basset, justiciar of England: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
15. Richard of Cornwall: N. Denholm-Young, *Richard of Cornwall* (Oxford, 1947), T. Roche, *The King of Almayne* (London, 1966).
16. Richard Siward, Constable of Bolsover Castle and Lord of the Manor of Headington: *CM*, iii, p. 369.
17. Robert Marmion: *CM,* iv, p. 174.
18. Robert of Tweng: *CM*, iv, p. 47.
19. Theodoric, Prior of the Hospitallers in England: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
20. William Longespée, claimant to the earldom of Salisbury: *Registres*, ii, no. 4096, *CM*, iii, p. 369.
21. William of Furnivall: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
22. Wiliam Perevel: *The Sandford Cartulary*, ed. A. Leys (2 vols., Oxford, 1938-41), i, no. 4.

English *crucesignati:* Simon de Montfort's expedition

1. Amaury of Saint-Amand: *CLR*, i, p. 471, *CR*, iv, p. 331, *CM*, iv, p. 44.

2. Fulk of Baugé: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
3. Gerard of Furnivall: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
4. Gerard of Peaumes: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
5. Hugh Wake: *Registres*, ii, no. 4509, *CM*, iv, p. 44. His coat of arms appears at Ascalon Castle.
6. Peter of Chauntenay: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
7. Punchard of Peaumes: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
8. Simon de Montfort: M. Labarge, *Simon de Montfort* (London, 1962), J. Maddicott, *Simon de Montfort* (Cambridge, 1996).
9. Thomas of Furnivall: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
10. William of Peaumes: *CM*, iv, p. 44.
11. Wischard of Leidet: *CM*, iv, p. 44.

English *crucesignati:* William of Forz's expedition

1. Alexander of Hilton: *CM*, iv, p. 89.
2. Ebelin of Rochefort: *CM*, iv, p. 89.
3. Geoffrey of Chandelers: *CM*, iv, p. 89.
4. John Ansard: *CM*, iv, p. 89.
5. Peter of Maulay: *CIPM*, i, no. 108, *CM*, iv, p. 89.
6. William of Forz: *CFR*, iii, no. 655, *CM*, iv, p. 89.

English *crucesignati:* Unclear which expedition they joined

1. Adam of Beretin: *CLR*, ii, p. 31.
2. Bertram of Gartlip: *CR*, iii, p. 391.

3. Betrand le Gros: *CLR*, i, p. 400.
4. Galfridus of Belchamps: *CRR*, xvi, no. 1895.
5. Geoffrey Hacard: Tyerman, *England and the Crusades*, p. 200.
6. Hugh of Oxford: *CPR*, iii, p. 175.
7. John, Earl of Lincoln: Lloyd, *English Society*, p. 99.
8. John of Wroxham: *CRR*, xvi, no. 2234.
9. Milo of Brehull: *CR*, iv, p. 288.
10. Nicholas Malesmeyns: *CPR*, iii, p. 231.
11. Oliver of Sancto Giorgio: *CPR*, iii, p. 101.
12. Peter de Lungeville: *CLR*, ii, p. 31
13. Peter of Bareny: *CLR*, ii, p. 31.
14. Philip of Albini: *CPR*, iii, pp. 74, 93.
15. Philip ?, brother of master Robert de Glovernia: *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, i, p. 159.
16. Radulf of Touny: *CRR*, xvi, no. 1625.
17. Ralph of Ringstone: *A Northamptonshire Miscellany* ed. E. King (Northampton, 1938), p. 45.
18. Ralph Pagani, royal sergeant: *CLR*, i, p. 384.
19. Ralph the otter-hunter of Aylesbury: *CFR*, iii, no. 323.
20. Randulf Sumer: *CRR*, xvi, no. 2003.
21. Reynold de Bernevall: *CLR*, i, p. 471.
22. Robert de Glovernia: *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, i, p. 159.
23. Robert Maleherbe: *CRR*, xvi, no. 2491.
24. Robert of Fraxineto: *CR*, iv, p. 489.
25. Robert of Gloucester: Grayzel, *The Church and the Jews*, no. 89.

