

Imperialism, Industrialisation and War: The Role of Ideas in China's Japan Policy, 1949-1965

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Abstract

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This thesis is a study of the People's Republic of China's foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. In particular, the thesis explores Chinese policy-makers' ideas about Japan in the wake of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), and considers how those ideas shaped China's foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. To do so, the thesis employs a four-part ideas framework that examines Chinese policy-makers' background, foreground, cognitive and normative ideas about Japan, and shows how the interaction between these four different idea types shaped China's Japan policy between 1949 and 1965. Furthermore, the thesis draws on over 200 recently declassified Chinese-language archival records from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as well as additional Chinese, Japanese, US and British archival sources. It argues that China's experience of Japanese imperialism, industrialisation and war during the first half of the twentieth century deeply shaped Chinese ideas about Japan after 1949, though in ways that at first seem counterintuitive. Although Japan had waged a brutal war against China, Chinese policy-makers viewed Japan as an important source of industrial goods, technology and expertise, and a symbol of a modern, industrialised nation-state. However, China's experience of Japanese imperialism and militaristic aggression often made it difficult to justify the policy of 'trading with the enemy'. Ultimately, the thesis argues that China sought to expand economic ties with Japan after 1949 because Chinese policy-makers believed that doing so would assist China in becoming a modern and industrialised state, one that was strong enough to withstand foreign imperialism and restore its central position in the international system. Chinese conceptions of Japan thus help to explain how Japan became China's largest trade partner by 1965, despite the bitter legacy of the War of Resistance and the Cold War divide between the two countries after 1949.

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Notes on Names and Terms

In this thesis, Japanese and Chinese names are written with the surname preceding the given name.

All Chinese terms, except for the names of well-known figures and institutions such as Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen or the Japanese Kwantung Army, or terms directly cited from other works, are transcribed in the *pinyin* transliteration system.

Japanese long vowels are indicated by a macron, except for well-known names such as Tokyo.

All transliterations in parentheses throughout the text are Chinese terms: (*zhengzhi*). Any Japanese terms are indicated separately as follows: (JP: *seikei bunri*).

Abbreviations

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCPIT	Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade (<i>Zhongguo guoji maoyi cujin weiyuanhui</i>)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Europe
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project
FMA	Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLF	Great Leap Forward
GMD	<i>Guomindang</i> (also referred to as 'KMT' or the ' <i>Kuomintang</i> ')
IR	International Relations
JAPIT	Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade (JP: <i>Nitchū kokusai bōeki sokushin kyōkai</i>)
JCFA	Japan-China Friendship Association (JP: <i>Nitchū yūkō kyōkai</i>)
JCIEA	Japan-China Import-Export Association (JP: <i>Nitchū yushutsunyū kumiai</i>)
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JCTPA	Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (JP: <i>Nitchū bōeki sokushin kai</i>)
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (of Japan)
LT Trade	Liao-Takasaki Trade
NIE	National Intelligence Estimate
NSC	National Security Council
PLA	People's Liberation Army
POW	Prisoner of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
UKNA	United Kingdom National Archives
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USDS	United States Department of State
USDNSA	United States Digital National Security Archive
USNA	United States National Archives
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

In February 1971, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reported that Japan had become China's most important source of steel, machinery, precision instruments and transportation equipment. The CIA noted that these products were not only important in themselves, but were even more important 'for the Japanese technological expertise which comes with them'.¹

This is counterintuitive. Between 1937 and 1945, China's War of Resistance against Japan had left between ten and twenty million Chinese dead and displaced 100 million more.² In 1971, China and Japan had not yet officially ended the state of war between their two countries, and memories of that devastating war were still very fresh in China. Indeed, scholarship on the Sino-Japanese relationship tends to centralise the influential and negative role that the legacy of this war has had on bilateral ties between China and Japan.³ More than six decades after the war's end, Chinese leaders continue to demonstrate that they are unwilling or unable to

¹ 'Japan between the Two Chinas', CIA Office of National Estimates, 10 February 1971, United States Digital National Security Archive (hereafter 'USDNSA'), File JT00099, 8.

² For discussion of different estimates of casualties, see John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 295-296; Diana Lary and Stephen MacKinnon, *The Scars of War: The Impact of Warfare on Modern China* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001), 6.

³ See, for example, Allen S Whiting, *China Eyes Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Xue Li, 'Zhongri Guanxi Nengfou Chaoyue Lishi Wenti? [Can Sino-Japanese Relations Overcome the History Question?]', *Zhanlue yu Guanli [Journal of Strategy and Management]* 4(2003); Peter Hays Gries, 'China's "New Thinking" on Japan,' *The China Quarterly* 184(2005); Yinan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II* (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Caroline Rose, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future?* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005).

overcome their ‘historically rooted and visceral distrust’ of Japan.⁴ The wartime legacy has also shaped Chinese assessments of the Japanese security threat, thus ensuring relatively consistent Chinese support for the US-Japan alliance as a ‘cap’ on Japanese remilitarisation.⁵ Furthermore, scholars suggest that the wartime legacy is an important factor in explaining why economic interdependence has failed to bring about closer political ties between China and Japan.⁶

This, then, is a thesis about an empirical puzzle at the heart of the China-Japan relationship. In the aftermath of major war, why did the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attempt to build a close economic relationship with its former enemy, Japan? Building this economic relationship was made even harder given the Cold War environment of these years, a time when the Japanese government—first occupied by, then allied with, the United States—did not officially recognise the PRC.⁷ Yet despite these Cold War constraints, the Chinese government embarked on a policy of ‘People’s Diplomacy’ (*minjian waijiao*) towards Japan.⁸ During the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing exchanged a host of cultural and political delegations with Japan, and the two countries signed four rounds of trade agreements. The bitter legacy of the war did not appear to play an important role in China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan.

⁴ Thomas J Christensen, ‘Chinese Realpolitik,’ *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 5 (1996), 41.

⁵ Thomas J Christensen, ‘China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,’ *International Security* 23, no. 4 (1999). China’s view of the US-Japan alliance has somewhat soured since the mid-1990s, however, as revisions to the alliance have resulted in a more militarily active role for Japan. For more on this, see Wu Xinbo, ‘The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance,’ *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (2005-2006), 119-120.

⁶ Michael Yahuda, ‘The Limits of Economic Interdependence: Sino-Japanese Relations,’ in *New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy*, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S Ross (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 168-170, 181-182.

⁷ Between 1949 and 1971, the Republic of China, led by Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government, represented “China” at the United Nations.

⁸ ‘People’s Diplomacy’ was China’s use of unofficial economic, political and cultural ties as a means of promoting the establishment of an official relationship. Peng Tao, ‘Assessing People’s Diplomacy and Its Impacts on the US-Japan Security Alliance,’ *Historia Actual Online* 7(2005), 68.

This puzzle raises a number of important questions. First, at a time when devastating war with Japan was so recent, and the two countries were situated on opposite sides of a strategic, political and economic Cold War divide, why did China's leaders try so hard to build an economic relationship with their wartime enemy and Cold War opponent? Second, and related to this, having just ended the war with Japan, how did Chinese policy-makers justify and legitimate their policy of engagement with Japan to a Chinese domestic audience still struggling to overcome the effects and memories of that war? Third, after 1949, China's Communist leaders pursued a Soviet economic development model, and received vast quantities of economic aid, investment and expertise from the Soviet Union throughout the 1950s. Why, then, did China's leaders work hard to build economic ties with Japan, a country whose capitalist development was so different to China's own? Finally, China and Japan had a long history of close economic interdependence, particularly during the first half of the twentieth century. However, that economic interdependence was, in many ways, coerced through Japan's semi-colonisation of China. In the second half of the twentieth century, China was no longer a semi-colonial country. Instead, China's Nationalist and then Communist leaders were able to pursue an independent foreign and economic policy for the first time since the establishment of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. Thus, it seems reasonable to ask: how did the leaders of a newly independent China consider their foreign and economic policy choices towards Japan?

In this thesis I explore a major subset of these questions. The central research questions in this thesis are: *How did the PRC's policy-makers conceive of Japan in the wake of the War of Resistance against Japan, and how did these ideas shape China's foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965?*

The thesis argues that the experience of imperialism, industrialisation and war at Japan's hand deeply shaped Chinese ideas about Japan after 1949. In the wake of the War of Resistance against Japan, Chinese policy-makers were deeply concerned about how to strengthen China. They sought to 'reconstruct' China so that their country could withstand the kind of aggressive militarism and imperial exploitation that had left China vulnerable to foreign imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and as a victim of aggressive war with Japan between 1937 and 1945. For China's leaders, rapid industrialisation was at the heart of their efforts to modernise and make China strong. In the chapters that follow, I outline the range of ideas about Japan held by Chinese policy-makers, the relationships between these ideas, and the ways in which they changed over time. Within this range of ideas, I argue that two important strands emerged.

First, although Japan had waged a brutal war against China, China's political elites came to view Japan as a crucial trade partner and symbol of a modern, industrialised nation-state. Japan's long-term economic interdependence with China, and Chinese familiarity with Japanese industrial practices and technology, meant that Chinese officials saw Japanese industrial goods, technology and expertise as crucial in helping to meet the goal of rapid industrialisation decreed by the Soviet economic model. Then, as Chinese officials began to draw sharper distinctions between China and the Soviet Union during the late 1950s and early 1960s, they viewed Japan—then the world's only industrialised, 'Eastern country' (*dongfang guojia*)—as an important yardstick against which to compare China's own levels of development. Chinese officials stepped up their efforts to import Japanese goods, expertise and technology,

and to learn from the ways in which Japan had used science and technology to become a modern, industrialised country.

Second, China's experience of Japanese imperialism and militaristic aggression shaped Chinese ideas about, and foreign economic policy towards, Japan, though not always in a coherent way. On the one hand, Chinese leaders wrestled with how to legitimate the policy of 'trading with the enemy' to a Chinese domestic audience which had fresh memories of bitter war with Japan. And at times, Japan's conservative government and its alliance with the 'imperialistic' United States, made it impossible for China's leaders to condone trading with Japan. On the other hand, Chinese leaders argued that the Japanese people were common victims of US imperialism, and that Japan and its economy were suffering as a result of the US imperialist (economic) order in Asia. Thus, calling for the establishment of 'normal' economic relations between China and Japan became a way for Chinese officials to oppose the US-led economic embargo on China, and mount a campaign against US imperialism in Asia.

Nevertheless, Chinese policy-makers also held 'mistaken' ideas about Japan. Chinese policy-makers' anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology made them unwilling or unable to acknowledge or recognise that Japan might have achieved higher levels of postwar industrialisation than China because Japan was a capitalist country, or because the United States had played a crucial role in rehabilitating Japan's economy. Instead, Chinese policy-makers wrongly credited Japan's inherent 'industriousness' for its relatively higher levels of development and 'modernity'.

These conceptions of Japan help us to understand China's Japan policy between 1949 and 1965. China sought to expand economic ties with Japan after 1949 because its policy-makers believed that doing so would assist China in becoming a modern and industrialised state, one that was strong enough to acquire a central position in the international system. Of these Chinese policy-makers, we will see that it was the ideas and actions of one individual in particular—Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai (周恩來)—which played the most important role in shaping China's policy of economic engagement with Japan.

There has been a common tendency in the literature to explain China's foreign policy as being either 'pragmatic' or 'ideological' during the Mao years.⁹ However, the distinction between pragmatism and ideology is an unhelpful one; all states—regardless of how 'ideological' or 'revolutionary' they are—require some form of pragmatic or practical behaviour to deal with contingent situations. Furthermore, arguing that China was, at times, behaving as an 'ideological' state does not provide us with much guidance on the particular policy choices that China's leaders might make; not all 'ideological' or 'revolutionary' states are the same, and the terms 'ideological' and 'pragmatic' have been used to explain many different kinds of policy behaviour. Indeed, the period under investigation in this thesis—1949-1965—is marked by a number of particularly radical and unpragmatic choices in Chinese foreign policy, such as the Taiwan Straits crises, the breakdown in relations with the Soviet Union, and isolation from both of the superpowers. Yet at a time when Chinese policy-makers failed to act 'pragmatically' on so many occasions, they appeared to have behaved 'pragmatically' towards Japan.

⁹ For an extensive criticism of this issue, see Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 244-246.

We will return to this issue of ‘pragmatism’ versus ‘ideology’ throughout the thesis, and particularly in Chapter Six. I will suggest that employing an ideas framework that explores the ideas of Chinese policy-makers is, arguably, a more useful method of analysis than simply describing Chinese behaviour as ‘pragmatic’ or ‘ideological’. That is, by looking at the range of cognitive theories, historical lessons, and normative goals that shaped China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan, we will be able to understand how both the broad ‘ideological’ objectives of the CCP combined with more specific day-to-day choices vis-à-vis Japan. Ultimately, in this thesis, I will argue that China’s Japan policy—and particularly its goal of expanding economic ties with Japan—stemmed not from pragmatism or from a single ideology, but rather from the set of Chinese ideas outlined above. Nevertheless, in making this argument, I do not claim that Chinese officials’ ideas about Japan were the only, or even the most important, factor shaping China’s policy of economic engagement with Japan after 1949. As we shall see, a host of material and historical factors—such as geography, the economic complementarity of the two countries’ trade profiles, and a long history of economic interdependence—also helped to provide the conditions for China and Japan to resume economic engagement at war’s end.

From here, this Introductory chapter outlines the existing literature on postwar relations between China and Japan, and the theoretical framework and methods adopted in this thesis.

1.2 Existing Explanations

At first glance, China’s relatively positive relationship with Japan in the aftermath of war is not so puzzling when we consider other historical examples. The end of the

Second World War saw the evolution of peace treaties, security alliances, and political and economic integration between bitter wartime enemies such as France and (West) Germany, and the United States and Japan. In many respects, the onset of the Cold War and the need for postwar reconstruction encouraged the leaders of these states to pursue top-down reconciliation. Although the populations of these countries may still have held grievances about the war, the structures imposed from above were important in helping to shape long-term reconciliation. Yet what *is* puzzling in the case of China and Japan is that the bitter legacy of the war re-emerged in the Sino-Japanese relationship after decades of apparently having been played down. This has caused at least one scholar to ask,

...why did the history issue become politically salient from the 1980s but not immediately after the war, when most people had firsthand war experience?¹⁰

In trying to account for the relatively positive relationship between China and Japan immediately after the war, scholars have emphasised the effects of China's Communist revolution and the Cold War bipolar order on China's relationship with Japan. Caroline Rose and Rana Mitter argue that after 1949, China's negative view of Japan and the War of Resistance took a backseat to the Communist revolution in the official history of the new PRC. Indeed, even before 1949, negative ideas about Japan and the War of Resistance were downplayed because of the Civil War raging between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists (*Guomindang*, GMD) from 1946 to 1949.¹¹ The Communists therefore directed all their military and propaganda efforts to fighting the revolutionary war against the Nationalists, and emphasised Chiang

¹⁰ He, *The Search for Reconciliation*, 16.

¹¹ For an overview of the Chinese Civil War, see Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

Kai-shek's Nationalists as the primary target of Beijing's hostility.¹² Through the analysis of Chinese history textbooks, memorial sites, and official media, Yinan He shows that the War of Resistance and anti-Japanese sentiment were strategically downplayed in official Chinese views during the early postwar decades. This was to,

...construct a Communist national identity that emphasized the irreconcilable antagonism between the Chinese Communists on the one hand and capitalists and imperialist forces, including the KMT and its American ally, on the other, rather than between the Chinese and Japanese nations.¹³

It was not until the 1980s that a set of transformations within China subsequently allowed official memory of the War of Resistance to re-emerge. As Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening policies created political and economic uncertainty within China, China's leaders used the history of the War of Resistance to forge a unified Chinese national identity and to shore up domestic support for the Communist Party.¹⁴ During the 1980s, memories of the brutal war with Japan were instrumentally reintroduced into the Chinese national consciousness through leaders' statements, history textbooks, official commemoration, academic history-writing, and museum building.¹⁵ Parks Coble suggests that the 'new remembering' of the War of Resistance by Party and academic historians made war with Japan a centrepiece of contemporary Chinese nationalism after the 1980s.¹⁶ While Shogo Suzuki argues that memories of Japanese brutality have long been embedded in Chinese national identity, he nevertheless suggests that the recent emergence of Japan as a 'victimising other' is,

¹² Rana Mitter, 'Old Ghosts, New Memories: China's Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics,' *Journal of Contemporary History* 38, no. 1 (2003), 120-128; Rose, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, 39.

¹³ He, *The Search for Reconciliation*, 134-135.

¹⁴ Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C Saunders, 'Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,' *International Security* 23, no. 3 (1998-1999), 119-126; Mitter, 'Old Ghosts, New Memories.'

¹⁵ ———, 'Old Ghosts, New Memories,' 120-128; Gilbert Rozman, 'China's Changing Images of Japan, 1989-2001: The Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,' *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 2, no. 1 (2002); Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*.

¹⁶ Parks M. Coble, 'China's "New Remembering" of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-1945,' *The China Quarterly* 190(2007), 403.

...a by-product of China's attempts to regain its social and moral legitimacy within a post-Cold War International Society increasingly dominated by the Western powers.¹⁷

Yinan He and Caroline Rose also centralise the importance of the Cold War order as a second critical factor that shaped the China-Japan relationship during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Chinese elites attempted to engage with Japan to draw Japan away from the side of the West during the Cold War, to undercut Japan's security alliance with the US, and to 'erode international support for the US-led containment of China'.¹⁸ The Chinese government also played down the wartime legacy to encourage Japan to transfer its diplomatic recognition from US-backed Taiwan to mainland China.¹⁹ Ultimately, however, these scholars argue that the bipolar Cold War structure brought China and Japan into the 'subsystems' of the two superpowers.²⁰ US pressure prevented Japan from officially recognising the PRC as the legitimate Chinese government until US-China *rapprochement* in 1972.

This focus on either domestic Chinese politics or the bipolar structure of the Cold War system in explaining the Sino-Japanese relationship of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s is compelling. However, there is a tension between these two explanations. The first explanation—that China's Communist revolution relegated Chinese grievances about the war to the background—assumes that latent Chinese grievances about the war did exist. Although not explicit, the domestic politics explanation suggests that were it not for the PRC's more pressing struggle with the Nationalists, Chinese

¹⁷ Shogo Suzuki, 'The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts,' *The Pacific Review* 20, no. 1 (2007), 23.

¹⁸ He, *The Search for Reconciliation*, 134.

¹⁹ Caroline Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-Making* (London: Routledge, 1998), 43-45.

²⁰ He, *The Search for Reconciliation*, 134-135.

grievances over war with Japan might have bubbled to the surface. That is, China's 'new remembering' of the war may have taken place well before the 1980s.²¹

Yet, the second explanation—that the Cold War order prevented the two countries from realising political reconciliation—assumes that the Sino-Japanese relationship of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was a positive one, or one that was at least motivated by instrumental goals. Here, arguments by He and Rose imply that were it not for the fact that China and Japan were situated on either side of the bipolar Cold War divide, the two countries might have successfully negotiated the diplomatic reconciliation both desired. These authors maintain that China's desire for closer political and economic ties with Japan was based on instrumental goals. As such, the War of Resistance and tensions over that war were not strong features of official Chinese attitudes towards Japan before the 1980s.

Quite clearly, then, these dominant explanations are based on contending perspectives about the nature of Chinese attitudes towards Japan after 1949. This is hardly surprising given that these dominant explanations arise out of quite different research approaches that emphasise, for example, domestic politics, the international system, economic factors or an English School understanding of international society. Yet, by setting these explanations against one another, we can see that what is absent from these accounts is a clear understanding of Chinese policy-makers' ideas about Japan

²¹ One might argue that Japan's military modernisation did not substantially take place until the 1990s and 2000s, and that this helps to explain why the Chinese government was willing to play down Japan's wartime legacy during the early decades of the Cold War. While there is some merit to this argument, this does not explain the re-emergence of the wartime legacy in Chinese discourse in the 1980s. Furthermore, the domestic politics explanation outlined above actually emphasises developments in China, rather than Japan, as the basis for China's 'new remembering' of the war in the 1980s.

in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and how the experience of war with Japan influenced those ideas.

1.2.1. Why have we failed to explore Chinese ideas about Japan?

There are a number of reasons why we have so little understanding of Chinese leaders' ideas about Japan in the decades immediately after the war. First, the history of the War of Resistance did not feature prominently in official Chinese historiography after 1949. In Mao's China, the story of the Communist revolution and the Communist defeat of the Nationalists was a far more important narrative than the story of war with Japan.²² This not only ensured that 'the traumas of the Japanese invasion were downplayed and stylised in the historiography of the early PRC',²³ but also that the history of China's war with Japan has been downplayed in our study of China more generally. Related to this, there has been a tendency to consider China's 1949 Communist revolution as *the* defining event in China during the twentieth century.²⁴ Chinese and Western scholars alike have traditionally viewed 1949 as a major turning point in Chinese history and as the starting point of the 'new China', primarily as a result of the CCP's own narrative of Communist Liberation. Equally, Western historical literature on the Second World War has largely ignored the experience of the war in Asia in favour of scholarship on the European and American Pacific theatres.²⁵ Although China's War of Resistance against Japan lasted nearly twice as long as the Soviet-German or Japanese-American conflicts, the China-Japan

²² Coble, 'China's "New Remembering" of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance, 1937-1945,' 394.

²³ Mitter, 'Old Ghosts, New Memories,' 119.

²⁴ See Julia Strauss, 'Introduction: In Search of P.R.C. History,' *The China Quarterly* 188(2006), 855-856.

²⁵ Notable exceptions to this include Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London: Longman, 1987); Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

War has remained under-explored as a key theatre in the Second World War.²⁶ We therefore have little understanding of how the experience of the Second World War (the War of Resistance against Japan) may have shaped Chinese leaders' thinking about Japan in the years after 1949.

This thesis seeks to make the Second World War and its legacy a central focus in the study of China. Numerous studies consider how Chinese foreign policy has been influenced by factors such as Sino-centrism, nationalism, anti-imperialism, Mao Zedong Thought, Marxist-Leninism, and China's relationships with the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Third World, for example.²⁷ Yet the record on how the Second World War shaped China and its foreign policy is thin.²⁸ Nevertheless, the Second World War was a 'total war' that dramatically disrupted Chinese politics and society.²⁹ Indeed, Mao Zedong's own writings during the War of Resistance indicate that Mao himself recognised the potential impact that the War would have on both China and Japan.³⁰ Although Mao recognised that victory over Japan would not come quickly, he believed that the war was the crucial catalyst needed to revolutionise China and to shake China out of what he regarded as its weak, semi-colonial and semi-feudal state. In 1938, Mao presciently stated that:

²⁶ Steven I. Levine and James C. Hsiung, *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), xvii-xviii.

²⁷ See, for instance, Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993); Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S Ross, *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2006).

²⁸ One major exception to this is William A. Callahan, *China: The Pessimist Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 6.

²⁹ Rana Mitter and Aaron W. Moore, 'Special Issue: China in World War II, 1937-1945: Experience, Memory, and Legacy,' *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no. 2 (2011).

³⁰ Mao Zedong, 'On Protracted War,' in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1938), 178.

The Sino-Japanese War will remould both China and Japan; as long as China persists in the resistance and in the united front, the war will surely remould the old Japan into a new Japan, and the old China into a new China, and people and things in both China and Japan will be remoulded during and after this war.³¹

This quote suggests that it is necessary to examine precisely how the war ‘remoulded’ China and, in particular, how the war ‘remoulded’ China’s subsequent thinking about Japan.

The second point is a theoretical one. It is only since the end of the Cold War that the study of ideas—predominantly associated with the approach of constructivism—has forcefully entered mainstream International Relations.³² Until recently, rationalist accounts of state behaviour have been particularly dominant. Although rationalism is not hostile to the study of ideas, rationalism arose in the 1960s as a way of studying, for example, the problem of nuclear deterrence, and hence was heavily influenced by realism and realism’s emphasis on material power.³³ Given this influence, and the fact that the two dominant approaches to International Relations—realism and liberal institutionalism—use rationalist models as their starting point, it is therefore less surprising that those studying the China-Japan relationship have paid less attention to ideational factors.

Third, the way in which ideas have been studied in the Chinese case has somewhat obscured the study of Chinese ideas about Japan. There has been a tendency in the

³¹ Ibid.

³² Nina Tannenwald and William C. Wohlforth, 'The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War,' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 2 (2005), 3-4; Peter J Katzenstein, ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).

³³ James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,' in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, et al. (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 59.

literature to explore Chinese ideas through the lens of Communist ideology.³⁴ While earlier connotations of Chinese ideology, rooted in Marxism-Leninism, were somewhat stylised and ahistorical, we now have increasingly nuanced understandings of Chinese Communist ideology. This is thanks, in large part, to the opening of Chinese and Soviet archives over the last decade, and to the rise of a 'new Cold War history' that places greater focus on the role of ideas and culture in understanding state behaviour during the Cold War.³⁵ Scholars such as Michael Hunt, Chen Jian and Niu Jun have been instrumental in arguing that China's foreign policy behaviour during the Cold War can best be explained through China's domestic politics and historical experiences, and thus identify concepts such as nationalism and anti-imperialism as important sources of Chinese foreign policy ideology.³⁶ Nevertheless, it remains difficult to square this ideological account of China's foreign policy behaviour with China's policy towards Japan. If China was so influenced by an official ideology rooted in nationalism and anti-imperialism, why did Chinese officials attempt to build a relationship with Japan, the state that had so brutally invaded and colonised China during the first half of the twentieth century?

Fourth, the period between the end of the Second World War and Sino-Japanese diplomatic reconciliation in 1972 is an under-examined period in the literature on

³⁴ For discussion of this issue, see Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 245-248.

³⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Xia Yafeng, 'The Study of Cold War International History in China: A Review of the Last Twenty Years,' *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, no. 1 (2008); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler, 'Review Essay: The Cold War: What Do "We Now Know"?,' *American Historical Review* April(1999).

³⁶ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*; Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*; Niu Jun, *Cong Yan'an Zouxiang Shijie: Zhongguo Gongchandang Duiwai Guanxi De Qiyuan* [from Yan'an to the World: Origins of the Foreign Relations of the Chinese Communist Party] (Beijing: Gongchandangshi Chubanshe, 2008).

Sino-Japanese relations and on the history of East Asia more generally.³⁷ The end of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War provided the catalyst for a major reshaping of security architecture in East Asia, with the establishment of the American-led San Francisco alliance system and the US occupation of Japan. The processes that led from the end of World War II to the onset of the Cold War are an important backdrop to defining moments in Asia's Cold War history, including the Korean and Indochinese Wars, the development of the US-Japan alliance, and US-China *rapprochement*. Yet we know relatively little about the trajectory of one of the most important relationships in Asia—the Sino-Japanese relationship—during this period. In large part, this is because the Cold War order disrupted diplomatic contact between China and Japan, and heavily curtailed political and economic ties between the two countries until 1972. Some go so far as to argue that 'China was closed to Japan in the 1950s and 1960s.'³⁸ Yet during the 1950s and 1960s, there was more political, economic and cultural contact than one might expect given the Cold War divide between the two countries.³⁹

³⁷ A great deal of the contemporary Western literature focuses on the post-1972 or even post-1989 Sino-Japanese relationship. See, for instance: Reinhard Drifte, *Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning?* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003); Marie Soderberg, *Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-First Century: Complementarity and Conflict* (London: Routledge, 2002); Wan Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006); Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*. Some recent exceptions are Yinan He, 'Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006,' *History and Memory* 19, no. 2 (2007); Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash, 'To Serve Revenge for the Dead': Chinese Communist Responses to Japanese War Crimes in the PRC Foreign Ministry Archive, 1949-1956,' *The China Quarterly* 200(2009); Caroline Rose, 'Breaking the Deadlock: Japan's Informal Diplomacy with the People's Republic of China, 1958-9,' in *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, ed. Makoto Iokibe, et al. (London and New York: Routledge, 2008).

³⁸ Shiraishi Takashi and Caroline Sy Hau, 'Only Yesterday: China, Japan and the Transformation of East Asia,' in *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds*, ed. Yangwen Zheng, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 32.

³⁹ This point has been briefly touched upon in Akira Iriye, 'Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-1990,' in *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*, ed. Christopher Howe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 52-53.

Of those who have studied the Sino-Japanese economic relationship of the 1950s and 1960s, most have focused on Japanese attitudes and policies towards China, rather than the reverse.⁴⁰ As a result, we have a far more sophisticated understanding of official Japanese attitudes towards trade with China, and the varied attitudes held by different Japanese political parties and party factions, than we do of Chinese attitudes towards Japan. The limited existing literature overwhelmingly emphasises the role of Japanese politicians, intellectuals and business groups in sustaining the Sino-Japanese economic relationship after 1949. Some argue that Japanese actors were motivated to build a Sino-Japanese trade relationship because of Japan's need for Chinese raw materials;⁴¹ because of a desire to achieve some foreign policy autonomy from the United States;⁴² or because of a sense of guilt about Japan's aggression towards China during the war.⁴³ The Japanese side of the story has been well told. Yet while important, these studies tend to treat China as a static and monolithic state whose elites merely responded to Japanese overtures, or rejected them when 'revolutionary' politics got in the way.

At the same time, much Chinese scholarship also ignores Chinese agency during this period, instead focusing on the impact of US policy on Sino-Japanese trade.⁴⁴ Of

⁴⁰ This is largely because of the relative ease of access to Japanese sources from this period. See, for instance Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Donald C. Hellman, 'Japan's Relations with Communist China,' *Asian Survey* 4, no. 10 (1964); George P. Jan, 'The Japanese People and Japan's Policy Towards Communist China,' *The Western Political Quarterly* 22, no. 3 (1969); Chalmers Johnson, 'The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982,' *Pacific Affairs* 59, no. 3 (1986); Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center Press, 2006).

⁴¹ David G. Brown, 'Chinese Economic Leverage in Sino-Japanese Relations,' *Asian Survey* 12, no. 9 (1972).

⁴² Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 15.

⁴³ Franziska Seraphim, 'People's Diplomacy: The Japan-China Friendship Association and Critical War Memory in the 1950s,' *Japan Focus* August 18(2007), chapter 4; Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 16-19.

⁴⁴ Deng Feng and Du Yu-rong, 'Meiguo Lengzhan Zhanlue Yu Zhongri Maoyi Guanxi (1948-1950) [American Cold War Strategies and Sino-Japanese Trade Relations (1948-1950)],' *Dongbei shi daxue bao [Journal of Northeast China Normal University]* 5(2007); Wang Huiyu, 'Meiguo Dui Ri Jingji

those who have explored the Chinese side of the relationship, most argue that Chinese officials pursued an economic relationship with Japan for two reasons. First, it is argued that Chinese officials used trade with Japan as a lever to woo Japan away from the United States alliance and to obtain diplomatic recognition from Japan.⁴⁵ Second, it is argued that once the Soviet Union withdrew its economic support for China in 1960, Chinese leaders pragmatically turned to Japan and others to provide the capital goods needed for China's economic development.⁴⁶ While these studies provide relatively good detail on Sino-Japanese economic ties during the 1950s and 1960s, they rely almost entirely on Western, Japanese and Taiwanese sources. They are therefore unable to examine the motivations of Chinese policy-makers in pursuing economic ties with Japan, and tend to over-emphasise the role of the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan in shaping China's Japan policy.

1.2.2. *The importance of studying Chinese ideas about Japan*

Why should we study Chinese ideas about Japan and, in particular, Chinese officials' motivation to build an economic relationship with Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War? After all, it is important to acknowledge that for much of the 1950s and 1960s, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship was a modest one. As


Fuxing Zhengce Yingxiang Xia De Riben Yu Dongbei Maoyi [Japan's Trade Relations with Northeast China in the Shadow of the U.S. Economic Recovery Plan toward Japan], *Riben yanjiu [Japan Studies]* 2(2009); Li Enmin, *Zhongri minjian waijiao: 1945-1972 (Sino-Japanese Private Economic Diplomacy: 1945-1972)* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1997); Cheng Yongming and Shi Qibao, *Zhongri Jingmao Guanxi Liushi Nian (1945-2005) [Sixty Years of Sino-Japanese Economic and Trade Relations (1945-2005)]* (Tianjin: Tianjin Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe 2005).

⁴⁵ Brown, 'Chinese Economic Leverage in Sino-Japanese Relations,' 762-767; Peng Tao, 'Assessing People's Diplomacy and Its Impacts on the US-Japan Security Alliance,' 68-69; Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 25; Robert Taylor, *Greater China and Japan: Prospects for an Economic Partnership in East Asia*. (London: Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series, 1996), 3.

⁴⁶ ———, *Greater China and Japan*, 3; Chad J. Mitcham, *China's Economic Relations with the West and Japan, 1949-1979: Grain, Trade and Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 2005).

Figure 1 shows, the Sino-Japanese trade relationship was extremely limited relative to China's trade relationship with the Soviet Union.

Figure 1: China's trade with Japan and the Soviet Union, 1950-1970
(\$US millions)⁴⁷




Moreover, the Sino-Japanese trade relationship of the 1950s and 1960s was much less significant than Sino-Japanese trade ties during all other periods in the twentieth century. Figure 2 depicts Sino-Japanese trade as a share of China's total trade from 1895 to 1995. It shows that during the twentieth century Sino-Japanese trade has accounted for at least 10 percent of China's total trade, *except* for the years between 1945-1965. That is, the period broadly under examination in this thesis. And for a great deal of the two countries' history, the bilateral trade relationship has been much closer to 20 or 30 percent of China's total trade. (Due to the distorted nature of Sino-

⁴⁷ Data compiled by author from International Monetary Fund, 'Historical Direction of Trade Statistics (1948-1980),' (ESDS International, University of Manchester, 2002); United Nations, 'Yearbook of International Trade Statistics,' (New York, Various years). All figures have been converted to millions of US dollars for the purpose of comparison using the following exchange rates: the official Soviet-US exchange rate of 4 roubles per US dollar for figures from 1950 to 1958 (this rate was introduced on 1 March 1950); and the official Soviet-US exchange rate of 0.90 'new roubles' per US dollar for figures from 1959 to 1971 (the 'new rouble' was introduced on 1 January 1961 but the United Nations Yearbook reports both new and old rouble rates for the years 1959 and 1960).

Japanese trade during the war years, Figure 2 does not depict the period between 1937 and 1945).

Figure 2: A century of Sino-Japanese trade, 1895-1995
(% share of China's total trade)⁴⁸



Finally, other potential areas of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation—such as the major levels of investment in Manchuria during the first half of the twentieth century, or the high levels of Japanese investment and foreign aid to China since the late 1970s—were negligible features of the Sino-Japanese economic relationship during the 1950s and 1960s. For these reasons, it is hardly surprising that existing literature tends to overlook the 1950s and 1960s, or considers this period to be an aberration in an otherwise sizeable Sino-Japanese economic relationship across the twentieth

⁴⁸ Data compiled by author from Hsiao Liang-lin, *China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), 152-157; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongji jubian [National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC], *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook]* (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, Various years). Original figures for 1895-1932 in 1000s of Haikwan taels, for 1933-1947 in 1000s of standard dollars, 1948 in 1000s of gold yuan, and 1949-1995 in millions of US dollars. Due to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria from 1932 onwards, trade between China and Manchuria for 1932-1937 is regarded as Japanese trade with China. All figures have been converted by the author to represent Sino-Japanese trade as a percentage of China's total trade. For more discussion on sources and limitations of Chinese historical trade data, see Hsiao Liang-lin, *China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949*, 8.

century. Why, then, should we consider the 1950s and 1960s at all? I suggest that China's foreign economic policy towards Japan, and Chinese ideas about Japan more generally, remain significant and worthy of study for three reasons.

First, steps taken by Chinese and Japanese during the 1950s and early 1960s paved the way for Japan to become China's largest trade partner by 1965. During the 1950s and 1960s, officials in China and non-governmental actors in Japan, signed a series of 'unofficial' trade agreements.⁴⁹ These trade agreements were deemed unofficial because they were signed by Japanese left-wing politicians or business representatives rather than the Japanese government. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese government faced considerable pressure from Washington not to export strategic items to China, or to offer China any trade advantages that could confer recognition on the PRC government or jeopardise Japan's relationship with Taiwan. Nevertheless, as we will see, the Chinese Foreign Ministry consistently pushed for the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, and for features such as long-term trade agreements, government-issued bank credit, and semi-official trade representatives stationed in each country. By 1965, Sino-Japanese trade accounted for 15 per cent of China's overall trade, and these trends continued throughout the Cultural Revolution. This is significant. Just two decades after the War of Resistance, Japan had become China's largest trade partner. Although Sino-Japanese trade during the 1960s did not reach the heights of the Sino-Soviet trade relationship during the 1950s, Japan filled a significant portion of the economic gap left by the Soviet Union when it withdrew from China in 1960. By 1970, China's trade with Japan was almost sixteen times the size of China's remaining trade with the Soviet Union (see Figure 1 above). What

⁴⁹ See Appendix 1 for details of these trade agreements.

were Chinese views about the economic relationship with Japan, and why were Chinese officials so motivated to rebuild this economic relationship in the wake of the Second World War?

Second, the *kinds* of goods that China imported—or attempted to import—from Japan are significant in terms of understanding China’s economic development goals after 1949. During the Maoist era, China’s foreign trade strategy was based on importing the capital goods and technology that China needed to support its goal of rapid industrialisation and mechanisation of agriculture.⁵⁰ The Soviet Union was the major source of these goods and technology. Yet despite the relative wealth of goods that could be provided by the Soviet Union, and the political and strategic constraints of trading with Japan, from 1949 onwards Chinese policy-makers worked hard to obtain a wide range of raw materials, machinery and technology from Japan. In the wake of the Soviet economic withdrawal from China in July 1960, China then significantly increased its imports of machinery, industrial equipment and petrochemical goods from Japan.⁵¹ Japan was also becoming increasingly capable of investing in Chinese heavy industry and supplying industrial plants to China, and Howe argues that ‘the groundwork for the future was being laid by the visits to China of hundreds of [Japanese] businessmen and specialists’.⁵² By the time of the fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-1975), Japan was China’s most important source of industrial goods, providing


⁵⁰ Christopher Howe, ed. *China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 121.

⁵¹ Ibid., 14; Chae-Jin Lee, *China and Japan: New Economic Diplomacy* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), 32-33; Robert L. Price, 'International Trade of Communist China, 1950-65,' in *An Economic Profile of Mainland China*, ed. Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 602-604. Soviet exports of machinery, industrial equipment and petrochemicals declined by around 90 per cent over the 1960s. Mitcham, *China's Economic Relations with the West and Japan*, 98-105.

⁵² Yokoi Yoichi, 'Plant and Technology Contracts and the Changing Pattern of Economic Interdependence between China and Japan to 1989,' in *China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects*, ed. Christopher Howe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 130.

China with over 60 percent of all industrial plant and technology contracts to China.⁵³ Of course, after the Soviet withdrawal, a number of capitalist economies in addition to Japan became important trade partners to China (see Figure 3 below). States such as Australia and Canada were major providers of grain, while a number of Western European nations supplied significant industrial goods and plant technology.⁵⁴

Figure 3: China's leading trade partners, 1960-1970
(\$US millions)⁵⁵



Nevertheless, in both quantity and quality, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship became the major replacement for the Sino-Soviet economic relationship after 1960. In doing so, Japan returned to its prewar position as the major source of industrial goods and technology in China. What do Japan's industrial capabilities—and their

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Price, 'International Trade of Communist China, 1950-65,' 602; Thomas Robinson, 'China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China's Inner Asian Frontiers,' in *The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution 1966-1982*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 253-254.

⁵⁵ Data compiled by author from United Nations, 'Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.'; International Monetary Fund, 'Historical Direction of Trade Statistics (1948-1980).'

importance to China's own economy—tell us about China's economic development goals after 1949?

Finally, and most importantly, a focus on Chinese ideas about Japan in general, and Chinese thinking about the Sino-Japanese economic relationship in particular, is a lens through which to understand broader Chinese thinking about the legacy of imperialism and war. During the first half of the twentieth century, Japan had engaged in imperial exploitation and then aggressive war in China. How did the legacy of Japan's war and imperialism in China inform Chinese thinking about Japan and these broader concepts after 1949? Moreover, how did these ideas shape China's foreign economic policy towards Japan after 1949? These questions will be explored in the remainder of this thesis. Before doing so, however, the following sections of this Chapter explore the theoretical framework and methods used in this study.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

The ideas literature is a broad one. In many cases the term 'ideas' refers to a range of different things, or nothing very specific at all. At different times, ideas are defined as attitudes, worldviews, ideology, shared belief systems and culture. Cognisant of the danger of conceptual fuzziness, I seek to provide a clear definition of what I do and do not mean by ideas. In what follows, I provide a discussion of the ideas literature and the definitions adopted in this thesis. I specifically focus on the relationship between ideas, interests and material factors, the tensions between broadly rationalist and constructivist approaches to ideas, and the way in which ideas can usefully be studied in International Relations (IR). I conclude by discussing the four-part ideas framework that I adopt in this thesis.

1.3.1. What are ideas?

We can distinguish ideas in terms of who holds them (individuals or groups), or in terms of whether they are cognitive or normative constructs.⁵⁶ Cognitive ideas are ‘descriptions of what is the case and tools for understanding how things work’, while normative ideas are values and attitudes that define what is good or bad, right or wrong.⁵⁷ Some authors refer to cognitive ideas as ‘cause and effect ideas’ or ‘causal beliefs’, and normative ideas as ‘principled beliefs’, but see the same distinction between (normative) ideas that ‘develop or justify value commitments’, and (cognitive) ideas which ‘provide guidance as to how to achieve preferred objectives’.⁵⁸ In addition to distinguishing between cognitive and normative ideas, or individual or collective ideas, ideas can also be distinguished by the level at which they operate. Most scholarship draws a distinction between world views, ideologies and shared belief systems which operate at the broadest level, and policy prescriptions and strategies of action, which descend from these broad ideas, but which operate at a more specific, concrete or programmatic level.⁵⁹ Finally, most of the recent literature on ideas tends to adopt definitions that encompass both a basic statement about what ideas *are* and how they *work*. For instance, Checkel defines ideas as ‘broad concepts and basic beliefs that can play a central role in organizing politics and shaping public policy’.⁶⁰ Goldstein and Keohane similarly suggest that ideas ‘influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors’ clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of

⁵⁶ For an excellent overview, see Nina Tannenwald, ‘Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda,’ *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 2 (2005), 14-15.

⁵⁷ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ‘Why and How Ideas Matter,’ in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* ed. Charles Tilly and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 228.

⁵⁸ Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 11.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 8-11; Tannenwald, ‘Ideas and Explanation,’ 14-17.

⁶⁰ Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 5.

strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions.’⁶¹

1.3.2. *Ideas versus ideology*

At this point, it is useful to distinguish ideas from ideology. The study of ideology in foreign policy is a welcome addition to scholarship on China, as well as International History and International Relations more generally.⁶² However, ‘ideology’ is somewhat unhelpful as a central concept in this study. Like ideas, the concept of ideology ‘has achieved prominence despite a remarkable elusiveness in meaning’.⁶³ Of course, some have offered possible articulations of that meaning. Michael Freeden defines ideologies as ‘those systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended, through which individuals and groups construct an understanding of the political world they, or those who preoccupy their thoughts, inhabit, and then act on that understanding.’⁶⁴ Similarly, Michael Hunt defines ideology as, ‘an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.’⁶⁵ In these definitions we see that ideologies are ‘both ways of viewing the world and calls for particular actions at specific moments.’⁶⁶ Thus, ideology takes

⁶¹ Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 3.

⁶² On the role of ideology in Chinese foreign policy, see for example Steven I. Levine, ‘Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy,’ in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*; Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*. On the role of ideology and culture during the Cold War, see for example, Qing Sime, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Zheng Yangwen et al., eds., *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

⁶³ Walter Carlsnaes, *Ideology and Foreign Policy: Problems of Comparative Conceptualization* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 3-4.

⁶⁴ Michael Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 3.

⁶⁵ Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), xi.

⁶⁶ Shibusawa Naoko, *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 6. See also Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Neoconservatism and the Domestic

on all of the definitions of idea types set out by scholars such as Goldstein and Keohane above.⁶⁷ This is not necessarily problematic. Indeed, as will be seen below, my approach to the study of ideas is not dissimilar to Freedman's approach to the study of ideologies.

Nevertheless, I treat ideas as distinct from ideology for two reasons. First, I consider ideas as a subset of an overarching ideology because I do not think it is possible to have an ideology about Japan. Rather, I suggest that Chinese policy-makers' ideas about Japan helped to comprise a broader Chinese foreign policy ideology. Second, in the Chinese case the term 'ideology' takes on particular historical baggage, where 'ideology' is strongly connected to particular kinds of ideas about Marxism-Leninism or Maoism. While this study hopes to make a contribution to more nuanced understandings of Chinese foreign policy ideology during the Cold War, I prefer to use the less baggage-laden term 'ideas'.

1.3.3. The relationship between ideas, interests and material factors

Rationalists and constructivists have long debated whether (material) interests or ideas provide better explanations of state behaviour.⁶⁸ While a site of fruitful debate, one of the major shortcomings of the rationalist-constructivist divide is that scholars have tended to neglect the question of *how* ideas and material factors exist together.⁶⁹ The real world is complex, and state behaviour and the foreign policy decisions of elite actors are motivated by the intersection of both ideational and material

Sources of American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom,' in *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, ed. Steve Smith, et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 262.

⁶⁷ Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 8-11.

⁶⁸ For an excellent outline of the debate between rationalism and constructivism, and its flaws, see Fearon and Wendt, 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View.'

⁶⁹ Tannenwald and Wohlforth, 'The Role of Ideas and the End of the Cold War,' 8.

phenomena. Indeed, as we shall see, China's relationship with Japan between 1949 and 1965—like any real world case—was shaped by a host of ideational and material factors. Attempting to determine whether ideas *or* material factors shape outcomes is therefore both impossible and uninteresting. Acknowledging this point, in the early 1990s scholars such as Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane sought to explore the joint role of ideas and (material) interests in explaining outcomes.⁷⁰ In their seminal work, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, Goldstein and Keohane take an approach that treats ideas as independent or intervening variables that can explain the residual variance in outcomes when (material) interests alone are not sufficient to explain a particular case.⁷¹ *Ideas and Foreign Policy* is a major contribution to IR scholarship seeking to find explanations for 'messy' real world outcomes. Yet the approach taken in *Ideas and Foreign Policy* fails to advance the debate on the relationship between ideas, interests and material factors for a number of reasons.

First, the authors do not clarify the analytical relationship between ideas and interests on the one hand, and material factors and interests on the other. Goldstein and Keohane define 'interest' in modern economic theoretical terms, such that actors are 'materialistically egocentric maximizers' of self-interest.⁷² Yet the relationship between self-interest and material factors is never made clear. At times, the authors refer to material factors and interests, or materialism and rationalism, in the same breath, while at other times they acknowledge that the concept of 'interests' does include some conceptual space for ideas.⁷³ Furthermore, by equating materialism with rationalism, this approach confuses our understanding of what rationalism is. Indeed,

⁷⁰ Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ *Ibid.* See also Robert O. Keohane, 'Ideas Part-Way Down,' *Review of International Studies* 26(2000), 129.

much of the recent divide between rationalism and constructivism on the question of the relationship between ideas and interests stems from the fact that rationalism is all too often (wrongly) equated with materialism. We frequently assume that rationalist explanations of international relations ignore ideational factors and focus on material factors such as military power and economic wealth. But rationalism does not require this, and much rational choice scholarship explores highly 'ideational' concepts such as the preferences, beliefs, values and goals of actors.⁷⁴ Yet, in their study, Goldstein and Keohane choose to bracket off questions about how an actor's interests came to be. This approach is problematic because it leaves us unclear about the relationship between ideas, interests, and material factors. Moreover, by describing interests as coterminous with material factors, and bracketing off questions about how an actor's interests came to be, the Goldstein and Keohane approach does not help us to solve a more practical problem. That is, in a situation in which multiple material factors are at play (such as economic wealth, geography or military capabilities for example), this approach does not help us to determine *which* material interests an actor will choose to maximise.

Second, and related to the previous point, *Ideas and Foreign Policy* sets up a false distinction between ideas and interests. In a rationalist vein, Goldstein and Keohane authors conceive of ideas and (material) interests as competing explanatory variables. Yet it is impossible to know what a state's or actor's interests *are* without first knowing their ideas. As Peter Katzenstein has argued, 'the assumption that actors know their interests, though convenient for analytical purposes, sidesteps some of the

⁷⁴ Fearon and Wendt, 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,' 58-60. These authors suggest that the association between rationalism and materialism is a quirk of the IR field, and one that most likely stems from the neorealist attachment to the distribution of material capabilities in the international system.

most important political and intriguing analytical questions in contemporary politics'.⁷⁵ Indeed, in later writing following the publication of Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*, Robert Keohane himself challenged Wendt for defining interests (and indeed the entire doctrines of classical realism, neorealism and neoliberalism) in purely material terms. In doing so, Keohane and others argued that Wendt had set up a false dichotomy between ideas and interests.⁷⁶ Keohane argued that few theorists regard interests as being 'idea-free baselines'; that 'all interests involve beliefs, and therefore ideas as we conceive them'; and that 'new ideas may even lead—even if not immediately—to a significant change in the very constitution of interests'.⁷⁷ Subsequently, 'selecting which of [ideas or interests] is "fundamental" would not be a sensible enterprise'.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, this is the very approach adopted by Goldstein and Keohane in their earlier *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.

Third, and most importantly, as a study which seeks to take seriously the role of ideas in shaping foreign policy, Goldstein and Keohane's text in fact treats ideas in a relatively marginal way. By treating ideas and (material) interests as competing explanatory variables, the authors take a residual variance approach that only considers ideas after (material) interests are found to be insufficient explanatory variables.⁷⁹ As Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes argue, this approach ultimately downplays the importance of ideas, and 'does not succeed in challenging the

⁷⁵ Peter J Katzenstein, 'Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan,' in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 294.

⁷⁶ Keohane, 'Ideas Part-Way Down,' 125-128.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 127-128. Indeed, certain chapters in this volume (notably that by Kathryn Sikkink) demonstrate explicitly how ideas fundamentally reshaped national interests.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁷⁹ Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 7-8, 26. For a similar approach see Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change*.

dominant rationalist or interest-based approach to foreign policy and state action'.⁸⁰ This somewhat marginal treatment of ideas stems largely from the fact that *Ideas and Foreign Policy* takes a positivist causal approach that studies the particular 'impact' or 'effect' of ideas on foreign policy. Much non-positivist scholarship—typically associated with the constructivist tradition—has come under fire for failing to move beyond mere description of ideas.⁸¹ Some constructivists have responded to these criticisms by attempting to shift their ideational claims into the positivist tradition, and to find an independent, causal role for ideas.⁸² However, that is not the approach taken in this thesis. Attempting to establish the independent, causal force of ideas is problematic for two reasons. First, it is extremely difficult to prove the causal mechanism, or find the 'smoking gun', between an actor's ideas and a particular outcome. An actor's ideas or values are often not prescriptive, but merely set out the range of actions that are possible given a particular ideational framework.⁸³ Second, the attempt to find causal mechanisms or 'smoking guns' has had a dangerous effect on the *kinds* of ideas that are studied in much IR scholarship. As Laffey and Weldes caution, it is often simpler to establish the causal effects of narrow, policy-oriented ideas (such as ideas about trade policy), and much harder to find the precise causal effects of broad ideas or worldviews (such as the liberal worldviews from which ideas about trade policy flow). In the quest for causality, IR scholarship has neglected the study of the broad, prior ideas that delineate not only narrow ideas, but also the very

⁸⁰ Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, 'Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations,' *European Journal of International Relations* 3, no. 2 (1997), 199.

⁸¹ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 'Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War,' *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000/2001); David Dessler, 'Review of Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Politics,' *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (2000), 1002-1003.

⁸² For examples of more positivist constructivist scholarship, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,' *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998); Checkel, *Ideas and International Political Change*; Alastair Iain Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁸³ Friedrich V. Kratochwil, 'How Do Norms Matter?,' in *The Role of Law in International Politics*, ed. Michael Byers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 51-62.

issues that actors define as problems and the range of solutions they consider acceptable.⁸⁴ While there are examples of literature in both the constructivist and rationalist traditions that have demonstrated the causal role of ideas, that is not the goal of this thesis. Instead, this thesis seeks to understand the constitutive or prior questions that, while still integral to causal analysis, are often neglected in a positivist approach to the study of the impact or effect of ideas.⁸⁵ In doing so, this thesis seeks to address the major empirical gap in our understanding of the way in which Chinese policy-makers conceived of Japan between 1949 and 1965, and how these ideas made possible China's Japan policy. In the section below, I outline what this means in practice.

1.4 Methods: How to study ideas

Recognising the problems inherent in the Goldstein and Keohane approach outlined above, this thesis instead adopts a constructivist approach that starts with ideas.⁸⁶ It treats ideas as phenomena that set the parameters within which material factors are perceived, and out of which interests develop.⁸⁷ Ideas give meaning to material factors, shape the preferences and identities of actors, and influence policy-choices and decision-making by enabling certain policies and precluding others.⁸⁸ To explore the role of ideas in shaping China's Japan policy, I draw on a four-part ideas typology first established by John Campbell in his work on the role of ideas in macroeconomic

⁸⁴ Laffey and Weldes, 'Beyond Belief,' 201-202.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 205; Tannenwald, 'Ideas and Explanation,' 33-39.

⁸⁶ For discussion on this point, see Alexander Wendt, 'On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics,' *Review of International Studies* 26(2000), 168.

⁸⁷ For similar approaches, see Tannenwald, 'Ideas and Explanation,' 17.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 20-21.

policy-making in the United States.⁸⁹ This framework is outlined in more detail below.

1.4.1. *Four-part ideas framework*

Campbell’s four-part ideas framework divides ideas along two separate dimensions: background and foreground ideas, and cognitive and normative ideas. Each of these different idea types—and their function—is defined as follows, and is outlined in Figure 4 below:

Figure 4: Four-part ideas framework⁹⁰

BACKGROUND COGNITIVE IDEAS • Underlying theoretical/ontological assumptions about how the world works • Constrain the range of solutions considered possible	BACKGROUND NORMATIVE IDEAS • Underlying assumptions about what is considered desirable/legitimate • Constrain the range of legitimate solutions to policy problems
FOREGROUND COGNITIVE IDEAS • Specific solutions to policy problems • Provide guidance on how to achieve objectives	FOREGROUND NORMATIVE IDEAS • Reflect the values in background normative ideas • Framing symbols and concepts used to develop and legitimate specific policy proposals

1. *Background cognitive ideas* are ‘underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about how the world works’, and the ‘taken-for-granted assumptions residing in the background of policy debates’.⁹¹ These ideas may be derived from theory, such as economic theories of neoclassical economics

⁸⁹ John L. Campbell, 'Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' *Theory and Society* 27, no. 3 (1998).
⁹⁰ Adapted from *ibid.*, 385.
⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 384, 389.

or Keynesianism for instance,⁹² or may be derived from lessons learned in the past. These kinds of ideas powerfully ‘define the terrain of policy discourse’ because they both diagnose problems,⁹³ and constrain the range of solutions that policy-makers consider possible or useful.⁹⁴

2. *Foreground cognitive ideas* are ‘concepts and theories located in the foreground of policy debates’.⁹⁵ They are constituted by background cognitive ideas, and provide specific solutions to policy problems defined at the background level. These ideas are described as ‘enabling’ because they provide policy-makers with guidance on how to achieve specific objectives.⁹⁶
3. *Background normative ideas* consist of broad-based attitudes and normative assumptions about what is considered appropriate or not. They delimit or constrain the range of legitimate or appropriate solutions to policy problems. Examples of background normative ideas in the literature include public opposition to budget deficits and tax increases,⁹⁷ or the ideas about self-determination that became increasingly salient following the end of the Second World War.⁹⁸
4. *Foreground normative ideas* are the framing symbols and concepts used by actors to develop, explain and legitimise specific policy proposals.⁹⁹ We most often find examples of foreground normative ideas in rhetoric, speeches, and

⁹² See, for example, *ibid.*, 389-392; G. John Ikenberry, 'Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,' in *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press: 1993).

⁹³ Rueschemeyer, 'Why and How Ideas Matter,' 243.

⁹⁴ Campbell, 'The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' 389.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 384.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 386; Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 11.

⁹⁷ Campbell, 'The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' 392-394.

⁹⁸ Robert H. Jackson, 'The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in International Relations,' in *Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993). Jackson refers to these ideas as ‘principled ideas’ rather than background normative ideas however.

⁹⁹ Campbell, 'The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' 394-398.

public pronouncements. The symbols and concepts that we find in foreground normative ideas reflect, and are constituted by, the sentiments and goals that comprise background normative ideas.

Advantages of the framework

With respect to the research goals of this thesis, there are a number of advantages to this four-part ideas framework. First, distinguishing between background and foreground ideas is useful as a way of integrating Chinese policy-makers' specific ideas about Japan with their broader cognitive and normative ideas. This is important because, unlike the approach taken by Goldstein and Keohane, it allows this thesis to explore the relationship between broad worldviews and narrow policy solutions.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, using a multi-level framework is particularly important because Japan was *not* the most significant actor in Chinese foreign policy after 1949. Rather, China's cooperation and confrontation with the Soviet Union and United States, respectively, were the dominant factors in shaping Chinese security, economic and political thinking. Premier Zhou Enlai's speech at the inaugural meeting of the Foreign Ministry in November 1949 is indicative of this. Zhou spoke at great length about China's 'brotherly friendship with the Soviet Union' and China's strong opposition to the United States, but did not once mention Japan by name.¹⁰¹ The background and foreground framework therefore allows me to explore how China's most important foreign and economic policy ideas—developed largely in response to its relations with the United States and Soviet Union—helped to constitute narrower, more specific ideas about Japan.

¹⁰⁰ While Goldstein and Keohane recognise that there are multiple levels of ideas, in practice, their work tends to study only narrow foreground ideas, whose effects are much easier to 'measure' in positivist-inclined research.

¹⁰¹ 'Xin Zhongguo de waijiao' [New China's diplomacy], in *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan*, [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai], Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe: Beijing, 1990, 1-7.

Second, the framework allows me to explore how these ideas relate to or ‘fit’ with the particular historical context in which these ideas, and policy-makers, existed. As Ian Hall has argued, it is important ‘to examine not just belief but the circumstances that make it seem plausible to particular actors at particular historical junctures’.¹⁰² Similarly, Dietrich Rueschemeyer suggests that all ideas, ‘even of considerable potential utility, then, have to meet with complex favorable conditions before they are accepted and used’.¹⁰³ To consider how particular historical circumstances shaped the development of ideas, and their traction or influence, each of the four main empirical chapters opens with a brief sketch of the historical ‘context’ (which is broadly defined as the range of domestic and international political, economic and security features) of the period under investigation. This material is then weaved through the discussion of the development of different idea types. This is a way of showing how Chinese ideas about Japan ‘fit’ with broader historical developments being negotiated by Chinese policy-makers.

Third, the framework is useful as a way of teasing out how ideas are produced and transmitted. Where possible, each chapter focuses on the particular individuals, organisations and mediums by which ideas were developed, transmitted and communicated. This allows us to see whether different kinds of actors were involved in producing cognitive and normative ideas, and the particular communication tools and strategies used in the transmission of ideas. However, it must be remembered that the focus of this thesis is less about the mechanisms by which ideas had their impact, and more about the nature of those ideas themselves. This is because, as outlined in

¹⁰² John A. Hall, 'Ideas and the Social Sciences,' in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 41.

¹⁰³ Rueschemeyer, 'Why and How Ideas Matter,' 241.

Section 1.2.1. above, we have little empirical understanding of Chinese policy-makers' ideas about Japan after 1949. It is not the goal of this thesis to demonstrate, causally, how these mechanisms worked or to establish the independent causal effect of ideas on policy.

Finally, this framework is useful as a way of exploring the discursive use of ideas and, in particular, the way in which Chinese policy-makers used ideas about Japan to legitimate and enable their Japan policy. This is of particular concern for the sections of the chapters that focus on *foreground normative ideas*. As we recall, foreground normative ideas are the framing symbols and concepts used by actors to develop, explain and legitimate specific policy proposals. Where the source material allows, I therefore pay attention to the possible different audiences to which Chinese policy-makers framed their policies. Unfortunately, the nature of the source material means that I focus on the way in which Chinese policy-makers expressed ideas *to* different audiences, and thus I grant little agency to these audiences themselves. There is little documentary evidence available to suggest that the Chinese domestic public influenced Chinese foreign policy-makers on Japan policy. However, as the following chapters show, the Chinese government certainly had its domestic population in mind when expressing certain ideas about Japan in the *People's Daily* and in public speeches. In addition, some records do lend themselves to an analysis of agency with regard to China's main alliance partner during much of this period, the Soviet Union, while other records allow us to see how Japanese actors attempted to shape China's policy-making process.

Sceptics might retort that the discursive use of foreground normative ideas is, in fact, little more than a post hoc way of rationalising or explaining a policy already adopted on interest-based grounds.¹⁰⁴ However, this retort does not hold a great deal of weight. Even the use of ideas in a purely rhetorical sense tells us something important about the way in which policy-makers attempt to shape the public realm and ‘sell’ different policies.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, it is important to recall that ideas are phenomena through which actors perceive the material world, and from which actors’ interests develop. Thus ideas, as I treat them, constitute what an actor’s interests can legitimately be. This is not to suggest that Chinese policy makers did not deploy ideas to instrumentally ‘sell’ policy to different audiences with different interests. But it is to suggest that interests do not simply exist ‘out there’, in an external, rational-choice world that has no relationship to ideas.

Limitations of the framework

There are, however, some limitations to this four-part ideas framework. First, for the purpose of analysing policy makers’ ideas, demonstrating the relationship between different idea types, and organising the empirical material, this four-part typology is a useful one. However, the four-part ideas framework set up by Campbell faces the major limitation that it is a static framework which only takes a snapshot of the four different idea types at a particular moment in time.¹⁰⁶ Yet throughout this thesis, as

¹⁰⁴ See the discussion of this point in Laffey and Weldes, 'Beyond Belief,' 200-201.

¹⁰⁵ Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, 'Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of Nato,' *Journal of Political Philosophy* 11, no. 3 (2003), 238-239; Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 62.

¹⁰⁶ It should be noted that Campbell hypothesises (but does not test) that the ‘cumulative effect’ of each of the four different idea types determines whether a particular policy solution leads to a change in outcome. In doing so, Campbell implicitly acknowledges that there is interaction between different idea types. Similarly, Goldstein and Keohane note that different idea types ‘may be linked’. However, in practice, both of these frameworks remain silent on precisely how different idea types interact, and

we explore these ideas over time, we shall see that there is a great deal of interaction across the different idea types. We therefore need a better framework that captures this interaction. To do so, this thesis builds on the Campbell framework and does not deploy the four-part ideas framework in the same way throughout the thesis. In Chapter Three, I make use of the four-part framework, and explore each of the *background cognitive*, *foreground cognitive*, *background normative* and *foreground normative* ideas in turn. Chapter Four continues to use the four-part framework, but shows how Chinese foreground normative ideas about Japan fed back into Chinese background normative ideas. This presents the first hint that there is a need to explore the interaction between different idea types. Consequently, in Chapters Five and Six, I depart from Campbell and deploy a variation of the four-part ideas framework. Specifically, in Chapter Five, I relax the four-part framework and instead explore Chinese ideas about Japan only along their *cognitive* and *normative* dimensions. We will see how cognitive and normative ideas interact and, in particular, that cognitive ideas alone are not sufficient to lead to changes in policy because they have normative implications. Thus ‘good ideas’ that make sense at a theoretical or ontological level, must also be acceptable—potentially to a number of different audiences—at the normative level. In Chapter Six, I interrogate the relationship between *background* and *foreground* ideas. In doing so, I move beyond the Campbell framework and show that not only do background ideas shape foreground ideas, but that there is an ongoing interactive relationship in which foreground ideas shape background ideas and vice-versa.

how this interaction ultimately shapes policy. See Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 10-11; Campbell, 'The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' 399-400.

The second limitation is a more significant one, and relates to the scope of the claims being made in the thesis. This thesis engages in a form of constitutive, rather than causal, explanation, asking how Chinese ideas about Japan made possible China's Japan policy between 1949 and 1965. Constitutive explanation is a form of 'non-causal explanation' that asks 'how possible' questions. It highlights the properties of ideational structures that make certain actions possible, and preclude others.¹⁰⁷ In doing so, the thesis looks at the constitutive effects of ideas and the 'deeper' or 'indirect' way in which they work in constituting actors' interests, identity and policy.¹⁰⁸ Taking this approach, the thesis does two things. First, it asks: what are Chinese ideas about Japan, and what are the properties of those ideas? Second, the thesis asks: how was it possible that Chinese ideas about Japan produced this particular Japan policy?¹⁰⁹

How one answers this second question, and the scope of the claims that are made in doing so, is one of the major dividing lines in constructivist approaches to International Relations.¹¹⁰ Constitutive explanation differs from causal explanation in the scope of the claims that can be made. Unlike causal analysis, which seeks to demonstrate that ideas have an independent causal effect on outcomes (that is, without ideas, a particular outcome would not have occurred), constitutive explanations can, at most, claim that without an understanding of ideas, a particular outcome is not

¹⁰⁷ In this, I take the view that constitutive explanation is a form of explanation rather than merely description or understanding. For this position, see Jutta Weldes, 'Constructing National Interests,' *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 3 (1996), 283; Alexander Wendt, 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,' *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 5 (1998), 104. For the alternative view, see Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). For an excellent overview of this issue, see Tannenwald, 'Ideas and Explanation,' 35-37.

¹⁰⁸ ———, 'Ideas and Explanation,' 19.

¹⁰⁹ For more discussion on the two kinds of questions asked in constitutive analysis, see *ibid.*, 38-39; Wendt, 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,' 109-113.

