Citizen Wellbeing in Hybrid Regimes



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for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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Abbreviations

AFP	Australian Federal Police
ALTA	*Agricultural Land and Tenants Act 1978*
ANC	All Nationals Congress
AP	Alliance Party
AusAID	Australian Aid for International Development
BLV	*Bose Levu Vakaturaga* – Great Council of Chiefs
CAMV	Conservative Alliance-*Matanitu Vanua*
CLI	Civil Liberties Index
COG	Commonwealth Observer Group
CRWU	Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit
CSN	Civil Society Network
CSO	Civil society organisation
CWMH	Colonial War Memorial Hospital
EMB	Electoral management body
FAP	Fijian Association Party
FHMRP	Fiji Health Management Reform Project
FLP	Fiji Labour Party
FMA	Fiji Medical Association
FNA	Fiji Nurses Association
FTA	Fijian Teachers' Association
FTU	Fiji Teachers Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GPI	Gender Parity Index
GVP	General Voters Party
HDI	Human Development Index
HOG	Head of government
HOS	Head of state
HR	Hybrid regime
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IFM	Isatabu Freedom Movement
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEF	Malaita Eagle Force
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MP	Member of Parliament
MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NFP	National Federation Party
NLTB	Native Lands Trust Board
NVTLP	Nationalist *Vanua Tako Lavo* Party
NZ	New Zealand
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS	Ordinary least squares
PANU	Party of National Unity

PAP	People's Alliance Party
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
PCSE	Panel-corrected standard errors
PIF	Pacific Islands Forum
PINA	Pacific Islands News Association
PPIA	*Political Parties Integrity Act 2014*
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands
RFMF	Republic of Fiji Military Forces, formerly Royal Fiji Military Forces
RIC	Rotuman Islands Council
RNZ	Radio New Zealand
RNZI	Radio New Zealand International
RSIPF	Royal Solomon Islands Police Force
RTU	Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill
SDL	*Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua* – United Fiji Party
SE	Standard error
SIAC	Solomon Islands Alliance for Change
SIBC	Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation
SICA	Solomon Islands Christian Association
SIDP	Solomon Islands Democratic Party
SIDT	Solomon Islands Development Trust
SIG	Solomon Islands government
SINUW	Solomon Islands National Union of Workers
SVT	*Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei* – Fijian Political Party
TPA	Townsville Peace Agreement
TSCS	Time series cross-section
TSI	Transparency Solomon Islands
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UDP	United Democratic Party
UGP	United General Party
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States
USP	University of the South Pacific
VAT	Value added tax
V-Dem	Varieties of Democracy
VLV	*Veitokani ni Leweni Vanua Vakaristo* – Christian Democratic Alliance Party
WDI	World Development Indicators
WHO	World Health Organisation

Abstract

Citizen Wellbeing in Hybrid Regimes

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The post-Cold War triumphalism regarding the spread of democracy has faded. Hybrid regimes (HRs), which combine democratic and autocratic institutions, are now the most common type of political arrangement in the developing world. Despite this, there is little agreement in the literature about how HRs should be defined, and a comprehensive typology of HR subtypes is yet to emerge. Concerningly, we also know very little about the socioeconomic consequences of political hybridity. These problems are interrelated: the lack of a shared lexicon has inhibited the execution of comparative analysis among HR subtypes, and the development of subtype-specific bodies of knowledge. Therefore, I put forward a new HR typology and use this to conduct mixed methods analysis into the effects of political hybridity on citizen wellbeing. This combines statistical analysis of the relationships between HR subtypes and four outcome areas (health, education, living standards, and gender equality) with qualitative case study research on Fiji and Solomon Islands. Key findings include that more competitive elections do not necessarily improve citizen wellbeing; that wellbeing is often highest in HRs where the executive is held accountable by other institutions; and that the effects of political regime type on wellbeing are conditioned by dynamic interactions between formal and informal institutions.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Rationale & Research Questions

The post-Cold War triumphalism regarding the spread of liberal democracy has faded. Samuel Huntington's (1991) 'third wave of democratisation' petered out, and Francis Fukuyama's (1992) 'end of history' failed to materialise. In many political systems, democratic institutions mesh with authoritarian tendencies (Obuch 2014, 3), and it is now widely accepted that these countries are not necessarily transitioning towards democracy (Cassani 2014, 543; see also Geddes 1999; Linz 2000; Carothers 2002). They are 'hybrid regimes' (HRs), occupying the 'grey zone' between democracy and autocracy,[1] and they are now the most common political arrangement in the developing world (Carothers 2002, 9, 18; Levitsky and Way 2010, 3). However, a diverse range of countries falls within the HR category. For example, in some HRs a strong party retains power by manipulating the electoral playing field; in others, the state restricts the population's civil and political rights; or it may be that the government is beholden to a non-elected actor such as the military. This heterogeneity has created a great deal of definitional confusion, resulting in "a failure to produce cumulative knowledge" in the field (Cassani 2014, 543).

There is no existing classificatory scheme that clearly defines the HR *genus* and comprehensively differentiates between its *species* (Morlino 2009, 276). Countries in the grey zone have been described as 'semi-consolidated democracies' (Freedom House 2015a), 'partial democracies' (Epstein *et al* 2006), 'illiberal democracies' (Zakaria 1997), 'defective democracies' (Merkel and Croissant 2004), 'competitive authoritarian' states (Levitsky and Way 2010), 'semi-authoritarian' states (Ottaway 2002), 'democratically disguised

[1] Following the Polity IV Project, I prefer 'autocracy' to the more loaded term 'authoritarian'. According to Polity, the defining feature of autocracies are that they "sharply restrict or suppress competitive political participation… chief executives are chosen in a regularized process of selection within the political elite, and once in office they exercise power with few institutional constraints" (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016, 15).

dictatorships' (Brooker 2014, chap. 9), 'electoral authoritarian' states (Schedler 2013), and more. As this range of terms suggests, there is still much debate over whether HRs should be conceived as foundationally democratic, authoritarian, or somewhere in between. The consequent absence of a shared lexicon has prevented the development of species-specific bodies of knowledge and the execution of comparative analysis among different types of HR.

An important example of this is the lack of research into how the various distinctive forms of politics evident in HRs affect the wellbeing of citizens living in these countries (Snyder 2006, 220). We know very little about how the interplay of democratic and autocratic tendencies affects a country's socioeconomic outcomes. Do some types of HR exhibit better outcomes than others? If so, why might this be the case? Moreover, because existing theories about the causal mechanisms linking political regime type and citizen wellbeing were developed with reference to democracy and autocracy, it is unclear whether these theories can help to explain outcomes in the hybrid context. The lack of research on the relationship between political hybridity and citizen wellbeing has practical implications. To effectively address issues in areas such as health and education, the design and implementation of development programmes needs to be underpinned by an understanding of the functional logic that characterises a country's political system, and how this logic affects its socioeconomic outcomes.

In this dissertation, I address the lack of a comprehensive HR typology and the absence of comparative research on variations in development outcomes across different types of HR. My work is structured around two primary research questions, with the second divided into two sub-questions:

1. 'How should hybrid regime subtypes be categorised?'; and
2. 'What is the relationship between political regime hybridity and citizen wellbeing?'

a. 'Are specific hybrid regime characteristics associated with different levels of citizen wellbeing?'
b. 'Are distinct hybrid regime subtypes associated with different levels of citizen wellbeing?'

The sub-questions are used to explore whether the various component parts of HRs affect citizen wellbeing in isolation, and whether the ways that these components combine to form HR subtypes significantly affects citizen wellbeing. I use 'citizen wellbeing' as an overarching term that encompasses four key areas – health, education, living standards, and gender equality – that combine to provide a holistic overview of the impact that political hybridity has on people's daily lives.[2]

Methods & Findings

To answer my research questions, this thesis is divided into two major components. The first is a multidimensional HR typology rooted in contemporary theory. Typologies are important because although they never perfectly reflect reality, they provide a structure that facilitates the comprehension and communication of complex concepts (Geddes 2003, 50; see also Morlino 2009, 289), and allow us to link those concepts to empirical outcomes (D. Collier and Levitsky 1997, 432). My typology clearly differentiates the HR genus from democracies and autocracies and delineates a set of 11 mutually exclusive HR species (or subtypes). The three dimensions used to categorise HR subtypes are derived from the 'expanded procedural minimum' definition of democracy, which has achieved something approaching consensus in the literature (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5–6). The 'Elections' dimension is concerned with pre-electoral manipulation and the fair execution of polling. The 'Political Freedoms'

[2] My approach to wellbeing and its differences to related concepts such as happiness and human development are explained in Chapter Four.

dimension encompasses the freedoms of information and discussion, academic and cultural freedom, and the ability of individuals to form associations such as political parties and civil society organisations (CSOs). The 'Effective Power' dimension assesses whether the actions of the elected government are restricted by non-democratic actors, and whether the executive routinely overrides institutionalised checks on its power. The typology is operationalised[3] using data from Version 7 of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, which includes 350 indicators covering 177 countries from 1900 to 2017.

The second component of this thesis is a mixed nested analysis of the links between various aspects of political hybridity and citizen wellbeing. Mixed nested analysis combines quantitative and qualitative research "to overcome potential sources of bias and to sort out spurious findings" that could result if either method was used in isolation (Lieberman 2005, 450). To frame my quantitative work, I created five hypotheses regarding the effects of political hybridity on citizen wellbeing:

1. Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes with fair elections.
2. Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes with high political freedoms.
3.
    a. Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes where the power of the executive is unrestricted.
    b. Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes where the executive is accountable.
4. Citizen wellbeing is highest in 'Soft' hybrids and lowest in 'Hard' hybrids.
5. Different hybrid regime subtypes have different levels of citizen wellbeing.

The first three hypotheses test theories of how various democratic and autocratic institutions help to improve citizen wellbeing.[4] The fourth hypothesis takes the idea that 'more democratic' political regimes have higher levels of human development (Wullert and Williamson 2016, 1058), and adapts it to the hybrid context using a 'partially-ordered scale'[5]

[3] This is the process of disaggregating each dimension into measurable indicators (Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 2005, 951).
[4] These theories are explored in Chapter Two.
[5] The 11 subtypes are divided into three categories, ordered from most to least democratic: Soft, Intermediate, and Hard. See Chapter Three.

of HR subtypes. The final hypothesis tests the idea that the overall character of political hybridity affects citizen wellbeing. The dependent variable is proxied by 12 quantifiable indicators, divided into four themes: health, education, living standards, and gender.[6]

My quantitative analysis demonstrates that the effects of political regime hybridity are not consistent across the four wellbeing themes, or even for all indicators within each theme. These mixed results demonstrate that using only one or two outcome variables to assess the overall effects of political regime type on people's lives – which is the approach that most studies take – is likely to produce inaccurate results (Kramon and Posner 2013). Political regimes are complex phenomena, and their various constituent parts may pull socioeconomic outcomes in different directions – particularly in HRs, where institutions do not necessarily function in the same ways as in democracies or autocracies. Therefore, to gain a holistic understanding of how different types of political regime affect wellbeing it is vital to use a wide range of outcome variables.

Despite the mixed results, some broad patterns emerge. Most importantly, I find strong evidence that different types of HR have varying levels of wellbeing. With the notable exception of outcomes in the education sector, more democratic HR subtypes generally have higher levels of wellbeing. Moreover, HRs where the executive is held accountable by the judiciary and legislature often have better wellbeing outcomes. Surprisingly, there is little variation between HRs with fair elections and those with minimally competitive elections, which calls into question the literature's heavy focus on electoral politics in HRs. Overall, the variations in performance across different types of HR suggest that more in-depth comparative statistical analysis is warranted in the future.

[6] I also use HDI score as a supplementary dependent variable, because it is a well-known and widely available composite indicator of wellbeing.

For the qualitative element of my mixed nested analysis, I conducted case study research on Fiji (1993-2006) and Solomon Islands (2001-15). I used these countries for a combination of 'model-testing' and 'model-building' small-N analysis (Lieberman 2005, 442–43), allowing me to investigate potential explanations for the mixed nature of my quantitative results. Over the course of nine weeks fieldwork,[7] I completed 33 semi-structured interviews with former government ministers, senior bureaucrats, trade unionists, and leading civil society figures. Interviews were supplemented with analysis of newspaper articles, policy documents, government speeches, and academic literature. The result was a wide-ranging set of observations on topics including the role of health and education issues in political discourse in both countries, the effects of militarisation on wellbeing in Fiji, and the impact of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) on socioeconomic outcomes.[8]

Qualitative data from case studies was integral to the theory-building element of my research. It became clear that in Fiji and Solomon Islands, wellbeing outcomes were only partially determined by formal institutional structures. Although both case study countries experienced changes in HR subtype during the periods I analysed, these shifts often had limited impact on trends exhibited by wellbeing outcomes. Interview data made it clear that this was due to continuity in key informal institutions – defined as "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727) – and social norms. Formal institutions combine with informal institutions and norms to constitute the broader political governance system[9] that ultimately shapes wellbeing outcomes.[10] In the case study countries,

[7] Supplemented by 10 weeks fieldwork conducted for my MPhil in 2015.
[8] RAMSI was a multilateral intervention that ran from 2003 to 2017. It was initially deployed to end ethnic conflict in Solomon Islands, and then transitioned into a peacebuilding and statebuilding role.
[9] Following Thomas Risse (2012, 7), I use governance to mean "the various institutionalized modes of social coordination [that] produce and implement collectively binding rules, or… provide collective goods".
[10] It is important to recognise that despite the prevalence of normative judgements in the literature (Christiansen and Neuhold 2012, 6), informal governance may have positive or negative outcomes.

informal institutions and norms influenced wellbeing in a variety of important ways. For example, in Fiji racialised voting patterns meant that elections did not provide vertical accountability; and in Solomon Islands, clientelism negatively affected wellbeing outcomes by inhibiting public service provision.

The role of interactions between formal and informal institutions and norms helps to explain the mixed results produced by my statistical analysis. The patterns which emerged suggest that the formal institutions which comprise most of my HR typology do exert a degree of influence over wellbeing outcomes. However, during my qualitative research I observed that informal institutions play an important role in either amplifying or confounding these impacts. This can be conceptualised using language adapted from the work of Hans-Joachim Lauth (2015, 60) and Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky (2004, 728–29). Where formal and informal institutions and norms are complementary, the latter will tend to reinforce the impact of the former on wellbeing outcomes. Where formal and informal institutions and norms work at cross-purposes, the impact on wellbeing outcomes will be dampened. In both cases, the overall effect is conditioned by the relative strength of each type of institution. The dynamics of these interactions are difficult to predict through broad, comparative statistical analysis for two reasons: first, they are highly context-specific; and second, informal institutions and norms are almost impossible to incorporate into typologies because they are very difficult to quantify (Lauth 2015, 60).[11]

I found the formal/informal institutions framework to be more useful than Joel Migdal's (1988, 2010) 'state-in-society' approach. Migdal's characterisation of 'weak states' as those in which 'state leaders' are unable to impose their desired rules on a society dominated by local 'strongmen' creates an unhelpful binary. There is a significant overlap between these two

[11] This is particularly relevant to HRs because the autocratic elements of a regime are often not formally codified (Way 2005, 134).

categories, particularly in Melanesia, with strongmen often becoming state leaders and using state institutions for their own ends. Thus, a state that is 'weak' in the Western sense of having limited ability to enforce formal institutions may have strong foundations in informal governance systems. Nevertheless, Migdal's work has been productively used by several scholars to examine the entwinement of state and society in the Pacific,[12] and these contributions are referenced throughout the case study chapters.

The overarching theoretical lesson to emerge from my mixed nested analysis is that to fully understand wellbeing outcomes in HRs, it is important to unite research into broad statistical patterns and in-depth case studies. While the former provides insight into global trends, the latter reveals context-specific informal processes that may subvert expectations derived from quantitative analysis. Relying solely on one of these research methods could lead to misleading conclusions: using only case studies blinds the researcher to similarities across regime types at the global level; while purely statistical work is likely to overlook informal institutions and thus risks "missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underlie political behaviour" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 725). In non-democratic contexts these potential issues are exacerbated because "political realities impose serious constraints upon researchers' ability to collect data in a systematic and comparable fashion" (Goode 2010, 1066). This increases the importance of mixed methods research because the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches serves as a form of 'methodological triangulation' (Goode 2010, 1069).

[12] See for example Dauvergne 1999; Larmour 2003; Kabutaulaka 2005.

Structure

Following this Introduction, my thesis is divided into eight chapters. In Chapter Two, I provide a review of the literature that deals with classifying HRs and summarise the various theories regarding how political regime type affects wellbeing. In Chapter Three, I argue that none of the extant HR classification systems is fit for purpose and set out my own typology. In Chapter Four, I define my hypotheses and my quantitative methodology, and in Chapter Five, I present the results of the statistical analysis and my interpretation of the patterns that emerge. Chapter Six outlines my qualitative methods, while Chapters Seven and Eight comprise the Fiji and Solomon Islands case studies. Finally, in Chapter Nine I provide a summary of my findings and highlight some potentials avenues for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The term 'hybrid regime' was first used in the mid-1990s to describe political systems featuring a combination of "elements of both authoritarianism and democracy" (Karl 1995, 73), and has since become a catchall for regimes in the grey zone between democracy and autocracy (Carothers 2002, 9). Although HRs are not new – as Larry Diamond (2002, 23) notes in his seminal article – they have proliferated in the post-Cold War era and consequently received significantly more academic attention. Although this includes an emerging body of classificatory work, no HR typology has yet achieved the status of orthodoxy. This is largely because much of the literature is rooted in an outdated binary paradigm that defines democracy and autocracy as either dichotomous categories or opposing poles on a continuum (D. Collier and Levitsky 1997). In the first half of this chapter, I argue that both approaches struggle to accommodate HRs, and that this has produced significant definitional confusion. I suggest that an alternative approach which treats HRs as a unique third type of political system offers a potential solution.

The fragmentation of the HR literature means that we know very little about the causal mechanisms through which political hybridity affects people's wellbeing. Therefore, in the second half of this chapter, I turn to the well-established literature on the links between democracy and autocracy and development, which provides insight into how the different parts of a political system might affect wellbeing outcomes. I also note the changing definitions of 'development' as a dependent variable, which underpin my decision to focus on citizen wellbeing. Finally, I summarise the small body of research on the socioeconomic consequences of hybridity.

What Are Hybrid Regimes?

The Dichotomous Approach


The first expression of the binary paradigm describes democracy and autocracy as 'bounded wholes' featuring their own unique functional logic (see for example Linz 2000; Przeworski 2000; Gandhi 2008). Built on the work of Giovanni Sartori (1970, 1991), this 'dichotomous' approach conceives democracy and autocracy as 'contradictions', which means that they are "mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive for all political regimes" and precludes the possibility of a third regime type (Gerschewski and Schmotz 2011, 13). For Sartori (1987, 184), it makes no sense to search for elements of democratic governance in an autocracy or vice versa because each regime type is qualitatively different.

Quantitative research adopting the dichotomous approach divides the explanatory variable into democracies and non-democracies by checking for the presence or absence of a set of specific characteristics. These are usually closely aligned with the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy, which has achieved relative consensus in the literature (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5–6). The expanded procedural minimum definition comprises several conditions that a political regime must fulfil to be considered a democracy: regular, genuinely competitive elections with full suffrage; effective protection for basic political rights, including freedoms of information, speech, and association; and a government that is not beholden to tutelary actors such as religious bodies, the military, or foreign powers (D. Collier and Levitsky 2009, 273). Dichotomous approaches are therefore able to effectively capture the multidimensionality of political regimes. However, the emergence of HRs has called into question the assumption that democracy and autocracy are Sartorian contradictions.

Within the dichotomous approach, HRs can be conceptualised as 'diminished' forms of democracy or autocracy, or as a true subtype of autocracy (Cassani 2014, 544). Creating

'diminished subtypes', which "display certain shortcomings that turn them into a lesser form of their respective root type" (Gerschewski and Schmotz 2011, 4), allows scholars to fit HRs within the democracy-autocracy binary (Figure 1). Diminished subtypes are constructed through the rigorous definition of "minimal conditions of their respective root types in order to define a clear threshold between intact and deficient regimes" (Gerschewski and Schmotz 2011, 15). The simplicity and expediency of this strategy explains the popularity of 'democracy with adjectives' in the 1990s and early 2000s (see for example Gasiorowski 1996; Zakaria 1997; Merkel 2004), and the later shift in focus to 'authoritarianism with adjectives' (see for example Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2006).

Figure 1: Applying the 'Diminished Subtypes' Approach



Although the use of diminished subtypes is intended to prevent 'concept stretching' (D. Collier and Levitsky 1997, 437–42), I argue that it perpetuates this problem. Consider Wolfgang Merkel's (2004) typology of 'defective democracies', which is constructed using five dimensions (which he calls 'partial regimes') that reflect the expanded procedural

minimum definition of democracy: elections; political liberties; civil rights; horizontal accountability; and effective power to govern. However, the only 'necessary' condition for democracy is electoral competitiveness. Defects in one of the other partial regimes result in the appendage of the appropriate adjective: for example, countries that restrict suffrage are designated as 'exclusive democracies' (Merkel 2004, 49). The first problem is that this effectively reduces democracy to its electoral dimension (Zinecker 2009, 306; Møller and Skaaning 2010, 267). The second problem is that Merkel's approach stretches the root concept by applying the term to regimes that violate its minimum requirements. This issue is common to all typologies that use diminished subtypes, and means that the root concept inevitably loses "connotative precision" (Sartori 1970, 57). This is encapsulated by the fact that democratic and autocratic diminished subtypes often have more in common with each other than they do with their respective root concepts.

Categorising HRs as a true autocratic subtype sacrifices analytical rigour for parsimony. This approach[13] obscures the qualitatively different ways that politics operates in contemporary HRs, compared to autocracies. As Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010, 27) argue, "the coexistence of meaningful democratic institutions and authoritarian incumbents creates distinctive opportunities and constraints for actors, which – in important areas of political life – generate *distinct patterns of political behaviour* [my italics]". At the structural level, Heidrun Zinecker (2009, 308–9) notes that the "democratic and nondemocratic components" operating within HRs will inevitably alter each other through their interaction, resulting in a new "fusion". An example of this is that unlike autocracies, governments in HRs cannot rely heavily on coercion to sustain political stability because they often need to maintain domestic and international legitimacy. This forces them to employ subtler methods of control (Desrues

[13] See Kailitz 2013; Brooker 2014; Cassani 2016.

2013; Mazepus *et al* 2016). Moreover, given the increasing predominance of HRs, it makes little sense to incorporate them into the broad category of autocracies.

In summary, the dichotomous approach is valuable because it draws attention to the multidimensional nature of political regimes, and the specific characteristics that define their functional logic. However, it has proved less able to deal with the rise of HRs: attempting to maintain the binary paradigm by defining HRs within the two traditional categories obscures their unique functional logic and leads to concept stretching.

The Graded Approach

A more common expression of the binary paradigm is the graded approach, in which democracy and autocracy are conceived as opposing poles on a continuum defined by a single variable or composite index. At its extreme, the graded approach implies a scale of "more or less 'democraticness' or 'autocraticness' that should not be interrupted by any categories or thresholds" (Gerschewski and Schmotz 2011, 13). However, to deal with HRs researchers use cutoffs to create intermediate categories between democracy and autocracy.[14] This is sometimes done using composite indices: Lisa Blaydes and Mark Kayser (2011, 897) define countries that score between four and 16 on a 20 point scale (derived from Polity IV) as HRs; Larry Diamond (2002, 26) uses Freedom House's index to divide states into six categories,[15] three of which are considered hybrids; and David Epstein *et al* (2006, 555) use the Polity IV index to categorise regimes as 'Autocracies', 'Partial Democracies', or '(Full) Democracies'. Alternatively, it is possible to use a continuum based on a single variable rather than a composite score. For example, Jason Brownlee (2009, 524) differentiates between

[14] These categories superficially resemble diminished subtypes, but it is important to recognise the different underlying logic. Unlike in classificatory systems built around bounded wholes, in graded approaches even so-called autocratic states may be seen as featuring elements of democratic governance, and vice versa.
[15] These are liberal democracy, electoral democracy, ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarian, hegemonic electoral authoritarian, and politically closed authoritarian.

'electoral authoritarianism', 'competitive authoritarianism', and 'hegemonic authoritarianism' using a measure of legislative and executive electoral competition drawn from the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions.

There are two main problems with applying the graded approach to the classification of HRs. First, the thresholds used to delineate regime types are arbitrary. Mark Gasiorowski (1996, 471) notes that "with a continuous measure… there is no systematic, unambiguous way to identify instances of regime change", and consequently, no objective method of choosing cutoffs between various regime types. Nigel Bogaards (2012) provides evidence of this in his survey of 55 peer-reviewed articles that categorise political regimes by applying cutoffs to the Polity index or Freedom House scores.[16] Despite a great deal of variation in the selected thresholds, 37 of the papers provide no justification for their choices even though several deviate from the original cutoffs used by Polity and Freedom House (Bogaards 2012, 695–96).[17] Most of the remaining 18 papers only make vague reference to 'conventional practice' or admit the arbitrary nature of their decisions (Bogaards 2012, 693–94, 697–98). The subjective nature of cutoffs is unavoidable, but it is remiss for researchers not to provide theory-grounded justifications for their choices.

Second, using a continuum is problematic because political regimes are complex, multidimensional phenomena. If the continuum is based on a composite index, this overall score will obscure "fundamental qualitative differences between political regimes apparently exhibiting the same degree of democratization" (Kailitz 2013, 39). In other words, it is likely that two regimes at the same point on the spectrum will be governed in very different ways. The alternative – using a single variable – makes little sense given the multidimensional nature of political regimes (Treier and Jackman 2008, 202). For example, it is overly simplistic to

[16] 31 use Polity and 24 use Freedom House.
[17] It is also worth noting that both Freedom House and Polity's ratings have been critiqued as "bearing an intrinsic bias toward an American libertarian understanding of democracy" (Korolev 2016, 442).

differentiate between regimes based solely on their degree of electoral competitiveness given that to form a complete picture of how a state is run, it is also important to consider other factors such as the degree to which political freedoms are protected, the effectiveness of the legislature, and the role of the military.

Moving Forward

The rise of HRs has pushed the binary paradigm to the limits of its usefulness, confounding both the dichotomous and graded approaches to regime classification. This has led several researchers to instate a regime trichotomy that defines 'hybrid regime' as a unique third type of political system,[18] which is justified on several counts. First, the proliferation of HRs since the end of the Cold War means that to adequately capture empirical reality, it is necessary to create "typologies that are more sensitive to intermediate cases and categories" (Wigell 2008, 233). Second, HRs "behave differently from either full democracies or full autocracies" (Epstein *et al* 2006, 551): they have their own unique functional logic defined by the ways in which their democratic and autocratic institutions encounter and reshape each other (Zinecker 2009, 308–9). Third, instituting a regime trichotomy has the value of preserving the autocratic and democratic bounded wholes, allowing for political regimes to be treated as multidimensional phenomena. Finally, the long-term stability of many HRs means they should be studied in their own right, not treated as a transitional phase between democracy and autocracy (Carothers 2002, 18).

Although HRs do not all share a single attribute in common, they are bound up in a 'familial resemblance' relationship underpinned by the way in which they combine autocratic and

[18] See for example Gasiorowski 1996; Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2001; Reich 2002; Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 2005; Wigell 2008; Gerschewski and Schmotz 2011; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011.

democratic characteristics (D. Collier and Mahon 1993, 847–48).[19] The familial resemblance approach, first articulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1991 [1953]), accepts that cases within a category do not all have to share the exact same set of attributes (Medin, Wattenmaker, and Hampson 1987, 243). This idea is closely linked to Max Weber's use of 'ideal types'. As Thomas Burger (1987, 115–16) explains, Weberian ideal types are 'general' concepts (such as 'bureaucracy' or 'conflict') that capture the key attributes of a concept (see also Collier and Mahon 1993, 853). Yet Weber recognised that the various empirical instances of these concepts are likely to feature slightly different definitional characteristics, or present these characteristics to different degrees (Burger 1987, 115–16; 156–57). These differences do not mean that cases are not linked:

> we can recognize the members of a human genetic family by observing attributes that they share to varying degrees, as contrasted to nonfamily members who may share few of them. The commonalities are quite evident, even though there may be no trait that all family members… have in common. (D. Collier and Mahon 1993, 847)

Thus, the cases grouped together must be connected in some analytically important way in order for the category to be worth retaining (D. Collier and Mahon 1993, 848). The key factor binding HRs together is that all cases within the category combine democratic and autocratic attributes in such a way that they fall short of the minimum conditions for the democratic and autocratic bounded wholes.

There are several examples of trichotomous typologies that treat political regimes as multidimensional phenomena. These 'configurative' approaches are well-suited to the task of classifying HRs because they account for the "multiple ways in which properties can combine to determine regime type" (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 282). For example, Mark Gasiorowski (1996), Scott Mainwaring *et al* (2001), Gary Reich (2002), and Kirk Bowman *et*

[19] This is further explained in Chapter Three.

al (2005) provide useful contributions that differentiate between democracy, autocracy, and 'semi-democracy'[20] using dimensions that approximate the procedural minimum definition of democracy. These typologies address some of the key problems associated with the dichotomous and graded approaches: by introducing a new category, they circumvent the issue of concept stretching and more accurately reflect the contemporary global political landscape; and they avoid the oversimplification inherent in using a composite score or single variable to situate political regimes on a continuum.

Instituting a regime trichotomy is only the first step in improving our understanding of HRs. The next stage is to fully map the hybrid political space by distinguishing between different species of HR. However, to my knowledge only two trichotomous, configurative typologies undertake this task.[21] Mikael Wigell's (2008) typology has two dimensions – electoralism and constitutionalism – which he argues reflect the component parts of liberal-democracy. In each dimension, he sets out a range of 'minimal' and 'additional' conditions that combine in various ways to define four major regime types (Table 1). Wigell considers electoral-autocratic regimes and constitutional-oligarchic regimes to be HR subtypes. Leah Gilbert and Payam Mohseni (2011) take a more complex approach that uses three dimensions: electoral competitiveness; protection of civil liberties; and tutelary interference. This engenders three HR subtypes (Table 2) and a range of other authoritarian and democratic regime categories (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 291–92). Unfortunately, both these typologies are flawed in ways fully detailed in the following chapter. Consequently, there remains a need for a comprehensive, theory-grounded, configurative typology that clearly delineates HR subtypes according to their defining autocratic and democratic characteristics.

[20] Which is not conceptualised as a diminished subtype despite the label.
[21] Levitsky and Way (2010) discuss the existence of various HR subtypes but do not provide a formal typology.

Table 1: Wigell's Typology I. Adapted from Wigell 2008, 243.

Regime Types	Minimal Electoral Conditions	Minimal Constitutional Conditions	Additional Electoral Conditions	Additional Constitutional Conditions
Authoritarian	-	-	-	-
Electoral-Autocratic	+	-	+/-	-
Constitutional-Oligarchic	-	+	-	+/-
Democratic	+	+	+/-	+/-

Table 2: Gilbert and Mohseni's Typology. Adapted from Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 291–92.

Subtype	Electoral competitiveness	Protection of civil liberties	Tutelary interference
Illiberal hybrid regimes	Competitive	Poor	No
Illiberal tutelary hybrid regimes	Competitive	Poor	Yes
Tutelary hybrid regimes	Competitive	Good	Yes

Political Regimes & Development

The vast literature on how a state's political system affects the lives of its citizens has been through several major transformations since the post-World War II frenzy of decolonisation sparked great interest in the topic. There have been changes in the mainstream view of which political system best facilitates development, the causal mechanisms through which political regime type is theorised to affect development, and the ways that 'development' is measured. Recently, a small subset of this literature has begun to focus on HRs, but it is fragmented thanks to the definitional confusion highlighted in the first part of this chapter. In this section, I provide an overview of the broader literature before narrowing my focus to the few studies that examine the economic and human development performance of HRs.

Democracy, Autocracy, & Development

In the 1950s and 60s, the development literature was dominated by modernisation theory. This paradigm was built on the assumption that 'pre-modern' societies must progress through a series of economic stages to become 'modern' societies, which were conceived as featuring a liberal-democratic political system and a capitalist economy (Leftwich 1993, 605). The most famous theory regarding this link between political regime type and socioeconomic development is Martin Lipset's (1959) argument that as a state's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) increases, it becomes more likely to transition to democracy. As Adam Przeworski *et al* (2000, 88–89) note, this proposition rests on a causal chain featuring "sequences of industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, mobilization, political incorporation, and innumerable other '-ations'… that make society ready to proceed to the final one, democratization". Democracy was the goal, and socioeconomic development – usually proxied by measures based on GDP – was the means.

Within this frame, some scholars identified autocracy as the most efficient form of government for increasing a state's level of socioeconomic development to the point that it becomes a democracy (see for example Galenson 1959; Schweinitz 1964; Huntington 1968). The argument was that because an autocratic government does not face the threat of losing power through elections, it is not required to pander to an electorate prone to short-termism due to a lack of education and information (Rao 1985, 79; see also Haggard 1990, 262). Therefore, the government can maintain centralised control of economic policy and facilitate industrialisation by enacting the (usually) unpopular policies that force the accumulation of capital (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, 130–31). In contrast, democratic governments permit and even encourage consumption spending to maintain electoral viability (Galenson 1959; see also Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 54). Thus, democracy is seen as "a luxury that cannot be afforded by a nation struggling to overcome poverty and starvation" (Bollen 1979, 574).

Autocratic governments are also assumed to provide greater social and political stability because they can use coercive methods to prevent foreign-sponsored domestic actors from undermining national development, suppress traditions that hinder modernisation, and tightly control labour power (Rao 1985, 79; for a summary see Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, 130–31). The conclusion for scholars subscribing to this view is that states should pursue economic development first, then let democracy emerge naturally with increased prosperity.

The appeal of this paternalistic 'liberty trade-off' argument faded during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Donnelly 1999, 627). The strong economic performance of many communist totalitarian regimes was revealed to be a façade, the credibility of East Asian 'developmental authoritarianism' crumbled following the 1997 Asian economic crisis (Thompson 2004), and living standards in many African autocracies were in freefall (Ake 1991, 35). These events coincided with the rise of the 'neoliberal' paradigm, which became the "model of developmental correctness" during the 1980s (White 1998, 2), in response to the perceived failures of 'import-substitution industrialisation' (Kiely 1998, 64). The neoliberal emphasis on supply-side economics, privatisation, deregulation, and entrepreneurial individualism was promoted in the developing world through conditions attached to structural adjustment loans provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. However, as Adrian Leftwich argues (1993, 609), neoliberalism "also has a functional theory of politics… it assumes that democratic politics is also *necessary* for a thriving free market economy, and vice versa". The idea of a symbiotic relationship between democracy and development is not confined to neoliberalism though,[22] and has now achieved the status of orthodoxy in academic and policy circles.

[22] For example, over a decade before neoliberalism came to prominence, Dankwart Rustow (1970, 362) argued that "mass education and social welfare services are more likely to be the result of democratization".

Changing definitions of development

As was the case in modernisation theory, the effects of democracy on development were initially measured in primarily economic terms. However, several decades of quantitative research failed to return conclusive evidence as to whether democracy facilitates economic growth. Some scholars find a positive correlation between democracy and GDP growth, per capita income, and reduced inequality (see for example Siegle, Weinstein, and Halperin 2004; Gerring *et al* 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Acemoglu *et al* 2019), but there is an equally strong body of evidence suggesting that the economic performance of democracies and non-democracies is not significantly different (Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005, 50; see for example Przeworski 2000). Some research has even found that democracy has a negative effect on GDP growth (Barro 1996; Tavares and Wacziarg 2001). As Matthew Baum and David Lake (2003, 345) note,

> the effect of democracy on economic growth is subtle, indirect, and contingent on levels of development. It is not surprising, therefore, that early studies that simply added a variable for democracy to the neoclassical growth model failed to find systematic and significant relationships.

To counter this, the literature shifted away from broad cross-country comparison towards more nuanced approaches incorporating proposed intervening variables between political institutions and growth (see for example Knutsen 2013, 2015). However, comprehensive meta-analyses of the issue indicate persistent uncertainty regarding the efficacy of democracy in promoting economic growth (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, 136–43; Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu 2008).

Since 1990, various alternative approaches to measuring the concept of development have gained traction. Building on the 'Basic Needs' approach[23] and the work of Amartya Sen (see

[23] See Palmer 1977; Streeten and Burki 1978; Streeten 1981; Streeten *et al* 1982.

for example 1982; 1983; 1985), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published the first *Human Development Report* in 1990. This landmark document repositioned individual quality of life as the goal of development, and therefore focused on states' successes in improving citizen life expectancy, educational achievement, and living standards as well as income (Harding and Wantchekon 2010, 2). The groundwork was thus laid for a profusion of new ways of defining and assessing development, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The increasing availability of measures such as these allowed researchers to pivot towards searching for correlations between democracy and non-economic outcomes, which has proved to be more fruitful. For example, scholars have found that democracy has a positive effect on daily caloric intake (Blaydes and Kayser 2011), health and education standards,[24] public spending on public services,[25] the absence of conflict (Collier and Rohner 2008; Hegre 2014), and even residential access to electricity (Brown and Mobarak 2009). Collectively, these findings have reinforced the idea that democracy is more likely to produce higher standards of wellbeing than non-democracy. Moreover, it is now widely thought that to fully understand the practical impact of political regimes, it is vital to consider the non-economic facets of development as well as more traditional GDP-related measures. This observation forms the basis of my decision to use a wide range of proxy indicators for the dependent variable of citizen wellbeing, which is discussed in detail in Chapter Four.

[24] See for example Brown 1999; McGuire 2001; Navia and Zweifel 2003; Franco, Álvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Altman and Castiglioni 2009; Kudamatsu 2012; Eterovic and Sweet 2014; Hanson 2015.

[25] See for example Brown and Hunter 1999; Lake and Baum 2001; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001; Stasavage 2005; Deacon 2009; Harding and Stasavage 2014.

Democracy & development: Causal mechanisms

The causal mechanisms thought to underpin the relationship between democracy and development fall into two broad groups:[26] those that emphasise the importance of elections; and those that focus on civil liberties (Gerring *et al* 2015, 5). Most attention has been focused on the links between elections and improved wellbeing (McGuire 2010, 9). First, some scholars argue that elections incentivise governments to enact policies that improve human development because political leaders can be voted out of power if citizen's needs are not being met (A. Sen 1983, 2000; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012). This idea is premised on Allan Meltzer and Scott Richards' (1981) seminal 'median voter' theory, which suggests that because the majority of people in a democracy will be poor or middle-class – and therefore more likely to vote for policies that redistribute wealth downwards and improve social services – democracies will be more equitable than non-democracies (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 19). Redistribution can in turn facilitate economic growth by permitting more of the population to access and participate in the market (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, 133). Additionally, it is argued that because elections involve a competitive selection process for political leaders, the winners are more likely to be competent individuals able to successfully implement policy (Besley and Kudamatsu 2006, 314).

The second set of theories captures the various ways in which the institutionalisation of civil liberties can improve human development.[27] Freedom of expression – particularly an independent media – facilitates the transmission of information throughout a society. This is theorised to have several benefits: it allows political elites to better understand and respond

[26] A popular theory not discussed at length here is that democracies are better able to protect property rights, which are seen as integral to economic growth (Olson 1993). This assertion has been neatly dismantled by Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (1993, 52–54), who note that scholars arguing in this vein fail to clearly state why democratic institutions *ipso facto* protect individual property rights.

[27] See for example Benello and Roussopoulos 1971; Barber 1988; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1994; Kawachi 2001; Fung and Wright 2003; Christoforou 2010; Pateman 2012.

to the desires of citizens (Drèze and Sen 1991; A. Sen 2000, 181);[28] it gives the public the opportunity to become better informed and more able to scrutinise government policy (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011, 654); and it permits the vertical[29] and horizontal[30] diffusion of critical information regarding best practices in health, education and other important areas (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011, 654). Conversely, in autocracies the government faces the 'dictator's dilemma', in which the state's need to understand citizens' preferences in order to prevent them from becoming restive must be balanced against its desire to control society by restricting information flows.

Freedom of association is thought to be vital because it enables a vibrant civil society, which is theorised to have several effects. First, CSOs can fulfil similar functions to the media by acting as information conduits between the population and the political establishment (McGuire 2010, 11). Second, interest groups can lobby political elites for better social services, increased wages, and other wellbeing-related policy interventions (Rudra and Haggard 2005, 1018; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011, 654). In this way, political empowerment may help to address "the unfair and graded distribution of social resources" (Marmot *et al* 2008, 1667). Third, the existence of CSOs and the political participation they facilitate may create social capital, which is thought to be positively correlated with improved human development outcomes (Christoforou 2010, 209; see also Kawachi 2001; Owen, Videras, and Willemsen 2008). In a functioning democracy, the interaction between these various mechanisms over time may transform "citizens' expectations of what they should receive from the state, thereby encouraging increased action to promote public welfare" (Harris 2014, 14; see also McGuire 2010, 57; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012). This

[28] Although, Drèze and Sen (1991) argue that this effect is strongest for famines and other newsworthy events, rather than ongoing issues such as chronic poverty.
[29] From the state to the public.
[30] Among citizens, and between citizens and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

suggests that states with long term democratic experience should perform better in human development terms.

However, for each of these theorised causal mechanisms there is a counterargument. In states where democratisation is new or ongoing, the assumptions of the median voter hypothesis are often undermined by poor voter information regarding incumbent performance, lack of a credible opposition, a weak party system, clientelism, and/or voting based on identity rather than policy (Keefer and Khemani 2005; Keefer 2007; Touchton, Sugiyama, and Wampler 2017, 86). In such polities the tenuous nature of democratic institutions biases both politicians and voters towards short-termism rather than long-term development (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012, 3). For these reasons, "scholars have repeatedly found that democracies redistribute far less than they 'should'" (Ansell and Samuels 2014, 5). Persistent inequality in advanced democracies also suggests that even where democracy is consolidated, the poor and middle-class majority may not be able to translate its numerical advantage into political power, or may be convinced to support policies that disadvantage the median voter (Przeworski 2010, 84–92). Moreover, lack of public knowledge regarding specialised areas – such as health and education – could mean that citizens vote for ineffective policies (McGuire 2010, 9). Even if elections bring to power a government firmly committed to policies designed to improve human development, low state capacity and the inherent complexity of effective development policy often lead to poor implementation (Rothstein 2011).

The relationship between civil and political rights and improved human development is similarly questionable. First, the poorest sections of society are not best-placed to make use of political freedoms because effective lobbying and mobilisation require time and financial resources (McGuire 2010, 11). This means that the issues receiving significant political attention are often those of concern to the most powerful interest groups, rather than the

most pressing in terms of citizen wellbeing. Second, political freedoms alone are not enough to improve human development. This endeavour requires large and long-term resource commitment that can only be provided by the state:

> it is unclear how citizen empowerment could muster these resources or manage their distribution on a permanent basis, especially in a poor country with limited infrastructure. The state is the only actor with sufficient material and managerial capacity to make significant and sustained improvements in the quality of human life for the thousands or millions of citizens located across a national territory. (Gerring *et al* 2015, 6)

Third, there is uncertainty regarding the direction of the causal relationship between citizen political empowerment and human development. Some studies have found that healthy people are more likely to vote, indicating that a minimum level of development may be required to drive significant political empowerment (Mattila *et al* 2013; Pacheco and Fletcher 2015). Fourth, even if citizen empowerment is able to improve human development outcomes, it inevitably does so by pressuring political elites rather than by circumventing them (Gerring *et al* 2015, 6). 'Active citizenship' alone is not enough.

Quantitative evidence

Most studies that examine the link between political regime type and development use either an index of democracy or a dummy variable for democracy[31] as the explanatory variable. Statistical analysis of the disaggregated constituent elements of democracy is less common, and research that takes this approach tends to focus on electoral competition rather than political freedoms and civil liberties (Benyishay and Betancourt 2010, 281–82; McGuire 2010, 9). For example, John Gerring *et al* (2015, 4) find that the electoral element of democracy is associated with improved mortality indicators. Similarly, Yi-ting Wang *et al* (2018) find that

[31] Where each country is either defined as a democracy or an autocracy.

higher scores on an index of electoral competitiveness are associated with lower rates of infant mortality. David Stasavage (2005) uses evidence from African states to show that more competitive elections are associated with higher state spending on education, while Robin Harding and Stasavage (2014, 244) find that primary school enrolment rates are higher in African countries that feature multiparty electoral competition.[32] Philip Keefer (2007, 810) finds that gross secondary school enrolment is higher the more continuous years of competitive elections a country has experienced. More broadly, Ignacio Amate-Flores *et al* (2017, 572) find that a higher score on Freedom House's Political Rights Index – which focuses on elections – is associated with increased Human Development Index (HDI) scores, while Vítor Castro and Rodrigo Martins (2018) find that the growth rate of a country's HDI score is higher in election years. Finally, in the non-democratic context, Michael Miller (2015b) finds that autocracies with multiparty elections have better health, education, and gender equality outcomes than their non-electoral counterparts.

There is less quantitative research on the links between political freedoms and the non-income aspects of development.[33] Jennis Biser and Jeffrey Edwards (2012) find that greater civil liberties are associated with better rates of access to an improved water source. Teheni El Ghak *et al* (2018, 23) find that higher degrees of civil liberty are associated with lower poverty rates, while Kirk Harris (2014, 14) finds that the protection of civil liberties is "moderately associated with improved food security" in Sub-Saharan Africa, whereas elections exert no significant effect. Counter-intuitively, Amate-Fortes *et al* (2017, 582) find that higher degrees of civil liberty are associated with lower HDI scores. However, these studies all use the Freedom House Civil Liberties Index (CLI) as their explanatory variable, which includes elements – such as religious freedom, the right to own property, and personal

[32] This is because these countries are more likely to abolish primary school fees.
[33] There are some studies of the effects of civil liberties and other non-electoral mechanisms on human development outcomes at the subnational level (see for example Touchton, Sugiyama, and Wampler 2017).

social freedoms – that extend well beyond the political freedoms that form part of the procedural minimum definition of democracy. The CLI also encompasses rule of law issues such as the independence of the judiciary that elide differences between political freedoms, civil liberties, and horizontal accountability. More specifically, Simon Wigley and Arzu Akkoyunlu-Wigley (2011) find that higher levels of press freedom are associated with higher life expectancy, even in autocratic countries. The paucity of studies in this area demonstrates a need for more comprehensive study of the effects of political freedoms on citizen wellbeing.

Development in Hybrid Regimes

To my knowledge there are no quantitative studies that take a configurative approach and incorporate HRs. Moreover, there is no comparative work on the development performance of different types of HR. I believe that these gaps in the literature are due to the typological confusion noted in the first half of this chapter: if the genus and its component species are not clearly defined then there is no basis for knowledge accumulation and comparison. Thus, the literature covering the link between political regime type and wellbeing is dominated by the graded and dichotomous approaches. This means that, as previously noted, the explanatory variable is expressed as either an index score or a dummy variable. Many prominent studies use a dichotomous dummy variable, thus ignoring the existence of HRs by classifying all states as democracies or autocracies,[34] while most index-based studies use a numerical score that represents the level of democraticness as the explanatory variable.[35]

[34] See for example Przeworski *et al* 2000; Zweifel and Navia 2000; Navia and Zweifel 2003; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006.
[35] See for example Nelson and Singh 1998; Lake and Baum 2001; M. Baum and Lake 2003; Brown and Hunter 2004; Shandra *et al* 2004; Ross 2006; Deacon 2009; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; Hanson 2015; Saha and Zhang 2017.

More promisingly, several studies that take the graded approach incorporate HRs by imposing cutoffs on an index and then converting the resulting categories into dummy variables. Blaydes and Kayser (2011) analyse a sample of 113 low-income countries for the period between 1961 and 2003, with countries divided into three categories – democracy, hybrid, and autocracy – using Polity IV index score. The study finds that democracies have higher levels of per capita animal-derived calorie consumption than hybrids (which in turn out-perform autocracies), although there is no significant difference in the availability of total calories in democracies and hybrids (2011, 905). Andrea Cassani (2016) uses the Polity IV 'Executive Recruitment' indicator to differentiate between democracy and electoral authoritarianism and Michael Wahman *et al's* (2013) typology to distinguish between authoritarian subtypes. Using a sample of 141 developing countries from 1980 to 2010, he finds that electoral authoritarian regimes have higher secondary school enrolment and lower infant mortality rates than one-party and military regimes, but that their performance was not significantly different to that of hereditary regimes or – surprisingly – democracies (Cassani 2016, 107–8). Katherine Wullert and John Williamson (2016) examine the impact of regime type on infant mortality, and use the Polity2 score to divide their sample of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries into autocracies, anocracies/hybrids,[36] and democracies. Using cross-sectional analysis of the year 2010, they find that infant mortality is higher in HRs than in democracies or autocracies. Unfortunately, all these studies are trapped in the binary paradigm, and none differentiates between HR subtypes.

[36] Conflating HRs with unstable 'anocracies' – which are "mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes" (Center for Systemic Peace 2016) – ignores the stability and longevity of many HRs.

Conclusion

The strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature help to structure the following three chapters. In this review, I argued that although the graded and dichotomous approaches to the classification of political regimes have been rendered obsolete by the emergence of HRs, a compelling alternative has yet to emerge. Therefore, in Chapter Three, I address this gap in the literature by setting out a typology intended to rectify the current problems regarding the identification and categorisation of HRs. In Chapter Four, I use the causal mechanisms theorised to link different political regime types and development as the basis of my hypotheses regarding the relationship between HRs and wellbeing. In the same chapter, I set out a holistic approach to the dependent variable intended to encapsulate the non-economic aspects of development. In Chapter Five, I conduct quantitative analysis of the wellbeing performance of various HR subtypes. This is a concerning blind spot for both HR scholars and development practitioners[37] given the prevalence of HRs in the developing world. Lack of knowledge in this area undermines the effectiveness of development programmes, which should be underpinned by an understanding of the functional logic that characterises the political system of the state in which they operate.

[37] I use this term to encompass developing country policymakers and civil society figures with an interest in improving wellbeing outcomes, as well as international development workers (such as relevant UN or NGO staff).

Chapter 3: Typology

If classification systems can never perfectly reflect reality, then what is the point of imposing "an uneasy order on an untidy empirical world" (Diamond 2002, 33; see also Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 271)? Put simply, this process helps to find order in chaos. Classification is a tool that confers "organization and stability on our thoughts about reality" (Marradi 1990, 154), thereby preventing us from being "inundated by complexity and unable to see the patterns underlying it" (Geddes 2003, 50; see also Morlino 2009, 289). Yet it is crucial to recognise that classificatory operations are, in Weberian term, 'abstractions from reality' that create ideal types "based on concrete historical data but constructed with conceptual purity and usefulness in scientific explanation in mind" (Siltala 2000, 30). More specifically to the study of political regimes, "labels are essential for analyzing comparative historical processes" (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Pérez-Liñán 2001, 50), while "improved description… is essential for assessing the causes and consequences of democracy" (D. Collier and Levitsky 1997, 432), as well as other regime types. Thus, although classificatory operations do not perfectly reflect reality, they remain valuable on two counts: first, because the structured frameworks they provide facilitate clearer comprehension and communication of complex concepts; and second, because they allow us to draw links between those concepts and empirical outcomes.

In this chapter, my goal is to develop a typology of HR subtypes that imposes a clear and logical structure on the grey zone between autocracy and democracy, thereby facilitating quantitative and qualitative research. In the first section of the chapter, I set out the key principles for an effective typology, and demonstrate that the typologies by Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) – the only trichotomous, configurative efforts to define HR subtypes – are unable to meet all these criteria. In the second section of the chapter, I build on previous scholarship by setting out my own typology, which both differentiates HRs from democracies and autocracies and defines 11 HR subtypes. In the interests of replicability, I

provide detailed descriptions of my decision-making processes at each stage: the selection of dimensions; operationalisation; and coding and aggregation.

Categorising Hybrid Regimes

What Makes a Good Typology?

A typology is a specific type of classificatory operation, which results from a researcher simultaneously applying several *fundamenta divisionis* (Marradi 1990, 129), defined as the specific attributes used to differentiate between two concepts.[38] For a typology to be effective the researcher must "construct a theory-based map of the property space by defining variables and the types these variables constitute through all their mathematically possible configurations" (A. L. George and Bennett 2005, 327). This summary encapsulates two key points. First, a typology must be rooted in theory, meaning that the 'variables' (referred to from here on as dimensions) used to construct subtypes must align with common understandings of the relevant concept (Bollen 1991, 10–11). Second, a typology should be comprehensive, in that it sets out all of the possible combinations of the selected dimensions to create a set of "mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive" subtypes (D. Collier, Laporte, and Seawright 2008, 157). Although some of these subtypes may not actually exist at any given time, it is important to acknowledge that they are theoretically possible.

Further to this, a typology should be replicable, which means the 'operationalisation', coding, and aggregation rules are clearly specified. Each of these procedures involves inherently subjective decisions, making it vital that the researcher clearly describes their logic. Operationalisation denotes the process of disaggregating each dimension into measurable

[38] It is the application of *fundamenta* that differentiates typologies from taxonomies: in the latter, the order in which the *fundamenta* are considered matters; in the former, sequence is irrelevant (Marradi 1990, 143).

indicators (Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 2005, 951).[39] Although "there are no hard and fast rules for choosing valid indicators", Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 15–17) suggest choosing multiple indicators to capture "the manifold empirical manifestations of a conceptual attribute" and ensure the "cross-system equivalence of these indicators". Fortunately, there are now several large-N datasets – including those by V-Dem, Freedom House, and Polity IV – featuring high quality disaggregated information on political institutions that can be used to operationalise typologies. The availability of these datasets means that researchers no longer have to undertake and justify their own coding at the indicator level. Instead, the researcher needs to clearly explain how the ratings applied in pre-existing datasets are translated into their own categorisation system.[40] Finally, the aggregation formulae need to match the theorised relationship between the indicators, the dimensions, and the concept being analysed. Munck and Verkuilen (2002, 24) neatly summarise the various options with reference to the creation of indices:

> if the aggregation of two attributes is at issue and one's theory indicates that they both have the same weight, one would simply add the scores of both attributes. If one's theory indicates that both attributes are necessary features, one could multiply both scores, and if one's theory indicates that both attributes are sufficient features, one could take the score of the highest attribute.

For configurative approaches, these decisions are taken regarding how indicator scores or labels combine to create dimensional ratings.

[39] Following Robert Adcock and David Collier (2001, 530) and Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002, 15), I use the term 'indicator' to describe quantifiable measures used to assess unobservable 'latent variables'.
[40] This process is fully explained in the second half of this chapter.

Existing Approaches

To summarise, an effective typology must be constructed using dimensions that align with common theoretical understandings of the relevant concept, fully map the property space, and feature clearly specified operationalisation, coding, and aggregation procedures. In this section, I argue that the Wigell and Gilbert-Mohseni typologies do not fully meet these requirements.

The first issue is that neither typology fully reflects contemporary theoretical understandings of the various ways in which a country may be non-democratic. Both have dimensions that adequately encompass the electoral and political freedoms elements of the expanded procedural minimum definition, while Gilbert and Mohseni also incorporate tutelary influence. Wigell's classification system positions tutelary influence as an 'additional' rather than 'minimum' condition (under the heading of 'electoral empowerment'). This means that he risks identifying cases in which the actions of the elected government are restricted by tutelary powers (such as religious bodies, the military, or foreign states) as democratic regimes.

Moreover, neither typology neither includes horizontal accountability as a minimum condition for democracy. Following Wolfgang Merkel (2004, 40; see also O'Donnell 1998), I define horizontal accountability as the presence of "a network of relatively autonomous institutions" that restrict executive operations "to constitutionally defined lawful action".[41] The idea that this is a key element of the procedural minimum definition of democracy is relatively recent and has yet to become the orthodoxy (D. Collier and Levitsky 2009, 279), which is surprising given that "holding delegated authority accountable is integral to the idea

[41] I put forward a narrow definition of horizontal accountability that specifically focuses on institutional checks and balances. A broader definition might include "strong and well-established intermediary structures (such as parties); a responsible, vigilant political opposition; independent media that are conscious of their civil function; and a well-developed network of active, informed organizations and associations that share democratic values" (Morlino 2004, 13), but these elements are adequately covered in other areas of the procedural minimum definition.

of government subject to popular control" (Goetz and Jenkins 2004, 2). As Sartori argues (1987, 206), institutionalised constitutional limitations on executive power are the "sine qua non conditions that allow for the replacing of leaders, for limiting their time in office, for holding them responsible to the people, and for averting abuses of power". Without these accountability structures, "pure procedural democracy can easily degenerate into non-democratic or even anti-democratic formalism" (Donnelly 1999, 618). Elections (which are vertical accountability mechanisms) are insufficient for this purpose because they are only held periodically and may be rendered ineffective by "inchoate party systems, high voter and party volatility, poorly defined issues, and sudden policy reversals" (O'Donnell 1998, 112). This has resulted in the recognition that democracy "requires governments that are not only accountable to their citizens but also subject to restraint and oversight by other public agencies" (Schedler 1999, 1; see also Merkel 2004, 41).

Ineffective horizontal accountability is a key characteristic that separates HRs from democracies (Kailitz 2013, 46; for empirical examples see Croissant 2003; Taş 2015). In HRs, the democratically elected executive often circumvents the checks and balances (primarily the judiciary and the legislature) that are supposed to prevent abuses of power (Epstein *et al* 2006, 555). This may be done by using decree power to weaken these institutions, or by stacking them with pro-regime officials to ensure compliance (Ekman 2009, 9). Andrea Cassani (2014, 550) notes that a lack of limitations on the "the arbitrary power of the chief executive" is one of the core 'micro-level institutional attributes' commonly identified in analysis of HRs, even where scholars disagree on their macro-level conceptualisation. Therefore, by failing to include horizontal accountability, the Wigell and Gilbert-Mohseni typologies are limited in their ability to successfully differentiate between democracies and HRs.

The second issue is that both typologies exhibit problems related to operationalisation, coding, and aggregation. Wigell does not set out his operationalisation or coding procedures, giving no indication as to the quantifiable indicators that might be used to assess his conditions or the thresholds that would be applied to such indicators. His aggregation method is also problematic. Although he specifies two broad HR subtypes – electoral-autocratic and constitutional-oligarchic regimes – and defines a 'pure type' for each, he does not fully map the property space within the two subtypes. For example, 'populist autocracy', the electoral-autocratic pure type, fulfils the minimal electoral conditions but not the minimal constitutional conditions, and may or may not meet some of the expanded electoral conditions (Table 3). As for other subtypes within the electoral-autocratic category, Wigell hints that "subcategories such as hegemonic-, competitive- and electoral-authoritarianism identified by the literature on hybrid regimes are *perhaps* to be found among these cases [my italics]" but does not adequately define these types or their relationships to each other. He is clearer in his aggregation of democratic subtypes, but the positioning of tutelary influence and horizontal accountability as additional rather than minimal conditions mean that regimes in the limited, electoral, and constitutional democracy categories should in fact be considered hybrids.

Table 3: Wigell's Typology II. Adapted from Wigell 2008, 243, 245.

Regime Types		Minimal Electoral Conditions	Minimal Constitutional Conditions	Additional Electoral Conditions	Additional Constitutional Conditions
Electoral-Autocratic	Populist Autocracy	+	-	+/-	-
Constitutional-Oligarchic	Liberal Oligarchy	-	+	-	+/-
Democratic	Limited	+	+	-	-
	Electoral	+	+	+	-
	Constitutional	+	+	-	+
	Liberal	+	+	+	+

There are two main technical issues with Gilbert and Mohseni's typology. First, their operationalisation process only employs one indicator per dimension, which increases the probability of misclassification due to measurement error (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 15–17). For example, their use of turnover as the sole indicator of electoral competitiveness[42] is problematic because it leads to incorrect coding of democracies with long-standing incumbents (such as Australia under Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, who was in power from 1949 to 1966 and won seven consecutive elections), and of HRs that experience a change in government but still fall short of democratic standards in other areas. Second, the use of single indicators for each dimension leaves Gilbert and Mohseni open to criticism regarding their coding choices. For example, their civil liberties dimension is assessed using Freedom House's CLI: a regime is coded illiberal if its score is between four and seven, and liberal if its score is between one and three (Gilbert 2016). This is problematic because the Freedom House index incorporates several variables – such as government control of the economy and individuals' rights to own property and businesses (Freedom House 2016b) – that go beyond the procedural minimum definition of democracy. As a result, it features "an intrinsic bias toward an American libertarian understanding of democracy" (Korolev 2016, 442). Additionally, as noted in Chapter Two, there is significant disagreement over the application of thresholds to Freedom House scales (Bogaards 2012).[43]

Overall, the Wigell and Gilbert-Mohseni typologies both have useful features, but neither fully meets the requirements for an effective typology. Therefore, there is a clear need in the literature for a comprehensive, practically relevant, and theoretically grounded configurative typology that clearly delineates HR subtypes according to their defining autocratic and

[42] A regime is coded as competitive if there has been turnover in the executive or legislature in the past four consecutive electoral cycles or 20 years, or uncompetitive if no turnover has occurred (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 279).

[43] It is also worth noting that Freedom House itself only designates states with a score of less than or equal to 2.5 as 'Free'.

democratic characteristics. This will in turn facilitate quantitative and qualitative analysis by providing a framework and shared lexicon for the study of HRs and their subtypes.

Typologising

In this section, I seek to comprehensively map the hybrid political space by constructing a typology that reflects a contemporary iteration of the procedural minimum definition of democracy and features clearly defined operationalisation, coding, and aggregation procedures. I use the intensional approach to classification, in which broad concepts are iteratively unpacked into smaller units. In this way, it is possible to divide an overarching concept into classes by applying a single *fundamentum divisionis* or a number of *fundamenta* (Marradi 1990, 134); these classes can then be further subdivided in the same way. The result is a set of types that are "mutually exclusive and exhaustive", with every case falling within only one type (A. L. George and Bennett 2005, 317).[44] I begin by differentiating between three broad regime types, before setting out the operationalisation, coding, and aggregation procedures used to create 11 mutually exclusive HR subtypes.

Broad Regime Types

In the previous chapter, I argued that the rise of HRs makes it necessary to abandon the binary paradigm and institute a regime trichotomy comprising autocracies, HRs, and democracies. Thus, the first step in mapping the hybrid political space is to differentiate HRs from the other two broad regime types. Following Gilbert and Mohseni (2011, 276, 280), I use 'electoral regimes' and 'non-electoral regimes' as "meta-level concepts that organize and


[44] Types should also be "designed to minimize within-type variation and maximize variation between types" (A. L. George and Bennett 2005, 317).

distinguish lower-tiered regime concepts". The *fundamentum divisionis* between electoral and non-electoral regimes is the presence of 'competitive elections',[45] which I define as featuring broad adult suffrage and opposition parties with a credible chance of winning elections (Levitsky and Way 2010, 12; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 278). Focusing on competitiveness allows for a clear delineation between autocracies on one hand and HRs and democracies on the other. Autocracies are non-electoral regimes, because elections are either not held or they are so heavily manipulated through the banning or harassment of opposition parties, fraudulent practices, and/or the restriction of suffrage that the incumbent "can rest easy on the eve of elections" (Levitsky and Way 2010, 12). Conversely, both HRs and democracies are electoral regimes because they feature competitive elections which are the primary method of gaining political power.

Within the electoral regimes category, the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy can be used to differentiate between HRs and democracies. To recap, for a regime to be considered a democracy it must feature the following: fair and competitive elections; effective protection for basic political rights; a government that is not beholden to tutelary powers; and, in accordance with the previous section, horizontal accountability. The advantage of using the procedural minimum definition to separate HRs from democracies is that it accounts for the multiple ways in which a regime may be non-democratic. In contrast, Gilbert and Mohseni (2011, 280) distinguish between democracies and non-democracies using only the 'fairness' of elections, which reduces democracy to its electoral dimension. My approach, which builds on Gilbert and Mohseni's work, is shown in Figure 2. The diagram

[45] This serves to differentiate regimes according to the primary method of accessing and maintaining political power, which is consistent with the standard definition of a political regime as "a set of formal and informal rules and norms that regulates who has access to power and how this power is exercised" (Gerschewski and Schmotz 2011, 7; see also Munck 1996).

Figure 2: The Regime Trichotomy



emphasises that HRs share characteristics with both other regime types: HRs and autocracies are both non-democratic regimes; and HRs and democracies are both electoral regimes.

Defining Hybrid Regime Subtypes

In the previous chapter, I argued that one reason for defining HRs as a unique third type of political regime is that cases within this category are bound up in a 'familial resemblance' relationship. This means that not all HRs have to share the exact same set of attributes. However, this requirement can be re-introduced at the subtype level,[46] where the goal is to create a set of mutually exhaustive and exclusive Weberian ideal types. Thus, each HR subtype is placed into only one category, and shares the same attributes as all other members of the category – with the caveat that these attributes may be present to different degrees in reality (Burger 1987, 115–16; 156–57). In the following section, I lay out the dimensions that comprise my typology, and the operationalisation, coding, and aggregation procedures used to delineate HR subtypes.

[46] Further specification of democratic and autocratic regimes is beyond the scope of this thesis, and has been extensively covered by others (see for example Dahl 1973; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a).

Dimensions

My typology consists of three dimensions, each of which reflects a key aspect of the procedural minimum definition of democracy. In this way, HRs are categorised according to the ways that they combine democratic and non-democratic attributes. Each dimension is divided into two components (Table 4). The 'Elections' dimension encompasses the electoral elements of the procedural minimum, bearing in mind that some of these – universal suffrage, the participation of multiple parties, regular elections – are used to differentiate between electoral and non-electoral regimes, and therefore need not be included again. Instead, Elections is focused on whether the incumbent has a significant advantage over its challengers, giving rise to two components: 'Free Elections' and 'Playing Field Evenness'. Free Elections is used to assess if voting is fairly executed, or whether it is marred by voter registry inaccuracies, vote buying, and electoral violence. Playing Field Evenness covers pre-electoral manipulation: media bias in election coverage; limits to the autonomy and capacity of the electoral monitoring body; and restrictions on party or candidate participation. The distinction between these two components is crucial because the two forms of non-democratic practice are qualitatively different: the former is a crude adjustment of the outcome; whereas the latter involves changing the 'rules of the game'.

The 'Political Freedoms' dimension assesses rights that are fundamental to the practice of democracy. The first component, 'Freedom of Expression', encompasses freedom of information, freedom of discussion, and academic and cultural freedom. The second component, 'Freedom of Organisation', is used to assess the ability of individuals to freely form groups such as political parties and CSOs. In combination, these two components cover the key rights that appear in other typologies.

The 'Effective Power' dimension is concerned with limitations on the elected government. The first component, 'Tutelary Influence and Reserved Domains', assesses whether the

government's actions are restricted by non-democratic actors, including foreign governments, the military, religious bodies, and hereditary powers. Reserved domains are policy areas in which tutelary powers exercise undue influence. The second component, 'Horizontal Accountability', is focused on whether the executive routinely overrides institutionalised checks and balances on its power, as is common in autocratic regimes. Theoretically, this is an important inclusion as HRs are characterised not only by the democratic qualities that they lack, but also by the autocratic features they exhibit. Thus, the Effective Power dimension accounts for situations in which the elected government's ability to govern is restricted, and situations in which it is inadequately constrained.

Table 4: Dimensions and Components

Dimension	Components
Elections	Free Elections
	Playing Field Evenness
Political Freedoms	Freedom of Expression
	Freedom of Organisation
Effective Power	Tutelary Influence & Reserved Domains
	Horizontal Accountability

Operationalisation

I use quantifiable indicators from V-Dem[47] to operationalise the three dimensions and their six components. The dataset includes 350 indicators, covering 177 countries from 1900 to 2016, and therefore constitutes one of the largest-ever social science datasets (Mechkova and Sigman 2016, 1). V-Dem data is well-suited to my purposes: the methodology used for assessing latent concepts minimises the influence of coder bias and error; the size of the dataset allows for the selection of multiple indicators for each component, reducing the potential for measurement error; and broad geographic and temporal coverage mitigate the lack of data on non-democratic states found in other datasets. Additionally, the newness of

[47] I used V-Dem data release 7, available at www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-7/.

the dataset means that its potential is relatively untapped, while the fact that it is publicly available makes replication analysis simple. The biggest potential problem with using V-Dem data is that my results are dependent on the quality of their coding.[48] However, as I explain later in the chapter, V-Dem's coding process is rigorous; and, where I have encountered errors, the data team has been quick to respond and make changes.

The first operationalisation task involved putting into practice Gilbert and Mohseni's differentiation between electoral and non-electoral regimes. Given the problems associated with their selected indicator (turnover), I have instead used V-Dem indicators that directly measure the constituent characteristics of electoral competitiveness (Table 5): regularity; broad adult suffrage; and participation by more than one party. First, the 'Electoral regime index' defines whether a state has "regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent" (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 67). Second, the 'Share of population with suffrage' indicator determines whether *de jure* broad adult suffrage exists. Although the indicator does not assess *de facto* restrictions on suffrage, regimes where this problem is present are likely to exhibit other non-democratic tendencies that will be captured by other indicators. Third, the 'Barriers to parties' and 'Party ban' indicators ensure that regimes with non-multiparty elections are designated as non-electoral regimes. Finally, the 'Election other voting irregularities' indicator checks for the presence of systematic, widespread fraud.[49]

[48] Data availability may have been an issue in the past as earlier V-Dem releases did not cover some high-performing autocratic countries, but this problem has been steadily rectified.

[49] Note that these last three indicators are also included in the Playing Field Evenness and Freedom of Organisation components because the coding responses above the non-electoral level help to define HR subtype. This will be clarified in the following section.

Table 5: Indicators Defining Electoral and Non-electoral Regimes

Indicator	Indicator Code[50]
Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg
Share of population with suffrage	v2x_suffr
Barriers to parties	v2psbars
Parties ban	v2psparban
Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg

The second operationalisation task was to choose V-Dem indicators to quantify the components comprising each dimension. Beginning with the Elections dimension, to assess the Free Elections component I selected five indicators (Table 6) that reflect the primary methods of direct electoral manipulation noted in the literature. Freedom House (2016b) assesses the freeness and fairness of elections according to the "accurate, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory" registration of voters, absence of voter intimidation, and the honest counting of votes. Andreas Schedler's (2002, 39) 'chain of democratic choice' includes similar concepts under the headings 'Insulation' and 'Integrity', which encompass citizens casting their vote freely and fair vote counting. Similarly, Levitsky and Way (2010, 7) state that elections are free when "there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters". These practices are relatively simple to identify. For example, various commentators observed that the 2013 Zimbabwean election featured direct manipulation tactics including intimidation and fraudulent voter registration by Robert Mugabe's incumbent Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (BBC News Online 2013).

In contrast, the practices that fit within the Playing Field Evenness component are more difficult to quantify. Various actors can utilise a diverse and amorphous range of tactics to tilt the electoral playing field, which may include the politicisation of state institutions, manipulation of access to state financial resources, and modifications to the electoral system.

[50] The meaning of the various V-Dem indicator codes is explained in the following section.

This forces the researcher to rely on proxy measures. Consequently, I divided the component into three key areas: the media; the application of election-related law; and the electoral system itself. The indicator selected for the first area is intended to identify whether the pre-election media landscape was biased in favour of the incumbent (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 255). In order to determine whether election-related laws were applied fairly and rigorously, I have used two indicators focused on the autonomy and capacity of the electoral management body (EMB). Regarding the electoral system, the selected indicator covers the barriers to entry for political parties. The 2009 Kyrgyzstani presidential elections exemplify how the playing field can be rendered unfair even though "the field of presidential candidates offered a genuine choice to voters" (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2009, 1; 14–15; 8; 10): the incumbent president received inordinate media coverage; the incumbent party, *Ak Zhol*, exercised significant influence over the various sub-national election commissions; and the candidacy requirements were prohibitive, including fluency in Kyrgyz and support signatures from 1.7 per cent of registered voters.

