BRITAIN AND THE [illegible] BUREAUCRACY: 1868 - 1896

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CHAPTER IV

[illegible] SECURITY

Persia's internal affairs in the reign of Naser ad-Din shah could not very easily be kept separate from her relations with her two powerful neighbours, Russia and England. The two powers, each pursuing its own interests in rivalry with the other, gradually came to dominate certain aspects of Persian political life. They interfered in the country's domestic affairs, connived at the appointment of ministers friendly to their own governments, secured privileges for their respective nationals and sought to influence the course of Persian policy. Their involvement in Persia also reinforced an inherent dichotomy between north and south in the country, as increasingly the north came to be regarded as falling within the Russian and the south within the British sphere of influence.[1] ". . . the antagonism existing between Russia and England has become such," Naser ad-Din shah bitterly remarked, "that should I wish to go out for an excursion or a shooting expedition in the north, east and west of my country, I must consult the English, and should I intend to go south I must consult the Russians."[2]

This dichotomy was reflected also in Tehran, in the division between those officials who looked to Russia and those who looked to England for support. The two countries

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[1] Lambton, "Persia: The Breakdown of Society," in The Cambridge History of Islam, 1, 449.

[2] Enclosure in Wolff to Salisbury, No. 242 (125), Tehran, 9 November 1888, FO 539/40.

gradually came to dominate Persian trade. Already by mid-century, this was reflected in the disruption of Persia's native crafts and industries through foreign imports and in the depreciation of its currency through the heavy drainage of specie from the country.[1]

Persia's relations with England and Russia also became inextricably intertwined with the question of internal reform. The threat posed by the Anglo-Russian rivalry to Persia's independence, and the growing conviction that the country's weakness stemmed from its system of government, as already mentioned, provided the initial motivation for attempts to reform various departments of the administration. Since both the powers believed their position would be affected, albeit in different ways, by major internal changes in Persia, the shah had often to consider the attitude of Russia and England when contemplating the introduction of reform measures.

Moreover, assistance for the country's development, for example in the construction of railways, could only come from Europe; and after 1871 England and Russia were able to exercise a virtual veto over concessions granted to nationals of countries other than their own. Thus economic development, which was closely related to the question of reform, could also not be carried out without the concurrence of one or both the great powers.[2]

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1 Lambton, "Persian Trade Under the Early Qajars", in Papers on Islamic History II: Islam and the Trade of Asia, ed. D.S. Richards, (Oxford, 1970), pp. 238-9.

2 As Naser ed-Din shah once remarked: "Whatever we do in the south to develop our country by the making of roads, &c., the Russians immediately say this is done for the benefit of the English . . . If we do anything in the north, east or west, the English immediately cry out and say that it is done in order to benefit the Russians . . ." Enclosure in Wolff to Salisbury, No. 242 (125), Tehran, 3 November 1888, FO 539/40.

> The heart of the matter [Malkam Khan remarked in 1883] is clear. The governments of England and Russia have a quarrel and a rivalry between them. Their field of battle has reached Khoresan. We too have fallen on bitter days between these two states, and it is impossible for us completely to escape the misfortune of having them as our neighbours.[1]

To design a foreign policy that would ensure Persia's independence and territorial integrity in the face of this 'misfortune' was the over-riding concern of Persian statesmen in the reign of Naser ed-Din shah. In this endeavour, Persia had little room for manoeuvre. Attempts to interest third powers in Persia's fate proved fruitless. Nor could Persia, given the pressures to which she was subject from St. Petersburg and London, hope to pursue a policy of strict neutrality between the two powers, remaining aloof from both and beholden to neither. "His Imperial Majesty desires in masterly fashion not to be drawn to one side or the other," wrote Amin ed-Dowleh in 1887. "But it is impossible."[2] Another sort of approach was called for.

Although Persia felt threatened by both England and Russia, her policy towards her two neighbours was determined to a degree by the different policies and aims Russia and England pursued in Persia. Britain's objective was primarily to make Persia a buffer between her empire in India and Russia's expanding empire in Central Asia. She thus wished to see Persia strong, independent and well-administered. Russia's objective was to gain access to the Persian Gulf, to absorb the khanates of the Turkoman steppe to which Persia had a

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1 Malkam Khan to Foreign Ministry, London, 10 October 1883, MFA 124/6127.

2 Amin ed-Dowleh to Malkam Khan, 15 Sha'ban [1304]/9 May 1887, Bibliothèque National, Supplément Persan (Hereafter as B.N.), 1997/71.

vague claim, and to dominate, if only covertly, Persia's rich northern provinces. She had no interest in a strong Persia. Britain's objectives made her a supporter, within certain limits, of Persian reform; Russia's an opponent of such reform.[1]

Persian statesmen were aware of these differences in British and Russian objectives in Persia. Moreover, there was the concrete fact of Russia's expansionist drive in Central Asia which, virtually completed with the fall of Merv in 1884, had brought under Russia's control the Turkoman territories that had served as a buffer between the two countries and carried Russian troops to the frontiers of Khorasan. This development, more than any other, cast its shadow over Persian thinking and determined the course of Persian foreign policy.[2] It caused Persia to look to England, rather than to Russia, for support and succor from the dilemma in which it found itself.

Superficially, then, there seemed to be much to bring Persia and England together. In practice, the two countries could not agree on a common policy. On the British side, differences of opinion between the British government and the Government of India; uncertainty as to Russian motives in Central Asia; caution lest a forward policy in Persia lead to similar action by Russia; the unavailability of funds to

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1 For a concise discussion of English and Russian objectives in Persia, see Lambton, "Persia: The Breakdown of Society", Cambridge History of Islam, I, pp. 440-462.

2 A typical formulation, as seen through Persian eyes, of the threat to Persia posed by Russia's expansionist ambitions can be found in "Memorandum on the Dangers Facing Persia," submitted by Malkam Khan to the Foreign Office on 8 April 1874 (in FO 60/366); this memorandum is discussed later in this chapter. See also the conclusions reached by a council of Persian ministers and reported to Naser ad-Din shah, undated, in S.I. 1987/44.

assist in the economic development of Persia when such occasions arose; the difficulty of defending Persia by force of arms; and, ultimately, the lack of real confidence in the shah and his government militated against the adoption of a policy that might win the shah's whole-hearted support.[1]

On the Persian side, suspicion of what were considered Britain's ulterior motives in Persia died hard. The shah could not forget that twice in the century British troops had occupied parts of south Persia. He believed that British proposals for the opening of the Karun to steam navigation and for the construction of a railway from Mohammarah masked a desire to dominate south Persia. He was haunted by the example of India and saw in the establishment of every British firm in Persia a potential East India Company that, as an agent of Whitehall, would eventually strip him of his power and his country of its independence.[2] The shah's fears were not allayed, nor his belief in England's desire for the development of his country strengthened, by a British propensity to oppose railway and other concessions given to nationals of other countries.[3]

The shah had also to move with an eye on the internal

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1. For a fuller discussion of these points, see M.L. Greaves, Persia and the Defense of India, 1884-1892 (London, 1959).

2. R.I. Thomson to Granville, No. 71, Confidential, Tehran, 18 April 1882, FO 60/453; and Nicolson to Currie, Private, Tehran, 30 March 1887, FO 60/486.

3. That part of the abortive Reuter concession of 1872 relating to railroads and Reuter's subsequent claims were as a matter of policy used in later years to block numerous other concessions, such as those negotiated with the Frenchmen Olleon and the American Hinston. (See Kazemzadeh Russia and Britain pp. 158-60 and 174; and Greaves, op. cit., p. 97). In a plea for the abandonment of this policy, Nicolson wrote in 1886 that it has convinced the shah that "we are determined at least to prevent all projects except those that we have ourselves proposed." (Nicolson to Iddesleigh, No. 154 (64), Tehran, 24 December 1886, FO 539/33).

repurcussions of the type of reforms and projects the English and his more enthusiastic advisors were proposing. The opposition aroused by the Reuter concession remained fresh in his mind, and he had no wish to risk stirring up the 'ulamā and the more conservative elements in the country again by permitting an increased foreign presence in Persia.[1] He was also concerned lest reforms, once begun, might spin out of control and undermine his authority.[2]

These considerations made it difficult for England and Persia to find a common ground on which they could co-operate at least in the reform and development of the country. But it was the shah's fear of Russia, and England's inability to allay that fear, that proved to be virtually the unsurmountable barrier to Anglo-Persian cooperation. The shah believed that Russia had designs against Persian territory. He was convinced, quite rightly, that any concession to England would have to be balanced by similar concessions to Russia.[3]

As he explained to Nicolson in 1888, he knew that Britain was his friend. He genuinely desired to reform and develop the country. He wanted to stand up to Russian intimidation and dictation. But he could do nothing without "a strong and powerful friend at his back."[4]

> We do not expect you to give us money, or to send us arms, or to land troops to protect

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1 Nicolson to Iddesleigh, No. 117 (24), Tehran, 27 September 1886, FO 539/31.

2 Nicolson to Salisbury, No. 12, Very Confidential, Tehran, 24 January 1887, FO 60/486; and Wolff to Salisbury, Private and Confidential, Tehran, 21 April 1888, FO 60/492.

3 Nicolson to Salisbury, No. 92, Tehran, 5 July 1887, FO 60/487.

4 Same to same, No. 9 (43), Secret, Tehran, 5 January 1888, FO 539/37.

> us, but we wish to be perfectly sure that, should Russia advance into, or seize Persian territory, England will demand the evacuation or take such measures where she can strike Russia as would cause the latter to hesitate in her action.[1]

But such assurances were not forthcoming. In reply to this particular communication, Salisbury asked Nicolson to assure the shah that the integrity of Persia was a material part of England's policy, but that a country with parliamentary institutions like England could not pledge herself to go to war in eventualities which could not even vaguely be foreseen.[2]

But this, to the shah, was no reply at all, the expression of what he described as "platonic sentiments" and "good advice and honeyed words but nothing else."[3] What he wanted from England was a firm guarantee. But as Philip Currie at the Foreign Office remarked, "He asks us for what we cannot possibly give."[4]

The shah, however, felt he had no alternative but to pursue the elusive British guarantee. The search for such a guarantee was reinforced by the activities of a number of high-ranking Persian officials whose primary interest lay, not in foreign policy, but in promoting a series of far-reaching reforms in Persia, and who came to regard foreign policy as a means of achieving what were more strictly domestic ends. The aims pursued by these individuals was profoundly to affect the

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1. Ibid.
2. Same to same, No. 6 (48), Secret, 8 February 1888, FO 539/37.
3. Same to same, No. 9 (63), Secret, Tehran, 5 January 1888, FO 539/37.
4. Minute by Currie in Decypher, Sir H. Wolff, No. 161, 5 September 1888, Most Secret and Confidential, FO 60/495.

nature of Persian reform activity in the 1870's and 1880's.

There were many ways, as already noted, in which the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia impinged on the country's internal politics. But in the minds of these officials, the question of an English guarantee and the urgency of domestic reform came increasingly to appear as inter-dependent, as the two sides of the same coin. In many instances, the major officials who were attracted to this point of view were the same individuals who, already in the 1860's, had begun to urge reforms on their government. Like many other Persian officials, they believed reform necessary to secure Persia against external dangers. But impressed with their country's backwardness and attracted by European ideas and forms of government, they also came to regard reform as a good in itself, as the door through which Persia might enter the community of civilized nations.

These officials in time also grew convinced that Persia could only hope to attract England's support if she proved herself worth supporting. This meant expanding Persia's commercial links with England by opening up the country to trade, building roads and railroads and encouraging local industry; and making the country more appealing to the British public and Parliament by giving it a system of administration more in keeping with European ideas of justice and good government. This was a point of view which English diplomats were themselves constantly pressing on the shah.[1]

They also came to feel that the shah would not risk incurring Russian displeasure or the internal disruption that

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[1] Nicolson to Salisbury, Confidential, No. 32, Tehran, 21 March 1887, FO 60/486.

might result from major change without having first, as it were, secured his flanks by obtaining a British guarantee. Finally, these officials, having failed repeatedly to make any progress in the reform field, came to feel that they could not on their own, alone and unaided, win the shah and his more conservative ministers to their view. They believed they needed foreign backing if they were to succeed in their aims; and they thus began to seek to enlist British support in their cause, to arrange, so to speak, for the exertion of pressure from abroad to achieve their goals at home.

The officials who began to think along these lines were not numerous. But they held key positions in Persia's diplomatic service abroad and in the government at home. Among them were Malkam Khan in London and Mohsen Khan Mo'in ol-Molk, the ambassador in Istanbul; Mirza 'Ali Khan Amin od-Dowleh, the shah's private secretary; Hasan 'Ali Khan Garusi and Mahmud Khan Naser ol-Molk both of whom had served in diplomatic missions abroad and as governors and ministers at home; and also Abol Qasem Naser ol-Molk, the grandson of Mahmud and heir to his title.

They did not constitute a formal party; nor did they have a carefully articulated programme. But a number of them had already begun to press for reform in the 1860's; they were friends and shared many attitudes and ideas in common. There is also evidence that they were often in touch with one another, either directly or through correspondence and that a few of them used these contacts to further certain general aims.

Malkam Khan, for example, maintained a correspondence with a number of high-ranking Persian officials in Tehran, and also with the shah's eldest son, Zell os-Soltan. Amin od-Dowleh

corresponded fairly regularly with Malkam Khan and was apparently also in touch with Mo'in ol-Molk. In Tehran itself, Amin od-Dowleh was in contact with a few other colleagues whom he occasionally consulted as to the course they should follow to induce the shah to undertake reform.[1] Amin od-Dowleh and Malkam appear to have been the key figures in this small group.

The close connection that existed in the mind of Malkam Khan between Persia's external and internal situation is well exemplified by the document entitled "Memorandum on the Dangers Facing Persia" that Malkam submitted to the British

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[1] The evidence for these remarks and for much of the subsequent material in this chapter is drawn from the collection of Malkam Khan's correspondence (Bibliothèque National, Supplément Persan, 1987-1991 and 1995-1998). The collection contains for the period up to 1890 letters to Malkam from Amin od-Dowleh, Hasan 'Ali Khan Garusi, Zell os-Soltan and the shah himself and less important letters from a number of other Qajar personages. There are no letters from Malkam to his correspondents, but the gist of his replies can sometimes be guessed at from the contents of the existing correspondence. By far the largest and most important part of the collection consists of over 200 letters from Amin od-Dowleh to Malkam dating from 1878 to 1896. From the Amin od-Dowleh correspondence it seems clear that both Mahmud Khan Naser ol-Molk and his grandson, Abol Qasem at times corresponded with Malkam. A number of other references suggest that Amin od-Dowleh, if not directly in touch with Mo'in ol-Molk, was at least aware of his movements and intentions. The son of Amin od-Dowleh and the daughter of Mo'in ol-Molk were married in the 1880s. Amin od-Dowleh occasionally also mentions other persons with whom he is in touch, for example Sadiq os-Saltaneh, Ilkhani and Qavam od-Dowleh. On frequent occasions, in offering advice or suggesting to Malkam a course of action, Amin od-Dowleh speaks in the collective "we" and uses expressions such as "your friends believe", thus suggesting that he and Malkam thought of these individuals as in some sense constituting a like-minded group. There are no grounds, on the basis of this correspondence, for assuming that, Malkam and Amin od-Dowleh aside, the association between these officials was tight or regular. Nor does it appear that more than a handful of officials were involved. Nevertheless even half-a-dozen would not have been an inconsiderable number, given the limited size of the top echelon of officials in the court and government under Naser ed-Din shah, and the even smaller number of these who expressed a commitment to reform.

foreign minister, Lord Derby, in 1874.[1] In this paper, Malkom argued that two great dangers threatened Persia. The first was external and obvious: Russia's "natural and almost inevitable" expansionist drive in Asia. But there was another danger confronting Persia, what Malkom described as "the great danger, the immediate danger", and this was the internal condition of Persia. To guarantee the frontiers of Khorasan it was not sufficient to obtain Russian assurances:

> It is necessary before all else to prevent Persia from attracting invasion. Before examining the aims of Russian policy, it is necessary to study what the situation of Persia requires. For, to repeat, the invasion of our frontiers depends far less on the impulsion given from St. Petersburgh than on the attraction exercised by Persia. Thus, to combat the evil . . . one must go to Persia.[2]

Persia itself, Malkom argued, had changed. Many ministers and the shah himself had travelled in Europe and had been awakened to new ideas. There was a genuine desire in the country for reform and change. But Persia could not get unaided. "Persia, abandoned to herself, can do absolutely nothing. Alone, she is irrevocably lost." Guided and supported by England, however, the country could rejuvenate herself, turn aside present dangers and give England every guarantee for the future. Nor was any material sacrifice required of Britain. It would suffice, he said, for England to exchange her attitude of indifference to one of interest and solicitude.[3]

In making such representations to the Foreign Office, Malkom Khan was not always acting on the shah's instructions. He was often acting on his own initiative. In the case of this

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1. "Memorandum on the Dangers Facing Persia", received by the Foreign Office on 8 April 1874, FO 60/366.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

particular memorandum, for example, he noted specifically that it reflected his own personal views.[1]

Malkom was not working only on the British. He was also sending pointed memoranda to his own government. In these he decried the absence of a proper financial, judicial and military administration in Persia; the lack of laws; the sale of offices; the strangulation of trade through vexatious internal tariffs and regulations; the unwillingness to build roads and railroads.[2]

He argued that Persia was endowed with all the requirements for rapid progress: rich and fertile provinces; an intelligent and hard-working population; a liberal monarch; and a homogenous people. Turkey's limited success with reforms was no guide to the Persian situation. Unlike Turkey, which was a pure theocracy with the caliphate playing the role of the established church, Persia--or so Malkom claimed--was a secular state, with a strong sense of nationhood. Moreover, while <u>sunni</u> Islam was a strict orthodoxy, closed to new ideas, the tenets of <u>shi'i</u> Islam were open to examination by living theologians, "an admirable principle which opens the doors to the broadest interpretations and the newest ideas."[3]

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1 <u>Ibid</u>. The memorandum bears the minute in Derby's hand: "Confidential: from the Persian Minister: but he desired that it might be regarded solely as the expression of his personal opinion."

2 "Extracts from Confidential Despatches addressed by the Persian Minister in London to the Persian Ministers, and submitted to His Majesty the Shah", Asia Confidential, FO 60/497, p. 1.

3 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 2. It no doubt suited Malkom's purpose to minimize the importance of religion in Persia and to exaggerate the flexibility of shi'ism. On the other hand, he appears genuinely to have held the view that Turkey, which he regarded as a theocracy, was held together by religion and that the destruction of Islam would also mean the destruction of the Ottoman state; but that in Persia, the idea of the nation could survive without religion. See also his memorandum, submitted to Derby,

Malkom also warned his government of the consequences of immobility:

> If Persia had heeded the councils of the English Government; if she had desired to establish merely a tolerable government; if she had developed at least a part of her immense resources; if she had organized her finances, army and administration a little; if she had allowed the expansion of her commercial links with the English people; then we could have flattered ourselves that in certain eventualities England would not hesitate to throw the weight of her power in the balance of Persia's destinies. But today, in our present state, what Power in the world could ever consider assisting us to maintain an independence that we ourselves have done so much to render unsustainable.[1]

In making these representations, both to his own and to the British government, Malkom Khan was being urged on by his friend and correspondent in Tehran, Mirza 'Ali Khan Amin ed-Dowleh. Amin ed-Dowleh was a member of one of the great Qajar bureaucratic families. In 1873, as noted earlier, he had become the shah's private secretary, a post he held until Naser ed-Din's death almost a quarter of a century later. He was also for many years the chairman of the dar ash-showra-ye kobra, the council of state; and he sat on many of the important ad hoc councils called by the shah to consider major questions before the government. He was thus privy to much of the shah's confidential correspondence and his private audiences; he was often the channel through which ministerial reports passed to the shah, and through which the shah's instructions were conveyed to the ministers; and he was a party to discussions held by the ministers on matters of policy.

Of a more conservative cast of mind than Malkom and

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on 2 December 1876 in FO 60/383.

1 "Extracts from Confidential Despatches . . .", FO 60/697.

more deeply rooted in Persia's bureaucratic traditions, he was more cautious in the nature of the reforms he espoused. But like Malkam, he early became convinced of the urgent need for reform; and for a period of more than fifteen years, the question of reform was the almost single and unvarying subject of his correspondence with Malkam Khan. Underlying this obsession with reform was Amin ed-Dowleh's deep sense of his country's grave and precarious situation.

He saw that the shah, although at times apparently prepared to act, was increasingly sinking into indifference; that those ministers who might advise him were either taken up with the pursuit of personal interests or too cautious to tell the shah of the true situation of the country; that paralysis was slowly overtaking the various branches of government; and that the external dangers Persia faced grew as the internal situation deteriorated.[1] "Now," he wrote to Malkam:

> disorders show their face on every side; corruption has arisen everywhere; the spirit of the kingdom has been exhausted; the government has no longer any strength or energy; we are drowned in every type of difficulty.[2]

It was to a search for a solution to this state of affairs that Amin ed-Dowleh addressed himself in his correspondence with Malkam Khan. This correspondence, a key to the understanding of some of the attitudes and aims of a number of important figures among the Qajar reformers, covered a wide

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1 For some examples, see Amin ed-Dowleh's letters to Malkam Khan of 11 Safar 1296/4 February 1879, S.P. 1997/6; 10 Rabi' II, 1296/13 April 1879, S.P. 1997/2; 6 Jomadi II 1296/28 May 1879, S.P. 1997/7; 4 Zi Qa'deh 1299/17 September 1882, S.P. 1997/27.

2 Amin ed-Dowleh's letter to Malkam of 29 Safar 1299/31 January 1881, S.P. 1997/194.

range of subjects. The two men discussed various projects, such as the establishment of banks and railroads and the reform of the financial system. Malkom shared with Amīn ed-Dowleh his ideas for reform. Amīn ed-Dowleh, with his privileged position in the shah's court, was able to give Malkom an intimate account of the affairs of the government, the shifting fortunes of friends and foes among the shah's advisors, and the shah's own changing moods and inclinations.

When Malkom was sent an official report on decisions taken in Tehran or was given instructions as to the tone he should adopt with the English government, Amīn ed-Dowleh often supplemented these with his own evaluation as to the true situation in Persia and offered suggestions for action by Malkom calculated to achieve more nearly the effects he and Malkom hoped for. Occasionally, he provided Malkom with confidential information the shah had decided to with-hold from his ambassador. At times, he conferred with colleagues in Tehran and conveyed to Malkom the general consensus as to what the minister in London should do and say.[1]

In all this, Amīn ed-Dowleh had one over-riding purpose: to use Malkom's position in London to overcome the shah's resistance to initiating sweeping change in Persia. In this endeavour, Malkom was well-suited to Amīn ed-Dowleh's purpose. Although boastful and given to exaggeration, regarded as a charlatan by some and resented by many others, Malkom nevertheless enjoyed a reputation in Tehran--a reputation he

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1. For instances where Amīn ed-Dowleh consulted with friends before advising Malkom, see his letters of 22 Moḥarram [1296]/16 January [1879], S.P., 1997/32; 29 Rajab 1297/7 July 1880, S.P. 1997/16; 22 Moḥarram 1299/14 December 1881, S.P. 1997/30; 15 Rabi' II [1306/19 December 1888], S.P. 1997/12; 18 Rajab [no year given], S.P. 1997/9.

assiduously fostered—as a man who understood the policies of the great powers, who had important contacts in the City of London, and who had plumbed the 'secret' of the West and understood such complicated matters as railroads, banks and financial reform.

Equally important to Amin ed-Dowleh was the fact that Malkom, based in London, was presumably in a position not only to influence the shah by interpreting for him British policies and intentions, but also to influence the English themselves as to the tone they should adopt with the shah. "Today," Amin ed-Dowleh wrote Malkom, "your remarks spring from a source which gives them the astringency of poison."[1]

Amin ed-Dowleh thus considered it imperative that Malkom maintain a regular correspondence with the Persian foreign ministry and with the shah. His letters are full of exhortations to Malkom to send in his reports regularly, "if not every day then once a week", and to make these despatches "good and spirited."[2] His words, as he repeatedly told Malkom, carried weight with the shah. "Now", he wrote him on one occasion, "I am waiting for detailed letters from Your Excellency containing those very points which I have in mind. Today, a major and important role, through which you can further our designs, lies in Your Excellency's hands."[3]

As to what Malkom should say to the shah, Amin ed-Dowleh was quite specific:

> In describing events and stating the

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1. Amin ed-Dowleh's letter of 4 Zi Qa'deh 1299/17 September 1882, S.P. 1997/27.
2. Letters of 11 Zi Qa'deh 1299/24 September 1882, S.P. 1997/ and 15 Moharram 1300/26 November 1882, S.P. 1997/36.
3. Letter of 30 Rabi' I 1300/8 February 1883, S.P. 1997/201.

> necessities of the moment, write that this is the time for reform, that if it does not take place things will be bad, and that the dangers and difficulties will increase.[1]

Week after week and month after month, Amin ed-Dowleh pressed Malkam to maintain unbroken the stream of his despatches to Tehran. Basing his judgement on the mood at the court, he advised Malkam as to the tone he should adopt with the shah. He advised him to be less cautious, more critical and outspoken, to put in an occasional warning. He informed him of the effect of his suggestions on Naser ed-Din.[2]

Malkam himself was a prolific writer, as attested by his voluminous despatches in the Persian foreign ministry archives. But his habits appear to have been erratic and irregular. Periods of intense activity and writing would be followed by periods of seeming indifference, when Malkam, possibly feeling that his advice went unheeded, relapsed into almost total silence. Weeks would go by without a single line reaching Tehran from London.[3] For Amin ed-Dowleh, feeling keenly his inability to influence the course of events in Tehran without some outside assistance, Malkam's silences were especially hard to bear.

> I have repeatedly said . . . [he wrote him] that your letters aside, there is nothing that can stimulate or spur us to action. To put it bluntly, the interruption

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1 Letter of 9 Shevval 1299/24 August 1882, S.P. 1997/25.

2 For examples see letters of 30 Rabi' I 1300/8 February 1883, S.P. 1997/201; 12 Shevval 1301/4 August 1884, S.P. 1997/124; 26 Moharrem 1302/13 November 1884, S.P. 1997/48; 11 Rabi' I 1301/10 January 1884, S.P. 1997/45.

3 Amin ed-Dowleh complains of Malkam's silences on several occasions. See for example letter of 22 Zi Hajjeh 1300/24 October 1883, S.P. 1997/43.

> of your despatches is death to us . . . You do not know how confused and frightening our situation is. You do not know what errors we are making.[1]

Amin ed-Dowleh's implicit faith in the effectiveness of Malkom's despatches was not entirely unjustified. The arrival of major memoranda from Malkom marked the few occasions when the shah, more and more falling prey to despair, could be moved into action. On a number of occasions when Malkom sounded the alarm, Naser ed-Din shah called a council of his leading ministers, instructed them to study Malkom's proposals and asked them to recommend to him a course of action.[2] These conferences, however, generally ended in indecision. Amin ed-Dowleh blamed this on the shah's increasing tendency to avoid troublesome problems, on the timidity of some ministers and the cupidity of others, and on the inability of the ministers to work together and to speak with one voice.[3]

The shah's indecisiveness was no doubt also prompted by his fear of the consequences of change and the fact that Malkom's proposals were not backed by the concrete promise of British support that he had so long sought. Replying to one of Malkom's many pleas for reform in 1304/1886-7, Naser ed-Din wrote to his minister that he (Malkom) had spoken repeatedly on this subject and lengthy discussions had taken place in Tehran:

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1 Ibid.

2 For examples of such conferences, see Amin ed-Dowleh's letters to Malkom of 11 Rabi' I 1301/10 January 1884, S.P. 1997/45; 25 Rabi' I 1301/24 January 1884, S.P. 1997/44 and 6 Zi Hajjeh 1301/25 September 1884, S.P. 1997/46. A detailed description of the deliberations of a council called after the arrival of one of Malkom's despatches is also given in Amin ed-Dowleh's memoirs. See Khaterat, pp. 104-107.

3 Khaterat, pp. 106-7.

> But you have not yet shown us the road that is necessary so that we may pursue that plan, way and task in confidence. Yet you tell us to move, blindfolded, towards present day civilization. But we do not see where we are going; and the danger is that, having begun to move, we shall fall into a deep pit from which we can never extricate ourselves.[1]

It was for this reason that Malkam and Amin ed-Dowleh, while attempting to influence the shah, sought simultaneously to influence the English. In adopting this course, the two men were actuated by a set of considerations. On the one hand, they felt that their hand would be strengthened if their appeals to the shah were reinforced by the representations of British diplomats in Tehran and London. On the other, they saw that only a determined stand by England could stiffen the shah to resist the pressure Russia was bringing to bear on him. Amin ed-Dowleh's activities following the Russo-Persian treaty of 1881 are instructive in this regard.

In 1881 the shah had negotiated and signed two frontier demarcation agreements with Russia under which Persia gave up its claims to several territories east of the Caspian. Only one of these agreements was made public at the time. The second, under which Persia's surrender of claims were greater than evident from the first, was kept secret.[2] The treaties were negotiated in great secrecy, and apart from the foreign minister Mo'tamen el-Molk, the shah appears to have taken only three other ministers into his confidence: Mahmud Khan Naser el-Molk, 'Abdol Wahhab Khan Nasir ed-Dowleh and Amin ed-Dowleh

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1 Shah's letter to Malkam Khan, 1304/1886-7, S.P. 1967/4.

2 Salisbury to Wolff, No. 14, Very Confidential, 29 February 1888, FO 60/491.

himself.[1] According to Amin ed-Dowleh, the agreement was concluded over the stiff objections of himself, Naser ol-Molk and Nasir ed-Dowleh, and it was the foreign minister who, sympathetic to the Russians, influenced the shah to yield to Russian demands.

The shah kept the secret agreement not only from the British but also from his minister in London and, despite Amin ed-Dowleh's pleas, did not inform Malkom Khan of the existence of the treaty when Malkom was in Tehran in March-June 1882. As the months were on, however, and the shah began to feel that the treaty gave him no security against Russia's threatening advance in Central Asia, he grew more amenable to Amin ed-Dowleh's advice. Late in 1882, he agreed that Malkom be informed and be instructed to approach the Foreign Office once again with a plea for a stronger show of support.[2]

Amin ed-Dowleh himself was quick to send Malkom Khan an account of his own on the nature and background of the treaty, providing details which were apparently not given to Malkom in the official communication.[3] He asked Malkom to find out "if the English will not abandon us because of this

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1 A detailed account of the circumstances in which the treaty was negotiated is given in Amin ed-Dowleh's letter to Malkom of 15 Moharram 1300/26 November 1882, S.P. 1997/34. The remarks that follow are based on this account. Amin ed-Dowleh also gives a more discreet, less detailed, account in his memoirs. See Khaterat, pp. 97-99.

2 It was probably after the receipt of these instructions that Malkom Khan saw Gladstone. The meeting is referred to in Amin ed-Dowleh's letter of 30 Rabi' I 1300/8 February 1883 S.P. 1997/201. Malkom, however, was apparently not authorized to reveal to England the existence of the treaty, about which the British learned only in 1887, and then from the government in Tehran rather than from Malkom in London.

3 Amin ed-Dowleh wrote Malkom: "In order that Your Excellency should know well the truth of the matter, I state this in the greatest secrecy, and my remarks are a trust in Your Excellency's hands." (Amin ed-Dowleh's letter of 15 Moharram, 1300/26 November 1882, S.P. 1997/24.

great error and if they will take pity on our plight . . ." and added:

> If, God willing, you are able to arrange the matter well, you will, in my opinion, have saved Iran. Not only will Russia not swallow us up. But also, with the support of England, our work will achieve some order; reform will of necessity become unavoidable.[1]

Malkam's representations to England on this particular occasion, officially sanctioned and given added impetus by his own and Amin ed-Dowleh's anxieties, did not lead to any positive results.[2] The pattern itself, however, was to be repeated. Alongside the official approach to England, sanctioned by Tehran, Malkam, encouraged by Amin ed-Dowleh, would make an unofficial, unsanctioned approach. Sometimes this would take the form of giving official communications a special emphasis, along lines suggested by Amin ed-Dowleh. Sometimes, it would take the form of a more openly private and independent appeal.

Amin ed-Dowleh encouraged Malkam to make these overtures by flattering him into thinking that the English counted on his despatches to influence the shah and were eagerly awaiting the result of his advice to Tehran before taking action of their own.[3]

> The time seems opportune [he wrote him in 1888] both for you to teach them (the British) what to say to us and for them to write us what is the condition for attracting their support and favour.[4]

When the sort of advice Amin ed-Dowleh hoped for proved difficult to secure, he did not hesitate to put words

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1 Ibid.

2 Letter of 30 Rabi' I 1300/8 February 1883, S.P. 1997/201.

3 Letters of 11 Sha'ban [1304]/5 May [1887], S.P. 1997/70 and 15 Sha'ban [1304]/9 May 1887, S.P. 1997/71.

4 Letter of 29 Rabi' II [1306]/13 January 1888, S.P. 1997/83.

more to his liking in the mouths of European statesmen. "For example," he suggested to Malkom

> write that in the German court I did such and such. They said, 'very well; we are ready to cooperate in every way we can in extending moral and material support to the Persian government. But on condition that the Persian government does not continue to maintain among the states and nations the reputation she has held up to now; that she improve her situation a little and show she is capable of survival.' In the same way [write] that following the occupation of Egypt, the English government has thrown a protective mantle over us (as ra shegh band gereftah ast). Report these matters more clearly and firmly than they are here set down. Perhaps we shall pay a little attention to reform or at least decide to maintain appearances.[1]

In making representations to the British Foreign Office, Malkom Khan needed little prodding from Amin ed-Dowleh. Throughout a long tenure at the London legation, he had urged his views through written memoranda and in personal interviews on a succession of foreign ministers and under-secretaries of state for India. His proposals often went far beyond his instructions.

