

SHOULD LEGAL EDUCATION BE TRANSFORMATIVE?

by Edward A. David

McDonald Postdoctoral Fellow in Christian Ethics and Public Life, University of Oxford. The author thanks Anton Sorkin and Mark W. Lee for their support and help in writing this essay.

Introduction

Browse the website of an elite law school, and you will likely find grand statements about the institution's "transformative" education. Harvard, for instance, claims that its "learning environment" is student-centered and "transformative."¹ Not wanting to be outdone, Emory prides itself on having several "transformative ... learning environments."² Gestures toward transformation abound.

But what exactly is a transformative education? And why is the corresponding promise of transformation so often made?

I suspect that the ubiquity has to do with the influence of Jack Mezirow who, in the late 1970s, pioneered a novel account of adult learning known as transformative learning theory.³ At its core, Mezirow's theory holds that student identities, or "perspectives," change for the better when students are exposed to "transformative" experiences.⁴ Such experiences — which may include on-site learning and exposure to different viewpoints — go all the way down. They completely change how a person feels, thinks, and acts. Thus, they stand against older, more superficial forms of learning — rote memorization, for example.

Affirming the modern individual, Mezirow's account of transformation has become a mainstay in educational theory.⁵ And so, looking back at Harvard, Emory, and similar institutions, I think it reasonable to interpret their transformative rhetoric through a Mezirowian lens. Their copywriters may not have studied under Mezirow, but his influence looms behind the screen.

Let us assume then that the transformative rhetoric of some law schools has, in fact, been influenced by Mezirow. We now ask whether legal education *should* be transformative in a Mezirowian sense. Immediately, the answer seems obvious. Of course it should. What student wouldn't want to be changed for the better? But certainly, there is more to Mezirow's theory than this; and one should wonder about *what* a transformed self would look like, and *how* that self might come to be. In short, students should question and be critical when lured by "transformative" promises. As Stanley Hauerwas might say, their "character" — one's very self — depends on this.⁶

Given the stakes, a healthy dose of criticism is in order. Therefore, in what follows, I interrogate Mezirow's theory of transformative learning. And I do so with an eye toward Christian character which is "exactly what makes us what we are," yet (as I demonstrate below) is precisely what Mezirow's transformation would seek to eliminate.⁷ Certainly, then, a different type of transformation — one that respects the character of students — would be welcome. On this front, the Christian tradition has many resources to offer. I explore these resources in the second half of this essay by reconstructing transformative learning upon Christian foundations.

What is Transformative Learning?

¹ *Student Life*, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (last visited July 15, 2023), <https://hls.harvard.edu/student-life/>.

² Jasmine Reese, *Investing in Student Flourishing*, EMORY LAWYER (Winter 2022), <https://law.emory.edu/lawyer/issues/2022/winter/worth-noting/investing-in-student-flourishing/index.html>.

³ SHARAN B MERRIAM & LAURA L BIEREMA, ADULT LEARNING: LINKING THEORY AND PRACTICE 84–86 (first ed. 2014); Andrew Kitchenham, *The Evolution of John Mezirow's Transformative Learning Theory*, 6 J. TRANSFORM. EDUC. 104, 119–120 (2008).

⁴ Kitchenham, *supra* note 3 at 104–105; Joe Levine, *Jack Mezirow, Who Transformed the Field of Adult Learning, Dies at 91*, TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (Oct 11, 2014), <https://www.tc.columbia.edu/articles/2014/october/jack-mezirrow-who-transformed-the-field-of-adult-learning-d/>.

⁵ Kitchenham, *supra* note 3; Levine, *supra* note 4; MERRIAM AND BIEREMA, *supra* note 3.

⁶ STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 39 (2nd ed. 2003).

⁷ *Id.*

As we begin, it is important to state that transformative learning should not be demonized. Mezirow's theory has important strengths and admirable ambitions. And one can see why its features may have been tacitly adopted by law schools and other educational institutions. In this section, I outline its main features. But, in the section that follows, I highlight ways in which transformative learning falls short.

So, what is transformative learning?

