ABSTRACT

Hinduism has always been noted for its ability to absorb potentially schismatic developments. The assimilation of heresies (pākhaṇḍa-dharmas) was made possible in part by the open-ended quality of the religion itself but also by the vagueness of the Hindu definition of heresy. The two primary, ostensible criteria of orthodoxy are the acceptance of the Vedas as the sacred canon and adherence to the basic law of society -- varṇāśrama dharma, the regulation of class and stage of life. By these criteria, heresy would seem to be a fairly straightforward matter, separating Hindus from non-Hindus, but this is not the case. To the Hindus as a whole, Buddhists and Jains (and Cārvākas or Materialists, with which these two religions are often confused) are heretics. To most Hindus but Śaiva Kāpālikas, Kāpālikas are heretics. To the Brahmin Kāpālikas, the Śūdra Kāpālikas are heretics. To most non-Tantric Hindus, Tantrics are heretics. Levels of heresy and hierarchical concepts of status cloud the issue and invalidate any single definition.

In spite of the confusion which naturally arises from this subjectivity, however, it is possible to deal with the mythology of heresy as a whole. Indeed, it is precisely because of the wide applicability of the term 'heretic' that one can generalize: the <u>content</u> of the heresy almost never makes any difference in the myth. Each myth draws certain conclusions about the way in which evil arises, and this is accepted by all versions of the myth, no matter what other

doctrinal beliefs are stated or modified in the course of the tale. Thus, in spite of their difference of opinion as to what precisely constitutes heresy, all Hindu sects agree upon its various causes and effects.

The heretic played an important role within the ranks of Hinduism, a role of a dialectical nature: he was an outcaste, but he functioned within the system. He formed a link between the two opposed forces of purity and impurity, the mediating factor that made it possible for the Hindu to deal with all possible aspects of doctrinal variation. The Hindu concept of evil (pāpa, or adharma) is complex, and it is only incidentally pertinent to a discussion of Hindu heresies, but the mythology of the origin of evil provides an essential background to the mythology of the origin of heresy. Episodes of heresy arose from and gradually superceded the more general mythology of evil. The first group of myths, dealing with the 'natural' origin of evil, concerns men usually described as evil or atheist. No explanation for this evil is provided; it simply appears at a certain point in primeval creation. Yet hunger and sexual appetites often originate simultaneously with man's troubles, sometimes causing them and sometimes resulting from them. Another early Indian attempt to account for the origin of evil relegates the cause to an earlier evil whose cause remains obscure; the logical inadequacy of this view is somewhat tempered by the Hindu belief in the chain of karma and the cyclic nature of time. These early myths mention sin and virtue, but without the doctrinal details which distinguish heresy from evil.

The blame for the origin of evil is placed upon different agents in different Indian traditions. Only in the tribal mythology do we encounter the notion that god visited death and other misfortunes upon man because of man's sin, though the early Indian myths frequently state that, without any intervention by god, the Golden Age disappeared due to some flaw that developed in man. A few Hindu myths cast the blame onto the demons (asuras), but this view is atypical, primarily because the demons are by no means clearly representative of evil. They are indeed the enemies of the gods, but this is a matter of power rather than morality, and the gods themselves are often far more wicked than the virtuous demons whom they trick and cheat. In Vedic times, the gods wished men to remain virtuous in order that they would continue to offer the sacrifices on which the gods depended; the demons interfered with the sacrifice in order to weaken the gods but may have corrupted mankind incidentally. Thus, in the early stages, men served merely as pawns in the battle between gods and demons. Later, however, when the sacrificial cult was challenged by the cult of individual asceticism, men and demons were able to threaten the gods by amassing an excess of ascetic power, forcing the gods to corrupt them. Thus, although the demons' relation to the gods is consistent, they have an ambiguous relation to mankind: at first, the gods are assisted by men in their fight against the demons, but, later, both men and demons pose a threat to the gods.

The overwhelming majority of Hindu myths blame the gods rather than the demons for the origin of heresy as well as of evil; the earlier layer of myths deals with the older concept of simple delusion (moha),

but the later myths enumerate actual heresies caused by the gods. The belief in the necessity of the gods' participation in evil first appears in terms of an amoral concept of creation and then influences the mythology of heresy; the 'seed of evil' leads to a denial of the Vedas, and the dualistic universe provides explicit heresies. A similar transition may be seen in the group of myths in which the necessity for death (evil) leads to the necessity for corruption (heresy) to maintain a limited population first in the universe and then in heaven.

The particular manner in which the gods are responsible for the creation of heresy reapportions the direct blame among demons and men; that is, although it is almost always the gods who teach the heresies, they are forced to do so sometimes through their own inadequacies (when they are threatened by virtuous ascetics) but sometimes through the dangers caused by demons or the curses given by mortal sages. Demons are thus indirectly responsible for the heresies involved in three important myths: when the demons of the Triple City usurp the rule of the universe through the power of their flawless virtue, the gods must corrupt them; in a variant of this myth, Viṣṇu becomes incarnate as the Buddha in order to destroy the demons -- and incidentally to create the heresy of Buddhism on earth. When Bṛhaspati, the guru of the gods, converts the demons to heresy (a form of Jainism) by impersonating their own guru, it is, for once, the content of the heresy -- a scorn for material power -- which renders the demons innocuous and restores the throne of heaven to the gods.

Heresies are often created by the gods in response to the flaws and curses of mortal men. Thus, the myths of Vena seek to account for the origin of Vena's heresy in the seed of some previous sin; this corruption is then used to explain the subsequent transference of sin to mankind in order that Vena himself may be purified. (The gods -- notably Indra -- also transfer their own sins directly to mankind, a reversal of the later, and less prevalent, motif of salvation, in which the god -- notably Śiva -- takes upon himself the sins of mankind.) In the cycle of myths of the Pine Forest sages, Śiva first appears as a heretic to Dakṣa and is cursed by Dakṣa to remain a heretic; Śiva then enlightens the heretic sages of the Pine Forest by appearing to them in the guise of a heretic and establishing yet another heresy. This 'homeopathic' religious technique is appropriate to the mythology of the Kali age, in which mankind, at its lowest moral ebb, must either ascend to true religion by the 'stairs' of heresy or sink to a heresy so low that it must rebound into the pure virtue of the Golden Age once again.

Certain broad historical trends may be discerned, such as a general development in the concept of evil, from a rather amoral category which includes disease and ritual error to a more personal view of individual shortcomings. A change also occurs in the attitude toward demons and heretics, who are at first only loosely contrasted with the gods and the orthodox but who become increasingly viewed (in the texts of the middle period) as wicked corrupters. Finally, certain late moral developments qualify the orthodoxy of the middle period and result in a more tolerant view of heterodoxy somewhat akin to that of the

earliest period.

It is possible to trace a definite ascent in the moral consciousness with which the ancient Indians approached the problem of the origin of evil through six basic stages of their texts. First come those texts which maintain the ideal of the Vedic sacrificial cult, which assume that the gods depend upon men and help them through the sacrifice; this viewpoint is implicit in the Ṛg Veda and Brāhmaṇas, but it also persists in many later texts, such as parts of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas. The origin of evil is not really discussed in the Vedas, which merely establish the primary relationship between men and gods, nor do the Brāhmaṇas come to grips with the problem, though they formulate the basic terms in which subsequent redactions viewed the matter; they are content with an immediate solution on the ritual level, the mythic belief that anything which was dealt with successfully 'then', at the time of primeval creation, is satisfactorily redisposed of whenever that ritual is re-enacted.

The second group of texts may be designated as 'orthodox Hinduism', based upon the ideals of caste, one's own role (svadharma), and the necessity of evil. These texts -- which include the dharmaśāstras and parts of the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas -- see the conflict between good and evil in a particular, temporal framework; dharma is what is good or right for the particular occasion, what one should do given the social and familiar position occupied and in the face of the particular obstacles of the moment. The relativity

of this view led to certain amoral formulations: just as it is necessary for certain men to perform evil tasks, so too evil has a necessary place in the universe, and the gods themselves must provide this evil willingly or in spite of their efforts.

A significant change took place when the sacrificial code was challenged by the ideal of asceticism. By the power of asceticism, a demon or mortal could challenge the livelihood of a god, and the gods were forced to corrupt mortals as well as demons in order to maintain their own positions and the balance of powers in the universe. A complentary group of texts, the fourth group, developed under the influence of the Upaniṣadic and early Buddhist doctrines of individual salvation, the belief that all existence (saṃsāra) is evil and that man's goal must be to seek release from it. These texts challenge the relativistic, amoral view of necessary evil: an individual could break away from the evil of his own caste, or his own time, or his involvement in the world, and swim up against the current of the universe to find his own release.

The role of the individual was strengthened by another important religious development, the cult of bhakti. The texts of this fifth group are again primarily Purāṇic, but they reflect the humanising effects of later Buddhism and of the sectarian movements, expressing the view that the gods participate willingly in the evils of the human condition because of their love for mankind. Again the individual is given a chance to escape from the rigid code of svadharma, but, unlike the doctrine of asceticism, the bhakti ideal

posed no threat to the gods; on the contrary, it assumed that god wishes men to be good, resulting in the same alignment of forces as that which prevailed in the first group (gods and men together against the demons), the gods striving to prevent evil from coming among mankind, in contrast with the second and third groups, in which the gods -- for very different reasons -- bring about evil and heresy on earth.

The final stage, the Tantric group, includes not only the Tantras themselves but those Purāṇic texts which deal with the underlying Tantric belief that, in the Kali age, man is inherently evil and religion must be directed 'down' to him at this level. Here again the gods are on the side of evil, though this evil is ultimately conducive to good. Here, too, _bhakti_ can reverse the flow of time, and an individual can escape from the relativistic ethics of the Kali age even as he could escape from those of the orthodox view.

These various attitudes toward the origin of evil and heresy appear in apparently infinite permutations and combinations in the course of Hindu mythology, offering a subtle and richly flexible set of approaches to this enduring dilemma.

THE ORIGIN OF HERESY IN HINDU MYTHOLOGY

by Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty

Thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Oxford University

Hilary Term, 1973 Linacre College



'Heresy is the lifeblood of religions.
There are no heresies in a dead religion.'

- André Suarès

'Dog as a devil deified lived as a god'

- a palindrome

CONTENTS

I. Introduction

1. Scope and method of the work 1.

2. The transition from evil to heresy 3.

3. The problems of periodization and classification 5.

II. The Role of Heresy in Hinduism

1. The Hindu definition of heresy 10.

2. The levels of heresy 12.

3. The relativity of heresy 17.

4. Heresy based upon the Vedas 19.

5. The hypocritical ascetic 22.

6. The assimilation of heresy 27.

7. The myth of the fall from caste 32.

8. Explicit heresy within orthodox Hinduism 34.

III. The Mythology of Evil

i. The Vedic View: Gods and Demons

1. The ambiguous virtue of demons 39.

2. The fall of the demons 45.

3. Evil created by demons 49.

ii. The Orthodox Mythology of the Origin of Evil: _svadharma_ and _karma_

1. The natural origin of evil and the loss of the Golden Age 59.

2. Women and the origin of evil 65.

3. Hunger and sin 68.

(III.ii.)

4. The chain of evil and the evil of civilisation 73.

5. Man himself as the cause of evil 77.

6. Evil due to god's error 81.

7. The transference of evil 87.

8. The sin and salvation of Vena 94.

9. The necessity of evil 107.

10. The necessity of death 113.

11. The evil of death: the Sthāṇu myths 118.

12. The tribal mythology of the origin of death 127.

IV. The Mythology of the Origin of Heresy

i. The Myths of Asceticism

1. The earth overburdened by virtuous men or sinners 136.

2. The gods' jealousy of mortals 144.

3. The corruption of demons by the gods 148.

4. The corruption of the demons of the Triple City 151.

5. Viṣṇu's avatar as the Buddha 154.

6. The corruption of Divodāsa 162.

7. Bṛhaspati and the demons 165.

ii. The Myths of Salvation and Devotion 172.

1. Dakṣa and the curse of heresy 172.

2. Śiva as outcaste and heretic: the Kāpālika myth 177.

3. The problem of imitation 190.

4. Gautama and the Pine Forest sages 197.

5. Śiva cursed in the Pine Forest:

the 'heresy' of *liṅga*-worship 205.

6. Śiva enlightens the Pine Forest sages 212.

V. The Tantric Myths of the Kali Age 222.

VI. Conclusion 236.

Bibliography 246.

Notes 259-291.

I. Introduction

1. Scope and method of the work

The question of the nature and origin of heresy arises in Hindu texts of the most various periods and contexts; moreover, it is a subject which reveals much about the manner in which Hindus thought about their own, 'true' religion by contrast with its mirror image. Yet very little has been written by European scholars on this subject; worthwhile comments can occasionally be gleaned from footnotes, translations, and introductions to pertinent Indian texts, but these scraps do not form any coherent argument, and I have therefore merely cited these throughout this work wherever they are pertinent. A considerable amount of ink has flowed in European languages concerning the Hindu _concept_ of evil, but this wide subject is beyond the scope of my thesis; and the question of the _origin_ of evil, and, more particularly, of the mythology of the origin of evil and heresy, has been almost entirely neglected.

Heresy may appear to be a theological problem and therefore not amenable to study from the standpoint of mythology. The answer to this is simply that the Hindus themselves did treat it in their mythology, and a study of that corpus of material may demonstrate a more popular, general, and coherent attitude toward heresy and evil than may be found in many of the dry, hair-splitting arguments of the Hindu theologians. Moreover, the myths are on the whole far more provocative and original than the textual discussions, for reasons which Heinrich Zimmer has discussed:

> 'Theologians very rarely produce first rate poetry or art. Their outlook on life's ambiguous and ambivalent features is narrowed by their dogmatism. They lack (this is a result of their training) that cynicism and that perilous innocence, candid and childlike, which are basic requirements for anyone dealing with myths. They

> lack (and this is their virtue, their duty) that touch of "amorality" which must form at least part of one's intellectual and intuitive pattern, if one is not to fall prey to predetermined bias and be cut off from certain vital, highly ironical, and disturbing insights.' [1]

Since the main body of Hindu mythology -- the medieval Purāṇas -- was compiled by Brahmins with a considerable knowledge of theology, some of these texts degenerate into little more than the sort of narrow-minded diatribes that Zimmer had in mind. Other texts, however, rise to the true level of myth, and these provide a more 'candid and child-like' response to the problem of evil.

In addition to the classical Sanskrit texts pertaining to this subject, I have occasionally drawn upon myths recorded by anthropologists conversant with the religions of Indian tribal communities. Although this material diverges from that of the Purāṇas in many significant respects, it is nevertheless possible to regard the two traditions as adjacent, if not actually contiguous. Verrier Elwin, who has produced many valuable studies of tribal mythology, has noted this continuity between his materials and those of the 'Sanskrit' tradition:

> 'My collection . . . will also provide material for the study of the diffusion of legends and will indicate how far the influence of the all-pervading Hindu tradition has proceeded. . . . The book may, in fact, be regarded as a sort of Aboriginal Purāṇa.' [2]

These tribal myths were all recorded during the last two centuries and are therefore liable to show traces of the influence of Christian missionaries, but such influences are usually immediately apparent, and the general agreement between tribal and Purāṇic mythology is striking.

The Sanskrit Purāṇas are extremely garrulous and digressive, and in order to include as wide a selection of myths as possible I have summarised rather than translated, omitting large bodies of material superfluous to the present study, such as hymns of praise, ritual instructions, detailed descriptions of people and places, and lengthy philosophical discourses. This extraneous material is not only unwieldy but would have tended to obscure the patterns which emerge from the more selective treatment. I have also omitted certain portions of the text which seem hopelessly corrupt, and in some instances where the meaning seems quite clear in spite of the garbled text I have given the best sense I could make of it; where obscurities remain, I have included the ambiguous Sanskrit text. I have not (knowingly) added anything that is not in the text, but I may omit in one version certain details that also occur in another. A general indication of the degree to which any particular citation has been compressed may be obtained by comparing the length of the English version with the length of the Sanskrit text as indicated in the bibliographic note. For the sake of convenience, I have set long translations from the Sanskrit in single-spaced, indented paragraphs, but these do not indicate word-for-word translations, as is the usual convention, nor have I employed triple dots to indicate omissions, as these would have occurred so frequently as to render the text unreadable. Quotations from secondary sources are indicated by quotation marks in addition to single-spacing.

In attempting to trace the mythology of heresy from the period of the Vedas through the present day, a number of significant variations and

contradictions have been encountered, and it is difficult to generalize and set forth 'the' Indian attitude to certain pivotal problems. Where the attitude has changed in the course of time, I have tried to trace it from the earliest known sources; where sectarian biases reverse the original conclusions, I have so indicated. Where my narrower subject touches upon more general topics (such as the origin of evil or death) or where certain of the better-known and more extensively narrated Hindu myths (such as the myth of the flood, or the sacrifice of Dakṣa) contain incidental material pertinent to this study, I have not attempted to deal fully with the wider subject, but merely to elucidate the points of particular relevance.

2. The transition from evil to heresy

The concept of evil in Hinduism is only incidentally pertinent to a discussion of Hindu heresies, but the mythology of the origin of evil provides an essential background to the mythology of the origin of heresy. The myths discussed below demonstrate the manner in which episodes of heresy arose from and gradually superseded the more general mythology of evil. The first group of myths, dealing with the 'natural' origin of evil, concerns men usually described as evil (pāpa) or atheist (nāstika). No explanation for this evil is provided; it simply appears at a certain point in primeval creation. However, even here it is interesting to note the frequency with which hunger and sexual appetites originate simultaneously with man's troubles, sometimes causing them and sometimes resulting from them. Although these myths may be compared with the Judeo-Christian myth of the expulsion from Eden in terms of the problem which both traditions confront, it will be seen that the assumptions and conclusions of the Indian versions differ from the myth of Genesis in many essentials. Indeed, Indian concepts of evil, sin, virtue, heresy, atheism, and 'religion' differ so

sharply from the Western concepts which approximate them that it will be necessary to define these terms at some length in their Indian context in the course of this work. Another early Indian attempt to account for the origin of evil relegates the cause to some early evil whose cause remains obscure; the logical inadequacy of this view is somewhat tempered by the Hindu belief in the chain of karma and the cyclic nature of time. These early myths mention sin and virtue, but without the doctrinal details which distinguish heresy from evil.

The blame for the origin of evil is placed upon different agents in different Indian traditions. Only in the tribal mythology do we encounter the notion, familiar to Western philosophies, that god visited death and other misfortunes upon man because of man's sin, though the early Indian myths frequently state that, without any intervention by god, the Golden Age disappeared due to some flaw that developed in man. A few Hindu myths cast the blame onto the demons, whose fall from heaven suggests certain parallels with the myth of Lucifer's expulsion. Here the concept of the demons embracing a 'different' (i.e. wrong) philosophy of the soul may represent a heresy, rather than the vague 'evil' which characterizes the myths discussed hitherto, but only a few rather atypical myths explicitly attribute heresy to the teaching of the demons.

The overwhelming majority of Hindu myths blame the gods rather than the demons for the origin of heresy as well as of evil; the earlier layer of myths deals with the older concept of simple delusion, but the later myths enumerate actual heresies caused by the gods. The belief in the necessity of the gods' participation in evil first appears in terms of

an amoral concept of creation and then influences the mythology of heresy; the 'seed of evil' leads to a denial of the Vedas (i.e. heresy), and the need for opposing forces in the universe leads to the creation of explicit heresies. A similar transition may be seen in the group of myths in which the necessity for death (evil) leads to the necessity for moral corruption (heresy) to maintain a balance of population.

The particular manner in which the gods are responsible for the creation of heresy reapportions the direct blame among demons and men; that is, although it is almost always the gods who teach the heresies, they are forced to do so sometimes through their own inadequacies (when they are threatened by virtuous ascetics) but sometimes through the dangers caused by demons or the curses given by mortal sages. Demons are thus indirectly responsible for the heresies involved in the destruction of the Triple City, the incarnation of Buddha, and the treachery of Bṛhaspati; heresies arising from the flaws and curses of mortal men are described in the myths of Vena, Dakṣa, Gautama, Bhṛgu, and the Pine Forest sages. The underlying philosophies of evil and the specific myths of heresy merge finally in the concept of the Tantric heresies of the evil Kali age.

3. The problems of periodization and classification

Historians of religion may regret that I have not traced the historical development of the mythology of heresy but have instead treated the separate philosophical strands. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, it is notoriously difficult to date Indian religious texts, though it is reasonable to postulate several broad areas

of Indian mythology: Ṛg Veda (c. 1200 B.C.), Brāhmaṇas and Atharva Veda (c. 900 B.C.), Upaniṣads (c. 700 B.C.), Mahābhārata (c. 300 B.C.–300 A.D.), Rāmāyaṇa (c. 200 B.C. - 200 A.D.), early Purāṇas (Brahmāṇḍa, Mārkaṇḍeya, Matsya, Vāyu and Viṣṇu, c. 300 B.C. - 500 A.D.), middle Purāṇas (Kūrma, Liṅga, Vāmana, Varāha, Agni, Bhāgavata, Brahmavaivarta, Saura, Skanda, and Devī, c. 500 A.D. - 1000 A.D.), later Purāṇas (all others, c. 1000 A.D. - 1500 A.D.), and modern Hindu texts. Wherever possible, within the discussion of a particular question, I have treated what appear to be the earlier texts first and indicated the emergence of 'later' concepts.

There is a more basic argument against treating the corpus of myths through a history of the texts: there are several recognizably different conceptual attitudes to evil and heresy, and I found it more illuminating to trace each of these separately than to divide the material into historical eras and summarize all the different philosophical concepts of evil that emerge in each era. The final objection to the historical method arises from the fact that there *is* no clear-cut development in Hindu mythology. Archaic concepts emerge again in late texts, often in direct conjunction with contradictory later concepts. This is due in part to the Indian habit of retaining everything old and simply adding new ideas, but it may also indicate a very basic and enduring confusion in the Indian attitude to evil.

Certain broad historical trends may be discerned, and I have indicated these where it seems most appropriate. Thus, a general development may be seen from the early myths which concentrate on evil (and within this category one may see a shift in the concept of

evil, from a rather amoral category which includes disease and ritual error to a more personal view of individual shortcomings) to the later myths which discuss the more specific heresies. A change also occurs in the attitude toward demons and heretics, who are at first only loosely contrasted with the gods and the orthodox but who become increasingly viewed (in the texts of the middle period) as wicked corrupters. Finally, certain late moral developments, such as the emergence of the devotional cult of bhakti, qualify the orthodoxy of the middle period and result in an ultimately more tolerant view somewhat akin to that of the earliest period.

It is possible to distinguish six basic stages of the mythology of evil and heresy. First come those texts which maintain the ideal of the Vedic sacrificial cult, which assume that the gods depend upon men and help them through the sacrifice; this viewpoint is implicit in the Ṛg Veda and Brāhmaṇas, but it also persists in many later texts, such as parts of the Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas. The second group of texts may be designated as 'orthodox Hinduism', based upon the ideals of caste, one's own role (svadharma), and the necessity of evil; this group is difficult to differentiate, but it includes the dharmaśāstras and parts of the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas. The third group appears in these same texts, but it appears to have arisen in response to a specific development, namely the ideal of tapas (ascetic power), which results in the belief that human beings may, through asceticism, transcend normal moral bounds and challenge the security of the gods. The fourth group of texts is 'Upaniṣadic' not because the myths of this category actually

appear in the Upaniṣads (though some do) but because they reflect the ideals developed in the Upaniṣads (and in Buddhism of the same period): principally, the belief that all existence (saṃsāra) is transitory and therefore evil, that man must seek release from it. The fifth group, containing the bhakti texts, is again primarily Purāṇic, but these myths reflect the Bodhisattva ideal and the humanism of the sectarian Hindu movements, resulting in the view that the gods participate willingly in the human condition because of their love for mankind. Finally, the Tantric texts are not only the Tantras themselves but those Purāṇic texts which deal with the underlying Tantric belief that, in the Kali age, man is inherently evil and religion must be directed 'down' to him at this level. These latter three groups often assume a monotheistic devotion; although the pantheon is still recognized, one god in particular -- Śiva or Viṣṇu -- releases or saves the worshipper, and one may speak of 'god' rather than 'the gods' as creating the evil factors in these myths.

These six viewpoints are often combined in a single text, and they weave in and out of each of the ideological strands which form the pattern of the myths, but they may be viewed in terms of a broad chronological development as well. Bearing in mind the fact that the six groups of texts do not necessarily develop chronologically, it is nevertheless possible to arrange the myths in these groups with the understanding that the ideas in the groups begin in successive periods. Thus the first, 'Vedic' group includes the basic conflict between gods and demons; the second, 'orthodox' group introduces the idea of the necessity of death and evil; the third, tapas group discusses the

corruption of men by gods; the fourth and fifth may be treated together as myths of salvation, for the Upanişadic ideal and the ideal of *bhakti* are closely allied in the myths; and finally the Tantric myths develop the implications of the Kali age. These and related general patterns are discussed in the conclusion.

II. The Role of Heresy in Hinduism

Hinduism has always been noted for its ability to absorb potentially schismatic developments; indeed, one of the prime functions of the caste system has been to assimilate various tribes and sects by giving them a place within the social hierarchy. Although the Ṛg Veda is regarded as a closed canonical collection, in actual fact this canon is not read by the vast majority of Hindus, most of whom (non-Brahmins, women, etc.) are forbidden to read it and almost all of whom are incapable of comprehending the many archaic passages which have baffled scholars. This general inaccessibility of the canon has facilitated an almost endless reinterpretation of doctrine.[1]

A particularly striking manifestation of this flexibility of Hindu tradition may be seen in the manner by which it has assimilated various heresies, a process so wide-ranging that, as Louis Renou has remarked, 'It is quite difficult in India to be completely heretical'.[2] This flexibility has not even necessitated the element of masquerade, the ability to change without appearing to change, that usually characterizes adaptations within a tradition; the myths of heresy make explicit note of the changes in doctrine. In part, this is made possible by the open-ended quality of the religion itself; in part, it is due to the vagueness of the Hindu definition of heresy.

1. The Hindu definition of heresy

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines heresy (from the Greek

αἱρέομαι, 'to choose') as 'theological opinion or doctrine held in opposition to the "catholic" or orthodox doctrine of the Christian Church. Hence, opinion or doctrine in philosophy, politics, science, art, etc. in variance with what is orthodox.' The Greek term was actually applied, by a Greek of the third century A.D., to one form of Indian religion; as the men he described were ascetics living without women or children, it is conceivable that they might have been considered heretics by their countrymen, but as they were Brahmins it is more likely that they were merely heretics from the standpoint of the Christian author.[3] The primary difficulty which arises when the Greek-derived term is applied to Indian religion is that the element of choice, which characterises not only heresy but, as we shall see, the more general concept of sin in Western but not in Indian theology, is totally inapplicable to the Hindu concept of heresy. The Hindu heretic does not choose his false doctrine; it is thrust upon him by his own ignorance or by a curse. A heretic is often called vedabāhya, 'outside the Vedas', a condition which results from the action of the orthodox; he is excommunicated, quite literally, the victim rather than the conscious agent of heresy. (It is interesting to note that the association of the concept of choice with heresy is preserved in the middle Persian varan, which is related to the Sanskrit root √vṛ, 'to choose'. Varan is defined as heresy or concupiscence; the latter element is omitted from the Hindu definition of heresy but, as will be seen at length below, it is inextricably linked with the mythology of heresy.[4])

In spite of these differences of connotation, the English term 'heretic' corresponds most closely in negative tone as well as in denotation

to the Sanskrit pāṣaṇḍa (later, sometimes pāṣaṇḍin or pākhaṇḍa), and throughout this work I will translate these Sanskrit terms by the English 'heretic'. The earliest occurrence of this term, in the edicts of Aśoka (third century B.C.) is not necessarily pejorative; it merely denotes a sect or religious doctrine of any kind.[5] Yet, even here, the context indicates that non-orthodox sects in particular may be denoted by the term, and certainly in all later texts, from the Mahābhārata on, non-orthodox sects are pejoratively designated by the term pāṣaṇḍa. The etymology of the term is obscure. Mayrhofer suggests that it may be derived from pāriṣada, designating one around whom a group of disciples sat in a gathering.[6] If this is valid (although there are arguments against it, such as the subsequent appearance of the nasal[7]), the term might indicate a contrast with the upaniṣads, for which a similar verbal base has been suggested -- the pāriṣada/pāṣaṇḍa being the teacher around whom non-Brahmin students sat, the Upaniṣadic teacher the one beside whom Brahmin students sat, or at least students who remained within the orthodox Hindu fold.

Contradiction of the Vedas is the basis of heresy in most Hindu texts. The Śabdakalpadruma gives several false etymologies for the term pāṣaṇḍa: (a) from pā(pam) san(oti), 'He gains evil'; (b) from pā ('protection [of the dharma of the Vedas]') khaṇḍa(yanti), 'They shatter the dharma of the Vedas'. The lexicographer adds that these people perform various rites opposed to the Vedas, wear several types of clothing, and bear the marks of all castes; they are Buddhists, Jains, etc.[8] Medhātithi glosses

pāṣaṇḍin as an outcaste (Śaiva?) ascetic (bāhyaliṅgin), one who wears a red robe, goes naked, or wanders about, etc., but Kullūka specifies that heretics bear marks (or the liṅga) of vows outside the Vedas (vedabāhyavratalingadhāriṇaḥ), like Buddhist monks, Jains, etc., while Rāghava merely says that they do not believe in the Vedas.[9] Vijñāneśvara defines heretics as those who have taken to an order of life opposed to the dictates of the three Vedas, or those Jains, Buddhists, etc., who deny the authority of the Vedas, and the Tantrādhikāranirṇaya refers to heretics born of evil wombs, who proclaim doctrines transgressing the Vedas.[10] According to the Padma Purāṇa, heretics are those who perform non-Vedic rites as well as those who do not perform the actions enjoined by the Vedas.[11] A Viṣṇu Purāṇa commentary describes the heretic as a man who has fallen from his own dharma and performs unlawful, prohibited acts (vikarmastha, niṣiddhakṛt).[12]

A possible distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy or heresy might be sought in the fact that the Hindus conceive of two types of religion, Nāstika and Āstika. The terms are traditionally (and probably correctly) derived from the phrase 'Nāsti' -- i.e., a Nāstika is one who says 'It/he is not', while an Āstika says 'It/he is'. Parmenides, perhaps under Indian influence, makes a very similar distinction between two ways of inquiry: '...the first, that says that (it) is and that it cannot be that (it) is not', and the second that says the opposite.[13] A Nāstika is, literally, a 'nay-sayer'. But to what does he say 'Nay'? The subject of the copula is omitted in both the Sanskrit and the Greek, which has left the more precise meaning of the term open to some dispute. 'It/he'

may refer to a god, as in a phrase in the Ṛg Veda: 'They say of him [Indra], "He is not".'[14] In a passage in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, however, the unexpressed subject could refer to the brahma/ātman: 'How can [it] be comprended except by one saying, "[It] is"?'[15] The primary meaning of Nāstika is generally defined by the Indian commentators as 'atheist' -- i.e., one who denies the existence of the gods; a secondary qualification more Upaniṣadic than Vedic is also often included: a Nāstika is one who believes that there is no other world nor any lord (Nāsti paraloka Īśvara veiti matir yasya).[16] Finally, this definition is almost always linked with a third criterion which brings the Nāstika much closer to the heretic: the Nāstika denies the validity of the Vedas. Thus Manu refers to Nāstikas and revilers of the Vedas together,[17] and Hemacandra defines an Āstika as one who says 'The lord exists', one who accepts the authority of the Vedas.[18] Surendranatha Dasgupta suggests that the term āstikyam originally referred to belief in the existence of another world but then came to denote 'faith in the ultimate truth being attainable only through the Vedas'.[19] Thus a Nāstika is equated with a pāṣaṇḍa;[20] a Nāstika is 'an atheist, unbeliever, one who denies the authority of the Vedas and a future life or the existence of a supreme ruler or creator of the universe', and nāstikyam is thus 'atheism, infidelity, heresy'.[21] The St. Petersburg dictionary defines Nāstika as an 'unbeliever' (a definition which, like the Sanskrit word, leaves unspecified the actual doctrine which is not believed), but an Āstika is said to be one who believes in the truth

of the tradition ('Ueberlieferung' -- i.e., the Vedas).[22]

By these criteria, then, it is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the heretic from the atheist. Louis Renou remarks upon the early connexion between 'the question of the astitva of the gods -- and, therefore, indirectly that of the Veda';[23] clearly, if one does not believe in the gods, one does not believe in a canon purported to have been inspired by them. Moreover, the contrast between the Nāstika and the Āstika was soon refined into a distinction between specific doctrines far more complex than simple atheism versus simple faith. Thus the Āstika religion is said to consist of the six darśanas, the orthodox philosophies;[24] these are usually listed as the Sāṅkhya, Yoga (of Patañjali), Vedānta, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā (of Jaimini), Nyāya, and Vaiśeṣika. There is less agreement upon the constituents of the Nāstika school; traditionally, the Nāstikas are Buddhists, Jains, and Cārvākas, who deny both the Vedas and the ātman of the Upaniṣads; according to Hemacandra, however, the Nāstika religion consists of the Bārhaspatyas, Cārvākas and Laukāyatikas,[25] who are usually regarded as a single school, that of the Materialists. Other authorities observe yet finer distinctions: Nāstikas are of six kinds, Cārvākas, Digambaras (i.e. Jains), Mādhyamikas, Yogācāras, Sautrāntikas, and Vaibhāṣikas (four great Buddhist schools).[26] In spite of these differences, it is apparent that the broad distinction between Āstikas and Nāstikas corresponds in application, if not always in theory, to that which obtains between orthodox Hindu and heretic (pāṣaṇḍa). Throughout this work, I will translate Nāstika as 'atheist'.

2. The levels of heresy

The importance of caste (which is what is particularly meant by the need to obey one's own dharma) provides a second important criterion of heresy which usually coincides with the criterion of the Vedas: 'Those who transgress the dharma arising from the distinction of class and stage of life (varṇāśrama) and declared by the Vedas and the lawbooks (śrutismṛtyudita) . . . they are heretics.'[27] These criteria clearly separate the Hindus as a whole from the non-Hindu sects such as Jainism and Buddhism. In keeping with this view of heresy, the Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa remarks, 'Since the Buddhists decry the Vedas, they are called heretics', and Nārada glosses the term 'heretic' as it appears in Manu as 'Buddhists and so forth'.[28]

By these criteria -- acceptance of the Vedas and adherence to caste law -- heresy would seem to be a fairly straightforward matter, separating Hindus from non-Hindus, but this is not the case. Renou has shown that

many Hindu sects that actually reject the Vedas are not considered heretics, and he distinguishes between semi-Vedic sects (the extreme Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva sectarians), a-Vedic sects (the Tantrics and Śāktas) and anti-Vedic sects (Jains, Buddhists, and Ājīvakas).[28a] Edward Washburn Hopkins has demonstrated that even at the time of the Mahābhārata the term 'heretic' sometimes denoted Śaivas and sometimes Buddhists.[28b] We might therefore designate two levels of heresy, the 'unorthodox' heresies (Renou's anti-Vedic sects, Jains, Buddhists, etc.) and the 'orthodox' or Hindu heresies (such as Renou's semi-Vedic and anti-Vedic sects), the latter includin the Śaiva sects of the Kāpālikas, Kaulas and Pāśupatas and the Vaiṣṇava sects of the Pañcarātras and Sahajiyās, who pay lip service, at least, to the Vedas and thus remain technically within the Hindu fold. Some texts include both groups in their definition of heretics: those who act against the Vedas, as well as those who carry skulls, are smeared with ashes, and wear matted locks (i.e. the Śaiva sects) are heretics.[28c] The Kūrma Purāṇa offers this list of heretics: Buddhists, Jains, Pañcarātras, Kāpālikas, and Pāśupatas, and the reference to heretics in Manu which Nārada glosses as referring to Buddhists is interpreted by Medhātithi as a reference to Kāpālikas and those wearing red garments (probably Buddhists).[28d]

Most texts, however, even while considering both groups to be heretics, clearly distinguish between them. The sectarian heresies are sometimes said to propound doctrines which emanate 'more or less directly, from the doctrines of the original creed',[28e] in spite of the fact that certain

aspects of their rituals are clearly antagonistic to Vedic religion. The acceptance of these heresies is rationalized by some Hindus who consider that, although the Kāpālikas, for instance, live contrary to the Vedas, they were formerly Brahmins.[28f] The 'orthodox' heresies themselves, of course, are eager to maintain this dichotomy; a Kāpālika in a Sanskrit play refers to the Jains' useless and false philosophies and evil shrines, and he wishes to cleanse his mouth (with wine, anathema to an orthodox Hindu) for having mentioned them.[28g] Certain Hindu texts, however, consider the Kāpālikas even worse heretics than Jains or Buddhists: after touching a Buddhist, Jain, Pāśupata, Cārvāka or Kāpila, one must immerse oneself fully dressed, but an additional penance must be performed if a Kāpālika is touched, and this may be due to an actual coalescence between the Kāpālikas and the arch-heretics, the Cārvākas.[28h]

Within the 'orthodox' heresies, several distinctions are made between levels of heresy. Certain texts seem to use the term 'heretic' to denote Tantric sects: 'By saluting a _liṅga_ worshipped by the Pāṣaṇḍas one becomes a Pāṣaṇḍa. . . . A twice-born man must never worship an image of Viṣṇu or Śiva that has been worshipped by those who have forsaken their own orders of life.'[28i] Similarly, Vallālasena rejects the _Devī Purāṇa_ (a Tantric Purāṇa) as being a Pāṣaṇḍa work,[29] and he condemns all those Purāṇas which are associated with worshippers of Kāma, hypocrites, heretics, and false ascetics.[30] More explicit descriptions of Tantric heresies appear in several of the myths of heresy

discussed below.

A further distinction is made between Brahmin and non-Brahmin Kāpālikas[31] and between Tantric and Vedic Pāśupatas.[32] Vedic Pāśupatas, who considered the presence of Tantric Pāśupatas to be polluting, hated even to mention them.[33] Orthodox (Vedic) Pāśupatas are forbidden to talk to Śūdras.[34] This division appears in the Śaṅkaravijaya, in which the great Śaiva philosopher Śaṅkara confutes heresy on both levels -- the 'orthodox' heresies (Vāmācāras and Kāpālikas) as well as Jains, Buddhists, and Cārvākas.[35] The Brahmin Kāpālikas are heretics but can be enlightened. To the Śūdra Kāpālika, however, who says that there are only two castes (men and women), Śaṅkara merely replies, 'Go where you wish. We have come to chastise Brahmins who adhere to evil doctrines, but what are your standards, you who have fallen from caste?'[36]

The caste dichotomy within the heretic sects serves to explain certain apparently contradictory statements which may be understood in the light of the particular status and affiliation of the author of the text. Thus, the strictly orthodox sects refer to the Kāpālikas and Pāśupatas as heretics.[37] Aparārka, in rebutting the Mahābhārata passage in which Śiva states that he himself established the Pāśupatas, cites a verse instructing the orthodox Hindu to gaze at the sun and to bathe after seeing a Kāpālika, Pāśupata, or Śaiva, and the Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa prescribes a similar expiation for anyone who has touched a Śaiva, Pāśupata, Cārvāka, or Nāstika.[38] Orthodox Pāśupata texts, such as the Kūrma Purāṇa, describe at great length the merits of the Pāśupata

vow while they state elsewhere that Pāśupatas (by which one must understand the Tantric Pāśupatas) are wicked heretics.[39] Thus, Śiva himself states in this text,

> 'Formerly I created the Pāśupata vow, auspicious, subtle, and containing the essence of the Vedas, for the sake of enlightenment. The adept should remain chaste, study the Vedas, smear his body with ashes, go naked or wear a loincloth, control his mind perfectly, and practise the Pāśupata yoga. . . . But there are other texts which, though narrated by me, cause delusion in this world and are contrary to the statements of the Vedas, such as the Vāma [left-hand, or perverse] Pāśupatas, the Soma, the Lākula [another Pāśupata sect], and the Bhairava [Kāpālika]. These doctrines are not to be practised, for they are outside the Vedas.'[40]

Śiva emphasizes that <u>his</u> Pāśupata sect is based upon the Vedas, just as he remarks, in the <u>Mahābhārata</u>, that the Pāśupata vow which he revealed occasionally agrees with orthodox <u>varṇāśrama</u> religion, though it is basically contrary to it.[41]

A final variation of the use of the term 'heretic' arose from the development of more vehement conflict between Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva sectarians. It has been noted how the Śaiva Kāpālikas were often singled out (usually by Vaiṣṇavas, though by orthodox Śaivas as well) for condemnation as heretics; this is emphasized by the manner in which they are said to corrupt virtuous Vaiṣṇavas in many myths. One myth of this type shows particularly clearly the imposition of specifically anti-Śaiva sentiments upon a typical myth of heresy. In the first of the two versions of this myth, no Śaiva is involved:

> There was a Dravidian king named Citra, who was lustful and greedy and quick-tempered. He reviled Viṣṇu and hated the Vaiṣṇavas, saying, 'Who has ever seen this Viṣṇu?' He oppressed the Vaiṣṇavas, refused to perform any Vedic ritual, and sided with

> the heretics. When he died, he went to hell and was tortured. Then he was reborn as a demon (<u>piśāca</u>) until a sage enlightened him and he found salvation.[42]

This Vaiṣṇava text calls the king a heretic both for denying Viṣṇu and for failing to perform Vedic sacrifices. Another version of the same text, however, introduces a Śaiva heretic as the instrument of the king's corruption:

> There was a Dravidian king named Citrasena, who was famous for performing Vedic rituals. One day he met some extra-Vedic (<u>veda-bāhya</u>) heretic Śaivas who had matted hair and who had ashes smeared on their bodies [i.e. Pāśupatas or Kāpālikas]. These Śaivas denounced the Vedas and the caste system and caused Citrasena to abandon Viṣṇu and to join their sect. At their instigation, Citrasena prohibited the worship of Viṣṇu in his kingdom and threw the images of Viṣṇu into the sea.[43]

Although nothing is said here of the king's fate, the cause of his anti-Vaiṣṇava behaviour is described at great length. His heresy becomes specific and more intense: he not only fails to perform rituals, but forbids them and speaks against the Vedas and caste.

Sectarian myths of this type are common, but it is interesting to note that, even in Śaiva texts, myths in which Vaiṣṇavas corrupt Śaivas are not nearly so numerous as those in which Śaivas corrupt Vaiṣṇavas. This may be due to the particularly offensive character of the Kāpālikas, who have no true parallel among the Vaiṣṇavas. The Kāpālikas themselves show a strong sectarian bias; even Jains are admitted to their sect, but Vaiṣṇavas are excluded.[44]

3. The relativity of heresy

It should now be apparent that, in India, heresy is in the eye of the beholder. To the Hindus as a whole, Buddhists and Jains (and Cārvākas or Materialists, with which these two religions are often confused)

are heretics. To almost all Hindus but Kāpālikas, Kāpālikas are heretics. To the Brahmin Kāpālikas, the Śūdra Kāpālikas are heretics. To most non-Tantric Hindus, Tantrics are heretics. To many Vaiṣṇavas, Śaivas are heretics, and to many Śaivas, Vaiṣṇavas are heretics. And, to complete the circle, the Jains considered the Hindus to be heretics.[45] In short: 'I am a true believer; you are a heretic.'

Sir Richard Burton satirized this attitude in his 'translation' of the story of the king and the vampire. When asked to define the term 'atheist', the vampire replies:

> 'Of a truth, it is most difficult to explain. The sages assign to it three or four several meanings: first, one who denies that the gods exist; secondly, one who owns that the gods exist but denies that they busy themselves with human affairs; and thirdly, one who believes in the gods and in their providence, but also believes that they are easily to be set aside. . . . Thus the Vishnu Swamis of the world have invested the subject with some confusion. The simple, that is to say, the mass of mortality, have confounded that confusion by reproachfully applying the word atheist to those whose opinions differ materially from their own.' 46

Sir Richard's account may have been influenced by his reading of Plato, who distinguishes three impious views held by the corrupt (διεφθαρμένοις): that the gods do not exist; that they exist but do not care for men; that they are easily bribed (παραγομένους) by offerings and prayers.[47]

In spite of the confusion which naturally arises from this subjectivity, it is possible to deal with the mythology of heresy as a whole and to generalize from it. Indeed, it is precisely *because* of the wide applicability of the term 'heretic' that one can so generalize: the *content* of the heresy hardly ever matters to the myth. The *pattern* of the myth follows one of a set number of forms, whatever its bias; at a certain point, the subject of the myth becomes 'corrupted by a heretic', and the cause and effect of this corruption are in no way affected by the nature of the doctrine which destroys him.

Thus, one version of a myth may state that a demon was corrupted by a Buddhist; another version will state that he was corrupted by a Kāpālika; yet another will confound and confuse the doctrine of the heretic. Yet, in each case, the myth draws certain conclusions about the way in which evil arises, and this is accepted by all versions of the myth, no matter what other doctrinal beliefs are stated or modified in the course of the tale. This is indeed a striking and significant point: in spite of their differences of opinion as to what precisely constitutes heresy, all Hindu sects agree upon its causes and effects.

4. Heresy based upon the Vedas

In almost every case, the subtle distinction between the two main levels of heresy hinges upon the sect's actual or professed relationship to the Vedas. The sect whose name is almost synonymous with heresy in India, the Cārvākas or Materialists, are guilty of no offensive behaviour, for they are simply a philosophical school; but the philosophy condemns the Vedas as 'a pious fraud'.[48] Mādhava summed up the Cārvāka doctrine thus: 'The Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology; the imposters who call themselves Vedic scholars are mutually destructive; and the three Vedas themselves are simply the means of livelihood for those devoid of wit and virility.'[49] Such an explicit denial of the Vedas and Brahmins caused this philosophy to be ranked with Buddhism and Jainism as prime heresy.

But there is danger of contradiction and confusion when the touchstone of the Vedas is applied to other potential heresies. Certain Tantric

sects which say that they agree with the Vedas, though actually propounding anti-Vedic, or at least non-Vedic, doctrines, may be accepted on the basis of their own statements of orthodoxy. On the other hand, doctrines which, like Buddhism, maintain that they are not derived from the Vedas, though they agree in fact with many essentials of orthodox Hinduism, are rejected. This situation is made possible by the Hindu belief that religion consists more in adherence to ritual than in correct belief; orthodoxy in this context is not a literally appropriate term, and we might better describe the acceptable position as orthopraxy.[50] The good Hindu is not so much a true believer as he is a true performer.

Thus one might commit almost any act or believe almost any doctrine, as long as one professed allegiance to the Vedas and the caste system. Although the Mahābhārata treats liberally many divergent philosophies, it gives no quarter to the heretic who despises the Vedas.[51] The heretic was not the man whose beliefs differed from those of the Vedas, nor even necessarily the man whose behaviour did not follow the prescribed pattern, but the one who flouted religious convention, who wilfully and publicly rejected orthodox values.

The complications arising from this point of view are apparent in Kumārila's discussion of certain heretics' claims to follow doctrines based upon the Vedas or upon a 'lost' branch of the Vedas; since they do not behave in a Vedic way, the validity of their doctrine is not pertinent to the question of orthodoxy (i. e. orthopraxy):

> The Sāṅkhyayoga, Pāñcarātra, Pāśupata, Buddhist and Jain teachings have a very little bit in common with the Vedas and orthodox lawbooks [śruti and smṛti], such as the doctrines of non-injury, speaking truth, control of the senses, charity, and pity; [but these doctrines occur only occasionally and incidentally], just as herbs and spells occasionally succeed in curing and expelling poison; and [they occur in small proportion] like [much] water fragrant with [a little] perfume. Their major portion consists in other teachings, outcaste texts mixed with barbarian practices; and since they contradict the Vedas and are sceptical [haituka], they are not to be accepted.
>
> Even if these sects were based upon a lost branch of the Vedas, they would have to be rejected, for they do not themselves accept the fact that the Vedas are the basis [of their teachings], just as an evil son who hates his parents is ashamed to admit his descent from them.
>
> With the exception of a few doctrines like self-control and charity, the teachings of the Buddhists etc. are altogether contradictory to the teachings of the Vedas and were composed by the Buddha and others like him whose behaviour is contradictory to the Vedas; they were then taught to people beyond the pale of the Vedas, people who do not follow the rules of the four classes, and it is thus inconceivable that they could be based upon the Vedas. These are heretics who perform unlawful acts and produce skeptical arguments.[52]

As is clear from the entire second half of this argument, the doctrine is rejected because the proponents' behaviour contradicts the Vedas, defying caste stricture and the acceptable realm of 'lawful acts'.

Elsewhere in this work, Kumārila rejects even the Vedic portions of the heretic dharma, arguing on the principle of contamination which is more appropriate to Hindu ritual belief than to intellectual argument:

> Like milk which has been kept in the skin of a dog, the few statements appearing in these (heretical) texts which agree with the Vedas, such as the doctrine of non-injury, etc., are not to be believed until they are found in the dharmaśāstras; and when the meaning is clear from the śāstras, the heretical texts have no use.[53]

The taint of the heresy corrupts even the true doctrine, just as a dog pollutes an orthodox Hindu by his touch or, sometimes, merely by his

shadow. And Kumārila rejects these 'true' bits of heretic doctrine on the same principle as that embraced by the Muslims who burnt the library at Alexandria, arguing that those texts which disagreed with the Qu'rān were heretical, while those that agreed with it were redundant. Aparārka is more liberal upon this point, maintaining that while the texts of the Śaivas, Pāśupatas, Pañcarātras and similar sects are not to be followed altogether, one may follow those statements that do not contradict the Vedas.[54]

Kumārila rejects, in passing, the theory that the heresies, while perhaps not actually derived from the extant Vedas, are derived from a 'lost' Veda or branch of the Vedas, an argument which was used to justify several heresies. The Mattavilāsaprahasana similarly satirizes the theory of the lost Vedas, placing the argument in the mouth of a corrupt Buddhist monk:

> 'Why did [the Buddha] not think of sanctioning the possession of women and the drinking of wine [surā]? Since he knew everything, it must be that the small-minded and spiteful Elders, envying us young men, erased the sanction of women and wine in the books of the Canon. Where can I now find an uncorrupted original text [avinaṣṭamūlapāṭham]?' 55

Thus, the strictly orthodox view, which was well established by the time of Kumārila, rejects both levels of heresy in spite of their partial affinity with Vedic doctrine, on the grounds of their anti-Vedic behaviour.

5. The hypocritical ascetic

The distinction between what men say and what they do is manifest in yet another ramification of Indian heresy. For the heretic was often

confused with another religious figure, well known to the lawbooks and myths, who behaved in an apparently acceptable manner while his true doctrine was anathema: this was the hypocritical ascetic, in many ways the mirror-image of the honest heretic. The Sanskrit dictionaries themselves maintain the confusion between the two. V. S. Apte gives 'hypocrite' as a secondary meaning of pāṣaṇḍa,[56] and Sir Monier Monier-Williams includes in his definition of this term 'any one who falsely assumes the characteristics of an orthodox Hindū, a Jaina, Buddhist, ib &c. [sic]'.[57] The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad juxtaposes the hypocrite and the heretic: 'There are those who falsely wear the red robe, earrings, and skulls. And moreover, there are others who wish to erect themselves as judges concerning Vedic matters by weaving illusions with logic, illustrations, and sophisms.'[58] The first sentence seems to combine the two figures, describing someone who pretends to be a Buddhist or Kāpālika.

The term nagna ('naked') was originally applied to the Buddhists and Jains, who were 'clothed in the sky', that is, nude (digambara). But certain Hindu sects went naked as well, while some Jains did not and no Buddhists did, and the term was later interpreted metaphorically as the rejection of 'the raiment of holy writ'.[59] The Vāyu Purāṇa extends the word to naked Brahmins who 'practise austerities fruitlessly, that is, heretically or hypocritically': 'The Brahmin who falsely bears a staff, shaves his head, goes naked, undertakes a vow, or mutters prayers -- all such persons are called "Nagnas" etc.' [60]

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa excoriates 'heretics . . . by whom the three Vedas have been abandoned, evil ones who dispute the doctrine of the Vedas, . . . those who perform evil rituals, hypocritical "cat" ascetics, skeptical "crane" ascetics. These are the evil heretics, men who falsely wear matted locks or shave their heads.'[61] The commentator notes that the 'cat' ascetic seems pleasant at first but then acts very unpleasantly; the 'crane' is a rogue who is falsely polite. Manu similarly defines the 'cat' as one who is covetous, deceitful, injurious, and hypocritical; the 'crane' is cruel, dishonest, and falsely gentle. Manu does not refer to these two types as heretics, however, but merely as Brahmins, and he groups them with those who have sinned and hide their sins under a pretext of asceticism.[62] The Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa also omits any explicit reference to heresy but groups the 'cat' ascetics with those who retire to the woods like ascetics but continue to enjoy 'country pleasures [grāmyabhujān]' and those who have fallen from the rituals appropriate to their class -- one of the usual criteria of heresy.[63] Yajñavalkya states that one should avoid hypocrites, skeptics, heretics, and those who act like cranes.[64] The Kūrma Purāṇa lists 'cat' ascetics with heretics who perform evil rites and with the left-hand Pañcarātras and Pāśupatas. An alternative reading of this text substitutes for 'cat' ascetics (vaiḍālavratinaḥ) outcastes (caṇḍālavratinaḥ) -- the polar opposites of Brahmin hypocrites.[65]

The animal nicknames probably derive from the extensive anti-ascetic folklore of India.[66] The cat appears in the Tantropākhyāna:

> A certain cat lived like an ascetic at the entrance to a household-hole, eating fallen fruits and leaves as if he had refrained from all sins. The mice made pious circumambulations around him and the cat grabbed and ate the last of the mice returning to the hole each day. The mice, noting that their number was diminishing, decided to test the cat by sending a mouse named Romaśa ('Hairy') to the cat, who ate him. When the rest of the mice saw the bones and hair of Romaśa in the faeces of the cat they went to him and said, 'This is not virtue or proper behaviour, to make a living by performing _tapas_. Hairy faeces do not come from one who eats roots and fruits.' And so, after calling the cat a hypocrite and a heretic, the mice went away.[67]

It may be noted here that even in the folk literature the confusion between hypocrisy and heresy persists, for the mice call the cat a heretic. The cat ascetic appears on the famous seventh-century bas-relief of the descent of the Ganges at Mamallipuram; the cat stands on one leg with his paws about his head in imitation of the human ascetic who appears nearby, and he is surrounded by mice.[68] The crane appears in a Sanskrit poem:

> The ugly vulture eats the dead,
> Guiltless of murder's taint.
> The heron swallows living fish
> And looks like an ascetic saint.[69]

Śaiva ascetics are particularly liable to this kind of satire. The charlatan Kāpālika in the _Śaṅkaravijaya_ has adopted the character of an ascetic as an excuse for throwing off all social and moral restraint.[70] Two other Sanskrit works satirize Śaiva ascetics in the houses of harlots or in love with dancing-girls.[71] The Kāpālika in the _Mattavilāsaprahasana_ consorts with a female member of the sect in a _surā_ bar which he likens to a sacrificial temple: The _surā_ is the Soma, the drunks are the priests, the drunken cries the hymns, and the bartender the sacrificial sponsor.[72] No particular sect is mentioned in most of the examples of this genre,

which is based not so much upon doctrinal offenses (although these do enhance the satire) as upon a deep-seated anti-ascetic tradition in orthodox Hinduism.[73] The question of chastity is germane to much of this anti-ascetic feeling, and the ascetic was condemned whether he was honest or false: if he was truly chaste, his behaviour offended that major portion of orthodox Hinduism which required a man to marry and beget sons and support the Brahmins -- i.e. his behaviour constituted a kind of heresy. If, on the other hand, he merely pretended to be chaste while actually applying the widely credited erotic powers of the ascetic, then he was a hypocrite.[74]

The ascetic's position was further weakened by the practice of kings, from the time of the Mauryan empire, who employed as their spies men who masqueraded as ascetics.[75] That this tradition has persisted for more than 2,000 years is apparent from the recent accusation made by a member of the Indian Parliament, who charged that the United States Pentagon and the C.I.A. were infiltrating into the Himalayas spies disguised as yogis.[76] The folk motif of the hypocritical ascetic should not be taken as a literal index of the existence of such figures, however, for the motif is a naturally attractive and humorous one, widely distributed throughout the world. Mockery, and even self-mockery, rather than fanatical disapproval is the motivating spirit of many Indian referances to the religious hypocrite:

> 'So, friar [bhikṣo], I see you have a taste for meat.'
> 'Not that it's any good without some wine.'
> 'You like wine too, then?' 'Better when I dine
> With pretty harlots.' 'Surely such girls eat
> No end of money.' 'Well, I steal, you see,
> Or win at dice.' 'A thief and gambler, too?'
> 'Why, certainly. What else is there to do?
> Aren't you aware I'm vowed to poverty?' [77]

6. The assimilation of heresy

The fact that heresy is effectively defined in India in terms of action rather than thought may be viewed as both the result and the cause of an extremely tolerant attitude toward the actual content of the doctrine. The manner in which this attitude results from am emphasis upon behaviour has been described at length above; since the term 'heretic' was used as a mere catch-all to condemn anyone who flouted the religious and social status quo (that is, the authority of the Vedas and the Brahmins), doctrines so widely divergent as those of the Cārvākas, Buddhists, Śaiva Pāśupatas and Brahmin hypocrites could all be subsumed under the same term. But the manner in which a peculiarly tolerant attitude toward doctrine brought about a further emphasis upon behaviour is more deep-seated.

Hinduism and Buddhism differ from Christianity in that they regard heresy as a failure of understanding rather than as a deliberate choice of error; ignorance rather than sin is the cause of all evil, 'an act of intellectual misapprehension and not . . . an act of volition and rebellion'.[78] The more general concept of 'evil' (the English term usually employed to translate the Sanskrit pāpam) under which heresy was eventually subsumed in Hindu mythology was considered, in the early Purāṇas, in terms of darkness and delusion (tamas, moha) rather than sin. In this, the Hindu concept of sin is less akin to the Hebrew terms which denote a conscious moral disobedience to god and alienation of oneself from him, than to the Greek concept of sin as

ἁμαρτία -- a mistake, a 'going-off-the-track', which is literally approximated by the Sanskrit concept of the 'wrong path' (vimārga, pāṣaṇḍamārga) or 'error' (literally, 'wandering' -- bhrānti). Thus the element of choice implicit in the term 'heretic' in Western theology but absent from the Sanskrit pāṣaṇḍa similarly distinguishes 'sin' from the more passive Sanskrit equivalents -- pāpa, adharma, moha, tamas, etc.

Devoid of its moral element, the intellectual doctrine of heresy could be contrasted even more easily with its behaviouristic element. This moral indifference to doctrinal content, when coupled with the general moral relativity of caste ethics -- the notion that different

moral codes apply to different social groups -- made possible an infinitely elastic toleration of religious deviation. The vagueness of the term for heresy served not only to exclude various groups of heterodox thinkers but also to include many of them under the equally vague aegis of Hinduism itself. Thus the Vāyu Purāṇa remarks: 'Many dharmas are described in the Purāṇas -- the six doctrines of Brahmā, Śiva, Viṣṇu, Sūrya, Śakti, and that of the Arhats [i.e. Buddhism].'[79] If the bounds of heterodoxy ballooned over into the mainstream of religion, so too the bounds of orthodoxy proved extremely flexible.

The whole tradition of asceticism, as seen in the Upaniṣads, the sannyāsa or ascetic stage of life, and the goal of mokṣa (release), was originally a violent challenge to the Brahmanical sacrificial system, which managed nevertheless to assimilate it by making the sannyāsin the man who entered the fourth stage of life (after the original three: brahmacārin, gṛhapati and vānaprastha) and mokṣa the fourth goal (after dharma, artha and kāma). Moreover, various non-Vedic rites practised by the indigenous population of India were absorbed by the 'Aryan' religion and practised 'without incongruity or contradiction being felt by the participant'.[80] Many of the teachings of the Buddha were assimilated by Hinduism and influenced the Bhagavad Gītā; as J. N. Farquhar remarks, 'It is of importance to realize that, though the teaching of the [Bhagavad] gītā is now the very cream of orthodoxy, it was in some respects heterodox when the poem was written.'[81] This basic tolerance worked in the reverse direction as well; the faith demanded of the lay Buddhist did not entail 'a rejection of his ancestral beliefs and of the Brahmanic religious usages of his social environment. The

Triple Jewel is not a jealous God, and is not displeased by the worship of the deities of a man's country or caste.'[82]

Śaiva cults, in particular, betray an obviously heterodox origin. Aboriginal deities are even today being transformed into epiphanies of Śiva and Durgā,[83] a process which began even in the Vedic period.[84] As Eliot remarks, although certain Śaiva rites are 'if not antagonistic, at least alternative to the ancient sacrifices, yet far from being forbidden they are performed by Brahmans, and modern Indian writers describe Śiva as peculiarly the Brahman's god'.[85] The dichotomy between the two groups of Pāśupatas may be explained in the light of the possibility that the orthodox sect, as represented by the Pāśupata Sūtra and its commentary by Kauṇḍinya, is the work of a reformer who attempted to cleanse the sect of its heterodox element,[86] the element represented by the older description of Śiva Paśupati which appears in the Mahābhārata.[87] The Bowdlerized nature of the Pāśupata Sūtra is obvious: The devotee is instructed to 'pretend' to be drunk, to make indecent gestures toward women, etc., but not actually to violate any caste strictures. By this means he obtains the unjust censure of passers-by, and thereby his bad karma is transferred to them and their good karma to him.[88] Daniel H. H. Ingalls remarks, 'One suspects that the sūtras concerning lechery, improper action and improper speech once referred to actions less innocent than those specified by the commentator Kauṇḍinya.'[89] Since the whole logic of the expressed purpose of the Pāśupata ritual turns on this point -- that the actions should seem to be more immoral than they actually are -- this seems most likely. (Here again we see an example of the purposely exaggerated flouting of tradition which characterizes the heretic

and makes him the mirror-image of the hypocritical ascetic, who disguises his actually unorthodox behaviour.) It may even be that the expected remarks of the bystanders ('This is no man of chastity, this is a lecher')[90] have reference to the original sect from which the Pāśupatas were descended, a sect which conscientiously offended orthodoxy. The Pāśupata Sūtra then substituted mere symbolic gestures for the original rituals, and rationalized these as well.