¹¹⁰ Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, *Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), 15.

logical or plausible.¹¹¹ In this thesis, I do not claim that Chinese ideas about Japan are the only, or even the most important, factor shaping China's Japan policy between 1949 and 1965. As outlined above, factors such as economic complementarity, geography, and shared history are all important in helping to explain China's policy of economic engagement with Japan after 1949. Yet, by themselves, these factors are not sufficient to make China's Japan policy seem logical. Rather, I suggest that Chinese ideas about Japan are necessary to explain why Chinese officials worked so hard to build a trade relationship with their wartime enemy and Cold War opponent. Nevertheless, the findings in this thesis rest on logic and plausibility. They are therefore unable to satisfy positivist-inclined scholars who seek an independent, causal role for ideas.

Before moving on to a discussion of sources, three final issues are worth touching upon. First, there are a number of methodological options for studying the role of ideas in international relations, including operational codes,¹¹² schemas,¹¹³ and cognitive maps.¹¹⁴ These are all situated at the level of the individual. In this thesis, I adopt an alternative approach. I treat ideas as social rather than individual phenomena, and examine how actors' ideas are intersubjectively constructed in

¹¹¹ Richard Price, 'Detecting Ideas and Their Effects,' in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* ed. Charles Tilly and Robert E. Goodin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 259; Wendt, 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,' 105-106.

¹¹² Alexander L. George, 'The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Makers,' *International Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (1969); Ole Holsti, 'The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 1 (1970).

¹¹³ Deborah Welch Larson, 'The Role of Belief Systems and Schemas in Foreign Policy Decision-Making,' *Political Psychology* 15, no. 1: Special Issue: Political Psychology and the work of Alexander L. George (1994).

¹¹⁴ Steven Casey and Jonathan Wright, eds., *Mental Maps in the Era of Two World Wars* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

practice.¹¹⁵ This approach is adopted for two reasons. First, as noted in the discussion of different audiences above, this thesis is more interested in the properties of the social context in which ideas about Japan existed than the characteristics of the individual policy-makers who uttered those ideas. Second, one of the challenges presented by literature that studies the cognitive maps or schemas of individual policy-makers is the type of empirical material required. Ole Holsti and Deborah Larson, for example, require a large volume of declassified archives such as diaries, letters and other personal papers to undertake the necessary fine-grained analysis of leaders' personal beliefs. While this material may be available in the United States or United Kingdom, for example, it is much more difficult to access the quantity and quality of this kind of material in China (see my discussion of source limitations below).

Second, this study is not focused on Chinese identity-formation, but rather on how Chinese ideas about Japan shaped China's foreign economic policy towards Japan. Nevertheless, ideas go on to shape the preferences and identities of actors.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, in studying the role of ideas in a bilateral relationship, it is important to recognise that there is a social, intersubjective relationship between China and Japan. Thus, Chinese officials' ideas about Japan (the 'other') are shaped by, and go on to shape, ideas about China (the 'self'). As Suzuki suggests, 'Social actors cannot know their identities a priori, and it is only through social interaction that a sense of the 'Self' is formed'.¹¹⁷ In studying a pair of bilateral states, we need tools to help us

¹¹⁵ For similar examples, see Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2006); Laffey and Weldes, 'Beyond Belief.'

¹¹⁶ Tannenwald, 'Ideas and Explanation,' 21.

¹¹⁷ Suzuki, 'The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity,' 30.

work out how to consider intersubjective relationships. However, one problem with much of the work on self-other relationships is the tendency to become ‘overly concerned with difference’.¹¹⁸ The ‘other’ need not be a ‘different’ other, and yet difference is often emphasised when we consider self-other relationships. In this study, I recognise that ‘othering’ takes place in any bilateral relationship, but am sensitive to the fact that this ‘othering’ may simply be about comparing rather than contrasting. That is, Chinese policy-makers may frequently compare China with Japan, but not necessarily contrast China with Japan. In fact, throughout this thesis, I find that Chinese policy-makers’ frequently looked to Japan for advice, technology and goods because they saw Japan as more similar to China than many other states.

Finally, this thesis will offer a typology of the range of ideas about Japan held by Chinese policy-makers, and the extent to which this changed over four time periods during the early Cold War (1949-1952, 1953-1957, 1958-July 1960 and August 1960-1965).¹¹⁹ The timeframe 1949-1965 has been selected because these years constitute a particular puzzle in the trajectory of the Sino-Japanese relationship. As noted at the outset to this paper, the positive Sino-Japanese relationship of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s is at odds with our expectations given the constraints of two wars: the Cold War taking place at that time, and the legacy of China’s War of Resistance to Japan (1937-1945). These years also present an interesting case for research because dominant explanations for China’s Japan policy during this period are based on contending and under-explored assumptions about how Chinese leaders conceived of Japan and the War of Resistance. There is a need to better understand the content of Chinese leaders’ ideas about Japan during the Cold War. However, this thesis does

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ See the ‘Chapter Organisation’ below for further discussion on the selection of these time periods.

not consider the years after 1965, due to the dramatic shift in Chinese foreign policy during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During the most radical phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969), the Foreign Ministry was taken over by Red Guards, leaders such as Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai lost their power within the Foreign Ministry, and China recalled all but two of its diplomats from abroad.¹²⁰ The second phase of the Cultural Revolution (1969-1972) then saw China's *rapprochement* with the United States as well as armed conflict against the Soviet Union. China's foreign policy and the policy-making apparatus underwent such a significant shift during the Cultural Revolution that it is therefore difficult to make fair comparisons between this period and the years prior to it.¹²¹

1.5 Sources

To examine my central research questions, my thesis draws upon a major new Chinese archival source: the recently declassified records of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In 2004, the Foreign Ministry Archives of the People's Republic of China (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu dang'anguan*) underwent an extensive declassification process under enforcement of the 1998 Archives Law.¹²² Different estimates suggest that anywhere from forty to seventy per cent of the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic archives have been declassified.¹²³ Analysis of these archival

¹²⁰ Robinson, 'China Confronts the Soviet Union,' 244-254; Gong Li, 'Chinese Decision Making and the Thawing of US-China Relations,' in *Re-Examining the Cold War: U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973*, ed. Robert S Ross and Jiang Changbin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 321-327; Michael Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases,' *The China Quarterly* 36(1968), 104-111.

¹²¹ However, in the Conclusion to the thesis, I briefly summarise the developments that led to the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972.

¹²² Zhang Sulin, 'The Declassification of Chinese Foreign Ministry Archival Documents: A Brief Introduction,' *CWIHP Bulletin* 16(2007/2008), 10.

¹²³ Chen Jian and Shen Zhihua, 'New Evidence from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,' *ibid.*, 7; Xia Yafeng, 'New Scholarship and Directions in the Study of the Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China,' *The Chinese Historical Review* 14, no. 1 (2007), 91-92.

materials provides an important new lens into the development of China's Japan policy. Existing scholarship has examined Chinese attitudes about the War of Resistance using sources such as textbooks,¹²⁴ newspapers,¹²⁵ and museum displays.¹²⁶ However, as far as I am aware, this thesis is the first time that China's Foreign Ministry archives have been systematically studied to access internal Foreign Ministry deliberations on economic policy towards Japan.

In addition, I also examine a range of other Chinese primary documents, including *Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji* (Documents on Post-war Sino-Japanese Relations, 1945-1970), *Zhanhou zhongri guanxi nianbiao, 1945-1993* (Chronology of Post-war Sino-Japanese Relations, 1945-1993), *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the PRC), *Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan* (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong), *Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan* (Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai), *Zhou Enlai nianpu, 1949-1976* (A Chronicle of Zhou Enlai), *Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao* (Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy), *Dang de wenxian* (Party Historical Documents), *Selected works of Mao Zedong, 1949-1959*, and biographies of particularly influential actors in the making of China's Japan policy, such as Zhou Enlai, Liao Chengzhi and Sun Pinghua. These books and archival sources have been obtained via the Chinese Foreign Ministry archive, the Institute of Modern History at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and the Peking University Library in Beijing; the Center for Cold War International History Studies Centre at East China Normal University in Shanghai; the Library of Congress

¹²⁴ He, 'Remembering and Forgetting the War.'; Suzuki, 'The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity.'

¹²⁵ ———, 'The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity.'

¹²⁶ Rana Mitter, 'Behind the Scenes at the Museum: Nationalism, History and Memory in the Beijing War of Resistance Museum, 1987-1997,' *The China Quarterly*, no. 161 (2000).

and China Documentation Center at George Washington University in Washington DC; and the Bodleian Library at Oxford University.

One of the major limitations involved in studying any aspect of Chinese foreign policy is the bias of the Chinese government in making decisions to declassify certain documents over others.¹²⁷ The selective declassification of Foreign Ministry archives, and the lack of access to the archives of the Foreign Trade Ministry or CCP Central Committee (both of which are yet to be declassified) posed a particular limitation in researching this thesis. In particular, it has meant that I am unable to draw strong conclusions about the extent to which there were contested views about Japan within the Chinese government or heated debates about China's Japan policy. For this reason, in this thesis we must be cautious in relying on factionalism within the CCP to explain China's Japan policy; the sources available have likely led this thesis to depict policy-making as being more streamlined and uncontested than it actually was.¹²⁸

In addition, we must be aware of the problem of selection bias. Daqing Yang has argued that,

...remembering is always a selective process. This is especially true in countries where "memory making" and "history writing" have been largely dictated by the state or influenced by other powerful institutions.¹²⁹

Subsequently, the political context of both the past and the present must be considered when examining all archival materials. In this respect, the goal of researching Chinese foreign policy towards Japan presents particular difficulties. The current Sino-Japanese relationship is a contested and difficult one, tied up in debates over wartime

¹²⁷ Xia Yafeng, 'The Study of Cold War International History in China,' 91-93.

¹²⁸ For a critique on the use of factions as a tool for explaining CCP policy given this lack of transparency, see Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 242.

¹²⁹ Yang Daqing, 'Convergency or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing,' *The American Historical Review* 104, no. 3 (1999), 858.

atrocities and the retelling of history. As such, Chinese and Japanese leaders have incentives to release historical information supporting their own political and nationalist agendas, and to withhold those archival materials that do not accord with their desired view of history. Furthermore, Japan and the Sino-Japanese relationship remain controversial issues within China, and Chinese academics have experienced difficulty in questioning state policy towards Japan.¹³⁰ While the relatively limited amount of previous scholarship on the Sino-Japanese relationship presents an important opportunity for new research, one must be mindful of the limitations presented by studying this historically contested relationship.

To deal with the issue of selection bias in particular, this thesis ‘triangulates’ the information gleaned from Chinese archival sources with Japanese, British and American sources. Due to time and budget constraints, it was not possible to undertake archival research in Japan. However, in the thesis I make use of published Japanese foreign policy archives for the period under investigation, including *Nitchū kankei kihon shiryōshū, 1949-1997* (Compilation of Basic Materials on Japan-China Relations, 1949-1997), which was produced by the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Asia Bureau. I also draw on a number of studies that make use of Japanese primary sources, including in particular work by Soeya Yoshihide, Arthur Stockwin, Ian Neary and Franziska Seraphim.¹³¹ Furthermore, the thesis makes use of US State Department, National Security Council, and CIA files housed at the US National Archive and National Security Archive; the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series; and relevant documents from the Woodrow Wilson Center’s *Cold War International History Project*. Finally, the thesis draws on open sources such as the

¹³⁰ Xia Yafeng, 'The Diplomatic History of the PRC,' 134-135.

¹³¹ See the Bibliography for an extensive list of works by these authors.

text of official Chinese and Japanese agreements housed at the University of Tokyo's *World and Japan* database project, and China's major newspaper, the *People's Daily* (*Renmin Ribao*). In particular, using digital search software available at the University of Oxford, I examined the 495 *People's Daily* editorials that made reference to Japan between 1949 and 1965. Archival materials were gathered during a total of eight months of fieldwork in Beijing and Shanghai, a one month period of fieldwork in Washington DC, and ongoing archival research in the United Kingdom throughout the course of preparing the D.Phil thesis.

1.6 Chapter Organisation

The first substantive chapter in this thesis, Chapter Two, explores the three key themes that would dominate Chinese ideas about Japan after 1949: imperialism, industrialisation and war. It shows that these three themes did not emerge in 1949, but rather had a much longer history in shaping Chinese conceptions of Japan. This chapter explores China's experience of, and contact with, Japan from the time of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) to the years immediately following the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945). The chapter argues that between 1894 and 1949, China's relationship with Japan was dominated by the experience of becoming a victim of Japanese imperialism; by learning from, and supplying the raw materials and markets for, Japan's rapid industrialisation; and by facing two destructive wars at the hands of a far more militarily powerful Japan. Yet this chapter also demonstrates that, in places such as Manchuria, the legacy of Japanese imperialism is complex. While Japan was rightly understood as an aggressive and exploitative imperialist, Japan also served as a positive model of industrial and technological prowess for Chinese elites trying to introduce China's own process of modernisation and

development. The complex relationship between the concepts of imperialism, industrialisation and war would have implications for Chinese Communist ideas about Japan after 1949.

From there, the four main empirical chapters in the thesis are organised chronologically, and are divided into distinct periods in China's post-1949 history. Using the four-part ideas framework outlined above, Chapter Three argues that China's dire economic conditions at the end of the Second World War meant that economic reconstruction was of prime importance to the PRC's leaders when they came to power in 1949. These economic concerns shaped Chinese cognitive and normative ideas about Japan, though not always in a coherent way. The chapter shows that Chinese officials attempted to rebuild economic ties with Japan immediately after coming to power, but that they also struggled to legitimate this policy of 'trading with the enemy' to a Chinese domestic audience.

Building on the ideas that emerged between 1949 and 1952, Chapter Four then explores how the economic dimension of Chinese thinking about Japan crystallised between 1953 and 1957. In particular, this chapter explores Chinese ideas about Japan against the backdrop of the Bandung movement. It argues that Chinese leaders came to see economic industrialisation as integral to revolution, and insisted that only through industrialisation could weak countries stand up to foreign imperialism and regain their sovereignty. Nevertheless, this chapter also argues that there were inherent tensions in Chinese views about the relationship between imperialism and industrialisation. Although this period was one of increasing Sino-Japanese economic ties, Japan's aggressive history of imperialism and industrialisation, meant that

Chinese leaders grappled with the conflicting normative ideas posed by Japan's developmental path.

In Chapters Five and Six, the thesis deploys a variation of the four-part ideas framework to examine the interaction between different idea types. In Chapter Five, I consider the interaction between cognitive and normative ideas, and explore the breakdown in Sino-Japanese economic ties that occurred when cognitive and normative ideas collided. This chapter also examines the question of 'whose ideas matter?', and shows how the ideas of certain policy-makers, such as Zhou Enlai, were particularly influential in helping to repair the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations during the Great Leap Forward. Nevertheless, this chapter also suggests that Chinese policy-makers held a number of 'mistaken' ideas about Japan, and briefly explores how and why these mistaken ideas developed.

In Chapter Six, I explore the interaction between background and foreground ideas. This chapter shows that the relationship between background and foreground ideas is not unidirectional; between August 1960 and 1965, Chinese foreground ideas about Japan were also important in shaping Chinese background ideas about the need to use science and technology to modernise China's economy. However, this chapter also shows that ideas have to meet with favourable historical conditions before they are accepted and used. The growing influence of Mao's struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism—a struggle that would ultimately pave the way for the Cultural Revolution—meant that Chinese ideas about science and technology, the Four Modernisations (first considered in 1964), and the need to draw on the expertise

and technology of capitalist countries had a limited impact on China's economic direction during the early 1960s.

The concluding chapter draws together the range of ideas about Japan held by Chinese policy-makers between 1949 and 1965. This chapter also offers conclusions for the broader International Relations literature about the relationship between different idea types, and the role of ideas in shaping foreign policy. Finally, this chapter suggests how and why Chinese thinking about Japan has shifted since 1965; considers the ramifications of this period for our understanding of the contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship; and discusses the implications of these findings for our understanding of China during the early Cold War.

Chapter Two

Imperialism, Industrialisation and War *The China-Japan relationship, 1894-1949*

2.1 Introduction

This thesis argues that three themes dominated Chinese ideas about Japan after 1949: imperialism, industrialisation and war. In the following chapters we will see how these ideas developed after 1949, their relationship to the broader historical context, and how—as background, foreground, cognitive and normative ideas—they shaped China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. Yet these three themes did not emerge fully formed in 1949. Rather, they have a much longer history in Chinese conceptions of Japan. This chapter argues that from the time of the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895, China’s relationship with Japan was dominated by the experience of becoming a victim of Japanese imperialism; by supplying the raw materials and markets for Japan’s rapid industrialisation; and by facing two destructive wars at the hands of a far more militarily powerful Japan. Yet this chapter also argues that China’s experience of Japanese imperialism had a more productive side as well. The chapter demonstrates that in the first half of the twentieth century, Japan served as a positive model of industrial and technological prowess for Chinese elites trying to modernise and develop China. Moreover, under Japanese control, China’s Northeast region of Manchuria underwent a major industrial transformation, which created an economic base in Manchuria that was far more developed than most other parts of China, and one that would become critically important to China’s ongoing industrial development after 1949. These early experiences of Japan would go on to influence Chinese conceptions of Japan after 1949.

To further explore the complex and interdependent relationship between the themes of imperialism, industrialisation and war, the chapter presents a series of statistics, compiled by the author from historical and contemporary Chinese, Japanese and Western sources. These statistics demonstrate how China's economy became increasingly interlinked with that of Japan after 1894, and show that Japan became a particularly important source of machinery and industrial goods in different parts of China, even during the bitter eight-year War of Resistance against Japan. In the aftermath of this war, the reality of China's economic interdependence with Japan was an issue that occupied the minds of leaders in the United States, Japan, Nationalist China, and Communist-held areas of China. For those who had a stake in the shape of postwar East Asia, China and Japan's economic reliance on one another was complex given the legacy of Japanese war and imperialism in China, and the looming question of how best to economically rebuild postwar China and Japan against the backdrop of an increasingly divided Cold War world.

It is important to note from the outset that a number of the concepts used in this chapter, in particular concepts relating to development and modernisation, are not unproblematic ones. It would be wrong to assume that modernisation is simply a linear process in which the 'impact' of the modern, industrialised West, catalysed a period of political and economic 'catch up' in pre-modern societies. Rather, both China and Japan's experience of modernisation was inextricably linked with imperialism. In the nineteenth century, European 'semi-colonialism' and 'gunboat diplomacy' forcibly coerced elites in China and Japan to adopt European-style political institutions, norms, and standards of industrialisation and military

development.¹ In the early twentieth century, Japan then emulated the Europeans and embarked on its own ‘civilising’ mission in China.² While this process of modernisation produced a number of outcomes that would be later seen as beneficial, we should not forget that elites in China and Japan were forcibly coerced into transforming their political, economic and military institutions into ‘civilised’ and ‘modern’ Western versions. Failure to modernise would prevent either country from being recognised by the West as an equal, sovereign nation, and would leave each unable to defend itself against the more powerful and expansionist West.³

2.2 Imperialism, industrialisation and war after the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)

From the time of the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) to the end of the War of Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), Chinese experiences of Japan took place in the form of Japanese military aggression and imperial exploitation of China; growing economic interaction with Japan; and observing and learning from Japan’s path to industrialisation and modernisation. It was through these experiences that Chinese elites began to shape their ideas about the relationship between imperialism, industrialisation and war.⁴ Japan and China both experienced the same ‘shock’ of encroachment by Western powers in the nineteenth century. The British Opium Wars with China and the US Perry Expedition to Japan forced elites in both countries to

¹ Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

² Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan's Encounter with European International Society* (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), 11-25.

³ For critical discussion of this issue as it relates to the study of modern China, see Paul Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Rana Mitter, 'Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China,' *The Historical Journal* 48, no. 2 (2005), 524.

⁴ On Chinese interaction and economic ties with Japan before this period, see Howe, ed. *China and Japan*, 1-9; Lu Yan, *Re-Understanding Japan: Chinese Perspectives, 1895-1945* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004), 11-14.

realise that they were ‘now part of a new international system which they could not afford to ignore’.⁵ Elites in China and Japan learned that the European (and American) international order was ‘a highly coercive and insecure one’.⁶ Observing nineteenth century Europe, Chinese and Japanese came to understand that the states who survived and were treated as equals in this international order were those that possessed military and industrial power and those who were recognised as ‘civilised’.⁷ For weaker countries outside that ‘civilised’ international order, survival would be precarious. Yet China and Japan responded differently to this threat of encroachment from the West. While the ‘shock’ catalysed Japan’s Meiji Restoration in 1868, and led to the complete reform of Japanese political institutions, industry and military, China took much longer to realise the need for reform. Although efforts were made to industrialise and strengthen China by reformists such as Li Hongzhang (李鴻章), most Chinese elites did not believe that European-style institutions and legal and political norms were particularly desirable or appropriate for China. Ultimately, the stronger conservative factions within the Qing court successfully resisted reformists’ calls for change.⁸

Japan also adopted the darker, imperialist side of the European world order, and this was to have dire consequences for China. Japanese elites had learned from Europe that one of the key markers of being a ‘civilised’ and sovereign state was the possession of highly industrialised economies, and powerful, technologically-sophisticated weapons.⁹ If Japan was to undertake this rapid industrialisation and

⁵ Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire*, 60-61.

⁶ Ibid., 63.

⁷ Ibid., 89.

⁸ Ibid., 89-113; Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750* (London: Bodley Head, 2012), 90-100.

⁹ Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire*, 125-128.

military development, the Japanese Meiji government needed raw materials, new markets for Japanese exports, and the kind of wealth that could only be generated through international trade.¹⁰ Japanese elites saw in China (and China's tributary state, Korea) an answer to these needs. Japan's military victories—first against China in 1894-95, and then against Russia (in Northeast Chinese territory) in 1904-05—opened the Chinese economy to Japan. The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed following Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War, granted Japan most favoured nation status, preferential treatment for Japanese goods in China, and foreign investment rights for Japanese manufacturers in China.¹¹ Similarly, Japan acquired large swathes of territory and economic privileges in Northeast China following its victory in the Russo-Japanese War. This pattern of behaviour was not particular to Japan. China's foreign economic relations during the late nineteenth century were born out of a series of unequal treaties that forced China to open to foreign trade and granted extraterritorial rights to a host of foreign powers.¹² Countries such as Britain, which was a major trade partner and China's leading source of state investment until 1936, also built economic ties with China through coercion and force.¹³ However, over the first half of the twentieth century, Japan, more than most, exhibited an especially high degree of both economic exploitation and military encroachment in China.

Japan's military victories in China served as a wake-up call to China's Qing rulers that the country had slipped far behind Japan in terms of raw military power, technological advancement, and institutional development.¹⁴ The first Sino-Japanese

¹⁰ Howe, ed. *China and Japan*, 6-7.

¹¹ Yu-Kwei Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China: An Historical and Integrated Analysis through 1948* (Washington: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1956), 9.

¹² *Ibid.*, 7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 18, 20, 43-45.

¹⁴ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, 29-30; Westad, *Restless Empire*, 100-105.

War demonstrated where Meiji Japan had successfully reformed in response to European encroachment, and where China had not. To be sure, Chinese elites had been aware of the need for ‘self-strengthening’ since the aftermath of the Opium Wars in the 1860s. The seeds of international independence, nationalism, modernisation and industrialisation were not sown in Japan, but arose in a China that had become victim to European aggression and uncomfortably pushed towards opening up to foreign trade. Nevertheless, the Sino-Japanese War was an important catalyst in precipitating a new period in the Sino-Japanese relationship, and one in which Japan now served as a model of development and modernisation for China.

In the decade or so following the first Sino-Japanese War, a ‘Golden Decade’ of cooperation took place between the two countries. In the years before the first Sino-Japanese War, Sino-Japanese trade had been a meagre 4 percent of China’s total trade each year. By 1906, a decade after the Sino-Japanese War, bilateral trade had more than tripled to around 14 per cent of China’s total trade (see Figures 5 and 6).¹⁵ In particular, China began importing large quantities of metals and machinery from Japan and, in exchange, exported goods such as coal and soybean to Japan.¹⁶

¹⁵ Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China*, 18.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

Figure 5: Sino-Japanese trade, 1875-1930
(1000s of Haikwan tael)¹⁷





Figure 6: Sino-Japanese trade as a share of China's total trade, 1868-1930
(percent)¹⁸



¹⁷ Data compiled by the author from Hsiao Liang-lin, *China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949*, 152-154. Japanese trade with Taiwan (Formosa) is included in these figures.

¹⁸ Data compiled by author from *ibid.*

Furthermore, Japan played a critical role in supporting China's process of industrialisation, institution-building and military reform.¹⁹ One of the most important forms of practical assistance and intellectual influence was the training of thousands of Chinese students in Japan. Between 1898 and 1911, at least 25,000 Chinese students spent a period of time in Japan.²⁰ The Chinese student movement to Japan 'was probably the largest mass movement of students overseas in world history up to that point'.²¹ Importantly, this first wave of students paved the way for subsequent waves of Chinese students to visit Japan, many of whom would go on to become key figures in shaping China's post-1949 policy towards Japan. For instance, future Chinese Communist leader and PRC Premier, Zhou Enlai (周恩来), went to Japan to study in 1917; the PRC's leading Japan expert, Liao Chengzhi (廖承志), had entered Japan's Waseda University in 1928, and the PRC's first trade representative in Japan and head of the China-Japan Friendship Association, Sun Pinghua (孙平化), had studied at a school attached to the Tokyo Industrial University during the Second World War.²² Their experience would be crucial in shaping China's Japan policy after 1949. Japan was attractive to these Chinese students not only because it provided a successful model of reform, but also because, as the conservative reformer Zhang Zhidong noted,

Since China and Japan have similar circumstances and customs, this would facilitate our imitation [of the West]. We can reap twice the results with half the effort (*shi ban gong bei*).²³

¹⁹ Douglas Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinzhen Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

²⁰ Ibid., 42.; Marius Jansen, 'Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 1911,' in *Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 348.

²¹ ———, 'Japan and the Chinese Revolution of 1911,' 348.

²² Howe, ed. *China and Japan*, 8; Morizumi Kazuhiro, *Go-Jyū Nen No Hensen--Sun Pinghua Shi Ni Kiku [Fifty Years of Change--Interviews with Mr Sun Pinghua]* (Beijing: Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe 1995), 132-134.

²³ Quoted in Reynolds, *The Xinzhen Revolution and Japan*, 44.

Fear of further European encroachment in Asia was another factor helping to underpin this early cooperation between China and Japan. As Japanese Prince Konoe Atsumaro (近衛篤磨), founder of the Japanese 'East Asia Association' (JP: *Tō-A Kai*) argued,

East Asia will inevitably become the setting for a racial struggle in the future...we are fated to have a struggle between the white and yellow races, and in that struggle Chinese and Japanese will both be regarded as the sworn enemies of the whites.²⁴

Japanese like Konoe thus argued that Japan's support in building a modern, industrialised China would help the two countries become partners in the struggle against Europe in East Asia.²⁵ These plans aligned closely with the goals of key reformists in China, such as Kang Youwei (康有为), Liang Qichao (梁启超) and Sun Yat-sen (孫中山), who were attempting to reshape the political landscape of their own country, and they received considerable practical support from the East Asia Association during the early 1900s.²⁶

Yet it quickly became evident to Chinese elites that Japan's goals in China were ultimately self-serving ones. In 1915, the Japanese government, which was competing with Western powers in the scramble for China during World War I, presented the new Chinese President Yuan Shikai (袁世凱) with a list of demands. Japan insisted on recognition of Japanese foreign rights in China, control over certain Chinese industries, and a commitment that China not cede any territory to a third country. Although Japan eventually withdrew the last troublesome demand, China was forced

²⁴ Marius Jansen, 'Konoe Atsumaro,' in *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions*, ed. Akira Iriye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 113.

²⁵ Howe, ed. *China and Japan*, 7.

²⁶ Hsüeh Chün-tu, *The Chinese Revolution of 1911: New Perspectives* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1986); Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954).

to accept the remaining ‘Twenty-One Demands’ on 9 May 1915.²⁷ It did not take long for the relatively new government of the Republic of China to realise that Japan was now playing the European game of imperial expansion, and that China was not considered an equal in this game. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, China was then forced to accept the terms of another unequal treaty. The Treaty of Versailles, which decided on German reparations at the end of World War I, did not return the German colonies on Chinese territory to China, but rather, citing terms agreed to under international law, handed them over to Japan. Chinese protests over this treaty sparked the beginning of the May Fourth movement, and the birth of two new political forces in China: the Chinese Nationalist Party (*Guomindang*, GMD) and the Chinese Communist Party (*Gongchandang*, CCP). Over the next decades, these two political parties embarked on parallel—and often interlinked—missions to modernise and strengthen China, combat China’s internal political weaknesses, and eradicate the traditions that had made China a victim to foreign incursion by Japan and Europe.²⁸

2.3 Manchuria: a hub of imperialism, industrialisation and war

Yet despite the surge of these new political forces in China, the Japanese imperialist project was just getting underway. Following Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan had acquired rights to parts of China’s Northeast region of Manchuria. In 1906, Japan embarked on its industrial transformation of the region with the establishment of the South Manchurian Railway (SMR). Then, in 1932, Japan formally occupied Manchuria, and established the Japanese-controlled state of

²⁷ Karl G. Gerth, ‘Consumption as Resistance: The National Products Movement and Anti-Japanese Boycotts in Modern China,’ in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (Munich: Iudicium, 1998), 133; Westad, *Restless Empire*, 115-116.

²⁸ Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China’s Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), especially Chapter 1. For discussions of how the ‘Japan question’ shaped Chinese politics during the 1930s, see Parks M. Coble, *Facing Japan: Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

‘Manchukuo’.²⁹ In this, and the chapters that follow, we will frequently return to Manchuria and see how it became a site connecting the themes of imperialism, industrialisation and war in Chinese ideas about Japan.³⁰ In Manchuria, China experienced a Japan that was rapidly industrialising its economy to ‘catch up’ with the Western powers. At the same time, Chinese saw how Japan played the European game of imperialism by exploiting Chinese territory to fuel its industrial expansion. Manchuria’s mineral deposits and agricultural supplies made it highly important to Japan’s economy and its military supply lines. Japan sourced more than half its total coal imports, a quarter of its iron ore imports, and almost all of its imports of tung oil and soybean (which was a major food source and source of fertilizer) from the region.³¹

Yet in Manchuria, Chinese also observed and directly benefited from the results of Japan’s goal of industrialisation. Given the significance of Manchuria in Japan’s economy, the Japanese Imperial Government recognised the importance—and believed in the ‘civilising virtue’—of developing the Manchurian economy. Japan’s goal was to transform the economic profile of Manchuria from being a low-technology and agricultural-based production area, into a high-technology,

²⁹ The region of Manchuria was referred to as the Republic (and later Empire) of Manchukuo by the Japanese, but is referred to in Chinese scholarship as “puppet Manchukuo” (*wei Manzhouguo*, 伪满洲国). Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 59.

³⁰ While this thesis is concerned with China’s experience of Japanese imperialism, it should also be noted that there has been a wave of recent scholarship documenting the Japanese experience of empire in Manchuria. See, for example Louise Young, *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1998); Y. Tak Matsutaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria: 1904-1932* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, *Crossed Histories: Manchuria in the Age of Empire* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005).

³¹ NIE-52, ‘The probable future orientation of Japan’, 29 May 1952, CIA Records Search Tool, US National Archives at College Park, MD (hereafter cited as USNA), 3; US Embassy, Tokyo, to Department of State, ‘Economic difficulties posed by Japan’s maintenance of strict control over trade with Communist areas’, 21 February 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/8-1952, RG59, USNA, 6.

industrialised region that could better supply Japan's industrial and military needs.³² To do so, Japan began investing heavily in the region. By the late 1920s, 85 percent of Japan's total foreign investment was directed towards China, and nearly all of this was destined for Manchuria.³³ Furthermore, Japan worked to develop light and heavy industries in Manchuria, including production of ceramics, glass, gas, textiles, coal, iron and steel. In the decade after the establishment of Manchukuo, industrial production in Manchuria increased almost three-fold.³⁴ This industrial transformation of Manchuria was also aided by the import of huge quantities of Japanese industrial goods into the region. Approximately eighty per cent of all Japan's exports of machinery and industrial equipment went to China, almost half of which were sent directly to Japanese occupying forces in Manchuria.³⁵ Indeed, Northeast China absorbed such large quantities of textiles, steel and industrial equipment from Japan that US officials would later note that,

...the historical pattern of Chinese foreign trade has been for the most part with Japan and the western world, and a Chinese Communist regime will be dependent largely on a resumption of this trade pattern if it is to rehabilitate.³⁶

Finally, to assist in building its 'modern enclave' in Manchuria, Japan established a large number of schools, hospitals and research centres throughout the region, and introduced banking reforms and a new Japanese yen-linked currency that helped to

³² Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 66-68, 116-124 ; Herbert P. Bix, 'Japanese Imperialism and the Manchurian Economy, 1900-31,' *The China Quarterly* 51(1972), 435-440. For the Kwantung Army's economic plans for Manchuria after 1931, see Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 61-62.

³³ Kungtu C. Sun, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 61-75. Louise Young estimates that between 1932 and 1941, Japan invested almost 6 billion yen in Manchuria. See Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, 183-184, 213-185.

³⁴ Sun, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, 102.

³⁵ Arthur N. Feraru, 'Japanese Trade with China,' *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no. 17 (1949), 201-202; Sun, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*.

³⁶ NSC 41, 'Draft report by the NSC on US policy regarding trade with China', 28 February 1948, *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter abbreviated as *FRUS*), 1949 Volume IX: The Far East: China, 826. Similar statements can be found in Far Eastern Department, 'Pre-war trade between Japan and China', March 1952, FO 371/99315, FC 11323/25, United Kingdom National Archives (hereafter abbreviated as UKNA).

stabilise and strengthen the Manchurian financial system.³⁷ By the end of the Second World War, the Japanese presence in Manchuria meant that China's Northeast region had acquired a far more developed economic and industrial base than other parts of China.

Nevertheless, Chinese elites quickly came to understand that the benefits of this industrialisation were achieved through Japanese coercion in China. Japan was able to achieve almost total control over Manchuria's economy because it succeeded in stifling Chinese competition. From 1928 to 1931, the Chinese militarist ruler of Manchuria, Zhang Xueliang (张学良), worked hard to resist Japanese economic control in the region. Zhang tried to encourage the expansion of local Chinese investment in agricultural exports, which had been the economic mainstay of the region. However, his efforts were thwarted by the worldwide effects of the Great Depression and by Japan's own vociferous expansion.³⁸ By 1932, when Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo, Japan controlled 64 percent of Manchuria's total industrial capital.³⁹

Within this puppet state, Japan ensured that although government ministers were often Chinese nationals, the real power lay with the Japanese officials and staff around them. For example, Sun Pinghua (孙平化), who in the 1960s would become the PRC's first trade representative stationed in Japan, joined the tax bureau of the Manchukuo Ministry of Economics (*Manzhouguo jingjibu*) in the 1930s after excelling in his high school exams. Reflecting on his experience later in life, Sun said

³⁷ Sun, *The Economic Development of Manchuria in the First Half of the Twentieth Century*, 68.

³⁸ Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth*, 66-68.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 66-67. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 48.

that the person who ‘had the real power’ (*zhengzheng zhangwo shiquan de*) in the Ministry was the Deputy Minister of Economics: the Japanese national Kishi Nobusuke (岸信介).⁴⁰ As we shall see in Chapter Five, in 1957 Kishi would become Prime Minister of Japan, and would be vilified by Beijing on account of his ‘imperialistic’ behaviour in China during the 1930s and 1940s.

This experience of Japan, particularly in Manchuria, powerfully shaped Chinese conceptions of the relationship between imperialism, industrialisation and war. Since the mid-nineteenth century, Chinese elites had learned that as non-industrialised states, China and Japan were vulnerable to coercion and imperialism by the more powerful, industrialised states of the West. Furthermore, they observed how Japan had responded differently to this encroachment by reforming its political institutions and rapidly transforming its industrial and military profile into that of a modern and powerful nation-state. Yet in the process, Chinese elites also saw how Japan preyed on China, exploited Chinese resources, ignored Chinese sovereignty, and made attempts to forcibly ‘civilise’ its weaker neighbour.

Through this experience of Japan—and other similar semi-colonial Western powers in China—Chinese elites developed a very particular understanding about how the world of these more powerful states worked.⁴¹ In particular, they came to understand that industrialisation existed in a close relationship with military aggression and imperial expansion. Industrialisation could not be achieved by countries working in isolation. Rather, industrialisation required international trade because industrialising countries

⁴⁰ Morizumi Kazuhiro, *Sun Pinghua Shi Ni Kiku*, 131-132.

⁴¹ For more on the Chinese experience of other foreign colonial powers in China, see for example, Robert A. Bickers, *The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

needed access to foreign technological goods and machinery, raw materials and export markets. Moreover, without engaging in trade on an international scale, countries could not generate the kind of wealth needed to further the industrialisation process.⁴² As Shogo Suzuki writes, major Chinese texts written in the second half of the nineteenth century indicate that Chinese elites believed that ‘the pressures for trade were responsible for the bellicose behaviour by the Europeans, particularly the British’ and that ‘in order to support their trade, they [the British] used their soldiers; commerce and military helped each other’.⁴³ Similarly, in the early twentieth century, Chinese such as Zhang Xueliang and Sun Pinghua observed how Japan mimicked the Europeans, and used its Kwantung Army to exploit China for its raw materials and exports markets.

Yet at the same time, China’s experience of Japanese imperialism and industrialisation had a more productive side as well. Chinese reformists such as Li Hongzhang and Kang Youwei understood that China’s own political reform and industrial development had been accelerated thanks to the wake-up call of the first Sino-Japanese War. Furthermore, in places such as Manchuria, China had directly benefited—though not of its own choosing—from the industrial transformation brought about under Japanese imperial control. On the whole, the *positive* effects of Japan’s industrial legacy have been neglected in much Chinese and non-Chinese literature. As Prasenjit Duara has argued, while most scholarship has rightly concentrated on the negative effects of Japan’s imperial presence in China,

⁴² Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire*, 57-62, 101-106.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 59, 60.

The wider effects of Manchuria's massive industrialization, urbanization, and modernization—perhaps more massive than elsewhere in Asia during the period—have barely been probed.⁴⁴

We must not neglect the terrible brutality that the Japanese state inflicted on China, but we must also acknowledge that Japan was a major catalyst for China's economic and industrial development—and Chinese conceptions of the importance of that industrial development—during the first half of the twentieth century.

Finally, China's experience of imperialism, industrialisation and war was rendered even more complex when war broke out between China and Japan in 1937. Japan's economic exploitation of China was designed to fuel the Japanese war machine that would later wreak havoc on China. The eight-year war with Japan meant that China's relationship with Japan was far more complicated than the Chinese experience of semi-colonisation at the hands of other, Western powers. As we shall see in more detail below, from 1937 onwards, Japanese imperialism in China—and particularly in Manchuria—was intimately linked to the Japanese war effort.

2.4 The Chinese economy during war with Japan, 1937-1945

In July 1937, the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Konoe Fumimaro (近衛文麿), announced that Japan was mobilising troops against China. War had broken out between China and Japan. From 1937 onwards, Japanese-occupied areas in China, such as Manchuria, became increasingly important to Japan's economy and, indeed, to feeding the Japanese people. The Japanese Kwantung Army's first five-year plan (1936) for Manchuria explicitly sought to develop the Manchurian economy so that the Japanese army could become self-sufficient as it expanded its colonial reach in

⁴⁴ Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 59.


East Asia, embarked on war with China, and later took on the European powers and the United States in the Pacific.⁴⁵ Japan sourced from Manchuria nearly all of its soybeans, almost half of its salt, over eighty percent of coking coal, and more than ninety percent of staples such as wheat, millet, and linseed.⁴⁶ Furthermore, Manchuria was hugely important as an export market for Japan. Between 1937 and 1941, Manchuria absorbed more than 75 percent of Japan's total exports (including exports from Japan's colonies in Korea and Formosa). This fuelled the Japanese economy during the war years and, more importantly for our purposes, increased the spread of Japanese industrial and manufactured goods into China.⁴⁷ Figure 7 below indicates that in the first few years of the war, Japanese trade with Manchuria and the Kwantung Leased Territory comprised more than two-thirds of China's trade with Japan.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 61-62.

⁴⁶ US Political Adviser for Japan to Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 'Notes on Japan-China potential trade', 26 January 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/1-2652, RG59, USNA, 1.

⁴⁷ Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China*, 195-196.

Figure 7: Japanese trade with mainland China, Manchuria and the Kwantung Leased Territory, 1934-1944
(1000s of Japanese yen)⁴⁸



Given Japan's imperial control over Manchuria, and China's increasing economic dependence on key Japanese goods, China was relatively helpless to impose an economic blockade on Japan. Here, however, we need to distinguish between 'free China', which was controlled by the Nationalist government, and 'occupied China', which was controlled by Japan and the collaborationist Wang Jingwei (汪兆铭) regime. Japan used Manchuria as a base from which to trade with the rest of occupied China during the war years. During the first few years of the war, well over 20 percent of Manchuria's exports—goods such as grain, cotton textiles, machinery and mineral oil—were sent to other parts of occupied China by Japan. In particular, the Japanese Imperial Government envisaged North China as a new and important source

⁴⁸ Data compiled by author from Ministry of Finance, Customs Bureau, Japanese Government, 'Notes on prewar and potential trade between Japan and Communist China', 31 July 1953, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-3153, RG59, USNA; Feraru, 'Japanese Trade with China,' 201-202.

of industrial raw materials. Thus, between 1939 and 1941, Japan sent large quantities of machinery and metal products from Manchuria to North China to build up the industrial base in that region.⁴⁹

In free China, the Chinese Nationalist government initially moved quickly to prohibit trade with Japan after the outbreak of the war. Nevertheless, by 1939, the Nationalist government was forced to reverse this decision due to shortages of essential commodities, such as gasoline, cotton, steel, chemicals and communication equipment, for which it had been heavily dependent on Japan before the war.⁵⁰ Furthermore, Japan also used trade through Hong Kong as a way of surreptitiously exporting goods to free China. Goods travelling through Hong Kong did not require labelling of origin, and so Japan was able to use trade through Hong Kong as a way of dumping goods such as cotton manufactures, paper, sugar and chemicals onto free China.⁵¹ Table 1, compiled by the author, indicates that the first half of the war saw a dramatic increase (from 4.7 percent of China's total imports in 1938 to 58.3 percent in 1941) in imports into free China from Hong Kong. This trade dropped off sharply, however, when Japan occupied Hong Kong in 1942.⁵²

⁴⁹ Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China*, 124, 196-197.

⁵⁰ The US and Britain were major trade partners for free China during the war, but still could not supply all that it needed. Ibid., 127-128, Chapter 127. 'Notes on prewar and potential trade between Japan and Communist China', 31 July 1953, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-3153, RG59, USNA; Feraru, 'Japanese Trade with China,' 201-203.

⁵¹ However, *exports* from Free China via Hong Kong were largely destined for the Soviet Union. Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China*, 128-129, 145-129.

⁵² However, it is likely that the increase in imports from Japan into free China in 1943-1944 represents some trade with Japanese-occupied Hong Kong, and with the former French-leased territory of Kwangchowwan (Guangzhouwan).

Table 1: China's wartime trade with Japan, 1938-1945⁵³

	1938		1939		1940		1941		1942		1943		1944		1945 (Jan-Aug)	
	J	HK	J	HK	J	HK	J	HK	J	HK	J	HK	J	HK	J	HK
Imports into Occupied and Free China (from Japan and Hong Kong) (As % share of total imports into Occupied or Free China)																
Occupied China	42	1.8	38	1.4	38.1	2.2	30	1.8	68.1	2	61.1	2.1	58	3.3	71	0.5
Free China	0.2	4.7	0.2	13.8	*	40.2	*	58.3	1.3	10.7	22.8	14.5	14.4	15.8	1	13.3
Exports from Occupied and Free China (to Japan and Hong Kong) (As % share of total exports from Occupied or Free China)																
Occupied China	33.1	11	15.2	14.8	16.4	13.3	23.4	17.6	66.5	1.5	67.3	2.1	64.2	4	71.1	0.7
Free China	2.1	67.3	*	51.7	*	55.8	0.8	78.9	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*


Legend: J = Japan, HK = Hong Kong, * = less than 0.05%

Furthermore, Figure 8 below shows that as the war progressed, both free and occupied China comprised increasingly large shares of Japanese trade. By the late stages of the war, when Japan had been cut off from all other foreign markets, Japan was dependent on China for more than 90 percent of its total trade.⁵⁴

⁵³ Data compiled by the author from Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China*, 134-155. Please note: "Occupied China" does not include Manchuria; "Japan" includes Japan, Korea and Formosa (for 1938-1941, the figures for "Japan" also include the Kwantung Leased Territory). Trade data is not presented for 1937 due to the unreliability of data that year.

⁵⁴ Japanese trade with occupied China actually declined during the first half of the war, largely because high inflation in North China frustrated Japanese attempts to get exports of raw materials from the region. Japan had converted North China (which it occupied) into a yen-bloc area in 1938, and so inflation in North China made these raw materials relatively more expensive than those in other of Japan's colonies. See *ibid.*, 124. 'Notes on prewar and potential trade between Japan and Communist China', 31 July 1953, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-3153, RG59, USNA.

Figure 8: Japanese trade with free and occupied China, 1931-1945
(% share of Japan's total foreign trade)⁵⁵



Nonetheless, it is important to note that the eight-year war with Japan also decimated China's economy. The war destroyed 55 per cent of China's total industrial and mining capital, and damaged almost all of China's bridges, rail lines and shipping infrastructure.⁵⁶ As a result, at the end of the war, China's industrial output was at just 30 per cent of prewar levels.⁵⁷ Even occupied China suffered from shortages of raw materials, inflation in commodity prices, and the destruction of major industrial centres such as Shanghai, Nanjing and Wuxi.⁵⁸ The industrial hub of Manchuria was also devastated during the escalation of the Pacific War after 1942, and Cheng estimates that Japanese industrial plants in Manchuria could only operate at one-

⁵⁵ Data compiled by the author from *Nihon Tōkei Nenkan [Japan Statistical Yearbook]*, (Tokyo: Nihon Tōkei Kyōkai [Japan Statistical Association], Mainichi Shinbunsha, Various years). 'Free and occupied China' includes areas in mainland China, as well as Manchuria and the Kwantung Leased Territory. Japan's 'total foreign trade' includes trade with Korea and Formosa (Taiwan).

⁵⁶ William C. Kirby, 'The Chinese War Economy,' in *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945*, ed. Steven I. Levine and James C. Hsiung (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 185.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 185-186; Diana Lary, 'China and Japan at War: Suffering and Survival, 1937-1945,' *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 48-2-10(2010); Zhang Shu Guang, 'Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,' in *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), 193.

⁵⁸ Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China*, 99-114.

quarter of their prewar capacity.⁵⁹ The Soviet occupation of Manchuria in August 1945 led to further destruction in that region. At the end of the war, it cost China's Nationalist government \$US2 billion to rehabilitate Manchurian industries and restore prewar levels of production.⁶⁰ Nevertheless, by the time the Communists came to power in 1949, Northeast China still possessed the legacy of Japan's industrial footprint. As we shall see in the chapters that follow, this would be vitally important for China's postwar economic reconstruction after 1949.

2.5 Postwar economic relations between China and Japan, 1945-1949

What happened to this extensive economic contact between China and Japan at the end of the Second World War? Furthermore, how was China's prewar and wartime economic relationship with Japan conceived by those in China given the legacy of Japanese aggressive imperialism and destructive war with China? Finally, as the late 1940s progressed, how did different groups of Chinese conceive of their economic ties to Japan at a time when the battle lines for the Cold War were beginning to be drawn?

Before answering these questions, it is important to first make clear that China's postwar economic relationship with Japan—and Nationalist and Communist Chinese conceptions of their country's economic ties to Japan—were not developed in isolation. In fact, at the end of the Second World War, the economic relationship between Japan and China would be shaped almost entirely by the United States' relationships with each country. US officials had already begun drafting plans for the

⁵⁹ Ibid., 119.

⁶⁰ Kirby, 'The Chinese War Economy,' 185.

postwar re-ordering of East Asia during the late stages of the Second War.⁶¹ They understood the significant role that Japan's quest for rapid industrialisation had played in Asia during the first half of the twentieth century. US officials knew that Japan's search for raw materials and markets had played a major role in leading to Japanese imperialism and aggression, and that Japan's industrial and military capabilities had allowed it to dominate and exploit relatively weaker neighbours such as China. Thus, when US occupying forces moved into Japan at war's end, they immediately tried to establish a more peaceful basis for economic relations in East Asia. The US set about dismantling Japan's 'war-producing industries', breaking up the Japanese *zaibatsu* that had controlled these industries, and putting together plans for a reparations program that would transfer much of the machinery and equipment that underpinned Japan's industrial empire to its poorer neighbours.⁶² This, US officials believed, was the best way to bring about stability in East Asia. The Pauley mission, dispatched by the Truman administration to catalogue Japan's economic empire in preparation for this reparations program, noted that Japan needed to deal with the countries of East Asia as trading partners rather than as sites of economic exploitation.⁶³ Nationalist China, therefore, stood to gain much from these early US plans for the postwar disarmament of Japan.

Yet within two years of the war's end, there had been a dramatic shift in US thinking vis-à-vis the economic relationship between China and Japan. In 1947, President Truman announced his plans to bolster the strength of the capitalist world as a way of containing the Soviet threat. The economic rehabilitation of Japan was central to these

⁶¹ Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), viii-ix.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 25-38.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 35-37.

plans. Architect of the US Marshall Plan, George Kennan, argued that Japan was one of 'five centers of industrial and military power in the world' that mattered most to US security interests, and believed that without economic rehabilitation, a weak Japan was at risk of becoming a drain on US resources or falling to the Soviets.⁶⁴ Over the course of 1947 and 1948, the United States set about planning Japan's economic recovery. This completely changed how US officials now thought about the economic relationship between Japan and its Asian neighbours, particularly China. If its economy—and particularly its heavy industry—were to be recovered, Japan needed access to a ready supply of raw materials, markets for its exports, and the rebuilding of its 'war-supporting' industries.⁶⁵ Each of these things—raw materials, markets, and its industrial hub—could be found in Japan's former colonies or the areas it had occupied in Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria and North China. One economic specialist in the US State Department, while thinking about Japan's need to access raw materials, markets and industrial capital, mused that there had been 'much merit' in Japan's vision of a Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere; it was only Japan's reliance on military force that had 'corrupted' this vision.⁶⁶ By 1948, as a Communist victory in China looked likely, Japan increasingly became seen as the linchpin in the US containment strategy in East Asia. Yet, even after the Chinese Communists took power in October 1949, there were still great debates within Washington about whether or not to restrict Japan's trade with Communist China. While the US Defense Department agitated for the need to deny Japan's industry and technology to the Communists, many in the US State Department recognised the importance of Japan's historical patterns of trade with China. The US State Department argued that without

⁶⁴ Ibid., 88.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 122-140; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, 'American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years: Politics and Prosperity,' *Diplomatic History* 8, no. 3 (1984), 187.

⁶⁶ Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 142.

access to Chinese raw materials and the Chinese export market, Japan stood little chance of making a full economic recovery.⁶⁷

In Japan, Japanese officials had little control over their country's international policy and economic direction in the immediate postwar period. Nevertheless, most Japanese held great enthusiasm for renewed trade with China. Japanese officials and those in commercial circles were all eager to have access to the cheap Chinese raw materials and export market that had been so essential for Japan's economic prosperity during the 1920s and 1930s. A private Chinese trade mission to Japan in March 1948 'caused great enthusiasm among the Japanese', and was welcomed by large crowds of Japanese, and by posters and streamers lining the main Ginza commercial area in Tokyo.⁶⁸ Nancy Tucker argues that by 1948, Japanese newspapers such as the *Asahi* and *Yomiuri Shimbun* were writing that given the interdependence of the Japanese and Chinese economies before and during the war, 'Japanese industrialization would be as important to China as the stabilization of China's economy would be for Japan'.⁶⁹ Furthermore, even as the Chinese Communists grew more powerful in 1949, Japanese of all political stripes continued to hold out hope for re-establishing Sino-Japanese trade. Those on the left and right in Japan seemed to accept that the Communists would prevail. Even Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (吉田茂), a staunch anti-Communist, stated that he did not 'care whether China is red or green. China is a natural market, and it has become necessary for Japan to think about markets'.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Tucker, 'American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade,' 183; Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 180-187.

⁶⁸ It should be noted that this trade mission was very much of a private character, and had not been approved or sent by the Chinese Nationalist government. See IC Mackenzie, British Embassy, Shanghai to LH Lamb British Embassy, Nanking, 'China: Resumption of trade with Japan', 14 June 1948, BT 11/3513, CRT 2503/1947, UKNA.

⁶⁹ Tucker, 'American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade,' 193.

⁷⁰ Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 188-189.

Ultimately, the threat of economic crisis in Japan, and the knowledge that geographic proximity, historical precedent, and the lack of alternatives for Chinese raw materials and the Chinese export market, meant that Japanese politicians, officials and business groups were all eager to restart trade with China, whatever its government might look like.⁷¹

How did US strategic thinking vis-à-vis Japan, and the changing fortunes of the Chinese Communist Party, shape China's economic ties to, and foreign economic policy ideas about, Japan after the Second World War? As Civil War raged in China between 1945 and 1949, and as the Chinese Communists grew increasingly powerful, these questions were answered quite differently by officials in the Nationalist Chinese government and the Communist-held areas of China.

In Nationalist China, attitudes towards trade with Japan were far more negative than those held by officials in the United States and Japan. The Nationalists were deeply opposed to the US economic rehabilitation of Japan, arguing that the United States should not rehabilitate Japan while China was still so poor.⁷² The Nationalists were also fearful that Japan's economic recovery would lead to the revival of Japanese militarism. An article by Wang Yunsheng (王芸生), editor in chief of the *Ta Kung Pao*, in September 1947, warned that Japan's democratic transformation under the US occupation was only 'skin deep', and that the US had failed to realise that Japan was still a dangerous country.⁷³ Similarly, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Shijie (王世杰) warned in 1948 that China must have 'definite safeguards against the resurgence of

⁷¹ Tucker, 'American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade,' 184-196.

⁷² A Gascoigne, British Embassy, Japan to Foreign Office, London, 'China: Resumption of trade with Japan', 24 March 1948, BT 11/3513, CRT 2503/1947, UKNA.

⁷³ Wang Yunsheng, 'Japan's Dangerous Road', *China Magazine*, 17, September (1949), cited in Tucker, 'American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade,' 189.

Japanese militarism' because in the past Japanese economic expansion had preceded military expansion.⁷⁴ Indeed, in the wake of the Second World War, the Nationalist government promulgated laws designed to retain those 'Japanese with expertise which China currently lacked'.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the Nationalist government ultimately failed to make the best use of these Japanese because they feared that Japanese nationals had plans to undertake further aggression in China. For instance, TV Soong, the official in charge of rebuilding industries in the former Japanese-occupied areas of China, so despised the Japanese that he refused to make use of their skills or to put them in charge of key industries.⁷⁶

Furthermore, the Nationalist government also urged the United States and its allies to restrict Japan's industrial output and foreign trade because they feared it would hurt the Chinese economy. Cognisant of Japan's 'formidable competition' in the Chinese market before the war, those in Nationalist China's industrial and export circles were concerned that cheap Japanese goods would flood the Chinese market, and that China's own exports would be forced to compete with Japanese exports on the world market.⁷⁷ These Nationalist fears of trade with Japan, combined with the country's inability to engage in much trade while fighting the civil war, meant that trade levels between Japan and China remained extremely low between 1945 and 1949. In 1946,

⁷⁴ Cited in *ibid.*, 191.

⁷⁵ Donald G. Gillin and Charles Etter, 'Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949,' *Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (1983), 500; Yang Daqing, 'Resurrecting the Empire? Japanese Technicians in Postwar China, 1945-49,' in *The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy*, ed. Harald Fuess (Munich Iudicium, 1998), 187-196.

⁷⁶ Gillin and Etter, 'Staying On,' 510. Similarly, for discussion of Jiang Jingguo's failure to make use of Japanese in Manchuria, see Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 84.

⁷⁷ JC Hutchison, British Embassy, Shanghai to Export Promotion Department, Board of Trade, London, 'China: Resumption of trade with Japan', 5 August 1947 and 21 January 1948, BT 11/3513, CRT 2503/1947, UKNA.

Nationalist Chinese trade with Japan represented less than 1 percent of China's total trade, and by 1948, it had grown to little more than 3 percent of China's total trade.⁷⁸

The Chinese Communists, however, held quite different views regarding the benefits of trade with Japan. Although the Communists were just as hostile as the Nationalists towards US plans to rehabilitate the Japanese economy and its 'war-supporting industries', the Communists did not oppose trading with Japan. Michael Schaller argues that although the Chinese Communist Party actively campaigned against the threat of renewed Japanese imperialism and condemned the US presence in Japan, the Communists also 'retained a realistic understanding of their need for foreign trade, especially with Japan'.⁷⁹ Trade with Japan would provide badly-needed foreign exchange, and give the Communists access to technology and industrial goods. In early 1949, the CCP had negotiated a barter-trade deal to import Soviet industrial goods and machinery, and in February 1949 the CCP Central Committee officially adopted a foreign trade policy that gave clear priority to trade with the Soviet Union and socialist bloc.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, there were gaps in what the Soviets could provide to the CCP. There is no doubt that the socialist bloc was intended to be the linchpin of Communist China's foreign trade, yet the CCP's foreign trade policy also acknowledged that,

Only in the situation that the Soviet Union and other new democratic countries are not in a position to buy from us or sell to use will we do some business with capitalist countries.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Hsiao Liang-lin, *China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864-1949*, 266-269.

⁷⁹ Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 188.

⁸⁰ Zhang Shu Guang, 'Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,' 195.

⁸¹ CCP Central Committee to the North and Northeast Bureaus, 16 February 1949, in *ibid.*, 195-196.

Shortly after the adoption of this foreign trade policy, and specifically in the spring of 1949, Communist officials from northern China started approaching US occupation forces in Japan to try and purchase various kinds of Japanese machinery and industrial goods that they could not get from the Soviet Union.⁸² These goods included copper wire, steel and other industrial products for which North and Northeast China had previously depended upon Japan.⁸³ Indeed, the Communists considered these Japanese industrial goods ‘so vital’ that they offered to pay for them in gold or US dollars, or to have them smuggled through Hong Kong.⁸⁴ General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) forces then occupying Japan would not allow official dealings with Chinese Communist forces or visits by Communist trade delegations, but he permitted limited Japanese trade with Communist areas, and turned a blind eye to the fact that Communist traders were often bypassing US officials and making direct contact with Japanese traders.⁸⁵

It is not clear whether Moscow knew about or endorsed the CCP’s trade with Japan. By 1947 the Soviet Union had begun dispatching economic advisers to Communist-held parts of China, and the Soviet model of economic development was already having a great influence on key CCP officials such as Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇) and Ren Bishi (任弼时).⁸⁶ Yet we do know that the Soviets were not enthusiastic about the CCP’s use of Japanese engineers and other technicians who had stayed behind in Manchuria at the end of the Second World War. For instance, the Soviet Union

⁸² Tucker, ‘American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade,’ 192.

⁸³ See *FRUS*, 1949 Volume IX: The Far East: China, 973-998.

⁸⁴ Tucker, ‘American Policy toward Sino-Japanese Trade,’ 193.

⁸⁵ Though he mostly followed Washington’s instructions to limit Japanese trade in strategic goods with Communist-held areas in north China, MacArthur was often willing to break the rules because he recognised the importance of trade with China to Japan’s economy. Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 188-192.

⁸⁶ Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 119.

pressured the Chinese government to expel the 3,500 Japanese technicians living in Dalian after 1945 because they wished to replace the Japanese with Soviet technicians and therefore guarantee Soviet influence on China.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, as the following chapter will show, the CCP would continue to make use of these and other Japanese technicians until at least 1952.

On the eve of the Communists' takeover of mainland China, the CCP was preparing the way for renewed economic ties with Japan. From this brief discussion we have seen how, in the immediate postwar period, the Communists were far more willing than the Nationalists to put aside the bitter experience of the war, and to expand their economic contact with Japan. To understand *why* the CCP was so willing to engage economically with Japan, this thesis will explore the ideas that underpinned its foreign economic policy towards Japan after 1949.

2.6 Conclusion

In the chapters that follow, our story will focus exclusively on the Chinese Communists and will explore how they navigated their foreign economic policy towards Japan in the political and strategic setting of the Cold War. Two factors would make the Cold War era a very different one from that of the first half of the twentieth century. First, the European and Japanese empire in Asia would be replaced by a new American empire, one that would be described as 'US imperialism' by the Chinese Communists, and as the 'San Francisco alliance system' by America's allies. Second, the new Communist government in China would adopt an economic development strategy explicitly modelled on the Soviet Union. As we will see, both of

⁸⁷ Yang Daqing, 'Resurrecting the Empire?', 200.

these factors would make the post-1949 economic relationship between China and Japan quite different to that which had taken place during the first half of the twentieth century.

Yet although 1949 signalled a new era for China and for the international order more generally, much of what the Chinese Communists thought about Japan, and about the relationship between imperialism, industrialisation and war, were ideas that had been shaped through Chinese experiences in the first half of the twentieth century. After 1949, Chinese Communist officials would understand the need for rapid industrialisation, and the relationship between industrialisation, military power and strength in war. This particular understanding of the relationship between imperialism, industrialisation and war was shaped in China in the late nineteenth century, and strengthened against the backdrop of European and Japanese ‘semi-colonisation’ of China, and then war with Japan in the first half of the twentieth century. While the Chinese Nationalists had embarked on their own major campaigns, such as the New Life Movement, to politically reform and strengthen China during the 1920s and 1930s, the Nationalists’ reform efforts were badly thwarted by Japanese aggression.⁸⁸ The Communists now saw it as their task to strengthen and industrialise China so that it could stand up to foreign powers.

The Communists would also understand that the European powers and Japan had pursued their industrial expansion on the back of imperial exploitation of weaker, less equal states like China. China’s leaders—Communist and Nationalist alike—remained fiercely opposed to imperialism, having borne the brunt of it in the late

⁸⁸ Rana Mitter, *China's War with Japan, 1937-1945* (London: Penguin Books, Forthcoming).

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet the Communists had also observed—often directly, as in the case of Sun Pinghua—how regions such as Manchuria had experienced major and beneficial industrial development under Japanese rule. How Communist Chinese officials navigated this complex relationship between imperialism and industrialisation in a new Cold War environment—and how these themes permeated Chinese ideas about Japan—will be the subject of the chapters that follow.

Chapter Three

Trading with the Enemy *The role of ideas in China's Japan policy, 1949-1952*

3.1 Introduction

On 1 November 1949, precisely one month after Mao Zedong claimed victory for his Communist Party and officially ‘liberated’ the people of China, the North China foreign trade bureau received a letter from a new Japanese organisation calling itself the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association (JCTPA, JP: *Nitchū bōeki sokushin kai*). The JCTPA was requesting permission to visit Beijing to discuss the possibility of establishing trade ties with the new PRC government.¹ Knowing this would have implications for China’s foreign affairs more generally, officials in North China sought advice from Beijing. When the request reached Premier Zhou Enlai’s desk, he initially responded stating that he was uncertain about whether China should pursue trade relations with Japan.² Zhou believed that China did not yet ‘have a clear understanding of Japan's foreign policy’. Yet at the same time, Zhou also recognised that Japan possessed a range of industrial goods and machinery that China badly needed to rebuild its economy.³ Despite this initial uncertainty, recently declassified Chinese archives show that by the following year, Sino-Japanese trade mirrored the type, albeit not the volume, of trade that had taken place between occupied China and Japan before and during the war. The PRC had actively begun trading with its erstwhile wartime enemy, Japan.

¹ Archives of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC (hereafter referred to as “FMA”), File No. 105-00077-02, 1 November 1949-1 June 1950, ‘Ribei zhongguo maoyi cujinhui yaoqiu pai daibiai laihua de qingkuang’ [The situation regarding the request by Japan's China-Japan Trade Promotion Association representative to visit China], 4-7.

² Zhou Enlai, who also served as Foreign Minister between 1949 and 1958, was the official who took primary responsibility for China's trade policy towards Japan.

³ FMA File 105-00077-02, 1.

In this chapter I explore how Chinese policy-makers' ideas shaped this policy of 'trading with the enemy' between 1949 and 1952. Using the four-part ideas framework outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, the chapter outlines the dominant background cognitive and normative ideas in Chinese foreign economic policy thinking between 1949 and 1952. It briefly traces the historical development of these background ideas, and then shows how they were influenced by the new Cold War environment and by China's relations with the United States and Soviet Union in particular. The chapter then considers how these background ideas subsequently shaped Chinese foreground cognitive and normative ideas about Japan. It argues that the years between 1949 and 1952 were ones of great transition and uncertainty in China, in large part because Chinese policy-makers faced a range of profound economic, political, and security challenges after coming to power in 1949. Yet because of China's dire economic conditions at the end of the Second World War, in this chapter I argue that economic reconstruction was of prime importance to the PRC's leaders when they came to power in 1949. China's own history had shown its leaders the importance of rebuilding China's economy to allow it to stand up to foreign imperialism, and restore China's central place in the international order. These economic challenges underpinned, though not always in a coherent way, Chinese foreground cognitive and normative ideas about Japan between 1949 and 1952.