Table 6: Elections Dimension Operationalisation

Component		Indicator	Indicator Code
Free Elections		Proper voter registry	v2elrgstry
		Vote buying	v2elvotbuy
		Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg
		Government intimidation	v2elintim
		Other electoral violence	v2elpeace
Playing Field Evenness	Media	Media bias	v2mebias
	Law	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut
		EMB capacity	v2elembcap
	Electoral System	Barriers to parties	v2psbars

The Playing Field Evenness component has two key limitations. First, there are no V-Dem indicators (or viable indicators from other datasets[51]) that can be used to proxy financial imbalance between competing parties caused by incumbent use of state financial resources to encourage voter support (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 412). This is a difficult practice to measure as it may manifest itself in a range of ways. For example, in the lead up to the 2014 election in Fiji – the country's first following eight years of military rule – former military commander Voreqe 'Frank' Bainimarama's interim government gifted material goods to key chiefs and villages, instituted pay rises for civil servants, and announced various large infrastructure projects (Fraenkel 2015, 155–56). The government also used state funds to employ Qorvis, a United States (US) public relations company, which deployed social media campaigning and an avalanche of positive press releases to improve the government's image and attack its critics (American Independent Institute 2012). Second, there is no V-Dem indicator that assesses whether techniques such as gerrymandering – the redrawing of electoral boundaries to benefit a particular party – or the choice of voting system have been used to ensure that the electoral system itself favours the incumbent. Taking Fiji as an example again, the use of open list proportional representation drawn from a single national constituency inordinately benefitted Bainimarama's FijiFirst party in 2014 because the leader's high vote share helped less prominent FijiFirst candidates to win seats (Lal 2014, 459–60; Ratuva 2016, 32). Despite these two weaknesses, the range of indicators used to assess the Playing Field Evenness component should be broad enough to create a sufficiently accurate picture of the pre-election environment.

Shifting to Political Freedoms, the Freedom of Expression component assesses the extent to which citizens can speak freely and access a range of information sources (Table 7). To

[51] V-Dem provides an indicator from Judith Kelley's (2010) dataset on election quality that assesses whether state resources were used improperly in the pre-election environment (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 334), but there are too many observations missing for it to be used here.

structure this component, I have identified three key areas: 'Freedom of Information' uses six indicators to assess government censorship and the availability of multiple, critical media perspectives; 'Freedom of Discussion' is concerned with the ability of men and women to conduct private political discussions; and 'Academic/Cultural Freedom' assesses state repression of academic and cultural expression. For the Freedom of Organisation[52] component, I selected three indicators. The first, 'Party ban', defines the degree to which opposition parties are permitted. It is included here instead of within the Elections dimension because it is concerned with the existence of parties as organisations, rather than barriers to their participation in the electoral process. The remaining two indicators assess the ease with which CSOs can form and operate and the extent of CSO repression. V-Dem defines CSOs broadly, covering "interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic [NGOs]" (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 243).

Table 7: Political Freedoms Dimension Operationalisation

Component		Indicator	Indicator Code
Freedom of Expression	Freedom of Information	Government censorship effort	v2mecenefm
		Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn
		Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen
		Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit
		Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange
		Internet censorship	v2mecenefi
	Freedom of Discussion	Freedom of discussion for men/women	v2cldiscm/ v2cldiscw
	Academic/Cultural Freedom	Freedom of academic/cultural expression	v2clacfree
Freedom of Organisation		Party ban	v2psparban
		CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs
		CSO repression	v2csreprss

[52] The analogous term 'freedom of association' is also commonly used in the literature.

The first Effective Power component, Tutelary Influence and Reserved Domains, is operationalised using four indicators (Table 8). Two of these assess which powers can remove the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG) from office. If a non-elected actor has the *de facto* ability to do this, then tutelary influence is present. Second, two indicators assess whether the HOS and the HOG must obtain approval from tutelary powers before making important domestic policy decisions. This is a proxy for the presence of reserved domains. Finally, 'HOS appointment in practice' assesses how the HOS reached office. Pakistan is a useful example of a state featuring problems in this area: the country has experienced three military coups since 1958; and even when an elected government has been in place, the military has constrained their actions in some areas of public policy (Croissant 2004, 160; Adeney 2015, 11–14). However, it must be noted that the role of non-elected powers is difficult to measure, and the indicators used here are susceptible to measurement error.

The second Effective Power component, Horizontal Accountability, is operationalised using two indicators that proxy the presence of checks and balances on executive power. 'Judicial constraints on the executive' is an index constructed by V-Dem to reflect the independence of the judiciary and the degree to which the executive abides by the constitution and complies with court rulings (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 277). 'Legislative constraints on the executive' is a similar index, capturing the ability of the legislature and government agencies to critique, investigate, and exercise oversight over the executive (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 277). In combination, these indicators give insight into the executive's relationship with the other key democratic institutions. In states with poor horizontal accountability the executive is able to rule by decree, a mode of government epitomised by Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2011 (Taş 2015).

Table 8: Effective Power Dimension Operationalisation

Components	Indicator	Indicator Code
Tutelary Influence & Reserved Domains	HOS removal by other in practice	v2exrmhsol
	HOS control over domestic policy	v2exctlhs
	HOG removal by other in practice	v2exrmhgnp
	HOG control over domestic policy	v2exctlhg
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs
Horizontal Accountability	Judicial constraints on the executive	v2x_jucon
	Legislative constraints on the executive	v2xlg_legcon

Coding & Aggregation

Determining the coding and aggregation rules for each indicator is an inherently subjective task. Therefore, in the interests of academic rigour, my decision-making processes are set out here for critique – something that many researchers unfortunately fail to do (Bogaards 2012, 702). As Levitsky and Way argue (2010, 35), when these procedures are "transparent, consistent across cases and regions, and easily falsifiable" then it is possible to "maximize measurement validity while retaining a level of rigor and standardization… sometimes lacking in more qualitative studies". I generally use a binary approach to coding at the indicator, component, and dimension levels. A three-tiered coding system would have been preferable, but this would have created an unwieldy number of HR subtypes. In typological theory, there is a constant tension between parsimony and accuracy – or, to put it in terms borrowed from biology, 'lumping' and 'splitting' (Simpson 1961).[53] I am sympathetic to Katherine Adeney's (2015, 5) view that dichotomous coding can entail a significant loss of information, but in my case the use of 12 sub-dimensional components necessitated a simplified coding strategy. However, later in this section I argue that the potential for

[53] These terms have also sometimes been used to discuss political regimes (see Elkins 2000, 298).

information loss is ameliorated by the process of selecting thresholds for each V-Dem indicator. Finally, it is important to note that I have generally chosen to set the bar for democracy high to push back against the overuse of the term in popular discourse.

To understand my decisions regarding the thresholds used to code each indicator, it is important to outline the structure of the V-Dem dataset. The majority of indicators I use are 'C' type indicators, meaning that they are coded by country experts (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 34). Coders are asked to answer a question[54] by selecting a response on an ordinal scale. For example, for the 'Media bias' indicator coders are asked to answer the question 'Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?' The potential responses are:

> 0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.
>
> 1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.
>
> 2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.
>
> 3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates.
>
> 4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.[55]

Usually, at least five coders respond to each question independently (Coppedge *et al* 2015, 2). Following this, the V-Dem team uses Bayesian item response theory modelling techniques to generate interval-level estimates of the ratings for each indicator. This process corrects for differing coder interpretations of the subjective terms used in the ordinal scale level

[54] Most questions are accompanied by a detailed clarifying note.
[55] See Coppedge *et al* 2017, 255.

descriptions (such as 'almost' and 'somewhat'), thus reducing measurement error (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 34).

I generally use the 'ordinal scale' version of an indicator, denoted by the suffix '_ord'. This means the estimates produced by the Bayesian measurement model have been converted back to the original ordinal scale presented to the coders. In other words, the given value "represents the most likely ordinal value on the original codebook scale into which a country-year would fall, given the average coder's usage of that scale" (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 36). There are a few exceptions to this. The 'Electoral regime index',[56] 'Judicial constraints on the executive index',[57] and 'Legislative constraints on the executive index'[58] are all 'D' type indicators, meaning they are created using the measurement model estimates for several other indicators (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 34). For the latter two indicators, I have used the five-level ordinal versions (suffix '_5C'), which are produced by imposing five categories on the initial normalised indices (Table 9).

Table 9: Five-level Ordinal Version of an Index. Adapted from Lindberg 2015, 11.

Ordinalised Level	Index Range[59]
0.00	I >= 0.00 and I <= 0.20
0.25	I > 0.20 and I <= 0.40
0.50	I > 0.40 and I <= 0.60
0.75	I > 0.60 and I <= 0.80
1.00	I > 0.80 and I <= 1.00

The process of translating ordinal measures into binary variables involved carefully selecting cutoff points. Bogaards (2012, 690, 702), discussing how to impose cutoffs on interval

[56] This indicator receives a dichotomous yes/no coding based on several other indicators that cover the successful completion of executive and legislative elections and interruptions to the electoral cycle (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 67).
[57] For this index, the component indicators are 'Executive respects constitution' (v2exrescon), 'Compliance with judiciary' (v2jucomp), 'Compliance with high court' (v2juhccomp), 'High court independence' (v2juhcind), and 'Lower court independence' (v2juncind) (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 59).
[58] For this index, the component indicators are 'Legislature questions officials in practice' (v2lgqstexp), 'Executive oversight' (v2lgotovst), 'Legislature investigates in practice' (v2lginvstp), and 'Legislature opposition parties' (v2lgoppart) (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 59).
[59] 'I' denotes index.

measurement scales based on continuous data, notes that "although the identification of these thresholds is crucial, there is hardly any theorizing about how and where to draw the line" and that although it is important to justify thresholds, "only a minority of the studies included [in his article] adhere to this obvious rule". The same is true regarding cutoffs for ordinal data. Fortunately, the detailed descriptions provided for each level of V-Dem's C type indicators offer a solution. These 'linguistic qualifiers' help the researcher to determine the point at which a political regime shifts from a situation that is acceptable in a functioning democracy – as determined by the expanded procedural minimum definition – to one that is not. To illustrate, take the potential responses to the 'Media bias' indicator listed above. Scores of 0 and 1 describe practices that would not be considered acceptable in a minimally democratic state. It could be argued that a score of 2 is enough to qualify as minimally democratic practice given that some opposition parties or candidates are covered "more or less impartially" by the media, but I maintain that the neglect of at least one key opposition actor undermines the evenness of the electoral playing field. A score of 3 means that some bias still exists but is unlikely to significantly affect the election outcome, while a score of 4 is clearly at the standard expected in a democracy. Thus, I code scores of 0, 1, and 2 as cases of media bias, and scores of 3 and 4 are recorded as an absence of media bias. The application of this process for other indicator types is set out below.

Given that the definition of competitive elections is crucial to the meta-level of this typology, it is important to clearly explain the threshold choices I have made here (Table 10). The 'Electoral regime index' is straightforward, as it is already dichotomous: "a country is coded 0 until the first election, at which point it is coded 1 until there is an electoral interruption…. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election occurs" (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 67). For the two indicators reflecting whether opposition parties can seriously compete in elections, I had to select thresholds using the linguistic qualifiers. For 'Parties ban', V-Dem

ratings of 0, 1, or 2 clearly indicate a non-electoral regime because at best, many opposition parties are banned. Similarly, for 'Barriers to parties', V-Dem ratings of 0 and 1 indicate a non-electoral regime because it is "virtually impossible" for opposition parties to participate in elections (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 128–29). For 'Election other voting irregularities' a regime is classed as non-electoral if it is given a V-Dem rating of 0 – which requires "systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities" such as ballot-stuffing and false counting – whereas ratings of 1 and above indicate that at worst, there were some non-systematic irregularities (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 94).

Table 10: Differentiating Electoral and Non-electoral Regimes

Indicator	Indicator Code	Threshold and Coding
Electoral regime index	v2x_elecreg	Electoral Regime: 1 Non-electoral Regime: 0
Share of population with suffrage	v2x_suffr	Electoral Regime: >= 0.9 Non-electoral Regime: < 0.9
Barriers to parties	v2psbars_ord	Electoral Regime: 2, 3, 4 Non-electoral Regime: 0, 1
Parties ban	v2psparban_ord	Electoral Regime: 3, 4 Non-electoral Regime: 0, 1, 2
Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg_ord	Electoral Regime: 1, 2, 3, 4 Non-electoral Regime: 0

I chose to set the threshold for 'broad adult suffrage' at 90 per cent or more of the adult population.[60] Most theorists set the bar significantly lower. Polity IV's threshold requires that only 20 per cent of the adult population be enfranchised for a regime to be considered democratic (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016, 27), while others suggest that the cutoff should be 50 or 60 per cent of the adult male population (Huntington 1991, 16; Boix 2003, 66). Jamie Lee Ray (1993, 257) uses 50 per cent of the adult population, arguing that higher thresholds would "exclude all pre-20th century states from the category 'democratic,' because female suffrage is with only minor exceptions a 20th century phenomenon". Leaving aside

[60] Suffrage is a better measure than participation because although it is important for citizens to have the right to participate, it is also within their democratic right to choose not to exercise this ability (Hadenius 1992, 41).

the problems associated with using historical standards to define modern democracy for comparative purposes, the 50 per cent threshold is unacceptable as it could result in contemporary regimes which limit suffrage based on gender being labelled democratic. At the other end of the scale, requiring 100 per cent suffrage is not feasible because all modern democracies retain some restrictions based on "residence, mental health, and law abidingness" (Beckman 2009, 17). Munck (2009, 44) argues that the key concern should be whether "the right to vote has been extended to at least two groups, one of which is a mass, nonelite group". Although he concludes that a fixed percentage "is unlikely to travel well across countries" with different societal structures, setting the threshold at 90 per cent guarantees that at least two social groups are enfranchised in most cases. Additionally, the 90 per cent threshold has some pedigree in the literature, as it was implicitly used by Robert Dahl (1973) to differentiate between polyarchy and non-polyarchy (see also Munck 2009, 43).

My distinction between electoral and non-electoral regimes is open to challenge. Some elements of the definition of competitive elections can be assessed objectively: whether elections occur regularly; whether opposition parties are legal; and whether there is large-scale fraud. However, the ideas of 'broad' suffrage and 'serious' competition are inherently subjective. I have attempted to quantify these nebulous concepts using thresholds that are grounded in theory, but other researchers may wish to reconfigure the typology using alternative thresholds.

Due to space constraints, I will not describe the decision-making process for every indicator used in the typology proper. In Table 11, Table 12, and Table 13, I have provided the relevant thresholds for all indicators, and detailed how these translate into my coding system. For example, 'Proper voter registry' is coded as 'Free' (1) if it receives a V-Dem rating of 2 or higher and 'Unfree' (0) if it receives a V-Dem rating of 1 or lower on the ordinal scale defined

by linguistic qualifiers. The process of threshold selection was slightly different for indicators in the Effective Power dimension. For the Tutelary Influence & Reserved Domains component, this is because the indicators used are categorical. For example, the 'HOS removal by other in practice' indicator asks which actors have the *de facto* ability to remove the HOS, with the potential responses being: 0) None; 1) A foreign power; 2) The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system); 3) A royal council; 4) The military; 5) A religious body; 6) A tribal or ethnic council; 7) Other (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 158). Ratings of 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are indicative of tutelary influence, and coded with a value of 0 (non-democratic). A rating of 0 suggests that tutelary influence is not present, and so the indicator is coded as 1, while a rating of 2 suggests that the polity is a non-electoral regime and it is coded as such.[61] The other indicators in the component operate in a similar way. Finally, the two Horizontal Accountability indicators – which are ordinalised versions of indices – a regime is coded as 'High' (1) if it scores 0.75 or more, which translates to a value of more than 0.6 on the original, normalised index. This is a demanding standard, but one that allows for occasional incidents where the executive pushes back against democratic checks and balances.

[61] In the V-Dem dataset, each response is given its own column (e.g. v2exrmhsol_0_ord, v2exrmhsol_1_ord, etc.), and coders place a 1 in the column if they believe the actor has the power to undertake the action defined by the question, or a 0 if they do not. I have aggregated these for ease of interpretation.

Table 11: Thresholds for Elections Dimension

Component	Indicator	Indicator Code	Thresholds and Coding
Free Elections	Proper voter registry	v2elrgstry[62]	Free (1): 2, 3, 4 Unfree (0): 0, 1
	Vote buying	v2elvotbuy	Free (1): 2, 3, 4 Unfree (0): 0, 1
	Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg[63]	Free (1): 2, 3, 4 Unfree (0): 1
	Government intimidation	v2elintim	Free (1): 4 Unfree (0): 0, 1, 2, 3
	Other electoral violence	v2elpeace	Free (1): 3, 4 Unfree (0): 0, 1, 2
Playing Field Evenness	Media bias	v2mebias	Even (1): 3, 4 Uneven (0): 0, 1, 2
	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut	Even (1): 3, 4 Uneven (0): 0, 1, 2
	EMB capacity	v2elembcap	Even (1): 2, 3, 4 Uneven (0): 0, 1
	Barriers to parties	v2psbars[64]	Even (1): 4 Uneven (0): 2, 3

Table 12: Thresholds for Political Freedoms Dimension

Component	Indicator	Indicator Code	Thresholds and Coding
Freedom of Expression	Government censorship effort	v2mecenefm	High (1): 3, 4 Low (0): 0, 1, 2
	Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn	High (1): 3, 4 Low (0): 0, 1, 2
	Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen	High (1): 2, 3 Low (0): 0, 1
	Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit	High (1): 3 Low (0): 1, 2
	Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange	High (1): 3 Low (0): 0, 1, 2
	Internet censorship	v2mecenefi[65]	High (1): 3, 4 Low (0): 1, 2
	Freedom of discussion for men/women	v2cldiscm/ v2cldiscw	High (1): 3, 4 Low (0): 0, 1, 2
	Freedom of academic/cultural expression	v2clacfree	High (1): 3, 4 Low (0): 0, 1, 2
Freedom of Organisation	Party ban	v2psparban[66]	High (1): 4 Low (0): 3
	CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs	High (1): 3, 4 Low (0): 0, 1, 2
	CSO repression	v2csreprss	High (1): 3, 4 Low (0): 0, 1, 2

[62] A rating of 2 indicates that "there was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes" (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 89).
[63] A V-Dem rating of 0 on this indicator means that it is classed as a non-electoral regime.
[64] A V-Dem rating of 0 or 1 on this indicator means that it is classed as a non-electoral regime.
[65] If there is no data for this indicator it is coded as 'High' (1), because NA values generally indicate a time before high levels of internet penetration.
[66] A V-Dem rating of 0, 1, or 2 on this indicator means that it is classed as a non-electoral regime.

Table 13: Thresholds for Effective Power Dimension

Components	Indicator	Indicator Code	Thresholds and Coding
Tutelary Influence & Reserved Domains	HOS removal by other in practice	v2exrmhsol[67]	No TI (1): 0 TI (0): 1, 3, 4, 5, 6
	HOS control over domestic policy	v2exctlhs[68]	No TI (1): NA TI (0): 1, 3, 4, 5, 6
	HOG removal by other in practice	v2exrmhgnp[69]	No TI (1): 0, 5 TI (0): 1, 3, 4, 6, 7
	HOG control over domestic policy	v2exctlhg[70]	No TI (1): 5 TI (0): 1, 3, 4, 6, 7
	HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs[71]	No TI (1): 1, 6, 7 TI (0): 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8
Horizontal Accountability	Judicial constraints on the executive	v2x_jucon	High (1): 0.75, 1 Low (0): 0.00, 0.25, 0.50
	Legislative constraints on the executive	v2xlg_legcon	High (1): 0.75, 1 Low (0): 0.00, 0.25, 0.50

Having defined a set of coding rules, the next step is to elaborate the similarly subjective process of aggregation. The key questions here revolve around which traits are *necessary* for a regime to be designated as a democracy, and which are *substitutable*. This question is relatively simple to answer at the dimensional level, where all traits are necessary. If an electoral regime does not conduct free and fair elections, fails to adequately protect political freedoms, or does not feature an accountable executive free of tutelary influence, then according to the expanded procedural minimum definition it cannot be a democracy. However, matters become murkier at the indicator level. Can harassment of journalists be offset by adequate academic/cultural freedoms or widespread public internet access? Does executive compliance with the decisions of an independent judiciary balance out a weak legislature?

I treat the majority of my indicators as non-substitutable, meaning that each is a 'necessary condition' for democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 24). This is reflected in the formulae provided in Table 14, Table 15, and Table 16. The indicators for Free Elections, Playing Field

[67] A V-Dem rating of 2 indicates a one-party state, and therefore a non-electoral regime.
[68] A V-Dem rating of 0 means that the HOS does not make important policy decisions.
[69] Again, a rating of 2 indicates a one-party state, and therefore a non-electoral regime.
[70] Again, a rating of 0 means that the HOG does not make important policy decisions.
[71] A V-Dem rating of 1 indicates that a foreign power appoints the HOS, but this is coded as 'No Tutelary Influence' to avoid classing constitutional monarchies such as Australia as non-democratic. If foreign powers exert non-democratic influence, this will be picked up by the other indicators.

Evenness, Freedom of Organisation, Tutelary Influence and Reserved Domains, and Horizontal Accountability components are all aggregated using the multiplicative method. This ensures that if any indicator is coded as 0 (non-democratic), then that component will also be coded as 0. The exception is Freedom of Expression, which comprises three sub-components (Freedom of Information; Freedom of Discussion; and Academic/Cultural Freedom). Indicators within the Freedom of Information sub-component are aggregated using the additive method, with four or more indicators needing to be coded as 'High' (1) for the sub-component to be coded as 'High' (1) overall. The additive method is also applied when aggregating to the component level: at least two of the three sub-components need to be rated as 'High' (1) for Freedom of Expression to be 'High' (1) overall. This is because these indicators are substitutable: for example, government censorship efforts can be offset by a critical media sector and open access to the internet. Similarly, when aggregating to the component level it makes intuitive sense that, for example, limited Freedom of Information can be mitigated if Freedom of Discussion and Academic/Cultural Freedom are both protected.

Table 14: Elections Dimension Aggregation Formulae

<table>
<tr><th>Component Aggregation</th><th colspan="2">Indicator Aggregation</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Elections = FE x PFE</td><td colspan="2">Free Elections (FE) =
v2elrgstry x v2elvotbuy x v2elirreg x v2elintim x v2elpeace

• If FE = 1, it is coded as 'High' (1)
• If FE = 0, it is coded as 'Low' (0)</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Playing Field Evenness (PFE) =
M x L x ES

• If PFE = 1, it is coded as 'Fair' (1)
• If FE = 0, it is coded as 'Unfair' (0)</td><td>Media (M) = v2mebias</td></tr>
<tr><td>Law (L) = v2elembaut x v2elembcap</td></tr>
<tr><td>Electoral System (ES): v2psbars</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">• The Elections dimension is rated 'Fair' if Elections = 1
• The Elections dimension is rated 'Unfair' if Elections = 0</td></tr>
</table>

Table 15: Political Freedoms Dimension Aggregation Formulae

<table>
<tr><th>Component Aggregation</th><th>Components</th><th>Indicator Aggregation</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="3">Political Freedoms = FoE x FoO</td><td rowspan="2">Freedom of Expression (FoE) = FoI + FoD + ACF

• If FoE >= 2, it is coded as 'High' (1)
• If FoE < 2, it is coded as 'Low' (0)</td><td>Freedom of Information (FoI) = v2mecenefm +v2meharjrn + v2meslfcen + v2mecrit + v2merange + v2mecenefi

• If FoI >= 4 it is coded as 'High' (1)
• If FoI < 4, it is coded as 'Low' (0)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Freedom of Discussion (FoD) = v2cldiscm x v2cldiscw</td></tr>
<tr><td>Freedom of Organisation (FoO) = v2psparban x v2cseeorgs x v2csreprss

• If FoO = 1, it is coded as 'High' (1)
• If FoO = 0, it is coded as 'Low' (0)</td><td>Academic/Cultural Freedom (ACF) = v2clacfree</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">• The Political Freedoms dimension is rated 'High' if Political Freedoms = 1
• The Political Freedoms dimension is rated 'Low' if Political Freedoms = 0</td></tr>
</table>

Table 16: Effective Power Dimension Aggregation Formulae

<table>
<tr><th>Component Aggregation</th><th>Indicator Aggregation</th></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Effective Power = TIRD x HA</td><td>Tutelary Influence & Reserved Domains (TIRD) = v2exrmhsol x v2exctlhs x v2exrmhgnp x v2exctlhg x v2expathhs

• If TIRD = 1, it is coded as 'No Tutelary Influence' (1)
• If TIRD = 0, it is coded as 'Tutelary Influence' (0)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Horizontal Accountability (HA) = v2x_jucon x v2xlg_legcon

• If HA = 1, it is coded as 'High' (1.5)
• If HA = 0, it is coded as 'Low' (1)</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">• The Effective Power dimension is rated 'Restricted' if Effective Power = 0
• The Effective Power dimension is rated 'Unrestricted' if Effective Power = 1
• The Effective Power dimension is rated 'Accountable' if Effective Power = 1.5</td></tr>
</table>

The linguistic qualifiers attached to each V-Dem indicator proved invaluable when aggregating to the component level. I used these descriptions to determine cutoff points by developing snapshots of hypothetical marginal cases. For example, it may seem overly restrictive to demand that all Freedom of Organisation indicators be coded as 'High' (1) for the component to receive this rating overall – until the relevant scores are translated into a narrative. To demonstrate, consider the hypothetical marginal case presented in Figure 3. I argue that the direct interference of the state in the civil society sector, with the express purpose of supressing dissent, means that a regime featuring this combination of ratings should not be considered a democracy. Such marginal cases are rare, and the scenario outlined in Figure 3 applies to only two countries in the dataset between 1990 and 2015: Honduras (2013-15); and Madagascar (2010-12). This reinforces that at the indicator level, democratic and non-democratic traits are often bundled together.

Figure 3: Freedom of Organisation Hypothetical Marginal Case

Component coding:

Party ban (v2psparban): 4 = 'High' (1)
CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs): 4 = High (1)
CSO repression (v2csreprss): 2 = Low (0)

Equation

Freedom of Organisation = v2psparban x v2cseeorgs x v2csreprss
∴ Freedom of Organisation = 1 x 1 x 0
∴ Freedom of Organisation = Low (0)

Snapshot

No parties are officially banned, and the government does not prevent the formation and operation of CSOs (excluding those attempting to violently overthrow the government). However, the government does use "material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves", and "also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves" (Coppedge et al. 2017, 244).

Aggregation to the dimensional level is the final step in the process. For each dimension, I have again chosen to adopt a 'necessary conditions' approach. Thus, Elections cannot be rated as 'Fair' unless Free Elections and Playing Field Evenness are coded 'High' (1) and

'Even' (1) respectively (Table 14). Similarly, Political Freedoms cannot be rated as 'High' unless both Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Organisation are coded as 'High' (1) (Table 15). The Effective Power dimension is slightly different, although it still uses a multiplicative formula (Table 16). There are three potential ratings: 'Restricted', where tutelary influence or reserved domains are present; 'Accountable', where tutelary influence and reserved domains are absent and horizontal accountability is high; and 'Unrestricted', where tutelary influence and reserved domains are absent but the executive enjoys relatively unfettered power. These ratings are categorical rather than ordinal, and the values applied in Table 16 are purely to make the equation work from a mathematical perspective. 'Restricted', 'Unrestricted', and 'Accountable' regimes are conceived as qualitatively different, not as degrees on a scale.

Summary

My typology produces 11 mutually exclusive HR subtypes, presented in Table 17 with examples.[72] The typology also generates 'Democracy' as a type for electoral regimes that fulfil all the requirements of the expanded procedural minimum definition. The typology does not generate 'Autocracy' as a type because of the prior differentiation between electoral and non-electoral regimes. I have chosen to label subtypes according to the ways each deviates from the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy. Typologies always entail a balance between parsimony and complexity, and for some researchers, 11 subtypes may veer too far towards the latter. However, political regimes are complex, multidimensional phenomena, and it is vital to account for all the different ways in which their dimensions

[72] See Appendix I: Hybrid Regimes, 1990-2015 for a full list of countries by HR subtype for the period between 1990 and 2015.

may combine. If less fine-grained distinctions are required, researchers can use the broad HR label or utilise the 'partially-ordered scale' set out in the following chapter.

Table 17: Hybrid Regime Subtypes

		Effective Power = Accountable	**Effective Power = Restricted**	**Effective Power = Unrestricted**
Elections = Fair	**Political Freedoms = High**	Democracy	Restricted HR *Ecuador 1990-2007*	Unrestricted HR *Argentina 1990*
	Political Freedoms = Low	Illiberal HR *Turkey 2007-12*	Restricted Illiberal HR *Libya 2013*	Unrestricted Illiberal HR *Turkey 2013*
Elections = Unfair	**Political Freedoms = High**	Unfair HR *Botswana 1990-2015*	Restricted Unfair HR *Fiji 1993-99*	Unrestricted Unfair HR *Lebanon 2006-13*
	Political Freedoms = Low	Illiberal Unfair HR *Colombia 1990-2010*	Restricted Illiberal Unfair HR *Iran 1997-2003*	Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair HR *Russia 1991-2015*

Conclusion

In this chapter, I set out the theoretical basis for the remainder of this thesis. I argued that both existing configurative, trichotomous HR typologies suffer from problems with their theoretical foundations and technical implementation. In light of this, I proposed a new, practically relevant typology that reflects contemporary theoretical perspectives. First, I differentiated between three broad regime types – Democracy, HR, and Autocracy – using the meta-level distinction between electoral and non-electoral regimes and an updated version of the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy. Second, I defined 11 HR subtypes according to the ways in which they deviate from the procedural minimum definition. The extensive description of the logic underpinning the construction of my typology and its operationalisation, coding, and aggregation procedures is intended to allow future researchers to make their own adjustments while retaining the broader framework of a shared lexicon for the analysis of HRs. In the remainder of this thesis, I use the HR subtypes

and their component parts to structure a mixed nested analysis of the relationship between political hybridity and citizen wellbeing.

Moving forward, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of my typology. As Diamond (2002, 33) notes, classificatory schemes are neat and the real world is messy. We should not expect typologies to perfectly reflect reality – especially given the subjective nature of the choices that form the basis of any such system. Nevertheless, classificatory schemes are valuable because they structure our thinking, help us discern broad patterns among apparent chaos, and provide a shared language for the communication of complex concepts.

Chapter 4: Hypotheses & Quantitative Methods

In this chapter, I set out my hypotheses and the quantitative element of my mixed nested analysis. The value of mixed methods for research on political hybridity is that the strengths and weaknesses of the respective methods balance each other out. Statistical analysis provides scientific rigour and conventional generalisability (Hodkinson and Hodkinson 2011, 9–10; Flyvbjerg 2006), and can help to discern whether there are any broad patterns inherent in the relationship between hybridity and wellbeing. Conversely, in-depth qualitative case analysis – further discussed in Chapter Six – offers rich detail and insight into informal processes, which play an important role in shaping the politics of HRs (Goode 2010, 1057).

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I convert the theories described in the Literature Review into five hypotheses regarding the relationship between political hybridity and wellbeing. The first three hypotheses focus on the relationship between specific HR characteristics and citizen wellbeing; and the remaining two hypotheses deal with the relationship between distinct HR subtypes and citizen wellbeing. In the second section, I deal with the technical aspects of my quantitative approach. This involves: demonstrating how the dependent variable, citizen wellbeing, can be proxied by a set of directly observable indicators; outlining the logic behind the various control variables included in each model; and describing the strengths and weaknesses of my statistical model. Equipped with these tools, it is possible to bring to bear quantitative analysis on the question of whether there is an association between different types of HR and citizen wellbeing.

Hypotheses

In this section, I present my five hypotheses and the explanatory variables used to test them. To recap, in democratic regimes the key institutions theorised to help improve citizen

wellbeing are elections and political freedoms, while scholarship on autocratic development suggests that the most important consideration is the degree to which executive power is constrained. Hypotheses 1 to 3 address the first part of my second research question by testing the effects of the individual dimensions drawn from my typology. The latter part of my second research question – which focuses on aggregated HR subtypes – is investigated through the remaining two hypotheses. The fourth hypothesis investigates whether HRs with more democratic characteristics have higher levels of citizen wellbeing, and the fifth hypothesis tests whether citizen wellbeing varies across HR subtypes. At the end of the section, I note the number of observations for each explanatory variable.

Hypothesis 1

Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes with fair elections.

H1 tests whether fair elections improve citizen wellbeing. This theory is premised on the assumption that elections allow the principal (the electorate) to punish a poorly performing agent (the government) by voting them out of power, thereby encouraging more effective political leadership. This argument – premised on Meltzer and Richards' (1981) median voter theory – assumes that in democratic states the poor and working-class majority will vote out candidates or parties that fail to effectively provide health and education services, infrastructure, and other basic needs. However, as noted in the Literature Review, this logic breaks down in the face of complex development issues "where the failures are less obvious, less dramatic, and less easily tied to the current government" (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012, 3). This may be compounded by any combination of several problems: poor understanding of the relevant issues among the population; voting based on identity politics rather than government performance; short-term thinking on the part of the electorate

and/or the political establishment; and lack of a viable opposition. Any of these factors can undermine the potential for elections to improve citizen wellbeing.

Although many studies have compared human development outcomes in electoral and non-electoral regimes (see for example Harding and Stasavage 2014; Cassani 2016), less attention has been paid to the effects of electoral fairness on citizen wellbeing. On the qualitative side, Giovanni Carbone (2011, 384) uses evidence from Ghana to suggest that "the more competitive the political system, the stronger the pressures both for addressing voters' concerns with proper election platforms, and for actually delivering policy responses once in power". The best quantitative example comes from Gerring *et al* (2015, 8), who argue that "a minimal amount of contestation is good for human development, but… greater contestation is even better". Using their 'Multiplicative Electoral Democracy Index' (MEDI) and a 'Clean Elections' index (one of the MEDI's components), they find that electoral competitiveness "bears a continuous and monotonic relationship to human development", as proxied by infant mortality (Gerring *et al* 2015, 29).[73] Leaving aside methodological differences between their approach and mine,[74] the problem with this is that it does not take in to account the broader context of political regime type.

Recalling that all HRs are electoral regimes – meaning that they hold minimally competitive elections – it is the fairness of elections that varies across subtypes. Using the Elections dimension of my typology, HRs are designated as 'Fair' or 'Unfair' based on the evenness of the electoral playing field and whether voting is executed freely. This allows for the use of a dichotomous explanatory variable: an HR country-year receives a 1 if it is rated as 'Fair' and

[73] See also Wang *et al* 2018.
[74] Gerring *et al* (2015) take a graded approach.

a 0 if it is rated as 'Unfair'.[75] Following Gerring and Carbone, I expect that HRs rated as 'Fair'[76] will have higher levels of citizen wellbeing than hybrids with 'Unfair' elections.[77]

Hypothesis 2

Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes with high political freedoms.

H2 tests the theory that the institutionalisation of strong political freedoms leads to improved citizen wellbeing. As noted in the Literature Review, the few studies that examine this aspect of the link between regime type and wellbeing define political freedoms more broadly than required by the procedural minimum definition of democracy. Therefore, in line with my typology, I narrow the focus to the basic freedoms of organisation and expression. Freedom of organisation is theorised to improve citizen wellbeing by fostering a lively civil society featuring actors[78] that transmit information between citizens and the government, lobby political elites for improved basic services, and create social capital (Rudra and Haggard 2005, 1018; McGuire 2010, 11; Christoforou 2010). Freedom of expression is thought to improve citizen wellbeing by allowing an independent and critical media to hold the government to account for its failings (Drèze and Sen 1991; A. Sen 2000), and by permitting the public to openly discuss human development issues. In contrast, autocratic governments typically prevent citizens from forming groups that could challenge their power and attempt to control public access to information. This may produce a 'dictator's dilemma', in which the government is unable to identify and address the needs of the electorate (Malesky and Schuler 2011; Croissant and Wurster 2013, 5; Magaloni 2008; M. Miller 2015a).

[75] Non-election years are coded the same as the most recent election.
[76] Restricted, Unrestricted, Illiberal, Restricted Illiberal, and Unrestricted Illiberal HRs.
[77] Unfair, Restricted Unfair, Unrestricted Unfair, Illiberal Unfair, Restricted Illiberal Unfair, and Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair HRs.
[78] Including trade unions, politically active religious groups, specific interest groups, and charity organisations.

There is significant variation in the protections afforded to political freedoms across different types of HR. Those that respect freedoms of organisation and expression at the minimum level expected of democracies are rated 'High' on the Political Freedoms dimension, while HRs that curtail these rights are rated 'Low'. As with H1, this allows for a dichotomous explanatory variable: an HR country-year receives a 1 if it is rated 'High' and a 0 if it is rated 'Low'. If the theories drawn from the literature are correct,[79] then HR subtypes with high political freedoms[80] should have better citizen wellbeing outcomes than those with low political freedoms.[81]

Hypothesis 3

a) Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes where the power of the executive is unrestricted.
b) Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes where the power of the executive is accountable.

H3a is based on the now unfashionable idea that autocratic governments are more able to drive rapid development than democratic governments. This was thought to be because autocratic governments can enact long-term policies without worrying about electoral defeat, use coercion to maintain domestic stability, and prevent external actors from undermining national development (Rao 1985, 79; Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, 130–31). In contrast, some scholars demonstrate the pitfalls of unrestrained executive power (see Ake 1991; Thompson 2004), and argue that it is associated with increased economic instability and poor growth rates (Acemoglu *et al* 2003; Anderson and Hachem 2013). Therefore, H3b tests the alternative proposition that an accountable executive is best placed to deliver improved

[79] See for example Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2011; Biser and Edwards 2012; Harris 2014; Ghak, Zarrouk, and Aloulou 2018.
[80] Restricted, Unrestricted, Unfair, Restricted Unfair, and Unrestricted Unfair HRs.
[81] Illiberal, Restricted Illiberal, Unrestricted Illiberal, Illiberal Unfair, Restricted Illiberal Unfair, and Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair HRs.

citizen wellbeing. Although this is an under-studied topic, some researchers argue that accountability mechanisms such as judicial independence increase economic growth (Voigt and Gutmann 2013), and that effective horizontal accountability increases government social spending (Healey and Tordoff 1995; Kumah and Brazys 2016).

The links between executive power and wellbeing in the hybrid context have not been explored. In my typology, the executive in an HR will, by definition, face some degree of electoral accountability. Beyond this, there are three possible ratings for the Effective Power dimension: 'Accountable', meaning that checks and balances on the executive operate at the minimum standard expected in a democracy; 'Restricted', meaning that the executive is beholden to a tutelary power; and 'Unrestricted', meaning that the executive routinely overrides institutionalised checks and balances. To test the association between these different ratings and citizen wellbeing, I created a dummy variable for each. If H3a is correct, HRs where Effective Power is 'Unrestricted'[82] should have the highest levels of citizen wellbeing. Alternatively, it may be that theories regarding the positive effects of horizontal accountability are correct, in which case 'Accountable' regimes[83] should perform best.

Hypothesis 4

Citizen wellbeing is highest in 'Soft' hybrids and lowest in 'Hard' hybrids.

H4 adapts the popular idea that 'more democratic' political regimes have higher levels of human development to the hybrid context (Wullert and Williamson 2016, 1058). Although I argue that the multidimensional nature of political regimes undermines the usefulness of an overall scale of 'democraticness', my typology can be used to create a 'partially-ordered scale' for HRs (Collier, Laporte, and Seawright 2008, 157; see also Dahl 1973, chap. 1). This

[82] Unrestricted, Unrestricted Illiberal, and Unrestricted Unfair HRs.
[83] Illiberal, Unfair, and Illiberal Unfair HRs.

approach builds on the work of Wigell (2008, 242): although his HR typology is constructed around the idea of political regimes as bounded wholes, he acknowledges that within these some regimes are more democratic than others. Table 18 depicts the partially-ordered scale of HR subtypes derived from my typology. HRs that are non-democratic in all three dimensions are labelled 'Hard' HRs, those with two non-democratic dimensions are 'Intermediate' HRs, and those with only one non-democratic dimension are 'Soft' HRs.

Table 18: Partially-ordered Scale

Hard HRs	Intermediate HRs	Soft HRs
Illiberal Unrestricted Unfair HR	Unrestricted Unfair HR	Restricted HR
Illiberal Restricted Unfair HR	Unrestricted Illiberal HR	Illiberal HR
	Restricted Unfair HR	Unfair HR
	Restricted Illiberal HR	Unrestricted HR
	Illiberal Unfair HR	

If the prediction that more democratic regimes have better human development outcomes is true, then within the realm of HRs we should expect to find the highest levels of citizen wellbeing in Soft HRs, followed by Intermediate HRs, and then finally Hard HRs. To test this, each category is converted into a dummy variable. It is important to note that although there is no *a priori* ranking of regimes within the three broad categories, it is possible that intra-category patterns reflecting the theories tested by the first three hypotheses might emerge.

Hypothesis 5

Different hybrid regime subtypes have different levels of citizen wellbeing.

H5 tests one of the core proposition of my thesis: that to fully understand the impact of political hybridity on citizen wellbeing, it is vital to understand how different combinations of hybrid traits affect outcomes. To investigate this, each of the 11 HR subtypes – expressed

in dummy form – becomes an explanatory variable. By testing for significant variations in citizen wellbeing across HR subtypes it is possible to examine how different dimensional combinations jointly affect citizen wellbeing, instead of analysing specific elements in isolation. The proposition that it is crucial to study the interactions between the different dimensions of a political system has significant support in the literature. For example, Gerring *et al* (2015, 23) note that "the various ingredients of electoral democracy have important interactive effects", and Alexander Korolev (2016, 453) argues that it is vital to "explain the relationship between different attributes of democracy in generating certain social outcomes". Finally, Sen (2000, 142) suggests that

> even though different commentators have chosen to focus on particular institutions… we have to view them together, to be able to see what they can or cannot do in combination with other institutions. It is in this integrated perspective that the different institutions can be reasonably assessed and examined.

The same logic holds for the hybrid context.

Important practical lessons can be drawn from variations in citizen wellbeing across HR subtype and what these demonstrate about dimensional interactions. For example, it may be that in HRs, strong electoral competition alone decreases citizen wellbeing because it reifies societal divides and promotes adversarial politics, but when political freedoms also improve, this negative effect is ameliorated by increased social capital and public debate. Thus, through H5 it may be possible to learn how to productively sequence development interventions aimed at democratising elements of a political system.

Explanatory Variable Data

Using my typology, it is possible to elaborate some of the characteristics of the hybrid political space between 1990 to 2015.[84] During this period, 120 countries were HRs at some point, resulting in 1,919 HR country-years.[85] Notably, only 5.26 per cent of HR country-years were defined as 'Fair' on the Elections dimension, making 'Unfair' HR variants by far the most common subtypes (Table 19). For the Political Freedoms dimension, country-years were split roughly equally between the 'High' and 'Low' ratings. Just over 70.77 per cent of country-years were given a non-democratic rating on the effective power dimension, with 'Restricted' regimes (38.51 per cent) outnumbering 'Unrestricted' regimes (32.26 per cent). Therefore, it is unsurprising that Intermediate and Hard HRs accounted for 71.29 per cent of country-years. This emphasises that non-democratic practices are not usually confined to just one dimension of the political system.

Table 19: Explanatory Variable Observations

Hypothesis	Explanatory Variable		Observations (country-years) *n = 1,919*	% of Observations
1	Elections	Fair	101	5.26
		Unfair	1,818	94.74
2	Political Freedoms	High	1,103	57.48
		Low	816	42.52
3	Effective Power	Unrestricted	619	32.26
		Accountable	561	29.23
		Restricted	739	38.51
4	Partially-ordered Scale	Hard HR	705	36.74
		Intermediate HR	663	34.55
		Soft HR	551	28.71
5	HR Subtype	Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair HR	319	16.62
		Restricted Illiberal Unfair HR	386	20.11
		Unrestricted Unfair HR	248	12.92
		Unrestricted Illiberal HR	3	0.16
		Restricted Unfair HR	318	16.57
		Restricted Illiberal HR	1	0.05
		Illiberal Unfair HR	93	4.85
		Restricted HR	34	1.77
		Illiberal HR	14	0.73
		Unfair HR	454	23.66
		Unrestricted HR	49	2.55

[84] The reasons for using this time period are set out later in this chapter.
[85] Compared to 1,164 democratic country-years and 1,268 non-electoral regime country-years.

Quantitative Methods

Dependent Variable

My dependent variable is 'citizen wellbeing', an overarching term that I use to connote the holistic welfare of a state's population. Using this term places the emphasis of my research on the impact that political hybridity has on people's daily lives in a broad sense, which is a vital topic given the prevalence of HRs in the developing world. I prefer citizen wellbeing to 'human development' for two reasons. First, human development is conceived as a process (Harding and Wantchekon 2010, 2), whereas I use citizen wellbeing to capture a snapshot at a particular time. Second, human development has specific associations with the HDI and the UNDP's *Human Development Report*, which use different indicators. My use of citizen wellbeing bears no relation to subjective concepts such as happiness, for which the term has sometimes been used as a synonym (Anand 2016, 4).

Citizen wellbeing is a nebulous concept that cannot be directly measured. Therefore, it is necessary to define a set of quantifiable proxy indicators that combine to capture the key aspects of wellbeing. GDP per capita has traditionally been used for this purpose due to its wide availability, ease of interpretation, and high correlation with other potential indicators such as life expectancy. Yet the use of this purely economic measure to proxy wellbeing is problematic because it "interprets every expense as positive and does not distinguish welfare-enhancing activity from welfare-reducing activity", ignores non-monetary transactions and their effect on wellbeing, and does not take into account inequality (Kubiszewski *et al* 2013, 57). The focus on GDP per capita as an indicator of development is demonstrative of a broader preoccupation in the literature with economic outcomes over the actual wellbeing of citizens (Harding and Wantchekon 2010, 2–3).

Over the past decade, high-quality cross-national data more closely related to wellbeing has become widely available. This data has been used to construct several multidimensional

indices that attempt to capture the essence of wellbeing, and I use two of the most prominent – the HDI and the MPI – to guide my own selection of proxy indicators. Both indices have their roots in Sen's capabilities approach, which forms the basis of the human development paradigm. Sen (2000, 85) describes a person's capabilities as their real opportunities to do and be what they value and have reason to value, meaning that the primary goal of development is to expand "the real freedoms that people enjoy" (2000, 4). The central idea of the human development paradigm is that development is not simply about improving economic outcomes, but enlarging people's choices and consequently their ability to live rich and fulfilling lives (UNDP 2015, iii). Consequently, the first *Human Development Report* (1990) highlighted longevity, knowledge, income, and living standards as key elements of human existence (Harding and Wantchekon 2010, 2). The HDI operationalises these indicators by combining average income, life expectancy, and literacy rates to create a country's composite score.[86] The Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative's MPI takes a broader approach, using ten indicators divided into three dimensions (Table 20). Unlike the HDI's top down approach, the MPI is based on individual/household data that is aggregated to the national level.[87]

Table 20: MPI Construction. Adapted from Alkire *et al* 2014, 2.

Dimension	Indicator	Relative Weight
Education	Years of Schooling	1/6
	Child School Attendance	1/6
Health	Child Mortality	1/6
	Nutrition	1/6
Living Standard	Electricity	1/18
	Improved Sanitation	1/18
	Safe Drinking Water	1/18
	Flooring	1/18
	Cooking Fuel	1/18
	Assets	1/18

[86] As of 2014, the HDI covered 188 states (UNDP 2015a).

[87] The overall MPI score is calculated by multiplying the percentage of individuals classified as multidimensionally poor and the average number of indicators in which poor people are considered deprived, and therefore reflects both the incidence and intensity of poverty (Alkire, Conconi, and Seth 2014, 4).

Both the HDI and the MPI have received robust criticism. Leaving aside methodological issues[88] and debates about the merits of composite indices (see for example Kelley 1991; Fukuda-Parr 2003; McGillivray 2005; Ravallion 2011; Yusof *et al* 2015, 45), the pertinent question for this thesis is whether the dimensions and indicators used to construct each index adequately capture the concept of wellbeing. The HDI's simple formulation uses a single indicator to proxy each broad dimension drawn from Sen's theoretical work. This approach was driven by data availability at the time of the HDI's inception (Alkire 2007, 98), and has the advantage of parsimony. However, the HDI's limited set of indicators is unable to fully capture the broad scope of Sen's theory (Ranis, Stewart, and Samman 2006, 324), and the increasing availability of vast amounts of data on other aspects of people's lives means it has become possible to move beyond the HDI's narrow approach.

The pertinence of the HDI's dimensions, if not its indicators, was recognised by the architects of the MPI (Alkire and Santos 2010, 12). In fact, one of the guiding principles in the selection of the MPI's dimensions was alignment with pre-existing measures of development, poverty, and wellbeing, such as the HDI and the MDGs (Alkire and Santos 2014, 253). Beyond this, selection was informed by participatory exercises and theoretical reasoning (Alkire and Santos 2014, 253). The goal was to ensure that the MPI is relevant to the communities to which it is applied, comparable to existing measures, and reflective of academic understandings of basic needs and rights. However, the development of the MPI was constrained by practical limitations, including interpretability and the availability of data (Alkire and Santos 2013, 10).

There is disagreement over whether the MPI adequately captures the experience of poverty, and by extension, the concept of wellbeing. Martin Ravallion (2011, 238) argues that the MPI confuses elements of poverty that are intrinsically valuable, such as health, with those that

[88] Such as the weighting and aggregation of indicators.

should be valued instrumentally, such as education. Fortunately, this debate is tangential to my analysis, because the goal of developing a broad picture of citizen wellbeing is best achieved by including both instrumental and intrinsic factors. More concerning are the aspects of wellbeing that are absent from the MPI, with the most notable being gender equality, and violence and personal security (Green quoted in Ravallion 2011, 238).

Following the HDI and the MPI, I use the themes[89] of Health, Education, and Living Standards to capture the concept of wellbeing. The theoretical justification for this is that each is a fundamental good, "upon which the enjoyment of all other goods depends" (Gerring *et al* 2015, 10; see also Sen 2000; McGuire 2010, 2013). Additionally, as noted by the creators of the MPI, these themes are identified consistently in participatory exercises and used in other measures of development, wellbeing, and poverty (Alkire and Santos 2014, 253). However, I have also sought to address a key omission from the MPI by including Gender Equality as a theme, which is important on several counts. First, because gender, "as an analytical category, captures the complex matrix of social relationships within society" it can provide insight into distributions of power within the economic, political, and social spheres (Caprioli 2005, 165). Second, women often experience the impact of changes in societal wellbeing more acutely than men (see Rogan 2016, 990–91 for a summary of literature in this field), making gender indicators useful bellwethers.[90]

Having selected four themes, the next step was to operationalise these as quantifiable indicators. This process was governed by two requirements: the availability of enough data to facilitate regression analysis; and alignment with best practice in the literature.[91] In terms

[89] The term 'theme' is used in place of dimension to avoid confusion with the three dimensions that comprise my typology.
[90] For example, Baum and Lake (2003, 338) "focus on female human capital indicators because we anticipate they will be more sensitive to variations in regime type than male health and education".
[91] Because my goal is to give a sense of generalised citizen wellbeing across different types of political system rather than develop a composite index, my selection of indicators was not bound by technical considerations such as weighting, source equivalence, and correlation between indicators.

of the former, my analysis requires time-series cross-section (TSCS) data, which is "characterized by having repeated observations on fixed units" (Beck and Katz 1995, 634) – in this case, countries. There are few sources that provide data in country-year format over a long enough period to capture the effects of changes in political regime type. The need for global coverage precluded the use of the Demographic and Health Survey and the Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey, which form the basis of the MPI. The best available source for my purposes is the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI), the most comprehensive, up-to-date, and widely used development-related dataset. To help ensure the robustness of results, I limited the pool of potential indicators to those with over 1,000 observations for HR country-years between 1990 to 2015.[92] I use only HR country-years because my focus is on the ways that the elements of a political system interact in the context of hybridity, which is qualitatively different from its autocratic and democratic counterparts. It is also important to note that I have chosen to focus on outcome indicators rather than government spending on areas related to wellbeing, such as health and education. This is partly due to problems with the reliability and availability of spending data, and partly because government expenditure is an intervening variable between regime type and citizen wellbeing. However, this could be a productive area for future analysis.

With these practical considerations in mind, I chose four indicators for the Health theme, three for the Education theme, and two each for the Living Standards and Gender Equality themes (Table 21). Each of the Health indicators are commonly used in the literature as proxies for wellbeing.[93] Infant mortality is particularly popular, as it is sensitive to

[92] The reasons for using this period are discussed below.
[93] See for example Zweifel and Navia 2000; Navia and Zweifel 2003; McGillivray 2005; Ross 2006; McGuire 2010; Blaydes and Kayser 2011; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; Kudamatsu 2012; Harris 2014; Cassani and Carbone 2015; Cassani 2016.

> many other conditions – including access to clean water and sanitation, indoor air quality, female education and literacy, prenatal and neonatal health services, caloric intake, disease, and of course, income – that are hard to measure among the very poor. (M. Ross 2006, 861)

Similarly, under-5 mortality and life expectancy are useful indicators because the "avoidance of early death is necessary for the exercise of any human capability" (McGuire 2013, 55; see also Sen 1999). Maternal mortality, defined as "the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination" (World Bank 2017b), provides insight into the nexus between health policy and gender equality.[94] Moreover, all four indicators are objective, widely available, and easily measurable (Gerring *et al* 2015, 10).

Table 21: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variable Indicators

Indicator	HR Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births)	1,894	43.13	29.73	2.10	150.60
Under-5 mortality (per 1000 live births)	1,894	62.62	52.08	2.70	326.50
Maternal mortality (modelled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	1,871	293.24	317.19	5.00	2890
Life expectancy at birth	1,896	64.93	8.58	27.61	82.74
Secondary school enrolment rate (gross)	1,283	62.10	26.80	5.21	153.41
Primary completion rate (% of relevant age group)	1,169	79.68	23.10	13.46	139.90
Mean years of schooling (age 25+)	1,716	6.28	2.79	0.30	12.90
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)	1,838	57.18	29.11	3.90	100.00
Access to electricity (% of population)	1,898	63.49	34.98	0.01	100.00
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament	1,400	14.56	10.25	0.00	63.80
School enrolment, secondary (gross), gender parity index	1,182	0.94	0.19	0.21	1.59
HDI	1,714	0.58	0.14	0.20	0.93

[94] Note that the maternal mortality ratio is estimated using a regression model (World Bank 2017b).

The three Education indicators are also commonly used in the literature.[95] I selected gross secondary school enrolment rate because it exhibits more variation than the primary school equivalent following decades of emphasis on primary education in development programmes. Gross secondary school enrolment measures "total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age", meaning that "a high ratio may reflect a substantial number of overage children enrolled in each grade because of repetition or late entry rather than a successful education system" (World Bank 2017a). However, the alternative measure of net secondary school enrolment rate had too few observations available to justify inclusion. Primary completion rate is useful as it "reflects an education system's coverage and the educational attainment of students" (World Bank 2017c), and mean years of schooling is part of the HDI.[96]

The two Living Standards indicators are both used in the MPI, with the sanitation indicator also included in the MDGs. Access to adequate sanitation supports improved health and education outcomes by reducing the incidence of disease, and therefore, "international organizations use hygienic sanitation facilities as a measure for progress in the fight against poverty, disease, and death" (World Bank 2017d).[97] Electricity access is a rough proxy for quality of housing (Alkire and Santos 2014, 254), and is also linked to educational outcomes (see for example Davis 1998, 209; Kanagawa and Nakata 2008, 2018; Kirubi *et al* 2009, 1210). In combination, these two indicators give an impression of the basic infrastructure available to citizens.

[95] See for example Lake and Baum 2001; M. Baum and Lake 2003; Deacon 2009; Eterovic and Sweet 2014; Cassani and Carbone 2015; Cassani 2016.
[96] The data on mean years of schooling used for the HDI is derived from a range of sources (see UNDP 2016).
[97] For more on the links between water, sanitation, education and health outcomes see for example Sullivan, Meigh, and Giacomello 2003; Larson, Minten, and Razafindralambo 2006.

Data availability was a key constraint on my choice of indicators for the Gender Equality theme. I considered using the Gender Inequality Index (GII),[98] which is calculated using the maternal mortality ratio, adolescent birth rate, share of parliamentary seats held by women, female secondary and higher-level educational attainment, and female labour force participation (UNDP 2016, 7). However, the GII has only been available annually since 2010, and there are methodological concerns regarding its construction (Klasen and Schüler 2011). Most notably, it "penalizes low-income countries for poor performances in the reproductive health indicators that are not entirely explained by… gender-related norms or discriminatory practices" (Permanyer 2013, 23). Instead, I chose to use the share of parliamentary seats held by women and the secondary school enrolment Gender Parity Index (GPI) because these indicators have more historical data available. The former is drawn from the GII's 'empowerment' dimension, and is a "crude, but widely available, measure of women's access to power" (Permanyer 2013, 3). The inclusion of female voices in parliament is important for wellbeing because it "leads to more governmental and institutional legitimacy as well as a fairer representation of interests and demands" (Stockemer 2011, 694). The GPI provides a useful insight into equality of access to higher levels of education, which has flow on effects in terms of economic opportunities and social status.

I also use HDI as a dependant variable proxy. Despite the critiques noted above, the HDI remains a widely used and easily interpretable measure of wellbeing. For the purposes of this thesis, it provides a useful counterpoint to the broad range of indicators used across the various themes. There is value in being able to contrast a single composite value against potentially divergent trends across a range of more specific proxy measures of wellbeing. To this end, I had initially hoped to use two other prominent and well-understood measures – the World Bank absolute poverty rate and the Gini index score – but there was insufficient

[98] As of 2015, the GII replaced the Gender Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure.

data available. Overall, using a wide range of indicators to create a comprehensive picture of citizen wellbeing is vital, because drawing broad conclusions about the effects of complex phenomena based on a single outcome can be misleading (Kramon and Posner 2013).[99]

To assist with interpreting the results derived from such a large range of dependent variable proxy indicators, I created an index for each theme. This was done using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a popular statistical technique for simplifying data sets that has been used to create composite scores such as the World Bank's asset-based socioeconomic status index (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006, 460). PCA involves combining the relevant indicators to create a set of uncorrelated 'components'. Each component assigns a different weighting to its constituent indicators, and components are ranked according to the percentage of variance in the data they explain. A principal component that explains a sufficiently high proportion of variance can be used as an index. Table 22 shows the percentage of variance explained by the best principal component for each theme, as well as the weightings that component allocated to its constituent indicators. It is important not to attach practical meaning to index scores derived from PCA, as the weightings applied to each indicator do not have any basis in theory regarding their relative importance for the concept of wellbeing. The indices are intended purely to assist with interpretation.

[99] Despite this, most studies examining the link between political regime type and wellbeing still use only one proxy indicator, such as infant mortality (M. Ross 2006; McGuire 2013; Wang, Mechkova, and Andersson 2018).

Table 22: Construction of Theme Indices

Index	Percentage of Variance Explained	HR Observations	Indicator	Weighting
Health	92.33	1,864	Infant mortality	0.508
			Under-5 mortality rate	0.514
			Maternal mortality ratio	0.494
			Life Expectancy	-0.484
Education	90.09	872	Secondary school enrolment rate	0.592
			Primary completion rate	0.571
			Mean years of schooling	0.569
Living Standards	89.8	1,833	Improved sanitation facilities	0.707
			Access to electricity	0.707
Gender Equality	58.6	938	Female parliamentary representation	0.707
			Secondary GPI	0.707

Time Period

I have chosen to focus my analysis on the period from 1990 to 2015, as this covers the post-Cold War wave of 'democratisation' and subsequent consolidation of regime types. Although many countries became somewhat less autocratic in the aftermath of the Cold War, it has since become clear that this was often not simply the first step of a transition to full democracy (Carothers 2002, 18). Instead, HRs are now the most common type of political system in the developing world (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3). The decision to restrict my analysis to 1990-2015 was also informed by practical considerations. First, because the V-Dem dataset was only instituted in 2014, all years before then are back-coded. Despite efforts to ensure the accuracy of the retrospective coding of subjective indicators, it is likely that data points further back in time are less reliable than those closer to the present. Using the period from 1990 to 2015 provides a compromise between data accuracy and having enough observations to examine the effects of HR subtype. Finally, there is significantly more data available on the indicators used to proxy the dependent variable (and my control variables, discussed below) for the post-1990 era.

Missing Data

Missing data in the indicators used to proxy the dependent variable is inevitable. This is not a problem if the missing data is random, but this is often not the case. For example, Michael Ross (2006, 865) notes that there is a consistent lack of data from high-performing non-democracies, which "may lead to the false inference that democracies outperform nondemocracies". Fortunately the WDI is constantly expanding its coverage, and there is now significantly more data available for high-performing non-democracies.[100] Given that Ross identifies non-democracies as having the least data available, we might expect that Hard HRs – representing the least democratic subtypes on the partially-ordered scale – would account for the majority of missing data. However, this was only the case for seven out of 13 indicators, with Intermediate HRs accounting for the highest proportion of missing data in the remaining six (Table 23). In fact, there are no consistent patterns apart from missing education data being slightly skewed towards Intermediate and Hard HRs. Ross' concerns are further ameliorated by the large sample of countries included in my analysis (Klomp and de Haan 2009, 40), and by the fact that the spread of missingness for HRs is relatively even across the five World Bank income categories (Table 24). It is therefore reasonable to conclude that my results will not be significantly affected by non-random missing data. Missingness is therefore dealt with through listwise deletion, rather than imputation.

[100] Such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Cuba (M. Ross 2006, 864).

Table 23: Proxy Indicator Missingness

Variable	No. Missing	% Missing	Missingness by HR Type (% of total no. missing)		
			Soft	***Inter.***	***Hard***
Infant mortality	25	1.30	1.45	2.11	0.43
Under-5 mortality rate	25	1.30	1.45	2.11	0.43
Maternal mortality ratio	48	2.50	1.45	3.77	2.13
Life Expectancy	23	1.20	1.45	0.75	1.42
Secondary school enrolment rate	636	33.14	20.51	39.82	36.74
Primary completion rate	750	39.08	29.04	43.14	43.12
Mean years of schooling	203	10.58	4.90	15.38	10.50
Improved sanitation facilities	81	4.22	3.99	4.07	4.54
Access to electricity	21	1.09	1.81	1.21	0.43
Female parliamentary representation	519	27.05	21.78	26.40	31.77
Secondary GPI	737	38.41	22.87	45.55	43.83
HDI	205	10.68	15.38	15.38	10.78

Table 24: Patterns of Missingness by World Bank Income Category[101]

Income Category	HR observations	% of data missing (all indicators)
Low income	420	14.01
Lower middle income	743	14.96
Upper middle income	667	11.11
High income	73	17.35

Transformations

To facilitate regression analysis, it is often necessary to transform the data. For example, James McGuire (2013, 59) uses the log of infant mortality as his dependent variable, which is "standard practice in infant mortality research". Log transformations serve two purposes: they can shift the distribution of a variable closer to normality; and when the dependent variable is expressed in percentage or proportion terms, they can ensure that a fixed effects model does not produce illogical estimates beyond the natural bounds of the unit interval (C. Baum 2008, 300). The former is not an issue for most of my dependent variables, as a non-normal distribution does not violate the assumptions required for fixed effects regressions.[102] However, the problem of illogical estimates is pertinent: for the mortality indicators, many

[101] There were 16 HR country-years not classified by the World Bank.
[102] It is the distribution of residuals that is key.

observations are near the lower bound of zero; and other indicators, including female parliamentary representation and those that comprise the Living Standards theme, are additionally bound by an upper limit of 100 per cent (Table 21). Using log values of these indicators means that the coefficient estimates can be interpreted "as the effects of [the] explanatory variables in terms of the percentage change they generate" (S. V. Subramanian and Canning 2009, 1919). However, this strategy is only feasible where the dependent variable does not take on values of less than one (C. Baum 2008, 301), meaning that electricity access and female parliamentary representation required a prior transformation: as indicated in Table 25, one is added to the base value before the log transformation is applied. These transformations meant that the same model specification could be used for all indicators.[103]

Table 25: Indicator Transformations

Indicator	Transformation
Infant mortality	Log
Under-5 mortality rate	Log
Maternal mortality ratio	Log
Life Expectancy	NA
Secondary school enrolment rate	NA
Primary completion rate	NA
Mean years of schooling	NA
Improved sanitation facilities	Log
Access to electricity	+1, Log
Female parliamentary representation	+1, Log
Secondary GPI	NA
Human Development Index	NA

Control Variables

The selection of control variables for each model was guided by the need to balance parsimony and model completeness. Christopher Achen (2002, 446) argues that with more than three control variables, "no one can do the careful data analysis to ensure that the model

[103] My preferred model (discussed below) is not compatible with other approaches suggested in the literature for dealing with percentage dependent variables, such as generalised estimating equations or generalised linear models.

specification is accurate". However, the danger of omitted variable bias leads many researchers to include a dizzying array of controls in their models (see for example Tavares and Wacziarg 2001; Cassani 2013). I err on the side of parsimony – although not to the extreme suggested by Achen – and only include control variables that "are largely immune to government influence" (M. Ross 2006, 867). Thus, factors which might affect the dependent variable but are products of government intervention – such as immunisation rates and government spending – are excluded so that they do not "reduce the substantive and statistical significance of the 'regime type' variables, and consequently, underestimate the role that governments play" (M. Ross 2006, 867). Using a limited number of controls is also advantageous because it means that fewer observations are dropped due to missing data. I do not control for relatively time-invariant factors – such as ethnic fractionalisation and religious affiliation – because these are accounted for through the use of country fixed effects (Mackenbach, Hu, and Looman 2013, 168).

With these considerations in mind, I selected five basic control variables that are included in every model (Table 26). The first of these is a set of dummy variables for all years except 1990, which control for aggregate trends and year specific shocks. The second is regime duration, with each country allocated a 1 in the first year it is defined broadly as an HR, then a 2 in its second year, and so on. Although my regression analysis is limited to 1990-2015, regime durations are calculated from 1950 onwards.[104] Duration is a proxy for regime consolidation, which is expected to have a positive effect on wellbeing due to the benefits associated with regime stability. Although duration and consolidation "are not perfect correlates…. The strong relationship between a regime's level of consolidation and its tenure is widely noted in the regime transition literature" (C. Bell 2011, 629). The third basic control is Official Development Assistance (ODA) per capita, which has "a direct effect on the

[104] For example, in 1990 Sweden's value for duration was 39, because it has been classed as a Democracy since 1952, when the data became available.

provision of schooling and health services" as well as the development of democratic institutions, and may therefore be a confounding factor (Cassani 2016, 102; see also Stasavage 2005, 350; Kudamatsu 2012, 1300–1301). The fourth and fifth basic controls are total population and the share of the population that lives in rural areas. These variables are important because population size and distribution affect the ability of the government to provide services to its citizens. Larger and more dispersed populations make it more difficult and costly to provide the health, education, and infrastructural services that underpin citizen wellbeing.[105]

Table 26: Control Variables

Variable	Source	Transformation	Health	Education	Living Standards	Gender Equality		HDI
						FPR	GPI	
Year dummies	Author	NA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Regime Duration	Author	NA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
ODA (per capita)	WDI	NA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population	WDI	Log	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rural Population	WDI	Log	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
GDP (per capita)	WDI	Log	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
GDP Growth (per capita)	WDI	NA	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Population Density	WDI	NA	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Conflict	UPCD	NA	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Natural Resources (% of GDP)	WDI	NA	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Fertility rate, total (births per woman)	WDI	NA	✓	-	-	✓	✓	✓
Youth (% of population)	WDI	NA	-	✓	-	-	✓	-
Population Growth	WDI	NA	-	-	✓	-	-	-
Females (% of population)	WDI	NA	-	-	-	✓	✓	-
Proportional Representation	V-Dem	NA	-	-	-	✓	-	-

[105] See for example Lake and Baum 2001; M. Baum and Lake 2003, 339; Mazumdar 2005, 103; Hanson 2015, 316; M. Miller 2015b, 1543.

All models except those which use HDI as the dependent variable also control for GDP per capita and the annual growth of GDP per capita. The former is expressed in constant 2011 international dollars[106] and the latter is in percentage form, with both being lagged one year behind the dependent variable. Controlling for a country's prosperity and economic progress is customary practice in the literature (see Mazumdar 2005; Cassani 2013; McGuire 2013), because wealthier countries generally have higher levels of citizen wellbeing. These controls are excluded from the HDI models because the index already includes GDP per capita (Özcan and Bjørnskov 2011, 757).

All models except those using female parliamentary representation as the dependent variable control for population density, the incidence of conflict, and a country's reliance on natural resources.[107] Like the share of population living in rural areas, population density affects service provision: a highly concentrated population makes it easier for the government to address citizens' basic needs (M. Ross 2006, 867; Korolev 2016, 444). The conflict control is a dummy variable constructed using data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), with a country-year receiving a 1 if there were 25 or more battle deaths in the calendar year. This reflects the UCDP's own definition of armed conflict (Pettersson 2015, 5).[108] It is expected that the occurrence of conflict will be associated with lower levels of citizen wellbeing. The percentage of GDP derived from natural resources is an important control because, like ODA, it is a predictor of both levels of wellbeing and democratisation (Cassani 2016, 102).

Finally, all models include controls specific to the dependent variable under examination. The Health, Gender Equality and HDI models control for fertility rate, defined as births per

[106] Data are converted from the national currency into international dollars using purchasing power parity rates.
[107] This is because there is no reason to expect that these variables would affect female parliamentary representation.
[108] Changing the threshold to 1000 battle deaths did not alter the results.

woman; the Education models and the secondary GPI model control for the percentage of the population under the age of 15; the Living Standards models control for the population growth rate; and the Gender Equality models control for the percentage of the population that is female. Accounting for these demographic characteristics, which are generally exogenous to government intervention, helps account for their effect on the state's ability to provide the relevant services (see Stasavage 2005, 350; Miller 2015, 1543). Models using female parliamentary representation as the dependent variable also include a dummy variable for whether a country uses a proportional voting system for lower house or unicameral elections. Proportional representation is associated with an increase in the number of female parliamentarians (Stockemer 2011, 698), and the variable is derived from V-Dem (Coppedge *et al* 2017, 111). With the dependent and control variables in place, it is now possible to define my statistical model.

Statistical Model Theory

Regression analysis using TSCS data is very popular in comparative politics (Beck and Katz 2011, 332). This is because it can be used to test theories about how outcomes change across both time and space, providing more sophisticated insights into political phenomena than can be achieved by conducting only cross-sectional *or* time serial analysis (Stimson 1985). However, this approach gives rise to several issues that need to be carefully considered when developing a model.

The use of ordinary least squares (OLS) to estimate TSCS models is problematic. The data often violate three assumptions that OLS makes regarding the error term: that the variance of errors is constant (homoscedastic); that errors are not spatially or serially correlated

(autocorrelation); and that therefore, errors are spherical (Beck and Katz 1995, 636).[109] One way of dealing with this problem is Richard Parks' (1967) feasible generalized least-squares method, which corrects for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and spatial correlation in the error term. However, this approach is only effective where the time dimension (*T*) is much larger than the cross-sectional dimension (*N*). Where $T<N$, as in my dataset, the Parks method produces extremely overconfident standard errors (SEs) (Beck and Katz 1995, 639). Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz's (1995) proposed solution to this problem is to use OLS to estimate the model parameters but include panel-corrected SEs (PCSEs) instead of the OLS equivalent. They argue that this combination "allows for accurate estimation of variability in the presence of panel error structures without inducing the severe problems caused by the Parks method" (Beck and Katz 1995, 645). In a later paper, Beck and Katz (1996, 5) suggest introducing a lagged version of the dependent variable to address the issue of serial correlation, with time and country dummies (fixed effects) being used to combat the problem of non-spherical errors (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 329).

