Neighbourhood Negotiations: Network Governance in Post-Katrina New Orleans

Stephen Danley
(Nuffield College, Oxford)

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Abstract

This inquiry into informal networks and policy negotiations is set in the theoretical framework of network governance. It builds theory to explain informal networks by examining neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans through a variety of qualitative methodologies including interviews, document analysis, surveying and ethnography.

In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations do not engage in social-service delivery, they prioritise neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood change. They represent their neighbourhoods through a system of intensive volunteering not elections. That system burns out neighbourhood leaders and leaves associations constantly looking for new volunteers. These associations partner with non-profits, work with politicians, and engage in fierce conflict when excluded from policy negotiations. Finally, they set their agenda based upon the physical characteristics of their neighbourhoods, investing in local institutions.

These findings contribute to network governance theory. New Orleans' democracy of volunteers introduces a new form of democratic anchorage to governance theory. Actors in informal networks have varying priorities. This demonstrates the importance of early involvement by these actors in policy creation and the ways in which policy construction can ignore community. Neighbourhood associations blackmail, bribe and coerce to create their own power, showing how power at the micro-level includes not only resources and decision-making, but also interest.

These findings fit into a broader theme. Negotiations with multiple actors improve policy by incorporating complex priorities and neighbourhood context into the policy system. This wider theme of how to address complexity is the policy equivalent of the wisdom of crowds. Policy-makers can either incorporate complexity such as local context and differing priorities or face the conflict and consequences of ignoring it.

♦

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"In New Orleans, everyone has a hustle. This is your hustle."
Karen Gadbois

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♦

CHAPTER ONE

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Network Governance in New Orleans

"Post-Katrina was the wildest ride in civil government anywhere."
President of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association

1.1 Introduction: Policy and the Wisdom of Crowds

Sitting in Sugar Hill, a small, historically African-American neighbourhood offset from downtown New Orleans, I asked a middle-aged woman how she became a neighbourhood activist. She told me, "I just got tired of going across the street to get my mail in the mud." The reference to street flooding, a common problem in New Orleans, was not unusual. But her answer, and the refusal of the United States Postal Service to deliver her mail, was. Here was a woman dedicating tremendous amount of time as the president of the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association, and she was doing it because of her mail. There was no higher calling, no interest in politics, and no particular belief that community involvement could improve government, just a steadfast belief that she didn't think that in America, "people should have to pay taxes and walk to their house in boots." And so, like so many others in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, she did something about it, spending years fighting with the United States Postal Service to return door-to-door mail service to her community.

On the opposite bank of the Mississippi River, in a second neighbourhood called Algiers Point, a neighbourhood leader described his local association as a watchdog. After the storm the Algiers Point Association fought to reopen the ferry that connected the neighbourhood to downtown New Orleans. It also sought to work closely with local law enforcement officers to combat crime in the area. Sitting in a sleepy local cafe, the neighbourhood president of the Algiers Point Association admitted that his neighbourhood association does not “have any formal power, but like most cities [*sic]*, if a neighbourhood association shows up with a few people, the city listens."

These two neighbourhoods have little in common. The first is a lower-class African-American neighbourhood, still forgotten long after the floods caused by Hurricane Katrina receded and the city began to recover. Cut off from the rest of the city by the I-10 highway, residents of Sugar Hill are fighting to receive basic services. In Algiers, residents want walking access to New Orleans’ French Quarter, both for professional and personal reasons, and are willing to use their connections to get it. But underneath these differences is a common story. Neither neighbourhood association has formal decision-making power over the policy it wishes to influence. Neither has professional staff, or a place at the negotiation table when their neighbourhood is discussed. Yet, both leverage their positions to impact local policy.

These associations are representative of a phenomenon that is increasingly rerecognised, and has long been noted in the field of community organisation: outside actors influence policy by engaging in negotiations and networks that function in the “grey zone” outside of government (Forest, 2003). How do such networks function? What types of policies do they address? Are there advantages or disadvantages to inviting these outside actors into the policy process?

In this research I investigate these questions in post-Katrina New Orleans by examining the roles of neighbourhood associations in informal networks and policy negotiations using network governance literature. As in Sugar Hill and Algiers Point, neighbourhood associations have become political forces in the New Orleans (Chamblee-Wright and Storr, 2009). The two examples above highlight many of the remarkable ways in which neighbourhood associations impact policy in New Orleans, and introduce trends that are important to the broader understanding of informal networks and policy negotiations in network governance. These two neighbourhood associations demonstrate community priorities. They seek first to protect their neighbourhoods and have limited interest in delivering social services. Their claim to democratic representation rests not upon formal elections but upon citizen volunteers who work intensively to help their neighbourhoods. These associations have relationships with businesses, local government and non-profits, partnering when possible but fighting when necessary.

The power of these small, informal associations lies not in their resources or their votes. Their power comes from the simple fact that policies affect them directly. Because of this, volunteers are willing to go to remarkable measures to get a seat at the negotiation table. In this study, neighbourhood leaders tell of blackmail, midnight bribes, and hours spent sorting through thousands of pages of legal documents. In each case, the association appears powerless, but ultimately impacts policy.

Neighbourhood associations take predictable paths into networks and policy negotiations. Their interests are grounded in their neighbourhoods. They care about local institutions, physical features of their neighbourhood, and are steeped in local history. They follow a micro-urban

agenda, one that emphasises hospitals not health care, concerned about the institutions in their neighbourhood boundaries rather than city-wide systems.

In this work I expand upon and examine each of these key findings, along with their implications for cities and for the wider literature on informal networks, policy negotiations, and network governance. I also look at the way such participation, and even conflict, by community groups bolsters and supports the policy process by adding alternate perspectives to these negotiations.

Each of these findings fits into a wider narrative of how to deal with complexity in policy. Parts of the policy-world are moving towards an "evidence-based" approach, drawn primarily from medical methodologies, that believes in assigning desired metrics as outcomes, and maximising these outcomes. This approach to policy rests heavily upon quantitative testing of policies and the wide adoption of "what works" across contexts. It emphasises research and minimises the role that local context and local participation play in the policy process.

Some critique this approach. Surowiecki (2003), in his groundbreaking work *The Wisdom of Crowds*, argues against the idea that experts outperform crowds, criticising policy experts for their oversimplification of the world. Issues such as community involvement, the influence of informal networks, and the impact of context upon policy outcomes complicate such a simplified view of policy. How can policy reflect the complexity that comes with competing values and ideas grounded in different contexts?

Evidence-based policy emphasises in-depth research on programs, and top-down application of these policies across jurisdictions. The wisdom of crowds approach argues that

aggregate knowledge produces positive outcomes, much like decisions by consumers help set efficient prices in markets.

The striking thing about this second approach to policy is how little is understood about how it works. Network literature typically focuses on who is connected, not the qualitative dynamics of the connections (Provan and Kenis, 2007). There is little focus on the composition of informal networks, the relationships within them, their activities, or their democratic nature.

The primary literature that underpins this research looks specifically at these intricacies. In Europe the concept of governance has changed from a traditional understanding of "governance" as the actions of government (Torfing, 2005) to include a wider set of actors that govern together.[1]

Network governance is defined by three primary features:[2] 1) Governance involves multiple actors. 2) The actors are non-hierarchical. 3) The actors involved in policy decisions use negotiation as their primary tool to make policy. Multiple actors refers to the inclusion of groups in the "grey area" of government: non-profits, community organisations, advocacy groups, unions and the like. Non-hierarchy refers to informal relationships. It does not mean that there are no power dynamics, but rather that there is no formal, constant relationship between actors, and such relationships are fluid and negotiated. Given this informal framework, these actors engage in negotiations in order to construct policy. The presence of these three features in post-Katrina New Orleans is part of the justification for its selection as an exceptional case in this study (See Section 2.2).

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[1] Network governance combines this top down European governance literature with a corresponding American literature focused on the "governance" of individual organisations and, particularly, non-profits (see Bryson *et al.* 2006). In the American literature, "governance" often refers to the boards of organisations, and intra-organisational activity. These two literatures meet in the "new governance" literature that focuses on how multiple actors govern.

[2] A broader summary of the literature on network governance can be found in Section 1.2.

Network governance research rarely focuses on the internal workings of informal networks and policy negotiations (Torfing, 2005). By studying such concepts as functions, roles and pathways of neighbourhood associations in informal networks, I seek to provide a theoretical foundation and language to be used in comparative work examining network governance. These dynamics can be applied in different contexts, including governance that spans across countries (Sorenso and Torfing, 2005) and governance that focuses on civil society (Forest, 2003).

Network governance theory is a tool that specifically addresses the ways governance occurs at the urban level; i.e., how participation interacts with policy. Using it as such, I frame neighbourhood associations'[3] involvement in the governance process. The urban context I examine is New Orleans in the six years after Hurricane Katrina. I examine the reasons for the selection of this case in more depth in Chapter Two, but briefly summarise them here. The first reason is conceptual; network analysis often happens at a broad level, with little attention paid to the details of relationships within networks. This problem is exacerbated in the network governance literature, where network governance configurations are typically discussed at the theoretical level, without attention to what happens in practice (for an exception, see Nyseth, 2008; more typical examples of theoretical discussions of network governance include Torfing, 2005; Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). Driving this lack of in-depth case studies are the complexity of these networks and the difficulty researchers find in gaining access to them (Cornforth, 2011). In this research, I made the strategic decision to select one context and do a comprehensive study, rather than focus on more comparative work across cities or countries that only lightly engaged with the networks.

[3] For a full explanation of neighbourhood associations and their history, see Section 2.3.

The second reason I select New Orleans is specific to the city itself. The circumstances faced in the city after Hurricane Katrina present a particularly dynamic context for the study of governance. During Hurricane Katrina the entire city faced mandatory evacuation and 80 per cent of the city was flooded (Baltimore, 2009; Slepski, 2007). The disaster was the costliest in the history of the United States with immediate damages of over $60 billion (Birkland, 2006). The infrastructure of the city was severely damaged, affecting virtually every policy area. Not only did the city require a massive immediate disaster response (see Sobel and Leeson, 2006), but it faced a long-term recovery so imposing that some recommended that the city be moved (Foster and Giegengack 2006).

New Orleans' recovery required that a tremendous number of policy decisions be made in a short period of time. In fields from education to health care to public housing, New Orleans faced massive changes. In response, residents of the city organised to ensure their voices were heard during this process of upheaval. The result is a tremendous density of policy issues, networks, and neighbourhood associations that allow for a wide variety of examples of policy negotiations. The types of policy decisions that would typically take years to study in an urban context are condensed, allowing for study and contrast.

In short, the selection of New Orleans is due to the unique policy context after Hurricane Katrina. This policy context encouraged neighbourhood participation on a tremendously wide range of issues. While there are drawbacks to such an approach, specifically the restraint that must be used in applying or generalising these results to other contexts, the opportunity to study such a dense configuration of networks and issues in one city is a core reason for the selection of the New Orleans case.

I study New Orleans using the theoretical tools developed in network governance, but this study applies to broader questions about the impact of community and other types of informal actors on the wider policy world. As such, it is designed to answer questions at three levels. 1) This research contributes to a wider debate about how to deal with the complexity derived from involvement of grassroots organisations that occurs just outside the scope of traditional government (Forest, 2003). 2) It develops theory to fill gaps in network governance literature about how such networks and negotiations function that can be applied to other policy contexts. 3) It speaks directly to the urban context in the United States, looking at how each of these wider issues plays out in a major metropolis.

The research design reflects these complementary objectives. The research question focuses on pathways into informal networks. How do neighbourhood associations join informal networks and participate in policy negotiations? Examining these pathways requires an understanding of what neighbourhood associations are, what they do, what types of relationships they have, and the ways they choose to engage in activities. These sub-questions form the structure of the thesis. Chapters One and Two introduce the main themes and methodology. Chapters Three and Four examine what neighbourhood associations are. Chapter Five examines their relationships. Chapters Six and Seven examine the diversity of associational activities and the factors that affect their agenda-setting.

These practical questions are underpinned by theoretical observations and sub-questions from network governance literature. Each chapter addresses key issues in the literature such as: the extent to which network governance improves democracy, the desire of informal networks to engage in service-delivery, the types of relationships and power dynamics within informal

networks, and the ways in which such networks are responsive or consistent in their choice of agenda. Each of these main themes is examined briefly in a literature overview and more depth at the beginning of each individual chapter.[4] Together, these core questions flesh out network governance, taking it beyond the theoretical debate of whether it "works," and allowing for an understanding of specific strengths and weaknesses of informal networks. The theory sets the stage for comparative study and for the use of network governance theory in wide-ranging situations from international relations to familial conflict.

Using post-Katrina New Orleans and network governance theory as building blocks, I also explain the specific mechanisms in which informal networks address complexity in the policy process. I show how these informal networks, rife with conflict and power struggles, negotiate over time to integrate competing value systems in a manner similar to the wisdom of crowds demonstrated by Surowiecki (2003) in futures markets. It is the power of these negotiations to integrate complexity into the policy system that is the primary feature of such systems, in the same way that a diverse aggregation of predictions outperforms the best experts over time (Surowiecki, 2003).

1.2 Literature and Theory

In Section 1.2 I briefly outline the practical arc of the thesis and the ways in which the network governance literature connects both to the specific New Orleans context and to broader themes about complexity and informal networks in policy construction. Each chapter in this

[4] An introduction to the literature is included in Section 1.2, but I eschewed a more formal literature review and spread such material throughout the chapters. I did this in part because of the variety of other literatures that inform this work, from urban studies to democratic theory to organisational studies. By splitting up the literature review, I could address each of these fields separately and in the context of their importance to the research.

thesis draws upon key themes and questions from network governance to examine the New Orleans case. The literature review begins with the concept of New Governance (1.2.1), and how the phrase 'new governance' has changed to include multiple actors in the scope of the policy process. It defines network governance (1.2.2), and explores the multiple stages of network governance research. In doing so, it introduces the relevant parts of the inquiry as they pertain to New Orleans and the wider debate around the value of informal networks in policy (1.2.3).

1.2.1 New Governance

Dahl (1961) famously asked "Who Governs?" The use of the term governance has changed over time (Kooiman, 1993). New understandings incorporate additional actors such as neighbourhood organisations into the governing process, a critical component in the case of New Orleans. Has a similar change occurred in practice? Does the inclusion of more actors empower citizens? Does it save money? New governance is a theoretical frame for discussing these issues.

The original usage of governance can be tied to traditional understandings of the policy process. Clarke (2002: 1 as quoted in Gaventa, 2004) argues that, "Ever since Edmund Burke's famous speech to the electorate of Bristol in 1774 the British way of politics has been to leave decision making to the politicians and the policy experts. The role of the public (or at least those that had the franchise) was to periodically pass judgement on their leaders at election time. This passivity has become an entrenched part of the British political culture." This view of the policy process as largely contained by government is reflected in theoretical discussion of governance.

Recently scholars claim that, "Public policy is less of a governmental dictum and more of an ongoing negotiation among government and non-government actors (Katz and Mair, 1995;

Castells, 1996; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Ornstein and Mann, 2000; Bingham et al, 2005a; Blyth and Katz, 2005)." (Crozier, 2008: 3) While Crozier (*ibid*) makes an empirical claim, other scholars soften the claim arguing, "the idea of a sovereign state that governs society top-down through laws, rules and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by new ideas about a decentred governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust." (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 195-196). Kooiman (1993) argues that the term "governance" entered the literature in the 1990s. Stoker (1998: 17) notes this shift and argues that,

> "Theoretical work on governance reflects the interest of the social science community in a shifting pattern in styles of governing. The traditional use of 'governance' and its dictionary entry define it as a synonym for government. Yet in the growing work on governance there is a redirection in its use and import. Rather governance signifies 'a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed.' (Rhodes, 1996, pp. 652-3)"

Stoker (1998) is not alone in noticing this shift in the understanding of governance. Forrest (2003: 593) argues that:

> "Traditional notions of 'governance' perceive the public sector policy process as centrally steered, managed through direct leadership or institutional control over decision-making and implementation. In contrast, many network analysts conceptualise governance as a relatively new type of policy process involving negotiated, multi-actor, interorganizational relations that link together state and society in a dynamic and flexible hybridity."

Bogason and Musso (2006: 4) describe this new term as referring to "an analytic focus, emphasizing process rather than formal organization, with a gradual evolution to recognition of processes as networks."

The shift in the use of the phrase "governance" is primarily a shift in the actors involved in the governing process, which brings up interesting questions about what consists of

"governing." The presence of additional actors introduces the possibility that non-governmental actors could "govern" without involving government (Rhodes, 1996); this could create outcomes parallel to traditional government activity (Chaskin and Garg, 1997). This is problematic because the set of governance outcomes was traditionally defined reflexively in terms of the actor. In other words, it is governance because government did it. Once the set of actors expands past government, it is unclear what activities are included in governance.

Partially due to this lack of clarity, definitions of governance are difficult to pin down. Torfing (2005: 306) states that, "Governance is a notoriously slippery term that vaguely refers to non- hierarchical attempts at coordinating public and private interests, actions and resources." This ambiguity underlies any governance discussion, but has not been satisfactorily addressed in the literature.

With the increase in the use of the phrase "governance" and the widening of the set of actors, niche literatures spring up specifying different types of governance systems. All of these systems incorporate a broader set of actors, and are largely differentiated based on the power dynamics between those actors. Three are of particular interest to this research: network governance, urban governance, and neighbourhood governance. Network governance will be examined in detail below. Urban governance[5] and neighbourhood governance[6] emphasise decision-making by local actors. These three styles of governance inform this research and raise a host of questions about what "new governance" looks like in practice.

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[5] Urban governance is defined as " institutions and processes in which collective decisions are made—policy formulation—and public goods and services are delivered—policy implementation in the urban setting," (Chen *et al.*, 2009: s109)

[6] Neighbourhood governance is largely self-explanatory, it involves participatory governance by residents of a given region (see Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008).

So, to summarise, the word governance has shifted from a synonym of government to include a new range of actors. This new understanding has empirical, normative and theoretical components. The contested empirical claim is that networks are more prominent in modern governing. The normative claim is that networks *should be* more prominent (Chaskin, 2003). Finally, the theoretical claim is that the examination of networks is a new way to *discuss* ways of governing that are not themselves new (Gunasekara, 2008). These debates over networks correlate strongly with wider debates about the value of experts and participation. The new governance debate is part of a larger question of how to deal with group opinions and group knowledge in comparison with expert opinion and expert knowledge. In this research I explicitly set out to examine these different types of knowledge and how they fit into the governing process, with a focus on community organisations.

1.2.2 Network Governance Definition

Network governance is directly derived from new governance, but includes a more formal definition and contains a number of theoretical insights and tools that make it more applicable to the urban context. In particular, network governance stipulates that relationships between actors in networks be non-hierarchical and that the policy process be a negotiation. These theoretical tools allow for the study of individual cases and testing of many of the tenets of new governance; much of which is included in the summary of network governance literature in Section 1.2.3.

Jones *et al.* (1997) define network governance as patterns of interactions in exchange and relations and flows of resources between independent units. These two basic concepts,

independence and relationships, are common in every definition of network governance. Sørensen and Torfing (2005: 197) provide the most in-depth look at network governance, stipulating five components:

> "• a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors
> • who interact through negotiations that involve bargaining, deliberation and intense power struggles
> • which take place within a relatively institutionalized framework of contingently articulated rules, norms, knowledge and social imaginaries
> • that is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies and
> • which contribute to the production of public purpose in the broad sense of visions, ideas, plans and regulations."

A key component of the Sørensen and Torfing (2005) definition is the conception of a pluri-centric system as opposed to the uni-centric system of government or the multi-centric system of market competition. Torfing (2005) focuses on the lack of official authority by superiors, and adds that there must be exchanges of resources. Network governance is non-hierarchical and based upon negotiation (Torfing, 2005), contrasting it with the study of institutions, legislatures or civics. "The notion of governance networks narrows the conceptual scope [of governance] considerably by focussing on the attempt at facilitating such coordination in and through negotiated interaction among a plurality of political actors." (Torfing, 2005; 306). Network governance is a set of non-hierarchical actors that engage in policy negotiations.

1.2.3 Network Governance Research

Network governance sometimes describes a particular governing style from among a set of governing options (see Jones *et al.*, 1997). The theoretical base of network governance is non-hierarchical actors and negotiations between them; the early network governance research

focused research on finding concrete examples of such negotiations. This work (see Jones *et al.*, 1997: 911 for examples) constitutes the first generation of network governance research and focuses on the formation and functioning of these examples (Torfing, 2005). These individual cases of network governance emphasise coordination between horizontally-related actors over bureaucratic structures (Jones *et al.*, 1997).

The first generation of research (Torfing, 2005) sufficiently proved that network governance arrangements exist in practice. A second generation of research focuses on the effects of governance in these examples. This research looked at four fundamental questions:

> "(1) how can governance networks facilitate collective decision making and joint coordination between different countries and across different local, national and transnational levels?
> (2) how can *inter alia*[7] public authorities regulate self-regulating governance networks through different kinds of metagovernance?
> (3) what is the role of knowledge, identity and discourse in forming and guiding the negotiated interaction in governance networks?
> (4) what are the democratic problems and potentials inherent in governance networks?" (Torfing, 2005: 311)

A third generation of work, including this research, takes these wider theoretical observations and examines them in terms of specific cases (see Torfing *et al.*, 2009; Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). All three generations of network governance research are dependent on an understanding of network governance as a stand-alone form of governance; they assume that network governance is an alternative to other governing systems.

This approach is highly contested. There is reason to question the claim that network governance is a type of governance which is exclusive from other types of governance, such as representative democracy. Gunasekara (2008: 207) argues that network governance is embedded

[7] "amongst other things"

within, not distinct from, traditional governance systems, stating, "Network governance is not new; governments have always operated, to some degree, through cooperative arrangements of various kinds." Two different parts of this statement contradict the idea of network governance as a distinct system of governance. First, this statement challenges the idea of a new, emerging governance style by placing network governance into historical context. Secondly, Gunasekara links network governance to existing government action. If government actors are present in network governance *then network governance cannot be replacing government*. Instead of replacing current institutions, network configurations are a component of the governance process. This understanding is present in other theoretical works (Newman *et al.*, 2004). Sørensen and Torfing (2005: 195) echo this understanding of network governance as complementary to government institutions saying:

> "Policy making and public governance are incongruent with the formal political institutions of parliament and public administration. The formulation and implementation of policy increasingly takes place in and through interactive forms of governance such as user boards, quasi-non-governmental agencies, interorganizational networks, public-private partnerships and quasi-markets. However, this does not mean that central and local governments are hollowed out since many of the old state capacities are still in place and new capacities are developed (Hirst 1994)."

Scholars that see network governance as complementary to government governance instead of replacing it are sceptical of claims of radical shifts in governance techniques. Gunasekara (2008: 200) states that the:

> "shift from government to network governance, even in acute economic crisis, may be more in form than substance. This is not necessarily because of a lack of intent or some disingenuous behaviour on the part of officials. Rather, there are powerful institutional obstacles to recasting the historical role and capacity of the state in economic coordination and in the relationships among tiers of government."

Bogason (1998: 347) similarly attempts to put changes toward network governance in context by arguing that "normally we are talking of marginal adjustments to specific clauses."

What does it mean if network governance is complementary to current institutional arrangements not replacing them? Within this understanding, network governance is less of a "choice" among other alternative governance systems. Instead, network governance is a theoretical tool to understand the way the world works. This tool can be used to understand the contributions of informal networks to policy processes.

Network governance provides the theoretical structure for understanding the world as it already exists. However, on the margin, the principles of network governance, such as involving new actors in policy negotiations, can be embraced or rejected. Such informal networks are part of a broader system of governance, but they can be shunned or encouraged to participate. These marginal choices are not full-scale changes in the governance system; they are not alternatives to the current system. Instead, they are choices about the ways to incorporate other actors into governance. Thus, network governance theory is applicable on two levels. First, it provides a way of understanding the world as it is; by providing tools to interpret the roles and activities of actors in informal networks and policy negotiations. But network governance is also a movement towards increased activities by non-hierarchical actors; it is a marginal movement towards embracing participation.

1.3 Network Governance Themes and Thesis Structure

The third generation of network governance research moves beyond looking for cases of network governance. It specifically studies the mechanisms at work *within* network governance,

the activities and priorities of these networks, the types of relationships found inside these networks, and the efficiency of network governance arrangements. These core themes map nicely onto the New Orleans-specific framework described above that looks at many of these same issues from the perspective of neighbourhood associations.

Much of the discussion around community participation in network arrangements is contextualised by a need to decrease the costs of public services (see Rhodes, 1996). This is a core theme in network governance literature, where Rhodes (*ibid*) explicitly describes governance as being about New Public Management and Stoker (1998) calls governance, "the acceptable face of spending cuts." More recent research focuses on the benefits of using networks to provide social services (see Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). This discussion of service-delivery is underpinned by several questions. One is empirical, whether network arrangements are involved in service-delivery. A second is whether such arrangements are effective. These questions frame Chapter Three, in which I examine the activities of neighbourhood associations in New Orleans.

A second large debate in network governance literature is whether such informal arrangements serve to strengthen democracy or undermine it (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). The link between communities and policy networks is called democratic anchorage. The core debate in democratic anchorage literature is between the "incompatibility conjecture," which argues that such networks undermine democratic mechanisms, and the "complementarity conjecture," which argues that networks support democracy and allow citizens to participate in an increasingly bureaucratic policy structure (Klijn and Skelcher, 2005). This debate serves as the frame for Chapter Four, in which I examine the democratic anchorage of networks and neighbourhood

associations in post-Katrina New Orleans. Chapters Three and Four lay out the "who" and "what" of neighbourhood associations. What do these actors look like and what do they do?

A third debate in network governance is the nature of the relationships within these informal networks. While network governance theory defines network governance as involving negotiations between non-hierarchical actors, this does not imply that there are not power dynamics in these relationships. Network governance literature focuses on partnerships (see Brown and Keast, 2003), that examine the length of relationships and types of interactions between partners. In the urban context, these theoretical tools overlook a common type of relationships: conflict. Adapting the idea of neighbourhood conflict (Arnold, 1979), in Chapter Five I examine relationships between neighbourhood associations and other actors in New Orleans' networks.

The final network governance debate I examine in this research is the ways in which actors choose to engage in policy networks. Hajer (2003) claims that actors are fundamentally reactive; that community organisations set their agenda in response to local crises. This contrasts with the more typical explanations that theorise that actors choose their activities based on characteristics of their localities, such as wealth, age or human capital (see Hawkins and Percy, 1997). In New Orleans these issues are manifested in the agenda-setting characteristics of neighbourhood associations. In Chapters Six and Seven I examine the pathways that neighbourhood associations take into informal networks and policy negotiations.

Each of these network governance debates bring conceptual clarity to the New Orleans case. I map them onto chapters addressing sub-questions about what neighbourhood associations are, what they do, and how they arrive in their policy networks. But each of these debates is also

unreconciled. In this research I use network governance theory to clarify the inquiry in New Orleans, but I also use the New Orleans case to sharpen network governance theory. I test debates in New Orleans. The results contribute to each debate in network governance literature.

1.4 Communities and Policy

A New Orleanian neighbourhood activist claims, "post-Katrina was the wildest ride in civil government anywhere." That “ride” has relevance to some of the most pressing issues in the policy world. “Networks” is a buzzword for a reason; cities are turning to their networks for help in difficult financial times (see Katz and Bradley, 2012). Questions about the links of these networks to communities and the scope of work done by such networks have implications beyond just urban areas in the United States. These questions delve into a greater debate about how to construct policy. In a world that has many formal and informal actors, there are two visions about policy. The Burkean view is of an expert-informed and expert-executed vision. Evidence-based policy, borrowing from medicinal methodology, encourages standard policies that “work” to be applied universally; in this world the answers are known, and the focus is on executing them. A second view of the policy world is of an informal network with negotiations across different values, objectives and policy ideas. In this world, solutions are highly tailored to context and community. This research sits at the core of this debate; it examines how communities engage these policies: what they do, how they do it, and how effective they are.

Network governance is particularly accommodating of complexity in values. A key component of network governance is knowledge sharing (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005; Brown and Keast, 2003). Technocratic, evidence-based policy depends on a system called knowledge

transfer, which seeks to distribute to policy-makers evidence from random-controlled trials (RCTs) conducted by academics. This sharply contrasts with a wisdom-of-crowds approach (Surowiecki, 2003), which emphasises individual decisions and aggregate knowledge. Such preferences are more efficient than centralised control at predicting the future (*ibid*). A similar phenomena exists in network governance; communities integrate local knowledge through negotiations to create better policies. In the evidence-based system, this local knowledge is of little value; in network governance it is central to policy creation.

Other disagreements, such as the importance of cultural context and public support to policies, take the same form. In each of these cases, the wisdom of crowds approach embraces complexities, differing opinions, different forms of knowledge and different actors, while evidence-based social intervention limits the scope of inquiry in search of programs that "work."

New Orleans is a fighting ground for these competing ideas and shows the complex relationship between them. As discussed in Section 5.3, these choices are not final; when policy-makers choose a technocratic approach to policy, communities insert themselves into the policy discussion through conflict. On the other hand, neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans are cognisant of the wide scope of activities for which they lack professional training. As a result, they engage in a limited number of activities focused on policies that directly affect their neighbourhoods. In this research, I delve into New Orleans' informal networks to understand the mechanisms that underpin the approach to complexity in policy. I show the specific dynamics at play when informal networks negotiate to create policy.



CHAPTER TWO

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A Methodology of Access

"*This book is about one city in the United States. But it isn't hyperbole to say that it could have been written about virtually any major city in North America. No two cities are alike--each has its own character and identity and spirit--but in all of them, the struggle for survival and finding a place in the changing landscape of the country goes on without relief.*"

Buzz Bissinger, Xiii, A Prayer for a City

2.1 Introduction

The methodology I use in this research is designed specifically to investigate the internal workings of informal networks. It focuses on understanding organisations, relationships and decisions by deeply examining the case of New Orleans and a sample of neighbourhood associations. The policy context of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina made dramatic policy changes necessary, creating an opportunity to study not just a single policy network, but many (see Section 2.2). Critical to the policy response in New Orleans were neighbourhood associations (see Section 2.3). The structure and mixed methods of this research allows for a systematic inquiry into New Orleanian network governance but also for deep investigation and interaction with extremely informal organisations.

This methodology incorporates ethnography, survey, document analysis and interviews and builds local knowledge to enable deep inquiry. It is designed to avoid three potential

problems. The first problem involves scope. Much of the literature on network governance focuses on meta-governance, the idea that governments construct spaces for actors to work within. But many informal networks are not constructed by government (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008). I start from the other end of the spectrum, focusing on the informal networks of neighbourhood associations. By starting with extremely informal organisations (see City Works, 2010), I examine informal networks as well as constructed ones. A second problem is selection and representation of the case and sample. In network governance, much of the discussion is theoretical (see the first wave of research referenced by Torfing, 2005). Only recently have individual case studies, looking at particular networks or policy areas, been called for (Bogason and Musso, 2006) and studied (see Nyseth, 2008; Damgaard and Torfing, 2010; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). These examples focus on a specific network. Studying just one network gives an incomplete perspective of the actors and their relationships. A similar weakness of the literature is the selection of "important" cases. Theory highlights the informality of networks, which the selection of cases does not reflect. The most informal networks are the least likely to be studied. I address this weakness in the literature by focusing on individual actors in the system and looking at their activities across multiple networks.

The small literature on neighbourhood associations in New Orleans has its own selection problems (see Chamblee-Wright, 2008; Chamblee-Wright and Storr, 2009; Ahlers and Hummel, 2007). In these studies, often only the most impressive neighbourhood associations are selected. In this research, I address these problems by selecting a sample of neighbourhood associations in New Orleans. In the network governance literature, no study has examined more than one

governance network. This research looks at over 80 relationships within networks (see Appendix VI for list).

The third problem addressed through methodology in this study concerns how to "know" or "understand" neighbourhood associations. As discussed both in theory (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009) and practice (City Works, 2010), actors in network governance can be extremely informal. This is even more the case for neighbourhood associations. The non-profit literature is well aware of the problems of asking non-profits for information (see Stablein, 1996). These organisations are known to provide optimistic views of their organisation, whether these distorted views be intentional or simply a reflection of passionate practitioners who truly believe in their work. I address the difficulty of "knowing" about non-profits in two ways. 1) By using multiple methods to get different slices of perspective on networks. This includes surveys of neighbourhood associations, interviews both inside organisations and with key members of the network, ethnography that includes attending association meetings and protests, and document analysis of meeting minutes and other historical records. 2) By structuring my research in such a way to build trust and local knowledge which allows me to delve deeper into interviews and is respectful of the organisations I study. Examples of this can be seen in Chapter Four, in which I use the City Works survey data to look at the democratic structure of neighbourhood associations, but also ethnographic and interview data to triangulate and form a deeper understanding of their democratic links. I use similar techniques in Chapters Three and Six, in which I use document analysis to underpin the investigation into specific cases of organisations activity in interviews.

These four problems make up the structure of this chapter. In Section 2.2 and 2.3, I introduce the context and unit of inquiry. In Sections 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6, I address the problems of representation and "how we know" by explaining the advantages of mixed methods. In Section 2.7, I address the ways in which the study is structured to enable wide access to both people in the New Orleanian community and deep access to specific types of information. I call this approach a *Methodology of Access*. It focuses on the two-way relationship inherent in research, and the way that good research is derivative of respect and interaction with interviewees.

2.2 The Context: New Orleans

New Orleans was chosen as the context for this study largely because of the policy context after Hurricane Katrina. The failure of the city's flood protection system and ensuing flooding of the city represented a short-term crisis, but also had long-term effects. In response to widespread damage across the city, policies in virtually every policy area were reconsidered and restructured. This created a density of policy action. Simultaneously, neighbourhood involvement increased. The combination of significant policy change and high levels of participation created a proliferation of examples of network governance, making New Orleans an ideal context for this study.

New Orleans is best understood as a port city (Sublette, 2008). It is in the United States, sitting as close as possible to the mouth of the Mississippi River (Barry, 1998). Its history is a complex one, having been under both French and Spanish control. As in many port cities, the result is a mish-mash of cultures, a blend that is often referred to in New Orleans as Gumbo Ya-

ya.[8] New Orleanian culture is distinct from the broader “south” of the United States in a number of ways. One is religion. While most Southern States are predominantly Protestant, New Orleans is a Catholic city, across Louisiana there are "parishes" instead of "counties" to delineate subdivisions in the state. Catholic Charities and the Catholic Church are still political and social forces in the city. Furthermore, because of the French and Spanish influence, the legal rights of slaves in New Orleans were distinct from the rest of the south. Owners were allowed to free their slaves. The Tremé neighbourhood was the first "free" African-American community in the United States. Often, these freed slaves were children of French residents and their slaves. To this day, a thriving "creole" culture exists in New Orleans of light-skinned blacks[9] with French names and families that can trace their history back to freed slaves and French ancestry.

Famous for its food and music, New Orleans has long been a cultural hotspot. The city is the home of the largest Mardi Gras celebration in the United States, as well as famous jazz musicians such as Louis Armstrong. Many of these traditions carry on to today, as "Second Line" funeral parades are conducted upon the death of community members, brass band music blends jazz and hip-hop, and Mardi Gras Indians sew costumes and march for Mardi Gras. The lead-up to Mardi Gras, called Carnival, contains a wide variety of events, from debutante balls to the making of floats for the famous parades which go down the iconic New Orleans' iconic St. Charles Boulevard.

The culture of the city is oft celebrated, but there is an uglier side to the city as well: a "back of town" in which prostitution flourished (Teachout, 2009), a city history with strong clefts

[8] I first ran across this phrase in the Community Book Center - the oldest African-American owned bookstore in the city and considered the center of African-American intellectualism in the African-American neighbourhood of Tremé.

[9] The use of African-American here would be inappropriate due to French origins.

between social classes (Sublette, 2008), and debauchery that has formally manifested itself through an entertainment district on Bourbon Street (HSSS, 2011). Currently New Orleans is the murder capital of the United States (McCollam, 2011).

New Orleans' port was once one of the most strategic locations in the United States (Barry, 1998), and as late as 1995, the port was moving more tonnage than any other in the country. However, as the port declined in importance, the New Orleans' economy struggled to keep up. Tourism became the core of the economy, leading to a decline in the middle class and a proliferation in service-sector jobs. This broader economic trend reinforced the already strong separation between "haves" and "have-nots" in the city, which often falls along racial lines.

Located between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain, the oldest part of the city was build upon a natural levee along the Mississippi River. The city expanded into lower-lying land and there the streets flood almost every time it rains. The city now has a system of pumps that pump water out of the city and into Lake Ponchartrain.

The possibility that New Orleans could suffer from a catastrophic flood was known long before Hurricane Katrina. John Barry's Rising Tide catalogues the devastation caused by the flood of 1927, and the political intrigue surrounding it. In 1927 city leaders chose to blow up the levee to protect New Orleans[10] flooding hundreds of thousands of, mostly African-American, citizens in the surrounding parishes.

Articles predicted that a hurricane could have a catastrophic effect on the city (see Bourne, 2004). Prior to the storm, the city had an antiquated flood protection system (Horne, 2008), and it often floods during routine rainfall. Furthermore, the nature of modern development

[10] Barry (1998) contends the levee was blown for largely economic not protection issues.

causes increased risk. As flood protection was built, and areas of swamp (such as New Orleans East or the Lower Ninth Ward) were dried and settled, the potential for danger grew. The city of New Orleans sinks into the ground at a rate of five to ten millimetres a year, in part because the flood protection system interrupts the natural flow of sediment to the area (Horne, 2008; Foster and Giegengack, 2006). As long as the flood protections were standing, the slight sinking of the city and the settling of low land were not problematic. But this approach was a ticking bomb; the eventual storm or flood that broke through that protection system was going to wreak even more havoc due to the system in place.

That storm was Hurricane Katrina. On August 29th, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the city of New Orleans. Originally a Category Five storm, the highest rating possible, by the time Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans it was a Category Three storm. The protection of New Orleans is overseen by the Army Corps of Engineers, whose legislative instructions from Congress had been to create a system able to withstand approximately a Category Three storm. The city was evacuated, displacing over 400,000 residents. At the time, that was the largest evacuation in United States history (Slepski, 2007). The ensuing failure of the levee system caused flooding in 80 per cent of the city (Baltimore, 2009; Slepski, 2007) and made New Orleans the costliest disaster in the history of the United States with immediate damages of over $60 billion (Birkland, 2006). Response to the storm included a massive disaster relief effort by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that was largely considered a failure (Sobel and Leeson, 2006). The long-term recovery of the city is ongoing.

The city itself has, in many ways, recovered. It is currently at over 80 per cent of its pre-storm population (GNOCDC, 2009), although certain neighbourhoods, particularly those hit with the most flooding (see Figure 2.2.1) have struggled to return (see GNOCDC, 2009).

The nature of New Orleans in the years after Hurricane Katrina is critical for understanding its selection as the wider context of this study. In some ways, this appears a curious choice. New Orleans, as a city, is not particularly comparable to many of its neighbours in the South. It is Catholic, not Protestant. Is has a French and Spanish Heritage, not British. Cultural issues differentiate it as well, as it has retained a strong Caribbean influence. As such, the ability to generalise from its experiences appear limited. But while broad generalisation is impossible, New Orleans is an exceptional context for building theory as its unique features make it a hallmark of future policy decisions.

The primary justification for the use of New Orleans in this research is the density of policy changes in the post-Katrina context. With so much of its infrastructure damaged, with so much Federal aid money coming in, and with its entire population displaced, New Orleans was faced with a tremendous number of policy decisions. In fields from education to health care to public housing, New Orleans faced massive changes.

In many ways, New Orleans is a microcosm of the decisions other American cities will be facing over the next 50 years; due to the storm, the city is making these all of decisions at once. New Orleans, as part of the post-Katrina context, is seen as an opportunity for new policies and research. This use of New Orleans assumes that New Orleans is a blank-slate, ready to test new policy ideas. One of the best examples of the blank slate theory is given by Paul Tough, the education reformer who guest-wrote *A Teachable Moment* for the New York Times. Tough




Figure 2.2.1 - Post-Katrina Flooding on August 30th. Source: NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(2007) states that, "The city's disastrously low-performing school system was almost entirely washed away in the flood — many of the buildings were destroyed, the school board was taken over and all the teachers were fired. What is being built in its place is an educational landscape unlike any other, a radical experiment in reform."

While the national narrative focuses on New Orleans as a policy model, the local response is critical of new policies. Rather than a blank slate, locals see disaster capitalism; an attempt by outsiders to take advantage of their misfortune (see Klein, 2007). The community backlash to the testing of trendy policies in their city has been furious: the original plan to shrink

the footprint of the city was widely condemned causing the mayor to quickly abandon it (Ford, 2010); the decision not to reopen Charity Hospital and instead to create a bio-medical district was protested (Lovell, 2011); citizens were pepper-sprayed at the city hall gates the day the demolition of the Lafitte public housing project was approved; and education reform has faced criticism in the African-American community due to the firing of largely African-American local teachers who were replaced with recently graduated Teach for America recruits. The legacy of the post-Katrina policy world in New Orleans is not as a laboratory for the testing of policy ideas but rather a flashpoint demonstrating that neighbourhood involvement and localism can drive key policy decisions. Local organisations want control over what happens in their neighbourhoods and have little desire to cede these decisions to experts from out-of-town.

These policy experts lack knowledge of the context and culture of New Orleans. The critical response by local organisations is part of a larger trend of increased citizen participation after the storm. Post Katrina, New Orleans experienced a large increase in participation, particularly in neighbourhood associations (City Works, 2008a). This uptick in citizen participation is common to post-disaster contexts (see Haas *et al.,* 1977). The involvement of these new participants and associations in the policy process is an example of network governance. These associations had no formal relationships with the other actors in the policy process, there was no formal hierarchy, and they depended almost entirely on negotiations during the process.

The lack of formal relationships in networks is itself a practical, and methodological difficulty in the study of network governance. It is difficult to uncover such informal networks.

In New Orleans, many cases exist and can be compared and analysed. This proliferation of cases came about, in part, because of the unique policy circumstances in the post-Katrina context.

The trends of increased participation and policy change create fertile grounds for the study of network governance but limit the ability to generalise from the study. The circumstances in New Orleans are unique, and all findings should be understood as stemming from this particular policy context. These findings should not be seen as binding to other localities. Instead, in this work I attempt to build network governance theory on the internal workings of informal networks so that localities can be compared.Thus, New Orleans serves less as a general case, and more as a unique opportunity to study and arrive at a baseline of theory that will be useful as other cities face future policy challenges.

In summary, post-Katrina New Orleans is an opportune location for the study of network governance because of its immense policy challenges and its increase in civic participation. These trends combine to create a very dense system of network governance; key for such study. However, focusing the research on one city limits the ability to generalise to other contexts.

2.3 The Unit: Neighbourhoods and their Associations

Central to my inquiry of network governance are neighbourhood associations. In this section I loosely outline and define neighbourhoods and neighbourhood associations. I also look at the history of associations in the United States and their recent history in New Orleans. In doing so, I build a broader argument for making them the central component of my investigation.

The concept of neighbourhood, much like the concept of community (see Smith, 1999; McMillan and Chavis, 1986), is an ambiguous one and often poorly defined. Definitions of

community are often split into communities of place, communities of interest and social communities (Smith, 1999). Communities of place are grouped by physical proximity, while communities of interest may be geographically disperse but have a common trait or focus that binds them. Finally, social communities are about the "feeling" of being in a community. Neighbourhood is typically used interchangeably with community of place to refer to a geographical area with clear boundaries. However, the concept of neighbourhoods and neighbourhood associations are both rooted in more complex notions of community. It is certainly true that neighbourhoods are continuous geographic areas, but the boundaries of these geographical areas are subject to interpretation. Richard Campanella (2011a) argues that neighbourhood boundaries themselves are a fallacy; that neighbourhoods should be understood as having strong cores, and bleeding out and overlapping at the edges. These strong cores contain physical features, boulevards and institutions.

Campanella's (2011a) argument about neighbourhood boundaries, and Keith Twitchell's (2011) response lay out two boundaries of the neighbourhood discussion. Campanella focuses on the concept of common interest and social connection, identifying neighbourhoods based on their cohesion. Twitchell is a primary advocate of the attempt to bring a Citizen Participation Plan to New Orleans and hopes to define neighbourhoods across the city to provide more information to residents and allow tneighbourhood input into city planning. Twitchell's (2011) position is rooted in a common need across bureaucracies to have neighbourhoods. The New Orleans Police Department splits up the city into crime districts. Ed Blakely, who was the disaster recovery director hired by Mayor Ray Nagin after the storm, divided the city into thirteen planning districts. The City Planning Commission defined 72 official neighbourhoods in 1980 (see Figure

2.3.2). These designations have historical idiosyncrasies (see Campanella, 2011b), including the separation of some of the public housing projects into their own mini-neighbourhoods. But defining neighbourhoods serves a bureaucratic purpose; it helps with the collection of data and the parsing of responsibilities.

Campanella (2011a) makes a compelling case against having boundaries of neighbourhoods at all. He argues that physical features and neighbourhood cores are an accurate description of neighbourhoods.[11] Particularly compelling is his account of how key boulevards, which could use the support of neighbourhoods, are used as boundaries and consequently neglected. However, for many practical bureaucratic considerations these definitions are not particularly helpful. If the concept of "boundaries" is accepted, a key distinction within different set of boundaries is the issue of "self-definition." Figure 2.3.2 shows the city's official definition of boundaries. The City Works map[12] from 2006 and 2010 (Figure 2.3.3) show the inherent messiness of self-definition -- in these maps neighbourhood associations define for themselves the neighbourhoods they represent. These maps, while less reflective of the bureaucratic and service-delivery reality of the city, more accurately reflect its civic boundaries. It is immediately clear that certain areas are well represented while others are not represented at all. Twitchell's (2011) Committee for the Betterment of New Orleans is attempting to raise money and political capital to begin a process of directing New Orleanian citizens to construct a more comprehensive, yet still self-defined, map that would have no overlaps or unrepresented areas.

[11] One of the core findings of this research is that the physical features which define a neighbourhood are the most significant pathway for the activities in which an organization engages.

[12] The second of these reports was compiled in conjunction with this research.




Figure 2.3.2 - New Orleans Map of Neighbourhoods

Neighbourhood associations have an important place in this complex geographic puzzle. For, who is the "self" in self-defining? In these cases references to the "community" refer not to a representative politician, but to bodies of citizens who bind together to represent themselves. These groups go by a number of different names, including improvement associations, societies, and associations. Broadly, they fall into a category called neighbourhood associations. Logan and Rabrenovic (1990: 68) theorise that “for our purposes, a neighbourhood association is defined as a civic organization oriented toward maintaining or improving the quality of life in a geographically delimited residential area.” Austin (1991: 516) adds that neighbourhood associations range from loosely knit organisations to highly formalised ones with written rules

and procedures, and participation spans a wide range of levels. These definitions identify three key traits of neighbourhood associations: 1) an organisation dedicated to improving the quality of life, 2) an organisation which serves a geographically delimited residential area, and 3) wide discrepancies in formality and participation among organisations. These groups are distinct from homeowners associations or condo associations because they serve *all* of those in a specific delimited geographical area, while renters are often excluded from ownership groups. The third component of varying levels of formality is similarly important. Neighbourhood associations are particularly difficult to define as they take a wide variety of different organisational forms. They




Figure 2.3.3 - City Works Self-defined Map of Neighbourhoods

do not fit squarely into non-profit research, as some of them are so informal as to not have any formal non-profit status (City Works, 2010). They cannot quite be considered governments, despite elections and geographic turf, because they have no formal authority over the areas they claim to represent (*ibid*). As such, they are murky entities that defy clean definitions along many of the characteristics used in the study of organisations.

Such organisations have a long and significant history in the United States. Some of the first writing about these associations was by De Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* (1835). De Tocqueville identifies these types of associations as the core of American civic life and political participation, along with religious organisations and other social associations. Halpern (1995) embeds this broader issue of neighbourhood participation into federal policy and the context of political belief systems. Much of the early federal efforts (circa 1930s) to improve neighbourhoods was based in an ethic of personal responsibility. They assume that those in poverty were at fault in some way and that they should not advocate for help, but help themselves, often through improvement associations backed by local business (*ibid*). This fed broadly into the American ethic of individualism and responsibility. Halpern asserts that Progressive thought was responsible for a shift away from a personal responsibility model towards one that accounted for the difficulties of impoverished life. This ultimately manifested itself in Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, which broadly approached poverty through welfare-style aid programs, but also included a small portion of funds to fund community efforts at improvement. This Federal program initiative failed due to the lack of demand for such programs (*ibid*). Simultaneously, neighbourhoods were adopting the techniques of Saul Alinsky (1971). These approaches were based on the idea that those in poverty were being systematically taken

advantage of by components of society with more power. In response, Alinsky argued for organising of community interests into coalitions, often formally called councils, which took aggressive political stances to advocate for changes in their communities (*ibid*). Later, the Federal government would again wade into the world of community organisations, when the Jimmy Carter presidency (1977-1981) used federal funds to fund neighbourhood organisations (Fagotto and Fung, 2006). This second Federal effort to fund community programs failed as it became extremely hard to measure and show the benefits of such programming (*ibid*).