At a cognitive level, the chapter argues that while the Soviet Union's model of rapid industrialisation offered a potent model of post-war reconstruction for a weakened China, China's leaders quickly found that to rebuild under the Soviet model, they needed goods, industrial expertise and technology from Japan. This cognitive view of Japan stemmed from lessons learned in the past and, in particular, from the economic

legacy that Japan had bestowed on China before and during the war. Yet at the same time, Chinese leaders also perceived Japan as a security threat to China by virtue of Japan's latent economic power, and its proven ability to draw on industrial capabilities for military ends in the first half of the twentieth century. Although Japan's economy was weak and damaged by war, China's leaders argued that Japan had the potential to become an economic and industrial threat once more.

At a normative level, the chapter shows that although this period was one of transition and uncertainty, Chinese officials' commitment to anti-imperialism, and their desire to restore China's central place in the international order, powerfully shaped Chinese normative ideas about Japan. I argue that Chinese policy-makers downplayed Japan's wartime atrocities and typically referred to the war only as a way of highlighting China's contribution to the defeat of Japanese imperialism. At the same time, Chinese officials argued that the Japanese people were victims of US imperialism. Framing Japan in these ways allowed Chinese officials to build ties with progressive forces in Japan, to underscore China's legitimate right to participate in international deliberations on the Treaty of Peace with Japan, and to discredit the United States' postwar plans for Japan. In this section I also demonstrate how economic issues pervaded early Chinese normative ideas about Japan. I suggest that Chinese officials saw re-establishing 'normal' trade relations between Japan and China as a way of challenging the US vision for order in East Asia and putting forward an alternative Chinese vision. Nevertheless, these ideas were sometimes constrained by China's normative opposition to imperialism, and the difficulty of legitimating trading with the 'imperialist' enemy to a Chinese domestic audience.

In the next section I explore the historical context of the years between 1949 and 1952, paying particular attention to the economic dimension of China's domestic, regional and international environment during this period. From there, the chapter examines the role of cognitive and normative ideas in China's Japan policy between 1949 and 1952. I first explore background and foreground cognitive ideas before moving on to a discussion of background and foreground normative ideas in China.

3.2 Historical Context, 1949-1952

October 1949 marked the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The early years of the PRC, examined here as the period between 1949 and 1952, were marked by political and military campaigns designed to shore up the Communist regime, both at home and abroad. Nevertheless, the early years of the PRC were also ones of transition and uncertainty for China, both domestically and within its regional environment. In particular, China's leaders were confronted with profound economic challenges when they came to power in 1949, in large part because of the experience of a long and highly destructive war with Japan.

3.2.1. China's postwar economy

China's economy was ruined by the eight-year War of Resistance against Japan. As Chapter Two demonstrated, the war destroyed much of China's industrial and mining capital, bridges, rail lines and shipping infrastructure. Furthermore, war casualties had decimated the population, casualties that were particularly high among Chinese farmers and labourers who had served as soldiers during the war.⁴ As a result, in 1946 China's industrial output was just 30 per cent of prewar levels, and by 1949

⁴ Exact figures are contested, but scholarly estimates suggest that the war left a total of 20 million Chinese dead and displaced 100 million more. See Dower, *War without Mercy*, 295-296; Lary and MacKinnon, *The Scars of War*, 6.

agricultural levels were still lower than those attained on the eve of the war.⁵ China's war-torn economy was further eroded by the plundering of Northeast China's industrial base by the Russian occupying army, hyperinflation of more than 230 per cent annually in some parts of China, and the ensuing Civil War between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist government. The combination of these events left China's economy reeling, and helped to pave the way for the Communists to come to power. As Diana Lary suggests,

The Resistance War left a devastated society. The regional variations were great, but this did not mean that any regions escaped the impact of the war. This damage was the pre-condition the CCP needed to launch the new society, one that Mao would later describe as 'poor and blank (*yiqiong erbai*)', a clean slate on which to launch their visions of a new world.⁶

The Communists encountered great need for economic reconstruction when they came to power in 1949. Yet the need for rapid economic reconstruction was made more difficult by the Communists' lack of experience in governing the urban areas most in need of rebuilding, and the lack of skilled labour upon which the Party-state could draw to aid in rebuilding. As Brown and Pickowicz suggest, 'Governing a country as huge, diverse, fragmented, and poverty-stricken as China was an overwhelming task, especially for a party that had spent the previous two decades in the hinterland.'⁷

3.2.2. China's entry into the Korean War

China's domestic economic weakness was then compounded by a host of new economic and security challenges brought on by China's entry into the Korean War in

⁵ Lary, 'China and Japan at War.'; Kirby, 'The Chinese War Economy,' 185-186; Zhang Shu Guang, 'Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,' 193.

⁶ Lary, 'China and Japan at War,' 1.

⁷ Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz, *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2.

October 1950. Beijing's decision to intervene in the Korean War was partly prompted by US forces crossing the 38th parallel into North Korea. However, the decision to intervene in Korea was more fundamentally motivated by Beijing's view that the Korean War was a test of China's commitment to the international socialist and anti-imperialist cause, and would be pivotal in shaping the long-term security order in East Asia.⁸ Beijing believed that US intervention in Korea was just the first step in Washington's imperialist strategy towards Asia, a strategy that could lead to US armed intervention in Taiwan, and a permanent US occupying presence on the Asian mainland.⁹ Mao also believed that Beijing had to commit to defending North Korea or risk the failure of the socialist revolutions in both China and North Korea, and a loss to China's prestige as a revolutionary power. Consequently, China's Premier Zhou Enlai swore that 'We cannot shut our eyes to the imperialists invading our neighbours without any resistance'.¹⁰

Nevertheless, in many ways, China's involvement in the Korean War ultimately harmed, rather than strengthened, China's economic and security conditions. In particular, the Korean War reshaped America's perception of the Communist threat in Asia, and strengthened the US decision to 'reverse course' in Japan.¹¹ As the US State Department insisted in December 1950,

Chinese aggression in Korea...renders the establishment [of] a genuinely cooperative

⁸ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 26. For an excellent overview of the changing historiography on China's decision to intervene in the Korean War, see *ibid.*, 2-4.

⁹ Zhang Baijia, 'Resist America': China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,' in *Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and Analysis*, ed. Michael D. Swaine and Tuosheng Zhang (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 184.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 190.

¹¹ The US decision to 'reverse course' and rehabilitate the Japanese economy as a bulwark against communism can be traced back to 1947, but the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 gave further impetus for the 'reverse course' policy. John Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies? United States Security and Alliance Policy toward Japan, 1945-1960* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 39-47, 57-76; Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, viii-ix, 104, 298.

relationship between the United States security forces and the Japanese of even greater importance than before.¹²

To achieve this cooperative security relationship with Japan, Washington first needed to convince its other regional allies, and in particular Australia and New Zealand, that a re-armed Japan would not pose a future threat. The compromise ultimately achieved by the United States was a combination of a multilateral Peace Treaty between Japan and its wartime opponents, and the ‘San Francisco alliance system’—a host of bilateral alliances between the US and regional states such as Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Republic of Korea signed between 1951 and 1954.¹³

Although China was the most significant of Japan’s wartime opponents, the United States refused to allow the PRC to participate in the 1951 Peace Conference, instead arguing that Taiwan was the legitimate representative.¹⁴ In the end, no Chinese representative—either from the mainland or Taiwan—was invited to attend the 1951 Peace Conference. Despite Beijing’s (and Taipei’s) attempts to negotiate a place at the table, the final peace treaty produced, as Japan described it, only a ‘partial peace’ in which the state of war was ended with some, but certainly not the most important of, Japan’s neighbours.¹⁵ The following year, under US pressure, Japan and the Republic of China (Taiwan) signed a separate Peace Treaty, thereby ending the state of war between Japan and Taiwan and paving the way for Japan’s diplomatic

¹² Robert Fearey, Office of North East Asian Affairs, US State Department, 5 December 1950, in Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 59.

¹³ D.W. Mabon, 'Elusive Agreements: The Pacific Pact Proposals of 1949-51,' *Pacific Historical Review* 57, no. 2 (1988).

¹⁴ Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960,' in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 252.

¹⁵ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 89; Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States, and the Cold War,' 252.

recognition of Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. In doing so, the Japan Peace Treaty signed at San Francisco created a policy environment in which Japanese and mainland Chinese officials would have to find ways to work around legal and Cold War constraints until the normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972.

3.2.3. The economic impact of the US trade embargo

In addition to the impact on Chinese security, China's economy was also directly affected by its involvement in the Korean War. After China entered the Korean War in October 1950, the United States introduced severe trade controls on China. The United States went from being China's leading trade partner in December 1950, to one that banned all American trade with China; froze all Chinese foreign assets; and instigated a UN General Assembly resolution that embargoed the export of all strategic goods to China.¹⁶ With the establishment of the US trade embargo, China was artificially separated from many of its former trade partners. Prior to 1949, China's strongest trade ties existed with capitalist countries such as the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Australia and Canada, and China's trade with the non-communist world comprised over 70 per cent of its total trade.¹⁷ After the introduction of the US trade embargo, China's trade patterns reversed almost overnight. By 1951, trade with the socialist bloc comprised two-thirds of China's total trade.¹⁸ As we shall see in more detail below, by severing China's economic ties with

¹⁶ Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: US Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 52-53.

¹⁷ Loren Brandt, 'Reflections on China's Late 19th and Early 20th-Century Economy,' *The China Quarterly* 150(1997), 285. Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 56-57. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 'internationalist' flavour of China's economy during the late 19th and early 20th centuries was largely influenced by Western and Japanese imperialism and economic exploitation of China.

¹⁸ 'Monthly International Bulletin, Special Issue on Red China Trade, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 7 June 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-1652, RG59, USNA, 4.

many of its former trade partners, the US trade embargo reinforced China's need to look to the Soviet Union for economic support.

3.3 Chinese ideas about Japan, 1949-1952

The historical context outlined above provides an important backdrop to understanding China's foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1952. The remainder of this chapter explores the ideas from which China's Japan policy emerged.

3.3.1. Background cognitive ideas

The CCP's decision to 'lean to one side'—the side of the Soviet Union—in the late 1940s, was the most important factor to shape China's foreign policy environment between 1949 and 1952.¹⁹ Yet, for our purposes, the CCP's relationship, and later alliance, with Moscow was also emblematic of the dominant background cognitive and normative ideas shaping China during this period. These ideas can be summarised as a staunch commitment to anti-imperialism, antipathy towards Western countries' 'unequal' treatment of China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Mao's unerring desire to transform Chinese state and society through a socialist revolution.²⁰ There are both cognitive and normative dimensions to these background ideas, but in this section we shall focus on the cognitive dimension only.

¹⁹ Mao formally announced the policy of 'leaning to one side' in favour of the Soviet camp on 30 June 1949 when he published "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship". See Niu Jun, 'The Birth of the People's Republic of China and the Road to the Korean War,' in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 236.

²⁰ Chen Jian, 'The Myth of America's "Lost Chance" in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence,' *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (1997), 84-86.

Background cognitive ideas are ‘underlying theoretical and ontological assumptions about how the world works’.²¹ These ideas may be derived from theory, such as theories about Marxism-Leninism or economic theories of neoclassical economics for instance, or may be derived from lessons learned in the past. These kinds of ideas powerfully ‘define the terrain of policy discourse’ because they both diagnose problems,²² and constrain the range of solutions that policy-makers consider possible or useful.²³

In cognitive terms, there was a strong ‘ideological overlay’ between the CCP and Soviet Union that had developed over the course of the 1920s and 1930s.²⁴ Marxism-Leninism was a theory that ‘combined radical economic progress with social justice, a shortcut to modernity for backward countries, a way of showing that their people counted for something’.²⁵ It is not difficult to see the ideological appeal of Marxism-Leninism for the Chinese Communist Party, which sought to bring about a national revolution, overthrow foreign imperialism, and transform China into a modern and strong nation-state. Moreover, there were many specific areas of ideological overlay, and elites in both China and the Soviet Union saw the world through a similar cognitive lens. The communist parties of China and the Soviet Union both applied the concept of class struggle to the international realm, and viewed the world as a struggle between nations of capitalists and nations of workers.²⁶ Furthermore, Mao’s ideas

²¹ Campbell, 'The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' 389.

²² Rueschemeyer, 'Why and How Ideas Matter,' 243.

²³ Campbell, 'The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,' 389.

²⁴ The CCP had maintained close (if often secret) ties with Moscow since the Party’s establishment in 1921, and relations between the two became particularly strong in 1936, on the eve of the War of Resistance against Japan. See Michael M. Sheng, 'The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949,' *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (1997), 96-98.

²⁵ Odd Arne Westad, *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), 2.

²⁶ Sheng, 'The Triumph of Internationalism: CCP-Moscow Relations before 1949,' 96.

about anti-imperialism were directly shaped by theories developed by Lenin. As John Garver suggests,

One of the core elements of the Leninism embraced by Mao was anti-imperialism. Imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism. It was imperialism emanating from the advanced capitalist countries that was oppressing China, Mao concluded.²⁷

Despite this strong ‘ideological overlay’ between communists in China and the Soviet Union, it is important to recognise that there were also profound ideological differences in how elites in China and the Soviet Union viewed the world and the possibilities for change. Odd Arne Westad suggests that the Chinese Communists, and Mao in particular, typically envisioned a world where ‘individual will, human capabilities, and mass action’ could be harnessed to overthrow the traditions and foreign oppression that had plagued countries like China in the past. This would clash with a Soviet worldview that increasingly showed a greater preference for maintaining international order and stability than for militarised revolution.²⁸ These differences would become prominent and play a role in the growing ideological divide between China and the Soviet Union, as the next two chapters will attest. Nevertheless, in these earliest years of the alliance, the Chinese side was both willing and able to adapt Soviet Marxism-Leninism to fit China’s own revolutionary experience. This relatively close cognitive overlay between China and the Soviet Union provided the ideational basis for China’s policy of ‘leaning to one side’, and would guide China’s relationship with the Soviet Union and its foreign policy thinking until at least the late 1950s.²⁹

²⁷ John W. Garver, ‘Little Chance,’ *ibid.*, 89.

²⁸ Westad, *Brothers in Arms*, 3-4.

²⁹ In fact Garver suggests that this set of cognitive ideas about the relationship between imperialism and capitalism remained deeply rooted in China even after the Sino-Soviet split. Garver suggests that Mao’s ‘cognitive precondition’ meant that after the breakdown in relations with the Soviet Union, Mao simply regarded the Soviet Union as no longer socialist, rather than changing his underlying views about the relationship between imperialism and capitalism. See Garver, ‘Little Chance,’ 88.

This point is not an uncontroversial one, as the 'lost chance' debates that have pervaded the study of US-China relations suggest. However, the most recent 'lost chance' scholarship is definitive in its finding that given the development of CCP ideas about anti-imperialism and socialist revolution, Chinese antipathy to Western, capitalist powers, and the United States' support for Chiang Kai-shek during and in the wake of the Civil War, it is highly unlikely that the CCP would ever have reached out to the United States rather than the Soviet Union in 1949-1950.³⁰

From an ideational perspective, the CCP's policy of leaning to the side of the Soviet Union firmly placed China on the path of introducing the Soviet economic model in China. In 1949 and 1950, senior Chinese officials were dispatched to the Soviet Union to learn from the Soviet model, and to begin drafting China's first Five-Year Plan. The Soviet Union would become the major catalyst for China's approach to nationalisation, collectivisation and a heavy industry-led economy. Over the course of the 1950s, the Soviet Union would send thousands of technical experts, and provide advanced industrial and military technology to China.³¹ Indeed, the success of China's economy during the first decade of the PRC owed much to Soviet loans, technical cooperation and investment in fledgling Chinese industries.³² Nevertheless, in these first few years between 1949 and 1952 there was still much that needed to be done before the Soviet economic model could be applied to China. In the early 1950s, the two countries were at vastly different stages of economic development, and the

³⁰ Warren I. Cohen et al., 'Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,' *ibid.*

³¹ See, for example Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li, eds., *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011); Deborah A. Kaple, *Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Westad, *Brothers in Arms*.

³² William C. Kirby, 'China's Internationalization in the Early People's Republic: Dreams of a Socialist World Economy,' *The China Quarterly* 188(2006), 884-887; Zhang Shu Guang, 'Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,' 201-211.

largely agrarian Chinese economy stood in stark contrast to the industrialised economy of the Soviet Union.³³

For this reason, between 1949 and 1952, Chinese policy-makers needed to reach a level of industrialisation from which they could begin to implement the Soviet economic model. To do this, the CCP embraced an economic development and postwar reconstruction program known as 'New Democracy'. New Democracy was a concept that was first developed by the CCP in 1941, during the war with Japan. It articulated a temporary strategy for rebuilding China's war-torn economy and developing China to a stage of industrialisation akin to that which had existed in the Soviet Union on the eve of its own socialist revolution. New Democracy allowed for the use of capitalist economic practices, private land ownership, and the accumulation of wealth by China's rural landowners. These were all strategies that were intended to enhance China's economic reconstruction and, just as crucially, to avoid creating political opposition for the new CCP government.³⁴

The background cognitive ideas of the Soviet economic model and New Democracy led China to rely heavily on the Soviet Union and the socialist economic bloc for investment and imports of capital goods and technology. Over the course of the 1950s, trade with the Soviet Union would account for almost 50 per cent of China's total trade, and by 1959, more than 65 per cent of China's total trade took place with

³³ Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Development: The Interplay of Scarcity and Ideology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 213.

³⁴ Nina P. Halpern, 'Creating Socialist Economies: Stalinist Political Economy and the Impact of Ideas,' in *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, ed. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1993), 94-95. 'Turning China into a powerful, modernized, socialist, industrialized country', 23 September 1954, in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), 142.

the Soviet bloc.³⁵ However, there were significant gaps in that trade which placed limitations on China's economic development. The Soviet bloc faced a number of structural weaknesses that artificially dampened trade levels between the socialist countries, and made it difficult for countries such as China to import the goods it needed to implement the New Democracy goals of rapid industrialisation. The bloc was primarily comprised of war-damaged countries with weak economies; its countries enjoyed little comparative advantage because each focused on the production of heavy industry under the Soviet model; and it was extremely difficult to build trade in the absence of freely floating prices or convertible currencies.³⁶ Furthermore, overland transport of goods from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries to China was costly and time-consuming.³⁷ Finally, as the Korean War intensified, China was forced to export almost all of its agricultural and mineral production to the Soviet Union in exchange for Soviet military supplies, and thus could not afford to import all of the Soviet industrial goods that were so badly needed in China.³⁸ By late 1951, the head of China's Foreign Trade Ministry, Ye Jizhuang (叶季壮), argued that China would depend on trade outside the Soviet bloc if it was to achieve its goal of rapid industrialisation.³⁹

3.3.2 *Foreground cognitive ideas*

Foreground cognitive ideas are ideas that provide specific solutions to policy problems. Scholars such as Campbell, Goldstein and Keohane describe these types of

³⁵ Although China never became a formal member of the Soviet economic bloc—the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in Europe—China sent delegations to official COMECON meetings, and formed extensive trade agreements with the Soviet Union and with Eastern European states participating in the bloc. Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 56-57; Kirby, 'China's Internationalization in the Early People's Republic,' 876-884.

³⁶ ———, 'China's Internationalization in the Early People's Republic,' 882-884.

³⁷ 'Special Issue on Red China Trade', 7 June 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-1652, RG59, USNA, 5-6.

³⁸ Zhang Shu Guang, 'Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,' 196-197.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

ideas as ‘enabling’ because they provide policy-makers with guidance on how to achieve specific objectives.⁴⁰ As we saw above, Chinese background cognitive ideas about the Soviet economic model and New Democracy led Beijing to pursue a strategy of rapid industrialisation. Yet gaps in the socialist economic bloc meant that Chinese officials needed to look elsewhere for assistance in rebuilding their economy.

In this section, I explore Chinese foreground cognitive ideas about Japan, showing how these ideas largely developed out of lessons learned from dealing with Japan in the (often recent) past. Although Japan had played an imperialist and aggressive role in China during the first half of the twentieth century, Japan had also bestowed a number of important economic legacies on China (as we saw in Chapter Two). Access to recently declassified Chinese archives shows that Chinese economic planners were familiar with Japanese industrial processes, capital and technology. Given the urgent need to rebuild China in these earliest years of the PRC, these archival records show that China’s economic planners often looked to Japan. Moreover, many thousands of Japanese remained living in Northeast China (Manchuria) in the early 1950s, and Chinese officials also made use of their industrial skills and expertise to aid in rebuilding this major industrial region of China. As we shall see, in the first few years after the establishment of the PRC, Chinese policy-makers saw Japan as an important source of industrial goods, and individual Japanese as having the technical skills, that were vital to China’s post-war economic reconstruction. Of course, China’s economic ties with Japan—and particularly the bilateral trade relationship—were limited by the US trade embargo on China. In 1950, China’s total trade with Japan was almost \$US60 million; after the introduction of the

⁴⁰ Campbell, ‘The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,’ 386; Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*, 11.

US trade embargo that level had declined in 1952 to less than \$US16 million. Nevertheless, the Sino-Japanese economic relationship between 1949 and 1952 is instructive. The *kinds* of goods that China imported—or attempted to import—from Japan were significant in terms of understanding China's goal of industrial development during the early 1950s.

However, there were other ideas in China that came into conflict with those advocating cooperation with Japan. This section will also show that in these early Cold War years, at a time when the Korean War was intensifying and the United States was rethinking its strategy towards Japan, Chinese officials also began to conceive of the possibility that Japan could pose a renewed threat to China. Chinese foreground cognitive ideas about the place of Japan in post-WWII East Asia are instructive because they show us how Chinese officials constructed the threat that Japan had posed to China during the Second World War. More importantly, however, they show us the lessons that Chinese officials had learned about the nature of modern warfare. In particular, we shall see that as a result of China's devastating experience of war with Japan, Chinese officials had learned that there was a close relationship between industrial strength and military capability, and that in future, modern wars would be industrial wars. This close relationship between industrialisation and war was established in Chinese thinking about Japan in the earliest years of the PRC.

a) Japan as a source of industrial goods and skills

As noted in the opening to this chapter, when the Communists came to power in October 1949 they were initially uncertain about whether to pursue trade relations with Japan. Yet from the earliest months of the PRC, we see that Chinese officials

began describing Japan as an important source of industrial goods and technical skills. These goods and skills were the same as had been introduced by Japan under Japanese colonisation and economic exploitation of China during the 1930s and 1940s. Japan was also struggling to rebuild after the destruction of the Second World War, but Tokyo still possessed a range of items and expertise that were needed in China. In May 1950, China's State Administrative Council called on three senior economic experts, Chen Yun (陈云), Bo Yibo (薄一波) and Ma Yinchu (马寅初), to work out how to turn the 'stagnant', 'sporadic' and 'small-scale' trade relationship with Japan back into the 'relatively close' economic relationship the two countries had enjoyed in the past.⁴¹ In their report to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and State Administrative Council, these economic experts argued that 'Japan has a number of metals (copper, silver, gold, iron, tin), electrical goods and other equipment which our side needs'.⁴² Moreover, in 1949, before the onset of the US trade embargo, PRC officials approached Takasaki Tatsunosuke (高崎達之助), who was the Japanese vice-president of Manchurian Heavy Industries and the Anshan Iron and Steel Works during the 1930s and 1940s, to supply the names of Japanese firms and price lists for industrial goods that could be purchased in Japan.⁴³ Under the Japanese rule of Manchuria, Takasaki had also served as an economic adviser to the Manchurian government and had participated in the formulation of Manchuria's Five Year Industrial Plan.⁴⁴ The PRC's use of Takasaki's industrial expertise in 1949 is an example of the way in which Japan's imperialism in, and industrial contribution to,

⁴¹ FMA File 105-00077-01, 27 May 1950, 'Guanyu kaizhan dui riben zhijie maoyi wenti de baogao' [A report on the development of direct trade to Japan], 3-4.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴³ Memorandum of Conversation between Takasaki Tatsunosuke and William Stokes, 24 May 1952, US State Department Central Files, 693.94 1950-1954, RG59, USNA.

⁴⁴ FMA File 105-01151-01, 25-26 October 1962, 'Liao Chengzhi guanyu jiedai Takasaki Tatsunosuke ji qi suixing ren yuan de qingshi, laifang renwu cailiao he yanlun' [Liao Chengzhi's request for instructions, background materials and comments concerning the reception of Takasaki Tatsunosuke and accompanying staff].

Manchuria played a role in shaping Chinese ideas about economic development and the possibilities for trade with Japan after 1949.

By 1950 Sino-Japanese trade almost mirrored the type of trade that had taken place between occupied China and Japan before and during the war. For instance, in 1949 and 1950, China's principal purchases from Japan included millions of US dollars worth of industrial products such as steel, galvanised iron sheets, copper wire, machinery for manufacturing paper and textiles, steel rails and railroad equipment.⁴⁵ Indeed, in 1950-51, Japan shipped 61 per cent of its total bar steel, 37 per cent of its steel plates, and 14 per cent of its galvanised iron sheets to China.⁴⁶ In exchange, China provided Japan with large quantities of food and raw materials that were badly needed in Japan, including, in particular, 65 per cent of Japan's total coal imports.⁴⁷ The majority of Japanese imports were destined for Northeast China where they found a ready home in the industrial plants and mills that had been previously built by Japanese in Manchuria.⁴⁸ Japanese machinery was sorely needed at the Jilin (Kirin) and Shenyang (Mukden) Mills, and the Overseas Trading Company of the PRC's Department of Trade imported various kinds of Japanese-made motors, generators, electric furnaces, and other items needed for manufacturing via the trading port at Yingkou.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ US Political Advisor for Japan to Secretary of State, 24 August 1949, US State Department Central Files, 693.9431/8-2449, RG59, USNA; US Political Advisor for Japan to Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 26 January 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/1-2652, RG59, USNA.

⁴⁶ 'Special issue on Red China trade', 7 June 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-1652, RG59, USNA, 11-17.

⁴⁷ Hemmendinger to Barnett, 'Japan's new mainland trade', 29 October 1951, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/10-2951, RG59, USNA.

⁴⁸ US Political Advisor for Japan, to Secretary of State, 'Enclosure 1: A report by the Japan Management Association on "Measures to Boost Trade with Communist China"', 6 December 1949, US State Department Central Files, 693.9431/12-649, RG59, USNA.

⁴⁹ US Consulate General, Peiping, to Secretary of State, 'List of industrial items desired from Japan by Chinese interests', 12 July 1949, US State Department Central Files, 693.9431/7-1249, RG59, USNA.

Beijing also adopted policies to draw on the skills of Japanese left behind in China at the end of the war. As the Second World War drew to a close in 1945, millions of Japanese nationals were repatriated back to Japan from China and the rest of Asia as part of a major Allied repatriation effort of Japanese forces.⁵⁰ However, thousands of Japanese slipped through the cracks of the repatriation process. By the time the Communists took hold of the whole of Northeast China—including the industries and enterprises that had been established by the Japanese—in the winter of 1948, between 20,000 and 30,000 Japanese were living and working in the Northeast.⁵¹

As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the end of the Second World War, the Nationalist government deliberately kept back a number of Japanese civilians whose skills and labour they needed.⁵² Nevertheless, the Nationalists feared that these Japanese planned to undertake further aggression in China, and so ultimately failed to make the best use of their expertise.⁵³ In contrast to the Nationalists, the Communists made far more use of the Japanese left behind in Northeast China. Although the Communists recognised that some Japanese might pose a security threat,⁵⁴ recently declassified archives suggest that the CCP understood that China's overall economic

⁵⁰ Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 1, 135-137.

⁵¹ It should be noted, however, that this figure is quite a contested one. In September 1949, Chinese Communist officials estimated that 34,000 Japanese lived in the Northeast (as seen in Table 2). However, by August 1951 they had revised this figure down to 21,063. See FMA File 105-00224-02, 16; FMA File 118-00118-02, 1 August-30 November 1951, 'Dongbei Ribenren qingkuang he chuli yijian' [Views on the situation and how to deal with the Japanese in Northeast China], 1. Figures calculated by China's Public Security Bureau in March 1951 (at Premier Zhou Enlai's request) found that 37,809 Japanese nationals were living *throughout* China in 1951, and the overwhelming majority of these were in the Northeast. See Liang Zhikou, 'Jianguo Chuqi Waiqiao Guanli Gongzuo Shuping [a Review of the Management of Overseas Nationals in the Early Liberation Period],' *Dangdai Zhongguo Shi Yanjiu [Contemporary China History Studies]* 13, no. 4 (2006), 48.

⁵² Gillin and Etter, 'Staying On.'

⁵³ Yang Daqing, 'Resurrecting the Empire?,' 190.

⁵⁴ For instance, in August 1949, the Shenyang branch of the Public Security Bureau found that a small number of the Japanese in the Northeast were 'agents' (*tewu*) of the *Guomindang* and the United States who had 'specially come to destroy us'. FMA File 105-00224-02, 11 August 1949, 'Guanyu dui Dongbei Ribenren gongzuo de zongjie baogao' [Summary work report on Japanese in Northeast China], 10.

reconstruction was far more significant to the CCP's long-term survival. In September 1949, the CCP established the Northeast Committee for the Management of Japanese (*Dongbei riben guanli weiyuanhui*) to manage these Japanese, and to provide statistics and reports to the Northeast Government and Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 'the situation of Japanese in Northeast China'.⁵⁵ In addition to providing education, cultural activities and welfare for these former occupiers, the Committee reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the important economic contribution they could make. The Committee argued that,

[Japanese] technicians have been working in the Northeast for the last two to three decades, and today the economic recovery of the Northeast region really requires the help of Japanese technicians.⁵⁶

China's Northeast region was critically important to China's overall economic development. Although Manchuria had been plundered by Soviet occupying forces at the end of the Second World War, the industrial base left in China's Northeast region was still vitally important for China's post-war economic reconstruction.⁵⁷ For this reason, senior economic officials such as Chen Yun (陈云) and Li Fuchun (李富春), who would become the respective heads of China's State Capital Construction Commission and State Planning Commission, advised Chairman Mao and the Central

⁵⁵ The Committee was formally created in September 1949—before the establishment of the PRC in October 1949—but began collecting statistics on these Japanese as early as August 1949. The Committee was led by an Executive Council of nine individuals, including Zhao Anbo (赵安博) from the Foreign Affairs Bureau (*waishiju*). Other representatives included Zhang Wenbao (张文豹) from the Northeast People's Government (*Dongbei renmin zhengfu*), Cheng Mingsheng (程明升) and Lin Zesheng (林泽生) from the Ministry of Industry (*gongyebu*), and five representatives from the Ministry of Public Security (*gong'anbu*), the Political Affairs Unit of the Northeast Military (*junqu zhengzhibu*), the Northeast branch of the Ministry of Railways (*tiedaobu*), and the Shenyang (*Shenyang shi zhengfu*) and Harbin Municipal Governments (*Ha'erbin zhengfu*). FMA File 118-00086-01, 1 August 1949-30 June 1950, 'Dongbei riben guanli weiyuanhui gongzuo baogao (1949 nian 8 yue dao 1950 nian 6 yue)' [Work report from the Committee for the Management of Japanese in China's Northeast (August 1949-June 1950)], 1-2.

⁵⁶ FMA File 118-00086-01, 4.

⁵⁷ Cheng, *Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China*, 163; Kirby, 'The Chinese War Economy,' 185.

Government that it was in China's interest to focus its development on the Northeast as a priority. They wrote,

The original facilities of the major industries in Northeast China were lost after '15 August' [the date of the Japanese surrender in World War II], but although these factories lost important equipment, the foundations of these factories still exist. Purchasing equipment in order to rebuild or expand these factories rather than opening new factories elsewhere, will allow us to invest much less, achieve results much more quickly, and to speed up [our development].⁵⁸

The Northeast provided more than a third of China's total industrial output in 1949, and this rose to over a half by 1952.⁵⁹ Indeed, in the mid-1950s, Zhou Enlai would report that industrial plants, such as the Anshan Iron and Steel Works originally built by Japan, were at the 'core' of China's reconstruction and industrialisation efforts in Northeast China.⁶⁰ Furthermore, in 1949, Japanese business groups noted with some satisfaction that,

Manchuria still possesses a number of workmen, trained when Japan ruled the country; has abundant natural resources and is not completely without technique and technical experience. For this reason the development of Manchuria differs from that in a country starting from absolute scratch and must be regarded as comparative [sic] easy.⁶¹

In their reports to Beijing, the Northeast Committee argued that 'it is very important that we increase the leadership and education of Japanese in the Northeast to better enable them to work for us', 'to mobilise additional Japanese to help contribute to the economic development of Northeast China', and 'to reform Japanese technicians to enable them to play their role in the economic development of the Northeast'.⁶² To

⁵⁸ 'Guanyu huifu, jianshe, xinjian gongchang de sheji qingkuang he yijian' [The situation and our views on investing in the restoration, reconstruction and building of new factories], 9 February 1952, in Chen Yun, *Chen Yun Wen Ji [Collected Works of Chen Yun]*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 356.

⁵⁹ Frederick C. Teiwes, 'Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime,' in *Cambridge History of China: The People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 82-83.

⁶⁰ *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 218.

⁶¹ 'Measures to boost trade with Communist China', 6 December 1949, US State Department Central Files, 693.9431/12-649, RG59, USNA.

⁶² FMA File 105-00224-02, 14.

this end, those Japanese regarded as ‘technicians’ (*jishuzhe*), ‘skilled workers’ (*jishu gongren*), ‘ordinary workers’ (*yiban gongren*), and ‘office workers’ (*zhiyuan*), were put to work in Chinese schools, factories, railways, post offices, mines and hospitals.⁶³ Table 2 below provides a more specific breakdown of the departments in which Japanese were found.

Table 2: Numbers of Japanese in the Northeast by Department, August 1949⁶⁴

Department (部门别)	Exact Count (确数)	Work Unit (单位)	Estimated Count (估计数)
Factories	4016	105	10000
Mining	2149	19	4500
Railways	1584	18	2500
Post	149	6/18	500
Hospitals	2839	78	7000
Farming	169	12	3200
Office workers	2108	121	2150
Schools	749	11	150
Other	3581	39	4000
Total	16744	409	34000

Furthermore, it is instructive to note that Chinese officials did not distinguish between Japanese civilians and military personnel, but rather differentiated them based on their skills.⁶⁵ This is in contrast to the situation in Japan where civilians who were eventually repatriated were referred to as ‘repatriates’ (JP: *hikiagesha*, 引揚者), while military personnel were classed as ‘demobilized soldiers’ (JP: *fukuinhei*, 復員兵).⁶⁶

⁶³ Ibid., 1-8.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 18.

⁶⁵ The Japanese Foreign Office estimated that approximately 40 percent of the Japanese left in Communist China after 1949 were Japanese military personnel, but the majority of these were most likely detained or killed by the Soviets at the end of WWII. The Soviet Union also transferred 1000 Japanese POWs into Chinese custody (in Fushun, near Shenyang) in July 1950. For more on this, see Adam Cathcart and Patricia Nash, 'War Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese Normalization: Zhou Enlai and the Shenyang Trials, 1954-1956,' *Twentieth Century China* 34, no. 2 (2009), 92-93. For the Japanese claims, see Johnson to McClurkin, 'Comparison between Chinese Communist position on repatriation of Japanese nationals and their position on repatriation of Korean POWs', 4 February 1953, US State Department Central Files, 693.9425/2-453, RG59, USNA.

⁶⁶ Watt, *When Empire Comes Home*, 13.

Among the Japanese in Northeast China, over 35 percent were designated as ‘technicians’ or ‘skilled workers’, 23 percent were ‘ordinary workers’, 4 percent were ‘office workers’, and 38 percent were ‘family members’.⁶⁷

These technicians and skilled workers were seen as vitally important across a range of Chinese industries, both before and after the establishment of the PRC in October 1949. At the May Day celebrations in 1949, the Health Unit of the Northeast Military (*Dongbei junqu weishengbu*) commended 33 Japanese doctors and nurses who had provided ‘outstanding service’ (*gongchen*) in Chinese hospitals, and by March 1950, more than a third of the Japanese working in the ten different *danwei* that made up the Ministry of Health were recognised for their ‘meritorious service’ (*ligong*).⁶⁸

Japanese engineers were also especially important to industrial development in the Northeast. One example was the Hegang Mine in Heilongjiang Province. The mine was home to more than 1,200 Japanese workers, and by late 1950, four of the six operation sites at the mine were led by Japanese.⁶⁹ In May 1949, almost half of these workers were recognised for having introduced the ‘longwall’ method of mining, and thereby increasing the safety and efficiency of the mine.⁷⁰ One of these workers was Akita Shun (秋田 俊), a 45-year old metallurgical engineer in the Northeast military industrial unit (*Dongbei junqu junshi gongyebu*). Akita and other Japanese engineers were responsible for developing a new high-steel hexagonal drill at the mine. According to Chinese officials, this new drill allowed much more efficient mining than previous methods used by Chinese engineers, and they estimated that it increased

⁶⁷ FMA File 105-00224-02, 20.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 7; FMA File 118-00086-02, ‘Guanyu Dongbei Riben ren de qingkuang baogao’ [Report on the situation of Japanese in Northeast China], 1 June-30 June 1950, 5.

⁶⁹ FMA File 118-00086-02, 5.

⁷⁰ FMA File 105-00224-02, 6-7.

mining output by 40 per cent. Similarly, in 1950, Japanese working at the Hegang Mine had introduced the 'four standard extraction methods' (*zhengguo si cai fa*) of mining, and they were among the more than 500 Japanese technicians who received commendation for their work at the May Day celebrations in 1950.⁷¹ As a result of these and other efforts, the Northeast Committee reported to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that Japanese technicians were 'hugely significant' in terms of the development of the Chinese economy.⁷²

The importance of these skilled workers to China's economic development was also a factor in Chinese officials' thinking about their repatriation. Many of the Japanese who remained in China hoped eventually to be repatriated to Japan. At first, the Northeast government agreed only to repatriate those Japanese who were sick and weak (*bingruozhe*), or those who could not find regular or proper employment (*wuguding, zhengdang zhiyezhe*).⁷³ The Committee reported that the repatriation of 1,126 Japanese from Shenyang and Harbin on the 30 June 1949, 'did not have an adverse effect on our economic development or any other work'.⁷⁴ However, by June 1950, China's policy of not repatriating skilled Japanese workers had become problematic as more and more Japanese started demanding to be repatriated to Japan. These Japanese were worried about the future direction of the PRC, and those with family members in Japan had begun receiving letters from home urging them to return to Japan.⁷⁵

Furthermore, the Soviet presence in Northeast China also contributed to Japanese

⁷¹ FMA File 118-00086-02, 5.

⁷² FMA File 105-00224-02, 7.

⁷³ Ibid, 15; FMA File 118-00086-02, 15, 22.

⁷⁴ FMA File 118-00086-02, 15.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 18-22.

desires to return home. These Japanese had experienced the brutality of the Soviet Army in Manchuria in 1945, and very clearly regarded the Soviet Union as the ‘enemy’ (*choushi*).⁷⁶ The Japanese technicians also believed that the Soviets had destroyed Japan’s economic project in Manchuria, saying that ‘the Soviet Union took good American and Japanese machinery from China, and brought bad Soviet machinery into China’.⁷⁷ Furthermore, it was clear that many of the Japanese technicians felt threatened by the Soviet presence in China. The Committee reported with some concern that since the arrival of the Soviets, the Japanese technicians believed that China no longer needed their skills.⁷⁸ All of these issues contributed to growing ‘chaos and disorder’ (*hunluan*) among the Japanese in 1950 and 1951, and the Northeast Committee grew concerned over the increasing numbers of suicide, and the fact that a number of young Japanese had become ‘slack’ (*sanman*) and had ‘lost all ambition’ (*zibaoziqi*) to work.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, demonstrating their ongoing concern about economic development in the Northeast, the Northeast Committee and Chinese Foreign Ministry agreed in June 1950 that only those Japanese who were not contributing to the ‘economic reconstruction of the Northeast’ should be permitted to return home.⁸⁰

b) Japan as a comprehensive threat

In the midst of the development of this economic engagement with Japan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry also began to formulate policy on a Peace Treaty with Japan. These discussions took place before China entered the Korean War, and were initiated in

⁷⁶ Ibid., 8.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 8.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 6-7, 18-22.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 10.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 22.

response to the United States' own early negotiations on a Peace Treaty with Japan.⁸¹ In May 1950, the Chinese Foreign Ministry established a Japan Peace Treaty Deliberation Group (*waijiaobu duiRi heyue shenyi weiyuanhui*), comprised of more than 35 officials and Japan-experts from Beijing and Shanghai.⁸² The meetings of this group and subsequent Foreign Ministry policy over the course of 1950 and 1951 allow us to examine Chinese policy-makers' ideas about China's security vis-à-vis Japan, and about the nature of modern warfare. One of the strongest themes to emerge during this period was that Japan posed a 'comprehensive' (*zonghe*) threat to China. The Foreign Ministry argued that it was not only traditional military capabilities that had made Japan a threat during the war, but also Japan's ability to draw on a range of political, economic, and cultural resources as part of their war capabilities.⁸³ They argued that,

In the past, wars were simply about armed force, but modern wars are a comprehensive system of military, economics, politics (diplomacy) and culture (propaganda).⁸⁴

Because of the comprehensive nature of the threat posed by Japan, Chinese officials therefore proposed a whole raft of changes to the political, cultural, economic and military systems in Japan. In addition to recommending the destruction and removal of Japanese arms and military equipment, the Chinese Foreign Ministry argued for the need to restrict certain areas of Japan's industrial production, to limit the tonnage and shipping routes of Japanese merchant ships, to prohibit the production of certain

⁸¹ The US began to seriously consider options for a peace treaty with Japan in late 1949 and early 1950 before China entered the Korean War, but these early peace treaty proposals were plagued by bureaucratic disagreements between the US State and Defense departments. See Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 39-47.

⁸² Notable members of the committee included Qiao Guanhua (乔冠华), head of the Asia Bureau within the Foreign Ministry and Zhang Hanfu (章汉夫), director of the Shanghai Department of Foreign Affairs. See FMA File 105-00089-02, 12 May 1950. 'Wo waijiaobu jiu duiRi heyue wenti jinxing de taolunhui jilu (1950 nian 5 yue 12 ri)' [Record of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's discussion group on the question of the Peace Treaty with Japan (12 May 1950)].

⁸³ FMA File 105-00090-01, 21 March 1950, 'DuiRi heyue youguan jiechu Riben junbei tiaokuan caoyue' [Japan Peace Treaty draft protocol concerning the removal of arms from Japan].

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

education materials and war propaganda, and to strictly regulate the work of Japanese military scientists and scientific industries.⁸⁵

Furthermore, in describing the comprehensive threat posed by Japan, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials paid particularly close attention to the *economic* threat posed by Japan, and the links between Japan's industrial capability and its preparedness for war. The Peace Treaty Deliberation Group argued that,

Today's wars are industrial wars and wars of goods and materials, thus the importance of economic planning for war is not second to that of military [planning for war].⁸⁶

Furthermore, they argued that success in war would be decided on the basis of a country's 'ability to achieve self-sufficiency in modern industrial resources', 'the military's daily rate of consumption', and 'the speed of daily industrial output'.⁸⁷ In modern wars, therefore,

...opposing aggression requires removing the aggressor's weapons, but removing its weapons is only part of [a country's] actual strength; stopping a country's re-armament requires limiting its latent potential.⁸⁸

The link between industrialisation and war was made clear during the Foreign Ministry's discussions on Japan's postwar future. The Japan Peace Treaty Deliberation Group argued that the destructive wars of the twentieth century had been caused by the fact that,

...the modern great powers (*xiandai lieqiang*) had, without exception, strived for economic sufficiency (*jingji chongzu*); the capitalist imperialists (*ziben diguozhuyizhe*) had even obtained colonial markets and raw materials, increased their productive efficiency in science and technology, and worked hard to expand their military arms, in order to plunder (*lüeduo*) and dominate (*bachi*) through armed force, and this led to war.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Ibid., 17-38.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 24.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 24.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 25.

While the foreground cognitive ideas about Japan and the nature of modern warfare contained in these discussions by Chinese Foreign Ministry officials clearly reflected China's historical observation and experience of Japanese imperialism, industrialisation and war, we must also acknowledge that these Chinese conceptions of Japan are not dissimilar to ideas put forth by the Allied Powers at the end of the Second World War. For instance, a number of Chinese Foreign Ministry discussions and reports around this time made reference to the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, which emphasised the need to remove 'Japan's war-making power', control Japanese access to raw materials, and limit the development of those industries that would allow Japan to re-arm.⁹⁰ It is therefore likely that Chinese officials were, in part, simply reflecting the same contemporary concerns of other major powers as they considered how to comprehensively disarm fascist countries such as Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War.⁹¹ In examining these foreground cognitive ideas about Japan, we must therefore acknowledge that a combination of China's historical experience of Japan *and* contemporary international discourse shaped China's ideas about, and policies towards, Japan.

Having identified the comprehensive, and particularly economic, nature of the threat posed by Japan, the Foreign Ministry therefore argued for the need to control Japan's science and technology industries, and the importance of directing these industries towards peaceful production.⁹² Yet despite describing in some detail the

⁹⁰ See the Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 1945, University of Tokyo, World and Japan digital archive (<http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/front-ENG.shtml>), accessed 1 June 2012.

⁹¹ For similar discussions of how the Allied powers deliberated the transformation of postwar Germany, for instance, see Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*, in particular at 115-124.

⁹² FMA File 105-00089-03, 16 May 1950, 'Wo waijiaobu jiu duiRi heyue wenti jinxing de taolunhui jilu (1950 nian 5 yue 16 ri xiaowu 2 shi)' [Record of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's discussion group on the question of the Peace Treaty with Japan (2pm, 16 May 1950)]; FMA File 105-00089-04, 17 May 1950, 'Wo waijiaobu jiu duiRi heyue wenti jinxing de taolunhui jilu (1950 nian 5 yue 17 ri xiaowu 2

comprehensive nature of the threat posed by Japan, Chinese officials did not describe Japan as an inherently militaristic nation.⁹³ The Foreign Ministry acknowledged that Japan could pose a future threat to China by virtue of its potential capabilities and geographic location, but did consider militarism to be an inevitable characteristic of Japan. Rather, Chinese officials described the host of steps that could be taken to remove the threat posed by Japan, such as democratising Japan, ridding the country of militaristic propaganda, and limiting Japan's military-industrial production.⁹⁴ These were all highly practical steps that would presumably have made little difference if Chinese officials had viewed Japan as an inherently dangerous and militaristic nation that was unable to be reformed. This view of Japan is further notable because it stands in stark contrast to language that began to emerge in the 1990s and 2000s, in which the Chinese government, official newspapers, and academics explicitly linked Japan's contemporary security and foreign policy with its historical and innate militaristic tendencies.⁹⁵

Yet although Beijing did not depict Japan as an especially aggressive or dangerous nation, Chinese officials still regarded Japan and the US Peace Treaty process as posing a threat to China. This was, in the view of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, because the United States was attempting to rehabilitate Japan's military-industrial capacity.⁹⁶ Chinese officials' fears about Japanese rearmament against the backdrop

shi)' [Record of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's discussion group on the question of the Peace Treaty with Japan (2pm, 17 May 1950)]; FMA File 105-00089-05, 18 May 1950, 'Wo waijiaobu jiu dui Ri heyue wenti jinxing de taolunhui jilu (1950 nian 5 yue 18 ri)' [Record of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's discussion group on the question of the Peace Treaty with Japan (18 May 1950)].

⁹³ FMA File 105-00090-01, 17-38.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Gries, 'China's "New Thinking" on Japan.'; Rozman, 'China's Changing Images of Japan.'

⁹⁶ FMA File 105-00020-01, 8 August 1951, 'Zhou Enlai zongli jian waizhang fabiao guanyu MeiYing dui Ri heyue cao'an ji Jiujinshan huiyi de shengming' [Statement issued by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on the US-British draft Peace Treaty towards Japan and the San Francisco Conference], 18-20.

of the Korean War were well founded. The US occupation of Japan was originally designed to bring about the demilitarisation and democratisation of Japan. However, the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June 1950 strengthened US plans to 'reverse course' in Japan. Subsequently, the US embarked on a policy aimed at rearming Japan and rehabilitating its economy.⁹⁷ Between 1950 and 1952, the Japanese government created a paramilitary National Police Reserve of 75,000 men, a 50,000-man National Safety Force, and a Maritime Safety Board (MSB) of 8,000 men, which provided logistical support to US bases housed in Japan.⁹⁸ Japanese manufacturers also provided the United States with ammunition, light weapons and napalm bombs, and Japanese workers performed repair and service work on US tanks, aircraft and military vehicles.⁹⁹

However, it was the US rehabilitation of Japan's economy that particularly worried Beijing. The US decision to procure industrial goods from Japan for use in Korea transformed Japan's economy.¹⁰⁰ During the first year of the conflict, Japanese exports increased by over 60 per cent, and US direct procurement of industrial goods accounted for around one-third of Japan's total export trade.¹⁰¹ Major manufacturing companies such as Toyota also received critical injections of funds and transfers of Western industrial technology, and used this boost to begin the research and

⁹⁷ Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States, and the Cold War,' 251; Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 44-45.

⁹⁸ Reinhard Drifte, 'Japan's Involvement in the Korean War,' in *The Korean War in History*, ed. James Cotton and Ian Neary (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 127-128; Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States, and the Cold War,' 255.

⁹⁹ John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II* (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 541-543.

¹⁰⁰ Indeed Dower notes that Prime Minister Yoshida saw the direct procurement policy as a 'gift from the gods'. Ibid., 541.

¹⁰¹ Drifte, 'Japan's Involvement in the Korean War,' 126; Okita Saburo, 'Japan's Economy and the Korean War,' *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 14 (1951), 141-142.

development that would underpin their economic success in the future.¹⁰² Beijing drew an explicit connection between Japan's economic rehabilitation and the military threat posed by Japan. For example, an editorial in the *People's Daily* in May 1952 warned that the United States had revived the very industries that underpinned Japan's military-industrial complex, including steel, heavy chemicals, electric power, railways and telecommunications.¹⁰³ There was a clear relationship unfolding between war, economic development and military potential in post-WWII Japan, and this relationship was one of great concern to Beijing.

This section has shown that there was a strong connection between industrialisation and war in Chinese ideas about Japan and the nature of modern warfare in the early years of the PRC. In observing Japan's experience of the Second World War, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had learned that modern wars were industrial wars. They understood that preparing for war required economic planning as well as military planning. The Foreign Ministry argued that states like Japan had become a 'comprehensive' threat because of their ability to use science and industry to modernise their economies and militaries. Furthermore, with the onset of the Cold War and its early manifestation in East Asia in the form of the Korean War, Chinese officials observed how the United States sought to rehabilitate Japan's military-industrial complex, while simultaneously limiting China's strategic capability by introducing a strict trade embargo on China. Thus, in the early Cold War, it became clear to Chinese officials that modern wars were indeed 'industrial wars'.

¹⁰² Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States, and the Cold War,' 257; Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, 289.

¹⁰³ *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), 7 May 1952, 'Jianjue zhizhi Meiguo zhunbei yuandong xin qinlüe zhanzheng de yinmou' [We are determined to stop the US plot to prepare for a new war of aggression in the Far East].

Nevertheless, there was an inherent tension in this relationship between industrialisation and war. Chinese policy-makers were concerned by the threat posed by an industrialised Japan, but simultaneously believed that China needed to import Japanese industrial goods as a means of enhancing China's own national strength. Chinese officials saw Japan as posing a 'comprehensive' threat to China, predominantly because of its latent economic and industrial capacity. The Chinese Foreign Ministry therefore recommended tight control over those Japanese industries that could be drawn upon in the event of war. At the same time, however, Chinese officials were also actively looking for ways to import Japanese industrial goods and make the best use of the expertise of Japanese technicians in Northeast China. Chinese officials saw Japan as a particularly appropriate source of industrial goods and skills because of Japan's economic legacy in China during the 1930s and 1940s, and believed that an economic relationship with Japan was necessary if China was to successfully rebuild its economy under the Soviet model. They sought industrial items such as steel, heavy chemicals, precision-instruments, and other high-technology items, all of which stemmed from industries that had helped to make Japan a 'comprehensive' threat during the war.

In these early years of the PRC, Chinese policy-makers did not attempt to resolve this tension. Chinese officials were simply trying to do their best to govern and rebuild a wartorn China, and faced threats from a number of different directions. Furthermore, there was an additional ideational constraint on China's Japan policy. As we shall see below, Chinese normative ideas—and in particular, staunch opposition to imperialism and the desire to re-establish China's central place in world order—also powerfully shaped China's Japan policy between 1949 and 1952.

3.3.2 Background normative ideas

China's policy of 'leaning to one side' was emblematic of a set of cognitive and normative ideas that became increasingly entrenched in the CCP between 1949 and 1952, as discussed above. Here I focus on the normative dimension of these background ideas. Background normative ideas consist of broad-based attitudes and normative assumptions about what is considered appropriate or not. They therefore delimit the range of legitimate or appropriate solutions to policy problems. Examples of normative ideas in the literature include the taboo around the use of nuclear weapons,¹⁰⁴ or the ideas about self-determination that became increasingly salient following the end of the Second World War.¹⁰⁵ Though the early years of the PRC were ones of transition and fluidity in Chinese foreign and domestic policy thinking, two background normative ideas were dominant. First, a staunch opposition to imperialism (which Mao saw as the highest stage of capitalism), and second, a belief that through socialist revolution, China could restore its central place in the global order.¹⁰⁶

These normative ideas were drawn out of lessons learned in China's own past, and in particular, from anger at China's experience of victimisation and imperialism by foreign powers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁰⁷ For a century, China had been a weak, semi-sovereign state, ruled through extraterritorial rights

¹⁰⁴ Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

¹⁰⁵ Jackson, 'The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization.' Jackson refers to these ideas as 'principled ideas' rather than background normative ideas however.

¹⁰⁶ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*; Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*; Niu Jun, *Cong Yan'an Zouxiang Shijie: Zhongguo Gongchandang Duiwai Guanxi De Qiyuan [from Yan'an to the World: Origins of the Foreign Relations of the Chinese Communist Party]*; Odd Arne Westad, 'Losses, Chances, and Myths: The United States and the Creation of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1950,' *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 1 (1997), 106.

¹⁰⁷ Chen Jian, 'The Myth of America's "Lost Chance" in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New Evidence,' *ibid.*, 86.

seized by foreign powers. Yet China's experience of war against Japan had changed all that. China's role as one of the Allied Powers in the Second World War was critical in raising China's global status and remaking China as a sovereign and equal state. Furthermore, by impeding Japan's victory in East Asia, China had contributed to the Allied cause against fascism and imperialism. For this, the Chinese Nationalist government, led by Chiang Kai-shek, was rewarded with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, and signed a treaty in 1943 that put an end to extraterritoriality and granted China sovereign independence.¹⁰⁸ Yet the Chinese Nationalist government was not the only one to claim this victorious legacy for China. When Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists fell to the Communists just four years after the end of the Second World War, the Communist Party was quick to claim its role as the leader of an independent and newly sovereign China.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, Mao Zedong's oft-quoted statement in October 1949 that 'the Chinese people, comprising one quarter of humanity, have now stood up' spoke directly to this claim.¹¹⁰ Subsequently, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the CCP drew clear links between China's own revolutionary struggle and the broader struggle for decolonisation taking place around the globe.

These background normative ideas powerfully shaped Chinese ideas about, and relations with, each of the superpowers. From a normative perspective, the revolutionary ideology of the Soviet Union held a particular appeal for countries going through the process of decolonisation. The Soviet Union's own transition from a 'backward nation into a modern industrial society' made Soviet Marxism-Leninism

¹⁰⁸ Rana Mitter, 'Changed by War: The Changing Historiography of Wartime China and New Interpretations of Modern Chinese History,' *The Chinese Historical Review* 17, no. 1 (2010), 92.

¹⁰⁹ Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 23.

¹¹⁰ Mao Zedong, "The Chinese People Have Stood Up", 21 Sept. 1949, *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, v (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 16.

and the Soviet economic model a powerful model for countries developing out of economic ‘backwardness’ and colonisation.¹¹¹ The normative appeal of Soviet Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet economic model was further underscored by growing CCP opposition to the alternative. From 1949 onwards, CCP leaders increasingly viewed the United States as the major new imperialist force in the world. US policy towards Asia—as represented by its support for Chiang Kai-shek, its efforts to contain the spread of communism, and its creation of the San Francisco alliance system—showed that the United States sought a different order in Asia to that envisaged in Beijing. In these early Cold War years, the US and China were locked in a clash of ideas about the future order of East Asia, and both sides used military, political and economic means to pursue their struggle. In Beijing, the view was that having successfully defeated Japanese imperialism and obtained Chinese independence, China now faced another imperialist power that was attempting to sabotage the Chinese revolution through its support for Chiang Kai-shek and interference in East Asia.¹¹² Antipathy towards *American* imperialism became central to Chinese background normative ideas.¹¹³ In the following section, I will explore how these background normative ideas—antipathy to imperialism and the desire to restore China’s central place in the international order—shaped Chinese foreground normative ideas about Japan.

3.3.4. *Foreground normative ideas*

Foreground normative ideas are the framing symbols and concepts that are used by actors to develop and legitimate specific policy positions. The symbols and concepts

¹¹¹ David C. Engerman, 'Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1962,' in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, ed. Odd Arne Westad and Melvyn P. Leffler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 40.

¹¹² Chen Jian, 'The Myth of America’s “Lost Chance” in China,' 85-86.

¹¹³ Zhang Baijia, 'China's Role in the Korean and Vietnam Wars,' 180-181.

that we find in foreground normative ideas reflect the sentiments and goals found in background normative ideas. Here, I show that Chinese foreground normative ideas about Japan between 1949 and 1952 closely reflected Chinese officials' broader opposition to imperialism, and their desire to challenge the US vision of international order in East Asia. In what follows, I first show how these foreground normative ideas shaped China's policy towards the Treaty of Peace with Japan, before discussing how Chinese officials attempted to restore a 'normal' economic relationship with Japan. Although the Peace Treaty was not explicitly related to China's foreign economic policy towards Japan, the Peace Treaty was fundamental in providing the legal and political basis upon which China's relationship with Japan would be based until 1972, and meant that China's economic ties with Japan would remain 'unofficial' until 1972 (as discussed in Section 3.2.2. above).

As we shall see below, China's commitment to anti-imperialism was inextricably linked to each of these policy issues, but the concept of imperialism was deployed in different ways depending on the issue and audience in question. At times, this reflected a set of rhetorical strategies conceived by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. At other times however, Chinese elites were simply grappling with a range of pressing domestic and international policy challenges, and had yet to develop a coherent set of views about, and policies towards, Japan. In particular, working out how and whether to justify 'trading with the enemy' to a domestic Chinese population would prove to be a considerable challenge for Chinese leaders.

a) China's defeat of Japanese imperialism

Between 1949 and 1952, Chinese officials played down Japan's wartime atrocities, and drew a clear distinction between the Japanese government and the Japanese people in attributing blame for Japanese imperialism and the Second World War. Nevertheless, to both domestic and international audiences, Beijing emphasised China's (and particularly the CCP's) contribution to the defeat of Japanese imperialism. For example, editorials in the *People's Daily* described the length of China's struggle against Japanese imperialism (arguing in some cases that the Chinese people had struggled against Japanese imperialism 'for about 50 years'); noted that Japan had fought the longest war against China (typically stated as being since 1931); and declared that the Chinese people had sacrificed the most of any country during the war.¹¹⁴ The Chinese Foreign Ministry was therefore particularly incensed when a draft text of the Peace Treaty, released by the United States and Britain in July 1951, described the start date of the Second World War as 7 December 1941. The Chinese Foreign Ministry argued that this completely 'obliterated' (*mosha*) China's much longer experience of war against Japan, ignored China's contribution to the defeat of Japanese imperialism, and therefore denied China's 'legitimate right' (*hefa quanli*) to participate in the drafting of a peace treaty with Japan.¹¹⁵ In a letter to the Soviet Ambassador to China, Nikolai Roshchin, Premier Zhou Enlai argued that given China's long history of struggling against Japanese aggression, Washington's refusal to allow China to participate in the Peace Treaty process was a 'great humiliation to

¹¹⁴ *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, 28 January 1951, 'Fensui Meiguo chongxin wuzhuang Riben de yinmou, zhengqu quanmian de gongzheng de duiRi heyue' [Smash the US plot to re-arm Japan, strive for a comprehensive, fair peace treaty with Japan].

¹¹⁵ FMA, File No. 105-00090-04, 4-5; See FMA File 105-00020-01, 9-10.

the Chinese people (*zhe shi duiyu Zhongguo renmin yi zong moda de wuru*)'.¹¹⁶

Similarly, an editorial in the *People's Daily* noted that,

Today, the People's Republic of China is a big and powerful country so much so that it plays a decisive role in both Asia and in the world, is the mainstay of peace in the Far East and in the world, and as the Peace Treaty with Japan is the guarantor of peace in the Far East, the PRC cannot be pushed out [of this treaty].¹¹⁷

We can understand this rhetorical strategy if we consider the particular context in which these statements were made. As mentioned above, in May 1950, the Chinese Foreign Ministry established a Japan Peace Treaty Deliberation Group (*waijiaobu duiRi heyue shenyi weiyuanhui*), which would formulate Chinese policy on a potential Peace Treaty with Japan, and Japan's future role in East Asia.¹¹⁸ However, after the onset of the Korean War, the United States (and its allies) would not condone China's participation in this multilateral Japan Peace Treaty Process, a decision that angered China's leaders. From Beijing's perspective, the goal of restoring China's central place in the international order stood in explicit opposition to the vision of order in East Asia being implemented by the United States. For China, Japan's future was one of the most critical questions for the future security and order of East Asia. Chinese officials argued that the US led-Peace Treaty with Japan, and its subsequent plans for a host of military alliances in East Asia, would lead to the remilitarisation of Japan, the permanent basing of US military forces on Japanese territory, and ultimately a US-dominated security order in East Asia.¹¹⁹ The members of the Peace Treaty Deliberation Group therefore faced the goal of ensuring that China had a place at the Peace Treaty table and, if this could not be achieved, discrediting the US-led Peace

¹¹⁶ FMA File 105-00019-03, 1.

¹¹⁷ *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), 26 May 1951, 'Zhichi Suliian duiRi heyue jianyi' [Support the Soviet Recommendations on the Japan Peace Treaty]. The term 'Far East' (*yuandong*) was used in the editorial to reflect the phrasing used in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

¹¹⁸ FMA File 105-00089-02, 1.

¹¹⁹ See, for example FMA File 105-00090-04; FMA File 105-00020-01.

Treaty process. Emphasising China's contribution to the defeat of Japanese imperialism allowed Chinese officials to underscore that China had a legitimate right to participate in the Japan Peace Treaty process.

b) The Japanese people as victims of imperialism

At the same time, Chinese officials also attempted to discredit the US-led Japan Peace Treaty process by describing the Japanese *people* as victims of imperialism and, in particular, of US imperialism. The Peace Treaty Deliberation Group argued that by describing the US Occupation of Japan as a form of US colonisation, and focusing on the 'struggle of the Japanese people' in all statements made about the Peace Treaty, China could succeed in driving a wedge between Japan and the United States, and disrupting the Peace Treaty process.¹²⁰ Members of the Peace Treaty Deliberation Group argued that the United States' long-term occupation of Japan had provoked strong anti-American sentiment among sectors of Japanese society, and therefore believed that conditions in Japan were ripe for a 'revolutionary movement'. The Deliberation Group argued that China was in a favourable position to take advantage of these revolutionary conditions and should therefore adopt a policy of 'supporting the Japanese people' and 'attacking US imperialism'.¹²¹

The Chinese Foreign Ministry thus adopted a strategy of amplifying the division between the United States and the Japanese people by mobilising civil society organisations and opposition political groups in Japan.¹²² To this end, between late

¹²⁰ FMA File 105-00089-03, 8.

¹²¹ These arguments, and the decision to frame the Japanese people as victims of US imperialism, was approved by Premier Zhou Enlai. FMA File 105-00089-03, 3-4, 8. For discussion of the growing anti-American sentiment in Japan, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 254-273.

¹²² FMA File 105-00090-04, 20-21 July 1951, 'Yanjiu Mei dui Ri heyue wenti ji wo zhi duice' [Research on the US position towards the Peace Treaty with Japan and our policy towards it"], 1-10.

1950 and September 1951 when the San Francisco Peace Conference was held, the Foreign Ministry used a range of different forums to highlight the United States' political and economic 'colonisation' of Japan via the Japan Peace Treaty process. For example, the Foreign Ministry devised a text that could be used in editorials and articles in the *People's Daily*; Zhou Enlai made two key speeches in 1951 outlining China's opposition to the Peace Treaty; and the Foreign Ministry sent letters to countries such as India and Burma who were involved in the Peace Treaty process but also sympathetic to the 'anti-imperialist' cause.¹²³ In these letters, editorials and speeches, the Japanese people were depicted as victims of 'US imperialism', and the US Peace Treaty proposals were described as denying Japanese sovereignty, ignoring the democratic process in Japan, and 'enslaving' the Japanese people.¹²⁴ Whether or not Chinese officials truly believed that the US Peace Treaty would 'enslave' the Japanese people, or whether this was merely an idea deployed for instrumental purposes, the anti-imperialist rhetoric used by Chinese officials drew a clear connection between US 'imperialism' in East Asia and the United States' plans to reshape the East Asian security environment.

