


PARTICIPATION
AND RECENT THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

Recent theories of democracy agree in rejecting the 'classical' theory and in giving only a minor place to popular participation. Attempts to defend the 'classical' theory have failed to show that the rejection is unjustified given the empirical evidence of the political apathy of the ordinary man.

Chapter 1. The theory of a very influential forerunner of recent theorists, Schumpeter, is discussed. The work of Mayo, Dahl and Sartori, theorists concerned to establish the defining characteristics of democracy, is examined. They agree that the essential feature is the electoral competition of leaders. So long as a certain minimum of the electorate periodically vote nothing further is required of them. Sartori argues that apathy is "nobody's fault".

Three theories of stable democracy, complementary to those of the first group of writers, are discussed. Berelson, Almond and Verba, and Eckstein are concerned with the attributes of the citizen and the forms of non-political authority structures required for a stable democratic system.

It is argued that all the writers considered adhere to a common theory of democracy; the contemporary theory. The critics of this theory argue a) that despite claims to the contrary, a new normative

theory has been produced: b) that the 'classical' theory has been misunderstood.

Chapter II. It is argued that although facts and values can be distinguished from each other there is no unbridgeable, logical gulf between them; rather a two-way relationship exists and values are 'vulnerable' to facts. Further it is argued that it is not possible for political theorists to use certain key terms, e.g. political equality, in a purely descriptive sense. An evaluative background is needed to make particular interpretations intelligible.

The evaluative framework of the contemporary theory of democracy, which includes a model of the ideal (private) citizen, is discussed.

The notion of one 'classical' theory of democracy is shown to be a myth. The contemporary theory descends from 'classical' theorists (e.g. Bentham) who held the same narrow, protective view of participation. Other 'classical' theorists held a very different view of participation.

Chapter III. On the basis of a discussion of the participatory theories of two 'classical' theorists, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and J.S. Mill, and one twentieth century theorist, G.D.H. Cole, it is argued that the significant contribution to democratic theory of the theorists of participation is the recognition of an inter-

relationship between the form of, and operation of, political institutions and the attributes of individuals interacting within them. The major hypothesis of these theorists is that participation is educative, in the widest sense of that term. The psychological impact of participation, and the political control it gives to citizens, means that the more men participate the better able they are to do so; the political system becomes self-sustaining. In Mill's and Cole's theories it is argued that if citizens are to participate at national level then they need 'practice' in more familiar spheres. Cole argues that the most important area for such participation is industry, so that industrial authority structures must therefore be democratised.

Chapter IV. Despite criticisms of the contemporary theory of democracy no attempt has been made to provide even the beginnings of a modern participatory theory of democracy that retains the essentials of the earlier theories.

It is argued that the crucial variable in the political socialisation process is the authority structures of familiar spheres of social life, the most important area being industry. The democratisation of this area makes possible the transformation of the existing political culture.

The evaluative framework of a modern participatory theory of democracy is discussed, including its wide definition of the 'political' itself. The theory argues that all men are potentially political animals; what is missing at present is the institutional setting to develop this potentiality.

Chapter V. Recent "empirical" democratic theory has ignored the important fact that the existing pattern of political participation is linked to class position. Furthermore, the social and psychological characteristics correlated with low rates of participation are not a random collection of items but form a non-participation syndrome; a syndrome having both cognitive and psychological aspects.

The empirical data in The Civic Culture support the argument of the participatory theory that the workplace is crucial for political socialisation. Other important, but neglected, evidence on this point is reviewed. It is argued that the typical socialisation process of the working class citizen, culminating, crucially, in socialisation in the workplace, accounts for the psychological aspect of the syndrome. The (inter-related) cognitive aspect of the syndrome is that apathy arises because participation in the existing system seems pointless to the ordinary citizen. This aspect of the explanation is supported by a reinterpretation of

working class respondents' replies to scales designed to measure political efficacy, and "authoritarianism" in the sense of commitment to democratic norms.

Chapter VI. The available evidence on participation in industry has been neglected by students of political socialisation and democracy. The argument that leisure is now more important than work is shown to be unconvincing. Participation at the lower (shop floor) level and the higher management level must be distinguished. There is a good deal of evidence to show both that the ordinary worker wants more participation at the lower level and that it is feasible. Evidence on experiments with participation at this level, and the collective contract in the mining and automobile industries is reviewed. The arguments of the participatory theory is also supported by experiments with small groups and by the writings of many modern management theorists who argue that lower level participation is essential for real efficiency in the enterprise.

Chapter VII. Most definitions of participation in industry are very imprecise, and 'participation' and 'democracy' are often used as synonyms, so that clarification is necessary. Pseudo-participation and two forms of participation (in decision making) are distinguished: partial and full participation. The claim that democracy in industry already exists is rejected. It is shown that it is a mistake to

equate 'democracy' and 'participation'. To influence both aspects of the non-participation syndrome higher level participation is required.

Three British examples of higher level participation are discussed, at Glacier Metal, John Lewis Partnership, and the Scott Bader Commonwealth. In general this, and other evidence, indicates that workers have little interest in higher level participation. But too hasty a conclusion should not be drawn. The evidence also indicates that the lower level in the enterprise acts as a 'training ground' for the higher, so that a system combining opportunities at both levels would be required for the maximum interest and activity.

Chapter VIII. For an example of an attempt to democratise industry over a whole economy one has to turn to the Yugoslav system of workers' self management. One major problem in assessing the system is the role of the Communist League. It is argued that though important this does not completely nullify the self-management structure. Another important factor is the economic reforms of 1965, especially since they have helped to increase the influence of 'experts' within the enterprise and within the workers' council itself. Despite the large numbers of people that have participated within the self-management system the general picture is one of relative apathy and disinterest on the part of the ordinary worker,

even though, formally, the system is participatory at both levels. Little information is available about the lower level but it appears that more could be done to make participation a reality there. Only tentative conclusions can be drawn from the Yugoslav evidence, but despite the defects and problems of the system, it indicates that claims that democratisation of authority structures in industry in the West is not feasible are premature.

The majority of recent theorists of democracy have failed either to be philosophers, or, more seriously in self-proclaimed "empirical" theorists, sociologists. All the evidence indicates that, far from being "nobody's fault", apathy arises from institutional features of the existing political system, features which could be transformed so as to create a participatory political culture. The empirical evidence also indicates that the value interpretations of the participatory theory neither set "too high standards" nor reflect "dangerous illusions". Participation can still be retained at the heart of a modern theory of democracy.

INTRODUCTION

During the last few years of the 1960's the word 'participation' leapt to the forefront of the popular political vocabulary under the impetus of demands from various groups, most notably students, for new areas of participation to be opened up. In France, 'participation' was one of the last of De Gaulle's rallying calls; in Britain we have seen the idea given official blessing in the Skeffington Report on planning, and in America the anti-poverty programme included a provision for the "maximum feasible participation" of those concerned. The popularity of the concept, and the fact that it is used in the context of a wide variety of different situations by different people, provide good reasons for devoting some attention to it. But, more importantly, the demand for more participation raises a central question of political theory; the place of the notion of participation in a modern theory of democracy.

It is ironical that participation should have become such a popular idea, particularly with students, for among political theorists and political sociologists the almost universally accepted theory of democracy is one in which the notion of participation has only a minimal role to play. Indeed, a prominent feature of recent, particularly American, theories of democracy is the emphasis placed on the potential dangers

inherent in widespread, active participation in politics by the ordinary citizen. Related to this are two other features of recent theories of democracy. First, the conviction on the part of the majority of writers that theories of earlier democratic theorists (the so-called classical theorists), that had the active participation of the citizen at their heart, are unrealistic and outmoded and hence in need of drastic revision, if not outright rejection. Second, there is a preoccupation with the stability of democratic systems, and a concern to formulate the conditions or pre-requisites for that stability.

It is not difficult to see how the bulk of recent democratic theory has come to exhibit these typical characteristics if one considers, even briefly, two aspects of their historical and intellectual background; specifically, the growth of political sociology and the rise of totalitarian states. Even at the beginning of this century the size and complexity of industrialised societies and the rapid development of bureaucratic forms of organisation seemed to many empirically minded writers on politics to cast grave doubts on the possibility of the attainment of democracy as that concept was usually understood. Mosca and Michels are two of the best known and most influential writers to advance such arguments. The former argued that in every society an elite must rule and, in his later writings combined this elite theory with an argument for representative institutions.

Michels, with his famous "iron law of oligarchy" -- formulated on the basis of an investigation of the German Social Democratic Party that was ostensibly dedicated to the principles of democracy inside its own ranks - Michels appeared to show that we were faced with a choice between two alternatives only: either organisation, which in the twentieth century seems indispensable, or democracy, but not both. Thus although democracy as the rule of the people by means of the maximum participation of all the people might still be an ideal, grave doubts, doubts put forward in the name of social science, appeared to have been cast on the possibility of its realisation.

But by the middle of the century even this ideal had begun to be called into question. At least, 'democracy' was still the ideal, but the emphasis on participation had become suspect and with it the 'classical' theory of democracy. After the second world war the spectre of totalitarianism was haunting political theorists and it was in the totalitarian states that mass participation was being held up as the ideal (albeit participation backed by intimidation and coercion). Participation thus tended to become linked to 'totalitarianism' rather than 'democracy' by theorists, and the collapse of Weimar, which had high rates of mass participation, into fascism and the instability of so many post-war states posed further questions about the relationship between participation and stable democracy.

The factor that confirmed these growing doubts about 'classical' democratic theory for the majority of recent theorists was the data produced by the expansion of political sociology over the last thirty years or so. Large scale empirical investigations into political attitudes and behaviour in many Western countries have revealed that the outstanding characteristic of most ordinary citizens is a general lack of interest in politics and political activity and further that non-democratic or authoritarian attitudes are widespread, particularly among working class individuals. The conclusion drawn from this data by most political theorists and political sociologists is that the 'classical' picture of the active, rational and informed democratic citizen is hopelessly unrealistic and, that in view of the facts, an increase in participation by present non-participants could pose dangers to the stability of existing democratic systems.

There is another aspect of the intellectual background that is also relevant to the form that recent democratic theory has taken. It might seem slightly odd that I should be devoting a study to the consideration of "recent theories of democracy" when at the very time that many of these democratic theorists were at work other writers were declaring that political theory was dead, or at least if it was not dead we were witnessing its death throes. However, far from this being paradoxical most of the theories of

democracy with which I am concerned could be taken as confirmation of the diagnosis because what was at issue in fact was not so much political theory itself as a particular form of political theory, namely "traditional" or "normative" political theory; it was on the latter that the death-sentence had been pronounced. "Traditional political theory" according to one influential modern theorist,

"has held and propagated an image of itself as narrowly engaged in and committed to the quest for an understanding of the nature of the good life ... Analysis of the moral rather than of the strictly empirical world has stood at the peak of theory's hierarchy of priorities" (Easton, 1965, p. 5).

That this was the form that 'classical' democratic theory took is something that is often asserted, and it is widely held among present day political theorists that that form of theory is no longer the appropriate one; political theory now should be "descriptive, empirically-oriented, operational or causal theory... the terms are synonymous" (Easton, 1965, p. 5). The development of political sociology contributed much to this rejection of "traditional" theory as did the work of the analytic philosophers. The latter seemed to cut the ground from under political theory in the traditional sense in two ways. First, by arguing that a logical gap exists between fact and value and that one cannot infer anything about values from factual statements (as the "traditional" political theorists had attempted to do): second, by appearing to show that many of the traditional problems (of

political theory as well as philosophy in general, could be resolved once the confusions caused by the intricate subtleties of ordinary language had been laid bare. Thus modern political theorists could - and should - concentrate on the "strictly empirical world" and eschew all (traditional) concern with values. Most recent work in democratic theory has been presented by its authors as an example of just such a value-free, empirical, descriptive political theory, grounded firmly in the known facts of political life.

There have been a few political theorists who have criticised the theory of democracy now accepted by most academic students of politics and who have criticised the rejection of the 'classical' theory. Unfortunately, they have done little to substantiate their case and it has made negligible impact on the theories criticised. The two basic arguments of the critics are that the 'classical' theory has been misunderstood by the theorists who have revised it, and that recent theorists have done much more than they claim to have done; they have not merely made democratic theory more realistic but have changed its normative significance, i.e. have produced a theory having its own evaluative content. Although I shall argue that on both these points the critics are right, I shall also argue that they have not done nearly enough to show that they are correct; nor, more importantly, have they really begun to show why their opponents in the controversy are not

justified in rejecting the central place given to participation by the 'classical' theorists. More specifically, they have failed to do this because four areas of argument that are crucial to the whole question of participation and democratic theory have not been sufficiently considered, or not considered at all.

First, the question just raised; that of the proper form that a modern political theory should take. Whether or not recent theorists have produced a theory of democracy having a different evaluative content from earlier theories is only part of the problem. Their aim of formulating a value-free democratic theory also has to be considered. The fact that they may not have done this could perhaps be remedied if, and this is the vital question, a value-free theory is in principle possible. Only when this question is settled, and I shall argue that the quest for a value-free theory of democracy is a mistaken one, can the problems of the evaluative content of the earlier theories be tackled. The defenders of these theories have implied that the 'classical' values are still very relevant to modern societies. But they have neither stated exactly what the evaluative content of the 'classical' theory is, nor have they shown that it is still relevant today, or indicated how this might be shown to be the case.

Second, although some political theorists have defended the 'classical' theory of democracy, they have failed to make it clear,

except in the most general terms, exactly why the participation of the ordinary citizen in the political life of his community played such an important and central part in that 'classical' theory. The reason that they have not done so is, I shall argue, because the defenders and the critics alike of the earlier theories of democracy have misunderstood and misinterpreted those theories, especially they have failed to question the validity of the notion of one 'classical' theory of democracy.

Third, and this is perhaps the most serious omission, their critics have completely failed to get to grips with the main plank of the arguments of recent theorists. That is, they have made virtually no attempts at all to challenge the major claim that given the facts of political life revealed by political sociology then 'classical' theory's emphasis on the active participation of the citizen, and its model of that citizen, are no longer realistic. Unless some empirical evidence can be offered to support these central features of the 'classical' theory then the case that participation has only a minimal role to play in a modern theory of democracy must be conceded.

Fourth, and finally, it is an odd feature of recent democratic theory that, despite the controversy about participation, no one has attempted to do what is needed if such an empirical investigation is to be undertaken, namely to construct, or at least to provide the elements of a foundation for the construction of, a

modern participatory theory of democracy that retains the essentials of the earlier theories. Either it is taken for granted that such a theory is unrealistic and so, presumably, not worth attempting, or theorists have gone no further than pointing out that the revisions of the earlier theories are more drastic than their authors suggest.

In this study I shall try to remedy these omissions and so, hopefully, arrive at some empirically based conclusions about the proper place of participation in a modern theory of democracy.

CHAPTER ONE

SOME RECENT THEORIES OF STABLE DEMOCRACY

The recent theories of democracy with which I shall be concerned in this study can be grouped into two broad categories. First, there are theorists (Mayo, Dahl, Sartori) who have mainly concentrated on establishing a realistic definition of 'democracy', who have set out the typical characteristics of democratic politics today. Second, there is a group of theorists (Berelson, Almond and Verba, Eckstein) who have focused their attention on the conditions necessary if a democratic system is to be a stable system. Like all classifications of this sort, this has an arbitrary element; for instance, the writers included in the first category are by no means indifferent to the question of stability, but it does reflect a real difference of approach to democratic theory among recent theorists and it also brings out some important aspects of the question of the place of participation in a modern theory of democracy.

In order fully to appreciate the context within which democratic theorists have been working over the past twenty years or so it is essential, as a preliminary, to look at the work of a writer who preceded them. Indeed, it may be doubted, even given the empirical evidence, whether the revision of the 'classical' theory of democracy would have been undertaken so enthusiastically by so many writers if the very question of the apparent contrast

between the facts of political life and attitudes and their characterisation in the earlier 'classical' theory had not been taken up, and answered, by Joseph Schumpeter. Although only Part IV of his book was specifically about democracy, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy has been extremely influential.

Published in 1943, it was written before the vast amounts of empirical information with which we are now confronted became available, nevertheless Schumpeter considered that the facts showed that 'classical' theory was in need of revision and he provided just such a revised theory, including, very importantly, a new, realistic, definition of democracy. This definition, Schumpeter's general method of approach and his theoretical framework have provided more recent theorists with their starting point.

1. A forerunner: Schumpeter's theory of democracy.

The procedure that Schumpeter followed in formulating his theory of democracy was to set up a model of what he called the 'classical doctrine' of democracy, to examine its deficiencies and then offer an alternative. He began by asserting that democracy is a theory unassociated with any particular ideals or ends.

"Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at political ... decisions and hence incapable of being an end in itself ... And this must be the starting point of any attempt at defining it." (p. 242).

To convince his readers of the validity of this argument Schumpeter proposed that they carry out a "mental experiment". Imagine a country which, democratically, persecuted Jews, witches and Christians; we should not approve of these practices just because they had been decided upon according to the democratic method, therefore, democracy cannot be an end. Insofar as one expresses "uncompromising allegiance" to democracy this was because one expected the method to further other ideals, e.g. justice.¹

Schumpeter's model of the "classical doctrine" of democracy will be examined in detail in Chapter Two; at this point it is sufficient to note that his main criticism was that the central participatory and decision making role allotted to the ordinary man in the theory was empirically unrealistic. This criticism, he thought, would be accepted by "most students of politics" and he also thought that they would agree with his revised theory of democracy which "is much truer to life and at the same time salvages much of what sponsors of the democratic method really mean by this term" (p. 269). In this theory the focus is on the

1. As Bachrach (1967, pp 18-20) points out, such systematic persecution would conflict with the rules of procedure necessary if the country's political method is to be called 'democratic'. Nor does Schumpeter make clear exactly why we should expect this political method to lead to justice or other ideals.

role of the leader, not that of the ordinary man. Perhaps not surprisingly, as Schumpeter was an economist not a political theorist, his democratic theory depends greatly upon an analogy with the economic sphere. Just as consumers choose between the products offered by competing entrepreneurs, so the people, the electorate, in fact choose between the policies being offered by competing political entrepreneurs or leaders; the reward for the latter being in this case not profit but power. "Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule them" (p. 285). According to Schumpeter what distinguished democracy as a political method was the competition among leaders for the votes of the people and he offered the following as a modern, realistic definition of democracy;

"that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (p. 269).

Thus the institutional arrangements of the democratic political method are essentially electoral arrangements and the electoral system plays, in Schumpeter's theory of democracy, a similar role to the market in economic theory.

Schumpeter thought that the democratic method would only work at all in certain societies, and for it to be successful certain conditions were required. The first condition that he mentions is that "the human material of politics" - and by this

he means not, as one might think, the people as a whole but "the people who man the party machines are elected to serve in parliament, rise to cabinet office", should be of a high quality. Among the other conditions is "Democratic Self-control" which, basically, enables the government to get on with governing: politicians should refrain from embarrassing the government unnecessarily and the electorate should "respect the division of labour between themselves and the politicians they elect" and not try to tell the latter what to do. This democratic self-control could only come about if "a national character and national habits of a certain type" existed, and Schumpeter did not think that the operation of the democratic method itself could bring this about. Altogether, the democratic method would only be a success if "all the interests that matter" were virtually unanimous "in their allegiance to the structural principles of the existing society".²

But if these are general requirements for the success of the democratic method, that method itself - the electoral competition of leaders - requires that a "tolerance for difference of opinion" exists (p. 295). "Our theory", says Schumpeter, "seems to clarify

2. P. 290 and pp 294-6. Schumpeter did not regard universal suffrage as a necessary condition of the democratic method. He thought that property, race and religious qualifications were all acceptable (pp 244-5). Here more recent theorists do not follow his lead.

the relation that subsists between democracy and individual freedom" (p. 271). If anyone is, in principle, to be free to enter the competition for office then a considerable degree of freedom of discussion and freedom of the press must exist; but that "is all there is to that relation (p. 272).³

The only means of participation open to the ordinary man in Schumpeter's theory of democracy are voting for leaders and discussion. Another aspect of Schumpeter's economic analogy has already been noted, that of the division of labour between leaders and ordinary citizens. This division is rigidly enforced in the theory. Schumpeter rules out such usually acceptable activity as "bombarding" the representative with letters because, he argues, it is, in effect, an attempt by the voter to control their decision makers and this is a negation of the whole concept of leadership. Ordinary men do not "normally" control their leaders except by replacing them at election time with alternative leaders so that "it seems well to reduce our ideas about this control in the way indicated by our definition" (p. 272). The focus of the

3. "In principle" - in fact Schumpeter thought that a political or ruling class was necessary to provide candidates for leadership (p. 291). The connection between freedom and democracy is very important "from the standpoint of the intellectual" but it can "be tampered with" (p. 272). There are no ideals attached to the democratic method.

theory is unequivocally on the minority of leaders; "the electoral mass", says Schumpeter, "is incapable of action other than a 'stampede'" (p. 283). But not only is the ordinary man circumscribed in his political activity in Schumpeter's theory of democracy. The notion of 'participation' itself has no special or central role in the democratic method - it is the competition among leaders that is the specifically democratic element in the method - all that theory entails is that enough citizens participate (vote) to keep the institutional arrangements, the electoral system, working satisfactorily.

Schumpeter's theory has influenced both groups of theorists to be discussed in this Chapter. Its influence is most obvious on the first group, as will be seen when their definitions of democracy, and the role of participation, are examined, but the 'confrontation' of the so-called 'classical' theory of democracy with the data collected by political sociologists, a typical procedure of the theorists included in the second category, also owes a lot to Schumpeter's characterisation of, and criticisms of, that "classical doctrine". There are, of course, differences too; especially, the overriding concern with stability is absent from Schumpeter's theory and the more recent theorists are more sophisticated in their analyses than their predecessor, but the theories discussed below are all descended from Schumpeter's attack on the classical doctrine of democracy and its replacement by a more realistic theory.

The writers included in the first group of theorists now to be discussed - those who have been mainly concerned with the elaboration of a modern definition of 'democracy' - are all well-known, and their 'textbooks' on democratic theory are widely used and quoted.

ii. The characteristics of democracy: Mayo, Dahl and Sartori.

In his book Introduction to Democratic Theory (1960), Mayo says that he is concerned with democracy only as a political theory and system, and that the key question which must be asked is "how are public policies made in a democratic political system and what justification may be given for such a method?".⁴ As well as following Schumpeter in regarding democracy as essentially a method of decision making, Mayo also utilises his analogy with the economic system. As in economic theory so in political theory, "we may most usefully start with how the policies are made. We can then tentatively agree to call a democratic system one which has characteristic principles of operation" (p. 33).⁵

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4. Pp. 27 and 28. At this stage only the characterisation of the method itself will be examined: the problem of its justification will be dealt with in the next chapter.
 5. This approach also has the added merit, in Mayo's eyes, of being the only one "at all likely to lead to general agreement in the profession" (of political science), (p. 34).

To discover what these principles of operation are we must, then, look at existing democratic systems and see how they work and how they differ from other systems. Mayo, using the Athenian political system as his 'classical' model with which to compare present day practices, concludes that the factor corresponding to the 'rule of the people' of ancient times is "the effectiveness of the popular control over the rulers or decision-makers. In short, a political system is democratic to the extent that the decision-makers are under effective popular control".

"Popular control" is, however, a matter of degree. At one extreme there is a Peron who "must sometimes take popular sentiment into account"; at the other, "an elected government anxious to be re-elected" (p. 60). The range of this continuum makes clear that Mayo shares Schumpeter's view that the notion of 'control' must be cautiously interpreted in a modern theory of democracy. He notes that the fact that 'popular control' is sometimes referred to as popular government, self-government or popular sovereignty is "harmless" providing that such phrases are not taken literally.

"If we take at the start the more realistic view that the public merely elects the rulers or policy makers we shall not be disillusioned when we learn that a high and impossible theory drawn from the small model does not and cannot fit the facts of political life" (pp 72-3).

The mechanism through which the ordinary man exercises control over his leaders is through periodic elections; "the

institutional embodiment of (popular control) universally regarded as indispensable in modern democracies is that of choosing policy-makers ... at elections held at ... regular intervals" (p. 61). A large part of An Introduction to Democratic Theory is concerned with a detailed examination of exactly what 'operational principles' are involved in the electoral process, what are the necessary conditions for its operation. Two of these necessary conditions are relevant to this study.⁶ First, political equality. This is "institutionalised as the equality of all adult citizens in voting" (p. 62), i.e. political equality refers to universal suffrage.⁷ Second, political freedoms are also necessary. The secret ballot is one such freedom and others that are required, if there is to be "what Schumpeter has called the competitive bidding for votes", include the freedoms of speech, assembly and organisation and the freedom to run for office. These 'procedural political freedoms (are) necessary if there is

6. The third is that majority voting prevails in decision making but a discussion of this falls outside the scope of this study which deals with the prior problem of who is to form part of the decision making body.

7. Mayo (p. 63) notes that there is "more to citizenship than voting, and hence other ways in which political equality or inequality can prevail" but he does not discuss these (or indicate what they might be. Chap. 6, on political equality is concerned solely with the franchise.)

to be any meaningful choice at the polls, if voters are to control the decision-makers at election times" (pp 64-5). Mayo adds that these freedoms are not valued merely as means but also in their own right. However, a clear line cannot be drawn between these and other liberties but it is these procedural liberties that are "part of the very definition, or at least of the necessary political conditions, of democracy; whereas some of the other substantive liberties may or may not be found in a democracy" (pp 144-6).

In Mayo's theory of democracy, as in Schumpeter's, the control of leaders is seen entirely in terms of the voter's decision at election time; will the incumbents be returned to office? In the theory of the writer to be considered next there is a wide area of agreement on this and other points.

Robert Dahl is probably the most influential of all the recent theorists of democracy considered here. In his A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956), and other writings, he has formulated a theory of democracy as polyarchy (or pluralism) - the rule of multiple minorities.⁸ "Democratic theory", states Dahl, "is

8. Other works by Dahl referred to in this section are Politics, Economics and Welfare (1953), Hierarchy, Democracy and Bargaining in Politics and Economics (1956a), Who Governs? (1961), and Equality and Power in American Society (1961a). Pluralist Democracy in the United States (1967) is also relevant.

concerned with the processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders" (1956, p. 3). The essential means through which control can be exercised is the electoral process and Dahl presents a set of defining characteristics of 'democracy', that is a set of 'institutional arrangements' comprising the free electoral system (p. 84). Any other control techniques are dependent upon the basic system of periodic elections (p. 125).

Dahl emphasises that more should not be put into the notion of 'control' than is realistically warranted. He points out that contemporary studies of politics illustrate that the democratic relationship is only one of a number of social control techniques that in fact co-exist in modern, democratic polities, and argues that this diversity must be taken into account in a modern theory of democracy (1956a, p. 83). The facts of political life today mean that 'control' depends more on the relationship between leaders than on the activities of non-leaders. It is no use putting forward a theory of democracy that requires maximum participation from ordinary people for 'control' to exist when we know, from empirical investigations, that most tend to be disinterested and apathetic about politics and Dahl suggests that in any social organisation only a small proportion of individuals will take up decision making opportunities (1956a, p. 87). It is, therefore, on the other side of the electoral process, on

the competition among minorities (leaders), that 'control' depends. The fact that an individual has the opportunity to switch his support from one (competing) leader to another ensures that leaders are "relatively responsive" to non-leaders. The value of the democratic (polyarchical) political system lies in the fact that it makes possible an extension of the size and diversity of the minorities that can make their influence felt on decision making; indeed, the distinction between democracy and dictatorship rests this competition, the distinction "between government by a minority and government by minorities" (1956, p. 133 see also 1953, p. 283). It is because he can put leaders out of office that the ordinary man can be said to govern.⁹

The theory of democracy as polyarchy might also give us a "satisfactory theory about political equality" (1956, p. 84). Once more, we must not ignore political realities; political equality must not be defined as equality of political control because, as Dahl points out, the lower socio-economic status groups - the majority - are "triply barred" from such equality by "their relatively greater inactivity, by their relatively

9. Dahl also notes that leaders are "limited" by their own values as "indoctrinated members of society" (1956, p.132), and in Who Governs he states that the ordinary man "can be said to 'govern' as much through the sharing of common values and goals with members of the political strata as by other means" (p. 92.)

limited access to resources" and, (in the United States), "by Madison's nicely contrived system of constitutional checks" (1956, p. 81). However, to say that the majority do not have equal control over decision making with the competing minorities is not to say that they have no influence at all. The inequality in resources is what Dahl calls a system of "dispersed" or "non-cumulative" inequalities, and this means that any group has the opportunity to get its way at least occasionally. (1961, pp 85 and 75 and 1961a p. 82). Nor does the existence of these dispersed inequalities in political resources mean that we cannot properly speak of political equality; realistically defined it refers to the existence of universal suffrage. Dahl, unlike Mayo (and Sartori, whose theory of democracy will be considered next) emphasises that the inter-election period is also of importance; it helps underpin the political equality and the control over leaders gained through the election itself. If a leader is to be elected (or re-elected) then he has to know the preferences of the electorate, and for this an equality of opportunity of access to influence over leaders must exist in the period between elections; different groups in the electorate, or their leaders, can make their voices heard. The inactivity of the majority is irrelevant so long as this equality of opportunity exists ("using 'opportunity' in a realistic rather than a legalistic sense" (1953, p. 313)) for all to act if they wish to, for then

"there is a high probability that those who do act will roughly represent those who do not"¹⁰(p. 313). Officials will not only listen to the various groups but "expect to suffer in some way if they do not placate the group, its leaders or its most vociferous members" (1956, p. 145).

The third example of this first approach to democratic theory can be found in the work of Giovanni Sartori, an Italian theorist, and the ghost of Mosca, as well as that of Schumpeter, haunts the pages of Democratic Theory (1962). This book is, in several respects, one of the more extreme of the recent revisions of the 'classical' theory of democracy. It's arguments are forcefully phrased, they are coloured by the fear that a more active participation by the people would lead straight to "autocracy", and Sartori is greatly concerned with the stability of democratic political systems. He also emphasises the difficulties of democracy and takes a generally more pessimistic view than the two writers previously discussed. For instance, like Schumpeter, Sartori sees a close resemblance between (democratic) politics and economics - "democracy is to politics what a market system is

10. "If the opportunities for political action are kept open to a representative section of the adult population specific policies will rarely violate highly ranked, stable, and relatively broad preferences of the greater number for a longer period than about the interval between elections" (1953, p. 314).

to economics" (p. 67) - but he notes that, in contrast to economics, "competition among political parties, ... easily escapes the control of the political consumer. Political goods are not tangible and cannot easily be evaluated".

Sartori also emphasises that, in today's polyarchical democracies, it is elites ("elite means 'worthy of choice'" (p.112)) that rule. "The democratic theory of elites is in the light of present day factual knowledge the core of democratic theory itself" (p. 128). This view is related to Sartori's arguments about the proper relationship between the democratic ideal ("deontology") and democratic practice, or, at least to what we can realistically expect to achieve. According to Sartori, a completely unbridgeable gap has appeared between the popular ideals of democracy, based on the 'classical' theory, and present day realities; "the ingratitude typical of the man of our time and his disillusionment with democracy are the reaction to a promised goal that cannot possibly be reached" (p. 54). Great care must be taken if the role of the democratic ideal is to be properly understood - even when it has been revised and reinterpreted. Once a democratic system has been established, as in the West, then the democratic ideal must be minimised (p. 65). This is because the democratic ideal is a levelling one and the major problem in a democracy is that of "retaining verticality", maintaining the structure of authority and leadership. The wrong kind of imagery

in the ideal can lead to catastrophic results for the system,

"our findings prove that the imagery of a self-governing demos is either a deceptive myth or a demagogic device, and that in both cases it can only foster the bankruptcy of the system" (p. 128).

Democracies today do not have to be on their guard, as they once did, against aristocracy but against mediocrity and the danger that they may destroy their own leaders and replace them with undemocratic counter-elites (p. 119 and 96).

Although in essentials Sartori agrees with Dahl's characterisation of modern democratic systems as polyarchies, he adds that there is a difference in their approach; "in my opinion what characterises democracy is not so much that it is an egalitarian polyarchy - as Dahl says - as that it is an electoral polyarchy". This does not mean that equality is not involved, although "the element of egalitarianism that goes into the construction of the power pyramid tends, if anything, to obstruct its vertical dimension", but it has to be realised that "the amount of equality that actually goes into the vertical construction can be inferred from the conditions that make elections democratic" (p. 125 Sartori's emphasis). That is, Sartori agrees with Mayo and Dahl that universal suffrage (political equality) and the existence of political freedoms are the crucial factors in democratic elections. Sartori's definition of democracy has, therefore, a familiar ring; democracy is "a

method or procedure by which, through a competitive struggle for sanctioned authority, some people are chosen to lead the political community", or again, "democracy consists in the procedure i) that continuously creates open, competitive minorities, ii) whose behaviour is guided by the 'rule of anticipated reactions'" (pp 124-5).

Sartori also disagrees with Dahl on another point. "Between elections", he says, "the people's power remains quiescent" (p. 73). This is an aspect of his more general argument about the proper role of the ordinary man in a democratic political system, where "the average voter does not act, he reacts" (p. 77). The most interesting and important point of Sartori's theory of democracy is that he actually poses the question, one notably neglected by most modern theorists of democracy, "How do we account for the political apathy of the average citizen?" His answer is that we do not have to account for it. Arguments that non-participation might be due to poverty, illiteracy, or insufficient information have been shown by events to be false, as has the suggestion that it might be due to the ordinary man's lack of practice in democracy, "we have learned that one does not learn how to vote by voting". Sartori argues that to try and find an answer to the question is a mistaken endeavour. The average citizen only really understands, or takes an active interest in, matters of which he has had personal experience or

ideas that he is capable of formulating for himself, and none of this is the case where politics is concerned. We have to accept these facts as they are. To try to change them would endanger the stability of the democratic system but, further, Sartori argues that there are only two ways in which we could try to change things; either we could coerce the apathetic or we could penalise the active minority, and neither of these methods is acceptable. Therefore, Sartori concludes that the political apathy of most ordinary people "is nobody's fault in particular, and it is time we stopped seeking scapegoats" (pp 87-90).

iii The theories of stable democracy of Berelson, Almond and Verba and Eckstein.

It is clear that there is a wide consensus of opinion among recent writers on democratic theory on the main characteristics of a democratic political system, and on the minimal role that the participation of the ordinary man has to play in that system. It is with democratic systems in this sense with which the theorists representative of the second category of recent writers on democracy are concerned. Writers such as Berelson, Almond and Verba and Eckstein take the validity of the arguments presented above for granted and concentrate on another aspect of the theory of democracy. It has been stated that "one of the 'great' - if not the most crucial problem - confronting contemporary political science is the construction of a theory of stable and effective

democracy" (Nordlinger, 1967, p. 210) and it is to this task that these theorists have addressed themselves.

The three examples of theories of stable democracy to be considered, like those theories of democracy already discussed, are all well known and influential works. They are also in important respects complementary to each other (the work of Berelson and Eckstein being quoted approvingly by Almond and Verba) since all three theories develop aspects of a certain conception of the social context necessary if leaders are to compete and elections take place without risk of instability. These theories of stable democracy are theories about the relationship between the attitudes and behaviour of ordinary citizens and the structure and operation of the political system as a whole, that is, they are all concerned with the relationship between the macro and micro levels of politics. The theories of Berelson and Almond and Verba are also of particular interest for this study because they make a direct comparison between the attitudes and mode of participation of the citizen in the so-called 'classical' theory of democracy and the empirical data that they themselves have collected.

Before discussing these theories in some detail it will be useful to note an argument that Dahl puts forward about stability and participation; as stated earlier the theorists in the first category are not indifferent to the question of stability. Dahl

argues that both a consensus on norms and political activity are necessary for polyarchy, but the relationship between participation and polyarchy is extremely complex. It is the lower socio-economic groups who are the least politically active but it is also among this group that authoritarian personalities are most frequently found. Because of this latter factor, to the extent that a rise in the present low level of political activity brought this group into the political arena the consensus on democratic norms might decline, and hence polyarchy decline. Thus, an increase in political activity could prove a danger to the stability of the system (Dahl, 1956, p. 89).

But if Dahl suggests that the apathy of many citizens is of positive benefit for the stability of the system, it is Berelson's argument in Chapter 14 of Voting (1954), called 'Democratic Theory and Democratic Practice', that is probably the best known argument on these lines.¹¹ Berelson sets out to examine the implications for 'classical' democratic theory of the empirical evidence to be found in the previous chapters of the book. He presents a model of the 'classical theory', or, more accurately, a model of the qualities and attitudes that this theory is asserted to require of individual citizens, and this

11. See also Berelson (1952).

procedure reveals that "certain requirements commonly assumed for the successful operation of democracy are not met by the behaviour of the 'average citizen'"¹². For example, according to the 'classical' theory, "the democratic citizen is expected to be interested and to participate in political affairs" but in Elmira "the majority of the people vote but in general they do not give evidence of sustained interest" (1954 p. 307). Nevertheless, despite this, and all the other deficiencies in democratic practice when measured against the theory, Western democracies have survived. So we are faced with a paradox,

"individual voters today seem unable to satisfy the requirements for a democratic system of government outlined by political theorists. But the system of democracy does meet certain requirements for a going political organisation. The individual members may not meet all the standards, but the whole nevertheless survives and grows" (p. 312 Berelson's emphasis).

The statement of this paradox enables us to see, according to Berelson, the mistake made by the 'classical' writers, and to see why their theory does not give us an accurate picture of the working of existing democratic political systems. He argues that

12. Berelson, in common with almost all other writers who talk of the 'classical' theory of democracy, does not give the names of the writers from whom his model is drawn. In his earlier article he remarks of the composite set of attitudes presented, that "while not all of them may be required in any single political theory of democracy, all of them are mentioned in one or another theory" (1952, p. 314). But he does not say which theories. Unlike other recent writers Dahl has cast doubt on the existence of one 'classical' theory. In fact he seems to have changed his mind on this since his earlier writings; then he wrote that "classical theory is demonstrably invalid in some respects" (1956a, p. 86), but in paper written in 1966 he says that there never was a classical theory of democracy. cf. "there is no democratic theory - there are only democratic theories" (1956, p. 3).

'classical' theory concentrated on the individual citizen, virtually ignoring the political system itself, and where it did deal with the latter it considered specific institutions and not those "general features necessary if the institutions are to work as required".¹³

Berelson also argues that the earlier democratic theorists assumed that a politically homogenous citizenry was required, homogeneous that is in attitudes and behaviour. In fact what is necessary, and, happily, what is found, is heterogeneity, or a balanced distribution of heterogeneous qualities among the electorate. This heterogeneity and balance is required because we expect our political system to perform "contradictory functions". Despite this, the system does work, and this is just because the balanced way that qualities are distributed among voters enables these contradictory expectations to be resolved and the stability of the system maintained. For example, the American democratic system is both stable and flexible because political traditions in families and ethnic groups, and the long lasting nature of political

13. pp 312-13. Berelson lists the conditions necessary "if political democracy is to survive" as follows; intensity of conflict must be limited, rate of change restrained, social and economic stability maintained, and a pluralist social organisation and basic consensus must exist. The specific connection between these conditions and democracy is not made clear; the first three would seem to be required, almost tautologically, for any political system to continue. Berelson adds that he is going to continue by exploring "the values" of the democratic political system. In fact what he does (in keeping with his own section heading) is to look at "the requirements for the system".

loyalties, contribute to stability, whereas

"the voters least admirable when measured against individual requirements contribute most when measured against the aggregate requirement for flexibility ... They may be the least partisan and least interested voters, but they perform a valuable function for the entire system" (p. 316).¹⁴

Berelson's conclusion is that although his theory of stable democracy is realistic, it accurately describes the working of existing democratic systems in the West, it is not irreconcilable with the "ethical and normative" content of the 'classical' theory. All that is required is that the latter is revised in a realistic direction; "the classical political philosophers were right in the direction of their assessment of the virtues of the citizen. But they demanded those virtues in too extreme or doctrinal a form". The empirical evidence on citizen's attitudes shows that the balanced distribution that exists "can perform the functions and incorporate the same values ascribed by some theorists to each individual in the system as well as to the constitutive political institutions!" (pp 322-3).

The argument that a certain balance of individual attitudes is required for a stable system of democracy also forms the basis

14. It is difficult to see why Berelson calls the items he cites "contradictory". Certainly they might be empirically difficult to obtain at the same time, but it is possible to have, and not illogical to ask for, both stability and flexibility, or to have voters who express free, self-determined choices while at the same time making use of the best information and guidance from leaders (See pp 314-15).

of Almond and Verba's theory. This is set within the framework of the concept of 'political culture' and it also contains a more detailed account of what the required attitudes are and, more importantly, how these are developed and maintained.

Like Berelson, Almond and Verba devote the final chapter of their book The Civic Culture (1965) to a consideration of the implications for democratic theory of the empirical data (gathered from five countries) reported in the main body of the book. They compare what they call the "rationality-activist" model of the democratic citizen which, "according to the norms of democratic ideology would be found in a successful democracy" with the pattern of attitudes and activity actually found in Great Britain and the U.S.A.¹⁵ That is to say, they are comparing the political culture in the 'classical' theory of democracy with existing democratic political culture, and "political culture", Almond and Verba say, refers to an individual's "attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system" (p. 12).

The basic question that Almond and Verba pose is "how far (political culture) goes toward creating and maintaining stable

15. Although the rationality-activist model is obviously meant to be a version of the 'classical' theory of democracy, the only specific reference that the authors give to indicate the source of the model is to an American civics textbook, see p. 338.

and effective democracy. Is there a democratic political culture - a pattern of political attitudes that fosters democratic stability, that in some way 'fits' the democratic political system?" (pp 357-8)

Now "fits" is a vague term; the authors also talk of a culture "appropriate" to a democratic system (p. 360), but this is not much clearer. What they mean to do is to see whether, given a certain model of democracy, certain patterns of attitudes in fact exist, that are logically necessary for the system to remain stable. (c.f. pp 33-4). What Almond and Verba do not appear to realise is that their procedure belies their intentions because it is a circular one. Their example (model) of a stable democratic political system is that existing in Britain or the U.S.A. - so that the author's affirmative answer to the question they have posed comes as no surprise. The empirical data show that the pattern of existing attitudes does match up to the "civic culture", the political culture that "fits" a democratic system. But this is necessarily so. Existing democratic systems have been defined as stable and successful, so that the existing culture must (logically) be the 'appropriate' one. Despite this however Almond and Verba's theory is worth devoting some attention to. Their empirical information, as will be shown later, is of central importance in a discussion of participation and democratic theory, and their arguments in the chapter of The Civic Culture with which I am now concerned are extremely helpful in clarifying exactly

what is involved in recent theories of democracy.

The most significant respect in which the rationality-activist political culture differs from the civic (democratic) culture is that the model of the former stresses "the role of the participant and says little about the subject or parochial" (p. 338). This terminology refers to the typology of political cultures drawn up by the authors at the beginning of the book. There are three types of culture: the parochial, where individuals are virtually completely unaware that a central government (political system) exists or that they are members of it; second, the subject culture, where the individual is aware of, and evaluates the 'output' side of the governments activities, but does not see himself as a part of that system; third, the participant culture where individuals are aware of all sides of the activities of government and of their own, participant, role in the system (pp 16-18). The rationality-activist culture is thus an example of the third type. The civic culture, on the other hand, is what Almond and Verba call a mixed culture;

"individuals become participants in the political process, but they do not give up their orientations as subjects or as parochials ... In a sense, the subject and parochial orientations 'manage' or keep in place the participant political orientations ... (this) leads to a balanced political culture" (p. 30).

In Almond and Verba's view, the 'classical' theory is deficient, therefore, because it takes account of only one of these dimensions. The rationality-activist model requires "that citizens be involved

and active in politics, informed about politics, and influential. Furthermore, when they make decisions ... they must make them on the basis of careful evaluation of evidence and careful weighing of alternatives". But, as the authors point out, the average citizen in the stable democracies presents a very different picture - inactive, uninformed and deciding by factors far removed from "rational calculation" (p. 338). Almond and Verba's resolution of the paradox of successful democracies and 'unsuccessful' citizens is similar to that of Berelson (and to the arguments of Sartori about 'minimising' the democratic ideal). Rejecting the possible conclusion that "insofar as people do not live up to the ideal of the active citizen, democracy is a failure", Almond and Verba suggest that the problem should be viewed in a different light by the modern political theorist or sociologist.

"If one holds to the view that theories of politics should be drawn from the realities of political life - a somewhat easier and probably more useful task - then this explanation of the gap between the rationality-activist model and democratic realities is less acceptable. From the latter point of view, one would probably argue that the gap exists because the standards have been set unreasonably high" (p. 340).

There is the further implication in Almond and Verba's theory that the 'classical' theory, as well as setting "unreasonably high" standards, involves a misleading idea of the character of a democratic political system. Like Berelson (and like Eckstein, below) Almond and Verba see the democratic polity as a 'mixture of

contradictions' (hence the mixed nature of the civic culture itself). According to Almond and Verba, the major contradiction is that between "governmental power and governmental responsiveness" (pp 340-1) which, in turn, means that the citizen "is called upon to pursue contradictory goals" (p. 342). If elites are to be responsive to citizens then the individual must act "according to the rationality-activist model of citizenship", yet if elites are to make decisions this model is inappropriate. Therefore, the individual has to be "active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential" (p. 344). This balance is achieved in the civic culture in several ways. A far larger proportion of citizens actually feel themselves competent to influence the government than try to do so and this ensures that elites can act unimpeded, yet elites are restrained in their actions by the potentiality that exists for citizen action, and by their belief that citizens ought to be influential - even if this influence is a myth (pp 345-6 and p. 352). As well as this distribution of attitudes among citizens, Almond and Verba also stress (as against Berelson) that there is a 'balance' within each citizen. The inconsistencies between the myth of influence and actual activity could cause "strain" within the citizen. This does not happen because politics is of such low salience to the average citizen; yet he is occasionally active and then the inconsistency disappears and such "cycles of citizen involvement,

elite response, and citizen withdrawal may tend to reinforce the balance of opposites needed for democracy".¹⁶

Almond and Verba conclude that

"the most striking characteristic of the civic culture... is its mixed quality ... The orientation of the parochial ... the passive political orientation of the subject, the activity of the citizen, all merge within the civic culture. The result is a set of political orientations that are managed or balanced. There is political activity, but not so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is involvement and commitment, but they are moderated ... The mixture of attitudes found in the civic culture ... 'fits' the democratic political system. It is, in a number of ways, particularly appropriate for the mixed political system that is democracy".¹⁷

The Civic Culture contains more than just an extension of arguments about the mixed or balanced nature of the democratic

16. pp 348-350. The authors also argue that there is a balance between effective and instrumental attitudes and between consensus and cleavage; the latter is 'managed' by the civic culture by e.g. the cleavage produced by primary group affiliations being 'balanced' by the "consensual norm" that such groups should not be politicised. (pp 354-5 and pp 358-9).
17. (P. 360) Nordlinger (1967) offers a theory of stable democracy that he regards as "functionally equivalent" to Almond and Verba's. In this theory there is only one necessary and sufficient condition for stability, that a mixture of "acquiescent and directive attitudes toward political authority" exist - with the emphasis being heavily on the acquiescent attitudes. A small, but curious, aspect of Nordlinger's theory is that he quotes Schumpeter's definition of democracy, and adds, "by giving great emphasis to the need for leadership in his analysis, Giovanni Sartori arrives at an almost identical definition, which lends the choice of the above definition something less of an arbitrary flavour" (p. 211). "Arbitrary" seems an odd word to choose in view of the widespread agreement "among the profession" on precisely this definition!

political system and its culture; the book also looks at the political socialisation process, i.e. the way in which the culture is developed and maintained. Although he does not use the terminology of 'political culture', one of the theorists discussed above, Dahl, devotes some attention to the "social prerequisites" of polyarchy. It will be helpful briefly to look at what he says before discussing Almond and Verba's theory of political socialisation as there are some interesting similarities between the two, and this reinforces the argument that the theories of democracy of the two groups of writers discussed in this chapter are complementary, indeed, that, as will be shown later, they form two aspects of one coherent theory of democracy.

As noted already, a basic prerequisite for polyarchy in Dahl's theory is a consensus on the norms of democracy,¹⁸ and there is, he argues, an interdependence between this consensus and "social training". This takes place through the family, schools, churches, newspapers, etc. and Dahl distinguishes three types of social training: reinforcing, neutral and negative. He argues that "it is reasonable to suppose that these three kinds of training operate on members of most, if not all, polyarchical organisations and perhaps on members of many hierarchical organisations as well" (1956, pp 76-7). Dahl does not say what the

18. The necessary and sufficient institutional conditions for polyarchy can be formulated as norms (1956, pp 75-6).

training consists of, nor does he offer any suggestions as to which kind of training is likely to be produced by which type of control system, but he does remark that its efficacy will depend on the existing "deepest predispositions of the individual" (p. 82). Dahl has also argued that no single 'democratic character' is required for polyarchy, as earlier theorists had suggested; this is unrealistic in the face of the "blatant fact" that individuals are members of diverse kinds of social control systems. What is required is personalities that can adapt to the different roles they have to play in these systems, but Dahl gives no indication how training to produce this kind of personality and the consensus on democratic norms (1956a, p. 89).