He even went to the extent of submitting to the Foreign Office copies of his despatches to Tehran, containing

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[1] Letter of 4 Zi Qa'deh 1299/17 September 1882, S.P. 1997/27. Amin ed-Dowleh was greatly exaggerating German interest in Persia. Malkom too engaged in this practice. After talks with Bismarck, he reported to the shah: "The aims of His Imperial Majesty were fully achieved on this trip. Prince Bismarck is a friend of Iran and a sincere devotee of His Imperial Majesty. To the extent that he rises in prestige and moral influence, to that degree he will support Iran." (Malkom's letter, undated, in IMFA 85/6128). The truth was, however, that Bismarck was indifferent both to Persian and to British suggestions that he take a greater interest in Persia. For the British approach to Germany, see Greaves, Persia and the Defense of India, pp. 85-100. The Persian approach to Germany is discussed in B. Martin, Persian-German Diplomatic Relations 1873-1912 ('s-Gravenhage, 1959) pp. 7-45. This account, however, is not entirely reliable and has to be treated with caution.

exhortations to reform and warnings that England would abandon Persia unless the government put its house in order.[1] He also suggested to England the line they should adopt with his government. Britain, he said in one memorandum, should tell the shah:

> Yes, I am your friend; yes, I have a great interest in maintaining your independence. But in order that I should be capable of being of use to you, it is indispensible that you yourselves begin to buttress your independence. And for that, this is what I propose:[2]

There followed a list of suggestions that comprised virtually all the projects that for two decades Persian reformers had been urging on the shah. Britain, Malkam said, should tell the Persian government:

> Establish regular ministries with European advisers; adopt laws, no matter which, provided that these are at least promulgated; establish a number of courts and, give your subjects at least a semblance of security and welfare; establish a bank; send a thousand students to various universities in Europe; build roads; build railroads; invite foreign capital; open your country to the commerce of all states.[3]

In short, Malkam advised, Persia should be told: "Undertake reforms; if not, you are irrevocably lost."[4]

Malkam Khan admitted that such an approach was somewhat at variance with accepted diplomatic usage. But he argued that diplomatic channels need not be used. The intimate personal interview was the most effective form of communication in Persia, and the British minister in Tehran was eminently well-placed to act in this fashion. Besides, the country, from

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1 "Extracts from Confidential Despatches addressed by the Persian Minister in London to the Persian Ministers, and submitted to His Majesty the Shah," Part I, FO 60/497.

2 Ibid., p. 4.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., p. 6.

the shah on down, was crying for reform, for some manner of "opening the door to felicity." Persian officials were acute enough to see that European systems of government were superior to the defective forms of administration prevalent in Asia. But the absence of any tradition and ignorance of the theory and techniques of European forms of administration militated against the adoption of European models. Those rare Persian ministers who had some idea of what was needed lacked the authority and prestige to gain acceptance for their proposals. "This authority and prestige," he said, "can only come to us from Europe."[1]

In Tehran, Amin ed-Dowleh himself was not idle. He too urged reform on the shah and occasionally succeeded in inducing Naser ed-Din to attempt to improve the administration, control corruption and check oppression.[2] He admitted, however, that "every once in a while I speak a little [of the situation in the country], and then spend days regretting it."[3] When Malkam's despatches arrived, he ensured that they were brought to the shah's attention and defended them against criticism.[4] Occasionally, he tried to coordinate activities in various places, say between Tehran, London and Istanbul.

For example, advising Malkam not to expect any concrete plan of action from friends in Tehran where the obstacles were too great and the determination lacking, he suggested

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1 Ibid., p. 5.

2 For some instances, see Amin ed-Dowleh's letters to Malkam of 11 Safar 1296/4 February 1897, S.P. 1997/6; 11 Zi Qa'deh 1299/24 September 1882, S.P. 1997/28; and 15 Moharram 1300/26 November 1882, S.P. 1997/36.

3 Amin ed-Dowleh's letter to Malkam of 4 Zi Qa'deh 1299/17 September 1882, S.P. 1997/27.

4 Letter to Malkam of 25 Rabi' I 1301/24 January 1884, S.P. 1997/44.

that Malkom ask the shah to permit him to come to Tehran from London for discussions and added:

> The gentlemen laid similar plans for Mo'in el-Molk [the ambassador in Istanbul]. But their efforts did not achieve the results they desired. However, it appears that he too will be obliged to make a trip to Tehran, that is in a few months time . . . I don't know whether I should drag His Royal Highness [Zell es-Soltan] to Tehran or not. The situation seems to require it.[1]

The name of Zell es-Soltan, the shah's eldest son, crops up frequently in Amin ed-Dowleh's letters to Malkom. He was a person whose favour the two men carefully courted. Though corrupt and oppressive, Zell es-Soltan was in the early 1900's a powerful man in south Persia, controlling from his base in Isfahan and through a string of governorships much of the southern part of the country. His ability to maintain order was impressive. Barred from the succession, he nevertheless entertained the highest ambitions and, partly for this reason, sought allies in the court at the capital. To Malkom, Amin ed-Dowleh and their friends, he professed an interest in reform.

Amin ed-Dowleh was one of his protegees. He designated Naser el-Molk as deputy-governor in one of the many provinces he controlled. He maintained a regular correspondence with Malkom Khan, invited Malkom submit to him proposals for reform, and flattered the minister in London by addressing him as "the learned scholar" and "the Plato of Iran."[2] Malkom and Amin ed-Dowleh, in turn, carefully nurtured

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1 Letter of 18 Rajab (no year given), S.P. 1997/9.

2 The Zell's letters to Malkom Khan can be found in S.P. 1990; a selection of these has been published in Yahsad o Panjah Sanad-e Tarikhi az Jaleyeran ta Pahlevi ed. Jahangir (a'em Maqami (Tehran, Solar 1348/1969-50), pp. 266-279.

Zell es-Solten.[1] Malkom flattered him by addressing him as his most gifted 'student' and appears to have encouraged him to think that, despite his disability, he might inherit the crown. In private correspondence, he even addressed the Zell as crown prince.[2]

Malkom and Amin ed-Dowleh were not the only persons interested in Zell es-Solten. He also attracted the attention of the English. Watching his growing influence, the Foreign Office and the Government of India concluded that his favour would be worth cultivating, both as a means of protecting existing British interests in the south and also as insurance against the future should Persia break up into two on the death of Naser ed-Din shah. Zell es-Solten himself encouraged the British as carefully as he had the reformers in Tehran. Partly at his instigation, he was in late 1887 awarded the Grand Cross of the Star of India. The conferring of this proved his undoing. The shah had long harboured suspicions against the Zell, and within weeks of the decision to make the award he was stripped of the bulk of his governorships; his power was reduced to a shadow of its former self.[3]

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1 Amin ed-Dowleh was often the medium through which the Zell's letters passed to Malkom Khan. He also frequently reminded Malkom to maintain a regular correspondence with the Prince. "Don't refrain from writing His Royal Highness Zell es-Solten," Amin ed-Dowleh wrote Malkom on one occasion. "His favour must be retained." (Letter of 30 Rabi' I 1300/8 February 1883, S.P. 1997/201). When the shah considered appointing Zell es-Solten minister of war, Amin ed-Dowleh, admitting he favoured the prince, spoke in support of the appointment and strongly hoped it would take place. (Letter to Malkom of 25 Rabi' I 1301/24 January 1884, S.P. 1997/44 and Khaterat, pp. 92-93.

2 The Zell's letter to Malkom, 25 Rajab 1325/4 September 1907, S.P. 1990/34.

3 An account of the award of the G.C.S.I. to Zell es-Solten and its aftermath is given in Greaves, Persia and the Defense of India, pp. 150-55.

The attempt by Amin ed-Dowleh and Malkom to build a policy around Zell es-Soltan thus proved an illusion. Though the Zell resumed a somewhat listless correspondence with Malkom, Amin ed-Dowleh doubted he would again serve any useful purpose.[1] A month after his sudden fall, Amin ed-Dowleh found him a different man. "This person," he wrote Malkom Khan, "has nothing in common with the man we formerly knew. His character and opinions, even his face and looks, have completely changed."[2] Malkom, submitting to him further proposals for reform and urging him to present them to the shah, received this reply from a much chastized Zell es-Soltan:

> It is true that there was a time when, actuated by the dictates of honour and patriotism, I used to hold certain discussions and was not averse to hearing and saying certain things. But since the time when I suffered the loss of two <u>grores</u> [of tumans], I have directed my attention to the repair of my personal affairs and have completely washed my hands of these discussions. For the sake of Your Excellency, I give notice that I no longer have anything to do with these matters, and I regard it as lying outside my responsibility to place certain subjects before the dust of the feet of His Imperial Majesty, may we be his sacrifice.[3]

Amin ed-Dowleh on occasion also directed his efforts to bringing Malkom Khan back to Tehran for consultations. Written despatches from London having failed to move the shah, he reasoned that Malkom's presence in Tehran, with the opportunity for ministerial conferences and audiences with the shah that this offered, might prove more effective. In 1882 Amin

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1. Letter of 6 Shavval [1305]/14 June 1888, S.P. 1997/84.
2. Letter of 6 February 1888, S.P. 1997/82.
3. Letter of Jamadi II [1305]/February-March 1888, S.P. 1990/23.

ed-Dowleh had succeeded in inducing the shah to recall Malkam Khan for consultation. On that occasion, discussions had led to an abortive attempt at a major reorganization of the administration. In 1886, Amin ed-Dowleh once again put to the shah the suggestion of temporarily recalling Malkam to Tehran. He appears to have won the shah's agreement by arguing that Malkam's views on a projected railway project, then under discussion, should be heard, but to have hoped that Malkam's arrival in the capital would permit broader issues of reform to be discussed.[1]

In the year or so before his departure for Tehran, Malkam Khan had called on a number of occasions at the Foreign Office where he had used the opportunity offered by the need to present an official communication to speak his own mind about the situation in Persia. Delivering one such note on March 11, 1885, Malkam went on to express to Lord Granville his personal views about the condition of his country. He expressed the fear that Persia might in certain eventualities break up into two parts, the north falling under Russian and the south under British domination. He also elaborated a plan by which he believed Persia could be regenerated and Britain be made master of the situation.

Malkam's proposals on this occasion are interesting as an indication of the hazardous role he was now playing. Unable to count with confidence on indigenous efforts to maintain the integrity of his country, acting independently of his government and desperate for outside assistance, he came dangerously close to offering England a protectorate over Persia.

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1. Letter to Malkam of 16 Shevval [13]03]/29 July 1886, S.I. 1997/64.

Malkam proposed that:

> four Persian Ministers should be appointed with European assistants carefully selected by him; that England should exercise as much direct or indirect influence over Persia as she thought fit. She might take the position towards Persia that France has done towards Tunis, but without assuming the open responsibility that France has done in that case.[1]

Malkam Khan claimed that the shah and his ministers were ready to adopt his views, that he himself was being urged to undertake the execution of this plan, but that "he could not take any action unless assured of the moral support of Her Majesty's Govt."[2]

Malkam had no sooner left Granville than he realized he had gone too far. The same day, he sent Granville a note saying he wished to correct a possible false impression on an important point created by his earlier remarks. Despite the clarification, Malkam's proposal remained equivocal:

> In citing the example of Tunisia and Egypt [he wrote] I did not mean to suggest the establishment of a similar protectorate over Persia. My idea, accepted by the Shah, is that Persia should organize her own internal affairs, finances, justice, army, public works and general administration exactly on the same principles and nearly in the same forms which France had applied

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1 Granville to R. Thomson, draft, No. 27, Confidential, 11 March 1885, FO 60/468. In the version of this despatch finally sent to Thomson, the last sentence in this paragraph is crossed out and the following sentence is substituted: "The administration of Persia would be reorganized on the same principles as has been done in Tunis and Egypt, but without any sacrifice of independence on the part of Persia, or any assumption of open responsibility on the part of England." This correction clearly took place following receipt of Malkam Khan's own rectification of his earlier remarks (see footnote 1, below). It was also then that a second paragraph was added to the Foreign Office's despatch to Thomson, the addition being an almost word for word translation from the French of Malkam Khan's subsequent clarification.

2 Ibid.

> in Tunisia and which you wish to introduce in Egypt. Persia would retain of course her political independence. But her system of government, reorganized on European principles under the auspices and the moral support of England, would voluntarily submit to the friendly direction of Her Majesty's Government and, in case of need, would naturally fall in the eventual sphere of English action.[1]

Two weeks later, Malkam Khan was back at the Foreign Office with further explanations in regard to the plan he elaborated on March 11. Although repeating the desire for European advisers, he no longer cited the example of Egypt or Tunisia as a model of what was wanted for Persia; his request for British advice was this time also couched in much more cautious terms. Malkam said he had submitted his ideas directly to the shah and had been corresponding with Naser ed-Din about the project for some time; that a radical and thorough-going reform of the administration was intended; and that the European advisors, who would work under Persian ministers, would be paid out of Persian resources. The advisors themselves would be neither Russian nor British, and he could guarantee that no foreign complications or difficulties with the mollas would result.[2] He did not ask for foreign aid:

> all he asks is for the countenance, and in case of need, the advice of H[illegible], both to be given confidentially. He would wish to consult them from time to time as to any arrangements he may recommend to his Government.[3]

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1. Malkom's note to Granville of 11 March 1885, marked "Confidential", in FO 60/476. It is this note that constituted the second paragraph of the despatch to Thomson referred to in footnote 1 above.

2. Granville to Thomson, Draft, No. 28, Confidential, 28 March 1885, FO 60/468.

3. Ibid.

Malkam concluded by asking particularly that his communication be treated as a private and personal one and that Thomson, the minister in Tehran, be asked not to mention it to the shah or his ministers "as H[is] M[ajesty] had not told the ministers and might not be pleased at Malkam's having mentioned the matter here, without having reported that he had done so."[1]

Malkam was thus at the same time claiming to have the shah's full approval for his plan and also requesting that the British not discuss this same plan with the shah. He was not, it seems, acting entirely without the shah's knowledge;[2] but once again he appears to have exceeded his brief. The project did not in any case get off the ground, due either to the lack of positive response in London or to the indecision prevailing in Tehran, or probably for both reasons.

Malkam touched on the idea of attaching European advisers to the Persian ministries once more, in two interviews in August with Lord Salisbury, who was now both prime minister and foreign secretary.[3] It was apparently not so

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1 The original memorandum on which this draft of the despatch to Thomson is based appears over the initials of someone other than Granville, apparently Philip Currie. The memorandum bears the minute in Granville's hand: "Ask Sir R. Thomson privately not to mention the matter to anyone." (FO 60/468).

2 Remarks in Amin ed-Dowleh's letters to Malkam Khan dating from this same period suggest that Malkam had submitted a number of proposals to Tehran, although the nature of these is not clear from the available material. By January 1886, however, a plan for the hiring of foreign advisers, submitted by Malkam, was under discussion in a council of a number of the shah's ministers. See Amin ed-Dowleh's letter to Malkam Khan of 22 Rabi' II, 1303/28 January 1886, S.P. 1997/58.

3 The first interview between Malkam and Salisbury was held in late July 1885 and the discussion was by agreement resumed on 31 July. The content of the discussions is covered in one comprehensive despatch from Salisbury to Thomson No. 75[illegible], 5 August 1885, FO 539/27.

much foreign advisers as some commitment from England towards Persia that he was seeking. Malkam dwelt at length on the condition of the country, its gradual decline, the external dangers threatening it and Britain's apparent indifference to these ominous developments. He insisted on the personal merits of the shah, on his increasing anxiety and his genuine desire for England's "sympathy" and "counsel".

Salisbury suggested that by "counsel" material and military assistance from England was intended and pointed out that due to geographical considerations, "it was almost absolutely out of [England's] power to afford him any substantial assistance at that end of his dominions which were at present threatened with attack." But Malkam denied any desire to ask for assistance in the shape of troops or money.[1]

> He reiterated again and again that what he wanted was advice, that England should show sympathy with the difficulties of Persia, and should give her counsel in her present distress.[2]

Salisbury suggested that England might be in a better position to help Persia against Russia if the shah moved the capital from Tehran to Isfahan, where it would be less exposed to Russian attack, and if he grappled with a firm hand "with the evils of a corrupt administration, and especially of a corrupt administration of justice, under which Persia had suffered so much." Malkam approved the idea of changing the seat of government. But, Salisbury noted, Malkam "did not apparently attach the same importance to the advice which I gave with respect to the internal administration of the country."

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1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

> He said it was not exactly that which he wanted. He recognized its truth, but what he rather wanted was the constant presence of men who in all Departments, military and civil, might infuse European actions and methods into the practice of the Persian officials, guide them bit by bit to the various improvements which were very necessary, and at the same time inspire them with a sense of the sympathy which such external manifestations of interest would justify. On this he dwelt with great earnestness, referring especially to the conduct of England at the beginning of the century, when such an expression of interest and sympathy was never grudged.[1]

Salisbury, however, remained in the dark as to what Malkom had in mind. He noted:

> I was not able to ascertain with any greater precision than this what was the exact nature of the interposition which he sought from the English Government. I was disappointed at this failure on my part to put his meaning into precise language, because I have known His Excellency for many years, and I never knew him urge a point with so much vehemence and pertinacity.[2]

This exchange illustrates the difficulties inherent in the type of diplomacy Malkom Khan was conducting and the failure of communication between the two men. The case Malkom was putting to Salisbury was substantially the case as it might have been put by the shah. In his frank exposition of Persia's ills, however, Malkom was going beyond what might have been authorized by Tehran. Moreover, Malkom appears to have envisaged a far greater involvement by England in Persia than he dared admit openly either to the shah or to Salisbury.

It was English, not just European, advisors that Malkom wanted, for it was their presence in Persia that could serve as a concrete manifestation of British "sympathy" for

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.

his country. Although Malkam disavowed any intention of asking for material assistance from England, the request for "advice" and "counsel" was actuated by the same intention: to involve England directly in the task of reforming Persia from within.

When Salisbury spoke of the need to reform the administration and check corruption he was merely echoing what Malkam and others had repeatedly told the shah. But Malkam's unenthusiastic reception of this suggestion, and his remark that "it was not exactly that which he wanted" stemmed precisely from the fact that he was looking for more than "advice", or at least that he wanted a form of "advice" that would strengthen his own hand in Tehran and instil in the shah either the confidence or the fear that would make him act.

Salisbury himself, while unclear as to Malkam's intentions, seems to have been vaguely aware of what Malkam might be working towards and took precautions to ensure that England was not in any way committed. In a note to his minister in Tehran he welcomed Malkam's remarks as a possible sign of "returning vigour" in the Persian government and said the shah could count on the "sympathy and, so far as it can be practically given, the assistance of Her Majesty's Government." But he was concerned lest Malkam pass on his remarks as advice volunteered by the English government. Indeed, he was convinced Malkam would do so, and asked Thomson to make clear, if the occasion arose, that it was Malkam Khān who had originated the conversation.[1]

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[1] Ibid., Salisbury's instructions to Thomson. It appears that Malkam Khān had indeed given such an interpretation to Salisbury's remarks, greatly alarming the shah. Salisbury's off-hand remark that the capital should be moved to Isfahan had something to do with the shah's concern. In this connection, see Thomson to

Malkom left London for Persia in August 1886 and arrived in Tehran around the end of September. As he was making his way to the capital, Amin ed-Dowleh wrote him a long letter, briefing him on the situation in Tehran, advising him on the attitude he should adopt with various high-ranking officials, and also instructing him on the tone he should adopt with the shah: "State any remarks or any matter you have brought with you very gently and very sweetly," he wrote. "His Majesty has no longer the tolerance he used to have for harsh and strong language."[1] The shah gave orders for Malkom to be received with great honour[2] and praised him warmly when he received him in audience.[3] Conferences were held; Malkom saw the shah privately on a number of occasions.[4] But nothing was done.

In a final audience, the shah described to Malkom the predicament in which he found himself. His ministers were either ignorant and inexperienced or intent on personal gain without regard for the interests of the country. His sons did not set a good example for others, and he was having difficulty asserting his authority over them. He was well aware, he said, that the whole fabric of government required repair; "but the task was prodigious; he was past middle age, and he had not a single advisor on whom he could rely."[5]

Salisbury, No. 110, Confidential, Tehran, 24 September 1885, FO 60/470, and same to same, No. 111, Tehran, 28 September 1885, FO 60/470, as well as J. Pauncefote's memorandum on a discussion with Malkom dated 16 August 1885, FO 60/476.

1 Letter of 17 Zi Hajjeh [1303]/17 August 1886, S.P. 1997/207.

2 Nicolson to Iddesleigh, No. 123, 1 October 1886, FO 60/480.

3 Entry for 1 Moharram 1304/30 September 1886, Ruznameh, p. 520.

4 Ibid., various entries pp. 520-29.

5 Nicolson to Iddesleigh, No. 142 (3), Confidential, Tehran,

Malkam returned to England early in 1887, despondent and disillusioned. He called on Philip Currie at the Foreign Office who noted: "He says that he is in despair about the state of his country."[1] Malkam told Currie that everything in Persia was going from bad to worse. Corruption and mal-administration were on the increase, the power of Russia was growing stronger every day, and the shah was opposed to rail-ways or any form of foreign enterprise that might interfere with his absolute power. He had deputed so much power to his three sons, who divided the administration of the country between them, that he would be powerless to improve provincial government even if he wanted to. In the event of the shah's death, there would probably be a struggle for the throne among his three sons.[2]

Malkam also called on Lord Cross at the India Office where he repeated the same remarks and painted, if anything, a blacker picture of the state of Persia.

> He says that Persia as an independent Power is no more. That she must fall either to Russia or to us, not as a province, in either case, but as a protected State, in which case she should be of the greatest assistance to the protecting Power, although as an independent Power she is practically useless. That internally at present there is in Persia no government whatever . . . That we make a mistake in dealing only with the Shah or the Government. What we have to impress is the people, as we formerly did, although, of course, as a matter of form, this might have to be accomplished through diplomacy with the

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3 December, 1886, FO 539/33. Nicolson was drawing on Malkam Khan's own account of this conversation, but it appears accurately to reflect the shah's mood.

1 Memorandum by Philip Currie, dated 14 February, 1887, in FO 60/490.

2 Ibid.

Government itself.[1]

Malkam told Cross that Persia could not be compared to Turkey, where the sultan, as caliph, was regarded as both temporal and spiritual leader.

> In Persia it is quite different. The Shah holds no such position. The people of Persia are a nation, and an ancient nation, far more ancient than the dynasty. The present dynasty is only one of many dynasties, and may go at any moment, and probably will do so soon.[2]

Malkam wanted England to show force, to use a little more money and to employ a more vigorous diplomacy; to convince the shah of the dangers to himself in the present situation and of the need for good government; and to insist on the opening of the Karun and the construction of a railroad.[3] Cross, impressed by Malkam Khan's revelations, made a number of recommendations to the government.[4] But these, although directed generally at a more active policy by England in Persia, fell short of the kind of measures Malkam had in mind.

Malkam's remarks to Currie and Cross suggest that his brief visit to Persia in 1886 had brought about a significant shift in his views in a number of respects. In previous discussions with British officials, he had always argued that with determination reform in Persia would not prove an impossible task. He now spoke of the country as being virtually beyond help, and of its emergence as a protected power under British or Russian domination as a virtual certainty. Moreover,

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[1] Cross's printed memorandum on conversation with Malkam, dated 28 February 1887, and marked "Secret", in FO 60/490.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] India Office to Foreign Office, 5 March 1887, Secret and Immediate, FO 60/490.

whereas previously he had insisted on the essentially liberal nature of the shah and depicted him as a man who, with proper guidance, could be won over to the task of reform, he now appears to have lost hope in Naser ed-Din. Indeed, in urging England to look to "the people" rather than to the shah and the government, in speaking of the transient nature of dynasties in Persia and in emphasizing, in contrast, the permanence of the Persian "nation", he seems to have been suggesting that the shah was not ultimately indispensible.

Malkam's sense of gloom was echoed from Tehran by Amin ed-Dowleh. Although occasionally he saw a glimmer of hope and believed he might collect his energies and make one last effort in the interests of reform,[1] he too in the closing years of the 1880's began to feel that the situation was beyond repair.

> I have grown weary and have withdrawn from all activity [he wrote Malkam Khan] . . . I also tell you that all that effort, all those explanations . . . all those detailed and praiseworthy proposals have had no effect. As the difficulties grow, as the noose grows tighter and as the shoe pinches harder, so we become more indifferent . . . grow in stupidity, eschew progress.[2]

By 1890, this mood of resignation had become widespread in the bureaucracy. It was both reflected in and encouraged by two agreements concluded by Russia and Persia in the closing years of the decade. In 1887, Naser ed-Din shah signed an agreement with the Russians under which he undertook not to permit the construction of railways or waterways by foreign firms in Persia without first consulting the Russian

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[1] Letter to Malkam of 17 Jomadi I [1307]/8 January 1890, S.P. 1997/98.

[2] Letter of 24 Moharram 1302/13 November 1884, S.P. 1997/48.

emperor. Three years later, this understanding was amplified in a further agreement, under which the shah put his signature to a ten year embargo on all railroad construction in the country.[1] This agreement virtually shut the door on hopes for the economic development of Persia. The Russians had shown by insisting on its terms how utterly opposed they were to this sort of enterprise; and the shah had indicated by acceding to them an attempt to escape the pressures of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia by opting out altogether from the effort to develop Persia with European assistance.

Since the economic development of the country and internal reform were always seen as closely inter-related by the reformers, the Russian stance and the shah's decision had important implications for the reform movement as well. Partly for this reason, the thrust for reform in the particular form pursued by men like Malkam Khan and Amin od-Dowleh had, by 1890, by and large petered out.

There were perhaps from the beginning inherent limits to the policy pursued by Malkam and Amin od-Dowleh. In attempting to enlist British support in their cause, Malkam, Amin od-Dowleh and their friends were walking a tightrope, and they had to proceed with great circumspection. Some of the measures they took in their correspondence to ensure secrecy appear today naively transparent. The shah, for example, was referred to as "the big boss", Amin os-Soltan, the prime minister, as "that youth", and a foreign minister, not without a touch of irony, as "that great man". Anyone perusing this

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[1] These agreements are described in Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 175-6 and pp. 238-9.

correspondence could have seen through this clumsy subterfuge. But the fact that subterfuge was practiced is an indication of a feeling shared by Malkam and Amin od-Dowleh that they were treading a path full of pitfalls. Those who shared their ideas were few, and this limited the scope of their contacts, activities and discussions at home, and cramped the fuller development of their ideas.

The need for circumspection also affected Malkam Khan's contacts with the British. He had, as noted, repeatedly to request that his communications be treated as confidential and not be discussed with the shah; this naturally undermined the credibility of what he had to say. Because he was making to the English proposals for which he had no official sanction and offering compacts which he could not fulfill, Malkam was forced again and again to shelter behind vague allusion and verbal imprecision. It is hardly surprising that British officials were often at a loss to understand just what Malkam had in mind. In 1885, Salisbury found he could not put into precise language the initiative Malkam wished England to take.

Ten years earlier, Malkam's "Memorandum on the Dangers Facing Persia" had produced similar perplexity at the Foreign Office. "It may mean anything from the guarantee by England of the integrity of the Persian Empire downwards," one official remarked. "I think if this memorandum points to anything practical, it means an English protectorate of Persia," minuted a second. A third official brushed it aside as "this excellent specimen of the higher school of Oriental Diplomacy."[1]

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[1] Minutes appended to Malkam's "Memorandum on the Dangers Facing Persia", FO 60/366.

Even had Malkom Khan been in a position to make himself clearer, it is unlikely that the sort of British backing he had in mind would have been forthcoming. England could not, or would not, give Persia a territorial guarantee. Nor was it likely that, in the interests of internal reform, she would choose to throw her support behind a small group of officials intent on pushing the shah and more conservative elements in the government to adopt their line of policy.

Although occasionally British support was extended to particular individuals in the Qajar bureaucracy, there was, in English policy in Persia, an underlying commitment to stability that ruled out any action that might undermine the position of the ruling monarch. Especially after the collapse of the project to build up the position of Zell os-Soltan, it became a principle of English policy to do nothing of this nature that would arouse the hostility and suspicion of Naser ed-Din shah.

Moreover, British officials tended on the whole to regard with scepticism the ideas of Malkom and his friends and, at times, the possibility of any reform in Persia. "You will see from the Despatche]s", Philip Currie wrote to the English minister in Tehran after Malkom had put to the Foreign Office his proposal for attaching European advisors to the Persian ministries, "that Malcom Khan has propounded a grand scheme of reform. I don't suppose there is the slightest possibility of its having any result."[1] Nicolson, writing in 1887, remarked:

> The panaceas, which Malcom Khan and a few others who assume they are the pioneers of

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[1] Letter from Currie to T. Thomson, 18 March 1885, FO 60/468.

> progress, are never weary of proposing, are scarcely adapted to a country in the position of Persia. Tribunals, legal codes, and the other paraphernalia of civilization would be of little avail. There is no indigenous material with which to work them. The pressing need is for development of natural resources, and closer contact and improved communication with the outside world.[1]

The dilemma for those Persians committed to reform in these years was that the internal condition of the country could not be divorced from the position of the powers in Persia. But the hope for succour from abroad was ultimately debilitating. It absorbed energies that might have more profitably been directed towards activity at home; it often led to a kind of paralysis of action as England's positive response to feelers put out to it were awaited; and it led some of the most active elements in the country to the verge of throwing up their hands in despair and inviting a foreign power to intervene and to solve their problems for them.

The English 'guarantee'--such as it was--when it was finally secured, made little difference to the issue of reform. In 1887, chiefly due to the energetic efforts of England's new minister in Tehran, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the shah agreed to open the Karun to steamship navigation in exchange for a promise by England to make "earnest representations" in St. Petersburg in case Russia infringed Persia's sovereign rights. The undertaking did not extend to Persia the material support that the shah and his ministers had so long sought. In addition, although the undertaking led the shah to grant a few concessions to British firms, it did not induce him to attack the misgovernment and maladministration that lay

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[1] Nicolson to Iddesleigh, No. 142 (S), Confidential, Tehran, 3 December, 1886, FO 539/33.

at the root of Persia's difficulties. Wolff also induced the shah to issue a proclamation guaranteeing security of life and property to his subjects. But this did not temper the arbitrariness of the shah's rule.

The reform activity of Malkam Khan, Amin od-Dowleh and others in the period up to 1896 also bore the firm imprint of its official, bureaucratic origins. It was to the shah and to their position as officials in his government that the reformers looked for material reward, the advancement of their careers, their position in the society. They were often engaged in the very activities they were criticising. In the same breath, for example, that they condemned the concession-granting policies of Amin os-Soltan, they discussed the best way of advancing the cause of concessions in which they themselves had an interest. Malkam Khan profited financially from the lottery concession. Both he and Amin od-Dowleh appear to have been involved in the Imperial Bank concession and to have expected some recognition for their services.[1] Such involvement does not necessarily rule out their sincerity in pressing for reform; but it blunted their purpose.

Moreover, directly engaged in the fierce bureaucratic rivalries which were a feature of Qajar politics, Malkam and Amin od-Dowleh contributed to the disunity of the government which made the pursuit of common goals impossible. The three prime ministers who held office during the 1870's and 1880's were each in turn the target of Malkam Khan's and Amin od-Dowleh's fulsome denigration and abuse. As Naser ed-Din shah

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1. This seems to be the import of veiled references to Reuter and his bank project in a number of Amin od-Dowleh's letters to Malkam in 1888-9 (see especially S.r. 1997/84, 85, 86, 87 and 88. In a letter (of 5 Shavval [1306]/5 June [1889] S.r. 1997/6) Amin od-Dowleh wrote, "Reuter's organization has so far not shown any marks of appreciation for my sacrifices."

remarked, the implementation of reform required a group of ministers who were of one mind and could speak with one voice.[1] Such a united party never emerged during his reign, and the reformers, by and large, did little to temper the prevailing disunity.

When involved in reform activity at home, the reformers confined themselves largely to the official channels available to them as members of the bureaucracy. The fruit of their private discussions and correspondence ultimately expressed itself in appeals directed at other members of the bureaucracy and at the shah himself. In this, they were actuated partly by personal considerations, a fear that any wider form of activity on their part would be considered by the shah an act of insubordination and punished. But they were limited in the scope of their activity also by the fact that they could not easily hope to gain wider support for their aims. They had little contact with and no possibility of leading the lower classes, who remained faithful to Islam. The ideas the reformers were propounding were also alien to most of the other classes in the community.

In the bureaucracy itself, the reformers constituted a tiny minority. Moreover, personal rivalries, private interests and the pursuit of personal gain made it unlikely that the bureaucracy would voluntarily choose to reform itself; and the shah, whose support and backing was the ultimate object of rival factions and individuals within the bureaucracy, was too weak and vacillating, and by 1890 too frightened to take decisive action. The pursuit of the shah's favour by the

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[1] Naser ad-Din shah's letter to Malkam, undated, S.P. 1987/38.

reformers was thus in itself something of a dead end. "You wrote", Amin od-Dowleh remarked to Malkam Khan in 1890

> that you will remain determined to the very end to retain the good favour of His Imperial Majesty. Very well; I too in accordance with the dictates of honour and loyalty believe it necessary to devote myself to my last breath to satisfying the Imperial will. But it is clear to me beyond the shadow of a doubt that, today, it is impossible to say what the shah wants.[1]

It is significant in this context that it was only after he broke with the shah in 1890 that Malkam Khan began publicly to criticise the government and to seek to reach a wider audience, outside the bureaucracy, with his views on conditions in Persia and the need for reform. His advice to Lord Cross in 1887 that England should seek to reach the Persian people rather than confining their contacts to the shah and the government marked perhaps the beginning of an awareness that the long attempt to reform the government from within, through official channels alone, would not suffice.