Framing the Japanese people as victims of American imperialism also aided Beijing in the development of its relationship with a range of progressive forces in Japan. In December 1950, the Asia Section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry reported on a

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ *Renmin Ribao (People's Daily)*, 27 November 1950, 'Jianjue fandui Meiguo duiRi dandu gouhe de yinmou' [Firmly opposed to the US plot for a unilateral peace with Japan]; FMA File 105-00090-09, 1-30 April 1950, 'Guanyu duiRi heyue zhi youguan guojia zhaohui chugao' [First draft of the diplomatic note to concerned countries regarding the Peace Treaty with Japan], 7-8; FMA File 105-00019-03, 22 May 1951, 'Zhou Enlai zongli jian waizhang zhaohui Sulian dashi zhichi Sulian zhengfu guanyu Mei duiRi heyue cao'an de yijian' [Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai's diplomatic note to the Soviet Ambassador supporting the Soviet government's opinion on the draft of the United States' Peace Treaty for Japan], 2; FMA File 105-00020-01, 8 August 1951, 'Zhou Enlai zongli jian waizhang fabiao guanyu MeiYing duiRi heyue cao'an ji Jiujinshan huiyi de shengming' [Statement issued by Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on the US-British draft peace treaty towards Japan and the San Francisco Conference], 21-22.

survey of more than 3000 Japanese undertaken by a major Japanese newspaper, the *Asahi Shimbun*. They noted that while there was little consensus, those who were most likely to oppose US military bases, Japanese rearmament, and US Peace Treaty plans, tended to be supporters of Japan's Socialist and Communist parties and members of labour unions, factory workers, young people and university graduates.¹²⁵ The Japan Communist Party (JCP) shared a number of important links with the CCP. The JCP had been founded in 1922, just a year after the founding of the Chinese Communist Party, and its leader, Nosaka Sanzō had spent the 'crucial years' of 1940-1946 based in Yan'an with Mao Zedong.¹²⁶ During the war years, Nosaka had helped to convince the Chinese communists that the Japanese people stood together with the Chinese people in their battle against Japanese imperialism; after 1949, the JCP continued to demonstrate a shared antipathy towards American imperialism.¹²⁷ The CCP also developed increasingly close relations with the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), a political party that attempted to 'find an intellectual position between capitalism and communism'.¹²⁸ Beijing found a particular ideational alliance with leaders of the left-wing of the JSP, such as Matsumoto Jiichirō, who opposed both the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty with the United States, and believed that alliance with the United States would make Japan subservient and would lead to a resurgence of militarism in Japan.¹²⁹ Indeed, Matsumoto was an important member, and later

¹²⁵ FMA File 102-00239-03, 22 December 1950, 'Waijiaobu yazhousi bian "dui Ri heyue yu Riben zai wuzhuang"' [The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Asia Section reports on the "Japan Peace Treaty and Japanese Rearmament"], 4-7.

¹²⁶ J.A.A. Stockwin, 'Japanese Attitudes to the Sino-Soviet Dispute,' *International Journal* 18, no. 4 (1963), 494.

¹²⁷ Liu Jianping, 'Nosaka Sanzo Yu Zhongguo Gongchandang De Riben Renshi -- Xin Zhongguo Dui Ri Waijiao Sixiang Tanyuan [Nosaka Sanzō and the Chinese Communist Party's Understanding of Japan -- an Investigation of New China's Thinking on Foreign Policy Towards Japan],' *Kaifang shidai [Open Times]* 6(2007).

¹²⁸ J.A.A. Stockwin, 'Foreign Policy Perspectives of the Japanese Left: Confrontation or Consensus?,' *Pacific Affairs* 42, no. 4 (1969-1970), 435.

¹²⁹ Ian Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan: The Career of Matsumoto Jiichiro* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2010), 168-169.

leader, of the Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA, JP: *Nitchū yūkō kyōkai*), a Japanese organisation that had been founded on 1 October 1950, to commemorate the first anniversary of the PRC. The JCFA was comprised of left-wing intellectuals, JSP politicians, and a large number of individuals from the Japanese business world, many of whom felt a strong need to atone for Japan's aggression in China during the war.¹³⁰ The JCFA sought to build friendly relations with Communist China, and to rebuild economic ties between the two countries. As we will see in the chapters that follow, civil society groups such as the JCFA would be highly important in negotiating economic ties between China and Japan during the 1950s and 1960s.

c) Restoring China's 'normal' relations with Japan

Despite Beijing's concerted campaign against the US-led Japan Peace Treaty and US-Japan Security Treaty, China was ultimately unable to halt the signing of these treaties. Both the Japan Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty were signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951.¹³¹ In a statement made following the signings, Zhou Enlai condemned the US-Japan Security Treaty in particular, arguing that it was designed to 'revive Japanese militarism', was an 'expression of animosity' towards Communist China and the Soviet Union, and 'threatens the security of Asia'.¹³² Nevertheless, Beijing responded to these developments by ratcheting up its own efforts to put forward an alternative order in East Asia. The question of Japan's post-war future was central to these Chinese efforts. In October 1952, China hosted 37 foreign countries at its own rival Peace Conference—the Asia-Pacific Peace Conference—in Beijing, and invited a delegation of sixty left-wing Japanese

¹³⁰ Seraphim, 'People's Diplomacy: The Japan-China Friendship Association and Critical War Memory in the 1950s.'

¹³¹ Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, 8 September 1951.

¹³² CIA *Daily Digest*, 20 September 1951, CIA Records Search Tool, USNA.

delegates to attend.¹³³ The ‘Japan Question’ was one of the major issues discussed during the ten days of the conference. The Conference resolution demanded a ‘complete’ (*quanmian xingze*) peace treaty with Japan rather than the ‘one-sided’ (*pianmian*) treaty signed at San Francisco; an end to the revival of Japanese militarism and the establishment of an ‘independent, democratic, free and peaceful new Japan’; the removal of all foreign military bases from Japanese territory; and the end of foreign interference in Japanese domestic affairs. Most importantly for our purposes, Beijing’s Peace Conference also called for the removal of limitations on Japan’s trade with foreign countries, and the re-establishment of ‘normal’ economic relations in East Asia.¹³⁴

1952 thus saw the start of Chinese efforts to put forward an alternative vision for the international economic order of East Asia. Yet doing so required building more extensive unofficial ties with Japan. In December 1952, the Chinese Foreign Ministry found that one way to achieve this was to revisit the issue of repatriating those Japanese in Northeast China who wished to return home.¹³⁵ The Foreign Ministry realised that it could no longer detain these Japanese against their will. Thus, on 1 December, the Chinese government announced that it was willing to negotiate the repatriation of Japanese nationals from China with three specific organisations in Japan. These were the Japanese Red Cross, which was an official organisation linked to the Japanese government; the Japan-China Friendship Association described above;

¹³³ However, the Japanese government refused to grant passports or visas to the delegation, and only fourteen of the sixty Japanese invited were able to secretly travel to Beijing. Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan*, 184-185.

¹³⁴ Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji, 1945-1970* [Documents on Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations, 1945-1970] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1996), 137-138.

¹³⁵ ‘Zhongyang renmin zhengfu youguan fangmian jiu zai Zhongguo de Riben qiaomin de ge xiang wenti da Xinhuashe jizhe wen’ [Central Government answers to questions put by Xinhua journalists concerning aspects of the overseas Japanese in China], 1 December 1952, in *ibid.*, 139-140.

and the Japanese Peace Liaison Committee, a left-wing organisation that had been set up in Japan following the Beijing Peace Conference.¹³⁶ In doing so, China's Communist leaders had found a way not only of linking the issue of Japanese repatriation with the goals of the Beijing Peace Conference, but also of opening up an unofficial channel of communication with Japan.¹³⁷

Furthermore, in April 1952, an International Economic Conference was held in Moscow as part of a socialist-led campaign to build trade between the socialist and capitalist blocs. Nan Hanchen (南汉宸), Governor of the People's Bank of China and soon to be head of the Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT, *Zhongguo guoji maoyi cujin weiyuanhui*), worked hard to encourage a Japanese delegation to attend, and wrote letters to numerous Japanese business groups and left-wing politicians in the leadup to the conference.¹³⁸ These Japanese politicians and business leaders were similarly keen to restart trade with China, given that Japan had suffered from the loss of a cheap and ready supply of Chinese raw materials and foodstuffs.¹³⁹ The Conference was attended by delegates from 49 countries, including the United States and many of its European allies. At the conference, Nan Hanchen made it clear that China wished to expand trade with the free world on the basis of

¹³⁶ 'Hōjin kyoryūmin no kikoku enjo mondai ni kansuru nihonsekijūjisha nado to Chūgoku akaijūjikai to no mōshiawase' [Arrangements between the Japanese Red Cross etc and the Chinese Red Cross to deal with the issue of assistance for the repatriation of Japanese nationals', 5 March 1953, *Nitchū kankei kihon shiryōshū, 1949-1997 [Compilation of Basic Materials on Japan-China Relations, 1949-1997]*, Tokyo: Kazankai, 2008, 48-49.

¹³⁷ Kurt Werner Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan, 1945-83: The Role of Liao Chengzhi* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1990), 99-100. By the end of October 1953, over 26,000 Japanese had left China and returned to Japan. Liang Zhikou, 'Jianguo Chuqi Waiqiao Guanli Gongzuo Shuping,' 53.

¹³⁸ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 28.

¹³⁹ For an excellent overview of the steps taken in Japan to circumvent the economic embargo, see George P. Jan, 'Japan's Trade with Communist China,' *Asian Survey* 9, no. 12 (1969), 904-906; Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*.

equality and mutual benefit, even in the absence of diplomatic relations.¹⁴⁰ Although Japan was not the only state that China was hoping to build economic ties with, Nan Hanchen reserved greatest attention for Japan in his speech at the conference. He stated that China needed Japanese industrial machinery, raw materials and industrial products. In turn, he knew that the Japanese economy was in real need of Chinese coal, salt, soybeans and oil. On multiple occasions, he referred to the Sino-Japanese 'normal trade relationship' (*zhengchang maoyi guanxi*), and criticised the United States for having cut off Japan from her 'normal' trade partners, such as China.¹⁴¹

The most important outcome from the Moscow conference was the signing of the first Sino-Japanese 'unofficial' trade agreement between Nan Hanchen and three Japanese Diet Members, including Hoashi Kei (帆足計), President of the JCTPA.¹⁴² The JCTPA had been established in May 1949 by the same kinds of progressive Japanese that went on to form the JCFA in 1950.¹⁴³ On 1 June 1952, a radio broadcast from Beijing announced that the two sides had signed a barter agreement for each side to trade £GBP30 million worth of exports and imports.¹⁴⁴

In part, Beijing's efforts to restore 'normal' economic relations with Japan were simply motivated by China's immediate economic needs. The absence of trade with Japan had had a deleterious effect on China's ability to pursue rapid industrialisation

¹⁴⁰ 'Nan Hanchen zai guoji jingji huiyi shang de baogao' [Nan Hanchen's Report to the International Economic Conference], 4 April 1952, in Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 120-121.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² These Dietmembers were members of opposition parties and thus did not officially represent the government. The other signatories were Japanese Dietmember, Kora Tomi (高良富), and Miyakoshi Kisuke (宮腰喜助), General Secretary of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Diet Members' League and member of the Lower House. See 'Special Issue on Red China Trade', 7 June 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-1652, RG59, USNA, 27.

¹⁴³ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 25-27.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

under its policy of New Democracy. For example, the Kailan Mines, established under Japanese rule in Manchuria, had produced between 27,000 and 28,000 metric tons of coking coal each day during the Japanese occupation. However by 1951-52, Kailan was producing just 7,000-10,000 metric tons a day.¹⁴⁵ The mine desperately needed Japanese replacements parts and construction supplies, such as copper wire and steel plates. Kailan Mines contacted technical experts in Tokyo to try and source these goods from Japan. However, most of these goods were on the list of strategic items controlled by the US embargo, and Japan was banned from exporting them to China.

Beijing hoped that Kailan would produce sufficient coal to fuel not only Northeast China's railroads and factories, but also to export to countries such as Japan and Korea in exchange for badly needed foreign currency.¹⁴⁶ However, Japanese technicians, who had worked at the mine during the war, estimated that unless the mine received Japanese replacement parts and equipment, the amount of coal being produced by Kailan would be insufficient to meet even China's domestic industrial needs.¹⁴⁷ The loss of trade with Japan also affected China's light industries, such as cotton spinning. In 1951, the China Cotton Spinning Company carried out a survey of China's prewar and current spinning production levels. It estimated that without

¹⁴⁵ Chinese sources reported that Kailan Mines were producing 10,000 metric tons a day, but the British estimated that the level was just 7,000 metric tons a day. See US Political Advisor for Japan to Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 26 January 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/1-2652, RG59, USNA, 8-9.

¹⁴⁶ 'Negotiations with Communists concerning the Kailan Mining Administration', 14 May 1949, FO 371/75929, File 1463, UKNA.

¹⁴⁷ US Political Advisor for Japan to Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 26 January 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/1-2652, RG59, USNA, 8-9.

importing spinning machinery and cotton textiles from Japan, China could not increase its cotton production above prewar levels.¹⁴⁸

Throughout 1951 and 1952, Chinese officials had tried to obtain a wide range of industrial goods and manufactured products from Japan. Japanese importing firms received offers from Chinese exporters hoping to import Japanese steel, pipes, mining machinery, tinplate, caustic soda, various heavy chemicals, rails, copper wire and aluminium products. In exchange, Chinese exporters drew up lists of the precise quantities of coal, iron ore, soybean and salt that they could export to Japan. However, given the strategic nature of most of China's desired imports, the US embargo forced Japan to reject all but a few of these potential contracts.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, even the signing of the unofficial trade agreement in June 1952 had little positive impact on Sino-Japanese trade. Despite strong support for trade with China from Japanese industrial groups and pro-China members of the Japanese Diet, the conservative Japanese government faced considerable pressure from Washington not to permit the export of strategic items to China while the Korean War continued. As a result, only a small percentage of the £30 million agreement was ever realised.¹⁵⁰

Yet in addition to trying to meet China's short-term economic needs, Chinese calls for the re-establishment of 'normal' trade in East Asia were also emblematic of Beijing's broader normative ideas about challenging the US economic order in East Asia. Though the ideas being expressed between 1949 and 1952 were still in a fledgling

¹⁴⁸ 'Japan's New Mainland Trade', *Economist*, 13 October 1951, cited in Hemmendinger to Barnett, 29 October 1951, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/10-2951, RG59, USNA.

¹⁴⁹ US Political Advisor for Japan to Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 26 January 1952, US State Department Central Files 493.949/1-2652, RG59, USNA.

¹⁵⁰ NSC 125/1, 'United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Japan', August 1952, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 125 series, USNA; 'Special Issue on Red China Trade', 7 June 1952, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-1652, RG59, USNA, 29-35.

stage, we see evidence that Chinese officials sought to challenge the dominant role of the United States in Asian economies; to restore ‘normal’ trade relations between countries such as China and Japan, whose trade had been disrupted by the introduction of US-led strategic trade controls; and to condemn US attempts to build a military-industrial hub in East Asia that linked economic production in countries such as Japan to US military goals.

These Chinese ideas were developed within the Foreign Ministry by groups such as the Japan Peace Treaty Deliberation Group, but were also shaped, in large part, through meetings with prominent left-wing Japanese who travelled to China in the early 1950s. For example, in October 1952, two weeks after the Asia-Pacific Peace Conference was held in Beijing, Chinese Foreign Ministry and CCPIT officials held talks with Suzuki Kazuo, (鈴木一雄), another leading member of the JCTPA. Suzuki was deeply critical of the dominant role of the United States in the Japanese economy. Access to the Chinese archival record shows that, in a series of meetings with Chinese officials, Suzuki outlined at great length how US ‘interference’ in the Japanese economy had skewed Japan’s trade away from its traditional trade partners, and had made Japanese firms dangerously reliant on the US market. Moreover, he informed his Chinese counterparts that the US Korean War special procurement policies had forced Japan’s ‘peaceful industries’ (*heping chanyue*) to shift their production in a military direction, despite the Japanese public’s opposition to rearmament.¹⁵¹ Suzuki also argued that America’s dominance in the Japanese economy had particularly harmed Japan’s small and medium enterprises (SMEs). He argued that unlike the heavy industries and major conglomerates, Japan’s SMEs were typically unable to

¹⁵¹ FMA File 105-00238-16, 29 October 1952, ‘Ribei Suzuki Kazuo de tanhua jilu’ [Record of conversation with Japan's Suzuki Kazuo], 1-8, 26-27.

switch their production towards the lucrative US special procurement program. As a result, large numbers of SMEs had suffered bankruptcy and worker layoffs, and this had helped to build a large, left-wing trade union movement in Japan.¹⁵² Furthermore, Suzuki informed the Chinese officials that because Japan's SMEs had a long history of prewar and wartime trade with China, SMEs would be particularly receptive to Chinese attempts to re-start trade with Japan.¹⁵³

This information was extremely important in shaping Chinese officials' understanding of the economic situation in Japan. Beijing subsequently pursued a strategy of reaching out to SMEs, their workers, and related civil society groups as a way of challenging the dominance of the United States in Japan's economy. For instance, *People's Daily* editorials (which were translated and read in Japan) argued that Japan's SMEs and workers had directly suffered as a result of US interference in the Japanese economy, and the United States' efforts to rebuild Japan's war industry.¹⁵⁴

Nevertheless, these fledgling normative ideas for an alternative economic order in East Asia existed in a somewhat uneasy relationship with China's staunch opposition to imperialism. The fact that Chinese officials also framed Japan as a proponent of imperialism meant that it was sometimes difficult to justify China's efforts to restart trade with Japan to a domestic Chinese audience. Not having had the opportunity to sign a Peace Treaty with Japan, China and Japan officially remained in a state of war. Moreover, the US-Japan Security Treaty made Japan a strategic opponent and

¹⁵² Ibid, 3-6. Soeya notes that the JCTPA was comprised largely of representatives from small and medium Japanese firms who were highly dependent on trade with China. See Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 25-26.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 3-6.

¹⁵⁴ US Embassy, Tokyo to State Department, 'Chinese Communist policy toward Japan: Enclosure 2', 9 June 1954, US State Department Central Files, 696.94/6-954, RG59, USNA, 1.

‘imperialist’ enemy in the Cold War. The Chinese Foreign Ministry therefore grappled with the question of how to depict its trade relationship with Japan to a Chinese audience. For example, the 1952 unofficial trade agreement between China and Japan decreed that Japanese vessels were not permitted to fly the Japanese flag within 15 nautical miles of Chinese ports.¹⁵⁵ This clause was likely attached to the trade agreement because Beijing did not wish to advertise the fact that, less than a decade after war’s end, Japanese vessels—even if not the same vessels as those used by the Imperial Japanese Navy during the war—were now appearing in Chinese ports once more.

Furthermore, in June 1952, Suzuki Kazuo wrote to the Shanghai-based East China Textile Industry requesting information on the industrial situation in Shanghai, and for permission for Japanese firms to advertise in Shanghai. The Shanghai Foreign Affairs Bureau requested advice from Beijing on how to proceed with such a request. This set off a flurry of decision-making within the central Government about whether or not to exchange industrial data with foreign countries, and whether China should distinguish between ‘fraternal countries’ (*xiongdi guojia*) and ‘imperialist countries and their followers’ (*diguozhuyi yu jiqi cong pugu*), such as Japan, in its trade policy. After much deliberation between the Foreign Ministry, the CCPIT, and other central government departments (including the Ministry of Industry, and the Finance and Economic Committee), the Foreign Ministry released a policy response in September that year.¹⁵⁶ It was decided that countries ‘ought to be distinguished based on their

¹⁵⁵ ‘Zhongguo guoji maoyi cujin weiyuanhui guanyu Riben chuanzhi hangxing’ [The Chinese Committee for the Promotion of International Trade concerning Japan’s shipping vessels], in Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 138-139.

¹⁵⁶ FMA File 105-00237-02, 30 July-15 September 1952, ‘Guanyu riben fangmian lai han suoqu gongshang shuju ji yaoqiu kandeng guanggao deng shi de baogao ji chuli yijian’ [A Report and views on how to deal with the letter from Japan seeking industrial data and requesting to advertise].

national character', but that in the case of 'imperialist countries and their followers', decisions would be made on the basis of China's economic necessity. Thus, as long as China officially remained in a situation of hostilities with Japan, Japanese firms would not be permitted to advertise in official Chinese newspapers, or in the publications of Chinese government institutions or other organisations. However, the CCPIT would willingly provide industrial data to trusted, left-wing economic groupings such as the JCTPA to build Sino-Japanese trade ties.¹⁵⁷ Chinese officials were not necessarily trying to *hide* the existence of the China-Japan trade relationship, as the radio broadcast announcing the signing of the 1952 trade agreement suggests. However, the refusal to allow Japanese vessels to fly the flag, or to allow Japanese firms to advertise in China, shows that the Foreign Ministry was still grappling with the question of how to legitimately portray its trade relationship with Japan to a domestic Chinese audience.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that between 1949 and 1952, Chinese officials held a host of different, and sometimes conflicting, ideas about Japan. On the cognitive side, they saw Japan as an important source of industrial goods and skills, and as a 'comprehensive' threat by virtue of Japan's proven ability to use economic and industrial capabilities for military ends. These cognitive ideas about Japan developed as a result of lessons learned from dealing with Japan and its economy during the first half of the twentieth century, but also reflected contemporary international discourse regarding the postwar disarmament of fascist powers. On the normative side, Chinese officials opposed Japan's past imperialistic behaviour, but also attempted to reach out

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 6-8, 12, 16-20.

to the Japanese people whom they saw as fellow victims of US imperialism. At the same time, they believed that restoring China's 'normal' relations with Japan was an important way of challenging the US vision of international order in East Asia.

This range of ideas about Japan reflected the dominant background cognitive and normative ideas in China between 1949 and 1952: a staunch commitment to anti-imperialism; antipathy towards Western countries' 'unequal' treatment of China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and a belief that by transforming Chinese state and society through a social and economic revolution, China could restore its national strength and central position in the international system.

Yet at a time of transition and uncertainty in China, these background cognitive and normative ideas did not always translate into a coherent set of ideas about, or policies towards, Japan. Chinese officials saw Japan as an imperialistic actor, but also as a state whose people and left-wing civil society groups similarly opposed imperialism. They saw Japan as a comprehensive threat by virtue of its economic capabilities, but also saw that these economic capabilities made Japan an important source of industrial goods and skills for China. We should not be surprised by this lack of coherence in Chinese thinking about Japan. In these early years of the PRC, China's leaders were responding to a number of pressing economic, political and security challenges and this historical context shaped Chinese ideas about Japan. Indeed, a number of these challenges—China's dire economic conditions, the US-led Japan Peace Treaty process, US strategic trade controls on China, and the rehabilitation of Japan's military-industrial complex during the Korean War—directly impacted China's thinking about, and policy towards, Japan.

Yet while historical context clearly mattered, this chapter has shown that even in these early years of the PRC, there were some important common threads running through Chinese ideas about Japan. In particular, this chapter has shown that economic questions underpinned a great deal of Chinese cognitive and normative ideas about Japan. On the cognitive side, there was a close linkage between industrialisation and military strength in terms of how Chinese officials conceived of the Japanese threat, and of the importance of building an economic relationship with Japan for the sake of China's own industrial capability. On the normative side, this chapter argued that restoring 'normal' economic relations with Japan was a key plank in Chinese efforts to challenge the US 'imperialist' order in East Asia. Furthermore, economic questions underpinned one of the earliest challenges for Chinese officials as they attempted to legitimate their Japan policy to a Chinese domestic audience. This chapter has shown that between 1949 and 1952, Chinese officials grappled with the question of how to portray their policy of trading with an imperialist wartime enemy to a domestic Chinese audience.

In the next chapter, I show how the relationship between these interrelated concepts of imperialism, industrialisation and war preparedness, were thrown into starker relief against the backdrop of the Bandung era. Yet once again, we will see that, between 1953 and 1957, Chinese leaders continued to grapple with often conflicting ideas about Japan and the tensions inherent in the relationship between imperialism, industrialisation and war.

Chapter Four

Revolution through Industrialisation *The role of ideas in China's Japan policy, 1953-1957*

4.1 Introduction

In September 1953, a group of thirteen Japanese politicians and ten industrial experts and businessmen were dispatched to Beijing on a mission to discuss possible ways to expand trade between China and Japan. The mission was, as the British Embassy in Tokyo noted, ‘clearly something more than the usual somewhat pathetic little band of fellow travellers who generally constitutes such delegations to Iron Curtain countries’.¹ Yet even the Japanese politicians and businessmen were surprised by the enthusiastic welcome they received in Beijing. At a reception on the evening of 30 September to mark their arrival, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China, Nan Hanchen, unexpectedly put forward a proposal for a second unofficial trade agreement with Japan.² The agreement was designed, Nan argued, to be a major step towards overcoming the ‘interference’ of the US-led embargo on China, and developing ‘large-scale Sino-Japanese trade’.³ This second trade agreement (the first had been signed in 1952), and a third that would be signed less than eighteen months later, transformed economic relations between the two countries.⁴ Japan began exporting to China goods such as medical instruments, spinning machinery, textiles, iron and steel products, and chemical goods such as ammonium sulphate (used in

¹ Cortazzi, Tokyo to Far Eastern Department (China), ‘Japanese trade delegation’, 28 October 1953, FO 371/105258, FC 11323/34, UKNA.

² Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 35.

³ ‘Speech of Nan Hanchen at signing of new Sino-Japanese trade agreement’, 3 November 1953, in FO 371/105258, FC 11323/34, UKNA.

⁴ All agreements were signed by Nan Hanchen or Lei Renmin as representatives of the CCPIT, and by the Japanese Diet Members League or JAPIT. For more details on the trade agreements see Appendix 1.

producing fertilizer).⁵ In return, Japan received large quantities of badly needed soybean and coal. By 1956, Sino-Japanese trade levels were almost triple the level reached in 1950.

The years between 1953 and 1957 marked a new postwar high in economic interaction between China and Japan. Large numbers of Japanese politicians, trade unions, captains of industry, and agricultural advisers began travelling to China, and China began sending its own trade officials to Japan. Of course, we should be careful not to overestimate the size of the Sino-Japanese economic relationship at this point. Sino-Japanese trade increased from just 1.4 percent of China's total trade in 1953 to around 4.5 percent of China's total trade in 1957, but this was dwarfed by China's trade with the Soviet Union, which represented around half that total.⁶ Furthermore, the United States and Southeast Asian countries were far more important to Japan's economy than was China.⁷ Sino-Japanese trade was constrained by a number of factors, but the principal ones were the US-led trade embargo, economic inefficiencies in China, and the fact that the Chinese economy was still so linked to the Soviet bloc.⁸

⁵ Embassy of Japan, Washington to Mr Robert McClurkin, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, 'List of export items released from embargo to Communist China', 6 July 1953, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-653, RG59, USNA; American Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, 'EXCON: Japanese bilateral understanding', 7 May 1954, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/5-754, RG59, USNA.

⁶ International Monetary Fund, 'Historical Direction of Trade Statistics (1948-1980).'; Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia tongji jubian [National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC], *Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian* [China Statistical Yearbook].

⁷ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 40; *Nihon Tōkei Nenkan* [Japan Statistical Yearbook].

⁸ 'Japanese trade with Communist China', 16 December 1954, Policy Planning Council, 1948-1961, NSC Series 166, Box 7, USNA, 8; Memorandum to the NSC, 'United States and Free World controls over transactions with Communist China', 3 March 1954, Executive Secretariat: Records relating to National Security Council Policy Papers, 1947-1979, Box 25, USNA, 13.

Yet although economic ties between the two countries remained quantitatively small, this chapter argues that a *qualitative* shift took place in Chinese economic policy towards Japan between 1953 and 1957. In the previous chapter we saw that the years between 1949 and 1952 were marked by profound economic, political, and security challenges in the new PRC. Against the ongoing threat of invasion by US-backed Nationalist forces in Taiwan and the decision to embark on military conflict in Korea, the Chinese Communist Party laboured to rebuild and govern a war-torn country. This was a period that required urgent solutions to policy problems, and given the prewar pattern of economic ties between the two countries, Japan seemed a natural economic partner for the new Communist regime. By the mid-1950s, however, Chinese policy makers were beginning to think much harder about the economic model that China needed to pursue, and about the normative goals that underpinned that economic model.

This is the backdrop against which I explore the role of ideas in shaping China's economic policy towards Japan between 1953 and 1957. Drawing on the four-part ideas framework outlined in the Introduction to this thesis, this chapter demonstrates the constitutive role of ideas on policy, and the different mechanisms by which ideas are produced, transmitted, and strategically employed by actors to shape policy. Between 1953 and 1957, Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong adopted an increasingly radical (Stalinist) version of the Soviet economic model. The goals of this model were rapid industrialisation, mechanisation of agriculture, and collectivisation in the countryside. Furthermore, in this era of the Bandung movement, Chinese policy makers began to argue that economic development through rapid industrialisation was the only way for the developing countries of Asia and Africa to achieve

decolonisation and national strength. I argue that these background cognitive and normative ideas about the ability to achieve a revolution through rapid industrialisation constituted Chinese ideas about, and subsequent policy towards, Japan.

Having explored these background ideas, the chapter then focuses on Chinese foreground cognitive and normative ideas about Japan. I argue that in this ideational environment, Chinese officials increasingly came to see Japan as a solution to some of the industrial and agricultural problems diagnosed by the adoption of a more Stalinist economic model. They did so for two reasons: first, between 1953 and 1957, Chinese policy-makers developed much more detailed knowledge about the Japanese economy; and second, hundreds of Japanese and Chinese began travelling between the two countries during this period. These individuals were critically important in transmitting knowledge about the Japanese economy to China, and in informing senior Chinese officials precisely how economic cooperation with Japan could solve China's economic problems.

The chapter further argues that Chinese normative thinking during these years enhanced the likelihood that China would see Japan as a solution to its economic development goals. Indeed, I suggest that during these 'Bandung' years, Japan's historical developmental path reinforced Chinese thinking about the ability to achieve a revolution through industrialisation. Yet given Japan's aggressive history of imperialism and industrialisation in China, Chinese leaders still grappled with the conflicting normative ideas posed by Japan's development path. Subsequently, the final section of the chapter explores how Chinese policy-makers strategically used

ideas as framing devices to explain and justify their Japan policy to a range of different audiences.

From here, the chapter proceeds with a brief historical overview of China's domestic and international environment between 1953 and 1957. It then explores the role of ideas in shaping China's Japan policy by employing the four-part ideas typology outlined in the Introduction to this thesis. Chinese background and foreground cognitive ideas are first considered before turning to a discussion of the background and foreground normative ideas about Japan.

4.2 Historical overview, 1953-1957

The goals of decolonisation and standing up to imperialist powers took on new significance in Chinese foreign policy between 1953 and 1957. This was a result of China's rising international status and a growing shared identity with the countries of the Third World.⁹ At the same time, China's increasingly destructive relations with its chief 'imperialist' enemy, the United States, and the gradual emergence of problems in China's relationship with the Soviet Union, began to push Chinese foreign policy in the direction of the Third World, as we shall see below.

4.2.1. China's rising international status

The Korean War (1950-1953) reshaped China's international status. Despite the considerable economic and human costs of the conflict for China, China had also

⁹ Throughout this chapter I use the term 'Third World' to refer to developing countries that had experienced imperialism in the past. It should be noted that this term was not explicitly used by Chinese officials until the 1960s, however. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Chinese conception of 'Third World' also referred to countries that were opposed to the two major centres of world power—the United States and Soviet Union. For more on this, see Peter Van Ness, 'China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity,' in *China's Quest for National Identity*, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 196-197.

managed to inflict great casualties against the far more powerful United States. By the end of the Korean War, China had demonstrated its revolutionary mettle and worth as an ally to the Soviet Union and thus, in the eyes of Chairman Mao Zedong, China was now an equal partner in the Sino-Soviet alliance.¹⁰ More importantly, the end of the Korean War marked the first time that the People's Republic of China was recognised as one of the world's five 'Big Powers'. In the wake of the Korean armistice signed in July 1953, China was invited by the Soviet Union to participate in the Geneva Conference.¹¹ The significance of China's involvement in the Geneva Conference cannot be understated. This was the first international conference attended by the People's Republic of China since its establishment in 1949.¹² The Chinese Foreign Ministry spent weeks preparing for the conference, and Geneva became an opportunity to demonstrate China's—and particularly Zhou Enlai's—diplomatic skills on the world stage.¹³ The Chinese delegation was eager to find a diplomatic solution to formally end the conflicts in Korea and Indochina so that China could focus on economic and socialist reconstruction at home.¹⁴

Another important outcome of the Geneva Conference was that it enhanced Chinese understanding of the historical experiences and concerns of Third World countries, such as Laos and Cambodia, who were still suffering under colonialism. At Geneva, Chinese leaders began to appreciate that China's own history gave it a shared identity

¹⁰ Westad, *Brothers in Arms*, 12-14.

¹¹ The Geneva Conference was held in the latter half of 1954 to bring about formal peace settlements in the Korean and Indochinese conflicts.

¹² Taiwan was not invited to attend, which was viewed with great concern in the United States. Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization: The "Bandung Discourse" in China's Early Cold War Experience,' *The Chinese Historical Review* 15, no. 2 (2008), 221, 226; Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 198.

¹³ Qiang Zhai, 'China and the Geneva Conference of 1954,' *The China Quarterly* 129(1992), 107-108.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 110; Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 147.

with these countries of the Third World.¹⁵ During, and in the wake of, the Geneva Conference, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong also began meeting with the heads of two leading Third World states: Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu. In these meetings, the leaders developed and agreed to a set of 'Five Principles' that would be the basis of relations between China, India and Burma, and would be the principles they would aspire to in their international relations more generally.¹⁶ The 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' embraced ideals, such as respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, which these Third World countries had not enjoyed in the past.¹⁷ Crucially, however, these principles also recognised that Third World countries were economically weak, and thus needed peaceful external environments so that they could focus on the demands of economic development at home. As we shall see throughout this chapter, adopting the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence would allow China to relax tensions in its international environment while simultaneously introducing radical economic policies at home.

This experience at Geneva and the development of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence paved the way for a shift in Chinese foreign policy. Chinese foreign policy was still defined by revolution—and still firmly in step with the Soviet Union—but its leaders now regarded decolonisation for Third World countries as the

¹⁵ Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization,' 224-225.

¹⁶ Ibid; Zhang Shu Guang, 'Constructing 'Peaceful Coexistence': China's Diplomacy toward the Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954-55,' *Cold War History* 7, no. 4 (2007), 519-521.

¹⁷ The five principles were: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty (*huxiang zunzhong lingtu zhuquan*), mutual non-aggression (*hubuqinfan*), mutual non-interference in internal affairs (*hubuganshe neizheng*), equality and mutual benefit (*pingdenghuhui*), and the principle of peaceful coexistence (*heping gongchu de yuanze*). *Dangdai Zhongguo Waijiao [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy]*, (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1987), 80. For an excellent discussion of the development of ideas around peaceful coexistence in Asia in 1954-55, see Amitav Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 41-60, 69-81.

most important form of revolution.¹⁸ In April 1955, the PRC participated in the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, along with 28 other countries. In his speech to the conference, Zhou described the themes of decolonisation and revolution as being the most powerful forces shaping the international system, and argued that the national liberation movements and decolonisation processes taking place in Asia and Africa were *the* most important form of world revolution.¹⁹ Zhou skilfully portrayed China as a like-minded Third World country which had experienced the oppression of foreign imperialism, but which had overthrown imperialism and achieved independence through revolution. Zhou's diplomatic skill was highly effective in reaching out to countries of the Third World, and portraying China as a leader in the Third World. To this end, Zhou persuasively argued that China would not 'interfere' or 'intervene' to support communist insurgencies in Southeast and South Asian countries, and argued that China desired peaceful relations with countries of different political and social systems, rather than simply the countries of the socialist bloc.²⁰ In linking the two themes of decolonisation and revolution in this new 'Bandung discourse', Chinese foreign policy makers had begun to build a 'united front' with the countries of the Third World. In doing so, they had subtly shifted China away from solely being a member of the socialist camp, to being a member of the Third World camp as well.

¹⁸ Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization,' 222.

¹⁹ Main speech by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Plenary Session of the Asian-African conference, in *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 9-20.

²⁰ For discussion of the concerns about China's 'interference' in Southeast and South Asia, see Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter?*, 55-57.

4.2.2. *China's relationship with the United States*

China's rising international status, both as one of the five 'Big Powers' and as a leader within the Third World, had a pronounced and negative effect on its relations with the United States.²¹ US officials feared that Beijing's diplomatic successes at Geneva and Bandung had enhanced support for communism within Asia. The formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, China's entry into the Korean War, and the rise of McCarthyism in the United States, all helped to create an environment in which Chinese behaviour was predominantly viewed through an anticommunist lens.²² As a result, US policy-makers interpreted China's behaviour and ideology as a 'violent rejection of the American model' and as a 'threat to American security'.²³ In response to these perceived threats, the US pursued a strategy of 'undermining Chinese prestige' and curbing the influence of 'Red China' throughout the 1950s.²⁴ The United States stepped up its efforts to contain the further spread of communism in Asia by providing military and economic support to non-communist states such as South Vietnam, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, and enhanced security cooperation with regional allies through the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954.²⁵ Furthermore, despite somewhat relaxing its trade controls on the Soviet Union, the United States maintained a far stricter embargo on China, and continued to restrict European and Asian allies from

²¹ Foot, *The Practice of Power*, Chapter 8.

²² It was difficult to achieve a more nuanced US understanding of China because, with the rise of McCarthyism, 'virtually no one with expert training or experience in China remained in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department' by 1954. Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 130.

²³ *Ibid.*, 124.

²⁴ Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 205; Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 124.

²⁵ ———, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 140, 148-149. The full membership of SEATO was Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

carrying out trade in all strategic and many non-strategic items with China.²⁶ The United States also provided significant economic aid to countries such as India and Japan to make these countries ‘alternative models’ for Asian developing nations.²⁷ Unsurprisingly, Beijing interpreted these US moves as a threat to China’s own security.²⁸ Zhou Enlai condemned the United States as the ‘most ambitious colonial power’ in the international system, and one that was ‘now most active in preparing for a world war’.²⁹ Indeed, in 1954-1955 the two countries almost came to war over offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits. Beijing’s shelling of the islands of Quemoy and Matsu was both a form of domestic mobilisation, and a demonstration that Beijing was willing to stand up to the United States.³⁰

4.2.3. *China’s relationship with the Soviet Union*

Sino-Soviet relations remained far more positive than China’s tense relationship with the United States during this period. During the mid-1950s, China relied on the Soviet Union for significant economic and military assistance, directly imported the Soviet model of economic planning for its first Five-Year Plan, and drew upon the advice of more than five thousand Soviet technical advisers and experts.³¹ Nevertheless, by 1956 and 1957 China’s growing association with the goals and concerns of Third World countries began to create strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship. In particular, Beijing’s new ‘Bandung discourse’ created the beginnings of an ideological split

²⁶ Memorandum for the National Security Council, ‘Economic defense policy with respect to trade with the Communist bloc’, 3 May 1955, Executive Secretariat: Records relating to National Security Council Policy Papers, 1947-1979, Box 25, USNA; *ibid.*, 140.

²⁷ Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 201.

²⁸ Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 133.

²⁹ Premier Zhou Enlai’s report on the Asian-African Conference at the Standing Committee of the National People’s Conference, in *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, 40.

³⁰ Chen Jian, ‘Bridging Revolution and Decolonization,’ 228-229. For an overview of the Taiwan Straits Crisis, see Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 143-144.

³¹ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 126-132; Westad, *Brothers in Arms*, 16-17.

between China and the Soviet Union. For the CCP, the 'Bandung discourse' was about linking the experiences of decolonisation and revolution; CCP leaders now argued that the most important world revolution was that taking place among the former colonised and semi-colonised countries of the Third World.³² As a major power, fully-fledged member of international society, and country that had not been victim to imperialism in the past, the Soviet Union could not, by definition, be the leader of this struggle.³³ By 1956 and 1957, Mao argued that the main dividing line in the world was between the forces of imperialism and anti-imperialism.³⁴

Tensions between China and the Soviet Union were further exacerbated by the death of Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, in March 1953. Stalin's death created a leadership vacuum in the international communist movement, and one that Mao Zedong believed that he alone was able to fill.³⁵ Since 1949, there had been a profound tension between Mao's claim that the Chinese people had finally 'stood up' to foreign imperialism, and his willingness to subordinate himself to Stalin within the Sino-Soviet alliance. By the mid-1950s, this inequality in the Sino-Soviet relationship became increasingly problematic. Mao believed that China's contributions to the Korean and Indochinese wars meant that China was no longer 'a little brother' to the Soviets.³⁶ Echoing this, Mao was highly critical of what he perceived as Moscow's failure to treat countries of the socialist bloc as equals. In this vein, the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 were

³² Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization,' 238.

³³ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side*, 247.

³⁴ And, for instance, while China and the Soviet Union both emphasised 'peaceful coexistence' in their foreign policy, by 1957 they diverged on whether it was possible to pursue peaceful coexistence with imperialist countries. See Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization,' 237.

³⁵ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side*, 155-156.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

viewed within the Chinese leadership as evidence of the dangers of Soviet 'big-power chauvinism'.³⁷

By the mid-1950s, Beijing also began to experience growing disillusionment with Soviet economic aid and with the economic direction being pursued in the Soviet Union. Soviet aid and economic advisers had been vitally important to China's economic development and successful growth rates of around 7-8 percent a year during the first Five Year Plan (1953-1957).³⁸ Furthermore, in the wake of Stalin's death, Soviet leader Khrushchev sought to improve relations with Mao by expanding economic assistance to China. Nevertheless, this did not improve ties. Rather, Dikotter argues that 'instead of showing gratitude, leaders in Beijing saw this as their due, seeking to extract ever greater amounts of economic and military support through a mixture of bargaining, begging and cajoling'.³⁹ In addition, by 1956, Beijing was increasingly experiencing frustration with the Soviet experts dispatched to China. Many of these experts were seen by the Chinese side as incompetent, were physically weak or old, or were simply ill-prepared for Chinese working and living conditions.⁴⁰ While they remained important to China's economic development, these experts became another thorn in the side of the Sino-Soviet relationship. In 1956-57, CCP leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yun began blaming Soviet advisers for 'harmful results', and argued that China should rely on 'fewer but better' Soviet experts.⁴¹

³⁷ Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization,' 235.

³⁸ Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 196.

³⁹ Frank Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 7.

⁴⁰ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side*, 127-128; Deborah A. Kaple, 'Soviet Advisors in China in the 1950s,' in *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), 134-135.

⁴¹ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side*, 129.

The most important strain in Sino-Soviet relations, however, was the divergence in economic policy that occurred during these years. The death of Stalin made it possible for Khrushchev to criticise negative aspects of the Soviet economic model, such as excessive bureaucratisation, lack of separation between the party and government, and the over-emphasis on heavy industry at the expense of light industry and agriculture.⁴² Following Stalin's death, Khrushchev began to make alterations to economic policy in the Soviet Union by decreasing central control over economic planning, increasing incentives for agricultural production, and giving greater rights to collective and state farms to manage agriculture production.⁴³ Yet this perceived 'weakening' of the Soviet economic model was perceived by Mao as a betrayal of Marxism and Stalin, and as a form of 'capitalist restoration'.⁴⁴ When Khrushchev stated, in November 1957, that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in production within fifteen years, Mao famously responded by stating that China would surpass Great Britain within fifteen years.⁴⁵ Yet reflecting the growing tensions between China and the Soviet Union, in making this statement, Mao's 'real intention was to surpass the Soviet Union' and to prove that China's socialist revolution would be 'fuller, quicker and more effective' than that which was being pursued in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev.⁴⁶

We should not, however, overstate the tensions in Sino-Soviet relations. While the Sino-Soviet relationship would ultimately break down, that split was not yet

⁴² Kong Hanbing, 'The Transplantation and Entrenchment of the Soviet Economic Model in China' in *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present*, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2011), 161-162.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁴⁵ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side*, 156-157.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 157. See also the similar point made by Lorenz M. Luthi, 'Sino-Soviet Relations During the Mao Years, 1949-1969,' in *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present*, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2011), 38.

inevitable.⁴⁷ In the mid-1950s, the two countries maintained their closely intertwined foreign and domestic policy, and even as tensions picked up in 1957, the Soviet Union remained China's most important military, economic, and diplomatic partner.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the pull of China's Third World identity, dissatisfaction at Chinese subordination to the Soviet Union, and the emergence of different views about the best way to pursue economic development, all led to growing practical and ideological tensions between the two countries. As we shall see, Chinese leaders were beginning to question whether Khrushchev's Soviet Union was still the most appropriate model for the Chinese revolution.

4.3 Chinese ideas about Japan, 1953-1957

China's growing association with the Third World, its open hostility towards one superpower, and its emerging ideological tensions with the second, provide the backdrop against which we shall now explore China's economic policy towards Japan between 1953 and 1957. Using the ideas framework described in the Introduction to this thesis, the following section demonstrates the constitutive role of ideas on policy, and the way in which ideas were produced, transmitted, and strategically used by Chinese policy-makers to shape China's economic policy towards Japan.

4.3.1. Background cognitive ideas

Background cognitive ideas are theoretical or ontological assumptions about how the world works. They diagnose problems, and constrain the range of solutions that policy-makers consider possible or useful. In this section, I show that the adoption of new economic thinking in China between 1953 and 1957 created a new set of

⁴⁷ ———, 'Sino-Soviet Relations During the Mao Years,' 349.

⁴⁸ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side*, 148-149.

economic problems in China, and constrained the range of possible solutions to these problems. Specifically, I suggest that Mao's adoption of a radical form of Soviet, and particularly Stalinist, economic planning led to a set of urgent policy problems that needed solutions. These problems included the need for more industrial goods, guidance on speeding up industrialisation in China, and advice and techniques on how to mechanise and increase the scale of agricultural production in China. Recently declassified Chinese archives show that, having adopted the background cognitive idea of the Soviet economic model, Chinese policy-makers would look to Japan for specific policy solutions to some of these problems.

The years between 1953 and 1957 witnessed a dramatic shift in Chinese economic thinking. The Party moved away from its temporary strategy of postwar reconstruction under the doctrine of 'New Democracy', and towards wholesale adoption of the Soviet economic model.⁴⁹ This shift in economic thinking in 1953 took place for a number of reasons. First, the end of the Korean War provided an opportunity to renew the focus on economic reconstruction at home.⁵⁰ Second, the political campaigns of the early 1950s, such as the Three Antis and Five Antis campaigns, had been more successful than anticipated in deepening the CCP's control over Chinese society, ridding the country of political opposition, and enhancing the CCP's political authority.⁵¹ The Party now believed it was in a position to roll out Soviet economic planning. Third, and most importantly, Mao Zedong argued that the

⁴⁹ Michael M. Sheng, 'Mao and Chinese Elite Politics in the 1950s: The Gao Gang Affair Revisited,' *Twentieth Century China* 36, no. 1 (2011), 82-83.

⁵⁰ Ibid. 'Problems of policy for economic development', 10 November 1956, in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 241-243.

⁵¹ Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization,' 218-219.

economic policy of New Democracy was creating policy uncertainty and leading to political tensions within the upper echelons of the Party.⁵²

In a bid to inject new economic ideas into the Party, and to strengthen his own political control, Mao began to politicise economic planning.⁵³ In late 1952 and early 1953, Mao stepped up his control over economic affairs. Until then, Chinese economic policy had been largely controlled by a 'managerial elite' of leaders including Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun and Bo Yibo.⁵⁴ Seeking to wrest control over this 'managerial elite', Mao began to criticise this group for following the policy of 'New Democracy'. He argued that if left unchecked, 'New Democracy' would lead to a capitalist economic future for China.⁵⁵ Mao used Northeast CCP leader Gao Gang (高岗) as his 'puppet' in economic affairs, and began to challenge the individualist and market-oriented approaches being advocated by Zhou Enlai and others.⁵⁶ By late 1953, Mao had achieved the party's approval to adopt the Soviet economic model of state-controlled industrialisation, centralised planning, and the collectivisation of agriculture.⁵⁷ This model underpinned the economic direction of China's first Five Year Plan (1953-1957).

However, the implementation of these new Soviet economic ideas created major problems for the Chinese economy. The Soviet model created a 'bifurcated' Chinese economy that focused on heavy industry at the expense of light industry and

⁵² Halpern, 'Creating Socialist Economies,' 97-98.

⁵³ Sheng, 'Mao and Chinese Elite Politics in the 1950s,' 81.

⁵⁴ Alfred L. Chan, *Mao's Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China's Great Leap Forward* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 16; Sheng, 'Mao and Chinese Elite Politics in the 1950s,' 76.

⁵⁵ Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, eds., *The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization in China: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the "High Tide" of 1955* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 29.

⁵⁶ Sheng, 'Mao and Chinese Elite Politics in the 1950s.'

⁵⁷ Halpern, 'Creating Socialist Economies,' 91; Hou Xiaojia, "'Get Organized": The Impact of Two Soviet Models on the Ccp's Rural Strategy, 1949-1953,' in *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present*, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Hua-Yu Li (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2011), 187.

agricultural development. To maintain this focus, China's industrial sector became dangerously reliant on external investment from the Soviet Union, while its agricultural sector operated well below maximum capacity.⁵⁸ Indeed, before his death in 1953, Stalin himself had cautioned Mao about rapid adoption of the Soviet model.⁵⁹ Yet Mao's response to these problems was to forge ahead with an even more radical version of the Soviet model, by modelling China's economy on the 'Revolutionary Stalinism' pursued in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s and 1930s. In the second half of 1955, Mao directed the Party to introduce unrealistic targets in cotton, grain, and steel production, and to accelerate collectivisation in the countryside.⁶⁰ Foreshadowing the Great Leap Forward that was to come, this 'Little Leap' resulted in production bottlenecks, shortages of raw materials, famine, and widespread opposition in the countryside.⁶¹

Aware of the long-term problems facing the Chinese economy if it proceeded down this path, moderate economic planners such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun called for more restraint at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956.⁶² Yet ultimately, Mao's radical policies of 'rash advance' (*maojin*) and 'more, better, faster, and more economical' (*duohao kuaisheng*) held sway. Mao's success in entrenching this radical, Stalinist version of the Soviet economic model was due to a combination of his own political skill, and to domestic and international political developments. At home, the Anti-Rightist Campaign resulted in Mao linking economic moderation with 'rightist' and

⁵⁸ Lorenz M. Luthi, 'Sino-Soviet Relations During the Mao Years, 1949-1969,' *ibid.*, 35-36. 'Problems of policy for economic development', 10 November 1956, in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 233-244.

⁵⁹ Hou Xiaojia, "'Get Organized'", 186.

⁶⁰ Teiwes and Sun, eds., *The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization in China: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the "High Tide" of 1955*; Chan, *Mao's Crusade*, 17-24.

⁶¹ Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 8.

⁶² Chan, *Mao's Crusade*, 21-22. 'Economic work should be conducted in a practical way', 8 February 1956, in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 195-196.

conservative political thought. Aware of the dangers of being characterised as rightists, Zhou Enlai and the other moderate economic planners chose to throw their support behind Mao's radical economic policies rather than continue to assert the need for economic moderation. Internationally, Khrushchev's attempts to wind back some of Stalin's economic policies in the wake of Stalin's death were perceived by Mao as a dangerous form of 'revisionism',⁶³ and Mao thus forged ahead with an even more radical form of Stalinist economic policy than was being implemented in the Soviet Union.⁶⁴

Policy leaders such as Zhou Enlai, Bo Yibo, and Chen Yun were now required to put aside their moderate economic views and find solutions to the problems diagnosed by an economic model that demanded 'more, better, faster, and more economical'.⁶⁵ These problems included the need to achieve increases in agricultural production, mechanisation of agriculture, and rapid industrialisation. Increasing agricultural output was important, not only to feed China's population, but also to provide the raw materials that were so badly needed for industrialisation.⁶⁶

The adoption of this radical version of Stalinist economic planning in China—and the economic targets that accompanied this shift—was the backdrop against which new policy ideas about Japan emerged between 1953 and 1957. It is important to remind ourselves that background cognitive ideas constrain the range of solutions considered

⁶³ Kong Hanbing, 'Soviet Economic Model in China,' 161-162.

⁶⁴ Halpern, 'Creating Socialist Economies,' 99-101.

⁶⁵ Despite the move to decentralisation of economic planning around this time, the most important heavy and high technology industries remained under central control. This meant that central ministries, led by policy-makers such as Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun and Bo Yibo, continued to exert a great deal of influence over key economic affairs. See Chan, *Mao's Crusade*, 28.

⁶⁶ *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 146-147, 235; Alexander Eckstein, *China's Economic Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 54-55.

possible. Thus, China's adoption of an economic model that embraced state-led planning, collective land ownership, and collectivisation of agriculture precluded Chinese policy-makers from importing a more market-oriented economic model from Japan. Let us be clear: Japan did not become a replacement for the Soviet economic model. Nevertheless, radical Stalinist economic planning created a host of specific industrial and agricultural problems in China that required solutions. Access to recently declassified archives shows that policy-makers such as Zhou Enlai began to turn to Japan for solutions.

4.3.2. Foreground cognitive ideas

Foreground cognitive ideas are ideas that provide specific solutions to policy problems. Here, I show that, between 1953 and 1957, Chinese records suggest that Chinese policy-makers came to see Japan as a source of the goods and advice needed to solve some of China's industrial and agricultural problems. Of course, as discussed above, Soviet advisers and experts continued to provide the most abundant economic advice and aid to China until 1960. Moreover, in late 1954, the Soviet Union also began trying to normalise economic and diplomatic ties with the new Hatoyama government in Japan, and thus cooperated with Beijing in trying to build political and economic contacts with Japan.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, evidence of difficulties in the Sino-Soviet economic relationship began to feature in Chinese officials' conversations with Japanese representatives. For example, in a meeting with Murata Shōzō (村田省藏),

⁶⁷ See for example FMA File 105-00159-01, 27 July 1954, 'Ribei guohui yiyuan daibiaotuan yu Sulian fuwaizhang Weixinsiji huitan neirong' [Content of talks between the Japanese Parliamentary Delegation and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky], 5. Furthermore, a Sino-Soviet joint statement on Japan released in October 1954 expressed the two countries' readiness to establish political and economic relations with Japan. See American Consulate General, Hong Kong to Department of State, Washington, 'Review of Sino-Japanese relations, October 1954 to October 1955', 10 October 1955, US State Department Central Files, 693.94/10-1055, RG59, USNA, 2; CW Braddick, *Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964: In the Shadow of the Monolith* (Oxford: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2004), 21-57.

Chairman of JAPIT, in 1955, Zhou Enlai admitted that '[Soviet] material assistance is not as great as you might think'. Nonetheless, Zhou went on to note that 'we consider the Soviet Union our elder brother'.⁶⁸

In addition to the emergence of problems with Soviet economic assistance, there were two important reasons why Chinese policy-makers increasingly came to see *Japan* as a solution to its economic problems. First, between 1953 and 1957, policy-makers such as Zhou Enlai developed a much better understanding—that is, developed new cognitive ideas—about the characteristics of the Japanese economy, and about the success of Japan's industrial and agricultural sectors relative to those in China. As a result, they tried to gather advice from Japanese experts, and to increase imports of goods and technology from Japan. Second, the years between 1953 and 1957—and particularly between 1955 and 1957—saw much larger numbers of Japanese and Chinese travelling between the two countries. These individuals helped to increase the spread of ideas between Japan and China and, as I will show, demonstrated to Chinese policy-makers precisely how economic cooperation with Japan could solve specific policy problems. These two factors combined to create new foreground cognitive ideas—of Japan as a solution to industrial and agricultural development problems in China—between 1953 and 1957.

a) Developing a greater understanding of the Japanese economy

In 1957, Premier Zhou Enlai, Vice-Minister of the Foreign Trade Ministry, Lei Renmin, and head of the People's Bank of China, Nan Hanchen, met with industrial representatives from Japan's Kansai region. During the meeting, the Chinese officials

⁶⁸ Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Murata Shōzō, 23 January 1955, in *ibid.*, 113.

questioned the Japanese industrialists at length about developments in Japan's ship-building, silk, chemical, and salt-producing industries. Zhou sought detailed information from these Japanese representatives about the number of workers in the different industries; the average salaries of these workers; the yearly output of different industries; the different 'supply chain' factories used in the production of ships, salt and silk; and the quantity of goods that Japan exported abroad.⁶⁹ During these discussions, Zhou and other Chinese officials frequently compared figures such as Japan's levels of output, factory size, and average salaries, with both those in China and with figures from Japan's prewar economy. Zhou was impressed to learn that Japan's ship-building industry had revived to a point where Japan now produced more ships than it had before the war, and that Japan was now the world's largest producer of ships.⁷⁰

These and other meetings also provided Chinese policy-makers with a better understanding of the particular goods and technological processes that China might be able to import or borrow from Japan to enhance China's own productive capacity.⁷¹ For example, one Japanese industrialist (a producer of automotive conveyor belts) reported that after having visited several factories in China's Northeast region, he believed that China's factories and mines could increase their productive output two to three times if they mechanised their production processes and used assembly-line

⁶⁹ FMA File 105-00540-04, 20 March 1957, 'Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Riben Kansai jingji jiefangHua youhao daibiaotuan tanhua' [Memorandum of conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and Japan's Kansai Economic Friendship delegation to China], 2-3, 6-7.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 3.

⁷¹ Other key meetings include a visit by Japanese exporters to Tianjin in December 1955; a visit by representatives from Japan's Meiwa Industrial Trade Association in June 1956 to discuss the export of Japanese machinery to China; and a three-month tour of Japanese factories by the Chinese Industrial Chemists' Inspection Team (*Zhongguo huaxue gongye shichatuan*) from November 1957 to February 1958. See Cheng Yongming and Shi Qibao, *Zhongguo Jingmao Guanxi Liushi Nian*, 82-83.

production. To this end, he offered to dispatch some of his Japanese staff to provide technical advice as China prepared its second Five Year Plan.⁷²

Japanese advice was not limited to the industrial sphere. At a meeting with representatives from Japanese agricultural industries in August 1957, Zhou Enlai and the Minister and Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Liao Luyan (廖鲁言) and Yang Xiandong (杨显东), sought extensive advice about ways to enhance China's agricultural output. Zhou informed the Japanese representatives that the average crop production in China was much less than that in Japan, and so 'we want to learn from you'.⁷³ Zhou also sought answers to very basic questions about agricultural production from the Japanese advisers, for instance asking how much food the Japanese government considered sufficient to feed its population, and the levels of grain that Japan needed to produce and import to achieve this goal.⁷⁴ He also spent a great deal of time asking about the average size of Japanese rice-paddies, the size of the Japanese farming population, how Japanese farming land was tilled in different seasons, and the percentage of Japanese cultivated land relative to the farming population. At one point in the conversation, Zhou asked a series of highly detailed questions about the production of fertilizer in Japan. He wished to know which type of fertilizer was simplest to produce and, upon learning that it was carbamide-based

⁷² Ibid., 10. It is not clear whether this offer was accepted by Zhou, but in March 1958, Foreign Minister Chen Yi requested that Japanese experts be sent to China (see further discussion of this in Chapter 5).

⁷³ FMA File 105-00541-03, 7 August 1957, 'Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Riben nongye jishu fangHuatuan tanhua jilu' [Memorandum of conversation from Premier Zhou Enlai's meeting with the Japanese Agricultural Technology Delegation to China]. A number of other visits by Japanese agricultural advisers to China took place during this period, including in May 1955, June 1957 and October 1957. See Cheng Yongming and Shi Qibao, *Zhongri Jingmao Guanxi Liushi Nian*, 82-83.

⁷⁴ The Japanese side replied that 120 kg rice (which is about 8 *dou*) per person per year was considered sufficient. Ibid., 5.

fertilizer (*niaosu*), asked whether the technology to produce this type of fertilizer had been patented and would be available for export from Japan.⁷⁵

As noted above, by late 1955, Mao Zedong had embarked on a policy of rapid agricultural development via collectivisation in the countryside. Zhou Enlai's meeting with these Japanese agricultural advisers demonstrates the need in China for practical guidance on how to achieve this increase in agricultural output. While the model of development remained a Stalinist one, the model had created problems that Chinese policy-makers believed Japan could help solve. As Zhou stated,

Agriculture is a great problem, especially for us Asian countries. For our cooperatives [*zuzhi hezuoshe*], the primary issue is increasing the output of each *danwei* area. The government must help the cooperatives solve issues to do with water conservation and fertilizers, so with regards to these techniques, there is much we want to learn from you.⁷⁶

Thus, Zhou asked the Japanese agricultural representatives to meet with the Chinese departments of agriculture, irrigation, fisheries and forestry to answer more specific questions. He also asked the Japanese representatives to travel to tea cooperatives in Hangzhou to provide advice on mechanisation of the tea industry.⁷⁷ Finally, shortly after this visit by Japanese agricultural advisers, a team of 22 Chinese officials—led by Wang Zhen (王震), Head of the State Council's Agriculture Reclamation Bureau (*guowuyuan nongkenbu buzhang*)—spent two months inspecting agricultural sites all over Japan, exchanging ideas with Japanese agricultural specialists and farmers, and learning about Japanese agricultural technology.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 6. For examples of some of the problems created by the policy of large-scale agricultural collectivisation, see 'Problems of policy for economic development', 10 November 1956, in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 238-239.

⁷⁷ FMA File 105-00541-03, 7.

⁷⁸ The delegation was officially titled the 'Chinese Agricultural Technology Delegation' (*Zhongguo nongye jishu daibiaotuan*). Li Enmin, *Zhongri minjian waijiao*, 197.

These interactions with Japanese agricultural and industrial advisers not only enhanced Chinese understanding of the nature of the Japanese economy, but also dramatically increased China's economic ties with Japan. Between 1953 and 1957, China's trade with Japan increased more than four-fold, from \$US34 million in 1953 to \$US141 million in 1957.⁷⁹ In line with the advice received from these Japanese industrial and agricultural advisers, China increased its imports of Japanese chemical fertilizer, rolled steel, machinery and chemical fibres. Of these, chemical fertilizer was by far the most significant Japanese export to China, representing more than 20 percent of total Japanese exports to China in 1956 for example.⁸⁰ Yet the ongoing US-led trade embargo prevented Japanese firms from exporting many of the strategic goods—goods that included building-quality steel, large-scale machinery, ships and electricity-generating equipment—that China so badly needed.⁸¹

The Japanese side also gained a great deal from these meetings in China. Much of the advice provided by Japanese industrial or agricultural representatives also increased the likelihood of greater Sino-Japanese trade. For example, Japanese shipbuilding representatives informed the Chinese side that they were unable to procure sufficient iron ore from Southeast Asia, Canada or India, and so were eager to import iron ore from China.⁸² Similarly, in meetings with Kansai business leaders, CCPIT officials learned that the Japanese paper, fertilizer, mining, and electricity industries were all very eager to trade with China in exchange for goods such as Chinese iron ore, coal

⁷⁹ FMA File 105-00793-02, 22 March-22 September 1956, 'ZhongRi maoyi cankao ziliao' [Reference materials on China-Japan trade], 23-24; United Nations, 'Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.'

⁸⁰ Cheng Yongming and Shi Qibao, *Zhongri Jingmao Guanxi Liushi Nian*, 78-79.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² FMA File 105-00540-04, 3-4.

and salt.⁸³ Between 1953 and 1957, China therefore dramatically increased the sale of soybean, rice, coal, iron ore and salt to Japan.⁸⁴

b) The flow of ideas between China and Japan

Japan's own economic and political climate was important in helping to spread these new cognitive ideas about the potential for Sino-Japanese economic cooperation. Despite the perceived success of Japan's economy within China, the 1950s was actually a time of economic gloom in Japan. Although Japanese industrial output in the mid-1950s had revived, Japan's foreign trade levels remained well below prewar levels, and the economy was still heavily reliant on US assistance.⁸⁵ Japanese business groups, the left-wing opposition, and even the conservative Japanese government, increasingly viewed trade with China as a solution to Japan's economic woes, and there was mounting pressure on the United States to allow Japan to trade with China. As James Martin, Jr., Chief of the Economic Section in the American consulate in Kobe-Osaka wrote, with some sympathy, in 1953,

Japan has emerged from the womb of the Occupation into an unpleasant world. But she is not yet entirely independent in action because psychologically, politically and economically she is still tied to American apron-strings. The harsh economic realities require a greater volume of export trade from Japan before she can be said to be self-supporting. But trade outlets are denied or limited in some directions by high tariffs, closed in others by bitter memories of war, and in the direction of Red China and the USSR they are held to a trickle by—let us be honest with ourselves—by the insistence of the United States in the first instance and only secondarily by the conviction of the Japanese Government, and scarcely even remotely by the agreement of the Japanese people.⁸⁶

⁸³ Ibid., 4.

⁸⁴ Cheng Yongming and Shi Qibao, *Zhongri Jingmao Guanxi Liushi Nian*, 78-79.

⁸⁵ 'Japanese foreign trade', 23 June 1953, Policy Planning Council, 1948-1961, NSC 125 Series, Box 17, USNA; 'Progress report on United States objectives and courses of action with respect to Japan', 28 October 1954, Executive Secretariat: Records relating to National Security Council Policy Papers, 1947-1979, Box 17, USNA, 1-5.

⁸⁶ American Consulate General, Kobe to Department of State, 'Memorandum: American policy towards Japanese trade with Communist China', 18 June 1953, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/6-1853, RG59, USNA, 1.

Despite this occasional sympathetic view, however, the US government would not tolerate much of a relaxation on Japanese trade controls towards China. The US saw China as the major strategic threat in Asia, and thought the ‘wide-eyed’ Japanese were naïve in viewing China as the answer to Japan’s economic troubles.⁸⁷ The impotence of the Japanese government in taking the lead on expanding trade with China subsequently prompted a huge wave of civil society activity across the political and economic spectrum in Japan. For instance, the Japanese Japan-China Trade Promotion Diet Members League (hereafter referred to as the ‘Diet Members League’), which became particularly active during the mid-1950s, was comprised of over 300 politicians from all political parties in Japan.⁸⁸ Furthermore, major Japanese conglomerates such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi were now publicly discussing the importance of trade with China in the Japanese press, and the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry had received requests by companies such as Sumitomo (which produced fertilizers), and Komatsu (which produced arms) to visit China to help build trade.⁸⁹ Finally, Japan’s SMEs, which had participated enthusiastically in Japanese trade exhibitions in Beijing and Shanghai, began putting pressure on the Japanese government to open trade with China.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ American Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, Washington. ‘Japanese interview with Chou En-lai’, 17 February 1955, US State Department Central Files, 693.94/2-1755, RG59, USNA, 1-3.