Almond and Verba offer a more detailed account of how this training or socialisation might take place. They see the individual's experiences in a variety of non-political groupings as the crucial factor in the socialisation process and the formation and maintenance of the civic culture. "The civic culture is transmitted by a complex process that includes training in many social institutions - family, peer group, school, work place, as well as in the political system itself" (p. 366-7). The important question is whether the individual's experiences in these areas develop attitudes that 'fit' the democratic political structure; is there "a close relationship between the roles that a person plays in non-political situations and his role in politics?" (p. 271). And the

authors think that the "authority patterns within nonpolitical social groups may be the crucial variable to consider" (p. 271).

Almond and Verba have remarked that "by examining the relationship between political cultural tendencies and political structural patterns, we can avoid the assumption of congruence between political culture and political structure. The relationship (then) ... becomes one of the most significant researchable aspects of the problem of political stability" (pp 32-33). (Although, as already shown above, this relationship of congruence exists by definition in their theory). However, this formulation of the problem as that of the relationship between political culture and structure is misleading in that it is too simplified an account of what they are actually looking at. This is the development of, as well as the type of, political culture. The hypothesis is that the individual attitudes that make up the culture are developed through the individual's experiences in all kinds of authority structures in the (democratic) polity, i.e. attitudes and structures at this level are congruent. So that implicit in Almond and Verba's argument is the hypothesis that it is non-political structures together with the attitudes that they foster and develop that must 'fit' the democratic polity.¹⁹ Almond and

19. Thus, again, it is not surprising that in e.g. Mexico the authors found that the culture did not 'fit' stable democracy, because the 'social infrastructure' on which the national political structure has been superimposed is not one which one would expect to give rise to that nice balance of attitudes which constitute the civic culture.

Verba reach the only possible conclusion, given the circular form that their reasoning takes, that political socialisation in the U.S.A. and Britain "provides an excellent way to inculcate the subtleties that comprise the civic culture" (p. 367). A citizen is developed with the right mix of attitudes to allow him to play a stabilising role in the contradictory system of democracy. For example, through his everyday interaction in the authority structures of family and school, and through the "manifest teaching of the norms of political participation" the child comes to learn to expect "opportunities to participate in decisions"; but a balance is produced because

"at the same time, his exposure to the necessarily hierarchical patterns of authority in family and school will temper his expectation of mastery over his political environment. Similarly, what he learns in civics textbooks about the need for political activity ... will be tempered by what he observes of the actual political behaviour and attitudes of adults" (p. 367).

The third theory of stable democracy is Eckstein's A Theory of Stable Democracy (1966). Whereas Almond and Verba concentrate on the pattern of attitudes necessary for stability, Eckstein is concerned with the structure of authority in non-political areas that foster those attitudes.

Eckstein defines a democratic political system as one where elections decide "the outcome of competition for power and policies; for what else can one mean by democracy?" (p. 229). He also discusses what is involved in a stable system. 'Stability'

is not the same thing as "longevity", that could come about by accident. Rather it implies a capacity for "adapting to changing conditions, for realising political aspirations and holding fast allegiances", and it also implies that decision making is effective "in the basic sense of action itself, any sort of action, in pursuit of shared political goals or in adjustment to changing conditions" (p. 228).²⁰

How then, is stability in this sense attained? Eckstein points out that one aspect of social relations "most obviously and immediately" relevant to political behaviour has been neglected; that is

"authority patterns in non-governmental social relationships, in families, schools, economic organisations, and the like ... it stands to reason that if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experiences with authority that men have in other spheres of life, especially those that mold their personalities and those to which they normally devote most of their lives" (p. 225).

"Authority" denotes "relationships of superordination and subordination among individuals in social formations ... (and) authority in some form is a characteristic of practically any persistent social aggregate" (p. 233).

20. Eckstein does not elaborate on the connection between this last condition and a specifically democratic system. Nor does he explicitly consider the relationship between his theory and 'classical' theory. He does however remark that "for our own world" we need a "more pessimistic" approach to democracy, and not one (presumably that of earlier theorists) based on the assumption that men are natural democrats; we need an approach that focuses on the "calamitously improbable combinations of circumstances which actually make democracy work" (p. 286).

The first proposition of Eckstein's theory, one that relates to any form of government, is that "a government will tend to be stable if its authority pattern is congruent with the other authority patterns of the society of which it is a part" (p. 234). Eckstein considers that 'congruent' can have two senses, which I shall refer to as the strong and the weak. The strong sense is that of "identical", synonymous in Eckstein's terms with a very close resemblance (p. 234). This strong sense of congruence of authority patterns is, however, impossible in a democracy. "Some social relations simply cannot be conducted in a democratic manner, or can be so conducted only with the gravest dysfunctional consequences". Families or schools, for example can imitate or simulate democracy (or can be permissive, that is "authoritarian in a lax and lenient manner") but only to a limited extent if "they are not to produce warped and ineffectual human beings". Eckstein concludes that neither in childhood or adulthood are democratic authority patterns possible;

"the socialisation function, must therefore always be to some extent out of tune with democratic patterns, and potentially at odds with them. The same point applies, almost as obviously, to certain relations among adults. We have every reason to think that economic organisations cannot be organised in a truly democratic manner, at any rate not without consequences that no one wants" (p. 237).

The weak sense of 'congruent' is not completely clear but Eckstein argues that some "segments" of society are "closer" to

government than others, either because they involve adults or because they are political. There will be congruence in the weak sense if "a high degree of resemblance exists in patterns adjacent to government and one finds throughout the more distant segments a marked departure from functionally appropriate patterns for the sake of imitating the governmental pattern or extensive imitation of the governmental pattern in ritual practices", or if authority patterns "constitute a graduated pattern in a proper segmentation of society" - by which I take it that Eckstein means that the "closer" a sphere is to government the more it should resemble it in authority structure (pp 239-240).

It is this weak sense of congruence that is applicable to a democratic system, but Eckstein has already emphasised that even spheres close to government cannot be democratised. On the face of it this would seem to pose a difficulty for the theory, especially as it also has a psychological element. Eckstein argues that "incongruity", like 'anomie' and 'strain', to which it is closely related, denotes a psychological state as well as a social condition. 'Strain' is the most relevant concept for the theory; this refers to "the coexistence of different, perhaps even contradictory, norms of conduct in regard to a particular set of actions or an individual's actions in general", and incongruity in authority patterns is "an obvious source of strain" (pp 254-256). Strain can be minimised if roles are segregated,

but the ubiquity of authority relations makes this impossible (p. 257), and also, in a democracy, by providing opportunities (especially for the political elites) to learn the appropriate patterns of action, but the difficulties here have already been noted.²¹ However, the difficulty can be overcome and strain "managed" because there is a further possibility and that is to ensure that the authority pattern of government itself is the appropriate one; it must 'fit' the (only possible) pattern of non-governmental authority relations. As Eckstein says, it follows from his analysis that

"governmental democracy will tend to be stable only if it is to a significant extent impure - if, in short, the governmental authority pattern contains a balance of disparate elements, of which democracy is an important part (but only a part)" (pp 261-262).

Thus Eckstein arrives at the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that if a democratic system is to be stable then it cannot be really - or at least purely - a democratic one.

There are other reasons too, apart from the congruency theory, why "a healthy element of authoritarianism" is necessary for stability. First, it is necessary if government is to govern as well as represent (if it is to take that action that is implied

21. Since most people will be socialised into non-democratic authority structures (especially as most are politically inactive and so will not interact in those segments closest to government in the sense of being political), Eckstein's theory supports the argument that greater participation by the presently inactive could pose a danger to the stability of the system.

in the notion of 'stability' itself). Second, "human beings just are not one-sided" - and strain can result from over-consistent, as well as inconsistent, norms - men need firm leadership, not just a government with which they can identify. Thus Eckstein feels that his theory "lends support to the still older theory ... that mixed government is the most stable form of government - and puts it also in a new light" (pp 265-267).²²

iv. The contemporary theory of democracy.

Although the theorists discussed in this chapter concentrate on different aspects of democratic theory, and each has his own method of approach, the most striking and significant feature is the remarkable agreement they show on the major elements of a modern, realistic theory of (stable) democracy, and the place of participation in that theory. That is to say, there is a theory of democracy common to them all - and to many other recent writers on democracy. The differences are differences of emphasis and interest, rather than disagreement on essentials. Since the theories considered above speak very well, and clearly, for themselves a relatively brief outline of this common theory of democracy,

22. Cf. Dahl's (1961a, p. 85) comment on "mixed" political systems; "Some of you may draw comfort from the belief that the American system, if I have described it rightly, comes close to the mixture of democracy and oligarchy that Aristotle concluded was 'the best constitution and the best way of life for the majority of states and men', and which he called a polity".

which, for convenience, I shall now refer to as the contemporary theory of democracy, a brief outline is all that is required.

All the theorists discussed take as their starting point the fact that the Anglo-American democracies function well and have remained stable despite the political inactivity and indifference of most of their citizens, whereas, it is generally agreed, the 'classical' theory required the maximum possible amount of participation by ordinary men if democracy was to succeed. A modern, realistic, theory of democracy must, therefore, begin from the facts of apathy and stability.

Agreeing with Schumpeter that 'democracy' refers to a method of decision making in national government, there is a general consensus among recent theorists that it is the (free) electoral process, with its competition by leaders for decision making office, that is the defining characteristic of democracy, the feature that distinguishes a democratic, from other political systems. All that the theory requires from the ordinary man is that a sufficient (minimum) number of individuals participate by voting for their choice of leader. (Dahl's emphasis on opportunities for participation in the inter-electoral period is not logically required by the theory; to that extent Sartori's disagreement on that point is well founded). Another area of agreement with Schumpeter is that a division of labour operates in politics; although citizens 'control' leaders through the electoral sanction,

and this is one side of the democratic system, equally important is the fact that control (the participatory element) is 'balanced' by the freedom allowed to leaders to decide without interference for the rest of the time. Thus, the kind of 'democratic character' advocated by the 'classical' theorists would prove a destabilising factor because it emphasised only part (the part needed for participation) of the pattern of attitudes, or political culture, required. The stability of the Western democracies is largely due to the fact that the political socialisation process (social training) does produce the necessary 'balanced mixture' of attitudes. The authority structures of non-political spheres, the crucial variable in the socialisation process, are such that the 'participant attitudes' are not overemphasised; indeed, according to Eckstein, the 'one-sided' attitude pattern of the 'classical' theory could not be produced anyway since it is not possible fully to democratise non-political authority structures.

In broad outline this is the contemporary theory of democracy. However, there is also a subsidiary argument of some importance. Stability is also aided by the fact that the section of the population that tends to be most apathetic, that tends not even to vote, also tends to have the largest proportion of individuals with personalities that are 'one-sided' in the opposite direction from that advocated by the 'classical' theory,

i.e. that are authoritarian. Thus an increase in participation by this section could prove destabilising.

The argument that there is a (new) common theory of democracy that underlies the bulk of recent work on the subject is not entirely an original one; the "elitist theory of democracy" (Walker, 1966), the "new democracy" (Duncan and Lukes, 1963), the "theory of democratic elitism" (Bachrach, 1967) has not gone completely unnoticed, or uncriticised, but the critics voices have been rather muted. And, apart from Berelson's theory, the work of the writers who fall into my second category has tended to be neglected by the critics.²³ The criticism has been centred round two major points. First, the critics argue that the advocates of the contemporary theory of democracy have misunderstood the 'classical' theory; it did not set out to provide a description of democratic political systems, rather it was "an essay in prescription" (Davis, 1964, p. 39). This argument will be discussed detail later. The second criticism

23. Most of recent work on democratic theory supports the contemporary theory but for some further examples see Lipset (1960 and 1962); Levin (1966); Milbrath (1965); Morris Jones (1954); Parsons (1960); Plamenatz (1958); Pulzer (1967). For examples of criticism see, Bachrach (1967); Bay (1965); Davis (1964); Duncan and Lukes (1963); Rousseas and Farganis (1963); Walker (1966). Also relevant is McCoy and Playford (1967), a collection of essays which includes Bay, Duncan and Lukes, Davis and Walker.

is that in revising the 'classical' theory recent writers have in fact rejected the ideals and values of the earlier theory and replaced them with others; "the revisionists have fundamentally changed the normative significance of democracy" (Walker, 1966, p. 286). This second charge will now be considered.

The argument that the contemporary theory has changed the normative significance of democracy presupposes that the contemporary theory includes a normative element - that it is not value-free. It has already been emphasised that recent theorists have stressed that what they are concerned with is the realism and descriptive accuracy of democratic theory and, in reply to Walker's critical paper, Dahl (1966) has explicitly rejected the charge that what he, and others, have in fact been doing is producing a new normative theory. Dahl (p. 298) says that the new theories "are not attempts to prescribe how democracy ought to work but to describe how some of the political systems widely called by that name do in fact operate and to explain why they operate in this way" (Dahl's emphasis). Dahl mentions Mayo in this connection but Mayo himself gives a rather different account of his theory of democracy; "surely" he says, "democracy, even if 'merely a method', must be put in the category of instruments which can only be put to certain uses", and he makes use of the analogy between an economic and a democratic system to illustrate his point. Even though the results of a competitive, private ownership economy may differ in different

countries, "surely we should say the kind of result is the same ... The values inherent in the free market economy are the same wherever such an economy is found" - and similarly with the democratic political system (pp 214-15). And it was noted in the discussion of Mayo's theory that he regards democracy as "both a political system and a theory to explain and justify it" (p. 29, my emphasis).

In order, then, to assess the validity of the criticism that the contemporary theory of democracy has changed the normative or value side, as well as the descriptive aspect, of the 'classical' theory, it first has to be ascertained whether Dahl's or Mayo's is the correct view of the nature of their theories, or rather, what has to be decided is whether the intention of the majority of recent theorists to produce a purely descriptive theory of democracy is one that is capable of being carried out. Dahl has said that "I do think that it is a serious misunderstanding to interpret (recent) writers as essentially normative theorists" (1966, p. 301). However, this misses the point. The really serious criticism centres on the question not of whether recent theorists are essentially normative theorists, but whether a value-free political theory is possible at all. Their intention to produce a purely descriptive democratic theory is in line with the views of the majority of students of politics, who agree that political theory and political sociology should, properly, be

value-free; modern political theory should deal only with the facts, be empirical and scientific. The contemporary theory of democracy offers therefore an extremely interesting 'case study' of whether this aim can, even in principle, be realised. Although a great deal of discussion has gone on among social scientists on exactly what is involved in their discipline being free from values, much of it has centred on the practical difficulties of living up to this ideal; thus it is suggested, for example, that the student must 'declare his values' and then his audience can be alert to make sure that bias does not inadvertently creep into his interpretation of the facts that he is investigating.²⁴ Pertinent though such advice may often be, it takes for granted the fundamental issue. That is whether it is indeed possible for the social scientist, in this case the political theorist, to concern himself solely with facts and build a completely empirical theory; that is to say, it takes for granted that facts and values can be dealt with independently of each other. If it can be shown that they cannot, in political theory at least, then it will also have been shown that the nature of the enterprise which most recent theorists of democracy have set themselves is such that it cannot be carried out.

24. See Gouldner (1963) for a brief discussion of what adherence to the aim of a value-free social science might mean in practice.

CHAPTER TWO

VALUES AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

1. Some philosophical arguments about facts and values.

In taking for granted that a logical gulf obtains between facts and values and that it is not the job of the political theorist or sociologist to deal with the value side - that is up to the policy maker, or perhaps the 'old-fashioned' political philosopher - students of politics have been following the mainstream of Anglo-American philosophy in this century. It is therefore necessary to discuss briefly some of the main arguments of the philosophers on the fact/value problem before coming on to the specific question of the possibility of a value-free political (democratic) theory.

The most striking thing about the philosophical discussion is the narrow and formalistic terms in which it has been carried on; in particular moral philosophy has often appeared to consist of little except a continued discussion of, and rejection of, the 'naturalistic fallacy' of trying to deduce values from facts, with the argument centring on the word 'good' and conducted in terms of grading apples and the performance of augers. It is curious that political theorists have been content to accept the conclusions of the philosophers, and the characterisation of value judgements on which they are based, but have made little attempt to apply the

philosophical arguments to the concepts that political theorists use, or to examine the form that political arguments typically take. This neglect of the details of the philosophical argument is reflected in the fact that the (now growing) criticisms of the doctrine of the separation of fact and value being voiced by philosophers themselves, especially moral philosophers, have had, so far, virtually no impact on the field of politics.

The modern philosophical argument that facts and values are logically independent derives, via Moore, from Hume's celebrated remarks on 'is' and 'ought', although whether Hume in fact meant what the advocates of a value-free social science, and the philosophers who have spent so much time and effort attacking the 'naturalistic fallacy' have interpreted him to mean is open to question.¹ The upholders of the fact/value distinction rest their case on three major points; a) that evaluative conclusions cannot be deduced from factual premises, b) that facts and values, or descriptive statements and evaluative statements, have a very different logical status, and this means that c) facts and values (description and evaluation) are independent and unrelated and can be clearly and unambiguously separated from each other. The mark of a descriptive statement is generally taken to be that it

1. On this point see MacIntyre (1959).

is possible to ascertain objectively its truth or falsity, as we could with "Smith is six feet tall and has red hair". This is not the case with an evaluative statement, say, "Smith is a good man"; we cannot check whether Smith is good in the way that, once we know what red hair is, we can check whether his hair is indeed red. In making the evaluation we have 'gone beyond' the facts. Exactly what we are doing when we evaluate something as opposed to describing it is a matter of some dispute among philosophers who maintain the fact/value distinction, but we may, for example, be commending it or expressing an attitude toward it. How these views have influenced political theorists can be seen from Easton's remark that it is "generally" held by social scientists that "values can be ultimately reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the individual's total life-experience" (1953, p. 221).

If one holds to Easton's characterisation of values it would follow that very little, or no, reasoned discussion would be possible about them. However, it would seem doubtful if all political theorists who saw their job as that of constructing value-free theories would be happy with this conclusion. Recent theorists of democracy, for instance, although not explicit about their views, would seem to be saying that it is not their task to discuss values, rather than saying that values are not capable

of being intelligibly discussed at all; (Mayo, who does not share the view that democratic theory is value free does discuss various democratic values in his Introduction to Democratic Theory). If this is a correct interpretation of the position of at least some theorists of democracy then it is a mistaken position for, as will be shown below, one cannot hold both that facts and values are (can be) separate and unconnected, and that values can be the subject of rational inquiry (even if by someone else). But it should be noted that this does not mean that one is saying that there is no logical distinction at all between facts and values, rather it is the claim that they are completely logically unrelated so that purely descriptive political theories can be constructed that is being brought into question.

The criticism that the argument that an unbridgeable logical gulch obtains between facts and values entails that value-judgements are completely arbitrary and not open to question is one that has formed a major point of attack on the accepted view by philosophers like Mrs. Foot (to whom my argument here owes a good deal). As she has pointed out, if values are logically distinct from facts and if my evaluation is merely e.g. the expression of an attitude or a commendation then, given a certain set of facts, there are no restrictions on what is to count as an evaluation and no reason why I should take what is generally held to be evidence for

a value-judgement as evidence at all for me (See e.g. Foot, 1967). On this argument I need no evidence, can have no evidence, for the individual is "the supreme arbiter of values" (Montifiore, 1966, p. 202). Characterised thus, the argument gains both attractiveness and plausibility; until one stops to think exactly what it can mean when philosophers have claimed, or at least their arguments have implied, that the individual alone is the "supreme arbiter" on value matters. What has, until the relatively recent criticisms, been completely ignored in the philosophical debate on facts and values is how we actually learn to use value terms. This has been obscured because of the concentration on the analysis of individual (often trivial) sentences that have been prised out of the social context in which in fact they are normally used.

If all we are doing when we make an evaluation is, for example, expressing an emotion that is unrelated to any facts then it is always open to us to do something like the following. Individual X agrees that the car is (can be described as) red and that its engine, brakes, tyres and electrical circuits are in order, but he can, if we accept the view current among social scientists, either refuse to 'evaluate' the car at all, or he could make the evaluation, for instance, that the car is 'bad' (or since there are no restrictions on what is to count as an evaluation, perhaps, 'stupid'). If we take the first case first,

the question arises of what we are to say about X who refuses to 'go beyond' the facts. In the rest of his conversation X indicates that he is quite familiar with the usage of terms like 'good', 'bad', 'excellent' etc., it is just in this case that he decides not to make an evaluation. We would be almost bound to conclude that X was playing some kind of game if he insisted that he was just going to 'describe' the car. If he has learnt to speak intelligible English then he has not learnt merely to speak grammatically or put together sentences of differing logical structure but he has also learnt what words 'mean' by actually using them in differing social contexts. As Barry has argued, "one must be prepared to recognise a social content over and above the linguistic content of utterances" (1965, p. 30), and we know perfectly well that in an ordinary social context the car referred to is what we mean by a 'good' car and that X is doing something very odd when he denies that there is, or need be, any evaluative implication at all in his agreement with the description.

In the second case, where X makes the evaluation that the car is 'bad' (or 'stupid') we may or may not find this acceptable. It depends whether X is able to provide some background information, some reasons, to make this judgement intelligible; it is not enough for him to 'make an evaluation' and leave it at that.

Perhaps he might say that the car is 'bad' because it uses too much petrol for the ordinary man to run it and if X does this then the way is open for a sensible discussion on his point of view, but this is precisely because we can argue about the factual basis of his judgement (how much petrol does it use, does that outweigh its other features etc.) That is to say, there is some relationship between facts and values, they are not completely logically divorced from and independent of each other. If we are to carry on any kind of intelligible discourse at all then our value-judgements must have some basis in the facts of the case, we must be able to give some reasons for them, or we should never know what anyone else was talking about even where quite mundane matters are concerned.

However, here also a logical limitation is involved; just to say that we must be able to give reasons for our judgements is not enough, they must be reasons of an appropriate kind. To see that this is so one only has to consider what it is that philosophers are talking about when they use the terminology of 'evaluation' and 'evaluative statements', or what it is that social scientists mean when they speak of a value-free social science. The philosopher's terminology here is another aspect of the artificiality of much of their discussion on this topic; as Barry (1965, p. 9) has pointed out, we do not use the word 'evaluate' much "in any sense". And it is clear from the

discussion so far that we are not just expressing our emotions in making value-judgements. In Political Argument, Barry has a useful discussion of what we are doing (pp 9-10). He points out that we quite often speak of 'valuing' something when we think that it is worthwhile, and he notes that 'appraise' is a synonym for 'value'. He concludes that what is being referred to in talking of 'evaluation' is a process of "'weighing up', (things, people, evidence), to see what they are 'worth'". Thus, on Barry's argument a 'value' would be something we regard as being worthwhile trying to live up to, to achieve, or pursue, and a 'value-free' political theory would, therefore, be one which contained no reference whatsoever to the worth of the system with which it was concerned. If we are undertaking this weighing-up process when we make value-judgements then the reasons that we give for our judgements, and the facts that we adduce in their support, must be the relevant ones for deciding the worth of something; that is, there will be a limit on the reasons that can intelligibly be offered in any given case. In the context of the argument that values and facts are completely logically independent it is, therefore, extremely misleading to suggest that the individual is the "supreme arbiter of values" if what is meant is that there are no (logical) restrictions on when and

how the individual can make value-judgements, or on what can count as a value for him in a given context.²

The fact that there are many persons with eccentric interests from whose viewpoint the normal criteria of evaluation in any given case are not the relevant ones does not alter the fact that we expect (and have learnt when we learnt to speak) that, for example, a 'good auger' is one that bores a neat hole. Where it is persons (or conceptions of man), human ideals, institutions, or social relationships that are being considered, our appraisal will only make sense if we bring forward facts and reasons relevant to an assessment of the worth of these; that is, as emphasised by the critics of the upholders in philosophy of the 'autonomy of values' position, we must conduct our arguments in terms of people's wants, needs, desires, interests, health, happiness and

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2. The attractions of such a formulation arise from the fact that we are all in favour of the individual making his own choices. But the question of individual choice at the level of language does not arise. If the aphorism that "language is a form of life" has any significance it is surely in highlighting the fact that in so far as we have learned to speak a language intelligibly then we have also simultaneously, grasped the social context within which we speak and this is one where, normally, what counts as a 'good X' for example, is (socially) understood as limited by, and only intelligible in the light of, certain facts about X. The language that we speak contains a built-in logical link between fact (social context) and evaluation. This level appears to have been confused with that of practical decision making in the world, where it does make sense to talk of the individual choosing his values. He always has to decide whether, for instance, to act with generosity, to tell the truth on this occasion, or whether he thinks that political relationships should be organised on the basis of political equality.

so on. It is by using these notions that we can make a bridge from 'is' to 'ought'. None of these notions are simple ones and it is precisely for this reason that moral and political arguments prove so intractable over time; exactly what men need, or what their interests are (or, worse still, what their 'best' interests are) are unresolved questions that lie at the heart of moral and political theory. But the arguments that we bring to bear on such questions are not deductive in form and it is an irrelevant confusion to suggest, as have some philosophers, in their analyses of the 'language of morals', that because we cannot deduce values from facts then that is the end of the argument about a possible relationship between them. If we look at actual political arguments and theories it is clear that they are not, and do not aim to be (usually), deductive in form, but that nevertheless, their arguments need be no less valid for that. Deduction is not the only acceptable mode of argument or reasoning and in politics it is not a question of formally proving, say, that "democracy is the only form of political organisation that maximises men's freedom". Rather it is a matter of deciding what we mean by 'democracy', 'freedom' etc., a matter of the weighing of evidence for and against our interpretation and of putting forward good reasons to enable

other people to accept our judgement.³ That is, in formulating and assessing political theories we are concerned with both facts and values and there is a two-way process between the two. If deduction were the only way of linking fact and value, if values were indeed arbitrary, then very little, or no, political discussion of any interest would be possible at all.⁴

11. Values in political theory.

At this point a determined advocate of a value-free political theory might object to this characterisation of his discipline. He might argue that even if the philosophers have been mistaken in thinking that there was no logical bridge to be erected between facts and values it is still the job of the political theorist to deal only with the factual aspect, he should leave others to build and cross the bridges. This argument depends on the prior assumption, made by most recent theorists of democracy, that it is always possible to prise the facts loose from values, or at least it depends on the possibility that certain terms can be used in a purely 'descriptive' sense with no evaluative

3. cf. Perelman's notion of "argumentation" as opposed to formal logic, which comprises "the discursive techniques which make it possible to evoke or further people's assent to theses presented for their acceptance" (1963, p. 155).

4. See also Runciman's (1965 and 1968) comments on Weber's view that value positions were of an arbitrary nature, illustrated by the latter's example of a syndicalist.

implications. To see if this assumption is justified let us return to the example of individual X. ✓ Suppose that X agrees that Smith may be described as honest, courageous and kind but insists that this is pure 'description' with no 'evaluation' involved. Now the descriptive terms used are all virtue terms, i.e. they are all traditionally regarded as being part of the attributes of a 'good man'. The questions that X has to answer are why, say, courage should be regarded as a virtue, and second, whether we can use the word 'courageous' to describe someone without, at the same time, making an appraisal of his worthiness as a man. Unless we can do the latter the basis for a value-free political theory begins to look shaky.

Whether or not we assess a particular action as a courageous one depends upon what has been done (on the facts of the case). It is not just a matter of a man overcoming his own feelings of fear, or of putting himself at risk in some way; if this were all that is necessary we should never, as we sometimes do, speak of 'misplaced' courage. We make the latter comment when we feel that the risk was taken for something that was not worthwhile; compare the man who performs some daredevil deed during the course of a robbery with the man who, in a police state, refuses to turn informer on his friends. Both may be afraid, both are certainly taking risks but ✓ (unless, perhaps, the robber is giving to the poor) we should probably feel that it is the latter who is using

his courage as it should be used. That is to say, both a reference to the facts and an appraisal (evaluation) of those facts are 'built-in' to the term 'courage' and to a designation of an act or a man as 'courageous'. Courage is a 'virtue' precisely because, in the normal meaning of the term, it carries the implication that the courageous man has acted so as to benefit his fellows in some way (and so is a 'good man'). In other words we have neither just described nor just evaluated Smith when we say that he is a courageous man, nor could we, given the way that our language works, separate out these two aspects and use the term in a purely descriptive sense. As Louch (1966, p. 59) has argued, sometimes we "identify and describe items in our experience by means of terms of appraisal" and the very fact that such terms exist in our language "allows us to describe what people do and are likely to do in ways which would be quite out of reach without them".

Our advocate of a value-free political theory might object again here on the grounds that although one might not be able to use the virtue terms in a purely descriptive sense, nevertheless political theorists do not on the whole spend their time discussing the virtues, so that the above analysis tells us nothing about the terminology of political theory. Little ✓ attention has been paid by the philosophers to the concepts of politics and sociology, but the above analysis does throw light

✓ onto concepts like 'political equality', which as shown in the last chapter is a key notion in the contemporary theory of democracy, although there are some important differences between a virtue term like 'courage' and 'political equality'. One important difference is that our "terms of appraisal" are not always, as is the case with the virtue terms, terms of positive appraisal. Whereas to call a man honest courageous and kind implies that he is a 'good man', to say that a polity is organised on the basis of political equality does not necessarily imply that a political theorist will regard it as the best kind of polity; some political theorists, for example Burke, have advocated systems based on political inequality. But this is not to say that these terms are value-free and can be used purely descriptively. To show that this is so let us take a closer look at 'political equality' and another of the ways in which it differs from 'courage', viz. that there is no general agreement on what counts as 'political equality' as there is on what counts as an instance of a courageous act. ✓ Many recent theorists of democracy have argued that 'political equality', used purely descriptively, characterises the institutional arrangements, or one aspect of them, of the existing Western democratic political systems. The crucial question is how we are to decide whether these institutions have been correctly described. It will be recalled that in the contemporary theory of democracy 'political

equality' refers to the existence of universal suffrage in free elections for competing (potential) decision makers. But suppose that another political theorist claims that this is not political equality at all; 'political equality', he says, refers to a situation where individuals actually have an equal voice in making decisions, not just voting for decision makers. How are we to choose between these two conceptions of political equality? Both theorists agree that political equality is a vital aspect of democracy but they disagree over what counts as an instance of 'political equality'. The history of political theory is full of just such disagreements over what is the proper content of notions such as 'political equality', 'freedom', 'justice' and so forth. It is not just a case of a particular theorist saying 'this is my definition' - and no more; a reasoned justification can be given for the interpretations chosen (even if this may be partly implicit in any given theory). In the case of the contemporary theory of democracy the argument (to be discussed in more detail later) is twofold: an empirical argument that this is the only realistic interpretation of 'political equality', and a justification for this interpretation in terms of the securing of the control of leaders (decision makers) so that, through the elimination of arbitrary government, the interests of the individual members of the polity are protected and furthered. But we can go on and ask, how are these interests

conceived?; and, further still, what conception of (political) man is implied by this? But this has taken us a long way from the claim that 'political equality' in the contemporary theory of democracy is used purely descriptively, with no evaluative implications. Once again we have a term whose application and interpretation involves 'description through appraisal', both of which aspects are an inseparable part of our understanding of the notion of political equality. This also explains why the appraisal in the case of political equality is not always a positive one. For a political theorist with a different conception of the citizen and his interests it might be political inequality (not political equality however interpreted) that will provide a polity best able to protect and further those interests. A large part of the terminology of political theory, or rather the way in which key terms are interpreted, is only intelligible against a background of (evaluative) assumptions about the kind of men (citizens) involved, their needs, wants, interests, etc. and the ways in which these can best be provided for through the political arena.

This adds a further dimension to the interesting analysis by Taylor (1967) of some recent work in political theory. Taylor argues that in establishing a theoretical framework of explanation, in delineating from the phenomena under consideration those that

need to be explained and those that are relevant to that explanation, the political theorist not only rules out certain dimensions of explanation - which may be crucial for another theory - but that his own chosen dimension supports a value position implicit in theory itself. The relevance of this argument to the contemporary theory of democracy is not difficult to see. It has been shown that the theory includes a set of standards or criteria by which a political system may be judged 'democratic'; but the criteria are those inherent in the already existing Western (Anglo-American) system, that is to say, we already have the ideal democratic polity. Berelson (1954, p. 312), for example, says that the American political system "not only works on the most difficult and complex questions but often works with distinction". Dahl concludes A Preface to Democratic Theory (pp 149-51) by remarking that although he has not attempted to determine whether the system he has described is a desirable one, nevertheless it does enable all active and legitimate groups to be heard at some stage in the decision making process, "which is no mean thing"; the system is also "a relatively efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging moderation, and maintaining social peace". Clearly, a political system that can and does tackle difficult questions with distinction, that can and does ensure social peace, is a desirable one. Furthermore, by taking certain dimensions as given, by assuming that certain aspects of

politics need no explanation, the contemporary theory presents us with two, and only two, alternatives; a system where leaders are controlled by the electorate, where the latter have a choice between competing elites - and a system where this is not the case ('totalitarianism'). But the choice is made for us by the presentation of the alternatives, and, therefore, we do have the very system that we ought to have, a democratic one.

Following Taylor's argument it certainly seems as if the critics of the contemporary theory are correct and that it is not a value-free theory. But could this value element be avoided as Dahl and other theorists believe? The answer to this question, as shown above, is 'no', for the very basis for a value-free political theory, using key terms in a purely descriptive sense, is not possible. It might be objected here by our determinedly empirical political theorist that this may be quite true if we insist on using the old terminology of 'political equality' and so on, but that we have no need to use these. What we must do is to construct a new, technical vocabulary and get rid of value laden terms from political theory. The difficulty here is that although new vocabularies may be relatively easy to produce, in using these vocabularies for the purpose of building a political theory exactly the same problems arise of the basis on which the facts to be explained are selected and ordered, which are to be taken as given in the theory and so on. New vocabularies have

been produced; for example there is Easton's "systems theory" with its inputs and outputs, demands, supports and doorkeepers, but this is basically a sophisticated analogy, a sophisticated way of re-describing the perfectly familiar features of political life, and the same thing is true of other technical terminology, like that of political culture used in this study. Such technical terms may be very useful for organising large amounts of comparative empirical data, but once one turns to the business of drawing substantive conclusions from that data, or constructing theories from it, evaluative problems re-occur. Furthermore, the new vocabulary has to be 'translated' so that we can recognise which features of empirical political life we are dealing with; despite 'inputs', 'demands' and the rest we still have to get back to talking about pressure groups, electoral systems, democracy - and even freedom and equality⁵ and we cannot avoid the problem of what we mean by many of these terms.

5. In his concise exposition of Easton's systems theory Mackenzie (1967, p. 106) refers to one aspect of it as follows. "Stress arises if 'channels' are 'over-loaded' with demands: life will be easier for the system if it can widen channels all over - but it is useless to increase input channels (to democratize a backward country, for instance) if output channels (i.e. government's capacity to act) are not eased also, and this may be impossible". Clearly, when one asks for example what is involved in "increasing input channels" and finds that it is democratisation then all the problems being discussed in this study have to be dealt with, evaluative implications as well as questions of empirical feasibility. As Mackenzie rather tartly remarks (p. 107) "to put it at the lowest, Easton's conceptual framework has generated for him a convenient and interesting set of chapter headings under which to write a book about politics in general".

Similarly, as will become clear later although it is useful shorthand to talk of 'political culture' and 'political socialisation' the problems that arise when we stop to consider which combination of individual attitudes - which type of political culture - best 'fits' a democratic political system, involve evaluative as well as empirical factors: we still have to decide which are the characteristics of a 'democratic' system.

How we 'see' men and their relationships to each other and to the polity provides us with the ultimate justification and explanation for the different interpretations of 'freedom' and 'equality' - or for the rejection of political equality - contained in different political theories; it explains why a political theorist points to this set of institutions as comprising the best kind of polity and not another set. Such interpretations and appraisals are unintelligible without the background provided by the wider evaluative assumptions of the theorist. Thus the theoretical framework of a given theory not only "supports" a value position, as Taylor argues, rather the framework itself derives from, or at least rests upon that set of value assumptions.⁶

6. cf. Runciman's argument (1965, pp 177-178). "In saying what he chooses to mean by 'democracy', a political theorist is doing more than delimiting his subject matter and guarding against misunderstanding in his discussion of it ... Because to decide what is important about 'democracy' is at once to predetermine the criteria of explanation for what is to be explained and thereby to preselect, in terms not of praise or blame but of meaning and significance, what is important in the way men are governed by other men ... (a theory of democracy) is bound itself to imply some prior evaluation which could not be derived from within the definitions adopted in it and the evidence adduced in its support".

The search for an exclusively descriptive political theory may be doomed to failure but it is important to realise that because values are inevitably involved in political theory, including the theory of democracy, objectivity is not thereby ruled out. The fear that it would be is in fact probably much more the impetus behind social scientists' desire for value-free theory than adherence to specific philosophical doctrines about the relationship between facts and values. Objectivity is possible because the investigation of both facts and values can be carried out according to the accepted (objective) techniques of inquiry and assessment of evidence. Indeed, the recognition that political theory cannot be purely descriptive makes for greater objectivity, for example, it prevents the presentation, in the guise of a value-free and scientific theory, a theory of democracy that rules out what might be a viable alternative interpretation of 'democracy' and sets up as a model of the ideal polity the existing Anglo-American political system.

Any assessment of a political theory will involve a combination of analyses of both facts and values. To investigate the role of participation in a modern theory of democracy is not just a matter of 'looking at the facts', of formulating a 'realistic' and 'empirical' theory. The facts that are included in the framework of one theory find their place in the light of the particular value position involved; from the perspective of

a different evaluative viewpoint other facts may be relevant, new hypotheses and different interpretations of the facts may be suggested. Here, of course, empirical data is crucial but when this has been examined a return can be made to the evaluative aspect. The empirical investigation may indicate that certain value interpretations are feasible ones, or, alternatively, that an interpretation of a certain value is just not an empirically feasible one, or that its realisation would lead to conflict with another value in the theory or to further unacceptable consequences. This kind of assessment is possible because values are not arbitrary; a two-way relationship exists which renders values 'vulnerable' to the facts. As Runciman has stated, it is very often

"feasibility which constitutes the crucial criterion by which a political argument may be settled; and it is such arguments which, if established, very often require the abandonment of a prescriptive political position" (1968, p. 565).⁷

Although the critics of the contemporary theory of democracy claim that it has changed the normative significance of (classical) democracy none of them has looked in detail at a) exactly what the relevant value assumptions of the contemporary theory are, or

7. See also the account by Gallie (1956) of "liberal" and "socialist" morality with their contrasting interpretations of 'justice', 'liberty' and 'good government', and the author's view that the socialist morality is a protest against the liberal, a "protest lodged largely on factual grounds". (my emphasis).

b) at exactly what, both empirically and evaluatively, is involved in the 'classical' theory. The latter is especially important for none of the defenders of that theory, except perhaps Bachrach, even begins to address himself to the vital question of whether, given the available empirical evidence, the theorists discussed in chapter one are not right to revise the 'classical' theory as they have done, including its values, which its defenders agree involved the maximum possible participation by the ordinary man. They all suggest that the revisions are uncalled for, or at least in a more careful statement, that they have not been shown to be called for; as Duncan and Lukes (1963, p. 160) state, "it needs to be shown exactly how and why the ideal is rendered improbable or impossible of attainment. This has nowhere been done". But neither, on the other hand, have the defenders of the 'classical' theory shown that the ideal is attainable.⁸ Perhaps Sartori is right to suggest that it is a mistake to look for reasons for the political apathy of the majority; perhaps the theorists of contemporary democracy are right to stress the fragility of democratic systems and the "calamitous improbability" that the right combination of prerequisites for stability will occur in more than a few countries.

8. Bachrach (1967) gives only the most general suggestions on how the ideal might be realised and no evidence to show whether this is possible.

The way that we can decide whether they are right is on the basis of the kind of analysis outlined above; by an examination of and assessment of the two theories of democracy, the contemporary and the 'classical', in terms of both empirical evidence and values. The first step in this analysis was taken in the last chapter, where it was established how 'democracy' was characterised in the contemporary theory, including the place of participation and the political culture necessary for the stability of the system.

iii. The evaluative implications of the contemporary theory of democracy.

That the contemporary theory of democracy not only describes the existing Western democratic political systems but also evaluates them as the best that we can hope to attain has some interesting implications for the way in which the proper interpretation of values is seen by recent theorists of democracy; it explains why these theorists offer arguments that might otherwise seem rather strange. Sartori's argument that in so far as democracy is attained the democratic "deontology" should be revised downward or "minimised" has already been mentioned, as have the arguments of the theorists of stable democracy that what is wrong with the model of the ideal citizen in the 'classical' theory is that it demands certain qualities in too high or extreme a form. This counsel of caution so far as values are

concerned is also urged by Mayo. He argues that we should endeavour to see that our interpretation of values like 'justice' is "only a little better than actual practice" because if we have too "high" an ideal then values like justice could prove "more than frustrating, they may be dangerously disruptive" (1960, p. 230). It is certainly the case that if an individual or group are denied justice, justice that is as they see it, which may to others seem an unrealistic or too high a notion of what 'justice' is, then they may take action which could prove disruptive to the status quo. But it might be that their claim to justice is not unrealistic or unacceptable and that some disruption is to be preferred to the status quo. One could only rule this latter possibility out of court and suggest that in all cases we should rank the existing, stable position highest in our scale of value preferences, or must always 'tone down' our ideal of justice so as not to upset the stable status quo, if one held, and could back this up with (empirical) arguments, that the existing system did really represent the most that we

could achieve as far as justice is concerned.⁹

It is, of course, precisely this (implicit) assumption that underlies these arguments of recent theorists of democracy and which accounts for a significant feature of the contemporary theory of democracy, despite the claim that 'stability' is one of the 'givens', the conditions for which have to be 'described', and that is an overriding value commitment to the preservation of the stability of the existing status quo. Or, rather more accurately, it is not so much that stability as such is a value, for the term "stability" itself is far from unambiguous. It can, in what might be called its technical sense, refer to the constancy of a state of affairs over time - any state of affairs.

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9. Sartori also offers another, somewhat perverse, assertion, namely that "ideals are predestined not to succeed" (p. 64). If this is so, then it would seem irrational ever to look beyond the existing state of affairs with a view to improving it; probably all we should do is upset the existing stability and achieve nothing - or make matters worse as Sartori fears. But can we take this assertion seriously? It is true that attempts to realise political values may have unforeseen and unintended consequences, but that is true of any action even one taken to maintain the status quo. All we can do is act carefully on the basis of existing information. The element of truth in Sartori's assertion is that experience gained in the realisation attempt may lead us to amend our original conception of the ideal or we may find we have to compromise between two values; but this is not to say that ideals are never "successful". For example, if we can take it that a widely shared political ideal pre-1948 was that each individual should obtain free medical treatment when required then this ideal was realised with the setting up of the N.H.S. Indeed, far from revising ideals downward, historical experience would seem to suggest that, if anything, the nearer we come to success, the more likely we are to revise the ideal 'upward'; consider the ideal of 'health', and standards of treatment for the ordinary man.

But as used by recent theorists of democracy, the "stable" state of affairs referred to is a political system that is regarded as exemplifying what an ideal democratic political system should be,¹⁰ an evaluative element has already been built into the word. Thus Eckstein, as cited earlier, says that to say that political system is "stable" implies that it has a capacity for "adapting to changing conditions, for realising political aspirations and holding fast allegiances".

The investigation, in the last chapter, of the 'description' of a stable democratic political system contained in the contemporary theory of democracy goes a long way to elucidate what the values are to which a reference is built in the term "stability". However, what I am concerned with in this study is not to discuss all of the values that might be part of, or associated with, a theory of democracy. A great variety of values have been claimed as specifically democratic values, or those that are best realised in a democratic polity, for instance, the peaceful change of rulers is probably one of the most often cited.¹¹ It would obviously be a large task to investigate all

10. See also Easton (1968, pp 132-3) and Easton and Dennis (1969, p. 25 ff).

11. See eg. Mayo's discussion of democratic values which includes a discussion of the suggestion that a democratic polity best promotes the advancement of science; clearly one could range very widely.

the likely candidates for inclusion, and it would be a task that contributed little to the specific problem in the theory of democracy being considered in this study, the place of participation. The values to be considered here are those whose interpretation is logically related to the interpretation of, and role of participation in democratic theory. That is to say, the values that are intrinsic to the charge that the 'classical' theory of democracy is unrealistic and the counter-charge that the contemporary theory of democracy has changed the normative significance of democracy.

As Mayo (1960, p. 213) has noted the values in the (contemporary) theory of democracy are those "which follow logically or emerge from the actual working of a democratic system"; in this case the existing system. It has already been shown that there is a consensus of opinion among recent theorists of democracy that a democratic system is one that can be 'described' in terms of the 'control' of leaders by ordinary citizens (the existence of 'popular sovereignty'), and the existence of 'political equality' and 'political freedom', but, as we have seen, the interpretation of these terms necessarily involves the theorist in appraisal as well as description. (Mayo does in fact include political freedom in his discussion of the values of democracy). It also needs to be emphasised that the contemporary theory of democracy involves the claim that there are no other realistic interpretations

of these values than its own. Little more needs to be said about the interpretation of 'political equality' and 'control' in the contemporary theory; it has been made clear enough that both are defined in terms of the exercise of the vote, under universal suffrage, in free elections for competing potential decision makers.

Earlier it was shown that 'political freedom' in the contemporary theory meant the existence of civil liberties and Sartori (1962) has some remarks about the relationship between political freedom and participation which it is worth noting. He emphasises that political freedom is not "of the psychological, intellectual, moral, social, economic, or legal type" (p. 279). Our political rights (freedoms) are "civil liberties which have been extended and protected" (p. 316) and political freedom is liberal freedom that is institutionalised in law as "freedom from, the juridical garb of a liberty conceived of as absence of restraint" (p. 313, Sartori's emphasis). Political freedom is "a defensive or protective freedom" (p. 283); it is not the same as freedom as autonomy, the freedom that is held to result from the "effective, continuous participation of the citizens in the self-government of a small community" (p. 305). "Participation in the exercise of power does not necessarily imply individual liberty" (p. 257) and it is the latter that is the concern of democracy. Although political freedom is a preliminary for the other kinds it is, like them, concerned only with a specific

problem and we should not try to present political freedom as "a complete liberty" by stressing participation; "we must remember that participation is made possible by a state of independence" and the latter is provided for by political freedom (pp 286-7).

The notion of political participation in the contemporary theory of democracy provides the key to these value interpretations. Once participation for the ordinary man is taken properly to refer to voting in periodic elections and it is not realistically required that everyone vote in order for the "institutional arrangements" of democracy to operate then the above interpretations of 'political equality', 'popular sovereignty' and 'political freedom' logically follow. It is the fact that what is presented as a 'description' of the attitudes and activity of the ordinary citizen involves as well a (favourable) appraisal that provides the evaluative perspective required to make intelligible why these particular interpretations, and not others, were chosen.

Bachrach (1967, pp 94-95), one of the critics of the contemporary theory of democracy, has argued that justifications of the contemporary theory are rarely couched in terms of what might be called the operational values even though 'democracy' itself is defined in operational terms. Rather it is justified in terms of a particular end achieved; "it is invariably defended today on the basis of its service to the interests of the people".

Dahl is the most explicit of the theorists considered on this point arguing that all groups can get what they want at least sometimes and that the democratic system is one where "all the active and legitimate groups ... can make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the process of decision" (1956, p. 137). But this justification is implicit in the work of all the theorists discussed, flowing from their characterisation of the democratic method; it is, as it were, a kind of taken-for-granted conclusion to the whole contemporary theory of democracy, the result of the operation of the electoral process.¹² This justification however is one that could be advanced for any political method. What is of interest is not so much that it is offered, implicitly or explicitly, by recent theorists of democracy, but how the people's 'interests' are seen so that it is the democratic method that best serves them. This will be considered shortly. There is also a further evaluative implication in this claim; if indeed the existing democratic system does serve the interest of all its members then one could reasonably draw the conclusion that it is a just system.

Although they talk of political equality and political freedom recent theorists of democracy tend to avoid the word

12. Thus Mayo does not specifically include this point in the section of his book devoted to the justification of the democratic method; but it is the only conclusion that one can draw.