Two other events intervened at this stage to mark the end of the type of reform activity characteristic of the 1870's and 1880's and the beginning of a reform movement of a markedly different temper and significance. The first of these events was Malkam Khan's dismissal from the shah's service over the dispute surrounding the lottery concession.[2] With Malkam dismissed from the London legation, the vital link between the reformers in Tehran and--through Malkam--the Foreign Office in London was broken; direct access to the Foreign Office on which Amin od-Dowleh's strategy was built,

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1. Letter of 17 Jamadi I 1307/8 January 1890, F.O. 1997/08.
2. On this concession, see pp. 292-3.

was no longer possible. At the same time, Afghan, having for all practical purposes broken with the shah and no longer able to hope for favour from the Persian government, went into open opposition. By publishing his newspaper, Kaveh,[1] which was clandestinely circulated in Persia, he made his criticisms public, sought to reach a wider audience, and worked to bring popular, as against merely official, pressure on the shah to institute reform. This was a new departure for Afghan; it marked an important change in tactics.

The second event, and one of much greater significance for the future of the reform movement in Persia, was the opposition aroused in the country by the tobacco monopoly concession that the shah granted to a British national in 1890.[2] The concession was encouraged by the British minister, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. Along with the opening of the Karun to navigation and the Imperial Bank concession which he secured as a settlement of Baron Reuter's claims arising out of his cancelled 1872 concession, Wolff came to see the tobacco monopoly as part of a policy to strengthen Persia by opening up the country to trade.

The concession vested all rights for the sale and distribution of tobacco in Persia, and the export of tobacco from the country, in the Imperial Tobacco Corporation. It also gave the foreign company control over the regulation of

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1 Kaveh is discussed in more detail in chapter VI.

2 The history of the tobacco monopoly concession has been extensively covered in a number of recent works: Algar, Religion and State (Chapter 12); Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain (Chapter 4); Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London, 1966); and Lambton, "The Tobacco Regie: Prelude to Revolution", in Studia Islamica, 25 (1965), pp. 119-57 and 28 (1966), pp. 71-90. The last two of these four works offer the most detailed and complete accounts. I have drawn on both for my evaluation.

the annual crop. It thus affected the interests not only of the large merchants and landowners involved in the cultivation and sale of tobacco, but also of the more numerous shopkeepers and peasants engaged in the tobacco trade. Merchant resentment was reinforced by the concession granted to the Imperial Bank, whose operations threatened to deprive the money lenders of their business.

The concession also earned the hostility of the 'ulama. Some of these were actuated by genuine fears that large-scale contact with foreigners would weaken the religion of the people; others may perhaps have been concerned lest the opening up of the country lead to a decline in their own influence. The 'ulama may also have been influenced by the economic implications of the concession, through their traditional links with the merchant community and their own considerable interest in agricultural land as administrators of waqf properties. Support also was given by religious leaders abroad, such as Mirza Hasan Shirazi, the recognized head of the shi'i community, resident in Samara.

The 'ulama, who along with the merchant class were throughout the leaders of the movement, were also able to build on the widespread belief among the people that Persia was being sold to the foreigner. The opening of the Karun, the Imperial Bank concession and the tobacco monopoly, following close on the heels of one another, helped to strengthen this feeling. There was also an awareness that the Shah and Amin os-Soltan were financially implicated in the grant of the concession, and a well-founded belief that the concession was secured through bribes to other government officials.

Opposition was led by general discontent over

conditions in Persia: the debasement of the coinage with its resulting inflation; the hoarding of grain and other food in the cities by powerful individuals and the high price of food; the pilfering of army funds so that army pay was always in arrears; and the usual corruption, extortion and misgovernment.

The activities of Persians abroad in time reinforced the activities of those at home. Malkum Khan, through the columns of Qanun, and a group of Persians centred around the newspaper Akhtar in Istanbul helped to publicise both the criticisms of the concession and the opposition to it. The Islamic reformer, Jamal ad-Din Afghani, also helped to stir up the agitation.

Afghani had been in Persia briefly in 1885-6. He returned to Persia, at the shah's invitation, in late 1889. On this, as on the previous occasion, he spoke to those who came to hear him against autocracy and of the need for reform. In July 1890, fearing the shah's displeasure, he took sanctuary in the shrine at Shah 'Abdul 'Azim. In December, at the shah's orders, he was forcibly expelled from the shrine and sent out of the country. From Basra, he addressed a letter to Mirza Hasan Shirazi at Samara, sharply criticising the shah's government. His letter may have influenced Shirazi's later intervention over the tobacco monopoly. It was subsequently also printed and widely circulated in Persia.[1]

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[1] There is now an extensive literature on Afghani, on his visits to and influence in Persia, see Keddie, op. cit., pp. 16-27, 69-72; Algar, op. cit., pp. 197-214; Elie Kedouri, Afghani and 'Abduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activism in Modern Islam (London, 1966), pp. 56-6 ; and Nikki Keddie, Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani" (Paris, 1969), pp. 113-118; 135-175. Discussions of his ideas can be found in the works by Kedouri and Keddie; also in Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939

The Russians, who saw in the concession the instrument for increased English political influence in Persia and were in any case opposed to measures that might strengthen Persia by improving its trade and commerce, used their influence with a number of officials and with other elements in the society to rouse feeling against the concession.

Finally, opposition to the concession developed within the government itself, and a number of officials worked covertly against the concession or purposefully refrained from assisting in measures that might quell the agitation. Some of these officials may have sincerely believed the concession harmful to the country. Others saw in the movement that developed against it the opportunity to further their reformist aims. Still others, notably the shah's son Kamran Mirza, who as commander of the army and governor in Tehran was in a key position to help or hinder the movement, acted chiefly from a desire to undermine and overthrow the prime minister, Mia os-Soltan. Many no doubt were actuated by a combination of these motives.

The result of the coming together of these various forces was a protest movement that affected not only Shiraz but also spread to major provincial cities such as Shiraz, Isfahan, Mashhad and Tabriz. The protest was expressed in broadly similar forms in all the major centres. Anti-government and anti-concession placards and leaflets were circulated, sermons were preached in mosques, demonstrations took place. The climax of the movement occurred early in December 1891 when a fatva appeared in Tehran in the name of Mirza Hasan Shirazi

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(London, 1962) and Keddie, "Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani" (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1968).

declaring the use of tobacco as tantamount to war against the Hidden Imam and thus forbidden. Almost immediately, a boycott on the use of tobacco was observed throughout the country. The success of the boycott and the mounting opposition forced the government's hand. In January, 1892, it cancelled the concession.

The tobacco protest movement and its successful outcome was fraught with significance for Persia's internal politics. It further discredited an already little-loved government and badly shook the position of the shah. It undermined the British position in Persia; and Malkom-Khan, who pursued a markedly pro-British policy before 1890, began to display pro-Russian tendencies and to lean on Russian support for some years after the event. Compensation to the Imperial Tobacco Company burdened the already depleted exchequer with a heavy debt from whose consequences it was never really to recover in Naser ad-Din's lifetime.

The movement was a dramatic indication of the power of the 'ulama and of the effectiveness of the temporary alliance of disparate elements, such as the merchant community, religious leaders, reformers, and individual officials that came together over the tobacco concession. This was a lesson not lost on the reformers who sought, after this date, to link themselves with the 'ulama and the merchants in a common alliance against the government. The movement was also an object lesson in the use of new techniques of propaganda, such as the jelly-graphed leaflet and placard, the clandestine newspaper, and the telegraph both in mobilizing the public and also in coordinating the efforts of the opposition in scattered centres within the country and between Persians at home and

those abroad.

Finally, as Professor Lambton has pointed out, the movement marked the beginning of the creation of public opinion in Persia; it was an indication that there was beginning to develop a middle class . . . who wished to be informed of, and consulted on, steps which would materially affect the life of the country.[1]

The dramatic changes these developments implied in the nature of the reform movement in Persia after 1891 became clearer in a comparison with reform efforts before this date. Up to 1890, the major pressure for reform came from within the bureaucracy; after 1891, this pressure came from outside the bureaucracy, was led by more popular leaders such as the *'ulama* and involved other classes, including the merchants and the urban population. Before 1891, the urge for reform expressed itself chiefly through official memoranda meant for the eyes and ears of the Shah and his ministers alone; after 1891 it found expression in sermons from the pulpit, in clandestine leaflets, in newspapers published abroad and secretly distributed at home. All these reached a much wider audience.

Before 1891, Islam was seen by the reformers in the bureaucracy as a brake and source of support; while some of this feeling remained after 1891, the reform movement became markedly more anti-foreign in nature and, by definition, grew to a much greater extent on indigenous sources to spearhead the movement and exert pressure on the government. Lastly, in the period before 1891, the major reformers never attacked

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[1] Lambton, "Tobacco Regie . . .", Studia Islamica, XX (1965), p. 139.

the person or the position of the shah. After 189[illegible], with the strength of movement coming to a greater extent than previously from sources not beholden to the shah or the government for reward and advancement, the shah himself came increasingly under attack and, indeed, the legitimacy of the very system over which he held sway came into question.

CHAPTER V

THE BREAKDOWN OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY

The last years of the reign of Naser ed-Din shah witnessed a serious deterioration in the already indifferent standards of Qajar administration. Injustice, corruption and civil disorder became more widespread. The finances of the state, never very strong, began to break down. The hold of the central government over the provinces weakened; and the tendency, not absent in previous reigns, towards a fragmentation of power, reasserted itself.

Naser ed-Din shah himself seemed to sink increasingly into indifference. In the early part of his reign he had displayed an intermittent interest in effective and well-ordered government. But even at the best of times, this impulse was precariously balanced against less laudable habits of rule. His earlier and better intentions did not survive the repeated failure of his attempts at reform, his inability to secure the cooperation and support of his ministers for these efforts, the humiliation suffered by the government over the tobacco concession, and the debilitating effects of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Persia. Naser ed-Din spent the last five or six years of his life adding to his numerous wives, pursuing private pleasures in the haram and neglecting the affairs of state.

In the court, he permitted himself the fulfilment of the most frivolous whim, regardless of the damage to his prestige and authority. He surrounded himself with sycophants, many of them mere youths, whose one thought was to enrich

themselves and whose conduct outraged the moral sense of the people. The most notorious of these was 'Aziz os-Soltan, better known as Malijak, the nephew of one of the shah's favourite wives, who was herself a peasant girl by origin. The boy, who came to court as an infant, exercised a strange and powerful attraction on Naser ad-Din shah.

At the age of eight, he was named a general in the army; at the age of nine, he received command of a cavalry regiment and the title of amir tuman, the highest rank the army could confer. Like the shah, he drove about in state, with page boys, farrashes and armed guards. When he went on a trip to Khorasan, the shah sent a whole regiment led by a Qajar prince to accompany him, and troops beat bystanders to clear a way for him and his entourage. His relatives used his influence to secure posts and pensions for themselves; his followers terrorized the inhabitants of the capital; and his conduct among the shah's wives became a court scandal so that, though a mere boy, he had to be separated from the harem.[1]

High-sounding titles, ranks and positions seemed increasingly to be conferred on mere boys, in what contemporary observers described as 'Malijak-mania'. Malijak's brother, aged three, scrambled among the courtiers wearing the insignia of the high military rank of mir panj.[2] Soleyman Khan, the son of the Qajar prince, 'Azd ol-Molk, served in his father's place as the keeper of the imperial seal; on formal occasions this eleven-year old boy sat in this capacity next to the monshi ol-mamalek as the royal farmans were being written out.[3]

References to Malijak in various published sources have been brought together in Bamdad, Rejal-e Iran, iii, 22-30. See also Enteraf, pp. 111 and 194-5.

Ruznameh, p. 629.

Ibid.

Looking around him, E'temād os-Salṭaneh felt that "our government has not only grown young; it has become a child and more infant."[1] After observing the rows of ministers, officers and officials at the new year *salaam* in 1890, he noted in his diary: "The minister of court and treasury (*mālīyyeh*) is 27 years old; the *mostowfī al-mamālek* is twelve; the colonels and generals are seven and eight years old . . . May God . . . grant this goodly king a few old and experienced servants; for the era of youth is destroying the soul of Persia."[2]

The shah's avarice seemed to grow with age. More money was needed to maintain a large court and a growing haram, now comprising about 200 wives. On one trip alone, to Mazanderan in 1894, the shah took four new wives. A short while later, Amīn ed-Dowleh noted that the shah was infatuated again, this time with both daughters of one of his gardeners.[3] Each of his wives maintained her own establishment, carriage, servants, and this proved a heavy drain on the exchequer.[4] For a number of reasons, meantime, there was a drop in tax revenues. But the scarcity of money helped to feed rather than to dampen the shah's greed; and court spending continued to be reckless.

When the shah went to Arak in 1892, for example, he was accompanied by a camp of over 5,000. At Mahallat, the royal party was joined by Zell os-Solṭān, who had come up from Isfahan with over 6,000 followers to greet the shah. To finance this

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1. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 565.
3. *Khāterāt*, p. 189.
4. Greene to Kimberley, No. 198 (93), Very Confidential, Gulhek, 26 September 1894, FO 539/68.

short trip, the shah had drawn 100,000 tumans (£29,000) from the royal treasury and had borrowed another 85,000 tumans (£24,500) from the Imperial Bank. Zell es-Soltan, who hoped to secure new appointments from his father, had spent an additional 135,000 tumans (£35,000). "In spite of the large amount paid by the Shah", the British minister noted, "the maintenance of so large a host practically devastates the country through which it passes."[1]

To raise money, the shah sold titles, medals, military rank and other honours. A day after a royal decree was issued banning the creation of any more amir tumans in the army, Kamran Mirza, with the shah's approval, conferred the title on two new candidates. E'temad es-Saltaneh remarked in his diary: "When during the prime ministership of Mirza Hosaya Khan . . . [he] asked for the title of amir tuman for the Amir Nezam, the shah stated that the government of Persia is not such as to have three amir tumans . . . Now there are more than one hundred amir tumans in Persia."[2]

For paltry sums, the shah signed away life pensions. A cash payment of £150 to the shah, for example, secured one petitioner a life pension of £200 a year.[3] Often, the shah signed away such payment orders knowing full well they could not be paid.[4] If in the past the property of wealthy officials

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1 Lascelles to Salisbury, No. 91 (69), Tehran, 14 May 1892, FO 539/57 and same to same, No. 117, Gulhek, 15 July 1892, FO 60/532.

2 Ruznameh, p. 1075.

3 "Memorandum by Sir M. Durand on the Situation in Persia", Confidential, p. 3a, FO 60/581. This document, (hereafter referred to as the Durand Memorandum) was printed for the use of the Foreign Office and includes notes and appendices by Col. M. Picot and Nowab Hasan 'Ali Khan. For the sake of simplicity footnote citations will refer to page numbers in the printed copy.

4 Khaterat, p. 192.

was at their death liable to confiscation by the shah, the practice was now extended and applied to even the insignificant sums left behind by the lowest servants of the crown. When an old groom in the service of one of the shah's uncles died, leaving his widow about 14,000/(£2,500) tumans, the shah caused a scandal by sending his farrashes to the obscure quarter of the capital where the groom had his house to sequester all his property. After remonstrances, the shah agreed to forego the complete spoliation of the widow on payment by her of the sum of 3,000 tumans (£600).[1]

Provincial governments were sold, and the important departments of state farmed out, with even less concern than previously for the qualities of the official involved or his conduct once installed in office. F'tezad ol-Molk, the governor of Semnan, was dismissed after petitioners led by the local mujtahid besieged the shah at his summer camp to complain of his extortionate practices. A week later, having adequately bribed the shah, he was reinstated in office.[2] The turnover of governors appears to have been greater than in the past, and the shah was perfectly capable of selling the same government to two different men in the same year. In 1894, the shah pocketed the 110,000 tumans (£23,000) that Nezam os-Saltaneh had paid for the government of Fars and then turned around and sold the same governorship to Rokn od-Dowleh, securing a second fee.[3]

The relatively greater insecurity of office intensified the usual attempt by governors and others to recoup their

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1 Greene to Kimberley, No. 198 (93), Very Confidential, Gulhek, 26 September 1894, FO 539/68.

2 Ruznameh, pp. 1027 and 1029.

3 Greene to Kimberley, No. 198 (93), Very Confidential, Gulhek, 26 September 1894, FO 539/68.

initial outlay and their additional profit as quickly as possible; the burden was ultimately born by the peasant. "A governor", wrote Amin od-Dowleh, "who mounts the saddle by paying pishkesh ('gift money') and who has no hope of permanence or stability does his business at the first opportunity. Since he has paid pishkesh he cannot be called to account for cruelty and oppression."[1]

Travelling in the south in 1894, the British consul in Isfahan found the state of Fars 'quite indescribable.' Far more damage had been done to the countryside by the tax collectors than by locusts or the depradations of Arab tribes. "The people say that never in their recollection have they been so hardly treated, so utterly thrust down by oppression."[2] Amin os-Soltan asserted that the shah would be willing to part with his throne for a suitable consideration, and the British chargé d'affaires, Conyngham Greene agreed with the sadr-e a'zam that "the Shah's averice has now reached the point of insanity."[3]

Provided that the money he required was made available to him, Naser ad-Din shah wished only to be left undisturbed to enjoy his last years in peace. He recoiled from confronting the problems before the country and pretended they did not exist. "The shah," wrote Amin od-Dowleh, "busied himself with the daughters of the gardener . . . and wanted to hear nothing of the condition of the country, which depressed and dispirited him, and to know nothing of the fate of

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1 Khaterat, p. 124.

2 Enclosure in Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 3, Tehran, 13 January 1893, FO 60/542.

3 Greene to Kimberley, No. 67 (7), Secret, Tehran, 13 March 1894, FO 539/67, and same to same, No. 198 (93), Very Confidential, Gulhek, 26 September 1894, FO 539/68.

Persia . . . The reputation of the state was also undermined, and in the eyes of the people, the government and the crown suddenly appeared contemptible."[1]

When pressed on the urgent need for reform, the shah took refuge in the contention that the Russians frustrated all his earnest desires to improve the country.[2] The British minister found that he managed to turn discussions on maladministration into conversations about hunting. After pointing out to him the troubled state of the country on one occasion, he noted: "The audience concluded by His Majesty giving me a description, partly in French, of one of his recent shooting excursions, in which he killed a wild boar, which had been seized by a greyhound, without injuring the dog, a matter in which His Majesty appeared to take a greater interest than in the state of his country."[3]

Those of his officials who spoke to him of the disordered state of affairs were chided by the shah and told to give him more cheering news. On one occasion, before the assembled ministers, the shah said to the prime minister, Amīn os-Soltān:

> When I go to my 'Anderun' five hundred women swarm around me and annoy me with their complaints. I come out, and disturbing reports are put into my hands. I go to the Amin-es Sultan, whom I have loaded with kindness, and whose pity I deserve, and he heaps coals of fire on my head. Try and be cheerful; enliven me up a little in my worries and troubles. Why do you also come with a long face and tell me that my administration is rotten, that

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1 Khāterāt, pp. 192-3.

2 Lascelles to Rosebery, No. 44 (58), Tehran, 12 February 1894, FO 539/66.

3 Lowe to Howe, No. 192 (24), Confidential, Tehran, 20 December 1892, FO 539/61.

> my power is gone, that my army exists but in name . . . and that no one will pay taxes or heed my commands? All I ask, in return for my past kindness to you is that you pity me and try to cheer me up a little.[1]

This mood of despair and resignation also took hold of the shah's leading officials, so that gradually the resolve, the very will to govern, of the bureaucracy was gravely eroded. "Do not expect any patriotism from us," Amin os-Solton told Lascelles. "It does not exist in the country. Self-interest, greed and avarice abound. Beyond that no one cares what happens."[2]

These top officials on whom ultimate responsibility for the survival of the administration rested invariably anticipated widespread disorders and a general collapse at the shah's death, if not in his lifetime. A struggle for power among the shah's three sons was expected; and the partition of the country and its eventual takeover by Russia and England was thought virtually inevitable. This was a takeover, it was believed, which the populace would welcome rather than resist.[3] When asked by the British minister if the people would acquiesce in a division of the country between the two great powers, Melk Ara, the shah's brother, replied in two words. "Mais certainement."[4]

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1 Same to same, No. 6, Secret and Confidential, Tehran, 16 January 1893, FO 60/542.

2 Same to same, Secret and Confidential, No. 6, Tehran, 16 January 1893, FO 60/542.

3 See for example, Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 42, Very Confidential, Tehran, 11 February 1894, FO 539/66; same to same, No. 168 (83), Secret and Confidential, Tehran, 9 November 1892, FO 539/59; and Durand to Kimberley, No. 249, Tehran, 23 December 1894, FO 60/559.

4 Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 18 (44), Confidential, Tehran, 20 January 1894, FO 539/66.

Some not only expected the north and south to fall, respectively, to Russia and England, but actually connived to bring this about. Ẓell os-Solṭān, predicting this to be the course of events after the shah's death, told the British consul that in such an eventuality Britain would have to place a prince at the head of the administration in the south, as it had done in Egypt.

> He then laughed and indicated, without saying it, that Her Majesty's Government would choose him as the Ruler of English Persia, and also hinted that it would be foolish for him to take any steps personally to cook his food, when he could get it gratuitously from us.[1]

This demoralization appears to have spread to lower levels of the court, so that even appearances and common services were no longer maintained. E'temād os-Salṭaneh found he at times could no longer get a meal at the palace, that the court now travelled about in disorder and on a motley assortment of horses, that the new year <u>salaams</u> grew more confused and without lustre year by year. "Despite the ten to twelve <u>crores</u> that the shah spends every year," he wrote, ". . . the situation has become such that none of his personal departments has any order. He has no stables, no workshops, no page boys, no mule house, no kitchens, no pantry, nothing."[2]

There was also a general decline in the standards of behaviour, in the moral tone of the government. After his return from the shah's third trip to Europe in 1889, Amīn os-Solṭān took to drinking openly and to excess,[3] and card-playing

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1 Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 22, Tehran, 23 January 1891, FO 60/522; for another instance of the expression by Ẓell os-Solṭān of similar sentiments, see <u>Rūznāmeh</u>, p. 933.

2 <u>Rūznāmeh</u>, p. 1180.

3 <u>Ibid</u>., p. 775.

and drinking became common features in the shah's camp.[1] "In the court of the Exalted State," wrote E'temad os-Saltaneh, "they now spend two-thirds of the time in gambling."[2]

Stories circulated in the city about Amin os-Soltan's affair with one of the shah's wives,[3] and of unseemly, night-long parties with dancing girls and drinking in the homes of the leading officials of the state.[4] According to Amin od-Dowleh, members of the court took to bringing such women with them to the shah's palace on Fridays. "Half the week was spent recalling the previous [week's] festivities, the other half was devoted to preparing for the drinking and pleasures of the Friday ahead."[5]

E'temad os-Saltaneh summed up the mood and condition of the court when he remarked in his diary that from a personal point of view, this state of affairs had its advantages:

> On the one hand, I look at my own situation and I am completely happy . . . We servants, possessing every privilege and extravagant incomes, are carefree and at ease, and it is a time to graze and laze about . . . On the other hand, when I look into the state of the kingdom, the manner of conducting government and the condition of the subjects, my eyes and heart weep and my nature cries out. But what is it to us? More particularly, what is it to me? Now we are happy. After us, the deluge.[6]

The weakening of the shah's control over the

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1 Ibid., p. 1025.

2 Ibid., p. 1091.

3 Khaterat, p. 189.

4 Ibid., pp. 180-1 and Ruznameh, p. 801.

5 Khaterat, p. 180.

6 Ruznameh, p. 1025.

activities of his officials permitted the reemergence of a feature of government evident under preceding Qajar monarchs and also in the early years of Naser ad-Din shah's own reign. There was a marked tendency in the period after 189[illegible] towards the plurality of office and for the offices themselves to become the private monopoly of the office-holder.

In Tehran itself, the sadr-e a'zam, Amin os-Soltan, gradually drew under his aegis most of the important offices of the kingdom. Having inherited, at his father's death, the ministries of court and treasury, he had, by 189[illegible], managed to make himself indispensible to the shah. He was prime minister, minister of court and interior and administrator of the southern ports. The minister of foreign affairs was his cypher. His brother ran the treasury. The head of the department that served as a finance ministry, was subject to his influence. He directly farmed the customs from the shah; and, except for a brief period when his associate, Mohammad Hasan Amin oz-Zarb, lost the farm of the mint, he was a sleeping partner in this enterprise as well. His protégés and relations held a number of provincial governorships and filled minor offices in the court and government.

Over the years, Amin os-Soltan also managed to eliminate or render ineffective most of his rivals who were in a position to mount a challenge against him. He had been partly instrumental in Zell os-Soltan's fall from power in 1888, and in the 1890's he fought off a number of attempts by the Zell to regain his former authority. He helped to prevent the appointment of Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh to the office of foreign minister. He tried, but failed, to have Amin od-Dowleh sent out of the capital as governor of Khorasan.

Amin od-Dowleh continued in the 1890's to be considered a possible candidate for the post of prime minister. But he had considerably less influence on the shah than in former years. Amin os-Soltan's only serious rival in the struggle for domination of the various departments of government was the shah's son, Kamran Mirza. The Na'eb os-Saltaneh was governor of Tehran and head of its police force. He was commander-in-chief of the army, an office which came to be synonymous with that of minister of war. He also headed or controlled all the departments related to the army, such as the arsenal workshops, munitions, ordnance, stores and clothing which in the past had been often, though not always, attached to the war ministry under one official. From this base, Kamran Mirza mounted bids for various parts of Amin os-Soltan's bureaucratic empire. The rivalry between the two was one of the prominent features of the last years of Naser ad-Din shah's reign.

One result of the heavy concentration of offices in the hands of the prime minister and one or two others was that the work of the government simply did not get done. As Sir Mortimer Durand pointed out, with Amin os-Soltan intent on controlling himself all the affairs of the administration, the government departments had practically ceased to exist.

> The Sadr-i-Asam's office is a black leather hand-bag, into which he thrusts his letters and telegrams as he receives them. Every one addresses him direct on every conceivable subject, so the bag is always bulging with papers; and at any spare moment he takes out a few and passes orders on them. Once a paper leaves this bag it is forgotten, and very likely lost, for the two officials who act as his secretaries are incompetent to a degree that cannot be described. Yet they practically

transact all the important correspondence of the Persian Government.[1]

The re-emergence of virtually independent domains within the bureaucracy also adversely affected the finances of the state. In the mint, the administration was such as to lead to a rapid fall in the value of the Persian currency. An unfavourable balance of trade and the drop in the world price of silver as a result of the exploitation of the silver mines in America contributed to this decline. But the root cause lay in the dishonest tampering with the silver content of the kran and the excessive issue of copper coin by the farmer of the mint.[2]

The mint master throughout the 1880s and early 1890's was Amin ez-Zarb, one of the great merchants of Persia. Amin ez-Zarb paid the shah 25,000 tumans a year for the farm of the mint and, enjoying the prime minister's protection, was able to make a handsome profit by issuing large amounts of copper coin and illegally alloyed silver krans. The value of the kran thus fell continuously: from 25 to the pound sterling in 1875, to 28 to the pound in 1880, 32 in 1885 and 38 in 1892.[3]

In 1893, Nasr os-Saltaneh, a protege of Kamran Mirza, offered the shah a pishkesh of 50,000 tumans and an annual rent of 120,000 tumans for the farm of the mint, as against the 25,000 tumans a year paid by Amin ez-Zarb. This challenge to one of the prime minister's valuable prerogatives almost led

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1 Durand Memorandum, p. 2n.

2 "Memorandum on the Imperial Bank of Persia", by J. Babino, 9 July 1890, enclosed in Wolff to Salisbury, No. 334, Confidential, Gulahek, 10 July 1890, FO 60/512.

3 Babino's "Report on the Possibility of the Reform of the Currency in Persia", 19 June 1894, enclosed in Greene to Kimberley, No. 146, Secret, Gulahek, 22 June 1894, FO 60/558.

to the resignation of Amin os-Soltan. But the sadr-e a'zam failed to get his way and the shah, though forewarned of the dangers of extracting such a high price for the mint, transferred the farm to Nasr os-Saltaneh. This led to a worsening of the situation. In the winter of 1894 business in the bazaar came to a standstill and dissatisfaction with the currency among the merchants and ordinary people was so great that it was feared there would be a repetition of the popular uprising against the tobacco monopoly concession.[1]

Because of these developments and through various intrigues and machinations, Amin os-Soltan was able in the same year to bring about the fall of Nasr os-Saltaneh and to secure the mint once again, initially in the name of another of his proteges and eventually in the name of Amin oz-Zarb himself--but only at the cost of matching and even slightly increasing Nasr os-Saltaneh's offer.

At such a high price, the mint could not be worked profitably by its farmer without a further debasement of the silver coinage and more massive copper issues. After 1893, the kran fell even more steeply than it had in the previous period, plummetting from 38 krans to the pound sterling in 1892, to 43 in 1893 and to 50 in 1895. Copper, or 'black money', in which all ordinary labourers, workers and craftsmen were paid, also experienced a drastic depreciation. Copper money was normally accepted in the bazaar only at a discount of 15-25 per cent; and discounts sometimes rose to fifty and even sixty per cent.[2] Since copper money was the universal medium of exchange of the lower classes, this imposed a heavy

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1 Kuznameh, p. 1070.

2 Durand Memorandum, p. 10; Khateral, p. 184.

loss on those who could afford it least. Amin od-Dowleh described the circulation of 'black money' as "a great scourge,"[1] and when it was suggested to Amin ez-Zarb that he should buy up the copper coin, he retorted: "Not only I, Naser ed-Din shah himself cannot do it. Who can any longer gather up all this black money?"[2]

The instability of the currency discouraged the expansion of trade, and encouraged the hoarding of gold. It cut down on the value of the shah's own revenues. It helped destroy public confidence in the government, and it became one of the causes of rioting in the towns and cities. Yet, according to Lascelles, the shah was of the opinion that the depreciation of silver was not attributable to the government and was "a matter which might be left to right itself."[3]

For the farm of the customs, Amin es-Soltan paid the shah an annual rent of slightly over 900,000 tumans (£180,000). He was himself believed to earn another £40,000 from the operation,[4] although Nasr es-Saltaneh's offer of 1,200,000 tumans (£240,000) a year for the customs would indicate his takings were even higher.[5] The officials to whom Amin es-Soltan sub-contracted the individual ports and customs houses pocketed a further considerable sum. The agents of these contractors, in turn, compounded with foreign and native merchants and, for a suitable consideration, charged substantially less than the legal customs duty on goods entering

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1 Khaterat, p. 184.

2 Ibid., p. 197.

3 Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 44 (58) Tehran, 12 February 1894, FO 539/66.

4 Lursad Memorandum, p. 20.

5 Ruznameh, p. 991.

or leaving the country. Altogether, the government lost an estimated £250,000 through this leakage.[1]

The government, moreover, exercised no control over one of its major departments which, although run by the prime minister, was operated as a private concern; it was ignorant of the true worth of the country's trade, which for many years remained under-valued; and it was in the dark as to the effects of this commerce, with its orientation towards the export of foodstuffs and the import of manufactures, on its economy.

Much more serious in its implications for the finances of the state was the influence both Amin os-Soltan and Kamran Mirza came to exercise over the daftar-e estifa', the great accounting department of the government, and the ability of each to subvert the functions of this office to his own particular advantage. To understand how this came about, it is necessary to say a word about the administration of the finances under the Qajars.

The official responsible for the financial affairs of the state was the mostowfi al-mamalek, whose functions were broadly those of a minister of finance. The daftar-e estifa' was the chief department under his aegis. It was responsible for preparing each year the ministerial and departmental estimates, drawing up the annual budget showing the anticipated revenues and expenditures for the whole kingdom, and conducting the year-end audit of the accounts of each of the different departments of the state.

On the basis of the annual budget, the daftar-e

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[1] Curzon Memorandum, p. 14a.

estifa' issued at the beginning of the year a *dastur al-'amal* or assessment, to each governor or head of department, listing the anticipated revenues of the provinces or office and the authorized expenditures to be met out of these revenues. The expenditures covered such items as pensions, salaries of troops and other government servants, purchases and administrative expenses.

Receipts were obtained from those to whom payments were made. Surplus revenues were remitted to the treasury in Tehran, often in instalments. At the end of the year, the governor or department head presented his accounts to the *daftar-e estifa'* together with the vouchers from the treasury for revenue instalments already transmitted to the capital and the receipts for authorized expenditure undertaken during the year.

Although these expenditures had been foreseen in the *dastur al-'amal*, the receipts were accepted by the accounting department as proof of expenditure only in the case of minor sums. For major expenditures, the receipt had to be exchanged for a *barat* bearing the seals of the *vazir-e daftar*, the prime minister and the shah. The *vazir-e daftar* and the *sadr-e a'zam* had also to approve and seal the final accounts of each province and office, once they had been verified by the *mostowfis* of the accounting department.[1]

The treasury, headed by an official with the rank of minister, received the surplus provincial revenues and the fixed incomes from the mint, the customs, concessions and miscellaneous items. Against these, as already noted, it issued

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[1] Ibid., p. 18. An account of the revenue and accounting system is also given in Lambton, *Landlord and Peasant in Persia*, (new edition, London, 1969), pp. 164-5.

vouchers which served the provincial governors and heads of other departments as receipts in their final, year-end accounting with the central government. It also paid out of its funds government expenses against barats issued by the daftar-e estifa'.

Like the other departments and provincial governments, the treasury was also issued with a dastur al-'amal at the beginning of each year, showing its anticipated receipts and its authorized disbursements. At the end of the year it was also required to submit its accounts for audit to the daftar-e estifa' and to secure the approval of the vazir-e daftar and the prime minister of this audit.[1] The same practice prevailed in regard to the army.

The barat and auditing system placed enormous power in the hands of the prime minister. It was for this reason open to many abuses. But it was a system which might have worked with a degree of viability as long as the daftar-e estifa' remained independent of the prime minister, and as long as the prime minister and the mostowfi al-mamalek acted as a check on one another's financial operations. Much depended on the probity and impartiality with which the year-end audit was carried out.

During the lifetime of Mirza Yusef Khan Mostowfi al-Mamalek, whose tenure at the ministry of finance spanned nearly a quarter of a century, the minister of finance was a powerful individual in his own right and was in a position to defend the prerogatives of his department against the encroachment of a succession of prime ministers. The two offices--

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[1] Mirand Memorandum, p. 21.

sadr-e a'zam and mostowfi al-mamalek--were briefly united under one official when toward the end of his life Mirza Yusef Khan assumed the office of prime minister while continuing to be responsible for the financial department.