Mezirow first articulated his theory in 1978, through a sociological study of women returning to higher education.⁸ That articulation features ten phases of a learner's transformational journey. It begins with a "disorienting dilemma" and culminates in a reintegration of one's knowledge, skills, and relationships based on "conditions dictated by . . . [a newly acquired] perspective."⁹

Since that first iteration, Mezirow developed his account in various ways. Most significantly, he elaborated upon the theory's normative foundations such that, by the early 2000s, Mezirow had clearly strengthened its distinctly liberal commitments. Chief among these is a deep suspicion of "fixed" viewpoints. Thus, Mezirow writes that transformative learning is

learning that transforms problematic frames of reference — sets of fixed assumptions and expectations (habits of mind, meaning perspectives, mindsets) — to make them more inclusive, discriminating, open . . . and emotionally able to change.¹⁰

Continuing, he defines these frames of reference in the following way. They are simply "[t]aken-for-granted" and include a range of phenomena, such as "fixed interpersonal relationships, political orientations, cultural bias, ideologies, schemata, stereotyped attitudes and practices, occupational habits of mind, religious doctrine, [and] moral-ethical norms . . ."¹¹

For Mezirow, it is the fixed nature of frames of reference that singles them out as problematic. To change them for the better, Mezirow insists that they must be subject to criticism — specifically a "rational process of critically assessing one's epistemic assumptions."¹² The chief way to do this, he claims, is a form of dialogue known as "critical-dialectical discourse" which elevates transformative learning into "emancipatory learning"¹³ — learning that frees a person from their former, and current, chains.

In sum, transformative learning has three parts. (1) It assumes that students come to the classroom with *problematic frames of reference*. (2) It asks students to critically reflect upon their assumptions and to change them through *critical-dialectical discourse*. And thus, (3) it aims to *transform* students' frames of reference.

Transformation into What? How?

If we were to take a bird's-eye view, we would be enamored with the general aspirations of transformative learning. Again, who would not want to be changed for the better, to be more critical and open-minded? But the devil is in the details. And in each part of Mezirow's theory, there are important features to interrogate. In this section, I raise two sets of moral objections, relying not on theological arguments but on the assumptions and internal inconsistencies of transformative learning itself. Before doing so, however, allow me to briefly elaborate upon the theory's central feature: critical-dialectical discourse.

Inspired by the political philosophy of Jürgen Habermas, Mezirow defines critical-dialectical discourse as "a form of dialogue in which the validity of ideas is seen as hypothetical and is explicitly addressed as problematic."¹⁴ Mezirow writes:

⁸ JACK MEZIROW, EDUCATION FOR PERSPECTIVE TRANSFORMATION: WOMEN'S RE-ENTRY PROGRAMS IN COMMUNITY COLLEGES (1978).

⁹ Kitchenham, *supra* note 3 at 105.

¹⁰ Jack Mezirow, *Transformative Learning as Discourse*, 1 J. TRANSFORM. EDUC. 58, 58 (2003).

¹¹ *Id.* at 59.

¹² John M. Dirkx, Jack Mezirow & Patricia Cranton, *Musings and Reflections on the Meaning, Context, and Process of Transformative Learning: A Dialogue Between John M. Dirkx and Jack Mezirow*, 4 J. TRANSFORM. EDUC. 123, 133 (2006).

¹³ Mezirow, *supra* note 10 at 60–61.

¹⁴ Jack Mezirow, *Concept and Action in Adult Education*, 35 ADULT EDUC. Q. AM. ASSOC. ADULT CONTIN. EDUC. 142, 143 (1985).

In discourse, we suspend our *a priori* judgment about the value of an idea and let the weight of evidence . . . establish or negate its validity. . . [I]t is a consensus among participants . . . that determines validity.¹⁵

Discourse thus understood has a certain liberal appeal: no idea is inherently better than the other, and validity is reached through a consensus among equals. Indeed, Mezirow himself associates transformative learning with democratic participation. Both, he claims, are “an important means of self-development . . . producing individuals who are more tolerant of difference, sensitive to reciprocity, [and] better able to engage in moral discourse.”¹⁶

Here, too, the general aspirations are to be admired, especially in the context of legal education. But insofar as transformative learning goes all the way down, affecting student identities, we should remain skeptical. In fact, the more one examines Mezirow’s theory, the more its liberal aspirations collapse into illiberal mandates.¹⁷

Critical-dialectical Discourse Is Illiberal

First, consider transformative learning’s central feature, critical-dialectical discourse, which, as just noted, aims to arrive at a (moral) consensus among participants.¹⁸ This aspiration is as unrealistic as it is illiberal.