'justice'. Possibly this is because it might be more difficult to (attempt to) strip justice of its evaluative implications and present it, along with political equality and political freedom, in a purely 'descriptive' guise; at least to talk of 'justice' would seem to bring the implicit evaluative framework of the theory nearer to the surface. In any event, Mayo, who regards democratic theory as normative as well as descriptive, devotes a short discussion to justice as one of the values of the democratic method (part of which has already been mentioned above). Mayo states that an implication of democracy, one that is "virtually irresistible", is that it produces government for the people (p. 216). The justice of the system rests on the fact of possibilities of redress for all citizens because of the existence of civil liberties, the opportunity to repeal legislation and because all interests are represented; "injured interests, being vocal ... are seldom likely to be ignored when policy decisions are being made" (pp 228-9). In his discussion of 'equality', Sartori notes that corresponding to political equality is the criteria of justice "to everyone the same legal and political rights, that is, the power to resist political power" (p. 338). An important aspect of this conception of justice, which arises from a set of institutional or procedural arrangements working to the advantage of all citizens, is that although it entails that each individual's (or group's) interests are secured (and

that each individual has the opportunity to make the most of his 'life chances') it does not imply that the outcome is to the equal advantage of each citizen.¹³

Another feature of this interpretation of 'justice' is that it is concerned with the interests of the citizen qua private individual; it is the effect of decisions made by elected leaders upon the everyday private life of the individual that is crucial to the question of justice. This brings us back to the point raised earlier; how are the interests of the citizen seen by recent theorists so that it is the democratic method that best serves them? Fortunately, these theorists have given us a very clear statement of the (ideal) model of the 'democratic citizen', and, here again, it is the mode of participation of this citizen that provides the key to the interpretation of his 'interests'.

13. cf. Gallie's (1956) description of "liberal' justice; "to each on his merits". If Berlin's notion of "negative freedom" provides a clear statement of the interpretation of political freedom in the contemporary theory of democracy, Rawls's series of articles on "justice as fairness" provide an interesting statement of the interpretation of 'justice' (see especially Rawls, 1967). Rawls argues that for a just system equality of liberty and equality of opportunity are necessary and that these can be secured through the institutional arrangements of a constitutional democracy (though in fairness to Rawls it should be noted that his system of institutions are not precisely analagous to existing ones). These give rise to a situation of "pure procedural justice" and 'automatically' give rise for example, to a just distribution of wealth. "If the correct initial choices of institutions are made, the matter of distributive justice may be left to take care of itself" (pp 78-9).

Clearly, these interests are such that voting, i.e. judging ex post facto the decisions of others, is sufficient to safeguard them. As just shown, a fundamental assumption in the contemporary theory of democracy is that the sanction exercised by citizens at elections is sufficient to ensure that leaders decisions are in the citizens interests; "elections are a crucial device for controlling leaders" (Dahl, 1956, p. 131). The participation of the ordinary citizen thus functions as a protective device against arbitrary government - and nothing more. Schumpeter's economic analogy is very apt for, in the contemporary theory of democracy, the citizen is a consumer of the decisions of others; occasional participation is the 'cost' that he has to pay to ensure that his interests are protected and served, interests that are centred in his private life. As theorists of stable democracy have stressed the democratic character required of the citizen in the contemporary theory is one where 'participant attitudes' are only a minor part of the whole. For the most part the attitudes required are those of a politically passive private individual; the model citizen in a stable democracy is relatively politically uninvolved, letting leaders, in the political division of labour, get on with the decision making while he gets on with his private life, the sphere in which his satisfactions are found. Dahl, in Who Governs (pp 224-5) gives a very graphic outline of this model democratic citizen, the apolitical (private)

citizen of the contemporary theory whom Dahl calls homo civicus. (In distinction from the member of the active, elite minority, homo politicus). So far as the ordinary citizen is concerned according to Dahl,

"the chances are very great that political activity will always seem rather remote from the main focus of his life ... as a strategy to achieve his gratifications indirectly, political action will seem considerably less efficient than working at his job, earning more money, taking out an insurance ... or coping with an uncertain future in manifold other ways... Homo civicus is not, by nature, a political animal".¹⁴

There is one other aspect of the contemporary of democracy theory that needs to be considered. Part of its evaluative framework consists in a particular view of what 'the political' itself comprises. When Dahl says that homo civicus is not by nature a political animal he means that the ordinary citizen feels no need, has no need, actively and fully to participate in the electoral decision making process that forms the national "institutional arrangements" i.e. the political aspect - of a democratic system;

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14. Mayo (1960, pp 262-8) argues that "any political system does entail or involve at least a partial view of human nature" and goes on to discuss the character presupposed by the democratic method (one that the method "tends to promote"). In view of Mayo's theory of democracy the list of characteristics he presents is rather odd: it bears more resemblance to the model of the citizen in the 'classical' theory, at least as that model is presented by recent theorists, than it does to the model logically implied by his own theory, one that is, as we have seen, also offered by his fellow democratic theorists. Although Mayo says that "we are often told" about this democratic character, he is not very specific about who has told us. Characteristics of the democratic citizen he lists include, "a desire to be self-governing", "an inquiring, independent, rational attitude", sympathy "for the claims of others", and no inclination to "extreme optimism or pessimism".

the role of the ordinary man is a necessary but very minor part of the 'political' process. This view of what the political is, one very close to that of the ordinary man in western political systems, means that in the contemporary theory of democracy the political system is seen as autonomous in the sense that it operates relatively independently of the ordinary citizen in his everyday social environment. This is not to say, of course, that there is no connection between the two. As shown, recent theorists have argued that for a stable democratic system a certain political culture is required and that the crucial variable in the development of this culture is the authority structure of non-political organisations and institutions, but these are part of the context in which the political sphere is set, they are not an integral part of it. This conception of 'the political' and its relative autonomy from the rest of society in the contemporary theory adds a further dimension to the earlier discussion of the interpretation of key value terms in the theory. Theorists such as Mayo and Sartori emphasise that what they are concerned with is democracy as a political system, and political equality, freedom and so on. These notions are seen as referring to, and involved in, the national institutional arrangements of the democratic system. Just as these institutional arrangements are defined in operational or procedural terms, so too these

values are interpreted in procedural or formal terms. Further, political control, political freedom and political equality are regarded as independent of, though perhaps related to, other types of equality etc. Sartori, for example distinguishes sharply between political (or "juridico-political") equality and social and economic equality, and he asks, "why is it that equalities are usually arranged in an order which goes from juridico-political equality to the economic equalities?" His answer is that it reflects not objective importance but desire, "man reaches out towards what he does not have, and is soon tired of what he already possesses" (pp 341-2), which is, presumably, political equality, i.e. universal suffrage.

The empirical and value aspects of the contemporary theory of democracy have now both been examined. The next step that must be taken if the validity of recent criticisms of the 'classical' theory of democracy are to be assessed is to turn to the 'classical' theory itself and subject it to the same kind of analysis as the contemporary theory.

iv. The 'classical' myth.

The major reason why criticisms of the contemporary theory of democracy have not been more compelling is that almost all the critics, like the majority of the theorists they are criticising, have taken for granted that the notion of a 'classical' theory of democracy is an unproblematical one. They also, have accepted Schumpeter's formulation of the problem of the gap

between political facts and the earlier theory and, even more importantly, the critics of the contemporary theory tend to accept the characterisation of the 'classical' theory of the writers whom they are criticising. That is, they tend to present a very general, schematic outline of the theory, either without specifying the sources from which it is drawn, or referring the reader to a very diverse list of writers.¹⁵ Both defenders and critics of the 'classical' theory of democracy agree that the maximum participation of all the people is central to it, and that the model of the democratic citizen it contains is that of "rational and active and informed democratic man" (Davis, 1964, p. 39), but what no one has done is to pause to inquire whether the idea of one 'classical' theory of democracy is itself a valid one. What neither its critics or defenders have realised is that this notion of a 'classical' theory is a myth, and they have not done so because neither side in the controversy has done the obvious, and the necessary, and looked to see what the earlier

15. Duncan and Lukes (1963) are an exception; they do take J.S. Mill as their example of a 'classical' theorist. Walker (1966), after objecting that it is usually unclear which theorists are being referred to, goes on to present a brief account of the 'classical' theory drawn largely from Davis' (1964) article in which the latter, although listing a diverse group of writers, does not indicate in the text from which of these he draws his material. Bachrach (1967) also refers merely to "classical theorists".

writers on democracy did in fact have to say. Thus the myth continues and the nature of the theories of earlier writers on democratic theory are persistently misrepresented. Not until the myth has been exposed and the work of the so-called classical theorists discussed in detail can we know whether recent theorists have in fact changed the normative significance of democracy or whether the charge of lack of realism against the earlier writers is justified.

The first thing that has to be done is to decide who these elusive classical theorists are. Obviously, there is a wide range of names from which one could choose, but equally obviously, there is a place from which to start in making the choice - Schumpeter's account of the "classical doctrine" of democracy. He defined the classical democratic method as,

"that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realises the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will" (p. 250).

Schumpeter refers to this classical democratic method as "eighteenth century" and says that it developed from a small scale prototype; he also calls it "utilitarian" (pp 248 and 267). So, taking these remarks as a guide we arrive at the names of Rousseau, the two Mills and Bentham, all of whom have good claim to the title of 'classical' theorist of democracy. But if the identification of the theory of any one of these with Schumpeter's

definition looks dubious, to suggest that the theories of all of them (and perhaps other writers as well) all underly the 'classical' theory as characterised by recent writers is an even more curious suggestion.

Schumpeter argues that for this classical democratic political method to work,

"everyone would have to know definitely what he wants to stand for ... a clear and prompt conclusion as to particular issues would have to be derived according to the rules of logical inference ... all this the model citizen would have to perform for himself and independently of pressure groups and propaganda" (pp 253-4).

Schumpeter makes two major criticisms of this political method which are of particular relevance, both of which we have already seen echoed by his successors who were discussed in the last chapter. First, he says that it is quite unrealistic and demands a level of rationality from the ordinary man that is just not possible. For the ordinary citizen, only things of which he has everyday experience are fully "real" to him, and politics does not usually fall into this category. On the whole, when the ordinary citizen has to deal with political affairs "the sense of reality is ... completely lost" and he drops to "a lower level of mental performance as soon as he enters the political field". Second, Schumpeter argues that the classical doctrine virtually ignores the question of leadership, (pp 258-61 and 270). If Schumpeter's characterisation of the 'classical' theory and what it

requires of the ordinary citizen were accurate then, no doubt, there would be a good deal of validity in his criticisms, but Schumpeter not only misrepresents what the 'classical' theorists had to say but he has not realised that two very different theories of democracy are to be found in their writings. To support this contention the work of the four 'classical' theorists chosen must be examined. At this point only the theories of Bentham and James Mill will be briefly discussed. The theories of Rousseau and J. S. Mill will be dealt with at length in chapter three.

Bentham and James Mill provide examples of writers from whose theories one could extract something which bears a family resemblance to Schumpeter's definition of the 'classical' doctrine of democracy. Bentham, in his later writings where he advocated universal suffrage, the secret ballot and annual parliaments, expected the electorate to exercise a fair degree of control over their representatives. He wished the latter to be called "deputies"; by that word, he said, a "plain matter of fact is indicated and that the appropriate one". He thought that the "locative" and "dislocative" functions were the most important that the electorate performed and this does imply that, on most issues, the electorate have an opinion on which policies are in their interest and hence an opinion on which policies their deputy should vote for.

Bentham argued that because the citizen's interest is in security against bad government so he will act accordingly, and

"for the gratification of any sinister desire at the expense of the universal interest he cannot hope to find co-operation and support from any considerable number of his fellow citizens".¹⁶

James Mill said that the people's sympathies were with one another, "not with those exterior parties whose interests come into competition with theirs" (quoted Hamburger, 1965, p. 54).

In view of all this one could perhaps draw the inference that Bentham and Mill expected that citizens would make each of their decisions independently of propaganda and form their opinions "logically", as Schumpeter said. However, neither writer expected that the political opinions of the ordinary man would be formed in a vacuum. Indeed, Bentham laid stress on public opinion and the need for the individual to take account of it; he pointed out that one advantage of the elector in a democracy was that

"into no company can he enter without seeing those who... are ready to communicate to him whatever they know, have seen, or heard, or think. The annals of the year... the pictures of all public functionaries ... find a place on his table in company with his daily bread".¹⁷

16. Bentham, 1843, Vol. IX, Bk. 11, Chap V, §1; Vol. IX, Bk. 1, Chap. XV, §1V.

17. Bentham 1843, Vol. IX, Bk. 1, Chap. XV, §5. For the importance of public opinion in Bentham's theory see Wolin, 1961, p. 346.

James Mill stressed the importance of educating the electorate into socially responsible voting and he thought that the main aspect of this education lay in the fact that the working classes did take the "wise and virtuous" middle classes as their reference group when forming their opinions. So neither Bentham or Mill shared quite the view of the electorate, even once it had been 'educated', imputed to them by Schumpeter.¹⁸ Nor was their main concern with the formulation of the electorate's opinions as such, rather it was with the choice of good leaders, representatives. Bentham expected that those citizens least qualified to judge a prospective representative's moral and intellectual qualities would ask the advice of the competent and that the representative himself would, on occasion, influence his constituents by his speeches. The fact that Bentham and Mill expected each citizen to be interested in politics because it was in his best interest to be so (and thought that he could be educated to see this) is not incompatible with some kind of 'influence' being brought to bear, nor does it imply, as Schumpeter suggested, that each citizen makes a discreet decision on each item of policy, logically based on all the evidence, in complete isolation from all his other decisions and from the opinions of others.

18. Wolin, 1961, p. 332, emphasises the role of the passions as well as reason in utilitarian theories.

Despite these differences there is a similarity between the utilitarian theories of Bentham and Mill and Schumpeter's model of the "classical doctrine" of democracy; but there is also a similarity with his revised, realistic version of the democratic method, and for a very significant reason. Bentham and Mill, like Schumpeter, are concerned almost entirely with the national "institutional arrangements" of the political system. In their theories, like recent theories of democracy, the participation (voting and discussion) of the people plays a narrow role; it ensures that good government is achieved through the sanction of loss of office of representatives, and "good government" for Mill and Bentham was government in the universal interest. For these two theorists the universal interest was merely the sum of the individual private interests of the members of the polity and participation thus has a purely protective function in the theories, the protection of individual (private) interests. Bentham's and Mill's theories are 'democratic' theories because they thought that the "numerous classes", the people, were the only body capable of defending the universal interest against the possibility of the government (leaders) pursuing their own "sinister" interests, they thus advocated the political participation of all the people (universal suffrage).¹⁹ However, other political theorists have

19. Hamburger (1962) argues convincingly that James Mill was not in favour of the restriction of the franchise to the middle classes as is often claimed.

held that participation is necessary because of its protective function without regarding it as necessary that all the people should, therefore, participate. There is nothing specifically democratic about this particular view of participation. It plays a similar role in Locke's theory for example, who was far from being a democrat (even though he has been claimed as one of the ubiquitous 'classical democrats' by Milbrath)²⁰.

It is just this notion of participation as solely a protective device that, as has been shown, forms part of the contemporary theory of democracy, together with the focus on the national electoral process, the choice between competing leaders or representatives. In other words, the recent theorists of democracy discussed in the last chapter, like their forerunners Bentham, James Mill and Schumpeter, who all hold the same view of participation, are primarily theorists of representative government - and government can, of course, be representative without being democratic. It is interesting that Sartori is well aware of which tradition of political theorising his theory, the contemporary theory of democracy, falls into; he lays great stress on the fact that his theory of democracy is, above all,

20. Milbrath (1965, p. 143), from the description he gives of Locke's political theory he seems to have confused him with Rousseau! Hegel, too, gives participation a philosophical justification in his theory of the state, and Burke allows that it is necessary for good government, but neither of these writers includes all the people in the electorate.

a liberal theory, i.e. it descends from liberal theorists like Bentham, Mill and Locke. To add force to this argument about the character and antecedents of the contemporary theory of democracy there is a significant remark of Berlin's; in his account of the concept of "negative freedom", which is essentially the interpretation of 'political freedom' in the contemporary theory, Berlin says that it is "not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or self-government".²¹ The theory of representative government and liberalism have contributed a very great deal to democratic theory, and practice; I have no intention of trying to maintain the absurd position that they have not. The crucial point however, a point that most of the recent work on democratic theory has overlooked, is that the theory of representative government is not the whole of democratic theory. The very importance of Schumpeter's influence is that it has obscured the fact that not all the writers who have good claim to be called 'classical' theorists of democracy shared the same view. The difference between the two schools of 'classical' theorists of democracy lies precisely in the conception of, and role of, participation in their theories. In the theories of Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, for example, participation is not

21. Berlin, 1969, pp 129-30, Cf. MacPherson's (1966) distinction between "liberal democracy" and other conceptions of democracy.

merely protective or defensive, it has a far wider function and significance for the establishment and maintenance of a (stable) democratic polity. I shall refer to theorists offering this conception of participation as theorists of participatory democracy.

The critics of the contemporary theory of democracy by clinging to the myth that there was one 'classical' theory of democracy have prevented themselves from explaining exactly what the role of participation was in the earlier theories of democracy and why some of the earlier theorists placed such a high value upon it. One of these critics, Davis (1964, pp 40-41), has said that 'classical' theory, i.e. the theory of participatory democracy, has an ambitious purpose, "the education of an entire people to the point where their intellectual, emotional, and moral capacities have reached their full potential and they are joined, freely and actively in a genuine community", and that the strategy in the theory for reaching this end is through the use of "political activity and government for the purpose of public education". He goes on to say that the "unfinished business" of democratic theory is "the elaboration of plans of action and specific prescriptions which offer hope of progress towards a genuinely democratic polity". But it is precisely this last that can be found in the work of the theorists of participatory democracy; a set of specific prescriptions and

plans of action necessary for the attainment of democracy.

This does involve "political education" but, as will be shown later, this depends on participation in many spheres of society, on "political activity" in a wide sense of that term.

Until the theory of participatory democracy has been examined in detail, in both its empirical and evaluative aspects, and when that has been done, the possibilities of its realisation assessed, we do not know how much "unfinished business", or of what sort, remains for democratic theory. It has all too readily been assumed by recent theorists that we do know what needs to be done without a re-examination of what earlier theorists had to say. In the next chapter I shall discuss the work of three theorists of participatory democracy which will enable the basis for a theory of participatory democracy of possible potential application to modern Western societies to be constructed. The first theorists are Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, two examples of 'classical' theorists of democracy, whose theories provide the basic postulates for a theory of participatory democracy. The third is G.D.H. Cole, a twentieth century theorist, in whose early writings can be found a detailed plan for a participatory democracy in the form of Guild Socialism. Cole's work is important because he built on Rousseau's insights to develop a theory of participatory democracy that was set in the context of a modern, large-scale, industrialised society.

CHAPTER THREE

THREE PARTICIPATORY THEORIES

1. The participatory theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Rousseau might be called the theorist par excellence of participation, and an understanding of the nature of the political system described in The Social Contract is vital for any theory of participatory democracy. Rousseau's political theory centres on the individual participation of each citizen in political decision making and participation, for Rousseau, is very much more than a protective adjunct to a certain set of institutional arrangements; it also has a psychological effect on the participants, ensuring that there is a continuing inter-relationship between the form of and working of the political institutions and the attitudes and qualities of individuals interacting within them. It is their recognition of this aspect of participation and its place at the heart of their theories that marks the distinctive contribution of the theorists of participatory democracy to democratic theory as a whole. Although Rousseau was writing before the modern institutions of democracy were developed and the ideal polity of The Social Contract is a non-industrial city-state, his theory provides the basic hypotheses for a modern theory of participatory democracy.¹

1. The political system described in The Social Contract was not, according to Rousseau's usage of the term, a democracy. By that term he meant a system where all citizens executed as well as made the laws, so it was fit only for gods. (Bk.111;4). It should also be noted that Rousseau did not advocate a representative legislative body, so his theory does not conform to Schumpeter's definition of the "classical doctrine".

Rousseau's political theory has been subject to widely differing interpretations, not least so far as participation is concerned, yet Rousseau himself is far clearer on that topic than many of his commentators have suggested. The best point at which to start an investigation of the role of participation in Rousseau's theory is with the conditions that he specifies if a participatory system is to work successfully. As is well known Rousseau's ideal was a society of small, independent peasant proprietors, but his reasons for advocating this ideal and the relationship between this form of social and economic organisation and the participatory nature of the political system of The Social Contract are less often discussed.

Rousseau's task, as he saw it, "was to show men models of what they could be, if only they were to abandon their chains" (Shklar, 1969, p. 3). But if men are to do the latter then they have to know something about the conditions that lead to their putting chains on, and it is this that Rousseau discusses in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality. In that work he gives an account, sets out a series of hypotheses, to explain how men might have arrived in their present (enchained) state of society. In that account (1913, pp 198-9) he notes that one epoch was "the happiest and most stable ... altogether the very best man could experience", and the nature of this epoch is of the utmost significance for his later political theory. The system of

The Social Contract is ideal because it reproduces in the only way open to man as he now is - man who can never return 'to nature' - this earlier, happier epoch. In that time men could "enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse" (my emphasis) and this continued

"so long as they undertook only what a single person could accomplish ... But from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared" (1913, p. 199).

There were thus two essentials for this ideal social state, this interlude - for it was no more-in men's development before the establishment of civil society; equality and independence. And both, as will be shown below, are vital for the participatory system in the Social Contract.²

Rousseau postulates that "the fatal accident" which cast men forever from this situation was that they learnt to work metals and cultivate the earth. "The cultivation of the earth necessarily brought about its distribution" and since men are unequal in their talents some soon amassed more property than others. As their property grew so did men's wants and their dependence upon, and interest in each other. Disputes arose and in order to find security men, especially the rich who have

2. The importance of the independence of individuals in this early social state and its relation to Rousseau's later theory was first suggested to me when I read an unduly neglected essay on Rousseau's political theory by the sociologist Emile Durkheim (1965).

feelings "in every part of their possessions", rapidly concluded that political institutions were required, "rules of justice and peace"; and so, "all ran headlong to their chains ... for they had just wit enough to perceive the advantages of political institutions, without experience enough to enable them to foresee the dangers" (1913, pp 201-7). All that they succeeded in doing, because they started from a situation of dependence and inequality, was to enter into a compact that "bound new fetters on the poor, and gave new powers to the rich".

As Rousseau himself points out, in The Social Contract he is "taking men as they are and laws as they might be" (1968, p.49). That is to say, Rousseau knew perfectly well that once man had become the social and political creature that he now is he could never return 'to nature'. What he could do is to move forward, move forward to gain the immense benefits that political society potentially held in store, benefits that Rousseau emphasised (see e.g. 1968, p. 65), but that could only be seized if men created a political society analagous to the pre-political 'golden age'. They had to cast off their chains, the chains of existing institutions, and recreate a situation of equality and independence. The first essential, then, is economic independence and this requires that each citizen should have some property, the "most sacred of all the rights of citizenship " (1913a, p.254). Economic equality (peasant proprietors) is thus a necessary

condition for the political system of The Social Contract. Not absolute equality; what is required is a situation where "no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as to be forced to sell himself" (Bk. 11; 2, p. 96). This economic equality is not by itself sufficient to ensure that men remain equal and independent, "precisely because the force of circumstance tends always to destroy equality, the force of legislation ought always to tend to preserve it" (Bk. 11;2, p. 97). The question then arises of how we ensure that the laws in fact do this, or rather, since in The Social Contract a "law" for Rousseau by definition preserves equality, the question is how we ensure that the polity is "law governed" in this sense. The answer that Rousseau gives is that a participatory system is required.

If the necessary economic conditions are established then individuals can assemble in the participatory sovereign (law making) body as independent equals. In civil society however, unlike the pre-political state, individuals are also interdependent, and Rousseau used this interdependence to ensure that the equality and independence of each individual was preserved. This is not as paradoxical as it sounds (nor, indeed, is much else in Rousseau's work as paradoxical as it has sometimes been made out to be). Rousseau says that "if each citizen can do nothing whatever except through cooperation with others, ... then we can say that law-making

has reached the highest point of perfection" (1968, Bk. 11; 7, p. 85), i.e. the final decision will be in conformity with the general will. This 'enforced' cooperation is the essence of the participatory situation and of the general will which it reveals, it ensures that each citizen is "excessively dependent on the republic", that is, there will be an equal dependence of each individual on all the others viewed collectively as the sovereign (Bk. 11; 12, p. 99).

The way in which the participatory decision making process works is both simple and subtle. The general will, the decision at which the citizens arrive, is, Rousseau tells us, "by its very nature" inclined "towards equality" (Bk. 11; 1, p. 69), and he makes it quite clear why this is so in his description of the general will. It is

"an institution in which each (citizen) necessarily submits himself to the same conditions which he imposes on others ... every act of sovereignty, that is, every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally" (Bk. 11; 4, p. 76),

and in a crucial passage in The Social Contract Rousseau asks,

"how should it be that the general will is always rightful and that all men constantly wish the happiness of each but for the fact that there is no one who does not take that word 'each' to pertain himself and in voting for all think of himself?" (Bk. 11; 4, p. 75).

This arises just because the citizens are all independent equals so that in the decision making assembly there is no reason why any man should vote for a policy that is not as much to his

advantage as it is to another's. Individual X will find it extremely difficult to persuade any other citizens to vote for a proposal that will give him alone some advantage, and so be to the disadvantage of the rest. In other words, given Rousseau's initial conditions, the only acceptable decision in a participatory assembly - the general will - will be one where any benefits and burdens are equally shared, that "binds or favours all the citizens equally". Thus through cooperation or interdependence the independence and equality of each citizen is maintained, the law does always preserve equality. The participatory "political method" ensures that political equality is effective in that the substantive policy result is, necessarily, a just one in Rousseau's interpretation of 'just' i.e. all individuals are affected equally so that, at the same time, individual interests and the public interest are protected and furthered. Men are thus governed by an 'impersonal' law formulated through the participatory process. The Social Contract can be read as an elaboration of the idea, an extremely important one for Rousseau (see further below), that law, not men, should rule. But perhaps an even better formulation of the role of participation is that it ensures that men are ruled by the logic of the situation that they have themselves created, thus reproducing 'artificially' the 'natural' (impersonal) situation

of independence and equality.³

Another condition that Rousseau lays down for the decision making assembly is that the members of the polity "do not have any communication among themselves" (Bk 11; 3, p.73). Saklar (1969, p.186), argues that this is because to recall to themselves the ever-present danger of a slide into inequality, men "must withdraw from their fellows and return to themselves". However, there seems no good reason why "withdrawing" should remind the citizen of the need for vigilance better than the fact of forming part of the decision making assembly itself. Barry (1964) points out that there is some experimental evidence to suggest that, in the absence of discussion, individuals would agree, at least as a 'second-best' solution, on an equal distribution of benefits. But Rousseau is not entirely consistent on this point; later he says that he intended to discuss "the right of speaking, proposing, dividing and debating" in the sovereign body in a "separate treatise" (Bk. IV; 1, p.151). Certainly, in the absence of more empirical evidence to the contrary, there seems no immediately obvious reason why, given Rousseau's conditions, even with discussion the participatory situation should not work in much

3. Rousseau's theory clearly does not require an ability to make "logical inferences" as in Schumpeter's "classical doctrine". Quite the contrary; the whole point of the participatory process is that it 'forced' each individual to apply the word 'each' to himself and to appreciate that there was only one (rightful) decision.

the same way; equal, independent individuals would still be motivated to resist potentially inequitable proposals. More important are Rousseau's reasons for being wary of discussion. He wanted to avoid giving "particular wills" any scope at all to operate; he notes that "long debates, dissensions and disturbances bespeak the ascendance of particular interests and the decline of the state" (Bk.IV; 2,151). He recognised that, inevitably, there would be "tacit associations", that is, unorganised individuals who are united by common interests, "whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent" (1913a, p.237), but he felt that without discussion there would be less chance that such tacit associations would combine into more formal groups who would then attempt to make their "particular wills" prevail in the assembly (i.e. gain an unequal advantage for themselves).⁴ If such groups cannot be avoided then Rousseau recommends that they should be as numerous and so as equal in power as possible, so that the situation of groups in decision making is analagous to that of individuals; "these are the only precautions which can ensure that the general will is always enlightened and the people protected from error" (Bk.II;3, p.74).

4. "The effective will of their members is that of their association, and this is usually injurious to society as a whole ... As individuals, members of these groups feel virtuous in their submission to collective ends, but these sacrifices of self to society are of no benefit to anyone but the members of a small body. That is how one can remain personally good and yet become a social menace" (Shklar, 1969, p. 93).

Two important points emerge from this analysis of the participatory system of The Social Contract. First, 'participation' for Rousseau means (equal) participation in the making of decisions. Second, although this participation, as in theories of those writers on democratic theory who are primarily theorists of representative government, is a means of protection for individual (private) interests (no individual can gain an advantage over others), in Rousseau's theory participation has far wider functions. Plamenatz (1963, Vol.1, p.440), has said of Rousseau that "he turns our minds ... to considering how the social order affects the structure of human personality". It is the psychological impact of social and political institutions that is Rousseau's main concern, which aspect of men's characters do particular forms of institutions develop? The ideal participatory system of The Social Contract is designed to develop responsible social and political activity by citizens through the effect on them of the participatory process. It is designed drastically to reduce the scope for amour propre to come into play and to aid ('force') men to deliberate on the basis of amour de soi and their "constant will". That is to say, the central and crucial function of participation in Rousseau's theory is educative one, using the term 'education' in its widest sense. As shown, during the participatory process the individual learns that the word 'each' must be applied to himself, he finds

that he has to take into account wider matters than his immediate private interests if he is to gain the cooperation of others. That is, as a result of participating in decision making the individual learns to be a public citizen as well as a private man. Once the participatory system is established, and this is of major importance, it becomes self-sustaining; the very qualities that are required of individual citizens if the system is to work successfully are developed through the operation of the participatory process itself. The more the citizen participates the better able he becomes to do so.⁵

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5. It is this element in Rousseau's theory that Shklar has neglected in her recent, and often illuminating, study of Rousseau, Men and Citizens. She states that (pp 182-3) "the people is, quite in keeping with Rousseau's psychology, reactive and passive in its moral life. Its activity, important though it be, is at most defensive ... the effect (is) of seeing people as subjects of a social situation that has been created for them ... At no time is there a sense of relations between people ... The only visible actors in society are the Legislator and the enemies of the people who compete for its opinions". The difference between this interpretation and my own arises because Shklar has not taken Rousseau's political, as opposed to his psychological, theory seriously enough. Both must be taken into account if what he says about participation is not to be misinterpreted. It is true that Rousseau was, personally, greatly impressed by authority figures such as the Legislator (and see Shklar on Wolmar in La Nouvelle Heloise) but so far as his political theory is concerned they must not be taken out of context. I would suggest that Rousseau's pessimism led him to underestimate the significance of the self-sustaining nature of his political system. Against Shklar I would argue that the Legislator (and public ceremonies etc.) can be seen precisely as contrivances "invented to give utopia a start" (p. 128); at most they reinforce participation, they cannot substitute for it. Shklar points out that the setting up of situations that 'force' the individual to learn for himself is the basis of the whole of Rousseau's theory of education; "the miracle of the true man of authority is that he subjugates the will of his pupils so that they may develop enough inner strength to throw off the yoke of personal servitude" (p. 129, see also Shklar, 1964). The ideal political system of The Social Contract eliminates "personal servitude".

It is just because participation has this educative effect that it enables men to reap the benefits of civil society so far, in Rousseau's view, denied to them. In civil society men's faculties are developed, their minds enlarged, sentiments ennobled and spirits elevated, and, most importantly for Rousseau, "man acquires with civil society, moral freedom, which alone makes man the master of himself" (Bk. 1;8,p.65). Of all Rousseau's political theory his interpretation of the concept of freedom has perhaps been the most criticised, and often this criticism is misleading, being based on a few short, but famous (or infamous) phrases torn from the context of Rousseau's whole theory; that a man might be "forced to be free" (Bk.1;7,p.64) and that "obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself is freedom" (Bk.1;8,p.65). The process by which individuals are 'forced' to be free is the same as that by which they are 'forcibly' educated, namely through participation in decision making. Only through the operation of the participatory process can citizens have any certainty that the laws by which they are governed are just, that is, in conformity with the general will, or affecting all citizens equally. Rousseau argues that it is only if laws are of this form that men will be unconstrained, because it is only then that men can 'conscientiously' accept the laws or "prescribe them to themselves".⁶ A second, subsidiary, function of participation

6. In the introduction to his recent translation of The Social Contract (1968,p.41), Cranston criticises Rousseau for never seeing institutions as a threat to freedom. The criticism precisely misses the point. Rousseau's argument is that existing, non-participatory socio-political institutions make freedom impossible - men are everywhere "in chains". The form of institutions described in the Social Contract is ideal because Rousseau regards it as the only one that gives any hope of establishing and maintaining freedom.

in Rousseau's theory is that it aids the acceptance of collective decisions.

This subjective element in Rousseau's interpretation of 'freedom', that governed by the general will men will feel free, has often been commented upon (though it should be added that one can accept Rousseau's insight on the relation between participation in decision making and the sense of freedom without also accepting that freedom consists in obedience). What is less often realised is that there is also an objective element in Rousseau's concept of freedom and that this is bound up with the notion of being one's own master. The individual's actual as well as his sense of freedom is secured and enhanced through the participatory process because it gives him a very real degree of control over the course of his life and the structure of his environment. Rousseau also thinks that citizens should closely control representatives where an indirect system is necessary (1953, pp 192 ff) and in any system the government (executors of the laws) should be under the close scrutiny of the people, especially in a large state;

"in proportion as the enlargement of the state means offering the holders of public authority more temptations and more opportunities to abuse their power, it follows that the more power the government needs to control the people, the more power the sovereign needs, in its turn, to control the government" (1968, Bk.111;1, p. 104; see also Bk.111;18,p.148).

In the eighth Letter from the Mountain (1965, Vol.11, p.234) Rousseau

says that freedom consists "moins à faire sa volonté qu'à n'être pas soumis à celle d'autrui; elle consiste encore à ne pas soumettre la volonté d'autrui à la notre. Quiconque est maître ne peut être libre." This notion of being one's own - but no one else's - master has, like the rest of Rousseau's concept of freedom, come in for a good deal of criticism, largely on the grounds that such a conception is potentially 'totalitarian', or at least, unlibertarian;⁷ although Cranston strikes a new note when he refers to it as the ideal of a footman - and so, presumably, not worthy of serious consideration (1968, p.42). Placed in the context of the rest of his political theory there is little 'sinister' in this idea of being one's own master and its connection with individual freedom. If no man, or group, is to rule over the rest, then all must equally be ruled by the (impersonal) law, and for this, Rousseau argues, a participatory system is necessary; this makes possible the replication of the individual independence ('mastery') and equality of the pre-political ideal state, but with the important difference that

7. See especially Berlin (1969), also Talmon (1952). This criticism depends on taking some of Rousseau's remarks out of their participatory (political) context and giving them a purely psychological interpretation, with the argument that in talking of being one's own master Rousseau is referring to mastery of one's 'lower nature' only. This is present in his theory, but to suggest that this is the whole of it is extremely misleading.

participation offers men the opportunity, as political creatures, of avoiding the slide back into the "chains" of inequality.

Finally, Rousseau suggests that participation has a third, integrative function, that it increases the feeling among citizens that they belong to their polity. It is true that Rousseau postulates as a necessary condition of his ideal political system that a wide degree of economic equality should exist, but he regards economic inequality as the fundamental division from which all other forms of inequality stem, and he argues that only a participatory system can ensure that unequal divisions between members of the polity can be prevented from opening up once more. Only participation provides the education that enables citizens to defend their independence, and maintain the cohesion of the community. A participatory system has a built-in tendency to integration rather than division because "the sovereign recognises only the whole body of the nation and makes no distinction between any of the members who compose it" (1968, Bk.11;4,p.76); under a participatory system one could never meet the man that Rousseau disapprovingly refers to in Emile who, when asked which was his country, replied "I am one of the rich" (1911, p.313).

The arguments about participation to be found in Rousseau's political theory reappear in the work of John Stuart Mill and G.D.H. Cole. They also emphasise the most important of the

hypotheses about the functions of participation revealed in this discussion of Rousseau; that participation in decision making educates the participants. Like Rousseau the basis of their theories of participatory democracy is that there is a relationship between the attitudes and qualities of individual members of the polity and the authority structures of their institutions, but in the later writers the argument is lifted out of the context of a 'city-state' of peasant proprietors into that of a modern political system.

ii Participation in the political theory of John Stuart Mill.

John Stuart Mill is an instructive figure to consider in any discussion of participation and democracy because while, on the one hand, his social and political theory has a wide, participatory basis, on the other hand he never completely rejected his early devotion to the teachings of Bentham and his father, James Mill, in whose theories, as has been shown, participation had a very narrow role. In addition other influences help lead his theory in a direction away from that implied by its participatory aspects and this is reflected in his more practical proposals for the establishment of his "ideally best polity".

Echoes of the utilitarian view of the purely protective function of participation can be found in Mill's mature political theory. For example, he says in Representative Government - which

expressed the principles "to which I have been working up during the greater part of my life" - that one of the greatest dangers of democracy lay in "the sinister interests of the holders of power: it is the danger of class legislation ... And one of the most important questions demanding consideration ... is how to provide efficacious securities against this evil".⁸ But for Mill Bentham's notion of good government dealt only with part of the problem.

Mill distinguishes two aspects to good government. First, "how far it promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of its various members", and this criterion relates to government seen as "a set of organised arrangements for public business" (1910, pp 203 and 195). Mill strongly criticised Bentham for building his political theory on the assumption that this aspect of government was the whole. He wrote in his essay on Bentham that all that the latter could do

"is but to indicate means by which in any given state of the national mind, the material interests of society can be protected; ... (his theory) can teach the means or organising and regulating the merely business part of the social arrangements ... He committed the mistake of supposing that the business part of human affairs was the whole of them" (1963, p.102, Mill's emphasis).

8. Mill (1910, Preface and p. 254). For an account of the "working up" see e.g. Burns, 1957.

In John Stuart Mill's estimation the merely "business" aspect of government is the least important; fundamental is government in its second aspect, that of "a great influence acting on the human mind". The criterion to be used to judge political institutions in this light is "the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency" (1910, p.195). In this respect Bentham's theory has nothing to say.

For Mill, political institutions are, first and foremost, educative in their impact, but the two aspect of government are related. Real success in the "business" side of government depends on success in the second aspect, namely the development of the required type of individual character, and, in the modern age, only certain kinds of institutions will be educative in this sense, but Mill argues that in general,

"the nature and degree of authority exercised over individuals, the distribution of power, and the conditions of command and obedience, are the most powerful of the influences, except their religious belief, which make them what they are, and enable them to become what they can be" (1910, p.197).

Thus Mill argues against a benevolent despotism which, he points out, could if it were all seeing, ensure that the business side of government was carried out, because as he asks,

"what sort of human beings can be formed under such a regimen? What development can either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it? ... Their moral capacities are equally stunted. Wherever the sphere of action of human beings is artificially circumscribed, their sentiments are narrowed and dwarfed" (1910, pp 203-4).

Again, he argues that a people "who expect to have everything done for them ... have their faculties only half developed; their education is defective in one of its most important branches" (1965, Bk. V;Xl,§6,p.943). Fundamental to Mill's theory then is the argument, already seen in Rousseau's theory, that responsible individual social and political action depends largely on the kinds of institutions within which the individual interacts. "It is evident", says Mill, "that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one where the whole people participate" (1910, p.217). The effect of this participation is that "education of the intelligence and of the sentiments is carried down to the very lowest ranks of the people" and Mill adds that he dwells "so emphatically" on this "because there are few who seem to attach to this effect of popular institutions all the importance to which it is entitled" (1910, p.277).⁹

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9. Like Rousseau, Mill sees the individual qualities necessary for a successful polity being as much developed by participation as existing beforehand, so that his political system also would tend to be self-sustaining. Duncan and Lukes (1963) note this characteristic but argue that this arises through the possession of legal rights. But Mill stresses that it is the exercise, not the possession that is important; without participatory institutions the possession of legal right would have little effect on character. Nor is it necessary for Mill's citizens to perform Schumpeter's logical calculations. In fact Mill remarks in Representative Government that a rational form of government would not require "exalted" principles of conduct to motivate men (p.253).

Mill sees the educative force of participation operating in much the same way as Rousseau does. Mill argues that where the individual is concerned solely with his private affairs then, as well as the capacities for responsible public action remaining undeveloped, the "self-regarding" virtues suffer too; where the individual does not participate in public affairs, then

"the man never thinks of any collective interest, of any objects to be pursued jointly with others, but only in competition with them, and in some measure at their expense ... even private morality suffers, while public is actually extinct" (1910, p.217).

The "private money-getting" occupation of most individuals uses few of their faculties and tends to

"fasten his attention and interest exclusively upon himself, and upon his family as an appendage of himself; - making him indifferent to the public ... and, in his inordinate regard for his personal comforts, selfish and cowardly" (1963, p.230; see also 1910, p.216).

This inter-relationship in Mill's theory between the individual's "self-regarding", and "other-regarding" actions and, more importantly, its connection to the socio-political institutions of society, is a feature that has tended to be overlooked, as

Halliday has noted, by recent commentators on John Stuart Mill.¹⁰ Halliday (1968, p.10) argues that Mill's criticism of Bentham can properly be reduced "to one accusation; that Bentham had not understood the inter-dependence of self-culture and social education, the close connections which exist between personal character and social and political institutions". It is precisely the appreciation of these connections that, I have argued, marks the major contribution of the theorists of participatory democracy to democratic theory. For Bentham a democratic polity could be built on the basis of the individuals self-regarding (private) interests and actions, all that is required is for the institutional arrangements to ensure that "sinister interests" are kept in check; that is, the self-regarding interests are seen as unproblematic, as given, there is no developmental aspect to the theory. But for J. S. Mill, and the other theorists who give the educational function of participation a central place in their theories, the

10. This is especially true of commentaries on On Liberty. Mill's complicated arguments in that work are often neglected in favour of emphasis on the question of legal (coercive) sanctions to control behaviour. But this ignores Mill's arguments about institutions and educating individuals for socially responsible behaviour. As Halliday (1968, p.15) notes, "the reform of social and political arrangements is central to Mill's understanding of liberty, since without it the persuasion and inducement to act responsibly will not exist" (see also p.12). In fact Mill's entire argument about the role of government is based on his belief that, apart from essential functions like taxation, it should be confined to helping citizens educate themselves by acting for themselves. See Political Economy Bk.V, Chap. XI, and the remarks in On Liberty pp 164-165.

effect of institutions on the psychology of individuals is crucial; they argue that the social and individual effects cannot be separated as theories like Bentham's demand. Mill believed that participatory institutions would transform both individuals and their society; like Rousseau, he saw the individual being 'forced' to widen his horizons and take the public interest into account. Participation is "a school of public spirit" and the citizen

"is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good ... He is made to feel one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit" (1910, p. 217).

So far Mill's theory has been shown to reinforce Rousseau's arguments about the educative function of participation. However, there is an aspect of Mill's theory which adds another dimension to this hypothesis, a dimension necessary for a theory set in a large-scale, modern society. I have already quoted from one of Mill's reviews of de Tocqueville's Democracy in America. This work had a decisive influence on Mill's political theory, in particular on his views on local political institutions; "after reading Democracy in America his political opinions ... became sure and, except with reference to means did not thereafter alter" (Fobson, 1968, p. 106, see also Mill, 1924, pp 162-4). Mill was very impressed with de Tocqueville's discussion of centralisation and the dangers inherent in the development of a 'mass society'.

In his Political Economy (Bk. V;Xl §6, p.944) Mill declares that "a democratic constitution, not supported by democratic institutions in detail, but confined to the central government, not only is not political freedom, but often creates a spirit precisely the reverse". In his review of Vol. 11 of Democracy in America Mill argues that it is no use having universal suffrage and participation in national government if citizens have not been prepared for this.

"A political act, to be done only once in a few years, and for which nothing in the daily habits of the citizen has prepared him, leaves his intellect and his moral dispositions very much as it found them" (1963, p.229).

If citizens in a large state are to be able effectively to participate in government then the necessary qualities for this participation have to be fostered and developed at local level. For Mill it is at local level that the real educative effect of participation is felt. There, not only do the issues dealt with directly affect the individual in his everyday life, but he also stands a good chance of being elected to serve on a local body and in this case he has to "act for public interests, as well as to think and speak, and the thinking cannot all be done by proxy" (1910, p.348). It is by participating at the local level that the individual 'learns democracy'.

"We do not learn how to read or write, to ride or swim, by being merely told how to do it, but by doing it, so it is only by practising popular government on a limited scale, that the people will ever learn how to exercise it on a larger" (1963, p. 186).

The notion of participation is very important for Mill's social and political thought, but it does raise a difficulty in his theory as a whole. In a large-scale society representative government will be necessary but Mill's practical proposals for this representation are at variance with the central role he gives to the educative function of participation. Indeed, so far as these practical recommendations are concerned he virtually forgets his theory of participation in favour of a system that will give the overwhelming influence to the "instructed" few.

Bentham and James Mill had thought that education, in a narrower, more 'academic' sense than I have used the term, was the major way of ensuring responsible political activity by the "numerous classes". John Stuart Mill never rejected this view of the efficacy of education, though he was concerned with "the Few" who could develop their intellect to a high degree, and were interested in doing so. He thought that a well cultivated intellect was usually accompanied by "prudence, temperance, and justice, and generally by the virtues which are of importance in our intercourse with others" (quoted Robson, 1968, p.210). The social and political institutions of the ideal polity should therefore be constructed to allow the "instructed" to exercise the major influence in society and guide the uninstructed multitude. Mill regarded democracy as inevitable in the modern

world; the problem was to obtain the right kind of democracy, one whose institutions would be compatible with the "natural state" of society. Mill introduced this distinction between the "natural" and "transitional" states of society in his essay on The Spirit of the Age, which marked his recovery from his mental crisis and contains his first revisions of the teachings of his early mentors, Bentham and James Mill.¹¹

The "natural" state of society is one where "worldly power, and moral influence, are habitually and undisputedly exercised by the fittest persons whom the existing state of society affords" (1963, p.17). His own day Mill saw as a "transitional" state; that is, an age where

"mankind have outgrown old institutions and old doctrines, and have not yet acquired new ones ... In an age of transition, the divisions among the instructed nullify their authority, and the uninstructed lose their faith in them ... the authority which sets the opinions and forms the feelings of those who are not accustomed to think for themselves, does not exist at all" (1963, pp 3, 8 and 17).

The political institutions that Mill describes in Representative Government (and also it might be added in On Liberty) are designed

11. The major influence on this essay is usually taken to be that of St. Simon and Comte, but in an interesting article Friedman (1969) suggests that it may well have been Austin's specifically utilitarian theory of authority, with which Mill was well acquainted, that made him particularly responsive to the ideas of the French theorists.

to promote the natural state. But Mill, it is important to note, did not want a situation where the multitude was deferential in the habitual, unthinking sense. Indeed, he thought that the time was past when such a thing was possible;

"the poor have come out of their leading strings ... whatever advice, exhortation, or guidance is held out to the labouring classes, must henceforth be tendered to them as equals and accepted by them with their eyes open" (1965, Bk. IV; VII, §2, p.763).

Although "the honour and glory of the average man is that he is capable of following (the) initiative" of the Few, he must be led "with his eyes open"; all the instructed can claim is "freedom to point out the way".¹²

Mill did not want the instructed elite to impose in an authoritarian way their views on the multitude, here he differed from the St. Simonians. The elite had to held accountable,¹³ but they were, nevertheless, an elite, and Mill's theory shows how misconceived is Schumpeter's claim that the "classical" theorists of democracy ignored leadership. From Mill's theory about the

12. Liberty p.124. Mill's arguments about "individuality" and "eccentricity" in Liberty are implicitly based on his notion of the natural state of society. Through their questioning and criticism (for which freedom of thought and discussion are necessary) the Few will arrive at true doctrines which the multitude can then properly accept. It is this that Mill has in mind when he says that "it is necessary ... to show, that these developed human beings are of some use to ... those who do not desire liberty ... that they may be in some intelligible manner rewarded for allowing other people to make use of it without hindrance" (1910a, p.122).

13. See Hamburger, 1965, p.86.

educative effect of participation one would expect his answer to the problem of how the instructed elite might be held accountable would be that the maximum amount of opportunity should be given to the labouring classes to participate, especially at local level, so that they would learn how to do this; it would also seem a legitimate extension of his argument that this participatory education might eventually teach the multitude to desire liberty and to be capable of doing more than taking the opinions of the instructed Few on trust. But Mill never suggests anything of the sort and he does not seem to realise that there is any ambiguity in his theory here; he does not seem to realise that the implication of his arguments on participation is that the "natural" state of society might not be natural at all, and that mankind might be "improved" still further. Certainly his proposals in Representative Government give no indication of this. There he distinguishes between "true democracy", which gives representation to minorities (and Mill favoured Hare's proportional representation scheme to achieve this), and his ideal system, which ensured, through plural voting, that the educated minority had a preponderant influence; "though everyone ought to have a voice - that everyone should have an equal voice is a totally different proposition".¹⁴

14. (1910, p.283). In his autobiography (1924, p.218) Mill admitted that the proposal for plural voting on the basis of educational attainment had found favour with no one.