As some heretical sects were willing to make compromises in order to be accepted in traditional circles, so too these circles willingly stretched a point in order to accept the prodigal movements back into the fold. Even Parsis and Muslims were allowed to qualify as Hindus under certain circumstances,[91] and a Hindu might even become a baptized Christian 'without ceasing to be a Hindu in both social and spiritual terms'.[92] The wording of the present legal definition of a Hindu involves this toleration for heresy: 'Acceptance of the Vedas with reverence; recognition of the fact that the means or ways to salvation are diverse; and realization of the truth that the number of gods to be worshipped is large, that indeed is the distinguishing feature of Hindu religion.'[93]

One of the texts cited in justification for this viewpoint is the Bhagavad Gītā, in which Kṛṣṇa says that he is reborn whenever righteousness wanes and that those who worship other gods are actually worshipping him.[94] Elsewhere, Kṛṣṇa declares, 'Worshippers of Sūrya, Śiva, Gaṇeśa, Viṣṇu, and Devī all reach me, just as all rains reach the sea.'[95] These texts may be interpreted to imply that 'any genuine religious reformer may be treated as an abode of divinity'.[96] Viṣṇu's incarnation as the

Buddha is by far the most important example of this process.[97] The Muslim sect of the Imam Shahis believed that the Imam himself was the tenth avatar of Viṣṇu and that the Qur'ān was a part of the Atharva Veda,[98] a view supported by the traditional argument that only fragments of the Vedas still exist. Christ is sometimes included among the avatars of Viṣṇu,[99] a practice that was once 'a cause of great alarm among Christian missionaries'.[100] Even Queen Victoria found a place in the Hindu pantheon; when a plague broke out in Bombay just after her statue had been insulted, it was believed by certain pious Hindus that the disease was 'the revenge inflicted by her as insulted divinity'.[101] A religion which can accommodate both Queen Victoria and the orgiastic goddess of Tantric worship is indeed a spacious abode.

Another curious manifestation of this tolerance derives from the Hindu belief that <u>any</u> contact with a god, even a negative contact, is beneficial. This is the philosophy of <u>dveṣa-bhakti</u>, 'hate-devotion', by which the heretic who reviles the god is actually considered to worship him. After Kṛṣṇa had killed the ogress Pūtanā, her body gave off a sweet smell as it burned, for she had been purified by her death at his hands; in fact, she won salvation by suckling Kṛṣṇa, even though she did it with the intention to poison him.[102] Similarly, when Kaṃsa, having slaughtered Kṛṣṇa's relatives, was afraid that Kṛṣṇa would try to kill him, he saw Kṛṣṇa everywhere he looked, on all sides of him, pervading his world;[103] this is precisely the same attitude as that of the enlightened man, who realizes that god actually does pervade his world, and thus Kaṃsa's violent hatred of the deity drew him into the

proper philosophical outlook that he would have reached through bhakti. A variation of this motif appears often in Śaiva mythology, in which the most abandoned sinner inadvertently commits, by his very sin, an act of salvation. Thus Guṇanidhi abandoned his wife for a prostitute and robbed the temple of its offerings, but he was saved from the tortures of hell because he had made a new wick for the temple lamp (though he made it in order to see what there was to be stolen).[104] This doctrine was specifically applied to the question of heresy: 'Those who become non-Vedic Pāśupatas and decry Nārāyaṇa [Viṣṇu] really worship the latter through the spirit of hostility (dveṣa-buddhi).'[105]

Thus the heretic played an important role within the ranks of Hinduism, a role of a dialectical nature: he was an outcaste, but at the same time he was within the system. Though he intended to harm the mainstream of the tradition, he was in fact considered to contribute to it. He was the link between the two opposed forces, the mediating factor that made it possible for the Hindu to deal with all possible aspects of doctrinal variation.

7. The myth of the fall from caste

By means of the process of assimilation, many non-Brahmin ministers of non-Vedic cults, such as the Vrātyas, came to claim Brahmin status and were finally admitted to that status but with the stigma that 'they had committed sins'. Similar reasoning allowed certain eighteenth-century Hindus to speak of the English as 'fallen Kṣatriyas'. Even Manu considered the Yavanas, Śakas, Pahlavas, Kirāṭas, and other foreigners to be Śūdras who had sunk from their former status as Kṣatriyas when they disregarded Brahmins.[106] This theory completely mirrors the historical process:

sects which had in fact risen to their position on the borders of orthodox Hinduism were said to have fallen from a yet more orthodox position to their ambivalent status. Yet there is probably some truth in the legends as well. Certain scriptures were said to have been revealed for the benefit of Brahmins whose sins had rendered them incapable of performing Vedic rites (an argument which was used to justify the heresies of the Kali age[107]), and Brahmins who were excommunicated may have become the ministers of non-Vedic cults.[108] Certainly this is the Hindu viewpoint; Kāpālikas are thought to have been Brahmins in former times.[109] According to Jain theory, all castes once professed Jainism, but certain groups fell into false ways and became Brahmins who formulated a cult sanctioning the slaughter of animals.[110]

Many castes consider themselves fallen Brahmins and justify their change of occupation when they move up the scale by stating that they are merely resuming their former status. Ambedkar revived the traditional myth when he argued that the Untouchables, and many Śūdras, were Buddhists who had suffered from the hatred of Brahmins when the Hindu renaissance occurred.[111] Local Hindus accepted the claim made by certain Untouchables that their ancestors had been kings who had fallen to their present status due to some sin;[112] one variation of this myth states that, when fighting the Muslims, the Kṣatriya ancestors of certain Untouchables pretended to be Untouchables and were cursed to remain in that state as punishment for their cowardice.[113] (This 'pretense' neatly mirrors the Pāśupata mime which derives from the actual sin, in contrast with the

Untouchable legend in which the pretense leads to the sin.) Yet another reversal of this myth appears in a late Purāṇa: In fear of Jāmadagni, who was exterminating all the Kṣatriyas, some Kṣatriyas disguised themselves as Mlecchas (barbarians) and spoke the Mleccha language; they sought refuge with a sacred Śiva-liṅga and concealed it, and eventually they were made hosts of Śiva.[114] In this version, the devout spirit of devotionalism has added a happy ending to the pattern of a myth of fall from caste.

According to the Mahābhārata, all castes were once Brahmins, but those who abandoned their dharma and fell prey to passion and anger became Kṣatriyas, those who took to agriculture and cattle-rearing became Vaiśyas, and those who indulged in falsehood and injury became Śūdras.[115] Another myth relates that certain 'Brahmin giants (the most mischievous of the race)' were Brahmins who had been turned into giants as a punishment for former crimes: 'Occasionally they adopted a hermit's life, without thereby changing their character, or becoming better disposed.'[116] In this myth, the 'fallen Brahmin' plays the role of another familiar figure in the mythology of heresy -- the hypocritical ascetic. The belief that impure status is the result of former crimes appears in the myths of the cycles of evil; and the concept of a fall from grace (man's fall from Eden or Lucifer's fall from heaven), whether or not it reflects historical development, is central to the mythology of the origin of evil.

8. Explicit heresy within orthodox Hinduism

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the conservative strength of Brahmin orthodoxy, heretical doubts have been raised in the mainstream

of traditional Hinduism from the earliest recorded sources. Atheistic sentiments are expressed within the Ṛg Veda itself; 'Whence this creation developed is known only by him who witnesses this world in the highest heaven -- or perhaps even he does not know.'[117] One hymn is addressed 'to Indra, if Indra exists',[118] and another refers to those who ask where Indra is.[119] Vasiṣṭha defends himself against charges of being a heretic and a demon: 'If I were a follower of false gods, or if I regarded the gods wrongly. . . .'[120] Anti-Vedic ideas appear frequently in the Upaniṣads and Āraṇyakas. The Bhagavad Gītā rejects the goals of the Vedas and considers the Vedas as much use to a wise man as a water tank in a flood.[121] In the Aitareya Āraṇyaka, certain sages remark, 'Why should we study the Vedas? Why should we sacrifice?'[122]

According to Jan Heesterman, the Nāstika or atheist was originally an integral part of the agnostic structure of the Vedic sacrifice. The term denoted one who confronted the Āstika as well as one who followed any of a variety of different teachings of materialism.[123] The doubts expressed in the Ṛg Veda[124] are merely part of the verbal contest with the official 'reviler',[125] who does not reject sacrifice as a matter of abstract doctrine but merely rejects his opponent's sacrifice. Later these complementary ritual roles gave way to mutually exclusive doctrines denying the abstract institution of sacrifice.[126] Even then, the Nāstika remained on the fringes of orthodoxy, the outsider within the structure. Yudhiṣṭhira , whose ideas of non-injury owe much to Buddhism, is accused by the warrior Bhīma of having Nāstika tendencies.[127]

A famous controversy over the sanctity of the Vedas appears in the

Nirukta of Yāska: ' "The Vedic stanzas have no meaning [anarthakā]" says Kautsa. . . . "Moreover, their meaning is contradictory [vipratiṣiddhārthā]".'[128] A later commentator, Durga, regarded Kautsa as a convenient invention used by Yāska in order to express Vedic scepticism,[129] but Kautsa appears in an ancient list of Brahmin teachers and may have been a historical rationalist.[130] Lakshman Sarup argues in support of the latter view: 'It is inconceivable that the learned theologians would reproduce, in their orthodox books, a controversy which challenges the most fundamental beliefs of their religion.'[131] Yet this is precisely what theologians in India have always done; the 'false' view is given first and is then rebutted by the favoured doctrine. Moreover, many originally controversial views have been reproduced eventually in orthodox books as accepted doctrine.

From Vedic times to the present day, heresy has been active within Hinduism. Politically, heresy has played a significant role; heretical creeds appealed to kings for assistance, and Brahminism called upon royal support for the status quo.[132] As K. V. R. Aiyangar remarks: 'The heretic might be a nuisance, but an administrator could not ignore his existence in society, especially when he had a powerful following. . . . Heterodoxy was often believed to possess a mystic power which was the source of its confidence. The rule is thus merely one of prudence.'[133] The seventh Pillar Edict of Aśoka states: 'I have arranged that some [Dhamma Mahāmātas] will be occupied with the affairs of the [Buddhist] Sangha. . . some with the Brahmins and Ājīvikas. . . some with the Nirgranthas [Jains]. . . with other religious sects [pāsandesu].'[134]

This apparent religious toleration may be viewed, however, in the context of the Buddhist legend that Aśoka at first attempted to destroy all the Nirgranthas and was unwittingly responsible for the decapitation of his own brother, who was staying in the home of a Nirgrantha. When Aśoka learned of his error, he was profoundly saddened and issued an edict forbidding the execution of any monks, Buddhist or heretic.[135] Aśoka's successor, Daśaratha, also patronized the Ājīvikas,[136] and various lawbooks state that the king must protect the customs of heretics.[137] Baudhāyana cites the view that non-Vedic local practices may be allowed in their own territory, but he immediately counters with his own opinion that one must never follow practices opposed to the tradition of learned authorities.[138]

Most of the lawbooks and Purāṇas, however, represent the strict orthodoxy that was unbendingly opposed to all forms of heresy, a tendency which increased with the passage of time; this process may be seen in the changing connotations of the term pāṣaṇḍa, which in Aśoka's day merely designated a sect but by the time of the Epic had acquired definitely pejorative overtones.[139] The increasing bias against heretics is evident from many of the definitions of heresy cited above and from such statements as Manu's 'Let not the householder honour . . . heretics'[140] and Yajñavalkya's 'One should avoid . . . heretics.'[141] Yajñavalkya[142] and Nārada[143] disqualify heretics and atheists as witnesses. The Saura Purāṇa says that Cārvākas, Buddhists, Jains, Yavanas, Kāpālikas and Kaulas should not be allowed to enter a kingdom.[144] Kauṭilya allows the king to confiscate the property of heretics in an emergency,[145] and he advises him to fine people who entertain Śākyas [Buddhists], Ājīvikas, or

heretical ascetics [vṛṣalapravrajita] at feasts of the gods or the manes.[146] This attitude grew more and more strict as Brahminism developed, and the late text of the Śukranītisāra exhorts the king to punish atheists and those who have fallen from caste.[147] By the tenth century A.D., heresy was so widespread and so abhorred that Śiva himself was believed to have become incarnate as the philosopher Śaṅkara in order to explain the Vedas, destroy the temples and books of the Jains, and massacre all who opposed him, particularly the Jains.[148]

The Prabodhacandrodaya, a remarkable allegorical play written during the following century, described the battle between good and evil, orthodoxy and heresy: 'The Pāṣaṇḍas placed the Lokāyatas [Materialists] in front, and they perished in the fight. After this defeat, the Pāṣaṇḍa books were uprooted by the sea of orthodox teachings [sadāgama]; the Pāṣaṇḍas, Saugatas [Buddhists], Digambaras [Jains], Kāpālikas, etc., concealed themselves among the most abject men in the countries of Pañcāla, Mālava, etc.'[149] Yet the very vehemence of these orthodox texts hints at the strength of the threat, the degree to which heresy had penetrated Hinduism by this time. Much of the assimilation took place in an earlier, more tolerant period, and more continued to take place on a popular level -- as expressed in the mythology of the Purāṇas -- in spite of the exhortations of the orthodox Brahmins. Thus the heretical creeds were first tolerated, then assimilated or absorbed, and then -- with the fanaticism which often characterizes the newly converted -- excoriated by orthodox Hindus.

III. The Mythology of Evil

i. The Vedic View: Gods and Demons

The Vedas themselves do not deal explicitly with the problem of evil, but the basic assumption underlying the 'Vedic' type of mythology (which is implicit in the Vedas, well-developed in the Brāhmaṇas, and persists in many Purāṇa texts) is basic to any understanding of the Hindu mythology of evil: the gods wish men to offer sacrifice to them, in return for which the gods provide men with their desires. The immediate corollary of this assumption concerns the demons: the gods need the sacrificial Soma to strengthen them in order that they may fight the demons who threaten both the gods and mankind. Thus on a very elementary level, the demons may be said to represent the powers of evil in the Vedic view, but this statement is immediately subject to many qualifications and reversals in the course of the development of Hindu mythology.

1. The ambiguous virtue of demons (asuras)

The crimes of demons are cited surprisingly seldom as a cause of evil on earth, primarily because the demons are by no means clearly representative of evil. They are indeed the enemies of the gods, but this is a matter of power politics rather than morals, and the gods themselves are often far more wicked than the virtuous demons whom they trick and cheat.

The precise nature of the threat posed by demons underwent a major change as the nature of Indian religion changed. In Vedic times,

it was believed that, if men were not virtuous, they would cease to support the gods; the gods, therefore, wished to maintain the force of virtue in the world, and the demons attempted to interfere with the sacrifice (and thus, incidentally, to corrupt mankind) in order to weaken their opponents, the gods. At this stage, men served merely as pawns in the battle between gods and demons.

Later, however, the sacrificial cult was largely replaced by the cult of individual asceticism (tapas), and Indian mythology became much more anthropocentric. At this stage, men could become a threat to the gods by amassing an excess of ascetic power; the gods, therefore, now regard men not as their allies against the demons but as potential enemies, and therefore the gods often attempt to corrupt powerful ascetics. The demons, however, also sought to profit by this change of cult, and individual demons, like individual men, would challenge the gods by the force of their asceticism, thus prompting the gods to corrupt them. These realignments and fluctuating ideals tend to obscure the already vexed question of the moral stand of the demons, for often even in late texts the demons will be accused of the archaic, but traditional, demon activity of interfering with the sacrifice, and gods will complain that men cease to offer sacrifice. Yet, in general, there are two discrete chronological levels: in the first, the gods are assisted by mankind in their fight against the demons; in the second, both men and demons pose a threat to the gods. Thus the demons have an ambiguous relation to mankind, though their relation to the gods is, at least superficially, consistent.

A further refinement of this complex of interrelationships is the result of a dichotomy between two types of demons in late Vedic times: the asuras are the enemies of the gods, the rākṣasas the enemies of men.[1] As this dictinction became blurred by the time of the Purāṇas, the demons' opposition to mankind was emphasized, though they were still opposed to the gods.

An example of the confusion which still prevails in the Hindu attitude toward demons may be seen in Radhakrishna Choudhary's mis-translation of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa myth of the Buddha avatar:[2] '[The demons] left the trodden path and abandoned Vedic practices and rites and decried Vedic sacrifices. This caused great apprehensions to Indra. [Viṣṇu corrupted the demons.] They, having been gradually overpowered by that folly, gave up their duties and were averse to the study of the Vedas. Then Indra killed them.'[3] This makes no sense, for there is no need to corrupt the demons if they are already corrupt. In fact, in this myth the demons do perform Vedic sacrifices, and Indra is apprehensive because of this 'later' threat of virtue rather than because of the more archaic threat of the 'decrying of Vedic sacrifices'.

Just as heretics were originally tolerated as being 'other' but bearing no moral stigma, and were gradually subjected to increasing disapprobation as orthodoxy strengthened its hold, so too the demons were at first barely differentiated from the gods, then came to be regarded as enemies by definition but not actually differing in qualities, and finally were described as hideous and immoral. Most of the myths of evil fall within the middle period: the gods and demons are 'separate but equal', rather like two separate castes; each has his own job to do --

the gods to encourage sacrifice, the demons to destroy it -- but there is no immorality in the demons; they are just doing their job, which is a destructive one, just as the sweepers perform their unclean tasks. Although this apparently tolerant attitude would seem to have more in common with orthodox Hinduism than with the less caste-oriented texts of the earlier and later periods, this is not in fact the case. The amoral view of the demons is prevalent largely in the earliest mythological texts, the Brāhmaṇas, and in the latest texts, in which the doctrine of svadharma is superseded by the idea of individual salvation through tapas or bhakti; here the demons merely play their role and are inevitably defeated or released altogether. But there is a large body of Purāṇic material composed between these two periods which regards the demons as 'evil' in spite of the fact that it is precisely these texts which emphasize the necessity of following one's pre-ordained path in life. For these orthodox texts display the same intolerance toward the demons as they do toward human heretics: to be other is to be bad.

S. A. Dange has pointed out that the asuras, like the gods, performed sacrifices, but 'in the wrong manner, . . . with the wrong result, according to the Devas [gods]'.[4] Naturally, the gods accused the demons of behaving 'in the wrong manner', since the demons were their enemies; even when the demons are patently virtuous, they are 'other' and must be slain; by definition, the gods must always win and the demons must always lose, but the gods are not 'better' than the demons. Time and time again it is said that the demons follow the code of svadharma, varṇāśrama dharma, and the Vedas, and therefore

cannot be slain;[5] yet it is always assumed that they must be slain. This stubborn and apparently illogical attitude is in part responsible for the otherwise puzzling and even more illogical orthodox condemnation of the demons: it is the svadharma of demons to be evil, but it is evil to disregard svadharma. Thus, whether they obey or challenge svadharma, the demons are condemned.

According to Jan Gonda, the central myth from the time of the Vedas on is of the conflict of the gods representing the powers of good with the powers of evil (Indra vs. Vṛtra, Rāma vs. Rāvaṇa, Buddha vs. Māra), the conflict between good and 'the evil power of destruction, starvation, and death'.[6] But the demons do not represent the evil powers of destruction, starvation and death, which are usually attributed to the gods, nor by any means do the gods (especially in the early period of the Mahābhārata, but also in the later sectarian myths of the Purāṇas) represent unmitigated 'good', nor, finally, are destruction, starvation and death always regarded as 'evil'. The one invariable characteristic of the gods is that they are the enemies of the demons, and the one invariable characteristic of the demons is that they are opposed to the gods. For this reason, when the later myths begin to apply new moral codes to the characters of gods and demons in myths, a number of inconsistencies and paradoxes arise, for the two groups are not fundamentally morally opposed.

The moral ambiguity of the demons begins even in the etymological confusion inherent in their name (asura); in Iranian mythology, ahura comes to mean a god, while in Sanskrit asura comes to mean a demon,

In the early Ṛg Veda, _asura_ still designates a god; only in the later books does it come to mean a demon. The myths with which the present work is concerned, however, all derive from the later period, in which _asura_ is linguistically no longer ambiguous, though it still retains its moral ambiguities.

By a false etymology which takes the initial a as privative, the word sura (i.e. 'not a-sura') is coined for 'god'. This term (sura) finally comes to be explained by a myth which states that the gods (suras) drink wine (surā), while the others, who had refused the wine, are asuras.[8] This episode occurs in the myth of the churning of the ocean, and the wine is a multiform of the Soma which the gods obtained at that time by defeating the demons; the Soma is the elixir of immortality, the possession of which distinguishes the gods from the demons.

A similar confusion is found in the more common word for god -- deva -- which comes to mean 'devil' in Avestan and Persian.[9] These linguistic labyrinths compound an already formidable moral haze, and by the period of the later Ṛg Veda the demons are often described as extremely virtuous; Hopkins, commenting upon one such passage,[10] remarks, 'When it is said that they "worshipped the gods", credulity is strained',[11] but this concept did not seem to strain the credulity of the New Testament author who said, 'Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well; the devils also believe, and tremble'.[12] Indeed, it is the virtuous nature of the demons which usually poses the more serious problems for the gods. As Alain Daniélou points out,

> 'It is interesting to remark that it was not for their vices that the asuras became destroyed but because of their power, their vertus, their knowledge which menaced those of the Aryan gods. They are often depicted as Brahmin saints; once vanquished they serve the gods faithfully.' 13

The demons are frequently indistinguishable from the gods. In the Jātakas, the fact that the demon (yakka) casts no shadow marks him as a non-human creature,[14] but this is the distinguishing characteristic of a

god as well.[15] Hopkins says of the asuras: 'Opposition to light and goodness, love of and use of māyā, illusion or deception, a roaring voice, ability to assume any shape, or to disappear, are their general characteristics; in which they differ from rākṣasas not at all and except for the first element not from the gods.'[16] Nor is there always opposition between gods and demons; the gods are said to use 'demon tricks [āsuravipralambhanam]' in their immoral enterprises.[17] In Buddhism, the gods are always righteous(dhammika) and the asuras unrighteous (adhammika),[18] but demons do not have any true significance in Buddhist cosmology, perhaps because they are all subsumed under Māra.

2. The fall of the demons

Nevertheless, gods and demons are almost always opposed in Hinduism, and this opposition sometimes seems to assume a moral dimension. According to the Brāhmaṇas, Prajāpati at first created gods and demons alike and did not distinguish between them.[19] In the late Ṛg Veda, though the demons come to represent the powers of darkness and the gods the powers of light, they do not dwell apart; it is only by the time of the Brāhmaṇas that the demons are said to inhabit a place of darkness below the earth; indeed, it is only at this period that the universe becomes 'ethicized' to any degree, and the Atharva Veda is the first text to know of hell at all. Thus, between the Ṛg Veda and the Purāṇas, the demons may be said to have 'fallen' from heaven to hell.

The manner in which the demons came to be thrust out of the divine pantheon and regarded as devils[20] is described in several different texts:

Gods and demons were created alike, but the demons placed their oblations in their own mouths, while the gods offered theirs to one another, and so the sacrifice became the property of the gods.[21] Both gods and demons sent representatives to Prajāpati to learn about the Self; the gods understood the doctrine better and thus gained all their desires.[22] Yet another text describes this conflict in terms of the transference of karma which is an important motif in other myths of heresy as well:

> The gods and demons both spoke truth, and they both spoke untruth. They were alike. The gods relinquished untruth, and the demons relinquished truth. The truth which was within the demons beheld this and went over to the gods, and the untruth of the gods went to the demons. 23

Although in each case the change in status results from a moral error, intellectual failure, or ritual mistake on the part of the demons, the chain is self-reinforcing, and the demons are further corrupted by their own incipient evil. This is expressed in terms of the transference of good karma from the demons to the gods and vice versa. In later mythology, the goddess of Good Fortune (Śrī) is similarly transferred:

> Śrī dwelt among the demons in former times; the demons were then firm in their own dharma and honoured their gurus and the gods. But then, with the passage of time and the change in their quality, their dharma was destroyed and they were in the grip of desire and anger. They became sinners and atheists, evil and immoral. (kṛtaghnā nāstikāḥpāpā....nirmaryādā). Then Śrī left them.[24]

Here the demons are destroyed by the same forces which corrupt mankind: the passage of time and the appearance of desire and anger.

Another passage in the Mahābhārata interprets the demons' downfall in terms of the older, Brāhmaṇa concept of the demons' natural disinclination to behave righteously:

> Formerly the gods delighted in dharma and the demons abandoned dharma. Then pride entered those who dwelt in adharma, and from pride came anger. Lakṣmī [another form of Śrī] entered the gods and Alakṣmī entered the demons. Then the spirit of Kali entered the demons, and they were destroyed. 25

The cumulative effects of evil culminate in the arrival of the Kali age, but the demons are responsible for initiating this process.

These myths generally account for the differentiation between gods and demons but do not usually involve mankind in any way. The demons who lose the right to rule in heaven are driven down beneath the earth and are thus not necessarily any closer to mortals on earth than are the gods in heaven. Certain commentators, however, perhaps influenced by ideas from Western theology, have interpreted the fall of the demons from heaven in terms of a subsequent fall of man. This attitude appears in the terminology used to describe the demons; according to T. O. Ling, the asuras in the Pali canon are fallen beings, 'devas in opposition or in revolt or disgrace',[26] and some eighteenth-century Hindus encountered by the Danish mission at Tranquebar were said to have believed that human souls are 'heavenly spirits, which for their sins are driven out of heaven'.[27]

J. Z. Holwell recorded at greater length a myth of this type, from 'Brahmāh's Shastah', but his interpretation is obviously clouded by Christian attitudes:

> '[The initial creation was a state of joy and harmony] which would have continued to the end of time, had not envy and jealousy taken possession of Moisasoor [Mahiṣāsura] and other leaders of the angelic bands. . . . They spread their evil imaginations among the angelic host, deceived them, and drew a large portion of

> them from their allegiance. The eternal One then commanded Sieb [Śiva] to go armed with his omnipotence, to drive them from Mahah Surgo [Mahāsvarga, heaven], and plunge them into the Onderah [hell], there doomed to suffer unceasing sorrows. . . . Part of the angelic bands rebelled and were expelled from the heavenly regions; the leaders of their rebellion, . . . in process of time, regained their influence, and confirmed most of the delinquents in their disobedience.' 28

Holwell's assumption that paradise 'would have continued to the end of time' conflicts with the general Hindu view of original creation, which is more closely represented by the statement that the demon rebels regained their influence 'in process of time'. (The statement that Śiva was to drive the demons from heaven corresponds with a more typical pattern of Hindu myths in which the demons are the victims and the gods the initiators of corruption.)

One tribal myth of the origin of evil shows the obvious influence of Christian mythology (particularly in the attitude toward the devil), but retains certain Indian ideas as well:

> In the old times, god gave people everything they needed. There was no shame of nakedness, and people lived for a thousand years. Then one man's heart became bold, and he thought that he did not need god. He tried to kill god, but god stripped off his wings and threw him down into hell and called him a devil. God allowed the devil to come up to earth only on the day of the dark moon.
>
> There were two beautiful people living on earth. When the devil saw how happy they were, while he suffered in hell, he resolved to destroy god's intention, thinking, 'If I do not cause this to cease, shall I be a devil?' God had told the people on earth not to eat certain griddle cakes, but the devil took the form of a snake and told the woman that if she ate the griddle cakes she would fly like a god. She ate them and felt shame. The snake, overjoyed, returned home. The woman made the man eat the cakes, and then they both covered themselves with leaves. . . . 29

The myth of Eden has been only slightly modified, and the ideas shared by both Indian and Christian mythology (the role of sex in the loss of

paradise, the danger of incorrect eating) appear in the Western form. The devil's concern about the fulfilment of his own role (' . . . shall I be a devil?') is, however, a particularly Indian feature.

3. Evil created by demons

Hindu mythology hardly ever blames the demons for the corruption of mankind, though isolated texts with this implication do appear from time to time, perhaps under the influence of Zoroastrian cults which were brought into India by the Śakas, Pahlavas, and Kuṣāṇas by about 200 A.D. and which certainly affected other aspects of Hinduism (such as cults of the sun). According to the Mahābhārata, all creatures were righteous and obedient until the demons caused a decrease in dharma, since they were filled with anger and greed.[30] It is probably only the virtue of the demons that is destroyed in this way, though they may have been responsible for a more general corruption as well. The demons' willing participation in their own corruption and the subsequent corruption of others is implicit in an Upaniṣadic myth:

> The gods and asuras came to Brahmā and asked him to tell them the Self. He thought to himself, 'These asuras desire a Self different [from the true Self].' Therefore a very different doctrine was taught to them, a doctrine which fools here believe in, praising what is false. 31

If the 'fools here' are mortals on earth, this myth may indicate that the demons are responsible for an important heresy. This possibility is enhanced by another Upaniṣadic myth:

> Prajāpati said that the one who understands the Self obtains all worlds and all desires. Both the gods and the asuras heard this, and the gods sent Indra from among them and the asuras sent Virocana. Without speaking to each other, the

> two of them approached Prajāpati and lived as disciples with him for thirty-two years. . . . Prajāpati taught them that the Self that they saw reflected in a mirror or a pan of water was the true Self. The two of them went forth, satisfied, and Prajāpati thought, 'They have not comprehended the Self. Whoever has such a doctrine, whether they be gods or _asuras_, shall perish.' Virocana came to the _asuras_ and taught them, 'Oneself is to be made happy here on earth. Whoever makes oneself happy here on earth obtains both worlds, this world and the world beyond.' Therefore even now here on earth they say of one who does not give [money to Brahmins], who does not believe, and who does not sacrifice, 'He is like an _asura_', for this is the doctrine of the _asuras_. But Indra went back to Prajāpati, dissatisfied with what he had learned, and after a hundred and one years he learned the doctrine of the Self, and since the gods had this doctrine they obtained all worlds and all desires. 32

The doctrine that the _asuras_ learn seems to be a kind of Materialism (which maintains that the physical body is the Self), and this doctrine involves a form of hedonism that is also said to be characteristic of the Cārvākas. Although Prajāpati is the one who teaches them (and the myth might thus be included in the more common group of myths in which the gods delude the demons, rather than those in which the demons are the deluders), it is nevertheless evident that the demons and gods are exposed to the same temptation, and that some flaw in the demons causes them to accept the false doctrine while the gods go on to seek the truth. Moreover, whatever the source of their own corruption, the demons are definitely responsible for the creation of heresy among men on earth, the Materialism which is known as the doctrine of the _asuras_. The _āsura_ doctrine which the _Bhagavad Gītā_ calls atheistic ('They say the universe is without a lord'), lascivious, deluded, and harmful to others, is identified by Śaṅkara as the Lokāyatika view.[33]

Debi Prasad Chattopadhyaya has discussed the belief held by orthodox thinkers that the Lokāyata philosophy was the 'asura' view.[34] He remarks that the doctrine of the Kāpālikas, Sahajiyās, and Nāstikas

in general was equated with that of the Lokāyatas and attributed to the asuras, and he refers to a work by D. R. Sastri which maintains that this association took place because 'degenerates attracted each other'.[35] Although this statement must certainly be challenged on sociological grounds, there is nevertheless considerable mythological material in support of the association of demons with the heresies of Materialism and atheism.

The Vāyu Purāṇa contains an episode which specifically describes the demons' intention to create a heresy: 'During the battle between gods and demons, the conquered demons changed all men into heretics; this was not part of the creation by Prajāpati.[36] These were the Nirgranthas, Śākyas, and the naked ones etc. who do not practise dharma, the Niṣādas, Nāstikas, and other evil-doers.'[37] This is one of the earliest texts to place the full blame for heresy unequivocally upon the demons. A later text, the Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa, describes at length a similar perversion:

> 'In ancient times, the mortals, being pious through the due performance of their duties, could go to heaven at the mere wish, and the gods also grew stronger by getting their due share in the sacrifices. Consequently, the Daiteyas and Asuras could not prevail upon the gods. In course of time two Daiteyas, Ṣaṇḍa and Marka by name, intended to annihilate the gods and performed a dangerous kṛtyā (a magic rite meant for destructive purposes), from which came out a dreadful figure called Mahāmoha ['Great delusion'], who had a very dark body resembling a mass of darkness and was extremely fierce, haughty, deceitful and lazy. This Mahāmoha was divided by Ṣaṇḍa and Marka into four parts, one of which decried the gods and Brahmins, another discouraged people from practising Yoga, the third engaged them in unlawful acts (vikarman), and the fourth deprived them of their jñāna [knowledge], made them accept ajñāna as jñāna under infatuation, and took delight in whatever went against the Vedas (veda-vāda-virodhena vā kathā

sāsya rocate). Thus produced by Ṣaṇḍa and Marka, this Mahāmoha, who was adharma in person (adharma-svarūpaḥ) and was polluted by pride and other vices, took his position among the people (lokeṣv eva vyavasthitaḥ) and deluded them in various ways. By his misleading instructions he turned them worthless through infatuation (mohābhibhava-niḥsārān) and made them discard their conscience as well as their respective duties enjoined upon them by their castes. . . . They turned Pāṣaṇḍins (or Pāṣaṇḍas) and Vrātyas, . . . decried the rites sanctioned by the Vedas. . . . They also spread their influence upon the less intelligent (alpa-mati) section of people and made them discard their own lawful duties and perform unlawful acts. Thus they led themselves as well as others to hell.' 38

Although this text was probably not composed until the third century A.D.,[39] it is based upon an assumption more representative of the mythology of the Brāhmaṇas than that of the Purāṇas, among which it is almost unique in attributing a heresy to the demons: this is the assumption that the gods are strengthened by receiving their share of the sacrifices from moral men, and that it is therefore to the advantage of the demons to interfere with human morality. That the demons interfere with the sacrifice is a belief shared by Brāhmaṇas and Purāṇas alike; it is the main purpose of demons. But that they should do so by corrupting men, though this is an obvious expedient, is a corollary which one encounters surprisingly rarely. Moreover, the Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa fails to make clear how this corruption benefits the demons; though they are obviously successful in their attempts to mislead mankind, they themselves are also doomed to hell.

A myth in the Mahābhārata equates heretics with demons in a passage which is used to justify the killing of a heretic by a Brahmin:

A Cārvāka who was a rākṣasa disguised as a Brahmin beggar approached Yudhiṣṭhira and chastised him for having murdered

> his kinsmen. The Brahmins then told Yudhiṣṭhira, 'This is a rākṣasa called Cārvāka, who has assumed the form of a wandering beggar'. They struck him down and burnt him up, and when Yudhiṣṭhira expressed concern over this action they said, 'Formerly in the Golden Age there was a rākṣasa named Cārvāka, who performed great asceticism, so that Brahmā granted him safety from all creatures. Then the evil one heated the gods [with his tapas], and the gods asked Brahmā to slay him. Brahmā said, "He will be killed soon, for he will be the friend of Duryodhana, and out of love for Duryodhana the rākṣasa will dishonour Brahmins, who will kill him".' 40

The demon is associated with the Cārvāka heresy as usual, though here it amounts to little more than the anti-caste misgivings expressed elsewhere by Yudhiṣṭhira himself and voiced by Arjuna in the Bhagavad-Gītā. This heresy, however, does not bring about the corruption of mankind; quite the contrary: it is his love for an evil mortal that destroys the demon. This myth is patterned on the common motif of the virtuous or powerful ascetic who must be made to utter a heresy in order to justify his destruction. Nevertheless, it does support the argument that at least some heretics were considered to be demons.

A later manifestation of the dualistic philosophy of evil appears in the Prabodhacandrodaya, in which the heresies themselves, personified, are said to attempt to corrupt the orthodox virtues in order to preserve their own race:

> Hypocrisy [Dambha] enters and says, 'Great Delusion [Mahāmoha] has commanded me thus: "Discrimination [Viveka] and his ministers have sent Tranquillity, Self-control, and the others to various holy shrines in order to encourage Enlightenment [Prabodha]. The destruction of our race is imminent, and you must take pains to prevent it. Go to the city of Benares, the holy place where beatitude is obtained, and interrupt the religious performances of those of the four classes who are engaged in asceticism." ' 41

The forces of evil here act in opposition to the forces of good, and mankind is caught in the middle.

The belief that the gods wish men to be good but that demons make them evil occurs from time to time in Sanskrit texts, though it is not the prevalent attitude of classical Hinduism. A striking expression of this belief appears in the Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa:

> A rākṣasa carried off the wife of a Brahmin, but he did not eat her. A king questioned him about this and received the following reply: 'We are not man-eaters; that is another kind of demon. We eat the fruit of a good deed. When we eat the patience of men, then they become angry; when we have eaten their evil nature [bhukte duṣṭe svabhāve ca], they become virtuous.' 42

The demon in this story is responsible for the disruption of the chain of karma in both directions. He destroys the power that causes men to pay for their past actions and thus changes evil men to good, as well as the reverse.

The Indian tribal tradition contains several manifestations of the belief that demons rather than gods are responsible for the corruption of man. In southeast India it was believed that, while god slept, 'the devil' performed certain destructive actions and brought death into the world.[43] The devil is responsible for death in a myth told among the Rajneni Pardhan:

> '[Mahadeo wanted to teach the Gonds certain magic] but Naita Dhobnin thought, "If these twelve brothers become adepts at this art, . . . [and] if they eat Mahadeo's body, . . . no one in the world will die". [She tricked Mahadeo so that he became ill, and she told the Gonds to cook and eat him. But then, saying, "What a great sin is this!", she tricked the Gonds into throwing the flesh into the river. She took the form of a crocodile and swallowed the flesh, and so she became a great witch.]' 44

Once again the corruption of man is associated with a woman and with a food tabu, but here no blame rests upon mankind or the gods. A similar witch appears in the popular tradition as Jatu-harini, 'a certain

goddess who plays tricks with mankind. If a son when grown up acts differently from what his parents did, people say that he has been changed in the womb'; it is she who is held responsible for transforming a Brahmin's son, raised in the strictest orthodoxy, into 'a high Buddhist, or in other words an utter atheist'.[45]

The Sanskrit tradition, however, does not usually regard demons in this way. One rākṣasa maintains that it is mankind who make demons evil, rather than the reverse:

> 'We are hungry and eternally devoid of dharma. We do not do all the evil that we do because of our own desire; it is because of your evil karma, and your disfavour toward us. Our faction increases because of the Brahmins who behave like rākṣasas and the evil actions of the other three classes. Those who dishonour Brahmins become rākṣasas, and our ranks are swelled by the sins of lascivious women.' [46]

In one version of this myth, the sages to whom the demons make this complaint take pity upon them and designate various sorts of unclean food for them; then, for their salvation, the sages produce a river for the rākṣasas to bathe in, and the rākṣasas are released from their sins and go to heaven.[47] Thus, the force of karma may be transferred in either direction; the demons cannot be made to bear the entire blame, for often they are simply produced by evil mortals or reborn from mortals who were evil in a former life.[48] (One late text reverses this assumption and states that those who were formerly rākṣasas became Brahmin heretics in the Kali age, false-speaking, devoid of Vedic dharma, revilers of the Vedas[49].) The more usual process, that evil men become or nourish rākṣasas, carries with it the corollary that demons are given as their food various groups of sinners and are allowed to dwell in the houses of evil men.[50] This is implicit in the statement

that when the demons have eaten the evil nature of men, the men become virtuous; from this point of view, the demons ultimately destroy evil rather than produce it.

The manner in which demons came to be regarded as corrupting influences in later texts may be seen in the various stages of the myth of the demon Naraka, also known as Bhauma, the son of the earth and of Viṣṇu in his boar incarnation. At first, in the Mahābhārata, Naraka is simply said to be an asura who threatens Indra because of his (Naraka's) virtue:

> Once a demon named Naraka performed asceticism for 10,000 years, wishing to obtain the place of Indra. Knowing of his power and his unbroken vow of dharma, Indra became frightened. He sought refuge with Viṣṇu, who said, 'Though he is firm in his asceticism, I will fight him, since he wishes to obtain your place'. Then Viṣṇu killed the demon. 51

Another Mahābhārata version of this myth adds two details which remain a part of the myth in all subsequent versions: Naraka steals the earrings of Aditi, and he is killed by Kṛṣṇa rather than by Viṣṇu in his 'full' form.[52] The Viṣṇu Purāṇa then adds several more details: Naraka not only steals the earrings of Aditi but also carries off the daughters of the gods, demons, and kings, and he dwells in a city in Assam.[53] In the Harivaṃśa, Naraka wins a boon from Brahmā, steals even more women and is described as an evil man (pāpapūruṣa).[54] The Kālikā Purāṇa combines the first version -- in which Naraka is a virtuous demon -- with the reversed premise of all subsequent versions -- that he is an evil lecher -- in a myth describing his transformation from virtue to evil. This myth is also unusual not only in accounting for the ambiguous nature of the 'virtuous demon' but also in casting

the blame for this transformation onto another demon rather than onto the more usual culprit -- a god:

> Naraka ruled justly over his kingdom in Assam. But towards the end of the Dvāpara age [the third of the four declining ages], Naraka became friendly with the demon Bāṇa, son of Bali, who worshipped Śiva and had a demon nature (āsura bhāva). Bāṇa influenced Naraka so that Naraka no longer honoured Brahmins or Viṣṇu, nor did he perform sacrifices. When the sage Vasiṣṭha came to visit Naraka and was refused admittance, he cursed Naraka to be killed by Kṛṣṇa. Naraka's city lost its splendour and many calamities occurred; many people died, and the waters of the river Lauhitya dried up. Naraka sought help from Bāṇa, who advised him to worship Śiva and Brahmā. As Śiva was already presant in Naraka's city, the demon performed asceticism for Brahmā for a hundred years,and Brahmā granted him several boons but advised him to avoid Tilottamā, the most famous of the apsarases (celestial courtesans in the service of Indra). Bāṇa, however, advised Naraka to attack Indra and to procreate sons. Naraka begat four sons upon his wife, and then he began to oppress the gods, for he assumed a demon nature. The earth sought relief from the gods, and as a result of her plea Viṣṇu became incarnate as Kṛṣṇa. Naraka abducted Tilottamā, and Kṛṣṇa killed him. 55

A number of familiar points occur in this myth. Naraka's nature begins to change at the change of the age, and this is also associated with drought and famine. The sectarian element is apparent: the Vaiṣṇava is corrupted by a Śaiva. Naraka's downfall is brought about through his own lust and, more particularly, through the agency of the apsaras whose main responsibility is the seduction of those who threaten to usurp Indra's throne. This motif of seduction by an apsaras is, as we shall see, almost almost always applied to a virtuous sage or demon who threatens Indra; that it is applied here to a demon who is already doomed by his voluntary acts of sensuality betrays the myth-maker's ambivalent attitude toward the demon. This ambivalence is evident from the contrast between Naraka and Bāṇa: although Naraka

is technically a demon and is called an asura in most other versions of this myth, he is here compared with Bāṇa, who has an asura nature from the very start, whereas Naraka only assumes an asura nature after a long association with Bāṇa. This distinction is a comparatively late refinement, and the Kālikā Purāṇa is a fairly late text, probably dating from the tenth or eleventh century A.D.[56] The implication here is that even a demon is not evil unless he is corrupted; that one's own attitude to the gods (bhakti) supersedes one's allotted role in life (svadharma). This doctrine will be discussed at length below; for the moment, it is sufficient to note that Narakas corruption is brought about by a demon and involves the re-emergence of his own demon nature.

These scattered myths of demons who cause evil and heresy to arise on earth form no coherent pattern. Most of them are isolated reversals of more common patterns in which the demons are not responsible for the creation of evil. In fact, the majority of these myths seem to be more concerned with an attempt to explain how the demons themselves came to be evil (usually through the agency of gods or men) rather than how -- if at all -- they cause others to be evil.

III. ii. The Orthodox Mythology of the Origin of Evil: svadharma and karma

The problem of the origin of evil and heresy has troubled Indian thinkers since Vedic times, contrary to the frequently expressed opinion (based upon a misunderstanding of the significant differences between Hindu and Christian conceptions of evil) that the Problem of Evil does not exist in India.[1] The early texts are less concerned with the specific problem of heresy than they are with the more general concept of evil (pāpa), which originally included natural misfortunes such as hunger, death, and ignorance, and only later assumed the connotations of sin and vice.

1. The natural origin of evil and the loss of the Golden Age

One of the earliest Indian discussions of the origin of evil among mankind appears in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa:

> Those [mortals] who made offerings in former times touched the altar while they were sacrificing. They became more evil [pāpīyās]. Those who washed their hands became righteous. Then men said, 'Those who sacrifice become more evil, and those who do not sacrifice become righteous'. No sacrificial food then came to the gods from this world. . . . The gods went to Bṛhaspati (their guru) and complained that unbelief [aśraddhā] was rife among men; he told them to sacrifice without touching the altar and they would become more righteous. 2

In this passage, evil (pāpa) results from a ritual defilement, a primitive or behaviouristic rather than a philosophical or intellectual view. A misunderstanding of the true cause of the evil then leads to unbelief (aśraddhā), the antecedent of heresy. It is significant that this unbelief works against the gods, demonstrating the Vedic concept of the dependence of the gods upon sacrifice. The ritual basis of this

early myth fails to provide any philosophical answer to the problem of evil, since the difficulty is quickly and superficially corrected.

A more generally prevalent view of the cause of evil first appears in the Mahābhārata:

> Formerly Prajāpati brought forth pure (viśuddhāni) creatures, who were truthful and virtuous (satyavādinaḥ . . . puṇyā). These brahmabhūtās joined the gods in the sky whenever they wished, and they lived and died by their own wish. Then, in another time, those who dwelt on earth were overcome by desire and anger, and they were abandoned by the gods. Then, by their foul deeds (aśubhaiḥ karmabhiḥ) these evil ones (pāpā) were trapped in the chain of rebirth (saṃsāra), and they became atheists. 3

The reference to 'another time' may signify the appearance of the Kali age or may simply describe the eventual appearance of the evil inherent in desire and anger and the subsequent loss of purity and immortality. For the original people are not mortals at all, but pure creatures (brahmabhūtās) who do not eat or die. They become physically corruptible (i.e. subject to carnal decay and saṃsāra) when they are morally corrupted; the two characteristics are inextricably linked, for embodied humans are corrupt, in both senses of the word, in Hindu mythology. Although this myth of the loss of the Golden Age has obvious parallels in the myth of Eden and the Hindu myth of the fall of caste, its emphasis is upon the development of heresy (i.e. atheism) and the chain of evil (saṃsāra) which is implicit in the myth of the four declining ages.

This myth of a lost Golden Age appears in Buddhist texts as well as Hindu; indeed, it is a widely distributed motif outside of

India. Charles Drekmeier has suggested a reason for its universal appeal:

> 'The Buddhist doctrine shares much with certain theories of psychoanalysis. Freud never postulated an idyllic natural state like the golden age that haunts Buddhist cosmogony. Before men united in civil socieities they were governed by the rule of the strong. But there is a golden age in the life of man. The quest (explicit in Buddhism, innate in man according to the psychoanalyst) is for this golden age before the organism had distinguished itself from its surroundings.' 4

This analysis implies that the Golden Age is characterized by a lack of differentiation, which is supported by those Indian texts which point out that there was no need for class separations in the Golden Age:

> In the Golden Age, people were happy and equal. There was no distinction between high and low, no law of varṇāśramadharma. Then, after some time, people became greedy, and the wishing-trees disappeared, and passions arose . . . 5

But it is also clear that both the psychoanalytic view and the Indian view of this golden time are more complex than Rousseau's theory that when man is at one with nature and free of civilization he is 'good'. The 'rule of the strong' applies even without society; this appears in Hindu mythology as the 'rule of the fishes [mātsya nyāya]', whereby the big fish eats the smaller fish, a metaphor for the dreaded state of anarchy.

Moreover, in the majority of Purāṇic myths, the Golden Age is only a temporary one, a passing phase, rather than the basic or natural state of man. Inevitable decay characterizes another myth of the origin of evil in the Mahābhārata:

> In former times there was no king, nor was there any rod of chastisement; of their own accord, and by means of dharma, all creatures protected one another. But then they wearied of this [khedaṃ paramam ājagmus] and then delusion entered them. Then brahma was destroyed, and so dharma was destroyed. Then greed and desire overcame them, and the gods became afraid, saying, 'Now that dharma is destroyed, we will become equal with the mortals, for their dwelling [varṣa] will rise and ours will fall when they cease to perform the rituals.' (Then, for the benefit of the gods, Brahmā established the science of government [daṇḍanīti] and Viṣṇu created kings -- Vena and Pṛthu.) 6

As in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa myth, the gods wish men to be virtuous so that they will continue to offer sacrifice to the gods; but a hint of the later, opposing, Purāṇic view appears in the statement that the gods fear not only their own descent but the ascent of men, a situation which in later mythology leads the gods to bring about the moral corruption of mankind rather than to re-establish dharma among mortals on earth.

Sheer boredom ('they wearied of this') seems to suffice to sow the seed from which corruption must develop, for it is dharma that bores them. Stemming from these same assumptions, several lawbooks use the premise of the destruction of man's original dharma to justify coercive authority, the chastising rod of the king.[7]

The Vāyu Purāṇa relates this story of man corrupted by nothing but time (or fate, kāla):

> In the beginning, people lived in perfect happiness, without class distinctions or property; all their needs were supplied by magic wishing trees. Then because of the great power of time and the changes it wrought upon them, they were overcome by passion and greed. It was from the influence of time, and no other cause, that their perfection vanished. Due to their greed, the wishing trees disappeared; the people felt heat and cold, built houses, and wore clothes. 8

Unlike the myths justifying the establishment of kingship, this text seems to imply that civilisation -- property and clothing -- is a source of further greed and sin, not a solution for them. This much the Hindu philosopher shares with Rousseau, but clearly his basic attitude lies closer to Hobbes: with the passage of time, man's inherent evil must come to the fore. The inevitable sin of greed, the killing of the golden goose, destroys the magic fruit of paradise.

The belief that time is morally destructive is related to the ancient doctrine of the four ages, conceived of in India not in terms of metals of decreasing value but as progressively lower throws of the dice: the first, or Kṛta, age (the Golden Age) is the best; then comes the Tretā, then the Dvāpara, and finally the lowest age, the Kali age in which we dwell:

> In the Kṛta age, dharma was complete [catuṣpāt, sampūrṇaḥ]. There was no sorrow or delusion or old age or misery, no injury or quarrels or hate or famine. Men lived a long life. . . . In the Tretā age, people were born by imagination. In the Dvāpara age, dharma was only half left, and injury, hatred, envy, quarrels, and cruelty arose, along with falsehood and delusion, sorrow and anger, evil, disease, old age, greed and wrath. Castes became mixed. . . . 9

A Buddhist text offers what may well be a satire upon this facile view of the corruption of man -- beginning with Brahmin sages:

> At first, all sages [isaya] were virtuous ascetics, but then came a reversal [tesam āsi vipallāso], and they began to covet one another's wealth, wives, and horses, and to slaughter cows. Indra, the gods, asuras, and rākṣasas cried out against this adharma; and thus the three original diseases (desire, hunger, and old age) developed into ninety-eight. 10

Although the gods' displeasure with the adharma on earth links this myth with the older layer, the manner in which the myth offers the expansion of three evils into ninety-eight as an 'explanation' of the loss of virtue may be a travesty of Brahmanical number mysticism. The text does not indicate whether the plague of evils arises directly from the loss of the sages' virtue or from the subsequent indignation of the gods, but the perversion occurs in the first place simply in the course of time.

Many Christian scholars have seen in this degenerative process a similarity to the doctrine of original sin and the fall from grace. The Brāhmaṇas do not appear to believe in the inheritance of original sin in the Christian sense, for one early text states, 'As little guilt as there is in a child just born, so little guilt is there in him who performs the varuṇapraghāsa sacrifice', [11] which seems to imply that a newborn child is more or less guilt-free. But this view was certainly not shared by later Hindus; Manu states that the elaborate birth ceremony is necessary to remove the impurity which the new-born child inherits

from the womb and the seed.[11a] In the Hindu view, the _brahma_-realized creatures of the original Golden Age are not a part of time at all; for them, _karma_ doesn't exist; they are 'beyond good and evil'. Their 'fall' consists of passing from eternity into time; once caught up in the flow of time, they are no longer immune to evil. The creatures of the first Golden Age, though they may dwell upon earth, are not the first members of the human race; almost by definition, as soon as they become 'human' the Golden Age must

immediately disappear. The Hindu concept of the Golden Age thus lacks the vision of pristine human innocence and the belief in a separate agency of evil which underlie the myth of Eden. To the Hindu, the original state of perfection is doomed to quick extinction from within, without the need for a serpent or devil to initiate the process.

Max Weber interpreted this Hindu relativity of paradise and sin in sociological terms:

> 'The conception of an "original sin" was quite impossible in this world order, for no "absolute sin" could exist. There could only be a ritual offense against the particular dharma of the caste. In this world of eternal rank orders there was no place for a blissful original state of man and no blissful final kingdom. Thus there was no "natural" order of men and things in contrast to positive social order. 12

Although it is true that ritual offenses usually occupy in Hindu myth the place Weber allots to 'sin', there is a contrast throughout the mythology between the positive social order and the 'natural' social order which becomes so quickly corrupt. Moreover, although the individual could only offend against caste law, the caste as a whole could violate a more universal law -- the law of dharma -- as may be seen in the myths of Brahmins who 'fell' to become Untouchables or demons.

It is the fleeting and insubstantial nature of the original paradise, and the pessimistic view of the nature of man, which distinguish the Hindu myths. In these myths, men -- and even demons -- are originally good, but evil passions inevitably appear soon after creation, and <u>this</u> is the natural (albeit not original) state of man. This inability to explain the loss of the Golden Age prevails even in tribal mythology. The Todas believe that once, long ago, gods and men inhabited the hills

together. 'The Todas can now give no definite account of their beliefs about the transition from this state of things to that which now exists.'[13]

2. Women and the origin of evil

One important motif which the Hindu tradition shares with the myth of Eden is the connexion between procreation and evil, the implication that sexual creation is the epitome of sin. This motif recurs constantly in the Hindu mythology of evil; women are not only the abstract cause of a number of evils and sins in the world, but they are used as the specific instrument of the gods in corrupting individual demons and sages. This is the natural consequence of the general misogyny of the Indian ascetic tradition and the Upaniṣadic doctrine of saṃsāra: reproduction traps men in the painful cycle of rebirth. Orthodox Hinduism, too, was prone to misogyny in its caste laws, which imposed increasing restrictions upon women.

As this tendency developed, abstract goddesses were cited with increasing frequency as the cause of evil on earth. Death, originally a male god, began to appear as a goddess; the stallion which had been the symbol of Aryan supremacy in the Vedic period was now replaced by the dangerous mare in whom the doomsday fire lurked, ready to destroy the universe;[14] this same doomsday horse appears as the mount of Kalkin, who comes to drive the barbarians out of India. In the Epic myths of the origin of evil, it is the goddesses of disease and destruction who initiate the downfall of mankind; the vague 'natural tendencies' of corruption are replaced by anthropomorphic (perhaps one should say gynecomorphic) goddesses of doom.

According to the Mahābhārata, men originally lived without fear of death and did not know of sexual intercourse; in the Tretā age people were born by imagination, but in the Dvāpara there arose copulation (maithuna), and in the Kali age pairing (dvandva). Then there was death. . . .[15] The distinction between copulation and pairing is obscure, but the latter may refer to twins, the brother and sister who are the (incestuous and therefore immoral) primeval couple in Vedic mythology (Yama and Yamī) and who appear in Jain creation myths,and Hindu:

> When Brahmā first performed creation, he meditated upon truth, and from his mouth he created pairs (of human beings) who were made of truth; from his breast he created pairs made of passion [rajas]; from his thighs those made of passion and ignorance; from his feet those made of ignorance. All of these pairs loved one another, and they began to mate. But although they had intercourse, women did not menstruate and so they did not bear offspring. At the end of the lifespan they brought forth a pair [of children to reproduce themselves). They were free of strife and hatred and jealousy. They lived without houses, and they were without desire, remaining happy and righteous. All were equal and remained young for 4,000 years, without any affliction. As time went by, people began to be destroyed, and gradually their perfections vanished. When they were all destroyed, liquids fell from the sky and from this liquid wishing-trees arose which formed houses and all food. Then, in time, without any cause [akāsmiko], passion arose in them, and because of their passion women began to menstruate, and they conceived again and again. Then, after an interval of time, greed came over them, and they fenced in the trees, and because of this misdeed the trees perished. They became hungry. They built cities. . . . 16

Although degenerative forces of time reappear constantly in this myth, which even states explicitly that passion arose 'without any cause', the motif of sexual passion is also clearly essential. In keeping with Hindu beliefs that fertility and eroticism are not necessarily connected and that it is necessary to control sexual passion even while procreating,[17] mankind encounters its greatest

difficulties not when sexual reproduction appears, but only when passion appears. It is clear, however, that reproduction also entails an element of evil, for the first troubles begin not when people merely reproduce but when they begin to increase -- i.e., to produce more than a pair of children. It is this which is symbolized by the menstrual flow which reappears throughout Hindu mythology in association with sin and pollution.

Edmund R. Leach has noted a similar tie between reproduction and sin in the myth of Eden:

> 'Adam and Eve eat the forbidden fruit and become aware of sexual difference, death becomes inevitable (III,3-8). But now for the first time pregnancy and reproduction become possible. Eve does not become pregnant until after she has been expelled from Paradise (IV,1).' 18

The significance of increase in population is linked with Indian ideas of food and death and their connexion with sexual reproduction. As in the <u>Mahābhārata</u>, death only arises when sexual increase appears; clearly, this is a result of the Hindu fear of overpopulation which is manifest at a surprisingly early period, at a time when, due to high infant mortality, it can hardly have been a realistic worry. Bluntly expressed, the logic implicit in this fear is simply that if too many people are born, some must die. The connexion with food is equally obvious: not only are hunger and desire the two most basic appetites, but they are closely associated in Indian mythology and they are interconnected through the theme of overpopulation: when too many people are produced, food becomes scarce. This may be the significance of the strange liquid which

falls from the sky when the perfection of mankind vanishes. The liquid which is associated with man's ensnarement in the cycle of rebirth may be traced back to the Upaniṣads: Men, upon cremation, are transformed eventually into cloud; they rain down, grow as plants, are eaten and emitted as semen.[19] Frederick Eden Pargiter misunderstands this verse or has a different text, and he seems to associate it with the Christian myth of the fall from heaven: 'Men [in place of 'liquids'] fell down from the sky'. Pargiter, or his text, may have been influenced by the Buddhist myth, in which beings from the _brahma_-world fall to earth when their merit is exhausted.[20] These creatures are further reminiscent of the _brahmabhūta_ creatures of the _Mahābhārata_, for they are self-luminous until they begin to eat (i.e., to have bodies) and to crave, whereupon their light leaves them. The magic liquid becomes necessary when people cease to live on their virtue alone; if man is prey to passion, he must have food.

3. Hunger and sin

Thus another element of the myth of Eden -- the fruit -- plays an important role in the Hindu mythology of evil. In one series of variations on this theme, men remain virtuous until the source of food begins to diminish, and only then do they become evil. This is perhaps the closest that the ancient Indians ever came to the concept of a virtuous natural state of man; only when an external force threatens him does he violate the moral law.