At his death in 1886, the title and office of mostowfi al-mamalek passed to Mirza Yusef Khan's twelve year old son. The boy was in no position to exercise the functions of this office and they were exercised, on his behalf, by the vazir-e daftar, Mirza Hedayetollah, the late Mostowfi al-Mamalek's cousin. Mirza Hedayetollah, however, did not wield much influence. Without a strong minister at his back, he was powerless to stand up to the prime minister or to the shah's son at the ministry of war. Amin os-Soltan and Kamran Mirza were, as a result, able to escape the year-end audit, and the daftar-e estifa' in the late 188[illegible]'s and early 189[illegible]'s become largely the instrument of those officials whom it was supposed to control.

The treasury, headed by Amin os-Soltan's brother, Amin ol-Molk, was run as a private banking operation by the two brothers. Government berats were left unpaid for eight or nine months while the funds of the treasury were loaned out at high interest by the minister. This was generally accomplished through the agency of sarrafs, or money-lenders, in the bazaar. The sarrafs also served the minister in the capacity of unofficial paymasters. The treasury issued cheques or money orders against these sarrafs to replace the berats held by officials and others. Close collaboration existed between the sarrafs and the minister; and since great delays in the cashing of these cheques were common, creditors were often willing to accept a 1-3% per cent discount to

ensure early payment of their bills. This constituted a source of considerable profit for the minister and the sarrafs collaborating with him.[1]

The decline in the status of the daftar-e estifa' permitted Kamran Mirza the freedom to operate the army finances in more or less the same manner as Amin os-Soltan used the treasury. The army's financial needs were traditionally accorded a special priority. But the army, at least in theory, was subject to the same financial controls as the other departments. Ministers of war often sought to free the army accounts from such controls. In the 1870's, for example, as noted in chapter three, Mirza Hosayn Khan Moshir od-Dowleh, then commander-in-chief, made such an attempt, but failed to overcome the shah's opposition to this move. But in April 1893, the shah granted to his son what he had some years earlier refused his minister. He ordered the separation of the military from the ordinary budget.[2]

After this date, although the army estimates and accounts were at the beginning and end of each year included in the over-all budget, the army began to draw up its own estimates and to conduct its own audit. Moreover, while at the provincial level pay for the troops continued to be included in the dastur al-'amal of the province and to be disbursed in the usual manner, in Tehran Kamran Mirza drew a lump sum for the payment of the troops and the expenditures of the various departments attached to the army. This money he disbursed himself. The treasury ceased to deal directly with the troops and the supply departments, and the daftar-e estifa' ceased by-

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1 Ibid., p. 21.

2 Khaterat, p. 906.

and-large to interfere with the military accounts department.[1]

Although graft had always been widespread in the handling of army funds, this was a grave development, especially in view of the substantial funds at the war minister's disposal. The cost of maintaining the army was, for Persia, astronomical, and may have come to as much as half the entire budget of the country.[2] The bulk of this expenditure now went to enrich Kamran Mirza himself or remained in the pockets of paymasters, officers and others who handled army funds.

Kamran Mirza received money to maintain what was nominally an army of between 9[illegible],000 and 1[illegible],000. In fact, none of the regiments were up to regulation strength. At any given time, the total of both those serving and those liable to be called up came to no more than half this number, while those actually under arms probably numbered no more than 30,000 and perhaps as few as 15,000.[3] Even these were generally of indifferent quality and armed with sub-standard weapons. When the shah asked troops standing guard at the Firuzeh palace to demonstrate how they would repel a band of robbers, the occasion turned out to be something of a fiasco. "First of all," it was noted, "[the soldiers] could not load the rifles. Then, the rifles could not be fired; and when they were, they did not hit the target. The shah was very upset."[4]

The pay and rations of even those troops that were

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1 Durand Memorandum, p. 19.

2 "Notes on the Persian Army", enclosed in Thomson to Granville, No. 146 (39), Tehran 21 June 1887, FO 539/18. For a later estimate, compare revenue and expenditure figures in Curzon, Persian Question, i, 614 and ii, 481-1.

3 See the figures compiled from a number of different sources in "Report on the Persian Army", by J.T. Douglas, 1 August, 1892, in FO 60/536.

4 Khanamah, p. 805.

maintained was several months in arrears. When it reached them, it was considerably diminished by the subtractions made by officers and others along the way.

Promotions could rarely be obtained without the payment of a suitable sum to the minister of war and, in the case of the higher ranks, to the shah himself. There was a regular traffic in the sale of honourary military titles. Army accountants, who in the provinces dealt with pay, checked expenditure and authenticated documents, purchased their posts for as much as 1,000 tumans.

In the budget of each of the departments related to the army, a sum was set aside and taken over by the military accounts branch of the war minister. This branch, like the treasury, was run as a private banking concern. While the troops remained unpaid, money was loaned out at high rates of interest in the bazaar to native sarrafs.[1]

Kamran Mirza appears also to have been involved in an illicit traffic in arms. He imported arms on his own account which he then sold at a profit; and he was not beyond raiding the army's stores for the same purpose. Some of these arms found their way into the hands of Armenian rebels in the Caucasus, causing both the Ottoman and the Russian governments to protest.[2] Kamran Mirza also sold rifles to some of the Persian tribes, such as the Kurds and the Lurs.[3] The commander-in-chief was thus in the position of arming the very groups it was his task to prevent from becoming a threat to the government.

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1 Murand Memorandum, p. 19.

2 Ruznameh, pp. 1177-8.

3 Ibid., p. 1172.

"The Minister of War," wrote Col. Ficot,

> unites in his own person several separate and distinct offices, such as those of Minister of War, Financial Secretary, the Commander-in-chief, and Paymaster-General. As Minister of War and Financial Secretary he prepares the Army Estimates, provides war material, equipment, clothing, tents, &c., and meets all pay disbursements, and checks the accounts of expenditure. As Commander-in-chief he accepts the material and equipment provided by himself as Minister of War. As Paymaster-General he deals with the executive disbursements to the troops. On him, therefore, devolves the whole responsibility, administrative, financial and executive.[1]

These developments, amounting to the capture of the major revenue sources of the government by a handful of individuals, severely disrupted the finances of the state. The government found it difficult to regain control over its revenues even in more limited spheres. Some [illegible] tumans (f100,000), for example, was disbursed annually through the ministry of pensions in allowances to 'ulama and religious students and also in stipends to private individuals, court favourites and the like. At the death of the pensioner, one-third of the pension was supposed to revert to the government and two-thirds to devolve on the pensioner's descendants. But a bribe usually secured continued payment of the full amount;[2] or other candidates stepped into the shoes of those who died. When the one of the chief officials passed away in 1891, his 3,600 tuman pension was immediately divided up among the shah's physician, the shah's dentist and the sons of two of his courtiers.[3]

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1 Durand Memorandum, pp. 26-7.

2 Durand Memorandum, p. [illegible].

3 Luzuneh, p. 923.

At the same time, there appears to have been a marked decline in the level of revenues remitted to Tehran from the provinces,[1] an indication that central control over the provincial governments was beginning to break down. This was a consequence partly of the shah's weakening hold on his officials and partly of the policies of Amin os-Soltan who, in his effort to run the entire government himself, was losing his grip on certain branches of the administration.

The rapid turnover of governors in the interest of the cash pishkesh they offered the shah militated against the orderly collection of revenues. Collusion between the provincial and the central authorities, and especially between the treasury and the provincial governors, appears to have become more extensive than in the past.[2] The army, unpaid, unarmed and untrained, was practically useless as an instrument either for the coercision of recalcitrant governors or for the restoration of order.

Fear of disorder, meantime, led the government to grant reductions on taxes and dues and to increase the list of those, particularly among the 'ulema, receiving pensions, stipends and allowances.[3] But the tax reliefs rarely accrued to the benefit of the peasants, while the distribution of pensions and other benefits to buy off opposition leaders did little to quieten public discontent.

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1 Durand, noting that the revenue of Persia in 1895 was slightly over £1,000,000, remarked: "It ought to be nearly a million and a half, but of late years the revenues are not being realized in full." (Durand Memorandum, p. 11n.) The size of the loss in revenues is difficult to estimate with accuracy; but other sources agree that it was considerable. See for example Khaterat, pp. 181-2.

2 Khaterat, p. 102.

3 Ibid., pp. 124-5.

Beginning in 1892, a deficit of some 300,000 tumans a year became more or less a permanent feature of the budget.[1] This did not include the 400,000 a year required to write off the regie debt, which was funded from other sources, including loans from the Imperial Bank. Amin os-Soltan was forced to draw on the shah's private treasury to meet expenses.[2] These drawings were treated as 'loans' from the shah to the government and were in theory repayable. Although the royal exchequer had been used to see the government through difficult periods in the past, it was almost always an indication that the finances were in a perlous state.

In order to raise money, Amin os-Soltan also began to sell khaleseh, or state, lands. Rather than working to the benefit of the government, this too became a vehicle for personal enrichment. The properties were purchased chiefly by the prime minister's own brother, Amin ol- olk, and other personages, such as Valijah and his aunt, Amineh Aqdas, at prices well below their real value.[3] Occasionally, half-hearted attempts were made to reduce the civil lists and to cut back on the size of the army.[4] But little was achieved. "The ministers were called [to audience] again today to discuss the accounts of the treasury", wrote 'Abdad os-Saltaneh. "I hear they want to cut down on the number of troops and servants in order to balance revenues and expenditures . . . But that is another illusion; for in this majlis, due to the fear of Amin os-Soltan, no one dares to speak."[5]

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1 Durand Memorandum, p. 1. Khaterat, p. 1006.

2 Khaterat, p. 136.

3 Ibid., p. 174.

4 Khaterat, pp. 934 and 936.

5 Ibid., p. 934.

Even had such measures been carried out, they would have made little impact on the heart of the problem, whose solution required a radical transformation of the Qajar financial system and the underlying concepts on which it was based. But the very precariousness of the finances ruled out any such attempt, or even measures of a more modest nature. Any change was instinctively resisted from a fear that it would lead to disruption and to a diminution, however temporary, of the revenues. The personal interests of the shah, those close to him such as Qavam Shirazi, and those on whom he depended such as Amin os-Soltan, were at the same time too closely linked to the existing system to permit much room for manoeuvre.

The shah, it was thought, might for example have been willing to do away with the sale of offices or to permit reform of the mint: but only on condition that he was guaranteed in some other way the £1.,[illegible] a year he earned from the sale of governorships and the £5,[illegible] a year he earned from the farmer of the mint. Moreover Amin os-Soltan was not thought prepared to divest his son of his income from the army; while Amin os-Soltan would not easily give up the £7.,[illegible] he was thought to make each year from the customs, the mint, the sale of offices and from miscellaneous sources.

The problem was complicated by the fact that, while often rich in land and other fixed assets, and drawing considerable incomes, men like Amin os-Soltan often were hard-pressed for cash. To reinforce their political and social influence, the leading members of the Qajar bureaucracy often lived and entertained on a lavish scale; they maintained a large entourage of relatives, political protegés and followers;

and they were required to make large cash gifts to the shah, either as a mark of fealty on special occasions or to ensure the renewal of an appointment.[1]

Many high officials were thus in the curious position of being at once very wealthy and also heavily in debt. Under these conditions, the loss of a source of revenue could be damaging and was powerfully resisted. It was partly for this reason that Curzon, who considered the customs the most promising field for reform, decided against pressing for a change in the customs administration. "Every one is agreed," he wrote, "that by the Customs Farm the 'sadr-i-'am will stand or fall, and it is, I think, to our interest at present that he should not fall.' The prime minister, he had noted "can only be regarded himself as a serious obstacle to all reform."[2]

Little reform was in any case attempted after 1890. Upon his return from his third trip to Europe, Nasir ad-Din shah named a commission under his brother, Malkom, to draw up a code of laws for the country.[3] The intention was to use European codes as a model, but to borrow only those laws considered in keeping with the *shari'a*. Translators were put to work on the Ottoman and some European codes, and the commission was also provided with copies of the Muslim code applied by the English in India and of the Code Napoleon as modified for Muslim populations under French rule.[4]

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1 On this point, see also Lambton, "Persia: The Breakdown of Society", Cambridge History of Islam, I, pp. 437-8.

2 Curzon Memorandum, pp. 14 and 2.

3 Nateq, pp. 141-2.

4 Curzon, Persian Question, I, 465; Luzzatto, p. 766.

But I'temad os-saltaneh was not sanguine. "In a little time," he noted, "when winter comes and everything freezes up, this royal intention will congeal as well."[1] He was not far wrong. Short time after the commission started work, the chairman, Ali Qoli Mirza, resigned. "It appears," I'temad os-saltaneh wrote in his diary, "that the promulgation of law is contrary to the taste of Amin os-Soltan. For this reason, he [Ali Qoli Mirza] was afraid and resigned."[2] Amin os-Soltan deterred the shah from accepting the recommendations of the commission and the scheme was abandoned.[3] In 1892, the shah asked the minister of justice to submit proposals for improving the judicial administration.[4] He appears also to have toyed with the idea of establishing a council to supervise the proper implementation of government decrees.[5] Neither of these measures came to anything.

The government could not risk, by attempting such reforms, stirring up the 'ulama and other elements in the population; and the shah's ministers were in any case too torn by faction to act. Referring to a session of these ministers convened to consider a question put to them by the shah, I'temad os-saltaneh noted that it did not get anywhere: "Sa'eb os-Saltaneh directed some spiteful remarks at the sadr-e a'zam and the sadr-e a'zam at him, both at the Ali os-Soltan, and Amin od-Dowleh at all three."[6]

Of these enmities, the most damaging to the

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1 Khaterat, p. 765.

2 Ibid., p. 771.

3 Khaterat, p. 143.

4 Ibid., p. 167 and enclosure to Salisbury, No. 24, 6 February 1892, F.O. 60/505.

5 Khaterat, p. 814.

6 Ibid., p. 1118.

government was the rivalry between Amin os- Soltan and Kamran Mirza. The sadr-e a'zam on several occasions attempted to unseat the shah's son,[1] and tried to secure from the shah a promise that he would dismiss him.[2] Kamran Mirza, as noted, made successive bids for departments controlled by Amin os-Soltan, such as the mint and the customs and, more successfully, the army accounts. Kamran Mirza also connived at, or at least turned a blind eye to, the posting of placards aimed at Amin os-Soltan in the streets of Tehran.[3] He apparently offered a leading mujtahid bribes and honours to oppose the government.[4] There were even rumours in the capital that Kamran Mirza and his party were prepared to instigate armed clashes between Persia and Turkey to discredit the prime minister and secure his dismissal.[5]

The rivalry between the two men paralyzed the work of the government and tied the shah's hands, for example in the matter of the finances. In 1893, several conferences were called by Naser ad- in to try and resolve a large budget deficit. The only result was that Kamran Mirza blamed this state of affairs on Amin os- Soltan, and Amin os-Soltan blamed it on Kamran Mirza.[6] "The intrigue between Sa'eb os-Saltaneh and the sadr-e a'zam," wrote Sa'ed os-Saltaneh, "has drained the life out of Persia and the Persians."[7]

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1 Ibid., p. 1105.

2 Decypher, Sir H. Lascelles, No. 12, 16 January 1893, FO 60/533.

3 Ruznameh, p. 804.

4 Enclosure in Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 146 (53), Tehran, 11 October 1893, FO 539/64.

5 Ruznameh, p. 1113.

6 Ibid., 1146.

7 Ibid., 1188.

This rivalry also spilled over into the haren. When Anineh Aqdas passed away, factions formed, each supporting a different candidate to succeed her as the shah's favourite wife. Amin os-Soltan's party supported his od- owleh, while Kamran Mirza's party supported another harem lady, Ghul Sikeh. "At bottom," D'tenad allamen commented, it is not a question of Amis od- owleh or Ghul Sikeh . . . but of the sadr-e a'zam and Na'eb os-Saltaneh. In the same way that, because of their enmity for one another, they have undermined and disordered the life of our King outside the haren and destroyed the foundations of the monarchy, so too these two honourable gentlemen have upset the little ease our King enjoyed inside the haren."[1]

The strained relationship between the shah and the prime minister also militated against a determined effort to improve conditions in the country. Although well-entrenched, Amin os-Soltan's position after 1892 was at the same time somewhat precarious. He had been discredited by the tobacco protest movement and he lost the confidence of the shah who blamed him for this setback. Although he continued to look to England for support, he was in the circumstances forced to lean increasingly on the Russians. However, continually threatened by Kamran Mirza and other rivals, forced to cater to the shah's whims, fearful that the shah was conspiring with his enemies, and lacking a strong financial base on which to build his position, Amin os- Soltan no longer devoted much attention to measures that might strengthen Persia. His energies were increasingly sapped by the struggle merely to

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[1] Ibid., 11:7.

> that no improvement could be hoped for, that matters would only go from bad to worse, and he did not wish to be associated with the catastrophe which he saw impending. Until now, the people had looked upon him as an intermediary between them and the Shah, but if they saw that he was merely the instrument of executing the Shah's caprice, he would lose all his popularity without being able to do any good.[1]

The Shah often worked at cross purposes with his ime minister and even sought to undermine him. If Amin os- ltan did not provide him with the money he wanted, he signed mself the necessary documents without the prime minister's owledge.[2] He communicated with the provincial governors hind Amin es-Soltan's back.[3] "Sa Majesté," remarked Naser -Din's French physician, "aime mettre les batons dans les nes de ses ministres."[4]

In opposing the wishes of his prime minister, the h often acted out of greed, or because of pressure put on by Kamran Mirza and other courtiers. He was perhaps picious of Amin es-Soltan's relations with the Russian assy. He also sought at times to reassert some control over departments which Amin es-Soltan had brought under his y, especially in the matter of the finances. Much of the ction between shah and prime minister arose out of attempts the shah to check abuses in the administration of the asury and to restore some order to the collection of the es.[5]

Lascelles to Rosebery, No. 5, Secret and Confidential, January 1893, FO 60/542.

Greene to Kimberley, No. 198 (93), Very Confidential, Tehran, September 1894, FO 539/68.

Khaterat, p. 993.

Greene to Kimberley, No. 207 (99), Very Confidential, Tehran, 11 October 1894, FO 539/68.

Khaterat, p. 175.

For these reasons the shah on a number of occasions seemed on the verge of dismissing his prime minister. Early in 1893, at a moment when Zell os-Soltan was about to return to the capital from Esfahan, the shah summoned Amin od-Dowleh, Kamran Mirza and another minister, Sekhbor od-Dowleh. He revealed to them in great confidence his intention of relieving the prime minister of his duties and asked them to reflect on, and present him with a programme for reform.[1] The shah apparently intended to employ Zell os-Soltan in some important capacity in the capital after dismissing Amin os-Soltan.[2] The shah, however, abandoned the scheme. According to Amin od-Dowleh, the Zell's avarice had now reached such lengths that he made a poor impression on the shah while the Russians made known to Naser ed-Din their strong disapproval of any move to unseat Amin os-Soltan. Apparently Kamran Mirza was sufficient-ly worried by his brother's appearance at the capital to alert his other rival, the prime minister, and Amin os-Soltan alerted the Russian embassy.[3]

Such crises in the relations between the shah and the prime minister occurred frequently. In February-April 1893, after another quarrel with the shah, Amin os-Soltan retir-ed to his home and despite numerous summons from the shah re-fused to come to court, claiming illness.[4] In late 1894, the shah once again took Amin os-Soltan to task for the state of the finances, and the prime minister again took to his house.[5]

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1. Ibid., pp. 175-6.
2. Ruznameh, p. 969.
3. Khateret, p. 176-7. Russia's support for Amin os-Soltan is also mentioned in Ruznameh, pp. 969-7[illegible] and hinted at in Lascelles Roseberry, No. 7, Confidential, Tehran, 16 January 1893, FO 5[illegible]/542.
4. Ruznameh, pp. 993 and 995-6.
5. Greene to Kimberley, No. 198 (93), Very Confidential, Gulhek, September 1894, FO 539/68.

Yet despite these crises, Amin os-Soltan was able to remain in power. He had neutralized most of his rivals. He succeeded after 1892 in making both England and Russia believe it was in their interest to maintain him in office. He managed, one way or another, to find enough money to keep the shah satisfied. All this gave him considerable hold over Naser ed-Din. "His strength," wrote Greene,

> consists rather in the weakness of his rivals than in his own present popularity with the Shah and the people. If there were anyone to replace him the Sadr Azem might be deposed tomorrow, but it is chiefly because the Shah has little hope of finding a better substitute that His Highness manages to keep his place.[1]

These developments at the capital also led to a deterioration in the position of provincial authority. It appears that the central government was at this time losing effective control over many areas outside Tehran. This permitted local officials to act with greater brutality and to avoid certain obligations, such as the remission of taxes to the capital. But it did not lead to a strengthening in the position of provincial governors. On the contrary, lacking support from Tehran, most governors were able to maintain themselves only with difficulty.

The fall of Asil os-Soltan is a case in point. By denying him the bulk of his governments, reducing sharply his sources of income and forcing the disbandment of his private army, the shah reduced the influence of a prince who had become a local power and constituted a potential threat to the

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[1] Greene to Kimberley, No. 196 (9[illegible]), Secret, Sulhek, 31 October 1894, FO 539/68.

throne. But this did not result in the assertion of the shah's authority in areas formerly run by the Zell. Instead, in provinces like Fars and Arabistan weaker governors--and in Isfahan a much weaker Zell os-Soltan--had to maintain themselves against what were now relatively powerful local forces.

In many parts of the country, there was a general breakdown of order. In the countryside, brigandage increased and in a number of areas the tribes, long kept relatively quiet, began to raid again. The Bakhtiyari country grew disturbed. In Fars, Arab tribes began to create disorder in the Fasa district, and the roads became so unsafe that local merchants were unable to transport their goods. In Shiraz, the local inhabitants were reported to have been stripped in broad daylight. The lutis,[1] local toughs who in some areas derived from medieval Islamic organizations, became active again. In Yazd, people were maltreated in the streets and homes were entered. In Isfahan, old luti rivalries between the Haydaris and the Ne'matis, dormant for twenty years, erupted once more.[2]

Anti-government uprisings and riots became common in the major towns. In Astarabad and Hamadan, the governors were forced to flee by the local population.[3] In Shiraz, the people took sanctuary in the local post office to protest the high price of bread, the depreciation of the currency, the lack of protection against the looting of Arab tribes, and the

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1 On the lutis, see Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia, (Oxford, 1954), pp. 18-9.

2 Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 128 (84), Lar, 11 August 1893, and enclosures, FO 539/60.

3 Decypher, Sir F. Lascelles, Tehran, No. 164, 9 November 1892, FO 60/533; and Lascelles to Roseberry, Tehran, No. 196, 21 December 1892 and enclosures, FO 60/532.

predations of the kalanter, Aevan ol-Molk. They asked for Aevan's dismissal (a demand to which the shah acceded) and en for his expulsion from the town (a demand which the shah fused). When troops believed loyal to Aevan were sent to sperse the crowd, they refused to obey orders and fraternized th the people.[1]

In Isfahan, where Zell os- olten, in collaboration th the local mujtahid, Aa Najafi, had established a corner grain, producing a tripling of grain prices, artificial ortages and famine, riots occurred. Placards condemning e Zell and the government appeared on the streets. Three Zell os-Soltan's villages were looted and part of his grain ores burnt.[2]

Similar grain-hoarding practices in Tabriz led to ngthy disturbances that seriously shook the government of e crown prince. Powerful officials around Mozaffar ad-Din rza, such as 'Abdol-Shah Khan Qa'em Maqam, the governor of e province, the beglarbegi of Tabriz, and others, allowed the orer classes in the city to starve while they held back in eir stores thousands of tons of grain. After representa- ions on behalf of all the classes of the people to the crown ince and the governor went unheard, rioting crowds smashed kery shops, looted the house of the Qa'em Maqam and forced st of the leading members of the crown princes government to ove town. Several persons were killed before order could be stored.[3]

Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 166 (92), Tehran, 9 November 92, FO 539/59; and cypher, Sir . Lascelles, Tehran, Nos. and 35, 17 and 20 May 1893, FO 60/544.

Lascelles to Roseberry, Nos. 167 and 168, both dated ehran, November 1893, FO 60/544.

Durand to Salisbury, No. 70 (50), 28 August 1895, and closures, FO 539/70.

Often both the central and the local government was ble to maintain order at such times. In Hamadan, disbances were quelled when the shah ordered the despatch of egiment of troops from outside the province with orders to sacre the trouble-makers. But elsewhere troops were either vailable or unreliable. During the troubles in ers, Tehran as was able to send only part of the troops thought essary by the shah to maintain order; the treasury was ty and it was impossible to send more soldiers without ing them.[1]

In the Tabriz riots, the troops were considered unable, as they despised their officers who they openly said bed them. Greater authority over the soldiers was exised by the Austrian advisor, General Wagner. But he could let the troops out of the barracks for fear of wholesale rties by the unpaid soldiers. To defend his house, the m Maqam had to call on lutis from the neighbouring village lsku.[2]

These disturbances were generally rooted in genuine lic grievances and derived their main impetus from the rful reaction produced among the people by the misrule of government and its officials. They were reinforced by support and, in certain instances, the leadership of certain uential individuals and groups from provincial centres. shah himself attributed the difficulties confronting the rnment in the provinces to local notables who, he said, their own reasons for opposing the government.[3] While this

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ascelles to Roseberry, No. 166 (92), Tehran, 9 November , FO 539/59.

urand to Salisbury, No. 70 (50), Tulbek, 28 August 1895, nclosures, FO 539/7[illegible].

ascelles to Roseberry, No. 192 (26), Confidential, Tehran, ecember 1892, FO 539/61.

as not a new phenomenon, locally influential individuals and roups began to carry more weight and their political opposition o be more damaging than the central government in the changed ircumstances of the 189 's than in the middle years of aser d-Din shah's reign.

Among those who reasserted themselves in this period, he 'ulama were perhaps the most important. As has been shown n recent studies,[1] although themselves sometimes obscurantist nd venal and although their position was somewhat compromised ecause they depended for their livelihood on government tipends and salaries, the 'ulama enjoyed a large following s guardians of religion and because they traditionally served he people as a refuge against oppression.

Since they held, at least in theory, that the only ist rule was rule based on the shari'a, the relationship tween the 'ulama and the government was characterized by an derlying tension. Relations grew strained, especially ring the second half of the 19th century, because of governtal measures the 'ulama regarded as posing a threat to their sition. The penetration of Persia by the European powers, a disruptive effect on the social and economic life of the untry, and the shah's concession-granting policy gave rise to belief that the government was selling the resources of rsia to foreigners and that both Islam and the independence the country were threatened. It was largely for these asons that the 'ulama emerged everywhere as the leaders of pular protest.

The government, aware of the threat posed to its

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[1] See further Algar, Religion and State, and Lambton, "The rsian 'Ulama and Constitutional Reform", in Le Shi'isme mite, pp. 245-269.

uthority by this development, sought in a number of ways to eutralize the influence of the 'ulama. In some instances, orce was used and politically active religious leaders were pelled from provincial centres and sent into exile. In ther instances, the government tried to purchase good be-aviour through a more liberal distribution of stipends and llowances.

In Tehran, Zell es-Soltan attempted, in meetings ith powerful figures like Mirza Hasan Ashtiani and correspon-nce with religious leaders in the holy places in Iraq, to rsuade the leading religious personalities to use their nfluence with the other 'ulama in the interests of order.[1] e shah himself sent intermediaries to some of the religious aders.[2] Large numbers were brought to the palace in efforts reaching an understanding.[3] There were also efforts to duce the Ottoman government to prevent the Persian 'ulama Iraq from creating difficulties for Persia.[4] These tactics, wever, met with little success.

This was equally true at the provincial level where e means at the disposal of officials was often more limited. Isfahan, Zell es-Soltan actually compounded with local ligious leaders, seeking to steer a difficult course in liance rather than against the 'ulama. The Zell explained s attitude to Sir Frank Lascelles:

> There were two sorts of influence, one of which was moral, such as the prophet enjoyed

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Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 148 (34), Gulahek, 28 September 892, FO 539/59; and same to same, No. 150 (35), 1 October 892, FO 539/59.

Kuznemeh, pp. 953 and 1151.

Lascelles to Roseberry, No. 143 (51), Confidential, Gulhek, October 1893, FO 539/64.

Kuznemeh, p. 1037.

> and the other [which] consisted in the possession of material force. He [Zell es-Sultan] did not pretend to be a prophet and his material force had been taken from him. He had now only two weapons at his disposal viz: flattery and bribery. Under these circumstances it was not to be wondered at that he should seek to ally himself with the Mullahs who were acquiring power in the country.[1]

In their political activity, the 'ulama often acted a partnership with the merchant classes. This was a reflection of the traditionally close links that existed between he merchant and religious communities; it was also an indication of the economic causes that lay behind some of the nti-government activity of this period.

The effects of misgovernment were felt directly by he merchants classes. The depreciation of the currency was o them a matter of great moment. Insecurity on the roads uld severely restrict trade or result in heavy losses. They d learned to live with a certain degree of official misrule d, in one way or another, were able to establish a working lationship with customs officers, tax collectors and other fficials with whom they were forced to deal. These accomodations always retained an element of instability, and it ppears that in the 18th 's government exactions began to appear many merchants to be increasingly onerous.

There was also the matter of European competition. uropean firms operating in Persia enjoyed a built-in advantage gainst native merchants in that they paid a preferential riff for their imports. Some Persian merchants found ways getting around this, but it was nevertheless a factor with

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[1] Lascelles to Roseberry, Tehran, 18 January 1893, FO 60/ 2.

which they had to contend. European, and especially British and Russian traders, able to fall back on the support of their diplomatic representatives, were also in a privileged position in disputes with local merchants.

Concessions, which gave monopoly privileges to foreign firms, were often damaging to the interests of Persian traders. The tobacco concession threatened the position of both tobacco growers and merchants; the Imperial Bank took business away from native money-lenders. Foreign imports also appear to have adversely affected local crafts and industries. Although much work remains to be done on this problem, it seems clear that, for example in the field of textiles, cheap foreign goods were driving local weavers out of business. Difficulties encountered by the merchants thus sometimes were felt also among a larger sector of the popula-tion.

A great deal of the agitation in Isfahan derived from these developments. Aqa Najafy and other religious leaders led demonstrations against the Imperial Bank; they forced foreign firms to reduce their prices for imported cottons;[1] they protected Persian merchants facing legal action for debts to foreign merchants.[2] Sometimes, seemingly fanatical out-breaks had easily traceable economic causes. Agitation against Jews in Isfahan, it was discovered, were aimed in fact against Manchester cottons which were sold from door to door by peddlers who happened to be Jews.

In many instances, those who lent their support to

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1. Lascelles to Rosebery, No. 9, 16 January 1893 and enclosure, FO 60/542.

2. Greene to Kimberley, No. 170, Gulhek, 14 August 1894, FO 60/559.

rotests against foreign penetration and to demands for
eform were among the leading merchants in the community. They
ossessed wealth, and this gave them a degree of influence;
nd because they were better travelled or had contacts with
raders outside the country they comprised a more enlightened
lass of the population. For these reasons, their alliance
ith the 'ulama mattered; for they carried weight and could,
ithin limits, make themselves felt. They came to constitute
nother element that in the 189.'s now began to range itself
gainst the government.

If the early years of Naser ad-Din shah's reign
ad seen a strengthening and expansion of the central authority,[1]
e gains made in this direction were in the last years of
is reign seriously eroded. In Tehran, large sectors of the
dministration had been virtually alienated from the shah's
ontrol and had fallen into the hands of particular officials;
e major revenue-earning operations of the government had
en transformed into what were almost private monopolies;
valry and faction among leading officials had practically
ralyzed the bureaucracy; and provincial revenue was no
nger remitted to the centre. In the provinces themselves,
e authority of the governors had been weakened, and this had
ven rise to public disorder and to the emergence of local
atres of power:

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[1] Arguing this point of view, Curzon wrote after his ex-
nsive tour of Persia in 1889 that life and property was
sure, brigandage was rare; "revenue is exacted even from
e nomad and the mountainous tribes; the provincial governors
e thoroughly under control and quake at the vibrations of
e telegraph wire from Tehran; the Shah is supreme from the
spian to the Gulf, and from the Kurdish mountains to Seistan;
d there is not a single man in the kingdom who dare venture
ther his voice or his position against the sovereign."
ersian Question, i, 4 6.)

the country [wrote Conyngham Greene], is falling to pieces as fast as it can, the army is unreliable, the officers are not loyal, the soldiers do not receive their pay, the finances are in disorder, there is no supervision of accounts, there is no money for public needs, there is no law and no justice, corruption is universal, everybody is discontented, and nobody either knows or cares what may happen to the country tomorrow.[1]

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[1] Greene to Kimberley, no. 207 (99), Very Confidential, Tehran, 11 October 1894, FO 539/68.

CHAPTER VI

THE QAJAR REFORMERS AND THEIR IDEAS: THE LATER PHASE

The discontent felt by Persians at the corruption nd oppression of the official classes and at the economic ondition of the country, and the belief that Persia's in- ependence and Islam itself were in danger led, in the last ears of Naser ad-Din shah's reign, not only to increasing nternal disorder but also to a more widespread demand for easures to correct abuses, to check the untrammelled authority f the shah and his officials and to permit the people a voice n the decisions affecting their lives. These demands were xpressed in a number of newspapers, books and other pub- ications that began to appear in the early 1890's.