Halpern (1995) and Arnold (1979) address neighbourhood associations in the narrow context of federal policy. While Federal funding has largely been considered ineffective, neighbourhood associations have reappeared on the local, city agenda in many cities. Often, these groups are formalised into a Citizen Participation Project (CPP) which enables the communication between the city administration and the associations. The most prominent CPP is in Portland and was started in 1974. CPPs exist across the country, including in Birmingham and Atlanta, and many cities are adopting a similar model, often including an Office of Neighbourhoods in the mayoral administration to interact with these groups (see City Works, 2008b). In Los Angeles, a strong network of empowered neighbourhood associations and neighbourhood councils became an alternative to secession from the city as it became too large to centrally control (Box and Musso, 2004). Similarly, in the power vacuum present after Hurricane Katrina, many neighbourhood associations helped with recovery efforts (City Works, 2008a).

Neighbourhood associations are present across these different policy spheres (federal and city level), as well as across time periods (from the start of the country to the present day). While

rarely the locus of study (for an exception, read Logan and Rabrenovich, 1990), they are a constant piece of community-level politics throughout the country's history.

Neighbourhood association involvement in New Orleans is central to this study. In New Orleans, these associations took on particular importance after Hurricane Katrina. In many cases neighbourhood associations already existed prior to the storm (City Works, 2010). However, after the storm they took unique roles in the rebuilding process. This was due to two related factors: the initial botched planning process after Hurricane Katrina (Ford, 2010), and the perceived success of Broadmoor and a number of other high profile neighbourhood associations after the storm (Ahlers and Hummel, 2007).

After Hurricane Katrina, both short-term planning and long-term planning were necessary. In the short-term, repopulating the city, getting city services back online and restarting the school system all had to happen even as civic employees were scattered across the country. Parallel to this process was a long-term planning component that was necessary on a number of levels. After Hurricane Katrina there were several calls to relocate the city and port of New Orleans to a less dangerous location (Foster and Giegengack, 2006). These proposals focused on the difficulty of flood protection in New Orleans, and its precarious position along the Mississippi river. Some thought a new city plan could address these concerns (Ford, 2010). A new city plan also provided an opportunity to improve the city; coverage of Hurricane Katrina had exposed the city's underbelly of inequality to the nation (Clark-Avery and Marable, 2007). As a result, the Urban Land Institute was brought in to create a plan that would guide the city (Ford, 2010).

As the plan neared completion in mid-2006, a public meeting was set up in which a series of maps were shown to the public. One primary aspect of the plan was a proposal to "shrink the footprint" of the city. The theory behind the plan was almost universally agreed upon by city planners (Ford, 2010); the plan called for increasing density in the older parts of the city; particularly those built on the natural levee along the Mississippi River. Rather than a sprawling city with extreme flood risk, the city was to become an efficient, dense, and well-protected modern city. The remaining land was to be turned into green space, which would serve to hold flood waters and create a more sustainable city. This green space was represented by green dots on the maps produced and shown to the public (see Figure 2.3.4).

Opposition to the “green dot” plan was immediate. Residents looked to see whether their neighbourhood was a "green dot." For those for whom it was, the prospect was emotional. After the federally-managed flood protection system had failed, destroying their homes, they had rebuilt out of their own pockets, risking bankruptcy.[13] Having returned, and struggled to restart their lives, they faced the prospect of being uprooted from their houses again. Within days, the mayor abandoned the Green Dot Plan due to extreme political pressure from returned residents (Ford, 2010).

Neighbourhood residents responded to the threat of becoming a green dot by investing time and effort into their neighbourhood associations. The Broadmoor neighbourhood responded by reviving their neighbourhood association: the Broadmoor Improvement Association. Partnering with Harvard University and Annunciation Church, the Broadmoor Improvement Association created its own professional neighbourhood plan and raised millions of dollars to

[13] The state-administered Road Home program reimbursed costs, but was so notoriously slow in doing so that many people faced bankruptcy and lost their houses.

improve the neighbourhood (Ahlers and Hummel, 2007). The success of Broadmoor received much attention. Harvard co-authored a report explaining, in painstaking detail, how the Broadmoor Improvement Association and its partners became so strong (see Ahlers and Hummel, 2007), arguing that Broadmoor was the model for neighbourhood recovery. A number of other quasi-academic or grey area literature articles advocated a similar approach (see Chamblee-Wright, 2008, and City Works, 2008a).




Figure 2.3.4 - Urban Land Institutes' Green Dot Map. Source: Karen Gadbois

Broadmoor itself was part of a trend of neighbourhood associations that proliferated after the storm (City Works, 2008a). These organisations had significant political power. An interview with the president of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association argued that this was because in the initial elections after Hurricane Katrina the population was significantly lower, and reaching out to neighbourhood associations was a good electoral strategy due to the high level of involvement of the first residents to return.

While it is the more powerful and successful neighbourhood associations, such as the Broadmoor Improvement Association, that have driven much of the political and academic narrative, evidence is strong that the vast majority of neighbourhood associations in New Orleans are different in a number of key ways from Broadmoor. In the summer of 2010, I worked in conjunction with City Works to update their neighbourhood census, under an agreement that such data would also be used in this research (see Section 2.5.2). The survey was conducted over four months ranging from late spring to early fall in 2010. The survey was completed by 146 neighbourhood organisations. An additional 77 did not respond, and 33 were confirmed to be inactive or defunct.[14]

A key finding from that research is that neighbourhood associations have civic similarities but dramatic differences in resources. Most organisations hold regular elections (86 per cent), use parliamentary procedure in their meetings (87 per cent) and have bylaws or a constitution (85 per cent). However, in attending meetings of neighbourhood associations it is readily apparent that this infrastructure is not always reflective of functioning democratic outcomes. These organisations often struggle to reach out to their broader neighbourhood, do not

[14] Of the 77 non-responses, I estimate that up to 50 of them likely had ceased to exist based upon information from city hall about the contact between the organisation and the city.

have enough volunteers to hold competitive elections, and are often dominated by a small group of core volunteers. The report concludes that while the wheels of democracy may be present, those wheels often cease to spin.

The capacity of these organisations are varied. Budgets range from $0 to $400,000. Forty percent of groups report yearly budgets of less than $1,000 and 77 per cent report budgets of $5,000 or less. At the low end of the budget range, 20 per cent of associations reported an annual budget of $0, leaving association officers to pay for any minor expenses out of pocket. The physical size of neighbourhoods varies tremendously, both in terms of area and households.

These organisations largely take the same form, holding elections, voting on issues, and representing their neighbourhoods. They have widely different capacities, although many appear to have limited financial resources. Further, the response numbers indicate that these organisations often cease to exist, or go in and out of existence. In fact, as indicated in the full City Works report (2010), thinking of these organisations in terms of existence at all is troubling; some lay dormant for years only to form and react when a neighbourhood crisis emerges.

In New Orleans, these shadowy, often informal neighbourhood associations are extremely involved in policy and local politics. It is a classic network governance situation; the lack of formal hierarchy between these organisations and other political actors makes for ambiguous relationships, yet they remain critical to the broader governance of the city. The current nature and influence of such shadowy organisations, combined with their history and the density of these associations and of policy issues in the post-Katrina context, make for an ideal opportunity to both investigate micro-urban network governance, and build applicable theory to the wider field of network governance.

2.4 The Case for Mixed Methods

Neighbourhood associations are theoretically ideal for the study of network governance, but are remarkably difficult to study. Studying New Orleans and its neighbourhood associations evokes particular problems, some of them common to non-profit research, and others specific to New Orleans and neighbourhood-level research. It is with these problems in mind that I selected mixed methodology.

The case for mixed methods research is rooted in both the difficulty of penetrating neighbourhood-level processes and the tendency for non-profits to tailor their answers to their audience (Stablein, 1996). This problem compounds the broader issue. It is very hard to collect effective, standardised or meaningful data on neighbourhoods and neighbourhood associations. Part of this is technical; data collection in New Orleans, for example, can be done by neighbourhood, police district, county or any other number of bureaucratic boundaries. Neighbourhood associations have their own neighbourhood boundary definitions. But the difficulty of collecting data runs deeper than differing outlines. Organisations define membership in ways to make such statistics virtually useless (City Works, 2008a). Individuals completing surveys from the same organisation give radically different answers.[15] Each of these issues addresses a broader underlying issue, that neighbourhood associations are extremely slippery organisations. They are informal and have complex histories.

Given the lack of clarity about neighbourhood associations, I chose to use multiple methods to provide different takes on associations. One "take" comes via a formal survey that gave an understanding of the variety and commonalities of neighbourhood associations. A

[15] I saw this firsthand when the same organisation in the City Works project answered the survey but could not even agree on the name of their organisation.

second approach is to root the inquiry in the historical documents of each neighbourhood association, focusing on records such as meeting minutes. A third approach is via in-depth interviews which query neighbourhood leaders themselves, and their partners, about these associations.

Using this mix of methods reflects realism about the limitations of each of these approaches. Using them together creates a more accurate understanding of associations. The flexibility of the methodology is an antidote to the opaque data on neighbourhood associations.

2.5 Description of Methods

I use four methods in this study: ethnography, surveys, document analysis and in-depth interviews. In this section I examine the process and purpose of each of these techniques. Throughout the study I attended meetings and had informal conversations with local leaders to provide ethnographic context for the research (a full listing of all the meetings attended can be found in Appendix II). I used the next three methods chronologically; with the survey occurring first, followed by the document analysis and finally the interviews.

2.5.1 Ethnography

During each trip to New Orleans, I attended neighbourhood association meetings, city council meetings, and met informally with local activists. This information served primarily to familiarise myself with the local policy context, and serves as background information for much of this research. A full listing of my activities is in Appendix II.

I use the Miles and Huberman (1994) system of field work notation for investigation by ethnography and interview (see Section 2.5.4). This system involves taking field notes, writing up interviews, compiling interview summaries, writing periodic briefings, and writing theoretical propositions.

Field notes are self-explanatory. I follow the Walker *et al.* (1992) model closely. I took notes directly from ethnographic activities in the field, such as associational events and meetings. I compiled interview write-ups and summaries after each interview. I filled in any gaps from my interview notes and wrote out all shorthand. I also wrote summaries of each interview that addressed key themes and topics. My self-memos highlighted any important ideas about the research I had during or after the research. They differed from interview summaries; they were creative and addressed ideas or themes that emerged during the course of the interview that I thought would appear again in the research. Finally, periodically, I wrote a larger theoretical set of "broad propositions" linking my work to my research questions and noting any changes.

2.5.2 Survey

I conducted a survey of neighbourhood organisations in collaboration with City Works that served several purposes. It updated City Works' Neighborhood Mapping Project. That project started after Hurricane Katrina and served to reconnect neighbourhood associations and non-profits (City Works, 2008a). The report was designed as a census. A master list of potential organisations was created based on functional criteria; organisations had to claim to represent a defined geographical area, presumably a neighbourhood. These organisations also had to be multi-purpose, not focused on a single issue. These criteria drew upon academic definitions of

neighbourhood associations (see Logan and Rabrenovich, 1990; Austin, 1991) as well as local journalism (see Campanella, 2011a; Twitchell, 2011). The included organisations were neighbourhood associations, homeowners associations and umbrella groups of these associations. Excluded from the study were a number of organisations that had been included in previous reports, including service-based non-profits such as ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now) and religious institutions. It was generally possible to tell if organisations fit these criteria based solely on the organisational name. When that was not possible, the organisations were included in the broader listing; if their survey responses showed they did not fit the criteria, they were excluded from the study.

Organisations are extremely informal and their existence fluid (see City Works, 2010 included as Appendix III, as well as Section 2.5). One of the primary justifications for updating the City Works report was that over time neighbourhood associations were started, abandoned, or fell off the radar of the city. In some cases this means they cease to be active, or new organisations spring up in neighbourhoods. In most cases, the need for updating is mundane. Because of the informality of these associations, contact information for the organisation is typically the email, phone number and address of the president of the organisation. When elections occur, the old presidents cease to respond, and the organisation can be extremely difficult to contact.

A master list of citywide organisations was constructed using the previous City Works list as lists from the Committee for a Better New Orleans, the Preservation Resource Center, the City Planning Commission, individual City Council offices and lists from umbrella organisations in

Algiers and New Orleans East.[16] The master list was supplemented by the attendance of local trainings and neighbourhood events to search for new groups.[17]

Each of these organisations was contacted via email, then phone. The survey could be taken both online and over the phone. The decision to conduct interviews via both internet and phone was consistent with the broader principles of the research (see Section 2.7); it helped make the research more convenient for participants and it also reflected the demographic variety found across neighbourhoods in New Orleans. Broadly, the most organised and affluent neighbourhood associations preferred to use the internet survey site, while less organised and less wealthy groups preferred to do the survey via phone.

The process of contacting associations was both intensive and persistent. Over the course of three months, organisations were emailed and called weekly. They were given the option to remove themselves from the email list, and were automatically removed if they answered the survey or chose not to answer the survey. Often the work was investigative; the City Planning Commission's listings went as far back as 1998. In many cases the person listed as the contact for an organisation had moved away from the city years ago and I was referred to three or four former presidents before finding the current organisational representative.

The survey set the sampling frame. There is very little good information on the population of neighbourhood associations, and one weakness of other studies of neighbourhood

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[16] A special thanks to each of these organisations for cooperating with this study.

[17] Religious institutions were excluded from the sample for two reasons. The first was practical, the lists from which the sample was drawn did not include religious institutions. Adding an appropriate sampling frame for religious institutions would have been a massive undertaking. The second reason is more arbitrary. In New Orleans, after Hurricane Katrina, neighbourhood associations were at the forefront of the public consciousness as a way to participate in governance (see Chamblee-Wright, 2008; Chamblee-Wright and Storr, 2009; Ahlers and Hummel, 2007). In order to capture these organisations, I sampled using the neighbourhood association criteria found in Logan and Rabrenovich (1990), and supplemented by local activists and academics (see Twitchell, 2011; Campanella, 2011a).

associations in New Orleans is the sampling of just the strongest associations. This study provided a sampling frame, but also a better understanding of the associations themselves. As a result of this information, the decision was made to sample organisations based upon budgets of neighbourhood associations. The second primary purpose of the survey was to work with a local non-profit (City Works) and introduce myself to neighbourhood associations. This process, discussed more in Section 2.7, helped alleviate concerns by local activists about "helicopter researchers."

2.5.3 Document Analysis

A third methodology I use in this research is document analysis. Working with each neighbourhood association from a sample of 14 associations (see Section 2.6), I created a plan to collect and analyse documents that represent neighbourhood history. These documents were directly analysed to provide a data set of "actions" (see Mayhew, 2002 and below) to show the trends in neighbourhood activities.

The philosophy behind studying documents is rooted in the observations of Korsgaard (2009). In *Self-Constitution*, Korsaard argues that the actions of individuals do more than reflect the identity of a person, these actions make a person who he is. This philosophical observation rings true in regards to non-profits; Stablein (1996) highlights the difference between organisations' stated objectives and the activities in which they engage. The precedent for judging organisations according to their activities is given by David Mayhew's analysis of congressional actions in America's Congress (2002). Mayhew (*ibid*) uses history texts to ascertain the activities of Congress. Similarly, in this research I draw from documents such as

meeting minutes, blog posts, emails and newsletters. I worked with each neighbourhood association to understand what documents they had, and what documents held the best records. Ten associations submitted documents for study, one association promised but never submitted materials, and four associations did not have adequate record keeping for document analysis. From these documents, I compiled a centralised database of activities. Each action was then coded for a wide variety of theoretically interesting features, including but not limited to: funding, decision-making and representation. The result of this coding was a database, which was used to analyse what organisations do and their roles in various activities.

The coding was based upon Knoke's (1988) identification of three primary categories of functions for associations: 1) service delivery to members 2) education and public relations and 3) political advocacy. To these functional categories this research adds 4) organisational maintenance (Bogason and Musso, 2006). However, the coding, as in Mayhew's (2002) analysis, was iterative, and categories were added throughout the analysis. Additional functions include: data collection, representation, such as when a group attends a meeting to represent its community, and social capital, which most often indicated an event for members such as a block party.

A number of roles were also coded for based upon importance in the literature on neighbourhood groups, including: relationship with government (Chaskin and Garg, 1997), funding (Crozier, 2008), decision-making (*ibid*), and expert opinion (*ibid*). Further, the category of dispersing information to members was added after it appeared in multiple sets of organisational documents.

Each action was coded along these categories, typically with one of functions selected and a number of the roles. For each action, coding of roles allowed for an understanding of whether or not the activity involved government, who had final decision-making power over the action, who funded it, and whether the association engaging in the action passed information up the ladder (expert opinion) or dispersed information to its members.

One weakness in this approach is the variety of forms that associations take to document their history. Not only do organisations use different mechanisms to record histories, such as meeting minutes, newsletters or blogs, but they record their activities at vastly different rates. My response is to divide any particular types of action by the total number of actions by the association. For example, an association recorded 15 activities and only five of them were service-delivery, their service-delivery rate would be 33 per cent. These percentages are compared across organisations to demonstrate the priorities of an association based upon their actions.

2.5.4 Interviews

The primary method used in this study is in-depth interviews. The same sample from the document analysis was used (examined below), with 15 associations agreeing to participate in interviews and 14 ultimately participating. Three interviews were selected from each association; two leaders from the association itself and one key partner. Forty-two local leaders were

interviewed, creating a participatory rate of 93 per cent (42[18] of 45 targeted interviews, for full list see Appendix I).[19]

These interviews loosely follow the Agency Profiling Method as described by Robert Walker *et al.* (1992). In that study, researchers entered local offices for a period of several days and completed conversations based off on a topic guide, observed working practices and interviewed organisations affected by a social fund. This process had a fundamentally different aim than the research discussed here; it was designed to evaluate social funds. However, these studies share a focus on the organisation and its decision-making.

Based upon the Agency Profile Method (ibid), I use an interview template (see Appendix V). This interview template focuses on background information, big picture priorities of associations and specific examples of important activities. The interviews are informal, with notes taken but no audio recorded. I chose not to record interviews in response to extreme scepticism I faced from the African-American community as a white researcher.[20]

The result was both an organisational understanding and a series of in-depth case studies of individual activities with each organisation that took place within wider networks. These individual activities formed the core of much of the practical analysis of governance networks.

I analysed the interview data using the methods described in the Walker *et al.* study (1992): using coding and classifying according to key themes as my primary source of analysis.

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[18] Of the 42 interviews, two involved multiple people and two times the same individual was interviewed about two associations.

[19] The Algiers Point Association only had two interviews while Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association had four.

[20] In one particularly memorable case I was accused of being in the Federal Bureau of Investigation but told that I could still conduct the interview because he would not tell me any of his illegal activities.

2.6 The Sample: 14 Neighbourhoods

A sample of 14 neighbourhood associations was selected based upon a random stratified sample. The use of a stratified sample ensured both that the neighbourhood associations selected would not solely be the powerful groups (see Chamblee-Wright and Storr, 2009) and segments of the population critical to network governance theory, such as tiny associations often too informal to be included in research and powerful associations which were essentially pseudo-governments (City Works, 2008a) are included in the sample. The population of neighbourhood associations was divided into 5 stratifications. The 5 budget levels are:

1) $0-$100

2) $100-$1000

3) $1,000-5,000

4) $5,000 and above

5) Did not answer the budget survey question[21]

The levels of the breaks between stratifications are based upon the results of the City Works (2010) survey. The presence of associations in the lists provided by city government shows how smaller and less formal associations often fly under the radar of the city for decades at a time (City Works, 2010). On the other end of the spectrum, pseudo-governmental neighbourhood associations (City Works, 2008a) are extremely rare, and stratification helps ensure their place in the sample. Annual budget is used as a proxy for the formality and informality of these associations, ensuring that both the most powerful groups and the least formal associations are included in the sample. In my later analysis, the associations in groups

[21] A “did not answer” group helps account for the possibility that associations with certain demographic makeup were less likely to answer a question about organisational budget.

one, two, and three (with annual budgets up to $5,000) were similar. The primary difference was between these groups and the higher budget groups which could afford paid staff and to run their own initiatives.

Associations were drawn from each strata in rough proportion to the general population. The sample was proportionately drawn with the final sample size of 15 in mind; an ad hoc sample size large enough to include multiple members from each group, but small enough to allow a single researcher to attend meetings and code documents. The only group that was over sampled was the "above $5000" strata; these groups were the theoretically interesting pseudo-

	$0-$100	**$100-1000**	**$1000-5000**	**$5000 and above**	**Unknown**
Total	15	18	32	12	14
Sampled	2	3	5	3	2

Table 2.6.1 - Sample

governmental neighbourhood associations (*ibid*).

Fifteen associations agreed to participate in the study. The 15th association was drawn twice more into its strata. The overall acceptance rate of 88 per cent (15 of 17) shows the benefits of the front-heavy approach of working with a local organisation to produce the Community Mapping Project through City Works. One of these groups later dropped out of the study, reducing the acceptance rate to 83 per cent.

2.6.1 The Sample: Introducing the Neighbourhoods

Fourteen associations took part in interviews, and ten associations in the document analysis.[22] As might be expected, random stratification showed diversity in other key areas such as geography, race, income and age. In this section I use the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center neighbourhood profiles[23] to introduce each neighbourhood.[24] Figure 2.6.2 shows the latest race, poverty and population numbers for each neighbourhood. Figure 2.6.3 shows the same numbers from before the storm.

2.6.2 The Sample: Uptown Neighbourhoods

Six associations are part of what is loosely called "Uptown" New Orleans. Uptown is roughly the section to the West of the I-10 highway, the upriver neighbourhoods.[25] It features Audubon Park, Tulane University, and Loyola University, and is considered safer, wealthier and whiter than the rest of the city. Six neighbourhood associations are drawn from this section of the city:[26] Upper Audubon Association, Fontainebleau Improvement Association, Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, Broadmoor Improvement Association, Hollygrove-Dixon Neighbourhood Association, and Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association. The Upper

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[22] Two associations (Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society, Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association) did not have internal records that could be used for document analysis, a third submitted documents out of the time range (Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association) and a fourth (Algiers Point Association) agreed to provide documents but did not provide them in the appropriate time window. The 15th association, which dropped out of the study, was Algiers Riverview.

[23] These profiles are based upon U.S. Census and American Community Survey.

[24] Data is general and not precise as neighbourhood associations define their own boundaries (see figure 2.3.3) which differ quite dramatically from official neighbourhood designation (see figure 2.3.2.). As a result, the charts include both the official neighbourhood listings (by the city) and the self-defined neighbourhoods. In one case (Gentilly Terrace), two associations are located within one official neighbourhood.

[25] Uptown can also be used to describe a specific neighbourhood.

[26] Some might contend that Carrollton is its own section of the city, though in Uptown when the term is used loosely.

People, household, and housing characteristics comparison for neighborhoods within Orleans Parish, 2010							
	for definitions see:	http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/def.html					
Neighbourhood Association	Algiers Point Association	Upper Audubon Association	Broadmoor Improvement Association	Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	French Quarter Citizens Inc.
Total numbers (2010)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
Population	2,455	15,865	5,381	11,257	4,373	1,270	3,813
Age (2010)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
65 years old and older	10.6%	10.2%	10.4%	12.9%	20.2%	14.8%	19.0%
Racial & ethnic diversity (2010)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
Black or African American	22.5%	4.8%	61.1%	72.4%	91.3%	90.3%	4.4%
White	68.9%	85.0%	28.8%	17.3%	3.3%	6.0%	87.6%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2010 Summary File 1 (SF1)							
Population in poverty (2006-2010)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
People living in Poverty	6.5%	18.0%	14.0%	37.9%	19.6%	42.1%	7.2%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from 2006-2010 American Community Survey							

Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association & Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association	Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	Lake Carmel Improvement Association	Fountainebleau Improvement Association	Pilotland Neighborhood Association		
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
8,210	4,377	3,373	31,698	5,749	974	343,829	308,745,538
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
11.3%	16.3%	9.3%	8.0%	10.9%	14.3%	11.0%	13.0%
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
77.8%	93.9%	39.9%	92.6%	23.9%	90.6%	59.6%	12.2%
15.3%	2.2%	49.2%	3.0%	63.9%	4.6%	30.5%	63.7%
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
16.1%	21.4%	22.4%	25.4%	17.6%	35.3%	24.4%	13.8%
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center		www.gnocdc.org					

Figure 2.6.2 Neighbourhood Data (2010) Adapted from the Greater New Orleans Data Center

People & Household Characteristics for Neighborhood Statistical Areas within Orleans Parish, 2000

for definitions see: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/def.html

Neighbourhood Association	Algiers Point Association	Upper Audubon Association	Broadmoor Improvement Association	Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association	French Quarter Citizens Inc.
Total numbers (2000)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
Population	2,381	14,898	7,232	19,072	6,471	1,772	4,176
Age (2000)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
65 years old and older	10.10%	11.30%	13.40%	12.60%	18.20%	13.40%	15.60%
Racial & ethnic diversity (2000)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
Black or African American	25.1%	5.1%	68.2%	87.1%	88.4%	94.9%	4.3%
White	67.4%	86.1%	25.8%	9.9%	6.9%	3.2%	89.7%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF1)							
Population in poverty (2000)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
People living in poverty	17.3%	17.9%	31.8%	49.8%	20.6%	31.1%	10.8%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3)							

Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association & Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors	Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	Lake Carmel Improvement Association	Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Pilotland Neighborhood Association		
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
10,542	6,919	4,270	44,311	6,740	6,427	484,674	281,421,906
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
12.10%	15.40%	8.40%	7.30%	15.90%	7.60%	11.70%	12.40%
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
69.7%	94.7%	68.4%	86.1%	27.9%	97.8%	66.6%	12.1%
24.9%	2.6%	26.0%	9.8%	62.6%	1.1%	26.6%	69.2%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 1 (SF1)							
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
16.1%	28.4%	41.1%	17.4%	12.9%	66.0%	27.9%	12.4%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF3)							
Greater New Orleans Community Data Center	www.gnocdc.org	Last modified: June 12, 2011					

Figure 2.6.3 Neighbourhood Data (2000) Adapted from the Greater New Orleans Data Center

Audubon Association and Fontainebleau Improvement Association are almost exclusively white, with upper class residents and high levels of homeownership. Their associations are understated and professional.

The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association and Hollygrove-Dixon Neighbourhood Association are located farther north and are primarily African-American. The neighbourhoods are showing hints of gentrification, as poverty rates have fallen since Hurricane Katrina. The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association is a tight-knit group of activists while Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association is new and still trying to find its feet.

The Irish Channel neighbourhood made a dramatic transformation after Hurricane Katrina. Prior to the storm it had extremely high rates of poverty. But the neighbourhood was one of the few in New Orleans not to flood. As a result it has gentrified, becoming whiter and wealthier. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association reflects these changes. The association leadership has changed and gotten younger, much like the demographics of the neighbourhood.

The Broadmoor neighbourhood has also seen a transformation, although it has been largely political. The Broadmoor Improvement Association has united some of New Orleans' oldest African-American political families with middle-class residents and poor ones. The association is tremendously strong and influential.

2.6.3 The Sample: Central City, Gentilly and New Orleans East

Six neighbourhood associations are sampled from overwhelmingly African-American neighbourhoods and high levels of poverty. The Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association is

tucked into Central City, the most violent area of the city. The association is tiny, and has its roots in a few people who stayed in the neighbourhood despite increased blight, crime and drugs.

Gentilly is home to the Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighbourhood Association, Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society, Pilotland Neighbourhood Association and Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighbourhood Association. These neighbourhoods are less dense, but often complain of being forgotten amidst the more famous New Orleans neighbourhoods. Gentilly is historically African-American, as it is one of the first places that African-Americans could buy property. The associations in this part of the city vary. Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association has strong leadership and a history of work. The other associations are newer less established.

New Orleans East contains the majority of the land mass in New Orleans. It is known for its subdivisions, which are typically communities of middle-class African-Americans. The East also contains much of the city's subsidised housing. The Lake Carmel is one of these subdivisions in the Little Woods neighbourhood. Its history is faith-based and the neighbourhood association, like most in New Orleans East, represents a single subdivision.

2.6.4 The Sample: French Quarter and the West Bank

The French Quarter is the most famous neighbourhood in New Orleans. It attracts tourists year-round for its music, culture, architecture and the infamous Bourbon Street. Its residents are older, white and wealthy. French Quarter Citizens Inc. represents these residents and is dedicated primarily to ensuring that tourism does not encroach upon the every-day-life of residents.

Algiers Point is located on the West Bank of the Mississippi River. The defining feature of the West Bank is its physical separation from the city, a separation that causes many New

Orleans residents to consider the West Bank a separate city. The Algiers Point Association deals primarily with issues arising from the ferry and crime from residents who cross it. The association is well-funded, it pays a resident part-time to produce a newsletter.

2.6.5 The Sample: Summaries

Like the residents of New Orleans, the neighbourhoods of New Orleans are diverse and eclectic. Each neighbourhood has its own character, introduced briefly here. In many of the policy examples in future chapters, the neighbourhood serves as a subtext for the policy dispute. This section is a short guide to that subtext.

2.7 A Methodology of Access

"This harvest thus laboriously made, I shut myself up, as in a tight space, and examine with extreme care, in a general review, all these notions that I have acquired by myself. I compare them, I link them, and I then make it my rule to develop the ideas which have spontaneously come to me in the course of this long labor, without any consideration whatsoever for the consequences that some persons might draw from them. ...as soon as I wanted to write from a preconceived perspective, to support a thesis, I lost absolutely all real talent, and I could do nothing worthwhile if I did not limit myself to trying to clearly render what was most personal and most real in my impression and opinions." De Tocqueville, On Intellectual Autonomy, Sept. 1 1856

I structured this research not solely to pursue valid data through sampling but also to enable in-depth, quality interviews. This meant accessing the right people to interview and the necessary information once in an interview. As such, the methodology here is part of a coherent narrative that gave me, as the researcher, the skills to effectively conduct this research in New Orleans. I did so by embracing the values expressed to me by neighbourhood activists in New Orleans and acknowledging, even designing my study to reflect, the ways in which research is a

two-way process (Holman, 1987). In this case, good methodology was not only about validity; my ability to get information to conduct research in New Orleans was dependent upon my embrace of local knowledge and my willingness to work with, and try to understand, the subjects of this study.

A common complaint in New Orleans is of "helicopter researchers" who fly in to the city, extract what they need for their work, and then fly out never to be seen again. Part of this frustration is practical; after Hurricane Katrina many researchers conducted work in New Orleans. The neighbourhood activists I talked to insisted that the benefit of this work was not for them. Rather, research benefitted the careers of academics. As such, it withdrew resources from the community (mainly time), while not adding resources.

I embraced this criticism and decided that, to get the access I required to neighbourhood associations, I needed to structure my research in a way that encouraged trust and participation. I accepted their criticisms and embraced their set of values; in particular, I structured my research to be convenient, and to give me the background information necessary to have succinct, quality interviews.

These principles informed my methodological choices. The broad narrative of the research design is not solely one of validity. It is also one of a methodology designed to encourage trust and participation. The flow of the research was from survey work, to document analysis and finally to interviews. While it may have been possible to use previous survey work to set the population (see City Works, 2008a), I decided to spend additional time in New Orleans at the front end of the research project. Doing so was in direct response to criticisms by local activists about other researchers' "fly-by" tendencies. My decision to be in the city, and to work

with local City Works on the survey, paid off. My participation rates were 68 per cent for the survey[27] and 93 per cent for the interviews. The City Works (2010) survey served as an introduction to local leaders and made them more likely to participate in interviews. I found that physically being in the city engendered trust and was a critical part of the research process.

Similarly, the document analysis and ethnography served a secondary purpose beyond the analysis mentioned in Section 2.5. These techniques allowed me to enter interviews prepared to engage on local terms. I used these documents to inform myself for what I call the "localness test." The localness test occurred in virtually every interview I conducted; it was a question from the interviewer which was designed to judge whether I knew the local context. It could be as simple as a reference to a local politician, a local issue, or the history of the neighbourhood. The way in which I answered dramatically altered the interview. Interviewees subtly required that I be prepared, in order to make the interview worth their time. By arming myself with local knowledge, I gained access to a more honest, and deeper, interview. Prior to conducting interviews, I personally read and coded thousands of pages of meeting minutes, returning to New Orleans several times to attend meetings and catch myself up on local happenings. The result of this process was that some interviewees praised me for knowing more about the history of their associations than they did. By the end of my time in New Orleans I had been nominated for a young leadership award by a City Council Office, and regularly met with local activists to exchange neighbourhood "gossip."

By engaging this deeply with the local context, I addressed the concerns of my participants regarding "helicopter research" and also addressed my need for in-depth knowledge

[27] One hundred and forty-six associations responded, and seventy-seven did not respond. An additional 33 associations were confirmed to be defunct. These were excluded from the participation rates.

about their organisations. I did so by embracing values that respected my participants and acknowledging the two-way relationship involved in interviews (Holman, 1987). While most methodological standards worry about "going native" by embracing the values of a community during field work, I found that doing so was the moral thing and led to better research.



CHAPTER THREE

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Of Service-Delivery and Neighbourhood Typology

"To me, there's no reason to even be paying taxes if we won't even get basic services."
Member of the Upper Audubon Association

3.1 Introduction

What do neighbourhood associations do? And, equally as important, what do they not do? In this chapter I examine the activities of neighbourhood associations. This work is largely descriptive, laying the groundwork for the subsequent examination of the pathways that neighbourhood associations take into informal networks. But I also touch on several main questions. The first is linked to a political narrative around budget deficits and cheaper services: are neighbourhood associations providing welfare-like services? The second question is primarily descriptive, but links closely to the academic literature on organisational typology and establishes a framework for studying neighbourhood associations: what activities do neighbourhood associations engage in? In examining these questions, I establish a typology of neighbourhood associations that is rooted in theories of non-profits found in organisational studies. This typology shows that neighbourhood associations come in two forms: 1) organisations that protect their neighbourhood and 2) organisations that promote neighbourhood

change. Given these priorities, associations use two strategies: 1) that of influencing other organisations (often government), and 2) that of producing their own programming.

A second major theme in this work is the placement of neighbourhood associations within governance networks, particularly focusing on their position in these networks in relationship to government. Drawing from the work of Chaskin and Garg (1997), Section 3.4 looks primarily at what neighbourhood associations choose not to do, which is compete with or participate in the provision of services. This theme of service delivery is critical to understanding where neighbourhood associations fit into network governance. Service delivery is an explicit theme in literature on community participation (see Rich, 2008; Yin and Yates, 1974), an explicit one in the literature on network governance (see Sørensen and Torfing, 2009) and a practical one in both the political sphere and the New Orleans context. The idea that communities can improve services is popular (see Gibson and Cameron, 2001), tested (Yin and Yates, 1974), and attractive politically. But neighbourhood associations in New Orleans overwhelmingly do not participate in public service-delivery. Associations neither engage in service-delivery in the sense of major social services or welfare services nor see it as their role to do so.[28] This reaffirms the role of government as the primary service-provider in cities, and accentuates the ways in which differing priorities, brought by new actors, affect network governance.

These findings show the diversity of values in informal networks. Different values underpin the policy process, motivating what associations chose to do (Chapters Six and Seven) and underpinning their partnerships and conflicts (Chapter Five). Understanding what actors in a network do is a first step in understanding the dynamics of the network.

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[28] A subset of neighbourhood associations in New Orleans do engage in small-scale services, such as child care and youth sports, while almost all associations are involved in services such as thoseq surrounding crime and neighbourhood beautification.

3.2 Literature and Theory

Organisational studies use a number of theoretical tools to understand organisations. These include typologies based upon "who benefits?" (Blau and Scott, 1962), financial resources (Vickers, 1972), and functions (Katz and Kahn, 1966) (see Section 3.2.1). A further perspective is that of Eldridge and Crombie (1974) which embraces an organisation's "functions and ideals" as the core of its identity. In this section I address the limitations of these typologies and the ways in which organisational theory underpins an understanding of neighbourhood associations in New Orleans. I also address a third major theme, the political importance of lowering the cost of service-delivery and the limited evidence that community participation is one way to achieve this cost efficiency.

3.2.1 Organisational Studies and Association Typologies

Typologies and categories differentiate between organisations and explain their position within their networks. These typologies are contested within the field of organisation studies. Eldridge and Crombie (1974) provide a vision of how to build theory on organisations. They (1974) argue that existing typologies for organisations are flawed because "As a methodological tool for the development of organisational theory the categories are at too high a level to be able to promote insights into the internal functioning of organizations." Instead, they argue that organisations are best understood in terms of their goals and objectives, and the functions that support those goals and objectives. I embrace this position and use data collected on the activities of neighbourhood associations and interviews with neighbourhood leaders to create profiles of neighbourhood associations. In doing so, I create a classification system that links the similarities

and differences of the functions and ideals of neighbourhood associations in New Orleans. Understanding what neighbourhood associations do is one step towards analysing their choice of informal networks and policy negotiations.

Eldridge and Crombie (1974) contend that organisational studies have failed to develop high level theory; much of the theory that has been developed is at a level so abstract that it is difficult to apply to real-world organisations (Aldrich, 1999). The literature has failed to develop holistic typologies of organisations. Instead, theorists create typologies based upon single characteristics of organisations. Blau and Scott (1962) classify based on "who benefits" from the organisation. Vickers (1972) bases his typology on the source of the organisation's financial resources. Katz and Khan (1966) classify based on the types of things organisations do. Without clear, applicable typologies of organisations, research at the middle range often depends on more practical categories (Eldridge and Crombie, 1974). The theoretical structures provided by Blau and Scott (1962), Vickers (1972) and Katz and Khan (1966) are incapable of doing more than to classify aspects of the organisations. Parallel, practical theoretical structures have been developed that classify organisations in a descriptive way. One version of this is naming different types of organisations, such as political parties, schools, armies and other groups (Eldridge and Crombie, 1974). Other common categories are the public and private sector, and for-profit and not-for-profit organisations (Anheier and Salamon, 2006).

These descriptive definitions are functional; in this study both sector definitions (such as non-profit and for-profit organisations) as well as specific descriptive definitions (such as Logan and Rabrenovic (1990)'s definition of neighbourhood association) are used, but descriptive classifications do little to build theory about differences between organisations. Eldridge and

Crombie (1974) address this issue by turning the focus to organisations' goals and objectives, and their foundational functions and ideals. Instead of practical, descriptive classifications, Eldridge and Crombie (1974) argue that what organisations do, and the reasons they do it, are the primary tools needed for classification. This approach is remarkably flexible. If used in a big-picture context, the "functions and ideals" test separates for-profit organisations, for whom the ideal is making money, and the activity is typically the selling of a product or service, from non-profit organisations for whom the goal is to serve a public good, and the method is typically a provision of a service funded by charitable donations or grants. The focus on functions and ideals is equally helpful in distinguishing political parties. Political parties share many activities, but are differentiated by their ideals. Similarly, advocacy non-profits may have the same ideals as a political party but their functions are persuasive not legislative.

In this chapter, I adapt the Eldridge and Crombie (1974) theory of organisations to neighbourhood associations and their roles in network governance in post-Katrina New Orleans. I use document analysis and interviews to understand what neighbourhood associations do and the ideals underpinning that involvement.

In doing so, I identify a set of ideals and a set of functions neighbourhood associations use to attain these ideals. Neighbourhood associations in New Orleans have ideals of protection and improvement. Protective neighbourhood associations are highly influenced by property values; they provide protection for their investments via crime patrols or crime districts, beautification, or issues such as blight or land use. In contrast, associations in struggling neighbourhoods often have less to protect and need to break long or short-term cycles of poverty.

They are interested in youth programs, social services, or, most commonly, attempting to bring a grocery store (or other basic retail) into the neighbourhood.

Neighbourhood associations demonstrate two dominant strategies (functions) for reaching these ideals. They attempt to influence other organisations through advocacy and they organise their own programming. I examine these functions and ideals further in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

3.2.2 Service-Delivery

It may seem strange to closely examine something that neighbourhood associations do not do, but service-delivery is critical to governance in three different ways. The first is its political relevance, the idea that community participation can improve and lower the cost of service provision permeates the political sphere. Secondly, the academic literature on community organisations explicitly discusses community effectiveness in service-delivery. Finally, the network governance literature implicitly focuses on service-delivery by emphasising meta-governance by elected officials. Meta-governance assumes that elected officials set up and structure informal policy networks. Focusing specifically on government-constructed networks implicitly focuses on governmental priorities. As this chapter shows, governmental priorities often differ from communal priorities. The unifying factors between these three different approaches is their positioning of community actors and government in the same governance network. Critical to the discussion of new governance is government's role in policy networks; it is important to not only understand what neighbourhood associations do, but also how this "doing" fits alongside what government is doing.

Note what is *not* discussed here: the explicit relationship between neighbourhood associations and government (discussed in Chapter Five). Instead, I focus on what neighbourhood associations do, and how this affects traditional understanding of what governments do. This distinction is best captured in Chaskin and Garg's (1997) description of four different ways of relating with government:

1) Parallel Institutions -- in which neighbourhood organisations provide another option for service delivery that currently is the responsibility of the local government.

2) Separate but Complementary Institutions -- in which they accomplish functions outside the scope of city government.

3) Incorporated Institutions -- which become formal extensions of city government.

4) Opposition Institutions -- which serve as a participation-based check on city government power.

This description of differing institutions focuses not on the direct relationship between "institutions" and government, but on the ways in which these institutions engaged in overlapping, competing and complementary roles in government. In the context of a network, these categories describe where different actors sit in the network. The political narrative, neighbourhood association literature and network governance literature all focus on "parallel institutions" and "incorporated institutions" in which neighbourhood associations are seen as a means to make government provision of services more efficient. In this chapter I examine those understandings of network positioning and why it matters that neighbourhood associations so radically reject these positions in their networks.

The political appeal of community is rooted in the promise that neighbourhood groups can help to make welfare-style service-delivery less expensive and more effective. Gibson and Cameron (2001: 7) note that: "Community has become a cult, an object of warm-and-fuzzy ritual worship for politicians of all stripes, academics and the rapidly expanding new class of social commentators. Nobody can get enough of the C-word." The need to cut costs is mediated by a belief in community such that "governance is the acceptable face of spending cuts" (Stoker, 1998). This narrative, that community organisations can improve traditionally provided services, underpins a number of policy initiatives. In the United Kingdom, the 2010 elections featured a prominent victory for conservatives who argued that “big government” could be replaced by “big society.” A crucial component of big society was the belief that incorporating an influx of volunteers and involvement from community organisations would improve services (Building Big Society, 2010). Similarly, George W. Bush ran for president in 2000 in the United States with a campaign of “Compassionate Conservatism.” A lynchpin of compassionate conservatism was faith-based provision of services (see DiIulio, 2007). This policy was grounded in the already-significant role that faith-based groups were playing in the service-delivery sector, often without public dollars (see Cnaan, 2006). More broadly, the United States system of “government-by-proxy” emphasises the role of non-profits and other non-governmental organisations in service-delivery (see DiIulio, 2007). A third example of this desire by government to see community organisations take on roles in service-delivery is New Orleans itself. The mayoral administration in New Orleans recently opened the Neighbourhood Engagement Office to interact directly with neighbourhood associations. At its introductory meeting, the office staff implied that neighbourhood associations should get involved in the provision of services.

Research on community organisations has a similar focus on service-provision. Some of this focus is theoretical, such as Teibut's (1956) argument that decentralisation and competition between localities leads to more efficient services. Box and Musso (2004) as well as Chaskin and Garg (1997) argue that local knowledge and input from communities lead to more efficient service-delivery. Yin and Yates (1974: vii) test this idea on 250 cases and find that, "the case studies have on balance reported a fairly positive picture for the decentralization experience." More recently, Dowding, John and Biggs (1994) have argued that while there are reasons that local service-delivery might be effective, there is little evidence that it is. Rich (2008) argues the opposite, declaring that:

> "citizen participation in the planning and delivery of services can enhance both the effectiveness and efficiency of those services by tailoring services to localized needs, mobilizing additional resources, and improving communications between consumers and producers of public services."

Both the theoretical and practical arguments for neighbourhood association involvement in service-delivery assume that these associations either produce on their own, or participate in government production of services (Rich, 2008). Thus, they serve as "parallel institutions," and "incorporated institutions." The governance literature makes similar assumptions, although it does so implicitly. Sørensen and Torfing (2009: 243) note that, "In those cases where governance networks are formed as part of a deliberate political strategy, the primary motive is often to enhance the effectivity of public governance." Goldsmith and Eggers (2003) provide a practical roadmap to the use of networks to provide public services at the city level. Rhodes (1996) notes that often the phrase "governance" is used to refer to New Public Management, bringing private sector performance practices into public sector governance. Osborne and Gaebler, (1992) argue

that governmental bureaucracy is an appropriate tool for steering policy decisions, but not for service-delivery.

Meta-governance is the dominant concept in the approach towards service-delivery within network governance literature. Meta-governance occurs when elected officials set up governance networks (Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). Meta-governance is prevalent throughout network governance literature (see Torfing, 2005; Sørensen and Torfing, 2005; Nyseth, 2008; Damgaard and Torfing, 2010; Torfing *et al.,* 2009). While the practical political sphere is explicit about the potential of community organisations to lower the costs of services, the implications in network governance literature are implicit. Network governance literature defines network governance in terms of meta-governance by elected officials, assuming these officials' priorities are the purpose of the network. Because of the current economic climate, this often means a focus on cutting the costs of services. Rhodes (1996: 666) warns about this, arguing that "there is a danger in these remarks. They treat networks as a tool of government. But they are not just a mechanism for delivering services. As important, they are a challenge to democratic accountability."

By embracing meta-governance, the network governance literature assumes that community organisations are "parallel institutions" and "incorporated institutions" which provide services or aid government in providing them. In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations definitively reject this understanding of their institutionality.[29] They do so both through their actions and through their words. This rejection is critical; it repositions neighbourhood associations inside the network as "separate but complimentary institutions" and "opposition

[29] When New Orleans neighbourhood associations provide services, they are not welfare-styled offerings linked to government, but ad hoc services at an extremely small-scale, such as Fountainebleu Improvement Association's annual caterpillar spraying for local trees.

institutions." It also introduces what will be a key theme throughout this research: the need to reorganise network governance theory around the preferences and activities of the variety of actors.

3.3 The Ideals of Neighbourhood Associations

Eldridge and Crombie (1974) argue that it is necessary to look at an organisation's functions and ideals to understand the differences between organisations. Applying this test requires both understanding what organisations do and creating the appropriate theory to understand their ideals. My approach to building these theoretical tools is to depend heavily on the motivations and theories neighbourhood associations use to describe their own actions, stemming from in-depth interviews. When describing neighbourhood associations, many associations self-identified as a "crime and blight" association. The "crime and blight" association is a typical configuration, one that focuses on limiting law enforcement problems in the neighbourhood and making sure there are no rundown buildings. The dominant form and understanding of neighbourhood associations in the interviews is of an organisation that is fundamentally concerned with *protection*. Other associations describe themselves in reference to this dominant construction, declaring themselves dedicated not to neighbourhood protection but to creating neighbourhood change. This dichotomy provides a theoretical tool for dividing and understanding the objectives and ideals driving neighbourhood associations. Protective organisations are concerned with issues such as crime and blight so as to keep property values up, or keep the quality of their living situation high. *Neighbourhood change* associations need to

fundamentally change their neighbourhood environment; often this is because the neighbourhood has already deteriorated and commerce has left the neighbourhood.

Two associations specifically describe themselves in protectionist terms; the Fontainebleau Improvement Association and the Upper Audubon Association. Both organisations talk about the need to protect their property values and emphasise that these property values are central to their involvement in the neighbourhood association. A third association, French Quarter Citizens Inc. describes protection in a more dynamic way. In the French Quarter, which includes the famous Bourbon Street and which more than seven million tourists enter every year (McNulty, 2012), there is a need to protect the quality-of-life of those who live in the neighbourhood. Faced with the prospect of business owners lobbying to expand opportunities for bars, neighbours often feel threatened by the tourism industry. As a result, French Quarters Citizens Inc. spends much of its time focusing on the enforcement of laws which protect residents of the French Quarter, such as limitations on when live music can be played outside, or noise ordinances that limit the ability of bars to blast music out their windows onto the streets.

