Abstract.

The basic intention of the thesis is to provide a reassessment of Constantius as a military man, specifically in the prolonged war with the Sassanian king, Sapor II. However, it also encompasses many aspects of the social, economic and religious life of the communities which lay on the frontier between Rome and Persia.

In the first chapter I discuss the historical background upto the death of Constantine, attributing the major reorganization of the eastern limes to the time of Diocletian and Galerius. In chapter II I describe events on the frontier during Constantius' reign. I adduce reasons for his adoption of a defensive strategy against the Persians and consider the nature of the Roman forces and fortifications in northern Mesopotamia. Chapter III contains a survey of the frontier legions and the major centres which they defended. In the fourth chapter an analysis of Persian aims and capabilities is offered, and particular notice is paid to the campaign of 359, while chapter V looks at the role of Armenia and especially of its southern provinces, the regiones Transtigritanae, in the conflict. The local communities of Mesopotamia are investigated in chapter VI, and in the final chapter I give an impression of the effect which nomadic Saracens had on the imperial frontiers.

I conclude that Constantius should be judged as a responsible and careful emperor, who succeeded in preserving the integrity of the eastern frontier in the face of a formidable and determined enemy.
In six appendices I present observations on the distribution of auxiliary units in the Mesopotamian provinces, the Romans' retreat from Ctesiphon in 363, the Persians' use of war-elephants and their lack of artillery, the chronology of fourth century Armenia and *dromadarii* in the Roman army. Five maps, one plan and twelve photographs accompany the text.
The Eastern Frontier of the Roman Empire
with special reference to the reign of Constantius II.

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Malatya'lı bir aile ile tanıştığımdan memnun oldum, ve özellikle yıllarca Müsemma'ya mutluluklar ve başarılar dilerim.
Preface

My attention was first drawn to the emperor Constantius II when I heard him spoken of as "this limited and much-maligned man." Whether limited or not, his reign as a whole is far beyond the scope of this *magnum opus*. Instead, I have contented myself with a reappraisal of his abilities as a military man and, more specifically, of his success or failure in the prolonged and arduous conflict with the Persians. I have tried to present a balanced view of his achievements in the East by looking at the events not only through the eyes of Romans but also, as far as possible, through those of their oriental subjects, allies and enemies. Consequently, my investigations have extended away from the person of Constantius to encompass a general picture of the eastern borderlands in the mid-fourth century. In doing so, I have entered fields of learning which have been left fallow by many another classical historian. My attempts to master the unfamiliar material may be judged inadequate, too, particularly as I have had to rely on translated versions of oriental works, but at least it has opened my eyes to the diversity and richness of civilization in late antique times.

The orthography of oriental names has been a constant source of aggravation to me. However, despite a plethora of variations, I have tried to adhere to a uniform spelling (except in direct quotations and reference titles). Wherever possible, I have adopted the form given by Ammianus, whether or not that is regarded as the most exact. Hence I call the Persian king Sapor in preference to Schapur or Shahpour. In the footnotes I have quoted references either *in extenso* or by using standard abbreviations which are, I hope, all self-evident. Two modern
works are spared full and endless repetition, largely in recognition of the fact that they were constant aids to my research. They are noted thus: A.H.M. Jones, *LRE* = *The Later Roman Empire 284-602. A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey* (Oxford 1964) and *PLRE I* = A.H.M. Jones, J.R. Martindale & J. Morris ed., *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire Vol. 1* (Cambridge 1971). In addition, I have provided to accompany chapters V and VI short bibliographies of the principal Armenian and Syriac sources.

During my labours I have received much help and encouragement from numerous individuals and institutions, a few of which I would like to acknowledge by name. At Oxford I have benefitted from the shrewd advice of John Matthews, the clarification of some important points of Syriac by Sebastian Brock and many lively discussions with Oliver Nicholson. In enabling me to undertake three marvellously exciting and instructive trips to eastern Turkey and Syria, I must thank David French and the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, the Craven Committee and my college, St. John's. But above all, I am extremely grateful to my excellent supervisor, Roger Tomlin, who has skilfully guided and goaded me to completion in less than three and a third years. While I owe a great debt to many people, I can rightfully claim as mine the misjudgements and mistakes of this work, all of which has been written and typed by my own erring fingers. Finally, I wish to thank my parents for their unfailing support and kindness.

C.S. Lightfoot.

A study of the eastern frontier at the time of Constantius II must necessarily commence with an account of the events which led up to the outbreak of hostilities at the very beginning of his reign. Historically, the most important occurrence in the East during the third century was the replacement of the Parthian Arsacids by the Persian Sassanian dynasty. From the first, Roman sources record the aggressive, neo-Achaemenid ideology of the new ruling family. Despite the fact that Rome had made significant territorial gains in Mesopotamia under Septimius Severus, the prosperous cities of Syria were laid open to repeated attack from the Persian forces led by the kings Ardashir and Sapor I. Their campaigns not only brought devastation and turmoil to the Roman East, but also drove the Arsacid king, Tiridates II, from his throne in Armenia and secured lasting control of the southern and eastern parts of Mesopotamia. The climax of Persian success came with the defeat and capture of the emperor Valerian in 260. Thereafter the Roman vassal state of Palmyra enjoyed a brief period of ascendancy over the eastern provinces, but with his victory over Zenobia in 272 Aurelian re-established the frontier with Persia under direct Roman rule.

It is, however, extremely difficult to ascertain the exact state of affairs during this period because of the scanty nature of both the literary sources and the archaeological material. The depredations of the Persian kings and then the dislocation and dissipation of the Roman frontier forces caused by the ambitions of the Palmyrenes and other usurpers cannot be estimated accurately. But it is certain that Sapor I captured and
destroyed numerous Roman fortified towns and castella. The extent of Roman territory in Mesopotamia under Palmyrene domination also remains conjectural, but since Odenathus is attributed with the recapture of Nisibis and his wife with the foundation of a city on the middle Euphrates, named Zenobia in her honour, one may tentatively postulate that the Severan frontier was all but restored. The state of affairs between Palmyra and Persia can only be guessed, although it does seem that friendly relations were established at some point. Certainly Zenobia would not have been able to contemplate expansion into Asia Minor and Egypt if there had been a threat of renewed Persian hostility. Moreover, cavalry from Persia is reported to have come to her aid in the struggle with Aurelian.

With the destruction of the Palmyrene forces and particularly the élite cavalry units, the clibanarii, it is clear that the eastern frontier was in need of urgent reinforcement and reorganization. Zosimus is our only source of information about the composition of Aurelian's victorious army; as well as legionary detachments and praetorian cohorts, there is special mention of light cavalry units of Danubian and Moorish origin. Similar units are found in the Notitia Dignitatum throughout the eastern frontier provinces, and although there is no direct evidence to link the late fourth century equites Illyriciani with Aurelian, it is at least attractive to think that he was responsible for the first introduction of such troops to the East as a counterbalance to the heavy, Persian-style cavalry. Nevertheless, it is rather unlikely that Aurelian was the instigator of a thorough reorganization of the limites Orientis. In 274 he returned immediately to the West, where he brought an end to the Gallic Empire, and early in the following year,
while he was planning a Persian expedition, he met with an untimely death at the hands of his staff officers. His two immediate successors, Probus and Carus, were also fully occupied during their brief reigns; the former in Gaul and on the Danube, the latter with his spectacular campaign against Persia. Probus dreamt of avenging the humiliation of Valerian, but he was unable to carry this into effect before he was murdered. Furthermore, it seems that during his reign there occurred a short-lived revolt in Syria, led by the provincial governor Iulius Saturninus. Carus may have brought fresh troops with him from the West to take part in his march to Ctesiphon, but after his sudden death it appears that considerable forces returned with the praetorian prefect Aper and Numerian's lifeless body to Asia Minor, where in the vicinity of Nicomedia Diocletian was proclaimed Augustus on 20 November 284. The turmoil of these years must only have increased the problems of insecurity and disruption on the eastern frontier. There can have been little opportunity for a major reconstruction of the provincial defences between the fall of Palmyra and the accession of Diocletian.

At the time that Carus sacked Ctesiphon, the Persian king Bahram II was faced with a serious revolt in the eastern parts of his empire. His brother Hormisdas, who was governor of the province of Khorassan, attempted to establish his own independent kingdom and had gained the support of the local tribes to this end. The king's preoccupation with internal troubles must have greatly facilitated the Roman success in 283. Yet it also seems that Rome's growing influence and strength in the East was sustained during the early years of Diocletian's reign. The Latin panegyrist's claim that before his accession
the Euphrates marked the limit of Roman territory, but this may be just conventional flattery and exaggeration. However, it is certain that at some point before the year 294 Diocletian received the title of Persicus maximus for the first time. The reference in a panegyric of 289-291 to an agreement with the Persian king concerning Mesopotamia may be connected with the adoption of the title.

Thus, apparently, dissensions within Persia allowed the gradual expansion and consolidation of Roman control in northern Mesopotamia, and perhaps Armenia, under Diocletian. It was to counteract this trend and to restore Persian authority and prestige that Narses, after he had usurped the throne, took the offensive. In 296 he invaded Roman Mesopotamia, where he encountered and defeated the Caesar Galerius between Carrhae and Callinicum. Despite the testimony of Zonaras, it seems unlikely that he crossed the Euphrates to threaten the cities of Syria, but the situation at this juncture was extremely grave. Clearly the Roman high command had been taken unawares by the attack and the border troops were insufficient to repel a large-scale and determined enemy force. In the following year Narses turned his attention to Armenia, presumably with the intention of deposing the Arsacid king and re-establishing direct Persian rule. Meanwhile Galerius, smarting under the rebuke of his senior colleague, gathered together a substantial field army which drew its troops from the Danube as well as the eastern provinces. He then led this force into Armenia, defeated Narses' army in a surprise attack on its camp and captured some valuable royal hostages. The Syrian chronicler, Joshua Stylites, attests that Galerius moved on southwards and took Nisibis in a year which is generally equated with October
297 to September 298.27

At this time Diocletian was occupied with the revolt of Domitius Domitianus in Egypt, where he remained until at least September 298.28 That the Egyptian revolt and Galerius' victory are contemporaneous is suggested not only by Aurelius Victor, but also by a fragment of Peter the Patrician, in which the Persian envoy Aphpharban makes an approach to Galerius alone and receives the promise of a reply later.29 Then in a second passage Peter describes a meeting between Diocletian and Galerius at Nisibis and the dispatch of Sicorius Probus to negotiate with the Persians on the river Asprudus.30 The date for these negotiations must be placed not before the winter of 298/9. If the defeat of Narses occurred in 297 as suggested, Galerius will not have been idle during the summer of the next year.31 It may be assumed that he was busy consolidating Rome's strengthened position in Mesopotamia. It also appears that Tiridates IV (the Great) was established on the Armenian throne during this interval.32 Certainly, the peace treaty which was exacted from Narses acknowledged not only northern Mesopotamia as Roman territory with the frontier marked by the river Tigris, but also the status of Armenia and Iberia as Roman client kingdoms. Furthermore, reference is made to five regiones Transtigritanae which were ceded to Rome.33

(b) The Tetrarchic Reforms.

The settlement with Persia and the ensuing peace heralded a complete reorganization of the Mesopotamian limes. Firstly, two new provinces were formed; one east of the Khabur, with its capital at Nisibis and named Mesopotamia proper, the other between the Khabur and the great loop of the Euphrates, called Osrhoene and with its capital at Edessa.34 Malalas records
that Diocletian established three arms factories in the East.\textsuperscript{35} One of them was at Edessa, and they are best viewed in the present context of a thorough overhaul of the eastern defence system. Unfortunately, the exact nature of the frontier in this most important sector, the salient between the Euphrates and the Tigris, cannot be ascertained from the available evidence. The Notitia Dignitatum gives us some indication of which troops were present and where they were deployed, but it does, nevertheless, reflect the situation almost a century later when, after the treaty signed by Jovian in 363, the Romans had lost control over the more remote part from Nisibis east as far as the Tigris.\textsuperscript{36} Archaeological work in the region has been hampered both by modern political divisions and by interest devoted to earlier civilizations. Surveys carried out some forty years ago by Poidebard and Stein suggest that the general line of the limes ran from Circesium on the Euphrates, up the Khabur valley towards Singara and Nisibis, and thence across to the Tigris in the region of Eski Mosul and Bezabde.\textsuperscript{37} Detailed excavation of late Roman sites has been undertaken at only a handful of places, although the wealth of material which might be preserved by the favourable climatic conditions of the area is amply shown by the remarkable finds at Dura-Europos.\textsuperscript{38} However, excavations at Dibsi Faraj on the Euphrates bank in the province of Augusta Euphratensis between Sura and Barbalissus indicate that the site was garrisoned, walled and given the rudiments of a town-plan by Diocletian, for in two places beside the fortifications there were found collections of coins from the Tetrarchy.\textsuperscript{39} This site has been identified with Neocaesarea, the station of the \textit{equites Mauri Illlyriciani} in the Notitia, and it may have been given this name in honour of
Galerius. Literary sources also provide some pieces of information. Ammianus states that Circesium was built by Diocletian *cum in ipsis barbarorum confiniis interiores limites ordinaret.* In his study of the Justinianic strengthening of the defences in the eastern provinces Procopius makes reference to earlier fortifications at numerous sites which include important strategic centres such as Edessa, Constantina, Resaina and Amida. He specifically attributes to Diocletian the construction of Callinicum and three other *apodota*, one of which he names as Mambri on the Euphrates.

The forces deployed in all the duchies from the Red Sea to the Tigris in the *Notitia* lists show a striking uniformity, particularly in the numbers of the élite cavalry vexillations. The *Illyriciani* are clearly derived from the mobile cavalry army which was first created by Gallienus, and it has been suggested that Aurelian brought a number of these units to the East for his war against Zenobia. The fact that light-armed *equites* proved successful against the heavy, Persian-style cavalry of Palmyra was probably not lost on later Roman generals. It is likely that Carus and then Galerius summoned additional units of this type to participate in their Persian campaigns. However, it seems reasonable to attribute the rigid and systematic distribution of the units of *equites* throughout the frontier provinces to the time of Diocletian's reorganization. The *Strata Diocletiana* and the province of Phoenicia provide an example of their deployment and dual purpose, which may be used by analogy to explain the system of defence in Mesopotamia. Van Berchem has shown that forts along the military highway which passes south of the Jebel Rawaq between Palmyra and Damascus were on the whole occupied by *alae* and
cohortes according to the deployment recorded in the Notitia. Only at al-Basiri is a unit of equites identified on the strata, and this proves to be a post of greater strategic importance, for an inscription attests the presence of a cohors VI Hispanorum there already during the Principate. The remaining eleven equites squadrons were distributed across the interior of the province, while of the two legions one, legio I Illyricorum, was stationed at Palmyra and the other, legio III Gallica, at Danaba (Mehin) to the north of the Jebel Rawaq and conveniently situated between the two major cities of the province, Damascus and Emesa (Homs).

The equites, therefore, were stationed primarily astride important roads behind the frontier, while the actual strata was manned by the old-style auxilia. On a local basis the mobile cavalry troops were intended to intercept enemy raids which penetrated the frontier in search of plunder, but they could also be removed temporarily to serve in an ad hoc field army if the necessity arose. They thus served an economical and efficient role in the total defence system. Although the peace settlement of 298 would have assured the security of the frontier against large-scale Persian aggression, there was doubtless always the threat of minor skirmishes and semi-official raids. Certainly, from the narrative of Ammianus it is evident that sporadic warfare was endemic in the border provinces of Mesopotamia and Osrhoene throughout the mid-fourth century. The forces of the two duces were surely intended on a day-to-day basis primarily to contain such razzias and regulate movements across the frontier.

A reconstruction of the deployment of forces under Diocletian can only be attempted in general terms. The legions were
stationed at key fortresses on the frontier to provide the back-bone of the defence system. Diocletian is known to have recruited numerous new legions; seven can be immediately identified in the *Notitia* by their imperial titles. Unfortunately none of these occur on the eastern front, but it is highly likely that *legiones I et II Armeniacae* and *legiones III to VI Parthicae* were also raised by him in order to garrison the Persian conquests. With regard to the *auxilia*, ten of which bear titles referring to either Diocletian or Maximian, very few of their garrison-stations have been confidently identified. The location of *ala I nova Diocletiana* may be sought between Tell 'Agaga and Tell Touneyir on the Khabur; *ala I victoriae Iovia* is placed in the *Notitia* at *contra Bintha*, which may be on the Euphrates near Zenobia; *cohors XIV Valeria Zabdenorum* is noted at Maiocariri on the road between Amida and Mardin; and finally, *ala II nova Aegyptorum* has its fort at Cartha, which is on the Tigris downstream from Amida. The *equites* apparently occupied sites in the rear on the military highroads. Thus, for example, the *Notitia* places cavalry units at such strategic centres as Resaina, Constantina and Callinicum. Nisibis may also have been garrisoned by cavalry units under the Tetrarchy, for it was a town of undisputed importance. Other *equites* are found on the *limes* proper at Amida, Oroba (Tell 'Agaga) and Thannouris (Tell Touneyir), but again these guard strategic points on the river boundaries.

This, then, is the sum of our evidence for the Diocletianic frontier, its units and their deployment. Diocletian made the most effective use of the military resources which were available to him. The old-style *auxilia* had borne the brunt of
the troubles during the third century and had suffered heavily as a consequence. Diocletian relieved them of the more arduous and dangerous tasks, making them into static troops used principally for police and observation duties on the actual limes. The equites served to patrol the large tracts of semi-desert within the provinces and to repel raiding parties of Persians or Saracens, while they also provided together with legionary detachments the nucleus of a field army. It does not seem to contradict the judgement of both Zosimus in the fourth century and the sixth century chronicler Malalas that Diocletian was responsible for re-establishing the eastern frontier on a sound footing.59

(c) The Opening Years of the Fourth Century.

Very little can be said with certainty about the frontier and relations with Persia from the time of the treaty with Narses until the last years of the reign of Constantine. It was claimed later that this was a period of peace between the two empires,60 and certainly for the most part both were too preoccupied with internal affairs to undertake serious hostile action across their mutual border. Rome retained its dominant position, apparently without much effort during the disturbed reign of Hormisdas II and the infancy of Sapor II. However, there is the suggestion in the imperial titles taken at this time of a certain amount of activity. A milestone dating to the winter of 312 or the spring of 313 records the title of Persicus maximus for Constantine and Maximinus,61 while two other North African inscriptions include among Constantine's titles those of Medicus and Armenicus maximus.62 It has been assumed that these titles relate to the activities of Maximinus Daia and Licinius in the East,63 but how, why and exactly where
they were won remains a mystery since ancient writers have failed to record in any detail the reigns of Constantine's opponents. Eusebius does, however, refer to trouble in Armenia which he associates closely with the persecution of Christianity by Maximinus in 312. An epigram of the elder Symmachus also indicates that a certain Verinus was the commander of troops in a successful war against the Armenians. But the brevity and obscurity of the reference make it extremely difficult to place the campaign in an historical context. Mesopotamia is completely absent from the literary sources throughout these years. What effect Licinius' struggles with Constantine had on the state of the defences and the manpower of the eastern garrison is unknown, but some units must have been withdrawn to join his field army in Europe. Yet it seems that he never feared serious attack from Persia and was spared the difficulties experienced by Constantius II in the mid-fourth century when he was twice faced with Persian invasions and western opponents at the same time.

The first contact Constantine had with his eastern neighbour came immediately after the defeat of Licinius in 324. Eusebius tells how a Persian embassy was sent to establish friendly relations with the new ruler of the Roman Orient. But Constantine himself paid scant attention to the eastern frontier in the following years. There is no indication that he ever visited the area except for a brief stay at Antioch. Solidi minted there in 324/5 have a reverse proclaiming his adventus, which may relate to a Church Council held in the city during that winter. Eusebius records another letter, sent to Alexander and Arius by Constantine in the hope of getting them to settle their differences, which refers to his failure to travel in
the East. The emperor claims that he was discouraged from doing so by the quarrels between the two Alexandrine clerics. But apart from ecclesiastical affairs which seem to have taken up an increasing amount of his time, Constantine concentrated his military activity on the Danube against the Goths and Sarmatians. This is shown clearly in the legislation, coinage and titulature of the period.

(d) The Outbreak of Hostilities.

In the early 330's relations between Rome and Persia deteriorated dramatically. According to Libanius, the Persian king sent ambassadors to demand frontier changes, presumably in similar terms to those used in a letter to Constantius in 358. It may be assumed that Constantine's reply was at least as forthright and uncompromising as that of his son a quarter of a century later. Possibly in response to the embassy and the threat of hostilities, Constantine dispatched the Caesar Constantius to the East in 333. Sapor, however, was not to be put off easily from his desire to regain the territory lost by his grandfather Narses. Recognizing the inadvisability of direct confrontation with Rome, he apparently decided to intervene in Armenian affairs in support of local chieftains and magnates who were at odds with the king, Chosroes II. Such action could clearly be regarded as a breach of the treaty of 298, but one which might persuade the Roman emperor to negotiate a new settlement rather than commit himself to a full-scale war with Persia.

The dissension in Armenia, however, escalated into open conflict. While a group of Armenian nobles loyal to the king appealed for Roman aid, Sapor sent an army under the command of his brother Narses to take control of the kingdom. The
Persian attack on Armenia probably necessitated Constantius' hasty return to the eastern command from Constantinople, where he had been attending the celebrations of both his father's tricennalia and his own wedding to the daughter of his uncle, Iulius Constantius. According to Malalas, the establishment at Antioch of the first comes Orientis, Felicianus, also occurred in 335. Since he was appointed in order to supervise troop movements and to facilitate the organization of military supplies, it seems that this, too, was closely connected with the worsening situation on the eastern front. The Chronicle of Theophanes says that the Persian forces overran Mesopotamia and took Amida, but that Constantius then defeated them, killing the prince Narses in the process. Unfortunately, there is some doubt about the veracity of Theophanes' statement, although it may be corroborated by Festus who refers to a successful battle of Constantius ubi Narseus occiditur. Ensslin thought fit to connect the two references and identified the site of the victory as Narrara, north of the Tigris on the road between Amida and Tigranocerta. Peeters, on the other hand, has argued that this pugna Narasarensi of Festus' Breviarium is in fact an early stage of the battle at Hileia near Singara in 344 or 348. One further piece of evidence may lend credence to the passage of Theophanes. Constantius is credited by several sources with the fortification of Amida while he was still Caesar. A plausible explanation for the refoundation of the city would be its capture by the Persians in 335. The work of surrounding it with strong walls and towers, as described by Ammianus, would then have been carried out in the last couple of years of Constantine's reign. The Syriac writer, Jacob the Recluse, also says that Amida was
built to help protect the frontier zone from Persian raiders who constantly made incursions and ravaged the countryside. These raids are attested by Festus,\textsuperscript{84} and it seems that Constantine was provoked to initiate plans for a Persian campaign more by the continued threat to Mesopotamia than by the failed attack on Armenia.

Towards the end of 335 Hannibalianus, the son of Constantine's half-brother Dalmatius, was endowed with the title of rex regum et Ponticarum gentium.\textsuperscript{85} The elevation of Hannibalianus has been regarded as an indication that Constantine wished to place a member of his own family on the Armenian throne, possibly as a counter-measure to Sapor's attempt to install a Sassanian prince.\textsuperscript{86} Such an act, however, would have been quite intolerable not only for the Persians but also for the majority of Armenians. Moreover, nothing is heard of Hannibalianus' actual installation or even of his presence in Armenia. The Chronicon Paschale in fact records that he set up his headquarters far off at Caesarea in Cappadocia. The Epitoma de Caesaribus suggests the real nature of Hannibalianus' command in the phrase: Armeniam nationesque circumsocias habuit.\textsuperscript{87} Explicit claim is made to the overlordship of Armenia, Iberia and the other minor principalities in the north-east in the face of renewed Persian attempts to gain control over them. Thus the title of rex regum was appropriate for one whose role was to safeguard these kingdoms bound to Rome by treaty and, to a certain extent, by religion,\textsuperscript{88} while it also served as an effective slight on the majesty of the Persian monarch.\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, it may even have been intended as a deliberate, provocative insult.
Wars on the Danube kept Constantine preoccupied from 328 until at least 334, if not 336. Many sources record that at the end of his reign he made ready for a grand expedition to the East. Eusebius even suggests that he was prompted by a desire to achieve a victory on this frontier to equal his exploits on the Rhine and Danube. However, it appears that his plans were still at an early stage when he was taken ill and died near Nicomedia in May 337. If Julian's expedition can be used as an analogy, Constantine would have required at least until the spring of 338 to make all his preparations. Thus his sudden death helps to explain why nothing is known of his exact intentions and leaves us with the question of whether he actually envisaged a major offensive similar to that undertaken by his nephew in 363. It might seem unlikely, particularly in the light of the later disaster, that an elderly and experienced ruler would seriously contemplate such a hazardous venture. Yet it may not have appeared so foolhardy at the time. The empire was united and secure; the army reorganized and fresh from recent victories, and the emperor, emboldened by his Faith, confident in his own invincibility. Moreover, the successes of Carus and Galerius must have reassured Roman minds that they had the measure of the Persians. It was, therefore, perhaps decided to deal with the upstart Persian king before he became too powerful and a real threat to Roman possessions in the East. If the intention was merely to discourage Sapor from his ideas of reconquest in Mesopotamia and Armenia, it is surprising that Constantine was apparently not satisfied with the delegation which was sent to sue for peace in the winter of 336/7.
(e) "The Lies of Metrodorus."

The surviving part of Ammianus' History contains the enigmatic remark that Constantine was to blame for the renewal of hostilities with Persia: *cum Metrodori mendaciis avidius acquiescit.* The full story of the philosopher Metrodorus is provided solely by Cedrenus, who may have derived it from a fourth century pagan intellectual writing in the same polemical tradition as that which influenced Ammianus. However, there is nothing to tell whether the relevant passage where Ammianus recounted the events at the end of Constantine's reign only made mention of Metrodorus, or whether other reasons were adduced for the outbreak of the war. Ammianus was well aware that the Persians were more aggressive and forceful during the mid-fourth century. One need only consider the letter which he quotes from Sapor to Constantius in 358 and his own personal experiences of the Persian onslaught in 359. Clearly the accusation as it stands is a poor piece of propaganda against Constantine, aimed at providing an excuse for the expedition of Julian while discrediting his uncle at the same time. Yet Ammianus' opinion that it was Constantine who stirred up the conflict with Persia may have some validity, even though it carries little weight as a justification of Julian's ambitious campaign in 363.

It is said that in the time of Constantine Metrodorus, a philosopher of Persian origin, travelled to India where he acquired great quantities of pearls and gems, some of which were gifts for Constantine from an Indian prince. On his return to Constantinople, however, Metrodorus presented the riches to the emperor on his own behalf and claimed that he had sent even more overland from India but that these had been
rebbe by the Persians. Constantine was enraged and wrote sternly to Sapor, demanding the immediate restoration of the confiscated articles.\footnote{101} When he received no reply, the peace between Rome and Persia was considered to be broken.

Although travels by philosophers in search of the wise and happy Brahmins had become something of a literary topos,\footnote{102} Metrodorus' visit seems to be an historical fact. Cedrenus can state that it took place at a specific date,\footnote{103} and the Church historian Rufinus says that the voyage of another philosopher, a Tyrian called Meropius, was stimulated by his example.\footnote{104} Rufinus claims that he obtained his information about this second trip from Aedesius, one of Meropius' young followers.\footnote{105} It is also recorded by Eusebius that an embassy came to Constantine in 335, declaring that the princes of India had set up paintings and statues in his honour and recognized him as their overlord.\footnote{106} Contacts with the sub-continent are further attested by quantities of Roman bronze coinage of fourth century date which have been found in southern India and Sri Lanka.\footnote{107} Demand for oriental luxury goods possibly increased with the restoration of peace and security in the Roman world under Diocletian and Constantine.\footnote{108} Moreover, their currency reforms, particularly the introduction of the gold solidus, provided a reliable and stable medium of exchange,\footnote{109} while the tight control of overland trade with Persia, which was channelled through Nisibis after 298, probably gave an added impetus to the development of the sea route from Egypt to India and beyond.\footnote{110} In this context one may note Metrodorus' interest in and ready acquisition of precious stones.\footnote{111} Likewise, the story of Meropius contains a reference to Roman merchants at a foreign port and associates
them with the establishment of Christian places of worship. Indeed, Christian missionary activity in the Orient is often mentioned in close connection with trade. The greater use of the southern sea route and the spread of Christian trading communities whose allegiance belonged to Rome may well have caused disquiet amongst merchantile circles in Persia. Certainly during the fourth century, with the severe restrictions now imposed on the passage of caravans across the desert frontier, the Persians gradually turned their attention to gaining a share in the maritime trade with the East.114 Perhaps, then, if there is any truth in Metrodorus' accusation that some of his gains from India were appropriated by the Persians, it is a reflection of their attempts to impose controls or to levy dues on merchandise passing through their lands. A letter from Constantine to Sapor on such a topic, particularly if written in one of his fits of anger, would doubtless have been strongly worded and highly provocative. Furthermore, evidence exists for another source of friction concerning trade. Libanius refers to a Persian embassy to Constantine which asked for permission to obtain supplies of iron from Roman sources. The ambassadors claimed that it was needed to make arms for a war against barbarian tribes, but Libanius clearly believed that it was intended for use against Rome.116 Thus the request, it seems, was refused. At least, in the mid-fourth century the Descriptio totius orbis records that it was forbidden to export iron and copper to enemies of the State, which included the Persians.117

(f) Constantine and the East.

While trade disagreements cannot be regarded as the proper cause of the hostilities between Rome and Persia, yet it is
possible to see them as a significant element in the
deterioration of relations between the two empires. In matters
of trade, as in diplomatic exchanges, Constantine's behaviour
does not appear to have been altogether statesmanlike. He
should have been more aware of the dangers of alienating his
powerful eastern neighbour. Greater efforts could have been
made to pacify and reconcile Sapor, but instead Constantine
seems to have inflamed his desire to avenge the defeat of
Narses and restore Persian honour and prestige. Indeed,
Constantine showed little interest in the eastern frontier
until the last years of his reign when the Persians were
already exerting pressure both by their intervention in Armenia
and by their sporadic raids on Mesopotamia. The ease with
which Amida fell to the army of prince Narses in 335 and the
fact that Constantius is attributed with its refoundation and
fortification demonstrate the neglect from which the whole
limes had probably suffered since the time of Diocletian and
Galerius. There is no evidence to suggest that Constantine
initiated a plan of refortification along the Tigris and
Euphrates frontier similar to that which he had carried out on
the Rhine and Danube. In fact, apart from numerous milestones
publicizing the Constantinian dynasty, only one inscription is
known in the eastern provinces which refers to the rebuilding
of military installations during the years of Constantine's
rule.

By contrast, one might consider the time, money and energy
which Constantine devoted in his later years to the construction
of churches in the East. Immediately after the defeat of
Licinius he circularized all the eastern metropolitans,
authorizing them to draw from the provincial governors or the
office of the praetorian prefect any sums which they required for repairing or enlarging the existing churches in their dioceses. \textsuperscript{121} This was a temporary measure, designed to make up for losses and damage caused by Licinius' persecution. But Constantine also built a considerable number of magnificent new basilicas, notably at Antioch and in Palestine. In a letter to Macarius, bishop of Jerusalem, about the projected church of the Holy Sepulchre, the emperor urged him to obtain craftsmen, labourers and materials without stint from the provincial governor and the \textit{vicarius Orientis}. \textsuperscript{122} Despite their value in psychological terms to the welfare of the state, such grandiose works must have put a heavy strain on the resources of the administration. Even if their cost was covered by the confiscation of treasures from pagan temples and cult centres, it seems from Constantine's directives to the public officials that the manpower was not readily available for large-scale building schemes. As well as the craftsmen and labourers who were thus drafted in on government orders, reference is made to the use of soldiers in the destruction of pagan shrines. \textsuperscript{123} All this activity could be a significant factor in explaining Constantine's failure to undertake a thorough refortification of the eastern defences.

One may believe, therefore, that Constantine was to a certain extent at fault over the war with Persia. His preoccupation with affairs elsewhere left him ignorant of growing Persian strength under the energetic young king, Sapor. When he suddenly became aware of troubles on the eastern frontier in the mid-330's, it almost seems that he overacted. The inflexible attitude of superiority which Constantine adopted towards Persia led him to believe that the problem ought to be
solved by military action, not by diplomacy and negotiation. Confidence, it is said, breeds contempt, and in this respect Constantine's handling of Persian affairs exacerbated an already difficult situation. Libanius later observed: 124

"Καν ἐξετάζει τις μετ' ἐμπειρίας τοὺς χρόνους, προσβυτέρων εὑρήσει τὴν ἀρχήν τοῦ πολέμου τῆς ἐκείνου (Constantine) μεταστάσεως, ἀμετέχες μὲν ἐκεῖνον ὁ πόλεμος διηνήσῃ, εἰς δὲ τὸν παῖδα τοῦ πολέμου τὸ ἔργον κατέβη."

2) The Sassanians demanded the full restoration of the Persian Empire to its greatest extent before the time of Alexander the Great. Their claims are succinctly recorded by Dio Cassius - LXXX,3,4, and Herodian - VI,2,4, with which compare those of Sapor in 358 - Amm. Marc. XVII,5,5 and below, ch.IV, p.132-3.

3) But note the prophetic words of Dio Cassius concerning the Severan conquest of Mesopotamia - LXXV,3,2-3:


6) The most notable example is Dura-Europos, which was left unoccupied after its fall in 256 - Amm. Marc. XXIII,5,8 and XXIV,1,5; P.V.C.Bauer, M.I.Rostovtzeff, A.R.Bellinger, et al. The Excavations at Dura-Europos Reports (New Haven 1929-1969).

7) SHA vita Gallieni 10,3; Tyr. Trig. 15,3; Zosimus I,39 and Zonaras XII,23-4.


9) As well as the reconquest of Mesopotamia, it is claimed by the Historia Augusta that Odenathus marched on Ctesiphon, put the Persian king to flight and captured his harem - SHA vita Val. 4,3; Gall. 12,1 and Tyr. Trig. 15,4.

10) Zenobia as an ally of Persia - SHA vita Gall. 13,5; Aurel.
23,4; Zosimus I,55. Also as an ally of the Armenians and Saracens - SHA Tyr. Trig. 30,7 & 18; Aurel. 27,4 & 28,4. Troops from these three nations are mentioned as fighting on her side against Aurelian in 272 - SHA Aurel. 28,2.

11) Festus, Breviarium ch.24: (Zenobia)...multis clibanariorum et sagittariorum milibus freta.
Two units designated Palmyreni appear in the Notitia Dignitatum - Or. VII,34 and XXXI,49. These are presumably survivals from the heavy second century recruitment of Palmyrene troops into the Roman army which is evidenced by the cohors XX Palmyrenorum, stationed at Dura-Europos during the first half of the third century - R.O.Fink, Roman Records on Papyrus (Cleveland 1971) nos. 1 & 2, pp. 18-81.

12) Zosimus I,52.

13) SHA vita Aurel. 35,4.

14) SHA vita Probi 20,1. This source also records that the Great King Narses sued for peace with Probus - Idem 17, 4-6 & 18,1. Recently scholars of Armenian history have linked this episode with a partition of Armenia and the establishment of Chosroes as a Roman vassal in the western half of the kingdom in 279/80. It is argued that Narses was then king of Greater Armenia, having assumed that position when his brother Hormisdas-Ardashir succeeded to the Persian throne in 271 - C.Toumanoff, "The Third Century Armenian Arsacids." R.E.Arm. ns. 6 (1969) pp.233-81 and B.MacDermott, "The Conversion of Armenia in 294 AD." R.E.Arm. ns. 7 (1970) pp.281-359.

The Historia Augusta, however, is notoriously untrustworthy, and the reconstruction of Armenian history by C.Toumanoff, although it is extremely astute and quite convincing, relies to a great extent on the manipulation of the equally unreliable Armenian sources. W.Seston has argued for a different interpretation of the SHA passages. He discounts the possibility that Probus could bring about the restoration of an Armenian king during his short reign. Instead, he believes that the appearance of a Persian embassy actually relates to the time of Narses' usurpation of the throne in 293. The passage is indeed closely connected by its dubious author with a revolt at Coptos in Egypt which has been ascribed to the same date - W.Seston, Diocletien et la Tétrarchie (Paris 1946) p.146f. One may also note that a Sicorius Probus is attested as taking part in the negotiations with Narses in 298 - Peter the Patrician, fr. 14 FHG IV (Müller) p.189.

15) Eutropius IX,17; Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus XXXVII,3; Zosimus I,66,1 and PLRE I sv. Saturninus 12 (p.808).

16) SHA vita Cari 8,1.

17) SHA vita Cari 8,1; Pan. Lat. XI (III),17,2. The revolt was supported by the Sacae, Kushans and Gelae. The Chronicle of Arbela also records a revolt by the satrap
of Adiabene against Bahram II - Sources syriques Vol. 1 ed. A. Mingana (Leipzig 1907) p.36-7 and trans. p.114.

Finally, one may note the opposition of Narses the Armenshah to the family of his brother Bahram I. Even if he was not openly hostile at that time, it is unlikely that he provided much assistance to the Persian king in these difficulties.

18) Pan. Lat. (Mynors) IX (IV),18,4; X (II),2,6 & 7,5. Aurelian is also attributed with bringing Mesopotamia back under Roman control - Zosimus I,39; 44-5; 50-60 and Zonaras XII, 27. But it is possible that the territory was evacuated in the confusion after the death of Carus and the defeat of Numerian - Zon. XII,30.


20) Pan. Lat. X (II),7,5; 10,6-7. Cf. also, XI (III),5,4 & 6,6.

21) Galerius had been summoned from the Danube to deal with the emergency - Aurelius Victor, De Caes. XXXIX,34; Eutropius IX,24; Festus, Brev. ch.25 and Orosius VII,25,9. The Armenian king, Tiridates IV (the Great), is said to have been brought up in the household of the future emperor Licinius - Agathangelos, Armenian version ch. 3 & 37; Greek version ch. 159 & 183; Arabic version ch. 147 & 176; Moses II,79. Moses tells how Tiridates fought in a battle beyond the Euphrates. Despite the fact that his horse was wounded, he managed to swim back across the river to rejoin Licinius and the defeated Roman army. Moses places the episode in the war of 283 after Carus' death, when his son, called in error Carinus, was defeated by the Persians on his retreat. However, it seems more likely that the passage is a recollection of the defeat of Galerius in 296. Eutropius vouches for Licinius' participation in the war against Narses - X,4,1, while other sources refer to him as a fellow-soldier and old friend of Galerius - Lactantius, De mort. pers. 20,3; Aur. Victor, De Caes. XL,8; Zosimus II,11 and Socrates, HE I,2.

22) Zonaras XII,31.

23) The circumstances of Narses' victory may suggest that the main line of Roman defence still lay on or behind the Euphrates at this time, since Galerius was unable to hinder or cut off the Persian advance by making use of well-manned fortresses inside Mesopotamia. Moses also says that the Roman army lined up on the west bank of the river after its defeat - II,79.

24) Amm. Marc. XXIII,5,11. This passage clearly implies that at least part of Armenia was under Roman control before 297.

A bronze medallion was struck at Siscia in the name of Galerius to celebrate the victory. The reverse bears the legend VICTORIA PERSICA and depicts the Caesar crowned by Victory. Two fallen Persian soldiers lie under his horse, while a child stands before him, together with a man and a woman, in a posture of supplication - R. Garucci, "A Brass Medallion representing the Persian Victory of Galerius." NC 10 (1870) pp. 112-8 and H. P. Laubscher, Der Reliefschmuck des Galeriusbogens in Thessaloniki Archäologische Forschungen I (Berlin 1975) plate 69, 1-2.

27) Joshua Stylites ch. 8, 6 ed. W. Wright (Cambridge 1882).


29) Peter the Patrician fr. 13, FHG IV (Müller) p. 188. Aurelius Victor also suggests contemporaneity - De Caes. XXXIX, 34-5. Lactantius attributes Diocletian with only a minor role in the Persian war - De mort. pers. 9, 6.

30) Peter the Patrician fr. 14, FHG IV (Müller) p. 189. John Lydus names a certain Palladius, not Sicorius Probus, as the envoy who negotiated with the Persians in 298 - De Mag. II, 25.

31) For hints of Galerius' energies and ambitions on the Persian front - Aurelius Victor, De Caes. XXXIX, 36-7 and Lactantius, De mort. pers. 9, 7.


34) Below, ch. III, pp. 77-8.

35) Malalas XII (Bonn) p. 307. One was located at Edessa διά τὰ τῶν ἔννοιας χρησιμοτηθέων and another at Damascus ἐννομόν τῶν δείκτων τῶν ἔργων. For fabricenses at Antioch - CTh VII, 8, 8 and X, 22, 1-6.

36) Below, appendix 1.

37) A. Poidebard, La Trace de Rome dans le Désert de Syrie (Paris 1934).

38) Ancient sites on the Euphrates and Tigris are now threatened by extensive reservoir and hydro-electric schemes. Although this has stimulated some excavation (as at Dibsi Faraj - see following note), doubtless much will be lost and overlooked in the short time before the river plains are flooded. Samosata is one of the most important and imperilled sites. Excavations had barely started there (on top of the massive tell) in 1979, but between two visits to the site (on 9/9/79 and 3/9/80) I observed that no further work had been carried out by the team of Turkish archaeologists. Above, n.6.


41) Amm. Marc. XXIII,5,1. The passage continues: ne vagarentur per Syriam Persae. This explains the main purpose of the Mesopotamian salient. Its occupation by Rome, with the provision of strong fortresses on all the major routes leading towards Syria, certainly prevented Sapor II from emulating the achievements of his third century namesake. Below, ch.II, pp.46-7.


43) Number of equites Illyriciani

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palaestina</td>
<td>five</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabia</td>
<td>four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenicia</td>
<td>four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osrhoene</td>
<td>three</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesopotamia</td>
<td>four</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The garrison of Armenia, however, is markedly different. It has no units of equites Illyriciani, but contains a much larger number of old-style auxilia. Presumably, while Armenia and Iberia remained client kingdoms, the Roman territories to the west were largely protected from enemy incursions. Thus the static alae and cohortes predominate, policing the border along the Upper Euphrates and the coastal strip east of Trapezus. Below, ch.II, pp.45-6.


45) Not. Dign. Or. XXXII,33-44

46) AE 1933, no.216
47) CIL III,133 and Not. Dign. Or. XXXII,30

48) For example, the activities of the Persian general
Nohodares - Amm. Marc. XIV,3 and XVIII,6,16. Cf. also,
XVII,6,9 and XXIII,3,4.
In 327 there is recorded the martyrdom of eleven people
in the province of Arzanene, which was then within the
Roman sphere of control. They were, perhaps, victims of
a Persian raid - J.S.Assemanus, Acta Martyrum Orientalium
Christianisme dans l'Empire Perse (Paris 1904) pp.50 (n.1)
and 78.


50) D.Hoffmann, Das spätromische Bewegungsheer und die Notitia
Dignitatum (Düsseldorf 1969-70) p.415 and A.H.M.Jones,
LRE p.57.
In Arabia legio IV Martis at Beththoro (Lejjun) may be a
Diocletianic formation, created as part of the strengthening
of the defences and the schematic allocation of two legions
to each province, for it follows in sequence after the
other legion in Arabia, legio III Cyrenaica - Not. Dign.
Or. XXXVII,21 & 22. D.Hoffmann has suggested that its
title also reflects the special relationship of Galerius
to Mars, and thus its creation dates after 293 - op.cit.
voll. 2, n.589 (p.69) and n.225 (p.91).

Ala nova Diocletiana and cohors III Herculia in Phoenicia
- Not. Dign. Or.XXXIII,34 & 40.
Ala I nova Herculia and cohors III Valeria in Syria -
Not. Dign. Or. XXXIII,30 & 34.
Cohors XIV Valeria Zabdenorum in Mesopotamia - Not. Dign.
Or.XXXVI,36.
Alae VII Valeria praelectorum, I Victoriae Iovia and
I nova Diocletiana in Osrhoene - Not. Dign. Or. XXXV,27,
28 & 31.


53) J.-P.Rey-Coquais, "Syrie Romaine de Pompée à Dioclétien."
JRS 68 (1978) p.69. Contra Bintha may, perhaps, be the
Mambri described by Procopius as a Diocletianic fort -
De Aedificiis II,8,7-8.

54) This place is mentioned by Ammianus, but without any
reference to a fort in its vicinity - Amm. Marc. XVIII,
6,16 & 10,1. Thus it is likely that the unit was moved
there only after the evacuation of the region east of
Nisibis on the orders of Jovian and that the cohort had
earlier been stationed in Zabdicene itself.


Similarly, the region around the confluence of the Belikh
with the Euphrates is heavily guarded. There are equites' forts at Barbalissus, Neocaesarea, Risapha and Dabana, as well as the legion stationed at Sura. This deployment was necessitated by the vulnerability of the rich lands and cities of Syria to raids from that sector of the limes.

57) Amm. Marc. 'XX, 6, 9.


59) Zosimus II, 34 and Malalas XII (Bonn) p. 308.

60) Ephraem, Carmina Nisibena XIII, 14; Festus, Brev. Ch. 14 & 25 and Libanius, Or. LIX, 65. On the other hand, both Julian and Libanius state that the Persians contrived to disturb and break the peace before Constantine's death - Jul. Or. I, 18b and Lib. Or. LIX, 60.

61) ILS 1,3956.

62) ILS 8942, dated 315 from Senta in Africa Proconsularis. ILS 696, dated 318 from near Sitifis in Mauretania.


64) Eusebius, HE IX, 8, 2. The campaign may be taken merely as an expedition to assist the Armenian king in the enforcement of the common policy against Christians. The martyrdom of Rhipsime and her companions at Vâlarshapat has been placed in this context by P. Peeters - "S. Grégoire l'Illuminateur." AB 60 (1942) p. 105-6. For Tiridates' adherence to the Roman government's policy of persecution there is the letter which he is said to have sent to Diocletian, quoted in the Greek version of Agathangelos - ch. 40 in G. Garitte, Documents pour l'étude du livre d'Agathange (Rome 1946) p. 37. R.W. Thomson believes that its composition is of an early date, but he does not support the view of M. L. Chaumont that it is "une authentique pièce de chancellerie" - Agathangelos. History of the Armenians (Albany 1976) Intro. pp. xlviii-xlxi. For the persecution ordered by Maximinus - R. M. Grant, "The Religion of Maximin Daia." in ed. J. Neusner, Christianity, Judaism and other Greco-Roman Cults Pt. IV (Leiden 1975) pp. 143-66.

65) Two Verini are known from imperial rescripts; one was praeses Syriae in 305 - C. I. II, 12, 20 & III, 12, 1, and the other, possibly his son, was praefectus urbis Romae in 323-5 - C. Th. II, 17, 1; XIV, 4, 2 & II, 24, 1. The fact that the
epigram comes last in a series of five, the others of which all concern city prefects under Constantine, and that it compares Verinus' military prowess with his abilities as an administrator suggests that Symmachus may have been praising the latter. This, however, does not help to identify his involvement in Armenia, but perhaps Maximinus' expedition or the supposed campaign of Licinius are the best possibilities.

66) Above, nn.21 & 63.

67) Eusebius, Vita Constantini IV,8.

68) Eusebius quotes a letter which Constantine sent to an eastern monarch at this time - Vita Const. IV,9,13. The authenticity of such documents has been accepted by A.H.M. Jones - "Notes on the Genuineness of the Constantinian Documents in Eusebius' Life of Constantine." Journal of Ecclesiastical History 5 (1954) p.200. It has long been assumed that it was addressed to the Persian king, Sapor II - Sozomen, HE II,15. But D.De Decker has now argued persuasively the case against this assumption, and instead he believes that the recipient was Tiridates, the king of Armenia - "Sur le destinataire de la lettre au Roi des Perses." Persica 8 (1979) pp.99-116. This certainly removes the awkwardness of imagining that Constantine in 324 sent such a provocative letter to Sapor. For evidence suggests that relations between Rome and Persia did not deteriorate until the mid-330's and that the persecution of Persian Christians did not commence until the 340's - below, ch.VI, n.24.

69) RIC Vol. 7 (London 1966) no. 48, p.685.

70) Eusebius, Vita Const. II,72,2-3: ἀνοιξτάτε δι' οὐ κατά τον έν τῇ καθ' υπόκε δύνατα τῆς ἐξασ την ἄκου, ἴν ταῖς πόδε ἁληώους φιλονευτικάς απευθείαται...

71) O.Seeck, Regesten der Kaiser und Päpste (Stuttgart 1919) pp,174-84. CTh XI,39,3 records Constantine's presence at Naissus on 25 August, 334. RIC Vol. 7, p.527 lists coins minted at Thessalonika, apparently in 335/6, which proclaim his adventus. Below, n.90.

72) Libanius, Or. LIX,71 and Amm. Marc. XVII,5,5.

73) While Constantine II campaigned on the Danube in 332, it seems that Constantius II deputized for his elder brother in Gaul - Julian, Or. I,12a. Julian implies that he was transferred directly to the eastern frontier in the following year in order to take command against the Persians - Or. I,13b & d.

74) Tiridates is said to have been murdered by a group of Armenian nobles shortly after the death of Gregory the Illuminator - Faustos of Buzanda III,2-3 and Moses II,92. C.Toumanoff has put forward arguments for the dating of the king's death to 330 - "The Third Century Armenian Arsacids." R.E.Arm. ns. 6 (1969) p.273.

76) Eusebius, Vita Const. IV, 49; Julian, Ep. ad Ath. 272d; Athanasius, Hist. Ar. 69 (Migne) PG vol. 25, 776.

77) Malalas XIII (Bonn) p. 318–9. The phrase ἐν τῇ ὑποτελείᾳ ἰουλίου κων�ταντίου καὶ κειονίου ρουφίου ἀλβίνου is taken to mean the consulship of Iulius Constantius and Ceionius Rufius Albinus, which dates to that year.

78) G. Downey, A Study of the Comites Orientis and the Consulares Syriae (Princeton 1939) pp. 9–11. Presumably Lucillianus was also instrumental in the preparations for Constantine's planned expedition in 337.

79) Theophanes 3a (am. 5815) in Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte ed. J. Bidez (Berlin 1972) p. 204. J. Bidez considered that the passage might be a fragment of an Arian hagiographer.


Julian, however, refers to the death of a Persian prince, after his capture together with all his escort, in the context of the battle of Singara - Or. I, 24d.

80) Festus, Brev. ch. 27, 2. Festus implies that although Constantius was responsible for the campaign, he did not take part personally in the battle. The name of the general who secured the victory is lost, but there are some pieces of evidence which, perhaps, point to his identity. Flavius Eusebius is one of the few magistri of the years before 350 who is known to us. (Others are Hermogenes, magister equitum in 342, and Flavius Iulius Sallustius, magister peditum before 344.) He was probably the father of Eusebia, Constantius' second wife, but he had already died before their marriage in c. 353 - Julian, Or. III, 110c-d. Eusebia's two brothers, Flavius Eusebius and Flavius Hypatius, shared the consulship in 359 – Amm. Marc. XVII, 1, 1 and XXI, 6, 4. One may suspect, therefore, that their father was already middle-aged in the 330's. He himself held the consulship in 347 – CIL X, 477, and Julian says that he was the first of his family to reach that office – Or. III, 108d. It is likely that he gained the honour as a reward for some notable service to the emperor. For Julian remarks in the context of Eusebius' consulship that, although deprived of its former powers, the office was still valued: οἵον γάλλον...καὶ γέρας ἀφετής καὶ πίστεως ἢ τινος εὐνοίας καὶ ὑπηρεσίας περὶ τῶν γάλλων ἀρχοντῶν ἢ πρόεξος λαμπρός – Or. III, 108a. It appears that Julian is making oblique reference to Eusebius' exploits.

Two pieces of information connect the family of the Eusebii with the Armenian sector of the eastern frontier. Firstly, there is the imperial rescript which, although attributed to Constantine and dated 17 June, 315, appears to have been revised by Constantius in 360 – ÇTh XI, 1, 1 and Th. Mommsen's note. This decree granted immunity from taxation to Datianus, to Arsaces, king of Armenia, and ad domum clarissimae memoriae Eusebii exconsule et exmag(is)tro equitum et peditum. Secondly, in 358 Constantius renamed
the diocese of Pontica (which bordered on Armenia) Pietas in honour of his wife Eusebia - Amm. Marc. XVII,7,6.
Yet the family came from Thessalonika in Macedonia and had no obvious connection with the Pontic diocese - Julian, Or. III, 106a-107d.
Consequently, one may advance the hypothesis that Flavius Eusebius was in fact the general who defeated the prince Narses and rescued Armenia from Persian invasion. For his success he was rewarded with a prominent position at Constantius' court (which led to both his consulship and his daughter's marriage) and, perhaps, with estates on the Armenian borderlands. Publicly, however, the credit would have been claimed by Constantius as commander-in-chief, if not by Constantine himself. Consider the complaints of Ammianus on this score - Amm. Marc. XVI,12,69-70. Even in the panegyric to Eusebia Julian would not perhaps have wished to refer openly to her father's military prowess in deference to her husband.

Below, ch.II, p.43.
83) Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,1; Theophanes 15 (am.5832); Chronicon miscellaneum ad 724 pertinens 15a and Chronicle of Michael the Syrian 15b in Philostorgius, Kirchengeschichte ed. J.Bidez p.212. Together with Amida these authors mention the refoundation of Tella/Constantina by Constantius. The town is also known by the name of Maximianopolis, which suggests an earlier phase of construction under the Tetrarchy. But, according to Malalas, it was captured by the Persians and then restored during Constantine's reign - Malalas XIII (Bonn) p.323. Jacob the Recluse, on the other hand, connects the fortification of Amida with the building of two other strongholds - F.Nau, "Résumé de monographies syriques: Jacques le Reclus." Revue de l'Orient Chrétien 20 (1915) p.7 and below, ch.III, nn.13 & 23.
84) Festus, Brev. ch.26: ..adsiduis eruptionibus, quae sub Constantio Caesare per Orientem temptaverant.
85) Anon. Val. 6,35; Amm. Marc. XIV,1,2 and Chronicon Paschale vol. 1 (Bonn 1832) pp.531-2.
N.H.Baynes, "Rome and Armenia in the Fourth Century." in Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (London 1955) p.189. Baynes also considered that Hannibalianus was responsible for the defeat of the Persian army under Narses - JRS 18 (1928) p.222. However, Ensslin pointed out that such a success would have enhanced his reputation with the army, a fact which is not supported by their behaviour towards
him after Constantine's death.

For coins of Hannibalianus - RIC Vol. 7, no. 100, p.584 & pl. 19 and nos. 145-8, p.589-90. Minted at Constantinople, this silver and bronze coinage has the obverse legend FL.(H)ANNIBALIANO REGI and depicts on the reverse a personification of the river Euphrates.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Metropolitan Athanasius claimed that Hannibalianus was the founder of the monastery of the Chrysocephalus in Trebizond (Trabzon).
G.Millet, however, has warned against trusting such evidence, since the Byzantines had the habit of attributing to Constantine and his family the foundation of any Christian monument whose true origin had been forgotten - "Les monastères et les églises de Trébizonde." Bull. de Corr. Hell. 19 (1895) p.421.

88) Peter the Patrician fr. 14, FHG IV (Müller) p.189. The eastern frontier of Armenia is defined in the treaty as the fortress of Zintha in Media Atropatene. Cf. M.-L. Chaumont, Recherches sur l'Histoire d'Arménie de l'avènement des Sassanides à la conversion de royaume (Paris 1969) p.126. Suzerain rights over Iberia were also ceded to Rome: τὸν δὲ Ἰβηριλάς βασιλέα τῆς οἰκείας βασιλείας τὰ σύμβολα Ῥωμαίοις ἐδέσθην.
Rufinus states that an embassy was sent to Constantine from Iberia which asked him to provide them with sacerdotes - HE I,10 (Migne) PLat. vol. 21, col.482; also, Socrates, HE I,20 and Sozomen, HE II,7. C.Toumanoff dates the conversion of the Iberian king to July 334 and the official adoption of Christianity by the kingdom to March 337 - Studies in Christian Caucasian History (Washington 1963) pp.374-7.


90) E.A.Thompson believes that the conquest of Oltenia across the Danube was carried out by Constantine between 328 and 332 - "Constantine, Constantius II and the Lower Danube Frontier." Hermes 84 (1956) pp.372-4. T.D.Barnes suggests that he gained the title of Gothicus maximus I in 328 or 329 after building the bridge over the Danube; Gothicus II in 332 when the Romans defeated the Goths in Sarmatian territory; Sarmaticus II in 334 when the Sarmatians expelled their ruling class after a Roman attack, and Dacicus maximus in 336 to mark the triumphant conclusion to his Gothic campaigns - art.cit. ZPE 20 (1976) pp.151-3.

91) Festus, Brev. ch.26; Anon. Val. 6,35; Orosius VII,28,31.

92) Eusebius, Vita Const. IV,56.
Perhaps, too, he sought to emulate the emperor Trajan, passing from the conquest of Dacia to that of Mesopotamia - above, n.90.

93) Julian left Constantinople for the East in May 362. But it is likely that his plans for a major war against Persia
were already under way at the very beginning of the year - Amm. Marc. XXII,9,2 and Julian, Ep.4. He spent a further nine months at Antioch, from June 362 to March 363, making preparations for the campaign - CTh XII,1,55; Amm.Marc. XXII,12,2 & XXIII,2,6. Julian then advanced to the Euphrates and finally crossed the frontier at Circesium at the beginning of April - Amm.Marc. XXIII,5,1 & 4; Zosimus III,13,3. Even so there was some confusion and anxiety over the punctual arrival of supplies, which resulted in the execution of one unfortunate by the praefectus Salutius - Amm.Marc. XXIII,5,6.

94) A.H.M.Jones, LRE pp.97-100.

95) Eusebius presents Constantine as ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς θεοτοκίας, elected by divine providence and granted success because of his Faith - HE X,8,6; 9,2 & 4-6. In the panegyric which he delivered at Constantine's tricennalia, he further declares: ...τίς ἀνωτέρω βασιλεὺς τὴν εἰκόνα φέρων ὁ τῷ δὲ φίλος βασιλεύς κατὰ μὴν οὗ τοῦ κράτους τῶν ἔπει γῆς αἵτων τῶν οἴκων διωκόμενον θάνατον - Laudatio Constantini I,6. Indeed, it seems that Constantine regarded himself as God's vice-regent not just in the Roman Empire but throughout the whole inhabited world - Eus. Vita Const. IV,9 (the letter addressed to the Armenian monarch - above, n.68). Eusebius says that even among the distant nations of India and Ethiopia Constantine: ...βασιλικαίς προσανατολισμοῖς τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἑδον ὑπερασπίσθη τῷ πάθει - Vita Const. I,8,4. It is also noteworthy that Constantine summoned bishops to accompany him on the planned campaign against Persia - Eus. Vita Const. IV,56. It was not only Christian writers in the Roman world who accredited his victories to his belief in God, for the Persian author Aphraates also looked forward to the victory of Rome, which was assured now that the emperor had embraced Christianity - Homily V, especially sections 1, 3, 13 and 23-5 (published in 337).

96) Festus, Brev. ch. 25: Persae non modo armis, sed etiam moribus Romanos superiores esse confessi sunt.

97) Eusebius says that Constantine accepted the Persian offer of peace, calling him ὁ εἰρηνικὸς βασιλεὺς - Vita Const. IV,57. This contradicts the view held by numerous other writers that Constantine was still intent on pursuing the war when he died - Festus, Brev. ch. 26; Eutropius X, 8,2; Aurelius Victor, De Caes. XLI,16; Anon. Val. 6,35; Julian, Or. I,18b and Chron. Pasch. 13 in Philostorgius, op.cit. p.208. It appears, therefore, that Eusebius has tried to conceal the truth about the embassy in order to preserve Constantine's image as a just and peace-loving monarch. One may compare the events leading up to Julian's expedition. In the winter of 362/3 envoys came from Sapor with proposals for negotiation and reconciliation. The Persian king was evidently alarmed, as in 336/7, by the news of large-scale military preparations on the Roman side. All of Julian's entourage, says Libanius (who was himself present among them), pressed him to accept the offer, but he curtly rejected the Persian overtures,
replying that there was no need to send envoys as Sapor would soon see him in person - Libanius, Or. XVIII,164. Julian's friends and admirers were at great pains to emphasize the necessity of resorting to arms at that time, partly in order to excuse the off-hand treatment of the embassy - Amm. Marc. XXII,12,1-2; XXV,4,24 & 26; Libanius, Or. XVIII,164 & 166.


100) Amm. Marc. XVII,5,5; XVIII,6,8ff; 7,4ff and XIX,8,5ff. Significantly, Aphraates also considered the Persians as wicked aggressors in the war, although he was of Persian origin himself - Homily V ed. I.Parisot, Patr. Syriaca I (Paris 1894) pp.185-238. Below, ch.IV, n.14 and ch.VI, pp.231-2.

101) Julian, writing in the Greek tradition hostile to Constantine, draws attention to his greed and weakness for luxury - Or. VII,227c and Caesares 329a; 335b & 336a; also Zosimus II,32, which derives from Eunapius' account of his reign and, consequently, indicates how the first Christian emperor was regarded by educated eastern pagans in the late fourth century - cf. Photius, Cod. 77 (54a).

102) India and philosophy had been a traditional theme since the time of Alexander's discussion with the gymnosophists - Plutarch, Alex. 65,5-6; Arrian, Anabasis Alex. VII,1,5-2,4 and Strabo, Geogr. XV,1,63-5. The wise and happy Brahmins became popular as models for the philosophic or ascetic life, and they attracted considerable interest from both pagan and Christian authors; for example, Tertullian, Apol. 42; Philostratus, Τὸ έκ τῶν Τούρακα 'Απόλλωνον III,15 and VI,6 & 11; Lucian, Alex. s.Pseudom. 44; Hierocles, Φιλόστορος FHG IV (Müller) p.430 and Ps-Palladius, De Moribus Brachmanorum. Cf. J.D.M. Derrett, "The History of 'Palladius on the Races of India and the Brahmins'." Class. et Med. 21 (1960) pp.67-8, n.22. Several philosophers are reputed to have journeyed to India, following in the steps of Megasthenes:- Apollonius of Tyana in the mid-first century - Philost. I, 41 and II,41. Pantaenus during the reign of Marcus Aurelius - Eusebius, HE V,10,3 and Jerome, De viris illustribus 36. Pantaenus' pupil, Clement, also met Indian wise men in Alexandria - Stromateis I,71,3-6. Plotinus enlisted in the army of Gordian III in 242 with the intention of travelling on to India - Porphyry, Vita Plot. 3. For the influence of Megasthenes and Eratosthenes on later works concerning India - A.Dihle, "The Conception of India in Hellenistic and Roman Literature." Proc. Camb. Phil. Soc. 190 (1964) pp.17-23.

103) In the twenty-first year of Constantine's reign - vol. 1, p.516.

105) Rufinus *HE* I,9: *qua nos ita gesta, non opinione vulgi, sed ipso Aedesio Tyri... referente cognovimus.* However, the story of Meropius, like that of Metrodorus, is fraught with difficulties and uncertainties. There is the confusion of India and Ethiopia, which appears in both poetry and prose from Homer (Od. 1,23-4) and Herodotus (VII,70) onwards — J.Y.Nadeau, "Ethiopians." *CQ* ns.20 (1970) pp.339-49. In the fourth century the name "India Minor" continued to be applied to Ethiopia — *Expositio totius mundi* 18,35. It was also used to denote southern Arabia by Syriac historians and lexicographers — A.Mingana, "The Early Spread of Christianity in India." *Bengal Journal of Religion and Literature* 10 (1926) pp.443-6. Note that the influential figure Theophilus is called "the Indian", although he was a native of the island of *Δορίς* (probably Socotra in the Red Sea) — Philostorgius, *HE* III,4. Rufinus, however, is at pains to distinguish between India citerior and ulterior. Metrodorus, he says, visited the latter, which is a great distance beyond Parthia and is inhabited by peoples of various races and languages. But with regard to Meropius' voyage he is less precise. No details are given until Meropius' ship puts in for food and water at a nameless port. There he and all his companions, except for Aedesius and Frumentius, are killed by the local inhabitants since a treaty which guaranteed the safety of Roman citizens had recently expired. The two young men become servants of the king and, after winning favour at the royal court, gain their freedom to return to Roman territory. While Aedesius is said to have gone home to Tyre, Frumentius stayed at Alexandria, where he reported to Athanasius on the establishment of Christianity among the barbarians. Since Athanasius was elected to the Alexandrine episcopate in 328, this date may serve as a terminus a quo for Frumentius' return to Egypt. He was then entrusted by Athanasius with the task of leading the Christian community in the barbarian lands. Thus he set out again ad *India* ind, and subsequently in *Indiae partibus et populi Christianorum et ecclesiae factae sunt.* Yet it is known from Athanasius himself that Frumentius was a bishop in Axum, not in India proper, for he quotes a letter (written in c.357) from Constantius to Aezanes and Sazanes, joint rulers of the Axumite kingdom, in which the emperor urged them to replace Frumentius with Theophilus — *Apol. ad Const.* 31. The latter was indeed sent on an embassy to the Homerites in c.356; according to Philostorgius, after visiting his native island he crossed *ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου... Ἰνὐσην* — *HE* III,5. Consequently, it is doubtful whether Meropius actually travelled as far as India. It seems more likely that he met his end at the Axumite port of Adulis on the Red Sea. Cf. L.Duchesne, "Les missions chrétiennes au sud de l'Empire romain." *Mélanges d'arch.et d'histoire* 16 (1896) pp.94-9. For the kingdom of Axum, its rise to power in the late third century and its control of maritime and caravan trade routes to East Africa and Arabia —

106) Eusebius, Vita Const. I,8,4 and IV,50. Philostorgius refers to a monkey called Pan: ἀν καὶ ὃ τῶν Ἰουδαίων βασιλέως Κωνσταντίνου ἐπεστάλειι - HE III,11 (but C.Mango says that it was sent to Constantinople - Byzantium. The Empire of New Rome (London 1980)p.179.). Compare the Indian envoys who presented themselves to Julian at Constantinople in 362 - Amm. Marc. XXII,7,10. The Serendivî probably came from Sri Lanka since that island is called Serendib by the Arabs.


108) Ammianus says that silk was so plentiful in the fourth century that even peasants could obtain pieces of it - Amm. Marc. XXIII,6,67.

109) A.H.M. Jones, LRE p.824-5. For the reputation of the solidus - Cosmas Indicopleustes II,116a and XI,448c-d.

110) Peter the Patrician fr.14, FHG IV (Müller) p.189. For later restrictions on overland trade - ILS 775 (371) and CJ IV,41,1 & 2.

111) Cedrenus vol. 1, p.516: λίθους τιμίους καὶ μαραδίς πολλοὺς ἔχετο. India, however, was not the only source of gems. In c.420 Olympiodorus of Thebes travelled south from Egypt into the land of the Blemmyes, where he learnt that emeralds could be found. But he could not obtain permission from the local king to visit the actual mines of the Smaragdus mons (Jebel Zebara) - fr.37, FHG IV p.66. The evidence of Olympiodorus is largely confirmed by a later fifth century work, Epiphanius' De Gemmis.

112) Rufinus, HE I,9.

113) A. Mingana has linked the early settlement of Christians in India to the sea-trade via the Persian Gulf - art. cit. BJRL 10 (1926) pp.435-514. One may note that, according to Procopius, it was monks who smuggled the precious silk-moth eggs from India in the reign of Justinian - Bell. IV,17. Theophanes, however, says only that a Persian brought the eggs to the West - FHG IV, p.270.


115) Pieces of imperial legislation seem to embody personal outbursts of the emperor; for example, CTh I,16,7 (331).

116) Libanius, Or. LIX,66-7.
According to M.Lombard, Islamic authors indicate that Sassanian Persia had insufficient resources of iron by reason of poor veins of ore and the lack of wood to treat the mineral when extracted - Les Métaux dans l'Ancien Monde du Vème au XIème siècle (Paris 1974) p.35.

117) Descriptio 22 in Geographicci Graeci Minores, ed. Müller (Paris 1861) p.516: (Merchants in Mesopotamia) accipientes enim a Persis ipsi in omnem terram Romanorum vendunt, et ementes quae necessaria sunt iterum tradunt, extra aeramen et ferrum; has enim species duas, hoc est aeramen et ferrum, non licet hostibus dare.

118) The presence of Hormisdas at Constantine's court must have been the source of some disquiet to the Persian king, especially during the years of his minority - Zosimus II,27; Zonaras XIII,5,30-1 and John of Antioch fr.178,1 in FHG IV, p.605. He owned property in Syria - IGLS 528,2.
According to Libanius, Julian intended to install him on the Persian throne in 363 - Or. XVIII,258.

119) With the creation of a larger field army Constantine had probably decreased the number of limitanei on the eastern frontier. Yet a substantial proportion of the comitatenses were newly-raised units with a large barbarian element, and consequently Zosimus' accusation that Constantine seriously weakened the frontier garrisons by withdrawing troops to the cities of the interior is only partially justified - II,34.

120) For example, a milestone at Cay in Phrygia which has three inscriptions: the first is Diocletianic, the second dates to c.317 and the third names the three sons of Constantine together with their cousin Dalmatius - SEG XXVI,1371 (335-337).


123) *Vita Const.* II,55,5 & 57,4. Constantine also reports that he has sent instructions to the *comes* Acacius to destroy the pagan centre at Mambre.

124) Libanius, *Or.* LIX,60.

Additional note on Metrodorus.

While Constantine became increasingly hostile to paganism, his attitude to individual pagans, especially men of letters, forms a most striking contrast. Thus we know of several philosophers and sophists who joined the imperial entourage and even became close friends and advisers of Constantine:

The Neoplatonic philosopher Sopater - Zosimus II,40,3;
Eunapius, *Vitae Soph.* VI,2,2 & 10 and *Suidas* sv.
The sophist Bemarchius - Libanius, *Or.* I,31 and *Suidas* sv.
Nicagoras, who visited Egyptian Thebes in 326, possibly on an official mission - *CIG* 4770. The inscription implies that he was a Neoplatonist and that he was granted use of the *cursus publicus* - P.Graindor, "Constantin et le dadaouque Nicagoras" *Byzantion* 3 (1926) pp.209-14.

It is, therefore, feasible that Metrodorus belonged to the circle of intellectuals who were admitted to the court. Moreover, as well as Metrodorus, a number of other Persians are seen to have enjoyed the protection and patronage of fourth century emperors. The most notable example is, of course, the prince Hormisdas, who fled from Persia and was welcomed either by Licinius or by Constantine in 324 - *Suidas* sv. *Μετρόδορος* (ed. Adler) vol.3, p.331 and above n.118. But there were also individuals of lesser standing, such as Arsacius, keeper of the imperial lions under Licinius - Sozomen, *HE* IV,16,6; Pusaeus, who was rewarded by Julian for the surrender of Anatha with the rank of tribune and later became *dux Aegypti* - Amm. Marc. XXIV,1,9 and Zosimus III,14,4; and Auxentius, who fled from Persia in the reign of Constantius to avoid persecution as a Christian. Respected for his piety and for his learning in both pagan and Christian literature, he became acquainted with Theodosius and held a post at court - Sozomen, *HE* VII,21,8. It is also likely that some of the eunuchs in the imperial service were of Persian origin, and presumably they sometimes helped compatriots to gain admission to the court. The cubicularius Arsacius, who was sent with Philagrius to install the Arian bishop Gregory at Alexandria in 339, may well have been a Persian to judge from his name - Athanasius, *Hist. Ar.* 10. Eutherius, Julian's respected and influential *praepositus cubiculi* in 356-360, was a native of Armenia. He had been enslaved in his youth by *finitimi hostes* (Persians?), castrated and sold to Roman merchants. He was then brought up at Constantine's court - Amm. Marc. XVI,7,5.

For privileges granted to *professores litterarum* by Constantine - *CTh* XIII,3,1 (321 or 324) and 3,3 (333).
Chapter II  The Roman Defence of Northern Mesopotamia.
(a) The Reign of Constantius II.

It seems inevitable that military activity on the Mesopotamian frontier should have intensified, whether or not Constantine had died in May 337. Spurred on by the news of the emperor's death and the resulting uncertainty among the Constantinian dynasty, the Persian king seized the opportunity to take the initiative himself. Later in the same year, or more probably in the early spring of 338, Sapor crossed the Tigris and laid siege to Nisibis. The stronghold, however, withstood his attacks for more than two months and thus effectively thwarted his hopes of making any immediate territorial gains during the transition of Roman power. 1 Meanwhile Constantius, following the disturbances in the summer of 337 at Constantinople, had emerged to reassert imperial control, albeit with a stained reputation. 2 Thereafter he was preoccupied by negotiations with his two brothers on the tripartite division of power, but as soon as an accord had been reached he set out to return to the East. 3

Despite their failure to capture Nisibis, the Persians continued to exert pressure on the Roman frontier defences, and the fact that they were unable to make any significant impression during the incessant warfare of the next twelve years was principally to the credit of the young co-emperor Constantius. Roman policy was founded on his determination to safeguard the existing position in Mesopotamia, which had been won by Galerius' victory. 4 Consequently, it was primarily defensive in outlook. Constantius, it seems, never contemplated a major expedition against the Persians. Instead, he kept his forces in check and allowed the Persian king to waste his
energies on lengthy, unproductive sieges and indecisive, costly skirmishing in Roman territory. Nisibis was besieged for a second time in 346, and Singara also suffered repeated attack, if not capture. There occurred only one major battle, near Singara in 344 or 348, but neither side could claim a victory and both suffered heavy losses. Indeed, the fighting throughout these years was altogether inconclusive. Although the destruction of property and the loss of life was considerable, both rulers remained intractable. Constantius refused to yield to the Persian's desire for a realignment of their mutual border, while Sapor persisted in backing his claims with force.

In 350, however, the revolt of Magnentius in Gaul and the murder of Constans created a major crisis for the sole surviving direct heir of Constantine. He had to decide how to balance the needs of the East against the necessity of meeting the usurper and imposing his legitimate control over the West. In turning quickly to face the western threat Constantius was able to nip in the bud the disaffection among the troops on the Danube, but by doing so he left the Mesopotamian limes dangerously open to attack. Fortunately, Sapor's third attempt on Nisibis during the summer of 350 was also frustrated by the superhuman efforts of its defenders, and soon afterwards he was summoned away to the distant borders of his empire in order to repel an invasion by nomads from Central Asia. In the following years, therefore, the fighting was on a reduced scale since the two leading protagonists had departed with a considerable portion of their armies to opposite ends of their domains.