⁸⁸ While a third of its members came from the left-faction of the Japanese Socialist Party, the League was also made up of members from different factions of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party, the right-faction of the Japanese Socialist Party, and other minor parties and independent members of the Diet. See FMA File No: 105-00252-02, 19 September 1953, ‘Guanyu “Ribei guohui yiyuan cujin RiZhong maoyi lianmeng” de ziliao’ [Information regarding the “Japanese Diet Members’ League for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade”], 5; LH Lamb to Anthony Eden, ‘Visit by Matsumoto Ji’ichiro (Vice-Chairman of the Peace Liaison Committee of the Asian and Pacific regions) to China in 1953’, 11 April 1953, FO371/105218, UKNA, 1-2. For an excellent discussion of the growth of Japanese civil society during this period, see Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan’s Economic Diplomacy with China*, 24-33.

⁸⁹ FMA File No 105-00506-03, 27 October 1956, ‘Ribei maoyi zhixing qingkuang’ [Japan’s trade implementation situation], 1-2.

⁹⁰ Ibid; American Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, ‘Notes on prewar and potential trade between Japan and Communist China’, 31 July 1953, US State Department Central Files, 493.949/7-3153, RG59, USNA, 2-3.

This growing civil society activity prompted an increase in the number of Japanese visiting China during the mid-1950s. In the early 1950s, the US occupation of Japan and the Yoshida government's unwillingness to grant visas for travel to the PRC, had significantly limited the numbers of Japanese travelling to China. However, this dramatically shifted between 1953 and 1957.⁹¹ In 1955, some 800 Japanese visited China, which represented half of all foreign visitors to China that year (not including those from the Soviet Union). By 1956, this had increased to 1243 Japanese visitors, with Japan the leading nationality (excluding the Soviet Union) represented among the 5200 foreigners who travelled to China that year.⁹² Although the number of Japanese in China certainly did not rival the number of Soviets—for instance, it is estimated that over 3,000 Soviet experts were based in China in 1956 alone—Japanese visitors nonetheless comprised a sizeable presence in China.⁹³

These Japanese travelled to China as part of trade fairs, cultural exchanges, trade delegations such as that of the Diet Members League that visited China in September 1953, or via political delegations such as the Parliamentary Delegation to China in October 1954.⁹⁴ They became important in building contacts with Chinese officials, and in sharing information about the characteristics of the Japanese economy and the political decision-making process in Japan. For example, representatives from the Japanese Socialist Party informed Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1957 that the

⁹¹ 'Review of Sino-Japanese relations, October 1954 to October 1955', 10 October 1955, US State Department Central Files, 693.94/10-1055, RG59, USNA.

⁹² 'Chinese Communist International Activities and Contacts', January 1958, CIA Records Search Tool, NARA, 89; Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 60.

⁹³ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Learning to One Side*, 127.

⁹⁴ FMA File 105-00253-07, 30 September 1953, 'Youguan "Ribei guohui yiyuan cujin RiZhong maoyi lianmeng" daibiaotuan cankao ziliao' [Reference materials on the "Japanese Japan-China Trade Promotion Diet Members League" delegation]; FMA File No: 105-00158-02, 20 October 1952, 'Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Ribei guohui yiyuan fangHuatuan ji Ribei xueshu wenhua fangHuatuan de tanhua jilu' [Records of the dialogue between Premier Zhou Enlai and Japan's Parliamentary Delegation and the Japanese Cultural Studies Delegation on their visit to China].

Japanese business community, the Japanese public, and the Japanese Diet all supported greater Sino-Japanese trade; that many saw the US trade relationship as one-sided; and that Japan was forced to buy goods such as bean curd, salt, flour and coal (all goods in abundant supply in China) at much higher prices from the US.⁹⁵

Furthermore, those Japanese who travelled to China were typically treated to the consummate diplomatic skills of Zhou Enlai and other senior Chinese officials. They returned home with positive views about the benign nature of the Communist regime, and the possibilities for expanded Sino-Japanese trade. Nevertheless, the Japanese who travelled to China were also given a glimpse of the difficulties facing the Communist regime. One Japanese Diet Member, Okada Shinji, who travelled to China in 1955, remarked on China's 'obvious lack of experienced technicians', and noted that Chairman Mao, during his meeting with the Japanese group, had said that China faced difficulties in its reconstruction efforts, on account of the 'more than thirty million Chinese peasants (who) still don't know what the construction program means'.⁹⁶

It was through these groups that new cognitive ideas began to spread between China and Japan. And some of the most important ideas that flowed between the two countries were ideas about the Japanese goods, technology and industrial processes that could spur on China's own economic development. In 1955, China sent its first trade delegation to Japan for a six-week visit under the leadership of Lei Renmin (雷

⁹⁵ FMA File 105-00540-01, 21 April 1957, 'Mao Zedong zhuxi, Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Riben shehuidang daibiaotuan jilu' [Record of Chairman Mao Zedong's and Zhou Enlai's meeting with the Japan Socialist Party delegation], 5.

⁹⁶ Telegram from American Consul General, Hong Kong to Secretary of State, Washington, 1 November 1955, US State Department Central Files, 693.94/11-155, RG59, USNA, 3-4.

任民), Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade.⁹⁷ The trade delegation was instructed to make extensive contacts with all sectors of Japanese society, but in particular they were ordered to ‘pay special attention to the conglomerates [*zaibatsu*], big capitalists and top officials’ who could have the greatest influence on the economic relationship.⁹⁸ In all their negotiations, meetings, and factory visits, the delegation was encouraged to ‘*put economic trade at the centre of discussions*’.⁹⁹ By the end of the trip the Chinese delegation had met with over 4,500 Japanese individuals, including representatives from both SMEs and large corporations, and had visited numerous Japanese factories to observe Japanese industrial production processes.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, accompanying a group of Japanese Diet Members on a visit to China in September 1953 were ten ‘industrial trade experts’ (*chanye maoyi zhuanjia*). These experts included senior representatives from Japan’s shipbuilding, fisheries, automotive, and chemical industries, such as the head of Kobe Steel’s machinery division, Ōshima Zenkichi (大島善吉), who travelled to China precisely to find ways to expand economic ties between their own industries and those in China.¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ Lei Renmin was acting head of the CCPIT, and the Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (until May 1966). Prior to this, he had served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Finance. See *Zhongguo Gongchandang Zuzhi Shi Ziliao [Organizational History of the CCP]*, (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2000), 80-81, 114. In August 1952, the Central Government abolished the Ministry of Trade, and separated it into the Ministry of Foreign Trade (*duiwai maoyibu*) and the Ministry of Commerce (*shangye*).

⁹⁸ FMA File 105-00300-01, 26 February 1955, ‘Zhongguo fangwen Riben maoyi daibiaotuan huodong fang’an’ [Plans for China’s visit with Japanese trade representatives], 3.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3. Emphasis in original.

¹⁰⁰ FMA File 105-00300-07, 22 June 1955, ‘Zhongguo fangri maoyi daibiaotuan gongzuo zongjie’ [Summary work report of the Chinese trade delegation to Japan], 2.

¹⁰¹ FMA File No: 105-00252-04, 18 September 1953, ‘“Ribei guohui yiyuan cujin RiZhong maoyi lianmeng” fanghua daibiaotuan bufen daibiao de jianjie’ [Introduction of members of the “Japanese Diet Members’ League for the Promotion of Sino-Japanese Trade” who are part of the delegation visiting China], 3.

c) Manchuria as an important site in the spread of ideas

Significantly, many Japanese who began travelling to China during this period had been stationed in Manchuria during the 1930s and 1940s. In addition, many of these individuals had initially been ‘purged’ by US occupying forces after the war, but by the mid-1950s held senior positions within Japan’s political and business worlds. One of the Diet Members who visited Beijing in 1953 was LDP politician Etō Natsuo (江藤夏雄). He had served in various official and administrative positions in Manchukuo, including as Vice-Counselor of the Southern Manchuria Railway.¹⁰² Another example was Uda Kōichi (宇田耕一), President of Yodogawa Steelworks and the Tosa Electric Railway Company, and who had worked for the South Manchurian Railway before the war.¹⁰³ These, and other Japanese were well placed to redevelop the trade links that had existed before the war, and to offer advice on economic development in the key industrial hub of China’s Northeast.

For instance, the President of Yodogawa Steelworks returned home pleased to have signed a contract for 1.5 million pounds sterling worth of Japanese iron and steel products in exchange for up to 400,000 tons of coal from the Kailan mines in Northeast China.¹⁰⁴ Similarly, in March 1957, Zhou Enlai met with representatives from the Japanese silk industry. One of these representatives was Mr Mori (森), who had been manager of the Jiuda Salt Industry (*Jiuda yanye*) in Tianjin, during the War of Resistance.¹⁰⁵ After spending four years in China, Mr. Mori returned to Japan and had become a major silk producer. His meeting with Zhou was instrumental in

¹⁰² FMA File 105-00253-07, 1-2.

¹⁰³ FMA File 105-00252-04, 10.

¹⁰⁴ BBC Monitor Report to Far Eastern Department (China), ‘Japan-China provisional barter agreement’, 5 November 1953, FO 371/105258, FC 11323/37, UKNA.

¹⁰⁵ The Chinese arm of the Jiuda Salt Industry moved to Zigong in Sichuan province in 1938 following the outbreak of the War of Resistance in 1937.

reminding Chinese economic officials of the importance of Chinese salt to the Japanese silk-producing industry.¹⁰⁶ Just over six months after Mori's meeting with Zhou Enlai, China's CCPIT dispatched one of its advisers to Japan to seek out Japanese imports of salt-production equipment.¹⁰⁷ Once again, and building on a theme that was developed in Chapter Two, we see the importance of Manchuria as a site that connected China and Japan. Japanese who had been based in Manchuria before the war became especially important in reinvigorating the Sino-Japanese economic relationship in the postwar period, and were an important source in spreading new cognitive ideas about Japan among the Chinese policy-making community.

The combination of increased numbers of Japanese and Chinese travelling between the two countries, and a deeper understanding of the characteristics of the Japanese economy, was crucial in shaping new foreground cognitive ideas—or policy solutions—about Japan during this period. Chinese policy-makers came to view economic cooperation with Japan as a solution to the industrial and agricultural problems that had been created by their adoption of the Stalinist economic model. Yet new cognitive ideas do not automatically lead to shifts in policy. However useful the policy solutions articulated by new cognitive ideas may be, cognitive ideas must also be seen as normatively acceptable if they are to be adopted and implemented.¹⁰⁸ In this case, cognitive ideas—that is, economic engagement with Japan as a way to solve problems created by the Stalinist economic model—had powerful normative implications stemming from Japan's history as an aggressive, imperialist neighbour to China. Indeed, the very reason that so many Japanese possessed useful ideas about

¹⁰⁶ FMA File 105-00540-04, 6-7.

¹⁰⁷ Li Enmin, *Zhongri minjian waijiao*, 196.

¹⁰⁸ Rueschemeyer, 'Why and How Ideas Matter,' 241.

Chinese economic development was because they had been part of the Japanese imperial project in Manchuria. To understand how Chinese policy-makers came to see Japan not only as a necessary but also as an *appropriate* source of economic assistance to China, we need to explore the normative ideas that shaped Chinese economic policy towards Japan during these years.

4.3.3. Background normative ideas

Background normative ideas consist of broad-based attitudes and normative assumptions about what is considered appropriate or not, and delimit the range of legitimate or appropriate solutions to policy problems. At a time when Chinese policy-makers were championing ideas about decolonisation and anti-imperialism as a powerful uniting force in the Third World, how did Chinese policy-makers square their need for trade with Japan with the negative legacy of Japan's history of war and imperialism in China? To answer this question, the remainder of this chapter shows that the development of particular normative ideas between 1953 and 1957 actually *increased* the likelihood that Chinese leaders would view Japan as both a necessary and appropriate solution to Chinese economic problems. That is, Chinese normative ideas enhanced the likelihood that cognitive ideas about Japan would be accepted and used.

What were these normative ideas? As was shown above, Chinese leaders' experience at the Geneva and Bandung conferences led to the emergence of a 'Bandung discourse' in Chinese foreign policy, a discourse which saw decolonisation in the Third World as the most important form of world revolution.¹⁰⁹ Here, I argue that a

¹⁰⁹ Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization.'

particularly important, and often overlooked, aspect of this ‘Bandung discourse’ was its focus on industrialisation. That is, Chinese policy makers argued that economic development through industrialisation was an important way for the ‘oppressed peoples’ of Asia and Africa to achieve independence and national strength. In this section I show that the background normative idea that revolution could be achieved through industrialisation would play a powerful constitutive role in shaping Chinese economic policy towards Japan.

The themes of decolonisation and anti-imperialism were the central focus of Zhou Enlai’s speech to the assembled delegates at the Asian-African conference in Bandung in April 1955. Zhou Enlai argued that,

...ever since modern times most of the countries of Asia and Africa in varying degrees have been subjected to colonial plunder and oppression, and have thus been forced to remain in a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness. Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered, and our destiny placed in the hands of others. Thus, we have no choice but to rise against colonialism.¹¹⁰

Having defined the global revolutionary struggle as one of decolonisation, Zhou then argued that only through economic development could the countries of Asia and Africa cast off the ‘shackles of colonialism’ and achieve independence.¹¹¹ Zhou Enlai spoke at length about the relationship between colonisation and economic exploitation. He argued that ‘[t]he majority of our Asian and African countries, including China, are still very backward economically owing to the long period of colonial domination.’¹¹² Economic weakness was seen as a direct result of colonial exploitation; and economic development was one of the most important ways in which to ‘facilitate the elimination of the economic and cultural backwardness caused

¹¹⁰ ‘Zhou’s speech to the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference’, 19 April 1955, in *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, 9-10.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 13.

by the long period of colonial exploitation and oppression'.¹¹³ This idea had existed in China since the May Fourth era, but became particularly acute in the mid-1950s, as Chinese policy-makers began to associate much more strongly with other developing countries of the Third World. For these Third World countries, economic development was paramount.

Furthermore, Zhou and other Chinese leaders stipulated precisely what *kind* of economic development was required to overcome the imperialism of the past. They argued that economic development through industrialisation was an important way for former colonised countries such as China to 'catch up'. Industrialisation was so important because it would,

...[make] it possible for China to produce sufficient quantities of major raw and semi-finished materials and to manufacture independently not only ordinary types of machines but also heavy and precision machinery as well as the new weapons necessary for self-defence, including atomic bombs, missiles and long-range aircraft.¹¹⁴

In his statement to the Bandung conference, fellow Chinese delegate and head of the People's Bank of China, Nan Hanchen, argued that when China was a 'semi-colonised country' (*ban zhimindi de guojia*), it had had a weak economy, with no industry, and no 'mechanised agriculture' (*meiyou jiqi nongzaoye*).¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, as Zhou stated in his speech at Bandung,

In China, ever since the people became masters of their own country, all their efforts have been directed to the elimination of backwardness left behind by the prolonged semi-colonial society and the building of their country into an industrialised one. In the last five years we have rehabilitated the national economy ruined by long years of war, and have since 1953 started the First Five-Year Plan of economic construction.

¹¹³ Ibid., 16-17.

¹¹⁴ 'Problems of policy for economic development', 10 November 1956, in *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 236-237. Importantly, Zhou also notes here that developing a comprehensive system of industry 'does not mean that the country will be fully self-sufficient', but that China would still need to depend on trade with foreign countries.

¹¹⁵ FMA File 207-0070-04, 12-31 March 1955, 'Zhonghua renmin gongheguo daibiaotuan zai YaFei huiyi shang guanyu jingji maoyi wenti de fayan gao (dierci xiugai)' [Draft statement by the representative of the People's Republic of China to the Asia-Africa Conference on economic and trade issues (second draft)], 1-2.

As a result of these efforts, production in all the main fields, such as iron and steel, cotton cloth and grains, have exceeded the level of any period in the history of China. But these achievements are still very small as compared with our actual needs. Our country is still very backward as compared with the highly industrialised ones.¹¹⁶

Thus, in this speech we see the clear linkage between the themes of colonisation, economic backwardness and national weakness on the one hand, and decolonisation, industrialisation and national strength on the other.

Nevertheless, for Chinese policy makers, the relationship between imperialism and industrialisation was a complex one. On the one hand, industrialisation was considered an important means by which the economically weak countries of Asia and Africa could escape out of imperialism, and become more than simply producers of raw materials. Historically, these countries had been exploited by colonial powers for their raw materials. The Chinese delegation at Bandung therefore called on the countries of Asia and Africa to industrialise and diversify their trade so that they would not be relegated to being just exporters of low-value raw materials. Furthermore, they urged the assembled countries at Bandung to cooperate and ensure that no one country became 'a sole producer of raw materials and a market for consumer goods'.¹¹⁷ To assist in this goal, the Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference stipulated that the participating countries would cooperate on economic matters by exchanging technical assistance and know-how where possible, establishing regional training centres and development funds, and by stabilising commodity trade prices within the region.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, 14.

¹¹⁷ 'Zhou's speech to the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference', 19 April 1955, and 'Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference', in *ibid.*, 17, 68-71.

¹¹⁸ 'Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference', in *ibid.*, 68-71.

Yet on the other hand, China's own history meant that its policy makers also conceived of industrialisation in a negative light. In their search to become industrialised countries, foreign powers in Europe and Japan had practiced imperialism in China. In his report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress following the Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai described colonialism in the following terms,

The essence of colonialism is the plunder and exploitation practised by capitalist countries against the backward countries, the transformation of the latter into the former's monopolized markets, sources of raw material, places of investment, and their military strategic bases. This prevents the development of the productive power of the backward countries and keeps these countries in a protracted stagnation, extreme poverty and bankruptcy.¹¹⁹

In the past, foreign powers had exploited China's market, raw materials and territory; after 1949, China's leaders therefore believed that industrialisation was inextricably linked—in negative ways—with imperialism.

This tension at the heart of the relationship between industrialisation and imperialism was reflective of a deeper tension in Chinese normative ideas during this period. During this Bandung era, Chinese officials advocated a new world order that was not defined by imperialism, but rather by a world in which all states, regardless of their size and power, enjoyed sovereignty and mutual equality. As Zhou argued in his speech to delegates at Bandung, 'Countries whether big or small, strong or weak, should all enjoy equal rights in international relations'.¹²⁰ Indeed, this was the normative goal at the very heart of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Yet at the same time, in speeches at Bandung and elsewhere, Chinese officials also argued that Third World countries must pursue industrialisation so that they could become

¹¹⁹ 'Zhou Enlai's report on the Asian-African Conference, made at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress', 13 May 1955, in *ibid.*, 37.

¹²⁰ 'Zhou's speech to the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference', 19 April 1955, in *ibid.*, 14.

strong, resist foreign imperialism, and achieve equality in the international system. And as we have seen, China's own development model was premised on the achievement of economic development and national strength through increased industrialisation and agricultural output. The tension was this: Chinese officials envisioned and advocated for a world that was not shaped by such *realpolitik* notions of power. Nevertheless, until this vision of a new world order could be realised, they had to deal with the realities of the international system as it then existed, and of China's own rather limited capabilities within that system.

This was not simply a pragmatic position, but rather a position that had been developed in response to lessons learned from China's own history. And as we know, one of the most important actors in the history of imperialism in China was Japan. Indeed Chinese specific ideas about Japan, found in the Chinese records, help us to understand how Chinese policy-makers reasoned through this tension between imperialism and industrialisation. In the following section I therefore show how Chinese foreground normative ideas about Japan helped to shape the background normative ideas discussed here. That is, Japan's history as the first industrial and powerful country in Asia was formative in shaping Chinese thinking about the importance of industrialisation.

4.3.4. Foreground normative ideas

Foreground normative ideas are the framing symbols and concepts that are used by actors to both develop and legitimate specific policy positions. The symbols and concepts that we find in foreground normative ideas reflect the sentiments and goals found in background normative ideas. Yet in this case, I depart from Campbell's ideas

framework and find that Chinese foreground normative ideas about Japan also fed back into background normative ideas, thereby shaping broader Chinese thinking about the normative goal of industrialisation for weak states. In what follows I explore the foreground normative ideas used by Chinese policy-makers to develop specific policy proposals towards Japan, and show how these ideas strengthened broader Chinese thinking about the ability to achieve a revolution through industrialisation. I then consider how Chinese policy-makers used ideas as framing devices to ‘sell’ or legitimate their Japan policy. To do so, I focus on three different audiences that were the targets of this framing: other Third World countries at the Bandung conference; different Japanese audiences; and domestic Chinese audiences. I explore the rhetoric used by Chinese policy-makers in their speeches and newspaper editorials. Importantly, because these speeches and editorials were received by multiple audiences, we can see how Chinese policy-makers used ideas as framing devices to explain the relatively complex message of the need for economic cooperation with a former imperialist country and US ally such as Japan.

a) Japan and the links between imperialism and industrialisation

Japan played a formative role in Chinese thinking about the relationship between industrialisation, imperialism, and national strength. As we saw in the previous chapter, immediately after coming to power in 1949, being an ‘industrialised country’ (*gongyehua de guojia*) was central to how Chinese leaders characterised Japan. In January 1955, in the lead up to the Bandung conference and China’s inaugural trade visit to Japan, Murata Shōzō, Chairman of JAPIT, visited Beijing and met with Zhou Enlai. During their four and a half hour meeting, Zhou described the Japanese people as ‘industrious’ (*qinlao*), and repeatedly referred to the fact that industrialisation had

taken place earlier in Japan than in China.¹²¹ Furthermore, Zhou argued that Japan was a special case because it was the first country in Asia to have industrialised, and remained the only Asian industrialised nation.¹²² This made Japan a model of what could be achieved by an Asian state, and a natural point of comparison for China; Zhou argued that China's 'economic culture' was still 'lagging behind' (*luohuo*) that of Japan, and that China must therefore use the path of industrialisation to 'try hard to catch up' (*yingtouganshang*) with Japan.¹²³

Similarly, in a meeting between Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and delegates from the Japanese Socialist Party, who visited China in April 1957, Mao argued that

There are ten industrialised countries in the world, and Japan is one of them, China still cannot be regarded as one, and neither can India. Because we have not yet industrialised.¹²⁴

It is important to appreciate the context of this comment by Mao. During this meeting, the two sides were discussing US military bases in Japan and the expansion of US military alliances around the region. Mao argued that Japan was 'the sort of country that could not be controlled (*kongzhi*) by foreigners in the long-term', and that Japan had the 'power' (*liliang*) to achieve independence from the United States precisely because it was an industrialised country.¹²⁵ Mao was clearly attempting to persuade his Japanese audience to expel US military bases from Japan. Nevertheless, the comment is instructive because it shows that Chinese leaders defined a state's power in terms of whether it had industrialised or not.

¹²¹ FMA File 105-00210-03, 8.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 7-9

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 11-12. For similar statements, see also FMA File 105-00158-02, 7.

¹²⁴ FMA File 105-00540-01, 4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

Of course, crucial to this discussion about the relationship between imperialism and industrialisation was the fact that ‘industrious’ Japan had also been the leading imperialist and aggressive nation in Asia. During this era when Chinese policy-makers held a strong attachment to normative ideas of anti-imperialism, they openly grappled with the model offered by Japan’s path to industrialisation. For instance, Zhou Enlai argued that Japan’s Meiji-era ‘industrialisation had brought militarism to Japan’, and with it, great suffering for both the Chinese and Japanese people. He argued that China must learn from (*xuexi*) Japan’s experience so that China’s industrial path was different. In particular, Zhou argued that the Chinese people’s suffering at the hands of foreign imperialism had taught the Chinese government that ‘external aggression will never be acceptable’.¹²⁶

Yet, it was China’s history of being a weak, non-industrialised country, and its suffering at the hands of other industrialised countries because of this weakness, that seems to have been the most influential lesson for Chinese leaders as they contemplated their economic policy towards Japan. In a discussion with Japanese parliamentarians in October 1954, Zhou Enlai outlined his thinking on the importance of industrialisation, making it clear that without industrialisation, China could never enjoy peaceful relations with other industrialised countries:

China and Japan should not forever be in the situation in which China is an agricultural country and Japan an industrial country...If China remains an agricultural, poor country, this will cause others to feel that they can invade China...Do you want China to forever be a backward, agricultural country? Or do you want China to be an industrial country? The first path is a bad one, and will lead to war. This has been the case for the last hundred years. Numerous imperialist countries waged war to capture the Chinese market. This has been our historical experience. What was the result of Japan’s victory in the Sino-Japanese war sixty years ago? The West interfered, and sought to snatch territory in China. This then brought about the Russo-Japanese war which, in order to divide their sphere of influence, brought chaos to China, made China poorer and poorer, and made the

¹²⁶ FMA File No: 105-00210-03, 22.

market smaller and smaller. Although this was advantageous for militarism, it was not advantageous for the people....The other path is letting China industrialise. This requires a peaceful international environment, and allowing us to reconstruct our own country. Only an industrialised China and an industrialised Japan will lead to peaceful coexistence and mutual prosperity....Only if the living standards of the Chinese people increase, will China's actual strength increase.¹²⁷

As we see from this statement, Zhou Enlai argued that it was China's economic backwardness that had allowed China to be exploited and invaded by foreign powers in the past. Only if China were industrialised would it be able to enjoy mutual equality and sovereignty in its relationships with industrialised states such as Japan.

Thus, we can see that Japan's historical development path, and China's suffering as a result of that development path, was formative in shaping Chinese normative ideas—about Japan, and about international relations more generally—during the Bandung era. Central to these normative ideas was the need for weak countries to industrialise in order to withstand foreign imperialism. Leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai articulated a view of the international system that was shaped by *realpolitik* notions that strong states have the power to do what they will, and that weak states suffer what they must.¹²⁸ As such, these leaders advocated the normative goal that weak states should pursue revolution through industrialisation. To be sure, in China's case it was the Soviet economic model that would provide the road map on how to achieve industrialisation. Nevertheless, we have seen here that the overall goal of industrialisation stemmed from the historical lessons that Chinese policy-makers had learned, in part, by observing countries such as Japan. Moreover, and as a result of comparative economic advantage and a shared economic history in places such as

¹²⁷ FMA File 105-00158-02, 16-17. See also the English version of this transcript recorded in American Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, 'Japanese interview with Chou En-lai', 17 February 1955, US State Department Central Files, 693.94/2-1755, RG59, USNA, 10-11.

¹²⁸ Paraphrasing Thucydides, 'The History of the Peloponnesian War', Book 5.89, in Chris Brown et al., *International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 54.

Manchuria,¹²⁹ Chinese leaders believed that Japan could provide China with many of the goods, technologies and expertise needed to go down the path of rapid industrialisation.

b) Framing 'Japan' to different audiences

But as ever, Japan's identity as a former imperialist country, a US ally, and a state with which China did not enjoy diplomatic relations, meant that the issue of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation was a particularly complex one. To see how Chinese policy-makers attempted to 'sell' and legitimate a policy of economic engagement with Japan to different audiences, we need to consider how Chinese policy-makers strategically used ideas to frame their Japan policy to three different audiences between 1953 and 1957.

Bandung Audience

The Chinese government played up a number of key themes to make Japan, a former colonial and aggressive power, appear more acceptable to other Third World countries participating in the Bandung conference. This was seen as important because, as Zhou Enlai argued,

Of all Asian and African countries, Japan is industrially more developed than the others. If it will give up its old practice of colonialism, Japan, too, can provide technical assistance to other countries in Asia and Africa.¹³⁰

The Chinese government therefore used speeches at the Bandung meeting and editorials in the *People's Daily* (which were translated and read in foreign countries) to communicate the message that, despite its history as a colonial power, the Japanese

¹²⁹ For more on this, see the discussion in Chapter Two.

¹³⁰ 'Zhou Enlai's report on the Asian-African Conference, made at the meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress', 13 May 1955, in *China and the Asian-African Conference (Documents)*, 46.

people now shared a common fate with Third World countries in Asia and Africa. Early in his speech to the assembled delegates at Bandung, Zhou Enlai made clear that China was ‘willing to promote the normalization of relations between China and Japan’ on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.¹³¹ More importantly, however, Chinese policy makers worked hard to emphasise to fellow Third World countries that Japan was also a victim of foreign imperialism. A series of editorials that were published in the *People’s Daily* in the lead up to the Bandung meeting depicted Japan as a fellow ‘semi-colonised country’ whose people were struggling against US imperialism. These editorials wrote of the United States ‘enslaving’ (*nuyi*) the Japanese people,¹³² and having ‘forced Japan into a semi-colonial state’ (*Riben beipo chuyu ban bei zhanling de zhuangtai*) at the end of the war.¹³³

Japanese Audiences

To Japanese audiences, Chinese policy makers used ideas as framing devices to achieve two things. First, they attempted to encourage Japanese business groups and left-wing politicians to put pressure on the Japanese government to strengthen its economic ties with China. As noted above, the US-Japan relationship impeded many aspects of the Sino-Japanese trade relationship in the mid-1950s. In addition to the ongoing US embargo on the trade of key strategic goods with China, direct shipping was prohibited, and the two countries were not permitted to run a system of credit

¹³¹ ‘Zhou Enlai’s speech to the Plenary Session of the Asian-African Conference’, 19 April 1955, in *ibid.*, 19.

¹³² *Renmin Ribao* [*People’s Daily*], 13 March 1954, ‘Meiguo qiangjia zai Riben renmin shenshang de you yi dao jiaoxiao’ [United States strengthens the yoke on the Japanese people]. For similar arguments, see also *Renmin Ribao* [*People’s Daily*], 26 February 1955, ‘Riben renmin mianlin zhe liang tiao daolu’ [The Japanese people face two roads]; *Renmin Ribao* [*People’s Daily*], 2 April 1955, ‘Jin yi bu fazhan ZhongRi liang guo de maoyi guanxi’ [Further development of Sino-Japanese trade relations].

¹³³ *Renmin Ribao* [*People’s Daily*], 19 October 1955, ‘Nuli cujin ZhongRi guanxi zhengchanghua’ [Work hard to promote the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations].

between their national banks.¹³⁴ The Japanese government feared that moving ahead on these issues would be interpreted in the US as *de facto* Japanese recognition of the PRC.¹³⁵ Officials in the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry therefore argued that they needed to,

Make the Japanese people and those enthusiastic about Japanese trade increase their resentment of the Hatoyama government on the Sino-Japanese trade issue, and increase their hatred of, and opposition to, US imperialism.¹³⁶

To do so, Beijing used speeches to visiting Japanese delegations and *People's Daily* editorials to argue that Japan's relationship with the United States was harming the Japanese economy. For instance, around the time of the Bandung meeting, one editorial argued that under US 'occupation' (*zhanling*) and 'control' (*kongzhi*), Japanese levels of foreign trade were just thirty to forty percent of prewar levels.¹³⁷ To drive home the point that it was trade with China that was largely missing in Japan's trade profile, the editorial also noted that 'because China and Japan are near neighbours they have historically enjoyed close economic relations'.¹³⁸ Another editorial argued that the United States was dumping surplus agriculture in Japan, which was hurting the interests of Japanese farmers and SMEs.¹³⁹ *People's Daily* editorials also attempted to stoke Japanese fears of US military policy in Asia. They

¹³⁴ Without bank credit, trade could only take place under a system of barter. See FMA File 105-00300-01; FMA File 105-00300-07.

¹³⁵ 'Review of Sino-Japanese relations, October 1954 to October 1955', 10 October 1955, US State Department Central Files, 693.94/10-1055, RG59, USNA, 6-9, 13.

¹³⁶ FMA File 105-00300-07, part 3.

¹³⁷ Notably, this editorial did not mention that it was Japanese imperial exploitation of Korea and Manchuria that had underpinned Japan's high levels of foreign trade before and during the war. *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*], 2 April 1955, 'Jin yi bu fazhan ZhongRi liang guo de maoyi guanxi' [Further development of Sino-Japanese trade relations].

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*], 13 March 1954, 'Meiguo qiangjia zai Riben renmin shenshang de you yi dao jiaxiao' [United States strengthens the yoke on the Japanese people].

argued that the United States was trying to drag Japan down the path of militarism,¹⁴⁰ and condemned US nuclear testing in the region.¹⁴¹

Second, Beijing also tried to portray China as a ‘moderate’ country in order to reach out to more conservative elements in Japan. For instance, the Chinese government offered flexibility on the conditions for normalisation of Sino-Japanese relations. During a meeting at Bandung with the head of the Japanese delegation and now Minister for International Trade and Industry, Takasaki Tatsunosuke, Zhou Enlai made it clear to Takasaki that ‘Japan does not need to break off relations with the US in order to build relations with China’.¹⁴² Furthermore, in their preparations for the Bandung meeting, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reflected that it risked embarrassing the Japanese delegation if China condemned the US at the meeting.¹⁴³ Thus, towards the end of his speech to the Political Committee at Bandung, Zhou Enlai made China’s moderate position clear, stating that,

China is willing to respect the choices of the American people and the Japanese people in choosing their own political and economic systems. We respected the choice of the Japanese people to elect the Yoshida Shigeru government, and we respect the choice of the Japanese people when they elected the Hatoyama Ichirō government.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁰ *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*], 27 November 1955, ‘Zhichi Riben renmin fandui Meiguo junshi jidi de douzheng’ [Support the Japanese people in their struggle against US military bases].

¹⁴¹ *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*], 7 August 1956, ‘Buxu Hiroshima Nagasaki beiju chongyan’ [Do not allow a repeat of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies].

¹⁴² FMA File 105-00211-04, 22 April 1955, ‘Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Riben Takasaki tanhua jilu’ [Records of the dialogue between Premier Zhou Enlai and Japan's Takasaki], 2. Zhou made similar statements on more than one occasion. See for instance, New York Herald Tribune to Far Eastern Department (China), ‘Chinese attitude towards Japan’, 31 December 1954, FO 371/115005, FC 10323/1, UKNA; FMA File 116-00285-03, 1 March 1956, ‘Zhou Enlai zongli dui Riben “Gongtongshe” jizhu Yorioka Kenichirō fang suoti wenti de dafu’ [Premier Zhou Enlai's answers to questions from Yorioka Kenichirō, journalist from Japan's "Kyodo News"]].

¹⁴³ FMA File 207-00085-24, 2.

¹⁴⁴ In this speech to the Political Committee towards the end of the Bandung meeting, Zhou Enlai outlined seven main points of discussion. This section on Japan comprised the sixth point. ‘Zhou Enlai zongli zai YaFei huiyi zhengzhi weiyuanhui huiyi shang de fayan’ [Zhou Enlai’s statement at the Asia-Africa Conference Political Committee Meeting], 23 April 1955, in Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 205-206.

To back up the ideas contained in this speech, China's inaugural trade delegation to Japan—which was visiting Japan during the Bandung meeting—was explicitly warned not to take part in any overtly political activities while in Japan. The delegation was warned: 'not to undertake any secret activities', 'not to interfere in Japanese domestic political disputes', and not to make special contact with organisations such as the Japanese Communist Party. The Chinese Foreign Ministry feared that such activities could be misinterpreted as attempts to export communism, overthrow the Japanese government, or interfere in the internal affairs of Japan.¹⁴⁵

Finally, the Chinese government once again used the issue of repatriation—this time the repatriation of Japanese war criminals—to present itself in a sympathetic light to Japan. Between 1954 and 1956, Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi announced their decision to repatriate the overwhelming majority of the 1063 Japanese war criminals held in China, and in the summer of 1956 held trials for another 45 alleged Japanese war criminals.¹⁴⁶ As a way of demonstrating China's benevolent nature, the CCP chose not to issue the death penalty to any of those found guilty and repatriated most of the war criminals back to Japan. In speeches and meetings with Japanese delegations after the trials, Zhou Enlai drew a contrast between China's liberal treatment of the Japanese war criminals and the United States' refusal to release the 210 Japanese POWs still incarcerated at Sugamo Prison in Japan. To emphasise this point, Zhou argued that China's treatment of the Japanese war criminals was 'intended to demonstrate China's desire for Sino-Japanese friendship'.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ FMA File 105-00300-01, 4-5.

¹⁴⁶ Cathcart and Nash, 'War Criminals and the Road to Sino-Japanese Normalization: Zhou Enlai and the Shenyang Trials, 1954-1956,' 95-99.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 107.

This tactic of framing Chinese diplomacy in a moderate light reflected growing Chinese awareness of the difficult position that the Japanese government found itself in. This growing awareness came about through increased contact with Japanese civil society organisations and political parties as discussed above. For instance, the Chinese Red Cross delegation, which had visited Japan in October and November 1954, and met with members of the Japanese Diet, business community and civil society organisations such as the JCFA and JCTPA, returned reporting that the United States was placing great pressure on Tokyo to resist all contact with China.¹⁴⁸ The Chinese Foreign Ministry was therefore cognisant that Japan was stuck between its alliance relationship with the United States on the one hand, and its desire—for a host of economic, political and security reasons—to normalise relations with China on the other. Thus, in its work report following the visit to Japan, the trade delegation reflected that because Japan was ‘a semi-occupied country’,

Fighting for Japan is long-term work; we must be patient, and must fully realise the difficulty of this work.¹⁴⁹

Domestic Chinese Audiences

‘Selling’ their policy to Chinese domestic audiences was arguably the most difficult task facing the Chinese government. It required explaining the relatively complex message that economic cooperation with a former imperialist enemy was both necessary and desirable. The Chinese Foreign Ministry employed a number of strategies in its attempt to do this. First, reflecting tactics used between 1949 and 1952, Chinese policy-makers used speeches and *People’s Daily* editorials to draw a

¹⁴⁸ FMA File 105-00300-01, 2; FMA File File No. 105-00161-03, 28 October-12 November 1954, ‘Zhongguo hongshizihui fangRi daibiaotuan zai Riben jiechu de ge fangmian zhuyao renwu mingdan’ [A list of the main people that the Chinese Red Cross delegation came into contact with during their visit to Japan], 1-68. For discussion on the Japanese government’s perspective, see Braddick, *Japan and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964: In the Shadow of the Monolith*, 112-113.

¹⁴⁹ FMA File 105-00300-07, part 2.

distinction between the peaceful Japanese people who were victims of US imperialism, and the ‘reactionary’ Japanese government who supported US militarism in Asia.¹⁵⁰ Straddling both of these positions at once was difficult. It was made even more difficult by the fact that Beijing appeared to be trying to use the same rhetorical devices, such as the *People’s Daily*, to speak to more than one audience. That is, *People’s Daily* editorials often contained the complex message that the Japanese people were the friends of the Chinese people; that Japan and its economy were being endangered by the US alliance; and that China opposed the ‘imperialist’ and ‘militaristic’ Japanese government. Whether or not the use of this complex message was inadvertent or by design, it was an impossible balance. Reflecting this, almost all American and British intelligence reports and diplomatic cables at the time interpreted Chinese propaganda simply as attempts to export communism to Japan and break up the US-Japan alliance. The economic goals of China’s Japan policy were overlooked or disregarded by officials in Washington and London.¹⁵¹

The Chinese government was arguably more successful in its second framing tactic. The Foreign Ministry sent internal directives to Chinese diplomats stationed abroad, and to lower-level officials within the CCP, explaining and justifying China’s economic policy towards Japan in ways that linked this policy with the background normative ideas discussed above. For example, in October 1954, Premier Zhou Enlai met with a group of Japanese Parliamentary and Cultural Affairs representatives.

¹⁵⁰ See for example, *Renmin Ribao* [*People’s Daily*], 30 October 1953, ‘Lun ZhongRi guanxi’ [On Sino-Japanese relations]; *Renmin Ribao* [*People’s Daily*], 13 March 1954, ‘Meiguo qiangjia zai Riben renmin shenshang de you yi dao jiaoxiao’ [United States strengthens the yoke on the Japanese people].

¹⁵¹ See for example, ‘Review of Sino-Japanese relations, October 1954 to October 1955’, 10 October 1955, US State Department Central Files, 693.94/10-1055, RG59, USNA, 1-2, 5; P. Wilkinson’s response to Sir E Dening, Tokyo to Far Eastern Department (China), ‘Agreement between the Chinese Trade Delegation and the Japanese Association for the Promotion of International Trade’, 11 May 1955, FO 371/115098, FC 11323/15, UKNA.

About a dozen other Chinese officials were in attendance at this meeting, as well as the head of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Guo Moruo (郭沫若). The records of this meeting were also sent to all of China's foreign ambassadors, diplomats, and charge d'affaires abroad.¹⁵² At this meeting, Zhou spoke at length about the historical development of Japanese industrialisation, militarism and imperialism:

Japan's economy and culture are ahead of China's, but Japan's industrial development also brought misfortune. It produced militarism, launched a war of aggression, and brought great misfortune to the Japanese people. However, this situation is in the past. The Chinese people are able to analytically distinguish these problems. Militarism brought great suffering to the Japanese people, but industrialisation brought great benefits and economic development to the Japanese people.¹⁵³

Having established this analytical distinction between the negative effects of militarism and the positive effects of industrialisation, Zhou went on to argue that trade with Japan could help China to industrialise. Zhou argued that,

China's economic development and growing market requires [Japan and China] to help supply each other's needs, develop trade, and increase the quantity of trade...Japan is our neighbour, you need our market and people. You understand us much more than other foreign countries, you know our goods, and know which goods you need most.¹⁵⁴

Zhou further explained that Japan was an appropriate economic partner for China because Japan had been a source of learning for China in the past:

Cultural exchange between our two countries has historically been a very frequent (*pinfan*) thing. Over the last eighty years, China's study of Western culture has been via (*tongguo*) Japan, that is, it has started by studying you. Many of the older generation in China who are active in politics today, studied in Japan. Mr Guo Moruo sitting here is an important example of one who studied in Japan. He studied medicine at your Imperial University, and after the failure of the revolution, lived in Japan for another decade. The *Guomindang* persecuted (*pohai*) him, exiled him to Japan, [but] you sheltered him, and for that we are very thankful. Japanese culture gave us many advantages, and we ought to be thankful for this friendship. When I was an exchange student, I also lived in Japan for half a year, but I didn't learn Japanese. Nevertheless, while I lived in Japan, Japan made a deep impression on me, and [I found] Japan's culture extremely beautiful (*feichang youmei*).¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² FMA File 105-00158-02, 2.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 7.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 16-17.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 18. For more discussion on the older generation of Chinese who had studied in Japan in the first half of the twentieth century, see Chapter Two of this thesis.

The key point to elicit here is not the question of whether or not Zhou genuinely believed that Japan's culture was 'extremely beautiful' or that the Chinese people ought to be 'thankful' for their historical friendship with Japan. Rather, it is that by framing Japan in this way to lower-level officials and Chinese diplomats, Zhou was signalling the official view that economic cooperation with Japan was of paramount importance for China's industrialisation. That is, Zhou was linking these foreground ideas about Japan with the background normative idea that industrialisation was necessary for China's economic development, but also that China's future industrial path would be different from the militaristic industrial path taken by Japan. Furthermore, Zhou was demonstrating that Japan was a particularly important economic partner for China because the two countries shared a long-term history of cultural exchange, that China had historically learned from the West by studying the development path of Japan, and that senior Chinese officials and celebrated intellectuals such as Guo Moruo had themselves learned something from Japan.¹⁵⁶ Through directives such as these, Chinese policy-makers demonstrated that trade with Japan was both necessary and legitimate.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the constitutive role of ideas in shaping China's economic policy towards Japan between 1953 and 1957. It has argued that during these years, the background cognitive idea of increasing industrial and agricultural output in line with the Stalinist economic model, and the background normative idea that China's anti-imperialist revolution could be achieved through industrialisation, were central in delimiting the foreground cognitive and normative ideas upon which

¹⁵⁶ At the same time, this meeting also signalled to the Japanese Parliamentary Delegation that Beijing sought a closer economic relationship with Japan.

Chinese economic policy towards Japan rested. Chinese policy-makers came to see economic cooperation with Japan as both a useful solution to some of the problems of economic development in China, and as an appropriate yardstick against which China's own development path could be compared. It is important to remind ourselves here that Japan did not replace the Soviet Union as a model of economic development in China during these years. Nevertheless, at a time when the Soviet Union was moving in a somewhat different direction, economically, to China, Japan provided much-needed industrial and agricultural advice, technology, and goods which helped China in implementing the goals of the Soviet model.

Furthermore, as the first and only country in Asia to have 'industrialised'—and to have done so at the expense of its weaker neighbours—Japan's development path was formative in shaping broader Chinese background normative ideas about the relationship between industrialisation, imperialism and national strength. Despite the aggressive nature of Japan's industrial development, Chinese policy-makers now argued that without industrialisation China could never be a powerful nation, or one that enjoyed peaceful relations with other industrialised (and therefore powerful) countries. In showing this, this chapter has argued that one often overlooked aspect of the 'Bandung discourse' that emerged in Chinese foreign policy thinking during this period was the focus on industrialisation as pivotal for Third World states emerging out of decolonisation. In addition, by showing how Chinese foreground normative ideas about Japan's development path fed back into Chinese background normative ideas, this chapter has also provided evidence of the need to build on Campbell's four-part ideas framework to explore more precisely how ideas interact across different levels.

Finally, this chapter has demonstrated some of the mechanisms by which ideas are produced, transmitted, and strategically employed by actors to shape policy. In this regard, the chapter has made two important arguments. First, it has argued that, if ideas are to have any role in shaping policy, individuals are critically important as transmitters of ideas. This finding is suggestive of similar work by scholars such as Ikenberry, who has explored the role of epistemic communities in propelling forward ideas about Keynesianism in the post-World War II era, and Finnemore and Sikkink, who have shown how early leaders in the women's suffrage movement served as 'norm entrepreneurs' in spreading new ideas about women's rights.¹⁵⁷ In this chapter, I demonstrated that visits to China by hundreds of Japanese political and business representatives—many of whom had lived and worked in China before and during the war—were crucial in spreading information about the Japanese economy to Chinese policy makers. Similarly, although the number of Chinese travelling to *Japan* was much smaller during this period, those individuals who did make the journey were also important in spreading ideas; these individuals came into contact with hundreds of Japanese, and were exposed to new factories and business practices during their visits to Japan. Furthermore, as alluded to by Zhou Enlai in 1954, Chinese cognitive and normative ideas had also been produced and transmitted by an older generation of Chinese who had studied abroad in Japan during the first half of the twentieth century. Many of these, such as Zhou, were now in charge of policy-making in China.

Second, this chapter has demonstrated how actors strategically use ideas as framing devices to 'sell' policy to different audiences. I argued that the necessity of trading

¹⁵⁷ Ikenberry, 'Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian "New Thinking" and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement.'; Finnemore and Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,' 895-899. See also Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (London: Cornell University Press, 1998).

with an imperialist country such as Japan was a particularly complex message, and one that was therefore difficult to sell to multiple audiences. It was made more difficult by the fact that Chinese policy-makers chose to or inadvertently used a single medium—the *People's Daily*—to reach out to more than one audience at the same time. In fact, the complexity of this message, and the fact that Japan was at once an economic partner, a US ally, and a former imperialist aggressor, would soon bring about a crisis in Chinese economic policy towards Japan. That crisis will be the subject of the next chapter.

Chapter Five

When Ideas Collide

Interaction between cognitive and normative ideas in China's Japan policy, 1958-July 1960

5.1 Introduction

On 9 May 1958, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi made a statement to China's state-run *Xinhua* news, condemning Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke for having 'openly sabotaged the Sino-Japanese trade agreement', making 'vicious and insulting attacks on China', and trying to 'fawn over the United States and the Chiang Kai-shek clique'.¹ Though the Chinese-state run press had criticised Japan and its 'imperialistic' behaviour in the past, this statement marked a low-point in the postwar Sino-Japanese relationship. In May 1958, trade relations between Japan and China would be completely suspended.

The previous two chapters have explored the development of Chinese ideas about Japan since 1949, showing that there was a relatively uneasy balance between the two most prominent Chinese ideas about Japan. On the one hand, Chinese policy-makers held the cognitive idea that Japan was an important source of the industrial goods and expertise needed for China's economic development. On the other hand, though Chinese policy-makers often downplayed Japan's history as an imperialistic and militaristic state that had victimised China in the past, they did not always find it easy to legitimate their policy of 'trading with the enemy', particularly given that Japan was now allied with China's chief 'imperialistic' enemy, the United States. As we have seen, this uneasy balance posed challenges to the Chinese leadership in terms of

¹ FMA File 105-00379-01, 9 May 1958, 'Chen Yi waizhang jiu ZhongRi guanxi fabiao tanhua (fu yingwen gao)' [Dialogue by Foreign Minister Chen Yi on the Sino-Japanese relationship (English draft attached)], 6.

how they justified their policy of ‘trading with the enemy’, and in how they conceived of the conceptual relationship between imperialism and industrialisation. In this chapter, I show that the clash between these ideas would bring about a crisis in China’s Japan policy between 1958 and July 1960.

The main theoretical question underpinning this chapter is the matter of what happens when cognitive and normative ideas collide. As we saw in the Introduction to the thesis, cognitive ideas—that is good solutions to policy problems—are not sufficient on their own to lead to acceptance and use because they also have normative implications. In this chapter we shall explore what happened when China’s cognitive ideas about Japan interacted with negative normative ideas about Japan. The chapter argues that the radicalisation of China’s domestic and foreign policy during the Great Leap Forward paved the way for the collision of cognitive and normative ideas about Japan. Building on the economic policies developed in 1956 and 1957 (discussed in Chapter Four), the Great Leap Forward (GLF) of 1958 was designed to strengthen China’s economy, thereby allowing China to stand up to the imperialist countries of the West, and demonstrate the superiority of Chinese socialism over that of Soviet socialism. While the environment of the GLF enhanced China’s need to look to states such as Japan for assistance in strengthening the Chinese economy, the GLF also accentuated the negative normative implications of trading with an imperialistic enemy such as Japan.

The previous chapter hinted at the need to adapt Campbell’s four-part ideas framework in order to interrogate how ideas interact across different idea types. As noted in the Introduction to the thesis, while useful, Campbell’s four-part ideas

framework is limited in that it is a static framework which only takes a snapshot of the four different idea types at a particular moment in time. We therefore need to build on Campbell's framework to capture this interaction. To do so, Chapters Five and Six therefore deploy a variation of the four-part framework. Chapter Five takes place during the GLF, a time of great radicalisation in China's domestic and foreign policy. This radicalisation sharpened the goal of rapid industrialisation in China, and Chinese criticisms of 'imperialism' and 'revisionism'. The GLF environment thus created the conditions for a potential clash between Chinese cognitive and normative ideas about Japan. To focus on the particular interaction between cognitive and normative ideas, Chapter Five therefore relaxes the four-part framework and does not distinguish between background and foreground ideas. Instead, this chapter solely explores Chinese ideas about Japan along their cognitive and normative dimensions.

In the next section I explore the radicalisation in China's foreign and economic policy between 1958 and July 1960. From there, the chapter shows that for the first few months of 1958, Chinese cognitive ideas about Japan were prominent. Despite an official policy of 'self-reliance', Chinese policy-makers saw Japanese goods and expertise as particularly important as China embarked on the GLF. However, the chapter then shows that the policies of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke—a leader who had been indicted as a Class A war criminal during the Second World War, and who therefore represented the worst of Japan's militaristic past—soon created major normative obstacles in Chinese thinking about Japan. After exploring the implications for China's Japan policy of this clash between cognitive and normative ideas, the chapter then draws on a range of Chinese and other archival documents to consider the ideational and other strategies employed by Chinese

policy-makers as they attempted to realign the cognitive and normative dimensions of China's Japan policy. In doing so, the chapter pays attention to those leaders, such as Zhou Enlai, whose ideas played a particularly influential role in getting the Sino-Japanese relationship back on track. Finally, in exploring these leaders' ideas, we shall also see how a number of 'mistaken' ideas about Japan shaped China's Japan policy between 1958 and July 1960.

5.2 Historical Context, 1958-July 1960

China experienced great political and economic radicalisation in domestic and foreign policy between 1958 and 1961, symbolised, in particular, by the policies of the GLF. The goals of this political and economic radicalisation stemmed from the same sets of concerns that had faced the Chinese Communist Party since 1949—the need for rapid self-strengthening at home and security in the world in order to face the sorts of challenges that had afflicted China during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, the particular nature of the political and economic radicalisation that took place in China in the late 1950s was also heavily shaped by growing political tensions within the Party and difficulties in China's relationship with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. In the midst of these domestic and foreign policy developments, China also faced a shifting regional security environment as the United States and Japan began to revise their security alliance.

5.2.1. Political radicalisation in China and the Great Leap Forward

An atmosphere of political openness characterised China during the 'Hundred Flowers Campaign' of 1956-1957. However, this openness was quickly curtailed by Mao after the Party became the target of mounting criticism. In the summer of 1957,

Mao initiated the Anti-Rightist campaign—a bitter crackdown on intellectuals and divergent opinion within the Party. This resulted in the side-lining of political moderates such as Premier Zhou Enlai, who was criticised for having opposed ‘rash advance’ in China’s economic development. Zhou was also criticised for having adopted a ‘conservative and rightist’ approach to China’s foreign relations, and for maintaining ‘a kind of wishful thinking concerning imperialism (especially towards Japan and the United States)’.²

These political dynamics also paved the way for the radicalisation of Chinese economic planning. Late 1957 saw the ascendancy of a group of economic planners from the heavy industry ministries who favoured, in particular, self-reliance instead of dependence on Soviet technology, the use of agriculture to support industrial development, and rapid growth in the heavy industry sector. This group, led by Li Fuchun (李富春), Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Bo Yibo (薄一波), Chairman of the State Economic Commission, revived the Yan’an slogan of ‘self-reliance’ (*ziligengsheng*), and argued that China could build faster, more efficiently, and more successfully than the Soviet Union. Although ultimate responsibility for the decision to embark on the GLF rests with Mao, Zhou Enlai and other top leaders in the CCP, the policies espoused by this group of planners appealed to Mao’s desire for rapid economic advancement in China and greater independence from the Soviet model being pursued by Khrushchev. These policies thus became the ‘central economic planks’ of the GLF.³

² Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, ‘Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,’ in *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963*, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), 267.

³ David Bachman, *Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China: The Institutional Origins of the Great Leap Forward* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 96-97. Bachman’s study offers an important neo-institutionalist analysis of the economic policy-making that led to the Great Leap

In August 1958, China embarked on its most radical—and ultimately destructive—set of economic development policies as part of the GLF. The failure of the GLF (1958-1961) has become a well-known story.⁴ Mao's desire for a 'Great Leap' in steel and other industrial output caused a substantial shift in the labour force away from agriculture and towards urban industrial production in 1958-1959. This led to a significant decline in the nation's grain output in 1959 and a concomitant increase in demand for rationed grain in urban areas.⁵ The pressure on these depleted grain supplies was further exacerbated by drought, miscalculation in state agricultural planning due to the acceptance of inflated production figures in 1959, and the introduction of the rural commune system.⁶ The latter was particularly disastrous for China's rural population: the commune system encouraged leaders to falsely report production levels, and caused farmland to be neglected by removing individual incentives for production and misallocating labour.⁷ The GLF resulted in a 26 per cent fall in grain output in 1960, a similar decline in the production of other crops and meat, and a staggering increase in mortality that year, particularly in China's rural areas.⁸

Forward. However, for a more critical view of the role of Mao and the central CCP leadership during the Great Leap Forward, see Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*; Yang Dali, *Calamity and Reform in China: State, Rural Society, and Institutional Change since the Great Leap Famine* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996).

⁴ See, for example ———, *Calamity and Reform in China*; Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*; Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, *China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward 1955-1959* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

⁵ Nicholas R. Lardy, 'The Chinese Economy under Stress, 1958-1965,' in *Cambridge History of China, the People's Republic, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949-1965*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 367-369.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Yang Dali, *Calamity and Reform in China*, 36; Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 52-55.

⁸ Yang Dali, *Calamity and Reform in China*, 37-38.

5.2.2. Breakdown in Sino-Soviet Relations

Mao's radical economic policies also significantly destabilised the Sino-Soviet relationship. Central to the policies of the GLF was the goal of surpassing the Soviet Union in the pace of socialist construction.⁹ Yet despite Mao's espousal of 'self-reliance', China actually needed to increase its imports of Soviet technology, plant equipment and industrial goods in 1958 and 1959 in order to pursue the GLF.¹⁰ Furthermore, although the Soviet Union was initially publicly supportive of Mao's plans for the GLF, Mao grew angry when, in the middle of 1959, Soviet leaders openly aired their doubts about China's economic policies and the use of people's communes in particular.¹¹ Furthermore, there were growing problems in the Sino-Soviet economic relationship. For instance, China complained that Soviet chemical fertilizer exports were costly, frequently delayed, and were limiting China's agricultural development. Consequently, China turned to Western Europe and Japan for agricultural technology and help in developing an indigenous chemical fertilizer industry after 1957 (when US restrictions on trade with China were somewhat relaxed).¹²

This bilateral economic tension came at a time when Khrushchev was already displaying concerns about China's militant tendencies and its ideological direction.¹³ During the late 1950s China provided substantial aid to militants struggling in Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Algeria.¹⁴ Furthermore, in August 1958, Mao instigated the second

⁹ Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, 'The Great Leap Forward, the People's Commune and the Sino-Soviet Split,' *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 72 (2011), 861-868.

¹⁰ Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 73-74.

¹¹ Zhang Shu Guang, 'Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,' 202-205; Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, 'The Great Leap Forward, the People's Commune and the Sino-Soviet Split,' 868-878. *ibid.*

¹² Mitcham, *China's Economic Relations with the West and Japan*, 19-20.

¹³ Mark Kramer, 'The U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split, September 1959,' *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7(1995), 174-175.

¹⁴ Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, 138-139.

Taiwan Straits Crisis and bombarded the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy (*Jinmen*) and Matsu (*Mazu*).¹⁵ Mao used this crisis to counter the US and British 'imperialist invasion' of Jordan and Lebanon, and to mobilise China's domestic population in the lead up to the GLF, but the second Taiwan Straits Crisis also had a profound impact on Sino-Soviet ties.¹⁶ By failing to alert the Soviet Union of his plans in advance, and showing a blatant disregard for the risk of potential nuclear-armed conflict between the superpowers, Mao undermined Khrushchev's trust and the solidarity of the alliance.¹⁷ As China's foreign policy grew increasingly radical throughout 1958 and 1959, the Soviet Union distanced itself further from China. Fearful of a potentially nuclear-armed China, the Soviet Union rescinded its pledge to provide a prototype nuclear weapon to China under the 1957 New Defence Technology Agreement.¹⁸ Then, on 16 July 1960, Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of all Soviet economic advisors and experts, and within one month more than 1300 had left China.¹⁹ This was devastating for the Chinese economy. The Soviet withdrawal forced China to cancel more than 250 construction projects, a number of military and high-technology projects were stopped partway through development, and China began to suffer from shortages of key products such as specialised petroleum, oil, aircraft parts and a range of other industrial goods.²⁰ Khrushchev also withdrew from twelve separate economic and technical aid agreements with China and there was a dramatic reduction in trade between the two countries after 1960.²¹

¹⁵ The Dachen islands were seized by the PRC during the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1955.

¹⁶ Speech by Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 8 September 1958 in Li Xiaobing et al., 'Mao Zedong's Handling of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958,' *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7(1995), 217; Thomas J Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 204-205.

¹⁷ Kramer, 'Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split,' 174.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 174-175; Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, 138-139.

²⁰ Mitcham, *China's Economic Relations with the West and Japan*.

²¹ Zhang Shu Guang, 'Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,' 214.

5.2.3. Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty

In addition to these shifts in China's relationship with the Soviet Union, the period between 1958 and 1960 also saw significant changes in China's regional security environment. In 1958 the United States and Japan began negotiations to revise their 1951 security treaty. Washington had begun to detect a negative shift in its relationship with Japan and Douglas MacArthur II, US Ambassador to Japan, was keenly aware of the potentially precarious state of relations.²² Although generally supported by the Japanese conservatives when it was entered into in 1951, the US-Japan Security Treaty had, by the late 1950s, become deeply unpopular in Japan. It was viewed as an unequal treaty that infringed on Japanese sovereignty, and placed Japan in a dangerous position between the world's two superpowers.²³ After his election as Japan's Prime Minister in 1957, Kishi Nobusuke took on the task of revising some of the more controversial aspects of the treaty: the number of American troops and bases in Japan, and Japan's lack of control over the deployment of US troops and weapons based on Japanese territory.²⁴

The United States saw an important window of opportunity to revise the treaty during Kishi's tenure as Prime Minister. Kishi had a strong mandate after his impressive performance during the May elections in Japan, and despite his desire for a more equal relationship with Washington,²⁵ the Prime Minister was a staunch supporter of

²² US Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, 12 February 1958, in FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XVIII, Japan and Korea, 4-5. Ambassador MacArthur was the nephew of General Douglas MacArthur, who had been Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers during the US occupation of Japan.

²³ George R. Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), 44-55; John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), 54, 112-113, 146-152.

²⁴ Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo*, 44-55.

²⁵ US Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, 5 June 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, vol. XVIII, Japan and Korea, 35-36.

‘long-term and durable security arrangements’ with the United States.²⁶ MacArthur believed that the US would have considerable leverage over Japan by revising the Security Treaty sooner, rather than once Japan had become politically and economically stronger.²⁷ Moreover, MacArthur recognised that if Japan continued to feel trapped in an undesirable security treaty, there was a chance, however slight, that it could follow some of its Asian neighbours in adopting a path of neutrality.²⁸

This push towards neutrality originated with the left-wing in Japan who believed that the alliance was a liability in Japan’s relationship with the PRC, and feared that the alliance could draw Japan into a US-inspired conflict in East Asia.²⁹ Indeed, there were even some within the conservative LDP who hoped that revising the treaty would allow Japan to chart a more independent course in relations with Communist China. In 1958, Japanese Foreign Minister Fujiyama admitted to journalists in Washington that ‘United States policy towards Communist China has not always been successful in our eyes’,³⁰ and MacArthur made this point clear to US policy-makers, stating that:

Some [Japanese conservatives] thought Japan should serve as a bridge between the East and West; to these people, a mutual security treaty was undesirable because it would commit Japan to the United States and would alienate Asians. Some conservatives thought that a mutual security treaty would anger the Chinese Communists. Still other conservatives, including the Foreign Minister himself, were afraid that the signing of a mutual security treaty would result in a knock-down, drag-out fight [within the LDP].³¹

²⁶ US Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, 31 July 1958, in *Ibid.*, 45.

²⁷ US Embassy, Tokyo to Department of State, 12 February 1958, in *Ibid.*, 4-7.

²⁸ US Department of State, ‘National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 41-58: Probable Developments in Japan’s International Orientation,’ 22 December 1958, in *Ibid.*, 114-116.

²⁹ *New York Times*, 2 September 1958, ‘Japan Seeks Voice on US Bases’ Use’, 5.

³⁰ *New York Times*, 31 August 1958, ‘Japan Will Seek US Pact Change’, 19.

³¹ US Department of State, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Security Arrangements with Japan,’ Washington D.C., 8 September 1958, in *FRUS*, 1958-1960, vol. XVIII, Japan and Korea, 58.

5.3 Chinese ideas about Japan, 1958-July 1960

Between 1958 and July 1960, China's relationship with Japan was buffeted by this combination of radical economic reorganisation in China, a deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union, and a changing regional security environment. Underpinning all of this was a set of goals about enhancing China's national strength and finding security in the world. Japan was certainly not the most important state in China's foreign policy thinking about these challenges during this period; the United States and Soviet Union remained the primary actors. Yet China's relationship with Japan was clearly influenced by developments such as the GLF, Sino-Soviet split, and revision of the US-Japan security treaty. In the following section I explore the interactive relationship between Chinese cognitive and normative ideas about Japan between 1958 and July 1960. I show that at a time of political and economic radicalisation within China, and in an increasingly threatening international environment, Chinese normative opposition to imperialism and the US-led 'imperialistic' order in East Asia grew more strident. On top of all this, Japan's election of a Prime Minister who represented the worst of Japan's imperialistic past, and who was attempting to usher in a more 'imperialistic' future for Japan, would soon bring about a crisis in the Japan-China relationship.

5.3.1. Early dominance of cognitive ideas

In the earliest stages of the GLF, Chinese leaders still believed that economic engagement with Japan provided a good solution to China's economic needs. That is, the foreground cognitive ideas that had been developed between 1953 and 1957 (as discussed in Chapters Three and Four) continued to hold sway in early 1958. While Japan's own economic development path certainly did not provide a model for the

radical economic policies of backyard steel furnaces and agricultural communes being rolled out in China, Japanese industrial equipment and agricultural technology became particularly useful for China as it attempted to dramatically increase its outputs of steel and grain. In February and March 1958, Foreign Minister Chen Yi (陈毅) held a series of meetings with the Japanese President of the Japan-China Import-Export Association (JCIEA), Nangō Saburō (南郷三郎). During these meetings, Chen Yi argued that ‘China needs machinery, infrastructure and technology to build its industrial and agricultural industries’.³² Given Beijing’s focus on ‘self-reliance’ (*zili gengsheng*) during the lead up to the GLF, Chen Yi made sure to describe the Sino-Japanese trade relationship in terms of the mutual benefits it could provide to both China and Japan. Chen Yi informed the Japanese representative that ‘we definitely don’t have difficulties...we will trade [with Japan] for friendship’.³³ Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister was also clear that trade with Japan could benefit China’s development. In particular, China needed to gain greater access to Japanese technology, machinery and chemical fertilizers. Chen Yi told Nangō that,

We will look towards Japan for agricultural study, and will study three things: 1) extermination of insects and pests, 2) chemical fertilizers, 3) water and soil conservation. This will allow us to increase our scale of production. We estimate that in ten years or eight years, or even shorter, say five years, we will be able to attain the targets of our Program for Agricultural Development.³⁴

People’s Daily editorials around this time also acknowledged the necessity of trade with Japan. This was in contrast to editorials from the early 1950s, which had emphasised Japan’s need to trade with China, but had played down China’s economic

³² FMA File 105-00595-03, 7 February 1958, ‘Chen Yi fuzongli jiejian Riben ZhongRi shuchuru zuhe lishizhang Nangō Saburō tanhua jilu’ [Records of the meeting between Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Japan’s China-Japan Export-Import Association President, Nangō Saburō], 22.