Other associations show smaller, less involved versions of the same thinking. The president of the Lake Carmel Improvement District justifies its security district on the grounds that people worked hard to move to a middle-class, residential neighbourhood, and, having purchased a home, want to protect it. Often this protection is linked to security programs; the Fontainebleau Improvement Association, Upper Audubon Association, and Lake Carmel all pay for some form of extra security in addition to the police, and the French Quarter recently rejected similar legislation despite endorsement by French Quarters Citizens Inc. Blight fits neatly into the theory as well; a blighted home brings down the value of all the homes around it. Renting is a

huge concern across neighbourhoods; members of these associations feel renters are less able (or inclined) to take care of their property, and that the neighbourhood will decline as a result of their presence. Often, the concern is in part because after Hurricane Katrina there were additional renters entering the neighbourhood quickly.

Renting as an issue is often framed racially throughout the city. This framing is difficult for middle-class African-Americans in New Orleans East. These middle-class neighbourhoods in the East are among the strongest in their opposition to renters. The Eastern New Orleans Neighborhood Advisory Commission (ENONAC) points out that 40 per cent of the subsidised housing in the city is located in New Orleans East. The President of ENONAC considers it a core part of the organisations' mission to support neighbourhood associations which oppose additional renting in their neighbourhoods. The associations need the support because opposition to renting is often viewed as racism. For middle class African-Americans racism is a particularly damning indictment. Beyond political ramification of opposing renting and subsidised housing are legality issues. Rental advertisements have come under scrutiny for excluding potential tenants that are on Section 8 or even based upon race (Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, 2009).[30] Often neighbourhood associations oppose subsidised housing projects, showing the same protectionist nature as can be seen in security efforts or concern with blight.

In other neighbourhoods the problem with renting is less systemic and more specific. The Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society was founded expressly to deal with a six-plex apartment that brought in tenants that made long-time neighbours feel unsafe. Members were convinced that new tenants were dealing drugs and even running a prostitution ring. The association rallied,

[30] Section 8 is a Federal housing program that provides subsidies for those unable to afford rent.

calling City Hall and pressuring the property owner. Similar stories occurred in a larger scale in different parts of the city. In Faubourg Lafayette, the president of the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association states that one of the downfalls of the historic neighbourhood in Central City was its location amidst four housing projects: Melpomene, Calliope, St. Thomas and Magnolia.[31] Much of the foot traffic in the neighbourhood was from people moving from one project to another, often to sell drugs. As a result, the neighbourhood lost control of its own streets. What was a historic neighbourhood with ballrooms and a commercial district fell into disrepair and is now the most dangerous area of the city.

Another example of the protective ideal is the preservation movement. New Orleans residents often talk about both preserving their culture *and* their physical structures. This is the case in the French Quarter, where culture brings tourists to the city in droves. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Irish Channel saw demolitions and "stealing" from houses as the oil boom ended and the neighbourhood saw its population decline. Construction companies were scheduled to demolish the homes, but instead took them apart by hand to sell the historic pieces. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association fought the demolitions, first getting an order to prohibit demolitions for a month, and later creating a historic district to keep houses from being demolished. The president of the neighbourhood association was so determined to have her temporary demolition moratorium approved that she received copies of a number of successful applications and then physically cut and pasted the applications to make hers.

The nearby Central City neighbourhood, including Faubourg Lafayette, was not as successful. It saw its historic housing stock raided. The Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association

[31] The interviewee used the old names of the projects; each project has been renamed when recently redeveloped.

had a system in which, if a house was being looted, its members would follow the looters to the bank where they were selling property. There, even with the materials in plain view, the banks would deny buying and selling the materials.

After Hurricane Katrina demolitions again became a political issue. One interviewee, a leader from the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association, received national media attention for exposing a scandal in which the New Orleans Affordable Homeownership program (NOAH) charged the city for demolitions of fictional houses. A rumour of houses being demolished by overeager contractors was a big issue after the storm when Mayor Ray Nagin declared an emergency power to demolish homes if they endangered surrounding houses. The president of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association, angry that she could not rally more people to put pressure on government to change the process, painted the demolition sign on her neighbours' houses in an effort to stir up controversy.

These issues of security, enforcement, renting/subsidised housing and preservation all follow an ideology of protecting the neighbourhood from a perceived threat. This protectionist identity is the core ideal behind the classic "crime and blight" association. However, some leaders specifically identify their association as counterexamples to these ideals. In the case of the Broadmoor Improvement Association and the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, the organisations follow very different priorities; they emphasise changing neighbourhoods. Other interviewees, such as those in the Upper Audubon Association and the Gentilly Terrace and Garden Neighborhood Association, express opposition to the protective nature of their own associations, and volunteer specifically with the hope of changing that ideal. These associations, which reject the protectionism of the classic neighbourhood association and instead focus on

improving the neighbourhood, come in several different forms. One is by linking to faith-based institutions (discussed in 3.4). Similarly, having young children in the neighbourhood changes the values of the association (discussed in Chapter Seven). Finally, neighbourhoods which once had vibrant commercial areas but saw that commerce leave focus on change out of necessity; their residents want the quality-of-life which was historically present in their neighbourhoods.

The Broadmoor Improvement Association took a dramatically different path from the typical crime and blight association. The association created an improvement district that taxes local property but allows a local set of elected neighbourhood leaders to spend the money on improving the neighbourhood. This bucked a city-wide trend in which neighbourhoods created taxing districts for the specific purpose of funding security; Broadmoor chose to widen the use of the tax funds. This required new legislation at the state level. All three interviewees from the Broadmoor Improvement Association reject the security model. The Executive Director of the Church of the Annunciation, Broadmoor Improvement Association's closest partner, refers to it as "silly" that the legislation would limit the use of tax dollars to just security. He emphasises that the goal of such legislation is to help people, and that you cannot do so by only punishing them. A board member of both the Broadmoor Improvement Association and the Broadmoor Improvement District describes the ideals by arguing that a focus on security is short-sighted. The long-term problem is poverty traps and the lack of opportunity for youth, breaking out of that cycle prevents criminals from being made. Rather than focus exclusively on security, the Broadmoor Improvement Association uses the tax dollars to fund development with the Broadmoor Community Development Corporation, social-services with Broadmoor Community Cares and youth work through Apex Ministries. These services embody their long-term model of

creating neighbourhood change, not protecting the neighbourhood from short-term criminal threats.

In the Irish Channel, the neighbourhood association made a similar shift from being a typical "crime and blight" association to working with the New Orleans Recreational Department and local coaches to create sports programs in their local parks. The language around the shift was very similar; the association focused not on reacting to crime, but on preventing crime long-term by helping keep youth off the streets. These changes coincided with new leadership in the association and with changing demographics after Hurricane Katrina. The Irish Channel neighbourhood did not experience flood damage after the storm. Situated on higher ground, the neighbourhood began to gentrify after the storm, getting younger. A long-time member of the association points out that this influx of youth and new blood into the association helped change the focus of the association to youth programming. The current president specifically notes that the association has shifted away from a crime and blight focus. Two older leaders in the neighbourhood emphasise that the crime and blight work was necessary at the time when the neighbourhood faced difficulties in the 1980s and 1990s. It is only as the neighbourhood improves that the association has the luxury to change its focus.

The Irish Channel narrative is one of progress; that as a neighbourhood improves it has the freedom to address long-term problems rather than focus on crime and blight. However, similar desires to improve the neighbourhood are found in neighbourhoods with far fewer resources. The Pilotland Neighborhood Association describes itself as a forgotten neighbourhood, a description that was seconded by the local city council staffer. Found at the edge of multiple city districts, Pilotland was one of the last neighbourhoods in the city to

convince the city to come to the neighbourhood to perform a "blight walk," a common practice after the storm to help inform the city about blighted homes and dangerous buildings. They also did not have an association prior to Hurricane Katrina; the leadership of a local pastor helped launch and maintain an association only after the storm. Pilotland was one of the first neighbourhoods in the city (after Tremé) to allow African-Americans to own property. While New Orleans was not strictly segregated, for a long-time it was an unofficial rule that African-Americans could not buy property in most neighbourhoods; they were forced to rent. The Pilotland neighbourhood was an exception, one of the first places in which African-Americans could build. Over time, the neighbourhood deteriorated. The local pastor, who also doubles as the president of the neighbourhood association, emphasises that the neighbourhood once had a pharmacy, health clinic, grocery store and its own school. Those businesses had left long before Hurricane Katrina. Since the storm, the association has been involved in convincing school officials to rebuild and re-open a school, as well as persuading a nursing home and a juvenile centre to locate there. These efforts to redevelop the neighbourhood are not protective in nature, for there is little development left to protect. Rather, the Pilotland model is a restorative one; a neighbourhood that is creative by necessity, as its community has struggled and is trying to restore commerce to the area.

This is a trend in older African-American dominant neighbourhoods. In Center City, the president of the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association refers fondly to the days of having "ballrooms on every corner" and dressing in all white to go to the local market. Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association has a similar focus on neighbourhood restoration. This narrative of returning the neighbourhood to a thriving yesteryear is based in racial history;

segregated neighbourhoods were more likely to have middle-class African-Americans in their neighbourhoods to provide local services. This older model of neighbourhood had local dentists, pharmacies and corner groceries, providing an image of the new neighbourhood for which neighbourhood associations strive.

A third narrative around the issue of proactivity rather than protectionism is the role planning plays in the formation of these neighbourhood associations. After the Green Dot debacle, neighbourhoods were informed that they needed to plan and prove themselves viable. Later, when the Lambert Plan and United New Orleans Plan were put together, numerous neighbourhood associations were told to "shoot for the moon" with their neighbourhood plans (Ford, 2010). For the Broadmoor Improvement Association, the opportunity to plan a better neighbourhood was critical. They partnered with Harvard and quickly realised that they could not depend on slow-to-be-released federal funds. The neighbourhood association partnered with the Church of the Annunciation to raise millions of dollars to implement their own plan. In other neighbourhoods, such as the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association and the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association, the results of the planning process were more modest. For Sugar Hill, the association received funding for a local park, and renovations for a major boulevard. In Northwest Carrollton, the association partnered with Hike for Katreena to plant hundreds of trees. In both cases, the neighbourhood went beyond traditional protective approaches to their neighbourhoods to put forth plans of what they wanted their neighbourhoods to look like.

Taking a step back from the minutiae of the specific neighbourhoods, protectionism and neighbourhood improvement are not mutually exclusive. Many associations show both ideals in their operation. The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association simultaneously fought a

protectionist battle over a development and planted hundreds of trees. The Broadmoor Improvement Association fought for the return of its library while simultaneously starting a new youth centre. These values coexist, and associations engage in activities motivated by each value. But there is a split between the traditional neighbourhood association, which is concerned with protective issues such as crime and blight, and proactive associations that add programming focused on youth sports and poverty alleviation. Within neighbourhood associations these values are often in conflict. A member of the Upper Audubon Association specifically volunteered to do historical work in the neighbourhood to get the focus off crime and negativity. In Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association the Nola Church Plant is leading a movement to turn the focus away from crime and blight and more onto poverty issues and community activities. In the Irish Channel that change has already occurred. These examples show that protectionism and proactivity are often in tension in neighbourhoods and emphasise their roles as the key ideals of these associations.

3.4 Neighbourhood Association Functions

Eldridge and Crombie (1974) argue that organisations should be understood in terms of their ideals and their functions. Neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans have ideals of protectionism and neighbourhood change, but face a variety of options of how to pursue those priorities. Using the database of neighbourhood association "actions," I create a theoretical tool that can be used to understand the primary ways in which neighbourhood associations pursue their ideals. This simplified system identifies two primary techniques for pursuing ideals: influence and programming. Faced with a local problem, neighbourhood associations face a

choice of attempting to fix the problem themselves, or influencing another organisation or governmental body to effect this change. This dichotomy, combined with the split in priorities between neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood change, provides a neighbourhood sorting system that categorises associations.

In building a new theoretical tool for understanding neighbourhood associations, it is useful to look in-depth at two similar organisations. The Fontainebleau Improvement Association and French Quarter Citizens Inc. provide an excellent example of the contrast in dealing with neighbourhood issues. Both associations have a solid financial base; the Fontainebleau Improvement Association's annual budget is $3000, putting it in the top half of neighbourhood associations. French Quarter Citizens Inc.'s annual budget is $36,000, among the highest of the associations surveyed. Both have upper-middle class residents who are primarily white. Both associations express concern with protecting their quality of life. However, the two associations have different approaches on how to do so. French Quarter Citizens Inc. takes a legislative and enforcement approach to quality-of-life; over the years the association has been successful in advocating for legislation to protect residents in the French Quarter. Now the association focuses its attention on enforcement by the police of those laws. The Fontainebleau Improvement Association, with similar demographics and a similar mindset, focuses much of its neighbourhood resources on the running of a security program. The association does advocacy work, both with government around minor issues in the neighbourhood and occasionally with businesses when there is development in the neighbourhood, but its primary focus as an organisation is its security patrol. That program is representative of a different approach by the two organisations: French Quarter Citizens Inc. sees itself primarily as an advocate for the

neighbourhood, while the Fontainebleau Improvement Association pools neighbourhood resources to create its own solutions.

This advocacy approach is common across associations. The president of the Pilotland Neighborhood Association insists that the biggest responsibility of the neighbourhood association is to identify the issues in the neighbourhood and to figure out what government agency to contact to get them fixed. A number of associations identify themselves as watchdogs for the neighbourhood. The watchdog function is simple; the association reports to government when a government function is not being fulfilled. If the problem does not go away, the association puts pressure on the government to fix the problem.

The watchdog function is present in *every* association; each association dedicates more than 15 per cent of its activity to this type of advocacy (see Figure 3.6.1). In some associations, such as the French Quarter Citizens Inc., Pilotland Neighborhood Association and Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association, advocacy accounts for over 40 per cent of their activity.

Advocacy and running programs are strategies that underpin these typologies. There are major philosophical differences not only in what associations are trying to do, but also in the manner in which they pursue their ideals. In the context of urban network governance, these differences between organisations are critical. The typical grounds for understanding the "negotiations" in network governance has been the effectiveness of service-delivery. This inquiry shows that neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans have different sets of ideals and functions which need to be addressed in urban network governance negotiations.

3.5 A Typology of Neighbourhood Associations

Neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans can be defined by these four items: the ideas of protecting the neighbourhood or changing the neighbourhood, and the strategy of influencing other organisations or running its own programming. The four theoretical constructs, grounded both in Crombie and Eldridge's (1974) broader theory of organisational definition by ideal and function, split neighbourhood associations into four categories. In this chapter, I use qualitative data and document analysis to place neighbourhood associations into each of these categories. The majority of neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans are protectionist, but they are split in strategy between focusing primarily on influencing others (often government) and providing their own programming via security programs. A limited number of associations focus on neighbourhood change, and in these cases, the associations do so through their own programming, not through advocacy.

The criterion used to categorise these organisations is simple. In each interview, neighbourhood associations were asked both to address their "macro" priorities and their "micro" activities.[32] Their answers are charted in Figure 3.5.1. These answers were then given a -1, for protectionism, a 0, for mixed priorities, or a 1 for neighbourhood changing focus. The results of that coding process are in Figure 3.5.2. Similarly, I created an index to show whether associations primarily attempt to influence other organisations, or conduct their own programming. That index takes the percentage of activities that a neighbourhood association spends providing a service to the neighbourhood and subtracts the percentage of activities in which the association is advocating for the neighbourhood. Using obviously limited

[32] See Appendix V for the full interview template.

Association	Macro	Micro
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	enforcement, working with the city, preservation	land use, street car line, security district proposal
Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	quality of life (not social services), “how do we make the system work?”, interacting with civil services	illegal dumping, grocery store development
Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	old: crime and blight, new: youth	blight, greening, youth programs
Upper Audubon Association	security, land use, watchdog	archiving, beautification, security district, advocacy
Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association	community-building, blight	traffic, community center development, blight
Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association	reach more people, crime	movie night, neighborhood watch, fundraising
Dreux Avenue	quality-of-life	one rental property
Pilotland Neighborhood Association	crime and blight, watchdog	blight, neighborhood watch, street repairs, zoning, development
Broadmoor Improvement Association	social services, redevelopment	housing, city planning, repopulation, tax district, youth services
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	quality-of-life, zoning, crime	security patrol, development
Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	visible advocate for community	return of mail, blight, opposition to subsidized housing project
Lake Carmel Improvement Association	Crime	Security patrol, beautification, night out against crime
Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	preservation	opposing demolitions, opposing grocery store development, fighting political corruption in neighborhood
Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association	participation/voice, blight	blight, block party, problems with the homelessness center
Algiers Point Neighborhood Association	crime and blight, ferry, sharing information	reopening the ferry, working with police, blight

Figure 3.5.1 - Macro and Micro Activities

neighbourhood data, these measures give a rough sense of whether organisations engage in protectionist activity or neighbourhood change, and whether their strategies seek to influence others or provide for themselves.

Ten associations provided data from both interviews and document analysis. Neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood change are graphed on a *y* axis with protectionist associations graphed at the negative one value. The difference between the percentage of attempts to influence and attempts to provide programming are graphed on the *x* axis, with advocacy organisations to the left (see Figure 3.5.3 for graph and 3.5.2 for source values). The neighbourhood associations sort into three distinct categories:

Association	Function	Ideals
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	14%	Neighborhood Protection
Sugar Hill	1%	Neighborhood Protection
Lake Carmel	-1%	Neighborhood Protection
Gentilly Terrace	-7%	Mixed
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	-51%	Neighborhood Protection
Irish Channel	3%	Neighborhood Change
Upper Audubon	-21%	Neighborhood Protection
Broadmoor Improvement Association	10%	Neighborhood Change
Pilotland Neighborhood Association	-25%	Neighborhood Protection
Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	-30%	Neighborhood Protection
Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	n/a	Neighborhood Protection
Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	n/a	Neighborhood Protection
Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association	n/a	Neighborhood Protection
Algiers Point Association	n/a	Neighborhood Protection

Figure 3.5.2 - Neighbourhood Protection and Neighbourhood Change




Figure 3.5.3 - Neighbourhood Typologies Chart

Key: French Quarter Citizens Inc. (FQC), Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association (NCNA), Pilotland Neighborhood Association (Pilotland), Upper Audubon Association (UAA), Lake Carmel Improvement Association (Lake Carmel), Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association (Sugar Hill), Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association (Gentilly Terrace), Irish Channel Neighborhood Association (Irish Channel), Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA), Fontainebleau Improvement Association (FIA).

In the far left of Figure 3.5.3 are advocacy organisations. These organisations primarily engage in advocacy to protect their neighbourhood, whether they work with the police or fight local businesses. The purest case is the French Quarter Citizens Inc. Other protectionist associations focus on influence to a lesser extent, including the Upper Audubon Association and the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association. Further along the axis, but still primarily focused on the protection ideal, are the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association, The Fontainebleau Improvement Association and the Lake Carmel Improvement Association. Each of these has a highly protective focus, but adds their own programming. Primarily, this programming comes in the form of security and beautification, although in the case of Sugar Hill, the neighbourhood did significant work with the U.S. Postal Service. Finally, there are a pair of outlying organisations, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association and the Broadmoor Improvement Association, that focus on neighbourhood change and do so with their own programming. Note that there are no organisations that primarily address neighbourhood change through advocacy.[33] Of the four associations that do not have record of their activities, attendance at their meetings and interviews with members indicate that all four are included in the bottom-left category of protection via advocacy.

These simple classifications show that in post-Katrina New Orleans, protectionist associations are the most common form of association. These associations seek to protect their neighbourhoods from a variety of threats, ranging from crime, lower property values, renters and even loss of culture. Within the protectionist contingent there is a variety of strategies of how to go about completing their purpose; some associations focus on advocacy while others focus on

[33] Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association is a hybrid of both ideals and strategies. That outlier is consistent with interviews which told of a power struggle between the "new guard" which is for neighbourhood change and the "old guard" which is protectionist

their own programs. The most typical protectionist strategy is to provide extra security though a neighbourhood watch, security patrol or security tax district. A small number of associations take a fundamentally different strategy, focusing on changing their neighbourhoods. These associations *always* focus on their own activities; youth programs, housing aid, or any number of other activities.

These categories, and how associations choose what to protect or change and whether to protect or change, are fundamental to understanding network governance in New Orleans. The values and ideals of associations underpin choices to participate in policy negotiations. This typology answers the "what" question; what do associations do? Understanding their ideals sets the stage for investigation into the dynamics of associational representation (Chapter Four), relationships (Chapter Five) and agenda-setting (Chapters Six and Seven).

3.6 Service-Delivery by Neighbourhood Associations

Service-delivery is rarely mentioned in a discussion of neighbourhood priorities and ideals. Certainly some service provision occurs in neighbourhoods that seek to change their surroundings. But even in these cases, service-delivery comes from "separate but complementary institutions" (Chaskin and Garg, 1997) which seek to supplement, not compete with or work with, government. Service-delivery in neighbourhood associations happens at the level of neighbourhood cleanup, not systematic outreach to the poor. I examine the extent to which neighbourhood associations deliver services in two ways. The first looks at the amount of service-delivery each association does in the context of its broader activities. This measure shows that there are three tiers of service providers; a few associations that emphasise service-

delivery, a few that do not do any service-delivery, and a majority that engage in limited service-delivery. The second way to examine associational service-delivery is to look at the types of services provided by each neighbourhood. This analysis shows that most organisations engage only in security and neighbourhood beautification. Exceptions to this rule are linked to faith-based institutions.

Neighbourhood association leaders are sceptical of involving neighbourhood associations in service-delivery. The scepticism of neighbourhood leaders relate to the concepts of participation in Chapter Four; neighbourhood leaders are already overworked and have full-time jobs. They are not capable or willing to provide broad welfare-style services. Taken together, the

Association	Service Delivery	Education	Advocacy	Representation	Social Capital
FIA	29%	37%	15%	26%	19%
Sugar Hill	17%	36%	16%	44%	6%
Lake Carmel	16%	8%	17%	19%	13%
Gentilly Terrace	14%	28%	21%	45%	11%
FQC	1%	20%	52%	40%	16%
Irish Channel	31%	20%	28%	68%	8%
Upper Audubon	0%	28%	21%	66%	7%
BIA	29%	33%	19%	52%	8%
Pilotland	15%	26%	40%	48%	1%
NCNA	16%	18%	46%	37%	3%

Table 3.6.1 - Neighbourhood Association Activity

Key: Fontainebleau Improvement Association (FIA), Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association (Sugar Hill), Lake Carmel Improvement District (Lake Carmel), Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association (Gentilly Terrace), French Quarter Citizens Inc. (FQC), Upper Audubon Association (Upper Audubon), Broadmoor Improvement Association (BIA), Pilotland Neighborhood Association (Pilotland), Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association (NCNA)

evidence from New Orleans emphasises that neighbourhood associations not only do not deliver services, but reject the the idea that they should.

Figure 3.6.1 shows each neighbourhood association and the characteristics of its actions. In 29 per cent of its activities the Fountainbleau Improvement Association (FIA) engages in service-delivery. In 37 per cent of its activities it educates the neighbourhood. In 15 per cent of its activities it advocates to business or government. In 26 per cent of activities, it represents the neighbourhood in a meeting. Finally, in 19 per cent of its actions it builds social capital in the neighbourhood by hosting social events.[34] [35]

These statistics show that service-delivery is central to three associations: the Broadmoor Improvement Association, the Fontainebleau Improvement Association and the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association. Each of these associations delivers a service in approximately 30 per cent of their actions. There is a large cluster of associations that engage in service-delivery 14 to 17 per cent of their actions. Finally, two associations (the French Quarter Citizens Inc. and the Upper Audubon Neighborhood Association) virtually never engage in service-delivery.

The types of service-delivery by associations include a wide spectrum of "services," from youth programming to security to beautification. Often a single initiative would be "driver" of an association's overall level of service-delivery. Security programs are a primary form of service-provision. The Fontainebleau Improvement Association hires off-duty police to patrol its neighbourhood. The patrol service is optional for residents, but is the associations' most

[34] These categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, a neighbourhood association could be at a City Planning Commission meeting advocating for a particular ruling on a land use case and be representing their community in doing so.

[35] The strength of using these percentages is discussed in Chapter Two, but bears repeating here: it standardises across neighbourhood associations by giving a sense of how large of a component certain types of actions are for an association. As such, it is a better tool to understand priorities as associations engage in highly variable numbers of actions.

significant program. The Lake Carmel Improvement Association has a similar system, except the security program is funded by a security taxing district. The bulk of its funds go to paying a private security group to patrol the neighbourhood in the evenings. Supplemental money goes toward beautification. The Upper Audubon Association also has a parallel security district but because the leadership of these two groups is more divorced, it does not include the actions of the district in the neighbourhood association meeting minutes and so they do not show up in the analysis of the association's activities.

Other associations primarily provide beautification and physical improvements to the neighbourhood. The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association partnered closely with Hike for Katreena to plant trees in the neighbourhood. The Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association and the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association also planted trees as part of wider cleanup efforts alongside data collection on blight and neighbourhood watch programs. The Pilotland Neighborhood Association did limited cleanup and grass cutting while providing a resource centre for its residents and engaging with the police.

This mix of services is divorced from more traditional social service-delivery discussed in the wider political sense; this is not welfare or the provision of civic services such as trash removal or repair of street lights. The vast majority of neighbourhood associations in this sample choose to focus on crime and cleanup issues rather than social service-delivery. Thus, even when these associations are providing services, they are doing so in a way that rejects the larger political narrative that neighbourhood participation could both cheapen and improve social services. Returning to Chaskin and Garg's (1997) analysis of local action as being parallel, supplementary or competing institutions to government, neighbourhood associations choose to

supplement government services not replace them. They do not create their own police force; they hire extra officers for late-night patrols. They do not replace public works efforts, they supplement them by doing neighbourhood cleanups or partnering to plant trees in the neighbourhood.

Two neighbourhood associations provide social services in their neighbourhoods that go beyond security and beautification. One is the Broadmoor Improvement Association. Broadmoor is a significant outlier; it has started its own service-delivery mechanism, called Broadmoor Community Cares. The model in Broadmoor is based on the Harlem Children's Zone and Obama's Promise Neighbourhoods; it provides wrap-around services from cradle-to-grave for its residents (see Tough, 2009). As such, the neighbourhood has opened a charter school (Wilson Charter School) and a community centre (Apex Ministries) and has a host of social programs, from child-care to weatherising homes. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association is an outlier as well, although its social programming is limited to youth programming.

The specific pathways taken by both the Broadmoor Improvement Association and the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association are examined in Chapter Six, but a key link between them is useful for analysis of the broader issue of social service delivery. Both the Broadmoor Improvement Association and the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association are linked to faith-based institutions. The Broadmoor Improvement Association is an extremely close partner with the Church of Annunciation. Annunciation is a key part of fundraising efforts and uses its strong church networks to bring volunteers to the neighbourhood, helping raise the equivalent of over $6 million in money, in-kind donations and volunteer hours in the years after Hurricane Katrina. Annunciation speaks of its contributions to the recovery effort in Broadmoor in expressly

religious terms, explaining that providing social services in the neighbourhood is "a natural place as a church and a mission" and that "it's really hard for people to hear the gospel if their stomach is rumbling too hard." The church's mission is to fill the physical, emotional and spiritual needs of the neighbourhood. Annunciation describes a classic network governance configuration; the fills the gaps for the Broadmoor Improvement Association. When the association cannot get a grant for an activity, Annunciation funds it. When the association cannot find volunteers, Annunciation provides them. The two organisations have an informal relationship that is extremely close. The role of Annunciation adjusts to the configuration of the network at any given time. The Executive Director of the Annunciation Mission, a spin-off of the Annunciation church that focuses explicitly on social services, talks about how the Broadmoor Improvement Association and Annunciation has shifted from disaster recovery to a social services model.

This shift includes a local funding mechanism, the Broadmoor Improvement District (BID). The Broadmoor Improvement District is a tax district that funds the Broadmoor Improvement Association for the purpose of bettering that community. The Executive Director of the Annunciation Mission emphasises that this model allowed the neighbourhood to address the root problems of the neighbourhood rather than just addressing their symptoms (crime). He also talks of the danger of having the actual provision by the neighbourhood association, arguing that it is better to have the neighbourhood partner with professionals in these areas. By allocating tax dollars to the local neighbourhood association, the Broadmoor Improvement District is engaging in its own government-by-proxy system, which he readily acknowledges, saying "Broadmoor functions as a city or a town." This experience of the neighbourhood association expanding to

include its own tax base, and conducting its own government-by-proxy social-service delivery system, is an extreme outlier. It is the only such example in New Orleans.

The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association is a much more typical neighbourhood association. Its history is focused on development issues such as preventing demolitions and addressing neighbourhood crime. In 2007, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association radically changed its priorities. Its increase in service-delivery is almost entirely due to a recent commitment to youth work. The neighbourhood association runs basketball leagues, baseball teams and weekly soccer training sessions. In Broadmoor, the religious principles of Annunciation influenced the Broadmoor Improvement Association to provide services. The process worked in reverse in the Irish Channel. There, the Rachel Sims Baptist Ministry had long run youth programs in the local park. After Hurricane Katrina, the ministry decided it could not remain open. The neighbourhood association noticed the lack of activities and decided to fill the gap. In response the association started a number of youth sports programs (this case is examined in more depth in Chapter Six).

The Broadmoor Improvement Association and the Irish Channel Neighbourhood Association are among the most active associations in the city. They focus explicitly on the provision of social services to their residents. In both cases, a faith-based institution played a formative role in the decision of these associations to provide services.

These findings bring a nuance to the political issue of service provision. Rather than being a silver bullet to cheapen and improve services, neighbourhood associations supplement existing programs. Secondly, when a neighbourhood association is involved in social services, there is a link to a faith-based institution. This link between faith-based institutions and social

services is well-established in the non-profit literature in the United States, most famously in Ram Cnaan's The Other Philadelphia Story (2006). In the wider scope of this research, such findings highlight the gap between the priorities of government, focused on cost effective service provision, and the priorities of neighbourhood associations in protecting and changing their neighbourhoods.

3.7 Discussion

A neighbourhood typology of protection and change provides a theoretical framework for understanding the perspective of neighbourhood associations in their networks and negotiations. These typologies underpin investigation of neighbourhood representation, relationships and agenda-setting, all of which I include later in this work. These classifications also demonstrate that neighbourhood associations bring new priorities to classic governmental issues of service-provision and cost efficiency. This association role as supplemental service-provider also reaffirms government's role as the primary service-provider, and highlights the lack of demand by participatory groups for provision by the community, a reality that reflects their lack of capacity in traditional measures such as annual income. Neighbourhood associations lack both the means and intent to do traditional, welfare-styled service, instead choosing to focus on issues such as neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood beautification.

Negotiations within network governance in New Orleans feature competing ideals and functions of its members, as seen clearly through the alternate perspective of neighbourhood associations. This idea of competing values needs to be incorporated further into network governance theory. One way to do so is to incorporate principles such as pluralistic evaluation

(Hall, 2004) into network governance. Pluralistic evaluation, originally developed within the nursing field, requires that programs be evaluated using metrics that reflect the objectives not only of the policy creator, but also of the participants and, in the case of nursing, the patients. This idea of evaluation which reflects multiple perspectives is starting to be considered in network governance literature (see Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). Evaluation techniques such as pluralistic evaluation, highlight the broader point that the defining of objectives is, by nature, a political act. To include a wide variety of actors in the defining of policy objectives is to embrace multiple perspectives and the complexity that comes with them. To refuse to do so is to simplify the process. But the decision to refuse communities the opportunity to impact policy objective-setting has implications as well (see Chapter Five).

Neighbourhood associations rarely provide social services, highlighting the limitations of informal networks and reaffirming the traditional role of government in this sphere. Despite a desire by local city officials to involve neighbourhood associations in service-delivery, neighbourhood associations refuse to become service-providers. There is a fundamental lack of supply from this group of actors for this type of participation. Such a lack of supply is important. The idea of supply by actors is nowhere in network governance literature. A critical component of informal network configuration in the future may be the ability to create supply for participation. This can likely be done through increasing the influence of actors early in the process and focusing on issues that actors find more important.

The rejection of service-delivery by neighbourhood associations also affirms the traditional service-provision role for government, although certainly other non-profit organisations take more active roles in such service-delivery. Much of the literature on network

governance and neighbourhood associations assumes that communities serve to compete with or help provide services (Chaskin and Garg, 1997). Instead, neighbourhood associations in New Orleans choose to provide supplemental services, such as security patrols. Sometimes they choose to advocate on issues of social service-provision, but rarely do they provide these services themselves. Thus, the New Orleans case supports network governance authors who are skeptical that network governance has permeated governance or is taking over traditional institutions (see Gunasekara, 2008).

The picture painted for the rest of this research is clear. Neighbourhood associations have clear priorities. They focus their limited resources on neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood change, using both local programming and advocacy as mechanisms to promote these goals. They bring these different priorities to policy negotiations. Meanwhile, governmental concerns of the cost of social services are largely ignored by associations. There is not associational supply for such participation. In the informal sphere there is a battle of priorities; if a policy does not adhere to an actor's ideals, that actor often refuses to participate. The lack of demand from associations to provide services shows the limitations of informal networks and reaffirms the role of government as a service provider.



CHAPTER FOUR

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A Democracy of Volunteers

"We don't actually have any formal power, but like most cities, if a neighbourhood association shows up with a few people, the city listens."
President of the Algiers Point Association

4.1 Introduction

In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations represent communities in informal policy networks. A core theoretical question within network governance is whether informal networks increase or decrease democratic anchorage (Torfing, 2005). Neighbourhood associations provide a link to community in New Orleans, but their ability to do so rests upon a system of volunteerism, not upon elections, a significant departure from other network governance examples.

Pierre (2009) calls for democratic innovation to match recent changes in new governance which emphasise new actors and informal networks. Post-Katrina New Orleans has a democracy of volunteers based upon deep participation by a few local leaders. At the level of government, such participation is not new, but new governance and network governance theory do not incorporate democratic theories (Pierre, 2009) such as deliberative democracy (Bessette, 1980) or participatory democracy. Pierre (2009) argues that new concepts of democracy need be incorporated into theory from practical examples.

In New Orleans, a democracy of volunteers addresses a major debate within democratic anchorage theory. Klijn and Skelcher (2007) summarise two conjectures about the democratic anchorage of informal networks. The “incompatibility conjecture” claims that such networks detract from democracy. The “complementarity conjecture” states the opposite. Both these theories are reflected in New Orleans, where neighbourhood associations represent their communities in governance networks.

4.2 The Call for Democratic Innovation

Pierre (2009: 593-594) asks: "As we reinvent governance, do we need to reinvent democracy as well?" Pierre (*ibid*) is referring to the commonly held understanding of links between democracy and government in network governance theory, emphasising that communities are represented by elected officials. But as governance increasingly incorporates informal networks into the policy process, these traditional links by elections are less relevant (Pierre, 2009). Pierre (*ibid*) calls for new configurations of democratic anchorage -- “democratic innovation” -- so that theory keeps up with the shifting ground of governance. Informal networks in New Orleans show a different configuration linking communities to policy, an example of Pierre’s (*ibid*) desired innovation.

Pierre (2009: 600) asserts that "the key problem is that democracy requires some degree of formality to ensure equal, say, conflict resolution and accountability, yet the founding principle of most networks is their informality." Pierre (*ibid*) argues that the increasing use of networks and expansion of governance from government to multiple actors creates a fundamental tension between informal networks and the need for democratic accountability.

Pierre (*ibid*) addresses this tension using the concept of meta-governance: the idea that networks can be democratically linked to communities based upon their construction by government. The choice of meta-governance as democratic innovation is fitting with the wider democratic anchorage literature (see Section 4.3), but it is only one of a broader set of potential innovations possible. Pierre (*ibid*) references deliberative democracy (Bessette, 1980) which calls for "a set of principles that are intended to establish fair terms of political cooperation in a democratic society" (Gutman and Thompson, 2002: 153). Young (2001) criticises deliberative democracy through the eyes of a (theoretical) activist, saying that it does not reflect or account for the world as it exists. Existing power structures make it impossible to have idealistic deliberations (*ibid*). Pierre (2009) criticises deliberative democracy on the grounds that it is primarily philosophical and rarely attempted in practice. Pierre (ibid) does not address participatory democracy, in which "a broad range of interests are represented and participants are integrally involved throughout the planning processes, from initiation through decision implementation and monitoring" (Moote *et al.,* 1997). While deliberative democracy is more theoretical than practiced, participatory democracy is common in land use cases in major urban areas (*ibid*).

The democracy of volunteers in New Orleans shares characteristics with both deliberative and participatory democracy, but has a number of distinctive features as well. In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations engage in negotiations with policy makers, although these negotiations are less deliberative and often feature power struggles. Similar to participatory democracy, New Orleans' democracy of volunteers uses public participation systems and associations are involved in networks making policy decisions. The primary distinctive component of the New Orleans system is its reliance on volunteers. Volunteers who staff

neighbourhood associations are the key link back to the community, more so than elections. As such, the democracy of volunteers is a different model of democracy, one that steers away from traditional anchorage through elections. This focus on volunteering is one of Pierre's (2009) innovations; it matches new governance with a different kind of democracy.

4.3 Theory and Literature: Democratic Anchorage

Network governance literature contains a number of tools to assess the democratic nature of governance networks. The literature on democracy in network governance is a debate between those that think networks detract from democracy and those that think networks further democracy. Sørensen and Torfing (2003) argue that, "Governance networks might contribute to an efficient governance of our complex and functionally differentiated societies, but the question is whether governance networks also lead to democratic governance." This component of governance which links back to community is called democratic anchorage (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005).

The literature defines democratic anchorage functionally (see Sørensen and Torfing, 2005), but it is best understood as the linking of governance networks to their communities. There are two primary conjectures as to the effect network governance has on democratic anchorage[36] (Klijn and Skelcher, 2005). The first is the "incompatibility conjecture" (*ibid*) which argues that network governance and representative democracy are fundamentally at odds with one another. "Governance networks have been accused of being undemocratic due to their closed and opaque character and lack of accountability" (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). Sørensen and

[36] Klijn and Skelcher propose two additional conjectures: transitional and institutional.

Torfing (2003) look at two primary arguments that networks are undemocratic. The first is that networks, by their very nature, include a wider circle of actors, thus limiting the influence of traditional democratic institutions. The second argument is "that governance networks suffer from the absence of open competition, legitimacy problems, and the lack of transparency, publicity and accountability" (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005: 200).

The counter argument to the incompatibility conjecture is that networks provide opportunities to link different democratic actors (see Jessop, 2000; Esmark, 2003 as seen in Sørensen and Torfing, 2005). Similarly, Rhodes (1996) contends that network governance provides alternatives to representative democracy, and Kooiman (1993, 36; 200, 143) argues that networks provide flexibility for democratic institutions. Klijn and Skelcher (2007) refer to these arguments as the complementarity conjecture. This second argument, particularly Kooiman's argument regarding flexibility, harkens to a broader discussion by Berger and Neuhaus (1977) and Boyte and Chatten (1980) about the need for mediating institutions. Berger and Neuhaus (1977) and Boyte and Chatten (1980) argue that electoral institutions have become technocratic which separates them from their democratic roots. As such, there is a need for mediating institutions that link bureaucracies back to the people.

The argument that network governance is democratic is born in the perception of a failure by representative democratic structures to maintain their relationship to their constituencies. While Sørensen and Torfing (2003) see new networks and institutions as undermining traditional representative democratic institutions, the complementarity conjecture sees traditional representative democratic institutions as having failed to maintain a functional relationship with

the citizenry. Thus, it looks to a wider network to supplement the connection between government and people.

There is a subtle, definitional difference in these two views and the ways in which they evaluate democracy. Klijn and Skelcher (2007) define democracy in terms of representative democracy. Things are "democratic" if they strengthen, or give power to, *traditional government representatives*. The complementarity conjecture, and the mediating institutions narrative, uses responsiveness to citizenry as an implicit measure of democracy; leaving open the possibility that things could become more democratic, yet not invest in governmental representation. This is, at its core, a definitional disagreement. The New Orleans case shows that these two views can coexist; neighbourhood associations serve as alternative representative institutions but are not seen by elected officials as competition. Elected officials support these smaller representative groups and use them to validate policies and gain information. In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations serve both as representative institutions and mediating ones.

There is an implicitly normative underbelly to the discussion of whether network governance has "more" or "less" democratic anchorage. The unwritten assumption is that "more" democracy is better. This is an odd assumption, and one that is worth parsing for nuance; although it is ultimately, like many normative discussions, unresolvable. The argument against democracy is a philosophical one (Plato, 2009); ancient Greece is often cited as an example of the perils of too direct a democracy, as are the problems caused by direct referendum, as in California, where taxes cannot be raised unless approved by the electorate (Matsusaka, 2005). In short, the typical Western preference of representative democracy is already one of limited democracy. The normative preference is not an absolute.

So then, why the clear preference towards democratic anchorage in the literature? The answer is in the two different narratives of democratic deficit that underpin the argument discussed above. The first narrative of democratic deficit is best visualised as smoky, back room dealing. Leaders make decisions apart from the democratic process. The second narrative is of decoupling, that the bureaucratic nature of government makes it difficult for representatives to hold up their end of the democratic bargain. In both cases, a situation arises in which representative democracy no longer functions correctly. When asking if network governance is "more" or "less" democratic, the implicit question is whether network governance compounds or alleviates these potential flaws in representative democracy.

Sørensen and Torfing (2003) propose a four step test to ascertain the level of democratic anchorage in network governance. The test asks if the governance network:

- is controlled by democratically elected politicians;
- represents the membership basis of the participating groups and organizations;
- is accountable to the territorially defined citizenry; and
- follows the democratic rules specified by a particular grammar of conduct (*ibid*).

In focusing on elections, representation, accountability and democratic rules, Sørensen and Torfing (2003) emphasise what Van Kersbergan and Van Waarden (2001) call "input legitimacy." Van Kersbergan and Van Waarden (2001) contrast "output legitimacy," the idea that policies are judged based on the efficiency of what they do, with input legitimacy, which judges policy based on the norms of its construction. Each of the four prongs of Sørensen and Torfing's (2003) test look at the input legitimacy of network governance. The test has two distinct, underpinning rationalisations. One is a preference for process and institutions to represent a

community. The other is control by democratically elected officials. These prongs are adapted in this study to analyse the democratic anchorage of New Orleanian network governance, and specifically, the democratic anchorage of neighbourhood associations which serve as primary links between the network and the community (see Section 4.4).

While Sørensen and Torfing (2005) provide four components to the democratic anchorage test, they focus explicitly on the first one (control by democratic election) as a cure-all for the other issues of representation, accountability and democratic rules. The emphasis on "control" is problematic, which Sørensen and Torfing (2005) acknowledge saying,

> the problem is that the very idea of exercising political control with governance networks is flawed. Governance networks are defined in terms of their capacity for self-regulation and cannot be controlled through the exercise of sovereign power within a hierarchical system based upon the giving of orders, detailed instructions and unconstrained overruling of discretionary decisions made by governance networks (Mayntz 1991, 10). Hence, we need to rethink the notion of political control in order to fully recognize the importance of mutual respect and reciprocity in the relationship between government and governance networks.

The solution by Sørensen and Torfing (2005), and echoed throughout much of the democratic anchorage literature, is "meta-governance:" the construction of networks and a policy process by government officials, who then leave the network to its own devices. Meta-governance addresses the formulation of governance networks, and their regulation. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) argue that while giving power to elected officials within governance networks would fundamentally alter them, it is still possible to give elected officials control over the structure of the networks.[37]

[37] Sørensen and Torfing also argue for extensive participation within networks of elected officials. It is unclear how these officials are supposed to construct and participate in these networks without “controlling” them.

Meta-governance is commonly referred to as the solution to questions on the democratic anchorage of network governance (see Sørensen and Torfing, 2005, Nyseth, 2008; Klijn and Skelcher, 2005). This understanding is theoretical; Bogason and Musso (2006) note this theoretical focus and call for more in-depth case studies as the next step to further understand the democratic anchorage of network governance. In absence of these studies in the network governance literature, other literatures provide clarity into the applicability of meta-governance. Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) refer in their study to neighbourhood governance rather than network governance. However, their core finding applies directly to a network governance system. In studying neighbourhood governance, they note that networks can occur in both "invited spaces" and "participatory spaces." Lowndes and Sullivan's (2008) "invited spaces" occur when non-governmental (or quasi-governmental) organisations are brought into the governance network by government itself, often into a defined role and defined process. While Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) do not expressly refer to Sørensen and Torfing's concept of meta-governance, meta-governance is, by definition, taking place as these "invited spaces" are constructed. Invited spaces are an example of government setting up the process but still including the wider network of actors characteristic in new governance. However, Lowndes and Sullivan (2008) also refer "participatory spaces" in which organisations create their own network on their own terms. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) do not expressly address network governance systems in which the networks exist in participatory spaces. Broadly, Sørensen and Torfing's call for meta-governance is a call for encouraging governance to take place in invited spaces, which are overseen by elected officials, and for participatory spaces to either become invited spaces or cease to exist. The application of Sørensen and Torfing's four-pronged test of democratic

anchorage provides a more nuanced perspective. Network governance in participatory spaces is representative of membership groups and accountable to a geographically defined citizenry.[38] Democratically anchored participatory spaces display a fundamental tension in Sørensen and Torfing's test. Representation and democratic institutions may not always complement each other. This issue plays out in New Orleans.

The tension between democratic elections and representation reflects Klijn and Skelcher (2007)'s complementary conjecture; that additional, non-governmental representative organisations improve rather than weaken democracy. This narrative appears in urban and grassroots governing processes where local government is portrayed as failing in some way (see Nyseth, 2008; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008). Nyseth (2008) looks at network governance and democratic anchorage in the context of urban planning. Nyseth (ibid) slightly adapts Sørensen and Torfing's (2005) test to include five prongs: 1) inclusiveness 2) transparency 3) accountability 4) public involvement and participation and 5) meta-governance.

Nyseth (2008) examines the Norwegian town, Tromso, which saw its typical planning process break down. In its place, a network of local actors was created to deal with a particularly thorny issue of a 13-story hotel development. This project was contentious, but also a reflection of a broader conflict between a modern, pro-growth city contingent, and locals concerned with historical districts and worried about change. Nyseth (2008: 512) concludes that:

> "The lesson to be learned from this experiment is that the question of meta-governance has to be taken more seriously. One of the problems was obviously related to the composition of the network. The link between the network and the public authorities was far too weak. Instead of being completely autonomous, the network should have been supplemented by members of the planning authorities

[38] A key question here is whether extremely informal neighbourhood organisations can better represent citizens than elected officials. That is extremely difficult to know - but it is clear from the literature and from this research that there is a demand for neighbourhood organisations to do so.

> and probably also some political representatives. If not in theory, then certainly in routine practice, the planning authorities turned against the ideas coming from the network. This might be because the ideas were too remote from routine planning practice and impossible to implement on a regular basis."

In arguing for stronger meta-governance Nyseth keeps his observations well within the broader theoretical framework of Sørensen and Torfing. The primary criticism of the networks is the lack of control by elected officials. This perspective is the exact opposite of the expressed opinions of the actual actors involved in Tromso governance. There, the network was seen as *more* democratic:

> "The network aimed to achieve urban transformation in a democratic framework, changing the discourse on city development, developing a new set of ideas, mobilising new actors and including new voices. A shared vision was developed, not only for democratic reasons, but also to incorporate other ideas in the process" (Nyseth, 2008: 503-504).

Again, in an urban, neighbourhood context, network governance is viewed locally as more democratic, an affirmation of Klijn and Skelcher's (2007) complementary conjecture.

In the case of Tromso, the extent to which a governance is evaluated as democratic is measured by the participation of local actors. This is a striking departure not only from Sørensen and Torfing's theory, but also from Nyseth's own conclusions. In both the Nyseth (2008) and Lowndes and Sullvan (2008) examples, participation emerges as an alternative to strengthen democracy. In Nyseth's account, the issue is expressly a failure of current institutions, an affirmation of the Berger and Neuhaus (1977) contention that technocracy has severed democratic links and there is a need for mediating institutions. One potential solution is participation; indeed, this is the approach taken in post-Katrina New Orleans.