Although Beck and Katz's approach – OLS regression featuring a lagged dependent variable, fixed effects, and PCSEs – has become the *de facto* standard in the literature it is not without problems (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 328). When the explanatory variables are time-invariant, fixed effects models fail (Plümper and Troeger 2007, 124–25), and when they are slow-moving "the fixed effect will soak up most of the explanatory power", which leads to underestimations of significance (Beck 2001, 285). Daniel Hoechle (2007, 284) demonstrates that PCSEs perform poorly where *N* is much greater than *T*, and suggests using the SEs produced by John Driscoll and Art Kraay's (1998) nonparametric covariance matrix estimator instead. This is useful for TSCS data because Driscoll-Kraay SEs are robust to cross-sectional correlation, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity. Finally, neutralising

[109] Non-spherical errors are simultaneously autocorrelated and heteroscedastic (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 329).

serial correlation by including a lagged version of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation soaks up much of a model's explanatory power. Serial correlation can be more efficiently addressed using an autoregression (AR) error model, which lags the residuals instead (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005, 342–43).

With these considerations in mind, I selected country fixed effects TSCS analysis using Driscoll-Kraay SEs as the best method of testing for associations between the various components of hybrid political systems and citizen wellbeing proxy indicators. The base model is

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta X_{it} + Z_{it} + \mu_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Y_{it} is the level of the dependent variable in country i at time t, α is the constant (the intercept for country i), β is the coefficient to be estimated, X is the explanatory variable, Z is the vector of control variables, μ represents the specific characteristics of country i, and ε_{it} is the error term. I use an AR(1) error model, meaning that the maximum lag considered for the residuals was 1. My data exhibits heteroscedastic error variance and serial error term correlation.[110] There is no viable test in Stata to check for cross-sectional dependence in unbalanced panels where N is large and T is small,[111] but it is highly likely that it is present in the dataset (McGuire 2013, 62). Alexander Chudik and M. Hashem Pesaran (2013, 2) argue that "the presence of some form of cross-sectional correlation of errors in panel data applications in economics is likely to be the rule rather than the exception". Thus, I have erred on the side of caution and used Driscoll-Kraay SEs.

[110] The presence of groupwise heteroscedasticity in the residuals of all models was confirmed through a modified Wald test, and the Wooldridge test showed that first-order autocorrelation of the error term was consistently present, except in several under-5 mortality models.

[111] Attempts to use the test developed by Rafael de Hoyos and Vasilis Sarafidis (2006) failed due to a problem with their Stata code.

The key term of interest is β, because it quantifies the impact of the explanatory variable (depending on the model, a political dimension or HR subtype) on the dependent variable (one of the proxy indicators for wellbeing). If the model is perfectly specified, β gives us the causal effect of X on Y in country $_i$ at time $_t$. However, there are a range of issues that undermine causal inference. Omitted variable bias and a failure to account for reverse causality are key sources of endogeneity[112] – meaning the explanatory variable is correlated with the error term – which can cause biased estimates and spurious inferences (Cassani 2016, 101). Fortunately, there are methods for addressing these issues.

I address the potential for omitted variable bias by using country fixed effects, year effects, and a comprehensive set of control variables. Country fixed effects control for country-specific factors that are relatively time invariant, such as ethnic fractionalisation and religious affiliation. The Hausman test confirmed that this approach was more appropriate than a random effects specification for almost all models. Andrew Bell and Kelvyn Jones (2015, 139) note that it is "'neither necessary nor sufficient'… to use the Hausman test as the sole basis of a researcher's ultimate methodological decision," but in this case the use of fixed effects is justified by the need to mitigate omitted variable bias. A downside of this approach is that it only examines the effect of changes 'within' groups, meaning countries in which the explanatory variable did not change between 1990 to 2015 are eliminated from the analysis.[113] Year effects – in the form of dummy variables for all years except for one – eliminate the influence of aggregate trends that are exogenous to the causal relationship between X and Y. For example, including year effects helps to account for the consistent decrease in infant

[112] Other sources of endogeneity include missing dependent variable data, incorrect functional form, and measurement error in the independent variables (McGuire 2010, 41; Cassani 2016, 104).
[113] To ensure that my results have not been affected by this, I used a random effects model as a robustness check.

mortality in most countries between 1990 and 2015 thanks to technological progress (McGuire 2013, 61).

The control variables I have selected are intended to eliminate potentially confounding time-variant, country-specific factors. This is not an exact science however, and the literature is replete with a dizzying array of other factors that could have been controlled for. These include household characteristics (Hilber *et al* 2010; Lakew, Bekele, and Biadgilign 2015), female labour force participation (Navia and Zweifel 2003), level of development (Navia and Zweifel 2003), income inequality (Franco, Álvarez-Dardet, and Ruiz 2004; Wullert and Williamson 2016), percentage of GDP derived from agriculture (Mulligan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin 2004, 57; Cassani 2013, 112), and HIV prevalence (Wullert and Williamson 2016). Some of these are adequately accounted for by the controls already included in my model; for example, GDP per capita is a proxy for level of development. I excluded other factors, such as income inequality, because they can be seen as intervening variables, linking government intervention to the dependent variable (M. Ross 2006, 867). Nevertheless, there are potentially important variables that could not be included in my specification. For example, the level of corruption and HIV prevalence may be correlated with both political regime type and various proxy indicators for wellbeing, but I could not control for the former because it is difficult to quantify, while there was not enough data available for the latter. This demonstrates that the potential for omitted variable bias can never be eliminated.

Reverse causality can be mitigated by lagging the explanatory variable (Gerring *et al* 2015, 19). However, the selection of lags is a vexed issue in the literature, with researchers rarely providing much theoretical justification for their choices (see Cassani 2016; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001). McGuire (2010) lags his explanatory variable (democracy) one year behind infant mortality but does not explain why, while Kirk Harris (2014) does not lag the explanatory variables in his study of the effects of civil liberties on food security. Lake and

Baum (2001, 610) are more forthcoming, stating that although it might be expected that "fairly long lags – perhaps of 5 years or more – would be required to influence such 'sticky' indicators as infant mortality", lags of three years or less produced the most significant results. They acknowledge that their approach of trialling various lags then choosing the optimum one could be considered 'data mining', but argue that this is the best option given the absence of a theoretical basis for deciding (Lake and Baum 2001, 609). Therefore, I have chosen to follow Lake and Baum in applying a three-year lag to all explanatory variables.

In summary, it would be overstretching to claim that my model demonstrates a causal relationship between HR subtype or political dimension and wellbeing proxy. If all time variant confounding factors could be included the most likely source of endogeneity would be greatly reduced, and it would be more justified to claim a causal effect. However, the specification presented here is sufficiently precise to argue that associations observed between the explanatory and dependent variables are not spurious.

Robustness Checks

The validity of my results is confirmed through a range of robustness checks. For the first set of checks, I use the base specification but alter various other elements of the model: the transformation applied to the dependent variable; the lag applied to the explanatory variable; and the autocorrelation lag. Following Cassani (2016, 105), I also test a 'thinner' model specification, which drops all control variables except for the country and year fixed effects. For the second set of robustness checks, I vary the model specification: one check uses a random effects model with SEs clustered by country; and another uses a random effects model with robust SEs. The results of these robustness checks are discussed in the following chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I put in place the framework for addressing my research questions using quantitative methods. As the first step in this process, I converted the key theories canvassed in the Literature Review into five hypotheses. These hypotheses set out expectations about how citizen wellbeing might be affected by a political system's various elements, both in isolation and when aggregated to form a distinct HR subtype. Second, I defined a set of quantifiable indicators that can be used to proxy citizen wellbeing. These are derived from existing best practice in the literature and approach the concept of wellbeing from several complementary angles. Third, I drew on the literature to select a range of control variables, tailoring them to each proxy wellbeing indicator to ensure that my statistical analysis does not under- or over-estimate the significance of my political explanatory variables. Finally, I defined my statistical model and explained the logic behind my specification choices. I also discussed how I have sought to mitigate issues that could cause endogeneity and set out the robustness checks used to confirm the validity of my findings. In the following chapter, I present my statistical results and discuss what they reveal about citizen wellbeing in HRs.

Chapter 5: Statistical Results & Analysis

In this chapter, I present the quantitative component of my mixed nested analysis. First, I report my statistical results and conclude that there is enough evidence to support H4 and H5, while H2 and H3b are partially supported. The results for H1 are ambiguous, and H3a is rejected. Second, I discuss four key points that emerge from my statistical analysis: that the fairness of elections exerts little influence over citizen wellbeing; that more autocratic HRs tend to have the best education outcomes; that using multiple indicators to proxy a complex dependent variable such as citizen wellbeing is crucial; and that there are important variations in citizen wellbeing across HR subtypes. These four findings provide some insight into the myriad ways that political hybridity can affect citizen wellbeing. However, the somewhat mixed nature of my results suggests that this relationship is also conditioned by factors that cannot be fully encapsulated by a typology primarily constructed using formal institutional characteristics.

Results

This section is structured around my five hypotheses. The summary tables included here present coefficients and Driscoll-Kraay SEs for the explanatory variables, which are drawn from regressions using the country fixed effects TSCS model specified in Chapter Four. Full regression tables, including the coefficients for the model-specific control variables set out in Table 26, are provided in Appendix II. A brief discussion of the robustness checks I conducted is provided at the end of the section.

Hypothesis 1

Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes with fair elections.

The evidence in support of H1 is surprisingly weak (Table 27). 'Fair' elections were only associated with significant positive results for three out of 12 indicators (mean years of schooling, electric access, and secondary GPI), while they were associated with significantly lower rates of secondary school enrolment. There were no significant results for the Health indicators or HDI. This ambiguity was reinforced by the theme index results.[114] Although 'Fair' elections were associated with higher scores on the Gender Equality Index and Living Standards Index, they had no significant impact on the Health Index and were associated with lower scores on the Education Index.

These mixed results could still be interpreted as providing partial support for H1 if not for the limited variation in the sample. Only 5.26 per cent of HR country-years in my dataset are rated 'Fair' on the Elections dimension (Table 19), meaning that in some cases the results may be driven by a small number of countries. For example, data on mean years of schooling was only available for 17 different HRs with 'Fair' elections. With this caveat in mind, it is not possible to either fully support or reject H1.

Table 27: Elections and Dependent Variable Indicators

	Health				
	Infant mortality	**Under-5 mortality**	**Maternal mortality**	**Life expectancy**	**Health Index**
Fair Elections	0.021	0.014	-0.064	-0.081	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.431)	(0.064)
Obs.	1,533	1,533	1,514	1,533	1,514
Countries	105	105	104	105	104
Within R^2	0.851	0.839	0.640	0.723	0.840

[114] Note that for the Health Index, lower scores imply better outcomes. For all other indices, higher scores imply better outcomes.

Education				
	Secondary school enrolment	**Primary completion**	**Mean years of schooling**	**Education Index**
Elections	-1.580*	-2.877	0.180*	-0.235***
	(0.826)	(1.713)	(0.094)	(0.073)
Obs.	1,020	975	1,401	725
Countries	95	94	100	86
Within R^2	0.683	0.495	0.857	0.827

Living Standards			
	Improved sanitation facilities	**Access to electricity**	**Living Standards Index**
Fair Elections	-0.014	0.208*	0.155*
	(0.009)	(0.109)	(0.083)
Obs.	1,510	1,532	1,506
Countries	104	105	104
Within R^2	0.626	0.513	0.644

Gender Equality			
	Female parliamentary representation	**Secondary GPI**	**Gender Equality Index**
Fair Elections	0.045	0.048**	0.306***
	(0.061)	(0.018)	(0.052)
Obs.	1,191	950	782
Countries	98	90	85
Within R^2	0.393	0.428	0.588

Human Development Index	
	HDI
Fair Elections	0.008
	(0.006)
Obs.	1,451
Countries	101
Within R^2	0.864

Standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficients.

* Significant at 0.1 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.01 level.

Hypothesis 2

Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes with high political freedoms.

There is some evidence in support of H2 (Table 28). HRs classed as 'High' on the Political Freedoms dimension were associated with better outcomes on all Health indicators and higher HDI scores. The latter finding runs counter to Amate-Fortes *et al* (2017), who find that higher scores on Freedom House's CLI are associated with lower HDI scores. However, the education results were counterintuitive: HRs with 'High' political freedoms were

associated with lower secondary school enrolment and primary school completion rates. There were no significant results for the Living Standards indicators, suggesting a lack of support for Biser and Edwards' (2012) finding that greater civil liberties are associated with better rates of access to basic infrastructure. The Gender Equality indicators produced two contradictory results: 'High' political freedoms were associated with improved rates of female parliamentary representation; but they were also associated with lower scores on the GPI, which is in line with the apparent negative impact of increased political freedoms on the other education outcomes.

Overall, Hypothesis 2 is only partially supported. The results suggest that the utility of political freedoms as a mechanism for improving wellbeing vary depending on the outcome area. This is confirmed by models using the aggregate indices. 'High' political freedoms are associated with better scores on the Health Index but lower scores on the Education Index, while the contradictory results for the Gender Equality indicators cancelled each other out at the index level.

Table 28: Political Freedoms and Dependent Variable Indicators

Health					
	Infant mortality	**Under-5 mortality**	**Maternal mortality**	**Life expectancy**	**Health Index**
High Political Freedoms	-0.064***	-0.058***	-0.031**	0.446***	-0.111***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.098)	(0.016)
Obs.	1,533	1,533	1,514	1,533	1,514
Countries	105	105	104	105	104
Within R^2	0.855	0.842	0.640	0.724	0.843
Education					
	Secondary school enrolment	**Primary completion**	**Mean years of schooling**	**Education Index**	
High Political Freedoms	-2.330*	-3.186***	0.027	-0.128***	
	(1.162)	(1.065)	(0.022)	(0.039)	
Obs.	1,020	975	1,401	725	
Countries	95	94	100	86	
Within R^2	0.687	0.501	0.856	0.827	

Living Standards			
	Improved sanitation facilities	**Access to electricity**	**Living Standards Index**
High Political Freedoms	-0.006	-0.030	-0.014
	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Obs.	1,510	1,532	1,506
Countries	104	105	104
Within R^2	0.626	0.507	0.640
Gender Equality			
	Female parliamentary representation	**Secondary GPI**	**Gender Equality Index**
High Political Freedoms	0.066**	-0.022***	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.039)
Obs.	1,191	950	782
Countries	98	90	85
Within R^2	0.394	0.424	0.580
Human Development Index			
	HDI		
High Political Freedoms	0.003***		
	(0.001)		
Obs.	1,451		
Countries	101		
Within R^2	0.864		

Standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficients.

* Significant at 0.1 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.01 level.

Hypothesis 3

a) Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes where the power of the executive is unrestricted.
b) Citizen wellbeing is higher in hybrid regimes where the power of the executive is accountable.

There were some patterns in the results for models testing this hypothesis (Table 29). For the Health theme, HRs where Effective Power was rated 'Accountable' were associated with lower rates of infant and under-5 mortality than their 'Restricted' and 'Unrestricted' counterparts. 'Accountable' regimes also had significantly lower maternal mortality than 'Restricted' regimes and significantly better life expectancy than 'Unrestricted' regimes. There were no significant differences in the performance of 'Unrestricted' and 'Restricted' regimes for under-5 and maternal mortality. However, 'Unrestricted' regimes were associated with

lower infant mortality rates but poorer life expectancy than 'Restricted' regimes. For the Education theme, 'Unrestricted' and 'Restricted' regimes were associated with higher rates of secondary school enrolment and primary school completion than 'Accountable' regimes. However, 'Accountable' regimes were associated with the highest mean years of schooling, followed by 'Unrestricted' and then 'Restricted' regimes. Results for the Living Standards indicators were also mixed. Notably, 'Unrestricted' regimes did not exhibit significantly different performance to 'Restricted' regimes for either indicators. Surprisingly, 'Accountable' regimes were associated with the lowest rates of access to electricity. For the Gender Equality theme, 'Restricted' regimes were associated with the lowest rates of female parliamentary representation, but there were no significant results for the GPI.

There is very little evidence in support of H3a, but H3b fared better. 'Accountable' regimes performed the best for both the Health and Gender Equality indices, while there was no significant difference between 'Restricted' and 'Unrestricted' regimes. 'Restricted' regimes were associated with the highest scores on the Education Index – driven by their much higher rates of primary completion – but there was no significant difference between 'Accountable' and 'Unrestricted' regimes. There were no significant results for the Living Standards Index. The only result in favour of H3a is that 'Unrestricted' regimes were associated with higher HDI scores than 'Accountable' regimes, but this is insufficient to outweigh evidence from the other areas of wellbeing. Given these results, H3a is rejected but H3b is partially supported.

Table 29: Effective Power and Dependent Variable Indicators

Health															
	Infant mortality			Under-5 mortality			Maternal mortality			Life expectancy			Health Index		
Accountable		-0.079***	-0.049***		-0.068***	-0.043**		-0.052*	-0.039		-0.132	0.503**		-0.116***	-0.135***
		(0.015)	(0.017)		(0.016)	(0.020)		(0.030)	(0.026)		(0.151)	(0.225)		(0.025)	(0.039)
Restricted	0.079***		0.030*	0.068***		0.024	0.052*		0.013	0.132		0.635**	0.116***		-0.019
	(0.015)		(0.015)	(0.016)		(0.018)	(0.030)		(0.022)	(0.151)		(0.251)	(0.025)		(0.038)
Unrestricted	0.049***	-0.030*		0.043**	-0.024		0.039	-0.013		-0.503**	-0.635**		0.135***	0.019	
	(0.017)	(0.015)		(0.020)	(0.018)		(0.026)	(0.022)		(0.225)	(0.251)		(0.039)	(0.038)	
Obs.	1,533			1,533			1,514			1,533			1,514		
Countries	105			105			104			105			104		
Within R^2	0.854			0.841			0.640			0.724			0.843		

Education												
	Secondary school enrolment			Primary completion rate			Mean years of schooling			Education Index		
Accountable		-2.926**	-2.226*		-3.411**	-1.216		0.226***	0.094*		-0.179***	-0.094
		(1.350)	(1.265)		(1.365)	(1.854)		(0.044)	(0.052)		(0.057)	(0.058)
Restricted	2.926**		0.700	3.411**		2.194	-0.226***		-0.132**	0.179***		0.086
	(1.350)		(1.680)	(1.365)		(2.112)	(0.044)		(0.049)	(0.057)		(0.069)
Unrestricted	2.226*	-0.700		1.216	-2.194		-0.094*	0.132**		0.094	-0.086	
	(1.265)	(1.680)		(1.854)	(2.112)		(0.052)	(0.049)		(0.058)	(0.069)	
Obs.	1,020			975			1,401			725		
Countries	95			94			100			86		
Within R^2	0.686			0.498			0.860			0.828		

Living Standards									
	Improved sanitation facilities			Access to electricity			Living Standards Index		
Accountable		0.007	0.007		-0.157**	-0.098**		-0.035	-0.037
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.062)	(0.036)		(0.028)	(0.024)
Restricted	-0.007		-0.001	0.157**		0.059	0.035		-0.002
	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.062)		(0.058)	(0.028)		(0.038)
Unrestricted	-0.007	0.001		0.098**	-0.059		0.037	0.002	
	(0.009)	(0.012)		(0.036)	(0.058)		(0.024)	(0.038)	
Obs.	1,510			1,532			1,506		
Countries	104			105			104		
Within R^2	0.626			0.514			0.641		

Gender Equality									
	Female parliamentary representation			Secondary GPI			Gender Equality Index		
Accountable		0.234***	0.036		-0.011	0.008		0.110*	0.124**
		(0.069)	(0.043)		(0.008)	(0.009)		(0.061)	(0.054)
Restricted	-0.234***		-0.197**	0.011		0.019	-0.110*		0.014
	(0.069)		(0.073)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.061)		(0.074)
Unrestricted	-0.036	0.197**		-0.008	-0.019		-0.124**	-0.014	
	(0.043)	(0.073)		(0.009)	(0.013)		(0.054)	(0.074)	
Obs.	1,191			950			782		
Countries	98			90			85		
Within R^2	0.403			0.419			0.583		

Human Development Index			
	HDI		
Accountable		-0.002	-0.006***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Restricted	0.002		-0.003
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Unrestricted	0.006***	0.003	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	
Obs.	1,451		
Countries	101		
Within R^2	0.864		

Standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficients.

* Significant at 0.1 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.01 level.

Hypothesis 4

Citizen wellbeing is highest in 'Soft' hybrids and lowest in 'Hard' hybrids.

The results for models testing H4 are more consistent (Table 30). Soft HRs were associated with the best outcomes for infant mortality, under-5 mortality, access to improved sanitation, and female parliamentary representation. Hard HRs were associated with the poorest outcomes for all the Health indicators and mean years of schooling. The performance of Intermediate HRs was sometimes indistinguishable from Soft HRs[115] and, less commonly, not significantly different to Hard HRs.[116] This is logical given that the Intermediate HR category encompasses some regimes that are close to being Hard HRs and others more proximate to Soft HRs. The only area in which Hard HRs demonstrated some success was education. Reflecting previous results, Hard HRs were associated with the highest rates of secondary school enrolment and primary school completion.

The Education theme notwithstanding, there is ample evidence in favour of the hypothesis that citizen wellbeing is highest in Soft HRs. They were associated with the best scores on the Health, Living Standards, and Gender Equality indices, making it surprising that there were no significant differences in HDI scores between Soft HRs and the other two regime types. The evidence that wellbeing is lowest in Hard HRs is less compelling. Although they were associated with lower HDI scores than Intermediate HRs and performed significantly worse on the Health Index, there were no significant differences between the two for any of the other indices. In summary, it is reasonable to conclude that citizen wellbeing is highest in Soft HRs, but not necessarily lowest in Hard HRs.

[115] For example, with regards to maternal mortality.
[116] For example, with regards to female parliamentary representation.

Table 30: Partially-ordered Subtypes and Dependent Variable Indicators

	Infant mortality			Under-5 mortality			Maternal mortality			Life expectancy			Health Index		
Health															
Soft		-0.040***	-0.084***		-0.036***	-0.076***		-0.011	-0.061**		0.109	0.466***		-0.045***	-0.158***
		(0.009)	(0.013)		(0.010)	(0.016)		(0.015)	(0.028)		(0.116)	(0.127)		(0.015)	(0.020)
Inter.	0.040***		-0.044***	0.036***		-0.040***	0.011		-0.050***	-0.109		0.356**	0.045***		-0.113***
	(0.009)		(0.010)	(0.010)		(0.012)	(0.015)		(0.017)	(0.116)		(0.138)	(0.015)		(0.015)
Hard	0.084***	0.044***		0.076***	0.040***		0.061**	0.050***		-0.466***	-0.356**		0.158***	0.113***	
	(0.013)	(0.010)		(0.016)	(0.012)		(0.028)	(0.017)		(0.127)	(0.138)		(0.020)	(0.015)	
Obs.	1,533			1,533			1,514			1,533			1,514		
Countries	105			105			104			105			104		
Within R^2	0.855			0.842			0.642			0.724			0.844		

	Secondary school enrolment			Primary completion			Mean years of schooling			Education Index		
Education												
Soft		-1.332	-3.631***		-1.414	-4.294***		0.039	0.136***		-0.147***	-0.218***
		(0.927)	(0.940)		(1.338)	(1.392)		(0.028)	(0.043)		(0.051)	(0.037)
Inter.	1.332		-2.299**	1.414		-2.880**	-0.039		0.097***	0.147***		-0.071
	(0.927)		(1.113)	(1.338)		(1.069)	(0.028)		(0.032)	(0.051)		(0.054)
Hard	3.631***	2.299**		4.294***	2.880**		-0.136***	-0.097***		0.218***	0.071	
	(0.940)	(1.113)		(1.392)	(1.069)		(0.043)	(0.032)		(0.037)	(0.054)	
Obs.	1,020			975			1,401			725		
Countries	95			94			100			86		
Within R^2	0.689			0.503			0.858			0.832		

	Improved sanitation facilities			Access to electricity			Living Standards Index		
Living Standards									
Soft		0.027***	0.000		-0.008	-0.046		0.063**	0.011
		(0.007)	(0.011)		(0.036)	(0.035)		(0.027)	(0.014)
Inter.	-0.027***		-0.027**	0.008		-0.038	-0.063**		-0.052**
	(0.007)		(0.011)	(0.036)		(0.026)	(0.027)		(0.024)
Hard	-0.000	0.027**		0.046	0.038		-0.011	0.052**	
	(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.035)	(0.026)		(0.014)	(0.024)	
Obs.	1,510			1,532			1,506		
Countries	104			105			104		
Within R^2	0.630			0.507			0.643		

Gender Equality									
	Female parliamentary representation			**Secondary GPI**			**Gender Equality Index**		
Soft		0.184***	0.143***		-0.001	-0.006		0.203***	0.154***
		(0.058)	(0.042)		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.051)	(0.030)
Inter.	-0.184***		-0.041	0.001		-0.004	-0.203***		-0.048
	(0.058)		(0.037)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.051)		(0.041)
Hard	-0.143***	0.041		0.006	0.004		-0.154***	0.048	
	(0.042)	(0.037)		(0.007)	(0.006)		(0.030)	(0.041)	
Obs.	1,191			950			782		
Countries	98			90			85		
Within R^2	0.403			0.417			0.590		

Human Development Index			
	HDI		
Soft		-0.001	0.002
		(0.001)	(0.002)
Inter.	0.001		0.003**
	(0.001)		(0.001)
Hard	-0.002	-0.003**	
	(0.002)	(0.001)	
Obs.	1,451		
Countries	101		
Within R^2	0.863		

Standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficients.

* Significant at 0.1 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.01 level.

Hypothesis 5

Different hybrid regime subtypes have different levels of citizen wellbeing.

The models used to test H5 employ Unfair HR as the baseline category for comparison, with the other ten subtypes incorporated into the model as dummy variables. Using Unfair HRs as the comparison category is justified on two counts. First, they are the most common HR subtype, providing a large sample size. Second, due to the lack of observations for the other types of Soft HR, Unfair HRs are the closest subtype to democracy and would therefore be expected to exhibit the best performance in terms of citizen wellbeing. I do not report or discuss results for Illiberal, Restricted, Restricted Illiberal, Unrestricted, and Unrestricted Illiberal HRs, because each of these had less than 50 country-years.[117]

The Health indicators produced a strong set of results (Table 31). Most subtypes were associated with poorer health outcomes than Unfair HRs, with the outcome that four out of five subtypes had significantly poorer Health Index scores than the baseline category. The only anomaly was Restricted Unfair HRs being associated with higher life expectancy than Unfair HRs. Results in the Education theme were more mixed, with fewer significant results. There was a degree of continuity with previous findings though, as the two Hard HR subtypes were associated with higher scores than Unfair HRs on the Education Index. Living Standards results were also mixed. For example, in comparison to Unfair HRs, Restricted Unfair HRs had lower rates of access to improved sanitation but higher rates of access to electricity. Overall, there were no significant differences between subtypes for the Living Standards Index. For the Gender Equality theme, four of the five subtypes had lower rates of female parliamentary representation than Unfair HRs, but three were associated with higher GPI score.

[117] This is without accounting for observations dropped due to missing data for each dependent variable.

There is significant support in favour of the hypothesis that different types of HR have different levels of citizen wellbeing. Unfair HRs are associated with better health outcomes and are more likely to have a higher proportion of women in parliament than other subtypes. There are also significant differences in the HDI scores obtained by different hybrids, although these results were somewhat surprising: only Illiberal Unfair HRs were associated with lower HDI scores than Unfair HRs; the remaining four subtypes all had significantly higher scores. Thus, although it is reasonable to conclude that different types of HR have different levels of citizen wellbeing, it does not follow that one subtype will consistently outperform the others. Potential explanations for the patterns observed will be discussed in the following section.

Table 31: HR Subtypes and Dependent Variable Indicators

Health Indicators					
	Infant mortality	**Under-5 mortality**	**Maternal mortality**	**Life expectancy**	**Health Index**
Illiberal Unfair	0.133***	0.127***	0.056**	-0.814***	0.163***
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.291)	(0.041)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	0.117***	0.100***	0.001	-0.296	0.153***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.207)	(0.033)
Restricted Unfair	0.063***	0.052**	-0.003	0.467**	0.041
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.195)	(0.026)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	0.098***	0.088**	0.067**	-0.732***	0.207***
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.205)	(0.047)
Unrestricted Unfair	0.056***	0.048**	-0.024	-0.644**	0.098**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.298)	(0.045)
Obs.	1,533	1,533	1,514	1,533	1,514
Countries	105	105	104	105	104
Within R^2	0.864	0.849	0.677	0.729	0.851
Education Indicators					
	Secondary school enrolment	**Primary completion**	**Mean years of schooling**	**Education Index**	
Illiberal Unfair	-0.112	2.869	0.141***	0.094	
	(1.125)	(2.142)	(0.046)	(0.071)	
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	3.886*	4.418*	-0.148***	0.200**	
	(1.914)	(2.218)	(0.044)	(0.080)	
Restricted Unfair	2.648	1.530	-0.109**	0.158*	
	(1.587)	(1.866)	(0.047)	(0.078)	
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	3.414**	3.634	-0.053	0.147*	
	(1.549)	(2.327)	(0.053)	(0.072)	
Unrestricted Unfair	1.329	-0.011	-0.016	0.085	
	(1.395)	(2.198)	(0.053)	(0.078)	
Obs.	1,020	975	1,401	725	
Countries	95	94	100	86	
Within R^2	0.702	0.507	0.866	0.836	

Living Standards Indicators			
	Improved sanitation facilities	**Access to electricity**	**Living Standards Index**
Illiberal Unfair	-0.056**	0.054	-0.048
	(0.024)	(0.059)	(0.054)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.012	0.189**	0.049
	(0.016)	(0.077)	(0.035)
Restricted Unfair	-0.035***	0.167**	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.070)	(0.031)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.010	0.115*	0.033
	(0.014)	(0.057)	(0.037)
Unrestricted Unfair	-0.030**	0.102**	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.024)
Obs.	1,510	1,532	1,506
Countries	104	105	104
Within R^2	0.632	0.529	0.651

Gender Equality Indicators			
	Female parliamentary representation	**Secondary GPI**	**Gender Equality Index**
Illiberal Unfair	-0.359***	0.027**	-0.283*
	(0.090)	(0.011)	(0.135)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.214***	0.054***	0.120
	(0.073)	(0.013)	(0.071)
Restricted Unfair	-0.294***	0.032***	-0.085
	(0.100)	(0.009)	(0.095)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.122**	0.013	-0.227**
	(0.056)	(0.014)	(0.087)
Unrestricted Unfair	-0.091	0.005	-0.114
	(0.056)	(0.008)	(0.093)
Obs.	1,191	950	782
Countries	98	90	85
Within R^2	0.417	0.467	0.609

Human Development Index	
	HDI
Illiberal Unfair	-0.010***
	(0.002)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	0.002
	(0.002)
Restricted Unfair	0.006***
	(0.002)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	0.003*
	(0.002)
Unrestricted Unfair	0.006**
	(0.002)
Obs.	1,451
Countries	101
Within R^2	0.869

Standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficients.

* Significant at 0.1 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.01 level.

Robustness Checks

To confirm the validity of my results, I conducted seven different robustness checks. Regression tables for these are not included due to space constraints,[118] but the results were generally in line with those returned by my primary model specification. Most importantly, although both types of random effects model – those with SEs clustered by country and those with robust SEs – tended to generate larger SEs and therefore fewer significant results, the coefficient signs consistently pointed in the same direction. This suggests that my results are not dependent on the use of a fixed effects model, which only tests for within-country variation. Similarly, models using the default Driscoll-Kraay autocorrelation lag produced slightly larger SEs – and therefore occasionally reduced significance levels – but were otherwise highly consistent with the primary model across all indicators.

Unsurprisingly, some alternative specifications produced different results. For the transformed Health and Gender Equality indicators, robustness checks using untransformed dependent variables produced markedly different results. Conversely, there was little difference between the results for the transformed and untransformed Living Standards indicators. As might be expected, the thin specification models also significantly altered the significance, coefficient signs and magnitudes, and SEs for most indicators. However, in most cases the explanatory power of the thin specification models was significantly lower, indicating that my choice of control variables was justified.

Removing the lag applied to the explanatory variable or extending it to five years caused noteworthy difference for H1 results in Health and Education, with variations in either sign or significance for most indicators. This reinforces that the results for H1 should be treated with caution due to the lack of country-years with 'Fair' elections. However, results remained highly consistent for the other hypotheses. For the Gender Equality theme and the HDI

[118] These can be provided on request.

indicator there was very little change. Results for the Living Standards indicators exhibited some variation across the different lag models, but there was no discernible pattern. It might have been expected that the unlagged models would generate fewer significant results and the five-year lag models more significant results given that the improvement or degradation of basic infrastructure takes time, but this was not the case. Overall though, the relative consistency across robustness checks combined with the theoretical justification underpinning my primary model indicate that my results are valid.

Discussion

Several important themes emerge from these findings: the limited role of electoral fairness in improving citizen wellbeing; the success of more autocratic states in providing education; the variations in the effects of the different dimensions across themes and indicators; and the significant differences in performance between HR subtypes. In this section, I discuss each of these areas in turn.

Underwhelming Elections

The results presented in the previous section suggest that the fairness – or competitiveness – of elections does not have much effect on citizen wellbeing in the hybrid context. Although the robustness of these results is questionable due to the small number of HRs with 'Fair' elections, further support for this finding can be derived from Cassani's work. Cassani (2016, 100) uses the Polity IV 'Executive Recruitment' indicator to differentiate between countries with "minimally competitive" elections (which he categorises as electoral authoritarian regimes) and those with "free and fair elections" (which he categorises as democracies). By using only one indicator to categorise countries, Cassani ignores other elements of the

procedural minimum definition of democracy. Therefore, many countries classified as HRs in my typology due to a lack of political freedom, deficiencies in horizontal accountability, or the presence of a tutelary power are categorised as democracies by Cassani (Table 32). However, Cassani's categorisation method means that when he compares wellbeing outcomes in 'democracies' and 'electoral authoritarian regimes', he is essentially testing whether the fairness of elections matters. The conclusion is that it does not: Cassani finds that rates of secondary school enrolment and infant mortality are not significantly different across the two regime types. Although there are differences in our samples due our divergent approaches to categorisation, Cassani's results reinforce my finding that the fairness of elections is not a key driver of improvements in citizen wellbeing.[119]

Table 32: Comparison with Cassani's typology

		Cassani			
		Democracy	**Electoral Authoritarian**	**Authoritarian**	**Total**
Hortle	**Democracy**	374	27	1	**402**
	Hybrid Regime	696	466	129	**1291**
	Non-Electoral Regime	23	336	564	**923**
	Total	**1093**	**829**	**694**	**2616**

The best explanation for this is that there is little marginal utility in shifting from minimally competitive elections – which all HRs feature by definition – to fair elections. This runs counter to Gerring *et al* (2015, 8), who argue that "a minimal amount of contestation is good for human development, but… greater contestation is even better". However, there are clear theoretical reasons why increasing the fairness of elections might not help improve wellbeing. Even in countries where elections are considered to be fair, vertical accountability is

[119] Further support for this argument can be derived from Harding and Stasavage (2014), who find that that in several African countries, improvements in primary school enrolment rates follow the introduction of elections, irrespective of playing field fairness.

compromised if voters lack information, candidate promises are not seen as credible, policymaking is subject to elite-capture, and/or the opposition is weak (Keefer and Khemani 2005; M. Ross 2006; Keefer 2007; Ansell and Samuels 2014). Moreover, fair elections may still feature voting patterns based on identity rather than policy (Touchton, Sugiyama, and Wampler 2017, 86), sidelining debates over how to best approach issues in key areas such as health and education. The lack of significant results linking 'Fair' elections to improved citizen wellbeing suggests that some of these problems pertain in most HRs. The case study analysis in the following chapters will explore this further.

Finally, the lack of support for H1 suggests a crucial theoretical point. As noted in the Literature Review, many studies linking political regime type to wellbeing use election-related indices to define the explanatory variable. If the fairness of elections is not a key driver of wellbeing in HRs, studies taking this approach are likely to underestimate variations in performance among different regime types. This reinforces the importance of approaching political regimes as multidimensional constructs.

Mandating Education

The results presented above indicate a complex relationship between political hybridity and education outcomes. Many studies have found that democratisation is associated with improvements in the education system (see for example Brown 1999; Lake and Baum 2001; M. Baum and Lake 2003), to the extent that this causal relationship has sometimes been characterised as axiomatic (Paglayan 2018, 3). However, I consistently find that more autocratic HR variants are associated with higher rates of secondary school enrolment and primary school completion. This is encapsulated in the performance of Hard HRs, which are associated with the best outcomes for both indicators.

It is important to consider that this finding could be due to the nature of the selected indicators. As noted in the previous chapter, high secondary school enrolment rates may be a sign of an inefficient education system, and therefore a reduction in this indicator could be positive. Moreover, although primary completion rate is "increasingly used as a core indicator of an education system's performance", it is subject to the same issues because it can exceed 100 per cent if a country has a large number of "late entrants and overage children who have repeated one or more grades" (World Bank 2018a). Thus, the higher rates of secondary school enrolment and primary completion in Hard HRs could indicate that more autocratic HRs have less efficient education systems. However, it appears that this is not the case. To reduce the likelihood that my findings were driven by these technical issues, I repeated the H4 education regressions but limited the observations to those with secondary school enrolment and primary completion rates of less than 100 per cent. Hard HRs still had the best outcomes for both indicators.[120]

There are good reasons to doubt the assumed link between democratisation and education. This relationship is based on two assumptions: that the majority of citizens see education as a desirable good; and that therefore, citizens will successfully pressure politicians to improve access to schooling through their voting choices or civil society activism (Paglayan 2018, 6). The first assumption is questionable because demand for education among the poor is often low, particularly in developing countries. Sending children to school is costly in the short-term – especially at secondary level – because it reduces their ability to work and requires expenditure on fees, uniforms, and other supplies, while the desirability of education may be reduced if its perceived long-term returns are not sufficiently attractive (Ganimian and Murnane 2016, 724, 729, 730–31). These factors may mean that education is viewed as a luxury good when compared to short-term survival-related goods such as basic health

[120] The coefficient for Hard HR was significant at the 1 per cent level for primary completion and the 5 per cent level for secondary school enrolment.

services and food. The second assumption breaks down if democratic institutions are unresponsive, as noted in the above discussion of the fairness of elections. The tenuous nature of this causal argument suggests we should not necessarily expect more democratic HRs to have higher rates of secondary school enrolment and primary completion.

In fact, there are reasons to expect harder HR variants to have higher rates of school enrolment than their more democratic counterparts. Historically, autocratic states such as Prussia under Frederick II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Stalin, and the People's Republic of China under Mao all achieved very high rates of schooling in the service of a variety of aims, including increased economic productivity, ideological indoctrination, and improving 'moral character' (Brown and Hunter 2004, 847; Paglayan 2018, 11–12). In fact, Agustina Paglayan (2018, 41) shows that in many countries which have experienced a transition from autocracy to democracy, the majority of children were already enrolled in primary school prior to democratisation.[121] In the hybrid context, political elites in Hard HRs may see the provision of schooling as a tool of control,[122] a way to improve future economic outcomes, or a method of demonstrating to the population their commitment to development. Additionally, it may be easier for the state to enforce mandatory school attendance and implement a cohesive approach to the education system in Hard HRs, compared to more open regimes where a wider range of actors can become involved in the sector.

Although Hard HRs had higher rates of secondary school enrolment and primary completion, they were also associated with the lowest mean years of schooling. This effect was evident in the results for H1 and H3, with 'Fair' elections and 'Accountable' regimes

[121] This suggests that previous regime type – and the resulting path dependency – is a potentially important causal factor in the relationship between HR subtype and citizen wellbeing. Although this should be captured by the country fixed effects model, it could be an avenue for future research.
[122] This could take multiple forms, including shaping young people's political values or instilling patriotism.

both associated with higher mean years of schooling than their non-democratic counterparts. Given that this indicator incorporates tertiary education, these results suggest that the positive association between non-democratic political institutions and education outcomes is only applicable at the primary and secondary levels. In other words, students in Hard HRs are more likely to complete primary school and at least begin secondary school, but they are less likely to attend university than students in Intermediate and Soft HRs. This is likely to be because the opening up of political institutions in the latter two regime types allows social groups who desire tertiary education to press their demands more strongly:

> Although numerically small, the middle- and upper-class groups interested in securing university funding typically have levels of knowledge, organization, and resources superior to those of the constituencies that lobby for basic schooling. Some of these assets can be put to use most effectively in democratic contexts. (Brown and Hunter 2004, 846–47)

Moreover, it may be that harder HR variants are less likely to support the tertiary sector because education to secondary level is sufficient for the control-related purposes noted above. Although it has also been observed that autocratic states may seek to appease the middle- and upper-classes by investing in tertiary education (Brown and Hunter 2004, 847–48; Stasavage 2005, 345), my results suggest that this effect is not evident in HRs.

Acknowledging Complexity

The inconsistent effects of the various dimensions across the four themes are a reminder of the complexity of the relationship between political systems and wellbeing. Quantitative researchers need to make more of an effort to capture this by utilising the large quantities of new data rapidly becoming available. Most studies in the field focus on one or two wellbeing proxies and use these to make generalisations about the performance of different regime types. However, this approach can produce inaccurate results (Kramon and Posner 2013).

Take infant mortality, a popular proxy indicator thought to be a "sensitive measure of many other conditions" (M. Ross 2006, 861). My results demonstrate that the effects of a specific political dimension on infant mortality are not necessarily aligned with its influence over other outcomes. For example, 'High' political freedoms were associated with lower infant mortality but poorer outcomes for gender equality in secondary schools. 'Accountable' regimes had the best rates of infant mortality, but lower rates of access to electricity than 'Unrestricted' and 'Restricted' regimes.

It is vital that researchers use more than one indicator to stand in for the broader concept of wellbeing. As Eric Kramon and Daniel Posner (2013, 469) argue, if only one outcome variable is used, "conclusions must either be couched narrowly in terms of the particular outcome being studied… or efforts must be made to assess the robustness of the results to alternate measures of the underlying concept". This is particularly important when studying HRs precisely because of the way these systems combine democratic and autocratic characteristics. Their constituent parts may pull socioeconomic outcomes in different directions, depending on the combination of formal institutions and the characteristics of the various outcome variables – something which I begin to explore in the following section. Overall, to gain a holistic understanding of how different types of political regime affect wellbeing it is vital to use a wide range of outcome variables.

Wellbeing in Hybrid Regimes

One of the central goals of this thesis is to determine whether HR subtypes exhibit different levels of citizen wellbeing. The quantitative evidence presented in this chapter suggests that they do, with Unfair HRs emerging as the best performing subtype. Outside the Education theme, there was only one example of a significant result in which another subtype exhibited better overall performance than the Unfair HR category: Restricted Illiberal Unfair HRs were

associated with higher scores on the Gender Equality Index. This result was driven by the GPI, and came despite Restricted Illiberal Unfair HRs being associated with lower rates of female parliamentary representation than Unfair HRs. Unfortunately, the lack of observations for the other types of Soft HR[123] means it is not possible to compare performance within this broad grouping.[124] However, the strong performance of Unfair HRs in comparison to subtypes with more non-democratic components reinforces that HRs which are closer to meeting the procedural minimum definition of democracy are likely to have the highest levels of citizen wellbeing.

The performance of Illiberal Unfair HRs opens some interesting avenues for analysis. Countries in this category – which included Colombia (1990-2010), Albania (1992-99), Seychelles (2004-15), and Philippines (1992-2015) – were associated with higher mean years of schooling than Unfair HRs, bucking the general trend of more democratic subtypes performing better on this indicator.[125] This may be evidence of 'autocratic appeasement', in which the state seeks to ameliorate opposition to crackdowns on political freedoms by providing additional benefits to those most likely to protest: university students and the middle- and upper-classes.[126] The contrast in performance between Unfair and Illiberal Unfair HRs demonstrates that it is vital to focus on the ways in which hybrid characteristics interact: different combinations of dimensions may produce divergent incentives for actors operating within the system; and hybrid traits may pull outcomes in different directions. Therefore, the comparative analysis of HR subtypes represents a productive area for future study.

[123] Restricted, Unrestricted, and Illiberal HRs.
[124] Although there are too few observations for robust statistical inference, it should be noted that Illiberal HRs tended to perform better than Unfair HRs, while Restricted and Unrestricted HRs generally exhibited worse performance. As always, there were some anomalies.
[125] Illiberal Unfair HRs also had higher scores on the GPI than Unfair HRs.
[126] There was insufficient data on tertiary education spending to test whether Illiberal Unfair HR governments were spending more on this sector.

Comparing results for subtypes within the Intermediate HR category provides further evidence that the interactions between dimensions are key. Additional regression analysis with observations limited to Intermediate HRs demonstrates that Illiberal Unfair HRs were associated with significantly higher secondary school enrolment rates, mean years of schooling, and secondary GPI scores than Restricted Unfair and Unrestricted Unfair HRs. This implies that HRs where the executive is subject to horizontal accountability in the form of a strong legislature and judiciary have better education systems. This is likely to be because horizontal accountability means that the relevant government policies are subject to ongoing scrutiny in between election campaigns. In contrast, where horizontal accountability is absent the executive is insulated from critique and becomes the sole arbiter of 'good' policy (O'Donell 1994, 59–61). It also emerged that Unrestricted Unfair HRs had higher rates of female political representation than Illiberal Unfair HRs, providing evidence that the Political Freedoms dimension has strong links to equality of representation. This relationship, which was also observed in the results for H2, is logical given that freedom of organisation allows women's rights organisations to flourish, providing a greater voice for women and creating pathways into the political establishment.

Conducting the same analysis within the Hard HR category produced only one noteworthy significant result: Restricted Illiberal Unfair HRs were associated with lower HDI scores than their 'Unrestricted' counterparts. The lack of significant results in other areas suggests that it makes little difference to wellbeing outcomes whether the executive is unrestricted or constrained by a tutelary power if both other components are non-democratic. Again, this demonstrates the importance of paying attention to the interactions between the different components of a hybrid political system.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I searched for statistical evidence in support of five hypotheses underpinned by theory drawn from the literature. Overall, there were mixed results for the hypotheses testing whether specific HR characteristics are associated with different levels of citizen wellbeing (H1-H3). For example: 'Fair' elections were only associated with improved outcomes for three out of 12 indicators; and HRs with 'High' political freedoms had higher HDI scores and better outcomes in the health sector, but were only positively associated with two of the remaining indicators. As well as demonstrating the importance of using multiple dependent variables to proxy complex concepts such as wellbeing, the inconsistencies across the four wellbeing themes (and even for the indicators within a theme) suggest that it is insufficient to focus on the effects of a single dimension of hybridity. To fully understand the relationship between political hybridity and wellbeing, it is vital to study the effects of different combinations of hybrid characteristics.

This reinforces the importance of the latter part of my second research question, which asks whether distinct HR subtypes are associated with different levels of citizen wellbeing. There were clearer patterns in the results for the hypotheses testing this proposition. For H4, there was strong evidence that citizen wellbeing is highest in Soft HRs, bolstering the argument that even in the hybrid context, more democratic regimes are better at looking after their populations. However, it was less clear that wellbeing is lowest in Hard HRs. The lack of performance difference between Intermediate and Hard HRs suggests that once a regime features more than one non-democratic dimension, its systemic logic is fundamentally altered. Regarding H5, there were some patterns although there were not always significant differences in performance between all HR subtypes. Unfair HRs exhibited consistently strong performance, while in the Intermediate HR category, Illiberal Unfair HRs generally

outperformed the other two subtypes. Therefore, the quantitative evidence supports the idea that different types of HR have different levels of citizen wellbeing.

In this chapter, it became clear that wellbeing outcomes are only partially determined by the formal institutional structures that dominate my typology. This highlights a key limitation of my quantitative research: because the statistical analysis is reliant on a typology primarily constructed around formal institutional structures, the patterns that it reveals only tell part of the story. To counteract this, in the following chapters I address my second research question using qualitative methods. My aim is to flesh out the causal mechanisms underpinning the statistical relationships observed in this chapter, and to contribute to the process of theory-building by investigating why these relationships were somewhat inconsistent.

Chapter 6: Qualitative Methods

In this chapter, I set out the qualitative element of my mixed nested analysis. As noted in Chapter Four, the strength of mixed methods is that its component approaches complement each other. Quantitative methods reveal broad trends and similarities across cases, whereas qualitative research provides deep insight into complex issues and context-specific "processes that occur over time" (Snape and Spencer 2003, 5). This is particularly useful for investigating the informal processes that typically characterise politics in HRs (Goode 2010, 1057). However, qualitative research involves a distinct set of challenges that need to be carefully considered. In this chapter I deal with several important topics: the case selection process; the conceptualisation of the explanatory and dependent variables; and my fieldwork strategy, encompassing a discussion of my efforts to mitigate the challenges inherent in field research.

Case Selection

I selected Fiji and Solomon Islands as case studies to test the relationships uncovered through my statistical analysis and investigate the role of informal processes in HRs. Because I use a diachronic approach to control for country-specific variables (Gerring 2007, 162–64), I had to select countries that had experienced a change in the explanatory variable of interest, HR subtype. Further to this, given that there is likely to be a lag between a shift in regime type and resulting changes in the dependent variable, I required countries that had been one type of HR for at least three years, and then another subtype for a further three years. Fiji and Solomon Islands both fit this requirement: the former was a Restricted Unfair HR (1993-1999) then a Restricted Illiberal Unfair HR (2000-2006); and the latter was an Unfair HR (2001-2004) then a Restricted Unfair HR (2005-2015).

Given the mixed nature of the statistical results presented in Chapter Five, I required cases that could be used for model-building. Lieberman (2005, 445) argues that in this situation, "*at least one* case that has not been well predicted by the best-fitting statistical model should be selected [original italics]". Solomon Islands fits this requirement, as most of its wellbeing outcomes improved after it transitioned from Soft to Intermediate HR in 2005. Conversely, Fiji is closer to a 'conforming' case, as most wellbeing indicators worsened after 2000, which is predicted by the results presented for H2 and H4. In terms of representativeness, the two case studies cover three of the four most common HR subtypes: Unfair HRs; Restricted Illiberal Unfair HRs; and Restricted Unfair HRs.[127] However, I am circumspect regarding the generalisability of my findings because HRs are heterogeneous (even within subtypes), and interactions between formal institutions and informal processes are highly context-specific. Finally, it should also be noted that both cases involve a shift to a 'harder' HR variant, and therefore do not offer insight into the opposite transition.

Nevertheless, Fiji and Solomon Islands are valuable case studies for a variety of other reasons. First, small states provide an excellent opportunity to observe the informal processes that play a crucial role in shaping outcomes in HRs (Goode 2010, 1057). This is because they often feature weak formal institutions, strong informal governance, and tight-knit political elites, making these aspects of the political system easier to study (Corbett and Veenendaal 2017, 33). Second, there is a lack of research on 'small states' in the democratisation literature. Wouter Veenendaal and Jack Corbett (2014, 529, 531) suggest that this "greatly distorts our understanding of the causes and stimuli of transition and consolidation" by sidelining the case selection principles of representativeness and variation. This study will provide an important reference point for generalisability as case studies of policy in larger HRs emerge. Fourth, the Pacific is set to become an increasingly significant region as China and Russia

[127] The third most common HR subtype, Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair HR, is not represented.

expand their influence in the area, posing a challenge to the traditional dominance of Australia, New Zealand (NZ), France, and the US (Wilkins 2010; Firth 2013; Ratuva 2014b). As two of the largest countries in the region, Fiji and Solomon Islands will be focal points for this contest, making it important to better understand their internal political dynamics. Fifth, the small geographical size and tight-knit political elite in both countries made them manageable prospects for a short research time frame. Finally, given my previous research experience in Fiji and familiarity with the South Pacific region, it made sense to select countries in this area.

Explanatory & Dependent Variables

In Chapter Four, I described how the various dimensions and components of my typology are converted into dichotomous explanatory variables using thresholds applied to V-Dem data. For my qualitative analysis, the process is similar but the outcome is different: in each case, the explanatory variable is the rating applied to each dimension for the country under consideration. For example, when examining the relationship between electoral politics and citizen wellbeing in Fiji between 1993 and 1999, the explanatory variable is the 'Unfair' rating applied to the Elections dimension during this period. Part of the research process involved using primary and secondary sources – detailed below – to confirm the veracity of my ratings for each dimension.

The conceptualisation and measurement of the dependent variable is narrower than the quantitative component of my research due to data availability and space constraints. Instead of using 12 quantifiable indicators, I restricted my focus to the four health indicators, the three education indicators, and HDI score. Country-level data for these outcomes was extracted from the WDI dataset used for the statistical analysis, and is presented in graph

form at the beginning of each case study chapter to demonstrate trends across different regime periods. The decision to analyse only two of the four wellbeing themes – with HDI included as an overall measure – was driven by space constraints and the lack of available data for the remaining two themes in the case study countries.

Finally, it is important to note two points regarding the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables. First, I focus on the association between each case study country's HR subtype and trends in its wellbeing outcomes *during* the specified periods, rather than the effects of the transition *between* regime types. This is because my aim is to use analysis of the ways in which causal processes change over time to better understand how day-to-day political practice affects wellbeing outcomes. Although a regime transition may have a significant impact on wellbeing outcomes – especially if it takes the form of a coup or a similar dramatic event – I look beyond these atypical occurrences to investigate the daily workings of political hybridity in consolidated HR subtypes.[128] Second, it is vital to recognise that identifying the impact of informal processes on the selected indicators is difficult. The assessments made in the following chapters are inherently subjective, as they are based on my best judgement as a researcher. My conclusions regarding the causal link between processes and effects should be treated accordingly.

Fieldwork

The primary field research for this dissertation was conducted between 21 February and 2 May 2018. For the first five weeks I was based in Suva, Fiji's capital, where I conducted 17 interviews. The remainder of my time was spent in Honiara, capital of Solomon Islands,

[128] There is a distinct literature that deals with regime transitions (see for example O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Brownlee 2009; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014) but engaging closely with it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

where I completed 15 interviews. A final interview was completed by Skype after I had returned to Oxford. Additionally, I have drawn on data from my 10 weeks of MPhil field research in Suva (31 July to 24 September 2015), during which I completed 16 interviews.[129] All interviews were conducted using a semi-structured 'interview guide' approach[130] featuring questions designed to test the accuracy of the ratings applied to each dimension and the effects of these dimensions on trends in the selected proxy indicators. Interviewees comprised former government ministers, senior bureaucrats, and key civil society figures including trade unionists, activists, and religious leaders. To ensure anonymity, informants are identified in the text using a pseudonym, which is attached to a footnote that gives the interview's identifying letter and location. A brief description of each informant's role is included in the reference list. Most interviews were around 60 minutes in length.[131]

To select interviewees I relied on the 'snowball sampling' technique (Merriam 1998, 63), which entails selecting several well-positioned people and asking them to suggest information-rich participants (Patton 2015, 298). This approach is well-suited to Fiji and Solomon Islands because both countries have small, tight-knit pools of potential informants. However, I struggled to overcome one of the technique's key problems: sampling bias caused by gatekeepers referring the researcher to those with similar outlooks to their own (R. Atkinson and Flint 2001, 2). I attempted to mitigate this by engaging a diverse range of gatekeepers, but nevertheless many of my interviewees were drawn from an interconnected,

[129] In 2015, I also worked as a lecturer for a local university, delivering a unit on international development that formed part of a postgraduate diploma. The students were senior public servants and CSO workers, and classroom discussions with them immeasurably improved my understanding of Fijian identity, the relationship between indigenous and Indo-Fijians (see Chapter Seven), and the impact of socio-cultural factors on the country's politics. In particular, my students provided invaluable insights into the kinship relations and socio-political units that characterise indigenous society.

[130] Meaning that topics were predetermined based on the informant's area of expertise but questions were sometimes reworded spontaneously to fit the context (Rapley 2001, 315). This approach, well-suited to the informal Pacific manner, allowed me to adapt my line of questioning as required (Patton 2015, 439).

[131] The shortest was 20 minutes, and the longest 87 minutes.

politically engaged, and academic set.[132] This lent additional importance to the triangulation process noted below, which helped to uncover alternative viewpoints.

Analytically, I have taken a centrist position in the 'objectivist/subjectivist' debate, assuming that although my interview data does not perfectly reflect the social world it offers insights into the meaning informants attach to particular concepts (J. Miller and Glassner 2004, 126). The veracity of the qualitative data has been confirmed through the process of triangulation, whereby primary sources are compared and cross-checked against secondary sources (Davies 2001, 78). Key secondary sources included newspaper articles, policy documents, government speeches, and academic literature. I benefitted from access to the National Archives of Fiji, through which I obtained copies of the independent *Fiji Times* newspaper and various government reports for the relevant period (1993-2006). Similar hard copy documents were not available for Solomon Islands, as they were destroyed by the Tensions[133] and flooding during a cyclone. Fortunately, the online archive maintained by the *Pacific Island Report* provides access to a vast array of news articles and press releases dating back to 1997, which proved an invaluable resource for both countries. I have endeavoured to study all texts as products of their context (Prior 2003, 26), bearing in mind their readership and authorship and recognising that they may not objectively report reality (P. Atkinson 1990, 7).

Challenges

It is important for qualitative researchers to consider their own positionality when conducting fieldwork. In both countries, I am a 'youth' according to official government definitions and cultural tradition (Government of Fiji 2011; Ministry of Women, Youth, Children and Family Affairs 2017, 14). However, as far as I could tell this was mitigated by

[132] Although it is possible that this group had formed a shared viewpoint on my topic, I do not believe this was the case: most of my interviewees described my approach as new.
[133] A period of violence and instability that occurred between 1998 and 2003. See Chapter Eight.

the prestige attached to my scholarship and attachment to the University of Oxford – several informants specifically commented on these labels – enabling me to equalise power relations in interviews. Both countries are generally patriarchal, but the potential power differential between myself (a white, cisgender, heterosexual, and middle-class male) and my female interviewees was mitigated by the fact that the women I interviewed were all well-educated, older than me, and working in high-level positions.[134]

In addition to these general challenges, conducting political science research in HRs entails a set of idiosyncratic problems (Goode 2010, 1058). Because criticism of the government can lead to reprisals ranging from intimidation and surveillance to outright violence, people may be unwilling to be interviewed. This threat may discourage those who agree to participate from giving honest answers. Fortunately, these issues did not affect my interviewees. In Fiji, I was studying a period that ended over a decade ago and is considered less sensitive than the years between the 2006 coup and the 2014 election. In Solomon Islands, the state is not known for engaging in repressive tactics, and although interpersonal feuds are common my interviewees were assuaged by guarantees of anonymity and my focus on broad systemic issues.

More relevant to my situation was that "relations between a foreign researcher's and respondent's governments may be mapped onto the researcher-respondent relationship" (Goode 2010, 1057). This is particularly problematic where the former is from a country that actively advocates for democratisation in the latter's country. I was aware that as an Australian, the diplomatic tensions between Fiji and Australia after the 2006 coup (Stewart 2014) might colour interviewees' perception of my agenda. However, my association with a United Kingdom (UK) university and reassurances as to my academic neutrality seemed to ameliorate any concerns. In Solomon Islands, RAMSI and Australia are often seen as

[134] I interviewed 10 women and 23 men.

synonymous, meaning that criticisms of the former and the latter become interchangeable. The most common critiques encompass a perceived failure to raise basic living standards, lack of sensitivity to local culture, and encroachment on domestic sovereignty (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 21–25). However, I found that interviewees were very happy to voice these criticisms, suggesting that the relationship between our two countries did not impact their willingness to discuss sensitive issues with me.

Summary

Qualitative research has the potential to counter the tendency of quantitative methods to create "highly stylized pictures in which the action is frozen" (Migdal 2010, 23–25). However, effective case study analysis requires a careful design process that is shaped by the researcher's goals. Therefore, in this chapter I set out the key choices I made during the design process and reflected on the issues associated with field research and the interpretation of qualitative data. The following chapters present the results of my case study analysis, with an emphasis on the ways in which formal and informal institutions and norms interact to shape wellbeing outcomes in HRs.

Chapter 7: Fiji

In this chapter, I use Fiji as a case study to explore the role that informal processes play in the relationship between political hybridity and citizen wellbeing. I begin with a brief summary of Fiji's history and key socio-political developments up to 2006, then present an in-depth analysis of two regime periods: 1993 to 1999, when Fiji was classified as a Restricted Unfair HR; and 2000 to 2006, when Fiji was a Restricted Illiberal Unfair HR. Within each regime period, I examine the links between the dimensions that comprise my typology – elections, political freedoms, and effective power – and citizen wellbeing, proxied by health and education outcomes.

I argue that wellbeing outcomes in Fiji between 1993 and 2006 were the product of interactions between formal and informal processes. This was most notable in three areas. First, institutionalised *Taukei* political dominance and racialised voting patterns undermined the potential for elections to help improve wellbeing outcomes through the mechanism of vertical accountability. Second, Fiji's strong tradition of civil society activism meant that although the government sought to restrict political freedoms in the aftermath of the 2000 coup, this is unlikely to have had a significant negative effect on wellbeing outcomes. Third, the process of societal militarisation in Fiji is likely to have had a negative impact on wellbeing outcomes. Additionally, the Fijian case study provides useful insight into the causal mechanisms driving the statistical association between horizontal accountability and wellbeing observed in Chapter Five.

History & Politics

Country Overview

The Republic of Fiji is a group of approximately 330 islands in Melanesia. Although the area was first settled by the Lapita people three to four thousand years ago, oral traditions indicate that indigenous Fijian (*Taukei*[135]) political consciousness began to emerge between 1500 and 1600 AD (Baledrokadroka 2009, 415). From this period on, power slowly consolidated in eastern Fiji's large, hierarchical confederacies (Howard 1991, 17). Extensive European contact with Fiji commenced around 1800 (Howard 1991, 19), and in 1874, Fiji was ceded to the British by a group of 10 chiefs, nine of whom were from the east (Lawson 1996, 45). Between 1879 and 1916, the colonial administration transported 60,639 Indian indentured labourers and their families to Fiji to work in the cane fields (Lal 1992, 14). The ethnic divide between the descendants of these labourers and the indigenous population has since been exacerbated by *Taukei* resentment of Indo-Fijian commercial success and the exclusion of Indo-Fijians from the national identity (Howard 1991, 31; Lawson 1996, 52). As of 2012, Fiji's population of 858,038 was 59.65 per cent *Taukei* and 33.81 per cent Indo-Fijian, rounded out by small numbers of other ethnicities[136] including Chinese, Europeans, and Rotumans (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 2012b, 3).

Political Context

Fiji's recent political history has featured four coups – in May and September of 1987, May 2000, and December 2006[137] – which are key to understanding the country's hybrid political

[135] This term is commonly used to refer to indigenous Fijians as a group.
[136] Note that the terms 'ethnicity' and 'race' are used interchangeably in Fiji, both officially and popularly (Naidu 2013, 7).
[137] This thesis does not fully rehash the mechanics of each coup. For explanations of 1987, see Deryck Scarr (1988) and Stephanie Lawson (1996, chap. 2). For the 2000 coup, see Robbie Robertson and William Sutherland (2001), and Michael Field, Tupeni Baba, and Unaisi Nabobo-baba (2005). For the 2006 coup, see Jonathan Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij Lal (2009).

system. Fiji became an independent constitutional monarchy in 1970, and for the next 17 years government was dominated by the Alliance Party (AP) – the political vehicle for Fiji's eastern chiefly elite – which won elections in 1972, 1977, and 1982. Then, in 1987 the AP was defeated by a coalition comprising the Indo-Fijian-dominated National Federation Party (NFP) and the unionist Fiji Labour Party (FLP). This led to the May 1987 coup, in which the AP used *Taukei* fears regarding the increasing power of Indo-Fijians as a smokescreen for its attempts to regain power (see Robertson and Tamanisau 1988; Howard 1991; B. Lal 1992; Sutherland 1992; Lawson 1996). Senior members of the AP decried the coalition as a threat to *Taukei* supremacy and Fiji's Christian values (Howard 1991, 243–44; Srebrnik 2002, 192), prompting Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka and the Royal Fiji Military Forces (RFMF; latterly the Republic of Fiji Military Forces) to overthrow the new government.[138] After three months of violence and instability, a compromise known as the Deuba Accord was reached between AP moderates and the NFP-FLP coalition.

In September 1987, Rabuka staged a second coup, this time motivated by a combination of ethno-nationalism and his desire to maintain the RFMF's influence over civilian politics. In the lead-up to the Deuba Accord, the *Taukei* Movement – a nationalist network created by conservative members of the chiefly elite (Howard 1991, 273) – encouraged Rabuka to repeat his intervention and provoked a spate of attacks on Indo-Fijians (Lawson 1996, 63–64). Rabuka, worried about increased civilian control of the military and dissatisfied with his exclusion from the negotiations, mimicked the *Taukei* Movement's rhetoric on the dangers supposedly posed by Indo-Fijians (Lal 1992, 292; Lawson 1996, 64). The day after the Deuba Accord was signed, Rabuka acted independently of the chiefly elite to abrogate the 1970 Constitution and declare Fiji a republic (Baledrokadroka 2015, 130).

[138] Rabuka was third in command of the RFMF.

For the next five years, Fiji was ruled by a "quasi-civilian interim government" (Lawson 1996, 64). In 1990, a new constitution was enacted, which gifted the *Taukei* a majority in both houses of parliament. Of the 70 elected members of the lower house (the House of Representatives), 37 were reserved for *Taukei*, 27 for Indo-Fijians, five for general electors, and one for Rotumans. Each seat was elected only by members of the relevant ethnic community. The upper house (the Senate) comprised 34 appointed members. The *Bose Levu Vakaturaga* (BLV; Great Council of Chiefs) nominated 24 *Taukei* senators, the president nominated nine senators to "to represent other communities" (Ghai and Cottrell 2007, 650), and the Rotuman Islands Council (RIC) was allocated one nomination.

The 'communal voting' system ensured that the first post-coup elections in 1992 were won by Rabuka's *Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei* (SVT; Fijian Political Party) – a reconfiguration of the AP – and its junior coalition partner, the General Voters Party (GVP).[139] This return to electoral politics marks the beginning of the period on which I focus in this chapter. The SVT remained in power until 1999, but the latter years of Rabuka's reign were marked by a growing feeling in the *Taukei* community that the government had failed to deliver them prosperity. This sense of marginalisation was exacerbated by the institution of the 1997 Constitution, which abolished the *Taukei* parliamentary majority,[140] and by the victory of the multiracial 'People's Coalition' at the 1999 general election (Alley 2001, 225). Hoping to capitalise on the ill-feeling, businessman George Speight and members of the RFMF's Counter Revolutionary Warfare Unit (CRWU) stormed Fiji's parliament on 19 May 2000.

[139] The coalition was also supported by two independent members of parliament (MPs) and the MP from Rotuma, a Fijian dependency (Scarr 1993, 90).
[140] From 1999 to 2006 there were 71 lower house seats, with 23 reserved for *Taukei*, 19 for Indo-Fijians, three for general electors, and one for Rotumans. A further 25 seats were decided by votes from "all communities registered on an open roll" (Government of Fiji 1997, sec. 52(1)(b)). The upper house consisted of 32 senators, with the BLV allocated 14 nominations, the prime minister nine, the leader of the opposition eight, and the RIC one.

The 2000 'civilian coup', which marked Fiji's shift from a Restricted Unfair to Restricted Illiberal Unfair HR, was a chaotic event. Speight assumed that the rest of the RFMF and the *Taukei* political establishment would rally behind him (Robertson and Sutherland 2001, 12, 17), but this did not occur. Both the BLV and the RFMF were immobilised by divisions between supporters and opponents of Speight, underpinned by historical *vanua*[141] rivalries (Norton 2009, 105–6). Eventually, then-Commodore Frank Bainimarama prevailed over the RFMF's ethno-nationalist factions (Connew 2008, 78; Fraenkel and Firth 2009, 5), and on 29 May the military intervened to depose the president, abrogate the 1997 Constitution, and negotiate with Speight (Fraenkel 2013, 333). Bainimarama elevated himself to head of state, then on 29 June, installed an interim administration under the leadership of *Taukei* businessman Laisenia Qarase rather than reappointing Mahendra Chaudhry, Indo-Fijian leader of the People's Coalition.

In 2001, Qarase's newly formed *Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua* (SDL; United Fiji Party) won elections held under the reinstated 1997 Constitution. Over the following years, Bainimarama became increasingly dissatisfied with Qarase's reign as the prime minister showed lenience towards those involved in the 2000 coup, attempted to end the commander's commission, and cut the RFMF budget (Firth and Fraenkel 2009, 125–26; Ratuva 2011, 112). These actions prompted Bainimarama to set himself against the SDL's ethno-nationalist agenda. He was able to avoid mutiny despite his new progressive, multiracial ideology by conducting purges that ensured the majority of RFMF officers owed their positions to him (Fraenkel 2009a, 46–47). The SDL won elections in May 2006, but seven months later the government was deposed by the RFMF, which instituted eight years of authoritarianism under an 'interim' military government.

[141] This complex term encompasses "a people, their chief, a defined territory, land, [and] socio-cultural system" (Mateiviti-Tulavu 2013, 10).

1993-99: Fiji as a Restricted Unfair Hybrid Regime

In this section, I analyse how the configuration of the Fijian political system affected citizen wellbeing from 1993 to 1999. During this period, Fiji experienced a slow but steady increase in GDP per capita (Figure 4). Indicators of public health improved steadily: infant mortality decreased by 10.65 per cent (Figure 5); under-5 mortality decreased by 11.37 per cent (Figure 6); maternal mortality decreased by 24.56 per cent (Figure 7); and life expectancy increased by approximately one year (Figure 8).[142] Primary school completion rates were relatively stable from 1994 to 1998, averaging 102.7 per cent, then dipped to 99.61 per cent in 1999 (Figure 9). Mean years of schooling peaked at 9.8 in 1995 but had fallen to 9.6 by 1999 (Figure 10), with a net increase of 4.35 per cent for the period under consideration.[143] In line with these improvements, Fiji's HDI score rose from 0.658 in 1993 to 0.681 in 1999 (Figure 12), an increase of approximately 3.5 per cent. Data on health spending was not available before 2000, while education spending increased gradually from 1998 to 2000 (Figure 13).[144] The overall impression is of significant improvements in health outcomes, coupled with more modest advances in the education sector. But to what extent were these trends affected by the character of political hybridity in Fiji?

[142] This was an increase of 1.81 per cent. During the same period, life expectancy in Samoa and Vanuatu increased by approximately 3.84 per cent and 4.03 per cent respectively.
[143] Statistics for secondary school enrolment are only available from 1998 onwards.
[144] The data on health and education spending come from the WDI. It is important to note that figures from the MoH and the Fiji Bureau of Statistics are very different. However, data from these sources are either patchy or not publicly available.

Figure 4: Fijian GDP Per Capita, 1993-2006[145]





Figure 5: Infant Mortality in Fiji, 1993-2006



[145] For all graphs in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight, the bold dashed line indicates the first year of the new regime period.

Figure 6: Under-5 Mortality in Fiji, 1993-2006




Figure 7: Maternal Mortality in Fiji, 1993-2006




Figure 8: Life Expectancy in Fiji, 1993-2006




Figure 9: Primary School Completion Rates in Fiji, 1993-2006




Figure 10: Mean Years of Schooling in Fiji, 1993-2006




Figure 11: Secondary School Enrolment Rates in Fiji, 1993-2006




Figure 12: HDI in Fiji, 1993-2006





Figure 13: Health and Education Expenditure in Fiji, 1993-2006



The period under consideration encompasses both the Rabuka and Chaudhry administrations, but the transition between the two did not alter Fiji's HR subtype. Elections were held in 1994 and 1999, although in both cases the playing field was tilted in favour of the incumbent administration. The government generally respected freedom of organisation,

with the unions being particularly influential actors, but freedom of expression was more limited. Although the RFMF did not play an active role in daily politics, the disruptive power it had demonstrated in 1987 loomed over the Fijian political landscape. Below, I discuss each of these dimensions in turn, analysing the ways in which formal and informal institutions and norms interacted to affect wellbeing outcomes.