³³ *Ibid.*, 22.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 30-31.

need to trade with Japan.³⁵ Editorials also emphasised the *inevitability* (*shisuobiran*, *lisuodangran*) of Sino-Japanese trade for reasons of geography, shared history, and the ‘objective needs’ of economic development in both countries.³⁶ For instance, one editorial argued that,

As neighbouring countries, China and Japan have a long history of trade relations. The development of bilateral trade has economic advantages for both countries. China is now starting its second Five-Year Plan, and requires a lot of construction materials. Japan is currently facing economic problems including overstocked products, and shortages of steel, non-ferrous metals, fibres and other material for the industrial sector. With the decline in its economic relations with the capitalist world, it is even more apparent that the development of trade between China and Japan is important and urgent for Japan’s economy...In short, from the perspective of geography, history, resources, production conditions etc, China and Japan are rendering financial assistance among good friends, and the future development of Sino-Japanese trade is inevitable. The objective needs of economic development in the two countries have determined that this is the inevitable outcome. There is no way that measures like the “[US trade] embargo” and other artificial barriers can block this.³⁷

In the years from 1955 to 1957, Sino-Japanese trade had risen to well over \$US100 million each year, and in the first few months of 1958 trade levels were on track to easily surpass this level.³⁸ It was expected—though never realised, for reasons that we shall see below—that this trade would be further boosted by the signing, in February 1958, of an agreement for trade of £GBP100 million in iron and steel over five years. China would export iron ore and coal to Japan, and would import various kinds of steel, zinc and silicon products from Japan, including goods directly to be used in implementing the GLF such as steel plates for furnaces.³⁹

³⁵ See Chapter 3.

³⁶ *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily], 6 March 1958, ‘ZhongRi maoyi xieding zhongyu qianzi’ [Sino-Japanese trade agreement finally signed].

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ International Monetary Fund, ‘Historical Direction of Trade Statistics (1948-1980).’; Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Shi Nianbiao, 1945-1993* [Chronology of Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations, 1945-1993] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [Chinese Social Science Press] 1994), 101-109.

³⁹ Cheng Yongming and Shi Qibao, *Zhongri Jingmao Guanxi Liushi Nian*, 84-86.

Japan was by no means the only country from which China increased its imports during the early stages of the GLF. Chinese imports from the Soviet Union increased dramatically in 1958 and 1959 as mentioned above. Furthermore, in 1958 and 1959 China also started looking to Western European countries for capital and industrial goods needed to aid the increase in production during the Great Leap. During this period, West Germany and Britain, which had been permitted by the US to relax some of their trade controls on China, became increasingly important sources of industrial and capital goods to China.⁴⁰

Nevertheless, Chinese policy-makers increasingly came to see Japan as a distinct and particularly appropriate source of economic support for China during the early stages of the Great Leap. They did so for two reasons. First, Chinese policy-makers argued that Japan was a more appropriate economic partner for China than the Soviet Union or other European powers because Japan was, like China, an ‘Eastern country’ (*dongfang guojia*). On a very pragmatic level, it was convenient for Chinese officials to emphasise the geographic proximity between the two countries; the fact that Japan was also an Eastern country simply meant that trade with Japan was cheaper and easier than trade with Europe. Chen Yi told the Japanese representative that,

China has a saying: “neighbours are dearer than distant relatives”. We have built a relationship with Europe, but the road is far and it costs a lot in time and money to reach, so it is not worthwhile. Japan is only separated by a strip of water, and so it is relatively convenient.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 75.

⁴¹ FMA File 105-00595-04, 14 March 1958. ‘Chen Yi fuzongli jiejian Riben guoji maoyi cujin xiehui huizhang Yamamoto Kumaichi, Riben shuchuru zuhe lishizhang Nangō Saburō tanhua jilu’ [Records of the dialogue between Vice Premier Chen Yi and the Japan International Trade Promotion Association President Yamamoto Kumaichi and Japan-China Import-Export Association President Nangō Saburō], 35.

However, this sameness went deeper than mere geography. Officials such as Chen Yi also argued that Japanese goods and experts were somehow better suited to China's needs:

...China really needs doctors. Before Liberation, we had only 20,000 doctors, and today we have more than 70,000, but for a population of 600 million this is nowhere near enough. The cost of European doctors is too high; one month costs 700, 800 or even 1000 yuan. If they were Japanese doctors, I don't think it would be that high. With respect to planning, European experts' plans are not compatible with, and do not suit, China's situation. Japanese experts' plans would be relatively more suitable to us.⁴²

Second, Chinese policy-makers argued that Japan's levels of economic development were important for China to observe because, like China, Japan was an Eastern country. That is, by observing Japan, Chinese policy-makers were reflecting on the potential level of economic development that could be achieved by an Eastern state.

As Foreign Minister Chen Yi said to Nangō Saburō in early 1958,

The Chinese people have a great interest in Japan's development because Japan is an Eastern country, and your social customs and habits are very similar [to ours]. Since the Second World War, Japan's industry has developed significantly, and we are very happy about this.⁴³

Similarly, during a second meeting with Nangō in March 1958, Chen Yi reinforced his view that China and Japan were alike because they both were Eastern. The Foreign Minister joked with Nangō that,

We are both people with Eastern characteristics [*dongfang ren fengge*]; you like what I like, and I like what you like; you dislike what I dislike, and I also dislike what you dislike. America is most disgusted by [*taoyan*] New China; similarly, New China is most disgusted by America.⁴⁴

While this last statement is one of frivolity, it shows clearly that policy-makers like Foreign Minister Chen Yi conceived of Japan and China as alike because of their shared 'Eastern' characteristics. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that by

⁴² FMA File 105-00595-03, 31-32.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ This statement was followed by a great deal of laughter on both sides. See FMA File 105-00595-04, 35.

emphasising the two countries' sameness, the Foreign Minister may simply have been attempting to flatter his left-wing Japanese counterpart and persuade him to increase trade with China. This is not an unusual diplomatic technique. Nevertheless, the point remains a significant one because it shows that Chen Yi thought that Japan would be helpful and appropriate in aiding China's economic development because of the geographic closeness, shared history and relative suitability of Japan and its technology, goods and expertise to China. It is also significant because at a time when China's leaders were implementing a set of economic policies aimed to help China catch up with the great powers of the West, Japan provided a model of the potential industrial development that could be achieved by a fellow Asian country. To be sure, Japan's capitalist economic practices did not provide a model for China. However, Chinese policy-makers' ideas about Japan shed light on Chinese thinking about the *goal* of rapid economic development and catch up growth so badly needed in the developing countries of the East.

5.3.2. The clash between cognitive and normative ideas

However, the prominence of these cognitive ideas in China's Japan policy soon came to a dramatic halt. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, throughout the 1950s, China and Japan had negotiated a series of unofficial trade agreements that now underpinned the small but significant levels of trade between the two countries. In March 1958, representatives from China's CCPIT and three separate Japanese organisations negotiated the fourth unofficial trade agreement between the two countries.⁴⁵ This trade agreement was a controversial one because it provided various 'diplomatic-style' privileges to Japanese and Chinese trade representatives, and

⁴⁵ On the Japanese side, the associations were the JAPIT, the Diet Members League, and the JCIEA.

stipulated that permanent bilateral trade liaison offices would be established in Tokyo and Beijing. These clauses could easily be perceived as Japanese diplomatic recognition of Beijing.⁴⁶ Reflecting this controversy, a week after the signing of the fourth trade agreement, Chiang Kai-shek wrote to Japanese Prime Minister Kishi protesting the agreement. Over the next few weeks, Chiang Kai-shek placed further pressure on Kishi's government by first calling off trade talks between Japan and Taiwan, and then announcing an economic boycott of Japan.⁴⁷ Under this pressure from Taipei, the Japanese government quickly announced that Japan would only support the unofficial trade agreement with China 'in line with the principle that Japan did not recognize Communist China', would not grant official status to a PRC trade agency, and would prohibit the PRC flag being flown in Japan.⁴⁸ As depicted in the opening passage of this chapter, Beijing responded with great hostility to these moves in Japan. Relations then worsened in May 1958 when two Japanese youths tore down the flag of the People's Republic of China at a trade exhibition in the Japanese city of Nagasaki. The issue rocked relations between the two countries after Kishi failed to reprimand the youths for destroying the flag, and the Japanese government officially informed China that it 'had no intention to recognise Communist China [sic]'.⁴⁹

In what follows I show that in mid-1958, the cognitive idea that trade with Japan would help China's own economic growth began to clash with Chinese normative ideas. Cognitive ideas—solutions to policy problems—are not by themselves

⁴⁶ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 38.

⁴⁷ I.I. Morris, 'Foreign Policy Issues in Japan's 1958 Elections,' *Pacific Affairs* 31, no. 3 (1958), 220-221.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 221.

⁴⁹ Chalmers Johnson, 'The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982,' *ibid.* 59(1986); Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 38.

sufficient to shape policy, particularly when they have negative normative implications.

a) Opposing Kishi

Chinese policy-makers were predisposed to be antagonistic towards Kishi Nobusuke because he represented the most imperialistic and militaristic elements of Japan's wartime past. Kishi had served as Minister of Munitions in Tojo Hideki's wartime Cabinet, and was suspected of having captured Chinese forced labourers during his time as an official in Manchukuo. For this, he was imprisoned, although never tried, as a Class A war criminal.⁵⁰ As an editorial in the *People's Daily* argued,

Kishi's hostility towards the Chinese people did not start today. Rather, it started as early as 1936 when Kishi Nobusuke oppressed and crushed the people of China's Northeast when he became a senior official in Manchukuo, and collaborated extensively with the Japanese Kwantung Army's invasion of Northeast China.⁵¹

Indeed, *People's Daily* editorials and public speeches by Chinese officials mentioned Japan's wartime atrocities particularly frequently and graphically during Kishi's tenure as Japanese Prime Minister. For instance, an editorial in the *People's Daily* following the visit of West German President Konrad Adenauer to Japan, described in some detail Japanese wartime atrocities such as massacres in Nanjing and Singapore, the bombing of Chongqing, and the policy of 'burn all, kill all, loot all' in Huabei (*Huabei gedi sanguang zhengce*). They also likened Japan's wartime atrocities to the establishment of Nazi concentration camps at Majdanek and Buchenwald.⁵²

⁵⁰ Kishi was released by the US Occupying Force in 1948. Guthrie-Shimizu, 'Japan, the United States, and the Cold War,' 250.

⁵¹ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 11 May 1958, 'Zai chi Kishi Nobusuke' [Once again denounce Kishi Nobusuke].

⁵² *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 4 April 1960, 'Adengna fangRi shuomingle shenme?' [What does Adenauer's visit to Japan show?].

Although Kishi's statement of non-recognition of Communist China merely drew attention to Japan's already existing policy, the Chinese government responded with great hostility. In May 1958 they suspended all trade with Japan, and in June and July fleshed out 'three political principles' necessary for continued trade and political relations between the two countries:

That Japan should not (1) adopt policies hostile to China; (2) participate in any plot aimed at creating two Chinas; and (3) obstruct the normalisation of relations with China.⁵³

In the year following the announcement of these 'three political principles', Sino-Japanese trade decreased by 75 per cent.

China's dramatic policy shift towards Japan represented a direct clash between Chinese cognitive and normative ideas about Japan. Until then, Chinese officials had managed to sustain their policy of 'trading with the enemy' relatively well. Furthermore, as we saw in Chapter Four, Chinese officials argued that economic engagement with Japan served an important additional, normative goal for China: by trading with Japan and importing Japanese industrial goods and technology, China could enhance its own industrial and economic development and thereby achieve its 'revolution through industrialisation'. Managing this ideational balance was not always easy however. As we saw in the previous chapters, justifying China's need to trade with its former wartime enemy and now Cold War opponent often posed a challenge for Chinese propaganda and rhetoric. For instance, it was not until 1957-1958 that *People's Daily* editorials openly discussed the importance of pursuing bilateral trade with Japan. However, on the whole, in the early 1950s Chinese officials had been willing to overlook Japan's imperialistic past and its alliance with the United States because they believed that Japan was moving in the right direction, away from

⁵³ Rajendra Kumar Jain, *China and Japan, 1949-1980*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981), 44.

the influence of the United States. Chinese officials such as Zhou Enlai noted that Japan's two most recent conservative Prime Ministers, Hatoyama and Ishibashi, had taken a relatively independent stance from the US and were in favour of expanding ties with China.⁵⁴

Now, however, things had changed. In Kishi Nobusuke, Chinese officials had a clear example of a militaristic and imperialistic Japanese leader that was willing to disrupt Sino-Japanese trade and the *de facto* recognition that had been negotiated by the fourth trade agreement, because of pressure from the United States and Taiwan. Furthermore, Beijing quickly discovered that Kishi's move had not proved all that unpopular in Japan. At the Japanese general election in May 1958, just one month after the Nagasaki flag incident and Beijing's suspension of trade with Japan, the issue of improving Sino-Japanese relations took on huge significance.⁵⁵ The conservatives succeeded in casting Kishi as the victim of China's unilateral suspension of trade and denounced Beijing's move as an attempt timed to interfere with the Japanese election. This played directly into Japanese voters' opposition to foreign interference, and Kishi's LDP increased its share of the vote that year.⁵⁶

By the middle of 1958, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and Beijing more generally, was openly hostile towards Japan. They particularly resented Japan's policy of '*seikei bunri*', which allowed Japan to maintain political ties with Taiwan while obtaining

⁵⁴ See, for example FMA File 105-00500-07, 6 November 1956, 'Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Riben defang yiyuan daibiaotuan tanhua jilu' [Memorandum of conversation between Zhou Enlai and the Japanese regional Parliamentary delegation], 5-7, 9-10.

⁵⁵ Morris, 'Foreign Policy Issues in Japan's 1958 Elections,' 226-228.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

economic benefits through trade with mainland China.⁵⁷ The Foreign Ministry began to argue that, ‘politics and economics cannot be separated’ (*zhengzhi, jingji buneng fenli*).⁵⁸ Furthermore, this clash between cognitive and normative ideas began to find its way onto the pages of the *People’s Daily*. Whereas just months earlier Chen Yi had lauded Japan as a successful example of ‘Eastern’ development, and the *People’s Daily* had spoken of the ‘inevitability’ and ‘necessity’ of Sino-Japanese trade, now editorials in the *People’s Daily* quickly changed tune. Japan was likened to other imperialistic and Western industrialised powers, such as Britain, that China sought to catch up with.⁵⁹ One editorial in the *People’s Daily* in May 1958 wrote that ‘in about 15 years time we will catch up with and surpass Britain in the main industrial products, and it will be even easier to catch up with and surpass Japan (*ganshang he chaoguo Riben jiu geng buzaihuaxia le*)’.⁶⁰ Supporting this statement, the editorial argued that in 1958, China had only needed to import thirty thousand tons of steel from Japan because local production had topped seven million tons of steel; the idea that China was dependent on Japanese steel was ‘a total fantasy’ (*shizu de huanxiang*).⁶¹ Under the unusually radical domestic political conditions that pervaded China at the start of the GLF, Chinese normative ideas—and in particular the opposition to imperialism—were now able to drown out cognitive ideas in China’s Japan policy.

⁵⁷ During the 1950s, Japan had adopted the principle of ‘separating politics from economics’ (JP: 政経分離, *seikei bunri*) in order to establish trade relations with countries, such as the PRC, while simultaneously recognising Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. For more on this, see Drifte, *Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989*, 2; Jan, ‘Japan’s Trade with Communist China,’ 605.

⁵⁸ FMA File 105-00600-03, 4 August 1958, ‘Dangqian RiZhong maoyi de wenti suozai’ [Current issues relating to Sino-Japanese trade].

⁵⁹ See, for example, *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily], 3 April 1958, ‘Buneng rongxu Kishi Nobusuke zhengfu pohuai ZhongRi maoyi xieding’ [We cannot permit the Kishi Nobusuke government’s attacks on the Sino-Japanese trade agreement].

⁶⁰ *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily], 16 May 1958, ‘Bo Kishi Nobusuke’ [Denounce Kishi Nobusuke].

⁶¹ Ibid.

b) Opposing revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty

In addition to their opposition towards Kishi's perceived willingness to disrupt Sino-Japanese economic relations, Chinese policy-makers were also especially hostile towards Kishi because of his efforts to revise the US-Japan Security Treaty. Chinese opposition to the US-Japan Security Treaty itself stemmed from both cognitive and normative ideas. At a cognitive level, Chinese leaders understood that the revised US-Japan Security Treaty would enhance the security threat facing China. They argued that the revised treaty preserved US military basing rights in Japan, and permitted the US to use these bases for the 'maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East'.⁶² Chinese Foreign Ministry officials complained bitterly that American bases in Japan were 'directed at' (*zhixiang*) China, and demanded that the US cease using Japanese territory to 'intimidate' (*donghe*) China.⁶³ Chinese officials were also preoccupied with the question of American nuclear weapons stationed in Japan, although there was no mention of nuclear issues in the revised treaty.⁶⁴ A *People's Daily* editorial wrote that 'Japan will become America's military base for carrying out nuclear war in the Far East and Pacific Asia...The Japanese people will not be able to avoid becoming the victim of America's nuclear struggle'.⁶⁵ Furthermore, in his report to the second session of the Government Working Party People's Conference, Zhou Enlai wrote that,

⁶² FMA File 105-00378-02, 7-30 November 1958, 'Waijiaobuzhang Chen Yi jiu Riben Meiguo xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" fabiao shengming de youguan qingshi ji shengminggao' [Draft statement and request for instructions for Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statement on revision of the Japan-US "Security Treaty"].

⁶³ FMA File 105-00669-02, 4 June-12 September 1959, 'Liao Chengzhi yu Ishibashi Tanzan de tanhua jilu (san ci)' [Record of the dialogue between Liao Chengzhi and Ishibashi Tanzan (3 times)].

⁶⁴ FMA File 105-00378-02; File No. 105-00955-04, 10 April 1959, 'Ribei, Meiguo xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" zuijin dongxiang' [Recent trends in the revision of the Japan-US "Security Treaty"]. A Japanese government investigation has recently revealed that secret nuclear deals were signed between the US and Japan in 1960 and 1969. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 'Iwayuru "mitsuyaku" mondai ni kansuru yuushikisha iinkai houkokusho' [Expert Committee Report into the "Secret Agreements" Issue], 9 March 2010, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/kekka.html>, [accessed 20 May 2010].

⁶⁵ File No. 105-00435-08, 9 January 1960, 'Zhongguo Sulian guanyu RiMei xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" de tifa' [Sino-Soviet wording on the revision of the Japan-US "Security Treaty"].

Recently, the Kishi Nobusuke government has been actively preparing to revise the Japan-US “security treaty”, has undertaken new military collusion with the United States, and is attempting to arm the Japanese military with nuclear weapons. This creates a serious threat towards Asia’s security and particularly our security.⁶⁶

On the cognitive side, Chinese officials also opposed revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty for economic reasons. In the late 1950s, Chinese officials began to argue about the danger of Japan’s ‘latent’ (*qianli*) power being harnessed by the United States to wage war in Asia. As we have seen in previous chapters, since 1949 the Chinese Foreign Ministry had drawn a direct link between Japan’s wartime industrial and economic power and Japan’s military strength. They argued that modern wars were industrialised wars, and thus countries needed industrial potential to be militarily capable. By the late 1950s, Chinese officials began to show concern about Japan’s ‘latent’ power, which, they argued, stemmed from Japan’s economic and particularly industrial capacity. An editorial in the *People’s Daily* in October 1959 outlined the relationship between Japan’s present economic capacity and its future military power:

Although Japan is a defeated nation, it is not an economically backward nation. Rather, it is an economically developed capitalist country. To take over Asia, the US imperialists must use Japan’s industrial capacity and military potential, make Japan the cat’s paw of the US, and urge Japan to enter a subordinate alliance relationship with the US.⁶⁷

Another editorial in the *People’s Daily* argued,

Today, the Kishi government, which is served by Japanese capital, is still founded on the past Japanese imperialist-era economic structure. In the postwar period, the Kishi Government is reliant on the “prosperity” brought about by US “special needs” procurement stemming from the pool of blood of the Korean War.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Zhou Enlai, 18 April 1959, in FMA File 105-00435-08.

⁶⁷ *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily], 22 October 1959, ‘Fandong MeiRi junshi tongmeng he baowei yuandong heping shi ZhongRi liangguo renmin de gongtong renwu’ [Opposing the US-Japan military alliance and defending peace in the Far East is the joint task of the Chinese and Japanese people].

⁶⁸ *Renmin Ribao* [People’s Daily], 15 April 1958, ‘Zai chi Kishi Nobusuke zhengfu pohuai ZhongRi maoyi xieding’ [Once again denounce the Kishi government for attacking the Sino-Japanese trade agreement].

As we see, it was not Japan's military capabilities that raised concerns in Beijing, but rather Japan's ability to use its economic and industrial capacity for military ends, particularly within the context of the US-Japan alliance. Indeed, during the 1950s and early 1960s, Japan's indigenous military capabilities were relatively limited. Tokyo restricted defence spending to around one per cent of GDP, even when the United States drastically reduced its military assistance to Japan in the late 1950s.⁶⁹ Furthermore, as a result of public opposition to rearmament, the Japanese government had resisted pressure from the US to increase Japanese troop levels, and they remained at just 100,000 troops.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, Chinese policy-makers still saw Japan as a latent power because of Japan's renewed economic capacity and, in particular, because of the rehabilitation of Japan's military-industrial base through US procurement policies during the Korean War.⁷¹ Another editorial in the *People's Daily* in July 1958 argued that, 'the Japanese military industry has been completely restored, and its latent capability today is greater than its capability before the war'.⁷²

Interestingly, Chinese officials continued to show concern about Japan's military-industrial complex even after the 'militaristic' Kishi Nobusuke was forced to step down as Prime Minister in June 1960. A *People's Daily* editorial published more than a year after the more moderate LDP Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato replaced Kishi did not distinguish between the Kishi and Ikeda administrations, and continued to criticise

⁶⁹ The formal decision to limit Japan's defence spending to 1% of GDP was not introduced until the early 1970s. In the late 1950s, Japan sometimes spent up to 1.5% of GDP on defence spending.

⁷⁰ Although the Yoshida government did agree to additionally increase Japan's National Police Reserve to 110,000 troops in 1952. See Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 188-207.

⁷¹ For more on this see Chapter 3.

⁷² *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 7 July 1958, 'Zhongguo renmin jianjue fandui Riben qianzai de diguozhuyi' [The Chinese people resolutely oppose Japan's latent imperialism].

the rehabilitation of Japan's military-industrial capability.⁷³ This suggests that the Chinese Foreign Ministry saw the US ability to draw on Japan's economy and industrial base—and not just 'militaristic' leaders such as Kishi—as posing a potential threat to China. In Chinese eyes, opposing the revision of the security treaty was therefore a sensible cognitive solution to mitigate the threat it could pose to China.

Chinese officials also opposed the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty for normative reasons. At a normative level, Chinese officials were opposed to the treaty because they believed that it would entrench a US-led 'imperialistic' order in East Asia, something they were deeply opposed to. As we saw in Chapters Three and Four, these normative ideas of opposition to imperialism had been shaped through China's own experience of semi-colonisation and war during the first half of the twentieth century. As the US-Japan Security Treaty came up for renewal in the late 1950s, the Chinese Foreign Ministry argued that the proposed treaty paved the way for the dangerous expansion of a US-led 'monopoly capitalist' empire into the Far East. Furthermore, in a clear nod to Japan's imperialistic past, the Chinese Foreign Ministry argued that the US-Japan Security Treaty was a revival of Japan's 'old dream of the "Great East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere"'.⁷⁴

⁷³ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 18 September 1961, 'Buxu xin de "jiu yi ba" shibian zai yazhou chongyan!' [We must not allow a repeat of the "September 18" incident in Asia!]. For evidence of Beijing's more moderate view of the Ikeda administration, see *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 11 October 1960, 'Ping Ikeda zhengfu de waijiao dongxiang' [Commentary on the foreign policy direction of the Ikeda Government].

⁷⁴ See 'Nichibei anpo jōyaku kaitei ni kansuru Chen Yi gaikō buchō no seimei' [Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statement on revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty], 19 November 1958, *Nitchū kankei kihon shiryōshū, 1949-1997* [Compilation of Basic Materials on Japan-China Relations, 1949-1997], Tokyo: Kazankai, 2008, 153-156; FMA File 105-00435-08. The 'Far East' was defined in very large geographical terms as the area surrounding Japan, areas north of the Philippines, and areas under the control of South Korea and Taiwan. See Glenn D. Hook et al., *Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Sheffield Centre for Japanese Studies/Routledge Series, 2005), 148-149.

Thus, a powerful normative goal for Chinese officials was reshaping the order of East Asia in ways that did not reflect US ‘imperialistic’ hegemony. Prior to the Nagasaki flag incident and the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations, Chinese officials had been quite optimistic about the possibilities of reshaping the present order in East Asia. In early 1958, in discussions with a Japanese representative from the JCIEA, Foreign Minister Chen Yi argued that the current US-led order in East Asia was both abnormal and impermanent. Furthermore, he argued rather presciently that China and Japan would normalise diplomatic relations within a decade, stating that,

This year is 1958. I hope that in another four or five years, or seven or eight years, we can restore diplomatic relations. Today’s situation cannot continue for a long time. Japan should not stop building ties with China or sacrifice its friendship with China, for the sake of its friendship with the US. The current relationships are not normal. A normal relationship ought to be a diplomatic one, with developed trade and cultural ties, and bilateral cooperation. We believe that one day we will achieve this, don’t you? The Japanese government can see clearly that the sooner you adopt these measures the better. The world situation is shifting quickly, and developing in the direction of reconciliation and friendship.⁷⁵

Yet Chen Yi made this statement at a time when Japan’s left-wing movement was relatively strong, and before Kishi had actively started working with the United States to revise the US-Japan alliance. Now China faced a new and disturbing political environment in Japan. In the following section I explore the range of strategies and ideational tools employed by Chinese officials as they attempted to negotiate this new Japanese political environment, prevent the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, and find a way for the cognitive and normative dimensions of their economic policy towards Japan to coincide once more.

⁷⁵ FMA File 105-00595-03, 24.

5.3.3. *Breaking the deadlock: the intersection of cognitive and normative ideas*

From late 1958 to 1960, Beijing pursued a multi-pronged strategy aimed at undermining Kishi and preventing revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry believed that by undermining Kishi's political power they could prevent revision of the Security Treaty in Japan, overthrow the 'imperialistic' Kishi government, and get Sino-Japanese economic relations back on track.⁷⁶ To do so, Beijing reached out to both left-wing Japanese and to representatives from Japan's conservative LDP government.

a) Reaching out to Japanese left-wing groups

The late 1950s was a time of great political upheaval in Japan. Protest movements in Japan were becoming more active in opposing the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, and the issue prompted Japan's 'greatest political crisis since 1945'.⁷⁷ Left-wing groups staunchly opposed Kishi's efforts to railroad the treaty through the Japanese Diet, and opposed Kishi's attempts to amend the Japanese Constitution, increase the power of the army, and increase police powers in Japan.⁷⁸ Japanese leftists also favoured the total abolition of the treaty for reasons that were similar to Beijing's: they argued that the treaty would allow the US to use Japan as a nuclear base and create a *de facto* North-East Asia Treaty Organisation, that it would unnecessarily provoke China and the Soviet Union, and that it would promote militarism in East Asia and thereby enhance the likelihood of war.⁷⁹ Both the JCP and

⁷⁶ FMA File 105-00669-02; FMA File 105-00933-01, 14 January 1960, 'Ji Pengfei fubuzhang huijian sulian zhuHua dashi Qierwonianke tongbao waijiaobu jiang jiu RiMei anquan tiaoyue de fabiao shengming' [Vice-Director Ji Pengfei meets Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko to circulate information about the Foreign Ministry's statement on the Japan-US Security Treaty].

⁷⁷ J.A.A. Stockwin, *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and Its Foreign Policy* (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1968), 86.

⁷⁸ Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 230-231.

⁷⁹ Stockwin, *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism*, 86-87; Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan*, 178-179, 203.

JSP therefore put forward calls for Japan to take a path of neutrality in East Asia, and remove itself from participation in ‘military blocs’ such as the US-Japan Security Treaty.⁸⁰ Beijing sought to capitalise on this crisis in Japan and invited delegations from Japan’s Communist and Socialist parties to China to join in condemning the Kishi ‘clique’; organised mass protests in Beijing; and aided the organisation of protests against Kishi and the Security Treaty in Japan.⁸¹ The Foreign Ministry also worked hard to exploit political opposition to Kishi within Japan by providing ideological and practical support to Japanese left-wing opposition groups such as the JSP, JCP and the General Council of Trade Unions (JP: *Sōhyō*).⁸²

Throughout this period of suspended economic relations, left-wing and pro-China trade groups in Japan also played a major role in trying to negotiate between the two governments to re-open trade ties. Groups such as the Japan-China Friendship Association, headed by JSP Chairman Matsumoto Jiichirō, were invited to Beijing for the October National Day celebrations in October 1958. On this trip, Matsumoto met with Zhou Enlai, managed to secure an agreement extending fishing rights to Japanese trawlers in Chinese waters, and wrote an article in the Japanese press arguing that it was critically important to expand ties with China at a time when Kishi was trying to take the country in a ‘reactionary’ direction.⁸³ Similarly, in late 1958, members of the Japanese Diet Members League and JAPIT stepped up their pressure on the Kishi government to re-open trade relations with China, and simultaneously wrote to Nan Hanchen, Chairman of the CCPIT to request the resumption of trade.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Stockwin, *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism*, 87-90.

⁸¹ Jain, *China and Japan*, 44-45; Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 231.

⁸² Jain, *China and Japan*, 44-45. Rose, 'Breaking the Deadlock,' 186-191.

⁸³ Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan*, 203; Rose, 'Breaking the Deadlock,' 189.

⁸⁴ ———, 'Breaking the Deadlock,' 190.

Beijing used ideas as framing devices in a number of different ways to mount this campaign against Kishi and drum up left-wing support for opposition to the treaty. First, the Chinese government focused their attack on Kishi, singling him out as the key villain in Japan. In the two months before the ratification of the US-Japan Security Treaty in the Japanese Diet, a dozen editorials were published in the *People's Daily*.⁸⁵ These editorials were highly critical of Kishi and criticised him for using 'dirty tricks' (*beibi shouduan*) to force the Treaty through the Diet.⁸⁶ These editorials also played up Kishi's militaristic wartime record, an issue that had made Kishi just as unpopular with left-wing Japanese as it did with Chinese officials in Beijing.⁸⁷ Declassified records of parallel Sino-Soviet discussions in 1959 and 1960 show that Chinese officials believed that they stood the best chance of preventing the revision of the treaty if they could successfully undermine Kishi's political power in Japan. In parallel meetings with the Soviet Union, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was critical of the Soviet Union's official statement on the US-Japan Security Treaty for putting little emphasis on 'attacking and isolating the Kishi Nobusuke government'.⁸⁸ Moreover, when the Soviet Union suggested wooing Japan away from the United States by offering a three-way nonaggression pact between the Soviet Union, China and Japan, the Chinese Foreign Minister rejected this suggestion, warning that:

The Japanese people currently oppose the Kishi government's revision of the Japan-US 'Security Treaty'. If we issue a recommendation that the Soviet Union, China and Japan conclude a nonaggression pact, this will create the incorrect impression among some of the Japanese people who will think that we are eager to improve relations

⁸⁵ The revised US-Japan Security Treaty was signed in Washington on 19 January 1960, but was not ratified in Tokyo until June 1960.

⁸⁶ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 10 May 1960, 'Zhongri liangguo renmin tuan jie qilai, dadao Mei diguozhuyi!' [Chinese and Japanese people unite to defeat US imperialism!].

⁸⁷ See, for example *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 16 May 1960, 'Huxiang tuan jie huxiang zhichi gongtong doufeng', [Unite Together, Mutual Support, Joint Struggle]. On Japanese opposition to Kishi, see Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 230.

⁸⁸ FMA File 105-00378-03, 27 November-7 December 1958, 'Sulian jiu Riben Meiguo xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" fabiao shengming shi' [The Soviet Union's statement on revision of the Japan-US "Security Treaty"].

with Kishi Nobusuke, and therefore shake their resolve in fighting in opposition to Kishi Nobusuke.⁸⁹

Yet in the midst of this vociferous condemnation of Kishi, Chinese officials were also clear in disassociating the Japanese people from war-guilt and describing the Japanese as a peaceful people. They saw this as an important way of reaching out to the Japanese public and Japanese left-wing civil society groups. Consistent with ideas expressed about Japan since 1949, between 1958 and 1960 China's policy-makers continued to articulate a distinction between the 'millions of peace-loving Japanese people' (*aihao heping de qianbaiwan Riben renmin*) and the 'handful of militarists' (*yixiaocuo Riben junguozhuyi fenzi*) such as Kishi who had ruled Japan in the past.⁹⁰ Editorials in the *People's Daily* argued that the Japanese people had the support of 650 million Chinese people in their struggle against Kishi and the United States.⁹¹ Similarly, Foreign Minister Chen Yi's 1958 public statement on the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, included a passage declaring that,

The Japanese people are a hardworking, intelligent and courageous people...The Chinese people consistently support the Japanese people's struggle for independence, peace and democracy, and genuinely hope that Japan will become a peaceful, neutral country.⁹²

Furthermore, editorials in the *People's Daily* were also used to support left-wing Japanese arguments that revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty would revive

⁸⁹ FMA File 105-00378-02.

⁹⁰ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 25 June 1958, 'ZhongRi wenhua wanglai buneng bushou yingxiang' [Sino-Japanese culture exchange cannot be affected]; *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 5 August 1959, 'Riben renmin fandui MeiRi junshi tongmeng he hewuzhuang de xin gaochao' [The Japanese people oppose the US-Japan military alliance and the new surge in nuclear weapons].

⁹¹ See, for example *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 10 May 1960, 'ZhongRi liangguo renmin tuanjie qilai, dadao Mei diguozhuyi!' [Chinese and Japanese people unite to defeat US imperialism!]; *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 14 May 1960, 'Sihao meiyou "wujie"' [Not even the slightest "misunderstanding"]; *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 16 May 1960, 'Huxiang tuanjie huxiang zhichi gongtong doufeng' [Unite Together, Mutual Support, Joint Struggle].

⁹² Foreign Ministry of the PRC, 19 November 1958, 'Chen Yi waijiaobuzhang guanyu RiMei xiugai "anquan tiaoyue" de shengming' [Foreign Minister Chen Yi's statement on the revision of the US-Japan "Security Treaty"].

Japanese militarism, lead Japan into war once again, and expose the Japanese people to renewed suffering. One editorial in August 1959 noted that Japan's war of aggression had decimated Japan's population, leaving behind two million Japanese orphans and over 1.8 million Japanese widows.⁹³ Other editorials went further and drew an explicit connection between the suffering of the Japanese people in the past, and their suffering at the hands of the United States' current policies towards Japan, such as through Japan's 'semi-occupied status' (*ban bei zhanling de zhuangtai*) under the US-Japan Security Treaty.⁹⁴ The same editorial also detailed the many crimes committed by US soldiers based in Japan, taking care to detail those which depicted Japan as victim, such as the rape of Japanese women by US soldiers.⁹⁵

b) Reaching out to conservative Japanese representatives

In addition to reaching out to left-wing groups, from late 1959 onwards the Chinese Foreign Ministry also began to reach out to members of Japan's conservative, LDP government. In the second half of 1959, the Chinese Foreign Ministry identified key politicians within the LDP who were opposed to revision of the Security Treaty, and invited these members of the ruling LDP to China. They believed that if these more moderate representatives from the LDP were to come to China, 'this would positively affect our splitting up the Japanese ruling clique, and accelerating opposition to Kishi's powerful alliance'.⁹⁶ The first round of talks, from September to November 1959, involved China's Premier Zhou Enlai, Foreign Minister Chen Yi and China's

⁹³ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 5 August 1959, 'Ribei renmin fandui MeiRi junshi tongmeng he hewuzhuang de xin gaochao' [The Japanese people oppose the US-Japan military alliance and the new surge in nuclear weapons].

⁹⁴ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 16 April 1959, 'Burang MeiRi fandongpai ba Ribei yinxiang zhanzheng daolu' [Do not let the US-Japan reactionaries take Japan down the path of war].

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ FMA File 105-00955-07, 25 June 1959, 'Ribei qian shouxiang Ishibashi Tanzan xi fangHua shi' [Former Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan's hopes of visiting China].

leading Japan-expert, Liao Chengzhi.⁹⁷ On the Japanese side was former conservative Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan (石橋湛山), who had advocated closer ties with the PRC during his brief tenure as Prime Minister.⁹⁸ The second participant was a pro-China member of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, Matsumura Kenzō (松村謙三), a personal friend of Zhou Enlai and Liao Chengzhi, and a politician whose career had continued successively during the prewar, wartime and postwar Japanese governments.⁹⁹

Through this group, the Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasised a somewhat different set of ideas about and policy towards Japan. In these private meetings with Japan's LDP representatives, China's officials were far less vitriolic in their criticism of Kishi. For instance, during talks with Ishibashi Tanzan, Chen Yi explained that 'we do not oppose Kishi personally, but we do oppose his policy of hostility towards China'.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, in these meetings with LDP representatives, Chinese policymakers also emphasised the idea of Japan as a peaceful nation, and suggested that there was a clear distinction between the peaceful Japan and the 'imperialistic' United States.¹⁰¹ This enabled Chinese officials to legitimate and put forward certain policy proposals. For example, Foreign Minister Chen Yi told Matsumura Kenzō that because there was a difference between militaristic leaders such as Kishi, and the peaceful Japanese people, Beijing did not believe that Japan was a particularly dangerous or militant actor in and of itself. Similarly, Chen Yi argued that the

⁹⁷ Ishibashi and Matsumura made separate trips to China; Ishibashi's visit took place in September 1959 and Matsumura's visit took place from October-November 1959.

⁹⁸ Ishibashi had been forced to resign as Prime Minister after just two months in office due to ill health. See Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 160.

⁹⁹ Johnson, 'The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China,' 406.

¹⁰⁰ FMA File 105-00667-04, 23 October 1959, 'Chen Yi fuzongli huijian Riben youren Matsumura Kenzō de tanhua jilu' [Record of the dialogue between Deputy Premier Chen Yi and Japanese friend Matsumura Kenzō], 12.

¹⁰¹ FMA File 105-00667-04, 2; FMA File 105-00669-02.

Chinese government endorsed Japan becoming a neutral country outside of the US alliance, and sanctioned the limited re-arming of Japan—with ‘weapons of self-defence’ (*ziwei du wuzhuang*)—if Japan was no longer allied with the United States.¹⁰² Emphasising that China’s leaders saw Japan only as a threat to China within the context of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty, Chen Yi informed Matsumura Kenzō that:

So long as Japan does not revive militarism with the US, and the US does not use bases in Japan to endanger China, then there will be no problem. However, Japan’s collaboration with America, America’s use of military bases in Japan to endanger the Chinese mainland, the transport of nuclear weapons into Japan, the revival of militarism – there can be no talk of any kind of friendship given this new assault on China.¹⁰³

As a way of explaining China’s willingness to engage with Japan if Japan was no longer allied to the United States, China’s Japan expert Liao Chengzhi told Ishibashi Tanzan that,

Even though we can forget our differences with Japan, we cannot forget our differences with the United States; moreover, we will never forget.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, in these meetings, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi began to emphasise the importance of restarting the economic relationship between China and Japan. Records of the talks with Ishibashi and Matsumura show that, in 1959 while Kishi was still in power, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was already attempting to find a formula to move beyond the inseparability of economics and politics. For instance, the communiqué issued at the end of Ishibashi Tanzan’s visit to Beijing in September 1959 demonstrated an important shift in China’s attitude towards trade with Japan and

¹⁰² ‘Chen Yi waijiaobuzhang guanyu RiMei xiugai “anquan tiaoyue” de shengming’ [Foreign Minister Chen Yi’s statement on the revision of the US-Japan “Security Treaty”], 19 November 1958, accessed via Basic Documents of Postwar International Politics, University of Tokyo, <http://avatoli.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPOCH/19581119.O1C.html>, [accessed 1 February 2012].

¹⁰³ FMA File 105-00667-04, 3.

¹⁰⁴ FMA File 105-00669-02, 2nd meeting, 2.

Japan's policy of separating politics and economics.¹⁰⁵ The communiqué denounced Japan's recognition of Taiwan, but made no reference to Japan's official recognition of the PRC as a precondition for restarting economic relations.¹⁰⁶ China's leaders had begun moving away from the 'three political principles' of 1958 and their insistence that Japan enter diplomatic relations with the PRC as the sole government of China.¹⁰⁷

By the time of the Matsumura visit in October 1959, this stance was even clearer. The public record of these talks, such as Zhou Enlai's farewell speech to Matsumura reported in the *People's Daily*, shows that Zhou insisted that politics and economics could not be separated and that the 'three political principles' must be upheld.¹⁰⁸ However, the record of closed-door meetings with these Japanese representatives tells a different story. The recently declassified records show that China's leaders had removed the most difficult condition—diplomatic recognition by Japan—as a precondition for restarting economic ties.¹⁰⁹ Indeed, on 21 October 1959, Liao told Matsumura:

As Premier Zhou has said, when we talk about politics, this does not mean that resuming diplomatic relations should be the prerequisite.¹¹⁰

This was highly significant. For Japan, forming a diplomatic relationship with China would necessitate severing ties with Chiang Kai-shek who was just as insistent about the recognition of 'one China'.¹¹¹ Tokyo also knew that recognition of China during

¹⁰⁵ FMA File 105-00669-04, 20 September 1959, 'Zhou Enlai zongli yu Riben qian shouxiang Ishibashi Tanzan huitan gongbao' [Communique from talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and former Japanese Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan].

¹⁰⁶ Ibid; *Renmin Ribao* (People's Daily), 23 September 1959, 'Zhou Enlai zongli he Ishibashi Tanzan xiansheng de huitan de zhongda yiyi' [The great significance of talks between Premier Zhou Enlai and Mr Ishibashi Tanzan].

¹⁰⁷ FMA File 105-00669-02, 6-7; FMA File 105-00669-04, 1-2.

¹⁰⁸ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 98.

¹⁰⁹ FMA File 105-00667-03, 21 October 1959, 'Liao Chengzhi huijian Riben youren Matsumura Kenzō de tanhua jilu' [Record of the dialogue between Liao Chengzhi and Japanese friend, Matsumura Kenzō].

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ogata Sadako, 'Japanese Attitude toward China,' *Asian Survey* 5, no. 8 (1965), 397-398.

the tense environment of the Cold War was impossible given its alliance relationship with the United States.¹¹² By not insisting on diplomatic recognition, Beijing was allowing Japan to maintain this particular balancing act between the US, Taiwan and China. In doing so, the Chinese government had begun to develop its own version of separating politics and economics. Liao Chengzhi explained this shift in policy to Ishibashi Tanzan by stating that,

China has begun building the country, and has made a leap forward. From now we will continue to make rapid progress. Numbers are not important; the most important thing is the speed of construction. The needs of the Chinese people are a major problem. We have a population of 670 million, and although we have made great achievements in construction, each person's share is small. To meet the needs of the nation's people, we must increase the speed with which we build the country. In the process of building, we may encounter some difficulties. However, we do not need to rely on other countries to solve these difficulties. We have experience, and we have the confidence to rely on our own strength to overcome difficulties. In spite of this, although China's reconstruction has begun to develop, Japan's reconstruction has also made progress. Building a cooperative relationship on the basis of Sino-Japanese friendship would be very convenient.¹¹³

Although Liao's face-saving statement makes clear that China did not need to rely on external assistance to build the Chinese state, the leadership clearly believed that economic cooperation with Japan could serve China's development needs. Despite the dangerous political atmosphere in the wake of the Lushan conference—a time when it was politically disastrous to criticise the economic policies of the GLF—Liao was at least willing to allude to some of China's economic difficulties, and China's need for help in resolving these difficulties, to his Japanese counterpart.¹¹⁴

It is not exactly clear why economic issues returned to the negotiating table in late 1959, but there are several reasons that can be surmised from China's past negotiating strategies with Japan, China's domestic and international situation in late 1959, and

¹¹² Jain, *China and Japan*, 234-235.

¹¹³ FMA File 105-00669-02, 2.

¹¹⁴ Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 100-101.

from the statements made by Chinese officials in these meetings outlined above. First, throughout the early 1950s, the Chinese Foreign Ministry had used Sino-Japanese trade as a form of leverage in its negotiations with Japan. As we saw in the previous chapters, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry were well aware of Japan's dire need for Chinese agricultural goods, such as soy beans, and industrial raw materials, such as iron ore, and of Japan's desire to use China as a major export market for Japanese manufactured and industrial goods.¹¹⁵ In the late 1950s, the Chinese Foreign Ministry continued to hope that it could use the trade issue to put further pressure on Japan's Kishi government. In Chinese meetings with Japan's LDP advisors in late 1959, simply floating the possible renewal of Sino-Japanese trade was sufficient to spark a flurry of interest in Japan. On 25 November 1959, less than two weeks after Matsumura's return from Beijing, representatives from more than one hundred Japanese industrial and commercial organisations met in Tokyo demanding that the Kishi government change its position on trade with China. Encouraging these groups, China's CCPIT Chairman Nan Hanchen sent a congratulatory telegram to the representatives at this meeting, and less than a week later received a reply from Japanese business groups in Kansai pledging their resolve to restart Sino-Japanese trade.¹¹⁶

Second, the deterioration in China's international relations began to concern China's leaders in the second half of 1959. There were tensions on the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet borders, and the situation in Indochina had worsened after the United States escalated its involvement in Laos.¹¹⁷ Prompted by these increased international

¹¹⁵ Cheng Yongming and Shi Qibao, *Zhongri Jingmao Guanxi Liushi Nian*, 104-105.

¹¹⁶ Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Shi Nianbiao*, 141.

¹¹⁷ Niu Jun, '1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy,' *CWIHP Working Paper* Number 48(2005), 9.

tensions all around and involving China, CCP leaders decided over the course of late 1959 and early 1960 that it was necessary to ‘create a new situation in diplomacy’ and to ease some of these regional tensions.¹¹⁸ Although Sino-Japanese relations were not as tense as relations with India or the situation in Indochina, it is likely that leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi were looking for ways to mend relations with Japan. Re-starting their important economic relationship with Japan would be an important step.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the economic failures of the GLF were becoming apparent to China’s leaders by the middle of 1959. We know that by the time of the Lushan Conference in July 1959, leaders such as Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Chinese Defence Minister Peng Dehuai (彭德怀), had detailed knowledge of China’s dire grain situation and the fact that millions were suffering from famine.¹¹⁹ Indeed, Peng Dehuai would suffer greatly for his willingness to raise the failures of the Great Leap with Mao at Lushan.¹²⁰ Although the worst of the famine was still to come—as Mao forged ahead with the GLF and cracked down on ‘rightist’ criticism of GLF policies within the Party—it appears that the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Zhou Enlai were already beginning to look for ways to make foreign trade help the Chinese economy.

For each of these reasons, Zhou Enlai and his colleagues in the Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry were willing to countenance re-starting trade with Japan. To be sure, however, the Chinese side made it clear that significant Sino-Japanese trade

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 9-10.

¹¹⁹ See Mitcham, *China's Economic Relations with the West and Japan*, 51-52; Lardy, 'Chinese Economy under Stress,' 379-380; Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan*, 128-129; Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 94-95.

¹²⁰ ———, *Mao's Great Famine*, 90-99.

would not be re-opened until Kishi left office.¹²¹ For the host of normative reasons discussed above, Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi remained hostile towards Kishi who, they argued, had treated China and the fourth unofficial Sino-Japanese trade agreement with such an ‘imperialistic’ attitude.¹²² However, the fact that these Chinese officials were willing to consider re-starting trade with Japan at all is significant, and speaks to a deeper set of normative goals shaping Chinese thinking at this time. As was argued in Chapter Four, the normative idea of revolution through industrialisation—that is, the goal of becoming strong and throwing off foreign imperialism through economic, and particularly industrial, growth—remained highly important to China’s policy-makers. The historian Zhang Shu Guang argues that ‘aside from security concerns, economic reconstruction became a life-and-death issue for the CCP in its initial years of ruling China.’¹²³ War with Japan, and the later Civil War and Korean War, had left China in economic ruins. Furthermore, the focus on economic reconstruction only sharpened as the 1950s progressed. In 1958, before the breakdown in Sino-Japanese relations, Chen Yi told the head of Japan’s JCIEA, Nangō Saburō, that China’s experience of war and the ensuing ‘unequal peace in the Far East’ meant that it would take thirty to fifty years for China to become self-reliant.¹²⁴ Liao Chengzhi further argued that China had only been able to begin its badly needed reconstruction efforts once the Korean War had ended in 1953, and that ‘to satisfy the people’s needs, we must build for at least 50 years’.¹²⁵

¹²¹ A very limited amount of Sino-Japanese trade was negotiated through Japan’s left-wing union groups in late 1959, but significant levels of trade would not re-start until August 1960. See Rose, ‘Breaking the Deadlock,’ 194.

¹²² FMA File 105-00667-04, 8.

¹²³ Zhang Shu Guang, ‘Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation,’ 193.

¹²⁴ FMA File 105-00595-03, 9.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 9; FMA File 105-00669-02, 17.

It is important to remember that ideas about the other are often powerful reflections of ideas about the self.¹²⁶ As noted above, one of the reasons why Chinese officials were opposed to revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty was because they believed it would allow the United States to draw on Japan's 'latent' economic and particularly industrial power. This concern about Japan's ability to use industrial capabilities for military ends reflected Chinese officials' concern about China's own relative lack of economic development and thus military weakness. In the late 1950s, Chinese officials argued that China had been the victim of war in the past because of its own economic weakness and internal instability.¹²⁷ For instance, Liao Chengzhi suggested that 'America judged that China was not stable, and therefore thought that it could damage China if China were drawn into a great war'.¹²⁸ Furthermore, an editorial in the *People's Daily* around this time made a similar point, arguing that 'as past history tells us, a militaristic aggressors' expansion is frequently directed at what they think is the weakest place (*boruo de difang*)'.¹²⁹ China's relative lack of economic development was an important aspect of that perceived weakness, and it was these ideas that had, in part, helped to fuel Mao's decision to pursue the policies of the GLF. Through rapid economic growth and industrialisation, China's leaders believed they could catch up with the more powerful countries of the West.

Now, in late 1959, this normative idea of revolution through industrialisation once again aligned with the cognitive idea that trade, technology and expertise from Japan

¹²⁶ See Section 1.4 of the Introduction for more discussion on this point.

¹²⁷ For more on this point, see James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983); Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964).

¹²⁸ FMA File 105-00669-02, 11.

¹²⁹ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 3 December 1959, 'Jinian Katayama Sen dansheng yibai zhounian' [Commemorating the 100th anniversary of Katayama Sen's birth], quoted in FMA File 105-00435-08. Katayama Sen was co-founder of the Japan Communist Party in 1922.

could aid China on its path to rapid economic growth and industrialisation. This re-alignment of ideas in the second half of 1959 became even more important when, in July 1960, the Soviet Union abruptly recalled all of its economic advisors from China. As outlined in the Historical Overview above, this move, at a time when China's economy was already so weak, further devastated the Chinese economy. Re-starting trade with Japan became increasingly urgent.

As we shall see in the next chapter, in August 1960, Zhou Enlai would introduce 'three trade principles' as a way of re-opening economic ties with Japan.¹³⁰ Given that this came in the wake of the Soviet pullout, and the replacement of Japan's 'imperialistic' Prime Minister Kishi by Ikeda Hayato in July 1960, most existing scholarship argues that the Soviet pullout and the resignation of Kishi were the most important factors driving China's shift in policy in August 1960.¹³¹ However, Chapters Three and Four of this thesis have shown that since 1949, Chinese policy-makers had held the cognitive idea that Japanese goods and expertise could aid China's economic development and industrialisation, and the normative idea that restoring China's central place in a non-imperialistic international system could be achieved through industrialisation. Between 1958 and July 1960, these two ideas temporarily diverged as Chinese officials' view of Japan and its imperialistic Kishi government drowned out all other ideas in its Japan policy. Given Chinese officials' antipathy towards Kishi, and the fact that Beijing had expended so much political capital in denouncing Kishi, it would be impossible to re-open trade with Japan while Kishi remained in power. Yet once Kishi had resigned as Prime Minister, Chinese

¹³⁰ The content of the 'three trade principles' will be discussed in Chapter 6.

¹³¹ See, for example Lee, *China and Japan*, 5; Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 61-62.

cognitive and normative ideas about Japan were able to re-align in China's Japan policy once again.

5.3.4. Whose ideas matter?

Why, at this moment, did the normative idea of revolution through industrialisation come to intersect with the cognitive idea that economic engagement with Japan could aid China's economic growth and industrialisation? To understand how and why this re-alignment of cognitive and normative ideas took place in late 1959, we need to appreciate the role of Zhou Enlai in particular. Zhou's ideas about economic development were particularly important in shaping the shift in China's Japan policy in late 1959. As we have seen in previous chapters, Zhou Enlai held ultimate responsibility for foreign trade in China, and he had long favoured the expansion of China's trade with countries outside the communist bloc, including, and in particular, with Japan. His allies in the Finance Coalition and Ministry of Foreign Trade, such as Ye Jizhuang and Chen Yun, also supported the dramatic increase of Chinese trade in order to access capital, technology and expertise from abroad.¹³²

Yet since 1957, Zhou Enlai and the Finance Coalition had been far less influential than the Planning Coalition in shaping Chinese economic policy. Furthermore, Zhou, Chen Yun and others had had to repeatedly abandon their economic ideas and swear their allegiance to Mao's radical economic plans to ensure their own political survival.¹³³ In late 1959, though the leadership recognised the need to moderate Chinese foreign policy and ease some regional tensions, this relative moderation was not reflected in economic policy. In the second half of 1959 and the first half of 1960,

¹³² Bachman, *Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China*, 67. Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 77-79.

¹³³ ———, *Mao's Great Famine*, 15-21.

Mao instead forged ahead with the GLF.¹³⁴ It is therefore by no means clear that Mao fully endorsed Zhou's decision, in late 1959, to begin reaching out to a capitalist, imperialistic country like Japan. It seems that Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and the Foreign Ministry were moving somewhat faster than Mao and other more radical Chinese economic planners in making overtures to representatives from the conservative LDP. Mao did not meet with the LDP representatives Ishibashi and Matsumura, and there is no evidence that the minutes of their meetings with Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi were forwarded to Mao or other government departments for their information or approval.¹³⁵

To be sure, Zhou Enlai was certainly not hiding the fact of these meetings from Mao or his colleagues. Editorials in the *People's Daily* in September and October welcomed Ishibashi and Matsumura to China, and both Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De held separate meetings with these Japanese representatives.¹³⁶ However, it seems that in late 1959, Mao's attention was elsewhere. During the same period in which Ishibashi and Matsumura were separately visiting Beijing, Mao instead held numerous meetings with left-wing Japanese representatives, such as those from the JCP and with a delegation celebrating the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the PRC.¹³⁷ In these meetings, attention was paid to the normative ideas of anti-imperialism and opposition to Kishi and the United States, rather than to the intersecting cognitive and normative idea that China's own industrialisation and revolution could be aided by

¹³⁴ Ibid., 100-103.

¹³⁵ That is, unlike the records of so many other meetings and memoranda of conversation kept in the Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive, these files contained no instructions requesting that the minutes be forwarded to other departments in the Central Government. Similarly, Mao frequently left handwritten marginalia on documents he had read; unlike other reports, the absence of marginalia on these records suggests it is possible that Mao or those in his office were not aware of their contents.

¹³⁶ Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Shi Nianbiao*, 134-141.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

economic engagement with Japan. As we shall see in the next chapter, by early 1961, Mao would also come to describe Japan's conservative LDP advisors as 'indirect allies' in China's global struggle.¹³⁸ However, in late 1959 at least, Mao's attention remained focused on meeting with like-minded left-wing groups that similarly shared his goals of maintaining the revolution against imperialism and revisionism.

Finally, in contrast to efforts made in the early 1950s, Zhou Enlai and other senior officials within the Chinese Foreign Ministry made little attempt at this point to try and justify their shift in Japan policy, either to lower-level Chinese officials, or to the broader Chinese population. Editorials in the *People's Daily* continued to insist that the 'three political principles' towards Japan were being maintained.¹³⁹ Furthermore, there is no available evidence to suggest that Zhou Enlai, Liao Chengzhi or Chen Yi informed lower-level officials or Chinese diplomats stationed abroad of this shift in policy. Instead, it appears that, at a time of great economic severity and domestic political upheaval, and at a time when the central leadership had decided to find ways to ease some of the regional diplomatic tensions it faced, the political and economic conditions were in place to allow Zhou Enlai to exert significant leverage on Chinese foreign economic policy towards Japan without needing to legitimate that policy to a domestic audience.

¹³⁸ FMA File 105-01779-03, 24 January-6 March 1961, 'Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian Kuroda Hisao, Tanaka Toshio, Matsumoto Shichirou, Okada Haruo siwei Riben guohui yiyuan tanhua jilu ji waijiao tongbao di 17qi' [Records of the meeting between Chairman Mao Zedong and four Japanese Diet members: Kuroda Hisao, Tanaka Toshio, Matsumoto Shichirou and Okada Haruo, and Foreign Ministry Briefing No. 17], 5; FMA File 105-01863-02, 22 September 1963, 'Mao Zedong zhuxi tong Rigong zhongwei Takenake Tsunesaburō deng tanghua jilu' [Record of the dialogue between Chairman Mao Zedong and Japanese Communist Party Central Committee member Takenaka Tsunesaburō and others], 1.

¹³⁹ See, for example *Renmin Ribao* [*People's Daily*], 23 September 1959, 'Zhou Enlai zongli he shi qiao zhanshan xiansheng de huitan de zhongda yiyi' [Significant talks held between Premier Zhou Enlai and Mr Ishibashi Tanzan].

5.3.5. *The role of mistaken ideas*

Finally, despite the realignment of cognitive and normative ideas in China's Japan policy in late 1959, it is important to recognise that the cognitive and normative ideas about Japan held by Zhou Enlai and others were not necessarily accurate ideas. 'Mistaken ideas' about Japan played an important role in China's Japan policy in two ways.

First, as we saw in Section 5.3.1. above, Chinese leaders saw Japan as a distinct and particularly appropriate source of economic support for China during the early stages of the GLF because Japan was an 'Eastern country' whose goods, technology and expertise were better suited to conditions in China than those from the Soviet Union or Europe. More importantly however, Chinese policy-makers lauded Japan's levels of economic development, and saw Japan as a powerful model of the kind of industrialisation that could be achieved by a fellow Asian country. Yet at no time did Chinese policy-makers show any understanding that Japan might have achieved these levels of postwar industrialisation because it was a capitalist country. Rather, as we have seen in this and the previous chapter, they attributed Japan's higher levels of development to Japan's inherent 'industriousness', and to the fact that Japan had embarked on its industrial development phase earlier than China.

Furthermore, though Chinese policy-makers and *People's Daily* editorials regularly lambasted the United States for reviving Japan's military industries, they showed little awareness of the *positive* role that the United States had played in rehabilitating Japan's economy after the Second World War. Since 1947, the US had sustained a policy of investment in Japanese firms, a low-tariff market for Japanese exports, and

an ongoing demand for Japanese high-technology goods. The US did so in order to link Japan's economic rehabilitation and industrialisation to US strategic goals in Asia: the containment of the communist threat and the establishment of US strategic hegemony in the region. These US policies transformed the postwar Japanese economy as we saw in Chapter Three.¹⁴⁰ Chinese officials wanted to emulate Japan's levels of industrialisation, but profoundly misunderstood how Japan had got there.

A major explanation for the development of these 'mistaken ideas' in China was the fact that these ideas were being shaped through Chinese interactions with a very particular sub-section of the Japanese population. Since 1949, Chinese officials had held numerous meetings with representatives from left-wing political and economic groups in Japan such as the JCPTA and JAPIT. These groups were predominantly made up of Japanese individuals linked to the Japanese Socialist and Communist parties, and representatives from Japan's SMEs. These individuals were all deeply critical of the dominance of the United States in Japan's economy. Japanese SMEs had, on the whole, not enjoyed the fruits of US special procurement policies during and after the Korean War, and argued that they had suffered the most from the embargo on Japanese trade with China.¹⁴¹ In addition, and at the encouragement of the JCTPA in 1952, Chinese officials had expended much more effort in making contact with industrialists and *zaibatsu* representatives from Japan's Kansai (western) region than with those from the Kantō (eastern) region. On the whole, Kantō business leaders were much more closely linked to the Japanese government than business leaders from Kansai. Kansai business groups, by contrast, were far more fervent about

¹⁴⁰ See also William Borden, *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984); Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*.

¹⁴¹ Rose, 'Breaking the Deadlock,' 190. FMA File 105-00238-16, 29 October 1952, 'Ribben Suzuki Kazuo de tanhua jilu' [Record of conversation with Japan's Suzuki Kazuo], 1-8, 26-27.

the need to restart trade with China, and were more willing to criticise what they saw as particular failures in US and Japanese government policy, such as the failure to foster alternative trade networks for Japan in Southeast Asia.¹⁴² As a result, it is less surprising that Chinese officials showed a disproportionate awareness of the negative impact of the United States in Japan's economy.

Yet this first 'mistaken idea' also developed as a result of political and normative constraints in China. As we saw in the previous chapter, there were huge debates in the mid-1950s about the best way to pursue economic growth and industrialisation in China. In the end, it was a combination of the success of the Planning Coalition's unerring focus on heavy industry, and Mao's own normative ideas about the need to stay true to revolutionary Stalinism, that had prevented leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun from taking a more moderate, or market-oriented path. By the late-1950s, the radical policies of the GLF were a powerful symbol of China's 'mistaken ideas' about the best way to achieve catch up growth and industrialisation.

Second, Chinese policy-makers spectacularly overestimated their ability to draw Japan away from the US alliance and prevent revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. The Chinese Foreign Ministry had worked hard to undermine Kishi and the passage of the US-Japan Security Treaty through a multi-pronged campaign of *People's Daily* editorials, negotiations with Japanese of all political stripes, and support for the Japanese protest movement. Yet the Chinese fundamentally misunderstood the degree of opposition to the US in Japan. Huge protests against the Security Treaty rocked Japan in May and June 1960, leading the Chinese side to

¹⁴² FMA File 105-00238-16, 8-9.

conclude that Japan's 'revolutionary situation' was well advanced.¹⁴³ There is also little doubt that the left-wing movement in Japan was strong, particularly among student groups such as the All-Japan Federation of Students (JP: *Zengakuren*) which boasted one-third of all Japanese students as members, and which had organised large-scale demonstrations against the treaty.¹⁴⁴ However, the Chinese side misunderstood that many of these Japanese protestors were simply opposed to Kishi rather than to the United States more generally. Furthermore, Foreign Ministry officials such as Liao Chengzhi and Chen Yi overlooked the 'large, silent conservative majority in Japan' who did not join the protest movement, and who continued to support the US-Japan alliance.¹⁴⁵ Even Japan's pro-China politicians believed they had little choice but to support the US-Japan alliance. The Chinese records show that LDP representatives, Ishibashi and Matsumura, agreed in meetings with their Chinese counterparts that Japan's alliance with the US was detrimental to China.¹⁴⁶ However, given the particular international constraints faced by Japan during these Cold War years, Japan had little choice but to maintain its alliance with the United States.

The US-Japan Security Treaty was revised in Washington in January 1960, and successfully ratified in the Japanese Diet in June that year. Revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty *did* come at a huge political cost for Kishi; the protests of May and June 1960 ultimately forced Kishi's resignation as Prime Minister of Japan.¹⁴⁷ Yet Chinese officials had misunderstood that, notwithstanding the loss of Kishi, there was

¹⁴³ Herbert Passin, 'The Sources of Protest in Japan,' *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 2 (1962), 391.

¹⁴⁴ Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 231.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 231-233.

¹⁴⁶ FMA File 105-00669-02.

¹⁴⁷ Packard III (1966), 44-55. Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 230-235.

very little they could do to disrupt the US-Japan alliance, which had become the bedrock of Japan's security. This suggests that China's leaders profoundly misunderstood the nature of the postwar and Cold War world they had been thrust into.

