Misunderstanding and Mistranslation in the Origins of the Pacific War of 1941-1945:

The Importance of "Magic"

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
University of Oxford by

Keiichiro Komatsu
St. Catherine's College

October 1994

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Abstract

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The thesis is concerned with a specific example of misunderstanding as a factor in international crisis leading to war. The example is the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 and the thesis gives special importance to the mistranslation and misinterpretation of "Magic" (Magic, as the thesis explains, was the name given to the American decoding of the secret Japanese codes). The argument is that misunderstanding was a cumulative factor in relations between the United States and Japan, and that in the final negotiations mistranslation of Magic was a significant factor in the failure to reach an agreement. The thesis argues that as late as the last week in November 1941 the attack on Pearl Harbor could have been averted.

The thesis opens with an introduction referring to the literature on the causes of war and misunderstanding in international politics. A brief comparison is made with crises which did not lead to war, such as the Cuban missile crisis.

Part I is entitled "The Historical Legacy" and surveys briefly the period from the Spanish-American war to 1940. It does not claim to be a comprehensive account of U.S.-Japan relations. It is designed to show how successive crises increased misunderstanding. It emphasises the importance, for Japan, of the danger from Russia and demonstrates the lack of control in Japanese foreign policy.

Part II opens with an examination of the way policy was formed and decisions made in the United States and Japan, discussing the role of Roosevelt, Hull and other influential members of the Administration in the United States, and the lack of a central core of decision-making in Japan. It then proceeds with a chronological study of negotiations from November 1940 to October 1941.

Part III examines in detail the mistranslations from Magic, including the technical problems of coding and decoding and linguistic factors and problems of translation.

Part IV studies chronologically the final negotiations, including Proposal B and the Hull Note, up to the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. It shows in detail the synchronisation and lack of synchronisation between the two sides and demonstrates the points at which accurate translation and clear understanding might have altered the course of events.

The brief conclusion explains how the thesis adds to existing literature, notes the present state of archival material and speculates on the possible course of events had the attack on Pearl Harbor not occurred.

There are five appendices: (i) Magic materials; (ii) List of Important Magic Misinterpretations; (iii) Historiographic Developments; (iv) Bibliography; (v) Maps.

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Keiichiro Komatsu

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Table of Contents

Introduction i

Part I: The Historical Legacy

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: The Russo-Japanese War and the Open Door 15

Chapter 3: The First World War and its Aftermath 24

Chapter 4: Disarmament and the Manchurian Incident 39

Chapter 5: The China Incident 67

Part II: Turning Points in the Negotiations I

Chapter 6: Policy-Making and Decision-Making: Japan and the United States 114

Chapter 7: The Draft Understanding Proposal: November 1940-October 1941 195

Part III: "Magic" as a Cause of U.S.-Japan Misunderstanding

Chapter 8: Technical Problems of Coding and Decoding 279

Chapter 9: Linguistic Factors and Problems of Translation 315

Part IV: Turning Points in the Negotiations II

Chapter 10: Proposal B and the Hull Note: October 1941-December 1941 329

Conclusion 395

Appendices:

"Magic" Materials App-1

List of Important Magic Misinterpretations M-1

Historiographic Developments H-1

Bibliography B 1

Maps MP 1

Introduction

The causes of wars, as Professor Sir Michael Howard has pointed out, cannot be said to be "understudied".[1] The thesis which follows examines the origins of one war, that which started with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Some historians have regarded this war as a great tragedy which was bound to happen. But the argument of this thesis is that the cumulative effect of misunderstanding in the negotiations preceding the Pacific War contributed to the outbreak of the conflict, which was then precipitated by faulty communication. This included the significant role played by Magic, the decoded intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages delivered to the American decision-makers by the U.S. Army and Navy intelligence services.

Although the situation existing in the autumn of 1941 made conditions very difficult for averting the war, and the possibility of a different end to the U.S.-Japan peace talks was slight, it is argued that several occasions existed which can be regarded as potential turning-points for a different outcome even in the last stage of the peace talks, that is to say in the period of less than three months between October and early December 1941, immediately prior to Pearl Harbor. It is argued that mistranslations and distortions, especially in Magic, played a major part in the sequence of events which led to the failure of the U.S.-Japan negotiations, particularly in those cases which occurred in the last, sensitive stage, between October and December 7th, 1941.

A distinction must be drawn between the underlying factors which caused a crisis in U.S.-Japanese relations and those which led to war. In simpler terms they may be described as the long-term and the immediate origins of the war — a distinction which is readily made by historians analysing, for example, the origins of the First World War.

Amongst the factors which caused the U.S.-Japan crisis it is easy to identify ideological differences between the two countries, the difference in their

strategies in foreign affairs, their mutually incompatible national interests, the endless political disputes and criticism which arose between the two sides and the considerable internal discord within both countries. All these, and other important factors, help to explain why the U.S.-Japan crisis occurred in the period up to 1941.

An international crisis, however, need not always develop into an actual war. In this sense, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 might be a good example to illustrate this significant point. As far as the factors which caused the Cuban crisis are concerned, one can identify several, such as ideological differences between the sides, the difference of the participants' foreign strategies, etc., which are similar to certain factors of the previous crisis, i.e. the U.S.-Japan crisis in the early 1940s. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, it has become known how dangerously close to war the situation came during the Cuban crisis. That is because it has been analysed on a day-by-day basis with the co-operation of the participants, of some politicians who were actually involved in the events, and of scholars from the United States, the former Soviet Union and Cuba. The Third World War, however, in contrast with the Pacific War, did not break out. In other words, in addition to the root causes of the U.S.-Japan crisis, a further element was added, the misunderstanding arising from Magic. The comparison with the Cuban crisis is the more apposite given the importance of communication between Washington and Moscow and the fact that its limitations led to the establishment of the telephone hot-line between the two capitals.[2]

The study of misunderstanding and misperception, and the persistence of stereotypes and "images" have been an important part of the growth of the discipline of international relations since the Second World War. One author has expressed the need "to consider the subjective dimension in international conflict, to understand how and why the images held in other nations may differ from our own" (*Image and Reality in World Politics* by John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith).[3] Some adopt a mainly psychological approach, for instance, Robert

Jervis.[4] Most studies work from a relatively shallow historical perspective. For example, Stanley Hoffman, writing about Franco-American relations, is mainly concerned with the Gaullist period.[5] But some authors find a much longer time-perspective indispensable for their explanation. Thus, Benjamin Schwartz, writing on *The Maoist Image of World Order* [6] finds it necessary first to explain "the persistent features of the traditional image of world order" including "the Chinese culture-area conceived of as the center of a higher civilization that is ideally associated with a universal state ... occupying a unique cosmic status."[7]

The thesis draws on this literature and attempts to add to it, identifying specific characteristics of misperception and misunderstanding between Japan and the United States or, more widely, the West. In this example there is no escape from the problem facing any analyst who adopts a deep historical perspective. On the one hand, it is impossible to make a direct link between the ideas which men had about each other in the seventeenth century and the conduct of diplomacy in the twentieth. On the other hand, it would be quite unhistorical to assume that twentieth-century misperceptions do not have their roots in earlier centuries. Such a view becomes even more untenable with the end of the Cold War and the re-emergence of centuries-old ethnic conflicts in Europe, or with the endurance of millennial conflicts between, for example, Arabs and Persians on opposing sides of the Gulf.