Elections

The 1994 and 1999 general elections were both classed as 'Unfair'. Yet even unfair competitive elections are supposed to improve citizen wellbeing (Gerring *et al* 2015, 8), because they allow the electorate to punish the government for poor performance and produce more effective political leadership through competitive selection. I use analysis of interview data and media coverage to argue that these mechanisms were not strongly evident in Fiji in 1994 and 1999. The prevalence of race-based politics and an associated lack of policy differentiation among the major parties sidelined health and education issues, making it unlikely that vertical accountability had a positive influence on wellbeing outcomes during this period.

1994: The snap election

Rabuka was forced to call an election in 1994, only 18 months after the previous poll, because seven government MPs joined the opposition to vote down the proposed budget in November 1993. Acting President Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara agreed to prorogue parliament from 19 January 1994, and the election was called for the week beginning 18 February (Lal 2006, 114). The ensuing campaign was described by Brij Lal (2006, 122) as a "curiously quiet, uneventful affair… There were few large rallies and virtually no campaigning through the

media. Most people seemed uninterested and disenchanted." However, a detailed examination of *Times*[146] reporting during the three months prior to the election gives the impression of a campaign that featured a great deal of animosity, particularly between Rabuka and the defectors' Fijian Association Party (FAP).

Health and education were not prominent in media coverage of the campaign period, undermining the idea that competitive elections improve citizen wellbeing because the electorate will vote out a government that performs poorly in these areas. In December 1993, there were very few articles on education but several on health issues, including doctor shortages (Matau 1997, 3), non-communicable diseases (Fiji Times 1993b, 2), regional hospitals (Fiji Times 1993d, 4, 1993f, 3), breastfeeding (Fiji Times 1993e, 12), and general public health (Waqa 1993, 7). There were also two supplements on the Colonial War Memorial Hospital (CWMH) (Fiji Times 1993g, 1–14; L. Whippy 1993) and one on World AIDS day (Fiji Times 1993a, 26–29). However, health issues were rarely linked to politics or framed as relevant to the election. In January 1994 the balance was reversed, with several education-related articles and very few on health. Again, coverage was largely apolitical and failed to highlight major problems with Fiji's education system (Fiji Times 1994a, 23–25, 29, 31–33, 1994d, 1–3, 4, 9–12). Immediately prior to the election, in the first two weeks of February 1994, there was again little coverage of health and education as campaign issues.

Engagement with education and health issues in the messaging from the key political parties was minimal, making it difficult for voters to compare party policy platforms. The SVT announced F$2 million for anti-poverty initiatives, increases in grant aid to primary schools, a new hospital in Vunisea, and an increase in rural electrification (Matau 1994, 3). At the opening of the CWMH extension, Rabuka used his speech – which the *Times* (1993g, 4–5)

[146] The *Times* is Fiji's major English daily paper (Robertson 2017, 133), and was consistently critical of the Rabuka, Chaudhry, and Qarase governments.

printed in full – to emphasise his government's commitment to improving health services (Mataika 1993, 3). In one example of education being used as a campaign tool, the Minister for Education blamed the hardships facing school children on the FAP members who voted against the 1994 budget and took the opportunity to outline the government's policies, including the introduction of free education (Fiji Times 1994e, 3). However, Rabuka's eight-point plan for improving government performance, presented at the launch of the SVT campaign, did not mention health and education (Kakaivalu 1994b, 1, 3). Instead, the prime minister focused on the claim that only he could unite the *Taukei* community, thereby maintaining Fijian and Rotuman paramountcy within a multi-racial society (Rabuka 1994). At one point, he even stated that "voters must not forget who started the fight to ensure political dominance for Fijians in their country after they were not allowed to form a Government following the 1987 elections" (Kakaivalu 1994a, 1). The SVT's traditional coalition partner, the GVP, placed some emphasis on health, education, and women's rights (Sorby 1994, 4), but its campaigning was derailed by acerbic exchanges with the All Nationals Congress (ANC; Tora 1994, 5).

At times the FAP, led by former Finance Minister Josefata Kamikamica, focused on pro-poor policies. Lal (2006, 117) claims that "on the campaign trail, the [FAP] had only one issue: Rabuka was an unworthy leader", but this was not the case. When explaining why he voted against the budget, Ratu Emosi Vuakatagane stated that he was concerned about the impact of rising food prices on the poor (Matau 1993, 4). Ratu Serupepeli Naivalu claimed that "the Budget was not aimed at helping the poor and destitute. I felt that I had to vote against it" (Fiji Times 1993h, 3), later reiterating that "the harmful effects of the budget on poor people stood out loud and clear" (Fiji Times 1993c, 3). The FAP even directly linked the budget's defeat to education, arguing that the government had "failed school children and their parents because they did not ensure the Budget was passed" (Fiji Times 1994f, 3).

Yet this did not feature in the FAP policy platform, which did not mention health or education (Fiji Times 1993i, 5), although it did include the re-instatement of the Poverty Alleviation Fund and increased public housing support (Fiji Times 1994b, 17, 1994g, 4). The FAP saw social welfare as a way of differentiating itself from Rabuka but pursued this line of campaigning half-heartedly.

The key policy issue for both the FLP and the NFP was a review of the 1990 Constitution, which placed severe limits on Indo-Fijian political power (Reddy 1994, 5; Chaudhry 1994, 4). The NFP provided little further policy detail, but the FLP sometimes framed its rejection of the Constitution as a method of standing up for the underprivileged (Chaudhry 1993, 6; Fiji Times 1994c, 5; Rashid 1994, 3; S. Sen 1994, 3). The FLP also vocally opposed the *Agricultural Land and Tenants Act 1978* (ALTA; Sen 1994, 3), citing this as a key issue affecting the lives of poor Fijians (Rashid 1994, 3). There was some friction over education funding when the FLP's Krishna Datt critiqued NFP leader Jai Ram Reddy's claim that private schools should not receive government support (A. Kumar 1994, 5), but this was not a key campaign issue.

It is unlikely that the 1994 election had a significant effect on trends in education and health outcomes in the following years, because party policies in these areas did not shape the election outcome. Rabuka himself stated that health and education were not key issues.[147] Results demonstrated that within each community, people voted for the party they believed would be able to maintain intra-ethnic unity.[148] On the *Taukei* side, the SVT won 31 seats (Table 33) and formed a coalition government with the GVP and two independent MPs. Supported by the Methodist Church, the military, and the majority of the chiefs (Chin 1995, 313), Rabuka's 'honest soldier' persona and emphasis on *Taukei* unity won out against the FAP's perfunctory 'pro-poor' platform, which jarred with Kamikamica's attempts to position

[147] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[148] Interview K, Suva; Interview D, Suva.

himself as natural heir to the AP model of chiefly leadership (Lal 2006, 116–17). The NFP triumphed in the Indo-Fijian communal electorates, gaining six new seats. Its strong performance was partly due to Reddy's statesmanlike reputation (Lal 2006, 120), but more important was the FLP's inability to gain voter trust. After the 1992 election, the FLP had agreed to support Rabuka's bid to be prime minister on the proviso that he would revise the 1990 Constitution, scrap the value added tax (VAT), revoke several labour decrees, and reconsider ALTA (Lal 2006, 97). When Rabuka failed to enact these changes, the FLP lost credibility within the Indo-Fijian community. This was exacerbated by leader Mahendra Chaudhry's confrontational style and preference for true multiracialism, which were contrasted unfavourably against Reddy's gradualist approach (Lal 2006, 120–22).

Table 33: 1994 Election Results

	Taukei	**Indo-Fijian**	**General Elector**	**Rotuman**	**Total**
SVT	31	-	-	-	**31**
NFP	-	20	-	-	**20**
FLP	-	7	-	-	**7**
FAP	5	-	-	-	**5**
GVP	-	-	4	-	**4**
Independents	1	-	-	1	**2**
ANC	-	-	1	-	**1**
Totals	*37*	*27*	*5*	*1*	***70***

The potential for the 1994 election to serve as a mechanism for vertical accountability in the areas of health and education was further undermined by two other factors. First, many *Taukei* voters were heavily influenced by respect for chiefly authority:

> in many of these isolated villages located on the outer islands, the issues of Fijian leadership and politics in Suva seemed remote and detached…. Many of these inexperienced and traditional voters followed the lead of their chiefs, and in this election, the majority of the chiefs endorsed SVT. (Chin 1995, 313)

This suggests a disconnect between the principal (the electorate) and the agent (the government) and indicates that voting patterns were sometimes determined by intra-elite machinations rather than voters' basic needs. Second, the lack of differentiation in health

and education policy, particularly between the SVT and the FAP (Lal 2006, 116), meant that the election did not operate as a 'marketplace of ideas' in which voters could select their preferred approach.

The character of development policy under Rabuka was intertwined with the 'unfair' nature of the 1994 election. The constitutional entrenchment of indigenous political dominance prevented the SVT-GVP coalition from being held to account by Indo-Fijians, permitting the government to further its agenda of *Taukei* affirmative action. This involved programmes in the business and education sectors that aimed to "reconfigure the ethnic and class structure" by "creating an indigenous middle class" (Ratuva 2015, 139). Counterintuitively, affirmative action was closely tied to the government's efforts to consolidate neoliberal reforms initiated by the AP in the early 1980s. For example, the privatisation of state assets was used to give indigenous entrepreneurs the opportunity to assume key management positions (Ratuva 2015, 139).[149] Conversely, poor Indo-Fijians came under growing pressure thanks to decreasing wages and welfare payments (S. Kumar and Prasad 2004, 478). Overall, the 1994 election did not serve as a mechanism for vertical accountability with regard to citizen wellbeing, and it is plausible that more competitive elections would have resulted in greater improvements in Fiji's wellbeing indicators during the 1990s.

1999: The landmark election

By the late 1990s, the Fijian electorate was in a grim mood. Economic mismanagement, poorly designed policy, and corruption had caused a recession, and the cost of living, crime rates, and illiteracy were all increasing (Snell and Prasad 2001, 90). Moreover, the affirmative action policies that were supposed to benefit poor *Taukei* had been heavily abused by

[149] Examples included Fiji Post and Telecommunications and Fiji Pine Ltd (Snell and Prasad 2001, 88).

indigenous elites (S. Chand 2009, 140). The election campaign itself saw a dramatic realignment of alliances, because the 1997 Constitution eliminated the automatic *Taukei* parliamentary majority that shaped campaigning in 1994. This meant that winning a parliamentary majority required inter-ethnic cooperation. The incumbent SVT-United General Party (UGP)[150] coalition joined forces with the NFP, despite Reddy's longstanding role as opposition leader. The People's Coalition alliance of the FLP, the Party of National Unity (PANU), and the FAP was similarly incongruous: Chaudhry had refused to support the FAP in 1994; and PANU founder Apisai Tora had a confusing history of veering between multiracialism and ethnonationalism.[151] The key factor uniting the parties was the desire to end Rabuka's reign, rather than a coherent political philosophy (Lal 2006, 162). Thus, both competing blocs experienced fractious relations among their constituent parties.

Health and education issues – as well as social justice in general – were more prominent during the campaign than they had been in 1994. Krishna Datt, former minister in three Fijian governments, argues that 'everyone's rhetoric was welfare-based – you simply can't go into an election without talking about health and education'.[152] This was reiterated by Filipe (a doctor and Ministry of Health [MoH] official), who says that political candidates 'had to talk about health and education policy'.[153] Most notably, the People's Coalition used the FLP's origins in the trade union movement to frame itself as the champion of working-class Fijians. Chaudhry led the charge, promising to roll back the VAT (Fiji Times 1999o, 2; McCutchan 1999a, 3), and attacking the SVT for overseeing rising poverty (Fiji Times 1999c, 2). His coalition partners followed suit: PANU's president stated that "the coalition would like to see a government which looked after the welfare of the poor" (Nadore 1999, 2); and

[150] A reformulation of the GVP.
[151] Tora had been a member of most major Fijian political parties, founded three parties of his own, and was a key figure in the *Taukei* Movement (Lal 2006, 163).
[152] Interview with Krishna Datt, Suva.
[153] Interview J, Suva.

several FAP candidates highlighted problems with Fiji's education system, health services, and basic infrastructure, as well as the various hardships faced by the working class.[154] This shift in emphasis for the FAP was driven by the party's new leader, Adi Kuini Bavadra Speed – the widow of Dr Timoci Bavadra, former prime minister and leader of the FLP – who succeeded Kamikamica in 1998. By the 1999 election, nearly all of the FAP's "leading Fijian candidates were former members or friends of the Labour Party" thanks to Speed's connections (Lal 2006, 164).

The SVT-NFP-UGP coalition placed less emphasis on health and education. The SVT sought to highlight its record in government, with Rabuka and his allies arguing that more people were satisfied with health and education than ever before due to improved accessibility and affordability (Fiji Times 1999h, 1999q, 2).[155] Yet this claim was undermined by constant reminders from the People's Coalition that the SVT had presided over rising unemployment and various corruption scandals (S. Prasad and Snell 2000, 44; Lal 2006, 172). This first point clearly resonated with the public: a *Times* poll found that unemployment was the most important electoral issue for 26 per cent of voters (Fiji Times 1999p, 1). Although the SVT and the NFP trumpeted the 1997 Constitution as a landmark achievement many *Taukei* saw the document as a betrayal (Lal 2006, 170), because it extended affirmative action to all disadvantaged Fijians (Government of Fiji 1997, chap. 5; Ratuva 2015, 140). Thus, the SVT-NFP-UGP coalition found it difficult to unite its various ideological viewpoints into a coherent campaign.

Despite increased party rhetoric regarding health and education issues, the election result did not exert a long-term effect on citizen wellbeing in Fiji. This is partly because the reign of the victorious People's Coalition (Table 34) was foreshortened by Speight's coup in May

[154] See Fiji Times 1999b, 2, 1999g, 4, 1999i, 5, 1999j, 5, 1999k, 4, 1999l, 5, 1999r, 5.
[155] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.

2000. The effectiveness of the election as a mechanism for creating vertical accountability on wellbeing issues was also undermined by similar factors to those noted in the analysis of 1994. It would be easy to attribute the People's Coalition victory to its emphasis on macro-level wellbeing issues, but the cohesiveness of its platform should not be overemphasised. The People's Coalition brought together a diverse range of parties and "political refugees" with conflicting views (Lal 2006, 164–65); in reality, anti-Rabuka sentiment and the politics of race were the election's deciding factors. The Coalition

> owed its victory not just to the new popularity of its ideology (mainly with Indian voters), but much more to the unprecedented political fragmentation of Fijians that had been provoked partly by resentment against Rabuka's compromising with Indian demands. (Norton 2000, 56)

The SVT, which won only eight seats, was preferenced last by most parties (Wise 1999b, 3), and was abandoned by *Taukei* nationalists, who shifted their allegiance to the Nationalist *Vanua Tako Lavo* Party (NVTLP) and the *Veitokani ni Leweni Vanua Vakaristo* Party (VLV; Christian Democratic Alliance), both of which appealed to *Taukei* unhappy with the SVT's softening stance towards multiracialism (Lal 2006, 165–66).[156] The NFP, which failed to win a single seat, was punished for siding with the SVT by Indo-Fijians unable to forgive Rabuka for the 1987 coup.

Table 34: 1999 Election Results

	Taukei	Indo-Fijian	Communal	General Elector	Rotuman	Total
FLP	-	19	18	-	-	**37**
FAP	10	-	1	-	-	**11**
SVT	5	-	3	-	-	**8**
PANU	4	-	-	-	-	**4**
Independents	-	-	1	2	1	**4**
VLV	2	-	1	-	-	**3**
UGP	-	-	1	1	-	**2**
NVTLP	2	-	-	-	-	**2**
Totals	*23*	*19*	*25*	*3*	*1*	***71***

[156] The VLV eventually took up two cabinet seats in the People's Coalition government.

The politics of race was also influential. Lal (2006, 158) argues that "race was relegated to the background because both coalitions were multiracial", but this was not the case. Notably, the debate over ALTA (see Fiji Times 1999p, 1; Gopal 1999, 3; Smiles 1999, 7; Wise 1999a, 3) demonstrated the continued relevance of ethnicity, given the intertwined politics of land ownership and ethnicity in Fiji. When asked whether health and education were important at the 1999 election, interviewees acknowledged that they were more prominent than in the past,[157] but that race shaped people's votes in the first instance.[158] Similarly, Lemeki (a former high-ranking Ministry of Education [MoE] official) argues that candidates focused on race issues and that Rabuka antagonised *Taukei* nationalists by championing the 1997 Constitution.[159] Conversely, the SVT was also criticised for focusing too heavily on *Taukei* rights,[160] adding to the confusion of an already complex campaign. This dilemma is neatly summarised by Lal (2006, 162) – contradicting his own argument that race was a background issue – who states that the SVT and NFP were torn between pandering to their respective ethnic bases and trying not to alienate voters who supported the other party.

Like in 1994, the potential for the election to improve wellbeing-related policy through competitive selection was undermined by a lack of policy differentiation between the major parties. As noted above, all parties felt the need to show a commitment to improving education, health, and basic infrastructure, but as an editorial in the *Times* argued,

> a glance through the various manifestos offers the depressing conclusion that they all say the same. They all claim to have the answers to everything…. Few, however, offer any credible insight into how these solutions will be imposed or achieved. (Fiji Times 1999s, 6)

[157] For example: Interview G, Suva; Interview I, Suva.
[158] For example: Interview G, Suva; Interview N, Suva.
[159] Interview E, Suva.
[160] Interview N, Suva.

This uniformity reinforced the importance of race. Because the major parties all had similar policies, elections came down to who people believed[161] – and voters were more likely to believe members of their own ethnic group.[162] This was the result of decades of institutionalised communal voting, which created a political culture that encouraged voters to only trust leaders from their own ethnicity (Lal 2006, xi).

Summary

The most important theme to emerge from this section is that in 1994 and 1999, voting in Fiji was heavily influenced by race, and this inhibited the potential for electoral accountability to facilitate the development of effective national policy in the health and education sectors. In 1994, wellbeing issues were marginalised by the reification of racial divides through the formal institution of communal voting, which caused the political elite and voters to focus on racial unity. The resulting race-specific policies – epitomised by Rabuka's affirmative action programme – were unable to adequately address complex issues that were not bounded by ethnicity. This demonstrates the importance of the interactions between the formal and informal aspects of a political system. Institutionalised communal voting reinforced the informal norm of racialised policy, particularly regarding education and welfare, and the result was a failure to significantly improve wellbeing in these areas.

In 1999, the more egalitarian reconfiguration of parliamentary seats defined by the 1997 Constitution meant that parties were caught between the need to appeal to their traditional constituency, and either hold together fragile coalitions with other parties or win over voters from other ethnic communities. This dynamic was partly responsible for the distinct lack of

[161] The importance of trust and keeping promises was emphasised by other interviewees. For example: Interview C, Suva; Interview F, Suva.
[162] Interview N, Suva.

policy variation and specifics across party platforms. Platitudes regarding the need for improvements in areas such as health and education were important touchpoints for candidates, but providing potentially controversial policy detail could have been disastrous. Although *Taukei* political dominance was no longer institutionalised, the informal norm of voting along ethnic lines dampened the potentially positive impact of electoral politics by sidelining wellbeing issues and militating against the development of comprehensive policy for key wellbeing-related areas. Overall, between 1993 and 1999, these interactions between formal and informal institutions and norms meant that elections were not effective mechanisms for improving the Fijian population's wellbeing.

Political Freedoms

From 1993 to 1999, Fiji was rated 'High' on the Political Freedoms dimension. This reflects the vibrant nature of civil society during the mid-1990s – spearheaded by powerful trade unions – and adequate academic/cultural freedoms and freedom of discussion. However, freedom of information in this period was more limited, with the country's small media establishment often coming under government attack. According to the literature, a lively civil society helps improve wellbeing by transmitting information between citizens and the government, lobbying political elites for improved basic services, and creating social capital. Freedom of expression is thought to improve wellbeing by allowing the media to hold the government to account and permitting public debate. In the following section, I argue that mechanisms associated with freedom of organisation made a positive contribution to health and education outcomes under Rabuka and Chaudhry.

Legal protections

Under both governments there were some *de jure* protections for political freedoms, with important limitations. The 1990 Constitution included a Bill of Rights that protected

freedoms of religion, expression, and association, among others (Government of Fiji 1990, chap. 2). However, it also gave parliament the power to override individual rights to safeguard "the economic social, educational, cultural, traditional and other interests of the [indigenous] Fijian and Rotuman people" (Government of Fiji 1990, chaps. 2, Section 21(1)). The 1997 Constitution removed this broad caveat from the Bill of Rights (1997, chap. 4), added a chapter on social justice (1997, chap. 5), and established the Fiji Human Rights Commission (1997, sec. 42). However, several questionable colonial-era laws remained in force: the *Press Correction Act 1949*, which criminalised the publication of 'malicious material'; the *Public Order Act 1969*, which prohibited activities liable to create racial unrest; and the *Parliamentary Privileges and Powers Act 1965*, which sanctioned up to two years gaol for the publication of materials presented to a closed parliamentary committee. Additionally, the *Emergency Powers Act 1998* enabled "parliament to impose broad press and communications censorship, seize private property, conduct searches without warrants, and ban public meetings" (Freedom House 2000, 191). However, these pieces of legislation were rarely used.

Freedom of organisation

Both governments generally respected freedom of organisation. Citizens were able to form opposition political parties, and several sources describe civil society during the 1990s as vibrant and active (Freedom House 1998, 241; Premdas 2002, 24; Llewellyn-Fowler and Overton 2010, 832; Cameron 2016, 133). Workers could join unions and organise strikes (Freedom House 1994, 258), and although Isimeli (a member of the Fiji Teachers Union [FTU] and high-ranking official of an international education CSO) noted that Rabuka tried to curb union power early in his rule, he quickly realised this would be too difficult.[163] Rabuka stated that he realised the value of working with the unions, and attributed the low number

[163] Interview D, Suva.

of strikes during his reign to the government's 'constructive relationship with the unions in terms of policy'.[164] Nevertheless, the unions vocally opposed the government over issues such as deregulation (Slatter 2006, 29). Taufa (a former high-ranking Fijian Teachers' Association [FTA]) official states that Chaudhry knew the role of the unions better than his predecessor,[165] although this did not prevent the occurrence of several strikes. More generally, Elenoa (a prominent civil society activist) says that throughout the 1990s, CSOs were able to organise marches without fear of police reprisal.[166] According to Freedom House (2002, 237), the Chaudhry government "often denied permits for large outdoor political meetings and demonstrations", but several protest marches by *Taukei* nationalists were permitted to go ahead (PACNEWS 1999a; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2001). In fact, when the home affairs minister announced a ban on large protests Chaudhry overruled him (Robertson 2017, 137).

Consequently, from 1993 to 1999, CSOs were generally able to act as a bridge between the public and the government in the areas of health and education. This was exemplified by the 'Education Forum' (hereafter 'the Forum'), which brought together a range of actors including the Permanent Secretary for Education and representatives from the Indo-Fijian-dominated FTU and the *Taukei*-based FTA. Lemeki states that the Forum facilitated the 'healthy exchange of ideas', although he feels the unions were sometimes too confrontational.[167] Taufa is less sure of the Forum's value, suggesting that it was simply used by civil servants to tell stakeholders what was happening.[168] Nevertheless, there were clearly open channels of communication between government and civil society. Tomasi (a current high-ranking FTA official) states that the Rabuka government worked well with both

[164] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[165] Interview I, Suva.
[166] Interview L, Suva.
[167] Interview E, Suva.
[168] Interview I, Suva.

teachers' unions, and that the FTA was able to negotiate with Chaudhry.[169] Manasa (a high-ranking FTA official) believes that despite some conflict the Rabuka government supported union involvement in discussions of teachers' working conditions, claiming that 'they came to us' to talk about such issues.[170] On the Indo-Fijian side, Isimeli recalls that CSOs and unions worked with both governments,[171] while Datt, who was an opposition MP at the time, states that the 'government's doors were open for discussion'.[172] Both Rabuka and Tomasi suggest that the quality of engagement between the government and the education unions was similar under the SVT-GVP and People's Coalition administrations.[173] Finally, Rabuka states that international NGOs (INGOs) contributed to education policy when he was in power.[174] This was confirmed by Tomasi, who identified Education International and the Council of Pacific Education as particularly influential.[175]

In the health sector, interviewees were similarly positive about the relationship between government and civil society. Kaali (a former senior MoH official) states that CSOs were often involved in the creation of health policy,[176] while Adi (also a former senior MoH official) notes that CSOs such as *Soqosoqo Vakamarama iTaukei* (the largest indigenous women's organisation) were often used as implementing bodies.[177] Filipe and Poasa (a former high-ranking MoH official) both identify the Fiji Nurses Association (FNA) as a strong body that had a constructive relationship with Rabuka's government.[178] Epeli (a prominent lawyer) states that although Chaudhry was 'very focused on control', the FNA had the confidence to go on strike over pay rates (Kissun and Delailomaloma 1999).[179] Filipe says that the Fiji

[169] Interview G.
[170] Interview H, Suva. This was confirmed in Interview I, Suva.
[171] Interview D, Suva.
[172] Interview with Krishna Datt, Suva.
[173] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva; Interview G, Suva.
[174] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[175] Interview G, Suva.
[176] Interview K, Suva.
[177] Interview N, Suva.
[178] Interview J, Suva; Interview Q, Suva.
[179] Interview P, Suva.

Medical Association (FMA), which was traditionally less politically active than the FNA, had a good relationship with both governments.[180] Finally, Poasa suggests that Rabuka and Chaudhry were similar in terms of engagement with health sector CSOs.[181] In both the health and education sectors *de jure* protections for freedom of organisation were complemented by the informal norm of consultation between CSOs and key government departments.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression was a more contentious area, with several incidents of repression occurring between 1993 and 1999. For example, the Rabuka government "occasionally pressured publications not to run articles on sensitive topics" (Freedom House 1996, 228), and in 1996 it banned a *Times* columnist before public outcry forced the decision to be reversed three days later (Freedom House 1997, 240). Media self-censorship was an issue due to frequent government criticism and the potential for prosecution under the *Press Correction Act* and the *Parliamentary Privileges and Powers Act* (Freedom House 1993, 229, 1998, 241). Chaudhry's relationship with the media was even more fractious. Shortly after the 1999 election the government decided that only the *Daily Post* would receive public sector advertising contracts, ostensibly because the state held shares in the paper (Freedom House 2000, 191). This financially disadvantaged the *Times*, which Chaudhry accused of being biased against him (Robertson 2017, 133). Then, in December 1999, the government refused to renew the work permit of the *Times'* Scottish editor-in-chief (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2001), and ordered Fiji Television's Canadian chief executive to leave the country because it was claimed that the position should have been given to a Fijian (Ramesh

[180] Interview J, Suva.
[181] Interview Q, Suva.

1999c). The government also initiated court proceedings against several journalists under the *Parliamentary Privileges and Powers Act* (Freedom House 2001, 206).

Despite these incidents, the Fijian media ventured some critiques of government policy in the health and education sectors. According to Rabuka there was 'not so much coverage of health and education' in the 1990s, although he recalls that letters to the editor on these topics put pressure on government.[182] Kaali agrees that the Rabuka government listened to media criticism,[183] but Adi states that during her time the media did not pay much attention to problems such as medical staff shortages.[184] This is belied by archival research, which reveals many articles on this topic during the 1990s.[185] According to Poasa, the media critiqued the availability of services rather than policy direction, and therefore had a healthy relationship with the MoH.[186] On the union side, Selai (a former high-ranking FNA official) says that the FNA received good coverage and believes this affected the government's attitude.[187] For example, the dispute over nurses' pay during Chaudhry's reign received a great deal of media attention,[188] which Thakur Singh (2011, 34) argues was a symptom of the *Times'* bias against Chaudhry. However, from Poasa's perspective the MoH's relationship with the media did not change much after the 1999 election.[189]

In the education sector, Lemeki recalls that the MoE sometimes had to defend itself from media criticism.[190] Manasa states that MoE staff felt they had to address these critiques and respond when the public voiced concerns through letters to the editor.[191] Isimeli also believes

[182] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[183] Interview K, Suva.
[184] Interview N, Suva.
[185] See for example Whippy 1993, 4; Matau 1997, 3; Motufaga 1999, 1; Fiji Times 1999a, 10, 1999k, 3, 1999l, 8, 1999d, 32.
[186] Interview Q, Suva.
[187] Interview C, Suva.
[188] See for example Fiji Times 1999t; Delailomaloma 2000a, 2000b; Daily Post 2000; Fiji Times 2000a, 2000c, 2000d; Kissun 2000.
[189] Interview Q, Suva.
[190] Interview E, Suva.
[191] Interview H, Suva.

that the Rabuka government paid attention to media coverage.[192] However, there were very few education-focused articles during the People's Coalition's reign: one *Times* editorial praised the government's policy of integrating Indo-Fijian teachers into *Taukei* schools, and vice versa (Fiji Times 2000b); there was some reporting on the need for more CSO involvement in curriculum development (PCRC/Pasifik Nius/Niuswire 2000); and a brief, factual article detailed the creation of the Education Commission (PACNEWS 1999b).

Summary

Was there a link between political freedoms and citizen wellbeing in Fiji between 1993 and 1999? Freedom of organisation was generally respected by the government, although public demonstrations were occasionally prevented; and Rabuka and Chaudhry both had working relationships with civil society actors in the health and education sectors. It is likely that these close links between the state and civil society were facilitated by tight social networks: in small island states such as Fiji, "social proximity can fulfil many of the same functions as cumbersome accountability institutions" (Corbett 2015, 62). Thus, CSOs were able to lobby the government, hold politicians accountable, and contribute to policy creation. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that freedom of organisation contributed to the steady improvement in Fiji's health indicators during the 1990s. However, this effect was less evident in the education sector, with Fiji's outcomes worsening marginally during the 1990s. This could be explained by the government's emphasis on affirmative action for *Taukei* education, which resulted in wasted funding and sidelined other important issues such as curriculum changes, infrastructure development, and improving pedagogy (Puamau 2001, 116–17).

[192] Interview D, Suva.

Freedom of expression did not operate as an accountability mechanism in the health and education sectors due to government intimidation and weak media sector capacity. Despite several comments from interviewees suggesting that the government was willing to listen to media criticism, the various incidents of repression highlighted above induced significant journalistic self-censorship. In combination with poor-quality reporting, this may be responsible for the Fijian media's lack of long-term critical engagement with complex societal problems: as noted in my analysis of the 1994 and 1999 elections, a great deal of reporting on health and education issues during this era was simplistically factual. Therefore, the mechanisms associated with freedom of expression were unable to exert much positive influence over wellbeing in Fiji between 1993 and 1999.

Effective Power

This section examines the power of the executive in Fiji from 1993 to 1999, which is characterised as 'Restricted' in my typology. This means that the ability of the Fijian executive to govern effectively was constrained by a tutelary power – in this case, the RFMF. However, several other non-elected actors also played important roles: the BLV; the Methodist Church; foreign states; and international institutions. Not all constraints on the executive are negative though, and in Fiji's Westminster-style system, the responsibility for horizontal accountability lies with the legislature and the judiciary. I begin this section by discussing executive unity under Rabuka and Chaudhry, before analysing how the interactions between the government and horizontal accountability institutions, domestic tutelary powers, and external actors affected citizen wellbeing. I also examine the relationship between the executive and the civil service, which impacts the processes of policy development and implementation. It becomes clear that the ability of horizontal accountability actors to shape health and education

outcomes through formal institutions or informal norms and processes was limited, and that the militarisation of Fijian society had a negative influence on broader wellbeing.

The executive

Under the 1990 and 1997 Constitutions executive power technically resided with the president but by convention was exercised by the prime minister and cabinet, which I therefore refer to as 'the executive'. From 1993 to 1999, the executive – the members of which were drawn from the bicameral legislature – was the most important branch of the state. Under Rabuka, the executive comprised members of the SVT-GVP coalition, and several interviewees stated that it was a powerful body.[193] However, it is important to note that the presence of GVP cabinet members and divisions within the SVT meant Rabuka had to "work with a team whose political loyalties were divided – and who had their own mandates" (Lal 2006, 103). It is unsurprising then that Rabuka comments that he 'wanted to be more powerful'.[194] He found himself bound by the informal norms of consultation derived from the practicalities of coalition government.

Similarly, the dynamic of the People's Coalition cabinet was defined by the FLP's need to appease its coalition partners and reassure the *Taukei* population that Chaudhry would respect their interests. To address the former issue, the FLP took 11 of the 17 cabinet positions, and distributed the remainder among PANU, the FAP, and the VLV. To mitigate the indigenous population's fears, Chaudhry appointed 11 *Taukei* cabinet ministers, but this strategy proved ineffective. Chaudhry was a strong leader in charge of a divided cabinet that "often spoke with discordant voices" (Lal 2006, 183), and so his critics, "rightly or wrongly,

[193] For example: Interview I, Suva.
[194] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.

saw his unmistakable imprint on every policy decision of the government" (Lal 2006, 193).[195] It is true that Chaudhry's forceful personality and the weakness of his cabinet helped the prime minister to force rapid changes – which played a large part in his downfall (Robertson 2017, 134–38).

Although Rabuka and Chaudhry's respective cabinets were both shaped by the realities of party politics, this had a limited effect on health and education. Between 1993 and 1999, policy in both areas was characterised by incremental change driven by the line ministries, rather than the executive.[196] According to Filipe, the transition from Rabuka to Chaudhry did not lead to any major shifts in health policy:[197] both governments focused on improving services[198] and reaching rural areas.[199] Adi recalls that Rabuka would often talk about health issues in caucus, but the two had no major disagreements on health policy.[200] According to Poasa, Chaudhry's Minister for Health, Isimeli Cokanasiga, was a good man but a 'puppet',[201] and media reporting from 1999 shows that Chaudhry had a direct role in dictating health policy. For example, shortly after the election, Cokanasiga "imposed an immediate smoke and grog [kava] ban on all medical and health centers. The directive… came from Prime Minister Chaudhry, who emphasized a need for a clean and healthy hospital environment" (Ramesh 1999b). I was not able to uncover any examples of health or education policy being significantly derailed by intra-cabinet machinations. More important was the way the executive interacted with other actors in the Fijian political system.

[195] Other important factors in Chaudhry's failure to reassure the *Taukei* electorate included his efforts to rapidly tackle sensitive issues such as land ownership (Robertson 2017, 135–36) and the politically expedient adoption of extremist positions by opposition parliamentarians (Lal 2006, 183).
[196] This is discussed in detail in the 'civil service' section.
[197] Interview J, Suva.
[198] Interview Q, Suva.
[199] Interview K, Suva.
[200] Interview N, Suva.
[201] Interview Q, Suva.

Horizontal accountability: The legislature

The primary actor mandated to limit executive power in Fiji between 1993 and 1999 was the legislature. However, prior to the 1999 election the legislature's ability to fulfil this role was undermined by the 1990 Constitution, which gifted the *Taukei* a majority in both houses of parliament. This had important implications for the relationship between the legislature and executive, with a flow-on effect for wellbeing-related policy. Sunil Kumar and Biman Prasad (2004, 480) argue that parliamentary debates on poverty were often "rhetorical, lacking supporting data, analysis and constructive dialogue". According to a former senator interviewed by Audrey Aumua (2014, 135), this was because

> politicians in Fiji are ex public servants, they do not know how to have policy development discussion, they don't have the training and they are inept in this regard. This is why we don't have good public policy dialogue in any of our sectors.

More specifically, legislation relating to health and education received limited parliamentary attention. Rabuka recalls that health policy mainly entered parliamentary proceedings through budget debates.[202] Major initiatives such as the Kadavu Rural Health Project (1994-97) and the Taveuni Community Health Project (1999-2003)[203] were not debated,[204] because they were funded and developed through partnerships between the MoH and external donors. For example, the A$9.3 million Fiji Health Management Reform Project (FHMRP)[205] was based on a memorandum between Fiji and Australia, which was initially deemed "sufficient endorsement… that it was not necessary for the proposal to go through a cabinet process or be debated in parliament" (Aumua 2014, 134). A senior official in Rabuka's office stated that consequently

[202] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[203] Both funded by Australian Aid for International Development (AusAID).
[204] Interview J, Suva.
[205] Further discussed in the 'civil service' section.

> the majority of government ministers did not know the detail regarding the reforms nor were involved in any of the discussions between the MoH and the [Australian government]. The reforms started under the parliamentary radar, there was not much visibility from where I sat. (Aumua 2014, 134)

Education issues received somewhat more attention in the legislature due to the prominence of affirmative action for *Taukei* education. Lemeki states that in the 1990s, parliament debated how *Taukei* could 'catch up',[206] but there is some truth to Taufa's assertion that parliament did not have much influence over education policy.[207] The only amendment to the *Education Act 1978* between 1993 and 1999 was a minor reconfiguration of the membership of the education forum in 1998 (Government of Fiji 1978, 1998b). Like in the health sector, policy debate was sidelined because changes were primarily driven by partnerships between aid donors and the MoE.

It is possible that these factors had a negative effect on the trajectory of wellbeing indicators between 1993 and 1999. Reforms with far-reaching implications were designed in partnership with aid donor agencies and passed off as technocratic interventions, thereby escaping parliamentary scrutiny. Moreover, until 1999, the ability of parliament to exercise oversight on executive power was limited by the institutionalised *Taukei* majority, which allowed Rabuka's government to dominate proceedings. This changed slightly during Chaudhry's brief rein when a hostile parliament did its utmost to frustrate the People's Coalition's legislative program, although the prime minister's force of personality allowed him to override this obstacle in some cases. Finally, the legislature was hampered by capacity constraints, making it poorly equipped to scrutinise the minutiae of sectoral policy (National Council for Building a Better Fiji 2008, 44; 95). This is a common problem in the Pacific due to high rates of skilled migration and "the disproportionately high cost that parliamentary

[206] Interview E, Suva.
[207] Although he admits that he may think this due to a lack of media coverage of parliament. Interview I, Suva.

oversight and accountability mechanisms present" (Corbett 2015, 62). It is reasonable to conclude that increased parliamentary oversight in the key areas of health and education could have contributed to improved policy, and might therefore have helped Fiji to achieve better wellbeing outcomes between 1993 and 1999.

Horizontal accountability: The judiciary

The Fijian judiciary is intended to be an impartial institution that can hold the executive accountable by upholding the rule of law, in keeping with the Westminster tradition. The 1990 Constitution established a High Court, Court of Appeal, Supreme Court, and several Magistrate's Courts (Government of Fiji 1990, sec. 101(1)), a structure maintained in the 1997 Constitution (Government of Fiji 1997, sec. 117(1)). Throughout the 1990s, Freedom House described Fiji's judiciary as independent of government interference,[208] and several interviewees also identified the judiciary as independent.[209] There were some examples of the judiciary influencing policy regarding violence against women (Fiji Law Reform Commission 1999; State v Bechu 1999), and Elenoa highlights the role of Justice Nazhat Shameem in expanding women's rights in the 1990s.[210] However, the judiciary had little involvement in other areas related to citizen wellbeing: my interviewees could not recall any judicial activism in health and education policy between 1993 and 1999.

Domestic tutelary powers

Between 1993 and 1999, there were several domestic tutelary powers that the elected government had to take into consideration. The RFMF was the most important of these due

[208] See for example Freedom House 1993, 229, 1994, 258, 1995, 246, 1998, 241, 1999, 185.
[209] Interview C, Suva; Interview with Krishna Datt, Suva.
[210] Interview L, Suva.

to its proven ability to take control of the country using force, but it was also the actor with the least interest in health and education policy. The BLV and the Methodist Church were less of a threat to the government's survival but were more involved in areas related to wellbeing.

The military


The military's role in Fijian politics has deep historical roots. Many of the country's pre-colonial social structures emerged in response to the imperatives of war (Howard 1991, 17–18),[211] and the prominence of the armed forces increased as Fiji became an increasingly militarised society in the aftermath of the 1987 coups.[212] The RFMF's politicisation was also shaped by Fiji's contribution to international peacekeeping missions, which has "indelibly shaped the mediator self-image of [Fijian] military officers" (Baledrokadroka 2012, 111), and contributed to the military's view of itself as "performing [the] system maintenance role" of removing 'bad' civilian governments (Scobell 1994, 195). Additionally, preparation for peacekeeping involves broad training that includes economic and bureaucratic management skills, which can lead senior officers to believe they could manage government business better than civilian leaders (Stepan 1973; Scobell 1994). Between 1993 and 2006, RFMF personnel comprised an average of 1.23 per cent of the Fijian labour force (Figure 14).[213]

[211] As did the Western state (Tilly 1975).

[212] I use the term 'militarisation' to refer to increases "in armaments, advances in the destructive capacity of weapons, growing numbers of people under arms, and... increases in military expenditure" (Eide and Thee 1980, 9–10; A. Ross 1987). This often leads to a "consequent rise in the political role and impact of the military, whether or not that impact manifests itself in the form of a military regime" (Charlton and May 1989, 16). I use 'militarism' to refer to a behavioural predisposition towards the use of force as a method of conflict resolution by states and state authorities (Kinsella 2012, 105). However, it is important to note that there is no consensus in the literature on the definitions of these terms (Skjelsbaek 1979; A. Ross 1987; Kinsella 2012).

[213] In contrast, US military personnel made up an average of 1.08 per cent of the labour force during the same period (World Bank 2018b).


Figure 14: Fijian Armed Forces Personnel, 1993-2006



The RFMF did not interfere in daily politics during the 1990s (Tarte 2010, 82), due to Rabuka's military ties and commitment to *Taukei* paramountcy. In fact, this period saw the military embark "on a re-professionalisation programme" to shift the training of officers back towards military tactics and logistics (Baledrokadroka 2015, 131), and government military expenditure decreased from 1.96 per cent in 1993 to 1.23 per cent in 1999 (Figure 15). Yet the groundwork for the RFMF's more assertive future role had been laid. To instigate the second 1987 coup, Rabuka acted independently of the chiefly elite, signalling that the military had become a political actor in its own right (Baledrokadroka 2015, 130). The 1990 Constitution codified the RFMF's praetorian role, describing it as having "overall responsibility… to ensure at all times the security, defence and well being of Fiji and its peoples" (Government of Fiji 1990, 94(3)). Moreover, during the 1990s the CRWU steadily expanded its operations to include intelligence gathering and counter-terrorism – skills that were instrumental to its role in the 2000 coup. After the 1999 election, military discontent

with Chaudhry's policy agenda demonstrated that the RFMF's quiescent period under Rabuka was merely temporary.[214]

Figure 15: Fijian Military Expenditure, 1993-2006




The RFMF did not intervene in health and education policy between 1993 and 1999, but its praetorian role is likely to have influenced wellbeing trends in less direct ways. There is no simple causal relationship between militarisation and wellbeing (Dixon and Moon 1986, 681), but high levels of military spending can divert resources away from social development (Lebovic and Ishaq 1987), and impede states from providing citizens with basic services (Felice 1998). Leading Fijian civil society figure Shamima Ali argues that militarisation led to increased discrimination and violence against women (George 2012, 192; Figure 16). The ethnic homogeneity of the RFMF, which consists almost entirely of *Taukei*, meant that during the 1990s the military "continued to be seen as a threat by most members of the Indo-Fijian community" (Teaiwa 2005, 210). Moreover, crimes perpetuated by soldiers and criminals using army-issue weapons became increasingly common in the 1990s (Teaiwa 2005, 215–16).

[214] After the 2000 coup, "several senior military figures professed public sympathy for Speight's agenda but disapproved of his method" (Lal 2006, 208).

Linked to this, the Fijian Police Force budget "remained between $10m to $15m less than the military's budget" during the 1990s – a direct result of increased military spending in 1987 – which undermined law and order (Halapua 2003, 112–13). Although these effects of societal militarisation on development outcomes are difficult to quantify, there is a solid theoretical basis to expect that the RFMF's prominent role in Fijian politics had a negative effect on citizen wellbeing between 1993 and 1999.

Figure 16: Domestic Violence in Fiji, 1993-1999 (Fiji Women's Crisis Centre 2018)



The Bose Levu Vakaturaga

The BLV was originally established by the British as an advisory body in 1876. In the 1950s, its membership began expanding to encompass representatives of trade unions and other organisations. This process accelerated after independence, and "by the late 1970s, sometimes half the [BLV] members were commoners or people of modest chiefly rank" (Norton 2009, 99). Following the 1987 coups the BLV reverted to its traditional role as a council of hereditary chiefs, and set about restoring elite *Taukei* control (Robertson 2000, 280). During this period, the BLV acted as "an institutional 'shock absorber' in Fiji's body politic, its long-established ritualized assertion of indigenous Fijian identity and strength dampening the force of aggressive nationalism" (Norton 2009, 103). The BLV's political

power was expanded in the 1990 Constitution, which permitted the council to nominate the majority of senators and appoint the president and vice-president. As a result, the BLV had a *de facto* veto over all legislation until 1997.

The BLV and the government had a cordial relationship for most of the 1990s. Although Rabuka – himself a commoner – was less amenable to the BLV taking an overtly political role than some chiefs had expected (Robertson 2000, 280), the potential for conflict was mitigated by the SVT's electoral successes in 1992 and 1994, and the prime minister's pursuit of policies that benefitted members of the council. For example, the affirmative action programme was a lucrative source of funding for Fijian Holdings Ltd, the BLV's primary investment company (Robertson 2017, 147). When the 1997 Constitution reduced the chiefs' senate nominations to 14 of 32 seats, this was offset by the fact that the BLV retained the right to select the president and vice-president, and was also given a secretariat and guaranteed financial autonomy. In Rabuka's words, the BLV was "vocal" but "cooperative",[215] and my interviewees perceive the BLV and the SVT to have been closely aligned.[216] After the 1999 election, Chaudhry sought to reassure the BLV that his government would protect *Taukei* interests (Ratuva 2014a, 143), but the relationship deteriorated in the lead-up to the 2000 coup, with several government proposals being blocked by the chiefs (Ramesh 1999d; Norton 2009, 105).

The BLV's influence over wellbeing in Fiji was concentrated in the *Taukei* sphere due to its constitutional mandate to protect indigenous rights. Rabuka describes the BLV's involvement in health in terms of chiefs quibbling over staffing appointments, with the implication being that they were unhappy about Indo-Fijian nurses being allocated to their

[215] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[216] For example, Interview B, Suva. This symbiotic relationship is further demonstrated by the way in which Rabuka encouraged the BLV to provide a moderate voice during the constitutional consultation process to balance the SVT's more ethnonationalist rhetoric (Norton 2009, 104).

constituencies.[217] These concerns did not translate into involvement in broader health policy. According to Filipe, the BLV was 'not interested' in health policy,[218] while Adi recalls that the BLV left the MoH alone.[219] The council was far more active in education. Isimeli notes that the BLV often pressured the government to make education free for *Taukei*,[220] and although this was not implemented, affirmative action in education was a centrepiece of government policy between 1993 to 1999. Lemeki recalls that during his time with the MoE in the 1990s, the BLV consistently lobbied for more *Taukei* scholarships, and that the Ministry 'saw where they were coming from and agreed in general'.[221] A further indication of the BLV's importance in this sector is that Chaudhry announced his plan to commit F$5 million[222] to *Taukei* education during a speech to the council (Ratuva 2014a, 144).

Despite the BLV's mandate, there is little evidence that they exerted strong influence over wellbeing trends in Fiji during the 1990s. As Table 35 demonstrates, *Taukei* health outcomes during this period were not significantly better than those of Indo-Fijians and were worse in some cases. Wadan Narsey's (2008b, 76) analysis of poverty in Fiji finds that the incidence of poverty for Indo-Fijians was slightly higher than for *Taukei* in 1997,[223] but in specific areas of deprivation the picture was more complex: Indo-Fijians were less likely to have access to safe drinking water; but *Taukei* were more likely to experience food poverty and lack access to electricity (Sriskandarajah 2003, 314). *Taukei* were less educated on average than Indo-Fijians, although as of 1996 the latter were also more likely to have no formal schooling and be illiterate (Sriskandarajah 2003, 314–25). If the BLV had been able to exert a significant

[217] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[218] Interview J, Suva.
[219] Interview N, Suva.
[220] Interview D, Suva.
[221] Interview E, Suva.
[222] Approximately US$2.52 million.
[223] Narsey (2008a, 20) uses separate 'basic needs poverty lines' for Indo-Fijians and *Taukei* based on the different food consumption baskets of each ethnicity.

influence over health and education policy, it might be expected that *Taukei* outcomes would be significantly better.

Table 35: Fijian Mortality Statistics by Ethnicity and Gender. Adapted from Taylor *et al* 2013, 510.

	Infant Mortality (Deaths per 1,000 live births)		**Adult Mortality** (Probability [%] of dying between 15 and 59 years old)				**Life Expectancy** (years at birth)			
	Taukei	Indo-Fijian	Taukei		Indo-Fijian		Taukei		Indo-Fijian	
			Male	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*	*Male*	*Female*
1986	20	22	25	21	32	21	65	69	65	69
1995-97	26	19	26	20	29	19	65	68	64	69
1996-98	20	21	25	21	33	20	65	67	63	69
1999-2001	22	25	25	22	33	18	65	67	63	69
Average	**22**	**21.75**	**25.25**	**21**	**31.75**	**19.5**	**65**	**67.75**	**63.75**	**69**

The Methodist Church

The Methodist Church (hereafter 'the Church') was a powerful body in Fijian politics during the 1990s. According to the 1996 census, 36.2 per cent of Fijians identified as Methodist, outstripping Hinduism (33.7 per cent) as the country's most popular religion (Fiji Bureau of Statistics 2012a). Several interviewees saw the Church as synonymous with the BLV and the SVT,[224] but closer analysis shows that this alignment fluctuated. During the early and mid-1990s, the Church openly supported the government (Robertson 2017, 116), but Rabuka's increasingly moderate position leading in to the 1999 election exposed intra-Methodist political factionalism. Church President Reverend Ilaitia Tuwere advocated for the separation of church and state and encouraged Rabuka to endorse the 1997 Constitution (Field 1998), but Tuwere was replaced in 1999 by the more fundamentalist Reverend Tomasi Kanailagi (Ramesh 1999a). Although Kanailagi officially forbade pastors to preach politics (Fiji Times 1999e, 1), Selai recalls walking out of her church because the pastor told them to vote for

[224] For example: Interview B, Suva; Interview C, Suva.

the SVT[225] and a *Times* editorial noted that "some people in the Methodist Church" were seeking to "use the cloth as a tool to promote a political agenda" (Fiji Times 1999d, 6).[226] Some members of the Church threw their support behind the newly formed VLV due to Rabuka's refusal to reinstate the 'Sunday Observance Decree'.[227] Kanailagi himself was seen at a VLV rally and there were accusations that church facilities were being used to help the party (McCutchan 1999b, 3; Raicola 1999a, 3, 1999b, 3). After the election, Church powerbrokers were displeased with the Chaudhry government's agenda, and Methodist networks were used to mobilise opposition to planned land reforms (Lal 2006, 194).

The Church did not exert a great deal of direct influence over health outcomes in Fiji between 1993 and 1999. Filipe notes that the Methodists were involved in providing health services in regional areas where NGOs were absent,[228] and more vaguely, Poasa recalls that in his time with the MoH, the Church wanted to be involved in major health issues and was 'a positive influence'.[229] Despite the absence of explicit political lobbying, the Church is highly likely to have had a tacit influence over health policy given that many of Fiji's political elite during the 1990s were Methodist, including Rabuka and former Minister for Health Mere Samisoni. The impact of this is difficult to assess, but it is likely to be at least partly responsible for the lack of government policy on HIV/AIDs, which the Church would not allow to be discussed at its congregations during the 1990s (UNDP 2011, 69).

The Church had a more direct effect on the education sector. The country's first formal schools were established by missionaries (who began to arrive in Fiji in 1835) and the

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225 Interview C, Suva.
226 Despite this, Rabuka later blamed the SVT's defeat on the Methodist Church and the BLV: "they [the BLV] took their stand behind the 1999 general election with the Methodist Church against the SVT… Methodist ministers preached from the pulpit and in the *bose vakavanua* (meetings of the people) causing a cultural revolution which totally annihilated the SVT" (S. R. Whippy 2003).
227 This decree banned sport and trading on Sundays and was in force from 29 October 1987 to 25 October 1995.
228 Interview J, Suva.
229 Interview Q, Suva.

tradition of school ownership by religious institutions has persisted: as of 2005, the Methodists operated 16 primary schools, 11 secondary schools, and one vocational training centre (MoE 2005, 15).[230] According to the MoE, this ownership model allows

> schools to be responsive to the local community and environment. It also engenders parental commitment and partnership in education at all levels and demonstrates to young people the exceptional value which is placed upon teaching and learning in the lives of all our citizens. (Senibulu 1999, 5)

However, it also meant schools were run by committees of unpaid volunteers, which sometimes led to conflict with government-employed teachers (Bray 2003, 37).[231] All teachers were trained by the University of the South Pacific (USP) or the Fiji College of Advanced Education, meaning that ostensibly, the quality of education provided by a school did not depend on its religious affiliation. Yet the Church remained influential in other ways: its education department retained the right to approve the appointment of principals; and its president was traditionally a member of the Education Forum. Despite this, there is no evidence that the Church significantly restricted the power of the executive and negatively affected citizen wellbeing.

External actors

International institutions, transnational NGOs, and other countries may also act to restrict executive power in a non-democratic way. Between 1993 and 1999, key institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF were less prominent in Fiji than they were in other developing countries during the same period. This was partly because the structural adjustment reforms carried out by the SVT-GVP coalition were not mandated by funding agreements with the

[230] The MoE controlled two out of 719 primary schools and 12 out of 162 secondary schools (MoE 2005, 15–16).
[231] This issue was not unique to Methodist schools.

World Bank or the IMF (Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi 2000, 77), and partly because the government's commitment to affirmative action caused it to resist external pressures. For example, World Bank criticism of the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) in 1995 did not change the government's approach to the issue of land ownership (B. Prasad and Kumar 2000, 126–27). By the late 1990s, the confluence of poor domestic economic performance, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and Fiji's acceptance into the World Trade Organisation forced the government to pay more attention to international demand for reforms, particularly deregulation.[232] However, this did not reach a level that could be considered un-democratic.

Because the Fijian health and education sectors received significant aid funding in the 1990s, foreign country development agencies were very influential in these areas (Schmaljohann and Prizzon 2014, v).[233] As noted above, major reforms were designed and implemented through partnerships between external actors and line ministries with little executive oversight. For example, although the Permanent Secretary for Health initially requested Australian assistance with the restructuring of Fiji's health sector (Aumua 2014, 106), poor domestic technical knowledge and MoH reliance on external funding meant that local officials "tended to defer to donor expertise without really identifying their own priorities" in the development of the FHMRP (Aumua 2014, 107). Similarly, the value of external support for education in Fiji has been called into question by broader critiques of the role of aid in the Pacific. Over-emphasis on technical assistance or 'soft' reforms, 'supply chasing demand', and excessive payments to consultants have all contributed to a dilution of aid effectiveness (Levine 2013, 33–37).

[232] Especially from Australia and New Zealand through the South Pacific Forum, and the EU in relation to sugar exports (Sutherland 2000, 218).
[233] Key donors included Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, and the Asian Development Bank. Despite high levels of funding in some sectors, Fiji is not an aid-dependent country. For example, as of 2005, aid constituted 2.2 per cent of gross national income, while donor agencies provided 5.3 per cent of the country's total health expenditure (MoH 2007, 22).

Nevertheless, there is an important theoretical distinction to be made between tutelary powers that restrict the ability of an elected government to rule effectively, and actors that influence sectoral priorities through financial muscle and superior technical expertise. The development of programs such as the FHMRP involves negotiation, conflict, and the establishment of consensus between aid donors and recipients. This is itself a political process (Cramer 2002, 12–13), and – when it does not entail coercive conditionality – is not in conflict with the principles of democracy. External participation in the development of domestic policy can also entail the intentional delegation of responsibility. For example, in interviews with Fijian government officials, Maya Schmaljohann and Annalisa Prizzon (2014, 13) found that "direct channelling through grant management units reduce[d] pressure on already-stretched administrations". The heavy involvement of external actors in the health and education sectors was not an infringement on the Fijian government's sovereignty. In fact, without the significant amounts of aid funding that Fiji received during the 1990s, it is likely that improvements to the country's health and education outcomes would have been much slower.

The civil service

An important factor that I was not able to account for in my typology or control for in the statistical analysis – but which nevertheless affects citizen wellbeing policy – is the relationship between the state bureaucracy and the elected government. This is crucial because civil servants develop and implement policy in concert with the relevant minister. The archetypal Weberian civil servant is neutral and efficient, but individuals inevitably have their own political opinions and views on how their portfolios should be managed. Nor are they always effective in their role, whether through incompetence or wilful obstinacy. These issues affect developed and developing countries, but they are compounded in the Pacific by

small human resource talent pools and the way in which overlapping political, bureaucratic, business, and civil society elites are bound together by complex kinship relations (Corbett 2015, 56). Combined with the "propensity for power to be concentrated in individuals rather than the office they hold", this means that "political practice in the Pacific often appears the antithesis of the Weberian rational-legal ideal" (Corbett 2015, 61). In Fiji, although the 'British left a good civil service structure',[234] these problems were still present between 1993 and 1999. For example, Rabuka describes the civil service in Fiji as politicised because although bureaucrats were appointed by the Public Service Commission, if the relevant minister expressed a preference that person would likely be hired.[235]

These issues had several important implications for citizen wellbeing policy in Fiji. First, limited technical expertise was a key problem for the MoH, as demonstrated by confusion over the guiding principles of Fijian health policy between 1993 to 1999. During this period, there was no national policy framework for the Fijian health sector (Aumua 2014, 98), which was instead loosely guided by international trends. In the mid-1990s, the emphasis slowly shifted from primary health care provision – as defined in the 1978 Alma-Alta Declaration – to 'health promotion',[236] which was given a Pacific twist in the 1995 Yanuca Declaration and the resulting 'Healthy Islands' policy initiative.[237] This change manifested in the 1993-94 and 1995-96 MoH annual reports, with the chapter on primary health care in the former replaced by a chapter on health promotion in the latter (MoH 1999, 2001). However, a working paper by Joel Negin *et al* (2010, 11)[238] demonstrates confusion within the MoH about whether health promotion was intended to supersede or complement primary health care provision.

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234 Interview with Krishna Datt, Suva.
235 Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
236 Health promotion emerged from the 1986 Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion, and is defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as "the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve their health" (Nutbeam 1998, 1).
237 The Yanuca Declaration was a product of the first Pacific Island Ministers of Health Conference.
238 Negin *et al* (2010, 1) conducted 14 "telephone and in-person interviews with representatives of government agencies, multilateral organisations, donor agencies, academic institutions and experienced health consultants to the region".

For example, the Kadavu Rural Health Project was described at the time as both a 'health promotion model' and a 'primary health care approach' (Roberts 1997). It was also lauded for shifting decision-making power to the local level (Negin, Roberts, and Lingam 2010, 12), *and* encouraging communities "to take responsibility for their own health and for decreasing passive dependency on government service" (Roberts 1997, 287). This encapsulates the uncertainty about whether primary health care and health promotion were conflicting or complementary, and whether the latter had replaced the former as the guiding paradigm of the Fijian health sector.

Second, weak sectoral capacity was sometimes compounded by a lack of political leadership. This affected the long-planned FHMRP,[239] which was intended to address structural problems including long chains of command and the MoH's lack of autonomy to "decide on matters concerning personnel and finance" (Senate Select Committee 1997 quoted in WHO 2003, 53). A former health minister interviewed by Aumua (2014, 137) states that

> there were times admittedly when I was Minister that I felt I didn't know a lot about the [FHMRP] reforms but I trusted the bureaucracy and the AusAID [Australian Aid for International Development] consultants to manage this… what could I add, I was put there as Minister.

Consequently, AusAID contractors found that health ministers "did not champion the reforms and provide important political leadership for them" (Aumua 2014, 133). This combination of limited capacity and weak political leadership in the implementation of the FHMRP may have contributed to Fiji's poor health outcomes in the early 2000s.

Third, power struggles between the government and line ministries may have affected the development and implementation of policy in health and education. Kaali recalls that in her

[239] The decentralisation of Fiji's health services was supposed to begin in the late 1980s (WHO 2003, 53), but was delayed due to a lack of funding.

time with the MoH under Rabuka, the government generally 'won the health policy battles' when it came into disagreement with the department.[240] Although Rabuka states that during his reign the minister for education was usually a former teacher, Taufa mentions that there was still sometimes conflict between bureaucrats and the minister.[241] Apparently, this was often because the minister demanded that reforms be enacted more rapidly than the ministry thought feasible.[242] The relationship between the permanent secretary and the prime minister was also important. For example, Poasa suggests that although he 'knew Chaudhry well' on a personal level, they had a worse working relationship than Poasa enjoyed with Rabuka, who was apparently more respectful of his authority.[243]

The issues highlighted in this section, while important, were not a function of political hybridity. Power struggles between the civil service and the executive in Fiji from 1993 to 1999 were no worse than those found in many developed countries and were not egregious enough to undermine democratic processes or affect citizen wellbeing outcomes. Weak civil service capacity in the health and education sectors is more likely to have had a negative impact on Fiji's development indicators, but this was due to limited human resources and funding rather than the imperatives of hybridity.

Summary

Between 1993 and 1999, horizontal accountability in Fiji was facilitated by an independent judiciary and the informal norms associated with coalition-based cabinet government – such as consultation and unity – which combined to prevent outright executive dominance. Nevertheless, poor quality parliamentary debate and erstwhile entrenched *Taukei* political

[240] Interview K, Suva.
[241] Interview I, Suva.
[242] Interview I, Suva.
[243] Interview Q, Suva.

dominance meant that the legislature was unable to effectively scrutinise health and education policy. This may have contributed to the negative trends in education outcomes by limiting opportunities for critique of the Rabuka government's affirmative action programme in the sector. The development of effective policy in these sectors was further complicated by complex relationships between the government and the civil service, featuring the cocktail of power struggles and capacity constraints that often afflicts small Pacific states.

However, the dominant characteristic of the Effective Power dimension in Fiji from 1993 to 1999 was the ever-present threat of military intervention. The RFMF's informal role as the protector of *Taukei* political dominance is unlikely to have had a direct impact on Fiji's wellbeing indicators because the military was not specifically concerned with fields such as health and education. However, the militarisation of Fijian society is likely to have had a more diffuse negative effect on wellbeing through the diversion of public funds into the defence budget, increased violence against women, and the rise of violent crime. Other domestic actors – such as the BLV and the Church – took a more explicit interest in policy areas related to wellbeing but did not resort to undemocratic methods of shaping government policy. Similarly, the role of external actors such as AusAID was significant but not to the extent of infringing on Fiji's sovereignty in the fields of health and education policy.

Conclusions

The analysis presented in this section offers some important insights into the ways that formal institutions and informal institutions and norms may combine to affect wellbeing outcomes. At the 1994 election, the formal institution of communal voting reified the major ethnic divide in Fijian society, encouraging political campaigning to focus on intra-ethnic unity and sidelining health and education issues. In 1999, the abolition of the automatic

Taukei majority and the introduction of 'open roll' seats meant that to win government, parties had to engage in inter-ethnic cooperation and/or expand their support base beyond their traditional constituencies. This dynamic was partly responsible for the increased focus on health and education issues during the campaign,[244] but the need to maintain fragile coalitions and avoid controversy meant that policy detail was lacking. Moreover, the informal norm of racialised voting remained the key factor in shaping people's choices. As a result, electoral politics is unlikely to have contributed to Fiji's improved health outcomes during this period.

In the Political Freedoms dimension, there is evidence that strong freedom of organisation contributed to the steady improvement in Fiji's mortality indicators and life expectancy between 1993 and 1999. Institutionalised protections for key freedoms including the rights to strike and protest reinforced the political heft of the health sector trade unions, and combined with Fiji's tight-knit elite networks to ensure that there was significant government engagement with civil society. The absence of similar improvements in education outcomes during the 1990s could be explained by the sectoral focus on the poorly implemented affirmative action programme. In terms of freedom of expression, *de jure* protections were undermined by occasional government intimidation and weak media sector capacity. As a result, there was little critique of government policy in the areas of health and education.

Finally, the ever-present threat of military intervention, coupled with limited horizontal accountability, are likely to have had a negative impact on wellbeing trends in Fiji between 1993 and 1999. After the 1987 coups, the RFMF's use of force to protect *Taukei* political dominance became tacitly accepted as an informal institution, which shaped the 1990 Constitution and thus exerted a significant effect over Fijian politics throughout the 1990s. Additionally, the less tangible phenomenon of societal militarisation is likely to have

[244] Fiji's poor socioeconomic performance at the end of the 1990s was also a contributing factor.

negatively impacted Fiji's wellbeing outcomes during this period. The maintenance of *Taukei* political dominance until the 1999 election also undermined horizontal accountability, with indigenous unity in parliament privileged over rigorous debate and the scrutiny of legislation. Overall, the effects of each of the three dimensions was relatively consistent during the period discussed. It is not until 2000 that we see a change in Fiji's HR subtype, the implications of which are analysed in the second half of this chapter.

2000-06: Fiji as a Restricted Illiberal Unfair Hybrid Regime

In this section, I examine the effects that political hybridity had on the Fijian population's wellbeing between 2000 and 2006. During this period, GDP per capita slowly recovered from the negative impact of the 2000 coup (Figure 4). Infant mortality (Figure 5) and under-5 mortality rates (Figure 6) fell from 2000 to 2001 then began to worsen, resulting in net increases of 4.19 per cent and 4.91 per cent respectively by 2006. The rate of improvement in maternal mortality slowed between 2000 and 2003 then plateaued between 2004 and 2006 (Figure 7), resulting in a 7.1 per cent improvement overall.[245] Life expectancy improved steadily, in line with the previous period (Figure 8). Primary school completion rates reached a low point of 94.98 per cent in 2000 then recovered rapidly to exceed pre-coup levels (Figure 9). Mean years of schooling continued their pre-2000 downward trend until 2005 then began to show signs of recovery (Figure 10). Secondary school enrolment rates improved rapidly from 2000 to 2004 before slowing from 2005 to 2006 (Figure 11), generating a net increase of 16.17 per cent. Fiji's HDI score rose slightly from 0.683 in 2000 to 0.698 in 2006, despite a dip in 2005 (Figure 12). Health expenditure fell after the 2000 coup then remained relatively stable, while education spending increased before returning to its 1998 level in 2006 (Figure

[245] Compared to a 24.56 per cent improvement between 1993 and 1999.

13). Overall, the 2000 coup appears to have set in train noticeable negative trends in mortality indicators and slowed Fiji's progress in improving other wellbeing outcomes despite having little impact on the share of GDP spent on health and education.

The period analysed in this section spans the years between the 2000 and 2006 coups. It encompasses the Qarase administration in its iterations as a military-appointed interim civilian administration and – following 'Unfair' elections in 2001 – an elected government. According to my typology political freedoms during this period were more restricted than they had been in the 1990s, although qualitative evidence presented below calls this into question. Most importantly, in the aftermath of the 2000 coup the RFMF adopted an increasingly praetorian role, further restricting the effective power of the elected government. As in the previous section, I discuss each of these dimensions in turn to examine the effects that the interactions between formal and informal institutions and norms had on wellbeing outcomes.

Elections

In the aftermath of the 2000 coup, ethnonationalism returned with a vengeance. The 2001 elections were held under the 1997 Constitution, which had been briefly abrogated by the RFMF before it was reinstated by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) found that the election adequately reflected the preferences of the Fijian public (Pacific Islands News Association [PINA] Nius 2001), although Chaudhry claimed that the vote had been rigged and the Fijian media highlighted the low turnout, high number of invalid votes, alleged voter intimidation, interference by the military, and threats of violence.[246]

[246] See for example ABC News 2001; A. Chand 2001; Field 2001; Fiji Sun 2001; Skehan 2001a; Tapueluelu and Raiyawa 2001.

Despite the economic downturn that followed the 2000 coup – and the consequent increases in poverty, unemployment, and violent crime – the 2001 campaign was dominated by the politics of race.[247] According to Lemeki, nationalism was rife,[248] while Rabuka himself states that everything went back to race.[249] Health and education policy were barely mentioned: Taufa states that education was not an issue at all;[250] and Audrey Aumua (2014, 140) demonstrates that only one of the 19 parties contesting the election mentioned health reform in their manifesto. The SDL and the FLP sometimes campaigned on wellbeing issues, but primarily with reference to their respective communities. For example, the "SDL emphasised the ethnic-Fijian backwardness in business and the FLP led a campaign on state discrimination and lack of opportunities for Indo-Fijians" (S. Kumar and Prasad 2004, 482). According to Vijay Naidu, the election "exposed and reinforced" deep racial fissures in Fijian society (Wansolwara Online 2001b), which precluded the discussion of poverty and development as national issues affecting both major ethnic groupings.

Thus, the election was dominated by parties that focused on their ethnic roots. On the *Taukei* side, Qarase's SDL won 32 seats and Speight's new party, the Conservative Alliance-*Matanitu Vanua* (CAMV), won six seats even though Speight was still awaiting trial for his role in the coup (Table 36). Indo-Fijians were fearful and disengaged having had their political power forcibly curtailed for the second time in 13 years, and rallied around the furious Chaudhry and his FLP, which won 27 seats. Parties that evinced 'moderate', multiracial platforms performed poorly (Lal 2006, 223–24; see also Dutt 2001; Raiyawa and Goundar 2001; Wansolwara Online 2001a; Yaya 2001): the SVT and the FAP both failed to win any seats; and the NFP won only one seat. Because no party won an outright majority, the SDL formed a coalition with the CAMV and three other MPs. However, under Section 99 of the 1997

[247] It is important to note that intra-ethnic power struggles also persisted (Daily Post 2001; Ramesh 2001a).
[248] Interview E, Suva.
[249] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[250] Interview I, Suva.

Constitution and the Korolevu Declaration, Qarase was obliged to offer the FLP eight of the 20 cabinet positions, reflecting the party's proportion of lower house seats. Chaudhry surprised Qarase by accepting this offer, but the SDL leader refused to take this in good faith and argued that the FLP would not abide by "the principle of consensus and collegiality" in cabinet (Lal 2006, 227). The ailing president, allegedly swayed by his nationalist advisers (Lal 2006, 227), chose to swear in Qarase's cabinet without any FLP representation.[251] The result was five years of acrimonious politics, during which the Qarase government pushed forward with a broad programme of affirmative action for the *Taukei* community.

Table 36: 2001 Election Results

	Taukei	Indo-Fijian	Open	General Elector	Rotuman	Total
SDL	18	-	13	1	-	**32**
FLP	-	19	8	-	-	**27**
CAMV	5	-	1	-	-	**6**
NLUP	-	-	1	1	-	**2**
Independents	-	-	1	-	1	**2**
NFP	-	-	1	-	-	**1**
UGP	-	-	-	1	-	**1**
Totals	*23*	*19*	*25*	*3*	*1*	***71***

Summary

At the 2001 election, racialised politics prevented the emergence of a national discussion of policy related to health, education, and other areas of wellbeing. This effect was even more pronounced than it had been during the 1994 and 1999 elections. Despite the election being held under the rules set out in the 1997 Constitution, which were designed to facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation, the rancour engendered by the 2000 coup bolstered the informal norm of ethnic solidarity. Health and education issues were almost entirely absent from the campaign and played little or no role in determining voting patterns. Even within Fiji's ethnic groups, the results suggest that policies related to wellbeing were sidelined: the SDL won

[251] The subsequent legal wrangling is detailed by Lal (2006, 227–31).

based on their commitment to maintaining indigenous political paramountcy and unity within the *Taukei* community; and Indo-Fijians sought to defend their own rights by rallying behind the more politically aggressive FLP. These imperatives were not conducive to the development of effective national policy in the health and education sectors, and as a result, the 2001 election failed to serve as a mechanism for improving the wellbeing of the Fijian population.