There is an expansive literature on participation with many distinct parallels to considerations of democratic anchorage. Participation literature is often characterised as a debate

between participation as an “end” or “means” (Oakley, 1991). The ends and means discussion is about whether participation should be evaluated on its outcomes as compared to non-participatory approaches, or whether there is a normative reason to prefer participation to non-participation. The first approach is primarily concerned with the efficiency of moving decision-making closer to citizens -- does it make for better decisions and services? There are a variety of different theories why local participation in government would provide better and less expensive services, including the benefits of local knowledge (Box and Musso, 2004; Chaskin and Garg, 1997) and varieties of service provision between localities which allows residents to choose their optimal level of service provision (Tiebout, 1956). Alternatively, advocates of centralisation often argue that administrative organisation and economies of scale lead to better efficiency (Box and Musso, 2004). This debate, while appearing empirical, has not been sufficiently resolved (Dowding, John and Biggs, 1994; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008). The second approach argues for the normative value of participation, and often does so by supporting democracy.

The "means" argument in participation literature is a distant cousin to the normative arguments for democratic anchorage. Both arguments depend on the intrinsic good (of either participation or democracy), and emphasise the process over the outcome. The debate between ends and means is unresolved, in part because it is a values discussion, and in part because of the difficulty of testing the "results" of as slippery a concept as participation.

The normative school of participatory thought has developed to incorporate the concept of participation as a right (Lister, 2007).[39] Conversely, there is also a right not to participate; if

[39] I am generally skeptical of “rights” language in debates, as it too often acts as a rhetorical technique to avoid discussing underlying values and making the case for a provision or freedom.

participation is not possible the non-participant should not face negative outcomes (*ibid*).[40] The rights language around participation is premised on both the assumption of participation as a normative good, as well as the sense that quality of participation is beneficial (Pateman, 1970). This second assumption is of particular importance. While participation is not traditionally understood as simple actions such as voting (Cnaan and Goldberg-Glen, 1991), the importance of quantity to participation emphasises relatively light involvement across a spectrum of participants. The "quality" of the participation is understood in terms of Arnstein (1969)'s ladder of participation. Pateman (1970) echoes this argument claiming that quality is important in so much as the participation has the opportunity to affect the policy outcome. This is a functional definition of the nature of participation, focused on the ways in which outcomes are produced. What the functional definition does not address is the depth of participation by individual participants.

In this study, the "rights" discussion is turned on its head; the findings have to do with the practical results of participatory and democratic organisations. I ask questions just on the institutional structures which allow (or do not allow) participation, but also on the practical nature of that participation. I look not only at the role which participation plays in the process, but also the depth and commitment required of the participant. In doing so, participation lays the groundwork for a deeper analysis and understanding of the democratic anchorage of neighbourhood associations.

The democratic anchorage literature lays out the scope of inquiry in the New Orleans case. The theoretical frame is that of Klijn and Skelcher's (2007) incompatibility conjecture and

[40] I am similarly skeptical of this concept. If not participating and participating are synonymous, how can participation be meaningful?




Figure 4.4.1 - Democratic Anchorage in Urban Network Governance

complementarity conjecture. These competing narratives discuss both a movement away from representative democracy in network governance, and the possibility that network governance fulfils a need for a mediating institution that is caused by an increasingly bureaucratic government. Sørensen and Torfing's (2005) as well as Nyseth's (2008) pronged tests provide the analytical tools for evaluating democratic anchorage in New Orleans. These tests focus primarily on elected officials and the representativeness of the networks. Finally, the case studies in the literature identify participation as a key element of democratic anchorage that is not addressed formally in network governance theory. Participation is key to understanding the New Orleans governance system; rather than elections, New Orleans neighbourhood associations emphasise participation as a way to link informal networks to community. This leads to a host of concerns about equity and opportunity.

4.4 The New Orleans Network Governance Model

In New Orleans, democratic anchorage occurs at two levels. The first is the system level, in which neighbourhood associations represent their residents in policy negotiations. They do so alongside elected officials who also represent their communities. In an informal network that includes policy experts, businesses and governments offices (among others), the community is represented by neighbourhood associations and elected officials (see Figure 4.4.1). This New Orleans system highlights many of the classic characteristics of a network governance; rather than containing a formal hierarchy, organisations are linked through informal channels to one another. These organisations work through negotiation to enact policy changes in a wide number of areas.

The second level of democratic anchorage is the ability of neighbourhood associations to represent their residents. This second level looks specifically at the mechanisms used by these associations. How do associations represent their communities?

In this research, I examine both levels of democratic anchorage, looking at whether associations represent community in policy negotiations, and at the ways associations claim to be representative of their communities. Both of these inquiries apply directly to democratic anchorage theory (see Sørensen and Torfing, 2005).

4.5 Findings

These findings follow a multi-step approach to examining democratic anchorage in neighbourhood associations and their corresponding governance networks. The first step is to examine democratic anchorage by looking at the role that neighbourhood associations fulfil in

the wider system of network governance. Neighbourhood associations claim to represent their neighbourhoods across a wide spectrum of activities. A second finding examines the institutional input of neighbourhood associations: the electoral and parliamentarian constructs that underpin neighbourhood associations' claim to be representative organisations. Finally, these neighbourhood associations are analysed from a perspective of practice, examining the ways representation works on a daily basis.

Neighbourhood associations claim to represent their neighbourhoods in policy discussions and government depends upon neighbourhood associations (sometimes even requesting they be created). The model of urban network governance is that neighbourhood associations are the link to community.

A focus on neighbourhood associations as the locus of democratic anchorage is a shift away from Sørensen and Torfing (2005). Sørensen and Torfing (2005) exclusively focus on formal representative democratic institutions. If neighbourhood associations are central to the model of democratic anchorage in network governance, the focus naturally should shift from governmental elections, to a parallel set of democratic elections taking place in neighbourhood associations. This parallel democracy is controversial; does it undermines broader democratic principles or support them? These informal elections have low turnout and few contested races. The system depends on volunteers to represent their community. Is this a step away from democracy, or a means to improve it?

4.5.1 Representation and Micro-Democracy

To look at the legitimacy of neighbourhood associations in providing democratic anchorage, it is first necessary to look at the roles they play within the wider network governance system. This concept can be understood as democratic output legitimacy; do neighbourhood associations provide democratic anchorage to the broader network?[41]

Neighbourhood associations claim to represent their communities. Representation has a familiar look; it is often seen in police meetings. The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) is returning to community policing techniques. Doing so includes a variety of strategies, including police officers walking beats, using bicycles, and having community meetings. Anyone can participate in these meetings, but, according to the President of the Upper Audubon Association, repeated attendance tends to come from crime committee members in neighbourhood associations.[42] Without the self-organisation of community, the engagement component of the police policy is not meaningful. Neighbourhood associations, by creating crime committees, formalise participation in this policy. In this way, by representing the community at these meetings, neighbourhood associations *enable* community-focused policies. This need for community participation has historically caused government to try to manufacture community organisations, just to have someone to participate in its policies (Fagotto and Fung, 2006). When neighbourhoods participate in this way, there is a representative component; attendees of these

[41] This analysis is done in terms of actions, looking at what organisations do, and, specifically, how often they claim to represent their neighbourhoods to the wider network. As discussed in Chapter Two - the analysis of actions is based upon David Mayhew's 2002 analysis of the congressional record in *America's Congress.* A further core principal is Korsgaard's (2009) construction of actions constructing identity. Actions are examined within neighbourhood associations' documented histories; meeting minutes, emails, blogs and newsletters. Each of these documents have records of individual activities of the association which were coded according to functions and roles (see Knoke, 1988). One function is that of "representation," in which the association speaks for the broader community at a wider policy meeting (City Works, 2010).

[42] This theme is repeated throughout this chapter; anyone has an opportunity to participate, but participation happens in predictable and ordered ways through institutions such as neighbourhood associations.

Association	Service Delivery	Education	Advocacy	Representation	Social Capital
FIA	29%	37%	15%	26%	19%
Sugar Hill	17%	36%	16%	44%	6%
Lake Carmel	16%	8%	17%	19%	13%
Gentilly Terrace	14%	28%	21%	45%	11%
FQC	1%	20%	52%	40%	16%
Irish Channel	31%	20%	28%	68%	8%
Upper Audubon	0%	28%	21%	66%	7%
BIA	29%	33%	19%	52%	8%
Pilotland	15%	26%	40%	48%	1%
NCNA	16%	18%	46%	37%	3%

Table 4.5.1 - Activities of Neighbourhood Associations

meetings are expected to speak on behalf of their communities. Although anyone can attend, the process is often streamlined, and informal representatives attend the meetings on behalf of their neighbourhood.

Figure 4.5.1 list the key functions for each association included in the document analysis.[43] The table compares the percentage of time that neighbourhood associations engaged in representation with other key functions such as service-delivery,[44] education of its residents, advocacy and social activities. There are distinct trends in the activities of neighbourhood associations. First, neighbourhood associations consistently represent their neighbourhoods.

[43] Every time a neighbourhood association filled this role of participating in an event to represent their neighbourhood, the action found on the meeting minutes/internal documents was coded to reflect this representation. These findings were aggregated, then divided by the total number of actions. Different associations reported vastly different numbers of actions. In part, this reflects diversity of associations, but it also reflects the vastly different approaches to documentation taken by different groups. Dividing by the total number of actions provides standardisation; it allows for a comparison of the types of things done by associations, and how large a component of the association's activity any given type of action was.

[44] See Chapter Five for a full discussion of service-delivery and the spectrum of functions in which an association engages.

Representation is the first or second highest priority for every single association (see Figure 4.5.1). The overall rate of representation is high, ranging from 19 per cent to 68 per cent. For eight of the ten associations in the data set, representing their community is the thing they did most often. These trends show that representation is a critical function for neighbourhood associations. Further, it shows that within governance networks, neighbourhood associations represent their communities, a confirmation of the broader model of urban network governance.

Interviews confirm several components of the broader role of neighbourhood associations as representative. In particular, government is seen as needing a stamp of approval from neighbourhoods; the president of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association describes this saying, "Everyone else sends us info so that they can say we have butts in the chair" and that politicians offer a Faustian bargain: "Let me say I reached out to you and say you came." Similarly, the neighbourhoods understand their influence when representing the community. The president of the Algiers Point Association claims that, "We don't actually have any formal power, but like most cities, if a neighbourhood shows up with a few people, the city listens." These examples confirm the broader consensus that the city wants neighbourhood associations to represent their neighbourhoods, described most vividly by a City Council staffer saying "Without them coming to us, we wouldn't know there was an issue." Neighbourhood associations express the same desire.

Representation takes place in a wide variety of different neighbourhood association activities; ranging from attendance at policy meetings, to planning and zoning meetings, to arguing for legislation or enforcement. Wider themes include advocacy; often the neighbourhood

argues for or against a policy when it represented its community.[45] Also, when city planning occurs, neighbourhood associations attend to represent their communities. Finally, as in the aforementioned police example, policies call for participation. In these situations, neighbourhood associations fulfil discreet policy functions. The dynamics of policies which require participation are closely related to coproduction, in which the labor of the community contributes to service-delivery (Stephens *et al.*, 2008). In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations *enable* community-centred policy strategies to be enacted. The partnership with government goes even farther than enabling policy. For example, a couple of concerned citizens went to Councilmember Stacey Head of the New Orleans City Council about concerns with zoning in their neighbourhood. They were told that they needed to organise as a neighbourhood association to have an impact, and the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association was born. Elected officials, such as City Council Members, not only partner with neighbourhood associations, but actively encourage their creation. There is danger in this encouragement; council members sometimes use neighbourhood associations to provide cover for their policies. Involving neighbourhood associations is a way to claim community support for a policy, a phenomena noted in other cities (Fagotto and Fung, 2006).

This representational function confirms components of both the complementarity conjecture and the incompatibility conjecture. By representing the residents of a neighbourhood, neighbourhood associations are taking on traditional functions of elected officials; in this way the associations appear to compete with traditional institutions as theorised in the incompatibility conjecture. However, this competition does not threaten or replace democratically elected

[45] Examples include: land-use disputes, code enforcement hearings, community-budgeting, zoning hearings, legislation on noise levels and a wide host of other issues.

officials. Somewhat startlingly, elected officials depend on, and even encourage these neighbourhood associations to exist. The coexistence of both neighbourhood associations and democratic institutions supports the complementarity conjecture; that neighbourhood associations are mediating institutions which fill a distinct need in the complex landscape of urban networks.

Thus, there are two primary takeaways from the representational role of neighbourhood associations. The first is that neighbourhood associations do represent communities in their broader networks. The second, more theoretical, takeaway is that in practice, network governance (in urban situations) appears to confirm *both* the complementarity and incompatibility conjectures; neighbourhood associations represent neighbourhoods in a way that would traditionally be expected of elected officials, yet do so with the *blessing* of those officials. Neighbourhood associations and democratic institutions are both competing and complementary; they share roles, even occasionally replacing one another, but in doing so increase democratic linkages.

4.6 Institutional Analysis

Neighbourhood associations clearly play a role of representation in their respective policy networks. What is unclear from examining their outputs is the extent to which these organisations have the democratic anchorage to effectively[46] represent their neighbourhoods. The Sørensen and Torfing (2005) test primarily focuses on government institutions, but some of its prongs are useful for the testing of the democratic anchorage of neighbourhood associations as

[46] Ethics is a consideration as well.




Figure 4.6.1 - City Works Self-defined Map of Neighbourhoods

well. Sørensen and Torfing (*ibid*) test networks by asking if there are democratic elections, representation, accountability and democratic rules. Neighbourhood associations can be tested on the same grounds.

I use the Sørensen and Torfing (2005) framework in two primary ways. The first is with the census conducted with City Works; survey data provides information on both elections and democratic rules. The second is by using Sørensen and Torfing's (2005) concepts of representation of the community and accountability. This is done through interviews and

ethnographic research, an analysis primarily of how the democratic institutions function in practice.

4.6.1 Neighbourhood Association Elections

Virtually every neighbourhood association adheres to basic democratic principles such as elections (86 per cent), parliamentary procedures (87 per cent) and constitutional bylaws (85 per cent).[47] These neighbourhood associations cover a tremendous amount of the city (see figure 4.6.1). The combination of expansive coverage by neighbourhood associations and their strong formal democratic structures supports the supposition that neighbourhood associations perform a parallel representative function to traditional democratic institutions such as the City Council. This parallel plane has its own democratic institutions but remains almost entirely decoupled from the local, formal representative democracy.

The survey results are extremely cut and dried, painting a clear picture of representative democratic institutions embedded in neighbourhoods. According to the electoral and democratic rules prongs of Sørensen and Torfing's (2005) test, neighbourhood associations have strong democratic anchorage. In practice, the democratic anchorage of these associations is far more complex. Despite the presence of regular elections, voting procedures and constitutional bylaws, neighbourhood associations have messy democratic underbellies.

One example of this complexity is neighbourhood associations' elections. Representative democracy represents citizenry on the basis of a process in which citizens have a choice as to their representatives. In neighbourhood associations, this assumption breaks down; there are so

[47] The survey has three questions which address institutional structures: one each about elections, parliamentary procedures and bylaws (full survey is included in the City Works report in Appendix III). The responses for each of these questions show an overwhelming democratic structure within neighbourhood associations.

few volunteers for leadership positions that voters do not have choice, and residents are pressured into leadership positions. In the Sugar Hill neighbourhood, the President referred to her current position by saying, "I got elected and they just won't let me go." Similarly, the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association President opined, "I'm new at being president; they threw me under the bus with that."[48] In Gentilly Terrace, a local minister was asked to run for president, despite only having attended a few meetings. He declined, in part because he did not feel capable of representing the community after living in the neighbourhood for so little time. He called the elections a "battle of attrition" and claimed the president who was elected did not want to be president but "didn't say no loud enough." In the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, a former president claimed she was nominated and elected before she even arrived at the meeting. Anecdotally, in attending a meeting at the Coliseum Square Association, I was asked if I would serve as an interim Vice President while I was in town; despite the fact that I not only did not live in the neighbourhood, but did not even live in the country.[49]

Even in more established neighbourhoods, associations are quite dependent on a single person (often the president and founder). This is the case in the Pilotland Neighborhood Association, the Upper Audubon Association, the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association and the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association. Each of these associations has a dynamic leader. In a number of them the president has been in the position since the beginning of the organisation, and in the Upper Audubon Association the president is serving multiple terms

[48] The Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association is loosely related to the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association sampled in this study. HFLA ceased to be active, and FLNA was restarted some years later. The linkages between the two are not exactly clear. Some residents believe they are the same association.

[49] I thought this was done in jest, but they followed up the nomination by inquiring seriously about how long I would be in town and whether I would consider the position on a temporary basis, insisting that I seemed capable of being Vice-President.

and described by other members as "doing everything."[50] Similarly, in the Broadmoor Improvement Association, the president is serving multiple terms and described as the centre of all the activity.[51] Even when elections are not dominated by a single candidate, they often do not feature candidates running against one another as there are not enough volunteers.

Elections are not providing different leadership options within the context of representative democracy. Sørensen and Torfing (2005) call for effective “representation” and “accountability.” Without meaningful choices between leaders, and with entrenched leadership, there is a risk of runaway neighbourhood associations. This risk is mentioned as a danger by a City Council staffer who laments the use of some neighbourhood associations for private purposes. Equally as problematic, entrenched leadership increases the likelihood that only specific cohorts within the neighbourhood are represented, and increases the difficulty of making the entrenched leadership accountable to these populations. In neighbourhoods with a spectrum of families across different socio-economic ranges, this is a significant issue. For example, in Gentilly Terrace Neighborhood Association, the association has difficulty recruiting from "across Mirabeau Street," in the predominantly African-American section of the neighbourhood. With a model of entrenched leadership and a lack of choice in elections, the quality of representation for populations not participating likely suffers.

Elections do mediate this difficulty somewhat, but they do so rarely and as a last resort. While acknowledging the typical lack of turnover in leadership positions, the associations still see turnover when needed. In the Gentilly Terrace Neighborhood Association the president

[50] The Pilotland Neighborhood Association, Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Assocaition and the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association still have their founding presidents.

[51] As in everything, Broadmoor is an outlier with a significantly wider pool of volunteers and professionals to call upon. However, despite these differences, in interviews the president of the improvement association, Latoya Cantrell, is cited as having exceptional power.

describes a battle between the "Old Guard" and "New Guard" of the neighbourhood association; with the "New Guard" attempting to change the priorities of the association to better represent African-American sections of town. Similarly, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association refers to attempted "coups" in which a cohort within the neighbourhood attempted to change the leadership team of the association. So while the elections in neighbourhood associations do not provide regular choices in elections, these elections still serve as an escape hatch if the leadership were to take the association in a direction not supported by its members. Thus, elections provide accountability in the long-run, despite the lack of short-run choices.




Figure 4.6.2 - The Burnout Cycle

The lack of volunteers willing to engage in extremely time-consuming activities to run these organisations undermines the representative purpose behind the elections. The elections still occur, but often they are uncontested, and the primary challenge is finding someone to volunteer to run, not the competition between candidates. This condition has effects in both the style of governance[52] used by these organisations, and the type of participation found in associations. The nature of intensive participation in these associations is their defining feature.

4.6.2 Neighbourhood Association Volunteers

A lack of volunteers for elections means that the same people stay in jobs long after they want to. This consistently leads to a sense of burnout.[53] A long-time member of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, who talks about burnout and volunteers, describes this process as part of a continual renewal in the neighbourhood in which neighbourhood associations have a few key, passionate leaders, who completely immerse themselves in the neighbourhood and burn out, at which point the association has to recruit new leadership (see Figure 4.6.2). Certainly, burnout by volunteers is not a finding unique to this research (Maslach and Leiter, 1997), but in the context of neighbourhood associations and network governance it has additional relevance. The core discovery here is that the burnout process is linked to the life-cycle of the association itself. Associations depend on issues to help recruit new leadership; these recruits quickly become neighbourhood leaders. This, in turn, leads to burnout. Associations must "trust" that a new issue will come along which will attract additional leadership. This process is extremely

[52] Here "governance" is used in the American style to refer to the organization of a single organization.

[53] In an informal meeting with a local leader of a neighbourhood group, I was told that "If I have to participate one more time I'm going to scream."




Figure 4.6.3 - Broadmoor's Governance

important both for understanding the representative nature of neighbourhood associations, but also more widely for understanding why associations engage in certain types of activities. Hajer (2005) theorises that policy stimulus affects organisational activity, not the other way around. The burnout cycle indicates that far more than activity is driven by policy stimulus; it indicates that response to policy stimulus also is an integral piece of the representation process at the grassroots level. The nature of participation is such that associations are dependent on passionate leaders responding to specific crises.

This process emphasises a key finding of the type of participation in neighbourhood associations; participation is extremely intensive and done by just a few individuals. This is universally true across the associations studied here; even the Broadmoor Improvement Association which has paid staff, referred to a core group of members that made the process

work. These key members often served on multiple boards; in Broadmoor they explicitly refer to this process as "incest;" in which board memberships of their local charter school, the association itself, the Broadmoor Improvement District, has so much overlap as to make legal distinctions between them almost meaningless. Figure 4.6.3[54] shows the stylised case of the Broadmoor neighbourhood. While Broadmoor, in part because of its compelling story and in part because of its exceptional leadership and partners, is an extreme case, it shows the complexity of neighbourhood participation. The Broadmoor Improvement Association is at the centre of the neighbourhood governance structure. It has a number of funders and partners (such as Harvard and Bard College). The Broadmoor Improvement Association created the Broadmoor Improvement District, which is a tax district to fund the association. Those two organisations overlap and legally are required to have identical boards. A number of other groups, such as the Broadmoor Community Development Center, Apex Youth Center and Broadmoor Community Cares are all linked to the Broadmoor Improvement Association through funding, contracts, and, informally, through their boards. The Wilson Charter School has no formal links to the Broadmoor Improvement Association, but the charter management company which runs the school was recruited by the Broadmoor Improvement Association, and when the school scored low on standardised test scores, the Broadmoor Improvement Association informally replaced a number of board members with community leaders.

This web of formal and informal relations puts an extreme amount of pressure on a few key neighbourhood volunteers, who are responsible not only at this level of neighbourhood governance, but also for representing their community in the wider city system of network

[54] This figure is a wonderful example of how quickly network governance becomes almost incomprehensibly complex. This is a simplified version of Broadmoor's organizational connections. Anytime the Broadmoor Improvement Association is involved in policy, some mix of these organizations is involved as well.

governance (see Figure 4.4.1). These internal neighbourhood groups are only a part of the wider influence of the Broadmoor Improvement Association. Dedicating the time to manage and be involved in so many organisations leads to quick burnout. It also is a tremendous barrier to entry for participants. Often potential volunteers are hesitant to get involved, and it takes a "push" from a local crisis to get them involved in the association.

The Broadmoor example is an extreme case of an overwhelming amount of neighbourhood involvement by leadership in a multitude of organisations. The more classic scenario involves neighbourhoods which pass legislation to have a security district. Security districts levy an additional property tax on property owners in a neighbourhood for the express purpose of hiring additional security for the area.[55] These security districts are found in a number of neighbourhoods, including Lake Carmel, Fontainebleau[56] and Upper Audubon. In each of these cases, the security patrol, and all the money involved, is run by a separate legal entity, not the neighbourhood association. However, all three cases have significant overlap in the individuals on the board of the security district and the leadership team of the neighbourhood association. In Lake Carmel, the meetings of the two entities are held simultaneously, and often the entire membership of the Lake Carmel Improvement District insists on voting on matters germane to the security patrol. In this way, the association overrides the legal voting process of the association, in which only nine elected officers can vote. A similar mixing takes place in Upper Audubon, where the president of the neighbourhood association is formally enshrined on the board of the security patrol. In Fontainebleau, the two organisations were started

[55] Some of these districts hire private companies to do security, other hire off-duty police officers. Due to a recent scandal, the process of hiring off-duty police officers (previously attractive due to their ability to make arrests) is being changed.

[56] The Fontainebleau neighbourhood had an extensive security program but it was not mandatory like the others.




Figure 4.6.4 - The Megaphone Model

simultaneously, but kept separate to avoid litigation against the neighbourhood. Over time, they merged together, and the president of the security patrol is also the head of the crime committee for the neighbourhood.

These examples of overlapping boards underscore the wider theme of participation that varies radically from the expectations in the literature. Pateman (1970) talks about participation being thinly spread across the population. Lister (2007) focuses on the rights of everyone to participate. However, in post-Katrina New Orleans, neighbourhood associations are driven by participation that relies on the deep individual commitment of a limited number of participants. This deep participation manifests itself in the mixing of organisational boards; the willingness

and depth of individual participation is often the critical factor in governance and it overwhelmed the legal separation between entities.[57]

The nature of intensive participation, and the lack of volunteers to engage in it, has significant effects upon the governing of these neighbourhood associations. Individuals willing to participate deeply in the organisation are extremely valuable. Organisations develop explicit strategies to attract and keep these volunteers. The President of French Quarters Citizen Inc. expresses this the most clearly; he sees it as the role of the neighbourhood association to support individuals with particular policy goals. In other words, if a member wants to do it, the association supports it. For him, this was part of the reason to have a neighbourhood association; associations serve as a megaphone to amplify the power of individual citizens (Figure 4.6.4). This "megaphone model" is closely linked to burnout and the trouble with finding volunteers for elections. Because organisations are so desperate for volunteers, they are willing to become a megaphone to amplify a single member's concern. The bargain here is that the member has his or her concern amplified by the entire neighbourhood association (thus the megaphone effect), but must take on deeper voluntary tasks to do so. Sometimes these tasks are limited to the single issue the member is interested in, and sometimes the volunteering goes further. Using the association as a megaphone for an individual resident helps recruit volunteers. That strategy is driven by the nature of the representation model of the association. It is democratic in strikingly non-traditional ways; the neighbourhood association is representative of its community not because of a majority opinion, but because of its willingness to throw its political voice behind

[57] It is important to note that this took place in the context of wider participation (City Works, 2008a) which reported significant overall increases in participation in New Orleans. Despite this influx of participants, individual associations still felt extremely taxed by their responsibilities, and repeatedly reported burn out.

any member who is willing to volunteer. This is the core mechanism of what I call here, "A Democracy of Volunteers."

Other organisational presidents refer to the same process in much more practical terms. The President of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association and the President of the Gentilly Terrace Neighborhood Association both refer to their recently created neighbourhood watch programs as policies that they were not personally invested in. One of the first lessons they learned as presidents was that if someone wanted to start something and put the time into it, they should just let them do it. Many associations take this strategy, and it results in a patchwork of activities. In one case, an archivist in Upper Audubon began to compile a neighbourhood history; a perfect example of the responsibilities and activities of a neighbourhood association responding directly to the quality and skills of its participants. The general lack of volunteers means that organisations are willing to support almost any activity for which there is man power. The concerns of individual volunteers drive the associations into certain types of activities.

The common thread between these different models for organisational behaviour is volunteering, not electoral representation. The nature and intensity of participation in neighbourhood associations is a driving force for how they act, for their life-cycles of leadership, and is the critical piece for understanding the way in which these associations represent their communities. Representing communities by providing a megaphone for individual participants represents a severe departure, from the understanding of democratic anchorage found in Sørensen and Torfing's (2005) theory. In post-Katrina New Orleans, traditional democratic mechanisms such as elections, parliamentary procedure and voting all are present, but all take a back seat to the nature of volunteerism.

4.7 Discussion

In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations and their informal networks have a complex relationship with democratic anchorage. These associations represent their communities. There is a demand for them to serve as mediating institutions, a demand that comes both from the community itself, but also from government which faces a time-consuming task of reaching out and understanding community. The need for these mediating institutions confirms the notion of a democratic deficit, and the role neighbourhood associations are playing within the New Orleanian system of network governance shows the demand for additional representational infrastructure. But these neighbourhood associations also represent a shift from traditional democratic principles. They fulfil some representational functions that have traditionally been filled by elected officials. Neighbourhood associations have elections and votes, but depend on a more complex system of volunteerism to link to their communities. Those that choose to volunteer have influence because of the scarcity of volunteers. This democracy of volunteers differs from deliberative democracy and participatory democracy. It depends more on volunteers than Sørensen and Torfings' (2005) concept of democratic anchorage by meta-governance. But is this democracy of volunteers innovation *good?*

The normative nature of this question reflects the normative underpinnings of the broader democratic anchorage literature. In that literature, the assumption is that more democracy is better society. What is unclear in this case is whether *different* democracy is better for society.[58] What are the normative implications of a system that depends so heavily on volunteers?

[58] The answer largely depends on the standard upon which it is judged. Any number of standards can be applied. For example, the standard of efficiency, largely lacking in democratic anchorage literature, might posit an empirical question about whether the policies produced by this process are more "efficient." Another standard might be that of traditional democratic values; which this new system of a democracy of volunteers clearly fails. Finally, the standard of whether the people involved in the innovation approve of it might be applied. It is this standard which will be examined here.

This system of a democracy of volunteers in post-Katrina New Orleans is popular. Government is (typically) pleased to have an organised community group to reach out to, and neighbourhood associations want a larger voice. Associations are "mediating institutions" and considered valuable both by government and community. But the system is imperfect. Participants burn out and the system of volunteers as representatives potentially disenfranchises those unable to participate.

This system of democratic anchorage rests upon the notion that residents in communities have the opportunity to participate in these associations; volunteers link associations to community. There are a myriad of reasons to suspect that this opportunity is not always available; a simple look at the map of neighbourhood associations (Figure 4.6.1) shows that not all neighbourhoods are represented by an association. Even if a neighbourhood is represented, personal matters may make it more difficult to volunteer: issues such as having a family, working long hours, or any other limitation. If the claim to "representativeness" depends on everyone having the opportunity to volunteer, what does it mean if certain groups find themselves unable to do so?

The reservations of potential volunteers, and the quick burnout of leaders, both reflect this concern from the other side. Leadership in a neighbourhood association is something which many sides feel is *necessary* but few want to engage in. A democracy of volunteers is a democracy of necessity, in which other institutions have failed, and citizens feel a need to participate despite their desire to spend their time doing other things.

This observation, that a democracy of volunteers is necessary but not ideal, is at the heart of all the processes discussed in this chapter. The demand for mediating institutions at the

neighbourhood level creates a pull on volunteers, all of whom engage deeply and ultimately burn out. The associations structure their organisations to recruit more volunteers who will temporarily step in. The system perpetuates itself, but stems from a perception that traditional democratic methods have failed to adequately represent the neighbourhoods of New Orleans.

New Orleans' democracy of volunteers is patchwork system. It addresses flaws of representative democracy, and reconnects neighbourhood residents to governing bodies, but sets forth another set of problems. It likely alienates those less able to participate and puts tremendous pressure on volunteers. In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations are an imperfect form of democratic anchorage trying to fill the gap caused by a democratic deficit.



CHAPTER FIVE

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Conflict and Collaboration

"We came up with all kinds of clever things like that, it was just guerilla warfare."
President of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association

5.1 Introduction

Network literature focuses on the overall relationships in a network rather than the nature of the relationships in the network (Provan and Kenis, 2007). Network governance literature shows the same tendency. This chapter adapts the framework of Brown and Keast (2003) to categorise relationships in network governance as cooperative, coordinative and collaborative. In broadening this theory from community involvement to urban network governance, I add two additional categories: collegial relationships and conflict relationships. Collegial relationships keep with the general framework of the Brown and Keast (2003) typology; they are long-term but relatively light partnerships. Conflict relationships are a significant addition to network governance theory. Informal networks are often defined as collaborative or based on common priorities. In New Orleans, conflict and force form networks and define relationships within them.

These categories are built upon theory emphasising the length of the relationships and the extent to which power, formed by mutual objectives, decision-making and resources, is shared

between organisations. In this chapter I argue that these power dynamics are fundamental to understanding relationships within network governance. Power dynamics explain how relationships change across networks; neighbourhood associations are aware of governance networks in which they do not have power and act accordingly. Neighbourhood associations, also aware of their limited capacity and protective of their flexibility in responding to neighbourhood threats, cultivate long-term collegial and cooperative relationships to counteract their weaknesses.

When such partnership is not an option and neighbourhood associations have no power, they assert themselves through creative and coercive means into networks. In this chapter, I examine the use of creative means by neighbourhood associations, such as blackmail, elections and public records requests, to empower themselves. Building from these examples, I re-examine the construction of power within network governance, and argue that network equilibrium exists when each actor has power in proportion to the extent to which the policy construction and implementation affects it. When out of this equilibrium, actors use creative means to assert themselves through conflict.

5.2 Literature and Theory

Provan and Kenis (2007) argue that it is critical not only to know the outcomes of networks, but to understand how they function. By looking at relationships within governance networks, I examine the mechanics of how these networks function. Brown and Keast (2003) categorise these relationships based upon the intensity of partnership and length of the relationship. The intensity of partnership includes information sharing, resource sharing, agenda-

setting and decision-making. Brown and Keast (2003) reference these as relational dynamics. They are also aspects of power (Lukes, 1974). When actors in networks find themselves in conflict, these power dynamics are highlighted. In this section I introduce the literature on categories of relationships within informal networks, and the classical definitions of power which underpin these definitions.

5.2.1 Defining Relationships

Brown and Keast (2003) title their classification of relationships in the context of community networks as the "3Cs." These categories are cooperation, coordination and collaboration. The categories are based upon differing levels of partnership. Cooperation is the least formal of these configurations.

> "The key element of the term cooperation is the establishment of short term, often informal and largely voluntary relations between organisational entities (Hogue 1994; Cigler 2001; Lawson 20020. In cooperative relationships participants may agree to share information, space or referrals, however no effort is made to establish common goals and each agency remains separate, retaining their own autonomy and resources (Winer and Ray 1994; Cigler 2001; Mulfor and Rogers 1982; Melavillee and Blank 1991)." (Brown and Keast, 2003: 7)

> "Coordination is argued to involve strategies that require information sharing as well as joint planning, decision-making and action between organisations (Mulford and Rogers 1982; Daka-Mulwana 1995; Lawson 2002). Therefore, coordination essentially occurs when there is a need to align or 'orchestrate' people, tasks and specialised interventions in order to achieve a predetermined goal or mission (Litterer 1973, Lawson 2002)." (Brown and Keast, 2003: 7).

Brown and Keast (*ibid*) also argue that:

> "Collaboration is usually the most stable and long-term type of integration arrangement and it requires the strongest linkages and tightest relationships among members (Gray 1989; Mandell 1999; Cigler 2001). Such relationships require comprehensive planning and well-defined communication channels operating at many levels the requirement for high levels of trust among members

> means that collaboration can be a very time consuming process." (Brown and Keast, 2003: 8)

Brown and Keast (*ibid*) ground these categories in the political context of "growing calls by the community for improved connection between government and citizens, and greater integration and cooperation." Brown and Keast narrow the five categories of relationships from “informal, cooperative, coordination, collaborative and integrative” (Hogue, 1994; Cigler, 2001; Leutz, 1999; and Szirom *et al.*, 2002), and build upon the five companion ‘c words’ for integration used by Lawson (2002): co-location, communication, coordination, collaboration and convergence. Brown and Keast (2003) use the more recent consensus that has emerged (see Winer and Ray, 1994; Konrad, 1996 and Fine, 2001) around the use of 3Cs: cooperation, coordination and collaboration.

These 3Cs are defined by two key factors. Relationships are classified based on the length of their relationships (short-term and long-term) and the extent to which organisations work together (from minor information sharing to sharing of power such as setting objectives, sharing resources and sharing decision-making). The Brown and Keast (*ibid*) framework is particularly applicable because of the theoretical links made to both network literature and to community engagement literature. In this chapter, I apply this framework of three categories, based upon length of relationship and nature of shared power, to partnerships from post-Katrina New Orleans. In doing so, I have three objectives. The first is to examine the applicability of the incorporated theory. Do these categories apply to relationships between actors in post-Katrina New Orleans, and does the theory add to the understanding of these factors? The second objective is to analyse and look for trends across partnerships; do neighbourhood associations act

in predictable ways when conducting relationships within networks? The third objective is to widen theory based upon the presence of items in New Orleans which are not explained or adequately described by current theory. In doing so, there is a particular focus on conflict relationships and the ways in which power influences informal networks.

5.2.2 Classical Power

A tenet of network governance is non-hierarchy between actors. When informal networks coalesce, they do so outside of a constitutional or legal framework. This is not to say each relationship is a blank slate and all dynamics between actors disappear. On the contrary, such dynamics remain strong, as is seen throughout this work. Brown and Keast (2003) categorise relationships based in part upon the extent of partnership between them; highlighting shared resources and objectives. But such partnerships exist between a variety of actors, some with more to offer to partnerships and some with less. Underpinning relationships within network governance is power: who has control over what.

Lukes (1974) defines power as the "capacity of A to affect B contrary to B's interests." Hunter (1969) similarly defines power as, "men going about the business of moving other men." This conception focuses on one actor having power "over" another actor (Lorenzi, 2006). It manifests itself in different dimensions; Lukes (1974) argues that decision-making and agenda-setting are two primary sources of power. Emerson (1962) adds economic dependence as a source of power. These definitions differ from Faucaultian power (Gaventa, 2003). Lukes (1974) and other power theorists define power as something owned by an individual or an institution.

Relationship types	Shared Information	Shared Power
Short-term	Cooperative Relationships	Coordinative Relationships
Long-term	(Collegial Relationships)	Collaborative Relationships

Figure 5.3.1 - Relationship Types

For Lukes (1974) it is summative, one party must have power over the other. Emerson (1962) contends that there is also reciprocal power; that both parties can have power over the other.

These conceptions of power underpin my discussion of relationships within informal networks. Neighbourhood associations cite components of power, including finances, decision-making and agenda-setting, when discussing their relationships. But cases of conflict also demonstrate that power comes from self-interest in a policy, and that neighbourhood associations create influence. I discuss these cases in reference to the traditional understanding of the power of one actor over another in Lukes (1974), Emerson (1962) and Hunter (1969).

5.3 From 3Cs to 5Cs

Brown and Keast's (2003) categories of cooperation, coordination and collaboration are directly applicable to the New Orleans case. These categories depend on two key factors: length of relationship, and shared power. This categorisation can be seen visually in Figure 5.3.1. Cooperative relationships are short-term and have limited shared objectives (top left).

Coordinative relationships are short-term but involve shared objective-setting, decision-making and resources (top right). Collaborative relationships are long-term with shared power (bottom right). The Brown and Keast (*ibid*) framework does not account for the (bottom left) possibility that there could be a long-term relationship with little collaborative strategising. New Orleanian neighbourhood associations often show this configuration, herein titled *collegial* relationships. Further, an implicit assumption of the relationships in Brown and Keast's (*ibid*) categorisations is that relationships are founded on a mutual desire to work together. This is not the case in New Orleans and in studies of urban neighbourhoods where conflict exists within networks.

A first step in analysing this framework within the urban network governance of post-Katrina New Orleans is to use specific examples to demonstrate that these classifications can be applied to the New Orleans context. A second step is to address whether this categorisation brings additional value above the theory already used. Neighbourhood actors in associations have developed an informal system in which the type of organisations involved in the relationship are understood as dictating the relationship. Using basic typologies by sector (see Etzioni, 1961), there are a series of informal claims about relationships in networks. These informal premises are used as a second baseline for comparison with the Brown and Keats (2003) theory:

1) Relationships between government or business and neighbourhood associations are based upon conflict.

2) Relationships between non-profits or neighbourhood institutions and neighbourhood associations are mutually-beneficial partnerships.

I examine five cases, one in each category identified above. Each case looks at a key relationship from the perspective of a neighbourhood association leader, addressing both the theory of Brown and Keast (2003), and the informal system of classifying relationships according to sector. Brown and Keast (*ibid*) classify relationships based upon length of the relationship and extent of the partnership.[59]

The first case study, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, exemplifies the collaborative relationship model and demonstrates how the system of classifying the relationships according to the types of actors can be misleading. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, influenced in part by the presence of parks in its neighbourhood (see Chapter Seven for a more in-depth examination of this case), works closely with the New Orleans Recreation Department (NORD) to provide youth programming to the neighbourhood. NORD has a program partnering with neighbourhood organisations to create booster clubs to help fund youth programming. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association chose to partner with NORD and create the Lyons-Burke Booster Club. NORD's program stipulates that if a booster club provides funding, coaches, volunteers and kids, then NORD will provide park supervisors and organise sports leagues. The relationship between the city agency and the neighbourhood association fits the basic criteria of collaboration in Brown and Keast(2003); NORD and the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association have a long-term relationship and share strategic decisions and power. The language used by the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association to describe NORD went beyond "collaborative;" the relationship with NORD was described as "symbiotic."

[59] I interpret "length of time" to be long-term if the organisations engage in open-ended work on multiple projects. I interpret the extent of the partnership based on descriptions of whether the organisations shared decision-making and financial resources. Often, if power was not shared, the organisations primarily engaged in information exchange.

The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association is among the strongest models of collaboration found in the study.[60] This example also shows the danger of categorising relationships according to the sector of the actors. Here a neighbourhood association and government organisation work closely and effectively. Further, this collaboration reaffirms the aspects of Brown and Keast's system; in interviews, the president of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association cites the shared objectives and shared decision-making ability as key to the relationship. Thus, the theoretical factors that are used by Brown and Keast are cited as *causal factors* in interviews about the relationship.

Closely related to the collaborative relationship model is the cooperative one. Collaborative relationships engage in shared decision-making, pooled resources and shared vision over multiple projects; coordinative relationships do so over a single project. This is a particularly common relationship type between issue-based non-profits and neighbourhood associations. In New Orleans, one example is a series of non-profits that sought to plant trees in neighbourhoods to replace those damaged by the storm or killed by the ensuing flooding. These coordinative relationships are best described by the president of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association. She describes a partnership with Hike for Katreena, a tree-planting non-profit, as working "perfectly," having "no battle for power," and as "just a good thing." She describes the motivations of both organisational leaders as "doing it from the heart." The partnership with Hike for Katreena is built upon mutual need; the neighbourhood association needs the expertise and resources of Hike for Katreena, while the non-profit needs permission and local knowledge to fulfil its mission of planting trees. Lastly, these organisations were

[60] The Broadmoor Improvement Association's relationship with the Church of the Annunciation is another example of an extremely close partnership.

interacting to further a common goal; they both wanted the same outcome. However, despite this overwhelmingly positive relationship, the relationship was short-lived; the basis on which they built the relationship depended on a single project.

Of the ten neighbourhood associations which submitted documents for this study, five of them worked with either Hike for Katreena or another non-profit, Parkway, to plant trees in their neighbourhood.[61] Kaboom!, a national non-profit which builds playgrounds in urban neighbourhoods around the United States, fosters similar relationships. Kaboom! requires neighbourhood organisations to provide partial funding and recruit volunteers to engage in the planning and building of neighbourhood playgrounds.[62]

Tree planting and playground building are single projects. They have short-term focus but involve a wide range of mutual decision-making and mutual need to complete the project. Further, these examples confirm the general construction that non-profits have close relationships with neighbourhood associations, but distinguish some of these close relationships as being project-based. Non-profits also can have long-term relationships with neighbourhood associations; these are born out of proximity rather than projects.

Brown and Keast (2003) do not identify a classification for relationships which are long-term but do not share goals, resources or have mutual needs, but these relationships exist in New Orleans. I call these long-term, informal relationships *collegial* due to their professional and long-term nature; they involve information sharing, but little collaboration.

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[61] The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association worked with Hike for Katreena, the Fontainebleau Improvement Association, Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association and Irish Channel Neighborhood Association all worked with Parkway, and the industriously green Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association worked with both.

[62] The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Association and Broadmoor Improvement Association all built playgrounds with Kaboom!. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association did not stop until they had partnered to build four playgrounds.

Numerous neighbourhood associations discuss collegial relationships with their City Council representative. The City Council relationship is a complicated one. It contains aspects of short-term relationships with a defined end date; with term limits council members can only be in office so long. It is also institutionally long-term; neighbourhood associations work repeatedly with their council member, and continue to work with the council even as elections change their Representatives and staff. Similarly, at times a Council office works extremely closely with a neighbourhood association on a specific issue, showing overlapping objectives. There is a causal component to these objectives, one former council staffer claims that Council offices are responsive to neighbourhood associations because they consider working with neighbourhood associations an opportunity to gain votes.

However, in interviewing one former and one current City Council staffer, their relationship with neighbourhood association emphasises information. A current staffer argues that, "without them coming to us, we wouldn't know there was an issue." A former council staffer describes the relationship by saying "Would it be up to them to tell you what they need? Yes." But she continues to argue that the Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association, with whom she had worked, was, "One of my favourites actually. If you showed them the direction they would do the footwork."

Both City Council staffers emphasise the informational nature of the relationship between neighbourhood associations and the city council, but also the inability of the City Council to directly fix most of the problems brought by neighbourhood associations. Both the council and neighbourhood associations identify good relationships as ones in which the council is a resource for associations to address their own problems, occasionally serving as intermediaries to other

government agencies. This intermediary role is a historical one, built out of what one staffer calls the "bump up" process. The bump up process stems from a lack of transparency and effectiveness in basic civil services, issues such as getting permits, fixing street lights or fixing pot holes. The system, particularly in years after Hurricane Katrina when staffers were still returning and problems had multiplied, is described as "completely arbitrary." "It was like the Wild West," according to city council staff, with the Safety and Permits Office doing work via handwritten notes which were walked to the office by City Council staffers.

The bump up system was exacerbated by the increase in issues after Hurricane Katrina but existed long before the storm. New Orleans has a long tradition of making who you know more important than what you know. As street lights remained unlit and pot holes unfilled after the storm, neighbourhood associations and influential citizens began trading in favours with their council members or the relevant city administration office in order to be bumped up to the top of the list.

While the staffer interviewed insists that the bump up system no longer exists, he emphasises that the inability of many of the city's agencies to do their job effectively often means that the City Council is a catalyst for action. "Every once in a while there is an error in the department." At these points, the City Council assumes the role of ensuring that such work gets done.

Relationships between neighbourhood associations and City Council Representatives focus on information sharing over prolonged periods of time. Neighbourhood associations play multiple roles in this relationship: feeding information on needed repairs to City Council, as well as distributing information to its members from the city. Missing in most of this activity

(although not all) is any pooling of resources or sharing of power. Occasionally, due to their democratic links, these organisations do loosely share objectives which leads to partnering, but the relationship is one of shared information not shared responsibility. Due to its resemblance of a long-term professional contact, I call these relationships collegial.

The relationship between police and neighbourhood associations (described in Chapter Four) is pure example of the collegial relationship. In law enforcement, neighbourhood associations engage in community policing; contributing information to police officers and attending community meetings. This long-term relationship is at the centre of the city's policing strategy despite no shared power. The result is a collegial relationship in which information is shared even if there is little pooling of resources or any other wider collaborative strategy.

Collegial relationships challenge and bring nuance to the general description of conflict between governmental entities and neighbourhood associations. While it is true that regarding specific projects, neighbourhood associations often are in conflict with various components of government, these collegial relationships with the City Council point to long-term positive partnerships in which information-sharing happens despite both parties' unwillingness to share power and responsibility.

The fourth type of relationship in the Brown and Keast's (2003) theory is cooperative. Cooperation emphasises short-term relationships of information sharing but little sharing of objectives or responsibility. In the 14 primary partners identified in interviews, and the 82 issues described by interviewees (of which 57 partnerships are included in Figure 5.4.2 in Appendix VI), there were no strong examples of cooperative relationships. The closest example was the Nola Church Plant, which worked with the Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood

Association on a series of movie nights for the community, but expressed a desire to work together further. Several other examples of short-term relationships for individual projects with which the associations had light involvement could be found in the meeting minutes of documents; events such as conferences, visiting academics,[63] guest speakers on a single issue, or even individual projects by organisation members. These activities never were addressed during the interviews.

Neighbourhood associations' lack of cooperative relationships shows two different inherent characteristics of neighbourhoods. The first is that the physical rootedness of the neighbourhood association as a neighbourhood institution makes for longer relationships with other actors. In other words, cooperative relationships with neighbourhood associations often grow into longer-term, more stable relationships because of proximity and location. The lack of cooperative relationships also emphasises the desire of neighbourhood associations to engage in long-term relationships, and its scepticism of outsiders. This is discussed expressly in Section 2.7 in which a number of neighbourhood associations express extreme dislike with academics who conduct "helicopter research" by flying in and out of the neighbourhood. Such short-term partnerships are aggressively described as sucking information out of the neighbourhood without giving anything back. This attitude towards short-term collaborations helps explain why there are so few examples of such collaboration.[64]

Conflict is the fifth type of relationship, and is a significant addition to the theoretical base of network governance. Networks literature defines networks in terms of shared goals (see

[63] Some associations included my attendance at meetings and collaboration through research in meeting minutes.

[64] It also serves as a warning to academics which conduct research in short bursts with community organisations; such research is likely unwelcome.