To start, it is highly unlikely that all students (i.e., dialogue partners) will enter critical discourse having truly suspended their *a priori* judgements — including their own values. As David Hume says, and as Jonathan Haidt empirically confirms, “[moral] reason is . . . the slave of the passions.”¹⁹

Furthermore, in an ethically pluralist student body, some or even many dialogue partners may embrace moral systems that rub against the radical liberal ethos of transformative learning. For instance, some students may espouse community-based ethics that consider interpersonal relationships, not individual autonomy, to be morally paramount. Such relationships hold communities together: their functional effectiveness relies upon fixed perspectives (traditions, mores, conventions, etc.) that community members view as authoritative.

While such perspectives can and do develop over time, and while certain perspectives probably ought to morally change, critical-dialectical discourse seems to wish upon them a state of permanent instability. This would undermine their functional effectiveness. From a communal ethic, such undermining can destroy associations themselves. From a liberal ethic, it can harm the associating individuals in turn. In this sense, then, critical-dialectical discourse tends toward the illiberal: its ideal involves a flattening of substantive moral perspectives — including those espoused by diverse groups — for the sake of consensus.

Indeed, transformative learning’s notion of consensus *is* illiberal. Mezirow claims that the use of evidence in discourse “would lead *any* rational, objective and informed judge to come to the *same* conclusion.”²⁰ This is an astonishing claim that deserves two rejoinders. First, for the sake of argument, assume that Mezirow’s judge endorses a Rawlsian form of rationality, a type of public reason that adjudicates by “political values alone,” not by deeply held convictions or “comprehensive doctrine[s].”²¹ In a “veil of ignorance” scenario, critical-dialectical discourse could result in a shared conclusion — concerning treatment of the least well-off in society, for instance.²² However, in actual fact, unbridled passions and private interests would likely chip away at that idealized consensus.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ Mezirow, *supra* note 10 at 62.

¹⁷ A similar complaint is made regarding transformative learning and consent in Douglas W. Yacek, *Should Education Be Transformative?*, 49 J. MORAL EDUC. 257 (2020).

¹⁸ Transformative learning also addresses non-moral phenomena such as scientific theorems. However, given Mezirow’s emphasis upon personal transformation, I stress the theory’s moral aims.

¹⁹ DAVID HUME, *A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE* II.3.3 415 (David F. Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2006); JONATHAN HAIDT, *THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION* 29 (2013).

²⁰ Mezirow, *supra* note 14 at 143 (emphasis mine).

²¹ John Rawls, *The Idea of Public Reason Revisited*, in *THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH “THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REVISITED”* 129, 164 (1999).

²² JOHN RAWLS, *JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT* 15 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).

Following this, a second and more important criticism emerges: critical-dialectical discourse is stricter than Rawls's public reason in an important sense. It demands liberal consensus with respect to *personal* views and thus infiltrates private life. By contrast, public reason (in theory) is only concerned with *public* views (dealing with "constitutional essentials") and so is far less personally threatening than transformative learning.²³ This asymmetry is inappropriate for a theory that is held out to be "the other side of the coin" of democratic participation.²⁴

Finally, consider the procedural nature of critical-dialectical discourse. In modern democracies, proceduralism entails the rule of law which helps ensure fair processes and equal access to justice.²⁵ Critical-dialectical discourse offers a procedure for consensus-making and so falls within a proceduralist ideal. Yet, insofar as that procedure disparages only certain perspectives, critical-dialectical discourse is not the liberal tool that Mezirow considers it to be.

Indeed, critical-dialectical discourse treats certain perspectives unequally in the first instance. As Mezirow claims:

not all frames of reference are equal; some are more useful in dealing with diverse or changing circumstances . . . Generally speaking, frames of reference that are more inclusive, differentiating, open to other perspectives, [and] critically self-reflective . . . are better able to deal with a wider range of decision-making.²⁶

Normatively loaded, critical-dialectical discourse is biased from the start. What grounds are there for students to trust it?