Political Freedoms

According to my typology, political freedoms in Fiji were 'High' from 1993 to 1999, and 'Low' from 2000 to 2006. This shift was due to a decrease in Fiji's rating on the 'Freedom of academic/cultural expression' indicator. This was likely due to USP's decision to shut down student training newspaper *Wansolwara* on 29 May 2000 (Drugunalevu and Manarae 2015, 155–56), and ensuing concerns regarding 'political pressures' on the university (Pasifik Nius 2001). These included disparaging comments from Qarase, which prompted the USP staff association's general secretary to state that "we don't mind the government responding to issues raised by academics. But when it involves personal attacks and threatens funding, then it borders on suppression of academic freedom at USP" (Fiji Times 2002). Additionally, "government work-permit stipulations and [USP] contract regulations effectively deterred most university employees from participating in domestic politics" (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2006). Because Fiji's scores were already marginal, this pushed the country into the illiberal category.

However, it appears that changes in this specific type of freedom of expression went unnoticed by broader civil society. Most of my interviewees argue that the degree of political freedom enjoyed by Fijians did not change. For example, Elenoa and Poasa both state that

political freedoms were consistent under the Rabuka, Chaudhry, and Qarase governments,[252] while Filipe suggests that the level of freedom actually improved.[253] There was a 'clamp down' during the 2000 coup, but according to Isimeli, people in civil society were able to use personal connections to rekindle their working relationships with Qarase's government.[254] Only Joeli (a prominent civil society activist) suggests that the government became more anti-civil society over the course of 2000-01.[255] This demonstrates one of the key difficulties associated with typology cut-offs: for borderline cases, a small shift in one element can downgrade the overall rating despite a lack of noticeable change on the ground. This is an important reminder that, as noted in Chapter 3, typologies are 'abstractions from reality' intended to help us organise our thinking and identify broad patterns – they are not perfect reflections of the real world. Nevertheless, it is important to ascertain whether the marginal change identified by my typology had an impact on wellbeing outcomes.

Freedom of organisation

The Qarase government demonstrated questionable respect for freedom of organisation in both its non-elected and elected incarnations. In the aftermath of the 2000 coup, the military-appointed interim administration scrambled to quell opposition and restore domestic stability. On 19 May, President Mara invoked the *Emergency Powers Act* to declare a state of emergency, which remained in force until 5 October 2000. This mandated the government and its military backers to require special permits for all public and private meetings (Government of Fiji 1998a, sec. 5(2)), allowing it to disrupt civil society meetings and prevent protest marches (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2001). Although these

[252] Interview L, Suva; Interview Q, Suva.
[253] Interview J, Suva.
[254] Interview D, Suva.
[255] Interview A, Suva.

restrictions were loosened following the 2001 election, the government still "denied permits for several high-profile political marches and rallies" (Freedom House 2003, 209).[256] Moreover, the Citizen's Constitutional Forum, a CSO established to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance, was de-registered as a charitable organisation in 2003, allegedly in retaliation for mounting court cases challenging the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution and dismissal of the Chaudhry government (Lal 2006, 247). Finally, according to Satendra Prasad and Darryn Snell (2004, 274), the SDL government sought to "further fragment trade unions along racial lines", which helped to "dissipate union energies and exert pressures on progressive trade union leaders". I was unable to find empirical evidence of this, although the government did declare that 20 out of the 25 strikes held in 2002 and all 15 strikes held in 2003 were illegal (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2004b).

Surprisingly, the recollections of my interviewees do not match this depiction of the Qarase government's repressive approach to freedom of organisation. According to Isimeli and Tomasi the government invited unions to discuss education policy,[257] and Rabuka recalls that Qarase had a cordial relationship with the health and education unions.[258] Taufa is less positive, arguing that under Qarase there was less consultation because key decisions were pre-determined by high-level ministerial meetings at the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), limiting opportunities for local CSO engagement.[259] In the health sector, Selai says that although she was initially shunned by the MoH, the government eventually came around to a more inclusive approach.[260] She also states that under Qarase, strikes were not difficult to organise and the government understood the causes.[261] Similarly, Filipe identifies no significant

[256] Permits were also sometimes granted (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2006). For example, in November 2002, the Fiji Trade Union Congress, the National Farmers' Union, and other CSOs were able to hold a series of protests against proposed increase to the VAT (Mausio 2003, 444).
[257] Interview D, Suva; Interview G, Suva.
[258] Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[259] Interview I, Suva.
[260] Interview C, Suva.
[261] Interview C, Suva.

changes in government interaction with the FMA from Chaudhry to Qarase.[262] However, there was some sense that engagement with the government began to get more difficult in 2005, due to CSO activism against the controversial *Qoliqoli* Bill.[263]

The disjunct between my interview data and other sources regarding Qarase's approach to civil society is likely to be the product of two factors. First, it seems that my interviewees were affected by a distinct sense of nostalgia for the pre-2006 era. Since the 2014 election, there has been increasing concern among civil society actors that the FijiFirst government is attacking their capacity to act as a check on state power. In particular, the unions have been gutted through a series of laws that prevent unionists from standing for election (Government of Fiji 2013a, sec. 14)), restrict the organisation of strikes (Government of Fiji 2011a, sec. 27 [1]), and deny civil servants the right to collective bargaining agreements (Danford 2018). As a result, a constant theme during interviews was that things were much better in the 1990s and early 2000s,[264] suggesting that the highly restrictive nature of the Bainimarama years has made Qarase's reign seem tolerant in comparison. Second, it may be that the close links between Fiji's political and civil society elites ameliorated the additional restrictions placed on political freedoms. This is hinted at by Isimeli, who states that civil society actors used personal connections to re-establish links with Qarase's government after the 2000 coup. This is a good example of an informal norm mitigating the effects of the government using its formal powers to restrict political freedoms.

Freedom of expression

The SDL government's commitment to freedom of expression was similarly patchy. During the state of emergency, the interim administration was permitted by law to restrict freedom

[262] Interview J, Suva.
[263] Interview B, Suva. *Qoliqoli* is a term that describes foreshore areas and fishing grounds. The Bill proposed to transfer the rights over these areas from the state to the *Taukei* community.
[264] For example: Interview C, Suva; Interview D, Suva; Interview L, Suva.

of expression through the "censorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communication" (Government of Fiji 1998a, sec. 5(2)(k)). As noted above, interviewees felt that once these post-coup measures were lifted, freedom of expression was not significantly worse than it had been before 2000.[265] This is surprising, as there are several examples of the government attacking the media establishment. Freedom House (2003, 209) observed that in 2002, the SDL administration tried to "pressure editors and otherwise [interfere] with the press". In 2004, Freedom House (2004, 205) stated that "the government exercises considerable authority in censoring the media and restricting freedom of speech. Politicians frequently threaten journalists for reporting 'negative' stories about the country." Moreover, the government retained shares in Fiji TV One and the *Fiji Sun*, and in October 2004, it took over the *Daily Post*. The editorial independence of the organisations did not appear to be affected (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2003; Freedom House 2006, 254). For example, *Island Business* reported that

> despite its Fijian establishment connections, [Fiji TV] was annoyed when Opposition Leader, Mahendra Chaudhry, last month accused it of being biased politically in favour of the government. Its best local feature, the evening news, has no qualms about running stories criticising the government; and also Chaudhry and the Fiji Labour Party. (Keith-Reid 2005)

Nevertheless, the involvement of the state in several key outlets is likely to have created the impression that the media establishment was under scrutiny.

While the media regularly covered education and health issues during Qarase's reign, critique of government policy was muted. Perhaps due to the intimidatory tactics noted above, the *Blueprint for the Protection of Fijian and Rotuman Rights and Interests and the Advancement of Their Development* (henceforth the Education Blueprint; Government of Fiji 2000) – a key pillar of

[265] For example: Interview Q, Suva; Interview L, Suva; Interview P, Suva.

the SDL's programme of *Taukei* affirmative action[266] – received little interrogation in the media. There were a few reports featuring criticism of the Education Blueprint by the Fiji Human Rights Commission and other organisations (Gurdayal 2000; Fijilive 2006; Fiji Times 2006), and Fiji TV broadcast at least one story describing the policy as racist (Radio NZ International [RNZI] 2004). Tellingly though, the small number of *Times* editorials on the affirmative action plan and other educational issues were extremely circumspect (see Fiji Times 2005a, 2005g). For example, a piece on the high rate of primary school dropouts vaguely observed a "need for greater action in the area of education in this country" but provided nothing more in-depth (Fiji Times 2005f). Reporting on health was dominated by factual articles that did not critique government policy (see Fiji Times/Fiji's Daily Post/PINA Nius Online 2000; Fiji Sun 2004a). An editorial on Fiji's mid-2005 typhoid outbreak epitomises the cautious language used by the *Times* during the Qarase government's reign: "perhaps the Ministry of Health should return to the bush to preach and show basic hygiene practices" (Fiji Times 2005d). In both sectors, the apolitical coverage and guarded language suggest self-censorship.

Summary

The evidence presented in this section suggests that between 2000 and 2006, political freedoms in Fiji did not operate consistently enough to significantly ameliorate the negative impacts of the coup. In terms of freedom of organisation, it is important to balance my interviewees' recollections against problems documented at the time. The SDL government's willingness to maintain a degree of cooperation with health and education unions suggests

[266] This also included *'50/50 by year 2020': 20-year development plan (2001–2020) for the enhancement of participation of indigenous Fijians and Rotumans in the socio-economic development of Fiji* (Government of Fiji 2002). These documents set out pro-indigenous policies for land and the business sector, including the proposed transfer of all crown/state land to the NLTB, and tax exemptions for indigenous-owned companies (Lal 2006, 214–15).

that there were some opportunities for CSOs to influence policy creation. Again, this demonstrates the importance of personal relationships between political and civil society elites. However, the tighter regulation of strikes and protests undermined the potential for citizens to affect wellbeing outcomes through public displays of dissatisfaction. Like its predecessors, the Qarase administration consistently attacked the media establishment. A 2003 WHO report noted that the Fijian media "functions as an important channel for people's views and public health issues are often actively aired in a variety of media outlets" (WHO 2003, 54), but the overall impression is of a media establishment unwilling to undertake hard-hitting investigative journalism. This is likely to have limited the potential for freedom of expression to contribute to better policy through the mechanisms of public debate and critique. Finally, although the reduction of academic freedom was not reflected in my interview data, analysis of media coverage of the period suggests that the downgrade is justified.

Thus, while Fiji's ratings in most of the components comprising the Political Freedoms dimension did not change after 2000, there is a distinct sense that the environment became more restrictive. This change was not significant enough to negatively impact wellbeing outcomes, but it is reasonable to suggest that it made it more difficult for civil society to contribute to the post-coup recovery effort.

Effective Power

As with the period from 1993 to 1999, the power of the executive in Fiji between 2000 and 2006 was defined in my typology as 'Restricted'. In fact, the RFMF became increasingly politically assertive after the 2000 civilian putsch, culminating in the 2006 coup. I begin this section by discussing the character of the executive under Qarase, then examining how the legislature and the judiciary interacted with the administration. I then analyse the impact of

the increasing prominence of the RFMF, and briefly touch on the roles of the BLV and the Methodist Church. I have omitted the sections on external powers and the civil service, as there were no changes in these areas significant enough to have impacted wellbeing trends in different ways to those observed between 1993 and 1999. Overall, I find that the RFMF's increased prominence continued to drive the militarisation of Fijian society, which in turn negatively impacted wellbeing trends.

The executive

After the 2001 election, Qarase's first cabinet featured a set of competing interests because it included members of both the SDL and the CAMV. According to Krishna Datt, Qarase was a moderate who had to appease the extremist sections of his own party and its coalition partner, as well as making some effort to work with the FLP opposition and recognise the plurality of Fijian society.[267] My interviewees suggest that Qarase was initially unable to manage these tensions: Adi comments that he was a 'nice guy' but his ministers were 'playing politics';[268] and Taufa explicitly states that he was 'out of his depth'.[269] An added complication was that the prime minister found himself trying to prevent several political allies, including cabinet ministers and the vice president, from being prosecuted for their participation in the 2000 coup. Qarase's efforts in this regard were opposed by Bainimarama – as well as Fiji's regional partners and much of the domestic electorate – which played a key role in the deterioration of relations between the two men. Nevertheless, the prime minister honed his skills in managing cabinet in the years following the 2001 election, and by 2006 he had become the "undisputed leader of the SDL" and turned the party "into a cohesive, well-oiled fighting machine" (Lal 2007, 20). He achieved this by implementing the majority of the

[267] Interview with Krishna Datt, Suva.
[268] Interview N, Suva.
[269] Interview I, Suva.

policies demanded by *Taukei* nationalists, which eventually allowed the SDL to absorb the CAMV (Fraenkel and Firth 2007, 72–73). Following the 2006 election victory, Qarase's position was so solid that he felt comfortable enough to institute a multiparty cabinet featuring FLP ministers.

Qarase's efforts to maintain executive unity had little discernible impact on health policy, but they did have significant implications for the education sector. The presence of the CAMV in cabinet and pressure from ethnonationalists within the SDL ensured that the government prioritised the implementation of the Education Blueprint, which was championed by Qarase himself rather than his Minister for Education.[270] Among other things, the government established a Fijian Education Board and allocated F$8.4 million[271] to educational infrastructure intended to benefit the *Taukei* community (Robertson 2017, 169). The importance of affirmative action was reflected in MoE annual reports: in 2000, the MoE 'Highlight of the Year' was the drafting of the Education Blueprint (MoE 2001, 5); and in 2001, its 'Highlight of the Year' was the affirmative action programme's launch (MoE 2002, 8). The following year, the MoE (2002, 40) stated that

> after the [2001] elections… the [Fijian Education] Unit was made very aware of the fact that Fijian [*Taukei*] education is one of the top priorities of the ministry and needs some vigorous debate and action to lift our perspectives on the related issues.

However, the Education Blueprint failed to generate significant positive outcomes. For example, the policy of directing additional funding to *Taukei*-run schools backfired, because the majority of indigenous students went to non-*Taukei* owned schools which "were not supported" (Naidu 2013, 13). Moreover, the Education Blueprint did not address concerns raised by the Fiji Islands Education Commission/Panel report *Learning Together: Directions for*

[270] For evidence of this see Fiji Daily Post 2001; Kiran 2002; Ramesh 2002a; Ratuva 2013, chap. 6; Robertson 2017, 169.
[271] Approximately US$3.71 million

Education in the Fiji Islands (Robertson 2017, 169).[272] This landmark document identified a range of issues, including access and equity, an outdated curriculum, teacher shortages, poor teaching quality, and deficiencies in pedagogy (Crossley *et al* 2017, 876), which were ignored at the expense of the Education Blueprint's emphasis on *Taukei* affirmative action. Thus, Qarase's need to appease the ethnonationalist elements within his cabinet is likely to have negatively impacted education outcomes in Fiji by privileging racialised policy over attempts to address genuine national concerns.

Horizontal accountability: The legislature

Qarase did not have things all his own way in the parliament. In its early days, the SDL government was accused by Chaudhry, then opposition leader, of rushing bills through parliament (RNZI 2002). However, Datt recalls that debate was still free,[273] and Qarase became increasingly cognisant of the way that lively deliberation could confer democratic legitimacy on bills. A key example of this was the way the government approached the Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity (RTU) Bill. As a *Fiji Sun* (2005) editorial commented, the government could have used its parliamentary majority to "ram this measure through", but Qarase instead chose to undertake consultation with the public, the provincial councils, and the BLV. Further to this, the FLP opposition was able to

> block the Bill to transfer agricultural land leases from ALTA… to [the Native Land Trust Act] by denying the government the two-thirds vote majority it required as a result of constitutional protections connected to land legislation. (Pareti 2007, 90)

[272] The report was commissioned by the Chaudhry government. Initially conceived as a Commission, it was later downgraded to a "report from a Panel of individual contributors" due to the commissioners' failure to reach consensus on a number of issues (Kotobalavu 2000, iii).
[273] Interview with Krishna Datt, Suva.

These examples demonstrate the ability of the Fijian legislature to exert a degree of democratic control over the executive during the Qarase years.

The effects of the interactions between legislature and executive on wellbeing outcomes in Fiji between 2000 and 2006 are unclear. At the broadest level, a 2008 report commissioned by the military regime argues that prior to 2006, parliament did not "scrutinise the activities of the executive Government in an effective way" thanks to "a tendency by Members of Parliament to focus on issues of adversarial politics rather than on examining matters that are in the public interest" (National Council for Building a Better Fiji 2008, 44; 95).[274] This is in accordance with the views of Kumar and Prasad (2004, 480) and Aumua (2014, 135) noted in the first half of the chapter. Similarly, Kumar (2007, 216) suggests that during the Qarase years there was a "lack of clarity in the mainstream welfare policies of the state" and a "lack of motivation and understanding of the welfare issues".

Similar problems were evident regarding health and education. Health policy received little attention in parliament due to capacity constraints and the framing of new initiatives as technocratic and apolitical, as outlined in the first half of the chapter. For example, when legislative amendments sanctioning the decentralisation of health services were tabled in August 2002 (Aumua 2014, 145), they were passed without extensive debate. Education issues received somewhat more attention in the legislature due to the government's focus on affirmative action. Media reports describe how the FLP harried the government in parliament over the allocation of school funding, describing it as "highly discriminatory, since it ignored indigenous Fijian students attending schools run mainly by Indo-Fijians" (Ramesh 2001b). Isimeli recalls that besides this issue, there were debates over access, quality, and teacher

[274] This problem was at its peak in the early days of the SDL government, when racial slurs became so common in parliament that Qarase and Chaudhry actually agreed to cooperate on preventing abusive language (Fiji Times/PINA Nius Online 2002).

salaries (see for example Daily Post 2002b).[275] However, as with health, some key education policies were not debated in parliament because they were implemented in the form of technical partnerships between aid donors and the MoE. For example, the AusAID-funded Fiji Education Sector Program – which ran from June 2003 to December 2009 and was worth approximately F$7.9 million[276] per year – aimed to facilitate "system-wide improvements to education planning, management and delivery" (Pennington, Ireland, and Narsey 2010, 6), but was not discussed in parliament as far as I have been able to determine.

Parliamentary oversight of education was also limited by the Qarase government's tactics. The best example of this is the *Social Justice Act 2001*, which translated the Blueprint into legislation (Government of Fiji 2001), and contained provisions related to the MoE's role in improving *Taukei* educational outcomes. The bill was heavily critiqued by opposition MPs, who argued that it would facilitate policies that were "discriminatory and blatantly [ignored] the plight of poor Indo-Fijians" (Kamea 2001; Ramesh 2002b). However, no amendments were made to the bill's education provisions, and the government only allowed the parliamentary select committee three business days to advertise for, receive, and read public submissions before it had to report back (National Farmers' Union 2002). The committee recommended a delay to allow for more public consultation, but instead the government suspended lower house standing orders in order to pass the bill before the Christmas break (National Farmers' Union 2002). This prompted the FLP to accuse the government of 'bulldozing' the important legislation "through parliament without consultation, or time for them to be examined, studied and debated" (FLP 2003). Thus, although Qarase faced a hostile parliamentary environment at times, this did not prevent him from implementing his desired, and ultimately damaging, policies for affirmative action in education.

[275] Interview D, Suva.
[276] Approximately US$4.19 million.

Horizontal accountability: The judiciary

In the aftermath of the 2000 coup, the ability of the judiciary to act as a check on executive power was hampered by the emergence of deep fractures between senior judges. Chief Justice Timoci Tuivaga was heavily critiqued in the media and by the Fiji Law Society for prematurely deciding that the 1997 Constitution had been abrogated, abolishing the Supreme Court, and providing unconstitutional advice to the president (Lal 2006, 208). High Court judge Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi and two magistrates resigned in protest against the actions of Tuivaga and other High Court judges, who were alleged to have helped Bainimarama draft decrees to replace the 1997 Constitution (Draunidalo 2009, 312). According to Jonathan Fraenkel (2007, 437), the independence of the judiciary was "damaged but not broken" by this incident. In 2001, the judiciary went some way towards reasserting its independence when the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's ruling that the 1997 Constitution remained in force (Freedom House 2002, 236). This meant that Qarase's interim government was deemed illegal, forcing the president to call the 2001 election. During the remainder of the SDL administration, the judiciary demonstrated willingness to oppose the executive but was sometimes unable to enforce its decisions. The best example of this came in August 2004, when the High Court sentenced Vice President Ratu Jope Seniloli to four years gaol for his role in the 2000 coup. However, Seniloli was permitted by the government to receive his salary and act as vice president while incarcerated, and was released after only three months for "unspecified health reasons" (Freedom House 2006, 253).

However, the Fijian judiciary had little involvement in issues of citizen wellbeing. My interviewees could not recall any judicial activism in the field of health policy,[277] and the only incident relevant to education came in 2002, when the High Court banned corporal

[277] Interview J, Suva.

punishment in schools (Pareti 2002).[278] Thus, the ability of the judiciary to provide horizontal accountability in areas related to wellbeing went untested between 2000 and 2006.

Domestic tutelary powers

The RFMF was the most important domestic tutelary power between 2000 and 2006. During this period, the BLV and the Church became less politically prominent. This was partly because their priorities were generally aligned with those of the Qarase government – reducing the need for political advocacy – and partly due to the predominance of the military.

The military

After the 2000 coup, the RFMF became an increasingly prominent political actor. Although Bainimarama appointed a civilian interim government then stepped back during the 2001 election, the episode "inspired later military aspirations for more protracted control" by reinforcing the RFMF's view of itself as the guardian of Fiji's national interest (Fraenkel 2013, 333). The relationship between Bainimarama and Qarase began to deteriorate severely in 2003 (Robertson 2017, 183), and their increasingly intense public spats covered issues including the commander's commission, the military budget, civilian control of the RFMF, and what Bainimarama saw as the lenient treatment of those who had been involved in the 2000 coup (Firth and Fraenkel 2009, 125–26; Ratuva 2011, 112). In 2005, Bainimarama's vehement opposition to the government's National Security White Paper led to the document being scrapped (Baledrokadroka 2015, 132). Crucially, Bainimarama also set himself against the *Qoliqoli* Bill, which he claimed would "drive Fijians back to grass skirts and cannibalism" (Robertson 2017, 200). This was an example of the commander's efforts

[278] Interview E, Suva.

to expand the military's political role and reposition it as a progressive institution in favour of multiracialism. The 2006 'good governance' coup was the culmination of this process and represented the RFMF's accession to an outright praetorian role (Fraenkel and Firth 2009).

Despite the RFMF's heavy involvement in Fijian politics post-2000, it rarely took a direct interest in policy related to citizen wellbeing. Elenoa recalls that the military was always more interested in national security than 'normal policy areas'.[279] Although Bainimarama encouraged the RFMF to see its praetorian role as encompassing all Fijians – prior to 2000 its role as guardian of the 'national interest' had been synonymous with *Taukei* paramountcy – this did not translate into direct intervention in areas such as health and education. However, the previously noted militarisation of Fijian society was amplified after the 2000 coup. Military expenditure between 2000 and 2006 averaged 1.72 per cent of GDP, yet the RFMF consistently exceeded its budget.[280] Bainimarama constantly dropped public hints that he was considering a military coup and placed ministers under surveillance (Robertson 2017, 188, 190); he also failed to address the ethnic homogeneity of the RFMF despite his professed commitment to multiracialism. In the aftermath of the 2000 coup, law and order problems intensified (see Halapua 2003), despite the RFMF taking on a larger role in domestic security and disaster relief operations (Robertson 2017, 189). Thus, my conclusions are similar to those from the first half of the chapter: between 2000 and 2006, societal militarisation in Fiji is likely to have negatively impacted wellbeing outcomes, although this is difficult to quantify.

The Bose Levu Vakaturaga

The BLV was a less influential body under Qarase than it had been during the Rabuka and Chaudhry administrations. After the 2000 coup, the BLV was crippled by internal division

[279] Interview L, Suva. Robertson (2017, 169) provides the only hint at military interest in wellbeing-related policy, writing that "education, which Bainimarama believed essential for Fijian development, received no boost in the first Qarase budget".
[280] The corresponding figure for 1993 to 1999 was 1.59 per cent.

between supporters and opponents of Speight. Brij Lal (2008, 15) argues that the BLV became a:

> diminished body of dithering men and women, confused, partisan, manipulable, unable to exercise their much sought after — and much hoped for — role as the custodians not only of indigenous Fijian but also of Fiji's broad national interests.

After the High Court's ruling that the 1997 Constitution remained in force, the BLV somewhat redeemed itself by appointing a new president and supporting the 2001 election (Norton 2009, 106). Prior to the 2001 poll, the BLV made the landmark decision not to endorse the SVT, declaring that it would no longer "favour any one political party" (Fraenkel and Firth 2007, 68). However, after the election the chiefs found a strong ally in Qarase, whose relationship with the council was reminiscent to that of Rabuka thanks to an alignment of policy priorities.[281] To counterbalance Bainimarama's growing influence, Qarase cultivated the BLV's support by providing government funding for the council's new administrative complex (Fiji Times 2005b), praising its 'stabilising' role in the 2000 coup (Daily Post 2002b), and seeking its approval for policies such as the harvesting of Fiji's mahogany forests (Fiji Times 2001).[282]

Although Qarase sought to use the BLV as a counterweight against the RFMF, the council evinced little interest in health policy and was unable to exert much influence over the government's approach to education. This was demonstrated in 2004, when the government chose not to renew chairman Ratu Epeli Ganilau's membership of the BLV due to his "strong outbursts" against its affirmative action programme (Fiji Sun 2004b; Firth and

[281] Interview G, Suva. According to Rabuka, Qarase had an even better relationship with the BLV than he did, although it remained an 'advisory not executive' body. Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka, Suva.
[282] In late 2006, "Qarase sought help from the BLV, hoping that the chiefs could mediate a resolution of his worsening conflict with Bainimarama" (Norton 2009, 107).

Fraenkel 2009, 127). Thus, the BLV had little impact on wellbeing trends in Fiji between 2000 and 2006.

The Methodist Church

The Qarase government and the Church were closely aligned between 2000 and 2006 thanks to the former's pro-*Taukei* policy programme and deeply Christian rhetoric. Following the 2000 coup, the Church's general secretary submitted an affidavit supporting Chaudhry's dismissal to Justice Michael Scott (Field 2001), and before the 2001 elections, the Church endorsed the SDL and the CAMV. This was "an important reason for their achieving respectively 50 per cent and 20 per cent of the indigenous Fijian vote" (Fraenkel 2009b, 168). After the election, the SDL government nominated Reverend Kanailagi to the Senate (Radio Australia 2001d), while Reverend Akuila Yabaki, a vocal critic of the 2000 coup and the interim administration, was defrocked (Emberson 2001). The Church's president regularly visited Qarase in his office "for prayer and devotion" and to remind him "that as an elected leader, he was accountable to God in ministering to the people of Fiji" (Fiji Times 2005c).[283] This close relationship brought the Church into direct conflict with the military: for example, Bainimarama threatened to prevent Methodist preachers from accompanying Fijian peacekeeping missions if the Church did not withdraw its support for the RTU Bill (Fiji Times 2005e). Nevertheless, a number of Methodist lay preachers ran as SDL candidates at the 2006 election (Fijilive 2005; Durutalo 2007, 83).

The Church was indirectly influential in the areas of health and education thanks to its close alignment with the Qarase government. For example, the Church argued against the legalisation of artificial insemination and same sex marriage as part of the Family Law Bill (Radio Fiji 2002), and these sections were eventually left out of the legislation (Jalal 2005).

[283] Qarase later proved willing to go against the Methodists on some issues, such as gay rights (Fiji TV 2005).

Although none of my interviewees from within the MoE recalls being lobbied by the Church, as noted previously, Methodists have always been heavily involved in education in Fiji due to the religious origins of the schooling system. Thus, the Church's influence over health and education outcomes in Fiji between 2000 and 2006 was most likely perpetuated through its integration into everyday life, rather than explicit political lobbying. It is therefore unlikely to have negatively impacted wellbeing by restricting the effective power of the government in these areas.

Summary

Between 2000 and 2006, the legislature and the judiciary were able to provide some degree of restraint on executive power. In particular, the opposition used parliament as a forum for critiquing government education policy, despite Qarase's attempts to limit opportunities to review proposed legislation. The BLV and the Church approved of the government's ethnonationalist agenda and acted to shore up Qarase's position in the face of Bainimarama's increasing disgruntlement. It was the commander's deteriorating relationship with the prime minister that gave rise to the defining feature of the period under consideration: the constant threat of military intervention, which was actualised in late 2006. In the first half of this chapter, I argued that in the 1990s the militarisation of Fijian society was likely to have had a diffuse negative impact on wellbeing trends. This effect was amplified after the 2000 coup as Bainimarama's influence strengthened the informal norm of military engagement in politics. However, it is impossible to identify a direct causal link between this and the increases in infant and under-5 mortality and the slower rates of improvement in other indicators that Fiji experienced between 2000 and 2006.

Conclusions

This analysis of the period between 2000 and 2006 gives rise to several key points. First, as with the 1994 and 1999 elections, the poll in 2001 was limited in its ability to serve as a vertical accountability mechanism for improving wellbeing because voting was determined by racial allegiance rather than genuine competition over policy platforms. An important legacy of the 2000 coup was a hardening of the ethnic divide in Fiji, which strengthened the informal norm of racialised voting even though the 2001 election was held under the same formal institutional structure as the 1999 poll.

Second, the attacks on academic freedom that prompted Fiji to be downgraded on the Political Freedoms dimension had little practical impact on wellbeing trends. It is possible that the Qarase government's stricter regulation of strikes and public protests – which was insufficient to decrease Fiji's scores on the relevant indicators in my typology – served to slow the recovery of Fiji's health and education indicators after of the 2000 coup because there was less opportunity for the public to voice its concerns with government policies. However, this is likely to have been ameliorated by relative continuity in the relationship between Fiji's political and civil society elites, which allowed for the re-establishment of consultations between the two groups after 2000.

Finally, the RFMF's increasingly praetorian role is likely to have amplified the negative effects of societal militarisation. After 2000, Bainimarama positioned himself and the military firmly at the centre of the country's political discourse, increasing the visibility of the RFMF in the daily lives of Fijians and ensuring that the spectre of a coup was constantly at the front of people's minds. While the 2000 coup is likely to have been the primary driving force behind worsening infant and under-5 mortality rates and slower rates of improvement in maternal mortality, primary school completion, electricity access, and HDI score, the combination of trends across the three dimensions identified in this section may have also played a role.

Political Hybridity & Wellbeing in Fiji

The analysis presented in this chapter suggests that subtle changes in the interactions between formal and informal institutions and norms had more of an effect on Fiji's wellbeing outcomes than the shift in regime type which occurred in 2000. This transition from Restricted Unfair to Restricted Illiberal Unfair HR (and consequently from Intermediate to Hard HR) was the result of increased restrictions on academic freedoms that are unlikely to have exerted much impact on wellbeing outcomes, and were not significant enough to be recalled by interviewees nearly two decades later. However, in this chapter I have highlighted several examples of more subtle changes in the character of political hybridity in Fiji that are likely to have impacted wellbeing outcomes.

The first example is the shifting dynamics of the electoral arena. In 1994, communal voting was a formal institution, codified in the 1990 Constitution. Different ethnic groups were only permitted to vote for seats allocated to their specific ethnicity, and the *Taukei* population enjoyed an automatic majority in both houses of parliament. This produced an election campaign in which wellbeing issues were sidelined by the politics of race. The introduction of the more egalitarian 1997 Constitution meant that the 1999 election campaign had a slightly different character. The abolition of the automatic *Taukei* majority and the creation of open roll seats forced political parties to form inter-ethnic coalitions. The two main opposing coalitions made broad commitments to improve the country's health services, education system, and basic infrastructure, but the fear of marginalising one ethnic community or the other meant that policy detail was lacking. Although racialised voting was no longer fully institutionalised, the informal norm of ethnic solidarity persisted, manifesting itself in discussions of perennially controversial issues such as land tenancy. In 2001, the election was shaped by the racial divide, which had been hardened by the 2000 coup. This reinforced that despite changes made by the 1997 Constitution, the mentality of voting along

ethnic lines persisted. Health and education issues played almost no role in shaping voting patterns, as the two major ethnic communities rallied around candidates they believed would aggressively defend their political rights. Thus, the interaction between formal and informal institutions was slightly different in 1994, 1999, and 2001, but the outcomes were similar: each election failed to serve as a mechanism for improving the wellbeing of the Fijian population.

The second example comes from the Political Freedoms dimension. Although Fiji's ratings on the Freedom of Organisation component did not change between 1993 and 2006, the nature of the state's interactions with civil society changed. Under Rabuka and Chaudhry, civil society actors in the health and education sectors were able to engage with the government at the elite level, while strikes and protests provided the public with opportunities to voice their dissatisfaction. In the aftermath of the 2000 coup, the close links between Fiji's political and civil society elites allowed the latter to slowly rebuild working relationships with the state. However, the Qarase government was more willing to shut down mass opposition gatherings than its predecessors, while the coup had also intangibly "weakened community leadership" (Negin, Roberts, and Lingam 2010, 14). These subtle changes in the dynamic of state-society interaction are likely to have been partially responsible for the slower rates of improvement in several indicators – such as maternal mortality ratio and HDI score – in evidence after the 2000 coup.

These two examples highlight the importance of using mixed methods to study HRs. Some parts of my typology provide insight into informal processes – for example, the indicators which assess the presence of tutelary influence – but there are aspects of political hybridity which are extremely difficult to capture using quantifiable indicators. Consequently, the statistical results set out in the previous chapter only tell part of the story: in-depth qualitative

analysis of the Fijian case shows that informal institutions and norms can reinforce or dampen the impact of formal institutions on wellbeing outcomes.

Chapter 8: Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands offers a useful contrast to Fiji, demonstrating the diversity that can exist within HR subtypes. Fiji and Solomon Islands have both been designated as Restricted Unfair HRs at different times – but for quite different reasons.[284] In Fiji, electoral accountability broke down because voting patterns were shaped by the stark divide between the *Taukei* and Indo-Fijian populations, and the RFMF's role as a tutelary power had a negative impact on wellbeing trends. In Solomon Islands, the electoral mechanism was undermined by the interaction between kinship ties and a political system that incentivises politicians to focus on delivering material benefits to their specific constituency. Solomon Islands was classed as a 'Restricted' regime due to the presence of RAMSI, which was invited into the country by the national government in 2003 with the specific goals of restoring law and order and strengthening institutions. It succeeded to some extent, but its overwhelming size and financial muscle had a debilitating effect on political engagement in sections of the population. These notable differences reinforce the importance of combining quantitative and qualitative methods: the contrast between two cases that fit within the same HR subtype is a valuable reminder that statistical analysis using constructed categories cannot tell the full story.

In the first section of this chapter, I give an overview of the historical and political context of Solomon Islands, including a summary of three important factors: the way in which the *wantok*[285] system of informal governance has blended with the Westminster system introduced by the British colonial administration; the period of violence and instability known as 'the Tensions' (1998-2003); and the role of RAMSI. The second section analyses the period from 2001 to 2004, during which Solomon Islands was classified as an Unfair HR.

[284] This is not necessarily a problem given that widely used categories such as 'parliamentary democracy' and 'bureaucratic authoritarianism' encompass a similarly diverse set of political systems.
[285] The literal translation from Pijin is 'one talk'.

The third section turns to the period from 2005 to 2015, during which Solomon Islands was a Restricted Unfair HR. As with the previous chapter, I examine the ways in which formal institutions combine with informal institutions and norms to shape wellbeing outcomes. This analysis produces four main findings. First, the meshing of the *wantok* system with the formal institutions of electoral politics sidelined health and education issues during election campaigns. Second, the potential for political freedoms to facilitate improved wellbeing outcomes was undermined by an inexperienced civil society sector that lacked funding and struggled against cultural norms. Third, Solomon Islands' weak party system and the associated phenomenon of 'grasshopping' (in which MPs switch between the government and the opposition) undermined horizontal accountability, derailing effective policy in key areas. Finally, RAMSI was able to drive improvements in wellbeing outcomes – primarily due to the huge influx of funding and technical expertise – but its presence also fostered a culture of dependency that may have long-term negative impacts.

History & Politics

Country Overview

Solomon Islands is a Melanesian state that comprises six main islands and approximately 900 smaller islands. As of 2018, the population of 660,000 was 94.5 per cent Melanesian, 3 per cent Polynesian, and 1.2 per cent Micronesian (Central Intelligence Agency 2019).[286] Although English is the official language, around 64 indigenous languages exist, and most people communicate using Solomon Islands Pijin (Central Intelligence Agency 2019). Since the area was first settled roughly 30,000 years ago (Gosling and Matisoo-Smith 2018, 54), there have been several waves of migration, including the arrival of Austronesian speaking

[286] There was also a small but politically significant Chinese population of unknown size (Cave 2018).

people between 5,000 and 3,500 years ago, and the arrival of the Lapita people 3,500 years ago (Taika 1989, 152). Regular contact with Europeans commenced in the 1820s when French, British, and American traders and whalers began to frequent the area (Corris 1970, 3). The first missionaries arrived in 1845, but Christianity – now the dominant religion – did not begin to take hold until the 1870s (Corris 1970, 9–11). In 1870, the first 'labour recruiters' arrived to procure workers for the British colonies in Fiji and Queensland.[287] Known as 'blackbirding', this exploitative practice often involved deceit and violent kidnapping (Corris 1970, 55).[288]

In 1885, Germany made the northern Solomon Islands a protectorate, and the British did likewise for the southern islands in 1893. More islands were added to the British protectorate over the following seven years, and those controlled by Germany were ceded to the United Kingdom in 1900. Agitation for self-determination began to gain momentum after World War II, and local councils elected by universal suffrage were introduced in 1952. The protectorate administration created a national Legislative Council[289] in 1960, although all 21 members were appointed by the British high commissioner. Elected positions were introduced gradually, and in 1976, a general election was held for all of the governing body's positions for the first time. Solomon Islands gained full independence on 7 July 1978.[290]

Political Context

Post-independence politics in Solomon Islands has been characterised by tensions between local modes of governance and the Westminster system imposed on the country by departing

[287] Later, labour was also recruited for Samoa and New Caledonia.
[288] Blackbirding was shut down by British regulation in 1911. By this time, approximately 30,000 Solomon Islanders had been recruited as indentured labourers, with roughly 18,000 of those having returned home by 1914 (Corris 1970, 334–38).
[289] The Legislative Council was later renamed the Governing Council (1970) and then the Legislative Assembly (1974).
[290] For a detailed account of the events leading up to independence, see Saemala 1979.

British administrators. The resulting political instability and ineffective government were at the heart of the Tensions (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 291–92). Since 2003, Solomon Islands politics has been dominated by the relationship between the national government and RAMSI, which was deployed to end the Tensions and facilitate longer-term statebuilding. The following section gives an overview of these three themes – Solomon Islands' uneasy relationship with Westminster-style government; the interplay between the Tensions and the country's political system; and the effects of RAMSI – which underpin my analysis of political hybridity in the country. Additionally, each of these themes draws attention to the key differences between Solomon Islands and Fiji as HRs. The latter has a strong party system, has not experienced an extended period of violence, and has not been subject to external peacekeeping intervention.

Wantoks & Westminster

At independence, the Solomon Islands was bequeathed a "hastily assembled" institutional framework with "shallow foundations in Solomon Islands society" (Dinnen 2008c, 346). The 1978 Constitution – which was drafted in London with little input from Solomon Islanders (Saemala 1979, 3–4) – established a Westminster system featuring a unicameral legislature, with MPs elected for four-year terms via single-member constituencies using a first-past-the-post system. The prime minister is elected by parliament and is responsible for selecting the other members of cabinet, which forms the *de facto* executive (Hodge, Slatyer, and Skiller 2015, 7).[291]

This system is ill-suited to governing a scattered collection of islands with no collective pre-colonial political identity. The country's borders encircle a diverse range of ethnic groups,

[291] Officially, executive power is held by the governor general as representative of the British monarchy.

languages, and traditions with no history of shared political community. Independence therefore created "a state without a nation" where the concentration of power in a central government was at odds with the "prevalence of localism in virtually all aspects of social, political, and economic life" (Dinnen 2008b, 55). Prior to the colonial era, it was rare for a single authority to govern a whole island, much less the entire archipelago (Corrin Care 2005, 160). Migration to the capital city, Honiara, has gained pace since independence, but the majority of the population still lives in "village micro-communities" that are isolated by poor transport and communications infrastructure (Steeves 2011, 344). These issues have been compounded by a lack of the "human resources needed to operate a complex bureaucratic state" and a small, inexperienced political elite (Dinnen 2008b, 54). As a result, the Solomon Islands state has struggled to compete for authority with actors more embedded in society, including churches, CSOs, and traditional leaders (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 298).

Foremost among these competing priorities – although perhaps the most difficult for outsiders to comprehend – is the *wantok* system. This term "conveys common linguistic or kinship bonds, but is frequently also used to mean 'belonging to the same island' or even, when Solomon Islanders are overseas, 'belonging to the same nation'" (Fraenkel 2004, 206). In practice, the *wantok* system is a "a network of cooperation, caring and reciprocal support, and a shared attachment to *kastom*[292] and locality" (Nanau 2011, 32, 42). Within the *wantok* system, leadership is typically provided by a *bigman*, an individual elevated to the role due to their social influence (Alasia 1989, 138). According to Gordon Nanau (2011, 45),

> in this web of giving and supporting each other, there is always a towering individual who is a sign of unity that usually leads the people. He is the key player and is always responsible for the needs of all in his close group. This *bigman* is a sign of unity, security and stability among wantok members.

[292] A set of practices, including indigenous leadership norms and methods of conflict settlement (Fraenkel 2004, 10–11; Nanau 2011, 33).

The *bigman* is also responsible for mediating relations with other groups (Nanau 2011, 42–48). The *wantok* system is therefore inherently political, because it encompasses an unwritten social contract and structures relations between different sections of society.

Many of the issues affecting post-independence Solomon Islands politics are derived from the ways in which *wantokism* has been reinvented and transposed onto the formal political system.[293] This process has resulted in a potent mix of clientelism and voting patterns based on kinship.[294] Terence Wood (2014b, 8) notes that people "typically vote for the candidate they think is most likely to help them, their family, or possibly their community, directly" rather than selecting candidates based on "national issues or quality of national governance". The desire to secure localised or personalised benefits leads people to vote for those with whom they have close ties – usually their *wantoks* – in the belief that that these bonds will ensure the candidate delivers on their promises (Wood 2014b, 9). Thus, clientelism operates as a mutation of the *bigman* model, with candidates supplying voters with excludable material benefits – such as bags of rice, outboard motors, and other goods (J. Atkinson 2009, 54; Cox 2009, 974)[295] – in exchange for political support (Wood 2018, 482–83). The combination of clientelistic gifting and voting based on kinship encourages MPs to focus on "delivering goods or similar assistance to their supporters, rather than concentrating on legislation or bureaucratic performance or national policy" (Wood 2018, 485), and also encourages voters to "see their local members of parliament as their savior, someone they choose so that they can be assisted in return" (Diamana 2016). The result is a form of zero-sum politics, where those who did not vote for the winning candidate receive little benefit (Dinnen 2008b, 57).

[293] As Sinclair Dinnen (2008a, 29) argues, "the peculiarities of Solomon Islands' electoral politics, process of government formation and volatile system of coalition government cannot be understood in isolation from their encompassing political culture".
[294] It is important to note Tony Hiriasa's (2016, 3) point that clientelism is not always a successful strategy for electoral victory: "gifting [is] embedded within kin-based social organisation and kin networking and… outside of kin groups, the impact of gifting is always uncertain".
[295] Interview G1, Honiara; Interview L1, Honiara.

The clientelistic model has been facilitated by the Rural Constituency Development Funds (RCDFs; also known as CDFs), which were introduced in 1993. RCDFs are tranches of money under the control of MPs that are supposed to finance small development projects at the constituency level; in reality, they are electoral slush funds (Cox 2009, 970; Fraenkel 2011, 312). Between 1993 and 2015, RCDFs increased from an initial level of SI$100,000 per MP to SI$8-10 million per MP (Batley 2015, 1).[296] The initial expansion was financed by successive national governments, but since 1998, the bulk of the funding has come from the Republic of China (Taiwan hereafter; Fraenkel 2011, 313).[297] RCDFs are often portrayed as the root of all evil in Solomon Islands politics: according to Nelson (a high-ranking bureaucrat in the Department of Premier and Cabinet), all people talk about is how to distribute the funds;[298] Ema (a CSO worker) says that the availability of RCDFs has inhibited national policy because it encourages MPs to focus on their constituency and exacerbates the culture of relying on handouts from a *bigman*;[299] and Sam Alasia (an academic, political adviser, and former Minister for Education) argues that the focus on distributing RCDF money has converted MPs from legislators to project managers.[300]

The adaptation of *wantokism* to the national political context has also contributed to the country's weak political party system. Once elected, MPs have to compete with other *bigmen* "within parliament for a share of government expenditure" in order to deliver "community projects such as water supplies, government roads, and so forth" (Alasia 1989, 137, 151). Because resources are scarce and failure to deliver benefits at the constituency level mean that an MP is likely to lose their seat (Alasia 1989, 151; Steeves 2011, 344), elections from

[296] Approximately US$1-1.3 million. This equates to 10 to 15 per cent of government expenditure (Wiltshire and Batley 2018, 1).
[297] Solomon Islands has maintained a strong relationship with Taiwan since 1983. Solomon Islands is one of the few states that grants Taiwan diplomatic recognition and supports its participation in the UN, and in return it receives a significant amount of aid (Lyons 2019; Zhang and Aqorau 2019).
[298] Interview B1, Honiara.
[299] Interview G1, Honiara.
[300] Interview with Sam Alasia, Honiara.

independence to 2013 featured an average incumbent turnover rate of 53 per cent (Corbett and Wood 2013, 322). Combined with the privileging of local over national issues and the personality-based *bigman* leadership model, this volatility has hampered the emergence of parties (see Allen 2008, 47; Steeves 2011, 345). As a result, most candidates usually run as independents (see COG 2006, 2014; Wood 2014b, 2).

The absence of strong political parties means that the chaotic and corruptible process of forming government occurs after an election. Unlike in Fiji, which has a strong party system, in Solomon Islands it is the post-election "decision to appoint the prime minister that is crucial in determining who is to govern" (Fry 1983, 50), with each aspiring leader attempting to rally a bloc of MPs large enough to win this 'shadow election' (Dinnen 2008b, 71).[301] The resulting coalitions are very fragile, and even after the government and opposition have been established both remain susceptible to defections by MPs, a practice known as 'grasshopping'. Unsurprisingly, there were nine mid-term changes of government between 1980 and 2017 (Corbett and Wood 2013, 322). The mutability of the government means that the opposition coalition is "ineffective in holding the governing group accountable" because MPs "must keep their options open at all times and be prepared to move across the floor of parliament" (Steeves 2011, 345). The emphasis on either shoring up or destabilising the incumbent administration distracts from the business of government itself (Diamana 2016).

A further problem is that when the mutual reciprocity that characterises *wantokism* infiltrates the supposedly meritocratic state bureaucracy, it becomes reframed as corruption or nepotism (Nanau 2011, 35). Solomon Islanders in positions of relative influence or wealth are obliged to help their *wantoks* by providing employment, a place to live, or simply cash gifts (Solomon Times Online 2008). This support system is an important safety net in subsistence communities, but when it extends beyond the local level and becomes enmeshed

[301] See for example Alasia's (2007) account of the manoeuvring after the 2006 election.

with the formal institutions of government, it can undermine the equitable distribution of resources and opportunities (Nanau 2011, 50; Brigg 2009, 156). Thus, *bigman* MPs are expected to redistribute the spoils of office to their constituents (Cox 2009, 967), and civil servants must help their *wantoks* through "favors that border corruption, such as offering a job or contract" (Solomon Times Online 2008). These incidents are often described as 'petty corruption' in Western parlance (Larmour 1997, 1; Cox 2009, 969).

Solomon Islands politics is also plagued by examples of 'grand corruption' (or state capture) that go well beyond doing favours for one's *wantoks*. Many of these incidents are linked to the logging industry, which has been a vital income source in Solomon Islands since the mid-1990s. Malaysian, Taiwanese, and South Korean companies have furnished politicians with millions of dollars' worth of bribes, and allegedly bankroll the financial inducements that competing coalitions use to woo MPs during the battle to form government (Kabutaulaka 2005a, 95; Alasia 2007, 173; Dinnen 2008c, 349; Katovai, Edwards, and Laurance 2015, 721). There have also been several episodes of ministerial-level tax and customs fraud, and bribery related to the approval of large investments (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 72). This has created a top-down culture of corruption – leading to embezzlement and the rorting of procurement processes at all levels of government (see for example Solomon Star 2016; Radio NZ [RNZ] 2017a, 2017b) – that bears no relation to the *wantok* system, despite efforts by perpetrators to frame their behaviour as 'traditional' (Larmour 1997, 2).

The Tensions

The violence and unrest that plagued Guadalcanal from 1998 to 2003 were the apotheosis of decades of tensions between Guales and migrants from the nearby island of Malaita. Employment opportunities associated with the US presence on Guadalcanal during World War II and the designation of Honiara as the administrative centre of the British Protectorate in 1952 both resulted in influxes of migrants from other islands, particularly the densely-

populated Malaita (Dinnen 2008b, 60; Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 18). Guale resentment of the Malaitan population grew over the years as a result of the latter group's relative economic success and alleged insensitivity to local customs (Dinnen 2008b, 61).

The issue came to a head at the end of 1998, when Guadalcanal Premier Ezekiel Alebua issued a set of demands to the national government. These included monetary compensation for the murder of 25 Guales, the institution of a federal system of government featuring Guadalcanal as a state, restrictions on people from other provinces owning land on the island, and stricter internal migration controls (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 23; Allen 2012, 166). Shortly after this, groups of young Guales – later known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM) – initiated violent attacks against Malaitans and other migrants, leading to the "progressive paralysis of central government, escalating lawlessness, and deepening economic crisis" (Dinnen 2008b, 61). A state of emergency was declared in June 1999, and in response to a request for help from Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, the Commonwealth Secretariat appointed former Fiji Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka as a special envoy and deployed a small number of unarmed police from Fiji and Vanuatu (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 285). These measures proved ineffective, and by July 1999, up to 20,000 people – mainly Malaitans – had been displaced (Dinnen 2008b, 61).

In response to perceived government inaction, Malaitan leaders in Honiara formed their own militia, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) in early 2000 (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 285). On 5 June 2000, the MEF took control of key positions in Honiara and effectively deposed the government by placing Ulufa'alu under house arrest. On 30 June, parliament elected Manasseh Sogavare as prime minister, but violence between the IFM and the MEF escalated resulting in an unknown number of deaths (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 286).[302] On 15 October,

[302] The best estimate is that there were between 150 to 200 deaths, and roughly 450 non-fatal injuries (Muggah 2004, 5).

several parties to the conflict signed the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA), which required the militias to disarm and resolve their issues peacefully. However, several key militia leaders refused to sign, the disarmament process was a failure, and the financial compensation scheme intended as a 'traditional' form of reconciliation "deteriorated rapidly into outright criminality and corruption" (Dinnen 2008b, 62). Moreover, fractures emerged within the Guale and Malaitan communities that led to continued violence (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 292).

Despite ongoing instability, national elections were held in 2001, bringing Sir Allan Kemakeza to power. The following two years saw high rates of criminal activity in Honiara as militants turned their attention to growing marijuana, trading weapons, and intercepting cash as it arrived at the Department of Finance (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 38–39). Eventually, after requests from successive Solomon Islands governments, RAMSI was deployed in July 2003. Although less than 200 fatalities occurred during the Tensions (Barbara 2008, 129), the economic and social impacts were serious: public services became almost non-existent; GDP fell by 24 per cent between 2000 and 2001; and by mid-2003 national debt had reached A$352 million (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 293).

Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

RAMSI arrived in Honiara on 24 July 2003. Although the mission was led by Australia, it was endorsed by Solomon Islands domestic legislation and sanctioned by the PIF, the first time the regional body had authorised a multilateral operation to address a crisis in one of its member states (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 12). The initial intervention force was 2,200 strong – approximately 77 per cent of which were from Australia[303] – and consisted of 330 police officers, 1,800 military personnel, and a small number of civilian advisors

[303] The remainder were from NZ, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu.

(Dinnen 2008b, 65). RAMSI's original mandate was to restore law and order, foster long-term economic recovery, and rebuild the "machinery of government" (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 14).[304] These became the mission's 'three pillars': 'Law and Justice'; 'Economic Governance'; and 'Machinery of Government' (Solomon Islands Government [SIG] and RAMSI 2017, 21). RAMSI officially concluded on 30 June 2017, and is estimated to have cost nearly A$3 billion, 95 per cent of which was provided by Australia (SIG and RAMSI 2017, 23, 26).

Australia's decision to lead the operation was a rapid reversal of previous policy. Canberra had previously rejected requests for assistance from the SIG and even ruled out intervening only six months before RAMSI was deployed (O'Callaghan 2001; Kabutaulaka 2005b, 287). The change in stance was influenced by the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and the 2002 Bali Bombings (in which 88 Australians were killed), which prompted increased concerns about 'failed states' in Australia's immediate region.[305] An influential report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute titled *Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands* (2003) reinforced the fear that Solomon Islands could become a convenient base for terrorists and international criminal networks to infiltrate Australia. Thus, the decision to lead the intervention was largely driven by Australia's foreign policy interests rather than worsening conditions in Solomon Islands (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 301).

RAMSI had five broad phases (SIG and RAMSI 2017, 27–28). First, from 2003 to 2004, the emphasis was on restoring law and order and stabilising the government's finances. During this period several militia leaders were apprehended, over 3,000 weapons were handed in,[306]

[304] This involved reducing corruption, downsizing the civil service, and stopping extortion (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 14).
[305] Additionally, Prime Minister John Howard was keen for Australia to take a prominent role in the US-led 'war on terror'. For a full discussion, see Kabutaulaka 2005b.
[306] In fact, the announcement of RAMSI's imminent arrival was enough to improve the law and order situation. By the time the intervention force arrived, key militants had decided to surrender, large amounts of stolen property had been returned, and 2,500 weapons had been surrendered (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 52–53).

RAMSI personnel were inserted into key SIG ministries, and public services resumed (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 54, 51; SIG and RAMSI 2017, 18, 27). Second, from 2004 to 2005, RAMSI turned its attention to the prosecution of those involved in the Tensions and "institutional strengthening" in the areas of finance and justice (SIG and RAMSI 2017, 27). Tax collection increased sharply (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 56), and the cleanout of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) gained pace.[307] Third, from 2006 to 2008, RAMSI expanded its capacity building efforts, for example by implementing training courses and pairing RAMSI personnel with local government staff (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 51–52). Fourth, the 2009 to 2013 'transition' period was dominated by withdrawal planning (SIG and RAMSI 2017, 28). During the final 'drawdown' phase between 2013 and 2017, all military personnel departed, the RSIPF took over all police duties, and RAMSI's capacity building work was handed over to bilateral development partners (SIG and RAMSI 2017, 28).

2001-2004: Solomon Islands as an Unfair Hybrid Regime

In this section, I analyse how the Solomon Islands' political system affected the wellbeing of the population between 2001 and 2004. In 2002, the country's GDP per capita reached the bottom of the slump precipitated by the Tensions, then began a gradual recovery (Figure 17). Despite the chaos during this period, infant and under-5 mortality rates both decreased very slightly (Figure 18 and Figure 19),[308] and the maternal mortality ratio improved by 15.27 per cent (Figure 20). Life expectancy increased by 2.85 per cent, from 63.8 years in 2001 to 65.6 years in 2004 (Figure 21).[309] Data for primary school completion and secondary school

[307] By the end of 2006, 25 per cent of the RSIPF had been sacked or arrested (Dinnen 2008a, 13).
[308] By 1.63 per cent and 2.03 per cent respectively.
[309] For comparison, during the same period life expectancy in Samoa increased by 1.48 per cent, while the corresponding figure in Vanuatu was 1.58 per cent.

enrolment rates was patchy (Figure 22 and Figure 23), but mean years of schooling increased from 4.6 to 4.8 (Figure 24). Interestingly, the Solomon Islands' HDI rose from 0.446 to 0.465 (Figure 25) despite the Tensions. No data was available for education spending during this period, but health expenditure fell from 6.49 per cent in 2001 to 5.35 per cent in 2004 (Figure 26). In combination, the small magnitude of the changes across the various indicators suggests a slight improvement in overall wellbeing.

Figure 17: Solomon Islands GDP Per Capita, 2001-2015




Figure 18: Infant Mortality in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015




Figure 19: Under-5 Mortality in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015




Figure 20: Maternal Mortality in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015




Figure 21: Life Expectancy in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015




Figure 22: Primary School Completion Rates in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015




Figure 23: Secondary School Enrolment Rates in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015




Figure 24: Mean Years of Schooling in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015




Figure 25: HDI in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015





Figure 26: Health and Education Expenditure in Solomon Islands, 2001-2015



The period from 2001 to 2004 encompasses the second year of Sogavare's first stint as prime minister and three years of Kemakeza's administration, which began following elections on 5 December 2001. From 2001 to the mid-point of 2003 there were *de jure* protections for political freedoms, but the persistence of widespread criminality and sporadic violence meant they were not exercised fully. Even after the arrival of RAMSI, the rebuilding of civil society – particularly in the Western sense – was a gradual process. RAMSI's presence introduced a new dynamic into the exercise of executive power in Solomon Islands, reconfiguring the political system through its sheer size. In the following section I analyse how these changes affected wellbeing outcomes in Solomon Islands.

Elections

The only national election held in Solomon Islands during the four-year period under consideration occurred in December 2001. Given that the campaign took place in the midst of the poorly implemented TPA disarmament process and ongoing violent criminality, it is

unsurprising that the restoration of law and order was the dominant issue.[310] Reflecting this, a survey of Honiara residents conducted by the Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC) during the campaign found that law and order, the economy, disarmament, and corruption were the top four concerns (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001q). Similarly, a spokesman for the Solomon Islands Development Trust (SIDT), one of the country's leading CSOs, said that his organisation wanted "a government that will restore law and order" (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001l). Security was sometimes linked to economic development: Ulufa'alu said that "without law and order the Solomon Islands would not do anything in terms of development" (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001n); and the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA) stated that the organisation wanted "a government that can move the peace process forward, and one that would rebuild the country's economy" (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001l). However, policy detail was conspicuously lacking.

Health and education issues were almost entirely absent from the election campaign. My research[311] returned only one explicit mention of health and education in relation to the election. This came the day before the vote as part of a litany of problems in a *Solomon Star*[312] editorial: "this country is broke financially. No more exports. No more essential services. No more schools and payment of salaries. Many leaders are corrupt. They tell lies and give sweet talks on the streets" (Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2001d). According to Patrick (a former senior civil servant with the MoH), candidates and parties rarely had health and education policies.[313] Alasia says that even when such policies existed, before the Tensions

[310] It is important to recognise that many of these security issues were confined to Guadalcanal and Malaita (Boyd 2001).
[311] Unfortunately, this was limited to interviews and the online archives maintained by the Pacific Island Report. Hard copies of newspaper articles from this period were destroyed by the Tensions or flooding during a cyclone, depending on who you ask.
[312] An independent daily English language newspaper.
[313] Interview J1, Honiara.

ended the general population knew little about them.[314] The election clearly did not serve as a forum for the public to compare candidate policies in these areas.

The related issue of poor economic performance was prominent during the campaign. In May 2001, the Central Bank's governor highlighted that the economy had contracted by 14 per cent in the previous year, with the key industries of agriculture, mining, and fisheries all suffering (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001c). In August, the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC) – a coalition featuring two former prime ministers, Ulufa'alu and Sir Francis Billy Hilly – launched a policy platform that put significant emphasis on economic recovery (Radio Australia 2001c), although reforming the police force was their first priority (Radio Australia 2001e). The pertinence of economic issues was reinforced several times during the campaign: in August public servants stopped working because they had not been paid for four weeks (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001f); power and water supplies in Honiara were often rationed (Sydney Morning Herald 2001); and in October, Solomon Airlines was "effectively shut down by Australian authorities" due to safety concerns (Sydney Morning Herald 2001). However, concerns regarding the country's economic development did not determine voting patterns for a variety of reasons detailed in the following paragraphs.

According to my typology the 2001 election was classed as 'Unfair', but at the time international observers took a different view.[315] Monitors from the PIF stated that the election process and polling day were "generally free and fair" (PIF Secretariat 2001), although they were only present in 15 of the 50 constituencies (Toma 2001). However, the supposed fairness of the election was severely undermined by numerous incidents of violence and intimidation. In June, Premier Alebua was shot three times (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001d), and in October, the *Sydney Morning Herald* (2001) reported that shots had been

[314] Interview with Sam Alasia, Honiara.
[315] Matthew Allen (2008, 47) argues that there are compelling reasons to doubt this.

"fired at politicians and officials". The home of the deputy prime minister was shot at and ransacked, armed men surrounded a rally in Honiara and frightened participants by firing shots into the air (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001k), and there were several instances of potential candidates being threatened with violence (Skehan 2001b; Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2001b, 2001e). Adding to uncertainties regarding voter safety, approximately 500 high-powered weapons remained unaccounted for (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001m), and the RSIPF threatened to boycott their election duties if their overdue salaries were not paid (Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2001b). Although the polling day itself was relatively uneventful, the violence and intimidation that occurred during the campaign severely undermined the potential for the election to contribute to improved wellbeing by operating as a mechanism for vertical accountability.

Nevertheless, 328 candidates contested the 50 available seats (Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2001b), and the voting turnout was 63 per cent (Alasia 2007, 172).[316] The electorate delivered a sound rebuke to the incumbent political elite for its perceived failure to resolve the Tensions and fix the economy (Brisbane Courier-Mail 2001). Only 40 per cent of sitting members kept their seats (Morgan and McLeod 2006, 417), and 62 per cent of the new parliament had never served in the legislature before (Fraenkel 2008, 164).[317] However, this did not translate into any meaningful change due to the vagaries of the ensuing race to form government, which began while episodes of political violence continued (Radio Australia 2001g; SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001p; Wood 2015b, 15).

The new MPs flew from their constituencies to Honiara, where camps began to form at the capital's various hotels. The SIAC chose Patteson Oti as its prime ministerial candidate, which caused Ulufa'alu to withdraw his Liberal Party from the coalition and run separately

[316] Only seven political parties ran candidates (Radio Australia 2001f).
[317] No women were elected, and the only female sitting MP lost her seat (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001o).

(SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001r). The choice of Oti was allegedly driven by rumours that a coup would occur if Ulufa'alu became prime minister again (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001r), despite evidence of public support for the former leader (PINA Nius Online 2001a; SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001r). The splintering of the SIAC prompted several vacillating MPs to join the other major grouping, which comprised Kemakeza's People's Alliance Party (PAP) and the "vaguely coherent" Association of Independent MPs (Fraenkel 2008, 157). The result was victory for Kemakeza, who "exploited his newfound status [as a knight] to emerge triumphant" (Fraenkel 2008, 153).[318] Kemakeza's victory came despite his unpopularity due to his prominence in previous corrupt governments and role in the embezzlement of TPA compensation funds, for which he had been sacked as deputy prime minister in August 2001 (SIBC, Paoa FM, and PINA Nius Online 2001).[319]

The shadow election was marred by allegations of intimidation and corruption. Local CSOs "appealed to the observer missions to prolong their stay to ensure there's no intimidation in the lead up to the prime ministerial vote" but were ignored (Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2001c). In the face of widespread rumours that MPs had been offered up to SI$50,000[320] to switch sides (Fraenkel 2008, 153), the Civil Society Network (CSN)[321] appealed to MPs not to sell their votes (PINA Nius Online 2001a). The shadow election was clearly not won and lost based on policies and ideology, making it difficult to see how it could have exerted a positive effect on wellbeing trends in Solomon Islands.

[318] Kemakeza received 29 votes, Oti 13, Gordon Darcy Lilo 5, and Ulufa'alu 3.
[319] The announcement of Kemakeza's victory was "greeted with dismay by the crowds outside parliament" (Fraenkel 2008, 153–54).
[320] Approximately US$8,935.
[321] A peak body for CSOs that emerged during the Tensions.

Summary

Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that the 2001 election provided effective vertical accountability. It did not serve this function in the wellbeing-related areas of health and education due to the lack of media coverage in these areas and the failure of parties or candidates to release relevant policies. More generally, public dissatisfaction with the political elite – demonstrated by the high incumbent turnover rate – did not translate into meaningful change. The vagaries of the shadow election resulted in a victory for the unpopular Kemakeza, ensuring a degree of continuity in the country's political leadership. Additionally, like their predecessors, the new MPs had been shaped by – and then had to operate within – a political system characterised by the tensions between formal Westminster-style institutions and the informal norms of the *wantok* system. Parliament remained hobbled by a weak party system and fierce competition between MPs for constituency funding. These issues meant that even though the public voted for change, it was not forthcoming. However, there appears to have been no causal link between these problems and the country's health and education outcomes, which improved modestly during the period from 2001 to 2004.

Political Freedoms

From 2001 to 2004, Solomon Islands was rated 'High' on the Political Freedoms dimension. CSOs played a key role in attempting to end the Tensions, and the media establishment was active even if the quality of reporting was questionable. My hypotheses suggest that effective freedoms of expression and organisation should help to improve wellbeing by facilitating information flows between citizens and the government, providing lobbying channels, and creating social capital. Although both the media and civil society were preoccupied by the Tensions during this period, activism and reporting on issues related to wellbeing – such as corruption and economic development – also occurred. These efforts are likely to have

exerted a positive impact on wellbeing outcomes in the country, even though they were not directly focused on health and education.

Legal protections

Solomon Islands has had codified protections for political freedoms since independence. The 1978 Constitution safeguards individual rights including freedoms of expression, assembly, association, and movement (SIG 1978, chap. II), and the right for workers to form unions and go on strike is recognised in law (Freedom House 2001, 487). Moreover, the government ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1982, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 2002. However, freedoms of expression and assembly/association can both be suspended "in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health" (SIG 1978, II, secs. 12, 2(a); II, 13, 2(a)). As detailed below, these caveats were used during the Tensions.

Freedom of organisation

The Sogavare and Kemakeza governments generally respected the right to freedom of organisation. There is no record of permits for public meetings and protests being denied by either administration (Freedom House 2001, 487), and there were many strikes[322] between 2001 and 2004 (Freedom House 2001, 487). In February 2003, the Kemakeza government threatened to "place a moratorium on 'trade union activity'" if the Solomon Islands National Union of Workers (SINUW) went on strike in protest against unpaid wages (Radio Australia 2003a), but SINUW and the Solomon Islands Public Employees Union were undeterred

[322] See for example SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001h; Radio Australia 2002c, 2002f; RNZ 2003; SIBC 2004b.

(RNZI 2003c; SIBC 2003e). Meanwhile, health workers went on strike on 13 March and 30 June (SIBC 2003f, 2003a), and close to 3,000 teachers went on strike in August to protest unpaid wages (RNZI 2003a).

There is little record of Solomon Islands CSOs engaging in advocacy specifically in the health and education sectors during the period under consideration.[323] My media analysis returned only a few examples: in 2002, the SIDT's Dr John Roughan criticised the government for failing to address the country's collapsing health service (Radio Australia 2002d); and later that year, SICA "called on the government to declare the current breakdown of medical services a national emergency" (Radio Australia 2002e). Understandably, civil society was instead focused on peace, reconciliation, and corruption. Throughout the Tensions, church organisations, women's groups, and other CSOs were key to preventing the conflict from escalating (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 31). After RAMSI's arrival, local CSOs continued to be instrumental in the peace process. For example, SICA was a key advocate for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the National Peace Council worked consistently on disarmament and community-level reconciliation (Kabutaulaka 2004, 396). The CSN and the SIDT were also notable for their vocal critiques of government corruption (Radio Australia 2001b; Freedom House 2003, 506, 2004, 514). Through these efforts, local CSOs are likely to have exerted a positive influence on the population's wellbeing – albeit through the mechanisms of peacebuilding and anticorruption rather than through direct impact on my focal areas.

[323] There were some instances of environmental activism (SIBC 2004c), and more general attempts to draw attention to the wide variety of problems facing the country (SICA *et al* 2001; Roughan 2001).

Freedom of expression

Between 2001 and 2004, the capacity of the Solomon Islands media establishment to effectively report on issues of national importance was hampered by three factors. The first of these was its lack of reach. In 2001, there were three private newspapers, a private FM radio station, a public radio station run by state-owned SIBC, and a single Australian television channel (Freedom House 2001, 487). By 2004, a second FM station and a second television channel (BBC International) had been added, but the print media had been reduced to one daily and one weekly newspaper (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2004a). The newspapers struggled to circulate outside Honiara due to poor transport infrastructure and high illiteracy rates (Freedom House 2003, 506). Therefore, the SIBC's radio service – recognised for providing impartial coverage (Freedom House 2001, 487, 2003, 506) – was the most important source of information, although its availability was sporadic on the outer islands (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2004a).

The second factor was a lack of training and funding. According to Fletcher (a former high-ranking RAMSI official) media outlets lacked the budget and training for proper investigative journalism.[324] For example, the SIBC did not receive its allocated government funding in 2001 and 2002, while the *Solomon Star* "was forced to cut its number of pages by almost half" due to a lack of advertising revenue (Committee to Protect Journalists 2003). These funding issues had a negative effect on the quality of reporting, with several of my interviewees suggesting that the newspapers emphasised gossip rather than in-depth analysis.[325]

The third factor was intimidation by private individuals and the government. In 2001, the Australian High Commissioner to Fiji noted that the Solomon Islands' press faced "harassment, political pressure, and in some cases attempts to use the courts to frustrate

[324] Interview O1, Skype.
[325] Interview B1, Honiara; Interview G1, Honiara.

media freedom" (Radio Australia 2001a). Although there was no systematic government effort to restrict freedom of expression (Freedom House 2004, 513), there were several examples of intimidation: in February 2001, Sogavare's press secretary threatened to blacklist the SIBC for broadcasting opposition critiques of the government (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001b); Kemakeza and other members of his government blamed the media for the country's economic problems and instability (Committee to Protect Journalists 2003); and in January 2002, a government minister and several armed supporters forced the *Solomon Star* to pay compensation for an 'insulting' story (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2004a). The situation improved somewhat with the arrival of RAMSI: according to the general manager of the SIBC, "With RAMSI in town, the media has been operating more freely than within the past four years" (Committee to Protect Journalists 2004). However, militants continued to occasionally threaten journalists (Freedom House 2003, 506).

Despite these issues, the media demonstrated some willingness to critique the political establishment. This was particularly evident regarding the issue of corruption. For example, a *Solomon Star* editorial printed during the 2001 prime ministerial race argued that the new leader "must not accept bribes from outsiders for their own ends. The public will not tolerate this…. We need a person of integrity. We need a person who is strict and does not bend rules." (SIBC, Solomon Star, and PINA Nius Online 2001a). There were also several investigative reports into "official misconduct and links between the government and ethnic militias" (Committee to Protect Journalists 2003), leading Freedom House (2004, 513) to comment that "media reports on corruption and abuses by politicians frequently make headlines".