Yet the very nature of that 'external threat' was given moral overtones in some texts. This is evident from an eleventh century Jain myth which begins, like the Buddhist and early Hindu creation stories, with the postulation of limitless food coming from the wishing trees:

> But with the passing of time in that place, the power [prabhāvaḥ] of the wishing trees became weak, like that of ascetics who have violated their vows [cāritrabhraṣṭa]... as if by some evil fate the trees had been changed, replaced by others. . . . As the consequence of such a time, [the sins of greed etc. appeared among mankind]. At first, in order to restrain evil-doers, it was sufficient for people to say, 'Hā! You have done evil'. Then they had to say 'Mā! ['Don't!]' and then, later, 'Dhik! ['Fie!']'. . . . Then, because of the fault of the time, as the power of the trees failed, the passions such as anger appeared in people, and they transgressed even in spite of the laws of Hā, Mā and Dhik. They informed their king of the sins that had arisen, and he reassured them and ordained food for them to eat. Then a fire arose from the branches of trees rubbing together, and people began to cook their food. When they were frightened of the fire and asked the king what it was, he replied, 'This fire arises because of the fault of a time that is both

> harsh and smooth. It does not exist in a period that is altogether harsh nor in one that is altogether smooth.' Then he began to institute social order and laws of conduct and punishment. . . . 21

As usual in such myths, time is made to bear the major portion of the guilt, and the workings of an evil fate (durdaiva) are also suggested, for time and fate are one. But nature herself seems to have moral qualities which inevitably decline. The trees waste away not because of the sins of mankind but because of the 'loss of power' of the trees themselves, a 'power' which is likened to a loss of chastity -- the sin usually associated with the people who lose the trees. When moral law further decays, the king provides food -- first raw, and then cooked; civilisation enters at this point, and the king's explanation of the birth of fire is significant: fire is symptomatic of the ambiguous time -- a mixture of good and bad -- which characterizes the Hindu universe[22] (though the Jain text states that we now live in a completely harsh era, the fifth of six). This text thus makes explicit what is implicit in all the myths of this cycle: that man and nature inevitably interact in such a way as to corrupt one another; man's sin causes food to decrease, and hunger causes man to violate the moral law.

The connexion between hunger and evil is an ancient one. The Ṛg Veda says: 'The gods did not give [us] hunger as [an instrument of] slaughter [vadhá; 'Todesstrafe' (Geldner)]; for [various] deaths overcome one who has eaten.'[23] But creators' intentions often miscarry, and by the time of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa a more realistic and cynical attitude toward hunger and thirst prevailed: 'Whenever there is drought, then the stronger seizes upon the weaker, for the waters are dharma.'[24]

When Brahmā began to create in his passionate (rājasa) form, he produced hunger, whence was born anger and the starving rākṣasas.[25] Similarly, when Śiva created the Rudras they threatened to eat him.[26] In many creation myths of this type, the first evil creatures that the creator produces are hungry, and they trouble the universe until they are assigned suitable food. Thus, in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, it is said that Prajāpati feared that Agni would eat him, since there was no other food, and he satisfied Agni by offering him a wife, Svāhā, the oblation, the food of fire.[27] It is significant that the original threat posed by hunger is ultimately removed by the satisfaction of the closely related sexual drive; Svāhā is both Agni's food and his wife.

This link endures in a much later Purāṇic myth:

> The demon Ruru attacked the gods, who sought refuge with the Goddess. She created goddesses who killed Ruru and his army, but then they asked for food. The Goddess summoned Rudra Paśupati, who offered them the food that pregnant women have defiled, and newborn children, and women who cry all the time. They refused this disgusting food, and at last Rudra said, 'I will give you the two balls resembling fruits below my navel. Eat those testicles and be satisfied.' The goddesses were delighted and praised him. 28

Both forms of the food offered to the goddesses are sexual in nature; the first is closely associated with the pollution of procreation and, in particular, with procreative women and women in general ('who cry all the time'); the second is more crudely sexual. Another, earlier version of this same myth omits the second food, for the goddesses immediately accept the original offer of food defiled by pregnant women etc.;[29] this part of the myth also follows the pattern of those stories

in which an evil force is distributed among sinful mortals.[30]

A tribal myth preserves this basic link between the dangers of hunger and sexual desire:

> '[A man saw a beautiful maiden] and he wanted to devour her, for he had no penis and he could only find pleasure in swallowing. [Mahadeo came there and made sexual organs for the man and the woman.] The world was saved.' 31

As is often the case, the tribal myth recognizes the same basic problems as are treated in Hindu texts, but is content to settle for a solution of the immediate problem without considering the implications of the enduring philosophical conflict.

In human terms, hunger is the epitome of <u>āpad-dharma</u>, the extremity in which caste law ceases to function:

> Once there was a twelve-year drought, when Indra sent no rain. All dharma was destroyed and people ate one another. Sages left their hermitages and wandered about; the great sage Viśvāmitra came to a place inhabited by outcastes who ate dogs; the place was strewn with skulls and bloody bones. Viśvāmitra begged but was given no food; seeing a dead dog, he tried to steal it, reasoning that theft was permissible in time of extremity [<u>āpad</u>]. A Caṇḍāla tried to stop him from committing the sin of eating a dog, but in vain. Viśvāmitra ate the rump of the dog and burned away his sin by performing asceticism, and eventually Indra sent rain. 32

The initial premise of a twelve-year drought is a frequent motif in later myths of heresy, as is the complete reversal of moral roles -- the sage being instructed by the outcaste.

In fact, the satisfaction of hunger, rather than hunger itself, is often considered the cause of the evil: 'When the starving creatures had devoured one another, Adharma was born. His wife was Nirṛti [Wickedness], who had three terrible, evil sons: Fear, Terror, and Death.'[33] Improper eating (which is of course the basic caste tabu) is the source of sin. A myth dating from the fifth century A.D.[34] seems

explicitly to connect the eating of the fruit of the knowledge of good and evil with the fall from grace, as in the myth of Eden. F. Otto Schrader considered this myth to correspond to 'the Fall of Man in Jewish and Christian theology',[35] but Eliot pointed out the significant difference: 'Here the ground idea seems to be not that any devil has spoilt the world but that ignorance is necessary for the world process, for otherwise mankind would be one with God and there would be no world.'[36] The myth itself is brief and obscure:

> Knowledge became a cow, with a portion of herself, that is, she became a cloud. Then the milk called 'the year' flowed from her and became food. But all the Manus, who had been omniscient [*sarvajña*], ate that milk of knowledge (or the milk of the Vedas, [*vaidyaṃ payaḥ*]) and lost their knowledge [*jñānabhraṃśaṃ prapadyante*]. Thereupon the *śāstra* was promulgated by the Manus. 37

'The *śāstra*' is a Pāñcarātra text, regarded as a heresy by the orthodox Hindus though not by the Pāñcarātra author of this myth, of course. An immediate reversal of the Judeo-Christian theme is apparent: the first beings lose their omniscience by eating of the fruit of knowledge. This apparent paradox results from the Indian emphasis upon ignorance (darkness, delusion), loss of knowledge, in place of what the Judeo-Christian would designate as sin -- loss of virtue resulting from acquisition of knowledge. This 'knowledge' in the Pāñcarātra myth, however, may be orthodox scriptural knowledge (Vedic, or at least *vidyā*) as contrasted with the intuitive knowledge (*jñāna*) that is exalted by the Pāñcarātras and supposedly contained in their *śāstras*. Eliot interprets the myth as an indication that 'souls have naturally unlimited knowledge' which 'for some reason becomes limited and obscure, so that religion is necessary to show the soul the right way'.[38] But these absolute statements must be qualified: Souls once had unlimited knowledge for a brief time, but the casual manner in which this knowledge was destroyed indicates the necessity of religious law (just as it justifies regnal law) -- particularly the necessity of the Pāñcarātra law

which is appropriate to the lowly condition of man.

4. The chain of evil and the evil of civilisation

In some of these myths, the corrupting influence -- sexual passion or hunger -- simply arises in the course of time; other myths, however, sought an explanation for this inevitable corruption and found it in the doctrine that 'former sins' caused the loss of the Golden Age. The apparent logical fallacy of this view is somewhat resolved in the context of the doctrine of karma: evil is a chain which has no beginning or end.

An interesting Buddhist example of this chain of reasoning may be considered here, but it must be taken with a grain of salt. The Buddhist doctrine of the origin of evil, which lies outside the scope of this work, is a central and widely discussed point of Buddhist belief; the second noble truth enunciated by the Buddha states that misery arises from craving. The Buddhists tended to face the problem of evil in terms of psychological factors within man rather than cosmological factors acting through or upon gods, and most cosmogonic myths in Buddhism are probably intended as satires on Hindu myths. Nevertheless, these texts often reproduce in faithful detail the main points of the Hindu myths, for, whether or not they still accepted them, early Buddhists were well aware of the common pre-Buddhist corpus of Indian legends upon which both they and the later Hindus drew (a corpus of which the Jātaka stories are perhaps the best example).

The 'chain of evil' is particularly appropriate in a Buddhist

context, since the Buddha himself explained the origin of evil in terms of causal links in the chain of misery. Thus the Agañña Sutta myth of the origin of evil shows both Hindu and Buddhist elements, ultimately falling back upon a still earlier evil to explain the fall:

> The earth was spread out upon the cosmic waters for the original creatures, who had no distinctions of sex. The earth was fragrant and sweet as honey. At first no one touched it, but then a certain being, born greedy [the commentator, Buddhaghosa, remarks, 'Greedy from a former birth'], said, 'What can this be?' and tasted it, and craving overcame him. The others followed his example and tasted the earth greedily. Their bodies became solid. Some people became beautiful, others ugly. The beautiful despised the ugly. Therefore the sweet food disappeared. Then women were differentiated from men, and passion arose. People began to couple, and when others saw them doing so they threw dust and ashes and cowdung at them and shouted, 'Perish, you foul one. How could one person treat another like that?' Then men built huts to conceal their sexual intercourse. Then someone of a lazy disposition decided to store rice instead of harvesting it . . . Then someone of a greedy disposition appropriated another field that had not been given to him . . . From such beginnings arose theft, censure, false speech, and punishment. 39

Physical beauty is, in this philosophical context, an ironic variant of the motif of differentiation. A related Buddhist text also uses this criterion but blames the ugly, not the beautiful, for the final link in the chain of immorality: 'Those who were ugly envied the beautiful and committed adultery with their wives. . . . Thus sexual wrong-doing [kāmesu micchācāre] arose . . . and then wrong opinions [abhijjhā-vyāpāda] grew.'[40]

Sexual appetites and hunger initiate the degenerative process, as they do in many Hindu myths (sometimes in that order, sometimes reversed) and in the second Noble Truth. The earth is made of honey, as are the wishing-trees in the Hindu versions, and the Agañña Sutta myth goes on to explain the origin of caste in what appears to be a satire upon the Mahābhārata description of this process.[41] But certain assumptions are shared by the Buddhists and Hindus. Punishment is in itself regarded as an evil institution (grouped with

theft, censure, and false speech) rather than a satisfactory answer to the problem of the evil nature of man, which results from various wicked dispositions from former births. Property, the direct result of passion or greed, introduces all the evils of civilisation. Other Hindu texts similarly imply that the need for houses (civilisation) arises directly from the increased sensitivity to pain, heat, and cold which afflicts mortals when human nature is no longer perfect (i.e. indifferent);[42] when the wishing trees perish, men are forced to build cities.[43]

This concept of civilisation as one of the links in the downfall of man is inherent in the idea of the Golden Age as a state of nature, yet it seems to be contradicted in those texts which describe the Kali age as one in which cities are destroyed and men live in the forest.[44] This paradox may be resolved when one bears in mind the cyclic nature of the chain of evil in Hinduism (the belief that the end of the kalpa is followed, after a 'timeless' interval, sometimes symbolized by the sleep of Viṣṇu or Brahmā, by a new beginning) together with the confusing tendency to identify oppositions (whereby the state of nature is both the condition of innocent perfection, the state in which the sages dwell, and the condition in which the animal appetites of mankind assert themselves). In this the Hindu seems to stand sometimes with Hobbes and sometimes with Rousseau in his view of the relative merit of nature and civilisation.

The cumulative effects of the evils of civilisation are noted in a Buddhist description of a much later stage of society, in which one of the Universal Emperors fails to rule properly:

> He did not give wealth to the poor, and so poverty became widespread. Soon a certain man took what had not been given to him, and this was called theft. They caught him and accused him before the king, who gave him wealth. People heard of this and thought they would do the same in order to receive wealth from the king. To put a stop to this, the king began to execute thieves. Thus came poverty, theft, murder, and falsehood. [45]

Once need (nature) has caused men to sin, the cycle has begun and cannot be arrested, even by the correction of need (civilisation). The king's belated generosity only inspires further wrongdoing, and coercive authority (though considered to be tantamount to yet another evil -- murder) must take effect. Since need is originally responsible for man's fall, since hunger is man's eternal condition, temporary satisfaction merely masks the flaw.

Interesting evidence of the antiquity of the Dīgha Nikāya myth of the origin of evil (and hence of the even greater antiquity of the Brahmanic myth on which it is based) appears in the report which Strabo attributes to Onesicritus, who entered India with Alexander in 327 B.C. and heard this tale from a naked 'sophist' named Calanus:

> In olden times the earth was full of barley and wheat; fountains flowed with water, milk, honey, wine and olive oil. But man's gluttony and luxury [τρυφή] led him into boundless arrogance [ὕβρις], and Zeus, hating this state of things, destroyed everything. When self-control and the other virtues reappeared, blessings were again abundant, but the state of man is again increasing in arrogance and the destruction of all existence is imminent. [46]

The basic elements of the Indian myth are faithfully reproduced here, in spite of the apparent Hellenization evident in the olive oil and Zeus: Food is at first limitless; greed appears naturally; the gods hate man and destroy his welfare; virtues reappear; but man is near his ultimate destruction (i.e. the end of the Kali age). This degeneration,

preordained in spite of all episodes of virtue, is inherent in all the Indian versions of the myth. When the magic trees disappear, creatures are reborn as Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, and Śūdras according to their respective deeds in previous births.[47] Not time alone, nor hunger alone, but both of these coupled with the individual predilection to sin destroy the Golden Age.

5. Man himself as the cause of evil.

The Greek passage states in recognizable Western terms an idea which is implicit in many of the myths cited above: that god intended man to live in a state of perfection, but man himself destroyed this perfection and thus either brought about the evils of the world or (as in the Greek text) caused god to destroy him. The latter situation arises very seldom in Sanskrit texts; the blame is either cast upon god himself (who through his own shortcomings causes man to be born with the imperfections which are inevitably to result in his downfall) or upon certain demons (who spoil the world for mankind and cause the gods to destroy it). Far more often, the Sanskrit texts emphasize the reverse situation: men are good until evil gods corrupt them. The belief that man himself is the author of his woes is, however, entirely consonant with the early mythology of the degeneration of civilisation and the evil nature of man, and it re-emerges in certain myths of heresy in which men corrupt one another.

One myth which appears in the Brāhmaṇas seems to imply that man commits a moral error which forces the gods to destroy him:

> Prajāpati created beings but they were seized by poverty and anxiety [aṃhas], and so Varuṇa seized them. They treated him with disdain and left him. Prajāpati, then becoming Varuṇa, seized them. 48

The first part of this myth is familiar: when animal need comes upon man, he is driven to commit some moral offense. The unique feature of this version is that the offense is against the gods (as we usually find in much later texts) rather than against mankind (as is typical of this earlier layer of the mythology of the origin of evil), and that the archaic god who represents moral indignation and punishment -- Varuṇa -- punishes them. The second half of the myth is unclear from this text but emerges more clearly upon comparison with another Brāhmaṇa:

> When they were created, all the creatures ate the barley corn belonging to Varuṇa, and because of that Varuṇa seized them. They became swollen [with dropsy, the punishment sent by Varuṇa, god of the waters], but Prajāpati healed them and freed them, and his creatures were born free of disease or fault [akilviṣāḥ]. Prajāpati created an abundance [of food] and freed the creatures. 49

The original sin is directly related to hunger, and the cure is simple: Prajāpati creates an abundance of food. The conflict between the two gods is apparent: Prajāpati creates man and protects him, while Varuṇa punishes him. Yet neither acts as the devil, and the blame is laid upon mankind.

It is in the tribal mythology of India, however, that one often encounters myths which correspond to the Western idea that god is forced to destroy man because of his wickedness, and this may be due to Christian missionary activity among the tribes, whose traditions were recorded only after such activity had been taking place for some time. Many of these myths are used to explain the origin of death, which may be regarded in simple terms as a manifestation of the separation of man from god (i.e. mortal from immortal):

> 'When God first made the world, He [created man and woman from ashes and] then called the man by name, saying, "Manoo [Manu]", and the man replied, "Hoo" instead of "Ha Jee" (Yes, Life) respectfully, as he should have done. For this reason was everlasting life denied him.' 50

A similar myth is told among the Kuruk of Middle India:

> '[Mahapurub made a boy and a girl.] When they grew up they quarrelled. Mahapurub called them and said, "You are disturbing me with your quarrels". He picked them up and killed them.' 51

The Jhoria believe that there was no death until men and gods began to fight against each other; then Mahaprabhu created the waters of death and immortality and tricked men into accepting the former.[52] Although the pattern of this myth is that of the Sanskrit myths of the wars between gods and demons (who fight against one another for the drink of immortality, which the gods obtain by tricking the demons), the antagonism between men and gods rather than demons and gods (and the concern with the origin of man's mortality) is more characteristic of tribal mythology.

Often, the gods destroy mankind by means of a great flood. The flood motif occurs in the very oldest layers of Indian mythology, where it accounts for Viṣṇu's avatar as the fish or boar,[53] but it never occurs as a punishment for man's wickedness in Sanskrit texts; it is merely an inevitable natural occurrence, corresponding to the great flood which takes place at the end of every era. Since the end of the era is the end of the Kali age, in which wickedness thrives and forces Viṣṇu to become incarnate as Kalkin to destroy sinful mankind,[54] it is easy to see how these motifs came to be combined in tribal mythology.

According to the Kamars, 'Bhagavan made the world virtuous, yet after a time it sank into sin', and he sent a flood to destroy it.[55] The Kols also attribute the flood to man's wickedness, which 'so provoked the deity that he determined to punish them';[56] they believe that Sirma Thakoor destroyed the earth with water or fire 'because people became incestuous and unmindful of God'.[57] The Bhils, however, believe that the earth simply sinks naturally into the flood waters,[58] as it does in Hindu mythology.

A motif closely related to that of the flood does appear in Sanskrit texts, however, and that is the series of myths in which the earth sinks into the cosmic waters because of an excessive weight placed upon her, a burden which god removes by destroying those who are causing the earth to sink down.[59] When the burden is caused by the weight of mankind in general, death is introduced to remove the excess; this then corresponds to the myths in which the flood occurs naturally at the end of the era, devoid of any moral element. Since overpopulation is linked to sexual procreation, however, it may be said that even here man's 'wickedness' causes god to destroy him. A still closer parallel occurs in the myths in which it is the excess burden of evil demons that causes the earth to sink into the cosmic waters until god destroys the demons. Here, however, the myth differs from the tribal corpus in that it absolves mankind of any part of the sin which causes god to destroy the race, nor in fact is mankind destroyed. In short, Sanskrit tradition does not really offer any true parallel to the Western idea that man's wickedness forces god to punish him.

6. Evil due to god's error

The corpus of myths attributing the origin of evil to mankind is both inconsistent and scanty. Far more typical are those myths in which evil is the work of god himself, created by him sometimes on purpose, sometimes in error. E. M. Forster recorded a conversation with the Maharajah of Dewas Senior which reveals the persistence of this attitude:

> 'When I asked him why we had any of us ever been severed from God, he explained it by God becoming unconscious that we were parts of him, owing to his energy at some time being concentrated elsewhere. . . . If you believe that the universe was God's <u>conscious</u> creation you are faced with the fact that he has consciously created suffering and sin, and this the Indian refuses to believe. "We were either put here intentionally or unintentionally", said the Rajah, "and it raises fewer difficulties if we suppose it was unintentionally". 60

The unintentional creation of evil is apparent in this early text:

> Prajāpati created the golden egg of the universe. He created the gods, and there was daylight. Then, by his downward breathing, he created the demons, and they were darkness for him. He knew that he had created evil for himself; he struck the demons with evil and they were overcome. Therefore, the legend which tells of the battle between gods and demons is not true, for they were overcome because Prajāpati struck them with evil. 61

Here we encounter a logical inversion which haunts these myths: Because the demons were evil, Prajāpati made them evil, a corollary to the theory of the chain of evil. The gods are responsible for the creation of evil demons; then, to overcome these demons, they corrupt them further. The apparent nonsense of this concept is somewhat offset by the Hindu view of self-correcting cycles, but this is certainly a weak point which betrays the confusion that the origin of evil generated in the Hindu mind.

Similarly circular logic pervades another myth recorded by Holwell:

'[After the revolt of the demons] the eternal One spoke again and said, "I have not withheld my mercy from . . . the leaders of the rebellious Debtah [Devatās, i. e. gods]; but as they thirsted for power, I will enlarge their powers of evil; they shall have liberty to pervade . . . and the delinquent Debtah shall be exposed and open to the same temptations that first instigated their revolt; but the exertion of those enlarged powers, which I will give the rebellious leaders, shall be to them the source of aggravated guilt, and punishment; and the resistance made to their temptations, by the perverted Debtah, shall be to me the great proof of the sincerity of their sorrow and repentance." 62

The temptation in this episode is contrary to the general pattern of Hindu mythology, in which the evil man who is tempted with further evil is meant to succumb in order that the god may conquer him. Here, the temptation is a true test which god hopes the devotee will pass. But, whatever the intention, the net result is the same: the punishment is merely an enlargement of the sin, in this instance with the consequent guilt that is a moral torture in the Christian context and a source of the progress to a cycle of improvement in the Hindu context.

Although the secondary corruption of the 'rebellious leaders' is intentional in the Holwell myth, the source of the original sin is not specified and may have been a mistake on the part of god. Gauḍapada, author of the first Vedantic treatise on a monist Upaniṣad, actually states that god was deluded by his own power of delusion (māyaiṣā tasya devasya yayā saṃmohitaḥ svayam),[63] and the Prabodhacandrodaya describes how delusion overcomes god.[64] In most of the creation myths, delusion simply appears and continues to generate evil forces:

When Brahmā was thinking about creation, at the beginning of the era, there appeared a creation preceded by ignorance and made of darkness; from it was born five-fold ignorance, consisting of darkness, delusion, great delusion, gloom, and blind-darkness

> [tamo moho mahāmohas tamisro hy andhasaṃjñitaḥ]. Seeing that this creation was imperfect [asādhakam], Brahmā began to create again. . . . His fourth creation produced creatures in whom darkness and passion [tamas and rajas] predominated, afflicted by misery; these were mankind. 65

The qualities of passion and darkness appear in the course of creation as the natural complement to the third basic quality -- sattva, light and truth -- and they influence subsequent creation until another force predominates. As usual, it is mankind who bear the burden of god's inadequacy.

Demons, too, are created unintentionally by Brahmā:

> After creating the gods, asuras, manes and mankind, Brahmā became afflicted with thirst and hunger, and he took another body composed of passion and darkness. In that darkness he created deformed creatures thin with hunger, and they began to eat his body, for they were the rākṣasas and yakṣas. When Brahmā saw them he was displeased, and his hair fell out and became serpents. When he saw the serpents he was angry, and the creatures born of his anger were the fierce, flesh-eating piśācas. Thus Brahmā created cruel creatures and gentle creatures, dharma and adharma, truth and falsehood. 66

Hunger and thirst are the germinal evil-producing force for Brahmā as they are for mankind on earth. The chain then takes over, and his displeasure and anger lead to further unsatisfactory creations, with which Brahmā is explicitly said to be dissatisfied. Though he seems thus to be attempting to create a world devoid of evil, the Paurāṇika at the end implies that he cannot (and perhaps should not): creation is composed of equal measures of the forces of good and evil.

The vain attempt of the gods to prevent evil from overcoming their creation is described at some length in a much later text which explicitly rejects the chain-reaction theory used to 'explain' the origin of evil in many earlier Purāṇas. Thus, when the Paurāṇika

simply states, 'In the Dvāpara era, dharma was only half left, and injury, hatred, envy, quarrels, and cruelty arose, and then came falsehood, anger, evil, disease, old age, and greed', the listener interrupts to ask, 'How did the dharmas of injury, hatred etc. arise, and how did dharma disappear?' The sage then explains:

> Formerly, the eleven Rudras were born of Brahmā's anger; they were terrible and destructive, ruining the universe. Brahmā Prajāpati, seeing that they were unsuitable for the time [tatkālānucitān], instructed Dakṣa to restrain them, for Dakṣa was capable of doing this. But when Dakṣa reached them he obtained an evil disposition [kumatim] from contact with them. Therefore Śiva himself arrived at that moment and suppressed them [saṃśamayām āsa]. Because of this they became anger, injury, old age, etc. They stood there terrified of Śiva's strength, but then in the Dvāpara age they overran him. When Śiva saw them he was frightened and tried to protect himself with his trident. Then they were terrified and bowed to him, and they begged him to give them a position, saying, 'If you do not find a place forus, we will eat you'. Hearing this, Śiva said, 'Go to Brahmā. He will give you a livelihood, for he is the creator.' They left Śiva and went to Brahmā, saying, 'We are injury and your other sons. Since we were frightened of Śiva, we remained hidden, as we had no opportunity (to act). But now that dharma is dwindling we have found our opportunity, and we want a position and a livelihood.' Brahmā said, 'I have a son named Kāma [Desire], who will help you. When Kāma is born in someone's body, anger arises, and from anger comes delusion, and thence come greed, doubt, old age, disease, and death. And I have another son, Adharma, and when he terrifies Dharma you heroes will do your work.' Then they took refuge in the assistance of Kāma and Adharma, who was born of Brahmā. 67

The series of attempts to contain the evil which Brahmā had accidentally created merely transform it from one level to another. At first, the Rudras are simply destructive demons; when Dakṣa tries to control them, they pollute him; when Śiva tries to suppress them, they turn into the personifications of all evils; when he threatens them with his trident, they seem to subside, but in truth merely remain waiting for a chance to re-emerge. Eventually, when Śiva has shifted the responsibility to Brahmā and he in turn has sent them to Kāma, the evils find their usual

lodging place: within the human body. Thus Śiva and Brahmā fall back upon what amounts to the traditional solution: when the hungry forces of evil threaten to eat them, they offer in place of themselves human beings for food, and they attempt to mitigate this selfish and cowardly act by stipulating that only evil beings (in this instance, those who have fallen prey to desire, the usual flaw) will provide food for the demons. The belief that evil must emerge sooner or later, in one form or another, is here combined with the theory of degenerating eras: although Śiva appears to suppress the forces of injury etc., they merely remain in hiding until they find their 'opportunity' -- the Dvāpara age when dharma is fated to decay anyway.

Tribal mythology affords instances of the belief that god, against his will, inflicts evil upon mankind:

> '[After Ponomosor had destroyed mankind by fire, he could find no survivor, and therefore no one could give him sacrificial food. He was forced to make an agreement with Dakai Rani in order to find survivors. It is because of this agreement that Dakai Rani has seven eighths of men's bodies (the portion that is subject to death) and Ponomosor has only one eighth (the soul which survives after death).]' 68

Ponomosor finds himself here in a quandary implicit in many Sanskrit texts: though he is forced to corrupt or destroy mankind (because of men's evil behaviour or because of some threat that they pose to him), he needs the sacrificial offerings which they can only supply when they are uncorrupted or undestroyed. To resolve this conflict, he enters into an explicit compromise with the powers of evil -- though the proportion allotted to each side betrays the cynicism with which Indians regarded the balance of moral powers on earth.

Evil is an integral part of god and stems from him. This is apparent from a passage in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa which describes the parts of the creator which correspond to and produce the parts of the universe: His rectum is the origin of injury, misfortune, death, and hell; his back is the source of defeat, adharma, and ignorance.[69] According to a later text, Brahmā created from his back a terrible, filthy creature made of his own sin [svapātaka]; this was the evil Adharma, and from him were born deception, greed, wickedness, anger, and the Kali age.[70] The substance of Adharma comes from Brahmā's back, but the essence of it is his own pātaka -- the flaw which would otherwise cause Brahmā himself to fall to hell. In a multiform of the creation myth, the goddess of misfortune, Jyeṣṭhā, appears from the ocean when it is churned by the gods, who instruct her to dwell wherever there are quarrels or false speech and to eat people who lie and who fail to wash their feet.[71] The existence of the evil goddess on earth is the fault of the gods, who produce her -- as they produce the Kālakūṭa poison which immediately precedes her -- when their greedy determination to obtain the Soma causes them to churn the ocean too fast. But, like the demons and mortals whom Prajāpati corrupts, she may only prey upon those who are already evil.

In the Parāśara Purāṇa, heresy arises through the mistaken ideas of the sectarian gods Viṣṇu and Brahmā, who have replaced Prajāpati as creators. This late text specifies heresy rather than the older, general evil:

> Brahmā and Viṣṇu were arguing, each shouting that he was supreme. In anger, Brahmā cursed Viṣṇu: 'You will be deluded and your devotees will have the appearance of Brahmins, but they will be against the Vedas and the true path to Release. They will be

> Tantric Brahmins, initiated into the Pāñcarātra, ever averse to the Vedas, lawbooks, and the proper rituals that give Release.'72

The ultimate expression of this belief that the gods are responsible for all the troubles of mankind appears in the mythology of the Hill Saora, who state that the gods are the troubles of mankind:

> 'In the days before gods and the Dead troubled men, there were no priests. But in time the gods were born for every caste and they began to trouble them and men fell ill.' 73

This idea recurs among the Koya tribe, who view with remarkable cynicism the gods' need for sacrificial food:

> 'There were no gods, no priests, no sorcerers at first. Men increased in number and prosperity. The gods were living with Deur and he found it a great burden. Deur thought, "I'll send these gods to men and they'll have to see about feeding them". [He lowered the gods to earth and told them to force men to feed them by inflicting fever, belly-ache, blindness, etc. upon mankind, who would then have to seek help from the gods.] ' 74

7. The transference of evil

Thus, against their will, the gods are forced to create certain forms of evil which trouble mankind forever after. Inherent in several of the creation myths cited above is the belief that certain troubles originate within the gods themselves and might have remained outside the sphere of mankind had not the gods elected to inflict them upon mortals, to transfer them from themselves to mankind. This theme recurs in many myths in which sin (moha, kalmaṣa or pāpa, or a particular sin like Brahminicide), conceived of as a physical entity like karma, arises in a god who is then forced to rid himself of it by transferring it to mankind. This is the reverse of the motif (rare in Hinduism, but found in the later bhakti myths[75]) in which god takes to himself the sins of mankind, and it forms a bridge between two related but contrasting ideas of evil:

that god creates evil against his will and that he wishes to create it. The myths of transference form a mediating corpus, for although god does not wish to have evil arise in the first place, once it has been created he willingly 'creates' it for mankind in order to free himself of it.

An early example of such a concept of transference appears in the Brāhmaṇa ritual of the varuṇapraghāsa sacrifice, in which (according to Jan Heesterman) sin is transferred not from a god to a man but from the sacrificer to his rival. The rite focuses on the sacrificer's wife, who is asked to name her paramours; in this manner, untruth (anṛta) is turned into truth (ṛta, satya), and untruth is transferred to the rival who is seized by Varuṇa.[76] The role of the woman is essential here as it is in all later myths of transference of sin; her guilt is assumed and is implicit in the rather leading question which is put to her, asking not if she has a paramour but who he is, or even how many paramours she has.[77] This guilt is transferred to the sacrificer's rival; 'thus evil (pāpman) is taken away from the aśvamedha sacrificer by affinal relatives'.[78] Marital union is said to be essential for release from Varuṇa's bonds;[79] the woman may be the cause of all evil, but it is she who takes the burden of it away from man.

Later mythology maintains this ambiguous attitude toward the role of women. Indra, king of the gods and most immoral of them, often places the burden of his sins on men -- or women. Once, when the demon of intoxication was conjured to punish Indra (a notorious drunkard), Indra was saved when the demon was distributed among women, drinking, dice,

and hunting.[80] When Indra slew the demon Vṛtra he was guilty of Brahminicide; he transferred his guilt to women and granted them in return the boon of having children,[81] a familiar instance of the association of sin and procreation. In later versions of this myth, the women remain as receptacles of Indra's sin but are joined by others: fire, waters, grasses, trees, and apsarases, this last portion to be further transferred to any man who makes love to women during their menstrual period,[82] yet another instance of procreative pollution. Similarly, Indra's Brahminicide is divided among trees, rivers, mountains, the earth, and women, or among water, earth, fire, and women, the latter portion to appear in the blood of the menstrual flow.[83]

In the Rāmāyaṇa, Indra is said to have performed a horse sacrifice in order to be relieved of the sin of having killed Vṛtra, and the spirit of Brahminicide came out of Indra's body and asked the gods to give it a dwelling place, whereupon it was told to divide itself into four parts, one to dwell in rivers in flood in the rainy season, one in saline soil, one to live for three nights each month with beautiful young women in order to humble their pride, and one to dwell with those who slanderously destroy innocent Brahmins.[84] This text mitigates the harm done in this way by limiting the evil to wicked people (proud women and Brahmin-slanderers) and by a qualifying side-effect: it is said that, as long as Indra suffered from Brahminicide, he withheld himself (i.e. the rain) from earth, causing

a terrible drought which desolated all creatures; when Indra was freed from Brahminicide, all creatures rejoiced. Thus the earlier _Mahābhārata_ story is slightly modified in this later text to reflect less discredit upon Indra.

Another _Rāmāyaṇa_ tale similarly mitigates Indra's selfishness:

> Indra slew Vṛtra and was afflicted with impurity [_mala_]. Then hunger and Brahminicide entered him. The gods purified him by bathing him with sanctified water, and the filth entered the earth in the cities of Malada and Karūṣa. The gods rejoiced to see Indra pure, and Indra granted the two cities the boon that they would become famous and prosperous. 85

Although the actual transference is straightforward and concrete -- the 'filth' is washed off Indra and soaks into the earth (the recipient of the sin in other, less concrete versions as well) -- the more abstract 'sin' of hunger is still associated with the crime of Brahminicide. The cities which receive Indra's sin become famous, supposedly by virtue of that very fact; i.e., - they take upon themselves the virtue of the saviour which in other contexts might be associated with the very god who defiles them.

Often the evil (pāpa) is taken up by sinful or procreative women in this manner, and the myth is thus used to explain the origin of lascivious women. Such a myth explains the origin of adultery on earth: When Indra seduced Ahalyā, her husband Gautama said to him, 'This emotion which you have shown here will also appear among men in the world, and the man who (commits adultery) will have half the sin, and you will have half'. And Gautama cursed mortal women to have the beauty of Ahalyā, the cause of the trouble.[86] Such actions by the gods are usually accepted without comment by the Paurāṇikas, but this myth of Ahalyā is used to discredit the gods when Bṛhaspati corrupts the demons.[87]

Indra's weakness is responsible for the creation of a number of specific heresies in another myth:

> Pṛthu performed a horse sacrifice, but Indra was jealous of him and stole the horse. The sage Atri saw Indra flying away like a heretic who mistakes adharma for dharma, and Atri urged Pṛthu to kill Indra. Pṛthu's son set out after Indra, but when he saw him wearing matted locks, carrying a skull and a club, and smeared with ashes [i. e. in the form of a Śaiva Kāpālika], he thought him dharma incarnate, and he did not release his arrow. Again Atri urged him to kill Indra, saying, 'Kill Indra, who has destroyed the sacrifice and is the lowest of the gods'. Indra then released the horse and vanished, and the boy took the horse back to his father's sacrifice.
>
> All the forms that Indra took in order to steal the horse are portions [khaṇḍāni] of evil [pāpasya]. Thus when Indra stole the horse to destroy Pṛthu's sacrifice, the doctrine of heresy was taken and released by him among men. And those who are naked or wear red robes, thinking, 'This is dharma', attach themselves

> to adharma, through a mistaken idea [bhrāntyā]. (The commentator, Śrīdhara, concludes: From then on, the paths of heresy existed -- Jains, Buddhists, Kāpālikas, etc.) 87

Indra is often jealous of virtuous men and inclined to steal sacrificial horses. Here he interferes with the son of Pṛthu, who is associated with the origin of heresy through his father, Vena.[88] It is unclear why masquerading as a heretic should prevent Indra from being shot (unless perhaps he hopes thus to seem beneath contempt, like the Kṣatriyas who pretended to be Untouchables rather than face the Muslims), nor is it clear why Pṛthu's son should consider a heretic to be 'dharma incarnate'. But it is evident that the myth explains the origin of heresy and even gives a false etymology for the term pākhaṇḍa (pā[pasya] khaṇḍā[ni]).

Śiva inherits many of these motifs of transference from Indra, who is Śiva's prototype in many ways.[89] The essence of Indra's Brahminicide is said to be derived from a force originally created by Śiva, partially distributed, later transferred to Vṛtra, whence it entered Indra and was further transferred to living creatures:

> [When Śiva destroyed Dakṣa's sacrifice], a drop of sweat fell from his forehead and became a great fire like the doomsday fire; then it became a man named Fever, short, excessively red-eyed, red-bearded, hair standing on end, very hairy, dark-skinned, wearing red garments. Brahmā said to Śiva, 'All the gods will give you too a share (in the sacrifice). All the gods and sages find no peace, because of your anger. If this man born of your fever wanders among men in one piece, the whole world will not be able to bear him. Restrain (him), and let him be divided into many.' Śiva, thus implored and having been given a share, said, 'So be it,' and for the peace of all creatures he distributed Fever among the headaches of elephants, slough of serpents, sore hooves of bulls, blindness of cattle, constipation of horses, moulting of peacocks, red eyes of cuckoos, disturbances in sheeps' livers, hiccups of parrots, fatigue of tigers, and fever among men. 90

The original man, who closely resembles the man born of Vena's sin, is still too dangerous, so, since Śiva cannot altogether destroy his destructive fire, he distributes it 'for the peace of all creatures' -- i.e., in order

to do the least possible harm; he does not intend to do evil, but his action inflicts diseases upon various beings. The fever which causes the initial trouble is the power which destroys Dakṣa's sacrifice and which leads to various heresies in later, Purāṇic versions of the myth.[91] Another Śaiva myth uses the Indra motifs to account for the distribution of the seed of Śiva which is placed within Agni: Śiva promises Agni that he will be relieved of the torture caused by the seed if he releases it in the body of those women who warm themselves each month,[92] a possible reference to the sin associated with the menstrual flow. The pattern of the distribution of Indra's sin is also followed in the myth of the burning of Kāma by Śiva. After burning Kāma, the fire from Śiva's third eye, augmented by the fire of Kāma himself, threatened to burn all the universe until it was distributed among mango trees, Spring, bees, the moon, flowers, cuckoos, and the passion of lovers; among proud men and pleasure gardens.[93] The fever of Kāma tortures Śiva until Śiva transfers it to the son of Kubera, to whom Śiva gives the ability to drive men mad,[94] a more explicit example of the transference of sin from gods to mortals.

The Koya myth in which mankind lives happily on earth until Deur sends the gods to them may be read as a myth in which evil is transferred from gods to men, the evil in this case being the gods themselves. Other tribal myths describe this transference; a Gond myth retains many of the motifs of the Sanskrit Śaiva cycle:

> '[Mahadeo and Parvati were living in the jungle. She conceived but then miscarried and threw the foetus into a stream, where it became a fish. The seven daughters of Jalandhar Guru fell into the pool and contracted syphilis, gonorrhea, rheumatism,

bloody discharges, boils, sores, and menstrual problems, all because of the foetus of Parvati.]' 95

Another tribal myth also blames Mahadeo and Parvati for the origin of venereal disease, though the evil is 'transferred' not in any supernatural manner but merely as the disease is actually transmitted:

> '[A demon was in love with Śiva's wife Pārvatī. Śiva, with Viṣṇu's help, tricked the demon into burning himself to ashes, but as he died his seed came out from him. Viṣṇu placed the seed in a hollow bamboo, where two girls were born from it. Śiva and Pārvatī found them, and Śiva said that, since they were born of evil seed, they would give gonorrhea and syphilis to to any man that made love to them.]' 96.

Although any form of evil may be transferred from gods to mortals, sexual sin is particularly polluting and thus particularly easy to transmit.

The Gadaba have a myth which is even more explicit in its recognition of the fact that, once created, evil cannot be destroyed but can at best be transferred:

> '[Bhima Mahaprabhu and his son lived in heaven. Thakurani wanted to eat the son, but Bhima Mahaprabhu hid him and lied to her. She cursed him so that his son was afflicted with sores and wounds. Later, Thakurani was propitiated and cured the boy.] "But where shall we put this disease?" asked Bhima. "Let us throw it down to mankind", said his wife. They threw it down and in this way came disease and death into the world.' 97

Hunger and women are as usual the sources of the trouble, the latter appearing in two forms: first as the evil goddess who creates the diseases and then as the wife who suggests that they be transferred to mankind. But the gods benefit from an act which causes mankind to suffer.

8. The sin and salvation of Vena

An important series of myths in which a super-human creature is freed from his own sin by bringing forth sins upon earth appears in the saga of Vena. Some versions of this myth concentrate on the chain of evil leading to Vena's wickedness, others on the chain of evil which he brings about, so that a series of transferred sins stretches behind him and ahead of him.

The myth as it appears in the Mahābhārata gives neither the cause of Vena's sin nor the source of his salvation, but it provides the basic seeds out of which later texts were to develop both of these episodes:

> Atibala, the son of Anaṅga [Desire], married Sunīthā, who was the daughter of Mṛtyu [Death]. Their child was Vena, who was in the grasp of passion and hatred and spread adharma among his people. The sages killed him with sacred grass that had been purified by mantras. Then they churned his right thigh, and from it was born a deformed little man, dark as a burnt pillar, with red eyes and black hair. He was the ancestor of the Niṣādas, who are cruel mountain-dwellers, barbarians. Then they churned his right hand, and from him was born Pṛthu. 98

Vena is descended from death and desire, though no causal relationship is suggested here; and after his death he produces the ancestor of wicked tribes, though again this is not said to affect Vena himself in any way.

The Matsya Purāṇa elaborates upon these essential points:

> Aṅga married the very ugly daughter of Mṛtyu, named Sunīthā. Their son was Vena, who harmed people, took pleasure in adharma, and stole the wives of other men. The sages tried to instruct him in dharma, but in vain, and then they caused him to die, by a curse. But then, oppressed by fear of anarchy, the sinless Brahmins churned his body, and the races of barbarians came forth from that part of his body that was his mother's. From his father's portion, from the right hand, came forth a righteous king, named Pṛthu. 99

The lineage of the father is here purified, which leads to a dualistic view of Vena's sin: the wicked part of him (descended from death, through his mother) produces the barbarians, while the good part of him (descended from Svāyambhu Manu) produces the virtuous king. This text also explains why the sages churned Vena's body: not in order to purify Vena in any way, but simply in order to continue the royal line.

The Harivaṃśa further explains Vena's sin and its results:

> There was a righteous king named Aṅga, who married Sunīthā, daughter of Mṛtyu. Their son was Vena, who was not very learned in dharma. Because of the fault of his mother's father, who was Kāla [Death], Vena put his own dharma aside and plunged himself into lust. He ignored the moral bounds, transgressed the dharma of the Vedas, and took pleasure in adharma. He forbade people to sacrifice or to offer oblations, and he said that sacrifices and oblations were only to be offered to him. The sages tried to correct his behaviour, but the evil-minded king laughed at them and said that he excelled all of them in strength, asceticism, and truth, and that if he wished he could burn the earth or flood it. The sages became angry, and they grabbed him and churned his left thigh, and from it was born a short, black man, the founder of the Niṣāda line, born of the impurity [kalmaṣa] of Vena. He was the ancestor of all the tribes who dwell in the Vindhyas, the Tuṣāras, Tumbaras, and the others who delight in adharma. Then the sages churned Vena's right hand, and Pṛthu was born. 100

The nature of Vena's misbehaviour is expanded here to include certain heretic practices as well as certain characteristics of the dangerous ascetic: his excessive ascetic power gives him magical control over fire and water, according to his own boast. This text makes explicit the fact that Vena's sin was due to his descent from death, through his mother, and that the tribes are born of Vena's sin and are creatures of sin, who delight in adharma. Two other texts which are almost identical to the Harivaṃśa add minor details: the sages become

angry at Vena's offense (aparādhāt or apacāreṇa); they churn his right hand for the sake of progeny (or for the sake of the people [prajārtham]), as in the Matsya Purāṇa; the tribes descended from Vena include the Dhīvaras, Tumburas, Tuvaras and Khaśās, who delight in adharma because they were born from the sin of Vena.[101]

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa emphasizes the pre-ordained, inevitable nature of Vena's sin and introduces the important idea that the creation of the Niṣādas not only produces a new king but frees Vena of his guilt:

> Aṅga married Sunīthā, daughter of Mṛtyu, and she gave birth to a son. He took after his maternal grandfather, who was born of a portion of Adharma, and therefore Vena became attached to adharma. He went hunting and killed all the poor wild animals; he killed children as if they were beasts. Vena's father was very upset about this; after losing much sleep, he finally took counsel with his ministers. They said to Sunīthā, 'They have consecrated Vena as king, but he is by nature unfit [prakṛtyā...asammatam]. He obstructs dharma and goes about like a mad elephant in rut. One can feed a serpent on milk and raise him, but still there is no merit in him; even so, Vena is by nature [prakṛtyaiva] a rogue, born of the womb of Sunīthā. Instead of caring for his subjects, he destroys them. Nevertheless, let us propitiate him; let not his sin [pātaka] touch us.' In vain they pleaded with him, for he merely mocked them, reviling the gods; he told the sages to sacrifice to him, and he became more and more evil. The sages killed him, but Sunīthā took up the corpse of her son and preserved it magically. One day the sages saw evil portents and feared lest the Dasyus [non-Aryan Indian tribes] would overrun them. Realizing that they needed a king descended from Aṅga, they churned the thigh of the fallen [vipannasya] king, and a dwarfish man appeared, black as a crow, with short arms, flat nose, red eyes and red hair. He was the ancestor of the Naiṣādas who live in the mountain forests, and when he was born he took away the burning impurity [kalmaṣa] of Vena. Then the sages churned again, and Pṛthu was born. 102

The churning of Vena's body here has two distinct purposes. First he is churned to purify him of his sin, which is transferred to the Niṣāda, the bad king(who is, ironically, the very image of the Dasyus whose threat led to the creation of the Niṣāda). Only then can Vena

be churned to produce a good king (which was the original reason for the action, both within the logic of the myth and in its historical development).

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa further emphasizes the source of Vena's sin (Vena, 'who inherited the evil propensities of his maternal grandfather', was by nature evil[103]) and states that the birth of both sons was necessary for the purification of Vena, though the primary purpose of the churning (the need for a good king) is retained and expanded:

> . . . . The sages became angry and said, 'Kill this evil one [pāpa]', and they beat him with sacred grass and killed him. Then the sages saw great clouds of dust everywhere, and they asked the people what it was, and they were told, 'Now that the kingdom is without a king, the robbers are raising this dust'. The sages took counsel, and then for the sake of a son [putrārtham] they churned the thigh of the childless king. From him there arose a man dark as a burnt stake, very short, with flat features. He was the ancestor of the Niṣādas who are devoted to evil deeds. By this means, the evil went out of the king, for the Niṣādas born from him destroyed the sin of Vena. Then the sages churned the right hand of Vena, and Pṛthu was born. And because of his son thus born, Vena went to heaven, for he was protected from hell by his noble son. [104]

The birth of a good son to save his father is an ancient belief to which the Viṣṇu Purāṇa refers: the word 'son' (putra) is said, by a folk etymology, to refer to one who protects (tra) his father from the hell named Put. Thus the idea that a good son protects his father combines with the concept of transferred sin (by which an evil son removes his father's guilt), and Vena is doubly saved.

A similar folk etymology is used in the Vāmana Purāṇa version of the Vena myth, which states: 'Pṛthu deliberated how to help his father, for he thought, "A son is one who saves his ancestors" (pi[tṝṃs] trā[yate]).' [105] This text goes on to explain the way in

the good son protected his wicked father:

> Once when Manu sneezed, from his mouth there came forth a king who was the defender of dharma. This king married Bhayā, the daughter of death, and from him was born the wicked Vena. When the king saw the face of his son, he went to the forest, performed asceticism, and attained the heaven of Brahmā. Vena behaved evilly and was killed; the Niṣāda and Pṛthu were born of him.
>
> Pṛthu thought, 'My father was a wicked destroyer of sacrifices. How may I perform for him the death-rites that procure happiness in the next world?' Nārada told Pṛthu that Vena had been reborn among barbarians and that he suffered from leprosy and consumption. Pṛthu asked Nārada how he might save his father, and Nārada told him to go to various shrines [tīrthas]. Pṛthu set out for the north and found his father; the barbarians allowed him to take Vena home, and Pṛthu brought him on a palanquin to the shrine of Sthāṇu [a form of Śiva]. There he began to bathe him, but Vāyu [the wind] cried out, 'Do not be so rash. Protect the shrine. This man is enveloped in a terrible evil [pāpa], and if he bathes he will destroy the great shrine, for he has reviled the Vedas.' Pṛthu replied, 'He is indeed enveloped in a terrible evil, and I shall do the expiations that the gods require'. The gods then said, 'Bathe in shrine after shrine and sprinkle (him) with the water, referring to him when you bathe, and he will become pure'.
>
> A man who had sinned was reborn as a dog. The dog became thirsty and swam in the Sarasvati river, and his sins were shaken off. Then he became hungry and entered Vena's hut, and when Vena saw the dog he was afraid, and he bathed in the Sthāṇu shrine, having touched the dog gently. The dog showered him with drops of water from the shrines that he had bathed in. Because of the greatness of the Sthāṇu shrine, Vena was saved by his son. Śiva offered Vena a boon, and Vena said, 'I plunged into the lake out of fear of this dog, for I had been forbidden by the gods to bathe in this shrine. The dog did me a favour, and so I ask you to favour him'. Śiva was pleased and promised that the dog would be freed from sin and would proceed to the heaven of Śiva.
>
> Śiva said to Vena, 'I am pleased with you. You will dwell in my presence for a long time. Then, born from my body, you will be reborn as the demon Andhaka, and due to your former, terrible adharma -- reviling the Vedas -- you will become full of passion for Pārvatī. Then I will destroy you and purify your body with my trident. Freed from all impurity [kalmaṣa], you will become the leader of my hosts. 106

This text begins with an episode which foreshadows, in reverse, the main theme of the purification of a wicked father by a good son; for the virtuous father of Vena leaves his evil son but manages to attain

heaven by his own efforts. When Pṛthu is then born of Vena, he is faced with a logical impasse which the gods insist upon: since Vena is wicked, he is barred from participation in the ceremonies which might purify him. (This paradox underlies a number of the Tantric myths of heresy, which offer an intermediate religion for those too sinful to purify themselves by the true religion.) Only the devotional sacrifice -- the _bhakti_ -- of one who is pure (the son) can break the chain of evil _karma_.

Thus, in addition to the usual, straightforward transference of sin from Vena to one who is sinful (the Niṣāda) --a measure which does _not_ enable Vena to proceed to heaven, in this text -- another kind of transference is introduced, a transference of salvation: the virtuous son must accumulate good _karma_ and transfer that back to his father, even as he transfers the water from the shrines to his father, who is forbidden to touch them directly. In addition to this, another sub-motif of transference is introduced: the unclean dog transfers the holy water from his body to that of Vena, and Vena in turn intercedes for the dog with Śiva. Finally, it appears that even these episodes are insufficient to free Vena from the entire burden of his guilt, and the chain continues into two more rebirths: first as the evil demon who will sin because of Vena's sin, and then, after the intercession of Śiva himself to remove this final evil, as the virtuous leader of Śiva's hosts. In this way, Vena is purified first by his two sons (one evil and one virtuous) and then by becoming two sons of Śiva (first evil, then virtuous).

The belief that it is the good son, rather than the evil one, onto whom Vena's sins are transferred, recurs in three texts which dwell at far greater length upon the heretical nature of Vena's wickedness. In the first he is simply an atheist and a materialist:

> Vena, the son of Anga, was an atheist devoid of dharma, who took pleasure in evil śāstras; he was a prominent materialist (Lokāyatika). When the sages said to him, 'You ought not to destroy by your materialist speeches the moral bounds that were formerly set by our ancestors', Vena replied, 'You are babbling in vain. Those who are dead are dead; the spirit leaves the body like a breeze, and no body is obtained thereafter. All the rituals of horse sacrifice etc. are child's play; as long as one lives, one should live happily, for no one who is burnt to ashes returns again.' The sages decided to kill him, and the gods advised them to churn his thighs so that they would have a king descended from him. They killed him, and when they churned his two thighs the Niṣāda was born of Vena's sin [kalmaṣa]. Then they churned his right hand, and from it Pṛthu was born. By the birth of Pṛthu, Vena was freed from his evil [pāpa], for by obtaining a good son the evil Vena, who had committed all sins, went to heaven. 107

The hedonistic details of Vena's wickedness do not alter the course of the myth, which seems to distinguish between Vena's sin (kalmaṣa), which produces the Niṣāda, and his evil (pāpa), from which the other son releases him.

In the Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa, the nature of Vena's wickedness has a definite effect upon the role of Pṛthu:

> Formerly, Veṇa [sic] left the path of dharma, and there arose the mixture of castes. Veṇa was descended from Mṛtyu, for his mother Sunīthā was Mṛtyu's daughter, and because of his nature [svabhāvataḥ] Veṇa oppressed all his people. He took the children from every house and bound them and threw them into wells, and did other miserable things such as this. Aṅga was very upset about his son and went to the forest, and so, since the country then suffered from anarchy, the sages made Veṇa king. But Veṇa, oppressive by his nature [svabhāvapīḍako], forbade the dharma of varṇāśrama; he was the leading atheist. When the sages tried to reason with him, Veṇa replied, 'Since you say that mixing castes leads to hell, I will cause them to mix everywhere'. The sages

> were very upset and went away, and the atheist Veṇa caused Brahmins to beget sons in Kṣatriya wives, Kṣatriyas sons in Vaiśya wives, etc., producing the mixed castes of the Māgadhas, Vārajīvis, etc.
>
> Then from the body of Veṇa himself was born a son named Mleccha (Barbarian), from whom were descended the Pulindas, Pukkaśas, Khaśas, Yavanas, Kambojas, Śavaras, etc. Seeing these creatures who were born of the transgression of dharma, the sages killed the evil Veṇa and churned both of his hands. Pṛthu and his wife were born of the body of Veṇa, and dharma was once again established, for Pṛthu reinstated all the castes, and by Pṛthu's decree all the castes became devoid of evil [pāpaśūnya] and auspicious. 110.

The barbarian races which in all versions of this myth are created from the body of Vena appear here, but this motif is repeated in another form as well, and Vena creates other impure castes by explicit decree. (A similar duplication may be seen in the Vāmana Purāṇa, where Vena not only begets barbarians but is reborn among them). Both evil groups appear before Vena is killed in this text, and the dualistic birth from his dead body is maintained by the statement that it produced a male/ female pair in place of the usual good/evil pair. Nothing is said of the purification of Vena himself, but Pṛthu is born in order to 'purify' one set of Vena's offspring, i. e., to make the mixed castes devoid of evil. This is the only text in which Vena does not succeed in transferring his sin to others; he himself remains (presumably) damned, and though he does produce the barbarian races, his son undoes the main evil which Vena has produced (the mixture of castes).

A final, greatly expanded version of the myth returns to the question of Vena's personal salvation, which is achieved, as in the Vāmana Purāṇa, by the direct intervention of a god (here Viṣṇu instead of Śiva) who takes upon himself at least part of the responsibility for Vena's

corruption. The text first tells the Vena myth as it appears in the Harivaṃśa, changing a few of the concluding details:

> . . . The sages churned Vena's left thigh, and from him was born the ancestor of the Niṣādas, Kirāṭas, Bhillas, Nāhalakas, Bhramaras, Pulindas, and the other races of barbarians who dwell in the mountain forests. All of these evil-doers were born from Vena's body, and the sages were relieved when they knew that the king's sins were gone. Then they churned his right hand and Pṛthu was born from him. . . .
>
> (The sages listening to this tale said, 'What was the nature of the evil committed by this evil Vena, and what deserts did he obtain?' The bard said:)
>
> When his son, Pṛthu, was born, the king became spotless and righteous again, for all the evils done by the lowest men are destroyed by contact with the good. The sin of king Vena was obliterated in this way, even though it was a terrible sin [kalmaṣa], and Vena was sullied with the fault of his grandfather.
>
> (The sages said, 'What was the fault of his grandfather? This was Mṛtyu, who never harmed anyone, and Mṛtyu was established in his job (or in his evil [pratiṣṭhitaḥ pāpe or pade]), and all people are in the power of their karma. For this reason, I do not understand the fault. Because of what fault of Mṛtyu did Vena become evil?' The bard replied,) 'Mṛtyu is the commander of evils and of evil thoughts. An evil-doer by his evil deeds reaches hell, where Yama [Mṛtyu] heats him, while a good man obtains heaven.' 111

The original statement that it is the evil son who purifies Vena is retained in this text, but the story is then continued and attributes to Pṛthu the purification of Vena. The statement which appears in almost every version of this myth -- that Vena was evil because of his ancestry or because of his nature -- is repeated here, but now for the first time it is challenged by the listeners, who first of all question the evil nature of death (a question which recurs in the mythology of the origin of death[112]). The bard first answers this simply by stating that death *is* evil, but in order to emphasize the way in which this evil is transferred to Vena by the chain of *karma*,

he goes on to narrate a lengthy episode explaining the evil link between Mṛtyu and Vena:

> Sunīthā, who was virtuous [puṇyā], was born from Mṛtyu, and by the ripening of her father's karma she came one day to a lovely wood, where she saw the son of a gandharva, named Suśaṅkha. He had great ascetic power and was meditating; she offended him every day, but he bore it and merely kept saying, 'Go away'. Finally she struck him, and then he became angry and said, 'Evil one, why have you done this evil thing, to strike at me when I had committed no offense and was performing asceticism?' Then he controlled his anger, realizing that she was a mere woman, but she, because of her evil, or delusion, or simply due to her youth, said to him, 'My father is the chastiser of those who dwell in the triple world. He punishes the evil and not the good, and there is no fault in that, but merely merit.' Then she went to her father and told him, 'In the woods, I struck the son of a gandharva who was performing asceticism. Tell me the cause of this.' But Mṛtyu said nothing to her, and she went to the woods and struck Suśaṅkha again, and this time he became angry and cursed her, saying, 'Since you struck me, therefore when you marry you will have a son who behaves in evil ways, reviling the gods and Brahmins, taking pleasure in all evil. This evil will come forth from your womb.' Then Sunīthā went home and told her father what had happened, and he said, 'You should not have struck the ascetic when he had not offended against you'. And Mṛtyu was very unhappy. He told her that she had done a very wicked thing, and he advised her to begin doing works of merit and associating with the good. She went into the forest and became an ascetic [tapasvinī], determined to obtain a virtuous husband.
>
> The sage Aṅga, son of Atri, obtained from Viṣṇu the promise that he would have a virtuous son. When Sunīthā learned of this she decided to marry him, for she thought that, with his boon from Viṣṇu, Aṅga would beget a virtuous son in her, and Suśaṅkha's curse would be in vain.
>
> They married and had a son, Vena, who was learned and good and virtuous. When Sunīthā saw that her son had been anointed king during the reign of Nāhuṣa, when people had begun to diminish, she was worried because of his origin and because of the sage's curse. She told him to be virtuous, and he was. 113

Although the ostensible purpose of this episode is to justify the evil of Vena as an inescapable result of his ancestry, it has the opposite effect. Sunīthā directly contradicts the bard's statement of the

evil nature of death, pointing out (as the myths of death often do) that death only punishes the wicked and is not to be blamed for this, for this is the punishment which maintains the force of dharma in the face of man's evil nature. Moreover, the myth supports this view by making it apparent that Mṛtyu objects to Sunīthā's wicked behaviour, that she torments the ascetic because of her own evil, or delusion, or youth. Mṛtyu, in fact, plays the role of the virtuous father of an evil child, a multiform of Aṅga. The newly postulated immediate cause of Vena's evil is the curse of the sage Suśaṅkha, which stems in turn from the (inexplicable) 'evil' of Sunīthā, not from her ancestry. Even this is undercut, however, when Viṣṇu intercedes and promises Aṅga a virtuous son, an act which seems to negate Suśaṅkha's curse as well as Sunīthā's 'evil' and to produce a virtuous son. This, however, cannot be, and another episode is introduced to corrupt the king:

> (The sages asked, 'How did Vena come to abandon his virtue and righteousness?' The bard replied, 'How could the curse of the sage Suśaṅkha fail to come true? I will tell you how Vena committed his sin [pātakācāram]':)
>
> When Vena was ruling virtuously, a man came there, naked, bald, carrying a broom of peacock feathers, and reading the Marut-śāstra which is contrary to the Vedas. He was evil, and he was named Evil [Pāpa], but when Vena asked his name he said, 'I am Dharma and Mokṣa. I have taken the form of a Jain, the embodiment of the dharma of truth. The Arhats are the divinity and charity [dayā] is the highest dharma. There is no use in sacrifice or meditation on the Vedas or asceticism; only meditation upon the Arhats is beneficial. This is the way of dharma as taught in the path of the Jains.' Vena was deluded by that most evil man, and he abandoned the dharma of the Vedas, and the world became evil by his command. Aṅga tried to turn him from his wicked course, thinking, 'How could he have become so evil?' (or 'How could such an evil one have been born in my family?'), and finally he asked his wife, the daughter of Mṛtyu,

'By whose fault has this happened? Tell me the truth, my dear'. She told him about Suśaṅkha's curse that had caused their son to be wicked, and then the seven sages tried in vain to enlighten Vena, saying, 'All your people are deluded by evil, taking refuge in Jainism which is the root of evil. When all men have been ruined by the evil of Jainism, Viṣṇu will come to remove the evil, taking the form of a barbarian, and he will destroy all sins. And when all the evils are gone, he will become Kalkin to destroy the barbarians. But now you must abandon the behaviour of the Kali age and behave virtuously.' But Vena would not listen, and so the sages became angry, and they churned his left hand and the ancestors of the evil Niṣādas was born. Seeing this evil creature, the sages churned Vena's right hand, and Pṛthu was born. 114

In order to make Suśaṅkha's curse come true -- in effect, in order to undo his own previous negation of Suśaṅkha's curse -- Viṣṇu appears in his familiar Jain-Buddhist avatar. The manner in which Viṣṇu first corrupts and then (in the following episode) enlightens Vena is foreshadowed in the above episode by the reference to the way in which Viṣṇu will corrupt and enlighten mankind in general at the end of the Kali age: first he will come as a barbarian (as he has just come to Vena in the form of a Jain) and then he will come as Kalkin (as he will now come to Vena as the true god). The sages who tell Vena about these future avatars, however, stress that the time has not yet come, for they tell Vena to stop behaving in a manner appropriate to the Kali age. At the end of this passage, Vena seems to have been purified neither by the birth of his evil son nor by his virtuous one, and it is necessary for Viṣṇu to return yet again in the final episode:

(The sages said, 'How did Vena go to heaven when he had committed such a terrible sin?' The bard replied:)

From contact with the merit of the sages, and conversation with them, and by the churning of his body, they say that his evil was driven out. Afterwards, when Vena's soul was full of merit, he obtained eternal knowledge and performed asceticism for a hundred years, and when Viṣṇu appeared to offer him a boon, Vena asked to

> be brought to Viṣṇu's heaven with his mother and father. Then Viṣṇu said to him, 'What has become of the great delusion [mahāmoha] by whom you were deluded and set on the path of greed and darkness?' Vena said, 'I was deluded by my own evil deeds of the past [yan me pūrvakṛtam pāpam tenāham mohito vibho]. Therefore, raise me up from that terrible evil.' Viṣṇu said, 'Your evil has been destroyed and you have been purified by asceticism. The birth of Pṛthu made your soul pure, too. Suśaṅkha cursed your mother in her youth, but I gave Aṅga a boon that he would have a good son, and having promised this to your father, I will see that you obtain a good end. I took the form of the sin [pātaka] of Sunīthā, and I took the form of the naked monk to set you on the path of unrighteousness, so that the words of Suśankha would come true.' Then Viṣṇu instructed Vena in the way of salvation. 115

Vena is said to be purified in a number of ways: first by his contact with the sages, then by the birth of Pṛthu, then by his own asceticism, and finally by the teaching of Viṣṇu. This multiplicity of explanations, together with the persistent questions of the bard's audience, demonstrates the degree to which the myth of Vena remained troublesome to the Hindu mind and raised more questions of the nature of evil than it resolved. The Padma Purāṇa seems particularly troubled by the chain of events and constantly reverts to the past for explanations; even at the end, Vena remembers to ask Viṣṇu to bring his parents with him to heaven. The ultimate explanation for all the logical inconsistencies of the myth in this version reverts to Viṣṇu, who assumes responsibility not only for the delusion and enlightenment of Vena, but for first causing the curse of Suśaṅkha (by taking the form of Sunīthā's sin) and then obviating it (by giving a boon to Aṅga). Viṣṇu's offer to take the full blame for Vena's evil by appearing in person in his avatar of Mahāmoha is explicitly rejected by Vena, who reverts to the original, simplistic view of the origin of evil, the chain ('I was deluded by my own evil deeds of the past'). The initial premise of the early myths of Vena -- the

belief that he was released from his sin by transferring it to someone evil (the Niṣāda and his descendants) -- is reversed by the intervention of Viṣṇu, for Viṣṇu corrupts Vena not (as is usual) in order to rid himself of some sin but rather, ultimately, in order to remove such a sin from a mortal.