Given that Mill rejects Rousseau's argument that each individual should participate equally, the question arises whether participation would have the educative effect that Mill postulates. The important point about Rousseau's paradigm of direct participation is that individuals taking part are, so to speak, psychologically 'open' to its effects. But in Mill's proposals the majority are branded by the suffrage system as political inferiors and cannot be sure that they can resist the implementation of disadvantageous policies. Another aspect of Mill's argument makes the answer to this question even more doubtful for what Mill, implicitly, seems to mean by 'participation' in much of his political theory is participation through discussion, not, as Rousseau does, participation in decision making. Mill does talk of learning by doing, but he places just as much reliance on the effect of learning through discussion, (part of his belief in the value of education in the narrower sense). The multitude can follow the guidance of the Few with certainty precisely because the latter have exhaustively discussed every question, and Mill regards discussion only as the proper job of elected representatives; they discuss, and then accept or reject legislation prepared by an expert commission (1910, p.235ff). Mill also comments that it is

"by political discussion that the manual labourer, whose employment is a routine, and whose way of life brings him in contact with no variety of impressions, circumstances, or ideas, is taught that remote causes, and events which take place far off, have a most sensible effect even on his personal interests" (1910, p.278).

All this makes it difficult to see how Mill's 'participation' is to play the part that he gives it, for his ideal political system provides the individual with a far less obviously educative environment than that of Rousseau.¹⁵

These difficulties aside, the two subsidiary hypotheses about participation drawn from Rousseau's theory can also be found in John Stuart Mill's writings. Part of his argument is just that participation (at least through discussion) aids the acceptance by the multitude of the decisions of the Few. Mill also emphasises that participation has an integrative effect; he says that it is "from political discussion, and collective political action" that the individual "becomes consciously a member of a great community" (1910, p.279). But perhaps the most interesting aspect of Mill's theory is that, in his later work, he suggests an extension to the central hypothesis about the educative effect of participation. He points to a whole new area of social life,

15. Even in local government, that as shown, Mill regards as educatively so important, he advocates plural voting and says that there is not "so decisive an objection" to making the franchise depend on a "mere money qualification" (1910, p.349).

that of industry, where this effect might come into play.

Mill came to regard industry as another area, like local government, where the individual could gain experience in the management of collective affairs. Just as Mill saw government as "an agency of national education" (1910, p.196) so he saw the various experiments and theories of socialism and co-operation of his own times in the same light; the main thing was that they should be tried. As one would expect he was suspicious of schemes that were centralist in character. As Robson (1968, p.245) points out, Mill gives his approval to "such socialist schemes as depend on voluntary organisation in small communities and which look to a national application of their principles only through the self-multiplication of the units". Mill argues that "all classes of the community" should be encouraged to manage "as many as possible of their joint concerns by voluntary co-operation" (1965, Bk.V, p.944) which, he thought, would lead to a "moral transformation" of those taking part, and a change in society. "No soil", he says, could be more conducive to educating the individual to feel "the public interest his own" than a "communist association" (1965, Bk.II; I, §3, p.205; Mill uses the word 'communist' more loosely than we do today). Through the co-operative principle we

"may see our way to change in society, which would combine the freedom and independence of the individual, with the moral, intellectual and economical advantages of aggregate production" (1965, Bk.IV; VII, § 6, p.793).

And it would also lead to

"the transformation of human life ... to a friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all; the elevation of the dignity of labour; a new sense of security and independence in the labouring class; and the conversion of each human being's daily occupation into a school of the social sympathies and the practical intelligence" (p.792).

Just as Mill regarded democracy as inevitable in the political sphere, so he regarded some form of co-operation as inevitable in the industrial sphere. Now that the labouring classes were out of their "leading strings" the employer/employee relationship would not be maintainable in the long run;

"the relation of masters and workpeople will gradually be superceded by partnership, in one of two forms: in some cases, associations of the labourers with the capitalists; in others, and perhaps finally in all, associations of labourers among themselves" (Bk.IV;VII, p.769).

Mill, in the Political Economy, comes to the conclusion that if "mankind is to continue to improve" then, in the end, one form of industrial association will predominate,

"not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief, and workpeople without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves" (Bk.IV;VII,§6,p.775).

These arguments of Mill's about co-operation in industry, and the suggestion that participation in the management of collective affairs in that sphere might, like participation in local

government, develop the qualities required in individuals for a successful democratic polity, are peripheral to the main body of his political thought. In the democratic theory of G.D.H. Cole, however, it is industry that holds the key that will unlock the door to a truly democratic polity.

iii. G.D.H. Cole: Industry and Participatory democracy.

The theory of participatory democracy presented in Cole's early writings, and it is with these that I am concerned in this study, is of particular interest because it is a theory of modern, industrialised societies. In his theory of guild socialism Cole worked out a detailed scheme of how a participatory democracy might be organised. This is of intrinsic interest, but I shall be concerned with the principles that underlay this scheme rather than the details of the plan itself. A second reason for choosing to consider Cole's work is that, at least in this early period, perhaps the major influence upon him was Rousseau.¹⁶ There were other influences also, William Morris and Marx for instance, but many of Cole's basic concepts are derived from Rousseau's work and the spirit of Rousseau pervades

16. Another illustration of the fact that recent writers on democratic theory have used the term "classical" theory without much thought as to what they actually mean by it is provided by Eckstein (1966,p.259), when he remarks that Cole is a theorist "out of sympathy with classical democratic ideas."

his whole theory. I have already argued that Rousseau's theory provides the starting point and the basic materials for any discussion of a participatory theory of democracy but discussions of his political theory often reach the conclusion that it is of little relevance today, so that an examination of Cole's theory might offer some suggestions on how it might be possible to translate Rousseau's insights on participation into the context of a modern society.

Cole's social and political theory is built on Rousseau's argument that it is will, not force, that is the basis of social and political organisation; "society is to be regarded as a complex of associations held together by the wills of their members" (Cole, 1920a, p.12). Men must co-operate in associations to satisfy their needs so, says Cole, we must begin by looking at "the motives that hold men together in association" and the "way in which men act through associations in supplement and complement to their actions as isolated or private individuals" (1920, pp6 and 11). Or rather, what Cole is concerned with is elucidating the way in which men can best co-operate together without infringing their individual freedom. Despite the fact that Cole's democratic theory is a theory of associations he did not see the whole life of the individual as encompassed in these groups. Some of its most valuable aspects found expression

outside association; the individual, for Cole, is "the pivot on which the whole system of institutions turns. For he alone has in him the various purposes of the various institutions bound together in a single personality" (1918, p.191). "I assume", Cole says, echoing Mill's criticism of Bentham, "that the object of social organisation is not merely material efficiency, but also essentially the fullest self-expression of all the members" (1920, p.208), that is, the fullest freedom of all the members for "freedom is to find perfect expression" (1918, p.196) and for this participation is essential. "Self-expression involves self-government" and to obtain the latter Cole argues that it is necessary to call forth the people's "full participation in the common direction of the affairs of the community" (1920, p.208). As well as "personal liberty which is confined to the sphere of personal relations" Cole argues that the individual should also have "social freedom" which he defines as "a right to a full share in (the) government and control" of the associations to which he belongs (1920, p.187).¹⁷ The latter presupposes that the associations control their own affairs - Cole regards the interference of the state as the main danger here - and for this

17. Following Rousseau, Cole also says that the individual is "most free where he co-operates with his equals in the making of laws", but he did not, like Rousseau, see freedom as consisting in obedience. Laws are "the scaffolding of human freedom; but they are not part of the building" (1919, pp 182 and 1918, p.197).

they need to be roughly equal in power. In The World of Labour (p.23) Cole argues that the suppression of groups in the French Revolution was an historical accident because of the privileges they then possessed, and he adds that

"in recognising that where there must be particular associations, they should be evenly matched, Rousseau admits the group-principle to be inevitable in the great State. We may then regard the new philosophy of groups as carrying on the true egalitarian principles of the French Revolution".

Cole's "new philosophy of groups" can be seen as an application of Rousseau's theory of participation to all the associations of which society is composed; his theory of democracy requires that the individual must participate in all social spheres and not just in the political sphere. However, Cole did not reach this conclusion solely by an extension of Rousseau's theory. His theory of democracy is also linked to his theory of associations through the principle of function and functional representation.¹⁸ Function, he argues, is "the underlying principle of social organisation" (1920, p.48), it is "the principle underlying the unity and coherence of associations" (1920, p.50). For Cole, democracy is "only real when it is conceived in terms of function and purpose" (1920a, p.31) and social purposes, he argues, are

18. All I shall do here is present Cole's arguments. A critical examination of his use of the concept of function would take us too far from the main themes of this study. For some criticisms see Berg (1964).

"the raw material of social functions, and social functions are social purposes selected and placed in coherent relationship" (1920, p.54); the function of an association is based on the purpose for which it was formed.

In modern societies representation is essential, indeed, every association

"which sets before itself any object that is of more than the most rudimentary simplicity finds itself compelled to assign tasks and duties, and with these powers and a share of authority, to some of its members in order that the common object may be effectively pursued" (1920, p.104).

However, Cole thinks that existing forms of representation, including that in the political sphere, are in fact misrepresentation, "the idea of democracy has become almost inextricably tangled up ... with a particular theory of representative government based on a totally false theory of representation" (1920, p.103). This arises because it is assumed that "one man can 'represent' another or a number of others", whereas "it is impossible to represent human beings as selves or centres of consciousness". But this does not rule out representation altogether because "it is quite possible to represent ... so much of human beings as they themselves put into associated effort for a specific purpose . True representation ... is always specific and functional" (1920, pp 103-6). Functional representation is also important in Cole's theory for another reason.

Another aspect of the false theory of representation under the existing political system is that it actually denies the right of the individual to participate because "having chosen his representative, the ordinary man has, according to that theory, nothing left to do except to let other people govern him" (1920, p.114). This is made worse because

"such democracy as is recognised is conceived in a narrowly 'political' sense, as applying to a quite peculiar sphere known as politics, and not in a broader and more comprehensive sense, as applying to all the acts which men do in association or conjunction" (1920a, p.14).

The democratic principle, Cole argues on the basis of both his reading of Rousseau's theory and his principle of function, must be applied

"not only or mainly to some special sphere of social action known as 'politics', but to any and every form of social action, and, in especial, to industrial and economic fully as much as to political affairs" (1920a, p.12).

The system of functional representation and organisation

"imply the constant participation of the ordinary man in the conduct of those parts of the structure of Society with which he is directly concerned, and which he has therefore the best chance of understanding ... Functional representation gives everyone the chance of being ... an active citizen" (1920, pp 114-15).

G.D.H. Cole places participation at the heart of his theory of democracy because he regarded it as operating with an educative force on individuals. "Theoretical democrats" he states in Guild Socialism Restated, (p.14),

"totally ignore the effects of undemocratic organisation and convention in non-political spheres of social action, not only upon the lives which men lead in those spheres, but also in perverting and annihilating in practice the theoretical democracy of modern politics."

For Cole, it was only if the individual could participate in all aspects of social and political life that he could 'learn democracy', develop the attitudes and qualities necessary in and for a democratic polity; "over the vast mechanism of modern politics the individual has no control, not because the state is too big, but because he is given no chance of learning the rudiments of self-government within smaller units" (1919, p.157).¹⁹ Like Mill, Cole emphasises the importance of local government in this learning process, but the special interest of his theory lies in the fact that he saw industry as the all important arena where the individual's education through participation would take place; it was largely in industry that the "annihilation in practice" of democracy took place. It was for this reason that Cole exclaimed that the answer that most people would give to the question "what is the fundamental evil in our modern society?", would be the wrong answer: "they would answer POVERTY, when they

19. Actually, Cole in this statement has rather disregarded the implications of some of his own arguments. It is partly just because the modern state is so big that it needs to be 'broken up' into smaller units; the control that any one individual can exercise over the area of the whole state is necessarily limited.

ought to answer SLAVERY" (1919, p.34). It was pointless to talk of self-government and democracy when the millions who had been given the franchise, given the formal means to self-government, had in fact been "trained to subservience" and this training had largely taken place during the course of their daily occupation. Cole argues that

"the industrial system ... is in great measure the key to the paradox of political democracy. Why are the many nominally supreme but actually powerless? Largely because the circumstances of their lives do not accustom or fit them for power or responsibility. A servile system in industry inevitably reflects itself in political servility" (1918, p.35).

It was only, in Cole's view, if the whole organisation of industry was changed, if it was organised on a democratic basis (along with all other spheres of social life) that we could talk of 'democracy' at all. "Real democracy is to be found, not in a single omni-competant representative assembly, but in a system of co-ordinated functional representative bodies" (1920, p.108), i.e. in a system of participatory bodies, and Cole's scheme of guild socialism provided just such a system. He remarks that if guild socialism was largely a theory of institutions this was not because

"it believes that the life of men is comprehended in their social machinery, but because social machinery, as it is good or bad, harmonious or discordant with human desires and instincts, is the means either of furthering, or of thwarting, the expression of human personality. If environment does not, as Robert Owen thought, make character in an absolute sense, it does direct and divert character into divergent forms of expression" (1920a, p.25).

Like Rousseau, Cole regarded a large measure of economic equality as a necessary condition for a participatory system, or 'real' democracy. The "abstract democracy of the ballot box" obscured the differences in wealth, status and power that existed; this was another factor ignored by "theoretical democrats", that "vast inequalities in wealth and status, resulting in vast inequalities of education, power and control of environment, are necessarily fatal to any real democracy, whether in politics or any other sphere" (1920a, p.14; see also 1913, p.421). Cole's guild socialist theory offers some interesting indications of how the economic equality that Rousseau found in a society of peasant proprietors might be achieved in a modern society. One of his major objections to the capitalist organisation of industry was that under it labour was just another commodity, and the "humanity" of labour was denied. Under guild socialism, Cole argues, this humanity would be fully recognised, which means "above all else, the recognition of the right ... to equality of opportunity and status" (1918, p.24). It is the latter which is the most important element in Cole's arguments about the achievement of economic equality - and, although Cole does not put it in these terms his arguments reflect those of Rousseau on the need for individual independence, it is this that equality of status

would bring.²⁰ The organisation of industry under the guild socialist system would remove the existing, basic inequality of status between 'managers', the decision makers, and the 'men', the receivers of orders; all would be equal members of a communal enterprise and all would share in decision making and control. The second aspect of equality of status in Cole's theory is that "unemployment, or rather loss of employment as it now exists, will have disappeared" (1920a, p.74), that is, inequality in security of tenure of employment would also be abolished.

Although Cole regarded "material efficiency" as only one object of social and political organisation, he thought that under a guild socialist, participatory system in industry this aspect would be superior also. Under conditions of economic equality and security the profit motive - the motive of "greed and fear" - would be replaced by the motive of free service. Cole thought that there existed large, untapped reserves of energy and initiative in the ordinary man that would be released under a participatory system. It was self-government in industry that held the key to efficiency; the workers would never be persuaded to give of their

20. Partly Cole saw the equality of status arising from the socialisation of means of production under the guild system, and thus the abolition of classes (by definition, Cole used the term in a Marxian sense). Cole also thought that there would be a move toward the equalisation of incomes, finally arriving "by the destruction of the whole idea of remuneration for work done, and the apprehension of the economic problem as that of dividing the national income, without regard to any particular work or service, among members of the community" (1920a, pp 72-3).

best under the existing system "which from any moral standpoint is utterly indefensible".²¹

Although Cole's theory of democracy hinges on the establishment of a participatory, democratic, system in industry, he is, despite Schumpeter's strictures on the 'classical' theorists of democracy on this point, very conscious of the problem of the preservation of leadership under a participatory system. Here again, he thinks that the principle of function provides an answer, together with an answer to the old problem of 'representatives' versus 'delegates'. Under the existing system the latter appear necessary because it seems the only way that control can be exercised by the electorate in a system where "as soon as the voters have exercised their votes, their existence as a group lapses until the time when a new election is required". The system of functional representation "makes it possible to abandon the theory of delegation without imperilling democratic control" because functional associations will have a continuous existence and so can continually advise, criticise, and if necessary recall the representative. They also have an additional merit in that "not only will the representative be chosen to do a job about which he knows something, but he will be chosen by

21. Cole 1919, p.181 and 1920b, p.12. Some criticisms of guild socialism from an economic point of view can be found in Glass (1966) and Pribicevic (1959).

persons who know something of it too".²²

The doctrine of guild socialism "is far wider than industry, although it springs out of industrial conditions. It amounts in the last analysis to a complete Social Theory" (1920, p.10) and it is in this wider perspective that it is of special interest in a discussion of participation and democratic theory. Nevertheless Cole's specific plan for the establishment of a guild socialist system is worth describing very briefly for it does give us one man's idea of what a participatory democracy might look like. Cole put forward several versions of his 'blueprint' for a participatory system but the most theoretically pluralist is to be found in Guild Socialism Restated on which this account is based.²³

22. Cole, 1920, pp 109-113. This, in itself, would go part of the way to meeting objections about the amount of 'rationality' that a participatory democratic political system requires of the voter. Carpenter (1966) has argued that Cole was untouched by the insights of his day into the irrational elements of human behaviour. Be that as it may, Cole, like the other theorists of participatory democracy, stressed that 'rationality', like other requirements for the democratic system, was in large part acquired through the process of participation. Cole also distinguishes between "leaders", "men whose work is mainly that of directing the work of others", who should be elected by those whom they lead; and 'technical experts' whose choice, he thinks, "does not raise the democratic issue" (see 1920a, pp 52-9).

23. An account of the development of guild socialism and a critical examination of its theory - Cole was only one of those involved - can be found in Glass (1966). Whether his plan would have turned out in practice to be as 'pluralist' as he hoped has been questioned. Cole thought that once guild socialism began to get under way the state would gradually wither away from lack of a real function, but it has been argued that his National Commune, the new "co-ordinating" body, would be in essentials the state renamed.

The guild socialist system was to be organised, vertically and horizontally, from the grass roots upward and was to be participatory at all levels and in all its aspects. The division between the vertical and horizontal structures was based on functionalist principles; the vertical structure was to be concerned with the economic functions of society and the horizontal with the political functions. The economic side was itself to be divided between the functions of production and consumption.²⁴ The associations that would usually come to mind when the term 'guild' is mentioned were actually to be the organisational units on the production side, but there were many other bodies involved as well. In the economic (vertical) sphere Cole proposed that there should be consumer co-operatives, utility councils, for the provision of gas etc., civic guilds to take care of health and education, and cultural councils to "express the civic point of view" - and any other ad hoc bodies that might prove necessary in a particular area. On the production side the workshop was to be the basic 'building block' of the guild and, similarly, the grass roots unit of each council etc. was to be small enough to allow the maximum participation by everyone.

24. It was over this last division that Cole differed both from the collectivists and the advocates of co-operation, because neither of these allowed the right of the producer to self-government, and from the syndicalists because they did not admit the special claims of the consumer.

Each guild (and other body) would elect representatives to the higher stages of the vertical structure, to local and regional guilds and councils, and, at the highest level, to the Industrial Guilds Congress (or its equivalent).

The purpose of the horizontal (political) structure was to give expression to "the communal spirit of the whole society."²⁵ Each town or country area would have its own commune where the basic unit, corresponding to the workshop, would be the ward, again small enough to allow maximum participation, and representatives would be elected from the guilds etc. and any other local bodies to the commune on a ward basis. The next horizontal layer was to be composed of regional communes, bringing together representatives of both town and country and the vertical structure and at the apex of the whole system would be found the National Commune which would, Cole thought, be a purely co-ordinating body

25. Implicit in Cole's participatory theory of democracy is the subsidiary hypothesis about the effect of participation already noted in the theories of Rousseau and J.S. Mill; that it will have an integrative effect. This underlies Cole's many references to the establishment of "community" and the importance he attaches to local political institutions where man can learn the "social spirit". In the industrial sphere it is the basis of his assumption that the new form of organisation would lead to co-operation and fellowship in a community of workers and that conflict would be abolished. This also assumes that participation would lead to the acceptance of collective decisions by all. (See Cole 1920, p.169 and 1920a, p.45).

neither functionally, historically nor structurally continuous with the existing state.

The precise merits or demerits of this particular participatory blueprint do not concern us here; as Cole himself remarked (1920c, p.7)

"the principles behind guild socialism are far more important than the actual forms of organisation which guild socialists have thought out".

It is with these principles, the principles underlying a participatory theory of democracy and their empirical relevance for the present day, that this study is concerned.

The very great difference between the theories of democracy of the writers discussed in this chapter and the theories of those writers concerned largely with (national) representative government, makes it very difficult to understand how the myth of one 'classical' theory of democracy has survived so long and been so vigorously propagated. Once the theories of Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and G.D.H. Cole are examined in detail it is clear to what a large extent they, and other writers offering similar theories of democracy, have been misrepresented - by those who would defend a theory of participatory democracy as well as by, though to a much greater degree, its more numerous critics. The theorists of participatory democracy discussed in this chapter are not merely offering "essays in prescription"; as has been shown their theories contain specific hypotheses about the

effect of participation on individuals and also, particularly in the case of Cole's theory, a "plan of action" for the attainment of a ("really") democratic polity. But perhaps the most curious misunderstanding of all (and one that defenders of the 'classical' theory have tended to take at face value) is contained in the oft-repeated criticism that, as Berelson has put it, the earlier theorists of democracy were not concerned with the political system as a whole and that they ignored "the general features necessary if the (political) institutions are to work as required". It is obvious as soon as one starts to read the theorists of participatory democracy that this is exactly what they were concerned with.

Now that the arguments of some earlier theorists of participatory democracy, including two 'classical' theorists, have been clarified it is possible to take another step towards an assessment of the claims of recent theorists of democracy. That is, to construct, on the basis of this examination of the earlier theories, the beginnings of a modern theory of participatory democracy, making explicit, as has been done for the contemporary theory of democracy, both its empirical and evaluative aspects. This will be undertaken in the following chapter. It will then be possible to turn to the empirical data relevant to the question of political participation to see whether, today, a central place for participation in a theory of democracy is, indeed, unrealistic and outmoded.

CHAPTER FOUR

A MODERN PARTICIPATORY THEORY OF DEMOCRACY

1. Some empirical hypotheses.

The acceptance of a misinformed stereotype of the nature of earlier (participatory) theories of democracy on the part of some of the most influential of recent writers on democratic theory has resulted in some striking continuities in earlier and more recent theories being completely overlooked. Continuities, it should straight away be said, not, of course, in the conclusions drawn by the theorists, but in focus of interest and in a specific empirical hypothesis. These continuities have been obscured by the widely held, but erroneous, view that the earlier democratic theorists were concerned only with the characteristics of the individual (democratic) citizen as such and not also with the relationship of these individual characteristics to the functioning of the institutions of the polity. In fact, looked at from one point of view, the theorists of participatory democracy discussed in the last chapter can be seen as direct forerunners of the recent theorists who have concentrated on building theories of the necessary conditions for stable democracy; to use the modern terminology, both the earlier theorists of participatory democracy and the recent theorists are interested in the form of political culture required for (stable) democracy and in the political socialisation process that develops and maintains this culture.

This kind of continuity in political theory is not, in itself, remarkable (unless one takes the view that earlier theorists have little or nothing to say to modern 'scientific' students of politics). What is worth noting is that both the earlier theorists of participatory democracy and the recent theorists of stable democracy point to exactly the same variable as the crucial one in the political socialisation process; namely the authority structures of non-political associations and organisations. It will be recalled that this hypothesis was the basis of the theories of both Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture and Eckstein in his Theory of Stable Democracy; "it stands to reason", says Eckstein, "that if any aspect of social life can directly affect government it is the experiences with authority that men have in other spheres of life". This can be compared to Mill's statement, also quoted earlier, that "the nature and degree of authority exercised over individuals ... (is) the most powerful of the influences ... which makes them what they are". Cole's whole theory rested on this same hypothesis, that unless individuals interact within the requisite type of authority structure, then the necessary political culture for (true) democracy will not be developed. But if the contemporary theory of democracy and a modern theory of participatory democracy can both make use of this basic hypothesis, where they cannot be reconciled is in their respective arguments about the form of authority structures necessary for a (stable) democratic polity.

The first elements of a modern theory of participatory democracy can now be put together. In one of its aspects the participatory theory of democracy can be seen as a theory of the necessary conditions for the maximum participation by all the members of the polity in the national "institutional arrangements". If this is to occur, then the necessary pattern of individual attitudes and qualities, the necessary political culture, must exist. The general hypothesis, as just stated, is that the crucial variable in the political socialisation process is the authority structures of non-political institutions and organisations. However a vitally important hypothesis specific to the participatory theory of democracy is that participation itself is educative. That is to say, the theory argues that the necessary political culture is developed through the individual's experience of participation in the non-political groupings. Of course, if individuals are to participate inside many different social spheres then the authority structures of these spheres must be such as to allow this participation to take place. This was just G.D.H. Cole's point when he argued that "democracy" should not be confined to a special sphere known as 'political' but applied to numerous other social areas. In a sense this argument of the participatory theory of democracy is obvious enough; that if the individual spends all, or a great deal, of his time in situations (authority structures)

where he has no chance to participate in the running of collective affairs and where he merely carries out the decisions of others, then, when called upon to participate in political life, he is unlikely to have developed the necessary psychological basis to enable him to feel competent to do so. In other words just as theorists accepting the contemporary theory of democracy have argued that for a political culture appropriate to that particular (stable) democratic method the authority structure of non-political spheres must be "congruent" with the authority structure of government, so the participatory theory of democracy embodies a similar hypothesis. If a participatory political culture and participatory democracy are required then authority structures in all spheres must be organised on a participatory basis.

The participatory theory of democracy, however, also includes the hypothesis that one area of social life is of particular importance for political socialisation, namely industry. This is following up Mill's suggestions about the potential educative effect of participation in industry and taking up Cole's argument that it is in industry that individuals are "trained to subservience", which training greatly influences their behaviour in the political sphere. Cole tends to assume that this is obvious to those who will but look, but, initially, one could offer the following arguments in favour of this hypothesis. That attitudes might be

developed that affect political behaviour as a result of the individuals experiences in industry is plausible because the workplace occupies an exceptionally important place in his life as a whole, occupying a great deal of his time and providing him with his income. In modern societies the role allotted to the ordinary employee (the majority) inside the authority structure of industry is that of permanent subordinate, who carries out the orders of (permanent) management. He plays no role at all in either decision making or in the choice of decision makers, he is not, that is, learning 'participant' attitudes. There is also another good reason for arguing that industry could be crucial in the political socialisation - or education - process. To argue that participation has an educative effect is suggestive but not very precise. On the basis of the discussion of the ideas of the earlier theorists of participatory democracy two aspects could be distinguished in this educative effect. First there is the psychological, aspect mentioned already (the "training for subservience" - or participation); second, there is the widening of outlook that the earlier theorists stressed so much, the development of a concern in the individual for matters outside his own, narrow private interests. Here could be added the development of specifically political (democratic) skills.¹ Both of these

1. Cf. Dawson and Prewitt (1969, p.69) and the "apprenticeship" aspect of political socialisation.

factors could certainly be thought of as 'education', and an education that could be provided particularly well through the workplace where the individual could participate in making decisions that have potential significance, in a modern economy, far beyond the individual enterprise or those immediately concerned.

But however plausible this argument may seem it is still only an argument. Empirical support has yet to be given to these hypotheses of the participatory theory of democracy; support to the suggestion that there is a link between participation in spheres like industry and the development of attitudes necessary for participation in national politics, support for the suggestion that industry occupies a crucial place in the political socialisation process. The construction of a realistic, modern participatory theory of democracy on the lines of the earlier theories also depends on the empirical feasibility of organising the authority structure of industry on participatory or democratic lines. This aspect of the theory is directly challenged by one of the advocates of the contemporary theory of democracy, Eckstein, in A Theory of Stable Democracy (p.237), where he states that "we have every reason to think that economic organisations cannot be organised in a truly democratic manner, at any rate not without consequences that no one wants". If Eckstein were right about this then the theory of participatory democracy would not be viable,

for if it is not possible to democratise industrial authority structures then it is useless in an industrial society to postulate a participatory political culture as a basis for a democratic polity. However, Eckstein does not base his argument on the empirical evidence, at least he offers none in A Theory of Stable Democracy, he merely asserts that this is the case. In fact this assertion follows from the premises of the contemporary theory of democracy which is based, as shown, on the argument that existing political attitudes and behaviour must be taken as given, i.e. the existing political culture is the most that can be achieved, hence it follows that existing authority structures of non-political spheres cannot be made any more participatory. The participatory theory, on the other hand is arguing precisely that the existing facts need not be taken as given, that far from the political apathy of the ordinary man being just the way things are, or as Sartori puts it, "nobody's fault", it can be explained in terms of the existing structure of authority, especially in industry, which, the theory suggests, could be democratised.

This explains the absence of any special concern with the stability of the system in the theory of participatory democracy. (In the earlier theories stability was taken for granted). In the contemporary theory of democracy one potential danger to stability is the attitudes of present non-participants if in future they

actively entered into political life. The argument of the participatory theory is that this inactivity itself is capable of being explained in terms of lack of opportunities to 'practice democracy' in spheres outside the national political arena. If individuals were given this opportunity then the educative effect of this participation would result in their entering political life fully equipped to do so; their attitudes, to use Almond and Verba's terminology, would then "fit" the political system. The subsidiary hypotheses about the function of participation found in the earlier theories of participatory democracy also reinforce this approach to stability; that participation has an integrative effect and aids the acceptance of collective decisions. If empirical support can be given to the hypotheses about the effects of participation on individuals then the earlier theorists would seem to be correct in their assumption that a participatory system would be a self-sustaining one and that stability would provide no special problem.

It would provide us with no special problem that is, from the perspective of the participatory theory of democracy. The development of such a participatory political culture would give no basis at all for stability in terms of the contemporary theory where it is argued that, in a democratic polity, a "balance" of individual characteristics is required. Here we come up against one of those differences in interpretation in political theory

that, it was argued in chapter two, are only explicable in terms of the value assumptions of the theories concerned. On the one hand, the contemporary theory of democracy argues that a "balanced" or "mixed" political culture is required; on the other hand the participatory theory of democracy argues that a "participatory" political culture is necessary, a culture, that is, that is seen as too "extreme" or too one-sided by the contemporary theory. So we are faced with the question of how we decide which of these is indeed the political culture required in a democratic polity. It was also argued in chapter two that questions of empirical feasibility are intimately connected to value questions, especially that of the interpretation of values. Now if in fact a participatory political culture could be developed, if the existing facts of political behaviour and political attitudes need not be taken as given, then the value interpretations of the contemporary theory of democracy, which rest on precisely the assumption that these facts must be taken as given, these interpretations are themselves open to challenge. Just as the participatory theory offers an alternative explanation of the facts of existing political attitudes and behaviour so it offers an alternative interpretation of the key value terms of the contemporary theory of democracy: it has its own evaluative framework that includes a model of the ideal democratic citizen and his attitudes, and its own interpretation of 'democracy' itself.

11. The evaluative implications of the theory.

This difference in the conception of what a democratic polity consists in accounts for the difference in characterisation of the political culture necessary to maintain it. So far the theory of participatory democracy has been considered only in one light, as a theory of the necessary conditions for maximum (electoral) participation in a 'democracy' conceived in much the same terms as in the contemporary theory, viz. a system where leaders compete for national office at periodic elections. But the participatory theory rejects this conception of 'democracy'. It argues that a 'democratic' polity is one where individuals can participate in very many different spheres, where all authority relations are democratised. Furthermore, the participatory theory involves not only an extension of the area of participation to these wider spheres but also a different notion of participation itself and, as shown for the contemporary theory, it is the notion of participation that is crucial for the value interpretations in the theory. The three earlier theorists discussed in the last chapter did not entirely agree on the content of 'participation'. Mill tends to speak in terms of taking part in political discussions and Cole of the election of leaders (representatives) in industry and other areas. Rousseau presents the most radical interpretation - the direct participation of each individual in decision making.

Prima facie, it does seem more plausible that so far as the educative effect of participation is concerned, this education would be more likely to occur, or at least would occur to maximum effect, if individuals actually took part in making decisions rather than being confined to choosing those who are to make them. Moreover, although advocates of the contemporary theory would undoubtedly seize on this aspect as another indication of the lack of realism of a participatory theory of democracy, we need not assume that Rousseau's notion of participation is unrealistic in all areas potentially open to participation until empirical evidence has shown it to be so.

The conception of a 'democratic polity' in the participatory theory, it has just been stated, is one where all authority relationships are democratised, or, to put it slightly differently, it is a polity in which all political systems are democratised. That is, another difference in interpretation in the evaluative framework of the two theories of democracy is in the nature of the 'political'. If one applies Rousseau's arguments about participation to all organisations and associations in the polity, or considers Cole's arguments that 'democracy' should not be confined to a "special" area of social life in conjunction with recent wide definitions of the 'political', it is clear that implicit in the arguments of the earlier writers is the idea that

the 'political' aspect of social life can refer to a wide range of relationships of authority, and not merely to those involved in the national, electoral arrangements; here again modern political theorists who have formulated wide definitions of 'political' have something in common with their predecessors. However, another of the curiosities of recent work in democratic theory is that the implications of the new definitions of 'political' for democratic theory do not appear to have been considered; not even when the definitions have been formulated by the very writers discussed in chapter one. Perhaps the best known of the new definitions of 'political' is that of Easton (1953, p.12) who sees politics as the "study of the authoritative allocation of values for a society". But Dahl, for example, whose theory of democracy was discussed in chapter one, says that "a political system is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule, or authority", and he notes that associations such as private clubs, religious organisations and "perhaps even families" can therefore be regarded as political systems (1963, p.6).

Most clearly with Dahl's definition the area singled out in the participatory theory as the most important for participation, namely industry, is a political system. If this is so it would then follow that participation in industry, and other areas, is political participation in its own right and not merely a non-

political basis for political participation itself. It would also follow that the 'autonomy' of the political from the citizen in his everyday environment, a feature of the contemporary theory, would be absent from a modern participatory theory of democracy. It is interesting that such a wide conception of the political has been vigorously attacked by Wolin, in his book Politics and Vision, precisely for undermining the autonomy of the political sphere, so that it is worth considering the case for a wide definition. This also has the advantage of bringing out some further points in support of the central place of industry in the participatory theory of democracy.

Wolin argues that the major characteristic of modern social and political thought is the "sublimation" of the political;

"From an examination of recent theorising, it is fairly clear that a reaction against some of the major categories of political thought has occurred ... (what is peculiar to the present is) the sublimation of the political into forms of association which earlier thought had believed to be non-political" (p.429).

He does not spell out exactly what he means by this "sublimation", but it appears to be something fairly close to what I take to be psycho-analytic connotation of the word. Just as efforts to sublimate, say, an unreturned affection for a person in hard work may lead to that feeling 're-appearing' in apparently unrelated manifestations (perhaps a 'psycho-somatic' disorder), so the disappearance of the political as an autonomous sphere in modern political theory is accompanied by its reappearance, or at least

the reapplication of the concept, to other social areas, like business organisations, previously thought of as non-political, or private. Just as in the contemporary theory of democracy homo-civicus the non-political citizen, is essentially a private person, so Wolin, too, contrasts the 'political' and the 'private' (p.353), emphasising that since ancient times the 'public' (or the "common" or "general") has been regarded as synonymous with the 'political' (p.9).²

This, however, is not the only contrast he draws: the political sphere has been "sublimated" in the 'social' rather than the 'private' sphere. Beginning with Locke, we can see in modern social and political theory the "decline of political categories and the ascendancy of social ones" (p.363). Particularly since the nineteenth century this is distinctive of all political theory, whether of writers usually thought of as radical or conservative, socialist or reactionary, whether they are theorists of modern business organisation or anarchists like Proudhon; in all these writers, according to Wolin, we see the "glorification of society" at the expense of the political realm.³ The question

2. Though Wolin also agrees with recent definitions that relationships of power and authority are also involved (pp 67 and 61).

3. It is true that all the diverse theorists that Wolin discusses (in Chap. X, "The Age of Organisation and the Sublimation of Politics",) do emphasise 'the social' and 'the community', but that is often all that they do have in common. They have very different ideas of the kind of society in which 'community' can be realised, and they use very different arguments and different interpretations of concepts in reaching their varying conclusions, so that it is misleading to treat them as Wolin does.

that one immediately wants to ask here is what exactly is to be put into these three spheres of the 'public', the 'social' and the 'private', for Wolin is not at all explicit about this.

To begin with the 'public' or 'political' area, it is clear that what Wolin actually means here is the modern (western) nation state, more specifically the centralised, governmental apparatus of that state and the role of citizen associated with it. (cf. the contemporary theory of democracy). Wolin argues that the political order has a special function, "the general responsibility for the welfare of the whole society" and that membership (citizenship) in this order raises problems of a unique nature (pp 429 and 433). What Wolin does not do is to present convincing arguments why the notion of the 'public' or the 'political' should be confined to matters that affect this specific territorial area, or why it raises problems different in kind from those raised by membership of other large scale organisations, say business organisations.⁴ This problem becomes particularly urgent when the nature of the 'social' is considered, Hannah Arendt (1959) is another theorist concerned with these

4. He remarks (p.431) that recent political theory has produced "a picture of society as a series of tight little islands ... each without any natural affiliations in a more comprehensive unity". Clearly what he has in mind here is the "comprehensive unity" provided by the political organisation of the state; but why should this be any more "natural" than e.g. the city, the province, or the whole world?

three categories and she says that the social realm "is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance" (p.43), i.e. that economic life and organisation assumes public significance.⁵ But once we look at 'the social' in this light then it is not at all clear, as Wolin claims, that for a theorist to treat a business organisation as a political system leads to "a series of dead ends" (p.432). Surely it is far more reasonable in modern societies to regard the social realm as public (political) than to regard it - as Wolin does - as private; that private sphere, the household or the family, which Arendt states, has as its function in the modern world "to shelter the intimate" (p.35).

On a wider understanding of the notion of the 'public' than Wolin's (implicit) usage the place of industry - economic organisations - is clear. According to Brian Barry, (1965, p.190), a definition of 'public' which "it is impossible to improve upon" is the following (first offered in 1832);

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5. Thus it is not surprising that Wolin dates a concern with the social in political theory from the time of Locke, for when Locke was writing economic production had clearly begun its move from the household, and by the end of the nineteenth century - when the "glorification of society" in political theory had become apparent - it had become bound up with the ('political') government of the state, (see below).

"that which has no immediate relation to any specified person or persons, but may directly concern any member or members of the community, without distinction".

So, taking this as our definition of 'public', and making use of Dahl's definition of a political system, quoted earlier, which stresses relationships of authority, we can say that a political system is

any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves a structure of power or authority and where decisions taken are public in their scope.⁶

Industry, business organisations, in modern society have clearly defined structures of authority, decision making procedures and means of enforcing those decisions, so that the first criterion of the definition is met. But nor do they fall short on the second, on Wolin's own main criterion. In large scale, modern, industrialised societies, business organisations are in fact bound into the political, state system and its administrative

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6. This definition would exclude the family, the 'private' sphere. Family decisions affect only their members, and, unlike public organisations the family is composed of members linked by ties of blood. The definition quoted by Barry is an extremely useful one but this is not to say that there is nothing more at all to be said about the notion of "public". For example, although we usually do mean "unspecified persons", we may wish to talk of a decision affecting "the public" even though we could specify those involved. If a firm decides to discharge noxious wastes into a river then those affected living along its banks may be specifiable but we might still want to say that "the public" was affected, or that the firm was creating "a public nuisance".

apparatus; they are part and parcel of Wolin's public realm. As Lipset (1960, p.357) has noted, many of the organisations that he (Lipset) calls "private governments" actually "acquire the right to act for the state in specific areas, or are assigned actual monopolies". Further, quite apart from the fact that industry forms part of the public realm in this sense, the activities of economic organisations may "directly concern any member of the community" in a very real sense. Indeed, from Dahl's characterisation of homo civicus it would appear that the ordinary citizen sees his own, and perhaps the general welfare, very much in terms of the opportunities open to him in the economic sphere.

If there are good reasons for using a wide definition of the 'political' in political theory and for including many different areas of 'social' life under this heading - industry providing a particularly clear example of a political system - then far from "sublimating" the political, modern theorists are rather recognising the structural and institutional realities of modern societies with their definitions.⁷ If this is so what of Wolin's objections

7. Any political theorist who is to say anything worthwhile must work with concepts that relate to and illuminate the reality of his own time. One might have expected that Wolin would welcome recent attempts to rethink the notion of the 'political' for he says early in his book that the concept of the 'political' is a created one, "the legacy accruing from the historical activity of political philosophers", but an activity whose basic data are furnished by the social and political forms of their own times (p.5).

that this undermines the 'autonomy' of politics? That is to say, what of Wolin's arguments that membership of the state raises problems of a quite different order from those arising from, for example, membership of an economic organisation, and his statement that "to contend that individual participation can be satisfied in a political way within the confines of non-political groups is to deprive citizenship of its meaning" and to "fragment" the political. (p.433). Dahl (1967, p.962), despite his definition of 'political', offers a similar argument; "I do not believe that democracy in the work place is a substitute for democracy in the state ... to accept (this) as a focus for self-government ... would be to trivialise the democratic idea."

The first point to be made here is that in the participatory theory of democracy the argument is not that participation in other (political) areas is a substitute for participation in national political life but that it is an integral part of it; that political participation encompasses all these different areas and is not confined to one 'special' area of national electoral arrangements. That is, there is no "fragmentation" of political life in the recognition that areas like industry form political systems; rather it involves the further development of political life, development toward (a different conception of) democracy. Far from "depriving citizenship of its meaning" the participatory theory, as will be argued below, suggests that

only by participating in all political areas will the ordinary citizen come to appreciate (learn) the full meaning of citizenship and its relationship to his control over his own (private) life and environment.⁸ The participatory theory rejects the notion that the political sphere should be 'autonomous' if what this involves is that it is seen as something apart from, and independent of men's everyday lives and in which their participation has only a minimal role to play.⁹

Second, if problems of citizenship in the state really do raise unique problems then it follows that concepts like political equality, political freedom and so forth that are bound up with the notion of citizenship, have no application outside the sphere of the state. This is, of course, just the argument of the contemporary theory of democracy, that such concepts refer only to the national "institutional arrangements" and are distinct from and relatively independent of other forms of equality etc., such as economic equality. It is significant that, if economic organisations cannot legitimately be analysed as political systems,

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8. The reason why Wolin does not consider this possible interpretation of participation in industry and elsewhere is that he - like the advocates of the contemporary theory of democracy - sees only two alternatives; the existing Western democratic system or 'totalitarianism'. See e.g. Wolin pp 252-4 and 433-4.
9. This is not to say that there are no differences between The Government and governments in other political areas. Following Weber, the distinctive mark of the Government is that it holds the exclusive authority to regulate the use of force within its area. (see Dahl, 1963, pp 12-13).

Wolin makes no suggestions as to which concepts are appropriate to such an analysis. In so far as such bodies are 'public' then questions - 'political' questions - of who shares in decision making and how they do it are crucial ones. Indeed, it may be as Partridge (1965, p. 19) has suggested, that it is rather in the context of economic and other large, complex organisations, than at the level of the state, that issues of equality and freedom do arise for the citizen in the industrialised, Western democracies. That is to say, in the latter half of the twentieth century national citizenship, with its attendant civil liberties, is taken for granted and does not enter in a concrete way into the immediate, familiar everyday life of the individual (this would certainly seem to be so in the case of homo civicus).¹⁰

The next question that poses itself is what difference all this makes to the interpretation of the key value terms discussed in chapter two. Given that there is a good case for the wide conception of the 'political', and that the question of the empirical realism of the notion of 'democracy' in the participatory

10. For some empirical evidence that the question of freedom, at least, assumes most practical importance in the workplace see Lane (1962, pp 236-7). It is true that a problem like conscription is unique to the state but this is not related to citizenship in the same way as freedom etc. The latter are part of what citizenship is about; whether or not armies are raised by conscription is itself a political decision.

theory, as a polity where individuals can participate in decision making in all political spheres, is at the least an open one, how then, does this affect the interpretation of notions like 'political equality'.¹¹

Together with its rejection of the claim that the existing facts of political life must be taken as given, with the corollary that key value terms must be interpreted in terms of the operation of the existing democratic political method, the participatory theory of democracy also rejects the arguments that universal suffrage is sufficient for political equality and that political equality does not imply equality of political control. Following

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11. Recent theorists of democracy also have a specific interpretation of the notion of 'pluralism'. A democratic polity as conceived by the participatory theory can be seen as made up of a plurality of smaller political systems and therefore can be legitimately be called 'pluralist'; but it is important to remember that the theory also requires that the authority structures of all political systems should be democratised. Presthus (1964, p.10) has remarked that "there has been a curious reluctance on the part of scholars precisely to define 'pluralism'". Dahl for instance, refers to his theory of polyarchy as "pluralist" i.e. it refers merely to the existence of competing leaders. Other theorists, e.g. Kornhauser in The Theory of Mass Society, use 'pluralist' to refer to the mere existence of intermediate associations between the individual and the state irrespective of the structure of authority of the associations. What the writers in the earlier part of the century, of whom Cole was one, who advocated 'pluralism' meant by the term was a polity composed of self-governing associations, where the power of the state was shared with, or even, as Cole, hoped in Guild Socialism Restated, appropriated by those associations so that the state 'withered away'. (On the 'pluralism' of this era see e.g. Hsiao, Political Pluralism).

from its different interpretation of 'participation' the participatory theory sees individuals as political equals in the substantive sense that each individual has equal (the same) opportunities for control over the decision making process in political areas. Thus the citizen body is undifferentiated in respect of control exercised; it is not divided into (a minority) homo politicus and homo civicus, the ordinary citizen. That individuals are political equals in all political systems means that the relationship between political and economic equality looks very different in the two theories of democracy. In the contemporary theory the latter is interpreted largely in terms of equality of wealth (cf. Sartori, p. 338 ; and it is probably this that Dahl has in mind when he refers to the lower SES groups relatively limited access to resources), and this is a widely accepted interpretation. But from the perspective of the participatory theory equality of wealth or income is of lesser importance: fundamental when industry is seen as a political system is equality of power in the economic sphere; i.e. it is a question of the structure of (decision making) authority in the enterprise.¹²

12. This is not to say that the extent of equality of distribution of income/wealth is unimportant; Rousseau and Cole both regarded it as vital. But this distribution is itself greatly influenced by the structure of authority and, second, it is an empirical question how much equality of income/wealth is required for a successful modern participatory system. What is more important from the viewpoint of the participatory theory are the differences in job security, conditions of employment etc. that mark the differences in decision making powers inside the enterprise. For details of these differences see Wedderburn (1970).

Because the key value terms are not interpreted in purely procedural terms in the participatory theory they cannot be kept 'separate' from each other as they can in the contemporary theory; (on the interpretations in that theory it would be possible to have, for example, political equality, i.e. universal suffrage, without political freedom i.e. civil liberties or vice versa). 'Political freedom' in the participatory theory refers to the equal freedom of each (politically equal) individual citizen. In both theories of democracy the existence of civil liberties can be regarded as good in itself since they are an essential basis for the exercise of any free choice by the individual, and ensure the absence of arbitrary interference (coercion). In the participatory theory however civil liberties although necessary, are not sufficient for political freedom, which refers not to the freedom of the individual qua individual, but to his freedom qua member of a collective, as citizen; (although the participatory theory sees the two as interrelated in practice). The theory argues that if each individual is to have equal freedom then, together with legal guarantees of free choice, the question of what the individual is able to choose from also has to be taken into account; the range of alternatives from which he can make his choice must be no less than those open to others. The way in which this condition can be approached and maintained is through individual participation in decision making in all political

spheres. In this way the individual has the opportunity to resist disadvantageous policies (the reduction of alternatives) and to exercise control over the course of his life and the development of his environment. From the perspective of the participatory theory (unlike the contemporary; cf. Berlin, 1969) it is not possible to separate these two aspects of political freedom; that of the legal framework of civil liberties and that of the structure of authority which largely determines how choice-alternatives are distributed - both are two sides of the same coin of political freedom.¹³

Sartori argues that political freedom is properly a defensive or protective freedom. Clearly, political freedom in the participatory theory is regarded as the major protection of the interests of the citizens, but just as participation itself is not merely protective, nor is the political freedom of which it is an essential part; that, too is educative or developmental and is linked to the lack of a special concern with stability in

13. One point on which Sartori and the participatory theory are agreed is that political freedom is not freedom as "autonomy" if by the latter is meant the 'inner' or subjective freedom of the individual. The working of the participatory process may well lead to the individual feeling free, but this is secondary to his objective freedom. A good deal of misunderstanding is caused by the interpretation of political theories of freedom in psychological terms. "Mastering an impulse" or some such may well open otherwise closed alternatives, but this is quite different from the 'external' freedom of the citizen. At that level political decision making, not self-control, decides what alternatives are open.

the participatory theory. Nevertheless there is a similar central value commitment as in the contemporary theory - but to 'popular sovereignty' or 'self-government', not stability. But, again, 'popular sovereignty' is interpreted not in the sense of the (electoral) 'control' of leaders, but in terms of the equal individual participation already discussed, a participation, that is, that is of value in itself, and not merely for its protective function. Of value because of the kind of (ideal) democratic citizen which, it is argued, can only be developed through the participatory process.