Malkom Khan launched his newspaper, Qanun, in London February 1890.[1] Two other Persian language newspapers llowed: Hekmat, first published in Cairo in 1310/1892-3 and bl al-Matin, started in Calcutta in 1311/1893-4. In Tabriz, o jellygraphed satirical sheets, Shabnameh and Talqinnameh-ye ha, appeared and were surreptitiously distributed among a

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Qanun was registered in London as a periodical for circulation read in 1890 and was published by the Oriental Press Associa- on, Ltd., 38 Lombard Street, London. This company was gistered on 6 February 1890. Its articles of association ovided for a nominal capital of £10,000 divided into 99 dinary shares of £100 each and 100 founder shares of £1 each. firm of solicitors investigating for the Persian legation ported that only seven persons who had taken ordinary shares re listed as shareholders. These were Makonneff, W.J. Waller, . W. Clark, Richard Foster, Arthur Carter, Mirza Yusef (?) n and Herbert Mott. (See Mohammed 'Ali to Salisbury, 19 1891 and enclosures in FO 60/530).

mall group of people. It was also in the early 1890's that hree books, each in its own way reflecting the changing ntellectual temper of the times, were produced: Mirza Habib sfahani's translation of Morier's Hajji Baba of Ispahan, 'Abdol him Talebof's Ketab-e Ahmad, and Zayn ol-'Abedin Maraghe'i's iyahatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beg.[1]

How wide a circulation these publications enjoyed uring Naser ed-Din shah's lifetime is still a matter for con-ecture, although their influence is generally believed to ave been considerable. Questions of circulation aside, the ppearance of these books and newspapers suggests that certain ducated Persians were beginning to feel a compulsion to speak ut publicly about the state of their country. These men were rawn from a variety of backgrounds. Some were members of the ureaucracy, others were sons of merchant families and many ame from the ranks of the 'ulama and other educated classes.

They lived for the most part outside Persia, and lmost all the new writing they produced was printed abroad, or the simple reason that criticism of the regime could not e voiced openly at home. But even inside the country there as an increasing number of individuals willing to take the isk of either issuing leaflets and letters themselves, or lse distributing material that was sent to them from abroad.

E.G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia (Cambridge, 914), pp. 19-23. Ketab-e Ahmad was first published in 1894. he publication date of Siyahatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beg is less ertain. According to the introduction by Mohammed Karim irazi in the 1910 (Calcutta) edition, the book was written n 1880 and published in 1886. On the other hand, there are umerous references in the book to events up to the year 1889 nd at least two references to events occurring in 1894 (the ino-Japanese War and the publication of Ketab-e Ahmad). These tter two references, may, however, be additions made in ter editions. It is in any event clear that the book was ritten during Naser ed-Din shah's lifetime.

In these writings it is possible to discern the beginnings of a process through which basic and traditionally-held ideas about religion, the state, the role of government and the place of the individual in society were being slowly reformulated. Some of these reformulations were foreshadowed much earlier in the writings of Akhundzadeh, Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar ed-Dowleh and Malkam Khan himself. But they now began to be stated with greater force and frequency, with greater relevance to the existing situation in Persia and, increasingly, for the ears of a larger audience.

Of the publications that appeared in Naser ed-Din Shah's lifetime, Qanun was the most important and influential. The immediate event that led Malkam to launch this newspaper was the quarrel that developed between himself and the government over the lottery concession he had obtained from the shah in the summer of 1889 when Naser ed-Din was on his third trip to Europe. Upon his return to Iran, the shah had second thoughts about the wisdom of introducing a lottery and gaming into the country; in November 1889, Malkam was informed that the concession had been withdrawn. In the exchanges that ensued, the prime minister, Amin os-Soltan, used a telegram from Malkam containing offensive references to himself to have Malkam recalled to Tehran.

Malkam chose to ignore both the revocation of the concession and the instructions to return home. He and his partners had already managed to send the premium on the lottery and related concessions sky-rocketing on the London exchange by transferring (to themselves) the shares in the undertaking through a series of dummy corporations. Malkam now kept the news of the concession's revocation secret until he had sold

his shares in the enterprise for $40,000.[1] Meantime, the acrimonious exchanges with Tehran continued; and in February 1890 Malkam began publishing Qanun.

In launching Qanun, Malkam was prompted by various and sometimes conflicting motives. He was no doubt unwilling to give up the profits, at that time amounting to a small fortune, derived from the lottery concession. He appears to have feared he might suffer some indignity once back in Tehran.[2] Qanun was also intended as a lever with which to dislodge Amin os-Soltan from power. Malkam's friend, Amin ed-Dowleh, had for over a year detailed in letters to Malkam Amin os-Soltan's growing hold over the shah. Malkam had experienced personally the disadvantages of this development.[3] As Amin ed-Dowleh's close friend he may have been especially the object of Amin os-Soltan's intrigues.

The rivalry between Malkam and Amin os-Soltan was exacerbated during the shah's trip to England in the summer of 1889.[4] Moreover, encouraged by Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, Amin os-Soltan was the prime mover behind the shah's decision to cancel the lottery concession.[5] The first issue of Qanun

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An entire volume in the British Foreign Office Records (FO 60/551) is devoted to the lottery concession case. There are scattered references in other volumes for 1889-90. The facts surrounding the concession and its sale are summarized in Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain, pp. 262-7.

Draft, Sir H.D. Wolff, Telegram, No. 85, Secret, Foreign Office, 3 December 1889, FO 60/503. Malkam throughout his official career showed little desire to return to Persia. In the entire period between his appointment to London in 1873 and his death in 1908, he returned to Persia only twice, and then only with great reluctance and for very brief periods.

See Malkam's letter to the Persian foreign minister enclosed in Wolff to Salisbury, No. 25, Tehran, 29 January 1890, FO 60/510.

Wolff to Salisbury, Telegram, No. 164, Confidential, Tehran, 5 November 1889, FO 60/504.

Wolff was from the start opposed to the lottery concession on economic grounds. But he was also motivated by a desire to

eflected Malkom's particular enmity for Amin es-Soltan. It as directed not at the shah, for whom the paper expressed evotion and respect, but at the prime minister and his faction he were invariably described as "the kitchen staff", in an llusion to Amin es-Soltan's beginnings as an employee in the ah's kitchens. Members of the court for some time believed hat Malkom was using Qanun merely as a bargaining counter in he dispute over the lottery concession and his over-all osition in the government,[1] and that he would give up the per if offered adequate material inducements.

Malkom's private correspondence during this period at credence to this view. Following his recall, and his fusal to return home, Malkom continued to maintain a semi-fficial and a private correspondence with several high-ranking fficials, including the foreign minister and, on occasion, in es-Soltan himself. Malkom sought in this correspondence th to ingratiate himself again with the shah and to win pporters within the court. The "terms" under which Malkom uld return to government service were the subject of part of is correspondence. Malkom was eventually offered the post minister to Rome, but his own demands appear to have been tched much higher. If Amin es-Soltan is to be believed, he s asking for both the Paris and the London embassies, the

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rongthen the hand of Amin es-Soltan who had suggested to that Malkom, backed by Amin ed-Dowleh and Mo'in el-Molk, d mounted a campaign to oust him from office and had for is reason "adopted the Russian standard." (See Wolff to lisbury, No. 217, Tehran, 28 November 1889, FO 60/502). The ssians were in fact opposed to the concession, fearing the lension of British influence in Persia. (See same to same, legram, No. 167, Confidential, Tehran, 30 November 1889, 60/502).

Amin ed-Dowleh to Malkom, 25 Ramazan [1307/15 May 1890], P. 1997/172.

retention of the lottery concession, a new title and a higher decoration.[1]

Malkam also continued for nearly a year after he began publishing Qanun to send messages to the shah, chiefly through such intermediaries as Amin ed-Dowleh and the foreign minister Qavam ed-Dowleh. In October 1890, at the advice of Amin ed-Dowleh, Malkam finally wrote the shah directly, reaffirming his loyalty and declaring himself prepared "to obey better than any slave, and without [even] a salary or official position, whatever are His Majesty's wishes."[2] The letter was in many ways a peculiar one. In it, Malkam hinted at the possibility that the shah might be secretly pleased at the publication of Qanun; he suggested that the shah might want him to carry out some confidential assignment; and he even proposed some privately agreed code by which the shah might make known to Malkam his intentions.[3]

Although never explicit, the implications of these allusions is fairly clear: Malkam was suggesting that the shah was a prisoner of his prime minister, so much so that he could only communicate to Malkam his innermost desires by secret code; that he actually wished Malkam to continue publishing Qanun; and that this was somehow connected with the shah's desire to get rid of Amin os-Soltan. Whether Malkam really believed in such a possibility is uncertain. Far-fetched as the idea seems, wishful thinking may in his own mind have

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Wolff to Salisbury, No. 153, Confidential, Tehran, 25 April 1890, FO 60/511.

Malkam to shah, London, 2 October 1890, S.P. 1987/39. Compare this letter to the one Amin ed-Dowleh suggested that Malkam should write the shah. (See Amin ed-Dowleh to Malkam, 8 August [1890], S.P. 1997/109).

Ibid.

grown to a vague conviction; for he personally sent the shah copies of Qanun, and even wrote to him complaining of the unjustness of the ban placed on his newspaper.[1]

The shah's reply to Malkam's communication was prompt and straightforward. Malkam, he said, must act in a manner befitting a loyal servant of the state; he must give up his claims to (and by implication his profits from) the lottery concession; he must stop publishing Qanun. "You must not," the shah wrote him, "any longer send these types of pamphlets and 'news' to Iran and should impose the exertions of your pen on Us alone."[2] Malkam, who had undertaken "to obey . . . whatever are His Majesty's wishes," chose to ignore this advice.

While maintaining these contacts with the shah, Malkam also sought to organize in the court and the government a movement directed against Amin os-Solton and sympathetic to himself. He mentioned favourably the names of a number of high-ranking officials in the columns of Qanun. He sent letters to the shah's son, Kamran Mirza, whom he also provided with copies of the newspaper. This was an attempt to suggest that Kamran Mirza shared Malkam's views on reform since, by Qanun's own account, the paper was sent only to those numbered among the 'elect'. Malkam also sent a letter in January 1891 to

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1 Amin ed-Dowleh to Malkam, 22 Zi Qa'deh [1307]/10 July [1890] S.P. 1997/126, and same to same, 6 Zi Hajjeh [1307]/24 July [1890] S.P. 1997/127.

2 Shah's handwritten minute, dated 18 Rabi' I 1308/1 November 1890, on Malkam's letter to shah of 2 October 1890, S.P. 1997/99. The shah, it appears, was especially annoyed that Malkam did not share with him the £40,000 he had earned from the lottery sale. After touching on the damage Malkam had done the country by his activities, the shah pointed to Malkam's personal profit and added: "From all these large sums that you received from the shareholders, have you given a diner to the government of Iran or has a [diner] reached Us?"

Yahya Khan Moshir od-Dowleh, the shah's brother-in-law and a man of some influence in the court.

In it, Malkom tried to rouse Yahya Khan's ambitions by telling him that his abilities qualified him for a post much higher than the one, as minister of justice, he was then holding. He indirectly criticized Amin os-Soltan for concentrating all power in his own hands. He also justified his own activities by the claim that he was fulfilling the function of "the ministerial opposition," a function which is, "according to the principles of the European Gov[ernmen]ts, one of the greatest services to the Gov[ernmen]t . . . Your Highness knows that this alone is the moving spirit of all progress in Europe."[1] He compared his role to that played by Gladstone and Salisbury when in opposition, and said his only purpose was to introduce in Persia the principle that ministers out of office should render themselves useful both by their criticism and their approval of the government.

Malkom's explanations made little impression on the shah, who took a very serious view of Malkom's approach to Komran Mirza and Moshir od-Dowleh. In February, he called a council of leading princes and ministers, denounced Malkom Khan as a traitor, declared correspondence with him tantamount to treason, and announced his decision to deprive Malkom Khan of all his medals and titles.[2]

The shah's actions stemmed from a fear of the implications for himself of Malkom's various activities. He did not trust his ministers and was suspicious of his sons. He could not rule out the possibility of a movement organized in

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[1] Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 66, Tehran, 10 March 1891, and enclosures, FO 60/[illegible].

[2] Ibid.

the court against, if not himself, then certainly his prime minister; and he must have felt that Kamran Mirza, as commander of the army, was especially well-placed to lead such an attempt. Besides, Qanun's influence was already beginning to be felt inside the country and, reinforced with the nascent anti-regie agitation, was beginning to seem a genuine threat to the stability of the regime.

For despite Malkam's desire, as revealed in his private correspondence, to reinstate himself in the shah's favour, Qanun was not an instrument designed for the advancement of purely personal ambitions. From its earliest issues, both in its criticism and its demands, the newspaper constituted a serious challenge to the status quo in Persia, a challenge that Malkam was pressing publicly at the very time when he was expressing privately his loyalty to the shah. This attempt to pursue two somewhat incompatible aims was rooted in Malkam's personal predilections and in his equivocal position as one of the shah's servants.

While there were already signs in 1886-7 that he was losing hope in the shah as a potential instrument for reform and was beginning to look elsewhere for the support to make reform possible, Malkam nevertheless may have still believed he could, through Qanun, influence the shah's views and policies. Moreover, the simultaneous display of reformist zeal and personal self-interest was not entirely untypical of Malkam. If his behaviour over the lottery concession was a reflection of his taste for wealth, influence and high office, the contents of Qanun represented an extension and development of his earlier reform efforts and ideas.

The comparison of his activities to those undertaken

by 'the ministerial opposition', far from being a cynical justification for his actions, probably expressed fairly accurately the role to which Malkom genuinely aspired. He wished to remain in favour, to be accepted as a member of Persian officialdom and to enjoy the privileges of office even while using his considerable talents as a pamphleteer and popularizer of ideas to build up a movement in the country committed to his reform ideas. He sought, as before, to advance his personal aims and ambitions by playing on the rivalries and factions within the bureaucracy. At the same time, he introduced a new element into the situation by extending his political activity into the public sphere.

Within the framework of a European-style 'ministerial opposition', Malkom might theoretically have been able to engage in both sorts of activity. But under the shah's rule there was no room for a 'ministerial opposition', for political activity independent of and divorced from service to the shah.[1] In trying to be at once loyal to the shah and critical of his government, Malkom was in effect trying to play mutually exclusive roles, and he could not long avoid a clear cut choice.

In making such a choice, the shah's action in depriving him of his titles, honours and post, and considerations of personal interest undoubtedly played a part. But they offer only a partial explanation and were probably not decisive. The shah wanted Malkom to give up Qanun, and this was a price

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1 Malkom's activities, it is instructive to note, put a strain on Amin ed-Dowleh's loyalties. He had been sending Malkom letters lauding Qanun and noting with approval its influence in awakening the people to the government's misrule. But when the shah denounced Malkom and deprived him of his post and titles, Amin ed-Dowleh wrote to criticise Malkom for his excessive stubbornness and his refusal to do the shah's bidding. (See Amin ed-Dowleh to Malkom, S.P. 1997/120.

for the shah's favour that Malkam refused to pay. The success that Qanun was in the meantime enjoying in Persia no doubt strengthened Malkam's resolve in this regard.

The first issues of Qanun began to arrive in Persia in April/May 1890; at the same time, or shortly afterwards, the newspaper began to reach the hands of Persians in Baghdad, Istanbul, Cairo, Bombay and other cities in India. It is now possible from existing private correspondence to piece together a fairly clear picture of how Qanun was circulated.[1] Generally, the paper was sent from London where it was printed through the posts to cities in Iran, the Ottoman Empire and India. Those who were known to Malkam by name, whether in Persia or out of it, were sent the paper directly. The list of direct recipients was expanded as Malkam's contacts in Istanbul, Tehran and elsewhere sent him names and addresses of those who had actually asked for subscriptions or who were considered potential readers.

Men like Amin od-Dowleh in Tehran, Mo'in ol-Molk, the ambassador to the Porte, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani,[2] a Persian living in Istanbul, and other contacts acted as distributing agents, receiving several copies of the paper and then giving these to others. The paper, both in Persia and out of it, was of course passed from hand to hand. There is also some evidence that supporters of the paper occasionally made copies of some issues in the interests of wider circulation.

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1 Much information on this subject can be culled from the letters of Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani and Amin od-Dowleh to Malkam. See for examples S.P. 1996, Nos. 79, 118, 124 and 126-5; and S.P. 1997 Nos. 112, 117, and 127.

2 On Kermani, see further pp. 320-29; 339-42.

When the shah first ordered a ban on the paper coming through the posts from London, batches were sent to Istanbul and elsewhere and posted to Iran so that they bore a non-London postmark and thus presumably escaped suspicion. When the shah demanded a tightening of postal controls, Qanun was printed on thin paper and sent in envelopes as ordinary letters; and when letters too, were opened for inspection, those committed to Qanun's distribution had recourse to sympathetic merchants who hid copies in merchandise coming into the country from outside.

As head of the post office, Amin od-Dowleh was in any case in a position to apply the postal ban selectively. He had no doubt to produce confiscated newspapers for the shah as evidence of his zeal in censoring the mail. But he repeatedly impressed on Naser ed-Din the difficulty of blanket censorship, and he let through uninspected packages addressed to sympathizers he knew were receiving Qanun.[1]

The paper was apparently sent for the most part to members of the educated classes and those with standing in the community. The few lists of subscribers that have come to hand show a heavy preponderance of merchants, bureaucrats and similar persons among the recipients. In one list of eighteen subscribers residing outside Persia sent to Malkam by Kermani from Istanbul, thirteen of those that can be identified are merchants.[2] In another such list, this time of fourteen subscribers resident in Bombay, Baghdad, Erzerum, Trabzon, Tiflis and Istanbul, of those that can be identified seven are

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1 Amin od-Dowleh to Malkam, 25 Ramazan [1307/15 May 1890], S.P. 1997/172; and Hajj Mohammad 'Ali Sayyah, Khateret ye Dowreh-ye Khowf va Vahshat, ed. Hamid Sayyah and Sayfollah Golkar (Tehran, solar 1346/1967-8), p. 339.

2 Kermani to Malkam, S.P. 1996/103.

merchants, four members of the Persian bureaucracy or consular service and one, Mirza Mehdi Dokter, the man who was afterwards publisher of the Cairo newspaper Hekmat.[1]

The same classes of people appear to have received the paper in Persia itself. Reporting to Malkam on one occasion that all but a few of his letters to Persia had been opened and censored, Kermani remarked that the envelopes had fortunately been addressed to mujtahids, princes, government officials and the men of standing (mo'tabarin) in the community. Had the recipients been men of little influence, he added, they would have been in difficulty.[2]

In another letter to Malkam, Kermani expressed the hope that Qanun would arouse the 'middle classes' (mardom-e motavasset), which he described as comprising land owners (dahaqin), the notables (a'yan) and the well-born (nejaba) of Persia.[3]

It was to these groups that Qanun primarily addressed itself. The paper, it is true, spoke often of the millat, or nation, which it claimed to represent. But the classes it specifically mentioned and that it foresaw as playing a major role in a new Persia were never, or hardly ever, the urban masses, the peasants, or even the shopkeepers and tradesmen. They were, rather, again and again described as the men of standing in the community: the 'ulama, the merchants, the officers of the army, the learned, the notables of the provinces. These men were grouped alongside the bureaucrats in the columns of Qanun as in some way entitled to

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1 Same to same, S.P. 1996/96.

2 Same to same, S.P. 1996/77.

3 Same to same, S.P. 1996/113-112.

speak for the community as a whole, to share in the making of decisions and in the running of the government.

Qanun appears very quickly to have gained for itself what was for the time a fairly wide readership among these classes and perhaps among persons further down the social scale. Amin ed-Dowleh remarked that despite the postal ban,

> from the Ottoman lands, from the Caucasus area, from the direction of Arab 'Iraq, the newspaper, carried by merchants and travellers, entered Iran in sufficient quantities to quench the desires of a number of persons; and those in the kingdom who had suffered affliction, whose rights had rotted in the saddlebags of the kitchen staff, whose nostrils had been offended by the stench of the dung of the mule stables, were stirred to a high pitch by these publications; they gradually made the newspaper the talking point of every meeting and the subject of every gathering.[1]

Along with a number of other reformers, Amin ed-Dowleh initially believed that the people, oppressed and out of touch with modern civilization, would grasp the import of Qanun's message only with difficulty, and that they would not easily be moved to action.[2] But he soon noted that the paper was beginning to influence the attitudes and consciousness of Persians. He believed that Qanun was avidly read because it for the first time articulated grievances and aspirations Persians had long since felt but had never expressed. He reported that many were taking its pleas for unity and cooperation to heart. He found that increasingly there were people who were willing to speak out.[3] He wrote Malkam:

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1 Khaterat, p. 148. The 'kitchen staff' and the 'mule stables' refer to Amin os-Soltan. He headed both the royal kitchens and the royal stables.

2 Amin od-Dowleh to Malkam, 18 Rabi' II [1308]/1 December [1890], S.P. 1997/112.

3 Same to same, 9 Moharram [1308]/25 August [1890], S.P. 1997/110; and same to same, 8 Sha'ban [1308/19 March 1891],

> So little any longer is the cruelty of our administration hidden from view that not only the grocerof Tehran but even the cultivator and farmer of Nahavand has become aware [of it] . . . I see that most of the people from classes from which there was no such expectation are saying certain things and have grown determined to save the fatherland. It is the first stage of the people's awakening . . . If the newspaper continued [to publish] for a long time, the major, the *mostowfi*, the *mujtahid*, the merchant and etc. have important and worthwhile things to say, and they want to send [their remarks] to the offices of *Qanun*.[1]

These effects of *Qanun* did not go unnoticed by the government. Not long after the appearance of the first issues of the paper, the shah pressed the British government to prevent the publication of *Qanun* in England and to expel Malkom from the country. The shah was informed that the British government could not legally take either step; but the Foreign Office, with the cooperation of the Queen, eventually arranged to have Malkom barred from court functions.[2]

Official concern at the impact *Qanun* was making on readers inside the country grew in the early months of 1891, as the anti-régie agitation began to gather steam. Beginning in January, there was a wave of arrests of persons suspected of anti-government activity or of collaboration with *Qanun*. Those arrested can conveniently be divided into four groups.

First, a number of influential religious leaders came under attack. In January, as noted earlier, Jamal ad-Din

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S.P. 1997/173.

1 Same to same, 26 Ramazan [1307/15 May 1890], S.P. 1997/172.

2 Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 66, Tehran, 10 March 1891, FO 60/522; and Draft, Mr. Kennedy, Telegram, No. 10, Foreign Office, 10 March 1891, FO 60/525.

Afghani was expelled from the country. Two other outspoken mollas., Hajj Seyyed 'Ali Akbar Fālasiri of Shiraz and Hajj Molla Fayzollah Fazel Darbandi of Tehran, were also arrested and forced to leave the country for Iraq.

Secondly, a number of high-ranking government officials came under suspicion, in this instance because of collaboration with Malkam Khan. Mohsen Khan Mo'in ol-Molk, the ambassador in Istanbul and a friend of both Malkam Khan and Amin od-Dowleh, was recalled, on the not unjustified suspicion that he had been collaborating with Malkam Khan. Mo'in ol-Molk, fearing punishment, refused to return to Tehran and remained in Istanbul under the sultan's protection. Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar od-Dowleh, the author of Yek Kalameh and at this time the foreign ministry agent (hargozar) in Azarbayjan, was arrested, his house was searched and incriminating correspondence with Malkam Khan was discovered. An attempt was also made to incriminate Amin od-Dowleh. But despite his regular correspondence with Malkam Khan, no evidence was discovered.

At the same time, a number of middle-level officials were found to be collaborating with Malkam. The consul-general in Baghdad was recalled for distributing Qanun. In Tehran, E'temad os-Saltaneh's secretary, Mirza Feraghi, along with Mohammad 'Ali Khan, a former second secretary at the London embassy, and Seyyed Vali, a (Persian) secretary at the Austrian embassy, were found to have collaborated in writing a critical article they intended to send to Qanun. "The Shah," wrote Kennedy, "says that he scarcely knows in whom he can place confidence."[1]

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[1] Decypher, Mr. Kennedy, No. 194, 23 September 1891, FO 60/525.

Finally, a group of lesser individuals, including Mirza Reza Kermani, Afghani's servant and later the assassin of Naser ed-Din shah, were imprisoned for anti-government activities. The group included Hajj Sayyah, a colourful figure and a kind of professional wanderer, who had travelled from Persia to Europe, America, China and India before coming back home. Sayyah was acquainted with both Malkam Khan and Afghani, associated with a number of high government officials, and had worked for a period for Zell os-Soltan. He and a number of others had written three open letters, addressed to the shah, the 'ulama and to the Persian nation, had had hundreds of copies made and had distributed them among the inhabitants of Tehran.[1]

These arrests on the part of the government were motivated to a large degree by security considerations. But personal rivalries and interests also played a role. Amin os-Soltan and Kamran Mirza, each for different reasons, were both eager to discredit the faction led by Amin ed-Dowleh and including Mo'in el-Molk, Mostasher ed-Dowleh and Malkom. Kamran Mirza hoped to link Sayyah's activities with Zell os-Soltan and thus to undermine his brother in Isfahan. By uncovering 'plots', Kamran Mirza also sought to make himself appear indispensible to the shah; and he often made arrests merely to extort money out of the detainees before releasing them.

The arrests nevertheless give some insight into the degree to which Persians in different social strata were prepared to engage in anti-government activity, often at considerable risk to themselves. It is also clear that links were

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[1] For an account and the text of these letters see Hajj Sayyah, Khaterat ya Dowreh-ye Khowf va Vahshat, pp. 332-339; the names

beginning to develop between persons drawn from widely differing groups, with individuals like Hajj Sayyah acting as go-betweens. Much of this activity was being encouraged by Qanun.

Qanun was never a newspaper in the commonly understood sense of the term; it did not report day-to-day news. The fact that it appeared only once a month (and later at even longer intervals), that its readership was located at some distance from its place of publication, and that its distribution was clandestine and thus subject to unpredictable delays militated against any attempt to be up-to-date.[1] Akhtar, published as a weekly in Istanbul and with a large local readership, could afford to carry news of local and world events and material, such as bond issue prices and market reports, of immediate interest to merchants. Qanun could not.[2]

It was not so much a newspaper as a political pamphlet, designed to arouse in Persians a sense of their country's backwardness and of the government's corruption, oppression, mismanagement and immoral behaviour; to create in the country a powerful demand for reform; to mould this demand into an organized, if clandestine movement; and to

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of those arrested are given on pp. 343-4 and 373.

1 After the 7th issue, Qanun no longer carried a date of publication and in the 14th issue it boasted: "They still think that Qanun is a newspaper whose news will grow stale and useless if it does not arrive by post. They have not yet understood that whether Qanun arrives by post or by pack animal, whether today or next year, its material will always be fresh."

2 Malkam was advised frequently by Mirza Aqa Khan, who had worked for Akhtar, to include in Qanun items "about the politics of other states, the science of the wealth of nations, commerce and new, important, wondrous and useful inventions." It was advice he always ignored.

direct the efforts of this movement towards certain specific ends.

It reflected Malkam's growing conviction that the shah and his immediate officials would not adopt a new course unless forced to do so by a broad movement of opposition and a demand from below and particularly from the educated classes for change. As conceived by Malkam, such a movement presupposed unity and a degree of agreement among different elements of the population as to the nature of their grievances, the means which should be adopted to seek redress, and the goals towards which the movement should work. Thus posed, the task at hand was to find the means to over-ride sectarian, geographical and social differences, to create a strong community of feeling in an area and over issues where it was weak or non-existent.

The content of Qanun was determined to a large degree by these considerations: it sought to serve as a broad umbrella under which as many individuals and groups as possible could come together. This intention is evident not only in the content but also in the tone and style of the paper. In style, Qanun was clear, simple and easily accessible to a wider audience. It marked a further simplification of the already much simplified Persian Malkam had been writing in his official despatches. As in his political essays the vocabulary was drawn largely from daily usage and, Qur'anic or hadith quotations aside, was largely free from Arabic. The sentences were short, each expressing a basic and simple idea.

The material itself often appeared either in a question and answer form, almost like a catechism, with each question designed to elicit a small amount of additional and

easily absorbable information; or it was presented in the form of a series of variations on two or three basic ideas. The repetitive style of many single issues was a feature of Qanun as a whole during its five-year existence. The tone of the paper tended in time to grow more radical and the emphasis to shift as the appreciation of political realities grew. But Qanun throughout confined itself to a limited number of themes which had been introduced in the first few issues. This made the paper a highly effective organ for propaganda and public education.

The search for a broad consensus is also reflected in Qanun's attitude to personalities. The paper retained over the years its hostility to Amin es-Soltan. But after the early issues, Malkom abandoned the practice of picking out particular individuals for special praise and attention. He quickly discovered that this could be a divisive rather than a unifying tactic. Those given special mention were annoyed at having become objects of the Shah's suspicions. Those not mentioned resented the elevation of a rival to prominence or took Malkom to task for favouring persons they considered dishonest or reprehensible.[1] It thus became standard practice for Qanun to make few references to individuals, and to claim that it was concerned with principles and not with personalities.

In pursuing this line, Malkom was also motivated by the desire to protect his own vulnerable position. His Armenian background was not easily forgotten. He had at one time enjoyed a reputation as a free-thinker and a man of no

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[1] Amin ed-Dowleh to Malkom, 6 Zi Hajjeh [1307]/24 July [1890], S.P. 1997/127; and same to same, 16 Zi Hajjeh [1308]/23 July [1891], S.P. 1997/120.

religion. His early connections with the farāmūshkhānah had brought charges of irreligion and republicanism. 'All these accusations were now revived to discredit Malkam.[1] He thus sought, very early in Qānūn's life, to play down the matter of personalities where the paper's own staff was concerned. Questions as to the identity of the paper's editor and publisher and the source of its ideas were dismissed as irrelevant. The suggestion that a single individual abroad wrote Qānūn was termed erroneous. "The writer of these issues," Qānūn revealed, "is the people of Iran."[2]

If Malkam did occasionally mention names of leading officials in later issues, his motives were different. He sought in this way to show dissension in the royal entourage by suggesting that courtiers close to the shah were secretly sympathetic to Qānūn's cause; and he wished to create the impression that there was large scale conversion in the court and government to the reform camp. Thus names were mentioned indiscriminately, in large numbers and included often known enemies of Malkam.[3]

Many other items in Qānūn were designed to reinforce the impression that the country as a whole was rallying to the principles advocated by the paper. Qānūn published (often fictitious) letters and reports allegedly coming from major

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1 See the attacks on Malkam printed in the official newspaper Ittilā' and enclosed in translation in Kennedy to Salisbury, No. 84, Tehran, March 30, 1891, FO 60/522.

2 Qānūn, Nos. 11 and 16.

3 Qānūn, No. 28; the issue names some two dozen leading officials, merchants and princes as sympathetic to Qānūn and credits a number of them with making financial contributions to the cause of ādamiyyat. The information is attributed to an alleged report on the ādamiyyat movement presented to the shah by a courtier which Qānūn pretends to reprint without comment.

cities and towns all over Persia and even from Iranians in Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, India, the Caucasus and Afghanistan criticising the government, praising Qanun and reporting the activities of pro-Qanun groups. To buttress the claim that Qanun spoke for the whole nation, this correspondence was attributed to princes, ministers, courtiers, merchants, religious leaders, accountants and ordinary people. Cryptic messages or instructions to persons identified by code names only suggested that Qanun's agents were everywhere.[1] Particular efforts were made to undermine the loyalty of the army, from whose officers alleged declarations were printed complaining of arrears in pay and maladministration and announcing refusal by the troops to assist the government in oppressing the people.[2]

The assertion that the inhabitants of the entire country were united behind Qanun lent to the pages of the newspaper certain nationalist overtones. In addition to frequent use of the word millat, and its derivatives milliyyat and milli (to signify 'nation', 'nationality' and 'national'), Qanun often issued appeals in the name of the people of Iran or asked its readers to drew up a 'national plan'. These signs of a nascent nationalism were less pronounced in Qanun than in other writings of the period; but the paper devoted its entire attention to the problems of Persia itself and gave little or no space to what was taking place elsewhere.

The paper, for example, displayed relative indifference to European opinion or to the attitude of the great powers.[3] This represented a departure from Malkam's earlier

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1 Qanun, Nos. 22, 23 and 27.

2 Qanun, Nos. 14 and 20.

3 For these few references to the European powers, see Qanun, Nos. 17, 22 and 28.

eagerness to win British support for reform in Persia and reflected a new-found conviction that it was from within Persia itself that pressure for reform must come.

Malkam also appears to have attached little importance to the project for Islamic unity under the aegis of the sultan Abdulhamid II that Afghani began to promote from Istanbul after 1892. At least one of Afghani's Persian collaborators in this scheme, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, was also closely associated with Malkam in promoting Qanun. Kermani had attempted to serve as a link between Malkam and the sultan and to secure financial assistance for Qanun from Abdulhamid.[1] Malkam thus had reason to wish to flatter the sultan and to pay at least lip service to his Pan-Islamic schemes. But apart from the occasional reference to the idea of Islamic unity and scattered instances of praise for Abdulhamid, Qanun paid little attention to the question. This was due in part to Malkam's conviction that the combination of temporal and spiritual leadership in the person of the sultan stood in the way of reform in Turkey and his belief that sunni Islam was less flexible on the issue of reform than shi'i Islam.[2]

To promote his aims for the reform of Persian government and society, Malkam sought through the pages of Qanun

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1 Kermani to Malkam, S.P. 1996/84.

2 References to the Ottoman Sultan and to Islamic unity occur in Qanun, Nos. 16, 17, 18 and 27. Malkam's views on the different roles of religion in Persia and the Ottoman Empire are recorded in Lord Cross's memorandum on a conversation with Malkam Khan, dated 26 February 1887, in FO 60/490, cited in the previous chapter, and also in Qanun, No. 26, discussed later in the present chapter. For other evaluations of the pan-Islamic issue, see Algar, Religion and State, pp. 227-229; and Nikki Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism" (paper read at the annual convention of the American Historical Association, New York, 1966).

to bring about the creation of a particular type of political organization which he called the jam'e-e adamiyyat, or League of Humanity. This almost certainly represented a revival of the scheme for a 'religion of humanity' of which he had spoken to Blunt and which he had attempted to introduce through the agency of his faramushkhaneh before his expulsion from Persia in 1861.

In the faramushkhaneh, however, Malkam was elaborating his ideas behind closed doors to a select and elite audience. In Qanun three decades later he was attempting to spread very much these same ideas to what was perhaps still a somewhat select but nevertheless a much larger audience. This change of tactics was dictated partly by Malkam's changed circumstances and partly by his search for a broader base on which to build a movement in support of his ideas. It suggests perhaps that a broader constituency on which to build had come into existence. The more varied and diffuse audience to which Malkam was now speaking may also have influenced somewhat the form and language in which he presented his ideas.