Echoing this point, shortly after the passage of the treaty, in a conversation with another LDP advisor, Zhou Enlai reflected on why Japan could not simply 'be like India' and take a neutral path in the Cold War. The Japanese LDP adviser responded that Japan could not be considered the same kind of state as India; Japan was locked into a peace treaty and an alliance with the United States because it had 'adopted an aggressive policy of militarism and imperialism towards China' in the past.¹⁴⁸ Yet Zhou appeared to be willing to absolve Japan of its wartime responsibility, for he stated that:

In the postwar period, Japanese war criminals have been tried, Japan's political system has been changed, and a peace treaty has been entered into. Japan has given up its colonies; it has paid part of its war reparations; that is, [Japan] has already been made accountable for the war.¹⁴⁹

Whether or not Zhou truly believed that Japan had been made accountable for its wartime aggression, Zhou's statement shows a profound lack of understanding about the long-term implications of Japan's role in the Second World War. Furthermore, it shows a lack of awareness of the concerns of other Asian countries, who had also borne the brunt of Japanese imperialism, and thus felt reassured by the US role in limiting Japan's remilitarisation. Finally, this statement by Zhou simply fails to acknowledge the political, economic and security constraints on Japan in this postwar

¹⁴⁸ FMA File 105-00735-01, 1 November 1960, 'Zhou Enlai zongli huijian Riben Takasaki Tatsunosuke tanhua yaodian' [Major points from Premier Zhou Enlai's meeting with Japan's Takasaki Tatsunosuke].

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

and Cold War era. The US alliance was seen as critically important in defending Japan against the Soviet threat, and given Japan's economic constraints, there was little appetite in the country for the major rearmament that would be required if Japan were to 'go it alone' outside of the US alliance.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, Japan's postwar Constitution had placed major constraints on the country's rearmament. Thus, except for those on the Left who wanted Japan to take a more neutral stance in the Cold War, the US alliance remained the least politically and economically costly way of securing Japan.¹⁵¹ Although Zhou's statement is highly significant in that it shows he believed—or was at least willing to argue—that Japan had taken responsibility for its acts during the war, the kind of relationship Zhou now envisaged between China and a neutral Japan was rendered impossible by the legacy of the Second World War and the Cold War order that had descended on Asia.

5.5. Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the clash between cognitive and normative ideas produced a crisis in China's Japan policy between 1958 and July 1960. It has shown that although cognitive ideas may provide good solutions to policy problems, cognitive ideas alone are not sufficient in shaping policy, particularly when they have dangerous normative implications. During the GLF, at a time when Chinese officials were trying to rapidly increase China's economic growth and industrial output, Japanese goods, technology and expertise initially appeared to be a useful cognitive solution to China's economic needs. Yet, at its heart, the GLF also symbolised China's normative goal of standing up to imperialist powers and becoming a more

¹⁵⁰ Although it should be noted that the Japanese government had also consistently resisted US pressure to re-arm Japan *within* the framework of the US-Japan alliance throughout the 1950s. See Swenson-Wright, *Unequal Allies?*, 187-235.

¹⁵¹ Richard J Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2007), 40-45.

powerful, industrialised nation. Mao and other Chinese leaders argued that through rapid growth and industrialisation, China could surpass the imperialist countries of the West, thus restoring China's central place in a new, anti-imperialistic international order. The normative ideas underpinning the GLF meant that when Kishi Nobusuke, a leader who represented the most 'imperialistic' aspects of Japan's wartime past and its present Cold War policy, came to power as Prime Minister of Japan, there was a major clash of ideas in China's Japan policy. The chapter argued that, under the particularly radical domestic political conditions of the GLF, the normative idea that Japan was an imperialistic actor was able to exert a more powerful leverage than any other Chinese ideas about Japan. In May 1958, Chinese officials suspended all trade with Japan, openly denounced Japan and its government on the pages of the *People's Daily*, and came to define Japan as one of China's imperialistic foes.

Yet, very quickly, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials began trying to break the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations and bring about a realignment in cognitive and normative ideas. Having identified Kishi Nobusuke as the chief imperialistic foe, Foreign Ministry officials sought to undermine Kishi's political power in Japan, bring about his political downfall, and halt what they saw as Kishi's most imperialistic policy: revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty. They did so by pursuing a two-fold strategy of reaching out to both left-wing Japanese and representatives from Japan's conservative ruling party. Chinese officials framed Japan in slightly different ways to either group. To left-wing Japanese, Chinese officials emphasised the shared struggle of the Chinese and Japanese people against imperialism. To Japanese conservative representatives, they demonstrated a clear distinction between the United States and

the Japanese government, emphasising that the Chinese government could ‘forget our differences with Japan’, and arguing that they did not perceive Japan as a threat.

The most significant, and ultimately successful, shift came in late 1959 however, when Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi demonstrated that cognitive and normative ideas had begun to realign in China’s Japan policy. By late 1959, economic issues returned to the negotiating table, and the long-held and underlying cognitive idea that Japan was an important economic partner for China began to realign with the normative idea that China’s revolution could best be achieved through economic engagement with industrialised states such as Japan. This shift in policy was achieved through the influential role of Zhou Enlai and his understanding, developed over the course of the 1950s, of the importance of Japan to the Chinese economy. Despite the fact that Zhou’s understanding of the Japanese economy—and the US role in aiding its economic development—was somewhat flawed, the realignment of cognitive and normative ideas would help to re-start economic ties between Japan and China in August 1960. Ultimately, one particularly catastrophic event—the Great Leap Forward—provided the political and economic conditions that first allowed normative ideas to have considerable leverage in China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan, and later allowed Zhou Enlai to take the relatively unilateral decision to restart economic ties with Japan.

Nevertheless, the ongoing tension between the more radical Maoist ideas of standing up to imperialist powers, and ideas about the need to strengthen and industrialise China’s economy would continue to shape China and its Japan policy throughout the 1960s. As the following chapter will show, these two strands in Chinese foreign and

economic policy thinking would play a major role in shaping China's Japan policy in the wake of the GLF.

Chapter Six

Comparing Ourselves with Japan

Interaction between background and foreground ideas in China's Japan policy, August 1960-1965

6.1. Introduction

On 6 October 1963, Chinese officials and ordinary Chinese people woke to read an editorial in the pages of the *People's Daily* congratulating Japan on the opening of a major trade exhibition in Beijing.¹ The exhibition, by more than 600 Japanese firms displaying around 1200 different types of goods and technology, had been organised by the CCPIT, JAPIT and JCTPA the previous year. Of particular significance, the *People's Daily* editorial noted, was that in contrast to earlier Japanese trade shows in China, the overwhelming majority of goods displayed at this exhibition were high-technology equipment and machinery from Japan's heavy and light industrial sectors.² After the almost total cessation of Sino-Japanese trade between May 1958 and August 1960, this *People's Daily* editorial signified a major shift in the China-Japan relationship. As the editorial's opening paragraph made clear,

We believe that this exhibition will play a major role in strengthening mutual understanding between China and Japan, increasing friendship between the two countries' people, and spurring on the development of economic and technological exchange between China and Japan.³

This chapter explores the major shift in China's foreign economic policy towards Japan following the complete breakdown in Sino-Japanese economic relations discussed in the previous chapter. In particular, this chapter considers how it was possible that, by 1965, Japan had become China's most important trade partner. In the

¹ *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], 6 October 1963, 'Zhuhe Riben gongye zhanlanhui kaimu' [Congratulations on the opening of the Japanese industrial exhibition].

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

previous chapter we were interested in the matter of what happens when ideas—and in particular cognitive and normative ideas—collide. We saw that the cognitive idea that Japanese goods, technology and expertise could aid in China's economic development, was unable to shape policy when it clashed with the normative idea that Japan was an imperialistic and aggressive actor. This clashing of cognitive and normative ideas led to a total breakdown in Sino-Japanese economic relations in May 1958. However, the previous chapter also showed that by late 1959 and early 1960, key Chinese leaders such as Zhou Enlai found ways to realign the cognitive and normative dimensions of Chinese ideas about Japan. Thus, for the period between August 1960 and 1965, the explanatory value of distinguishing between cognitive and normative ideas has diminished as these ideas have been brought into realignment. Subsequently, in Chapter Six, the ideas framework will focus only on the *background* and *foreground* dimension of ideas. Doing so will also allow us to continue to build on Campbell's ideas framework and interrogate more precisely how ideas interact across the background and foreground levels.

This chapter argues that, in response to the failure of the Great Leap Forward, two major background ideas became prominent in Chinese foreign and economic policy thinking between August 1960 and 1965. The first was a set of ideas about how to achieve more balanced economic development in China, and how to modernise China's economy. The second idea—developed as a result of Mao's response to Party criticism of his role in instigating the failed Great Leap—was a renewed focus on anti-capitalism, anti-revisionism, and anti-imperialism in Chinese foreign policy thinking. The chapter shows how these dual background ideas shaped Chinese foreground ideas about Japan and, in particular, the idea of 'walking on two legs'.

Between August 1960 and 1965, the foreground idea of ‘walking on two legs’ produced a two-pronged economic policy towards Japan in which China engaged in both ‘Friendship Trade’ with progressive, ‘friendly’ Japanese firms who pledged their allegiance to mainland China and agreed not to trade with Taiwan, and in ‘Liao-Takasaki Trade’ with major Japanese firms who could provide the industrial goods and technology so badly needed in China.

Second, the chapter argues that the relationship between background and foreground ideas is not unidirectional. In the second half of the chapter I depart from Campbell’s argument that only background ideas shape foreground ideas, and instead show how Chinese foreground ideas about Japan played an important role in shaping broader background ideas in China’s foreign and economic policy thinking in the early 1960s.⁴ In particular, the chapter shows that in the early 1960s, Chinese policy-makers actively began comparing China’s levels of development with those in Japan, and found China lacking. I argue that as Chinese officials began to compare China with Japan, their ideas about Japan helped to shape Chinese background thinking about how to modernise the country’s economy and military, and how science and technology could help ‘late developers’ like China and Japan pursue ‘catch up’ growth. The chapter shows how Chinese officials therefore looked to Japan for the technology, goods and expertise needed to modernise and industrialise China’s economy (and, to a lesser extent, its military). It is important to note, however, that this chapter does not seek to determine whether background or foreground ideas played either the most important or precipitating role in catalysing Chinese thinking about the need for a modernised economy, modern industrial sphere, and greater use

⁴ Campbell, ‘The Role of Ideas in Political Economy,’ 384-385.

of science and technology. The chapter acknowledges that these ideas had a long, indigenous history in China. The goal of the chapter is simply to demonstrate the interactive relationship between background and foreground ideas. In doing so, it shows that Chinese foreground ideas strongly reinforced background ideas about economic development and modernisation in China.

Running throughout the two main halves of the chapter is a third major argument. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, a great deal of the literature on the development of Chinese foreign and domestic policy during the Mao years suggests that Chinese policy has been shaped by either ideology or pragmatism.⁵ That is, despite the Party's ideological roots, China's leaders have often responded in quite pragmatic ways to deal with challenges posed by the country's immediate economic, political or military needs. While this chapter acknowledges in some detail the range of pressing economic and security needs facing China in the wake of the Great Leap Forward and Soviet withdrawal, it does not argue that China's Japan policy was purely pragmatic. Rather, the chapter argues that what appears to be a pragmatic foreign economic policy towards Japan actually stemmed from Chinese ideas about how to become a developed, industrialised and strong state. In the early 1960s, Chinese ideas about how to achieve industrialisation and development were no longer shaped entirely by the Soviet example. Instead, China's leaders began looking to Japan for precise examples and guidance on how to develop, industrialise and strengthen the Chinese state.

⁵ See Section 1.1 of the Introduction.

From here, the chapter precedes with a brief historical overview of the period between August 1960 and 1965. It then explores how Chinese background ideas shaped Chinese foreground ideas about Japan, and discusses the ‘ideology versus pragmatism’ debate in China’s Japan policy. In the second half of the chapter, we consider how Chinese foreground ideas shaped background ideas in China’s economic and foreign policy, looking in particular at the way in which Chinese policy-makers began comparing China’s development levels with those in Japan. Finally, the chapter explores which ideas mattered most in shaping China’s Japan policy during the first half of the 1960s, arguing that because all ideas have to meet with favourable conditions before they are accepted and used, the Maoist strand of ideas about anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-revisionism ultimately had the most powerful effect on China’s foreign and economic policy towards Japan.

6.2. Historical Context, August 1960-1965

From the second half of 1960 to 1965, Chinese domestic and foreign policy was wracked by worsening relations with the Soviet Union, dire economic conditions at home, and political turmoil within the CCP over how to assess the failures of the Great Leap Forward. In the following section, we will see that, internationally, China grew increasingly isolated from both of the superpowers during this period, while at home, a brief period of moderate economic and foreign policy was soon upended by Mao’s plans for ‘continuous revolution’.

6.2.1. An isolated China

As Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross have noted, China was the only major power in the Cold War that remained unaligned from either of the superpowers and the target

of both their enmity.⁶ China's isolation from both of the superpowers commenced in the wake of the Soviet economic withdrawal from China in July 1960. The Sino-Soviet relationship temporarily stabilised in 1961 and 1962 as the CCP leadership attempted to reach out to Moscow and secure much-needed Soviet economic aid and military supplies.⁷ However, by late 1962, relations had significantly deteriorated. The worsening relationship was signified by Soviet support for India in the Sino-Indian border war, and Chinese condemnation of the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of the superpowers' imperialistic treatment of the Cuban people.⁸ The Soviet decision to sign the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the United States and Great Britain in 1963 was the decisive factor in precipitating the Sino-Soviet split. For China, the test ban treaty impeded China's ability to resist the nuclear threat from the United States. Mao believed that Soviet 'revisionism' had led Moscow to join with the United States in oppressing China, and as the 1960s progressed, he became increasingly paranoid that the US and Soviet Union were colluding to launch a joint attack on China.⁹

In the United States, attitudes towards China remained extremely negative. The Sino-Indian border war in 1962 'hardened' the attitude of a number of American officials who were sympathetic to India, and reinforced US concerns that China was a dangerous, expansionist power. American officials were also highly worried about the development of a Chinese nuclear capability, believing that the Chinese Communists

⁶ Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S Ross, *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 13.

⁷ Soviet evidence now indicates that the Soviet Union provided China with high-level military technology until late 1962. Westad, *Brothers in Arms*, 26-27.

⁸ The Soviet Union sold MiG-21 fighters to India in November 1962, in the midst of the Sino-Indian war. Ibid., 28.

⁹ Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases,' 94-96.

would not adhere to international norms prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁰ However, as the early 1960s progressed, the US also began to show an increasing awareness that China was less an expansionist threat than a 'revolutionary rival'. China's economic weaknesses, and its failure to industrialise in the way that the Great Leap Forward had promised, meant that US officials showed a growing awareness of China's military limitations. This did not lessen US concerns however. Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations fiercely opposed China's support for revolutionary communism. For the Johnson administration in particular, China's military support in Vietnam 'reinforced the image of China as America's worst enemy'.¹¹ The US now saw China as a greater threat than the Soviet Union.

China's international isolation was further entrenched when, in October 1964, it became the world's fifth nuclear weapons state. Since 1955, China's leaders had worked to develop the country's nuclear program, believing that nuclear weapons were an important marker of a country's economic and technological progress.¹² As Zhou Enlai wrote in his report to the Third National People's Congress in December 1964,

Haven't we attained a reasonably good level in all fields of socialist revolution and socialist construction after 15 years of endeavour, starting from "poverty and blankness"? Haven't we also exploded an atomic bomb? Haven't we flung off the label "sick man of the East" that was fastened on us by Westerners?¹³

Yet China's nuclear test further isolated the country by eroding support among a number of governments and political movements that had once supported the PRC. This was especially the case in Japan. As the only country to have suffered from

¹⁰ Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China*, 24-27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹² Nicola Horsburgh, 'China's Engagement with Global Nuclear Order since 1949' (D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 2012), especially Chapter 2.

¹³ 'Major tasks for developing the national economy', 21 December 1964 *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 460.

nuclear attack in war, Japan was home to a large and vocal anti-nuclear coalition. Japanese progressives, who had previously lined up in support for the CCP, were now divided over their position on China and its nuclear test. The Japanese Socialist Party was deeply critical of China's nuclear test, stating that,

The JSP has decided that it will oppose any country testing a nuclear weapon. No matter whether the country testing a nuclear weapon is the US, Soviet Union, China, our attitude will remain the same.¹⁴

By contrast, the Japan Communist Party supported the Chinese nuclear test, arguing that the test was for the purposes of China's defence. Similarly, the JCP-aligned Japan-China Friendship Association published a statement declaring 'complete understanding of the Chinese government's position on the nuclear issue'.¹⁵ This division between the JCP and JSP over the Chinese nuclear test reflected a deeper tension in Japan over whether to support the Soviet Union or China in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split. While the JSP more or less aligned with the Soviets, the JCP initially remained aligned with Beijing.¹⁶ As we shall see below, however, Mao's policies of 'continuous revolution' and support for militant wars of national liberation, would eventually cause divisions between the JCP and Beijing as well.

6.2.2. Mao's 'continuous revolution'

Mao's political dominance waned in the late stages of the GLF, and in 1960 he was (somewhat willingly) relegated to the 'second line' of the leadership.¹⁷ Subsequently, in late 1961 and early 1962, the country embarked on a more moderate phase in economic and foreign policy, in an attempt to ease some of the worst of the economic

¹⁴ FMA File 105-01301-01, 15 October 1964, 'Zhongguo renmin waijiao xuehui jiedai Riben shehuidang di si ci fangHua daibiaotuan jianbao (1-26 qi)' [Report by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs on their reception of the 4th Japan Socialist Party delegation to China (No. 1 – 26)], 2. The left-wing faction of the JSP initially supported the Chinese nuclear test, but eventually fell into line with the position of the right-wing faction of the JSP.

¹⁵ Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Shi Nianbiao*, 242.

¹⁶ Stockwin, 'Japanese Attitudes to the Sino-Soviet Dispute,' 495-496.

¹⁷ Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,' 275.

and social upheavals experienced during the GLF.¹⁸ However, all this would change by the middle of 1962 as a result of Mao's response to Party criticism of his role in instigating the failed GLF. The details of this criticism, particularly at the Lushan Conference in July 1962, will be discussed in the sections that follow. However, here it is sufficient to note that in response to criticism of Mao by his colleagues, and Mao's dissatisfaction with the more moderate economic policy that had been adopted by the Party, he shifted abruptly to the left. The Chairman attempted to reinvigorate 'class struggle' in the countryside, and engaged in brutal political campaigns to expel those he saw as 'revisionists' within the CCP.¹⁹ These policies, and Mao's political campaigns, would ultimately prepare the 'ideological and intellectual groundwork' for the radical policies of the Cultural Revolution.²⁰

Over the course of the 1960s, Mao strengthened his struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism, both at home and abroad. In foreign policy, the culmination of Mao's 'left turn', and the isolation from both of the superpowers, led to attempts to create a new united front amongst the revolutionary countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.²¹ By 1965, Beijing was providing 'indirect' political and moral support for a number of revolutionary movements in the Third World, and was providing military and other material support to certain wars of 'national liberation', such as that in Vietnam.²² Yet Mao also faced limitations in his efforts to create a united revolutionary front in the Third World. In 1965 and 1966, a number of African

¹⁸ Ibid; Niu Jun, '1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy,' 9-10.

¹⁹ Lardy, 'Chinese Economy under Stress,' 397.

²⁰ Gao Wenqian, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 99; Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution: The Coming of the Cataclysm 1961-1966*, vol. 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

²¹ Yahuda, 'Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases,' 95-96.

²² Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 77-197.

countries suspended diplomatic relations with Beijing. Furthermore, China lost the support of key allies in Asia, such as North Vietnam, which shifted closer towards Moscow, and Indonesia, after Beijing's backing of an Indonesian Communist Party coup failed.²³ Mao's struggle for 'continuous revolution' also alienated once staunch supporters such as the Japan Communist Party. In late 1965, the JCP began to argue that Beijing's policy of 'national liberation' was an unhelpful one. The JCP was particularly critical of Beijing's support for the Indonesian Communist Party and its failed attempts to 'liberate' that country.²⁴ By 1966-1967, relations between the JCP and CCP were openly hostile and Beijing began looking for alternative allies among Japan's progressive forces.²⁵ As we shall see, China's foreign policy of 'continuous revolution' would have a major impact on China's broader ideas about, and foreign economic policy towards, Japan in the first half of the 1960s.

6.3. Chinese ideas about Japan: August 1960-1965

Chinese background and foreground ideas were shaped by the range of pressures in its historical environment outlined above: isolation from the superpowers, engagement with the revolutionary forces of the Third World, political contestation within the CCP, and dire economic conditions at home. In the following section, I first show how this led to the formation of two somewhat contradictory background ideas in Chinese foreign and economic policy. I then explore the interaction between Chinese background ideas and policy-makers' foreground ideas about Japan, and show how Chinese foreground ideas about Japan reinforced and fed back into Chinese broader background ideas.

²³ Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 213.

²⁴ Sheldon W. Simon, 'Maoism and Interparty Relations: Peking's Alienation of the Japan Communist Party,' *The China Quarterly* 35, no. July-Sept (1968), 42.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 44-51.

6.3.1. Background ideas shape foreground ideas

Two major background ideas became prominent in Chinese foreign and economic policy thinking in the wake of the GLF. The first was a set of ideas about how to achieve more balanced economic development in China, and included a renewed focus on agriculture and ideas about modernising the economy along four specific dimensions. The second idea was strong antipathy towards the capitalist, imperialist international order, and thus a renewed focus on anti-capitalism, anti-revisionism, and anti-imperialism in Chinese foreign policy thinking. Although profoundly different ideas, both developed in response to the failures of the GLF. In the section that follows, I show how these two background ideas shaped Chinese foreground ideas about, and subsequent policy towards, Japan in the first half of the 1960s. In particular, I will show that these two background ideas produced two quite different aspects of economic policy towards Japan, a policy that would become known as ‘walking on two legs’. This section will also discuss the difficulties in maintaining this two-pronged economic policy towards Japan, and will conclude by arguing that it was ideational factors, rather than pragmatism, that shaped China’s Japan policy.

a) ‘Agriculture First’ and ‘Four Modernisations’

The first ideational response to the failure of the GLF was a shift in thinking about how to put the Chinese economy back on track and achieve a more balanced and sustainable form of economic development in China. As discussed above, the political fallout from the GLF had left Premier Zhou Enlai and the Finance Coalition in a relatively more powerful position vis-a-vis the economy. Zhou Enlai now rekindled ideas about balanced economic development that had been championed by the Finance Coalition in the mid-1950s. In particular, Zhou argued that China now

needed to shift its economic focus to a prioritisation on agriculture rather than heavy industry. The failures of the GLF had shown Chinese policy-makers the devastating effects of an economic model that prioritised heavy industry rather than agriculture. As we saw in the previous two chapters, since the mid-1950s, China's economic development had been controlled by a coalition of economic planners who favoured the rapid growth of heavy industry.²⁶ Although this coalition did not deny the importance of agricultural development, they viewed agriculture almost entirely through the lens of heavy industry. The Planning Coalition saw agricultural output solely as a raw material for industrialisation, and believed that in order to increase agricultural output China simply needed to focus on the heavy industries—such as chemical fertilizer—to do so.²⁷ Ultimately, this coalition believed that economic development could be measured by a country's output of steel, petroleum and other heavy industrial goods. This skewed approach to economic development, coupled with the Party's mobilisation tactics employed in the rural communes, and the extraction of grain from the countryside to feed the cities, led to disastrous outcomes.

In the wake of the GLF, Zhou Enlai argued that agricultural output was now the highest priority for China's economic planners, and that China needed to lower the 'extraordinarily high' production targets of heavy industry.²⁸ In line with this, between 1963 and 1965, there was a major cut back in heavy industrial projects and investment in the industrial sector. Furthermore, thousands of urban construction and manufacturing projects were shut down, leading to the forcible resettlement of between 30 and 50 million urban industrial workers from the cities to the

²⁶ Bachman, *Bureaucracy, Economy, and Leadership in China*, 119.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 96, 124-126.

²⁸ 'Readjustment of the national economy and our current tasks', 28 March 1962, *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 387.

countryside.²⁹ In turn, China saw huge increases in state investment in agriculture, the introduction of major new water conservation projects, increased specialisation in agricultural farming in regions that had a comparative advantage or historical knowledge in the production of certain types of agricultural product, and a shift in industrial production towards farming tools and other agriculture-related goods.³⁰ This renewed focus on agriculture did not, however, mean the abandonment of industry. Although Zhou declared that the country should finish off existing construction projects before embarking on new ones, he did not intend for China to abandon industry altogether.³¹ Rather, he recognised that agricultural and industrial development had to work together if both parts of the Chinese economy were to develop. Thus, Zhou declared that ‘agriculture is the foundation and industry is the leading factor’.³² Heavy industry would focus on providing chemical fertilizer, pesticides, farm machinery and fuel to spur on agricultural production, while in turn, increased agricultural output would be used to feed the population and would be used as raw materials in the production of both light and heavy industry.

Zhou and the Finance Coalition’s plans for balanced economic planning were also crystallised in another policy idea unveiled by Zhou in 1964. In his speech to the Third National People’s Congress in December that year, Zhou set out, for the first time, his ideas about ‘Four Modernisations’ in the Chinese economy. As he argued,

The major task for developing our national economy in the years to come is, in brief, to turn China into a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, modern

²⁹ Lardy, ‘Chinese Economy under Stress,’ 386-387.

³⁰ Eckstein, *China’s Economic Revolution*, 59-62; Lardy, ‘Chinese Economy under Stress,’ 388-391.

³¹ ‘Major tasks for developing the national economy’, 21 December 1964, *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 458-459.

³² Eckstein, *China’s Economic Revolution*, 59.

industry, modern national defence and modern science and technology in not too long a period.³³

Central to the ideas underpinning this early articulation of the Four Modernisations was the recognition that each of the four areas—agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology—must be developed in tandem so that they could promote each other. Crucially, and as a clear sign of learning from the earlier mistakes of the 1950s, Zhou made it clear that China must not wait for industry to develop before it set about modernising the other three areas. Rather, balanced development across each of the four areas was the goal.³⁴ To achieve the Four Modernisations, Zhou called on Chinese economic planners to draw on the technical innovations of other countries; to promote, in particular, the development of science and technology within China; and, most importantly, to pursue a style of economic planning that relied on data collection and accurate statistics rather than ideologically-driven targets. To this end, he called on economic planners to ‘seek truth from facts’.³⁵

Today, it is Deng Xiaoping who is credited with the introduction of the Four Modernisations and market reforms in 1978.³⁶ We should not deny that these reforms required political courage by Deng, and that they had a powerful transformative effect on the Chinese economy. However, many of the ideas behind Deng’s Four Modernisations and Reform and Opening policies had their origins in the 1950s and 1960s. In addition to Zhou Enlai’s ideas about the Four Modernisations, Chen Yun and the Finance Coalition were also instrumental in introducing early ideas about

³³ ‘Major tasks for developing the national economy’, 21 December 1964, *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 458.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 459.

³⁵ ‘The key to building a powerful socialist country is to modernize science and technology’ in *ibid.*, 427-431.

³⁶ Ezra F. Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 121-133, 217-227.

market reform into the PRC, ideas that were ‘tried and tested’ first in 1956, and again in the early 1960s following the GLF.³⁷ Yet these ideas underpinning balanced economic development would not really take hold in China until after Mao’s death in 1976. In part, this is because it would take time for China’s economy to recover from the disastrous effects of the Great Leap Forward.³⁸ The more significant reason why these background ideas of balanced economic development and the Four Modernisations would not have a powerful influence on the Chinese economy until the late 1970s and 1980s was, however, because they clashed with a second strand of background ideas. This second set of background ideas also developed in response to the failure of the Great Leap Forward, and exerted a powerful influence on Chinese policy in the early 1960s, as we shall see below.

b) Maintaining the struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism

The second ideational response to the failure of the Great Leap was a renewed focus on anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-revisionism, both within China and abroad. Initially, however, late 1960 ushered in a more moderate period in Chinese foreign policy. Some key leaders recognised that the country needed to minimise hostilities in its external environment—such as the Sino-Indian border war and confrontations with the United States in Southeast Asia—in order to improve the chances for economic development at home.³⁹ However this all changed when it became clear that the GLF had failed. As Niu Jun argues, the denunciation of the GLF

³⁷ Chen Yun’s most significant ideas related to the introduction of indirect planning in agricultural production, fluctuating prices, and a greater response to the market. See Dorothy J. Solinger, ‘Economic Reform Via Reformulation in China: Where Do Rightist Ideas Come From?’, *Asian Survey* 21, no. 9 (1981), 949-951.

³⁸ Despite the renewed investment and attention paid to agricultural production for example, by 1965, per capita production levels still remained well below pre-Great Leap Forward levels. Lardy, ‘Chinese Economy under Stress,’ 391-392.

³⁹ Niu Jun, ‘1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China’s Foreign Policy,’ 17-18.

by certain CCP leaders led to the revival of 'extreme leftist' ideas in Chinese foreign policy in 1962.⁴⁰ At the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference in January 1962, Party members, most notably Liu Shaoqi, began to criticise the policies and behaviour that had led to the devastating effects of the GLF.⁴¹ Furthermore, their criticism strayed beyond the specific issue of the GLF to broader areas of economic and political decision-making.⁴² This was interpreted by Mao as a direct and personal attack. At the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference, and later at the Beidaihe conference in August 1962, Mao struck out at critics such as Liu Shaoqi, and made it clear who the real enemies were. He condemned Liu Shaoqi as a revisionist, and argued that Liu's criticism of the GLF was a sign of 'Chinese revisionism'.⁴³ More importantly, however, Mao drew an explicit connection 'between revisionism at home and abroad'. Mao centred his attack on '*di xiu fan*' (imperialists, revisionists, and anti-revolutionary elements), and argued that there was a connection between the imperialists, revisionists and anti-revolutionary elements within China and those abroad.⁴⁴

Mao's linkage between domestic and international imperialism and revisionism was critical in reshaping Chinese foreign policy after 1962. Building on ideas that had first emerged during the Bandung years, Mao sought to distinguish China from both the US 'imperialists' and the Soviet 'revisionists' by building a new coalition of Third World countries from Asia, Africa and Latin America. Yet this Third World approach in the early 1960s was distinct from Chinese foreign policy during the Bandung years

⁴⁰ Ibid., 32.

⁴¹ Gao Wenqian, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary* 96-97; MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution*, 142-155.

⁴² Niu Jun, '1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy,' 31.

⁴³ Ibid., 33.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 32-33.

in an important way. In contrast to Chinese ideas about ‘peaceful coexistence’ during the Bandung period, Beijing now pursued a far more militant form of anti-imperialism. Countries who chose to remain non-aligned were now ‘barely acceptable’ to Beijing, and, in 1965, China began providing indirect support for wars of national liberation.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Mao’s attitude towards the United States and Soviet Union grew increasingly hostile. As the Soviet Union moved towards détente with the United States—signified most explicitly by the signing of the Partial Test-Ban Treaty in 1963—Beijing’s antipathy towards the Soviet Union grew increasingly bitter.⁴⁶

These two dominant strands of background ideas—both produced in response to the failure of the GLF—had a powerful effect on shaping Chinese foreground ideas about Japan. As the following section will show, these background ideas led to the development of the foreground idea of ‘walking on two legs’ in China’s economic policy towards Japan after August 1960.

c) Chinese foreground ideas about Japan: ‘walking on two legs’

As we have seen above, the fallout from the Great Leap Forward resulted in two dominant strands of ideas about economic development and foreign policy coming to the fore in China in the early 1960s. These dual background ideas each created a set of policy problems that required solutions. First, the background idea of balanced economic development, Agriculture First and the Four Modernisations created the need for goods, technology and advice on how to achieve the economic development goals set out by Zhou Enlai and the Finance Coalition. Second, Mao’s articulation of

⁴⁵ Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, 15.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

China's ongoing struggle against imperialism, revisionism and anti-revolutionary elements dictated that China needed to find allies in this struggle. What effect did these background ideas have in shaping Chinese foreground ideas about Japan?

Between late 1960 and 1965, the dual background ideas outlined above underpinned a particular foreground idea about Japan: the idea of 'walking on two legs'. Before discussing this idea in more detail, it is important to remind ourselves that, as noted above, this chapter does not distinguish between the cognitive and normative dimensions of foreground ideas. Instead, this chapter simply focuses on the interaction between ideas at the background and foreground level. Thus, in what follows, I show how the dual background ideas of balanced economic development and hostility towards imperialism, capitalism and revisionism, shaped Chinese foreground ideas about Japan in general, and do not refer to these as foreground cognitive or foreground normative ideas in particular.

After August 1960, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry—supported by top members of the leadership including Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and Chen Yi—implemented a two-pronged approach in their economic policy towards Japan. This approach was underpinned by the foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' (*liang tiao tui zoulu*). During the GLF, the idea of 'walking on two legs' referred to Chinese economic planners' attempts to combine ideological goals with economic realities.⁴⁷ In the case of Japan, 'walking on two legs' reflected the attempt to combine dual background ideas by implementing two different kinds of trade with

⁴⁷ That is, during the GLF, 'walking on two legs' resulted in the Party pursuing a two-pronged strategy of developing small-scale labour-intensive industry, such as 'backyard' steel furnaces, to increase local self-reliance and pursue a uniquely Chinese style of rapid industrial development, while at the same time bowing to economic realities by importing high-technology capital and equipment to develop a modern, large-scale industrial sector. Lardy, 'Chinese Economy under Stress,' 364.

Japan. As a directive from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the central government, the *People's Daily*, and all Chinese ambassadors put it,

Currently our policy towards trade with Japan ought to be 'walking on two legs': one aspect is to continue carrying out trade with friendly companies in order to support Japanese progressive forces and small and medium enterprises; the other aspect is to establish genuine contacts with monopoly capitalists, and sign some long-term contracts for trade on a scale that is advantageous for China and for essential items.⁴⁸

In this recently declassified statement we see a clear example of how the foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' reflected the dual background ideas of support for anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-revisionist forces on the one hand, and the achievement of balanced economic development on the other. The issue of whether the foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' simply reflected a strategy of combining ideological goals with economic realities—as it had during the Great Leap Forward—will be discussed in more detail in the following section. First however, let us explore what 'walking on two legs' meant in practice.

The foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' dictated that, between August 1960 and 1965, Sino-Japanese economic cooperation took two forms: Friendship Trade and Liao-Takasaki (LT) Trade. Friendship Trade was introduced in August 1960, following Zhou Enlai's announcement of the 'three trade principles'. As we saw in the previous chapter, the announcement of the 'three trade principles' was a means of breaking the deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations. This deadlock existed as a result of Chinese hostility towards the 'imperialist' Kishi government. Between May 1958 and August 1960, the clash of cognitive and normative ideas about Japan had led the Chinese government to suspend all Sino-Japanese trade. However, in late 1959 and early 1960, leaders such as Zhou Enlai had been instrumental in trying to bring about

⁴⁸ 'Waijiao tongbao di 70 qi' [Foreign Affairs Circular No. 70], in FMA File 105-01815-02, 4 April-21 November 1962, 'DuiRi maoyi ji ZhongRi beiwanglu maoyi youguan wenjian' [Documents concerning trade with Japan and Sino-Japanese Memorandum Trade], 1.

a realignment in Chinese cognitive and normative thinking about Japan, arguing that China needed economic engagement with Japan if it were to achieve its normative goal of industrialisation and increased national strength. When the ‘imperialistic’ Kishi resigned as Prime Minister of Japan in July 1960, Zhou Enlai quickly announced the ‘three trade principles’.⁴⁹ The first of the three trade principles stipulated that all future trade agreements must be between the governments of China and Japan, thereby ostensibly forcing the Japanese government to grant diplomatic recognition to China. The second and third principles, however, provided an escape clause: individual companies on both sides could still sign private contracts (*minjian hetong*), and China would permit trade with ‘friendly’ Japanese companies on a case-by-case basis if they were supportive of China’s ‘three political principles’.⁵⁰

Friendship Trade fulfilled the background idea decreed by Mao of promoting anti-imperialism and anti-revisionism and supporting revolutionary forces. The Foreign Ministry described the ‘three trade principles’ and Friendship Trade as important in ‘supporting the Japanese people’s struggle against the United States’, and in ‘putting considerable pressure (*xiangdang de yali*) on the Japanese government’.⁵¹ Initially, Beijing only permitted a handful of small companies linked to the communist-aligned JCTPA, to be considered ‘friendly’ companies. However, within six months, the Foreign Trade Ministry recognised the need to increase the scope of trade, and in

⁴⁹ Statement of Zhou Enlai made to Suzuki Kazuo, Managing Director of the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association, 27 August 1960, in Howe, ed. *China and Japan*, 14.

⁵⁰ The ‘three trade principles’ can be summarised as: 1) *zhengzhi xieding* (government agreement); 2) *minjian hetong* (private contract); and 3) *gebie zhaogu* (case-by-case or individual consideration). See ‘Zhou Enlai zongli guanyu cujin ZhongRi guanxi de zhengzhi san yuanze he maoyi san yuanze de tanhua’ [Zhou Enlai’s statement on the three political principles and three trade principles for promoting Sino-Japanese relations], 27 August 1960, in Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 503-504.

⁵¹ ‘Waijiao tongbao di 70 qi’ [Foreign Affairs Circular No. 70], in FMA File 105-01815-02, 1.

particular to expand trade with larger firms in Japan.⁵² Subsequently, Beijing decided to allow firms of any size to trade with China, as long as they had been introduced to China by left-wing ‘Japanese friendship groups’ (*Riben youhao tuanti*), or had expressed their ‘willingness to promote Sino-Japanese friendship’.⁵³ In practice, this meant that ‘friendly’ Japanese firms could not also trade with Taiwan.

In March 1961, the number of friendly firms rose to 77, and by 1963 it stood at 200. The vast majority of the ‘friendly firms’ trading with China were left-leaning SMEs which had had a long history of trading with China, and had established links to China via Japan’s Socialist and Communist parties. On Liao Chengzhi’s recommendation, Chen Yi and Zhou Enlai agreed that China needed to cultivate relationships with these small, friendly firms. They believed these firms would play a role in further developing Sino-Japanese friendship, and would ‘increase contradictions between Japan and the United States, and among the Japanese ruling classes’.⁵⁴

The second form of trade was Liao-Takasaki (LT) Trade (later known as ‘Memorandum Trade’). LT Trade fulfilled the second background idea of achieving balanced economic development by modernising China’s economy and enhancing its agricultural output. Unlike Friendship Trade, LT Trade took place under the auspices

⁵² FMA File 105-01470-03, 2 February-13 March 1961, ‘Duiwai maoyibu guanyu ZhongRi maoyi minjian hetong de juti zuofa’ [The Foreign Trade Office’s specific measures concerning Sino-Japanese private trade].

⁵³ Ibid.; Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 67-68.

⁵⁴ Liao estimated that around 130 of the 200 friendly firms were of this type. Another 70 were deemed to be much weaker companies who had little management expertise and who did not have a promising future. Finally, there is some evidence that a very small number of these firms were ‘dummy’ companies, set up by some of Japan’s largest conglomerates, in order to engage in trade with both Taiwan and mainland China. See FMA File 105-01863-01, 25 July-28 August 1963, ‘Liao Chengzhi de xiabannian duiRi gongzuo de qingshi baogao’ [Liao Chengzhi’s half-yearly report asking for instructions on Japan]; FMA File 105-01470-03; *ibid.*, 64-69.

of a more general trade agreement that had government endorsement on both sides. Under this trade agreement, ‘the Japanese side’ and the ‘Chinese side’ agreed to trade in certain items, rather than delegating trade to private companies.⁵⁵ LT Trade was enacted on 9 November 1962, and was named after the two individuals—Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke—who led the negotiations on the agreement.⁵⁶ Moreover, LT Trade came about through initiatives on both the Japanese and Chinese sides. In the spring of 1962, Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda had asked leading Japanese businessman, Okazaki Kaheita (岡崎嘉平太), to come up with a plan for trade that was ‘more sensible’ than Friendship Trade.⁵⁷ Okazaki, who similarly feared that Friendship Trade was vulnerable to political manipulation by Beijing, drafted a trade plan that would allow direct participation by large manufacturers, a 3-5 year ‘long-term’ trade agreement, deferred payment, and the introduction of trade liaison offices to coordinate the trade.⁵⁸

It is important to acknowledge that it was the Japanese side, and indeed a non-governmental actor, who took the initiative on this occasion. However, the provisions outlined in Okazaki’s plan merely reiterated provisions that Beijing had been urging since the Second and Third unofficial trade agreements in the early 1950s. Specifically, we should recall that the Chinese side had advocated trade liaison offices, deferred payment and longer-term trade contracts between the two sides to allow for a greater degree of certainty in Sino-Japanese relations. The main reason

⁵⁵ ‘Liao Chengzhi he Takasaki Tatsunosuke guanyu fazhan ZhongRi liangguo minjian maoyi de beiwanglu ji di yi ci xieyi xiangmu’ [Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke on the development of the bilateral Sino-Japanese trade memorandum and the program for the first agreement], 9 November 1962, in Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 646-649.

⁵⁶ For details of this trade agreement, see Appendix 1.

⁵⁷ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 82.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

why these clauses had not been agreed to in the early 1950s was because Japan was under US pressure not to grant such clauses to China.⁵⁹

On the Chinese side, Zhou Enlai began to argue in 1962 that Friendship Trade was ‘not sufficient’ (*bu chongfen*) if China were to seriously build economic ties and closer relations with Japan.⁶⁰ Zhou argued that Friendship Trade was limited because it did not allow high-level financial circles and large trading firms in Japan to make contact with China (unless they were willing to relinquish lucrative trade with Taiwan and agree to the PRC’s ‘three trade principles’). Moreover, Zhou realised that Friendship Trade was not able to ‘satisfy China’s mounting demands for long-term credits, complete industrial plants, and stable supply of machinery and fertilizers’.⁶¹ Zhou acknowledged that,

China is emphasising the approach of self-reliance, but this certainly does not mean that we have to produce everything ourselves to achieve self-reliance. In order to increase the speed [of development] we ought to buy what we need.⁶²

The idea of ‘self-reliance’ (*zili gengsheng*) had been an idea used in Chinese thinking about development throughout the 1950s. It took on particular significance during the GLF, as Chinese officials tried to demonstrate their country’s ability to produce more efficiently and faster than the Soviet Union, through small-scale, indigenous Chinese methods, rather than large-scale imports of Soviet capital and technology.⁶³ In the wake of the Soviet economic withdrawal from China in July 1960, ‘self-reliance’ became an even more important organising principle for a country that could no

⁵⁹ For more on this point, see Chapter 4.

⁶⁰ Morizumi Kazuhiro, *Sun Pinghua Shi Ni Kiku*, 157.

⁶¹ Chae-Jin Lee, ‘The Politics of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations, 1963-68,’ *Pacific Affairs* 42, no. 2 (1969), 130-131.

⁶² Morizumi Kazuhiro, *Sun Pinghua Shi Ni Kiku*, 157.

⁶³ Nevertheless, China dramatically increased its capital imports from the Soviet Union during the first two years of the Great Leap Forward. For more on this, see Chapter 5.

longer afford to rely on unpredictable allies like the Soviet Union. However, as the above quote by Zhou Enlai suggests, self-reliance was not the same thing as autarky or isolation. Rather, Zhou was acknowledging that China needed to increase its imports of goods such as industrial plants, machinery and fertilizer.

Thus, in July 1962, Zhou Enlai instructed Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi to dispatch Sun Pinghua (孙平化), the head of Beijing's Foreign Affairs Institute, to Japan to sound out the Japanese side on building a new form of trade. Sun Pinghua was a highly appropriate choice to send to Japan. As a boy growing up in Manchuria, Sun had been a high school student when the 'Manchurian Incident' took place on 18 September 1931, precipitating Japan's colonial takeover of Manchuria. Excelling in his school exams, Sun had entered the Japanese Manchukuo government's Economics department, which was then headed by Kishi Nobusuke. To further his training, Sun was sent to study at the Tokyo Industrial University for four and a half years during the war, and it was there that he developed strong opposition to Japanese aggression in China, but also an understanding of Japan's economy and Japanese industrial practices.⁶⁴ In July 1962, Sun Pinghua was dispatched to Japan as the deputy head of a visiting Chinese chess (*weiqi*) delegation. During the visit he met with Okazaki Kaheita, discussed the Okazaki trade proposal, and subsequently invited two familiar Japanese LDP advisers, Matsumura Kenzō and Takasaki Tatsunosuke, to come to China to further discuss the establishment of a second form of trade.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Morizumi Kazuhiro, *Sun Pinghua Shi Ni Kiku*, 129-136.

⁶⁵ For an excellent discussion of the Okazaki plan and the development of LT Trade from the perspective of the Japanese side, see Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 79-94.

LT Trade was significantly different from Friendship Trade for three main reasons. First, LT Trade allowed China to access goods from Japan that were ‘badly needed’ (*jixu*) in China as the country renewed its focus on industrially-supported agricultural development at the end of the GLF. These were goods such as synthetic fibres (vinyon), rolled steel and fertilizers.⁶⁶ In return, China would export coal, salt, iron ore and soybean to Japan.⁶⁷ LT Trade also paved the way for the export of Japanese plant technology and patents, and for the exchange of Japanese technicians with China. In October and November 1962, a group of Japanese businessmen began travelling to Beijing to discuss patents, export of technology and assistance in helping the Chinese to set up factories in Beijing.⁶⁸

Second, whereas Friendship Trade mostly took place with SMEs, the firms involved in LT Trade were the major conglomerates (Japan’s ‘monopoly capitalists’) such as Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Mitsui whose subsidiaries produced the ‘badly needed’ goods such as chemical fertilizer, rolled steel, and machinery. At first, it was not straightforward getting agreement on the export of these goods from the Japanese side. The Japanese steel industry had close ties with the United States, and was concerned about the US reaction to expanded trade with the PRC. Similarly, Japan’s ammonium sulphate industry, which produced chemical fertilizer, was not willing to

⁶⁶ Letter from the Foreign Trade Ministry to the State Council Foreign Affairs Department, 4 June 1962, in FMA File 105-01815-02.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 35-41; ‘Liao Chengzhi he Takasaki Tatsunosuke guanyu fazhan ZhongRi liangguo minjian maoyi de beiwanglu ji di yi ci xieyi xiangmu’ [Liao Chengzhi and Takasaki Tatsunosuke on the development of the bilateral Sino-Japanese trade memorandum and the program for the first agreement], 9 November 1962, and ‘Zhongguo guoji maoyi cujin weiyuanhui he RiZhong maoyi cujinhui, Riben guoji maoyi cujin xiehui, Riben guoji maoyi cujin xiehui guanxi benbu yidingshu’ [The CCPIT protocol with JCTPA, JAPIT, and the Kansai branch of JAPIT], 27 December 1962, in Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 646-649, 650-651.

jeopardise its trade relationship with Taiwan.⁶⁹ Taiwan threatened to cancel its contracts with Japanese conglomerates if they pursued trade with mainland China, and when China ultimately purchased four times the contracted amount of ammonium sulphate in 1964 (the second year of the LT Trade Agreement), Taiwan cancelled its contracts with Japan in retaliation.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, by 1964, many Japanese companies had realised that trade with mainland China could be far more lucrative than would ever be possible with Taiwan. In August 1964, China and Japan signed a new three-year agreement for the import of not 50,000 tons (as was originally stipulated in the LT Agreement) but one million tons of ammonium sulphate. This agreement was a major boon for the Japanese chemical fertilizer industry which, until 1964, had been operating well below capacity.⁷¹ Furthermore, this point underscores how important it was to both the Chinese and Japanese economies to restore their 'normal' prewar levels of trade.

Third, and most importantly, the LT Trade Agreement was significant because it went far further than any previous trade agreement in institutionalising Sino-Japanese trade, and giving the relationship more 'official' characteristics. The agreement established trade liaison offices with diplomatic privileges and 'semi-official' status in Beijing and Tokyo, and in August 1964, Sun Pinghua became the first Chinese representative of the 'Liao Chengzhi liaison office' (*Liao Chengzhi lianluochu*) in Tokyo.⁷² Furthermore, the agreement allowed companies to negotiate 'long-term' contracts of

⁶⁹ Letter from the Chinese Foreign Trade Ministry to Li Xiannian, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Li Fuchun, 7 June 1962, in FMA File 105-01815-02; Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 86-87.

⁷⁰ That is, China purchased 200,000 tons of ammonium sulphate in 1964, rather than the contracted amount of 50,000 tons. Ibid., 88-90.

⁷¹ Alexander Eckstein, *Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade* (New York McGraw-Hill, 1966), 207.

⁷² See Clause 4 of the LT Trade Agreement in Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 648; Morizumi Kazuhiro, *Sun Pinghua Shi Ni Kiku*, 154.

3-5 years. Indeed, in his early negotiations with Japan, Zhou Enlai had shown far more interest in implementing an agreement that would ensure the longevity and stability of Sino-Japanese trade, than in haggling over the particular amount of trade agreed to.⁷³ Finally, the Japanese side agreed to allow China to defer payments, using a system of credit from the Bank of Japan, for certain ‘badly-needed’ goods such as steel and compound fertilizer. In the wake of the GLF, when China was badly strapped for foreign exchange reserves and had identified the need for machinery and fertilizer to help increase agricultural output, Japan’s agreement to allow deferred payment of between 1 and 1.5 years was critically important to China.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, Japan’s agreement did not come easily. The Ikeda government was clear to ensure that the advantageous conditions provided to China should not be more beneficial than those provided to other countries, and in particular to Taiwan.⁷⁵ The Chinese side had hoped for a period of deferred payment of 2 or 3 years in fertilizer and rolled steel, but the Japanese side was unwilling to extend more favourable conditions to China than it had extended to other countries.⁷⁶

6.3.2. *Ideas or pragmatism?*

By undertaking Friendship Trade and LT Trade in parallel, China’s leaders had found a way to adhere to Mao’s ideas about anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-revisionism, while simultaneously extracting important economic benefits from Japan. Yet was the foreground idea of ‘walking on two legs’ shaped by China’s dual background ideas, or was it simply a pragmatic way for Zhou Enlai and others in the

⁷³ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 89.

⁷⁴ Letter from the Foreign Trade Ministry to the State Council Foreign Affairs Department, 4 June 1962, in FMA File 105-01815-02.

⁷⁵ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 86.

⁷⁶ ‘DuiRi maoyi tanpan fang’an’ [Plan for Japanese trade negotiations], 7 September 1962, in FMA File 105-01815-02.

Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry to meet both Mao's ideological conditions and China's dire economic realities? Given the widespread suffering and economic shortages brought about by the GLF, and the capital, technology and expertise lost when the Soviet Union withdrew its support for China, China had severe economic needs that could be solved, in part, through trade with Japan. We should not deny the importance of scarcity in motivating China's Japan policy after August 1960. In fact, this interplay between ideology and scarcity in shaping Chinese domestic and foreign policy has been well-noted in the literature. Alexander Eckstein argues that,

China's economic development since 1949 can best be understood as revolving around a continuous confrontation of Chinese Communist ideology with the realities of the country's economic backwardness.⁷⁷

Similarly, Odd Arne Westad has suggested that as early as the late stages of the Civil War, the Chinese Communists' ability to reform China was 'caught between the visions of their ideology and the limitations that circumstances and party tactics imposed upon them'.⁷⁸ Furthermore, in foreign policy, Chinese desires to restore their country's central place in the international system and stand up to foreign powers have consistently been constrained by the country's military and economic weakness. There is, Lowell Dittmer and Samuel Kim argue, a 'vast gap between capabilities and [ideological] commitments'.⁷⁹ In the case of China's foreign economic policy towards Japan, the foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' seems like a clear example of the interaction between ideology and scarcity, or the need to maintain ideological rhetoric while pragmatically dealing with economic reality. Chinese officials used Friendship

⁷⁷ Eckstein, *China's Economic Development: The Interplay of Scarcity and Ideology*, 2.

⁷⁸ Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 272. Van Ness also similarly notes that Chinese officials have often skilfully combined ideological rhetoric with highly pragmatic tactics. See Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, 16.

⁷⁹ Dittmer and Kim, *China's Quest for National Identity* xi.

Trade to live up to Mao's ideological dictates, while using LT Trade to obtain badly-needed goods and technology from Japan.

However, while we cannot deny the importance of economic scarcity in motivating this Japan policy during and in the wake of the GLF and Soviet pullout, I suggest that China's approach towards trade with Japan was not simply a pragmatic response to immediate economic and political conditions. Rather, I suggest that the foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' closely reflected the two sets of background ideas that were shaping China in the early 1960s. Friendship Trade allowed officials such as Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi to meet the background idea decreed by Mao that China must maintain the struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism. Friendship Trade therefore provided an important counterpoint to LT Trade, and allowed these Chinese officials to demonstrate that even though China was pursuing trade with Japanese 'capitalists', China was also pursuing a more normatively acceptable form of trade with firms that were 'friendly' to the PRC, that were maintaining the struggle against the imperialist United States, and that were 'expanding the contradictions' within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan.

Yet LT Trade was just as important in fulfilling the background idea that China needed balanced economic development, Four Modernisations and a renewed focus on agricultural development. As we saw above, these long-term ideas about balanced economic development had first been introduced by the Finance Coalition in the mid-1950s, and were rekindled by Zhou Enlai in the early 1960s. Though available archives do not provide explicit evidence of this, it is likely that 'walking on two legs' therefore also reflected factionalism between those who supported Mao's ideological

battles and those, particularly in the Finance Coalition, who supported Zhou's ideas about balanced economic development. Zhou and the Finance Coalition had put forth the strong background idea that without the goods, technology and expert advice provided to China via LT Trade, China would not be able to achieve its goal of becoming a modern and industrialised state.

Throughout this thesis it has been argued that Chinese ideas about how to achieve modernisation and national strength were intimately connected to economic development and industrialisation. In the early years of the PRC, economic development was seen as vital in reconstructing a war-torn country, and mitigating against further imperialist attack. Furthermore, observing Japan's own path to war, Chinese officials noted that 'today's wars are industrial wars' and thus argued that China needed to rapidly industrialise if it were to withstand foreign aggression in the modern, Cold War environment. Yet the very fact of the Cold War made this a time of competing ideas about the best path to modernity. On the one hand, there was a capitalist development model, represented by the United States and the rest of the free world. On the other hand, there was the model of socialist development, which eschewed free markets in favour of a centralised state, collective ownership and a particular focus on heavy industry.⁸⁰ Because they conceived of capitalism as the highest form of imperialism, the CCP rejected the capitalist model of modernisation, and instead chose a path that had been modelled by the Soviet Union's own transformation from a 'backward', feudal state into one of great industrial prowess.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, especially Chapters 1 and 2.

⁸¹ Kirby, 'China's Internationalization in the Early People's Republic.'; Mitter, 'Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China.'

However, by the mid-1950s, Chinese leaders were already beginning to experience the negative side of the Soviet developmental model. As we saw in Chapters Four and Five, Chinese leaders began to argue that China needed to pursue a form of socialism that was better suited to China's own experience and economic characteristics. The failed adventures of the GLF were, in part, an attempt to find an alternative development path for China, and one that was faster, better and more efficient than that demonstrated by the Soviet Union or imperialist world.⁸² China's specific economic policies shifted radically throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, but the unerring goal of rapid economic development did not. In the early 1960s, China's leaders continued to argue, as they had in 1949, that without the development of a modern, industrialised economy, their country would never be able to stand up to foreign powers. The difference was that in the early 1960s, leaders such as Zhou Enlai now understood that industrialisation could best be achieved through balanced economic development, Agriculture First, and the Four Modernisations. Ultimately, it was Chinese officials' long-held ideas about the need for rapid industrialisation and economic development, rather than simply a pragmatic response to economic scarcity and Mao's dictates, that shaped China's foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' and, in particular, the policy of LT Trade with Japan.

After August 1960, officials such as Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi and Liao Chengzhi therefore attempted to meet both sets of background ideational demands and put forward a coherent policy on trade with Japan. They argued that 'walking on two legs' would genuinely be a two-pronged approach, and that LT Trade would not be

⁸² For more on this point, see Chapters 4 and 5.

allowed to ‘squeeze out’ trade with friendly firms.⁸³ Nevertheless, the first background idea of opposing imperialism, capitalism and revisionism often sat in tension with the second background idea of turning China into a modern, industrialised country. This ideational clash filtered down to Chinese foreground ideas about Japan in a way that was clearly evident between 1958 and July 1960, as was demonstrated in the previous chapter, but continued to be evident after August 1960 as well. Reports between the CCPIT, Foreign Trade Ministry and Foreign Ministry in the early 1960s, suggest that Chinese officials frequently found it difficult to balance both LT Trade and Friendship Trade in their foreign economic policy towards Japan. For example, upon the signing of the LT Trade Agreement with Japan, officials from the CCPIT noted their concern that pursuing a combination of LT Trade and Friendship Trade had ‘created confusion among Japan’s progressive groups’.⁸⁴

Furthermore, it was often difficult to justify to other socialist countries why China had introduced more favourable trade agreements with a capitalist country such as Japan. The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry noted that the signing of the LT Trade Agreement had drawn a great deal of attention from China’s socialist allies, many of whom were ‘suspicious’ (*caiyi*) of the agreement. The Bulgarian Ambassador to China, for instance, criticised China for granting a 5-year trade agreement with Japan when socialist countries such as Bulgaria did not enjoy such long-term trade agreements. In a directive to all of China’s ambassadors stationed abroad, the Chinese Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry therefore instructed

⁸³ DuiRi maoyi tanpan fang’an’ [Plan for Japanese trade negotiations], 7 September 1962, in FMA File 105-01815-02.

⁸⁴ FMA File 105-01153-03, 20 January-14 December 1962, ‘Zhongguo guoji maoyi cujin weiyuanhui guanyu jiedai Suzuki Kazuo, Shukuya Eiichi deng ren de qingshi’ [The Chinese International Trade Promotion Association’s request for instructions regarding the visit by Suzuki Kazuo, Shukuya Eiichi and others], 1.

their ambassadors that, if faced with ‘attack and slander’ over the issue of Sino-Japanese trade, they should argue that China’s economy was still in a period of adjustment, and thus had not yet been able to sign long-term trade agreements with all socialist countries.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the recently declassified directive went on to instruct China’s ambassadors that:

In order to speak with one voice to foreigners, when discussing Sino-Japanese trade relations and the memorandum issue to foreigners in future, you should use the following explanation:

1. Sino-Japanese trade is still civil trade in nature, and is not trade between the governments. China's trade with Japan still complies with Premier Zhou Enlai's three political principles towards Japan, the three trade principles, and the principle that politics and economics cannot be separated.
2. China’s memorandum with Takasaki is signed on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, and is for the further development of bilateral non-governmental trade, it is not a bilateral government trade agreement.
3. The style of trade under the Memorandum is to adopt a comprehensive style of trade. Through this form of trade, the Japanese side will use the deferred payment method to export to us commodities such as steel and fertilizer each year, and will provide us with some plant equipment, while the Chinese side will pay for this with the export of commodities. In order to implement this kind of comprehensive barter trade and realise bilateral balance of payments, our bilateral trade needs to be planned over a longer time-scale.⁸⁵

As this discussion shows, Chinese officials still saw the need to justify their policy choices to different audiences. In this case, an important—though ultimately problematic—audience was the socialist bloc. In the early 1960s, when China’s relationship with the Soviet Union had become hostile and China had lost the Soviet Union as a key source of economic support, negotiating China’s place in the socialist world economy was no longer straightforward. More importantly, though, without the guiding model of the Soviet Union, Chinese leaders began looking beyond the

⁸⁵ FMA File 105-01589-04, 17 January 1963, ‘Waijiaobu, duiwai maoyibu guanyu ZhongRi maoyi guanxi he ZhongChao changqi maoyi xieding wenti de tongbao’ [Foreign Ministry and Overseas Trade Office Bulletin concerning the issue of Sino-Japanese trade and the China-Korea long-term trade agreement], 1-2.

socialist world economy and paid greater attention to the development paths taken by other modern, industrialised states. One of the most important of these states was Japan. As we shall see below, Chinese foreground ideas about Japan in the early 1960s played an important role in shaping Chinese broader thinking about how to become a modern, industrialised state.

6.3.3. Foreground ideas shape background ideas

Chinese ideas about, and policy towards, Japan, were not simply constituted by Chinese background ideas. The relationship between background and foreground ideas is not unidirectional. In this section I show that after August 1960, Chinese foreground ideas about Japan were particularly important in helping to shape Chinese background ideas and, in particular, ideas about how to become a modern, industrialised nation state. It is important to recall here that the goal of this chapter is not to engage in a chicken-and-egg exercise in order to determine whether background or foreground ideas precipitated China's Japan policy, or were more important in shaping China's Japan policy. Chinese background ideas—and particularly the need to look for new ways to achieve economic development and modernisation—meant that Chinese leaders were predisposed to look to industrialised countries such as Japan for new ideas in the early 1960s. And, as we saw in the previous chapter, Chinese policy-makers already believed that Japanese goods, expertise and technology were more appropriate to China's needs because Japan was an 'Eastern country'.

In this section, I build on these arguments by showing that foreground ideas about Japan not only reinforced certain background ideational themes in China but, as

Chinese officials began comparing China to Japan, also helped to create new thinking in China about the best way to modernise and industrialise China's economy. In the early 1960s, Chinese policy-makers began to actively compare China's levels of development with those in Japan. In drawing these comparisons, Chinese officials particularly began to absorb Japanese thinking about the role that technology could play in transforming China's economy and military. Furthermore, by drawing these comparisons, certain policy-makers, notably Zhou Enlai, began to develop a more accurate understanding of Japan's postwar development path, and thus began to amend certain 'mistaken' ideas about Japan.

a) Comparing ourselves with Japan

In the wake of the Great Leap Forward and Soviet economic withdrawal from China, China's leaders increasingly began comparing China's levels of development with those in postwar Japan. In doing so, they found China lacking. For instance, in meetings between Mao Zedong and delegations of left-wing Japanese Diet members in 1960 and 1961, Mao was quick to praise the Japanese economy, and to draw comparisons between China and Japan's levels of development. Mao argued that 'Your economy, culture and technology are all relatively more developed than ours, so I am afraid to say that we cannot help you, it is you who will help us more'.⁸⁶

Furthermore, Mao described Japan as a 'great nation' (*weida de minzu*) whose,

...economy and culture are ahead of China's. It is said that there are seven universities in Okayama prefecture [in Japan]. We have Wuxi, whose culture is relatively developed, but it does not have seven universities. We have no such county that can be compared with Japan.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ FMA File 105-01779-03, 24 January-6 March 1961, 'Mao Zedong zhuxi huijian Kuroda Hisao, Tanaka Toshio, Matsumoto Shichirou, Okada Haruo siwei Riben guohui yiyuan tanhua jilu ji waijiao tongbao di 17qi' [Records of the meeting between Chairman Mao Zedong and four Japanese Diet members: Kuroda Hisao, Tanaka Toshio, Matsumoto Shichirō and Okada Haruo, and Foreign Ministry Briefing No. 17], 10.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

A particularly stark picture of the comparative levels of industrial development in China and Japan emerged in October 1960 when Premier Zhou Enlai invited Takasaki Tatsunosuke, the former vice-president of Manchurian Heavy Industries during the war, and former Minister in the Kishi Cabinet, to China to undertake an ‘inspection tour of the PRC economy’.⁸⁸ Takasaki was accompanied by a number of Japanese economic and industrial advisors, including representatives of Japan’s iron, steel, chemical engineering and textiles industries. The records of the Takasaki mission demonstrate China’s leaders’ desire to obtain information and technical assistance from Japan.⁸⁹ When Takasaki met with Zhou Enlai on 11 October 1960, the meeting quickly shifted from an exchange of pleasantries to a detailed exchange of information between Zhou and Takasaki’s industrial advisors.⁹⁰ Zhou questioned these advisors for information on issues such as the types of machines used in cloth-weaving, the yearly output of Japan’s nitrogen and phosphate fertilizer industries, the grade of chemicals and rubber Japan needed to import for the production of plastics, and the daily output of Japan’s steel furnaces. However, the exchange is telling not only for the depth of information that Zhou sought from the Japanese delegates, but also for Zhou’s surprise at the size of Japan’s output in comparison to China’s. One example is the exchange between Zhou and Mr Shiga, Japan’s steel representative:

Premier: Japan has a large blast furnace, doesn’t it?
Shiga: Yes, Japan’s largest blast furnace puts out about 1500 tons of iron every day.
Premier: Japan also has a small blast furnace?
Shiga: The smallest produces 300 tons.
Premier: Does Japan not have a blast furnace as small as China’s?
Shiga: No. Japan’s smallest blast furnace puts out 300 tons, and its volume is 270 cubic metres.

⁸⁸ FMA File 105-00740-02, 21 September 1960, ‘Ribei Takasaki Tatsunosuke jiu fangHua wenti zhidian Zhou Enlai zongli’ [Japan’s Takasaki Tatsunosuke’s telegram to Premier Zhou Enlai on the issue of his visit to China], 1.

⁸⁹ FMA File 105-00736-01, 13 October 1960, ‘Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Ribei Takasaki Tatsunosuke dengren tanhua jilu’ [The record of Premier Zhou Enlai’s reception of Japan’s Takasaki Tatsunosuke and others].

⁹⁰ Ibid.

Premier: The blast furnace we consider small is less than 100 cubic metres, and our smallest is 3 cubic metres. 100-500 cubic metres is medium-scale, and anything more than 500 cubic metres is considered large-scale. What is Japan's largest blast furnace in terms of cubic metres?