Any discussion of this deeper perspective must be controlled within the bounds of a thesis whose central focus is the events of three months in 1941. But the problem of the relationship between deep cultural attitudes and decisions taken under pressure, in an international crisis when war is an imminent possibility, must be explored even if no quick or satisfactory answer can be given. "What seems clear and distinct is apt to be influenced by what one thinks is fair and equitable. These beliefs are determined in large part by assumptions and theories, often implicit, about norms and political rights that may not be shared among conflicting states" (*The Logic of Images in International Relations* by

Robert Jervis).[8] Finally, to quote again the same passage in Farrell and Smith: the need "is practically relevant as well as theoretically interesting ... to make our images more realistic and our perceptions keener".[9]

It should be clear from the above that the author's intention is not to become involved in any political or ideological disputes, such as whether the war was mainly caused by the fault of the Japanese leaders or by that of the Western leaders, or whether mainly by Japan's military aggression since the early 1930s or by Western colonialism, including its implied threat to Japan since the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the author recognises the significant points of these disputes, and the importance of historical analysis and interpretation of these themes, he can hardly expect to find the measure with which to judge the conclusions reached. One can only say that all the countries which were involved in such a full-scale war should, to a certain extent, take some responsibility for the war, but it is impossible to judge which country should take a greater responsibility than other countries, particularly in the case of such an extremely complicated large-scale war.

The author agrees with some points in an essay entitled *Senso Sekinin* *戦争責任* (War Responsibilities) written by Professor Saburo Ienaga 家永三郎, in which, with a detailed analysis of both the legal and moral aspects, including the issue of atrocities, Ienaga discusses the degree of responsibility which should be attributed to most of the participants in the war. He is clearly aware of the responsibilities which Japan owes to each of the Asian countries, i.e. China, the Philippines, Malaya, etc., and also to the U.S. and her allies, and even to the former Soviet Union and to the neutral states, i.e. the Portuguese colonies in the region, while he also discusses the responsibilities which the United States and the former Soviet Union may have towards Japan.[10]

Part of the argument of the thesis is that if specific misunderstandings recur the effect is cumulative. The starting-point of each new crisis is the misunderstanding produced by its predecessor. This is particularly true when

conflict between states is generated by their rise or fall in the world balance of power, as was the case with the growth of Japan in the twentieth century.

Finally, the thesis argues that as late as the second part of November 1941 the attack on Pearl Harbor might have been averted. Against the background of accumulated misunderstanding Magic played a crucial part in the failure to control the crisis which, in the event, led to war.

The Plan of the Thesis

The thesis is divided into four parts, followed by a brief conclusion. Part I outlines the main events in U.S.-Japan relations in the twentieth century. Its purpose is not to give a comprehensive account but to emphasise certain major themes. It contrasts the perceptions of the United States, a continental power thousands of miles distant from the coasts of Asia, with those of Japan, geographically and historically close to the Asian mainland. It argues that "principles" such as the "Open Door" and the "territorial and administrative integrity of China" were important in U.S. foreign policy, while Japanese policy was more pragmatic. The discussion of Japanese foreign policy in the same period emphasises Japan's traditional fear of the Russian threat and stresses the lack of decision in Japanese policy formation. It outlines the different perspectives of the United States and Japan on Manchuria, gives special attention to the Tripartite Pact as a cause of misunderstanding in U.S.-Japan relations, and studies the Nomonhan Incident to explain Japan's fear of Russia.

Part II opens with a study of policy formation and decision-making in the United States and Japan. It depicts Roosevelt as a President always concerned with domestic politics and, in foreign policy, giving primacy to Europe. It studies the role of Hull and of other principal actors in the Roosevelt Administration, including the minimal influence exercised by Joseph Grew as Ambassador. It contrasts Japanese policy-making, arguing that rivalries between the Army and

the Navy and between civilian and military were conducted without the type of central core contained within the American Presidential system. For this purpose, it examines in detail the Japanese practice of inscribing conflicting views (Ryoron-heiki 両論併記) in a Sakubun 作文 and the indecision which this practice implies. The second chapter of Part II examines in detail the turning points in negotiations around the Draft Understanding Proposal, from November 1940 to October 1941.

Part III analyses the technical and linguistic problems of coding and decoding Japanese diplomatic traffic and shows how mistakes of decoding by Magic, and mistranslation, produced significant elements of misunderstanding.

Part IV continues the detailed chronological account begun in Chapter 7, following the diplomatic exchange around Proposal B and the Hull Note, up to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Finally, the Conclusion explains how the thesis adds to the existing literature on Pearl Harbor, notes the present state of the Magic archive, and reflects on the possible sequence of events if the attack on Pearl Harbor had not been made.

Notes

Japanese personal names have been written in the English order, i.e. surname last, wherever they are written in English. When written in Japanese script, the order is Japanese, i.e. surname first; for example, Shigeru Yoshida 吉田茂. Chinese names are given in the Chinese order, i.e. surname first, as this convention is already widespread in English writing, e.g. Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石. The American spelling of "Pearl Harbor" has been used throughout the thesis. Mukden (from the Manchu language) is known as "Mukden" in English, "Hoten 奉天" in Japanese, and "Fengtien 奉天" in Chinese.

At the risk of offending the specialist, long vowel indicators have been omitted (Ōkawa Shūmei, for example, could be used to indicate the pronunciation "Ohkawa Shuumei"). The use of these indicators, however, will mean little to the general reader; whereas the specialist will have little difficulty in recognising long vowels where they occur.

The ideographs are provided for the Japanese and Chinese terms, personal names and institutions used in this thesis. As is demonstrated in the following chapters, one of the causes of serious international misunderstanding between the West and Japan at the time, i.e. the mistranslations of Magic, was this very tendency to underestimate the significance of the part played by ideographs in the Japanese language. Even native Japanese speakers, including the author, have sometimes experienced difficulties in understanding some English essays which do not include the ideographs for names.

The difficulty occurs with some Japanese abbreviations, in addition to personal names, mainly because one ideograph usually has more than one pronunciation, and conversely the same pronunciation can apply to more than one ideograph. In some cases, therefore, it is necessary to know both the ideographs and also their contextually correct pronunciations in order to ensure positive identification of the person. For example, General Hajime Sugiyama

杉山元 and General Gen Sugiyama 杉山元 are the same person's name written with the same ideographs, but often pronounced differently by different writers. Conversely, Foreign Minister Ishii, written 石井, and Diplomat Ishii, written 石射, are different persons with different names using different ideographs, both pronounced the same way; both held the post of Ambassador, although at different times. The author has, therefore, included the ideographs for personal names, for institutions and wherever he considers it to be necessary, usually when the name appears for the first time in a chapter.

Concerning the official titles of Japanese documents, there is no equivalent to capitalisation in the Japanese language, therefore it is sometimes difficult to determine what should or should not be treated as an official title requiring capitalisation in English. The ones that have been capitalised here, however, are in a formal "Chinese" style (although not necessarily following Chinese word order), as indicated by the fact that they are mostly a succession of nouns with fewer particles and sometimes no particles. (Japanese particles are somewhat equivalent to English prepositions.) This rather formal style gives the group of words the feeling of a title, although in English they appear more like abbreviated sentences. The process is somewhat similar to what is done in the German language, where two, three or more words are strung together to form a long compound noun. A typical example is the title of a document dated August 6th, 1941, which can be translated as: "Matters Relating to Action Japan Should Take with Regard to the Situation of Relative Strength of Japan and the Soviet Union" (日ソ間の現勢に対し帝国の採るべき措置に関する件).

