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Truthful approximations to range voting

Abstract:

We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization under general cardinal preferences on a finite number of alternatives and without money. The well-known range voting scheme can be thought of as a non-truthful mechanism for exact social welfare maximization in this setting. With m being the number of alternatives, we exhibit a randomized truthful-in-expectation ordinal mechanism with approximation ratio Ω(...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_13

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Computer Science
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer Verlag (Germany) Publisher's website
Series:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publication date:
2014-01-01
DOI:
EISBN:
9783319131290
EISSN:
1611-3349
ISSN:
0302-9743
Pubs id:
pubs:578435
URN:
uri:695543d2-d6d1-4ded-a240-84f29c2e6734
UUID:
uuid:695543d2-d6d1-4ded-a240-84f29c2e6734
Local pid:
pubs:578435
ISBN:
9783319131283
Keywords:

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