Shiga: 1350 cubic metres. Japan now has three such large blast furnaces.⁹¹

Two years later, Mao engaged in a similar comparative exercise during his meetings with representatives from the JCP. Mao argued that he was grateful for the catalysing experience of war with Japan, stating that 'if Japan had not occupied half of China, our revolution would not have been victorious'. Nevertheless, Mao noted that China was still at an 'extremely backward' level of development, that the country did not have 'mechanised agriculture' or a large urban population, and that a transformation of the Chinese economy 'is still some decades away'.⁹² He then went on to compare Japan's developmental path with China's, saying,

It took Japan one hundred years to change from a feudal society into a capitalist society following the Meiji Restoration of 1868. In 1968 it will have been one hundred years. The Japanese working classes under this capitalist system have created a huge production capability, and have transformed Japan from a feudal society into one of the few great and powerful countries [*da qiang guo*] in the world. There are less than ten of these so-called great powers [*qiangguo*] in the world. In Asia, of the countries that have genuinely crossed the agricultural industrial barrier [*gongnongye guoguan de*], there are none to rival you. We are currently going down this road on the basis of socialism, and perhaps won't need a hundred years, perhaps we will only need half that. You are helping us, not only in terms of the political struggle, but also in terms of the technological revolution.⁹³

We learn two important things from these conversations between Mao, Zhou and Japanese politicians and industrial advisers. First, it is clear that Mao and Zhou both believed that as a more developed and industrialised country, Japan could provide the goods, technology and expertise so badly needed in China. It is therefore quite likely that these statements by Zhou and Mao were deployed for instrumental reasons.

⁹¹ Ibid., 5-6.

⁹² FMA File 105-01863-02, 22 September 1963, 'Mao Zedong zhuxi tong Rigong zhongwei Takenaka Tsunesaburō deng tanhua jilu' [Record of the dialogue between Chairman Mao Zedong and Japanese Communist Party Central Committee member Takenaka Tsunesaburō and others], 4-6.

⁹³ Ibid., 5-6.

Praising Japan's relatively higher levels of development was a way to flatter Japanese representatives and persuade them to continue sending technology and technicians to China. Moreover, these statements were modulated for different audiences. As we can see, when Mao met with left-wing representatives, such as members of the JCP in 1963, he made it clear that Japan's technological assistance was helping China to pursue its socialist revolution. Yet when speaking with members of the conservative ruling Party in Japan, Zhou alternatively emphasised that China needed Japanese technology and assistance because of China's relative economic weakness.⁹⁴ Both of these conversations are significant because they demonstrate that at a time when war with Japan was still recent, and when China and Japan were effectively 'closed' to each other, China's leaders were nonetheless eager to import goods, technology and expertise from Japan.

Second, and even more interestingly, we see that by the early 1960s, Chinese leaders had begun to compare China's levels of modernisation and industrialisation with those in Japan, and to find China lacking. Why was Japan an appropriate point of comparison for China? Japan served as a ready point of comparison because, as we saw in the previous chapter, China's policy-makers regarded Japan as a common 'Eastern country' with similar characteristics to those in China. In fact, as we saw in Chapter Two, since the first Sino-Japanese war, Japan's own modernisation and industrialisation had served as a point of comparison for Chinese elites. The sentiments expressed by Mao, Zhou and others in the early 1960s are highly similar to those uttered by Chinese elites and intellectuals during the 1920s and 1930s as they

⁹⁴ FMA File 105-00736-01.

compared China's levels of development with those in Japan.⁹⁵ In both periods, Chinese elites argued that, unlike Japan, China had failed to significantly modernise and therefore become strong enough to stand up to foreign imperialism. In comparing the two countries, Chinese elites found China lacking.

However, China and Japan were very different societies. It is clear from these statements that although Mao and Zhou admired Japan's higher levels of technology and industrial development, they were *not* advocating that China become a capitalist country. Nevertheless, they still believed it was possible to draw comparisons between countries even if they had different economic and social systems. As Mao said, in a conversation with JCP representatives in 1963,

We should compare. Marxists acknowledge that comparing is a fairly good method. For example, comparing primitive with hard-working societies, comparing hard-working societies with feudal societies, comparing feudal societies with capitalist societies, and comparing capitalist societies with socialist societies. Comparing capitalist societies with socialist societies is comparing societies which are by nature different.⁹⁶

Thus, we can see that although Mao recognised that China and Japan were different kinds of countries, he still believed it was appropriate and possible to compare levels of development in either country. After all, in Mao's view, in the century since Japan's Meiji Restoration, Japan had become the only 'great power' in Asia and one of just a handful in the world. Although China's path to development would be a different one to that taken by Japan, Japan had shown the levels of industrialisation that could be achieved by an 'Eastern country', and this was the goal now held by Mao.

⁹⁵ Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution*, 95.

⁹⁶ FMA File 105-01863-02, 6.

b) The role of technology in building a rich nation, and strong army

One of the ways in which comparisons with Japan were drawn particularly sharply, and with important consequences, was in the area of military-industrial development. As Evan Feigenbaum writes, in July 1961, while participating in a defence industry conference at Beidaihe, People's Liberation Army (PLA) Marshal Nie Rongzhen (聂荣臻), received a phone call from Mao's secretary. Nie was informed that Mao had read a report from Japan and wanted to urgently discuss the report's findings with Nie as he set about planning China's own military and industrial development in the early 1960s.⁹⁷ In February 1960, Japan's Finance Policy Affairs Study Committee had been requested by the Japanese Defence Office to prepare an internal report on the economics of defence production in Japan.⁹⁸ The report was prepared by Fukuda Takeo (福田赳夫), the head of the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council, and by Yamagiwa Masamichi (山際正道), the president of the National Bank of Japan.⁹⁹ In Mao's summary of the report, he noted that 'the Japanese drew explicit connections between advanced defence technology and overall national competitiveness', and that developments in military science and technology needed to work in tandem with increases in economic and industrial output.¹⁰⁰ In a subsequent letter to Nie and other key military officials on 16 July 1961, Mao requested that these officials read the report on Japan, saying that,

⁹⁷ Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu [Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen]*, vol. 3 (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986), 811; Evan A. Feigenbaum, 'Soldiers, Weapons and Chinese Development Strategy: The Mao Era Military in China's Economic and Institutional Debate,' *The China Quarterly* 158(1999).

⁹⁸ 'Zai guanyu Riben jingji zhengce he guofang gongye fazhan wenti de yifeng cailiao shang de piyu' [Written comments on materials concerning Japan's economic policies and military industrial development], 16 July 1961, in Mao Zedong, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao [Selected Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the Republic]*, vol. 9 (Beijing: Central Documents Press, 1996), 530-531.

⁹⁹ The report was known, in Chinese, as 'Cong jingji zhengce lai fenxi fangwei chanye' [An economic policy analysis of defence production]. Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Feigenbaum, 'Soldiers, Weapons and Chinese Development Strategy,' 295; Mao Zedong, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 530-531.

China's industrial and technological level is far behind Japan's [*bi Riben cha de hen yuan*], it would be very worthwhile studying this as we select our approach'.¹⁰¹

In early 1960, Japan's military and economic planners had grown concerned that the relationship between defence and industrial production had grown out of synch, and that Japan needed to improve its technological capabilities in order to improve not only its military strength but also its industrial strength.¹⁰² In the Japanese view, technological, military and industrial capacity were intimately linked. The need to focus on technology in order to enhance Japan's military and overall 'national industrial competitiveness' is an idea that has a long history in Japan. As Richard Samuels argues, Japan developed a set of ideas about 'technonationalism' during the Meiji Restoration that shaped the country's rapid military and economic success during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Samuels further argues that this 'technonationalism' has continued to shape Japanese thinking about development in the post-WWII period.¹⁰³ For Japan, the ideology of technonationalism treats technology as the 'holy grail' of industrialisation, and sees no distinction between 'military and commercial sources of national strength and security'. It has often been summed up in the phrase 'rich nation, strong army' (JP: *fukoku kyōhei*).¹⁰⁴

Like so many other sources of Japanese culture and thinking, this idea of 'rich nation, strong army' was itself originally a Chinese concept, stemming from China's Qin dynasty.¹⁰⁵ The idea was then transported to Meiji Japan at a time when Japanese

¹⁰¹ In addition to Nie Rongzhen, the officials were Marshal Lin Biao (林彪), Marshal He Long (贺龙), and political commissar in the PLA, Luo Ruiqing (罗瑞卿). ———, *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, 530-531.

¹⁰² Feigenbaum, 'Soldiers, Weapons and Chinese Development Strategy,' 395.

¹⁰³ Richard J Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 35.

elites were deeply concerned about Japan's 'special vulnerabilities in a Hobbesian world' in which the great powers of the West preyed on weaker, non-industrialised states such as Japan.¹⁰⁶ For Japan, these 'special vulnerabilities' were the fact that the country was scarce in natural resources, and that Japan had begun to develop much later than America or Europe.¹⁰⁷ As a result, leaders in Imperial Japan sought to counter these Japanese weaknesses by becoming strong in science and technology, and investing heavily in industrialisation. For Japanese during the Meiji era, the ultimate goal was to 'catch up and surpass [the West]' (JP: *oitsuki, oikose*).¹⁰⁸

For anyone who studies China in the 1950s, the phrase 'catch up and surpass the West' is remarkably familiar. The goal of catching up and surpassing the West has been prominent in China since at least 1957 when it inspired the Great Leap Forward (as we saw in Chapter Five). Indeed, we have seen that since 1949, CCP leaders had consistently argued that without economic construction, China would not be strong enough to achieve its revolution and stand up to foreign imperialism. Throughout the 1950s, economic assistance from the Soviet Union had been vitally important in strengthening China's 'backward' economy and thereby aiding the Chinese revolution. From the Chinese perspective, Soviet economic support was therefore 'one of the centerpieces of the alliance'.¹⁰⁹ By 1960, however, China could no longer

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., ix-x.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 34.

¹⁰⁸ In Japanese characters, the phrase is 追いつき、追い越せ. That is, the Japanese uses two Chinese characters. The first is 追 (*zhui*), which in Chinese is translated as 'to chase, pursue or seek'; the second is 越 (*yue*), which in Chinese is translated as 'to get over' or 'to exceed'. The second character is used in the Chinese phrase 超越 (*chaoyue*), which is translated as 'surpass', as well as in the term 大跃进 (*dayuejin*), 'Great Leap Forward'. In Chinese, the term 'catch up' is typically translated as 赶上 (*ganshang*), and thus is slightly different to that used in the Japanese term.

Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 262-263.

rely on the Soviet Union for economic support. Chinese officials therefore began to look to Japan.

Before examining precisely how and why Japanese technology and military-industrial practices influenced Chinese foreground, and ultimately background, ideas, it is important to acknowledge that Chinese ideas about the need to ‘catch up’ and modernise China’s economy and society did not originate in Japan. As we saw in Chapter Two, Chinese intellectuals and government officials had been arguing, though at times to little avail, of the need to use science and technology to modernise China since the late nineteenth century.¹¹⁰ The parallel modernising projects of the GMD and CCP both saw science and technology as key to their plans for China’s nationalist, modernising revolution.¹¹¹ Furthermore, since the establishment of the PRC, leaders such as Marshal Nie Rongzhen had also been especially influential in arguing for the need to invest in high technology as a way of underpinning both military modernisation and economic modernisation. Nie’s ideas about the role of technology mapped closely onto Zhou Enlai’s arguments in 1963 and 1964 that science and technology should be at the heart of China’s efforts at modernisation. Nie was directly involved in the military sphere, and in particular the debates in 1955 about the need to develop a Chinese nuclear capability. However, his views extended beyond the military sphere and he argued that the development of high technology programs in China was the best way in which to foster economic innovation, and to turn China into a modern, industrialised country.¹¹² Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, therefore, Nie argued that strategic weapons programs could ‘integrate security

¹¹⁰ Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire*, 89-113.

¹¹¹ Mitter, 'Modernity, Internationalization, and War in the History of Modern China,' 537-540.

¹¹² ‘ZhongSu keji hezuo zhong de bozhe’ [The twists and turns of Sino-Soviet cooperation on science and technology] and ‘Jianchi gongguan’ [Persisting in tackling key problems] in Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu*, 800-809, 810-812.

with core economic development concerns' and 'lay the foundation of a truly systemic high technology industrial and science base that would influence China's overall development trajectory'.¹¹³

However, there are two key reasons why *Japanese* ideas about the role of technology in developing a rich nation and strong army became particularly influential in China in the early 1960s. The first factor was the historical context. The Soviet withdrawal of economic aid, technicians and high technology catalysed a sense of urgency about the need to develop indigenous Chinese technology. In addition, the worsening relationship with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, and Soviet-US 'collusion' in signing the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1964, further heightened China's sense of insecurity and encouraged Chinese officials to look beyond the Soviet Union for ideas about how to modernise China's industry and military. As Nie Rongzhen argued, in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal of experts from China in the summer of 1960, China 'was forced to move much more quickly down the road of independence and self-reliance, and to embark on a new phase of tackling key issues of scientific research'.¹¹⁴ Indeed, attempting to put a positive gloss on what was otherwise a disastrous situation, Mao stated that because the Soviet pullout had instigated a major turning point in China's science research history, 'we should give Khrushchev a one-ton medal'.¹¹⁵ Chinese policy-makers therefore began to look elsewhere for assistance and ideas about developing China's science and technology.

The second factor was more ideational however. When Chinese officials compared China's levels of development with those in Japan, they found China badly lacking.

¹¹³ Feigenbaum, 'Soldiers, Weapons and Chinese Development Strategy,' 288.

¹¹⁴ Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen Huiyilu*, 809.

¹¹⁵ Mao Zedong quoted in *ibid.*

The visit by Takasaki Tatsunosuke and his industrial advisers provided an important wake-up call to Chinese officials that although Japan's economy and industrial sector had been devastated by the Second World War, Japan's postwar industrial development had proceeded far more rapidly than that in China. Furthermore, China's leaders viewed Japan as an appropriate point of comparison—and ultimately an important source of technological assistance and expertise—because Japan was a fellow 'Eastern country', and a similar 'late developer' which had also to rely on technology in pursuing 'catch up' growth. Leaders like Nie Rongzhen had long argued about the important role that technology could play in China's military and economic development. However, it was not until Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong began to compare China's industrial and technological level with that in Japan, that the foreground idea of needing to draw on Japanese military-industrial policy and Japanese technology and expertise, really took hold in China.

This combination of drawing comparisons between China and Japan, and a growing sense of insecurity in China's relationships with the superpowers, ultimately catalysed the development of new Chinese background ideas about the role of technology in China's own economy and military. For instance, in the early 1960s, leaders such as Zhou Enlai began to articulate the need to embrace science and technology in China. As we saw in the first half of this chapter, developing science and technology was one of the key planks of Zhou's 'Four Modernisations' concept, and his goal of turning China into 'a powerful socialist country with modern agriculture, modern industry, modern national defence and modern science and technology'.¹¹⁶ Chinese foreground ideas about Japan in the early 1960s reinforced this key plank in Zhou's Four

¹¹⁶ *Selected Works of Zhou Enlai*, 458.

Modernisations. Reflecting the ideas about technology developed in Meiji Japan, Zhou suggested that it was only through the use of science and technology that late developer countries could modernise and ‘catch up’ with more developed countries.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, he argued that greater use of science and technology would allow a late developer like China to move from being a ‘follower’ country to being one of the leading, powerful countries in the world. As Zhou argued in his report to the Third National People’s Congress in December 1964,

We cannot just follow the beaten track traversed by other countries in the development of technology and trail behind them at snail’s pace. We must break away from conventions and try to adopt as many advanced technologies as possible in order to turn our country into a powerful, modern socialist state in not too long a historical period.¹¹⁸

In addition to helping to constitute Chinese background ideas about the role of science and technology, what practical effect did drawing comparisons between China and Japan have in shaping China’s foreign economic policy towards Japan in the early 1960s? Zhou Enlai was eager to increase China’s indigenous science and technology capabilities. Zhou argued that the use of science and technology would allow China to become increasingly self-reliant, rather than eternally dependant on economic assistance from unpredictable allies such as the Soviet Union. Thus, Zhou advocated the need to increase the number of scientists in China, improve conditions for scientific work, undertake extensive scientific experiments, and develop China’s own indigenous technology by ‘relying on the diligent labour of [China’s] own people’.¹¹⁹ However, the severity of China’s economic situation meant that Zhou could not simply rely on the ‘diligent labour of [China’s] own people’. Instead, the country’s leaders also needed to rely on outside assistance. For this, Chinese officials began to

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 428.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 460.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 459.

turn to Japan. In his half-yearly report on Japan in 1963, China's chief Japan expert, Liao Chengzhi, argued that using Japanese technicians and technology had become increasingly important in the wake of the Soviet pullout. Although the section of the report on the Soviet Union was partly censored, it is possible to read some of Liao's statement that,

Although our conditions are much better than the Soviet Union's, we were caught out [*zhua chi le yi bu*], and have fallen behind the Soviet Union.¹²⁰

Liao's report went on to outline the range of ways in which China ought to increase its use of Japanese technicians and technology in order to 'catch up'. Liao noted that China's Ministry of Industry was already making use of Japanese information and equipment needed in the production of oil and chemical fertilizer. Chinese technicians had also made contact with Japanese technical experts in the fields of oil, metallurgy, nitrogen, silicon and resin-production, as well as experts from Japan's auto industry.¹²¹ In the wake of Liao's report, Chinese officials increased their overtures to Japanese firms and technicians. In late 1963, a delegation from China's synthetic fibre dyeing and finishing industry was dispatched to Japan to undertake a study of the Japanese textile production process.¹²² Furthermore, Chinese officials made attempts to purchase telecommunications equipment and other electronic equipment needed to build a more sophisticated long-range radio broadcasting system in China.¹²³ All of this was organised through China's State Planning Commission (*guojia jihua weiyuanhui*) and Science and Technology Commission (*kexue jishu weiyuanhui*), which had brought Japanese technicians and technology to China after the signing of

¹²⁰ The three lines following this sentence were censored in the document. See FMA File 105-01863-01, 6.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ CIA Office of Research and Reports, November 1964, 'Possible Chinese Communist purchases of telecommunications equipment in Japan', CIA/RR OB, 64-74.

the LT Trade Agreement in November 1962.¹²⁴

Nevertheless, the increasing use of Japanese expertise and technology in place of that from the Soviet Union was not always a smooth process. While China had similarly experienced problems in its use of Soviet experts throughout the 1950s, the problems faced in dealing with Japanese experts were somewhat different.¹²⁵ In his report to the central government, Liao Chengzhi noted that Chinese technicians had achieved ‘some results’ (*you yixie shouhuo*) by making contact with Japanese experts.¹²⁶ However, he argued that China was poorly equipped to make the most of the Japanese experts because China had had little experience in exchanging technicians with capitalist countries. Liao complained that China’s industrial departments simply wanted to grab complete industrial plants or important technology from Japan ‘in one fell swoop’ (*yixiazi*), rather than developing a deeper understanding of Japanese technology and processes. He suggested that China’s industrial departments believed that if they could not get the industrial technology or expertise they needed right away, then there was no ‘profit’ (*youshui*), and the whole process was simply ‘bothersome’ (*mafan*) for the Chinese side.¹²⁷ Instead, what Liao Chengzhi was now advocating was a different approach to that which had been taken during the period of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Liao argued, and was endorsed by Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi, that Chinese technicians needed to spend more time patiently getting acquainted with Japanese technicians even if it was not immediately clear how China would benefit from the exchange. He argued that,

¹²⁴ FMA File 105-01863-01.

¹²⁵ For more on the problems posed by the use of Soviet experts in China, see discussion in Chapters 3 and 4.

¹²⁶ FMA File 105-01863-01, 8-9.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

Only if we get acquainted with [the Japanese side], will we be able to determine whether there will be any profit, and this relies on our side's work. It is not possible to foresee whether the [Japanese] who come will all be profitable or whether they will all suit our needs, but even so, we should take a positive approach.¹²⁸

To this end, Liao argued that the relevant departments and ministries within the Chinese government should assign particular individuals to be in charge of the exchange of technicians with Japan. He recommended that the Science and Technology Commission, the State Planning Commission, and the Foreign Trade Ministry's Technology Import Company (*waijiaobu jishu jinkou gongsi*) set up specialists and special agencies to manage matters relating to the exchange of Japanese technicians.¹²⁹ This recommendation was endorsed by Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi and sent to each of the relevant ministries in August 1963.¹³⁰

c) Amending mistaken ideas about Japan

Finally, as China's leaders began comparing China and Japan's relative levels of modernisation and industrialisation in the early 1960s, one leader in particular began to show signs of a more accurate understanding of Japan's path of rapid postwar reconstruction and economic development. In contrast to his 'mistaken' ideas about Japan in the late 1950s (discussed in Chapter Five), by the early 1960s Zhou Enlai demonstrated a closer understanding of the economic and security factors that had shaped Japan's particular trajectory of postwar development. As we saw in the previous chapter, despite its best efforts, the Chinese government had failed to prevent the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960. In the aftermath of the

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

signing of the revised treaty, Zhou had showed limited understanding of the reasons why Japan could not ‘be like India’ and take a neutral stance in the Cold War order.¹³¹

However, by 1961 Zhou was beginning to demonstrate a clearer understanding of the security and economic factors that underpinned Japanese support for the US alliance. In discussions with the German Democratic Republic (East German) Ambassador to China in June 1961, Zhou commented on the postwar trajectory of West Germany and Japan. Zhou noted that Japan’s economic situation was much more precarious than that of West Germany; whereas West Germany had ample supplies of natural resources and access to the ‘Western Common Market’, Japan was ‘highly dependent’ on the United States for ‘coal, iron, steel, oil’ and ‘even for food’.¹³² Zhou further demonstrated his understanding of Japan’s reliance on external sources of raw materials and markets—that is, the ‘special vulnerabilities’ that elites in Meiji Japan had once been so concerned about—when he discussed how Japan’s need for raw materials and markets had prompted its historical path of imperialist aggression during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Comparing the fascist, nationalist movements of Imperial Japan and Hitler’s Germany, Zhou stated that the problem for Japan was that it needed to look outside of Japan for the raw materials and markets needed for its economic development. He stated that in the past,

Japan looked to the East for development and was obstructed [*zulan*] by the US, it looked to the west and was obstructed by China, it could not look to the North to develop, and so it could only look to the South. The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, etc were all partly occupied by Japan.¹³³

¹³¹ See discussion of this point in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.5.

¹³² FMA File 105-01066-06, 9 June 1961, ‘Zhou Enlai zongli jiejian Minzhu Deguo zhuHua dashi Yue Heigen tan Kennidi zhengfu duiwai zhengce, Xide he Riben junguozhuyi fuhuo deng wenti’ [Premier Zhou Enlai meets with the German Democratic Republic Ambassador Hegen to discuss the Kennedy Administration’s foreign policy, and the revival of West German and Japanese militarism], 2.

¹³³ FMA File 105-01066-06, 4.

Zhou's statement clearly suggests that he understood that Japan's economic needs and its search for industrial development at a time of nationalism, had propelled Japan's drive for imperialism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While Zhou certainly did not condone Japan's aggressive imperialism, he did however recognise the links between economics and security in Japan's search for modernisation and industrialisation. Zhou therefore acknowledged that, in the post-war and Cold War period, Japan had no choice but to rely on the United States for the food, raw materials and export markets it needed to survive. Given this, and the strength of the US occupying force in Japan, Zhou concluded that Japan 'just has to follow America'.¹³⁴ Perhaps unsurprisingly, Zhou did not go so far as to say that the United States had played an important or positive role in catalysing the postwar rehabilitation of Japan's industry and economy. Nevertheless, this statement does show a clearer understanding by Zhou Enlai of Japan's economic as well as security reliance on the United States, and the US role in propping up the Japanese economy in the postwar era.

6.3.4. Which ideas matter?

The discussion thus far has shown that from August 1960 to 1965, two dominant background ideas shaped Chinese thinking about, and policy towards, Japan: first, the ideas of Zhou Enlai and other Chinese policy-makers about the need to modernise China through balanced economic development and the use of science and technology; and second, Mao's ideas about the need to maintain the struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism. Furthermore, it has been shown that Chinese foreground ideas about Japan as a relatively more developed, modern and

¹³⁴ Ibid., 2.

industrialised country reinforced the first of these background ideas, and encouraged Chinese policy-makers to look to Japanese technology and military-industrial development policy for guidance in developing China's own economy. Yet given the strength of these foreground ideas about Japan, and their role in reinforcing the first background idea, why did Zhou Enlai's thinking about the Four Modernisations and greater use of science and technology not seriously take hold in China until the late 1970s, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping?

The answer to this question lies in the second background idea. In the early 1960s, China was still a radical, Marxist state and one in which Mao's ideas about anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-revisionism held utmost sway. Although this period preceded the even more radical ideological years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao's policies and ideas during the early 1960s prepared the 'ideological and intellectual groundwork' for the Cultural Revolution.¹³⁵ In the Introduction to this thesis it was suggested that it is important not only to examine actors' ideas, but also the circumstances that make those ideas plausible and influential to particular actors at particular historical moments.¹³⁶ This is because, as Dietrich Rueschemeyer reminds us, all ideas, 'have to meet with complex favorable conditions before they are accepted and used'.¹³⁷

As we have seen from the discussion in the Historical Overview above, the period from late August 1960 to 1965 was one in which the more moderate elements in the CCP leadership enjoyed just a brief moment of relative power before the radical ideology of Mao, and his political calculations, took hold. These particular

¹³⁵ Gao Wenqian, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary* 99.

¹³⁶ Hall, 'Ideas and the Social Sciences,' 41.

¹³⁷ Rueschemeyer, 'Why and How Ideas Matter,' 241.

circumstances meant that ideas about science and technology, the Four Modernisations, and the need to draw on the expertise and technology of capitalist countries—ideas all primarily associated with the relatively moderate Zhou Enlai—had a somewhat shallow impact on China’s economic direction and its foreign policy towards capitalist countries such as Japan. Although Mao, too, staunchly advocated the goal of rapid industrialisation and economic development, this normative goal was frequently superseded by what he saw as the need to struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism, and by the sheer force of Mao’s political dominance within the CCP. In 1961, Mao had called on Nie Rongzhen and his military colleagues to ‘catch up’ with the more industrially and technologically advanced Japan. By 1966, however, a US CIA report found that China’s science, technology and industrial capabilities remained extremely limited.¹³⁸

Historical circumstances external to China also made Mao’s ideas of anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-revisionism more influential than Zhou’s ideas about balanced economic development as the 1960s progressed. The US military campaign in Vietnam, US and Soviet ‘collusion’ in signing the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and growing isolation from the Soviet Union, all gave added weight to Mao’s view that the world was full of forces that were hostile to China. Furthermore, and importantly for our purposes, a host of developments in Japan in the early 1960s reinforced the more radical strain of background ideas in China. From August 1960 to 1963, Chinese officials had initially been cautiously optimistic about the strength of progressive forces in Japan. After the resignation of the ‘imperialistic’ Kishi, Chinese officials were far more willing to deal with Ikeda Hayato, the leader of the pro-China faction

¹³⁸ Cited in Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 210-211.

within the LDP.¹³⁹ Furthermore, Mao Zedong regarded the presence of ‘indirect allies’ such as Matsumura, Okazaki and Takasaki as a clear sign that the LDP was not a ‘monolithic bloc’, but rather a party that ‘can be divided’.¹⁴⁰ However, this sense of optimism came to a halt when Satō Eisaku (佐藤栄作) was elected as Prime Minister of Japan in November 1964. Satō was a leading member of the conservative, Yoshida Shigeru faction of the LDP, and the younger brother of Kishi Nobusuke. He had also opposed China’s nuclear test, had refused to allow a Chinese delegation led by Peng Zhen (彭真) to travel to Japan early in his tenure, and in the ensuing months would yield to US pressure to sign a peace treaty with South Korea and show support for the Vietnam War.¹⁴¹ For all of these reasons, Beijing’s response to Satō was not warm. In December 1964, shortly after Satō’s election, the Chinese Foreign Ministry decreed that,

We should continue to be friendly towards the Japanese people, [but] we should expose and strike down Satō’s attitudes of hostility towards China, we should support the Japanese people in their revolutionary struggle, and promote division within the Japanese ruling classes.¹⁴²

Satō’s tenure as Prime Minister of Japan also renewed obstacles in the Sino-Japanese trade relationship, obstacles which the Chinese side hoped had been eradicated through the introduction of the LT Trade Agreement. In January 1965, Satō approved the export of Japan’s first whole industrial plant—a vinylon plant from the Kurashiki Rayon Company—to China. This was to be an important new industrial plant that would greatly enhance China’s textile industry. However, under US and Taiwanese

¹³⁹ FMA File 105-01863-01; CIA Office of Current Intelligence, 1 May 1964, ‘The China Problem in Japanese Politics’, 3-5

¹⁴⁰ FMA File 105-01863-02, 2-3.

¹⁴¹ FMA File 105-01759-17, 24 April 1965, ‘Guowuyuan waiban: Riben ziyouminzhudang he longduan ziben de yixie Dongxiang (“Ribei qingkuang” di 17qi)’ [Foreign Affairs Office of the State Council: Some trends in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party and among monopoly capitalists (“The Situation in Japan” No. 17)].

¹⁴² FMA File 105-01896-02, 3 December 1964, ‘Ribei xin neige chengli he wo dui ce’ [The establishment of Japan’s new Cabinet and its strategy towards us], 1-2.

pressure, the Satō government refused to allow China to fund purchases of plant equipment using credit from the Export-Import Bank of Japan.¹⁴³ Given the parlous state of the Chinese economy, its inability to use Japanese bank credit ultimately forced the cancellation of the purchase of the vinylon plant, as well as other major contracts such as the purchase of cargo ships from the Hitachi shipbuilding company in Japan.¹⁴⁴ China's policy of 'walking on two legs' by using both LT Trade and Friendship Trade was also obstructed during Satō's tenure. The US and Taiwan put considerable pressure on Satō and Japan's largest firms not to trade with mainland China. This created major obstacles to what was intended to be the most lucrative and economically significant form of trade—LT Trade—in particular. In 1963, LT Trade represented two-thirds of all Sino-Japanese trade, but by 1969 it had fallen to just one-tenth of Sino-Japanese trade. In contrast, Chinese trade with 'friendly' small and medium firms occupied 90 percent of total Sino-Japanese trade in 1969.¹⁴⁵

Finally, China's own domestic politics and Mao's revolutionary ideas created additional obstacles to Sino-Japanese trade in the mid-1960s. As noted in the Historical Overview above, relations between the JCP and CCP soured in 1964 and 1965 as Japanese communists grew alarmed at Beijing's militant support for national liberation movements. Furthermore, the Sino-Soviet split complicated relations between the JCP and China. In 1966, when the JCP tried to persuade Beijing that China must unite with the Soviets to provide aid to Vietnam, Zhou Enlai flatly rejected JCP efforts, and head of the Chinese Academy of Science, Guo Moruo,

¹⁴³ FMA File 105-01409-02, 25 February-7 May 1965, 'Guanyu goumai Riben huolun he weinilong chengtao shebei wenti' [Issues concerning the purchase of Japanese cargo ships and the vinylon plant].

¹⁴⁴ Radtke, *China's Relations with Japan*, 163-164.

¹⁴⁵ Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 78.

publicly described the JCP as ‘philistines who sold principle’.¹⁴⁶ In response to what it perceived as disloyalty and ‘revisionism’ by the JCP, in 1966 and 1967 Beijing sought to cut off all sources of revenue for the JCP. Beijing severed economic interaction with the JCP-linked JCTPA, and halted Friendship Trade with the SMEs that were linked to the JCP.¹⁴⁷

During the early years of the Cultural Revolution, China also created a raft of confusion among Japanese progressive groups as it sought ties with new Japanese friendship organisations and trading groups that it deemed pro-China. The politics of the Cultural Revolution meant that, by 1966, Japan was home to both a ‘pro-China’ Japan-China Friendship Association, and an older Japan-China Friendship Association that was linked to the JCP.¹⁴⁸ While there continued to be broad left-wing support in Japan for the expansion of Sino-Japanese trade, China’s radical politics, and ongoing US pressure on the Satō government not to export strategic goods to China, ensured that Sino-Japanese trade remained limited. Japan became China’s leading trade partner in 1965, but it would not be until the 1970s and 1980s that the two countries would develop a major trade and investment relationship, thereby restoring Japan’s prewar position in the Chinese economy.

6.4 Conclusion

In the early 1960s, Chinese policy-makers began comparing China’s levels of development with those in Japan. Finding China weak and under-developed by

¹⁴⁶ Sheldon W. Simon, ‘Maoism and Inter-Party Relations: Peking’s Alienation of the Japan Communist Party,’ *The China Quarterly* 35(1968), 47.

¹⁴⁷ Unfortunately for the JCP, most of these ‘friendly companies’ simply chose to cut ties with the JCP rather than losing their trade with China. Lee, ‘Politics of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations,’ 136-137; Simon, ‘Maoism and Inter-Party Relations,’ 53.

¹⁴⁸ Lee, ‘Politics of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations,’ 138.

comparison, they set about attempting to trade with Japan and to absorb large quantities of Japanese goods, technology and expertise. Yet this policy was frequently thwarted by Mao's 'continuous revolution' and his ongoing struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism. By 1965, the most important firms engaged in trade with Japan were not the major trading houses such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi—who could supply China with the industrial goods, chemicals and technology needed to develop and modernise its economy—but rather hundreds of small and medium firms who, the Chinese hoped, would further the revolutionary struggle in Japan. Similarly, although China began inviting large numbers of Japanese technicians and experts to China, policy-makers lamented that China was poorly equipped to draw on technology and developmental advice from a capitalist country such as Japan.

This chapter has sought to illuminate the two somewhat competing pressures on China's Japan policy between August 1960 and 1965. It has shown that in the wake of the GLF, there emerged two dominant ideas in Chinese background economic and foreign policy thinking: first, the need to pursue balanced economic development and find ways to modernise the Chinese economy, and second, the need to maintain the struggle against imperialism, capitalism and revisionism both at home and abroad. These ideas shaped Chinese foreground ideas about Japan, ultimately producing a two-pronged trade policy of LT Trade—designed to help modernise the Chinese economy—and Friendship Trade—designed to engage with fellow anti-imperialist, anti-revisionist and anti-capitalist elements in Japan. Yet this chapter has argued that it was not simply a pragmatic response to immediate economic scarcity that motivated the foreground idea of 'walking on two legs' in China's foreign economic policy

towards Japan. Rather, it has been shown that Chinese attempts to draw on Japanese goods, technology and expertise stemmed from the long-held idea that China needed a modern and industrialised economy if it were to become a strong state, able to stand up to foreign incursion.

Furthermore, the chapter has argued that Chinese ideas about how to become a modern, industrialised and strong state did not only stem from Chinese background ideas. That is, the relationship between background and foreground ideas is not unidirectional. Rather, the chapter has argued that Chinese foreground ideas about Japan also played a role in shaping Chinese background ideas and, in particular, were important in shaping Chinese thinking about how to become a modern, industrialised and strong state. In the early 1960s, China's relationship with the Soviet Union was worsening, and China's leaders began to look elsewhere for assistance and ideas about how to develop and modernise the Chinese economy. While China and Japan were very different societies, Chinese leaders believed that they had at least one thing in common. Both states had been vulnerable to Western imperialism in the past because they had been late developers. Chinese leaders now looked to Japan to see how Japan had used technology as the means to modernise its economy and military, and how Japan had sought to 'catch up' with the more advanced, industrialised countries of the West. Although Chinese foreground ideas about Japan were certainly not the only factor to have shaped Chinese thinking about the Four Modernisations or the need for industrial development more generally, Chinese foreground ideas about Japan were important in catalysing both a shift in Japan policy and the broader thinking of key leaders such as Zhou Enlai and, to a lesser extent, Mao Zedong.

Finally, however, this chapter has shown that all ideas have to meet with favourable conditions before they are accepted and used. In the early 1960s, Mao's political dominance in the CCP, China's growing isolation from the superpowers, and the election of a particularly conservative Japanese Prime Minister, provided the necessary contextual conditions to help strengthen and give traction to Mao's radical ideas of anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism and anti-revisionism. Under these historical conditions, Mao's radical ideas frequently exerted greater leverage on China's Japan policy than Zhou Enlai's ideas about how to become a modern, industrialised state. To be clear, this chapter—and the thesis more generally—has not sought to explain China's Japan policy as being the result of factional struggles within the CCP. The available archival records do not allow us to draw firm conclusions about the extent to which Japan policy was contested within the upper echelons of the CCP.¹⁴⁹ Instead, this chapter has looked to Chinese ideas about Japan, within the context of broader historical developments, to demonstrate the competing pressures on China's Japan policy in the early 1960s.

The tension between the ideas held by Mao and Zhou would grow during the Cultural Revolution as Mao Zedong drew even sharper divisions between 'red and expert', and this would have a dampening effect on the Sino-Japanese economic relationship. It would not be until the late 1970s, following the end of the Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao, and Reform and Opening under Deng Xiaoping, that the two countries would develop major trade and investment ties. Nevertheless, we have seen that Chinese foreground ideas about Japan—and in particular the idea that China could draw on Japanese technology, expertise and industrial policy to modernise its

¹⁴⁹ Given the lack of transparency of CCP decision-making, Michael Hunt has cautioned against relying on factions as an analytical tool to explain CCP policy. See Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 242.

economy and ‘catch up’ with the industrialised powers of the West—developed in the early 1960s as Chinese leaders began comparing their country with Japan.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion

7.1. Sino-Japanese economic ties during the Cultural Revolution

The Sino-Japanese economic relationship was not left unaffected by China's Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Sino-Japanese trade dipped sharply in 1967 and 1968 after Chinese officials refused to trade with certain of Japan's 'monopoly capitalists'.¹ Furthermore, though Japan's trade liaison offices in China were maintained throughout the Cultural Revolution, only 20 of the 100 Japanese trade representatives stationed in China stayed on, and many of those who did were harassed or arrested by Red Guards.² Yet despite the frequent difficulties of trading with China during the first half of the Cultural Revolution, by the late 1960s Japan had become China's most important source of high technology and industrial goods and expertise. Between 1964 and 1968, Japanese firms had constructed 25 large electronics manufacturing plants in China, exported high technology goods such as micrometers, vinylon and magnetic tapes to China, and exported about half of Japan's total chemical fertilizer to China.³ By 1971, 27 percent of China's imports came from Japan.⁴

This strong economic relationship was all the more significant because Japan's role in the Chinese economy predated the normalisation of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Most scholarship on the Sino-Japanese relationship considers 1972, the year

¹ Lee, 'Politics of Sino-Japanese Trade Relations,' 134.

² Ibid., 141.

³ 'Japan between the Two Chinas', CIA Office of National Estimates, 10 February 1971, United States Digital National Security Archive (hereafter 'USDNSA'), File JT00099, 8; 'Sino-Japanese economic relations on the eve of the Tanaka-Chou summit', CIA Office of National Estimates, September 1972, USDNSA, File JT00125, 3.

⁴ 'Sino-Japanese economic relations on the eve of the Tanaka-Chou summit', 4.

in which China and Japan restored full diplomatic ties for the first time since 1938, to be the 'starting point' in the PRC's relationship with Japan.⁵ Linked to this, it is often argued that Sino-Japanese economic engagement could not take place until the 'shock' of US *rapprochement* with China in 1971-1972. However, such an argument belies the evidence, presented in this thesis, that for the two decades prior to 1972, there had been a major flow of goods, people and ideas across the diplomatic and Cold War divide between China and Japan.

Of course, it must be acknowledged that diplomatic normalisation and, more importantly, Deng Xiaoping's policies of Reform and Opening and the Four Modernisations in the late 1970s, did dramatically transform the *scale* of the Sino-Japanese economic relationship. In 1971, Sino-Japanese trade stood at \$US900 million; by 1985, it had swelled to almost \$US22 billion, and this represented more than 30 percent of China's total trade.⁶ As had been the case since the early 1900s, this trade relationship was built on the back of a high degree of natural complementarity between the two economies. Japan could exchange industrial products and technology for China's raw materials and primary products. Furthermore, after the OPEC oil crises of the 1970s, Japan sought to diversify its oil dependency away from the Middle East, and China became an additional source of oil.⁷ Finally, the willingness of the United States to maintain open markets for Japanese, and increasingly Chinese, exports was a particularly important catalyst for the development of Sino-Japanese economic ties in the 1980s and 1990s. The United

⁵ See, for instance Wan Ming, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation*; Shiraishi Takashi and Hau, 'Only Yesterday: China, Japan and the Transformation of East Asia.'

⁶ International Monetary Fund, 'Historical Direction of Trade Statistics (1948-1980).'

⁷ Dong Dong Zhang, 'Managing Bilateral Economic Differences,' in *Japan and China: Rivalry or Cooperation in East Asia?*, ed. Peter Drysdale and Dong Dong Zhang (Canberra: Australia-Japan Research Centre, 2000), 52-53. Prior to this, Japan imported 70 per cent of its oil from the Middle East.

States provided the single most important market for cheap exports produced by Japanese firms investing in China's manufacturing industry.⁸

Yet this major Sino-Japanese economic relationship was built on more than simply economic complementarity, shared geography, or the shift in the Cold War international environment that resulted from US-China *rapprochement* in 1972. Each of these factors was important. However, for China, this economic relationship with Japan was made possible by the ideas its policy-makers' had held about Japan since 1949. This thesis has explored those ideas.

7.2. Chinese ideas about Japan in the wake of the War of Resistance

This thesis has shown that Chinese policy-makers held a range of ideas about Japan in the wake of the War of Resistance. Of these, there were two particularly important strands in Chinese thinking about Japan.

First, it was shown that Chinese policy-makers saw Japan as an important source of industrial goods, technology and expertise. This was a powerful and consistent theme in Chinese conceptions of Japan from the earliest years of the PRC, at a time when China's Communist leaders were struggling to rebuild their war-torn country. Japanese industrial products and machinery were familiar to officials and factory-workers in China, particularly in Manchuria and North China where Japan had played a major role in catalysing industrial development. Furthermore, Japanese refugees left behind in Manchuria at the end of the Second World War had engineering and other skills that were badly needed in the reconstruction of the Chinese economy.

⁸ Iriye, 'Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-1990,' 55-56.

Familiarity with Japanese industrial goods, technology and expertise further developed over the course of the 1950s as larger numbers of Japanese technicians and industrial advisers visited China. Through this, Chinese policy-makers came to see that importing Japanese technology and manufactured goods was critical to China's attempts to pursue the rapid economic development and industrialisation first prescribed by the Soviet development model. Furthermore, the thesis demonstrated that as Chinese officials began to draw sharper distinctions between China and the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, they increasingly came to see Japan as a fellow, 'Eastern' country, whose goods, technology and expertise were particularly appropriate in meeting China's development needs. By the early 1960s, in the wake of the failed Great Leap Forward, China's leaders then came to appreciate how Japan had used science and technology to rapidly modernise its economy, thereby achieving the 'catch up' growth so important to a late developer country.

Second, the thesis demonstrated that Chinese policy-makers conceived of Japan as *both* an imperialistic country and as a victim of imperialism. Chinese officials therefore wrestled with how to legitimate the policy of 'trading with the enemy' to a Chinese domestic audience which had fresh memories of bitter war with Japan, and who were schooled in the importance of continuous opposition to imperialism. When Kishi Nobusuke—a man who represented the worst of Japan's imperialistic past—came to power as Prime Minister of Japan, China's leaders were no longer able to condone 'trading with the enemy'. Yet at the same time, Chinese officials also argued that the Japanese people were victims of US imperialism, and that Japan and its economy were suffering as a result of the US imperialist (economic) order in Asia. Framing the Japanese as victims of US imperialism was a way for China's leaders to

oppose aspects of the US-led international order in Asia such as the US-led Peace Treaty with Japan. Moreover, calling for the establishment of 'normal' economic relations between China and Japan was a way for Chinese officials to oppose the US-led economic embargo on China and oppose US imperialism in Asia. Ultimately, Chinese officials saw economic engagement with Japan as a way to enhance China's industrial strength, achieve a 'revolution through industrialisation', and thereby stand up to hostile foreign powers.

Uniting these two strands were ideas about imperialism, industrialisation and war. This thesis has argued that in the wake of the War of Resistance against Japan, Chinese policy-makers were deeply concerned about how to strengthen China so that their country could withstand the kind of aggressive militarism and imperial exploitation that had left China vulnerable to foreign imperialism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and as a victim of aggressive war with Japan between 1937 and 1945. For China's leaders, rapid industrialisation was at the heart of their efforts to modernise and make China strong. They believed that weak, agrarian economies like China's had fallen victim to foreign imperialism in the past, and must therefore industrialise in order to strengthen their economic and military power.

The thesis has demonstrated that from Chinese ideas about Japan, we can learn much about Chinese views of the relationship between imperialism, industrialisation and war. In observing Japan's path to industrialisation, Chinese policy-makers had observed that historically, European countries and Japan had achieved their industrialisation by colonising and exploiting weaker countries as export markets and

sources of raw materials. Subsequently, after 1949, China's Communist leaders began to articulate their vision of a new international order, based not on the imperialist system of the past where strong countries victimised the weak, but rather a system of peaceful coexistence, sovereign equality, and 'peaceful trade' based on mutual benefit for all countries, whether strong or weak.

Yet these visions of a new international order of equality between strong and weak states belied a deeper paranoia that, without rapid industrialisation, China would never be treated as an equal state. Chinese policy-makers had observed how, in the first half of the twentieth century, Japan had successfully drawn on its industrial capabilities for military ends, in ways that had had disastrous consequences for China. After 1949, Chinese officials learned, in part from observing Japan, that modern wars were industrial wars, and viewed national strength in terms of raw industrial capability. Thus, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, China's leaders pursued a relentless campaign—characterised by gross failures such as the Great Leap Forward—to industrialise and strengthen China. Observing Japan's historical path to war, and the rehabilitation of Japan's 'latent' industry and military capabilities in the postwar period, Chinese leaders argued that unless China similarly industrialised and modernised, it too would forever remain a victim to imperialism and industrialised warfare.

7.3. The role of ideas in shaping China's Japan policy

To explore Chinese policy-makers' ideas about Japan, this thesis moved beyond the 'ideas versus interests' framework set out by scholars such as Goldstein and Keohane,

and instead employed a four-part ideas framework first developed by John Campbell.⁹ Chapters Three and Four set out the key background, foreground, cognitive and normative ideas that shaped China's foreign economic policy towards Japan. From there, the thesis demonstrated the need to build on Campbell's static, four-part framework in order to fully explore how ideas shape policy. In particular, in Chapters Five and Six we established the necessity of exploring the interaction between different idea types. In Chapter Five it was shown that while cognitive ideas may provide highly useful solutions to policy problems, ideas must also be seen as appropriate or legitimate before they can be accepted and used. This chapter therefore demonstrated that under particularly radical political or economic conditions—such as those that existed during China's Great Leap Forward—normative ideas may have greater leverage than cognitive ideas in shaping policy.

Furthermore, and in contrast to the model offered by Campbell, Chapter Six demonstrated that the relationship between background and foreground ideas is not unidirectional. That is, while background ideas shape foreground ideas, Chapter Six argued that Chinese foreground ideas about Japan also played an important role in shaping the broader background ideas in Chinese foreign and economic policy thinking. By directly interrogating the interaction between different idea types, the variation on Campbell's framework employed in this thesis was better able to consider the conditions under which certain ideas have more leverage than others, and the ways in which different idea types influence each other. Ultimately, it has been shown that understanding the interaction between different idea types is crucial if we are to fully appreciate their role in shaping policy.

⁹ Campbell, 'The Role of Ideas in Political Economy.'; Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.

The thesis has also explored a number of the mechanisms, though more superficially, by which ideas about Japan were produced, transmitted and strategically employed by actors to shape policy. First, on the production side, we have seen how a number of different actors played an important role in shaping Chinese policy-makers' ideas about Japan. In Japan, politicians, businessmen and industrialists who had lived and worked in China before and during the war played a critically important role in shaping Chinese ideas about the Japanese economy, and in expanding economic ties between the two countries. After 1949, these individuals were extremely influential in establishing civil society organisations such as the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association, which lobbied the Japanese government to expand ties with China, sponsored trade delegations to China, and served as the Japanese signatories for the series of 'unofficial' trade agreements signed during the 1950s and 1960s.

On the Chinese side, it was noted in the Introduction to the thesis that the nature of Chinese sources means that we can make only tentative assessments about the extent to which China's Japan policy was contested within the upper echelons of the CCP. Nevertheless, the thesis has shown that, of all Chinese officials, it was the ideas of Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai that played the most significant role in shaping China's policy of economic engagement with Japan between 1949 and 1965. From 1949 onwards, Zhou held relatively moderate, market-oriented views about economic policy and was often aligned with the Finance Coalition in supporting more balanced economic development, the greater use of science and technology, and economic engagement with capitalist, industrialised states such as Japan. Though Zhou all too often fell in behind Mao's radical economic and foreign policy views in order to sustain his own political power, it was Zhou Enlai who took the most

important steps in choreographing China's economic engagement with Japan. In addition, Foreign Ministry officials such as Liao Chengzhi and Sun Pinghua, both of whom had spent extended periods of time as students in Japan, worked closely with Zhou in shaping China's Japan policy.

For Mao Zedong, Japan policy was less central than it was for Zhou Enlai. At times, such as when directing Nie Rongzhen to study Japanese military-industrial policy, Mao's statements and instructions enabled lower-level officials to expand China's economic engagement with Japan. On other occasions, Mao's role was felt when his anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist sentiments prevented Foreign Ministry and Foreign Trade Ministry officials from doing business with Japan. On the whole, however, this thesis has shown that Mao's involvement with Japan policy was typically limited to entertaining and meeting with delegations from Japan's Socialist and Communist parties.

Second, we have seen how Manchuria served as a particularly important site linking Chinese and Japanese individuals, and in spreading ideas about imperialism and industrialisation from Japan to China. The 30,000 Japanese stationed in Manchuria at the end of the war played a role in helping to reconstruct Northeast China after 1949. Furthermore, Japanese such as Takasaki Tatsunosuke, who had lived and worked in Manchuria during the 1930s and 1940s, played an active role in promoting Sino-Japanese economic cooperation after 1949.

Third, the thesis has shown how Chinese leaders used a range of different mediums to communicate their ideas about Japan. Editorials in the *People's Daily*, public

speeches, and directives to lower-level officials, used ideas as framing devices to legitimate their policy of economic engagement with Japan, to rail against Japan's post-1949 imperialistic and militaristic alliance with the United States, and to articulate China's vision for a new international order based on 'normal' economic relations between China and Japan. Yet in doing so, we have seen that, whether inadvertent or by design, by framing Japan in so many complex ways, and to so many different audiences at once, China's leaders often struggled to put forward a coherent policy towards Japan.

Finally, the thesis has shown that Chinese leaders' ideas about Japan were sometimes 'mistaken' ideas. Though ideas are, by nature, subjective phenomena that cannot be described as 'true' or 'correct', the thesis has argued that certain Chinese ideas precluded the development of others. Chinese policy-makers' background normative and cognitive ideas—premised on Marxism-Leninism and a particularly anti-American brand of anti-imperialism—created ideational 'blindness' that prevented Chinese leaders from understanding or acknowledging that Japan might have achieved its rapid postwar economic development thanks to the capitalist nature of its economy, or as a result of US economic assistance to Japan. Nevertheless, these 'mistaken' ideas were also a function of the fact that Chinese policy-makers most often came into contact with left-wing Japanese politicians, and representatives from Japan's small and medium enterprises, who were themselves opposed to the US occupation and alliance with Japan, or who had failed to benefit from the US economic assistance to Japan.

Ultimately, we have seen how this range of Chinese background, foreground, cognitive and normative ideas about Japan, working through a range of mechanisms,

helped to shape China's foreign economic policy towards Japan between 1949 and 1965. The constitutive role of these ideas, combined with factors such as geography, economic complementarity, and a shared history of economic interdependence, give logic to China's attempts to build an extensive economic relationship with its erstwhile wartime enemy and Cold War opponent, Japan.

7.4. Placing 1949-1965 in the broader Sino-Japanese relationship

The role that China and Japan have played in each other's historical development has often been sidelined in the literature in favour of a focus on 'the West's "impact" on Asia and the latter's "response" to the West'.¹⁰ Furthermore, the legacy of Japanese aggression against China has made it highly problematic for scholars to deal seriously with the idea that the relationship has had constructive elements, as well as highly destructive ones. Yet there are some scholars who, in writing about the Sino-Japanese relationship in the first half of the twentieth century, recognised that there were both constructive and destructive elements to the relationship. Allen Whiting has argued that for Chinese in the early twentieth century, 'Japan appear[ed] alternately as a military threat to be feared and a modernization model to be studied'.¹¹ Similarly Lu Yan suggests that, between 1895 and 1945,

To many Chinese, the rise and expansion of Japanese power during the years between the two Sino-Japanese wars (1895-1945) presented a paradox: With its successful modernization, Japan became a model to be emulated; yet as the country's imperial ambitions on the continent grew, it posed an ever-increasing threat.¹²

Both scholars acknowledge the paradoxical character of Chinese conceptions of Japan up to the moment of the War of Resistance against Japan. Yet, both fail to consider what happened to Chinese conceptions of Japan immediately *after* that war. Lu Yan

¹⁰ Akira Iriye, *The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 4.

¹¹ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, 29.

¹² Lu Yan, *Re-Understanding Japan: Chinese Perspectives, 1895-1945*, front jacket.

briefly concludes that ‘The once vibrant and multidimensional Sino-Japanese interactions came to an abrupt end when China and Japan stopped fighting in 1945’.¹³ Equally, Allen Whiting argues that until 1972, the dominant developments in Sino-Japanese relations ‘involved confrontation and conflict, not cooperation’.¹⁴ These, and other scholars, have concluded that, in the aftermath of the War of Resistance, Chinese conceptions of Japan—and the Sino-Japanese relationship more generally—were negative.

The findings in this thesis contradict these arguments. This thesis has shown that, in spite of China’s recent and devastating war with Japan, after 1949 China’s political elites continued to view Japan as a crucial trade partner and symbol of a modern, industrialised nation-state. Chinese officials believed that trading with Japan, and drawing on Japanese technology and expertise, would aid China’s own search for industrial development and modernisation. To be sure, Japan did not serve as an economic model for China after 1949, for that role was held by the Soviet Union. However, Sino-Japanese relations were not frozen in 1945; nor were they characterised only by conflict and confrontation. Rather, by exploring Chinese ideas about, and foreign economic policy towards, Japan, we have seen that Japan featured heavily in the PRC’s international relations and economic development strategies during the early Cold War.

Furthermore, this study of Chinese ideas about Japan has shed light on broader Chinese foreign and economic policy ideas during the early Cold War. Like Chen Jian, I agree that ideas matter in our study of China’s external relations during the

¹³ Ibid., 247.

¹⁴ Whiting, *China Eyes Japan*, 40.

Maoist era, and that China's experience of foreign imperialism and war played a fundamental role in shaping Chinese ideas during the Cold War.¹⁵ Yet the findings in this thesis suggest that we need to re-emphasise the *economic* dimension of China's experience of imperialism and war. Through exploring Chinese ideas about Japan we have seen that China's economic weakness meant that industrialisation became a core idea in Chinese foreign and economic policy thinking after 1949. Through their ideas about Japan, China's leaders developed their own understanding about the urgency of industrialisation, and the need to industrialise without resorting to the imperialism of the past. These ideas, I have argued, developed, in part, out of Chinese observations of Japan's historical path of imperialism, industrialisation and war.

It is frequently argued that, since the era of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Party has placed great priority on economic development and modernisation, believing it to be crucial in underpinning the legitimacy of the regime, and China's overall national strength and security.¹⁶ Yet this thesis has shown that ideas about economic development, and the most effective and legitimate means of achieving that economic development, were powerful imperatives in China during the Maoist era as well. Of course, the gross failures of the Great Leap Forward and economic decline during the Cultural Revolution are testament to the fact that Chinese policy-makers' focus on economic development rarely resulted in success. In Mao's China, ideas about the need to modernise and strengthen China through rapid industrialisation were often sidelined by Mao's impatience for anti-imperialist revolution, and his unwillingness to countenance the introduction of capitalist or 'revisionist' economic

¹⁵ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 4-5.

¹⁶ Ibid., 277-278; Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, see especially Chapter 7. In doing so, Vogel explicitly compares the modernisation of China's economy under Deng Xiaoping, with the modernisation of Japan that took place during the Meiji era.

ideas to China. Furthermore, as history has made clear, the decision to embark on a Soviet path of economic development and modernisation was flawed from the start.

The Cold War was a time of competing models for development and modernisation, models that were represented by the Soviet Union and United States.¹⁷ For China's Communist officials, the Soviet development model appeared to offer a rapid and socially just way for backward economies to become strong. In Japan, US occupying forces rolled out a capitalist, development model designed to remove the state-led economic structures that had underpinned Japanese militarism, to turn Japan into a 'poster child' of capitalist modernisation, and make Japan a counterpoint to the communist development model in Asia.¹⁸ But the development models offered by the United States and Soviet Union were not always well suited to local economic, geographic, cultural or historical conditions. Moreover, Cold War strategic competition meant that the US and Soviet Union artificially carved up the globe into their own economic spheres of influence, and used trade embargoes as a weapon of war. For China and Japan, these Cold War economic models and trade embargoes distorted what had historically been a highly interdependent and complementary economic relationship, albeit one that was fostered through Japan's imperialist exploitation of China. Despite this, this thesis has shown that throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese and Japanese governments, as well as individual politicians, business groups, and civil society actors in Japan, laboured to build an economic relationship across Cold War lines.

¹⁷ Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*.

¹⁸ In addition to Japan, the United States also saw India as an important counterpoint to the communist development model. See Foot, *The Practice of Power*, 201-202.

This is significant because it suggests that the strict binary of Cold War communist and capitalist development models may not be particularly suitable analytical categories for thinking about postwar development in China and Japan. Moreover, it suggests that we need to consider the 1950s and 1960s as an important period in the history of non-Western models of development. Since the late 1970s, there has been a growing discourse about the importance of Asian development models. This discourse developed against the background of both Japan's rising economy and the emergence of the rapidly-industrialising 'Asian Tigers'.¹⁹ That literature has largely overlooked the 1950s and 1960s however. The findings in this thesis show that earlier debates about 'Eastern' models of development were beginning to take place in China and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s, and suggests that we need to place this period into this wider discourse about non-Western models of development and late industrialisation in Asia.

Finally, the findings in this thesis have implications for our broader understanding of the Sino-Japanese relationship. The thesis has argued that the Sino-Japanese relationship has long been characterised by both constructive and destructive elements. Moreover, and despite the wartime legacy and Cold War divide between China and Japan, the paradoxical quality of that relationship was a consistent feature in the 1950s and 1960s. Today, the contemporary Sino-Japanese relationship is often cast as one of 'hot economics' and 'cold politics', where the wartime legacy explains why economic interdependence has failed to bring about closer political ties between China and Japan.²⁰ Although China's Communist officials chose to downplay the bitter legacy of Japanese imperialism and war during the 1950s and 1960s, war and

¹⁹ See, in particular Ezra F. Vogel, *The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).

²⁰ Yahuda, 'The Limits of Economic Interdependence.'

imperialism were still important features in the Sino-Japanese relationship during the 1950s and 1960s. For China's leaders, however, it was the economic (and particularly industrial) drivers of war and imperialism, rather than a focus on Japan as the enemy, which most powerfully shaped China's relations with Japan during the 1950s and 1960s.

China's 're-remembering' of the war, and the downturn in Sino-Japanese relations after the 1980s is not inconsistent with these findings. As Chinese officials in the early years of the PRC were plagued by concerns about China's economic weakness, so too have Chinese officials been plagued by concerns about China's weaknesses since the 1980s. The Chinese Communist Party's search for legitimacy at home, and China's search for a central place in the world, are both driven by a lingering 'victim' mentality.²¹ Of course, Japanese leaders' failure to adequately address their country's militaristic history have contributed to the tense political relationship between China and Japan since the 1980s. Yet, it is Chinese conceptions of China's own history of weakness and vulnerability to hostile foreign powers that continue to play the most important role in shaping Chinese conceptions of Japan.

²¹ Callahan, *China: The Pessoptimist Nation*, especially Chapter 6.

Appendix 1

Chinese trade agreements and trade with Japan, 1949-1965

Table 3: First Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement¹

Signed on 1 June 1952 by the CCPIT (for the Chinese side) and JAPIT, JCTPA and the China-Japan Trade Promotion Diet Members League (for the Japanese side).

Category (quantity) ²	Chinese exports to Japan	Japanese exports to China
Class A (40%): 甲类	Coal, soybeans, manganese sand, magnesite, bristles.	Copper, steel, construction steel, rail steel, tinplate, black iron, galvanized tin, tin drums, lead ingots.
Class B (30%): 乙类	Salt, beans, peanuts, tung oil, magnesium, bauxite, fluorine, refractory clay, sesame seeds, flint clay, apatite, feathers, asbestos, cotton, wool.	Textile machinery and parts, ships (cold storage ships), small locomotive, pesticides, sulfonamides, caustic soda, carbolic acid, borax, high-grade ink, cranes, radio equipment, trucks, electrical equipment.
Class C (30%): 丙类	Cottonseed cake, leather, talc, graphite, gypsum, arsenic sulfide, gallnut, rosin, licorice, herbs, raw lacquer and cotton, castor seed, hemp seeds.	Agricultural equipment, bicycles, car parts, typewriters, computers, microscopes, measuring instruments, ball bearings, X-ray medical equipment, soda ash, fertilizer powder (ammonium sulphate, superphosphate, lime nitrogen), artificial silk, cloth, yarn dyes, photographic equipment, chemical equipment, kelp, paper, recording equipment.

¹ Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 130-134.

² These trade 'categories' (A, B and C or 甲, 乙 and 丙), which were initially proposed by China, required either side to export goods according to the ratios indicated above. Thus, 40% of Chinese exports to Japan should come from Class A category goods, in exchange for 40% of Japanese exports from Class A. However, this arrangement was problematic for Japan. The imports that Japan most needed from China were those found in Classes A and B, but the Japanese exports in Classes A and B were all considered 'strategic' items and therefore banned according to the US-led trade embargo. This meant that the majority of trade took place among Class C goods. In subsequent trade agreements, the category ratios and the goods comprising those ratios were therefore somewhat altered to allow more Sino-Japanese trade to take place, despite the trade embargo. For more on this, see Soeya Yoshihide, *Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China*, 33-35.

Table 4: Second Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement³

Signed on 29 October 1953 by the CCPIT (for the Chinese side) and the Diet Members League (for the Japanese side).

Category (quantity)	Chinese exports to Japan	Japanese exports to China
Class A (35%): 甲类	As for the First Agreement (with the deletion of bristles).	As for the First Agreement (with the addition of aluminum ingots, railway equipment, large-scale machinery, ships, cold storage ships).
Class B (40%): 乙类	Salt, magnesia, magnesium ore, bauxite, flint clay, clay, fluorine, apatite, asbestos, antimony, bristles, wool, cashmere, feathers, tung oil, beans, oilseed oil, ramie, silk.	Textile machinery and parts, cranes, ball bearings, machinery, radio equipment, trucks, motor vehicles and parts, electrical equipment, motorbikes, optical instruments, medical equipment, drugs and pharmaceutical raw materials, antibiotics, sulfur, insecticides, industrial chemicals, fertilizers (sulfur amine, superphosphate, lime nitrogen), ink, dyes.
Class C (25%): 丙类	Talc, graphite, gypsum, realgar, pigskin, handmade carpets, lacquer, cotton waste, silk, plaited straw, wheat bran, seed cake, rosin, gallnut, licorice, herbs, cinnamon, musk, star anise, other.	Agricultural machinery, chemical equipment, calculators, typewriters, bicycles, sewing machines, watches, household electrical appliances, household radio, telegraphy machine, tape recorder, microphone, camera equipment, fishing tools, fishing nets, aquatic products, kelp, cloth, yarn, miscellaneous paper, other.

³ Sun Pinghua et al., *Zhanhou Zhongri Guanxi Wenxianji*, 154-155.

Table 5: Third Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement⁴

Signed on 4 May 1955 (and extended on 15 October 1956) by the PRC Trade Delegation to Japan (for the Chinese side), and JAPIT and the Diet Members League (for the Japanese side).

Category (quantity)	Chinese exports to Japan	Japanese exports to China
Class A (35%): 甲类	As for the Second Agreement (with the addition of iron ore and pig iron).	As for the Second Agreement (with the addition of power generating equipment).
Class B (40%): 乙类	As for the Second Agreement (with the addition of rice, tobacco, hemp and hide skins).	As for the Second Agreement (with the addition of chemical fibres, various ferro-alloys, and precision instruments).
Class C (25%): 丙类	As for the Second Agreement (with the addition of film).	As for the Second Agreement.

Table 6: Liao-Takasaki Trade Agreement⁵

Signed on 9 November 1962 by Liao Chengzhi (for the Chinese side) and Takasaki Tatsunosuke (for the Japanese side).

Year	China exports to Japan	Japan exports to China
1963 (1 st year of the agreement)	100,000 tons of coal 450,000 tons of salt 150,000 tons of soybean 100,000 tons of corn 30,000 tons of beans 500 tons of tin	Fertilizers: 200,000 tons of ammonium chloride; 225,000 tons of urea; and 50,000 tons of ammonium sulfate. £GBP6.4 million of steel £GBP1 million of pesticides £GBP1 million of agricultural machinery £GBP1 million of industrial equipment
1964 and subsequent years	As above, with the addition of iron ore and coal.	As above, with the addition of synthetic thiamine.

⁴ Ibid., 207-211.

⁵ Ibid., 646-649.

Table 7: China-Japan Trade, 1949-1965⁶

Year	Chinese imports from Japan (US\$ thousands)	Chinese exports to Japan (US\$ thousands)
1949	3,100	21,800
1950	19,633	39,328
1951	5,828	21,606
1952	599	14,903
1953	4,539	29,700
1954	19,097	40,770
1955	28,547	80,778
1956	67,339	83,647
1957	60,485	80,483
1958	50,600	54,427
1959	3,648	18,917
1960	2,726	20,729
1961	16,639	30,895
1962	38,460	46,020
1963	62,417	74,599
1964	152,739	157,750
1965	245,036	224,705

⁶ United Nations, 'Yearbook of International Trade Statistics.'

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