The author makes a distinction in this text between the terms "Mongol" and "Manchu" on the one hand, and "Mongolian" and "Manchurian" on the other. The former refers to those who think they belong, or can be regarded as belonging, to that ethnic group, while the latter indicates all of the population within the areas using that name, and which could include many non-Mongols and non-Manchus.

1 Howard, Michael. *The Causes of Wars*, Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1984, p. 7.

2 Garthoff, Raymond L. *Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis*, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1987, pp. 85-8.

3 Farrell, John C. and Smith, Asa P. *Image and Reality in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968, p. viii.

4 Jervis, Robert. "Perceiving and Coping with Threat", in Jervis, Robert and Lebow, Richard Ned and Stein, Janice Gross, *Psychology and Deterrence*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985, pp. 13-33.

5 Hoffman, Stanley. "Perceptions, Reality, and the Franco-American Conflict", in Farrell, John C. and Smith, Asa P. *Image and Reality in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968, pp. 57-71.

6 Schwartz, Benjamin I. "The Maoist Image of World Order", in Farrell, John C. and Smith, Asa P., *Image and Reality in World Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968, pp. 92-102.

7 Ibid., pp. 92-3.

8 Jervis, Robert. *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1970, p. 141.

9 Farrell and Smith, op. cit., p. viii.

10 Ienaga, Saburo 家永三郎. *Senso Sekinin* 戦争責任 (War Responsibilities), Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1985, pp. 48-165.

Part 1

The Historical Legacy

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Pacific War has a central place in the history of the twentieth century. Like any other event of comparable magnitude it has its antecedents in history, which are examined in this chapter. Subsequently, an attempt is made to explore the growth of different perceptions between East and West through centuries of intermittent contact. But this chapter is concerned with the more immediate prelude.

It begins a generation after the end of the American Civil War and after the Meiji 明治 Restoration in Japan. As the nineteenth century drew to a close the continental expansion of the United States was complete and America expanded into the Pacific, beginning the process which would make it a dominant world power some fifty years later. At the same time Japan ceased to be merely the recipient of foreign influence and engaged in wars with its neighbours, which led to its own imperial expansion. Thus the twentieth-century change in the power balance began.

It is not the intention of this section to give a detailed diplomatic history of the forty years that followed. Its purpose is to provide a prelude to the themes which form the main argument of the thesis.

Firstly, it contrasts the Pacific view of the United States with the Japanese view of the unstable political situation across the Japan Sea. The United States, a continental power with no threat to its own security, formulated a foreign policy which mixed ideals and self-interest.[1] The thesis follows the arguments of George Kennan in emphasising the importance of "principles" in American foreign policy.[2] The Japanese view of the political turmoil persisting in the border regions of China, Korea and Russia, caused partly by ethnic divisions scarcely understood in Washington, was calculating and pragmatic, even when it was tinged by a certain romanticism.

No less important was the Japanese view of Russia, particularly that of the Japanese Army, a constant enemy up to the present day. The Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 did nothing to diminish, in the Japanese perspective, the threat from the North. The acquisition of Korea gave Japan a land border with Russia which was extended, but left undefined in places, by the creation of Manchukuo. From Washington, Tokyo is on the other side of the world and in the American popular consciousness Russia means Moscow. But from Aomori 青森 in North Honshu 本州 to Vladivostok is 450 miles, the distance from Washington to Boston or Miami to Guantanamo in Cuba.

The historical survey which follows, as the main body of the thesis, therefore gives major attention to Japanese preoccupation with the frontier region of China, Manchuria, Mongolia and Korea. The area was as familiar to the Japanese as the North-West Frontier was to the British, while remaining relatively unknown to the United States, which only developed its intelligence services during and after the Second World War. The thesis naturally reflects the work of Japanese scholars, largely unknown in the West where, except in specialist works, a simplified view of the region prevails.

Secondly, the survey emphasises a major theme in the thesis, the nature of decision-taking in the Japanese system. The argument is that rivalries within the political system resulted in lack of control over policy, and that Japanese foreign policy was the product of those rivalries, amongst Japanese forces abroad and between them and the Tokyo government. The divisions were not only between the political and the military but also between the Army and the Navy and within the Army. These divisions were only partly understood in Washington where the central direction of Japanese foreign policy was exaggerated.

Thirdly, attention is drawn to efforts by the Japanese government to limit and contain conflict and expansion — efforts which failed because of the divided nature of the political community and the stifling of diplomatic effort.

These themes are examined briefly in four periods: the period of American and Japanese expansion up to the First World War; the war and its aftermath; the Manchurian Incident; and finally the China Incident, or, as it has become known more recently, the Sino-Japanese War.

Constitutional Structure: Lack of Control in Japanese Politics up to 1945

The structure of Japan's pre-war political system is worth reviewing in order to analyse an important source of the lack of control over national policy-making in a crisis, which derived from some of the characteristics of the political structure itself. Although the pre-war system proved its effectiveness on many occasions in peacetime, it revealed its weak points in times of crisis. The political system worked well to keep the domestic power of balance stable, but in many instances failed to adapt to the international environment and solve serious international issues.[3] Although the Japanese political system was dramatically changed after the end of the Pacific War, Michael Blaker of Columbia University points out that some of the characteristics of the post-war Japanese system and decision-making style have been inherited from those of the pre-war period.[4] In fact, Japan's post-war history, including its record high pace of economic growth, has proved the effectiveness of some of the characteristics of the system in peacetime. Despite the post-war experience, however, many Japanese have argued that the lack of an effective crisis management system still presents a serious problem in the post-war political system. Their experiences in the Oil Crisis of 1973 and in the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1 are among the examples given of this problem.

As noted by Professor Albert M. Craig of Harvard University: "Government in Japan between 1890 and 1945 was constitutional, but it was not mainly parliamentary. The constitution gave different powers to different bodies".[5]

The Army and Navy's "right of autonomous command", called in Japanese "Tosuiken Dokuritsu 統帥権独立", was based on the Meiji Constitution. The "right"

was technically under the direct control of the Emperor, although in practice it was exercised by the chiefs of staff of the services. The chiefs of staff could justify their execution of the right of autonomous command by claiming the authority of the Emperor on a constitutional basis. In particular, the result of the London Disarmament Conference of 1930 triggered dispute in Japan, over the long-term question of "where this right ended and foreign policy began".[6]

In addition, the frequent conflicts between the Army and Navy created difficulties in important national policy-making. Originally, while the leadership of the Army had been dominated by members from the former "Choshu han 長州藩", Choshu Province, that of the Navy had been from the former "Satsuma han 薩摩藩", Satsuma Province, from the Meiji Restoration of the late 1860s up to the first decade of the 1900s. As a result, these conflicts were over policy-making and were linked to the rivalry between these two factions in the central government.[7]

The traditional conflict became more serious after the revision of the document entitled "Directives for Japan's National Defence" (Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin 帝国国防方針) in January 1923. The Navy became responsible for the potential threat of the Americans, while the Army was still responsible with regard to the Russian threat.[8] Thus, the lack of smooth relations between the Army and the Navy accelerated up to the Pacific War. Makoto Ikuta 生田惇, of the Military History Department of the Defence Agency, notes that the first joint operational plan in the history of the Japanese armed forces, the Imperial Army and Navy Operational Plan (Teikoku Riku-Kai-gun Sakusen Keikaku 帝国陸海軍作戦計画), was only formulated as late as January 20th, 1945, the last of the four years of the Pacific War.[9]

The "Genro 元老" (elder statesmen) named the Prime Minister on behalf of the Emperor, although, as noted by Professor T. Takeuchi 竹内 as early as 1936, they had "no status within the Constitution".[10] Although they were an "extra-legal body", in practice they had powerful authority since most of them were the

original members who formed the new Meiji regime (Genkun 元勲).[11] They were powerful enough to control both the cabinet, the Army and the Navy. Thus, one of the characteristics of the method of operation under the Meiji system was a combination of the constitutional organs and the extra-legal bodies. This was perhaps an inevitable product of the combination of the new system modelled on the West and of Japan's traditional social conditions evolved during the long strict seclusion period of the previous two and a half centuries.