9. The necessity of evil

The myths of the transference of evil may thus be adapted to demonstrate a number of different religious points of view, but the basic, primitive impact of the concept stems from the belief that the gods are forced to place evil among mankind because they cannot otherwise dispose of it; this assumes that the gods do not wish for evil in the first place but that, given its existence, they would rather have it survive among men than among themselves. Other Hindu myths seem to imply, however, that even without any danger to himself, god wills mankind to sin, that evil does not arise by accident but that god creates it as a positive element, that evil is included in creation just as the heretic is 'included' in Hinduism. In this view, the gods are entirely responsible for the origin of evil.

Holwell compares the implications of the Western view that god creates evil against his will with the 'Indian' view that he creates it willingly; he remarks that the problem of the origin of moral evil has led some (Western) authors to

> 'very strange conclusions. . . . "That God was necessitated to admit moral evil in created beings, from the nature of the materials he had to work with; that God would have made all things perfect, but . . . there was in matter an evil bias, repugnant to his benevolence, which drew another way; whence arose all manner of

> evils; and that, therefore, to endue created beings with perfection, that is to produce good exclusive of evil, is one of those impossibilities, which evdn infinite power cannot accomplish. . . . " How much more rational and sublime the text of Brahmah, which supposes the Deity's voluntary creation, or permission of evil, for the exaltation of a race of beings, whose goodness as free agents could not have existed without being endued with the contrasted, or opposite powers of doing evil.' 116

Both of the ideas which Holwell here contrasts (that god creates evil of necessity, and that he creates it willingly) appear frequently in Hindu mythology and are explicitly compared by the Hindus, as we have seen from E. M. Forster's conversation with the Maharajah. Together, these two ideas may be contrasted with the belief that god is not responsible for the origin of evil at all (that the demons are responsible for this), a concept which also occurs in Hinduism, though less often. Not only is the first view more prevalent, but it is frequently and facilely combined by the Hindus with the second: because god recognizes that evil is necessary, he willingly creates it. The contrast which Holwell recognizes in moral terms -- that goodness within an individual only becomes valuable when it is pitted against evil -- is recognized by the Hindus in cosmological terms: that the good in the universe is only valuable because it exists together with evil.

The Hindu view of the interaction between good and evil has caused much debate, a great deal of it uninformed and biased, and little of it useful to the present study. Mircea Eliade once noted that in India there is not only no conflict between good and evil, but there is in fact a confusion between them;[117] Eliot attributed this tendency to the nature of pantheism, which 'finds it hard to distinguish and condemn evil'.[118] Statements of this kind are confusing, for Hinduism and Buddhism

are concerned more with ignorance than with sin, valuing virtue only as an adjunct to knowledge, by means of which the philosophic saint rises above both good and evil,[119] and most Indian religions view suffering rather than sin as the fault in the world.[120]

It is, nevertheless, possible to ascertain the Indian concept of evil (pāpa), and to note how ideas of sin do in fact begin to colour it in the later texts, though it remains closely tied to the concepts of ignorance, death, and misfortune that we associate more with suffering than with sin. Given this concept of evil, it is possible to see how the Hindu view of the universe as an organic whole which contains, unmodified and unsynthesized, the oppositions of good and evil will lead to a belief in the inextricable connexion between the forces of divinity and the powers of evil. In this context, it is not surprising that evil should be regarded as essential and that the gods should seek to include it in their creation.

In justifying the wickedness of kings, Arjuna argues, 'I do not see any creature in this world that lives without injuring others; animals live upon animals, the stronger on the weaker. . . . No act is entirely devoid of evil.'[121] This doctrine is further developed and more specifically related to the gods in a Tantric hymn describing Śiva's cosmic dance: 'By the stamping of your feet you imperilled the safety of the earth and scattered the stars of the heavens. But you dance in order to save the world. Power is perverse [vāmaiva vibhutā].'[122] The commentator explains that Śiva behaves in the manner of a king protecting his subjects, an allusion to the view that, if a village is troubled by robbers or demons, the king's army will protect it, but the village will

then have to tolerate the evils resulting from the presence of the army itself (rape, pilfering, etc.).

This argument, that god is forced to commit evil, appears in Hinduism with the corollary that god does not wish to avoid evil. Sin is necessary for the balance of earthly society; it is necessary for there to be Untouchables in order for there to be Brahmins; purity depends upon impurity. Goddesses of disease and filth are worshipped throughout India despite their impurity; the Hindus recognize the necessity of coming to terms with evil. Within this wide scope, each member of the society has his svadharma, his own particular role to fulfil, and of necessity some of these must be evil roles (the slaughterer of animals, the presser of seeds) the benefits of whose labours are enjoyed by castes too pure to indulge in them themselves. As these tasks are necessary, they are not considered to conduce to damnation. On the contrary, it is only by abandoning one's own impure svadharma in aspiration to a higher way of life that, in the classical Hindu system, the individual is damned.

The doctrine of svadharma raises certain interesting problems when applied to the demons, as we have seen. A striking illustration of this idea may be seen in the myth of the rākṣasa Sukeśin, who abandoned his demon dharma of rape and plunder in order to devote himself to the higher goals of truth and compassion; for forsaking his appointed role, he was cast down from the sky by the envious sun god.[123] Yet this myth occupies a turning point in the moral evolution of the concept of evil. Though the demon is weakened by

his violation of the strict caste law, nevertheless the higher ideal of an absolute morality appears as well. This is due to the influence of the medieval bhakti movement which subordinated caste law and ritualism to the power of a direct bond of love between the worshipper and his god. Thus, Sukeśin is eventually vindicated and restored to heaven in spite of his admitted lapse. In a similar story in another text, the theory of svadharma, though clearly stated, is again challenged:

> There was a yakṣa named Harikeśa, who devoted himself to asceticism, dharma, and Śiva, behaving like a Brahmin. His father said to him, 'This is not the behaviour of our family. We are cruel by nature, harmful flesh eaters and scavengers. Your behaviour is not what the creator instructed you to do.' But Harikeśa went to Benares, where he performed asceticism until Śiva accepted him as a great yogi, one of Śiva's own hosts. 124

Traditional ritualism continued to exert its power alongside the new devotional movement, however, and the earlier, more orthodox doctrine of svadharma, together with its corollary of the necessary role of evil in the universe, prevails in most of the Purāṇas. The creator purposely incorporated evil into his world: 'In order to distinguish actions, the Creator separated virtue and sin [dharmādharma] and made the pairs of opposites such as happiness and unhappiness [sukhaduḥkha]. And whatever he assigned to each at the first creation, truth or falsehood [ṛtānṛta], that quality clung spontaneously to it.'[125] The Viṣṇu Purāṇa contains a key passage in which the evil which is an essential part of god results in the basic heresy -- the denial of the Vedas:

> That portion of Viṣṇu which is one with Death [Kāla] caused (created beings) to fall, creating a small seed of adharma from which darkness and desire were born, and passion was brought about. . . . Those in whose minds the seed of evil [pāpabindu] had been placed in the first creation, and in whom it increased, denied Vedic sacrifices and reviled the gods and the followers of the Vedas. They were of evil souls and evil behaviour. 126

The Liṅga Purāṇa also attributes to god the explicit wish to make the universe ambivalent by means of heresy as well as evil fortune (Alakṣmī):

> Nārāyaṇa [Viṣṇu] made the universe twofold [dvaidham] for the sake of delusion. He made the Brahmins, Vedas, and the goddess Śrī, and this was the best portion. Then he made Alakṣmī and the lowest men, outside the Vedas, and he made adharma. When the goddess Jyeṣṭhā appeared from the ocean, the sage Mārkaṇḍeya said, 'Jyeṣṭhā is Alakṣmī'. She must dwell far from where men follow the path of the Vedas and worship Nārāyaṇa and Rudra. But she may enter wherever husband and wife quarrel, wherever there are people who delight in heretical practices and are beyond the pale of the Vedas, wherever there are atheists and hypocrites, Buddhists or Jains. 127

This myth accounts for the presence of wicked people on earth by making them 'food' for the goddess Jyeṣṭhā in the usual manner, but it also accounts for the heresies of Buddhism and Jainism; or, to be more precise, the myth implies that heretics exist as part of the 'other' portion of the universe created by Nārāyaṇa, for he created the Vedas and so he had to create people beyond the pale of the Vedas. In a similar manner, Hinduism describes the origin of the 'left-hand' Visaraga sect: 'Formerly Prajāpati, in order to conceal (the true) teaching [upadeśagūhanārtham], created the branch of the Visaragas, which deluded even the sages, let alone ordinary men.'[128] No motivation is given for Prajāpati's act, but the corpus of myths of heresy can supply any one of a number of possibilities, perhaps the most basic of which is the simple belief that evil and heresy are as necessary as good and orthodoxy. The belief that the gods wish men to be heretics is basic to the mythology; thus it is stated that pleasure in (the company of) heretics and delight in their

arguments arise in those fools who have fallen into the ocean of Viṣṇu's power of delusion.[129] Only fools will fall in, but the ocean of delusion is the work of god.

10. The necessity of death

The mythology of death plays an essential role in the Hindu literature of the origin of evil and heresy. This is evident from the fact that the two groups of myths, those dealing with evil/heresy and those with death, follow identical sets of patterns, sharing the same recurrent motifs, offering the same solutions to the different problems posed. Time is the corrupting factor in many of the myths of the origin of evil, and the word kāla, which means 'time' in the Ṛg Veda and the Brāhmaṇas, later comes to mean 'destructive time' or 'death' in the Mahābhārata. In the absence of death, the earth becomes overburdened and men must be killed; a similar burden afflicts the earth when it is overcrowded with men who are either excessively good or excessively evil and must be made into heretics in order that the earth may be relieved. The origin of evil is inextricably associated with the appearance of sexual desire and hunger; death is also closely connected with these motifs, for sexual procreation produces the increase in population that death must abate (and sexual sin provides the means by which death may be introduced), while hunger is both an obvious natural cause of death and a condition that death (of part of the population) alleviates for mankind in general. In this context, sexual desire and hunger are the primary causes of the overburdening or overcrowding of the earth.

The corpus of death myths is further connected with evil and heresy by the moral element which recurs within it. The gods inflict death upon mankind either out of recognition of its necessity or through less laudable motives of jealousy and inadequacy. Death is explicitly regarded as an evil in many myths, even in those which accept the need for the existence of the oppositional pair of life and death in an ambivalent cosmos. Death both results from man's evil (in those myths in which man is denied immortality as punishment for having committed some sin) and prevents further evil (in those myths in which the threat of death is regarded as the greatest inducement to morality on earth).

That the possibility of the absence of death was considered, though inevitably rejected, is evident from a myth which appears first in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa:

> The gods feared the year, Death, Prajāpati; they performed various rituals in order to become immortal, but in vain. They went on toiling [śrāmyantas] and Prajāpati taught them the proper ritual to perform, and they became immortal. Then Death [Mṛtyu] said to the gods, 'Surely in this way all men will become immortal. Then what will be my share [bhāga]?' The gods said that the body would not be immortal, and would be the share of death, but the rest of the man who had achieved immortality through knowledge [vidyā] or ritual acts [karman] would become immortal. 130

In this myth, differentiation into dualities takes place on several levels. The year is at first both creator (Prajāpati) and destroyer (Mṛtyu); when these functions become divided, Prajāpati teaches the gods how to overcome Mṛtyu. Yet a portion must be given to Mṛtyu, and so creatures are divided into mortal bodies and immortal spirits (the latter achieved by yet another duality -- knowledge and ritual). The

'share' that Death, the destroyer, claims may be seen as an early form of the 'share' that another destroyer, Rudra, claims in other Brāhmaṇa myths, the same share that the non-creative aspect of Rudra/Śiva -- Sthāṇu -- rejects in later mythology.

A later attitude to the possible absence of death appears in a Mahābhārata myth:

> Once, the gods were preparing a sacrifice, and they made Yama [the god of the dead] their slaughterer of sacrificial animals [śāmitṛ]. Then Yama did not kill anyone among creatures, and so creatures became numerous. Therefore the gods went to Prajāpati and said, 'We are frightened by this increase in men, and we have come to you for refuge.' Prajāpati said, 'What fear have you from men, since you are all immortals? A mortal can be no danger to you.' The gods said, 'Mortals have become immortals, and there is no distinction, because of the lapse of death. Therefore, wishing for such a distinction, we have come here.' Prajāpati said, 'Since Yama is engaged in the sacrifice, men are not dying. When he has completed his ritual, there will be death [antakāla] for them.' Then the gods went back to the sacrifice. 131

The explicit need for a 'distinction' between the two groups is a manifestation of caste ethics -- that there should be a hierarchy -- as well as of the jealousy of the gods. The problem of death is not really faced in this myth, since the absence of Yama is regarded as merely a temporary episode, but the problem arising in the absence of

death is the same as that which appears before death has ever been created at all: there is overcrowding.

A later version of this myth appears in the Brahma Purāṇa, which offers a more complex set of problems and solutions:

> Once the sages made Yama their slaughterer of sacrificial animals. No one died then except those animals slaughtered for the sacrifice; mortality became immortality. Heaven became empty and the mortal world, ignored by death, became overcrowded. The gods said to the demons, 'Destroy the sacrifice of the sages'. The demons attacked the sacrifice, but the sages begged Śiva to help them, and he himself completed their sacrifice. The sages then said to the gods, in anger, 'Since you sent the demons to destroy our sacrifice, let the evil demons be your enemies.' And thenceforth the demons became the enemies of the gods. 132

In this myth, evil for the gods originates in the absence of death; supposedly there were no evil demons until the gods sent them to interfere with the sages. The opposition between gods and mortals in the Mahābhārata myth is here replaced by the opposition between sages and demons. Nothing is said of the return of Yama to the world, and the solution for the problem of overcrowding is not the primary, simple one of the Mahābhārata (to destroy everyone) but the later one typical of the Purāṇas (to destroy their virtue, i. e. to destroy the sacrifice which makes them immortal by 'distracting' Yama). Even this temporary solution is rejected, however, for Śiva completes the sacrifice, and thus ultimately the original problem of overcrowding is forgotten, and the machinations of the gods backfire on them, leaving them with (supposedly) still increasing mankind as well as demons who harass not mankind but the gods themselves. This confusion arises in part from the Paurāṇika's ambivalent attitude to the role of sacrifice; on the one hand, the gods

depend upon the sacrifice (which they themselves perform in the earlier version and which the demons, their arch enemies, obstruct) but on the other hand we find the later attitude that the sacrifice, by producing unusual virtue in the sacrificer, threatens the gods. This ambivalence is enhanced by the ambiguous position of the sacrificers -- sages who are semi-divine, mediators between gods and men.

Another myth which begins with the absence of death among mankind but then changes its focus to the demons appears in the Mahābhārata:

> Formerly, in the Golden Age, when there was no fear or danger, the eternal primeval god (Adideva) acted as Yama, and while he did so no one died, but people continued to be born. Then all creatures increased, birds and cows and horses and wild animals, and men increased by the millions. Thus there arose a dangerous crowd, and the Earth was excessively burdened and sought refuge with Viṣṇu. He said, 'Do not worry. I will see to it that you are lightened.' Then he dismissed her and he became a boar who grasped the Earth with his tusks and raised her up. A great trembling arose, frightening the gods, who sought refuge with Brahmā; he reassured them that there was no danger from the demons, and they went home. 133

The original premise that death is put hors de combat by officiating at the sacrifice is here slightly modified: another, more merciful, god takes the place of death. Another basic premise -- that the overcrowding is caused by an excess of people in general -- is here modified to imply the secondary motif, that virtuous people cause this excess; this is implicit both in the statement that the myth takes place in the Golden Age, when all men are still virtuous, and in the statement that Yama found no one to kill. (The other possible modification, that an excess of wicked people is causing the trouble, is suggested by the gods' fear that demons are responsible for the disturbance of the Earth, but this possibility is dismissed by Brahmā.) Like the first

Mahābhārata myth of death, this text ultimately takes the form of a mere episode resolved, one assumes, by a return to the previous state (i.e., Yama takes over from Ādideva, just as he resumes his official duties in the other text) rather than by a reconsideration of the nature of death.

The confusion between the problem of an excess of people in general and an excess of extremely virtuous or evil people causes the pattern of this myth to be used for a related series which expresses the necessity of punishment rather than of death. This correlation is apparent from the earliest myths of the origin of evil, in which the rod of punishment (daṇḍa), wielded by a king, becomes necessary when the evil nature of man first becomes apparent. Another link is furnished by the myths in which the 'punishment' of the evil demons is offered as a solution for the overcrowding of earth. One myth of punishment begins, like several myths of death cited above, with Brahmā's involvement in a sacrifice:

> This is how punishment arose for the sake of protecting the moral rules [vinaya] of people, for punishment is the eternal soul of dharma. Brahmā created by means of a sacrifice, and because of the prevalence of happiness [hṛṣṭarūpapracāratvāt], punishment vanished. A confusion [saṃkara] arose among men: there was nothing that was to be done or not to be done [naiva kāryaṃ na cākāryaṃ], nothing to be eaten or not to be eaten. Creatures harmed one another and grabbed from one another like dogs snatching at meat; the strong killed the weak, and there were no moral bounds [nirmaryādam]. Then Brahmā said to Śiva, 'You should have pity on the good people [sādhu] and let there not be this confusion [saṃkara] (of good and bad).' Then Śiva created punishment, which was his own self, and he created Yama and Mṛtyu. [134]

This myth seems to imply that the world cannot function when there is nothing but happiness, that even in the Golden Age the law of the fishes (the strong eating the weak) will prevail and men will harm one another unless punishment is introduced to protect the good from the wicked. But it also implies that unqualified happiness is undesirable in itself, that

there must be discrimination between oppositions, for when there is nothing to be done or not to be done the universe cannot function. The word used for this indiscriminate mixture of moral elements (saṃkara) is the term often used to denote intermixture of castes, the cardinal Hindu sin, and clearly concepts of hierarchy are in play here: there must be punishment not only to prevent evil, but to separate good and evil. That Śiva creates Yama and Mṛtyu immediately after punishment has been established follows both from the interaction of the two mythologies and the fact that Yama is the overseer of the dharma and adharma of the universe.[135] It is in fear of Yama's punishment that all creatures follow dharma.[136] (Similarly, the Buddha remarked that when men live for more than a hundred thousand years they forget about birth, old age, and death and would therefore not be interested in salvation, though he also remarked that when men live less than a hundred years they become exceedingly corrupt.[137]) Thus death and punishment are necessary for the preservation of virtue among mankind.

11. The evil of death: the Sthāṇu myths

Although normally Brahmā is the creator and Śiva the destroyer, there is a series of myths in which their roles are superficially reversed, and Brahmā prevents Śiva from creating immortals.[138] In several myths of this group, it is at once evident that Śiva must cease creating immortals in order to avoid the familiar problem of overcrowding:

> Brahmā began to create by meditation, but darkness and delusion overcame him. His mind-born sons, all passionless yogis, devoted to Śiva, did not want to create, so Brahmā performed asceticism, but still he was unable to create. He begged Śiva to help him, and Śiva agreed, but the creatures that Śiva made were immortals like

> himself, and they filled the universe. Brahmā said, 'Do not create this sort of creatures, but make them subject to death'. Śiva said, 'I will not do that. Create such mortals yourself, if you wish.' Then Śiva turned away from creation and remained with his seed drawn up in chastity from that day forth. 139

The traditional roles of Śiva and Brahmā are maintained in this myth: Śiva refuses to create in part because Brahmā explicitly asks him to refrain, but in part because he is himself by nature an ascetic; this is evident from the early references to the passionless sons of Brahmā who, in their devotion to Śiva, disobey Brahmā's command to create, just as Śiva himself does, in effect.

The ascetic nature of Śiva's withdrawal from creation is stressed in another version of this myth, in which Śiva also rejects the anthropomorphic aspect of creation -- his wife:

> Brahmā performed asceticism and created Rudra, the androgyne, who divided himself as Brahmā commanded him to do. Dakṣa then took the female half of the androgyne to be his daughter, and he gave her to Rudra. Brahmā said to Rudra, 'Śiva, lord of Satī, perform creation', but Rudra said, 'I will not perform creation. Do it yourself, and let me destroy. I will become Sthāṇu ['The Pillar', i.e. an ascetic].' And thus having commanded Brahmā to create, Śiva went to mount Kailāsa with Satī. 140

Thus the basic meaning of the Sthāṇu form of Śiva is that of death. Śiva has his own role, his svadharma, which is to destroy, and he commands Brahmā to follow his (Brahmā's) svadharma, to create.

This simple division, however, is reversed in a series of myths which recognize the necessity of an ambiguous, mortal creation:

> Brahmā asked Rudra to create, and the three-eyed Rudra created perfect hosts just like himself, free from old age and death, three-eyed, immortal. Brahmā then stopped him, saying, 'Let not creation be thus, free from old age and death. Only that creation which is composed of good and evil [śubhāśubha] is enjoined [praśasyate].' And so Rudra ceased creating and became Sthāṇu. 141

The implication that Rudra's creatures are too numerous or too powerful (i.e. immortals, like Rudra) frightens Brahmā, who introduces death. Śiva's refusal to create may also be interpreted as superficially destructive, but this is not the case; for, by refusing to create mortals instead of immortals, Śiva indulges in a kind of preventive euthanasia, a reversal of the reversal, so that he ends up creative after all. That he has the welfare of mankind at heart in refusing to create mortal creatures is apparent; yet, one version of this myth returns to the premise of Śiva's destructive role and justifies this as a favour to mankind: 'Out of compassion, Rudra gives final peace to all creatures, effortlessly, for he gives passionlessness and release.'[142]

Usually, however, Śiva does not wish to inflict the sorrows of mortality upon his creatures: when Śiva creates beings free of death and passion, Brahmā tries in vain to make them subject to birth and death, and Śiva withdraws from creation; when Brahmā asks Śiva to create beings subject to birth, death, and fear, Śiva smiles in pity and says, 'I will not create beings subject to death and fear, devoid of glory, in the power of <u>karma</u>, sunk in an ocean of misery. Create such miserable creatures yourself.'[143] In all of these myths, however, Śiva's withdrawal from mortal creation is only made possible because it is understood that Brahmā will perform this role; each, by following his own <u>svadharma</u>, ensures that the universe is supplied with both mortality and immortality; each of the oppositions must be preserved. This is evident from those versions of the Sthāṇu myth in which, when for some reason Brahmā's creatures fail to increase (a common inverse of

the 'overcrowded earth' motif), Śiva immediately comes to his assistance and participates in creation.[144]

An interesting variant of the Sthāṇu myth appears in a text which introduces a moral consideration of the nature of the creatures to be killed: their fault is not merely that they are immortal or too numerous, but that they are a threat to Brahmā, like the demons. This version incorporates the concept of the Rudras as dangerous or evil creatures, a characterization which appears in other myths of death:

> Brahmā created the mind-born sages, who remained celibate and refused to create. Brahmā then created Rudra from his anger, and he gave him various wives and told him to become a Prajāpati and to create. Rudra created beings like himself, who swallowed up the universe on all sides, burning up the skies with their blazing eyes. Prajāpati was frightened and he said, 'No more of these creatures. Perform asceticism for the sake of all creatures and create the universe as it was before.' Śiva agreed, and he went to the forest to perform asceticism. 145

Brahmā does not object to immortality in general in this text, but merely to the creation of immortals who threaten to upset the balance of the universe.

These two objections are combined in yet another version of the Sthāṇu myth:

> Brahmā began the process of creation, but he succeeded only in producing adharma, delusion, suffering, death, disease, old age, sorrow, and anger. These offspring were miserable, and they had no wives or children. Then Brahmā said to Rudra, 'Create creatures', and Rudra mentally created creatures like himself, carrying skulls and drinking Soma, their seed drawn up in chastity. They had thousands of eyes and were of such terrible gaze that one could not look upon them, for they were great ascetics with great fiery power [tejas]. They were the Rudras, who devour oblations. When Brahmā saw them he asked Śiva to create instead beings who would be subject to death, for, said Brahmā, 'Creatures free from death will not undertake actions'. Śiva refused and remained thenceforth as Sthāṇu, his seed drawn up in chastity. 146

The myth begins with the familiar episode of Brahmā's accidental creation of adharma and all the subsequent evils, including death. Although he is not satisfied with this creation, Brahmā nevertheless objects even more to Rudra's immortals (who are destructive heretics as well -- skull-bearing Kāpālikas). Yet Brahmā reiterates the need for an ambiguous creation: 'Creatures free from death will not undertake actions.' Only the threat of death compels creatures to undertake actions and to remain virtuous. Moreover, just as both mortality and immortality are necessary, so are the moral oppositions: 'Only that creation which is composed of good and evil is enjoined.'

In this way, Brahmā and Śiva combine forces to produce the necessary balance in the universe. Mortality is necessary on one level, but it can be transcended on another (just as the doctrine of svadharma itself can be transcended by bhakti): Brahmā's creatures must die, but those who are devoted to Śiva are freed from the wheel of rebirth. For the motif of overcrowding must be understood in the context of the Hindu universe, which is closed, visualized as an egg, so that its total contents can never actually increase. No one is ever destroyed, either, for the belief in reincarnation allows only a kind of recycling; it is merely when temporary crowds arise in certain places (notably on earth, or in heaven) that death or corruption must be introduced in those places.

In keeping with these views of the relativity of death, certain texts emphasize the cyclic nature of the universe, the manner in which periodic creation and dissolution (pravṛtti and nivṛtti) alternate just as Brahmā and Śiva alternate in their tasks. This concept underlies

another version of the Sthāṇu myth which appears in the Mahābhārata in two closely related texts. It begins with the premise of an amoral necessity for death (i.e., a dangerous overcrowding brought about by an excess of people whose only flaw is that they do not die) but soon introduces moral judgments regarding not mortals but Death itself. (The primary version will be cited, and where the secondary version differs from it, the latter -- or alternative readings -- will be placed in parentheses):[148]

> Long ago, Brahmā produced creatures who increased greatly but did not die. There was no space anywhere for people to breathe in the triple world. (When Brahmā saw that the universe was unrestrained [asaṃhṛtam], he began to worry about destroying or restraining it [saṃhara].) A fire arose from his anger and began to burn the universe on all sides. (He enveloped earth and heaven in a halo of flames and burnt the whole universe, killing everything.) Then Śiva, in the form of Sthāṇu, came to Brahmā and said, 'My duty is to create creatures, for these were created by you.' (Sthāṇu, the lord of those who wander at night, sought refuge with Brahmā and said, 'You have made an effort to create creatures, but now in anger you are burning them. Your fiery power [tejas] is burning everyone. Do not get angry at them. When I see this, I am filled with pity. Have mercy.') Brahmā said, 'I am not angry, nor do I desire that there should not be creatures. But because I wish for the lightness (or welfare) of the earth, I have brought about this destruction. (This anger has entered me). The goddess Earth, oppressed by her burden, is sinking into the water, and she begged me to bring about a universal destruction. But since I do not understand in my mind how to destroy all these increased [vṛddhā] (measureless [aprameyā]) beings, anger entered me.' Sthāṇu said, 'Have mercy in this destruction and do not get angry or destroy all creatures. You have burnt them all to ashes, and those who have been destroyed will never again return. Therefore restrain your tejas and think of some other means for the welfare of all creatures, so that these creatures may return. (By your favour, let the universe be threefold: future, past, and present. Turn back your tejas and let it subside.)' Then Brahmā restrained his tejas in himself and created pravṛtti and nivṛtti. And from him as he restrained the fire of his anger there appeared a black woman with red garments and red eyes, and Brahmā called her Mṛtyu and told her to destroy everyone.

This first half of the myth combines (or confuses) two related motifs: god kills men either because they have increased in numbers (as is usually the case) or increased in years (i.e., aged, ready to die);

vṛddha can mean either of the two, but the secondary text substitutes for this the word aprameya, which can have only the former meaning. The latter meaning (aged in years) appears in the tribal mythology of death, but the former is far more likely and fits the context better. At several points the myth implies that death comes about because of some shortcoming or mistake of god: Brahmā does not know how to destroy things properly, and though he at first denies that anger has entered him, he later admits that it has. Moreover, he expressly states that he does not wish to do what he is doing, and finally, when he does restrain his destructive tejas, it is not wholly destroyed but is merely transferred to someone else -- a woman, as usual.

The second half of the myth introduces several new but related motifs:

> Mṛtyu wept and said, 'How could you create a woman such as I am? How could I perform such a cruel task? I fear adharma. Instruct me in some righteous action. I will not kill sinless [anāgasa] children or old people, dear ones and sons and brothers and mothers and fathers. Evil-doers go to the house of Yama when they die. (Let me not go to the dwelling of Yama.) Have mercy on me and let me perform asceticism.' Brahmā said, 'Mṛtyu, you were created by me for the destruction of creatures. Do it, and do not worry, for you cannot do otherwise. (You will be without blame in the world.)' Mṛtyu did not agree, but stood there in silence. (She determined not to engage in destruction, for she desired the welfare of all creatures). Brahmā smiled and restrained his anger, and Mṛtyu went away and performed asceticism. (She satisfied Brahmā with her dharma, and he said to her, 'Why are you performing this excessive asceticism? She said, 'I will not kill creatures. I fear adharma, and so I have performed asceticism.') Brahmā said, 'There will be no adharma in you, Mṛtyu. Creatures oppressed with diseases will not blame you. The tears you shed will be diseases which will oppress men when their time has come. At the time of death, you will cause creatures to be attached to anger and desire, and thus you will escape adharma. (Yama, who is eternal dharma, will assist you, and so will his assistants, the diseases.' She said, 'If it must be so, then grant me this: let greed, anger, envy, wrath, malice, delusion, shamelessness and cruelty split the body into separate parts.' Brahmā said,

> 'Thus it will be. Your dharma will be in the killing of creatures. Adharma will kill those of vicious conduct. Therefore purify yourself, and abandon desire and anger, and kill living creatures.') Since she feared being cursed if she refused the task of being death, she agreed. And so at the time of death she deludes creatures with desire and anger and kills them, and the diseases born of her tears destroy the bodies of men. (At the time of death, she abandons desire and anger and, unattached, she takes away the breath of creatures that breathe.) At the proper time, she kills people. (At the proper time, just as the Destroyer herself [saṃharitrī] takes away the breath of creatures, creatures all kill themselves, and it is not Mṛtyu, with her staff in her hand, who kills them.)

Death is a woman here, which is unusual in Sanskrit mythology, but she behaves like Alakṣmī, Jyeṣṭhā, and other female personifications of evil. Her concern for the wickedness of her assigned task is not dismissed, as it is in other texts of this nature, with a simple reference to the doctrine of *svadharma*, though Brahmā does use this as one of his arguments when he says, 'Your dharma will be in the killing of creatures'. Like Śiva, Mṛtyu wishes to perform asceticism instead of becoming involved in destruction, but, unlike him, she is not allowed to do this, for there is no one else to assume the role she wishes to reject, as Brahmā assumes Śiva's role. The relationship between Mṛtyu and Yama is a confused one, and the two texts differ on this point. Sometimes Mṛtyu seems to fear that Yama will punish her for her own sins; sometimes she seems to state that there is no need for her, as Yama already carries off evil-doers; and sometimes Yama appears as her assistant. A similar confusion is apparent in her relationship with disease: sometimes it is said that she creates diseases, but elsewhere their role seems to be to separate her from the blame of death; just as Brahmā has transferred to her his own guilt of destruction, so she transfers it to the diseases, who kill people either by her command or in her stead.

The final moral problem appears in the manner in which the two texts differ on Mṛtyu's relationship with desire and anger. The primary text, continuing the metaphor of transference and the series of measures by which Mṛtyu is expiated of the guilt of killing, states that she fills creatures with desire and anger at the time of death so that she herself is free of adharma. Thus she corrupts them before she kills them, making them deserving of death, so that she avoids the sin of killing virtuous people. (This is the basic motif of the myths of heresy.) The secondary text, however, simply states that if she frees herself of her own desire and anger, and kills people emotionlessly, unattached, she will commit no sin; this is a more sophisticated conception than that of the primary text, one which also appears in the _Bhagavad Gītā_, where Kṛṣṇa justifies killing: as long as one does not kill while under the influence of desire and anger, there is no sin in it. These discrepancies demonstrate the confusion in the Hindu attitude to the problem of the _svadharma_ of killing and the moral necessity of death itself.

The disinclination of Mṛtyu to perform her own _svadharma_ appears in another text in which Mṛtyu is, as is more usual, a god rather than a goddess:

> When Brahmā had created the Rudras and they asked him for a livelihood, he gave them Kāma as their assistant, and Adharma.[149] The son of Adharma was Mṛtyu, and Adharma told Mṛtyu to kill people, but Mṛtyu said, 'How can you tell me to hurt people? How can I perform such an evil action?' Adharma said, 'There will be no sin in you if you hurt people. You will direct old age, disease, fever and the other ills which I have created, and by those means people will die. Destruction is your nature, and you will put auspicious diseases into all bodies.' Then Mṛtyu took his army of Injury, Quarrels, etc. and wandered among men. 150

Here again Mṛtyu is freed of the responsibility for death by transferring it to the actual diseases which are the technical cause of death. Yet the element of evil still clings to Death itself, for he is told that destruction is his nature, and in this text Adharma incarnate (whom the female Mṛtyu so fears in the *Mahābhārata* text) assigns the task in place of Brahmā.

The Sthāṇu myths thus demonstrate a continuous interplay between an absolute and a relative morality in the attitude toward death. The more basic Hindu view is the relative view: that, just as each person has his own *svadharma*, so there must be a god whose *svadharma* is destruction. This view is, however, constantly challenged by a more absolute morality which questions the necessity of death and clearly associates it with evil. Although in the classical Sanskrit texts this view appears to be secondary and later, it is obviously a very primitive attitude, and it emerges far more often in Indian tribal mythology, which is not so closely tied to hierarchical Hindu concepts of moral relativity.

12. The tribal mythology of the origin of death

It is not surprising that many of the classical themes of the Sanskrit texts occur in the myths recorded by anthropologists in India, since these tribes have a strong Hindu heritage. The differences, however, are equally significant, and many of the myths seem to be more similar to those of tribes in other countries than they are to the Purāṇic corpus. In the final balance, I think the Hindu, or at least the Indian, element prevails, and it is worthwhile to consider these myths alongside those of the Sanskrit texts.

The motif of overcrowding is basic here as it is to the Sanskrit corpus. As Verrier Elwin remarks, 'The notion that if nobody died the world would become overcrowded and unable to support the population is widely distributed.'[151] A typical example of such a myth appears among the Bhuiya:

> '[At first there was one couple.] So long as they were alive, no one died, no one could die. People increased in number so much that there was no room for them to live. [Mahaprabhu sent a centipede to bite the couple; they died, and henceforth there was death.]' 152

A slightly more elaborate version of this myth is told among the Rengma Nagas:

> '[At first there was no day and night, and the dead lived in the same world as the living. God had to divide day and night, so that the dead would work at night, and he moved the dead] to another world, too, for when the dead and the living lived in the same world they were so numerous that there was danger of there not being enough land . . . . ' 153

The Hindu belief in the need for differentiation of all kinds, between day and night as well as mortal and immortal, the need for a separate place for each of the two groups, combines here with the more basic idea of overcrowding.

As in the classical corpus, this basic motif is often embroidered with the secondary motif of corruption: when death becomes necessary, sin enters the world. Among the Bondo, this corruption is spontaneous, but it involves food and women, as usual, and a snake, as in Eden:

> '[At first there was no death, and there was not enough room. The gods sent a snake to bite a child, who died. The mother roasted the snake and ate it, and henceforth there was witchcraft.' 154

In another Bondo myth, the woman is omitted but god personally ensures the destruction of man:

'[At first there was no death, and the earth was overcrowded. Mahaprabhu sent mangoes. Men ate them and died.]' 155

From this text it is not clear whether the eating of the mango is considered a sin or merely a poisonous weapon, like the snake in the other Bondo myth. The element of corruption is unmistakable, however, in a similar Juang myth in which the gods take an even more active part:

'[At first there was no death, and there was not enough room. Mahapurub tricked a couple into eating their own children. Henceforth, there was death.]' 156

Yet another variant of the overcrowding motif seems explicitly to deny the Hindu doctrine of reincarnation:

'[The dead used to be cremated and then to return to earth. There were too many people.] At last Mahapurub cursed mankind so that no one should ever return from the dead.' 157

In the majority of these myths, the gods introduce death upon earth for a good reason, almost always for the benefit of mankind. A few myths of this type, however, offer no clear reason for the gods' decision to make men mortal:

'In the days when there was no death, Mahaprabhu came to the Middle World and said to the people, "Now you have got to begin dying." They replied, "We are willing, but we don't know how to." Bhagavan therefore died himself to teach men the way of death.' 158

Here, as in several of the tribal myths, one suspects the influence of Christian teachings; in Hindu mythology, as will be demonstrated below, the central doctrine is that man must not imitate the gods, that one of the primary purposes of mortality is precisely to separate and distinguish men from gods. (The reverse view, sanctioning imitation, and the idea of a saviour, also occur, but more rarely.)

Another tribal myth which offers no clear reason for god to introduce death on earth seems closer to the Sanskrit texts in its use of the basic motifs:

> 'In Koeli-Kachhar lived a Baiga and a Baigin. When Bihi Mata saw that nobody was dying she was troubled; she made from the dirt of her body a Sahis and his wife and sent them to the Baiga, saying, "Make a drum of earth and go and dance in front of these Baiga". The Baiga could not help it, he fell in love with the Sahis woman. Now, before that time, man and woman had never been to one another and that was why there was no death in the world. But when the Baiga met the Sahis woman alone in the forest there was an earthquake. Mother Earth trembled and the Baiga died immediately. From that time there has been death in the world.' 159

Not only the connexion between death and sex, but the particular manner in which the gods send a woman to corrupt the unoffending mortal, link this myth closely with those of the classical Hindu corpus. Other tribal myths seem also to imply that 'death comes into the world by the treachery of the gods',[160] that although man falls into mortality by committing offenses associated with sexual desire or hunger, it is the gods' wish that he should do so, perhaps because of the gods' jealousy of their special privileges:

> 'The Juang say that formerly men did not die because they did not sleep, and Bhagavan had to send a woman to sell them curds mixed with sleep-medicine. When they ate the curds, they slept and died.' 161

The suggestion of jealousy is present in the imagery, if not necessarily explicitly stated, in a myth of the Kond:

> '[In olden times, milk shrubs used to grow out of a rock.] Out of the rock came a boy and a girl. They drank the milk of the shrubs and kept themselves alive. At first this milk was sweet but when Burha Pinnu saw that men would drink the milk and live for ever he made it bitter. . . . They married and from them all human beings have come.' 162

Here the usual premise -- that when sexual procreation arises, death becomes necessary -- is reversed: only after death is introduced does sexual procreation become possible.

The belief that death arises due to some ill-will among the gods toward men is implicit in a Baiga myth:

> 'Bhagavan grew tired of the Baiga. He wanted other jīv [living creatures] in the world. But he could not kill Nanga Baiga. So he made the sensation of itching. . . . One day, when Nanga Baiga picked up a stick to scratch himself, Bhagavan turned it into a cobra. It bit him and he died. We would never have been subjects of death if Bhagavan had not tricked us. . . . [As Nanga Baiga died, he told his sons to boil and eat his flesh.] But Bhagavan, seeing what would happen if they ate their father's flesh, was frightened and came to them disguised as a sadhu. [He told them not to eat the flesh, for he said,] "But that is a great sin". They were afraid of the sadhu, so they did as he told them [and threw the flesh into the river]. . . . All the rest of Nanga Baiga's magic was lost to us through this Hindu god's deceit. Down the river, three women ate Nanga Baiga's flesh and became witches.' 163

The Hindu elements are actually recognized by the storyteller, who blames it all on 'this Hindu god's deceit'. The motif of eating the father's flesh in order to become immortal is a complete reversal of the Juang myth in which people become mortal by eating the flesh of their children. The connexion between sin and death is also reversed: Bhagavan tricks the Baiga into dying by telling them that it would be a sin for them to do that which he knows would give them immortality. In this way the elements of food tabu, wicked women, and snakes are rearranged to produce yet another explanation of the origin of death.

The Hindu belief that death and evil result from the gods' mistakes or weaknesses combines with the motifs of hunger, women, and death in a Gadaba myth which attributes death to the hunger of the gods:

'[At first there was no death. The gods could only eat human corpses, and so they were always hungry. God killed a child and made him into bread; he took the form of an old woman and gave the bread to men. They ate it and died.]' 164

The gods here behave both like rākṣasas (who eat corpses and are always hungry) and like the gods of the older layer of Hindu mythology, who depend upon men for their food (the sacrificial offering in those texts being replaced here by the actual physical bodies of the worshippers). The hunger of the gods leads to the hunger (i.e., the violation of a food tabu) of the worshippers, who are tricked into committing a grave sin. The pollution of death is more literally transferred in a Gond myth which displays many classical motifs:

'[The sixty-four Yoginis who lived in the underworld bathed in the sea once when they were menstruating. The shadow of a hawk fell on their blood and a girl was born. They gave her men as her food. But men at this time kept the Water of Immortality in a hollow bamboo and were able to return to life after the girl ate them. When she became hungry again she sent the sixty-four Yoginis to Mahadeo. He stole the Water of Immortality and there was death in the world.]' 165

The 'sin' usually committed by mortals -- the sexual procreation symbolized by menstruation -- appears here among the gods but is transferred so that only mankind becomes mortal. The 'stealing of the elixir' motif which is widepread in Indo-European mythology is here reversed: the elixir is stolen not by men from the gods, as it is usually, but by the gods from men.

The gods inflict mortality upon mankind not merely because of their own physical need but often for lesser motives of jealousy. A recurrent motif which appears in the Sanskrit myths of the origin of heresy and death is the belief that there must be death in order for Yama to keep his job:

'[At first there was no death or birth; everyone was immortal and there was no change. Mahaprabhu gave the throne of Jampur to Jam Raja [[Yama]] but he had nothing to do. Jam Raja complained, "What kind of a kingdom is this?" So Mahaprabhu took away immortality.]' 166

This simple fear of Yama's unemployment underlies a more complex Maria myth:

'In the Middle World no man died, and Mahapurub wondered how he was to get souls for his kingdom. . . . He had a son. He killed him and prepared to carry him out for burial. But when his wife heard of it, she ran weeping to the place and, taking her son from him, sat with the corpse in her lap. [He tricked her into imagining that she had become a witch and was eating the corpse.] She wept bitterly, but gave the body to Mahapurub. He buried it, and from that day, death has been in the world.' 167

Here it is god himself who needs 'souls for his kingdom', and his own son who provides both the first 'soul' and the instrument by which a woman (his wife) is deluded. The elaborate mirage created to make her 'think' that she had become a witch is typical of Sanskrit myths of seduction by the gods.

Another classical strain in the tribal mythology of death may be seen in a series of myths which recognize the positive aspects of mortality:

'[At first there was no death, but there was old age. The old men asked Mahapurub for death. Then everyone, even some young people, died.]' 168

The implication here is that death is a mixed blessing: it is better than old age, but it is not a blessing for the young. This concept, that death is good for some people but not for others (a concept supported by hierarchical Hindu social values) also occurs among the Toda:

'At first no Toda died. After a time a Piedr man died. . . . [at the funeral, some people wept, but others danced and sang. The goddess Teikirzi, seeing the people weeping] took pity and came to bring the dead man back to life. [But then she saw that some people seemed quite happy, and she decided not to raise the dead man. Then she decreed that at funerals some would weep, while others would be happy.]' 169

This ambivalent attitude toward death merges with the more sophisticated belief that death signifies union with god in a Juang myth:

> '[At first there was no death. Mahapurub thought, "None died, what shall I do?" There was a little boy whom all loved. Mahapurub had him killed and brought to him, but when Mahapurub's messenger saw how much everyone mourned for the little boy, he returned the child to earth.] But the boy had been very happy with Mahapurub. He had as much food as he could eat and there were always games to play. He had no desire to stay on earth. [He fasted until he died. Henceforth there was death in the world.]' 170

Hunger is, as usual, the weapon with which god inflicts death upon mankind; it appears first in the boy's wish to taste again the food of heaven and then in his fatal fast on earth. Although no reason is given for Mahapurub's initial desire to kill men, he behaves at first as he does in those myths in which he destroys men for his own benefit: he murders a much beloved child. Yet, perhaps under Christian influence but perhaps simply under the influence of the Hindu doctrine of blissful Release from the wheel of existence, god's act is interpreted as one of favour toward mankind.

A final 'classical' variation in tribal mythology may be seen in those myths in which a general increase in mankind leads to an increase in wicked men, who must be destroyed not only to relieve the earth of an intolerable burden but also to satisfy outraged morality:

> 'Originally all men were immortal, but they increased too much and fought among themselves and were wicked, till one day Khazangpa got angry and said, "Let all the men in the world die." . . . [Two survived and created the human race again.]' 171

The precise nature of this wickedness is suggested by a similar Kharia myth:

> '[Ponomosor, the Supreme Being, created the world and people.] They multiplied and soon there was a scarcity of food. [He gave them more food, but] men annoyed Ponomosor by cutting down fruit-bearing trees and he sent a flood to destroy them. [Again they displeased him and he sent a rain of fire, which only a few survived.]' 172

Hunger leads to the violation of a food tabu (the destruction of the magic trees); the flood and fire of universal destruction are sent in punishment. It will be apparent from this selected corpus that the origin of death and the origin of evil are as closely intertwined in Indian tribal mythology as they are in the Sanskrit texts.

IV. The Mythology of the Origin of Heresy

i. The Myths of Asceticism

1. The earth overburdened by virtuous men or sinners

Death and evil are closely related in a series of myths in which people become virtuous, heaven is full, and hell, the abode of Death, is empty. The philosophical ties between the two groups of myths are somewhat complicated by two conflicting strains in Indian thought: although the ages of man, and the virtues of man, decline steadily, it is nevertheless said that an individual may rise against the current, may better himself through successive rebirths until he is Released, even as, in a single life on earth, the individual-centred doctrine of *bhakti* may enable the worshipper to escape from the group-centred practice of *svadharma*. Given the Indian premise of a closed universe, in the form of a cosmic egg, there cannot be true overcrowding, but there is a dangerous bottleneck in heaven, an unbalanced distribution of population.

The crisis caused by an excess of virtuous people is a recurrence of the problem posed by the original Golden Age, but since it is the excess of virtuous people, not of immortals or people in general, that upsets the balance, heresy rather than death may be used to solve the problem. There are many early texts dealing with the basic disinclination of the gods to allow crowds in heaven. The *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* states that the gods, having conquered heaven, tried to make it unattainable by men; they drained the sacrificial sap and concealed themselves.[1]

Although this is a Vedic text, the gods' opposition to human virtue (more particularly, the gods' wish that men should not perform the sacrifice) results from the confusion of the gods' need for the Soma and their fear that men will use it to become immortal themselves. The more typical attitude of the earlier texts is explicitly stated in another Brāhmaṇa:

> The gods and men failed to subdue the people by kindnesses, and so the gods disappeared. Then Prajāpati said to them, 'Who will protect creatures now that you have vanished? People, unprotected, will be afflicted with adharma, and they will cease to make the offerings which are our livelihood.' Then the gods made a king to protect dharma. 2

Even when this ancient sacrificial bond between men and gods was reversed by the transition to a religion of asceticism and release by the sixth century B.C., it still continued to prevail in some orthodox texts of a much later period. Thus, the Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa presents the earlier viewpoint:

> 'In ancient times the mortals, being pious through the due performance of their duties, could go to heaven at the mere wish, and the gods also grew stronger by getting their due share in the sacrifices. Consequently, the Daiteyas and Asuras could not prevail upon the gods.' 3

In this text, it is the evil demons who eventually corrupt mankind. Demons who are excessively virtuous, however, are the prime target of the gods, for these demons present a double justification for their destruction: they are by definition 'bad' and they are too powerful (too virtuous). In fact, it is by their excess of virtue that the demons are often overcome. A Sanskrit aphorism points this out; the reference is to the myth in which Viṣṇu became incarnate as a dwarf and tricked the demon Bali into giving him back the universe which Bali had usurped: 'Because of his excess of generosity, Bali was captured. . . . Excess should always be avoided.' [4]

Far more often, however, the gods fear competition from virtuous men even more than they fear competition from 'evil' demons:

> Formerly, all creatures were virtuous, and by themselves they obtained divinity. Therefore the gods became worried, and so Brahmā created women in order to delude men. Then women, who had been virtuous [sādhvyo] became wicked witches [asādhvas...kṛtyā], and Brahmā filled them with wanton desires which they in turn inspired in men. He created anger, and henceforth all creatures were born in the power of desire and anger. 5

Elsewhere, Viṣṇu uses books of heresy to thin out the ranks of heaven:

> Formerly, the inhabitants of the earth all worshipped Viṣṇu and reached heaven, filling the place of Release [muktipada]. The gods said, 'How will creation take place, and who will dwell in hell?' Viṣṇu assured them that in the Kali age he would create a great delusion, causing Śiva to teach the śāstras of Naya Siddhānta and Pāśupata in order to delude those outside the path of the Vedas. 6

Just as the Kali age itself, and the subsequent universal destruction, are necessary to bring death to the entire world, so the heresies taught by Viṣṇu are necessary to prevent heaven from becoming overcrowded.

Other examples of this motif occur in several medieval texts, often in order to demonstrate the miraculous efficacy of some local shrine:

> The mere sight of Skanda was sufficient for anyone to reach the world of heaven, no matter how sinful he might be -- women, Śūdras, dog-cookers, all went to heaven. Learning of this, Yama went to Śiva and complained, 'Each of the gods has his own job to do; but now that even the most evil are transported to heaven by a sight of your son, leaving my kingdom of hell, what am I to do?' Śiva replied, 'The evil within these people is dispelled by the sight of the shrine. Those women and Śūdras and dog-cookers who act due to the force of karma from their previous lives have become purified even in evil actions.' Śiva then taught the doctrine of the unity of all the gods, and Yama departed. 7

This text stretches the doctrines of bhakti and pantheism to overrule svadharma. In other texts, the problem posed by Skanda's grace is overcome by the creation of Gaṇeśa, the second son of Śiva, who is usually worshipped as the remover rather than the inciter of

obstacles:

> 'Heaven became overcrowded by pilgrims. So Parvati made Ganesha, who created obstacles to men going to heaven by diverting their longing for pilgrimage to desire for the acquisition of wealth.' 8

In yet another version of this motif, Śiva's kindness creates the problem:

> 'Formerly, during the twilight that intervened between the Dwapara and Kali yugs, women, barbarians, Sudras, and other workers of sin, obtained entrance into heaven by visiting the celebrated temple of Someshwara [Śiva]. Sacrifices, ascetic practices, charitable gifts, and all the other prescribed ordinances ceased, and men thronged only to the temple of Shiva. Hence old and young, the skilled in the Vedas and those ignorant of them, and even women and Sudras, ascended to heaven, until at length it became crowded to excess. Then Indra and the gods, afflicted at being thus overcome by men, sought the protection of Shiva. . . . [They said,] "By thy favour heaven is pervaded by men, and we are nearly expelled from it. . . . Dharma Rajah [Yama], beholding the register of their good and evil deeds, remains silent, lost in astonishment. For the seven hells were most assuredly intended for their reception. . . ." [Śiva told them that he could do nothing, as it was his vow that caused the problem, but he advised them to seek help from Pārvatī.] She created Ganesa and said, "Desirous of your advantage have I created this being, who will occasion obstacles to men, and, deluding them, will deprive them of the wish to visit Somanatha [Someshwara], and thus shall they fall into hell." This heard, the gods were delighted, and returned to their own abodes, relieved from all fear of mankind.' 9

In an attempt to justify the behaviour of the gods, this text substitutes for the excessive virtue of the worshippers at Someshwara the motif of their excessive sin -- the fact that their release is automatic and that therefore Vedic rites are being neglected. But the element of jealousy and ill-will on the part of the gods re-emerges in the statements that the gods have almost been expelled from heaven and that they fear mankind.

The problems caused by the emptying of hell and the subsequent unemployment of Yama appear in a remarkably similar myth in Dostoevskii's *The Brothers Karamazov*, where it is referred to (by Mitya) as a 'folk legend' (*narodnaia legenda*):

> ' . . . When the Son of God was nailed on the Cross and died, He went straight down to hell from the Cross, and set free all sinners that were in agony. And the devil groaned, because he thought that he would get no more sinners in hell. And God said to him, then, "Don't groan, for you shall have all the mighty of the earth, the rulers, the chief judges, and the rich men, and shall be filled up as you have been in all the ages till I come again." Those were His very words. . . . ' 10

In a *Purāṇa* which originates in Assam, the holiness of this part of the world is extolled in a variant of the myth of overcrowding which accounts for the gods' inadvertent creation of a heresy:

> The people who worshipped in Assam [Kāmarūpa] obtained Release [nirvāṇa], or else they become servants of Śiva, and Yama could not impede them or lead them to his dwelling place. The messengers of Yama became frightened, and Yama complained to Brahmā, saying, 'People who bathe in Assam become Śiva's servants. I have no function there and I cannot prevent them. Restore the usual rules [ucitām nītim].' Viṣṇu said, 'Men in Assam are becoming gods or immortals, since Yama has no power. When Yama is cast off, there are no moral bounds [maryādā].' Śiva agreed, and he took his troops to Assam and began to drive everyone away.
> The sage Vasiṣṭha came there, and when he was harassed he became angry, and he cursed Śiva, saying, 'Since you have insulted me, you will be worshipped in the left-hand manner [i.e., by Tantrics]. And since these stupid troops wander like barbarians [Mlecchas], let barbarians dwell in Assam. And since Śiva tried to expel me, an ascetic Brahmin, as if I were a barbarian beyond the pale of the Vedas, let Śiva be dear to barbarians (or fond of barbarians [mlecchapriya]) and let him wear bones and ashes.' Then all the troops of Śiva became barbarians, and the Goddess became Tantric [vāmā] in Assam, and Śiva became fond of barbarians, and the Śaiva texts [āgamas] became devoid of the Vedas or the four classes. And in a moment, Assam came under the sway of Yama.
> Later, when Viṣṇu came there, the shrine was freed from the curse, but then, so that men and gods would not be able to worship there, Brahmā devised a means to hide the shrine. He flooded all the shrines in Assam, and by hiding them in this way he fulfilled the curse of Vasiṣṭha. 11

The gods' desire for the old-fashioned, orthodox religion is manifest in their statement that in the absence of Yama the usual rules and moral bounds do not function. Śiva does not intend to corrupt the worshippers, but his action ultimately has this effect and is performed in response to the threat which usually causes the gods to corrupt mankind (the insufficiency of sinners for Yama to rule). Later, when Brahmā destroys the shrines, this too is hastily attributed to Vasiṣṭha's curse rather than to the malice of the gods, but here again Vasiṣṭha plays the role of the 'ascetic Brahmin' whose powers cause the jealous gods to attempt to corrupt him. The pattern of the myth thus contradicts the explicit blameless 'intentions' of the gods and reveals their baser

motives. Just as, in the older layer, the gods are inadvertently weakened by the corruption of their worshippers (through the subsequent loss of sacrificial offerings), so Śiva is tarred by the brush of heresy when he destroys the sanctity of a shrine. Thus the gods' inept reaction to the sudden increase in virtuous mortals results in the creation of a considerable amount of evil on earth, evil which rebounds against the gods as well as against mortals.

In another variant of this theme, the gods take similar measures to destroy a holy place, but this time in vain:

> When Śiva had established the Sthāṇu-liṅga beside a lake, heaven was soon filled with men, because one gains heaven merely by looking at that liṅga. Then all the gods sought refuge with Brahmā, saying, 'Protect us, for we are in danger from men.' Then Brahmā said, 'Let the lake be filled with dust immediately.' Indra caused dust to rain for seven days, and he filled the lake as the gods asked him to do. But when Śiva saw this rain of dust, he held the liṅga and the sacred fig tree on the bank in his hand, and this liṅga and fig tree grant the wishes of anyone who performs the ritual here. And when the sages saw the lake full of dust, they faithfully smeared their bodies with the dust, and their sins were shaken off with the dust, and they were honoured with the gods and reached the abode of Brahmā. 12

The preliminary conflict between too virtuous mortals and gods in an overcrowded heaven is soon superseded by a conflict between the gods of the old religion (led by Indra) and the devotional Śiva, who is ultimately victorious; the original problem is never solved at all.

In keeping with the usual sectarian biases of this motif, the Pañcarātras have their own version:

> 'The original religion (ādhyadharma, to wit the Pañcarātra) was first in the Kṛta age proclaimed by god Brahmán to the sages of sharpened vows, who taught it to their disciples. All people followed the Pañcarātra and were liberated or went to heaven; hell became naught and a great decrease of creation took place [sṛṣtikṣayo mahān āsīt]. [Brahmā complained to Viṣṇu], "All men, being full of faith and masters of their senses, sacrifice as

> prescribed in the Great Secret; and so they go to the Place of Viṣṇu from which there is no return. There is (now) no heaven and no hell, neither birth nor death." This, however, was against the plan of the Lord, and so He started, with the help of Brahmān, Kapila, and Śiva, five more systems (Yoga, Sāṅkhya, Bauddha, Jaina and Śaiva), conflicting with each other and the Pāñcarātra, for the bewilderment of men.' 13

This text is unique in attributing the teaching of the Buddhist and Jain heresies to the threat of an excess of virtuous mortals (rather than particular mortals or demons). The original problem of the loss of the Golden Age is here combined with the multiform (an overcrowded heaven)by the simple expedient of setting the origin of the Pāñcarātra school in the Golden Age.