Transformative Learning Lacks Moral Coherence

Perhaps students would place more trust in transformative learning if they could understand, and critically engage with, the details of its underlying moral theory. Unfortunately, this is a difficult task. For it seems that transformative learning is animated by theories that are incompatible with each other. Indeed, it could be utilitarian, pragmatic, (il)liberal, or (surprisingly) of an ethically naturalist hue.

Consider a utilitarian characterization. Would transformative learning attract the Benthamites among us — students who see legal education as a means to, say, high salaries? Mezirow might think so. After all, transformative learning values frames of reference that are "useful" for "diverse or changing circumstances."²⁷ Today's legal market is certainly changing.

Yet Mezirow elsewhere suggests that transformative learning is pragmatic, perhaps in a Deweyan way. In particular, he says that critical-dialectical discourse is "simply . . . found to work *better* in more circumstances than . . . other options."²⁸ But better for what? Like most pragmatists, Mezirow (mostly) refrains from offering fixed ethical guidance: in a certain sense, anything goes.

However, if transformative learning is to really motivate (and if the "transformative" rhetoric of law schools is to be more than hot air), then it would do well to adopt an inspiring moral purpose. Of course, to do this, transformative learning must be *for* a specific thing. Most schools might say that transformation is for justice. This is appropriate and sensible. But Mezirow would say that transformative learning is for the formation of a certain type of student, one with no "fixed" normative commitments. Here, again, we verge into the illiberalism as discussed above.

All that said, another — and surprisingly plausible — characterization is available: transformative learning could be aligned with a form of ethical naturalism. (Maybe, then, a school's natural lawyers would be keen to support it.)

Elaborating on critical-dialectical discourse, Mezirow claims that its procedure is "predicated upon universal principles" that relate to the operation of reason itself.²⁹ Such principles include judgment,

²³ Rawls, *supra* note 21 at 168.

²⁴ Mezirow, *supra* note 10 at 62.

²⁵ LON FULLER, *THE MORALITY OF LAW* 153 (rev. ed. 1969).

²⁶ Jack Mezirow, *Beyond Freire and Habermas: Confusion. A Response to Bruce Pietrykowski*, 46 ADULT EDUC. Q. AM. ASSOC. ADULT CONTIN. EDUC. 237, 238 (1996).

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ Jack Mezirow, *On Critical Reflection*, 48 ADULT EDUC. Q. AM. ASSOC. ADULT CONTIN. EDUC. 185, 188 (1998) (emphasis mine).

²⁹ *Id.*

meanings, and validations. And they, Mezirow claims, explain shared values across space and time. “Some . . . validations are universal in scope,” he writes, “. . . This is why quite different cultural traditions share many of the same values — like life, health, children, kinship, love . . . — while often making different interpretations of how to apply them.”³⁰

Mezirow may not equate these values with “eternal verities” (indeed, he rejects “an order of reality that transcends the empirical world”), but his comments seem to endorse a form of ethical naturalism.³¹ Would he claim that these values should inform moral reasoning? Would he thus find moral wisdom outside of a consensus-seeking procedure? If so, then transformative learning may not be so aggressively positivist as one might think.

With this possibility in hand, let us leave Mezirow’s fuddled ideas behind. Perhaps we can make better moral sense of transformative learning by looking elsewhere.

A Theological Reconstruction

Thus far, I have argued that transformative learning is problematic due to its illiberal tendencies and moral incoherence. I raised these points by attending to its own assumptions and internal inconsistencies; and, notably, no theological critique was needed. At this point, however, we would do well to turn our criticism into positive construction, converting the weakness of transformative learning into its strength. Wisdom from the Christian tradition can help.

In this section, then, I provide an alternative construction of Mezirow’s theory. I retain its three parts — pertaining to frames of reference, critical-dialectical discourse, and transformation — but recast them using Christian ethical intelligence. It is this intelligence that helps us appreciate what a genuine and ethically appropriate form of transformation might look like. As I suggest below, true transformation entails a caring and patient cultivation of student character.