Torfing, 2005). This generally lends itself to a discussion of partners and excludes the existence of conflict. However, urban governance literature (Arnold, 1979) and the governance networks in New Orleans reveal that conflict is a key component of governance networks. Including conflict in concepts of networks requires a subtle shift in definition. Often networks are defined as connecting for positive reasons, groups working together for a common goal or to share resources (see Torfing, 2005). In New Orleans, actors in networks also join for negative goals: to stop things from happening, or oppose specific policies. This implies a shift in the definition of network, from shared goals to one of shared interest.

Among the organisations I studied, there are myriad examples of conflict.[65] A simple example of conflict in a governance network is the conflict between the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society and the HAMP construction company. HAMP bought a property on Dreux Avenue after the death of a long-standing, eccentric resident. The property had six apartments, which most neighbours were unaware of or unconcerned with as the previous owner had not chosen to rent out any of his superfluous rooms. Once the property was renovated and occupied, residents were happy to have six new neighbours. Almost immediately there were problems. The new neighbours allegedly did not have jobs and sat in the front yard drinking alcohol. There were accusations of drug sales and prostitution. No one in the neighbourhood could remember having called the police before, but there were 20 calls from various neighbours in six months.

Not knowing what to do, a few neighbours banded together and formed the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society; a name they took ironically, because all they wanted was their neighbours to be good. At this point, they entered a governance network that had previously been

[65] Here I introduce the idea of conflict within networks to the broader categorization of relationships within informal networks. In Section 5.4.2, I examine the inner workings of such conflicts, along with its origins and prevalence.

entirely unknown to them. They reached out to their local City Council Representative, attended meetings held by the local police, and attended meetings at a larger neighbourhood association.[66] In engaging with so many groups, the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society discovered that this was not the first time HAMP had bought apartments and "ruined" them. They also learned that HAMP had political connections, or so they assumed based on the fact that HAMP had underbid a neighbour who attempted to purchase the home, and yet still received the property. The deeper they dug into the issue, the more disturbed they were; the neighbours became convinced that the tenants of the property were not Section 8 -- the Federal housing voucher program often criticised by neighbourhoods -- but that they were ex-felons and part of a mental health facility. HAMP strongly denied this claim, but multiple neighbours insisted that the apartment was "literally a loony bin without a gatekeeper" and "the people were actually, literally, by definition, crazy."

The issue of the six-plex was not solved by the entry of the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society. Numerous neighbours acknowledged that their efforts with various other actors were limited because the purchase of the property by HAMP gave the legal right to rent the property. They asked, "People that lived in a mental facility and have criminal records, can they just show up in my neighbourhood? The answer is yes." But the association claims to have raised awareness with the city council, police, and surrounding neighbourhood associations, based upon their difficulties. The problem of drug dealing, prostitution and general unruliness in their local six-plex apartment was eventually solved when tenants of the six-plex themselves complained about a resident, who was arrested for violating parole. Since that time the issues

[66] The Gentilly Terrace and Garden Neighborhood Association technically covered their three blocks on Dreux Avenue. They claimed the association was not interested in such a small issue.

have largely disappeared. Although the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society does not consider its own activity to have caused the victory, they are pleased with the connections and contacts they have in the neighbourhood due to their formation of the association. The Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society has continued, described by a neighbour as, "like the knights of the round table, we're only there when there's a problem." They have recruited new residents to the neighbourhood and dealt with minor issues such as loitering or alcohol sales at a local gas station.

Many conflict relationships share these dynamics. Neighbourhood associations force entry into governance networks and negotiations, building credibility in the association among residents. On Dreux Avenue the problem was a private business and the tenants in one of its properties, but often these disputes take place over development or legislation. Nonetheless, the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society example shows several key aspects of conflict relationships. The first is that conflict is present when those affected by a decision are excluded. Conflict is rooted in powerlessness. This demonstrates the origin of generalisations about conflict happening between neighbourhood associations and business or government. Business or government are often the primary actor in a specific sphere of policy or development. As such they are involved early and have significant power. Neighbourhood associations have little legal say in these local matters, and often enter the network via conflict and opposition after something goes wrong.

In New Orleans there are 5Cs. These categories expand upon Brown and Keast's (2003) 3Cs and better explain relationships in informal networks. Conflict relationships and collegial relationships add new value to theory, showing how neighbourhood associations fight to get into

informal networks, and how relationships extend over long periods of time without formal partnering. These 5Cs outperform both Brown and Keast's 3Cs and the local system of defining relationships based upon the sector of the actors. Categorising relationships based upon the length of the relationship and the depth of partnership is more effective than assuming businesses (or government) will conflict with neighbourhood associations. These 5Cs can and should be used to understand informal networks in other cities.

Categorising relationships according to their underlying dynamics provides nuance to understanding relationships in informal networks. One application of this nuance is to the cases in which these relationship classifications appear to change over time. For example, the Dillard CDC and Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association describe each other as long-term partners, a collegial relationship based upon mutual decision-making and shared objectives that borders on being collaborative. However, when Dillard University started a program in the Sugar Hill neighbourhood which put non-violent ex-offenders in the neighbourhood, the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association switched into conflict mode; demanding that the program be moved out of the neighbourhood and opposing Dillard's request for support for a zoning change on another property in an attempt to gain power. This conflict happened simultaneously to numerous other cooperative activities with the Dillard CDC.

Issues such as the length and history of the relationship, and the extent to which objectives and resources are shared are critical to understanding relationships in informal networks. Government more broadly, and City Council specifically, often show these changing dynamics with relationships. Particularly in the case of City Council, the shifting power dynamics prescribe changes to the relationship. With issues such as street light repairs or pot hole

repairs, controlled by the executive branch of government, the council is a partner that ensures work is done. Yet, when the council has the power to make the final decision, this relationship changes dramatically. French Quarter Citizens Inc. and the Vieux Carre Property Owners both do advocacy work on legislation passed by the City Council. This advocacy often involves a much more contentious relationship with the City Council. These changes in the nature of relationships emphasise how the use of Brown and Keast's categories, as well as the widening of the theory used above, helps categorise and explain relationships according to fundamental power dynamics such as resource distribution and shared or conflicting objectives, while also acknowledging context in the form of the length of the relationship.

5.4 Association Strategies

In this section I examine the distribution and commonalities between neighbourhood associations' relationships in informal networks. I show that consistent use of collaborative and coordinative relationships by neighbourhood associations reflect a strategy used to counteract neighbourhood associations' lack of resources (see Section 5.4.1 on partnerships) and that conflict relationships are sensitive to power dynamics; neighbourhood associations, when they feel other actors in the network have power over them (see Lukes, 1974) use coercion to manufacture influence in networks (see Section 5.4.2 on conflict). Collaborative strategy by resource-poor associations and coercion by power-poor associations, show that power dynamics are central to government networks and that there are network equilibriums. Governance networks are in equilibrium when the power and responsibility of the actors in the network reflect the extent to which actors are affected by the policy or its implementation. Actors which

find themselves with little influence but highly impacted by policy use a variety of options at their disposal to establish themselves as key policy actors.

5.4.1 Partnerships

I analyse 71 cases of neighbourhood partnerships in this chapter.[67] The predominant relationship type is collaborative.[68] This focus on collaborative relationships shows a concerted strategy on behalf of neighbourhood associations to develop and maintain collaborative relationships. Almost every neighbourhood association discussed a collaborative partnership, the only exceptions being the newest and least formal neighbourhood associations,. These collaborations are reflective of two strategies used by neighbourhood associations to further their influence: partnering to expand their resource base and the creation of organisations to focus on a particular issue in the neighbourhood.

As discussed in Section 2.3, neighbourhood associations have remarkably few resources. Similarly, as discussed in Chapter Four, associations struggle to attract volunteers. Given low levels on these two basic parameters of capacity, neighbourhood associations have designed particular strategies of partnering to increase their capacity. The Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association addresses these issues explicitly in its interview, arguing that visibility is key to representing their neighbourhood. Arguing that, "the only way you can be visible is to be

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[67] Neighbourhood associations identify 14 relationships as critical to their organisation and 57 additional relationships were culled from case studies. Each association recommended a key organisation with whom a follow-up interview was conducted. Those organisations, and the classification of their relationships with the neighbourhood association, are classified according to the 5Cs in Table 5.4.1. The remaining organisations, drawn from interviews but with whom follow-up interviews were not conducted, are categorised according to the 5Cs in Table 5.4.2. These tables are in Appendix VI.

[68] The sample of relationships discussed here is not a representative one. The relationships in 5.4.1 (see Appendix VI) were recommended as important by neighbourhood association leaders; increasing the chance that these relationships be long-term. Similarly, the relationships in Table 5.4.2 are culled from key issues as described by neighbourhood association leaders, leading to an overemphasis on important relationships.

visible," the president and vice-president of the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association either joined the boards or became members of a host of organisations: the Neighborhood Partnership Network, Beacon of Hope, Gentilly Civic Improvement Association, and the Dillard Community Development Center (CDC). They also developed long-term relationships with their local City Council Representative and with Volunteers of America. In each case, they used the expertise and resources of these other organisations to improve the neighbourhood.

They describe this process as "a chain reaction." The Sugar Hill partnership model entails attending meetings, learning the expertise of other organisations, and applying the "fits" to the needs of their neighbourhood. Despite having only a handful of active members, the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association has been able to work with the New Orleans Redevelopment Agency on blight and policy programs like the Lot Next Door program; they were guided in this process by Beacon of Hope, a non-profit which specialises in blight and housing issues. Similarly, the Dillard CDC has helped them host housing fairs, hold computer training sessions for citizens and hold health fairs for the neighbourhood. These minor projects fit into a larger strategy of addressing the education, retail, infrastructure and medical needs of the neighbourhood and is only possible because of the association’s partnerships.

While the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association is the most explicit about using the resources and expertise of other organisations to overcome their own lack of capacity, a wide range of associations apply this strategy. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association pursues the partnership strategy with the New Orleans Recreational Department. The Broadmoor Improvement Association takes a similar approach with its close partner the Church of the Annunciation, with which it taps into the wide Episcopal network for fundraising and volunteers.

Similarly, the Broadmoor Improvement Association works with Harvard University and Bard College to incorporate academic know-how and student volunteers into its neighbourhood efforts.

The use of outside organisations as resources also extends to the examples of coordination, in which the relationships are much shorter. Examples like tree planting by Hike for Katreena and Parkway, as well as building playgrounds by Kaboom! show how neighbourhood associations actively seek outside resources through partnership. Finally, policies which require "participation," particularly those by the police, fit this model as well. By advocating over the long-term for changes in police coverage, neighbourhood associations leverage their relationships into change they would never have had the resources to pursue.

The second collaborative strategy neighbourhood associations use is the creation of other neighbourhood organisations. Neighbourhood associations spin off organisations to deal with specific issues in their communities. One example is the creation of a security district like those found in Lake Carmel and Upper Audubon. These districts are created by state legislation and provide a specific tax base for use in the purchase of private security or off duty police forces. The Broadmoor Improvement Association created the Broadmoor Improvement District, using similar legislation that gives the neighbourhood association power over the use of the collected funds. Recently French Quarter Citizens Inc. saw their security district voted down, while the Fontainebleau Improvement Association is linked to a crime patrol which is responsible for similar security services, but is optional for residents. In addition, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association and Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association are in the process of starting Neighborhood Watch programs under the guidance of the New Orleans

Police Department. These programs are likely to be quasi-independent, but still extremely closely linked to the two neighbourhood associations.

A number of associations created non-security organisations; the Algiers Point Association created the Friends of the Ferry to address the issue of ferry hours from the West Bank (this example is discussed in more detail below). The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association's relationship with the New Orleans Recreational Department (NORD) is introduced in Section 5.3 and examined again in Chapter Seven. The association partners with NORD to provide youth services; the Irish Channel fundraises and recruits the youth, NORD provides administrators and structures sports leagues across the city. The entire process is dependent upon the association's creation of a booster club to fund the partnership. A final example is French Quarter Citizens Inc. This association worked for years to bring the North Rampart Main Street initiative to the neighbourhood. North Rampart Main Street now encourages investment in the area and is advocating for a street car line to be added to the old Rampart Street line. The French Quarter Citizens Inc. member who fought for so many years for the Main Street program to come to Rampart now serves as the president of North Rampart Main Street.

Of the 14 associations sampled, eight have created an autonomous organisation with which they remain closely affiliated. The benefit to spinning off organisations is unclear, and some associations are starting to reabsorb these entities into their associations. The Fontainebleau Improvement Association originally constructed its Security Patrol as a separated entity for legal reasons; they were worried about the liability for its volunteers. Now those organisations have merged. The Lake Carmel Improvement Association combines the meetings of its neighbourhood association and security district; members of the association insist on voting on

items that legally should be decided only by elected officials of the security district. This reflects the fluid nature of electoral techniques in informal, neighbourhood networks. The Broadmoor Improvement Association shares a board with the Broadmoor Improvement District, but is careful to keep a legal distinction between the meetings, hosting them one after another on the same evening. Such distinction requires teaching board members the distinctions between the two groups. At one Broadmoor Improvement District board meeting I attended, there were numerous disputes about which concerns should be brought up at which meeting. Further, there are legal grey areas in such network arrangements; the Broadmoor Improvement Association has written to the Louisiana State Attorney General for clarification about the responsibility of the association to answer public record requests and the extent to which the Association falls under the Freedom of Information Act.

These examples show the difficulty neighbourhood associations have in forming their local networks and organisations in a manner that complies with legal requirements, but they also are demonstrative of an awareness by neighbourhood associations of their niche in networks. With little capacity, one of the comparative advantages of neighbourhood associations is their ability to quickly respond and adjust to a transforming neighbourhood context, while still representing their neighbourhoods. Rather than run extensive programs from within the neighbourhood association, they create separate organisations that leave the neighbourhood association capable of representation on a variety of issues. The Lake Carmel Improvement Association president explains that the benefit of having two organisations, one which handles security district business and another for the neighbourhood more broadly, is that it allows the the neighbourhood association the freedom to do what it pleases. This reflects Haas *et al.'s*

(1977) assertion that neighbourhood organisations are often responsive to policy changes. [69] The Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society argues, "we're busy being responsive to life rather than being strategic in life," and that, "our lives have been response-based, not proactive." A number of other associations, particularly those that find themselves in conflict situations, such as the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association, the Algiers Point Association or the Upper Audubon Association, described their mission similarly as responsive to external threat, a phenomenon examined more completely in Chapter Six.

These strategies reflect a profound awareness by neighbourhood associations of the limitations constraining their organisations. On one hand, associations are very aware that to effect changes (or, in some cases, prevent changes) they need collaborative and coordinative relationships. Similarly, they have a self-defined sense of purpose, which is linked to the freedom to quickly respond to neighbourhood crisis. These associations often create other organisations to deal with neighbourhood issues partly as an attempt to maintain the wider mission for the neighbourhood association itself. These strategies are closely linked to the neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood change organisational types discussed in Chapter Three. Neighbourhood associations, in the way in which they choose their close relationships, do so to maintain their efficacy at the community level and to keep the association from becoming a single service-delivery mechanism.

[69] This is examined further in Chapters Six and Seven.

5.4.2 Conflict[70]

As neighbourhood protectors and agents of community change, associations frequently find themselves in conflict. Urban theory is cognisant of the role played by neighbourhood groups in conflicts in neighbourhood development. This role is canonised by Saul Alinsky (1971), and examples of conflict are numerous in New Orleans. These conflicts follow a distinct pattern. There is an external change that is enforced upon the neighbourhood. The neighbourhood, with the neighbourhood association acting as proxy, dislikes the change and feels unable to impact the decision. The neighbourhood association uses creative, and sometimes coercive, means to assert itself as an influential player in the governance network. Often, these creative techniques involve finding leverage from something previously considered outside the legal and relevant considerations of the policy network, but neighbourhood associations use them anyway to insert themselves into the policy negotiation.

A prime example of creativity by a neighbourhood association is the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association's opposition to a supermarket in Central City. The Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association opposed a proposed development in 1998[71] on several grounds; the first was the sprawling, suburban model of development, which featured a large store and expansive parking lots. The second reason was preservation; the development designs called for the demolition of eight historic homes. However, local City Council Representative Oliver Thomas, the latest rising star in a political machine in Central City run by former City Council

[70] Conflict is introduced as a category of relationship type in Section 5.3. Here I examine its place in New Orleanian network governance.

[71] The Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association (HFLA) voluntarily donated documents from outside the specified date range, in part because the association had more or less ceased to exist by Hurricane Katrina. Much of the interview material with the former president of HFLA came from the pre-Katrina time period. However, a new neighbourhood association, the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association (FLNA), was recently started. Some residents claim they are the same organization. Leaders from FNLA were interviewed regarding more current issues.

Representative Jim Singleton, supported of the project, and it appeared that the developer had bought all the property necessary to start the development. With little legal power and no financial resources, the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association had no means to impact the debate. Even the populist route was not available to the association, as at a prominent meeting Oliver Thomas criticised its protest as being supported by white preservationists who did not live in the neighbourhood, undercutting political support. There were racial undertones to this whole debate, and although the president of the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association was African-American, most of her most vocal supporters, along with her greatest ally in nearby Felicity Street Redevelopment Project Inc., came from the nearby Garden District and were almost all white.

Lacking public support, money or legal influence, the neighbourhood association set out to gain all three. Working on a local tip, its members discovered that one of the properties, which the developer believed it had purchased, was still on the market. Often, in relatively poor, African-American neighbourhoods in New Orleans, this type of confusion over property exists; properties stay in the family for generations and paperwork is rarely up to date. As a result, one of the homes that needed to be purchased by developers was available, even though the developers were unaware and believed they owned it. Sensing an opportunity, the preservationist Felicity Street Redevelopment Project Inc. and the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association approached a second grocery store which had been spurned in the development process. They elicited a six figure donation from the grocery chain, then used that money to purchase the home. Under cover of darkness, and worried that the developer would discover their plot, they met with the homeowner and purchased the property.

The purchase slowed the development, and although it was eventually abandoned for other reasons, that purchase was considered to be a key moment in the policy process by interviewees from the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association and collaborative partner Felicity Street Redevelopment Project Inc. It also gave them a stake in a policy process from which the association was excluded, by leveraging resources considered by others to have been outside of the process.

The Algiers Point Association followed that same pattern in a conflict with Crescent City Connection. The Algiers Point neighbourhood is across the Mississippi River from the rest of New Orleans. Known as the West Bank, many of the neighbourhood residents commute into the city for work. Poorer residents often use the free ferry to cross into the French Quarter, where the tourism industry thrives and where they work at a variety of restaurants and stores. After Hurricane Katrina, the ferry service was suspended, and later opened with limited hours. This was an area of concern for residents of Algiers Point, as they found themselves stuck in the French Quarter because shifts ended after the ferry had closed for the night. As a result, many found themselves paying for taxis to return to their families after work, an added expense they could not afford. Neighbourhood association meetings dealing with the ferry saw spiked attendance, and the association started an organisation called Friends of the Ferry specifically to deal with the issue.

Friends of the Ferry interacted primarily with an organisation titled Crescent City Connection which was in charge of all travel between the West Bank and New Orleans. According to members of the Algiers Point Association, Crescent City Connection repeatedly stated that there simply was not enough demand to justify running the ferry later, a curious claim

because the ferry was free and there was no monetary impact from running the ferry with few riders. Friends of the Ferry, with no legal say in the matter, had no way to impact this decision. Without power, Friends of the Ferry set about to create some. It made public records requests and sorted through the records of the Crescent City Connection. In these records they found that Crescent City Connection had broken a political promise made to the West Bank. Along with the ferry, the other primary manner in which residents commute to and from New Orleans is via a bridge. This bridge has a toll, and many residents of the West Bank are forced to pay it in both directions each day. West Bank residents were promised that the toll money from this bridge would be reinvested into transportation issues which affected the West Bank; such as repairs to the bridge and funding of the ferry. The Crescent City Connection records revealed that instead of keeping the funds from the toll local, they were being used to fund highway repairs on the LA-1, far to the west of Algiers Point. Friends of the Ferry took this information to State Senator Pat Connick and the state senator used the information to place political pressure on the Crescent City Connection causing Crescent City to change the policy and revert to the full complement of hours.

Just as the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association aggressively inserted itself into a policy negotiation, the Algiers Point Association, faced with no say, on a topic which dramatically and primarily impacted residents of the neighbourhood, found creative and powerful ways to insert itself into the governance network.

A third example of conflict is the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association's battle over the development of a Walgreens pharmacy on a primary corner in the neighbourhood. Similar to the development of the grocery store in Central City, the neighbourhood association

believed that the store model was too suburban and not respectful of the neighbourhood and its history. The association engaged in a number of tactics to attempt to influence aspects of the development, from the direction the stores would face, to the look of the construction plans. At one point, it even engaged in what it cleverly called a "guerilla warfare" approach that involved hanging handmade signs from the construction that lamented "Walgreens kills neighbourhoods." The association did deep research into the land use qualifications of the corner lot, finding that some of the plans were inconsistent with the legal requirements. Also, the association made the grocery store an issue in an election. City Council candidate Shelly Midura included support of the neighbourhood association against Walgreens as a plank of her platform in her campaign. When she was elected, she held a press conference in support of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association, which was cited as the turning point in the policy negotiations.

Again here, the neighbourhood association, which was excluded from all meaningful aspects of a decision with quite a large impact on the neighbourhood, found a creative way to insert itself into the policy negotiation. In this case, research and legal approaches complimented a broadly political strategy, both designed to give the association power at the negotiating table. The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association received only minor concessions from Walgreens, but these included historically influenced designs as well as a shift in the back facade of the building so as not to screen out the neighbourhood.

Neighbourhood associations often lack of power in policy decisions that directly affect them. When possible, neighbourhood associations pursue a strategy of building strong collaborations with non-profits, governmental officials or other neighbourhood organisations. But when the neighbourhood associations cannot use other organisations to leverage and

overcome their own lack of capacity and power, they use coercive means to insert themselves into the negotiations. Lacking traditional power such as resources or decision-making ability (Lukes, 1974) neighbourhood associations use a variety of creative, and quite often aggressive, means to insert themselves into a policy network. From blackmail, to elections, to midnight land purchases, neighbourhood associations use any means possible to obtain power in their own neighbourhoods.

These strategies reflect an awareness by neighbourhood associations of their own condition. Most associations are incapable of running their own programming so they create sister organisations to address key issues. When dealing with partners, neighbourhood associations report using a two-pronged test for the relationships; they assess at what point in the policy process they were invited into the network, and they assess how responsive organisations were to their inquiries. These tools serve as proxies for the underlying principles of the 5Cs. An invitation into the network is a proxy for length of the relationship, and responsiveness is a reflection of the extent to which the associations are valued (and have power) in the network. These practical methods by neighbourhood associations help reinforce that relationships are strategically used by self-aware associations to emphasise their strengths and compensate for their weaknesses, all the while staying true to organisational objectives that prioritise neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood change.

5.5 *Power and Network Equilibrium*

The 5Cs explain relationships in networks through the lens of relational characteristics. By shifting from judging relationships based on the sectors of organisations involved, a more

complex view of relationships within network governance can be examined in detail. This examination, in post-Katrina New Orleans, shows two distinct trends that advance the broader theory of network governance. The first is that the trend and preference for long-term relationships shows that relationships are not embedded in policy networks. Rather, they need be conceptualised as stretching across networks that address specific policies. These relationships are sensitive to the power dynamics within individual networks, which leads to fluid relationships which differ across networks.

The second trend is that neighbourhood associations creatively assert themselves into networks from which they are excluded, creating both influence and conflict. When neighbourhood associations have influence in proportion to the effect of the policy on their neighbourhood, the risk of conflict is greatly reduced. This is an equilibrium state; in networks, actors create conflict when they are underrepresented.




Figure 5.5.1 - Democratic Anchorage in Urban Network Governance

Neighbourhood associations clearly prefer long-term relationships with other actors in network governance. This extends beyond collaborative actors, which often extend an association's resource base, and includes collegial actors with whom long-term relationships exist without shared decision-making or resources. It can be seen even more clearly when looking at the lack of cooperative actors (see Table 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 in Appendix VI). This preference for long-term relationships reflects a key aspect of neighbourhood associations, their self-awareness. Neighbourhood associations show an ability to compensate for their lack of capacity, as seen when they bring in partners that supplement association weaknesses in resources and expertise. Neighbourhood associations also show self-awareness by adjusting their understanding of relationships according to underlying power dynamics. Thus, relationships with City Council, businesses, or even non-profits are fluid and depend on the specific dynamics of networks.

This calls for a recasting of network governance to include the element of time. Figure 5.5.1, re-examined here from Chapter Four, shows links in a specific network. However, at any given time in network governance, the relationships between these actors, here represented as lines connecting them, are influenced by different relationships by the same actors in other networks, and also by the influence of past relationships by these the same actors in various previous networks. Thus, relationships in networks must be understood in terms of historical consequence, aware of the context of other and previous network arrangements.

The fluidity of relationships is relevant in cases of conflict. The incorporation of urban conflict into network governance is, by itself, an important broadening of network governance theory. Networks have hitherto been defined by shared values, objectives and resources.

Empirical evidence of conflict in urban policy networks shifts the discussion to one about *competition* over objectives and resources. Neighbourhood associations are particularly likely to engage in conflict with other actors in a governance network if the association is excluded from the network. Such conflict is predictable based upon a disconnect between the affect of the policy on a neighbourhood and the extent to which a neighbourhood associations has a say in the formation and implementation of the policy. In other words, a lack of neighbourhood power, combined with high neighbourhood stakes, leads to conflict.

Faced with this conflict, neighbourhood associations are not simply begging for more of a say. If that were the case, a compassionate solution might be one of delegating powers to associations, while a cynical one might simply ignore the opinions of these associations. Both of these solutions depend on top-down "fixes" from institutions which would need to voluntarily give up power. If that were the only solution, the empowerment of neighbourhood associations would be unlikely.

But there is a second component to these conflict scenarios. Faced with little traditional power (Lukes, 1974) and policies which significantly impact neighbourhoods, associations become extremely creative (and aggressive) about finding additional ways to insert themselves into the policy network. Rather than depending on devolution of power, neighbourhood associations assert power in creative ways.

The key is this: the ability of neighbourhood associations to assert power and insert themselves into a governance network is *not* derivative of well-intentioned government or businesses *giving* power and influence. Rather, neighbourhood associations assert power that is

inherent in the extent to which the policy affects them. Power, then, is derivative from the extent to which actors are affected by the policy.

This leads to a radically different understanding of network governance. Rather than focusing on the construction of networks in meaningful and equitable ways, as Torfing (2005) argues when he focuses on meta-governance, power dynamics in informal networks depend on the effects of the policy. These networks can be understood as being in equilibrium when the distribution of power in the network is proportional to the distribution of effects. When networks are out of equilibrium, and actors which are directly affected by the impending policies have no voice, it can be expected that these actors will creatively assert themselves in the network. To avoid this conflict, it is often in the interest of all actors to ensure that the network moves closer to equilibrium.

Networks are in equilibrium when the power of the actors is proportional to the impact policies have on the actors. Out of equilibrium networks will see unempowered actors, through creative and sometimes destructive means, reassert themselves as influential. This equilibrium need not depend on good will, and conflict can be avoided by involving all actors proportionally to the extent to which they are affected.



CHAPTER SIX

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Micro-urbanism: Physical Neighbourhoods, Institutions, and History

"If your playgrounds are a mess, your neighbourhood is a mess."
Former president of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association

6.1 Introduction

Rich (2008: 83) argues that efficiency "is used to refer to the ratio of the costs residents will bear as a result of using a given strategy to secure services to the value they receive from the resulting services." Hitherto, network governance theory has focused on whether policies produced in governance networks are "efficient." But "there is a danger in (doing so). They treat networks as a tool of government. But they are not just a mechanism for delivering services" (*ibid*). In this research, I examine the agenda-setting of neighbourhood associations, showing how neighbourhood associations enter informal networks the pathways they take to do so. Chapter Six focuses on pathways that depend on institutional neighbourhood characteristics, particularly: the physical characteristics of their neighbourhoods, neighbourhood institutions, and neighbourhood history. Chapter Seven focuses on socio-demographic neighbourhood characteristics that are aggregated at the neighbourhood level, such as wealth, age, race and human capital.

Neighbourhood-level priorities, such as physical characteristics, institutions and history, diverge from an efficiency framework. Neighbourhood associations value "hospitals over health care" and buildings over legislative bills; they prioritise fixing local institutions over fixing systems. There is a difference between the local, context-driven priorities of neighbourhood associations and the wider economic efficiency priorities of the wider system (see Halpern, 1995). Neighbourhood associations have a different set of priorities, reflecting an urban reality; the primary benefit of network governance is not "efficient" outcomes from a single perspective, but that negotiations serve to incorporate multiple actors' priorities into a final policy solution. I theorise that the efficiency of network governance comes from the system's ability to incorporate different priorities and values through negotiation.

Much of the last three chapters define what happens *inside* the network governance system in New Orleans, using the city to build principles and theory that apply to the broader network governance literature. This wider work emphasises the different spaces within networks; neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina fill a representational space in the network, as well as a participatory space that helps underpin the activities in policy. As discussed in Chapter Five, when neighbourhood associations are not included in policy networks, they force themselves into the policy discussion through conflict. One constant through these discussions is the importance of individual organisations in understanding network governance. As Eldridge and Crombie (1974) theorise, organisations can be understood through their ideals and their functions; in the case of New Orleanian neighbourhood associations, this means categorising associations based on their prioritisation of neighbourhood protection or neighbourhood change, as well as their

preference for influencing others to make these changes, or attempting to do so themselves. The core principle behind these discussions is central role pluralism plays in networks.

In previous chapters I look at the dynamics of neighbourhood associations within a governance network, extrapolating to the values of the associations, but do little to explain how the associations came to be in the specified network. In this chapter I look at those "pathways" into specific issues and networks. This can be understood as neighbourhood-level "agenda-setting," which is defined by Rogers and Dearing (1988) as "issues or events that are viewed at a point in time as ranked in a hierarchy of importance," and highlighted by Lukes (1974) as a central component of power.

At the neighbourhood level, several key pathways exist for neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans. Neighbourhood association agendas emphasise what I refer to as a micro-urban agenda; they are highly concerned with physical buildings and other physical characteristics of their own neighbourhood and less invested in broader policy issues. Similarly, the history of a neighbourhood impacts the agenda of a neighbourhood association, as it provides vivid imagery for the future. If a neighbourhood has lost an important institution, business or landmark, that item is typically on the top of the association's to-do list. Finally, these issues manifest themselves in particular patterns. Neighbourhoods with contained residential areas seek primarily to protect those areas from crime and blight, while more diverse areas are involved in other institutions (schools, libraries), commercial development (the return of grocery stores, protesting non-urban styled development), and youth work (in cases of local schools or local parks). To understand what a neighbourhood association does, one has to look at its neighbourhood.

At the urban level, these findings are useful in their own right; they show a distinct departure from the approach of current area-based programs (see Tough, 2009) in the United States which seeks to apply the Harlem Children Zone model of evidence-based interventions across different contexts, although one that emphasises previous findings in the field of community organisations (see Florin and Wandersman, 1990). These findings indicate that the priorities of the neighbourhood vary from priorities of area-based practice; focusing not on packaged parenting classes and school reform, but on the physical condition of the neighbourhood and the health of the specific institutions inside it.

The results have broad implications for network governance theory. The strong subset of priorities in neighbourhood associations is additional evidence of the plurality found within network governance; the subsets show how multiple actors with different priorities impact governance. Building from these findings, I theorise that the benefit of network governance is not less expensive services. Instead, the key gains from network governance stem from the use of negotiations to integrate the values and priorities of different actors into policy.

6.2 Tools for Understanding Pathways

There are two theories that attempt to explain the pathways taken by actors in network governance. Hajer (2003) argues that neighbourhood organisations are fundamentally reactive; that associations set their agenda by responding to policy. Hawkins and Percy (1997) provide a different vision, arguing that static characteristics of neighbourhoods, such as wealth and population, dictate the agenda of local organisations. These theories provide the theoretical tools

for understanding and distinguishing between different pathways taken by neighbourhood associations into governance networks.

The Hajer (2003) theory is simply portrayed; Hajer (*ibid*) describes a hypothetical scenario in which a local park is going to be lost to development. A local group forms in response to the decision and posts an empty picture frame looking out onto the park. The message is that the park itself is beautiful and worth preserving, a piece of art as it is. The example is simple and gets the main component of Hajer's theory. The action is reactive; the local group took action *after* the initial policy with which it disagreed.

It is easy to reimagine Hajer's (2003) example fundamentally differently. Instead of a group that is *reactive* to the policy, perhaps the local group is called the "Friends of the Park."[72] "Friends of the Park" would fundraise to keep the park open, hold periodic events to clean the park, and be involved in the policy discussions around its closure from the beginning. In this situation, permanent factors, such as the presence of the park in the neighbourhood, the financial resources of the neighbourhood, and enough human capital to fulfil volunteer positions would underpin its activities.

This counter example follows the fundamental principles of the pathways described by Hawkins and Percy (1997). In examining Residential Community Associations (RCAs)[73] Hawkins and Percy (*ibid*) found that permanent factors, such as financial resources, age of the

[72] There is a “Friends of Armstrong Park” organisation in the Tremé neighbourhood, although that group is notably less active than the hypothetical group used in this example.

[73] RCAs have distinct differences from neighbourhood organisations in that they have more legal power (including, often the power to levy a tax on residents or enforce neighbourhood standards) but the two types of organisations share a number of features. First, they are both grounded in a neighbourhood / locality. Second, they are both representative organisations or those localities. As such, they have significant overlap is responsibilities and functions.

population and total population represented were key to determining the level of services provided by the associations.

There is a contrast between Hajer's (2003) vision of reactive neighbourhood groups and Hawkins and Percy's (1997) vision of consistency. Hajer's (2003) vision is of neighbourhood organisations that drift from controversy to controversy, reacting to individual policy issues that affect the neighbourhood. Hawkins and Percy (1997) portray constant associations that have bedrock principles drawn from slow-to-change characteristics of the neighbourhood. Of course, these two visions are not mutually exclusive: as shown later in this chapter, it is possible to combine the core principles of both theories of neighbourhood associations. But the theories do provide tools for discussion and analysing the pathways of neighbourhood associations.

This chapter depends on a second theoretical distinction, one between institutional neighbourhood characteristics and socio-demographic neighbourhood characteristics. School and grocery stores are neighbourhood characteristics; they are inherent to the neighbourhood and cannot be devolved to the individual. Characteristics of individuals, such as wealth, age and race are also characteristics of a neighbourhood, but they are aggregated. This distinction between neighbourhood characteristics and aggregate neighbourhood characteristics provides a second set of theoretical anchors for a discussion of neighbourhood pathways. In this chapter, I examine the influences of institutional neighbourhood characteristics upon the agenda-setting of neighbourhood associations, looking at neighbourhood institutions such as schools and parks. In Chapter Seven, I examine the effects of socio-demographic neighbourhood characteristics such as wealth, age, race and human capital.

6.3 Findings

Neighbourhood characteristics prove critical to the choices of neighbourhood associations to join informal networks and engage in policy negotiations. Physical characteristics of neighbourhoods, the presence (and condition) of institutions such as schools, and the history of the neighbourhood all play prominently in associational agenda-setting.

Neighbourhood associations have a pattern of pathways into informal networks. They protect their neighbourhood institutions, build upon the physical assets of their neighbourhoods, and work hard to bring back commerce.[74]

6.3.1 Physical Characteristics

Physical characteristics of the neighbourhood dictate the networks and negotiations of neighbourhood associations. Neighbourhood associations are far more likely to be involved in an issue, or run a program, that directly impacts or threatens a building or physical feature of their neighbourhood; repeatedly, the most important aspects of associations' agendas are focused on physical buildings, parks and geography. Prominent examples include the parks in the Irish Channel, the ferry in Algiers Point, the historic housing in the Irish Channel, Faubourg Lafayette (Central City) and the French Quarter, the isolation caused by Hollygrove-Dixon's location, and Faubourg Lafayette's proximity to the I-10 highway. In each of these examples, an association engages in an activity due to the prominence of a physical feature of the neighbourhood.

Located Uptown, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association is the only association in New Orleans working closely with the New Orleans Recreation Department (NORD). As

[74] For each of these pathways, I examine one exemplary case in great depth, and look at the broader supporting narratives from other initiatives in other associations to evaluate the prevalence of the pathway.

discussed in Chapter Five, NORD has a program in New Orleans in which neighbourhood organisations partner to create booster clubs to fund youth programming. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association chose to partner with NORD and helped create and fundraise for the Lyons-Burke Booster Club. The booster club is named after two prominent parks in the Irish Channel: Burke Park and Lyons Park. The Irish Channel Neighbourhood Association builds its agenda around the physical strengths of the neighbourhood; it not only runs programming in its parks, but uses them to raise money, engage with city agencies, and recruit volunteers. This strategy results in unrivalled youth programming. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, and affiliated Lyons-Burke Booster Club, runs basketball, baseball and soccer programs, in all neighbourhood parks.

The most critical features of the Irish Channel geography are its parks. In Gentilly Terrace and Gardens, playgrounds are a central component of the neighbourhood. Nola Church Plant, a new Christian congregation in Gentilly, was interviewed as the partner organisation of Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association. The two organisations struggle to work together given their different missions; Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association focuses on neighbourhood protection such as crime and blight. Nola Church Plant focuses on building community and youth work. They partner to host movie nights in local playgrounds, and Nola Church Plant also runs its own child care programs.

The contrast between Nola Church Plant's activities and the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association's programming is instructive. They have similar priorities; both expressing their interest in youth programming in terms of compassion and keeping kids off the streets. But in the Irish Channel, the neighbourhood has parks, so they engage in sports activities. In Gentilly

Terrace and Gardens, the neighbourhood has playgrounds, so Nola Church Plant runs child care and hosts movie nights. Differences in geography help set the agenda.

The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, as well as the Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Association, did not always engage in these activities. If the parks and playgrounds are permanent, how does this theory account for the changes in the activities of the neighbourhoods?

This question merits a response on several different levels. The first is that a prominent pathway is not the *only* pathway. Even within organisations, or single activities, there are multiple forces acting on the neighbourhood association at any given time. Theory-building is not designed to identify single causal explanatory factors, but to establish prominent pathways, and to use these paths both to inform urban governance, and extrapolate back to wider network governance situations.[75] A second reason not to dismiss the Irish Channel example is that the previous focus of the organisation was largely based on the deterioration of its housing stock, another physical characteristic of the neighbourhood. The Irish Channel Neighborhood Association's previous president cites the demolition of housing stock as the biggest issue for the association. This former president applied for a stay in the demolitions and the creation of a historic district. The competing issue of protecting historic housing was a priority over use of the parks, but still confirms the wider trend of a focus on physical characteristics of the neighbourhood.

The examples of Algiers Point and the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association, examined in depth in Chapter Five, exemplify the same pattern. In Algiers, the neighbourhood geography across from the Mississippi River creates a focus on the ferry.

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[75] The lack of simple causal explanatory factors is one of the reasons for the use of in-depth qualitative methodologies.

In Central City, the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association fought a grocery store development to protect historic housing stock. Years later, in the same neighbourhood, a new association sprouted to deal with a different component of Central City's geography: the I-10 highway which runs along the East border of Central City. The sheltered space under the highway is a magnet for the homeless population, and as a result, a prominent homeless shelter, the Mission, is located in the Faubourg Lafayette section of Central City. A member of the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association details the negative effect that the homeless population, drawn by the highway and housed at the Mission, has on the neighbourhood: she says that at six am the homeless are released from the shelter, and they walk through the neighbourhood, leaving beer cans scattered through her yard, and even occasionally peeing on the side of her house. In response, her morning routine includes cleaning her front yard, so that she can send her small children into the yard without worrying about them finding beer cans. That experience drove her to get involved and start an association.

Other less extreme examples include the French Quarter, where residents are concerned about the protection of the historic housing stock and worry that increased entertainment will turn the area into a stagnant Disney Land or Williamsburg, Virginia. The Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Association, which represents just a block tucked into the corner of Gentilly Terrace, was founded solely to deal with a single six-plex apartment in the neighbourhood which attracted tenants who caused neighbours to be fearful. The Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association is increasingly concerned with the need for a community centre in its neighbourhood because construction on main thoroughfares has isolated the neighbourhood and causes children to play unsafely in the streets rather than at parks in surrounding neighbourhoods.

In each of these neighbourhoods, the core feature driving neighbourhood involvement is a physical characteristic of the neighbourhood. This finding is strong support for considering neighbourhoods as distinct units, not simply aggregates of individuals. It also provides a nuanced view of the dynamic v. static debate found in Hajer (2003) and Hawkins and Percy (1997). Neighbourhood association leaders conceptualise their actions as reactive. In the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society a member argues that "we're busy being responsive to life rather than being strategic in life," and that, "our lives have been response-based, not proactive." But in the cases above, a permanent, static neighbourhood characteristic is often mixed with a short-term stimulus or issue. The association may be responding to a crisis, but the reason the association cares is because of the threat to something physical in the neighbourhood. The prominence of the neighbourhood characteristic pathway for neighbourhood association agenda-setting is evidence of the complexity of responses by local organisations; they react to current controversy selectively based upon the characteristics of their neighbourhoods.

6.3.2 Neighbourhood Institutions

A slight twist on the pathway described above is the ability of institutions in neighbourhoods to propel neighbourhood association into action. In the above examples, geographic features, such as location or parks, as well as historic buildings, are cited as critical to determining the pathways of neighbourhood associations. A slight variation on this theme are situations in which institutions are embedded in neighbourhoods. Examples include the library and school in Broadmoor, the Bethune Elementary School in Hollygrove-Dixon, universities adjacent to Upper Audubon and Sugar Hill, churches in Broadmoor, Gentilly Terrace and

Gardens, and the Irish Channel, as well as a myriad of examples in neighbourhoods not included in the sample, such as lower Mid-City's battle over the development of the biomedical district and Tremé's experience with the Lafitte housing project.

Of course, the importance of institutions to local areas is well established; it is featured in Cnaan's (2006) *The Other Philadelphia Story,* as well as the youth literature of asset-mapping (see McKnight and Kretzmann, 1993). These two works, among others, identify institutions as key to processes in urban neighbourhoods. However, in my research I emphasise the power of physically having an institution in the neighbourhood on the agendas of associations.

The best example of the effect of local institutions upon the pathways of a neighbourhood association is the Broadmoor Improvement Association. The Broadmoor Improvement Association's story is a compelling one; the neighbourhood faced being turned into park land when the initial city plan by the Bring New Orleans Back Commission was released to the public. The neighbourhood rallied around the Broadmoor Improvement Association, which had existed in a minor capacity before the storm, and the Broadmoor Improvement Association became the classic example of a successful neighbourhood association (Chamblee-Wright, 2008; Chamblee-Wright and Storr, 2009). The association partnered with high powered organisations such as Harvard University and brought in millions of dollars through the Church of the Annunciation and the Clinton Relief Foundation. In the process, Annunciation and the Broadmoor Improvement Association became almost indistinguishable. They applied for grants under whichever name they thought would be most likely to win. Together, they became one of the largest relief operations in the south of the United States; creating a 24/7 campus for hosting volunteers that lasted for years after the storm.

The Broadmoor Improvement Association pushed the boundary of law and legislation, creating an Improvement District that collected local taxes to fund the association. The district required a new state law be passed because it gave tremendous freedom to the association. The conventional district allows tax receipts to be spent only on security. The association is now involved in issues from public works street repairs, to complex volunteer coordination, to greening of abandoned lots. Yet, in interviews, the linchpin of the association's long-term strategy to revitalise the neighbourhood is its library and school. One board member of the Broadmoor Improvement District describes the importance of the two institutions by arguing that the neighbourhood was not a destination; it did not have parks, university, or history. But "everyone wants a great school." She argues that "you need a school in your neighbourhood. It's an anchor that keeps people there." The Broadmoor Improvement Association's plan is built around those two key institutions. The association received a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York for the Rosa F. Kellery Library, and the Andrew H. Wilson Charter School was one of five schools selected by Louisiana State Educational Superintendent, Paul Pastorek, to be constructed as part of the "Quick-Start" program after the storm. Years later, when the Andrew H. Wilson Charter School was not only constructed, but fully functioning, the Broadmoor Improvement Association remained involved, if informally, in its governance. The association helps recruit volunteers for tutoring programs, and when the school's test scores were low, it overhauled the school's governing board by replacing the old board with neighbourhood activists.

The association's emphasis on the library and school are part of a wider strategy to create an educational corridor, which has led to more recent organisations, such as Apex Ministries,

which does youth programming, to be funded by the tax dollars from the Broadmoor Improvement District. This strategy focuses on education but is rooted in a philosophy of building from a neighbourhood's strengths. In this case, the presence of two institutions, the library and school, were considered anchors of the community, and a selling point for its future.

The same pattern of neighbourhood institutions as pathways for associations is found across neighbourhoods. The Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association does not have the organisational capacity of the Broadmoor Improvement Association, but has coalesced around a similar strategy of highlighting and working with its neighbourhood institutions. Bethune Elementary School, tucked into the Hollygrove-Dixon neighbourhood, received the third highest test scores in the city, behind only two charter schools. The association held a Celebrate Bethune event that featured famous New Orleanian singer Irma Thomas singing the national anthem. The president of the association says that the event was "fabulously successful" as is the school; after the test scores were released, Louisiana State Schools Superintendent Paul Pastorek called Bethune to see if its standardised test scores were real. The president of Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association argues that the neighbourhood needs a plan that "leverages our assets." Hollygrove-Dixon is a relatively young association; the school is at the centre of its plan to bring in more volunteers and grow.

Both Hollygrove-Dixon and Broadmoor have local schools that they consider central to their neighbourhoods. The power of institutions to influence the pathways of a neighbourhood is not always underpinned by such a positive relationship. In some neighbourhoods, the relationships with institutions are far more mixed. For example, the Upper Audubon Association is adjacent to both Tulane University and Loyola University. The neighbourhood is extremely

pricey, in part due to the proximity of the universities (as well as Audubon Park, probably the nicest park in the city). On that level, the universities contribute extremely positively to the neighbourhood.

The neighbourhood association interacts with them in a more conflict-ridden manner. The Upper Audubon Association is extremely protective of its residential life. As reported in other neighbourhoods (such as Fontainebleau), universities can cause minor problems in neighbourhoods because of the dissonance in lifestyles between resident homeowners and renting students. Parties, poor upkeep, and trash are all nuisances that can be exacerbated by students. In Upper Audubon, Tulane purchased space in a local commercial development called Uptown Square and planned on using it for student housing. The association strongly protested this development, although the conflict was interrupted by Hurricane Katrina. Given the difficulties that Tulane University had after the storm, the increased student housing project was tabled, but its potential for institution-based conflict is still fresh in the memories of the members of the Upper Audubon Association.

Another example of a mixed relationship with a university is that between Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association and Dillard University. The location of Dillard University in Gentilly has not done as much to increase property values and "improve" the neighbourhood as is seen in Upper Audubon, but Dillard is key to the Sugar Hill neighbourhood in a few ways. The first is cultural; Dillard is an historically African-American university, making the largely African-American neighbourhood of Sugar Hill more likely to look to the university for help. Building upon that, after Hurricane Katrina, Dillard University set up a Community Development Corporation (CDC) for the express purpose of helping neighbourhoods rebuild after the storm.

The Dillard CDC works with 10 neighbourhoods in predominantly African-American neighbourhoods in Gentilly and New Orleans East.

The CDC, recognising that federal recovery dollars would not make their way to the neighbourhood levels, expressly uses a recovery strategy that focuses on building upon "internal resources" such as schools and churches. As a CDC, Dillard is able to help neighbourhoods apply for resources, help with the professional aspects of neighbourhood plans and coordinate other logistical details. The CDC also helps with small things such as meeting places and running health clinics in neighbourhoods.

The Dillard CDC emphasises the impacts of institutions on the pathways of neighbourhood associations on two different levels; the first is the impact the CDC, as a local institution, has on Sugar Hill. The second is the CDC's own strategy of emphasising institutions in the planning and recovery process.

Dillard's influence in Sugar Hill is not monolithically positive. Even while working together, the Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association found itself in conflict with the university. The conflict was over a program that Dillard was running in the Sugar Hill at a house that had been donated to the university. Initially the donated house was a faculty centre and served as residential space for a dean. Most recently, the university used the house to run an environmental justice program that does remediation training for individuals who had committed minor misdemeanours. Most of the individuals in the program were men. There were a number of alleged incidents in which these men were calling out to under-aged girls walking home from school. The association complained, and their complaints gained traction when the university needed the association's support to change the zoning of another donated house in the

neighbourhood. The association responded by refusing to support the zoning change until the issues with the first house were dealt with, demonstrating the type of creative use of power described in the conflict relationships in Chapter Five.