In spite of their obvious axes to grind, these myths demonstrate an underlying assumption that it is not good for everyone to go to heaven. A peculiar example of this line of thought may be seen in the episode in which the mountain Himālaya, personified as a king, becomes so devoted to Śiva that he is about to leave earth and go to heaven. This would deprive the earth of all the valuable gems and magic herbs of which Himālaya is the prime source, and to prevent this Śiva himself comes to Himālaya, disguised as a Vaiṣṇava Brahmin, and reviles himself just enough to make Himālaya lose his pure devotion and remain on earth.[14]

The gods are also endangered by any excess of wickedness among mortals. Here the motif of overcrowding combines with the rarer motif of the scourge sent to punish or destroy the wicked on earth in a series of myths in which the Earth, overburdened by wicked demons, begins to sink into the cosmic floods, from which Viṣṇu rescues her:

> Formerly, the demons were full of anger and greed, intoxicated with their strength, and they increased so that the gods could not bear them and could find no refuge. They saw that the earth was oppressed and overcrowded by the terrible demons, and that she was sinking. The gods were frightened and said to Brahmā, 'How can we bear this oppression from the demons? The demon Hiraṇyākṣa has seized the earth and we cannot enter his water fortress [beneath the ocean, whither he carried the earth].' Brahmā said, 'The sage Agastya will drink the water.' The gods begged Agastya to protect them by destroying the water. Agastya agreed and drank the ocean in an instant. Then Viṣṇu became incarnate as the boar and he entered the earth and the demon abode below [rasātala], and he conquered all the demons there. 15

In the earlier layer of the mythology as it appears in the Brāhmaṇas, the earth simply sinks into the cosmic waters in the course of time, and it (or she) is rescued by a fish, tortoise, or boar. Later, these three animals became the first three avatars of Viṣṇu, and the boar is made to battle demons as well as to rescue the earth. The amoral motif of the earth sinking into the waters is then combined with the idea that a demon has carried her away beneath the waters, and from here it is merely one additional step to say that she sinks into the waters because of the weight of the demons upon her.

Viṣṇu rescues the overburdened earth in another avatar as well, that of Kṛṣṇa:

> The earth was oppressed by millions of armies of demons and proud and deceitful kings; because of this great burden she sought refuge with Brahmā. He went with her and the gods to seek refuge with Viṣṇu, who said that he would become incarnate to remove the burden of the earth. . . . In order to lift up the burden of the earth, Viṣṇu will be born among the Yadus (as Kṛṣṇa, says the commentator). 16

Other Purāṇas elaborate upon this reason for the Kṛṣṇa avatar:

> At the time (when Kaṃsa was flourishing in his wickedness), the earth was oppressed by her excessive burden, and she went to heaven and said to the gods, 'Numerous armies of proud demons are upon me, and I am tortured by the weight of them and cannot support

> myself beneath this load. Help me so that I do not fall down into hell [rasātala].' Brahmā told Kṛṣṇa, 'This earth is oppressed by numerous demons and seeks refuge with you to remove her burden,' and Kṛṣṇa said, 'I will become incarnate on earth to destroy the misery of this burden.' . . . When the earth was oppressed by the burden of demons, Viṣṇu raised her up, established dharma, and banished evil [pāpa]. 17

The wheel thus comes full circle: when the earth is overburdened by virtue, the gods introduce corruption; when it is overburdened by evil, they remove corruption.

2. The gods' jealousy of mortals

The gods object to any excess which threatens the balance of the universe; when there is an excess of evil, the more conventional mythology prevails and the gods fight the demons. When there is an excess of virtuous people, however, the more idiosyncratic mythology of heresy comes into play, and the gods corrupt either the offending virtuous demons or mortals (either the human race in general or certain individuals). The latter situations will be discussed first, as they are both more common and more significant for the mythology of heresy.

Indian gods are inclined to become jealous of mortals because the line between them is not inalienably demarcated; as in many of the early myths of evil and death, from time to time mortals become immortals and the hierarchy is upset. This is an increasingly common situation in those texts which exalt the practice of asceticism (tapas), by which a mortal gains great supernatural powers which make him a threat to the gods. This then creates in Indian mythology the circumstance that mortals constantly come up to heaven and trouble the gods, in contrast with, for example, the Greek, where the gods interfere in the affairs of men on earth.

The exception to this general rule is the avatar (primarily associated with Viṣṇu, though Śiva is also said to have avatars and does often appear in disguise as a mortal), but these are temporary and 'playful' (undertaken in a spirit of play [līlā] or illusion [māyā]); moreover, they usually occur in response to a challenge from a mortal (or demon) who has usurped divine powers and reversed the avatar process. This transfiguration of a mortal (known as āropa) is regarded as a danger in pre-bhakti texts which pit the gods against virtuous demons and men, but it comes to be regarded as a desirable process in later texts which assume that god loves men and wishes to help them find salvation.

The belief that the gods are sometimes jealous of mortals occurs in Indian tribal mythology: the Agaria believe that the loss of the Golden Age and the fall of the Agaria kingdom was due to the jealousy and subsequent treachery of Bhagavan.[18] The Marias considered the gods to be both jealous and petty-minded:

> 'A Kol story from Bondi shows the Supreme Chando so exasperated at the sight of the parents of mankind enjoying sexual intercourse that he killed them out of jealousy. A Kuruk tale describes how Mahapurub destroyed his own children for making too much noise.' 19

And in the Punjab they tell the tale of Harī Chand (Hariścandra in the Purāṇas), who is treated like other virtuous sages in the classical tradition: Indra feared Harī Chand's great virtue and sent the sage Nārada to ruin it.[20]

The earlier mythology of usurpation may be seen as yet another manifestation of the overpopulation motif: there are too many candidates for one job, the job of rule in heaven. In classical mythology of the earliest period, the gods corrupt mankind because of their own sense of insecurity. This may be implicit in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa's statement

that the gods were displeased with man and visited upon him the evils of sleep, sloth, anger, hunger, and the love of dice and women.[21] A more specific reason for the gods' displeasure with men who aspire too high is given in the Upaniṣads:

> 'I am brahma [aham brahmāsmīti]' -- whoever among gods, sages or men became enlightened to this, he became it all; even the gods had no power to prevent him becoming thus, for he became their self [ātmā hy eṣām]. But whoever worships another divinity is like a sacrificial animal for the gods, and each person is of use to the gods just as many animals would be of use to a man. Therefore it is not pleasing to those (gods) that men should know this. 22.

The lack of differentiation (that men will become the 'self' of the gods) is superimposed upon the basic Vedic theory that men who sacrifice (instead of seeking what this text considers the better religion -- Upaniṣadic enlightenment) are like sacrificial animals, of which the gods want to possess as many as possible. Later, the worshipper who threatened the gods by abandoning sacrifice in order to seek enlightenment was replaced by the more direct threat of the man who not only abandoned sacrifice but amassed an excess of ascetic powers. Thus, in the Rāmāyaṇa the gods are worried by the great asceticism of Viśvāmitra, which they fear will cause mankind to become atheistic;[23] this text may intend to suggest that people will see that Viśvāmitra is like a god and doubt the existence or the power of the true gods.

Indra, the king of the gods, is most often subject to this difficulty. Indra's throne is an uncertain one, for where asceticism is might, Indra's debauchery makes him less powerful than many mortals.

He is often overpowered: he flees in fear of the sage's curse when he has raped Utathya's pregnant wife, and he is forced to hide in a lotus after he has killed the Brahmin Vṛtra;[24] he is conquered and made a butter merchant when he has dishonoured the sage Durvāsas and received his malediction;[25] he is defeated by Indrajit as a punishment for having seduced Ahalyā.[26] When he is thus embarrassed, Indra is forced to resort to trickery to overcome his enemy. Thus he uses puns and riddles to violate his treaty with Namuci,[27] and he avoids punishment for the slaughter of Vṛtra only by a grammatical error made by his enemy (Tvaṣṭṛ sacrificed to get a son who would be an Indra-killer, but he misplaced the accent and so obtained a son killed-by-Indra instead).[28] Frequently Indra must be rescued by the sectarian gods, Viṣṇu and Śiva: when the mother of Śukra paralyses Indra with the power of her asceticism, Indra persuades Viṣṇu to kill her and to accept the resulting penalty for the sin of slaying a woman.[29] Indra's susceptibility to attack by virtuous mortals is such a commonplace that his own vow of truth is this: 'If a Brahmin on earth be not afraid of

me from birth, by his chastity and asceticism he will cause me to fall from heaven. By this truth I swear.'[30] As one king comments on the seduction of a great sage by an apsaras sent by Indra, 'The gods do have this fear of other people's ascetic powers.'[31]

Occasionally Indra uses fairly subtle methods to turn ascetics from their asceticism: he takes the form of an old Brahmin ascetic trying to build a bridge of sand across the Ganges in order to teach the futility of asceticism;[32] he successfully tempts another sage by assuming the form of a mercenary soldier and enchanting him with the appeal of glittering arms.[33] Usually, however, Indra plots, 'How can he be made addicted to sensual enjoyments so that he will cease his asceticism?'[34] Indra sends a celestial prostitute (apsaras) to the sage, who usually abandons his chastity and sheds his seed.[35] He disposes of a number of famous sages in this way,[36] and he sends Kāma, the god of desire, to interfere with Nārada's asceticism when he fears that Nārada wants to usurp his kingdom.[37] Indra uses his own wife, Śacī, to overpower a demon by playing upon the demon's desire for her.[38]

Viṣṇu and Śiva also use lust as a weapon to overcome powerful enemies, whose power is sometimes said to depend not only upon their own virtue but upon the chastity of their wives. Thus when Viṣṇu seduces the wife of the demon Jalandhara he says, 'He cannot be conquered in any other way, for he is so well protected by the chastity of his wife', and Pārvatī agrees, 'You must break the fidelity of his wife, for there is no dharma like the dharma of wifely fidelity'.[39]

Similarly, Śiva dissipates the dangerous ascetic power of the Pine Forest sages by seducing their wives and causing them to lose their tempers.[40] Lust is thus the perfect means of destroying the virtue of an individual, just as it is the inevitable accompaniment to the original loss of virtue among mankind in general.

3. The corruption of demons by the gods

These measures are equally successful when used against the demons. The gods have at their disposal various methods for dealing with these enemies, of which the most basic is to do battle with them, as they do from the earliest Vedic texts through the latest Purāṇas. The second method, which appears in the Brāhmaṇas and continues in the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas, is to deny them access to the sacrifice by stealing it from them or by keeping them out of heaven. Thus the Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa states, 'The gods, by means of the half iḍā having repelled the asuras, ascended the world of heaven', and the commentator (Sāyaṇa) remarks, 'They prevented the asuras from entering heaven'.[41] Elsewhere this same text states, 'The asuras once had the whole sacrifice. By means of (various formulae) the gods took from them the Agnihotra, the full- and new-moon sacrifices, the seasonal sacrifices, and the Soma sacrifice.'[42] This is a transition point; the gods in effect corrupt the demons, for they deny them Vedic religion, but they do so by a physical or magical assault, as in the more primitive mythology.

Other Brāhmaṇas state more specifically the notion that the gods protect their own interests by corrupting their enemies:

> The gods, speaking truth, were very contemptible and very poor, but the demons, speaking untruth, were very prosperous. The gods then began to do the sacrifice, and each time the demons came

> where they were preparing it, the gods snatched up the sacrifice and began doing something else. And the demons went away, thinking, 'It is something else that they are doing'. Then the gods completed the sacrifice and they prevailed, and the demons came to naught.[43]

Although the gods seem to find virtue of little material assistance, while the wicked demons flourish like a green bay tree, they rely upon the older aspect of 'virtue' (i.e., the sacrifice) for their welfare, and they trick the demons into ignoring this source of strength. In many of these myths, it is evident that the gods make the demons evil, not for the sake of mankind or to preserve the cosmic balance, but simply in order that the gods themselves may remain supreme. In the Buddhist tradition, Indra is said to have brought about the fall of the demons from heaven because of his own jealousy and greed. Thinking, 'What good to us is a kingdom which others share?', he made the demons drunk and hurled them from heaven.[44] Similarly, the jealous sun god threw the demon Sukeśin out of heaven when he became too virtuous for a demon.

Lust is the gods' chief weapon against the virtuous demons, as it is against virtuous mortals. Just as Indra uses his wife, Śacī, to seduce his demon enemies, so Śiva destroys the demon Andhaka by playing upon Andhaka's desire for Pārvatī.[45] Other demons are similarly overcome when weakened by their desire for the Goddess, but more frequent is the inverse: they are weakened when their own wives are seduced by the gods. The moral balance is a delicate one: although by seducing a woman (the demon's wife) the 'virtuous' god loses his own ascetic powers of chastity, he thereby also destroys the power of chastity by which the demon's wife protects her husband, and

the enemy remains suppressed while the god renews his powers. When anyone attempts to seduce the wife of the god, on the other hand, the powers of the seducer are destroyed while the god remains intact; the god always emerges from the final conflict strengthened. Thus Śiva destroys Jalandhara by repaying him in kind: when Jalandhara disguises himself as Śiva and attempts to seduce Pārvatī, she immediately recognizes him and flees; but when Śiva sends Viṣṇu, disguised as Jalandhara, to seduce Jalandhara's wife, Vṛndā, Viṣṇu succeeds and destroys the virtuous power of the demon, so that Śiva is able to kill him.[46]

These myths, in which lust is used as a crude weapon, shade off into the myths of heresy, in which a doctrine of lust is preached. Viṣṇu uses both levels of lust against the demon Ghora:

> The demon Ghora was born when the Goddess revived the demon Dundubhi, who had tried to seduce her but was burnt by Śiva. Śiva then cursed Ghora to die when he attempted to seduce the Goddess.
>
> Ghora attempted to throw the gods out of heaven and to occupy it himself. Brahmā then instructed Indra to send Nārada to delude Ghora by causing him to become attached to adharma, and to cause his wife to be attached to adharma, and to make all his people become evil, by any means possible. Nārada went there and Ghora received him with all honour. Then Nārada said to Ghora, 'The best way to propitiate the gods is by the enjoyment of sensual objects. Indra and the other gods all pursue pleasure; Śiva went to the Pine Forest to make love to the wives of the sages, and he knows the essence of the highest truth.' Nārada taught Ghora the Viṣṇutattva, Kāmatattva and Śivatattva as proclaimed by the sage Kapila and told to Nandin. He also praised the seduction of a young girl sixteen years old. Thus Nārada inspired Ghora with a fraudulent dharma and persuaded him to abduct Pārvatī. When Ghora countered in favour of restraining the senses, Nārada overcame his arguments.
>
> Ghora then forsook dharma, under the influence of the false dharma that Nārada had taught him, and he did not honour Brahmins or the Vedas or Viṣṇu. He became fond of the wives of other men, and he considered his own wife to be poison. Incited by Nārada, he wanted to carry off the beautiful Pārvatī. Ghora's wife, Candramatī, knowing that Nārada had corrupted him in this way,

tried to give her husband good advice, and she warned him of the dangers of naked Jain monks. But Nārada succeeded in deluding Ghora.

Then Nārada deluded Ghora's queen so that she became devoted to Digambaras [Jains], Hetuvādins[logicians, perhaps materialists], and heretics. Nārada also corrupted all of Ghora's servants and soldiers. Thus weakened, Ghora went to the mountains in order to abduct Pārvatī. He saw her and was overcome by desire for her, and then she slew him. [47]

The more traditional means of corruption -- the use of a woman to seduce the enemy -- is here combined with the details of heresy; together, they destroy the demon. It is ironic that a woman, the very instrument of his ultimate downfall, warns Ghora of the dangers of heresy; but, as she is poison to him, he ignores her advice, and when she too is corrupted by Nārada's heresies the demon's last bastion of virtue falls.

By seducing the wives of demons or sages, or by causing the men to be seduced by apsarases, the gods not only cause their enemies to lose their powers but they also transfer those powers to themselves. Just as sin may be transferred from one person to another, so the quantity of good karma amassed by a person may be transferred to one whom he has wronged in any way. After Jalandhara and his wife have been killed, having first been weakened by means of seduction, the glory (tejas) of the wife emerges from her body and enters Pārvatī, and the glory of Jalandhara enters Śiva.[48] The law of karma thus provides an additional strong incentive for the gods to wish to corrupt their enemies rather than merely to destroy them, since by causing their opponents to sin the gods may hope to obtain their powers.[49]

4. The corruption of the demons of the Triple City

These general patterns of myths in which the gods corrupt their enemies, be they mortal or demon, appear in several important myths

dealing with the origin of heresy. One of the most famous of these is the myth of the destruction of the demons of the Triple City. This is an old myth, and in the earliest texts in which it appears it is not associated with heresy, though an essential element of the myth even here is that the demons are extremely virtuous. By their virtue, they obtain from Brahmā the promise that they can only be destroyed by Śiva, and only if all three cities may be destroyed by a single arrow. At the crucial moment, the three cities become aligned, and Śiva destroys them.[50]

Later texts, troubled by the fact that Śiva destroyed three creatures who, albeit demons, were deeply devoted to him, began to insert explanations of the way in which the demons in fact ceased to remain virtuous Śaivas. In certain Śaiva texts, Śiva commands Viṣṇu to preach heresy (Buddhism) to the demons of the Triple City, and the virtuous demon king watches helplessly as his people fall prey to greed, lust, and adharma, and are ultimately destroyed. This destruction is brought about in various ways. According to the Matsya Purāṇa, the demons remained orthodox -- chanting the Vedas, worshipping the gods, and honouring Brahmins -- until Alakṣmī, Asūyā, thirst, hunger, Kali, and quarrels entered the city.[51] No further motivation is given for this sudden change of fortunes, which may be assumed to have developed 'in the course of time'. Yet after the evil has spread through the city, bringing sexual immorality, dishonour of the gods and Brahmins, and the destruction of temples and hermitages, the text remarks that the demons had been corrupted by Indra.[52] This may be a vestige of another version in which Indra, rather than fate, was

responsible for the corruption of the city. Elsewhere in the Matsya Purāṇa, Śiva (at the request of Indra and the gods) sends Nārada to corrupt the Triple City by means of a change of doctrine (matim anyām pracodaya or prabodhaya).[53] Nārada teaches Anupamā, the wife of the demon Bāṇa, the vow by which Pārvatī came to share Śiva's body. In this way, he destroys her chastity, thus creating a 'chink' in the virtue of the city, so that Śiva is able to destroy it. The nature of the heresy taught here is not clear; it may simply be the old motif of the corruption of virtuous women, or it may represent a form of Tantrism. Among the evil omens that appear in the city are dreams in which people wear red garments,[54] a possible reference to Buddhism.

Other versions of the Triple City myth state the necessity for the corruption: 'Indra and the gods and Brahmins were burnt by the fire of the Triple City like trees burnt by a forest fire, and in fear of the demons they went to Viṣṇu.'[55] This fire is the heat of asceticism, particularly when connected with the worship of Śiva: 'All the demon women were true to their husbands, and the demons worshipped Śiva devotedly. By their asceticism they caused Indra and the other gods to wane away and to be burned by the demon glory [tejas].'[56] There is no moral contradiction here, but elsewhere Viṣṇu states that 'the asuras are maddened [durmada] and evil [pāpā], but they cannot be slain by the gods, because by their worship of Śiva they are freed from sins [pāpa, pātaka].'[57] In order to corrupt the demons, who are said to be most righteous, Viṣṇu created a man of delusion, Māyin:

> Viṣṇu taught Māyin a Śāstra which deluded everyone; it was opposed to the Vedas and lawbooks, devoid of varṇāśrama dharma, teaching that heaven and hell are nowhere but right here ([Saura Purāṇa:]

> that the body is the Self, that there is no other way to the other world, and that one should gratify one's own desire by theft etc.). Viṣṇu sent Māyin to destroy the dharmas, Vedas, and lawbooks of the Triple City. Nārada assisted Māyin, and all the women of the city became unchaste and corrupt. Then by Śiva's command Alakṣmī entered the city, and Lakṣmī, who had been won by the demons' asceticism, departed. Thus heresy was established by Viṣṇu, and the demons were abandoned by Śiva, who was then able to destroy them. The demons went on the path of heretics, outside the path of the Vedas and the worship of Śiva. [58]

In this version, Alakṣmī's appearance is explained: she was sent by Śiva's command. The heresy in the Saura Purāṇa is slightly more specific than that of the Liṅga Purāṇa, with possible elements of materialism: 'Men and women desired only visible fruits [dṛṣṭa-phalārthinaḥ].'[59] But the underlying 'heresy' is merely the loss of chastity, associated as usual with Nārada and instigated by the supreme gods.

5. Viṣṇu's avatar as the Buddha

Often the heresy taught to the demons is merely a vague sensualism or materialism. Sometimes, however, the heresy is specifically identified as Buddhism or Jainism. Hindus came to regard the Buddha as an avatar of Viṣṇu between A.D. 450[60] and the sixth century,[61] for the Buddha avatar is not mentioned in the Mahābhārata and appears first in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (400-500A.D.), where it is already established in full detail. The Buddha avatar is represented on the Gupta Daśāvatāra temple at Deogarh (c. 600 A.D.) and it is mentioned in a seventh century Pallava inscription.[62] Schrader suggests that the earliest texts which mention the Buddha avatar [63] may antedate the Mahābhārata,[64] but this cannot be proven.

Within a few centuries, the pattern of the Viṣṇu-Buddha myth was well enough established to serve as the model for historical writings.

The Skanda Purāṇa relates that, in the beginning of the Kali age, and under the influence of monks known as Kṣapaṇas (i.e., Jains), the people of King Āma's kingdom renounced their Vaiṣṇava faith and became followers of the Buddhist dharma. The king's daughter was influenced by the Jīvika (sic; Ājīvika?) named Indrasūri, and the people followed the Jain dharma and disregarded the Brahmins. King Āma was surrounded by heretics and refused to shelter Brahmins who were deprived of their villages, for he considered them guilty of injury (hiṃsā) in their animal sacrifices.[65] According to Rājaśekhara's Prabandhakośa, a Jain monk converted king Āma, son of Yaśovarman of Kanauj (A.D. 728-753) to Jainism.[66] This historical fact is embroidered with all the standard motifs in the Skanda Purāṇa tale. Similar stories of kings corrupted by Jains appear in other Indian texts,[67] and the Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa offers a similar instance:

> The virtuous Bhadraśīla was in his former life a king named Dharmakīrti. He was very evil and careless [pramatta], and by contact with heretics he became a heretic and lost his former merit. 68

Whatever historical truths may be contained in these texts, they are adapted to fit the fictional pattern set by the Viṣṇu-Buddha myth.

The Bhāgavata Purāṇa refers to the Buddha incarnation in the form of several prophesies:

> When the Kali age has begun, in order to delude the enemies of the gods, Viṣṇu will be born as the Buddha, son of Ajana, among the Kīkaṭas. . . . When the demons come to know the Vedic rites and begin to oppress people, then he [Viṣṇu] will assume an attractive and deluding form and teach them adharma. . . . With words he (commentator: the Buddha avatar) will delude those (demons) who are not deserving of the sacrifice. . . . Homage to Buddha, the pure, the deluder of the demons. 69

The purpose of the incarnation is evident: although the demons 'come to know the Vedic rites', they are 'not deserving of the sacrifice'; their moral ambiguity makes it necessary for them to be corrupted as well as destroyed.

The confusion of Buddhists and asuras throughout the various versions of this myth stems in part from the superimposition of the Buddha myth upon the older model of the conflict between gods and demons and in part from the intermixture of the older formula (gods versus demons for the sake of mankind) and the later formula (gods versus human heretics), for although Viṣṇu sets out to corrupt demons, his action results in the creation of human heretics. (Moreover, in the myths of Vena and Divodāsa,[70] Viṣṇu appears as the Buddha or Jina not in order to destroy demons but in order to corrupt a virtuous mortal.) The Buddha avatar may also represent an attempt by orthodox Brahmanism to slander the Buddhists. H. H. Wilson suggests, 'We may have in this conflict of the orthodox divinities and heretical Daityas some covert allusion to political troubles, growing out of religious difference, and the final predominance of Brahmanism.'[71] Thus, the Buddha incarnation, accomplishing the delusion of the asuras/Buddhists, was to be followed by the avatar of Kalkin, who would exterminate the heretics and barbarians.

In fact, the Buddha avatar may have been inspired by the Kalkin avatar. The Mahābhārata[72] and the Vāyu Purāṇa,[73] which do not mention the Buddha avatar, say that Viṣṇu will be born as Kalkin in order to destroy barbarians and heretics. It is possible that these passages were a reaction against the invasion of India by Greeks, Scythians,

Pahlavas and Kuṣāṇas during the centuries immediately preceding and following the turn of the Christian era. Romila Thapar suggests that the Kalkin avatar may be connected in some way with 'the idea of the Millennium, as it was current in Europe and elsewhere' at the same time (c. 300-700 A.D.),[74] but according to A. L. Basham the main inspiration was the Buddhist doctrine of Maitreya, the future Buddha, which may have been derived from Zoroastrian doctrines [75] (perhaps brought into India by these same invaders). The fact that Kalkin appears as a warrior on horseback -- the very image of the invading hordes and of the conquering Aryan -- supports the possibility of some such political reference. Only later, in the Gupta period, when Jainism and Buddhism posed a serious threat to the fast-burgeoning Hindu revival, does the Buddha appear in the list of avatars, immediately preceding Kalkin. The Viṣṇu Purāṇa (the first text to describe the Buddha avatar) also refers to Kalkin, who will come after invasions by Scythians, Greeks, and Huns etc. have polluted India.[76]

Thus Viṣṇu as Buddha creates the barbarians and heretics whom he earlier (in terms of actual cult development) destroyed as Kalkin. Or, from the viewpoint of the texts, Viṣṇu first became the Buddha to destroy the demons and make them into heretics and then became Kalkin to destroy both heretics and barbarians. These two avatars appear together in most Purāṇas, where their tasks are explicitly related and even confused. One Purāṇa states that Viṣṇu will appear as Buddha because of the multitude of heretics and as Kalkin because of impurity (buddhaḥ pāṣaṇḍasaṃghātāt kalkir avatu kalmaṣāt).[77] The basic distinction -- that the Buddha destroys the demons and Kalkin destroys

heretic mankind -- is blurred, since the demons have become heretic men. The two avatars are almost never represented separately, but they appear together on reliefs of the ten avatars from the Gupta period onwards.[78]

In spite of this association of demons and Buddhists, some non-Buddhists accepted the Buddha incarnation as a positive contribution by Viṣṇu. Kṣemendra, a Jain, describes the Buddha avatar of Viṣṇu in a straight, heroic tale based upon the standard episodes of Gautama's life as related in the Pali canon.[79] Jayadeva, a twelfth century Hindu, states that Viṣṇu became the Buddha out of compassion for animals, to end bloody sacrifices.[80] V. S. Agrawala, a Hindu scholar, equates the Buddhists with the asuras, but he remarks, 'In spite of their Asura appellation, . . . no one could shut one's eyes that they were also good religious people believing in an ethical and moral religion.'[81] The Devībhāgavata Purāṇa offers homage to Viṣṇu, 'who became incarnate as the Buddha in order to stop the slaughter of animals and to destroy the sacrifices of the wicked (duṣṭayajñavighātāya),[82] thus adding a significant moral judgment to Jayadeva's more general statement; here, only wicked sacrificers are condemned, not virtuous Hindus.

European scholars have emphasized this positive element of the Buddha avatar. Thus Keith remarks upon the Buddha avatar as 'a curious example of the desire to absorb whatever is good in another faith',[83] and Gonda suggests that the Buddha was identified with Viṣṇu because of Viṣṇu's general helpfulness to mankind in distress, which made possible

the connexion with Rāma, Kṛṣṇa, and the Buddha, 'noble and heroic men who are great benefactors of mankind'.[84] This view is, I think, wholly unjustified. As Radhakrishna Choudhary describes the Buddha avatar, Viṣṇu teaches the doctrine to the demons 'not for their benefit but for their destruction'.[85] A confusion has arisen between the idea of the gods as opponents of the demons (and benefactors of mankind) and the idea of the gods as the opponents of mankind. Hinduism has indeed tried to 'absorb whatever is good' in Buddhism, notably in the doctrine of non-injury mentioned by the Devībhāgavata Purāṇa and Jayadeva, but this assimilation took place in the earlier, more tolerant period, long before the texts in which Viṣṇu appears as the Buddha.

The interplay of these conflicting attitudes toward the Buddha avatar is well illustrated by J. M. Macfie's analysis of this episode:

> 'Modern writers dwell on the beauty of Buddha's character and the pity which he showed towards his fellow-men. But the compilers of the Puranas looked upon the teaching of both the Buddhists and the Jains with peculiar loathing, and found in it a manifestation of evil and not of good. . . . And so, to put the mark of shame upon them, they invented a story, which is to be found in this [Viṣṇu Purāṇa] and other Puranas. . . . As a Hindu villager repeats for your information the list of Vishnu's descents, he includes that of the Buddha among the ten. Probably he knows nothing of the details of the story as it is told in the Puranas. On the other hand, the educated Indian . . . has little idea that the Buddha he is taught to admire was an illusion of Vishnu who came to deceive and destroy the demons by the inculcation of heresy and falsehood.' 86

Basham describes a similar inconsistency in the importance which modern Hindus place upon the Buddha avatar:

> 'Until quite recently the temple of the Buddha at Gayā was in the hands of Hindus, and the teacher was there worshipped by Hindus as a Hindu god; but in general little attention was paid to the Buddha avatāra.' 87

A further confusion in attitudes toward the Buddha avatar is suggested by the ultimate reversal: a tradition apparently originating in medieval Ceylon refers to ten Bodhisattvas, one of whom is Viṣṇu.[88]

It is, indeed, ironic that the idea of Viṣṇu becoming incarnate as a 'benefactor of mankind' -- as an avatar, Kṛṣṇa or Rāma -- may very well have been inspired by the popular and humanistic appeal of Buddhism, both in the human character of Gautama himself in early Buddhism and by the later ideal of the compassionate Bodhisattva who postpones his own release in order to remain among men. Nevertheless, the Buddha avatar, which appears in Hindu texts composed after the initial idea of human avatars (Kṛṣṇa and Rāma) had been accepted, is portrayed in order to discredit the Buddhist doctrines. In the myth of the conversion of the demons to Buddhism, the teaching is always clearly intended to be destructive, to be preached by god in bad faith.

In the Agni Purāṇa, Viṣṇu uses a combination of Buddhism and Jainism to corrupt the demons:

> When, during the battle between the gods and demons, the gods sought refuge with Īśvara [the lord], he became the son of Suddhodana and deluded the demons. They became Buddhists and abandoned the Vedas. Afterwards he became an Arhat and made others into Arhats. Thus the heretics came into being; at the end of the Kali age, Kalkin will supress the barbarians and establish dharma. 89

A similar confusion of doctrines appears in the Garuḍa Purāṇa's statement that, at the end of the Kali age, in order to delude the enemies of the gods, Viṣṇu will be born as Buddha, the son of Jina, and later as Kalkin.[90] In one list of avatars given in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Viṣṇu is said to become incarnate as Ṛṣabha (the first Jain Tīrthaṃkara) and then as the Buddha.[91] This confusion may derive from

the fact that many Buddhist texts refer to the Buddha as Jina.

The Viṣṇu Purāṇa also combines the doctrines of Buddhism and Jainism, as well as other heresies:

> The demons had stolen the sacrificial portions of the gods, but they were so full of svadharma, Vedic worship, and asceticism that they could not be conquered. Viṣṇu created a man of delusion to lead the demons from the path of the Vedas; the man was naked, bald, carrying a peacock-feather fan [as the Jains did], and he made them all into Arhats, discouraging them from their asceticism and teaching them contradictory tenets about dharma. Then the man put on red garments and taught the rest of the demons that the sacrifice of animals was an evil act. He said, 'If the animal slaughtered in the sacrifice is assured of arrival in heaven, why does the sacrificer not kill his own father?' Then the demons became Buddhists, and they caused others to become heretics, abandoning the Vedas and reviling the gods and Brahmins, discarding their armour of svadharma. The gods attacked them and killed them. 92

Certain arguments, such as the satire on the Hindu rationalization of animal sacrifice and the appeal to 'words of reason [yuktimadvacanam]',[93] may refer to a third heresy, that of the Cārvākas.[94]

In the Śiva Purāṇa, Viṣṇu's role is subordinated to that of Śiva, but no Śaiva heresies are taught. Viṣṇu creates only one man of delusion, a Jain named Arihan who is described at some length:

> The man was bald, wearing dirty clothes, carrying a whisk broom which he moved gently and constantly for fear of harming living creatures, moving his hand with a piece of cloth on his mouth [i.e. masked]. He taught a great śāstra of delusion, opposing śruti and smṛti [the Vedas and lawbooks], written in dialect [apabhraṃśa], taught in Buddhist texts. . He had four pupils who aided him in the spreading of his heretical dharma. 95

At first, due to the strength of the demons' devotion to Śiva, the Jain made no headway. Then Śiva sent Nārada, who corrupted the king with a doctrine teaching non-injury and the irrelevance of caste,[96] and Nārada corrupted the chastity of the women, as well. Then, for good

measure, Śiva sent Alakṣmī to the city, and Lakṣmī departed. When the demons had thus been made evil, the gods praised Śiva for having made them take refuge in Buddhism;[97] though the doctrine is said to be taught in Buddhist texts, it seems far more like Jainism and is identified as such by the commentator.[98] Finally, Brahmā praised Śiva for having taught the heresy himself (though in fact it was Viṣṇu who, as tradition demands, created the original heretic); Brahmā said to Śiva, 'There is no evil [in this act], because you, the greatest of yogis, commanded it. By your command they were deluded; you were the initiator. Now you must kill the hosts of barbarians in order to protect the good.'[99] It appears that Śiva is to take upon himself the functions of Viṣṇu's Kalkin avatar as well as those of the Buddha; nor is this inappropriate, for it is Śiva who destroys the universe at the end of the Kali age. The confusion between the roles of Śiva and Viṣṇu stems in part from the attempt to combine the Triple City myth (in which Śiva destroys the demons) with the Buddha avatar (in which Viṣṇu corrupts the demons). This confusion persists in the _Vāyu Purāṇa_, which refers to Śiva as the Buddha[100] but does not explain this statement or elaborate upon it.

6. The corruption of Divodāsa

Śiva plays an even more important role in another version of the Viṣṇu-Buddha avatar, the myth of the corruption of king Divodāsa. Like the myth of the Triple City, this story appears first without any reference to the heresy of Buddhism, and although the original version says nothing of the virtue of the king, the need to corrupt him is assumed:

> King Divodāsa lived in the city of Benares in splendour and abundance. Now, at this time Śiva married Satī and lived with his in-laws, anxious to please Satī. All his attendants, assuming various forms, pleased Śiva and Satī, but they did not please Menā, the mother of Satī. She was disgusted with Śiva, and she said to her daughter, 'Your husband does not behave properly in my presence. He is very poor and does nothing but sport with you.' Thus addressed by her mother, Satī could not bear it, and she went to Śiva and said, 'I will not live here. Take me to your o n home.' And so Śiva looked over all the worlds, and he chose Benares as a pleasant place to live.
>
> But when he saw that Divodāsa was living in the city, Śiva summoned Gaṇeśa and said, 'Go to the city of Benares and empty it. Use gentle wiles, for the king is very mighty.' Then Gaṇeśa went there and appeared in a dream to a certain barber, saying, 'I will make you fortunate. Build a place for me and make an image of my form and place it within the city.' The barber did this, and Gaṇeśa was honoured in the shrine and gave boons to all who worshipped him there; he gave them sons and gold and all that they desired. Now, the chief queen of Divodāsa, named Suyaśā, was urged by the king to have a son, and she went to the shrine of Gaṇeśa and performed worship and asked for a son, going there again and again. But Gaṇeśa did not give her sons, because he thought, 'If the king becomes angry at us, I will succeed in my purposes.' After a long time, the king did become angry, for he thought, 'Gaṇeśa is constantly honoured by my people, in my city, but he does not give me a son. Therefore I will destroy the place of that evil-minded, gluttonous maker of obstacles.' With this in mind, the evil-minded king foolishly destroyed the shrine of Gaṇeśa, and Gaṇeśa went to the king and said, 'Since you have destroyed my shrine when I had not offended you, therefore your city will become empty.' And so Benares became empty, and Śiva came and dwelt there with Satī. 101

Nothing is said here of the king's virtue; Śiva advises Gaṇeśa to use treachery because the king is very mighty, not very virtuous. Moreover, Divodāsa is described as evil-minded and foolish, although this is only said after Gaṇeśa has infuriated him. The city which Śiva destroys, however, is very virtuous, and this myth is introduced when the hearers ask the Paurāṇika why Gaṇeśa put a curse upon such a holy place as Benares. The fact that a holy shrine is destroyed by the gods links this myth with the series of tales in which the gods destroy a shrine which has allowed too many people to enter heaven; in these, as in the myth of

Divodāsa, Gaṇeśa, 'the maker of obstacles', is the one who ruins the shrine. Thus Śiva corrupts an ordinary king and an extremely holy city simply because of a whim of his own, a whim which results, moreover, from his own shortcomings (his failure to provide a satisfactory home for his wife).

The Skanda Purāṇa version of the Divodāsa myth greatly alters several of the moral issues, producing certain logical inconsistencies:

> Śiva lived on Mount Mandara, but he wished to live in Benares, which was at that time ruled by the virtuous king Divodāsa. Hoping to destroy Divodāsa's dharma and thus overpower him, Śiva sent his female ascetics [yoginīs] to seduce the king and cause him to fall from his own dharma, but they failed. Gaṇeśa took the form of a Brahmin astrologer and deluded many of the people in the city, including the king's wife, but the king then spoke to Gaṇeśa and converted him to orthodoxy. Then Viṣṇu took the form of a Buddhist named Vinayakīrti, and his wife became a Buddhist nun named Vijñānakaumudī. They taught the Buddhist doctrine that non-injury is the highest dharma, that caste distinctions are meaningless, that the pleasures of the body should be cultivated. Thus they corrupted the women of the city and the harem. Deeply upset, the king sent for a Brahmin to advise him.
>
> Viṣṇu came to him in disguise, and Divodāsa said, 'How shall I find rest? Two sides are striving against one another in my mind. I have worshipped the gods and followed dharma, but I know how many have been destroyed because of the hostility of the gods. The demons of the Triple City, though true to their vows of dharma and devoted to Śiva, were destroyed by Śiva. I have no wish to oppose the gods, but I do not fear them, for my asceticism is greater than theirs.' Viṣṇu said, 'It is true that you have never been hostile to the gods, nor indulged in adharma. The fault seems to me to lie in your heart, that you have kept the Lord of Benares [Śiva] far away. Now your life is fulfilled, and you may go to heaven to dwell eternally.' Divodāsa mounted to heaven, where he became a servant of Śiva, three-eyed, and adorned with serpents like Śiva himself. 102

Divodāsa explicitly notes the parallel with the myth of the Triple City, but he fails to see how it applies to him; the fact which he cites in his own favour (that his asceticism is greater than that of the gods) is of course the basis of the gods' resentment of him. Viṣṇu attempts to

find a flaw in the king -- that he kept Śiva far from his heart -- but the text makes it clear that the king is completely virtuous, and the overtones of Viṣṇu's statement suggest the true reason for the gods' hostility: Divodāsa has kept 'the Lord of Benares' too far away -- i.e., out of the city whence Śiva will derive this epithet. The inconsistencies in the development of the plot stem from the fact that this text combines several episodes of heresy. The simple seduction by the apsarases (here yoginīs) -- the traditional technique of Indra -- fails. The second strategem, the masquerade of Gaṇeśa, fails too, and is only included as a remnant from the early version of the Divodāsa myth where it is successful. The Skanda Purāṇa, however, whitewashes both Śiva and Divodāsa almost beyond recognition, so that the king not only fails to be corrupted but teaches Gaṇeśa orthodox Hinduism, and Śiva never comes to occupy the city at all, though this is the original motivation for the whole myth. When Gaṇeśa's tricks fail to corrupt the king, the myth of the Buddhist heresy is introduced, though still without any effect upon Divodāsa. At last, the gods grant him the reward of translation to heaven, which may be viewed as a favour or as a last resort, the only strategem left to get him out of Benares.

7. Bṛhaspati and the demons

The heresies of Buddhism and Jainism are thus grafted on to two cycles of myths (the tales of Vena and Divodāsa) which are derived from earlier, more general tales of corruption. A third cycle which is treated in this way is the series of myths in which Indra enlists the aid of his preceptor, Bṛhaspati, to overcome his demon enemies. The presence of Bṛhaspati, the Vedic priest-god, in place of the

sectarian gods suggests that this is an early myth, and early texts seem to refer to the story. We have seen how Virocana in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad taught the demons a wrong doctrine, and the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad adds some details which recur in the Purāṇic myth:

> Bṛhaspati became Śukra [the guru of the demons], and for the sake of Indra's security he created [a doctrine of] ignorance [avidyā] for the destruction of the demons. By this, men say that the inauspicious is auspicious, and that the auspicious is inauspicious. They say, 'Let there be study of dharma which is destructive of the Veda and of other Śāstras.' Therefore, one should not study this. It is false and barren. Its fruit is mere pleasure [ratimātram]. 103

The doctrine of ignorance taught by Bṛhaspati may well be the materialist doctrine called Bārhaspatya and traditionally attributed to him.[104] This is supported by the fact that materialism is closely associated with the demons and is called the āsura doctrine. Moreover, the Cārvāka heresy often quotes Bṛhaspati and occurs in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa version of the Buddha avatar myth as another variant of demon materialism. The vagueness of the materialist doctrine whose fruit is 'mere pleasure' makes it difficult to identify in the mythology, a difficulty compounded by the fact that most of the sources describing it are orthodox texts which refer to it in the most pejorative and most likely distorting terms. As Hopkins remarks, 'The worst thing that is said of Bṛhaspati's teaching is that it is drawn from a study of the female intellect, which is full of subtilty and deceit.'[105]

In the early Purāṇas, the gods practise a double treachery against demons:

> During the battle between the gods and demons, it was learned that the faction which had king Raji [a descendant of Divodāsa] fighting on their side would be victorious. Both gods and demons asked Raji to fight for them, and he said that he would fight for whichever side would make him their king. The demons said, 'We cannot say one thing and mean another; we have our king, Prahlāda.' But the gods agreed to make Raji their king, and he fought on their side and the demon army was destroyed. Indra came to Raji and knelt at his feet and said, 'I will be your son,' and Raji smiled and said, 'So be it.'
>
> When Raji died, his five hundred sons were urged by Nārada to demand the throne of heaven as their hereditary right. When Indra refused this to them, they overcame him by force and usurped his

> office. After some time, Indra, who had been deprived of his share of the sacrificial offerings, begged Bṛhaspati to secure for him a little sacrificial butter, even if no more than the size of a jujube. Bṛhaspati then began a sacrifice in order to increase Indra's strength and to delude the sons of Raji and cause their downfall. Deluded, the princes became haters of Brahmins, revilers of the Vedas, and devoid of dharma. Then they were slain by Indra. 106

The gods display none of the demons' scruples about being true to their word. Indra tricks Raji out of his right to pass the throne on to his children by getting Raji to accept him as a son, thus gaining the right to re-inherit his throne. This strategem is emphasized in a closely related text, which remarks that the trusting Raji was fooled by Indra's deceptive words.[107] This word-splitting proves ineffectual, however, and Raji's sons regain their throne by force; Indra is then weakened by his failure to receive the sacrificial offerings, not because mortals are too wicked to offer sacrifice (as is usually the case) but merely because they are not offering sacrifice to _him_. This point of view cleverly resolves the conflict between the older premise that the gods are strengthened by mortal virtue and the later one (which also operates in the Raji myths) that they are threatened by mortal virtue. The heresy which corrupts the demons is not described in any detail here; the _Vāyu Purāṇa_ remarks that Bṛhaspati saw to it that the sons of Raji became full of passion, overcome by desire and anger.[108]

Another chapter of the _Vāyu Purāṇa_ expanded the myth along the lines of the myths of Buddha and the Triple City, substituting the demons as a whole for Raji's sons and re-introducing Bṛhaspati's masquerade:

> As the gods were winning supremacy over the demons, Śukra went to seek special incantations from Śiva, and during his long absence the demons made a truce with the gods. But Indra, finding out the true reason for the truce, sent his daughter Jayantī to Śukra; at her request, Śukra cast a haze around them so that no one could witness their love-making. When the demons then sought their guru to obtain the incantations, they could not see him, and they went away disappointed. Meanwhile, Bṛhaspati took the form of Śukra and went to the demons; they mistook him for their own guru and he instructed them. After some time, the real Śukra returned to the demons, but they failed to recognize him. Then he cursed them, saying, 'Since you reject me, your wits will be destroyed and you will be defeated.' Bṛhaspati vanished, and the demons realized that they had been deceived by him. They begged Śukra to forgive them, and he promised that they would regain their wits and conquer the gods. 109

The earliest method, which is foreshadowed in the Vāyu Purāṇa's statement that the sons of Raji were overcome by passion, is used here: Indra's daughter is sent to seduce a powerful sage. This method is supplemented with the form of the myths of heresy, but Bṛhaspati does not utilize his opportunity to corrupt the demons, and they are overcome not because they embrace a false doctrine but simply because they infuriate their own preceptor so that he curses them. Thus, although Bṛhaspati sets the stage for the curse, their own guru destroys them.

The Matsya Purāṇa agrees with the Vāyu on the essential details of this myth. The actual nature of the doctrine taught by Bṛhaspati is mentioned in the Matsya text, which seems to discriminate (like the Vāyu) between the myth of Raji and the myth of Śukra and Jayantī:

> The sons of Raji, full of virtue and ascetic power, usurped heaven. Indra sought the aid of Bṛhaspati, who deluded them with the Jain dharma that is beyond the pale of the Vedas, though he himself knew the Vedas. Then Indra killed them all. 110

The Padma Purāṇa then takes up these separate threads and combines them

all with the myth of the Buddha avatar. It begins with the tale of Śukra and Jayantī as it appears in the Vāyu and Matsya Purāṇas, but it then introduces motifs from the Raji myth:

> Bṛhaspati, disguised as Śukra, said to Śukra, 'You are Bṛhaspati, author of the heresy of materialism; you have taken my form to come here and delude the demons.' Furious, Śukra departed; Bṛhaspati then taught the demons to despise the Vedas and the gods. The demons then asked him to teach them another religion. He thought, 'How can I make them evil, outside the Vedas, a laughing-stock?' Then he thought of Viṣṇu, and Viṣṇu created Mahāmoha (or Māyāmoha), who took the form first of a Digambara [Jain] and then of a Raktāmbara [Buddhist], arguing, 'If the beast slain in the sacrifice goes to heaven, then why does the sacrificer not kill his own father?' In the first form he deluded some of the demons, and in the second form he deluded others. Thus he made the demons Jains and Buddhists.
>
> Bṛhaspati departed and Indra approached the demons, who told him that they had renounced the world in order to become monks, and that he might have the rule of the universe. Indra agreed, and the demons, thus deluded, dwelled on the banks of the Narmadā river until, awakened from their vow by Śukra, they again resolved to steal the triple world. 111

Several interesting variations may be seen here. Bṛhaspati, with notable nerve and presence of mind, accuses Śukra of his own treachery and his own heresy, materialism. The double heresy of Buddhism and Jainism is used not merely as a technicality by which the demons are weakened, but as an actual philosophy which causes them to renounce their kingdom, a far more perceptive use of the doctrine. The gods are quite content to let the demons have the spiritual merit (especially as the gods must consider that the 'merit', being heretical, will do them no good), while they, the gods, maintain the secular power.

The Devībhāgavata Purāṇa interpolates an interesting conversation between Vyāsa, who tells the myth, and the king who hears it:

> The king asked Vyāsa, 'How could the guru of the gods trick the demons like that? If he, who taught the dharma of truth, lied to the demons, then who can be truthful?' Vyāsa said, 'All creatures

are subject to emotions; the gods are all subject to passion. Otherwise the universe, composed as it is of good and evil, could not continue to develop.' 112

The basic justification for the gods' involvement in heresy is here explicitly stated by the narrator of the myth of heresy. The question of the imitation of the gods' bad moral example is a complex one which emerges in other contexts.[113]

One other myth which may be loosely connected with this series (as it involves Bṛhaspati and the corruption of the demons) also seems to take into account the content of the heresy by expanding a motif which appears in the earlier Raji myths -- the loss of sacrificial offerings:

The demon Raktāsura conquered the gods and ruled the triple world. One day he said to the demons, 'Sacrifice to me and honour me. I will kill anyone who defends the gods. Abandon all contributions to Brahmins and enjoy the wives of the gods as much as you please.' Thus the ritual of sacrifice was destroyed, the world was without dharma, and Indra's strength was therefore reduced. The demons, knowing this, attacked Indra and conquered him. Bṛhaspati sought the help of the Goddess, who killed the demons, and the gods rejoiced. 114

The Goddess replaces Jayantī as the agent of Bṛhaspati, and the demons pervert themselves without Bṛhaspati's agency. The result of their moral corruption, however, is the weakening of Indra's power, rather than of their own; once again, he lacks even so much as a jujube's weight of sacrificial butter. Thus the content of the heresy (the fact that as heretics they fail to offer sacrifice to the gods) changes the plot; the ultimate result is that heresy strengthens the demons, who must then be overcome by an entirely different force, the Goddess.

This is the final permutation of the corpus of myths in which the gods teach heresy to the demons. Certain of the premises underlying these myths do not apply to mortals, but the majority of the motifs are

derived from the earlier mythology of evil and apply equally well to any enemies of the gods. The moral nature of the demons, though ambiguous, is not fully taken into account in these myths; sometimes the demons follow Brahminical varṇāsrama dharma and perform Vedic sacrifices, sometimes they follow demon dharma and oppose the Vedas, but the threats to the gods (and the subsequent measures that the gods undertake) are the same: the creation of heresy.

IV. ii. The Myths of Salvation, Devotion, and Release

The ambiguous moral stature of mortals is of a different nature from that of the demons: mortals are (in the Kali age, at least) too wicked for pure religion but too virtuous simply to be corrupted as the demons are. This problem is treated in a series of myths in which the heresy itself is taught not as a curse but as a release from a previous curse. The myths in this cycle are the episode of Dakṣa's sacrifice, Śiva as the Kāpālika (or Kapālin), Gautama and the Pine Forest sages, and Śiva and the Pine Forest sages.

1. Dakṣa and the curse of heresy

The myth of Dakṣa, which is told in many texts,[1] states that Dakṣa gave a sacrifice and did not invite Śiva; Śiva came, destroyed the sacrifice, and beheaded Dakṣa, who then recognized Śiva's divinity and praised him. Śiva then restored the sacrifice and replaced Dakṣa's head (which had been thrown into the fire) with that of a goat.

In many versions of this myth, which forms the first stage of the series, a heresy is established: Dakṣa curses Śiva to be denied a share in the sacrifice, to be impure and banished from heaven, to be king of ghosts and _piśācas_,[2] and a chain of curses occurs:

> Dakṣa called Śiva a heretic and cursed him to be outside the Vedas; Nandin, the servant of Śiva, said that Dakṣa's curse was false; Dakṣa then cursed Nandin and all the servants of Śiva to be beyond the Vedas, heretics, outcastes. Nandin cursed Dakṣa to be a hypocrite, full of lust and greed, a false Brahmin. [3]

In other versions of this myth, Dadhīca (who assumes the role of Nandin) curses the Brahmins who hate Śiva, so that they will be beyond

the pale of the Vedas, taking pleasure in the behaviour of heretics;[4] they are to be reborn in the Kali yuga as Śūdras, to say prayers for Śūdras, to go to hell,[5] to be outside the three Vedas, their minds struck down by evil.[6]

Śiva, through his mercy, sometimes forgives Dakṣa and allows him to find release and even to become a leader of Śiva's hosts.[7] When Nandin curses Dakṣa's priests to be poor and greedy, Brahmarākṣasas, Śiva chastises him for losing his temper with Brahmins.[8] But Dakṣa's curse takes effect, as the sects which he curses (Kālamukhas and Kāpālikas) were actual heretical Śaiva sects, and Dakṣa's own adherents are condemned to something worse (from the partisan Śaiva standpoint): they are doomed to hypocritical Vaiṣṇava orthodoxy:

> Nandin said, 'May those who hate Śiva be averse to the true, attached to houses of fraudulent dharmas, because of a desire for country pleasures, practising ceremonies with a mind dulled by Vedic formulae, indulging in ignorant rituals, deluded by the flowery speech of the Vedas; let them be magicians and ascetics, omnivorous, delighting in wealth and sensuality, wandering beggars.' 9

The myth is not content with this exchange of imprecations, however, but seeks to trace a more basic cause in the source of Dakṣa's hatred of Śiva. The myth of Śiva's destruction of Dakṣa's sacrifice is an ancient one involving many Vedic threads, not all of which are pertinent to the present discussion.[10] Although the Purāṇic myth is used to justify and assimilate the heterodox Śiva, many of the Vedic antecedents of the myth indicate that Rudra beheaded the Dakṣa figure (Prajāpati) in order to protect the orthodox moral order, to punish the incestuous creator or to 'stretch his bow against the hater of religion [brahmadviṣ]'.[11] Thus, at first this myth represents a

conflict between a moral Śiva (Rudra) and an immoral Dakṣa (Prajāpati), rules that are <u>apparently</u> reversed in the Purāṇa versions.

Some of the ambiguities in the Purāṇic myth result from the combination of two separate, though complementary, Vedic myths, elements of each of which appear in scattered passages throughout Vedic literature but neither of which appears complete in any Vedic text. The first group is united by the basic premise of Prajāpati's incest as the precipitating factor of the myth: Prajāpati was about to commit incest with his daughter; she took the form of an animal to elude him and he took the form of an animal to pursue her; the gods created Rudra to avenge this outrage; Rudra shot ah arrow at the Prajāpati beast.[12] The second group is smaller and more consistent, based on the premise of Rudra's exclusion from the sacrifice: Prajāpati (and the gods) excluded Rudra from the sacrifice; Rudra beheaded the sacrificial beast; the gods gave Rudra a portion of the sacrifice.[13] Some texts begin to combine elements of the two myths, starting from the premise of Prajāpati's incest but including references to Rudra being given a portion of the sacrifice.[14] Finally, in the Purāṇas, the Dakṣa myth combines these motifs in a single myth: Dakṣa does not want Śiva to marry his daughter (and Dakṣa has incestuous intentions); he excludes Śiva from his sacrifice; Śiva destroys the sacrifice and beheads Dakṣa, replacing Dakṣa's head with that of the sacrificial beast; Śiva is given homage. Thus Śiva is simultaneously the defender of orthodox morality (i.e. the incest tabu) and the unorthodox interloper (the violator of the sacrifice).

This ambiguity is essential to the ritual myth, in which Śiva plays the role of mediator, resolving the ambivalences of both of the Vedic myths. In many tribal myths, it is necessary for primeval creation to be incestuous (as the original One creates the female with whom he then performs procreation); but incest is forbidden by the social law. Therefore Prajāpati must commit incest but he must be punished for it, and the act of his punisher is ambiguous -- necessary, but sinful, like the original creation itself. Similarly, the sacrificial beast must be killed, but killers are usually unclean in the view of later Hinduism; the sacrificer is automatically exempt from the stigma of killing, as the sacrificial beast is said to go to heaven. Only Rudra, who is the killer par excellence, can simultaneously destroy the sacrifice and perform it (by throwing the beast's head into the fire). Śiva thus mediates between Vedic and non-Vedic views of ritual; he resolves incest and the tabu against incest, sacrifice and the tabu against killing. Though he is at first said to have no share in the sacrifice, he is then given a share in the sacrifice; though at first excluded, he is then included, bridging the gap between two conflicting ritual needs and traditions.

The fact of Dakṣa's hatred of Śiva, whatever its historical sources, was well established by the time of the Mahābhārata, and a number of different reasons for this hatred are stated in different versions of the myth. The Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa falls back upon fate to explain it: 'There arose an enmity in Dakṣa toward Śiva for no reason, by chance [nirarthakaṃ daivayogāt].'[15] Hardly more explicit, and equally reminiscent of the classical Hindu myths of evil, is the Liṅga Purāṇa statement that Dakṣa reviled Śiva 'because of the curse of Nārada.'[16] This text also invokes the curse of Dadhīca, described at length in the Śiva Purāṇa, which explains the conflict between Dakṣa and Śiva by a previous conflict between their representatives, Kṣuva (a king) and Dadhīca (a Brahmin), who are assisted by Viṣṇu and Śiva, respectively, during an argument about the relative importance of kings and priests.[17] As a result of this conflict, Dadhīca curses Viṣṇu and the gods to be burned by the fire of Śiva's anger (i.e., in the course of Dakṣa's sacrifice),[18] a sequence which seems to explain the myth as one of sectarian and class conflict.

Many versions of the myth attribute Dakṣa's hatred of Śiva to the fact that Śiva married Satī, the daughter of Dakṣa. These conflicts may be traced to the Vedic episode in which Śiva punishes Prajāpati (the ancestor of Dakṣa) for committing incest with his daughter, a connexion which persists in those passages in which Śiva curses Dakṣa to become incestuous.[19] The more immediate source of Dakṣa's irritation, however, is expressed in texts which describe the manner in which Śiva came to Dakṣa's house disguised as a ragged old beggar and carried Satī away; Śiva married her and transformed her from golden to black, much to Dakṣa's shock and disapproval.[20] In the course of his many tirades against Śiva, Dakṣa frequently objects to the excessive sexuality of his son-in-law, who is constantly engaged in sexual dalliance with Satī.[21] More explicitly, Dakṣa is cursed (by Śiva himself) to commit incest,[22] and in one obscure myth Dakṣa's hatred of Śiva is said to have originated from a sexual irregularity [paśukarmarata] commited by Daksa and regarded as an evil act [pāpa] [23] Apart from the particular obscurities of causation (compounded by the veiled nature of the sexual conflict between Dakṣa and Śiva throughout the corpus), this myth falls into the category of those which 'explain' sin by previous (unexplained) sin.

In many other Purāṇa texts, the problem is still a sexual one but is expressed in different terms: Dakṣa objects to Śiva's marriage to his daughter because Śiva is an ascetic and therefore an unsuitable son-in-law.[24] Slightly more straightforward are those myths which attribute Dakṣa's antipathy toward Śiva to a former slight, or imagined slight. Once Śiva honoured Dakṣa as was customary, but Dakṣa wished for more

honour than he deserved, and he reviled Satī, saying, 'All my other sons-in-law are better than your husband Śiva.'[25] Other texts state that Rudra actually did slight Dakṣa by failing to bow to him.[26] Dakṣa complained to Satī, 'My other sons-in-law honour me more than your husband does; Śiva vies with me and dishonours me always, going against my grain.'[27] In one Hindi version of the myth, the fault is entirely Dakṣa's:

> 'Brahmā . . . made Dakṣa chief of the Lords of creation. When Dakṣa was invested with such high office, he became exceeding arrogant; never was a man born into the world whom dominion did not intoxicate. [He gave a sacrifice but did not invite Śiva, who said to Satī,] "Dakṣa has summoned all his daughters, but because of his quarrel with me he has left you out. Once he was displeased with me in Brahmā's court, and that is why he slights me to this day." ' 28

The deep devotional spirit of this author makes it impossible for him to entertain the notion that Śiva might have been responsible in any way for Dakṣa's hatred of him. Dakṣa himself, in another text, is aware of Śiva's divinity, but he admits to irrational feelings: 'Although I know that Śiva is the Purāṇa Pūruṣa, I have always been unable to brook him [asūyāmi];' but then he goes on to justify himself by explaining 'the root of it: I command the eleven Rudras, who are a part of Rudra; yet Brahmā has made me give my daughter to him. Therefore I hate him.'[29]

2. Śiva as outcaste and heretic: the Kāpālika myth

This apparent nonsequitur arises from the fact that the text cited above is a misquotation of an earlier text in which Dakṣa explains to Dadhīci (sic) that he does not honour Śiva because, although he knows eleven Rudras, he does not know Maheśvara.[30] This is, in fact, the actual historical basis of the mythological conflict: although the eleven Rudras (or Maruts) are Vedic storm gods, the individual Rudra

who eventually subsumes them all is non-Vedic in almost all essentials -- a combination of the Indus Valley Paśupati, a tribal god of destruction, a Vrātya ascetic, the Agni of the Brāhmaṇas, and various other local strains all grafted onto the shadowy Rudra of the Ṛg Veda (himself a foreign god hated and feared, worshipped with offerings at crossroads but never with a share in the Vedic sacrifice).

The connexion between the exclusion of Śiva and his destruction of the sacrifice with his third eye may be traced back to the Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa: 'The gods divided the domestic beasts [paśūn] among themselves. They excluded Rudra. He fixed his looks on them.'[31] Sāyaṇa says, 'Rudra looked at the beasts, wishing to kill them',[32] but W. Caland interprets 'them' as referring to the gods.[33] In either case, Dakṣa -- who represents both the gods (since he gives the sacrifice) and the beast (since his head is replaced by that of a goat) -- inherits the role of Rudra's enemy. In other versions of this myth, Rudra is dissuaded from killing Prajāpati by the latter's promise to make him Paśupati[34] -- but Rudra already was Paśupati when this text was composed.

