- Abstract:
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We consider the fundamental mechanism design problem of approximate social welfare maximization under general cardinal preferences on a finite number of alternatives and without money. The well-known range voting scheme can be thought of as a non-truthful mechanism for exact social welfare maximization in this setting. With m being the number of alternatives, we exhibit a randomized truthful-in-expectation ordinal mechanism with approximation ratio Ω(...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Version:
- Accepted manuscript
- Files:
-
-
(pdf, 272.7KB)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_13
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- Publisher:
- Springer Verlag (Germany) Publisher's website
- Series:
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publication date:
- 2014-01-01
- DOI:
- EISBN:
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9783319131290
- EISSN:
-
1611-3349
- ISSN:
-
0302-9743
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:578435
- URN:
-
uri:695543d2-d6d1-4ded-a240-84f29c2e6734
- UUID:
-
uuid:695543d2-d6d1-4ded-a240-84f29c2e6734
- Local pid:
- pubs:578435
- ISBN:
- 9783319131283
- Keywords:
- Copyright holder:
- Springer
- Copyright date:
- 2014
- Notes:
-
This is the author accepted manuscript following peer review version of the article. The final version is
available online from Springer at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_13
Conference item
Truthful approximations to range voting
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