During this period, the media also dedicated some attention to health and education issues. Regarding health, articles were primarily informational (see for example SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001j), but there was some in-depth coverage of the challenges facing the

country. In 2001, the *Solomon Star* (2001a) reported on service cuts at the National Referral Hospital in Honiara due to a lack of government funding. In 2002, there were stories on the shortage of medical supplies and exodus of health professionals, both of which were linked to the Tensions (PINA Nius Online 2002; SIBC 2002; Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2002a). Finally, in 2003, the SIBC published discussions about the government's response to the international outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, and called attention to vaccination supply problems (SIBC 2003d, 2003c).

Coverage of education was extensive. In 2001 and 2002, the focus was on the plight of government-funded university students in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Fiji. Various news outlets provided in-depth reports on how the financial crisis caused by the Tensions meant that the government was unable to pay fees and transport costs for its students at the University of PNG (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001a, 2001e, 2001g), and at USP in Suva (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2002e; Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2002c, 2002d, 2002e). In 2003, the biggest stories in the education sector revolved around the Solomon Islands College of Higher Education, which was forced to delay the beginning of its academic year until Taiwan stepped in to provide funding to the government (SIBC 2003b). In another interesting government critique, the SIBC reported that Bob Pollard (a businessman and board member of Transparency Solomon Islands) told a regional conference on education aid that the Tensions "compounded educational issues faced in Solomon Islands, leading to the closure of a number of schools on Guadalcanal" and that "the conflict also had a significant impact on the morale of teachers" (SIBC 2003g).

Summary

Between 2001 and 2004, Solomon Islands had adequate protections for key political freedoms. CSOs made some use of these to fight corruption and advocate for peace and

reconciliation. However, health and education challenges were largely sidelined by the emphasis on peacebuilding, and government engagement with civil society was limited (Roughan 2001).[326] More positively, the media engaged with wellbeing-related issues despite government criticism and intimidation. It is reasonable to suggest that these factors contributed indirectly to the slight improvements in HDI score, mean years of schooling, life expectancy, and the three mortality indicators between 2001 and 2004. There was little else during this period – prior to the arrival of RAMSI – that could be credited with these advances given the woeful economic situation and significant reduction in the country's aid inflows.

Effective Power

In this section, I analyse the operation of the SIG between 2001 and 2004. According to my typology, there were no restrictions on the effective power of the government in this period despite the arrival of RAMSI in 2003. However, the executive was extremely unstable during these years, which contributed to a lack of leadership and policy direction in the health and education sectors. Moreover, the legislature failed to hold the executive to account due to the twin problems of grasshopping and the poor quality of debate in parliament. The judiciary and civil service were barely functional during this period (see for example Warner 2004; Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 54), and therefore these sections have been omitted. Despite the absence of a 'Restricted' rating, it is worth considering the role of tutelary powers given that militias continued to operate, and Solomon Islands was heavily reliant on financial aid from Australia, New Zealand, and Taiwan. The picture that emerges

[326] The only counter to this is that shortly after the 2001 election, the Kemakeza government launched the Economic Think Tank Taskforce, which included representatives of the CSN (SIBC, Solomon Star, and PINA Nius Online 2001b).

is of a state lacking executive cohesiveness and accountability, leading to poor processes for policy development in the areas of health and education.

The executive

The 1978 Constitution defines the governor general as the head of state (SIG 1978, sec. 30), but in keeping with the Westminster tradition of constitutional monarchy, actual executive power lies with the prime minister and cabinet. During the period under consideration, Solomon Islands had two prime ministers: Sogavare and Kemakeza. Sogavare came to power through a parliamentary vote after Ulufa'alu was ousted by the MEF. He quickly announced a new cabinet, which included Kemakeza as deputy prime minister (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2000a). However, the prime minister's control over his cabinet was minimal. For example, in October 2000, Foreign Minister Danny Philip flew to Hong Kong to request aid funding from China despite Solomon Islands' strong relationship with Taiwan. According to Sogavare, cabinet only found out about the trip "after the Foreign Minister rang from Brisbane to say he was on his way to Beijing" (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2000b). Then, in August 2001, Kemakeza was sacked for allegedly paying himself SI$851,000[327] as part of the Taiwanese-funded TPA compensation scheme (SIBC, Paoa FM, and PINA Nius Online 2001). According to Sogavare, Kemakeza also "deliberately defied Cabinet decisions, and on a number of occasions misled the Cabinet" (SIBC, Paoa FM, and PINA Nius Online 2001). After this, Sogavare struggled to maintain his parliamentary majority until he lost power at the 2001 election (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 29).

Kemakeza became prime minister in December 2001, and to this day his government remains the only post-independence administration to survive in office for a full term

[327] Approximately US$152,000.

(Dinnen 2008a, 1).[328] Nevertheless, his large cabinet (comprising 40 per cent of sitting MPs) was fractious and barely functional. As mentioned previously, in January 2002, a minister and several militants attacked the *Solomon Star* headquarters (Field 2002; Committee to Protect Journalists 2003), but the minister was not sacked.[329] On 27 March 2002, the finance minister announced a 25 per cent currency devaluation without consulting cabinet or the prime minister (Radio Australia 2002b),[330] and was sacked five days later (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2002a).[331] In early August, a cabinet reshuffle by Kemakeza caused disgruntlement within the government because the prime minister failed to consult his coalition partners (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2002b). Later that month, the government's weakening authority was underscored when a minister was killed by militia (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2002c, 2002d). Eventually Kemakeza gained the support of parliament to request an international intervention (ABC News Online 2003), driven by a desire to save his life and political career (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 55). The arrival of RAMSI significantly altered the country's political dynamic: a parliamentary 'truce' took hold as MPs sought to "assist the country's recovery by keeping political infighting to a minimum" (Keith-Reid 2004). For Kemakeza, this had the benefit of sheltering the government from parliamentary scrutiny (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 300).

The instability that characterised government under Sogavare and Kemakeza was detrimental to the health and education sectors. This is exemplified by the fact that there were four different education ministers and three different health ministers between 2001 and 2004, contributing to a lack of leadership in both sectors. In particular, the Kemakeza government's

328 As discussed below, it is unlikely that this would have occurred without the stabilising influence of RAMSI (Braithwaite *et al* 2011, 55).
329 He was eventually arrested in November 2003 – after the arrival of RAMSI – on a separate charge (Keith-Reid 2003).
330 The finance minister claimed that he had consulted the prime minister and the Central Bank governor (Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2002b)
331 In the aftermath of the devaluation the opposition tabled a motion of no confidence in the government (Radio Australia 2002b), but this was later withdrawn following claims of intimidation by both the government and opposition (RNZ 2002).

"policy-making was often handicapped by the need to hold together fragile coalitions" (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 15). The inability of either government to address the country's economic crisis meant constant strikes by unpaid teachers, nurses, and doctors (see for example Radio Australia 2002c; RNZI 2003a; SIBC 2003f), the closure of schools and hospitals (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001i; Radio Australia 2002f; RNZI 2003b), and shortages of medical supplies (Solomon Star and PINA Nius Online 2001a; PINA Nius Online 2002).[332] More generally, the country experienced "the declining ability of the government to provide adequate, quality social services; protect its citizens; and pay its employees" (Kabutaulaka 2004).[333] Executive instability hampered the development of both general policy aimed at restoring security and arresting economic decline, and specific policies for addressing the crises in the health and education sectors.

Horizontal accountability: The legislature

The Solomon Islands parliament failed to operate as a forum for scrutinising and improving legislation between 2001 and 2004. Despite Sogavare's argument that "locking people into political parties is basically locking people up" (SIBC and PINA Nius Online 2001p), the absence of a strong party system was key. The frequency of cabinet reshuffles and the attendant grasshopping prevented the emergence of a cohesive opposition: few opposition MPs were willing to consistently critique the government for fear of missing out on a cabinet position in the next reallocation of ministerial portfolios. For example, after the 2001 elections Oti said that the SIAC would "provide a constructive opposition to the new government, to ensure it delivers what it promised" (PINA Nius Online 2001b). However,

[332] Surprisingly, these problems are not reflected in the WDI data, as discussed below.
[333] In fact, Kemakeza himself acknowledged that "all political and economic services in the country have ceased to operate effectively because of mismanagement over the last ten years" (SIBC 2001), but neglected to mention his own role in the governments perpetuating this mismanagement.

he defected to the government in February 2004 (Radio Australia 2004a), as did his replacement as opposition leader, John Garo, a few months later (SIBC 2004a).

The quality of debate in parliament was also undermined by disinterestedness and poor knowledge on behalf of many MPs. According to Tome (a senior education union official) of the 50 MPs only a few would ever speak, with the rest being 'basically asleep'.[334] This was particularly relevant to health and education. Tome says that even though several MPs were former teachers they would rarely speak up on education issues because 'they're in another life – they're not coming back to teaching so they don't care'.[335] Gabriel (a top-level political adviser) states that the quality of debate regarding health and education suffered because the country's political leaders were 'not well-educated'.[336] Michael (a current MP) concurs, saying that 'we don't have debate like in the UK'.[337] Although Ulutah (a former senior civil servant with the MoH) believes that there was a 'lot of support for health' in parliament, he agrees that more debate on health policy was needed.[338] The lack of scrutiny was exacerbated by limited sitting time: parliament rose in December 2002 and did not reconvene until July 2003. Due to these problems, the legislature did not help to improve wellbeing outcomes in Solomon Islands between 2001 and 2004 because it failed to contribute to horizontal accountability.

Tutelary powers

Between 2001 and 2004, V-Dem's indicator ratings did not to designate Solomon Islands as 'Restricted'. Nevertheless, during this period there were several non-elected actors placing significant pressure on the government: the militias; foreign powers Australia and NZ; and

[334] Interview E1, Honiara.
[335] Interview E1, Honiara.
[336] Interview I1, Honiara.
[337] Interview L1, Honiara.
[338] Interview K1, Honiara.

after mid-2003, RAMSI. The IFM and the MEF were influential from 2001 to mid-2003, but their focus was on continued enrichment through patronage networks and taking part in the post-TPA "compensation feeding frenzy" (Hameiri 2007, 429), rather than inserting their leaders into political positions. Although the militias were not tutelary powers in the usual sense, they clearly negatively impacted wellbeing outcomes prior to RAMSI's arrival. The violence and instability that crippled the state resulted in severe disruptions to key health and education services (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 293), while the government's need to appease the militias meant that significant amounts of aid funding were lost to embezzlement. Australia and NZ were also influential in Solomon Islands politics between 2001 and 2004, with both countries threatening to cut aid funding if corruption continued unabated (PINA Nius Online 2001b; Radio Australia 2002a). However, failure to follow through and the reliability of Taiwanese funding meant this threat created little change.[339]

After RAMSI arrived in 2003, it exerted significant influence over the effective power of the SIG. However, it also reconfigured the country's political regime more generally. For example, RAMSI made it safer for Solomon Islanders to exercise their political freedoms and helped the judicial system to start functioning again. Although these changes were not associated with a shift in Solomon Islands' HR subtype, RAMSI can be seen as an exogenous shock that affected the character of political hybridity in the country. One of the intervention's goals was to rebuild the country's formal political institutions, although as Dinnen (2008a, 28–29) argued at the time,

> the idealised institutions the interveners are seeking to (re-)build.… cannot be separated from what Leftwich… calls 'the raw processes and practices of politics' that gave rise to them in the first place and that have shaped their evolution ever since.

[339] Australia made no cuts, and although NZ halved its aid to Solomon Islands in 2002, the previous level was restored in 2003 (OECD 2019).

This draws attention to the way in which informal institutions such as the *wantok* system persist even as formal political structures are altered. RAMSI's primary effect on wellbeing outcomes between 2001 and 2004 was at this systemic level, via a huge influx of funding. Total aid to Solomon Islands increased from US$47.86 million in 2002 to US$170.74 million in 2004 thanks to RAMSI's presence (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] 2019).[340] Alongside the restoration of law and order, this funding helped to restart basic public services, thereby contributing to improvements in wellbeing indicators.

As well as reshaping the country's political system, RAMSI was as a key actor within the Effective Power dimension. The most serious ramifications emerged after 2005, when RAMSI's mandate expanded significantly from the maintenance of law and order, but the shadow of things to come can be observed in 2003 and 2004. Most importantly, it is unlikely that the Kemakeza government would have survived without the support of RAMSI: according to Dinnen (2008b, 70), "some local critics viewed RAMSI's cooperation with the Kemakeza government as vesting the latter with legitimacy that it patently lacked among most Solomon Islanders".[341] Similarly, Tarcisius Kabutaulaka (2005b, 300) argues that "the RAMSI intervention propped up [Kemakeza's] position and sheltered him from parliamentary and public challenges" despite his previous brushes with corruption. Finally, although the intervention plan was drafted by Australia in consultation with Kemakeza and the *Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003* was passed unanimously by the Solomon Islands parliament (Dinnen 2008b, 64–65), tensions between the intervention force and the host government quickly emerged. For example, in late 2003, Kemakeza authorised a pay raise for public servants that was blocked by RAMSI Special Coordinator Nick Warner,

[340] Amounts given in constant 2017 US$.
[341] This point is also made by Fraenkel (2008, 157) with reference to the Australian High Commission, which was at times indiscernible from RAMSI.

"much to the chagrin of Kemakeza and the public service unions" (Carroll and Hameiri 2007, 419–20).

Summary

The dynamics of effective power outlined in this section are highly unlikely to have exerted a positive influence on wellbeing trends in the Solomon Islands. In fact, it is reasonable to argue that the country could have improved on the small gains made in several health and education indicators between 2001 and 2004 if there had been more effective government leadership and horizontal accountability. The executive was riven by corruption scandals and competing agendas that prevented it from dealing with the country's deteriorating law and order situation, much less developing coherent health and education policies. Similarly, the legislature was ill-equipped to hold the executive to account: parliamentary debates were brief and low-quality; and opposition MPs jockeyed for the chance to gain a ministerial portfolio instead of robustly critiquing the government's agenda. Prior to the arrival of RAMSI, millions of dollars were diverted by corruption and the need to appease the militias, to the detriment of key health and education services.

Conclusions

The analysis presented in this section generates several findings regarding the ways in which formal institutions and informal processes combined to affect wellbeing outcomes. First, the 2001 election was not an effective mechanism for improving the wellbeing of Solomon Islanders, primarily because of the way the that formal institutional structures and the *wantok* system interacted to incentivise short-term, constituency-specific thinking by political leaders. Even though the electorate voted for change, the new parliament failed to act

differently to its predecessor. Moreover, the election did not facilitate accountability in terms of health and education due to a lack of media coverage of these issues and the failure of parties and candidates to release policy platforms. Second, although Solomon Islands had adequate *de jure* political freedoms between 2001 and 2004, media outlets were repeatedly threatened and attacked, while groups engaged in public protests were often subject to intimidation. More positively, several local CSOs were strong critics of government corruption and facilitated mediation between combatants during the Tensions. These efforts are likely to have a positive impact on the population's wellbeing in broad terms by ameliorating the effects of the Tensions.

Third, although effective power in Solomon Islands was not defined as 'Restricted' between 2001 and 2004, the government struggled to provide the population with basic services, let alone proactively develop and implement policies designed to restore stability and arrest the collapse of the country's economy. Moreover, the ability of the judiciary and the legislature to provide horizontal accountability was severely limited. For the former, this was due to violent intimidation and a lack of funding. For the latter, the key problems were the constant reconfigurations of the opposition and ruling coalition, a poor standard of debate, and inadequate parliamentary sitting time. This demonstrates that formal institutional structures have limited power to affect the behaviour of political actors without the accompanying informal institutions and norms, such as party loyalty.

These three findings are an important reminder that the different aspects of hybridity can pull wellbeing outcomes in different directions, as noted in Chapter Five. Although it is impossible to draw strong causal conclusions, it may be that the contrasting dynamics evident in the Effective Power and Political Freedoms dimensions largely cancelled each other out in terms of their impact on wellbeing outcomes, with other factors – such as the end of the

Tensions and RAMSI's arrival – responsible for the modest improvements in several indicators.

2005-2015: Solomon Islands as a Restricted Unfair Hybrid Regime

In this section, I analyse how political hybridity in Solomon Islands affected the wellbeing of the population between 2005 and 2015. Initially, the country experienced a gradual increase in GDP per capita before a dip in 2009, followed by rapid recovery then a levelling out period (Figure 17). Infant and under-5 mortality rates decreased by 7.9 per cent and 8.7 per cent respectively (Figure 18 and Figure 19), while the maternal mortality ratio improved by 30.3 per cent (Figure 20). Life expectancy improved from 66.1 years in 2005 to 70.5 years in 2015 (Figure 21).[342] Data for primary school completion and secondary school enrolment rates was patchy (Figure 22 and Figure 23), although mean years of schooling increased from 4.8 to 5.3 (Figure 24).[343] Reflecting these improvements across various areas of wellbeing, Solomon Islands' HDI rose from 0.470 to 0.515 (Figure 25).[344] Heath expenditure peaked in 2005 and then gradually decreased, while there was little data on education spending (Figure 26). These trends represent an acceleration in the improvement of the country's wellbeing outcomes compared to the previous period, with particularly noticeable changes in the health indicators. This suggests continued recovery from the Tensions but is at odds with the shift in regime type from Soft to Intermediate HR due to the Effective Power rating changing to 'Restricted'.

[342] This represents an increase of 6.56 per cent, compared to increases of 5.24 per cent in Samoa and 3.92 per cent in Vanuatu.
[343] It should again be noted that these were generally modelled estimates by the World Bank.
[344] This increase of 9.57 per cent was approximately double the improvements witnessed in Vanuatu (4.72 per cent) and Samoa (4.90 per cent) during the same period.

As with the previous section, I discuss the three dimensions of Elections, Political Freedoms, and Effective Power in order to understand how formal and informal institutions and norms combined to shape wellbeing outcomes. Between 2005 and 2015 there were three elections, all of which were classed as 'Unfair' due to sporadic violence and persistent vote buying. Political freedoms were generally respected, although they remained under-utilised by the local population. The executive was typically unstable, with a total of seven governments under six different prime ministers. Most importantly, the expansion of RAMSI's mandate raised questions about the impact of the intervention on Solomon Islands' sovereignty.

Elections

Solomon Islands had national elections in 2006, 2010, and 2014, all of which were classed as 'Unfair'. However, as previously noted, even unfair elections may improve citizen wellbeing (Gerring *et al* 2015, 8). As with the 2001 election, in 2006 and 2010 Solomon Islanders signalled their discontent by voting out the majority of incumbent MPs, but the character of parliamentary politics remained unchanged. I argue that the combination of the prime ministerial 'shadow election', pervasive vote buying, and the absence of policy platforms on health and education make it unlikely that these elections had a positive influence on wellbeing outcomes. The 2014 election may prove to be a landmark in Solomon Islands politics, as 78 per cent of sitting MPs were returned to power. Rather than signalling public satisfaction with the political establishment, this new development was probably the result of massive increases in the RCDFs available for incumbent MPs.

2006: Rini & the riots

The election on 5 April 2006 – the first following the deployment of RAMSI – was classed as 'Unfair' by my typology due to poor ratings on the indicators for vote buying and electoral violence. The pervasiveness of vote buying was recognised at the time by the COG (2006, 25) and the local media (Fraenkel 2008, 166), and has been catalogued since by several researchers (see for example Alasia 2007, 171). The violence noted by V-Dem's coders did not occur during the election itself – which was "an improvement on the 2001 election because of the absence of guns and intimidation" (Alasia 2007, 172) – but after the 18 April announcement that Snyder Rini had been elected prime minister, which sparked riots in Honiara (further discussed below). There were various other problems with the electoral process: the continued fluidity of political alliances, with some candidates being claimed by more than one party (COG 2006, 18); extremely low turnout in some electorates (Fraenkel 2008, 150); and a bloated and inaccurate electoral roll (Fraenkel 2008, 150).

Health and education issues were once again sidelined during the election campaign. This is reflected by a lack of media reporting: I was only able to find two articles that delved into the relevance of these two areas to Solomon Islands politics. On 19 February, Solomon Islands academic Transform Aqorau (2006) wrote that

> the effects of the rapid population growth is [sic] quite visible in the areas of public health and education…. There is generally poor sanitation, and drainage with the general environment (dusty and dirty) not conducive to healthy living…. In education, the annual increase in the number of school children is obvious. There is overcrowding in schools which generally are under resourced.

In a commentary piece published on 29 March, Johnson Honimae (2006) quoted a report from the SIDT on education in the Solomon Islands, in which Dr John Roughan argued that "the government had failed in providing quality education", and that "in spite of the millions earmarked… teachers' entitlements and their end of the year transport back home were often

paid late". More generally, Honimae (2006) argued that "one thing is clear: Candidates must be prepared to explain how their getting into parliament would improve the lives of their voters", although this claim appears hopeful given the lack of critical engagement with key issues during the campaign. When health and education were mentioned by candidates it was usually as part of a generic list of problems (see for example Solomon Star 2006b).

In fact, the election campaign was largely devoid of substantive issues. Despite a field of 13 political parties, local commentators lamented that there was "very little difference in their priorities" (Honimae 2006) and that "Solomon Islands has not reached a stage where elections are dominated by discussions about issues rather than the personality of those contesting the elections" (Aqorau 2006).[345] Parties claimed to have manifestoes but did not make them easily available (COG 2006, 25): for example, Kemakeza's PAP charged SI$70[346] for a copy of its document (Fraenkel 2008, 167). In a scathing editorial, the *Solomon Star* (2006b) noted that there was

> very little publicity of real issues that voters expect candidates to voice during the current election campaigns. Issues like the country's state of the economy, changes in the Constitutions, foreign policies, the control of immigrant expatriates, security, education, finances and the lot.

The only issue that received consistent attention was corruption. This was largely thanks to local CSO network 'Winds of Change', which used a combination of educational initiatives and media-based campaigning to push for a clean election (COG 2006, 12).[347] Local media outlets ran many stories on alleged corruption by the previous administration, which

[345] One anomaly was Sogavare's Solomon Islands Social Credit Party, which campaigned on an oddly specific platform of hostility to banks and advocacy for "monetary reforms aimed at relieving national indebtedness" (Fraenkel 2008, 169).
[346] Approximately US$9.60, a significant sum in a country still primarily reliant on subsistence agriculture.
[347] There was also an Australian-funded 'Clean Election Campaign'.

reinforced "the already strong popular perception of Kemakeza's government as corrupt" (Fraenkel 2008, 167).

The 2006 election results are difficult to interpret. None of the 13 parties won more than four seats and 46 per cent of sitting MPs lost their seats – including nine of the 20 cabinet ministers. In each seat the result was determined by a complex equation, in which the key variables included the candidates' perceived personal integrity, their national profile, kinship ties, the strength of their patronage networks, and the availability of resources to distribute through these networks.[348] According to Fraenkel (2008, 162), most seats were "decided by local verdicts about the personal integrity (or otherwise) of candidates". In other cases, such as that of Kemakeza and Rini, the canny disbursement of cash and gifts through strong patronage networks was enough to make voters ignore allegations of corruption and incompetence (Fraenkel 2008, 166). Those who lost their seats tended to be "rank-and-file" MPs with limited resources and brand recognition (Fraenkel 2008, 167). For this reason, Fletcher argues that despite rhetoric around moving forward post-RAMSI, 'the good guys lost, the rascals came back in'.[349] More importantly, there is no evidence that health and education issues shaped people's votes. This being the case, it is hard to see how the 2006 election could be considered to have had a positive impact on wellbeing outcomes.

As always, the national election was followed by the race to form government and select a prime minister. The protracted, bribery-riddled negotiations between three camps – headed by Rini, Job Dudley Tausinga, and Sogavare – have been well-chronicled elsewhere (see Alasia 2007; Fraenkel 2008; Atkinson 2009). On 18 April, when the governor-general announced that Rini had been elected prime minister, the crowd outside parliament

[348] Interview O1, Skype. It is also important to note regional variations in turnover: "On Choiseul and in Western Province, all MPs bar one were returned to office, and the one casualty lost by only two votes after a recount. On Isabel and in Honiara, all the incumbents lost their seats. On Malaita, Guadalcanal and Makira, the picture was much more varied" (Fraenkel 2008, 165).
[349] Interview O1, Skype.

immediately "began shouting such words as 'corruption', '*waku*[350] government', 'same old government' and 'we want Tausinga'" (Alasia 2007, 175). Although there are conflicting narratives of how the next few hours unfolded, it is incontrovertible that the situation quickly spiralled beyond the control of the RAMSI Participating Police Force. The result was two days of rioting and looting that "reduced much of Honiara's Chinatown district to ashes" (Dinnen 2008b, 71) and saw several RAMSI vehicles torched (Alasia 2007, 176). On 19 April, roughly 1,000 people marched to government house to deliver a petition to remove Rini (Alasia 2007, 176), who refused to step aside and was sworn in as prime minister. However, unbeknownst to Rini, Sogavare had abandoned his position as a cabinet minister and taken over leadership of the main opposition group from Tausinga (Alasia 2007, 178). The result was that when parliament sat on 26 April, Rini was forced to resign in the face of a no confidence motion. The result was a second prime ministerial race, from which Sogavare emerged victorious.

While the 2006 riots were the product of several factors – including fears regarding the influence of Taiwan and Asian logging companies, and discontent with RAMSI – they were also a clear expression of dissatisfaction with 'business as usual' in Solomon Islands politics. The public anger at Rini's election at the head of a government comprising many former ministers showed how unpopular the previous administration had been. That the election results did not force the government to move on from the Kemakeza era signifies a breakdown in the mechanism of vertical accountability.

[350] Pijin slang for the Chinese/Asian community.

2010: It's quiet… too quiet

The 2010 election took place in a tense atmosphere thanks to fears that there would be a repeat of the 2006 riots. These concerns proved to be unfounded, although the election was still classed as 'Unfair' due to a poor rating on the indicator for vote buying. Health and education were again marginal issues during the campaign. Kabutaulaka (2010) bemoaned the use of empty rhetoric by candidates – something that was clearly in evidence with regard to health and education. Although some parties made reference to the need to improve services in these areas (Solomon Star 2010a; Solomon Times 2010), no policy detail was forthcoming. Despite the country's ongoing problems in providing basic health and education services, candidates and parties again failed to engage in substantive debate about how to address these issues.[351]

The 2010 election was consistent with previous elections in that it produced a fragmented parliament. The poll was contested by 508 candidates[352] and 19 parties, and voter turnout was approximately 85 per cent (Wood 2014b, 2).[353] Independent candidates won 28 seats, but parties performed better than they had done in 2006: the Solomon Islands Democratic Party (SIDP) won 13 seats; the new parties fronted by Sogavare and Lilo each won three seats; and six other parties won single seats (Steeves 2011, 348). Similar to previous years, the incumbent turnover rate was 50 per cent (Steeves 2011, 349). As in 2006, voting patterns were determined by a combination of kinship ties, the perceived integrity of candidates, *bigman* reputation,[354] and – for incumbents – their "record in bringing development to one's village or area" (Steeves 2011, 348–49). In the aftermath of the election, Sogavare argued that "the election results have shown people are not yet ready to focus attention on party

[351] More generally, policy debates were "largely absent beyond general pronouncements by parties favouring national unity and reconciliation, rural development and economic advance" (Steeves 2011, 348).
[352] Although 22 women contested seats, none were elected (Steeves 2011, 348).
[353] As opposed to 53 per cent when calculated using the inflated and inaccurate electoral roll.
[354] However, it is notable that this time several *bigmen* lost their seats, including former prime ministers Kemakeza and Billy Hilly, and former opposition leader and minister Oti (Steeves 2011, 349).

policies" (Steeves 2011, 351). Similarly, respected elder statesman Sir Peter Kenilorea argued that "voters have paid little allegiance to party policies and platforms and instead vote on personalities and community leaders" (Steeves 2011, 351). These comments are somewhat disingenuous considering the lack of policy substance for voters to engage with, particularly in the areas of health and education.

The struggle to form government was again a tortuous affair. After the customary period of negotiation – marred again by allegations of bribery – two prime ministerial candidates emerged: Steve Abana, whose coalition was dominated by the SIDP; and Danny Philip, whose coalition comprised seven parties. The process was notable for an excellent example of what Jeffrey Steeves (2011, 350) calls 'unbounded politics', with incoming MP Jackson Fiulaua declaring "that he would remain independent through the bargaining period in order to have the freedom to join the government side when the final result became apparent". This was a stark reminder of the irrelevancy of ideology and policy platforms in Solomons politics: MPs were primarily concerned with being on the winning side in order to secure benefits for themselves and their constituencies, with a view to re-election. The shadow election, which was won by Philip, again demonstrated that voters had little control over the eventual makeup of the government.

2014: Rinse & repeat

The 2014 election, held on 19 November, was the first since the withdrawal of RAMSI's military component. The COG (2014, 23) found that the election was "inclusive and competitive", but according to my typology the election was 'Unfair' due to pervasive vote buying. This assessment is validated by reports of candidates visiting people's homes and "offering huge sums of money and benefits in exchange for their support" (Inifiri 2014a). 'Turnout buying', in which candidates paid for voters to travel home to vote, was also rife

(Wood 2014a). Linked to this was the use of RCDFs for campaigning purposes by incumbent MPs, which the COG (2014, 24) acknowledged "may have created an uneven playing field". On the positive side, the electoral roll was updated through a shift to biometric registration,[355] which resulted in a 35 per cent reduction in the size of the roll.[356] Another key development was the pre-election introduction of the *Political Parties Integrity Act 2014* (PPIA), which created a "legal framework for the formation, registration and administration of political parties" (COG 2014, 3). Its provisions include mandating the registration of political parties, instituting public funding for parties, and requiring that at least 10 per cent of a party's candidates be women. While the legislation has helped to formalise some aspects of party politics, it does not contain any mechanisms for preventing grasshopping or the swift renegotiation of coalitions (COG 2014, 9; Wood 2015a, 155).

As in the past, health and education were touchstones for candidates, but were only mentioned in the context of a list of things that they would provide for their constituents (see for example Hobbis 2016, 130). Michael, who successfully ran for office in 2014, stated that candidates did talk about improving schools and clinics,[357] but as in previous elections, no policy detail was forthcoming. Party manifestos – when they were even produced – were once again superficial and lacking significant points of difference (see for example SIBC 2014b). It is unsurprising then that unsuccessful candidate David Tuhanuku said that "if you look at the manifestos of the different political parties they are quite similar" (Hawkins 2014d), while the COG (2014, 13) observed that "policy development seemed to still be at a nascent stage".

[355] The electoral commission reported roughly 5,000 instances of multiple registration, many of which were never investigated (COG 2014, 8).
[356] Due to the removal of duplicates and dead voters.
[357] Interview L1, Honiara.

Instead, the lead-up to the 2014 poll was dominated by debates about the misuse of public funds for electoral campaigning. The first aspect of this was the RCDFs. Reporter Dorothy Wickham told RNZ that

> there's a lot of talk of reforming the [RCDFs]…. A lot of the new [candidates] are saying, this needs change, it's because of that, that we are having problems, in terms of corruption [sic] distribution of wealth, development infrastructure into the provinces. (Hawkins 2014b)

Similarly, during the campaign, Kabutaulaka wrote that Solomon Islanders elect people

> not because they're going to be good legislators, not because they have brilliant ideas about the kinds of policies that we have…. [W]e choose people mostly because we think they are going to distribute the RCDF to us. (Blades 2014)

The second aspect was the controversial SI$400,000[358] payout provided to all incumbent MPs at the dissolution of parliament (COG 2014, 5). This was a 300 per cent increase from the payment received by MPs before the 2010 election (RNZI 2014a). Officially, the payout is to help MPs reintegrate into the community, but according to the head of Transparency Solomon Islands (TSI), it is used for electoral campaigning (Hawkins 2014a). In an attempt to address these issues, TSI created an election integrity pledge for candidates, but two weeks out from the election, only 60 had signed (SIBC 2014c).

The election itself featured 447 candidates, 204 of which were registered as members of a party (COG 2014, 3). This was an increase in party membership of 23 per cent compared to 2010, demonstrating the influence of the PPIA (Wood 2015a, 155). However, the best performing party, the Democratic Alliance Party, still only won seven seats, followed by the United Democratic Party (UDP) with five, the PAP with three, and three other parties with one each. Independent candidates won 32 seats. In a break from the past, 78 per cent of sitting MPs retained their seats (Wood 2015a, 156). This phenomenon is best explained by

[358] Roughly US$54,460.

the large increases to the RCDFs between 2010 and 2014, which combined with the 300 per cent payout increase to give incumbent MPs a massive financial advantage. As Terence Wood (2015a, 156–57) argues, although the RCDF model

> is not new and has coexisted with high MP turnover rates in the past… in the 2010 to 2014 term the amounts involved grew so rapidly that it is likely the money significantly aided incumbents.[359]

This is consistent with TSI Chief Executive Daniel Fenua's view that "when you have got that [SI$]400,000 in your hands, you can manipulate, you can buy voters, you can get more voters…. they have more chances than a poor person, a poor candidate" (Hawkins 2014a), while journalist Tony Kando (2014a) highlights that "the promise of cash and food by candidates is enough to sway voters… that is what these people need – assistance today". Given that the amount of money available through RCDFs has continued to increase since 2014, it is likely that this trend of incumbent dominance will characterise future elections.[360] The key factor in determining voting patterns in 2014 was clientelism facilitated by the increased funding available to incumbent MPs, rather than health and education issues. This underlines that elections in the Solomon Islands are unlikely to exert a positive impact on wellbeing trends.

The race to form government was again characterised by rapid-fire negotiation and bribery,[361] despite the PPIA. In fact, a caveat in the legislation which permits independent candidates to join parties after an election increased the intricacy of the shadow election and rendered the final result even more unpredictable.[362] The victorious Democratic Coalition for Change initially comprised three parties that had collectively only won seven seats, but during the

[359] See also Barbara 2019, 287.
[360] This was demonstrated at the 2019 election, where 73 per cent of incumbents were re-elected (Wood 2019).
[361] According to Alfred Legua, president of the Kadere Party, "promises of future positions in government and tens of thousands of dollars in cash are being offered to individual MPs by various parties" (RNZI 2014b). Allegations of corruption were also noted by the COG (2014, 24).
[362] See for example Hawkins 2014c; Inifiri 2014b; Kando 2014b; Osifelo 2014a, 2014b; Solomon Star 2014.

shadow election several MPs who had contested the election as independents signed up to these parties. Most notable among these was Sogavare, who joined the UDP, became its leader, and was elected prime minister for the third time.

Summary

Elections did not serve as a mechanism for improving Solomon Islands' wellbeing outcomes between 2005 and 2015. Health and education did not shape voting patterns. This was constantly reiterated by the majority of my interviewees: Alasia notes that education was not really important;[363] George (a doctor and prominent unionist) argues that health policy did not affect voter behaviour, because if basic medication was available people were satisfied;[364] David (a senior MoH official) observes that elections were not about competing ideologies on health;[365] and Kai (a prominent philanthropist) states that health and education didn't determine elections.[366] The interviewees who saw health and education as significant focused on the availability of facilities,[367] which fits with the observation that it was common for candidates to promise to build more clinics and schools for their constituents (Hobbis 2016, 130). This echoes my finding from Fiji: candidates must mention health and education, but because they all make very similar promises these issues do not play into people's calculation of who to vote for.

A key reason for the lack of focus on health and education as election issues was the weakness of the party system. Because parties were ephemeral and not defined by ideology,[368] no party had a clear policy platform.[369] Very few parties released manifestos at any of the elections,

[363] Interview with Sam Alasia, Honiara.
[364] Interview A1, Honiara.
[365] Interview F1, Honiara.
[366] Interview H1, Honiara.
[367] For example: Interview K1, Honiara.
[368] Interview G1, Honiara.
[369] Interview J1, Honiara.

and when they did, these documents were not widely available and contained very little detail. This was exacerbated by the fact that there were no debates between candidates, no national television coverage of election campaigns, and limited opportunities for reporters to ask candidates about their policies.[370] The weakness of party affiliations also made the process of forming government unpredictable, which inhibited any sense that voters had control over the eventual makeup of the government.

Also important was the availability of the RCDFs, which ensured that campaigning was individualised and focused on clientelism rather than policy.[371] MPs increasingly became seen as the embodiment of the state by their constituents due to their use of their RCDFs – which are de-linked from the national government[372] – to provide basic services.[373] The identification of the state with an individual is problematic because it implies that if the individual loses power, constituents will no longer receive public services. This militates against incumbent MPs being voted out. Thus, the focus on RCDF distribution shifts the focus away from national policy. Kabutaulaka's historical perspective is instructive:

> I had the privilege of reading the debates in the Solomon Islands parliament since 1978, looking at the old Hansard reports over time, and I've seen the nature of discussions change over time and particularly so in the last ten years when the RCDF became very, very important. There's a lot of preoccupation of parliament and discussions in parliament shifted away from issues of policy and issues of law to a great deal of discussion about distribution of the RCDF. (Quoted in Blades 2014)

The availability of RCDFs also inhibited policymaking because everything done in a constituency had to be signed off by the MP.[374] In this way, RCDFs have both altered the

[370] Interview G1, Honiara.
[371] Interview G1, Honiara.
[372] Interview O1, Skype.
[373] This has worked in a mutually reinforcing process with the *bigman* element of the *wantok* system and the historic inability of the state to reach the majority of the country's rural population (Barbara 2019, 288).
[374] Interview G1, Honiara.

form of the social contract between the population and the state (Barbara 2019, 287), and undermined the national government's role in creating social policy.

Between 2005 and 2015, the interaction between the weak party system, the distorting effect of the RCDFs, and voting patterns based on factors other than health and education – notably kinship relations and vote buying – meant that elections in Solomon Islands did not contribute to improvements in the country's health and education indicators. This reflects a high degree of continuity from the 2001-04 period, although the expansion of the RCDFs has increased their importance. Unfortunately, there is little cause for optimism: as Wood (2015a, 157) argued in the aftermath of the 2014 election, "there is no evidence that the central pathologies of Solomon Islands politics have diminished". Unless changes are enacted that encourage political stability and voting based on policies rather than promises of short-term goods, vertical accountability will remain poor.

Political Freedoms

From 2005 to 2015, Solomon Islands was rated 'High' on the Political Freedoms dimension. In the absence of the threatening environment created by the Tensions, Western-style civil society activism increased. In the following section, I argue that both freedom of expression and freedom of organisation are likely to have had a positive impact on wellbeing trends in the country during this period. However, it also becomes evident that the effectiveness of political freedoms in this regard was undermined by the limited capacity of CSOs, the quality of media reporting, government antagonism, and informal norms. As there were no significant changes to *de jure* protections for political freedoms in Solomon Islands during the period under consideration, I have omitted this heading.

Freedom of organisation

Between 2005 and 2015, the government generally respected freedom of organisation.[375] Unions were prominent during this period, and there were numerous strikes that achieved their goals. For example, in August 2011, a strike by public sector workers ended after one day when the union "accepted the government's offer of a 4 per cent increase in the cost of living allowance" (Freedom House 2012). The SINUW was forced to disband in 2013 following a long court case over an illegal strike, but a replacement union was established in 2014 (Freedom House 2016a). Freedom House (2015b) notes that CSOs were able to "operate without interference". Examples of this include organisations pushing aid donors to "demand greater accountability from the government" in 2014 (Freedom House 2015b), while prominent actors such as SIDT, the Development Services Exchange,[376] and the Joint Civil Society Groups & Concerned Citizens were vocal on issues such as corruption and transparency (see for example E. Palmer 2014). The government also proved to be susceptible to public pressure. For example, in April 2013, public backlash forced the Lilo government to abandon plans to provide former prime ministers and their spouses with a wide range of benefits including an extremely generous pension (Freedom House 2014).

However, there were several issues related to freedom of organisation. First, local civil society in the Western sense was still nascent,[377] causing several interviewees to comment that although there were *de jure* protections for political freedoms, these were not fully utilised.[378] This meant that the sector tended to be dominated by the more experienced and better funded INGOs.[379] Second, the quality of the working relationship between civil society and the government varied. Nelson suggests that Sogavare instituted some consultation with civil

[375] See Freedom House's *Freedom in the World* reports for 2005 to 2016.
[376] A national umbrella organisation established to strengthen the country's civil society sector.
[377] Interview C1, Honiara.
[378] Interview F1, Honiara; Interview O1, Skype.
[379] Interview G1, Honiara.

society, but that this was motivated by a desire to 'pacify' CSOs rather than genuine interest in their input.[380] This was reinforced by Crystal (a senior civil society figure), who says that although Sogavare recruited Dr John Roughan (former head of SIDT) as an adviser in 2005, 'the same old things kept happening'.[381] Ema observes that there was no public advertisement of new policies, so CSOs would not know about changes unless they were specifically consulted.[382] Moreover, although there were public hearings of some new policy proposals, these were dominated by MPs and ministry staff;[383] and when parliament invited written submissions, it would often only provide 12 hours' notice via newspaper advertisements, making it almost impossible for regional actors to participate.[384] For this reason Crystal suggests that there was a need for more CSO dialogue.[385] Fletcher agrees, stating that 'the government didn't go out and solicit opinions', although he also states that they did not get much sense of CSOs lobbying the government.[386]

Finally, informal norms are likely to have played a role in the under-utilisation of political freedoms. According to Ema, traditional respect for authority meant people would not challenge powerful figures in public.[387] David asks 'are we passive?', suggesting that maybe it is part of *bigman* culture that 'we just follow the leader',[388] while Crystal says that close networks and a small elite make it hard to raise contentious issues sensitively.[389] However, my interviewees sensed that this may have begun to change in the past few years due to generational change, media reporting on elite corruption, and the rise of social media as a platform for debate.[390] These factors interact with other trends – such as high unemployment,

[380] Interview B1, Honiara.
[381] Interview M1, Honiara.
[382] Interview G1, Honiara.
[383] Interview G1, Honiara.
[384] Interview G1, Honiara.
[385] Interview M1, Honiara.
[386] Interview O1, Skype. Although he acknowledged that this 'may have been going on informally'.
[387] Interview G1, Honiara.
[388] Interview F1, Honiara.
[389] Interview M1, Honiara.
[390] For example: Interview M1, Honiara.

increasing urbanisation, and improving education levels (see UNDP, United Nations [UN] Women, and SIG 2018) – to encourage greater activism, particularly by young people (Ride 2019). This demonstrates how informal norms can shift over time.

There was some civil society activism in the health and education sectors. Strikes by teachers and health workers were common (Solomon Star 2006c; Freedom House 2007; SIG 2007; Freedom House 2008), and their efforts were sometimes rewarded. For example, the Lilo government was ordered to provide striking teachers with back pay in 2013 (Freedom House 2014). However, Ulutah notes that the presence of five unions in the health sector during this period caused coordination difficulties.[391] There was some government interaction with other types of CSO in the fields of health and education. Ulutah recalls that the MoH had quarterly meetings with civil society stakeholders such as Oxfam, and that consultation occurred through the annual national health conference.[392] In another instance, David recalls that with the support of the government, a CSO conducted interviews in a hospital to investigate patient complaints.[393] However, Ulutah also states that CSOs sometimes didn't work with the MoH, and that relationships were dependent on the personalities of the leaders involved.[394] According to Alasia, the relationship between CSOs and the MoE was 'ok'.[395] However, it is clear that consultation in these areas was patchy.

Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression was also usually respected by the government. However, between 2005 and 2015, Freedom House (2015b) consistently noted that "politicians and elites

[391] Interview K1, Honiara.
[392] Interview K1, Honiara.
[393] Interview F1, Honiara.
[394] Interview K1, Honiara.
[395] Interview with Sam Alasia, Honiara.

sometimes use legal and extralegal means to intimidate journalists".[396] Sogavare clashed with the media over his appointment of Julian Moti as attorney general:[397] according to Samson (a current MP), Sogavare tried to control the media;[398] and Freedom House (2008) reported that the prime minister "threatened to file criminal defamation charges against anyone who criticized the attorney general". In 2010, Freedom House (2010) noted that "government harassment of the media has eased since Manasseh Sogavare's administration", although in May 2009, Prime Minister Sikua sued the *Island Sun Daily* for defamation after they published a story accusing him of being drunk and acting inappropriately while attending the UN General Assembly in late 2008. Alongside this, the Leadership Code Commission, a government accountability agency, was accused of "intimidation and violating media freedom by requesting that two journalists reveal their sources in relation to articles alleging wrongdoing by members of Parliament" (Freedom House 2010). Lilo also sometimes attacked the press for "irresponsible" reporting (see for example Marau 2012b). These incidents did not discourage the Solomon Islands media from extensively covering contentious issues – notably government corruption.

A key factor towards the end of the period under consideration was the rise of social media. Although internet penetration was estimated at only 10 per cent by 2015 (Freedom House 2016a), social media played an important role at the 2014 election. As Wood (2015a, 155) notes, "the years preceding the 2014 election… saw the rise of social media-focused civil society groups", with Forum Solomon Islands International (FSII) being the key player. FSII began as a Facebook group in which political discussions took place, but rapidly evolved into an advocacy organisation. It was vocal after the 2014 poll, calling on defeated candidates to "control their supporters" and prevent a repeat of the 2006 riots (Hawkins 2014c). FSII's

[396] See also Freedom House 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014.
[397] The saga of Moti's appointment is discussed below in the section on RAMSI.
[398] Interview D1, Honiara.

growing influence was exhibited in January 2015 when it presented a list of ten priority issues to the government (Solomon Star 2015). In response, the prime minister's office encouraged "FSII members to continue promoting proactive national advocacy towards change and good leadership" and said that it "welcomed the FSII's initiative to directly convey the concerns of their members to the government" (Solomon Star 2015). The attention paid to the demands of an actor derived from a social media group is remarkable.

Health and education received significant media coverage during the period, which built pressure on the government to address issues in these areas. For example, a *Solomon Star* editorial after Philip's election in 2010 implored the new prime minister to "prioritize health and education…. The future of this country lies in these two sectors" (Solomon Star 2010b). Samson comments that the media did well covering health and education, and that critical reporting would force the relevant ministry to 'follow up quickly through caucus and cabinet'.[399] Tome says that the Solomon Islands National Teachers Association would go to the media when their negotiations with the government broke down, and that the government 'hated' this because they did not want to be seen as unresponsive to the demands of teachers.[400] David notes that there was 'a lot of writing about health in the media', although much of the information wasn't coming from the MoH.[401] It is therefore puzzling that these issues faded into the background during election campaigns.

There were issues regarding the quality of reporting and the media's relationship with the government. Ema notes that there was not much actual debate of health and education policy: journalists relied heavily on press releases, which were often published verbatim.[402] Moreover, Nelson argues that newspapers were very Honiara-centric[403] and spent a lot of

[399] Interview D1, Honiara.
[400] Interview E1, Honiara.
[401] Interview F1, Honiara.
[402] Interview G1, Honiara.
[403] Relatedly, Patrick notes that newspaper readership was small. Interview J1, Honiara.

time covering gossip instead of doing in-depth analysis.[404] Leotina (a high-ranking INGO official) suggests that there was little accountability regarding the information published,[405] while David describes the media establishment as 'still growing up'.[406] In the area of health, Ulutah and Patrick both criticise the media for failing to crosscheck information with the MoH, which they say resulted in factual errors.[407] Nelson also notes that relationships between government officials and the media were 'not great'.[408] Nevertheless, Ulutah says that they learned it was important to engage with the press.[409] Overall, Fletcher summarises the situation by describing the media as reasonably critical and independent but 'not as much as you'd like' due to limited financial resources and a lack of training for journalists.[410]

Summary

The overarching finding for this section is that although political freedoms were adequately protected, they were somewhat under-used. As David comments, 'we have political freedoms but don't utilise them'.[411] This is partly due to the issues noted regarding funding and training, but also due to the influence of informal norms of respect for authority and limiting discussion of contentious issues to the private sphere. This is an example of how the impact of formal institutions on wellbeing outcomes can be dampened by informal processes. Overall, the impression is that freedoms of organisation and expression only contributed in a small way to the improvements in Solomon Islands' health and education indicators that occurred between 2005 and 2015.

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404 Interview B1, Honiara. Fletcher agrees, noting a side tradition of muck-raking journalism, which 'results in a lot of rumour and makes it hard to ascertain facts'. Interview O1, Skype.
405 Interview C1, Honiara.
406 Interview F1, Honiara.
407 Interview J1, Honiara; Interview K1, Honiara.
408 Interview B1, Honiara.
409 Interview K1, Honiara.
410 Interview O1, Skype.
411 Interview F1, Honiara.

Effective Power

During the period under consideration, Effective Power in Solomon Islands was classified as 'Restricted' due to RAMSI's expanded mandate. There is substantial evidence that high-ranking RAMSI staff sought to exert significant influence over the SIG, and the potential effects of this on wellbeing outcomes are discussed under the 'Tutelary Power' heading. In this section, I also detail how executive instability continued to undermine the ability of the SIG to shape national policy in the areas of health and education, the persistently dysfunctional nature of the legislature, the minimal role of the judiciary with regard to wellbeing, and the effects that a lack of executive leadership had on the MoH and the MoE.

The executive

Between 2005 and 2015, there were six different prime ministers (Table 37). Kemakeza, who had been prime minister since 2001, finished his term at the end of 2005 and acted in a caretaker capacity until national elections in April 2006. Snyder Rini only survived in the role for a few days before being succeeded by Sogavare, who lasted over a year before succumbing to a no confidence vote in 2007. His replacement was Derek Sikua, who presided over a period of relative stability until the August 2010 election. Danny Philip emerged victorious from the subsequent prime ministerial election but only lasted one year before a spate of MP defections forced him to resign. He was succeeded in 2011 by Gordon Darcy Lilo, who stayed in the role until he lost his seat at the 2014 election. After a month of negotiations, Sogavare became prime minister for the third time.

Table 37: Solomon Islands Prime Ministers, 2001-2017

Commenced	Ended	Leader	Mode of departure
17/12/2001	05/04/2006	Sir Allan Kemakeza	Election
20/04/2006	04/05/2006	Snyder Rini	Resignation
26/04/2006	20/12/2007	Manasseh Sogavare	No confidence motion
20/12/2007	24/08/2010	Derek Sikua	Election
24/08/2010	16/11/2011	Danny Philip	Resignation
16/11/2011	09/12/2014	Gordon Darcy Lilo	Election
09/12/2014	15/11/2017	Manasseh Sogavare	No confidence motion

There were too many different administrations in the period from 2005 to 2015 to provide a detailed examination of each one. The key themes that cut across all of these were government instability and the limited attention paid to policymaking in the key areas of health and education. As Fletcher observes, because the incumbent prime minister had to focus on maintaining a majority in parliament, little attention was paid to policy discussion.[412] Nevertheless, my interviewees typically identified the executive as the most powerful branch of the state.[413]

As with the previous regime period, cabinet reconfigurations and grasshopping were common between 2005 and 2015. In Kemakeza's case, ministerial reshuffles and the enticement of opposition leaders to join the government "assisted the extraordinary survival of Kemakeza's government" (Fraenkel 2008, 154–55). Sogavare was less skilful at this art: his allegedly dictatorial, non-consultative leadership style prompted a mass defection of ministers and backbenchers, leading to his defeat in a no confidence motion (Marau 2007).[414] Sikua's cabinet comprised a volatile mix of five parties, and was riven by conflict over the prime minister's attempts to pass a precursor to the PPIA in late 2009 and early 2010:

[412] Interview O1, Skype.
[413] For example: Interview D1, Honiara; Interview with Sam Alasia, Honiara; Interview F1, Honiara.
[414] Sogavare's 2006-2007 cabinet had taken an early blow when two of his appointments were withdrawn following huge domestic and international criticism: at the time, both MPs were under investigation for crimes relating to the 2006 riots (Alasia 2007, 180–81).

> when the Bill failed to pass, a furious PM sacked five of his senior ministers…. Sikua was upset with the non-appearance of his ministers, 'Member for Guadalcanal is not here because he has been bought off, member for Gela is not here because he has been bought off'. (Steeves 2011, 347–48)

Sikua's control of his cabinet was further undermined by attempts to enact other unpopular initiatives, such as cutting the number of ministerial positions from 21 to 11 and reducing MP salaries (Freedom House 2009). Philip sought to manage the problem of instability by increasing the number of cabinet positions to 23 – nearly half the parliament (Steeves 2011, 355). However, he lost ministers to criminal charges, and was himself forced to resign on 10 November 2011 to face corruption charges (Freedom House 2012). Philip's successor, Lilo, sought to mitigate the constant threat of no confidence motions through mooted and actual cabinet reshuffles (Marau 2011b; Osifelo 2012b; Freedom House 2013), but this only contributed to fractures within the government (Marau 2012a; Marau and Osifelo 2012; Osifelo 2012a).

As was the case in Fiji under Rabuka and Chaudhry, cabinet instability had little direct effect on health and education policy. This is because policy was generally developed and implemented by line ministries, with limited involvement from the relevant minister (further discussed below). However, it is likely that the constant cabinet reshuffles had an indirect negative impact on health and education policy. From 2005 to 2015 six individuals held the role of health minister, with the position changing hands seven times;[415] and nine men took on the role of education minister, with the position changing hands eight times.[416] Even allowing for the fact that ministers generally had little involvement in policy, this constant churn contributed to the bureaucratic inertia and lack of policy direction noted below.

[415] These were Benjamin Una, Johnson Koli (twice), Clay Forau Soalaoi (twice), Martin Maga, Charles Sigoto, and Tautai Agikimu'a Kaitu'u.
[416] These were Snyder Rini, Edward Huni'ehu (for 14 days), Derek Sikua (twice), Francis Zama (for less than one month), Job Dudley Tausinga, Matthew Wale, Dickson Ha'amori, and John Moffat Fugui.

Horizontal accountability: The legislature

Between 2005 and 2015, several factors prevented the legislature from acting as an effective house of review. First, grasshopping created significant political instability. For example, by 2013, 17 MPs had changed the political affiliation under which they contested the 2010 election (Corbett and Wood 2013, 322). According to Fraenkel (2008, 157), "opposition leaders switching sides explained their action as driven by a desire for positions of responsibility, or pressure from constituents, but self-interest and hunger for power played their part". Despite the intentions of the PPIA, its failure to increase party discipline meant that "politicians showed no more interest in national governance than before" (Wood 2019). Second, there were several examples of the government attempting to restrict the time allocated to parliamentary debate. In 2011, Lilo was "accused of gagging Parliament proceedings" (Marau 2011a), and in 2012, Sikua (leader of the opposition at the time) said that Lilo was "holding the country at ransom by not allowing the members of Parliament to exercise their constitutional right to scrutinize the Prime Minister and his dealings" (Marau 2012c). This reflects Nelson's concern that despite the *de jure* separation of powers, the executive was able to dominate proceedings in practice.[417]

Third, when parliament did convene, debates were often poor quality. According to Nelson, it was mainly the budget that was discussed in parliament, rather than specific policies:[418] these remained siloed within ministries, creating a disconnect between policy and legislation.[419] Patrick believes that there was 'no good debate' because the quality of politicians was mixed, with many unable to understand their jobs.[420] Moreover, Gabriel suggests that debate was often tokenistic because the government had already decided its

[417] Interview B1, Honiara.
[418] Interview B1, Honiara.
[419] Interview B1, Honiara.
[420] Interview J1, Honiara.

course of action, and because only a few MPs actively contributed.[421] This problem was quantified in a survey conducted by TSI, which found that from 1 October 2010 to 28 May 2014, only seven MPs contributed to more than 50 per cent of the 37 bills put to parliament (SIBC 2014a). The informal norm of respect for authority may have played an underlying role, as diversity of opinion is sometimes regarded as disrespectful in Solomon Islands.[422]

These issues affected parliament's treatment of health and education issues. David says that legislative debates on health topics focused on narrow technical issues such as drug shortages and medical training rather than ideological approaches to health care,[423] while Patrick argues that debates about health policy were shallow and primarily focus on infrastructure.[424] Regarding education, Tome notes that although there were several MPs who had been teachers, it was rare to hear them contribute to education policy debates.[425] According to Alasia, MPs tended to just agree with MoE proposals, and that the 'opposition didn't modify things'.[426] Additionally, interviewees note that parliamentary committees did not provide scrutiny and oversight.[427] Patrick describes the health services committee as 'asleep' despite being chaired by the leader of the opposition,[428] and Ulutah recalls that the committee rarely met during his time with the MoH and he was never invited.[429] Thus, although the legislature existed as a formal horizontal accountability institution, problems derived from informal processes undermined its potential to exert a positive impact on wellbeing trends in the country.

[421] Interview I1, Honiara. On the positive side, he also notes that MPs were better educated than in the past. See also Interview D1, Honiara.
[422] Interview I1, Honiara.
[423] Interview F1, Honiara.
[424] Interview J1, Honiara.
[425] Interview E1, Honiara.
[426] Interview with Sam Alasia, Honiara.
[427] Interview B1, Honiara.
[428] Interview J1, Honiara.
[429] Interview K1, Honiara.

Horizontal accountability: The judiciary

The ability of the judiciary to provide horizontal accountability between 2005 and 2015 was questionable. During this period, Freedom House consistently noted that minor corruption and threats against legal personnel "weakened the independence and rigor of the judiciary" (see for example Freedom House 2006, 647, 2012). Moreover, lack of resources caused trial delays and meant that state-funded legal counsel was often unavailable (Freedom House 2012). Interviewees had mixed opinions regarding the effectiveness of the judiciary as a check on executive power: Fletcher argues that it had a good record of independence despite its lack of funding;[430] but several interviewees suggested that occasionally, judges' contracts were not renewed for political reasons.[431] The High Court successfully convicted and gave gaol sentences to Kemakeza (for demanding money with menace, intimidation, and larceny) and several MPs (Lenga 2009, 378–79),[432] but its limitations were demonstrated by the case of former militia leader Jimmy 'Rasta' Lusibaea. Shortly after Lusibaea became an MP at the 2010 election, he was sentenced to two years and nine months gaol for violent crimes committed during the Tensions, and thus lost his seat in parliament. However, he was released on parole after just 41 days, and a week later the police minister used his discretionary powers to reduce the sentence to one month. This allowed Lusibaea to resume his seat in parliament at a time when the Philip government was struggling to maintain its majority. The High Court later ruled that the police minister had acted in error and Lusibaea was again barred from parliament, a decision finally accepted by the government (RNZI 2011). There was very little judicial activism in the areas of health and education.[433]

[430] Interview O1, Skype.
[431] Interview N1, Honiara; Interview O1, Skype; Interview with Sam Alasia, Honiara.
[432] These included Charles Dausabea, Peter Shannel, Mark Kemakeza, and David Pacha.
[433] Interview J1, Honiara.

Tutelary powers

Taiwan, various Asian logging companies,[434] and domestic actors such as the church were integral to Solomon Islands politics between 2005 and 2015, but they were all overshadowed by the behemoth of RAMSI. Therefore, this section focuses on RAMSI as a tutelary power. Given the potentially controversial nature of this designation – recalling that the mission was deployed at the request of the SIG and had a positive mandate of restoring stability and statebuilding – I first investigate whether RAMSI acted to restrict the effective power of the SIG. Second, I argue that the perception of RAMSI's dominance had a negative effect on democratic accountability in Solomon Islands. I then turn to the impact of RAMSI in the areas of health and education. It is worth noting that although RAMSI was not technically an Australian operation, the fact that most of its high-level personnel and funding were provided by Canberra led to a great deal of confusion about whether specific activities were being undertaken by RAMSI or Australia. This fostered the perception that RAMSI was serving Australia's interests rather than those of Solomon Islands.

Why did V-Dem's coding designate RAMSI as a tutelary power after 2005? The best explanation for this is that following the initial phase of the intervention, during which the priority was the restoration of law and order, the implications of RAMSI's statebuilding mandate became clearer. Although Dinnen (2008b, 66) argues that "from the outset the security work was integrated into a longer-term statebuilding exercise", prior to 2005, public and institutional attention was heavily focused on RAMSI's efforts to arrest, disarm, and charge militants (see for example Kabutaulaka 2005b, 297–98; Barbara 2008, 135). It was only once stability had been restored and the SIG began to reassert itself that the intricacies of the power balance between RAMSI and its host state became clearer. This was illustrated in February 2005, when Kemakeza sacked Finance Minister Francis Zama, Communication

[434] See for example Fraenkel 2008.

Minister Patteson Oti, and Police Minister Michael Maina, apparently due to their criticism of RAMSI (Iroga 2005b).[435] Zama later alleged that his sacking had been instigated by Australia, although this was denied by Kemakeza (Iroga 2005a). Nevertheless, Kabutaulaka (2005b, 299) bluntly stated at the time that "to a large extent, the Solomon Islands state is influenced, if not directly controlled, from Canberra", with the head of RAMSI's influence being "pervasive" in some areas.

After the turning point of 2005, there are several examples of RAMSI potentially transgressing the sovereignty of the SIG. In the aftermath of the 2006 riots, a leaked email from a RAMSI official revealed that the Australian High Commissioner Patrick Cole had been seeking to prevent Rini from becoming prime minister, and was concerned that the anticipated sacking of Finance Minister Peter Boyers would leave Australia "'with no effective voice in cabinet to guide economic and fiscal policy'" (leaked email quoted in Fraenkel 2008, 171). This suggests a willingness to circumvent democratic processes in the service of RAMSI's goals. After Sogavare became prime minister in 2006, relations between the SIG and RAMSI reached an "all time low" (Solomon Star 2007a). A key factor in this was Sogavare's decision to make Australian citizen Julian Moti the attorney general in September 2006. Shortly after rumours of this appointment emerged in June 2006, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) announced that they wanted to question Moti for alleged child sex offences committed in Vanuatu in 1997, for which he had already been cleared (Sydney Morning Herald 2006). Sogavare refused to extradite Moti, who was arrested in PNG in September 2006, but fled back to Honiara while on bail. RAMSI forces then arrested Moti for illegal entry to the country and raided Sogavare's offices in search of evidence that the prime minister had been involved (Freedom House 2007). At the same time, media stories broke alleging that Cole had been trying to prevent an inquiry into the 2006 riots and

[435] Zama and Maina were eventually arrested and charged with corruption (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 17).

"talking too much to the Solomons opposition" (RNZI 2006), causing Sogavare to expel the high commissioner. The illegal entry charges against Moti were dismissed in December 2006 (SIBC 2006), and he was sworn in as attorney general in July 2007. In response to the pursuit of Moti by RAMSI and the AFP, the Sogavare government declared the Australian head of the RSIPF to be an 'undesirable' immigrant, rejected visas for the families of RAMSI staff, "demanded a timeframe for RAMSI's withdrawal", and threatened to repeal the law allowing RAMSI to operate (Freedom House 2008).

In September 2007, Sogavare commissioned a review of RAMSI based on legal advice from Moti. This met heavy criticism from RAMSI's chief of mission (Solomon Star 2007b), to which Sogavare responded that RAMSI could not "usurp the constitutional role and prerogative of our Parliament and Parliamentarians" (Solomon Star 2007b). Moti was extradited to Australia after the Sogavare government fell in December 2007, but the case against him was dismissed by Judge Debra Mullins, who called the AFP's conduct an "affront to the public conscience" (Butler 2009; see also Freedom House 2008). An independent review of RAMSI published in 2014 argues that the episode revealed "the contradiction between RAMSI's declared emphasis on creating a new legal and moral order and what it was prepared to resort to in the face of a government perceived as hostile to the mission" (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 18).

The potential for conflict between RAMSI and the SIG was reduced following Sogavare's deposition at the end of 2007. Sikua was more conciliatory, facilitating Moti's deportation and pledging to rebuild diplomatic relations with RAMSI and Australia (Solomon Times 2007; Solomon Star 2008). The Philip government released a plan for RAMSI's phased exit shortly after the 2010 election but unlike during the Sogavare era, this was supported by RAMSI itself (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 24). There were occasional tensions though: in February 2011, Philip's office released a statement alleging that Australia and

RAMSI were behind efforts by the opposition to bring down the government (Solomon Times 2011). This was strongly denied by the RAMSI special coordinator (RAMSI 2011), and the SIG later admitted that there was no evidence for these assertions (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 20).

The most obvious instances of RAMSI restricting the actions of the SIG occurred under Sogavare, when the interests of the two parties diverged. However, throughout the period under consideration RAMSI also impinged on Solomon Islands' sovereignty at a more subtle level due to the size of the intervention. Gabriel describes RAMSI as a 'big monster' that had its 'tentacles' everywhere,[436] and according to Ema this combined with the poor state of bureaucracy in Solomon Islands to make restrictions on the government inevitable.[437] These comments are aligned with Dinnen's (2008b, 68) view that RAMSI's vastly superior resources sometimes led to "asymmetry in its relations with a much less well-endowed [SIG]", which contributed to "an impression that RAMSI constitutes a 'shadow government,' operating alongside, but distinct from, the legitimate government of Solomon Islands". Similarly, Fletcher describes a form of 'shared sovereignty' at the informal level due to RAMSI placing foreign staff in key positions within ministries.[438] At the elite level, Fletcher says that the head of RAMSI could have 'very influential conversations' with the prime minister.[439] The total effect of these resource and power asymmetries can be seen as a restricting influence on the SIG.

However, the interesting tension here is that the intervention force's goals were ostensibly positive. RAMSI was tasked with improving the country's political institutions, reducing corruption, and facilitating socioeconomic development. Despite being a tutelary power, it

[436] Interview I1, Honiara.
[437] Interview G1, Honiara.
[438] Interview O1, Skype.
[439] Interview O1, Skype.

also provided a form of horizontal accountability. This contrasts with the role of the military in Fiji between 2000 and 2006: Bainimarama was primarily concerned with protecting the defence budget and his own commission, although he also used the protection of multiracialism to justify his political interventions. Yet despite RAMSI's positive mandate, it was still a foreign intervention force – with a non-democratic internal structure – that was seeking to impose Western-style 'good governance' that was at odds with some aspects of the *wantok* system and Solomon Islands' formerly de-centralised power structures (Kabutaulaka 2005b, 308; Hameiri 2007, 411). This encapsulates one of the key debates regarding the ethics of 'humanitarian' statebuilding (Barbara 2008, 126), and indicates that despite RAMSI's intentions, it may have some long-term negative effects.

A useful example of this is the way that RAMSI's presence fostered a mentality of dependency. Kabutaulaka (2005b, 284) warned of the potential for this in 2005, highlighting the emergence of the phrase '*Weitim olketa RAMSI bae kam stretem*' ('Wait for RAMSI to come and fix it'). According to David, part of the reason that RAMSI had so much influence was that the population allowed this to occur: it 'goes back to culture of passivity'.[440] Ema states that RAMSI perpetuated the 'hand out culture' and 'white master syndrome' that had already been in evidence due to the British colonial era.[441] Moreover, the excess of foreign consultants and RAMSI officials placed in key positions led to dependency rather than capacity building.[442] Reinforcing this, the 2014 review found that the "presence of RAMSI has entailed a decade during which many Solomon Islanders felt unable to address or resolve their own problems" (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 25). Similarly, Braithwaite *et al* (2011, 135) note that dependence on RAMSI "has held back the rebuilding of confidence in Solomon Islands institutions". While there was pushback at the political elite level – notably

[440] Interview F1, Honiara.
[441] Interview G1, Honiara.
[442] Interview F1, Honiara.

by Sogavare – there remains a sense among my interviewees that Solomon Islands' leaders had failed to 'step up'.[443] This apathy is detrimental to the development of democratic accountability, which requires vigorous involvement by citizens in both civil society and political processes such as elections.

In terms of health and education, RAMSI had little direct impact at the policy level. This is because the MoH and the MoE were the province of bilateral support programmes, although "few Solomon Islanders see the difference between RAMSI and bilaterally-funded initiatives" (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 89), due to Australia's dominance in both regards. However, as noted above, RAMSI's presence allowed these bilateral programmes to expand: shortly after the intervention, NZ increased its aid to Solomon Islands by 75 per cent (Radio Australia 2003b); and the planned development expenditure in the 2004 budget was entirely funded by aid donors (Kabutaulaka 2004, 400). Notably, Tome recalls that the arrival of RAMSI meant that Australia and New Zealand were willing to provide more funding to the education sector.[444] This influx of aid funding was largely responsible for the rapid improvement of Solomon Islands' wellbeing outcomes during the period under consideration, but is exogenous to the impacts that the changing character of regime hybridity had on these outcomes.

The civil service

Given that health and education policy in Solomon Islands were generally created at the ministry level, it is important to note the role of the civil service in relation to wellbeing. Patrick observes that health policy was mainly driven by the MoH because the government

[443] Interview M1, Honiara.
[444] Interview E1, Honiara.

failed to 'walk the talk'.[445] He notes that although some MPs wanted to influence the area of health, he did not 'know their priorities'.[446] Further to this, he suggests that during his time with the MoH, the minister lacked the relevant expertise.[447] Similarly, during Ulutah's time the under-secretaries were all doctors whereas the minister was 'not a health person', so he listened to their advice.[448] According to Tome, the same was true of the education sector, but this was not necessarily a good thing.[449] He recalls that although the MoE ran policy consultations in rural areas they would often handpick participants, resulting in a lack of linkage between policy and reality.[450] In both sectors, corruption was also an issue: for example, in 2010, six MoH employees were found to have embezzled SI$10 million[451] (Betteridge 2013), causing AusAID to suspend its funding.[452] The overall impression is that in both sectors, the civil service suffered from a lack of financial and human resources (see for example Freedom House 2010), poor political leadership, and corruption (see for example Freedom House 2012). According to Nelson, these problems caused bureaucratic inertia.[453]

Summary

Several key points emerged in this section. First, the improvements in Solomon Islands' health and education outcomes between 2005 and 2015 could have been significantly greater if there had been a stable executive able to take a lead on developing health and education policy. Second, the legislature did not act as an effective forum for the scrutiny of policy in

[445] Interview J1, Honiara.
[446] Interview J1, Honiara.
[447] Interview J1, Honiara.
[448] Interview K1, Honiara.
[449] Interview E1, Honiara.
[450] Interview E1, Honiara.
[451] Approximately US$1.25 million.
[452] Interview K1, Honiara.
[453] Interview B1, Honiara.

these areas due to the phenomenon of grasshopping[454] and the poor quality of debate. These problems meant that line ministries were required to take a lead on policy development, but they were in turn hampered by corruption, inadequate funding and human resources, and constant turnover at the ministerial level.

Third, improvements in Solomon Islands' wellbeing outcomes between 2005 and 2015 were largely due to the presence of RAMSI. The intervention force's stabilisation role facilitated a massive injection of aid funding that restored basic health and education services, resulting in reduced infant, under-5, and maternal mortality rates, improvements in life expectancy, and increased mean years of schooling. Despite limited data, there is also evidence to suggest that secondary school enrolment rates were much higher in the second half of this period. However, RAMSI also acted as a tutelary power, which may have long-term negative impacts on wellbeing trends. It occasionally restricted the sovereignty of the SIG, and was accused of failing to address the root causes of the Tensions (Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 2014, 92): as Leotina notes, it may have missed an opportunity to 'create real change'.[455] Moreover, the scale of the intervention fostered a mentality of dependency among sections of the population, which may inhibit the country's future development. The presence of these underlying currents reinforces the importance of mixed methods research, in which case studies can illuminate the reality behind the categorisations automatically imposed by typologies and statistical analysis.

[454] Which also made it "hard for voters to attribute credit for national-level economic performance" (Wood 2015a, 156).
[455] Interview C1, Honiara.

Conclusions

The analysis presented in this section suggests that many of the problems identified for the period from 2001 to 2004 persisted between 2005 and 2015. Elections remained ineffective as a means for improving wellbeing outcomes due to the prevalence of vote buying, which meant that voting patterns were based on factors other than policy. This problem was exacerbated by huge increases in the funding available to incumbent MPs. Moreover, the weakness of the party system remained an important factor despite the introduction of the PPIA. The effects of formal electoral institutions on wellbeing outcomes were heavily modified by the strong informal norms and institutions of clientelism and the corrupt shadow election. Fortunately, these informal aspects were captured by my typology, resulting in Solomon Islands' classification as 'Unfair' on the Elections dimension.