Another early text, the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa, repeats the assertion that Rudra was excluded from the sacrifice and relates several more details which reappear in the Dakṣa myth:

> Prajāpati excluded Rudra from the sacrifice. Rudra seized the sacrifice and cut off a piece, which became the prāśitram oblation. They offered it to Bhaga but he looked at it and his eyes fell out. They offered it to Savitṛ but it cut off his hands. (They gave Savitṛ hands made of gold.)
> They gave it to Pūṣan and his teeth fell out. They gave it to Aṅgiras and his head fell off. Then they desired, 'Let it not be destroyed', and they put it in the mouth of Agni, the belly of Indra, and the belly of Varuṇa. [35]

The 'piece' that Rudra cuts out of the sacrifice is treated in precisely the same manner as that in which, according to other Brāhmaṇas,[36] the seed of Prajāpati or the arrow of Rudra is treated when Rudra has pierced Prajāpati. Once again, both the incest myth and the myth of the destruction of the sacrifice result in the exclusion of Rudra.

Thus, the apparent result of Dakṣa's curse is actually its cause: because Śiva was always a heretic, denied a share in the sacrifice, Dakṣa curses him to be such. This circular reasoning (which accounts for other heresies and evils in many myths) is apparent from most versions of Dakṣa's curse:

> 'The Brahmins will not sacrifice to you along with the other gods; when anyone offers an oblation to you he will touch water in his rites.[37] . . . When the twice born have worshipped you with the articles, they will abandon them.[38] . . . Śiva has defiled the path followed by good men; he is impure, an abolisher of rites and demolisher of barriers, [who gives] the word of the Vedas to a Śūdra. He wanders like a madman, naked, laughing, the lord of ghosts, evil-hearted. Let Śiva, the lowest of the gods, obtain no share with Indra and Viṣṇu at the sacrifice; let all the followers of Śiva be heretics, opponents of the true Śāstras, following the heresy whose god is the king of ghosts.' [39]

Since Śiva has no share of the sacrifice, he is cursed to be a heretic, and since he is a heretic he is denied a share in the sacrifice.

The temporal ambiguity of Dakṣa's curse is evident from other versions of the myth in which Dakṣa explicitly curses Śiva to be a heretic because he is already a heretic:

> 'You are excluded from the rituals and are surrounded by ghosts in the burning ground; yet you fail to honour me, while all the gods give me great honour. Good men must scorn all heretics; therefore I curse you to be outside the sacrifice, outside caste; all the Rudras will be beyond the Vedas, avowing heretic doctrines, Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas.' [40]

In particular, Dakṣa says he hates Śiva because Śiva is a Kāpālika,[41] and when, for all of these various reasons, Dakṣa refuses to invite Śiva to his sacrifice, the Kūrma Purāṇa states the basic cause: Dakṣa says, 'In all sacrifices, there is no share ordained for Śiva, the naked Kāpālika.'[42] The Vāmana Purāṇa remarks, 'Although Śiva was the eldest, most noble, most eminent, and first of the gods, he was not invited by Dakṣa, who said, "He is a Kapālin".'[43] At this point, the listeners ask the bard, 'How did Śiva become a Kapālin?'

The answer to this question is a story well known throughout India, a story on which the myth of Śiva's fight with (and beheading of) Dakṣa is based: In the course of an argument, Śiva beheaded Brahmā, whose skull stuck to Śiva's hand. Śiva wandered for years performing the Kāpālika vow, naked, until at last he reached the shrine of Kapālamocana ('Skull-releasing') in Benares, where he was purified.[44] This myth may be traced back to the Vedic conflict between Rudra and Prajāpati, but in this secondary version the reasons for the beheading of Brahmā are still more complex.[45]

One myth of this group explains the beheading with the circular reasoning typical of myths of heresy:

> Once when Śiva mounted Brahmā's shoulder, Brahmā's fifth head said to him, 'Be a Kapālin', thus addressing Śiva by his future names [bhaviṣyair nāmabhir]. Śiva became angry at the word kapāla and cut off the head, which stuck to his hand.[46]

The myth seems to recognize the confusion of time cycles, for it notes the incongruity of Brahmā using Śiva's 'future' name; Śiva becomes a Kapālin because he is called Kapālin. Since the name is the person in Hinduism, by naming Śiva, Brahmā makes him what he calls him -- a Kāpālika.

Śiva is frequently criticized for having committed Brahminicide; in the Prabodhacandrodaya, Anger cites this as an instance in which he overpowered Śiva,[47] and the author of the Mattavilāsaprahasana treats with sarcasm the Kapālin who ostensibly praises Śiva for establishing his vow: the Kapālin assures his girlfriend that the skull he carries can be purified, for, he says, 'Our lord was released from the sin arising from having cut off the head of the Grandfather'.[48] The skull-bearer is the epitome of Śiva's demonic side; according to an early text, rākṣasas drink out of skulls and carry tridents[49] -- i.e., the Śaiva Kāpālikas are already associated with demons.

Later, more devotional Śaiva texts insist that Śiva established the vow 'for the sake of his devotees', that he could have made the head fall from his hand had he not wished to suffer for the sake of his worshippers; this is a rare example of a Hindu saviour myth of the Christian type, the inverse of the far more usual myths in which the god inflicts his own sin upon mankind (as, in many texts, Indrá does distribute his sin of Brahminicide among mankind). One mýth of this type explicitly states that Śiva could have avoided the punishment had he wished to do so:

> Brahmā desired Sarasvatī and asked her to stay with him. She said that he would always speak coarsely. One day when Brahmā met Śiva, his fifth head made an evil sound and Śiva cut it off. The skull remained stuck fast, and though Śiva was capable of burning it up, he wandered the earth with it for the sake of all people, until he came to Benares. [50]

Other myths are not satisfied with this rationalization and find it necessary to remove Śiva himself from the punishment, substituting for him a man whom he creates:

> Once when Brahmā and Viṣṇu were arguing about which of them was supreme, a flame _liṅga_ appeared between them, and from it there emerged a three-eyed man adorned with snakes. Brahmā's fifth head called the man his son; thereupon the man, who was Rudra, became angry; he created Bhairava and commanded him to punish Brahmā. Bhairava beheaded Brahmā, for whatever limb offends must be punished. Brahmā and Viṣṇu were terrified; they praised Śiva, who said to Bhairava, 'You must honour Viṣṇu and Brahmā, and carry Brahmā's skull.' Then Śiva created a maiden named Brahminicide, and he said to her, 'Follow Bhairava until he arrives at the holy city of Benares, after wandering about, begging for alms with this skull and teaching the world the vow that removes the sin of Brahminicide. You cannot enter Benares, so leave him there.' Bhairava wandered, pursued by Brahminicide, until he came to Viṣṇu, who gave him alms and said to Brahminicide, 'Release Bhairava'. But she said, 'By serving him constantly under this pretext (of haunting him for his sin) I will purify myself so that I will not be reborn'. Then Bhairava entered Benares with her still at his left side, and she cried out and went to hell, and the skull of Brahmā fell from Bhairava's hand and became the shrine of Kapālamocana. 51

Not only is Śiva freed from the stigma of having committed the sin himself, but it is he who creates the punishment (which is inflicted upon him against his will in other versions). Moreover, rather than being himself defiled by his sin, he purifies the very sin itself (herself); this cumbersome justification accounts for the otherwise embarrassing fact that the god was associated with the most serious of sins: he did it for the good of the sin, as well as for mankind in general (to whom he 'taught the vow that removes the sin of Brahminicide').

This late justification of the Kapālin myth represents an important development in Hindu theology. The motif of the head sticking to Śiva's hand may be traced back to the Vedic mythology of Indra: Indra tore off Namuci's head, from which there sprang a _rākṣasa_, who kept calling after him, 'Where will you get rid of me?' Indra beat the _rākṣasa_ off.[52] Indra's sin creates the _rākṣasa_ which he drives away

from himself -- to torment mankind. But, although Śiva acts similarly in some myths,[53] in certain later texts Śiva himself takes up the sin in order to free mankind from the sin of Brahminicide. In the Mahābhārata, Śiva is said to free Vālmīki from Brahminicide,[54] and the contrast with the Indra myth is significant, for Śiva at first absorbs many of the Indra myths of the distribution of sin but later certain reversals must take place as Indra is replaced by 'moral' gods.[55] Thus Śiva becomes a saviour of mankind, an ideal which may be derived in part from the Mahayana Buddhist ideal of the Bodhisattva who willingly suffers in order to teach others how to find release. This change in Śiva may also be associated with the bhakti movement, with its belief that god loves mankind, a notable change from the earlier myths in which the gods are jealous of virtuous men.

The Kāpālika may be regarded as an avatar of Śiva. Although he is not mentioned in the official lists of Śiva's avatars created in imitation of those of Viṣṇu, these lists do say that Śiva will become incarnate in the Pine Forest,[56] and Śiva usually enters the Pine Forest as a Kāpālika.[57] Moreover, there is an ambivalence in the Paurāṇika's attitude toward the cause of the avatars of both gods: just as Śiva is sometimes cursed to become a Kāpālika and sometimes assumes this role of his own will for the sake of mankind, so Viṣṇu is often said to have been cursed to be born seven times among men as punishment for his sin of killing a woman (at the behest of Indra, who commits similar offenses himself at times) although the text quickly adds that he became incarnate 'for the sake of the world'[58] or that he will be reborn again and again to establish dharma when it is threatened, and

in order to destroy demons.[59] This latter reason, without the curse, is cited by Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad Gītā to explain his repeated incarnations.[60] Śiva's appearance on earth as the Kāpālika more closely approaches the ideal of the saviour than do Viṣṇu's incarnations, for Viṣṇu 'plays' roles in the Purāṇas, resuming full divinity whenever he pleases, while Śiva truly suffers. (Śiva also acts as a saviour when he drinks the poison which emerges from the ocean to threaten mankind.[61]) Thus two parallel moral developments arise: first the god transfers his sin onto mankind and is forced to become incarnate by a curse resulting from his sin, and then he takes upon himself, willingly, a vow of expiation for the sake of removing the sins of mankind and becomes willingly incarnate for the sake of mankind.

Other versions of the Kāpālika myth which have been revised to reflect credit upon Śiva claim that he acted as he did in order to benefit various people. According to the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa, Śiva beheaded Brahmā for Brahmā's own good, though this text, like others cited above, still finds it necessary to have Śiva create a factotum to perform the vow (though not the deed itself):

> Once when Brahmā was trying to create, he produced a beautiful woman and grabbed her by force. When he asked her to make love with him, she became angry and said, 'This fifth head is inauspicious on your neck. Four faces would be more suitable for you.' She then vanished, and the fire of Brahmā's anger burnt up all the water on earth. Rudra appeared and severed the fifth head with his nails; he then took up the severed head and became the Kāpālika. When he reached Kapālamocana, the skull fell from him, the gods praised him, and he was purified. Śiva then created an ascetic who wandered and taught the Kāpālika vow. 62

In addition to benefitting mankind in general -- both by destroying the head that blazes so destructively and by establishing an ascetic to

teach the vow -- Śiva's action helps Brahmā in creation, by removing the 'inauspicious' fifth head. In the Brahmā Purāṇa, the head is inauspicious not because of any incestuous tendencies but because of demonophile ones:

> Brahmā's fifth head was helping the demons to devour the gods. When the gods asked Viṣṇu to cut it off, he said, 'If the head is cut off it will destroy the universe.' They praised Śiva, who agreed to cut off the head and hold it, since the earth could not bear it and the ocean would have been dried up in a minute. Then, out of pity for the world, Śiva held the head until he placed it in Benares. 63

Here, as in the Bhaviṣya Purāṇa version, the head is particularly dangerous because of its fiery quality. This is the essence of its nature in the Padma Purāṇa as well:

> Brahmā's fifth head had such excessive glory [tejas] and shone so brilliantly that all the gods and demons were unable to see or move, for it was far brighter than the sun, and it swallowed up the glory and power of the gods. 64

The moral partisanship cited as justification of Śiva's action in the Brahmā Purāṇa is invalid here; the head is as dangerous to demons as it is to the gods. The threat that it poses is the recurrent one of an excess of glory (tejas), the quantity which must be limited in anyone bad or good. This same glory threatens Brahmā's sons in yet another version of the myth:

> Śiva created Brahmā, who had five heads. When Brahmā failed to create, he asked Śiva to be his son, whereupon Śiva said that he would cut off Brahmā's head. Brahmā then created a five-headed son, Rudra, and sent him to Himālaya. But Brahmā became foolish and proud, and he thought that he had created everything. His fifth head produced a glory so great that it destroyed the wits of his sons, just as lamps fail to glow when the sun has risen. His sons took refuge with Śiva, telling him how Brahmā's fifth head had destroyed their glory and asking him to restore things as before. Śiva overwhelmed Brahmā with his glory, and he cut off Brahmā's head. 65

The justification for Śiva's action in destroying an excessively glorious head is somewhat weakened by the statement that Śiva's glory was even greater than Brahmā's. A further confusion is evident in the implication that Śiva is his own grandfather (for he is the son of his son Brahmā), a situation which exists in other Purāṇas and in the Ṛg Veda[66] but is usually less blatantly apparent. Once again, logical stumbling-blocks reveal a moral dilemma; the Paurāṇika finds it difficult to justify the actions of the Kāpālika, and most Śaiva theologians consider the episode to reflect to the discredit of Śiva.

Dakṣa has a particular reason to object to the Kāpālika Śiva, for the Kāpālika myth is a multiform of the Vedic/Purāṇic myth of the beheading of Prajāpati/Dakṣa by Rudra. We have, therefore, yet another logical circle: Śiva beheads Dakṣa because Dakṣa has insulted Śiva for having beheaded Dakṣa (Prajāpati).

Thus, Śiva is a heretic long before Dakṣa curses him to be so. Śiva appears in the Mahābhārata as a naked Kirāṭa, an outcaste hunter.[67] He is said to be an outcaste, lower than a Śūdra.[68] He is involved sexually with outcaste women.[69] Jitendranath Banerjea describes an icon of Śiva with a bell tied to his leg, a common image of his beggar form (Bhikṣāṭanamūrti) as he appears in the Pine Forest. As bells were worn by outcastes in order to warn the upper castes of their approach, the iconography 'emphasizes in a way the belief that the god was outside the pale of orthodox Vedism'.[70] In this form, Śiva is often accompanied by a dog, the scavenger outcaste of the animal world.

The belief that god himself is a heretic results in a number of theological dilemmas. One important result of the change in Śiva's status from that of an outcaste to that of the supreme god was that many of his worshippers remained outcaste, while their god was forced to justify his actions in having created sects of which he now was said to disapprove, sects which were an embarrassing reminder of his former, disreputable position. Śiva became dissociated from some of the more extreme members of his own sects, who still nevertheless maintained that it was he who taught them to behave as he had done. Śiva is said to have remarked, 'The vāma [left-hand, i.e., Tantric] ritual, though declared by me, was intended for Śūdras only. A Brahmin who drinks liquor is no longer a Brahmin; let it not be done.'[71] The implication here is that Śiva himself no longer indulges in alcohol though the 'Śūdra' members of his sects do so by his instruction. Similarly, Pārvatī remarks to Śiva, 'I fear that those rites which were enunciated by you for the welfare [of men] have been perverted [viparītāni](in the Kali age),'[72] implying that Śiva himself had never behaved as his worshippers now did, in the Kali age. This view appears in the Śaṅkaravijaya, where the Kāpālika whose practices are contrary to the Vedas, who drinks wine, kills Brahmins, and breaks the moral laws, summons Bhairava (Śiva) to defend him against Śaṅkara, only to hear Bhairava say to Śaṅkara,

> 'One must perform the dharma of the Vedas, Śāstras, and Purāṇas. Teach these Kāpālikas how to act like Brahmins. In the confusion of the Kali age, they did whatever they pleased; I was overcome by mantras and no longer present in dharma.' [73]

Thus the 'caste' distinction within the ranks of the heresy is enlarged

to include the god in the higher rank of Brahmin heretics and to dissociate him from the lower rank of Śūdra heretics.

The difficulties that arise from the attempt to dissociate the god from the heresies that he creates are indicated by a statement made by Śiva in the Varāha Purāṇa, after he has taught the Naya Siddhānta heresy and the Pāśupata doctrine at the request of Viṣṇu: 'In order to delude those outside the Vedas, I propounded these Śāstras. But I am the very form of the Vedas, and my true form is not known to those who speak the doctrine of other Śāstras. I am to be known by the Vedas.'[74] A more lengthy discussion of this point of view appears in the Padma Purāṇa:

> Pārvatī said to Śiva, 'You have said that one should avoid conversation with heretics. What sort of people are they?' Śiva replied, 'Those who carry skulls and bones and wear ashes and matted locks, those who use non-Vedic rites and do not follow the lawbooks, they are all heretics.' Pārvatī was amazed and said, 'But you yourself carry skulls and bones and ashes; why is this reviled?' Śiva then told the great secret about his own behaviour, which must not be told among men:
>
> 'Formerly, the demons delighted in Viṣṇu and were pure, devoid of all evils. Indra and the gods were disturbed and full of fear, for the demons shook off their sins by means of asceticism and they were invincible. Viṣṇu then told me, "Create a heretical dharma in order to delude the enemies of the gods; narrate Purāṇas of darkness to the ten sages, Gautama, Jaimini, Kapila, Durvāsas, Jamadagni, Kaṇāda, Śakti, Upamanyu, Mṛkaṇḍu, and Bṛhaspati. Enter into them and teach the Pāśupata Śāstra and the schism of the Kaṅkāla Śaiva heretics. Bear the skull, ashes, and bones yourself, to cause the people in the triple world to worship you in this form, and I will worship you in this form in order to delude the creatures of darkness." I was very upset about this, fearing that it would destroy me, but Viṣṇu said, "Do as I say, for the sake of the gods, and you will restore yourself by reciting my thousand names." Then for the sake of the gods I created the way of heretics, entering Gautama and the other Brahmins. They all became attached to sense objects, devoid of truth and strength, and they were conquered by the gods, falling from all dharma to the lowest place. Thus I created the reviled sect of outcastes proclaiming the Śaiva, Pāśupata, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Cārvāka and Buddhist heresies

> by entering into various sages. The doctrine that Viṣṇu had told, in the form of the Buddha, to destroy the demons, that very doctrine of Buddhism I taught in the Kali age. And, to delude the universe in the Kali age, I taught a great doctrine having the essence of the Vedas but, by its delusion, non-Vedic [vedārthavanmahāśāstraṃ māyayā yad avaidikam]. The six Purāṇas of darkness, which lead to hell, are the _Matsya_, _Kūrma_, _Liṅga_, _Śiva_ _Skanda_, and _Agni_; and the _śāstras_ of darkness are the Gautama, Bārhaspatya, Sāṃvarta, Yama, Sāṅkhya and Auśanasa.' 75

The myth begins with the need to corrupt virtuous demons but results in the corruption of mortal Brahmins. The text retains other traditional motifs (such as the role of Bṛhaspati and the use of Buddhist as well as Cārvāka heresies) and adds others associated with the Śaiva cycle, such as the references to Gautama and the Pāśupata heresy. Like Death, Śiva at first objects to his appointed wicked _svadharma_ but is finally persuaded to perform an evil act for a good end; in fact, his action is to the disadvantage of mankind, though it is, as usual, to the advantage of the gods. Śiva manages to clear himself by denying any value to any of the heresies which he teaches, taking refuge in the worship of Viṣṇu, and falling back upon the final argument that he was only obeying orders. (This rationalization is also used by the _Varāha Purāṇa_,[76] which, like the _Padma_, has a Vaiṣṇava bias which leads it to attribute _all_ the deeds of Śiva, good or evil, to Viṣṇu's command.)

In the context of this historical background of Śiva as an outcaste and heretic, the Dakṣa myth which seems at first to exclude Śiva actually represents his assimilation into the orthodox pantheon. After the curses have been exchanged, Śiva comes to the sacrifice and destroys it, and he forces Dakṣa and his faction to acknowledge him and to give him a share in the sacrifice. The first part of the myth, however,

containing the tirades against Śiva, represents an earlier stage at which the more obviously non-Vedic characteristics of Śiva had not yet been rationalized philosophically. Thus, from the initial premise of Rudra's heresy, the myth comes full circle to the episode in which Dakṣa curses Śiva to be an outcaste and his followers to be heretics, while Dadhīca/Nandin (the representative of Śiva himself) produces yet another group of heretics, the followers of Dakṣa. Due to these different historical levels preserved within a single myth, the relationship between the heretical god and his more orthodox followers, on the one hand, and the relationship between the 'reformed' god and his still unregenerate followers, on the other, led to various theological conflicts. Chief among these was the question of imitation, which applies not only to Śiva but to other gods of the Hindu pantheon as well (primarily Indra and Kṛṣṇa), whose immoral behaviour was a source of embarrassment to the more pious members of their sects.

3. The problem of imitation

When Śiva was eventually accepted into the orthodox pantheon, his antisocial behaviour raised serious problems when regarded as a possible model for the worshipper. The evil actions of the god were used to explain the vice that is in the world, justified, as Vyāsa justified Bṛhaspati's dishonesty and heresy, by the accepted analogy between human and divine emotions:

> Śiva's cobra, hungry, wishes to eat the rat of Gaṇeśa;
> And the peacock of Skanda wishes to eat the cobra.
> The lion of Pārvatī is greedy for the snake-eating bird.
> Since there is such strife even in the house of Śiva,
> How could it be otherwise in the universe, which is
> The form of that household? 77

The belief that the behaviour of the gods has not only an analogous but also a causal effect upon human behaviour appears in an inverted use of the same animal metaphor: when Śiva performs asceticism and becomes completely calm, the natural enmities of the animal kingdom are overcome, and cows play with tigers, deer with lions, snakes with rats, dogs with cats.[78] If the gods, then, behave badly, how can man aspire to virtue? 'If Brahmā be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds; if the eye of the god who destroyed the sacrifice of Dakṣa burn with desire when he embraces Gaurī; . . . how can tranquility be obtained by men?'[79]

The next logical step, from the model of explanation to the model for imitation, recurs throughout Hindu writings but is ultimately rejected. Thus Nārada attempts to convert Ghora to hedonism by citing the fact that Śiva, who knows the highest truth, seduced the wives of the Pine Forest sages.[80] Kṛṣṇa assumes that men imitate the gods when he says that he keeps working

because men would follow his example if he did not; the example that Kṛṣṇa sets by committing adultery with the gopīs must then be justified by elaborate arguments,[81] and in certain sects, such as the Sahajiyās of Bengal, Kṛṣṇa's example does lead to behaviour contrary to the Hindu norm. As Eliade writes,

> 'One becomes truly a man only by conforming to the teaching of the myths, that is, by imitating the gods. . . . Even the most barbarous act and the most aberrant behaviour have divine, transhuman models. . . . Religious man sought to imitate, and believed that he was imitating, his gods even when he allowed himself to be led into acts that verged on madness, depravity, and crime.' 82

The gods, like men, often justify their wickedness by citing each others' sins. When Indra kills a woman he excuses himself on the grounds that Viṣṇu slew Śukra's mother (which he did at Indra's behest);[83] Indra is said to have brought adultery into the world by his bad example,[84] and when Nahuṣa attempts to seduce Indra's wife, he replies to the gods' objections by stating that they never objected when Indra raped Ahalyā and committed other deeds contrary to dharma.[85] Rāma is urged to slay a female demon by the reminder that Indra once slew Virocana's daughter, Mantharā, when she intended to destroy the earth.[86] The Bhāgavata Purāṇa even goes so far as to justify Kṛṣṇa's adultery with reference to human behaviour, saying that since even the sages are uncontrolled and act as they please, how could one possibly restrain Viṣṇu when he becomes voluntarily incarnate?[87]

As early as the Upaniṣads, Indra boasts of his unpunished sins and offers to share his immunity with his worshippers:

> 'I killed the three-headed son of Tvaṣṭṛ; I delivered the ascetic Arunmukhas to the jackals; breaking many treaties, I overcame the demon Prahlāda, the Paulomas, and the Kālakañjas. And yet not a hair of my head was harmed. So he who understands me is not injured by any deed, not even by stealing, killing an embryo, matricide or parricide. If he has committed any evil [pāpa], he does not become pale.' 88

Paul Deussen, in commenting upon this, suggests that the worshipper is thus immune from the consequences of his deeds because they are no longer his deeds, as, by his enlightenment, he is no longer an individual.[89] One might say that the manner in which Indra seems to be able to perform, unscathed, acts forbidden to Hindus bound by strict caste law functions as a kind of vicarious release, a safety valve for his worshippers; the myth functions as the negative example of a difficult reality. But Indra here represents the mukta, the released man who cannot be affected by good or evil deeds. The moral dilemma only arises when the ordinary worshipper is allowed to share the

god's immunity; then the model leaves the realm of the ideal, becomes an actuality, and must be justified by the doctrine of imitation.

Even Manu states that any sin whatsoever, however extreme, may be entirely expiated if the worshipper performs the appropriate ascetic act or recites the appropriate Vedic verses.[90] The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad says, 'He who knows this, though he seem to commit much sin, is pure, clean, ageless, immortal',[91] and Eliade comments, 'This is as much as to say that every human experience is capable of being transfigured, lived on a different, a transhuman plane'.[92] The Buddhist Dhammapada also recognizes this spirit: 'A true Brahmin [this is a reference to enlightenment, not to caste] goes scatheless, though he has killed father and mother'.[93] Yet, even the gods do suffer for their sins; this is a basic assumption of the myths of heresy as well as the myths of expiation. It is precisely because the gods do not remain moral, and cannot escape the consequences of their immorality, that it is necessary for men to be corrupted as well.

Putting aside for the moment the question of punishment, the belief that the gods behave immorally was accepted by almost all Hindus from the very earliest period, and the corollary that some mortals may therefore behave in the same way appears in several orthodox texts. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa states that such prohibitions as 'He is to approach his wife at the proper time' or 'He is not to approach the wife of his guru' do not apply to the supra-moral soul who recognizes the identity of the Self and the godhead.[94] The more esoteric sects were quick to take advantage of this philosophy; although not everyone

was permitted to imitate the gods, the initiated man was ranked with the gods and set above the moral law. Thus Indrabhūti says that only the yogin may enjoy as many women as he wishes, drink alcoholic beverages, steal, and kill without committing a sin; if anyone else does this, 'great evils would result'.[95]

Certain Hindu theologians were thus able to justify the heretical behaviour of their sects by referring to the heretical behaviour of their gods:

> 'What the gods do and what the worshippers do in their service cannot according to Hindu opinion be judged by ordinary laws of right and wrong. The god is supra-moral; the worshipper when he enters the temple leaves conventionality outside.' [96]

Thus, the more orthodox view holds that the gods alone are supra-moral, but the 'left-hand' sects maintain the validity of imitation and hold the 'released' worshipper equally unbound by the morality of svadharma. This view, though of special benefit to the esoteric sects, is obviously supported by the social atmosphere of orthodox Hinduism, so thoroughly conditioned to the idea that there are natural divisions among men, that what is appropriate for the elect (the Brahmin) is not appropriate to the Śūdra, that 'quod licet Jovi non licet bovi'. The hierarchy of morality thus serves both to support and to challenge the doctrine of imitation, depending upon the status of the mortals involved in the action: the gods rank above mankind, and are therefore not to be imitated, but the 'enlightened' man (and sometimes the Brahmin) also ranks above mankind and may behave immorally without suffering the consequences of his action.

The doctrine of imitation was more often rejected and criticized for the abuses it encouraged than accepted as dogma. The Śaivas who justified their excesses by saying that they were merely copying their

god became the object of satire and disapproval in such plays as the Mattavilāsaprahasana and the Karpūramañjarī. The wicked Kali complains about this double standard when he says to the gods, 'Let Brahmā sport with any girl, and you amuse yourselves with apsarases, but Kali must live in celibacy. You preach dharma, and yet you do things that one can hardly bear to hear about.'[97]

The gods are said to commit serious sins in order 'to awaken people to a sense of the dangers of adharma'[98] -- that is, as a negative moral example. The extremes of Tantrism are only considered suitable for people at the extremes of the moral scale -- the gods and truly enlightened sages, on the one hand, and the degraded mortals of the Kali age, on the other. The usual justification for Tantric practice -- that the enlightened may achieve salvation by the very acts that cause common men to burn in hell[99] -- was often explicitly cited and rejected. Thus, when Śiva is criticized, Nārada remarks,

> 'If [Pārvatī] be married to Śamkara, everyone will regard even those faults as virtues. . . . The sun and fire devour all sorts of food, but no one blames them for it. Though both pure and impure water flow in the Gangā, no one calls the river foul. The powerful, sire, can do no wrong, like the sun and the fire and the Gangā. But if any stupid man, wise in his own conceits, would do as they do, he falls into hell and stays there for an aeon. Can the creature be compared to God?' [100]

Similarly, it is said (in explaining why Kṛṣṇa's adultery cannot be taken as license for men to do the same) that Rudra alone may drink poison unharmed, just as no blame is imputed to fire, which consumes all fuel.[101] Another reason for men to refrain from imitating Kṛṣṇa's adultery is simply a rephrasing of Kali's complaint about the gods' moral hypocrisy: 'We should act as the gods say, not as they do; let no one other than a superior being [anīśvara] even think of acting thus.'[102]

Śrīdhara comments on this statement:

> 'In order to refute the charge (of immorality) against the supreme deity, the author speaks of the behaviour of the great, the transgression of dharma. He mentions the outrageous behaviour [sāhasam] seen in Prajāpati, Indra, Soma, Viśvāmitra, etc., and says that no fault is attached to them because of their glory [tejas]. But if anyone else should act in this way, not being divine, (there would be a fault attached to them).' 103

The idea that we must heed the teachings of the gods but not imitate their actions also appears in Mahayana Buddhism, though it arises from a very different philosophy; the Buddha says, 'Knowing (men) to be perverted, infatuated, and ignorant, I teach final rest, myself not being at rest'.[104] The idea that man should behave better than god is implicit in much of the Old Testament and also appears in the teachings of the Buddha; thus he is said to have remarked that human beings are ideally situated to seek moral perfection or release, because they are more highly endowed than animals (who lack the intellect to strive for salvation) but less privileged than the gods (who, enjoying such happiness in heaven, do not have the motivation to seek salvation).[105] A similar concept appears in a verse addressed to Śiva:

> 'From my incarnation I infer that in a former birth
> I surely gave you, Lord, no adoration.
> From bowing to you in this birth I shall in future
> be disincarnate [atanur] and incapable of worship.
> For these two sins [aparādhadvayam], oh Lord, I beg forgiveness.' 106

If human beings in general had a certain moral advantage over the gods, the 'enlightened' man was far above the conventional moral law. This belief may have led to certain abuses, and in order to counteract these tendencies and to return to a measure of orthodoxy, some Tantras finally denied to their worshippers the basic justification for their heterodox action, saying that a theoretical statement of fact that one who knows brahma is beyond good and evil is not a statement that he

may will to do, and is permitted to do, evil.[107]

These conflicting philosophical points of view are all pertinent to the problem of Śiva as a heretic and as the author of heresies. Ultimately, the majority opinion, and certainly the orthodox opinion, compromised by maintaining that the god was not to be imitated by his worshippers in all his immoral actions, but that the heresies which he introduced on purpose for the sake of immoral men were to be followed -- at least by those men. The major Śaiva heresies are said to have been propounded by him for certain special groups of men, not those set above the normal moral law (such as the 'enlightened' men and Brahmins exempted by the Upaniṣads and certain esoteric texts) but those specifically set below the normal moral law: the heretic groups created by the curses of Dakṣa, Dadhīca, and the sages Gautama and Bhṛgu. We have already seen how the first two groups arose; now let us consider the final groups, all of whom are associated with the Pine Forest in some way.

4. Gautama and the Pine Forest sages

Gautama is listed as one of the greatest heretics in the Padma Purāṇa conversation between Śiva and Pārvatī cited above, and his curse is an accepted source of heresy: 'Either because of the curse of Gautama and the others, or because of the great evil [mahāpāpa, i.e. saṃsāra], men outside the Vedas and those who are born of mixed castes, as well as women and Śūdras, take the Tantras as their text.'[108] 'The curse of Gautama' may be interpreted objectively or subjectively -- that is, a curse given by Gautama or to him -- for there are two myths of heresy in which he plays an important role, first as author of the curse and then as its recipient.

The first set of myths attempts to trace the seed of evil back at least one step, as usual, to explain why Gautama cursed the sages:

> Formerly, in the Pine Forest, there were householder sages who performed asceticism for Śiva. One day a terrible drought destroyed all living creatures, and the sage Gautama fed the Pine Forest sages, at their request, for twelve years. Then the drought ended and the sages wished to leave Gautama, but he wished them to stay. They created the illusion of a cow who died at Gautama's touch, and they used this as an excuse to refuse his food and to return to the Pine Forest to practise asceticism. When Gautama discovered that the cow-slaughter was an illusion, he cursed them to be beyond the pale of the Vedas. 109

Even in this myth, which is an attempt to find a cause for the later curse in the Pine Forest, the curse of Gautama is taken back yet another step and attributed ultimately to a drought and hunger, the source of the **first** sin, in the corpus of myths of the origin of evil. Several versions of the episode emphasize the force of famine:

> Once, Indra sent no rain for fifteen years. Because of the drought, food was scarce; it was not possible to count the corpses in every house. Some people ate horses and others even ate human corpses; a mother would even eat her child, and a husband his wife, all were so tortured by hunger and famine.[110] . . Formerly, in the ripening of time, and by the force of the *karma* of living creatures, there was a twelve-year drought. Men behaved in evil ways because of their desire for food; some, deluded, killed and ate others; some ate elephants and horses. 111

Once more, the cause of the drought is further sought in time and *karma*, but the narrator dwells upon the inevitable evils of hunger.

The *Skanda Purāṇa* centres wholly upon the famine:

> Once there was a twelve-year drought in the hermitage of the Seven Sages -- Atri, Vasiṣṭha, Kaśyapa, Bharadvaja, Viśvāmitra, Jamadagni, and Gautama. They abandoned all dharma and vows and rituals and they ate improper things; mothers abandoned their sons, men their wives, kings their dependents, and everyone stole grain shamelessly, oppressed with hunger. The Seven Sages wandered until they found a dead male child; they cooked and ate him. As they continued to

> wander, they found a lake full of lotuses; they collected the delicious lotus filaments and left them on the bank while they performed their lustrations, but upon emerging from the lake they found that the filaments were gone. Furious, and tortured by hunger, they suspected one another and cursed the unknown thief to be omnivorous, hypocritical, a drinker of wine and eater of meat, to have unlawful intercourse with women, to sell the Vedas, to be a whoremaster, a horse dealer, to question Śūdras about dharma, to revile his guru, and to dishonour his parents. At length, a wandering ascetic named Śunomukha admitted to the theft, which he had only done in order to test their dharma, for he was Indra in disguise. Indra said that he was satisfied by their lack of greed; the sages remained there performing asceticism and they obtained immortality. 112

Here, as in the second set of Pine Forest myths to be discussed below, Gautama is himself one of the cursed sages. The original myth, in which the drought sent by Indra causes the sages to become heretics, is reworked to the credit of the sages, and the drought becomes a trial of their 'lack of greed'. The god's purpose here is not to tempt them in order to make them evil (as is usually the case and as is suggested by their eventually realized goal -- to achieve immortality) but to tempt them in order to prove their virtue. The curse of heresy, which is their punishment in those versions in which they fail the test, remains in this myth, for in fact the sages do _not_ behave well -- they abandon all dharma and violate food tabus. Yet, since they are _said_ to have behaved well, the curse is not applied to them; apparently it is applied to Indra (whose role is assumed by Śiva in most versions of the myth), but nothing further is said about it when Indra's identity is revealed. Thus the myth fails to resolve the two conflicting attitudes toward the virtue of the sages, and, as a result of this failure, the curse of the sages which is the original point of the myth is transformed and nullified, and the heresy is left without any object.

The Devībhāgavata Purāṇa dwells at length upon the nature of the heresy which Gautama brings upon the other sages:

> When Gautama learned what the sages had done (in creating an illusion that he had killed a cow), he was furious, and he cursed them to be averse to Śiva and to the eternal rituals, outside all sacrifices, Vedas, and lawbooks, to be evil men, adulterers, averse to the gods, sellers of the Vedas, initiated in the Kālamukha, Śākta, Buddhist, Jain, Pāśupata and Sāmbhava sects, and into other heresies and paths outside the Vedas.[113]. . He cursed them to turn from all traditional religious acts and beliefs; to be attached to the Kāpālika, Buddhist, Pāñcarātra, Kāmaśāstra, and various heretic doctrines and rituals; to commit adultery and incest. When the sages begged for mercy, Gautama said, 'You will be reborn in the Kali age, and if you honour the feet of Gāyatrī you will be released from the curse'. Therefore the sages were born in the Kali age outside the Vedas, followers of Kaulika, Kāpālika, Buddhist, and Jain heresies, doomed to return to the Kumbhipaka hell because of their karma. [114]

Although there is an apparent moment of mercy, when the sages are promised salvation if they worship Gāyatrī (i.e., return to the Vedic rituals), the curse of heresy would seem to make such worship impossible, and they are finally doomed to hell anyway.

The question of Gautama's mercy toward the sages is central to the Śiva Purāṇa version of this myth, which consists of two different versions explicitly compared precisely from the standpoint of mercy. The second of these versions is largely the same as that of the Devībhāgavata Purāṇa, which is clearly the more common and widespread of the two, for it is introduced after the first version told by the Paurāṇika, when the sages hearing the tale interrupt to say, 'But we heard it told in a different way; we heard that Gautama cursed the sages'. The bard then replies, 'That is true, but it happened in a different eon', and he goes on to tell the Devībhāgavata Purāṇa version, altering a few details. The most important of these changes is the

attempt to explain the quarrel in terms of a different basic human flaw -- sexual desire instead of hunger:

> When Gautama saw the sages suffering from famine, he performed asceticism for Varuṇa and obtained from him the boon of unlimited water. His hermitage became fruitful and he fed everyone. But one day the evil wives of the sages, who felt dishonoured because of the water [? perhaps because they had to beg for it], became angry and spoke to their husbands spitefully about Gautama. The sages, whose wits were destroyed, then made an illusion of a cow who died at Gautama's touch. But when Gautama found out about the cow he became angry and he cursed the sages, saying, 'You evil ones who have caused me misery will be averse to the Vedas, devoid of faith in the Śaiva path which gives release. You will fall to hell, and my curse will affect all your descendants, who will not be Śaivas, and you will dwell in hell with your sons. You will be Cāṇḍālas.' And so all the sages, beyond the pale of Śaiva dharma, and all their sons, lived together, and at the beginning of the Kali age there will be many wicked men. 115

This text implies that the sages were reborn first in hell and then on earth in the Kali age, as in the Devībhāgavata Purāṇa version. Although the motif of famine remains, it is subservient to the wickedness of the sages' wives, which is an essential point of many of the Pine Forest myths. The role of the wives is, however, more fully developed in the other, more obscure, version of the myth which the bard first tells to the sages:

> Formerly, the sage Gautama lived with his virtuous wife Ahalyā, performing asceticism. One day a drought arose for a hundred years, and Gautama performed asceticism for Varuṇa, who granted him the boon of a fabulous well which irrigated his hermitage and made it continuously fruitful, a place of refuge for everyone. Sages came there by the thousands and lived there with their wives and children. One day Gautama's disciples went to the well and were abused by the wives of the sages, who insisted upon drawing their water first; then Ahalyā went there and was abused by them. The evil-wishing women lied to their husbands about what had happened, and when the sages heard of this, being in the power of their future karma, they became angry with Gautama and propitiated Gaṇeśa to make an obstacle against Gautama, to throw Gautama out of the hermitage. Gaṇeśa objected at first, saying, 'It is not right to become angry

with someone who has not offended you. You will be destroyed. You are deluded by the power of your wives.' Yet, when they insisted, he agreed to do as they asked, and the illusion of the cow killed by Gautama took place; it was Gaṇeśa who became the cow. The sages and their wives abused Gautama and Ahalyā and threw stones at them and drove them out of the hermitage.

Gautama begged the sages to tell him how he might expiate his sin [pāpa], and they prescribed a lengthy series of expiations, which Gautama performed faithfully. At length Śiva appeared, and when Gautama asked to be made free of sin [niṣpāpa], Śiva said, 'You always were free of sin, but those evil sages deceived you. By the mere sight of them, let others become most evil, for they have become murderers and there is no expiation for them anywhere.' But Gautama said, 'The sages did me a favour, since if they had not acted as they did I would not have seen you. I am grateful to them for this favour, for their evil action has brought good fortune to me.' Gautama then asked Śiva to let the Ganges flow through his hermitage and to remain there himself in the form of a liṅga.

When people heard of the miraculous powers of the river and the liṅga in Gautama's hermitage, they came from far and wide to worship there, and the sages who were Gautama's enemies also came there to bathe, but when the Ganges saw them she vanished, saying, 'These are the most evil murderers, enemies of their master, villains, heretics who must not even be looked upon'. But Gautama said to her, 'These men were blinded by their passion for women, and he who does a favour to those who have offended against him, he will become purified.' The Ganges appeared again and said that the sages must beg Gautama's forgiveness and she would reveal herself to them. Then they who had been murderers became ashamed and begged forgiveness. 116

In this version, Gautama is not merely one of the Seven Sages but also the husband of Ahalyā, as he is in the myth in which Indra commits adultery; this may serve to link this cycle of myths with the episode in which Indra himself 'tests' the famished sages, as well as with the group in which Indra's failure to send rain provides the initial impetus. Ahalyā is not, however, the epitome of female evil here, but the foil against which the wickedness of the other Pine Forest wives is displayed. The manner in which the episode of the cow is 'explained' by the wickedness of the wives in this version may be seen in the use of the exact same phrase, 'because of the power of future karma', which

is used here to justify the sages' subservience to their wives but which is used in the other Śiva Purāṇa version to explain why the cow falls dead.[117] In the vain attempt to find a first cause for the seed of evil, the myth falls back upon the image of the fabulous, fruitful garden of virtue which is ruined by hunger and sinful women.

More significant changes may be seen, however, in the manner in which the myth attempts to trace the further consequences of evil, to see how the chain, whatever its origin, may ultimately be broken; in this it borrows several motifs from the later myths of Vena. The question of expiation is first applied to Gautama rather than to the sages, for in this text they throw him out of the hermitage, rather than cause him to give them an excuse to leave themselves. In order to do this, they enlist the assistance of Gaṇeśa, just as Śiva uses Gaṇeśa to throw Divodāsa out of Benares, and Gaṇeśa at first objects to bringing about this evil, just as Death objects to his/her role. Gaṇeśa's objections are expressed not in moral terms but rather in terms of the Pāśupata logic: he worries that by offending against an innocent man he and the sages will be destroyed. (The myth emphasizes that the sages' wives lie about the episode at the well, precisely as they lie about Śiva in other Pine Forest myths, maintaining that he tried to seduce them when in fact they had tried to seduce him.[118] This element of false suspicion is essential to the Pāśupata technique.) The Pāśupata theme extends throughout the myth, for Gautama at the end says that he is grateful to the sages for having inadvertently done him a favour by attempting to do him a disservice; moreover, he advises the

Ganges to reveal herself to them even though they do not deserve it, since in that way she will be doing a favour to those who have offended (against her), and thus she too will gain merit. Thus, by suffering a curse which he does not deserve, and by performing an expiation for a sin which he has not committed, Gautama gains great merit.

The question of the expiation of the sages themselves is more difficult, and more reminiscent of the Vena myth. The purifying water is too pure for the wicked sages to use, and it is only by interceding in the name of mercy that Gautama is able to break the otherwise infinite chain of punishments, just as Vena's son intercedes to break the chain for him. Since Gautama refuses to take part in the corruption of the sages in this version, it remains for Śiva himself to bring the curse upon them, and indirectly it is Śiva who frees them from it as well, since it is he who brings the Ganges down to earth for them.

Śiva provides more directly for the sages' release from the heresy in the Varāha Purāṇa version of the myth:

> When Gautama had cursed the Seven Sages, they went to Śiva and said, 'In the Kali age, sages will have your form, with matted locks and the clothes of corpses; some śāstras should be given for their sake.' Śiva then made a śāstra related to Vedic ritual, called Niḥśvāsa,[119] which is the true Pāśupata śāstra; the sages became hypocrites and made their own śāstras, which, since they departed from the Vedas, were lowly rites devoid of purity. Śiva dwells only in the Niśvāsa śāstra, not in those made by fickle students of Vedānta in the Kali age. By the curse of Gautama, the Brahmins will be born in the line of Rudras; but those of them who delight in Śiva's command will obtain heaven, while those Vedānta philosophers who revile the Śaiva sect are the Brahmins who were burned by Gautama's fire [i.e., his curse]; they will go to hell, by Śiva's command, for they are heretics. 120

Here it is apparent that the sages are to be reborn in the Kali age, at which time Śiva provides for their release from the curse of Gautama by giving them heretical texts that are suitable for them. This text, like that of the Padma Purāṇa, is narrated by Śiva himself to explain why he made delusory śāstras, but, unlike that Vaiṣṇava text, the Varāha Purāṇa raises one heretical śāstra -- the 'orthodox heresy' of the Pāśupatas -- to the level of the god himself, instead of stating that all the heretical śāstras were taught by him in bad faith. The text is inconsistent about the fate of the sages, assigning some of them to hell and some of them to heaven, while allowing some to worship Śiva correctly in spite of their heresy, just as the Devībhāgavata Purāṇa allowed the heretics to worship the Gāyatrī.

5. Śiva cursed in the Pine Forest: the 'heresy' of liṅga-worship

The sectarian bias of each version of the myth of Gautama obviously affects the Paurāṇika's attitude to the content of the heresy which Śiva eventually teaches them; and this ambiguity is compounded in the myths of Śiva and the Pine Forest sages discussed below. But the question is further complicated by the basic Hindu attitude toward the purpose of heresy, the manner in which it is sometimes used to destroy an enemy (as in the case of the demons) but sometimes to release a friend (as in the case of the mortals of the Kali age). All of these ambiguities are pertinent to yet another sub-episode of the Pine Forest cycle, an important myth which accounts for the establishment of liṅga-worship: Śiva entered the Pine Forest disguised as a naked beggar; the sages' wives fell in love with him; the sages cursed him to be castrated; his phallus wrought havoc among them until they placated him and he taught them to worship the liṅga.[121]

In some of these myths, Śiva is cursed to be worshipped

in the form of a _liṅga_ (i.e., the _liṅga_-worship cult is regarded as a kind of inferior religion, if not necessarily a heresy), while in others he curses the hostile sages to worship him in this form (in itself a double-edged incident, depending upon whether Śiva regards _liṅga_-worship as a true doctrine to save them or an inferior doctrine to corrupt them). Yet, in the final encounter with the sages, it is evident that the cult which he establishes in the Pine Forest is a great boon for them, and one which he establishes out of his mercy toward them; there is no question of any curse.

It should be noted at the outset that almost all the myths which treat _liṅga_-worship as the result of a curse are late texts. One anomalous Sanskrit text which attributes _liṅga_-worship to a curse is not part of the Pine Forest corpus:

> One day when the sage Atri was performing asceticism with his wife Anasūyā, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva came to him and offered him a boon. When Atri continued to meditate, the three gods went to Anasūyā; Śiva had his _liṅga_ in his hand, Viṣṇu was full of erotic feeling, and Brahmā, beside himself with desire, said, 'Make love to me or I will die'. When she heard this coarse speech, Anasūyā made no reply, for, although she feared the anger of the gods, she was true to her husband. But the three gods were overcome by delusion, and they raped her by force. Then she became angry, and she cursed Śiva to be worshipped as a _liṅga_, Brahmā to be worshipped as a head, and Viṣṇu to be worshipped as feet, in order to ridicule them all, and she cursed them all to be reborn as her sons. Because of this, Śiva was born as Durvāsas. 122

The relationship between Brahmā and Anasūyā, and the way that she criticises him for his 'coarse speech', are reminiscent of the incestuous relationship which leads to the beheading of Brahmā by Śiva in an adjacent chapter of this Purāṇa;[123] this is reinforced by the fact that Anasūyā curses Brahmā to be worshipped as a head, the form in which he participates in the Kāpālika myth. A closer link with the Pine Forest myth may be seen in the pattern of the three gods in opposition to a sage, a variant

of the Pine Forest sub-motif in which the sage Bhṛgu tests the three of them before cursing Śiva to be worshipped as a liṅga. That Anasūyā regards liṅga-worship as an insult to Śiva is evident from her statement that she cursed them all in order to ridicule them.

In the majority of the Sanskrit myths of the Pine Forest, however, it is by no means clear that liṅga-worship is regarded as a curse. Usually, Śiva is indeed cursed by the sages, but he is merely cursed to be castrated; it is as a result of the difficulties which arise due to this castration that the sages are cursed in return (or at least forced) to worship the liṅga. Thus even in the Sanskrit texts the element of antipathy is present, strongly reminiscent of the Dakṣa myth: Śiva is spurned by the sages until he forces them to acknowledge his greatness and to worship him as the liṅga.[124] Once they have been forced to recognize him, however, Śiva is gratified by their worship of him in this new form, a form which he has established for their own benefit.[125] The clear division between these two aspects of the myth -- the curse of castration and the beneficial establishment of liṅga-worship -- is apparent from a text in which Sāvitrī, whom Śiva has wronged, curses him to be castrated in the Pine Forest, whereupon Gāyatrī, whom Śiva has assisted at Sāvitrī's expense, turns the curse into a boon, saying, 'When your liṅga has fallen, men will do honour to you and will thereby win heaven. You will exist forever by the banks of the Ganges in the form of a liṅga.'[126]

The Padma Purāṇa alone among Sanskrit texts of the Pine Forest myth treats liṅga-worship as an injury to Śiva and associates it with heresy:

> The gods asked Bhṛgu to decide for them who among the three gods was the greatest. Bhṛgu went to see Śiva on Mount Kailāsa, but Nandin prevented him from entering Śiva's house, saying, 'Śiva is making lov e to Pārvatī. Turn back if you wish to stay alive.' After many days of waiting at the door, Bhṛgu said, 'Since he dishonours me, while he is making love to a woman, let his form be that of the liṅga in the yoni. And since he does not recognize me, a Brahmin, let him be no Brahmin, and let his worshippers be heretics, outside the Vedas, smeared with ashes.' 127

This myth may be identified as a variant of the Pine Forest myth in two ways: both myths account for the origin of liṅga-worship, and Bhṛgu is active in both. Moreover, in another variant of this myth, Bhṛgu is said to have been sent by a group of sages to test the three gods; Bhṛgu tried Śiva's patience, and Śiva raised his trident to kill Bhṛgu, but the Goddess fell at Śiva's feet and placated him.[128] Bhṛgu is responsible for cursing the worshippers of Śiva to be heretics in one version of the Dakṣa myth, and it is he who curses Viṣṇu to become incarnate, while Viṣṇu maintains (like Śiva) that he fulfils the curse willingly, for the sake of mankind.[129]

Bhṛgu is the antagonist in another version of the myth that was cited by Abraham Roger in the seventeenth century. In this version, Bhṛgu is a 'Lord of Sages' ('Monisvvera') who comes to see Śiva when he is with Pārvatī ('Therefore the sage came at an inopportune moment'), is made to wait, and curses Śiva to become that with which he is at the moment involved; later, however, the sage ordains that anyone who worships the liṅga in the yoni will be blessed.[130] Both the curse and the blessing appear in the version of the myth recorded by the Abbé Dubois at the turn of the nineteenth century, by which time the one sage had become a group again:

'[Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Vasiṣṭha, with many sages, came to visit Śiva on Mount Kailāsa one day] and surprised him in the act of intercourse with his wife. He was not in the least disconcerted by the presence of the illustrious visitors, and so far from showing any shame at being discovered in such a position, continued to indulge in the gratification of his sensual desires. . . . At sight of him some of the gods, and especially Vishnu, began to laugh; while the rest displayed great indignation and anger, and loaded the shameless Śiva with insults and curses. [They cursed him to be banished from the society of honest folk, and they retired, covered with shame. When Śiva had recovered his senses a little and learned from the guards what had taken place] the words of the guards fell on Śiva and his wife Durgā like a clap of thunder, and they both died of grief in the same position in which the gods and the penitents had surprised them. Śiva desired that the act which had covered him with shame, and which had been the cause of his death, should be celebrated among mankind. "My shame," said he, "has killed me; but it has also given me new life, and a new shape, which is that of the lingam." [And he ordained that men should offer him worship in that form.]' 131

Nothing is said here of any benefits which might be given to anyone worshipping the linga; Śiva seems to attempt to make the best of an unfortunate situation, and it is he who ordains that linga-worship should take place, though he is embarrassed by the entire episode. It is significant that the gods and sages here curse Śiva to be 'banished from the society of honest folk' -- i.e., to become an outcaste.

A rather loose variation of Dubois' version of the myth was narrated recently by a Brahmin in Benares:

'Śiva had been discovered in bed with his wife Durga by Brahma, Vishnu and other gods. He had been so drunk that he had not thought it necessary to stop. The majority, all except Vishnu and a few of the broader-minded, thought them nasty and brutish and said so. Śiva and Durga died of shame in the position in which they were discovered; but before they expired Śiva expressed the wish that mankind should worship the act manifest in the form which he now took to himself, the lingam.' 132

Here Śiva is merely said to be 'nasty and brutish', but this is given as a descriptive statement rather than a curse. Another

contemporary version of the myth eliminates even this vague pejorative statement but restores a vital element from the older Pine Forest stories; here it is Śiva who comes into the forest where the sages are practising asceticism, rather than they who come to his house, as in the Bhṛgu series:

> 'Shiva one day roamed into a forest with his wife where some Rishis were practising austerities and, forgetting that the spot was sacred to the sages, suddenly became amorous. In the heat of the moment he lost all sense of decorum and embraced his spouse in an open place. As ill-luck would have it some of the sages who inhabited the woods came that way, and saw Shiva and his wife in each other's arms. The outraged saints converted Shiva into a Lingam by a curse.' 133

Although Śiva is not cursed to be a heretic in this text, it is explicitly said that he was converted into a liṅga by a curse, not merely castrated, in contrast with other secondary texts in which he himself (freely or under compulsion) creates the practice of liṅga-worship.

A final contemporary version returns to the primary Pine Forest pattern but again omits the reference to heresy:

> '[After the death of Satī, Śiva wandered like a demented creature through the forest. The young wives of the sages asked him the cause of his distress, and Śiva told them that his beautiful wife had killed herself because he had been insulted by her father. One of the women laughed and said that] he looked indeed a man for whom a beautiful young woman would commit suicide! This taunt so infuriated the god of virility that he violated her. Her husband came on the scene and cursed the god to be worshipped as the Lingam.' 134

Śiva's direct sexual encounter is with the wife of a sage, rather than with his own wife, but Satī is nevertheless the root of the trouble since her death causes both his entrance into the forest in a 'demented' state and the insult which leads him to violate the sage's

wife and to be cursed to become the linga.

Thus the myth develops from the Sanskrit texts, in which Śiva, though in many ways antagonistic toward the sages and cursed to be castrated, establishes linga-worship for their benefit, through the Padma Purāṇa episode where he is cursed to be a heretic and to be worshipped as the linga, into the texts in which (probably under the influence of European abhorrence of phallic cult) the form of worship itself is taken to be heretical and unclean, inflicted upon Śiva against his will, yet even here a source of blessing for the worshipper. The tension between the apparent antagonism between Śiva and the sages in terms of the plot and the recurrent insistence by the Paurāṇika that Śiva came to the forest in order to help the sages is evident even in the Sanskrit texts, where the ambivalent attitude of the god toward his heretical worshippers results in various contradictions and confusions. The antagonism is evident not only from the exchange of curses but also from the historical context, for Śiva is traditionally opposed to sages whose excess asceticism threatens the universe, a fault sometimes attributed to the Pine Forest sages.[135] Nevertheless, the Purāṇas insist that Śiva acted only out of the highest motives:

> When Śiva entered the Pine Forest, he intended to do a favour for the forest-dwellers there. . . . Śiva entered the Pine Forest in disguise and enlightened the sages dwelling there. . . . When Śiva was cursed by the sages, he himself let his linga falls, in order to instruct them. 136

At the end of the myth, however aggressively Śiva may have acted toward the sages, he always shows them his favour: 'The Goddess pitied

the sages and begged Śiva to give them peace from passion and hatred; thus implored, Śiva looked upon them with favour and removed their delusion, giving them peace.'[137] Nīlakaṇṭha, in commenting on two epithets of Śiva in the Mahābhārata, explains both the aggression and the favour: 'He is called "Greatly Reviled" because he was reviled by the sages, who said, "He came into the Pine Forest in order to bewitch the minds of our wives, for he is an evil wretch". . . . He is called "Giver of Peace" because after the sages of the Pine Forest had reviled him he gave them peace by destroying their doubts and giving them knowledge of the true nature of things.'[138] The initial aggression is necessary, for only by spending their wrath on him (and perhaps by a kind of dveṣa-bhakti) can the sages be enlightened: 'The sages of the Pine Forest became angry at Śiva. . . . They did not recognize him. . . . As soon as they had cursed him, they knew him to be the lord, and they sought refuge with him.'[139]

6. Śiva enlightens the Pine Forest sages

In the simpler versions of the Pine Forest myth, Śiva enlightens the sages by teaching them the non-heretical, though non-Vedic, cult of liṅga-worship. In later versions, however, Śiva comes to the Pine Forest to teach the sages other, heretical doctrines, and yet even here he is said to act for their benefit. These heresies are said to be taught by Śiva to release the sages from the previous curses of heresy, just as Viṣṇu teaches the Buddhist heresy to Vena to release him from a curse. This episode is foreshadowed at the end of the Kūrma Purāṇa version of the Gautama myth which seeks, like the episodes of the Varāha and Devībhāgavata Purāṇas, to temper the curse with the

mercy of a hope of salvation:

> When Viṣṇu learned that Gautama had cursed the sages to be outside the pale of the Vedas, he went to Śiva and said, 'There is not even a drop of merit in a man who is beyond the Vedas. But nevertheless, because of our devotion to them, we must protect them even though they will go to hell. To protect and delude the evil ones beyond the Vedas, let us make Śāstras of delusion.' Śiva agreed, and they made the Kāpāla [or Kāpila], Nakula, Vāma, Bhairava, Pūrvapaścima, Pāñcarātra, Pāśupata, Mudgala, and other Śāstras. For the sake of the sages, Śiva descended to earth when the force of the curse had come to an end, and he begged alms from those who were outcaste, deluding them as he came there adorned with skulls, ashes, and matted locks, saying, 'You will go to hell, but you will then be reborn and gradually work your way to the place of merit.' 140

The ambivalent moral status of the sages in this version of the myth is evident from Viṣṇu's statement: the men are evil, and doomed to hell, but the gods must protect and delude them so that they will ultimately find merit. Even though the doctrines that Śiva teaches are mediating ones -- below the Vedas but above damnation -- he cannot teach them while the sages are still cursed to be heretics, but must come 'when the force of the curse had come to an end' -- and teach them new heresies. The prediction that he gives them at the end of the myth is similar to that which is described at the end of the myth of Dakṣa and Dadhīca:

> Śiva promised that those sages who read the Vedas would go to heaven; that those who did not would become householders, and he would release them from their sins by coming to them at noon, smeared with ashes, and begging alms from them. Whoever gave alms to him would go to heaven. 141

This prediction is realized in the Pine Forest, where Śiva releases the sages by begging from them.

The Devībhāgavata Purāṇa explains how it is that Śiva hopes to free them from heresy by teaching another heresy:

> There are various non-Vedic _śāstras_ in the world, such as the Vāma, Kāpālika, Kaulaka, and Bhairavāgama. They were expounded by Śiva for the sake of delusion and have no other cause; they were taught because of the curse of Dakṣa, Bhṛgu, and Dadhīca. In order to raise up, in the manner of stairs, step by step, those Brahmins who were burned by the curse and forced outside the path of the Vedas, Śiva expounded the Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, Saura, Śākta, and Gaṇapātya _āgamas_; even though there is here and there a bit which is opposed to the Vedas, there is no sin in their being taken up by Vaidikas. 142.

The _Kūrma Purāṇa_ explicitly connects the curses of Dadhīca and Gautama in a chain, one leading to the other:

> Formerly, in the sacrifice of Dakṣa, Brahmins were burned by the curse of Dadhīca, who said, 'These Brahmins and others who were burned by the curse of the noble Gautama will be born in the Kali age and will follow vows outside the Vedas, evil ways. Then in the Kali age, Rudra will bring salvation to men and gods. He will become incarnate in order to establish the Vedas and lawbooks for the sake of his devotees.' 143

Gautama's curse precedes Dadhīca's, and Śiva releases the sages from both. Elsewhere, the sages responsible for the curses of heresy are merely listed in a group, which sometimes includes Bhṛgu; all three of these sages are included in the group of Seven Sages or Pine Forest sages, so that the perpetrators of the curse as well as the recipients are the subject of Śivà's grace at the end. Gautama, who appears most often as both subject and object of the curse, is implicated in two further offshoots of heresy: he is the author of the Nyāya heresy in the _Padma Purāṇa_ and he is one of the Seven Sages who are guilty of eating the dead male child. Śiva releases all of these sages from the curse of heresy by begging from them in the Pine Forest.