This example is extremely minor, the executive director of the Dillard CDC called it "nonsense" and was insistent that, "there is no winner in this." But it shows that institutions can serve both as positive and negative influences in the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood associations often support and build their neighbourhood institutions, but are extremely willing to fight them over development and other issues if they feel the institution is hurting the neighbourhood. As in the examples in Chapter Five, a key distinction here is the extent to which neighbourhood associations are involved in the policy process. Less involvement and later involvement often lead to additional conflict.

A final example of the power of institutions to influence the pathways of neighbourhood associations is the faith-based institutions. This connection to faith-based institutions is found in a number of associations including: the Broadmoor Improvement Association, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, the Pilotland Neighborhood Association and the Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association. The ways in which faith-based institutions affect associations, and particularly their link to service-delivery, are discussed more fully in Chapter Three. However, faith-based institutions clearly influence neighbourhood associations to deliver services.

The impact of institutions on agenda-setting points out a significant hole in the theories of Hajer (2003) and Hawkins and Percy (1997). Neighbourhood associations react to crises, but only when these crises affect their physical neighbourhood or neighbourhood institutions.

6.3.3 History

In addition to the impact of physical characteristics and institutions on neighbourhood associations, a core pathway is the impact of neighbourhood history on the activities of neighbourhood associations. Neighbourhood history is a key factor in influencing neighbourhood associations' placement in governance networks. The influence of neighbourhood history occurs at both a macro and micro level. At the macro level, the history of the entire neighbourhood is often linked to changes from desegregation. The image of the historical neighbourhood provides a map for what the association fights for in the future. At the micro level, individual buildings have histories as well, and the previous use for abandoned buildings is often a motivating factor in the engagement of the neighbourhood associations.

Several neighbourhood leaders cite broad historic factors when involvement in particular actions. The Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association, Pilotland Neighborhood Association and Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association all frame their activities historically. A number of common threads link these neighbourhoods. They are currently, as well as historically, African-American. Each harkens to the vibrant history of their neighbourhoods; a time when the neighbourhood had commerce and was self-sustaining.

These neighbourhoods are portrayed in interviews as having been alluring. Lafayette, located in Central City, had dance halls on every corner. Pilotland and Sugar Hill had pharmacies, grocery stores, health clinics and community centres. The historical vibrancy of these neighbourhoods is a key motivating factor for attempts to change them. The use of neighbourhood history to provide a vision for the future is reminiscent of Haas *et al.*'s theoretical work on post-disaster conflicts (1977). Haas *et al.* (*ibid)* argue that after a disaster, residents of a

city have a clear vision of the city they want. They want the old city to be rebuilt. Haas *et al.* (*ibid*) argue that many of the conflicts in city planning after the storm come because planners overlook the old city plan imprinted upon the consciousness of the city's residents. Something similar is happening in historically African-American neighbourhoods; the residents of such neighbourhoods have a historical vision that impacts their desires for the futures of their neighbourhoods.

Cities across the United States changed dramatically in the 1950s due to racial "redlining" which encouraged white flight to the suburbs. They changed again in the 1980s as crack cocaine entered city streets (Tough, 2012). In New Orleans, the effects of crack were compounded by the burst of the oil bubble.[76] The result was increased crime and abandoned houses, with more high-income citizens moving to the suburbs and undercutting the tax base of the city. Another factor, less often cited in interviews, is the cultural differences caused by desegregation. As Grayson (2009) argues, segregation had the unintended effect of keeping professional African-Americans in lower-income neighbourhoods. African-Americans owned small businesses and professionals, such as doctors and dentists, lived and worked in the neighbourhood. As desegregation occurred, these middle-class professional African-Americans had the opportunity to move to middle-class neighbourhoods. In New Orleans, many chose to live together in new developments in New Orleans East which promised bigger houses and fit the American vision of a quiet neighbourhood, a yard and a white picket fence. Poor neighbourhoods were stripped of their services and had to go elsewhere for their services or groceries.

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[76] Off-shore drilling is a huge part of Louisiana's economy.

There are three aspects to this broader impact of African-American history upon neighbourhood association action. The first is the repeated complaint from these neighbourhoods about having to go support *other* businesses, neighbourhoods or even parishes[77] instead of keeping their dollars in their own neighbourhoods. Residents argue that if they could keep their dollars local, jobs would also stay local. Second, underpinning this complaint is an image of a sustainable neighbourhood. The desire for sustainable, walkable neighbourhoods with services and commerce is not limited to the African-American community. These are the core components of New Urbanism (see Jacobs, 1961), and more affluent neighbourhoods in New Orleans advocate for very similar things. In Fontainebleau, the neighbourhood association president emphasises that what makes the neighbourhood so attractive is that residents are within walking distance of a park, many can walk to work at one of the local universities, and there is commerce within walking distance as well. The only thing they lacked was a grocery store; something they spent years working to bring to the neighbourhood.[78] The difference cited by the Fontainebleau Improvement Association is that they have these things. In Sugar Hill, Pilotland and Central City, these vibrant neighbourhoods are relics of the past.

The third relevant component of history in these African-American neighbourhoods is cultural. The manager of the oldest African-American-owned bookstore in the city explains that what made the old African-American neighbourhoods so special was that everyone knew each other. If a child was sick, a parent could call the doctor no matter what time of night because the doctor lived in the neighbourhood. Having that kind of service, right in the neighbourhood, was a

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[77] Rather than counties, Louisiana has parishes, a reflection of the French and Catholic influences on the city. In some traditional African-American neighbourhoods, the lack of commercial development makes it necessary to shop across the parish line.

[78] Bringing a grocery store to the neighbourhood is one of the micro examples of history affecting neighbourhoods examined below.

tremendous part of the neighbourhood culture; the memory of it serves as a guide for neighbourhood associations.

History plays a similar role at the micro-level, impacting not just the vision of neighbourhood associations, but also directly impacting their day-to-day activity. Often, history directs the type of advocacy an association does for development activities. Following the same Haas *et al.* (1977) principle that the past provides a natural plan for residents, neighbourhood associations have an easier time advocating for the return of things they have lost. The need to recruit volunteers compounds this effect, as residents are more likely to volunteer if doing so helps an institution return to the neighbourhood than if the institution or business had never been there. The past is a powerful motivating factor for associations.

The power of the past in micro-urban activities and development is exemplified in Northwest Carrollton and Fontainebleau. These neighbourhoods had traditionally shared an iconic A&P grocery store. When that grocery store left the neighbourhood, a number of members of the Fontainebleau Improvement Association began recruiting other grocery stores to use the corner lot. The A&P location was at the key intersection of Carrollton Avenue and Claiborne Avenue, one of the last available corners for a grocery store, and just across the Fontainebleau neighbourhood boundary, in Northwest Carrollton. These volunteers used professional contacts to engage with a wide number of grocery stores over the course of several years, eventually convincing Walgreens to partner with Roberts grocery to bring a pharmacy and grocery store to the corner. The persistence of the volunteers over years shows that, in the context of neighbourhood associations' more general struggle to retain volunteers, neighbourhood history has a strong ability to engage its citizens.

The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association faced a different set of struggles. As the new complex was in their neighbourhood, they faced troublesome prospects such as delivery trucks cutting through their neighbourhood, lower property values due to a large back wall of the building, and the possibility of a large number of dumpsters next to their houses. The president of the Fontainebleau Improvement Association acknowledges that the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association had to deal with the realities of the development, while Fontainebleau residents got to have the benefits of a local grocery store without any of the difficulties.

Well aware of these quality-of-life issues, the greatest concern of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association was historical. They did not want a modern pharmacy with neon signs in a neighbourhood where an iconic bubblegum factory had previously existed. Instead, they wanted the building to reflect the character of the neighbourhood. The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association insisted that Walgreens change the layout of the development and make the construction of the Walgreens more consistent with the old bubblegum factory. Their members' protests helped ensure an urban model for the grocery store by Roberts; a more compact store, and one that didn't completely focus outward to the main avenue, ignoring the neighbourhood. The protests and negotiations with Walgreens were contentious, although Walgreens did agree to minor changes and included turrets modelled after the old bubblegum factory.

The Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association was extremely aggressive in its negotiations with Walgreens. This scepticism and strategy was founded in the history the neighbourhood and the city, had with Walgreens. The president of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association contends that Walgreens has an urban strategy of buying up important

corner plots throughout the city to prevent other pharmacies from developing stores that would compete with Walgreens. Walgreens allegedly does this often with little intention to develop the property, content to limit the overall number of pharmacies rather than face competition or open a store that may not make the company profits. This has extremely negative effects on the neighbourhood, leaving a prominent corner blighted and unused. This story played out in Northwest Carrollton, where Walgreens bought the plot and then sat on it for years, leaving the neighbourhood without a grocery store, a pharmacy, or any commerce in a critical location. When Walgreens did decide to develop, there was little trust remaining in the neighbourhood, a significant factor in the aggressive nature of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association protests.

The power of specific history is most clearly seen in the Walgreens/Roberts example in Northwest Carrollton, but it was common across neighbourhoods. Many of the examples previously discussed here contained benchmarks from the neighbourhood's history that affected the neighbourhood's activities at a micro-level. In Algiers Point, the association fought hard for a return to pre-storm hours for the ferry. The Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association engaged in long-term negotiations with the U.S. Postal Service to have individual mail delivery resumed in its neighbourhood. Sometimes history was a more explicit part of neighbourhood activity; the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association fought for, and received, a historic district designation, while the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association was unable to do the same, thus failing to stop demolitions in their neighbourhood.

These micro-level examples show that volunteers are more likely to engage in a neighbourhood association activity if they are fighting for something they have lost rather than

for a new activity. In light of the lack of volunteers and tendency of burnout in these associations, history is a core contributor to the pathways neighbourhood associations take into various activities.

Stepping back from micro-examples, the finding that history contributes to the location of neighbourhood associations in network governance fits within the broader categories of associations in Chapter Three. The desire for a mixed-use, "new urban" neighbourhood was not universal across the neighbourhoods studied. Some areas preferred a traditional American model, where they lived in a suburban-style residential space. This is particularly prominent in New Orleans East, where most of the housing is in "subdivisions" that are set apart from commercially zoned areas. Similarly, in certain parts of uptown New Orleans, most notably in Upper Audubon, the goal is to have a residential area that is set apart from the city. In these neighbourhoods, a different image is dominant; rather than emphasising walkability and commerce, these neighbourhoods emphasise safety.

Returning to the categories of neighbourhood associations in Chapter Three, underpinning features of neighbourhoods can be seen as crucial for explaining both the activities and ideals of neighbourhood associations. Neighbourhood associations are both protective of, and respondent to, physical features and institutions in their neighbourhoods. Further, many of their ideals are linked to the history of their neighbourhood. In both of these cases, neighbourhoods that are entirely residential lean towards protectionist ideals.

This is a contrast in neighbourhood history between vibrant, "new urban" neighbourhoods that include walkable commerce, and with neighbourhoods that create suburban-styled residential developments and are set apart from the bustle of city life. In these second,

residential neighbourhoods, such as Lake Carmel or Upper Audubon, associations are protective. With so little commercial activity in the neighbourhood, associations focus on traditional "crime and blight" roles to protect their investments. The more varied the neighbourhood, the more likely the association is to be involved in other activities ranging from commerce to education. In this way, the first two pathways discussed here, physical characteristics of the neighbourhood and institutions, dovetail into the same understanding. The presence of schools, parks, universities, or even unique geographic features (such as Algiers Point's location across the Mississippi) makes it more likely that neighbourhood associations act in different ways. Sometimes these ways may still be protectionist, but often they involve changes from the traditional "crime and blight" association and increase the possibility that the association be involved in neighbourhood change. Solely residential areas are linked closely to protectionist neighbourhood associations, while mixed-use neighbourhoods are more likely to engage in neighbourhood change activities.

6.4 Discussion

Neighbourhood associations' activities are explained by physical characteristics of the neighbourhoods, local institutions, and neighbourhood history. Associations prioritise hospitals not health care; they are interested in the specific buildings, neighbourhood characteristics and circumstances of their neighbourhood first when entering into policy deliberations, and are less interested in broader systemic concerns. The specific agenda-setting strategy of neighbourhood associations highlights the different value systems across actors in network governance, a critical note to understanding how negotiations work. These different systems are the foundation of

negotiations within network governance; the process of negotiating across different value systems is the mechanism by which network governance produces improved solutions.

The three findings here, those of physical characteristics, institutions and history, all point to a nuanced, context-driven understanding of neighbourhood governance, which contrasts sharply with a technocratic evaluation of policy that focuses on “efficiency” of services (Rich, 2008). They also show a clear theme: neighbourhood associations are primarily concerned with neighbourhood-level processes. At the neighbourhood level, the critical issues are specific institutions. Participation occurs at the level of buildings and not bills. The history of actors takes precedence over the "efficient" outcome, or over any other activity. In the Northwest Carrollton case, the scepticism towards Walgreens by the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association was founded in years of backstory, but resulted in very real opposition to a pharmacy and grocery store development. From a macro-policy level, the opposition to development at an empty and blighted street corner is virtually nonsensical. But neighbourhood associations, local participation, and urban network governance do not function solely on the macro-policy level. Issues such as the history of the actors are serious concerns.

Contrast the focus on history, institutions and physical characteristics with the policy sphere’s fascination with jobs and economic efficiency (see Halpern, 1995). The discordant values of neighbourhood associations provide an opportunity. Arguments for economic efficiency produce singular outcomes, either for or against a policy on the basis of the bottom-line dollar figure. By producing another set of priorities, those of neighbourhood interest, institutions and buildings, the groundwork is set for the negotiations which make the core of network governance.

In urban network governance systems, multiple non-hierarchical actors negotiate on policy areas. Neighbourhood associations in network governance in post-Katrina New Orleans bring fundamentally different priorities to these negotiations, emphasising history, institutions and physical characteristics. These differing priorities provide the tension necessary for negotiations; at times this means conflict, at times it means negotiation and information sharing, and at times it means neighbourhood associations running their own programs to fulfil needs in the neighbourhood. Regardless of the specific outcomes, the result is negotiations between the priorities of the neighbourhood associations and other actors in the network (government, other neighbourhoods, business interests, non-profits).

The tensions between actors are the *source* of the negotiations. As described by Fisher *et al.* (1981): in negotiations, the key to producing value is the sharing of information across different value systems. If all actors in a negotiation have the same priorities, the negotiation is likely to devolve into a zero-sum game in which one side's gain is another side's loss. The existence of different priorities between actors is not just grounds for evaluation such as in pluralistic evaluation (Hall, 2004), it is the foundation of the gains to be had from negotiating. In New Orleans, this tension plays out across neighbourhood associations, with priorities as described above, and a host of other actors with other priorities: businesses concerned with profit, elected officials with city-wide politics, and non-profits with their missions.

The specific case of New Orleans points to the wider potential of network governance. By incorporating differing priorities of different actors into negotiations, the network governance setting moves beyond policies which conform to a single view of "efficiency" and produce policies that are negotiated for efficiency across different value systems. This is the core benefit

of such systems. Network governance is a systemic way to improve policies while incorporating the different value systems of diverse actors.

In conclusion, the findings regarding the pathways of neighbourhood associations have two levels of application. The first is the importance of micro-urban issues to urban governance. Neighbourhood associations, and citizen activists within them, prioritise neighbourhood-level characteristics such as institutions, history and physical characteristics when deciding their activities. This speaks to a different brand of politics at the local level, one which focuses on local concerns such as cleaning up neighbourhoods, not "systemic change." Second, these findings have application at the broader level of network governance theory. The existence of a different set of priorities within neighbourhood associations points to a wider component of network governance: the plurality of values held by different actors in the network. This plurality of values is the basis for negotiation; network governance system derives its benefit from a negotiation process which is capable of incorporating competing value systems. The greatest advantage of a system of network governance is the ability of such a system to transcend a zero-sum, efficiency-focused policy paradigm and instead use negotiation to maximise outcomes based on the priorities of diverse actors in the system.



CHAPTER SEVEN

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Income, Age, Race and Human Capital:

Does the Neighbourhood Matter?

"I'd be absurd to go out there and assume I know what's going on out in these neighbourhoods without talking to these people."
Executive Director of the Dillard University Community Development Corporation

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter I continue to examine my central research question: what pathways do neighbourhood associations take into governance networks and policy negotiations? As discussed in Chapter Six, this discussion is anchored by a perspective that argues that community groups are reactive to policy (see Hajer, 2003), and a socio-demographic perspective which argues that community groups are primarily influenced by factors that are constant over time (see Hawkins and Percy, 1997). This chapter examines socio-demographic neighbourhood characteristics that are aggregated at the neighbourhood level, such as income and age, and traits of individuals such as human capital. The purpose of this inquiry is to further define the dynamics within governance networks and policy negotiations and the ways these dynamics address complexity and context.

Chapter Six focuses on characteristics of neighbourhoods that cannot be devolved further than neighbourhood-level, such as institutions, schools, hospitals and physical buildings, while also looking at the influence of neighbourhood history. In this chapter I examine aggregate characteristics of individuals in neighbourhoods and the impact of these factors upon the activities of neighbourhood associations. The narratives are simple; high-income residents in a neighbourhood provide financial resources for the association that allows the it to engage in more activities and programs. Large numbers of elderly residents, because of life-cycle factors, support "crime and blight" associations. And high-levels of human capital provide volunteers and effective advocates for neighbourhoods.

In each of these cases, these narratives prove over simplistic. Neighbourhood income, age and human capital change over time and the effects of these factors are mediated by neighbourhood context. Income is mediated by the perception of threat in the neighbourhood, and contentment with quality-of-life. Rich neighbourhoods often have inactive associations because the residents perceive no threat to the neighbourhood. There is no impetus to use their resources.

The impact of age is mediated by different factors. Elderly neighbourhoods, without many children, often focus on protection (see Chapter Three). However, this effect is mediated by the dynamics of the housing market and neighbourhood change; as these problems are "solved," the neighbourhood becomes more attractive to younger families, which have different priorities in the neighbourhood. This entire process is affected by differences in the life-cycle.

Race, while rarely discussed by interviewees, plays a complex and often unspoken role in these debates. Finally, human capital is critical to neighbourhood associations but not because

of its aggregation. Neighbourhood leaders describe the importance of idiosyncratic human capital. Key volunteers alter the paths of neighbourhood associations based on their concerns and specialties. Neighbourhood associations adjust their agendas in response to the expertise of their leadership.

These issues challenge the idea that communities are primarily reactive to policy ideas. Associations do not bounce from controversy to controversy. Rather, they are deeply rooted in priorities which are influenced by their physical surroundings and aggregate characteristics as a neighbourhood (Chapter Six). But these aggregate characteristics are not constant, and as they change, neighbourhood associations change with them. Associations have scopes of interest and activity that change in response to neighbourhood change and neighbourhood threat. These priorities reflect limitations of network governance, communities are involved in limited issues and do not participate in activities outside the scope of their priorities. There is limited supply for participation from the community. But neighbourhood associations also demonstrate the strength of informal networks, that is, the ability to incorporate complex contextual factors into policy negotiations. Neighbourhood associations are responsive to neighbourhood changes in demographics, changes in institutions and other context. They bring this responsiveness to policy negotiations, part of the wider embrace of complexity within network governance.

7.2 Literature and Theory

How do neighbourhood associations choose their governance networks and policy issues? The debate over the pathways of neighbourhood associations is between two primary ideas which are discussed at length in Chapter Six. The first is the idea that neighbourhood

associations are fundamentally reactive (Hajer, 2003), that they respond to a crisis or threat to the neighbourhood. As such they are less involved in policy creation than in policy adjustment (*ibid*). The other view of neighbourhood associations is that they have a set of priorities and issues that are socio-demographic and influenced by relatively permanent characteristics (see Hawkins and Percy, 1997 for examples). Neighbourhood associations, when asked directly about how they choose and engage in networks and activities, respond with explanations outside these two narratives from network governance theory. They describe pathways such as the physical characteristics of the neighbourhood, neighbourhood institutions, and neighbourhood history. Neighbourhood leaders also identify a second set of pathways: aggregate neighbourhood characteristics such as income, age, race and human capital. In this section I introduce and define these terms and contextualise them in the wider debate of socio-demographic or "responsive" pathways. As such, these neighbourhood pathways are discussed with reference to underpinning concepts such as neighbourhood change and neighbourhood choice. The result is a conceptual framework which allows for the analysis of the pathways.

7.2.1 Income

Hawkins and Percy (1997) argue that additional financial resources help an association to provide services. In this work I extend this proposition but keep its internal logic. When residents have financial resources, their associations have high capacity. Whether these associations choose to be involved in advocacy or service provision (see Chapter Three), they are in a better position to do so. In this section I use U.S. Census and American Community Survey data on

household income within neighbourhoods as a frame for a discussion about whether these neighbourhoods have associations with higher capacity.

7.2.2 Age

Discussions of neighbourhood age focus heavily on the life-cycle. Life-cycle is closely linked to residential choice (Foote *et al.,* 1970; Speare, 1970; Johnston, 1972; Golant, 1972; Guest, 1972), with a particular focus on the need for additional space while young children are in the house (Rossi, 1955). Again, the narrative for neighbourhood associations is simple; the elderly are at a different life stage and have a fundamentally different set of neighbourhood needs than families with young children. For the elderly and retired, these needs reflect a desire for quality-of-life and basic services such as street lights, good streets and transportation. Families' needs align with their children, focusing on schools and child-care. Similar observations could be made for areas hosting pre-family, young professionals, although this was not an issue within the sample.[79] I use neighbourhood age data from U.S. Census and American Community Survey to frame this discussion and evaluate claims about the interaction between the age of residents in the neighbourhood and the association's pathways.

Both income and age differ from the neighbourhood characteristics that underpin the pathways discussed in Chapter Six. Those issues were characteristics solely of the neighbourhood. Schools, the streets, services such as street lights, and even neighbourhood history cannot be broken down beyond the neighbourhood level; they are not the traits of individuals. Neighbourhood income and neighbourhood age are traits of individuals that are

[79] This is possibly due to the sample which did not draw from rapidly gentrifying neighbourhoods such as Faubourg Marigny and the Bywater.

aggregated to the neighbourhood level. In this chapter I examine the effect these aggregate traits have upon the pathways associations take into networks.

7.2.3 Human Capital

Human capital, defined as "the skills, knowledge, and experience possessed by an individual or population, viewed in terms of their value or cost to an organization or country," (New Oxford American Dictionary, 2005) could be aggregated at the neighbourhood level based on basic measures, such as education. A similar case could be made for its effect on the pathways of neighbourhood associations into networks and policy negotiations; more human capital in a neighbourhood results in more capacity by the association. However, the importance of human capital in interviews is not aggregated; neighbourhood leaders describe human capital idiosyncratically. Human capital is important because individual skills by leaders impact the direction of the association, not important because neighbourhoods have a deeper pool of volunteers from which to choose. Rather than being an aggregate measure, this is a leadership measure. Leaders change the direction of organisations.

7.2.4 Race

Little mention is made of race when associations discuss their pathways. This is particularly strange given the importance of race to the city's political scene and history (Sublette, 2008). Most racial issues in New Orleans are framed as white and black, although the Hispanic population has grown since Hurricane Katrina, in part drawn by the influx of construction jobs. Within races there are complexities, as African-Americans in New Orleans'

rough 7th Ward are famous for applying the "paper bag test" in which African-Americans are shunned if their skin is darker than a paper bag. This test has its roots in Creole culture, a uniquely New Orleanian phenomena stemming from a class of freed children of French slave owners and their slaves (Sublette, 2008) that is still powerful in the black community.

Discussions of race often happen implicitly in New Orleans through issues such as renting. Allegations of racial discrimination took the form of not allowing Section 8 renters, with government subsidised vouchers, into rental properties (Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, 2009). This issue of low-income housing is a racially charged one, particularly in New Orleans East, where a local leader claimed one third of the housing is low-income and subsidised.

Like income and age, race is an aggregated neighbourhood characteristic. Unlike income and age, it is not explicitly mentioned in interviews. However, in several of the cases examined, such racial implications lie underneath the surface.

7.2.5 Neighbourhood Choice and Neighbourhood Change

Neighbourhood residents cluster into areas based on life-cycle, income and race (Chevan, 1982). Part of this clustering is due to economic pressure, but another component is choice. Choice dynamics are constant in neighbourhoods. Tiebut (1956) frames this choice as competition between localities and residents' preferences of local service levels. DiFelicitano (2009) frames this choice in terms of selection of school districts. As previously discussed, in the Irish Channel and Central City, many homeowners lost the ability to choose neighbourhoods when property values dropped significantly due to the oil crash in the 1980s.

Over time, the choice of residents compounds and changes the neighbourhood. Jane Jacobs (1961) argues that neighbourhoods themselves have a lifecycle. She argues that mixed-use neighbourhoods depend on thriving entrepreneurship and creativity made possible by low-rent opportunities. Over time, self-selection into these neighbourhoods causes rent to rise, pricing out the type of creative use that made the neighbourhood attractive. High rents lead to specialisation, which undermines the components which made the neighbourhood attractive, leading to gradual decrease of rents and the process starting again. This cycle shows the systemic nature of neighbourhood choice.

In New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina was a catalyst for neighbourhood change; areas which did not flood, such as the Irish Channel, started to gentrify. Other areas, such as Gentilly and New Orleans East saw significant flooding and population decline. These issues of neighbourhood change also happened at a micro-level; because of damage to the housing stock, the price of rents skyrocketed, and, in response, additional units were rented.

At the broader theoretical level, the concepts of neighbourhood choice and neighbourhood change bring complexity to the debate about whether associations are reactive to crises or deal with a few key issues rooted in consistent traits of the neighbourhood. Aggregate neighbourhood characteristics such as race, income and age change over time. Sometimes this change is the very stimulus to which associations react. In this chapter, I examine how neighbourhood choice and change mediate these aggregate neighbourhood characteristics and their affects on the pathways of neighbourhood associations.

7.3 Findings

Neighbourhood leaders cite three pathways that neighbourhood associations take into governance networks and policy negotiations. These influencing factors are aggregate neighbourhood income, neighbourhood age and idiosyncratic human capital. Income is affiliated with latent capacity; neighbourhoods with high income residents have *potential* power, but are often mediated by the perceived lack of threats in these neighbourhoods. Advanced age corresponds to protectionist neighbourhood associations. Residents in later stages of their life cycle are more protective. But the impact of age is also mediated by neighbourhoods change. For example, as neighbourhoods become more attractive to younger potential residents, priorities shift from crime and blight to youth programming and schools. Human capital is a complex explanatory factor and links to issues with volunteers discussed in Chapter Four. Individual volunteers, particularly charismatic leaders, tend to focus on issues with which they are familiar, leading their neighbourhood associations into their specialties. Each of these factors is mediated by interactions with the broader systems of neighbourhood choice and neighbourhood change, and often race is an underlying and unspoken factor.

7.3.1 Aggregate Income

Having income in a neighbourhood is a benefit. It allows for increased donations by residents and often means that citizens have more free time to participate in the process, both of which theoretically increase the capacity of the neighbourhood association. In practice, these factors are not sufficient for a neighbourhood association to be active and engaged with policy networks. The capacity of a neighbourhood association also depends upon the perceived threats

People & Household Characteristics for Neighborhood Statistical Areas within Orleans Parish, 2010							
	for definitions see:	http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/def.html					
Neighbourhood Association	Algiers Point Association	Upper Audubon Association	Broadmoor Improvement Association	Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association	French Quarter Citizens Inc.
Income Distribution (2006-2010)	Algiers Point	Audubon	Broadmoor	Central City	Dillard	Dixon	French Quarter
Less than $10,000	0.9%	10.8%	12.1%	23.9%	11.1%	25.1%	6.7%
$10,000-14,999	3.4%	4.6%	3.6%	13.0%	8.6%	23.9%	4.5%
$15,000-19,999	4.1%	2.6%	7.1%	10.4%	7.9%	0.0%	7.4%
$20,000-24,999	0.8%	3.2%	5.5%	9.2%	7.0%	0.0%	4.1%
$25,000-29,999	8.7%	2.4%	2.2%	6.1%	10.2%	3.2%	9.4%
$30,000-34,999	7.0%	3.6%	8.4%	3.1%	6.0%	0.0%	4.4%
$35,000-39,999	1.8%	1.8%	3.9%	4.7%	5.6%	10.1%	1.7%
$40,000-44,999	3.2%	2.2%	2.0%	3.4%	9.2%	7.8%	5.7%
$45,000-49,999	9.9%	3.1%	3.2%	4.5%	4.6%	8.9%	1.6%
$50,000-59,999	3.6%	3.9%	8.1%	6.5%	7.0%	12.1%	6.0%
$60,000-74,999	15.0%	8.7%	7.5%	3.1%	10.7%	0.0%	10.3%
$75,000-99,999	11.2%	11.1%	19.4%	4.6%	9.1%	8.9%	9.8%
$100,000-124,999	12.9%	11.4%	6.0%	2.5%	2.1%	0.0%	4.6%
$125,000-149,999	8.9%	5.9%	1.9%	2.3%	1.1%	0.0%	5.4%
$150,000-199,999	3.2%	5.1%	5.6%	0.9%	0.0%	0.0%	7.2%
$200,000 or more	5.4%	19.7%	3.7%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	11.3%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from 2006-2010 American Community Survey							

Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association & Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Associatoin	Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	Lake Carmel Neighborhood Association	Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Pilotland Neighborhood Association		
Gentilly Terrace	Hollygrove	Irish Channel	Little Woods	Marlyville/	St. Bernard Area	Orleans Parish	United States
6.7%	6.7%	13.0%	12.9%	7.5%	35.4%	13.9%	7.2%
7.5%	17.8%	14.9%	7.2%	6.0%	11.5%	8.0%	5.5%
8.9%	14.6%	7.2%	10.0%	2.6%	0.0%	7.3%	5.3%
5.7%	6.4%	10.7%	5.8%	5.0%	0.0%	6.7%	5.5%
5.5%	7.1%	6.0%	8.6%	1.5%	13.0%	6.3%	5.2%
4.2%	8.5%	2.1%	5.4%	6.6%	5.3%	5.3%	5.3%
7.0%	2.6%	3.3%	4.6%	1.9%	6.5%	4.6%	4.9%
5.1%	6.1%	4.8%	7.3%	3.4%	4.7%	5.0%	4.9%
5.1%	3.3%	3.2%	4.5%	7.9%	6.8%	3.9%	4.3%
11.5%	9.2%	1.7%	6.0%	7.1%	11.8%	7.0%	8.2%
10.2%	7.4%	6.0%	11.0%	10.0%	3.1%	8.3%	10.3%
11.8%	6.4%	6.6%	8.6%	10.2%	1.9%	8.5%	12.3%
6.0%	2.2%	10.8%	4.3%	6.2%	0.0%	4.9%	7.8%
1.3%	0.6%	6.8%	2.6%	5.7%	0.0%	3.2%	4.5%
1.5%	0.0%	2.2%	0.9%	9.4%	0.0%	2.9%	4.4%
2.0%	1.2%	0.7%	0.2%	8.9%	0.0%	4.2%	4.2%

Table 7.3.1 Neighbourhood Income Adapted from the Greater New Orleans Data Center (GNOCDC.org)

and needs of the neighbourhood. High-income residents self-congregate into neighbourhoods with fewer problems (Chevan, 1982). Residents choose neighbourhoods because they provide excellent quality-of-life. The result is neighbourhood associations with high-income residents display low activity levels. There simply is not as much to do.

I examine three high-income neighbourhoods here: Audubon, Fontainebleau and the French Quarter (see Table 7.3.1 for income data for each neighbourhood). Each is represented by a neighbourhood association: The Upper Audubon Association, the Fontainebleau Improvement Association and French Quarter Citizens Inc. The first two of these neighbourhoods are located uptown near the universities, while the French Quarter is the primary tourism destination in New Orleans.

The Upper Audubon Association shows how neighbourhood associations with high capacity often engage in little activity as an organisation. One interviewee contends that the average value of a home in Upper Audubon is $2 million.[80] Its own residents describe it as rich, "elitist" and "upper, upper middle income." But the association takes a very limited approach to governing. The president insists that they deal with "only things that have a direct impact on Upper Audubon," limiting the association from participating in city-wide issues and more prominent protest movements. He is aware of how this limited the group, arguing that "there are so many things we can do that we don't." One member describes the association as concerned only with security because "they don't have to concern themselves with quality-of-life." She declares that the reason for the focus on security is "just because they're so elitist that they don't need anything."

[80] The President of the Upper Audubon Association thinks the number is closer to $1 million.

The president confirms that security is the primary issue for the association, arguing, that "we can't ignore our highest priority: safety." The biggest action by the neighbourhood association in recent years was the creation of a security district. One interviewee, a member of the Upper Audubon Association, argues that the reason for the security district is that the neighbourhood had gotten active in opposition to a potential expansion by Tulane University (discussed in Chapter Five), but since that issue disappeared after Hurricane Katrina it wanted to do *something* but did not know what to do, so it created a security district.[81]

The main narrative across the Upper Audubon Association is that upper-class residents in good neighbourhoods are content with their current quality-of-life. As a result, they do not need active associations. Without threats, there is little reason for someone to volunteer. The capacity of the neighbourhood remains only potential as it has no use for the financial resources of its residents. Neighbourhood association activity is mediated by the high quality-of-life that already exists in upper-class neighbourhoods.

The same pattern manifests itself in the Fontainebleau Improvement Association. The organisation shows a similar configuration to the Upper Audubon Association, with its primary interest being in security and a secondary focus on land-use. Its involvement is understated, with an explicit rule against engaging in politics or having political speakers. Association leaders admit to lacking "a galvanising issue." The association membership is aware that the association does not often need to fight, declaring that after the storm "we weren't a target" as a neighbourhood in the way that the Green Dot neighbourhoods were threatened (see Chapter

[81] The President of the Upper Audubon Association disputes this claim arguing that the interest in a security district stemmed from the structure of their previous security program, which provided security for the entire neighbourhood for 25 years despite payments from only 50 per cent of the population. He claims the security district was created to eliminate this free rider problem.

Two). Further, the neighbourhood has a number of institutional assets, from primary schools to universities.

The Fontainebleau Improvement Association is similar to Upper Audubon. It involves itself in governance networks on a limited basis. When the association does engage it is in a capacity to protect what already exists in the neighbourhood. The Fontainebleau Improvement Association also demonstrates that when it wants to get involved, it is effective. While other associations express frustration with the bureaucracy at City Hall, the Fontainebleau Improvement Association's president insists that he knows where to go in the city, saying "we're like a mini city council office," "we make the right calls and get it done." The neighbourhood association also emphasises the high quality of human capital in the neighbourhood and the association, citing personal connections of its members as a factor in association success. When the Fontainebleau Improvement Association wants to get something done, it gets done. But that does not often need to happen.

The third upper-income neighbourhood association I examine is French Quarter Citizens Inc. This association has a different context. Rather than being primarily residential, the French Quarter draws over seven million tourists each year (McNulty, 2012). There are two associations in the Quarter, the French Quarter Citizens Inc. and the Vieux Carre Property Owners Association. Both of these associations are structured around the threats posed by tourism (and businesses catering to tourists) to the residential community. These range from daily issues, such as making sure residents know when cultural events will limit road access, to a large focus on enforcement and legislation. The problems of tourists seem small, but quite dramatically affect quality-of-life. For example, residents in the French Quarter cannot leave trash bins outside, as

tourists will fill them with alcohol bottles and other unsavoury rubbish. In the Vieux Carre Property Owners Association there is also a concern that the financial resources of business will overwhelm the interests of residents.

In the French Quarter the mediation of income effects by perceived threat clearly goes in the opposite direction. Both French Quarter associations are extremely aware of the unique challenges tourism brings to the neighbourhood. As a result, they have been very active in local activities. The Vieux Carre Property Owners Association is particularly strong, being one of the few associations in the city with a full-time paid staff member. French Quarter Citizens Inc. has enough influence to have been able to convince the new police chief, Ronald Serpass, to speak at its annual open meeting and party.[82]

The two organisations cite their involvement in legislation to help protect the quality-of-life of the neighbourhood, for example, legislation limiting the hours that live music can be played at certain volumes. French Quarter Citizens Inc. insists that it has been largely successful in getting the legislative changes it wants; its new strategy is to focus on enforcement of this new legislation.

In each of these neighbourhoods, income is not sufficient for an association to have high capacity. In neighbourhoods where there is perceived threat, that threat mediates the effect of wealth: neighbourhood associations are powerful entities. But, in neighbourhoods with high quality-of-life and relatively few threats, such capacity remains latent.

The opposite occurs in low-income neighbourhoods; too much need paralyses the neighbourhood association and makes it more difficult to have an effective association. Two of

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[82] I attended this event. See Appendix II.

the lowest income neighbourhoods in the sample are Pilotland and Faubourg Lafayette (see Table 7.3.1). Pilotland is in the broader Gentilly while Faubourg Lafayette is ensconced in Central City. These locations are important; neighbourhood groups across Gentilly often lament that it is isolated from the city. Central City is more prominent, but is the most violent neighbourhood in the city.

The neighbourhood associations in these areas are often paralysed by the overwhelming challenges and lack of resources in their neighbourhoods. The president of the Pilotland Neighborhood Association explains this in detail by describing the difficulty in getting citizens involved; he argues that one of the primary needs of the neighbourhood is civic education. It is only when citizens are voting and politically active that the neighbourhood association can be effective.

The Pilotland Neighborhood Association is aware of its civic deficit and the scope of its needs. There is a particular historical awareness of the void left by commercial businesses and institutions, and engage in a concerted effort to try to bring them back. But these challenges are large for a fledgling neighbourhood association with few resources; the president of the association emphasises that much of the economic development and service provision has to come from other organisations. A local City Council staffer describes the neighbourhood as forgotten and overlooked, telling a story about how they appeared years after the storm and asking for the council office to do a public relation event in the neighbourhood. The council staff insisted that he was not aware either of the neighbourhood association, or amazingly, of the

neighbourhood itself, despite its being in his jurisdiction.[83] Somehow Pilotland has slipped through the cracks.

The former president of the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association is just as explicit in discussing the difficulties of working in a poor neighbourhood. She compares the experience to her previous volunteer activities in Detroit, where her neighbourhood association was truly representative and flush with volunteers. In her New Orleans neighbourhood, the opposite is true; it is nearly impossible to get signatures for a petition, much less volunteers. The result is that a few of the neighbours volunteer for the entire neighbourhood. These volunteers are not representative; the president emphasises that her preservation views are different than those of the majority of her neighbours. Her biggest issue is saving the historic housing but she claims that 65 per cent of the community is renting and prefers to strip and sell the valuable aspects of the houses, not save them.

The presidents of the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association and the Pilotland Neighborhood Association express these difficulties by addressing democracy, never explicitly talking about income.[84] They both cite a common strategy for neighbourhood associations to deal with low capacity, recruiting more active members into the association. The democratic theory, that more members means more influence with government, is a common belief by low-income neighbourhood associations.

As discussed in Chapter Four, a lack of volunteers is universal across associations and not unique to low-income neighbourhoods. But in low-income neighbourhoods the process is different. In high-income neighbourhoods, capacity is mediated through need. In low-income

[83] Pilotland is a self-designated neighbourhood at the corner of two different council jurisdictions.

[84] Members of both associations are critical of renters which is often subtext for race and income issues.

neighbourhoods, needs are always present, but mediated through a variety of other factors, including democratic participation.

Hawkins and Percy's (1997) theory that high income residents enables neighbourhood associations to be more effective is largely correct, but lacks context and an understanding of the mediation of other factors. When high-income residents live in a neighbourhood, the primary mediator is the perceived threat to the neighbourhood; associations leverage their wealth only when their neighbourhood faces a crisis. Much of this capacity remains untapped. In low-income neighbourhoods, where need is higher, mediation is done by democratic participation, human capital and partnerships. These associations face profound struggles and often lack the skills and wealth to address them on their own.

7.3.2 Age

Age is linked to protectionist neighbourhood associations. Elderly residents in neighbourhoods are concerned with protecting the neighbourhood while younger families focus on schools and child care. However, that link is contextualised with the effects of neighbourhood choice. Older residents become trapped in declining neighbourhoods due to drops in property values, accentuating the need to improve streets and avoid crime and blight. Once these issues are addressed, neighbourhoods become more attractive to younger residents, who move in and shift the focus to schools and youth programming.

Two neighbourhoods cite age explicitly; both are undergoing significant changes in their associations and neighbourhoods (see Table 7.3.2). The first example has been discussed repeatedly, that of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association (see Chapters Five and Six). The

People & Household Characteristics for Neighborhood Statistical Areas within Orleans Parish, 2010

for definitions see: http://www.gnocdc.org/NeighborhoodData/def.html

Neighbourhood Association	Algiers Point Association	Upper Audubon Association	Broadmoor Improvement Association	Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association	French Quarter Citizens Inc.
Age (2010)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
5 years old and under	7.0%	4.3%	6.4%	7.5%	5.9%	13.1%	0.9%
6-11 years old	5.0%	4.8%	7.2%	6.4%	6.0%	8.7%	0.4%
12-17 years old	4.0%	4.0%	8.6%	5.9%	6.9%	5.7%	0.8%
18-34 years old	25.2%	48.9%	30.4%	27.2%	24.7%	24.6%	23.4%
35-49 years old	24.3%	13.1%	18.9%	18.4%	15.1%	15.3%	24.7%
50-64 years old	24.0%	14.6%	18.1%	21.6%	21.2%	17.6%	30.7%
65-74 years old	5.7%	5.5%	5.7%	7.3%	10.7%	7.2%	13.4%
75-84 years old	3.5%	3.2%	3.4%	3.9%	7.5%	5.7%	4.5%
85 years old and older	1.4%	1.5%	1.3%	1.8%	2.0%	1.9%	1.1%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2010 Summary File 1 (SF1)							
Racial & ethnic diversity (2010)	**Algiers Point**	**Audubon**	**Broadmoor**	**Central City**	**Dillard**	**Dixon**	**French Quarter**
Black or African American	22.5%	4.8%	61.1%	72.4%	91.3%	90.3%	4.4%
White	68.9%	85.0%	28.8%	17.3%	3.3%	6.0%	87.6%

Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association & Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Associatoin	Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	Lake Carmel Neighborhood Association	Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Pilotland Neighborhood Association		
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
7.7%	8.8%	6.0%	10.2%	6.1%	10.6%	7.6%	7.9%
7.0%	8.4%	3.1%	9.5%	5.8%	7.4%	6.8%	8.0%
8.5%	8.4%	4.2%	9.3%	5.1%	10.0%	6.9%	8.2%
22.0%	21.8%	38.2%	26.7%	34.3%	21.9%	29.2%	23.2%
20.6%	17.0%	22.4%	17.9%	20.4%	14.6%	19.2%	20.7%
22.9%	19.4%	16.9%	18.5%	17.4%	21.4%	19.4%	19.0%
6.9%	9.0%	5.8%	5.1%	5.3%	6.9%	6.1%	7.0%
3.1%	5.3%	2.7%	2.2%	3.2%	5.3%	3.4%	4.2%
1.4%	2.0%	0.8%	0.7%	2.5%	2.1%	1.5%	1.8%
Gentilly Terrace	**Hollygrove**	**Irish Channel**	**Little Woods**	**Marlyville/ Fontainebleau**	**St. Bernard Area**	**Orleans Parish**	**United States**
77.8%	93.9%	39.9%	92.6%	23.9%	90.6%	59.6%	12.2%
15.3%	2.2%	49.2%	3.0%	63.9%	4.6%	30.5%	63.7%
Source Citation: GNOCDC analysis of data from U.S. Census 2010 Summary File 1 (SF1)				Greater New Orleans Community Data Center		www.gnocdc.org	

Figure Table 7.3.2 Neighbourhood Age Adapted from the Greater New Orleans Data Center (GNOCDC.org)

second is the Gentilly Terrace and Garden Neighborhood Association.

To briefly recap, the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association saw a significant shift in recent years from being a traditional "crime and blight" association to being the only neighbourhood association in the city to partner closely with the New Orleans Recreation Department.

Neighbourhood choice affects the Irish Channel in multiple ways. The first is the history of the older constituency. Many of these residents bought houses prior to the oil crash in the early 1980s. That oil crash, and the crack epidemic, undermined the value of houses in the Irish Channel. Homeowners' properties depreciated. This left many incapable of moving. This was particularly difficult as crime increased, and houses were demolished or their valuable components stripped. In better times, residents might have chosen to sell their property and leave the neighbourhood. That was no longer possible, so they engaged in an active neighbourhood association to protect the neighbourhood from crime and dilapidated houses.

After Hurricane Katrina, housing values started to rise.[85] The Irish Channel, due to its location along the natural levee of the Mississippi River, did not flood. Neighbourhood choice worked in the other direction; families seeking safe locations moved in and the dynamics of the neighbourhood changed for the better. With fewer renters and fewer low-income residents, crime and blight declined. Simultaneously, younger residents with different priorities chose to move to the neighbourhood. High on that list of different priorities was youth programs and schools.

Long-time residents are emphatic that these issues were ordered; crime and blight has to be dealt with first, only after these problems are addressed can things such as youth

[85] Property values rising create a different set of problems as the same families that saw their property values fall in the 80s are now worried that property taxes will force them to move in their retirement.

programming be started. The former president insists that she always wanted to do youth work, it was just that the crime and blight were so bad that they had to be addressed first. She insists the neighbourhood is improving and can attract families with children in part because crime and blight declined. She highlights a vision of neighbourhood change. In this model, low-income neighbourhood associations (and other forces) must address crime and blight prior to younger families moving into the neighbourhood, and the neighbourhood association can then shift to a family-friendly agenda.[86]

The neighbourhood change process highlights that, as the Irish Channel got younger, it engaged in more youth work. A struggle in Gentilly Terrace and Gardens is happening along similar lines. A local pastor describes a conflict between "old school" residents who want to focus on crime and blight, and "new school" residents who want to focus on youth. This pastor describes a rift in neighbourhood participation. He blames a participation gap that sees lower income families participate less often. This participation cleft happens on two levels. One is who participates. A number of older residents are deeply involved in the association, but members claim that the way they run meetings and the things they are interested in are off-putting to younger residents.[87] There is also a lack of representation from African-American sections of the neighbourhood. The local pastor hopes to influence the neighbourhood association to do more to reach out to these families, admitting that these priorities are rooted in his religious beliefs and his position as pastor. He argues that a key first step is reaching out to the young families to

[86] This process is disputed by the new leadership of the neighbourhood association, which insisted that a focus on crime and a focus on youth programming were reflective of different values. Addressing crime with the police was seen as being punitive, while the new leadership wanted to be proactive and preventative by ensuring the kids were in youth programs rather than committing crime.

[87] I attended a number of Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association meeting and did not notice this dynamic.

recruit representatives from this segment of the neighbourhood to be more involved in the association.

Age is rarely mentioned in other neighbourhoods, just as income and race are discussed less than physical characteristics of the neighbourhood or local institutions. Even when aggregate characteristics do impact neighbourhood association, they are mediated by other features and context. It is very hard to make generalisations about the affects of aggregate neighbourhood characteristics on associations without understanding the context of the neighbourhood. In particular, high-income neighbourhoods see the effects of their high-income residents mediated by the perceived threats to the neighbourhood. Neighbourhoods with high income and high quality-of-life have latent capacity, while neighbourhoods with wealth and a high level of perceived threat have an easier time influencing and protecting their neighbourhood. Similarly, age and lifecycle interact with the effects of neighbourhood choice. Older neighbourhoods are more protectionist, in part because older neighbourhoods have residents trapped by drops in property values. Shifts to a youth-centric agenda depend on self-selection into the neighbourhood by younger families.

7.3.3 Human Capital

In contrast to aggregate neighbourhood effects such as age and wealth, which are rarely discussed in interviews, individuals are cited as quite important for neighbourhoods. When explaining the choice of activities, or just the associations themselves, members often cite individuals and their specific characteristics as central to associations. These descriptions range from charismatic leaders, to specialists, to self-interested parties, but there is general agreement

that the agenda-setting of associations is contingent on the idiosyncratic interests and skills of specific individuals.

The influence of these idiosyncrasies is a significant departure from the aggregate neighbourhood factors I examine. Those factors focus on aggregate individual-level traits, while these descriptions focus on specific aspects of individuals within the neighbourhood. These individual descriptors loosely fall under the umbrella of human capital: skills and education.