Persian activity did continue, however, in the form of lesser
incursions and general border warfare under the direction of
the local satraps. 10 Initially, Gallus was appointed Caesar
in order to guard the eastern provinces during Constantius'
absence, and he was apparently successful in keeping in check
the Persian attacks. 11 But after his demise in 354, it was
decided to try to secure a peaceful settlement to the frontier
troubles. Thus in 356 Musonianus, the praefectus praetorio
 Orientis, opened negotiations with the Persians to this end. 12
But in the meantime Sapor concluded an alliance with the
Chionitae, whom he had been fighting, and now being in a
stronger position he sent an embassy to Constantius in 358
reiterating the traditional Sassanian claim to all former
Achaemenid territory, but insisting only on the return of
Mesopotamia and Armenia. 13 The emperor rejected the demand
out of hand, but since he was committed on the Danube against
the Sarmatians, he attempted to put off the threat of renewed
and redoubled Persian activity by further diplomatic missions. 14
In 359, however, Sapor led his army, swelled by his new allies,
into Roman territory. But instead of attacking Nisibis or one
of the other fortresses, he adopted a new plan, attributed to
a Roman deserter called Antoninus, whereby he intended to move
rapidly north-west through Mesopotamia to the Upper Euphrates. 15
This campaign was a turning-point in the fortunes of the
Persian king in his long struggle to wear down the Roman
defences. For, although he was drawn unwillingly into
besieging Amida, after seventy-three days he succeeded in
breaching the fortifications and sacking the city. In the
following spring he attacked again, returning his attention to
the fortresses of Mesopotamia. He achieved a twofold success,
capturing Singara and Bezabde. Although he quickly evacuated
the former, he refortified the latter which then resisted a
vigorous assault by Constantius after his urgent return from
the Danube in the late summer.\textsuperscript{16}

The final crisis came early in 361 as it became clear that
Julian was marching to claim the imperial throne, while yet
another Persian onslaught was expected. The dilemma was faced
resolutely by Constantius at Edessa. He sent a detachment of
troops to oppose Julian's advance in Thrace,\textsuperscript{17} but he kept the
majority of his forces on the eastern frontier. Sapor was thus
unable to take advantage of the opportunity presented by
Julian's rebellion. For he was deterred from crossing the
Tigris, not just by unfavourable auspices or the severe losses
which his army had sustained in the previous two years,\textsuperscript{18} but
more by Constantius' clear determination not to surrender the
strategic Mesopotamian fortresses. Consequently, the situation
at Constantius' sudden death on November 3, 361 was that after
nearly thirty years of hostilities\textsuperscript{19} the Tigris still
constituted the frontier, except at Bezabde, although a number
of towns and forts had been destroyed and their garrisons
killed or carried off into captivity.\textsuperscript{20} It appears that the
more easterly of the \textit{regiones Transtigritanae} had reverted to
Persian control,\textsuperscript{21} but on the other hand Armenia itself
remained a faithful ally of Rome, despite all the diplomatic
and military pressure which the Persians had exerted in an
attempt to undermine the alliance.\textsuperscript{22}

(b) Operations in the Field.

Although Constantius' policy concentrated on the defence of
strategic fortresses, he did undertake some active campaigning.
In the early 340's he launched several offensives across the
Tigris in retaliation for Persian raids, thereby gaining the
title of Adiabenicus. He was also prepared to confront Sapor in the field, but in this he was severely restricted by circumstances which were largely beyond his control. The battles of Singāra and Mursa must have seriously diminished the size and fighting strength of the eastern field army, and after 350 other commitments prevented Constantius from mustering a sufficient number of troops on the Mesopotamian limes to oppose the Persians in open combat. Unfortunately, the only major battle against the Persians during Constantius' reign is poorly attested in the surviving sources. Indeed, even the date remains a matter of disagreement. But from what is known it is clear that at first the Romans had the upper hand, and it was only when, disregarding Constantius' orders, they broke ranks in pursuit of the enemy that they were worsted. Contemporary writers present this as an humiliating and costly defeat, belittling Constantius as a ruler who was only successful in fighting civil wars. Their judgement, however, is less than just and impartial. Ammianus, in particular, is at fault for his great admiration of Julian, which blinded him to the qualities and virtues of his predecessor.

Although attempts to improve the quality of Roman cavalry had been made as early as the second century, the army still relied for its basic strength on the infantry. But, whereas in the days of the Republic and early Empire the latter acted as a formidable offensive force, by the fourth century both legionary and auxiliary units had become static, defensive formations on the field of battle. Nevertheless, it was in this role that they proved to be most effective, not only against the barbarian tribes of northern Europe, but also
against their adversaries in the East.

Arrian describes in considerable detail how the tactics had already been developed to counter the mounted, heavily-armoured Alani in the mid-second century. The main body of infantry served as a defensive wall against the anticipated frontal attack. They were drawn up eight deep to ward off the horsemen with thrusting pikes and spears, while behind them were stationed javelinmen, archers and field-catapults. Arrian placed his greatest confidence in the barrage of missiles which could be launched against the oncoming enemy. Naturally, the light-armed troops could not be expected to continue the barrage unless they were protected by the line of heavy infantry. It was essential, therefore, that the latter kept in tight formation and stood their ground. If they did not (as at Singara), or if the Romans were attacked on the march before they could draw up their lines properly, the enemy cavalry could charge much more effectively, scattering the infantrymen and turning the battle into an unequal contest between individual horsemen and foot-soldiers.

In the third century the need for a more mobile central army had given rise to a large number of mounted formations. These became the élite troops who accompanied the emperor on his far-flung campaigns. Although most were light-armed horsemen, in response to the threat from Sassanian Persia more heavily equipped units were also formed. Constantius himself is attributed with a major part in the development of this type of cavalry. Nevertheless, despite their much enhanced prestige and better equipment, Roman cavalrymen still proved to be unreliable in combat, even against poorly armed barbarians. Against the Persians, who excelled in horsemanship
and enjoyed a long reputation as formidable mounted warriors, they were seen to be far inferior. On the battlefield, therefore, the brunt of the fighting fell on the foot-soldiers, while the cavalry was relegated to the role of protecting the rear and flanks of the infantry formations. On the march the mounted troops performed similar duties in the van and on the wings, reconnoitring, patrolling and skirmishing in order to guard the main body of the army from sudden attack. They showed themselves to be reasonably effective in such operations against bands of barbarians; for example, before the battle of Adrianople in 378 small mobile units led by Sebastianus prevented the Goths from raiding the area of Beroea and Nicopolis with impunity. But as the climax of Julian's expedition demonstrates, the Roman cavalry could be easily outmanoeuvred and outwitted by their Persian counterparts.

In the Notitia it can be clearly seen that there were numerous cavalry but few infantry units stationed on the eastern frontier. This has been regarded as a strange incongruity, both because of the emphasis on static defence and because the infantry still formed the more effective fighting force. Yet there are sound reasons for the preponderance of mounted units on the limes. Firstly, horsemen were more useful for patrolling and policing duties along the extensive border on account of their superior mobility. Thus a single cavalry squadron could cover a large expanse of ground than a similarly sized infantry unit. Furthermore, mounted troops could be deployed much more quickly than foot-soldiers against sudden raids and incursions by either Persians or local tribesmen. Secondly, many of the cavalrymen were trained archers. Their skill with the bow and arrow will have been
of considerable value during the many sieges of Roman fortresses. Indeed, these archers must have provided the major part of the fire-power of the defenders, for apart from the torsion engines they alone could fire long-range missiles at the besieging forces. 44

(c) The Importance of the Fortresses.

Belisarius, while addressing his officers before the Persian fort of Sisauranon in the mid-sixth century, underlined the significance of military strongholds by saying: ἔπιστασθε τοῖς πυλίων ἐστὶ καὶ τὸν στρατευμα ἐς γῆν πολεμίων, πολεμιῶν μὲν ὁχλομαθέων, πολλῶν δὲ μαχίμων ἐν τούτοις ἄνδρῶν ὑπεδεχθην ἀπολελειμμένων, πορεύσασθαι 45 The danger, he goes on to explain, lay in that the advancing army might be caught between these forces and a second group approaching from behind the frontier zone. There would also be the fear of ambush and the risk to the army's lines of communication and retreat. Just as Belisarius, having already by-passed the strong fortress of Nisibis, thought it prudent to capture Sisauranon before attempting to proceed farther into Persian territory, so Sapor was obliged to devote his attention to reducing the strongholds of Mesopotamia before he could hope to threaten the Euphrates and the wealthy cities of Syria. Only in 359 did he adopt a more ambitious plan, perhaps encouraged by the fact that his army had been considerably enlarged by his Chionite allies. Certainly, Ammianus gives these forces a prominent place in his narrative. 46

For the Romans, therefore, the Mesopotamian strongholds were of major importance. Constantius counted each one so valuable that he spared no effort to safeguard them. Throughout the 340's he devoted much of his time to visiting the establishments on the eastern frontier and conducting in person
the necessary military operations. In 360-1 he again took direct command and by his presence not only restored the morale of the troops generally but also inspired them to great efforts during the siege of Bezabde. Ammianus even suggests that in the latter year he contemplated meeting the Persians in battle as well as making another assault on the fortress. We can also see the care and attention which Constantius paid to the maintenance of the strongholds from the time that, as a youthful Caesar, he fortified Amida and Constantina, to the year of his death when, according to Ammianus, he made plans to safeguard the eastern frontier: consultans prudenter ne mox partes petiturus arctoas improtectum Mesopotamiae relinquaret latus. Similarly, Julian himself praises Constantius because he made careful provision for the eastern cities before leaving to confront the usurper Magnentius, while Zonaras states that he took time to repair the fortifications of Nisibis and provide compensation to its inhabitants for the losses which they had suffered in the siege of 350.

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the three fortresses of Amida, Singara and Bezabde fell to the Persians because of poor construction work in their fortifications. Amida was captured when part of the mound which the Romans had hurriedly erected collapsed at a critical moment in the fighting and allowed the besiegers to scramble across the rubble into the city. At Singara the Persians brought up a large battering-ram against a newly repaired tower where the mortar was still moist and weak, and thus they gained entry into the fortress. Ammianus refers to parts of the fortifications at Bezabde which were intuta carieque nutantia and quae antehac incuria
corruperat vetustatis. This suggests that there had been a certain neglect in the maintenance of the fortifications during the quieter years of the 350's. But we would not be justified in seeking to condemn Constantius himself of negligence. The greater part of the blame must go to the local commanders, and especially the magister militum, Ursicinus, for failing to make sure that the defences were kept in good repair.

The importance of fortresses is further attested by the interest of contemporary authors. Ammianus provides detailed accounts of several sieges as well as an excursus on various siege weapons. The De Rebus Bellicis, which was probably written during the joint reign of Valentinian and Valens, suggests inventions for the use on or against fortifications; for example, the Fulminalis which is intended to be mounted on a city or fortress wall. A few years later Vegetius, when discussing fortifications in his Epitoma rei militaris, writes almost exclusively from the point of view of the besieged, indicating that defensive methods and tactics were of primary significance for military commanders. The truth of this is amply borne out by the archaeological remains, for all late Roman fortifications, both civilian and military, have one common ingredient - they were built as positions of all-round defence, usually on higher ground with strong walls and secure supplies of food and water.

Archaeological excavations make it clear that, as well as towns and forts, many smaller fortified structures were built during the fourth century - burgi, signal- and watch-towers, fortified granaries, bridgehead fortlets and defended landing-places for ships. All these provided the frontier provinces with a broad defensive zone which was intended to absorb and halt enemy incursions. Ideally, the watch-towers
and forward posts would raise the alarm; the fortified bases of the interior would deprive the invaders of much-needed supplies, and the resistance of the fortresses would enable time for the mobile forces to muster and organize a counter-offensive. Unfortunately, little is known of the smaller fortifications on the eastern frontier since none has yet come under the archaeologist's trowel, although aerial surveys before the Second World War noted the existence of many isolated ruins. The literary sources are also unhelpfully reticent. Ammianus refers to a military supply-base in Isauria and to the construction of granaries in Gaul by Julian. Φοινίκα on the Tigris are mentioned by Julian in connection with Constantius' raids across the river, while Ammianus states that in 359 the Euphrates crossings were guarded by castellis et praeacutis sudibus omnique praesidiorum genere communibant, tormenta... locis opportunis aptantes.

(d) The Nature of the Fortifications.

Even in the more stable and ordered times of the second century it is extremely difficult to find two forts which are exactly alike. In the fourth century fortifications come in a bewildering variety of shapes and sizes. However, it is possible to identify a number of special features which were widely adopted for the sake of greater security. The ground-plans of towns and forts show far greater diversity than those of the Principate. Traditional squares and rectangles are often repeated, not only on sites which had a long history of occupation, but also on ones which were completely new constructions. But, wherever possible, fortifications were built on rising ground with walls that followed the lie of the land and were in consequence completely
irregular in shape. There was a great awareness of the advantage to be gained by placing fortresses on elevated sites and employing natural barriers. Thus in his description of Bezabde Ammianus states that it was located on a hill of moderate height which sloped towards the edge of the Tigris. He also points out that where it was not well protected by natural barriers, its defences were strengthened with a double wall.

Late Roman walls were of considerable thickness, usually three to four metres, in order to withstand battering-rams and sappers. Projecting towers of various designs were added at frequent intervals to strengthen the circuit-wall. The fortifications were surrounded either by two or three ditches of V-section or by a single wide, flat-bottomed ditch beyond a wide berm. These served to keep attackers at a distance from the walls but still within range of the defensive artillery. There were also innovations at the gateways, which were commonly strengthened by large bastions with inner courtyards and by recessing or masking the actual entrances. But the most obvious feature was the restriction in the number and size of the gate-openings. Posterns, narrow angled exits usually passing through the base of a tower but sometimes built into the adjoining curtain-wall, only appear in late Roman fortifications. Work at Singara has provided a rare description of an eastern fortress and shows how closely it conforms to this pattern, which is largely derived from the much more extensive field-work done in the West. Its defences consisted of a ditch about fifteen metres wide and still in places up to three metres deep in solid rock. The walls, over three metres thick, stood about eight metres behind the ditch
and were interspersed with projecting towers which were at least two storeys high.

It is evident from their addition to earlier walls and from their sheer number that towers were a most important feature of late Roman fortifications. They served to provide artillery positions and were usually solid up to the level of the rampart walk, with two or more storeys above from which *ballistae* could enfilade the adjoining curtain-wall. The best surviving examples of late Roman towers are found in the western provinces. A tower at the Gallic town of Senlis still displays a complete frontage of two storeys with three windows in each, while Barcelona had interval towers rising to a height of three storeys and bastions at the gateways with four storeys. Large, arched windows, usually over a metre wide and between 1.5 and 2.0 metres in height, were used for firing through, thus enabling the machines to be largely protected from the weather and enemy fire. At Lugo and Beauvais the towers have four windows, which make it clear that the intention was not to shoot straight out from the fortifications but rather to enfilade the adjacent walls. Besiegers were thus exposed to fire from the towers if they tried to attack the curtain-wall or gateways. But a direct assault on a tower lessened this advantage to the defending garrison. As a consequence towers, despite their great size and apparent strength, became the most vulnerable places in the circuit of fortifications. It is noteworthy that a tower was the target on all four occasions when battering-rams were used successfully in the sieges described by Ammianus.

(e) The Use of Artillery.

Catapults were employed by the Romans throughout the imperial
centuries. Their machines were adopted, with certain modifications and refinements, from the siege-weapons of the Hellenistic kingdoms. But in the late Roman period, when defence was all important, their use became much more widespread. The basic reason for this development is obvious. The fire-power of a garrison was greatly increased when it was equipped with a battery of catapults. Far fewer men were thus able to resist besiegers, assailing them with missiles at a greater distance and inflicting heavier losses on both their men and machines. In the fourth century there were two basic types of defensive artillery: the ballista, an arrow-firing, two-armed torsion engine; and the onager or scorpio, a single-arm stone-thrower. The latter was a large machine, often employed by defenders against siege-towers, as described by Ammianus during the siege of Amida. But it could also be used with good effect against massed assaults. In his excursus on siege-weapons Ammianus points out that the onager should be placed super congestos vel latericios aggeres and not on the wall itself, since the masonry could not stand the recoil of such a heavy machine. It is probable, therefore, that the onager was sited on low, solid platforms at intervals just behind the curtain-wall, and the missiles were hurled over the heads of the defenders on the rampart-walk. The only archaeological evidence comes from the fort at Risingham in northern Britain, where excavations have revealed resilient platforms of stone and clay extending ten metres behind the inner face of the Severan fort-wall. At High Rochester, however, there are early and mid-third century inscriptions attesting to the construction of platforms called ballistaria.

The ballista, a much lighter machine with a less grievous
recoil, was certainly located on the fortifications. In the projecting corner-towers of the small, late Roman forts at Gornea and Orșova near the Iron Gate on the Danube some metal parts of catapults have been found. The ballista appears to have been an extremely accurate anti-personnel weapon. Thus the Chionite prince was picked off by one at Amida and, when seventy Persian archers gained the top of a tower inside the same city, the Romans ended the threat with withering volleys from five of the lighter, more manoeuvrable ballistae. It is obvious that gunners firing from the higher elevation of the towers or walls enjoyed a distinct advantage over their counterparts below. Consequently, besiegers attempted to construct raised emplacements for their own artillery; in 360, for example, Constantius ordered his engineers to surround Bezabde with tall siege-works which overtopped the walls and offered excellent firing positions. In this manner the Romans pinned down the defenders so successfully that they were forced to make a sortie to set fire to the towers. Thus, by and large the two types of catapult served different roles in the defence of fortresses: the ballista was aimed at individuals, while the onager was directed against larger targets.

The problem of who manned these artillery pieces can only be tentatively answered because of the small amount of evidence. The Notitia records five legiones comitatenses or pseudo-comitatenses with the additional title of ballistarii, two in each of the field armies of Oriens and Thrace, and one in that of Illyricum. In addition, throughout the frontier provinces only the dux Moquntiacensis has a unit designated milites ballistarii under his command. This title has been taken to mean that in the fourth century all the legions were no longer
equipped with artillery, but that special units were formed to maintain and use such machinery. It is clear, however, that fortified towns and military posts were furnished with considerable numbers of ballistae and onagri. Consequently, most frontier troops must have had a basic working knowledge of the machines. Moreover, if only ballistarii manned the engines, one would expect to find more widespread and abundant evidence for such troops than appears to be the case.

Ballistarii are mentioned once by Ammianus, but they are then seen acting as an escort for Julian on a dangerous march from Autun to Troyes in 356. Admittedly, at the siege of Amida Ammianus refers to two Magnentian legions, which had recently been brought from Gaul, as being of no help with the artillery or the construction of defences. But troops with long experience of warfare on the eastern frontier were on the whole adroit at manning engines and building siege-works. Furthermore, the two legions and the cohort of sagittarii who withstood a siege by Julian's forces at Aquileia in 361 are not known to have been artillery specialists, and yet they used ballistae and onagri with marked success. Thus it is perhaps best to take the name ballistarii in the Notitia as a mere honorific title, although it is possible that the units acquired it from their connection with imperial workshops, where the machines were assembled and given major overhauls.

(f) General Observations.

Garrisons stood a very good chance of resisting an assault and surviving a siege if they were well supplied and defended themselves stoutly. This fact was fully appreciated by besieging generals who, therefore, often tried to induce garrisons to capitulate in order to avoid the expenditure of
time and resources needed to overcome a fortress. In his account of the siege of Aquileia Ammianus remarks that the defenders were confident of their own security: *mentibusque fundatis et compositis per opportuna tormentis, indefesso labore, vigilias et cetera subsidia securitatis implebant.* They thwarted several sustained attacks by the use of missiles, fire and sorties, and even when Julian's troops resorted to trying to cut off their water-supply, they continued in their stubborn resistance until they were absolutely sure that Constantius had died.

The eastern garrisons, too, despite their reputation for ease and idleness, made a determined show against the Persians. Nisibis withstood three sieges, each of which lasted more than two months. On the last occasion, when the enemy even managed to make a breach in the defences, the Romans continued to repulse their attacks and then, in a lull in the fighting, constructed a second wall to block the gap. Ephraem, who was present during the siege, implies that the sudden appearance of this new wall utterly disheartened the Persian forces and persuaded Sapor to call the retreat. In 359 when Roman preparedness and morale were at their lowest ebb, Sapor only succeeded in capturing Amida after a costly siege of seventy-three days. In the following year Ammianus describes how the defenders of Singara *viso hoste longissime, clausis ocius portis, ingentibus animis per turres discurrebant et minas, saxa tormentaque bellica congerentes, cunctisque praestructis, stabant omnes armati, multitudinem parati propellere, si moenia subire temptasset.* In short, it seems that the fortresses of Amida, Singara and Bezabde fell because the strength of their defences failed to match the determination of their garrisons
to resist the Persians. The accounts of the Mesopotamian sieges, therefore, contradict the statement of Libanius that Constantius' defensive strategy sapped the fighting spirit of the Roman troops.

Smaller and weaker places naturally fell as easier prey, or they were prudently evacuated before the Persian advance. It is likely that in troubled times the garrisons of fortlets and outposts sought refuge in the larger fortresses, just as did the rural population. There is some slight evidence for the participation of civilians in the defence of towns in the fourth century. The Theodosian Code records instructions to cities as well as frontier commanders to build new walls and to keep old ones in good repair. Doubtless the local population were often constrained to provide the labour for such tasks. During actual sieges most of the fighting fell to the military personnel. But at Aquileia Ammianus states that the troops who resisted Julian were aided by the indigena plebs, and after the surrender of the city two local curiales were put to death along with the chief military instigator of the so-called rebellion. Singara is said to have been defended by two legions, some auxiliary cavalry and indigenae plures; Sapor's first attack was repulsed by the oppidani standing on the battlements. Similarly, Julian describes how the non-combatants in Nisibis were posted on the ramparts in place of troops who were needed to defend the breach in the wall.

However, it is highly unlikely that civilians would resist hostile forces without the presence and leadership of imperial troops. Thus, for example, in the third century the town of Pityous in Colchis was at first successfully defended against
the Goths by the Roman garrison under the command of a certain
Successianus, but when he was moved elsewhere the town fell
easily. When the Sarmatians invaded Pannonia in 374, the
walls and ditch of Sirmium had to be repaired in great haste
with funds intended for a new theatre. According to Ammianus,
the praefectus praetorio Probus considered flight initially,
but then he realized that omnes secuturos confestim, qui
moenibus claudebantur, tegendos latebris opportunis: quod si
contigisset, impropugnata civitas venisset in manus hostiles.
Consequently, he stayed to refortify the city and summoned a
cohort of archers from the nearest station. In the sixth
century numerous eastern towns which had no regular garrison
capitulated to the Persians and paid large sums of silver to
secure their withdrawal; in 540 Antioch only decided to offer
resistance to Chosroes after the fortuitous arrival of six
thousand regular troops.

The Roman art of static defence had, therefore, reached a
considerable degree of sophistication in the fourth century.
Fortresses, if well supplied and manned by a sufficient number
of troops, could endure long, hard sieges with a certain amount
of optimism. Fritigern's famous remark that "he was at peace
with walls" sums up the attitude of most northern barbarians.
Even the Persians, who were better equipped and organized,
only managed to capture strongholds at the expense of much
time, effort and loss of life.


3) CTh XII,1,23 shows that Constantius was at Antioch on 11 October, 338; cf. also Julian, Or. I,20b-c. Athanasius says that he met Constantius at Caesarea in Cappadocia as he was returning to Alexandria from exile - Apologia ad Const. 5.

4) This is exemplified by his efforts to recapture Bezabde in the late summer of 360 - Amm. Marc. XX,11,6-25 & 31-2.

5) Ephraem, Carmina Nisibena XIII,15-7; Jerome ann. 346 and Theophanes am. 5838.

6) Amm. Marc. XIX,2,8 and XX,6,5. Below, ch.III,n.71.


8) In Illyricum the magister peditum, Vetranio, seized power. However, it seems likely that this was done with the connivance of Constantius so as to block Magnentius' progress eastwards. Sources record that it was his sister Constantina who encouraged Vetranio to rebel against the Gallic usurper - Philostorgius, HE III,22 and Chronicon Paschale sa.350; cf. PLRE I, sv. Constantina 2. Nevertheless, both Constantius and Vetranio had to harangue the troops at Naissus in order to secure their loyalty and support for the coming struggle against Magnentius - Julian, Or. I,26c-d & 30b-31d; Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus XLII,1ff; Zosimus II,43-4; Philostorgius, HE III,22-4 and Eutropius X,10-11.

9) Below, ch.III, pp.94-103. Amm. Marc. XIV,3,1 and XVI,9,3.

10) Amm. Marc. XIV,3,1-2; XVI,9,1 and XVIII,6,16; Libanius, Or. II,407f; Philostorgius, HE III,25 and Zonaras XIII,8,3-4.


12) Amm. Marc. XVI,9,2-4 & 10,21.

13) Amm. Marc. XVII,5,1-8. Themistius saw the Persian envoys at Antioch - Or. IV,57b.
16) Amm. Marc. XX,7,16 & 11,4-6.
17) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,16.
18) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,8. Ammianus portrays the Persian king as greatly distressed by the losses which he had incurred in undertaking the sieges - XIX,9,9. He also states that in the siege of Amida alone Sapor lost thirty thousand men, although it may be that this 'official' figure was somewhat exaggerated in order to offset the loss of the three Roman strongholds with their sizeable garrisons. The Chionitae do not appear in Ammianus' account of Julian's expedition in 363 which, perhaps, suggests that they had returned to the East. If Grumbates withdrew his troops from Sapor's army in 361, this might have been a contributary factor in the cancellation of the anticipated offensive - below, ch.IV,n.45.
19) Thus Ephraem praises Constantius because he had resisted the Persians stoutly for thirty long years - Hymni contra Julianum II,20 and IV,15. According to Ammianus, another leading citizen of Nisibis, a certain Sabinus, rebuked Jovian for his concessions to the Persians while observing that Constantius, despite being reduced to dire straits on occasion, nihil tamen ad perdidisse supremum - Amm. Marc. XXV,9,3.
20) Karka de Ledan was founded by Sapor for captives from Singara, Zabdicene, Corduene, Arzanene, Armenia and Beth Arabaye - Chronicle of Seert in Histoire Nestorienne, Patr. Or. IV, fasc.3 trans. A.Scher (Paris 1907) p.78 and Acta of Simeon bar Sabba'e, trans. M.Kmosko Patr. Syr.I,2 (Paris 1907) col.832. The latter source states clearly that at the time of the catholikos' martyrdom the town "had been recently built". Hence it appears that the campaigns on which these prisoners were taken should be dated to the late 330's and early 340's. In 359 large numbers were led off into captivity from the various forts that fell into Sapor's hands - Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,2; XIX,6,1-2 & 9,1-2. Likewise, in the following year those who survived the storming of Singara and Bezabde were removed into Persian territory - Amm. Marc. XX,6,7-8 & 7,15 and AMQ tom. I ed. J.S.Assemanus (Rome 1747) pp.134-40.
23) CIL III,3705 = ILS 732 (Sirmium, dated 355); Theophanes am. 5834. Athanasius records that Constantius defeated the Persians in the autumn of 343 - Hist. Ar. 16,2, and Libanius says that he even captured a Persian town and settled its population in Thrace - Or. LIX,83.
24) Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,7; Eutropius X,10 & 12; Festus, Breviariu... 5835. Furthermore, it is possible that the Goths stirred up trouble on the Danube in the 340's - E.A. Thompson, "Constantine, Constantius II and the Lower Danube Frontier." Hermes 84 (1956) pp. 372-81. In a speech delivered in 348 or 349 Libanius says that Constantius persuaded them to make peace, since he was at the time occupied with marshalling his forces against the Persians - Or. LIX,89; cf. also ILS 732, which describes Constantius as Gohticus (sic) maximus. Libanius also states that Gothic troops were sent to Constantius' aid on the eastern frontier - Or. LIX,92f. This suggests that they were present at the battle of Singara, and it was perhaps because of their lack of training in Roman tactics that the undisciplined rush towards the Persian camp took place.

25) Constans' offer of sending soldiers' families by the imperial postal service perhaps hints at the dispatch of troops to the East in 349 - CTh VII,1,3 (349) with Amm. Marc. XX,4,11. Certainly, after the defeat of Magnentius, some of his forces were sent to the eastern frontier - Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,3 and XIX,5,2. Ammianus also refers to a couple of cavalry squadrons in 359: ad subsidium Mesopotamiae recens ex Illyrico missi - XVIII,8,2. The request which Julian received in the winter of 360/1 to send Constantius some troops seems fully justified by the serious Persian threat to the eastern defences at that time - Amm. Marc. XX,4,2-3. Constantius also asked for reinforcements from the tribes along the Danube: mercede vel gratia - Amm. Marc. XX,8,1.


29) His partiality towards his former commander, Ursicinus, also caused Ammianus to blacken Constantius' name - E.A. Thompson, op. cit. pp. 53-55.

30) For example, Hadrian's special interest in cavalry training - CIL VIII,2532.
31) There was a gradual change in the Roman infantry from heavy to light-armed troops, especially archers. Vegetius notices the first signs of this trend - *Epitoma rei militaris* I,15 & 20. But the bulk of the infantry still wore armour at the time of the battle of Adrianople - Amm. Marc. XXXI,13,3 & 7 and Anon. *De Rebus Bellicis* 9,1; 15, 1 & 4.

32) Arrian, *EKTOL ECTAL* 14. Similarly, Vegetius lays emphasis on the immobility of the heavy cavalry infantry: tamquam murus..ferreus stabat. The pursuit of the enemy should be left to the light-armed troops: nec aciem suam ordinationemque turbaret et ad dispersos recurrentes hostes incompositos obprimerent - *Epit.* II,17 (this is exactly what seems to have happened at Singara). Cf. also Ammianus' description of the infantry at the battle of Strassburg - Amm. Marc. XVI,12,44 & 49.

33) Arrian, *EKT.* 15-9. According to Vegetius, the infantry were armed with long swords (*spatæ*), five javelins (*hastae plumbatae* or *martiobarbuli*) which they hurled at the first enemy charge, and two other *missibilia*, a larger javelin with a triangular iron head (*pilum* or *spiculum*) and a shorter projectile (*vericulum* or *verutum*) - *Epit.* II,15. The Anonymous describes two types of *plumbatae* - *De Rebus Bellicis* 10: the *tribolata* which had iron spikes attached to the lead weight so that, if the missile failed to find its mark, it could still act as a caltrop against the enemy's horses, and the *mamillata* which had a round, tapering head for piercing shields and body-armour. Cf. P.Barker, "The Plumbatae from Wroxeter." BAR International Series 63 (Oxford 1979) pp.97-99.

The *carroballistæ* could be deployed either on the flanks or behind the main line of infantry - Arrian, *EKT.* 19 and Vegetius, *Epit.* III,14. He calls the operators of field artillery *tragularii* - *Epit.* III,15; note that Sapor narrowly missed injury from a *tragula* shot from the walls of Amida - Amm. Marc. XIX,1,5. Vegetius also implies that *carroballistæ* were used on the eastern frontier, for he advises that the heavier models should be aimed at the elephants - *Epit.* III,24 and below, appendix 4, n.24. In addition to javelins, arrows and catapult-bolts, sling-shot was also used to good effect. Vegetius reckoned that biconical sling-missiles were more deadly than arrows against opponents clad in leather jerkins, since they caused more severe internal injuries - *Epit.* III,14.


36) Two funerary steles from North Africa depict Roman *contarii* of the late second century. The riders hold long thrusting spears with both hands, but they do not appear to be heavily armoured - *Libyca* 2 (1954) p.122f and plates 12 & 15 (p.147).

The first recorded use of Roman clibanarii occurs in 312 at the battle near Turin between the forces of Constantine and Maxentius - Pan. Lat. X,22,4-24,5 (in Maxentius' army). Julian states that many of Constantius' cavalrymen at the battle of Mursa were clibanarii, and he attributes Magnentius' defeat to them - Or. I,37d and II,57c. Zosimus, however, stresses the role of the sagittarii in the victory - Zos. II,50. Yet he does say that because of his overall cavalry superiority Constantius had been delighted by the prospect of confronting Magnentius on the plains of Siscia - II,45,3-4; cf. also II,48,3. Clibanarii are certainly prominent in Constantius' triumphal parade through Rome in 357 - Amm. Marc. XVI,10,8. It is noteworthy that the Notitia Dignitatum lists three armament factories devoted to the production of equipment for clibanarii. All three are found in the East: at Antioch - Or.XI,22; at Caesarea in Cappadocia - Or.XI,26 and at Nicomedia - Or.XI,28. In the West there is only a factory ballistaria et clibanaria at Augustodunum (Autun) - Occ.IX,33. Similarly, there is a preponderance of clibanarii in the eastern commands: three units under the magistri militum praesentales - Or.V,40 and VI,32 & 40; three units under the magister militum per Orientem - Or. VII,31; 32 & 34, whereas only one unit is recorded in the western sections of the Notitia - Occ.VI,67 = VII,185 (in Africa). Cf. D. Hoffmann, Das spätromische Bewegungsheer und die Notitia Dignitatum (Düsseldorf 1969-70) pp.269-73. Since breeds of horses in the Roman world were generally small and lightweight, the question arises of how and whence the army obtained a good supply of horses for the heavy cavalry. Presumably, most of the mounts came from imperial stud-farms in various provinces, but especially in Cappadocia, whose breed of horses was famous throughout the Empire and matched most closely the Persian breeds in size and strength - J.K. Anderson, Ancient Greek Horsemanship (Berkeley 1961) pp.18 and 22, and below, ch. IV, n.25. Horses from the Taurus region were considered the best by two late Roman authors - Oppian, Cynegetica I,197 and Nemesianus, Cynegetica 240. Yet there is also considerable legislation concerning the levy of horses for military purposes. Of the numerous edicts one is directed specifically to the eastern provinces - CTh XIII,5,14 (371); cf. A.H.M. Jones, LRE pp.625-6; T. Frank (ed.), An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome IV (Baltimore 1936) pp.152-3 & 617-8; and R.W. Davies, "The Supply of Animals to the Roman Army and the Remount System." Latomus 28 (1969) pp.435-55. But note that Ammianus refers to a strator called Constantinianus in Sardinia - Amm. Marc. XXIX,3,5, and that an edict issuing regulations about military horses was addressed to a certain Zosimus, who was the praeses Epri Novae - CTh VI,31,1 = CJ XII,24,1 (373).

38) At the battle of Strassburg, for example, the cavalry on the Roman right wing broke ranks and fled - Amm. Marc. XVI, 12,37-8.

39) Below, ch.IV, pp.135 & 151.
40) *Arrian, Ekt. 4 & 9.* According to *Vegetius,* the heavy cavalry squadrons (*loricati et contati*) were placed next to the line of infantry in order to protect its flanks, while the light horsemen (*sagittarii* and those without *loricae*) were deployed in the rear to attack and disrupt the enemy's flanks - *Epit. III,16.*

One may also note the general but perceptive remarks which *Ammianus* makes about the effectiveness of mounted troops in battle conditions - *Amm. Marc. XVI,12,21-2.*

41) *Amm. Marc. XXI,11,2-3 & 5.* Mounted troops were also used to good effect by *Theodosius in Britain* - *Amm. Marc. XXVII, 8,7.*

42) The general impression is that *Julian* was mortally wounded in a sudden and confused skirmish, but in fact the Romans marched into a well-prepared ambush. *Ammianus* acknowledges that this was the case, both by his introductory reference to *structis insidiis* and also by his mention of elephants being present in the fighting - *Amm. Marc. XXV,3,1 & 4.* Yet, at the time of the first attack on the rearguard of the Roman column, he notes that the flanks were securely protected - *XXV,3,2.* Cf. N.J.E.Austin, *Ammianus on Warfare* (Brussels 1979) pp.154-5.

At an early stage of the expedition the cavalry troop of the *Tertiaci* was punished for cowardice - *Amm. Marc. XXV, 1,7-8.* *Ammianus* also records the unpreparedness and cowardice of Roman cavalry units during the campaign of 359 - *XVIII,6,13 & 8,2.*

43) *The Notitia* lists for *Osrhoene* - *Or.XXXV: equites - 9, alae - 6, legiones - 2 and cohortes - 2; and for Mesopotamia - *Or.XXXVI: equites - 8 (+2), alae - 3, legiones - 2 and cohortes - 2.*

44) Mounted units are mentioned in the sieges of 359 and 360:- at *Amida* a *turma indigenarum* and a large proportion of the *comites sagittarii* - *Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,3 & 4; at *Singara* an unnamed group of *equites* - *XX,6,8;* and at *Bezabde* the native *Zabdiceni sagittarii* - *XX,7,1.* According to *Vegetius,* *burgi* were manned by *sagittarii* - *Epit. IV,10.*

45) *Procopius, Bell. Pers. II,19,7-8.*

46) References to the *Chionitae* - *Amm. Marc. XVI,9,3-4; XVII,5, 1; XVIII,6,22; XIX,1,7-10 & 2,1-6.*


47) Several edicts record his presence at bases on the eastern frontier during the 340's:-

- *CTh XII,1,30 - Edessa, 12 August 340.*
- *CTh XII,1,35 = VII,22,4 - Hierapolis, June 343.*
- *CTh XV,8,1 - Hierapolis, 4 July 343.*
- *CTh XI,7,5 - Nisibis, 12 May 345; cf. also, Ephraem, Carmina Nisibena XIII,4; 6 & 14.*
His presence is also attested in the vicinity of Singara, which was regarded as an isolated and vulnerable post - Amm. Marc. XX,6,9 and XXV,9,3; Festus, Breviarium 27; Athanasius, Hist. Ar. 7 and below, ch.III,n.71.

Zosimus, who is generally hostile towards Constantius, has the people of Nisibis make the following remark in their appeal to Jovian in 363: 'Καὶ οἱ οἰκονομοί τῆς πόλεως Περσικῆς πολέμου ἑλότεσθαι μετὰ τοῦ πάσην ἕλαττωσάντα Νισίβιος ἀντιλαβέσθαι, καὶ πολλοῖς ἀβέβαιοι καὶ εἰς ἐκείνην ἀδύνατον ἐκβολήν διὰ πᾶσης περιοχῆς σπουδῆς - III,33,3 (in this context the three wars are clearly the sieges which the city endured) and above, n.19.

48) Amm. Marc. XX,11,12 & 14.

49) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,1: nunc ad concursatorias pugnas militem struens, nunc si copia patuisset, obsidione gemina Bezabden aggressurus...

50) Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,1. Julian also mentions forts which he had built to guard the Tigris - Or. I,22a. Presumably, these were some of the fifteen castella which were evacuated in 363 - Amm. Marc. XXV,7,9.

51) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,1.

52) Julian, Or. I,26d.

53) Zonaras XIII,7; also implied by Julian - Or. I,30b, and Theodoret - HE II,26. During excavations at Pağnik Üreni a primary deposit of coins was found beside one of the towers (no.3). Since they belong to the period of Constantius and Julian as Caesar (355-361), they provide evidence for the building of military installations and the strengthening of the Upper Euphrates zone late in Constantius' reign - R.P.Harper, "Two Excavations on the Euphrates Frontier: Pağnik Üreni and Dibsi Faraj." Limes Congress 10 (Bonn 1974) p.455. For building work carried out farther south, on the Arabian limes, during Constantius' reign - below, ch.VII, n.54. Note also an inscription from Cilicia which records the construction of a wall for the city of Eirenopolis by the general Aurelius Iustus between 355 and 360 - AE 1974, no. 644. An edict of 358 shows Constantius' attention was drawn to the defences of the African cities - CTh IV,13,5. Ammianus, however, criticizes him for a lack of concern for the welfare of the provinces and contrasts this with Julian's deep commitment to restoring the prosperity and security of the whole empire - Amm. Marc. XXI,16,17 with XVI,5,14-5; 11,11; XVII,3; XVIII,1,1 & 2,3-5. Below, n.57.

54) Amm. Marc. XIX,8,1-4. This passage (taken in conjunction with XIX,6,6) is the only hint in Ammianus of Persian mining operations - below, ch.III,n.148 and ch.IV,n.43. One may compare the circumstance of the downfall of Dura-Europos a century earlier - C.Hopkins, "The Siege of Dura."
Classical Journal 42 (1947) pp.251-9. The archaeological remains there prove that the Persians were able to dig tunnels, both to gain hidden access to a fortress and to undermine its defences, causing them to subside - Excavations at Dura-Europos ed. M.I.Rostovtzeff, A.R. Bellinger, C.Hopkins & C.B.Welles, 6th Prelim. Report (Yale 1936) pp.188-203 and plate XII.

55) Amm. Marc. XX,6,5-6.

56) Amm. Marc. XX,7,9 & 11,6.

57) Note the remark of Ursulus, the comes sacrarum largitionum, while inspecting the ruins of Amida in 360 - Amm. Marc. XX,11,5.
Constantine had confiscated city revenues, vectigalia, thereby depriving local communities of the funds which were required to pay for the upkeep of their fortifications - A.H.M.Jones, LRE p.110 and n.73. These revenues were partially returned by Constantius - CTh IV,13,5 (358) and Julian, Or. I,42d-43a, but they were only fully restored by Julian - Amm. Marc. XXV,4,15.
It was a regular practice for military commanders to inflate the numbers enrolled in the army in order to divert pay and rations into their own pockets - A.H.M.Jones, LRE p.628f. One may presume that similar irregular appropriations occurred with regard to funds intended for the construction and restoration of defences.

58) Amm. Marc. XXIII,4.

59) Anon., De Rebus Bellicis 18,1 & 9.

60) T.D.Barnes has recently reasserted the view that Vegetius dedicated his handbook to Theodosius I (379-395) - "The Date of Vegetius." Phoenix 33 (1979) pp.254-7.

Units of the comitatenses could be dispatched to a province in a major emergency, as were the equites Dalmatae Aquesiani comitatenses who are named on an inscription at Bedaium in Noricum, set up after a victory over barbarian invaders - CIL III,5565 = ILS 664 (dated 27 June, 310).
Likewise, four units of comitatenses were sent by Julian, under the command of his magister equitum Lupicinus, against the Picts and Scots in 360 - Amm. Marc. XX,1,1-3.
Note also the presence of comites sagittarii at Amida when it was attacked by the Persians in 359 - XVIII,9,4.

The Aerial Photographic Archive for Archaeology in the Middle East, c/o Dept. of Ancient History and Classical Archaeology at the University of Sheffield, contains a number of oblique views of the area between Nisibis, Singara and Mosul. These include pictures of a site called Thebeta, which is a large irregular enclosure with signs of internal buildings - Iraq IV AP 1671-2 & 1693-4; cf. Amm. Marc. XXV,9,3; Hibita statio intuta. There are also pictures of Tell Uwainat - Iraq I AP 1656, and Tell Hugna,
where there appears to be a small square fort - Iraq II AP 1704-5. These two places must have lain very close to the Roman-Persian border in the first half of the fourth century.

63) Amm. Marc. XIV,2,13.

64) Amm. Marc. XVIII,2,3-4. Cf. Pan.Lat. VI,16 (Mynors) and Ausonius, Mosella vv.459-60.

65) Julian, Or. I,22a.

66) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,6. Suidas, sv. Zeugma, describes how the bridge there was fortified with towers containing catapults and archers. But this may ultimately derive from Tacitus' account of Corbulo's defences on the Euphrates in the mid-first century - Annales XV,9.

67) H.von Petrikovits has expressed the opinion that "any tendency to date...Roman fortifications on typological grounds...(with few exceptions) is worse than useless in the late Roman period." - "Fortifications in the north-western Roman Empire from the third to the fifth centuries A.D." JRS 61 (1971) p.203.

68) For example, the Saxon Shore fort at Porchester, probably built just before Carausius' time; the Constantinian fort at Deutz-am-Rhein, and the fort at Alzey built by Valentinian.

69) For example, the forts of Isny, Pevensey and Pilismarot, and the mountain strongholds and refuges of Moosberg, Lorenzberg and Auf Krüppel.


71) Multiple ditches are a regular feature of earlier fortifications. At Great Casterton, for example, the second century defences consisted of an earth rampart and two steep-sided ditches, but in the mid-fourth century a new ditch, twenty metres wide, was dug much farther from the wall and the earlier inner ditch was filled to construct projecting angle-bastions - P.Corder, "The Reorganization of the Defences of Romano-British Towns in the Fourth Century." Archaeological Journal 112 (1955) p.20ff. However, these old-style multiple ditches are also found at late Roman forts; for example, Richborough and Breisach. Ammianus refers to fossae at three fortified towns - Amm. Marc. XIX,8,4 (Amida); XX,7,2 (Bezabde) and XXXI,15,9 (Adrianople). Cf. S.Frere, Britannia revised ed. (London 1978) pp.290-1.

72) At Bitburg and Pachten a wide flat ditch has been excavated at a distance of 20m. and 16m. respectively from the walls - E.M.Wightman, Roman Trier and the Treveri (London 1970)
JULIAN refers to a wide ditch at Nisibis, which the Persian besiegers had difficulty in crossing, but it is impossible to be certain whether this is an authentic element in his account of the siege in 350 - Or.II,64d-65a and below, ch.III, pp.98-102.

For example, the recessed gateways at Porchester and Bürgle. In the East the fortress of Virta is described as a munimentum...muris velut sinuosis circumdatum et cornutis, instructioneque varia inaccessum - Amm. Marc. XX,7,17. This stronghold is placed at Birecik on the Euphrates - L.Dillemann, Haute Mésopotamie Orientale et Pays Adjacents (Paris 1962) p.298f and J.Szidat, Historischer Kommentar zu Amm. Marc. Buch XX-XXI Part 2 (Wiesbaden 1981) pp.19-20. However, I find it hard to accept this identification. Simply in terms of available time it is difficult to fit in a march right across Mesopotamia and back between Sapor's capture of Singara and Bezabde and Constantius' attempt to retake the latter fortress. Moreover, the reference to Virta in Ammianus is almost incidental. One would expect much more significance to be given to it if the Persian army had reached the banks of the Euphrates - cf. Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,7. L.Dillemann also ignores the fact that Sapor would have to pass by the strategic cities of Nisibis, Constantina and Edessa in order to reach Birecik from Bezabde. Yet Ammianus states that in 360 the greater part of the eastern army was camped at Nisibis, presumably to prevent the Persian king advancing westwards across Mesopotamia - XX,6,9 (hence after taking Singara Sapor prudently turned aside from Nisibis and attacked Bezabde instead - XX,7,1).

Ammianus refers to Virta as valde vetustum, ut aedificatum a Macedone credatur Alexandro, which indicates that he had Ptolemy's Birtha-Macedonopolis (Tekrit) in mind - Amm. Marc. XX,7,17 and Ptol. V,18. Thus it appears that he has confused two distinct places on the river Tigris with the same name, probably by trying to supplement his memory of the events in 360 with information drawn from literary sources - compare his mistaken double appellation for Bezabde - below, ch.III, p.87.

E.Honigmann equated Virta with a sixth century fort mentioned by Procopius and George of Cyprus, and he suggested as its site modern Mirdon on the Tigris opposite the mouth of the Batman Su: "eine Stelle die als das 'Ende' von Mesopotamien gelten konnte" - Die Ostgrenze des byzantinische Reiches (Brussels 1935) p.14, n.2 and below, ch.IV, n.107.

For a description of the remains of another fourth century Mesopotamian fortress, Resaina - C.H.Kraeling & R.C.Haines, "Structural Remains" in C.W.McEwan et al., Soundings at Tell Fakhariyah Chicago Oriental Institute Publications 79 (1958) pp.11-7 and Plates 10-2; 24-5 & 87. However, the stone fortifications are attributed to Theodosius, who is...
known to have rebuilt the city and changed its name to Theodosiopolis - Malalas (Bonn) p.345 and Notitia Dignitatum Or.XXXVI,4 & 20.


77) Amm. Marc. XX,6,5-6 (Singara); XX,7,13 (Bezabde); XXIV,2,12 (Pirisabora) and XXIV,4,19 (Maiozamalcha). Ammianus also records two less successful attempts during the Roman investment of Bezaube - XX,11,15 & 21.


79) The distinction is clearly drawn by Ammianus, both in his excursus - XXIII,4,2 & 6, and in an earlier passage: nec ballistae tamen cessavere nec scorpiones, illae tela torquentes, hi lapides crebros... - XX,7,10.

80) Amm. Marc. XIX,7,7. Also used at Bezabde in the following year to hurl flaming wicker baskets coated with tar and asphalt at the Persians' rams - XX,7,10 & 12.

81) Thus at the siege of Adrianople in 378, although the stone projectile dashed to the ground without hitting anyone, it nevertheless succeeded in causing great terror and confusion among the Goths - Amm. Marc. XXXI,15,12. But at Amida Ammianus says: diffractis capitibus, multos hostium scorpionum iactu moles saxae colliserunt - XIX,2,7. There is also a cursory reference to infantry being crushed by sassa immania at Aquileia - XXI,12,11.

82) Amm. Marc. XXIII,4,5.

CIL VII,1045-6 = RIB 1280-1.


85) Amm. Marc. XIX,1,7 and 5,5-6. Zosimus records the story of a master artilleryman in the service of the Isaurian brigand, Lydios, in the reign of Probus - 1,70. He was a deadly shot with the ballista, but when one day he had the misfortune to miss his target, he was severely reprimanded by Lydios for his unaccustomed failure. During Vitigis' siege of Rome in 536 a Goth was hit by a ballista-bolt as he sat half-way up a tree shooting arrows at the defenders on the walls. The bolt passed straight through him and nailed him to the trunk -
86) Amm. Marc. XX,11,20-3.

The fire-arrow, the malleolus, which was filled with bitumen and set alight, was used on numerous occasions to set fire to siege-works - Amm. Marc. XX,11,13 (Bezabde) and XXI,12,10 (Aquileia). But it does not appear to have been fired from a ballista. Indeed, Ammianus draws a contrast between the loose bow required to shoot fire-darts (saying that they are extinguished by too fast a flight) and the ballista, which shoots missiles so quickly that they hit their targets before they are seen - XXII,4,3 & 14. The onager was much more suitable for hurling combustible material - above n.80. Vegetius refers to flame-throwing machines as maiores ballistae - Epit. IV,18, and he advises that bitumen should be kept ready in fortresses for use against siege-engines - IV,8.

Fireproofing was, therefore, an important requirement for both defences and siege-engines. Ammianus refers to the Persian use of iron-clad towers at Amida - XIX,7,2, and of a battering-ram covered with wet hides at Bezabde - XX,7,13. Compare the towers hung with iron plates and hides which the Goths used while besieging Side in Lycia in c.269 - Dexippos FGH (Jacoby) 100 F.29. The wooden gates of fortresses were especially vulnerable to attack with fire; for example, at Mursa where the flames were extinguished with water thrown from the fortifications - Zosimus II,50,1. Consequently, they were often provided with a covering of iron or hide - Amm. Marc. XXI,12,13 (Aquileia) and XXIV,2,14 (Pirisabora). A papyrus records how the governor of the Thebaid, Julius Athenodorus, issued orders for a quantity of hides to be sent to Eudaimon, the prefect of a fort near Psinabla: προς έκχρομων πυλάμων και τυλίγκων τάν ἐν τοῖς κατορχοῖς - Panopolis Papyrus 1,385-91 ed. T.C.Skeat (Dublin 1964). It is noteworthy that asbestos was mined in Persia at least as early as the mid-fifth century - B.Laufer, Sino-Iranica (Chicago 1911) pp.498-500. But it is not known whether they made use of its flame-proof properties.

88) Legiones comitatenses: -
Not. Dign. Or.VII,43 - ballistarii seniores
Or.VIII,46 - ballistarii Dafnenses
Or.VIII,47 - ballistarii iuniores

Legiones pseudocomitatenses: -
Or.VII,57 - ballistarii Theodosiaci
Or.IX,47 - ballistarii Theodosiaci iuniores

Not. Dign. Occ.XLI,23: milites ballistarii. But the units in this particular list seem to be detachments from other units.

89) The walls of Rome could have carried more than seven hundred machines - M.Todd, The Walls of Rome (London 1978) p.34. Even small fortifications such as the signal-towers on the Yorkshire coast at Scarborough and Goldsborough were probably equipped with light ballistae - The History of Scarborough, ed. A.Rowntree (London 1931) p.40ff and J.D.Laverick, Arch. Journal 89 (1932) p.203ff; cf. Vegetius,
Epit. IV, 10.
Note that Ammianus records Constantius' establishment of a conditorium muralium tormentorum at Amida when he fortified the city - Amm. Marc. XVIII, 9, 1.

90) A bronze plaque from a vexillum, found at Novae, was dedicated by a certain Priscinius, a ἑκατοπτης of legio I Italica. On the basis of its Greek letter-forms it is dated to c. 300 - W. Kubitschek, Jahreshefte des österreichischen archäologischen Instituts in Wien 29 (1934) pp. 44-8. Two inscriptions referring to ballistarii are known from the East. One simply records: χαλκίδιος βαλλισταριος - Syria 14 (1933) p. 167; the other reads: σίδηρος ἵππηλου, ἄρχης βαλλισταρίου (ἀρχηβαλλιστάριου;) Καππάτου ἀπό (Θηρίου) - M. Dunard, "Nouvelles inscriptions du Djebel Druze et du Hauran." Revue Biblique 41 (1932) p. 400. However, no date can be given to either of these inscriptions.

91) The cataphractarii and ballistarii were not a suitable escort for the Caesar because, Ammianus says, these heavily armed troops were unable to give chase to the marauding bands of Alamanni - Amm. Marc. XVI, 2, 5-6.

92) Amm. Marc. XIX, 5, 2. These may have been newly raised or poorly trained by the usurper, although he does say that they were ad planarios conflictus apti. Probably, they were auxilia recruited from amongst the Germans.

93) Amm. Marc. XXI, 11-12.

94) Only two fabricae ballistariae are known for certain. Both are located in Gaul, one at Trier and the other at Autun - Not. Dign. Occ. IX, 33 & 38. One must, of course, draw a distinction between the comitatenses and the limitanei. If the majority of the latter were familiar with the handling of defensive artillery, this does not exclude the possibility that the field ordinance was concentrated in specific units of the comitatenses, which thereby acquired the title of ballistarii - cf. Vegetius, Epit. II, 25.

95) For example, Sapor at Singara and Bezabde in 360 - Amm. Marc. XX, 6, 3 & 7, 3; and Julian's forces at Aquileia - XXI, 12, 4. But such persuasion rarely succeeded, a notable exception being the capitulation of Anatha in 363 - XXIV, 1, 8-9.

96) Amm. Marc. XXI, 12, 17.

97) As they drew close to the fortifications, the besiegers were assailed by groups of men who rushed out from postern gates. These entrances were shielded by a turf vallum, behind which the defenders lay in wait to make their counter-attacks - Amm. Marc. XXI, 12, 13.

98) Amm. Marc. XXI, 12, 17.

100) Ephraem, Carmina Nisibena II,17-9 and III,6.

101) Amm. Marc. XIX,9,9. Throughout the siege Ammianus stresses the bravery and determination of the defenders - XIX,2,4; 6 & 13; and 8,2.

102) Amm. Marc. XX,6,2.

103) Above, pp.47-8.

104) Libanius, Or. XVIII,208 & 210-1. In contrast, Ammianus praises the fighting quality of the eastern army: legiones...quarum statariae pugnae per orientales saepius eminuere procinctus - Amm. Marc. XX,8,1.

105) At Reman/Busan the garrison was overcome by a sudden panic and promptly surrendered to Sapor - Amm. Marc. XVIII,10, 1-2. In the following year, after the capture of Bezabde and before the unsuccessful attempt on Virta, Ammianus mentions: interceptis castellis aliis vilioribus - XX,7,17.

106) Carrhae in 359 - Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,3. Amudis was regarded as another munimentum infirmum - XVIII,6,13.

107) Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,13 (Amida); XVIII,10,2 (Reman/Busan); XIX,6,1 (Ziata) and XX,6,8 (Singara). At news of Sapor's advance in 359 Euphronius, the rector Mesopotamiae (= civil governor?), was alerted to compel the peasants to move to safer places with their families and flocks - XVIII,7,3.

108) CTh XV,1,34 & 36. A number of undated inscriptions on Hadrian's Wall record work undertaken by civitates of southern Britain; two mention the civitas Dunoniorum, one the civitas Catuvellanorum, two the Durotriges Lendinienses, and one refers obscurely to a civitas Bricic - RIB 1672-3; 1843-4; 1962 and 2022. Note also two inscriptions attesting work done by individuals - RIB 1629 and 2053. The inscriptions have been assigned to various phases of reconstruction, from the Severan period right up to the final Theodosian work in 369 - S.Frere, op.cit. pp.198-9 & 394.

109) Corvées were apparently used to construct the Aurelian walls of Rome - M.Todd, op.cit. p.43. Similarly, the Theodosian walls of Constantinople were built by the city factions - E.Stein, Geschichte des spätrömischen Reiches (Vienna 1928) p.440.

110) Amm. Marc. XXI,11,2 & 12,20.

111) Amm. Marc. XX,6,4 & 8. It is probable that a significant proportion of the limitanei were local recruits. Some units were formed specifically from native troops; for example, the Zabdiceni sagittarii at Bezabde - XX,7,1. A number of the townsmen must also have been veterans, whose military experience added greatly to the strength of the garrisons. Note how veterans saved Autun from capture
Julian, Or. II, 64c. Sirmium held out against the usurper Magnentius when he advanced down the river Save. According to Zosimus, it was defended by τοῦ πλήθους τῶν οικητῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιτεταγμένων τὴν πολὺν συλλήπτειν στρατιωτῶν - II, 49.

Zosimus I, 32-3.

Amm. Marc. XXIX, 6, 9-11 and Libanius, Or. XXIV, 12.


Chapter III The Principal Roman Cities and their Garrisons.

(a) The Frontier Legions.

It is well-nigh impossible to place accurately all the forts and military units of the Mesopotamian limes in the first half of the fourth century. The Notitia Dignitatum provides a rough guideline, but it is fraught with difficulties and uncertainties, not least because it reflects the situation only after the withdrawal from the sector east of Nisibis.¹ The legions alone present considerable problems. They served as the backbone of the frontier forces, but it can be seen that they were not totally static units. In times of emergency they could be moved to reinforce other garrisons which were likely to come under attack from the Persians. Also, it is likely that they took part in offensive campaigns, for Ammianus records the presence of the dux Osrhoenae on Julian's Persian expedition.² Thus in some respects the frontier legions were indistinguishable from those which were allotted to the field army.

Yet each legion was assigned to a specific fortress. Such, at least, is the conclusion which can be drawn from Ammianus' reference to Amida as the permanent base of legio V Parthica.³ Of the other major fortresses it seems certain that Bezabde and Singara were legionary bases. Ammianus records which forces tried unsuccessfully to defend those towns in 360. He names two legions at Singara, legiones I Flavia and I Parthica,⁴ and three at Bezabde, legiones II Flavia, II Armeniaca and II Parthica.⁵ But in each case probably only one of these units was the regular garrison. The additional legions should be regarded as reinforcements which were sent to the fortresses when the Persians threatened to attack. It has often been
assumed that Singara was garrisoned by *legio I Parthica* from the time of its formation by Septimius Severus. The evidence, however, is slight. Dio Cassius attests to the presence of the legion in Mesopotamia as part of the Severan establishment, and an inscription shows that Singara was a legionary base in the early third century, but only the reference in Ammianus specifically connects the two. In the *Notitia*, on the other hand, *legio I Parthica* bears the epithet *Nisibena*, which surely implies that the legion had had a long association with the fortress of Nisibis. If this is correct, only one known unit is left at Singara, *legio I Flavia*. Its companion unit, *legio II Flavia*, is the first of the three legions which are recorded at Bezabde. The pair have been equated with the *legiones I et II Flaviae geminae* which appear in the field army of Thrace. However, it is equally possible that they are quite distinct from the Thracian units and disappear completely from the record after 360, just as *legio V Parthica* does after its loss at Amida in the preceding year. If so, there exists a strong argument for regarding the Flavian legions as the permanent garrisons of Singara and Bezabde during the reign of Constantius. Hence the other legions mentioned by Ammianus perhaps survived the fall of the fortresses because they were merely reinforcing detachments whose headquarters were elsewhere. It ensues that *legio II Parthica* might be placed at Cepha from the time that a fortress was founded there by Constantius, although it has also been suggested that it replaced *legio VI Parthica* at that station only later in the fourth century.

Another pair of legions which were involved in operations against the Persians are the *legiones I et II Armeniacae*.14
They appear as units of the eastern field army in the Notitia, but it is thought that they were formerly frontier legions. Their quarters have been sought in the vicinity of the Upper Euphrates, where they formed part of the garrison of the Cappadocian limes. Yet it is striking that the scholars who have tried to unravel the distribution of units on this frontier have always omitted the important regiones Transtigritanae from their calculations. Admittedly, it is improbable that they came within the scope of the Diocletianic reorganization. But in the renewed troubles of the 330's steps were evidently taken to protect these lands with Roman fortresses: Amida for Greater Sophene, Cepha for Arzanene and probably Bezabde for Zabdicene. The two Armenian legions may similarly have been assigned to stations from which they could supervise the other principalities of Anzitene and Lesser Sophene. Thus during Constantius' reign the regiones may have been guarded by five frontier legions. This number was certainly regarded by the ancient sources as being of particular significance with respect to the principalities, although it is clear that in fact there existed a larger number of distinguishable areas. Another unit which may have been transferred from the frontier forces appears alongside the legiones Armeniacae in the Notitia. This is legio VI Parthica, but where in Mesopotamia its base should be located is open to conjecture. I believe that Castra Maurorum is one possibility, since Ammianus singles it out as one of the most important fortresses among those which were surrendered to Sapor in 363. It is, however, extremely difficult to be certain about the place and purpose of the legions which are listed by the Notitia as pseudo-comitatenses in the eastern
Osrhoene apparently had a complement of two legions throughout the fourth century. The Notitia records legio IV Parthica at Circesium, which was probably a legionary base from the time of its refortification by Diocletian. An unfortunate lacuna has deprived us of the name and location of the second unit. But most scholars have accepted Seeck's view that the missing legion is legio III Parthica, since the other five in the Parthica series are accounted for and there is no obvious alternative to put in its place. A fortress called Apatna is pictured in the schematic representation of the province but without a corresponding entry in the Notitia list. Consequently, it is thought to be the most likely site for the second legionary base. One reservation which has been voiced on this score is that Apatna has been identified with Tell Fdeyn on the Lower Khabur, only about thirty kilometers from Circesium. Yet this is not so improbable as might seem at first. For the frontier legions were intended primarily to guard strongholds which stood on the major invasion routes. There were basically two of these; one ran from the Tigris across the northern edges of the Mesopotamian plain, the other followed the banks of the Euphrates. Between the two there stretched, south of the Jebel Sinjar and east of the Khabur, an inhospitable desert zone across which no large invasion force could travel. Since the legionary fortresses of provincia Mesopotamia controlled the former route, it is reasonable to assume that those of Osrhoene would be concentrated on the latter, leaving the large intervening section of the limes along the Khabur to be guarded by auxiliary units, which would operate mainly against
the small-scale raids of hostile tribesmen.  

The distribution of the frontier legions during the reign of Constantius may be postulated anew in the light of the above, briefly stated arguments. The following pattern fits well with the general system which is visible throughout the eastern provinces from the Black Sea to Egypt.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>3rd Century Legion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osrhoene</td>
<td>Circesium</td>
<td>legio IV Parthica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apatna</td>
<td>legio III Parthica (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesopotamia</td>
<td>Nisibis</td>
<td>legio I Parthica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Singara</td>
<td>legio I Flavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Castra Maurorum)</td>
<td>legio VI Parthica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regiones</td>
<td>Bezabde</td>
<td>legio II Flavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cepha</td>
<td>legio II Parthica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amida</td>
<td>legio V Parthica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Anzitene) (?)</td>
<td>legio I Armeniaca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Lesser Sophene) (?)</td>
<td>legio II Armeniaca</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, because of the meagre or unreliable nature of the literary sources and the great lack of archaeological evidence, it is impossible for the time being to say categorically which units were stationed where and for how long on the late Roman frontier in Mesopotamia.  

(b) Edessa.  

Edessa has been in many ages the principal city of northern Mesopotamia. At the end of the third century, after Galerius' victory over the Persians, it became the capital of the new province of Osrhoene. As such it had an equal importance as an administrative centre and military headquarters. It played a complementary role to that of Nisibis, the major fortress of the province of Mesopotamia proper. While the latter stood as a bulwark of the Roman limes, Edessa acted as a base where
fresh supplies of men and matériel could be gathered. It was probably during the Diocletianic reorganization that a state factory was built there to provide arms and equipment to the troops deployed on the frontier. Although Edessa was fortified, its defences were never tested by the Persian army during the reign of Sapor II. There is no indication that it had a regular garrison, apart from those soldiers who were seconded to serve on the staff of the dux Osrhoenae. This may partly be because it was such a large and important urban centre that no troops could be stationed there permanently. But more importantly, Edessa was not regarded as a normal frontier fortress which might house units of the limitanean forces. Rather, it was a strategic command post which often had to accommodate a substantial part of the eastern field army. Thus, for example, the magister militum Sabinianus made it his headquarters during the crisis of the Persian invasion of 359. He was accompanied by a sufficient number of troops for Ursicinus to urge him to go to the assistance of the besieged at Amida. Likewise, in the following year Constantius himself came first to Edessa. He stayed there a considerable time, while his forces assembled and abundant supplies were collected, before he set out for Amida and then Bezabde. Again, in the spring of 361 the emperor hurried to the city from his winter quarters in Syria when he heard that the Persian army had mustered and was approaching the Tigris. He remained there, using it as a base from which to dispatch troops to either East or West, until the threat of a renewed Persian attack had been removed.

Only minor excavations have been carried out at Edessa, largely when ancient monuments have been unearthed in the
course of modern redevelopment. No important edifice which can be dated to the fourth century has yet been discovered, and the literary and epigraphical sources give little information about the city's public buildings. One minor act of imperial munificence at Edessa is recorded by Ammianus. He states that Constantius set up there statues in honour of those who had fought bravely in the siege of Amida. From this it seems likely that Ammianus had detailed information or personal knowledge of the city. But unfortunately in the surviving books of his Histories he does not have call to give further details about its lay-out.

The local Syriac chronicles attribute the construction of several churches to bishops in the fourth century, but no visible trace of them remains. A palace had existed by the sacred fish pools at the foot of the citadel in the time of the last kings of Edessa. Presumably, it was used thereafter by the Romans, although Segal believes that the provincial governor's residence, the Praetorion, was situated on the citadel itself. In the sixth century Procopius refers to a χωροτρόφον attached to part of the circuit-wall, apparently in the same locality as the former palace below the citadel. Apart from this and the state arms factory, nothing is known of the military installations within Edessa. It is, however, unlikely that a large area of the city was set aside for purely military purposes. Of the soldiers who mustered there most would have been lodged with the townsfolk or bivouacked in the streets. It is probable that the fourth century walls followed the same course as the fortifications which can still be traced today. On the north and east sides the city is bounded by the channel which Justinian built for the Scirtus
(Daisan) rivulet, while the citadel marks the south-west corner of its defences.\textsuperscript{45} The area thus enclosed measures approximately twenty-seven hectares, an adequate size for the populous and flourishing fourth century city.

(c) Amida.

The early history of Amida is unknown. According to Ammianus, it was extremely small until the site was fortified and made into a major military post by Constantius.\textsuperscript{46} Probably, then, it cannot be counted among the fortresses established by Diocletian. It was not, however, merely a garrison fort. Civilians, too, lived there, and it became a safe place of refuge for the local inhabitants against Persian raiders.\textsuperscript{47} During the siege of 359 large numbers of people were shut up inside its fortifications. As well as the regular garrison of legio V Parthica and a company of native militia, six other legions and the greater part of the \textit{comites sagittarii} had arrived there as timely reinforcements.\textsuperscript{48} In addition to the military personnel, there were the townsfolk and a crowd of fugitives from the surrounding countryside. Ammianus' estimate of the numbers present in the city may be accurate; twenty thousand is not an excessively large number,\textsuperscript{49} and he was in a position to get first-hand information about such things.\textsuperscript{50} The proportion of troops to civilians, therefore, may have been approximately equal.

Without the evidence of systematic archaeological excavations of both the existing walls and the interior of the city, it is impossible to be precise about the size and lay-out of the fortress during Constantius' reign. Two opposite conclusions have been drawn by scholars who have ventured to survey the enceinte. Gabriel believed that the fortifications took their
lasting shape between 367 and 375, when the size of the city had been doubled by the influx of refugees from Nisibis. 
Van Berchem, on the other hand, argued that the essential form and lay-out of the walls should be ascribed to the time of Justinian. The scanty epigraphic and literary evidence is called upon to support each of these hypotheses, but neither is totally convincing.

Ammianus remarks that in 359 the city was still none too large, and he stresses the cramped conditions of the besieged. The existing circuit of fortifications is far too large to be made crowded by twenty thousand people. Consequently, Gabriel suggested that only the eastern half of the town was occupied before 363, and that the main street from the Kharput to the Mardin Gate marked the line of the earlier defences on the western side. But even this area seems to be large by late Roman standards and would have been more than spacious for its regular garrison and civilian population. Perhaps, then, a smaller circuit should be envisaged, covering only the north-east quarter of the present walled city. The citadel doubtless formed the nucleus of the early settlement. Ammianus refers not only to the citadel, but also to a spring which is to be found at its foot. It is interesting that he describes the latter as being in ipso.. Amidae meditullio. Although he may be speaking metaphorically in order to emphasize the important of this secure source of water during the siege, the expression would surely not have come so readily to mind if the spring had then been located very much in one corner of the fortress. Hence it may be that Constantius' foundation was restricted to an area running approximately from the Kharpout Gate to the main crossroads in the centre of the town.
and thence in the direction of the main east gate, Yeni Kapi. 58

Ammianus' description of the site of Amida raises several problems. It is necessary to alter the order of the text which has come down to us so that the city has its proper orientation. For the Tigris cannot be said to wash its southern side, nor do the plains of Mesopotamia lie to the east of Amida. These two directions must be interchanged, since the remaining two sides seemingly face the right ways: west towards the fertile region of Gumathene and north towards the Taurus mountains and central Armenia. 59 On the other hand, Ammianus is not in error when he says that a part of the southern walls looks down over the Tigris. 60 In this sector he describes a large tower perched high on precipitous rocks through which ran a passageway down to the water's edge. 61 Presumably, then, the tower stood in the far south-east corner of the defences, but no exact location can be assigned for it at present. Likewise, Ammianus refers on several occasions to gates and posterns without either distinguishing or locating them precisely, except for one instance when he states that one contingent of the Persian army was drawn up opposite the west gate. 62 Thus we have no clear indication of how many gates Amida had in the mid-fourth century. It can only be supposed that the postern through which Ammianus himself entered the town lay on the steep and rocky eastern side. 63 But the meaning of his words about the pathway up to the city is not fully understood. 64 Indeed, his description of the fortress and the surrounding terrain is generally superficial and imprecise. It was, of course, not his intention to give a detailed and accurate report of the locale; he merely sought
to set the scene for the dramatic actions of the siege which his narrative vividly recalls.

(d) Singara.

According to Ammianus, Singara was an outlying fortress which served to give early warning of hostile movements. As such it not only presented the first major obstacle to the Persians when they sought to invade Roman territory from the Tigris valley to the south-east, but it also acted as a guard-post against raids by the nomadic tribesmen who roamed the plains between the Khabur and Tigris rivers. Ammianus, however, considered that Singara's usefulness was outweighed by the losses which were incurred from its repeated capture. How many times Singara fell to the Persians is uncertain, but it seems that it was taken at least once during the 340's and then, finally, in 360. It was officially and permanently ceded to the Persians by Jovian three years later. Ammianus, perhaps, overemphasizes the remoteness and vulnerability of Singara. As with all the major fortresses, it was expected to withstand attack without the hope of immediate relief. Ammianus himself states that the provincial military commanders believed it to be sufficiently well fortified with men and supplies in 360. Moreover, he gives the impression that the defenders of the city were not disheartened by the approach of the Persian army but eagerly prepared for a siege. Finally, the area about Singara was the site of considerable fighting during the 340's, including the only major battle between the armies of Constantius and Sapor. The presence of the Roman emperor during this conflict argues against the validity of Ammianus' statement about the isolation of Singara.

The fortifications of Singara have been surveyed and
They mark out a considerable area, some seventeen hectares, which must have housed both troops and civilians. Unfortunately, there are no visible remains of any buildings of the Roman period within the defences, nor has any epigraphic or literary evidence survived to shed light on the lay-out of the town. The walls, however, are considered to have been built originally by the Romans, although Oates is not definite about the date of their construction. He merely states that they "were built, at the latest, in the first half of the fourth century." His comparison of the defences of Singara and Amida is less than convincing or conclusive. If Singara became a legionary fortress immediately after the extension of the Mesopotamian limes by Septimius Severus, the existing enceinte may date back to the first years of the third century. But in this case the fortifications must have undergone quite considerable patching and restoring, if not wholesale rebuilding, during the next century and a half as the town became a pawn in the fluctuating struggle between Rome and Persia. Ammianus bears this out to a small degree in the one detail he gives about the defences in 360. He refers to a round tower where a breach had been made in the previous siege. The tower was now attacked again and, because the repairs had only recently been completed and had not fully hardened, a large battering-ram was able to cause its collapse for a second time. I believe, therefore, that Oates' plan of the Roman walls, showing a series of U-shaped towers, is too orderly. One should envisage a more irregular lay-out with signs of alterations and additions at the different stages in the fortress' history.
(e) The Site of Bezabde.

It is evident that Bezabde was an important fortified town in the first half of the fourth century. In 360 three legions, together with a considerable number of local archers, were assigned to its defence and put up stout resistance to the assaults of Sapor's army. After its fall the Persian king took pains to strengthen its fortifications and lay in stores for its new garrison, for he expected, rightly, that the Romans would try to recover the stronghold. The loss of Bezabde was indeed a serious blow. Late in the same campaigning season Constantius, having come posthaste from the Danube, made a very determined effort to recover it. Moreover, it seems that he would have renewed the siege in 361, if the double threat of a further Persian invasion and of Julian's usurpation had not prevented such action.

According to Ammianus, Bezabde was a munimentum velut insolubile claustrum hostium excursibus obiectum. But it seems unlikely that the fortress acted as a barrier to full-scale invasions of Mesopotamia. Sapor was able to launch attacks on Nisibis, Amida and Singara without having to pass before the walls of Bezabde. Indeed, in 360 after the capture of Singara his army approached Bezabde from the south-west. Numerous crossing-places on the Tigris existed further downstream, providing more direct routes for the Persian invasions of northern Mesopotamia. The very position of Bezabde speaks against it playing a prominent part in the defence of the Mesopotamian limes. In this respect Nisibis was of much greater importance, since it stood on the major highway which stretched from the Tigris to the Euphrates. Bezabde, however, is regarded as the principal town of Zabdicene, one of
the *regiones Transtigritanae*, which were handed over to Rome by Narses in 298. Therefore its garrison may have been established on the orders of Diocletian to safeguard these newly acquired territories. On the other hand a Syriac writer, Jacob the Recluse, says that Constantius, while he was still Caesar, built three fortresses to protect the frontier zone of south-east Armenia from Persian raiders who constantly made incursions and ravaged the countryside. As well as Amida and Cepha, one was built at an unspecified site on the borders of Beth 'Arbaye. Perhaps Bezabde itself is meant, for in controlling the region of Zabdicene it effectively blocked the way northwards into Arzanene and Greater Sophene and to the strategic passes which led through the Taurus mountains into central Armenia. Presumably Bezabde also exercised some influence over the principality of Corduene which lay beyond the Roman frontier to the east of the Tigris. Although Roman strategy during Constantius' reign was mainly defensive, some counter-raids were made into Persian territory in the 340's, and Bezabde would have been a useful forward base for such operations. The loss of the fortress must have seriously threatened the security of the Arabian march, enabling Sapor to prize the local princes away from their allegiance to Rome and greatly weakening the position of the Armenian monarch. In short, Bezabde stood as a bulwark not of Mesopotamia but of Armenia and principally of the Transtigritane provinces.