The Pine Forest sages are often said to be heretics. In the _Mahābhārata_ they are simply atheists:

> Certain Brahmins abandoned their houses and went to the forest, thinking, 'This is dharma', and they engaged in chastity. Indra had pity on them and told them to give up their asceticism and to devote themselves to their own _svadharma_ as householders, to practise

> Vedic rituals [karmāṇi]. Then they abandoned the way of atheists and took to the householder dharma. 144

This 'atheism' [nāstikyam] is apparently based upon the anti-ascetic tradition which regarded any asceticism, particularly when practised by householders, as a threat. Another form of atheism is described in the Skanda Purāṇa, which also identifies the sages specifically as those of the Pine Forest:

> Formerly, in the Pine Forest there were Brahmins performing asceticism, vying against each other in various ways, but they did not achieve fulfilment [siddhi]. Then they thought, 'The sages did not speak the truth when they said that success in everything is obtained by asceticism'. Overcome by impatience, they put aside their dharma of asceticism and became atheists. But at this time a voice said to them, 'Do not despise the scriptures. Do not blame asceticism or dharma, but blame yourselves. You strive against each other, desiring success, and because of that your asceticism is fruitless, destroyed by desire, egotism, anger, and greed. Go to the Mahākāla woods and propitiate the liṅga of Śiva and you will obtain success.' The Brahmins were amazed, and they obeyed the voice and worshipped the liṅga of Śiva and obtained fulfilment [siddhi]. 145

The philosophical commitment of this text is directly opposed to that of the Mahābhārata: where the Epic considered the householder's asceticism to be atheism, the Skanda Purāṇa considered the abandonment of asceticism (or the false performance of asceticism) to be atheism. Indra 'converts' the ascetics from the first excess; Śiva 'converts' them from the other extreme by teaching them liṅga-worship.

One contemporary text states that 'several heretic sages refused to believe in the gods and in the Triad. Shiva decided to visit them in their forest home and teach them the truth.'[146] These sages are atheists, followers of the most simple and obvious of heresies. Other late versions of the Pine Forest myth identify other heresies:

'It came to the knowledge of Shiva that there resided in the Tāragam [Pine] forest ten thousand heretical rishis, who taught that the universe is eternal, that souls have no lord, and that the performance of works alone suffices for the attainment of salvation. Shiva determined to teach them the truth. [He seduced the sages and their wives].' 147

The heresy is difficult to identify. That 'souls have no lord' might be the teaching of the atheists in general;'that the performance of works alone suffices for the attainment of salvation' is the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā view which Śiva challenges in the Kūrma Purāṇa version of the Pine Forest myth.[148] T. Gopinatha Rao suggests another heresy: 'In the forest of Taraka dwelt multitudes of Heretical Rishis, followers of the Mimansa. Thither proceeded Śiva to confute them.'[149] The Mīmāṃsā is one of the six classical 'āstika' schools of Hindu philosophy, hardly a heresy, as it is based upon exposition of and absolute obedience to the Vedas (though a Vedāntin would regard the Mīmāṃsā as 'incomplete').

A few late versions of the myth regard the sages as Buddhists:

'The Buddhist Bhikshus. . . did not understand the true significance of Linga and fell a prey to moral lapses, even taking recourse to sex-perversions. Notwithstanding the fact that they apparently derided Linga worship, the women folk in their camp were seen overpowered by erotic impulse. It is this hypocricy found amongst their order that is brought to light in this satirical incident. . . . The trend of the story is a subtle reflection on the morals of the Buddhist monks in the monasteries who were ultimately converted to the way of the Pāśupatas in putting their faith in the efficacy of the Linga.' 150

The view that the sages were Buddhists is supported explicitly by no Sanskrit text, but the Kathāsaritsāgagara states that Śiva himself took the form of a Buddhist monk (kṣapaṇaka) to enter the Pine Forest in order to show Pārvatī that even sages are not calm.[151] The Pine Forest heresy was identified as Buddhism by one nineteenth century European, who based his belief on the mistaken assumption that the Gautama of the Pine Forest was the same as Gautama the Buddha. The Pine Forest

myth is told here much as it appears in the Śiva Purāṇa, but the author then remarks:

> 'Gautama is the principle divinity of the Burmese. According to tradition, he was so offended with the Brahmins that he determined to separate himself from them and establish a new religion.' 152

He accompanies this statement with a drawing of a Buddha, entitled, 'Gautama, or Budh'.

In the true context of the original myth, the heresy is of secondary importance. Once in the forest, Śiva seduces the wives of the sages, and the heresy is merely a later rationalization of the adulterous behaviour which Śiva inherited from the Epic myth of Agni and the sages' wives.[153] Thus, René Grousset places the heresy in its proper perspective -- as an afterthought to justify Śiva's less laudable intentions in the earlier versions of the myth:

> 'In a fit of virtuous indignation at an act of incest contemplated by Brahmā, Śiva cut off one of the culprit's five heads, after which he was . . . overcome by madness. This madness went so far as to make him commit various strange actions, such as the seduction of the wives of the anchorites in the forest of Taragam -- though, to be sure, the anchorites were heretics!' 154

The connexion with the beheading of Brahmā is important, as we shall see below, but the heresy of the sages is of minor importance, as in fact it fails entirely to explain Śiva's other 'strange actions' such as the seduction of the sages' wives, an act of no doctrinal meaning.

A similarly illogical juxtaposition of the seduction and the vague 'heresy' appears in another contemporary account:

> 'The God Shiva as Bhikshatana (the beggar) had to atone for his crime of cutting off Brahma's head, by begging for his food from door to door. In the course of his wanderings he used to infuriate the Brahmins, who did not believe in him, by amours with their wives.' 155

That the Brahmins 'did not believe in him' is evidently superfluous to this myth, as it was superfluous to the earliest Sanskrit versions. Yet, if one goes back still further, to the Vedic Prajāpati myth underlying the Pine Forest episode (and still associated with it in these late versions), the heresy proves to be an ancient element of the myth: the gods/Prajāpati/Dakṣa are punished because they refuse to give Rudra a share -- i.e., they do not believe in him.

For the lustful behaviour of the Pāśupata is closely connected with the Kāpālika cult, and the persistence of the Kāpālika motif in the Pine Forest indicates that, whether or not the sages of the Pine

Forest were heretics, Śiva himself enters the forest in the role of a heretic, a Kāpālika. The Pine Forest myth directly follows the episode of the beheading of Brahmā in many Sanskrit texts,[156] and there are explicit references to the Pāśupata and Kāpālika cults: at the end of one Pine Forest myth, Śiva says to the sages, 'Formerly I proclaimed the Pāśupata vow for the salvation of all; one should perform this vow peacefully, with a controlled mind and a body smeared with ashes, taking pleasure in chastity, naked or with a loin cloth.'[157] Elsewhere, it is said that Śiva established in the Pine Forest the Kāpāla and Pāśupata cults, among others,[158] and that he established the Śaiva, Pāśupata, Kāladāmana and Kāpālika sects.[159] The Śiva Purāṇa describes the way in which Śiva allowed himself to be reviled and beaten for twelve years,[160] and other Pāśupata qualities of his behaviour there have been pointed out above.

The Kāpālika aspect of the Pine Forest myth appears in two versions of the myth which are also reminiscent of the related myth of Dakṣa:

> Formerly, there was a great sacrifice in the Mahākāla forest, and all the Brahmins went there. Śiva took the form of a Kāpālika, with a skull in his hand and skulls for ornaments, bald, smeared with funeral ashes, and he went there. The sages reviled him and started to throw him out, but he promised to go away when he had been fed. He threw the skull upon the altar, and the sages, who did not recognize Śiva, killed him and threw the skull out, but another skull immediately took its place. Millions of skulls appeared in this manner, and then the Brahmins realized that the man was Śiva. They praised him, and Śiva said, 'In the midst of all the skulls, there is a liṅga which will dispel the sin of Brahminicide, in expiation for which I was wandering as a Kāpālika myself. Worship it and you will be absolved of your sins.' They praised him and worshipped the liṅga. 161

As usual in the Sanskrit texts, the original antagonism between the sages and Śiva (based here, as in the Dakṣa myth, upon the Kāpālika's

exclusion from the sacrifice) results in his favour to the sages and the granting of the boon of liṅga-worship. The motif of expiation supplies an important link: the liṅga absolves the sages of their (unspecified) sins, presumably including the sin of having offended their god, just as it releases the god himself from the sin (Brahminicide) which caused them to offend him in the first place.

Another Pine Forest myth which stresses the skulls goes into greater detail about the 'sins' from which the Brahmins are to be released:

> Śiva entered the sacrificial grounds to beg, carrying a great skull and adorned with skulls. The priests reviled him and threw out the skull he was carrying, but more and more skulls appeared to replace it. The priests accused him of coming there for their women, and they beat him until he cursed them, saying, 'You will be beyond the Vedas, devoid of the Vedas, wearing matted locks, adulterers without progeny, begging for alms and living on the scraps of others. You will seduce the wives of other men, and you will take pleasure in prostitutes and dice. But those who live without egoism or wealth will be born again in good families. And those who are peaceful and constrained and devoted to me will not lose their knowledge, wealth, or descendants.' Thus he gave them a curse and a boon, and he vanished. 162

This is the most emphatic of all the texts in its description of Śiva's curse of the sages, but their heresy is rather vague: the sages are to be outcastes (beyond the pale of the Vedas) but their lust is emphasized, as in the early myths of corruption, and only the statement that they are to have matted locks implies a particularly Śaiva heresy. Thus Śiva curses them to be heretics in his own image, but even here he tempers his curse with mercy.

How can Śiva give the sages salvation by teaching them a new heresy? The myth offers several answers based upon the concept of moral relativity. Though the sages are doomed to hell, Viṣṇu and Śiva decide to help them by giving them <u>some</u> religion, albeit a heresy, since they are denied the

Vedas. 'In order to raise up, in the manner of stairs, those Brahmins who are outside the Vedas, Śiva expounded the Śaiva doctrines, which, though occasionally contradictory to the Vedas, are not sinful for Vaidikas'.[163] Because of the curse, the sages needed something to bridge the gap between true religion and complete darkness, to purify them enough so that they could enter the waters of purification: they needed an orthodox heresy. This use of an intermediary doctrine in the Pine Forest is discussed by Nīlmaṇi Mukhopadhyāya:

> 'Mention is made of certain Brahmanas who had lost the privilege of studying the Vedas through the curse of the sage Gautama, and who were directed by [Śiva and Viṣṇu] to write on and teach other sciences of a perverted character, showing their utility for the confounding of the wicked, and thereby find a way to the expiation of their sins. It is not easy to describe what these sciences were, but one thing is clear, that all this means a covert attack aimed at the schisms consequent on that nascent spirit of innovation exhibited in the various forms of Śākta, Vaiṣṇava, and Śaiva worship which sprung up in medieval India after Buddhism had been stamped out.' 164

How the sages were to expiate their sins by corrupting others into their own heresy is not clear. Perhaps their own guilt was to absolve them, as it was to torture the demons described by Holwell. It is rather in the 'lost privilege' of Vedic worship that the usefulness of their heresy should be sought.

The basic principle in these chains of heresy is that of 'homeopathic' curses: One can teach heresy only to a heretic; 'you can't cheat an honest man'. The curse merely emphasizes the fault which inspires it. Thus, the Goddess says that she created the Kāpāla, Bhairava, Yāmala, Vāma, Ḍāmara, Kāpila, Pāñcarātra and Ārhata śāstras which are opposed to the Vedas and lawbooks, in order to delude in the next life those who here delude men with evil śāstras (ye kuśāstrābhiyogena mohayantīha mānavān mayā sraṣṭāni śāstrāṇi mohāyaiṣāṃ bhavāntare).[165] Only the corrupt are susceptible

to corruption (the 'good' demons are a notable exception to this), and only they can profit by it, as it is better than the corruption in which they already dwell. Viṣṇu is said to have become the Buddha because of the lack of enlightenment, the force of heresy, and the madness prevalent at the time[166] -- that is, to root out evil with evil, just as Prajāpati cursed those demons who were already evil. In one text, Śiva says that he reveals himself primarily for the sake of atheists, to keep them from being evil-doers;[167] elsewhere, he is said to become incarnate for the sake of all creatures, and as an instruction to atheists.[168] Were there only believers, god would not need to partake in religious life or to prove his existence. A similar sentiment, though tainted with a Vaiṣṇava bias, appears in Madhva's statement that the Śaiva scriptures were composed by Śiva at Viṣṇu's command, in order to delude men with false śāstras, to reveal Śiva and to conceal Viṣṇu (prakāśaṃ kuru cātmānam aprakāśaṃ ca māṃ kuru);[169] the distinction which the gods are always so concerned to maintain between themselves and mortals is here extended to a sectarian moral test characteristic of later bhakti mythology; still, even here, the gods wish to confuse the heretics.

In this view, Śiva makes men heretics in the first place so that he can ultimately enlighten them, just as he destroys Himālaya's love for him so that he can re-inspire that love. This is perhaps an extension of the orthodox idea that good can only exist when evil is also present. Śiva teaches heresy as a favour to the prodigal sages.[170] This serves either to make them slightly better, so that they may start on the path back to the Vedas, or to make them so evil that they must reach the farthest point of the cycle and rebound from the extreme, to become good again.

V. The Tantric Myths of the Kali Age

Heresy is thus the first step to salvation for those who are not yet capable of proceeding on the higher path. This is the philosophy which underlies certain rationalizations of Tantric religion: it is the path for those incapable of higher (Vedic) religion. The Tantras are said to be useful even for those who are excessively evil; those who abandon the Vedas will be initiated into the Pañcarātra, Kāpāla, and other heresies.[1] The difficulty of understanding the Vedas, which was one of the historical causes for the rise and assimilation of non-Vedic doctrines, is accepted by exponents of Vedic religion: Viṣṇu, knowing that the Vedas were difficult to grasp, became incarnate as Vyāsa Viṭapaśa and divided the Vedas into branches.[2]

What may thus appear as a doctrine which allows immorality to members of a religion is considered by the Hindus themselves more as a doctrine which allows religion even to those who are immoral. Sir John George Woodroffe noted that 'the bent toward religion of some sort is so strong in India that some of its people even "sin religiously"'.[3] This belief is supported by the doctrine of svadharma; thus Eliot writes, 'An immoral occupation need not be irreligious; it simply requires gods of a special character.'[4] In the field of religion, however, there is an element of choice; thus the Kūrma Purāṇa remarks that each man worships a divinity who appeals to him.[5] Yet the religion does not consist merely in the sin itself; just as special gods sanctify certain profane aspects of life, so the worshipper must make a special effort to transform the spiritual tone of his behaviour. Thus Woodroffe

remarks, 'Every ritual of sexual union must be performed correctly, so that a man does not offer his sin to the deity: the natural, animal functions must be converted into acts of worship.'[6]

This process of conversion takes place within the framework of the transition from irreligion through heresy to religion, which is the basis of Tantric rationalization. Blood-drinking demons excuse themselves on the gounds that evil acts and sexual faults in their past have given them a nature unfit for higher action,[7] thus justifying immorality by immorality in the classical Hindu manner. T. O. Ling, in a discussion of the role of native demonology in the Buddhist church in Burma, speaks of the retention of the figure of Māra in Buddhism: 'Such a symbol would have a particular appropriateness for the purpose of leading towards the ultimate truth those whose native mental world was largely coloured by demonological ideas.'[8] This is precisely akin to the concept of 'weaning' expounded by apologists for the Tantras:

> 'Śiva knowing the animal propensity of their common life must lead them to take flesh and wine, prescribed these [Tantric] rites with a view to lesson the evil and to gradually wean them from enjoyment by promulgating conditions under which alone such enjoyment could be had, and in associating it with religion. "It is better to bow to Nārāyaṇa with one's shoes on than never to bow at all."' 9

Śūdras and the victims of curses are forbidden to study the Vedas; certain others are incapable. Out of pity for all of them, Śiva teaches heresy, raising them up 'step by step', a doctrine which may have been influenced by the Buddhist idea of 'skill in means' -- suiting the teaching to the level of the person to be enlightened.

The Tantras are particularly well suited for men of the Kali age, who are so benighted that they can neither understand nor appreciate the Vedas. People fallen from Vedic rites and afraid of Vedic penances

should resort to the Tantras;[10] the Pāñcarātras, Vaikhānasas, and Bhāgavatas use Tantric texts written by Śiva for people who have fallen from the Vedas.[11] The Kūrma Purāṇa tells of an outcaste Pāñcarātra Vaiṣṇava, a Sātvata, who was prompted by Nārada to teach a śāstra suitable for bastard sons of married women and widows, for their welfare.[12] The āgamas should not be used, however, by good men; the steps work in both directions, and the gods often use them to bring good men down, just as they use them to bring heretics back to the Vedic fold.[13]

This argument -- that only low men should follow heretic texts -- is somewhat undercut by the important doctrine which states that in the Kali age, the present age, all men have fallen below the spiritual level necessary for Vedic religion and that they must proceed by the 'stairs' of heresy. As the Mahābhārata says of the Kali age, 'Nowadays, even the gods lie'.[14] This doctrine is very difficult to date. It is foreshadowed in the Brāhmaṇas in its broadest sense -- the concept that the universe proceeds through time cycles of definite duration[15] -- and P. V. Kane maintains that 'the idea that man lives in an age of degeneration evolves simultaneously in Hindu thought with the whole cyclical theory of time-reckoning'.[16] Cornelia Church has, however, discovered four distinct stages in the development of the cyclical theory of time-reckoning, in which the idea that moral virtues decrease in time occurs only in the last stage.[17] Kane agrees that the 'dharma' elements of the myth accrued to it only after its inclusion in the Purāṇic material, but he places this period as early as 200 B.C.[18] Certainly the theory of degenerative time is known to the Mahābhārata[19];

and it is fully developed in the early Purāṇas.

Significantly, Śiva is said to be the god of the Kali age,[20] for this is the age in which the Śaiva heresies flourish: in the Kali age, Brahmins and Kṣatriyas become Vāmas, Pāśupatas, and Pāñcarātras;[21] Kāpālikas are omnipresent;[22] people become Pāṣaṇḍas, Kāpālas and monks [bhikṣus].[23] The latter term may refer to Buddhists, who also characterize the Kali age: Śūdras become heretic ascetics, shaving their heads, wearing ochre robes, and propounding false doctrines.[24] The list of Buddhist heresies is sometimes given in detail:

> The earth will be crowded with many heretics and full of false ascetics. People will become Utkocas, Saugatas, delighting in Mahāyana, and they will be heretical Kāpilas and monks. Some will become Śākyas, Śrāvakas, Nirgranthas, Siddhaputras.....[25]

Usually, as in the above list, the heresies are somewhat mixed. In the Kali age, all kinds of heresy are rampant.[26] Śūdra kings support heretics, who teach evil rituals and sell the Vedas;[27] people become heretics and betray the four stages of life.[28] Men become heretics, thinking themselves wise, and, under the influence of the Kali age, man <u>of his nature</u> becomes wicked and inclined to all sins.[29] In fact, the degree to which the Kali age is upon us may be measured precisely by the degree to which heresy thrives.[30] It is interesting to note that the Kali age is almost always marked by overpopulation ('the earth will be crowded with heretics'), the constant accompaniment of evil times as well as the recurrent Indian problem of the present (Kali) age.

It is in the Kali age that the curses of Dadhīca and Gautama are

to take effect.[31] The curse of Dakṣa is also indirectly related to the heresies of the Kali age in another myth, which begins with a variant of the usual premise of overpopulation:

> King Pratardana, an ardent worshipper of Śiva, ruled a kingdom in which there was not a single heretic nor a sceptic [haitukin], and everyone followed the varṇāśramadharma. After a long time, all the most evil [pāpiṣṭā] demons [daityās and dānavās], and all the barbarians [mlecchās], left hell and went to heaven, for they followed the path of the Vedas. Yama became worried and said, 'The dwelling place of 8,400,000 creatures will be destroyed. The evil ones [pāpavān] in hell are released by the religious acts and offerings of their sons.' Indra said, 'Without these creatures, there is nothing to distinguish us. Bṛhaspati, formerly you taught the Cārvāka, Buddhist and similar doctrines, by which the demons were made to stray from the Vedic path. Do this now.' Bṛhaspati said, 'There is not a single Cārvāka, Buddhist, Jain, Yavana, nor even a Kāpālika or Kaulika in his kingdom. How then can I do this?' Indra pleaded with him, and when Bṛhaspati then offered to destroy Śiva worship in Pratardana's kingdom, by a trick, so that all the ancestors of his subjects would return to hell, the gods at first hesitated, saying to one another, 'This is not a pleasant action,' but at length they consented. Indra then commanded a kiṃnara [horse-headed man or human-headed horse] to go, disguised as a Vaiṣṇava, and to destroy the worship of Śiva. The kiṃnara spoke to the people of Pratardana's kingdom, saying that Śiva was not proclaimed by the Veda, that he lived in a burning ground, naked, adorned with snakes, carrying the head of Brahmā. Though the king defended Śiva, many people were persuaded by the kiṃnara; quarrels [or the spirit of Kali] entered the Brahmins, and they began to argue. Many people embraced atheism [nāstikatā], but the king did not kill the kiṃnara, for he feared the crime of Brahminicide. The hells became full once again.
>
> At this time Viṣṇu, who had been asleep, was awakened by the scream of Lakṣmī, who had seen a horrifying sight; she said to him, 'Mountains are falling, the seas are lifted by winds, the sun no longer shines, and the earth is about to be destroyed. You must do something.' They went, with the gods, to Mount Kailāsa. The gods apologised to Śiva for their act of deception, saying that they did it in order to protect creation. At that moment, Pratardana decapitated the kiṃnara, his followers, and all their cattle and horses. Śiva then assuaged Pratardana's anger and joined the horses' heads to the men's bodies and the men's heads to the horses' bodies, giving horses' heads to those who had spoken against Śiva and horses' bodies to those who had acted against him.

> Then Brahmā said, 'In the Kali age, when the earth is full of barbarians and men have fallen from good conduct [sarvācāraparibhraṣṭā], a very evil [pāpiṣṭa] Brahmin living in the South will beget in a widow a son named Madhu. As the Kali age progresses, Madhu will hate Śiva more and more. Then he will preach a false doctrine [māyāvādam asacchāstram]. His followers will only have the form of men, for they are on the way to hell. Even the sight of them will be polluting, for they will be even worse than Buddhists, Jains, or Kāpālikas.' The gods then departed, and Pratardana, having made his kingdom free of thorns (i.e. rooted out all evil-doers), died and found release. But in the Kali age there will be many of (Madhu's) pupils, dressed like sannyāsins, and there will be Kaulikas, who enjoy women and food that should not be enjoyed. They will study the Veda only in order to raise doubts. Madhu will be a disguised Cārvāka. 32

The initial problem of an empty hell is solved, but only to give rise to another extreme -- the overcrowding of hell, which brings about natural catastrophes portending the end of the universe. The true danger of Pratardana's virtue is not, as usual, the one stated explicitly by the gods but one which they do mention in passing: without the evil-doers in hell, there is nothing to distinguish the gods; this, too, is a traditional problem. (The actual means by which virtue on earth leads to salvation for those in hell is explained here in a manner reminiscent of the Vena myth: the virtuous sons redeem their evil fathers.) The gods admit openly the selfishness of their action and hesitate to do it, but later they justify themselves to Śiva by saying that they produced their deception 'in order to protect creation'. Yet another justification for the gods' behaviour is implicit in their assertion that it is their traditional enemies, the demons, who are to be destroyed (indirectly, by the corruption of their descendants in Pratardana's kingdom), and they explicitly request Bṛhaspati to

delude them as he did before, in battle.

The parallels with the Dakṣa myth are manifold. Śiva is reviled by a Vaiṣṇava who criticises him for carrying Brahmā's skull; as a result of this insult, the universe is in danger of being destroyed until Śiva is praised; the reviler of Śiva is decapitated (not by Śiva himself but by his servant, just as in many of the later versions of the Dakṣa myth Dakṣa is beheaded by Śiva's factotem, Vīrabhadra or Bhairava) and given the head of a beast; Śiva must then assuage the anger of his factotem even as he calms and distributes the rage of Vīrabhadra. The Dakṣa parallel serves to illuminate an otherwise obscure point of this myth, the weak bridge between the Pratardana episode and the description of the Kali age heresies. It becomes apparent that the purpose of the Pratardana myth is to explain the otherwise embarrassing fact that people in the Kali age hate Śiva; their hatred, like Dakṣa's, is sought in earlier obscure causes and curses. The Kali age almost begins during Pratardana's reign ('Kali' enters the Brahmins as he does when his time has come, though here it may mean only quarrels) but is then postponed; and the true heretic of the Kali age is an intellectual heir, if not necessarily a direct descendant, of the reviling kiṃnara. The actual heresy is complex, vaguely designated as Cārvāka, and taken as an opportunity for a thinly veiled attack on the thirteenth century Vaiṣṇava philosopher, Madhva. In passing, it is interesting to note that this text condemns both sacrilegious words (the horse-heads) and sacrilegious deeds (the horse-bodies), a distinction not usually made so explicitly.

Among several attempts to identify the Kali age heresies, H. H. Wilson describes them at some length and views them as

Buddhist or Śaiva, and he remarks:

> 'The complaints of the prevalence of heterodox doctrines . . . indicate a period of change in the condition of the Hindu religion, which it would be important to verify. If reference is made to Buddhism, to which in some respects the allusions especially apply, it would probably denote a period not long subsequent to the Christian era; but it is more likely to be of a later date, or in the eighth and ninth centuries, when Śaṅkara is said to have reformed a variety of corrupt practices, and given rise to others.' 33

The corrupting and heretical nature of the Kali age is expressed in anthropomorphic terms in the Mahābhārata tale of Nala, in which Kali is personified:

> The virtuous king Nala married Damayantī, who chose him, a mortal, from among the gods. Kali had wanted to marry Damayantī himself, and he determined to break Nala and take Damayantī from him. For twelve years Kali waited in Nala's presence, and finally he found an opportunity: Nala urinated at twilight and did not wash his feet. Then Kali entered Nala and caused him to commit a series of evil actions, culminating in Nala's desertion of Damayantī. Though Nala was drawn back to Damayantī again and again by his love, he was dragged away by Kali within him, and thus deluded he abandoned her. When Damayantī learned that he was gone, she said, 'Whatever evil one has done this to Nala, who has no evil thoughts -- let him live in misery.' After many years, Nala mastered the science of numbers and dice, and Kali came out of his body and resumed his own form. Nala wished to curse Kali, but Kali said, 'Because of Damayantī's curse, I was tortured and lived very unhappily within you. But now I will make you famous.' Then Nala refrained from cursing Kali, and Kali, who was still afraid, hid so that no one but Nala could see him. When Kali was destroyed, Nala was free of fever, and later when he was re-united with Damayantī he said to her, 'It was because of Kali that I left you, not because of my own will. But my determination and asceticism conquered him, and the evil [pāpa] left me.' 34

Although this episode follows several Purāṇic patterns, it reveals moral concepts more sophisticated than those typical of the Purāṇas. Kali plays the role of the god who is jealous of an excessively virtuous mortal as well as the role of a demon who desires the wife of a god. (Though Kali can hardly be said to pursue this original objective when, having entered Nala's body, he causes Nala [i.e., himself] to leave Damayantī). More specifically, Kali is the incarnation of the spirit of gambling (which is the undoing of Yudhiṣṭhira as well), for the

four ages were named after throws of the dice, Kali being the lowest throw; thus it is by mastering numbers and dice that Nala overcomes Kali, though he himself attributes it to his determination and asceticism. But Kali is clearly considered to be the incarnation of evil; he is called evil (pāpa) several times in the Nala episode, and his struggle with Nala is depicted as a psychological, moral dilemma: Nala is torn between his higher ideals and an ungovernable tendency to sin, which is personified as Kali within him. It is this aspect of the myth which raises it above the level of the typical Purāṇic tale. Another unusually perceptive moral insight is the statement that Kali suffers in making Nala suffer.

Other texts elaborate upon this myth but lack the subtlety of the Mahābhārata. The Kathāsaritsāgara describes Nala's moral degradation at greater length, making him a drunkard and an adulterer as well as a gambler.[35] The Naiṣadhacarita, probably under Purāṇic influence, attributes to Kali specific heresies as well as the general force of evil:

> On the way to the wedding of Nala and Damayantī, the gods encountered the army of Kali. His generals were Desire, Anger, Greed, Delusion, and others. A Cārvāka in the ranks mocked the gods, citing various Buddhist doctrines. Indra became angry and called Kali's troops atheists; Yama called them materialists [Lokāyatas], while Varuṇa called them heretics and atheists. Kali stood there surrounded by evils. When Kali determined to take Damayantī from Nala, he was at first unable to enter the city, because of Nala's virtues. He looked in vain for heretics, Jains, or Buddhists in the city. At last he found an opportunity, and he entered Nala. . . . [36]

The Mahābhārata tale of a hero's moral dilemma is thus embroidered with traditional Purāṇic descriptions of the heresies of the Kali age.

Two interesting arguments develop from the premise of the natural

wickedness of man in the Kali age. One is the doctrine of the kalivarjya, the belief that certain actions such as widow remarriage, though previously acceptable, are only to be considered immoral in the present Kali age, when men are not strong enough to indulge in them without ill effect. This doctrine is implicit in a myth which appears in the Mahābhārata:

> In the past, women were free to indulge their desires, and this was dharma. This ancient dharma is still practised by birds and animals. But then one day Śvetaketu saw his mother being abducted by a Brahmin in the presence of his father. The boy was angry, but his father explained that it was considered proper. Then Śvetaketu established the moral limits [maryādās]. . . . [37]

Animals still follow the earlier morality, a freer morality; it is only the shortcomings of mankind (implicit both in the lust of the Brahmin and in the incestuous jealousy of Śvetaketu) which makes a strict moral code necessary. By this circular reasoning, a more strict level of morality must be sought in the Kali age, since man himself is lower.

David Pocock considers this theory an indication that the Kali age 'is not homogeneous with the other yugas [ages], it is opposed to them, and the radical difference is that it is the age of time which is actually lived'.[38] The Kali age is the period in which man's true nature is revealed; moral laws are only valid now if they take into account this low moral condition. Another inversion of values appears in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa statement that the Kali age is best in the sense that by a small effort now one will win the merit that would require great asceticism in the Golden Age;[39] the commentator interprets this as an allusion to the worship of Kṛṣṇa. Here the 'easiest' path is equated

with the best, but it is also the Tantric path suited only for the 'worst' of men; whatever its moral value, good or bad, it is the only path which applies to the present state of man. That this argument is double-edged is apparent from the common statement that among the evils of the Kali age is the fact that even Śūdras are allowed to practise asceticism;[40] this orthodox view regards the fact that even the lowest of men are allowed to participate in religion as evidence of the disruption of the proper social order (svadharma) -- which is precisely the virtue of the Kali age from the Tantric point of view.

A third argument exalts the Kali age because it is the last stage before the return to the Golden Age. At the end of the Kali age, Viṣṇu will come as Kalkin to uproot the barbarians and heretics and usher in the Golden Age again.[41] The Kalkin avatar is first described in the Mahābhārata:[42] In the Kali age, the earth will be overrun with heretics and barbarians; then, at the end of the age, in order to increase mankind again (punarlokavivṛddhaye), Kalkin, a part of Viṣṇu (Viṣṇuyaśas[43]), will be born, and he will destroy all the barbarians and establish dharma and the Golden Age.

The Kalki Purāṇa, a late work, elaborates upon this event:

> At the end of the age, Brahmā created from his back an evil one known as Adharma. From him Kali was descended. Kali had a gaping mouth, a pendulous tongue, and he was foul-smelling and fond of dice, wine, gold, and women [Bengali commentator: prostitutes]. He begat Fear and Death (a daughter) upon his wife Durukti. Thus were born the many descendants of Kali, revilers of dharma. Men then became lustful, hypocritical, and evil, intent upon penis and stomach [śiśnodaraparāyaṇa], adulterers, drunkards, evil-doers. Ascetics [sannyasins] took to houses, and householders were devoid of discrimination. The earth yielded few

> crops. Men abandoned the study of the Vedas and sacrifices, and they ceased to offer oblations. The gods were all without sustenance, and they sought refuge with Brahmā.
>
> Then Viṣṇu was born as Kalki [sic]. He amassed a great army to chastise the Buddha; he met a Jina who came out of the city of Kali with a large number of his followers. Kalki fought the Buddhists, who were led by the Jina, and he defeated and killed the Jina. The barbarians assisted the Buddhists, but they were all defeated. The wives of the Buddhists and barbarians had also taken up arms, but Kalki taught them bhakti-yoga, karma-yoga and jñāna-yoga [the three paths of the Bhagavad Gītā]. Kalki then continued his march and met Dharma, who had been driven out by Kali. Kalki defeated Kali and his allies, the Khaśas, Kāmbojas, Śavaras, Varvaras, Cīnas, Pulindas, Colas, Niṣādas, and others. Kali escaped to another age. . . . [44]

Several elements from the oldest corpus of myths of evil are retained here: the Kali age brings a dearth of food (the initial premise of degeneration) and the gods are weakened by the decline in religious practices among mortals, as they are in the Brāhmaṇa texts. The next chronological level appears in a typical Purāṇic description of the characteristics of the Kali age: the caste lines and stages of life are destroyed, Buddhists and Jains (undifferentiated) are rampant, and various barbarians hold sway (including Chinese and South Indians, not usually included in lists of this sort, as well as the Niṣādas elsewhere said to be descended from Vena). The battle which takes place is not described in abstract terms, as one might expect from the nature of the participants (and as takes place in the Prabodhacandrodaya), but is a typical battle between gods and demons, using conventional Indian weapons. In keeping with this view of the conflict, Kali himself is personified (as he is in the Nala story) as a demon: the lolling tongue and gaping mouth are typical demonic features, as is his foul smell. He behaves like a demon, using the women of his city as weapons; here, however, the motif is reversed, and instead of the

god corrupting the women of the demon's city in order to weaken them and the demon, the god here enlightens the women in order to win them to his side; this is in keeping with the viewpoint of this text that the gods are weakened by man's failure to offer sacrifice. Unlike most battles between gods and demons, however, this 'decisive' victory is immediately undercut: Kali escapes to reappear in 'another age' -- in our age.

In this escape of Kali, as in the implication that the Kali age is best because it is the gateway to the renewed Golden Age, the Indian view of the cyclic nature of evil is apparent. In some descriptions of the Kali age, when civilisation is completely destroyed men are said to dwell in the woods living on roots and fruits and wearing rough bark garments;[45] this return to nature, though hardly equivalent to Rousseau's idea of the noble savage, is nevertheless strongly reminiscent of the Indian ideal of the holy man in the wilderness: by being reduced to his lowest state, man begins to regain his virtues. In many myths discussed above, individuals prone to evil may be cursed, homeopathically, to become so evil that they must eventually reform; one extreme leads to the other. At the end of the Pine Forest myth, Śiva deludes the sages further, making them so wicked that they realize their sins and repent. Similarly, mankind in general may be delivered from the sins of the Kali age only by being corrupted so completely by heresy that true enlightenment is the only possible consequence.

This cyclic effect may be seen in two Buddhist myths of evil:

> There will come a time when moral conduct [kusalakammapathā] will disappear, immoral conduct [akusala] will flourish, and even the word 'moral' [kusala] will no longer exist among humans. Then for Seven Days of the Sword, men will look on each other as wild beasts and kill each other. But a few will think: 'We do not want anyone to kill us, and we do not want to kill anyone. Let us hide and live on the fruits of the forest.' Thus they will survive. And after the Seven Days of the Sword they will come out and embrace one another and say, 'My friend, how good it is to see you still alive. We have lost so many of our kinsfolk because we took to evil ways [akusala]; now we must do good [kusala]. We must stop taking life.' Then they will increase in age and beauty, and they will practise virtues. India will be as crowded then as in Purgatory [avīci], with people like reeds in a jungle. 46

A few men seem to escape the corrupting influence of time by withdrawing into the ambiguous state of nature -- living on the fruits of the forest -- and they do succeed in initiating a new Golden Age, whether against the flow or simply after the end of the age of evil. But the forest life then appears again in a metaphor (men as numerous as jungle reeds) with future implications which are ominous: 'India will be as crowded then as in Purgatory'. T. W. Rhys Davids has pointed out that this overcrowding on earth is meant as praise (an indication of prosperity), though we in the twentieth century might well think of it as a kind of Purgatory; nevertheless, the simile is otherwise difficult to explain, and in the context it is apparent that the next cycle has already begun, with overcrowding on earth or in heaven.

The reason for this cyclic effect is suggested in other Buddhist texts:

> After a hundred thousand years, the cycle is to be renewed, and so the gods who inhabit the heaven of sensual pleasure wander about, weeping and saying, 'After a hundred thousand years, the cycle is to be renewed, and this world will be destroyed. . . . Therefore cultivate love, sympathy, pity, and equanimity; serve your mothers and fathers, and honour your elders.' 47

The philosophy underlying this passage is clearly akin to that cited above in other texts, Buddhist and Hindu, about death: only when destruction is imminent will mankind reform. Yet both Hindu and Buddhist texts more commonly state that this reformation takes place only _after_ the final cataclysm. Kalkin destroys the wicked cities of the Hindu plain, and in the Buddhist view the nature of the final destruction corresponds directly to the nature of the prevalent sin which causes it: when passion preponderates, the world

perishes by fire; when hatred, it perishes by water (some say the opposite, passion causing fire and hatred causing the flood); when delusion preponderates, it perishes by wind.[48]

Thus the cycles move up as well as down; after the Kali age comes the Golden Age again, and against the framework of the degenerating cycles of cosmic time the Indians set the progressive cycles of individual time -- rebirth. Although an evil action can cause one to be reborn in a lower form, the Indian ideal was for gradual improvement from birth to birth until final release from the cycle was achieved; thus the individual could not only rise in the cycle, but escape from it altogether; the personal moral code could supercede the cosmic, just as the inner moral code of _bhakti_ could transcend the social code of _svadharma_. As Pocock has said of the _kalivarjya_ theory, 'Parallel to this and at another level we may consider the great theory of successive births which is a counterpart of the caste hierarchy';[49] into the hierarchical warp is woven the thread of the individual's life.

Optimistic reformers might thus think it possible to hasten or even reverse the inevitable turning point of the cycle of evil, and indeed Manu states that the king, by his good or bad behaviour, produces the character of the Kali or Golden Age, not vice versa.[50] Similarly, the _Arthaśāstra_ suggests that the king, by maintaining the code of the Vedas, may cause the world to progress and not to perish.[51] Pocock has discussed this possibility of escape from the inevitable process of decay:

'The progression of the cycle from freshness to decay, from dawn to sad evening is inexorable. The gods themselves are no less subject to it. Nevertheless we find the element of intervention even here. We have the belief growing in strength from the Middle Ages onwards that Vishnu plays with the cycles of time. His avatars come increasingly to be considered as interventions on the behalf of society or some virtuous individual. He is believed to break through the progressive decay, arrest its course, and even reverse it. This is a remarkable contradiction and one of which our texts seem to be aware, for we find some attempt at reconciliation.' 52

Just as the brahma-realized creatures of the Golden Age are not yet ensnared in the coils of time at all, so too the creatures of the Kali age may be extricated from these coils, from the entire mundane level on which time functions. It is god's privilege to 'play' with time in this way, for, as Viṣṇu points out in the Bhagavad Gītā, he *is* time.[53]

This transition in attitudes may be seen not only in the changing powers of the gods -- the belief that Viṣṇu may counteract the force of time -- but in the changing moral nature of the gods -- the belief that the gods want us to be good, rather than evil. Nevertheless, this is not a universal, broadly accepted change; traditional Hinduism reasserts itself and warns against the dangers inherent in any challenge to cosmic order:

> The demon Bali, ruling in the Kali age, protected the universe with great virtue. When Kali saw this he sought refuge with Brahmā, for his own nature was being obstructed. Brahmā said, 'Bali has destroyed the nature of the whole universe, not merely your nature.' Then Kali went to a forest, and the Golden Age took place; asceticism, non-injury, truth, and sacrifice pervaded the world. Indra complained that his kingdom had been taken, but Brahmā said to him, 'This is the fruit of your own deeds'. Indra said, 'What have I done?' and Brahmā said to him, 'You destroyed an embryo, killing the foetus in the womb of Diti'. Indra said, 'This was because of the sin of Diti, who was impure.' Brahmā replied, 'The fault of the mother (caused the embryo to become subject to) slavery, but then the slave was also struck down by your thunderbolt.' Brahmā then told Indra how to atone for his sin and remove it. Indra performed asceticism for a year and bathed in a holy river. Men were born from the sin of the god when he had bathed, and they were called the Pulindas. Indra said to them, 'You were born of my sin [pāpa]'. Then the king of the gods, freed from his sins, went away, and Viṣṇu conquered Bali and made him rule in hell. [54]

This text, in seeking for the original, past cause of present sins, arrives at a kind of compromise: Indra's encounter with Diti is the result of both her own former karma and his jealous nature (for

he fears that Diti's unborn child will usurp his throne,[55] even as Bali has done). Yet, underlying the doctrine of individual *karma* (which is easily disposed of when Indra transfers his sins to a savage tribe, just as Vena does) is the deeper need for the *karma* of the universe, for evil to come when it is ripe. By his virtue, Bali does not merely threaten the gods (or produce an excess of virtue on earth or in heaven [a problem which is solved, paradoxically, by making the virtuous Bali rule in hell, where the demons belong]), but he threatens the nature of the Kali age, the nature of the whole universe, which must be evil at this moment.

Thus the mythology which began with the loss of the Golden Age ends with the final cataclysm at the end of the Kali age. Nature morally corrupts mankind; innocent babes are overcome by their own bad instincts. The gods of Hinduism are themselves in the power of these natural forces; they are therefore the instruments of fate or time in bringing about the moral corruption of mankind. . It is inevitable that the universe should be destroyed at the end of the Kali age, and before god destroys us he first weakens us with sin, just as he weakens the demons with heresy before he destroys them. Just as, when it was necessary to corrupt Himālaya's love for Śiva, only Śiva himself could revile himself, so only god is great enough to undertake the responsibility for the creation of the necessary evil that is in the universe.

VI. Conclusion

It is possible to trace a definite ascent in the moral consciousness with which the ancient Indians approached the problem of evil through various stages of their texts. The question does not really arise in the Ṛg Veda, but the groundwork is laid there for the primary relationship between gods and men: men offer sacrifice to the gods, who require the Soma in order to do battle with demons and who in return grant to men the good things of mortal life. Nor do the Brāhmaṇas come to grips with the problem, though they formulate the basic terms in which subsequent redactions viewed the matter; they are content with an immediate solution on the ritual level, the mythic belief that anything which was dealt with successfully 'then', at the time of primeval creation, is satisfactorily redisposed of whenever that ritual is re-enacted. Certain assumptions already emerge in these early texts: the gods must keep the demons from sacrificing, often by corrupting them, while they must keep mankind 'good' so that the sacrifice will continue.

The Mahābhārata and the Purāṇas formulate the problem of evil in terms which have misled many Western theologians to maintain that the Indians do not recognize this problem at all. These orthodox texts see the conflict between good and evil in a particular, temporal framework: dharma is what is good or right for the particular occasion, what one should do given the social and familiar position occupied and in the face of the particular obstacles of the moment (hence the need for āpaddharma, the dharma for emergencies).[1] Though

this code changed from time to time, the Purāṇas betray not the slightest doubt, throughout the myths, as to what was dharma and what was adharma, yet there was no absolute good or evil recognized as an enduring standard. The relativity of this view led to certain a-moral formulations: just as it is necessary for certain men to perform evil tasks, so too evil has a necessary place in the universe, and the gods themselves must provide this evil willingly or in spite of their efforts.

A significant change took place when the sacrificial code was challenged by the ideals of asceticism and release. By the power of asceticism, a demon or mortal could challenge the livelihood of a god, and the gods were forced to corrupt mortals as well as demons in order to maintain their own positions and the balance of powers in the universe. Moreover, under the influence of the Upaniṣadic and Buddhist doctrines of individual salvation, the relativistic, a-moral view of necessary evil was overthrown: an individual could break away from the evil of his own caste, or his own time, or his involvement in the world, and swim up against the current of the universe to find his own release. Hindus and Buddhists agreed that evil was implicit in human life, but the orthodox Hindu view stated as the corollary to this theory the belief that certain individuals were doomed to remain in the toils of that evil, while the doctrines of salvation demonstrated that, with the help of a god, the individual could seek a universal morality and escape from his 'evil' place in society.

The role of the individual was strengthened by another important religious development, the cult of bhakti. Here was another way to

escape from the rigid code of <u>svadharma</u>, but, unlike the doctrine of asceticism, the <u>bhakti</u> ideal posed no threat to the gods; on the contrary, it assumed that god wishes men to be good, resulting in the same alignment of forces as that which prevailed in the earlier sacrificial dharma (gods and men together against the demons). Yet, one aspect of the <u>bhakti</u> cult coincided with the attitude of the orthodox texts: god committed sins and taught them to mankind not (as in the earlier view) due to his own inevitable weaknesses but in order to save mankind. Thus, under the doctrine of sacrifice and one kind of <u>bhakti</u>, the gods strive to prevent evil from coming among mankind, while under the orthodox view, the philosophy of asceticism, and another manifestation of the <u>bhakti</u> cult, the gods -- for very different reasons -- bring about evil on earth.

The final stage, the Tantric doctrine of the Kali age, also places the gods on the side of evil -- though this evil is ultimately conducive to good. Here, too, <u>bhakti</u> can reverse the flow of time, and an individual can escape from the relativistic ethics of the Kali age even as he could escape from those of the orthodox view. All of these stages or any combination of them may be present in a single myth.

This chronological development in the attitude to the individual is closely related to a change in the attitude toward variety and uniformity. As this change takes place primarily with regard to human life, it is not really pertinent to the earliest stage, that of the late Ṛg Veda and Brāhmaṇas, where human beings merely represent pawns in the battle between gods and demons. The orthodox view

extrapolates from the social doctrine of svadharma, assuming that just as all roles, good and evil, are necessary to provide the infinite variety which constitutes society as a whole, so too the full variety of all moral possibilities in human life, including all evils (death, injustice, suffering) and the full variety of religious views (including all heresies) are necessary to fulfil human life. Although the individual has no choice of roles, society is disposed in such a way that each individual contributes in some manner to the totality of human possibility, all roles being equally valid, equally necessary. Action and variety, not peace and an absolute morality, are the values of this system. The individual creates his life not out of the full range of materials but, as it were, out of objets trouvés, and each individual is expected to create a different part of the mosaic, some of these parts necessarily involving suffering, heresy, or other evils provided by the gods, who are caught up in karma as we are. This view, which persists throughout orthodox Hindu texts, was then directly opposed by the group of doctrines which substitute the individual, a universally applicable morality, and a single goal (release from involvement in the cycle of rebirth, saṃsāra) for the svadharma, relativism, and variety of the orthodox view. Under the influence of Buddhism, the Upaniṣads, and the bhakti cults, the individual is given a choice of action, freedom from the strictures of caste; instead of creating his life from objets trouvés, he may, as it were, choose his medium and free himself from karma. (In terms of doctrine, the choice is not entirely free: in Buddhism, the choice is conditioned by past karma; in bhakti theory, god chooses the worshipper.

But viewed in terms of action, as it is in mythology, the individual consciously changes his life).

This attitude toward choice in the *bhakti* myths is in notable contrast with the characteristic attitude of the orthodox mythology. There, just as the individual is helpless to resist a possibly undesirable *svadharma*, so too his salvation is sometimes thrust upon him equally without his conscious agency or choice. Thus Guṇanidhi commits all manner of sins, including robbing a temple, and is saved from the tortures of hell because he had made a new wick for the temple lamp so that he could see better to steal the offerings; similarly, Devarāja, who had killed and robbed his parents and his wife, was saved from hell because once in the past he had accidentally heard the *Śiva Purāṇa* recited at a temple.[2] In this view, salvation appears to be as accidental as corruption; all is in the hands of fate.

The element of choice in the *bhakti* myths, however, furnishes yet another significant contrast. For, just as Western and Indian theologies differ on the question of choice in the matter of the original transition from orthodoxy to heresy ('heresy' implying an element of choice absent from the concept of the *pāṣaṇḍa*), so these elements have a reversed relationship in the matter of the transition back from heresy to orthodoxy (or, rather, to salvation): in Indian *bhakti* mythology the worshipper must make the choice to seek release; in Western theology, he must *be chosen.*

The freedom implicit in the *bhakti* view is counterbalanced by a

corresponding restriction of goals; everyone must, theoretically, seek to create the same type of life, the life which achieves release. The variety and action celebrated by the orthodox view are replaced by uniformity in the code of behaviour, and peace or quiescence (nirvāṇa, mokṣa, śānti) is the single goal. In this view, certain aspects of existence are rejected -- immoral behaviour in the individual, certain inherently 'evil' possibilities of action, certain roles which are provided for under the doctrine of svadharma -- and, as the ultimate abstraction, existence itself is considered either evil or non-existent. God here is on the side of good, working to help man free himself from evil behaviour and, ultimately, from the world of variety, action, and life.

The first of these two views is perhaps less challenging but more realistic; each individual knows what is expected of him, and need make no choice, yet all possibilities are accounted for. The second view requires a moral decision on the part of the individual, but its assumption of a single universal goal simplifies this decision. Both views assume that the gods wish man to have that for which he strives -- either the necessary evil of the orthodox view, or the universally applicable good of the non-caste view (i.e. mokṣa, which is beyond dharma and adharma). It is only in the transitional stages (when asceticism is a human goal that is not acceptable to certain of the older gods) that a conflict arises between man and god, and this conflict spills over into some orthodox or salvation-oriented texts as well, for asceticism may be used to obtain powers (in the orthodox view) or salvation.

These intricate intertwinings and discrepancies reveal the complexity of the 'Hindu' mythology of evil, particularly when one bears in mind the fact that two viewpoints which seem to agree in one particular will not only disagree in others but even in the reasons for which they apparently agree in that one. The gods generally act on behalf of men in all views except that of the asceticism-oriented mythology, but they do so for very different reasons and in very different ways -- sometimes in order that they themselves may survive on sacrificial offerings, sometimes out of love for mankind. The gods are responsible for the creation of evil and heresies in four groups for four different reasons: in orthodox Hinduism, because dharma is only possible, and valuable, when adharma also exists to balance it and to contrast with it; in the asceticism mythology, because the gods fear that men will become too powerful and overcome the gods; in devotional mythology because god wishes to descend to the level of evil, and to participate in it, to help or free mankind; and in Tantric mythology, because man is so low that he can only benefit from an evil, heretical religion.

Thus, the conflict between 'good' and 'evil' tends to disappear, or is disregarded, in various ways: the early texts (the Brāhmaṇas) brush the problem aside in favour of ritual solutions, while the orthodox texts attempt to reconcile good and evil and thus to avoid the conflict. The Naiyāyikas, Buddhists, and certain Hindus side-step the problem by positing karma as the only cause of good and evil; this results in an infinite chain of earlier and earlier causes which, like Achilles and the tortoise,[3] approach but never reach a final solution; since there is no beginning of karma, there is no ultimate cause.

But later texts, under the influence of Buddhism, the Upaniṣads, and bhakti, reveal a unique insight into the problem on a cosmic as well as an individual level. This is made possible by the manner in which Hindu mythology superimposes upon older views certain apparently conflicting later views, and balances the two. Thus it is possible for a Hindu myth to imply that the evil in human life is necessary, desirable, and intended by god, that everything in life is relative, and yet to assume at the same time a universally valid 'good' toward which all mankind should strive. 'Evil' must be accepted, but 'good' must be sought; these views together provide a working solution to the problem of evil, a framework in which mankind as a whole, and each individual, may function in the face of an ultimately insoluble problem. Although some Hindu texts seem to welcome the presence of evil, while others envision an escape from karma and from the evil inherent in it, the total corpus offers a fascinating encounter with one of the great, enduring human dilemmas.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Sanskrit Texts

* denotes primary version used, cited in bibliographic notes unless otherwise indicated

Abhidhānacintāmaṇi of Hemacandra. Bombay, 1896.

Abhijñānaśākuntala of Kālidāsa. Bombay, 1958.

Agni Purāṇa. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series #41. Poona, 1957.

Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā. 2nd. ed. Adyar Library #4-5. Madras, 1966.

Aitareya Āraṇyaka. Oxford, 1909.

Aitareya Brāhmaṇa. Bombay and London, 1863.

Anāgatavamsa. Pali Text Society Journal, 1886, pp. 33-54.

Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. Bombay, 1960.

Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra. Kashi Sanskrit Series #104. Benares, 1934.

Bhagavad Gītā, with the commentary of Śaṅkara. Poona, 1950.

Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Gorakhpur, 1962.

Bhaviṣya Purāṇa. Bombay, 1959.

Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa. Bombay, 1857.

Brahma Purāṇa. Calcutta, 1954.

Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series #102. Poona, 1935.

Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1888.

Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa. Asiatic Society of Bengal. Calcutta, 1891.

Darpadalana of Kṣemendra. Kāvyamālā Series #6. Bombay, 1890.

Daśakumāracarita of Daṇḍin. Bombay, 1928.

Daśāvatāracarita of Kṣemendra. Kāvyamālā Series #26. Bombay, 1891.

Devībhāgavata Purāṇa. Benares, 1959.

Dhammapada. Sacred Books of the East, X. Oxford, 1880.

Dhūrtanāṭaka of Sāmarāja Dīkṣita. Dacca University manuscript 1580, D. Calcutta, 1828.

Dīgha Nikāya. Pali Text Society. London, 1911.

Garuḍa Purāṇa. Benares, 1963.

Gītagovinda of Jayadeva. London, 1881.

Gopatha Brāhmaṇa. Leiden, 1919.

Haracarita(cintāmaṇi) of Jayaratha. Kāvyamālā Series #61. Bombay, 1897.

Harivaṃśa. Bombay, 1833-76.

Hāsyārṇava of Jagadīśvara. Jena, 1883.

Hiraṇyakeśin Gṛhya Sūtra. Vienna, 1889.

Jaiminīya [Talavakāra] Brāhmaṇa. Sarasvati Vihāra Series #31. Nagpur, 1954.

Jātakas. 7 vols. London, 1877.

Kālikā Purāṇa. Bombay, 1891.

Kalki Purāṇa. Calcutta,

Kārikā of Gauḍapada. Poona, 1953.

Kāṭhaka Āraṇyaka. ed. L. von Schroeder. Berl. Sitz. Ber. 137.

Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā [Die Sanhitā der Kaṭha-Śākhā]. ed. L. von Schroeder. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1900-1910.

Kathāsaritsāgara of Somadeva. Bombay, 1930.

* _Kūrma Purāṇa_. Benares, 1967.

" " . Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1890.

Liṅga Purāṇa. Calcutta, 1890.

* _Mahābhārata_. Poona, 1933-

" . With the commentary of Nīlakaṇṭha. Bombay, 1862.

Mahānirvāṇa Tantra. Tantrik Texts #13. Madras, 1929.

Mahimnastotra of Puṣpadanta, with the commentary of Madhusūdana. Benares, 1924.

Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā of the Yajur Veda. Leipzig, 1881, 1886.

Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. Text and trans. J. van Buitenen. 's-Gravenhage, 1962.

Mānavadharmaśāstra, with the commentary of Medhātithi. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1932.

" [The Laws of Manu]. Trans. Georg Bühler. Sacred Books of the East, #25. Oxford, 1886.

Manmathonmathana of Rāma. Ed. R. Schmidt. ZDMG 69 (1909), 409-37 and 629-54.

Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa. Bombay, 1890.

" " . Trans. Frederick Eden Pargiter. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1904.

Matsya Purāṇa. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series #54. Poona, 1907.

Mattavilāsaprahasana of Mahendravarman. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series #50. Trivandrum, 1917.

Mitākṣarā of Vijñāneśvara. Commentary on Yajñavalkya Smṛti. Bombay, 1909.

Naiṣadhacarita of Śrīharṣa. Jīvānanda Vidyāsagara ed. Calcutta. [1875-6].

Nārada Smṛti. Calcutta, 1885.

Nirukta of Yāska. Ed. Lakshman Sarup. Oxford, 1921.

* Padma Purāṇa. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series #131. Poona, 1894.

" " . Calcutta, 1958.

Pañcatantra. Bombay Sanskrit Series #4. Bombay, 1885.

Pāśupatasūtra with the commentary of Kauṇḍinya. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series #143. Trivandrum, 1940.

Prabandhakośa of Rājaśekhara. Singhi Jaina Series #6. Shantiniketan, 1935.

Prabodhacandrodaya of Kṛṣṇamiśra. Bombay, 1898.

Rāmacaritamānasa. See Das, Tulasi.

* Rāmāyaṇa of Valmīki. Baroda, 1960-

" . Madras, 1958.

Ṛg Veda, with the commentary of Sāyaṇa. London, 1890-92.

Śabdakalpadruma of Raja Sir Radhakant Deb Bahadur. Calcutta, 1886.

Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Bibliotheca Buddhica, X. St. Petersburg, 1908.

Śaṅkaravijaya of Ānandagiri. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1868.

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha of Mādhava. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1858.

Śatápatha Brāhmaṇa of the White Yajur Veda. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1903.

Saura Purāṇa. Calcutta, 1910.

* Śiva Purāṇa. Benares, 1964.

" " . Jñānasaṃhitā and Dharmasaṃhitā. Bombay, 1884.

Skanda Purāṇa. Bombay, 1867.

Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa of Vidyākara. Harvard Oriental Series #42. Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1957.

" . Trans. Daniel H. H. Ingalls. Harvard Oriental Series #44, 1965.

Subhāṣitāvali of Vallabhadeva. Bombay, 1886.

Śukranītisāra. Calcutta, 1882.

Sumaṅgalavilāsinī of Buddhaghosa. Pali Text Society, London, 1886.

Sutta Nipāta. Pali Text Society. London, 1913.

Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa of the Black Yajur Veda. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1859.

Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa, with the commentary of Sāyaṇa. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1869-74.

" ". Trans. W. Caland. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1913.

Tantrādhikāranirṇaya of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita. Benares, 1888.

Tantrāvarttika of Bhaṭṭa Kumārila. Commentary on Śabarasvāmin's Jaiminīya Mīmāṃsā Sūtra commentary. Benares Sanskrit Series. Benares, 1903.

Tantropākhyāna. ['Ten Tales from the Tantropākhyāna']. Text and trans. George T. Artola. Adyar Library Bulletin 29, 1-4. Madrás, 1965.

Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra of Hemacandra. Bombay, 1904-9.

Upaniṣads. [One Hundred and Eight Upaniṣads]. 4th ed. Bombay, 1932.

Vaikhānasasmārtasūtra. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1927.

Vājasaneya Saṃhitā. Berlin, 1952.

Vāmana Purāṇa. Benares, 1968.

Varāha Purāṇa. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta, 1893.

* Vāyu Purāṇa. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series #49. Poona, 1905.

" " . Bombay, 1867.

Viṣṇu Purāṇa. Gorakhpur, 1962.

Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa. Benares, Venkaṭeśvara Steam Press, no date.

Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa. Harvard Oriental Series, #41. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950.

Yāgīśvaramāhātmya. India Office manuscript 3719. Reproduced By Wilhelm Jahn, ZDMG LXX (1916), pp. 310-320.

* Yajñavalkya Smṛti. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series #46. Poona, 1903-4.

" " , with the commentary of Viśvarūpāchārya. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series #74,81. Trivandrum, 1922,1924.

B. Secondary Sources

Agrawala, V. S. Vāmana Purāṇa, A Study. Benares, 1964.

Śiva Mahādeva, The Great God. Benares, 1966.

Aiyangar, K. V. Rangaswami. Rājadharma. Adyar, 1941.

Altekar, A. S. State and Government in Ancient India. 3rd ed. Delhi, 1958.

Ambedkar, Bhimrao Ramji. The Untouchables. New Delhi, 1948.

Apte, V. S. Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary. 3 vols. Poona, 1957.

Artola, George T. See Tantropākhyāna.

Auboyer, Jeannine. Everyday Life in Ancient India. London, 1965.

Banerjea, Jitendra Nath. The Development of Hindu Iconography. 2nd ed. Calcutta, 1956.

Barker, W. B. Baitāl Pachīsi, or Twenty-Five Tales of a Demon. Hertford, 1855.

Barrow, H. W. 'On Aghorīs and Aghorapanthīs'. Proceedings of the Anthropological Society of Bombay, III (1893), pp. 197-251.

Basham, A. L. The Wonder that was India. London, 1967 (3rd ed).

Bhandarkar, D. R. Some Aspects of Ancient Hindu Polity. Benares, 1929.

Böhtlingk, Otto. Indische Sprüche. 3 vols. Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften. St. Petersburg, 1872.

Brough, John. Poems from the Sanskrit. Penguin, 1968.

Buch, Maganlal A. The Principles of Hindu Ethics. Baroda, 1921.

Bühler, Georg. See Mānavadharmaśāstra.