Malkam, it will be recalled, had in 1872 described to Akhundzadeh the seven duties man had to fulfill in order to achieve perfection and become the adam-e kamel or complete human being. These duties, he had said, were among the subjects discussed at the faramushkhaneh. He now through the pages of Qanun called on each of his readers to become an adam--a human being--and he set down, with only slight variation, almost precisely the same duties incumbent on such a person: to eschew evil, to do good, to fight oppression, to promote unity among his fellow men, to seek knowledge, to promote the principles of adamiyyat and to pursue these ends through an

order or system (nazm).[1]

Malkom explained this last point to mean that men must come together for the fulfillment of their aims through a network of adamiyyat societies.[2] In several issues of Qanun Malkom set down in great detail the organizational structure and procedures his followers were to adopt in forming these societies. Once a man had declared himself to be an adam and undertook to uphold the principles of adamiyyat, it was his duty to join an existing adamiyyat society or to seek like-minded friends and form such a society himself. The members of each society were to elect from among themselves the most learned and capable individual (the a'lam) as their leader, or amin.

Each amin was to run his society and also to act as a link between his own organization and the amins of other adamiyyat societies. The amins in each province were required, in turn, to form a provincial society (majlis-e sadar-e adamiyyat) headed by another elected official (the vali-ye velayat). The provincial societies were, finally, to come under the direction of a national organization (the kursi-ye 'adl), headed by the leader (the mazhar-e a'zam) of the entire adamiyyat organization.[3]

Members were required to take an oath to uphold the principles of adamiyyat, to remain devoted to their amins and their colleagues and to make a regular financial contribution, however small, to their society. The societies were required

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1 Malkom's essay, quoted in Azadi, pp. 210-212, and Qanun, No. 11. For a comparison with his remarks to Akhundzadeh, see p. 24 above.

2 Azadi, p. 212.

3 Qanun, Nos. 11, 21, 25, 28.

to discuss, in confidence but with complete freedom, ways to spread learning, justice and brotherhood, and to further propogate the adamiyyat system; they were also to use their funds for this purpose.[1]

Malkam was clearly intent on winning as many of the educated classes as possible to a general commitment to change. Looking for a type of organization that could be easily joined, easily established and difficult to identify, he purposely left the structure of the adamiyyat societies loose, the ideology general, the duties diffuse. The act of becoming an adam was itself made very simple. One had only to declare himself to be one, with the statement, 'I am an adam'. This declaration of faith, like the Muslim shahadat, was to be taken by other adherents at face value and not questioned unless the individual proved otherwise by his actions.

There was a political motive too behind this looseness of structure and ideology. As Malkam explained in one of the issues of Qanun, men could be prosecuted for declaring themselves to be Babis, Ja'faris, Shaykhis, or adherents of other creeds. "But what creature exists who will prosecute the people crying, 'why have you become human beings?' And on the other hand, what dishonourable fool exists who, fearing arrest, would declare, 'I am not a human being?'"[2]

Little is known about the extent to which adamiyyat societies were organized and active during the period before Naser ad-Din shah's death. The high levels of the organizational structure, at the provincial and national level described in Qanun, certainly expressed little more than wishful thinking

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1 Qanun, Nos. 11 and 25.

2 Qanun, No. 26.

on Malkam's part and did not come into existence. It was the small, single society organized at the local level that lay within the realm of possibility and on which Malkam laid the greatest emphasis; and it is not improbable that groups began to meet informally in the 1890's along the lines suggested by Malkam in Qanun.

For the period from 1906 onwards, there are records of the activities of a jam'e-e adamiyyat centred in Tehran, with four branches in the capital and at least three more in different provincial centres.[1] Other secret societies that began to meet in various parts of the country after 1906, and which played an important role in preparing the ground for the Constitutional movement, did not bear the name of adamiyyat; but it seems likely they were partly inspired by the guidelines laid down by Malkam Khan.[2]

From the very earliest issues, Malkam sought to give Qanun an Islamic colouring and to identify adamiyyat with Islam. Through the columns of Qanun, he characterized the government as ungodly and its acts as unislamic. He charged officials with selling the country to the unbeliever. He described the cause of adamiyyat as holy and support for it as a religious duty incumbent on all Muslims.

Whether unconsciously or by design, Malkam's adamiyyat societies also bore a certain resemblance to Islamic and especially to sufi orders. The initial act of becoming an adam, for example, required an internal conversion which,

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1 Azadi, pp. 219 and 225.

2 For a discussion of the post-1906 secret societies see Lambton, "Secret Societies and the Persian Revolution of 1905-1906", St. Antony's Papers, IV (1958), 43-60.

it was suggested, would be preceded by a sudden realization of where the true path lay. There was some suggestion that the adem, in the same way as the sufi, would pass through different levels of understanding and spirituality.

The amins often appeared to take on the attributes of a sufi pir or morshed. Qanun described them as teachers and guides; required that they be served hand and foot by the adherents of adamiyyat and be obeyed in all things; suggested that the 'ulama were the true amins of adamiyyat and hinted that they possessed secret, esoteric knowledge. Qanun also employed the vocabulary common to sufi orders to describe the adamiyyat societies. It often referred to the association as a selseleh, echoing the idea of a chain of authorities by which sufi orders trace their origin back to 'Ali; in sufi fashion, it called the adamiyyat society a tariqeh; and it foresaw the eventual establishment of a dowlat-e haqq, 'the kingdom of truth,' and the dawning of a new and golden era.[1]

In addition to these general allusions, Qanun made the more explicit assertion that adamiyyat derived its inspiration from Islam, constituted the practical application of Islamic principles and was based on beliefs identical to those of Islam.

> What are our beliefs [Qanun asked]? Our beliefs are those which we have made as clear as the sun on every page of Qanun. We have made the wisdom of the 'ulama of Islam the teacher and spiritual guide (morshed) of our humanity. In the world of adamiyyat, we have not a single new word to say . . . We worship whatever is considered the truth according to the learning of the 'ulama of Islam. We reject and condemn from the bottom of our hearts

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[1] Qanun, Nos. 16, 21, 24 and 29.

> whichever phrase in our statements that is not precisely in accordance with Islam.[1]

In keeping with other Islamic modernist movements of our time, with whose literature Malkom may have become familiar, Qanun treated the shari'a as the repository of all the wisdom, science, law, justice and reform (tanzimat) necessary to ensure the progress and well-being of mankind. It argued that Persia had no need to turn to Europe for its laws, reforms and other requisites of modern civilization. "The steamship, the telegraph, the good order of foreign lands, all the progress of the world," Qanun asserted, "is but the fruit of the light of Islam."[2]

Underlying this attempt to identify Islam with reform was Malkom's conviction that the changes he was proposing would be unacceptable unless falling within the compass of religion.[3] As he had remarked to Blunt of his earlier reform efforts, "I was determined to clothe my material reformation in a garb which my people would understand, the garb of religion." Malkam believed that reform had failed in the Ottoman empire because it was so obviously of European inspiration; and he felt that in Persia too reform would never take root unless it were seen to derive from Islam.

Addressing a European in one of the issues of Qanun, Malkam charged European states with two errors in relation to Islamic states. The first was to confuse the absolutism of the East with European absolutism and to believe that the former was as enlightened as the latter.

> Your second error is that when you want

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1 Qanun, No. 11.
2 Qanun, No. 21.
3 Qanun, No. 25.

> to be the initiators of progress in our kingdoms, you hold up the customs of Europe as an example to us. This approach is totally wrong. In the kingdoms of Islam any order that comes from abroad will have neither root nor fruit. Why did the Ottoman government, despite all the support of your governments, derive no benefit from its reforms? Because the Ottoman ministers wanted to bring the reforms from Europe, and this is impossible. In the kingdoms of Islam good order must of necessity arise from Islam itself.[1]

These same considerations led Allan to attempt to win the 'ulama over to his cause. Even before the tobacco protest movement demonstrated the power of the 'ulama and their ability to rouse the populace Allan had suggested in Qanun that the followers of adamiyyat looked to the 'ulama to lead the movement for reform. The reports printed in the newspaper of alleged political activities in Persia invariably listed the 'ulama as among the prominent members, and often as the leaders, or amins, of the adamiyyat societies, describing them as holding the highest positions in the movement and constituting the most learned and respected of those involved in adamiyyat activities.

Qanun urged its followers to honour and protect them, to look to them for guidance at all times and especially in moments of danger, and to recognize that their fortunes were bound up with those of the 'ulama.[2] It assigned to them a major role in any future institution charged with establishing a new order in Persia. It often asserted the readiness of adamiyyat's adherents to follow the dictates of the shi'i divine whom the 'ulama would jointly recognize as their leader.[3]

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1 Qanun, No. 36.
2 Qanun, Nos. 11, 17, 21 and 22.
3 Qanun, No. 29.

In seeking to win the cooperation of the 'ulama Malkam was assisted to a degree by Jamal ad-Din Afghani and to a greater extent by Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani. Afghani had joined Malkam in London after he had been expelled from Persia early in 1891. There he had worked with Malkam writing and attacking the shah's government and issuing some of his declarations through Qanun. He left London late in 1891 and went, at the sultan's invitation, to Istanbul, where he began working to forward Abdulhamid's scheme for Islamic unity. From Istanbul he occasionally sent Malkam advice on approaches he might make to the 'ulama.

The medium for Afghani's communications with Malkam from Istanbul was Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani. Mirza Aqa Khan came from a family of small landowners in Kerman. He had quit his native village in the early 1830's after a quarrel with the governor of the province and had gone to Isfahan where he remained some two years in the service of Zell os-Soltan. In 1886 or thereabouts he made his way from Tehran to Istanbul where he remained in self-imposed exile until shortly before his execution by the Persian authorities in 1896.[1]

In Istanbul, Kermani made his living by writing for Akhter, teaching, translating and copying books. He had contacts among the translators to sultan Abdulhamid and knew several of the Ottoman ministers and high-ranking officials, including Wonif Pasha, Reza Pasha (the minister of justice) and Yusef Reza Pasha (head of the immigration department), having

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[1] For brief biographies of Kermani, see translation of the preface to Hasht Behesht in Nikki Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism", Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1962), 265-295; and Adamiyyat, Andisheh-ha-ye Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (Tehran, 1346/1967-8), pp. 1-35.

instructed the latter two in Persian. He associated for a period with the Persian ambassador, Mo'in ol-Molk; he had wide contacts with the Persian merchant community in Istanbul; and he knew by name, if not personally, Persian merchant families in centres such as Baghdad, Cairo, Bombay and the Caucasus. He also appears to have maintained a correspondence with a circle of associates in Persia itself, chiefly among persons who seem to have shared his dissatisfaction with the existing regime in Persia.

When copies of _Qanun_ began to arrive in Istanbul, Kermani wrote to Malkam, introduced himself, expressed enthusiastic approval, and offered his services. Over the ensuing five or six years, Kermani was engaged in a number of activities on behalf of Malkam. Not personally a man of wealth, influence or high social standing, he was nevertheless well-placed to act as the link between _Qanun_ and those others in Turkey, Iraq, Persia and elsewhere who might be drawn into or were already actively engaged in similar activities.

Kermani provided Malkam with lists of persons in and out of Persia who had asked for _Qanun_ or whom he considered potential subscribers. He distributed the copies of _Qanun_ that Malkam sent him to Persians in Istanbul and posted other copies to individuals in Persia. He supplied Malkam with news of events in Persia for inclusion in _Qanun_. He tried to win converts to the cause of _adamiyyat_ among Persians who passed through Istanbul on their way to pilgrimages to Mecca.[1] He was also the initiator of a number of moves directed at the _shi'i 'ulama_ resident in the holy places in Iraq.

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[1] For examples of these activities, see Kermani's letters to Malkam in F.P. 1096/73, 88, 110 and 113-2.

Kermani had little admiration for the religious leaders, whom he described as "the stupid and ossified 'ulama," when he began his correspondence with Malkam Khan.[1] He nevertheless felt that the 'ulama remained at least "half-alive" in a country where all had grown indifferent and unable to act, and he suggested to Malkam the advisability of seeking in limited fashion their cooperation in furthering the cause of adamiyyat.[2] Kermani's attitude to the 'ulama grew more positive as they asserted their leadership over the tobacco protest movement, and he urged Malkam to speak well in Qanun of Mirza Hasan Shirazi and the other 'ulama, since "in truth they have become worthy of praise."[3]

In the months that followed, Kermani, working sometimes on his own and sometimes in cooperation with other Persians in Istanbul, attempted to assist Malkam in shaping an effective attitude for Qanun to adopt towards the 'ulama. Kermani based his suggestions on information he gathered, sometimes directly, sometimes through contacts, on 'ulama attitudes. These suggestions in part confirmed the policy already adopted by Malkam in Qanun. In part they were intended to overcome the resistance of the 'ulama to becoming involved in politics, to assure them that change would not necessarily lead to an unacceptable degree of violence, and to secure from them an official and public condemnation of the existing regime in Persia.

Kermani, for instance, transmitted to Malkam Khan a suggestion by Afghani that Malkam devote a special issue of

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1 Kermani to Malkam, S.P. 1996/82.
2 Same to same, S.P. 1996/128.
3 Same to same, S.P. 1996/118-17.

Qanun explaining the principles of adamiyyat and underlining the benefits of Islamic unity to the 'ulama of Najaf and Karbala. In order to stir to action Mirza Hasan Ashtiani, the shi'i leader in whose name the fatva proclaiming the ban on smoking tobacco had been issued in 1891, Malkam was specifically to ask:

> Why should a great personage like Hajj Mirza Mohammad Hasan, whom today 50 million shi'a all over the world regard as the deputy of the Imam, not do something so that, at least like the Pope of Italy, ambassadors should be sent to him from all the states and remain there? Why should he today be of so little standing that the mutasarref of Samarra should neither attach any importance to him nor recognize him?[1]

In due course, this item appeared almost word for word in Qanun along with a harsh condemnation on religious grounds of the regime in Persia.[2]

Kermani also reported to Malkam a project proposed by a number of Persians in Istanbul to secure a fatva on a minor matter from Mirza Hasan Shirazi, and then to transfer Shirazi's signature by photography to another fatva declaring "the payment of taxes to these cruel oppressors to be hereafter forbidden, a great sin and a great transgression."[3] Kermani refused to go along with this scheme. He found unconvincing the argument of its would-be perpetrators that a 'legal lie' is permissable in the public interest.

On the other hand, when a group of Persian merchants at the Ottoman capital asked Kermani to draw up for them an appeal to Shirazi urging him to follow up his initiative on

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1 Same to same, B.F. 1996/110.

2 Qanun, No. 29.

3 Kermani to Malkam, B.F. 1996/110.

the tobacco issue with a campaign to correct other abuses in Persia, Kermani was quick to let Malkam know and asked him to write the letter himself:

> I replied [to the merchants] that I must draw it up thoughtfully and with care and asked for time. I beg you quickly to send me a draft of this petition so that, having written [ie copied] it, I should hand it over and they should despatch it to Tamara.[1]

It is probably this same document that appeared in the twentieth issue of Qanun as an open letter addressed to Shirazi by 'the Persian exiles in Istanbul'. The letter praised Shirazi for securing the cancellation of the tobacco monopoly. But describing the régie as "only one per cent" of the oppression visited by the regime on the Persian nation, it called on Shirazi and the other 'ulama to show by their words and actions that poverty and backwardness are now characteristic of Islam and that "to the same extent that Islam comprehends good fortune in the after-life, so it must be the spur to development and the nurturer of progress in this world."[2]

This same issue took up in expanded and generalized form the idea that the 'ulama should be induced to declare the payment of taxes to the government a violation of Islamic principles. Qanun urged the leading 'ulama to issue a fatva and

> announce from the mosques of Iran that the implementation of the commands of tyranny violates spirit of Islam, destroys the well-being of the world and calls forth the wrath of God . . . The destruction of the foundation of tyranny, the breaking of the chains of slavery, and the revival of religion and the state depend on this one divine fatva.[3]

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1 Same to same, S.P. 1096/86.

2 Qanun, No. 20.

3 Ibid.

The 'ulama at the holy places in Iraq were not wholly inactive in the period following the successful campaign for the cancellation of the tobacco concession. They appear to have at least discussed the possibility of further moves against the Persian government.[1] They also maintained some contact with 'ulama in Persia itself and there was an effort to coordinate protest activities on at least one issue.[2] These activities were of some concern to Persia and the shah attempted, to induce the Ottoman government to secure undertakings from the 'ulama in Iraq to refrain from interfering in political matters.[3]

However it is clear from the Kermani-Malkam correspondence that the 'ulama on the whole remained reluctant to become deeply involved in a serious movement against the government. The reasons for such reluctance were made at least partly clear in a lengthy discussion Kermani held in Istanbul with Aqa Shaykh 'Ali, the son of the late Shaykh Ja'far, one of the 'ulama in Iraq. Kermani wrote Malkam of this conversation:

> The fear that this person has--and it is clear that the 'ulama there [in Najaf and Karbala] are victim to this same fear--is that if there is a change in the situation of the monarchy and the government, and especially if the 'ulama interfere, then . . . no one will be able to handle the affairs of the kingdom, politics and foreign relations, and that foreigners will gain control. For the 'ulama know nothing of politics and are incapable of handling [them]. These present ministers aside, no others have been trained. [He] is afraid matters will go from bad to worse, and that the state and the kingdom will be altogether

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1 Kermani to Malkam, F.O. 1996/66.

2 Same to same, F.O. 1996/73.

3 Ibid.

scattered to the winds.[1]

Kermani advised Malkam to use Qanun to quieten these fears, to suggest to the 'ulama that their learning, piety and patriotism suited them far better for government than Persia's incumbent and inept officials, and to reassure them that if they were to participate but two months in political affairs, "each, given this natural ability, learning and maturity, will far excel even Prince Bismarck and Lord Salisbury."[2] Shortly after Malkam received this letter, an item appeared in Qanun citing two 'misconceptions' that allegedly permitted the existing system of government in Persia to survive. The first misconception, common among the people, was that things simply could not be otherwise.

> The second misconception is that some uninformed mollas say that if these ministers are removed then there will be no one left to talk to foreign governments and that then all will be lost. God save us from ignorance! . . . We have two hundred students of Dar el-Fonun who can give a decade of lessons to our great ministers . . . In every branch of affairs they have committed all possible errors to cause Iran's ruin . . . Yet they [the ill-informed mollas] want to make Iran's survival dependent on such persons. Why should we think Persia so denuded? Among these very [government] officials, among these very mollas of ours, there are men who can be the pride of the state.[3]

The anxieties entertained by the 'ulama in regard to the repercussions of a concerted campaign of opposition were reiterated in a somewhat different context by Shaykh Mirza Saleh, the keeper of the keys (Kelid-dar) at the shrine in Karbala, who had come to Istanbul on business and whom Kermani

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1 Kermani to Malkam, n.d. 1096/66.

2 Ibid.

3 Qanun, No. 4.

was able to befriend and to engage in a lengthy discussion. It would appear from this discussion that Kermani was attempting to involve the 'ulama in a move to secure not only a change of ministers but the overthrow of Naser ed-Din Shah himself, while the 'ulama were fearful lest, in such an eventuality, the country be left leaderless or fall to an even more oppressive ruler. This is the import of an extremely guarded letter on Shaykh Saleh's remarks that Kermani sent to Malkam.

> He [Saleh] states that if one of the princes pledges that he will act in keeping with the interests of the nation, then the 'ulama will easily cooperate. For these 'ulama of ours have not the independence of spirit to take the initiative themselves without such an [assurance]. But they are themselves now to a degree prepared, so that if we are able to count on one of the princes, they will opt for change [of the ruler].[1]

This exchange led Kermani to seek to find himself a prince who would be acceptable to the 'ulama; he attempted to make an approach to Zell os-Soltan. Kermani had long looked to the Zell as a possible collaborator in a move to bring about a change in the system of government in Persia. In one of his early letters to Malkam, he had described Zell os-Soltan as 'the most suitable' means through which to advance the cause of adamiyyat. He suggested that Malkam write to trustworthy persons in the Zell's camp "to encourage him in the necessary way, albeit in a very secret manner so that fear should not get the better of him; for he is very cautious and, given his ambitions, does not wish to set tongues wagging."[2]

Returning to the subject in a slightly later letter, Kermani wrote to Malkam:

> The essential point and the heart of the

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1 Kermani to Malkam, S.P. 1996/107.
2 Same to same, S.P. 1996/92.

> matter is this: His Highness Zell es-Soltan is very suited to the furtherance of your plans. [Your] people in Iran must send a representative to him to give him assurances and make an agreement and an alliance. After that, he will act as you instruct.[1]

To carry out this mission to Isfahan, Kermani proposed the names of 'Tahir Effendi' (presumably the publisher of Akhtar) or Hajj Sayyah who, as will be recalled, had spent some time in Zell es-Soltan's service. Either of these, Kermani said, could go to Isfahan ostensibly to request financial assistance for Akhtar and to use the opportunity to sound the Zell out.

Salkam does not appear to have acted on Kermani's suggestions. But following his conversation with Shaykh Salah, Kermani decided to take the initiative himself. He had himself served the prince in Isfahan and was acquainted with members of the Zell's camp. He now wrote to one of these friends, hinted that something important was in the offing, and asked that a trustworthy person be sent on Zell's behalf from Isfahan to Istanbul for discussions. Kermani told Salkam he was expecting such a person to pass through Istanbul on his way to Mecca within a month.[2]

The names of some of the individuals involved in this project cropped up some years later, during the interrogation of Mirza Reza Kermani, the assassin of Naser ad-Din shah. Denying that Hajj Sayyah was one of his collaborators in the assassination, Mirza Reza was quoted as saying:

> No, Hajji Sayyah is an irresolute egotist: he never rendered me any help or service, although he profited by the occasion to make the water muddy so that he might catch

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1 Same to same, S.I. 1996, 120.

2 Ibid.

> fish for the Zillu's-Sultan. His idea was that perhaps this Prince might become King, and the Amin'ud-Dowla Prime Minister, and that he himself might accumulate some wealth . . .[1]

The material presently available does not indicate that Malkam ever took up Kermānī's suggestion that he set up Zell os-Soltān as claimant to the throne, and the Kermānī-Malkam correspondence is silent on Malkam's reaction to the scheme. In the existing letters from the Zell to Malkam, there is a considerable gap dating from shortly after Zell os-Soltān's fall in 1888 to after the Constitutional revolution in 1906. There is at present also no evidence that the Zell reacted positively to Kermānī's overtures, and Hājj Sayyāh makes no mention of the subject in his memoirs. Mīrzā Reżā's testimony indicates, however, that the idea of putting Zell os-Soltān on the throne was in the air. It is evidence of the Zell's lingering reputation as an able ruler and a supporter of reform and of the concept, prevalent among the Qajar reformers, that political change, whether gradual or sweeping, would have to come from above.

Malkam was meanwhile setting down in Qānūn his own blueprint for the political transformation of Persia. Against the background of the growing arbitrariness of the shah's rule, he called for laws guaranteeing the security of life, property and honour of the inhabitants. "Without law," he wrote, "there is no security, and without security, life is impossible."[2] As he had done in his official despatches, he

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1 Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (new impression, London, 1966), p. 76.

2 Qānūn, No. 11.

emphasized the benefits of the rule of law, which he now described as the source of all national strength and progress.

> In a country where there is law . . . famine and scarcity will be abolished; the blessings of life will be plentiful; the treasuries of the nation will be built up; the schools will be full of knowledge; the officials of the government will be all learned . . . the troops will be well-ordered; the rights of all men will be well-protected; lawful pleasures the lot of everyone.[1]

Whereas in the past Malkum had viewed reform as requiring the extension of government control over the country and had himself played a role under Qoshair od-Dowleh in the attempt to centralize provincial, judicial, financial and military affairs, he now laid much greater emphasis on the need for checks on governmental authority. Increasingly, he regarded the immediate task to lie in protecting the individual against the power of the state.

He spoke with growing frequency of the rights of the nation. He urged the establishment of governmental bodies staffed not by government officials as in the past but by persons whom he regarded as in some fashion representative of the people and the guardians of their rights. In speaking of the traditional three branches of government, he described the legislative and executive powers along lines common in Europe political literature. But he substituted for the judicial power the qodrat-e moraqebat-e ejra-ye qanun, or 'the power to supervise the implementation of the law.'[2]

This was a power which he had vested in the shah in his earliest essays, and which he had suggested the monarch

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1 Ibid.

2 Qanun, No. 24.

would exercise through a kind of intendant (the vakil-e qanun) appointed by himself. He now treated this power as residing in the people themselves and he urged them to exercise it, as had the members of the early Islamic umma, by involving themselves in the day-to-day political affairs of the country, ensuring the implementation of the laws and protesting against any act of injustice.[1]

To draw up and ensure the proper implementation of the laws, Na'ini urged in Tanbih the establishment of a consultative body which was to represent the people as a whole. This body Na'ini called the majlis-e showra-ye kobra-ye melli, or 'the great national consultative assembly'--almost the exact formula used in naming the Persian parliament established under the Constitution of 1906.

This majlis bore little resemblance to the consultative councils he had recommended earlier in his career; its duties and powers were based on different concepts. The majlis[2] was to be considerably larger than the earlier councils and to include at least 7[illegible] persons. Its members were not confined to persons drawn from the cabinet and the bureaucracy but were to include a much wider spectrum of leaders from different spheres of life. Na'ini identified these, in scattered references, as being drawn from the 'ulama, the military leaders, the learned, and the great men (bozorgan), in other words those who were, in some way or other, recognized as the leading members of society. They were to come not from Tehran alone but were to include leading figures from the

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1 Ibid.

2 The organization and powers of the assembly are spelled out in a number of issues of Tanbih. See Nos. 2, 18, 22 and 35.

provinces as well.

The power to make laws was to reside exclusively in the majlis-e showrā-ye kobrā-ye mellī. Such legislation was to cover every sphere of governmental affairs, including the designation of the number, functions and powers of the ministers, and the positions, salaries and duties of other members of the civil service; the establishment of courts; and commerce, agriculture and the army. The most important function and power of the majlis was described as the authority to review the annual budget and thus to control both government taxation and expenditure. Ministers were to be appointed by the shah but were responsible to the majlis and could not act without its authorization. The majlis was empowered to commit to trial ministers who violated the law.

The majlis was to draw up its own internal regulations and to choose its own president or chairman; its members were to enjoy freedom of speech inside the chamber and immunity from arrest for activities both inside and outside the chamber, unless the chamber itself waived this privilege. Members were to receive a salary commensurate with their high station.

In the early issues of Qānūn Malkom suggested that the national assembly would grow out of the existing council of ministers (the darbār-e a'zam) with the shah acting, if not as midwife, then at least as an approving onlooker at its birth. This implied that the assembly would be an extension of, and receive its authority from, existing governmental institutions. In later issues of Qānūn, however, he foresaw the birth of the assembly in a different set of circumstances. He predicted that the existing government would be ousted by a mass movement of the inhabitants of Tehran, led by the 'ulamā;

and when asked what would then happen painted a scenario that came surprisingly close to forseeing the course of events that preceded the calling of Persia's constituent assembly in 1906:

> Then now the task for that day is fixed, detail by detail. We will immediately collect together in the Shah Mosque the members of the [existing] _darbar-e a'zam_ and those _'ulama_, military officers and certain individuals whose names are registered in our plan notebook. That very day, we will proclaim to all the world in a _fatwa_ from the _'ulama_ those principles that we had some time ago prepared for the ordering of affairs . . . Then, without delay, the _mujtahids_ of the provinces, the _'ulama_ of the _'atabat_, the great men (_bozorgan_), the military officers, the wise men (_'oqala_) of the people (_qawm_) will appear from all the provinces of Persia; and at the capital they will convene a _majlis-e showra-ye kubra-ye melli_. They will publish and cause to be promulgated in complete independence all those laws, penalties, rights, councils and arrangements necessary for the administration of affairs.[1]

This suggests that the assembly would be the fruit of a movement by the people, that it would be called into being by the leaders of society (among whom government officials were included) and that it would be convened by representatives of all the different classes coming to Tehran from all parts of the country. Its legitimacy would appear to derive not from any act of the shah but from steps undertaken by representatives of the leading classes acting for the people as a whole. In later issues of _qanun_, Malkam spoke not of one chamber, but two: an upper house composed of the learned and mature members of the society, and alongside it 'the assembly of the representatives of the nation,' which would be elected by the people

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[1] _Qanun_, No. 22.

themselves.[1]

Qanun's attitude to Naser ad-Din shah also tended to grow increasingly outspoken over time. In the early issues of the paper, the shah was criticised only mildly and chiefly for giving power to a person such as Amin os-Soltan and surrounding himself with mediocrities.[2] He was treated as well-meaning and personally in favour of reform, but a dupe of his ministers and other court flatterers.[3] But even such gentle criticism was rare and was accompanied by pledges of loyalty and denials of any intention to insult the monarch whose person was declared to be sacred.[4]

In time, however, Qanun subjected Naser ad-Din shah increasingly to personal attacks. It questioned the very legitimacy of his rule and predicted the inevitability of his downfall. In issuing this challenge to the shah's authority, Malkom made use of Islamic arguments. In a later issue of Qanun he described the shi'i concept of the imamate as 'the key' to the situation in Persia and contrasted this with the position in sunni states where, he alleged, the sultan/caliph was regarded as absolute master. Speaking through the mouth of a fictitious 'ambassador,' he remarked:

> According to the principles of the shi'i religion, the present monarchy of Persia is contrary to the principles of Islam and the shah is a usurper. On the basis of this religious belief, there are in Iran today two governments: one legal and belonging to the 'ulama of the faith, and the other usurped and named the administration of tyranny. The servants of the legal government, i.e. the mujtahids, are of necessity the enemies of this administration.

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1 Qanun, No. 25.
2 Qanun, No. 8.
3 Qanun, No. 11.
4 Qanun, No. 17.

> They under no condition accept medals or salaries from the shah. Even those Muslims who have entered the service of the monarchy regard their salaries as unclean (haram) and serving this monarch as a sin.[1]

Malkam also revived the medieval Islamic theory that sovereignty belonged by right to the most just, the most learned and the most honoured among men. This subject was broached in a fictitious conversation between several persons in which one speaker, who asserts that the shah must be honoured and respected simply because he is the shah, receives this reply from an akhund:

> I cannot understand from which principles you derive this duty. This shah is neither imam nor caliph. This is an administration which has come and usurped all our rights, abolished all the laws of God's shari'a and made the Persian nation, among all the nations of the world, more base and scattered than any group of Jews. Of what creature can you require obedience to such an administration?[2]

The akhund rejected the charge of the first speaker that the followers of qudsiyyat intended to make a mujtahid the shah of Iran. "The spiritual leader of the nation", he stated "must be far more exalted in position than the shah." When the first speaker asked what, then, was to become of the monarchy, the question was sidestepped:

> First of all, this kind of monarchy, imposed by force, stands at the opposite pole from Islam. Secondly, in this age, when all the kings on earth have become subject to a hundred scientific laws, why in this Islamic land should the ruler not be subject at least to the commandments of God?[3]

Qanun's increasingly open challenge to the regime in

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1 Qanun, No. 26.
2 Qanun, No. 29.
3 Ibid.

ersia was reflected also in the prediction of an imminent take-over of the reigns of government by the enlightened members of society. The followers of adamiyyat, ready to assume power, Qanun alleged, had prepared their list of ministers, had agreed on their programme of action, and had drawn up their plans. Such predictions wildly exaggerated the strength of the opposition movement, and, along with many of Malkam's other assertions in Qanun, may have been partly the product of his long residence abroad and loss of touch with the situation in Iran.

Such accounts are nevertheless indicative of a state of mind, an evolving political attitude. They underline Malkam's growing readiness to contemplate civil disobedience, to brand the government as illegitimate and to look to the day when the existing order would be overthrown. It was against this backgr and that he sought to assure the 'ulama that the country possessed men of ability to replace those in power and to protect the state and the religion against foreign encroachment.

Malkam, however, while prepared to go so far as to seek the dethronement of Nasir ad-Din Shah was not preaching violent upheaval. The Adamiyyat movement, for example, rejected all but 'reasonable means' for achieving its ends.[1] Qanun foresaw that 'the ship of this monarchy must sink;' but it called on all men to ensure that when the existing administration did fall, a proper government was ready to take its place 'without revolution or bloodshed.'[2] Again, a young man speaking in violent terms about the situation in Persia was

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1 Qanun, No. 17.

2 Qanun, No. 26.

told by 'a wise man:'

> The confusion in affairs is undeniable. However, it must not be forgotten that in the creed of adaniyyat, salvation lies in the appearance of Law not in the day of revolution. In this land we constitute the roots (risheh) of order, not the arc (tigheh) of disorder . . . We are the waters after the Law, not its denigrators; and to achieve the Law, we recognize the sword of the word of truth as the only permissible weapon.[1]

Malkam seemed to believe that to bring about the changes he desired it would be sufficient to encourage a mass movement of protest, led by the 'ulama and the other enlightened members of society, that would at once reject the existing government and demand a say in shaping the future system of rule in Persia. He appears to have thought, as did many of the reformers and propagandists in the years preceding the constitutional revolution,[2] that to achieve this the spread of liberal ideas and--in Malkam's case--the proliferation of organizations such as the adamiyyat societies, through which men could grow enlightened and establish a degree of unity, would be enough.

Within this context, Malkam Khan's contribution through Qanun to the Constitutional movement was considerable. He gave voice to public grievances and provided a focus for public discontent. He taught that men must involve themselves in politics and must work together to promote common ends. He provided a model, however brief, for the organization of political societies for this purpose; and he specified the goals towards which an opposition movement must direct its

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1 Qanun, no. 17.

2 Lambton, "Persia: The Breakdown of Society," Cambridge History of Islam, i, 465.

attention. Of these goals, the most important was his proposal for an elected national legislative assembly. He was the first to give this idea wide currency; and his concept of the role and powers of such an assembly appears to have exerted considerable influence on the framers of the Persian Constitution.