A different way of approaching this is to look, as was done in chapter two, at a possible justification of a democratic (participatory) system on the grounds that it best serves, protects, the interests of the members of the polity. The 'justice' of such a system in the case of the participatory theory rests not on the existence of possibilities of redress, or at least these are not sufficient, rather it refers to the expectation that the system of participatory decision making will lead to an outcome to the equal advantage of all citizens. (cf. Rousseau's concept of 'justice'). For a second time we can also ask how the interests of the citizens are conceived so that it is this conception of 'democracy' that will best serve them. Bachrach, the critic who raised the question of this particular justification of the contemporary theory, also says that the latter theory

rejects "the contention of the classical theorists that interests also include the opportunity for development which accrues from participation in meaningful political decisions" (1967, p.95); that is, he argues, recent theorists have a "one-dimensional" view of 'interests'. Although the earlier theorists of participatory democracy did not explicitly frame their views in terms of a wide view of 'interests' they did, as shown, place the development of a certain kind of character at the centre of their theories. The relevant question for our purposes is not so much whether we should adopt Bachrach's suggestion and extend the notion of 'interests' as what kind of citizens could have these wide 'interests'. Obviously the model of the ideal citizen in the participatory theory of democracy is not the apolitical private citizen that Dahl has christened homo civicus. Rather it is that of a public (political) citizen; an individual who both appreciates the relationship between the pursuit of his own (private) interests and decisions made in the political sphere and who also finds a unique satisfaction in participating in the making of those decisions. A citizen, that is, who regards his political freedom as incomplete unless it includes the opportunity to participate in all political spheres, the opportunity to create and shape his own socio/political environment.

There is one final point to be made to conclude this discussion of the evaluative framework of the participatory theory

of democracy. The premise on which the participatory theory is based is not that man is a political animal but that all men are potentially political animals and that to develop that potential the right institutional setting is required. It is important to stress that this "development which accrues from participation" should not be interpreted too widely. Many writers have pointed out that (in one tradition of theorising) the primary end of a democratic polity is a human, not a policy one; "the realisation of human potentialities" (Davis, 1964 , p.40), or, "the highest possible development of all the capacities of personality" (Barker, 1951, p. 123), or again, it should maximise "men's powers, that is, their potential for using and developing their uniquely human capacities" (MacPherson, 1967, p.84). But all these, like Bachrach's formulation, are couched in too broad a fashion to be very useful. The participatory theory is concerned not with the general development of all of men's capacities, rather it is concerned with the 'participatory' capacities or attitudes, although so far in this study it has been left open as to what these might be.

A tentative beginning has now been made toward the formulation of a participatory theory of democracy of potential application in today's complex, large scale societies, and both the empirical and evaluative aspects of the contemporary and this participatory theory of democracy have been examined. The way is now open directly to confront the charge of recent theorists that the

'classical' theory of democracy, and hence a participatory theory drawn from it, is unrealistic in modern conditions. The initial step that will be taken in chapter five is to see what operational content can be given to the notion of a participatory political culture and what evidence there is for the basic hypothesis that there is a link between participation in industry and the development of attitudes necessary for participation in national politics.

CHAPTER FIVE

A PARTICIPATORY POLITICAL CULTURE: AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE

1. The non-participation syndrome.

Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, or Cole have not, unfortunately, left us any accounts of the ideal citizen of their theories to parallel that given by Dahl of homo civicus, or the discussion by Almond and Verba of the "balanced" political culture necessary for democracy. However, if we consider the kind of psychological basis necessary for the type of individual character that the earlier theorists indicated that they admired and wished to see developed, it leads us to an important body of empirical evidence about the personality bases of political participation. Or, to put it slightly differently, it leads us to one aspect of the (democratic) 'political self' of the individual that is crucial for participation. The notion of the political self refers to the individual's "entire complex of orientations regarding his political world, including his views toward his own political role" (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969, p.17).

In Representative Government (pp 208 and 211f) Mill stresses the desirability of an "active" or "self-dependent" character, and the kind of personality that Cole thought would be developed in a participatory polity might be referred to as a 'non-servile' one. Now, if one is to participate in decision making, in the

workplace for example, one necessary condition would be the belief that one was capable of doing so, the confidence that one could participate responsibly and effectively; these would certainly seem to be characteristics that 'active' or 'non-servile' individuals would require, that would form part of the political self of a (participatory) democratic character. One of the most important positive correlations that has emerged from empirical studies of political attitudes and behaviour is that between political participation and the sense of political competence or sense of political efficacy. Almond and Verba (1965, pp 206-7) have said that "in many ways ... the belief in one's competence is a key political attitude", and very many studies have found that the greater one's feeling of efficacy the more likely one is to participate in politics.

A scale to measure the individual's sense of political efficacy was first devised by Campbell et.al. (1954). They described it as the feeling that "individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e. that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" (p.187). Almond and Verba (1965, p.136-7) offer a similar formulation. The political influence of a group or an individual is, they say, "the degree to which governmental officials act to benefit that group or individual because the officials believe that they will risk some deprivation ... if they do not so act". If an individual "believes

that he can exert such influence, we shall view him as subjectively competent", (as having a sense of political efficacy). In a later study Campbell et al (1960) suggested that a more general personality trait lay behind this sense of political efficacy, namely a feeling of personal effectiveness, a "sense of control or mastery over the environment" (p.517). The sense of personal effectiveness and the sense of political efficacy were found to be highly correlated and, further, it has been found that "persons who feel more effective in their everyday tasks and challenges are more like to participate in politics" (Milbrath, 1965, p.59). Lane's (1959, p.149) definition of political efficacy combines both these aspects;

"it has ... two components - the image of the self and the image of the democratic government - and contains the tacit implication that an image of the self as effective is intimately related to the image of democratic government as responsive to the people".

The relevance of the sense of political efficacy to the ideal democratic citizen of the participatory theory can be seen from Lane's remark that "the world of the person with a low sense of political efficacy is a personal world, not a social or political world, and it is filled to overflowing with his own immediate and personal problems".¹

1. For a summary of the findings relating to political efficacy see Milbrath (1965, pp56-60) and Lane (1959, p.147f). On the importance of a sense of effectiveness and self-confidence compare Lane's (1962, p.400ff) discussion of various "pathologies" of the democratic character.

The next question relevant to an assessment of the realism of the participatory theory of democracy is how this sense of political efficacy is developed; what kind of political socialisation process is involved? Much empirical evidence on this point has been overlooked by democratic theorists and other evidence is capable of an interpretation that supports the arguments of the participatory rather than the contemporary theory of democracy. Recent theorists of democracy have accepted as one of the unchangeable facts of political life a feature of the empirical evidence on participation that should have indicated, especially to empirical and scientific theorists, that an explanation was called for. An important aspect of the whole issue of the place of participation in a modern theory of democracy, so far only casually referred to, must now be placed at the centre of this discussion.

Since ancient times the important distinguishing feature of a democratic political system has been that it is built on the active participation of the demos, the ordinary citizen. Yet, whether or not all the advocates of the contemporary theory fully appreciate the implication of their arguments, this tradition is rejected in the contemporary theory of democracy. All the investigations into the social and psychological bases of participation have shown that low rates of political participation, and a low sense of political efficacy that underlies it, are positively correlated with a low class position. (I am using 'class' in a

general sense to include SES (socio-economic status)). This puts into a different light the arguments of recent theorists that the facts of political apathy and disinterest must be taken as given for the purpose of theory building. If low rates of participation and a low sense of political efficacy were relatively randomly distributed among all sections of the population then one might feel inclined to accept the argument that apathy is "nobody's fault". But they are not so distributed. The effect of taking the actual distribution as given is to make one distinguishing feature of a (stable) democratic system, that the ordinary man only participates to the minimal extent necessary to keep the electoral machinery working. The whole emphasis of the theory has been shifted to the active minority - a middle class minority. But this is not so important for this study as the fact that empirical political theorists should regard a sociologically relevant feature, namely that differential rates of participation are linked to class position, as something that should be taken as given.

Another feature of the empirical evidence also regarded as a 'given', and so one to which little or no attention has been paid in the discussion on participation, is relevant to a different aspect of the stability argument. It will be recalled that individuals with "authoritarian" personalities also tend to be non-participants and so, recent theorists have argued, an increase

in participation on their part could pose dangers to the stability of existing democratic systems. Studies have shown that "authoritarianism" tends to be associated with low class position but this, together with an even more significant piece of data, have been ignored by recent theorists of democracy; that individuals with authoritarian personalities also tend to be low in the sense of political efficacy. Thus it is not the case that in modern democracies the majority of individuals - any individuals - just happen not to be interested or active in politics. Rather the non-participants exhibit a cluster of typical distinguishing features or traits, what I shall call the non-participation syndrome; a syndrome composed of low rates of participation, low class position, a low sense of political efficacy and an authoritarian personality. The relevant question that must now be considered is not just how does a sense of (or lack of a sense of) political efficacy arise, but how does this whole non-participation syndrome arise. The explanation suggested by the participatory theory of democracy, as developed in the last chapter, is that it derives from the individual's experiences with various authority structures, especially that of industry, and it is this suggestion that will be explored, beginning with the evidence on the development of the sense of political efficacy.

ii. Evidence from The Civic Culture.

One of the most important sources of evidence of the conditions necessary for the development of the sense of political efficacy is Almond and Verba's The Civic Culture, the theoretical side of which has already been discussed. As stated earlier Almond and Verba consider that for the process of political socialisation the "authority patterns within nonpolitical social groups may be the crucial variable to consider" and they argue that

"if in most social situations the individual finds himself subservient to some authority figure, it is likely that he will expect such an authority relationship in the political sphere. On the other hand, if outside the political sphere he has the opportunity to participate in a wide range of social decisions, he will probably expect to be able to participate in political decisions as well" (pp 271-2).

X The evidence in The Civic Culture offers support to the main hypotheses of the participatory theory of democracy despite the very different conclusions that the authors themselves draw from their investigation.

Almond and Verba agree with J. S. Mill about the importance of participation in local government. They found that in all five countries covered by their survey there was a positive relationship between a high score on the political efficacy scale and participation in politics. The sense of efficacy tended to be higher at local than national level and it was highest of all in those countries, the U.S.A. and Britain, where the most

institutional opportunities existed for local participation, and they remark that these facts give

"an argument in favour of the classic position that political participation on the local level plays a major role in the development of a competent citizenry. As many writers have argued, local government may act as a training ground for political competence. Where local government allows participation, it may foster a sense of competence that then spreads to the national level" (p.145).

But their main interest is in "nongovernmental patterns of authority"; specifically - and this is directly relevant to the arguments of the participatory theory -

"in the effect that these patterns have on the political attitudes and behaviour of those who have been exposed to them. ... We want to know if a sense of ability is in some way transferred from the more limited sphere of participation in nonpolitical decisions to the larger one of participation in politics ... is the member of a democratic family more likely to be a democratically competent citizen?" (p.284).

Almond and Verba investigated participation in the family, the school and the workplace. So far as the first two are concerned it was found that, in all five countries, respondents who reported remembering "being able to express themselves in family decisions" and remembered participating "informally in decisions in the school" all had a high sense of political efficacy (pp 284-6, Table XI.4; p.288, Table XI.5).²

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2. On school participation they also found (pp 291-2) that those who scored lowest on the political efficacy scale tended to be those who reported that they had not taken advantage of participation opportunities, and Almond and Verba suggest that this may be due to "personal reasons" or social reasons "such as membership in a relatively less privileged group". Social reasons would seem to provide the explanation. Almond and Verba do not give the class background of these respondents but I would suspect, as argued below, that they would tend to come from lower class homes.

Their findings on the effect of participation in the workplace support the central argument of the participatory theory that industry is vitally important for political socialisation. In Almond and Verba's own words,

"of crucial significance ... are ... opportunities to participate in decisions at one's place of work. The structure of authority at the work place is probably the most significant - and salient - structure of the kind with which the average man finds himself in daily contact" (p.294).

They found that respondents who reported participating in decisions in the workplace, whether unskilled, skilled or white collar workers, tended to have a high sense of political efficacy (p.295, Table, XI.6), although the unskilled workers reported the least opportunities for participation. They also found that job participation has a positive impact on political efficacy in individuals of both higher and lower educational level, unlike the other two areas of participation.³ Finally, Almond and Verba found that participation in these three spheres had a cumulative effect; for instance, individuals who had participated in both the family and the workplace scored higher on the efficacy scale than those who participated only in the family (p.297, Table XI.7). They

3. The experience of higher education itself is an important factor in the development of the sense of political efficacy. (See pp 161-3, Figs. VI.1 and VI.2). Almond and Verba found that to some extent it could substitute for a lack of participation in family or school, and they comment that "education above the primary level represents a many sided experience that can, in a large number of ways, increase an individual's potentiality to participate" (p.302). Workplace participation does not seem to act as a substitute in this way.

also found that there was a rank order in the strength of the connection between political efficacy and the different areas of participation, the strongest connection being between job participation and efficacy. There was also a strong connection with participation in voluntary organisations and Almond and Verba suggest that this is because

"the individual's experiences at work and in voluntary associations differ basically from those in the family and the school in that they are closer - in time as well as structure - to the polity. Job and group memberships are contemporaneous with political participation. More important, perhaps ... (is that) authority patterns in the work place and voluntary associations are ... in many ways similar to patterns of political authority" (pp 303-4).

The general conclusion drawn by Almond and Verba is that

"in a relatively modern and diversified social system socialisation in the family and, to a lesser extent, in the school represents inadequate training for political participation" (p.305).

The information in The Civic Culture thus offers considerable support to the argument in the participatory theory that industry is the crucial area for the educative or socialisation impact of participation, at least in its 'political culture' aspect, and this point will be taken up again shortly. Almond and Verba do not break their data down according to class position, another component of the non-participation syndrome, so it is not possible to see directly from The Civic Culture itself whether those respondents with a low sense of efficacy also tended to be lower class. That this is in fact so can be seen from the re-examination

of the data by Nie et al (1969) in two recent articles that look at (among other things) the way in which social status affects political participation. They state that their

"basic finding is both simple and important. Virtually all the relationship between social status and participation is explained by the linking attitude variables ... This does not mean, it must be emphasised, that the correlation between status and participation is spurious; on the contrary, it means that intervening attitude variables explain how a citizen's social status affects his political activity" (p.811, authors' emphasis).

The "attitudinal resources" of the individual sensitise him to "political messages and provide him with the sense of competence needed to engage in political behaviour" (p.825), and so far as this sense of efficacy is concerned Nie et al found that it "was more important as a link to the more active forms of participation ... than it was in talking politics" (p.817).⁴ But although this may

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4. The wider purpose of the study was to find out which social experiences explained the higher level of mass participation in developed, compared to economically undeveloped, countries. The general explanation was in terms of development leading to a change in class structure (larger middle class) and the growth of 'secondary' organisations. Very interestingly it was found that "social status and organisational involvement operate through quite different causal paths in their impact on political participation. This finding holds true in all five countries and remains the case in spite of various manipulations of the data" (p.811). Organisational membership, that is, did not operate via the attitudinal variables. Members could be mobilised by leaders, especially if the organisation was linked with public affairs, without any change in attitudes (they may have joined the organisation for a variety of reasons). Thus the authors note that the quality of participation will differ in the two cases; a citizen may lack 'democratic attitudes' if he is mobilised through organisations; "the content of his effort to influence will be largely determined by the mobilising leaders, a possibility suggesting that organisations are more the base of a 'counter-elite' than a source of broader and more democratic patterns of political influence" (p.827).

tell us how class position affects participation it does not tell us why this should be so; we still do not know why differences in the level of the sense of political efficacy are typically related to differences in class position.

iii. Class, the sense of political efficacy and the workplace.

The most useful way to approach the problem of class and political efficacy is indirectly. By stressing the importance of the workplace in the political socialisation process, Almond and Verba are arguing that it is adult rather than childhood experiences that are most significant, but this is a matter of some dispute among students of politics. For example, one of the most influential of the writers on political socialisation, Easton, argues for the importance of the childhood years. Before considering the empirical evidence on this matter, it should be noted that from the theoretical viewpoint of the participatory theory of democracy we should expect adult experiences to be vital since much of the individual's adult socialisation would be direct political socialisation, i.e. would take place inside political systems, unlike the individual's earliest experiences which occur in the private sphere of the family. (cf. Almond and Verba's remark about the "similarity" of authority structures in the workplace and politics, quoted earlier). This is not to suggest that childhood experiences are of no importance at all for later political behaviour and attitudes; rather it

will be argued that later experiences can either work in the same, or a different direction and so, as it were, either reinforce or 'replace' the initial basis for the adult political self.

The political socialisation process itself is made up of many different elements and part of the difficulty over the question of the relative importance of later and earlier experiences is that investigators are neither all interested in the same aspects of socialisation nor in the same aspects of political behaviour and attitudes. It is by no means obvious that the same aspects of the socialisation process are relevant to the development of partisan allegiance, for example, as to the development of a sense of political efficacy. Much of Easton's (and associates) work, and the still growing amount of research which has followed from it, has been concerned with showing that specifically political learning does take place in childhood, in the sense that even quite young children have been found to be aware that 'a government' exists and that Presidents and policeman are connected with it. (In England children seem particularly aware of the Queen, see Greenstein et al, 1969). One might feel that it would be more surprising in an age of mass communication and formal education if children, even 7 year olds, were not aware of such authority figures and their connection with politics. But, more importantly, the data in a study like Easton and Dennis's Children in the Political System do little or nothing to establish a connection between this

kind of learning and specific forms of adult political behaviour or attitudes; indeed many of the authors' own comments cast doubts on its later importance.⁵

Although the fundamental importance of the earliest experiences is often asserted, Easton and Dennis themselves note that "surprisingly, even in an era shot through with Freudian pre-conceptions, the effect of childhood experiences on adult behaviour is still moot" (p.75). More important, so far as the empirical evidence itself is concerned, is the fact that parents tend to shield their children from the realities of political life;⁶ all the data shows an increasingly realistic (less idealised) appreciation on the part of the older children of how the political system works, as they can read and see for themselves and their intellect develops.

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5. The authors of this study may reply that it is not meant to. They want to know how far early socialisation contributes to later "diffuse support" for the political system. They argue that the child's awareness of himself as a member of a political system and his favourable evaluation of it establish a reservoir of diffuse support for political authority as such. This provides a bulwark against adult disillusionment with a particular form of political authority spilling over into disillusionment with political authority as such; "only under very special conditions, where succeeding structures repeatedly fail to capture the support of the members, might a situation arise in which some kind of system would be unable to continue" (pp 310-11). But whether this tells us much, or anything at all, about adult political behaviour and attitudes is doubtful.
 6. Easton and Dennis, pp 357-8. See also Greenstein (1965, p.45) and Orren and Peterson (1967.). Easton and Dennis's findings are also probably culture-bound, see e.g. Jaros et al (1968).

Easton and Dennis do not entirely neglect these later experiences, in fact they say that, "secondary socialisation, during the period beyond childhood, may under certain circumstances work in an opposite direction ... with the net outcome dependent on the situational events" (p.310).

More directly relevant to the issues being considered in this study is the finding that levels of political efficacy in children are also related to class position (see e.g. Easton and Dennis, 1967, p.36 Table 4; Greenstein, 1965a, p.106). In a paper dealing with the sense of efficacy in children Easton and Dennis⁷ argue that since it is not realistic to expect children to feel politically efficacious in exactly the same sense as adults, what the efficacy scale measures in children is rather the way that the child sees adults, and so he can be expected to see himself in similar terms.⁸ This would help explain the differences in levels of political efficacy in children because we know that

7. They are not concerned as are Almond and Verba with the problem of the development of the sense of efficacy, but primarily with the question of whether children accept the norm of political efficacy. In a curious argument (1967, p.38) they suggest that the "internalisation" early in life of a norm that one ought to have a say in government will, in itself, help to counteract later adult frustration when we find that some apparent opportunities to do so are illusory. It would seem more likely to have the opposite effect.
8. Questions asked were eg. "My family doesn't have any say about what the government does".

lower class parents tend to have a lower sense of political efficacy than those of middle class position. But we have already seen from the Almond and Verba data that low feelings of efficacy are linked to lack of experience of participation so perhaps it might be that lower class parents not only present an 'inefficacious image' to their children but that they also provide a less participatory home environment than middle class parents. Evidence on class differences in methods of child-rearing give support to this suggestion. To put crudely a complex matter, the working class family structure tends to be more 'authoritarian' stressing conformity to externally imposed rules, while the middle class family tends to be more participatory, emphasising the self-direction of the child.⁹

If this analysis offers an explanation of the differences in political efficacy in children, the original problem still remains; how can the class related differences in adults be explained? It is not enough to refer to the effects of their own childhood ... Moreover, there is the question of why adults of different class background should stress such different values in child-rearing. This would seem to be related to the component of the non-participation

9. On these class differences see Kohn (1963), and for England, for example Klein (1965), also Newson (1965). The differences are not just a matter of discipline but include the very form of language that the child learns, something that is extremely important for his school career, and hence whole life chances. On this aspect see the very important and interesting researches of Bernstein.

syndrome so far ignored; the tendency toward "authoritarianism" found among individuals from lower class backgrounds. This might explain their stress in child-rearing on conformity to externally imposed rules.

Greenstein (1965 , p.82) has called the amount of research into the authoritarian personality "one of the wonders of recent social science scholarship". Nevertheless, although we have a good deal of information on the social correlates of authoritarianism, attempts to explain its social distribution are few and far between.¹⁰ This is no doubt partly due to the fact that the "authoritarian personality" as described in the original California study is made up of a group of diverse, though that is not to say unrelated, characteristics, and it is by no means certain (it would seem rather unlikely) that one explanation could account for the development of the whole range of characteristics. Nor is it clear that all the dimensions that might be included in a description of the "authoritarian personality" are equally relevant for political behaviour, or that the dimensions that are relevant are relevant for all aspects of political behaviour or attitudes. Some more recent investigations into the relationship between authoritarianism, class and political behaviour point to general features in the adult's social environment to account for the greater predominance of

10. Cf. the remarks of Hyman and Sheatsley (1954, p.97).

authoritarian characteristics among lower class individuals.

Janowitz and Marvick (1953, p.186) argue that of the dimensions of the original F scale two, "authoritarian submission" and "power and toughness", are the most useful for political behaviour research and that they are most relevant to questions of participation and self-confidence. In their sample the most authoritarian group were the lower middle class and they suggest that "frustrated social mobility, thwarted status aspirations and inadequate purchasing power" may account for this. They conclude that

"modern society apparently needs to be viewed in terms which interrelate functionally its various strata and status segments. There is no need either to single out the personality syndrome of authoritarianism or to point to the frustrating social circumstances in an effort to determine the cause ... The social and psychological elements of which the 'authoritarian response pattern' is composed stand in mutual interdependence" (1953, p.197).

Farris (1956, p.73), noting the correlation between authoritarianism and "political confidence" and class suggests that "the apparent effects of authoritarianism, then, may be dependent on, rather than independent of," class and political efficacy. In a study of the relationship between authoritarianism, anomie, prejudice and SES McDill (1960) found that a common factor accounted for a large part of the correlation, namely a "negative weltanschauung";

"the perspective of being mastered by threatening forces beyond one's personal control ... the way to live in this threatening world is through obedience to authority figures and through conventionalism ... Furthermore, there is a punitive attitude towards violators of obedience" (p.244).

The SES distribution of this weltanschauung "indicates a definite relationship between the socio-cultural environment to which one has been exposed and one's general social perspective" (p.245).

Such studies do give support to the suggestion that we are dealing here, not with a collection of social factors that happen to be correlated to non-participation, but with a set of inter-related factors that form a non-participation syndrome, one associated with a typical view of the political world, and one that has its roots in the typical life experiences of lower class individuals. But which experiences are the most important for the development of this syndrome? In a recent article Kohn and Schooler (1969) investigated the social roots of the different attitudes of middle and working class individuals to their view of themselves and of social reality and their attitudes to child-rearing, (the lower class perspective being very similar to McDill's negative weltanschauung, or the features associated with authoritarianism or lack of political efficacy). They state that

"our principle hypothesis is that class correlated differences in men's opportunities to exercise occupational self-direction - that is, to use initiative, thought and independent judgement in work - are basic to class differences in values and orientations. Few other conditions of life are so closely bound up with social position as those that determine how much opportunity, even necessity, men have for exercising self-direction in their work" (p. 659).

They found that "class correlated occupational conditions are significantly related to values and orientations, independently of

their relationship to social class" (p.671) and they conclude that,

"the conditions of occupational life at lower class levels limit men's view of the job primarily to the extrinsic benefits it provides, foster a narrowly circumscribed conception of self and society, and promote the positive valuation of conformity to authority" (p.677).

In an earlier piece of research Lipsitz (1964) had also found a relationship between the amount of control that an individual could exercise over his work and his political attitudes. Of the manual workers that he interviewed those "who are conscious of having the least control over their own lives at work show the most pronounced tendency to view the social and political worlds as unalterable", and they also tended to have punitive attitudes, (pp 955 and 957). On the other hand, all the workers, whether skilled or unskilled, had a general picture of government as "a group of men who arrange to keep themselves in power and don't care about the interests of the common people" (p.958). Lipsitz's conclusion is that

"the work men do can have important consequences for their ego strength ... Men in a work environment they cannot control may be to some unknown degree damaged in their sense of mastery, and this damage may render them less capable of coping with and altering an environment they find unsatisfactory" (pp 961-2).

Other investigators have also found that the authority structure in the enterprise and the demands of technology, which both determine the amount of self-direction or control that the individual can exercise at work, are crucial influences on the

development of ego-strength or the general sense of efficacy and confidence which lies beneath the sense of political efficacy.¹¹ For example in Alienation and Freedom (1964), Blauner looked at the (American) printing, textile, automobile and chemical industries in which the technical processes, the organisation of the work and the rank and file worker's relation to the authority structure all differed considerably. In the automobile and textile industries conditions were not conducive to the development of feelings of efficacy. "The automobile work environment is so highly rationalised that workers have practically no opportunity to solve problems and contribute their own ideas", and on the assembly line itself the individual has no control over the pace or technique of his work, no scope to exercise skill or leadership (p.98 and pp 111-113). This technology, combined with the typical authority structure of the assembly line plant, contribute little

11. This is not a new observation. Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations (1880, Vol.11, pp 365-6); "in the progress of the division of labour, the employment ... of the great body of the people comes to be confined to a few simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations ... has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become ... (he is incapable) of forming any just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country, he is altogether incapable of judging".

to the worker's self-esteem and "the social personality of the auto worker ... is expressed in a characteristic attitude of cynicism toward authority and institutional systems" (p.178). The textile industry presented an even less favourable situation. Not only did the technical process reduce the worker's control over his job to a minimum, but he was also "at the mercy of both major and minor supervisors". Blauner quotes from a psychological study made of the textile workers and it described their typical personality as one where the individual is "resigned to his lot ... more dependent than independent ... he lacks confidence in himself ... the most prevalent feeling states ... seem to be fear and anxiety" (pp 69-70, p.80). A complete contrast is provided by the printing and chemical industries. In the former, still largely a craft industry, the worker has a high degree of personal control over his work, high, internalised standards of workmanship and responsibility and a large degree of freedom from external control. All these factors add up, says Blauner, to a

"social personality characterised ... by a strong sense of individualism and autonomy, and a solid acceptance of citizenship in the larger society. (The printer) ... has a highly developed feeling of self-esteem and a sense of self-worth and is therefore ready to participate in the social and political institutions of the community" (p.176 and p. 43ff).

In the chemical industry the psychological result is similar, but this does not come about through the control exercised by an individual craftsman, but through the collective responsibility

of a crew of employees for the maintenance and smooth running of a continuous process plant. Each crew has control over the pace and method of getting the work done and the work crews are largely internally self-disciplining. Again this contributed to the sense of efficacy of the members. (p.132ff, p.179 and p.159). Blauner concludes that "the nature of a man's work affects his social character and personality" and that "an industrial environment tends to breed a distinct social type" (p. VII and p.166).

The impact of hierarchical authority structures and the subdivision of work on personality, and so, it is argued, on the efficiency of the enterprise, has also received attention from writers on management. Argyris (1957; 1964) for example, on the basis of two models, one of the hierarchical, bureaucratic, organisation, and the other of the psychologically healthy individual, argues that industrial organisations typically fail to meet individual needs for self-esteem and self confidence and personal "growth", and he cites copious empirical material in support of this argument. Further, he argues that at the top of the authority structure the "organisational norms" force the executive to hide his feelings and make it difficult for him to develop competence and confidence in interpersonal relations. Efficiency is impaired and the "rigidity" of the organisation reinforced,¹² thus heightening

12. This is similar to Merton's argument in his well-known essay on Bureaucratic Structure and Personality (1957), where he says that with bureaucratic organisational forms increasing "it becomes plain to all who would see that man is to a very important degree controlled by his social relation to the instruments of production. This can no longer seem only a tenet of Marxism but a stubborn fact to be acknowledged by all". The bureaucratic organisation fosters timidity, displacement of goals, ritualism etc. on the part of officials.

the effects on the rank and file worker. The latter, in a situation where he can exercise little initiative or control over his work, tends to experience "a decreasing sense of self-control and self-responsibility". The cumulative effect may be to "influence the employees view of himself, his esteem of himself ... his satisfaction in his life, and indeed his values about the meaning of work" (1964, p.54; pp 87-8). Argyris speculates that this psychological effect may be linked to lack of interest and activity in politics but he does not pursue this himself.

These findings support those writers who argue, as one would also argue on the basis of the participatory theory of democracy, that adult experiences are of greatest importance for political socialisation, at least so far as political participation is concerned. The lower sense of political efficacy found among children from lower class backgrounds arises from the 'inefficacious image' presented by their parents and from the tendency for lower class parents to provide a less participatory family environment than middle class parents. The lack of efficacy of the parents is part of a more general outlook which includes the tendency to value conformity to external authority and so forth. Post-childhood experiences may either reinforce early socialisation or work in the

opposite direction, so 'resocialising' the individual.¹³

In the case of the working class individual reinforcement is the most likely. This is shown by the evidence on the fundamental importance of experiences in the workplace to the individual's attitudes towards and confidence in the world,¹⁴ together with Almond and Verba's findings on the cumulative effect of participation in different spheres. The typical life experiences of an individual from a lower, unlike a middle class background tend to be a cumulation of lack of opportunities for participation; thus a very different political self is developed in the two cases. Turning specifically to Britain for a moment, we might draw up an 'ideal type' of the background of the typical, apathetic disinterested citizen. He was born into a working class family and

13. Cf. these comments of Inkeles (1969, p.216) on adult socialisation; "our results indicate that substantial changes can be made in a man's personality or character, at least in the sense of attitudes, values, and basic orientations, long after what are usually considered the formative years". And his comments on the factory as a "school for citizenship" in developing countries (p.213). In another paper (1969a, p.1139) he notes that the objection that the hierarchical authority structure of the factory might have the opposite effect, presupposes a background where centralised authority is already well established, unlike the background provided by an 'undeveloped' village.

14. This connection between work experiences and methods of child-rearing is also suggested in other studies, see Colgrove (1967, p.57).

had little or no opportunity to participate within the home. The same situation confronted him at his secondary school - he failed his eleven plus exam.¹⁵ Leaving school at the statutory minimum age he went to work at an unskilled manual job in a nearby factory¹⁶ where the demands of technology meant that he had little control over the way that he did his job and where the (orthodox) authority structure of the enterprise allowed him no part in making decisions either about his own job or about the running of the enterprise. Some years ago Knupfer emphasised the psychological effect of the American lower class life pattern. In the article Portrait of the Underdog Knupfer argues that the different aspects of status cluster together and form a vicious circle that "recalls the Biblical dictum 'to him that hath shall be given'". The author suggests that the common lack of effort by low SES groups to control their environment may arise from "deeply ingrained habits of doing what one is told". Economic underprivilege is linked to psychological underprivilege and engenders

15. Working class children are proportionally under-represented in grammar schools (on this see Douglas, 1964) and secondary modern schools often operate by what have been called "drill sergeant" methods (see Webb, 1962). How far this pattern survives the spread of comprehensive education depends on just how 'comprehensive' the schools are and whether or not they continue to stream children inside the schools (on streaming see Douglas; also Jackson, 1964).
16. Even among working class children at grammar school there is a tendency toward early leaving and we know that higher education is important for the development of a sense of political efficacy. On the low aspirations of working class children see e.g. Carter (1968).

"a lack of self confidence which increases the unwillingness of the lower status person to participate in many phases of our predominantly middle class culture beyond what would be a realistic withdrawal adapted to the reduced chances of being effective."

iv. A new look at participation and the sense of political efficacy.

The analysis in this chapter so far has given a good deal of support to the two central hypotheses of the participatory theory of democracy, that participation is educative and that participation in industry is crucial for the development of a participatory political culture. However, although the evidence cited provides us with an explanation for the psychological aspects of lower class non-participation, the lack of a feeling of effectiveness, it will be recalled that in the definitions of the sense of political efficacy quoted at the beginning of the chapter, two components were distinguished;¹⁷ the sense of effectiveness and a cognitive component, the belief that a democratic government is "responsive to the people", and this latter element must now be brought into the discussion. I shall argue that the non-participation syndrome itself is composed of both these components and that this has important implications for many of the arguments of recent theorists of democracy, arguments based on a particular interpretation of the evidence on

17. Cf. also the definition of the political self.

political efficacy and authoritarianism. I shall also argue that an alternative explanation is possible, one favourable to the arguments of the participatory theory of democracy, but that this interpretation has been ruled out in much recent work because of an evaluative assumption involved.

First let us examine the sense of political efficacy itself. The original definition was that "it was worthwhile to perform one's civic duties", and the questions that made up the efficacy scale implied that it was indeed worthwhile to participate; e.g. "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think", "people like me don't have any say about what the government does" (disagreement indicates efficaciousness). This is also true of other efficacy scales (see appendix to this chapter); that is, a politically efficacious person, by definition, is one who sees the (existing) system as "responsive to the people", sees it, in other words, as recent theorists of democracy characterise it. But this is not necessarily the same thing as having a (psychological) feeling of effectiveness. The other important feature of the efficacy scales, or rather of the interpretation of them, is that although *prima facie* the questions seem aimed at eliciting how the system appears to respondents, their answers are usually interpreted as telling us something about how (psychologically) effective the individual feels, at least, this is the implicit interpretation. In fact replies to such questions may tell us

nothing at all about the psychology of the individual, rather it may indicate the way the system seems to him to operate irrespective of any feelings of effectiveness. This is especially important so far as lower class respondents are concerned because if what their responses indicate is the way the political system seems to them to operate this indicates another explanation for the lower rates of political participation by such individuals. Non-participation is a realistic response; it does not seem worthwhile to them to participate, given their perception of the system.

It should be noted however that non-participation is a realistic response not, as the contemporary theory of democracy argues, because participation is an unnecessary cost, individual's interests can often be secured without it, but rather because it seems to the individual that his interests will be neglected whether or not he participates; it is irrelevant. Nevertheless, he may feel confident that, in a different situation, he could participate; the two components of the non-participation syndrome are not necessarily found together, although I shall argue that in practice they almost invariably are (hence the existence of the syndrome). It is clear that this alternative interpretation of the political efficacy evidence is ruled out for recent theorists because of their underlying (evaluative) assumption that in the existing system all individual's (groups') interests are served and that participation is therefore, in principle, worthwhile for

everyone. Moreover it explains why the perceptions of middle class respondents (the efficacious) are interpreted to be an accurate reflection of reality whereas those of lower class respondents are (must be) taken to reflect their psychology. The Civic Culture provides an illustration of this point. Almond and Verba's empirical investigation (reported above) into the socialisation process that contributes to the development of a high level of "subjective competence" is tapping, I suggest, the (psychological) feeling of effectiveness. On the other hand the subjective competence scale itself (see appendix) is composed of statements to which the responses will largely reflect the individual's experiences of his political system, i.e. the cognitive aspect of political efficacy. It is the evaluative assumption about the operation of existing democratic political systems that hides, but also forms a bridge between these two elements. Almond and Verba, it will be recalled, argue that individuals generalise from their experiences in areas like the family and the workplace to the political sphere. In other words The Civic Culture contains an implicit explanation for apathy; it is assumed that participation is worthwhile, so that those individuals low in "subjective competence" are making an erroneous generalisation onto the political sphere, a generalisation arising from their own (psychological) feelings of ineffectiveness.

That the alternative offered in this study is not an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence is shown by an examination of investigations into authoritarianism. Greenstein (1965, p.93) has pointed out that a difficulty with the notion of 'authoritarianism' (just as, it might be added, with political efficacy is that it is applied not only to a certain individual psychological type but also to the content of political beliefs. It is the latter aspect that is of particular relevance to the arguments of recent theorists of democracy. It is because of the content of the beliefs of certain present non-participants, those that Dahl (1956, p.89) calls the "authoritarian-minded", that their participation could pose dangers to the stability of the system. Several studies have (been held to have) shown that lower class individual i.e. the non-participants, tend to be more authoritarian in the sense of having a weaker commitment to the rules of the democratic game than middle class individuals. The two best known studies are probably those of Stouffer (1955) and McClosky (1964), (see also Lipset, 1960, pp 101-5), but here again a different interpretation can be given to working class responses.

In his investigation McClosky compares the replies of the "influentials" (whom we know tend to be middle class) with those of "the general electorate" and he draws conclusions about the functional nature for the system of the apathy of the ordinary citizen similar to those of the recent theorists discussed in this

study. But these conclusions depend on the same evaluative assumption as those drawn from the efficacy studies. Part of McClosky's survey deals with attitudes toward "political equality" and "economic equality" as well as including scales designed to tap "political cynicism" and "political futility" (inefficacy). A large number of the questions (from all the scales) are those to which answers could be legitimately interpreted as reflecting the respondents view of the operation of the political system, rather than indicating anything about attachment to democratic norms.

Typical questions from McClosky's survey are as follows; (for his efficacy scale see appendix)

on "political equality": "'issues' and 'arguments' are beyond the understanding of most voters"; (% agreeing, influentials 37.5; general electorate 62.3)

on "economic equality": "labour does not get its fair share of what it produces"; (20.8%; 44.8%)

"the government ought to make sure that everyone has a good standard of living"; (34.4%; 55.9%)

on "cynicism": "both major parties in the country are controlled by the wealthy and run for their benefit"; (7.9%; 32.1%)

"no matter what the people think, a few people always run things anyway"; (30.0%; 53.8%)

on "rules of the game"; "we might as well make up our minds that in order to make the world better a lot of innocent people will have to suffer"; (27.2%; 41.6%).

On the face of it there is no good reason to suppose that this data tells us anything more than that respondents have divergent perceptions of the working of the system. There is also other evidence in some of the "community power" studies in the U.S.A. to show that the active elite and the ordinary citizen do not view the system in the same way. For example in Men at the Top (Presthus 1964), in answer to the statement "anyone in (the community) who wants to, gets his chance to have his say about important issues", 95% of "Edgewood leaders" agreed and only 5% disagreed, whereas 60% of the "community" agreed and 35% disagreed. (In Riverview, leaders 84% agree, 11% disagree; community, 58%, 34%). In response to "the old saying, 'You can't fight city hall', is still basically true"; 23% Edgewood leaders agreed, 77% disagreed and 44% of the community agreed, 53% disagreed. (Riverview, 16% agreed and 60% disagreed of leaders; the community 45% and 47%) (pp 334 and 336, Tables 10.6 and 10.8).¹⁸

18. The controversy among community power investigators whether a plurality of elites or one elite exists in American local government is irrelevant to this study since both sides take for granted that the ordinary citizen has only a minimal role to play in a democracy.

That working class respondents tend to have a less favourable view of the system than the "influentials" is illustrated by the study by Lipsitz, cited earlier in the chapter, where he found that all the workers he interviewed saw government "as a group of men who arrange to keep themselves in power and don't care about the interests of the common people". But that we should not necessarily conclude anything about adherence to democratic norms from these findings is suggested by the work of Rothro and Grigg (1960) who found that around 95% of the (American) people agreed with the basic principles of democracy; where disagreement arose was over the application of those principles - or one might add over whether those principles are in fact being applied in existing systems.¹⁹ Some other interesting evidence on these points can be found in Form and Rytina's (1969) investigations into the ideological beliefs of different income groups on the distribution of power in the United States. They set out to test the hypothesis that "the higher their income, the greater the tendency for people to believe that the dominant ideology of political pluralism more or less accurately describes the way the system really works" (p.21). They found that this was in fact

19. Cf. my earlier remarks on the disagreement among political theorists over what counts as 'political equality' etc. There is likely to be no less disagreement among ordinary citizens.

the pattern of beliefs (p.23, Table 1) and the authors also found that when asked who they thought had the most influence, although half the respondents selected "rich people" or "big business", of the higher income groups themselves 54% regarded the unions as the most powerful (Table 3). It was also found that the higher income groups were least likely to agree that all groups in the system ought to be equally powerful; 30% of them thought that "big business" should exercise most influence (Table 6). Ford and Rytina (p.30) conclude that "these observations support the growing evidence that the higher income groups clearly do not understand the principles of political pluralism nor do they support them consistently".²⁰

On the other hand, the other part of McClosky's survey indicated that the "general electorate" were less committed to democratic norms in the sense that they were less likely to uphold minority rights and civil liberties. On this point Miller and Riessman (1961) have suggested that rather than a specific disavowal of civil liberties these responses may reflect a more general acceptance of punitive measures against deviants. In the light of the studies of the social distribution of "authoritarianism"

20. The authors add that the higher income groups "have the most favourable attitude toward sources of power in the community; they have the strongest feelings about their beliefs; they have the most outgroup antipathy; they are the most class conscious; they are the most tightly organised to maintain privilege. A case can be made that the syndrome amounts to an upper-class authoritarianism". (See also Rytina, Ford and Pease, 1970).

quoted earlier this is a plausible explanation. It certainly fits in with the general outlook or negative weltanschauung found to be typical of lower class individuals, part of which was just such a punitive attitude toward violators of authority. This weltanschauung, it was suggested, had its roots in the typical life experiences of lower class individuals and it has been argued by contributors to a critical study (Christie and Jahoda, 1954) of the original work on The Authoritarian Personality (that was regarded as a specifically "anti-democratic" personality) that it is these experiences that are reflected in working class replies to the questions designed to measure "authoritarianism".

As Christie argues,

"inasmuch as many of the F scale items are semi-projective there appears good reason to assume that the referents would differ among individuals drawn from different social backgrounds whose experiences with the symbols embodied in the F scale are quite different" (p. 174).

And the same writer added that

"anyone familiar with lower socio-economic groupings can scarcely be unaware of the fact that there is realistic justification for the view that the world is indeed jungle-like and capricious" (p. 175).²¹

21; Other contributors, Hyman and Sheatsley (p.96) argued that "we suspect that what is often being scored ... are not personality differences but simply the variations in the language of different social classes".

More recently Greenstein (1965) has suggested that we need two theories to account for the typical class responses to questions designed to measure 'authoritarianism'. An "ego defensive" theory for middle class respondents and a "cognitive" theory for working class individuals. Greenstein argues (p.88) that the social environment of the latter leads them to respond to the F scale in a similar way to middle class respondents but without exhibiting the postulated pathology; for individuals from a lower class background "'authoritarianism' reflects little more than learning from one's exemplars and realistic attempts to characterise one's environment".

Thus it appears, slightly paradoxically, that the studies of 'political efficacy' and 'authoritarianism' tell us little or nothing about the working class individual's psychology; rather they indicate how such individuals typically perceive the political system. Does this then mean that the non-participation syndrome itself is largely 'cognitive'? It would seem so if the political efficacy and authoritarianism scales are considered in isolation, but the analysis of these has to be seen in the context of the whole discussion of the evidence of the conditions required to develop a participatory political culture. We are not looking at several isolated factors that just happen to be associated with low political participation; these factors are themselves correlated. They must, that is, be seen as aspects of one non-participation syndrome, involving both psychological and cognitive components.

Furthermore, these components are mutually interdependent and interrelated. It is a vain endeavour to try to pinpoint one as the 'main cause' of non-participation. Earlier it was shown how the cumulation of lack of opportunities for participation, particularly the lack of opportunities to participate in industry, gave rise to the typical lack of a sense of effectiveness in dealing with the world found among lower class individuals. This forms the psychological aspect of the syndrome (and seems to be closely associated with a punitive attitude to deviants). However, this sense of ineffectiveness itself is reinforced by and contributes to a view of the political system as controlled by "city hall" or "a few people" (people unlike myself) and as unresponsive to the interests of the ordinary man.²² Because of this circular process of reinforcement it will probably be impossible to design a scale that would measure just one component; something of both will be present in respondents replies.²³

22. In Britain a general working class perception of a gulf between "us" and "them" has often been commented upon. For references see Goldthorpe et al (1969, p.120) - although the view of the "affluent worker" seems more complex. (See also Butler and Stokes, 1969, pp 92-3)

23. This analysis leaves open the question of whether or not some individuals (of either class) might have "authoritarian personalities" in some 'deeper' sense as this does not affect the evidence reviewed here; the evidence that is relevant to the arguments of recent theorists of democracy about political participation.

I stated earlier that this reinterpretation of the evidence has important consequences for democratic theory and these must now be considered. First, the reinterpretation challenges an aspect of the argument from stability in the contemporary theory of democracy. If the responses of working class individuals do not necessarily indicate that they have a less strong commitment to the rules of the democratic game then, if their rates of participation were to increase, there need be no danger to the stability of the system on that score at least.

Second, this reinterpretation highlights the evaluative assumption on which the accepted interpretation is based. I have said nothing about the respective merits of the divergent perceptions of the system, but the very fact that such a divergence exists (but is neglected or unrecognised by most recent theorists) puts the onus on the advocates of the contemporary theory of democracy to offer some empirical evidence to show that their evaluative assumption does in fact accord with existing realities. This cannot be taken for granted. In fact even a very cursory glance at the political scene should make it quite clear that the typical perceptions of the ordinary citizen must be taken as seriously by empirical political theorists as the perceptions of the active elite. As Parry (1969, pp 124-5) has put it in his excellent study of the community power investigations,

"it is not a necessary truth that in a competitive political situation all interests will be considered, let alone accomodated. A comparison can be made with a competitive market situation in economics. Such a market can only claim to meet the effective demands of the consumers, i.e. demands backed by purchasing power. It does not attend to the needs of everyone in the community since not all needs may be backed by purchasing power, and such needs do not go forward as demands".

The economic analogy should commend itself to recent theorists. It is fairly obvious that, in Britain, needs that have not "gone forward as demands" are those of the homeless, or of children living in poverty, who have only recently been 'discovered'. In the U.S.A. the blacks form the (glaringly) obvious example. Parry notes that two studies have found that the ordinary black citizen and the (white) leader rank issues very differently; "to the Negroes slum clearance and housing were the chief issues, whilst the Whites were very little concerned with these issues". Parry comments that such groups may cease to try to put their claims forward although their interests remain constant; they "might become apathetic, believing participation to be fruitless" (p.126).

Third, and most importantly, this reinterpretation together with evidence from The Civic Culture and evidence on the importance of experiences in the workplace in the development of the individual's weltanschauung, all this undermines the main premise on which the contemporary theory of democracy is built: that the political apathy and disinterest of the ordinary man must be taken

as given, that it is "nobody's fault". All the evidence shows that the apathy arises from institutional features of the existing system, or, more accurately, from the impact that these features have on the individuals that interact within them. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the participatory theory of democracy is correct to single out industry as the crucial area in a socialisation process that results in the development of the non-participation syndrome, a process that produces a group of people with "deeply ingrained habits of doing what they are told". But if the evidence indicates that, in principle, we need not take apathy as given, and if it gives support to the argument of the participatory theory that it is through participation itself that individuals can be educated for participation (that a participatory political culture can be developed), no evidence has yet been produced to show whether the institutional changes recommended in the participatory theory of democracy are feasible ones.