The exact location of Bezabde, however, has not been satisfactorily identified. Most scholars have assumed that it stood on the same site as Jazirat Ibn-Omar, modern Cizre. But no thorough survey of the town and its environs has been made; there is no record of Roman or Sassanian artefacts
having been found there, and no archaeological excavations have ever been carried out to prove the nature and history of the town. Gertrude Bell visited Jazirat in 1910 and described the ruins of its castle and town walls, as well as the remains of a masonry bridge "about half-an-hour's ride below the town." She subscribes to the identification of Jazirat with Bezabde, but she adds that "Ammianus' description applies better to Finik than to Jazirat." More recently Dillemann has also called into question the accuracy and reliability of Ammianus on this point. He believes that Ammianus derived the name Phoenicha/Phaenicha, by which he sometimes calls Bezabde, from a résumé of the Geography of Strabo and thus confused Bezabde with a place called Finik further upstream on the left bank of the Tigris. But while noting that the description of Finik recalls Strabo's reference to the three citadels of Pinaka, each fortified with a separate wall, he rightly observes that neither modern Finik nor Strabo's Pinaka can be equated with Ammianus' description of Bezabde. Furthermore, he argues that this description does not correspond to the position of Jazirat or its immediate vicinity, although he firmly believes that the Roman fortress was located there. Consequently, he falls back on the suggestion that Ammianus, since he was not an eye-witness of events at Bezabde in 360, was not familiar with its exact location and has drawn his setting for the siege almost at random, using the phrase colle mediocriter edito merely to create an impression of the difficult terrain which confronted the successive besiegers.

It is stated that Jazirat originally stood on a crescent-shaped promontory which jutted out into the Tigris from the east bank. The town's Arab founder, Hasan Ibn-Omar, is said
to have strengthened its defences by cutting a ditch or canal through the neck of land, thereby making the promontory into an island. In time the Tigris took this more direct channel for its main stream, while the original bed silted up. In this way Jazirat passed from the east to the west side of the river. Yet such an explanation for the origin of the name Jazirat Ibn-Omar and its history in the early Islamic period, while plausible in itself, does not lend support to the identification of Jazirat with Bezabde. Peter the Patrician records that the peace treaty of 298 defined the frontier between the Roman and Persian Empires as the Tigris. Therefore the existence of a Roman fortress at Jazirat on what was then the east bank of that river is highly suspect.

In his summary of the Arab sources for this area Le Strange does not indicate clearly on which side of the river Jazirat was located. He merely states that "the Tigris, as Yakut explains, went half round the city in a semicircle, while a ditch filled with water on the land side made it an island." But a little further on he adds the remark that "opposite Jazirat, on the west bank of the Tigris, was Bazabda of the Bakirda district..." Dillemann dismisses this reference to a settlement distinct from Jazirat on the west bank, for he claims that it must have stood directly opposite and very close to the town, and he points out that Jazirat is hemmed in to the north and west by the slopes of the Tur 'Abdin. Certainly there is no room here for Ammianus' Bezabde. But Dillemann completely ignores the possibility of finding a suitable site to the south of the town. Attention was first drawn to this direction by a German traveller, Eduard Sachau. Sachau visited the area in 1880, and he astutely noted that
since the ruined bridge over the Tigris lay a considerable distance from the town of Jazirat, some sort of habitation must have existed either to the east or west of the river in close proximity to the crossing-place. He commented that the ground to the west was more suitable because it was higher than the crescent-shaped plain to the east, and on his sketch map he indicates that the latter area was below the flood level of the river. But he admitted that he could not find any sign of a site nor give a name to the postulated settlement, although he suggested that ruins might be found on a small hill close to the west bank. Soon after the publication of Sachau's observations another German scholar, Martin Hartmann, had the idea of relating them to the description of Bezabde provided by Ammianus, thus making the hillock beside the ruined bridge the site of the late Roman fortress. Despite receiving some attention and acceptance, this identification has generally been rejected or overlooked. This is probably because Sachau's remarks do not seem the most reliable and convincing evidence. Also, his sketch map is small and rough, containing several inaccuracies and drawn without any indication of scale. Moreover, Hartmann, who did not know the site personally, provides little elaboration and somewhat confuses the issue by placing it amid a lengthy discussion of the regions of Corduene and Zabdicine.

Nevertheless, Sachau made one important point; he drew attention to the fact that the remains of the imposing stone bridge were too distant from Jazirat to be directly associated with it. Indeed, it is difficult to interpret the relationship between the two sites. Merchants plying their trade between East and West must have availed themselves of the easy passage
while the bridge was still intact. Semi-nomads, too, may have crossed this way on their migration to summer pastures in the mountains to the east from their homes in Mesopotamia. Yet the town would not appear to be close enough to have provided adequate protection and surveillance for this strategic crossing, and it would be strange if Jazirat was already a thriving community when the bridge was first constructed. On the other hand, there is no obvious reason for the foundation of the town away from the crossing unless the bridge had already fallen into disrepair or had been rendered useless by the changing course of the Tigris.

Unfortunately, the date of the bridge remains uncertain.
The single surviving arch, an impressive span of some twenty-one metres, is pointed not semicircular, and one of its piers is decorated with figures in high relief on rectangular blocks of white limestone. The panels consist of representations of various signs of the Zodiac, each bearing an inscription in Arabic naming the particular sign which it depicts. Sachau believed that they were of no great age, but it is possible that they were a later addition and embellishment to the bridge. This work is probably that to which the local writer Ibn al-Athir referred when he described the building of an elegant stone bridge over the Tigris by a minister of the governor of Mosul, Qutb-ed-Din, in the twelfth century. But, given that the existing remains date either in part or in whole only from mediaeval times, they retain importance since they provide a good indication of the site of an earlier crossing. It is very unlikely that the Romans, during their relatively short stay at Bezabde, built a permanent bridge to span the Tigris; one is neither mentioned nor implied by Ammianus.
However, the fortress presumably commanded some sort of crossing-place, and it is quite feasible that the Persians constructed a bridge there to facilitate movement across the river after they gained control of Zabdicene and northern Mesopotamia as far as Nisibis. It is clear from Ammianus that in 360 the Persians occupied and refortified the site of the Roman municipium.\textsuperscript{114} There is no evidence to suggest that at any time they removed the settlement to a new site. Thus I believe that a bridge was originally built in connection with the Sassanian fortress which stood apart from the later, mediaeval town of Jazirat.

It is immediately apparent to a visitor to the area\textsuperscript{115} that there is a suitable place for the Roman and Persian town which is not only quite separate from Jazirat but also closely associated with the ruined bridge. This is not the hillock which Sachau noted but a larger, elongated hill lying back a short distance south and slightly west of the bridge. The latter is, however, directly aligned with it and, consequently, points markedly away from Jazirat. This in itself is a strong argument in favour of the location of Bezabde here rather than on the island further upstream. Moreover, the shape of the hill fits nicely with Ammianus' description. It is roughly triangular, with its apex commanding a good view to south and east across the Tigris valley. Its two long sides are fairly steep; the one facing east across the Tigris itself, the other bordering on a stream which flows down from the Tur 'Abdin. This joins the Tigris to the south of the hill, thereby providing a useful obstacle before its western slopes. Easy access to the top of the hill is given only on the northern side. Here, one may surmise, was constructed the duplex murus to which
Ammianus refers. Although I was unable to inspect the northern end of the hill because of its close proximity to the modern border, I did take the opportunity to walk carefully over most of the plateau. This proved to be less fruitful than I had hoped, for I did not see any sign of man-made edifices on the hill, nor could I find any surface pottery in the corn stubble with which it was covered. If it is the site of Bezabde, one must assume that it has suffered considerable erosion, and probably also robbing for building materials, during the long period that it has been uninhabited. However, there are ruins to both sides of the hill. A pile of rubble, which I took to have once been part of a bridge, stands in the bed of the stream to the west, while at the foot of the eastern slope there is a ruined monument decorated with an Arabic inscription beside a spring of fresh water. These traces, though slight, do lend some support to the view that the hill was formerly inhabited, and I believe that Ibn al-Athir's reference to a village called Bazabda opposite Jazirat is a reminiscence of this earlier settlement, Roman Bezabde.

(f) Nisibis and the Siege of 350.

Very little of ancient Nisibis has survived the ravages of time. All sign of the fortifications has disappeared. Early European travellers to the city rarely speak of its walls, and the bridge over the Mygdonius which they do mention (as a Roman construction) has also vanished. There remain only the church of St. Jacob, the nucleus of which dates back to the fourth century, and a small group of Corinthian columns, which possibly mark the forum area in the centre of the city and which are now located in the no-man's land of the Turko-Syrian border. Because of its position astride the international
frontier no excavations have been possible in recent times; one can only hope that a wealth of material lies safely below ground and that modern construction work in the Turkish town of Nusaybin is not destroying valuable evidence unbeknown to the archaeologists.

Since we are ignorant of the exact extent and configuration of the fortress, a doubt lingers over whether the river Mygdonius flowed beside or through Nisibis. The sources are less than consistent on this point, although it is of considerable importance for the central episode of the third siege. Bar Hebraeus says that the Mygdonius ran through the city. The testimony of Theodoret is ambivalent: in the Historia Ecclesiastica he speaks of the river ὁ μυγδών διατείμη τὴν πόλιν, whereas he introduces the participle παραπατῶν to describe it in the Historia Religiosa. Later descriptions, by both Arabs and Europeans, weigh heavily in favour of the view that the river flowed past the city. But most credence should be given to Ephraem, the esteemed native and resident of Nisibis. He states clearly that the Mygdonius lay outside the city. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the modern town of Nusaybin lies a short distance to the west of the river.

The fortress of Nisibis was fundamental to the strategic defence of Roman Mesopotamia in the first half of the fourth century. It stood on the major East-West highway, and it was thus intended to block the advance of the Persians towards the Euphrates and Syria. It was not only the headquarters of the dux Mesopotamiae, but also it often served as the forward mustering-point for the mobile forces of the magister militum. Nisibis was defended by legio I Parthica, presumably with the assistance of sizeable reinforcements when it came under direct
attack. This it successfully thwarted on three separate occasions during Constantius' reign. The first and second sieges conducted by Sapor are little known in detail; the first, probably in the spring of 338, is described briefly by Christian writers who attribute a leading role in the defence to bishop Jacob, while the only certain fact about the second is its date, 346. By contrast the third siege in 350 has almost an overabundance of material.

There are five main sources, all of which contain many difficulties and uncertainties as well as a great deal of useful information. Ephraem was present in Nisibis during the prolonged investment, and he refers to it in two works which were composed nearly a decade later. Unfortunately, since they are in form poetic and in content religious-didactic, these works do not constitute a thorough historical account but provide only brief, unconnected allusions to the siege. Julian's panegyric speeches to Constantius include the earliest detailed narrative, but its veracity has been brought into question by striking similarities to the Aethiopica of Heliodorus. The next major reference to the siege occurs in the works of the Christian writer Theodoret in the mid-fifth century, but this adds even more confusion with its emphasis on the role of bishop Jacob and the supernatural elements. The mid-seventh century Chronicon Paschale claims to derive from a letter of Vologaeses, the contemporary bishop of Nisibis, while the Byzantine historian Zonaras in the twelfth century provides another version of the siege.

From these divergent sources it is possible to construct a picture of the main elements of the siege.

(i) Sapor besieged Nisibis in the absence of Constantius.
The emperor's whereabouts, however, remain uncertain. Theodoret says that he was at Antioch, but the trustworthiness of this statement is lessened by the apparent play on names by the Christian author, who wishes to present Sapor as deceived and dispirited by a vision of his Roman adversary on the walls of Nisibis. Julian states that the siege took place at the very time when Constantius was preparing to march against the usurper Magnentius, while the Chronicon Paschale describes how he set out from Antioch to deal with the rebellion before it mentions the siege. Zonaras, on the other hand, says that Constantius was still undecided whether to oppose the Persian attack or to march to the West when Sapor laid siege to Nisibis. It is likely that Magnentius' revolt prevented the emperor from taking direct action to counter the Persian invasion, for he could not risk his field army against the forces besieging Nisibis when it was required to defeat the usurper.

(ii) The siege was prolonged, although the sources differ about the precise duration. Theodoret says that it lasted for seventy days, the Chronicon for a hundred, and Julian for four months. Sapor was able to continue his operations for such a length of time largely because the Roman emperor was in no position to bring his forces to the relief of the city.

(iii) Taking the sieges of Singara and Bezabde as analogous, it seems likely that the Persian king tried to persuade the garrison to capitulate on his arrival before the fortress. When this failed, he marshalled his forces for an assault on the defences. Three of the sources imply that certain measures were taken before Sapor sanctioned the construction of earthworks involving the Mygdonius. Thus the Chronicon speaks of elephants, mercenary princes and all sorts of siege machinery: καὶ διάφορας ἐν πάντι
Theodore describes the Persians as digging ditches, building palisades and bringing up siege-towers (ἐκτομέλα) against the city walls. Zonaras' account mentions battering-rams and tunnels, as well as referring to the devastation of the countryside and the capture of some forts before the investment of Nisibis. Szepessy has pointed out that these "traditional manoeuvres" are not mentioned by Julian; indeed, the start of his account is so abrupt that he even fails to name the city.

(iv) The river Mygdonius was dammed upstream from the city and, when a large volume of water had collected, it was released with sudden force against the fortifications. This, together with the collapse of part of the defences which it caused, is attested by all five sources. The flood certainly occupies the central position in Ephraem's Carmina Nisibena, being mentioned twenty-three times, while the collapse of the wall is referred to sixteen times. Since it seems unlikely that the Mygdonius flowed through the city, Theodoret's account of the fortifications collapsing in two places (the points of entry and exit) should be dismissed. Indeed, this would have made the task of resisting an attack and repairing the damage doubly difficult. The Chronicon, although it is ambiguous concerning the course of the river, clearly implies that there was only one breach, as does the account in the Historia Religiosa. If, then, the river ran past the fortress, it must have been necessary for the Persians to dig a channel and/or construct a dyke in order to divert the water from its normal course. But I will return later to the siege-works which Julian and Ephraem describe. Zonaras produces a rationalized version of the use of the Mygdonius; firstly, Sapor diverted the river merely to
deprive the city of its water-supply, but when he found that
the besieged could still obtain water from wells and springs
inside the fortress, he decided to release the torrent against
the walls.\textsuperscript{156}

(v) There is a major divergence of opinion among the sources
regarding the next part of the siege. Theodoret and Zonaras tell
of an overnight delay before the Persian assault on the breach,
during which time the defenders were able to repair the walls.\textsuperscript{157}
Furthermore, these accounts make only brief and indirect mention
of Persian attacks after the collapse of a section of the
fortifications;\textsuperscript{158} instead, they emphasize how Sapor was
disheartened by the sight of the rebuilt wall as well as by
heavenly signs and visions.\textsuperscript{159} Yet it is certain that an
assault was launched after the flood had brought down part of
the wall,\textsuperscript{160} and it seems unlikely that an immediate attempt
to storm the breach would not have been made, whatever the state
of the ground before the city.\textsuperscript{161} Thus the \textit{Chronicon} says that
the Persians threatened to enter the city through the breach,
stationing armed elephants nearby and "urging a mass of troops
to commit itself more earnestly to the battle..."\textsuperscript{162}

(vi) It appears that because of the difficult terrain in front
of the walls and the staunch resistance of the besieged the
Persians' attempt to storm the breach proved unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{163}
According to the \textit{Chronicon}, the defenders used their artillery
to good effect and even succeeded in killing some of the
elephants.\textsuperscript{164}

(vii) Presumably the repulse of this assault provided the Romans
with a respite (perhaps overnight) during which they were able
to make hurried repairs to the breach.\textsuperscript{165} This activity further
demonstrated to Sapor the determination of the besieged, while
his army was growing more disheartened and disillusioned with the lengthy siege. Conditions in the Persian camp were becoming steadily worse; supplies must have been more difficult to obtain the longer the siege continued and, on top of the mounting number of casualties from the fighting, disease was probably effecting a considerable proportion of the army. Perhaps, as Zonaras suggests, the Persian king was also prompted to signal the retreat by the news of unrest on the eastern borders of his realm. Whatever the case, the flood, the collapse of the wall and the repulsed attack are seen as the climax of the whole siege. Thereafter Sapor decided to cut his losses and abandon the siege.

How does Julian's account square with this reconstruction of the main elements, based as it is on the other four sources? However slight Constantius' personal connection with the defence of Nisibis, Julian intended his narrative to demonstrate and eulogize the emperor's effective control over and protection of the Empire. Thus he claims the repulse of the Persians as an unprecedented achievement since it was οὐ πάλιν οὐδὲ μάχαιραν, οὐλ' οὐδὲ στρατιώτην τῶν εἰς καταλόγου προέμενον... In order to make this most emphatic he concentrates on the climax of the struggle for the town and ignores less important facts and events. This was, of course, quite permissible for a writer of panegyric.

The account in Oratio I contains a number of discrepancies. (i) No mention is made of the river being held back and released with great force against the walls. Instead, Julian describes how the city was surrounded by χώρα and how the Mygdonius flowed in to flood the area around the fortress. (ii) Then he introduces the story of boats carrying
siege-engines or towers which sailed to attack the defences. This leads to a grand description of carnage and destruction which is reminiscent of many battle scenes involving men, water and ships in classical literature from Herodot onwards.  

(iii) By contrast, in the résumé of Sapor's futile attempts to capture Nisibis, Julian says: έπορεύεται οἱ ποταμοὶ καὶ τὰ τεῖχη διαλύεται οἵτινες ἁπέτειλτο τῆς πόλεως περιγενόμενος δοχεῖν ... This agrees much more closely with the other sources, having the essential elements of flood, collapse of wall and assault.

(iv) In another passage, although he says that Nisibis was encircled with water, Julian again refers to the river directed against the fortifications and the fighting around the breach. Here he states that the city was surrounded by λάκτον instead of by χάμα.

The second panegyric also contains a description which includes the construction of χάμα, the formation of a lake with Nisibis standing in its midst like an island, and the involvement of ships and πυγμαί. However, Julian then says that after a number of days part of the χάμα broke and the water flowed out bringing down with it a portion of the wall. This passage does not imply that the flood water was deliberately released in order to undermine the fortifications. He then proceeds to describe the Persian assault on the breach in considerable detail. The cavalry launched the first attack, supported by Indian elephants carrying towers full of archers. As they tried to cross the ground in front of the walls, they were repulsed not only by a barrage of missiles from the battlements, but also by a sortie. Julian draws one's attention to the awkward terrain and remarks on the ditch, dug
long before to protect the town, which was now filled with mud. Both horses and elephants floundered on the water-logged ground. 182 Thereafter Sapor ordered his archers to train their fire on the breach in order to prevent the defenders from rebuilding the wall. In this, too, the Persians proved unsuccessful, for during the course of a day and a night the besieged managed to raise a wall to the height of about twelve feet. As in the other sources, the sight of this new wall, together with the resistance of the garrison, greatly dismayed the Persians. 183 Sapor launched further attacks before he eventually decided to abandon the siege, 184 but Julian passes over these in one short sentence, wishing to present only the critical episode involving the flood and the assault on the breach.

It can be seen that Julian's account agrees at important points with the other sources, 185 and this suggests that he had obtained some reliable information concerning the siege, perhaps from an official report. 186 On the other hand, he introduces elements not mentioned elsewhere, 187 and it has been noted that these show a striking resemblance to an episode in the Aethiopica of Heliodorus. 188 In the fictional siege of Syene the Ethiopian king orders the construction of a ditch and embankment around the city. He then floods the area around the walls by digging a canal from the Nile. The pressure of the standing water causes the collapse of part of the town wall. Thereupon ten boats are sent across the lagoon to parley with the Persians who are confined within the city. Meanwhile the inhabitants of Syene rebuild the ruined section of wall by night just at the same time as the flood waters break through the embankment and flow away. However it is not yet possible for
the opposing forces to pass across the area which had been flooded since the ground is covered with a deep slime. The Persian troops take advantage of this, making their escape from the city by means of a gangway of planks across the mud.\textsuperscript{189}

It has been suggested that Julian was inspired by this story and modelled his account of the siege of Nisibis extensively on it.\textsuperscript{190} Even though it may be true that Julian had read the \textit{Aethiopica},\textsuperscript{191} it is evident that he was not wholly dependant on the Greek novelist.\textsuperscript{192} There is also the awkward fact that two striking similarities between Julian and Heliodorus occur in the other sources.\textsuperscript{193} Szepessy has argued that the earthen dykes, lake and ships of Julian's account must be fictional since it is inexplicable for the Christian authors to omit these extraordinary elements which would have greatly enhanced the divine role in the salvation of Nisibis.\textsuperscript{194} Likewise, it is possible to argue that they did not draw their information from Julian but were completely independent of his writings. It is, therefore, difficult to ascertain what relationship exists, if any, between the Christian writers and Heliodorus, particularly with regard to their references to impassable mud which, on the one hand, kept the opposing forces apart at Syene and, on the other, thwarted Sapor's attack on Nisibis.\textsuperscript{195} Nor is it possible to state categorically the date and provenance of the \textit{Aethiopica} from its correspondencies with the speeches of Julian, although it does seem that the work could easily antedate the third siege of Nisibis.\textsuperscript{196}

Because of its internal discrepancies, Julian's account of the siege appears to be a combination of factual and fictional details. This is best demonstrated by his confused references to earthworks. The \textit{σχήματα} which surround Nisibis may be
compared to the embankment around Syene. Yet Julian describes *xámma* as serving as firing-positions, while he also mentions *λανπ* around the city, neither of which corresponds with the idea of an embankment or dyke. Furthermore, he seems to refer to *xámma* in the sense of a dam across the Mygdonius. In reality, therefore, standard siege-mounds were probably raised by the Persians, but with the added purpose of holding back the river and deflecting it against the fortress wall. All this suggests that Julian has tried to weave together incompatible elements, one drawn from a fictional source and the other from a fairly reliable account of the actual events. Szepessy believes that the second speech contains a more accurate and trustworthy description of the siege than that of the first, having been written some three years later when Julian was better informed about events at Nisibis. However, a close examination of the two passages reveals that Julian merely wished to avoid repetition and thus concentrated on different aspects of the siege in the later oration. It is clear that the first passage includes the same basic facts, and it is doubtful whether Julian would have received more reliable and detailed information by 358/9 than what was available to him in 355/6. Of course, as a panegyrist Julian was entitled to add to and distort historical facts in order to enhance his praise of the emperor. Thus, although it is in all probability based on the truth, his account of the siege must be treated with the utmost caution. Just as the fighting from the ships has more in common with a literary *topos* than with reality, so the description of the assault in the second speech may be coloured with a certain amount of illusory embellishment.
Finally, two general conclusions can be drawn from our knowledge of the siege of Nisibis in 350. Firstly, there is the fact that the Persian king was prepared to devote a lot of time, effort and expense to the capture of this strategic fortress. Secondly, it is evident that the defenders were well organized and confident, despite the absence of Constantius and his inability to come to their aid. In 359 and 360 Amida, Singara and Bezabde were quickly stormed when breaches were made in their fortifications, but at Nisibis the collapse of part of the wall failed to discourage the garrison. Assisted by the difficult terrain in front of the wall and encouraged by the Christian leaders in the town, they managed to repulse the Persian attack on the breach and then made hurried repairs to the wall. The rigours of this third lengthy siege did not lessen the loyalty of either troops or civilians to the Roman cause.
1) Below, appendix 1, pp.297-303.
2) Amm. Marc. XXIV,1,2.
3) Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,3.
4) Amm. Marc. XX,6,8.
5) Amm. Marc. XX,7,1.
7) Dio Cassius LV,24,4.
8) ILS 9477.
9) Not. Dign. Or. XXXVI,29. D.Hoffmann could not accept this conclusion, but nor did he think it plausible that the legion received the title during a short stay at Nisibis between 360 and 363. Instead, he falls back on the suggestion that a detachment of legio I Parthica was permanently stationed at Nisibis during Constantius' reign - op.cit. p.419. But one would expect such an important fortress to contain more than just a vexillatio from a legion which was based at another, more distant stronghold - above, p.83.
11) Amm. Marc. XX,6,7-8 and 7,15.
12) Their title indicates that they were probably Constantinian formations. Indeed, they may have been created to fill gaps in the frontier establishment when this was enlarged in the last years of Constantine's reign by the foundation of new fortresses - below, n.18.
13) Not. Dign. Or. XXXVI,30. D.Hoffmann, op.cit. p.413. Little can be said about the history of Cepha. It served as the principal fortress for Arzane, but strangely it is never mentioned by Ammianus. Nowadays the place is noted for its ruined bridge, fortified citadel and other mediaeval Islamic monuments - A.Gabriel, Voyages Archéologiques dans la Turquie Orientale (Paris 1940) pp. 55-81. No evidence remains of earlier Byzantine or Roman occupation, except for coins which travellers report were presented to them there - J.G.Taylor, "Travels in Kurdistan." JRGS 35 (1865) p.33. It is presumed that the Roman fort was located on the citadel heights which overlook the Tigris from the south. Late Roman fortifications were, of course, frequently built on sites which recommended themselves by their strong natural defences, and Cepha was intended to provide a secure refuge for the local population against Persian raids - below, n.18. Yet it is noteworthy that, according to Yakut, the north bank of the Tigris had also been inhabited at one time - II,277. Thus, perhaps,
one cannot discount altogether the possibility that the legionary base was situated on the more open and level ground on the north side of the river. The mound on which stands the ruin of Imām 'Abd Allāh may mark the focal point of the settlement below the imposing cliffs of the south bank - Encyclopaedia of Islam new ed. vol. 3 (Leiden 1967) pp. 506-9 and A. Gabriel, op. cit. plate XL.

14) Legio II Armeniaca took part in the unsuccessful defence of Bezabde in 360 - Amm. Marc. XX, 7, 1. According to Eutychianus of Cappadocia, the Primoarmeniaci (= legio I Armeniaca) took part in Julian's Persian expedition - F HG IV, 6 = Malalas XIII (Bonn) p. 332.

15) Not. Dign. Or. VII, 49 & 50. D. Hoffmann did not believe that the two legions were already enrolled in the mobile forces under Constantius - op. cit. p. 422-3.

16) D. Hoffmann, op. cit. p. 412-3. The limes of Cappadocia and Armenia Minor had two long-established legionary fortresses, Satala and Melitene. The latter was garrisoned by legio XII Fulminata from its foundation in the first century until at least the time of the Notitia - Or. XXXVIII, 14. A mutilated inscription from Satala apparently refers to legio II Armeniaca - CIL III, 13630. On the evidence of this D. Hoffmann has assumed that the legion was stationed there from the time of the Tetrarchy until the second half of the fourth century. But legio XV Apollinaris is attested at Satala both in the third century and again at the end of the fourth - Itin. Anton. 183, 5 and Not. Dign. Or. XXXVIII, 13. E. Ritterling thus believed that it stayed there during the intervening period - P-W, RE XII/2 sv. legio cols. 1754-5. Certainly, one isolated inscription cannot be taken as firm evidence for the permanent quarters of a unit. For instance, although legio I Pontica was based at Trapezus on the Black Sea - CIL III, 6746 = ILS 639 (dated between 293 and 305) and Not. Dign. Or. XXXVIII, 16, an inscription has been found which records that on May 25, 288 the legion completed the construction of a parade-ground in the mountains of eastern Pamphylia - J. F. Gilliam, "A Diocletianic Inscription from Ayasofya." ZPE 15 (1974) pp. 183-91.

Since he attached four legions to this sector of the frontier in the first half of the fourth century, D. Hoffmann has looked for two other legionary sites. He tentatively suggested Zimara on the Upper Euphrates between Satala and Melitene and Claudipolis to the south-east of Melitene - op. cit. vol. 2, p. 173, n. 791. Zimara is a quite plausible site, but if the two legiones Armeniacae are to be connected with the Transtigritane principalities, I believe that it would be preferable to find a site farther downstream. A suitable location might be Dascusa, which stands at the confluence of the Euphrates and Arsanias. The siting of the remaining fortress on the Euphrates where it curves eastwards to pass through the Kurdish Taurus is probably the most reasonable suggestion that can be made in the light of the paucity of our present knowledge. The position of
Claudiopolis, however, remains uncertain - below, ch.IV, n.102. It may, perhaps, be the case that one or other of these fortresses lay to the east of the Euphrates. Ziata would be a suitable location for the stronghold which guarded Anzitene, although Ammianus does not refer to it as a legionary base but only says that it was a large, fortified site - Amm. Marc. XIX,6,1 and below, ch.IV, p.149.

17) Only A.H.M.Jones notes that the legions recorded as pseudocomitatenses in the Notitia Dignitatum (Or. V) may earlier have served in the regiones - LRE p.369, n.6.


19) Above, n.16.


22) D.Hoffmann, op.cit. p.413.

23) Amm. Marc. XXV,7,9: munimentum perquam oportunum. Elsewhere Ammianus implies that Castra Maurorum lay east beyond Nisibis and Sisara - XVIII,6,9. E.Honigmann identified its site as Babil - Byzantion 9 (1934) p.478. D.Oates, on the other hand, suggested that it was farther south, in the region of Abu Wajnam or Tell Abu Dhahir, and that its name derived from the cohors IX Maurorum which had been stationed at Hatra in the reign of Gordian III but had then been moved back to the area north-east of the Jebel Sinjar by Philip the Arab in 244 - Studies in the Ancient History of Northern Iraq (London 1968) pp.75 & 77. However, the site of Castra Maurorum and its relationship to the later fort of Rhabdion remains an enigma.

Another possible site for legio VI Parthica is Constantina. Ammianus mentions its refoundation by Constantius in the same context as that of Amida - Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,1; cf. also Malalas XIII (Bonn) p.323 and Chronicle of Seert in Patrologia Orientalis vol. IV, fasc.3 (Paris 1907) p.97. If Constantius made this into a legionary base like Amida, it is most likely that legio VI was the unit stationed there, thus forming a pair in sequence with legio V Parthica. But since the Notitia records legio I Parthica at Constantina during the latter part of the fourth century, one must assume that the first Parthian legion replaced the last when it was withdrawn from Nisibis in 363. Thereafter the sixth legion, being surplus to needs on the contracted frontier, was assigned to the mobile field army.


In 359 the garrison of Amida was reinforced by mobile troop detachments - Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,3. Ammianus' list includes two units, the Magnentiaci and Decentiaci, which had recently been transferred from Gaul - XIX,5,2. They have, of course, left no trace in the Notitia, for even if
they survived the fall of Amida, they would not have continued to be known by these names - compare Not. Dign. Or. V,52: Constantiacci. But two of the other legions may be identified among the forces of the magister militum per Orientem; they are the Fortenses = Fortenses auxiliarii and the Decimani = Decima gemina - Not. Dign. Or. VII,15=51 and 7=42. However, P.De Jonge, following D.Hoffmann, suggests the emendation of Decimane Fortenses to Decimanique Pretenses, thereby reducing the total of extra legions to the stipulated number of six - Philological and Historical Commentary on Amm. Marc. Bk. XVIII (Groningen 1980) pp.290-1. Of the three remaining units named by Ammianus, the Superventores and Praeventores had clearly served on the eastern frontier for a number of years since he refers to them fighting at Singara in the 340's - Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,3. Finally, the Tricensimani are recorded among the mobile forces in Gaul - Not. Dign. Occ. VII,108. This unit is believed to be descended from legio XXX Ulpi, which was stationed at Vetera in Lower Germany from 119 - P-W, RE XII/2 sv. legio cols. 1823 & 1827 and A.H.M.Jones, LRE p.373. When the detachment found at Amida was transferred from the West is not known, but it is unlikely to antedate the disturbances of the mid-third century. Perhaps it should be assimilated to one of the Magnentian legions which Constantius dispatched to the East after 353. Indeed, if this is a duplicate name for either the Magnentiaci or the Decentiaci, it would offer a solution to the problem of Ammianus' total of six units and a list of seven names - Amm. Marc. XVII,9,3. Further on Ammianus reiterates that there were seven legions inside Amida during the siege (the six additional units plus its regular garrison, legio V Parthica) - XIX, 2,14.


28) The legion was, however, stationed at Resaina in the third century - P-W, RE XII/2 cols. 1539-40. Resaina was probably part of Osrhoene before 363 - below, appendix 1, p.297.

29) V.Chapot, La Frontière de l'Euphrate... (Paris 1907) p.78, n.2 and p.88. D.van Berchem, L'armée de Dioclétien... (Paris 1952) p.28 and n.2. Roman and Byzantine pottery have been found in abundance at Tell Fdeyn (Tell Fiden) - W.Rollig & H.Kuhne, "The Lower Habur." Annales arch. arabel syriennes 27-8 (1977-8) p.120-1 and figs. 2, 7 & 8. D.Hoffmann, op.cit. p.415 and n.815. He has suggested as an alternative the site of Arabana/Tell Adjadjie (Tell 'Agaga West/'Arban on the Upper Khabur, where surface material of the Graeco-Roman period has also been found - W.Rollig & H.Kuhne, art.cit. p.125.
Apatna is to be equated with the place called Apphadana/ Appadana - Ptolemy V,18,3 and Dura Papyrus no. 60 = R.O.Fink, Roman Records on Papyrus (Cleveland 1971) no. 98. But whereas L.Dillemann locates Apphadana at Tell Fdeyn - Haute Mésopotamie Orientale et Pays Adjacents (Paris 1962) p.146, R.O.Fink appears to identify it with Circesium - op.cit. p.15, and recently J.-P.Rey-Coquais has put it on the right bank of the Euphrates a little above the confluence with the Khabur - "Syrie Romaine de Pompée à Dioclétien." JRS 68 (1978) p.69 and fig.2 (p.48).


33) Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,7 and XXI,7,1.

34) For the troubles caused by friction between the soldiers and the citizens of Edessa - J.B.Segal, op.cit. pp.161-3. Similarly, despite its size and importance, Antioch does not seem to have had a regular garrison in the mid-fourth century - J.H.Liebeschuetz, Antioch. City and imperial administration in the later Roman Empire. (Oxford 1972) pp.116-7.

35) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,7 and XIX,3,1. But see below, ch.IV, n.101.

36) Amm. Marc. XX,11,4.

37) Amm. Marc. XXI,7,7; 13,1; 13,3 & 7-8.

38) Amm. Marc. XIX,6,12. Statues of Constantine and Constantius II are also mentioned at Edessa - J.B.Segal, op.cit. pp. 179 & 181, n.1.


40') Egeria, Peregrination 19 and J.B.Segal, op.cit. pp.24-6.

41) J.B.Segal, op.cit. p.120. Procopius refers to a hippodrome at Edessa - De Aedificiis II,7,9. From his description it was apparently located in the north-west corner of the town.


44) A minor but instructive episode during Julian's expedition is recorded by Ammianus. He tells how, as Julian was entering the city of Hierapolis, a colonnade collapsed, killing fifty soldiers who had set up camp beneath it - Amm. Marc. XXIII, 2, 6. Hierapolis was, like Edessa, a mustering-point for troops; thus in c.340 it was the destination for new recruits from Egypt - P. Abinnaeus I, 9-10. Above, ch. II, n. 47. Ammianus also refers to the forces mustered at Nisibis in 360 as being camped sub pellibus - Amm. Marc. XX, 6, 9.

45) Procopius does not imply that Justinian enlarged the circuit of walls when he had repairs made to the fortifications - De Aedificiis II, 7, 12. J. B. Segal, op. cit. figs. I & II, pp. 262 & 264.

46) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 9, 1. Also, Jacob the Recluse - above, n. 18.

47) Amm. Marc. XIX, 2, 14: civium sexus utriusque plebe. XVIII, 9, 1: ut accolae suffugium possint habere tutissimum.


49) Amm. Marc. XIX, 2, 14. In his edition of the text C. U. Clark added the word centum, thereby making the figure 120,000. - Ammiani Marcellini Rerum Gestarum (Berlin 1910) p.160. This emendation should be regarded with great scepticism.

50) Ammianus was also able to record the number of Persian casualties in the siege, and how and by whom they were counted - Amm. Marc. XIX, 9, 9. Similarly, he takes care to list prominent individuals who were executed or taken prisoner by the Persians. Thus it seems that he had access to official reports about the disaster. Indeed, it has been argued that Ammianus was on the headquarters staff at Amida during the siege - N. J. E. Austin, Ammianus on Warfare (Brussels 1979) pp. 14-5.

51) A. Gabriel, op. cit. pp. 175-82. Malalas XIII (Bonn) p.336: καὶ τείχος τοῦ ἡτοίματος Ἀμιδᾶς, καὶ τοὺς την καταλαβόντας... and Chronicon Paschale I (Bonn) p. 554.


53) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 8, 13; XIX, 2, 14; 4, 1 & 8.

54) A. Gabriel argued that there are signs of different periods of construction in the city walls which may indicate the stages of the city's expansion. The ramparts on the east and south-east sides, from the Kale to Keçi Burçu, are not regular; the towers are for the most part rectangular,
but some are semi-circular, and the length of wall between towers is very variable, as is the number of buttresses. Although the irregularities may be due in part to the natural strength of this sector, a series of transformations and alterations appear to have been carried out here, whereas the rest of the circuit is much more regular in design and seems to have been built as one project. On the stretch of wall east of Keçi Burçu A. Gabriel noted a gateway flanked by two semi-circular towers (which he numbered LV'1 and LV'2). He believed that they marked the position of the south gate in the smaller, Constantian town, but no epigraphic evidence has been found to support this suggestion. The only fourth century inscription to be seen now at Amida is in Latin and has been re-used in the Islamic masonry of the Kharpur Gate - CIL III, 6730 and A. Gabriel, op. cit. pp. 134-6. This records a building of the city a fundamentis during the reigns of Valentinian, Valens and Gratian. It probably represents the extension of the town caused by the resettlement of people from Nisibis - above, n. 51. However, J. B. Tavernier claims that over one of the city gates he saw an inscription in Greek and Latin "that makes mention of one Constantine" - The Six Voyages (London 1677) p. 104.

In Byzantine times Amida is said to have been restored partly by Anastasius, partly by Justinian - Procopius, De Aedificiis II, 3, 27. Certain striking features of the fortifications do bear a close resemblance to other sites, notably Dara and Martyropolis, which were also fortified by those emperors - Proc. De Aed. II, 1, 13f and III, 2, 11. The τάπρος, προτειχίσμα and τείχος with its large circular towers and intervening buttresses, which follow a regular pattern in the sector from the Kharpur Gate to tower XXIV south of the Urfa Gate, correspond to the normal Byzantine pattern. In places the curtain wall carries a covered gallery, lit by arched windows facing into the city, immediately below the parapet-walk. This, too, is a well-known Byzantine feature, described at some length by Procopius in the walls of Dara - De Aed. II, 1, 14-7. Six Greek inscriptions of poor quality, found in the sector between the Mardin Gate and tower LV, attest to a Byzantine restoration. They have the same basic text: Αύτος Βασιλείου ο Μεγάλου - A. Gabriel, op. cit. pp. 160-2 & plate 65/4. Thus there is considerable evidence that much of the existing circuit can be dated to the sixth century, as van Berchem argued. It seems improbable that the fourth century walls were so completely hidden or dismantled by the Byzantine architects as to leave such little trace. Rather, it suggests that the earlier fortifications had in large part a different, smaller circuit which has been lost under the expanding town.

55) The total area enclosed by walls is 140 hectares; the eastern half of the town measures 77 hectares and the north-east quarter, including the mediaeval Kale, is 33 hectares. All these figures are approximate, but they indicate clearly the vast size of Amida. By comparison Edessa measures 27.5 hectares, Resapha 21 hectares and Singara 17.5 hectares. In the West late Roman fortresses are very much smaller: Kaiseraugst (Diocletianic) is 3.6
hectares, Intercisa (Constantinian) 3.5 hectares, Boppard (Constantian or Valentinianic) 4.4 hectares and Alzey (Valentinianic) 2.6 hectares. Even the legionary fortresses of the Principate measured only some 20 to 25 hectares.

56) Below, fig.3, p.344.

57) Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,2 and XIX,6,1. He nowhere implies that the citadel had its own fortifications at the time of the siege. When the town walls were breached, the defenders do not appear to have been able to fall back on the citadel - XIX,8,3-5.

58) During a stay in Diyarbakır in September 1981 I took the opportunity to examine as closely as possible the fortifications between these two gates. The inspection proved to be especially rewarding in the sector between Yeni Kapı and the postern P15. Firstly, three Christian rosettes were seen in the upper courses of tower LXV. The stones on which they were carved were long and thin, giving the impression that they had originally been door lintels, possibly in a church. Secondly, outside tower LXVII there were quite substantial remains of a fore-wall. (Neither of these features is mentioned by A.Gabriel.) Finally, just to the north of tower LXVIII the rubble core of the curtain wall contains a regular line of four tile courses. This, however, cannot be taken as an indication of the earliest, fourth century phase of construction, for the same feature was observed in the walls to the west of the Mardin Gate. Tower LXVIII stands beside a postern, P14. This is nowadays obscured by modern dwellings, but it does appear that a smaller tower (which was left unnumbered by Gabriel) flanked the other side of the gateway. It is tempting to see P14 as one of the original entrances to the fortress, and perhaps even the postern which Ammianus used - below, n.63. Cf. A.Gabriel, op.cit. plate 62/3; M.van Berchem & J.Strzygowski, Amida (Heidelberg 1910) plate I and photographs at end.

59) Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,2: qua Euri opponitur flatibus, geniculato Tigridis meatu subluitur, proprius emergentis; et a latere quidem australi, Mesopotamiae plana despectat; unde aquiloni obnoxia est, Nympheo amni vicina, verticibus Taurinis umbritur, gentes Transtigritanas dirimentibus et Armeniam; spiranti zephyro contraversa Gumathenam contingit...

60) Amm. Marc. XIX,5,4. It is, perhaps, significant that he uses the same word, despectat, here as when he is describing Amida's relationship to the Mesopotamian plains - see previous note.

61) The remains of a similar stairway can still be seen cut into the rock of the Kale at Eğil - J.G.Taylor, "Travels in Kurdistan," JRGS 35 (1865) p.36. There is also one cut into the cliffs at Hisn Keyf - Idem p.33 and A.Gabriel, op.cit. plate 38/3.
62) Amm. Marc. XIX, 2, 3; 5, 3; 6, 4 & 10-1.

63) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 8, 13. Was this the same postern as that from which the Gallic troops issued on their night attack and by which Ammianus made his escape after the fall of Amida - XIX, 6, 7 & 8, 5?

64) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 8, 11. The most reasonable explanation is offered by P. De Jonge. He suggests that the path was purposely made narrower by stone obstructions, the molinae, in order to prevent the enemy from rushing the gateway - Philological and Historical Commentary on Amm. Marc. Bk. XVIII (Groningen 1980) pp. 274-5.

65) Amm. Marc. XIX, 6, 9: ad praesciscendos adversos subitosque motus, id munimentum opportune locavit antiquitas...

66) Amm. Marc. XX, 6, 9: ..dispedio tamen fuit rei Romanae, cum defensorum iactura aliquotiens interceptum. Compare Dio Cassius LXXV, 3, 2-3 - above, ch. I, n. 3.

67) Amm. Marc. XIX, 2, 8 and XX, 6, 5 & 7.

68) Amm. Marc. XXV, 7, 9.

69) Amm. Marc. XX, 6, 1.

70) Amm. Marc. XX, 6, 2-3. He mentions a sally by the defenders of Singara during an earlier siege - XVIII, 9, 3. This also suggests that the morale and fighting spirit of the troops remained high despite being cut off by the Persians.

71) Festus, Breviarium ch. 27: Singarena et iterum Singarena, praesente Constantio, ac Sicgarena, Constantiensi quoque... Narasareni...nocturna vero Eliensi prope Singaram pugna, ubi praesens Constantius fuit...

In this chapter Festus states that there were nine major battles or sieges on the eastern frontier during Constantius' reign. Yet he proceeds to list the place-names of ten separate engagements. The generally accepted solution to this problem has been to regard the Narasarensis pugna as only the first stage of the battle near Singara in 344 or 348. The identification of Narasarensi with Hileia was first made by P. Peeters - "L'Intervention politique de Constance II dans la Grande Arménie en 338." Bull. de la Classe des Lettres de l'Acad. Royale de Belgique 3ème série, 17 (1931) p. 43ff. J.W. Eadie apparently understands Constantiensi to indicate the emperor's presence at an unidentified place called Sicgarena, although this would mean that Constantius was present at three engagements whereas Festus states clearly that ipse praesens bis adfuit. However, J.W. Eadie does note that the similarity of the latter name to Singarena/Singara suggests the possibility of an erroneous scribal repetition - The Breviarium of Festus (London 1967) pp. 149 & 151. In fact, I believe this to be so and, in order to keep to Festus' total of nine, I interpret Constantiensi (most of the early MSS read Constantiniensi) as a place-name. The town of Constantina (modern Viransehir) is well-known - above, n. 23. In the
surviving books of his *Histories* Ammianus does not mention any fighting there, but then nor is anything known about the engagement at Sisarvena, which is probably Ammianus' Sisara - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,8. Thus, apart from the pitched battle at Hileia, Festus records two engagements at Singara itself, which were presumably assaults on the fortress. Since he attributes Constantius' presence to the second occasion, both must date to the period before 350. Ammianus, too, implies that there were two sieges during the 340's, one of which was successful (the capture of Roman *ballistae* - XIX,2,8), the other less so (XIX,9,9 and the fact that Aelianus and his troops evidently survived an investment of the fortress and were not taken captive by the Persians - XVIII,9,3.). However, since the details of events before the commencement of Ammianus' narrative are scarce, it cannot be said with complete certainty that only two attacks were made on Singara before 354. Moreover, Festus' list should not be regarded as exhaustive; two omissions which are immediately apparent are the sieges of Bezabde and Singara in 360.


75) Amm. Marc. XX,6,5-6.

76) D.Oates, *op.cit.* fig.8, p.98.

The Aerial Photographic Archive for the Archaeology of the Middle East, which is kept by the Department of Ancient History and Classical Archaeology at the University of Sheffield, contains a good number of clear and detailed photographs of Singara.

77) Amm. Marc. XX,7,1 & 16; 11,24.

The fact that there was a bishop at Bezabde in 360 suggests that it had a sizable civilian population - Amm. Marc. XX, 7,7-9. The *Acta Martyrum Orientalium* claim that after the storming of the town more than nine thousand survivors were led away into captivity - J.S.Assemanus torn. I (Rome 1747) pp.134-40.

78) Amm. Marc. XX,7,1.

79) Amm. Marc. XX,7,16 & 11,6.

80) Amm. Marc. XX,7,16; 11,6 -24 & 31.

81) Amm. Marc. XXI,7,1; 7,6-7 & 13,1-2.

82) Amm. Marc. XX,11,24.

83) Amm. Marc. XX,7,1: *rex Nisibin prouentii consilio vitans* .. *dextrum latus itineribus petit obliquis Bezabden*.

84) In Islamic times the major highway from Mosul to Nisibis

85) Below, n.127.
87) Above, n.18.

88) The construction of Bezabde by Diocletian after 298 or even by Constantius in the late 330's is not inconsistent with Ammianus' references to its defences in 360 as being *intuta carieque nutantia* and *quaie incuria corruperat vetustatis* - Amm. Marc. XX,7,9 & 11,6.

89) The major pass north of Jazirat is that through the Bitlis gorge to Lake Van - H.F.B. Lynch, *Armenia* vol. 2 (London 1901) p.148. But once the Bohtan river has been reached, one can also turn west towards Martyropolis (Silvan) and Amida.

90) Ammianus says that Corduene was a territory which belonged to Rome until 363, although he admits that its satrap, Iovinianus, could not openly express his pro-Roman sympathies since his land was subject to Persian power - Amm. Marc. XXV,7,9 and XVIII,6,20. Doubtless in the years 360-363, with the Persian occupation of Bezabde, Roman influence and control over this area was further weakened.

92) Little resistance was offered to the Persian occupation of Armenia after the treaty of Jovian - Amm. Marc. XXV,7,12 and XXVII,12,1-3.

93) D. Hoffmann, *op.cit.* p.413.

95) I. Dillemann, *op.cit.* pp.84-5.
96) It is noteworthy that maps mark two places with similar
names some distance above Jazirat. For example, in the Türkiye Jeoloji Haritası series (Ankara 1961) the 'Diyarbakır' sheet shows a place called Findik at N37°31' E41°58', nine kilometers east of the Tigris, while the 'Çizre' sheet has a Damarza (Finkiravi) at N37°25' E42°05', one kilometer north of the river and about twelve kilometers north-west of Jazirat.

97) Amm. Marc. XX,7,1: in colle mediocriter edito positum atque ubi loca suspecta sunt et humilia, duplici muro vallatum.
Strabo, Geog. XVI,1,24: πρὸς δὲ τῷ Τίγρει τὰ τῶν Γορδυκίων χώρα...καὶ αἱ πόλεις αὐτῶν ἐσφέρεται τοιαύτα καὶ Εὐπρεπες καὶ Πώλεμος, κράτισσον ἑξωκράτει τρισάμεθη τις περιχωμένην, ὡσεὶ οὖν τρίπολιν εἶναι.
G.Bell, op.cit. pp.298-9: "By the gorge of Finik we rode under a crag which is crowned by the most imposing of the many castles...we entered it on the side furthest from the Tigris, the face of the hill turned towards the river being a precipitous rock. The castle wall is partly of masonry and partly of natural rock...the masonry is not very ancient. But the position overhanging the Tigris is superb, and it is difficult to think that the Phoenice which Sapor overthrew stood on another crag."

While it is true that Ammianus never mentions visiting Bezabde, it is not impossible that he went to the fortress at some point in his military career. Moreover, he should have been well acquainted with the layout of at least the principal frontier forts since he served on the staff of the magister militum per Orientem, Ursicinus, and in 359 he acted as an intelligence officer, being sent on a mission to Corduene - Amm. Marc. XIV,9,1 and XVIII,6,20-1.
L.Dillemann has suggested that he drew on an official handbook, as required by Vegetius, for his references to places on the frontier - "Ammien Marcellin et le pays de l'Euphrate et Tigre." Syria 38 (1961) p.106, n.2 and Veg. De Re Militari III,6.
Throughout Ammianus' account of the two sieges of Bezabde there are references which imply that the fortress was situated on an elevated site.

XX,7,10: angustae calles difficiliorem aditum dabant ad muros...
XX,7,10: lapides..qualique..quorum assiduitate per proclive labantium.
XX,7,11: naturall situ et ingenti opere munitum...
XX,7,13: unus aries residuis celsior...erepsit nisibus magnis ad murum.
XX,7,13: inventoque tutiore ascensu, armata irruit multitudo.
XX,11,10: dolia desuper cadebant et molae et columnarum fragmenta.
The Romans built siege-towers, and it evidently took them some time to raise them to a height sufficient to overtop the walls of the fortress - XX,11,12; 16 & 20.
100) Peter the Patrician fr.14: ...καὶ τὸν Τίγριν ροταμὸν ἐπατέρας πολιτείας ὑποδέστον εἶναι...

101) G. Le Strange, op. cit. p. 93. This information appears in Yakut's Moudjem al-Boudan (IV,56) and is derived from a work written in the twelfth century by Ibn al-Athir, himself a native of Jazirat.

102) L. Dillemann, op. cit. p. 84-5.

On 25 September 1981 I examined the small mound which stands slightly to the north-west of the bridge. I found a piece of very rough masonry near the top of the hillock as well as some bits of surface pottery. It seems likely that the hillock was once the site of a small guard-house for the bridge.


P-W, RE Supplement I, col.250 (Streck). L. Dillemann omits to mention the works of E. Sachau and M. Hartmann in his discussion of the site of Bezabde. They are also overlooked by Elisséff in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam - above, n.93.

107) E. Sachau, op. cit. p.379. One important feature which is absent is the stream flowing down from the Tur 'Abdin. Below, figs. 4 & 5, pp.345-6.

108) Thus Streck apparently confused Hartmann's location of Bezabde with that of the region of Beth Zabda/Zabdicene - P-W, RE Supp. I, col.250. M. Hartmann places the former on the west bank of the Tigris, but he believes that the latter lay on the east side - art. cit. p.102.

109) Royal Geographical Society, Map of Eastern Turkey, Syria and Western Persia (1910). This plots the approximate routes of annual migration by the principal Kurdish tribes to their summer grazing grounds. It shows that the Miran tribe travelled from the area between Nisibis and the Tigris via Jazirat to the mountains around the head-waters of the Bohtan river, south of Lake Van. Cf. also, Geographical Handbook Series (Naval Intelligence Division), Turkey vol.2 (1943) p.537.
110) At present the river holds its main stream to the east of the bridge and the ruins are surrounded by sand-dunes and stagnant pools - F.İliter, "Güney-doğu Anadolu erken devir Türk köprülerin yapısal ve süsleyici öğeler Yöünden değerlendirilmesi." Anadolu 18 (1974) plate V/2. But during the spring floods most of the sand-bar is covered. Thus when Gertrude Bell photographed the bridge in May 1910, the river was flowing closer to it - op.cit. fig. 186. W.F.Ainsworth remarked on the ruins of the bridge: "Why it should not have been at Jazirat itself can only be accounted for by the fact that the stream is wider at this point and less deep and rapid." - A Personal Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition vol.2 (London 1888) p.329.
A modern map indicates a "ford in autumn" at a point south of the bridge and hill near the spot where the Tigris bends round to the east - Iraq: Jazirat Ibn-Omar/Amadia/ Diza-Gawar (1926).

111) For photographs of the bridge - G.Bell, op.cit. figs. 186 & 188; C.Preusser, Nordmesopotamische Baudenkämäler altchristlicher und islamischer Zeit (Leipzig 1911) plates 38-40; L.Dillemann, op.cit. plate XIb (entitled "Pont Sassanide") opposite p.130; F.İliter, art.cit. Anadolu 18 (1974) plates V/2 & VIII/2 and photograph at end.

112) The reliefs are discussed by W.Hartner - "The Pseudoplanetary Nodes of the Moon's Orbit in Hindu and Islamic Iconographies." Ars Islamica 5 (1938) pp.113-54. Close examination suggests that the facing blocks on the piers are not bound into the masonry below the surviving arch and that they do not match the courses of stone there.

On the approaches to Jazirat A.Poidebard noted three bridges which he considered to be of Roman origin - op.cit. p.159f and plate 158/1, and L.Dillemann, op.cit. plate Xlc.
I have seen the bridge which crosses the dead arm of the Tigris just to the south of the town. It consists nowadays of five very irregular arches, and most of the visible masonry seemed to be a fairly modern piece of reconstruction work. Only the southerly pier of the tallest arch showed traces of more ancient stone-work. I was unable to find any trace of the other two bridges.

114) Amm. Marc. XX,7,16 & 11,6.

115) I visited the Turkish town of Cizre on 14 September 1980 and, having crossed the frontier into Syria (at Nusaybin/ Qamishli), made a trip to the ruined bridge on 17 September. I then made a second visit to the area in September 1981. It is noteworthy that an important oil-field exists today beside the main road from Qamishli to Dayrik. Both Romans and Persians made use of burning pitch in their defence of Bezabde - Amm. Marc. XX,7,10 & 11,15. Since the oil-field lies only about twenty miles south-west of the site, it
must have served as the most convenient source of combustible material for them. Ammianus draws attention to the walls of the Persian citadel at Pirisabora, which were built of bitumen and baked brick - Amm. Marc. XXIV,2, 12; also Libanius, Or. XVIII,235. Although no reference is made to it, this type of construction may have been used by the Persians at Bezabde. It was ideally suited to withstand the pounding of battering-rams, and certainly the repairs carried out there on Sapor's orders stood up well against the vigorous attempts of Constantius to recapture the fortress - Amm. Marc. XX,11,11-5 & 21.

116) Amm. Marc. XX,7,1.

117) The stream-bed produced a considerable amount of surface pottery, some of which was green-glazed mediaeval ware, but other pieces were of good quality buff earthenware, typical of the late Roman period. One such sherd was picked up from the soil which has accumulated at the foot of the western slope of the hill.

118) For example, J.B.Tavernier states that "in the way to the river are several pieces of wall, with an arch, which made me conjecture, that formerly the city extended as far as the river." - The Six Voyages (London 1677) p.71. J.M.Kinneir refers to "the ruins of the ancient city, which occupy a large space along the bank of the river Mygdonius...the substructions of the walls may yet be traced, and appear to have been carried along the edge of some eminence, defended by the Mygdonius to the north-east and a morass to the south." - Journey through Asia Minor, Armenia and Koordistan (London 1818) p.443. J.S.Buckingham describes the bridge as "a long and level work of masonry thrown across the river, and supported on twelve arches of Roman work; the pathway, or platform, of the bridge being not more than ten feet above the level of the stream...no doubt originally of Roman construction, though it has undergone repairs, in later times, from Mohammedan workmen..." - Travels in Mesopotamia (London 1827) p.250. For a comprehensive list of travellers who refer to Nisibis - J.M.Fiey, op.cit. pp.114-26.


120) See photograph at end. G.A.Olivier mentions a block of marble which he saw not far from the Corinthian columns. It was inscribed with a Latin inscription, of which he could only read the words currus...victoriam stadii - Voyages dans l'empire ottoman, l'Egypte et la Perse (Paris 1804) vol. 4, p.248. According to Ammianus, Nisibis also possessed a palatium - Amm. Marc. XXV,8,17.

121) Bar Hebraeus, Chronography vol. 1 (Oxford 1932) ch.61, p.60.

122) Theodoret, HE II,30,5. Zonaras also says that the river
flowed through the town - XIII,7,4.

123) Theodoret, Hist. Rel. (Migne) PG vol. 82, col.1304, line 22.

124) The Arab sources are collected in G. Le Strange, op.cit. pp.94-5. Note especially Ibn Jubair's reference to an ancient bridge over the river "where it flowed by the town".

Of the accounts given by European travellers, one may cite J.B. Tavernier: "Half a league from Nisibin runs a river..." - op.cit. p.71, and M. Otter: "Le Hirmas descend d'une montagne au nord de cette ville, et passe à côté d'elle."

- Voyages en Turquie et en Perse tom. 1 (Paris 1748) p.121.

125) Carmina Nisibena XIII,18.

126) L. Dillemann, op.cit. plate VII, opposite p.80: a photograph of Nusaybin and Qamishli (Kamechlie) in 1932, showing the main stream of the Djaghdjagh flowing to the right (east) of the two towns.

127) Amm. Marc. XXV,8,14.

128) Until 363 Nisibis was probably the provincial capital - Dio Cassius LXXV,9,1. The dux Cassianus was present at Nisibis in 359 - Amm. Marc. XIX,9,6. The magister militum Ursicinus was summoned from there in 354 - XIV,9,1, and most of the field army was camped there in 360 - XX,6,9.

129) Above, p.74.


131) Jerome, Chron. ann.346 and Theophanes (am.5838).


133) Ephraem's references to the siege are too brief and disjointed to be of use except as a control source for the other authors. Since he wrote for the edification of his fellow-citizens, it is reasonable to assume that what facts he gives are accurate.

134) Below, ch.VI, n.37.


136) Carmina Nisibena II,2.

137) Theodoret, *HE* II,30,1-2; 9-10 & 31,1. The passage describing the siege is immediately preceded and followed by the assertion that Constantius was at Antioch at the time of the siege. Theodoret also makes it plain that Nisibis was known by the name of Antiocheia Mygdonia. These are not idle bits of information but are meant as sign-posts for the reader. A major element in the account is the appearance on the city walls of an imperial figure dressed in finery and wearing the purple robe and royal diadem. Sapor thus believes that Constantius is present within the fortress, but his advisers insist that they are telling the truth when they say he is at Antioch. Clearly Theodoret is exploiting the confusion between the Antioch on the Orontes and that on the Mygdonius to emphasize the blind folly which God has inflicted upon the Persian king.

138) Julian, *Or.* II,62b. He also praises Constantius for achieving the repulse of the Persians without suffering any loss among his own troops - *Or.* I,29a-b.

139) Chron.Pasch. in Philostorgius, *op.cit.* p.215, lines 22-4. This, however, claims that he set out for Italy, whereas in fact he first went to meet Vetranio in Illyricum.

140) Zonaras XIII,7,3. He adds that Constantius strengthened the fortifications and comforted the people of Nisibis before his departure for the West.

141) Magnentius was proclaimed emperor on 18 January, 350 - Cons. Const. sa.350. Julian says that when news was received of Magnentius' usurpation (presumably by Julian himself): ήν μεν γαρ ο κρίμαν ἐπὶ ἐξῆς τας γῆς - *Or.* I,26b. A.J.Festugière dates Julian's stay at Macellum (Göreme) from 345 to 351 - "Julien à Macellum." *JRS* 47 (1957) p.54. On the other hand, G.W.Bowersock places the six years of imprisonment between 342 and 348 - Julian the Apostate (London 1978) p.27, while others have dated it even earlier, in 341-7 - J.Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien* (Paris 1930) p.38 and D.Bowder, *The Age of Constantine and Julian* (London 1978) p.97. If this is correct, Julian would have been staying at Nicomedia in 350 and would have been able to hear all the latest news.

At any rate, the rebellion clearly occurred before Sapor started his campaign. Thus the news of trouble in the West probably spurred Sapor on in his third attempt to capture Nisibis. But, despite the fact that the Persian king was kept well-informed about events in the Roman world - below, ch.IV, n.165, it is perhaps too ambitious to say that the siege was prompted by the revolt of Magnentius.
There does not appear to have been sufficient time for the news to reach the Persian court and for things then to be put in motion for the attack. Note that, if the first siege is placed correctly in 338, a considerable lapse of time occurred between the death of Constantine and Sapor's invasion of Roman territory - above, ch.II, n.1; cf. also ch.I, n.93.

When Julian was proclaimed Augustus in 360, Constantius was faced with a similar dilemma to that in 350. Yet Sapor did not on that occasion cross the Tigris, most probably because the emperor took greater care than in 350 to forestall a Persian attack before turning his attention to the revolt in the West - Amm. Marc. XXI,13,1-8.

142) Theodoret, HE II,30,4.


144) Julian, Or. I,28d and II,62d.

145) Amm. Marc. XX,6,3 & 7,3-4.

146) Chron.Pasch. op.cit. p.216, lines 2-5. The phrases εί μη βούλετο την πόλην ἐκκρατεῖν (line 5) and τῶν δὲ Νισιβηνῶν ἀντεχόντων πρὸς τὴν παράδοσιν (lines 6-7) support the view that an attempt was made to win the garrison's capitulation. However, Mr. D.A.Russell has suggested to me an emendation in the latter phrase in order to make better sense of the pronouns in the main clause of the sentence, which would thus read: τῶν δὲ Νισιβηνῶν ἀντεχόντων πρὸς τὴν παράδοσιν, το λοιπὸν ἐξουσιασθείς ταύτην τῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ποταμῷ διεγερθεὶς ἡ Σάφηρος.

147) Theodoret, HE II,30,4. The account in the Historia Religiosa contains more details; as well as siege-towers, palisades and ἰππηκατηματα placed around the fortress, archers are stationed on the towers with orders to fire on the defenders, while other troops try to undermine the walls - (Migne) PG vol. 82, col.1304, lines 13-20. But the passage is prefaced with a statement recording Constantine's death and Sapor's disdain for his sons, and this gives the reader to believe that it refers to the siege in 338. Theodoret's assimilation of the first and third sieges of Nisibis makes it impossible to attribute particular details to one or the other. The description of towers, machines and mining operations, all of which were of common use in siege warfare, may accurately reflect Sapor's measures on both occasions, but equally its value as a reliable source for a particular incident is somewhat impaired by the glaring confusion.


150) Julian, Or. I,27b.
151) **Carmina Nisibena** I,1-2; 4 & 8. G. Bickell’s Latin translation gives the expression *percutere murum* - II,16 (twice); II,19 and XI,17. The breach, *scissura*, is mentioned in II,1; 10; 17 (twice); III,6 and XI,14. Ephraem also alludes to the collapse of a tower - XI,15.

152) Theodoret, HE II,30,6. Moreover, if the river ran through the city, it is odd that no mention is made of any water-gates, which would inevitably have been the most vulnerable sections of the defences during a flood - compare those at Edessa and Dara - Procopius, *De Aedificiis* II,7,3 and 2,13-18. Below, n.155.


155) Zonaras XIII,7,4-8. Zonaras, or his source, places the construction of the dam in the hills above Nisibis where the river ran through a gorge - XIII,7,7. Thus he avoids the problem of trying to collect a large volume of water on level ground. Theodoret apparently recognized this difficulty, for he describes how the banks of the river were raised in order to hold in the amassed water: ...καὶ τὸς δόχος ἐκκατέρωθι ποταμῷ καὶ ὑψήλος ἑργασάμενος ἵνα τὸ βῆμα συνέχοι - HE II,30,5. It is impossible to believe Zonaras’ version, however sensible it might appear, since Nisibis lies some considerable distance from the foothills of the Tur 'Abdin whence the Mygdonius rises - J.G. Taylor, *art.cit.* JRGS 35 (1865) p.55. If the dam was built in the gorge, the flood of water would have lost most of its momentum by the time that it reached the walls of the city. Nevertheless, a sudden torrent of water could easily overcome a city’s fortifications. This is amply illustrated by the destruction caused at Edessa and Dara when local streams were swollen by heavy rains. Procopius describes a flood at Dara during the reign of Justinian - *De Aedificiis* II,2,13-8. There were repeated disasters at Edessa; the earliest recorded flood occurred in 201 - J.B. Segal, *op.cit.* pp.24-5. The collapse of part of the city walls is also mentioned in connection with floods in the years 413, 525, 667, 740 and 834/5 - Idem, pp.187 and 203-4.

The diversion of a fairly fast-flowing river, swollen by water collected behind a dam blocking its natural course, may be assumed to have had a similar effect on the walls of Nisibis. The Persians had long practice and skill in the field of hydrodynamics, notably in the construction and maintenance of the numerous canals and waterways of southern Mesopotamia. Zonaras relates how they diverted the Tigris against the camp of Carus’ expeditionary army near Ctesiphon in 283: ἐν κολύμῳ γὰρ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο τόπῳ δὲ οἱ Πέρσαι διασάμενοι τὸν ἔκει οἰκονόμησαν ποταμῷ εἰς τὸν κολύμῳ ἐκείνον τόπῳ διὰ διάφορος ἐπιφυλακτὸν - XII,30. Sapor himself used the canals to good effect against Julian’s army in 363 - Amm. Marc. XXIV,3,10 and below, ch. IV, p.152.
Hushing was used by the Romans in their gold-mining operations in north-west Spain - O.Davies, Roman Mines in Europe (New York 1979) pp.18 & 102. But I have been unable to find any evidence for the use of such techniques by the Persians, although Socrates records that they hired Roman engineers to help run their gold mines - HE VII,20.

156) Ephraem alludes to a spring inside Nisibis - Carmina Nisibena XIII,18. There is no reason to doubt that such a source of water actually existed. Its importance to the besieged is obvious; compare Ammianus' references to the spring at Amida - Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,2 and XIX,6,1, and Egeria's account of the miraculous emergence of springs in Edessa - Peregrinatio 19,7-12 and J.Wilkinson, Egeria's Travels (London 1971) pp.284-7. G.Bickell, however, saw the fons as symbolizing the body of Jacob, from which sprang all hope of salvation for Nisibis - Carmina Nisibena (Leipzig 1866) p.99. Thus the fluvius superbus extra eam (Nisibis) is not only the Mygdonius, but could also refer metaphorically to Sapor - compare Amm. Marc. XVII,5,15; XVII,10,2; XIX,9,9 and below, ch. IV, n.12.

157) Theodoret, HE II,30,7 and Hist. Rel. PG vol. 82, col.1304, lines 31-5. He says that it was impossible to attack at once because of the mud and water lying around the town. The only reason which Zonaras gives for the delay is that evening was approaching - XIII,7,9.

158) Theodoret, HE II,30,8: (Jacob)...τον τε περίβολον ὕδατων καὶ...τοὺς προσεύμονας ἐξῆλθεν. Zonaras XIII,7,12. Sapor, realizing his mistake in not attacking immediately, nevertheless continued the siege: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐτέρα κατὰ τῆς πόλεως ἐπινοοῦσινος.

159) Theodoret, HE II,30,8 and Hist. Rel. PG vol. 82, col.1304, lines 53-9. The miraculous elements and the leading role of Jacob are wholly absent from Zonaras' account.


161) Singara was stormed in 360 as soon as a battering-ram made a breach through a tower, despite the fact that this occurred as evening was approaching - Amm. Marc. XX,6,5-7.


163) The Chronicon Paschale suggests that the Persians were hampered by the flood water and, consequently, were suffering heavy casualties as they attacked - op.cit. p.216, lines 12-3.

164) Chron. Pasch. op.cit. p.217, lines 4-7. Other elephants sank in the mud which had collected in the ditches.

165) Theodoret describes the hurried reconstruction of the damaged fortifications. The work was carried out during
the night and the new wall was high enough to prevent horses jumping it and men scaling it without ladders - Historia Religiosa PG vol. 82, col.1304, line 59-col.1305, line 6. The Carmina Nisibena contain the suggestion that the wall collapsed on a Saturday and was rebuilt on the Sunday - III,6.

166) Theodoret, HE II,30,7 and Historia Religiosa PG vol. 82, col.1304, line 57ff.

167) Finding enough fodder for the elephants alone must have been a difficult and onerous task - below, appendix 4, n.30. Theodoret mentions a plague of gnats and flies which attacked the Persians' elephants, horses and other animals. He attributes the coming of this plague to the prayers of bishop Jacob who, at the request of Ephraem and the people of Nisibis, went up onto the battlements to curse the besieging army - HE II,30,13-4 and Historia Religiosa PG vol. 82, col.1304c. Although Theodoret's reference to the physical presence of Jacob suggests that he is describing the first siege, the coming of a swarm of flies and gnats, if at all factual, is even more appropriate to the situation of the third siege. Moreover, Ibn Jubair refers to the plague of gnats which troubled the people there - G.Le Strange, op.cit. p.95; also, J.G.Taylor, art.cit. JRGS 35 (1865) pp.53-4, and Ammianus remarks on the general insect nuisance in Mesopotamia - Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,5 and XXIV,8,3. Doubtless this was aggravated at Nisibis by the presence of an army before its walls during the hot summer months, and the flooding may well have caused an outbreak of malaria among Sapor's troops. Certainly, the incidence of disease in armies was very great right up until the twentieth century - W.H.McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (Oxford 1977) pp.259 & 285. Cf. E.Neufeld, "Insects as warfare agents in the ancient Middle East." Orientalia 49 (1980) pp.30-57. One may also note the use of insects by the besieged Hatreni in 198 (F.Millar dates both the sieges undertaken by Septimius Severus to that year - A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford 1964) p.143). Herodian describes how the defenders bombarded their Roman attackers with pots filled with poisonous flies (malarial mosquitoes?), which afflicted them in their eyes and on their bare skin - III, 9,5. It is also stated that the Roman soldiers could not endure the stifling heat, but fell ill and died. Thus Herodian remarks that most of Severus' army was lost not in the fighting but because of the insects, heat and disease - III,9,6. This seems to be a perfectly reasonable explanation of events at the siege of Hatra, and yet it has been found unacceptable by one scholar. C.R.Whittaker says that in Herodian's account "must surely be a slang word for arrow...and the ballistic machine was called a scorpio; hence the ingredients for a story about stinging insects" - Herodian Loeb ed. vol. 1 (London 1969) footnote on p.319. I find such disbelief and misplaced ingenuity incredible, especially in a person who was attached to the University of Ghana, where the effect of heat and virulent diseases must have been readily apparent. C.R.Whittaker also shows a poor knowledge of Roman catapults; the scorpio, of course, fired stones, not
arrows - Amm. Marc. XXIII,4,6-7.

168) Zonaras XIII,7,12.

169) According to the Chronicon Paschale, Sapor carefully ordered the siege-machines to be burnt and all the other works (presumably the earth-works, palisades, etc.) to be destroyed before he withdrew from Nisibis - op.cit. p.218, lines 13-5.

170) Zosimus, Historia Nova III,8,2 attributes the defence of Nisibis to the general Lucillianus.

171) Julian, Or. I,29a-b.

172) Mention has already been made of the abrupt introduction of the siege and the omission of Sapor's attempts to capture the city before he made use of the Mygdonius - above, n.149 & 150.

173) Julian, Or. I,27b-28d.

174) Or. I,27b.

175) For example, Achilles' fight with the river Scamander - Iliad XXI, especially lines 7-11; 20-1; 300-2 & 325. Also Aeschylus' description of the battle of Salamis - Persae 353ff, especially 418-21 & 424-7, and the sea-battle before Massilia in Lucan's Bellum Civile - III,567ff.

176) Julian, Or. I,28d. He goes on to compare the siege with the Celtic attack on Rome in 390 BC. He says that Brennius' forces poured down on the capital like a winter torrent: χάλκιν πολλά και μαλακός ο ποταμός - Or. I,29d. Julian's interest in the Celts was clearly prompted by his own presence in Gaul - Gauls and Celts are again mentioned in Or. I,34c; 36b (where he praises the bravery of Gallic soldiers) and 56b (where he extols the fighting qualities of western troops generally).

177) Or. I,30a.

178) The river is likened to a battering-ram: ποταμὸν ἐπανύημενον οἶνον μηχανή - Or. I,30a, just as it is by Theodoret - HE II,30,5 and Hist. Rel. PG vol. 82, col.1304, lines 35-6. The fighting ὑπὲρ τῶν ὁλοτῶν and περὶ τῆς τείχου may refer back to the description of the battle involving the siege-towers and ships. On the other hand, it is similar to a passage in the Chronicon Paschale: καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους τῶν ἤθεσαν ἀντέχεσθαι, ὡς καὶ τοὺς ἀπολέσαν. οἱ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πεποιήθη ἦπελθον διὰ τοῦ καταπεραρθοῦν μέρους τῆς τείχους εἶσελθεῖν - op.cit. p.216, lines 12-3.

179) Julian, Or. II,62b-63a.

180) Or. II,63a-66d. There is no mention of delay in the attack. Julian describes the breach as blocked by a wall of men -
Or. II,64c. This suggests that at first the defenders had no time to build a barricade or to effect repairs to the wall.