26. Robert of Govyz: *CLR*, i, p. 373.
27. Robert of Musters: *CLR*, i, p. 379.
28. Robert of Sabloil: *CLR*, i, p. 378.
29. Roland de Bray: *CLR*, i, p. 380.
30. William of Cley: *Charters of Norwich Cathedral Priory*, ed. B. Dodwell (2 vols., London, 1974-85), ii, no. 140.
31. William Goscelin: *CR*, iv, p. 95.
32. William Maleherbe: *CRR*, xvi, no. 2610.
33. William of Mastac: *CLR*, i, p. 384.
34. William Peverel: *CFR,* iii, no. 53.
35. William Say: *CPR*, iii, p. 222.
36. William ?, brother of master Robert de Glovernia: *Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland*, i, p. 159.

Welsh and Marcher *crucesignati*

1. Ednyfed Fychan, the seneschal of Gwynedd and his companions: *CR*, iii, p. 101, *CPR*, iii, p. 108.
2. Giles de Clifford: *CLR*, ii, p. 29.
3. Llywelyn ap Gruffydd: *Chronicon de Lanercost* ed. Stephenson, p. 48, Hurlock, *Wales and the Crusades*, pp. 110-4.
4. Oliver de Albini: *CPR*, iii, p. 106.
5. Philip of Albini, governor of Ludlow: *CPR*, iii, pp. 74, 93, 106.
6. Ralph de Teoni of Painscastle: *CFR*, iii, no. 237.
7. William de Chany: *CPR*, iii, p. 106.

Scottish *crucesignati*

1. John le Scot, Earl of Chester: *CM*, iii, p. 369 [Died before departure].
2. Peter II of Brus, with lands in Yorkshire and Durham: *CFR*, iii, no. 29, *CM*, iv, p. 44.
3. Richard of Thony: *Registres*, ii, no. 4450.
4. Several unnamed *crucesignati*: *Registres*, ii, no. 4220.

Italian *crucesignati*

1. R. de Supino and those accompanying him: *Registres*, ii, no. 4032.

Imperial *crucesignati*

1. Rudolph of Greifenstein: *BF*, pp. 229-30.
2. The 10 men serving on behalf of Hugh, a lord of Ulm: *Registres*, ii, no. 2696.
3. The unnamed killers of the Bishop of Chur: *Registres*, ii, no. 2699.

Participants from Outremer

1. Armand of Périgord, Grand commander of the Templars: *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 531, 539.
2. Balian of Ibelin, Lord of Sidon: *LGdC*, p. 119, *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 414.
3. Betrand of Comps, commander of the Hospitallers up to 1240: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 539.
4. Conrad of Thuringia, commander of the Teutonic Order: *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 531, 539.

5. Eudes of Montbéliart, Constable of Jerusalem and Lord of Tiberias: *LGdC*, p. 119, *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 414.
6. Gerold, patriarch of Jerusalem: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 531.
7. John of Ibelin, Lord of Arsuf: *LGdC*, p. 119, *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 414.
8. Peter of Sergines, Archbishop of Tyre: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 531.
9. Peter of Vielle-Bride, master of the Hospitallers from 1240: *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 419-20.
10. Ralph of Tournai, Bishop of Acre: *RHC-Oc*, ii, p. 531.
11. Walter, Count of Jaffa: *RHC-Oc*, ii, pp. 531, 539, 541 543.

Probable participants from Outremer

1. Eustorge of Montaigu, Bishop of Nicosia: *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ed. Martene and Durand, i, pp. 1012-3.
2. Geoffrey of Estraing, Lord of Haifa: ‘Acte de soumission des barons de royaume de Jérusalem à Frédéric II (7 May 1241)’, p. 403.
3. G. warden of the Hospital: *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ed. Martene and Durand, i, pp. 1012-3.
4. Henry, Archbishop of Nazareth: *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ed. Martene and Durand, i, pp. 1012-3.
5. Hugh, abbot of the Temple: *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ed. Martene and Durand, i, pp. 1012-3.
6. Ralph, Bishop of Lydda: *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, ed. Martene and Durand, i, pp. 1012-3.

(Total named participants: 240 (246))

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