The evidence from Blauner's book shows that it is possible to have situations inside the workplace that do develop the individual's sense of effectiveness and confidence in facing the world. What is not clear is how far it would be feasible to introduce situations of this kind into industry on a large scale. I shall investigate this problem next. If participation of this kind did prove feasible it would however only affect one component

of the non-participation syndrome, the psychological; we have seen that the individual's perception of the operation of the political system is also extremely important. The central factor to be borne in mind here is the conception of the political in the participatory theory of democracy. The situations described in Blauner's study clearly do not involve the kind of participation in the management of the collective affairs of the enterprise that is implied by the argument that industry provides a sphere of political participation and should therefore be democratised. No evidence has yet been brought forward to indicate whether or not democracy and this wider participation is feasible inside industry. However, if it is, because, has already been argued, industry in a modern society is intimately bound into the national political process itself, such a change in the authority structure of the enterprise would have a far-reaching impact. Not only would the opportunities for participation offered in each enterprise greatly increase the individual's control over his own life, but in a wider perspective a participatory system in industry could be expected to influence, indeed transform, the operation of the whole political system.

Appendix to chapter five.

Some political efficacy scales used by writers discussed in this chapter.

The original "political efficacy" scale developed by Campbell et al (1954):

"I don't think public officials care much what people like me think"
 "Voting is the only way people like me can have any say about how the government runs things"
 "People like me don't have any say about what the government does"
 "Sometimes politics and government seems so complicated that people like me can't really understand what's going on"

The questions asked by Almond and Verba (1965, p.141) to measure "subjective competence" were:

"Suppose a law were being considered by (national legislature) that you considered to be unjust or harmful. What do you think you could do?"
 "If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?"
 "If such a case arose, how likely is it you would actually try to do something about it?"

McClosky's (1964) "political futility" scale:

"It's no use worrying my head about political affairs; I can't do anything about them anyhow"
 "The people who really 'run' the country do not even get known to the voters"
 "I feel that my political leaders hardly care what people like myself think or want"
 "Nothing I ever do seems to have any effect upon what happens in politics"
 "Political parties are so big that the average member hasn't got much say about what goes on"
 "There doesn't seem to be much connection between what I want and what my representative does"
 "It seems to me whoever you vote for things go on pretty much the same"

Farris's (1956) "political confidence" scale is the same as Campbell above except for item two.

"So many other people vote in most elections that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not"

McClosky's "political equality" scale provides an interesting comparison:

"The main trouble with democracy is that most people don't really know what's best for them"

"Few people really know what is in their own best interest in the long run"

"'Issues' and 'arguments' are beyond the understanding of most voters"

"Most people don't have enough sense to pick their own leaders wisely"

"It will always be necessary to have a few strong, able people running things"

Some "effectiveness" and "authoritarianism" scales.

Campbell et al, "personal effectiveness" scale:

"I would rather decide things when they come up than always try to plan ahead"

"I seem to be the kind of person that has more bad luck than good luck"

"There's not much use for me to plan ahead because there's usually something that makes me change my plans"

"I have often had the feeling that its no use to try to get anywhere in this life"

The "authoritarian submission" scale from The Authoritarian Personality

"One of the main values of progressive education is that it gives the child great freedom in expressing those natural impulses and desires so often frowned upon by conventional middle class society"

"He is indeed contemptible who does not feel an undying love, gratitude and respect for his parents"

"It is essential for learning or effective work that our teachers or bosses outline in detail what is to be done and how to go about it"

"Every person should have a deep faith in some supernatural force higher than himself to which he gives total allegiance and whose decisions he does not question"

"Sciences like chemistry, physics and medicine have carried men very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind"

"Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn"

"What this country needs is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in"

No sane, normal, decent person could even think of hurting a close friend or relative"

The "power and toughness" scale from TAP.

"Too many people today are living in an unnatural soft way; we should return to the fundamentals, to a more red-blooded active way of life"

"There are some activities so flagrantly un-American that when responsible officials won't take the proper steps, the wide awake citizen should take the law into his own hands"

"No insult to our honour should ever go unpunished"

"To a greater extent than most people realise, our lives are governed by plots hatched in secret by politicians"

"What this country needs is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless devoted leaders whom the people can put their faith in"

Farris's (1956) "authoritarianism" scale

"People can be divided into two classes, the weak and the strong"

"Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publically whipped or worse"

Last and second from last items in TAP "authoritarian submission" scale

Janowitz and Marvick's (1953) "authoritarianism" scale.

"Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict"

"A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk"

"Women should stay out of politics"

"Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power"

"An insult to your honour should not be forgotten"

"People can be trusted"

CHAPTER SIX

THE FEASIBILITY OF LOWER LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN THE WORKPLACE

There is available a body of empirical evidence on participation in the workplace and democracy in industry which has been completely neglected by recent theorists of democracy, although it is relevant to political socialisation and the place of the notion of participation in a modern theory of democracy. The idea of participation has been at the centre of new theories of management produced in recent years and various examples can be found of the introduction of participation into the workplace. Furthermore, questions of what we mean by industrial participation and democracy, and how these might be put into practice are becoming (even since I began work on this study) matters of topical public debate; a fact perhaps best indicated by the title of The Times Management Lecture (May, 1970), which was Industrial Democracy. The important problem of the exact relationship between participation, or rather between the forms that participation can take, and (industrial) democracy itself - the terms are often used very loosely in the current discussion and in earlier management writings - is best left until this empirical material has been examined.

1. The leisure argument.

It might be argued, however, that this further investigation is irrelevant. Although industry has been shown to be vitally important for the development of a sense of political efficacy, and so important for wider, national political participation, the workplace, it might be argued, is coming to occupy an increasingly unimportant place in the life of the ordinary man; leisure is rapidly becoming the focus of his interest and the place where he expects to gain, and can gain, psychological satisfactions. Writers who argue for the central importance of leisure in the life of the ordinary man, point to the fact that many, particularly manual workers, are tending to regard work as something of purely instrumental value and are centring their aspirations on leisure. Thus, it might be suggested that leisure could provide a replacement for work so far as the development of a sense of effectiveness is concerned.¹ However there are considerable difficulties with this

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1. From the viewpoint of the participatory theory of democracy a primarily instrumental attitude to work could be taken as an indication that few opportunities for participation existed. Participation would be expected to lead to a largely intrinsic evaluation of work because of the control over his job and his enterprise that it would give the worker, the interest that it would add to his working life and the psychological satisfactions that would accrue. Arguments similar to those of Argyris, cited in the last chapter, that certain (non-participatory) work environments could lead the worker to re-evaluate work itself on instrumental lines, can be found in e.g. Chinoy (1955) and Lipsitz (1964). In the recent study of the Vauxhall car workers however it is argued that an instrumental attitude is brought to the job rather than the job being the main factor in its development and that the workplace has little influence on

argument.

Even if leisure could replace work in this respect, it would result, as Blauner (1964) points out, in a basic inequity, "a division of society into one segment of consumers who are creative in their leisure time but have meaningless work and a second segment capable of self-realisation in both spheres of life" (p.184) - but this presupposes that the same, or equivalent psychological benefits accrue in both leisure and work, yet there are significant differences between them. The term "leisure" covers a wide range of activities, some of which, especially some hobbies, do closely resemble "work" activities, but they differ in the context in which they are carried on. By "work" we mean

the individuals wider attitudes. (Although Goldthorpe et al were not concerned with the specific political attitudes discussed here). But the points made about the increasing social pressures on the individual to regard his work in a mainly instrumental fashion are compatible with the arguments presented here. The fact that few opportunities exist for the ordinary worker to participate in modern industry and that nothing in his typical experiences leads him to expect much more from his work than the opportunity to earn as much as he can (decision making is the 'prerogative' of management, and the monotony and limited scope of the average rank and file job in a modern economy have been well documented) all this, it might be argued, provides the precise industrial environment that makes the commercial and 'leisure time' pressures to make money the main consideration in work so compelling. (This is not to say, of course, that in a participatory situation, money would be unimportant. The worker would still have the perfectly laudable desire to provide the best that he could for his family).

not just the activity that provides for most people the major determinant of their status in the world, or the occupation that the individual follows 'full time' and that provides him with his livelihood. We refer also to activities that are carried on in co-operation with others, that are intimately related to the wider society and its needs; thus we refer to activities that, potentially, involve the individual in decisions about collective affairs, the affairs of the enterprise and of the community, (i.e. are public affairs) in a way that leisure time activities most usually do not. But even if some hobbies might have the same psychological effects as Blauner indicates accrue to the (printer) craftsman, all leisure activities are not hobbies, many - most - do not involve the production of anything by the individual, rather he consumes, so that the activity as well as the context is different.

More importantly the "leisure argument" ignores the argument of the theorists of participatory democracy that individual attitudes and forms of authority structure of institutions are inter-related; if a certain kind of industrial authority structure can affect political participation then might it not affect leisure as well? This kind of link has been suggested by several writers. For example, Bell (1960 p.233), who writes that "'conspicuous loafing' is the hostile gesture of a tired working class", and

Friedman (1961), who argues that

"that fragmentation of labour does not always cause the worker to seek leisure activities of greater scope in order to compensate for his frustrations. It may tend instead to disorganise the rest of his life" (p.113),

and who regards "killing time" as a general feature of mass behaviour at the present time. Riesman (1956 and 1964) has changed his mind about what he wrote on leisure in The Lonely Crowd and more recently has argued that both work and leisure must be "meaningful", (see also Mills, 1963). Also to be taken into account is the significant fact that those persons who participate most in "meaningful" leisure (in voluntary organisations and the like) are largely drawn from the middle class, i.e. are just those persons most likely to work in an environment conducive to the development of a sense of effectiveness. But even if this whole argument about the importance of leisure as opposed to work looked more plausible it would still be an argument more applicable to the (distant?) future than the present; most people, at least in Britain, have very little leisure time and there are no very clear indications that this is likely to change very dramatically in the foreseeable future.²

2. See Boston (1968). Many workers seem more keen to work extra overtime than to increase their leisure. The speed at which automation is likely to be introduced on a wide scale also often tends to be over-estimated, see Blumberg (1968), p.55).

Moreover, even if the working day for most people were greatly reduced, this extra leisure, when regarded from the perspective of the participatory theory of democracy, could not provide a replacement for participation in the workplace. The fact that business organisations in modern society are woven into the fabric of the national political sphere means that if the individual turns his back on decisions taken in the workplace he is giving up a major channel of control over his own life and environment (and hence part of his political freedom). Finally, it must be repeated that the participatory theory of democracy regards industry as a political system in its own right, and participation there as part of the individual's political participation and a good in itself - irrespective of whether similar opportunities can or cannot be found in the sphere of leisure.

ii. Some examples of lower level participation.

In the evidence cited in the last chapter from Blauner's Alienation and Freedom on the psychological impact of different work situations, the crucial variable distinguished was the amount of control that the individual could exercise over his job and immediate job environment; those individuals who could exercise little or no control tended to lack a sense of (political) efficacy. The close connection between control and participation has been

emphasised in the discussion of the participatory theory of democracy, but it is fairly obvious that the scope of both could vary widely in an industrial enterprise. If the individual worker is to have control over his own job and immediate job environment then, clearly, he will need to participate in those decisions that directly affect his work and the way in which he carries it out. However, it is quite possible for him to participate at this level of the enterprise without necessarily participating in making decisions that have a wider scope; that is, he can participate at the lower management level in decisions relating to the day to day shop floor activity, without participating in higher level decisions relating to the running of the whole enterprise, decisions on investment, marketing and so on. The theory of participatory democracy involves participation at both management levels and evidence on both will be considered. In this chapter I shall deal with participation at the lower level, (which as already shown is extremely important for the development of the sense of political efficacy), in order to come to some conclusions about the feasibility of its introduction on a large scale.

All the available evidence shows that most workers in industrialised countries do desire a fairly large measure of control over their jobs at the lower management level; although, as far as research into participation generally is concerned, as Hespe and Little (1970, p.1) have noted,

"remarkably little research has so far been done, particularly in Great Britain, on what attitudes groups of shop-floor employees actually hold towards various schemes of participation and their responses to and preferences for the various kinds already tried or suggested".

In a survey carried out in Norway covering over 1100 non-supervisory workers in Oslo, 56% of the blue-collar workers and 67% of the white-collar felt that they would like to participate more in "decisions that directly concerned my own work and working conditions" (Holter, 1965, p.301, Table 2). In Britain Hespe and Little are currently engaged in an investigation of the "propensity to participate" of workers in six different organisations. So far five have been studied, a public service organisation, two steel firms (one nationalised), a colliery and a wire-mill. In all these different organisations a widespread desire exists among workers for participation in decisions that affect their own jobs.³ Again in a study of 5700 workers in heavy industry in the U.S.A. it was found that over half wanted more say in the way in which the work was carried out (cited Blumberg, 1968, p.115).

There is also some indirect evidence on this topic. First, in Britain, from the trend which strikes have taken since the war.

3. Hespe and Little (1970, Table IV and Table 1). The workers under 26 years of age were the least interested in this level of participation, see Table 11.

Strikes over other than wage demands, particularly strikes relating to working arrangements, rules and discipline, now total about three-quarters of all stoppages; that is, most strikes are now over issues that, broadly, relate to "control". Turner (1963, p.18) has commented that it could be said that these strikes all "involve attempts to submit managerial discretion and authority to agreed ... rules; alternatively that they reflect an implicit pressure for more democracy and individual rights in industry".

Second, the same desire for more participation at the lower level can be seen reflected in the (voluminous) material on job satisfaction. It might be supposed that most workers would be dissatisfied with jobs that allowed them to exercise very little control but in fact just the opposite appears to be the case; all the evidence shows that most workers are satisfied with their jobs. But this evidence of general satisfaction is now being interpreted rather more cautiously than it often was in the past. As Goldthorpe has recently remarked, "results of this kind have in fact been several times achieved in cases where other evidence has indicated fairly clearly that the workers in question

experienced quite severe deprivations in performing their jobs".⁴ More significant are the reasons given for disliking a job; the main one is that the individual can exercise very little control over what he does or the conditions under which he does it. This applies particularly to the most extreme case (as can be seen from Blauner's study) of the "man on the track". Those assembly line workers who do find the job satisfactory often give as a reason that they are able to build up banks of work, i.e. they find a way to exercise an element of control. In general it is found that satisfaction expressed with a job declines as skill level declines, and the least skilled jobs would be the least likely to involve opportunity for controlling the work process.⁵

4. Goldthorpe et al (1968, p.11). There are various reasons for this odd fact. Work meets a whole multitude of human needs including those for sheer activity and social intercourse; it is also difficult for a worker to admit he dislikes his job and not threaten his self-respect, he is "condemned out of his own mouth for not bestirring himself to find more congenial work", (Flanders et al 1968, p.120-1, see also Blauner 1960). One also finds workers making comments like "if I didn't enjoy (work) I would be miserable" (Zwieg 1961, p.77). The latter provides also an example of the uncritical interpretation of the "satisfaction" finding when he says "the syndrome 'Unhappy Worker' may have been a fact in the past ... but there is very little of it in modern, well-organised and well-run industrial establishments" (p.79). An interesting theory about job satisfaction which throws light on these findings can be found in Hertzberg (1959) and (1968).

5. This last finding holds for the U.S.S.R. as well, see Hertzberg (1959, p.164-5). On the assembly line worker see Walker and Guest (1952, p.58ff) and the comments in Goldthorpe et al (1968, p.23).

Blauner, (1960, p.353) has remarked that "the fact that surrender of such control seems to be the most important condition of strong dissatisfaction (is a finding) at least as important as the overall one of general satisfaction".

The reason for the interest in job satisfaction and its relationship to the amount of control that the worker can exercise over his job and immediate work environment is a significant one given the argument of the last chapter about the crucial importance of the workplace in the development of a participatory political culture. It is precisely because of the adverse psychological effects of this lack of control that so much attention has been paid to it, and to job satisfaction. The worker's satisfaction with his job has been found to be closely related to his morale, to his efficiency and productivity, and hence to the efficiency of the whole enterprise. One of the methods used to attempt to increase the workers satisfaction is through the process of job enlargement. A job is "enlarged" when its content is increased and, according to a management specialist, there are three major assumptions behind this idea: it will enable the worker to use more of his abilities, give him more control and so increase output; secondly, it will create greater interest and so increase satisfaction and finally it will help overcome "the inability to secure from the rank and file any real feeling of participation in the affairs of

a business or enduring concern for its success" (Stephens, 1962). A typical example of job enlargement is provided by the reorganisation of the jobs of girls on an assembly line so that they performed nine operations instead of just one, did their own inspection, and obtained some of their own supplies.⁶

Job enlargement can be seen as a rudimentary example of one form of, or as a step towards, participation in the workplace. In fact, the larger job enlargement experiments are almost indistinguishable in form from the more minor examples of experiments that are explicitly labelled "participation" experiments and this is because the same hypothesis about the amount of control that the individual can exercise over his work and his psychological attitude underlies both. Various participation experiments have been carried out over the past three decades, both as a result of deliberate management policy and as a result of initiatives from the workers concerned, and the accounts of these experiments, previously rather inaccessible, have now been gathered together and summarised by Blumberg in Chapter 5 of his recent book Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation (1968). As he points out, these participation experiments have taken place in a wide variety of organisational settings

6. Guest (1962). Stephens (1962) provides several varied examples; see also Blumberg (1968, pp. 66-8) Friedman (1961) Chapter IV, and Walker (1962, Part 2, §4).

"including boys' clubs, women's organisations, college classrooms, factories of many different kinds, offices, stores, scientific laboratories, and so on. Similarly, they have been conducted upon a tremendous variety of persons differing in age, sex, education, income, occupation, and power. They have involved young boys, housewives, college students, manual workers at different levels of skill and in diverse types of factories, supervisors at different levels, clerical workers, salesmen, and scientists" (p.75).

In these industrial participation experiments an increase in worker participation has invariably been found to have beneficial results. For instance, in one of the best known, four groups of workers were selected in a garment factory. In two groups, all the members participated in the reorganisation of their job on the basis of a plan presented by the management. In another group they participated through representatives and in the fourth no participation at all occurred. The result was that in the latter group there was hostility, a fall in output and some workers left the factory. In the two "total participation" groups, in contrast, the atmosphere was co-operative and production increased. (Coehtland French, 1948; Blumberg pp 80-84). The common feature of all the experiments cited by Blumberg is that they enabled workers to decide for themselves matters previously reserved for a unilateral (lower) management decision, matters such as the speed of work, the allocation of work, how a change in the job is to be organised and so on. The important thing is the psychological effect that this participation had on the participants; in effect, in these experiments the worker's position was transformed into one analagous to

that of the craftsman as described by Blauner, and had a similar effect on the sense of confidence and effectiveness.

However, although the examples in Blumberg's book do involve an increase in participation in decision making by workers, they are all examples of rather small, short term experiments, involving few workers and relatively minor decisions, and, more importantly, the overall structure of authority in the enterprise is not affected at all. A major defect of Blumberg's book is that though he has conveniently collected together these examples of experiments in participation, he has not set these within the context of an analysis of the concept of (industrial) participation itself and so does not discriminate sufficiently between the various examples nor systematically relate the small scale participation experiments to his discussion of participation on a very much larger scale in the chapter devoted to the organisation of industry in Yugoslavia.

He has also overlooked some important material on industrial participation which provides an example of a different form of participation from that in the participation experiments material. The latter provides an example of what I shall later distinguish as "partial participation" but there is also evidence available which illustrates that what I shall call "full participation" is possible at the lower level. The significant difference here is that in

the latter situation groups of workers are largely self-disciplining and a considerable transformation of the authority structure of the enterprise takes place, at least at the level of the everyday work process. Moreover, in the examples that follow, not only do groups of workers exercise full control over their work over a wide area, but they do so not as part of an experiment but in the course of their day to day work; indeed, their work is organised on precisely that basis.

These examples are of interest also for quite a different reason. If, as argued in the participatory theory of democracy, a necessary condition for a democratic polity is that individuals can participate in all political systems, then, given that we wish to develop such a polity, the problem arises of how we might make the transition from the existing position to a participatory system. One way, in the industrial sphere at least, might be gradually to increase the scope of participation by the ordinary worker from the lower to the higher management level. In fact this is very close to the policy that Cole advocated for making the transition to guild socialism; he saw this transition coming about through a policy of "encroaching control". This policy was directed

"not to the admission of the workers to the conjoint exercise of a common control with the employer but to the transference of certain functions completely from the employer to the workers" (1920b, p.156).

The means through which this transfer would take place was the collective contract; collective bargaining would be extended over a much wider field than at present and give the workers new powers. A contract would be negotiated by all the workers in a particular shop or enterprise under which the workers collectively would control such matters as hiring and firing, pace of output and choice of foreman, and they would, as a group, be responsible for discipline and would receive a lump (collective) payment which would be shared out by the men in an agreed distribution.⁷ That this sort of arrangement and this sort of participation by workers is quite feasible is shown by examples drawn from two very different industries.

Collective arrangements have been a traditional feature of British mining, and the modern form, in the Durham coalfields, has been the subject of intensive and detailed study in recent years, the study initially being prompted by the large amount of stress illness to be found among miners.⁸ Under the traditional working

7. See e.g. Cole (1920b, pp 154-7) and (1920a, p.198ff).

8. The work was carried out by the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations within the framework of a concept developed by them, that of the "socio-technical system". The relevance of this concept to the present discussion is obvious; from this viewpoint a productive system is seen not just in terms of a technological process, but as a system of three inter-related variables, the technological, the economic and the socio-psychological. The form of work-organisation and its social and psychological properties are seen as independent of, though limited by, the technology. (see e.g. Trist and Emery 1962).

methods the miner, the collier, supervised himself and was directly responsible for production; the role of the deputy was one of service rather than supervision. Post-war, a form of work organisation had been adopted, known as conventional longwall working, that was based on mass production methods and the division of labour. It was from this form of work organisation that the investigators saw the deleterious psychological effects arising. In particular, this method meant that co-ordination and control had to be provided externally, by the management, and this implied a degree of coercion that was completely out of place in a high-risk situation. (Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Trist et al 1963, p.289ff). But there was also another form of work organisation available, one that had its roots in the traditional mining methods, the composite longwall method; this involved a form of collective contract and the abolition of the rigid division of labour, the workers operating as a self-regulating group. This has been described as follows,

"the group takes over complete responsibility for the total cycle of operations involved in mining at the coal face. No member of the group has a fixed work role. Instead, the men deploy themselves, depending on the requirements of the on-going group task. Within the limits of technology and safety requirements they are free to evolve their own way of organising and carrying out their task. They are not subject to any external authority in this respect, nor is there within the group itself any member who takes over a formal directive leadership function ... The all-in wage agreement is ... based on the negotiated price per ton of coal produced by the team. The income obtained is divided equally among the team members" (Herbst, 1962, p.4).

Under the composite longwall system productivity was higher than under the conventional longwall method and it was more conducive to "low cost, work satisfaction, good relations and social health" (Trist et al 1963, p.291). For two years, groups of forty to fifty miners operated in this way and at the end of that time were, in the opinion of the investigators, still growing "in their capacity to adapt to changes in their task environment and to satisfy the needs of their members".⁹

If miners, and mining, might be thought to be in some sense exceptional, there is a second example of this form of participation to be found in the car industry. In his book Decision-making and Productivity (1958), Melman gives an account of the gang system of work organisation that operated at the Standard car plant at Coventry in the early 1950's. Although the tasks that each worker performed were very much the same as at any other car assembly plant the form of work organisation was quite different,

9. Trist et. al. (1963, p. XIII). An experiment in the reorganisation of work in a textile mill in India using self-regulating groups of workers was also successfully carried out, see Rice (1958). J.S. Mill also mentions a collective contract among Cornish miners of his time and noted that this system produced "a degree of intelligence, independence and moral elevation, which raises the condition and character of the Cornish miner far above that of the generality of the labouring class" (Mill, 1965 Bk. IV, Chapter VII, §5, p. 769).

being based on self-regulating groups similar to those in the composite longwall method of mining. (Hence the name "gang system"). In 1953 in the motor vehicle plant the workers were grouped into fifteen, self-recruiting gangs, and in the tractor plant all 3,000 workers operated as one gang, payment being on the basis of the occupational rate plus a bonus based on gang output as a whole. Under this system the workers "are not only production employees carrying out ... occupational tasks. They are also active as formulators of decisions on production which they themselves execute" (1958, p. 92). A car worker describing the gang system said that it "provides a natural frame of security, it gives confidence, shares money equally, uses all degrees of skill without distinction and enables jobs to be allocated to the man or woman best suited to them, the allocation frequently being made by the workers themselves" (Wright, 1961, p.50). Melman concluded that under the gang system

"thousands of workers operated virtually without supervision, as conventionally understood, and at high productivity; the highest wage in British industry was paid; high quality products were produced at acceptable prices in extensively mechanised plants; the management conducted its affairs at unusually low costs; also workers had a substantial role in production decision making" (1958, p.5).

The collective self-regulation exercised by these groups of workers in the mining and car industries puts them into a situation analagous to that of the crew in the continuous process

chemical plant discussed by Blauner and could thus be expected to have a similar favourable impact on the sense of (political) efficacy. That the car industry could be transformed in this way is of particular interest for we have already seen that the technology of that industry combined with the orthodox authority structure produces a very unfavourable situation for the development of the sense of effectiveness. The evidence from the participation experiments and these two examples of wider participation at the lower management level suggest that a modification of the orthodox industrial authority structure to allow widespread participation by workers at that level is feasible and that this would not hinder the efficiency of the enterprise. Indeed, the evidence so far, and much modern management theory indicate that it might well improve efficiency.

iii Participation and management theory.

There is also another body of material relevant to participation in the workplace (albeit that it is often concerned with what I shall distinguish later as pseudo-participation); this further reinforces points made already, but its interest lies largely in the support that it gives to the subsidiary hypotheses about participation in the theory of participatory democracy. Much of recent management theory stressing participation is based on the results of experiments into the effects of different styles of

supervision in the workplace. In the late 1930's a very famous series of small-group experiments was undertaken, under the direction of Lewin, that seemed to show that a "democratic" form of leadership was more effective than an "authoritarian" or "laissez faire" form. The superiority arose from the psychological effects of the element of participation in the "democratic" form; this enhanced the morale of the group, its harmony and co-operation, individuals' interest in the task etc.¹⁰ These experiments gave rise to others on supervisory styles and accounts of these, and their effects, can be found in Blumberg's book (1968, pp 102-119). Usually "close" and "general" or "participatory" styles are contrasted. The latter seem to be related

"to a whole cluster of other traits, such as tendencies to delegate authority, not to impose pressure on subordinates, and to permit freedom of conduct to employees ... under general supervision workers are freer to use their own initiative, to make more decisions concerning their job, and to implement those decisions" (Blumberg, p.103.)

That is, the "participatory" style of supervision gives rise to a situation, and to effects, similar to those created by job enlargement or the participation experiments.

The advocacy by management theorists of the participatory style of supervision rests on its favourable effect, through its psychological impact, on the harmony and co-operation of the work

10. There are various account of these experiments. See e.g. White and Lippitt (1960).

group - and so on efficiency. That is to say, these experiments offer support to the argument in the participatory theory of democracy that participation has an integrative effect and aids the acceptance of decisions. In the participation experiment briefly described on p236 the point of the exercise was to secure the acceptance by the workers of a change that management proposed in their work arrangements by letting the workers themselves decide how this change was to be put into effect. A similar hypothesis about the introduction of change underlies a large number of the small group experiments; they have been used to test what Verba (1961, p.206) calls "the participation hypothesis", namely that

"significant changes in human behaviour can be brought about rapidly only if the persons who are expected to change participate in deciding what the change shall be and how it shall be made".

In view of the emphasis in Rousseau's theory on the importance of the impersonal nature of the decision making process and its relationship to the individual acceptance of collective decisions, it is interesting that this is one of the factors that Verba picks out as significant in these small group experiments. The 'impersonality' of a process where each individual in the group could observe the others making an 'internalised' commitment to a decision was an important contribution to group harmony and co-operation (pp 173-5; pp 227-8).

Finally, these small group and participation experiments are also relevant to the question of "authoritarianism". It was argued above that in large part at least what is involved in "authoritarianism" can be seen as just one aspect of the non-participation syndrome, the lack of a feeling of effectiveness being particularly important in producing the "authoritarian" responses. Some of these experiments illustrate that a change to a more participatory authority structure in the workplace can help diminish "authoritarianism". Blumberg (1968, p.109) points out that the famous Lewin experiments showed that "personality traits ... were dependent variables, significantly altered by the organisation of the group into authoritarian, democratic or laissez-faire structures". And such an argument about the 'dependence' of personality traits on forms of authority structure is, of course, an important part of a modern theory of participatory democracy. An experiment very relevant to this argument was one that measured the result of clerical workers operating for a year in a more participatory situation than previously. There was found to be a decrease in the potency of "hierarchical trends" in their personalities and the "autonomous trends" had more opportunity for expression; "the data seem to indicate that measurable change can be affected by a persisting change in environmental conditions. Furthermore, the change seems partly explicable in terms of the movement of personality toward equilibrium with its environment" (Tannenbaum, 1957.) Or, as Blumberg puts it,

"a structure of participation ... in the long run becomes more effective because of the eventual compatability of personality with structure. In other words, the organisation that permits participation ultimately produces individuals who are responsible (sic) to participation" (p.109).

The experiments on different styles of supervision have, as noted, been a major influence on much recent management theory. This presents a striking contrast to more orthodox management theory which has its roots in Taylor's doctrines of "scientific management" and stresses the pyramid shaped authority structure, the chain of command, the span of control etc. Other influences on the theories of writers like McGregor in The Human Side of Enterprise and Likert in New Patterns of Management are the psychological theories of Maslow which focus on the individual's need for "self-actualisation" and, importantly, the whole human relations tradition in management which stems from the famous Hawthorne experiments.¹¹ Indeed, these more recent theorists are sometimes referred to as neo-human relationists, and, like their

11. The reports of the Hawthorne experiments have recently been subjected to a searching examination by Carey (1967), who concludes, after some stringent criticisms of the way in which they were conducted, that "the limitations of the Hawthorne studies clearly render them incapable of yielding serious support for any sort of generalisation whatever". Blumberg devotes two chapters of his book to a reinterpretation of the Hawthorne studies, but it would seem as dubious to use this material in support of a thesis about participation as in support of anything else.

forerunners they emphasise the need for the right interpersonal "climate" between management and labour within the enterprise. Likert argues that for real efficiency the management structure should be built round work groups whose supervisors adopt a participative style, or in Likert's terminology, according to the principle of "supportive relationships". Each group is linked into the overall organisation through supervisors "who hold overlapping group membership. The superior in one group is a subordinate in the next group, and so on through the organisation" (p.105). He argues that "different levels in the organisation should not be thought of in terms of more or less authority but rather as co-ordinating or linking larger or smaller numbers of work groups".¹² If this form of organisation is to be effective then, Likert stresses, the flow of communication has to be downward and sideways as well as upward; "the giving and sharing of information is an essential step in the process of participation" (p.243).

12. Likert (1961, p.186). Likert emphasises that it is necessary for the supervisor in one group to be able to participate in the other group to which he belongs. If he does not, expectations and aspirations may be raised through participation in his own group which cannot then be met because of his own lack of influence. In such circumstances a participatory supervisory style may lead to dissatisfaction (p.113). See also Blumberg (1968, pp 116-7).

Under the impact of the need to keep up with rapid technological change these theories are gradually being taken up in day-to-day management practice. In The Human Side of Enterprise, McGregor argues that, for maximum efficiency, needs of the individual worker must be met that, in the usual (lower) management situation, are disregarded; that is, needs such as those for self-esteem and recognition for ones contribution to the work-task. McGregor acted as consultant to ICI and this Theory Y, as he calls it, has played a large part in the introduction of a widespread scheme of job enlargement and a participative style of management in ICI factories, especially in the British Nylon Spinners plant at Gloucester. (See The Times, Sept. 8, 1970). So, far from lower level participation in the workplace being a completely unrealistic notion, it is advocated by many modern management theorists, and is beginning to be recognised, and adopted, as the most efficient way of organising production. Thus Cole would not seem to be alone in his view that there are reserves of initiative in the ordinary worker which the existing system leaves untapped but which would be released under a participatory system.

Blumberg (1968, p.123) has stated of the evidence of (lower level) participation in the workplace that

"there is hardly a study in the entire literature which fails to demonstrate that satisfaction in work is enhanced or other generally acknowledged beneficial consequences accrue from a genuine increase in worker's decision making power. Such consistency of findings, I submit, is rare in social research".

This is quite true, it is difficult to find anything that suggests otherwise (I have not done so).¹³ Partly this may be due to the fact that a multiplicity of effects are involved; exactly how beneficial it seems may depend on one's precise focus of interest. But the important point is that there are no effects that would render lower level participation impracticable. The desire of workers for participation at this level, and the interest beginning to be shown by management, means that a favourable situation exists for the widespread introduction of lower level participation. In other words, all the evidence indicates that it is feasible to establish at least part of the necessary conditions for a participatory political culture. The evidence also shows that more than one kind of participation at the lower management level is possible, and in the light of this evidence the relationship between the various forms of participation in the workplace and democracy in industry can now be explored.

13. Blumberg (1968, pp 131-3) notes, and counters, some objections to participation in the workplace. The evidence from the car and mining industries, which Blumberg does not include, illustrates that one criticism, that participation is only effective in unit or craft settings is misplaced. Whether or not participation is useful in crisis situations (which itself tends to be taken for granted) is largely irrelevant for our purposes, since we are interested in the everyday situation of participation in the workplace. Further difficulties relating to higher level participation will be dealt with later.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRACY IN INDUSTRY

i. Conceptual clarification.

There is a good deal of confusion about what exactly is involved in participation in the workplace and how this relates to democracy in industry. In much of the literature on participation in management definitions offered are very imprecise, giving no real indication of the scope of participation or of the level of management at which it takes place.¹ McGregor (1960, p.124), for example, after remarking that "participation is one of the most misunderstood ideas that have emerged from the field of human relations", goes on to say that participation

"consists basically in creating opportunities under suitable conditions for people to influence decisions affecting them. That influence can vary from a little to a lot ... (participation) is a special case of delegation in which the subordinate gains greater control, greater freedom of choice, with respect to his own responsibilities. The term participation is usually applied to the subordinate's greater influence over matters within the superior's responsibilities" (p.126 and p.130).

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1. This vagueness is not confined to advocates of industrial participation, it is quite general as far as 'participation' is concerned. For example, in an article in The Times recently, the Director of the housing pressure group Shelter stated that, "participation to me is primarily the ability or opportunity to fulfil oneself as a contributing member of a progressive community" (Wilson, 1969).

Both McGregor and Likert (1961) present continua of situations to which the term 'participative' can be applied. McGregor's (pp 126-7) continuum ranges from a situation of "little" participation, where subordinates can question a manager about a decision, to a situation where the manager is indifferent to several alternatives so that employees can choose between them. Likert's (p.243) continuum covers a wider range, from a situation where "no information (is) given to employees, either about the current situation or in advance of proposed changes" to one of a "lot" of participation where "subordinates and leader functioning as a group tackle the problem and solve it, using the best available methods for group functioning".

Lammers (1967, p.205) says that participation in decision making is

"the totality of such forms of upward exertion of power by subordinates in organisations as are perceived to be legitimate by themselves and their superiors".

Perhaps more typical is the definition offered by Sawtell (1968, p.1),

"participation is any or all of the processes by which employees other than managers contribute positively towards the reaching of managerial decisions which affect their work".

The International Institute for Labour Studies is currently studying worker participation in management in a variety of countries² and 'participation' has been analysed rather more carefully in their work. Walker (1968, p.142 and 1970, pp 12 and 29) has distinguished three forms of participation: integrated, which involves "a modification of the internal, formal organisation of the undertaking"; bargaining, "through the interaction of the undertaking with another formal organisation, the union"; third, informal participation, "for example adoption of a 'participative' decision-sharing style of management by a supervisor". While these distinctions tell us more about participation than the other definitions quoted, Walker's discussion does not deal satisfactorily with the relationship between participation and democracy in industry; the two terms tend to be treated as synonyms. This is a very common mistake which only a more satisfactory analysis will rectify.

It is probably not surprising that writers on management usually do not discriminate more carefully between different 'participative' situations, for their interest in it arises because of the contribution that participation can make to greater

2. Reports have so far been published in the Institutes Bulletin on Poland, India, France, Germany and the U.S.A. Other countries covered in the study; Israel, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Spain, U.A.R. Yugoslavia and Great Britain.

efficiency in the enterprise; for them it is just another technique to achieve this end.³ In ordinary speech we do use the word 'participation' in a wide sense to cover almost any situation where some minimal amount of interaction takes place, often implying little more than that a particular person was present at a group activity. In talking of industrial participation we mean much more than this. As Walker and de Bellecombe (1967, p.68) put it, "the basic idea is obviously that the people who are managed should have some say about the decisions which affect them". That is, industrial participation involves a modification, to a greater or lesser degree, of the orthodox authority structure, namely one where decision making is the 'prerogative' of management, and the managed play no part. But writers on participation are often talking not of a system of decision making at all, but of a technique to persuade employees to accept decisions that have already been made by the management. Many of the supervisory and small group experiments took this form; the leader (supervisor) allowed the group to discuss decisions, created a feeling of participation and thus got his decisions fully accepted. Following Verba (1961) I shall refer to this technique as pseudo participation.

3. Cf. Kilroy-Silk's (1970, p.173) comment on the Labour Party's report on Industrial Democracy; it is, he states, "more concerned with creating an efficient industry and a dynamic economy than industrial democracy per se".

As he points out, in these cases 'participation' is

"limited to member endorsements of decisions made by the leader who ... is neither selected by the group nor responsible to the group for his actions ... the group leader has a particular goal in mind and uses the group discussion as a means of inducing acceptance of the goal"

He adds that it is in the field of industrial psychology in particular that "participatory leadership has become a technique of persuasion rather than of decision".⁴

Having distinguished pseudo participation (and Walker's category of informal participation would often involve no more than this) we can now turn to participation in decision making itself. A useful starting point is provided by a definition offered by French, Israel and Aas (1960, p.3). Participation in industry refers to

"a process in which two or more parties influence each other in making plans, policies or decisions. It is restricted to decisions that have future effects on all those making the decisions and on those represented by them."

This definition, they point out, excludes situations where individual A merely takes part in a group activity, where A is given information on a decision affecting him before it is

4. Verba (1961, pp 220-1). cf. Bell's comment on the human relations management school; "the ends of the enterprise remain, but the methods have shifted and the older modes of overt coercion are now replaced by psychological persuasion" (1960, p.244). See also Tannenbaum (1968, p.10 and p.20).

executed and where A is present at a meeting but has no influence. That is, it excludes situations of pseudo participation. This definition is useful because in its reference to 'influence' and 'parties' it illustrates a widespread confusion about participation (and industrial democracy). This view assumes that the most that 'participation' can mean, or what 'industrial democracy' refers to, is a situation where one of two existing parties or 'sides', in industry, the workers, can 'influence' to a greater or lesser degree the decisions taken by the other 'side', namely management. The only alternatives are assumed to be "shared" decision making or unilateral decision making by one side or the other. This view is common to both writers on management (see e.g. Sawtell, 1968, p.3 and p.28) and advocates of worker's control as this, rather extreme, passage from Can the Workers Run Industry (Coates, 1968, p.228) illustrates. "Participation has the closest and ugliest relationship with a whole train of mean and sleazy predecessors in the sequence of devices for 'heading off' a growing working class demand for control". This overlooks the fact that participation and control do not represent alternatives, rather there can be no control without participation, how much control depending on the form that participation takes and this may be such as to abolish the two 'sides' in the existing sense.

"Power" Laswell and Kaplan (1950, p.75) have said, "is participation in the making of decisions". In the definitions quoted 'influence' not 'power' is referred to in connection with participation and although the two terms are closely related they are not synonymous. To be in a position to influence a decision is not the same as being in a position to (having the power to) determine (control) the outcome of that decision or to make that decision. Following Partridge (1963, p.111) we can say that 'influence' is applicable to a situation where individual A affects individual B without B subordinating his wishes to those of A. That is to say, A has influence over B and over the decision that B has to make but it is B that has the power finally to decide. Within the orthodox industrial authority structure the final power to decide is the 'prerogative' of one of the sides, management; the workers may be able to influence that decision, to participate, but they remain permanent subordinates. This type of participatory situation I shall refer to as partial participation and the French, Israel and Aas definition can thus be amended to read that

partial participation is a process in which two or more parties influence each other in the making of decisions but the final power to decide rests with one party only.⁵

Some of the examples of participation in the last chapter were of (lower level) partial participation - it can take place at either, or both, management levels. The most usual way in which workers (through their representatives) participate in this way is through the normal collective bargaining process (Walker's participation through bargaining). In Britain the scope of collective bargaining is fairly narrow, generally being restricted to matters of wages, job conditions and security etc and rarely impinging upon the most important higher level decisions. In the U.S.A. it can cover a wider field; "in a small but not negligible number of cases collective agreements concluded in the US contain mutual undertakings on such points as technological change, which

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5. In practice it might be difficult in a particular case to decide whether pseudo or partial participation had taken place, but the theoretical distinction is clear. It is important that partial participation should be distinguished from situations where influence occurs but no participation at all takes place. This is the case of Friedrich's anticipated reactions. Management might exclude a theoretical possibility from the list of alternatives from which a decision is to be made, say a wage cut, because union strength puts it out of the question. Here the union has 'influenced' the final decision but no participation has taken place. Verba's (1967, p.55) definition of "democratic participation" is of interest here: "acts by those not formally empowered to make decisions - the acts being intended to influence the behaviour of those who have such decisional power".

are generally considered to be matters on which the employer alone should decide" (Walker, 1967, p.71).⁶

Along with the examples of partial participation in chapter six there were also two examples of another form, those of the collective contract in the car and mining industries. It will be recalled that in those industries groups of workers operated virtually unsupervised by management and made their own (lower level) decisions about how the work was to be done. In this type of situation there are not two sides to the decision but a group of (equal) individuals who all participate in the decision making process. Situations of this type I shall call situations of

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6. In April 1970 an Industrial Relations Bill was presented to Parliament (by the now-defeated Labour Government) that would have given unions rights to commercial information about enterprises. This may or may not have eventually encouraged them to extend the range of their collective bargaining. Walker (1970, p.28) remarks that "historically, the trend of collective bargaining has been towards increased intervention in the enterprise", but although British unions have 'encroached' on management in areas such as safety regulations they have never followed Cole's plan of a gradual change in the authority structure of industry through "encroaching control". Indeed, it has been stated that the trend of productivity bargaining (which could be used to bargain for control) has been to entrench management control more fully (Sunday Times, 29 March 1970). Russell (1938, p.124) characterised the power of management in these terms; "the power of the industrialist ... rests in the last analysis, upon the lock out, that is to say, upon the fact that the owner of a factory can call upon the forces of the state to prevent unauthorised persons from entering it". More recently, the whole idea of management 'prerogatives' has been attacked on both legal and theoretical grounds, (see Chamberlain, 1958, chap. 12, and 1963; Young 1963; Chandler, 1964). See also the discussion in Walker (1970, pp 16-21) based on the notion of the enterprise as a socio-technical system. For a defence of managerial prerogatives as deriving from the "nature of man" see (O'Donnell 1952).

full participation, namely

a process where each individual member of a decision making body has equal power to determine the outcome of decisions.

It has been shown that this form of participation is possible at the lower level; the crucial question for the participatory theory of democracy, of course, is whether it is feasible at the higher level also.

It is now possible to turn to the question of the relationship between these forms of participation and democracy in industry. The term 'democracy' is used just as loosely as 'participation' in the literature (or, as Kilroy-Silk (1970, p.169) notes, is not defined at all). As already observed the two are often taken to be, or treated as, synonymous, so that democracy, like participation, is used to refer not to a feature of the structure of authority in the enterprise, but to the general "climate" that exists, a climate created by the method of approach of the supervisor. That is, 'democracy' is often applied to situations of pseudo-participation, or used merely to indicate that a friendly atmosphere exists. Kariel, in a criticism of the Lewin experiments, says that the assumption was that democracy would "result naturally from a person-to-person feeling in tolerant and generous community living".⁷

7. (Kariel 1956, p.288). The original experiments that are held to show the superiority of the 'democratic' method of leadership were actually with ten year old boys. Essentially all they did was to put the boys in the child-centred environment that they might find today in a modern school, staffed by teachers familiar with up-to-date teaching methods and educational psychology. Walker (1970, p.23) distinguishes four forms of industrial democracy: democratisation of ownership, democratisation of the government of the enterprise; democratisation of the terms of employment; democratisation of management. A discussion of the question of ownership would take us too far from the main theme

It is also often claimed that industrial democracy already exists in industrialised Western countries. Perhaps the best known expression of this view is that of one of the foremost British experts on industrial relations, H. A. Clegg, in his book A New Approach to Industrial Democracy (1960). It is especially interesting that Clegg bases his arguments on the work of the advocates of the contemporary theory of democracy, but his statement that "in all the stable democracies there is a system of industrial relations which can fairly be called the industrial parallel of political democracy" (p.131) is simply not correct. Clegg argues that recent democratic theory has shown that the main requirement for democracy is the existence of an opposition (p.19) - competing teams of leaders. In industry, he argues, this opposition is provided by the unions with the management performing the role of 'government'. The latter analogy is perfectly acceptable, but the wider comparison of the authority structure of industry with that of existing democratic systems is not a valid one. As several commentators have pointed out, here in the words of Ostergaard, in industry

of this study, but some further examples of participation, below, show that there are alternatives other than 'private ownership' or 'total nationalisation'. An interesting recent discussion on ownership can be found in Derrick and Phipps (1969, pp 1-35). Walker's other three forms are all necessarily involved in the democratisation of industry and do not form three distinct categories of democracy.

"the government (the management) is permanently in office, is self recruiting, and is not accountable to anyone, except formally to the shareholders (or the state)".⁸

It would be a most curious kind of 'democratic' theorist who argued for a government permanently in office and completely irreplaceable! The defining characteristic of 'democracy' in the contemporary theory is, of course, that leaders can be replaced through the electoral process.

Most of the confusion over 'industrial democracy' would be avoided when the (political) term 'democracy' is applied to industry, if it was realised that industry is (can be seen as) a political system so that no 'special' sense of the word is involved. If we are properly to speak of democracy in industry then either we must use 'democracy' in the sense of the contemporary theory of democracy and the authority structure must be a parallel to ("congruent with") the existing national political system or, alternatively, the authority structure could be 'democratic' in sense of that term in the participatory theory of democracy. In the first case, the management must be elected and be removable by the whole body of

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8. Ostergaard (1961, p.44). Clegg also argues that "it is impossible for the workers to share directly in management" (p.119) Again this is very odd. As shown, workers do (partially), participate in management through the collective bargaining process on which Clegg lays so much stress. Nor does he seem to realise the significance of the example of the collective contract to which he refers. For a recent, more extended criticism of Clegg's book see Blumberg (1968, chap. 7).

employees in the enterprise. But this would mean that the present distinction between a management permanently in office and the men, permanent subordinates, had been abolished. Ultimately, as in the national political sphere, the whole body of employees (citizens) would have the power to remove the management body so an element of full participation is involved. But, for the most part, the final power to decide would rest with that elected body, i.e. participation would be partial for the majority.⁹ Full participation would be increased if, for example, the management submitted all important decisions for ratification by the whole enterprise. It would be at its maximum if a system of participatory democracy were introduced in industry, i.e. a system where all employees participated in the making of all decisions so that the 'management' was merely the 'men' in a different capacity. In modern, large industrial enterprises it would seem implausible *prima facie* that such a system could be instituted, but that does not rule out the possibility of a democratic system where some, but

9. This is different from the partial participation situation of the unions at present since they are (representative of) permanent subordinates. But it is this latter situation which the Labour Party take as their basis for the development of "industrial democracy". "So far as forms of participation are concerned our conclusion is that we must develop industrial democracy on the basis of a single channel of representation. This representation can only be that of trade union organisation" (The Labour Party, 1967, p.34), i.e. "industrial democracy" is seen in terms of the joint administration of industry by two 'sides'; cf the Donovan Report (1968, §999).

not all, higher level decisions are taken by an elected, accountable management body, together with a system of full lower level participation. The latter has already been shown to be feasible.

This analysis shows that, contrary to what is often suggested by writers on management, 'participation' in the workplace is not in itself necessarily a sign that democracy exists in industry. It is possible for partial participation to take place at either management level within existing (non-democratic) authority structures and it is also possible for full participation to be introduced at the lower level without the overall authority structure being democratised. Given this, the implications for the participatory theory of democracy have to be considered.

ii. Forms of participation and the sense of efficacy.