181) According to Ephraem, bishop Vologaeses led one sortie against the Persians - Mēmra de Nicomedia XV, vv.145ff.

182) Julian says that some of the elephants were wounded - Or. II,65d-66a, as does the Chronicon Paschale - above, n.164.

183) Julian, Or. II,66b. Above, n.165 & 166.

184) Or. II,66c: οὐ μὴν ἀνήγειν εὐθὺς τὴν στρατιάν, ἕλλ' ἀδέξης τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆται πολλαῖς μοι.

185) These may be summarized briefly as:-
(a) The river directed against the city wall.
(b) The collapse of part of the fortifications.
(c) The assault on the breach.
(d) The resistance of the defenders and the repair of the wall.
(e) The use of elephants by the Persians and artillery by the Romans.

186) Ammianus mentions official dispatches issued by Constantius which reported on victorious engagements with the enemy - Amm. Marc. XVI,12,69-70. Note particularly: et si verbi gratia eo agente tunc in Italia, dux quidam egisset fortiter contra Persas, nulla eius mentione per textum longissimum facta, laureatas litteras mittebat. This may even be an obscure reference to the successful defence of Nisibis in 350.

Julian also refers to accounts which had been written of Constantius' military exploits - Or. II,74b.

187) The major differences are:-
(a) The formation of a lake around the city.
(b) The use of ships.
(d) The accidental collapse of the χώρα and the town wall.
Libanius refers to ἡ ἐν θυρείῳ νοικικηγα - Or. XVIII, 208. But this speech is dedicated to the memory of Julian, and it is likely that the reference merely reflects Julian's own account of the siege.

However, it is not necessary to interpret the μηχανήματα referred to by Julian in Or. I,28a as artillery pieces - below, appendix 3, n.4.

M.Van der Valk, "Remarques sur la date des Éthiopiens
It is noteworthy that the siege of Syene has the same basic elements of an encircling embankment and inundation as Xenophon's account of the siege of Mantinea in 385 BC - Hellenica V,2,4-5. E. Feuillatre believes that several passages in the Aethiopica were inspired by Xenophon - Études sur les Éthiopiques d'Héliodore (Paris 1966) p.139. Below, ch.IV, n.25.


In a later letter Julian suggests that he was conversant with Greek novels - Ep. 89,301b: πρέπει δ' ἄν ήμιν ἱστοριάς έντυγχάνειν, ὅπως συνεκαθήσομεν ἐπὶ πεπουλημένοις τοῖς ἔργοις. δοκεῖ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν ἱστοριάς εἴηει παρὰ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἀπεγγελθείη πλοῦστα παραπτείνον, ἐρατικὰς ὑποδέσεις καὶ παντὰ ἀλήθες τα τοιάδα. Heliodorus' novel may have held a special attraction for Julian because of its emphasis on the cult of Helios. However, it must be admitted that if Julian drew on the Aethiopica, Heliodorus appears as an odd companion to the authors of Classical Greece. For both of the orations are permeated with allusions to the works of Aeschines, Aristophanes, Demosthenes, Euripides, Herodotus, Hesiod, Homer, Isocrates, Pindar, Plato, Simonides and Xenophon.

There is, for example, no mention of elephants or μυχώματι at the siege of Syene, nor is there a major assault on its walls to match that described by Julian. Elephants, however, do appear in the Aethiopica in the battle between the Ethiopians and Persians which immediately follows the episode at Syene - IX,16: (Hydaspes) τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν πυρομαχόντων ἔλεγανται οὖν ἄντεταξα.

These are the rebuilding of the breach in the walls and the mention of the muddy ground left by the receding waters. Julian, Or. II,66b; Theodoret, HE II,30,7 and Hist. Rel. PG 82, col.1304, lines 56-7 with Heliodorus, Aethiopica IX,8, and Julian, Or. II,64d-65c; Chron. Pasch. op.cit. p.217, line 7; Theodoret, HE II,30,7 and Hist. Rel. col. 1304, lines 31-2 with Heliodorus, Aeth. IX,8.

T. Szepessy, art.cit. Eirene (1972) p.285. He also notes that Ephraem draws a comparison between Nisibis and Noah's Ark when it was buffeted by the flood, but that he did not seize the opportunity of using the striking oxymoron of ships sailing on dry land - T. Szepessy, art. cit. Acta Antiqua 24 (1976) p.264 and Ephraem, Carmina Nisibena I, 3-4 & 8.

Heliodorus, Aeth. IX,8-9: ἢν δὲ σοι' ἃς παρευτεύα ταῦτ' ἀλλήλοις σοδ' ἐκατέροις...μέν' δὲ ὧν ποιος καὶ τρεῖς οὗτοι διήγον... Theodoret, HE II,30,7 and Hist. Rel. PG 82, col.1304, lines 31-5 & 40-1. This similarity, such as it is, may of course be purely accidental. Zonaras mentions the delay
in Sapor's attack without any reference to the state of the ground - XIII,7,9.

196) J.R. Morgan has argued that the Aethiopica was written after 350, but that Heliodorus stands independently of Julian in drawing on the events at Nisibis for his story about the siege at Syene - A Commentary on Heliodorus Aethiopica Books IX & X (D.Phil Ms. Oxford 1978) introd. pp. vi-xxxii. He concludes that the episode is an irrelevancy to the basic plot of the Aethiopica and "is most easily explained as an exploitation of public interest in the spectacular events at Nisibis...the episode would also contribute to Heliodorus' realism in that he would be seen by his reader to be describing the sort of things that happen in the real world." Hence J.R. Morgan dates the composition of the Aethiopica to the period 350-370. I find these views very hard to accept. First and foremost, J.R. Morgan assumes that the elements of lake and ships in the accounts of Heliodorus and Julian are derived from factual events at Nisibis. But in all likelihood these have no basis in historical fact - above, n.194. Furthermore, as a writer of "escapist literature", Heliodorus was surely trying to create situations noted for their novelty and eccentricity. A distinct lack of realism is what was called for in the plot of a Greek novel; only the motives and emotions of the principal characters needed to be presented in a realistic way. Finally, J.R. Morgan himself admits that certain aspects of the siege at Syene are physical impossibilities and incompatible both with other elements in the story and with those in the siege of Nisibis - cf. his comments on IX,3,2 (p.20); 3,3 (p.21f); 4,1 (p.28) and 8,2 (p.73f).


198) Julian, Or. I,27c.

199) Or. I,30a. Immediately above Julian had referred to the Capitoline Hill in Rome as a λόχος - Or. I,29d. This term agrees most suitably with the Syriac word used by Ephraem - below, n.201. Procopius uses the word λόχος to describe a siege-mound built by Kavad against Amida in 502 - Bell. Pers. I,7,14.

200) Julian, Or. II,64d. Two other references may be interpreted either as an embankment or dam: - part of the καταλλήλωσις gave way - Or. II,63a, and the καταλλήλωσις were swept away by the river - Or. II,66d.

201) Ephraem refers to mounds in the Carmina Nisibena - I,3; II,9 & 15 (denoted as tumuli in G. Bickell's translation). The word he uses in all three places is τιμώματα, which does not seem an appropriate expression for an embankment or dyke. Ch. Renoux translates the Armenian version of Memra XV, v. 112 as "des digues furent élevées et ils les (murs) abaissèrent" - Les Discours sur Nicomédie (Louvain 1975) p.317. But he seems to be in error in using the word

202) T. Szepessy, art. cit. Acta Antiqua 24 (1976) p.266-7. Julian may, of course, have met officers who had served in the East and then had been transferred to the West. The magister militum Ursicinus and his staff (including Ammianus) were sent to Gaul in 355 soon after their return from the eastern frontier - Amm. Marc. XV, 5, 18-31. Flavius Philippus, praefectus praetorio Oriens from 344, was dispatched as an envoy to the usurper Magnentius in 351 and thus came into contact with Gallic troops from the Rhine - A. H. M. Jones, "The Career of Flavius Philippus." Historia 4 (1955) pp. 229-33. It is also noteworthy that Nigrinus, who led the resistance to Julian at Aquileia in 361, was a native of Mesopotamia - Amm. Marc. XXI, 11, 2 & 12, 20.


204) Above, n. 175.

205) Note Julian's passion for literary ṭaḵašešyacna. For example, he describes Sapor as watching the attack on Nisibis from an artificial hill just as Xerxes did to view the battle of Salamis - Or. II, 63b; Herodotus VIII, 90, 4 and Aeschylus, Persae 465-7. In fact, the whole of the second oration provides a comparison of Constantius' achievements with the exploits of the Homeric heroes, and it concludes with a discourse on virtue and kingship which is resonant with echoes of Plato.

206) Amm. Marc. XIX, 8, 2-4 (Amida); XX, 6, 7 (Singara) and XX, 7, 13-4 (Bezabde).
Chapter IV  Aspects of the North-West Frontier of the Persian Empire in the Reign of Sapor II.

(a) King and Commander.

The reign of Sapor II commenced when he was but a new-born baby, and it continued for seventy long years. Along with those of Sapor I and Chosroes I, his reign was regarded by later tradition as one of the great eras of Sassanian history. Although the internal stability of the Persian Empire was always uncertain, these three kings were able to divert attention away from problems and conflicts at home to produce periods of great strength and success abroad.

Sapor himself came to the throne during a period of dynastic unrest, when no one member of the royal house showed himself sufficiently capable and strong enough to rule. According to Arab tradition, the powerful hereditary nobles took advantage of the unstable situation to nominate the infant Sapor. Thereby they secured peace within the royal family, but presumably they also gained greater authority and independence for themselves. Unfortunately, very little is known about Persian affairs during Sapor's minority. It is generally assumed that the noble families continued to take the lead in government, but doubtless personal rivalries amongst them precluded any major activity in the political and military spheres.

The first remarkable feat of Sapor's reign was his emergence in early manhood as a self-willed and forthright ruler. How he achieved this in the face of certain opposition from the entrenched nobility is left unrecorded. Yet it is evident that he quickly succeeded in uniting the country behind him. Brought up in an atmosphere of court intrigues and quarrels, he must have learnt at an early age the skills of playing one
faction off against another and of winning adherents by the bestowal of honours and rewards. This training stood him in good stead throughout his life. Moreover, as soon as he was able, Sapor embarked on a policy of foreign campaigns. Although this may have been necessary and justifiable in purely military terms, it also served to distract and dissipate the internal forces which threatened to weaken his rule. Sapor was astute enough to realize that the best method of neutralizing the power of the local magnates was to remove this most active and militant element from its normal social environment. Thus, throughout his reign he engaged many of the nobles and their retinues to fight in his army on distant frontiers of the Empire. Whatever the nature of Persian relations with neighbouring states or peoples, it must not be forgotten that Sapor's military campaigns were partly motivated by his desire to preoccupy the energies of his nobility and provide them with an outlet for their natural aspirations to power and fame.

Sapor's success at subjecting the magnates to his will and authority may be measured by the length and stability of his reign. There exists no evidence for any revolts and uprisings on their part despite the severe financial and military burdens which befell Persia at that time. Ammianus records how they served loyally and died bravely for their king on the field of battle. Of course, Sapor led by example; he was a very active and, it seems, charismatic monarch. The Acta Martyrum Orientalium indicate that he travelled widely and almost continuously throughout his realm, and other sources attest that he personally commanded the major campaigns. In this manner he was able both to superintend the provincial governors and to maintain the loyalty of his army. As with other rulers,
the Sassanian king depended heavily on the support of his armed forces. Yet the upkeep of the troops and the almost incessant warfare during Sapor's adult years placed a serious financial load on the already delicate internal position. It is clear, for instance, that Sapor faced economic difficulties because of his prolonged campaigns against Rome. The Acta suggest that the cost of warfare on the western frontier obliged him to levy extra taxes from the Christians and other unprivileged groups. Hence an important element in all military operations was the seizure of prisoners and plunder, which would help to offset the expenses of the army and bring new wealth in the form of property and labour into the Empire.

The reason for the conflict between Persia and Rome was not, however, merely one of internal and self-perpetuating expediency. Despite the fact that the Sassanian dynasty was relatively young, it inherited a strong tradition of continuity in empire stretching back to Achaemenid times. Moreover, Sapor could already look back to the victorious exploits of his great-grandfather, Sapor I, and to the humiliating defeat of his grandfather, Narses. The latter event apparently stimulated in Sapor a genuine desire for revenge. But also the loss of Armenia and northern Mesopotamia seriously weakened the north-west frontier of the Empire. It opened to their main adversaries not only easier access to the rich lands of southern Mesopotamia, but also possible routes into the very heartland of the Iranian plateau. The fear of a Roman invasion must have always troubled the Persian king. Finally, the continued presence of an Arsacid on the Armenian throne must have raised doubts and worries about the re-emergence of the deposed clan in Parthia itself. Consequently, one must reconsider the opinion expressed
by the Roman sources that Sapor was a fearsome aggressor, totally bent on destruction and conquest.\textsuperscript{14}

It is certain that Sapor was most dissatisfied with the treaty which had been forced upon Narses after his defeat by Galerius, and it seems that he strove to make the Romans renegotiate its terms. Thus on numerous occasions he sent envoys to the emperor, hoping to gain a re-adjustment in the frontier by means of diplomacy.\textsuperscript{15} However, when these missions failed, he was not slow to take advantage of opportunities to press his claims by military means. To achieve the withdrawal of Roman forces from the Tigris Sapor had two options; he could either try to inflict a major defeat on them in the field or steadily attack and reduce their strongholds. But since it proved difficult to secure a crushing victory while Constantius kept his troops on the defensive, Sapor was obliged to adopt the second option as his modus operandi. Consequently, for long periods Persian forces were engaged in warfare on the borders of Armenia and Mesopotamia. However, Sapor's military objectives and territorial claims were distinctly limited. One is forced to this conclusion first and foremost by the nature of the peace treaty which was made in 363. Libanius expresses for us all his astonishment at the generous and moderate terms which Sapor demanded of Jovian when it appeared he had the Roman army completely at his mercy.\textsuperscript{16} For he merely required the newly-elected emperor to surrender that portion of Mesopotamia stretching from Nisibis east to the Tigris and to accept his right to intervene in Armenia as he saw fit.\textsuperscript{17} If he was satisfied with such limited gains at a time of superiority, he surely could not have hoped for greater acquisitions during his long and even struggle with Constantius. Indeed, during the
latter's reign Sapor must have developed a healthy respect for the determination of the Romans to hold on to their possessions in northern Mesopotamia. Although he wisely launched most of his major attacks during the emperor's absence, he encountered stout resistance from the remaining garrisons and found morale generally high among the second-rate frontier troops. It is, therefore, extremely unlikely that the Persian king fostered any grand ideas of western conquest. He regarded Armenia and the lands around the Upper Tigris as belonging historically to the Persian, not the Roman, sphere. In order to achieve their restoration, he embarked on a cautious but persistent campaign, bringing to bear on the Romans both diplomatic pressure and military force. Without doubt, from the Persian point of view this was not aggression but an honourable and justifiable struggle against Roman encroachment.

(b) The Persian Army.

Festus, in his Breviarium, proudly asserts that after Galerius' victory the Persians acknowledged the superiority of Roman arms. What was the nature of the army commanded by Sapor in the mid-fourth century and how, in fact, did it compare with its Roman counterpart?

While mounted detachments became increasingly important in the late Roman army, cavalry had long been the most significant element in Parthian and Persian forces. It can be divided into two groups; first, the mounted archers, relatively light-armed and highly mobile troops, well-known to the Romans since the defeat of Crassus, and secondly, the heavy, armour-clad knights, called in Latin clibanarii. The latter appear to have been introduced, or at least given more prominence, by the Sassanians themselves. The main offensive
weapon of this type of cavalry was a long lance which the rider held in both hands. For this reason he carried no shield but was clad from head to toe in armour. His horse, too, was protected from blows and missiles; according to Ammianus, by a covering of leather, while other writers describe a coat of mail. The appearance of these iron-clad warriors excited a fair degree of awe and apprehension in the Roman world, becoming the subject of something of a literary topos.

But the proportion of heavy cavalry in the Persian army is unlikely to have been high. As with mediaeval knights, their numbers were restricted on account of certain economic and social factors. Only the very rich nobles could afford the costly armour and the expenses of a retinue. Also, the lengthy apprenticeship for developing the equestrian and martial skills, as well as for building up the necessary physical stamina, could be undertaken only by the highest social class, who had the time available for practice. Moreover, the expensive equipment served not merely to protect the wearers in battle, but also to distinguish them from their social inferiors. They sought to intimidate with their strength and splendour their own subjects as well as their enemies. It almost seems that the desire to emphasize their aristocratic elitism outweighed the practical considerations of warfare. For the military effectiveness of heavy-armoured cavalry, especially without the assistance of stirrups, may be seriously questioned.

Because of the limited number of fully-armed troops, it is improbable that there existed whole squadrons of such cavalry in the Persian army. Rather, it was only the noble commanders and their immediate subordinates in the local contingents who wore the resplendent armour and who, being in the forefront of
the battle line, thus caught the attention of their adversaries. Most of their followers must have been equipped in the more traditional manner as horse-archers with little, if any, body armour. In battle the principal role of the heavy cavalry was to lead the charge on the enemy ranks with the intention of scattering their line at the first onslaught. Certainly, Roman authors regarded the impetus of such a charge as almost irresistible. But whereas the tactic of a massed cavalry attack could be expected to be successful against poorly equipped and undisciplined militias, against the well-drilled close formations of the Roman legions it more often proved to be ineffectual. Its lack of success is evident on the rare occasions when pitched battles took place between Persians and Romans during the mid-fourth century. Details of the battle of Singara are uncertain, but the sources suggest that the Persian army, having been put to flight at first, rallied and successfully counter-attacked the Roman forces, which had lost their cohesion, having scattered across the battlefield and the captured Persian camp in search of booty. Likewise, on Julian's expedition the Persians were soundly beaten in the fighting before the walls of Ctesiphon, whereas they were much more effective when harassing and attacking the Roman army on the march. If the cavalry charged against infantry drawn up in good order and failed to put them to flight, the rest of the Persian army was ill-equipped for engaging in hand-to-hand combat. The Romans clearly recognized this deficiency. They sought to close with the Persians as quickly as possible, since only thus could they avoid staying in range of their bowmen. The Persian horse-archers naturally kept their distance in the fray and, if the enemy tried to advance towards them, they would
withdraw, employing the famous "Parthian shot". Consequently, their main role was that of skirmishers, although Ammianus does describe how they could let fly a deadly barrage of arrows at the outset of battle, and of course they were ideally suited for the pursuit of a routed enemy.

The brunt of the hand-to-hand fighting was borne by the infantry, but all the Roman sources agree that this was a very inferior arm of the Persian forces. The rank and file were peasants, compelled to do military service as part of their duty to the nobles whose lands they cultivated. According to Ammianus, they were armed like gladiatorial murmillones; presumably he meant that, except for some sort of head-gear, they wore no armour and carried only light weapons. They were, however, protected by large, oblong shields of wicker-work with hide coverings. But they received neither pay nor military training, and they probably had little heart for the fight, resenting their absence from their families and fields. They were certainly no match for the Roman legions in equipment and discipline. Yet they must have constituted a substantial part of the Persian army, and at sieges of Roman fortresses they must have been in the forefront of the assaults with their battering-rams and scaling-ladders.

In contrast to the poor quality of the native foot-soldiers were the auxiliary troops drawn from the warlike tribes on the borders of the Empire. Some of these were subject peoples who provided contingents as part of their obligation to the Persian king, but others apparently retained their independence and served as mercenaries. For example, it is generally assumed that the Chionitae, who swelled Sapor's forces in 359, were "federates". Most of the auxiliary troops were light, mobile
horsemen, especially those from the nomadic tribes of the central Asian steppes, while detachments of Armenians most probably followed the Parthian and Persian models. All of these contingents served under their own chieftains, but although they were highly valued fighting units their loyalty must always have been slightly suspect and their indiscipline a continual source of disquiet. Sapor, however, was one of the more successful Sassanian rulers at winning people's allegiance and obedience. He made repeated approaches to the king and nobles of Armenia and, it seems, gained considerable support from the latter on several occasions. Similarly, he obtained the services of some of the Arab sheikhs to the south-west by a subtle blend of threats and promises. But his most remarkable success was on the eastern frontier where, during the mid-350's, he was able to turn the Chionitae from hostile invaders into powerful allies whom he could lead against Rome.

Apart from men and horses, the Indian war-elephant played its part in the Persian army. Their employment is attested both in the field and in siege operations. Sapor brought considerable numbers of them against Julian's army in 363 and, according to Ammianus, lost a greater number of them in this single year than in all the previous years of his reign. Unfortunately, Ammianus gives no clear indication of how they were deployed on the battlefield, but it is likely that they were meant to charge the enemy and throw their ranks into confusion. In this case it is possible that the elephants did not carry towers, since their speed and mobility would have been greatly impeded by such a burden. Certainly, Ammianus' brief references to the beasts in this context do not contain any mention of towers or fighting men on their backs, but only of
Sapor also used elephants in his attacks on Roman fortresses. Several sources, including the eye-witness Ephraem, record their presence at the third siege of Nisibis in 350, and Ammianus saw them in action again before the walls of Amida nine years later. On these occasions they definitely carried towers and archers, but it is Procopius in the sixth century who best describes their function at sieges: they would be led up to selected points whence the bowmen could shoot down on the Romans defending the stronghold. Thus they could provide covering-fire while other troops brought up rams and scaling-ladders against the fortifications. It is apparent that in some respects elephants were preferred to static or wheeled siege-towers. They could move from one point of attack to another, negotiating more easily the difficult terrain around a fortress, and they could also be withdrawn at night out of reach of sorties by the defenders. But, on the other hand, they were not nearly as stable and reliable as solid wooden structures from which to fight, and they could suddenly become uncontrollable in the thick of the fray.

But whatever their practical effectiveness, war-elephants could have a great psychological impact on the opposing forces. Ammianus himself was clearly impressed by their frightening appearance, for he remarks more than once on their immense size, their loud trumpeting and their nauseous smell. Julian, in fact, states that the Persians advanced their elephants at Nisibis purely in the hope of intimidating the defenders. One may believe that the beasts held more terror for fresh recruits and less-disciplined troops, especially the Germannic auxiliaries, than for hardened veterans of the eastern frontier. Perhaps this was part of Sapor's thinking when he deployed so
many elephants against Julian's army, which contained a large number of troops from the West. At any rate, it was widely recognized that elephants could unnerve troops unfamiliar with their appearance and trouble horses which were unaccustomed to their noise and stench.

It can be seen, then, that the Persian army was principally a cavalry force. As such it had the great advantage of mobility and could, therefore, fight whenever and wherever it chose. In this way the Persians proved to be an elusive and unpredictable foe for the slower-moving, methodical Roman forces. On the other hand, the superiority of the Persian horse was balanced by the strength and discipline of the Roman infantry, which could both ward off their attacks and overwhelm their own foot-soldiers in a pitched battle. The Persians were well aware of the necessity to break up the Roman formations in order to put them at the mercy of their swiftly manoeuvring cavalry, both lancers and archers. Thus the introduction of the war-elephant may be seen as an attempt to terrorize and even physically scatter the legionaries. But the real solution to the problem would have been to raise the status and morale of the foot-soldiers so that they could engage the Romans on equal terms. This, however, was impossible, given the nature of Persian society. The strict divisions of rank and class dictated the structure of the army; the Persian nobility could no more surrender their military pre-eminence than their social and economic dominance.

(c) The Campaign of 359.

Ammianus is our most authoritative source for the Persian invasion led by Sapor in 359. Not only was he an eye-witness, but he was also an active participant in the campaign, serving
on the staff of the general Ursicinus. Yet his narrative of the events is coloured by vivid details and personal experiences which detract from its objectivity and accuracy. Ammianus concentrated on particular episodes which lent themselves to colourful and dramatic descriptions, whereas he passed quickly and imprecisely over other matters. Consequently, both the route and the objective of the invasion have remained uncertain. However, it has generally been acknowledged that the campaign of 359 saw a major strategical change on the part of the Persians. Ammianus attributes the adoption of a new plan to the defection of a certain Antoninus, whose background and activities he recounts in considerable detail. On several occasions he refers to the advice which Antoninus gave to the Persian king, emphasizing that speed and surprise were essential for the success of the campaign. Thus scholars such as Warmington have thought that the original intention of the attack was "to move rapidly through Mesopotamia and Osrhoene to the Euphrates and then to cross into Syria, without attacking Nisibis and other strongly fortified places." But this is not the only feasible interpretation; it is possible that from the outset Sapor planned to outflank the Romans by heading in a different and unexpected direction, namely towards Lesser Armenia and Cappadocia. It is difficult to prove that this theory is correct, partly because Antoninus' plan was never completely fulfilled and partly because, although at a later date he somehow learned what the new strategy had been, Ammianus narrates events as they happened and as they appeared to him, without adding a clear, running commentary of Persian intentions. Nevertheless, a detailed reappraisal of Ammianus' account produces some worthwhile new insights on the campaign.
After telling the story of Antoninus' flight to the Persians, Ammianus says that it was soon learnt that Sapor was making preparations for the renewal of hostilities. Ursicinus, who had been replaced as magister militum per Orientem by Sabinianus and had set out to go to Constantius' court in the West, was suddenly ordered to return to Mesopotamia. But by the time that he reached Nisibis Persian raiding parties under the command of Tamsapor and Nohodares had already crossed the Tigris and were ravaging the countryside as far west as the city. This was, it appears, a highly successful operation, for the raiders not only harrassed and disrupted Roman attempts to organize their defences in the sector nearest the Tigris, but they also succeeded in making the Romans think that the Mesopotamian fortresses would be the principal targets of the attack. It is clear that the local population and garrisons were taken by surprise by the sudden appearance of the Persian cavalry. Thus Ammianus describes how he himself rescued a small boy who had been abandoned by his mother a couple of miles from Nisibis in the desperate flight from the enemy, and how he signalled a warning to some troops who were resting at Amudis/Amouda and had put their horses out to graze. Unfortunately, no information is given about the fate of the garrisons farther east; Ammianus merely states that smoke and fires were seen in the direction of Sisara and Castra Maurorum.

Having made his escape to Amida, Ammianus was then sent on a reconnaissance mission to Corduene. The truth of this whole episode has been questioned and certainly some details of it are highly suspect, but there can be little doubt that Ammianus' visit to the satrap Iovinianus actually took place. He states
that the Persian army, led by Sapor himself and accompanied by
the kings of the Chionitae and Albani, passed by Nineveh and
crossed the bridge over the river Anzaba.\textsuperscript{78} The mention of
these two localities and the fact that Ammianus was present in
Corduene indicate that the Persians were marching northwards
beyond the Tigris at that point in time. Nowhere is it stated
that Sapor had already crossed the Tigris; Procopius' cryptic
message merely implies that he was expected to do so.\textsuperscript{79}
Ammianus' reconnaissance, therefore, can have provided little
new information. He evidently saw the enemy forces from a
considerable distance and only for a brief period of time. He
cannot at this stage have known at which targets Sapor was going
to launch his attack, and yet he seems to have taken it for
granted that he would attempt to march through northern
Mesopotamia and cross the Euphrates into Syria. For, on his
return to Amida, instructions were sent to Cassianus, the dux
Mesopotamiae, and to the provincial governor Euphronius to take
steps for the security of the local population, the setting
alight of the Mesopotamian plain and the guarding of the
Euphrates crossings.\textsuperscript{80} Moreover, Ammianus records that
Sabinianus remained at Edessa throughout the campaign.\textsuperscript{81} Despite
all his hostile remarks about Ursicinus' successor, it is clear
that the new magister militum took up this position for the
sound reason of blocking the Persians' direct route to Syria.\textsuperscript{82}

From this point in Ammianus' narrative it becomes unclear
which route the Persian army took to reach Amida. Without
mentioning any crossing of the Tigris, Ammianus says that the
kings (Sapor, Grumbates and the others) passed by Nisibis in
accordance with the plan suggested by Antoninus, and that they
advanced sub montium pedibus per valles gramineas in order to
avoid a shortage of fodder.\textsuperscript{83} Dillemann has drawn Sapor's route as crossing the Tigris below Nineveh, going through Singara and then turning north to pass west of Nisibis.\textsuperscript{84} This, however, seems most improbable, for there would have been no reason for Ammianus to mention Nineveh, nor indeed any real possibility of his sighting the Persian army from Corduene, if it had passed south of that place. Furthermore, Dillemann's route would require not only that the Jebel Sinjar and the eastern wadis of the Khabur should be recognized as Ammianus' mountains and grassy valleys, but also that the Persians passed without notice through Singara, a place where, as Antoninus reminded Sapor, the Romans had checked his advances before.\textsuperscript{85}

It is more likely that Sapor crossed the Tigris unheralded above Nineveh and then, following in the tracks of Tamsapor and Nohodares, marched along the southern edge of the Tur 'Abdin. Ammianus' description of the terrain is quite appropriate for this region, particularly at that time of year when the vegetation was most verdant. Moreover, his vagueness is understandable because the frontier zone beyond Nisibis had been thoroughly disrupted by the Persian vanguard before he came to the city. Hence he can only report that smoke and fires were visible, stretching right across from the Tigris to the vicinity of Nisibis itself.\textsuperscript{86} The vastatoriae manus were clearly very successful at concealing the progress of Sapor's main army from Roman eyes. They also apparently picketed Nisibis, so that when Sapor approached the fortress, regarded as the bulwark of the Mesopotamian defences,\textsuperscript{87} he was able to pass by it safely.\textsuperscript{88} The Roman forces stationed there under the command of Cassianus did not hinder his advance, perhaps because they had orders, like Sabinianus, to avoid direct confrontation with the Persian
army. But the curtain of troops formed around the city by the Persian vanguard must also have prevented them from attacking the main bulk of Sapor's forces as they marched past.

Ammianus then says that the Persian king came to a place called Bebase, which was a hundred miles across a parched land stretching from Constantina. This passage raises several problems. Dillemann has identified Bebase with Thilapsum (Tell Chakar Bazar), about twenty-two miles south-west of Nisibis. He discounts other proposals for its location, including that of Chapot, who sought to place it farther east a little beyond Nisibis. But his own suggestion that Bebase is a mutated form of the name Thilapsum is far from convincing as the sole basis for his identification. Moreover, the distance of a hundred Roman miles (91½ statute miles) does not fit, since Tell Chakar Bazar is only about sixty-seven statute miles from Constantina (Viranşehir). If Ammianus' figure is at all accurate, Bebase would have to be located some distance east of Nisibis. Yet it is difficult to believe that Bebase lay in this direction since Ammianus' narrative implies that the Persian army had already passed that fortress by the time it reached Bebase. It is, therefore, impossible to locate Bebase precisely. Ammianus' reference to it as a villa indicates that it was a small and insignificant settlement, and the multiplicity of similar names, both ancient and modern, in the region only adds to the confusion. A further difficulty is presented by the description of the land between Bebase and Constantina. Although Dillemann quotes from the Handbook of Mesopotamia that "water (is) very scarce from Mardin to Urfa except in the neighbourhood of Viranşehir", the area does not seem to be any more arid and desolate than the rest of northern Mesopotamia. Indeed,
Ammianus has already stated that the Romans had set fire to the Mesopotamian plain and laid waste the ripening crops so that *ad usque Euphraten ab ipsis marginibus Tigridis nihil viride cerneretur*. So presumably fodder would have been harder to come by the farther west the Persians advanced, regardless of the natural deficiencies of the landscape. Thus Ammianus' reference to the desert tract appears to be only a preliminary explanation for the change of course which Sapor's army made at Bebase.

Ammianus continues his narrative by saying that the Persians hesitated for a long while at Bebase. He offers no explanation for this delay on a campaign of which speed was the essence, but it was perhaps necessary in order to let the slower-moving units (including the elephants) catch up before the army embarked on the second phase of the campaign. Ammianus states that the Persian commanders had just resolved to cross the barren waste towards Constantina when they suddenly learned from a reliable scout that the Euphrates was in flood and could not be forded. This, however, seems to be a rather lame excuse for the failure of the Persians to make for the Euphrates crossings from Osrhoene to Syria. They must have been familiar with the seasonal flooding of the river. They were also aware that Sabinianus was stationed at Edessa with most of the eastern field army, but Ammianus, being intent on blackening the name of Ursicinus' successor, does not give him any credit for halting the Persian advance directly across northern Mesopotamia. According to Ammianus, a council was then held, at which Antoninus persuaded Sapor to turn his march to the right and, *per longiores circumitum* through lands untouched by the Romans, to head for the forts of Barzalo and Claudias where the
Euphrates was small and shallow near its source. This is presented as an abrupt change from the original plan, implying that Sapor's first objective had been to cross the Middle Euphrates. Yet the advice now given by Antoninus, although more detailed and specific, does not seem to differ essentially from that offered before the start of the campaign. Moreover, the reasons given by Ammianus for the change in direction are most inadequate. Indeed, he persisted in the belief that the Persians still intended to attack the lands to the south of the Taurus mountains. For otherwise the preparations to go to Samosata and to break down the bridges at Zeugma and Capersana do not make any sense.

There follows an account of events which forms almost a digression. It is full of detailed episodes which are largely concerned with Ammianus' own part in the campaign. However, it is apparent that the Persian cavalry under the command of Tamsapor and Nohodares, which had earlier carried out extensive duties around Nisibis, was now converging on Amida. Meanwhile the Persian king himself set out from Bebase and advanced northwards through Horre, Meiacarire and Charcha. But when he came near the forts of Reman and Busan, he decided to attack them because he learned from deserters that they contained a great quantity of property. Despite the delay involved in the capture of these forts and the slow progress of his army, it is clear that Sapor still intended to follow Antoninus' advice and press on beyond Amida. It seems unlikely, therefore, that he planned to make any attempt on that fortress. The first attack occurred while he and the main army were still a considerable distance to the south. Nor was it at all deliberate, but rather it developed accidentally from the
skirmish with Ursicinus' forces. Ammianus says that the Persian vanguard had taken up a position in which they were hidden post tumulos celsos vicinos Amidae. Clearly they had not wanted to be seen from the town. However, they were spotted when Ursicinus set out for Samosata, and a general skirmish ensued in which the Romans were scattered in all directions. But some, like Ammianus himself, managed to flee back towards the fortress. The Persian cavalry followed in hot pursuit and were thus drawn into making an unsuccessful assault on the stronghold.

Having gained such places as Reman and Busan with relative ease and hearing that his cavalry vanguard had already made an attack on Amida, the Persian king apparently became confident that he could quickly take that fortress as well. Hence he temporarily put aside his gloriosa coepta, hoping to persuade its garrison to capitulate. The Romans, however, were not as unprepared and disorganized either as Sapor was expecting or as Ammianus' narrative suggests. The regular garrison of Amida had been greatly reinforced. Ammianus states that six additional legions, as well as the greater part of the comites sagittarii, had managed to outstrip the advancing Persian forces and reach the city in time to render aid in its defence. This indicates that the Roman high command did in fact anticipate the Persian swing northwards. But, of course, they still had to be wary in case Sapor suddenly veered round again and headed for the Euphrates crossings to Syria.

The death of the Chionite prince, the son of Grumbates, during negotiations with the defenders of Amida raised unexpected problems for Sapor. He was now obliged to pursue the siege in earnest in order to avenge the death with the destruction of the city. Consequently, the length of the siege, the stubborn
resistance of the garrison and the large number of casualties which the attackers suffered effectively thwarted Antoninus' plans to advance farther towards the Upper Euphrates.  

However, during his long and detailed account of the siege Ammianus also briefly refers to the capture of a place called Ziata, a *castellum...capacissimum et munitum*, where a large crowd of people had taken refuge. Dillemann places it at Ammaneh, near the confluence of the Arghana and Dibene rivers, about twenty-five miles north of Amida. The fortress certainly lay to the north of Amida, since we are told that the numerous prisoners from there were led past the besieged city en route for captivity in Persia. But Ziata has also been identified with the citadel of Kharpout because of the name Ḥişn-Ziyād which was given to that place by Arab writers. This is an attractive possibility. Kharpout was a site of considerable strategic importance since it stood guard over the main route which led through the Ergani Pass. Thus if Sapor's troops took this fort, they controlled the western approaches to the pass and hence blocked the road to Amida from Melitene and central Anatolia. But without it, their position at Amida during the lengthy siege was very vulnerable, for Roman relief forces could threaten to attack them from two directions: the command centres of Edessa and Melitene. As it was, it seems likely that the Persians secured their flank to the north-west by seizing Ziata. Consequently, Sabinianus' opposition to Ursicinus' plan to lead a light-armed force from Edessa against the Persian army camped before Amida must be seen in a different light. The *magister militum* rejected these proposals as too dangerous not only because he had general instructions from Constantius, but also because as the commander on the spot he
was aware that the enterprise was too risky without the support of a second thrust coming from the Upper Euphrates.\footnote{124}

After the thorough sack of Amida and the pursuit of what fugitives there were,\footnote{125} Sapor decided to call a retreat. Sadly, Ammianus has very little more to say about the campaign. He tells us about his own escape by rough paths to Melitene and eventual return to Antioch.\footnote{126} He also gives the story of Craugasius, mentioning that he fled from Nisibis to a band of Persian raiders. They conducted him to Tamsapor post diem quintum, who in turn took him to the king.\footnote{127} Thus it appears that the main bulk of Sapor's army was some distance from Nisibis at that time, and perhaps it was still encamped around Amida. Moreover, the fact that Craugasius was able to leave the safety of Nisibis and go out to his country villa indicates that no serious and immediate danger threatened the area. But nothing is said which could be taken to have a bearing on the Persians' line of retreat. We must presume that they retraced their steps, first south and then eastwards along the edges of the Tur 'Abdin. Despite being exhausted after a long siege, depleted by heavy casualties and burdened with a large number of captives and spoils, the Persians apparently withdrew without serious harrassment from the intact Roman forces which remained at Edessa, Nisibis and elsewhere. The explanation for this lies not only with Ursicinus' instructions and the relative weakness and poor morale of the imperial troops after the disaster at Amida, but also with the continued activity of the Persian cavalry which escorted and shielded the rest of the army.

The campaign of 359, therefore, is illustrative of a number of significant points. Firstly, it shows that Ammianus, even when he had been an eye-witness to events, must be treated with
extreme care. His interpretation of certain episodes is coloured by his own personal prejudices and his participation detracts from his objectivity as an historian. Moreover, the place-names which he records are fraught with difficulty. Nevertheless, it does become clear that Antoninus' plan was a completely new departure in Persian strategy, for which the Romans were not fully prepared. The evidence of Ammianus suggests that it was in fact a consistent and well-organized attempt to catch the defending forces on the wrong foot. It is also evident that the most important element in its successful execution was the central role played by the mobile cavalry units. They harried and terrified the Roman forces with their sudden onslaughts, thereby clearing and safeguarding a path for Sapor's main army. Finally, the campaign presents the Persian king as a circumspect military leader. For, despite his great ambitions and the depleted strength of the Romans, he does not appear to have considered embarking on a hazardous expedition to Syria in imitation of his illustrious predecessor and namesake. But rather, he was quick to adopt an imaginative scheme whereby he could cause a maximum of damage and disruption to his enemy while minimizing his own risks. His judgement was amply rewarded; the year 359 proved to be the turning-point in his long struggle against Constantius. Before that date he had achieved little in all his Mesopotamian campaigns, but in the following year he went on to capture two other major fortresses and ultimately these successes were in part responsible for Julian's disastrous Persian expedition.

(c) The Frontier Defences.

There is, unfortunately, little evidence for Persian defensive positions, especially on the border with the Roman
Empire. However, it is certain that they built and held some strategic points with permanent garrisons. The accounts of Julian's expedition show that there was a series of fortresses along the Lower Euphrates, whose main purpose was to prevent or hinder Roman invasions. Similarly, there were strongholds on the Tigris in order to secure that route towards Babylonia. The Persians were, apparently, skilled at constructing strong defences; at least, Ammianus praises the materials they used, mud-bricks and bitumen, as being the most indestructible. Generally their fortifications stood up well to Roman assaults with battering-rams and other devices. They also enhanced the strength of their fortresses by selecting sites which had excellent natural defences, and they were particularly adept at using water as a defensive barrier. Not only did they place numerous forts on islands in mid-stream, but they also diverted rivers and canals either directly against the enemy or into his path. But, of course, skill at regulating and manipulating the ubiquitous waterways of southern Mesopotamia was one which its inhabitants had always enjoyed and practised. Moreover, according to Arab sources, linear barriers protected various sections of the Persian frontiers. Sapor himself is credited with the construction of one of these, the Khandaq Sabur, which ran from Hit down to the Persian Gulf near Basra. Yakut states that he ordered a moat and wall to be built to protect al-Hira and the rich lands of southern Mesopotamia against raids from the western desert. Mention is also made of forts and watch-towers along the Khandaq, and Baladhuri adds that the Arabs who lived in the vicinity guarded it and in return had the use of the land thereabout as a fief. Ammianus refers to other earthworks beside the Tigris to the north of Samarra, which were
likewise intended to halt incursions by the Saracens into the plains of Assyria.  

It seems that the fortresses were manned by a mixed force of horse and foot. Ammianus states that the large wicker shields of the infantry were visible on the battlements of Pirisabora. Yet in the same episode he describes the close-fitting armour of the heavy cavalry. But little is known for certain about the nature of the garrison troops. Most were probably local levies, commanded by Persian officers and reinforced by relatively small numbers of higher grade troops (archers and horsemen) of Iranian or allied origin. Ammianus remarks that the men whom Sapor left to defend Bezabde in 360 were insignis origine belligique artibus claros. This, however, was clearly an exceptional circumstance, where Sapor required a special force to withstand the threat of an imminent Roman counter-attack. Ammianus indicates that the morale of these troops was excellent, and they successfully resisted Constantius' vigorous attempt to recapture the fortress. Elsewhere, too, Persian garrisons showed themselves to be confident and in good spirits. Nor were they slow to make sallies from their defences, if a good opportunity presented itself or necessity required it. Initially in the campaign of 363 they were taken by surprise by the speed, and possibly by the direction, of Julian's advance. Thus Anatha, the first fortress down the Euphrates from the Roman border, surrendered without a fight when Julian's army suddenly appeared before its walls. But thereafter Julian was obliged either to leave uncaptured strongholds in his rear or to undertake perilous sieges. Indeed, in some instances it seems that the Persians, as part of their delaying tactics, purposely provoked the emperor in order to make him halt and
besiege a fortress. It is clear that the Persians concentrated their forces on the more defensible and important positions, abandoning weaker forts and evacuating towns and villages as far as possible. The major strongholds were well-provisioned, having sufficient stores of food and arms to withstand a long siege. This, together with their strong defences, enabled the garrison troops to have good grounds for optimism. Moreover, they knew that their mobile forces were constantly harassing the Romans' advance, and they expected the king to arrive soon with his main army. Finally, severe punishment awaited those who thought of surrender to the enemy. Strict laws were laid down for such crimes as cowardice and desertion; not only were the culprits, if caught, punished with immediate death, but also all their relatives suffered the same fate. Ammianus actually tells how Julian beheld the impaled bodies of the kinsmen of Mamersides, the commander who had surrendered Pirisabora.

(e) Spies and Scouts.

The gathering of reliable intelligence has always been an essential ingredient in the successful conduct of military operations. Nor were the Sassanians deficient in this respect; in fact, it may be judged that they were superior to their Roman adversaries in the various sorts of espionage. It can reasonably be assumed that the Persian king took care to acquire accurate intelligence in order both to plan and to carry out his campaigns effectively. There are two broad categories of intelligence, strategic and tactical. The former would consist of such things as ascertaining the whereabouts of the Roman emperor, his commitments elsewhere in the Empire, and the overall strength of Rome and its army. Such intelligence could
be gained most easily from information supplied by diplomats, merchants and travellers. The latter category was of a more localized nature, concerning the terrain, fortresses and troops which would face an invading army. To a large extent it would be gathered by scouts and from deserters and captives as the campaign proceeded.

Christensen has remarked: "L'Iran a connu, des les plus anciens temps, un espionnage bien organisé." The very secrecy which surrounded this activity has meant that it has received scant notice in the ancient sources. It is, nevertheless, possible to assume, from random pieces of evidence, that there existed a well-organized intelligence system in Sassanian Persia. According to Procopius, it had long been the custom of both Persians and Romans to maintain καταναξιόποιοι at public expense. Most of these, he adds, served their respective country loyally, but a few did turn traitor. Procopius also acknowledges that merchants often acted as spies abroad. This may have been one reason for the severe restriction which was imposed by the treaty of 298 on commercial contacts between Rome and Persia. Ambassadors, too, were sent not only to conduct negotiations, but also to collect as much information as possible about the enemy's state of preparedness. Thus, for example, Ammianus refers to a message in cipher received from Procopius, who had been sent as an envoy to the Persians, warning of Sapor's hostile intentions in 359. Obviously both sides were aware that spies and informers were at work. Hence they took care to try to conceal, or at least to misrepresent, their own schemes. Yet Sapor's prompt response either militarily or diplomatically to events in the Roman world suggests that he had an alert and speedy system for learning of their plans or problems.
Furthermore, it appears on the evidence for the campaign of 359 that the Persians enjoyed a degree of success in deceiving and surprising their adversaries. Significantly, Ammianus records the important role of Sapor himself in this process. For reports were often made to the king in person, thereby restricting the spread of information and reducing the risk of it falling into the wrong hands. Indeed, in reporting on the situation in 361 Ammianus refers to the conflicting accounts which were brought to Constantius by scouts and deserters concerning Sapor's intentions and movements. He goes on to explain that this was because *apud Persas nemo consiliorum est conscius, praeter optimates taciturnos et fidos, apud quos Silentii quoque colitur numen.*

The invasion of 359 best illustrates the effective use to which the Persians put scouts and forward parties, both in gathering tactical intelligence and in denying it to the enemy. Several episodes are recounted by Ammianus which show how the vanguard of Sapor's army under the command of Tamsapor and Nohodares was rapidly and widely deployed. Cavalry units fell suddenly on the Romans around Nisibis, seizing and interrogating personnel such as Abdigildus' servant. When they learned from him that the magister peditum Ursicinus was in the vicinity, a large band was sent at breakneck speed to intercept and capture him. Although they failed in this enterprise, the speed and unexpected manoeuvres of Tamsapor and Nohodares' forces caused considerable disruption to the Romans' hurried attempts to organize resistance to the invasion. A former Gallic trooper who was captured by Ursicinus and his staff at Meiacarire confessed that he was working for these Persian generals and was on his way to report back to them what he had...
learned. It was probably another of their scouts who, according to Ammianus, brought Sapor the news that the Euphrates was in flood and hence impassable. Doubtless such agents also kept the Persian king acquainted with the movements of Sabinianus and the forces at Edessa. Later, it seems almost by arrangement that Craugasius made his escape from Nisibis to a band of Persian troops. These pieces of evidence suggest that the Persians' scouting parties were well-organized for gaining vital information and securing important locations and personnel. It is noteworthy that Tamsapor and Nohodares appear as major functionaries in the co-ordination of these activities, and hence one can recognize the appointment by Sapor of alert, capable and efficient men to the frontier commands.

Ammianus mentions several deserters and prisoners who rendered useful service to the enemy. Roman emperors issued edicts threatening torture and capital punishment in an attempt to curb such acts of perfidy. It was also a risky business to go over to the other side because fugitives might be suspected of being double-agents or false traitors. Thus generally, it seems, persons would only contemplate desertion when forced by necessity in one form or another. For example, the standard-bearer of the Ioviani fled to the Persians and informed them of Julian's death because he feared the outcome of his personal feud with Jovian, now that he had been raised to the imperial purple.

The former merchant and protector, Antoninus, was driven to turn traitor by the unjust exactions of Roman officials. His defection was a major stroke of luck for the Persian king, and Ammianus rightly stresses his influential role in the campaign of 359. Being exercitatus et prudens, Antoninus
realized that he could make himself most valuable and welcome to Sapor if he provided detailed information about the Roman order of battle. Hence before his flight he carefully noted the strength and location of military units, impending troop movements and the position of stores of weapons and supplies. Only then did he enter into negotiations with Tamsapor for his safe reception into Persia. Antoninus' ability to exert so great an influence on Sapor's plans for the campaign stemmed from his precise knowledge of Roman depositions. But it is noteworthy that Tamsapor insured his trustworthiness by sending men to help in the removal of his whole household across the Tigris.  

There are other instances when the Persians are seen to take precautions with regard to informants. For example, the Parisian deserter had been well-received, had married a local woman and fathered children. With his family acting as tokens of his loyalty, he was then sent out on numerous spying missions. Later in the campaign Ammianus indicates that Sapor was quick to seize on the capture of Craugasius' wife as a possible means of bringing about the betrayal of Nisibis. She was, therefore, treated most respectfully and was allowed to send a messenger to her husband, reassuring him of her safety. When he fell under suspicion and fled from Nisibis, he was also greeted handsomely in the Persian camp, although his flight must have dashed all Sapor's hopes and plans for the subversion of the city. Ammianus rightly observes at this point that Craugasius' value to the Persian king was far inferior to that of the resourceful Antoninus.  

The sources record one notable success on the part of Persian agents. It involves events surrounding Julian's decision to burn his ships and to make a strategic withdrawal overland from
Ctesiphon. Although the actual details are uncertain because of differing traditions, it appears that Julian was influenced by a Persian deserter who claimed that he would lead the army into the heartland of Persia. In fact, this guide was a loyal Persian agent whose object was to deceive the Roman emperor. Consequently, the fleet was set alight and the Roman forces were led off across a tract of land stripped of crops and supplies in the direction of Sapor's advancing army. This act of individual heroism contributed greatly to the subsequent train of events which ended calamitously for the Romans.

One may conclude, therefore, that the Sassanian Empire in the mid-fourth century presented itself as a worthy rival to Rome. The stalemate which endured along their mutual border for most of Sapor's reign is indicative of the similar circumstances of the two powers. Both suffered from a certain feeling of insecurity and, at times, from pressing needs elsewhere; both had large and burdensome armies, although their strengths and skills were most often at variance; and both could draw on vast resources which lay securely beyond the enemy's reach. But in the figure of Sapor the Persians, perhaps, held an advantage. For he displayed not only the best qualities of leadership but also an adroitness in diplomacy which overshadowed his Roman counterparts. Nevertheless, it must be said that Constantius was a shrewd and careful man, who proved to be a worthy foil to the flair and ambition of the Persian king.


But gradually the Sassanian Empire changed and became more centralized. Sub-kings and great aristocratic families were supplanted by a large number of lesser nobles, who filled the military and civil posts in a highly organized bureaucratic system. This process must have advanced considerably during Sapor's reign, although it is evident that members of the traditional nobility still played a leading role in military affairs - below, n.5.

3) Ammianus includes in his version of Sapor's letter to Constantius the remark: sed ubique mihi cordi est recta ratio, cui coalitus ab adulescentia prima, nihil umquam paenitendum admisi - Amm. Marc. XVII,5,5.

Tabari says that as a young prince Sapor showed extraordinary discretion and intelligence - Th.Nödeke p. 54-5.


4) Tabari says that the "Turks" and Romans desired to take Persia during Sapor's infancy - Th.Nödeke p.53. Although Tabari has mistakenly identified an unknown central Asian people with the much later Turkic tribes, the statement may have some basis in historical fact. For Ammianus implies that there was trouble with tribes on the eastern frontier before Sapor was called to deal with the Chionitae personally in the 350's - Amm. Marc. XIV,3,1. R.Ghirshmann believed that Sapor campaigned in the East during the years from 340 to 344 - "Les Chionites-Hephthalites." Mém. de l'Inst. franc. d'arch. orientale du Caire 80 (1948) p.70. It is, however, difficult to comment with any certainty on the state of affairs in the eastern
regions of the Persian Empire. But in the western parts Arabs were certainly active in raiding Persian territory during the period of Sapor's minority - Tabari, trans. Th. Nöldeke p. 53-4 and below, ch. VII, pp. 266-7.

5) Ammianus names Pigranes, Surena and Narseus, potissimi duces, in a battle before Ctesiphon - Amm. Marc. XXIV, 6, 12. Later, the retreating Roman army was confronted by a large Persian force commanded by Merena, equestris magister militiae, in company with two of Sapor's sons and many nobles - Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 11. During the expedition of 363 are recorded the deaths of Adaces, nobilis satrapa, - Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 6 and Zosimus III, 27, and fifty other nobles and satraps, including Merena and Nohodares who also receive the epithet potissimi duces - Amm. Marc. XXV, 3, 13. On the other hand, Julian claims that Sapor put to death many satraps at the abandonment of the third siege of Nisibis, believing them to have let him down in various ways - Or. II, 66d.

6) A unique silver head, hammered from a single sheet of metal, probably represents Sapor in the prime of life - O. Grabar, Sassanian Silver (Ann Arbor, Michigan 1967) no. 50. One notable example of his personal courage and leadership occurs during the siege of Amida, when he leapt into the thick of the fighting like a common soldier - Amm. Marc. XIX, 7, 8. Ammianus gives only a grudging recognition to his bravery, saying that the Persian king was never required to take part in the actual fighting and that on this occasion Sapor acted novo et nusquam antea cognito more. Note also how the defenders of Malozamalcha taunted the Romans with praise of their king's bravery - Zosimus III, 22, 5. Below, n. 8.

Attested at Ledan in the province of in the first year of persecution, c. 344/5 - p. 21.
At Seleucia/Ctesiphon in the second and fifth years of persecution - pp. 90 & 105.
At Sciaharcadata, capital of the province of Beth Garmal in the fourth year - p. 98. Beth Huzzae.
Possibly in the province of again in the fifth and sixth years - pp. 101 & 114.
Naturally, the Acta only record the king's presence in the western districts where most of the Christian communities were to be found.

Or. II,62d; 63d; 65d-66d; Theodoret, HE II,30,1ff; Chron. Pasch. in Philostorgius, op.cit. pp.216-8.

Festus also suggests that Sapor was present at the battle of Singara - Brev. ch.27: fugatoque rege. Cf. also, Julian, Or. I,23d-24a.

Ammianus describes Sapor at the head of the army which invaded Roman Mesopotamia in 359 - Amn. Marc. XVIII,6,22. He states that he also witnessed the Persian king before the walls of Amida - XIX,1;3.

A.D.H.Bivar, however, has questioned the authority of Ammianus on this point, identifying the royal figure at Amida with the Kushano-Sassanian ruler, Varahran II. He bases the identification on the similarity between the crown of Varahran as shown on his coins and the helmet worn by the Persian commander which Ammianus describes as: aureum capitis arietini figuramentum, interstinctum lapillus. It is, indeed, a striking coincidence, but nothing more. For Bivar's dating of Varahran depends solely on this identification - The Kushan-Sassanian Episode (Ms. D.Phil. Oxford 1955) p.202.

The chronology of the Kushano-Sassanian coin series remains uncertain. There are no reliable historical sources for eastern Iran in this period, and the many and varied coins have not been properly classified. Briefly, there are two main schools of thought. The first, led by Herzfeld, considers that all the Kushano-Sassanian coins belong to the third century - E.Herzfeld, "Kushano-Sassanian Coins." Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India 38 (Calcutta 1930). The second, represented by Cunningham, Göbl and others, refers them to the fourth - A.Cunningham, "Coins of the Later Indo-Scythians: Scytho-Sassanians." NC 1893, pp.166-77; R.Göbl, "Die Munzprägung der Kusan." in F.Altheim & R.Stiehl, Finanzgeschichte der Spätantike (Frankfurt 1957) ch.7; and G.V.Lukonin, "Zavoevaniya Sasanidov na Vostoke." Vestnik Drevnei Istorii (1969) Pt. 3, pp.39-44.

Moreover, the ram's-horn helmet which is vividly described by Ammianus need not be regarded as the distinguishing crown of a specific ruler. He clearly states that the king is wearing it in place of his crown: pro diademate gestans. E.Herzfeld has pointed out that the ram had symbolic importance in the story of Ardashir's flight from the court of Artabanus - op.cit. p.22-3. Hence a ram, adorned with regal fillets, is often depicted in Sassanian art:- On seals - Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum Pt. III, Pahlavi Inscriptions vol. VI (London 1968) Plates XXI,1 & XXV,2-6. On textiles - R.Ghirshman, Iran. Parthians and Sassanians (1962) illus. 273 & 277. On a stucco panel from Ctesiphon - F.Sarre, Die Kunst des alten Persien (Berlin 1923) Plate 103. Finally, such headgear is portrayed elsewhere on Kidarite coinage and Sassanian silver plate - A.D.H.Bivar, "The Kushano-Sassanian Coin Series." Journal of the Numismatic Society of India 18 (1956) Plate IV, no.39; compare the coins of Varahran - Idem, Plate II, no.13 & III, nos.31-31a. A silver dish now in Leningrad depicts a royal personage on a boar-hunt wearing a ram's-horn helmet. It bears an inscription on the underside of the rim in letters which appear very like ancient Sogdian - Y.I.Smirnov, Argenterie Orientale (St.Petersburg 1909)
no.53. A Sassanian queen is also shown wearing a ram's-horn helmet on another silver plate, possibly of the fifth century - F. Sarre, *op.cit.* Plate 111.

9) The *Acta* of Simeon bar Sabba'e preserve an order issued by Sapor to the tax collectors in Beth Aramaye - *Acta martyrum et sanctorum* ed. P. Bedjan (Paris 1890-7) vol. 2, p. 136, and J. Labourt, *Le Christianisme dans l'empire perse sous la dynastie sassanide* (Paris 1904) p. 45-6. Sapor's persecution of the Christians is said to have been prompted by their refusal to pay the additional taxes - *Histoire Nestorienne* Patr. Or. IV, 3 (Paris 1907) p. 300 and AMO tom. I, p. 17. For it seems that the king regarded this as proof of their treachery to Persia and their sympathy with Rome. But, as Simeon rightly informed him, the Christians were generally poor people who could ill afford to pay the regular taxes. Also, many had adopted ascetic practices and renounced all their worldly goods, making it impossible for them to pay the increased poll-tax. The insurrection at Susa may well be connected with the imposition of harsher taxation. The town had a Christian community since a certain Milles had been appointed as its bishop. However, it seems that he was not well received by the majority of the inhabitants and was eventually driven out. Hence the *Acta* give one to believe that the destruction of Susa by Sapor's troops was an act of divine punishment - AMO tom. I, p. 70 and Sozomen, HE II, 14. Cf. R. Ghirshman, "Cinq campagnes de fouilles à Suse, 1946-1951." *R. Assy.* 46 (1952) pp. 1-18.

The Jewish communities, too, were burdened by heavy taxes. Attempts at evasion were severely punished; for example, the death of Rabbah, conventionally dated to 330, was specifically described as a consequence of this - Babylonian Talmud, Bava Mezi'a 86a. Some rabbis tried to avoid the taxes by actually denying their religion and affirming that they were "worshippers of fire" - Bab. Tal. Nedarim 62b. Another passage suggests that it was not uncommon for gentiles as well as Jews to try to evade their taxes - Bab. Tal. Bava Batra 54b. Thus it appears that tax evasion was a serious and widespread problem for the Sassanian authorities.

The coinage of Sapor II is the second most abundant in modern collections of Sassanian coins. This is partly because of the sheer length of his reign, but it is also partly because he minted large sums in order to pay for his armies, and especially for the auxiliaries from Central Asia. It is noteworthy that the coins issued during his minority were only of 70% purity, but when Sapor began to rule in his own name a new style of coin was minted which was of a higher silver content - J. L. Bacharach & A. A. Gordus, "The Purity of Sassanian Silver Coins." *JAOS* 92 (1972) pp. 280-3.

10) According to Tabari and Tha'alibi, after defeating the hostile Arab tribesmen, Sapor transplanted them to various parts of his empire - Tabari, trans. Th. Nöldeke pp. 57 & 67; Tha'alibi pp. 616-9.

The *Acta* of Simeon bar Sabba'e record that he settled many captives from Singara, Bezaabde, Armenia, Arzanene, Corduene

Roman sources make frequent reference to the plunder and captives carried off by Sapor's troops; for example, Libanius, Or. XVIII,207; Amm. Marc. XVI,9,1; XIX,6,1-2; 9,1; XX,6,7 and 7,15, where Ammianus describes the Persians at the capture of Bezabde as: gens rapiendi cupidior, onusta spoliorum genere omni, captivorumque examen maximum ducens.

11) For example, Julian's remarks - Or. II, 63a-b. R.N. Frye notes the Parthian and Sassanian claims to descent from the last Achaemenid king, Artaxerxes II - "The Charisma of Kingship," Iranica Antiqua 4 (1964) pp.36-54. The juxtaposition of many Sassanian rock-reliefs to Achaemenid royal tombs was, I believe, intended to proclaim Ardashir and his successors as equals and worthy heirs of the ancient Persians. Thus Ammianus makes Sapor not only demand as his birthright the full extent of the Achaemenid Empire, but also assert his pre-eminence over the kings of old - Amm. Marc. XVII,5,5. When Robert Byron, a respected eastern art critic and traveller, visited Naq-i-Rustam in 1934, he remarked on the Achaemenid appearance of some of the figures in the Sassanian reliefs: ".I wonder..if this look is the result of conscious antiquarianism." - The Road to Oxiana (London 1937) p.180-1.

12) Sapor's letter to Constantius in 357/8 contains a note of righteous indignation amid its general tone of disciplined admonition - Amm. Marc. XVII,5,3-8. After magnanimously waiving his right to nearly the whole of the Eastern Roman Empire, he declares: ideoque Armeniam recuperare cum Mesopotamia debo, avo meo composita fraude praeruptam - XVII,5,6. Note also the reference to pertinax alieni cupiditas - XVII,5,3. Thus when Sapor attacked Armenia in 365, he claimed that the treaty of Jovian allowed him to recover the land: quae antea ad maiores suos pertinuisse monstrabat - Amm. Marc. XXVI,4,6. Of course, Ammianus does not claim to have copied Sapor's words from the letter; he admits that he is merely giving the tenor of his message - Amm. Marc. XVII,5,2. One has to assume that the historian reflects this fairly accurately, despite his personal antipathy towards the Persian king - see his hostile remarks about Sapor in XVII,5,2; 14,2; XIX,1,1; XX,7,16 and XXV,7,9.

13) He would have been able to recall the numerous occasions when a Roman army had swept southwards to sack his winter capital, Ctesiphon, as most recently under Carus in 283 - Eutropius IX,18; Festus, Brev. ch.24 and Amm. Marc. XXIV, 5,3. Note also the effect which, according to Festus, the threat of Constantine's planned expedition had on the Persians: sub cuius (Constantini) adventu Babyloniae in tantum regna trepidarunt ut supplex ad eum legatio Persarum adcurreret... - Brev. ch.26. Below, ch.V, pp.207-9.

14) Julian, Or. I,27a; Libanius, Or. XVIII,207; Amm. Marc. XVII,5,15; XVIII,10,2; XIX,2,4; XX,6,1; 7,8; and XXII,12,1.
But compare the observation in Aurelius Victor, De Caes. XXXIX, 37.

15) An embassy was sent to demand frontier changes, probably in 334 - Libanius, Or. LIX, 71.

A peace delegation presented itself before Constantine in 336/7 - Festus, Brev. ch. 26 and Eusebius, Vita Const. IV, 57. Zonaras refers to a truce in 350, but it is likely that his source made this assumption from the reduced scale of the fighting during the 350's - Zon. XIII, 7, 14. However, Sapor's general in the West, Tamsapor, readily engaged in discussions with his Roman counterparts in 356 - Amm. Marc. XVI, 9, 1. Themistius also mentions an embassy to Constantius at this time - Or. III, 57b.

In 358 the emperor received Sapor's famous letter. Before laying out the Persian demands, it states: propositum meum in paucia conferam reminiscens haec quae dicturus sum me saepius replicasse - Amm. Marc. XVII, 5, 4. Note also the declaration with which the letter concludes; Sapor warns that if the embassy fails he will resort to action in the following spring - XVII, 5, 8.

In the winter of 362/3 Sapor sent word to Julian in an attempt to avert his planned expedition - Libanius, Or. XVIII, 164; XVII, 19 & XII, 76. The Persians also made overtures for peace as the expedition actually proceeded. According to Libanius, an envoy was sent to Julian after the fighting around Ctesiphon - Or. XVIII, 257-9. Certainly, when Julian had been killed and Jovian had been chosen as his successor, it was Sapor who took the first steps towards the cessation of hostilities - Amm. Marc. XXV, 7, 5. Note that during this campaign there is mentioned among the Persian casualties a satrap called Adaces, who is described as: legatus quondam ad Constantium principem missus ac benigne susceuptus - Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 6 and Zosimus III, 27.

16) Libanius, Or. XVIII, 279.

17) Amm. Marc. XXV, 7, 9 & 11-2.


20) Festus, Brev. ch. 25.

21) Above, ch.II, pp. 43-5.


23) Heliodorus, Aethiopica IX, 15, 1 & 5; Julian, Or. II, 57c; Libanius, Or. XVIII, 265; Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 13. The xovoder is shown as the prestige weapon of the heavy cavalry on the Sassanian rock-reliefs:- At Firuzabad, the victory of Ardashir over Artabanus - R. Ghirshman, op. cit. illus. 163 & 166.
At Taq-i-Bustan, the equestrian figure in the Grand Iwan - R.Ghirshman, op.cit. illus.235.  
A fresco from Dura-Europos also shows warriors jousting - Idem, illus.223.

24) Julian comments that they do not need a shield - Or. II, 57c. Libanius states that both hands were needed to yield the long αξύν - Or. L IX, 70. This appears to be borne out by the rock-reliefs - see previous note. Heliodorus describes a strange contrivance whereby the ΚΟΥΤΟΣ, protruding far in front of horse and rider, is held up by loops slung around the horse's neck and flanks - Aethiopica IX,15,5. Such a device is patently impractical and must be regarded as a fanciful piece of invention on the part of the novelist.  
The suit of chain-mail armour - Julian, Or. I,37d; Claudian, In Ruf. II,357-8 and Heliodorus, Aeth. IX,15,2-3. On the rock-reliefs at Firuzabad the Sassanians clearly wear chain-mail but with a breast-plate, whereas their adversaries appear in plate-armour - R.Ghirshman, op.cit. illus.163-6.  
Their invulnerability to missiles - Amm. Marc. XXV,1,12; Vegetius, De Re Militari III,23 and Heliodorus, Aeth. IX, 15,3.

25) Amm. Marc. XXIV,6,8; Claudian, In Ruf. II,361-2; Servius, Comm. ad Aen. XI,768ff and Heliodorus, Aeth. IX,15,4.  
The last mentions ΚΟΥΝΤΟΣ on the horse. I am inclined to believe that in this peculiarity Heliodorus has either simply misunderstood the exact nature of horse-armour or deliberately indulged in a ridiculous exaggeration. One may note that he also refers to ΜΑΓΝΗΣΙΑ for horses. This word occurs in Arrian's Tactica 4,1, and it seems most likely that both Heliodorus and Arrian derived it from Xenophon, who uses it in his description of the horses in the imaginary battle-scene of the Cyropaedia (where Egyptians play an heroic part, fighting on behalf of Croesus against the Persians) - VI,4,1. F.Altheim argues that Heliodorus' description of heavy cavalry must have been written at a time when they were still a novelty - Literatur und Gesellschaft im ausgehenden Altertum (Stuttgart 1948) p.111ff.  
Writers on equestrian matters remark on the large size of Persian breeds, a most necessary requirement for carrying the heavily-armoured warriors - Vegetius, Digestorum artis mulomedicinae libri III,6,4 and Apsyrtus, Corpus Hippiatricorum Graecorum 1,372-4.
26) Clibanarii are often compared to statues - Amm. Marc. XVI, 10,8; Julian, Or. I.37c-d & 11,57b; Libanius, Or. LIX, 70; Claudian, In Ruf. II,359 & De Consulatu Honorii 572-4 and Heliodorus, Aeth. IX,15,5. Their brightly glittering armour is also remarked upon - Amm. Marc. XVI,10,8; XIX,1,2; XXIV,6,8 & XXV,1,1.

27) For an extended campaign more than one horse would have been necessary for each heavily-armed rider. He would also have needed help in manipulating and carrying his arms; at the very least he would have been attended by a squire and a groom.

Some examples of Sassanian equipment have survived: swords with decorated silver or gold hilts and scabbards, and a silver shield boss, engraved with the face of a lion - R.D.Barnett, BMQ 37 (1973) p.127 and plates LIXa & LVIIc.

28) A Pahlavi text enumerates the skills which a noble youth learned - "King Chosroes and His Page," ed. and trans. J.M.Unvala (Paris 1922). They include those of riding and archery, of levelling the spear (that is, of combat on horseback with spear and sword), and of wielding the mace and battle-axe - ch.11-2. Cf. J.Duchesne-Guillemin, "Le texte pahlavi 'Xosrow et son page' et les origines de l'amour courtois." Acta Iranica 4 (1975) pp.209-14.

It required a considerable amount of discipline and co-ordination to carry out cavalry manoeuvres swiftly and effectively. Ammianus notes briefly that military exercises were carried out regularly in Persia in order to keep the cavalry at the peak of its fitness and efficiency - Amm. Marc. XXIII,6,83. The Karnamagh mentions among the intimates of the Persian king "the instructor of the cavalry" - Kārnāmāgh 1 Ardashir 1 Pābhaqhan 10,7 and A.Christensen, op.cit. p.132 & n.5. Presumably, then, the training was organized through the royal court on a national basis. However, the fact that the cavalry squadrons were composed of regional units, in which the lesser nobles and landowners served under their local lord, probably aided this process and increased their efficiency, as well as providing them with an esprit de corps. One may compare the importance of family and clan ties for the cohesion of knightly units in the Middle Ages - J.F.Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages (Amsterdam 1977) pp.65-72.

All the cavalry units had their own banner - A.Christensen, op.cit. pp.210-2. Note those depicted on the rock-reliefs at Naq-i-Rustam - G.Hermann, op.cit. p.7 and plates 2a & 3. Ammianus refers to a flammeum vexillum being raised to signal the start of the assault on Singara - Amm. Marc. XX, 6,3. At Amida, on the other hand, he states that Persian aeneatores sounded the attack. But trumpets were used on that occasion because it was still dark and a signal would not have been visible - Amm. Marc. XIX,2,5. For the Persian banner which was hoisted over Nisibis in 363 - below, ch.VI, n.20. Procopius mentions the standard-bearer of the general Baresmanas - Bell. Pers.1,14,47. He implies that the Persian forces, including the "Immortals", rallied in order to try to save their general's banner - 1,14,49. Thus the banner may have carried the same importance in the
Persian army as later for mediaeval knights, when it served as a rallying-point during the fighting and, if taken or broken down, as the signal for flight. The signs shown on the hats of dignitaries surrounding the king on some reliefs may be intended to distinguish individual princes or nobles - R.Ghirshman, op.cit. illus. 219 and G.Herrmann, "The Darabgird Relief - Ardashir or Shahpur?" Iran 7 (1969) plate VIIIB. The horses' accoutrements are also decorated with distinctive emblems - R.Ghirshman, op.cit. illus.163 & 165-6.

29) Even in the Middle Ages, when heavy cavalry developed into a formidable fighting machine, the superiority of the knightly warriors was based on their economic and social dominance. Proud of being able to fight and manoeuvre swiftly and skilfully, they could look down on the body of ill-equipped and slow-moving infantry. Thus normally in mediaeval warfare the foot-soldiers fled at the first onset of the enemy horse. But when infantry overcame this psychological fear and stood firm against the mounted knights, the weaknesses of such cavalry tactics became all too apparent. Cf. M.E.Howard, War in European History (Oxford 1976) pp.1-19 and J.F.Verbruggen, op.cit. pp.50-2 & 154-9.

30) One probable exception is the unit called the "Immortals" - below, n.144.

31) Amm. Marc. XIX,1,2; XXIV,6,8 and XXV,1,1.

32) Amm. Marc. XXV,3,4: ex alia parte cataphractorum Parthicus globus centurias adoritur medias...contis et multiplicatibus missilibus dederat. Ammianus also describes the Persian forces which confronted Julian at Maranga: erant omnes catervae ferratae...quorum pars contis dimicatura...iuxtaque sagittarii... - XXV,1,11-3. Ammianus gives a short account of the battle of Vagabanta in 371 - XXIX,1,1-3. He says that the Persian army consisted of mobile troops - cataphracti, sagittarii and mercenaries. They apparently made repeated charges on the Roman lines, but with little success. The use of lance and bow are not mutually exclusive. Persian nobles were trained in both, and doubtless fought with each as the occasion demanded. There were also other weapons in the armoury of the Persian cavalry - the mace or battle-axe and the lasso - above, n.28. Some, if not all, of these weapons would have been available to the mounted troops during a battle, and it was this adaptability which proved to be one of their greatest assets.

33) Amm. Marc. XXIV,4,2: equitatus Persici..accursu, cuius fortitudo in locis patentibus, immane quantum gentibus est formidata. Cf. also Pan. Lat. X,24. Libanius remarks in a general and somewhat exaggerated manner on the cowardice of Constantius' soldiers before the Persians - Or. XVIII, 210-1: πορώδεν ημιν ομοιοτός άρθρες...οϊκ άνψιδι προς συμβολήν, άλλ' ἐτρεπεν εἰς μυγήν. Vegetius remarks that it was the radiance of arms which
carried the greatest terror to the enemy - De Re Militari II, 14. But whereas the Romans intimidated the northern barbarians with the display of their gleaming equipment and standards - Amm. Marc. XVIII, 2, 17; XXVII, 2, 6 & 5, 3; XXVIII, 5, 3 and XXXI, 10, 9, they in turn were somewhat overawed by the Persians - above, n. 31.

34) Julian provides the most detailed description of the battle - Or. I, 23a-25a. Naturally he minimises the Roman losses, but Zosimus preserves a comment of Eunapius that Julian's panegyric gives an adequate appreciation of the Persian wars of Constantius - Zosimus III, 8, 2. However, most sources regard the fighting as a defeat for the disobedient Roman troops - Festus, Brev. ch. 27; Eutropius X, 10, 1; Amm. Marc. XVIII, 5, 7; Jerome ann. 348 and Socrates, HE II, 25.

35) Amm. Marc. XXIV, 6, 8-12 and XXV, 1, 2-3 & 5. Another large-scale battle took place in an area called Maranga. Here, too, the well-ordered Roman infantry drove back and inflicted greater losses on the Persian ranks - Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 11-9. Thereafter, Ammianus says, the Persians restricted themselves to laying ambushes and making unexpected attacks: cum saepe afflictici peditum stabiles pugnas horrent - Amm. Marc. XXV, 3, 1.

36) Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 18.

37) Amm. Marc. XXIV, 6, 11 and XXV, 1, 13 & 17.

38) Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 17-8.

39) Amm. Marc. XXIII, 6, 83; Julian, Or. II, 63c and Amm. Marc. XXIV, 8, 1. Compare the opinion of the famous sixth century general, Belisarius - Procopius, Bell. Pers. I, 14, 25-6.

40) Amm. Marc. XXIII, 6, 83.

For murmillones - M. Grant, Gladiators (Harmondsworth 1971) pp. 56-7.