Recognizing the Good in Different Viewpoints

Recall the first part of Mezirow’s theory: it assumes that students come to the classroom with a *problematic* frame of reference. Recall, too, that it immediately views some frames of reference as more problematic than others. Behind this judgement, I proposed, is a restrictive notion of rationality, one that too readily discounts “fixed” beliefs and commitments.

How might a Christian perspective respond? To start, we turn to reason as conceived within the Christian tradition. In some of its most influential strands, the tradition treats human reason more generously than Mezirow’s implicit account. For instance, with Saint Augustine, tradition holds that reason always reaches out to the good: even if a desired end is ultimately morally questionable, reason finds in it a semblance of goodness.³² This point is adopted by Saint Thomas Aquinas, as well, who notes that conscience — even when it errs — responds to the goodness that is rationally perceived.³³ In other words, a Christian account of reason is positive and affirming in the first instance: everyone pursues good; there are (good) reasons for their actions and beliefs.³⁴

This is all very well, one might say. But a critic would point to the moral judgements that Christian reasoning would eventually make. Such judgements, the critic would stress, can be equally dogmatic and ready to condemn. This rejoinder, however, misses the point. At issue here is the *immediacy* with which reason reaches its moral conclusions. Reason within Mezirow’s paradigm judges immediately, based on tenuous notions of fixedness or utility. Christian reason, on the other hand, recognizes (perceived) good(s) from the very beginning; and only later, through *informed* deliberation, does it sift the wheat from the chaff and thus terminate in moral conclusions.³⁵

³⁰ Mezirow, *supra* note 26 at 237.

³¹ Mezirow, *supra* note 28 at 188.

³² SAINT AUGUSTINE, *THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS* (R. W. Dyson tran., 1998), bk. XIX, ch. 1.

³³ THOMAS AQUINAS, *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE* (English Dominicans ed., 1964), pt. I, q. 79, art. 13.

³⁴ See, e.g., OLIVER O’DONOVAN, *RESURRECTION AND MORAL ORDER: AN OUTLINE FOR EVANGELICAL ETHICS* (2nd ed. 1994); G. E. M. Anscombe, *Modern Moral Philosophy*, in *HUMAN LIFE, ACTION AND ETHICS: ESSAYS* 176 (Mary Geach & Luke Gormally eds., 2005).

³⁵ AQUINAS, *supra* note 33. For a distinction between moral judgement, which is made immediately and emotionally, and moral reasoning, which requires deliberate thought, see HAIDI, *supra* note 19 at 47.

I address *what* may inform Christian moral reasoning immediately below. But first, let us replace Mezirow's notion of rationality with our Christian alternative. Now, transformative learning — in its first part — no longer considers student perspectives to be initially problematic. Instead, it accepts students' frames of reference as immediately "valid," as aiming toward intelligible goods. While those frames may eventually require moral adjustment, our renewed first part remains open to the goods and reasons pursued.

Embracing Community Membership

The second part of Mezirow's theory asks students to reflect upon their assumptions and to change them through the exacting norms of critical-dialectical discourse. One of the troubles with this demand is its assumption that the human person is little more than a transcendental "I." Never fully attached to prior moral convictions, this "I," as Hauerwas might say, is "impersonal" and "free from [a given] history."³⁶ It is infinitely malleable through choice.

This post-Kantian characterization is problematic for reasons relating to moral identity and formation. One way to debunk it is to use empirical data that underscore the contextualized (including habitual) aspects of human nature. For instance, moral psychologists affirm that humans form deeply engrained habits early in life and within particular communities.³⁷ It is difficult to change them and can even be dangerous to do so.³⁸

Complementing the psychological, we look to Christian insights that speak to our nature as storied, or "historied," beings. Hauerwas reminds us that human existence is, in fact, "historically determined," such that "our moralities are [inescapably] historical."³⁹ David Fergusson, too, notes that ethical commitments "*must* be borne by a community in which historical examples are remembered and interpreted in the light of new circumstances."⁴⁰

Christian thinking, then, both recognizes the givenness of our communal existence and affirms this as something good. For that groupish nature is the foundation upon which our personal histories — i.e., our moral character — is built. And, indeed, God builds through the words of the church, through "a very definite story with [morally] determinative content," says Hauerwas.⁴¹ This is the church's story of Christ: through it, we "see the world rightly."⁴²

Is moral formation confined to the church alone? By no means. Any community in which excellence is practiced can positively shape our habits of mind.⁴³ And so, even if we acknowledge the church as the most complete moral community, we can still affirm the moral contributions of virtuous community life — no matter its concrete manifestations.