However, this Meiji constitutional system seemed to be somewhat unprepared for the disappearance of the Genro. In fact, most of them had disappeared by the early 1920s because of old age. The ex-prime ministers, called "Jushin 重臣", were not powerful enough when they took over, for one reason because the Jushin could claim neither to be the original members in the formation of the Meiji regime nor to be a constitutional organ. The weak point of the Meiji constitutional system began to be revealed. This system could cause the problem of lack of national control since the constitution gave different powers to different bodies although the Genro no longer existed.

The evaluation of the Meiji constitutional system has been controversial, since it has been both praised on certain points and heavily criticised on others. Craig, for instance, states that "The constitution was a blend of many conflicting ideas, but it turned out to be a reasonably successful balance among the various political forces of the time".[12] In fact, it can be said in a certain context that the system was well designed to prevent the emergence of personal dictatorship, both in the civilian as well as in the military command, since neither the cabinet and Diet nor the chiefs of staff of the services had direct control over the other. In other words, the civilian government could not produce a dictator, because he would not have control over the military, and the armed services could not wield absolute power because of the presence of the Army and Navy ministers representing the government.

Professor Mikiso Hane of Knox College, on the other hand, notes, quoting from Robert A. Scalapino, that "It can be said that 'The Meiji Constitution was essentially an attempt to unite two concepts which ... were irreconcilable: Imperial absolutism and popular government' ..." and concludes that "Consequently, if the constitution was to function effectively, compromises had to be made, but the side that was destined to make the major concessions was the one representing the popular elements."[13]

The nature of the Meiji Constitution, as Professor John W. Hall of Yale University states, "proved to be a remarkable combination of Western political technology and traditional Japanese political ideas". Hall continues: "Its philosophy of government, particularly in its handling of the question of sovereignty and the relationship of the emperor to government and to the people, was based on principles which Japanese for centuries had looked upon as their inherited polity (kokutai [国体])". Indeed, as is often pointed out on the basis of Article One of the Constitution, "The emperor was legalized as an absolute, sacred monarch, above the government and yet the very embodiment of the state".[14] As Professor Shoichi Watanabe 渡部昇一 notes, the fear of the founders of the Constitution including Hirobumi Ito 伊藤博文 was of the possibility of a revival of the Tokugawa Shogunate dual-ruling system, which included the Imperial Court (see Chapter 9). Thus, they wished to restore a strong measure of authority to the Emperor. In this context, although Article One only of the Constitution is often quoted, it should properly be considered in conjunction with Article Four. As John Hall states, Article Four "provided that government should be conducted 'according to the constitution', [which] opened the way for theorists to claim that there could be a law above the emperor and hence that government should be responsive to popular will".[15]

Mikiso Hane states that "Sovereignty was lodged in the Emperor, who held supreme command over the armed forces and possessed broad executive authority" and "Government officials, including cabinet ministers, were

responsible to the Emperor, not to the Diet".[16] Craig, however, points out that "It [the Meiji Constitution] has often been condemned in recent years for having provided too little democracy, but this is the perspective of a later age. At the time most Western countries themselves had limitations on the electorate and parliamentary power, and the advice to the Japanese of most Occidentals, including such disparate figures as President Grant and Herbert Spencer, was to go slow on democratic experimentation".[17] Similarly, John Hall states that "The constitution was carefully devised to maintain the political status quo, to be sure, but it proved far less authoritarian than some members of the high bureaucracy would have wanted. And once it was promulgated it had the approval of the Japanese press and of constitutional scholars and lawyers the world over, including such men as Herbert Spencer and Oliver Wendell Holmes".[18]

The system did, however, raise the possibility of another kind of problem: lack of control over policy. The principal conflicts were those between the civilian leaders and the military leaders, i.e. between the Prime Minister and the Army or the Navy Minister, and between the administration and the command, i.e. between the Army or the Navy Minister and the chiefs of staff of the Army or the Navy. Furthermore, the constitutional position of the Emperor remained ambiguous (see Chapter 9). In certain areas this complex combination led to a lack of definition or to inadequate definition of some specific constitutional responsibilities.

In the conduct of foreign policy, particularly in times of crisis, this became a very important problem, as there was no effective, consistent decision-making based on agreement or compromise among the elements of the government and of the military. There was in practice no authority which could force them to compromise or agree. It is clear then that the problem, far from being one of totalitarian control, was in fact the opposite, that of lack of control.

Constitutional Structure: Divisions in the American Political System

Divisions in the Japanese government were paralleled by divisions in the American system. The emergence of the United States into world affairs was accompanied by academic discussion of the role of Congress and the possibilities of presidential leadership. The approach to the Second World War followed a century after Tocqueville's study had questioned the ability of a democracy to conduct a successful foreign policy. In 1885 Woodrow Wilson wrote his classic *Congressional Government* and James Bryce's *The American Commonwealth* was published in 1888. The debate on the separation of powers and foreign policy, which had begun with the drafting of the Constitution, entered a new phase which has not ended today.

It was also a matter of great practical importance. The division between President and Congress was of fundamental importance in the first half of the twentieth century. President Wilson assumed an unprecedented role as an international leader negotiating the Treaty of Versailles. He expressed, as no one else did, the hopes of millions of people for a new era of diplomacy and he was directly involved in the negotiation of the Treaty. But, as is well-known, the United States Senate refused to ratify the Treaty. This moment in time, 1920, can be seen as halfway between the closing of the frontier in 1890 and the appointment of a Supreme Commander in Europe in 1950.

Thereafter, isolationism continued to be a dominant force in Congress, growing in importance during Roosevelt's presidency as the world crisis became more intense. By passing the neutrality legislation Congress asserted its right to limit the powers of the President in foreign policy. Roosevelt was acutely aware of a growing crisis, especially in Europe, which could eventually affect American security. Congress, or at least those representatives and senators from the Middle West, were determined to place a brake on any American involvement in world affairs. The President trod a careful path between rallying support for his own

views and responding to public sentiment in order to safeguard his political position. The "quarantine" speech of October 5th, 1937, was an example of this tension.

As far as the executive was concerned there was a difference between the Japanese and the American systems. In theory there is none of the ambiguity which surrounded the position of the Japanese Emperor nor the diffusion of power which characterised the Japanese prime-ministerial system. In practice the system is more complex. Every President has his own style of government. The virtual absence of a formal cabinet system leaves the President free to consult wherever he wishes in the political system, without regard to formal title or office. Although he is ultimately responsible for the whole of government, in practice he leaves much to his subordinates for the greater part of the time. Inevitably therefore the system is open to bureaucratic politics as members of the Administration compete for influence over the President's ultimate power of decision.