As with the first regime period, *de jure* protections for political freedoms were not fully utilised. In the aftermath of the Tensions, civil society actors became increasingly vocal, and the media establishment did engage in some investigative journalism in the areas of health and education. However, the contribution of political freedoms to improvements in wellbeing trends was undermined by informal norms that privileged consensus and respect over public debate, and a lack of financial and human resources in the media sector.

Overall, the most important factor was the presence of RAMSI. The intervention continued to facilitate a huge influx of aid and technical expertise that reshaped the provision of health and education services and catalysed economic growth, thereby making a significant contribution to the improvement of wellbeing outcomes in the country. However, during the period under consideration, RAMSI also acted as a tutelary power, even though the complex reality of the tensions between its positive goals and its status as an intervention force somewhat belie the negative associations of this label. Leaving this aside, at times RAMSI did restrict the effective power of the SIG, and inadvertently fostered a mindset of

dependency among sections of society. Despite these issues, there remains a great deal of trepidation regarding the post-RAMSI future, with some interviewees even predicting a return to the Tensions.[456]

Political Hybridity & Wellbeing in Solomon Islands

The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that despite the exogenous shock of RAMSI's arrival, there was a surprising degree of continuity in the ways that formal and informal institutions and practices affected wellbeing outcomes. This is aligned with the finding from the Fiji case study that it is important to pay attention to subtle changes in both the formal and informal aspects of political hybridity. In Solomon Islands, the primary contrast between the two regime periods was the role of RAMSI, which has been discussed extensively above. Therefore, in this concluding section I focus on examples of gradual change from the Elections and Political Freedoms dimensions, and offer some thoughts on what these can tell us about the study of HRs.

In the Elections dimension, the best example of this was the gradual reshaping of electoral politics thanks to increases in the funds available to sitting MPs for campaigning. While vote buying has been a consistent feature of Solomon Islands politics since independence, the expanding financial power of incumbents has slowly made it more difficult for new candidates to mount successful challenges. This process accelerated between the 2010 and 2014 elections, resulting in a historically low MP turnover rate – a trend that continued at the 2019 election and is likely to characterise Solomon Islands politics in the future. The reinforcement of the clientelistic model militates against health and education becoming important electoral issues, because it encourages candidates and voters to focus on short

[456] Interview F1, Honiara; Interview J1, Honiara.

term gains. It is notable that the presence of RAMSI exerted little observable effect on the conduct of elections.

In the realm of Political Freedoms, change was more subtle. The arrival of RAMSI made it safer for civil society actors and the media to operate – although it must be noted that several organisations had operated undeterred during the Tensions. However, a lack of significant improvement in the availability of human and financial resources, coupled with the persistence of informal norms related to respect for authority and the avoidance of public disagreement, meant *de jure* freedoms of organisation and expression remained under-utilised. There was some sense that cultural norms had begun to change, but this is inevitably a slow process. The interaction of these factors within the Political Freedoms dimension is an excellent example of how the potential impact of formal institutions on wellbeing outcomes can be dampened by informal practices that pull outcomes in a different direction.

Finally, politics and policy in Solomon Islands remained highly personalistic and informal during the period under consideration. This sort of political system is difficult to accurately characterise using techniques that categorise many countries simultaneously, as my typology does. In countries such as Solomon Islands, formal indicators of regime type can only tell us a limited amount about how politics works on the ground, and thus what processes interact to shape wellbeing outcomes. Yet categorising such countries can still be a useful exercise: in this case, the dimensions of my typology provided a convenient starting point and helped to structure my analysis. Additionally, several key features of the system were captured by my typology: the 'Unfair' nature of elections; the absence of serious constraints on political freedoms; and the changing nature of RAMSI's mandate. However, the significance of informal institutions and processes in the Solomon Islands case reinforces how important it is to use qualitative methods to look beyond the generalisations inherent in quantitative analysis.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Gone are the days when political scientists could divide the world into democracies and dictatorships, then try to ascertain which regime type was best by comparing their respective per capita incomes or GDP growth rates. Both the explanatory and dependent variables have been refined, nuanced, problematised, and then refined again. Yet a great deal of the literature seems to yearn for a bygone (and probably fictional) age of analytical simplicity: HRs are treated as defective democracies or disguised authoritarian systems, or worse, dismissed as unstable waypoints between the two canonical regime types; and the complex concepts of human development and wellbeing are proxied by single outcome variables such as infant mortality. Research of this type fails to make use of the swathes of new, fine-grained data that have become increasingly accessible, and ignores the importance of HRs as a unique third type of political system. A smaller section of the literature has embraced complexity, examining the links between the constituent elements of political regimes and previously neglected outcome variables such as the distribution of access to electricity (Brown and Mobarak 2009). These studies add rich detail to the literature, but rarely engage with political hybridity as an overarching concept. Given the prevalence of HRs in the developing world, there is a pressing need for more research that treats hybridity as a complex, multidimensional phenomenon and examines its effects on people's daily lives.

Therefore, in this dissertation I put forward a new way of categorising HRs, and addressed the under-theorised topic of wellbeing in hybrid systems. This resulted in a range of observations regarding the nature of political hybridity, its impact on wellbeing from a quantitative and qualitative perspective, and the relevance of mixed methods analysis to the study of HRs. This concluding chapter brings together my findings in each of these areas and highlights their relevance to political scientists and development practitioners, before setting out some future avenues of research.

Conceptualisation

HR scholars need to move beyond the current preoccupation with competing typologies if they wish to produce more practically useful and nuanced comparative studies. Even though it is increasingly accepted that HRs are a unique third type of political system, there is little consensus on the most analytically useful way of differentiating and defining HR subtypes. To address this gap in the literature, I set out a new theory-based HR typology that fully populated the hybrid 'property space' with a set of 11 "mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive" subtypes (D. Collier, Laporte, and Seawright 2008, 157). These subtypes can be used for statistical analysis, structuring comparative research, or framing in-depth case study analysis. I recognise that creating a new typology could add further complexity to an already crowded field. However, as detailed in Chapter Three, existing categorisation systems are not fit for purpose because they do not adequately incorporate the concepts of tutelary power, reserved domains, and horizontal accountability. By neglecting these elements of the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy, existing typologies fail to capture important ways in which political systems may be non-democratic. Therefore, I maintain that my typology is a necessary and important contribution to the HR literature – and the broader literatures on democracy and autocracy – because it captures contemporary theoretical perspectives on the divide between democracies and non-democracies, and challenges the dominance of the dichotomous and graded approaches to regime classification.

In an effort to make my typology durable, I have clearly set out my methods of operationalisation, coding, and aggregation. This means that future HR researchers can work within the theoretical framework I have defined – based around the three dimensions of Elections, Political Freedoms, and Effective Power – but modify formulae at the component level. For example, others might wish to take an additive rather than a multiplicative approach, or change the thresholds applied to V-Dem indicators. While this would inevitably

alter the categorisation of some country-years, it leaves the overall typology intact and thus retains a shared vocabulary and general theoretical approach. In this way, I hope that my typology will provide a platform for redressing the "failure to produce cumulative knowledge" in the HR literature (Cassani 2014, 543), and will thereby help to bring some analytical clarity to the grey zone between autocracy and democracy.

As demonstrated in this thesis, my typology facilitates quantitative and qualitative research into the effects of political hybridity on outcomes that are of interest to development scholars and practitioners. The specific HR and partially-ordered subtypes can be used as variables in statistical work, while the individual components can be used for more fine-grained analysis. Using the qualitative lens, the typology provides insight into the political changes that countries have undergone and directs attention to the institutions which require further analysis. For example, in the case of Fiji the 'Restricted Unfair' classification for the period from 1993 to 1999 led me to focus my research on the actors restricting the executive in wellbeing-related policy areas, and on how the electoral playing field was being manipulated and by whom. Then, following the shift to a Restricted Illiberal Unfair classification in 2000, I attempted to discern which political freedoms had been reduced, how this altered the interactions between dimensions, and the consequent effects on wellbeing outcomes. Therefore, my typology can both enable quantitative research into the effects of hybridity on wellbeing – a topic that the HR and development literatures have largely neglected – and provide a framework for richly detailed HR case study analysis.

Wellbeing

Mixed methods analysis is key to the study of HRs. Writing on the contradictions between the state's powerful, unified image and its fragmented constituent parts, Migdal (2010, 22–

23) argues that "theories that do not incorporate the two sides of the paradoxical state end up either overidealizing its ability to turn rhetoric into effective policy or dismissing it as a grab-bag of everyman-out-for-himself, corrupt officials". Similarly, theories that do not incorporate quantitative and qualitative methodologies risk either missing emerging global patterns or ignoring the importance of fine-grained detail. My mixed nested analysis produced a range of important findings regarding wellbeing in HRs. Some findings were derived from a single method – for example, the statistical relationship between harder HR variants and better education outcomes, the strong performance of more democratic HR subtypes, and the country-specific observations outlined in the two case study chapters – and will not be rehashed here. However, there were three key cross-cutting findings, bolstered by both quantitative and qualitative data, that are relevant to the HR and development literatures as well as broader scholarship on the links between political regime type and development.

First, horizontal accountability is significantly linked to wellbeing. Statistical analysis showed that HRs where the legislature and the judiciary operate as effective checks on executive power often had better wellbeing outcomes. Qualitative evidence from Fiji and Solomon Islands demonstrated why effective horizontal accountability and the concomitant absence of tutelary influence are important. In Fiji, the RFMF's tutelary role between 1993 and 2006 meant that military intervention was an ever-present threat and drove an insidious process of societal militarisation. Simultaneously, poor quality parliamentary debate and erstwhile *Taukei* political dominance undermined the ability of the legislature to scrutinise the executive's policy programme in key areas including health and education. In Solomon Islands, the legislature was ineffective as a mechanism for horizontal accountability due to the preoccupation of MPs with what Migdal (2010) calls the 'politics of survival', and the resulting phenomenon of grasshopping. Thus, the issue was not a determined executive

bulldozing its agenda through without adequate scrutiny; instead, the government was barely functional, especially in terms of providing leadership in the health and education sectors.

The specifics may vary from case to case, but the effective power of the elected government clearly affects wellbeing outcomes. This is an important finding because it reinforces the importance of including horizontal accountability in the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy (see O'Donnell 1994). Research into the links between regime type and development (which cuts across the broader literatures on democracy and autocracy) has typically focused on elections and political freedoms as the most important causal mechanisms, and as a result there is very little analysis of how effective power affects development. My work indicates that this would be a productive avenue for future study. This finding also has implications for development practitioners: it suggests that strengthening horizontal accountability institutions could be an efficient method of improving wellbeing outcomes.

Second, my research adds nuance to the theorised link between elections and wellbeing, calling into question Gerring *et al's* (2015) assertion that increased electoral competition improves development. Quantitative analysis suggested that the differential effects of minimally competitive and fair elections on wellbeing outcomes in the hybrid context are small. Fiji and Solomon Islands offer some insight into why this may be the case, even though both were designated as 'Unfair' regimes during the selected time periods. Voting patterns in both countries were based on factors other than policy or ideology, which would have been unlikely to change even if issues regarding media freedom, voter intimidation, and vote buying had been addressed. There is contemporary evidence in support of this assertion. Fiji no longer has mandated communal seats, but at the 2014 and 2018 elections most Indo-Fijians voted for the FijiFirst party because its leader, Bainimarama, had been responsible for deposing the ethnonationalist SDL in the 2006 coup. Conversely, the main opposition party

drew its support almost exclusively from the *Taukei* population due to its pro-indigenous platform (Firth 2018). Thus, these elections were determined by identity rather than wellbeing-related issues. In Solomon Islands, the prevalence of voting based on *wantok* ties and the persistent weakness of the party system mean that even fair elections would be unlikely to centre on issues of wellbeing. For researchers interested in the theorised benefits of democratisation, these observations should serve as a reminder that it is vital to look beyond elections to the role of formal and informal institutions, and the other dimensions that comprise a political system.

This is also an important finding for development practitioners, as it highlights that a specific set of circumstances must pertain for fair elections to have a significantly more positive effect on wellbeing outcomes than minimally competitive elections. It is vital that formal and informal institutions create an environment which encourages parties to compete based on clear wellbeing-related policy platforms and incentivises the electorate to vote based on these policies – a scenario often chimerical in established democracies, let alone hybrid political systems.

The third finding is that wellbeing outcomes in HRs are the product of dynamic interactions between formal and informal institutions. This is why mixed methods research is vital: as Lauth (2015, 65) notes, "it is certain that informal institutions influence the outcomes in political, social, and economic areas", yet "empirical comparative research still focuses predominantly on formal institutions". Some of the quantitative indicators used to construct my typology (such as vote buying and media self-censorship) provide insight into the informal institutions that characterise a hybrid political system, but the majority quantify formal structures. Therefore, the patterns revealed through statistical analysis only tell part of the story. Formal and informal institutions, as well as societal norms, may pull in different directions or reinforce each other with regard to socioeconomic outcomes. These processes

can confound statistical analysis by either over-determining or 'flattening' the impact of politics on wellbeing. Thus, qualitative research is vital for investigating where institutions and norms are working in concert, and where they are opposed.

A good illustration of the above interactions is the impact of RAMSI on wellbeing outcomes in Solomon Islands. The theoretical expectation regarding tutelary powers is that they have a negative impact on citizen wellbeing, because they suppress mechanisms of accountability and restrict the actions of the elected executive. In this case though, the goals of the intervention force – which included restoring peace and security, reinstating basic public services, and reinvigorating the economy – meant that RAMSI tried to improve the efficiency of an executive that was barely functional and boost wellbeing through injections of funding and technical expertise. While these actions are likely to have exerted a positive impact on trends in wellbeing, other aspects of RAMSI may have had the opposite effect. Most notably, RAMSI has been criticised for reinforcing the 'handout culture' among the local population and inducing a sense of apathy regarding the country's future. In this way, the positive impacts of the formal institutions that RAMSI sought to reinforce have been counteracted by norms that its presence strengthened.

In summary, it is important to recognise that while "formal and informal institutions can be held distinct for analytical purposes", in reality they are "thoroughly intertwined when it comes to explaining political outcomes" (Bratton 2007, 98; Fjelde and Hegre 2014, 271). Formal institutions, which have their roots in the state, are inevitably altered by contact with informal institutions and norms, which are derived from other social forces. Moreover, the state itself is not a unified entity: it has its own "internal tensions and competition among state sections" which "significantly shape state policies, actions, and capacity" (Dauvergne 1998, 2). As Solomon Islands politics demonstrates, the state can be permeated by informal institutions to such a degree that it becomes a vehicle for maintaining practices which bear

little or no resemblance to its codified laws and regulations. Yet even in less extreme cases, the key point is that formal and informal institutions entwine and alter each other, and ultimately shape wellbeing outcomes. This should be kept in mind by scholars conducting statistical research into the links between political regime type and socioeconomic indicators, and by those designing policy interventions aimed at improving these outcomes.

Future Steps

In this dissertation, I have charted how political hybridity affects people's lives. In doing so, I addressed gaps in both the HR literature and the body of research into the relationship between political regime type and development: my HR typology is the first to fully map the hybrid property space using contemporary understandings of democracy and autocracy; and I conducted the first mixed nested analysis of the links between HR subtypes and wellbeing outcomes. I also contributed to the literature on politics and development in the Pacific by framing Fiji and Solomon Islands as HRs. This perspective offered new insights into the ways that political dynamics shape wellbeing outcomes in these countries. The case studies will be useful reference points for future comparative work on wellbeing in HRs and the role of interactions between formal and informal institutions more broadly. I hope that my research will also serve as a reminder of the value of mixed methods approaches for the study of political regimes.

My analysis is highly relevant for development practitioners. The association between horizontal accountability and wellbeing suggests that strengthening democratic checks and balances on the executive might be an efficient way of improving human development, while my findings regarding elections indicate that the current heavy emphasis on the conduct of polling is unhelpful from a developmental perspective. More research into these relationships

is required to facilitate effective, theory-informed development interventions. Yet I want to emphasise that it should not be assumed that HRs cannot improve citizen wellbeing. For example, consider Fiji under Rabuka. Despite the military's role, civil society was active and influential. There was a vibrant opposition movement, albeit one subject to occasional harassment, and the government put significant emphasis on improving people's lives – even if it primarily focused on the *Taukei* population. Fiji's wellbeing outcomes improved gradually during the 1990s, despite the problems dogging some aspects of its political system. It is important to study when hybridity works, as well as when it does not.

Another key task for researchers is to develop more sophisticated descriptions of how daily politics operates in HRs. In the same way as I have sought to show that formal institutions combine with informal institutions and norms to shape wellbeing outcomes, we need a better understanding of how democratic and autocratic forces encounter and reshape each other. Heidrun Zinecker (2009, 308–9) draws on the cultural sciences to argue that an HR's component parts

> do not necessarily remain unmodified, nor do they disappear when each meet…. new mixed segments evolve into a new fusion resulting in hybrids within hybrids…. the category of "hybrid" does not refer to the relation of form and content, that is, formal and substantial democracy, where democracy is merely the formal cover of a nondemocratic meaning. It refers instead to a blend of democratic and nondemocratic components.

Formulating a theory of how the hybridisation of institutional purpose affects both political practice and people's wellbeing is an important task for development scholars given the prevalence of HRs in the developing world.

In conclusion, I wish to draw attention to the broader applicability of research into political hybridity. As Paul Goode (2010, 1070) notes, studying HRs "invites us to reflect on the quality and fragility of democratic institutions". With 'autocratisation' increasingly evident in established democracies in Europe and the Americas (Lührmann *et al* 2019), the lessons

drawn from the study of HRs become more and more apposite in the developed world. I hope that at points in this dissertation, readers from established democracies have wondered whether their own country might be edging towards political hybridity, and how this might affect the population's wellbeing in the future.

Appendix I: Hybrid Regimes, 1990-2015

Table 38: Soft Hybrid Regime Subtypes, 1990-2015

Unfair HR	Illiberal HR	Unrestricted HR	Restricted HR
Albania 2004-15	Belgium 2004	Argentina 1990, 2013-14	Ecuador 1990-2007
Benin 1992-95, 1999-2015	Hungary 2006, 2013-15	Bolivia 1993-2005	Lesotho 2013-15
Botswana 1990-2015	Israel 2013-15	Czech Republic 1990	Libya 2012
Bulgaria 1990-2010, 2013-15	Turkey 2007-12	Lesotho 2002-11	Sao Tome and Principe 2003-09
Cape Verde 1991-94		Mexico 1999	Suriname 2013-15
Colombia 2011-15		Nicaragua 1990-2000	Taiwan 1996
Czech Republic 1998-2001		Panama 2014-15	Vanuatu 1990
El Salvador 2010-12		Romania 2000-03	
Georgia 2013-15		Sao Tome and Principe 1991	
Ghana 2004-14		Taiwan 1997	
India 1990-2013		Tunisia 2011	
Indonesia 2000-15		Venezuela 1999	
Jamaica 2000-01, 2007-10			
Liberia 2006-09, 2013-14			
Macedonia 1998, 2002-05			
Malawi 2004-15			
Mali 1992-2011			
Mauritius 1990-2015			
Mexico 2006-15			
Moldova 2014-15			
Mongolia 1992-2012			
Montenegro 2006-12			
Namibia 1991-2013			
Nepal 1991-99			
Niger 2000-09, 2012			
Papua New Guinea 1990-2006, 2012-15			
Paraguay 2000-12			
Peru 2002-10			

Romania 2004-13			
Senegal 1990-2000, 2013-15			
Serbia 2001, 2012			
Slovakia 1998			
Solomon Islands 1990-99, 2001-04			
South Africa 1994-2015			
South Korea 1993-96			
Taiwan 2001-03, 2005-07			
Tanzania 1995-99, 2005-15			
Zambia 2013-15			

Table 39: Intermediate Hybrid Regime Subtypes, 1990-2015

Illiberal Unfair HR	Restricted Illiberal HR	Restricted Unfair HR	Unrestricted Illiberal HR	Unrestricted Unfair HR
Albania 1992-99	Libya 2013	Afghanistan 2008	Mexico 1997-98	Albania 2002-03
Benin 1991		Armenia 1998-2002, 2014-15	Turkey 2013	Armenia 1990-94
Bhutan 2008-2015		Bangladesh 1991-2006, 2013-14		Bolivia 1990-92, 2006-13, 2015
Colombia 1990-2010		Bosnia and Herzegovina 1996-2015		Comoros 2002-12
India 2014-15		Burkina Faso 1993-2015		Dominican Republic 1996-2015
Macedonia 1994-97		Chile 1990-92		El Salvador 1993-2009
Moldova 2005-09		Comoros 1991, 1993-99, 2013-15		Georgia 1992, 1995-98, 2004-12
Mongolia 1990		Ecuador 2008		Guyana 1992-99, 2013-2015
Nepal 2008-15		El Salvador 2013-15		Haiti 2007-08
Niger 1993-95		Fiji 1993-99		Honduras 2012
Philippines 1992-2015		Ghana 1996-99, 2015		Jamaica 1990-99
Seychelles 2004-11, 2013-15		Guatemala 2000-15		Kyrgyzstan 2011-14
Tanzania 1993-94		Guinea 2011-12		Lebanon 2006-13
		Guinea-Bissau 2014-15		Lesotho 1993
		Haiti 2012-14		Liberia 2010-12
		Honduras 1995-2008		Macedonia 2008-12
		Ivory Coast 1995-2015		Madagascar 1994-2001
		Kenya 2002-15		Maldives 2009-11
		Kosovo 2007-15		Mali 2013-15
		Lebanon 2014		Moldova 1994-97
		Lesotho 1994, 1998		Mozambique 1995-2015
		Liberia 2005, 2015		Namibia 1990
		Madagascar 2014-15		Nicaragua 2001-06
		Mali 2012		Niger 2013-15
		Mauritania 2006-12		Nigeria 1999-2002, 2011-15
		Mozambique 1994		Panama 2013
		Niger 2011		Paraguay 2013-15
		Nigeria 1992		Peru 2001

		Pakistan 1997-99, 2009-14		Republic of the Congo 1993-96
		Panama 1990-2012		Romania 1990-99
		Paraguay 1990-99		Senegal 2001-12
		Peru 1990		Serbia 2013-15
		Solomon Islands 2000, 2005-15		Sierra Leone 2002-15
		Taiwan 1993-95		South Korea 1990-92
		Thailand 1995-2005		Sri Lanka 2015
		Restricted Unfair 2013-15		Taiwan 1998-99
		Vanuatu 1991-2015		Timor-Leste 2002-06
		Zambia 1992-2012		Ukraine 1994-96, 2007-10

Table 40: Hard Hybrid Regime Subtypes, 1990-2015

Restricted Illiberal Unfair HR	Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair HR
Afghanistan 2004-07, 2010-15	Albania 1990-91, 2000-01
Algeria 1990-92	Algeria 2007-15
Angola 1992, 2008-12	Angola 2013-15
Armenia 1995-97, 2013	Armenia 2012
Azerbaijan 1990-95, 1998	Azerbaijan 1996-97, 1999
Bangladesh 1990, 2008-12, 2015	Belarus 1995-99
Burkina Faso 1991-92	Bolivia 2014
Burundi 1993, 2005-14	Cambodia 1993-96, 1998-2015
Cambodia 1997	Croatia 1992-94, 1997-99
Cameroon 1990-91	El Salvador 1990-92
Central African Republic 2015	Guinea 2013-15
Comoros 1990	Guinea-Bissau 2006-07
Democratic Republic of Congo 1991-92, 2006-15	Guyana 2000-12
Djibouti 1992-2015	Haiti 1998
Ecuador 2009-15	Honduras 2010-11
Egypt 1993-98, 2011-15	Indonesia 1999
Ethiopia 2015	Kazakhstan 1991-98, 2011-15
Fiji 1992, 2000-06, 2014-15	Kyrgyzstan 1992-99, 2005-06, 2010, 2015
Gambia 1990-93, 1997-2000, 2002-15	Macedonia 2013-15
Georgia 1991	Madagascar 1990-93, 2002-08
Guatemala 1990-99	Malawi 1993-94
Guinea 2010	Malaysia 1990-94, 2004-15
Guinea-Bissau 1994-2005, 2008-12	Maldives 2005-08, 2012-15
Haiti 1990-91, 1995-97, 1999, 2006, 2009-11	Mexico 1990-96

Honduras 1990-94, 2009, 2013-15	Moldova 1991-93, 2001-04
Iran 1997-2003	Mongolia 1990
Iraq 2005-15	Montenegro 2013-15
Jordan 1992-2000, 2007-15	Nicaragua 2007-15
Kenya 1992-2001	Peru 2000
Lebanon 1990-2005, 2015	Republic of the Congo 1991-92
Liberia 1997-2003	Russia 1991-2015
Madagascar 2009, 2013	Serbia 1992-2000
Malawi 1995-2003	Seychelles 1993-2003, 2012
Mauritania 2013-15	Sierra Leone 1997
Morocco 1997-2015	Singapore 1990-2015
Myanmar 1990, 2012-15	Sri Lanka 1990-2014
Niger 1990-92, 1999	Turkey 2014-15
Nigeria 1993	Uganda 2011-13
Pakistan 2008, 2015	Ukraine 1990-91, 1997-2003, 2006, 2011-12
Peru 1991-95	Uzbekistan 1990-93
Philippines 1990-91	Venezuela 2000-12
Republic of the Congo 1997	Yemen 1995-96
Rwanda 1991-93, 2008-15	Zimbabwe 1990-99
Sierra Leone 1996	
Sudan 2015	
Taiwan 1990-92	
Tajikistan 1991-92	
Thailand 1990-92, 2006-13	
Togo 1991-92, 2007-12	
Turkey 1990-2006	
Uganda 2014-15	

Ukraine 1992-93, 2013-15	
Venezuela 2013-15	
Yemen 1990-1994, 2012-15	

Appendix II: Regression Tables

Table 41: Health Indicators & Elections

	Infant mortality	Under-5 mortality	Maternal mortality	Life expectancy	Health Index
Elections	0.021	0.014	-0.064	-0.081	-0.002
	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.431)	(0.064)
ODA	0.000	0.000	-0.000***	0.002*	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	-0.012	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.002)
GDP	-0.428***	-0.475***	-0.533***	5.029***	-0.999***
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.795)	(0.092)
Population	0.019	-0.200**	-0.549***	14.348***	-1.089***
	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.087)	(1.286)	(0.166)
Population density	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.003	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.141***	0.104*	0.085	4.105***	-0.064
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.074)	(0.725)	(0.093)
Conflict	0.036***	0.039***	0.111***	-0.437**	0.114***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.159)	(0.022)
Natural resources	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.007***	0.039***	-0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.001)
GDP growth	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.018	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.018)	(0.002)
Fertility	0.023*	0.036***	0.030	-1.289***	0.089***
	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.279)	(0.025)
1991	0.347***	0.311***	0.072*	2.317***	0.347***
	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.041)	(0.641)	(0.068)
1992	0.317***	0.282***	0.063	2.188***	0.312***
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.587)	(0.063)
1993	0.332***	0.303***	0.061*	1.602***	0.363***
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.036)	(0.537)	(0.055)

1994	0.317***	0.297***	0.049	1.081**	0.371***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.034)	(0.514)	(0.053)
1995	0.292***	0.273***	0.046	0.820	0.351***
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.511)	(0.051)
1996	0.277***	0.261***	0.056*	0.801*	0.337***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.447)	(0.047)
1997	0.255***	0.243***	0.039	0.708*	0.314***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.361)	(0.040)
1998	0.236***	0.231***	0.030	0.457	0.302***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.326)	(0.037)
1999	0.197***	0.187***	0.018	0.372	0.249***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.301)	(0.033)
2000	0.184***	0.177***	0.029*	0.176	0.248***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.273)	(0.029)
2001	0.153***	0.147***	0.011	0.130	0.203***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.214)	(0.023)
2002	0.120***	0.114***	0.010	0.077	0.161***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.204)	(0.020)
2003	0.087***	0.083***	-0.003	0.191	0.107***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.179)	(0.018)
2004	0.060***	0.067***	-0.008	0.171	0.077***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.149)	(0.016)
2005	0.036***	0.037***	-0.011**	-0.030	0.050***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.087)	(0.009)
2006	0.016***	0.017***	-0.010***	-0.032	0.021***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.055)	(0.006)
2007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2008	-0.018***	-0.021***	0.013***	0.007	-0.025***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.048)	(0.005)
2009	-0.042***	-0.048***	0.015*	0.119	-0.063***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.100)	(0.014)
2010	-0.075***	-0.078***	0.009	0.332**	-0.120***
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.142)	(0.017)
2011	-0.095***	-0.103***	0.010	0.284*	-0.147***

	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.158)	(0.019)
2012	-0.116***	-0.123***	0.003	0.290	-0.178***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.202)	(0.024)
2013	-0.125***	-0.131***	0.011	0.202	-0.183***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.244)	(0.029)
2014	-0.148***	-0.152***	-0.009	0.121	-0.216***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.300)	(0.036)
2015	-0.180***	-0.184***	-0.023	0.064	-0.259***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.342)	(0.041)
Constant	6.133***	10.409***	17.994***	-218.735***	25.818***
	(1.691)	(1.827)	(1.975)	(28.618)	(3.629)
Observations	1,533	1,533	1,514	1,533	1,514
Number of groups	105	105	104	105	104
Within R-squared	0.851	0.839	0.640	0.723	0.840

Table 42: Health Indicators & Political Freedoms

	Infant mortality	Under-5 mortality	Maternal mortality	Life expectancy	Health Index
Political Freedoms	-0.064***	-0.058***	-0.031**	0.446***	-0.111***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.098)	(0.016)
ODA	0.000	0.000	-0.000***	0.002*	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	-0.013	0.009***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.002)
GDP	-0.427***	-0.474***	-0.538***	5.026***	-0.999***
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.058)	(0.790)	(0.093)
Population	0.050	-0.172**	-0.534***	14.127***	-1.033***
	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.085)	(1.260)	(0.151)
Population density	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.003	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.123**	0.088	0.097	4.217***	-0.086
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.074)	(0.811)	(0.099)
Conflict	0.031***	0.034***	0.110***	-0.405**	0.106***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.165)	(0.021)
Natural resources	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.007***	0.040***	-0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.001)
GDP growth	0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.019	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.002)
Fertility	0.023**	0.036***	0.028	-1.289***	0.088***
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.029)	(0.288)	(0.025)
1991	0.345***	0.309***	0.067	2.336***	0.342***
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.644)	(0.068)
1992	0.310***	0.275***	0.056	2.242***	0.298***
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.589)	(0.063)
1993	0.329***	0.300***	0.056	1.629***	0.356***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.541)	(0.055)
1994	0.311***	0.292***	0.044	1.120**	0.361***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.518)	(0.053)
1995	0.290***	0.272***	0.043	0.833	0.348***

	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.514)	(0.050)
1996	0.278***	0.261***	0.054*	0.801*	0.337***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.447)	(0.045)
1997	0.256***	0.244***	0.037	0.702*	0.315***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.360)	(0.039)
1998	0.238***	0.233***	0.028	0.445	0.305***
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.323)	(0.035)
1999	0.199***	0.189***	0.016	0.362	0.251***
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.300)	(0.031)
2000	0.185***	0.178***	0.026	0.175	0.247***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.268)	(0.027)
2001	0.155***	0.149***	0.009	0.117	0.205***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.211)	(0.021)
2002	0.122***	0.116***	0.007	0.067	0.163***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.197)	(0.018)
2003	0.086***	0.081***	-0.006	0.203	0.103***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.175)	(0.017)
2004	0.059***	0.066***	-0.009	0.178	0.075***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.148)	(0.016)
2005	0.034***	0.035***	-0.013**	-0.020	0.048***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.083)	(0.009)
2006	0.014***	0.015***	-0.011***	-0.021	0.018***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.052)	(0.006)
2007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2008	-0.019***	-0.022***	0.013***	0.014	-0.027***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.046)	(0.005)
2009	-0.045***	-0.051***	0.015*	0.139	-0.067***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.092)	(0.013)
2010	-0.078***	-0.081***	0.009	0.352**	-0.124***
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.134)	(0.017)
2011	-0.099***	-0.106***	0.011	0.310*	-0.153***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.152)	(0.018)
2012	-0.122***	-0.129***	0.003	0.334	-0.188***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.196)	(0.023)

2013	-0.132***	-0.137***	0.011	0.250	-0.195***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.237)	(0.028)
2014	-0.154***	-0.158***	-0.009	0.162	-0.226***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.293)	(0.035)
2015	-0.186***	-0.190***	-0.022	0.105	-0.268***
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.335)	(0.041)
Constant	5.731***	10.041***	17.769***	-215.891***	25.092***
	(1.579)	(1.743)	(1.960)	(28.372)	(3.411)
Observations	1,533	1,533	1,514	1,533	1,514
Number of groups	105	105	104	105	104
Within R-squared	0.855	0.842	0.640	0.724	0.843

Table 43: Health Indicators & Effective Power

	Infant mortality			Under-5 mortality			Maternal mortality			Life expectancy		
Accountable		-0.079***	-0.049***		-0.068***	-0.043**		-0.052*	-0.039		-0.132	0.503**
		(0.015)	(0.017)		(0.016)	(0.020)		(0.030)	(0.026)		(0.151)	(0.225)
Restricted	0.079***		0.030*	0.068***		0.024	0.052*		0.013	0.132		0.635**
	(0.015)		(0.015)	(0.016)		(0.018)	(0.030)		(0.022)	(0.151)		(0.251)
Unrestricted	0.049***	-0.030*		0.043**	-0.024		0.039	-0.013		-0.503**	-0.635**	
	(0.017)	(0.015)		(0.020)	(0.018)		(0.026)	(0.022)		(0.225)	(0.251)	
ODA	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Regime duration	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
GDP	-0.439***	-0.439***	-0.439***	-0.484***	-0.484***	-0.484***	-0.545***	-0.545***	-0.545***	5.064***	5.064***	5.064***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.811)	(0.811)	(0.811)
Population	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.221**	-0.221**	-0.221**	-0.568***	-0.568***	-0.568***	14.687***	14.687***	14.687***
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(1.341)	(1.341)	(1.341)
Population density	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural population	0.116**	0.116**	0.116**	0.083	0.083	0.083	0.088	0.088	0.088	4.217***	4.217***	4.217***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.772)	(0.772)	(0.772)
Conflict	0.033***	0.033***	0.033***	0.036***	0.036***	0.036***	0.111***	0.111***	0.111***	-0.470***	-0.470***	-0.470***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Natural resources	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	0.040***	0.040***	0.040***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
GDP growth	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.020	0.020	0.020
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Fertility	0.024*	0.024*	0.024*	0.037***	0.037***	0.037***	0.028	0.028	0.028	-1.314***	-1.314***	-1.314***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.273)
1991	0.328***	0.328***	0.328***	0.294***	0.294***	0.294***	0.056	0.056	0.056	2.438***	2.438***	2.438***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.681)	(0.681)	(0.681)
1992	0.298***	0.298***	0.298***	0.265***	0.265***	0.265***	0.047	0.047	0.047	2.311***	2.311***	2.311***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.632)	(0.632)	(0.632)
1993	0.311***	0.311***	0.311***	0.284***	0.284***	0.284***	0.043	0.043	0.043	1.716***	1.716***	1.716***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.575)	(0.575)	(0.575)
1994	0.299***	0.299***	0.299***	0.282***	0.282***	0.282***	0.035	0.035	0.035	1.159**	1.159**	1.159**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.538)	(0.538)	(0.538)
1995	0.278***	0.278***	0.278***	0.261***	0.261***	0.261***	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.893	0.893	0.893
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.532)	(0.532)	(0.532)
1996	0.266***	0.266***	0.266***	0.251***	0.251***	0.251***	0.046	0.046	0.046	0.875*	0.875*	0.875*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.466)	(0.466)	(0.466)
1997	0.243***	0.243***	0.243***	0.232***	0.232***	0.232***	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.760*	0.760*	0.760*

	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.381)	(0.381)	(0.381)
1998	0.225***	0.225***	0.225***	0.222***	0.222***	0.222***	0.020	0.020	0.020	0.507	0.507	0.507
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.339)	(0.339)	(0.339)
1999	0.186***	0.186***	0.186***	0.177***	0.177***	0.177***	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.416	0.416	0.416
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.313)	(0.313)	(0.313)
2000	0.173***	0.173***	0.173***	0.167***	0.167***	0.167***	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.197	0.197	0.197
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.277)	(0.277)	(0.277)
2001	0.142***	0.142***	0.142***	0.137***	0.137***	0.137***	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.148	0.148	0.148
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.220)	(0.220)	(0.220)
2002	0.109***	0.109***	0.109***	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.108	0.108	0.108
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.210)
2003	0.079***	0.079***	0.079***	0.075***	0.075***	0.075***	-0.011	-0.011	-0.011	0.219	0.219	0.219
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.182)	(0.182)	(0.182)
2004	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***	0.061***	0.061***	0.061***	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013	0.197	0.197	0.197
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
2005	0.030***	0.030***	0.030***	0.031***	0.031***	0.031***	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)
2006	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
2007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2008	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.020***	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
2009	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.040***	-0.046***	-0.046***	-0.046***	0.018**	0.018**	0.018**	0.114	0.114	0.114
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)
2010	-0.070***	-0.070***	-0.070***	-0.074***	-0.074***	-0.074***	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.327**	0.327**	0.327**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
2011	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.091***	-0.099***	-0.099***	-0.099***	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.259	0.259	0.259
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.169)
2012	-0.112***	-0.112***	-0.112***	-0.120***	-0.120***	-0.120***	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.248	0.248	0.248
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.217)	(0.217)	(0.217)
2013	-0.121***	-0.121***	-0.121***	-0.127***	-0.127***	-0.127***	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.172	0.172	0.172
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.255)	(0.255)	(0.255)
2014	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.146***	-0.150***	-0.150***	-0.150***	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	0.087	0.087	0.087
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.309)	(0.309)	(0.309)
2015	-0.178***	-0.178***	-0.178***	-0.182***	-0.182***	-0.182***	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	0.027	0.027	0.027
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.353)	(0.353)	(0.353)
Constant	6.641***	6.719***	6.690***	10.858***	10.926***	10.902***	18.362***	18.414***	18.401***	-224.746***	-224.614***	-225.249***
	(1.671)	(1.670)	(1.672)	(1.809)	(1.806)	(1.810)	(2.207)	(2.228)	(2.226)	(29.744)	(29.773)	(29.871)
Observations	1,533			1,533			1,514			1,533		
Number of groups	105			105			104			105		
Within R-squared	0.854			0.841			0.640			0.724		

Table 44: Health Index & Effective Power

	Health Index		
Accountable		-0.116***	-0.135***
		(0.025)	(0.039)
Restricted	0.116***		-0.019
	(0.025)		(0.038)
Unrestricted	0.135***	0.019	
	(0.039)	(0.038)	
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP	-1.019***	-1.019***	-1.019***
	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)
Population	-1.159***	-1.159***	-1.159***
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.177)
Population density	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	-0.107	-0.107	-0.107
	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Conflict	0.113***	0.113***	0.113***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Natural resources	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP growth	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Fertility	0.088***	0.088***	0.088***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
1991	0.308***	0.308***	0.308***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
1992	0.273***	0.273***	0.273***
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.068)
1993	0.321***	0.321***	0.321***
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
1994	0.339***	0.339***	0.339***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
1995	0.326***	0.326***	0.326***
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
1996	0.315***	0.315***	0.315***
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
1997	0.293***	0.293***	0.293***
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
1998	0.282***	0.282***	0.282***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
1999	0.230***	0.230***	0.230***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
2000	0.229***	0.229***	0.229***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
2001	0.185***	0.185***	0.185***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
2002	0.140***	0.140***	0.140***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
2003	0.093***	0.093***	0.093***

	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2004	0.066***	0.066***	0.066***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
2005	0.040***	0.040***	0.040***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
2006	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
2007	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2008	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.023***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
2009	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.058***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
2010	-0.110***	-0.110***	-0.110***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2011	-0.137***	-0.137***	-0.137***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
2012	-0.168***	-0.168***	-0.168***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
2013	-0.174***	-0.174***	-0.174***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
2014	-0.209***	-0.209***	-0.209***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
2015	-0.250***	-0.250***	-0.250***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Constant	27.213***	27.329***	27.349***
	(3.897)	(3.909)	(3.921)
Observations	1,514		
Number of groups	104		
Within R-squared	0.843		

Table 45: Health Indicators & Partially-ordered Subtypes

	Infant mortality			Under-5 mortality			Maternal mortality			Life expectancy		
Soft		-0.040***	-0.084***		-0.036***	-0.076***		-0.011	-0.061**		0.109	0.466***
		(0.009)	(0.013)		(0.010)	(0.016)		(0.015)	(0.028)		(0.116)	(0.127)
Intermediate	0.040***		-0.044***	0.036***		-0.040***	0.011		-0.050***	-0.109		0.356**
	(0.009)		(0.010)	(0.010)		(0.012)	(0.015)		(0.017)	(0.116)		(0.138)
Hard	0.084***	0.044***		0.076***	0.040***		0.061**	0.050***		-0.466***	-0.356**	
	(0.013)	(0.010)		(0.016)	(0.012)		(0.028)	(0.017)		(0.127)	(0.138)	
ODA	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	0.002*	0.002*	0.002*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Regime duration	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***	-0.013	-0.013	-0.013
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
GDP	-0.432***	-0.432***	-0.432***	-0.478***	-0.478***	-0.478***	-0.539***	-0.539***	-0.539***	5.052***	5.052***	5.052***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.790)	(0.790)	(0.790)
Population	0.019	0.019	0.019	-0.200**	-0.200**	-0.200**	-0.527***	-0.527***	-0.527***	14.228***	14.228***	14.228***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(1.307)	(1.307)	(1.307)
Population density	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural population	0.102**	0.102**	0.102**	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.089	0.089	0.089	4.245***	4.245***	4.245***
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.820)	(0.820)	(0.820)
Conflict	0.031***	0.031***	0.031***	0.034***	0.034***	0.034***	0.108***	0.108***	0.108***	-0.406**	-0.406**	-0.406**
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)
Natural resources	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.007***	0.041***	0.041***	0.041***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
GDP growth	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.018	0.018	0.018
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Fertility	0.026**	0.026**	0.026**	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***	0.029	0.029	0.029	-1.308***	-1.308***	-1.308***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.287)	(0.287)	(0.287)
1991	0.333***	0.333***	0.333***	0.299***	0.299***	0.299***	0.063	0.063	0.063	2.389***	2.389***	2.389***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.645)	(0.645)	(0.645)
1992	0.299***	0.299***	0.299***	0.265***	0.265***	0.265***	0.050	0.050	0.050	2.287***	2.287***	2.287***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.591)	(0.591)	(0.591)
1993	0.316***	0.316***	0.316***	0.289***	0.289***	0.289***	0.051	0.051	0.051	1.681***	1.681***	1.681***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.546)	(0.546)	(0.546)
1994	0.302***	0.302***	0.302***	0.284***	0.284***	0.284***	0.041	0.041	0.041	1.153**	1.153**	1.153**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.522)	(0.522)	(0.522)
1995	0.282***	0.282***	0.282***	0.264***	0.264***	0.264***	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.864	0.864	0.864
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.517)	(0.517)	(0.517)
1996	0.270***	0.270***	0.270***	0.254***	0.254***	0.254***	0.055*	0.055*	0.055*	0.821*	0.821*	0.821*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.452)	(0.452)	(0.452)
1997	0.248***	0.248***	0.248***	0.237***	0.237***	0.237***	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.722*	0.722*	0.722*

	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.367)	(0.367)	(0.367)
1998	0.232***	0.232***	0.232***	0.227***	0.227***	0.227***	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.466	0.466	0.466
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.328)	(0.328)	(0.328)
1999	0.193***	0.193***	0.193***	0.183***	0.183***	0.183***	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.385	0.385	0.385
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.304)	(0.304)	(0.304)
2000	0.180***	0.180***	0.180***	0.173***	0.173***	0.173***	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.189	0.189	0.189
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.273)
2001	0.149***	0.149***	0.149***	0.143***	0.143***	0.143***	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.135	0.135	0.135
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.216)
2002	0.116***	0.116***	0.116***	0.111***	0.111***	0.111***	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.087	0.087	0.087
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.201)	(0.201)	(0.201)
2003	0.082***	0.082***	0.082***	0.078***	0.078***	0.078***	-0.007	-0.007	-0.007	0.214	0.214	0.214
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)
2004	0.055***	0.055***	0.055***	0.063***	0.063***	0.063***	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	0.191	0.191	0.191
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.150)
2005	0.031***	0.031***	0.031***	0.033***	0.033***	0.033***	-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
2006	0.012***	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
2007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2008	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***	0.013***	0.013***	0.013***	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
2009	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.044***	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***	0.015**	0.015**	0.015**	0.128	0.128	0.128
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
2010	-0.075***	-0.075***	-0.075***	-0.078***	-0.078***	-0.078***	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.329**	0.329**	0.329**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.134)
2011	-0.096***	-0.096***	-0.096***	-0.104***	-0.104***	-0.104***	0.011	0.011	0.011	0.290*	0.290*	0.290*
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.153)
2012	-0.118***	-0.118***	-0.118***	-0.125***	-0.125***	-0.125***	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.309	0.309	0.309
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.197)
2013	-0.129***	-0.129***	-0.129***	-0.134***	-0.134***	-0.134***	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.226	0.226	0.226
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.238)	(0.238)	(0.238)
2014	-0.152***	-0.152***	-0.152***	-0.155***	-0.155***	-0.155***	-0.010	-0.010	-0.010	0.145	0.145	0.145
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.293)	(0.293)	(0.293)
2015	-0.184***	-0.184***	-0.184***	-0.187***	-0.187***	-0.187***	-0.024	-0.024	-0.024	0.091	0.091	0.091
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.336)	(0.336)	(0.336)
Constant	6.262***	6.302***	6.346***	10.520***	10.556***	10.596***	17.665***	17.676***	17.726***	-217.298***	-217.407***	-217.763***
	(1.589)	(1.586)	(1.583)	(1.729)	(1.724)	(1.720)	(1.945)	(1.952)	(1.959)	(29.325)	(29.361)	(29.298)
Observations	1,533			1,533			1,514			1,533		
Number of groups	105			105			104			105		
thin R-squared	0.855			0.842			0.642			0.724		

Table 46: Health Index & Partially-ordered Subtypes

	Health Index		
Soft		-0.045***	-0.158***
		(0.015)	(0.020)
Intermediate	0.045***		-0.113***
	(0.015)		(0.015)
Hard	0.158***	0.113***	
	(0.020)	(0.015)	
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP	-1.004***	-1.004***	-1.004***
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
Population	-1.052***	-1.052***	-1.052***
	(0.148)	(0.148)	(0.148)
Population density	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	-0.110	-0.110	-0.110
	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Conflict	0.104***	0.104***	0.104***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Natural resources	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Fertility	0.090***	0.090***	0.090***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
1991	0.329***	0.329***	0.329***
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)
1992	0.285***	0.285***	0.285***
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)
1993	0.342***	0.342***	0.342***
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
1994	0.352***	0.352***	0.352***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
1995	0.342***	0.342***	0.342***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
1996	0.334***	0.334***	0.334***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
1997	0.313***	0.313***	0.313***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)
1998	0.303***	0.303***	0.303***
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
1999	0.248***	0.248***	0.248***
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
2000	0.246***	0.246***	0.246***
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
2001	0.203***	0.203***	0.203***
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
2002	0.160***	0.160***	0.160***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2003	0.102***	0.102***	0.102***

	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
2004	0.073***	0.073***	0.073***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
2005	0.045***	0.045***	0.045***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
2006	0.015**	0.015**	0.015**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
2007	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2008	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.026***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2009	-0.066***	-0.066***	-0.066***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
2010	-0.119***	-0.119***	-0.119***
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
2011	-0.149***	-0.149***	-0.149***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
2012	-0.185***	-0.185***	-0.185***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
2013	-0.192***	-0.192***	-0.192***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
2014	-0.225***	-0.225***	-0.225***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
2015	-0.267***	-0.267***	-0.267***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Constant	25.376***	25.421***	25.534***
	(3.369)	(3.367)	(3.373)
Observations	1,514		
Number of groups	104		
Within R-squared	0.844		

Table 47: Health Indicators & Hybrid Regime Subtypes

	Infant mortality	Under-5 mortality	Maternal mortality	Life expectancy	Health Index
Illiberal Unfair	0.133***	0.127***	0.056**	-0.814***	0.163***
	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.021)	(0.291)	(0.041)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	0.117***	0.100***	0.001	-0.296	0.153***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.207)	(0.033)
Restricted Unfair	0.063***	0.052**	-0.003	0.467**	0.041
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.195)	(0.026)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	0.098***	0.088**	0.067**	-0.732***	0.207***
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.205)	(0.047)
Unrestricted Unfair	0.056***	0.048**	-0.024	-0.644**	0.098**
	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.298)	(0.045)
ODA	0.000	0.000	-0.000***	0.002*	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.005***	0.005***	0.004***	-0.011	0.008***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.002)
GDP	-0.431***	-0.474***	-0.535***	4.986***	-1.006***
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.061)	(0.812)	(0.099)
Population	0.008	-0.211**	-0.550***	14.498***	-1.110***
	(0.074)	(0.082)	(0.088)	(1.369)	(0.161)
Population density	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.004*	-0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.083	0.045	-0.003	4.322***	-0.173
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.075)	(0.796)	(0.101)
Conflict	0.028***	0.030***	0.097***	-0.436***	0.099***
	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.155)	(0.020)
Natural resources	-0.004***	-0.005***	-0.007***	0.039***	-0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.002)
GDP growth	0.001	-0.000	0.000	0.019	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.020)	(0.002)
Fertility	0.020	0.033**	0.047	-1.242***	0.093***
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.270)	(0.030)
1991	0.328***	0.298***	0.048	2.420***	0.304***

	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.668)	(0.074)
1992	0.294***	0.264***	0.040	2.338***	0.261***
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.619)	(0.070)
1993	0.310***	0.286***	0.039	1.694***	0.318***
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.039)	(0.570)	(0.061)
1994	0.296***	0.280***	0.032	1.157**	0.332***
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.545)	(0.057)
1995	0.277***	0.262***	0.034	0.880	0.324***
	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.032)	(0.540)	(0.054)
1996	0.262***	0.248***	0.043	0.867*	0.310***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.028)	(0.480)	(0.049)
1997	0.241***	0.231***	0.029	0.735*	0.293***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.392)	(0.042)
1998	0.224***	0.220***	0.021	0.485	0.282***
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.023)	(0.353)	(0.039)
1999	0.186***	0.178***	0.010	0.381	0.231***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.326)	(0.035)
2000	0.171***	0.166***	0.017	0.167	0.228***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.294)	(0.031)
2001	0.143***	0.139***	0.000	0.087	0.190***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.231)	(0.024)
2002	0.104***	0.100***	0.001	0.108	0.137***
	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.237)	(0.024)
2003	0.076***	0.073***	-0.012	0.209	0.088***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.193)	(0.020)
2004	0.053***	0.062***	-0.011	0.185	0.067***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.156)	(0.017)
2005	0.030***	0.032***	-0.013**	-0.020	0.041***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.094)	(0.010)
2006	0.012***	0.014***	-0.010**	-0.024	0.014**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.056)	(0.007)
2007	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
2008	-0.019***	-0.022***	0.014***	-0.001	-0.024***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.050)	(0.006)

2009	-0.042***	-0.048***	0.018**	0.135	-0.061***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.106)	(0.015)
2010	-0.068***	-0.071***	0.024**	0.322*	-0.103***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.160)	(0.020)
2011	-0.089***	-0.097***	0.030**	0.270	-0.129***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.170)	(0.021)
2012	-0.112***	-0.119***	0.026*	0.295	-0.162***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.216)	(0.026)
2013	-0.122***	-0.128***	0.031*	0.227	-0.172***
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.257)	(0.031)
2014	-0.144***	-0.149***	0.011	0.122	-0.203***
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.314)	(0.038)
2015	-0.176***	-0.180***	-0.004	0.052	-0.245***
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.361)	(0.044)
Constant	6.515***	10.792***	18.325***	-221.741***	26.580***
	(1.644)	(1.796)	(2.042)	(30.333)	(3.657)
Observations	1,533	1,533	1,514	1,533	1,514
Number of groups	105	105	104	105	104
Within R-squared	0.864	0.849	0.677	0.729	0.851

Table 48: Education Indicators & Elections

	Secondary school enrolment	Primary completion	Mean years of schooling	Education Index
Elections	-1.580*	-2.877	0.180*	-0.235***
	(0.826)	(1.713)	(0.094)	(0.073)
ODA	-0.010***	-0.020***	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.019	0.147***	0.003**	0.006***
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.001)	(0.002)
GDP	2.845	9.440*	-0.136	0.112
	(2.985)	(5.280)	(0.107)	(0.195)
Population	16.969***	63.030***	-0.490***	1.824***
	(5.658)	(10.945)	(0.158)	(0.444)
Population density	-0.111***	-0.152***	0.002***	-0.002*
	(0.008)	(0.033)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.572	8.982	0.010	-0.519
	(5.938)	(9.712)	(0.226)	(0.402)
Conflict	1.128	-1.041	0.116***	-0.015
	(0.784)	(0.849)	(0.028)	(0.038)
Natural resources	0.108*	-0.045	-0.007***	-0.000
	(0.059)	(0.079)	(0.002)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.173**	-0.152**	-0.000	-0.004
	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Young population	-0.786***	-0.577	-0.063***	-0.046***
	(0.176)	(0.404)	(0.008)	(0.011)
1991	-206.490*	7.826	-1.694***	-26.914***
	(106.092)	(7.829)	(0.090)	(8.683)
1992	-204.448*	7.975	-1.561***	-26.842***
	(106.014)	(6.868)	(0.086)	(8.704)
1993	-203.034*	3.686	-1.431***	-26.858***
	(106.192)	(6.593)	(0.080)	(8.717)
1994	-201.675*	3.680	-1.355***	-26.823***
	(106.294)	(6.491)	(0.069)	(8.734)
1995	-200.965*	0.684	-1.209***	-26.813***

	(106.475)	(6.334)	(0.069)	(8.736)
1996	-197.453*	2.343	-1.079***	-26.769***
	(106.607)	(6.055)	(0.074)	(8.737)
1997	-198.741*	1.730	-1.051***	-26.773***
	(106.863)	(5.998)	(0.067)	(8.728)
1998	-196.349*	3.427	-0.980***	-26.689***
	(106.977)	(5.190)	(0.062)	(8.763)
1999	-196.305*	1.073	-0.909***	-26.717***
	(107.116)	(5.096)	(0.056)	(8.768)
2000	-195.490*	1.878	-0.815***	-26.676***
	(107.302)	(4.697)	(0.052)	(8.780)
2001	-194.806*	2.322	-0.705***	-26.651***
	(107.312)	(4.401)	(0.049)	(8.788)
2002	-194.020*	2.013	-0.660***	-26.602***
	(107.319)	(4.141)	(0.046)	(8.802)
2003	-192.395*	1.679	-0.599***	-26.602***
	(107.541)	(3.799)	(0.048)	(8.807)
2004	-191.973*	2.106	-0.518***	-26.530***
	(107.726)	(3.544)	(0.041)	(8.821)
2005	-191.040*	3.032	-0.463***	-26.480***
	(108.000)	(2.989)	(0.038)	(8.832)
2006	-190.250*	2.660	-0.393***	-26.461***
	(108.170)	(2.543)	(0.032)	(8.849)
2007	-189.314*	2.354	-0.343***	-26.424***
	(108.363)	(2.333)	(0.027)	(8.860)
2008	-188.309*	1.484	-0.239***	-26.396***
	(108.657)	(1.970)	(0.022)	(8.873)
2009	-187.546*	1.035	-0.137***	-26.419***
	(108.706)	(1.585)	(0.011)	(8.886)
2010	-185.978	1.375	0.000	-26.328***
	(108.803)	(1.395)	(0.000)	(8.902)
2011	-184.644	2.060	0.117***	-26.260***
	(108.990)	(1.221)	(0.007)	(8.902)
2012	-183.935	1.897**	0.223***	-26.228***
	(109.149)	(0.817)	(0.009)	(8.913)

2013	-182.872	1.119*	0.316***	-26.230***
	(109.164)	(0.566)	(0.014)	(8.925)
2014	-182.100	0.255	0.416***	-26.218***
	(109.413)	(0.283)	(0.021)	(8.935)
2015	-181.664	0.000	0.404***	-26.239***
	(109.592)	(0.000)	(0.026)	(8.942)
Constant	0.000	-1,002.369***	17.532***	0.000
	(0.000)	(220.074)	(3.170)	(0.000)
Observations	1,020	975	1,401	725
Number of groups	95	94	100	86
Within R-squared	0.683	0.495	0.857	0.827

Table 49: Education Indicators & Political Freedoms

	Secondary school enrolment	Primary completion	Mean years of schooling	Education Index
Political Freedoms	-2.330*	-3.186***	0.027	-0.128***
	(1.162)	(1.065)	(0.022)	(0.039)
ODA	-0.011***	-0.021***	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.027	0.158***	0.003**	0.007***
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.001)	(0.002)
GDP	2.661	8.856	-0.120	0.050
	(3.142)	(5.448)	(0.106)	(0.209)
Population	18.559***	65.662***	-0.557***	1.975***
	(5.997)	(11.250)	(0.161)	(0.468)
Population density	-0.114***	-0.149***	0.002***	-0.002*
	(0.008)	(0.031)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.016	9.530	-0.052	-0.431
	(6.188)	(9.655)	(0.211)	(0.380)
Conflict	0.958	-1.176	0.115***	-0.022
	(0.814)	(0.824)	(0.028)	(0.037)
Natural resources	0.103*	-0.049	-0.007***	-0.000
	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.002)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.182***	-0.161**	-0.000	-0.005
	(0.061)	(0.068)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Young population	-0.816***	-0.653	-0.059***	-0.051***
	(0.173)	(0.392)	(0.007)	(0.011)
1991	-230.110*	8.257	-1.721***	-28.918***
	(116.579)	(8.031)	(0.093)	(8.972)
1992	-228.169*	8.158	-1.584***	-28.851***
	(116.451)	(7.086)	(0.088)	(8.996)
1993	-226.592*	4.119	-1.453***	-28.861***
	(116.654)	(6.797)	(0.083)	(9.006)
1994	-225.376*	4.181	-1.375***	-28.820***
	(116.725)	(6.682)	(0.073)	(9.025)
1995	-224.503*	0.953	-1.229***	-28.815***

	(116.940)	(6.525)	(0.072)	(9.027)
1996	-220.940*	2.917	-1.097***	-28.770***
	(117.036)	(6.227)	(0.077)	(9.033)
1997	-222.270*	2.216	-1.067***	-28.769***
	(117.290)	(6.139)	(0.070)	(9.028)
1998	-219.995*	4.043	-0.991***	-28.695***
	(117.487)	(5.414)	(0.065)	(9.062)
1999	-219.768*	1.675	-0.919***	-28.722***
	(117.647)	(5.361)	(0.058)	(9.065)
2000	-219.049*	2.312	-0.820***	-28.695***
	(117.828)	(4.981)	(0.054)	(9.076)
2001	-218.221*	2.750	-0.712***	-28.665***
	(117.885)	(4.667)	(0.050)	(9.087)
2002	-217.583*	2.292	-0.662***	-28.627***
	(117.906)	(4.417)	(0.048)	(9.100)
2003	-216.038*	1.867	-0.601***	-28.626***
	(118.086)	(3.989)	(0.049)	(9.110)
2004	-215.359*	2.300	-0.523***	-28.543***
	(118.323)	(3.694)	(0.043)	(9.125)
2005	-214.399*	3.312	-0.466***	-28.489***
	(118.619)	(3.148)	(0.039)	(9.138)
2006	-213.604*	2.756	-0.395***	-28.474***
	(118.805)	(2.643)	(0.032)	(9.156)
2007	-212.573*	2.665	-0.345***	-28.428***
	(119.027)	(2.487)	(0.027)	(9.166)
2008	-211.573*	1.801	-0.241***	-28.398***
	(119.328)	(2.101)	(0.022)	(9.182)
2009	-210.866*	1.300	-0.140***	-28.422***
	(119.355)	(1.713)	(0.011)	(9.194)
2010	-209.357*	1.493	0.000	-28.340***
	(119.445)	(1.500)	(0.000)	(9.210)
2011	-207.969*	2.191	0.116***	-28.267***
	(119.655)	(1.311)	(0.008)	(9.213)
2012	-207.322*	1.945**	0.224***	-28.235***
	(119.810)	(0.865)	(0.010)	(9.226)

2013	-206.287*	1.152*	0.318***	-28.235***
	(119.830)	(0.608)	(0.015)	(9.239)
2014	-205.464	0.402	0.418***	-28.224***
	(120.093)	(0.359)	(0.022)	(9.249)
2015	-204.987	0.000	0.407***	-28.246***
	(120.277)	(0.000)	(0.027)	(9.259)
Constant	0.000	-1,037.791***	18.561***	0.000
	(0.000)	(223.605)	(3.226)	(0.000)
Observations	1,020	975	1,401	725
Number of groups	95	94	100	86
Within R-squared	0.687	0.501	0.856	0.827

Table 50: Education Indicators & Effective Power

	Secondary school enrolment			Primary completion			Mean years of schooling		
Accountable		-2.926**	-2.226*		-3.411**	-1.216		0.226***	0.094*
		(1.350)	(1.265)		(1.365)	(1.854)		(0.044)	(0.052)
Restricted	2.926**		0.700	3.411**		2.194	-0.226***		-0.132**
	(1.350)		(1.680)	(1.365)		(2.112)	(0.044)		(0.049)
Unrestricted	2.226*	-0.700		1.216	-2.194		-0.094*	0.132**	
	(1.265)	(1.680)		(1.854)	(2.112)		(0.052)	(0.049)	
ODA	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.147***	0.147***	0.147***	0.003**	0.003**	0.003**
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP	1.936	1.936	1.936	8.549	8.549	8.549	-0.090	-0.090	-0.090
	(2.797)	(2.797)	(2.797)	(5.316)	(5.316)	(5.316)	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.115)
Population	16.695***	16.695***	16.695***	63.630***	63.630***	63.630***	-0.548***	-0.548***	-0.548***
	(5.905)	(5.905)	(5.905)	(10.663)	(10.663)	(10.663)	(0.178)	(0.178)	(0.178)
Population density	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.148***	-0.148***	-0.148***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	-0.589	-0.589	-0.589	9.077	9.077	9.077	-0.043	-0.043	-0.043
	(5.966)	(5.966)	(5.966)	(9.643)	(9.643)	(9.643)	(0.219)	(0.219)	(0.219)
Conflict	1.152	1.152	1.152	-1.063	-1.063	-1.063	0.125***	0.125***	0.125***
	(0.831)	(0.831)	(0.831)	(0.867)	(0.867)	(0.867)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Natural resources	0.096*	0.096*	0.096*	-0.047	-0.047	-0.047	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.006**
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.165**	-0.165**	-0.165**	-0.140**	-0.140**	-0.140**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Young population	-0.871***	-0.871***	-0.871***	-0.700*	-0.700*	-0.700*	-0.056***	-0.056***	-0.056***
	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.166)	(0.390)	(0.390)	(0.390)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
1991	-193.551*	-190.625*	-191.325*	8.124	8.124	8.124	-1.677***	-1.677***	-1.677***
	(110.327)	(109.985)	(110.247)	(7.726)	(7.726)	(7.726)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)
1992	-191.417*	-188.491*	-189.191*	8.050	8.050	8.050	-1.541***	-1.541***	-1.541***
	(110.221)	(109.881)	(110.140)	(6.816)	(6.816)	(6.816)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)
1993	-190.144*	-187.219	-187.919	3.821	3.821	3.821	-1.405***	-1.405***	-1.405***

	(110.339)	(110.001)	(110.252)	(6.497)	(6.497)	(6.497)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)
1994	-188.556	-185.630	-186.330	4.106	4.106	4.106	-1.337***	-1.337***	-1.337***
	(110.441)	(110.103)	(110.355)	(6.427)	(6.427)	(6.427)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.080)
1995	-187.721	-184.795	-185.495	0.750	0.750	0.750	-1.197***	-1.197***	-1.197***
	(110.634)	(110.296)	(110.549)	(6.249)	(6.249)	(6.249)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
1996	-184.052	-181.126	-181.826	2.797	2.797	2.797	-1.075***	-1.075***	-1.075***
	(110.673)	(110.338)	(110.583)	(5.971)	(5.971)	(5.971)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
1997	-185.328	-182.402	-183.102	2.143	2.143	2.143	-1.037***	-1.037***	-1.037***
	(110.956)	(110.620)	(110.866)	(5.930)	(5.930)	(5.930)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)
1998	-183.024	-180.099	-180.798	3.652	3.652	3.652	-0.962***	-0.962***	-0.962***
	(111.126)	(110.792)	(111.039)	(5.139)	(5.139)	(5.139)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
1999	-183.073	-180.147	-180.847	1.165	1.165	1.165	-0.889***	-0.889***	-0.889***
	(111.227)	(110.894)	(111.138)	(5.076)	(5.076)	(5.076)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
2000	-182.355	-179.429	-180.129	1.875	1.875	1.875	-0.785***	-0.785***	-0.785***
	(111.398)	(111.064)	(111.307)	(4.699)	(4.699)	(4.699)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
2001	-181.622	-178.697	-179.397	2.260	2.260	2.260	-0.677***	-0.677***	-0.677***
	(111.424)	(111.089)	(111.333)	(4.383)	(4.383)	(4.383)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.056)
2002	-180.973	-178.047	-178.747	1.788	1.788	1.788	-0.626***	-0.626***	-0.626***
	(111.462)	(111.128)	(111.372)	(4.163)	(4.163)	(4.163)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
2003	-179.067	-176.142	-176.841	1.759	1.759	1.759	-0.573***	-0.573***	-0.573***
	(111.639)	(111.307)	(111.548)	(3.794)	(3.794)	(3.794)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.053)
2004	-178.677	-175.751	-176.451	2.146	2.146	2.146	-0.497***	-0.497***	-0.497***
	(111.818)	(111.485)	(111.726)	(3.518)	(3.518)	(3.518)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
2005	-177.704	-174.779	-175.479	3.078	3.078	3.078	-0.442***	-0.442***	-0.442***
	(112.085)	(111.751)	(111.992)	(2.964)	(2.964)	(2.964)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
2006	-176.907	-173.981	-174.681	2.694	2.694	2.694	-0.373***	-0.373***	-0.373***
	(112.238)	(111.906)	(112.145)	(2.543)	(2.543)	(2.543)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
2007	-175.698	-172.773	-173.473	2.588	2.588	2.588	-0.334***	-0.334***	-0.334***
	(112.399)	(112.066)	(112.305)	(2.341)	(2.341)	(2.341)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
2008	-174.631	-171.706	-172.406	1.751	1.751	1.751	-0.229***	-0.229***	-0.229***
	(112.679)	(112.346)	(112.584)	(1.951)	(1.951)	(1.951)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
2009	-173.783	-170.857	-171.557	1.356	1.356	1.356	-0.134***	-0.134***	-0.134***
	(112.706)	(112.375)	(112.611)	(1.601)	(1.601)	(1.601)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
2010	-172.227	-169.301	-170.001	1.685	1.685	1.685	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(112.771)	(112.440)	(112.674)	(1.441)	(1.441)	(1.441)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)

2011	-170.837	-167.911	-168.611	2.357*	2.357*	2.357*	0.120***	0.120***	0.120***
	(112.954)	(112.622)	(112.857)	(1.276)	(1.276)	(1.276)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
2012	-170.208	-167.282	-167.982	2.074**	2.074**	2.074**	0.229***	0.229***	0.229***
	(113.123)	(112.791)	(113.025)	(0.864)	(0.864)	(0.864)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
2013	-169.054	-166.129	-166.828	1.317**	1.317**	1.317**	0.321***	0.321***	0.321***
	(113.114)	(112.784)	(113.016)	(0.592)	(0.592)	(0.592)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
2014	-168.414	-165.488	-166.188	0.365	0.365	0.365	0.427***	0.427***	0.427***
	(113.340)	(113.009)	(113.238)	(0.314)	(0.314)	(0.314)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
2015	-167.970	-165.044	-165.744	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.417***	0.417***	0.417***
	(113.489)	(113.158)	(113.385)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000	-1,002.712***	-999.301***	-1,001.496***	18.115***	17.889***	18.021***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(217.226)	(216.978)	(217.499)	(3.627)	(3.622)	(3.653)
Observations	1,020			975			1,401		
Number of groups	95			94			100		
Within R-squared	0.686			0.498			0.860		

Table 51: Education Index & Effective Power

	Education Index		
Accountable		-0.179***	-0.094
		(0.057)	(0.058)
Restricted	0.179***		0.086
	(0.057)		(0.069)
Unrestricted	0.094	-0.086	
	(0.058)	(0.069)	
ODA	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.006***	0.006***	0.006***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP	0.038	0.038	0.038
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.188)
Population	1.875***	1.875***	1.875***
	(0.447)	(0.447)	(0.447)
Population density	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.449	-0.449	-0.449
	(0.378)	(0.378)	(0.378)
Conflict	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)
Natural resources	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Young population	-0.055***	-0.055***	-0.055***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
1991	-27.193***	-27.013***	-27.099***
	(8.585)	(8.568)	(8.590)
1992	-27.129***	-26.950***	-27.036***
	(8.611)	(8.593)	(8.616)
1993	-27.153***	-26.974***	-27.059***
	(8.618)	(8.600)	(8.623)
1994	-27.099***	-26.920***	-27.005***
	(8.634)	(8.616)	(8.639)
1995	-27.099***	-26.919***	-27.005***
	(8.640)	(8.622)	(8.644)
1996	-27.027***	-26.848***	-26.934***
	(8.641)	(8.623)	(8.645)
1997	-27.026***	-26.847***	-26.933***
	(8.637)	(8.620)	(8.642)
1998	-26.966***	-26.786***	-26.872***
	(8.671)	(8.654)	(8.676)
1999	-27.006***	-26.826***	-26.912***
	(8.671)	(8.654)	(8.676)
2000	-26.977***	-26.797***	-26.883***
	(8.682)	(8.664)	(8.687)
2001	-26.949***	-26.770***	-26.856***
	(8.693)	(8.675)	(8.698)
2002	-26.913***	-26.734***	-26.819***
	(8.705)	(8.687)	(8.709)
2003	-26.889***	-26.709***	-26.795***

	(8.711)	(8.694)	(8.716)
2004	-26.819***	-26.640***	-26.725***
	(8.725)	(8.708)	(8.730)
2005	-26.763***	-26.584***	-26.669***
	(8.738)	(8.720)	(8.742)
2006	-26.745***	-26.566***	-26.652***
	(8.753)	(8.736)	(8.758)
2007	-26.695***	-26.516***	-26.601***
	(8.763)	(8.746)	(8.767)
2008	-26.664***	-26.485***	-26.570***
	(8.777)	(8.760)	(8.782)
2009	-26.683***	-26.504***	-26.589***
	(8.788)	(8.771)	(8.793)
2010	-26.598***	-26.419***	-26.504***
	(8.802)	(8.784)	(8.806)
2011	-26.525***	-26.346***	-26.431***
	(8.804)	(8.786)	(8.808)
2012	-26.495***	-26.316***	-26.402***
	(8.816)	(8.799)	(8.821)
2013	-26.495***	-26.316***	-26.402***
	(8.829)	(8.811)	(8.833)
2014	-26.492***	-26.313***	-26.399***
	(8.838)	(8.821)	(8.842)
2015	-26.516***	-26.337***	-26.423***
	(8.846)	(8.828)	(8.850)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	725		
Number of groups	86		
Within R-squared	0.828		