41) Amm. Marc. XXIV, 2, 10 & 6, 8.

42) Procopius describes the flight of Persian infantry - Bell. Pers. I, 14, 52. It does not seem that they even had the incentive of gaining much from the spoils of war. By Sapor's order the plundering of captured fortresses was regulated so that most of the prisoners and goods could be collected up and removed wholesale to Persia; for example, at Singara - Amm. Marc. XX, 6, 7-8. At Bezabde, however, Ammianus describes considerable carnage - XX, 7, 15, whereas the Acta attest that a large proportion of its population was spared and taken off into captivity - AMO torn. I, pp. 134-40.

43) Amm. Marc. XIX, 5, 6; 7, 4 and XX, 7, 6.

The mass of foot-soldiers must also have been employed in the construction of the various siege-works with which Sapor threatened to overpower Nisibis and the other fortresses. Although the common soldiery was naturally...
talented when it came to building mounds, dams or channels - below, n.138, it does not appear that the Sassanians had a corps of trained engineers or technicians. Note, for example, that in the early fifth century Socrates refers to a number of Roman mining engineers whom the Persians had hired to help run their gold mines - HE VII,20.

It may be argued that they were not expert in the use of ballistae - below, appendix 3.

Nor is there much evidence during Sapor's campaigns of them digging tunnels either to undermine fortifications or to gain stealthy entrance to a fortress - above, ch.III,n.148. At Amida in 359 the Persians made use of a concealed passage, but this was not of their own making - Amm. Marc. XIX,5,4-5, but also above, ch.II, n.54. Compare a similar situation in the siege of 502/3 - Procopius, Bell. Pers. 1,7,20ff. One occasion when they are known to have attempted tunnelling is the siege of Dara in 540 - Proc. Bell. Pers. II,13,20-7. But Chosroes' plan was thwarted by a Roman countermine which was dug according to the instructions of a certain Theodorus: Ετε οοοο ηηηη καλουμενη ομηκαμενη λογος άληπο - II,13,26.

44) Ammianus calls two nations acerrimi omnium bellatores, the Gelani and the Segestani - Amm. Marc. XVII,5,1 and XIX,2,3. The latter are identified with the Sacastani, a tribe from Seistan. At the beginning of Sapor's reign this region was governed by his half-brother, another Sapor, whose title was "the Saka king". An inscription from Persepolis records his journey to pay homage to his new sovereign lord in 311. In his entourage are mentioned "Persian and Saka knights" - R.N.Frye, "The Persepolis Middle Persian Inscriptions from the time of Sapor II." Acta Orientalia 30 (1966) p.85. There are coins of Sapor II with the mint mark of SKSTN (i.e. Seistan) - J.M.Unvala, NC 1957, pp.147-50 and plate XVIII, nos. 1-3.

45) Another inscription from Persepolis indicates that the area around Kabul was also under Sassanian jurisdiction at the time of Sapor II - R.N.Frye, art.cit. Acta Orientalia 30 (1966) p.87-8. But the exact nature and extent of their control over the Kushan kingdom remains shrouded in doubt - above, n.8. J.Markwart has restored the name Cuseni for !Euseni! in Amm. Marc. XVI,9,4 - Ernährung nach der Geographie von Ps. Molise von Khoren (Berlin 1901) p.36, n.5. It may thus suggest that the local Kushans supported the Chionitae against the Persian king during the 350's. It is assumed that the latter were Hunnic invaders from the north of Merv, but it is not easy to determine their relationship to the later Hephthalites - R.Göbl, Dokumente zur Geschichte der iranischen Hunnen in Baktrien und Indien (Wiesbaden 1967) I, pp.29-37. Nor is it at all clear how relations between the Chionitae and the Persian Empire developed. Faustos of Buzanda refers to an eastern campaign in which Armenian captives took part - FB V,7 & 37. Hence R.Ghirshman believes that this campaign is different from the wars of the 350's, and he places it instead in the years between 363 and 371 - "Les Chionites-Hephthalites." Mém. de l'Inst. franc. d'arch. orientale du Caire 80 (1948)
Certainly, the coinage of the two Chionite kings, regarded as the immediate successors of Grumbates, imitates in every detail the coinage of Sapor II - R. Ghirshman, *Art. Cit.* pp. 10-11 & 74.

46) Ammianus attests to the presence of Grumbates, the king of the Chionitae, and the *rex Albanorum* on the campaign of 359 - Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 22 and XIX, 2, 3.

47) Below, ch. V, n. 121.
Even in the 370's Sapor was eager to make an alliance with the Armenian king, Pap - Amm. Marc. XXX, 2, 1.

48) Among the Saracens who fought on the Persian side in 363 Ammianus refers to a sheikh (malechus or phylarchus) called Podosaces - Amm. Marc. XXIV, 2, 4.
Below, ch. VII, p. 274.

49) Amm. Marc. XVII, 5, 1; XVIII, 6, 22 and XIX, 1, 7.

50) Below, appendix 4.

51) Amm. Marc. XXV, 7, 1.

52) In one confrontation Ammianus describes the elephants as drawn up behind the Persian archers - Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 14, while in a later battle they are placed in front of the bowmen - Amm. Marc. XXV, 3, 11. On another occasion, in the fighting near Ctesiphon, they appear to be held in reserve behind both cavalry and infantry - Amm. Marc. XXIV, 6, 8.

53) Other references in Ammianus imply that, after a barrage of arrows - Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 13 & 17 and 3, 11, the elephants were sent forward to charge the enemy - Amm. Marc. XXV, 3, 4 & 6, 2; and Libanius, *Or.* XVIII, 248. Ambrose also provides a lengthy description of this use of elephants by the Persians. It includes the similes *acies eorum velut gradientibus turribus saepata procedit* and *velut quidam mobiles montes versantur in proellis et ut colles alto eminenti vertice* - *Hexameron* VI, 5, 33. Ammianus uses a similar expression: *elephanti gradientum collium specie* - Amm. Marc. XXIV, 6, 8.

54) Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 15: *quibus* (elephantis) insidentes magistri...*vires exsuperasset regentis*.


56) Amm. Marc. XIX, 2, 3 & 7, 6.

57) Procopius, *De Aedificiis* II, 1, 11-2.

58) For example, at the siege of Archaeopolis in the mid-sixth century - *Proc. Bell.* VIII, 14, 33. Ammianus hints that such a disaster occurred at Nisibis - Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 15.
59) Amm. Marc. XIX,2,3: elephantorum agmina rugosis horrenda corporibus...ultra omnem diritatem taetri spectaculi formidanda, ut rettulimus saepe. 
Amm. Marc. XIX,7,6: quorum stridore immanitateque corporum nihil humanae mentes terribilius cernunt. 
Amm. Marc. XXV,1,14: elephantorum fulgentium formidandam speciem et' truculentos hiatus, vix mentes pavidae perferebant... 
Ambrose, Hex. VI,5,33: mugitus fragore omnium perturbant confidentiam.

60) Julian, Or. II,65b.

61) Zosimus, in his only reference to elephants in the course of the expedition, says that their charge helped put to flight the soldiers of the Ioviani and Herculiani near Suma/Sumere, and that the tide was only turned by the Roman who bravely hurled javelins at the Persians and managed to wound some of the elephants, thereby causing them to disrupt their own cavalry formations - Zosimus III, 30,2-3. Compare the account of Ammianus, which records that it was the legiones (sic) Ioviorum et Victorum which came to the rescue and slew two elephants - Amm. Marc. XXV, 6,2-3.

62) In 121 B.C. Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus is said to have terrified the Gallic tribe of the Allobroges by employing elephants - Florus I,38 and Orosius, Adv. Paganos V,13,2: maxime cum elephantorum nova forma equi hostium hostesque conterriti diffugissent. 
Vegetius, De Re Militari III,24: elephanti in proeliis, magnitudine corporum, barritus horrore, formae ipsius novitate, homines equosque conturbant. 
Amm. Marc. XXV,1,14; 3,4 & 11; and 6,2. 
In such circumstances an elephant could have an effect on the enemy far beyond its physical capabilities. Thus Baber, the founder of the Mogul dynasty in India, tells in his memoirs how a single elephant was sufficient to enable Sultan Ibrahim's troops to rout the far larger forces of Alim Khan - Zehir-ed-din Muhammed Baber, Memoirs (London 1826) p.296.

63) Above, n.53 and Zosimus III,30.

64) Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,1-3. Ammianus may well have obtained the information on Antoninus' background from the dux Cassianus, whose apparitor and rationarius the defector had been - L.Dillemann, "Ammien Marcellin et les pays de l'Euphrate et du Tigre." Syria 38 (1961) p.103. 
The Armenian historian, Faustos of Buzanda, tells how an Armenian renegade called Meruzan Arcruni led the Persian army on a devastating raid "through Arzanene, Greater Sophene, Ingilene, Anzitene, Lesser Sophene", and farther north through Mzur, Daranašik and Akilisene - FB IV,24. 
It is tempting to identify this raid with the campaign of 359 and to see the Armenian Meruzan as the Roman Antoninus. The family of the Arcruni was, apparently, descended from the Orontid kings of Sophene - C.Toumanoff, Studies in Christian Caucasian History (Georgetown 1963) pp.293 & 299.
But it is also connected with the Persian province of Adiabene - J. Markwart, op. cit. pp. 165, 176 & 178. In the fourth century the Arcruni seem to have been of low rank in the Armenian hierarchy, but later they became one of the most powerful dynastic families, controlling large tracts of Persarmenia - C. Toumanoff, op. cit. p. 199f. Their co-operation with Persia probably explains their rise to prominence.

Is it possible that Antoninus was in fact a minor Armenian noble who espoused the Persian cause? Unfortunately, not enough is known from the Armenian source about Meruzan's background to approach the question from his side. But certain aspects of Ammianus' detailed description of Antoninus do not exclude the possibility. It is clear that he was a man of wealth and influence; he was a well-known figure throughout the eastern frontier lands and, despite the fact that he had been involved in the loss of huge sums through official extortion, he was able to purchase an estate conveniently placed on the Tigris. From there he entered into secret conferences with Sapor and gained Persian assistance for the removal of his whole household - Amm. Marc. XVIII, 5, 1-3. On his arrival at Sapor's winter palace he was warmly received and treated with the respect accorded to one of noble rank - XVIII, 5, 6. Also, later Ammianus describes him as wearing a tiara and bowing to Ursicinus in truly oriental fashion - XVIII, 8, 5. Moreover, he is said to be of far greater worth and talent than Craugasius, although the latter was a respected member of the Nisibene curial order - XVIII, 9, 8 & 10, 1. Antoninus' very Roman name does not prohibit him from being of Armenian nationality, for one may compare the satrap of Corduene whom Ammianus calls Iovinianus - XVIII, 6, 20. But it must be admitted that our knowledge of the participation of Armenians in the Roman civil service in the fourth century is sadly lacking.

65) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 3-4; 6, 18-9; 7, 10-11; 10, 1 and XIX, 1, 3.
67) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 5, 2-3.
68) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 3-4 & 8.
69) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 5, 5; 6, 1 & 5.
70) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 16.
71) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 9-12.
72) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 8 & 11. A passage in Ephraem's Mémoire de Nicomédie may be an allusion to the renewed danger which threatened Nisibis in 359 - Mémoire X, vv. 475-7.
73) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 10.
74) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,13.


76) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,17.


78) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,1: Nineve Adiabenae ingenti civitate transmissa.

79) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,18-9.

80) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,3-6.

81) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,7 and XIX,3,1. Above, ch.III, p.78.

82) Ammianus describes Sabinianus as imbellis et ignavus - XVIII,5,5; as inertissimus - XVIII,6,2; and as an oscitans homunculus - XVIII,8,7. He also makes derogatory remarks about his stature, as if that had any bearing on his abilities - XVIII,6,7. For the importance of physiognomy in Ammianus' biographical sketches - R.C. Blockley, Ammianus Marcellinus (Brussels 1975) p.37 and n.31. All of this gives one the impression that Sabinianus was totally unsuited and unqualified to take over from Ursicinus the command against Sapor. Ammianus clearly believed this to be the case, but it is not necessarily true. One may note that Ammianus himself says that Sabinianus was a senex when he was appointed magister militum - XVIII,5,5, and later, in citing the virtues of Constantius, he states: non nisi pulvere bellico indurati praeficiebantur armatis - XXI,16,3.

83) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,8.

84) L. Dillemann, op.cit. pp.290-2 and fig. XXXVII. He identifies the Anzaba river as the Greater Zab which flows into the Tigris about twenty-five miles south of Mosul - op.cit. p.167.

85) Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,7.

86) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,9. Ephraem testifies to the thorough destruction of the countryside around Nisibis at this time, but he attributes it to rapacious imperial troops rather than to the activities of the Persian vanguard - Carmina Nisibena V,2-3; 23-5; VI,11-2; 18-21 and VII,2-3.

87) Above, ch.III, p.93.

88) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,10: circumvallato murorum ambitu, praedatores latius vagabantur. Cf. P. De Jonge, Philological and Historical Commentary on Ammianus Marcellinus Book XVIII.
(Groningen 1980) p.178.
Note the irony of Ammianus' remark: Nisibi pro statione vili transmissa - XVIII,7,8.

89) Amm. Marc. XIX,3,2.

90) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,9. It is generally assumed that by Constantina Ammianus means the modern town of Viranşehir, which lies on the main route from Nisibis to Edessa - P.De Jonge, op.cit. p.245. Ammianus makes only one other passing reference to this place, and then he calls it by a former name, Antoninopolis - XVIII,9,1. Cf. also Theophanes 15 (am.5832) and Chron. Misc. ad 724, 15a in Philostorgius, op.cit. p.212.

91) L.Dillemann, op.cit. p.291.


94) E.Fraenkel states that Bebase is identical to Theophylact's το Βίβσα - I,15,15, and, perhaps, with the κάστρον of George of Cyprus - Descriptio no.935 and P-W, RE III, col.179. L.Dillemann, however, rejects both the assimilation of the three names and their identification with Tell Beş, twenty-five miles west of Dara - op.cit. pp.290 & 294.

95) L.Dillemann, op.cit. p.172, n.2.

96) On a modern map the region between Tell Chakar Bazar (Shāghir Bāzār) and Viranşehir is dotted with numerous villages and streams - Tactical Pilotage Chart G.4BG (Missouri 1975). Furthermore, I have travelled right across northern Mesopotamia on the main trunk road from Cizre to Birecik, and I found that, if anything, the most desolate and difficult stretch of road lay between Viranşehir and Urfa.

97) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,4. His subsequent remarks about lions suggest that he envisaged the area of the Khabur and its tributaries: inter harundineta Mesopotamiae fluminum et frutecta... - XVIII,7,5.

98) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,9.

99) At the outset Ammianus suggests that speed and surprise were essential ingredients of Antoninus' plan - XVIII,6,3. The idea of haste is repeated when the Persian king had reached Amida - XIX,1,3 & 6.

100) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,9.

101) It is probable that the eastern army was depleted at this time; some units must have been withdrawn first for the costly war against the usurper Magnentius and then later
for the campaigns on the Danube - Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,2.
Sabinianus' orders not to risk battle certainly imply
that he had weakened forces under his command at Edessa
- XIX,3,2.

102) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,10. The exact location of these two
places is not known for certain. But T.B. Mitford, who
among recent scholars is one of those most familiar with
the Kurdish Taurus region, has suggested for Claudias a
point above the mouth of the Gerger Çay, just west of
Tarakusu - "The limes in the Kurdish Taurus." Roman Frontier
Studies XII, 1979. BAR International Series 71 (Oxford
1980) vol.3, p.924 and fig.61/1. Since Ptolemy and the
Peutinger Table place it north of Barzalo, the kayik
crossing close to Tillo and opposite Çünküş has also been
proposed - L.Dillemann, op.cit. p.148 & fig. XVII and
T.B. Mitford, "Cappadocia and Armenia Minor." Aufstieg und
Niedergang II,7,2 (Berlin 1980) p.1191. Barzalo is
identified with Killik, the first village actually on the
ripa below the crossing-point of Tomisa in the Malatya
plain. It, too, has a kayik crossing, which gives easy
access to the plain of Diyarbakir and northern Mesopotamia
- T.B. Mitford, art. cit. Aufstieg und Niedergang II,7,2
pp.1189-90.
If it is correct to place Claudias and Barzalo on the
stretch of the Euphrates between Melitene and Samosata,
then Ammianus' reference to them is patently false:
ubi tenuis fluvius prope originem et angustus, nullisque
adhuc aquis advenis adolescens - Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,10

103) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,11: ab instituto itinere conversa.

104) Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,1. It is, of course, highly unlikely
that Ammianus could have learned what was discussed at the
Persian council.

105) For example, the vivid details that he saw a soldier whose
head had been split right in two, but who was held upright
in the crush of troops - Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,12; that he
fell in with a protector domesticus called Verennianus who
had an arrow stuck in his thigh and whom he seems to have
abandoned to his fate when the Persians closed in - XVIII,
8,11; and that he managed to enter Amida through a crowded
postern gate under a barrage of missiles from the battlements
- XVIII,8,13.

106) Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,3.

107) Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,1. Because Ammianus has already
described how he himself rode from Nisibis and passed
through Amudis and Melacarire on his way to Amida - XVIII,
6,13 & 16-7, the cold springs have been identified with
Aqua Frigidae and the modern Khan Cheikhan - L.Dillemann,
op.cit. pp.157-9. However, even if this identification
is correct, the other places offer considerable room for
speculation. Horre is a name unique to this passage,
although L.Dillemann has thought it to be the same site as
Lorne, which Ammianus refers to along with Maride (Mardin)
as a fort on Mount Izala - op.cit. p.216 and Amm. Marc. XIX,9,4. Charcha is located at Kerk on the Tigris about eighteen miles south-east of Amida. Compare Cartha of the Notitia Dignitatum - Or. XXXVI,25; Χαρχα and Χαρχαομαν of Theophylact Simocatta - I,13 & V,1. For a description of the site - J.G.Taylor, "Travels in Kurdistan." JGRS 35 (1865) pp.22-3. L.Dillemann has suggested that it is identical to Ammianus' two fortresses of Reman and Busan - op.cit. pp.156-7 and fig. XX. He also proposes that Charcha is to be found in Procopius and George of Cyprus in the forms Byrthon and Birtha - Proc. De Aedificiis II,4,20 and George, Descriptio no.937. Yet he does not believe that these are equivalent to Ammianus' Virta - op.cit. p.238 and above, ch.II, n.73. If we accept the threefold assimilation of Charcha, Reman and Busan, Ammianus' reliability with regard to places and names is seriously questioned. But if we do not, our present knowledge of the area does not allow us to suggest any alternative sites. Clearly Ammianus information on the events which took place there is incomplete. Thus, although he refers to the wife of Craugasius in connection with the capture of Reman and Busan, he was unable to specify exactly which of them (if they are distinct) was her place of refuge - Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,1.

108) Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,1-2. Ammianus mentions the presence of Antoninus in the skirmish which took place not far from Amida - XVIII,8,5-6. His absence from Sapor's side perhaps helps to explain how the Persian king came to be distracted from the basic plan: posthabitis civitatum perniciosis obsidiis - XVIII,6,3.

109) Admittedly, Ammianus refers to Sapor's haste in attacking the forts and the speedy surrender of the defenders. But even a short delay may have been detrimental to the grander design of the campaign. Amm. Marc. XIX,1,1: paulatimque incedens, Amidam die tertio venit.

110) Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,1 and XIX,1,3.

111) Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,1.

112) Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,3.

113) Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,4.

114) Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,8-13 & 10,1.

115) Amm. Marc. XIX,1,6.


117) Amm. Marc. XIX,1,7 & 2,1.

118) Amm. Marc. XIX,9,1.

119) Amm. Marc. XIX,6,1. Ephraem's Carmen Nisibenum X apparently refers to the capture of the fortress of Anazit, which

120) L. Dillemann, _op.cit._ p.155. Ammaneh is reported to stand on a plateau of some considerable size above the two arms of the Upper Tigris. These almost encircle the site, flowing in deep, steep-sided valleys, so that access can only be obtained across a neck of land on the northern side. In this vicinity traces of stone walls and a rock-cut ditch can be seen. I owe these observations to T.A. Sinclair, who visited Ammaneh in September 1981.

121) Amm. Marc. XIX, 6, 1: ...innumeram cernimus plebem, quae Ziata capto castello ad hosticum ducetur.

122) H. Hübschmann, _Die altarmenischen Ortsnamen_ (Strasbourg 1904) pp.432-3; N. Adontz, _Armenia in the Period of Justinian_ trans. N. G. Garsoian (Lisbon 1970) p.31 and A. Gabriel, _Voyages Archéologiques dans la Turquie Orientale_ (Paris 1940) p.257. However, Kharpot Kale is relatively small in size, a fact which strikes a discordant note with Ammianus' description of Ziata: locum ut capacissimum et munitum - spatio quippe decem stadiorum ambitur... - Amm. Marc. XIX, 6, 1 and A. Gabriel, _op.cit._ pp.260-1. In this respect Ammaneh seems to be the more appropriate site - see above, n.120.

123) Cedrenus remarks on its importance with regard to Mesopotamia - _Historia_ II (Bonn) p.419. See photograph at end.

124) Amm. Marc. XIX, 3, 1-2. The pincer-movement was a favourite tactic with Roman military commanders, even though it was an extremely difficult manoeuvre to co-ordinate and execute successfully over large distances - cf. Amm. Marc. XVI, 11, 1-3.

125) Amm. Marc. XIX, 8, 10 & 9, 2.

126) Amm. Marc. XIX, 8, 5-12. He states that he journeyed to Melitene via a place where there were hot springs: fontes sulphureos aquarum, suapte natura calentium - XIX, 8, 7. This is most probably Abarne, modern Çermik, some forty-five miles WNW of Amida - XVIII, 9, 2; Joshua Stylites, _Chronicle_ ch.34 and _Chronicon Edessenum_ ch.76, trans. I. Guidi (Louvain 1903) p.8. From there it is but a short way to the Euphrates, where he probably made use of the kayik crossing either at Killik or near Tillo - above, n.102. Then Ammianus fled across the Kurdish Taurus to the legionary fortress of Melitene: per dumeta et silvas montes petimus celsiores - XIX, 8, 12. The fact that he took this indirect route supports the theory that the Persians were in control of the main highway through the Ergani Pass.

127) Amm. Marc. XIX, 9, 7. Note that Ammianus concludes the episode of Craugasius with the vague expression: et haec quidem haut diu postea contigerunt - XIX, 9, 8.
128) The uncertainties of Ammianus' geography are perhaps to be explained by the fact that when he came to write his Histories a quarter of a century later, his memory failed to recall locations and place-names accurately.

129) Another example is given by Ammianus during his flight from Amida - Amm. Marc. XIX,8,10. He witnessed the pursuit of a scattered troop of Romans by a large force of Persian cavalry. He makes the pertinent remark: incertum unde impetu tam repentino terga viantum aggressa. Then he compares the Persian horsemen to the legendary Σμπρτολ - XIX,8,11.

130) Amm. Marc. XXII,12,1.

H.S. Nyberg claims to have deciphered a Pahlavi inscription from the small town of Mishkin in north-west Iran. He believes that it records how Sapor II built a fortress there in the years 336 to 342, thus realizing a project first contemplated by his grandfather Narses - "The Pahlavi Inscription at Mishkin." BSOAS 33 (1970) pp. 144-53.
A Sassanian fort has been excavated at Shiraf on the Persian Gulf. It was found to be approximately square and was enclosed on the northern (landward) side by a ditch, separated from the wall by a berm 1.75m. wide. The ditch was 1.25m. deep, with a vertical inner face and a flat bottom - D. Whitehouse, "Excavations at Shiraf." Iran 12 (1974) pp. 1-30. The shape and distance of the ditch from the wall suggest that ballistae were not installed on the fortifications of this Persian fort.

132) For example, Amm. Marc. XXIV,1,6-5,12.
Amm. Marc. XXV,6,4 (Sumere) and 8,7, (Ur); Zosimus III, 29-30.

133) Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,12 and Libanius, Or. XVIII,235.

134) Only on one occasion, at the siege of Maiozamalcha, does Ammianus refer to the collapse of part of the Persian fortifications under the blow of a battering-ram - Amm. Marc. XXIV,4,19 & 25. But even this did not result in the storming of the city. Instead, its fall is attributed to the band of Roman soldiers who entered secretly through a tunnel and took the sentries by surprise - 4,21 & 23. Cilicia appear as a Persian oddity in defensive tactics. These were stretched loosely along the battlements and provided cover for the defenders against the hail of missiles - Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,10 and Procopius, Bell. Pers. II,26,29 (where they are used by the besieging forces at Edessa). At the captured Roman fortress of Bezabde they may have been used to block up the large, arched windows which are typical in towers of late Roman fortresses. Certainly, Ammianus describes how the Persians hid behind these shelters and from there hurled stones and missiles.
down on their attackers whenever they pressed forward – Amm. Marc. XX,11,9. It may be that cilicia were designed specially by the Persians to halt the flight of missiles shot from Roman catapults, since they were made from an excellent absorbent material – Amm. Marc. XXIII, 4,6.

135) Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,1 (Thilutha); 2,12 (the citadel of Pirisabora); 4,10 and Zosimus III,21,3 (Maiozamalcha). Zosimus says that Pirisabora had a double wall as well as a walled citadel – III,17,3. One of its gateways is described as: περιμετρικὴ τῷ καὶ σκολία διώτος – III,17,4. One may compare the practice of recessing or masking entrances which was introduced into late Roman fortifications – above, ch.II, p.50.

On the east side of the fortress at Pirisabora there was a deep ditch and a wooden palisade with large brick towers; on the berm between them were fixed pointed stakes – Zos. III,17,5. He also describes the fortress near Besuchis as having a double wall and sixteen towers, surrounded by a deep, water-filled ditch – III,21,3; Amm. Marc. XXIV,4,10 (Maiozamalcha).

136) Amm. Marc. XXIV,1,6 (Anatha); 2,1 (Thilutha); 2,9 and Zos. III,17,4 (Pirisabora); and Zos. III,19,3 (a fort near a town called Φυσυμνία).

137) Amm. Marc. XXIV,1,11 and 3,10-11; Zosimus III,19,3-4 and Libanius, Or. XVIII,234.

138) When the Prophet Muhammed was beset in Medina by the Meccan troops, he found among his followers a slave of Persian origin called Salman al-Farisi, who taught him how to dig a moat around the town. The tactic of deluging one's enemy was still being used successfully in the Iraqi-Iranian War of 1980-81. An article in The Sunday Times of 4, January 1981 reported: "Near the village of Hamidiyeh, north-west of Ahwaz, a strange sight meets the eye. About 150 Soviet-built tanks and military trucks are buried up to their turrets and headlights in mud. "These are the remains of an Iraqi offensive towards Ahwaz, which was foiled by the Iranians... as the tanks advanced last November over seemingly solid ground, an Iranian engineer opened sluices upstream on the Kharkheb River, flooding the alluvial plain and turning it into a sticky mess of mud. That stopped the tanks in their tracks."


141) Amm. Marc. XXV, 6, 8. Also, at the village of Macepracta near the Euphrates Julian's soldiers, the traces of half-ruined walls: qui priscis temporibus in spatia longa potenti, tueri ab externis incursibus Assyriam dicebantur - XXIV, 2, 6. Below, ch. VII, pp. 273-4.

142) Amm. Marc. XXIV, 2, 10 & 4, 15.

143) M.-L. Chaumont, "Institutions de l'Iran ancien et de l'Arménie." Journal Asiatique 250 (1962) pp. 11-22. A manuscript written in 1197 contains the life of "Ma'in of Sinjar, one of the generals of the Persian king Sapor..." J.M. Fiey believes that Ma'in was very probably an Arab, who had lived in Beth Arabaye as the commander of some Arab auxiliary troops - "Ma'in, Général de Sapor II, confesseur et évêque." Le Muséon 84 (1971) pp. 437-52.

144) Amm. Marc. XX, 7, 16. These troops may, in fact, have belonged to the royal Persian bodyguard. This was an élite corps whose traditions stretched back to the Achaemenid period, whence it was called οὖτ' ἂνων and numbered ten thousand men - Herodotus VII, 31 and Socrates, HE VII, 20. But, from the name of its commander, hazarābad = χαζαράβαδ, it seems likely that in Sassanian times it numbered only a thousand men - M.-L. Chaumont, "Chiliarque et Curopalate à la Cour des Sassanides." Iranica Antiqua 10 (1973) pp. 139-65. It is probable that the sons of the nobility were recruited into this prestigious unit, hoping thereby to gain recognition and favour before the eyes of the king - Tabari, ed. Th. Nöldeke p. 391, n. 1. The "Immortals" escorted the king on campaign and served directly under his command - Amm. Marc. XIX, 1, 5 and XXV, 5, 8. Thus they gained a reputation for outstanding bravery and fearlessness - Amm. Marc. XIX, 5, 5 and Socrates, HE VII, 20. According to Malalas, Ardazanes, the Persian champion who fought Ariobindus in single combat in 422, was ἐν τούτῳ τὰγματος τῶν λεγομένων Ἀδαξίτου - Malalas (Bonn) p. 364.

145) Amm. Marc. XX, 11, 7-25.

146) Amm. Marc. XXIV, 2, 10 (Pirisabora); 4, 11 (Maiozamalcha); 5, 7 (another stronghold near Ctesiphon); and Zosimus III, 22, 25.

147) Amm. Marc. XX, 11, 16-8 & 22-3; XXIV, 4, 4 & 5, 8. Cf. also, XXIV, 4, 13.

148) The sources make it clear that Julian took care to keep his plans for the campaign secret - Libanius, Or. XVIII, 213; Eunapius fr. 10, 2 and Amm. Marc. XXIII, 2, 2. He had the option of two routes into Persian territory; the one down the Euphrates, the other across the Tigris - Amm. Marc. XXIII, 3, 1. According to Zosimus, Julian was still uncertain which route to take when he came to Carrhae - III, 12, 2-3. Certainly, it seems that the Persian king was deceived by Julian's feint towards the Tigris - Amm. Marc. XXIII, 3, 6. Below, ch. V, pp. 206-9.

149) Amm. Marc. XXIV, 1, 6ff; Libanius, Or. XVIII, 218. The
abandoned supplies at Dacira, the next post downstream from Anatha, suggest the haste of its evacuation - Zosimus III,15,2.

150) Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,1-2. According to Zosimus, after the capture of Anatha the Romans attacked a second fortress but found it impregnable - III,15,1.

151) Amm. Marc. XXIV,4,3ff; 5,6-7 & 11 and Zosimus III,20,2-5.

152) Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,2 & 4,1; Zosimus III,15,2 & 20,5. The Romans behaved in a similar fashion during Sapor's invasion of northern Mesopotamia in 359 - Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,3.

153) Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,2-3; 2,22; 4,1 and Zosimus III,19.

154) Amm. Marc. XX,7,16; Libanius, Or. XVIII,218. The Romans found that the abandoned town of Dacira contained a large supply of grain and salt - Zosimus III,15,2. Theophylact calls Pirisabora τὸ Ἀβάρων φορουλάν. Its Arabic name is al-Anbār, "the stores/granaries", which is said to have originated because the Sassanian kings made the town their major supply-base and arsenal for the wars against Rome - G.Le Strange, op.cit. pp.65-6. Certainly, it is recorded that the Romans captured a large amount of equipment and provisions there in 363 - Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,22 and Zosimus III,18,5. Of the arms, Zosimus says that those useful to the Romans were distributed to the army, but others were burnt or thrown into the river because they were τὰ ῾ΕΡΣΑΙῼΝ τῶν φρονίτων κρατεῖ, αὐτοῖς ἀπεσήματε - III,18,6. Unfortunately, it is not stated exactly what sort of weapons the latter were - below, appendix 3, n.3.

155) Amm. Marc. XXIV,5,7. Zosimus refers to the Persians' confident songs and shouting, which included praise of Sapor's bravery and abuse of Julian - III,22,5. Also, insults were hurled at the Persian prince Hormisdas - Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,11 and above, ch.I, n.118.

156) Amm. Marc. XXIII,6,81 and A.Christensen, op.cit. p.305.

157) Amm. Marc. XXIV,5,3.

158) By the first half of the fourth century their general knowledge of the Roman world must have been founded on a sure basis after a hundred years of contact with their western neighbour. They acknowledged the equal status of Rome as a sovereign state with just claims over most of its possessions - Amm. Marc. XVII,5,3ff. But how well its organization and extent were understood is uncertain. On the other side it is clear that even well-informed Romans had a very dim and muddled idea of the Persian Empire. Indeed, it is striking what little interest they showed in the aspects of its internal structure. Thus Ammianus' geographical digression on Persia in XXIII,6 draws heavily on previous accounts of the region - Th.Mommsen, Hermes 18 (1881) pp.602-36 and M.F.A.Brok, "Die Quellen von Ammian's Exkurs über Persien." Mnemosyne 28 (1975) pp.47-56. Agathias' friend Sergius went to Persia specially to

159) A. Christensen, op. cit. p. 129-30, n. 6.

Ammianus singles out for special mention a rationalis ex ministro triclinii called Mercurius, whom he dubbs comes somniorum because he would insinuate himself into banquets and meetings in order to eavesdrop on conversations about dreams. He would then make a report to the emperor personally, implied by the words: patulis imperatoris auribus infundebat. It is, perhaps, significant that this infamous informant at Constantius' court was a Persian - Amm. Marc. XV, 3, 4-5.

160) Procopius, Bell. Pers. I, 21, 11-2. He also mentions that Saracens were sent by the Persians as spies into Syria and Euphratesia in the reign of Kavad - Bell. Pers. I, 17, 35. Later he refers to a captured Persian spy who misinformed the Romans - Bell. Pers. II, 25, 10.

161) Proc. Anecdota 30, 13: οὗ δὲ ἐς τοὺς πολέμους λύντως ἐν τῇ τοῖς Περσῶν Βασιλείοις γυμνὸνην ἢ ἐμπορίας δύναμιν ἢ τρόπων ἐτέρω, ἐς τὸ δικαίως διερευνώμενον έκκατα...

162) Peter the Patrician fr. 14, FHG IV (Müller) p. 189.

At the beginning of the fifth century merchants in Mesopotamia were forbidden to hold markets wherever they pleased because it was feared that they would use such occasions to spy out the defences of the frontier - CJ 4, 63, 4 (408-9).

163) Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6, 17-8.

It is noteworthy that Malchus, when he had made his escape from captivity in Persian territory, was brought before the commander of the local frontier post in order that his identity might be verified. Moreover, he was then sent on to the dux Mesopotamiae - Jerome, Vita Malchi 48, PLat. vol. 23, pp. 54-60. Is it possible that he was interrogated by the military authorities in order both to ascertain that he was not a Persian agent and to learn from him any useful information which he might have picked up during his sojourn in enemy territory?

164) Libanius remarks on Julian's awareness of the need for secrecy when preparing his expedition against the Persians: εἴτε δὲ οὗ τοῖς εξελείπουσι εἴδος λοιπὰν ἐν ὧν κατασκεύασαι - Or. XVIII, 213 and above, n. 148.

165) On two occasions he was quick to respond to the news that expeditions had been set on foot against him. In the winter of 336/7 a delegation was sent to the court of Constantine to sue for peace - Eusebius, Vita Const. IV, 57 and Festus, Brev. 26. Again, in the winter of 362/3 a letter was presented to Julian with proposals for negotiation
to prevent the outbreak of fresh hostilities - Libanius, Or. XVIII.164.
Likewise, Sapor quickly took advantage of disruptions within the Roman Empire. Hearing of Constantine's death and the subsequent interregnum, he launched his first direct attack on Nisibis, either in the late summer of 337 or, more probably, in the spring of the following year - Libanius, Or. LIX,74; Jerome ann. 338 and Theophanes am.5815. In 350, too, he besieged the same fortress for a third time soon after Constantius had been forced to turn his attention westwards to the usurper Magnentius - Julian, Or. II,62b; Theodoret, HE II,30; Chronicon Paschale in Philostorgius, op.cit. p.215, lines 22-4 and Zonaras XIII, 7,3. Above, ch.III, n.141.

166) Above, pp.140-51.

167) Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,1; XIX,9,7 and XXV,7,1. Faustos describes how Sapor sent some agents to watch the movements of the Armenian king. When Arsaces stationed his forces to await the arrival of the Persian army on the borders of Azerbaijan, these spies reported this back to the Persians, who were thus able to make an unopposed incursion into Armenia by a different route - FB IV,24. Despite the unreliability and imprecise dating of such stories, it may perhaps be that this account refers to events during the campaign of 363 - below, ch.V, pp.206-9.

168) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,4.

169) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,12 & 15 and 8,10.

170) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,16.

171) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,9.

172) Amm. Marc. XIX,9,7.

173) CTh VII,1,1 (323); IX,14,3 (397); V,7,1 (366) and CJ VI,1,3. Ammianus refers with marked indifference to the killing of the Parisian soldier at Meiacarire after his Roman captors had extracted from him what he knew of the Persians' plans - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,16.

174) Amm. Marc. XXV,5,8. The Gallic trooper had deserted through fear of military discipline - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,16. On the other side, Nohodares' plan to raid the market-town of Batnae were betrayed by some of his own soldiers who deserted to the Romans: admitti flagitii metu exagitati - Amm. Marc. XIV,3,4.

175) Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,1.

176) Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,1-3; 6,3 & 19; 7,10-11; 10,1 and XIX,1, 3; 9,8.

177) Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,3.
178) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,16: saepe veros nuntios reportasse.

179) Amm. Marc. XVIII,10,1 & 3 and XIX,9,3-5.

180) Amm. Marc. XIX,9,7-8.


182) Magnus of Carrhae says that there were two guides - FGrH (Jacoby) p. 225, 9-12. Ammianus also refers to more than one deserter - XXIV,7,3 & 5. But all the other sources state that there was a single agent - Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. V,11-2 (Migne) PG vol. 35, 677; Festus, Brev. ch. 28; Epit. de Caesaribus XLIII, 2; Jerome ann. 363 (Helm) p. 243 and Philostorgius, HE VII, 15. Below, appendix 2.

183) Amm. Marc. XXIV,7,7 and Zosimus III, 28.

184) According to Magnus, the two guides went so far as to have their noses cut off in order to convince Julian that they were bona fide fugitives - FGrH 225,9-10. Both Ammianus and Sozomen mention the use of torture when the deception was revealed - Amm. Marc. XXIV,7,5 and Soz. HE VI, 1.

185) B.H. Warmington observes that in 356-8 Constantius was "keener on peace than Sapor and probably not only underestimated but unwittingly encouraged the latter's determination to recover Mesopotamia." - "Objectives and Strategy in the Persian War of Constantius II." Akten des XI internationalen Limeskongresses (Budapest 1977) p. 515.
Chapter V Armenia's Place in Relations between Rome and Persia.

(a) The Setting: Geographic and Social Divisions.

Armenia has been described as a massive rock-bound island rising out of the surrounding lowlands, steppes and plains, from which it is cut off on virtually every side by barriers of lofty hills and mountain peaks. Its position guaranteed the country a lasting importance, although other issues frequently overshadowed this basic reason in the struggles between Rome and her eastern neighbour, first the Parthian and later the Persian Empire. Control of Armenia gave easy access to the surrounding territories; westwards to the plains and valleys of central Anatolia, eastwards along the Kura and Araxes rivers to the steppes of Azerbaidjan, and southwards to the lowlands of Mesopotamia. In proof of this accessibility one may cite the construction of the Flavian limes across Cappadocia and Pontus; Heraclius' devastating campaigns against the Iranian hinterland, and the close interrelation of northern Mesopotamia and Armenia which dates back beyond the time of Tigranes the Great. It is this last aspect which is of primary significance for a study of the eastern frontier in the mid-fourth century. For neither Rome nor Persia appears to have seriously contemplated the use of routes through Armenia to threaten the inner lands of its adversary, while both sought to occupy the country in order to secure control of northern Mesopotamia (and vice versa). In social terms, however, one may envisage the struggle as having a more direct east-west orientation, with the Hellenistic and Christian influences pulling against the long-established Iranian background. But here, too, evidence exists for the strong ties which bound the Mesopotamian plain to the highlands of Armenia. Thus, in
order to make a full assessment of the Mesopotamian frontier, it is necessary to evaluate its relationship to Armenia and to identify the various circumstances and pressures which caused the latter's involvement in the conflict between Rome and Persia.

Armenia is intersected by ranges of fold mountains and studded with extinct volcanoes, features which mark the country's violent geological past. Even today it is subject to severe earthquakes. The main rivers which rise in its highlands sometimes meander across plains, sometimes occupy canyons through the lava obstructions or the non-volcanic mountains, and sometimes are forced to make circuitous detours to avoid such obstacles. The resulting landscape is spectacular, displaying elements from most of the geological phases of the earth's history. But with its two great lakes, its numerous peaks and volcanic craters, and its countless ravines and gorges, almost two-thirds of the territory of Armenia can be classified as unfit for settled habitation. Historically it has supported only a small and scattered population, most of which eked out a scanty pastoral living in rugged highland meadows or yailas. Only in the Araxes valley did a greater concentration of people exist, since careful irrigation of the alluvial soil there produced sufficient quantities of cereal and vegetable crops. In much of Armenia the severity of the agricultural conditions was aggravated by the climate. In the mountainous areas deep snow covers the ground for several months of the year and on the exposed plains the winter wind bites with freezing intensity. Landscape and climate combine to disrupt or prevent communication. Routes from one valley to the next are made impassable by snow or
raging torrents in winter and spring, while heat and aridity deter or debilitate travellers in the short, hot summer months. Thus the inhabitants of Armenia were isolated from each other and remote from central authority, whether vested in a native king or in a foreign power. Noble families established themselves as lords of these enclosed communities. Each was able to command affairs in their own district and remain relatively unconcerned with and undisturbed by higher powers. They occupied imposing strongholds perched high on outcrops overlooking their domains in the river valleys and sparse uplands. The very nature of the terrain greatly enhanced their security of tenure. Hence local magnates survived long after the dissolution of the monarchy.

However, at the beginning of the fourth century Armenia was still a kingdom. Tiridates IV (the Great) had been installed on the throne by the Romans in 298 after the defeat of Narses, and he remained a faithful ally of Rome until his death in 330. Although the Armenian sources present the country as unified and centralized under the Arsacid monarchy, in recent years scholars have highlighted the divisions and dissensions which actually existed. Armenia, in effect, comprised numerous separate cantons ruled over by the noble families, called nakharars and azats, who were vassals of the king or sub-vassals of the larger principalities. Among these the most powerful and independent were those entrusted with the protection of the borderlands, the four so-called bdeakhsh or marches. The nakharars held certain hereditary and honorific offices in the state in return for which they remained loyal to the king. A second social group consisted of a broader layer of small landowners and minor nobles, the azats. They were obliged to
enroll in the regional cavalry contingents, but for this service they were granted immunity from taxation. Below them came the peasantry, the shinakan, bound to the soil on the estates of the nobility, from whom they received protection and patronage. In return they served and supported both the local lord and the monarch by paying rent and taxes as well as acting as a pool of labour for major construction projects.

The urban population was small and, apparently, contained a large proportion of foreigners, mainly Jews and Syrians, who played a predominant role in the commercial and industrial life of the country. The lack of a significant urban element meant that the position and power of the king depended heavily on the wishes of the local magnates who had direct control over the majority of the population. Whereas the Sassanian kings are credited with the foundation of numerous cities and the establishment of a thorough bureaucratic system, their Arsacid counterparts in Armenia were unable to achieve a similar centralization whereby they could gradually restrict and reduce the authority of the nobles. There is, for example, little evidence for the existence of a class of secretaries and notaries in the Armenian kingdom, although this may be due in part to the assumption of such duties by the Christian clergy and by the lack of a native script until the time of Mesrop. Presumably one of the three neighbouring languages, Greek, Syriac and Middle Persian, was used in written transactions and documents. But this must have increased the difficulty of setting up a centralized bureaucracy.

The military organization was also fragmentary since the basic element of the army was the cavalry drawn from the nobility. Reference is made to two other groups; a company
of élite troops called the Ostam, who accompanied the king into battle, and the Mardpetakan, who formed a guard over the royal household. But these men, either mercenaries or levies from the royal estates, must have been greatly outnumbered by the nakharar cavalry. The bulk of the army consisted of such regiments, each of which was commanded by its local chieftain and served as a separate corps with its own standard.

Thus, although the king appointed a commander-in-chief, the Sparapet, it is evident that his effective control over the many localized contingents must have been extremely limited. According to Faustos, Chosroes II decreed that "the greater magnates, the nakharars who were possessors and lords of an entire province, those with 10,000 down to 1,000 men, should reside at court." The measure was clearly an attempt to restrict the independence of those nobles who commanded large military units and, in part, it seems to have been successful, for his successors were not plagued with revolts to the same extent. But it did not try to solve the problem at its base by removing military command from the lords altogether. This was, apparently, beyond the powers of the king. In short, the nobility was too firmly established as a major force in the military, economic and social life of fourth century Armenia.

The nobles were obsessed with their own hereditary status and regarded the king as nothing more than a primus inter pares. This rendered their subordination to him precarious, and amongst themselves it was also conducive to rivalry and bitter feuding. The preoccupation with ancient noble descent is shown by the tendency of Armenian writers to be the chroniclers of individual princely houses, and by their careful description of the complex system of precedence which
had evolved at the Armenian court. All this heightened the divisions and weaknesses in the kingdom, for the slightest infringement to the codes of rank and station could lead either to armed conflict or to the withdrawal of allegiance. Yet the sentiment of pride within the nobility was sometimes combined with one of profound loyalty to the king. It must be noted that the identification of the Armenian rulers with the Arsacid house is ubiquitous. The native sources treat the terms "king" and "Arsacid" as inseparable and synonymous, and they deny that anyone else, however illustrious, should be worthy of wearing the crown. Thus Moses states that a limit was set on the ambition of the vitaxa Bakur: "although he did not wish to reign because he was not an Arsacid, nonetheless he wished to be independent." Despite the fact that the Armenian historians probably exaggerate the loyalty to the Arsacid dynasty, it does nevertheless fit well with the rigid system of inherited precedence and position which appears to have been a corner-stone of Armenian society. Even after the partition of the kingdom in 387, the Persian king Sapor III granted the throne of Persarmenia to an Arsacid in an attempt to win the loyalty of the local population, and the same policy was adopted by the emperor Theodosius in the smaller Roman portion.

(b) Religious Influences.

Religion was another source of dissension. The indigenous polytheism had long been mixed with Iranian elements, and after the temporary subjugation of Armenia by Sapor I in the mid-third century it appears that measures were taken on the initiative of the Zoroastrian clergy, especially the high priest Kartir, to make Armenian religion conform even more closely. Moses
speaks of the reforms thus: "the Persian king increased the cults of the temples and ordered the fire of Hormizd, which was on the altar at Bagavan, to be kept perpetually burning."  
At the same time we find the earliest reference to Christianity in Armenia, for Eusebius mentions a certain Meruzanes, bishop of the Armenians, who was in correspondence with bishop Dionysius of Alexandria. Adontz has identified the seat of bishop Meruzanes with Sophene and connects this first stage of the diffusion of Christianity in the realm with its presence in neighbouring Mesopotamia and specifically in the city of Edessa. The evidence for an early Syrian influence on the Armenian Church is slight since it was submerged in the second and more powerful current coming from Cappadocia with Gregory the Illuminator at the beginning of the fourth century. But Armenian liturgical language has preserved many Syriac terms, and primitive monasticism in Armenia, as depicted by Faustos, bears a very close resemblance to that practised by the ascetics of Syria and Mesopotamia. Furthermore, a number of prominent Armenian clerics were Syrian by birth; for example, the saintly *chorepiscopus* Daniel who was head of the church of Taron in the 330's, while a disciple of his, Schaghita, became famous in Armenia as an anchorite living in the mountains and performing miracles. Whereas the family of Gregory came in the Greek or Caesarean sphere, Adontz believed that the other major ecclesiastical group in the fourth century, the house of Albianos, was permeated with Syrian influences because of its ties with Taron, Bzunik and other regions close to the southern border. The alternation of the descendants of Gregory and Albianos on the patriarchal throne attests to the rivalry between the two houses and probably between the two
sources of evangelizing activity, Cappadocia and Mesopotamia. It is impossible to clarify the nature of Christian belief in Armenia since the native sources do not recognize the existence of different sects, but rather present the kingdom as a unified, orthodox state. However, one can assume that Armenia, no less than other areas of the Christian world, had its share of heretics and fringe elements. It can be seen that Tiridates IV closely adhered to the religious policy of his ally and protector, Diocletian. But when Constantine rose to prominence and made Christianity the official state religion of Rome, the Armenian king was quick to accept conversion. From this example it has been argued that his loyalty to Rome was not simply a matter of diplomatic or military alliance, but that political circumstances influenced Tiridates' religious outlook. The emperor was indeed the religious as well as the secular head of state, and consequently, political and religious loyalty should be regarded as inseparable. Since Arianism was a powerful force in the mid-fourth century, both at the imperial court under Constantius and Valens and among the populace of the eastern half of the empire, it may be suggested that the Armenian kingdom also felt the influence of Arius' teachings. In fact Garsoian believes that the hostile accounts of Arsaces and Pap in the orthodox Armenian histories reflect the Arian sympathies of these kings. That several patriarchs are recorded as having fallen foul of them certainly indicates that there were moments of serious friction between the Church and the Monarchy. Likewise, Athanasius' condemnation of the marriage of Olympias to a "barbarian" may have been stimulated by the orthodox bishop's distaste for Arsaces' heretical inclinations. However,
another explanation can be adduced for the frequent conflict between the king and clergy. Although this is usually stated in terms of the monarch's sinfulness, the real causes may have been social and political. The patriarch, who was also a considerable landowner, may have incurred royal displeasure by his overzealous exercise of temporal power. His interference in national or regional affairs, either in his own interests or in those of the scattered Christian community, would doubtless have angered both king and nobles.33

Garsoian has rightly said that the religious division of Armenia into two opposing parties, the one pagan, the other Christian, would appear to simplify the situation beyond measure.34 Despite the weight of evidence for the overwhelming presence of Orthodoxy, prompted by the church of Caesarea and championed by the family of Gregory, one may justly suspect that other Christian or quasi-Christian groups flourished in Armenia, as they did in Mesopotamia. Thus, for example, Faustos records how Nerses, on his return from exile in 368, anxiously questioned his subordinate, Khad of Marak, in order to convince himself that "he had remained faithful to the truth and to orthodoxy... and that he had never erred either to left or to right."35 Clearly Nerses feared not Khad's apostasy but his tainture by heresy.

Nor should the strength of paganism in the kingdom be underestimated. The immediate and widespread conversion of Armenia by Gregory can be discounted as an exaggerated tradition. The fact that considerable missionary activity is ascribed to Mesrop a century later indicates that pagan cults survived throughout the fourth century.36 The conflict between king and nobles may be regarded partly in terms of the reaction of
conservative landowners to religious innovation. The rulers of the principalities and great estates were probably aware of the benefit of local cults in focusing the loyalty of their vassals and peasants. Consequently, they may have seen the imposition of a uniform religion, patronized by the royal house, as a threat to their independent status. But it is not easy to be precise about the interrelation and effect of the multifarious religious elements in Armenian society. To distinguish convictions of faith and political expediency or necessity is an impossible task, given the nature of our sources. One can only state in broad terms that religion played a significant part in the divisions and rivalries within Armenia during the decades after the official acceptance of Christianity.

(c) The Regiones Transtigritanae.

On the southern borders of Armenia lay the autonomous principalities which formed the Syrian and Arabian marches. The Arabian bdeakhsh, composed of territories taken from the former kingdom of Corduene and from Mygdonia, was ruled by the vitaxa of Arzanene. He commanded the princes of Moxoene, Corduene and Zabdicene, as well as other lesser nobles. The Syrian march consisted of the principalities of Ingilene, Anzitene, Lesser and Greater Sophene, ruled over by their own local dynasts, although a part of Ingilene appears to have been royal domain. The boundaries of the constituent parts of the two marches are ill-defined. This is mainly because ancient writers were imprecise and often contradictory in their use of appellations. Thus names are found in diverse authors which stretch from local, unofficial toponyms to the titles of multi-district, political units. Strabo the geographer, for
example, refers to the greater part of the Syrian march lands under the single name of Sophene, whereas Ammianus mentions a district called Gumathene which is not to be found in any other source and may, therefore, be taken as a contemporary local name. Consequently, Chaumont believes that not all the territories listed in these two bdeakhsh were "provinces" in their own right, but that some were merely "districts" or "cantons" included in a province. This is a likely explanation for the use of the terms gentes, regiones and ἅγια by the classical authors. It is not surprising then that there has been considerable discussion about the number and extent of the lands ceded to Rome in 298. The peace treaty, according to Peter the Patrician, specified Ἡ Ἰντηληνὴ ἡμᾶς Ἐφικτής καὶ Ἁρχανηνῆ ἡμᾶς Ἐφικτής. These do not correspond with the areas surrendered by Jovian in 363. Ammianus keeps the same number but, in place of Ingilene and Sophene, he lists Moxoene and Rehimene which are considered to be dependencies of Arzanene and Zabdicene respectively. The same five regions are named in 410 as comprising the diocese of the Metropolitan based at Nisibis. Since the principalities within the Syrian march are later recorded in the Roman sphere, it appears that it was only the Arabian bdeakhsh which was handed over to Sapor after Julian's death.

The establishment of the frontier thereafter along the Nymphios river and across the Tur 'Abdin between Cepha and Nisibis was not an arbitrary or fortuitous choice, but was based on the existing boundary between the Syrian and Arabian marches. Directly west of this line lay Greater Sophene, extending on both banks of the Tigris as far upstream as Amida. Ingilene and Anzitene were further north and west around the
headwaters of the Tigris, and Lesser Sophene is to be found beyond the Taurus along the river Arsanias. In the Arabian march Moxoene is located in the direction of Lake Van, while Arzanene proper lay east of the Nymphios and north of the Tigris. The territory of Corduene extended south from the Bohtan river; Rehimene may correspond to the eastern part of the Tur 'Abdin, and Zabdicene lay on both sides of the Tigris to the south. It appears, therefore, that Ammianus' description of these gentes as Transtigritanae and separated from Armenia by the Taurus mountains is roughly accurate, excluding Lesser Sophene and Anzitene which cannot be considered parts of the southern frontier since they border on the Upper Euphrates and Lesser Armenia.

The self-sufficiency of these principalities is amply demonstrated by the ease with which they were separated from the Armenian kingdom and passed into either Roman or Persian hands. Yet, according to the Armenian sources, they owed a certain degree of loyalty to the king. Documents of the Gregorian cycle mention the prince of Ingilene and Anzitene and the prince of Sophene in the entourage of Tiridates IV. Princes of the two marches continued to play a role in Armenian affairs under Tiridates' successors. Several are recorded in the service of Chosroes II during his troubled reign in the 330's. Under Tiran/Arsaces Faustos says that a certain Drastamat, styled the prince of Ingilene, was "entrusted with the treasures of the castle of Angl and with those of all the royal castles of that region." He was later taken prisoner and led into Persian captivity along with his king. Faustos also speaks of Daniel, prince of Greater Sophene, accompanying the catholikos Nerses on his mission to Caesarea in 358.
But although these local chieftains held a rather ambiguous position, they clearly preserved their individuality and autonomy. Indeed, Roman and Persian interference in Armenian affairs contributed in large part to the lasting strength of their principalities.

Under Roman control they enjoyed the status of *civitates foederatae*, apparently with immunity from imperial taxation, a fact which indicates their importance to the eastern frontier. This is borne out by Ammianus who states that in 361 Constantius was careful to send envoys with generous gifts ad *Transtigritanos reges et satrapas* in order to strengthen their loyalty to Rome. He also records that after the capture of Amida two years earlier the Persians sought out with extreme care those Transtigritani who had helped in the defence of the fortress and punished them with immediate death. Procopius later describes the honours accorded to the princes of this region, whom he calls the "Pentarchs of Other Armenia." On their accession they were invested by the emperor with royal insignia, including expensive garments and red buskins. Armenian sources describe the regalia of these princes in exactly the same terms.

Initially, it seems, the principalities were exempt from imperial garrisons and administration. But in the years after Tiridates' death the *vitaxa* of Arzanene attempted to transfer his allegiance to the Persian king. Julian refers briefly to the episode, but the Armenian historians tell of Bakur's revolt in more detail. Faustos reveals that among the princes sent by Chosroes to put down the rebellion were Jon of Corduene and Mar of Greater Sophene. Reference is also made to Roman military assistance. Certainly, it appears that after Bakur's
defeat and death a number of Roman fortresses were established to safeguard the principalities from further Persian infiltration. All of them are to be found on or behind the Tigris in accordance with the treaty of 298, which stipulated that the river should mark the frontier between the two empires. But one may note that there was a tradition among classical geographers to describe the principal source of the Tigris as issuing from the region called Thospitis. This name clearly derives from the ancient Urartian term for Van, and consequently the Bitlis-Bohtan Su appears to be regarded as a primary branch of the Tigris. What, then, was considered to be the course of the Upper Tigris when defined as the frontier by the treaty of 298? It has generally been assumed that it lay along the main stream which flows past Amida, but some evidence suggests that the officers or diplomats who drew up the terms of the treaty took the same view of the Tigris source as Strabo, Pliny the Elder and Ptolemy. According to Jacob the Recluse, the fortress of Amida was intended to protect "the territory of Mayferqat (Greater Sophene) and of Arzanene... because these lands were on the frontier and Persian raiders constantly made incursions and ravaged them." In the same passage Jacob mentions two other places in the vicinity of the Tur 'Abdin which were fortified by Constantius against Persian attacks; one on the borders of Beth 'Arbaye and the other at Cepha. Bezabde likewise served as the major fortress for the region of Zabdicene, and Til at the confluence of the Bohtan and Tigris may also have been a Roman military station during Constantius' reign. Corduene, on the other hand, which lay beyond the Bohtan, exercised military independence according to the Arab vita of Gregory. This statement is
supported by Jacob's remark that Roman supervision stretched across Sophene and Arzanene "upto the borders of Corduene", and by the reference in Faustos to the fact that Corduene was the only principality in the Arabian march to assist against Rakur. Ammianus says that it was a territory which belonged to Rome upto the treaty of 363, although he admits that its satrap Iovinianus, who had been brought up as a hostage in Syria, could not openly express his pro-Roman sympathies since his land was subject to Persian power. The reason for this ambiguous position is easy to find. Corduene lay outside direct Roman control because, unlike the other regions, it was on the Persian side of the frontier. Consequently, there are no grounds for believing that Roman garrisons existed in the principality, and Toumanoff is wrong to suggest that the fifteen forts which were surrendered to Sapor in 363 were in Corduene. They must, in fact, be located on the other side of the Tigris principally in the area between Nisibis, Bezabde and Singara.

Faustos mentions royal castles in the southern marches during the mid-fourth century, specifically naming Angl in Ingilene and Bnabel in Greater Sophene. The former has been identified with the modern village of Eqlil north of Amida, not far from the confluence of the Arghana and Dibene rivers. Markwart identified it as the same place as the Βασιλείων αρχόν of Procopius and the ιδιότρον βασιλικόν of George of Cyprus. Although it retained some of its importance as a refuge, being the treasury and burial place of the Armenian kings, Dillemann has suggested that it was displaced as the major centre of the region when Constantius enlarged and fortified Amida. The second castle, Bnabel, is more difficult
to locate. Faustos clearly states in two passages that it was in Sophene, but modern scholars have been inclined to accept its location in the vicinity of Mardin. This appears to rest on the scant testimony of a Syriac writer that John, bishop of Mardin, built the monastery of St. Stephen "in the direction of the villages of Benabel and Rismil." If the identification is correct, one would have to accept Dillemann's view that Faustos' reference to Benabel is anachronistic, for it is inconceivable that a royal castle and treasury existed in the first half of the fourth century in an area which was under complete Roman control and heavily garrisoned with imperial troops. Yet Benabel is closely associated in one of the passages with the murder of the catholicos Vrt'anes, which is dated to 342. It may well be that the Armenian stronghold should be sought further north either on or beyond the Upper Tigris.

(d) Relations with Rome and Persia.

It has been seen that the Persians were involved in fighting along the southern and eastern borderlands of Armenia during the final years of Constantine's reign. But after the return of the new co-emperor to the East in 338 this activity declined. Julian refers to Constantius' successful restoration of the eastern frontier, albeit in the glowing terms appropriate to a panegyric. He says that those Armenians who had sided with Persia now changed their allegiance again; that those who had remained loyal to Rome were rewarded with a safe return to their lands, and that their ruler was brought back from exile and established on the throne. Thus it seems that Constantius took the appropriate steps to ensure Armenian friendship and loyalty. Hostages were taken from those who had
shown sympathy with the enemy, while gifts and honours were
lavished on others who had supported the Arsacid king and
favoured the Roman cause. These measures, together with
the vigilance and readiness of Constantius to counter Persian
moves, were apparently successful in curbing pro-Persian
reactions among the nobility. There is no evidence that the
Persians were able to infiltrate or subvert the Armenian lands
in the 340's. Indeed, the conflict between the two empires
seems to have been limited to the Mesopotamian sphere, with
the indecisive battle near Singara and the second siege of
Nisibis as the main actions of that decade.

After Constantius' departure to the West in 350 and Gallus'
fall from power in 354 Rome's tight grip on Armenia slackened.
Although Sapor was preoccupied from 350 to 358 with campaigns
against nomadic tribesmen in the remote eastern lands, his
generals started to make raids on both Mesopotamia and Armenia.
These were, doubtless, intended to put pressure on the
overstretched Roman forces and on their allies. However,
despite the absence of the emperor and his field army, steps
were taken to preserve the strong ties with Armenia. Presumably
considerable sums of money were paid out in subsidies to the
principalities, while Arsaces was bound more closely to
Constantius by his marriage to Olympias. Various dates have
been suggested for this political union. Baynes supposed that
the quaestor Taurus was sent to Armenia in 354 in order to
escort Olympias to her royal husband. This may be so, but
another reason may be inferred for the quaestor's visit. The
reference to Taurus' mission in the middle of the account of
Gallus' downfall suggests an obvious connection between the
two events. Ammianus states that Taurus came directly from
Constantius' court and avoided meeting the disgraced Caesar en route. Thus it seems probable that he was sent to warn the Armenian king of the imperial deputy's removal and to reassure him that this occurrence would not affect the stability and security of the East. Taurus may also have come to put forward the idea of the matrimonial alliance which would bring Arsaces into the circle of the imperial family as some sort of replacement for Gallus. At any rate, the marriage had apparently taken place by 358 when it is mentioned by Athanasius. Other measures might also be connected with the pressure which the Persians were applying in the absence of Constantius and Sapor. In 358 or 359 a grant of tax exemption on estates in the Roman Empire belonging to Arsaces was endorsed; a group of hostages, including the princes Gnel and Tirith, were released, and the catholikos Nerses was sent into exile on Constantius' orders. All of these may be seen as moves to keep the goodwill of the Armenian king and to thwart Persian attempts to bring about his defection.

At this point it is necessary to discuss the chronology of events concerning the enigmatic figure Pharandzem. The sources are not always in agreement, but some facts can be deduced about her life. Her son, Pap, is portrayed by Ammianus as an energetic young man during his reign, and consequently he must have been at least sixteen years old at his accession in 368. This would suggest that his mother was Arsaces' queen in the early 350's. But according to Faustos, Pharandzem was first married to Gnel, Arsaces' nephew, and only married the king after Gnel's murder, which occurred soon after his return from being held hostage by the Romans. This event is closely connected with the exile of Nerses, which most scholars now
Therefore Pharandzem's marriage to Arsaces and the birth of their son would apparently have to date to 360 or later, making Pap come to the throne before the age of ten. It is, however, possible to explain this inconsistency while keeping largely within the bounds of the available evidence, if we consider that Pharandzem was first married to Gnel but before he became a Roman hostage. Then, during his absence, Arsaces became enamoured of his nephew's wife and took her as his queen, an act which provoked a stern response from Nerses. Pharandzem gave birth to a royal son, Pap, who was, as far as it is known, the only male heir to Arsaces. Meanwhile Constantius offered the hand of Olympias, the daughter of Ablabius and formerly betrothed to Constans, and the king readily accepted such a prestigious and respectable consort in place of Pharandzem. The latter, however, was not prepared to give up her royal position. Her first husband, Gnel, was quickly disposed of on his return in 359 and soon afterwards Pharandzem is said to have poisoned Olympias. Since Nerses, the vocal centre of opposition to her marriage to Arsaces, had been removed and since her son remained the sole direct heir, Pharandzem was restored as queen. Faustos says that the Persian king also offered Arsaces the hand of his daughter. He places the episode after the deaths of Gnel and Olympias, and states that the proposal was fiercely opposed by Pharandzem's father, Andovk of Siwnik'. But this overture could date to as late as 362 when Sapor received the startling news of Julian's planned expedition.

Despite the many inconsistencies and unreliable elements in his account, Faustos appears to reflect quite accurately the tension and drama which surrounded Armenian relations with the
two imperial powers in the late 350's and early 360's. It can be seen that the Persian king was making strenuous efforts to undermine Arsaces' allegiance to Rome. These consisted of not only diplomatic approaches but also military intervention. Perhaps one aim of the campaign of 359 was to prise the kingdom away from its alliance with the Roman Empire, for Sapor's army threatened to march towards the upper reaches of the Euphrates; that is, towards that region of Armenia which was most strongly attached to the Roman cause. Thus when Constantius returned to the East in the following year, he immediately summoned the Armenian king in order to make sure of his loyalty and friendship. He found that Sapor's threats and cajolery had achieved little success. Indeed, Arsaces remained faithful to both Constantius and Julian, although Libanius tried to suggest that he betrayed the latter. But it does seem that some nobles again inclined towards Persia, exemplified by the opposing views of Vardan and Vazak in the Mamikonian house. Certainly, the Armenian nobility offered little resistance to the Persian occupation of the kingdom after the treaty of Jovian.

(e) Events of the early 360's.

Unfortunately, it remains obscure as to what was happening in the Armenian borderlands during Constantius' last twelve months and Julian's short reign. Early in 361 it became clear that Julian had risen in revolt and was marching to claim the imperial throne. Despite this most inopportune threat from the West, Constantius remained resolutely at Edessa throughout the spring and summer, marshalling his forces either to make a second attempt on Bezabde or to repel a further attack by Sapor. Ammianus, however, is rather grudging in his
acknowledgement that it was the emperor's prudent action which prevented the Persian king from taking full advantage of the opportunity presented by Julian's rebellion. He admits that Sapor was close by on the other side of the Tigris and threatened to invade Mesopotamia, but as the main reason for his failure to cross the river it is stated that he received unfavourable auspices. This is a less than convincing explanation. It is more likely that the Persian king was deterred by the losses which his army had sustained in the two previous years and by Constantius' clear determination not to surrender the strategic fortresses of Mesopotamia. But it is also unlikely that the Persian king remained as inactive as Ammianus implies. Possibly he now turned his attention northwards to the border areas of Armenia, hoping to use this chance to weaken Roman control there. For he must have been aware that Constantius was reluctant to commit troops in this more remote zone when they were needed both to safeguard northern Mesopotamia and to oppose Julian. Thus Sapor may have engaged some of his forces in the regiones Transtigritanae, while retaining the option of striking into Mesopotamia again if Constantius withdrew his garrisons. Ammianus' silence on this score is not decisive. It is clear that the historian did not have the full facts about the situation in 361, since he comments on the unreliable and conflicting reports which scouts and deserters made about the Persians' intentions. Furthermore, he purposely played down the difficulties which beset Constantius on the eastern frontier because they made Julian's revolt appear all the more unjustifiable and irresponsible.

Again, there are indications that Sapor was involved in
south-east Armenia at the outset of Julian's expedition in 363. The Roman sources are not at all precise about the whereabouts of the Persian king and the bulk of his army at this time. Nor do they explain satisfactorily why the troops under the command of Procopius and Sebastianus failed to rendezvous with Julian in Assyria as expected. Ammianus, for example, appears to give a confused synthesis of the three options which were open to the second force when it was detached from Julian's army. While it remained in Mesopotamia, its role was primarily defensive, as Ammianus rightly points out. Yet, appearing close to the Tigris frontier, it could threaten the lands beyond, Corduene and Persian Adiabene, and even retain the possibility of marching down the river to meet Julian near Ctesiphon. Ammianus also says that it was intended to join the Armenian king in an attack on Persian territory si fieri potius posset. The reference to a route through Moxoene and Chiliocomum in Media suggests an ambitious plan for this combined invasion. The Romans would march from Mesopotamia via the Bitlis Pass to Lake Van. Meanwhile Arsaces would muster his forces in central Armenia and, linking up with Procopius to the north-east of Van, cross into Media Atropatene. Having devastated the plains around Lake Urmia, it was envisaged that they would then be able to advance through the Zagros mountains to the valleys leading down into Assyria, where they could join forces with Julian.

Unfortunately for the success of Julian's expedition it turned out that only the first objective, the protection of Mesopotamia, could be achieved. But the sources give little explanation of why neither Procopius nor Arsaces came to Julian's aid in Assyria at the critical point of the campaign. Libanius
hints briefly that Julian was betrayed by the Armenian king. The testimony of Ammianus, however, refutes this accusation; indeed, he says that Arsaces actually ravaged Chiliocomum in accordance with the emperor's orders. What happened, then, to the thirty thousand soldiers commanded by Procopius and Sebastianus? Ammianus provides no information at all about the course of their operations until Jovian's retreating army drew near to the Mesopotamian limes. In this respect Libanius seems to be somewhat better informed, for he says that at the outset they suffered some casualties on the banks of the Tigris and thereafter turned against the hostile forces. Thus it may be that their attempt to strike across the river was thwarted by the Persians. In fact, Sapor and his army were to be found in the vicinity of the Tigris frontier in the spring of 363, for it seems that he was deceived by Julian's feint and expected all the Roman forces to be directed across that river. However, when it was discovered that Julian had doubled back and was advancing down the Euphrates, the Persian king did not immediately withdraw southwards to protect his capital. This was probably because he still had to deal with the third threat from the north, a combined attack by Procopius and Arsaces. Malalas' account of his action at this juncture is significant. He states that when he learnt that Julian was behind him and that in front Roman generals opposed him with considerable forces, Sapor realized that he was surrounded and fled into Persarmenia. Although his choice of the word ἀπείτεω is patently mistaken, I believe that Malalas accurately records the direction of Sapor's first advance. In order to prevent the unification of Armenian and Roman forces for an invasion of the Persian hinterland, he
had to stand between them, and this was most effectively achieved by occupying Moxoene and seizing control of the strategic Bitlis Pass. Moses perhaps provides some unexpected support for this interpretation. He tells how the prince of the Rshtunik', Zawray, who was general of the forces in southern Armenia, failed to carry out the orders of his king. Instead, he withdrew his troops to the fastnesses of Tmorik', a region south of Lake Van. Although Moses places the episode immediately after the murder of the patriarch Yusik in 348 and explains Zawray's withdrawal in terms of his abhorrence at this crime, he also connects it closely with Julian and the time of his Persian expedition. Thus the episode may be an echo of events in 363. Zawray was an important local chieftain, whose lands stretched along the south shore of Lake Van and whose castle stood on the island of Akt'amar. As such he was entrusted with the protection of the major direct link between Arsaces in the north and the Roman generals in the south. But it seems that he was unable or unwilling to fulfil his task of holding the pass against the Persians. By gaining control of the Bitlis-Van route, Sapor severed the link between the Roman and Armenian forces and did sufficient to thwart any hopes or plans for a large-scale expedition from the north. Having removed this threat, the Persian king was at last able to turn his attention southwards and march against Julian who, by this stage, had already abandoned the idea of besieging Ctesiphon and was himself advancing north through Assyria.

It is evident, then, that the Romans and Persians attached considerable importance to Armenia and employed similar methods to gain control there. But there were two sides to
the relationship between the kingdom and its powerful neighbours. Not only did they seek to win friendship and influence by means of payments and privileges, but they also exploited the divisions in the realm to exact commitments from the king and nobles in the form of tribute and participation in military campaigns. Armenia in the fourth century was not sufficiently strong or united to resist such external pressures and exert its full independence. On the other hand, neither empire was able to take control of the whole country, partly because of those very differences and dissensions which caused its weakness. However, the days of this ambiguous and troublesome kingdom were numbered. A more satisfactory and less contentious solution was found in 387 when Armenia was partitioned. By the early fifth century the appointment of kings lapsed, the Arsacid dynasty disappeared and the separate principalities were fully absorbed into the system of provincial government within the Roman and Persian empires.
Armenian Sources

Agathangelos - Patmut'iw (Tiflis 1913).

Elisaeus - Patmut'iw Vardananc' (Tiflis 1913).

Faustos of Buzanda (FB) - Patmut'iw Hayots' (Venice 1933).

Movses Dasxurançï - Patmut'iw Ałwaniç asxarhi ed. J.Emin (Moscow 1860).

Moses of Chorene - Patmut'iw Hayots' ed. M.Abelyan & S. Yarut'iwnean (Tiflis 1913).

St. Nerses (Life of) - Patmut'iw srboyn Nersisi Part'ewi (Venice 1853).
  French trans: CHAMA II pp.21-44.

Sebeos - Sebeosi episkoposi i HerakLîn ed K.Patkanian (St. Petersburg 1879).

Stephen Orbelian - Patmut'iw tann Sisakan (Tiflis 1911).

Tovma Arcruni - Patmut'iw tann Arcruneay (Tiflis 1917).
  French trans: M.F.Brosset, Collection d'historiens arméniens I (St. Petersburg 1874) pp.4-263.

2) The most famous natural feature of Armenia is Mount Ararat, situated about halfway between its two great lakes, Van to the south-west and Sevan to the north-east. The Ararat massif combines with other volcanic peaks (the Boz, Ala, Tendürük and Hama Dağları) to form a great barrier between these two regions. To the north of Ararat and the Araxes river rises a second massive group of extinct volcanoes (the Alağz Dağ) which stretches from Lake Sevan westwards to the Arpa Çayi, a tributary of the Araxes. Lake Van is also surrounded by a scatter of volcanic peaks and lava flows (Nemrut, Artos, Varaq and, close to its north-west shores, the most impressive crater, Suphan Dağ). Further west is another notable massif (the Bingöl Dağ), where rise the headwaters of both the Araxes and the principal tributaries of the Euphrates, the Murat and Kara rivers. The upper courses of these rivers are mainly dictated by the fold mountains; from Erzincan the Kara is bounded to the south by the long range of the Munzur Dağları and the Murat lies immediately north of the Taurus, while to the east another range (the Şaitan and Ak Dağları) form part of the watershed between the Araxes and Murat.


It has been estimated that there were nearly two hundred districts of various sizes in the country, consisting of royal domains, military viceroyalties, separate principalities, municipal territories and Church lands. There were several dozen major principalities, many of which were non-Armenian in origin and had distinct political interests of their own. Thus R.H. Hewsen has expressed the view that "the Arsacid kingdom was not a state but a federation of states, forming a very divided and fragile geopolitical structure as much maintained by the will of Rome and Iran as it was self-sustaining." - "Introduction to Armenian Historical Geography." R.E.Arm. ns. 13 (1978-9) p.95.