The result, seen from the outside, may well be contradictions of policy and a confusion of signals, which foreign governments have to interpret as best they can. As a broad generalisation it can be said that Henry Stimson and Cordell Hull had a personal commitment to the principles which have been so important in American foreign policy, while President Hoover and President Roosevelt were, because of their office as well as their personalities, more pragmatic with regard both to domestic politics and foreign policy. Roosevelt's most recent biographer has written of Hull: "encumbered by principle, he was vulnerable to personal hurt by the adroit, pragmatic politician in whose Cabinet he served – and certainly he was much put upon by the President of the United States".[19]

There were differences, too, in the military sphere. The Navy held pride of place, as could be expected in a continental power like the United States. Its prestige and importance were increased by the impact of Alfred Thayer Mahan's essay on sea power and by the personal interest which both Theodore and

Franklin Roosevelt took in the Navy. Between the wars the Army had a less active role and the political battle necessary to establish an effective Department of Defense was not fought until after the Second World War. The conditions of peace did not call for a tight command structure — had it existed the surprise of Pearl Harbor might never have occurred.

At the same time it should be noted that one element of the post-war American system did not yet exist. The foreign intelligence services were undeveloped and were limited to the Army and Navy.[20] More importantly, the United States lacked the basic knowledge of conditions on the ground which might have modified the commitment to principles in foreign policy.

Cultural Factors and Problems of Perception

As historians have pointed out, international frictions often derive from entrenched mutual perspectives between cultures, based on their historical experiences over centuries. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to give a detailed analysis of historical events over such a long period of time, it is still useful to introduce some historians' views of this important background.

For example, Christopher Thorne states that:

> Stimson's reference to "contrasting civilizations", like Soekarno's assertions concerning "Europeans", indicates a further perspective within which Far Eastern developments were viewed ... When, in this vein, Sir Frederick Maze, the British Inspector General of China's Maritime Customs, saw the Tientsin crisis of 1939 as constituting a confrontation, not merely between Japan and Britain, but of "the Orient against the Occident — the Yellow Race against the White Race", he was adopting a perspective that can be traced back to the Roman Empire and the Greek city states.[21]

Similarly Endymion Wilkinson states that:

> When she [Japan] began forcing herself into the European consciousness by the defeat of China in 1895, or the victories over Russia in 1904 and 1905, Europeans were completely taken by surprise ... Negative images were evoked and the ones most readily available were the immemorial images of the Orient. So Japan was seen as a "Yellow Peril", an image which owed more to past fears of Attila or Genghis Khan or Tamerlane, rather than to any comprehension of the policies of the Meiji oligarchs.[22]

Taking into account the fact that there was very little contact between Japan and the West for over two and a half centuries, it is rather natural that there should have evolved mutual stereotypes which went unexamined. The seclusion policy itself resulted from mistrust, and this negative image remained until the re-opening of the country in the middle of the 19th century. It is not surprising that the traditional mistrust did not entirely disappear within the few generations between the opening of the country and the beginning of the Pacific War.

An early example of the mistrust was the dispute with Spain and Portugal over the Nagasaki 長崎 concession, which had been granted by the local warlord to the Jesuits, but was revoked by Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 in 1587. The European Catholic powers regarded this as a religious suppression of Christianity, while the Japanese authorities saw the concession as evidence of an intention to colonise the whole of Japan. This suspicion was an important factor in the decision eventually to close the country almost completely to foreign influence. This difference of views has not been reconciled to this day.

In a recent study, Diego Pacheco, S.J., analysed Japanese and Spanish primary sources[23] and asserted that: "The same conclusion may be deduced from all the contemporary documents — Nagasaki was given and was received, not as a concession of Japanese soil to foreigners nor as a colony".[24] He endorses the view that the Jesuits were invited to Nagasaki at the request of the local lord, and that any income they derived from their activities there was merely an expression of gratitude for their work.

On the other hand, Professor Kiichi Matsuda 松田毅一 concludes, in 1992, that "the Tokugawa shogunate's ban on missionary works motivated by their suspicion was well-grounded".[25] He then introduces the following Spanish document, a proposal from Don Rodrigo to the King of Spain:

It is needless to say that it is worthwhile for Your Majesty if Spain invaded such a large and prosperous Kingdom. I think that this country has only one problem which is the lack of sovereignty of Your Majesty. As a result of my consideration, I found that it is impossible to do so by military means because they have a large

population and the castles are strongly fortified ... so that ... there is no other way but through the evangelical work of the Holy Gospel to enforce the Japanese to place themselves at the service of Your Majesty.[26]

We can see that the perceptions from each side have changed very little in the last four hundred years. It is not at all surprising, therefore, to realise that a great deal of mutual suspicion and mistrust may have lain behind some of the difficulties of accurate perception experienced during the 1941 U.S.-Japan talks. This is an important factor when taking into account the suspicious views of pre-war Japanese leaders,[27] including Fumimaro Konoe 近衛文麿, towards Western intentions,[28] and those of contemporary American leaders including both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Henry L. Stimson who expressed negative images of Japan going back to "samurai" tradition (see Chapter 6).

As far as Magic, the decoded intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages, is concerned, Alwin D. Kramer, chief of the section of Naval Intelligence in charge of translating Japanese messages, still believed the Japanese tended to express themselves in milder words than those in which their thoughts were cast, and thus justified the harder tone of the English version. As noted by Professor Jay Rubin, however, "It is true that medieval aesthetic concepts in Japan favored the unspoken, the subtly suggested ... But the medieval period ended a long time ago".[29] Its residue was a secular misunderstanding between the West and Japan.

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9 M. Ikuta, op. cit., p. 222.

10 Takeuchi, Tatsuji. *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire*, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1936, p. 19.

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20 The Second World War brought a rapid development in this sphere and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was established by President Truman after the war. Conflicts between the CIA and other branches of government had not yet occurred.

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27 For example, the Ministry of War's famous Written Memorial (Kenpaku-sho 建白書) of 1870 recommended the establishment of a Navy in response to a perceived general threat from the West. See its content and analysis in Toyama, Saburo 外山三郎. *Nihon Kaigun-shi* *日本海軍史* (A History of the Japanese Navy), Kyoiku sha 教育社, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 37-8.

28 Refer to Konoe's essay entitled "Driving Out Anglo-American Self-centred Pacifism" 「英米本位の平和主義を排す」(Ei-Bei Hon-i no Heiwa Shugi o Haisu) written on November 3rd, 1918, quoted in Ueyama, Shunpei 上山春平 and Miyake, Masaki 三宅正樹. *Sekai no Rekishi — Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen* *世界の歴史 — 第二次世界大戦* (World History — The Second World War), Kawade Shobo Shinsha 河出書房新社, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 53-4.

29 Rubin, Jay. *Gone Fishin': New Angles on Perennial Problems*, Kodansha International, Tokyo,1992, p. 15.

Chapter 2: The Russo-Japanese War and the Open Door

The first decade of the twentieth century set the pattern, in several respects, for the next forty years. The annexation of the Philippines that resulted from the Spanish-American War marked the emergence of the United States as a future world power. It coincided with Japan's protection and extension of its interests on the Asian mainland, beginning with the war with China and the war against Russia and continuing with the annexation of Korea. Up to a point Japan was seen, by the American government, as a potential ally.