In pursuing these aims, Afghani sought to harness the power of the *'ulama* to the influence of religion to his cause. In the columns of *Urwa* he depicted the *shari'a* as the treasure-house from which Muslims would secure the blueprint for its salvation; he accorded to the *'ulama* the leadership role in the reform movement; and he in effect promised the religious leaders a predominant voice in the shaping of the new order in the country.

He was, in this, acting on a realization, shared by other like-minded reformers, that the masses would only respond to an appeal expressed in terms of Islam and for the restoration of just (or Islamic) government, and an awareness that only the *'ulama* could lead a popular movement.

Despite the protestations of orthodoxy, however, it is difficult to see how anyone reading *Urwa* could have come away with the impression that the paper was promulgating orthodox Islamic ideas. Afghani was, rather, promulgating a reformed version of Islam in which room had been made for his own European-inspired concepts of government. *Urwa* itself remarked in reply to a question about its defense of Islam:

> Yes, the conquest of the world is the right of Islam. But which Islam? The Islam of learning, not the Islam of ignorance; the Islam of love not the Islam of persecution; the Islam of progress, not the Islam of decline; the Islam of unity, not the Islam of division; the Islam of development, not the Islam of ruin; the Islam of reason

('aql), not the Islam of imitation (naql); the Islam of men, not the Islam of things.[1]

This studied imprecision was an integral part of Qanun, and the paper, as noted, was directed not at the masses but at the educated classes of society, those who constituted what might with caution be described as an emergent middle class. It seems safe to assume that this was an audience on whom this version of Islam, along with the new political order that Qanun was advocating, exercised a certain attraction.

There is evidence of changing attitudes towards the state, government and religion in other Persian writing of the early 1890's: for example in the work of Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, in books like Hayehatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beg and Seyah-e Ahmad, and also in material that was intended for more restricted circulation, such as the diaries of Hajj Sayyah and a private letter addressed to the crown prince by Mirza Yusef Khan Mostasher od-Dowleh.

In Istanbul, Kermani was not only collaborating with Malkom Khan and Jamal ad-Din Afghani; he was also developing and voicing his views in a number of books and essays.[2] It is possible to trace through these works the stages by which Kermani abandoned the ideas inculcated in him by a traditional type of education and gradually moved towards scepticism, disbelief and even an aggressive atheism in religion; towards rationalism and materialism in philosophy; and towards the ideas of Montesquieu and Rousseau in politics.

He also became in this process an ardent and sometimes

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1 Qanun, No. 27.

2 A full list of Kermani's writings appears in Adamiyyat, Andishehha-ye Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, pp. 37-57.

extreme nationalist, finding perhaps in his commitment to the idea of the vatan, or fatherland, the emotional fulfillment he had sought but failed to find in religion. He introduced into Persian, or at least introduced into more general use, a vocabulary of nationalism, coining a large number of terms to approximate the concepts of patrie, patriotism, nationhood, and national unity.[1] In his highly charged nationalism, he described Persia as 'father,' 'mother,' 'bride,' and 'the worshipped.' Its soil, he wrote, "is dearer than gold or silver;" its waters, like "the waters of paradise;" its frontiers "perfumed with amber." Even chronic diseases were not native to its pure air and had been brought into Persia from foreign places, like India, Arabia or Europe.[2]

Yet Kermani had little admiration for the condition of Persia in his own day. He condemned its system of government, administration, religion and even its classical literature. He looked, rather, to pre-Islamic Persia and especially to the early Achaemenian and Parthian periods, when the country was powerful and universally respected, its rulers were capable, the government was just and the people were prosperous. This happy state of affairs had failed to endure, he alleged, because of a decline in the moral character and sense of justice of the ruling class and the invasions which swept Persia, of which the most catastrophic was the Arab conquest:

> The root of each of the branches of the tree of ugly character of Persia that we touch was planted by the Arabs and its fruit sprang from the seed sown by the Arabs. All the despicable habits and

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1 Ibid., pp. 254 and 261.

2 Ibid., p. 254.

> customs of the Persians are either the legacy and testament of the Arab nation or the fruit and influence of the invasions that have occurred in Persia.[1]

The Arabs, an uneducated and barbaric people, claimed Kermani, imposed on Persia their language, whose crude alphabet was a passport to illiteracy and whose vocabulary was deficient in scientific and technical terms.[2] Even worse they had imposed on Persians, by the sword, Islam, a religion designed by Mohammad for an uncultured, thieving people. It was a religion totally unsuited to Persians who gave to Islam whatever culture and civilization it achieved by twisting its precepts and applying to it their genius.[3]

The Persians had acquired from Islam the reprehensible practice of taqlid, which demanded imitation and the suspension of reason, and taqiyyeh, which encouraged untruth among a people who had once considered falsehood the greatest sin.[4] They had learned to impose savage punishments such as the cutting off of limbs; and their rulers, since the time of the Arab kingdom, had all been tyrants who imposed their authority by violence and blood-letting.[5] Under the Arab impact, even the physiognomy of the Persians had changed; and the tall handsome Achaemenians had turned into stunted, pasty-faced hunchbacks, their energy sapped and their personalities stifled.[6]

Kermani's hostility to Islam was extended towards religion as a whole. He took at best a utilitarian view of

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1 Ibid., p. 180.
2 Ibid., pp. 112-3 and 1[illegible]-7.
3 Ibid., pp. 180-83.
4 Ibid., pp. 183-4.
5 Ibid., p. 189.
6 Ibid., p. 195.

religion, regarding it as a system of belief that had been useful to man during certain periods of his existence but progressively superfluous as civilization advanced. He asserted that it was [illegible] who had created man, but man who had created the idea of God.[1] The extreme nature of Tabrizi's nationalism with its glorification of Iran's ancient history, and the occurrence of this nationalism alongside strongly anti-Islamic and anti-Arab sentiments, makes him to a degree the follower of Akhundzadeh. In fact, he modelled his Yek Kalmeh closely on Akhundzadeh's Maktubat-e Sevvom va Chehel (see above, pp. 54-55), and it was here that he expressed his most extreme ideas.

Except perhaps for his articles in Akhtar and his political tracts, Yek Kalmeh and Sad Khatabeh, Tabrizi's writings do not appear to have found a wide audience during his own lifetime. The subject matter of much of his work--especially on philosophy and religion--was not such as to attract a wide audience. Even when he wrote on politics his theoretical bent and sometimes turgid style did not lend itself to easy reading. His hostility to Islam and his nationalism were also perhaps too extreme to appeal to that growing class of educated Persians at whom the new literature of the 1890's was directed.

Talebof's Ketab-e Ahmad and Kermani's Seh Maktubeh-ye Ebrahim Beg,[2] cast in a more popular mould, appear to reflect more nearly the views and aspirations of that growing

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1 Ibid., p. 9.

2 The editions used are Seh Maktubeh-ye Ebrahim Beg (Cairo, n.d.) and Ketab-e Ahmad, ed. [illegible] Jamalzadeh (paperback edition, Tehran, Solar 1346/1967-8).

class of educated Persians among whom Ganja also found its audience. Ketab-e Ahmad, modelled, by the author's own account, on Rousseau's Emile, describes the education of a seven-year old boy, Ahmad, by his father. His education is carried out in a series of discussions between father and son or in lengthy discourses by the father himself. The book contains a great deal of popularized physics, geography and natural history, as well as lessons in ethics and rules of decent social behaviour. In the course of this, the author introduces the reader to the material achievements and other manifestations of European civilization which he contrasts with the backwardness of Persia. It is in this sense a plea for the development and reform of the country.

Siyahatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beg purports to tell the story of Ebrahim Beg, the son of a wealthy Persian merchant resident in Cairo, who takes his father's advice to travel and on the father's death sets out on a tour of Persia, full of joyful anticipation at seeing, at long last, his homeland. He finds upon arrival that the country lacks roads, hospitals and schools; that its army is ragged, its government corrupt and its people oppressed; and that its trade is in decline and its ancient buildings falling to ruin. After a brief sojourn in the country, he returns to Cairo, a disappointed and broken man.

The two books have a great deal in common. Both were written in a simple and often idiomatic style. Both were clearly meant to entertain and in this sense designed for the general reader. Both employ a loosely fictional framework to permit the author to voice his views through the mouth of a fictitious character. The themes covered in both books are

similar. Unlike Qasem, these two books did not aim at stirring their readers to engage in specific political activity. But both were intended by their authors to educate the reader: to instil in him a sense of Persia's backwardness, to instruct him in new and different concepts of government and, in the case of Ketab-e Ahmad, to provide knowledge of a general sort on history, science and geography.

The emphasis on education was partly the product of a belief in the power of the word, of education, to influence the course of affairs. In the introduction to Ebrahim Beg, the author described books, newspapers, etc. (maṭbu'at) as the "primary instruments of the progress and civilization of nations, and their happiness and good fortune," while both here and in the introduction to Ketab-e Ahmad, it was suggested that by writing their books, the authors were performing a signal service to their nation and to humanity.

The emphasis on education also stemmed from a concern with useful learning, a concern which was shared by many others among the educated classes. The view that education should be 'useful' was a traditional one; but the concept of what constituted useful learning was clearly changing. Talebof and Naraghe'i both saw education as a means of catching up with the present age as a nation and advancing in life as an individual.

Ebrahim Beg on his travels in Persia is contemptuous of a traditional school run by an akhund where the Qur'an and the poetry of Sa'di are read by the students. He dismisses the poetry as useless and desires the instructor to teach his students maths and geometry.[1]

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1 Beg, 46-7.

The father of Ahmad decries the unlimited number of books in Persia on minute religious controversies and the absence of any on basic agriculture, animal husbandry, irrigation and economics.[1] He also withdraws his son, Ahmad, from a traditional school where the boy is learning little, and places him in what is described as a modern school where the boy learns history, geography, mathematics, geometry, physics, chemistry, and literature in several languages.[2] He prescribes the learning of foreign languages as useful both for defending religion against external threats and also for expanding the import and export business of merchants engaged in trade.[3]

Meraghch'i and Talebof both came from merchant families. Both were also expatriates, Persians who, like Kermani and Malkam, were writing about Persia from abroad. In both there is a strong streak of nationalism, a notion that appears to have developed more rapidly among Persians abroad, than those at home due to contact with European nationalist ideas and movements and also to the fact that long separation from Persia encouraged romantic notions about the country.

The nationalism of Jeleh-e Ahmad is not strident or aggressive in the manner of Kermani, nor does it fall back on ancient history or theories of racial superiority to justify itself. It is less conspicuous than in the work of Talebof, but an undertone of nationalism nevertheless runs through the book. The term vatan, fatherland, appears frequently but is employed naturally, an implication perhaps that such a notion

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[1] Ahmad, p. 91a.

[2] Ibid., p. 93.

[3] Ibid., p. 94.

was already gaining wider currency and acceptability. The book is dedicated to the service of the nation. Defense of the homeland is described as a duty incumbent on every citizen and a comparable to a religious crusade.[1] It is said in praise of a man that his daily purpose is to promote the case of the people of his fatherland, its wealth and service to the nation.[2]

The nationalism in Ibrahim Beg is more pronounced. Ibrahim Beg's father, for example, is described as a man who, despite a long sojourn abroad, remained steadfast in his attachement to Persian customs of dressing, eating and social intercourse. He refused to speak a single word of Arabic throughout the years he lived in Egypt. In his home on winter nights, Persian friends gathered to read Persian history aloud and to marvel over the achievements of Persia's great kings: "He was in Egypt and his thoughts were always in Persia." If an acquaintance spoke ill of Persia, he labelled him dishonourable and irreligious and never spoke to him again to the end of his life; and although the activities of Persian consuls abroad had forced many Persian merchants to change their nationality, he never was willing to follow suit.[3]

His son, Ibrahim Beg, exceeds even his father in his love for his country. Because it was Alexander the Great who had conquered the Achaemenian empire and burned Persepolis, he refuses to utter the name of Alexandria and refers instead to 'the port on Egypt's coast.'[4] Here he first sets foot on

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1 Ibid., p. 62.
2 Ibid., p. 53.
3 Ibid., 5-7.
4 Ibid., pp. 15-16.

Persian soil, he descends from his carriage, takes a fistful of earth smells it, kisses it and rubs it against his eyes.[1] The state of his country causes him such grief that he falls into delirium. When a Persian patriot and a fellow-passenger on the boat Ibrahim Beg notices Malkom Khan's expression of pleasure at finally [illegible] out of the country, Malkom weeps and cries out:

> My dear and beloved fatherland! May my body and soul be sacrificed to you. In my religion, you are more blessed than paradise. Your soil is the stuff of life, and your air is the envy of eternal heaven. Alas that [illegible] have debased your exalted worth, have not striven to preserve your illustrious standing, have made you appear contemptuous and insubstantial in the eyes of foreigners, and have neglected the love for you which the immaculate prophet of God put on a par with faith.[2]

Economic considerations reinforced these nationalist sentiments. Kermani, Qaraghah'i and Talebof all expressed resentment and concern at Persia's dependence on imported goods for basic requirements and on the people's growing taste for foreign luxuries.[3] "I fear," remarked Kermani, "that very soon, ignorance and stupidity will bring Iran to such a pass that even water will be imported from Europe and sold . . . at the price of wine."[4] Ketab-e Ahmad expressed a strong hostility to foreign firms operating in Persia. It described foreign concessionnaires as "these most contemptible and despicable of foreign [illegible]eurs" and foreign merchants as "desert rats" who tour the world in order to discover and devour the riches of others wherever they can find them.[5] It

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1 Ibid., p. 91.
2 Ibid., p. 191.
3 Ahmad, pp. 97-8 and [illegible]k, pp. 66-7.
4 Maqamiyyat, Kermani, [illegible]-8.
5 Ahmad, pp. 83-4.

referred contemptuously to Persian merchants who thrived on importing and selling foreign goods at a profit as "the porters of foreigners," and contrasted them with the Russian/Armenian merchant who made himself a handsome profit while giving his country a worthwhile industry by investing in oil wells in Baku.[1]

Ibrahim Beg urged the people and the government to join hands in promoting local industry,[2] while according to Ketab-e Ahmad the country could make great strides forward

> if we wore the cloth (qadak) of Isfahan and made clothes from the woolen cloth (ghal) of Yazd and Isfahan; if instead of the felt of the foreigner, we made hats out of the skins (post) of Shiraz; instead of foreign chinaware, we used the silver-like copper plates of the kingdom; preferred our earthenware hubble-bubbles to the crystal of the foreigner; did not burn at a single party 500 camphor candles of a foreign nation; did not buy their products; and did not become the object of the envy of the poor.[3]

While they continued to believe that the key to Persia's regeneration lay in the material development of the country, these writers also began to regard national unity, among the people themselves and between the rulers and the ruled, as the necessary pre-condition for success in this and other fields of endeavour. Kermani attributed the strength, power and material achievement of European states to such unity.[4] Maraghe'i in Ebrahim Beg viewed national unity as the means by which all problems facing the country could be overcome.

> If the nation regarded itself as [part] of

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1 Ibid., pp. 119-20.
2 Beg, p. 279.
3 Ahmad, pp. 135-6.
4 Ademiyyat, Kermani, p. 267.

> the government, and the government regarded itself as [part] of the people and understood that these are of necessity inseperable, are two in name only and one in meaning, all the difficult tasks would be arranged and solved.[1]

A similar point of view was expressed in the letter[2] addressed to the crown prince, Mozaffer ed-Din Mirza, by Mirza Yusef Khan Mostashar ed-Dowleh in 1306/1888-9. Gravely ill when he wrote this letter and believing he had only a few more days to live, Mirza Yusef Khan spoke with a sense of urgency and, as he himself remarked, more forthrightly than he might otherwise have done.[3] He asserted that the country would not survive the dangers threatening it unless it was strengthened internally and this, he said, "will not be possible unless there is an effort to make all the different peoples who inhabit Persia partners and participants in the good and the bad of the fatherland."[4]

Mirza Yusef Khan went on to make this unity itself contingent on the introduction of the rule of law, the spread of education, the grant of freedom of expression, the reform of the judiciary, and the protection of property against arbitrary confiscation. Drawing on the example of European states, he argued that the laws should apply equally to the great and the humble, that ministers and other officials should be bound in their actions by the law, that these laws should suit the circumstances of the time and the place (i.e. that they should not be eternal and unchanging), and that they should be published and promulgated so the people in the

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1 Ibid., 69.

2 For text, see Bidari, Introductory volume, pp. 206-11.

3 Ibid., p. 206.

4 Ibid., p. 210.

remotest villages should be informed of them.[1] The laws, he said, should be drawn up by a consultative body of officials, meeting in regular session.[2]

In the writings of Kermani there was also the suggestion that national strength and well-being derives from the rule of law and the closely-knit national community, and that these two elements are closely interdependent. For him too, the most desirable form of government was one based on the principles of law, consultation and representation; and the most desirable type of country was one in which a people from a common racial stock, with a shared history, culture and language come together to form a national community. The concept claims of nationalism was thus used to reinforce the arguments for a reform of the system of government.

Alongside this there began to appear to and to be tentatively articulated the idea of natural and individual rights. Kermani, drawing on Rousseau and Montesquieu, asserted that human communities were founded by voluntary association on the basis of the social contract by free men, who therefore retained certain rights in association.[3] Such ideas occur also in a watered down and popularized version in both Kotab-e Ahmad and Ebrahim Beg. Talebof described the origin of human communities in somewhat similar terms as Kermani and spoke of the 'coming into being' of rights (huquq) when such societies were formed. Government, he said, was established to protect these rights.[4]

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1 Ibid., pp. 207-8.
2 Ibid., p. 208.
3 Adamiyyat, Kermani, pp. 97; 234.
4 Ahmad, pp. 40-41.

Marāgheh'ī, divided such ḥoqūq (which he employs to mean rights, and also obligations and duties), into four categories: those belonging to the fatherland, those belonging to individual citizens, those belonging to the government, and those belonging to the national community as a whole.[1] There is in the book a curious and somewhat confused mixture of medieval Islamic political theory, overlaid by nineteenth century European ideas on government.[2]

In both Ketāb-e Ahmad and Ebrāhīm Beg there is a plea, in a very general way, for the establishment of legislative and representative institutions. Ebrāhīm Beg called for the establishment of a majlis-e showrā, a consultative assembly, and for the creation of two seperate bodies, one to legislate and the other to implement the law.[3] Ahmad's father praised the principles of consultation and representation[4] and attributed Japan's great advances to the adoption of a 'basic law' and a constitional form of government.[5] He also gave a clear and concise definition of three different forms of government; absolute monarchy (salteneh-e motlaqeh), constitutional monarchy (salteneh-e mashrūteh) and a republic or presidential system. He expressed no preference as between the two latter forms of government, but he made clear what he thought of the first, or absolute monarchy, where

> the citizens and subjects do not know the penalty for any crime before [the sentence] is issued. Sometimes the murderer is caressed; sometimes the innocent is executed. The government of the provinces is

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1 Beg, pp. 82-3.
2 See, for example, Ibid., pp. 94-97.
3 Beg, pp. 82 and 87.
4 Ahmad, pp. 54a. and 104.
5 Ibid., p. 60a.

> sold to the governors. The taxes of the citizenry are farmed out. The implementation of the law is contingent on the size of the 'gift money'. . . . The oppressed cannot live in their own fatherland and emigrate in hoards . . .[1]

In attempting to relate the changes they were proposing to Islam, Mostasher od-Dowleh and others often asserted that the threat of foreign domination made the adoption of foreign laws not a matter of choice but of necessity. "It is patently clear," Mirza Yusef Khan remarked in his letter to the crown prince,

> that none of the Islamic and non-Islamic peoples and nations will be able after this to exist without law; and if [we ourselves] do not take steps to promulgate laws, they will not leave us in peace and force us, in the same way that they forced the Ottoman government, with all her power, in the case of Serbia and elsewhere.[2]

Talebof adopted a similar line in Ketab-e Ahmad. Law, he wrote, was the key to civilization. Without law and guarantees for the rights of the people, the country could not progress and in that event

> our descendants will in future become the apprentices, servants and shepherds of foreign nations. Their condition and character will accord with the taste of the agents of foreigners. The chant of worship and the morning call to prayer from the minarets of our mosques will disturb the sweet sleep of their women and will be banned. The sound of the _nagus_ will obliterate the _ma'azen_. Wine shops will open at every crossroads. Our women will be forced to go unveiled; and in keeping with [the saying] 'all powerful is the victor,' our pure _shari'a_ will disappear.[3]

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1 _Ibid._, p. 128.

2 _Bidari_, Introductory volume, p. 209.

3 _Ahmad_, p. 99. The _nagus_ was a kind of wooden gong used instead of church bells by the Christians in Persia.

In arguments reminiscent of Qasim, these writers also asserted that the adoption of European laws and the codification of the shari'a would not violate Islamic principles. In his tour of Persia, for example, Ebrahim Beg is made to meet an eminent and highly learned personage who has in considerable secrecy compiled from French, British, Ottoman and Russian law codes a multi-volume code of laws for Persia. He has placed these European laws not in accordance with Islam in a seperate volume entitled "The Book of the Cursed Law." But he has been able to fill four volumes with laws perfectly acceptable to Persia and Islam.[1] The promulgation of laws," asserted Mostasher ed-Dowleh, "is in no way contrary to the true religion of Islam and will never violate religion or Islam."[2]

Closely related to this was the contention that the 'ulama could not object to measures intended to spread justice, prevent oppression, place limits on the illegal activities of officials and increase the wealth and prosperity of the people: that is, measures intended to produce that state of affairs generally enjoined by religion. The great personage whom Ebrahim Beg meets disagrees with him that the 'ulama constitute a barrier to reform:

> Do not the 'ulama want their fatherland to be developed and the nation to be at ease? How could the 'ulama of the nation be displeased that all the creatures of God the creator enjoy equality under the law? Don't the 'ulama know that the law is nothing else but the implementation of the commands of the shari'a. The shari'a is the basis of the law. The meaning of both words is the implementation of justice

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1 Beg, p. 84.

2 Sidari, Introductory volume, p. 209.

on the basis of equality.[1]

This same spokesman in Ebrahim Beg asserts that the principles of European laws are not only identical to those underlying the shari'a but actually derived from Islamic law. "My dear fellow," he is made to say:

> whatever good laws the Europeans have they have taken them from the sacred books of Islam. Most of them are from the glorious Qur'an, the holy hadith, the sublime sayings of . . . 'Ali b. Abi Taleb (peace be upon him) and the books of jurisprudence of the Muslims. For in the religion of the Christians there were and are no commandments.[2]

While Malkom Khan in Qanun studiously avoided any criticism of the 'ulama, in Ebrahim Beg praise for Islam often occurs side by side with sharp attacks on the religious leaders. Ebrahim Beg himself is described in the book as a highly religious man and one of his first acts on entering Persia is to spend twenty-two successive days at the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad attending daily prayer.[3] However, as he travels around the country he finds that the 'ulama are engaged in hair-splitting and pedantic theological arguments;[4] that they are engaged, like the governors, in fleecing the people;[5] and that they respect power and wealth more than piety and learning.[6] He blames the country's weakness and poverty on their opposition to new learning and goes so far as to assert that "the principle cause for every plague that has befallen us and all Persians are these self-same ignominous

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1 Beg, p. 90.
2 Ibid., p. 87.
3 Ibid., p. 33.
4 Ibid., p. 37.
5 Ibid., pp. 182-4.
6 Ibid., p. 230.

persons."[1]

Similar criticisms are levelled against the 'ulema by Hajj Sayyah. On the evidence of his diaries, he was not a very religious man, but neither was he vehemently opposed to Islam. His criticisms stemmed more from a feeling that abuses had crept into the practice of Islam as he observed on his return to the country after his lengthy travels. He found that the standards of teaching even in religious subjects such as fiqh and usul at the madrasas of Isfahan had sadly declined;[2] that under the influence of obscurantist mullas the people were increasingly given to superstition;[3] that the 'ulema were party to the commercialization of the ta'ziyyeh (performance of passion plays);[4] and that the 'ulema themselves were waxing rich by plundering the poor.[5]

It has been suggested in a number of recent studies that many Persian reformers pushed their own unorthodox religious views into the background and paid lip service to Islam in order to secure the support of the 'ulema for their reforms.[6] This was undoubtedly sometimes the case, but it should not be assumed that those who asserted the compatibility of Islam with reform universally engaged in deception. Some of those who espoused the cause of reform appear to have been religious men who sincerely believed that Islam, correctly

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1 Ibid., p. 233.

2 Hajj Sayyah, Khaterat va Dowreh-ye Khowf va Vahshat, p. 42.

3 Ibid., pp. 25-26.

4 Ibid., p. 88.

5 Ibid., pp. 21-22.

6 This has been the theme of much of the recent work of Nikkie Keddie. See for example, "The Origins of the Religious-Radical Alliance in Iran", Past and Present, No. 34 (1966), 70-80, and also "Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism", previously cited.

understood and applied, could serve as the basis for progress and civilization. One cannot, for example, read Mostashar ed-Dowleh's letter to the crown prince without sensing the depth of his religious feelings.[1]

There were others who believed that in urging a reformist view of Islam, they were merely asking Islam to be true to itself. This attitude underlies to a degree the criticisms of the 'ulama found in the diaries of Sayyah and in Ebrahim Beg. Many individuals from the religious classes who supported the cause of reform no doubt held a similar view.

While the masses continued to cling to a traditional concept of Islam, there were others from the more educated classes, still a small minority, who wished for a more 'forward-looking' Islam, one that would facilitate the spread of new learning and the expansion of trade and help in changing the system of government, both because they believed that the country was in danger and because of their personal aspirations.

Moreover, alongside Islam, the idea of the nation was beginning to develop as a focus for the loyalty of Persians, although religion and nationalism were not initially easily distinguishable from one another. This concept of the Persian nation gradually merged with the older demand, which was now no longer confined to the bureaucracy, for a government based on the rule of law, guaranteeing the people certain

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[1] Mostashar ed-Dowleh wished his friends at his death to drag his body through the dust to its grave: "for I am going," he said, "towards Him in whose Glorious Presence the greatness of none of the beings in Creation has any significance. Perhaps he may take pity on the vileness of his slave and bathe my soul in the spirit of his mercy." (Sidqi, Introductory volume, pp. 205-6).

basic rights and permitting them a voice in the making of decisions affecting the life of the country. These ideas did not lead to a national movement until a decade after Nasr ad-Din's death. But already at his assassination in 1896, new currents were stirring among his people.

CONCLUSION

At Naser ed- in shah's death in 1896, there was little concrete to show for nearly four decades of intermittent attempts at reform. The administration of the finances remained unchanged. The administration of justice continued to be largely arbitrary and those regulations that had been promulgated were largely ignored. The Cossack Brigade apart, training, strength and equipment of the army had not noticeably improved. The bureaucracy was considerably larger. But the ministries were organized more or less on the same principles as in the early part of Naser ed-Din shah's reign. The council of state had ceased to meet. The underlying relationship between the shah and the government, and between the government and the people, had altered little.

Nevertheless, the attitude towards government among the leading classes of the community was undergoing a transformation. The call for reform in the early part of Naser ed-Din's reign had come from within the bureaucracy itself. Those who advocated reform were actuated by a desire to secure their country against foreign domination. They wished to see Persia take its place among what they considered to be the world's civilized states. They also hoped to temper the prevailing insecurity and the arbitrariness of the shah's rule.

Although the emphasis differed from individual to individual, those who espoused the cause of reform generally believed that the European states owed their material achievement, culture and power to the rule of law. They thus urged on their government the introduction of the rule of law in Persia. They believed that a change in the system of

government was necessary for the material development of the country and for securing a British guarantee of Persia's territorial integrity against Russian encroachments.

The reformers expressed some concern for the situation of the population at large. But their primary aim was to strengthen the power and position of the state. This was partly because of their belief that Persia was threatened by the great powers, and especially Russia; partly because they saw the government itself as the agent of change. They for this reason sought to extend, rather than to curb, the influence and jurisdiction of the central government. They hoped to subject the shah to the rule of law; but they believed their proposals would reinforce rather than undermine the power of the Crown. They in this sense considered themselves agents acting on the shah's behalf and hoped to win the shah over to the idea of reform.

Their hopes, however, proved largely illusory. Naser ad-Din shah, in the early years of his reign and especially after the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-7, appeared eager for reform. In 1871 he named Moshir od-Dowleh prime minister; he put his signature to the administrative changes Moshir od-Dowleh proposed to him; he agreed to grant the Reuter concession; and, also at Moshir od-Dowleh's advice, made his first trip to Europe.

Although the opposition that coalesced over the Reuter concession forced him to sacrifice his prime minister, he returned him to office and throughout the 1870's and early 1880's sought in various ways to create a viable administration. He worked with and without prime minister; he sought to establish a number of different cabinet bodies; he maintained

an advisory council or council of state. He often urged his ministers and officials to adopt new methods of consultation and administration.

But Naser ad- in was at the same time unwilling to see his own arbitrary power curbed or his privileges undermined. Fear of Russian displeasure often prevented him from taking action. After the experience over the Reuter concession, he hesitated before doing anything which would arouse the 'ulama. He proved too weak to overcome the resistance of his own officials to change. Within the bureaucracy, officials jealously guarded private interests and prerogatives which they feared might be damaged by reform. The changes the reformers advocated also often ran counter to traditional concepts of government and administration.

The reformers themselves were not always disinterested in the policies they pursued. They initially held perhaps an overly-simple idea of what was involved in the task of reform. The shah apart, they had no place else to turn to for support in seeking to forward their aims. For a time individuals among them believed they could secure British backing for their reform plans. But the English government, for a number of reasons, did not give them the support they desired.

The 'ulama were on the whole hostile to the type of measures advocated by the reformers, some were obscurantist; others were instinctively opposed to changes inspired by an alien culture and regarded many of the government's centralizing measures as an encroachment on their own prerogatives. The masses were either untouched by the reforms or found that in practice the extension of central authority meant an

extension of misrule and extortion.

Misgovernment was not new in Persia. But in the last year's of Naser ed-Din shah's reign oppression not only grew more widespread bu' it also took place in a different context. On the one hand, the belief spread among the masses that the shah and his officials were selling the country to the foreigner and therefore endangering not only Persia but Islam itself. The loyalty of the people to the shah as the guardian of state and religion was undermined. On the other hand, the new and largely European-inspired ideas about government that earlier in the shah's reign had been confined chiefly to the higher ranks of the bureaucracy had begun to influence also the thinking of the educated classes in general.

In this process, certain other changes took place. While members of the official classes continued to play a leading role in advocating reform, other groups and classes, sometimes with greater influence among the masses, such as the 'ulama, the merchants and persons drawn from the educated classes of the community began to play a more active role in calling for reform in the system of government. The idea that reform should come from the top still remained strong. But the shah and those closest to him were now discredited. The advocates of change no longer believed that Naser ed-Din would promote reform, or that the government, unprompted, would do so. The idea that the leading classes of society must play a role in promoting change grew more widespread.

As a corollary to this, there came to be expressed the idea that the people themselves, either individually or as a nation, have certain rights; and that the legislative power should reside not, as the earlier reform essays had suggested,

in a council appointed by and deriving its authority from the shah, but in a national assembly elected by the people. While the early reformers had looked to laws and regulations as a means of strengthening the administrative machinery of the state, there was a tendency to regard law increasingly as a means of protecting the people against the exactions of government.

Many of these ideas were expressed in terms of Islam because the masses remained wedded to a traditional concept of religion. But nationalism emerged alongside religion as a new focus for loyalty, at least among certain sectors of the community; while Islam itself began to be interpreted in new ways by some members of the educated classes. The spread of new attitudes on the role and function of government among the educated classes meant that reform was no longer primarily the concern of a limited number of major officials, as it had been earlier in Naser ed-Din shah's reign. In this sense, the last years of the reign of Naser ed-Din shah mark the beginning of the movement that was to culminate in the grant of a Constitution in 1906.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

The main entry for each individual is given under the person's title or family name, if any. Occasionally, where the official is more commonly known by his first name (for example, Malkam Khan), the main entry occurs under the first name. Cross references, however, are in every instance provided. Where the sources disagreed on particular dates, I have chosen that which in my judgement seemed the more accurate. The notes have not been carried beyond 1896.

'ABBAS MIRZA (NA'IB OS-SALTANEH) (1789-1833): second son of Fath 'Ali shah; declared crown prince and appointed governor of Azarbayjan, 1799; led Persian troops in the two wars against Russia, 1811, 1828; was responsible for early 19th century attempts at military reform; had numerous sons who held important posts during the reign of Naser ed-Din shah.

'ABDOL WAHHAB NASIR OD-DOWLEH, see Nasir od-Dowleh, 'Abdol Vahhab.

ABOL QASEM NASER OL-MOLK, see Naser ol-Molk, Abol Qasem Khan.

ĀḴUNDZĀDEH, MIRZĀ FATḤ 'ALĪ (1812-1878): born to Azarbayjani father who was initially a district officer (kadkhodā) in Azarbayjan and later became a merchant in the Caucasus; spent boyhood in Caucasus and educated in various maktabs, 1815-34; translator on staff of Russian commander of the Caucasus in Tiflis, 1834; and taught Turkish at local school, 1836; promoted to translator in Oriental languages on commander's staff, from 1844; translator to Russian mission to Persia, 1848; visited Istanbul at invitation of Mirzā Ḥosayn Khān Moshir od-Dowleh to present plan for reform of Arabic alphabet, and met Malkam Khān, 1863; wrote satirical plays, 1850-57; and essay on reform of the Arabic script, 1858; and Maktubāt-e Kamāl od-Dowleh, 1862-3; and various essays on history and literature, translations from J.S. Mill, Mirabeau, Sismondi, 1862-77.

'ALI ASGHAR AMIN OS-SOLṬĀN, see Amin os-Soltān, 'Ali Asghar.

'ALI KHĀN AMIN OD-DOWLEH, see Amin od-Dowleh, Mirzā 'Ali Khān.

'ALI QOLI E'TEZĀD OS-SALṬANEH, see E'tezād os-Saltaneh, 'Ali Qoli.