Burrow, Thomas. The Sanskrit Language. London, 1955.

Burton, Sir Richard. Vikram and the Vampire, or Tales of Hindu Devilry. (London, 1893). New York, 1969.

Caland. See Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa.

Chakravarti, Chintaharan. The Tantras: Studies in their Religion and Literature. Calcutta, 1963.

Chattopadhyaya, Debi Prasad. Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism. New Delhi, 1959.

Chattopadhyaya, Sudhakar. The Evolution of Theistic Sects in Ancient India. Calcutta, 1962.

Choudhary, Radhakrishna. 'Heretical Sects in the Purāṇas.' Annals of the Bhandharkar Oriental Research Institute, XXXVII (1957), 234-257.

Vrātyas in Ancient India. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series #38. Benares, 1964.

Church, Cornelia D. 'The Purāṇic Myth of the Four Yugas.' Purāṇa XIII, 2 (July, 1971), pp. 151-159.

Conze, Edward. A Short History of Buddhism. Bombay, 1960.

Dangé, S. A. India From Primitive Communism to Slavery. New Delhi, 1949.

Daniélou, Alain. Hindu Polytheism. London, 1964.

Das, Bhagavan. Krishna. Madras, 1929.

Das, Tulasi. The Holy Lake of the Acts of Rāma [Rāmacaritamānasa]. Trans. W. D. P. Hill. London, 1952.

Dasgupta, Surendranath. History of Indian Philosophy. 5 vols. Cambridge (England), 1922-55.

Derrett, J. D. M. *Religion, Law, and the State in India*. London, 1968.

Dessigane, R.; Pattabiramin, P. Z.; and Filliozat, Jean. *Les legendes Çivaites de Kāñcīpūram*. Publication de l'Institut Français d'Indologie #27. Pondichéry, 1964.

Dessigane, R., and Pattabiramin, P. Z. *La legende de Skanda selon le Kāñchīpurāṇam Tamoul et l'iconographie*. Publication de l'Institut Français d'Indologie #31. Pondichéry, 1967.

Deussen, Paul. *Sechzig Upaniṣads des Vedas*. Leipzig, 1897.

Dikshitar, V. R. R. *Purāṇa Index*. University of Madras, 1952.

Dracott, Alice E. *Simla Village Tales*. London, 1906.

Drekmeier, Charles. *Kingship and Community in Early India*. Stanford, 1962.

Dubois, Abbé Jean Antoine. *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*. (Paris, 1825). 3rd ed., trans. Henry Beauchamp. Oxford, 1959.

Dumont, Louis. 'World Renunciation in Indian Religion.' *Contributions to Indian Sociology* 4 (1960), pp. 33-62.

Eliade, Mircea. 'Notes de Démonologie.' *Zalmoxis* I (1938), 202 ff.

Yoga: Immortality and Freedom. New York, 1958.

The Sacred and the Profane. New York, 1959.

Eliot, Sir Charles. *Hinduism and Buddhism*. 3 vols. London, 1921.

Elwin, Verrier. *The Baiga*. London, 1939.

The Agaria. Bombay, 1942.

Maria Murder and Suicide. Oxford, 1943.

Myths of Middle India. Oxford, 1949.

Tribal Myths of Orissa. Bombay, 1953.

Emeneau, Murray B. *Kota Texts*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1944-6.

Farquhar, J. N. *An Outline of the Religious Literature of India*. Oxford, 1920.

Filliozat, Jean. Les relations extérieures de l'Inde. Institut français d'Indologie. Publication #2. Pondichéry, 1956.

Forster, E. M. The Hill of Devi. London, 1965.

Ghosh, Oroon. The Dance of Shiva. New York, 1965.

Ghoshal, U. N. A History of Indian Political Ideas. Oxford, 1959.

von Glasenapp, Helmuth. Buddhism: A Non-theistic Religion. London, 1970.

Gombrich, Richard F. Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon. Oxford, 1971.

Gonda, Jan. Aspects of Early Visnuism. Utrecht, 1954.

Der Jüngere Hinduismus. Vol II of Die Religionen Indiens. Stuttgart, 1963.

Grousset, René. The Civilization of India. New York, 1931.

Hastings, James. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. 13 vols. Edinburgh, 1908-26.

Hazra, Rajendra Chandra. Studies in the Purāṇic Records on Hindu Rites and Customs. University of Dacca Bulletin #20. Dacca, 1948.

Studies in the Upapurāṇas. I: Saura and Vaiṣṇava Upapurāṇas. II: Sakta and Non-sectarian Upapurāṇas. Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series 11 and 22, Calcutta 1958 and 1963.

Heesterman, J. C. 'On the Origin of the Nāstika.' Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner, WZKS #12-13 (1968-9), pp. 171-185.

Heesterman, J. C. 'Kauṭalya and the Ancient Indian State.' WZKS #15 (1971), pp. 5-22.

Hill, W. D. P. See Das, Tulasi.

Holwell, J. Z. Interesting Historical Events relative to the Provinces of Bengal. London, 1766, 1767, 1771. Reprinted in Marshall pp. 56-68 ff.

Hopkins, Edward Washburn. 'The Divinity of Kings.' JAOS 51(1913),300-316.
The Great Epic of India. New Haven, 1920.
Epic Mythology. Strassburg, 1915.

Hussy, Edward. The Pre-Socratics. London, 1972.

Ingalls, D. H. H. 'Cynics and Pāśupatas, The Seeking of Dishonour.' Harvard Theological Review 55 (1962), 291 ff.

See Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa.

Ivanow, W. 'The Sect of Imam Shah in Gujurat.' JBBRAS 1937, 19-70.

Jacobi, H. 'Ages of the World (Indian).' ERE I, pp. 200-202.

Kane, P. V. History of Dharmaśāstra. Poona, 1930-62.

Keith, Arthur Berriedale. Indian Mythology. In The Mythology of All Races. Vol IV. Boston, 1917.

The Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas and Upanishads. Harvard Oriental Series #31-32. Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1925.

Khandalaval, Karl. 'Some Paintings from the Collection of the late Burjor N. Treasuryvala.' Marg, 1, 1, October, 1946.

Kosambi,D.D. Introduction to the Study of Indian History. Bombay, 1956.

Lamotte, Étienne. Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien. Louvain, 1958.

Leach, Edmund R. 'Genesis as Myth.' Discovery, May, 1962. Reprinted in Middleton, pp. 1-13.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Raw and the Cooked. London, 1964.

Lewin, Thomas Herbert. The Wild Races of Southeast India. London,1870.

Ling, T. O. Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil. London, 1962.

Lorenzen, Davd N. The Kāpālikas and Kālamukhas: Two Lost Śaivite Sects. Berkeley, 1971.

Macfie, J. M. The Vishnu Purāna, A Summary with Introduction and Notes. Madras, 1926.

Maity, Pradyot Kumar. *Historical Studies in the Cult of the Goddess Manasa*. Calcutta, 1966.

Marshall, Peter J., ed. *The British Discovery of Hinduism in the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge, 1970. John Zephaniah Holwell, 'The Religious Tenets of the Gentoos', pp. 56-7, 68 ff.

Meinhard, Heinrich. *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Śivaismus nach den Purāṇa's*. Bessler Archiv. Berlin, 1928. pp. 1-45.

Meyer, Johann Jakob. *Sexual Life in Ancient India*. 2 vols. New York, 1930.

Trilogie der Altindischer Mächte und Feste der Vegetation. Zurich, 1937.

Mayrhofer, Manfred. *Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary*.Heidelberg, 1963.

Middleton, John, ed. *Myth and Cosmos*. New York, 1967.

Mills, J. P. *The Rengma Nagas*. London, 1937.

Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Oxford, 1899.

Muir, John. *Original Sanskrit Texts*. 5 vols. 2nd ed. London, 1872.

Müller, F. Max. *A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*. London, 1859.

Newby, Eric. *Slowly Down the Ganges*. New York, 1966.

Nivedita, Sister, and Coomaraswamy, Ananda K. *Myths of the Hindus and Buddhists*. London, 1913.

Nyāyālankara, Nīlmaṇi Mukhopadhyāya. Preface to *Kūrma Purāṇa*.Calcutta,1890.

O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger. 'Asceticism and Sexuality in the Mythology of Śiva.' *History of Religions* 8,#4(May, 1969) 300-337 and 9, #1 (August, 1969) 1-41.

'The Submarine Mare in the Mythology of Śiva.' JRAS 1971(1) 9-27.

'The Origin of Heresy in Hindu Mythology.' *History of Religions* 10, #4 (May,1971), pp. 271-333. Some of the material from this article has been included in the present dissertation.

Orme, Robert. India Office, Orme Manuscript 1.179. I am indebted to Dr. Peter J. Marshall for the transcript of this manuscript.

Pal, Dhirendra Natha. Śrīkṛṣṇa. Calcutta, 1923.

Pargiter, Frederick Eden. 'Purāṇas.' In ERE X, 447-455 (1908-26).

. See Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa.

Parry, N. E. The Lakhers. London, 1932.

Piatigorskii, A. M. 'O psikhologicheskom soderzhanii ucheniia rannego Buddizma.' In Oriental Studies I, Tartu State University, Tartu, 1968, pp. 170-212.

Pocock, David. 'The Movement of Castes.' Man, 1955.

'The Anthropology of Time-Reckoning.' In Contributions to Indian Sociology 7 (1964), pp. 18-19; reprinted in Middleton,303-314.

Prasad, Beni. Theories of Government in Ancient India. Allahabad, 1927.

Rajagopalachari, C. Ramayana. 5th ed. Bombay, 1965.

Rao, T. Gopinatha. Elements of Hindu Iconography. Madras, 1916.

Renou, Louis. Hinduism. New York, 1961.

The Destiny of the Vedas in India. New Delhi, 1965.

Rivers, W. H. The Todas. London, 1906.

Roger, Abraham. Offne Thür zu den Verborgenen Heydenthum. Nürnberg,1663.

Roy, S. C. and R. C. The Kharias. Ranchi, 1937.

Sarup, Lakshman. See Nirukta.

Sastri, D. R. Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalism and Hedonism. Calcutta. no date.

Schrader, F. Otto. Introduction to the Pāñcarātra. Adyar Library #3. Madras, 1916.

Shastri, Suryakanta. The Flood Legend in Sanskrit Literature. Delhi, 1950.

Shivapadasundaram, P. The Śaiva School of Hinduism. London, 1934.

Sinha, Hara Narayana. The Development of Indian Polity. New York, 1963.

Sircar, Dines Chandra. Select Inscriptions. 2nd ed. Calcutta, 1965.

Studies in the Society and Administration of Ancient and Medieval India. Calcutta, 1967.

von Stietencron, H. 'Bhairava.' ZDMG 1969, Supplement I, Vorträge, Teil 3, pp. 863-871.

Strabo, Geography.

Tawney, C. H. Trans. The Ocean of Story [Kathāsaritsāgara]. 10 vols. London, 1924.

Temple, R. C. Legends of the Punjab. 3 vols. Bombay, 1884,1885,1900.

Thapar, Romila. A History of India, Vol I. Penguin, 1966.

Thomas, P. Epics, Myths and Legends of India. Bombay, 1958.

Kama Kalpa, The Hindu Ritual of Love. Bombay, 1959.

Toporov, V. N. 'Madkh'iamiki i Eliaty: neskol'ko parallelei.' in Indiiskaia Kul'tura i Buddizm. Moscow, 1972, pp. 51-68.

Weber, Max. The Religion of India. New York, 1958.

Wilford, Francis. 'On Egypt and other countries...from the ancient books of the Hindus.' Asiatick Researches III. Calcutta, 1792. pp. 295-468.

Wilkins, W. J. Hindu Mythology, Vedic and Purāṇic. 2nd ed.Calcutta, 1900.

Wilson, Horace Hayman. Sketches of the Religious Sects of the Hindus.

Vol I: Essays and Lectures on the Religions of the Hindus. London,1861-2.

The Vishnu Purāṇa. 3rd ed. (London,1840). Calcutta, 1961.

Woodroffe, Sir John George. Shakti and Shakta. Madras, 1959.

Wright, Caleb. Lectures on India. New York, 1848.

Zimmer, Heinrich. Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization. N.Y.,1946.

The Art of Indian Asia. 2nd ed. New York, 1960.

NOTES

I.

1. Zimmer (1946), p. 179 n.

2. Elwin (1949), pp. x and xi.

II.

1. Renou (1965), *passim*.

2. Renou (1961), p. 46.

3. Filliozat, pp. 34-60. In 234 A.D. St. Hippolyte wrote a 'Refutation of All Heresies', κατὰ πασῶν αἱρέσεων ἔλεγχος. Portions I.24.1-3 and I.24.7 of this work refer to certain Brahmins who said that they had rejected wrong doctrine (κενοδοξία), a term which the author applies elsewhere to certain heretic sects who were influenced by Indian doctrines. Thus the Greek term 'heresy' was applied to one Indian religion which claimed to have rejected 'wrong-doctrine', a term which was applied to another Indian religion.

4. I am indebted to Professor R. C. Zaehner for bringing this reference to my attention.

5. Seventh pillar edict; cf. Sircar (1965), p. 63, line 15; and cf. Renou (1965), p. 70.

6. Mayrhofer, p. 65.

7. I am indebted to Professor Thomas Burrow for pointing out this etymological problem.

8. *Śabdakalpadruma*, vol. III, p. 135, *pāṣaṇḍa*.

9. Medhātithi on *Mānavadharmaśāstra* 4.30, and Rāghava on the same verse, cited by Bühler, p. 133.

10. *Mitākṣarā* 1.130; 2.192; and *Tantrādhikāranirṇaya*, p. 25.

11. *Padma Purāṇa* 6.263.3-5.

12. Commentary on *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 3.18.9ff; cited in *Śabdakalpadruma*.

Notes to pages 11b-13

13. Parmenides, fragment 2, cited in Hussy, p. 81. Some striking parallels between the thought of Parmenides and the Madhyamikas have been discussed at length by Toporov, pp. 51-68.

14. Ṛg Veda II.12.5. utém āhur naiṣó astī́ty enam.

15. Kāṭha Upaniṣad 6.12-13.

16. Śabdakalpadruma.

17. Mānavadharmaśāstra 2.11 and 4.163; cf. Medhātithi on 4.163.

18. Hemacandra, cited in Śabdakalpadruma.

19. Das Gupta, III, p. 62; cf. also III, 512-550, 'The Lokāyata, Nāstika and Cārvaka'. He cites Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā xxxi.18-23 for the 'later' view.

20. Śabdakalpadruma.

21. V. S. Apte, under nāstika.

22. Sanskrit Wörterbuch (ed. Otto Böhtlingk and Rudolph Roth), I, 742, and IV, 127.

23. Renou (1965), p. 60.

24. Ibid., p. 2.

25. Abhidhānacintāmaṇi (3).862-3.

26. Śabdakalpadruma.

27. Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa 25, fol. 421, cited in Hazra (1958), p. 146.

28. Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa 14.70, cited in Hazra (1958), p. 326; Medhātithi and Nārada on Mānavadharmaśāstra 5.90, cited in Bühler, p. 184.

28a. Renou (1965), pp. 2-4 and p. 1.

28b. Hopkins (1920) pp. 87-89.

28c. Padma Purāṇa 6.263.3.

28d. Kūrma Purāṇa 2.21.32-33; Mānavadharmaśāstra 5.90; Bühler, p. 184.

Notes to pages 13-16

II.28e. Wilson (1861), I, p. 265.

28f. Gonda (1963), p. 219.

28g Mattavilāsaprahasana, act I, prose between verses 8 and 9.

28h. Ṣaṭtriṃśan-mata, cited in Devaṇabhaṭṭa's Smṛti-candrikā, II, p. 310, cited in Hazra (1963), p. 154; Eliade (1958), p. 420.

28i. Hazra (1958), p. 326 and (1963) p. 157; Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa 14.56; and 14.61.

29. Dānasāgara of Vallālasena, p. 7, verse 67, cited in Hazra (1963), p. 157.

30. Ibid., p. 7, verses 63-66.

31. Gonda (1963), p. 219.

32. Hazra (1948), pp. 67-68; Chattopadhyaya, Sudhakar, pp. 69-76.

33. Kūrma Purāṇa 2.16.15.

34. Pāśupatasūtra 1.13-17.

35. Śaṅkaravijaya chapter 23.

36. Ibid., chapter 24.

37. Kathāsaritsāgara 26(3.5).204, -.218, -.249-250.

38. Aparārka's commentary on Yajñavalkya Smṛti (ASS), p. 18; Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa, cited in Devaṇabhaṭṭa's Smṛti-candrikā, II, p. 311, cited in Hazra (1963), p. 164.

39. Kūrma Purāṇa 2.16.15.

Notes to pages 16-23

II. 40. Kūrma Purāṇa 2.37.142-48.

41. Mahābhārata XII, appendix 1, no. 28, l. 405; cf. Vāyu Purāṇa 30.293-5; Brahma Purāṇa 40.108-110; Liṅga Purāṇa 2.20.9-11.

42. Padma Purāṇa 6.250.1-23. Here, and throughout this thesis, I have summarized long myths instead of translating them literally.

43. Māgha-māhātmya of the Uttara Khaṇḍa of the Padma Purāṇa, in a Bengali manuscript, Dacca University Mss. no. 931, fols. 44 ff., chapter 10 ff., cited by Hazra (1963), p. 362.

44. Barrow, pp. 197-251.

45. Nandisūtra p. 391, cited in Altekar, p. 15; Prasad, p. 225.

46. Burton, pp. 162-3.

47. Plato, Laws, X.885.

48. Bhandarkar, p. 4.

49. Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, p. 3; Prabodhacandrodaya, act II, verse 26; Arthaśāstra, 1.2.5.

50. I am indebted to Dr. Richard F. Gombrich for bringing to my attention the distinction between these terms, and for so admirably demonstrating their application in his work on Buddhism in Ceylon (1971).

51. Hopkins (1920), p. 89.

52. Tantrāvarttika, pp. 114-117, commenting on Śabarasvāmin 1.3.4.

53. Tantrāvarttika, p. 127, on Śabarasvāmin 1.3.7.

54. Aparārka on Yajñavalkya Smṛti (ASS) 1.7.

55. Mattavilāsaprahasana act I, prose between verses 11 and 12.

56. Apte, on pāṣaṇḍa, vol. III, p. 1017.

57. Monier-Williams, p. 624.

Notes to pages 23-26

II.58. *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad* 7.8.

59. Wilson (1961), pp. 267-268 n.

60. *Vāyu Purāṇa*, cited by Wilson (1961), p. 268:
vṛthā vratī vṛthā jāpī te vai nagnādayo janāḥ

61. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 3.18.95-104.

62. *Mānavadharmaśāstra* 4.192-198.

63. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 47.58-60.

64. Yajñavalkya *Smṛti* 1.130.

65. *Kūrma Purāṇa* (Benares) 2.16.14-15; (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 444.

66. O'Flaherty (1969) pp. 321-325.

67. *Tantropākhyāna* 29.1-4.

68. Zimmer (1960), plate 276.

69. Brough, verse 21; *Subhāṣitāvali* verse 757.

70. Wilson (1861), I, p. 21.

71. *Hāsyārṇava* and *Dhūrtanāṭaka*, *passim*.

72. *Mattavilāsaprahasana* act I, prose between verses 9 and 10.

73. Dumont, *passim*.

74. cf. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 321-323.

75. *Arthaśāstra* 1.11.13. The commentator interprets *muṇḍa* as a reference to Śākyas, Ājivakas, etc., and *jaṭila* as a reference to Pāśupatas, etc.; he thus includes both types of heretics.

76. *New York Times*, August 14, 1968.

77. Brough, p. 105; Böhtlingk 4, 588; *Subhāṣitāvali* 2, 402.

Notes to pages 27-31

II.78. Conze, p. 6.

79. *Vāyu Purāṇa* (Bombay) 2.42.15-16.

80. Kosambi, p. 8.

81. Farquhar, p. 91.

82. Conze, p. 23.

83. Eliade (1958), p. 388.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

85. Eliot, II, 192.

86. Chattopadhyaya, Sudhakar, p. 69.

87. *Mahābhārata* XIII.17.45 ff; cf. XIII, appendix I, no. 4, ll. 66-67; XII, appendix I, no. 28, l. 405.

88. *Pāśupatasūtra* 3.6-10.

89. Ingalls, p. 291.

90. Kauṇḍinya's commentary on *Pāśupatasūtra* 3.15.

91. Derrett, pp. 46-51.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

94. *Bhagavad Gītā* 4.7, 9.23.

95. *Padma Purāṇa* 5.90.63.

96. Derrett, p. 50.

97. See below, pp. 154-162.

98. Ivanow, pp. 62-64. I am indebted to Dr. Peter Hardy of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, for this reference.

99. Daniélou, p. 12.

Notes to pages 31-35

II.100. Drekmeier, p. 120.

101. Hopkins (1913), p. 314.

102. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 10.6.24, -.34-6.

103. Ibid., 10.2.24.

104. Śiva Purāṇa 2.1.17.48 -- 2.1.18.38.

105. Hazra (1948), p. 99 n.

106. Mānavadharmaśāstra 10.43-44.

107. See below, pp. 222-236.

108. Eliot, II, 193.

109. Gonda (1963), p. 219.

110. Prasad, p. 225.

111. Ambedkar, p. 78.

112. Pocock (1955), final paragraph; (1964), p. 303.

113. I am indebted to Dr. David Pocock of the University of Sussex for this information.

114. Kālikā Purāṇa 80.155-157.

115. Mahābhārata XII.181.10-13.

116. Dubois, p. 516.

117. Ṛg Veda X.129.7.

118. Ṛg Veda VIII.100.3.

119. Ṛg Veda II.12.5.

120. Ṛg Veda VII.104.14.

121. Bhagavad Gītā 2.41-46.

122. Aitareya Āraṇyaka 2.1.2. cf. Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad 1.2.8.

Notes to pages 35-38

II.123. Heesterman (1968) p. 171.

124. Ṛg Veda V.30.1, VI.18.3, VI.27.3, VIII.64.7, VIII.100.3, X.22.1.

125. Heesterman (1968), pp. 180-181.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

127. *Mahābhārata* XII.10.20.

128. Yāska, *Nirukta*, 1.15.

129. Muir, II,169-172.

130. Müller, pp. 142 and 181.

131. Sarup, p. 72.

132. Sinha, p. 70.

133. Aiyangar, p. 12.

134. Sircar (1965), pp. 62-64.

135. *Aśokāvadāna* and *Divyāvadāna*, cited in Lamotte, pp. 267-269.

136. Basham (1967), p. 297.

137. Nārada *Smṛti* 10.1-2; Yajñavalkya *Smṛti* 2.192.

138. Baudhāyana *Dharmasūtra* 1.2.1-9.

139. Hopkins (1920), p. 89.

140. *Mānavadharmaśāstra* 4.30.

141. Yajñavalkya *Smṛti* 1.130.

142. *Ibid.*, 2.70.

143. Nārada *Smṛti* 4.180.

144. *Saura Purāṇa* 38.54.

145. *Arthaśāstra* 5.2.

146. *Ibid.*, 3.20.

147. *Śukranītisāra* 4.1.97-8.

148. *Śaṅkaraprādurbhāva*, cited by Wilford p. 411.

149. *Prabodhacandrodaya*, act V, prose between verses 10 and 11.

Notes to pages 39-46

III.i.1. Keith (1925), I, 239.

2. See below, p. 161.

3. Choudhary (1957), p. 241.

4. Dange, p. 87.

5. cf. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 3.17.39.

6. Gonda (1954), p. 162.

7. Daniélou, p. 271.

8. Rāmāyaṇa I.44.21-23.

9. Burrow, p. 5.

10. Mahābhārata XII.221.27-28.

11. Hopkins (1915), p. 47.

12. James 2.19.

13. Daniélou, p. 218.

14. Jātaka, V , #513.

15. Mahābhārata III.57.23.

16. Hopkins (1915), p. 48.

17. Daśakumāracarita, p. 85.

18. Ling, p. 23.

19. Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 1.4.11.

20. Meyer, II, 251.

21. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 5.1.1.1.

22. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.7-12, esp. 8.12.6.

23. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 9.5.1.12-15. condensed.

24. Mahābhārata XII.221.27-78. condensed.

Notes to pages 47-55

III.i.25. *Mahābhārata* III.92.6-10. condensed.

26. Ling, p. 22.

27. Orme, 1, 179. I am indebted to Dr. Peter Marshall of King's College, University of London, for the transcript of the Orme manuscript.

28. Holwell, p. 71 and 57.

29. Emeneau, pp. 174-191.

30. *Mahābhārata* XII.160.26.

31. *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad* 7.10. condensed.

32. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 8.7-12. condensed.

33. *Bhagavad Gītā* 16.7-18; Śaṅkara on 16.8.

34. Chattopadhyaya, Debi Prasad, pp. 14 ff.

35. Shastri, *passim*; Chattopadhyaya, Debi Prasad, p. 17.

36. *Vāyu Purāṇa* 78.29-30.

37. *Vāyu Purāṇa* (Bombay) 2.16.29-35.

38. *Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa*, chapter 25, cited in Hazra (1958), 128. condensed.

39. Hazra (1958), p. 143.

40. *Mahābhārata* XII.39.22-49. condensed.

41. *Prabodhacandrodaya* act II, prose before verse 1.

42. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 67.17-18. condensed.

43. Lewin, pp. 225-226.

44. Elwin(1949), p. 451.

45. Burton, p. 162.

46. *Vāmana Purāṇa*, *Saromāhātmya* 19.31-35. condensed.

Notes to pages 55-65

III.i.47. Mahābhārata IX.42.14-26.

48. cf. Dubois, p. 516.

49. Devībhāgavata Purāṇa 6.11.42.

50. cf. Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa 47.42-61.

51. Mahābhārata III, appendix 1, no. 16, ll. 33-55. condensed.

52. Mahābhārata V.47.74-79.

53. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 5.29.7-22.

54. Harivaṃśa 2.63.5-125.

55. Kālikā Purāṇa 39.1ff, 40.2 ff. condensed.

56. Hazra (1963), p. 245.

ii. 1. Buch, p. 9.

2. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 1.2.5.24-26. condensed.

3. Mahābhārata III.181.11-20. condensed.

4. Drekmeier, p. 105; cf. Piatigorskii, passim.

5. Skanda Purāṇa 1.20.40.173-185. condensed.

6. Mahābhārata XII.59.13-30. (and 30-115). condensed.

7. Nārada Smṛti 1.1-2. condensed.

8. Vāyu Purāṇa (Bombay) 1.8.77-88. condensed.

9. Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa 3.12.1-24. condensed.

10. Brāhmana-dhammika Sutta, Sutta Nipāta, pp. 51-55. condensed.

11. Heesterman (1971), p. 13, citing Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā 1.10.10 and Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā 36.5.

11a. Mānavadharmaśāstra 2.27.

12. Weber, p. 144.

13. Rivers, p. 183.

Notes to pages 65-72

III.ii.14. O'Flaherty (1971 A), *passim*.

15. *Mahābhārata* XII.200.34-40.

16. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 46.1-35; *Kūrma Purāṇa* (Benares) 1.28.15-40. condensed.

17. cf. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 315-317.

18. Leach, p. 8.
19. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 5.10.6.
20. Pargiter(1904), 49.27 (p. 239). cf. *Visuddhimagga* 13.44.

21. *Triṣaṣṭiśalākāpuruṣacaritra* I (*Ādīśvaracaritra*) 2.148-163; 2.893-4; 2.941-4. condensed.

22. Lévi-Strauss, pp. 136-195. See below, pp. 107-118.

23. Ṛg Veda X.117.1.

24. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 11.1.6.24.

25. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 1.5.41-43.

26. *Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa* 3.12.26-41.

27. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 9.1.1.1.; 2.2.4.1.

28. *Padma Purāṇa* 5.26.91-125; cf. *Liṅga Purāṇa* 1.106.1-27; *Matsya Purāṇa* 252.5-19; 179.7-187; *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.16.141-222. condensed.

29. *Varāha Purāṇa* 96.1-144.

30. See below, pp. 87-94.

31. Elwin (1949), p. 261.

32. *Mahābhārata* XII.139.13-92. condensed.

33. *Mahābhārata* I.60.52-53.

34. Schrader, p. 97.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

Notes to pages 72-80

III.ii.36. Eliot, I, lxxx, n. 1.

37. *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* 7.59b-63a.

38. Eliot, I, lxxx.

39. *Dīgha Nikāya*, Aggañña Suttanta xxvii.10 ff, vol. III, p. 84 ff; *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* of Buddhaghosa, III,865; *Visuddhimagga* 13.49.

40. Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Suttanta. *Dīgha Nikāya* III, pp. 69-70.

41. cf. *Mahābhārata* XII.181.10-13.

42. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 1.6.17-20; cf. *Vāyu Purāṇa* 1.8.77-88.

43. *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.28.15-40; *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 46.1-35.

44. See below, pp. 231-232.

45. *Dīgha Nikāya*, Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Sutta, III, 65-70. condensed.

46. Strabo, book 15, chapter 1, paragraph 64.

47. *Vāyu Purāṇa* 1.8.154-159.

48. *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1.6.4.1; cf. *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* 1.10.19 and *Kāṭhaka Saṃhitā* 36.5, cited by Heesterman (1971) pp. 13 and 16.

49. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 2.5.2.1-3 and 5.2.4.1-2.

50. Dracott, p. 5.

51. Elwin (1949), p. 42.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 510.

53. Shastri, *passim*.

54. See below, pp. 156-158 and 229-230.

55. Elwin (1953), p. 5.

56. Elwin (1949), p. 20.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Notes to pages 80-89

III.ii.59. See below, pp. 136-144.

60. Forster, p. 25.

61. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 11.1.6.1-11.

62. Holwell, p. 76.

63. *Kārikā* of Gauḍapada, 2.19.

64. *Prabodhacandrodaya*, act I.

65. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 1.5.4-8, -.16-18.

66. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* 45.18-40. condensed.

67. *Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa* 3.12.1-50. condensed.

68. Roy, p. 417.

69. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 2.6.8-9.

70. *Kalki Purāṇa* 1.1.14-19.

71. *Padma Purāṇa* 6.260.22-33.

72. *Parāśara Purāṇa*, chapter 3, cited in the *Tantrādhikāraṇirṇaya*, 34. condensed.

73. Elwin (1953), p. 503.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 591.

75. See below, pp. 181-186.

76. Heesterman (1971) pp. 13-14; *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 1.6.5.3.

77. Heesterman (1971), p. 13, citing Āpastamba *Śrauta Sūtra* 8.6.20.

78. *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 3.8.4.1, cited by Heesterman (1971), pp. 13-14.

79. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 2.5.2.17 and -.36.

80. *Mahābhārata* III.125.7-9.

81. *Vājasaneya Saṃhitā* 5.7.

82. *Mahābhārata* XII.273.26-54.

Notes to pages 89-96

III.ii.83. Mahābhārata V.13.17; Skanda Purāṇa 5.3.118.27; Bhāgavata Purāṇa 6.9.6-9; Skanda Purāṇa 1.1.16.20-41.

84. Rāmāyaṇa VII.86.1-17. condensed.

85. Rāmāyaṇa I.23.16-23. condensed.

86. Rāmāyaṇa VII.30.20-45. condensed.

87. Padma Purāṇa (ASS) 5.13.337-338; see below, pp. 165-172.

88. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 4.19.1-25. condensed.

89. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 2-4.

90. Mahābhārata XII.274. 36-59; cf. Brahma Purāṇa 40.112-119; Vāyu Purāṇa 1.30.298-305; Matsya Purāṇa 72.11-16; Padma Purāṇa 5.24.26-32. condensed.

91. See below, pp. 172-177.

92. Skanda Purāṇa 1.1.27.69.

93. Matsya Purāṇa 154.250-255; Skanda Purāṇa 1.2.24.42-43; cf. Haracarita 9.59.

94. Vāmana Purāṇa 6.45-55.

95. Elwin (1949), p. 349.

96. Ibid., p. 348.

97. Ibid., p. 419.

98. Mahābhārata XII.59.99-103. condensed.

99. Matsya Purāṇa (ASS) 10.3-10. condensed.

100. Harivaṃśa 1.5.1-21. condensed.

101. Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 2.39.108-126; Vāyu Purāṇa 2.1.91-124.

102. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 4.13.25-47; 4.14.1-46; 4.15.1 ff. condensed.

Notes to pages 97-112

III.ii.103. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1.13.12.

104. Ibid., 1.13.7-41.

105. Vāmana Purāṇa, Saromāhātmya 26.31.

106. Ibid., 26.4-62; 27.1-23. condensed.

107. Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa 1.106.5-66. condensed.

110. Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa 3.13.1-60; 3.14.1-45. condensed.

111. Padma Purāṇa (ASS) 2.27.19-46; 2.29.1-46; (Calcutta) 2.28.19-46; 2.30.1-46. condensed.

112. See below, pp. 113-136.

113. Padma Purāṇa (ASS) 2.29.47-82; 2.30.1-73; 2.32.1-25; 2.33; 2.34.1-15; 2.35.1-51. condensed.

114. Padma Purāṇa (ASS) 2.36.1-59; 2.37.1-38. condensed.

115. Padma Purāṇa (ASS) 2.38.1-45. condensed.

116. Holwell, p. 70.

117. Eliade (1938), pp. 202 ff.

118. Eliot, I, ci.

119. Ibid., I, lxxii.

120. Ibid., I, lxxix.

121. Mahābhārata XII.15.20, --.50.

122. Mahimnastotra, verse 16.

123. Vāmana Purāṇa, chapters 11 and 16.

124. Matsya Purāṇa 180.5-99, esp. 8-13. condensed.

125. Mānavadharmaśāstra 1.26, --.29. condensed.

126. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1.6.14-15, --.29-31. condensed.

127. Liṅga Purāṇa 2.6.1-57. condensed.

128. Vaikhānasasmārtasūtra 8.11.

129. Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa chapter 3, fol. 11.b, cited in Hazra(1958),p. 146.

Notes to pages 112-128

III.ii.130. Satapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.4.3.3-9. condensed. cf. Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 2.69-70.

131. Mahābhārata I.189.1-9. condensed.

132. Brahma Purāṇa 116.1-21.

133. Mahābhārata III, appendix 1, no. 16, ll. 70-126. condensed.

134. Mahābhārata XII.122.14-29. condensed.

135. Matsya Purāṇa 11.18-22.

136. Mahābhārata III, appendix 1, no. 8, l. 5.

137. Jātaka I.48.

138. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 8-16.

139. Śiva Purāṇa 7.1.12-17; cf. Vāyu Purāṇa 1.10.42-59. condensed.

140. Skanda Purāṇa 7.2.9.5-17. condensed.

141. Matsya Purāṇa 4.30-32. condensed.

142. Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 2.9.68-92; Liṅga Purāṇa 1.6.10-22.

143. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.10.17-40. Śiva Purāṇa 2.1.15.49-64.

144. Saura Purāṇa 23.16-52; 25.5-20; Kūrma Purāṇa 1.10.17-40; etc.

145. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 3.12.1-26. condensed.

146. Liṅga Purāṇa 1.70.300-342. condensed.

148. Primary version: Mahābhārata XII.248.13-21, -.249.1-22, -.250.1-41;

Secondary version: Mahābhārata VII, appendix I, no. 8, ll.35-249. condensed

149. See above, p. 84.

150. Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa 3.12.48-60. condensed.

151. Elwin (1949), p. 411.

Notes to pages 128-137

III.ii.152. Elwin (1949), p. 416; also (1943), p. 182.

153. Mills, p. 27; cf. Elwin (1949), p. 411.

154. Elwin (1949), p. 416.

155. Elwin (1953), p. 508.

156. Elwin (1949), p. 421.

157. Elwin (1949), p. 416. Bison-Horn Maria.

158. Elwin (1949), p. 415. Bhuiya.

159. Elwin (1949), p. 414. Agaria.

160. Elwin (1943), p. 182.

161. Idem.

162. Elwin (1949), p. 288.

163. Elwin (1939), pp. 328-9 and 414.

164. Elwin (1953), p. 509.

165. Elwin (1949), p. 420.

166. Ibid., p. 509. Gond.

167. Elwin (1943), p. 182; cf. (1949), p. 426.

168. Elwin (1949), p. 426. Muria.

169. Rivers, p. 400.

170. Elwin (1949), p. 422.

171. Parry, pp. 488ff.; cf. Elwin (1949), pp. 25-6.

172. Roy, pp. 414 ff; cf. Elwin (1949), pp. 24-5.

IV.i. 1. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 1.6.2.1-4.

2. Viśvarūpa commentary on Yajñavalkya Smṛti 1.350. Ghoshal thinks that this is 'probably from a lost Brāhmaṇa work' (p. 29). condensed.

Notes to pages 137-146

IV.i. 3. Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa chapter 25. Hazra (1958), p. 128.

4. Böhtlingk, I, p. 26,#136 (54)from Śārṅgadharapaddhaniti, 26; and p. 27, #137.

5. Mahābhārata XIII.40.5-12.

6. Varāha Purāṇa 70.29-42.

7. Skanda Purāṇa 1.1.31.1-78.

8. Thomas (1958), p. 25.

9. Wright, p. 20. cf. Wilkins, p. 330, citing the Skanda Purāṇa. (not in the published Sanskrit text).

10. F. M. Dostoevskii, Brat'ia Karamazovy. vol. 9 of Sobranie sochinenii, Moscow, 1958. p. 513. trans. Constance Garnett, New York, 1950, p. 500.

11. Hazra (1963), p. 232; Kālikā Purāṇa 84.1-36. condensed.

12. Vāmana Purāṇa, Saromāhātmya 24.6-17.

13. Schrader, p. 83, citing the Padma Tantra, part 1, chapter 85, and Viṣṇutilaka, 1. 146 ff.

14. Śiva Purāṇa 2.3.31.1-52, 2.3.32.1-65.

15. Mahābhārata XII.202.7-33. condensed.

16. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 10.1.17-22 and 11.4.22. condensed.

17. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 5.1.12-60; Devībhāgavata Purāṇa 10.5.11-12. condensed.

18. Elwin (1942), p. 92 and p. 87.

19. Elwin (1943), p. 181.

20. Temple, III, 53 ff.

21. Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa 1.97.

22. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.10. condensed.

23. Rāmāyaṇa, inserted after I.64.7 in the Baroda edition.

24. Skanda Purāṇa 2.7.23.8-40; Mahābhārata I.70.24-27.

25. Padma Purāṇa 3.8; Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa 1.36.

Notes to pages 146-150

IV.i. 26. Rāmāyaṇa VII.29-30.

27. Mahābhārata IX.42.28-41.

28. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 1.6.5.1.

29. Matsya Purāṇa 47.91; Vāyu Purāṇa 2.35.125.

30. Śiva Purāṇa, Dharmasaṃhitā 44.21-22.

31. Abhijñānaśākuntala I.1; cf. Hopkins (1915), p. 139.

32. Mahābhārata III.135.16-42.

33. Rāmāyaṇa III.9.16-22.

34. Mahābhārata V.9.8.

35. cf. Meyer (1930), pp. 260-261.

36. Mahābhārata XII.329.21ff; Matsya Purāṇa 61.21-26; Bhāgavata Purāṇa 11.4.7.

37. Śiva Purāṇa 2.1.2.1-9.

38. Mahābhārata V.15.2-25.

39. Padma Purāṇa 6.104.28; Śiva Purāṇa 2.5.22.50-51.

40. Saura Purāṇa 69.37-40.

41. Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa 8.9.15.

42. Ibid., 8.6.5.

43. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 9.5.16-27.

44. Kuvālaka Jātaka, I, #31, pp. 198 ff.

45. Vāmana Purāṇa 9.10, 33, 37, 40-44; Kūrma Purāṇa 1.16.123-240; Liṅga Purāṇa 1.93.1-25; Matsya Purāṇa 179.1-86; Varāha Purāṇa 27.1-39.

Notes to pages 151-154

IV.i. 46. Śiva Purāṇa 2.5.22.3-43; 2.5.40.1-43; 2.5.41.1-34; Padma Purāṇa 6.104.20; 6.4.50; 6.16.46-7; 6.27.1-27; Vāyu Purāṇa 69.144-145; Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa 2.16.1-208; 2.17.1-90; 2.21.1-104; Śiva Purāṇa 2.5.13-26; Padma Purāṇa 6.3-19 and 6.98-107.

47. Devī Purāṇa chapters 8,9, and 13. condensed.

48. Śiva Purāṇa 2.5.23.48-9; 2.5.24.52; Padma Purāṇa 6.106.13-14; Dessigane (1964), 42.23.

49. See above, pp. 12-17.

50. Mahābhārata VII.150.

51. Matsya Purāṇa 131.10-50.

52. Ibid., 131.50.

53. Ibid., 187.1-52; 188.1-77, esp. 187.18.

54. Ibid., 188.12.

55. Liṅga Purāṇa 1.71.38.

56. Saura Purāṇa 34.23-24.

57. Liṅga Purāṇa 1.71.48, -.66, -.69.

58. Ibid., 1.71.75-96; Saura Purāṇa 34.42-72. condensed.

59. Saura Purāṇa 34.70.

60. Choudhary (1957), p. 239.

61. Hazra (1948), p. 103 and pp. 41-2.

62. Banerjea, pp. 420-425.

63. Banerjea, p. 392: Śāntātman.

64. Schrader, pp. 43-47: the thirty-ninth incarnation, Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā.

Notes to pages 155-159

IV.i.65. Dharmāraṇyakhaṇḍa of the Brahmakhaṇḍa of the *Skanda Purāṇa*, chapters 31-38, cited by Sircar (1967), p. 149.

66. *Prabandhakośa* pp. 27-45, 9.36-52.

67. Tawney, II, 204, citing W.B. Barker, *Vaitala-pachisi*, pp.184-191.

68. *Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa* 21.51 ff. condensed.

69. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 1.3.24; 2.7.37; 11.4.22; 10.40.22. condensed.

70. See above, pp. 94-107 and below, pp. 162-165.

71. Wilson (1961), p. 272.

72. *Mahābhārata* III.188.14-85.

73. *Vāyu Purāṇa* 2.37.390.

74. Thapar, p. 161.

75. Basham, p. 309.

76. *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 4.24.98; Wilson (1961) p. 381 ff.

77. *Garuḍa Purāṇa* 1.202, cited by Choudhary (1957): Buddhaḥ pāṣaṇḍasaṃghātāt kalkir avatu kalmāṣāt.

78. Banerjea, p. 424.

79. *Daśāvatāracarita* chap.9, ll. 1-74.

80. *Gīta Govinda* 1.1.3.

81. Agrawala (1964), p. xi.

82. *Devībhāgavata Purāṇa* 10.5.13. *duṣṭayajñavighātāya*....

83. Keith (1917), p. 169.

84. Gonda (1954), p. 159.

85. Choudhary (1957), p. 241.

86. Macfie, p. 8.

87. Basham, p. 309.

Notes to pages 160-167

IV.i. 88. Anāgatavamsa, pp. 33-54. I am also informed, by Dr. Richard Gombrich, that Viṣṇu appears as a Bodhisattva in the Dasabodhisattakathā, an unpublished medieval text, and that he is represented as one of the ten Bodhisattvas in Sinhalese temples, notably at Dambulla (eighteenth century).

89. Agni Purāṇa 16.1-10. condensed.

90. Garuḍa Purāṇa 1.32.

91. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 2.7.10; cf. 1.3.6-22.

92. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 3.17.9-45, 3.18.1-34.

93. Ibid., 3.18.30. yuktimadvacanam.

94. Wilson (1961), p. 272; cf. Choudhary (1957), p. 241.

95. Śiva Purāṇa 2.5.3-6, esp. 2.5.4.1-3, -.10-11, -.24-30; 2.5.5.35; Jñāna Saṃhitā 21.3-24. condensed.

96. Śiva Purāṇa 2.5.5.1-48.

97. Ibid., 2.5.6.28.

98. Śiva Purāṇa, Jñāna Saṃhitā 21.7-8.

99. Śiva Purāṇa 2.5.6.40-42.

100. Vāyu Purāṇa 1.30.215 and 2.35.176.

101. Harivaṃśa 1.29.36-63; Vāyu Purāṇa 2.30.25-55. condensed.

102. Skanda Purāṇa 4.1.43-58. condensed.

103. Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.7-12; cf. Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad 7.9; MhB XII.140.22.

104. Prabodhacandrodaya II, before v. 19; Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha I,

105. Hopkins (1920), p. 87.

106. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 4.9.1-22. condensed.

107. Vāyu Purāṇa 2.30.76-92.

Notes to pages 167-174

IV.i.108. Vāyu Purāṇa 2.30.92-100.

109. Vāyu Purāṇa 2.35.95-203; 2.36.1-50; Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 3.72-3; cf. Matsya Purāṇa 47.69-226. condensed.

110. Matsya Purāṇa 24.43-49. condensed.

111. Padma Purāṇa 5.13.205-420. condensed.

112. Devībhāgavata Purāṇa 4.11.1- 4.15.50, esp. 4.13.1-35. condensed.

113. See below, pp. 190-197.

114. Saura Purāṇa 49.7-143.

ii.1. Meinhard, p. 35 ff.

2. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 10.88.32.

3. Śiva Purāṇa 2.2.26.14-40; Skanda Purāṇa 1.1.2.23-6; 1.1.2.26-37.

4. Saura Purāṇa 7.39-40.

5. Tantrādhikāraṇirṇaya, p. 35; Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa 49.13; Skanda Purāṇa 7.29.90 ff.

6. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.15.28-33; Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa 49.12-13.

7. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.15.76-77.

8. Skanda Purāṇa 1.1.38.

9. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 4.2.21-26.

10. Meinhard, p. 91; O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 11-13.

11. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 8-10. Ṛg Veda X.125.6.

12. Ṛg Veda I.71.5, -.8; I.164.33; III.31.1; X.61.4-7; Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa 8.2.10 ff; Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 13.9-10; Śiva Purāṇa 2.2.2-4.

13. Gopatha Brāhmaṇa 2.1.2; Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa 7.9.16.

Notes to pages 174-179

IV.ii. 14. *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.7.4.1-4; *Maitrāyaṇi Saṃhitā* 4.2.12.

15. *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa* 4.38.5.

16. *Liṅga Purāṇa* 1.99.14-15.

17. *Śiva Purāṇa* 2.2.38.1-63; 2.2.39.1-48.

18. *Liṅga Purāṇa* 1.36.72-74.

19. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 4.2.22-23; *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.14.61; *Vāyu Purāṇa* 1.30.61; *Skanda Purāṇa* 7.2.9.42.

20. *Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa* 2.34.1-52; 2.35.1-8; 2.37.30-35.

21. *Śiva Purāṇa* 2.2.26.16.

22. *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.14.63 (Bib.Ind.); *Vāyu Purāṇa* 30.61; *Skanda Purāṇa* 7.29.42.

23. *Devībhāgavata Purāṇa* 7.30.27-37.

24. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 28-31, 34.

25. *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.14.53-65.

26. *Śiva Purāṇa* 2.2.26.11-12.

27. *Vāyu Purāṇa* 1.30. 42-49; *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* 2.13.44.

28. *Rāmacaritamānasa*, pp. 34-5.

29. *Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa* 2.35.24-33; cf. 2.33.34-50.

30. *Mahābhārata* XII, appendix 1, no. 28, ll. 40-45; *Brahma Purāṇa* 39.30-33; cf. *Bṛhaddharma Purāṇa* 2.37.50-66.

31. *Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* 7.9.16

32. Sāyaṇa on *Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* 7.9.16.

33. Caland, on *Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* 7.9.16.

34. *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* 4.2.12.

35. *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa* 2.1.2. condensed. cf. *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 2.6.8.5.ff.

36. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* 13.9-10; *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 1.7.4.1-7.

Notes to pages 179-183

IV.ii. 37. Brahma Purāṇa 2.13.70-73.

38. Garuḍa Purāṇa 6.19.

39. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 4.2.10-32. condensed.

40. Skanda Purāṇa 1.1.1.20-40; Śiva Purāṇa 2.2.26.14-27, -.27.42-54. condensed.

41. Padma Purāṇa 5.5.42-50; Kālikā Purāṇa 16.29ff, 17.1-16; Skanda Purāṇa 7.2.9.90.

42. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.15.8, -.11; cf. Vāmana Purāṇa 2.17, 4.1.

43. Vāmana Purāṇa 2.17-18.

44. Varāha Purāṇa 97.1-27; Śiva Purāṇa 3.8.36-66, 3.9.1-57; Jñāna Saṃhitā 49.65-80; Bhaviṣya Purāṇa 3.4.13.1-19.

45. See von Stietencron, passim.

46. Varāha Purāṇa 97.2-8. condensed.

47. Prabodhacandrodaya 2.31.

48. Mattavilāsaprahasana 17.

49. Hiraṇyakeśin Gṛhya Sūtra 2.3.7.

50. Śiva Purāṇa, Jñāna Saṃhitā 49.65-80. condensed.

51. Śiva Purāṇa 3.8.36-66; 3.9.1-57. condensed.

52. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 5.4.1.9-10.

53. See above, pp. 87-94.

54. Mahābhārata XIII.18.7-8.

55. Drekmeier, p. 43.

56. Liṅga Purāṇa 1.24.100; Vāyu Purāṇa 1.23.184.

57. See below, pp. 217-218.

58. Padma Purāṇa 1.13.244-7.

Notes to pages 184-191

IV.ii. 59. Matsya Purāṇa 47.235.

60. Bhagavad Gītā 4.7.

61. Mahābhārata I.15.1-4 and I.16.1 ff; Matsya Purāṇa 249.1-3, 250.1 ff; Vāyu Purāṇa 1.54.47-82; Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 4.6.31-47.

62. Bhaviṣya Purāṇa 3.4.13.1-19. condensed.

63. Brahma Purāṇa 113.1-22. condensed.

64. Padma Purāṇa 5.14.92-115. condensed.

65. Skanda Purāṇa 5.1.2.1-65. condensed.

66. cf. von Stietencron, passim, and Ṛg Veda X.90.5.

67. Mahābhārata III.40.1-5.

68. Skanda Purāṇa 4.2.87-89.

69. Manasābijay of Bipradās, pp. 1-235; cited in Maity, p. 79.

70. Banerjea, p. 483.

71. Wilson (1861), I, 252 n., citing Kāśīnātha's Dakṣiṇācara Tantra Raja.

72. Mahānirvāṇa Tantra, 1.64-65.

73. Śaṅkaravijaya, chapter 23.

74. Varāha Purāṇa 70.41-43.

75. Padma Purāṇa 6.263.1-91. condensed.

76. Varāha Purāṇa 70.41-43.

77. Pañcatantra 1.159; cf. Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa, verses 70 and 97.

78. Manmathonmathana 2.21.

79. Prabodhacandrodaya 2.28.

80. Devī Purāṇa chapters 8, 9 and 13; see above, pp. 150-151.

Notes to pages 191-196

IV.ii. 81. Bhagavad Gītā 3.23; Padma Purāṇa 6.272.176; Bhāgavata Purāṇa 10.33.34-6; Das, Bhagavan, p. 98; Pal, p. 68.

82. Eliade (1959), p. 100 and p. 104.

83. Rāmāyaṇa I.24.17-19.

84. Ibid., VII.30.20-45.

85. Mahābhārata V.12.6-7.

86. Rāmāyaṇa I.25.15-22.

87. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 10.33.35.

88. Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad 3.1.

89. Deussen, p. 41 n.

90. Mānavadharmaśāstra 11.240-264.

91. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 5.14.8.

92. Eliade (1959), p. 171.

93. Dhammapada 21.294-5.

94. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 2.3.48.

95. Indrabhūti's Jñānasiddhi, chapter 15; trans.by Eliade (1958),p. 263.

96. Eliot, II, 168.

97. Naiṣadhacarita 17.122-123.

98. Rajagopalachari, p. 40.

99. Eliade (1958), p. 263.

100. Rāmacaritamānasa, pp. 37-8. condensed.

101. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 10.33.30-31.

102. Ibid., 10.33.31-32.

103. Śrīdhara on Bhāgavata Purāṇa 10.33.30-32.

104. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka XV.21.

Notes to pages 196-207

IV.ii.105. Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa, cited by von Glasenapp, p. 29.

106. Subhāṣitaratnakoṣa verse 36, Ingalls' translation.

107. Śaktisaṅgama Tantra, IV: yady apy asti trikālajñas trailokyakarṣaṇakṣamaḥ tathā 'pi laukikacāram manasāpi na langhayet.

108. Tantrādhikāranirṇaya, p. 25.

109. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.16.95-108. condensed.

110. Devībhāgavata Purāṇa 12.9.1-10. condensed.

111. Tantrādhikāranirṇaya, p. 29; from the Skanda Purāṇa, Yajñavaibhava Khaṇḍa, p. 32. condensed.

112. Skanda Purāṇa 6.32.1-100. condensed.

113. Tantrādhikāranirṇaya, p. 31. condensed.

114. Devībhāgavata Purāṇa 12.9.1-97. condensed.

115. Śiva Purāṇa 4.27.23-46. condensed.

116. Śiva Purāṇa 4.25.1-58; 4.26.1-57; 4.27.1-22. condensed.

117. Śiva Purāṇa 4.27.31, 4.25.8: bhāvikarmavaśāt.

118. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 27-8.

119. A Śaiva Pāśupata Śāstra, according to V. S. Apte.

120. Varāha Purāṇa 71.48-62. condensed.

121. See O'Flaherty (1969), p. 307, n. 28, for Sanskrit references. condensed.

122. Bhaviṣya Purāṇa 3.4.17.67-78.

123. Ibid., 3.4.13.1-19; cf. Śiva Purāṇa, Jñāna Saṃhitā 49.65-80.

124. Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 2.27.1-127; Śiva Purāṇa, Dharmasaṃhitā 10.79-215; Jñānasaṃhitā 42.1-51; Śiva Purāṇa 4.12.1-54; Skanda Purāṇa 6.1.5-64; 7.1.187ff; 7.3.39.5-38.

Notes to pages 207-215

IV.ii.125. *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* 2.27.1-127; *Śiva Purāṇa*, Dharmasaṃhitā 10.79-215; *Skanda Purāṇa* 5.3.38.6-68.

126. *Padma Purāṇa* 5.17.269-71.

127. *Padma Purāṇa* 6.282.20-36; 6.255.6-43.

128. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 10.89.1-7.

129. *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* 4.2.27-32; *Padma Purāṇa* 1.13.244-247.

130. Roger, pp. 247-8.

131. Dubois, pp. 629-630.

132. Newby, p. 39.

133. Thomas (1959), p. 114.

134. *Idem*.

135. O'Flaherty (1969), *passim*, and esp. pp. 27-8.

136. *Śiva Purāṇa* 4.12.11; *Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa* 2.27.2; *Yāgīśvaramāhātmya* 26b.3. condensed.

137. *Darpadalana* 7.70-71.

138. Nīlakaṇṭha on *Mahābhārata* XIII.17.202 (XIII.17.99 in critical ed.).

139. *Kathāsaritsāgara* 3.6.131-133.

140. *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.16.109-120; *Tantrādhikāraṇirṇaya*, p. 27. condensed.

141. *Skanda Purāṇa* 7.2.94-96, -.136-142. condensed.

142. *Devībhāgavata Purāṇa* 7.39.26-32. condensed.

143. *Kūrma Purāṇa* 1.29.27-34. condensed.

144. *Mahābhārata* XII.11.1-28. condensed.

145. *Skanda Purāṇa* 5.2.11.1-26. condensed.

Notes to pages 215-221

IV.ii.146. Ghosh, p. 108.

147. Nivedita, pp. 310-311.

148. Kūrma Purāṇa 2.37.60-62, -.129-131.

149. Rao, II, I, 235.

150. Agrawala (1964), p. 86 and p. xiv.

151. Kathāsaritsāgara 3.6.131-133.

152. Śiva Purāṇa 4.2.25; Wright, pp. 14-17.

153. O'Flaherty (1969), pp. 4-7.

154. Grousset, pp. 191-192.

155. Khandalavala, p. 52. .

156. Meinhard, pp. 41-2; von Stietencron, passim.

157. Kūrma Purāṇa 2.37.131-142.

158. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.16.117; Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 2.27.116 ff.

159. Vāmana Purāṇa 6.87.

160. Śiva Purāṇa, Dharmasaṃhitā 10.196-7, -.213.

161. Skanda Purāṇa 5.2.8.1-45. condensed.

162. Padma Purāṇa 5.17.75-84. condensed.

163. Devībhāgavata Purāṇa 7.39.26-32.

164. Nīlmaṇi Mukhopadhyāya Nyāyālankara, p. xxv.

165. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.12.256-259.

166. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 6.8.19.

167. Padma Purāṇa 4.110.244.

168. Kūrma Purāṇa (Benares) 2.36.39.

169. Madhva, Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.1. (Mysore, 1911, I, 228), citing Varāha Purāṇa.

170. Nīlakaṇṭha on Mahābhārata XIII.17.202; Yāgīśvaramāhātmya 26b.3; Śiva Purāṇa 4.12.11; Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 2.27.2; Darpadalana 7.70-71.

Notes to pages 222-225

V.1. Tantrādhikāranirṇaya, p. 37, citing Parāśara Purāṇa, chapter 11.

2. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 2.7.36-39.

3. Woodroffe, p. 566.

4. Eliot, I, lxxxix.

5. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.22.39.

6. Woodroffe, p. 575.

7. Hopkins (1915), p. 45.

8. Ling, p. 78.

9. Woodroffe, p. 577.

10. Sāmba Purāṇa, quoted in the Vīramitrodaya of Mitramiśra, 1.24, cited by Chakravarti, p. 32.

11. Sāmba Purāṇa, cited by Ananta-bhaṭṭa in his Vidhānapārijāta, II, 519, cited in Hazra (1958), p. 93.

12. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.24.31-34.

13. Hazra (1948), p. 227.

14. Mahābhārata VIII.48.11.

15. Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 13.6.2.9-10.

16. Kane, III, chapter 34.

17. Church, passim.

18. Kane, III, xvii.

19. Mahābhārata III.188.9-13.

20. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.28.18.

21. Tantrādhikāranirṇaya, p. 36; Kūrma Purāṇa 1.29.25.

22. Tantrādhikāranirṇaya, p. 37.

Notes to pages 225-229

V.23. Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa 38.54, -.58, -.60, -.91.

24. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 6.1.37; Brahma Purāṇa 230.13; Vāyu Purāṇa 1.58.59; Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 2.31.59-60.

25. Viṣṇudharma Purāṇa 105, cited in Hazra (1958), pp. 148-9. condensed.

26. Matsya Purāṇa 144.40; Vāyu Purāṇa 1.58.31; Brahmāṇḍa Purāṇa 2.31.65-66; Kūrma Purāṇa 1.29.16 and -.25.

27. Vāyu Purāṇa 1.58.40-65.

28. Bṛhannāradīya Purāṇa 38.54.

29. Mahānirvāṇa Tantra 1.45. and 1.66.

30. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 1.6.45.

31. Tantrādhikāranirṇaya, p. 35, from Kūrma Purāṇa 1.27; cf. Kūrma Purāṇa 1.29.27 and 1.29.29.

32. Saura Purāṇa 38.30-96; 39.1-80; 40.60. condensed.

33. Wilson (1961), pp. 489-490.

34. Mahābhārata III.55.1-13, -.56.1ff, -.59.22-4, -.60.15-16; -.63.14-15; -.70.26-35; -.74.16-20. condensed.

35. Kathāsaritsāgara 56.

36. Naiṣadhacarita 17.13-37; -.88, -.97, -.102, -.157, -.182, -.186, -.201.

37. Mahābhārata I.113.3 ff.

38. Pocock (1964), p. 312.

39. Viṣṇu Purāṇa 6.1.60; cf. 6.2.34-36.

40. Rāmāyaṇa VII.74.27.

41. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 2.7.36-39. See above, pp. 156-8.

42. Mahābhārata III.188.14-93, -.189.1-13.

Notes to pages 229-243.

V. 43. Cf. Gonda (1954), p. 149.

44. _Kalki Purāṇa_ 1.1.14-39; 2.6.1 ff., 2.7.1 ff., 3.1.1 ff., 3.6.1 ff., 3.7.1 ff. condensed.

45. _Vāyu Purāṇa_ 2.37.389-407.

46. _Dīgha Nikāya_, Cakkavatti Sīhanāda Suttanta III, 71-75, and T. W. Rhys Davids translation, p. 73, note 1. condensed.

47. _Visuddhimagga_, Abhiññāniddeso, Pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇakathā. 13.34. condensed

48. _Visuddhimagga_, Abhiññāniddeso, Pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇakathā. 13.64.

49. Pocock (1964), p. 312.

50. _Mānavadharmaśāstra_ 9.301-2.

51. _Arthaśāstra_ 1.3.14-17.

52. Pocock (1964), p. 313.

53. _Bhagavad Gītā_ 11.32.

54. _Vāmana Purāṇa_ 49.1-14, 50.1-26.

55. _Rāmāyaṇa_ I.46-7.

VI. 1. I am indebted to Professor Daniel H. H. Ingalls of Harvard University for suggesting several of these formulations.

2. _Śiva Purāṇa_ 2.1.17-48 - 2.1.18.38. _Śivapurāṇamāhātmya_ 1.1.2.15-40.

3. The relevance of Zeno's paradox to Indian philosophy (and to Parmenides) has been noted by Toporov (see especially pp. 59 and 67, note 47).