The more lasting anxiety of the United States was, however, that Japan would join with the European imperial powers to establish exclusive spheres of influence in China. This fear was increased when the Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed in 1902. As George Kennan has written: "At the end of 1897 and the beginning of 1898 there was a real and justifiable fear that China would be partitioned".[1]

These fears gave birth to the policy known as the "Open Door". The Russians made evident their determination to have a special position in Manchuria, including a naval base at Lushun 旅順 (Port Arthur) and a commercial port at Dalian 大連, both to be connected by railway with the new Trans-Siberian. The Germans consolidated their control over the port of Kiaochow 膠県 and their influence in the Shantung 山東 Peninsula. The French, coming up from Indo-China, successfully negotiated with the Chinese government in Peking for the lease of a port, for railroad concessions, for the appointment of a French citizen as head of the Chinese postal services, and for other favours.

The British, who as long as they dominated the China trade had favoured the Open Door idea, now joined the rivalry for concessions. "To balance the Russian position at Port Arthur, they [the British] leased a strategic port on the other side of the Gulf of Pechili. They went into the railway concession business in a big way, particularly in the Yangtze Valley" and leased Kowloon 九竜 in

1898. As a result, the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs Service was forced to move from Kowloon.[2]

In the summer of 1899 John Hay and his colleagues prepared the Open Door notes and presented them to the powers. Shortly afterwards the Boxer rebellion, a nationalist movement in reaction to pressures from foreign powers, began in China. The rebellion, and the intervention which followed, increased Hay's anxiety that China would be partitioned. Moreover, it was a presidential election year. On July 3rd, one day before the opening of the Democratic National Convention, Hay issued the second Open Door Note, which was no more than a statement of the American position. It stated that "the policy of the Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, [and] preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity ..."[3] There was thus a significant shift from an Open Door for trade to the protection of the "Chinese territorial entity". The purpose was still to protect U.S. interests while avoiding American involvement in Asia.[4]

Two points are worth noting. One is that Hay had too much practical sense to demand the abandonment of the spheres of influence which the Europeans and Japan had acquired. The second is that the conflict between Russia and Japan was over interests in Manchuria, and "China", in the American mind, included Manchuria. This was important since the phrase used in the second Open Door Note was: "underwent a quiet transformation as the years passed, until in the minds of many Americans it became a guarantee of China's territorial integrity".[5]

There was thus a duality in American foreign policy. When the Russo-Japanese War began the United States took a favourable view of Japan, which was seen as a small power fighting the despotic Tsarist Empire and defending Manchuria from Russian penetration. President Theodore Roosevelt asserted: "Japan is playing our game".[6] But with the end of the Russo-Japanese War Roosevelt's favour towards Japan evaporated as Japan pressed its claims on Russia, although these were quickly moderated in the face of American opposition.

Moreover, Japan had now replaced Russia as the dominant power in southern Manchuria.

In 1906 U.S.-Japan relations worsened. While the Americans reacted against the Japanese because the Kwantung Army resisted when the U.S. attempted to expand her concessions in Manchuria, the Japanese reacted against the Americans because of the immigration dispute raised in California. Under these circumstances, the Tokyo government started to approach the countries of the Triple Entente in Europe (France, Russia and Britain), continuing its attempt to restore better relations with the U.S. As a result, the Franco-Japanese Entente was established in June 1907 and then the Russo-Japanese Entente in July 1907, while the Army again defined Russia as the most threatening hypothetical enemy in the document: the "Directives of Japan's National Defence (Teikoku Kokubo Hoshin 帝国国防方針)" of 1907.[7]

It is worth noting that the tension between the two powers was accompanied in both cases by domestic divisions. In Japan it was at this time that the inner discord between the Army and the government became serious. In fact, as Professor Toshihiko Shimada 島田俊彦 points out, Russian foreign policy towards Japan was temporarily softened immediately after the war of 1904-5, as the war became an immediate cause of the 1905 Revolution. But the Government-General of Kwantung, which faced the great Russian power in northern Manchuria, could not relax.[8] In the United States the Federal government was opposed to the government of the State of California, not wanting problems of immigration to create international tension.[9]

During this formative period of U.S.-Japanese relations there were important developments in the military field. The first American contingency plan for war against Japan was made in 1897,[10] ten years before the Japanese Navy's first recognition of the U.S. as a potential enemy in the "Directives for Japan's National Defence" of 1907.[11] The U.S. war game based on the assumption of the Japanese intention to attack the Hawaiian Islands took place in 1907,[12] twenty

years before Japan's first war game of 1927, which considered the possibility of attacking Hawaii.[13] Naturally the war games of both sides across the Pacific Ocean were mainly conducted by both countries' navies rather than by their armies. It cannot be said that the war plans were themselves a cause of war. There are certainly many thousands of war plans which never left the planning rooms of the world's armies and navies. But the U.S. Navy's plan had been defined as a "comprehensive offensive strategy".[14] As such it provoked a Japanese response, especially towards the U.S. position in Hawaii. Those who had predicted Japanese expansion across the Pacific could then see their predictions validated.

By 1907 the United States had finally annexed the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Hawaiian islands. The Japanese government accepted this expansion with no more than a formal protest and recognised the necessity of co-operating with the United States. They felt a serious threat posed by the Russians in the North, but did not yet recognise the U.S. as a threatening power. In 1901 "the Japanese, alarmed by the increasing pace of Russian encroachment in Manchuria, inquired politely whether the United States would be inclined to join them [the Japanese] in using force to assure the observance of the principles it had enunciated. Hay replied that the United States was not at present prepared to attempt ... to enforce these views in the east by any demonstration which could present a character of hostility to any other power ... They [the Japanese] were interested then, as always, in real military allies, not half-hearted ones".[15] One year later, in 1902, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was established.

At the same time the American view of China, as we have seen, gave increasing importance to the "integrity" of a "territory" which, in American eyes, included Manchuria as part of China. The Japanese perspective was different. Some leaders in pre-war Japan had believed that the Japanese were culturally and ethnically closer to the Tungusic Manchus than to the Chinese; for example, the Chairman of the Planning Board Naoki Hoshino 星野直樹, Chief Secretary to the Cabinet under Hideki Tojo 東條英機, assumed that the Japanese

originally belonged to the Tungus tribe, as did the Manchus, whereas the Chinese did not.[16] In an essay written in the late 1920s Lieutenant-Colonel Kanji Ishihara 石原莞爾, later one of the planners of the Manchurian Incident, also insisted that the local people in Manchuria had not originally been Han 漢 Chinese but had been closer to the Japanese.[17]

Not only that, but the Japanese Army naturally felt that the security of southern Manchuria was crucial for the security of Japan herself. As Yasunobu Somura 曾村保信 notes in his detailed study (1961) of Sino-Japanese relations in the 1910s, "the real motivation of [Japan's historical] involvement in the issue of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia (Man-Mo Mondai 満蒙問題) cannot be understood without taking into account the seriousness of the Japanese Army's view of Russia [as a threatening power]".[18] Somura points out the importance of the Japanese feeling of "Russophobia", which was particularly widespread among the members of the Army after the Russo-Japanese War, as a consequence of having suffered heavy casualties during the War. The Japanese fought an unusually full-scale war which was, in the Japanese view, "beyond their power".[19] Although Japan defeated Russia thanks to timely American mediation, the northern threat did not disappear.