6) Faustos lists the Armenian cities which were destroyed by Sapor in the period after the treaty of Jovian. Although the numbers of inhabitants taken into captivity have no historical value, the fact that the writer draws a distinction
between Armenians and Jews indicates that the latter formed a sizeable part of the urban population - FB IV, 24 & 55; Moses III, 35.

At the beginning of the fifth century commercial exchanges between Rome and Persia were restricted to three centres, Nisibis, Callinicum and Artaxata - CJ IV,63,4 (408/9). This system, with a point of control on each of the three main trade routes, may date back to the partition of Armenia in 387, since the document preserved in the Codex Justinianus refers to an earlier treaty - H.A.Manandian, op.cit. p.80. The route through Armenia to the Black Sea ports was of considerable importance, especially since the Mesopotamian centres were frequently embroiled in war. Moreover, until its partition Armenia may have enjoyed a freer market than those which were under direct Roman and Persian control. At least, Peter the Patrician does not suggest that the treaty of 298 included restrictions on trade via the Armenian route - fr.14 FHG IV (Müller) p.189. Procopius describes Dvin as a flourishing international centre in the sixth century - Bell. Pers. II,25,1-3.

7) A document which N.Adontz called the Military List gives a number for the cavalry contingents of each nakharar family. It concludes: "and the number of men from the nations was 84,000 beside those who serve the royal court, that is the Ostan, who go forth with the king, and the Mardpetakan, who are the inner guard over the queen and the treasure, and in all the number of Armenian forces is 120,000." - op.cit. pp.193-5 with text in Appendix IIIB, pp.68*-69*; also, C.Toumanoff, op.cit. p.234ff and Table V. N.Adontz considered the figure of 120,000 as an accurate reflection of the total military strength under the fourth century Arsacid kings - op.cit. p.225-6. However, all numbers given by the Armenian historians are highly dubious; they were, it seems, always inclined to exaggerate, and particularly so when they could use the figures to emphasize the strength and size of the Arsacid kingdom. N.Adontz acknowledged that at later periods the size of the Armenian cavalry was no more than 30,000 or even 15,000 - op.cit. p.226. Agathangelos states that the Armenian army numbered 70,000 in the days of Tiridates IV - ch. 126. Perhaps this is a more realistic total. But the importance of the Military List, whatever its value as evidence for actual numbers, is that it demonstrates graphically how the Armenian army was divided up into numerous small, localized contingents.

8) As in Persia, the infantry was a greatly inferior branch of the army - above, ch.IV, p.137. It seems to have played a very insignificant role and is rarely mentioned in the sources. Cf. R.Kherumian, "Esquisse d'une féodalité oubliée." Vostan 1 (1948-9) pp. 34-56.

9) Sebeos refers to an Armenian detachment of 15,000 knights which the emperor Maurice sent to the assistance of the Persian king Chosroes II. This army was composed of nakharar units of 100 to 1,000 men, each with its own commander and standard - Primary History (St. Petersburg
1879) p.36. Note also a passage in Faustos: "The chiefs of the most important families and of the various clans, the lords who had their own troops and their banners, all the satraps and nobles..." - FB IV,3.

10) FB III,8 and N.Adontz, op.cit. p.227.

11) Faustos and Moses indicate that the Armenian king strove to turn the ancestral lands of the nakharars into royal beneficia - FB III,9 and Moses III,38; 42 & 44. Faustos records that when Manuel Mamikonian defeated king Varazdat and drove him out of the kingdom in 377/8, he recounted the past services of the Mamikonian house to the Arsacids and also declared: "We have never been your vassals, but your comrades and superior to you, for our ancestors were kings of the land of China." - FB V,37 and C.Toumanoff, op.cit. p.139.

12) For example, a feud during the reign of Chosroes II in which the Manawazian and Orduni houses were mutually exterminated - FB III,4.

13) C.Toumanoff lists the noble houses to which Armenian writers were attached - op.cit. p.128, n.223. Various of the princely families claimed descent from exotic ancestors; for example, the Mamikonians insisted that their forefathers came from China - FB V,4 & '37; Moses II,81 (pp.229-31) and Sebeos, Patmut'iw n Herakln (Tiflis 1913) pp.18-20 and trans. in R.W.Thomson, Moses of Chorene (Washington 1978) pp.367-8.


15) One version of the story about the enmity between the Persian king and Andovk of Siwnik' tells that the quarrel arose because Sapor assigned to Andovk the fourteenth place in the order of Armenian princes at a royal banquet. Andovk took this as a personal slight. Consequently, he changed his allegiance and went over to the service of the Roman emperor - Movses Dasxuranci, History of the Caucasian Albanians II,1 trans. C.J.F.Dowsett (London 1961) p.61-2.


18) A frequently repeated theme in the Armenian histories is the destruction of a princely family with the exception of a single male child. He manages to escape and reappear later to lay claim to his rightful inheritance. Thus the massacre of the Rshtuni and the escape of Mehendak's son - Moses III,15 (p.269) and FB III, 8 & 16. Likewise, the story of the rescue of Gregory after his father's murder - Agathangelos ch.34, and Arsaces' massacre of the Kamsarakan family - Moses III,31 (p.288). Faustos also expresses the idea that the nobility looked upon the patriarchate as an hereditary office of the Gregorid family - FB III, 13 & 15. He tells how a council of nobles decided to find someone worthy of the office from amongst the descendants of Gregory because it was God's will that it should belong to the family. Consequently, the patriarchate was conferred on Nerses - FB IV,3. One may further note that Moses could claim that even in the last days of the Armenian kingdom Gregory's descendant, St. Sahak I, was honoured at the Persian court "first and foremost because of his illustrious pahlavik house...the Suren" and only then because of the respect due to God's servant - Moses III,51.

19) FB VI,1 and Moses III,42-3 (pp.304-6): Persarmenia, which remained a kingdom until 428. Thereafter a marzpan or margrave was appointed by the Persians.
FB V,34 and Moses III,40: Roman Armenia. But after the death of Arsaces III in c.391 the Romans appointed a comes to administer the country.


21) Eusebius, HE VI,46,2. Dionysius was bishop of Alexandria from 248 to 265.


24) FB III,14.

25) FB V,25-6. Later, according to the History of John
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Katholikos, Vahram V of Persia appointed as head of the Armenian Church first Berikišo' and then Samuel, both Syrians - p.74.


27) At the death of Gregory's grandson Yusik in 348 Pharen, who belonged to the same church of Taron as Daniel, was appointed catholikos - FB III,16. He in turn was succeeded by Sahak, from the family of bishop Albianos - FB III,17. After he had murdered Nerses Pap raised Yusik, a descendant of Albianos, to the patriarchal throne. This appointment was made without the consent of the See of Caesarea which had consecrated the previous holders of the office, and it heralded the start of the break in relations with the imperial church and the formation of an Armenian national church - FB V,29. N.Adontz held the view that "the Gregorids came forward as supporters of the imperial policy, while the Albianids sympathized rather with the Persians." - op.cit. p.275. This theory somewhat oversimplifies the complex relations between Church, Monarch and Empire during the conflict between Orthodoxy and Arianism. Moreover, at a time when Sapor was persecuting his own Christian subjects, it is difficult to envisage him receiving support from Christians in Armenia.


30) N.G.Garsoian, "Politique ou orthodoxie? L'Arménie au quatrième siècle." R.E.Arm. ns. 4 (1967) pp.297-320. There is a note of ambiguity in the sources which may support this theory. Arsaces, although continually accused of idolatry - FB IV,12, is defended as a Christian by Nerses - FB IV,51, while queen Pharanzem is portrayed as both martyr and criminal - FB IV, 15; 44; 55-6; V, 22; Moses III,22; 24 and 34-5.

31) Aristaces is said to have suffered a confessor's death - FB III,2. According to Moses, he was murdered by Archilaues, governor of "what is called Fourth Armenia" -
Archilaues was, perhaps, the name of a local satrap who had quarrelled with Aristaces. The hostility of a pagan mob towards his brother and successor, Vrt'anes, was aroused by the king's wife, and this led to his murder - FB III,3 and Movses Dasxuranči I,14. Moses refers to a plot to kill Vrt'anes at the time of Tiridates' death; the plot was devised "at the instigation of the princes" - Moses III,2. His son, Yusik, was put to death on the orders of Tiran/Arsaces - FB III,12; Moses III,14 (p.267) and Movses Dasxuranči I,14. The king was upbraided by Daniel for the death of Yusik, and in a fit of temper he ordered the chorepiscopus to be strangled - FB III,14 and Moses III,14. Nerses provoked the enmity of Arsaces by reprimanding him for Gnel's death - FB III,15 and Moses III,24 (p.279). Arsaces ordered Nerses' subordinate, Khad, to be expelled from his camp - FB IV,12 and Moses III,32 (p.289). Nerses' conflict with Pap resulted in his death at the royal command - FB V,22-4 and Moses III,38 (p.299). Vrt'anes' son, the younger Gregory, is said to have been murdered by the troops of the rebel Arsacid Sasan/Sanatruk - FB III,6; Moses III,3 and Movses Dasxuranči I,14. Movses also records the martyrdom of the priest of the town of Ćri, a disciple of the young Gregory. Significantly his death came when the town was recaptured after it had rebelled against the Albanian king and given assistance to the Persians. The priest of Ćri was murdered by the Argesaçık', who are equated with the Persians - Movses Dasxuranči I,19 and C.J.F.Dowsett, op.cit. p.33. It seems, therefore, that the Christian clergy were regarded as leaders of the opposition to Persian rule in the northern lands. One may also note that the remains of the martyred priest were removed by "certain Syrian priests...(who) placed them in a sanctuary and built a monastery around it." Below, appendix 5.

32) Athanasius, Hist. Ar. 69 (Migne) PG vol. 25, 775b.
33) Pap, for example, confiscated church property, with the clear intention of curbing the growth of the Church's wealth and influence - FB V,31. According to Moses, after Bakur's defeat the Armenian general Manachihr took retribution in "all the provinces of his state, not only the warriors, but also the common peasants." But he also took captives from the region of Nisibis, "including eight deacons of the great bishop Jacob" - Moses III,7 (p.259). Naturally Jacob interceded for these prisoners and urged Manachihr to free them. The Armenian chieftain, however, was unrelenting and thus Jacob turned to appeal directly to the king. Doubtless this sort of interference by clerics was greatly resented by the proud and wilful nobles. Cf. also, FB III,10.
35) FB IV,12; Moses III,31-2 (pp.287-90).
36) R.W.Thomson, Agathangelos... introd. p. lxxxviii-lxxxix. Likewise, the details of Gregory's life in Agathangelos (ch. 48-68) are modelled on the image of Mesrop: Gregory
is fitted into a monastic and celibate mould, although he was in fact married and had two sons.

37) It may not be necessarily true that those who sided with Persia were pagans and those who supported Rome Christians, although this is the most obvious and natural conclusion. In such a period of instability and changing fortune there must have been considerable fluctuation in people's religious practices as well as in their political allegiances.

38) Strabo, Geog. XI,12,3-4.

39) Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,2.


42) Peter the Patrician fr. 14, FHG IV (Müller) p.189.

43) Amm. Marc. XXV,7,9.


45) CTh XII,13,6 (387). This edict concerns Gaddana, the satrap of Greater Sophene. Numbered among the provinces represented at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 is Mesopotamia with six representatives: the bishops of Amida, Lesser Sophene, Anzitene, Martyropolis, Ingilene and Greater Sophene - Mansi VII, p.403. N.Adontz noted that the list of names is distorted to a certain extent in the single surviving manuscript, the Codex Maffeai - op.cit. p.390, n.22. CJ I,29,5 and Novella XXXI,1 (Const. XLV) in Corpus iuris civilis vol. 3 (Berlin 1912) pp.235ff.


47) Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,2.

48) Agathangelos, Arm. version ch. 112/795 and 126/873; Greek version ch. 136 & 165.

49) FB III,9.
50) FB V,7.


52) FB IV,4.

53) CTh XII,3,6. These privileges probably lasted until the time of the emperor Zeno - Procopius, De Aedificiis III,1, 25-6.

54) Amm. Marc. XXI,6,7.

55) Amm. Marc. XIX,9,2.


57) FB V,38; Elisaues 7; Moses II,7 & 47; Stephen Orbelian 4 and C.Toumanoff, op.cit. pp.134-5, n.235.

58) Julian, Or. I, 18d-19a.
FB III,9 and Moses III,4.

59) Moses says that "Greek" forces participated in the defeat of Sanatrük - III,6, but this disagrees with Faustos and his own implication that Roman help was sought not against Sanatrük but against Bakur - FB III,7 and Moses III,4. Moses names the Roman general as a certain Antiochus - Moses III,6 and Movses Dasxurangi I,12. Cf. R.H.Hewsen, "Caspiane: an historical and geographical survey." Handès Amsorya 87 (1973) col. 95.

60) Peter the Patrician fr. 14, FHG IV (Müller) p.189; Julian, Or. I, 22a-c and Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,3.

61) Strabo, Geog. XI,14,8; XVI,1,21; Pliny NH VI,31,127-8; Ptolemy V,13,7 & 18; also, Amm. Marc. XXIII,6,15 and Philostorgius, HE III,7. Cf. L.Dillemann, Haute Mésopotamie Orientale et Pays Adjacents (Paris 1962) pp.40-7 and fig.IV.


63) F.Nau, "Résumé de monographies syriques: Jacques le Reclus." Revue de l'Orient Chrétien 20 (1915) p.7 and above, ch.III, p.80. Julian's respected praepositus cubiculi in 356-60 was, perhaps, a victim of these raids. For, according to Ammianus, Eutherius, a native of Armenia, was captured in his youth by finitimis hostibus, castrated and sold to Roman merchants - Amm. Marc. XVI,7,5.

64) Below, ch.VII,n.7 and above, ch.III,n.13.


66) Below, appendix 1, p.298.

68) FB III,9: Jon of Corduene. The others in the list are the princes of Greater and Lesser Sophene, of Siwnik', Hasteank' (Asthianene - Proc. De Aedificiis III,3,7) and Basean (Phasiane - Xenophon, Anabasis IV,6,5).

69) Amm. Marc. XXV,7,9 and XVIII,6,20. Unfortunately, Ammianus does not record what befell Iovianius in 363 when Corduene was officially ceded to the Persians.

70) C. Toumanoff, op. cit. p.181. Amm. Marc. XXV,7,9. The sense of the passage is that the Persian king demanded as the ransom for Jovian's army five Transtigritane regions (which Ammianus then lists) and fifteen fortresses (as well as the three major ones which he names). In XXV,7,11 he refers to the garrisons of the munimenta in connection with Nisibis and Singara.

71) FB III,12; IV,24 and V,7.


73) L. Dillemann, op. cit. p.121. At the far end of the citadel from the Assyrian relief and the modern town stand a number of spacious tombs carved out of the rock - J. G. Taylor, art. cit. JRGS 35 (1865) p.36.

74) FB III,12: Greater Sophene. FB V,7: Sophene, without specifying Greater or Lesser.


76) J. S. Assemanus, Bibliotheca Orientalis tom. II (Rome 1721) pp.221 & 228.

77) One may note that Carcathiocerta, a place of some importance in the Armenian kingdom, is mentioned by Strabo as Παραμένων & τος Ευρωπηκ - Geog. XI,14,3, and is described by Pliny as proximum Tigri - NH VI,26. While L. Dillemann (pp.43 & 237) and C. Toumanoff (p.167) identified this place with the royal castle of Angl, N. Adontz (p.27) suggested that it might be an earlier name for Martyropolis. Cf. also, H. A. Manandian, op. cit. pp.35 & 205, n.24. It is possible that Faustos' two castles have become confused and that Bnabel is in fact the major site in Greater Sophene, just as Angl was the principal stronghold of Ingilene.


80) Iovinianus, the satrap of Corduene in 359, had been held as a hostage by the Romans - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,20. But since Ammianus describes him as adulescens, it seems unlikely that this happened as early as 338 - below, n.89.

81) Amm. Marc. XV,13,4.

82) This was a common practice, and in the case of Armenia it is definitely recorded at two other points in Constantius' reign: firstly, in 338/9 when he had to re-establish Roman control with the installation of Tiran/Arsaces; and secondly, in 361 when he was about to leave the East to face Julian - Amm. Marc. XXI,6,7-8.

According to Faustos, Mushel Mamikonian later suggested that a permanent subsidy from the Empire should be established for the Armenian nobility to counteract Persian advances - FB V,34. N.Adontz was rather sceptical that such a practice existed before the partition of the kingdom, but it cannot be doubted that payments were often made to the Armenian nobles in order to gain their support and services. For example, Amm. Marc. XXI,6,7:

ad Transtigritanos reges et satrapas legati cum munerebus missi sunt amplis.

83) Amm. Marc. XIV,11,14.

84) Athanasius, Hist. Ar. 69 (Migne) PG vol. 25, 775b.

85) CTh XI,1,1. This edict dates from 358 (the consulship of Datianus) or 359 (the consulship of the Eusebii). These estates perhaps came to the Armenian king as part of Olympias' dowry.

FB IV,5 & 15.

N.G.Garsoian has suggested that in 358 Nerses was encouraged by Sapor to serve as an intermediary between Persia and Rome in order to bring about a successful conclusion to the negotiations started by Musonianus and Tamsapor - "Le rôle de l'hierarchie chretienne dans la rapports diplomatiques entre Byzance et les Sassanides." R.E.Arm. ns. 10 (1973) pp.123-4 & 127. This seems highly improbable, both in that the Persian king would entrust such a task to the Armenian catholikos and in that he must already have been preparing for the new offensive against Rome, which took place in the following spring.
86) Amm. Marc. XXVII,12,9-14 and XXX,1. He is described as a *juvenis* - Amm. Marc. XXX,1,3. Cf. also Themistius, Or. VIII,116 (ed. Downey).

87) FB IV,5 & 15.


89) An opportune moment for the taking of the Armenian princes as hostages would be 350, when Constantius had to leave the eastern frontier in order to combat the usurper Magnentius. Perhaps Iovinianus was included in this group of hostages - above, n.80.

90) The Armenian sources attribute to Nerses certain reforms, which include the prohibition of marriages between close relatives - FB IV,4 and Moses III,20.

Although Faustos says that Constantius' banishment of Nerses angered Arsaces and provoked him to order the devastation of Roman territory in Cappadocia for six years - FB IV,11, in fact it appears that his removal was in the interests of both king and emperor. For the latter the Armenian catholikos was an obstacle to his attempts to bring about unity in the Church. The banishment may be compared to that of Athanasius, for both were staunch supporters of Orthodoxy who were unwilling to come to a compromise with their Arian rivals. Indeed, Moses' account openly states that this was the reason for Nerses' exile: "Some heretics of the Arian sect came to him (in Constantinople) and said, 'If you profess the faith with us, our father Macedonius (Patriarch c.342-360) will save you.' Since he did not agree, he was exiled." - Moses III,30 (p.287). It can also be viewed in the context of the letter which Constantius sent in c.357 to the joint rulers of Axum, Aezanes and Suzanes, urging them to send the orthodox bishop Frumentius back to Egypt to undergo investigation - Athanasius, Apol. ad Constantium 29 & 31 and above, ch.I, n.105.

Nerses certainly seems to have been something of an irritant to the king, constantly criticizing his actions - FB III,13. He is said to have reprimanded him for the death of Gnel, although this occurred during his time in exile - FB IV,15 and Moses III,24 (p.279).


If she was murdered, it is impossible that Arsaces would not have incurred the grave displeasure of the emperor. Julian, however, was preoccupied with other matters during his short reign and, perhaps, he was not too concerned about the death of a Christian noblewoman and protégée of his hated cousin.
92) FB IV,20.

93) FB IV,21. An alternative tradition presents the conflict between Arsaces and Sapor as the result of the injured pride of Andovk - Movses Dasxurançı II,1 and above, n.15.

94) FB IV,21. On the other hand, he says that "for more than thirty years the fury of battle raged between Arsaces and Sapor" - FB IV,20. Later he states that the conflict lasted for thirty-four years - FB IV,50, whereas Procopius (who probably derived his information about the imprisonment of Arsaces from Faustos - Bell. Pers. I,5,40) says that the τόλεμος...επονουμος between the Persians and Armenians lasted for thirty-two years - Bell. Pers. I,5,10. Faustos reverts to the round figure of thirty in IV,54. These differences may be explained by the confusion caused by dating from different events: the capture of Arsaces in 364 and the start of open warfare - Amm. Marc. XXV,7,12; the end of the siege of Artogerassa, which had lasted for over a year - FB IV,55 and Amm. Marc. XXVII,12,12; and the death of Arsaces in the "Castle of Oblivion" in c.368/9 - Amm. Marc. XXVII,12,3; Procopius, Bell. Pers. I,5,29 & 38-9; FB IV,55 and Moses III,35 (p.292-3). Like Procopius, Moses says that Arsaces committed suicide after his reign had lasted for thirty years - III,35 (p.294).

95) Above, ch.IV, pp.141 & 146-9.

96) Amm. Marc. XX,11,1-3.

97) Libanius Or. XVIII,260.
Ammianus emphasizes the loyalty of Arsaces to Rome - Amm. Marc. XXV,7,12: amicus nobis semper et fidus. It is inconceivable that he would praise the king's constancy if there had been any indication of betrayal of his hero Julian.
Arsaces' loyalty is also attested by the story of his interrogation by Sapor after his capture in 364. He alternately feigns support for Persia and reveals his true feelings of hostility - FB IV,54 and Procopius, Bell. Pers. I,5,18-28.

98) FB IV,16 & 18.

99) Amm. Marc. XXV,7,12 and XXVII,12,1-3.

100) Amm. Marc. XXI,7,6-7; 13,1.

101) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,2 & 8.

102) Amm. Marc. XIX,9,9.

103) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,4.

104) Amm. Marc. XXI,13,1 & 4.

105) Zosimus and Ammianus speak as if the thirty thousand men under Procopius and Sebastianus were only detached from Julian's army in response to a Persian raid into
Mesopotamia - Zos. III,12 and Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,4-5. The latter does, however, add the parenthetical remark: ut ante cogitaverat.

106) Amm. Marc. XXIV,7,8: ob causas impedita praedictas. This suggests that Ammianus had already explained the reason but that it has been lost in a lacuna earlier in the text, probably at XXIV,7,2.

107) Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,5 and XXV,8,16.

108) Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,5: per Corduenam...

109) Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,5. In the phrase per Corduenam et Moxoenam it appears that Ammianus is using the conjunction to express two alternatives. For the relative positions of the two principalities (which must have been familiar to him, if only from his visit to Corduene in 359 - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,21) preclude a single route from Roman Mesopotamia. Below, appendix 2.

110) Amm. Marc. XXIII,2,2.

111) Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,5: Chiliocomo uberi Mediae tractu, partibusque aliis praestriicto cursu vastatis. Below, appendix 2, p.304. It is noteworthy that Aurelius Victor, writing in 360 about Galerius' victorious Persian campaign, states: per Armeniam in hostes contendit; quae ferme sola seu facilior vincendi via est - De Caesaribus XXXIX,36.

For other examples of campaigns into Media from the West - M.V.Minorsky, "Roman and Byzantine Campaigns in Atropatene." BSOAS 11 (1944) pp.243-65. In particular, one might compare the campaign of 590 against the usurper Bahram Chubin. The forces which invaded Persian territory were divided into two groups. One, led by Chosroes II and the Roman general Narses, set out from northern Mesopotamia, crossed the Tigris and Great Zab rivers and reached Arbela. The other, under the command of Bindöö and the Prefect of Armenia, advanced to Lake Urmia from the north-west. Thus Bahram was faced with invasion on two fronts. Significantly, he abandoned the defence of Babylonia and Ctesiphon, and instead he tried to prevent the two armies from linking up together - Theophylact Simocatta V,8. However, he failed to stop Narses' advance across the Zagros mountains via Rewanduz and his union with the forces from Armenia near the southern shores of Lake Urmia. Consequently, Bahram and his troops fell back until the combined Roman and Persian armies caught up and defeated him at Gonzaka - Theophylact Simocatta V,10f; Evagrius VI,19; M.V.Minorsky, art.cit. pp.244-8 and H.C.Rawlinson, "Memoir on the Site of the Atropatene Ecbatana." JRGS 10 (1840) pp.65-158.

112) Libanius, Or. XVIII,260: καίτοι μηδετέρας ούτ’ (Julian) μούρας ελεύθερας μήτε τῆς οἰκείας μήτε τῆς συμφώνου, τῆς μὲν ἀδικία τοῦ τὸ ἔδυος ἐχοντος...

113) Amm. Marc. XXV,7,12. The exact nature of relations between Julian and Arsaces is unknown. It seems that they never
met personally, but that Julian sent the king instructions about the part he was to play in the Persian expedition - Amm. Marc. XXIII,2,2. Hence a tradition quickly developed on the theme of this correspondence. Although the surviving versions of Julian's letter are spurious and were intended to show the apostate's ἀφίκε, there is no indication either in them or in other sources that the religious differences of the two rulers affected their cordial relations. If Arsaces had defied or betrayed Julian because of his renunciation of Christianity, this would surely have been recorded by Christian and Armenian writers with the fullest praise.

114) Amm. Marc. XXV,8,16. Below, appendix 2, p.305.

115) Libanius, Or. XVIII,260: ...ἡ δὲ, ὁς ἐγείρει, κατ' ἀρχὰς εὔδος τοξουθήτων τινών ἐν τῷ Τιγραί τινιομένων, μετέχειν αὐτὸς ἠγίσατο το μάχεσθαι πρὸς αὐτός. The ὁς ἐγείρει may indicate Libanius' acceptance of a particular source of information.

116) Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,6.

117) Malalas, Chronographia XIII (Bonn) p.330-1:
καὶ δὴ ἐξισορρόδησεν αὐτῷ ἀπεικονίσαν ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Τιγραίτων καὶ πλῆθος πολλὰ, καὶ γνώτης ὅτι ἐμποδίζει, ἄρτοι ἐπὶ τὴν Περσαρμένην.


119) Zawray's failure to support the Romans is the context of a letter sent by Julian to the Armenian king, Tiran/Arsaces. Moses' text bears little resemblance to a Greek version which is preserved in the Julianic corpus - Ep.66 (Hertlein). Although both are highly dubious, the fact that Sozomen refers to such a letter from Julian to Arsaces shows that the tradition made an early appearance - Soz. HE VI,1.


121) There is no suggestion that Roman garrisons were established in Armenia proper before the partition of 387, and Roman troops are only attested in the kingdom when they were called upon to assist against Persian invaders or Armenian insurgents - above, n.59. Nor is there much evidence for Armenian enrolment in the imperial forces at this time, whereas from the second half of the fifth century onwards Armenians played an increasingly important part in the Byzantine army - P.Charanis, The Armenians in the Byzantine Empire (Lisbon 1964). This is presumably because the king mustered the native troops under his own command and and thus few able-bodied men were at liberty to seek employment in the Roman army. However, within the terms of Armenia's alliance with Rome it is clear that the king could be called upon to provide troops to assist the imperial army. Thus in 363 Arsaces was expected to participate in Julian's campaign against Persia - Amm. Marc. XXIII,2,2. Zosimus records
the death at the battle of Mursa in 351 of a certain Menelaus, who commanded a company of cavalry archers from Armenia - Zos. II,51,4-52,2. Perhaps these men, too, had been sent by the king at the request of Constantius. The Scriptores Historiae Augustae refer to Armenian contingents in the Roman army - vita Nigri 4,2; 'Titus' Tyr. Trig. 32,3 and Aureliani 11,2-4. Herodian also mentions Armenian archers in Maximinus' army - VII,2,1f. An Armenian was the commander of some Roman troops who were sent to put down Isaurian raids in 404 - Eunapius fr. 84; Zosimus V,25,2ff; Synesius, Ep. 135. Similarly, there is known a certain Bacurius, a nobleman from Iberia, who became the tribune of a unit of sagittarii and fought at the battle of Adrianople - Amm. Marc. XXXI,12,16; cf. Rufinus, HE I,11 and Socrates, HE I,20,20. Arsaces is also said to have given military aid to the Persians in a war against a barbarian land not far from Armenia - Procopius, Bell. Pers. I,5,11-5. The Armenian sources say that the Persian king asked Arsaces to join him in waging war against Rome. In Faustos' account he is seen leading in person a large army against the fortress of Nisibis - FB IV,20, but according to Moses, he avoided accompanying the Persians with his entire army and only sent a token force to Sapor's aid - Moses III,25. Several references are made to the payment of tribute by the Armenian king to both Rome and Persia. One source speaks of Tiridates IV as a tribute-paying vassal of Rome - the Arabic Life recension ch.167 in G.Garitte, Documents pour l'étude du livre d'Agathange (Rome 1946) p.106. Because the Persians were supporting insurgents in Armenia, Chosroes "broke the peace he had with Sapor and withheld from him the special tribute, giving it instead to the emperor." - Moses III,10. After his installation as king, Tiran/Arsaces made a new treaty with the Persians, "paying tribute to the Greeks and a special tribute to the Persians." - Moses III,11. Later Moses says, perhaps in the context of the renewed offensive in 359, "when Sapor had made peace with the northern nations and was free of war, he revealed the anger he bore against Arsaces for paying tribute not to him but to the emperor for so many years." - Moses III,25 (p.280). The surrender of hostages is mentioned as a method of gaining control, exploited by the Persians as well as by the Romans. Thus Sapor is said to have "subjected the order of princes by taking hostages from them all" when he supposedly installed Arsaces on the Armenian throne - Moses III,18 (p.272). Moses also speaks of the surrender of hostages by Tiran/Arsaces to Julian: "To spare his second son Arsaces, he gave his third son Tiridates with his wife and sons, and also his grandson Tirth, son of the dead Artashes, his eldest son." - Moses III,13. Later we are told that when payment of tribute was withheld in the reign of Valentinian, the royal hostage Tiridates was put to death and the general Theodosius threatened to attack Armenia - Moses III,19 & 21. If these passages have any historical value, one must discount as inaccurate the names of the Roman emperors and general. The events described might fit into the context of Constantius' reign. The royal hostages are the same group as those who returned
with Gnel and Tirith in 359 - above, n.85, and the episodes are connected by Moses himself first with Yusik and then with Nerses - Moses III,14 & 21. It is possible that Constantius extracted the hostages in order to ensure Arsaces' loyalty during his absence in the West, and perhaps the failure or delay in the payment of tribute roused Gallus' anger, causing him to order Tiridates' death (for the Caesar's cruel and violent nature - Amm. Marc. XIV,1,1 and 7,1-3).
Chapter VI  The Mesopotamian Communities.

(a) Contacts across the Frontier.

Despite the political division of Mesopotamia in late antiquity, the communities on both sides of the border shared a common social and cultural heritage. The Syriac language, of course, was spoken right across the Middle East from the Mediterranean coast to the Persian Gulf. This greatly facilitated communication, both in the exchange of ideas and with the movement of people across the boundary between the Roman and Persian Empires. Thus Aithallaha, who was bishop of Edessa from 324/5 to 345/6, apparently sent a letter to the Christians in Persia, informing them about the Council of Nicaea, while a Persian bishop called Milles is said to have travelled from Susiana to Jerusalem and Alexandria on a tour of famous monasteries. Clearly such men would have been very much at home on either side of the frontier.

Trade and commerce must also have played a significant part in the relations between Roman and Persian subjects, although this activity received very scant notice from local Syriac writers. Ephraem, whose Mémré de Nicomedia present a glimpse of everyday life in the frontier town of Nisibis, does not include merchants in his description of its inhabitants and their occupations. Yet, in accordance with the treaty of 298, all Persian merchandise had to enter Roman territory through Nisibis, and the Expositio totius mundi, composed in the mid-fourth century, states that the prosperity of Nisibis and Edessa was founded on the trade with the East.

A further means of intercourse was the common hazard of enslavement and deportation. The populations of captured towns were frequently removed from their homes and resettled on the
other side of the border. Moreover, it seems that numerous individuals and small groups crossed the frontier without the consent or knowledge of the military authorities. Jerome's vita Malchi indicates both the ease with which one might pass between Roman and Persian territory and the inherent dangers of living in this unsettled region.

(b) The Importance of Christianity.

As well as language, trade and movements of population, voluntary or otherwise, religion also helped to preserve the homogeneity of the largely Semitic peoples of Mesopotamia. Indeed, Peter Brown has asserted that it was the Christian element which did most to maintain contacts across the Fertile Crescent. It is undoubtedly true that Christianity and its heretical offshoots had spread throughout the region by the fourth century and consequently played a part in both local and wider issues. Because the sources which express the views of the Mesopotamian communities towards the outside world are all Christian, and more specifically of the Orthodox Church, it is necessary first of all to gauge the importance of the Christians and define their role in society.

As elsewhere in the Roman world, the conversion of Constantine had a profound effect. In northern Mesopotamia the official recognition of Christianity must have given the faith a considerable boost, while in the south it acquired a certain respectability as the "religion of Caesar", even though this was accompanied by suspicion and at times persecution. Consequently, there existed during the fourth century a vigorous, missionary church whose advocates were talented and vociferous men, exemplified by Jacob and Ephraem of Nisibis. Nevertheless it was a divided church. There were numerous sects of an
heterodox, para-Christian and Gnostic character in addition to those which were accepted as orthodox. How far these were distinguishable and how much they were mutually exclusive is now almost impossible to tell. Yet even Ephraem, the staunch champion of Orthodoxy, is said to have had two pupils, Paulanas and Aranad, who deviated from sound doctrine. Moreover, he laments that the Manichees adopted Christian customs which disguised their heretical beliefs. He also complains that at Edessa the majority of believers who bore the name of "Christians" actually consisted of groups influenced by the teachings of Marcion and Mani, while the orthodox minority had to be content with the humiliating situation of being called "Palutians" after the name of an early third century bishop. Likewise, the Marcionite movement was so strong in Persia and followed the same customs as those of the orthodox that its adherents could claim to be the "Christians". The works of Aphraates and Ephraem, so similar in many ways, indicate that the rivalry between these various sects was intense during the mid-fourth century. But it is also clear that there must have been considerable fluctuation and interaction amongst the Christianized population. Furthermore, this very struggle may well have exaggerated the importance of the Christian elements vis-à-vis the pagan or Jewish sections of the community. It certainly helped to keep them in the public eye and made them into what might be called in modern parlance "pressure groups".

In what ways did Christianity influence the local communities? First and foremost, it encouraged and strengthened their loyalty to the Roman state. Eusebius had presented Constantine as the "friend of God", elected by divine providence and granted success because of his Christian faith. From his
comparisons of Constantine, Constantius and Jovian with the respected bishops of Nisibis, it is evident that Ephraem regarded the imperial office in much the same way. He sees as his ideal the alliance of a strong (Christian) emperor and a faithful (orthodox) clergy. Constantius is, therefore, despite his support of Arianism, worthy of praise since he had aided the growth of Christianity and put up stout resistance to the Persians throughout his reign. This contemporary judgement is of the highest value in helping to achieve a balanced view of Constantius' abilities as a ruler. His absence from the East during the 350's is bitterly lamented, although it is unlikely that Ephraem was concerned with practical considerations, such as the shortage of military manpower in the absence of the central field army. Rather, he considered the presence of the Christian emperor as a token of that higher guardianship, against which the unbelieving Persians could achieve nothing. Julian, on the other hand, is the object of Ephraem's scorn and anger. His paganism is blamed outright as the cause of the failure of the Persian expedition and the humiliating surrender of Nisibis. Julian certainly encountered considerable hostility and opposition from the Christian community, notably at Antioch and Edessa during the preparatory stages of the expedition.

Favour towards Rome is also apparent amongst the Persian Christians. In 337 Aphraates prophesied that Persia would be defeated in the forthcoming struggle with Rome because the latter represented the cause of Jesus Christ. The final victory of Rome, he declared, was not forthcoming while it had remained a pagan state, but now that the emperor had embraced the Christian faith Persia was doomed to submit to its
superiority. Yet the preference for Rome was not due solely to the profession of Christianity by its rulers. The previous clash of arms in 297 had brought a decisive victory for the Caesar Galerius, and Sapor's invasions met with no real success until the fortresses of Amida, Singara and Bezabde fell to his assaults in 359-360. The attitude of such as Aphraates, even when couched in allegorical terms, cannot have endeared the Christians to their Persian masters. Thus, in addition to the religious hostility of the Magi, the priests of Zoroaster, Christians came to be politically suspect in the fourth century. The Passion of Simeon bar Sabba'e, bishop of Seleucia, makes it clear that it was the refusal of the Christians to support the campaigns against Rome by the payment of special levies and increased taxes which finally led to the outbreak of persecution under Sapor II. The stories of other martyrs indicate that the persecution was partially motivated by the fear that the Christians were a fifth column working for the Romans. Whether or not there was any substance to it, the fact is that profession of Christianity was regarded as tantamount to a declaration of treason and disloyalty.

The affiliations of heretical groups, however, and their reaction to the official recognition of Christianity in the Roman Empire remain uncertain. The Marcionites were at first allowed religious freedom by Constantine, but this was later revoked at the Council of Nicaea. Julian's letter to the people of Edessa illustrates, in the case of the Valentinians, how imperial disapproval of a particular sect could make it vulnerable to attack from their favoured rivals. Yet it was not until the reign of Gratian and Theodosius that harsh legislation was introduced against heretics. Moreover, their
situation in Persia appears to have been no happier. Manichees and Parsees were caught up in the general persecution of christianizing groups, attracting the enmity of the Zoroastrian clergy and the disapproval of the Persian king. With the recognition of Christianity its leaders enjoyed an enhanced position of prestige and influence. During the fourth century bishops rose to prominence in the community and were even entrusted with legal powers to a certain degree. Their statutory authority was, however, strictly limited in the East, where the acquisition of too much juridical independence by the Church would have constituted a serious threat to the highly centralized administration. Furthermore, it is likely that the dangers of giving bishops too much authority over a population still containing a large proportion of non-Christians were recognized and appreciated. There existed a delicate balance in the relations between Christians and pagans, which might easily be upset and cause civil discord. However, the real power of the bishop derived not so much from any legal privileges which he enjoyed as from his position as the spiritual leader of the Christian congregation. By setting a good example by his devout behaviour and being in many cases a well-known local figure, he developed a close attachment to the community which no official could hope to emulate. Landowners were often absent from their estates, preferring urban life to that of the countryside, and they showed little concern for the living conditions of their coloni, which might not in any case coincide with their own best interests. Officials, both military and civilian, were subject to frequent changes of post and consequently were unable to consolidate their relations with the local community as much as religious leaders who were permanent
residents.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, the patronage given by bishops or monks was distinguished from that of secular persons because of its moral and religious aspects. These, as well as being an effective curb on partiality and self-interest, served to confer great conviction and prestige on those who exercised it. Thus the bishop could intercede on behalf of his people with the local governor, the military commander or even with the ruler himself, as in the case of bishop Heliodorus during the siege of Bezabde.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, far beyond the practical and physical assistance which leading Christians gave to local communities was their impact on popular psychology in times of stress and crisis. The importance of local holy men is well attested in later, Byzantine society.\textsuperscript{36} Faith in their ability to intercede with God on behalf of the places with which they were associated either in their lifetimes or after death (by means of tombs and repositories of scattered remains) took a powerful hold on the Christian mind. The role attributed to bishop Jacob in the defence of Nisibis during the mid-fourth century is an early example of this process. According to Ephraem, not only did he take an active part in the first siege, but also after his death and burial within the city walls the sanctity of his remains afforded Nisibis divine protection against the subsequent Persian attacks.\textsuperscript{37} These claims indicate the importance of the bishop and the faith of local Christians in his supernatural powers. But it is impossible now to evaluate just how widespread the newly-founded cult was among Jacob's fellow-townsmen and how significant a contribution it really made to the heroic defence of the fortress.

The Christian community also served as an important link between the Syriac-speaking populace and the Greek cities of
Syria and Asia Minor. Libanius is probably not atypical in his lack of interest in the non-Greek culture of the eastern provinces. The division between the sophisticated, Hellenized city-dwellers and the rural or small town inhabitants was deep and almost impenetrable in certain respects. The mere difficulties of language and communication are self-evident. John Chrysostom refers to peasants coming into Antioch on Easter Day, who could be heard speaking a strange tongue. Yet Syriac-speaking bishops attended Church councils and Syrian monasticism gradually exerted an influence over wider horizons. Leading ecclesiastical figures such as Jerome and Basil of Caesarea took a significant interest in local saints, bishops and monks, and the visit of Egeria to Mesopotamia attests to the far-flung reputation of Edessa's Christian shrines and traditions. The writings of Ephraem are said to have been translated into Greek during his own lifetime and circulated widely throughout the East, while many theological and philosophical works of Greek masters were translated for the study and instruction of Syrian scholars in the Christian "schools" which developed, notably at Edessa and Nisibis. Thus the sharing of a common religion undoubtedly assisted in the cultural exchange, although one cannot assume from the lack of evidence that such components as trade and the presence of military personnel did not play an equal part in the process.

(c) The Jewish Communities.

Our information concerning the Jewish inhabitants of Mesopotamia in the fourth century is of a tantalizing brevity. The Babylonian Talmud testifies to the existence of vigorous and influential academies in the vicinity of Ctesiphon, and it is assumed that large numbers of Jews continued to flourish in
Adiabene. But in the Roman towns the Jews are relatively inconspicuous. Evidence from the second and third centuries attests to their role as merchants and craftsmen, especially in the luxury silk trade. It seems, therefore, that they played an important part in the economic life of the region and helped to preserve contacts across the frontier. While pursuing their legitimate occupations, the Jews appear to have maintained a political neutrality in the struggles between Rome and Persia. This, at least, is the inference which can be drawn from their treatment by the respective authorities.

During the long reign of Sapor II there is nothing to indicate that the Jews of Babylonia suffered persecution. Indeed, the stories in the Talmud concerning the Persian queen-mother, Ifra Hormizd, although their historicity is extremely dubious, suggest that they had established friendly relations with the Persian ruling class and were respected as good magicians and physicians. The only recorded trouble concerned Jewish attempts to evade the heavy taxes which were imposed on them by the king. Naturally, this brought severe punishment down upon the culprits. Two passages in the Talmud intimate that certain rabbis acknowledged the superiority of Rome, but this is not to say that they favoured the western power to any extent, except perhaps during the brief reign of Julian. This emperor, it seems, wished to gain Jewish support for his Persian expedition by promising to rebuild the Temple at Jerusalem. The Acta of Simeon bar Sabba'e record a massacre of Jews at Mahoza after they had been enticed by the promise into making plans for their return to Palestine. The story, though exaggerated, has an authentic ring, and it is possible that Sapor would have gone to such lengths to prevent groups
of valuable artisans from escaping to the enemy. But one
would expect to find evidence for some sort of retribution
after Julian's defeat if the majority of Jews in Persian
territory had shown open disaffection. The invasion caused
major devastation in Babylonia; numerous towns and villages
were destroyed, the countryside laid waste and the irrigation
system disrupted.\textsuperscript{52} In this the Jews suffered to the same
extent as the rest of the population,\textsuperscript{53} and it is likely that
their reaction to the approach of the Roman army was fairly
similar, namely one of passive resistance and resignation to
their plight.

The Jewish communities under Roman domination do not appear
to have been unduly harrassed by state persecution in the
fourth century. The Constantinian legislation protecting
converts to Christianity and prohibiting proselytism and the
circumcision of slaves bought by Jews was of minor inconvenience
to the daily life of Jews.\textsuperscript{54} Judaism remained a \textit{religio licita}
in the eyes of the imperial government, and synagogue officials
were confirmed in their immunity from the onerous curial duties.
Even after the pagan interlude under Julian, Valens continued
to treat the Jews with tolerance, and as a consequence of the
burning down of a synagogue in 388 Theodosius felt obliged to
instruct the military authorities in the East to punish anyone
who looted synagogues or interfered with Jewish religious
meetings.\textsuperscript{55} Although there was an alleged Jewish uprising in
Galilee under Gallus Caesar, there is no indication that the
trouble spread to the Jews of the Diaspora.\textsuperscript{56} Neither the
patriarch nor the rabbis were involved, and in general relations
remained friendly and co-operative between the Jewish leaders
and the Roman authorities. Thus the Palestinian Talmud states
that the rabbis ordered bakers to make bread on the Sabbath for the general Ursicinus because "he had no intentions to force the Jews to transgress their religion, he only wanted to eat fresh bread." Another passage records that a rabbi called Abbahn was received with much honour in the governor's palace at Caesarea. Finally, it is noteworthy that legislation banning Jews from the armed forces was only promulgated in the first decades of the fifth century. Presumably before that time Jews had enlisted in the imperial army in appreciable numbers, and doubtless those in the Mesopotamian towns assisted in the defence of their homes when threatened by the Persians.

The Jewish communities did, however, come into conflict with their Christian neighbours during the course of the fourth century. The two groups were closely related. Both used a Syriac version of the Old Testament, the Peshitta, and observed some common festivals and rituals. Many churches in the East used to celebrate Easter during the week of Passover. The Council of Nicaea decided to abolish this "Jewish practice" and tried to achieve unity among the churches with respect to the date of Easter. Nevertheless, some eastern churches obstinately persisted in their adherence to the Jewish custom. Aphraates testifies to the fact that Christians in Persia removed the blood from their meat and ate unleavened bread at Easter, but Ephraem urged his brethren to abandon the observation of the Sabbath and the practice of circumcision. Monotheism was becoming ever more popular at this time, and thus rivalry over converts may also have increased the bitterness of the discord between the Church and Judaism. Certainly, the Acta Martyrum assert that in the third century the Jews encouraged persecuted Christians to adopt their faith and thereby escape
punishment. A similar situation arose in Persia during the persecution under Sapor II, while the growing vigilance of the Church and the gradual increase in imperial legislation against heretical sects may have driven many to find refuge in the Jewish communities. The speeches of Aphraates and John Chrysostom clearly indicate that certain Christian leaders nourished a wild fear of the strength and attraction of Judaism. The fact that imperial legislation and the canons of Church councils laid down severe penalties for proselytism, intermarriage and mere contact with Jews also implies that such things were common happenings in a mixed society. Although proselytism is poorly attested in the Babylonian Talmud, the Jews in Persia undoubtedly resented attempts by the Christians to gain converts, and this possibly explains the origin of the story of their participation in the arrest of Simeon bar Sabba'e. But it was also the close ties between the two communities, rendering them indistinguishable to some outsiders, which largely compelled the Jews to denounce their Christian neighbours during the persecution. In this way they were able to demonstrate their own loyalty to the Persian throne.

Within this picture of close similarity and mutual rivalry one must set the effect of Julian's professed pro-Jewish sympathies. Sozomen expressed the view that he was not motivated by a genuine respect or liking for Judaism, but that he merely wanted to annoy the Christians. Yet, as we have seen, his declared intention of rebuilding the Temple was widely greeted with rejoicing and, together with the cancellation of the special taxes imposed by Constantius, it must have won him many friends among the Jews. They appear to have taken some part in the mob attacks on the more objectionable Christian
leaders during Julian's reign. Ambrose claims that two basilicas at Damascus were burnt down by the Jews at this time, and the Chronicon Pseudo-Dionysianum relates that the Jews and Samaritans slaughtered a number of monks. On the other hand, there are stories of Christian acts of violence against their Jewish neighbours. The Romance of Julian and the Chronicon of Bar Hebraeus recount the massacre of the entire Jewish population of Edessa after they had sent a delegation to complain to Julian about Christian attacks on them, and the Romance also narrates an expulsion of Jews at Nisibis. But the fact that neither Julian nor Ephraem refers to such open conflict in the Mesopotamian towns throws serious doubt on the historicity of these traditions.

Thus it appears that the Jews were generally allowed to live in peace and freedom by both Roman and Persian officialdom. Their importance socially and economically ensured their safety. Admittedly, they suffered minor inconveniences at the hands of rapacious officials or religious zealots, but their lot was very much the same on both sides of the frontier. An exemplary parallel is provided by the discussions which arose out of the billeting of troops with Jewish families. In the prolonged struggle between the two empires the Jewish population of Mesopotamia suffered considerably, but apart from the time of Julian's expedition there is no evidence to suggest that it was treated as a special group whose loyalty and support could be won and usefully directed by one side against the other.

(d) The Army and the Native Population.

The inhabitants of northern Mesopotamia, whatever their internal differences and their sufferings under Roman rule, do not seem to have shown serious disaffection during the fourth
Although certain individuals took advantage of the proximity of the border to escape from their difficulties, the vast majority remained loyal to the Roman cause and put up stout resistance to the Persian attacks. Apart from religious sympathies, which have been treated above, practical reasons may be adduced for this loyalty. Firstly, the permanent garrisons were largely integrated into the local communities. The troops lived cheek by jowl with the civilians in the fortified towns, and the two groups often suffered the same fate during those troubled times. Moreover, locals must have been recruited into the frontier army in considerable numbers. The Notitia lists several units of *equites indigenae* in the two provinces of Osrhoene and Mesopotamia, and Ammianus refers to native contingents participating in the defence of Amida, Singara and Bezabde. Veterans and the families of serving soldiers also strengthened the ties between the armed forces and the civilian population. Indeed, the latter, enduring not only the rigours of life in a naturally harsh environment but also the dangers of living in a precarious frontier zone, were a hardy breed of men. Thus, according to Ammianus, the people of Nisibis, motivated by a strong attachment to their homes, pleaded with Jovian to be allowed to oppose Sapor's occupation of the city, even without the assistance of imperial troops. In this we can see the first signs of local willingness to shoulder the responsibility for defence. Whereas in the fourth century fortresses were manned by regular troops, some of foreign, others of native origin, it later became the common, necessary practice for the local inhabitants to provide for their own safety.

Another bond between soldier and civilian was provided by
military patronage, a practice which is well attested in other regions such as Egypt and Syria, although no specific examples can be cited for Mesopotamia. Yet the involvement of military personnel in the affairs of Mesopotamian communities must have been considerable, both because they were so numerous in the frontier zone and because their fighting role made them of real importance. On the other hand, large-scale military occupation brought its own problems. Since the major towns doubled as fortresses for the frontier legions and the old-style auxilia in the laterculum minus served principally as a local police force, the military could easily be used to cajole or intimidate the majority of the settled population, either officially or unofficially. Officers and men alike abused their position, and general indiscipline was widespread among the troops. Disputes over billeting and provisioning frequently arose, particularly between local civilians and levies from far afield who had no long-standing connections with the region. The Theodosian Code contains nothing specifically on the relations between the inhabitants of cities and military units which were permanently stationed in them, whereas there are detailed and often repeated instructions about temporary billeting.

However, these were but minor tribulations compared with those which might occur when local interests conflicted with the wishes of the central government. In these circumstances the army could be used to impose imperial policy; for example, by supervising the collection of taxes or enforcing harsh legislation. Naturally, in time of war the troops carried out operations in total disregard for the local residents. Thus in 359 Roman soldiers laid waste the countryside as far as the
Euphrates before the advancing Persian army. Ephraem draws attention to the hardship which this caused to the peasant farmers. He clearly believed that the devastation was carried out more for the opportunity it gave to the imperial troops for collecting booty than as an effective means of delaying or halting Sapor's invasion. Reference has already been made to the fact that the evacuation of Nisibis in 363 was ordered against the wishes of its citizens. Ammianus states that those inhabitants who remained reluctant to obey the order had to be driven out of their homes by the soldiers.

Only two groups, the eremites and the Bedouin, avoided the tight control of the imperial authorities, and significantly, both exerted a marked degree of independence and self-will. Numerous stories illustrate how the ascetics wandered at liberty across the desert and flouted imperial authority by their attacks on synagogues and pagan shrines. Similarly, the nomadic tribes were a law unto themselves. In the struggle between Rome and Persia they exhibited no deep-seated preference but changed sides frequently, depending on their relative strength and success. But as for the rest, whether Christian, Jew or pagan, the presence of the military garrisons ensured not only their protection but also their acquiescence. Local feelings were of little significance in the eyes of distant masters.
Syriac Sources

Acta

Aithallaha

Aphraates

Chronica
- *Chronicon Edessenum* ed. L.Hallier (Leipzig 1892) with German trans.

Ephraem
  - E.Beck, CSCO vol.92-3 (Louvain 1961) with German trans.

Julian
1) For the date of Aithallahah's episcopacy, see J.S. Assemanus, Bibliotheca Orientalis tom. 1 (Rome 1719) p.424. For the letter De Fide, see I. Ortiz de Urbina, Patrologia Syriaca (Rome 1965) p.84.

2) AMO tom. 1, p.72. These travels may be dated to the latter half of Constantine's reign, for on his return journey Milles passed through Nisibis where he met the bishop Jacob, who is known from various sources to have died in 338 - below n.37 and J.-M. Fiey, Communautés syriaques en Iran et Iraq des origines à 1552 (Variorum Reprints, London 1979) IIIb, pp.141-2.

3) Ephraem describes the following: workers of the field - Mēmrā 8,441; vine-growers - Mēmrā 5,67; craftsmen such as weavers, tailors, carpenters and blacksmiths - Mēmrā 8,401 & 9,13-54; judges and civic leaders - Mēmrā 8,467; 15,27 & 235-6.

4) Peter the Patrician fr.14, FHG IV, p.189. Expositio totius mundi 22, Geogr. Graeci Minores ed. C. Müller (Paris 1861) vol. II, p.516. It is noteworthy that Milles, on his arrival in Adiabene, sent a considerable amount of silk thread to Jacob at Nisibis in order to help with the expense of the church which the bishop was then engaged in building - AMO tom. 1, p.72. Silk is mentioned again later in the Acta, where a certain Abtusciasatas ransomed the bodies of the martyrs Jonas and Brichjesus for fifty drachmas and three silk robes - tom. 1, p.224. In the third century the leader of the Christian community at Edessa, a man called Aggai, was a craftsman in silk who had the privileged task of making the royal head-dress - below n.46.

5) AMO tom. 1, pp.134-40. This records the fate of the people of Bezabde in 360. Once the fortress had been stormed, the Persians led away the survivors, who are said to have numbered more than nine thousand, and settled them in various Iranian cities. Incidentally, the Acta confirm the opinion of Ammianus that the bishop of Bezabde did not betray the fortress to the Persian king by indicating the weakest point in its defences - Amm. Marc. XX,7,7-9. For among those who were taken into captivity was bishop Heliodorus, together with his clergy and congregation. These Christians were subsequently separated from the rest of the prisoners and put to death. Above, ch.II, n.20. On the other side, the Chronicon Pseudo-Dionysianum states that "Julian marched into Persia and laid waste the whole region from Nisibis as far as Ctesiphon...and then he led away many men whom he settled on Mount Snsu" (possibly near Melitene) - I.B. Chabot, CSCO ser. 3, vol. 1 & 2 (Louvain 1927 & 1933) trans. p.133. Libanius reports that Constantius had earlier captured a Persian town and settled its population in Thrace - Or. LIX,83.

6) Vita Malchi (Migne) P.Lat. vol.23, pp.54-60.

8) H. Koester, "INOMAI ΔΙΑΓΩΡΟΙ" - The Origin and Nature of Diversification in the History of Early Christianity." HThR 58 (1965) pp.279-318. He concludes that "for several centuries Christianity in Edessa was dominated by controversies between several major heresies, the Marcionites, the Bardesanites and the Manichaeans. Compared with these, Orthodoxy, a late comer anyway (probably not much before AD 200), appeared as only a small and insignificant group still in the third and fourth centuries."

9) Sozomen, HE III,16,4: οὐκ Ὠτὸν ὑψόν δογμάτων διαμαρτήτων αὐτοῖς.

10) "For their works are similar to our works, as their fasting is similar to our fasting, but their faith is not similar to our faith." - Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and Bardesanes trans. C.W. Mitchell, vol. 1 (London 1912) p.184. R.M. Grant points out the similarities between Christians and Manichees, both in their ascetical practices and in the penalties which were imposed on the two communities during the reign of Diocletian - "Manichees and Christians in the Third and Early Fourth Centuries." in Ex Orbe Religionum Studia Geo Widengren Dedicata (Leiden 1972) pp.430-9.


12) On the short list of heretical groups dangerous to the Persian Church Aphraates put the Marcionites in first place - Hom. III,9. Simeon bar Sabba'e also warned his flock against the teachings of Marcion - AMS vol. 2 (Paris 1891) p.150f.

The story of Mar Aba, who died in 552, includes an encounter with a stranger at a crossing of the Tigris. The monk enquired about the traveller's faith and his reply was accompanied by the explanation that "following the local custom he used the word 'Christian' to denote a Marcionite." - P. Bedjan, Histoire de Mar Jabalah, des trois autres patriarches, d'un prêtre et deux laïques nestoriens. (Paris 1895) pp.206-74. One may also note the reference: "...the Christians were intermixed with Marcionites and Manichees, and participated in their works." - Histoire Nestorienne, Patr. Or. V,2 (Paris 1910) p.325. Even later, according to a statement of Jacob of Edessa, monks who were judged orthodox were living in friendship with others who adhered to doctrines considered heterodox - Reliquiae iuris eccles. antiqui, syriaci, resol. LIV ed. P.A.de Lagarde
13) Eusebius, HE X, 9, 2. In the panegyric which he delivered at Constantine's tricennalia, Eusebius declared that

...τῆς ἀκοντίας βασιλείας τὴν εἰκόνα φέρων ὁ τῷ δῆθι φίλος βασιλεύς κατὰ μέγιστον τοῦ κρείττονος τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς ἄραντων τοὺς

οἶκοις διαμιμηθὲν ἵνα τε " - I, 6.

14) Carmina Nisibena XXI, 14 & 21.

15) Carmina Nisibena XXI, 23.

16) Carmina Nisibena XIII, 15: "...die Krone, die unsere Kirchen erfreute." Ephraem also says that he was "herablassend und milde" (equivalent to the imperial virtue of serenitas) like bishop Vologaeses - CN XXI, 21.


18) CN IV, 18: "Wie könnte, mein Herr, die vereinsamte Stadt, - deren König weit entfernt, und deren Feind nahe ist, - bestehen ohne (dein) Erbarmen?"

Also, of course, his presence was valued because the local communities could benefit greatly from imperial patronage and munificence.

19) One may note the story of Constantius' phantom, which appeared on the battlements of Nisibis during the third siege to the dismay of Sapor and his army - Theodoret, HE II, 30, 8-10. Above, ch. III, n. 137.

Other contemporary Christian writers represent Constantius as God's vice-regent - Firmicus Maternus, De errore profanarum religionum 29, 3-4; Cyril of Jerusalem, Ep. ad Constantium 5 (dated 351), (Migne) PG vol. 33, 1172a; Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. IV, 34 (Migne) PG vol. 35, 560d-561b. Athanasius made exaggerated claims about the Arians' confidence in and worship of Constantius - Hist. Arian. 32-3 (Migne) PG vol. 25, 729b-732c and Ep. de synodis Arimensi et Seleuciana 3 (Migne) PG vol. 26, 685a.

In similar fashion the pagan eulogist, Themistius, emphasized Constantius' god-like virtues as the reason for the Persian failures on the eastern frontier - Or. I, 13. Note also the passage about Nisibis and Edessa in the Expositio totius mundi: Istae autem civitates semper stantes deum et imperatoris sapientia...

20) Hymni contra Julianum, passim.
Naturally, Julian's death was regarded as divine punishment, and the sight of his bier passing before the walls of Nisibis clearly made a strong impression on Ephraem - *Hymni contra Julianum* III,1-2. His description of this dramatic episode also contains reference to the Persian banner which was hoisted on one of the towers as the fortress was hurriedly evacuated by the Romans - *Idem* III, 3. Ephraem thus endorses one element in Ammianus' account of the surrender: Bineses, unus ex Persis...civitatem ingressum gentis suae signum ab arce extulit summa - Amm. Marc. XXV,9,1. Subsequently Ephraem rejoices at Jovian's accession - *CN* XXI, 14 & 19, whereas most Roman commentators criticized him severely for the ignobile decretum - Amm. Marc. XXV,7,13 and R.Turcan, "L'abandon de Nisibe et l'opinion publique." in *Mélanges A.Piganiol* II (1966) pp.875-90.


22) *Hom. V*: "...that kingdom of the children of Esau (Rome) will not be given over to the forces now gathered which are coming up against it, for it guards the kingdom for Him (Jesus) who has given it and He it is who protects it." - ed. I.Parisot, *Patr. Syriaca* I (Paris 1894) p.233, 12-5.

23) Christianity is referred to as "the religion of Caesar" - *AMO* tom. 1, p.137 and (in the reputed edict of Sapor) p.117. The *Acta*, however, cannot be regarded as an extremely reliable historical source, despite the fact that it claims to draw on eye-witness accounts - tom. 1, pp.208 & 257. It contains too many similarities with the standard martyrologies found in the Roman world: the publication of royal edicts against Christians; the interviews of martyrs with the king or one of his governors; their stubbornness and recalcitrant attitude towards the authorities; their repeated declaration of Christianus sum (compare the martyrs of Lyons - Eus. *HE* V,1,20) and their eagerness to suffer capital punishment. All these are highly stylized motifs, suggesting that the actual facts were worked up into a collection of elaborate stories for the edification and encouragement of the Christian community when it was again suffering persecution in the fifth century.

24) *AMO* tom. 1, p.17. It has been shown from the *Homilies* of Aphraates that the start of the persecution cannot be dated to earlier than 344/5. For the fourteenth Homily, which is dated to the thirty-fifth year of Sapor's reign (= 344), complains of the worldliness and ambition of the clergy at Seleucia. Such criticism is much more characteristic of times of peace than of persecution - M.Kmosko, *Patr. Syriaca* II (Paris 1907) pp.699-703. The *Acta* claim that the persecution continued for the last forty years of Sapor's reign, thus dating the start of the persecution to 341. But Aphraates concludes his twenty-
third Homily with the statement: "I am writing this letter to you, my friend, in Ab 656 Sel. era (= January 345), the thirty-sixth year of Sapor, who stirred up the persecution, and the fifth year of the destruction of the churches..." This perhaps explains the earlier date in the Acta. Cf. M.J.Higgins, "The Date of the Martyrdom of Simeon bar 'Sabba'e." Traditio 11 (1955) pp.1-36.

It is evident that persecution under Sapor was not carried out continuously but sporadically, with major bursts of activity after the first outbreak in the 340's and then in the last years of his reign - A.Voobus, A History of Asceticism I (Louvain 1958) pp.248-9.

25) For example, AMO tom. 1, pp.152-3.
26) Eus. Vita Constantini III,64-5.
27) Ep. 115 (Bidez). He asserts that the Arians attacked the followers of Valentinus: καὶ τετομήκαν τασαία κατά τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ἵνα ἀλήθεια ἐν εἰρημομοιώτητι πώλητι γένοιτο δὲν - 424c. Consequently, he ordered their valuables to be given to the soldiers as largitiones and their lands to be confiscated to the imperial exchequer. In the letter to the Bostrians Julian also refers to disturbances at Samosata: πολλα δὲ τοιάδε καὶ σαφώς τοιῇ τῶν λεγομένων αἱρετικῶν, ὡς ἐν Σαμοσάτῳ, κτλ. - Ep. 114, 436a.
28) The privileges extended to Christianity were reserved for adherents to the Nicaean Creed; heretics were diversis muneribus constrinqui et subici - CTh XVI,5,1 (326). From the time of Gratian and Theodosius heretics were forbidden to hold meetings or enter an orthodox church and were expelled from a city if they tried to teach there - CTh XVI, 5,4-6.
29) The Chronicle of Seert refers to the persecution in c.287 of a group of Manichees who were regarded as indistinguishable from Christians by the Persian authorities - Histoire Nestorienne, Patr. Or. IV,3 (Paris 1907) pp.237-8. Similarly, Acepsimas, the bishop of a village near Arbela, was brought before his Persian judges at the same time as a Manichee - AMS vol. 2 (Paris 1891) p.351.
30) Bishops had the right to manumit slaves and even to intervene in law-suits, provided that one of the parties requested it. Lesser clergy were granted the privilege of being tried before an episcopal instead of a secular court - A.H.M.Jones, LRE pp.90-1 & 480 and G.Fowden, "Bishops and Temples in the Eastern Roman Empire AD 320-435." JThS ns.29 (1978) pp.53-78.
31) Thus the Church acquired no direct authority over pagans until the edict of 407/8 - CTh XVI,10,19.
32) There was a marked pagan reaction under Julian. Churches were desecrated and bishops who had been particularly vigorous in the campaign against pagan cults were assailed and even killed. George, the Arian bishop of Alexandria, was lynched for the leading role he had played in the
seizure of pagan shrines in the city - Socrates, HE III,2; Sozomen, HE V,7; Amm. Marc. XXII,11,3-10 and Julian, Ep. 60. The pagans of Arethusa in Syria tried to force Mark, the bishop of that city, to rebuild at his own expense a temple which he had destroyed - Libanius, Ep. 819,6; Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. IV,88-91 and Soz. HE V,10,5-14. Julian himself exiled the bishop of Cyzicus, Eleusius, because he had demolished temples and made many converts from paganism - Soz. HE V,15,4-10. But a similar attempt to expel Titus of Bostra failed because the Christian community there strongly supported its bishop - Soz. HE V,5,11-2. In contrast, Ammianus says that the Christians of Alexandria failed to protect those who were set upon by the pagan mob because Georgii odio omnes indiscreta flagrabant - Amm. Marc. XXII,11,10.

33) John Chrysostom, In Acta Apost. Hom. XVIII (Migne) PG vol. 60, col.147. Libanius expressed his disgust for those who scorned the city life: ...τοις μὲν περὶ τὴν γῆν τούτοις και πόρῳ τῶν πόλεων καὶ οὖν συγγένειαν... - De Patrocinis Or. XLVII,22.

34) Abraham of Qidūnaīā is a good example of a contemporary religious leader and missionary in Mesopotamia. He spent many years at Qidūn near Edessa during the episcopate of Aithallaha, trying to convert the pagan villagers to the Faith. According to the Chronicon Edessenum, he became a recluse in 355/6, but he continued to attract disciples and acted as a monastic teacher - ch.21. Ephraem's Hymns allude to his journeys, to his activity as a counsellor and patron to the local rural community, and to his wider reputation - Hymni et Sermones III, col.821 Cf. P.Brown, "The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity." JRS 61 (1971) pp.80-101.

35) Amm. Marc. XX,7,7-8. Above, n.5. Similarly, in the reign of Theodosius the monk Macedonius, an ascetic who spoke only Syriac and was popularly known as Gubba, was one of the intercessors who saved the citizens of Antioch from punishment in 387 after the affair of the statues - Theodoret, HE V,20 and Historia Religiosa 13 (Migne) PG vol. 82, col.1404. In the early fifth century bishop Marutha of Maipherkat played an important part in the diplomatic exchanges between Persia and Rome - R.Marcus, "The Armenian Life of Marutha of Maipherkat." HThS 25 (1932) pp.47-73. On a more mundane level Theodoret tells how a monk called Abraham settled in the pagan village of Libanus and, by successfully intervening on behalf of the inhabitants with the tax-collectors, won such popularity that the whole village was converted, built a church and elected him to be their priest - Hist. Rel. 17. According to Sozomen, Ephraem interceded for the poor and needy during a famine at Edessa shortly before his death in 373 - Soz. HE III,16,12-5. Cf. also, J.B.Segal, "Mesopotamian communities from Julian to the rise of Islam." Proc. Brit. Acad. 41 (1955) p.114-5.

36) N.H.Baynes, "The Supernatural Defenders of Constantinople."


Ephraem regarded Jacob as the first bishop of Nisibis and called the church there "the daughter of Jacob" - CN XIV, 16-22. Jacob's death is recorded in Jerome, Chron. s.a. 338, and the later chronicler Jacob of Edessa places it in the second year of the reign of Constantius - Chronicon ed. E. W. Brooks & I. B. Chabot CSCO ser. 3, vol. 4, p. 218.

The Liber Calipharum contains two notes which suggest that Jacob died while the Persians were still besieging the city. For it dates his death to the thirtieth day of the siege, which lasted altogether for two months - Chronica Minora ed. E. W. Brooks & I. B. Chabot CSCO ser. 3, vol. 4, pp. 96 & 132. If this is accurate, it would seem remarkable that the death of such a champion of the city did not undermine the morale of the defenders. Yet a likely explanation of why it did not affect their will to resist is that Jacob immediately came to be regarded as a true martyr, having laid down his life while defying the infidel Persians. His death was seen as an act of expiation for the sins of Nisibis, and his body thus became a palladium and a token for its salvation. Such a belief existed already in the fourth century is clear from the writings of Ephraem. Perhaps, too, the pagan citizens of Nisibis were impressed by Jacob's apparent powers. Certainly, superstition and magic were strong influences on people's lives in late antiquity, and Ephraem reproved his fellow-townsmen for their indulgence in magical and astrological practices - Memra de Nicomedia XII, passim and CN XI, 15.

Ephraem also heaps praise on Jacob's successors, Babu and Vologaeses - CN XV-XVI. The latter, in particular, is said to have played a significant role in the third siege, even to the point of leading a sortie against the Persians - Memra de Nicomedia XV, vv. 149-54. A Greek inscription has survived which records the construction of the baptistry in the year 671 of the Seleucid era (=359) at the time of bishop Vologaeses - A. Khatchatrian, "Le Baptistere de Nisibis." in Actes du Vème Congrès Intern. d'Archéologie Chrétienne 1954 (1957) pp. 407-21.

38) The only reference to Syriac in his works mentions Syriac-speaking tinkers - Or. XLII, 31. John Chrysostom speaks of a preacher who, in eulogizing the monks from the countryside to an urban audience, has to apologize at some length for their rusticity and barbarous language - Huit catecheses baptismales ed. A. Wenger (Paris 1957) 8, 1-6.

39) Hom. ad populum Antioch. 19, 1 (Migne) PG vol. 49, 188.

The monks who poured into Antioch in 387 in order to pray in the market-place for the citizens and avert Theodosius' anger could not speak directly with the imperial emissaries but needed the help of an interpreter - Theodoret, Hist. Rel. 13 (Migne) PG vol. 82, col. 1400.
40) Aithallaha of Edessa and Jacob of Nisibis attended the Council of Nicaea in 325 - E.Honigmann, "La liste originale des Pères de Nicée." Byzantion 14 (1939) pp.17-76, esp. p.46. Ephraem was quick to learn of the earthquake disaster which occurred at Nicomedia in 358 - Mémére sur Nicomédie ed. Ch.Renoux, Patrologia Orientalia vol. 37, fasc. 2 & 3 (Louvain 1975) intro. pp.xxv & xxxiii. The development of Syrian monasticism and its influence on imperial affairs can be traced in broad terms. The example of Macedonius has already been mentioned - above, n.35. Simeon Stylites, who lived for forty years on a column near Antioch, is said to have persuaded Theodosius II to countermand the instructions of the praefectus praetorio per Orientem that synagogues taken over by Christians in Antioch should be restored to the Jews - Evagrius, HE I,13. Daniel, the first stylite to move to Constantinople, exerted considerable influence at the imperial court during the reigns of Leo and Zeno - P.Brown, art.cit. JRS 61 (1971) pp.92-3.


42) Sozomen, HE III,16,2.

43) J.B.Segal states that Ephraem was acquainted with the works of Greek philosophers, although it is doubtful whether he was greatly proficient in Greek - Edessa. 'The Blessed City'. (Oxford 1970) p.89.

44) The study of medicine was an important feature of the intellectual life of Mesopotamian communities. Following the example of the Jewish schools, the Christians gradually established medical colleges and hospitals in the major centres of population such as Nisibis and Beth Lapath - J.B.Segal, art.cit. Proc. Brit. Acad. 41 (1955) pp.128 & 132, n.5. A number of local physicians gained a wide reputation in both Persia and the Roman East; for example, Magnus 7 in PLRE I. Later, Stephen of Edessa cured the Persian king Kavad of an illness and then, in 544, he joined an embassy to Kavad's son, Chosroes I, in an attempt to persuade him to desist from besieging Edessa - Procopius, Bell. Pers. II,26,31-7.

45) The story of bishop Noah tells of his visit to Jerusalem as a child and of his conversion to Christianity there. Subsequently his parents feared to return to their native city of Anbar/Peroz-Shapur on the Lower Euphrates, and instead settled in Adiabene because, the chronicler explains,
many Jews lived in that region - Sources syriacques ed.
A. Mingana vol. 1 (Leipzig 1907) pp.13 & 89. There was a
Jewish academy at Arbela - Palestinian Talmud, Sotah IV,4
(19d).

46) The traditions of early Christianity at Edessa include
references to "the Jews...who carried on commerce in silk"
- G. Phillips, The Doctrine of Addai the Apostle (1876)
pp.32-3. Addai's successor was probably a Jewish convert
and, according to the legend, had been a craftsman working
with silk - Idem pp.33, 39, 45 & 49.
A Greek inscription at Constantina (Viransehir) records the
presence of a Jewish merchant, together with a physician -
J.-B. Frey, Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum II (Rome 1952)
p.342. Knowledge of the silk trade is evident from the
Babylonian Talmud - Shabbath 20b & 90a; Sotah 48b;
Qiddushin 7b, 32a & 73a. Western sources also record their
participation in trade and commerce - Gregory I, Ep. IX,104;
Gregory of Tours, Hist. Francorum IV,12 and VI,5.
According to Mas'udi and Tha'aliibi, the captives taken at
Amida and Singara in 359-60 were distributed between Sus,
Sustar and other towns in the province of Ahwaz, where they
introduced some new types of brocade and silk - Muruj
al-Dhahab II, p.186 and History of the Persian kings ed.
H. Zotenberg (Paris 1900) p.530.

47) Babylonian Talmud, Bava' Batra' 8a-b; 10b-11a; Zevahim
116b; Niddah 20b and Ta'anit 24b. The rabbis thus present
Persian outsiders as accepting the legality and efficacy of
their religion.

48) Above, ch.IV, n.9.

49) Babylonian Talmud, Shebu'oth 6b. The declaration of
R. Isaac is supported by a quotation from Daniel VII,23,
a chapter which is extensively used by Aphraates in his
fifth Homily to endorse his prophecy of the defeat of Persia.
The second such remark is connected with an episode which
attests to harassment by Zoroastrian fanatics - Bab.Tal.
Gittin 16b. Their opinion would most suit the period
between the defeat of Narses and the treaty of Jovian.

50) Ep. 204 (Bidez). John Lydus has preserved a sentence from
a letter written by Julian on the Persian campaign,
apparently addressed to the Jews of Mesopotamia and
Babylonia - De Mensibus IV,53 ed. Wunsch p.110 = Ep. 134
(Bidez).

51) The account of this massacre appears in the second recension
of Simeon's martyrdom, written towards the end of the fifth
811-2. It states that the bishop had prophesied a dreadful
slaughter of the Jews when they falsely accused him before
Sapor at his trial. This came about in the time of Julian
when, in response to his proclamation that he wished to
assist the Jews and further the rebuilding of the Temple
at Jerusalem, a number of them left their homes at Mahoza.
Setting out "in the hope of this return, they had gone
three parasangs' distance from the city when news was
brought to Sapor. He sent his troops to intercept them and slew many thousands of them..."