This is a return to many of the concepts of Chapter Four, which looks at how participation underpins the democratic links of neighbourhood associations. Associations depend on a small number of volunteers, particularly charismatic leaders, showing how community and networks are linked through neighbourhood associations. In this section I examine the implications of such a model for the pathways taken by neighbourhood associations into informal networks and policy negotiations.

A number of associations depend heavily on a single charismatic leader. A member of the Pilotland Neighborhood Association refers to its president saying, "He's the man. Oh my God. He has the power. He's the spokesperson. We follow his lead. If it wasn't for him I don't think no one else would have started." In the Upper Audubon Association there are similar sentiments, saying the president "just does everything."

Even in the high capacity Broadmoor Improvement Association this phenomenon exists. In one meeting for the Broadmoor Improvement District a board member repeatedly referenced a need to "check with Latoya," the president of the association, despite the fact that the board had the power to make the money allocations under discussion. One interviewee echoes the sentiment of Latoya Cantrell's charismatic and central role in the association, insisting that

Latoya will one day be mayor and arguing that Latoya is the only person who understands the network of neighbourhood organisations and activities and how they relate to the Broadmoor Improvement Association.

These charismatic leaders have direct effects upon the activities, programs and goals of neighbourhood associations. One way in which this happens is through the abilities and interests of specific members. Latoya Cantrell has a background in education. Her association focuses largely on its local school and library, and seek to create an education corridor. Similarly, the president of French Quarter Citizens Inc. has a small hotel. He is currently working on enforcement of legislation that limits the ability of residential (non-licensed) individuals to rent out rooms for profit. This initiative is clearly both an area of expertise and self-interest.

This interaction between idiosyncratic human capital of individuals in the neighbourhood association and the association's choice of activity is not limited to charismatic leaders. Sometimes individual members influence the association through very similar means. This phenomenon was highlighted in Chapter Four as the Megaphone Model (see Figure 4.6.3). In the Upper Audubon Association it manifests itself through an archivist doing a neighbourhood history project. In Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association, a former police officer helped to start a neighbourhood watch, and a yard sale specialist organised a neighbourhood-wide yard sale. Each of these activities originates in the ability and interest of individual members to take leadership roles.

These examples are part of a broader strategy to attract volunteers, and are part of a system that leans heavily on participation. Associational agenda-setting is sensitive to the individual skills and interests of members.

7.4 Integrating Complexity

Age, income, race and idiosyncratic human capital each affect the pathways taken by neighbourhood associations into governance networks and policy negotiations. The influence of these factors is secondary to the physical factors discussed in Chapter Six, but is still instructive in understanding the choices of neighbourhood associations to engage in policy negotiations. These aggregate neighbourhood-level measures show how the traits of individuals affect the agenda of neighbourhood associations, demonstrating how long-term neighbourhood characteristics anchor these institutions activities. But the mediators of neighbourhood choice and neighbourhood change undermine the theoretical contrast between the socio-demographic and "reactive" theories of community groups. While, in New Orleans, neighbourhood associations are influenced by socio-demographic neighbourhood characteristics such as age and income, they are also reactive to changes in their neighbourhoods; for example, neighbourhood associations with high-income residents act vastly differently depending on the perceived threat to their neighbourhood. Similarly, the crime and blight preference of elderly populations is influenced by their positions in the life-cycle and the ways in which the housing market traps the elderly into rapidly changing neighbourhoods. The influence of neighbourhood context reaffirms the finding in Chapter Six: neighbourhood associations activities are *both* grounded in a set of socio-demographic priorities around neighbourhood protection and neighbourhood change, and reactive to changes in the neighbourhood. More critically, neighbourhood associations incorporate contextual factors into agenda-setting strategies. This is strong evidence that negotiations are a tool capable of integrating complexity into policy construction.

Age, income, race and idiosyncratic human capital all fit broadly within the idea that neighbourhood associations choose their agendas based upon the socio-demographic characteristics of their neighbourhoods rather than responding to the latest crisis. Elderly residents, likely due to life-cycle and the absence of children in their homes, prefer a crime and blight association, while younger residents with families prefer schools and youth programs. A neighbourhood with high-income residents has latent capacity, but this capacity often goes unused as such sorting through neighbourhood choice results in high-income residents living in neighbourhoods which have fewer perceived threats to their quality-of-life. Race is rarely mentioned but is related to concerns about neighbourhood change and increased renters. Finally, the skills of leaders in neighbourhood associations dramatically alter the direction associations choose to take.

Each of these findings is muted and conditioned in interviews when compared to the overwhelming evidence of the importance of physical characteristics and institutions within a neighbourhood (see Chapter Six). They support a similar narrative. Aggregated neighbourhood characteristics, such as income, race and age, underpin core values for neighbourhood associations. These values affect the type of policy negotiations in which associations choose to participate. Neighbourhood associations have a core to their agenda that is dependent on the type of neighbourhood in which they are located, but the conditions and context of these effects is an important limitation for this narrative. While it is true that a socio-demographic characteristic such as age influences an association's agenda, the examples to support this specifically referenced how a changing age-range in a neighbourhood results in changed priorities for an association. As the Irish Channel and Gentilly Terrace and Gardens neighbourhoods got younger,

there was an increased emphasis on youth programming. Neighbourhood change is itself a "stimulus" for neighbourhood action; as neighbourhoods undergoes demographic changes, their associations react and reset their agendas.

In Chapter Six, neighbourhood associations prioritise their physical neighbourhood, a permanent consideration, but are extremely responsive to threats to these physical characteristics and institutions. Similarly, neighbourhood associations with aggregate characteristics have preferences and priorities for activities, but these associations are reactive to changes in these characteristics. Thus, organisations are reactive (see Hajer, 2003) and relatively stable (see Hawkins and Percy, 1997). These associations have a scope of priorities. Their activities come within this scope. However, within those boundaries, they are extremely reactive to threats; for example, if a physical institution is threatened, neighbourhood associations prioritise it immediately.

This picture of neighbourhood associations as both grounded in priorities and reactive to changes within their scope of interest has implications for two different aspects of wider network governance theory. The first is that it reaffirms the limitations of community involvement and reaffirms the role of traditional governmental institutions as service-providers. The second is that it demonstrates how actors in network governance incorporate a tremendous amount of complexity and context into policy negotiations.

Nowhere in the scope of activities engaged in by neighbourhood associations is service-delivery. This is not surprising: neighbourhood associations lack interest in providing services. The finding that neighbourhood associations are reactive organisations only within the scope of those things they find important reintroduces the idea of supply into network governance. These

findings indicate that, in New Orleans, there is only supply for network solutions in certain policy spheres. Neighbourhood associations want to be involved in governance networks when those networks deal with local institutions, but largely eschew and are unresponsive to similar networks around service-delivery. That reaffirms the role of government as a primary service-provider and places natural limitations on the use of governance networks to address certain policies.

While the impact of age, income, race and human capital display the limitations of using informal networks to negotiate policy, they also display a key strength. The influence of these aggregate neighbourhood characteristics on the agendas of associations is complex. Impact is different depending on specific neighbourhood context. This type of complexity is extremely difficult to incorporate into policy (Hawe *et al.*, 2004). Wagenaar (2007) argues that citizens are neither qualified nor interested in solving the complex problems of government. These findings show something more nuanced; neighbourhood associations are generally not interested in broader policy issues, but bring particular qualifications to policy discussions. Neighbourhood associations contribute to policy negotiations by incorporating neighbourhood context into policy deliberations. They do not show an ability to single-handedly create or execute large policies, but their involvement in policy networks leads to better incorporation of complexity stemming from local nuance. They make this contribution because this nuance is critical to their agenda-setting; local knowledge is a part of the fabric of these associations. Torfing *et al.* (2009) argue that networks are increasingly seen as a tool to address complex problems because of their ability to link government with community. In neighbourhood associations, one mechanism for doing this is the ability of neighbourhood and community groups to adjust to slight changes in

neighbourhood context. When neighbourhood associations bring neighbourhood context into a governance network, they simultaneously bring subtle adjustments that account for neighbourhood context and change. This is a fundamental strength of network governance; its ability to integrate context and complexity into policy.



CHAPTER EIGHT

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Embracing Complexity and Informal Networks

"It's how I got stuff done, I just called them, harassed the hell out of them."
Former president of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association

"We have everything they need, except we don't have the power to do anything"
President of the Pilotland Neighborhood Association

8.1 Introduction and Summary of Findings

The fundamental questions of this thesis examine informal networks and the impact these networks have upon governance. This inquiry is set in the theoretical framework of network governance and builds theory to explain how informal networks negotiate with one another. This is studied in the context of New Orleans, where many of these issues came to a head after Hurricane Katrina and the ensuing failures of the levee caused the city to flood (Baltimore, 2009; Slepski, 2007). Both network governance theory and the New Orleans case speak to a wider issue: complexity in the policy world that comes from community groups, informal actors and different values. One approach to this complexity is to simplify it (see Hawe *et al.*, 2004 on treating complex interventions like simple interventions), allowing only policy experts to make

decisions, narrowing the goals of policy to easily measured goals, minimising the impact of context and applying "what works" from a cadre of research approved options to as many contexts as possible (Hawe *et al.*, 2004). Using informal networks in policy formulation does the opposite; it embraces complexity by including multiple actors, multiple value systems, acknowledging the importance of context, and using negotiations within informal networks as a way of integrating complex factors into policy creation. In this chapter I argue for an embrace of complexity. I argue that policy is complex, that network governance is a theoretical framework to understand this complexity, and that embracing such policy leads to better policy and a specific urban agenda.

This discussion of complexity builds upon findings about the governance of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. This research focuses specifically on unpacking network governance; moving from a largely theoretical academic literature to specific examples of how it works in practice (for other examples see Nyseth, 2008; Sørensen and Torfing, 2009; Damgaard and Torfing, 2010). The research is structured around neighbourhood associations, which played key roles in the post-Katrina New Orleans context. The research asks a series of direct and grounded questions about neighbourhood associations and their functions and roles in network governance. The research question is: what pathways do neighbourhood associations take into governance networks and policy negotiations? A series of practical sub-questions structured the thesis, including: What are the characteristics of neighbourhood associations? In what activities do they engage? What types of relationships do they have with other actors in informal networks? How do they decide in which activities to engage? How can the diversities of activities by neighbourhood associations be explained?

These questions relate to a number of key themes in network governance. The literature on network governance focuses on democratic anchorage and efficiency. Debates include whether networks improve or detract from the democratic nature of the governing process (Klijn and Skelcher, 2005) and whether using a "system" of network governance improves the outcomes of governance. This second question assumes that network governance is a full system, rather than a supplemental aspect of typical governance systems, a theoretical assumption questioned both in the literature (Gunasekara, 2008) and in these findings. In keeping with the criticisms of Gunasekara (2008), this research supports the idea that negotiations within network governance are not new, and more critically, do not constitute a different system of governing. Negotiations and informal networks are embedded into everyday processes and governance systems. They do not replace them. Network governance theory is best used to understand these activities that already happen within government (and outside of it). This is not to say that all governance is "network governance," but instead to emphasise that elements of network governance are present in most governance systems. Negotiations can be increased or decreased, actors included or excluded, but such decisions happen in a context that already has partially embraced (often unintentionally) network governance principles.

In examining network governance in post-Katrina New Orleans, a host of themes new to network governance emerged, themes such as differing values, the importance of conflict in informal networks, and the nature of power. These themes are new to network governance but not to the study of community organisations (Florin and Wandersman, 1990). The new themes point to a need for a fundamental reconfiguration of network governance theory, one which

explicitly and constantly acknowledges the role that a plurality of actors plays in the governance system and incorporates more completely findings from the field of community organisations.

In this research, I explicitly link what organisations are with what they do, based upon the philosophy of Korsgaard (2009), which highlights the role of "self-constitution." Examining neighbourhood associations shows fundamental flaws of the dominant narrative of community organisations as "parallel institutions" and "incorporated institutions" (Chaskin and Garg, 1997) that provide services (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). Instead, neighbourhood associations in New Orleans focus on the dual roles of protecting their neighbourhoods and changing them. They take different strategies in doing so; some organisations focus on influencing other institutions, while others develop their own programming. These findings highlight the ways in which network governance theory needs to move away from a perspective that focuses on government priorities and objectives, the type of perspective that caused Stoker to state, "governance is the acceptable face of spending cuts." Instead, network governance theory needs to incorporate multiple sets of values and objectives from multiple actors.

These neighbourhood associations also demonstrated ways in which democratic anchorage occurs in New Orleans. While democratic anchorage is typically understood as happening through elected officials (Torfing, 2005), in New Orleans, democratic anchorage occurs through a process of volunteerism with local associations. There is demand for this system of democracy by volunteers both from elected officials, who depend on these associations for information about their constituencies, and from residents who often feel that government had become too disconnected from the people. But such a system of democratic anchorage has drawbacks as well. It quickly burns out its volunteers, and these associations must constantly

develop strategies to recruit new volunteers. This need for additional volunteers creates opportunities for those concerned about their neighbourhood, but it also makes these neighbourhood associations prone to abuse and control by a small number of volunteers.

At the level of network governance theory, this research shows that New Orleans has engaged in "democratic innovation," (Pierre, 2009) from the perspective of network governance. The link between neighbourhood associations, their networks, and their communities may not be innovative in the sense that it is something new to cities. But it is something new to network governance theory, which had not previously tied volunteerism and organic community representation to its conception of democratic anchorage.

The study also adds to existing theory on how different actors relate to one another in network governance. Brown and Keast (2003) had identified three "Cs;" categories of relationships based upon the scope of the partnership and the length of the partnership. In examining existing relationships between neighbourhood associations and their networks, a key missing piece to existing theory was exposed. In existing literature (see Brown and Keast, 2003), actors in governance networks are assumed to be partners and working together. In New Orleans, associations often injected themselves into networks while engaging in conflict. Such conflict is not unusual in the literature on urban governance (see Arnold, 1979), but is not found in network configurations. The concept of conflict in networks is a major contribution to theory in this work.

The investigation of relationships between actors in New Orleans governance networks also highlights the existence of collegial relationships, which feature long-term relationships with relatively little partnership. Just as the actors in these networks can be extremely informal organisations (City Works, 2010), the relationships themselves can be nuanced, long-lasting and

informal. Looking at the scope of relationships by any given actor, the complexity of a system of networks stands out. These informal, collegial relationships stretch across governance networks that form around specific policy issues, adding another dimension to the analysis of relationships in network governance.

These neighbourhood associations engage in a wide variety of activities and participate in an array of networks. The pathways they take into these different activities and networks are predictable. The primary pathways occur at the neighbourhood level; associations engage with networks when policies affect the physical characteristics of the neighbourhood, the institutions in the neighbourhood and the neighbourhood's history. There are also a number of factors, such as wealth and age of the neighbourhood, that help explain neighbourhood activity. But these factors are dependent upon and mediated by context. High levels of wealth, while having plenty of latent capacity from financial resources, often result in less activity by a neighbourhood association because this wealth is concentrated in neighbourhoods less threatened and which perceive themselves as having fewer needs. Neighbourhoods with mostly elderly residents typically have "crime and blight" associations that focus on protection, while neighbourhoods featuring parents with young children often engage in more youth programming. However, these effects are mediated by neighbourhood choice and neighbourhood need.

These pathways highlight neighbourhood priorities such as local institutions and physical features of the neighbourhood. The implications of these priorities for urban governance are examined in Section 8.3.3. In the context of network governance theory, these findings show that a critical feature of network governance is the negotiation between competing values and objectives coming from various actors.

Taken together, these findings improve network governance theory. Such improved theory helps to describe and acknowledge a complex world. It has direct implications for the best manner in which to deal with such complexity It is dealt with by embracing multiple value systems and multiple actors. However, these findings need also be judged in reference to the specific context in which they occurred. These findings were not collected in a comparative study. Instead, they were collected from an exceptional case: that of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. The goal of the research is not to provide generalizable findings which can be transferred to other localities intact, but to build theory against which other cases can be tested. Bissinger (1997) describes his single case of Philadelphia saying:

> "This book is about one city in the United States. But it isn't hyperbole to say that it could have been written about virtually any major city in North America. No two cities are alike--each has its own character and identity and spirit--but in all of them, the struggle for survival and finding a place in the changing landscape of the country goes on without relief."

I make a similar case for New Orleans. While Hurricane Katrina exaggerated many of the problems found in the New Orleans, the problems themselves can be seen in any number of cities. The New Orleans post-Katrina context was unique, but many of the issues of recovery[88] are similar to those faced in other cities: problems of disconnection between communities and government, urban poverty and failing institutions are found across cultures and contexts. Given these similarities, I use this chapter to discuss the implications of these findings, not that they be considered predictive of other contexts and cases, but that they be considered as the means by which the case of New Orleans might inform future study and governance.

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[88] New Orleanians often distinguish between disaster relief, such as was provided to save individuals from the immediate effects of the storm, and disaster recovery, which addresses larger systematic issues of getting the city back on its feet.

8.2 Network Governance as a Way to Understand the World

One significant departure from the network governance literature here is that network governance is typically described as a distinctive system (see Torfing, 2005); Gunasekara (2008) argues that network governance is not new, and is already a common component of governance. There are two components to this disagreement. The first is about "newness;" does network governance represent something different? While numerous authors assert that a focus on informal networks is increasing (Katz and Mair, 1995; Castells, 1996; Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999; Ornstein and Mann, 2000; Bingham *et al.*, 2005; Blyth and Katz, 2005), it has most certainly existed in government for some time (Gunasekara, 2008).

The second argument is about whether network governance can be considered a distinctive system which can be chosen among other options. The idea that network governance can be "chosen" to be used in a region (country or city), is pervasive in the literature, but ultimately unhelpful. Instead, most examples of network governance show informal networks and negotiations occurring in the context of a more formal system (see Nyseth, 2008; this work serves as another example). This theoretical shift has serious implications for the meaning of network governance; no longer is it about "replacing" government with informal networks. If network governance is embedded in systems, the theory surrounding it is useful for understanding those systems. One of its primary uses is that it is a more accurate way to understand the world. Using network governance theory as a tool to understand the world is a way to understand the complexity derived from having multiple actors, values and contexts involved in a given policy decision. It is a useful tool, one that accounts for the types of pressure

neighbourhood associations so often used in New Orleans to affect policy, and one that applies to national and international settings.

A helpful contrast to using network governance to understand the world is to look at the assumptions that underlie knowledge transfer. Knowledge transfer is a concept from evidence-based social interventions; it relies on using medical methodology, such as random control trials, to prove social programs work, then implementing these policies broadly (Lavis *et al.*, 2003). The policy framework is an attempt to maximise outcomes on defined metrics for low costs. But the assumptions are myriad and often problematic. Knowledge transfer assumes outcomes represent the goals of the program, can be measured, and that the world is such that the same program will be effective in different contexts (Hawe *et al.*, 2004). These assumptions do much of the hard work of policy and each of these assumptions impacts the final policy. To make these decisions about what metrics to use to define a project, or about whether a policy should be tailored to its specific context, without involving a wider set of actors is, in itself, a demonstration of power and exclusion.

It also ignores the jockeying behind the scenes that goes into these definitions. Defining policy as output by cost places the decisions made about goals and metrics outside the policy-making process. To include decisions about goals is to emphasise the importance of competing values and actors and to move towards informal networks and policy negotiations. Monolithic definition of outcomes in knowledge transfer is not only a narrowing of the definition of policy, it is also a misrepresentation of what happens. As seen over and over in the examples in this study, actors in governance networks engage in negotiations on these issues. If they are not invited to the negotiations, they force themselves into the discussion. This conflict is a central

finding, and a critical addition to network governance theory. Many disputes have to do with differing priorities and values that inform policy, as exemplified by neighbourhood organisations that worry about neighbourhood change brought by economic development. The theoretical framework of knowledge transfer is not capable of addressing multiple values and multiple actors. Instead, it assumes that its narrow focus on output per cost developed by a group of experts can resolve such issues (Lavis *et al.*, 2003). Such an approach has an appeal, as it makes the policy process seem cleaner; but to narrow the policy-process by ignoring the fight over objectives is misleading. It enshrines a set of values by ignoring the complexity of multiple value sets and by excluding the "wrong" actors from the process. It calls for a simple, technocratic understanding of "success" to be administered by experts.

Contrast this with the approach to complexity in network governance theory. Rather than trying to simplify the process and minimise the impact of context and differing values, network governance features as a first principle the need to include multiple actors and negotiate across the differences between them. This research builds network governance theory that, rather than minimise the number of actors by limiting decisions to professionals, assumes local actors and local context are critical to policy success. Such an approach embraces the messiness and conflict of the policy world and provides tools for understanding it. In knowledge transfer, such negotiations are largely considered beside the point, and to be avoided. Network governance theory, by acknowledging the role of informal actors and the importance of multiple values sets and objectives, is better positioned to understand negotiations during the objective-setting stages of policy creation. It embraces complexity, and emphasises the negotiations that integrate such differences. As such, it is a preferable means to understand the policy process.

8.3 "Efficient" Network Governance

By incorporating negotiations into the theoretical construction of the policy process, network governance better represents the informal impact of multiple actors in policy creation. Thus, the network governance lens is useful when considering governance. But networks and negotiations also can be embraced or eschewed by policy-makers and other actors. In this way, network governance is not just a means to understand the world, but also a means to include more actors in the governing process.[89] Just as network governance theory provides an advantage for understanding the world in its approach to complexity, using networks and negotiations provide policymakers advantages in formulating policy.

The fundamental advantage to negotiation is that, instead of basing efficiency on a quasi-scientific model that is highly dependent upon the proxies used to measure outputs and outcomes, negotiations incorporate the values and goals of multiple actors, in turn incorporating the complex knowledge underpinning each set of values. One of the strengths of negotiation as a process is that it is most effective when different parties have different values; this means the negotiation is not "zero-sum" and more efficient outcomes can be created. Thus, it reflects Surowiecki's (2003) theories regarding the wisdom of crowds. In futures markets and the other wisdom of crowds scenarios used by Surowiecki (*ibid*), one of the requirements of positive outcomes stemming from crowds is that these crowds have individual and differing opinions and information. In the complex world of social policy, allowing actors to represent their own values and views is much less likely to grossly misrepresent these values than would occur by having a single actor artificially assign a proxy as an outcome measurement. Further, negotiations limit a

[89] Albeit, one that almost all governments employ at one time or another, rarely using the formal language of network governance.

problem common to evaluation in which the program is manipulated to produce whatever metrics have been selected, losing sight of the mission of the policy.[90] Thus, using standard measurements of outputs and outcomes warps policy, while using the negotiation tactics in network governance incorporates complex objectives.

Benefits derived from the incorporation of complex agendas from multiple actors assume that the negotiations in network governance function. A critic might argue that such an informal system empowers the wrong people. A less cynical reader might still ask what policy reforms could be made to enable such an informal system of negotiation, something discussed more explicitly for the urban context in Section 8.3.1. But these are the wrong questions, because they assume government is in control and capable of enabling network governance. Network governance literature consistently argues for meta-governance as a solution to equity worries about the process of network governance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005; Torfing, 2005). But such an assumption ignores key qualities of network governance. In New Orleans, networks were not created by government. Networks were impromptu, and actors with a stake in the policy discussion fought to be included.

Spontaneity and complexity are critical components of governance networks, and paint a different picture than that implied by the meta-governance consensus. In New Orleans, network governance is not dependent upon a benevolent government willing to give up power to engage in a process that includes more actors. Rather, governance networks are thrust upon local government, and occur outside of local government, when local actors use creative and coercive

[90] This flaw of evaluation-driven policy, and the outcome of metrics driving policy, is often referred to as Campbell's law. An example in contemporary U.S. policy is the way No Child Left Behind focuses U.S. schools on test scores, creating schools that value test scores (and test prep) over learning.

ways to insert themselves into the governing process. The rooting of power and conflict in interest are key additions to network governance theory.

This distinction between governmental meta-governance and local protest is critical, as it points away from the adoption of network governance by government. Power in network governance stems not only from traditional means such as money (see Gaventa, 2003), decision-making authority (Lukes, 1974) or the ability to set the agenda, (*ibid*) but also from being impacted by policy itself. Actors influenced by policy seek to insert themselves into the process. This is inevitable.

Thus, the decision by government and powerful actors is not whether to include these actors in the system; the question is when to adopt and incorporate community actors. One approach, often seen in New Orleans, is to exclude actors from the process. However, this cannot last indefinitely. Instead, it both delays their involvement and makes conflict more likely. The other approach is to involve a wide variety of actors early in the process and in meaningful ways. By inviting the actors who are affected by policy to help set objectives and create policy, conflict is avoided and value can be found constructively.

The question for powerful actors is temporal and normative, but it is one that must be asked. To exclude other actors from the process is not in their power; to attempt to do so pushes their involvement down the road and makes conflict more likely. In contrast, involving other actors in the process early means working with these actors to incorporate their values.

Similarly, other actors in governance networks, like neighbourhood associations in New Orleans, need not be dependent upon government, business or other established actors in a governance network to give them power. The New Orleans example shows that such

organisations have latent power stemming from the impact that policy will have on them. Network governance does not require small actors to be given power; their impact in the network is dependent upon the extent to which the decisions at hand are influenced by the policy. The ensuing governance network and negotiations are organic; they grow from the complex dynamics of the specific situation.

The observation that involvement and power by other actors depends on the extent to which these actors are influenced by policy and interested in policy cuts the other direction as well. As seen in Chapter Three, neighbourhood associations rarely engage in service-delivery. While this is not true of non-profits and faith-based organisations (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; Cnaan, 2006), it shows how informal networks can result in limited participation. Neighbourhood associations do not see service-delivery as their responsibility. Thus, contrary to political hopes (see Building Big Society, 2010), it is unlikely that there is capacity in communities waiting to be tapped to improve and reduce the cost of services. The ways to bring hesitant members into governance networks are to increase supply. One way to make it worth the time for volunteers is to increase the importance of the volunteer component by engaging them in activities higher on Arnstein's ladder of participation (1969). Increasing the responsibilities of informal actors increases their interest. Similarly, convincing informal actors that it is in their interest to be involved has the potential to increase participation. But these approaches require culture and value changes, particularly when it comes to community groups and neighbourhood associations. These associations struggle to find volunteers and have relatively low capacity. They are willing to force themselves into policy networks when issues affect them directly, but hesitant to do so otherwise.

The organic nature of network governance is ultimately its greatest advantage; the system of governance shows the ability to integrate complex situations and values to create new policy solutions. But this complexity is also a fact of life; networks and outside actors exist in virtually every system, and often use informal means to influence the proceedings.[91] The question before actors such as governments, businesses or neighbourhood associations is not whether to choose negotiations, but when to engage in them. Reorganising governance practices to include more areas earlier is a return to the principle of the wisdom of crowds; it acknowledges the varying perspective of a plurality of actors, and rather than minimising the impact of such views, embraces them as a means to improve policy. Policy-makers who refuse to do so risk sticking their heads in the sand and facing conflict from community actors later in the process. Policy-makers who embrace multiple actors and perspectives early on benefit from creative solutions that address multiple constituencies and objectives through negotiations.

8.4 Urban Findings and Implications

The theoretical argument for network governance as an embrace of complexity is grounded in findings from the urban context in post-Katrina New Orleans. These findings have particular and specific implications for urban contexts. The focus by neighbourhood associations on neighbourhood history, institutions and physical features lays the groundwork for a new urban agenda, one which enables community input and local knowledge. The resulting implications for process and policy demonstrate concrete applications of broader network governance theory, and show how these ideas play out in a specific policy sphere.

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[91] Even in the monolithic communist government of China, there is evidence that local opposition is affecting development projects (Land, 2012).

What emerges from this study is a clear picture of the integration of neighbourhood associations into the governance system in New Orleans. These associations focus on neighbourhood protection and a subset of them add priorities around neighbourhood change (see Chapter Three). The specific issues chosen are often linked to physical characteristics or history of the neighbourhood (see Chapter Six). Aggregated characteristics of individual residents, such as wealth and age, play a role in these activities as well, but it is indirect and mediated by the broader neighbourhood context (see Chapter Seven). In attempting to achieve these priorities, neighbourhood associations engage in an active strategy of partnering with non-profits. When they are unhappy with their influence, they engage in conflict strategies as well. All of this work is underpinned by a system of democratic anchorage which links associations to their communities through key volunteers who are on the verge of burning out (see Chapter Four).

These findings present similar questions for the urban context as the theoretical questions examined above. How can informal networks integrate complex values at the urban level? What are the policy frameworks and best practices which enable that integration? What activities are likely to be emphasised in such an urban governance system?

8.5 Process Reforms in Urban Network Governance

In New Orleans, neighbourhood associations bring local values to governance networks and help incorporate local knowledge into the policy process. But this process is an imperfect one, as seen by the frequent conflicts between neighbourhood associations and their governments, and the value of such local knowledge is contested. This section lays out a series of practical reforms that are grounded in the assumption, explained for theoretical reasons above,

that participation from multiple actors in informal networks should be encouraged. Embracing the value of local knowledge and participation requires reorganising the policy process to encourage such participation. Such reorganisation could include changing the timing of public meetings to allow for attendance by workers, allowing for increased electronic participation, training "translators" to bridge the language divide between professional policy-makers and community members, and establishing norms which encourage actors to bring community actors into policy networks early and to be responsive throughout the policy process.

Access to participation by citizens is a critical issue in a system which embraces multiple opinions and perspectives. Because of this, special attention needs be paid to making participation more accessible to all citizens. One area in which cities often fail is that of public meetings. Regular meetings are typically held during the day to make them convenient for professional politicians, making it extremely difficult for blue-collar or service-industry workers to participate. Indeed, running a neighbourhood association is almost a full-time job; it requires someone without a day job to attend the cornucopia of meetings. If a commitment is made to participation and local knowledge, it is necessary to address the inequalities in the opportunity to participate.

An easy place to start opening up the participatory process is changing the schedule and nature of public meetings. To increase participation, open meetings should be held in the evenings and weekends. Similarly, testimony and public input should be able to be accepted via online communication and public meetings should be accessible via online recordings.[92] Many of these innovations are being implemented in New Orleans; I specifically attended a training for

[92] Such a focus on the internet has issues of access as well, particularly as low-income families are not likely to have internet service, but it is a start that makes materials more accessible to residents.

neighbourhood associations that taught associations to contribute to code enforcement hearings by electronically submitting evidence so that neighbourhood leaders would not have to show up at City Hall for the hearings. The mayor has led a series of popular public meetings around the priorities of the budget that brought key departmental leaders into the community to answer questions and gave neighbourhood residents a chance to help set the priorities of the city budget. In the smaller sense, adjusting participation methods allows people to participate without taking a day off work. Bigger picture, the participatory process needs to be structured with the ease of the participant as the core principle. Until this is done, participatory principles run the risk of excluding vulnerable swathes of the population.

Another way to encourage participation is to bridge the disconnect between the culture, ideas, priorities and, significantly, language, that exists between neighbourhood leaders and policy experts. The policy world is steeped in its own jargon and preferred analysis. The Dictionary of Modern American Usage (Garner, 1998) describes bureaucratese as "the jargon of bureaucrats," and "a type of writing characterised by buried verbs, passive voice, overlong sentences, and loose grammar."[93] Kristina Ford explicitly addresses the inaccessibility of policy-speak in *The Trouble with City Planning (*2010), arguing that city planning as a profession needs to make plans more accessible to average citizens.

There is an important distinction between expertise and having the language skills to convey policy ideas. As described above, local knowledge can be considered a type of expertise[94] in a system that embraces multiple values and perspectives. Such knowledge is key to network governance (Sørensen and Torfing, 2005); it is the voice of those with participatory knowledge

[93] Note the similarity to academicese.

[94] Simmons (2012) argues that the internet has helped popularise and legitimise local knowledge from sports fans.

of a policy. How can this local knowledge be communicated across cultural and language divides stemming from varying levels of education?

One way to address the disconnect in language between professional policy-makers and neighbourhood leaders is through the training and use of policy "translators." Neighbourhood associations, believing that their arguments are not always taken seriously because of such cultural barriers, often seek out professionals to help them express their policy concerns. An example is the land-use case of 1031 Canal Street that occurred in the French Quarter. The Vieux Carre Property Owners Association was concerned that its arguments, rooted in history of the neighbourhood and scepticism of a developer who had failed the neighbourhood before, would be overwhelmed by the attractiveness of "development" logic that would point out the jobs and increased taxes to be created by the development. The neighbourhood association asked a number of local academics and professionals to write in support of their argument.[95] The concern of the neighbourhood association was not that their arguments were insufficient, rather, that these arguments were insufficiently appreciated or insufficiently understood and needed to be translated.

These values are parallel justifications for outcomes and can exist without ever interacting with more traditional economic arguments. The 1031 Canal Street example shows this clearly; business and policy actors explicitly deal in economic values, while neighbourhood actors emphasise values such as history, trust and the integrity of the neighbourhood. It is extremely challenging to negotiate across these values, but in the 1031 Canal Street example, it

[95] I was asked and submitted a letter in opposition to the proposed changes to allow for a taller building at 1031 Canal Street.

is made tougher by differences in language and education. Before different value systems can be weighed against each other, the arguments must be understood by each side.

The Vieux Carre Property Owners Association specifically sought out "translators" who spoke the language of policy to make its argument regarding the proposed 1031 Canal Street development. In doing so, it explicitly acknowledged the gap in language and values between neighbourhood actors and other actors in the network. Policy-makers, local governments and businesses would be wise to train and employ individuals designed to do the same thing. All parties stand to gain by understanding the arguments from the other side; again, an embrace of complex perspectives that allows for negotiated compromise instead of political conflict and jockeying is preferable.[96]

Encouraging participation by changing meeting times or investing staff in "translating" policy concerns is part of a larger picture culture shift, one that respects actors that have informal relationships inside of governance networks. Neighbourhood associations have their own informal ways to judge this culture of respect; they evaluate their relationships on two simple metrics that reflect this understanding of the world. Neighbourhood associations evaluate their partnerships based upon whether they are included early in the policy process and whether organisations (or government) respond to them in a timely manner.

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[96] The mayoral administration in New Orleans recently hired a series of liaisons for its Neighborhood Engagement Office. At almost every neighbourhood association meeting I attended, one of these five employees attended. In attempting their jobs, they often phrased their responsibilities as one of linking neighbourhood associations to the appropriate contact within city government. This often frustrated the neighbourhood associations, who felt linking them was insufficient and wanted advocates for their policy ideas. French Quarter Citizens Inc. even went so far as to set up a meeting with Water and Sewage solely to test and see if the new Neighbourhood Engagement Office was on their side or that of the administration. While not completely solving these situations, a first step might be to explicitly make such liaisons translators for neighbourhood associations; to make them like lawyers who represent neighbourhood associations in such situations and translate their concerns into the appropriate bureaucratese. Doing so would alleviate troubling power dynamics by using city employees to support neighbourhood associations, and would explicitly address the difficulty of translating local knowledge.

Focusing on entry into the negotiation and responsiveness to all actors provides a practical roadmap for government. It is a precondition for the negotiations which theoretically drive network governance. Culture changes, such as inviting neighbourhood associations into the process, or assigning staff to respond to them via email and be a liaison, are relatively straight forward changes that could significantly alter relationships with such organisations and avoid conflict.

In summary, this research reveals a number of simple reforms to reduce conflict in urban network governance and improve policy by incorporating local knowledge and neighbourhood associations. Individual actors can involve neighbourhood associations early in the process, and give priority to quick responses to their inquiries.[97] System-wide, reforms can be made to encourage participation and make it easier for non-professionals to be involved by changing the times of meetings, allowing for electronic submission of public comment, and posting recordings of public meetings online. Finally, the use of staff or outside experts as translators can help to mediate cultural differences, language differences and value differences across the network. These process solutions do not change the power dynamics of the network immediately, nor do they change the agenda of a governance network (both of these issues are addressed in the urban context in Section 8.3.3), but they begin to change the culture of how local knowledge and neighbourhood participation are valued in urban network governance.

[97] Of course, this works the opposite way, neighbourhood associations can and should fight for early inclusion in the process. In my experience, they do not require this reminder.

8.6 A New Urban Agenda

Stephen Lukes (1974) argues that power comes from the ability to set the agenda. The values, priorities and pathways of neighbourhood associations in post-Katrina New Orleans are clearly disconnected from the broader priorities of the city's administration. While wider political narratives focus on budget and services, neighbourhood associations focus on local buildings, institutions and history. Conflating the consensus of neighbourhood associations and the community-at-large is problematic. As described at length in Chapter Four, neighbourhood associations thrive on intense participation by a few key volunteers, and, are often not electorally representative of their communities. However, this research has repeatedly found that neighbourhood-level factors and processes are critical to urban network governance. The disparity in values between actors in urban governance networks speaks to an opportunity to reconfigure the urban agenda. In this section I examine what an agenda would look like *if* the priorities and values of neighbourhood associations were adopted, and the political implications of that adoption.

The neighbourhood urban agenda proposed here, based upon the values and activities of neighbourhood associations, is best understood as a version of James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's (1982) theory of broken windows. The broken windows theory argues that one way to limit crime is by addressing small, aesthetic, problems in cities. The original example is that of a broken window. A later example is the reforms in New York that publicly enforced minor infractions for not paying fees for public transportation (Gladwell, 2000). By doing so, the theory goes, subtle signals are sent that a locality is not the type of place in which one commits a crime.

The broken windows theory focuses on enforcement; by enforcing less-serious crimes, serious crimes can be avoided. The neighbourhood urban agenda extends this idea to the physical characteristics in the neighbourhood. It argues for fixing pot holes,[98] addressing blighted houses, and focusing on key institutions in the neighbourhood. Doing so represents a significant departure from current budgetary practice that focuses on services. Improving the physical neighbourhood can be done through investment into the physical infrastructure of the neighbourhood by addressing issues such as blighted houses, abandoned storefronts, damaged streets, refurbishing playgrounds, and repairing hospitals and schools.

The idea that community members are primarily concerned with their physical neighbourhood is not new. Naomi Eisenstadt (2011), as director of the Sure Start program, built trust with local communities in the United Kingdom by building playgrounds, then used that trust to promote pre-natal and parenting classes. This neighbourhood urban agenda proposes not just to focus on these physical investments for the sake of building trust between communities and policy-makers, but to make them the central component of an agenda. The primary purposes of such investments are cleaning neighbourhoods and invigorating local institutions.

If the principle of investing in the physical neighbourhood is to be embraced, a key question is how this policy is distinct from current policy. In New Orleans a good example of this contrast is education reform. The New Orleans education system is considered a prominent example of the front wave of education reform; it emphasises charter schools, open enrolment, closing failing schools, hiring youth "outsider" teachers, and privatisation. Each of these components involves *weakening* the link between physical structures and institutions. With

[98] I firmly believe that the most accurate definition of a "community meeting" is one in which an individual argues passionately for a pothole in the neighbourhood to be fixed regardless of the actual purpose or topic of the meeting.

charter schools, neighbourhood residents lose the electoral oversight that tied them to their community schools. Further, charter schools have little record of staying rooted in neighbourhoods and the process of closing failing schools specifically undermines local institutions. Open enrolment has a similar affect by weakening the link between families and their local school by distributing students throughout the city. This link is further weakened by the replacement of local teachers, often with recent graduates in the Teach for America program. In these cases, choice is embraced while localness and rooted institutions suffer. The closing of schools, hiring of teachers from outside the community, and emphasis on privatisation sends a singular message to neighbourhoods: that policy-makers and outsiders need to fix neighbourhoods.

Contrast this with the involvement of neighbourhood associations in the education system. The Broadmoor Improvement Association has been active in recruiting local activists to fill spots on the school board and has worked with its local school to provide tutoring and after-school services. The Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association highlights, celebrates and raises money for its local school. These neighbourhood associations are asking for physical investments, but they are also asking for the opportunity to build up their own neighbourhood institutions, not weaken them.

Underpinning the urban agenda advocated by neighbourhood associations is a request; communities want government to invest in them without taking power away from communities. This involves a strategy of investment without strings; neighbourhood associations see fixing streets, investing in physical structures, and supporting institutions as the *primary* responsibilities of local government. They do not want to be "fixed" by outsiders with policy ideas. They want

government to give them the opportunity to live in a clean neighbourhood with anchoring institutions. Such an agenda is deeply rooted in network governance themes. It is a request for investment without adhering to a unified set of values defined by someone from outside of the neighbourhood. It is a request for recognition that their own values and policy knowledge have a place in the policy discussion, and for policy emphasis to respond to specific cultural and neighbourhood contexts.

8.7 Conclusion

A former neighbourhood association president, explaining her relationship with city government, stated "It's how I got stuff done, I just called them, (and) harassed the hell out of them." Such a process is messy, but instructive. In this case, a neighbourhood resident was convinced that the city was not applying its resources to the correct problems. She had different priorities, different values, and a different idea of what needed to be done. Because of the strength of these convictions, she "harassed" government officials, until her objectives were satisfied. This is how the wisdom of crowds works in policy. It is messy. It is complex. But its mistakes are mistakes of inclusion, not exclusion, of actors and ideas.

In this way, the New Orleans context is a view not just into the edges of urban policy, but into a wider debate about what efficient policy looks like, and what processes produce good policy. The field of economics is increasingly giving credence to future markets and the wisdom of crowds (see Surowiecki, 2005). In future markets, aggregate information from multiple actors addresses complexity more accurately than expert opinion. Informal networks do the same for

policy. Network governance theory helps explain the mechanisms by which such participation improves policy.

Negotiations have strengths, particularly their ability to integrate competing value systems. But their greatest utility lies in the contrast they provides with an increasing technocratic approach to policy. This technocratic approach leaves decisions in the hands of a few experts who define the "outcomes" and how best to get there. Masked in professionalisation is a system that depends on simplifying complex policies and ignoring competing values. The value of network governance's wisdom of crowds approach is similar to the value of markets: the ability to integrate vast amounts of information without centralised control.

Of course, New Orleans is not the first city to emphasise participation. Stephen Goldsmith did so in Indianapolis (Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004). President Jimmy Carter did the same at the federal level (Fagotto and Fung, 2006). And in the United Kingdom the Conservative Party is attempting to do so with its Big Society initiative. But network governance theory provides a framework for understanding the mechanisms which make such an approach fruitful. A system of negotiations deals effectively with complexity. Embracing this central observation provides a roadmap forward for policy-makers, informal networks, and community actors.

This research examines what is happening in the grey zone just outside of formal government (Forest, 2003). There, actors in informal networks jockey for influence, run their own programs, and have a vastly different approach to policy-making. Faced with this state of the world, policy-makers have a choice. They can double down on an increasingly technocratic approach to policy which limits complexity and claims to have found single measurements and perspectives by which to organise policy, or they can embrace messiness, complexity and

competing value systems by including actors early in negotiations and informal networks. Of course, this research also demonstrates that such a decision is largely pro forma. Actors will insert themselves into negotiations regardless of invitation. Policy-makers can choose to fight such informal involvement or embrace it. They cannot ignore it.

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APPENDIX I - INTERVIEWS AND DATES

June 10, 2011 - President of French Quarter Citizens Inc.

June 10, 2011 - President of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association

June 14, 2011 - President of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association

June 14, 2011 - President of the Upper Audubon Association

June 15, 2011 - President of the Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association

June 20, 2011 - Pastor of NOLA Church Plant (Recommended by the Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association)

June 20, 2011 - President of the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society

June 21, 2011 - Secretary of the Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association

June 23, 2011 - Former Staff Member in City Council (Recommended by the Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association)

June 24, 2011 - Executive Director of the Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents and Associates (Recommended by French Quarter Citizens Inc.)

June 25, 2011 - Vice-President of the Pilotland Neighborhood Association

June 27, 2011 - President of the Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association

June 27, 2011 - City Council Staff (Recommended by both the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association and the Pilotland Neighborhood Association)

June 30, 2011 - Member of the Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association

July 5, 2011 - Executive Director of the Church of the Annunciation (Recommended by the Broadmoor Improvement Association)

July 6, 2011 - Former President of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association

July 7, 2011 - President of the Pilotland Neighborhood Associatoin and Local Pastor

July 12, 2011 - Member of French Quarter Citizens Inc.

July 15, 2011 - Commissioner of the Broadmoor Improvement District and Broadmoor Improvement Association

July 15, 2011 - President of the Fontainebleau Improvement Association

July 18, 2011 - Crime Committee Chair of the Fontainebleau Improvement Association and President of the Fontainbleau Security Patrol

July 18, 2011 - Member of the Fontainebleau Improvement Association

July 19, 2011 - President of the Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association

July 19, 2011 - Vice-President of the Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association

July 20, 2011 - Commissioner of the Broadmoor Improvement Association and Executive Director of Apex Ministries

July 20, 2011 - President of the Lake Carmel Improvement District

July 21, 2011 - Vice-President of the Pilotland Neighborhood Association

July 22, 2011 - Member of the Upper Audubon Association

July 26, 2011 - Vice-President of the Lake Carmel Improvement District

July 28, 2011 - Vice-President of the Upper Audubon Association and Commissioner of the Upper Audubon Security District

August 1, 2011 - President of the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association

August 2, 2011 - Executive Director of the Dillard University Community Development Corporation (Recommended by the Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association)

August 4, 2011 - President of the Eastern New Orleans Neighborhood Advisory Council (ENONAC) (Recommended by the Lake Carmel Improvement District)

August 6, 2011 - President of the Algiers Point Association

August 9, 2011 - Member of the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society

August 17, 2011 - Founder of Friends of the Ferry (Recommended by the Algiers Point Association)

August 17, 2011 - Board Member of Felicity Street Redevelopment (Recommended by the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association)

August 19, 2011 - Member of the Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association

August 25, 2011 - Owner of HAMP Construction (Recommended by the Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society)

August 30, 2011 - Treasurer of the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association (Reincarnation of the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association)

August 30, 2011 - President of the Faubourg Lafayette Neighborhood Association (Reincarnation of the Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association)



APPENDIX II - MEETINGS ATTENDED

May 4, 2010 - West Barrington Association General Meeting

May 5, 2010 - Garden District Association Awards and Elections

May 8, 2010 - DeSaix Neighborhood Assocaion General Meeting

May 8. 2010 - Bunny Friends Neighborhood Association General Meeting

May 10, 2010 - Lagniappe Academies Community Meeting

May 10, 2010 - Faubourg St. John Neighborhood Association General Meeting

May 11, 2010 - East New Orleans Neighborhood Advisory Committee (ENONAC) General Meeting

May 12, 2010 - Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association General Meeting

May 13, 2010 - Holy Cross Neighborhood Association General Meeting

May 13, 2010 - Carollton Riverbend Neighborhood Association General Meeting

May 15, 2010 - Gentilly Civic Improvement Association General Meeting

May 17, 2010 - Coliseum Square Association General Meeting

June 2, 2010 - Meeting with Local Researchers from RAND

June 5, 2010 - Lower Ninth Ward Neighborhood Empowerment Network Association (NENA) General Meeting

June 12, 2010 - DeSaix Neighborhood Association General Meeting

June 22, 2010 - City Hall Public Meeting Regarding the Master Plan

June 27, 2010 - Informal Meeting with Local Author

August 3, 2010 - Night Out Against Crime (multiple neighbourhoods)

September 7, 2010 - Fontainebleau Improvement Association Meeting

September 8, 2010 - Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association General Meeting

September 8, 2010 - Lake Carmel Improvement District General Meeting

September 10, 2010 - Informal Meeting with President of Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association

September 13, 2010 - French Quarter Citizens Inc. Board Meeting

September 14, 2010 - Informal Meeting with President of Algiers Riverview Neighborhood Association

September 14, 2010 - Informal Meeting with President of Gentilly Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association

September 15, 2010 - Meeting with the Citizen Participation Project

September 15, 2010 - Informal Lunch with Local Priest

September 16, 2010 - Irish Channel Neighborhood Association General Meeting

September 17, 2010 - Informal Meeting with President of Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association

September 18, 2010 - Pilotland Neighborhood Association General Meeting

September 19, 2010 - Fontainebleau Improvement Association Annual Party

January, 6, 2011 - Pilotland Neighborhood Association General Meeting

January 10, 2011 - Informal Meeting with French Quarter Citizens Inc.