Manchuria created an enduring problem for the Tokyo government – that of the Kwantung Army. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, two divisions of the Japanese Army, a force 10,000 strong under the control of the Governor-General of Kwantung (Kanto Sotoku 関東総督), were stationed in the Liaotung 遼東 Peninsula of Fengtien 奉天 Province.[20] As a result of numerous internal discords, these troops were re-shuffled several times during the following years and were eventually named the "Kwantung Army (Kantogun 関東軍)" in 1919, from the name "Kwantung Chou (Kanto shu 関東州)", or "Province of Kwantung", a part of the Liaotung Peninsula. The problem for Japan of ruling this territory had already become clear before the end of the Russo-

Japanese War. According to Professor Shimada, it was a problem of "lack of fixed policy which was surprisingly serious".[21]

In a wider sense, many of the elements of U.S.-Japan relations were thus put in place in this first decade. The United States expanded across the Pacific, Russian expansion was made more practical by the construction of the trans-Siberian railway and Japan expanded into Korea and Manchuria. There was no direct conflict of interest between America and either Japan or Russia, whereas Japan faced Russian power in the North with an anxiety which was increased rather than diminished by the Russo-Japanese war. A set of principles lay behind U.S. policy in Asia, whereas Japan faced a series of practical problems in a region which was increasingly seen as one of vital national interest. Manchuria was at the centre of this difference. Furthermore, the Japanese government was divided, both in Tokyo and Manchuria, and, because the national interest was on the land and the ocean, these divisions extended to the military sphere, between the Army and the Navy. In contrast with the Army, the Navy recognised the U.S. as a potential enemy in 1907, and considered any involvement in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia as a potential security crisis.[22]

The problem for Japan was more complex than the simple relationship between Tokyo and the Kwantung Army. The Japanese governing system of the region was, in reality, under the control of the three authorities in competition: the "Kanto Totoku Fu 関東都督府", or Government-General of Kwantung, with its one army division, the South Manchurian Railway Company with its six battalions and the consulate under the direct control of the Foreign Office in Tokyo. Legally, Manchuria was still under the sovereignty of China, although China itself was ruled by a "foreign" government, i.e. the Manchu Ch'ing Dynasty. The situation was also complicated by the presence of so-called "Manshu Ronin 満州浪人" or continental adventurers,[23] retired officers and businessmen, who lobbied effectively with the Army on behalf of many conflicting interest groups. The

Kwantung Army officers themselves faced a bleak prospect on their return to Japan, and were therefore eager to exploit the local situation.[24]

Finally, the position of the Kwantung Army was made still more complex by the presence of several distinct ethnic groups in the region. Both the Kwantung Army and the ethnic groups felt pressure from their powerful neighbours: the Russians in the North and the Chinese in the southern region. The threat from the Russians was more keenly felt by the Kwantung Army, whereas the Chinese threat seemed more immediate to the ethnic groups, but their interests frequently coincided with respect to these twin dangers. At the same time the ethnic groups were themselves bedevilled by their own inter-group rivalry.[25]

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12 H. Miki, op. cit., p. 66.

13 Y. Hirama, op. cit., p. 354.

14 "Historians have relied on briefs written thirty years ago by U.S. Army scholars who branded Plan Orange a defensive failure because they overlooked the comprehensive offensive strategy developed by the navy to defeat Japan". In Miller, Edward S. *War Plan Orange — The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*, Airlife Publishing Ltd., Shrewsbury, England, 1991, p. xix.

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16 Muto, Tomio 武藤富男, *Watashi to Manshukoku 私と満州国* (My Involvement in Manchukuo), Bungeishunju 文藝春秋 Ltd., Tokyo, 1988, p. 10.

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20 Kuroha, Kiyotaka 黒羽清隆. *Nitchu Jugo-nen Senso (Jo) 日中十五年戦争 (上)* (The Fifteen-Year Sino-Japanese War (Vol. 1)), Kyoiku-sha 教育社, Tokyo, 1977, p. 67.

21 T. Shimada, op. cit., p. 2.

22 Colonel Tetsutaro Sato 佐藤鉄太郎 who lectured at the Navy College stated as early as 1908 that "As far as Japan's national security is concerned, it should be recognised that Japan could greatly benefit from abandoning her presence in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia". See Ikeda, Kiyoshi 池田清. *Kaigun to Nihon 海軍と日本* (The Navy and Japan), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 88-9.

23 "Manshu-ronin" is literally "non-employed in Manchuria", but the nuance contained in the term is, perhaps, closer to "continental adventurers".

24 Kitaoka, Shinichi 北岡伸一. "Shina-ka Kanryo no Yakuwari 支那課官僚の役割" (The Role of the Bureaucrats of the China Bureau) in Nihon Seiji Gakkai 日本政治学会 (The Japan Association of Politics), *Kindaika Katei ni okeru Sei-Gun Kankei 近代化過程における政軍関係* (Relations between the Political and Military Divisions in the Process of Modernisation), Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 1-23.

25 The participants in the ethnic conflicts in the region were not only the Han Chinese, Japanese, Koreans and Russians, but also the Barga, Bayats, Tarkut, Dorbets, Buryats, Urianghai and others, as well as the Khalkhas (the majority of the population of Outer Mongolia), the Chahars (the majority in Inner Mongolia), and several Tungusic nations including the Manchus. While the Khalkhas and Barga attempted to establish an alliance with the Russians against the Chinese, the Buryats stayed pro-Japanese and anti-Chinese. Dorbet separatism in Outer Mongolia (now independent Mongolia) was discussed and condemned by the Comintern. While most of the ethnic or tribal groups sought independence, the Tarkut maintained a strongly pro-Chinese position. Even after the Second World War, the complex ethnic situation has not changed. For instance, both autonomous republics, Buryatia of the Buryats and Tuva of the Tannu Urianghai, declared themselves fully "sovereign" after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. See:

Parlett, Harold, C.M.G., *A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events in Manchuria*, Oxford University Press, London, 1929, pp. 32-3.

Isono, Fujiko 磯野富士子. *Mongoru Kakumei モンゴル革命* (The Mongol Revolution), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 27-104.

Sanders, Alan J. K. *Mongolia — Politics, Economics and Society*, Frances Pinter (Publishers), London, 1987, p. 45.

Ferdinand, Peter. "Chinese Future?" in The Royal Institute of International Affairs, *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2, April 1992, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 281.

Chapter 3: The First World War and its Aftermath

In the second decade of the twentieth century, dramatic events and great changes occurred in international politics. The Revolution of 1911 began in China, culminating in the overthrow of the Ch'ing 清 government under the four-character slogan "Drive out the Tartars, revive the Chinese nation (tao-man fu-han 倒滿復漢)".[1] By "Tartars", they meant the occupying Manchus of the Ch'ing Dynasty, and other barbarians from outside the Great Wall in the North. "Chinese nation" referred specifically to Han 漢 China, the historical core of Chinese civilisation, as distinct from other, "foreign", dynasties such as the Mongol and Manchu ones.

In the same year, 1911, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed. In July 1914 the First World War broke out in Europe, and Japan, on the basis of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, declared war on Germany in August of the same year. In March 1917 the Russian Revolution broke out and this resulted in the emergence of the first Communist regime in history. In April of the same year the United States declared war on Germany. In 1918 Germany was defeated, and as a result of the First World War, Austro-Hungary, which had occupied the centre of Europe, disappeared. The American policy of principles provided the basis for the "New Diplomacy" of the post-war years even though, because of isolationist opinion, the League of Nations was established without American membership. The Washington Conference was held between November 1921 and February 1922 and the world-order system was embodied in three treaties, the Four-Power Pact, the Five-Power Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty on China. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was ended (technically by non-renewal) in December 1921.