A favourable reaction to Julian's proclamation is attested elsewhere. Ephraem states that the Jews were seized by a frenzied enthusiasm: "they blew the shofer (the ram's-horn) and rejoiced" - A.Rücker, Bibliothek der Kirchenväter 20 (1919) I, p.218. Gregory of Nazianzus wrote that they stood ready to depart with the greatest alacrity - Orat. contra Julianum IV (Migne) PG vol. 35, col.668. In Italy Rufinus states that they felt as if the Messiah had come - HE X,38. Other authors recall the collection of great sums in money and valuables from all parts of the world - John Chrysostom, Adv. Iudaeos V,11; Philostorgius, HE VII,9 and Sozomen, HE V,22. There is also epigraphic evidence; an inscription from Ascalon, dated to 362/3, proclaims "God is One. Victory to Iulianos." - M.Avi-Yonah, Quarterly of the Dept. of Antiquities in Palestine 10 (1944) p.160f., and the Ma'ayan Baruch inscription from Caesarea Philippi, praising Julian as the templorum restaurator - A.Negev, Israel Exploration Journal 19 (1969) pp.170-3.

52) Above, ch.IV, p.152.

53) Ammianus refers to a Jewish town which was destroyed by the Roman troops - Amm. Marc. XXIV,4,1. Its inhabitants, however, had already fled before Julian's advance.

54) Cf. A.H.M.Jones, LRE pp.944-50, and especially: "Christianity added theological animus to the general dislike of the Jews and the numerous diatribes against them, in the form of sermons or pamphlets which Christian leaders produced, must have fanned the flames. It is surprising, indeed, that the emperors, most of whom shared the popular view, maintained such moderation in their legal enactments...the attitude of the emperors seems to have been mainly inspired by respect for the established law. The Jews had since the days of Caesar been guaranteed the practice of their ancestral religion and the government shrank from annulling this ancient privilege."

But imperial forbearance of non-Christian groups was also motivated by economic factors; for example, Arcadius was reluctant to coerce the strong pagan element in Gaza since they had a very good record for paying their taxes promptly, and he did not want to jeopardize this revenue by causing a commotion - Vita Porphyrii 41 ed. H.Gregoire & M.A.Kugener (Paris 1930).

55) Curial immunity - CTh XVI,8,3 (321); XVI,8,2 (330) and XVI,8,13 (397).
Slaves - CTh XVI,9,1 (335) and XVI,9,2 (339).
No billeting in synagogues - CTh VII,8,2 = CJ I,9,4 (368).
Protection against Christian fanatics - CTh XVI,8,9.
Theodosius also forbade the prefect of Egypt from imposing special burdens on the Jews and Samaritans who performed the duties of navicularii - CTh XIII,5,18.

However, Jews were almost certainly subjected to discriminatory taxes during Constantius' reign, although these were abolished by Julian - Ep. 204 (Bidez).
56) Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus XLII,10; Socrates, HE II, 33 and Sozomen, HE IV,7. Ammianus mentions only that there were numerous plots and aspirants to the royal power while Gallus was in residence in Antioch - Amm. Marc. XIV,1,2. Cf. E.A.Thompson, "Ammianus' account of Gallus Caesar." AJPh 64 (1943) pp.302-15. Excavators at Tell Kedesh (near Meggido, south-west of the Sea of Galilee) would like to see the Roman stratum end in the rebellion of 351 - E.Stern & I.Beit Arieh, "Excavations at Tell Kedesh." Tel-Aviv 6 (1979) p.12.

57) Palestinian Talmud, Shebi'ith IV,1 (35a). Moreover, the rabbis ordered that "bread be brought for Ursicinus on the Sabbath because the community might be in need of it (or him)." That is, they gave orders in advance, before it was requested by the Roman commander, to avoid possible trouble - Pal. Tal. Bezah I,6 (60c). The same rabbis, R.Jonah and R.Jose, are said to have paid Ursicinus a visit in Antioch on some unspecified errand - Pal. Tal. Berakoth V (9a). One may tentatively identify this Ursicinus with the magister equitum of 349-359. He may have become involved with the Jewish communities during the troubles of Gallus' reign - see previous note. At least, his ownership of a house at Antioch is attested by Ammianus - Amm. Marc. XVIII,4,3, and no other Ursicinus listed in PLRE I can be associated more closely with Jewish affairs.

58) Babylonian Talmud, Ketuboth 17a.

59) CTh XVI,8,16 (404) and XVI,8,24 (418). Michael the Syrian testifies to the presence of Jews in the Persian army in the days of Kavad - ed. I.B.Chabot vol. 2 (Paris 1901) trans. p.191. The Chronicle of Joshua Stylites relates how the Jewish inhabitants of Constantina during the same period of conflict tried to make a hole in the town wall in order to let in the Persians who were besieging the place - ch. 58 ed. W.Wright (Cambridge 1882) p.47f. But there is no suggestion in Ammianus or any of the other fourth century sources that there was any fear of Jewish betrayal at the fortresses besieged by Sapor II.


61) Cf. Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (Paris 1932) vol. 11, p.1951ff. Eusebius, Vita Constantini III,15 (Migne) PG vol. 20, col. 1057. He also quotes Constantine's letter to the churches: 'μηθὲν τούπυ όστω ύμιν κοιμών μετά τού ἐξέθοστού τῶν θεσμῶν τὰ πρότερα' - III,18,2 (Migne) PG vol. 20, col. 1076. Athanasius states that the churches which ignored this directive were located in Syria, Cilicia and Mesopotamia - De synod. 5 (Migne) PG vol. 26,
col. 687 & 1032; cf. also, Epiphanius, Contra Haereses LXX,10 (Migne) PG vol. 42, col. 356-7.

62) Aphraates, Homily XIII,2. J.B.Morris, The Select Works of Ephraem (Oxford 1847) p.390f. It is, perhaps, possible that Ephraem was influenced in his attitude by Jacob who had participated in the Council of Nicaea and had witnessed the general desire for there to be a clear distinction between Christian and Jew - above, n.40. Thus Ephraem reviles the Jews as the murderers of Christ in just the same way as does Constantine - compare the passage quoted by J.B.Segal (op.cit. p.102) with Eusebius, Vita Const. III,18.

63) It is likely, however, that the long-standing antipathy between Greek and Jew added considerably to the religious hostility. Presumably this was less marked in the region of Mesopotamia, where Jew and Christian shared the same cultural and ethnic background.

64) Acta S. Pionii XIII,1. Eusebius states that Christians associated with the Jewish community in order to avoid persecution - HE VI,12,1. It is said that the Jews of Edessa openly sympathized with the Christians during the Great Persecution and joined in the mourning at the funeral of the martyr Ḥabbib - F.C.Burkitt, Euphemia and the Goth (Oxford 1913) Ḥabbib 38a, p.126.

65) It is significant that the Jews were not unaffected by the sectarian conflict between the Monophysites and Nestorians in the following century - J.B.Segal, art.cit. Proc. Brit. Acad. 41 (1955) pp.122-3.

66) Aphraates, Homilies XI, XII and XIX, passim. He was aware that Judaism would be an attractive alternative to irresolute Christians, and that the larger and more vigorous Jewish communities could offer them greater security and relief from the inconveniences of Persian rule, especially in times of persecution. Proselytes from Judaism would then naturally drift back to their former religion, while pagan converts might consider it preferable to reverting to polytheism.

John Chrysostom, Contra Iudaeos Orationes I-VIII (Migne) PG vol. 48, 843-942.

67) It does, however, declare that proselytes may be accepted from amongst the "Kurds" - Babylonian Talmud, Yeḥamoth 16a. It also contains a ruling about the acceptability of marriage to proselytes at Mahoza - Bab. Tal. Qiddushin 73a. Apparently Jewry in Babylonia was more isolated and conservative in its outlook than elsewhere. Consequently, it may not have conducted proselytism with the same vigour; at least, there is no sign that it provoked the deep hostility of the Zoroastrian priesthood by such activity.

68) J.S.Assemanus, Bibliotheca Orientalis tom. III (Rome 1725) part ii, p.lxxv (the conversion of a Jew and his family). Other stories illustrate the violent reaction of Jews to
apostates. For example, one may compare that of a Jewish shepherd boy from Singara who was converted to Christianity and thereafter slain by his irate father - P. Peeters AB 44 (1926) pp.313-8 and J.M. Fiey, "Encore 'Abdulmasih de Singar." Le Muséon 77 (1964) pp.205-23, with a similar one about a certain Lucius of Clermont. He was the son of one of the Jewish elders and became a convert through the ministrations of bishop Austremonius. When he learnt of his son's apostasy, the rabbi killed both Lucius and the bishop - Acta Sanctorum, Aprilis III.

69) The Passion of Simeon bar Sabba'e tells of Jewish involvement in the martyrdom of the bishop of Seleucia - AMO tom. 1, pp.20-1. It claims that the Jews incited Sapor's anger against the Christians by intimating that the Roman emperor regarded bishop Simeon much more highly than the King of Kings. Just how much truth there is in this story is impossible to determine, but Aphraates also says that the Jews rejoiced at the persecution of the Christians - Homily XXI,1.

70) Sozomen, HE V,22.

71) Ambrose, Ep. XL,15 (Migne) PLat. vol. 16, col. 1107. Chronicon ed. I.B. Chabot CSCO vol. 91, Scr. Syr. 43 (Louvain 1953) p.178. During the reign of Julian Mar Mattai is said to have left his monastery along with other monks and crossed the frontier into Persian territory, settling in the vicinity of Nineveh - AMS vol. 2 (Paris 1891) p.400f. A. Vööbus suggested that such cases as this might help to explain how exaggerated stories of the sufferings of Christians under Julian came to be circulated in Persia - op. cit. I pp.227-8.


73) Rava instructed the people of Mahoza about removing before the Passover bread belonging to troops billeted in their homes - Babylonian Talmud, Pesahim 5b, and he gave orders about how to carry the apparel of soldiers to the baths on the Sabbath - Bab. Tal. Shabbat 147b. He also refers to the possibility that a general, arriving in the town unexpectedly, might requisition food prepared for a wedding feast - Bab. Tal. Ketuvoth 3b. This is paralleled by the rabbinic directions regarding the provision of Roman troops - above, n.57 and S. Lieberman, "Palestine in the third and fourth centuries." Jewish Quarterly Review ns. 36/4 (1945-6) pp.352-9.

74) Brigandage and lawlessness existed throughout the Empire - R. MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman
Empire (Harvard 1963) pp.51-2. In Mesopotamia the proximity of the frontier doubtless facilitated such malpractices, but in that the Bedouin were the arch perpetrators, the settled population was discouraged from embarking on similar activities - below, ch.VII, pp.269 & 272. For the local inhabitants could neither compete with nor join the Saracens, whose skill at brigandage was widely recognized and whose closely-knit tribal system naturally excluded outsiders. Instead, the peasantry relied all the more heavily on what little protection the imperial forces could give against the incursions from the desert.

75) The most notable example is that of Antoninus - Amm. Marc. XVIII,5,1 and above, ch.IV, n.64.

76) Notitia Dignitatum Or. XXXV,18-23 and XXXVI,23-8; Amm. Marc. XVIII,9,3; XX,6,8 and 7,1.

77) The Abinnaeus Archive frequently refers to soldiers of the ala who lived in the villages between Dionysias and Arsinoe - nos. 28; 32; 33; 37 & 48. Letters concerning recruits and mentioning locally resident relatives of soldiers under Abinnaeus' command indicate that the ala was recruited mainly from the immediate vicinity of the camp. Thus language would not have been a problem for the majority of the limitanei. Only the senior officers and those troops in the field army who had come from the West suffered from an inability to converse with the local Syriac-speaking population. The generals and governors doubtless had skilled interpreters on their staff, just as a corps of interpreters was attached to the imperial court under the supervision of the magistri officiorum - Notitia Dignitatum Or. XI,52 and Occ. IX,46. In the case of the field army the lack of a common language must have contributed to the misunderstanding and disputes between soldiers and civilians. But it could also be a subject for miracles; for example, Jerome tells the story of a candidatus of Constantius, a red-haired, ruddy Frank, who visited the hermit Hilarion of Gaza in the hope of being freed of a demon which had troubled him from childhood. He spoke only Frankish and Latin, but had brought with him Greek-Latin interpreters. Hilarion, however, chose to address him in Syriac, and miraculously the Frank was able to understand and also reply in Syriac - Vita Hilarionis 22. In a short space of time foreign troops invariably gain some competence, either by picking up a basic vocabulary or by attracting local traders and servants who can act as intermediaries - F.C.Burkitt, Euphemia and the Goth (Oxford 1913) Euphemia 19, p.138 (the Goth learnt to speak Syriac during his stay at Edessa). One wonders how many languages the Parisian trooper turned Persian spy had at his command - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,16. Ammianus' lack of detail about the use of languages also leaves one to speculate about the tongue in which the little boy whom he rescued outside Nisibis told him that he was ingenui culusdam filius - Amm. Marc. XVIII, 6,10. Is it possible that an eight year-old child, even if he came from a well-to-do family at Nisibis, was able to speak Greek? It is perhaps more likely that one of Ammianus' companions on Ursicinus' staff knew sufficient
Syriac to ascertain the bare facts about the boy. Ammianus himself had a rudimentary knowledge of oriental languages - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,16 (the meaning of Meiacarire) and XIX,2,11 (saansaan & pirosen), but this is not enough to show that he was fluent in either Syriac or Middle Persian.

78) Amm. Marc. XXV,9,2 & 5. Thereafter the city must have been a source of some disquiet to the Persians. During the conflict in the years between 485 and 491 Zacharias declares that "the men of Nisibis were favourably inclined towards the Byzantines and showed themselves lazy in the fight (against them)." - Zach. Rhetor VII,5. A century later the city was in open revolt, and its submission to the Persian king's army is said to have been followed by a terrible massacre - Chronicon Anonymum ed. I.Guidi CSCO ser.3, vol. 4 (Louvain 1903) p.18f.

According to Ephraem, the inhabitants of Nisibis in the mid-fourth century responded to the raids of nomadic Saracens by seizing captives in return - Memra de Nicomedia XII, vv.1-8 and 55-66. Likewise, on the other side of the frontier the rabbis ruled that the men of Nehardea could carry weapons on the Sabbath as a protection against Arab raids - Babylonian Talmud, 'Eruvin 45a and Ketuvoth 23a.

Above, ch.II, pp.56-7.

79) Libanius' De Patrociniiis is the locus classicus for the extraordinary patronage of fourth century troop commanders - Or. XLVII, esp. 4-6 & 13-6. The Abinnaeus Archive evidences the wide range of affairs which came to occupy the officers of frontier units. For Abinnaeus received not only complaints and petitions from civilians against military personnel, or vice versa, but also letters in which civilians accuse other civilians - nos. 6-8; 21 & 30. Occasionally army commanders showed a genuine willingness to serve the local population and win its favour. Thus a poetic inscription on the road from Palmyra to Damascus is a lasting record to a certain comes named Silvanus who assisted local agriculture and travel by building a mansio with ample water cisterns beside the castrum - IGLSyr. V, 2704 (end of the fourth or early fifth century). One may also note the concern which Ursicinus showed for a child who had been abandoned on the road outside Nisibis during the panic caused by the Persian invasion of 359 - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,10 and above n.77. It is in marked contrast to Ammianus' own behaviour towards fellow-soldiers - Amm. Marc. XVIII,8,11 and XVIII,6,12.


81) The Abinnaeus Archive provides contemporary evidence for infringements of discipline and mistreatment of civilians - nos. 18; 28; 32 & 48. It is apparent, however, that for the most part the soldiers were not isolated from the local peasantry by differences in language, religion, social status or ethnic origin - R.Rémondon, "Militaires et civils dans une campagne égyptienne au temps de Constance II." Journal des Savants (1965) pp.132-43.

On the other hand, the civilians are not entirely faultless,
for the Archive records how they pilfered the property of military personnel - nos. 45; 47 & 49, and even resorted to violence - nos. 12; 51-2 & 57. Malpractices, especially among the senior officers, were caused by inflation eroding their living standards. They made up for the decreasing value of their salaries by embezzling funds intended for their men and extorting sums from civilians in exchange for real or supposed favours - A.H.M.Jones, "Inflation under the Roman Empire." Economic History Review 2nd series, 5 (1953) pp.305-7.

82) Ammianus remarks on the drunken and disorderly behaviour of the Petulantes and Celtae at Antioch during Julian's stay there in the winter of 362/3 - Amm. Marc. XXII,12,6. There was friction between the soldiers and inhabitants of Edessa in 503, caused by the influx of troops from outside the province to counter the Persian invasion. Joshua Stylites describes their behaviour and treatment during temporary billeting in the city both on their way eastwards and on their return - ch. 86 & 95. Cf. also, F.C.Burkitt, Euphemia and the Goth (Oxford 1913) Euphemia 5-6 & 15, pp.131 & 135 and J.B.Segal, Edessa. 'The Blessed City.' (Oxford 1970) pp.161-3. By contrast, local soldiers had set up a hospital there in 500/1 at the time of an outbreak of plague - Joshua Stylites ch. 43.

83) CTh VII,8-9. Special exemptions from billeting included synagogues - CTh VII,8,2 (c.370), and the residences of retired senior officials - CTh VII,8,3 (384).

84) Amm. Marc. XVIII,7,3-4.

85) Ephraem, Carmina Nisibena V,23-5 and VI,18-21. Within official circles, too, very strong criticism of the military was sometimes voiced, as in the case of Ursulus, the comes sacrarum largitionum, on seeing the ruins of Amida - Amm. Marc. XX,11,5. For the general animosity between soldiers and civilians in Ammianus' time - E.A.Thompson, The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus (Cambridge 1947) pp.74-8.

86) Amm. Marc. XXV,9,5. Ephraem implies that after their occupation of the city the Persians tried to curry favour with the Christian community by demolishing the pagan altars and honouring the Christian shrine which had delivered it from three sieges - Hymni contra Julianum II, 22. Thus Jovian's use of the troops may also have been to ensure that all the valued inhabitants were evacuated and did not abscond to the benefit of the Persians.

87) Monks who had given up work and urban life roamed the desert fringes like animals, wandering from place to place and eating only grass and roots - Ephraem, Opera Selecta ed. J.Overbeck (Oxford 1865) p.120; Aphraates, Homily VI,1 and Monumenta Syriaca ed. P.Zinerle (Oeniponti 1869) vol. 1, pp.5-7. Their anti-pagan activities were bitterly condemned by Libanius - Or. XXX,8-12. Ephraem makes it
clear that mockery and insults were often levelled at those who took up the monastic life - Hymni et Sermones ed. T.J.Lamy (Mechliniae 1882-1902) vol. 4, col.163 and Monumenta Syriaca vol. 1, p.11; also, F.C.Burkitt, op. cit. Shmona and Guria 70, p.109. Valens took drastic action against the Egyptian monks in order to punish them for their opposition to the Arian bishops whom he favoured. He condemned large numbers to the mines and quarries, deporting them to distant provinces - Cassian, Collationes 18,7. He is also said to have expelled bishop Barses on his visit to Edessa in c.372, and Jacob of Edessa records the flight of a number of bishops and monks to Persia because of his extreme Arianism - Chronicon ed. E.W.Brooks & I.B.Chabot CSCO ser.3, vol. 7 (Louvain 1903) p.222. Later, some of these fugitives returned home - Chronicon ad annum 846 ed. E.W.Brooks & I.B.Chabot CSCO ser.3, vol. 4 (Louvain 1903) p.156.
Chapter VII Saracens, Romans and Persians.

(a) The Definition of Saraceni.

The geographer Marcian describes the Saracens as the inhabitants of a large tract of desert land, bordering on Arabia Petraea and Deserta, on Palestine and Persia, and on Arabia Felix. He adds that they have many different names.\(^1\) Ptolemy, however, mentions a region called Saracene, which he places to the west of the "Black Mountains" in the Sinai peninsula.\(^2\) This precise localization is apparently confirmed by epigraphic evidence, for Sinaitic inscriptions of the second and third centuries have been found which refer to a people called the Sariki or Scharki.\(^3\) But, despite attempts to identify the Saracens with a particular tribe, it is clear that ancient writers most frequently used the term in a wider sense to describe various wandering tribes. The rather lax terminology of the Greek and Roman authors was undoubtedly caused by their inability to gain more precise information about individual tribes, made all the more difficult by their nomadic existence and by the fluctuating nature of their tribal confederacies. Thus, like Marcian, Procopius applies the name Saraceni to Arab tribes stretching from the Tigris to Egypt.\(^4\) Similarly, Ammianus' excursus on the Saracens suggests that he regarded the name as a collective term, for he describes them as gentes quarum exordiens initium ab Assyriis ad Nili cataractas porrigitur ...\(^5\) On two occasions he states that Saraceni was just another name for Scenitae Arabes,\(^6\) and the fact that he qualifies it with the additional name Assanitae when he mentions the phylarch Podosaces indicates that it was more of a generic than an ethnic term.\(^7\)

It seems, therefore, that the name Saraceni was used to denote
any nomadic tribe which lived a fairly free and lawless life on the edge of the Syrian desert, and it was roughly equivalent to the Syriac term Tayyaye and the later Arabic word Bedouin. Likewise, the word Arab itself, found in the ancient inscriptions of southern Arabia, is applied to the nomadic as distinct from the sedentary population and quite often means simply "raider". In the Koran it is used exclusively of the Bedouin and never in reference to the townsfolk of Mecca, Medina and other cities, whereas in the early Classical Arabic dictionaries there appear two forms of the word - 'Arab and A'rab; the latter meant Bedouin, while the former was applied to all who spoke the Arabic language and were full members by descent of an Arabian tribe. A further distinction is drawn by Syriac authors between the true nomads, whom they call Tayyaye, and the semi-nomadic people of the arid steppe-lands of northern Mesopotamia. These are known simply as 'Arab or 'Arbaye, and their principal home during the mid-fourth century stretched from Amida in the north to Thannourios in the south, and from the vicinity of Resaina east to the Tigris. According to the chroniclers, it was largely for the protection of the 'Arab against the Persians and Bedouins that the emperor Anastasius later built the fortress of Dara. 

(b) Their History in the Roman and Persian Empires.

After Trajan's annexation of the Nabataean kingdom of Arabia in 106 Rome came into much more direct contact with the Arab tribes of the desert fringes. Glimpses of these tribes can be seen in the many thousands of inscriptions, largely graffiti, which have been found both within and far beyond the boundaries of the province of Arabia. In the southern sector Romans and Arabs appear to have co-operated peacefully and successfully in
the supervision of the caravan routes from the Red Sea ports. This can be inferred from the presence of Roman military personnel in remote and far-flung places.\textsuperscript{12} Moreover, an inscription at Rawwafa, dated to 166-9, commemorates Roman assistance and support in the construction of a temple for the tribe, indicating that the tribe willingly absorbed some aspects of Nabataean-Roman culture. It was during this period that Thamudic tribesmen were enlisted as foederati and were entrusted with the defence of certain areas of the eastern frontier.\textsuperscript{13} However, the tribes themselves remained autonomous, presumably because they followed a semi-nomadic way of life and could not be enticed to settle down in places where they could be controlled more effectively by the Romans.

In contrast to the harmonious relations which were established with the Thamudic confederation in the mid-second century, indications are that the Arab tribes farther north in Trans-Jordan were more hostile and disruptive. Graffiti not only refer to the usual tribal warfare, vendettas and disputes over water-rights and grazing land, but also record occasional strife with Roman forces. Of particular interest are the Safaitic graffiti from El-Hifneh, a watering-hole in the Wadi Sham between the Hauran mountains and En-Nemara. Several allude to escapes from Roman patrols, and two mention fines which Rome imposed on a tribe and the arrest of some of its members.\textsuperscript{14} But it is only towards the end of the century that signs appear which suggest that the Romans were losing their ability to keep the tribesmen in check. Thus one inscription describes the eighty-fifth year of the Bostran era (= 190/1) as the year in which "the Arabs ravaged the land".\textsuperscript{15} The construction of fortifications and the general strengthening of
the defensive system during the last years of the Antonines and throughout the Severan period also point to increasing pressure from the frontier tribes. The third century brought more dislocation and disorder to the East, reflected in the continued Roman efforts to protect the border regions from attack. But the collapse of the Mesopotamian kingdoms of Osrhoene and Hatra, and the defeat of Palmyra provided an ideal environment for the expansion of the Saracen tribes. For, with the decline in settled life and regular trade, more and more groups resorted to nomadism and brigandage for their livelihood.

The emergence of the Sassanians as the rulers of a new Persian Empire contributed greatly to the destabilization of tribal communities throughout the Middle East. According to the Arab historians of the ninth and tenth centuries, the seizure of power by Ardashir provoked the migration of the Tanukh from the area of al-Qatif near Bahrain. They moved north-westwards to the Syrian frontier before eventually settling in the vicinity of al-Hira. A Greek-Nabataean inscription from Umm al-Jemal in the southern Hauran provides evidence for their wanderings since it commemorates a certain Gadimat, king (Battûtā /mlk) of the Tanukh, but there is no firm reason for identifying him and his people with the Arabs who assisted in the defeat of Zenobia, as an Islamic tradition claims. It is likely, however, that neighbouring tribes did benefit from the fall of Palmyra in that they were able to exploit the temporary power vacuum to establish their own spheres of influence. Thus the famous En-Nemara inscription (which, though written in the Nabataean script, is the earliest known piece of Arabic) glorifies one Imrulqais as the "king of
all the Arabs". The funerary text, dated according to the Bostran era to 328, records his conquests in the Arabian peninsula. These, it claims, extended as far as Thaj in the east and Najran in the south, but it is unlikely that his sovereignty actually stretched much beyond the Syrian desert. Yet the reference to his relations with Rome and Persia suggests that he at least regarded himself as the head of an important buffer state. It was not until the time of the Tetrarchy that any concerted effort was made to stem the growing tide of lawlessness and independence among the frontier tribes. According to one panegyric, Diocletian himself led a campaign against the Saracens in 290, and during the reorganization of the eastern limes it is evident that particular attention was paid to refortifying the crucial area at the head of the Wadi Sirhan. From dated inscriptions we know of building under the Tetrarchs and Constantine at Azraq, Bshir and Deir el-Kahf, as well as road maintenance in the area of Umm el-Qu'ttein.

Farther east on the fringes of the Persian Empire the tribes appear to have assumed the status of vassals during the second half of the third century. Ardashir and his son, Sapor I, are recorded by later Arab historians to have been active in bringing under their control the region of al-Hira and the western periphery of the Persian Gulf. An inscription at Paikuli, commemorating the accession of Narses to the throne in 293, includes in the list of rulers who were his friends and supporters 'Amru, king of the Lakhmids, and a sheikh of the Harvanik, possibly an Arab tribe settled on the north bank of the Naarmalcha. However, during the minority of Sapor II Arab tribesmen carried out extensive raids from across the Persian Gulf on the coastal districts of Fars, Khuzistan and Sawad.
Consequently, Sapor's first military expedition was directed towards the Arabian peninsula. As well as subduing the region of Bahrain, it is claimed that he took reprisals against the Bedouin tribes of the interior. Large numbers of prisoners were led away into captivity, tied together by cords through their shoulders - hence Sapor's Arabic cognomen, Dhu'l-Aktaf (Lord of the Shoulders). 27

(c) The Expansion of Nomadism.

The proliferation of nomadic groups in Arabia has been attributed to the disruptions of the third century and the consequent decrease in eastern trade. Certainly, although they were basically pastoralists, many Arab communities must have relied on the caravan trade to supplement their income, acting as guides and escorts in the employ of wealthy entrepreneurs from Palmyra, Hatra and other merchantile centres. Thus when these cities were eclipsed and trade was directed along a more northerly route through Nisibis, the Arabs of the Syrian desert and the Middle Euphrates were deprived of a vital source of income. 28

Another factor was that during late antiquity the Yemenite kingdoms, which consisted largely of settled agricultural communities, fell into decline and were eventually subjected to foreign rule in the sixth century. Arab tradition has telescoped this loss of prosperity into the symbolic episode of the breaking of the Ma'rib dam, as a consequence of which a sizeable proportion of the population migrated northwards. 29

These people adopted a nomadic way of life in order to survive their wanderings across the Arabian desert. They became known to the Syriac-speaking inhabitants of northern Mesopotamia under the collective name of Tayyaye, although there is no need to
believe that they were all members of the Tayy tribe. However, this tribe claimed to be of Yemenite ancestry and evidently at some imprecise date moved northwards into the border region between Persia and the Roman East. Such migrations are also attested for the Lakhmids and Ghassanids, who later played a leading part in Roman-Persian relations. These movements, whether caused by political, economic or climatic changes, doubtless brought pressure to bear on the limited grazing land and water resources of the northern desert fringes, and the resultant tribal rivalries were often the cause of further troubles and wanderings. Thus tribes became inured to their nomadic existence. Moreover, sporadic visitations of drought and famine gave an added impulse to the desert tribes to encroach on the more settled areas in search of sustenance. For example, a report to the League of Nations in 1928 records that drought caused the Shammar nomads from the northern Jazirah to move south into the alluvial plain as far as Kut, Hilla and Diwaniya in 1923, 1925 and 1928, and that measures had to be taken for their control.

Growing nomadization may also have been prompted by the unwillingness of peoples on the Persian and Roman frontiers to submit fully to imperial authority. In the fourth century both powers laid heavy burdens on their subjects in order to pay for large numbers of soldiers and officials. The attention of tax-collectors and troops may have encouraged some communities to prefer a freer nomadic existence to one of subsistence farming on marginal land. Mas'udi, who treats the political and social history of the pre-Islamic Arabs at considerable length, considers that their greatest source of strength lay in the fact that the desert was their habitat and nomadism their way of
life. He reports that their earliest leaders, having examined
the two ways of life, the settled and the nomadic, deliberately
chose the latter. The reason for their choice was that towns
and buildings were held to confine human beings both physically
and mentally. Of course, Mas'udi's main object was to show
that because of their intensely pure and spiritual life in the
desert the Arabs were ideally suited as recipients of the
Prophet's message. Yet this does not detract from the
impression we receive that the tribes actually preferred the
freedom of the desert to the restrictions and prohibitions which
were part and parcel of a settled life.
(d) Their Depredations.

The Saracens were renowned for their acts of brigandage.
Ammianus says that in a moment they would lay waste anything
they could find: milvorum rapacium similes. Julian makes
brief mention of marauding Arabs in his panegyric to Constantius,
while Procopius frequently refers to their depredations in the
sixth century. Belisarius is made to remark that they were
the cleverest of all men at plundering. In the Life of
Malchus Jerome describes one of their sudden attacks during the
mid-fourth century, saying that they had come armed not for
fighting but for seizing booty. They pounced on a group of
about seventy travellers on the road from Beroea to Edessa and
carried them off into captivity across the Persian border.
Similarly, Theophanes' Chronographia contains a reference to
Saracens selling Assyrians in Roman Mesopotamia. The basic
reason for this propensity for robbing and pillaging was their
extreme poverty. The anonymous author of the De Rebus
Bellicis acutely observed: afflicta paupertas, in varios
scelerum conatus accensa, nullam reverentiam iuris aut pietatis
affectum prae oculis habens, vindictam suam malis artibus commendavit. Nam saepe gravissimis damnis affectit imperia populando agros, quietem latrociniis persequendo... Although the writer is referring to brigands within the state, such as the Isaurians or the Bagaudae of Gaul, his opinion is just as valid for barbarian groups on the fringes of the Empire. Thus the Saracens are also called latrunculi.

Their ability to raid settled communities and to waylay travellers was greatly enhanced when a state of war existed between Rome and Persia. Joshua Stylites remarks that the conflict at the beginning of the sixth century was a source of much profit to the Arabs on both sides of the frontier, and that they wrought their will upon both empires. At times they were actually encouraged by one side to ravage the territory of the other. For example, Julian claims that Constantius turned the marauding Arabs against the Persians. In 541 Belisarius dispatched Arethas with his Saracen forces across the Tigris to pillage the rich plains of Assyria. On the Persian side Procopius suggests that Chosroes I persuaded Arethas' rival, Alamoundaras, to stir up trouble by overrunning Roman territory and thereby provide him with a pretext for renewed hostilities. But at other times, even though the evidence for their co-operation against desert raiders is slight, it suited the two empires at least to restrain and, when necessary, to punish the Arabs of their own sector for making attacks across the frontier. The peace treaty of 562 between Justinian and Chosroes included the stipulation that it should be binding on the border tribes. Important clauses of the treaty regulated the movement of travellers and merchandise, the control of smuggling and the settlement of disputes between people on
either side of the frontier. Earlier, in the reign of Anastasius, when some Arabs crossed into Roman territory without Persian consent and took captive the inhabitants of two villages, the Persian commander at Nisibis arrested their sheikhs and put them to death. Joshua Stylites also records that similar action was taken by Timostratus, the dux at Callinicum, in repraisal for attacks made by nomads from the Roman side.

(e) Methods of Imperial Control.

During the fourth century the Roman provinces from the Red Sea to the Tigris were guarded by a broad frontier zone manned by limitanei and backed by the mobile field army. Since the strength and disposition of the ducal forces were practically uniform and since small, widespread garrisons were clearly not intended to thwart large-scale Persian invasions, it is reasonable to conclude that their main task was the day-to-day supervision of the limes. Garrisons had broader responsibilities than the mere safeguard of the towns and fortresses at or near which they were stationed. An important part of their duties was to patrol the border, checking on tribal movements, establishing friendly contacts with the local Arab sheikhs and, when necessary, responding to minor incursions by nomadic bands. An elaborate system of defence against these raids has been postulated, involving watch-towers, signal-stations, fortlets guarding wells or reservoirs, and towards the rear strategically placed forts whence the squadrons of cavalry could repulse or encircle the attackers. Yet the late Roman army was apparently without the resources or, perhaps, the inclination to follow the example of earlier forces (such as the Palmyrenes) and establish lines of communication deep within the desert zones. Consequently, since they were unable to
anticipate the position and circumstances of the wandering Saracens at a given time with any great assurance, the limitanei could not usually forestall their incursions.53

It was necessary, therefore, to have places of security and refuge spread throughout the frontier lands. Many quadriburgia were built both by the military and by private landowners to provide shelter for the rural population and protection for vital supplies of food and water, which were most at risk from sudden raids.54 The Saracens were notoriously inefficient at siegecraft, and even the most simple defensive structures would suffice to deter them.55 Likewise, they were most reluctant to join in combat with the regular troops who were sent against them, except when they heavily outnumbered them.56 Thus it was unarmed travellers on the open road and peasants in their villages or fields who were most vulnerable to robbery and enslavement. The losses in agricultural produce must have been very considerable, but little could be done to stop nomads, driven by poverty and hunger, from suddenly descending on isolated farms, destroying the crops and driving off the livestock. However, it does appear that the local population sometimes offered resistance to their depredations. Ephraem mentions that the people of Nisibis recaptured some women who had been enslaved by desert raiders.57 John Chrysostom remarks on the precautions taken to safeguard a major road in Palestine; the magistrates of the local towns enrolled able-bodied men from the countryside to serve with slings, arrows and javelins as a check τοῖς τῶν ἐν οἰκουμένῃ ἑρμοῖς.58

At a later date the frontier tribes were organized into formal confederacies under the leadership of the Ghassanids on the Roman side and the Lakhmids on the Persian, but there is no
evidence to suggest that this was the case in the fourth century. In 363 Saracen princes presented themselves before Julian at the start of his Persian expedition and, as willing suppliants, offered him a golden crown. They were not summoned to take part in the campaign as were the regular allies such as the Armenian king. Ammianus does, however, refer to gifts and subsidies which had been paid to the Saracens in the past; Julian ordered these to be stopped and thereby alienated the tribesmen. But although such payments were a direct drain on the imperial treasury, they were advantageous in a number of indirect ways. Firstly, by subsidizing the nomads the prosperity of the settled communities on the fringes of the Empire would be preserved and, in consequence, they would be better able to pay their taxes to the full. Secondly, the burden on the frontier troops would be reduced, for they would gain the assistance of friendly tribes acting as a buffer beyond the limes. Moreover, within reason it was cheaper to buy off potential attackers than to mount punitive expeditions, which in the case of the Saracens in particular would furnish little booty beyond the goods they had previously stolen themselves. Finally, the payments would increase the wealth of the tribesmen, perhaps making them the prey for poorer folk farther out into the desert and certainly encouraging them to acquire horses which effectively tied them to the economy of the settled lands for fodder, if not for breeding stock.

Information concerning the Persian defences against the marauding nomads is even more scanty than that for the Roman limes. A Pahlavi manuscript states that Ardashir and Sapor I established a line of fortresses along the western edge of their realm. From the accounts of Julian's expedition we learn of
a whole series of walled towns on the Lower Euphrates, which probably served to ward off desert raiders as well as to block the approach to Ctesiphon for an invading Roman army. Ammianus refers to a place called Charcha on the Tigris where there were artificial mounds along the river bank in order to prevent Saracen incursions into Assyria. But the Persian kings apparently tried other ways to exert control over the nomadic tribes which lived beyond their west and south-west borders. Thus it can be seen that Sapor II not only led a retaliatory campaign against them in which he transported large numbers of captives from Arabia and resettled them in Persian cities, but also enlisted their support by recruiting them into his armed forces. In 363 he had the valuable assistance of these tribesmen; Podosaces, phylarch of the Assanitae, accompanied the general Surena in an attack on Julian's army and other Saracens harried the Roman stragglers during Jovian's retreat. Generally, then, the Persians seem to have been more successful than their Roman counterparts at warding off or winning over the Saracens, perhaps because their troops were better equipped to deal with highly mobile and proficient desert raiders, perhaps also because their territory was not so extensively vulnerable to incursions as the Roman East. Nevertheless, there was always the threat of trouble from the nomads during times of crisis or instability within the Persian realm. In the reign of Kavad, for example, the Arabs who were under his sway, when they saw the confusion of his kingdom, made predatory raids "as far as their strength permitted throughout the whole Persian territory". The sources also record the flight of some important Arabs from Persia. In c.420 a Mesopotamian chieftain moved across into Roman territory
and was rewarded by his appointment as phylarch of the allied Saracen tribes in the province of Arabia. Another interesting episode occurred in 473 when an adventurer of Arab origin called Amorcesos left Persia to try his luck on the Roman side of the frontier. There he amassed a considerable fortune and, despite his reputation as a brigand, visited Constantinople where he was received with great honour by the emperor Leo, much to the disgust of the courtiers.

(f) Mavia.

The most famous Saracen raid during the fourth century was that which is attributed to Mavia, the widow of an unnamed sheikh. According to the Church historians, who alone record these events, the incursion was more serious and wide-ranging than usual. Indeed, it is claimed not only that the cities of Palestine and Arabia were threatened, but also that the Roman army itself was defeated in battle. While it is extremely difficult to put much faith in these specious accounts, one must accept that the story of Mavia reflects genuine unrest among the Saracens during the reign of Valens. Certainly, steps were taken to strengthen the frontier garrisons of the East at this time, for inscriptions attest to building work at Umm al-Jemal in 371 and at Deir el-Kahf between 367 and 375. It is also possible that Valens raised two new alae as reinforcements for the army of the dux Arabiae in response to the Saracen attacks. The Christian authors offer no explanation for the unrest. Even if they knew the reason, it was of little interest to them, since their main purpose in recording the whole episode was to illustrate the pervading supremacy of the orthodox faith during a period of eclipse and persecution. It may be that the tribesmen were incensed by
Valens' refusal to make the payments which they had come to expect from the Roman government in return for their peaceful behaviour. Valens, although he generally receives much criticism from Ammianus, is praised for his fiscal policy. His efforts to stabilize and even to reduce the annual indiction recall the measures which Julian introduced as Caesar in Gaul and the ambitious plans which he had for the finances of the whole empire. Ammianus records that one of Julian's economies was to cut off the subsidies to the Saracens. It is easy to suppose that Valens tried the same measure, with the same result. The tribesmen, deprived of a very important source of income, became hostile and took to raiding Roman territory in order to satisfy their needs.

It appears, however, that good relations were soon restored, symbolized in the Christian accounts by the appointment of Moses as bishop and by the marriage of Mavia's daughter to the Patriarch Victor. Moreover, it is clear from Ammianus that Valens had the services of some Saracen troops at least in 378. They reportedly paid a significant role in the defence of Constantinople after Valens' defeat and death at Adrianople. One of the Saracens, scantily clad and uttering spine-chilling cries, made his way into the midst of the Gothic army where, after killing a man, he applied his lips to his throat and proceeded to drink his blood as it gushed forth. Ammianus stresses that this spectacle terrified the poor Goths and contributed greatly to the failure of their courage. It seems unlikely that such bloodthirsty Arab troops could have been Christians, and thus it must be doubted whether Socrates and Sozomen are correct in linking the Arab foederati at Constantinople with Mavia and her tribesmen.
(g) Religious Influences.

The Manichees say in their scriptures that a disciple of Mani called Papos brought word of the new religion to the Nile valley. When Alexander of Lycopolis wrote the first of many treatises *Contra Manichaeos* in c.300, the Christian opponents of the sect held this to be true. But during the first half of the fourth century there appeared an alternative version, which stated that Manicheanism was first preached in the Thebaid by a Saracen named Scythianus. According to Epiphanius of Salamis, Scythianus left his native land and travelled to the borders of Roman Palestine and Arabia. There he learned Greek and made a living from the trade between Egypt and India. This is not the only source which suggests that the religion attracted Saracen followers at an early date in its development. Al-Hira was known to Arab tradition to have had a community of Manichees, while a Coptic papyrus refers to an Arab sheikh called 'Amro as the great patron of the Manichees. This 'Amro seems to be the person who is mentioned in the Paikuli inscription. If it is so, the Manichees in the late third century had already gained an important and powerful ally. The papyrus tells how the sheikh interceded for them with Narses and persuaded him to end the persecutions which Zoroastrian fanatics had instigated.

By contrast, the appearance of Christianity among the Saracenic tribes was only starting in the fourth century. It occurred in a very haphazard way, mainly through contact with priests and monks who lived on the desert fringes and who distinguished themselves by their pure lives and miraculous works. Their ascetical practices were the principle attraction of Christianity for the abstemious and superstitious Bedouin. Sozomen speaks of a whole tribe who were converted not long
before the reign of Theodosius II through the ministrations of a monk who successfully prayed for their childless leader to be granted a son and heir.\textsuperscript{86} At a later date Simeon Stylites came to be so widely respected that Saracens even travelled from al-Hira to visit him,\textsuperscript{87} while the shrine of the martyr Sergius at Resapha became a centre of pilgrimage for the nomadic peoples.\textsuperscript{88} But it took a long time for Christian practices to become firmly established, and paganism survived until a late date. Zacharias Rhetor mentions sacrifices performed by the Bedouin to the planet Balti or 'Uzzay.\textsuperscript{89} The stories of the bloodthirsty Saracen who frightened the Goths outside Constantinople and of the abbot in the reign of Maurice who came upon three Saracens taking a handsome youth as a human sacrifice to their priest attest to their continued barbarity and paganism.\textsuperscript{90} Ephraem alludes to some "daughters of Agar" (= Saracen women) who acquired bodily freedom by leaving the desert to settle at Nisibis and spiritual liberty by entering the Church, but in a sermon \textit{Ad Poenitentiam} he tells of an Arab raid in which altars were plundered, churches destroyed, sanctuaries defiled and holy relics scattered to the winds.\textsuperscript{91} There are several accounts in the works of the Christian fathers of monastic communities suffering attack from Saracens. Although these have taken on many legendary elements, they appear to be based on historical events. John Cassianus, who spent some time in Palestine and Egypt, says that in the early fifth century the Saracens made an incursion and massacred a large number of hermits at Thecue.\textsuperscript{92} A similar fate befell monks on Mount Sinai,\textsuperscript{93} while farther east the \textit{Chronicle of Arbela} tells of the abduction of bishop Rethima.\textsuperscript{94} According to Procopius, the sanctuary of Sergius before its fortification by Justinian had been surrounded by a
It is quite understandable that, as such Christian centres became more famous and wealthy, they attracted less desirable visitors along with devout pilgrims.

The Saracens are an elusive subject to write about, just as they lived an elusive existence on the fringes of the two great empires of late antiquity. They impinged only marginally and at brief moments on the consciousness of Roman and Persian alike. Their everyday life in the inhospitable deserts of Arabia has passed almost unnoticed. A modern newspaper article quoted a statement by Emanuel Marx, professor of anthropology at Tel-Aviv University, about the present-day Bedouin of the Sinai peninsula. He states: "The Bedouin are involved in two economies. They make their income from wage labour, but they know this is a short-term gain. They can lose it at any time, through political upheaval or because they become old and decrepit. So they maintain the second economy too. They tend their orchards and flocks of sheep and goats, they retain a tribal framework and relations with kin who will look after them if times are hard. They balance the two very delicately. When they feel secure, they put less work into their orchards, flocks and family ties. When they feel less secure, they put more. But they never neglect the second economy altogether." This observation has a valid application for the Saracens of the fourth century. They were brought into contact with their sedentary neighbours by their search for income. They engaged in trade; they served the armies of Rome and Persia, and they gained wealth through brigandage. But they never forgot that their survival depended ultimately on their tribal, pastoral
and nomadic roots. This remained a mystery to the outside world, and consequently ancient writers have provided us with a much distorted picture of their way of life. If nothing more, I hope that this survey has indicated the difficulty of drawing together diverse and highly selective source material. There still remain many grey areas, many unanswered questions about the Saraceni, some of which may in due process of time be clarified by a thorough survey of the archaeological remains and by a more perceptive use of the literary evidence.
2) Ptolemy V,17,3.
3) P-W, RE sv. Saraka, col.2389 (Moritz).
5) Amm. Marc. XIV,4,3.
6) Amm. Marc. XXII,15,2 and XXIII,6,13.

Ptolemy, however, regards them as two distinct groups, for he places the Saraceni in the vicinity of Nabataea - VI,28,32, to the south of the Scenitae - VI,7,21. Pliny the Elder locates the Scenitae near the Lower Euphrates or below its confluence with the Tigris - VI,30,125 and 32, 143f, while Strabo says that they ranged from Mesopotamia to Coele-Syria - Geogr. XVI,1,8 & 2,1.

7) Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,4.

The first occurrence of the word in the north is in the En-Nemara epitaph - below, n.22.

10) Joshua Stylites ch. 38, 50 & 90; Zacharias Rhetor 8,5; 9,2-3 & 10,6-8; John of Ephesus, Lives 419. 

11) Joshua Stylites ch. 90 and Zacharias Rhetor 7,6. Similarly, Justinian built a fort near Thannourios on the Khabur in order to protect the local population from Saracen raids - Procopius, De Aedificiis II,6,15-6.

In 501/2 the 'Arab flocked into Amida during a great famine, although they were not well received by the townsfolk - Zacharias Rhetor 7,2-3.

One Syriac source claims that an attempt was made to settle the 'Arab on the borders of Armenia in the reign of Julian - G.Hoffmann, Auszüge aus syr. Akten Persischer Martyrer Abh.K.M. VII (1880) p.23 (the Life of Mar Saba, a martyr under Sapor II - Theodoret, Hist. Rel. II,14).

12) In the vicinity of al-'Ula Nabataean, Greek and Latin graffiti indicate that Roman cavalry and camel units served in the area in the late second century - M.P.Speidel, "Exercitus Arabicus." Latomus 23 (1974) p.935. A stele at Meda'in Salih, recording a dedication by a member of legio III Cyrenaica (based at Bostra as early as 144), appears to be from the same period as the graffiti - T.C.Barger, "Greek Inscription Deciphered: Seal found in Arabia." Archaeology 22 (1969) pp.139-40. A Latin inscription has been found at al-Jawf which bears the name of a centurion from the same legion - M.P.Speidel, "The Roman Army in Arabia." Aufstieg und Niedergang 11,8 p.694.
The extent of recruitment from the desert nomads into the Roman army is far from clear. The Notitia Dignitatum records four units of equites which indicate by their titles that they originated in Arabia:

- Or. XXVIII, 17 - equites Saraceni Thamudeni
- Or. XXXII, 27 - equites Saraceni indigenae
- Or. XXXII, 28 - equites Saraceni
- Or. XXXIV, 22 - equites Thamudeni Illyriciani

The Rawwafa inscription also mentions a ροσπού - compare Not. Dign. Or. XXXIV, 27: equites sagittarii indigenae, Robatha. Doubtless many of the equites sagittarii indigenae which are listed in the frontier provinces of the East contained a number of Arab volunteers, attracted by the pay and prospects of the army. Because of their background they would have been especially useful as scouts and dromadarii - below, appendix 6, p. 334. It is unlikely that the Romans were unduly worried about the loyalty of troops recruited from amongst the Saracens, for other barbarian races supplied the imperial army with large numbers of recruits without adversely affecting its efficiency or security. Furthermore, the Saracens were not a single, unified people, but a group of disjointed and rival tribes who were as often fighting amongst themselves as against the Romans and Persians. Inscriptions bear witness to incessant tribal warfare in Arabia - below, n. 14 and 15. Sozomen states that Zocomus' tribe in the first half of the fifth century was formidable to the Persians as well as to the other Saracens - HE VI, 38, and Procopius says that Arethas and Alamoundaras in the mid-sixth century waged war against each other on their own account, unaided by either the Romans or the Persians - Bell. Pers. II, 28, 12-4.

14) E. Littmann, Safaitic Inscriptions (Leiden 1943) nos. 644 & 653; cf. also nos. 87, 94, 157, 406, 424, 640, 675 & 709.

15) J. Euting, Sinaitische Inschriften (Berlin 1891) no. 463. The Scriptores Historiae Augustae claim to record the defeat of Roman troops by the Saracens during the brief reign of Pescennius Niger - SHA Pesc. Niger 7, 8.

16) A fort was built at En-Nemara under the Severi - IGL 2264; another was erected at Qaṣr al-Hallabat in 213 - CIL III, 14419/2 in R. E. Brünnow & A. von Domaszewski, Die Provincia Arabia (Strassburg 1909), p. 291; and Qaṣr al-Ushaikhan was constructed by legio III Cyrenaica in 201 to guard the entrance to the Wadi Sirhan - A. Stein, "Surveys on the Roman Frontier in Iraq and Trans-Jordan," GJ 95 (1940) p. 434. The fort at Qaṣr al-'Uweinid is also possibly Severan - S. Parker, "Archaeological Survey of the limes Arabicus: A Preliminary Report," Annual of Dept. of Antiquities of Jordan 21 (1976) p. 27.

17) The ala nova firma milliaria catafractaria arrived at Bostra to strengthen the legionary garrison between 244 and 249 - PAES IIIA (Leiden 1913) no. 527, p. 228. Qal'at

18) There was a similar deterioration in the security of southern Mesopotamia. The Babylonian Talmud, which probably reflects conditions there in the third century, contains references to Arab incursions. They were mainly intended to seize goods and enslave captives, but one case mentions the appropriation of land, which suggests that Arab tribes were then sufficiently powerful to occupy parts of Babylonia - Bab. Tal. Bava' Batra' 8b; 'Eruvin 45a; Ketuvot 23a and Bava' Batra' 168b. The Hebrew texts contain a number of Arabisms - D.S.Margoliouth, Relations between Arabs and Israelites prior to the Rise of Islam. (London 1924) p.58.


20) E.Littmann, Nabataean Inscriptions in PAES IVA (Leiden 1914) no. 41, pp.37-40.

21) It is recorded that a certain Gadima al-Abrash fought against Zabha = Zenobia - Hamza al-Isfahani, op.cit. trans. p.77.


Sapor I is associated by one source with the foundation of al-Hira - Shah rastaniha-i Eran ch.25. Hamza al-Isfahani gives the names of eleven cities which were reputedly founded or refounded by Ardashir, including Astabardk Ardashir (formerly Charax), Bahman Ardashir and Wahasht Ardashir. On the Persian Gulf there is Rev Ardashir (Rishahr on the Bushire peninsula) and Batu Ardashir on the Arabian coast (apparently opposite Bahrain).


31) T.E. Lawrence gives a succinct account of the movement of Bedouin folk northwards into the areas of cultivation in Syria and Mesopotamia - Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Harmondsworth 1962) pp.33-5. "Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq." HMSO (London 1929). The Letter of Barsamma (bishop of Nisibis), written in 484 to the Nestorian patriarch, Acacius, paints a vivid picture of the effect of the Bedouin on the settled population in time of drought and famine. They aggravated the plight of the rural inhabitants not only by destroying the fields with their flocks but also by raiding the villages - F. Nau, Les Arabes chrétiens de Mésopotamie et de Syrie du VIIème au VIIIème siècle (Paris 1933) pp.13-5.

32) In 85-6 many of Rome's subjects revolted when money was raised from them by force. Among them were the Nasamones, who killed the tax-collectors and defeated the governor of Numidia - Dio Cassius LXVII, 4, 6. The uprising of the Bucoli in the third century was caused by their outrage at the conduct of an army levy - R. MacMullen, "Nationalism in Roman Egypt." Aegyptus 44 (1964) p.185. The revolt supporting Iotapianus against Philip the Arab was produced by the weight of taxes - Zosimus 1, 20, 2. Firmus was driven to rebellion in Mauretania in 372 by taxes and irregular exactions - R. MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Harvard 1967) pp.204-5.


34) Amm. Marc. XIV, 4, 1. Cf. also Strabo, Geogr. XVI, 1, 26.
35) Julian, Or. I, 19a and 21b. Procopius, Bell. Pers. II,6,15-6 (Thannourios); II,11,10-2 (Palmyra); Bell. V,8,9 (Sinai) and Anecdota 18,22.


Other references to Arab raids across the desert include John of Ephesus, Eccles. History III,6,16; Michael the Syrian ed. I.B.Chabot vol.2 (Paris 1904) p.422 and the Chronicle of Meshihazkha 9 & 17 in Die Chronik von Arbela ed. C.E.Sachau (Berlin 1915) pp.64 & 85.

38) Theophanes, Chronographia am.5828 (= 336).

39) In his account of the infancy of Sapor II Tabari says: "The lands of the Arabs were nearest to Persia and, in addition, these people were more dependent than others on getting provisions and places to live elsewhere, for their circumstances were miserable and their food scarce. So they came in hordes...over the sea to...the coastal lands of Persia, where they took cattle, corn and other provisions from the inhabitants and made serious trouble in the land." - trans. Th.Nöldeke p.53-4.

40) Anon. De Rebus Bellicis 2,3.


42) Joshua Stylites ch.79.

43) Julian, Or. I, 21b.


47) Menander Protector fr.11, FHG IV (Müller) p.212-3. Unfortunately nothing is known of clauses concerning the Saracens in earlier treaties. Procopius, however, is mistaken when he says that no mention was ever made to them before the treaty of 562 - Bell. Pers. II,1,5. Malchus records that in 422, when open hostilities broke out between the Romans and Persians, an agreement was made to the effect that neither side would accept the Saracens as allies if any of them proposed to revolt from the enemy - fr.1, FHG IV (Müller) pp.111-32; cf. also, Socrates, HE VII,20 and Sozomen, HE IX,4. Recently it has been suggested that the Imrulqais of the En-Nemara inscription had his realm formally acknowledged by the Romans and Persians, perhaps even in a clause of the treaty of 298 - A.F.L. Beeston, art. cit. BSOAS 42 (1979) pp. 1-6.

48) Joshua Stylites ch.88.

49) Timostratus seized five of their sheikhs, two of whom were put to the sword and the other three impaled - Joshua Stylites ch.88.

50) One highly imaginative method of controlling the Saracens is attributed to the emperor Decius. He planned to import from Africa lions and other ferocious beasts and release them on the desert fringes of the East in order to frighten away the tribesmen and their flocks - Chronicon Paschale am.5760 (= 251), (Bonn 1832) p.504-5. Above, ch.II, p.48-9 & ch.I, p.7-8.

51) Papyri, discovered at Nessana and dating to the sixth century, show that even at this late date the duties of the numerus stationed there included mobile patrols and caravan escort work - C.J. Krämer, Excavations at Nessana vol. III: The Non-literary Papyri (Princeton 1958) no.35, pp.100-110 and no.37, pp.114-7. The Life of Alexander the Acoemete records how he wandered through the lands of Mesopotamia and Syria, probably in the early years of the fifth century. At one point Alexander is said to have led a hundred of his followers on an excursion into the Persian desert without taking proper consideration for their physical needs, so that they nearly died of hunger and thirst. Fortunately, they were rescued by a detachment of soldiers who were out patrolling the frontier - Vita Alexandri ch. 32-4 ed. de Stoop, Patr. Or. VI (Paris 1911) pp.682-5.


53) The incessant wandering of the Saracens is emphasized in the descriptions of them provided by Ammianus and Jerome. Amm. Marc. XIV,4,1; 3; 4 & 5: ...ultro citroque discursantes ...errant semper per spatia lange lateque distenta, sine
lare sine sedibus fixis...vita est illis semper in fuga... quoad vixerunt late palantur...
Jerome, *Vita Malchi* 43 (Migne) PLat. vol. 23, pp.54-60: Saraveni incertis sedibus huc atque illuc semper vagantur.

54) Vegetius, *De Re Militari* IV,10: castellum parvulum, quem burgum vocant, inter civitatem et fontem convenit fabricari ibique ballistas sagittariosque constitui ut aqua defendatur ab hostibus.

The construction of several military installations is attributed to the dux Arabiae, Silvianianus:-
(a) At Deir el-Kahf a τύπος dated 348 - *PAES* IIIA (Leiden 1910) no. 224, p.125. This inscription is placed at el-A'nat by the editors of *PLRE* I, sv. Flavius Silvianianus.
(b) At Khirbet el-Aradji a ψαπούτα dated 351 - W.H.Waddington, *Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie recueillies et expliquées* (Paris 1870) no.2194.
(c) At Radeime, undated - *AE* 1933, no.170 = *SEG* VII,1061. An inscription from a village near Palmyra on the road to Damascus praises a certain Silvinus, who had set up a castrum and mansio with an artificial oasis for the security and benefit of travellers and farmers. The text is accompanied by Christian symbols which, with Silvinus' titles, suggests a late fourth or early fifth century date - *CIL* III,6660 (Khan el-Abjad) = *IGLSyr*. V,2704.

A veteran who had served in Mesopotamia set up an inscription recording his building of a tower at al-Mesquq in 350 - *PAES* IIIA (Leiden 1921) no. 177, p.103. The assistance rendered by the military to the travelling public in the Judaean desert is mentioned in Eusebius' *Onomastikon*; Maledomni...ubi et castellum militum situs est ob auxilia viatorem - ed. E.Klostermann (Leipzig 1904) p.25.


Even at the end of the nineteenth century there was not a village in Mesopotamia without its watch-tower and sentinels to give warning of attack by nomadic tribesmen - E.Sachau, *Am Euphrat und Tigris* (Leipzig 1900) pp.43-4.


56) Ammianus remarks that Saracen troops were ad furta magis expeditionalium rerum quam ad concursatorias habillis pugnas - XXXI,16,5. Cf. also XXIII,3,8.

Both Ammianus and Jerome state that they used camels as well as horses on their raids - Amm. Marc. XIV,4,3 and Jer. *Vita Malchi* 43. But in combat against regular cavalry Arab tactics dictated that the camel-riders dismounted and fought as infantry or, if possible, changed mounts to a warhorse which had been brought along solely for use in fighting - *Encyclopaedia of Islam* 2nd ed. (Leiden 1960) sv. Badw, p.885 and below, appendix 6, pp.332-3.

There is a south Arabian gravestone depicting a warrior with
a long lance riding a horse right beside a camel -
M.Rostovtzeff, Caravan Cities (Oxford 1932) plate III, fig.1.

57) Ephraem, Mêmrâ de Nicomedia XII, vv.55-66.

58) John Chrysostom, Ad Stagirium 6 (Migne) PG vol. 47, 458.
Zosimus describes the farmers and slaves of Pamphylia as
being experienced in constant fighting against the
neighbouring brigands - Zos. V,15,8. A decurion was
killed while carrying out his duties in Syria - R.Mouterde,
"Inscriptions grecques conservées à l'Institut Français
de Damas." Syria 6 (1925) no.32, pp.243-6. Καλλιφράτου
private guards on large estates, are attested in several
provinces - M.Rostovtzeff, "Die Domänenpolizei in dem
römischen Kaiserreich." Philologus 64 (1905) p.301.

59) Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,8 & 5,1.
Their only recorded contribution to the expedition was the
capture of some Persian scouts - XXIV,1,10. It is highly
unlikely that they were of any great assistance in the
sieges of Persian fortresses or in the pitched battles.
Consequently, it may be that Julian recognized the danger
of leaving the Roman frontier at the mercy of these expert
raiders. So he took them along with him mainly to ensure
their good behaviour, although they may have served as
useful guides along the march down the Euphrates.

60) Amm. Marc. XXIII,2,2.
In a letter to Libanius, written in 363 on the journey
from Antioch, Julian says that he sent envoys to the
27 (Hertlein). This, as well as contradicting Ammianus -
XXIII,3,8, suggests that Julian did not think that he
could order them to come to him.

61) Amm. Marc. XXV,6.9-10.
The spurious Letter to Basil (Ep. 75) makes Julian boast
that he was planning to make the Saracens submit to the
Empire and consent to pay tribute and taxes. The letter
is apparently an early forgery since it was probably read
by Sozomen - HE V,18,7.

62) The horse has always been the prestige possession of Arab
tribesmen. Whenever there was money available to sustain
horses, they would want to own them - R.W.Bulliet, The

63) H.S.Nyberg, "Die sassanidische Westgrenze und ihre
Verteidigung." Septentrionalia et Orientalia. Studia

64) Above, ch.IV, pp.152-4.
65) Amm. Marc. XXV,6,8.
67) Above, ch.IV, n.143.


70) Joshua Stylites ch. 22. However, when they learned that Kavad had gathered together an army and intended to make war on the Romans, Joshua says that they flocked to join him - ch. 24.

71) Cyril of Scythopolis, Vita Euthymii 10. He is named as 'AmpēBetoc from the Pahlavi Spāhbašt, and in consequence he is regarded as a Persian, not an Arab, by A. Christensen - L'Iran sous les Sassanides 2nd ed. (Copenhagen 1944) p. 280, n. 3. Yet it is quite possible that Cyril has recorded not his actual name but his Persian title. The fact that he was appointed by the Romans to command the Saracens implies that he was of Arab descent himself.

72) Malchus of Philadelphia, Fragmenta 1 (Bonn) p. 231-4 = FHG IV (Müller) p. 112f. Theophanes, Chronographia am. 5990. In 502/3 another Arab called 'Adid, who had been under Persian rule, surrendered with his troop of men and became a Roman subject - Joshua Stylites ch. 75.


Two late sources claim that Mavia was a captive Roman and a Christian - Theophanes (Migne) PG vol. 108, col. 191 and Georgius Hamartolus IV, 195 (Migne) PG vol. 110, col. 681f.

74) Rufinus, HE II, 6: cumque frequentibus bellis Romanorum attrivisset exercitum, et plurimis peremptis reliquos vertisset in fugam...

Sozomen refers to native songs in which these events were celebrated - HE VI, 38, 4. P. Mayerson argues that the extent and success of Mavia's raids have been greatly exaggerated - "Mavia, Queen of the Saracens." Israel Exploration Journal 30 (1980) pp. 123-31.


The area west of the Euphrates was overrun by Saracenic tribesmen during Jerome's retreat into the Syrian desert in 374-5 to 376 or 377 - Jer. Ep. 5, 1; 7, 1 and 15, 2. The precise date of Mavia's insurrection is unknown, but it is believed to have occurred in c. 373, soon after the death of Athanasius, since Moses' ordination is assigned to the beginning of Lucius' bishopric at Alexandria - Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques (Paris 1924) sv. Arabie, col. 1191 (R. Aigrain).
77) Above, ch.VI, n.87.
78) Amm. Marc. XXXI,14,2.
79) Amm. Marc. XVI,5,14; XVII,3 and XXV,4,15.
80) Amm. Marc. XXV,6,10.
82) Amm. Marc. XXXI,16,5-6.
83) Socrates, HE V,1,3 and Sozomen, HE VII,1,1.
It is recorded that regular food subsidies were granted to the Saracens in the mid-fifth century - Theod. II Nov. 24,2 (443): de Saracenorum vero foederatorum aliarumve gentium annonariis alimentis nullam penitus eos decerpendi aliquid vel auferendi licentiam habere concedimus.
84) Epiphanius of Salamis (Migne) PG vol. 42,29; cf. also Cyril of Jerusalem (Migne) PG vol. 33,576-7.
86) Sozomen, HE VI,38.
Moses had clearly gained considerable fame and influence for Mavia to demand his appointment as bishop of her people. Rufinus describes him as a monk: qui in eremo partibus suis propinqua solitariam ducens, meritis et virtutibus ac signis quae faciebat Deus per illum, magnificè innotuerat - HE II,6 (Migne) PLat. vol. 21, col.515.
89) Zacharias Rhetor VIII,5.
Jerome refers to the demon cult of the Saracens - Vita Hilarionis 25 (Migne) PLat. vol. 23, col.41.
90) Amm. Marc. XXXI,16,6.
Vitae Patrum X,155.


92) John Cassianus, Coll. 6,1 (Migne) PLat. vol. 49,643-5. According to Jerome, Thecue was situated six miles south of Bethlehem - Prooem. in Amos and Comm. in Jerem. 6,1.

93) Narrationes de clade monachorum in monte Sinai (Migne) PG vol. 79,625-40. There is also the story of a solitary monk living on the mountain of St. Anthony, whose life was threatened by a Saracen but who was saved by a miracle - Vitae Patrum X,133 (Migne) PLat. vol. 73, col.187.

94) A. Mingana, Sources Syriagues vol.1 (Leipzig 1908) p.144.


96) Michael the Syrian relates how desert raiders descended on the monastery of Simeon Stylites and carried off numerous captives from the crowd which had gathered there for a festival - Chronicle ed. I.B. Chabot II (Paris 1904) p.422. Compare the plan of the Persian general Nohodares to attack Batnae during the annual festival in the autumn of 354 - Amm. Marc. XIV,3,2-4. It is interesting that Ammianus chose to include his short excursus on the Saracens immediately after this passage.

97) The Guardian, 13 November 1979: "Rulers change, the Bedouins stay" by Eric Silver.

98) For example, Ammianus' strange account of the customs and habits of the Saracens - Amm. Marc. XIV,4,3-7.
Conclusion.

What, then, is to be our judgement of Constantius' reign with regard to the defence of Mesopotamia? It is clear that generally he made good use of the resources which were available to him. The troops under his command were always numerically inadequate for the task. Julian stresses the fact that Constantius had only a third of the Empire's forces at his disposal initially, and from 350 onwards he was faced with pressing needs elsewhere.¹ Heavy losses of first-rate troops were incurred at the battle of Mursa in 353, so that in effect Constantius inherited all the commitments of his brother Constans with substantially fewer troops to cope with them. Towards the end of his reign the shortage of manpower became acute. Ammianus refers to an imperial letter received by Sabinianus which expressly ordered the magister militum to keep casualties to a minimum.² The failure to send relief forces to the besieged fortresses in 359 and 360 appears to have been caused more by the lack of adequate numbers than by the negligence of the army commanders or the cowardice of their troops.

Consequently, Constantius studiously tried to avoid pitched battles against the Persians, realizing that he had nothing to gain by risking everything in that fashion. Likewise, he did not embark on any major counter-offensives. For it is difficult to imagine what further advantage could be derived from a more aggressive strategy, and one only has to look at Julian's expedition to appreciate the dangers. In the early years of his reign flatterers hailed Constantius as a second Alexander.³ But, unlike his headstrong cousin, he refused to be drawn into trying to emulate Alexander's conquest of Persia.
Instead, he relied on defence, establishing key fortresses in northern Mesopotamia, not only to provide his troops with a greater chance of safety and survival, but also to present the enemy with a succession of hazardous obstacles. Admittedly, this meant that the initiative lay almost entirely in the hands of the Persian king, but he was singularly unimaginative in his repeated attacks on the same heavily fortified positions. There is little evidence to suggest that the Roman army's morale was adversely affected by being constantly on the defensive. On the whole the defence of the eastern frontier was efficiently and economically organized, and Libanius' judgement that Constantius' policy was cowardly is both untrue and unjust.

In addition to direct military action, Constantius exploited other means to keep the frontiers secure and intact. In true Byzantine fashion he used diplomatic contacts and financial inducements in order to ward off or disrupt hostile moves. Thus he ensured good relations with the Saracens by paying them subsidies and encouraging them to turn their raids towards Persian territory. Likewise, he supported the Armenian monarch politically as well as militarily against Persian attempts to infiltrate the kingdom and the bordering principalities. But, above all, his personal presence on the eastern frontier meant a great deal both to the frontier troops and to the local civilians. His popularity, based though it was on a certain loyalty to the Constantinian house, was enhanced by his careful attention to the pomp and majesty of his position, while he strengthened his ties with the soldiery by his active participation in military training and his presence on campaigns.

Julian, when he usurped the title of Augustus, was far from
certain to win the impending struggle for imperial control. A large part of the army and empire remained steadfastly loyal to Constantius, despite the attempts which Julian and his supporters made to blacken his name. Indeed, Constantius' reputation has suffered at the hands of both contemporary writers and modern scholars because of this propaganda. His faults and failings have gained greater attention and emphasis than his qualities and achievements, and in particular he has always fared badly in comparisons with his dashing young cousin. He is regarded as an old and experienced but highly suspicious, if not vindictive, ruler. This is, perhaps, an accurate picture of Constantius in his last years when he had endured a lifetime of constant warfare and rebellion. But it must be remembered that he was in fact only twenty years of age when Constantine died and the heavy burden of defending the eastern frontier fell fully on his shoulders. Pitted against a formidable opponent in the figure of Sapor II, Constantius nevertheless resisted with dour determination.

History on the whole neglects such uninspiring men and their achievements, but one could justly claim that Constantius was one of the most able and conscientious of the men who inherited the imperial purple. He did not win an empire like his father, but neither did his adversaries find it easy to deprive him of it.
In his account of the dispute between Constantine II and Constans Zosimus says that the latter concealed the real purpose of some troop movements by claiming that they were being sent to help Constantius II. Although it appears that Zosimus has confused the two western Augusti and that it was Constantine II who pretended to be sending troops from Gaul to the East when he invaded Italy - ed: F. Paschoud (Paris 1971) pp. 113-4, n. 54, nevertheless it does indicate that in 340 the pressing need for more soldiers to fight the Persians was recognized in the West.

2) Amm. Marc. XIX, 3, 2; also, his instructions to Arbitio and Agilo in 361 - XXI, 13, 3.
Constantius sent Silvanus, the magister peditum in Gaul, a directive about the granting of leave to soldiers - CTh VII, 1, 2 (dated to 3 November 353 by A. H. M. Jones - "The Career of Flavius Philippus." Historia 4 (1955) p. 232-3). The edict shows the emperor trying to tighten up against the serious problem of absenteeism - cf. also, Abinnaeus Archive no. 33; Synesius, Ep. 129 and CTh VII, 1, 12 (384). In another edict he orders the dux Mesopotamiae to ensure that the sons of veterans and serving soldiers do not avoid active duty by being assigned to praesidalia officia - CTh VII, 22, 6 (2 February 349). Ammianus lists among Constantius' merits that he was in conservando milite nimium cautos - Amm. Marc. XXI, 16, 1.

3) Itinerarium Alexandri 1-11 (a work dated to 340 or 345 - A. Piganiol, Empire Chrétien 2nd ed. (Paris 1972) p. 84 & n. 6.
Note also the alleged letter of Constantius to Vadamarius, a king of the Alamanni - Amm. Marc. XXI, 3, 4-5. Missions to two other important foreign states are recorded during Constantius' reign; that of Ulfila, who returned as bishop to Gothia in c. 341 - E. A. Thompson, The Visigoths in the time of Ulfila (Oxford 1966) pp. xlv-xvii & 96-7, and that of Theophilus to the Homerites of southern Arabia in c. 356 - A. Dihle, "Die Sendung des Inders Theophilos" Palingenesia 4: Politeia und Res Publica (Wiesbaden 1969) pp. 330-6. It is also reported that Constantius sent the Homerites two hundred thoroughbred horses from Cappadocia - Philostorgius, HE III, 4.

7) Julian's forces were relatively small in number and became more scattered as he advanced eastwards across Europe - Amm. Marc. XXI,8 and Zosimus III,10,2. He faced opposition from both the military and the civilian population - Amm. Marc. XXI,9,5 (Lucillianus); 10,7 (the Senate of Rome); 11,2-3 (troops from Sirmium and the populace of Aquileia) and 13,16 (Arbitio). Gregory of Nazianzus makes special mention of the excellent measures taken by Constantius to thwart Julian - Or. IV,48; cf. also Julian, Ep. ad Ath. 286b. Moreover, Constantius enjoyed a reputation for success in civil wars, so that no-one believed that Julian could succeed against him - Amm. Marc. XXI,7,3; cf. also, Eutropius X,15,2; Epitome de Caesaribus XLII,16 and Amm. Marc. XXI,16,15.

8) Ammianus frequently refers to Constantius' suspiciousness - Amm. Marc. XIV,5,4; 11,4; XV,3,3 & 9; XVIII,4,2 and XXI,16,8-9. Yet he admits that he was the object of many genuine plots - XXI,16,10, and one can find examples of such distrust in many other rulers; for example, in his father Constantine - CTh IX,1,4 (325), and even in Julian - Amm. Marc. XX,9,9.

R.C. Blockley has attempted to re-establish Constantius to a certain extent by exposing Ammianus' prejudice against him - Ammianus Marcellinus. A Study of his Historiography and Political Thought (Brussels 1975) pp.38-41.

9) Constantius was born in 317; he became Caesar at the age of seven and Augustus at twenty - PLRE I, p.226. Julian was born in 332 and was proclaimed Caesar in 355 when he was 23 - PLRE I, p.477-8. Thus at the time of his Persian expedition Julian was as old, if not slightly older, as Constantius had been when he fought the battle of Singara - Julian was 31-2 in 363, whereas Constantius was only 26-7 in 344 and 30-1 in 348.

10) Sapor, of course, was some seventeen years older than Constantius. During the periods from c.335 to 350 and from 359 to 361 it appears that he was able to devote most of his attention and energy to the problem of northern Mesopotamia and the kingdom of Armenia - above, ch.IV, pp.132-4.

11) His qualities and virtues are enumerated by several contemporary writers - Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus XLII, 23; Eutropius X,15,2; Amm. Marc. XXI,16,1-7; cf. also XVI,10,9-12; Julian, Or. I,11a-c & 41b-49a; Libanius, Or. LIX,122 and Themistius, Or. I,1-2 & 13.
Appendix 1  Notitia Dignitatum Or.XXXV & XXXVI
and their auxilia.

The Notitia frequently contains discrepancies and errors in its lists of units and places. Those for the provinces of Osrhoene and Mesopotamia are no exception. Moreover, it is impossible to allocate a number of the units altogether because of the inexact nature of our present knowledge of ancient sites in the region. Consequently, the lists present serious difficulties for anyone wishing to use them to ascertain the distribution of limitanei in northern Mesopotamia during the fourth century.