A Christian perspective thus takes umbrage with Mezirow's transcendental "I," the person psychologically unmoored from prior convictions. In its place, a renewed vision of transformative learning would embrace (fixed) communal narratives for their normative value. It would encourage students to embrace those narratives and to be open to learning from new ones. No mandate of perpetual change is required. The contextualized "I" has permission to be and to grow.

Cultivating Character

The final part of Mezirow's theory is its intended end: the transformation of students' frames of reference. Based on our discussion above, a Christian re-interpretation could read as follows: the end of transformative learning is a *transformation in moral vision*, one that results (in part) from an

³⁶ HAUERWAS, *supra* note 6 at 39.

³⁷ See, e.g., B. R. Andrews, *Habit*, 14 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 121, 144 (1903). A similar point is made in ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. I, chs. 7–9 (W. D. Ross tran., new ed. 2009).

³⁸ HAIDT, *supra* note 19 at 59; Yacek, *supra* note 17.

³⁹ HAUERWAS, *supra* note 6 at 29.

⁴⁰ DAVID FERGUSSON, COMMUNITY, LIBERALISM AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 53 (1998) (emphasis mine).

⁴¹ HAUERWAS, *supra* note 6 at 30.

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (3rd ed. 2007).

acknowledgement of the goodness sought in students' frames of reference, and from an appreciation of the communal narratives that may inform those views.⁴⁴

On this construction, transformation is a complex, moral phenomenon. It entails an interaction between right moral reason and a patiently cultivated moral character (the former flows from the latter, while the latter is shaped by the former).⁴⁵ It requires individual agency and communities of excellence (virtue cannot be forced into an individual, but it requires communal support).⁴⁶ And, importantly, it can be imagined in plural ways (different stories, reaching toward different goods, can be lived together, in the same time and place).⁴⁷

Education that strives for *this* type of transformation may rightly be called liberal. And educators who aim towards it do so with a certain humility: they are open to student perspectives; they encourage critical discourse; and they ensure the scales are not tipped against certain individuals and communities. These efforts engender trust in the procedures and aims of transformative learning.

Conclusion

If legal education is to be transformative, then it should be transformative in a Christian sense. At its bare minimum, this requires neither an institutional display of Christian credentials nor a formal association with a church. Instead, it requires Christian insight, with an openness to reason and an appreciation of diverse communal narratives, including religious stories. Stories in particular are to be valued — for they not only inspire us to become better, but they also constitute our very selves. Thus, Christian character lies at the heart of genuine transformation.

⁴⁴ For similar ideas, see STANLEY HAUERWAS, *VISION AND VIRTUE: ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICAL REFLECTION* (1981); STANLEY HAUERWAS, *CHARACTER AND THE CHRISTIAN LIFE: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS* (1st ed. 1985).

⁴⁵ See discussion of self-determining action in JOHN FINNIS, *AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY* 23 (1998). Consider, as well, the relation between virtue and practical reasoning in ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, *DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES* 92 (1999). For a critical survey of theories of virtue in relation to reason, see Martha C. Nussbaum, *Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?*, 3 *J. ETHICS* 163 (1999).

⁴⁶ For a discussion of virtue and force, see LISA TESSMAN, *BURDENED VIRTUES: VIRTUE ETHICS FOR LIBERATORY STRUGGLES* (2005), ch. 5. See, as well, MacIntyre's developing thoughts around virtue and community in MACINTYRE, *supra* note 43; ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, *WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?* (1988); MACINTYRE, *supra* note 45.

⁴⁷ One should not be naïve about this. Tensions can and will arise. For a Christian approach to the “tense communion” that features in social life today, see Joshua Hordern, *Loyalty, Conscience and Tense Communion: Jonathan Edwards Meets Martha Nussbaum*, 27 *STUD. CHRIST. ETHICS* 167 (2014).