Table 52: Education Indicators & Partially-ordered Subtypes

	Secondary school enrolment			Primary completion			Mean years of schooling		
Soft		-1.332	-3.631***		-1.414	-4.294***		0.039	0.136***
		(0.927)	(0.940)		(1.338)	(1.392)		(0.028)	(0.043)
Intermediate	1.332		-2.299**	1.414		-2.880**	-0.039		0.097***
	(0.927)		(1.113)	(1.338)		(1.069)	(0.028)		(0.032)
Hard	3.631***	2.299**		4.294***	2.880**		-0.136***	-0.097***	
	(0.940)	(1.113)		(1.392)	(1.069)		(0.043)	(0.032)	
ODA	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.156***	0.156***	0.156***	0.003*	0.003*	0.003*
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP	2.265	2.265	2.265	8.744	8.744	8.744	-0.104	-0.104	-0.104
	(3.022)	(3.022)	(3.022)	(5.445)	(5.445)	(5.445)	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.108)
Population	17.101***	17.101***	17.101***	64.187***	64.187***	64.187***	-0.558***	-0.558***	-0.558***
	(5.733)	(5.733)	(5.733)	(10.592)	(10.592)	(10.592)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.160)
Population density	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.111***	-0.147***	-0.147***	-0.147***	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	-1.094	-1.094	-1.094	7.830	7.830	7.830	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023
	(6.391)	(6.391)	(6.391)	(9.949)	(9.949)	(9.949)	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.218)
Conflict	0.912	0.912	0.912	-1.159	-1.159	-1.159	0.123***	0.123***	0.123***
	(0.845)	(0.845)	(0.845)	(0.829)	(0.829)	(0.829)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Natural resources	0.096*	0.096*	0.096*	-0.055	-0.055	-0.055	-0.007**	-0.007**	-0.007**
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP growth	-0.175***	-0.175***	-0.175***	-0.152**	-0.152**	-0.152**	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Young population	-0.796***	-0.796***	-0.796***	-0.637	-0.637	-0.637	-0.059***	-0.059***	-0.059***
	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.398)	(0.398)	(0.398)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
1991	-203.698*	-202.366*	-200.067*	7.830	7.830	7.830	-1.683***	-1.683***	-1.683***
	(110.438)	(110.194)	(110.531)	(7.876)	(7.876)	(7.876)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)
1992	-201.756*	-200.423*	-198.124*	7.829	7.829	7.829	-1.540***	-1.540***	-1.540***
	(110.321)	(110.076)	(110.414)	(6.970)	(6.970)	(6.970)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.088)
1993	-200.221*	-198.889*	-196.589*	3.718	3.718	3.718	-1.416***	-1.416***	-1.416***

	(110.511)	(110.264)	(110.606)	(6.624)	(6.624)	(6.624)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.083)
1994	-198.792*	-197.460*	-195.161*	3.985	3.985	3.985	-1.345***	-1.345***	-1.345***
	(110.576)	(110.329)	(110.671)	(6.525)	(6.525)	(6.525)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
1995	-197.819*	-196.487*	-194.188*	0.638	0.638	0.638	-1.204***	-1.204***	-1.204***
	(110.777)	(110.529)	(110.873)	(6.377)	(6.377)	(6.377)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)
1996	-194.178*	-192.846*	-190.547*	2.759	2.759	2.759	-1.080***	-1.080***	-1.080***
	(110.867)	(110.615)	(110.964)	(6.047)	(6.047)	(6.047)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)
1997	-195.457*	-194.125*	-191.826*	2.153	2.153	2.153	-1.050***	-1.050***	-1.050***
	(111.134)	(110.882)	(111.232)	(6.008)	(6.008)	(6.008)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)
1998	-193.060*	-191.728*	-189.428	3.894	3.894	3.894	-0.976***	-0.976***	-0.976***
	(111.306)	(111.056)	(111.404)	(5.257)	(5.257)	(5.257)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)
1999	-192.928*	-191.596*	-189.297	1.460	1.460	1.460	-0.903***	-0.903***	-0.903***
	(111.400)	(111.148)	(111.499)	(5.187)	(5.187)	(5.187)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
2000	-192.162*	-190.830*	-188.531	2.206	2.206	2.206	-0.806***	-0.806***	-0.806***
	(111.560)	(111.307)	(111.659)	(4.817)	(4.817)	(4.817)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
2001	-191.325*	-189.993	-187.694	2.619	2.619	2.619	-0.700***	-0.700***	-0.700***
	(111.604)	(111.351)	(111.702)	(4.509)	(4.509)	(4.509)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
2002	-190.677	-189.345	-187.046	2.117	2.117	2.117	-0.648***	-0.648***	-0.648***
	(111.618)	(111.366)	(111.716)	(4.285)	(4.285)	(4.285)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
2003	-189.080	-187.748	-185.449	1.809	1.809	1.809	-0.587***	-0.587***	-0.587***
	(111.779)	(111.525)	(111.877)	(3.896)	(3.896)	(3.896)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)
2004	-188.435	-187.103	-184.804	2.123	2.123	2.123	-0.510***	-0.510***	-0.510***
	(111.981)	(111.727)	(112.079)	(3.599)	(3.599)	(3.599)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)
2005	-187.408	-186.076	-183.777	3.190	3.190	3.190	-0.455***	-0.455***	-0.455***
	(112.266)	(112.011)	(112.365)	(3.050)	(3.050)	(3.050)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
2006	-186.597	-185.265	-182.966	2.670	2.670	2.670	-0.385***	-0.385***	-0.385***
	(112.425)	(112.170)	(112.524)	(2.590)	(2.590)	(2.590)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
2007	-185.394	-184.062	-181.763	2.669	2.669	2.669	-0.342***	-0.342***	-0.342***
	(112.605)	(112.349)	(112.704)	(2.431)	(2.431)	(2.431)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
2008	-184.334	-183.002	-180.703	1.874	1.874	1.874	-0.238***	-0.238***	-0.238***
	(112.898)	(112.640)	(112.997)	(2.041)	(2.041)	(2.041)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
2009	-183.593	-182.261	-179.962	1.441	1.441	1.441	-0.137***	-0.137***	-0.137***
	(112.925)	(112.668)	(113.026)	(1.678)	(1.678)	(1.678)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
2010	-182.020	-180.688	-178.389	1.737	1.737	1.737	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(113.003)	(112.744)	(113.104)	(1.494)	(1.494)	(1.494)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)

2011	-180.617	-179.285	-176.986	2.423*	2.423*	2.423*	0.117***	0.117***	0.117***
	(113.182)	(112.922)	(113.282)	(1.322)	(1.322)	(1.322)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
2012	-179.999	-178.667	-176.368	2.153**	2.153**	2.153**	0.226***	0.226***	0.226***
	(113.333)	(113.073)	(113.433)	(0.890)	(0.890)	(0.890)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
2013	-178.919	-177.587	-175.288	1.271*	1.271*	1.271*	0.321***	0.321***	0.321***
	(113.327)	(113.066)	(113.427)	(0.617)	(0.617)	(0.617)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
2014	-178.153	-176.821	-174.522	0.484	0.484	0.484	0.420***	0.420***	0.420***
	(113.560)	(113.297)	(113.661)	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
2015	-177.684	-176.352	-174.053	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.409***	0.409***	0.409***
	(113.726)	(113.464)	(113.828)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000	-1,011.167***	-1,009.752***	-1,006.872***	18.424***	18.385***	18.288***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(214.487)	(214.111)	(213.969)	(3.225)	(3.233)	(3.229)
Observations	1,020			975			1,401		
Number of groups	95			94			100		
Within R-squared	0.689			0.503			0.858		

Table 53: Education Index & Partially-ordered Subtypes

	Education Index		
Soft		-0.147***	-0.218***
		(0.051)	(0.037)
Intermediate	0.147***		-0.071
	(0.051)		(0.054)
Hard	0.218***	0.071	
	(0.037)	(0.054)	
ODA	-0.001**	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.007***	0.007***	0.007***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
GDP	0.033	0.033	0.033
	(0.207)	(0.207)	(0.207)
Population	1.827***	1.827***	1.827***
	(0.451)	(0.451)	(0.451)
Population density	-0.002**	-0.002**	-0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.584	-0.584	-0.584
	(0.396)	(0.396)	(0.396)
Conflict	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Natural resources	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Young population	-0.049***	-0.049***	-0.049***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
1991	-26.111***	-25.965***	-25.893***
	(8.687)	(8.681)	(8.685)
1992	-26.045***	-25.898***	-25.827***
	(8.711)	(8.705)	(8.708)
1993	-26.061***	-25.914***	-25.843***
	(8.722)	(8.716)	(8.719)
1994	-26.007***	-25.861***	-25.789***
	(8.740)	(8.734)	(8.738)
1995	-26.005***	-25.859***	-25.787***
	(8.744)	(8.737)	(8.741)
1996	-25.954***	-25.807***	-25.736***
	(8.748)	(8.742)	(8.745)
1997	-25.948***	-25.801***	-25.730***
	(8.745)	(8.739)	(8.742)
1998	-25.866***	-25.719***	-25.648***
	(8.777)	(8.771)	(8.774)
1999	-25.892***	-25.745***	-25.674***
	(8.779)	(8.773)	(8.776)
2000	-25.862***	-25.715***	-25.644***
	(8.789)	(8.783)	(8.786)
2001	-25.833***	-25.686***	-25.615***
	(8.800)	(8.793)	(8.797)
2002	-25.793***	-25.646***	-25.575***
	(8.812)	(8.806)	(8.809)
2003	-25.783***	-25.637***	-25.566***

	(8.821)	(8.815)	(8.818)
2004	-25.703***	-25.556***	-25.485***
	(8.837)	(8.830)	(8.834)
2005	-25.644***	-25.497***	-25.426***
	(8.850)	(8.844)	(8.847)
2006	-25.625***	-25.478***	-25.407***
	(8.867)	(8.860)	(8.864)
2007	-25.567***	-25.420***	-25.349***
	(8.877)	(8.871)	(8.875)
2008	-25.537***	-25.391***	-25.319***
	(8.893)	(8.886)	(8.890)
2009	-25.555***	-25.408***	-25.337***
	(8.904)	(8.898)	(8.901)
2010	-25.469***	-25.322***	-25.251***
	(8.920)	(8.914)	(8.918)
2011	-25.396***	-25.249***	-25.178***
	(8.923)	(8.916)	(8.920)
2012	-25.361***	-25.214***	-25.143***
	(8.935)	(8.929)	(8.932)
2013	-25.363***	-25.216***	-25.145***
	(8.948)	(8.942)	(8.945)
2014	-25.354***	-25.207***	-25.136***
	(8.959)	(8.952)	(8.956)
2015	-25.379***	-25.232***	-25.161***
	(8.968)	(8.961)	(8.965)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	725		
Number of groups	86		
Within R-squared	0.832		

Table 54: Education Indicators & Hybrid Regime Subtypes

	Secondary school enrolment	Primary completion	Mean years of schooling	Education Index
Illiberal Unfair	-0.112	2.869	0.141***	0.094
	(1.125)	(2.142)	(0.046)	(0.071)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	3.886*	4.418*	-0.148***	0.200**
	(1.914)	(2.218)	(0.044)	(0.080)
Restricted Unfair	2.648	1.530	-0.109**	0.158*
	(1.587)	(1.866)	(0.047)	(0.078)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	3.414**	3.634	-0.053	0.147*
	(1.549)	(2.327)	(0.053)	(0.072)
Unrestricted Unfair	1.329	-0.011	-0.016	0.085
	(1.395)	(2.198)	(0.053)	(0.078)
ODA	-0.011***	-0.021***	-0.000	-0.001*
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.056	0.136**	0.005***	0.008***
	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.001)	(0.002)
GDP	1.984	8.619	-0.105	0.036
	(2.841)	(5.437)	(0.116)	(0.202)
Population	16.713***	64.855***	-0.533***	1.818***
	(5.595)	(11.701)	(0.183)	(0.485)
Population density	-0.104***	-0.146***	0.002***	-0.001*
	(0.008)	(0.033)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Rural population	-1.391	7.199	0.018	-0.621
	(6.583)	(10.374)	(0.245)	(0.414)
Conflict	1.047	-1.313	0.134***	-0.020
	(0.834)	(0.947)	(0.029)	(0.041)
Natural resources	0.099**	-0.058	-0.006**	0.001
	(0.042)	(0.073)	(0.002)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.167**	-0.150**	-0.001	-0.004
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Young population	-0.854***	-0.644	-0.058***	-0.048***
	(0.165)	(0.431)	(0.008)	(0.011)
1991	-191.666*	7.600	-1.986***	-25.879**

	(106.822)	(8.271)	(0.118)	(9.388)
1992	-190.390*	7.294	-1.849***	-25.811**
	(106.792)	(7.324)	(0.114)	(9.415)
1993	-189.113*	3.560	-1.719***	-25.834**
	(106.860)	(6.901)	(0.108)	(9.424)
1994	-187.739*	3.701	-1.655***	-25.775**
	(106.969)	(6.809)	(0.095)	(9.441)
1995	-186.778*	0.397	-1.511***	-25.777**
	(107.171)	(6.615)	(0.093)	(9.446)
1996	-182.918	2.524	-1.393***	-25.713**
	(107.091)	(6.370)	(0.099)	(9.448)
1997	-184.294*	1.744	-1.357***	-25.724**
	(107.398)	(6.369)	(0.091)	(9.441)
1998	-182.126	3.621	-1.280***	-25.643**
	(107.582)	(5.538)	(0.087)	(9.479)
1999	-182.189	1.291	-1.207***	-25.667**
	(107.631)	(5.435)	(0.080)	(9.482)
2000	-181.523	1.948	-1.099***	-25.640**
	(107.740)	(5.034)	(0.075)	(9.492)
2001	-180.679	2.295	-0.993***	-25.613**
	(107.809)	(4.749)	(0.070)	(9.503)
2002	-180.185	1.935	-0.945***	-25.564**
	(107.857)	(4.375)	(0.066)	(9.520)
2003	-178.307	1.565	-0.890***	-25.550**
	(107.978)	(4.022)	(0.068)	(9.525)
2004	-177.785	1.879	-0.812***	-25.477**
	(108.176)	(3.801)	(0.062)	(9.539)
2005	-176.821	2.907	-0.759***	-25.424**
	(108.420)	(3.236)	(0.058)	(9.552)
2006	-176.028	2.381	-0.687***	-25.406**
	(108.559)	(2.764)	(0.050)	(9.569)
2007	-174.813	2.413	-0.645***	-25.351**
	(108.717)	(2.591)	(0.043)	(9.578)
2008	-173.844	1.606	-0.542***	-25.328**
	(109.001)	(2.153)	(0.036)	(9.593)

2009	-173.030	1.172	-0.447***	-25.346**
	(109.019)	(1.773)	(0.024)	(9.606)
2010	-171.523	1.567	-0.325***	-25.258**
	(109.006)	(1.524)	(0.017)	(9.623)
2011	-170.475	2.341*	-0.204***	-25.199**
	(109.223)	(1.329)	(0.015)	(9.625)
2012	-169.910	2.046**	-0.095***	-25.167**
	(109.388)	(0.891)	(0.008)	(9.639)
2013	-168.801	1.133	0.000	-25.167**
	(109.342)	(0.665)	(0.000)	(9.651)
2014	-168.096	0.474	0.105***	-25.157**
	(109.497)	(0.375)	(0.009)	(9.661)
2015	-167.686	0.000	0.097***	-25.181**
	(109.616)	(0.000)	(0.016)	(9.670)
Constant	0.000	-1,017.603***	18.107***	0.000
	(0.000)	(236.905)	(3.739)	(0.000)
Observations	1,020	975	1,401	725
Number of groups	95	94	100	86
Within R-squared	0.702	0.507	0.866	0.836

Table 55: Living Standards Indicators & Elections

	Improved Sanitation	Electricity Access	Living Standards Index
Elections	-0.014	0.208*	0.155*
	(0.009)	(0.109)	(0.083)
ODA	0.000	0.001***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.002***	-0.001	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
GDP	0.170***	0.038	0.301***
	(0.024)	(0.068)	(0.054)
Population	0.626***	1.691***	1.852***
	(0.038)	(0.094)	(0.078)
Population density	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.260***	1.102***	0.938***
	(0.032)	(0.138)	(0.108)
Conflict	-0.035*	0.018	-0.045
	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.044)
Natural resources	-0.001	0.007***	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Population growth	-0.037***	-0.042	-0.059**
	(0.009)	(0.033)	(0.028)
1991	-8.532***	0.042***	-35.792***
	(0.846)	(0.011)	(1.885)
1992	-8.527***	0.000	-35.816***
	(0.847)	(0.000)	(1.888)
1993	-8.549***	0.034***	-35.838***
	(0.849)	(0.006)	(1.889)
1994	-8.568***	-0.055**	-35.925***
	(0.847)	(0.025)	(1.879)
1995	-8.548***	-0.032	-35.888***
	(0.847)	(0.027)	(1.879)
1996	-8.557***	-0.004	-35.886***
	(0.847)	(0.029)	(1.882)
1997	-8.568***	0.010	-35.912***
	(0.847)	(0.026)	(1.888)
1998	-8.567***	0.081***	-35.864***
	(0.849)	(0.026)	(1.890)
1999	-8.558***	0.110***	-35.855***
	(0.851)	(0.028)	(1.889)
2000	-8.548***	0.102***	-35.845***
	(0.851)	(0.032)	(1.891)
2001	-8.549***	0.080**	-35.868***
	(0.852)	(0.036)	(1.892)
2002	-8.545***	0.098**	-35.850***
	(0.853)	(0.035)	(1.894)
2003	-8.536***	0.104**	-35.837***
	(0.852)	(0.042)	(1.893)
2004	-8.533***	0.101**	-35.839***
	(0.852)	(0.046)	(1.892)

2005	-8.530***	0.104*	-35.840***
	(0.853)	(0.053)	(1.894)
2006	-8.530***	0.093	-35.847***
	(0.853)	(0.055)	(1.896)
2007	-8.531***	0.099*	-35.841***
	(0.854)	(0.057)	(1.898)
2008	-8.528***	0.087	-35.841***
	(0.855)	(0.064)	(1.902)
2009	-8.535***	0.107	-35.850***
	(0.858)	(0.065)	(1.901)
2010	-8.530***	0.088	-35.850***
	(0.859)	(0.065)	(1.901)
2011	-8.522***	0.123	-35.823***
	(0.856)	(0.076)	(1.899)
2012	-8.522***	0.150*	-35.812***
	(0.858)	(0.077)	(1.901)
2013	-8.522***	0.162**	-35.808***
	(0.859)	(0.078)	(1.905)
2014	-8.533***	0.180**	-35.816***
	(0.862)	(0.078)	(1.910)
2015	-8.548***	0.176**	-35.840***
	(0.865)	(0.075)	(1.914)
Constant	0.000	-27.929***	0.000
	(0.000)	(2.191)	(0.000)
Observations	1,510	1,532	1,506
Number of groups	104	105	104
Within R-squared	0.626	0.513	0.644

Table 56: Living Standards Indicators & Political Freedoms

	Improved Sanitation	Electricity Access	Living Standards Index
Political Freedoms	-0.006	-0.030	-0.014
	(0.010)	(0.024)	(0.019)
ODA	0.000	0.001***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.002***	-0.001	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP	0.168***	0.052	0.311***
	(0.025)	(0.068)	(0.053)
Population	0.630***	1.696***	1.856***
	(0.038)	(0.097)	(0.079)
Population density	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.262***	1.039***	0.894***
	(0.032)	(0.123)	(0.094)
Conflict	-0.036*	0.012	-0.049
	(0.019)	(0.048)	(0.044)
Natural resources	-0.001	0.007**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Population growth	-0.037***	-0.039	-0.056**
	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.027)
1991	-8.585***	0.046***	-35.753***
	(0.853)	(0.010)	(1.849)
1992	-8.580***	0.000	-35.774***
	(0.853)	(0.000)	(1.852)
1993	-8.601***	0.036***	-35.794***
	(0.855)	(0.007)	(1.853)
1994	-8.621***	-0.059**	-35.885***
	(0.853)	(0.026)	(1.843)
1995	-8.600***	-0.034	-35.848***
	(0.854)	(0.029)	(1.842)
1996	-8.609***	-0.004	-35.845***
	(0.853)	(0.031)	(1.845)
1997	-8.620***	0.009	-35.871***
	(0.853)	(0.028)	(1.850)
1998	-8.619***	0.083***	-35.821***
	(0.856)	(0.029)	(1.852)
1999	-8.610***	0.112***	-35.813***
	(0.857)	(0.031)	(1.851)
2000	-8.600***	0.105***	-35.800***
	(0.857)	(0.034)	(1.853)
2001	-8.601***	0.082**	-35.826***
	(0.858)	(0.039)	(1.854)
2002	-8.597***	0.104**	-35.805***
	(0.859)	(0.038)	(1.855)
2003	-8.588***	0.103**	-35.796***
	(0.859)	(0.043)	(1.855)
2004	-8.585***	0.096*	-35.801***
	(0.858)	(0.048)	(1.854)

2005	-8.582***	0.098*	-35.803***
	(0.859)	(0.055)	(1.857)
2006	-8.582***	0.086	-35.811***
	(0.859)	(0.056)	(1.859)
2007	-8.582***	0.092	-35.805***
	(0.861)	(0.058)	(1.861)
2008	-8.580***	0.078	-35.807***
	(0.862)	(0.065)	(1.864)
2009	-8.586***	0.092	-35.819***
	(0.864)	(0.065)	(1.864)
2010	-8.581***	0.075	-35.818***
	(0.865)	(0.065)	(1.863)
2011	-8.573***	0.106	-35.794***
	(0.863)	(0.076)	(1.862)
2012	-8.573***	0.131*	-35.785***
	(0.864)	(0.076)	(1.865)
2013	-8.573***	0.141*	-35.782***
	(0.866)	(0.077)	(1.868)
2014	-8.584***	0.159**	-35.790***
	(0.869)	(0.077)	(1.873)
2015	-8.599***	0.156**	-35.814***
	(0.871)	(0.074)	(1.876)
Constant	0.000	-27.862***	0.000
	(0.000)	(2.176)	(0.000)
Observations	1,510	1,532	1,506
Number of groups	104	105	104
Within R-squared	0.626	0.507	0.640

Table 57: Living Standards Indicators & Effective Power

	Improved Sanitation			Electricity Access			Living Standards Index		
Accountable		0.007	0.007		-0.157**	-0.098**		-0.035	-0.037
		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.062)	(0.036)		(0.028)	(0.024)
Restricted	-0.007		-0.001	0.157**		0.059	0.035		-0.002
	(0.009)		(0.012)	(0.062)		(0.058)	(0.028)		(0.038)
Unrestricted	-0.007	0.001		0.098**	-0.059		0.037	0.002	
	(0.009)	(0.012)		(0.036)	(0.058)		(0.024)	(0.038)	
ODA	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP	0.170***	0.170***	0.170***	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.302***	0.302***	0.302***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Population	0.630***	0.630***	0.630***	1.636***	1.636***	1.636***	1.826***	1.826***	1.826***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.091)
Population density	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.265***	0.265***	0.265***	1.007***	1.007***	1.007***	0.889***	0.889***	0.889***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.123)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Conflict	-0.035*	-0.035*	-0.035*	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.048	-0.048	-0.048
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Natural resources	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.007**	0.007**	0.007**	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population growth	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.041	-0.041	-0.041	-0.057**	-0.057**	-0.057**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
1991	-8.620***	-8.627***	-8.626***	0.044***	0.044***	0.044***	-35.225***	-35.190***	-35.188***
	(0.851)	(0.850)	(0.852)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(2.026)	(2.017)	(2.039)
1992	-8.614***	-8.622***	-8.621***	0.000	0.000	0.000	-35.245***	-35.209***	-35.208***
	(0.852)	(0.851)	(0.853)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(2.028)	(2.019)	(2.041)
1993	-8.636***	-8.644***	-8.643***	0.030***	0.030***	0.030***	-35.266***	-35.231***	-35.229***

	(0.853)	(0.852)	(0.854)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(2.029)	(2.019)	(2.041)
1994	-8.656***	-8.664***	-8.663***	-0.057**	-0.057**	-0.057**	-35.354***	-35.319***	-35.317***
	(0.852)	(0.850)	(0.853)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(2.020)	(2.011)	(2.033)
1995	-8.636***	-8.644***	-8.643***	-0.028	-0.028	-0.028	-35.316***	-35.281***	-35.279***
	(0.852)	(0.850)	(0.853)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(2.019)	(2.010)	(2.032)
1996	-8.645***	-8.653***	-8.652***	0.005	0.005	0.005	-35.313***	-35.278***	-35.276***
	(0.851)	(0.850)	(0.852)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(2.023)	(2.014)	(2.036)
1997	-8.657***	-8.664***	-8.664***	0.016	0.016	0.016	-35.338***	-35.303***	-35.301***
	(0.852)	(0.850)	(0.853)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(2.029)	(2.020)	(2.042)
1998	-8.656***	-8.664***	-8.663***	0.091***	0.091***	0.091***	-35.288***	-35.253***	-35.251***
	(0.854)	(0.852)	(0.855)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(2.029)	(2.020)	(2.042)
1999	-8.647***	-8.654***	-8.654***	0.121***	0.121***	0.121***	-35.280***	-35.245***	-35.243***
	(0.855)	(0.854)	(0.856)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(2.029)	(2.020)	(2.042)
2000	-8.637***	-8.644***	-8.644***	0.114***	0.114***	0.114***	-35.266***	-35.231***	-35.229***
	(0.855)	(0.854)	(0.856)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(2.031)	(2.022)	(2.044)
2001	-8.638***	-8.645***	-8.645***	0.091**	0.091**	0.091**	-35.291***	-35.256***	-35.254***
	(0.857)	(0.855)	(0.857)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(2.033)	(2.024)	(2.046)
2002	-8.635***	-8.642***	-8.641***	0.112***	0.112***	0.112***	-35.271***	-35.236***	-35.234***
	(0.857)	(0.856)	(0.858)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(2.033)	(2.024)	(2.046)
2003	-8.625***	-8.633***	-8.632***	0.119***	0.119***	0.119***	-35.260***	-35.224***	-35.223***
	(0.857)	(0.855)	(0.858)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(2.034)	(2.024)	(2.046)
2004	-8.622***	-8.630***	-8.629***	0.115**	0.115**	0.115**	-35.264***	-35.229***	-35.227***
	(0.857)	(0.855)	(0.857)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(2.033)	(2.024)	(2.046)
2005	-8.619***	-8.627***	-8.626***	0.119**	0.119**	0.119**	-35.265***	-35.230***	-35.228***
	(0.857)	(0.856)	(0.858)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(2.037)	(2.027)	(2.049)
2006	-8.620***	-8.627***	-8.626***	0.110*	0.110*	0.110*	-35.272***	-35.237***	-35.235***
	(0.858)	(0.856)	(0.858)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(2.039)	(2.029)	(2.052)
2007	-8.621***	-8.628***	-8.628***	0.124**	0.124**	0.124**	-35.263***	-35.228***	-35.226***
	(0.859)	(0.857)	(0.860)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(2.041)	(2.032)	(2.054)
2008	-8.618***	-8.626***	-8.625***	0.112*	0.112*	0.112*	-35.264***	-35.229***	-35.227***
	(0.860)	(0.859)	(0.861)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(2.045)	(2.036)	(2.058)
2009	-8.624***	-8.632***	-8.631***	0.131*	0.131*	0.131*	-35.275***	-35.240***	-35.238***
	(0.862)	(0.861)	(0.863)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(2.044)	(2.035)	(2.057)
2010	-8.620***	-8.627***	-8.627***	0.121*	0.121*	0.121*	-35.273***	-35.238***	-35.236***
	(0.863)	(0.862)	(0.864)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(2.044)	(2.034)	(2.056)

2011	-8.612***	-8.619***	-8.618***	0.149*	0.149*	0.149*	-35.248***	-35.213***	-35.211***
	(0.861)	(0.860)	(0.862)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(2.043)	(2.034)	(2.056)
2012	-8.612***	-8.619***	-8.619***	0.176**	0.176**	0.176**	-35.238***	-35.203***	-35.201***
	(0.862)	(0.861)	(0.863)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(2.046)	(2.037)	(2.059)
2013	-8.612***	-8.619***	-8.619***	0.187**	0.187**	0.187**	-35.235***	-35.200***	-35.198***
	(0.864)	(0.862)	(0.865)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(2.049)	(2.040)	(2.062)
2014	-8.623***	-8.630***	-8.629***	0.201**	0.201**	0.201**	-35.243***	-35.208***	-35.206***
	(0.867)	(0.865)	(0.867)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(2.054)	(2.045)	(2.067)
2015	-8.638***	-8.646***	-8.645***	0.197**	0.197**	0.197**	-35.268***	-35.233***	-35.231***
	(0.869)	(0.868)	(0.870)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(2.057)	(2.048)	(2.070)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000	-26.707***	-26.551***	-26.609***	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(2.314)	(2.292)	(2.328)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,510			1,532			1,506		
Number of groups	104			105			104		
Within R-squared	0.626			0.514			0.641		

Table 58: Living Standards Indicators & Partially-ordered Subtypes

	Improved Sanitation			Electricity Access			Living Standards Index		
Soft		0.027***	0.000		-0.008	-0.046		0.063**	0.011
		(0.007)	(0.011)		(0.036)	(0.035)		(0.027)	(0.014)
Intermediate	-0.027***		-0.027**	0.008		-0.038	-0.063**		-0.052**
	(0.007)		(0.011)	(0.036)		(0.026)	(0.027)		(0.024)
Hard	-0.000	0.027**		0.046	0.038		-0.011	0.052**	
	(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.035)	(0.026)		(0.014)	(0.024)	
ODA	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.002***	0.002***	0.002***	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.005***	0.005***	0.005***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
GDP	0.169***	0.169***	0.169***	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.316***	0.316***	0.316***
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Population	0.652***	0.652***	0.652***	1.695***	1.695***	1.695***	1.904***	1.904***	1.904***
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Population density	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.279***	0.279***	0.279***	1.036***	1.036***	1.036***	0.933***	0.933***	0.933***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.099)
Conflict	-0.036*	-0.036*	-0.036*	0.011	0.011	0.011	-0.049	-0.049	-0.049
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Natural resources	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.007**	0.007**	0.007**	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Population growth	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.039	-0.039	-0.039	-0.056**	-0.056**	-0.056**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
1991	-9.011***	-9.038***	-9.011***	0.046***	0.046***	0.046***	-36.692***	-36.755***	-36.703***
	(0.820)	(0.821)	(0.820)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(1.896)	(1.907)	(1.897)
1992	-9.008***	-9.035***	-9.008***	0.000	0.000	0.000	-36.717***	-36.780***	-36.728***
	(0.821)	(0.822)	(0.821)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(1.899)	(1.909)	(1.900)
1993	-9.028***	-9.055***	-9.028***	0.037***	0.037***	0.037***	-36.732***	-36.795***	-36.743***

	(0.822)	(0.823)	(0.822)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(1.900)	(1.910)	(1.901)
1994	-9.046***	-9.073***	-9.047***	-0.057**	-0.057**	-0.057**	-36.822***	-36.885***	-36.833***
	(0.821)	(0.822)	(0.821)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(1.892)	(1.902)	(1.893)
1995	-9.026***	-9.052***	-9.026***	-0.031	-0.031	-0.031	-36.784***	-36.847***	-36.796***
	(0.821)	(0.822)	(0.821)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(1.892)	(1.902)	(1.893)
1996	-9.033***	-9.060***	-9.033***	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-36.779***	-36.842***	-36.791***
	(0.821)	(0.822)	(0.821)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(1.894)	(1.905)	(1.895)
1997	-9.044***	-9.071***	-9.044***	0.014	0.014	0.014	-36.805***	-36.868***	-36.816***
	(0.821)	(0.822)	(0.821)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(1.899)	(1.909)	(1.900)
1998	-9.044***	-9.071***	-9.044***	0.087***	0.087***	0.087***	-36.758***	-36.821***	-36.769***
	(0.823)	(0.824)	(0.823)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(1.901)	(1.911)	(1.902)
1999	-9.036***	-9.063***	-9.036***	0.116***	0.116***	0.116***	-36.751***	-36.814***	-36.762***
	(0.825)	(0.826)	(0.824)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(1.901)	(1.911)	(1.902)
2000	-9.026***	-9.053***	-9.026***	0.110***	0.110***	0.110***	-36.739***	-36.802***	-36.750***
	(0.825)	(0.826)	(0.825)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(1.902)	(1.913)	(1.904)
2001	-9.026***	-9.053***	-9.026***	0.086**	0.086**	0.086**	-36.764***	-36.827***	-36.775***
	(0.826)	(0.827)	(0.826)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(1.904)	(1.914)	(1.905)
2002	-9.024***	-9.051***	-9.024***	0.108***	0.108***	0.108***	-36.745***	-36.808***	-36.756***
	(0.827)	(0.828)	(0.827)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(1.906)	(1.916)	(1.907)
2003	-9.016***	-9.043***	-9.016***	0.107**	0.107**	0.107**	-36.739***	-36.802***	-36.750***
	(0.826)	(0.828)	(0.826)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(1.906)	(1.916)	(1.907)
2004	-9.013***	-9.040***	-9.013***	0.100**	0.100**	0.100**	-36.744***	-36.807***	-36.755***
	(0.826)	(0.827)	(0.826)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(1.905)	(1.916)	(1.907)
2005	-9.010***	-9.037***	-9.010***	0.102*	0.102*	0.102*	-36.747***	-36.810***	-36.758***
	(0.827)	(0.828)	(0.827)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(1.908)	(1.918)	(1.909)
2006	-9.011***	-9.038***	-9.011***	0.090	0.090	0.090	-36.757***	-36.820***	-36.768***
	(0.827)	(0.828)	(0.827)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(1.910)	(1.920)	(1.911)
2007	-9.012***	-9.039***	-9.012***	0.097	0.097	0.097	-36.753***	-36.816***	-36.764***
	(0.828)	(0.830)	(0.828)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(1.912)	(1.922)	(1.913)
2008	-9.009***	-9.036***	-9.009***	0.083	0.083	0.083	-36.754***	-36.817***	-36.765***
	(0.830)	(0.831)	(0.829)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(1.915)	(1.926)	(1.917)
2009	-9.015***	-9.042***	-9.015***	0.098	0.098	0.098	-36.766***	-36.829***	-36.778***
	(0.832)	(0.833)	(0.832)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(1.916)	(1.926)	(1.917)
2010	-9.011***	-9.037***	-9.011***	0.082	0.082	0.082	-36.767***	-36.830***	-36.778***
	(0.833)	(0.834)	(0.833)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(1.915)	(1.926)	(1.916)

2011	-9.002***	-9.029***	-9.003***	0.112	0.112	0.112	-36.742***	-36.805***	-36.753***
	(0.831)	(0.832)	(0.831)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(0.076)	(1.914)	(1.925)	(1.915)
2012	-9.004***	-9.031***	-9.004***	0.137*	0.137*	0.137*	-36.734***	-36.797***	-36.746***
	(0.832)	(0.833)	(0.832)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(1.917)	(1.927)	(1.918)
2013	-9.004***	-9.031***	-9.004***	0.147*	0.147*	0.147*	-36.732***	-36.795***	-36.744***
	(0.833)	(0.834)	(0.833)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(1.920)	(1.930)	(1.921)
2014	-9.014***	-9.041***	-9.015***	0.165**	0.165**	0.165**	-36.740***	-36.803***	-36.751***
	(0.836)	(0.837)	(0.836)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(1.925)	(1.935)	(1.926)
2015	-9.030***	-9.057***	-9.031***	0.161**	0.161**	0.161**	-36.765***	-36.828***	-36.776***
	(0.839)	(0.840)	(0.839)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(1.928)	(1.939)	(1.930)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000	-27.841***	-27.833***	-27.795***	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(2.174)	(2.177)	(2.164)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,510			1,532			1,506		
Number of groups	104			105			104		
Within R-squared	0.630			0.507			0.643		

Table 59: Living Standards Indicators & Hybrid Regime Subtypes

	Improved Sanitation	Electricity Access	Living Standards Index
Illiberal Unfair	-0.056**	0.054	-0.048
	(0.024)	(0.059)	(0.054)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.012	0.189**	0.049
	(0.016)	(0.077)	(0.035)
Restricted Unfair	-0.035***	0.167**	-0.000
	(0.007)	(0.070)	(0.031)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.010	0.115*	0.033
	(0.014)	(0.057)	(0.037)
Unrestricted Unfair	-0.030**	0.102**	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.024)
ODA	0.000**	0.001***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.002***	-0.002	0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.001)
GDP	0.170***	0.023	0.298***
	(0.025)	(0.069)	(0.055)
Population	0.646***	1.650***	1.860***
	(0.036)	(0.109)	(0.091)
Population density	-0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.277***	1.034***	0.929***
	(0.033)	(0.132)	(0.099)
Conflict	-0.036*	0.006	-0.050
	(0.020)	(0.049)	(0.045)
Natural resources	-0.001	0.006**	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)
GDP growth	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Population growth	-0.037***	-0.044	-0.059**
	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.028)
1991	-8.916***	0.045***	-35.873***
	(0.813)	(0.010)	(2.105)
1992	-8.911***	0.000	-35.897***
	(0.814)	(0.000)	(2.109)
1993	-8.931***	0.026***	-35.918***
	(0.815)	(0.008)	(2.109)
1994	-8.950***	-0.060**	-36.003***
	(0.814)	(0.025)	(2.099)
1995	-8.930***	-0.029	-35.963***
	(0.814)	(0.028)	(2.098)
1996	-8.937***	0.002	-35.958***
	(0.813)	(0.030)	(2.101)
1997	-8.948***	0.014	-35.983***
	(0.813)	(0.026)	(2.106)
1998	-8.949***	0.085***	-35.937***
	(0.815)	(0.028)	(2.107)
1999	-8.940***	0.116***	-35.929***
	(0.817)	(0.030)	(2.107)
2000	-8.930***	0.108***	-35.916***
	(0.817)	(0.032)	(2.109)

2001	-8.931***	0.091**	-35.937***
	(0.818)	(0.036)	(2.110)
2002	-8.928***	0.096**	-35.928***
	(0.819)	(0.036)	(2.112)
2003	-8.920***	0.115**	-35.910***
	(0.818)	(0.042)	(2.111)
2004	-8.918***	0.119**	-35.909***
	(0.818)	(0.046)	(2.110)
2005	-8.915***	0.123**	-35.911***
	(0.818)	(0.052)	(2.113)
2006	-8.917***	0.116**	-35.918***
	(0.819)	(0.054)	(2.115)
2007	-8.918***	0.131**	-35.910***
	(0.820)	(0.057)	(2.117)
2008	-8.914***	0.120*	-35.908***
	(0.821)	(0.062)	(2.121)
2009	-8.921***	0.146**	-35.915***
	(0.823)	(0.063)	(2.120)
2010	-8.916***	0.139**	-35.908***
	(0.824)	(0.064)	(2.120)
2011	-8.909***	0.167**	-35.885***
	(0.822)	(0.074)	(2.118)
2012	-8.910***	0.193**	-35.876***
	(0.823)	(0.074)	(2.121)
2013	-8.910***	0.205**	-35.873***
	(0.824)	(0.075)	(2.124)
2014	-8.921***	0.220***	-35.882***
	(0.827)	(0.075)	(2.129)
2015	-8.937***	0.216***	-35.906***
	(0.829)	(0.074)	(2.132)
Constant	0.000	-26.998***	0.000
	(0.000)	(2.445)	(0.000)
Observations	1,510	1,532	1,506
Number of groups	104	105	104
Within R-squared	0.632	0.529	0.651

Table 60: Gender Equality Indicators & Elections

	Female parliamentary representation	Secondary GPI	Gender Equality Index
Elections	0.045	0.048**	0.306***
	(0.061)	(0.018)	(0.052)
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	-0.005**	-0.002***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.003)
GDP	0.123	0.104***	0.507*
	(0.098)	(0.022)	(0.249)
Population	-0.196	0.232***	0.510
	(0.292)	(0.066)	(0.718)
Population density		-0.000**	-0.003**
		(0.000)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.156	0.257***	0.955**
	(0.238)	(0.039)	(0.376)
Conflict		0.007	-0.125**
		(0.009)	(0.059)
Natural resources		0.000	-0.022***
		(0.001)	(0.006)
GDP growth	0.004	-0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Young population		0.013***	0.051**
		(0.003)	(0.023)
Female population	0.120***	0.031***	0.243***
	(0.029)	(0.006)	(0.064)
Fertility	-0.139**	-0.081***	-0.596***
	(0.065)	(0.027)	(0.114)
Proportional representation	0.384***		0.429***
	(0.072)		(0.047)
1991	0.000	-0.020	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.031)	(0.000)
1992	0.000	-0.029	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.000)
1993	0.000	-0.034	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.000)
1994	0.000	-0.052*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.000)
1995	0.000	-0.034	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.027)	(0.000)
1996	0.000	-0.007	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.024)	(0.000)
1997	-0.811	-0.013	-28.145*
	(5.424)	(0.022)	(15.400)
1998	-0.684	-0.029	-28.104*
	(5.438)	(0.021)	(15.438)
1999	-0.645	-0.038*	-28.120*
	(5.447)	(0.022)	(15.450)
2000	-0.737	-0.033	-28.142*
	(5.443)	(0.020)	(15.444)
2001	-0.696	-0.043**	-28.177*

	(5.447)	(0.020)	(15.461)
2002	-0.628	-0.039*	-28.092*
	(5.450)	(0.019)	(15.473)
2003	-0.565	-0.038**	-28.035*
	(5.458)	(0.018)	(15.477)
2004	-0.507	-0.031*	-27.883*
	(5.464)	(0.016)	(15.497)
2005	-0.370	-0.024	-27.767*
	(5.460)	(0.015)	(15.505)
2006	-0.347	-0.015	-27.689*
	(5.466)	(0.013)	(15.520)
2007	-0.318	-0.015	-27.607*
	(5.471)	(0.012)	(15.535)
2008	-0.295	-0.003	-27.552*
	(5.471)	(0.010)	(15.547)
2009	-0.297	-0.001	-27.507*
	(5.477)	(0.008)	(15.568)
2010	-0.237	0.000	-27.452*
	(5.479)	(0.008)	(15.582)
2011	-0.217	0.005	-27.353*
	(5.481)	(0.008)	(15.578)
2012	-0.139	0.002	-27.250*
	(5.484)	(0.007)	(15.589)
2013	-0.147	0.007	-27.313*
	(5.489)	(0.006)	(15.613)
2014	-0.109	0.007**	-27.292*
	(5.494)	(0.003)	(15.635)
2015	-0.143	0.000	-27.378*
	(5.505)	(0.000)	(15.666)
Constant	0.000	-6.346***	0.000
	(0.000)	(1.496)	(0.000)
Observations	1,191	950	782
Number of groups	98	90	85
Within R-squared	0.393	0.428	0.588

Table 61: Gender Equality Indicators & Political Freedoms

	Female parliamentary representation	Secondary GPI	Gender Equality Index
Political Freedoms	0.066**	-0.022***	0.024
	(0.026)	(0.006)	(0.039)
ODA	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	-0.006**	-0.002***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.003)
GDP	0.131	0.107***	0.561**
	(0.096)	(0.022)	(0.249)
Population	-0.246	0.207***	0.290
	(0.281)	(0.068)	(0.699)
Population density		-0.000**	-0.003**
		(0.000)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.174	0.229***	0.801**
	(0.228)	(0.039)	(0.360)
Conflict		0.003	-0.138**
		(0.010)	(0.064)
Natural resources		0.000	-0.022***
		(0.001)	(0.006)
GDP growth	0.004	-0.000	0.000
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Young population		0.014***	0.061**
		(0.003)	(0.023)
Female population	0.125***	0.027***	0.232***
	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.062)
Fertility	-0.140**	-0.084***	-0.602***
	(0.062)	(0.026)	(0.115)
Proportional representation	0.384***		0.404***
	(0.071)		(0.055)
1991	0.000	-0.037	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.033)	(0.000)
1992	0.000	-0.049	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.033)	(0.000)
1993	0.000	-0.052*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.000)
1994	0.000	-0.068**	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.000)
1995	0.000	-0.048	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.029)	(0.000)
1996	0.000	-0.022	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.000)
1997	-0.297	-0.028	-24.375
	(5.343)	(0.024)	(15.019)
1998	-0.169	-0.039*	-24.295
	(5.357)	(0.022)	(15.059)
1999	-0.130	-0.047**	-24.310
	(5.366)	(0.022)	(15.067)
2000	-0.219	-0.040*	-24.317
	(5.361)	(0.021)	(15.060)
2001	-0.181	-0.049**	-24.359

	(5.366)	(0.021)	(15.076)
2002	-0.112	-0.044**	-24.252
	(5.369)	(0.019)	(15.087)
2003	-0.048	-0.045**	-24.206
	(5.376)	(0.018)	(15.091)
2004	0.009	-0.037**	-24.055
	(5.383)	(0.016)	(15.112)
2005	0.145	-0.028*	-23.937
	(5.379)	(0.015)	(15.120)
2006	0.167	-0.019	-23.856
	(5.386)	(0.013)	(15.134)
2007	0.195	-0.018	-23.774
	(5.392)	(0.012)	(15.150)
2008	0.218	-0.006	-23.720
	(5.392)	(0.011)	(15.162)
2009	0.216	-0.004	-23.678
	(5.398)	(0.009)	(15.181)
2010	0.277	-0.002	-23.613
	(5.399)	(0.008)	(15.194)
2011	0.297	0.003	-23.518
	(5.402)	(0.008)	(15.192)
2012	0.376	-0.000	-23.413
	(5.405)	(0.007)	(15.202)
2013	0.368	0.005	-23.472
	(5.410)	(0.006)	(15.226)
2014	0.406	0.006*	-23.449
	(5.415)	(0.003)	(15.248)
2015	0.373	0.000	-23.532
	(5.426)	(0.000)	(15.279)
Constant	0.000	-5.657***	0.000
	(0.000)	(1.575)	(0.000)
Observations	1,191	950	782
Number of groups	98	90	85
Within R-squared	0.394	0.424	0.580

Table 62: Gender Equality Indicators & Effective Power

	Female parliamentary representation			Secondary GPI			Gender Equality Index		
Accountable		0.234***	0.036		-0.011	0.008		0.110*	0.124**
		(0.069)	(0.043)		(0.008)	(0.009)		(0.061)	(0.054)
Restricted	-0.234***		-0.197**	0.011		0.019	-0.110*		0.014
	(0.069)		(0.073)	(0.008)		(0.013)	(0.061)		(0.074)
Unrestricted	-0.036	0.197**		-0.008	-0.019		-0.124**	-0.014	
	(0.043)	(0.073)		(0.009)	(0.013)		(0.054)	(0.074)	
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.005**	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP	0.101	0.101	0.101	0.109***	0.109***	0.109***	0.607**	0.607**	0.607**
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.261)	(0.261)	(0.261)
Population	-0.215	-0.215	-0.215	0.217***	0.217***	0.217***	0.403	0.403	0.403
	(0.294)	(0.294)	(0.294)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.680)	(0.680)	(0.680)
Population density				-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.150	-0.150	-0.150	0.234***	0.234***	0.234***	0.890**	0.890**	0.890**
	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.358)	(0.358)	(0.358)
Conflict				0.004	0.004	0.004	-0.145**	-0.145**	-0.145**
				(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.064)
Natural resources				0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
GDP growth	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Young population				0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.064**	0.064**	0.064**
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Female population	0.142***	0.142***	0.142***	0.030***	0.030***	0.030***	0.258***	0.258***	0.258***
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)
Fertility	-0.126*	-0.126*	-0.126*	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.602***	-0.602***	-0.602***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Proportional representation	0.420***	0.420***	0.420***				0.426***	0.426***	0.426***

	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)				(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
1991	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.022	-0.022	-0.022	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1992	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.031	-0.031	-0.031	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1993	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.036	-0.036	-0.036	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1994	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.054*	-0.054*	-0.054*	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1995	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1996	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.009	-0.009	-0.009	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1997	-1.455	-1.689	-1.491	-0.019	-0.019	-0.019	-28.254*	-28.364*	-28.378*
	(5.874)	(5.912)	(5.878)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(14.379)	(14.399)	(14.372)
1998	-1.332	-1.566	-1.368	-0.028	-0.028	-0.028	-28.175*	-28.285*	-28.299*
	(5.886)	(5.924)	(5.890)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(14.419)	(14.440)	(14.412)
1999	-1.293	-1.527	-1.330	-0.038*	-0.038*	-0.038*	-28.187*	-28.297*	-28.311*
	(5.895)	(5.933)	(5.899)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(14.429)	(14.450)	(14.422)
2000	-1.378	-1.612	-1.414	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032	-28.199*	-28.308*	-28.323*
	(5.891)	(5.929)	(5.895)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(14.420)	(14.440)	(14.413)
2001	-1.335	-1.569	-1.372	-0.042**	-0.042**	-0.042**	-28.239*	-28.349*	-28.363*
	(5.897)	(5.935)	(5.901)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(14.435)	(14.455)	(14.428)
2002	-1.269	-1.502	-1.305	-0.036*	-0.036*	-0.036*	-28.129*	-28.239*	-28.253*
	(5.900)	(5.938)	(5.904)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(14.448)	(14.468)	(14.441)
2003	-1.212	-1.446	-1.249	-0.036**	-0.036**	-0.036**	-28.094*	-28.204*	-28.218*
	(5.908)	(5.946)	(5.912)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(14.454)	(14.474)	(14.447)
2004	-1.158	-1.392	-1.195	-0.030*	-0.030*	-0.030*	-27.938*	-28.048*	-28.062*
	(5.915)	(5.954)	(5.919)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(14.473)	(14.494)	(14.466)
2005	-1.021	-1.255	-1.058	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	-27.823*	-27.933*	-27.947*
	(5.914)	(5.952)	(5.918)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(14.480)	(14.501)	(14.474)
2006	-0.999	-1.233	-1.036	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-27.744*	-27.854*	-27.868*
	(5.920)	(5.959)	(5.925)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(14.494)	(14.515)	(14.488)
2007	-0.978	-1.212	-1.014	-0.014	-0.014	-0.014	-27.675*	-27.784*	-27.799*
	(5.928)	(5.966)	(5.932)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(14.511)	(14.531)	(14.504)

2008	-0.950	-1.184	-0.987	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-27.624*	-27.734*	-27.748*
	(5.929)	(5.967)	(5.933)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(14.522)	(14.543)	(14.515)
2009	-0.961	-1.194	-0.997	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-27.586*	-27.696*	-27.710*
	(5.935)	(5.974)	(5.940)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(14.543)	(14.564)	(14.537)
2010	-0.906	-1.139	-0.942	0.001	0.001	0.001	-27.525*	-27.635*	-27.649*
	(5.936)	(5.974)	(5.940)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(14.555)	(14.576)	(14.548)
2011	-0.879	-1.112	-0.915	0.005	0.005	0.005	-27.431*	-27.541*	-27.555*
	(5.939)	(5.977)	(5.943)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(14.552)	(14.572)	(14.545)
2012	-0.796	-1.029	-0.832	0.002	0.002	0.002	-27.324*	-27.434*	-27.448*
	(5.941)	(5.979)	(5.946)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(14.561)	(14.581)	(14.554)
2013	-0.806	-1.040	-0.843	0.007	0.007	0.007	-27.389*	-27.499*	-27.513*
	(5.947)	(5.985)	(5.951)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(14.584)	(14.605)	(14.578)
2014	-0.763	-0.997	-0.799	0.007**	0.007**	0.007**	-27.361*	-27.471*	-27.486*
	(5.951)	(5.989)	(5.955)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(14.606)	(14.626)	(14.599)
2015	-0.793	-1.027	-0.830	0.000	0.000	0.000	-27.444*	-27.554*	-27.568*
	(5.960)	(5.999)	(5.965)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(14.637)	(14.657)	(14.630)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000	-6.041***	-6.030***	-6.049***	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(1.507)	(1.505)	(1.506)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,191			950			782		
Number of groups	98			90			85		
Within R-squared	0.403			0.419			0.583		

Table 63: Gender Equality Indicators & Partially-ordered Subtypes

	Female parliamentary representation			Secondary GPI			Gender Equality Index		
Soft		0.184***	0.143***		-0.001	-0.006		0.203***	0.154***
		(0.058)	(0.042)		(0.007)	(0.007)		(0.051)	(0.030)
Intermediate	-0.184***		-0.041	0.001		-0.004	-0.203***		-0.048
	(0.058)		(0.037)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.051)		(0.041)
Hard	-0.143***	0.041		0.006	0.004		-0.154***	0.048	
	(0.042)	(0.037)		(0.007)	(0.006)		(0.030)	(0.041)	
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.009***	-0.009***	-0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
GDP	0.137	0.137	0.137	0.107***	0.107***	0.107***	0.576**	0.576**	0.576**
	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.102)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.263)	(0.263)	(0.263)
Population	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	0.207***	0.207***	0.207***	0.551	0.551	0.551
	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.311)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.722)	(0.722)	(0.722)
Population density				-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.003**	-0.003**	-0.003**
				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.044	-0.044	-0.044	0.230***	0.230***	0.230***	0.983**	0.983**	0.983**
	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.239)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.367)	(0.367)	(0.367)
Conflict				0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.148**	-0.148**	-0.148**
				(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Natural resources				0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.021***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
GDP growth	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Young population				0.014***	0.014***	0.014***	0.059**	0.059**	0.059**
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Female population	0.124***	0.124***	0.124***	0.029***	0.029***	0.029***	0.229***	0.229***	0.229***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Fertility	-0.123*	-0.123*	-0.123*	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.083***	-0.579***	-0.579***	-0.579***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.114)
Proportional representation	0.394***	0.394***	0.394***				0.425***	0.425***	0.425***

	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.072)				(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
1991	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.030	-0.030	-0.030	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1992	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.041	-0.041	-0.041	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1993	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.045	-0.045	-0.045	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1994	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.061**	-0.061**	-0.061**	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1995	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.043	-0.043	-0.043	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1996	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1997	-3.956	-4.140	-4.099	-0.023	-0.023	-0.023	-29.069*	-29.272*	-29.224*
	(5.951)	(5.987)	(5.975)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(15.531)	(15.538)	(15.534)
1998	-3.841	-4.025	-3.984	-0.034	-0.034	-0.034	-29.028*	-29.230*	-29.182*
	(5.968)	(6.004)	(5.992)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(15.567)	(15.575)	(15.570)
1999	-3.803	-3.987	-3.946	-0.043**	-0.043**	-0.043**	-29.044*	-29.246*	-29.198*
	(5.976)	(6.013)	(6.001)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(15.579)	(15.586)	(15.582)
2000	-3.898	-4.081	-4.041	-0.036*	-0.036*	-0.036*	-29.058*	-29.261*	-29.212*
	(5.973)	(6.009)	(5.998)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(15.572)	(15.580)	(15.575)
2001	-3.852	-4.036	-3.995	-0.046**	-0.046**	-0.046**	-29.094*	-29.297*	-29.249*
	(5.978)	(6.014)	(6.003)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(15.591)	(15.599)	(15.594)
2002	-3.791	-3.975	-3.934	-0.040**	-0.040**	-0.040**	-29.005*	-29.207*	-29.159*
	(5.982)	(6.019)	(6.007)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(15.603)	(15.610)	(15.606)
2003	-3.732	-3.916	-3.875	-0.041**	-0.041**	-0.041**	-28.964*	-29.166*	-29.118*
	(5.991)	(6.027)	(6.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(15.609)	(15.617)	(15.613)
2004	-3.673	-3.856	-3.816	-0.034**	-0.034**	-0.034**	-28.808*	-29.011*	-28.962*
	(5.998)	(6.035)	(6.023)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(15.631)	(15.638)	(15.634)
2005	-3.541	-3.724	-3.684	-0.026*	-0.026*	-0.026*	-28.694*	-28.897*	-28.848*
	(5.996)	(6.032)	(6.021)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(15.639)	(15.647)	(15.642)
2006	-3.523	-3.706	-3.666	-0.017	-0.017	-0.017	-28.617*	-28.819*	-28.771*
	(6.004)	(6.040)	(6.029)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(15.655)	(15.663)	(15.658)
2007	-3.502	-3.686	-3.645	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-28.551*	-28.753*	-28.705*
	(6.012)	(6.048)	(6.037)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(15.674)	(15.681)	(15.677)

2008	-3.477	-3.661	-3.620	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-28.494*	-28.697*	-28.648*
	(6.013)	(6.049)	(6.038)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(15.687)	(15.695)	(15.690)
2009	-3.480	-3.663	-3.623	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-28.454*	-28.656*	-28.608*
	(6.019)	(6.056)	(6.044)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(15.710)	(15.718)	(15.713)
2010	-3.423	-3.607	-3.566	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-28.392*	-28.594*	-28.546*
	(6.022)	(6.058)	(6.047)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(15.723)	(15.731)	(15.726)
2011	-3.401	-3.585	-3.544	0.004	0.004	0.004	-28.301*	-28.503*	-28.455*
	(6.024)	(6.060)	(6.049)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(15.722)	(15.730)	(15.725)
2012	-3.325	-3.509	-3.468	0.001	0.001	0.001	-28.194*	-28.396*	-28.348*
	(6.028)	(6.064)	(6.053)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(15.734)	(15.741)	(15.737)
2013	-3.335	-3.519	-3.478	0.006	0.006	0.006	-28.265*	-28.467*	-28.419*
	(6.034)	(6.070)	(6.058)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(15.760)	(15.767)	(15.763)
2014	-3.298	-3.481	-3.441	0.006*	0.006*	0.006*	-28.238*	-28.441*	-28.392*
	(6.039)	(6.075)	(6.064)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(15.781)	(15.789)	(15.784)
2015	-3.333	-3.516	-3.476	0.000	0.000	0.000	-28.324*	-28.527*	-28.478*
	(6.051)	(6.088)	(6.076)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(15.814)	(15.821)	(15.817)
Constant	0.000	0.000	0.000	-5.765***	-5.763***	-5.759***	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(1.464)	(1.461)	(1.460)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	1,191			950			782		
Number of groups	98			90			85		
Within R-squared	0.403			0.417			0.590		

Table 64: Gender Equality Indicators & Hybrid Regime Subtypes

	Female parliamentary representation	Secondary GPI	Gender Equality Index
Illiberal Unfair	-0.359***	0.027**	-0.283*
	(0.090)	(0.011)	(0.135)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.214***	0.054***	0.120
	(0.073)	(0.013)	(0.071)
Restricted Unfair	-0.294***	0.032***	-0.085
	(0.100)	(0.009)	(0.095)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	-0.122**	0.013	-0.227**
	(0.056)	(0.014)	(0.087)
Unrestricted Unfair	-0.091	0.005	-0.114
	(0.056)	(0.008)	(0.093)
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	-0.004*	-0.002***	-0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
GDP	0.099	0.101***	0.563**
	(0.098)	(0.024)	(0.261)
Population	-0.145	0.238***	0.797
	(0.248)	(0.064)	(0.706)
Population density		-0.000**	-0.003*
		(0.000)	(0.001)
Rural population	-0.051	0.281***	1.289***
	(0.227)	(0.039)	(0.356)
Conflict		0.008	-0.118**
		(0.008)	(0.051)
Natural resources		0.000	-0.021***
		(0.001)	(0.006)
GDP growth	0.004	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Young population		0.012***	0.048**
		(0.003)	(0.021)
Female population	0.104***	0.029***	0.215***
	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.069)
Fertility	-0.113*	-0.088***	-0.603***
	(0.064)	(0.026)	(0.102)
Proportional representation	0.373***		0.397***
	(0.068)		(0.052)
1991	0.000	-0.021	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.034)	(0.000)
1992	0.000	-0.027	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.034)	(0.000)
1993	0.000	-0.033	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.030)	(0.000)
1994	0.000	-0.051*	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.029)	(0.000)
1995	0.000	-0.033	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.029)	(0.000)
1996	0.000	-0.006	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.026)	(0.000)
1997	-1.017	-0.014	-32.991**

	(5.138)	(0.025)	(15.658)
1998	-0.902	-0.026	-32.961*
	(5.153)	(0.023)	(15.703)
1999	-0.864	-0.035	-32.997*
	(5.160)	(0.022)	(15.707)
2000	-0.949	-0.031	-33.032**
	(5.156)	(0.021)	(15.696)
2001	-0.907	-0.039*	-33.062**
	(5.160)	(0.020)	(15.715)
2002	-0.838	-0.036*	-32.983*
	(5.162)	(0.019)	(15.730)
2003	-0.780	-0.035*	-32.927*
	(5.171)	(0.018)	(15.742)
2004	-0.730	-0.028*	-32.787*
	(5.181)	(0.016)	(15.759)
2005	-0.597	-0.021	-32.673*
	(5.179)	(0.016)	(15.765)
2006	-0.578	-0.012	-32.603*
	(5.186)	(0.014)	(15.780)
2007	-0.553	-0.011	-32.534*
	(5.194)	(0.012)	(15.796)
2008	-0.520	0.000	-32.485*
	(5.194)	(0.010)	(15.808)
2009	-0.529	0.002	-32.446*
	(5.201)	(0.008)	(15.832)
2010	-0.476	-0.000	-32.413*
	(5.201)	(0.007)	(15.848)
2011	-0.457	0.005	-32.322*
	(5.204)	(0.008)	(15.841)
2012	-0.379	-0.000	-32.241*
	(5.208)	(0.007)	(15.852)
2013	-0.386	0.006	-32.300*
	(5.212)	(0.006)	(15.879)
2014	-0.347	0.007**	-32.278*
	(5.216)	(0.003)	(15.897)
2015	-0.379	0.000	-32.377*
	(5.225)	(0.000)	(15.927)
Constant	0.000	-6.387***	0.000
	(0.000)	(1.471)	(0.000)
Observations	1,191	950	782
Number of groups	98	90	85
Within R-squared	0.417	0.467	0.609

Table 65: HDI & Elections

	HDI
Elections	0.008
	(0.006)
ODA	-0.000
	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.000
	(0.000)
Population	0.012
	(0.012)
Population density	0.000***
	(0.000)
Rural population	0.016
	(0.010)
Conflict	-0.005***
	(0.002)
Natural resources	0.000*
	(0.000)
Fertility	0.000
	(0.002)
1991	0.004***
	(0.000)
1992	0.010***
	(0.001)
1993	0.011***
	(0.001)
1994	0.014***
	(0.001)
1995	0.018***
	(0.001)
1996	0.024***
	(0.001)
1997	0.031***
	(0.002)
1998	0.033***
	(0.002)
1999	0.037***
	(0.002)
2000	0.042***
	(0.002)
2001	0.048***
	(0.002)
2002	0.052***
	(0.002)
2003	0.058***
	(0.003)
2004	0.065***
	(0.003)
2005	0.072***
	(0.003)
2006	0.078***
	(0.003)
2007	0.085***

	(0.004)
2008	0.092***
	(0.004)
2009	0.097***
	(0.004)
2010	0.103***
	(0.004)
2011	0.110***
	(0.004)
2012	0.116***
	(0.004)
2013	0.121***
	(0.005)
2014	0.126***
	(0.005)
2015	0.128***
	(0.005)
Constant	0.220
	(0.209)
Observations	1,451
Number of groups	101
Within R-squared	0.864

Table 66: HDI & Political Freedoms

	HDI
Political Freedoms	0.003***
	(0.001)
ODA	-0.000
	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.000
	(0.000)
Population	0.010
	(0.011)
Population density	0.000***
	(0.000)
Rural population	0.015
	(0.009)
Conflict	-0.005***
	(0.002)
Natural resources	0.000*
	(0.000)
Fertility	0.001
	(0.002)
1991	0.004***
	(0.000)
1992	0.010***
	(0.001)
1993	0.011***
	(0.001)
1994	0.014***
	(0.001)
1995	0.018***
	(0.001)
1996	0.024***
	(0.001)
1997	0.030***
	(0.002)
1998	0.033***
	(0.002)
1999	0.037***
	(0.002)
2000	0.042***
	(0.002)
2001	0.048***
	(0.002)
2002	0.052***
	(0.002)
2003	0.058***
	(0.003)
2004	0.065***
	(0.003)
2005	0.073***
	(0.003)
2006	0.079***
	(0.003)
2007	0.085***

	(0.004)
2008	0.092***
	(0.004)
2009	0.097***
	(0.004)
2010	0.104***
	(0.004)
2011	0.110***
	(0.004)
2012	0.116***
	(0.004)
2013	0.121***
	(0.004)
2014	0.126***
	(0.005)
2015	0.128***
	(0.005)
Constant	0.253
	(0.206)
Observations	1,451
Number of groups	101
Within R-squared	0.864

Table 67: HDI & Effective Power

	HDI		
Accountable		-0.002	-0.006***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Restricted	0.002		-0.003
	(0.002)		(0.002)
Unrestricted	0.006***	0.003	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population	0.009	0.009	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Population density	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.014	0.014	0.014
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Conflict	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Natural resources	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Fertility	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
1991	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1992	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1993	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1994	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1995	0.019***	0.019***	0.019***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1996	0.024***	0.024***	0.024***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
1997	0.031***	0.031***	0.031***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
1998	0.034***	0.034***	0.034***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
1999	0.038***	0.038***	0.038***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2000	0.043***	0.043***	0.043***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2001	0.049***	0.049***	0.049***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2002	0.053***	0.053***	0.053***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2003	0.059***	0.059***	0.059***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2004	0.066***	0.066***	0.066***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2005	0.074***	0.074***	0.074***

	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2006	0.080***	0.080***	0.080***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2007	0.087***	0.087***	0.087***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2008	0.094***	0.094***	0.094***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2009	0.099***	0.099***	0.099***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2010	0.105***	0.105***	0.105***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2011	0.112***	0.112***	0.112***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2012	0.118***	0.118***	0.118***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
2013	0.123***	0.123***	0.123***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
2014	0.128***	0.128***	0.128***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
2015	0.129***	0.129***	0.129***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.275	0.277	0.280
	(0.211)	(0.212)	(0.212)
Observations	1,451		
Number of groups	101		
Within R-squared	0.864		

Table 68: HDI & Partially-ordered Subtypes

	HDI		
Soft		-0.001	0.002
		(0.001)	(0.002)
Intermediate	0.001		0.003**
	(0.001)		(0.001)
Hard	-0.002	-0.003**	
	(0.002)	(0.001)	
ODA	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Population density	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rural population	0.014	0.014	0.014
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Conflict	-0.005***	-0.005***	-0.005***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Natural resources	0.000*	0.000*	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Fertility	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
1991	0.004***	0.004***	0.004***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1992	0.010***	0.010***	0.010***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1993	0.011***	0.011***	0.011***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1994	0.014***	0.014***	0.014***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1995	0.018***	0.018***	0.018***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1996	0.024***	0.024***	0.024***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
1997	0.030***	0.030***	0.030***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
1998	0.033***	0.033***	0.033***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
1999	0.037***	0.037***	0.037***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2000	0.042***	0.042***	0.042***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2001	0.048***	0.048***	0.048***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2002	0.052***	0.052***	0.052***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2003	0.058***	0.058***	0.058***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2004	0.065***	0.065***	0.065***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2005	0.073***	0.073***	0.073***

	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2006	0.079***	0.079***	0.079***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
2007	0.085***	0.085***	0.085***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2008	0.092***	0.092***	0.092***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2009	0.097***	0.097***	0.097***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2010	0.103***	0.103***	0.103***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2011	0.110***	0.110***	0.110***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2012	0.116***	0.116***	0.116***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
2013	0.121***	0.121***	0.121***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
2014	0.126***	0.126***	0.126***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
2015	0.128***	0.128***	0.128***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.261	0.261	0.259
	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.211)
Observations	1,451		
Number of groups	101		
Within R-squared	0.863		

Table 69: HDI & Hybrid Regime Subtypes

	HDI
Illiberal Unfair	-0.010***
	(0.002)
Restricted Illiberal Unfair	0.002
	(0.002)
Restricted Unfair	0.006***
	(0.002)
Unrestricted Illiberal Unfair	0.003*
	(0.002)
Unrestricted Unfair	0.006**
	(0.002)
ODA	-0.000
	(0.000)
Regime duration	0.000*
	(0.000)
Population	0.010
	(0.011)
Population density	0.000***
	(0.000)
Rural population	0.022**
	(0.009)
Conflict	-0.004**
	(0.002)
Natural resources	0.000*
	(0.000)
Fertility	0.001
	(0.002)
1991	0.005***
	(0.000)
1992	0.011***
	(0.001)
1993	0.012***
	(0.001)
1994	0.015***
	(0.001)
1995	0.020***
	(0.001)
1996	0.026***
	(0.001)
1997	0.033***
	(0.002)
1998	0.036***
	(0.002)
1999	0.039***
	(0.002)
2000	0.044***
	(0.002)
2001	0.050***
	(0.002)
2002	0.054***
	(0.002)
2003	0.061***

	(0.002)
2004	0.067***
	(0.003)
2005	0.075***
	(0.003)
2006	0.081***
	(0.003)
2007	0.088***
	(0.003)
2008	0.096***
	(0.004)
2009	0.100***
	(0.004)
2010	0.106***
	(0.004)
2011	0.113***
	(0.004)
2012	0.119***
	(0.004)
2013	0.124***
	(0.004)
2014	0.129***
	(0.005)
2015	0.131***
	(0.005)
Constant	0.234
	(0.206)
Observations	1,451
Number of groups	101
Within R-squared	0.869

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Interviews

Title	Pseudonym	Location	Date	Description
Interview A	Joeli	Suva	13/03/18	A prominent civil society activist
Interview B	Maca	Suva	14/03/18	A civil society activist
Interview C	Selai	Suva	15/03/18	A former high-ranking FNA official
Interview D	Isimeli	Suva	19/03/18	A member of the FTU and high-ranking official of an international education CSO
Interview E	Lemeki	Suva	20/03/18	A former high-ranking MoE official
Interview F	Seru	Suva	21/03/18	A businessman and philanthropist
Interview G	Tomasi	Suva	21/03/18	A high-ranking FTA official
Interview H	Manasa	Suva	21/03/18	A high-ranking FTA official
Interview I	Taufa	Suva	21/03/18	A former high-ranking FTA official
Interview J	Filipe	Suva	30/03/18	A doctor and MoH official
Interview K	Kaali	Suva	22/03/18	A former senior MoH official
Interview L	Elenoa	Suva	22/03/18	A prominent civil society activist
Interview with Sitiveni Rabuka	NA	Suva	23/03/18	NA
Interview N	Adi	Suva	27/03/18	A former senior MoH official
Interview with Krishna Datt	NA	Suva	28/03/18	NA
Interview P	Epeli	Suva	28/03/18	A prominent lawyer
Interview Q	Poasa	Suva	30/03/18	A former high-ranking MoH official
Interview A1	George	Honiara	06/04/18	A doctor and prominent unionist
Interview B1	Nelson	Honiara	09/04/18	A high-ranking bureaucrat in the Department of Premier and Cabinet
Interview C1	Leotina	Honiara	09/04/18	A high-ranking INGO official
Interview D1	Samson	Honiara	14/04/18	An MP
Interview E1	Tome	Honiara	19/04/18	A senior education official
Interview F1	David	Honiara	24/04/18	A senior MoH official
Interview G1	Ema	Honiara	25/05/18	A CSO worker
Interview H1	Kai	Honiara	25/04/18	A prominent philanthropist
Interview with Sam Alasia	NA	Honiara	27/04/18	NA
Interview I1	Gabriel	Honiara	28/04/18	A top-level political adviser
Interview J1	Patrick	Honiara	29/04/18	A former senior civil servant with the MoH
Interview K1	Ulutah	Honiara	29/04/18	A former senior civil servant with the MoH
Interview L1	Michael	Honiara	30/04/18	A current MP
Interview M1	Crystal	Honiara	30/04/18	A senior civil society figure
Interview N1	Ruth	Honiara	30/04/18	A CSO worker
Interview O1	Fletcher	Skype	22/05/18	A former high-ranking RAMSI official