Nevertheless, it is possible to make some general observations and deductions. It is obvious that the two lists must have required major alterations after the withdrawal from the sector between Nisibis and the Tigris in 363. Other changes in the position of garrisons and in the transfer, creation or disappearance of units during the subsequent decades have further added to the problematic appearance of the surviving entries. Yet it does appear that the revision was not carried out thoroughly. One important place, Resaina, seems to be repeated in both lists, which perhaps suggests that part of Osrhoene was transferred to the province of Mesopotamia after 363 in order to compensate for the loss of its territory farther east.¹ If this is so, the list for Osrhoene has clearly not been updated to register only those units and places which formed its garrison after the treaty of Jovian.² The Mesopotamian list is also in some considerable disarray. At least two places are depicted in the insignia, although they have units which belong to the laterculum minus.³ In all the other eastern frontier provinces only the equites and legiones of the laterculum maius
are distinguished by stylized representations of their castella. Finally, there is the omission of three posts in the lists which appear in the insignia. But, as with other lists, it is hazardous to speculate on how many "ghost" units are to be found in the Notitia for Mesopotamia and Osrhoene.

When units were withdrawn from the eastern sector of the province of Mesopotamia in 363, it seems likely that a number of them preserved the names of their former garrison-places by incorporating them into their titles. This certainly appears to be the case with three equites sagittarii indigenae listed under the dux Mesopotamiae. The equites Thibithenses at Thilbisme is the most persuasive example, for places called Thebeta or Hibita are mentioned in the sources. Although the exact location of both Thilbisme and Thebeta remains under discussion, it is thought that the former lay between Amida and Constantina near the modern village of Derik, while the latter is placed to the east on the highway between Nisibis and Singara. Likewise, it has been suggested that the equites Paphenses derived their name from Tell Fafan (Til) at the confluence of the Tigris and Bohtan rivers between Cepha and Bezabde. The unit was later moved to Assara, which may perhaps be emended to Massara and thus identified with Το Μαπέρκατ and Κάστρον Μασσάραν. Thirdly, there are the equites Arabanenses at Mefana Cartha. On the one hand, this station has been equated with Charcha on the Tigris south-east of Amida, in the belief that Mefana is merely a duplicate name of no significance. But, on the other, it has been suggested that it is a corrupt reading of Mefaracartha = Maipherqat (modern Silvan). There is no obvious location in eastern Mesopotamia with the name Arabana. But I believe that it is sufficiently similar to the
Sarbane of the *Peutinger Table* and the *Σισάρας/Σισάρας* of Theophylact Simocatta and Procopius. This place is equated with Ammianus' Sisara and the modern Sirvan on the plains between Nisibis and Bezabde.

In the case of the Syrian limes Van Berchem has demonstrated that as a rule units of *equites* were deployed not on the *Strata Diocletiana* itself but on important roads in the interior of the province. It seems appropriate that this system should be applied to the Mesopotamian provinces as well. Most of the *equites* were stationed on the major routes across northern Mesopotamia, while the river frontier of the Tigris and Khabur was guarded by the old-style *auxilia*.
1) Notitia Dignitatum Or. XXXV, 11, 23 & 30 and XXXVI, 4 & 20. In his edition of the Notitia O. Seeck drew attention to the similarity between the entry in Or. XXXV, 23 and a place mentioned by Procopius as 'Πάνη - De Aedificiis II, 4, 14. L. Dillemann has identified this as a site just to the south of Cepha in the Tur 'Abdin - Haute Mésopotamie Orientale et Pays Adjacents (Paris 1962) p. 232 and fig. XXXII. However, I prefer to regard Rasin as a corrupt form of the name Resaina, since that fortress is a much more probable location for the equites primi Osrhoeni.

2) Two other equites' forts, Banasam and Sina Iudaeorum, have been equated with places which Procopius names in connection with a list of Ἕλενον in the region between Dara and Amida - Or. XXXV, 18 & 19 and Proc. De Aedificiis II, 4, 14. Consequently, L. Dillemann believes that they have been wrongly assigned to the list of the dux Osrhoenae - op. cit. p. 225. Another duplicate entry may occur in the case of Apatna in Osrhoene and Apadna in Mesopotamia - Or. XXXV, 13 (+25) and XXXVI, 8 (+23); above, ch. III, p. 76. However, Procopius refers to a fort called τοῦ Ἀνδρέα in the vicinity of Amida - De Aedificiis II, 4, 20. Thus there may be two distinct sites with very similar names. Attempts have been made to identify the Mesopotamian Apadna either with Tell Ābād in the Tur 'Abdin or with Arcamo/Tell Harzem to the south-west of Mardin - G. Hoffmann cited in P-W, RE Suppl. I, col. 98-9 sv. Apadna (Streck) and L. Dillemann, op. cit. p. 159 and fig. XVIII.

3) Ripaltha - Or. XXXVI, 16 & 33; cf. Procopius, De Aedificiis II, 4, 14 and compare the forts called Alta Ripa on the banks of the Rhine and Danube. L. Dillemann locates it on the Tigris upstream from Cepha - op. cit. p. 231-2. Caini - Or. XXXVI, 15 & 34. Its site is unknown, although Dillemann has suggested that perhaps it does not belong in Mesopotamia at all - op. cit. p. 239, n. 3. The inconsistency may indicate that there had been a change of garrison at both places and that earlier they had been occupied by units of equites, but it is interesting that the alae recorded at Ripaltha and Caini both have the distinctive title of Flavia, which indicates that their existence must date back at least to the first half of the fourth century.

4) Apatna - Or. XXXV, 13 (+25).
Apadna - Or. XXXVI, 8 (+23). Above n. 2.
Constantina - Or. XXXVI, 9 (+24).
There are two possible explanations. Either these fortresses had lost all or part of their garrisons by the time that the Notitia was compiled in its present form in c. 395, or lacunae have appeared during the transmission of the text. But without further evidence it is impossible to ascertain which of these is the more probable.

5) Or. XXXVI, 25-7; compare Or. XXXV, 22: equites sagittarii indigenae Medianenses, Mediana.
6) Peutinger Table: Nisibis XXXIII Thebeta XVIII Baba XXXIII Singara. Also, Zacharias Rhetor IX,1 (ed. Ahrens) p.168 and Theophylact Simocatta III,10,5 (in the vicinity of Nisibis and occupied by the Persians in the sixth century). Ammianus refers to Hibita as a statio intuta, but this does not exclude the possibility that it was a fort garrisoned by equites in the period before 363 - Amm. Marc. XXV,9,3; compare XVIII,5,3, where he describes frontier troops as stationarii milites.


8) E.Sachau, "Syrische Inschriften aus Karjetên." ZDMG 38 (1884) p.544 and F.Sarre & E.Herzfeld, Archäologische Reise im Euphrat- und Tigris-Gebiet vol.1 (Berlin 1911) p.148. J.G.Taylor described the settlement at Til in the mid-nineteenth century: "Situated upon a mound, in the angle formed by the junction of the two rivers, (it) is built of the stone procured from some old massive buildings in the centre of the tumulus, portions of which are seen protruding from the ground all round its base, and for some way up the slope." - "Travels in Kurdistan." JRGS 35 (1865) p.32.

In contrast, E.Honigmann wished to locate the equites at a place called Fafi on the Tur 'Abdin to the east of Mardin - Byzantion 9 (1934) p.476, n.1; also, L.Dillemann, op.cit. p.210.

9) This site has also been placed on the Tur 'Abdin to the north of Dara - E.Sachau, "Über die Lage von Tigranocerte." Abhandlungen der preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaft (1881) p.67 and L.Dillemann, op.cit. p.230 and fig. II. It is, consequently, very near to Fafi, and one may perhaps conclude that the equites Paphenses introduced that name to the locality when they were transferred from their former station at the mouth of the Bohtan river.

10) J.Markwart, Südarmenien und die Tigrisquellen (Vienna 1930) p.162, n.3.


Thus Maipherqat/Martyropolis may have become a Roman fortress before the end of the fourth century, perhaps as a result of its capture by the Persians and the disorders in the reign of Pap - Faustos of Buzanda IV,20 and Moses III,28; cf.C.F.Lehmann-Haupt, "Eine griechische Inschrift aus der Spätzeit Tigranokerta's." Klio 8 (1908) pp.497-520. In the mid-sixth century Procopius states that Martyropolis had long been neglected by the Romans, but it seems that he is only referring back to the time of Anastasius when it yielded to the Persians - De Aedificiis III,2,3-4. Yet he does lend support to the idea of placing it under the dux Mesopotamiae, for there is a suggestion that he regarded it as belonging to that province rather than to one of the Armenias - De Aed. III, 2,1. This also appears in some Arab writings; for
example, Abu al-Fida, quoting the Lobāb of Ibn al-Athir, says that Maipherqat/Mayyafariqin is considered as a town of Mesopotamia - Taqwim al-buldān, Géographie d'Aboulfeda vol.2/2 trans. M.S.Guyard (Paris 1883) pp.50 & 56.

12) Theophylact Simocatta I,13,10 and III,6,1; Procopius, De Aedificiis II,4,8. Moreover, Arabana may be a Latinized version of the Syriac name for the region, Beth Arabaye, just as with Mefana Cartha = Mefayacartha.

13) Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,9.
L.Dillemann, op.cit. p.83.


15) The Notitia indicates that three units of equites had been stationed not on the limes itself but on important roads within the province of Mesopotamia:-
(a) At Sisara between Nisibis and the Tigris - Or. XXXVI, 25 and above, n.12.
(b) At Thebeta between Nisibis and Singara - Or. XXXVI, 27 and above, nn.6 & 7.
(c) At Constantina between Nisibis and Edessa - Or. XXXVI, 22.

Similar equites' forts may have existed at Amouda on the main road west of Nisibis - Amm. Marc. XVIII,6,13, and at Charcha on the road south of Amida - XVIII,10,1 and above, ch.IV, n.107.

On the other hand, two units were located at important posts at both ends of the frontier:
(a) At Thannouris - Or. XXXVI,28 and above, ch.VII, n.35.
(b) At Tell Fafan, which stands on the route to the strategic Bitlis Pass - Or. XXXVI, 26 and above, n.8.

Presumably, before 363 most of the old-style auxilla were stationed along the Tigris. Ammianus refers to the surrender of fifteen castella by Jovian - Amm. Marc. XXV, 7,9; cf. also his reference to castella villia between Bezabde and Virta - XX,7,17. Note also that two of the five surviving units in the Notitia have titles indicating their recruitment in this region - Or. XXXVI,34: ala XV Flavia Carduenorum and Or. XXXVI,36: cohors XIV Valeria Zabdenorum (both appear to have been formed during the Tetrarchy).

Likewise, in Osrhoene the equites are stationed mainly to the rear of the limes along the Khabur valley. For example, Ammianus mentions the castra praesidiaria at Dabana and the munimentum of Callinicum on the Belias (Belikh) river - Amm. Marc. XXIII,3,7 and Or. XXXV,16 & 17.

The forts of Canaba and Mediana figure in the Antonine Itinerary on the road between Edessa and the Euphrates at Zeugma - Itin.Ant. 189,3 & 4 and 191,3 & 4.

Although numerous sites on the Khabur have furnished evidence of late Roman occupation - W.Rollig & H.Kuhne, art.cit. (Tall Suwwar - p.121; Tall Rāya - p.121; Tall Marqada - p.123; Tall Šaddāda - p.125; Tall Umm Zirr - p.124-5 and
Only two of the places listed in the Notitia can be confidently assigned to the limes. One is the equites' fort at Oraba – Or. XXXV, 20 and W. Rollig & H. Kuhne, art. cit. p. 125 (Tall 'Ağāğa West/ 'Arban), and the other is the fort of ala I nova Diocletiana between Oraba and Thannouris – Or. XXXV, 31; cf. above, ch. I, n. 52 and D. van Berchem, op. cit. pp. 27-30. Below, fig. 2, p. 343.
Appendix 2 The Retreat from Ctesiphon in 363.

When Ctesiphon had been reached, Julian was quickly deterred from embarking on a siege of the city. Since it was impossible to return by the way he had come, there remained only the choice between two routes which led northwards from Ctesiphon to the east of the Tigris. It was decided to consult the gods: utrum nos per Assyriam reverti censerent, an...Chiliocomum prope Corduenam sitam ex improviso vastare. Although the omens were against both options, one had to be chosen and, in the circumstances, it was natural to choose the more direct route back towards the relative safety of Roman territory. Hence it was decided to head straight for Corduene. Julian's plan to advance towards the Iranian plateau was abandoned, and instead the army marched north across the plains, which had been burnt and stripped of fodder by the Persians. Ammianus attests that this route towards Corduene was followed until, after Julian's death, the troops demanded to cross the Tigris and Jovian was compelled to come to terms with Sapor. This took place to the north of a town called Dura, only about one hundred miles from Corduene; that is, in the vicinity of Tekrit to the south of the Lesser Zab and the Jebel Hamrin.

Having crossed the Tigris, the dispirited Roman army hurried on to Hatra. From there L.Dillemann believes that it headed north-west, passed by Singara unheralded and crossed the western spur of the Jebel Sinjar. While directness recommends this route, it is possible to muster arguments for a different interpretation of Ammianus' narrative. After leaving Hatra the Romans retreated across a desert plain extending ad usque lapidem septuagensimum. They marched for six days before they reached Ur, a Persian castellum, where they were met by
the dux Mesopotamiae, Cassianus, and a tribune named Mauricius. These officers brought much-needed supplies from the forces which had been left in the north under the command of Procopius and Sebastianus. The army then marched on to Thilsaphata, where the two generals greeted the new emperor and escorted him on the final stage of the journey to Nisibis. L. Dillemann has identified Thilsaphata with Thebeta near the Wadi ar-Radd between the Jebel Sinjar and Nisibis. If this is correct, Procopius and Sebastianus would appear to have been in an area where one would not expect to find them, for they had been ordered to take up position farther east on the Tigris. However, Thilsaphata has also been equated with Sapha which, according to the Peutinger Table, lay between Sarbane and the Tigris. M. Hartmann placed this site at Cillagha on the southern edge of the Tur 'Abdin about thirty miles west of Faysh Khabur. L. Dillemann agrees that Sapha must be sought in the region east of Sarbane and north of the Karatchok Dagh. He also connects the name with that of the stream, the Safan Su, which flows down from the Tur 'Abdin into the Tigris near Faysh Khabur. But he studiously ignores M. Hartmann's equation of Sapha with Thilsaphata. Yet, if the similarity between the two names has some validity, then Sapha would be a more attractive and, perhaps, a more expected place for the meeting of Jovian with Procopius and Sebastianus. Thus the army, after its imprudent detour into the desert surrounding Hatra, may have marched due north towards Tell Afar and Eski Mosul, and thence to the waters of the Safan Su, before turning westwards to Nisibis. This route, moreover, would have the advantage of taking the ill-provisioned troops away from the worst terrain, which lay on both sides of the Jebel Sinjar. The southern
slopes of the Tur 'Abdin would have offered them a better supply of food and water, particularly at that season of the year. 22
It seems that Ammianus envisaged the other route as being farther east of the Tigris, for he introduces the phrase: praeter radices montium lenius gradientes - XXIV,8,4. This suggests the route along the foothills of the Zagros Mountains through Kifri, Kirkuk, Altin Keupru and Arbela, which in the height of summer would have provided better supplies of water and fodder and might also have offered greater protection from the mobile Persian skirmishers than the burnt and scorching plains of Assyria.

Note also XXV,7,14: reversi itineribus aliiis, quoniam loca contigua flumini ut confragosa vitabantur et aspera. This appears to be an accurate reference to the north-west spur of the Jebel Hamrin, which runs along the right bank of the Tigris for some twenty-five miles above and below the confluence of the Tigris and the Lesser Zab.

L.Dillemann argues that Ur should be located at Ain el Chahid, some twenty miles east of Singara - op.cit. pp.310-311. Yet it might seem surprising to find a Persian frontier post so close to the major Roman fortress.
Cf. also, Geogr. Rav. 80,16; Plutarch, Lucullus 22,7 and Ptolemy V,17,6. On the basis of these references Sapha has also been identified with Bezabde – A. Poidebard, La Trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie... (Paris 1934) p.159 and P-W, RE sv. Sapha (Weissbach) & Supp. I, col.250 (Streck). This, however, has little to recommend it, for Bezabde did not lie on the major route from Nisibis to the Tigris – above, ch.III, n.84. Furthermore, at the time of Jovian's retreat Bezabde was still in Persian hands.

19) M. Hartmann, "Bohtan. Eine topographisch-historische Studie." Mitteilungen der vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft (1896) nr. 2 and (1897) nr.1, pp.99f & 133. Unfortunately, I have been unable to identify Čillagha on any of the maps which are available to me.

It has also been suggested that Sapha lay in the vicinity of the ancient crossing-place of the Tigris at the mouth of the Safan Su – J. Markwart, Südarmenien und die Tigrisquellen (Vienna 1930) pp.448-9.

In addition, Thilsaphata has been identified with Tell Afar – P-W, RE sv. Thilsaphata (Weissbach).

It is to be hoped that the confusion created by this multiplicity of names and sites will eventually be dispelled by a thorough archaeological survey of the area.

20) L. Dillemann, op. cit. p.160.

21) I propose that Eski Mosul is the most attractive site for the Persian castellum of Ur. According to Yakut, Balad/ Eski Mosul occupied the old Persian town of Shahrabad – Geogr. I,177.

22) I visited Tell Lelan in September 1980, when I found the surrounding countryside to be exceedingly dry and dusty. According to the maps of both A. Poidebard and L. Dillemann (fig. XVIII, p.149), Tell Lelan lies on the ancient Roman road from Thebeta to Nisibis. Ammianus himself confirms that the land between Singara and Nisibis lacked water – Amm. Marc. XX,6,9.

By contrast, M. Sykes describes a journey along the foothills of the Tur 'Abdin in 1902: "The road from Nisibin to Hajerlo...in spite of the unsettled state of the country the whole land is one vast cornfield stretching east, south and west, only limited in the north by the barren mountains... - Dar-ul-Islam (London 1904) p.143. Nowadays well-watered cotton fields extend for some twenty miles along the Nusaybin-Cizre road. Beyond that there are strips of cultivated land (fields of corn and melons), interspersed with stony pastures and the occasional stream."
Appendix 3  Artillery and the Persian Army.

It seems likely that the Persians were not usually equipped with artillery and did not possess the skills for its construction. The narrative of Ammianus gives some support to this view since the use of ballistae by Persians is recorded on only two occasions. Sapor deployed them to good effect on his siege-towers at Amida, but we are told that these machines had been acquired from the Romans when Singara was plundered on an earlier campaign. The second reference occurs when Julian was inspecting the walls of a fort near Ctesiphon; he was fired on by a tormentum murale. Generally the Persians rely on their archery to give covering fire during assaults on fortresses, while in their valiant defence of Bezabde they resort to rolling great jars, millstones and pieces of columns onto the Romans as they tried to scale or undermine the walls. Nor do they seem able to use onagri against the Roman siege-works but have to make repeated sorties to destroy them. Throughout Ammianus' account of the sieges in 359 and 360 much emphasis is laid on the Romans' ability to inflict heavy casualties on their assailants by means of missiles, whereas the Persians are unable to pin down the defenders and give covering fire to their own troops. There is a marked contrast in one assault on Amida; elsewhere around the defences the attackers suffered many losses and quickly began to retire, but in the sector with the captured Roman ballistae mounted on siege-towers the Persians turned the tables and caused great carnage among the imperial troops.
1) On his Persian expedition Julian was greatly aided by being able to transport his siege-engines down the Euphrates on boats - Amm. Marc. XXII, 3, 9. Sapor's army, operating in northern Mesopotamia, had no such assistance and thus would have been seriously slowed down by a siege-train. Yet it seems that this cannot be cited as a reason for the Persians' lack of artillery, for in 359 on a campaign noted for its speed and mobility Sapor took with him to Amida not only some captured Roman ballistae but also a number of slow-moving elephants - Amm. Marc. XIX, 2, 8 & 3.

2) Amm. Marc. XIX, 2, 8; 5, 1; 7, 2 & 5.

3) Amm. Marc. XXIV, 5, 6.

G. A. Crump states that the ships sent ahead across the Naarmalcha by Julian were ignited "by bolts from the Persian artillery" - Ammianus Marcellinus as a Military Historian (Wiesbaden 1975) p. 78. This is not borne out by the two sources to which he refers. Ammianus mentions only that the ships were set alight by facibus et omni materia qua alitur ignis - Amm. Marc. XXIV, 6, 5, while Zosimus records that the Persians shot τυρόκόχυα δελαχ  ταλάντα at them - III, 25. But, apparently, fire-arrows were not fired from ballistae - above, ch. II, n. 87.

At Pirisabora the Romans found a large supply of ὀναγαντικαὶ μενχανήματα - Zosimus III, 18, 5. Some of these weapons, which were suitable only for Persian use, were thereafter destroyed - III, 18, 6. Perhaps they were the large, tightly-strung Persian bows which served as a simple type of artillery piece - Amm. Marc. XXIV, 2, 13.

A. Tafazzoli lists a Pahlavi word for ballista, kaskanjir, but he says that it occurs only rarely - "Pahlavica." Acta Orientalia 33 (Copenhagen 1971) p. 199.

4) For example, at Singara - Amm. Marc. XX, 6, 6, and Bezabde - XX, 7, 13. In their defence of the latter - XX, 11, 10.

At Pirisabora the defenders in the citadel used large bows with iron-tipped arrows in reply to the barrage from the Roman ballistae - XXIV, 2, 13. At Maiozamalcha the Persians resisted an attempt on the walls with slingers and archers, by rolling down huge stones, and with torches and malleoli - XXIV, 4, 16. This description is immediately followed by a reference to ballistae and onagri, but their use is not specifically attributed to the Persians and it is more easily taken as an antithetical reference to the Romans' replying fire.

In his description of the third siege of Nisibis Julian says that μυχώναλ were brought up against the ramparts on boats - Or. I, 27b and II, 62c-d. It is difficult to interpret these as ballistae rather than as towers or another type of raised platform, similar to those used in an amphibious attack on Aquileia in 361 - Amm. Marc. XXI, 12, 9. There are also other arguments against these Persian machines being catapults:-

(a) Julian states that the plan was for one force to sail to attack the walls, while another group, presumably archers and slingers, kept shooting on the city's defenders from the siege-mounds - Or. I, 27b-c. Ballistae, being
long-range weapons, would have been better placed on the mounds and not brought up close to the walls.

(b) In describing the Persian casualties during this assault, Julian remarks that some were hit by missiles as they jumped from the ίνθακας - Or. I,28a.

(c) In the second panegyric he says that the defenders continually repulsed the Persians by setting the ίνθακας alight with fire-arrows, suggesting that they were wooden towers or rams - Or. II,62d.

(d) Some of the ships are said to have been shattered ποιας τῶν ἀκρεμένων δρόμων καὶ βάρους τῶν βελῶν - Or. II,62d, that is, by missiles from the walls, both large stones hurled by onagri - Or. II,63a, and, apparently, bolts fired with great force from ballistae. Significantly, Julian employs the word ὀψαυσων thereby distinguishing the Roman artillery from the Persian siege-engines.

Ammianus uses the term machina, the Latin equivalent of ίνθακας to denote siege-towers as well as catapults; for example, the helepolis is called a machina - Amm. Marc. XXIII,4,10 and XXIV,2,18; compare XIX,2,8 & 5,6. Procopius even says that the elephant is τῶν ίνθακῶν τοιοῦτων δέντολος - Bell. VIII,14,36.

Libanius does not provide any sure evidence either way for Persian artillery. In his glowing account of Julian's expedition he mentions the use of archers in the defence of Persian fortresses - Or. XVIII,228 (Pirisabora) and 236 (Malozamalcha). But his narrative is generally vague and imprecise; for example, he omits all mention of the helepolis which Julian was building to attack the citadel of Pirisabora and which, according to Ammianus, terrified the defenders into suing for peace - Amm. Marc. XXIV,2,18-19 and Zosimus III,18,3.

Finally, Procopius' narrative of the campaigns of Kavad and Chosroes does not give any firm evidence for Persian deployment of artillery in the first half of the sixth century. Admittedly, at the siege of Edessa in 544 the Persians are described as bringing up μύργον καὶ τάς ἄλας μῦθαντικά and then setting their scaling-ladders against the walls - Bell. Pers. II,27,29 & 39, but on several other occasions Procopius specifically defines the Persian μῆθαν as a battering-ram - Bell. I,7,12; II,17,9; V,21,5 & 22,2. By contrast, the defenders of the Justinianic fortress of Petra in Colchis make use of τῶν τῶν μῆθαντικά καὶ πάσην τοξευμάτων - Bell. Pers. II,17,15, where the implication is that these engines are some sort of catapult.

Procopius states that Belisarius placed arrow-firing ballistae on the towers of Rome and fixed other machines adapted for throwing stones (which, he says, resembled slings and were called δευτερολ) along the parapet of the curtain wall - Bell. V,21,19. Presumably either these were small stone-throwers or he has mistakenly placed them on instead of behind the wall - above, ch.II, p.52.

5) Amm. Marc. XX,11,23.

6) Amm. Marc. XIX,7,2-7. Ammianus provides hints that the Persians were scared of ballistae. Some of the seventy archers who briefly occupied one of the towers of Amida threw themselves to the ground through fear of the
machinarum...stridentium - XIX,5,6, and later in the same siege the tormentorum machinae were discharged without missiles to assist the safe return of the sortie of Gallic troops - XIX,6,10.
Appendix 4 The Persian War-Elephant.

Elephants have been utilized by man since the earliest historical times. Ancient Indian texts detail the various methods used for their capture and training, and Indian drivers or mahouts were acknowledged throughout the ancient world as the most expert handlers of the beasts. However, the first experience by Europeans of their use in warfare occurs only during the campaigns of Alexander. The Hellenistic kingdoms of the East followed the example and maintained a contingent of war-elephants in their forces, but thereafter the popularity of the elephant as an effective military instrument declined. Of their successors only the Kushans continued to employ the creature to any great extent, but of course they were the closest neighbours to India. The Parthians do not appear to have taken any interest in the beast; it is neither mentioned in literary sources which describe their empire, nor represented on any known artefact of Parthian date or provenance. The Romans, for their part, used elephants from North Africa, but only for entertainment purposes. They were frequently seen in processions and the bloody fights of the arena.

In India itself, however, the war-elephant remained an integral part of military organization, and the practice continued right up until the use of gunpowder became widespread in the sub-continent. It was direct contact with the Indian kingdoms which from time to time stimulated the adoption of the elephant as an animal of war by other powers, especially in the Middle East. Such appears to be the case when the Sassanians overthrew the Parthian dynasty and extended the Persian empire to the Indus valley. According to the Indian
writer Ferishta, Ardashir I marched into north-west India and exacted tribute, including elephants, from the local prince, Junah.\(^8\) Confirmation of the early date for Sassanian expansion eastwards comes in the Res Gestae Divi Saporis, which proclaims that the provinces subject to Persia included "the Kushan State as far as Peshawar."\(^9\) Thus by 262 those parts of the Kushan Empire west of the Indus, together with Sind, were at least nominally under Sassanian rule. From the conquest of these regions the Persians learnt the usefulness of the trained elephant. Subsequently it was often employed on royal hunts, the favourite pastime of Sassanian kings, and although it never became a major factor in Persian military strength, it played a lasting role in their armed forces right upto the final defeat by the Arabs at Kadisiya in 635.\(^10\)

Exactly when the Persians first used war-elephants is difficult to ascertain. The Scriptores Historiae Augustae claim that in 231 Alexander Severus defeated the army of Ardashir, which contained seven hundred elephants, but this is a most unreliable source.\(^11\) Herodian, a contemporary of the events, minimizes Alexander's success in stemming the Persian advance and makes no mention of elephants in his account of the fighting.\(^12\) Nor is anything heard of elephants in connection with the highly successful campaigns of Sapor I during the mid-third century.\(^13\) Indeed, the slow, lumbering animals would have been out of place on his swift and devastating invasions of Roman territory. It seems, therefore, that war-elephants were not much used by the Sassanians before the end of the third century.

The first definite evidence for elephants in the Persian army appears on the Arch of Galerius at Thessalonika.
four elephants, each mounted by a driver in Asiatic dress, are shown in the ranks of the Persian cavalry. Oddly, however, they are depicted as pulling a chariot. This may, perhaps, indicate the novelty of their appearance in the Persian army at that time, so that the Roman craftsmen, uncertain of their precise function, have portrayed them in a guise familiar to themselves, namely that of a triumphal procession. It is also evident that the Historia Augusta, which was possibly composed in the latter part of the fourth century, takes a noticeable interest in the animal. As well as attributing the use of war-elephants carrying towers and archers to Ardashir, it refers to elephants in connection with the triumphs of Gordian and Aurelian and mentions the presentation of an elephant to Aurelian before he became emperor when he went on an embassy to the Persian court. Moreover, the earliest reference to the Persian war-elephant in the Armenian sources occurs in the account of the martial exploits of Tiridates IV. It is claimed that he took part in the campaigns of Galerius against Narses in 296-7, so the ranks of elephants found in the Persian army during his lifetime fit neatly with the Arch of Galerius.

The Indian war-elephant carried not merely a driver but also fighting men, usually in a wooden tower. The sources differ about the exact number of riders, but a reasonable average is three to four, depending on the individual size and strength of each animal. The troops were armed with javelins or bows and arrows, which they could hurl or shoot with good effect from their elevated and mobile fighting platform. The driver wielded the traditional elephant goad, the ankus, and it seems that in battles a special knife was used to dispatch the beast
if it got out of control. The tower strapped on the elephant's back was often armour-plated to give added protection to the soldiers. Heliodorus also suggests that the elephant itself wore a coat of mail. Since Persian cavalry chargers are known to have been armoured, it is by no means improbable that their elephants were likewise shielded against missiles, although they were naturally more resilient to indiscriminate blows and wounds than horses. It is, however, claimed that the Roman defenders of Nisibis in 350 succeeded in shooting down with their artillery some of the elephants in Sapor's besieging army. Furthermore, the animal could be immobilized by a determined opponent if he succeeded in approaching close enough either to hamstring it or to cut its girth and dislodge its troop-laden tower. Faustos describes one such act of bravery in the struggle over Armenia after 363, but he has modelled his story closely on that of Eleazar the Jew in I Maccabees.

As well as taking part in actual fighting, elephants could be useful on campaign in other ways. Agathias describes how they helped the Persians to cross the river Phasis by standing as a barrier to the strong current. Doubtless they could be used to remove heavy obstacles from the path too. Procopius, for example, refers to eight elephants in the forces of Mermeroes which cleared a road through difficult, wooded terrain from Iberia to Colchis. According to Faustos, they were also employed by the Persian king to trample to death countless Armenian prisoners. This may be just a fanciful story, but there are recorded instances where elephants were actually used as royal executioners. On the other hand, the use of elephants caused certain difficulties. First of all, their ponderous
stride meant that on campaign the Persians could advance only at a very slow pace, and consequently engagements with the enemy had to be carefully planned. Furthermore, their food and water requirements must have put a severe strain on the Persians' ability to supply the army on the march, especially in the dry and sparsely cultivated areas of Mesopotamia. But the fact that these difficulties were overcome is an indication of both the efficient organization of the Persian army and the value of the beasts in the eyes of its commanders.

There were various counter-measures which the Romans could employ against the Persian war-elephants. The first was a well-directed missile (stone, ballista-bolt, javelin or even arrow). It was certainly preferable to try to wound or bring down the animal when it was still at a distance; only the very brave or foolhardy, like Eleazar, resorted to attacking it at close quarters. The second, very effective method was to assail it with fire, of which it had a great fear. Strangely, however, the Romans rarely seem to have used fire-arrows or burning torches to panic the enemy's elephants. Instead, they firmly believed that elephants were frightened of pigs and similar creatures. According to Procopius, they successfully used a squealing pig, which was hung from the walls of Edessa, to drive away an elephant whose archers were threatening to overpower the defenders at one of the city gates. But, as Carrington has remarked, it is extremely doubtful whether there is any truth in this belief. Indeed, the evidence of Persian rock-cut reliefs at Taq-i-Bustan suggests that it is quite unfounded, for they depict a royal boar-hunt, one of those scenes which Ammianus noted were typical of Sassanian art. The boars are driven through a
marshy landscape towards the king by ranks of elephant-mounted beaters. At the bottom of the frieze is a scene of beaters and elephants gathering up the fallen game; the elephants are shown in the act of lifting the dead boars onto their backs with their trunks.38

There remains the question of where and by what means the Sassanians acquired a steady supply of elephants for their hunting and fighting. Although the _elephas maximus asurus_ probably inhabited Mesopotamia and Syria in earlier historical times (and perhaps as late as the second century B.C.), it seems most unlikely that wild elephants survived within the Persian Empire until the Sassanian period. Hence the Persian kings must have secured a regular supply of the animals from India, some being exchanged for Persian horses, others sent as tribute or, in isolated cases, as diplomatic presents.39 Apparently there was considerable movement of elephants within the sub-continent. Ceylonese elephants, for example, were exported to the mainland. Sources also indicate that the animal was more widespread than it is today, especially in the north-west provinces of Punjab and Kashmir, which were in close proximity, if not actually subject, to the Sassanian Empire.40 Once in Persia, it is probable that the elephants were kept in the royal parks, where they would be on hand for use on hunts.41 At the royal palace of Dastagerd, captured by Heraclius in 628, there is said to have been a great pleasure park full of animals, including nine hundred and sixty elephants.42 It is doubtful, however, whether the Persians had any great success at breeding their own stock; the elephant must have been a comparatively rare animal in Persia.43 Yet the very fact that elephants found employment with the Sassanians right up until
the fall of their empire indicates that their usefulness, even just in the restricted fields of war and sport, was considered to outweigh all the difficulties which were associated with their supply, handling and upkeep.
1) The principal works on the elephant in antiquity are:
For methods of capture and training:

2) At Gaugamela in 331 B.C. Darius had in his army fifteen elephants, which had been brought from Arachosia, and Porus' forces on the Hydaspes included a large contingent of elephants.

3) P. Goukowsky discusses the use of elephants by Alexander and his successors - "Le roi Pôros, son éléphant et quelques autres." Bull. de Correspondance Hellénique 96 (1972) pp.473-505. For early Hellenistic representations of the turreted war-elephant - M. Rostovtzeff, A Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World I (Oxford 1941) plate 52, fig.2 & plate 53, fig.1. A painted plate of the third century B.C. from Campania depicts one of Pyrrhus' Indian elephants - J.D. Beazley, Etruscan Vase Painting (Oxford 1947) pp.211-215 and plate 39, fig.1. At the battle of Magnesia in 191 B.C. Antiochus III deployed fifty-four Indian elephants with towers on their backs - Livy XXXVII,39-44. Elephants were used by Lysias during the Jewish revolt in 162 B.C. - I Maccabees 6,34-46 and Josephus, Ant. Iud. XII,9,4.

4) Kushan coins portray the king seated on an elephant - J.M. Rosenfeld, The Dynastic Arts of the Kushans (UCLA 1967) coin nos. 17, 43 & 92.

5) Although the Tactica is based on Hellenistic military handbooks, Arrian left out the standard section on elephant formations. He makes only a passing reference to the animal - Tactica 19. This omission is good evidence for believing that the Parthians did not include elephants in their armies.

6) To celebrate the dedication of his theatre Pompey staged venationes. These included the pitiless slaughter of eighteen to twenty elephants, a sight which appalled even the Roman mob - Cicero, Ad Fam. VII,1,3; Pliny NH VIII,21 and Dio Cassius XXXIX,38. After capturing sixty-four elephants complete with their towers and ornaments at the battle of Thapsus in 46 B.C. - Bell. Afric. 83-6 and Dio XLIII,8,1-2, Caesar presented elephant fights at his triumphal shows - Pliny NH VIII,7; Suetonius, Div. Jul. 39,3 and Dio XLIII,23,3. It has been suggested that Caesar was thus experimenting with elephants as an arm of war with a view to his projected campaign against Parthia - G. Jennison, Animals for Show and Pleasure (Manchester 1937) p.57. The beast could be pressed into service in dire emergencies such as civil war. Thus elephants make a brief appearance in the forces of Anthony and Octavian - Cicero, Philippi...
V,17,46 and Dio XLV,13,4.
The reference to elephants in Arrian's *Indica* derives from the earlier work of Megasthenes - *Ind*. VIII,13-4. But it is clear that Arrian had also seen elephants performing tricks at shows - *Ind*. VIII,14,5-6. P.A.Stadter believes that these were probably African animals - *Arrian of Nicomedia* (North Carolina 1980) p.226, n.13.
For processions there is the example of the wall-painting of Venus in an elephant *quadriga* in the Via dell' Abbondanza at Pompeii. Also, below n.15 & 16.

The military use of elephants in India is referred to by several classical authors. Photius records that Ctesias of Cnidus wrote a work Περί τῶν τεῖχοσκελετῶν Ἕλεφρων - *Ind*. 3 (Jacoby) p.491. Aelian claims to quote from Ctesias when he provides information about the Indian elephant - *Hist. Animalium* XVII,29; cf. also Diodorus II,16ff.
Pliny and Solinus give detailed lists of the military strength of various Indian kingdoms - *Pliny NH* VI,21,8-23, 11 and Solinus 52,8-12.
Their use by White Huns in northern India is later mentioned by Cosmas Indicopleustes - XI,20-22.


Tabari states that Ardashir waged a campaign on Iran's eastern borders, occupying Sistan, Abarshahr (modern Nishapur), Marv, Balkh and Khwarazm, as well as receiving the submission of the king of the Kushans - trans. Th.Nöldeke (Leipzig 1879) p.17.

10) In 575 the Romans inflicted a defeat on the Persians at Melitene. Twenty-four elephants, which were captured in the battle, were later sent to Constantinople - *Theophylact Simocatta* III,10; 11 & 14. Elephants apparently fought on both sides in the struggle between Chosroes II and the usurper Bahram Chobin in 591 - *Theophylact Simocatta* V,10, 6 & 10. For the battle of Kadisiya - *Mas'udi, Muruj al-Dhahab* II,230.

11) SHA vita Sev. Alex. 55-6.

12) Herodian VI,5,2-10.

13) Of course, the sources for this period are extremely meagre and unreliable.
An elephant with a mahout appears at the very end of the triumphal procession in the Bishapur relief attributed to Sapor I. But probably it should not be associated with his victories over the Romans, for it is shown in company with east Iranian (or Indian?) delegates - G.Herrmann, *The

14) After the defeat of Narses Galerius obtained thirteen elephants - MGH Auct. Ant. IX, Chron. Min. I,148,26. These must be reckoned either among the booty from the battle or in the ransom which was paid for the royal Persian captives - Eutropius, *Brev.* IX,27,2; Theophanes, *Chron.* am 5796 and Zonaras XII,31.


15) Dio Cassius states that Alexander Severus' triumphal car was drawn by four elephants - LXXVIII,7,4. Similar chariots are mentioned by Lactantius - *De mort. pers.* 16,6, and Ambrose - *Ep.* 43,18 (Migne) *PLat.* 16, 1184a-b.

An issue of gold medallions, which celebrates the consulsiphip of Diocletian and Maximian in 287, depicts the emperors standing in a chariot drawn by four Indian elephants - F.Gnecchi, *I Medaglioni Romani I* (1912) plate 5, nos. 1 & 2. The Arch of Galerius also shows an elephant *quadriga* being presented to the Caesar by various deities - H.P.Laubscher, *op.cit.* p.81 and plates 61/1 & 2 and 62/1 & 2. It is noteworthy that, according to Malalas, Julian published the *Misopogon* on the Τετράδιπλος τῶν ελεφάντων beside the royal palace at Antioch - XIII (Bonn) p.328. Perhaps this monument, too, commemorated Galerius' victory and depicted Persian war-elephants.

A bronze *follis* was issued in Rome for Maxentius' third consulship in 310, which portrays the emperor in an elephant *quadriga*. Gold medallions struck at Trier for Constantine's vicennalia in 326 bear a caricature of an elephant-drawn chariot - *RIC* VII (1966) p.207-8, nos. 467-9 and plate 5.

16) SHA Gord. III, 27,9; Aurel. 33,4 & 5,5. One may compare the reputed embassy of Aurelian to that which Stilicho is known to have undertaken in 384 - Claudian 21,51ff. He brought back from Persia some elephanti regii, whose arrival was heralded by no less a personage than Symmachus - Rel. 9,5.

In addition, *statuae cum elephantis* are said to have been decreed to Balbinus and Gordian I - SHA Max. duo 26,5. Elagabalus, it is claimed, used to drive elephant *quadriga* in the Vatican region, destroying tombs which got in his way - SHA Elagab. 23,1. Also, the usurper Firmus, who temporarily controlled Egypt during the reign of Aurelian, is said to have ridden an elephant - SHA Firm. 6,1.


18) Concerning the elephant Isidorus states: hoc genus animantis in rebus bellicis aptum est; in eis enim Persae et Indi ligneis turribus conlocatis, tamquam de muro iaculis dimicant - *Etymologiarum* XII,2,15. This,
incidentally, appears to be the source for the phrase in the mediaeval English bestiaries which contain representations of the elephant and castle - for example, MS Bodley 764, fol. 12r and St. John's Coll., Oxford MS 61, fol. 10v.

There is a silver dish of eastern manufacture (Sassanian or Bactrian, date uncertain) which shows an Indian elephant with mahout and tower containing two armed men - T. Talbot Rice, Ancient Arts of Central Asia (London 1965) Illus. 121, p. 136.


Early European travellers to India:
- Vicence at Calcutta in 1507: three to four riders.
- The Venetian Federici at Pegu in 1570: three to four.
- The Dutchmen Van Schouten and Van der Hagen: four to six.


21) Amm. Marc. XXV, 1, 15.

22) Bell. Afric. 72, 4 & 86, 1; Josephus, Bell. Iud. I, 42 and Ant. Iud. XII, 373. Cf. also I Maccabees 6, 37 and Polyaeus VIII, 23, 5.

23) Heliodorus, Aeth. IX, 18, 8.


25) Compare Faustos IV, 22 and I Maccabees 6, 43-6.


27) Procopius, Bell. VIII, 13, 4-5.

28) Faustos IV, 23 & 57. III Maccabees contains the story of how Ptolemy IV Philopator intended to massacre the Jews by
sending five hundred drunken elephants to trample on them in the hippodrome at Alexandria - 5,1-5:51. Cf. R.Fishman-Lucker, "Remembering the Elephants." Byzantium 48 (1978) pp.51-63. This may well have inspired the references in the Armenian history, for Faustos presents the national resistance of the Armenians and their persecution by the Sassanian Persians in similar terms to that of the Jews by the Hellenistic Greeks.

Sapor II is said to have ordered three hundred elephants to trample down the ruins of the old city of Susa after the suppression of a revolt by its inhabitants - AMO S.Milles p.70 and Hamza Isfahani 52,18. Above, ch.IV n.9. According to Theophylact, Chosroes II used elephants to put to death prisoners after the defeat of Bahram Chubin - V,11,2.

The fourteenth century traveller Ibn Battuta refers to elephant executioners - Travels III,330; 354 & IV,45. Ferishta's account of the capture of Diu in 1402 by Moozuffur Shah states that the garrison was "nearly all cut to pieces, while the Ray with the rest of the members of his court were trod to death by elephants." - History of the Rise of Mahomedan Power in India Vol.IV, trans. J.Briggs (Calcutta 1908) p.8. Other references in P.E.P.Deraniyagala, Some Extinct Elephants, their Relatives and the two Living Species (Colombo 1955) p.68.

29) Their natural walking speed may be estimated as being four miles per hour. Above, ch.II, n.42 and ch.IV, p.146.

30) These are estimated as being about 200 litres of water and between 200 and 250 kg. of solid food per day - H.H.Scullard, op.cit. p.20 and Encyclopaedia Britannica Macropaedia (1977) Vol.15, p.2.

31) According to Vegetius, war-elephants could be opposed by either heavy infantry or velites (who aimed to kill their mahouts and the archers in the towers on their backs) or heavier carroballistae - Epit. rei militaris III,24.

32) This is noted by Aelian - Hist. Anim. VII,6.

33) Only Ammianus mentions it at the siege of Amida: quos (elephantos) flammis coniectis undique circumnexos, iam corporibus tactis, gradientesque retrosum regere magistri non poterant - XIX,7,7.

In the battle between the forces of Mahomed Kasim and the Raja Dahir, ruler of Sind, in 711 the Arabs threw naphtha balls at the white elephant on which the Indian prince was riding - Ferishta, op.cit. Vol.IV, p.408.


35) Procopius, Bell. VIII,14,35. Other reputedly historical instances are mentioned by Aelian - Hist. Anim. XVI,36, and Polyaenus - IV,6,3.

37) Amm. Marc. XXIV,6,3.

38) S. Fukai & K. Horiuchi, *op.cit.* Vol.1, plates 33-43 and 71-2. In the upper right-hand corner of the frieze other elephants are marching away laden with boars, which are strapped tightly to their backs - plates 76-8. On the opposite wall of the larger grotto is a relief portraying a deer-hunt. Here also elephants are shown driving the game from what appear to be enclosures - plates 82-5.

39) Ferishta recalls the payment of tribute by the Indian princes of Kunowj to the Persian kings, Bahram V, Peroz and Kavad - *op.cit.* Introd. chap. pp.lxxvi-vii & lxxix. Note also that a considerable amount of Sassanian coinage has been found at Taxila - J. Marshall, *Taxila* (Cambridge 1951) p.73-4. The orator Pacatus refers to a Persian embassy in 289 which brought gifts of gems, silks and elephants to the imperial court - *Pan. Lat.* II,22,5.

In more recent times J. Ranking records the movement of elephants to Persia; for example, at Meshchihd in 1740 "an ambassador from India, presented to Nadir Shah letters assigning certain revenues, and many chain elephants," and the same Shah "brought three hundred elephants from Delhi to Persia." - *Historical Researches on the Wars and Sports of the Mongols and Romans* (London 1826) p.99.

40) Aelian, *Hist. Anim.* XVI,2-22. The seventeenth century French traveller François Berwer remarks that the boldest fighting elephants came from Ceylon - *Travels in the Mogul Empire* trans. I. Brock (London 1826) Vol.1, p.314-5. Aelian also states that elephants from Taxila were larger than average - *Hist. Anim.* XII,8. Likewise, an Indian treatise refers to distinctive types of elephant from various regions, which include the Upper Indus valley and even Afghanistan - P. E. P. Deraniyagala, *op.cit.* p.134. Terracotta figurines of elephants have been found in Afghanistan, and ivory carvings of them have come from near Kandahar - F. H. Andrews, "The Elephant in Industry and Art." *Journal of Indian Art* 10 (1904) pp.51-64.


42) Ammianus does not mention elephants among the animals in the royal park near Ctesiphon which were butchered by Roman troops in 363 - Amm. Marc. XXIV,5,2. But it is quite feasible that they had been removed beforehand in order to join Sapor's army. Zosimus, in his account of the expedition, states that the Romans passed two royal parks on their way to Ctesiphon. He calls the second of them by the correct Persian name, *ŋapɔdʒiːoʊc* - Zos. III,23,1 & 25,2. Libanius refers to a place where a herd of wild pigs was kept -
Or. XVIII, 243. Cf. also Theophanes, Chron. (Bonn 1839) p. 495. Certainly the reliefs at Taq-i-Bustan show elephants taking an important part in the royal hunts, which were presumably staged in such parks - above n. 38. There is a photograph of what is thought to be a royal park in E. Schmidt, Flights over Ancient Cities of Iran (Chicago 1940) plate 96.

43) In later Persian poetry the birth of an elephant calf in the royal stables during the reign of Chosroes II is recorded as a remarkable occurrence. Aelian mentions that twelve elephants born of a herd kept near Rome performed at the shows presented by Germanicus in c. 12 - Hist. Anim. II, 11.
Appendix 5 Armenian Kings and Patriarchs.

There is considerable confusion in the Armenian sources regarding the chronology of the fourth century kings and patriarchs. It has been shown that the genealogy of father-to-son succession does not fit the time-scales which are available.\(^1\) Frequently names and events seem to be hopelessly misplaced. Yet the details in themselves often appear genuine and serve as valuable pieces of information once they are correctly identified. R.H. Hewsen has argued that the reigns of two third century kings, Chosroes and Tiridates III, have been inserted into the fourth century regnal list between Tiridates IV and Arsaces II.\(^2\) It is certainly possible to discount the king Tiran as an anachronism and reduplication. In some ways this figure bears close resemblance to his supposed successor, Arsaces; in others he retains the aspect of Tiridates III who, condemned as a usurper and fratricide, is omitted by the Armenian historians.\(^3\) However, the arguments for the non-existence of Chosroes II are not so convincing, for it would leave an interregnum of some eight or nine years between the death of Tiridates IV and the accession of Arsaces.\(^4\) Despite the turmoil of these years, especially the revolts of Sanatruck and Bakur,\(^5\) it is difficult to believe that there was such a long hiatus, since both internal and external forces would have acted quickly to fill the vacant throne. But it is evident that the Persian and Roman involvement in Armenia did not follow immediately on Tiridates' death. At first the succession must have been resolved internally. Only when the new king's position had been undermined by local quarrels and rebellions did the opportunity arise for the Persian attempt to seize the throne and the necessity ensue for the Romans to support the
Armenian monarchy. Chosroes' reign probably ended during the period of uncertainty and renewed Persian aggression after the death of Constantine. Faustos speaks of a bloody battle with the Persians, in which the Sparapet Vâče Mamikonian was killed. Thereafter the command of the Armenian army was temporarily entrusted to Arshavir Kamsarakken and Andovk Siwnik'. According to Moses, Arshavir "took Tiran, Chosroes' son, and went to the emperor (to ask) that he might make him king of Armenia in his father's stead." Although Faustos confuses the events at the end of Chosroes' reign with the defeat of Narses in 297, it is clear that the Persians tried to exploit the dissension in the kingdom both to gain control there and also to threaten the Romans' hold on northern Mesopotamia.


3) When the reigns of Tiran and Arsaces are compared, the following similarities are found:
   (a) Both are said to have been unconscientious rulers - FB III,13 and Moses III,19.
   (b) Both were bad Christians - FB III,12; 14 & IV,12 and Moses III,14 & 24.
   (c) Both attempted to exterminate princely houses - FB III, 18 & IV,19 and Moses III,15.
   (d) Both were arrested by the Persians and blinded - FB III,20 & IV,53-4 and Moses III,17.
   (e) Both are placed at the time of Julian's Persian expedition; Tiran by Moses - III,15, and Arsaces by Ammianus - XXIII,3,5.

   On the other hand, the whole episode of Tiran's arrest and blinding, followed by the appeal to the emperor (called Valens by Faustos) who routed the Persians in Armenia and put their king, Narses, to flight should be placed in the context of Galerius' victory in 297 - FB III,20-1 and N.H.Baynes, "Rome and Armenia in the Fourth Century." in Byzantine Studies and Other Essays (London 1955) pp.186.

   It is also striking that Tiran's eleven year reign corresponds exactly with the duration of that of Tiridates III (287-298) - Moses III,17.


   Moses dates the start of Tiran's reign to the seventeenth year of Constantius II, that is from 323 when he was made Caesar and not from the time when he became co-emperor in 337 - Moses III,11.

   Thus I support the following chronology for the fourth century kings and catholikoi:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
<th>Reign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tiridates IV</td>
<td>298 - 330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosroes II</td>
<td>330 - c.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsaces</td>
<td>338/9- 364 (died in captivity c.368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pap</td>
<td>368 - 374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregory</td>
<td>died c.327 or 328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristaces</td>
<td>320 - 327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vrt'anes</td>
<td>327 - 342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusik</td>
<td>342 - 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharen and Sahak</td>
<td>348/9- 352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nerses</td>
<td>353 - 373</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Nerses is in exile 359-368.

5) Chosroes II was regarded as a weak and ineffectual ruler - Moses III,8. Two serious rebellions are recorded during his reign; the one by a certain Sasan or Sanatruk, a member of the royal family, who attempted at the instigation of the Persians to set himself up as an independent ruler in P'aytakaran - FB III,7 and Moses III,3 & 6, and the other by Bakur, the vitaxa of Arzanene, who also received assistance from the Persians - FB III,9 and Moses III,4 & 7. Above, ch.V, pp.198-9.

6) Faustos suggests that the start of Chosroes' reign was
peaceful and prosperous - FB III,3.

7) FB III,11.

8) Moses III,10.
Appendix 6 Dromadarii in the Roman Army.

Papyrii, inscriptions and literary texts of the Roman period make occasional reference to dromadarii, but their role and status in the imperial army remains ill-defined. From documents of the second and third centuries it is known that a small number of auxiliary units had detachments of dromadarii. In 156 the cohors I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum had a complement of nineteen dromadarii, while the cohors XX Palmyrencrum at Dura-Europos included at least thirty such men in the early third century. These were not apparently organised into a separate squad but were attached individually to various centuriae or turmae. In a cohors equitata the cavalrymen were undoubtedly of higher rank and drew more pay than the pedites, but as regards the dromadarii there is no clear evidence. The fact that they are distinguished in the rosters implies that they were specialists of some note and importance. Yet the Dura rosters also suggest that not all dromadarii enlisted as such but were given the post after serving some years as pedites. So perhaps they held an intermediate rank between the cavalry and infantry.

There are, moreover, a few units which are specifically designated as dromadarii. The Notitia Dignitatum records four alae with this title, three of which appear under the command of the dux Thebaidos and one under the dux Palaestinae. If the title was intended to distinguish units forming specialist camel-corps whose main task was to patrol the unsettled desert limites, the number and distribution of these alae is, in the least, surprising. One would expect to find both more units named in this way and also a wider, more even allocation of such units throughout the eastern frontier provinces. However,
since this is not the case, one has to conclude that the title was bestowed in an haphazard and indiscriminate fashion on a few random units. Unfortunately, our scanty knowledge of the history of particular auxiliary units does not permit us to offer a better explanation of how and why the title was conferred on such a small number of alae.

But what duties did the dromadarius perform? There are two distinct possibilities; either he served as a soldier mounted on a camel, or he was a camel-driver. If the former is correct, then the Roman army must have been able both to recruit highly skilled 'meharistes' and to obtain thoroughbred dromedaries. Although units are recorded in the Notitia as having an Arab or Saracen origin, it is clear that the Romans never exercised enough control over the tribes of the Arabian peninsula to secure a steady supply of suitable men and animals. The only substantial evidence for a regular camel-corps comes from Palmyra. The city's prosperity depended on the caravans to and from Persia. Stone reliefs depict the camel troops who guarded the desert tracks against Bedouin raids. Palmyrene texts suggest that a system of guard-posts existed between the city and the Lower Euphrates, and doubtless soldiers mounted on camels were an important element in the surveillance and protection of the trade routes. Yet, despite this importance, the army of Palmyra was principally a cavalry force. The (admittedly poor) sources for Zenobia's defeat by Aurelian in 272 do not hint at any part played by camel-riders in the battles around Antioch and Emesa, but they do draw attention to the quality of the Palmyrene heavy cavalry.

It is, in fact, obvious that a camel-rider could never be the equal of a similarly armed horseman. Bulliet states that
"the gallop is an unusual pace for the camel and one that requires both a well-trained animal and an expert rider. Yet even with the gallop there is no parallel in camel warfare to the cavalry charge: the camel simply cannot produce the momentum and impact of the warhorse."\textsuperscript{14} Vegetius recalls the use of camels in war apud veteres, but he gives no indication that they played a part in the military effectiveness of the late Roman army.\textsuperscript{15} Moreover, the small number of dromadarii attested in auxiliary units suggests that they were unable to operate in the field as a separate body,\textsuperscript{16} and it is improbable that a patrol on active duty would consist of both cavalrymen and camel-riders. Thus the evidence points to the conclusion that the dromadarius was not engaged in duties of a purely martial nature.

It is clear that camels were used principally for transport purposes.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, they were the baggage animal par excellence of the Middle East, since they were ideal for use on expeditions in this arid region. Thus when Corbulo entered Armenia in 62, a great train of camels loaded with corn accompanied his army.\textsuperscript{18} In 216 a camel belonging to an Egyptian lady called Aurelia Taesis was requisitioned by a centurion for imperial service in Syria "in the most noble armies", probably in connection with Caracalla's planned eastern campaign.\textsuperscript{19} Camels are also mentioned on Julian's Persian expedition in 363.\textsuperscript{20} Papyri provide more mundane examples of the camel's use as transport; at Dura, for example, they were sent to fetch the cohort's pay from the procurator's office,\textsuperscript{21} and in Egypt camels were hired or requisitioned to carry goods and supplies.\textsuperscript{22} The forts and outposts of the eastern limites had to be regularly supplied even with the basic
essentials such as food, water and fuel, and it is likely that camels were kept mainly to serve in the Roman commissariat. The \textit{dromadarius}, therefore, was essentially a camel-driver. The fact that civilian cameleers are fairly well attested indicates that there was no shortage of men able to tend to the peculiar needs of these animals within the settled communities of the eastern provinces.\footnote{23}

On the other hand, a small number of fast camel-riders may have been attached to outlying forts in desert regions to serve as messengers and scouts; at Dura, for example, a \textit{dromadarius} is attested carrying letters.\footnote{24} An inscription of the second century records a dedication by the \textit{equites singulares exercitus Arabici item dromadarii}.\footnote{25} Evidently a number of \textit{dromadarii} served at headquarters in the retinue of the provincial governor. Speidel suggests that, because they were attached to the \textit{equites} and not to the \textit{pedites singulares}, these \textit{dromadarii} were combat troops.\footnote{26} This is not necessarily so; they may have been plain dispatch-riders, employed by the military commander to keep in touch with units and detachments posted far out in the desert.\footnote{27}

Although it is impossible to estimate any figures, it is likely that the number of \textit{dromadarii} and camels in regular service with the Roman army was always limited. For it seems that men and beasts were called upon specially when campaigns necessitated a greater concentration.\footnote{28} Moreover, the army must also have depended heavily on civilian labour to transport supplies and equipment by camel. But since we know of units in the second and third centuries which contained \textit{dromadarii}, but which did not apparently attract the distinctive epithet,\footnote{29} it is probable that at least some of the units listed by the
Notitia in the laterculum minus of the eastern duchies had a small complement of camel-drivers. Nevertheless, the paucity of evidence for dromadarii does suggest that they were neither a large nor a particularly distinguished branch of the imperial forces.
1) Rock-cut inscriptions in Greek and Nabataean have been found at a road-station between Mada'in Salih and al-Ula in the Hejaz. Several of them mention dromadarii - H. Seyrig, "Postes romaines sur la route de Medine." Syria 22 (1941) pp. 218-23, especially nos. 4, 6 & 10. The fort at Nemara, 80 km. east of Bostra, was garrisoned by detachments of legio III Cyrenaica, dromadarii and portions of another legion at the time of the Severi - IGL 2264. Ostraca from Bu Njem in Tripolitana refer to soldiers ad or cum camellos (-is) - R. Rebuffat & R. Marichal, "Les 'Ostraca' de Bu Njem." REL 51 (1973) pp. 285-6.

2) Ephemeris Epigraphica VII, p. 456ff. col. i, lines 16 & 33 = R. O. Fink, Roman Records on Papyrus (Cleveland 1971) no. 64, p. 229.


4) In the pridianum of cohors I Lusitanorum a newly recruited dromadarius is assigned to a turma - Eph. Epig. VII, p. 456ff. col. ii, lines 10-11 = Fink no. 64, p. 230. Another papyrus shows that dromadarii were distributed among the centuriae of the cohors XX Palmyrenorum - Dura Papyrus no. 100 & 101 = Fink no. 1 & 2, pp. 18-81.


6) For example, a Macrin(us) Maximus in Dura Papyrus no. 98, xi, 24 = Fink no. 6, p. 95; Dura Papyrus no. 100, xviii, 12 = Fink no. 1, p. 29; Dura Papyrus no. 101, xlv, 7 = Fink no. 2, p. 81 and Dura Papyrus no. 102, ix, 27 = Fink no. 8, p. 104. In a similar fashion the pridianum of cohors I Lusitanorum records under accessions pedites upgraded to equites - Eph. Epig. VII, p. 456ff. col. ii, lines 32-3.

7) An ala Ulpia dromadariorum milliaria in Syria in 156/7 - CIL XVI, 106 = ILS 9057. An inscription recording the career of a Tiberius Claudius Phi... states that he was at one stage the commander of an ala I Ulpia 6ρομαδαριωρον Palmyrenorum - AE 1947, no. 171. Another inscription probably referring to an ala dromadariorum comes from Rimet-el Lohf between Damascus and Canatha: Iulius Candidus vetranus ex dupl. Val. drum. - CIL III, 123 = ILS 2541. Th. Mommsen took this to be the ala I Valeria dromadariorum which was stationed in the Thebaid - Not. Dign. Or. XXXI, 57.

Or. XXXIV,33: ala Antana dromadariorum Admatha.
The exact location of these alae remains uncertain.
Preceteos is completely unknown. Psinaula was probably
near the starting-point of a road into the eastern desert
- P-W. RE XXIII,2 col.1407 (H.Kees). D.van Berchem
suggests that it should be located in the vicinity of
Panopolis since a papyrus (P.Lond. 1653) refers to a
village called Psinabla in the nome of that city -
L'armée de Dioclétien et la réforme constantinienne (Paris
1952) p.67. Maximianopolis is equated with Caenopolis on
the east bank of the Nile - P-W. RE XIV,2 col.2484-5.
Admatha has been identified as el-Ihmeime on the via nova
Traiana between Petra and Aelia - P-W. RE Supplement XIII,
col .443,31-2. But it may also be equated with Mattana
(el-Medeiyineh) to the east of the Dead Sea and south-east
of Madeba - N.Glueck, "Explorations in Eastern Palestine."
Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research 14


10) M.Rostovtzeff, Caravan Cities (Oxford 1932) p.151, plate
xxii. K.Michalowski, Palmyre: fouilles polonaises 1960
A relief depicting two men armed with shields and lances,
one on a horse, the other on a camel - H.Ingholt, Studier
over Palmyrensk Skulptur (Copenhagen 1928) plate XXIV,2.
Another relief shows three kneeling camels, whose equipment
includes a quiver, a bow-case and a small circular shield
- H.Ingholt, "Inscriptions and Sculptures from Palmyra."

11) A text from 'Umm es-Salabih, possibly the site of a
way-station on the road from Palmyra to Hit, mentions a
strategus at Ana and Gamla in 225 - J.Cantineau, Syria 14
(1933) pp.178-80, no. 4.
Another text, from the Euphrates valley south-east of
e1-Qayan, refers to a strategus named Yarhai - J.Starcky,
"Une inscription palmyrénienne trouvée près de l'Euphrate."
For the remains of a Palmyrene outpost at 'Umm el-'Amad,
possibly the Γεννήν καταλυμα ουνοδιου of SEG VII,135

12) Thus Arsu, the god of caravans, is usually depicted on or
next to a camel - M.Rostovtzeff, op.cit. p.151, plate xxii,
fig. 1. For an analysis of the representations of deities
bearing arms or mounted on camels from the area of Palmyra
A relief at Dura-Europos shows a religious procession
bearing the symbols of the gods on the back of a camel -
S.B.Downey, "A Camel Procession from Dura." Annales Arch.

13) See G.Downey, "Aurelian's Victory over Zenobia."
TAPhA 81 (1950) p.57ff. Note the survival of a cuneus equitum
secondorum clibanariorum Palmirenorum (sic) under the
command of the magister militum per Orientem - Not. Dign.
Or. VII,34.
14) R.W. Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Harvard 1975) p. 99. T.E. Lawrence describes a camel charge, in which he took part, against a Turkish relief battalion at Aba el Lissan in 1917. The Turkish infantry, however, had already been put to flight by the Arab horsemen, and Lawrence himself only succeeded in shooting his own camel from under him - *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (Harmondsworth 1962) pp. 309-12.

15) Vegetius, *Epitoma rei militaris* III, 23. Xenophon, however, states that camels were not effective in war and were only fit for carrying baggage - *Cyropaedia* VII, 1, 48-9.

16) The cohors XX Palmyrenorum milliaria had a maximum of thirty-nine dromadarii; the cohors I Lusitanorum quingenaria twenty, and an unnamed cohors quingenaria equitata fourteen out of a total of 487 men. This last unit is recorded in *P. Brooklyn Mus. Inv. no. 35.1207*, col. ii, lines 9-12 - J.D. Thomas & R.W. Davies, "A New Military Strength Report on Papyrus." *JRS* 67 (1977) pp. 50-61.

17) The common type of camel is the 'tulu', a cross between the dromedary and the two-humped Bactrian camel. This animal combines the qualities of the two breeds; it has the Bactrian's strength and stamina, but it also retains the dromedary's fitness to the desert environment, although it is not as fleet of foot as the slender thoroughbred Arabian camel.

18) Tacitus, *Annales* XV, 12, 2. At the defeat of Crassus in 54 B.C. the Parthian army under Surenas included teams of camels carrying large supplies of arrows - Plutarch, *Crassus* 25, 1. Hyginus states that camels were used to carry either booty or road-building equipment - *De mun. cast.* 29.


20) Amm. Marc. XXV, 8, 6. Libanius says that a camel train carrying wine was excluded from the expedition on Julian's personal orders - *Or.* XVIII, 26. On the Arch of Constantine at Rome, in the *profectio* frieze carved by a contemporary sculptor, a camel laden with a pack mingles with the marching soldiery - H.P.L'Orange & A. von Gerkan, *Der späantike Bildschmuck des Konstantinsbogen* (Berlin 1939) plates 3a, 6b & 7a. Compare the Arch of Galerius at Thessalonika; among the eastern prisoners depicted on one frieze there is a dromedary ridden by a woman with a small child, while the head of another camel, apparently carrying booty, is also visible - H.P. Laubscher, *Der Reliefschmuck des Galeriusbogens in Thessaloniki* (Berlin 1975) p. 36 and plates 14/1 & 19/1. Another relief consists of a procession of laden dromedaries with drivers, perhaps Roman dromadarii - H.P. Laubscher, *op. cit.* p. 44 and plate 28/3.
Procopius claims that for a long time it had been the custom for the State to maintain a large number of camels to carry all the supplies that the Roman army needed on campaign, but that Justinian practically abolished the whole of the camel service, with disastrous effects on the army's commissariat - Anecdota XXX,15,16.

According to Joshua Stylites, the Persians also used camels for carrying supplies on military campaigns - Chronicle ch.80. Whereas under the Parthians the Bactrian camel was used extensively in the eastern caravan trade, under the Sassanians one-humped camels became much more common in Iraq and western Iran - R.W. Bulliet, op.cit. p.164. Even the king Bahram V (Bahram Gur of Iranian epic) is depicted riding on a dromedary - R. Ettinghausen, "Bahram Gur's Hunting Feats or the Problem of Identification." Iran 17 (1979) pp.25-31 and especially plate Ib.

One-humped camels are also shown carrying game from a royal hunt on a relief at Taq-i-Bustan - S. Fukai & K. Horiuchi, Tag-i-Bustan (Tokyo 1969) vol. I, plates 81 & 102. Moreover, numerous seals of the Sassanian period figure one-humped camels.

21) Dura Papyrus no. 100, xliii,19ff = Fink no. 1, p.51: ten men assigned ad opinionem stipendii, including two equites and one dromadarius.
Also, Dura Papyrus no. 94, lines 4-5 = Fink no. 65, p.234: a party of troops sent in c.240 ad opinionem includes four milites and two dromadarii.

22) A camel was hired (ἐνὶ μὐ βοωοωωγ) to transport a large porphyry column from a quarry in Upper Egypt in 163 - BGU III, no.762. In 215 two camels belonging to Aurelia Taesia were taken for the visit of the emperor - BGU I,9 no.266, lines 7-10. P.Lond. II,328 refers to the requisition of a camel for service in the caravans which travelled from Berenice on the Red Sea: εἰς κυριακὰς χρήσεις τῶν ἀπὸ Βερενίκης γενομένων πορείαν.
A letter of 22 September, 203 demands camels which are fit and strong to carry gooτία - P.Flor. 278. Other requisitions of camels, for unspecified purposes in P.Lond. II 479.
Maximianopolis/Caenopolis, where the ala tercia dromadariorum was based (above n.8), was the starting-point for the caravan routes to Myos Hormos and Philoteras on the Red Sea. Indeed, Maximianopolis was of more than average importance since a unit of equites sagittarii indigeneae was also stationed there - Not. Dign. Or. XXXI,29. This fits well with its identification as a strategic depot and supply-base on the Nile, whence the dromadarii could carry provisions to the forts and outposts of the eastern desert.
Two papyri of the late sixth century record the levy of camels imposed on the village of Nessana to supply the needs of the army and the Church - C.J. Kraemer, Excavations at Nessana Vol. III Non-literary Papyri (Princeton 1958)
According to Eusebius, during the Great Persecution clergymen were sentenced to serve as keepers of camels or to work in the stables of government stationes - Martyr. Pal. 12. Basil of Caesarea refers to a monk who was in charge of a herd of camels - Ep. 158. Among the ostraca found at Bu Njem are letters which record convoys of wheat carried by local cameleers. One of them dates to 259 - R. Rebuffat & R. Marichal, art. cit., pp. 285-6. The Abinnaeus Archive contains several letters which mention the use of camels by civilians to transport goods - H. I. Bell, et al., The Abinnaeus Archive (Oxford 1962) nos. 8, lines 5-17; 30, lines 6-16; 31, lines 19-21; 42, lines 14-5; and 82 (a day-book recording sacks of grain carried by various camel-drivers). The fact that Eunapius can use a literary image involving a pack-camel suggests that it was a fairly familiar animal - vitae sophistarum VI, 10, 3.

Large numbers of camels are recorded in North Africa. Ammianus states that four thousand were demanded by Romanus, the comes Africae, from the people of Lepcis Magna in 364 - Amm. Marc. XXVIII, 6, 5. In the early fifth century the Ausurians raided Cyrenaica and loaded their booty on to five thousand camels - Synesius, Catastasis III, 302c. Native mausolea of the Roman period from Ghirza show that camels were used in Tripolitana not only as long-distance baggage animals, but also as farm animals for ploughing in areas away from the coast where there was not enough fodder and water to keep oxen - O. Brogan, "The Camel in Roman Tripolitana." PBSR 22 (1954) pp. 126-131 and plates XVII & XVIII.

24) Dura Papyrus no. 100, xliv, 22 = Fink no. 1, p. 51.
25) CIL III, 93 Bostra, before 198.
27) Thus, for example, an inscription from al-Jawf at the southern end of the Wadi Sirhan shows the presence of a legionary detachment there. It is dedicated pro salutе dоmm(ınorum) nn(ostrorum) Aug(ustorum), which suggests the reigns of either Marcus Aurelius and Verus or Septimius Severus and Caracalla - M. P. Speidel, "The Roman Army in Arabia." Aufstieg und Niedergang II, 8 p. 694. For an outpost in the Hejaz - above n. 1.
28) This is apparent from the makeshift nature of some of the requisitions; for example, the camels of Aurelia Taesis, both of which were taken in 215 and then returned. In the following year they were requisitioned again, only for one of them to be rejected as unfit for service - BGU I, 9 no. 266.
Perhaps, also, the vita Malchi accurately reflects the haphazard way in which the animals were acquired by the army. For, according to Malchus, when he had fled from captivity back into Roman territory and was brought before the dux Mesopotamiae, he sold the camels on which he and
his companion had escaped - Jerome, *vita Malchi* 48 (Migne) *PLat*. 23, col. 60.

29) For example, the cohors I Augusta Lusitanorum, which also appears in the *Notitia* under the command of the dux Thebaidos - Or. XXXI, 58. The cohors equitata of P.Brooklyn Mus. Inv. no. 35.1207, if this does not prove to be the same unit.

Camel-drivers may be attested for the cohortes I Nomidarum and II Ituraeorum - Fink nos. 52, c, 6 p. 203 and 78, receipts 48 & 49, p. 324.

The ala Antana dromadariorum is probably the same unit as the ala Gallorum et Thraecum Antiana and the ala Antiana Gallorum attested in Syria on diplomata - *CIL* XVI, 3 (dated 54) & XVI, 87 (dated 139). Consequently, it seems to have acquired the title of dromadariorum some time after the mid-second century.
Fig. 1. General Map of Mesopotamia and its Environs.

CAPPADOCIA

Samosata
Hierapolis
Beroea
Bat淮e
Seleudia
Apamea
Syria
Emesa
Heliopolis

Hindan
Meiacarire
Mardin
Nisibis
Thebeta
Singara
Hatra
Dura-Europos
Dura (Saraceni)

MOXOENE
CORDUENE
ADIABENE
Sarbeia
Samarras
Fig. 2. The Distribution of Frontier Units.

1. Mediana
2. Canaba
3. Dabana
4. Callinicum
5. Contra Bintha
6. Circesium
7. Apatna
8. Oraba
9. Inter Thannourin et Orabam
10. Singara
11. Thebata
12. Bezabde
13. Thilsaphata/Castra Maurorum?
14. Sisara
15. Nisibis
16. Amouda
17. Bethallaha
18. Thannouris
19. Resaina/Theodosiopolis
20. Thilbisme
21. Constantina
22. Meiacarire
23. Cepha
24. Fafa
25. Virta/Ripaltha?
26. Charcha
27. Amida
28. Mefaracartha
29. Ziata
30. Dausara
31. Massara
32. Apadna?
Fig. 3. The north-east quarter of Amida. (After A. Gabriel, *Voyages Archéologiques dans la Turquie Orientale*; Paris 1940. fig. 76)
Fig. 4. Cizre (Jazirat) and the site of Roman Bezabde.

KEY:

A HILL (BEZABDE ?)
B ARCHED BRIDGE
C PIER IN STREAM
D SAND-BAR
E MODERN BRIDGE
= TOWN WALLS
X BRIDGE SITES
--- INTERNATIONAL BORDER.
Fig. 5. Eduard Sachau's Sketch Map of the Tigris near Jazirat.

(Enlarged from Reise in Syrien und Mesopotamien, Leipzig 1883, p. 379).
Fig. 6. The Tigris Valley to the east of Nisibis.
List of Photographs.

I/1 - Amida. Tower LXVII with traces of fore-wall.
I/2 - Amida. Tower LXVIII with P14 to its right (behind modern dwellings).
II/1 - Amida. Christian rosette on tower LXV.
II/2 - The Citadel of Cizre (Jazirat) from the modern bridge to the north.
III/1 - The remaining arch of the Tigris Bridge from the Hillock.
III/2 - View from the Bridge looking south-west to the Hill.
IV/1 - The Hill from the track leading to the Tigris from Ain Diouar.
IV/2 - The west slope of the Hill, showing the stream-bed, looking north-west.
V/1 - The Vestiges of ancient Nisibis.
V/2 - The Ruined Bridge at Hisn Keyf (Cepha), with the citadel on the cliffs to the left.
VI/1 - Kharpurt Kale with Hazar Gölü in the distance to the left.
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