The evidence seems to suggest that a sense of confidence and effectiveness could be developed with only a relatively minor modification to existing industrial authority structures. Perhaps the most striking fact that emerges from the empirical evidence is that participation has a psychological impact on individuals even in the smallest amounts; even pseudo participation would seem to have some beneficial effects on confidence etc.¹⁰ But it is

10. Perhaps this is not surprising for participatory techniques are now quite often used for therapeutic purposes. A fairly radical experiment on these lines in the mental health field is described by Sugarman (1968). Blumberg (1968, pp 135-8) mentions that self-government experiments have been tried in American prisons.

reasonable to assume that actual participation would be more effective, if only because pseudo participation can raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled; so far as psychological effects are concerned Blumberg says (1968, p.79), "what is crucial ... is the ability and power of a group to arrive at a decision". But this decision need only be one concerned with the immediate job. In fact, this could have been inferred from the evidence from The Civic Culture cited in chapter 5. There, Almond and Verba's criteria of participation were given without comment; whether respondents were consulted when decisions were made on the job, whether they felt free to protest about decisions and whether they actually protested. Obviously this is - at most - lower level partial participation, but it was positively correlated with a developed sense of political efficacy. But we have no means of knowing whether one form of participation is more effective than another; it may be that for maximum psychological effect higher level participation is required.

To argue from this that participation in the wider political sphere could be easily and dramatically increased by introducing lower level partial participation is to forget that two components are involved in the non-participation syndrome. In fact, Almond and Verba (Tables VI.1; VI.2) found that fewer respondents had tried to influence government than actually felt competent to do so. The relatively minor modification of the industrial authority

structure involved in lower level partial participation might increase the general sense of effectiveness that is a vital part of a participatory political culture, but this participation would be introduced within the context of existing authority structures in the political system as a whole, a structure which we know tends to be perceived as irresponsive to their needs by lower class individuals. It is only, as was suggested at the end of chapter five, the democratisation of industrial authority structures that could be expected to help change this perception; it is only the democratisation of the political system of industry which is so closely bound into the public realm as a whole that could be expected to have an impact on the structure of authority of the polity and so change the individual's relationship to that structure.

There is also another reason why the democratisation of industry and higher level participation are important in the participatory theory of democracy. It was suggested in the discussion of that theory that two aspects of the educative effect of participation could be distinguished; so far, only one, the psychological, has been discussed. It seems unlikely that education in the second sense, the widening of the individual's outlook to encompass public affairs and the development of political (democratic) skills, a sense crucial to the ideal of the democratic citizen in the participatory theory, it seems unlikely that this could come

about without participation at the higher level of the enterprise because it is decisions at this level that are the public decisions that bind the enterprise into, and affect the wider community, i.e. they are political decisions.

iii. Three examples of higher level participation.

There are three examples of undertakings in Britain, on which research has been carried out, that have made arrangements that allow, or in principle allow, their employees to participate at the higher level. The following account of these will concentrate on three aspects: first, the extent to which employees are interested in and take up the opportunities open to them; second, the form that higher level participation takes in each case, and finally, the light that these examples throw on the feasibility of diminishing the inequality in job security etc. that marks and reinforces the inequality in decision making power in the orthodox industrial authority structure.

In the Glacier Metal Company, which employs about 5,000 people, participation is based on an extension of the usual collective bargaining and joint consultation arrangements in British industry. The company's three factories in Wembley, Kilmarnock and Chard each have an elected works council, but in other respects the management structure is the usual one.¹¹ Employee participation is based on

11. There are three other, smaller factories that do not have councils. For the theory behind the Glacier structure see Jaques (1951; 1968) Brown (1960). For an empirical study of the Kilmarnock factory see Kelly (1968).

"the clear distinction between managerial authority to make decisions and give instructions, and employee participation in formulating the policy framework within which managers are sanctioned and freed to make those decisions" (Jaques, 1968, p.1).

The composition of the "legislative" system of works councils is based on the principle of "each main layer in the factory's organisational hierarchy having representation on the Council" (Jaques, 1951, p.139). The councils consist of the chief executive, one representative of senior, two of middle level staff, three of clerical and other staff and the rank and file workers are represented by seven shop stewards, elected indirectly via shop and works committees. The councils meet monthly, any member can request that a subject be placed on the agenda and any employee can attend as a spectator. The "policy framework" is worked out by the councils in the form of written policy documents and "standing orders"; under the constitution management and men have agreed that no policy change shall be made unless it is agreed unanimously (Jaques, 1968, p.2).

In theory, the scope of the council's discussions could range very widely. In practice however the councils do not usually deal with top-level policy; subjects discussed have included wage systems, redundancy, factory closure and night shifts. At
Glacier

"top-policy making is the prerogative of the Board of Directors and Management. The directors authorise capital expenditure, decide dividends, appoint the Managing Director, decide directors fees, confirm senior appointments.. To say nothing of deciding who will 'take over' the Company and so on (Kelly, 1968, p.248).

At the Kilmarnock factory the council has been regarded with some suspicion by the workers and the company policy document was only relatively recently accepted by the shop stewards (Kelly, p.241, who stresses the difference in cultural background between this and the London factory). Perhaps this helps account for the lack of interest shown by the hourly paid workers' representatives in matters such as the annual report and accounts or even investment decisions. Little discussion occurs on these unless individual departments are affected; most discussion takes place on lower level matters. At the meeting attended by Kelly the Chairman and General Manager spoke for 74% of the time (pp 242-5).

Another side of the Glacier experiment is an attempt to clarify and systematize the formal role definitions and relationships of management and men. In Kelly's view the emphasis has shifted from the pre-1950 emphasis on group participation in decision making to this aspect, and there would seem to be something contradictory between an attempt both to operate a system where employees can participate in policy decisions and one that sharpens and enshrines in a company language the difference in role (authority) between managers and men.¹² In view of all this, and of the discussion of

12. Kelly, p.26, pp 251 and 232. As well as the internal "role language" use is made of command meetings which, as their name implies, are largely concerned with the issuing of managerial orders (and also the assessment of employees). "It would appear, going on impressions, that the word most frequently used in the Company is 'subordinate'" (Kelly, p.278).

the effects of lower level participation earlier, it is perhaps not surprising that the major effect of the Glacier structure in practice appears to have been to legitimise the decision making powers of the management;

"the experience of managers at Glacier Metal has on the whole shown that this constitution enables them to make far more decisions and changes without objections from representatives than is customary in other companies" (Jaques, 1968, p.4).¹³

The same limits in practice on participation appear again in the largest experiment in higher level participation in Britain, that of the John Lewis Partnership (which includes the department stores). An excellent study of this, including a brief history of the Partnership, has recently been published, from which this information is taken (Flanders et al, 1968).

As described in the house journal,

"the supreme purpose of the whole organisation is to secure the fairest possible sharing by all the members of all the advantages of ownership - gain, knowledge and power" (cited Flanders, p.42).

As has been argued the sharing of the first two items, gain and knowledge, is an important necessary condition for the sharing of

13. Cf. This passage from an article on Glacier in The Times (28 July 1969). "The works council does not in any sense manage the factory. It functions as a forum and a two way channel of communications between management and men. As management agrees in advance a policy with the council, it in fact has a lot more authority with which to implement that policy. In addition, it acts as a check on management actions, ensuring that management does not exceed the authority granted to it under the terms of the constitution".

power, and in the partnership they are shared to a greater extent than power itself. All partners (employees) are equal in the sense that all share in the distributed profits, (the shares are held in a Trust). However, distribution is according to level of pay so that it in fact "accentuates the prevailing hierarchical structure of remuneration".¹⁴ The sharing of knowledge is furthered through the internal press, to which anonymous letters are encouraged and answered, and a general meeting open to all partners held yearly in each branch. The central and branch councils also have trading accounts made available to them.

These councils¹⁵ are the major means through which participation can take place. The central council has rights which give it certain sanctions against the Chairman and Board if necessary; it appoints three Trustees of the Constitution who then become directors, and it nominates five other directors. Its main day-to-day function is the administration of a large welfare fund but, more importantly, it is entitled to "discuss any matter whatsoever and make any suggestion that they shall see fit to the Central Board or the

14. Flanders et al, p.185. It is a source of grievance to many partners that secrecy is maintained over wages. For their attitudes to the profit sharing scheme, some of whom would prefer a redistributive system see Flanders pp 102-6.

15. There are also committees for communication (solely rank and file bodies) which are essentially grievance settling bodies. These have no funds and no executive powers and cannot themselves take remedial action, so are of little relevance from a participatory point of view, (Flanders, p.50 ff).

Chairman" (Flanders, p.64). In theory this would seem to give the council unlimited scope but in practice it does not normally enter into detailed policy discussions so that its actual (participatory) influence is rather limited (p.177). About three-quarters of the central council's 140 members are elected (the rest are appointed by the Chairman, including all senior management). Partners standing for election are more likely to be of managerial than rank and file status. From 1957/5 to 1966/7 the proportion of managerial rank councillors varied from 61-70% and that of non-managerial from 8-19% (with 20-24% ex officio). In the sub-committees of the central council, which carry out a large part of the work, there is a marked shift to higher management membership.¹⁶

The branch councils, modelled on the central council and subordinate to it, are somewhat more representative of the ordinary employee in the Partnership, who comprise about half of the elected membership. (The councils average 35 members, about 15% ex officio). Apart from administering their own welfare funds the branch councils can sponsor resolutions to the central council which, if adopted, become recommendations to management. About six or seven of these resolutions are made each year to central council, covering such matters as the rules for life assurance and pensions;

16. Flanders et al, p.60, Table 5. 22% of men and 25% of women candidates for election to the council has held some "special status" within the Partnership (p.84).

from 1955-1964 about a third of the resolutions were accepted, but not all implemented (p.72, see also p.68, Table 11). It was a branch council that, for the first time, rejected a major management proposal, on five day trading. This was accepted by the Chairman of the Partnership, although it should be noted that no vital trading issues were involved. Whether this indicates that, in future, partners will make more use of the opportunities for (partial) participation open to them remains to be seen.¹⁷ Of the discussions on this issue that preceded the council's decision, the authors of the study of the Partnership remark,

"the decision process itself was basically the normal one of management deciding what it wanted to achieve, and preparing the ground in such a way that orders issued were likely to be obeyed" (p.176).

It was found that the level of interest in, and knowledge of the representative institutions of the Partnership was low among ordinary partners. Those most interested were men and women of over five years service, but even in this group the level of interest was greater in the branch than the central council (Flanders,

17. On the evidence this would seem rather unlikely. A recent report in The Times (12 July 1969) stated that the conclusion of a committee set up by the Chairman to investigate ways in which the "sharing of power" could be extended was that the majority of partners were not interested in this. The report stated that the majority were "not so much concerned with a greater share in decision-making and the responsibility that goes with it, as with being kept fully informed of what is happening and having a means and the right to have their views considered".

pp 114-6, Tables 25; 26). How far this lack of interest helps explain the relative lack of use of participation opportunities by the ordinary partner and how far the structure of the representative bodies, and the fact that these often seem to operate as pseudo-participatory devices, helps explain the lack of interest it is not possible to say.¹⁸ There is some evidence to support the latter suggestion in that partners did display an interest in lower level participation, which confirms the evidence on this point cited above, so that interest might increase if the branch councils really got to grips with these issues. For the present however the general finding is that about two thirds of the respondents "did not show any marked degree of interest in the Partnership's democratic institutions" (Flanders, p.127).

The third example of higher level participation is that of the Scott Bader Commonwealth, a plastic resin manufacturing company in Northants, which employs about 390 people.¹⁹ This company has made more far reaching changes in the orthodox industrial authority

18. It is significant that two-thirds of the partners are women; women tend to participate less than men (see e.g. Milbrath, 1965, pp 135-6). A high proportion of women answered "don't know" to a question on whether they would be sorry to see the representative institutions in the Partnership given up.

19. This company too has been the subject of a recently published study by Blum (1968). Additional information can be found in Hadley (1965); see also Exley (1968), Derrick and Phipps (1969, pp 95-8) and publications of Scott Bader and Co. Ltd.

structure than the two previous examples. The firm was deliberately re-organised along participatory lines by its founder, Ernest Bader, in 1951, and the institutions were modified further along participatory lines in 1963. All the shares of Scott Bader and Co. Ltd. are held by a charitable organisation, the Scott Bader Commonwealth and in the event of the company's sale the proceeds are to go to charity. Membership of the Commonwealth is open to all employees after a probationary period of a year (individual applications are decided on merit).

The organisational structure of the Commonwealth is rather complex. The main "legislative" body is the general meeting, which meets quarterly, and where each member of the Commonwealth has one vote. Its powers cover the approval, modification or rejection of the conduct of the business, the right of approval of any investment over £10,000 before it is made, and the approval of the disposal of the common surplus (profits) recommended by the community council and the board of directors. The constitution provides that the surplus must be distributed within the ratio 60% plough-back, 20% charitable purposes and 20% for employee bonus (recently the latter has run at 5-10%).²⁰ The community council is

20. Blum (1968, p.153 and p.212). Since 1965 the community council has recommended the method of distributing the bonus and the board of directors had determined its amount. A diagram of the structure of the Commonwealth can be found in Blum, p.157.

the main "administrative" body of Commonwealth and is composed of twelve people, nine elected, two nominated by the board and one, representing the local community, is nominated by the council and approved by the board. Apart from its recommendation about the common surplus, the council is concerned with welfare facilities and with the rules of membership for the Commonwealth. A novel feature of the Commonwealth organisation is the panel of Representatives, a body of twelve people, chosen at random from among Commonwealth members, which has to decide whether "the conditions and atmosphere that exist in the firm justify them in recording a vote of confidence in the Board of Directors".²¹

The Scott Bader Commonwealth provides an interesting example of how some of the inequalities of the orthodox industrial authority structure might be reduced. First, all Commonwealth members are equal in status in that all have one vote at the general meeting. Second, all employees enjoy a high degree of job security, gross misconduct and incompetence being virtually the sole grounds for dismissal, and in all cases the appeal system operates. (Clocking on has also been abolished). Third, all employees are salaried and have a guaranteed minimum wage; there is also a limit on top

21. Blum, p.154. If the answer is "no" a complicated procedure follows, but the final decision on what action, if any, is necessary devolves on the Trustees, whose main function is that of 'guardians' of the constitution of the Commonwealth. Two of the trustees are elected; see Blum, p.155f and pp 164-5. There is also another partially elected body, the council of reference, a final appeal body mainly concerned with disciplinary questions.

salaries, the constitution laying down that the ratio between highest and lowest must not exceed 7:1. Members of the Commonwealth also have access to information about the affairs of the enterprise. Management must answer all questions raised in the internal press, questions can be asked at the general meeting and members have the right to inspect accounts and ask for information through representatives or in personal interviews with management.²²

In the Commonwealth, according to Blum (p.166), the "organs (assure) a variety of checks and balances" on the exercise of power, and, perhaps, this might be a contributory factor to the relatively limited extent of participation in practice. Unfortunately, Blum does not say a great deal about the day-to-day working of the Commonwealth, but the general picture is fairly clear.²³ The proportion of employees holding office as representatives is not very large; from 1951-63 thirty four people served on the community council, about ten of whom were from the shop floor, but a "large majority" were elected for more than one term. (The term of office

22. Blum, pp 84-5; Hadley (1965). The Commonwealth is, like the other two firms, economically successful; since 1951 turnover has increased ten times to well over £4m p.a. More recently a firm of management consultants was engaged and they recommended that the ratio between the wages of supervisors and the men that they supervised be increased - something which would seem to work in an opposite direction from the participatory institutions. (Information from Roger Hadley).

23. An empirical investigation was carried out, but Blum's book is largely concerned with an interpretation of the principles underlying the organisational forms; his account is a very confusing one.

is three years which itself limits the numbers who can participate in this way; Blum, p.96). Blum (p.329) says that "there have been considerable differences in the participation of different groups ... Workers have undoubtedly participated less than other groups". Using as criteria of participation speaking at general meetings, obtaining information from representatives, standing for election and initiating proposals through a participative body, it was found that about a fifth of managers, technicians, junior managers and clerical workers were "high" or "moderate" participants, whereas all the factory workers were "low" or "non-participants" (p.374). Most of those questioned by Blum, particularly the factory workers, saw the "advantages of the Commonwealth" first and foremost in terms of the job security it gave (especially the six months sick leave), although "participation" was the item mentioned the next most frequently (pp 116-8 and pp 120-2). Finally, in questions on the powers of the community council it was found that 26% of respondents had a "working knowledge" 36% had a "partial knowledge" and 38% had "little or no knowledge" (p.375, also p.99).

iv. The need for participation at both higher and lower levels.

From the evidence provided by these three examples it would seem first, that it is quite feasible to modify the orthodox structure of authority in industry to provide (greater or lesser) opportunities for participation at the higher level, and the

evidence from Scott Bader illustrates that it is possible to eliminate some of the inequalities in job security etc without, necessarily, impairing economic efficiency. Secondly it would appear that the participatory theory of democracy is over-optimistic in implying that ordinary workers are greatly interested in, and so would take advantage of, such opportunities. Other evidence also indicates that workers have relatively little interest in higher, as opposed to lower level participation. In Holter's (1965) survey in Norway it was found that only 16% of blue collar and 11% of white collar workers wanted more participation in decisions concerning the management of the whole enterprise.²⁴ Hespe and Little (1970, p.4 gII) found that "a desire for greater influence over an employee's own job does not necessarily imply a desire for greater participation in the company's affairs of policy" and they say that, at least among their respondents "there is only very limited support for any notion of workers' control based on employee dominance of the company's decision making structure". In the recent study of the "affluent workers" at Vauxhalls respondents were asked whether they thought that unions should be solely concerned with pay and conditions or whether they should "try and get workers a say in management". 40% thought that they should -

24. Holter p.301, Table 2. On the other hand when asked whether employees in general were sufficiently involved with this level of decision making 78% of blue collar and 59% of white collar thought that they were not. (Table 1).

61% of the craftsmen - but the majority attitude is illustrated by remarks like; "the average person in a place like this likes to think he could manage, but management is really for educated people who can do it" (Goldthorpe et al, 1968, pp 108-9, Table 47).

Certain features of this evidence indicate that too hasty a conclusion should not be drawn from it; that is to say, although *prima facie* it may appear that the participatory theory is over-optimistic to expect widespread participation at the higher level, closer examination suggests that this is not necessarily the conclusion that should be drawn. It is significant that a majority of the craftsmen at Vauxhalls were in favour of the unions widening their scope, and that Holter found that those who did desire greater higher level participation were "responsible, confident, skilled", for we have already seen that it is skilled workers who are most likely to be able to participate at the lower level (and hence be most likely to have a developed sense of effectiveness). Hespe and Little (pp 4-5 § II) say that

"we wish to stress one important finding from our research programme, common to all the organisations studied, and this is that the more an employee influences the decision making structure (and here quite clearly ~~skilled workers are prominent~~ skilled workers are prominent) ... then the more he wishes to participate in the company's affairs".

What this suggests is that just as participation in industry provides an area where the individual is educated for participation in the wider political sphere, so participation at the lower level

of industry can be regarded as education, as a training ground, for participation in the political system of the enterprise as a whole. It could be argued that it is precisely because, in the three examples of higher level participation above, the participatory institutions have been superimposed on a structure that is virtually unchanged at the lower level, that workers appear so apathetic about these institutions. There is nothing in their everyday work-life to prepare or educate them for such opportunities.²⁵

Some evidence on the way that the attitudes of workers differ toward participatory issues at different levels of the enterprise is provided by the question of the founder members shares at the Scott Bader Commonwealth. Before 1963, the founder members had 10% of the shares and had certain rights; in 1957 Ernest Bader offered to transfer these shares to the Commonwealth. Discussion groups were set up to consider this and they reported that this was acceptable provided that the right of electing directors was also vested in the Commonwealth. This Bader rejected. In 1959, Blum investigated these issues and he found that in both cases, in the

25. Under the constitution of the Commonwealth provision was made for departmental committees but these never functioned regularly. More recently training schemes were started to teach workers about the processes involved in their work (Hadley, 1965). All this now seems to be in abeyance; the training is important if workers are to exercise more control over their work since the processes are fairly complicated and there is no "end product" that is accessible to the workers as, say, a motor car is. (Information from Hadley).

handing over of the shares and the election of directors, it was the managerial and laboratory workers who were mostly in favour and the factory workers who were uncertain or against these proposals. Typical of the comments from the latter were: "what on earth would we do, we don't know who should go on the board, only the higher ups know that"; "no, the Founder shares shouldn't go to the Commonwealth, after all he founded the firm, it was his money in the first place".²⁶

Comments such as these put flesh onto Cole's argument about the "training for subservience" received by many (rank and file) workers. It was argued in chapter five that such a training - one resulting in "deeply ingrained habits of doing what one is told" - is part and parcel of the typical socialisation process of working class individuals. It is a process that tends drastically to limit the number of roles in which the individual can (reasonably realistically) see himself. As Holter (1965, p.305) argues, specifically about the effects of the industrial authority structure on the ordinary worker,

26. In 1963 the shares were handed over and the founder members rights abolished. However, only two of the nine directors are elected (the list of candidates being approved by the board), five are nominated by the chairman and approved by the Trustees and the two Baders (father and son) became life directors.

"the atmosphere of hierarchical systems in general, the limited perspective inherent in the work of an operator or sub-clerical worker, may tend to lower beyond reasonable proportions the number of employees who are able to see themselves as participants in managerial tasks".²⁷

To change this image of the self, as already argued, it is necessary for the individual to be 're-socialised' through interaction in participatory institutions. In industry, the crucial area, all the evidence suggests that these must exist at both higher and lower levels; higher level institutions alone are too remote from the individual's everyday (and previous) experiences to mean a great deal to him.²⁸

The evidence from the German system of "co-determination" in the iron and steel industries would seem to bear this out. In these industries there is numerical parity between representatives

27. For evidence on the generally restricted range of reference groups of lower class individuals in Britain, see Runciman (1966). The selective nature of the British education system is important in this socialisation process because the 'selection' in practice is also selection for categories of employment and so affects the child's perception of the range of adult roles open to (children like) him. (cf. the importance of higher education for the development of the sense of political efficacy).
28. Arguments that worker directors on company boards, as instituted in the recently nationalised sector of the steel industry, would constitute a big step towards industrial democracy are rather wide of the mark. Regarding the worker's attitude to such directors, Hespe and Little (1970, p.7) found that in the company that had employee directors (presumably the steel company) "only 10% of employees knew of their existence". For some evidence on the variety of ways that employee directors see their task in Norway see Emergya and Thorsrud (1969, pp 18-23 and pp 68-76).

of employees and shareholders on the supervisory board (which does not usually interfere in day-to-day management; this board also, by majority vote, appoints the labour director (usually an ex-trade unionist) to the management board. There is also an elected works council, an employee body, that advises management on matters usually shared between joint consultation bodies and collective bargaining in Britain. The Bulletin (No. 6) of the International Institute for Labour Studies reporting on participation in German industry cites a study that found that only half the workers interviewed had any concrete ideas what co-determination actually meant. Perhaps this is not surprising in the light of the report's comment that the works council has

"only limited opportunities ... to give each employee the feeling of participation in management, due to the fact that it is a group of representatives within a hierarchical structure. It is also extremely difficult for a works council to influence decisively the business policy of an undertaking" (p.118).

And in the light of its statement (p.134) that co-determination

"does not give the individual worker the feeling of personally participating in those decision making processes affecting his own situation ... empirical research has shown time and time again that individual employees are very much concerned about taking part in effectively shaping their workplace relations".

That is to say, the evidence suggests, as Emery and Thorsrud (1969, p.86) argue, that

"if democratic participation is to become a reality, it seems inevitable that it must be started at a level where a large proportion of employees are both able and willing to participate".

Or, more strongly, that there must be participation at all levels of the enterprise.

Given the present evidence, it is as valid to argue (rather on the lines of Cole's arguments about "encroaching control") that, in the right conditions, most workers would participate, as it is to argue from worker's present attitudes to higher level participation that they are unlikely ever to be interested in it. Most of my evidence in this chapter has been drawn from Britain (partly this is due to limitations of language) and it might be objected that few conclusions can be drawn from the three isolated examples of partial higher level participation. This is true, but even though these are unique examples, and represent a relatively small modification to existing authority structures, they do suggest that higher level participation is feasible; there is little reason to suppose that industrial conditions in any modernised society would vary sufficiently to make this completely implausible for other countries. Also, together with the other evidence on participation, this does cast doubt on one of Eckstein's arguments, referred to in Chapter One. He argues that national government cannot be "purely" democratic because, for stability, its structure must be "congruent" with other authority structures in society, structures which of necessity cannot be democratised. The empirical evidence reported so far shows that there is nothing necessary about existing authority structures - certainly industrial structures

could be modified in a democratic direction. What next has to be investigated is how far democratisation is feasible, not just in a few isolated instances, but over a whole economy, and for evidence on this question, a crucial one for the participatory theory of democracy, one has to turn to evidence on the working of the workers' self management system in industry in Yugoslavia.

CHAPTER EIGHTWORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

Eckstein's (1966, p.237) claim that "some social relations simply cannot be conducted in a democratic manner" owes, it has already been suggested, more to the (implicit) evaluative assumptions on which his theory is based, than to a consideration of the empirical evidence on the question. He says that "we have every reason to think that economic organisations cannot be organised in a truly democratic manner, at any rate not without consequences that no one wants"; the most that we can realistically expect is some "simulation" or "pretense" of democracy. His only example is that some economic organisations "play a great deal at democracy and permit certain deviations from the logic of the double entry ledger in order actually to carry on certain democratic practices" (p.238) - what these practices are he does not specify. Just as Eckstein is silent on what reasons we have for doubting the feasibility of democracy in industry, so he is about what the "dysfunctional consequences" might be. Loss of economic efficiency, perhaps even economic collapse are possibilities that immediately spring to mind but the evidence, as will be shown, does not give

much support to this argument.¹

In Britain there is one example, on which information is available, of an enterprise that operates on democratic lines and which allows full participation at the higher level. This is the Rowen Engineering Company, in Glasgow, which, although very small, provides an interesting example of what is feasible.²

The controlling body of the factory is the general council. Membership of the council is open to all employees after three months service and each member has one vote. Meetings of the council are held fortnightly; the agenda is displayed two days beforehand and any employee is entitled to add items to it. Each member of the council occupies the chair for two meetings (which means that everyone has to make a contribution on at least those occasions). The general council decides all matters of policy, and anything else of importance. It elects the directors, the

1. Eckstein also says that "even certain kinds of public ownership (like the nationalisation in Britain of industries absolutely vital to the health of the whole economy) militate against a democratization of economic relations" (p.237). The point about this case is that it offers Eckstein no evidence at all. The 1945-51 Labour Government made a deliberate decision not to introduce democratisation when the coal industry etc were nationalised even though conditions were favourable, in the sense that there was a widespread desire for a 'new start' after the war. More recently, as already noted, employee directors have been introduced in the nationalised steel industry.
2. See Blum (1968, pp 49-51); Derrick and Phipps (1969, pp 104-7); Jarvie (1968); Rowen Factories (1967); Sawtell (1968, pp41-2). The factory began in 1963 on mostly donated capital as a worker controlled "factory for peace", its name deriving from R(ober) Owen. When the above accounts were written it was quite successful economically with a turnover in the region of £80,000 p.a. More recently it has had a setback, but this is due rather to the

factory manager, foreman and chargehand ("co-ordinator"). At each meeting the council receives reports on production, sales, finance etc. There is also a labour-sub-committee to deal with personnel matters, but this can only make recommendations to the council. Tea-break meetings are also held if need arises but any decisions must also be ratified by the general council.

Jarvie (1968) attended a meeting of the general council³ which illustrates the kind of discussions that take place. At the meeting a member of the assembly department suggested that production should cease on one model of heater as some were being returned. The professionally trained sales engineer denied that the design was at fault and presented a technical report to substantiate this. The report was vigorously challenged and it was finally agreed to institute an enquiry into the design. Here the report of an 'expert' was questioned, but one reason that Eckstein might have suggested why it is not feasible to democratise industrial authority structures is that a part time management body of ordinary workers would not

general economic "squeeze" and the product (storage heaters) than the democratic organisation. A second, similarly organised, factory has been set up in Wales and, after switching to producing garden furniture, this is now doing well. It employs previously unemployed, disabled miners and has achieved remarkable results as a rehabilitation unit. (Information from Roger Hadley).

3. There is also an advisory council, composed of representatives of organisations sympathetic to the aims of the factory, whose function is to ensure that general council decisions do not infringe the principles on which the factory is based.

be able to control the 'experts' of the enterprise who would, therefore, really run things. The evidence from the workers' self-management system in Yugoslavia shows that this is a difficult problem.

i. The general setting of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia.

No discussion of participation and democracy can ignore Yugoslavia. As one recent observer has commented, Yugoslavia

"provides a laboratory for research in the possibilities of decentralisation of control in modern, large scale societies and its psychological effects. There are virtually no limitations - except those of language - to such research at the present period" (Riddell, 1968, p.69).

Not only is it the only country that has attempted to introduce democracy in enterprises over a whole economy but it is of interest for this study because, at least formally, the Yugoslav socio-political and industrial organisational forms look in many respects remarkably like Cole's blueprint for a participatory system (although this account concentrates on the industrial side). There are, however, considerable difficulties involved in a discussion of the Yugoslav experience. Although English language studies of and commentaries on Yugoslav industrial organisation are growing, they are still few both in quantity and comprehensiveness. It is difficult to apply evidence from Yugoslavia to Britain, first because Yugoslavia is still a developing country, and one with wide divergences in development between its constituent

Republics.⁴ Many factory workers still work part time on the land (the bulk of which is privately owned) and much of the labour force is composed of ill-educated, first generation industrial workers.⁵ Even in 1953 the average level of illiteracy in the population over ten years old was 25.4% (women 35.8%), (I.L.O, 1962, App.1 Table A), and the nature of the work force obviously makes an assessment of the self-management system peculiarly difficult. Second, Yugoslavia is, of course, a Communist state, albeit rather different from others in East Europe, so that the role of the Party must be taken into account. Finally, the system

4. National Income 1964 (from The Economist, July 16, 1966)

	Billions of new dinars	£ per head	Population (millions)
Bosnia and Hercegovinia	6.8	56	3.5
Croatia	14.6	97	4.3
Macedonia	3.0	57	1.5
Montenegro	0.9	51	0.5
Serbia	21.5	78	7.9
Slovenia	9.0	161	1.6
Yugoslavia	55.8	83	19.3

In 1968, with a population of 20.2m, national income was £165 per head. (Times, Apr. 14, 1970). The Federal government has recently established a Fund for the Development of Underdeveloped Regions to try to reduce the imbalance between the Republics.

5. In 25 years the rural population has been reduced from 75% to 45% of the total (Economist, July 16, 1966). 1-2% of the increase in the industrial work force each year comes direct from the land (Auty, 1965, p.159). In 1947 manufacturing accounted for 18.5% GNP and agriculture for 45%; in 1975 it is hoped that manufacturing will contribute 40% and agriculture 18% (with tourism contributing a good deal of the remainder), (Times, Apr. 14, 1970).

of workers' self-management itself, originally introduced in 1950 after the break with the U.S.S.R. in 1948, but not really getting under way until reforms in 1953, has been continuously modified since then, which adds to the difficulties of evaluation.

Each industrial enterprise in Yugoslavia is managed by a workers' council, elected by the whole collective, i.e. all the employees - through electoral units in the larger establishments. By law all enterprises with more than 7 workers must have a council, but where there are less than 30 then all sit on the council. In larger enterprises the size of the council varies from 15-120 members, the average being from 20-22.⁶ Large enterprises can also, if they wish, elect departmental councils and, since 1961, each enterprise has been divided into viable production units, "economic units", which exercise a degree of self-management at that level and have their own worker's councils.⁷ Workers can also participate in management through meetings of the collective of the enterprise and through referenda on important topics.

Membership of the workers' council is for two years - members being subject to recall by their electorate - and the council meets

6. Blumberg (1968, p.198). Private employers are limited to five employees outside the family; privately owned trucks in particular flourish outside the state sector.

7. For a description of the organisation of Rade Koncar, the biggest producer of electrical equipment in Yugoslavia, see Kmetić (1967).

monthly. Workers' councils have sub-committees to deal with certain matters (since 1957 they have been obliged to have them for internal discipline, hiring and firing) and membership of the committees is not necessarily restricted to council members. The executive body of the council, the managing board, is elected, usually but not necessarily entirely, from among its members by the council (since 1969 there may, instead, be a business board, see below). The managing board has from 3-17 members - the director ex officio - elected for one year periods; if a member is elected twice in succession he is then ineligible for a further two years (Stephen 1967, p.12); Blumberg (1968, p.205) cites slightly different regulations). The board might meet several times a week and is responsible for such matters as the supervision of the director's work and the drawing up of the annual plan. Apart from the workers' council, the other legally obligatory "organ of management" is the director of the enterprise. Since 1964, the final choice of director is in the hands of the workers' council (the post is advertised) and his term of office is limited to four years.⁸ The director, together with "the collegium" of heads

8. Until 1952 he was appointed by the state and from then to 1964 by a commission composed of an equal number of representatives of the workers' council and the commune. The council has the power to remove the director. How far the councils actually make use of their formal power is not clear. The commune (and the managing board) still seems to play an important role. Research has indicated that the secretary of the Party Committee of the commune and the president of the commune Assembly may, in practice, be responsible for the appointment (see Moore, 1970, pp 15 and 18; Shoup, 1969, p.77).

of departments, is responsible for the day-to-day running of the enterprise and the execution of the council's decisions. He also has other powers defined by law such as the power to sign contracts in the name of the enterprise and to ensure that it operates within the law.

Perhaps the first thing that should be looked at is whether the workers' councils, in a Communist state, in fact operate merely as channels through which the Party can exercise its control and so have no independent power. (Although, even if they did not, nothing would follow about the possibilities of such a system in a different political context).

ii. The role of the Communist League.

The Communist League (party) of Yugoslavia presents a Jekyll and Hyde character to the observer. There is a continuing debate inside Yugoslavia about the role of the League and its relation to the state apparatus. Since the Ninth Congress of the League in 1969 there have been renewed efforts to limit the number of posts held by party leaders and to increase the freedom of discussion inside the party. In theory the League no longer exercises control through direct rule but maintains its leading position through "the strength of ideas and arguments"; it is now held that the League "is not a machinery of power but an instrument of mobilisation, of participation by the masses in decision-making and in the guidance

of society". This is in line with the formally participatory nature of the system and with the prevailing ideological view in Yugoslavia of a socialist society as

"one characterised by the conscious and organised control by the members of society themselves of all the institutions of their society" (Riddell, 1968, p.55).

In practice, however, despite the ideology and the debates about the League, "all the more important decisions about the development of society are still taken centrally by a small group of party leaders". (Riddell, p.55).⁹

There are several channels through which the League could exert influence or control over the workers' councils. One of these is

9. See Resolution on the ideological-political foundation for the future development of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1969). Also Draft Theses on the Further Development and Reorganisation of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (1967); Neal and Fisk (1966); Rubinstein (1968) and Shoup (1969). Nevertheless this ideology should not be dismissed out of hand as mere 'window dressing'. As Riddell points out the history of Yugoslavia is one of a tradition of local autonomy and hostility to central authority and the Yugoslav leaders were familiar with anarcho-syndicalist as well as the orthodox marxist doctrines. Today the League is organised on a Republic basis (although it should be noted on the other side that the old, but continuing nationalistic hostilities between the Republics and Yugoslavia's ethnic groups do pose a danger to stability for the future). The party reforms of 1969 have increased the power of the Republic parties; the members of the Presidium (which replaced the Federal Central Committee) are elected by the Republic party congresses, the parties have the right to draw up their own statutes and limited policy making authority. In the industrial field, if the aim had been only to "decentralise a socialised industry" (Rhenman, 1968, p.6) or give management more independence (Kolaja, 1965, p.75) then there would have been no need to set up the existing organisation - though this is not to say that all its consequences were either foreseen or intended. (For a history of the Yugoslav system see Auty (1965) and Deleon (1959)).

securing the election of League members to the Commune assembly. The assembly of the Commune (local government unit) is, like chambers at all levels, organised on a functional as well as territorial basis; "the citizens figure in this socio-economic organisation both as individuals and as collectives in enterprises and institutions", and the commune has a chamber of "producers" or "work communities" as well as the municipal chamber (and perhaps others).¹⁰ Nomination and election procedures to the Commune are complex, election is partly direct and partly indirect, but recently a real element of choice does seem to have been introduced into elections; "in communist Yugoslavia a vote is once again worth something", an extremely important factor so far as the role of the League is concerned.¹¹ The Communes have considerable local autonomy and, because a large part of their income depends upon the general prosperity of the locality, they are keenly interested in their own enterprises. The Commune has certain powers in relation to the enterprise, including the right to make recommendations about policy. Today, the Commune exercises less direct influence over

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10. Milivojevic (1965, p.9). See also, special issue of International Social Science Journal (1961) and Djordjevic (1958, p.214 ff). At Federal level there are chambers of economics; education and culture; social welfare and health; socio-politics and the chamber of nationalities.
11. The Economist, May 24, 1969. On elections see also, Riddell (1968, pp 58-9; Milivojevic (1965, pp 16-20); The Economist, Apr. 15, 1967. For elections under earlier electoral regulations see Hammond (1955).

the enterprise than earlier; for instance, it no longer has the power of veto over the wage structure of the enterprise and, as noted, at least formally the power of appointment of the director rests with the workers' council. In the factories studied by Kolaja (1965, pp 28, 62) the council took an independent attitude with regard to proposals and requests from the commune. On the other hand, "self-management" applies to all aspects of Yugoslav society, not merely to the enterprise, and the Commune can be seen as representing the individual as consumer not producer, so that (leaving aside the influence of the League) its power to approve e.g. certain price increases by the enterprise should not necessarily be seen as a diminution of the independence of the latter (see Moore, 1970, p.27).

The League can also make its influence felt through the trade unions. As in other Communist countries, the position of the unions in Yugoslavia is an ambiguous one;¹² however, a recent account states that they are becoming more active in defending the interests of their members (Shoup, 1969, p.72 also Moore, 1970, p.24). Perhaps their major function is an educational one, both educating workers to play their part in management and in adult education generally; the Yugoslav unions have "developed educational and cultural functions in recent years which are more comprehensive

12. For a Yugoslav view see Jovanovic (1966); also Kolaja (1965, pp 29-34).

than those of any working class body known to the authors" (Singleton and Topham, 1963, p.21). Inside the enterprise the power of the unions over elections to the workers' council has been curtailed (see below) and most of their other functions are shared with other bodies. Kolaja found that in the two factories that he visited the union was dependent on the council because of financial factors.¹³

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13. Kolaja (1965, pp 34-5). In a participatory polity, of course, trade unions as well as the workplace would be organised on a participatory basis. One writer (Hughes, 1968), who sees participation as educative, makes the following comment about member participation in British unions at the present time: "there is an important learning process involved - identification with wider collective needs and interests, committee work, orderly procedures of debate, the development of individual understanding and skills of communication to name only a few aspects... wider participation in trade union affairs ... provides the necessary framework for building up wider loyalties and a more comprehensive view of what is of collective concern" (gl8). A full discussion of the role of trade unions in a democratised industrial authority structure would take us too far from the main theme of this study, but a few, brief points can be made. First, whatever the composition of management, individual grievances and injustices will occur; the interests of the individual worker qua worker will still need protection. Second, in a participatory situation the unions could have a valuable role (as discussed below) in counteracting excessive influence of 'experts' by providing research and information for the elected management body. Third, even though the unions would no longer be one 'side' in a bargaining process, that does not mean that conflicts are absent. Some group(s) of workers may be better placed - or more able - to put forward, and press, a case to the management body, or the whole collective, for favourable treatment. Unions, then, could have the task of ensuring that all workers (especially the least educated and skilled who tend to participate least) receive equitable and just treatment and rewards. Fourth, and relatedly, the unions could act as an educative agency in that one danger in a participatory industrial situation is that an individual enterprise might act in manner detrimental to workers elsewhere or the wider community. A safeguard against this, especially in a multi-occupational and multi-industrial union situation like that of Britain, is that the unions would provide an essential connecting link not only between

Apart from these indirect channels, the most obvious way for the League to control or influence the council is to have League members elected to the workers' councils. The proportion of League members sitting on councils varies widely, but it is often high; Singleton and Topham (1963, p.10) cite an average of 35%, in the two factories visited by Kolaja (1965, p.16) it was 70% and just under 50% and a Yugoslav survey gave a range from 8-65% (cited I.L.O., 1962, p.33). One obstacle in the way of control by the League is the rapid rotation of council members, office being for two years with half replaced each year.¹⁴ Perhaps the proportion of League members on councils will gradually fall because of the change in election procedures in 1964. Originally a list of candidates could be nominated by 10% of the workers or by the union branch; usually this meant that the latter provided the lists. Now, candidates can be nominated by any worker and two seconders at a special meeting of the collective. The election is by secret ballot and is conducted by a special committee set up by the council;

one enterprise and another, but also between workers of different grades and occupations. This link would aid in the widening of the outlook of the individual participant and help the worker qua manager assess the impact of his decisions outside the enterprise.

14. Blumberg (1968, p.198) says that now no member may serve two consecutive terms. Riddell (1968, p.66) gives figures for those elected in 1962 which shows a considerable degree of continuity. The high proportion of League members mean that the councils are unrepresentative in that respect. Tito (1969, p.35) recently commented that "one of the greatest weaknesses of the league of Communists is that there are relatively few workers and direct producers in its ranks". In 1968 (in a population of over 20 million) there were 1146084 members of the League, of whom 31.3% were "workers".

in the shipyard visited by Stephen there were 76 candidates for 35 places in 1967.¹⁵

Kolaja (1965, p.63) concludes from his investigations that the League "apparently was not a frequent initiator, but rather an observer and censor". Some of the most interesting evidence on this point comes from a questionnaire administered by the same author in one of the factories that he visited. Of 78 respondents asked: "Who has the greatest influence in the enterprise?", only 4 put the League first; 11 put it second in influence and 9 third, whereas 45 put the workers' council first, 25 the director and 2 the union (p.34, Table 12). Any evaluation of the extent of the influence of the League is obviously extremely difficult. Perhaps all that needs to be said for our purposes is that although the League cannot be ignored neither does the evidence suggest that, merely because it exists, the whole organisational structure of workers' self-management therefore counts for nothing at all.

iii. Economic factors.

Other external factors may well in fact weigh equally or more heavily on the individual workers' council, namely economic factors.

15. Stephen (1967, pp 9-10). In the shipyard 87% of workers in 1966 and 91.2% in 1967 voted in the workers' council elections. Blumberg (1968, p.200) says that the collective has to vote to approve nominations. For elections under the earlier system see Singleton and Topham (1963, p.9).

It was suggested above that a clear reduction in economic efficiency (that could be unambiguously attributed to that cause) would be one good reason for claiming that democratisation of industrial authority structures is not feasible. The extent to which the system of workers' self management has actually helped or hindered Yugoslav economic advance it is extremely difficult to ascertain (indeed, it may well be impossible given the many, conflicting influences on that economy). By 1964 real income per head in Yugoslavia was almost four times greater than the pre-war level and, since the war, the growth rate has "been hardly less fast than Japan's" (Economist July 16, 1966; Aug. 19, 1967). This however is by no means a straightforward success story. In 1965 sweeping economic reforms were introduced to try to put right inflationary and balance of payments problems.¹⁶ Although production rose by about 12% during 1969 the rise was accompanied by inflation and a huge rise in imports (for details see Times Apr. 14, 1970).

Another major reason for the 1965 reforms was the desire to modernise techniques, to get rid of uneconomic investment, and increase exports. It might be argued that a workers' council system would prove a hindrance here as managing bodies of workers would be unlikely to vote for measures that, for example, involved redundancies;

16. For details of the reforms see Neal and Fisk (1966); The Economist, July 16, 1966; Moore (1970 pp 6-9).

one observer has stated that "many factories have been voting themselves higher wages than their productivity warranted at the expense of capital investment".¹⁷ But Yugoslavia's economic problems have an extremely familiar look to a British writer, and trades unions in Britain exert pressures in just the directions mentioned. However, successful "modernisation", from whatever initial level of development, depends on a whole variety of factors which influence the attitudes of employees toward measures aimed at rationalisation. The general economic situation is crucial; for instance whether housing is easily available, whether redundancy payments exist, and perhaps most important, whether there is full employment. In Yugoslavia at present unemployment is running at a rate of about 7.5%.¹⁸ The case of Britain illustrates very well that such problems are equally difficult to solve within an orthodox management structure. In one respect a self-management system may well have an advantage in that social cost may be more likely to be taken into account and so an effort made to avoid 'scrapping' superfluous

17. Bird (1969, p.88). Moore (1970, p.27) points out that there are checks against this. The importance of the technical sector in the enterprise, "conditioning and education" of employees, and the check against each other provided by the economic units into which the enterprise is divided.
18. Moore (1970, p.12). This would undoubtedly be greater if it were not for about 500,000 Yugoslavs working abroad, mainly in W. Europe. In 1969 they remitted \$250m to Yugoslavia - tourism contributed \$241m (Times, 14 Apr. 1970).

manpower. Moore (1970, p.11) gives two interesting examples of how redundant workers have been re-absorbed in a different capacity within the enterprise. In general, even if it is difficult to see exactly what the contribution of workers' self-management has been to either Yugoslavia's economic successes or difficulties, the evidence gives us no reason to suppose that, on economic grounds, the democratisation of industrial authority structures is not feasible.

On the other hand, and importantly from the point of view of this study, the Yugoslav evidence does show that the kind of economic system within which a democratised system operated could have significant repercussions on the internal working of the system. As a result of the 1965 economic reforms Yugoslavia now has a virtually free market economy; "we certainly do not idealise the market economy, but accept it as necessary at the present level of development" (Tito, 1969). Foreign investment is also being encouraged. Although rigid central planning of the kind typical in East European Communist states obviously negates decision making by employees in individual enterprises, the free play of the market can also place great strains on the system. In Moore's view (1970, p.5)

"even if the Yugoslav commitment to the price mechanism represents an integral part of its perspective development toward a self managed state ... There are already several indications that when market forces and socialist self management come into conflict, it is the latter which is adapted or even subordinated".

So far, only external influences on the workers' council have been considered but economic factors also exercise great influence over the actual structure of decision making in the enterprise itself. While it may be true as Neal and Fisk (1966, p.30) state that

"despite some restrictive laws, some intervention by the government and some pressure from the party, the workers' councils and their elected managing boards are in fact responsible for the control of their own enterprises",

this tells us nothing about the role of the ordinary worker in the self-management system. It tells us nothing about the problem posed earlier, the role of the 'expert' within the self-management system, but, particularly since the 1965 reforms, this is perhaps the crucial problem for the system.

iv. The workers' council and the role of experts.

Formally the workers' council has very broad decision making powers: it

"approves production, wage, and marketing policies and plans; rules of conduct; and reports submitted by the managing board; it decides how that part of the earnings which is left to the disposal of the enterprise is to be distributed ... In general, the workers' council is entitled to be concerned with every problem of the enterprise. It is also the highest authority in the enterprise to which persons can appeal" (Kolaja, 1965, p.6).

The I.L.O. (1962, p.163) report states the workers' management bodies

"are directly responsible for some of the duties that elsewhere fall to the top management and the senior and medium level executives - as regards a host of detailed decisions as well as policy matters".

Kolaja analysed the subjects discussed by the workers' councils in the factories that he visited (as recorded in the minutes for 1957-1959) and he found that in both factories the councils spent the greatest proportion of their time discussing matters in the "production-financial" category, i.e. on matters that fall largely into the higher management level.¹⁸

There has been an interesting evolution over time in the topics to which the councils have devoted most attention. A content analysis of the minutes of seven enterprises over a period of ten years showed that the amount of time devoted to higher level management matters had increased, while that on other topics decreased. The investigator argued (cited Kolaja, p.23) that this indicated that workers' council members were learning to deal with matters that

18. For details see Kolaja, 1965, p.24, Table 6. Stephen (1967, p.17) found a similar pattern in the Split shipyard. See also the list of agendas of 6,000 councils in Blumberg (1968, p.205-6) and the list of debates and decisions at Rade Koncar, Kmetić (1967, pp 27-8). The general level of education and economic development of the area in which the enterprise is situated is also important. In the less developed Republics questions "of canteen, toilet and working conditions" have been found to predominate on agendas (Moore, 1970, p.16).

transcended their immediate environment - or, as Riddell (1960, p.68) puts it, that they are "slowly 'catching up with the system'".