January 10, 2011 - Informal Meeting with Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association

January 11, 2011 - City Planning Commission Meeting

January 12, 2011 - Informal MEeting with Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society

January 12, 2011 - Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association General Meeting

January 14, 2011 - Informal Meeting with the Broadmoor Improvement Association

June 6, 2011 - Algiers Point Association General Meeting

June 7, 2011 - Fontainebleau Improvement Association General Meeting

June 8, 2011 - Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association General Meeting

June 9, 2011 - Irish Channel Neighborhood Association General Meeting

June 10, 2011 - Informal Meeting with Local Academic

June 13, 2011 - French Quarter Citizens Inc. Annual Meeting and Potlock

June 19, 2011 - Irish Channel Neighborhood Association, Lyons-Burke Booster Club Catfish Fy fund raiser

June 21, 2011 - Informal Meeting with Local Teacher

June 21, 2011 - Lunch with Former Executive Director of City Works

June 22, 2011 - Lunch with Staff member from The Lens

June 23, 2011 - Drinks with Executive Director of the Committee for a Better New Orleans

June 25, 2011 - Pilotland Neighborhood Association General Meeting

July 1, 2011 - Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Community Movie Night

July 4, 2011 - Informal Meeting with Resident of Faubourg Marigny

July 5, 2011 - Meeting with Harvard intern at the Broadmoor Improvement Association

July 5, 2011 - Meeting with local fellow from the Robert A. Fox Leadership Program.

July 11, 2011 - Broadmoor Improvement Association Board of Commissioners Meeting and Broadmoor Improvement District Meeting

July 12, 2011 - Bywater Neighborhood Association Meeting

July 13, 2011 - Lake Carmel Improvement District Meeting

July 18, 2011 - Broadmoor Improvement Association General Meeting



APPENDIX III - NEIGHBORHOOD MAPPING PROJECT, CITY WORKS 2010

(CONTACT INFORMATION REDACTED)

Neighborhood Mapping Project

By Stephen Danley

in collaboration with City Works

Summer 2010



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Stephen Danley can be contacted at:
(e) stephen.danley@gmail.com
(c) 504 322 3392

Introduction

History

In 2006, City Works commissioned a census of neighborhood associations. At the time, the primary purpose was networking. With recovery uncertain and disjointed, many neighborhood associations were taking action. However, there was little sense of connectedness across efforts, and a great desire to fight that isolation. City Works contribution to that effort was the first volume of this report. The report contained three sections: contact information, maps and analysis. At its core, the report was a resource -- designed to connect residents and associations, and show visually the presence of groups across the city.

When the report was commissioned a second time in 2008, the landscape had changed. While the maps and contact information were updated, much of the report focused on the role neighborhood associations were having in different planning processes; particularly the United New Orleans Plan (UNOP) which called for individual neighborhood plans. That 2008 City Works report focused on the differences between neighborhoods in "wet" and "dry" districts -- showing how neighborhoods that had not suffered flooding focused primarily on law enforcement and quality of life, while newer associations were particularly concerned with housing.

Purpose

In 2010, five years after the storm, a different set of themes and ideas have emerged regarding neighborhood associations. With the advent of the Master Plan, the planning merry-go-round appears to have stopped (for the time being). The need for associations' contact information is no longer dire -- like it was immediately post-storm -- but rather a difficulty of everyday life. Because associations rarely have their own offices, addresses or phone lines, their contact information often changes with yearly elections.

Much as the planning process drove previous analysis, a political issue drives this year's report. Associations are now an established component of city politics. The Master Plan specifically lays out a strategy for how to revamp citizen participation and a Citizen Participation Project (CPP) similar to those in Portland and Atlanta has been proposed.

There has been little formal study of New Orleans' neighborhood associations (see Ahlers and Hummel, 2007; Chamblee-Wright, 2008; Chamblee-Wright and Storr; 2009, Danley, forthcoming). None of these studies provide adequate background to inform a Citizen Participation Project. This report is specifically designed to provide more context and information for the upcoming Citizen Participation legislation. It will look at the ability of associations to fit CPP criteria, the ability of the plan to work for associations as well as analyzing specific components of the CPP plan.

Key Findings

- Neighborhood associations have similar civic foundations, but widely disparate capacity.
- There are a wide variety of types of neighborhood associations across New Orleans, including: umbrella associations, pseudo-governmental neighborhood associations, social capital associations, homeowners' associations and reactive associations.
- Neighborhood associations are often as important for the policies they make possible as for their own programming. They provide the structure that allows city government to reach out to citizens.
- Neighborhood associations are representative and participatory. Because of the particular nature of participation found in neighborhood associations, participation and representation are best understood as competing values and in constant tension with each other.
- The survey results indicate that the basic requirements of the CPP will not be difficult hurdles for the vast majority of associations. However, specific classes of associations (homeowners' associations and reactive association) may have more difficulty meeting these requirements.
- The CPP focuses on Land Use as its main function. It is unclear whether this approach matches the needs and goals of associations across the city.

Survey

Methodology

The survey (see Appendix IV) was completed by 146 associations. Thirty-three were confirmed to be defunct or inactive. An additional 77 associations were contacted but did not respond. Surveys were completed online or via phone. Qualitative participatory methods were also used to provide context for survey results. For more background on methodology, see Appendix III.

Results

Organization Size

This study used four different measures to indicate organizational size: budget, households, membership and attendance. This process underscores the difficulty of using self-reported neighborhood association data -- each association has a different idea of who is a "member" and exaggeration of meeting attendance is common. By using four different measurements, some of the influence of inaccuracies can be limited.

However, the size numbers are best used only for general comparisons and a broad sense of neighborhoods and involvement. These numbers are not accurate enough to be used to gage participation across the city of New Orleans or even within various neighborhoods.

What the data does show is an extremely wide range of size of neighborhood associations. Households (range: 1-50,000), budget (range: $0-$400,000) and membership (range: 0-2,000) all show extremely wide range. The exception in this case is attendance and membership. The attendance range was significantly smaller (range: 0-175) with over 75% of associations having attendance of less than 50 at a typical general meeting. This finding is echoed in membership numbers, where just over 50% of associations had 100 members or less.

What do these size measures indicate? They show that there is diversity in the size of the neighborhood and population, but there is convergence in membership and involvement.

Capacity

Neighborhood associations are civically similar while demonstrating widely different levels of capacity. Underpinning most associations are three core traits: elections, bylaws and parliamentary procedure. However, human capital and organizational capital vary greatly.

The Citizen Participation Project

Part of the purpose of this report is to provide contextual and theoretical background for the Citizen Participation Project (CPP).

The recently released CPP Model states that "The mission of the Citizen Participation Program (CPP) is to enable citizens to effectively participate in city government's priority-setting and decision-making, and to give government officials a clearly defined way to communicate with the people. CPP is a tool to establish a continuing dialogue between communities, neighborhoods and city government, taking into account the rights and needs of all communities and striving toward a consensus-based decision-making structure that benefits individuals, neighborhoods and the city as a whole."

It is worth briefly reviewing the structure of the model: The CPP is primarily about communication and land use. It provides citizens a system that informs them about land use issues and also provides a mechanism for their comments to reach city hall. The system incorporates two types of citizen groups: neighborhood associations and communities-of-interest. Each type is separated into a tiered structure.

On the neighborhood association side, the associations are one tier, District Councils composed of association leaders are a second tier, and the third tier is the CPP office. Similarly, communities-of-interest are composed of three tiers. The first tier is the communities-of-interest themselves. These groups are then formed into coalitions based on issues (such as housing etc). Again, the final tier is the CPP office.

The primary purpose of these structures is informational -- to allow citizens to get the information they need, and also to establish a process in which their input is heard by city government. However, it is important to note that there is no binding decision-making power or veto power over city government. The functions are informational and advisory.

This study addresses the basic requirements of the CPP (see page 3) and broader theoretical aspects the CPP (see page 9). The CPP model can be found online at http://nolacpp.wordpress.com.

Survey (continued)

Results (continued)

Civic Similarities

Neighborhood associations are underpinned by elections, bylaws and parliamentary procedure. Eighty-six percent of associations hold elections. Seventy-seven percent use parliamentary procedure in meetings. Eighty-five percent of associations have bylaws or a constitution. These three traits provide the civic foundation on which neighborhood associations are built and claim representativeness.

Varied Capacity:

Associations differ dramatically in human capital (households, membership, attendance) and organizational capital (budgets, legal status, paid staff).

Budgets range from $0 to $400,000. Forty percent of groups report yearly budgets of less than $1,000 and 77% report budgets of $5,000 or less. At the low end of the budget range, 20% of associations reported an annual budget of $0, leaving association officers to pay for any minor expenses out of pocket.

As mentioned previously (see page 2), the physical size of neighborhoods varies tremendously, both in terms of area and households. This is important for capacity because it limits the pool of volunteers in smaller neighborhoods. Similarly, size may dictate what an association does. An association such as Broadmoor Improvement Association can be involved in neighborhood-wide infrastructure like schools and libraries. A smaller association that covers only a few blocks would not likely participate on such a level.

In summary, associations have a common civic foundation but do not have similar capacity. It is unclear whether the variety of associations is due to different needs or a scarcity of resources.

Priorities:

The survey asked associations to choose its top three priorities from a list of ten priorities including: economic development, law enforcement, housing, infrastructure and public transportation, public education, community health, parks and natural resources, quality of life and zoning, property value and tax stabilization, and cultural and community facilities. The result is three distinct tiers of priorities.

The first tier of priorities is law enforcement (56%) and quality of life and zoning (71%). These priorities have widespread importance across associations.

The next tier of priorities includes: property value (34%), economic development (33%) and infrastructure and public transportation (24%).

A final tier of niche priorities includes: community health (14%), public education (13%), parks and natural resources (18%), housing (14%) and cultural and community facilities (11%).

While associations appear to have several overarching priorities (law enforcement and quality of life) there are also a wide variety niche issues that occupy association efforts.

Requirements of the CPP

The CPP has several requirements for associations to participate in the CPP including:

- regular elections
- regular and open quarterly meetings
- no mandatory dues and no membership restrictions for residents

The CPP also has a process for the solving of boundary disputes between associations.

Elections

The responses to this survey indicate that many of the associations (86%) already hold regular elections. However, it is worth noting that while many associations have elections, qualitative evidence shows that a large number of associations reelect the same few community leaders year after year.

Meetings

Sixty-nine percent of associations have at least quarterly meetings. However, there appears to be a reactive model of association that differs from this model dramatically (see page 6). A meetings requirement will likely prohibit these associations from participating. One qualitative theme was associations that claimed associational burn-out was caused by having too many meetings.

Survey (continued)

Requirements of CPP (continued)

Mandatory Dues

There are significant hurdles for compliance with the CPP requirement of not permitting mandatory dues.

Fifty-five percent of associations require mandatory dues of their members. The CPP deals with this issue by citing a proposed stipend (of an unknown amount) designed to cover basic costs and offset the loss of revenue when associations switch from mandatory to voluntary dues.

Fifty-five percent of yearly dues are either non-mandatory or lower than $25, so the strategy of offsetting mandatory dues with a stipend seems reasonably affordable and would be acceptable to the majority of groups. However, there are two gray areas that are worth considering.

The first gray area is homeowners' associations. More homeowners' associations than neighborhood associations require mandatory dues. On its face, this is not a serious problem because associations that only allow homeowners are not eligible to participate in the CPP. However, some homeowners' associations (for example the Lower Ninth Ward Homeowners Association and Pressburg East Homeowners/ Neighborhood Association) have adopted a neighborhood inclusive model. This is a particularly difficult issue for the CPP -- are homeowners' associations expected to drop their traditional structures and interests for the CPP model or are they expected not to take part? It appears the CPP gives them the option of inclusion, but this could create considerable confusion within areas about what groups are in the CPP. Certainly, homeowners' associations are a gray area that the CPP could do a better job of addressing (for more on homeowners' associations see page 5).

A second gray area is the presence of parallel organizations that require mandatory dues -- and the potential of the CPP to encourage these structures. Across the city, a large number of neighborhoods have tax improvement districts that primarily pay for security. Typically, these security districts have separate boards, although they are linked to neighborhood associations both through history and overlapping volunteers.

The Broadmoor Improvement Association is attempting to get similar tax legislation passed for its district, but will use the revenues to pay for programming and expenses of the neighborhood association. This tax district will have its own governing board and it is unclear if it will violate the CPP. If it is allowed, the restriction on mandatory dues can be circumvented by the most politically connected associations. However, if it is not allowed, the CPP has undercut the ability of its strongest associations to figure out democratic ways to pay for its services.

Boundaries

Finally, the boundary issue is a potentially sticky one for the CPP. It is worth noting that 55% of groups know of no other group claiming to represent their area. The maps (see Appendix I) indicate that number is low -- but areas that are unaware of border conflicts show that associations have been and can continue to co-exist. Furthermore, of the 45% of associations that report overlapping boundaries, one in five reference an umbrella group of which they are a member not a conflicting association. This indicates that while an isolated number of disputes may arise over boundaries, the problem is likely not system-wide.

Participation

Neighborhood associations are best understood in light of the tension between participation and representation. Those two underpinning concepts function as competing values. To understand why requires a closer look at what is meant by participation in the context of neighborhood associations.

Typically, participation refers to a type of civic action. This type of participation includes such actions as voting, protesting, writing an elected official, being a member of an organization and the like. Participation in a neighborhood association is a radical departure from this type of civic participation. Civic participation is characterized by an aggregation of one-time actions by individuals. As such, it is naturally complementary to representation. Democratic values underpin concepts such as "one man, one vote."

Neighborhood associations could not be farther from a "one man, one vote" model. This should be understood not as a drawback, but as a result of the type of participation required by associations. Instead of civic participation, neighborhood associations require "maven" participation. In Malcolm Gladwell's The Tipping Point (2000), he quotes Mark Alpert as saying "'a maven is someone who wants to solve other people's problems, generally by solving his own.'" Mavens are characterized by obsessively learning about extremely specific topics.

Analysis

Types of Associations

Introduction

Several different types of associations emerged from the survey and accompanying qualitative work. Some of these types -- such as homeowners' associations and umbrella groups -- are clear categories. The other types are more conceptual. Classifications such as social capital associations, reactionary associations and enabler associations are not distinct categories. An association may be a pure form of one of those types, but most associations have social capital, reactionary and enabler aspects -- it is more a matter of the extent to which they prioritize that component of the association.

Umbrella Associations

Umbrella associations are associations that have as their membership other neighborhood associations from a particular area. Groups such as the Eastern New Orleans Neighborhood Advisory Committee (ENONAC), the Algiers Council of Neighborhood Presidents and the Gentilly Civic Improvement Association (GCIA) are formed as representative associations with boards made up of their various member associations. Other groups, such as the Neighborhood Empowerment Network (NENA) are more service oriented. Similarly, Beacon of Hope is an umbrella in the sense that partners with associations but does not engage with them as representative organizations. As might be expected, umbrella organizations are perceived as being stronger and having more political sway than many individual associations. Based upon observation, this power is particularly strong in advisory issues, as they can weigh in on matters and be representative of a large swathe of associations. However, umbrella associations are also underpinned by a weaker financial structure. They have more trouble asking for direct dues from residents (who may already be paying dues for their associations) and charging association dues may lead to groups dropping out, or simply be insufficient for funding purposes. It is unclear what financial equilibrium exists for such groups, which is one reason some of them (particularly the Gentilly Civic Improvement Association) have been so quick to adopt the District Council component of the Citizen Participation Plan.

Homeowners Association

Homeowners associations are characterized by limiting their membership to homeowners in a residential area. They often charge dues, and membership in many neighborhoods is mandatory. As such, they are a poor fit for the CPP process, and most likely fit in as Communities-of-Interest not neighborhood associations; being a Community-of-Interest allows these associations as well as interested

Participation (continued)

Neighborhood associations volunteers are mavens by nature. They are extremely knowledgable not only about about their neighborhoods, but also about complex city and state policy programs, including but not limited to Road Home, the Lot Next Door, code enforcement and land use changes. Participation on these issues does not lend itself to broad participation by a high number of individuals. Rather, it requires extremely specific knowledge and an overwhelming number of volunteer hours.

This type of participation is fundamentally at odds with equal representation and "one man, one vote."

By necessity, issues such as land use or the Lot Next Door require power in the hands of a dedicated few citizens who have become mavens of the process. Attend any neighborhood association meeting and you'll meet these dedicated citizens -- the ones that go beyond civic participation and have become mavens for the sake of themselves and their neighbors.

The tension between representation and participation is the key to understanding neighborhood associations. This balance explains both the power and the drawbacks of these groups. With an undergirding of participation mavens, neighborhood associations have a tremendous ability to not only gather knowledge about the challenges faced in their neighborhood, but also impact complex policy systems. However, that type of ability is necessarily concentrated in a few hands in each neighborhood. As a result, neighborhood associations are particularly vulnerable to being hijacked by the political agenda of the few or having the organization struggle when a few leaders leave the neighborhood.

Understanding this different and powerful form of participation helps makes sense of some of the inherent contradictions in associations. It explains how associations could have the civic infrastructure of democratic institutions, yet run the risk of being personal organizations -- with the same individuals having power for decades at a time. Once a neighborhood has developed a maven, it is loath to lose that valued resource. Within neighborhood associations, the wheels of democracy often cease to spin.

Analysis (continued)

Types of Associations (continued)

individuals to participate in the CPP's Early Notification System.

However, some homeowners' associations -- such as the Lower Ninth Homeowners' Association -- have adopted more of a neighborhood-based model. They have opened up membership, and adopted a wider scope of potential action. In light of these associations' positive impact on their communities, it is highly advisable that homeowners' associations be given the option to be considered neighborhood associations under the auspices of the CPP. This is not without complication. Homeowners' associations are less likely to meet the CPP requirements and more likely to be housed completely within another neighborhood association. They likely merit additional scrutiny if they are going to be included as neighborhood associations in the CPP.

Associations that straddle definitions, such as homeowners' associations acting as neighborhood associations, are likely to give the CPP significant problems. While the requirements for participation as a neighborhood association are generally not burdensome, they are clumsy in dealing with exceptions.

However, this affirms a need for a Community-of-Interest component to the CPP. There may be associations that do not fit cleanly into the requirements set forth by the CPP. Becoming a Community-of-Interest could be a viable option for these groups -- however, the community-of-interest system is not currently well defined and it remains unclear if this will be a viable alternative for associations.

Pseudo-governmental Associations

In a previous version of this report (see City Works, 2008) the phrase "pseudo-governmental" organization was used to refer to the strongest grassroots organizations.

The City Works report cited several associations as examples, including: the Neighborhood Empowerment Network of Associations (NENA), Hollygrove Neighbors Association, Gentilly Civic Improvement Association (GCIA), Broadmoor Improvement Association, the Lower Gentilly Neighborhood Association and the Mary Queen of Vietnam Community Development corporation. That list contains quite a variety of associations, and is in need of conceptual clarification. A number of the associations are umbrella groups (GCIA and NENA), while others are not even associations (Mary Queen of Vietnam CDC). These associations are cited as pseudo-governmental because of their service delivery and their ability to bring resources to their neighborhoods.

Five years after the storm, it is unclear that service delivery and resource delivery are adequate requisites for pseudo-governmental organizations -- but few in the city would dispute that some associations have become pseudo-governmental. Certain associations still have an astounding combination of resources and political influence.

This political influence is perhaps best understood as a gateway mechanism. While a subjective measure, it is hard to imagine anything happening in certain neighborhoods without going to the neighborhood association first. These associations take several different forms. The strongest of these associations are the Lakeview Civic Improvement Association (LCIA) and the Broadmoor Improvement Association. These groups have strong resources, strong personalities at their head, and extreme political influence. A set of umbrella groups have similar but weaker influence, including ENONAC and GCIA. Finally, a series of less financially well off associations, such as Bunny Friends in the Upper Ninth Ward or Holy Cross in the Lower 9th are characterized by having extremely strong leadership, and as such, serve a similar gatekeeper function. A further set of groups (including Algiers Point and Downtown Neighborhood Improvement Association) are not quite household names like Broadmoor and LCIA, but they have deep pockets and political clout nonetheless.

Interestingly, budget is not an exact proxy for this type of work. Many of the associations with the highest budgets are either homeowners associations (or condo associations) that can charge high dues, or associations from relatively affluent neighborhoods. Associations can be better resourced while still maintaining a lower profile or choosing not to position themselves as political organizations. These associations, much like associations

Analysis (continued)

Types of Associations (continued)

on a shoestring budget, may focus primarily on social capital, or single issues such as crime.

Reactionary Associations

On the complete opposite end of the association spectrum are reactionary associations. These associations have few resources, and a much smaller footprint in the neighborhood. They may appear dormant for years at a time -- seemingly without meetings or leadership. However, they retain the capability to quickly respond to a crisis in the neighborhood. These associations maintain a nimble ability to act, but their actions are typically reactions to an event or policy affecting the neighborhood.

Reactive associations are characterized by low budgets -- close to 20% of neighborhood associations in New Orleans have a budget of zero dollars. That set of associations often lists its meetings "as needed" rather than a regular schedule.

Low-budget associations seemed to have adopted this model -- particularly because they run the risk of burning out their core volunteers if they have regular meetings and programming. But even a high-capacity association such as Algiers Point Association claims that when the ferry to Algiers is discussed it sees its meeting size jump from the 20s to hundreds.

A wide enough set of neighborhood associations show reactionary tendencies, that such a model appears to be a specific strategy. However, while there appear to be benefits from a reactive model, it is unclear if this is a last resort for associations under duress, or a specific strategy that associations would choose even given the option of more consistent meetings and activity. Because so little is known about the functions and roles of neighborhood associations, it is also difficult to analyze what types of activities are forgone through such a strategy.

Enabler Associations

Another way of understand neighborhood associations is not solely in terms of what they do, but rather as enablers of activity. For example, neighborhood associations in some neighborhoods are extremely closely tied to security districts (Upper Audubon Association, Lake Carmel Homeowners' Association). While neighborhood associations and security districts are typically separate entities, the neighborhood associations are often the impetus for the creation of security districts, and also maintain close relationships with the districts. An even better example is the NOPD's New Orleans Neighborhood Police Anti-Crime Council (NONPACC) meetings. The NOPD's effort to reach out to communities is laudable, but regular meetings require structure and consistency on the side of participation. Neighborhood associations provide the structure and volunteers to make community outreach work.

Perhaps the best example of this model is the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association which started a foundation to parallel its neighborhood association and fundraise for youth programming. However, it would be a mistake to

Associations and the NOPD

Sometimes the "outliers" or atypical survey responses tell as much as the responses that are repeated by the majority of associations. In one survey, a respondent stated the legal status of her association to be "part of the police department." She continued to explain that her association was started in the 1980s when the police department had reached out to neighborhoods for National Night Out Against Crime.

While it is extremely unlikely that the police department considers neighborhood associations part of their department, there can be no doubt that the relationship between the police department and neighborhood associations is very close. By far the most-mentioned event across the city was the Night Out Against Crime. Furthermore, in the meetings attended to complement this report, quality-of-life officers were a consistent presence. Neighborhood association presidents and residents were proficient in the use of "hot sheets" to help report issues and potential issues in the neighborhoods. Finally, the NOPD holds regular NON-PACC meetings that allow neighborhood associations (and other involved citizens) to keep up to date on and report issues in the neighborhood. While a survey cannot evaluate the effect on crime of these relationships, the strength of the neighborhood association-NOPD relationship shows that outreach is being effectively implemented.

Analysis (continued)

Types of Associations (continued)

evaluate the two organizations separately. They are best described as symbiotic. They share board members, and the foundation uses the organizing power of the Irish Channel Neighborhood Association to reach potential donors and recruit volunteers for community-service projects.

For some associations it is not enough to evaluate what they do, it is also necessary to look at what they enable.

Social Capital Associations

Amidst service-delivery, security patrols, government advocacy and other functions, it is easy to lose track of one of the most basic association functions; meeting and getting to know other neighbors.

Many associations exist solely for the purpose of increasing social capital between neighbors. These associations often limit their activities to block parties and the Night Out Against Crime. Their general meetings may only come once a year and may be more party than meeting.

Summary

This section has highlighted various types of associations, including: umbrella associations, pseudo-governmental associations, reactionary associations, homeowners' associations, social capital associations and enabler associations. However, many associations appear to belong to several of these categories.

The types of associations, as identified here, are best used not as a categorical tool, but rather as a way of understanding associations in New Orleans. Most associations have a social capital function, although for some groups it is minor, while to others it is their central mission. Similarly, a group can be both an umbrella and a pseudo-governmental neighborhood association. While the reactive model of neighborhood association may be present most strongly in low-capacity and low-resource groups, almost all associations have a reactive component to them. Rather than categorizing associations, the purest forms of these classifications provide an easy way to understand components found within associations and the differences in emphasis between them.

Is Existence Binary?

This report took as a fundamental tenet that neighborhood associations would either "exist" or not "exist." Nothing could be further from the truth. There is definitely not a binary set of associations in existence. Some groups change names with new leadership -- does this mean the old group has ceased to exist? More troubling are reactionary associations (see page 5). These groups are designed to ramp up in response to threats to their neighborhood.

But do they exist in between these threats? If an association hasn't met in three years, has no legal status, has no updated contact list, and no money, but could hold a community meeting within 3 days of a threat to the neighborhood surfacing, does that association exist? While reaching out to associations for the purpose of the survey, a number of different levels of "existence" were encountered. Groups were referred to as "inactive." Others were trying to become active again. In one case a former president stated that the group did not exist, while a group in the adjoining neighborhood claimed to be partnering with the association for a grant.

What does this variety of existence mean?

It has two consequences -- one is on the long-term stability and resilience of neighborhood associations. It appears that groups have intermittent periods of existence and should be understood as volatile yet resilient. Secondly, neighborhood associations appear to transcend traditional understandings of organizations. They have little solid structure -- whether it be a physical office or structure, or even a phone number. Rather, associations need be understood as fluid organizations -- extremely dependent on the forces around them and capable of forming in all different shapes and sizes.

Analysis (continued)

What it Means for the CPP

Introduction

This section addresses the theoretical underpinning of the CPP and looks at basic criticisms of the model. Topics include Land Use, District Councils, cost and Communities-of-Interest.

Is the CPP about Land Use or about Capacity?

This CPP, like those found in other urban areas, is built around land use issues. The CPP model focuses specifically on land use. Similarly, in a recent essay on land use in New Orleans as part of the GNOCDC Katrina at 5 project, the citizen participation project was cited as key to land use issues (Collins, 2010). The Bureau for Governmental Research released a report that makes similar statements (BGR, 2009).

While focusing on land use is an understandable and common way to approach a citizen participation plan, it is by no means the only option. The city of Hampton has put together an office of neighborhoods that focuses explicitly on helping neighborhood associations (see http://www.hampton.gov/neighborhoods/history.html). This office is focused on being a resource for associations and helping build capacity within them.

Clearly, there is a significant overlap between the two visions. The CPP specifically cites the need to build capacity within organizations if they are to represent their neighborhoods. However, there is a difference between building capacity for organizations in order to make them functional on land use issues, and simply helping neighborhood associations.

The first type of capacity-building makes the assumption that neighborhood associations want to address land use. There is tentative evidence to support that assumption. In this survey, 71% cite land use and quality of life among their top three priorities. However, because the question includes both land use and quality of life in one category, these findings are limited.

Another response might be that only those associations that are interested in land use need join the CPP. However, between the inducement of a stipend, and the thorny issue of what happens to neighborhoods that have associations that choose not to join, this brings up more questions than answers.

A further danger with regards to the land use is one of class. As seen in this report, neighborhood associations have a wide range of functions. While the quantitative survey responses are not sufficient to make this claim, there is limited qualitative evidence indicating that some of the difference in functions and roles may be split along socio-economic, and at times racial, lines. A system that focuses on Land Use runs the risk of catering to a specific class of association.

This consideration must be weighed against the best practices and guidance from other cities. Portland, the model city for Citizen Participation Projects, has a similar system based upon land use.

However, at a time when resources are limited, it is worth considering whether the CPP -- highlighted by an Early Notification System that will be used primarily for land use matters -- is focused on the right goals. Are land use advocacy and participation really the same thing? Does the system presuppose that the first priority of associations is land use? Is it a good thing if it does?

District Councils: Bureaucracy or Democracy?

One of the primary criticisms of the CPP is that it creates another layer of bureaucracy. Why would citizens want another system to navigate when they want to be heard?

That criticism is most poignant in relation to the District Councils -- which are essentially umbrella associations made up of representatives from the neighborhood associations in a planning district.

The CPP model cites three primary functions for District Councils and hints at a fourth. The three functions are: providing input for issues that are district-wide, providing a forum for the city to reach out quickly to local leaders in a District, and training neighborhood associations to help them adopt best practices.

The fourth function, which is only hinted at, is control over resources.

These needs are not terribly controversial. The Bureau of Governmental Research (2009) acknowledges the need to deal with district-wide issues and also the need for city government to reach out to a group for District-wide events. However, BGR advocates the creation of ad hoc councils to convene over individual issues.

Analysis (continued)

What it Means for the CPP (continued)

The best answer to this criticism comes from neighborhood associations themselves. In many parts of the city (Algiers, Gentilly, New Orleans East) there are already umbrella associations which mirror District Councils. Faced with the option of convening ad hoc meetings, or having a regular body meet, they chose the latter. That's not to say that District Councils are the best option in every part of the city, but the strength and vibrancy of these umbrella groups support the concept of District Councils.

The issues of neighborhood association training and supervision of resources by District Councils is fundamentally a question of "who do you trust?" Trust in a government system, or neighborhood associations for that matter, can be a tricky matter in New Orleans, but there are decisions to be made and they have to be made by someone.

For example, training and skilling of neighborhood associations is much needed across the city. Groups such as the Neighborhood Partnership Network and Beacon of Hope already have curriculums that seek to do this. Who will make the decisions about who does the training? Will they be made from City Hall?

By assigning that decision to the District Councils, the CPP sides with democracy. Instead of risking these contracts being handed out on a political basis, they will be controlled by a representative body of the people who it affects the most. There is always risk of corruption and politics being played, but District Councils will put the decision-making squarely in the hands of association leaders.

This democraticization effect is more critical in the case of the stipends awarded to neighborhood associations. These stipends are potentially the most flammable part of the entire plan. Adding just enough money that every association wants and needs more could lead to nasty conflicts between associations. Who will make the decisions regarding these stipends?

Should larger associations get a larger stipend? Should stipends be equal? If they are equal, will the stipends encourage groups to split to gain additional resources?

The CPP model does not specificy who has the power to make these decisions. However, one approach would be to leave the stipend allocation to the District Councils -- allowing representatives of an area to split the resources among themselves. This is the type of democratic process that the District Councils make possible.

So are the District Councils democratic or bureaucratic? The answer is, a little of both.

Is the CPP better than the current system?

One of the better arguments for District Councils is the presence of similar structures across New Orleans that have grown organically. But this line of argument brings up a second line of criticism. If so much stock is put into the organic growth of neighborhood associations, why change the current system?

And it is true, many of the troublesome portions of the CPP (membership rules, cost, boundaries) come out of an attempt to codify trends that are already happening across the city.

One of the key arguments made by the CPP is for consistency. While many associations have positive relationships with their elected officials, those relationships are often dependent on individuals, both individuals on the political side and on the association side. What the CPP attempts to do is codify and maintain those relationships despite changing individuals. In other words, it's about continuity. It is also about providing the same opportunity to citizens and neighborhoods that are less likely to have such connections.

Is there a cost to this continuity and opportunity? Yes. The cost is added structure.

Perhaps the bigger concern with codifying the system is stunting creativity. Right now associations across New Orleans are a patchwork of different ideas and opportunities. The Broadmoor Improvement Association is trying to get legislation for a tax district. Upper Hurstville has a security district. ENONAC has mandatory reporting on land use courtesy of state legislation. In short, neighborhood associations are taking numerous approaches to help their neighborhoods. Would a system such as the CPP stifle these groups? The flip side to this is that the current system, though creative, also includes a lot of neighborhoods that either do not have a

Analysis (continued)

What it Means for the CPP (continued)

neighborhood association or do not have one with high capability.

Is the CPP worth the money?

One of the difficult things about the CPP is judging the benefits against the costs. The current system is estimated to cost 2 million dollars. The Lens states that in a recent town hall meeting, "Landrieu asked rhetorically why people would pay for a program that lets them talk to him through a paid intermediary bureaucracy." (Gadbois, 2010).

One of the reasons it is hard to evaluate the CPP model financially is that there is not a budget in the model to explain where all the money goes. However, several expenditures can be culled from the model, including: stipends for associations, staff for District Councils and the central CPP office, training for associations and the creation of the Early Notification System.

With the budget shortfall left by the Nagin administration, the political climate is likely such that full funding for the CPP will be difficult. However, there is little in the CPP to indicate that the system need be fully funding from its outset, or that it could not function temporarily with a lower budget. Like any program in this political climate, the budget numbers are likely to require adjustments and scrutiny, but cost does not seem to be an irreconcilable difficulty.

What are Communities-of-Interest?

Among the more intriguing aspects of the CPP is the Communities-of-Interest component. This idea has the potential to allow institutions that have civic inclinations to participate in new ways. It allows them to opt into the the Early Notification System and also provide feedback to city government.

One of the primary concerns with this component is that it will give voice to organizations rather than citizens. However, nothing in the CPP gives binding decision-making power. Allowing these organizations -- such as businesses, churches or non-profits -- into the CPP system allows them to stay informed about their neighborhood and provide input when appropriate, without restricting the rights of any citizen to do that exact same thing. Furthermore, it may be that in a city with as vibrant a non-profit and religious culture as New Orleans, citizens prefer to participate through these organizations, meaning Communities-of-Interest may actually support, not stifle, citizen participation.

A more relevant concern is the opacity of the Community-of-Interest component of the CPP. While the model spends a lot of time laying out the definition of a Community-of-Interest, it does not spend as much time indicating exactly what this side of the CPP structure does. It hints at meetings of like-minded groups (rather than geographic groups) but such functions remain ambiguous.

While the inclusion of Communities-of-Interest seems to be built on the sound premise that including these groups would allow more citizens to participate through the civic organization of their choice, the ambiguity of the activities of Communities-of-Interest groups will likely give rise to concerns moving forward.

Summary

This study has attempted to provide context on both the practical and conceptual level for the Citizen Participation Project.

This survey shows a firm civic foundation for associations. The requirements in the CPP will likely be met by the vast majority of associations due to their elections, bylaws and use of parliamentary procedure. There is a concern that the requirements of the CPP make participation difficult for certain classes of groups, including reactionary associations and homeowners' associations.

On a more conceptual level, the report addressed a series of pertinent theoretical questions, such as: Are participation and representation in conflict within associations? Should land use issues be the primary focus of the Citizen Participation Project? Will changing the organic eco-system of associations across New Orleans stifle the creativity of such groups?

While these types of questions do not have answers, hopefully the way they have been addressed in this report can lead to further discussion and help inform the debate over the CPP plan.

Included in the appendix are a series of more practical tools for community consumption, including: links to maps of neighborhood associations boundaries and an updated database of association contact information.

Acknowledgements

A special thanks to all the association leaders who took the time to take the survey and work with me on the project and to those who provided contact information for associations. Thanks to City Works for providing me with an office and thanks to all those who supported me by listening and lending a hand.

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
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Appendix I

Boundary Maps

For convenience and versatility, the boundaries of all the neighborhood associations that filled out the survey have been uploaded onto Google Maps. The maps can be found here. These maps include street names, and can be examined from street level to see the boundaries of associations. The maps are interactive and include notes on the associations -- associations are listed in alphabetical order. A sample picture of the maps is included below.



Appendix III

Methodology Details

Intro

Below is an attempt at codifying the methodology which undergirded this project. However, surveying neighborhood associations is more sleuthing than procedure. Often getting an association to respond required multiple phone calls, sometimes starting from a president from years ago and no longer lived in New Orleans. It sometimes required physical follow-up, and other times required that I express enough knowledge about New Orleans to make the responder comfortable. While the process was messy, it had a payoff. The sample for this survey was significantly broader than many of the previous studies, or concurrent research in the city. The process was specifically designed to reach out to smaller neighborhood associations that might slip through the cracks, and the final set of surveys reflects that.

Population

This survey attempted to reach out to all the associations in the city. It used lists from City Works, City Planning Commission, CBNO-Mac, the CPP, the Neighborhood Partnership Network, Council-member Jackie-Clarkson's office and Council-member Arnie Fielkow's office. Those lists were compiled into one master list of 302 associations.

Responses

Of the 302 associations, 146 responded to the survey, 33 were confirmed to be inactive or defunct, 18 did not fit the selection criteria, 77 did not respond, and the 27 were confirmed to be a double-listing of the same association under two different names. Of the 77 non-responders, my educated guess is that roughly half of those associations no longer exist.

Survey

The survey and consent form can be found below. The survey was based upon the previous City Works survey used for this project, but updated to be more relevant to the CPP process. Associations were contacted via email and phone. Surveys could be completed online and via phone. While numbers collected via dueling mechanisms are sometimes viewed skeptically, the advantages of reaching a more comprehensive set of associations was considered to overwhelm this concern. Throughout the study, the convenience of associations was a high priority -- for some associations this meant using the online survey, but for other associations completing the survey over the phone was preferable.

Numbers

One of the important things to note about the survey responses was the unreliability of the numbers. In this report, no advanced statistical methods were applied to the quantitative results in the survey. Quantitative data analysis is always built on the quality of the data, and in many cases it was unclear how reliable the numbers in survey responses should be considered.

The lack of quantitive preciseness in the project is due to two primary factors. The first is that all information is self-reported. Maybe association leaders are naturally optimistic about their associations, or maybe they are under pressure to exaggerate their associations' influence, but numbers often looked better than expected.

The second reason is simpler. Many association leaders do not have reliable information on their own associations. This was painfully clear during the surveys; many of the association leaders were using ad hoc estimates to answer questions.

Associations are not built in a way that precise quantitative data is readily available. That does not mean that the information collected in this survey is useless. Rather, it indicates that numbers should be seen as ranges rather than specific integers.

For example, am I confident that an association that reported a budget of $5,000 has a significantly larger budget than one that reported a budget of $100? Yes. But am I convinced that either budget is accurate to within $100? Not necessarily.

Qualitative Research

The collection of surveys was paralleled by a qualitative component of the research that involved going to meetings, talking to people and leaders in New Orleans about their associations, and attending association functions. This process was largely one of contextualizing the data I was collecting, but at times it is referenced more overtly in the study.

Appendix IV

Survey

Community Mapping Project update

For the original Community Mapping Project go to http://www.city-works.org/maps.htm. Please contact Stephen Danley via phone (504-669-2386) or via email at Stephen.Danley@gmail.com with any questions.

Introduction

This survey is an update of City Works' Community Mapping Project. The former director of City Works, Jim Livingston, asked Stephen Danley to update the project as part of his doctoral research. City Works, NPN and CBNO-Mac all support this project.

Investigator

This study is being conducted by Stephen Danley, a doctoral student in the Department of Social Policy and Social Work at Oxford University and a Robert A. Fox Leadership Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania. This project has been approved by the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee.

Benefits

After the completion of the Community Mapping Project you will be provided an electronic copy of the maps and report.

Voluntary Participation and Confidentiality

Your participation in this evaluation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw your consent to participate at any time. If you choose to do so, any information derived from your participation will be deleted from the evaluation. This survey requires organizational consent. In the case that you are not able to provide this consent, please help the researcher contact the appropriate person within the organization. The individual (or individuals) who complete the report will not be named in the final project.

Methods/Procedures

This mapping project is part of a larger research project by Stephen Danley. The methods of data collection for this broader study will be an organizational survey, analysis of internal organizational documents and individual interviews. This survey looks at associations' basic information.

Risks and Inconveniences

There are no anticipated risks to participants or organizations. Some associations will be named in the Community Mapping Project as part of the report which is designed to provide information.

Questions

If you have any questions about this study at any time, you may contact Stephen Danley via phone at (w) 504-322-3392 and (c) 504-669-2386, or e-mail him at Stephen.Danley@gmail.com and he will be happy to answer any of your questions. Complaints and concerns may also be sent to Stephen's academic supervisor, Robert Walker, at robert.walker@socres.ox.ac.uk

Once again, we thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to participate in this evaluation process.

I have read the above statement and agree to its terms (please sign).

_____

Organization Information

Date of Survey:_____

Name of Association: _____

Current (mailing) Address: _____ Meeting Place

Address (if different):_____

Frequency and Times of Meeting: _____

Contact Person: _____ Contact

Person's Position:_____ Phone Number:

_____ Email Address:

_____ Founding Year of

Organization: _____

Legal status of organization:

a) No Legal Status
b) LLC (Limited Liability Corporation)
c)Incorporated with the State as Non-Profit
d) 501(c)3
e) Other, please specify: _____

Geographic Area/Neighborhood(s) the Organization Represents (Please describe the association's boundaries in terms of local streets and intersections):

_____

Approximate Number of Households in the Geographic Area/Neighborhood(s) this Association Represents:

_____

Neighborhood Organization Survey

1) From the list of ten (10) planning priorities listed below, the highest three (3) that have emerged from group discussions are:

1. Economic Development	6. Community Health
2. Law Enforcement	7. Parks and Natural Resources
3. Housing	8. Quality of Life, Preservation and Zoning
4. Infrastructure and Public Transportation	9. Property Value and Tax Stabilization
5. Public Education	10. Cultural and Community Facilities

2) Does your association use parliamentary procedure or formal rules for its meetings? An example of this is requiring motions to be offered and seconded prior to a vote. Yes No

3) Does your association have a formal set of bylaws or constitution? Yes No

4) What is your association's yearly budget? Please include the information for the last 5) completed budget by the association. If there is no formal budget, please include an informal estimate from the past year's activities.

_____

6) Are the following groups allowed to be members in your association (please select all that apply)?

a) homeowners b) renters c) absent property owners d) business owners e) institutions f) non-residents interested in the neighborhood g) others (please specify) _____

6) What is your associations' total number of members? _____

7) Voting typically takes place at what level?

a) the board b) the general body c) other (please specify) _____

8) Are dues a requirement for membership in your association? Yes No

9) If yes, what are the *yearly* dues for a resident member of your association? _____

10) What are your organizations' primary sources of income (please select all that apply)?

a) grants b) mandatory dues c) voluntary dues and donations d) other (please specify)

_____

11) Does your association have paid staff? Yes No

12) Are leaders in your organization elected by members? Yes No

13) Please describe the election process: _____

_____

14) What is typical attendance at your association's general meetings? _____

15) What other associations, non-profits or for-profit companies does your association partner with?

_____

16) Does another organization claim to represent all or part of your neighborhood? Yes No

17) If Yes, what is the name of the organization(s)? _____

Further Research

Would your association be willing to participate in further research? The next stage of this research involves studying meeting minutes to learn about the day-to-day functions of neighborhood associations. Yes No

Please add any comments, requests or clarifications here:

APPENDIX IV - CONSENT FORMS

Consent to Participate in a Research Study

Investigation in the roles and functions of neighborhood organizations in New Orleans

Investigator

This study will be conducted by [redacted] a doctoral student in the Social Policy and Social Works Department at Oxford University. This project has been approved by the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee.

Invitation to Participate & Purpose

You are being invited to be interviewed regarding the Algiers Point Association and its roles, functions and outcomes. Thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to consider participation.

Voluntary Participation

Your participation in this evaluation is completely voluntary and you may withdraw your consent to participate at any time during the process. If you choose to do so, any information derived from your participation will be deleted from the evaluations' findings.

Methods/Procedures

The methods of data collection for this study will be an organizational survey, internal organizational documents and individual interviews. The interviews will not be audio-taped. All interviewees will be anonymous.

Confidentiality

All interviews will be anonymous. This anonymity is subject to normal legal requirements. All information will be held on a private computer and anonymized.

Risks and Inconveniences

There are no anticipated physical risks to participants. One potential risk is that because organizations will be discussed and organizations are often small, interested parties might be able to surmise the identity of interviewees.

Benefits

The primary benefit to the interviewee would be a copy of the affiliated Community Mapping Project and also the final report. This final report will inform both practitioners and government officials of the roles and functions of neighborhood organizations, as well as their best practices. It will also provide information on the types of processes that shape neighborhood organizations.

Questions

If you have any questions about this study at any time, you may contact [redacted] at the Nuffield College or you may phone him at [redacted], or e-mail him at [redacted] and he will be happy to answer any of your questions. Complaints may also be sent to Stephen's academic supervisor, [redacted], at [redacted]

Once again, we thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to participate in this evaluation process.

By signing this form you are declaring that you have read this information sheet, had the opportunity to ask any pertinent questions, and agree to its terms.

Printed Name of the Participant _____

Signature of the Participant _____

Date_____

Printed Name of the Investigator _____

Signature of the Investigator _____

♦

APPENDIX V - INTERVIEW TEMPLATE (CONDENSED)

Pre-interview checklist: [ ] consent form, [ ] introduction,

Macro Objectives:

Types of Activities: how come to these things?

human capital
neigh charact
policy/stimulus
association
stimulus

Examples (advocacy organisation) ... how?

Micro Objectives:

Specific Activities: how come to these things?

human capital
neigh charact
policy/stimulus
association
stimulus

Examples (from documents) ... how?

Snowball Sampling:

Who else in organisation to talk to?

What other key partners to talk to? human capital

Pre-Interview Notes:

- Neighbourhood Characteristics
    - income
    - race
    - age
    - important events in neighbourhood ( )
- Physical Characteristics (assets based)
    - institutions
    - schools, hospitals, important businesses, universities, historical sights
    - public housing

♦

APPENDIX VI - FIGURES 5.4.1 AND 5.4.2

Association	Organization	Collab	Coord	Collegial	Coop	Conflict
Algiers Point	Friends of the Ferry	x				
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Security Patrol	x				
Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	HAMP					x
Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association	City Council			x		
Pilotland Neighborhood Association	City Council			x		
Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	New Orleans Department of Recreation	x				
Broadmoor Improvement Association	Church of the Annunciation	x				
Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association	Nola Church Plant	x				
Lake Carmel Improvement Association	Eastern New Orleans Neighborhood Advisory Council	x				
Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Dillard University			x		
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	Vieux Carre Property Owners Association	x				
Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	City Council			x		
Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Felicity Street Redevelopment	x				
Upper Audubon Association	Security District	x				

Figure 5.4.1 - Neighbourhood Partners

Association	Organization	Collab	Coord	Collegial	Coop	Conflict
Upper Audubon Association	Security District	x				
Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	New Orleans Department of Recreation	x				
Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	New Orleans Police Department			x		
Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	Walgreens					x
Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	Robert's Grocery					x
Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	Hike for Katreena		x			
Hollygrove-Dixon Neighborhood Association	City Council			x		
Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	HAMP Construction					x
Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	New Orleans Police Department			x		
Dreux Avenue Good Neighbors Society	Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association			x		
Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association	Nola Church Plant	x				
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	City Council					x
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	French Quarter Management District			x		
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	Informal Rental Houses					x
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	City Council			x		
Pilotland Neighborhood Association	New Orleans Police Department		x			
Pilotland Neighborhood Association	Neighborhood Watch	x				

Association	Organization	Collab	Coord	Collegial	Coop	Conflict
Pilotland Neighborhood Association	City Council			x		
Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association	New Orleans Police Department		x			
Gentilly Terrace and Gardens Neighborhood Association	Neighborhood Watch	x				
Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association	City Council			x		
Broadmoor Improvement Association	Church of Annunciation	x				
Broadmoor Improvement Association	Broadmoor CDC	x				
Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	Mayoral Administration					x
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	Federal Government		x			
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	City Council			x		
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	North Rampart Main Street Association	x				
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	Vieux Carre Property Owners Association					x
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Security Patrol	x				
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Take 5 Oil		x			
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Northwest Carrollton Neighborhood Association					x
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	Praveen Kailas					x
French Quarter Citizens Inc.	Neighborhood Conservation District Commission					x

Association	Organization	Collab	Coord	Collegial	Coop	Conflict
Broadmoor Improvement Association	Broadmoor Improvement District	x				
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Walgreens		x			
Fontainebleau Improvement Association	Robert's Grocery		x			
Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	US Postal Service					x
Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Beacon of Hope	x				
Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Dillard CDC					x
Lake Carmel Improvement Association	Security District	x				
Broadmoor Improvement Association	Apex Community Center	x				
Upper Audubon Association	Security District	x				
Lake Carmel Improvement Association	New Orleans Police Department		x			
Upper Audubon Association	Tulane					x
Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Grocery Store					x
Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Local Politicians					x
Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Volunteers of America					x
Sugar Hill Neighborhood Association	Dillard CDC	x				
Lake Carmel Improvement Association	Eastern New Orleans Neighborhood Advisory Council	x				
Algiers Point Association	New Orleans Police Department			x		
Algiers Point Association	Mayoral Administration		x			

Association	Organization	Collab	Coord	Collegial	Coop	Conflict
Algiers Point Association	Crescent City Connection					x
Historic Faubourg Lafayette Association	Felicity Street Redevelopment	x				
Historic Lafayette Neighborhood Association	Brown's Dairy					x
Irish Channel Neighborhood Association	Preservation Resource Center	x				
Historic Lafayette Neighborhood Association	Jericho Road	x				
Historic Lafayette Neighborhood Association	The Mission (homeless shelter)					x

Figure 5.4.2 - Neighbourhood Issues