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Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty

Abstract:

A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the parties involved. This paper models bribery as a double auction where a private citizen and a public official strategically interact as the potential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service. Individuals differ in the internalized moral cost generated by corruption, and may have only imperfect information on others' moral cost, i.e. their "corruptibility". This paper investigates the role the imperfect information ...

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Volume:
WPS/2008-22
Series:
Working Paper Series
Publication date:
2008-01-01
URN:
uuid:68245acd-7d61-48c0-865f-ffd587a1e2fe
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13194
Language:
English

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