This is a significant finding given the argument of the participatory theory of democracy that participation is educative, that experience of participation will widen the interests and outlook of the individual to encompass public matters.¹⁹

But if this is the formal picture, how are these decisions reached in practice? Do the elected workers' councils tend to follow the advice of their 'experts'? Perhaps the first thing that should be said is that individual enterprises vary enormously, as might be expected since the level of economic development also varies greatly, so that generalisation is hazardous. Nevertheless all the evidence points to an increasing tendency for technical and executive personnel to play a greater role in decision making at the expense of the workers' councils and the employees generally. Observations of workers' council meetings indicate that a considerable amount of influence is exercised by the director, the collegium and other technical experts. They do most of the talking and their suggestions are rarely rejected. It is only when lower level

19. Sturmfthal (1964, p.109) suggests that this evolution merely reflects legal changes. Although the legal framework of the workers' self-management system is frequently modified, the powers of the councils have always been extensive; the point is that they now seem more able and willing to exercise them.

matters are discussed - particularly the allocation of the housing that Yugoslav enterprises provide for their workers - that the rank and file councillors join in a vigorous debate or take notes. This pattern was followed even in the enterprise visited by Stephen, where the labour force was fairly highly educated and skilled (although some of the higher level matters had been discussed previously).²⁰ On the other hand, Moore (1970, p.17) says that there are "instances of particular proposals, and occasionally whole draft plans, being rejected by workers" and Singleton and Topham, (1963, p.23) report an enterprise where "Council and Economic Unit meetings attended were marked by very frequent voting, not normally unanimous, and many important decisions were taken which amended the proposals of Director, Chairman and sub-committees".

The drive to decentralise, develop and strengthen the Yugoslav economy that lies behind the 1965 economic reforms has done a great deal to increase the influence of the director and executive and

20. Stephen (1967, pp 38-41). Accounts of workers' council meetings can be found in Riddell (1968, pp 66-7); Kolaja (1965, pp 45-50, pp 19-21, Table 4). In the factory visited by Riddell the workers were of low skill status and in those visited by Kolaja a high proportion were women, though he seems to be unaware of the significance of this for participation. Kolaja (p.51) goes further than his evidence warrants when he attributes the lack of participation in higher management topics to lack of interest on the part of the council members; it could equally well have been due to lack of confidence or experience in dealing with these matters, or lack of sufficient information to criticise proposals made.

technical personnel. Moore (1970, p.17) comments that,

"the latest evidence suggests that Yugoslavs are prepared to 'streamline' their self management structures within enterprises so as not to hamper the development of technological progress or wider trade policies".

An interesting development along these lines is the provision of 1969 that makes the workers' council the only legally obligatory elected body in the enterprise; it is up to the workers to decide what other bodies there shall be and what powers they shall have. This has led in some enterprises to the replacement of the managing board by the business board. Little attention has been paid in the available accounts to the activities of the managing boards but they appear to exercise a considerable influence within the enterprise. They tend to be made up of highly qualified people (Moore, p.16; Blumberg 1968, p.218; Table 1) and as well as their duty of interpreting and executing the council's decisions, the board can submit its own proposals to the council (although these must be publicised in advance).

"Thus it is able to act as an initiator of regulations and policy, and this explains why the board has been compared to a cabinet rather than to a civil service" (Moore, p.15).

The business boards are a logical development of this. They usually consist of expert managerial staff, proposed by the director and elected by the council, and have very wide powers. That this considerably changes the balance of power between the

board and the workers' council can be seen from the fact that the idea has been put forward that a trade union representative should sit on the business board to ensure that all decisions are in the workers' interests!²¹

The role of the director within the enterprise has also probably been enhanced by the reforms of 1965, and especially by the drive for exports and foreign investment.²² In the earlier years of workers' self-management there were many cases of directors exercising "omnipotence" over their enterprises (see e.g. Ward, 1957; Tochitch, 1964), but there are now the pressures of the (international) market giving prominence to his role. Again, the scope open to the director will vary from area to area, but often the statut of the enterprise gives him very wide powers. This is the 'constitution' adopted by the enterprise itself within the framework of the Federal law relating to enterprises; it defines the relationship between the director of the enterprise and its

21. Moore, 1970, pp 17-8. Moore also notes that the centralised nature of the technical services increases their influence. He says that the trade union response to the business boards is "confused and non-committal".
22. Foreign investment obviously poses many problems for the self-management system, particularly as it may amount to as much as 49% in an individual enterprise (see the list of foreign investment in The Times, 14 Apr. 1970) Yugoslavia very recently became the first Communist country to enter into a trade agreement with the EEC; this includes special treatment in the EEC for Yugoslav baby beef, and the setting up of a joint EEC/Yugoslav commission to try to widen co-operation. (The Economist, Mar. 21, 1970).

units (Blum, 1970, p.32). For example, in the shipyard visited by Stephen (1967, p.35) there was a provision in the statut that prevented the council from changing a decision of the director on the execution of policy decisions, their only recourse was to involve the Commune or dismiss the director. How common provisions of this nature are is not known, but an extremely interesting example of the role that a director of a large enterprise can play is provided by the case of Emeric Blum, the director of Energoinvest, of Sarajevo. This enterprise and its director are exceptional, but indicative of a trend. The enterprise builds power stations, and is also involved in hydro-electric machinery and mining and it trades with thirty countries, Blum doing a great deal of travelling. The statut of the enterprise gives its director very wide powers (he recently called in McKinsey, the U.S. business consultants!), he chooses the "directors team" of executives and usually draws up the agenda of the workers' council meetings. The statut "provides for the legal possibility of the Director ... transferring certain powers to persons in executive positions in the enterprise, with the approval of the workers' council" (Blum, p.34). Blum himself has said that he considers that the enterprise

"should not differ in terms of organisation from enterprises in any developed society, irrespective of the social system. Everything that is specific to (the Yugoslav) social system has been respected in the basic

organisational decision, whereas the organisation of business ... is a matter for elaboration by experts".²³

It should perhaps be stressed again that Energoinvest and its director are atypical, but the wider problem of the influence over decision making exerted by experts is recognised inside Yugoslavia. Moore (1970, p.18) notes a workers' comment that "not infrequently the workers' council draws apart from the workers and falls under the sway of a group of executives". In a study of perceptions of the control structure in Yugoslav enterprises Zupanov and Tannenbaum (1968, pp 97-8) found that among the workers they interviewed

"the largest discrepancy between ideal and actual occurs for the workers as a group. The respondents clearly feel that the workers should have more control than they do. The managers are the only group ... for which respondents feel a decrease in influence would be appropriate ... The workers' council is perceived to have a reasonably high degree of control, and the discrepancy between actual and ideal for this group is not so large as that for the workers as a group".²⁴

A Yugoslav writer, in answer to the question he posed of whether inequality is being combatted under self-management, answered that

23. Blum (1970, p.39). Apart from Blum's own account, the rest of the information comes from an article on Blum in The Sunday Times, 8 Mar. 1970. Blum has been director for 16 years; last year the council insisted that he remain. The article comments that his "popularity is understandable", the average monthly wage at Energoinvest is about £10 above average and there is a long waiting list for jobs.
24. The workers interviewed were studying part time at the Workers University of Zagreb and were not typical of Yugoslav workers as a whole, being more highly educated and skilled. Also 89% of the 56 workers belonged to the Communist League.

in practice,

"bureaucracy in a transformed, decentralised form is appearing within each centre of decision making. It acquires the form of informal groups, striving to maintain a monopoly on the management of labour and on the disposal of the surplus product, bypassing the workers and their interests" (Pecujlic, 1969, p.24).

It might be thought that all this shows that the democratisation of industrial authority structures in the sense demanded by the participatory theory of democracy is unlikely to be feasible; is it not likely that the experts, as Michels argued, would always really play the major role in the decision process? Clearly the evidence on the influence exerted by the director etc in the Yugoslav self-management system does highlight a basic dilemma for any participatory system - but that is not to say that it is necessarily an insoluble one. If as many ordinary workers as is possible are to have the chance to sit on elected management bodies and to be 'educated through participation' then rapid rotation of office holders is required; yet if they are to control their 'experts' then such a system would seem to militate against it. The dimensions of this problem are accentuated in a still-developing country like Yugoslavia, but even in Britain, with an industrially sophisticated work-force the problem would still arise. Indeed it already does arise in the context of the relationship between national and local government and their permanent staff, the civil service and the 'town hall'. The real question, given that

participation by the ordinary man and his elected representatives is to be taken seriously, is what can be done to enable them competently to evaluate policies put forward by the 'experts' and to enable them to offer (alternative) policies of their own.

A major factor here is something that has been mentioned previously as a necessary condition for participation, namely the possession of the requisite information for decision taking. The importance of this is illustrated by the recent pressures by back-bench MPs in the House of Commons for select committees to be set up (with the necessary powers) that would be able to obtain information that would allow MPs properly to investigate and evaluate area of policy or particular institutions, enable them to see on what basis civil servants gave advice to ministers. Without such information policy cannot be effectively criticised, or responsibly accepted or rejected. Kolaja (1965, p.76) states that in Yugoslav enterprises "'the principle of publicity' is probably unique, in most cases providing more information to employees in Yugoslavia than is supplied to their counterparts in Britain, or the United States, or in the Soviet Union" (see also I.L.O. 1962, p.280). However, although one account says that in several enterprises council and economic unit meetings "were serviced with extensive documentation of items on the agenda" (Singleton and Topham, 1963, p.24), Riddell (1968, p.66) states that workers' council

members do not have advance notice of the recommendations to be made by the director and other technical staff. Obviously without this their chances of making effective contributions to discussions and decisions are slim. But even if they did have such advance notice, council members would still need access to information to allow them to evaluate the suggestions put before them. Here, the trades unions could play a valuable role by providing the councils with this kind of information, or, perhaps, as one Yugoslav discussion suggests, the council could hire its own experts (see Bilandsic, 1967; Dragicevic, 1966).²⁵

If the availability of information is one aspect of a possible solution to the dilemma, care has to be taken so far as industry is concerned, that the problem of the role of experts is not confounded by too great a reliance on market forces. A balance must be struck between central planning and co-ordination and the free market so that decision making by the employees of individual

25. The less educated workers would undoubtedly find this kind of material difficult to assimilate, and in this connection the work of the workers universities in Yugoslavia should be mentioned. In 1967/8 there were 236 of these universities catering for 311,000 people; the objectives of the universities are twofold, "to increase efficiency and working skills and to equip people for more demanding and highly skilled jobs ... to instil in them a broader grasp of their environment in order to fit them for their role as producer managers" (Moore, 1970, p.20). The same author comments that (p.21) the type of courses on which the universities concentrate in future "will form a reliable barometer for the Yugoslav balance between technocracy and self management".

enterprises is unhindered, yet overall cohesion and uniform development of the economy maintained.²⁶ In a study of this nature no discussion can be undertaken of this extremely complex problem, but it is obvious from the evidence from Yugoslavia that this balance is crucial to the success of democratisation in industry. Leaving aside this wider context, perhaps the answer that immediately springs to mind to the question of how the ordinary worker is to be effective in his role as manager is - through experience. And this brings us to another question, not yet touched upon; how far do ordinary workers in Yugoslavia show an interest in and participate in workers' self-management?

v. The participation of the ordinary worker.

From the arguments advanced in previous chapters it might be expected that Yugoslav workers would be active and interested in the workers' self-management system because it does combine participation at the higher and lower levels, with the decentralisation of the enterprise into economic units. Unfortunately most commentators virtually ignore the realities of participation at this level and

26. One aspect of the 1965 reforms is that reliance on the market means that imbalances in development between the Republics tend to become cumulatively greater. Well established enterprises (some of which have their own banks) also tend to "take over" less successful enterprises, and not always to the advantage of the workers in the latter (Moore, 1970, p.26). Generally, the Yugoslav government seem relatively unconcerned about the emergence of monopolies.

there is very little empirical evidence available on what actually happens in the economic unit.²⁷ In principle, however, these units, together with meetings of the collective and referenda, and the central council of the enterprise, provide just the kind of participatory model advocated earlier, offering opportunities for direct participation as well as the election of representatives.

According to Singleton and Topham (1963, p.17) "the Yugoslavs regard the creation of Economic Units as one of the most significant developments of the last twenty years" and they say that they were originally created as an attempt to overcome the tendency for workers' councils to become aloof from the body of the workers (p.14). Zupanov and Tannenbaum (1968, p.95) compare the economic units to the self-regulating socio-technical units in composite longwall mining and Singleton and Topham (1963, pp 15-7) say that the relationship between the economic unit and the central council of the enterprise may take the form of a kind of collective contract. The economic units have their own workers' councils (its average size is 12 members) and they have a considerable degree of autonomy in decision making. The unit's council disposes of the income earned by the unit, the method by which this is to be distributed among the

27. Blumberg (1968) for example, although the bulk of his book is devoted to examples of lower level participation, hardly mentions this level in his chapter on Yugoslavia, although it would have provided him with the connecting link that is lacking between his Yugoslav and other material.

workers in the unit, and it is responsible for hiring and firing, allocating workers to jobs etc (Moore, 1970, pp 13-4). What is not clear is how far all the workers in the unit are drawn into decision making about their own immediate job, or how far the workers as a whole are able to, and learn to relate decision making at this level to higher level decisions. Stephen (1967, p.16) notes that in the shipyard that he visited the less skilled and educated workers had proportionally greater representation on the departmental workers' councils than on the central council, and the I.L.O. report (1962, p.172) describes a regular workshop meeting where "comments and suggestions came from all sides ... a third or more of the workers took part ... and there was hardly any embarrassment due to verbal hesitancy ... or difference in grades between the speakers".

One way in which all workers have an opportunity to participate fully in higher level decisions is through meetings of the whole collective of the enterprise and referenda. The former are held to consider "the overall plan for the enterprise, major policy decisions (especially substantial investment undertakings) and important constitutional questions regarding the structure and functions of the self management machinery" (Moore, 1970, p.13). Each enterprise determines how its own referenda are to be executed, but usually the trade union instigates and organises it (Moore, p.27). The I.L.O. report says that these are usually held on the question

of income distribution (and Moore, p.27, gives an example where 7500 workers voted that 188m dinars should be equally divided between the industrial combine and personal incomes, rejecting three other alternatives including allocating it all to personal incomes), but referenda are also held on other questions. In the Split shipyard one was held on a government recommendation that the yard should form a consortium with three others; the proposal did not, on that occasion, go through as one of the yards voted against it.²⁸

The economic units, the referenda and the rapid rotation of office holders on elected management bodies means that there are many opportunities open to workers in Yugoslavia to participate at different levels of decision making, but, at present at least, only certain sections of the workers appear to take advantage of the opportunities or to take an active interest in the system as a whole. Perhaps the first point that should be made is that whatever the failings of the self management system a remarkable number of people have already held office; between 1950 and the early 1960's over a million individuals had served on workers councils and managing boards, about a quarter of the industrial labour force, (Blumberg,

28. Stephen (1967, p.43-4). The merger was later agreed to. Bird (1968, p.83) cites this as an example of the economic difficulties that can be created by workers' self-management and says that during the period of decision "key workers" went to Holland. For another example of a referendum see Moore, p.27.

1968, p.215; in 1960 the total labour force was 9m of whom 5m were agriculture workers, Auty, 1965, p.157). Since the development of the economic units this must have increased considerably, for instance in Energoinvest in 1960 9% of employees were members of managing bodies, in 1969 this had increased to 30% (Blum, 1970, p.32). However, these office holders are drawn disproportionately from certain sections of the working population; in 1962 women tended to be under-represented and skilled and highly skilled workers over represented on workers councils (Riddell, 1968, p.66). Information for more recent years from the Split shipyard confirms this pattern; from 1965-7 the proportion of manual workers on the council rose from 61.3% to 72.4% but in 1967 only 2.6% of these were semi-skilled and 3.9% unskilled.²⁹

The background to this activity is one where general knowledge of and interest in the workers' self-management system tends to be low. In one of the factories that Kolaja visited he spoke to twenty four people about the workers' council meeting, of whom ten

29. Stephen, 1967, p.11 and App.2:2:1. Of the white collar members only 3.9% were of elementary school level. cf. Kolaja (1965, p.17, Table 1). There is an ambiguity in the term "workers' self-management" (and "workers' control") in that in a democratic system all employees and not just manual "workers" are involved in decision making. The problem that these titles draw attention to is how to ensure that the majority (the manual workers) play a correspondingly important part in decision making. In Yugoslavia the division between manual and white collar workers is no longer officially recognised (Stephen p.13). Kolaja (1965, pp 7-8) and other writers state that three-quarters of the managing board must be employed directly on production, but in the shipyard they had no knowledge of this provision (Stephen, p.13), and in view of the evidence earlier on the composition and role of the managing board and the introduction of the business board this regulation would appear to be a dead letter.

knew nothing about it at all.³⁰ Riddell (1968, pp 62-3) cites several Yugoslav surveys of general knowledge about the system and these show that, although levels of knowledge vary according to the type of factory and worker, they do tend to be low. One researcher commented that "there is a striking fact that a comparatively large number of examinees possess no elementary knowledge and lack information on important social, economic and political problems".

Riddell (p.64) suggests that this lack of interest and knowledge arises because "in general the system has become too complicated for most of the workers who have to operate it". So far as the actual structure of participation is concerned this does not seem entirely plausible; certainly it is difficult to see how a less complicated structure could be devised that would give the same opportunities for participation at all levels. On the other hand the system of income distribution is very complicated and is not understood by many workers (for evidence on this see Riddell, pp 64-5). Also, as the same writer points out, the official (party) Yugoslav views on 'motivation to work' do nothing to help the development of the self-management system and have led

30. But it should be noted that a former chairman of the council remarked that "it is not the practice to report the workers' council agenda to workers" (Kolaja, 1965, p.51).

to the imposition of piece work in offices and professional occupations, and attempts to increase differentials. The 1965 reforms have also helped to widen differentials from a ratio of 1:4 to 1:8 over the past decade (Moore, 1970, p.25), and there is evidence that large numbers of workers think that these should be reduced (Riddell, pp 64-5 ; on the method of distribution see also Moore, p.26-7.)

Zupanov and Tannenbaum, in the study referred to earlier (p.98), say that the evidence on the workers' perceptions of the distribution of control in the enterprise "seem to suggest that the workers' council does not give workers a sense of control in their enterprises", (see also Riddell, p.65). We should not perhaps be surprised at this in the light of the evidence on the increasing influence exerted by 'experts', and the question of working methods is a good indication that much more needs to be done to make participation a reality for the ordinary worker at the lower level. There is more involved in the disinterest of the ordinary worker than a complexity of structure. Nor should it be forgotten that the contrast between the ideology and the actions of the Communist League, and the simultaneous commitment of the unions to the protection and furthering of worker's self-management and the implementation of the 1965 reforms (even where this conflicts with the former aim) are unlikely to inspire confidence in the system as a whole.

The Yugoslav evidence does not enable positive confirmation to be given to all the arguments advanced in this study. Only an example - which we do not have - of an industrial system participatory at both levels, where real efforts are made to discourage the development of a 'technocratic oligarchy', and where the political parties and trade unions have a more positive attitude to the system, will show for certain whether the educative effect of participation will 'spread' from the lower to the higher level in the enterprise, and from industry to the wider political system. But neither are the arguments of the participatory theory of democracy, that a political system can be developed where the ordinary citizen will avail himself of all the multiple opportunities for participation to the maximum possible extent, refuted by the evidence presented here. No one would wish to claim that workers' self-management in Yugoslavia provides us with a completely successful example of the democratisation of industrial authority structures over an entire economy, but, for our purposes that is not the point. The main thing is that it is not a complete failure either, and the evidence from Yugoslavia certainly does not support the claim that, however difficult and complex it may be, democracy in industry in the Western context just is not feasible.

With the rejection of this claim, all the claims of recent theorists of democracy that support their argument that popular

participation has only a minor role to play in a modern theory of democracy have now been examined and rejected. It therefore follows that a participatory theory of democracy, formulated on the basis established in this study, is a realistic and acceptable theory for the present day.

CONCLUSIONS

Among recent theorists of democracy there have been very few dissenting voices raised against the prevailing view that a major strand in earlier democratic theory, that giving a central place to participation and having Rousseau as its major figure, is now largely irrelevant. This assumption of irrelevance has meant that the bulk of recent work has fallen into a tradition of democratic theory that descends, through the crucially influential writing of Schumpeter, from liberal democratic theorists like Bentham and James Mill. That this tradition is only part of the whole of earlier theory, and that another potentially relevant tradition has been neglected, has been obscured by the myth that there is one 'classical' theory of democracy against which the contemporary theory has been measured. The acceptance of this myth, even by critics of the contemporary theory, and the failure to look more closely at the form taken by earlier theories of democracy has led to the present position where despite mounting discontent with the contemporary theory no substantive critique of the whole of that theory has been offered. It has been the aim of this study to supply at least the basis for such a critique by beginning at the point at which the defenders of the (participatory) 'classical' theory have rested their case.

A discussion of the place that participation can realistically occupy in a modern theory of democracy has not only to be conducted in terms of both facts and values but the attempt has to be made to construct the basis (however tentatively and crudely) for a modern, participatory theory of democracy. Without this the arguments of the advocates of the contemporary theory of democracy remain largely untouched on either the empirical or the evaluative level, (including the view that even the form of earlier theories is outmoded), and no effective challenge can be made to the claim that, today, a participatory theory of democracy is unrealistic and potentially destabilising, whatever may or may not have been the case in Rousseau's day, or even that of John Stuart Mill.

The body of work amassed on democratic theory over the past thirty years or so provides us with perhaps the best available 'test case' through which to come to some conclusion about the proper form for a modern political theory. If it is correct, as I have suggested, that political theorists have advocated value-free theory less from a consideration of the philosophical arguments on the relationship between facts and values than because of a desire to achieve and maintain objectivity, then the result, in democratic theory at least, is a nicely ironical one; the evaluative implications of the contemporary theory of democracy have been hidden from many of its formulators. As Bay (1965, p.42) has remarked,

"it is paradoxical that some of the leading behavioural writers on democracy continue to write as if they want to have it both ways: to be rigorously value-neutral and at the same time be impeccable champions of conventional pluralist democracy".

That is to say "impeccable champions" of 'democracy', conceived in terms of the rule of competing, multiple elites, against what from the perspective of recent theorists is the only alternative, namely the rule of one elite or 'totalitarianism'. For the empirical political theorist, who starts from the facts of the existing system of democracy, then one other possible alternative, a different, participatory conception of democracy, is ruled out as unrealistic. This appears either at best as hopelessly utopian, or at worst as a potentially destabilising "deceptive myth or demagogic device". More generally, a consideration of the contemporary theory of democracy illustrates that to hold up value-free theory as the proper form for political theory is to say that political theories must always be couched in such a form that they are bound to a perpetual present and the alternatives it, and it alone, offers. To take the facts as given, to build "descriptive" or "empirical" theories and to say that theorists must cast out values is to leave us with nothing against which to measure what we have already achieved in political life except other forms of political organisation that may already exist. In so far as the existing alternative to (empirically or descriptively defined)

democracy does not involve electoral competition between elites then we have good reason to be satisfied with what we have and good reason not to put democratic stability at risk, whether through increasing rates of participation by the ordinary citizen or by the propagation of "deceptive myths".

Fortunately, as shown by the analysis of the relationship between facts and values, there is no need for the political theorist to confine himself to the present. A modern political theory, just as much as a 'classical' theory, can still look to the future, can still, as Plamenatz (1967, p.29) has said, "help us decide what to do and how to go about doing it". The political theorist cannot discard values if he is still to go on theorising. It is not just pure chance that recent theorists have decided that the competition of elites for electoral office is what makes a political system 'democratic'; there must be some basis for deciding that this is the relevant criterion and it is provided by the evaluative framework of the contemporary theory, a framework that can ultimately be traced back to a particular conception of the democratic citizen and the kind of "institutional arrangements" that best protect and serve his interests. The difference in this respect between the contemporary and a modern, participatory theory of democracy is that the values of the former are those that follow from the working of the present system, whereas the evaluative

framework of the latter is relevant to a system that, it is claimed, might be established in the future and against which present achievements can be measured.

It is possible to see the relationship between the two theories of democracy in a similar fashion to Gallie's (1956) characterisation of the relationship between what he calls "liberal" and "socialist" morality; that the participatory theory is a protest against the contemporary on largely factual grounds. It is different estimations of what is empirically feasible so far as participation is concerned that underlie the evaluative differences in the two theories of democracy. Because of the two-way relationship between facts and values we can gauge from an empirical investigation how realistic a particular interpretation of a value is. Modern political theorists have many advantages over their predecessors; thanks to modern techniques of conceptual and empirical analysis objective studies of both the empirical and evaluative aspects of political theories can be undertaken with a rigour denied to earlier writers, yet recent theorists of democracy (even the critics of the contemporary theory) have not made the most of the opportunities open to them. By neglecting to look in detail at the controversy over facts and values they have failed to take advantage of modern conceptual analysis, but, more surprisingly on the part of "empirical" theorists, they have also failed to be sociologists.

The extent to which recent theorists of democracy take present political realities as unchangeable is highlighted by the fact that Sartori is the only theorist who has even posed the question of why the ordinary citizen tends to be apathetic and disinterested in politics. But even though the question is raised by Sartori one does not need the perspective provided by the participatory theory of democracy to find his reply, that it is "nobody's fault", unconvincing in the extreme. No recent theorist of democracy, whether a defender or critic of 'classical' theory, has appeared to notice, let alone realise the significance of the most immediately obvious feature of the empirical data on political participation and political apathy; that apathetic citizens are not to be found randomly distributed among all sections of the population but tend to be concentrated among citizens from a lower class background. To an empirical political theorist such a 'social fact' as differential class rates of political participation should call out for an attempt to be made to find an explanation. This is not to say that the possibility that it is indeed "nobody's fault" can be ruled out, of course it cannot, but without any investigation it cannot be taken for granted that such a feature as class-based political apathy (even one characteristic of most industrialised, Western countries) must be taken as given in a modern democratic theory. The lack of real empirical curiosity in the fact of the facts - the failure of recent democratic

theorists to be sociologists - becomes even more evident when the social correlates of participation are more closely examined. It is not the case that these are a relatively random collection of items that just happen to be associated with low rates of participation, rather there is ample evidence to indicate that we are faced with a set of inter-related factors, factors that, I have argued, form a non-participation syndrome. Once this is realised, then, far from beginning a theory of democracy by taking the syndrome as given, the questions that one immediately asks are can we account for the existence of the syndrome, and, the most important for democratic theory, can the syndrome be overcome and, further, why should we want to overcome it?

It is at this point that the need for a modern participatory theory of democracy becomes most acute, for without it, or at least without the attempt being made to construct such a theory, there is very little to indicate the area in which we should start looking for an explanation for the syndrome. An examination of the work of the earlier theorists of participatory democracy provides, as has been shown, hypotheses to account, in institutional terms, for the present apathy. The potential usefulness of the general hypothesis, that the type of political culture depends largely on the forms of authority structure within which individuals interact, is confirmed by the fact that the recent theories of

stable democracy of Almond and Verba and Eckstein are based on arguments about political socialisation that embody just such an hypothesis. But the participatory theory also goes further and makes the more specific suggestions that participation itself is educative and that the most important and potentially participative sphere, in which the roots of the non-participation syndrome are to be found, is industry.

If, *prima facie*, the last argument especially looks rather surprising or implausible, it does so because the available empirical evidence on political socialisation has until now been interpreted in one way only when used in democratic theory. That industry is crucially important in the political socialisation process emerges clearly from the evidence, but this fact and its significance for democratic theory have been overlooked, overlooked because the evidence has been viewed from within the (implicit) evaluative framework of the contemporary theory of democracy. From within this framework certain aspects of the information available on the two important items of the non-participation syndrome, the lack of political efficacy and "authoritarianism", are also hidden from view but these become apparent on closer examination from a different perspective. That is to say, the evaluative framework obscures the fact that two components, a cognitive as well as a psychological component are involved in the sense of political

efficacy and "authoritarianism" and, most importantly, in the non-participation syndrome itself.

In the critique of the original study of The Authoritarian Personality contributors suggested that the responses of individuals from different class backgrounds to the F scale should not necessarily be interpreted in the same way and that those of lower class respondents could best be seen not as telling us something about their psychology but as realistic accounts of their environment. This argument has not been considered by recent theorists of democracy, even though the alleged greater "authoritarian-mindedness" of (lower class) non-participants is cited as a potential danger to stability if rates of political participation were to increase. Nor have they considered the possibility that this criticism might also apply to other scales, such as the political efficacy scale. Its relevance to the case of political efficacy becomes clear from a consideration of the definitions of efficacy which involve both a cognitive element, the individual's perception of the operation of the system, and a psychological feeling of effectiveness. In the interpretation of replies to the efficacy scales however the cognitive component tends to disappear into the evaluative assumption that the system is responsive to all citizens and the replies of those respondents that conflict with this assumption are then - implicitly - interpreted as telling us

something about the individuals' psychologies. But we have independent evidence to show that middle and working class individuals systematically differ in their perceptions of the operation of the existing system, and it is the former who tend to share the favourable view of recent democratic theorists. The replies of lower class respondents to statements such as "people like me don't have any say about how the government runs things", or those designed to measure commitment to democratic norms, can reasonably be interpreted as giving a realistic account of those individuals relation to the system as they see it. Thus, one part of the explanation for low rates of political participation among the ordinary citizen is that it is a realistic response, because it does not appear worthwhile to the individual to participate. This is quite different from the apathy of homo civicus, for whom participation is an unnecessary cost; the fact that he could participate is enough to maintain competition between leaders, which itself is enough to ensure that his interests are protected.

The second, but inter-related, part of the explanation for low participation by the ordinary citizen is in terms of the typical political self developed through the political socialisation process. Here we are looking at the sources of the psychological aspect of the non-participation syndrome, for the typical political self of the ordinary citizen is one that lacks the necessary feeling of

effectiveness and confidence for participation. The relatively non-participatory structure of the lower class family is unlikely to develop the initial basis for adult effectiveness, but the important point is that the later experiences of the individual, the fact that he is less likely to continue to higher education than the middle class child, and, crucially, the lack of opportunity for him to participate in the workplace, all this reinforces the initial socialisation. In principle such a pattern of socialisation could go together with a perception of the operation of the system as responsive, but in practice this is unlikely. Lower class individuals tend both to feel ineffective and to see the political system as a whole as unresponsive; thus McDill can speak of a "negative weltanschauung", and Kohn and Schooler find that a similar outlook has its roots in the typical occupational experiences of lower class individuals, and the phenomena with which these investigators are concerned can be seen as another way of looking at aspects of the non-participation syndrome. In effect, the typical lower class life pattern is one of a 'vicious circle' of lack of opportunities for participation, a circle in which the basic lack of efficacy contributes to the view that the system is unresponsive, and actual experiences of lack of response in the political system reinforce the feeling of ineffectiveness. If this analysis can provide an explanation for the existence of the syndrome, the further investigations into the possibility of participation in industry indicate

that we need not take the syndrome as given, and that recent theorists are being far too hasty in assuming that apathy is "nobody's fault". Contrary to this view the evidence suggests that it is feasible to develop a 'virtuous circle' of participation, to develop a participatory political culture, by introducing a participatory system in industry.

To develop such a participatory political culture the transformation of existing industrial authority structures would have to be a fairly radical one, a lesser modification would leave the cognitive component of the non-participation syndrome untouched. All the evidence suggests that the introduction of lower level partial participation on a wide scale would pose relatively few difficulties; most workers actually want more participation at this level and many modern management theorists argue that it is necessary for maximum efficiency in the enterprise, a view which management itself, for instance that of ICI, is beginning to share. But although such participation does act positively on the sense of effectiveness and confidence (and whatever other intrinsic merits it may have) because it can be introduced without changing the overall structure of authority in the enterprise, itself a part of the existing structure of the polity, the individual's perceptions of the operation of the political system will remain unaffected, and he may still feel that participation is irrelevant. Participation would seem relevant when it gives the individual a

greater degree of control over political decision making, especially over decisions that directly affect, in an obvious way, his own life. It is precisely in this sense that the democratisation of industrial authority structures would be expected to have an impact far beyond the enterprise itself. Not only would higher level participation within a democratic industrial system provide the individual with that wider education, the broadening of interests and outlook, on which the earlier theorists laid so much stress, but because industry is so intimately woven into the very fabric of the national "public realm" in modern, industrialised societies, individual participation in decision making in the enterprise at the highest level, would have a positive impact on the responsiveness of the democratic political system as a whole to the demands of the ordinary citizen.

When we turn to the crucial question of the feasibility of democratising industrial authority structures the picture is far less clear than in the case of lower level partial participation. Of course, if we did have examples of enterprises, or even more relevantly a whole economy, operating successfully on democratic lines then much of the work in this study would not have been necessary; unfortunately on the basis of the available evidence any conclusions can only be tentative. Nevertheless, the absence of such examples should not be taken as confirmation of the

arguments of theorists like Eckstein that democratisation in industry is impossible. Certainly the evidence that we have shows that there are many difficulties and complexities involved - far more than are indicated in the early writings of G.D.H. Cole for example - but, on the other hand, there is also little to suggest that solutions to these problems cannot be found.

One conclusion that does emerge quite clearly from the evidence on participation in industry is that democratisation is unlikely to be successful unless it is thoroughgoing; that is, workers are unlikely to take advantage of the opportunities offered unless the enterprise is participatory at both higher and lower levels. In the face of the existing pattern of socialisation, producing habits "of doing what one is told", the lower level is the essential starting point for the 'resocialisation' of the ordinary worker. In the absence of opportunities for education through participation in decision making at the level of the familiar, everyday work-process, higher level participation is likely to appear as "unreal" to the worker as Schumpeter argues that politics in general is to the average citizen; the role of manager is one in which the worker needs practice, just as he does in the wider role of decision-making citizen, and in this respect the lower level of the enterprise bears the same relationship to the enterprise as a whole, as industry does to the national polity.

Furthermore, an industrial authority structure that is participatory at all levels would also provide far more opportunities than are usually supposed to be possible for the individual worker to participate directly in decision making. As the structure of workers' self-management in Yugoslavia illustrates, participation through the election of representatives and full participation are not mutually exclusive. In modern, large scale societies the former will be necessary in most spheres, including industry, but at the same time it seems feasible to replicate Rousseau's paradigm of the educative participative environment over important areas of decision making.

Of all the many practical problems that would arise in any attempt to democratise industrial authority structures the one perhaps most relevant to the question of participation is that of the influence exerted by the 'experts'. Cole thought that the choice of such experts does not raise "the democratic issue", but it is raised by the influence potentially available to employees who have scarce, specialised knowledge. The evidence from Yugoslavia presents this problem in a heightened form because of the relatively low level of economic development in that country and the inexperience of much of the labour force. The technical expertise to be found in a sophisticated workforce like that of Britain should not be underestimated, (it is relevant here that

managements often offer prizes to workers for "suggestions" to improve efficiency) but the problem still remains of how to ensure that the worker qua manager feels competent and confident to make use of the knowledge that he has, and also to ensure that he has access to sources of information to enable him to evaluate policies in areas at present unfamiliar to him. On the first point one can only come back to the necessity of a system that is participatory at all levels; as the examples of higher level participation in Britain show, opportunities for higher level participation by itself does very little to change the average workers existing feeling that management is for those "who can do it". In The Social Contract (Bk. 11;3) Rousseau remarks that in practice decisions in a participatory system may not be to the equal advantage of all; although "we always want what is advantageous ... we do not always discern it". A democratic system in industry would give the individual and his representatives multiple opportunities to resist disadvantageous policies - but without adequate information on all possible alternatives the most advantageous course may not even be considered. The way in which provision of such information could best be made, whether through the trades unions for example, is something on which little can conclusively be said at this stage, but until we have actually tried to democratise industrial authority structures on the lines suggested here, the evidence gives as much, if not more, reason for optimism than pessimism

about its eventual feasibility.

It might be argued that we would have grounds for pessimism so far as efficiency was concerned under a participatory system. Certainly, at a time when economic growth is such a high priority of all Western governments the question of efficiency is bound to loom very large. Cole thought that unused reserves of initiative and energy would be unleashed under a participatory system and, so far as lower level partial participation is concerned some management theorists would appear to hold a very similar view, but, unfortunately, the evidence available does not allow us to confirm or refute this argument when applied to a whole economy. However, it is not necessarily a straightforward question of efficiency because under a participatory system, together with the basic equality of power of decision making, many of the existing economic inequalities would also be greatly diminished. The income distribution inside the enterprise on which workers as managers would decide, and the extent to which equality of incomes is required for a successful participatory system can only satisfactorily be decided by being put to the test, but the Scott Bader Commonwealth does offer some interesting evidence to show that reduction of some of the usual inequalities of status inside the enterprise is not incompatible with productive efficiency. Such an extension of equality under a participatory system and any redistribution of

incomes that occurred might be held to compensate for any reduction in efficiency. Finally, even if a democratised industrial system were to prove less efficient than the existing system, whether or not this would provide a conclusive argument against it would depend on the weight given to its other consequences, to the human results of a participatory system which the earlier theorists of participatory democracy regarded as of primary significance.

The impact of a participatory system in industry on the outlook and attitudes of individuals is also very relevant to an objection that might be raised at this point by a defender of the contemporary theory. Such an objector might argue that even granted that a participatory system in industry is feasible it makes little difference to his definition of 'democracy'; the role of the individual at the level of the national polity will still be confined to choosing between competing leaders for electoral office. In one sense this is perfectly true. In an electorate of thirty five millions the role of the individual is bound to consist largely of choosing decision makers; even where he could cast a vote in a referendum his influence over the outcome would be infinitesimally small.

In another sense, however, this objection completely misunderstands the relevance of the participatory theory of democracy for modern, large scale societies. The development of a participatory

political culture would completely change the whole context in which national political life is carried on. Even if one can agree with Schumpeter and his followers that it is doubtful if the ordinary citizen would ever be quite as interested in all the decisions made at national level as he would be in those nearer home, nevertheless the citizen educated through participation in industry and other spheres would be better able to assess the implications of decisions made at national level and would be better equipped - and more likely - to take part in national political life when the opportunity arose for him to do so. Furthermore, and here we begin to move back to the evaluative aspects of the participatory theory, within the context of a participatory democracy the significance of his vote to the individual citizen would have changed. It would no longer be a periodic act (a cost which it may well be unnecessary to pay) that is isolated from the rest of his private life; rather it becomes an integral part of the multiple decision making activities in many different spheres of the public citizen. That is to say, in a participatory democracy the whole conception of what is 'political' would have changed, so the conception of democracy itself could no longer be that of the contemporary theory of democracy.

We are not, as the majority of recent democratic theorists would insist, faced with only one realistic theory of democracy given the conditions in modern societies. It is open to us to

choose between two theories of democracy, two theories that include very different interpretations of democratic values. The empirical investigations, in indicating that it is feasible to develop the foundations for a participatory political culture, also shows that a participatory theory is not merely propagating demagogic fantasies or setting "too high standards" in the values that it embodies. Indeed, these standards appear "too high" only from within a specific evaluative standpoint. Much of the general discussion of concepts like political equality and freedom that has gone on simultaneously with the formulation of the contemporary theory of democracy has been, implicitly, about political equality, freedom etc as conceived of in the context of the existing democratic system. Just as the active participation of the ordinary citizen has become suspect, so there has been a tendency for certain conceptions of freedom and equality to be associated with 'totalitarianism', or at least it has been suggested that certain notions are more likely to lead in that direction than toward democracy. Berlin (1969, p.171) in his famous essay on negative and positive freedom, for example, says that the former (which he associates with "pluralism") seems to him "a truer and more humane ideal" than the latter, the goal of those who seek freedom in "great, disciplined, authoritarian structures". But to interpret these political values in other than procedural terms is not necessarily to commit oneself

to the "authoritarian" alternative; we can both stay within a democratic system, if we choose the alternative of the participatory system, and look beyond the conceptions of political freedom and other values implied by the existing political facts and the existing democratic system.

I have argued that the two modern theories of democracy discussed here descend from two very different 'classical' traditions, but in saying this a tempting, but misleading way of characterising the relationship between their evaluative contents must be avoided. Sabine, in his well-known essay on The Two Democratic Traditions (1952) states that the first of these traditions "gave primary importance to liberty, while the second gave primary importance to equality". As has been shown, both these values are important and integral parts of both (modern) theories of democracy. The real difference between them lies not in the primacy of a particular value but in the different relationship between the values. In the contemporary theory each value, as it were, stands alone; given the procedural interpretation of political equality and freedom it would be possible to realise either without the other. In the participatory theory, on the other hand, the values are inter-related and each illuminates the other. It may appear that equality is the most important because it must enter into a discussion of the interpretation of any of the others; but one might, though not particularly helpfully,

argue that equality in the participatory theory is a necessary condition for achieving the primary value of political freedom, freedom in the sense of being (equally) one's own master, having (equal) individual control over one's life and environment.

The inter-relationship of the values in the participatory theory means that there is little point in trying to decide whether one or the other is "primary", but there is one further reason why it may appear that equality is so. Political equality, in a substantive sense, extends, in the participatory theory, into areas of social life that many political theorists consider to fall outside 'politics'. The wide conception of the 'political' which underlies the model of the participatory democratic citizen at once transforms the relation between political equality and what are usually regarded as separate forms of equality, for instance economic equality. With the establishment of the popular sovereignty or popular control of the participatory theory (which extends into the 'economic' sphere) the crucial problem of the equality of power of decision making is resolved and the problematical area of economic equality is that of the distribution of income and goods. As stated, the precise distribution under a participatory system must necessarily remain a matter of conjecture, but what can be said is that a 'just decision' in the participatory theory is one where the outcome is to the equal advantage of all, therefore a

system operating on that interpretation of 'justice' would not favour large income differentials.

Another difference between the two theories of democracy is that whereas the interpretation of democratic values in the contemporary theory excludes that of the participatory, from the perspective of the latter, universal suffrage, civil liberties and so forth can be regarded as necessary conditions for (but not as sufficient for) political equality, political freedom. In arguing that the existing facts of political life need not be taken as given, that is not to say that the participatory theory rejects as worthless such features of the present "institutional arrangements" as civil liberties; rather in saying that it is feasible to look beyond the existing system the participatory theory also looks beyond, but encompasses civil liberties etc into its wider, more thoroughgoing evaluative framework. Elucidating the participatory theory, establishing through investigation of the relevant empirical material the feasibility or otherwise of the value-interpretations embodied in that framework, these are the tasks of the political theorist. Beyond that we reach the point where it becomes intelligible to talk of the individual as the "supreme arbiter of values", for ultimately it is open to individual citizens to choose between the two theories of democracy and their respective value-interpretations.

The choice appears already to have been made by a minority of young people in the West, especially young people in America. It was the contrast between recent vocal demands, notably by these young people, for more participation (particularly in the sphere that most immediately concerns them, higher education) and the prevailing academic orthodoxy of the contemporary theory of democracy that provided the starting point for this study. The feasibility of moving towards a more participatory polity has been considered for only one sphere, that of industry, but all the evidence indicates this to be crucial for the realisation of the ideal of a participatory democracy. My analysis of the concept of (industrial) participation can be applied to other spheres besides industry, but the necessary empirical investigation must be made elsewhere. With respect to higher education, all that need be said here is that if my arguments about the educative effect of participation are convincing so far as the young worker is concerned, then arguments for providing his contemporary, the student, with opportunities for participation must be equally compelling. Little is to be gained by providing a catalogue of potential areas of participation in the polity, but perhaps it is worth mentioning one person who might seem to have been neglected; participation in the management of large municipal housing developments might prove particularly valuable for the ordinary housewife.

To some extent the recent upsurge of demands for more participation could be cited in support of the arguments advanced here, because the most prominent of those involved are young people from middle class backgrounds who have received, or are receiving, higher education. That is to say, these are precisely the individuals (and the generation) whom one would expect to have a well developed sense of political efficacy, and thus to take seriously what theorists like Almond and Verba call the "democratic myth" of citizen influence. It is interesting that the mass media have facetiously referred to the rebellious American students as the "Spock-marked generation" in recognition of the enormous influence (especially among the middle class), of Dr. Spock's theories of child-rearing; theories that would tend to provide just the participatory family environment that would produce an initial basis of a sense of effectiveness, later reinforced by higher education. But if these young people feel (psychologically) effective they also share one component of the non-participation syndrome; the belief that participation inside the existing system of democracy, i.e. periodic voting for competing leaders, is irrelevant since it does not result in or form part of a system responsive to their, and the ordinary citizen's needs. Hence the two youthful forms of dissent; either demands for more participation, for a responsive, participatory system, or complete rejection of

the whole basis of modern, industrialised societies by "dropping out" into various forms of "community" and "commune" , often in rural areas.

From the vantage point of mid-1970, after the events in the American cities and campuses of the late 1960's, after the campaigns of Shelter and the Child Poverty Action Group and the activities of the squatters in Britain, after the "May Days" in Paris in 1968, the claim of the contemporary theory of democracy that the existing democratic system is responsive, that all groups (individuals) can make their voices heard and that it "works on the most difficult and complex questions with distinction", may immediately look more suspect than it did in the 1950's and early 1960's when much of the work on democratic theory discussed in this study was written. But although dramatic events may now have drawn attention to the existence of serious problems in Western democracies, the position of the negro in America, and that of the poor and the homeless more generally, to name but the most obvious problems, was no better a decade or two ago; it merely did not enter into the contemporary theory of democracy (or into the headlines or on the television screen). It is the riots, the lootings and the burnings that are now causing larger numbers of academic students of politics to raise serious doubts about the contemporary theory of democracy. As Burtenshaw (1968, p.587) says,

how could all this happen (happen too in New Haven, where Dahl did the empirical investigations on which he based his theory of democracy discussed in Chapter 1) in a society

"of slack resources, in which any active and legitimate group can make itself heard effectively ... there must have been something fundamentally wrong with the theory pluralist democracy or the analysis would not have gone so wide of the mark".

That the contemporary theory failed to predict these events is because most democratic theorists have failed to raise certain questions, have ignored certain aspects of the empirical data on which their theory is based and have regarded certain conceptions of ideals like justice as potentially destabilising and as setting "too high standards". It is this last point that offers the main clue as to why the contemporary theory of democracy has been so overtaken by events; the empirical features that might have given some warning at least of what was to happen 'disappeared' in the theory behind the evaluative framework within which recent theorists have worked. This diagnosis of the failing of the contemporary theory has very recently been confirmed by the theorist, David Easton, whose very influential characterisation of the proper form for modern political theory I quoted in the Introduction. He writes (1969, p.1053) that "new conditions of the modern world" are forcing political scientists to "reconsider our image of what we want to be". He goes on to say (though, it should be noted, without

reference to his previous statement that values are ultimately reducible to "emotional responses" that I cited on p.57) that "the myth that research can be value-free or neutral dies hard", and that "behaviouralists" have not paid enough attention to the impact of values on research:

"we have continued to develop our discipline as though the subjects we select for research, the variables we choose to investigate, the data we collect, and the interpretations we generate, have some extraordinary pristine purity, unsullied by the kinds of value premises to which we subscribe, consciously or otherwise".

If this were not the case, how else could we account for, among other things,

"the failure of current pluralist interpretations of democracy to identify, understand, and anticipate the kinds of domestic needs and wants that began to express themselves as political demands during the 1960's" (p.1057).

It may be doubted whether all the conditions that are forcing this re-assessment are so very new, or that this is the only reason that it is needed. Furthermore the "myth" of value-freedom is not, as Easton appears to believe, merely a matter of individual theorists openly recognising the values to which they themselves subscribe; it also involves the mistaken belief that key terms in political theory can be used in a purely descriptive sense. Nevertheless, such rethinking can only be to the advantage of political theory as a whole, taking it out of the confines of the present and allowing us to judge political theories on the basis of broader

criteria than recently used. Criteria, perhaps, like that suggested by Kariel (1969, p.774): that is,

"the extent of (the) impact (of political science) on those it presumes to understand. It succeeds to the extent that it enables them to recognise more of themselves than they ordinarily recognise, that it raises their expectations, that it expands their consciousness... (it) serves to amplify and enlarge our existence by illuminating previously invisible ... dimensions".

Certainly, Easton recommends a new approach to political theory that will enable us to begin "to understand better the deficiencies of our own political system", and this approach is in striking contrast to his own until now and that of the recent theorists of democracy whom I have discussed. He suggests that "like the great political theorists of the past" the new approach should be that of "formulating ... broad, speculative alternatives to the here and now" (1969, p.1058).

Easton does not specify exactly what he means by "speculative" but we must not make the mistake of thinking that this involves mere guesswork, or the provision of what Easton calls "a new set of ethical perspectives" if this set of perspectives is floating in an empirical vacuum. Rather, if we are to attempt to emulate the great political theorists of the past, and construct "speculative alternatives", we must, as is shown by the case of participation and the theory of democracy, use the presently available evidence to take us beyond the present and assess both alternative forms of

political organisation and alternative value-interpretations. This procedure will illuminate the deficiencies in our own existing political system and in the theories of that system; notably, in the case of the contemporary theory of democracy it illuminates the deficiencies of political and sociological imagination that contributed to it. But such an alternative approach to democratic theory also does more. In showing that theories of democracy centring on the active participation of the ordinary citizen are neither unrealistic nor based on dangerous illusions it presents us with the plan of action necessary if we wish to move toward a participatory democratic system.

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