AMIN OD-DOWLEH, MIRZA 'ALI KHAN (1844-1904): son of Mohammed Khan Majd ol-Molk, chief secretary to Mohammad shah's mother, and under Nāṣer ad-Din shah a member of the foreign ministry and a minister of pensions and endowments; accompanied father to Baghdad on a mission to discuss outstanding Iran-Ottoman questions, 1858-9; after serving in foreign ministry, appointed secretary (monshī-ye huzūr) to Nāṣer ad-Din shah, 187[illegible]; private secretary to shah (vazīr-e rasā'el-e khāṣṣeh), and entitled Amin ol-Molk, 1873; chairman of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā (and the majlis-e tahqīq), 1875-to its dissolution in early 18[illegible]; head of mint, 1875-6; minister of posts, 1876-95, when he gave post to his son; minister of pensions and endowments, 1881, a post which later passed to his brother; title of Amin od-Dowleh, 1883; accompanied shah on his trips to Europe, 1873, 1878, 1889.

AMIN OS-SOLTAN, 'ALI [illegible] (d. 19[illegible]7): son of Āqā Ebrahim Amin os-Soltan; a court chamberlain and head of the court commissariat and transport department, (ṣāḥeb jam') during his father's lifetime. Inherited title and offices of father at latter's death, becoming inter alia minister of court and chief of customs, while treasury was run by his brother, 1883; named vazīr-e a'zam (prime minister), 1885; named ṣadr-e a'zam, 1886; went with shah to Europe, 1889; worked closely with Wolff, securing shah's agreement for Imperial Bank concession and opening of Karun, 1890-91; discredited over Tobacco monopoly concession cancellation, 1892; reconfirmed as prime minister by Mozaffar ad-Din shah after assassination of Nāṣer ad-Din, 1896.

AMIN OS SOLTAN, AQA EBRAHIM (d. 1883): son of Ali Khan, a Georgian slave who was a house servant to one of the Qajar princes and later one of the kitchen staff of Nāṣer ad-Din when crown prince in Azarbayjan; Āqā Ebrāhim accompanied Nāṣer ad-Din shah to Tehran when the prince acceded to the throne in 1848; became head of the royal kitchens (sabdār bāshī), 1864; also head of court commissariat and transport department (ṣāḥeb jam'), with title of Amin os-Soltan, 1871; member of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, 1877; also head of the royal stables and other court departments, granaries of Tehran and mint, by 1882; also head of treasury and customs, and minister of court, 1881. At his death in 1883, all these offices and his title passed to his son, 'Ali Asghar.

AMIR KABIR, MIRZA TAQI KHAN (d. 1852): son of cook to Abol Qāsem Qā'em-maqām, Mohammad shah's prime minister; muster-master (mostowfī-ye nezām) to Azarbayjan army, 1829; vazīr of Azarbayjan army, 1833; negotiator on Perso-Turkish frontier commission at Erzerum, 1844-46; vazīr of Azarbayjan, from 1845; prime minister and commander of the army to Nāṣer ad-Din shah, 1848; dismissed, Nov. 1851; executed in Fīn, Jan. 1852.

AQA EBRAHIM AMIN OS-SOLTAN, see Amin os-Soltan, Aqā Ebrāhim.

AQA KHAN FARHANI, see Farhani, Aqā Khān.

ḴĀN ḤĀKIM NŪRĪ, see Nūrī, Mīrzā Naṣr Allāh.

DOST 'ALI KHAN MO'AYYER AL-MAMALEK, see Mo'ayyer al-Mamalek, Dōst 'Alī Khān.

E'TEMAD OS SALṬANEH, Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān (1840-1896): studied at the Dār ol-Fonūn; given various ranks in the army, 1852-63; appointed as member of Paris embassy, under Ḥasan 'Alī Khān Amīrī, 1865; returned to Iran, appointed court translator, 1867; also head of the official gazette and title Amīn od-Dowleh, 1873; and member of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā; 1882; and minister of press, 1885; title of E'temād os-Salṭaneh, 1887.

E'TEZAD OS-SALṬANEH, 'Alī Qolī (c. 1819-1880): a Qajar prince; vazīr to Nāṣer ad-Dīn shah's mother, Mahd Olyā; title of E'tezād os-Salṭaneh, 1856; director of the Dār ol-Fonūn, minister of education and sent 42 Dār ol-Fonūn graduates for study in Paris, 1858; also minister of industry and mines, of commerce, and director of the official gazette, 1866; member of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, 1871; accompanied shah to Europe, 1873; minister of justice, 1878.

FARHĀD MIRZĀ MO'TAMED OD-DOWLEH, see Mo'tamed od-Dowleh, Farhād Mīrzā.

FARROḴH ḴĀN (d. 1871): from a family of Qajar court officials; page boy in the court of Fatḥ 'Alī shah and in attendance on Moḥammad shah; under Moḥammad shah sent to give order to the unsettled affairs, successively, of Mazandaran (1836), Isfahan (1837) and Gilan (1840); keeper of privy purse to Nāṣer ad-Dīn shah, 1855; given title of Amīn ol-Molk and headed mission to Paris to negotiate treaty ending Afghan war, 1856-7; minister of the presence (vazīr-e ḥuzūr) and keeper of royal seal, 1857; title of Amīn od-Dowleh, member of the majlis-e showrā-ye dowlatī and charged with responsibility for provincial affairs, 1859; head of customs, 1866.

FATḤ 'ALI SHAHZĀDEH, see Shāhzādeh, Fatḥ 'Alī.

FATḤ ALLĀH NOṢRAT OD-DOWLI, see Noṣrat od-Dowleh, Fatḥ Allāh Mīrzā.

GARŪSI ḤASAN 'ALI ḴĀN (1822-99): son of Reza Qoli Khān, chief of Garūs Kurds; governor and military commander of Garūs, 1851; minister in Paris, 1858-65; member of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, 1871; ambassador to Porte, 1871-2; minister of public works, 1872; accompanied shah on first trip to Europe, 1873; helped put down revolt of Shaykh Obaydollāh, 1880; commander of Azarbayjan troops, 1881; pishkār of Azarbayjan, 1882-91; title of Amīr Neẓām, 1885; dismissed from post for opposing tobacco régie, 1891; governor of Kurdistan and Kermanshah, 1891; again pishkār of Azarbayjan, 1897-9; governor of Baluchistan, 1899. Held district of Garūs as tuyūl and owned 34th regiment, Garūs infantry.

ḤAMZEH MIRZA ḤESHMAT OD-DOWLEH, see Ḥeshmat od-Dowleh, Ḥamzeh Mirzā.

ḤASAN 'ALI KHAN GARUSI, see Garūsī, Ḥasan 'Alī Khān.

HEDAYATOLLAH, MIRZA, [illegible] (d. 1893): from a family with a tradition of service in the finance ministry; after various posts as a revenue official, became secretary to the army (vazīr-e lašgar), 1871; head of the accounting department, (vazīr-e daftar), 1872-82; resigned over differences with Yūsef Mostowfī al-Mamālek, 1882; reappointed vazīr-e daftar at death of Mostowfī al-Mamālek, 1886.

ḤESĀM OS-SALṬANEH, [illegible] (1818-1883): a Qajar prince and a son of 'Abbās Mīrzā Nā'eb os-Salṭaneh; began career in army and participated in several campaigns; governor of Khorasan, 185[illegible]-4; occupied Herat in Afghan war, 1856; lost Khorasan governorship, 1858; reappointed, 1861; held various other governorships, 1860-71; dismissed from governorship of Khorasan by Mīrzā Ḥosayn Khān Mošīr od-Dowleh, 1872; accompanied shah on European tour and a leading figure in overthrow of qadr-e a'zam, 1873; held various other governorships, 1873-1883.

ḤESHMAT OD-DOWLEH, ḤAMZEH MIRZĀ (d. 1880): a Qajar prince and a son of 'Abbās Mīrzā Nā'eb os-Salṭaneh; appointed to different governorships, 1859-58; troops under his command defeated by Turkomans, 1860-61; recalled to Tehran, 1861; held several other governorships, 1862-1879; briefly minister of war, 1868-9; died during expedition to put down rising by Kurdish chief, Shaykh 'Obaydollāh, 1880.

ḤOSAYN KHAN MOŠIR OD-DOWLEH, see Mošīr od-Dowleh, Mīrzā Ḥosayn Khān.

JA'FAR KHAN MOŠIR OD-DOWLEH, see Mošīr od-Dowleh, Mīrzā Ja'far Khān.

KAMRAN MIRZA NA'EB OS-SALṬANEH (1853-1927): third son of Nāṣer ad-Dīn shah and probably his favourite; as a child, held, at least in name, various governorships and was nominally head of the government in shah's absence from the capital; governor of Tehran, minister of commerce, charged with the affairs of the 'olamā, Qajar princes and the merchant community, 1878; additionally minister of war, 1884-96; lost posts at death of father and accession of brother Mozaffar ad-Dīn shah, 1896.

KERMANI, MIRZA ĀQĀ KHAN (c. 1854-1896): born to a small land-holding family in Kerman with a history of religious unorthodoxy, studied at maktabs with Ḥājj Seyyed Javād Shirāzī and Ākhūnd Mollā Ja'far, the father of Shaykh Aḥmad Rūḥī; tax official in Kerman, 1881; left Kerman for Isfahan, entered service of Zell os-Solṭān, 1884; went to Tehran, Meshhed, then Istanbul, 1886; married daughter of the Azali Babi leader, Ṣobḥ-e Azal in Cyprus, 1886; worked on the newspaper Akhtar in Istanbul, 1886-91;

collaborated with Malkam Khān on Qānūn, from 1891; and with Afghāni on Pan-Islamic projects, from 1892; exiled by Ottoman authorities to Trabzon, 1895; extradited to Persia after assassination of Nāṣer ad-Dīn shah and executed in Tabriz, 1896.

MAḤMUD KHAN NAṢER OL-MOLK, see Nāṣer ol-Molk, Maḥmūd Khān.

MALKAM KHAN (1833-1908): son of Mīrzā Ya'qūb, an Armenian convert to Islam; studied in Paris (1843-52); official government translator, 1852-56; joined Farrokh Khān mission to Istanbul and Paris, 1856-7; wrote his first essay, Ketābcheh-ye Ghaybī, 1858-9; established the farāmushkhāneh, 1860; farāmūshkhāneh banned and Malkam banished, 1861; arrived in Istanbul, 1862; consul in Cairo, 1863; counsellor to the Istanbul embassy, 1864; suspended, 1866; took Ottoman citizenship, 1869; advisor to the ṣadr-e a'ẓam, Mīrzā Hosayn Khān Moshīr od-Dowleh, 1873; ambassador to England, 1873-89; lost post, December 1889; launched Qānūn, February 1890; his titles rank, and salary revoked, March 1891.

MO'AYYER AL-MAMĀLEK, DUST 'ALĪ KHAN (1821-73): family for many generations headed mint and treasury; related by marriage to the Qajars; succeeded to father's title, post of treasurer and head of the royal household (buyūtāt-e salṭanatī) at father's death, 1858; also treasurer of privy purse and master of the mint, 1866; given title of Neẓām od-Dowleh and passed on own title to his son, 1868; member of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, 1871; son married a daughter of Nāṣer ad-Dīn shah, 1873.

MOḤAMMAD ḤASAN E'TEMĀD OS-SALṬANEH, see E'temād os-Salṭaneh, Moḥammad Ḥasan.

MOḤAMMAD KHAN SEPAHSALĀR (d. 1867): son of Amīr Sardār, of the Davallū branch of Qajar tribe; began career in court, and held a number of governorships; commanded southern troops in Anglo-Persian war, 1856; minister of war with title of sepahsālār, 1858; member of majlis-e showrā-ye dowlatī, 1859; given powers and duties of prime minister but without title of ṣadr-e a'ẓam, 1865; shorn of these powers and appointed governor of Khorasan and other provinces, 1866.

MOḤSEN KHAN MO'IN OL-MOLK, see Mo'īn ol-Molk, Moḥsen Khān.

MO'IN OL-MOLK, MOḤSEN KHAN (d. 1900): son of Shaykh Kāẓem, merchant of Tabriz; commenced career in military service, 1848; participated in south Persia as colonel in Anglo-Persian war, 1856-7; first secretary to Paris legation under Ḥasan 'Alī Khān Garūsi, 1858; subsequently chargé d'affaires in Paris; minister in London, 1871-2; ambassador in Constantinople, 1872-90; dismissed for association with Malkam Khān and his newspaper Qānūn, 1891; recalled to Tehran, title of Moshīr od-Dowleh, appointed minister of commerce and justice, 1892; minister of foreign affairs, Nov. 1896.

MOSHIR OD-DOWLEH, MIRZA JA'FAR KHAN (d. 1862): sent for study to Europe by 'Abbās Mirzā, 1815; returned to Persia, 1819; taught mathematics and engineering; ambassador to Turkey, 1836-44; foreign ministry agent (kārgozār) in Tabriz, 1848; negotiator on Perso-Turkish frontier commission meeting in Erzerum, 1848-55; head of the majlis-e showrā-ye dowlatī, 1859-60; on special embassy to England, 1860-1; named keeper of the shrine of Imām Reza at Mashhad, Aug. 1862.

MOSHIR OD-DOWLEH, MIRZA ḤOSAYN KHAN (1828-1881): after studying briefly in Paris, appointed consul in Bombay, 1851; consul in Tiflis, 1855-58; minister, then ambassador to Istanbul, 1858-70; minister of justice and of pensions and endowments, December 1870; minister of war and commander of the army (sepahsālār), September 1871; sadr-e a'zam, November, 1871; took shah to Europe, fall 1873; dismissed from posts, September 1873; appointed foreign minister, December 1873; and minister of war, 1874; confirmed in these posts by royal decree in a dual division of all authority between himself and Mostowfī al-Mamālek, 1294/1877-8; reconfirmed in these posts by royal decree in a tripartite division of authority between himself, Mostowfī al-Mamalek and Kāmrān Mirzā, 1878; dismissed from all posts, 1880; briefly governor of Qazvin, 1880; and of Azarbayjan, 1880-81; led mission to Russia at accession of Alexander III, 1881; governor of Khorasan, 1881.

MOSHIR OD-DOWLEH, YAḤYA KHAN, see Mo'tamed el-Molk, Yaḥyā Khān.

MOSTASHĀR OD DOWLEH, MIRZA YUSEF KHAN (d. 1895): consul in Hajjī Tarkhān, 1854-62; briefly chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg, 1862-3; consul in Tiflis, 1863-7; chargé d'affaires in Paris, 1867-71; deputy minister of justice under Mirzā Ḥosayn Khān Moshīr od-Dowleh, 1871-2; foreign ministry agent (kārgozār) in Mashhad, 1873; reappointed deputy to ministry of justice with title of Mostashār od-Dowleh, 1873; imprisoned several months on charge of writing critical articles for newspaper Akhtar, 1882; consul in Bombay, 1884-6; kārgozār in Tabriz, 1889; arrested for association with Malkam's newspaper, Qānūn, 1891, released a few months later; author of Yak Kalameh.

MOSTOWFĪ AL-MAMĀLEK, MIRZA YUSEF KHAN (d. 1886): from an old bureaucratic family with long service in the ministry of finance; appointed chief financial officer of the state (mostowfī al-mamālek) under Moḥammad shah, 1845; retired to his village in Ashtian due to rivalry with the sadr-e a'zam, Mirzā Āqā Khān Nūrī, 1852; resumed the duties of mostowfī al-mamālek, 1858; again retired to Ashtian with emergence of Mirzā Ḥosayn Khān Moshīr od-Dowleh as shah's favourite, 1870-71; resumed functions of mostowfī al-mamālek and also appointed minister of interior, treasury, governor of Tehran and head of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, 1873; confirmed as minister of finance and interior by royal decree dividing all authority between himself and Moshīr od-Dowleh, 1294/1877-8; reconfirmed by royal decree dividing all authority between himself, Moshīr od-Dowleh and Kāmrān Mirzā, 1878; named head of the council of ministers (darbār-e a'zam), 1881; received title of

prime minister (ra'īs ol-vezarā), 1882; received title of sadr-e a'zam, 1884, holding it till his death.

MO'TAMED OD-DOWLEH, Farhād Mīrzā (1818-1888): Qajar prince, son of 'Abbās Mīrzā; governor of Fars, 1841; exiled to Teleqan and took refuge at British Legation, 1855; member of the majlis-e showrā-ye dowlatī, 1859; held various governorships, 1862-73, appointed to head government when shah went on his first trip to Europe, and participated in the move to overthrow the prime minister, Moshīr od-Dowleh, 1873; governor of Fars, 1876-81.

MO'TAMED OL-MOLK, YAHYA KHAN (1822-1892): brother of Mīrzā Hosaya Khān Moshīr od-Dowleh; studied in France; aide de camp and interpreter to shah, 1858; keeper of the privy purse and title of Mo'tamed ol-Molk; chairman of the dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, head of the shah's body guard, chief of the Qajar tribe (nayebat-e Ilkhānīgarī), 1871; accompanied shah to europe, 1873; briefly governor of Fars, then Mazandaran, 1875; acting minister of war and foreign minister in place of his brother during shah's second trip to Europe, 1878; title of Moshīr od-Dowleh at brother's death, minister of commerce and of justice, 1881; minister of foreign affairs, but dismissed due to British objections, 1884; reappointed minister of justice and of commerce, 1889; and held posts till death; was married to one of shah's sisters.

MO'TAMEN OL-MOLK, MIRZA SA'ID KHAN (1816-84): private secretary to Mīrzā Taqī Khān Amīr Kabīr, 1848-51; foreign minister, 1863-73; also member of majlis-e showrā-ye dowlatī, 1859; also governor of Gilān, 1869; member of dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, 1871; last post of foreign minister, named keeper of shrine of Imām Reza in Mashhad, 1873; reappointed foreign minister, 1880.

MOZAFFAR AD-DIN MIRZA (1853-1907): son of Nāṣer ad-Din shah; declared valī'ahd (crown prince), 1862; governor of Azarbeyjān from 1861; acceded to throne at death of Nāṣer ad-Din shah, 1896.

NA'EB OS-SALṬANEH, KAMRAN MIRZA, see Kāmrān Mirzā Nā'eb os-Salṭaneh.

NAṢER OL MOLK, ABOL QASEM KHAN (1853-1927): grandson of Moḥammad Khan Nāṣer ol-Molk; taken to Europe for study by grandfather, 1870; educated at Balliol College, Oxford; returned to Persia, 1884; accompanied grandfather to Khorasan as private secretary, 1886; inherited title and government of Hamadan at death of Moḥammad Khān, 1887; head of arsenal, 1896.

NAṢER OL-MOLK, MAḤMUD KHAN (d. 1887): from the Qaragozlū tribe of Hamadan; counseller, then charge d'affaires at St. Petersburg, 1852-5; title of Nāṣer ol-Molk and head of arsenal, 1858; member of majlis-e showrā-ye dowlatī, minister of commerce and industry, 1859; minister to London, 1862-4; member of dār ash-showrā-ye kobrā, 1871; deputy minister of war under Hosayn Khān Moshīr od-Dowleh, 1871; governor of Gilān, 1875; with shah on his second

trip to Europe, 1878; foreign minister, 1884; governor of Khorasan, title of Farmānfarmā, 1886; died in Tehran.

NAṢIR OD-DOWLEH, 'ABDOL WAHHAB (1826-1886): members of family had headed the arsenal both under the previous Zand dynasty and under the early Qajars; in the service of 'Alī Qolī E'tezād os-Salṭaneh, 1850; tutor to son of Mīrzā Aqā Khān Nūrī, 1852; various foreign ministry posts, 1857-60; foreign ministry agent, (kārgozār) in Tabriz, 1861-9; title of Naṣīr ed-Dowleh, member of dār osh-showrā-ye kobrā, minister of commerce, 1871; secretary of Mīrzā Ḥosayn Khān Moshīr ed-Dowleh (as minister of foreign affairs (and later also of war), 1874; vazīr of Azarbayjan, 1882-4; governor of Khorasan and keeper of the shrine of Imām Reza at Mashhad, 1884-6.

NAZAR AQA (1828-1904?): an Assyrian, born in Azarbayjan, educated at Lazarist brotherhood school in Istanbul; returned to Persia, taught history and geography at the Dār ol-Fonūn; translator to the Persian consulate in Tiflis, and subsequently the legation in St. Petersburg, 1855; translator to the legation in Paris, 1859; chargé d'affaires in Paris, 1869-73; minister in Paris, 1873-1904 (?).

NOṢRAT OD-DOWLEH, FIRUZ MIRZA (1818-1886): a Qajar prince and son of 'Abbās Mīrzā Na'eb os-Salṭaneh; held numerous governorships, including those of Fars and Azarbayjan, 1834-58; governor of Tehran and head of the government in the shah's absence on a three-month internal tour, 1859-60; member of the majlis-e showrā-ye dowlatī, 1859; vazīr of Azarbayjan, 1867; minister of war, 1868-71; reappointed minister of war, 1873-4; held further governorships, 1876-1881.

NURI, MIRZA AQA KHAN (1807-66): from old Qajar bureaucratic family; assumed father's post as muster-master (lashkar nevīs bāshī) of the army, 1827; secretary of the army (vazīr lashkar), 1835; sadr-e a'zam, 1851-58, while sons or brothers headed the treasury, the ministry of war and the accounting department (daftar-e estīfā'); dismissed and exiled, 1858; died in exile, 1865.

SA'ID KHAN MO'TAMEN OL-MOLK, see Mo'tamen ol-Molk, Mīrzā Sa'īd Khān.

SEPAHSALAR, MOḤAMMAD KHAN, see Moḥammad Khān Sepahsālār.

SOLTAN MORAD MIRZA ḤESAM OS-SALṬANEH, see Ḥosām os-Salṭaneh, Soltān Morād Mīrzā.

TAQI KHAN, AMIR KABIR, see Amīr Kabīr, Mīrzā Taqī Khān.

VAZIR-E DAFTAR, MIRZA HEDAYATOLLAH, see Hedāyatollāh, Mirza, Vazīr-e Dafter.

YAḤYA KHAN MO'TAMED OL-MOLK (later Moshīr ed-Dowleh), see Mo'tamed ol-Molk, Yaḥyā Khān.

YUSEF KHAN MOSTASHAR OD-DOWLEH, see Mostashār ed-Dowleh, Mirza Yūsef Khān.

YUSEF KHAN MOSTOWFI AL-MAMALEK, see Mostowfi al-Mamalek, Mirzā Yūsef Khān.

ZELL OS-SOLṬAN, MAS'UD MIRZA (1850-1919): eldest son of Nāṣer ed-Din shah; held various governorships from the age of 11; in early 1880's held joint governorships of Isfahan, Fars, Arak, Yazd and Arabistan and maintained a force of 15,000 troops; awarded G.C.S.I. by British government, 1887; army disbanded and limited to governorship of Isfahan alone, 1888; amassed great wealth; in 1896, was estimated to own villages and property worth £250,000 and to hold cash and shares abroad amounting to half a million sterling.

GLOSSARY

Âdam, man; human being; term used by Malkam Khân to designate the members of his projected Âdamiyyat societies and the followers of his ideas.

akhlâq, morals, ethics, virtues.

Âdamiyyat, humanity; name applied by Malkam Khân to the society which he sought to promote in the reign of Nâṣer ed-Dîn shah.

Akhtar, Persian language newspaper founded in Istanbul in 1875.

Akhund, a lesser member of the religious classes; a mollâ.

a'lam, (elative of 'alim), one who is most learned.

amin, one who is trustworthy; the name Malkam Khân gave to the leaders of the smallest units of his proposed Âdamiyyat societies.

amir tumân, a high military rank; literally, the commander of 10,000 troops.

anderûn, the inner, private quarters of a Persian house.

anjoman-e makhfi, secret society.

'aql, reason, or its application, as against naql, the acceptance of authoritative tradition.

ashrâr, disturbers of the peace.

'atabât, the shi'i holy places in Iraq, at Karbala, Najaf, Samara and Kazemayn.

a'yan, notables.

bab-e 'Âli, the Porte; the office of grand vizier and related departments forming the Ottoman government.

barât, draft; assignment on revenue.

beglerbegî, a kind of chief police officer or military governor.

bozorgân, the important or leading men or the community.

buyûtât, buyûtât-e saltanati, refers to a number of departments, such as the royal workshops, stables, palaces, etc. forming part of the shah's personal administration.

qrore, a numerical quantity, usually 500,000.

dafter-e estIfŠ', the great accounting department of the government; the chief financial department of the state.

dehqŠn, (pl. of **dehqŠ**), landowner, farmer.

dŠr esh-showrŠ-ye kobrŠ, the consultative council or council of state established by NŠser ed-DIn shah in 1871. It continued to exist, with some interruptions, until the early 1900's.

darbŠr-e a'zam, council of ministers. See also **majlis-e darbŠr-e a'zam**.

DŠr ol-fonŠn, the first of the modern schools, established in 1850; it taught military sciences, foreign languages, mathematics and general sciences.

dastkhatt, handwritten document, generally one bearing shah's own signature.

dastŠr ol-'amal, an assessment showing the anticipated revenues and expenditures of a district or province; also a memorandum of instructions issued to an official.

divŠn, judicial court; also ministry, department, the state.

divŠnbegi, official in charge of the courts of a district or province.

divŠn-e a'lŠ, high court.

divŠn-e edalŠ, a kind of administrative court.

divŠn-e tahqIq, investigative court.

divŠn-e tejŠrat, commercial court.

divŠn-nŠmeh, code to regulate the affairs of the central government.

dowlat-e haqq, kingdom of truth.

'obŠdat, worship.

edŠreh, department, office, administration.

edŠreh-nŠmeh, administrative code.

'emŠrat-e dowlat, 'government building', one housing office of prime minister and other departments.

estelŠl, independence.

e'teqŠd, faith, belief.

farāmūshkhāneh, the society established by Malkam Khān in about 1860.

farmān, royal decree, command, order.

farsakh, a measure of distance, sometimes roughly equal to 18,000 feet.

farrāsh, a minor official in the royal court who acted as a page or doorman, or who preceded the royal entourage to clear the way; sometimes used to carry out royal commands.

fatvā, a religious or judicial opinion given by a mufti.

fiqh, jurisprudence.

hadith, the sayings of the Prophet; among shi'a also the sayings of the imams.

haram, forbidden; prohibited by religion of Islam.

hudūd, (pl. of hadd); limits; also punishments.

hukm, order, decree, command.

huqūq, (pl. of haqq); rights; obligations or duties.

huqūq-nāmeh, bill of rights.

imām, in shi'i usage, the title of the hereditary successors to the Prophet through his son-in-law, 'Ali; the Ithna 'Ashari shi'is recognize twelve imams; the last is believed to have gone into occultation in 260/873-4 and is expected to return in time as the mahdi.

jabbeh, long cloak worn by Qajar officials.

jām'e-e ādamiyyat, the ādamiyyat society; see ādamiyyat.

jazā-nāmeh, criminal code.

kārgozār, a foreign ministry official assigned to the major provincial cities to look after affairs, especially commercial and judicial matters, involving foreigners.

kelīd-dār, keeper of the keys.

ketāb-e shar'i, books containing laws derived from the shari'a.

khāleseh, crown or state lands.

kharvār, unit of weight, equal to 100 tabrizi mans; generally, an ass-load.

khatt-e sherif-e gulkhaneh, the imperial rescript, issued by the Ottoman sultan in 1839, granting certain rights to the people of the empire; the khatt-e humayun of 1856 extended these rights and instituted further reforms.

kran, a monetary unit equal to 20 shahis; there are 10 krans to the toman.

kursi-ye 'adl, literally, seat of justice; part of the organizational structure Malkam Khan proposed for his Adamiyyat society.

lati, a tough; member of a type of brotherhood whose origins sometimes went back to the medieval Islamic period.

mahal, a specified source of revenue.

majlis, council.

majlis-e darbar-e a'zam, council of ministers; specifically the 'cabinet' established under Moshir od-Dowleh in 1872; see pp. 95 passim.

majlis-e shura, council of state.

majlis-e shura-ye dowlati, consultative council established by Nasr ad-Din shah in 1859.

majlis-e shura-ye kobra-ye melli, great national consultative assembly.

majlis-e sepahr-e Adamiyyat, part of the organizational structure of Malkam Khan's proposed Adamiyyat society.

majlis-e tahqiq, investigative council; small council established by shah to act as clearing house for larger dar ash-shura-ye kobra.

majlis-e tanzimat, reform or legislative council.

majlis-e vala-ye ahkam-e 'adliyyeh, the Ottoman council of judicial ordinances, established in 1838, and charged with preparing new regulations for the government.

majlis-e vozara, council of ministers.

maktab, an elementary school, usually run by a member of the religious classes.

mal, property, wealth, revenue.

maliyyeh, taxes; vazir-e maliyyeh was another title for the treasurer.

mardom, people; mardom-e motavasset, broadly, middle classes.

majlesi khaneh, advisory council of middle level civil servants and others established by Naser ad-Din shah in 1859. See pp. 89 passim.

mavajeb, salary, allowance.

mazalem, judicial courts; courts for hearing of grievances.

mehmandar-e a'zam, the highest official in Malkom Khan's proposed Faramushkhaneh society.

millat, nation; milli, national; millivvat, nationality.

mir panj, a high military rank; literally, commander of 5,000 troops.

mir-shab, a kind of intendent; an official charged with supervising the proper implementation of the law; synonymous with vakil-e shar.

modir, chief, head, principal.

mohassel, tax collector; sometimes an agent sent by the central government to settle an outstanding matter between the government and subjects.

molla, see akhund.

monajjem, assessor, usually tax assessor.

monshi al-mamalek, the secretary charged with writing out royal decrees and other important official documents.

morshed, teacher; spiritual guide along the mystical path.

mostamarri, pension; allowance.

mostowfi, revenue official; often an accountant.

mostowfi al-mamalek, chief revenue officer of the state; loosely, the minister of finance.

mo'tabarin, (pl. of mo'tabar), respectable personages.

motasarref, district tax collector.

mu'azzen, the person who chants the call to prayer.

mufti, a member of the religious classes whose opinion is sought on a point of religious law; this is usually issued in the form of fatva.

mujtahid, a person who may, by virtue of his learning or piety, give an authoritative opinion on points of religious law.

naql, deriving one's opinions from another rather than by exercising independent judgement. See also 'aql.

nāqūs, gong used by Christians in 19th century Persia in place of church bells.

nāyeb, deputy.

nazr, order.

nezam-nāmeh, military code.

nojabā, (pl. of najīb), respectable persons.

'oqalā, (pl. of 'āqil), wise men; the learned.

pīshkash, 'gift money' paid for the purchase of an office.

pīshkar, chief financial official of a province; in Azarbayjan, the seat of the crown prince, the pīshkār was often known as the vazīr of the province.

pīr, elder; in ṣūfī usage, the leader of a mystical order.

qeṭāt, cloth.

qānūn, law.

Qānūn, newspaper Mirzā Malkam Khān began publishing in 1890.

qowm, the people.

ra'īs ol-vozarā, chief minister; prime minister; the title is less prestigious than that of ṣadr-e a'zam.

ṣadr-e a'zam, prime minister.

salaam, a court ceremonial, usually observed during the New Year and other holidays, when members of government and army assembled before the shah.

salṭanat-e mashrūṭeh, salṭanat-e mo'tadel, limited, or constitutional, monarchy.

salṭanat-e mostabedeh, absolute monarchy.

sarrāf, money-lender, money-changer.

selseleh, the chain of authorities through which the foundation of a religious order is traced back, usually to 'Alī.

sepahsālār, commander-in-chief of the troops.

shahādat, bearing witness; in religious usage, the formula expressing belief in the oneness of God and in Muḥammad as his Prophet.

shāl, woolen cloth.

shāl-kolāh, tall conical hat frequently worn by Qajar officials.

shams al-'emāreh, one of the Qajar palaces.

shar', religious jurisdiction.

shar'ī, adjective derived from shar'.

shari'a, the law of Islam.

shaykh al-eslām, official, drawn from religious classes, presiding over the courts in major cities.

shurā-ye kobrā, see dār ash-shurā-ye kobrā.

ṣūfī, follower of the mystical path in Islām; member of one of religious orders dedicated to such a pursuit.

sura, verse of the Qur'ān.

takfīr-nāmeh, a document issued by one of the 'ulamā declaring a person to be an infidel.

tamkhāh, budget.

tanzimāt, reforms.

tanzimāt-e ḥasaneh, reforms instituted in 1874, providing for establishment of provincial councils and making other changes in provincial administration.

ta'shīr, practice of deducting one-tenth of a salary or allowance as the due of the official making the payment.

taqlīd, imitation; practice of following the practices and pronouncements of one more learned than oneself, without exercising independent judgement.

taqiyyeh, dissimulation, especially in matters of religious belief, when circumstances require it.

tariqeh, path; the ṣūfī path to mystical knowledge; the ṣūfī order itself.

Tarjumān-e Aḥvāl, the first privately owned Ottoman newspaper, first published in 1860.

ta'ziyyeh, religious passion plays, most often performed in the month of Moḥarram.

tūmān, monetary unit, equal to ten krāns.

tuyūl, land assignment.

'urf, customary law.

'urfī, customary.

'ulamā, those learned in religious law.

umma, the community of believers; the early Islamic community.

'uṣūl, principles and sources of the religious law.

vaṭan, patrie, fatherland.

vaṭan-parastī, patriotism.

vakīl-e gūmān, see mīr-gazab.

vālī, governor.

valī'ahd, crown prince; heir apparent.

vālī-ye velāyat, an official in Malkam Khān's proposed Ādamiyyat society.

vazīr-e daftar, the head of the daftar-e estīfā', the accounting department of the state.

vazīr lashkar, the secretary or treasurer of the army, charged with the finances of the ministry of war as against the sepahsālār who was commander-in-chief of the troops.

vazarā-ye mokhtār-e darbār-e a'zam, the council of ministers or 'cabinet' established by Nāṣer ad-Dīn shah in 1874. See p. 135-7.

velāyat, province.

zakāt, the legal, obligatory tax Muslims were required to pay according to the Qur'ān on merchandise, crops, animals.

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