In January 1912 the Russian government announced its support for the declaration of Outer Mongolian independence, and began to intervene in the independence movements both in Mongolia and in Sinkiang 新疆.[2] The tight relationship between the Russians and the Outer Mongolians against the Chinese

was maintained up to the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The British supported Tibetan independence from the beginning of the movement up to the Pacific War. On the other hand, the Kwantung Army, which attempted to advance to the "buffer zone" between China and Russia, attempted to support the independence movements several times in Manchuria and in Inner Mongolia, and this resulted in the establishment of "Manchukuo" after the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

While the Chinese factional armies led by semi-independent warlords were fighting each other, the Nationalist authorities and forces themselves split up into groups when Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 established his Nanking 南京 government through a coup attempt in April 1927. Among the groups, one was led by Chiang Kai-shek, another was the left-wing group of nationalists led by Wang Chao-ming 汪兆銘 (more familiarly known as Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛 in the West). The Communists also left the Nationalist forces in 1927.[3]

Throughout this period, the policy of "principles" in American diplomacy was, at least officially, maintained all the time. In this context, George Kennan notes that "if one had been asked at that time whether these arrangements were compatible with 'the administrative and territorial integrity of China', one could only have shrugged one's shoulders and asked in reply: What's in a name? It depends on what you call integrity".[4]

The clash of massive military forces in the First World War occurred in Europe, however, not East Asia. As far as Japan is concerned, several events stand out among the various incidents which had negative consequences in the subsequent years. One is that "One of the most controversial actions taken by the Japanese government toward China during the Taisho 大正 era was the submission of the Twenty-one Demands to the Yuan Shih-kai 袁世凱 government in January 1915".[5]

The demands were not acceptable to China as a fully independent country. The concept of condemning foreign concessions and colonies in China became

widespread after the Second World War, but at that time, neither Japan nor the Western countries which possessed the concessions clearly recognised this problem of justification. In fact these concessions and colonies were accepted even in the American diplomatic policy of "principle". Nevertheless, the fact that Japan did not recognise the problem did not mean that the Chinese at that time could quietly accept it. On May 7th, however, Yuan Shih-kai finally accepted sixteen[6] demands out of the twenty-one, under Japanese military pressure. This event further actively motivated China's anti-Japanese movements.

Initially, the Western countries' reaction on the issue of the Demands was not strongly anti-Japanese. Japan's policy, however, eventually caused Western concern since the demands in Group five were not communicated to the West in advance, although "Group five involved the most controversial set of demands. Among other things it asked the Chinese government: to employ Japanese political, financial, and military advisors; to establish joint Chinese and Japanese police forces whenever necessary ..."[7] In the end Japan gave up the demands and the Shantung Concession, but the image of Japan's foreign policy was deeply damaged.

The result of Japan's refusal of military co-operation against Germany in the First World War has attracted various opposing views. On August 7th, 1914, after the outbreak of the First World War in July of the same year, Britain requested Japan to search and destroy the German armed merchant vessels which were attacking British ships. Within 36 hours of the British request, Japan decided to accept participation in the war against Germany. The two main purposes of this decision were, firstly to fulfil Japan's duty based on the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and secondly to promote Japan's international status by removing the German bases from the East.[8] The British government was surprised by the decision because it did not expect Japan to participate in the war. As a result, the British government withdrew its request, worrying about possible conflicts in national interests between Britain and Japan in the East. Japan, however, declared war

against Germany on August 23rd and quickly occupied the German territories in China and the Pacific. On the other hand, Japan did not accede to the persistent Western requests for her military participation in Europe, neither during the first German offensives of 1914-15 nor during the dark days of 1917.[9]

In contrast to the Army, the Navy, which originally opposed the idea of dispatching the fleet, later decided to dispatch in secret one cruiser and eight destroyers to the Mediterranean. The General Staff of the Navy concluded, after much discussion, that the fleet should co-operate with the allies to protect the Japanese ships which were under attack by German submarines, and for "promoting Japan's post war status [in international society]".[10] This policy proved successful to the extent that Japan was guaranteed the recognition of its rule over the former German territories in the South Pacific and some additional rights in China.

In contrast, Japanese intervention in Siberia in the wake of the Russian Revolution was more complex and its significance is generally less well-known. In March 1918 Japanese forces under the command of Major-General Masatake Nakajima 中島正武 intervened in support of the Russian anti-Bolshevik Army. The Navy was strongly opposed to intervention, but in the end landed in order not to be left out.

The plan for Western intervention in Siberia was originally presented by the French Army Chief of Staff on December 3rd, 1917, in Paris, but it was refused by the Americans, British and Japanese at that time. However, on January 1st of the next year, Britain presented her plan of dispatching allied troops of the U.S., Britain and Japan to Siberia, after Britain changed from her original policy of December 1917.

In March when a large-scale military conflict broke out in Blagoveshchensk between the Russian Revolutionary Army and the Russian anti-Bolshevik Army, Major-General Nakajima actively moved to support the anti-Bolshevik Army. On the other hand, Rear-Admiral Kanji Kato 加藤寛治 of the

Navy, who had already stayed with the fleet in Vladivostok, disagreed with Nakajima's action and criticised the Army. This resulted in a serious conflict between the Army and Navy. Even on March 15th when Rear-Admiral Kato finally agreed to the policy of intervention in Siberia, and offered his plan to the Navy Minister to dispatch a naval landing party to the region, the Navy Minister once again refused.

On April 5th, however, a naval landing party eventually landed there for the primary purpose of keeping "the balance of power between the Army and the Navy".[11] On the same day the British Army also landed. On July 8th, the American government formally requested Japan to dispatch troops to Siberia. Although the Foreign Office in Tokyo had previously considered such a plan, it finally approved it following the American request. In other words, Japan's naval landing party was dispatched as the initial step to intervention in Siberia a few months before the formal American request and the subsequent official decision of the Foreign Office in Tokyo. Thus, Japan's intervention in Siberia was, in a certain sense, initiated as a consequence of developing inner disputes and for the purpose of keeping a domestic balance of power between the Army and the Navy, rather than as a deliberate foreign policy.

More important, the Siberian intervention was another cause of international tension. Thomas A. Bailey summarises: "The Japanese sent some 72,000 soldiers to Siberia; the Americans, 9,000; the British and French, minor contingents. No binding agreement had been made in advance as to the relative size of forces, but the disproportionate strength of the Japanese aroused deep misgivings in the United States".[12] However, Professor Teruyuki Hara 原暉之 of Hokkaido University noted in his publication of 1989 that Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., Kikujiro Ishii 石井菊次郎, reported that he took the American Secretary of State's pledge (genchi 言質) in advance on the subject[13]: "In view of the necessity of keeping unified command, [the U.S. Secretary of State agreed] that it is rather natural for the Japanese to recognise the need for self-command in the

event of the dispatch of troops [to Siberia], since the Japanese should send a large number of troops".[14] The Japanese at that time naturally underestimated the possibility of causing American misgivings by the disproportionate strength of the Japanese Army. It seems that only a few Western observers, up to the present, have been aware of this background to the Japanese underestimation. It is not an easy task to define conclusively whether Ambassador Ishii accurately reported the content of the conversation at his meeting with the U.S. Secretary, but the relevant point here is that a serious misconception existed and still exists on this subject between the two sides.

Similarly, although it is correct to point out that Wilson's "primary purposes were to rescue the Czechs ... and to restrain Japanese imperialists from seizing territory in Siberia and North Manchuria, to the detriment of the Open Door", it is difficult to find any references to the Japanese contemporary fear of "Dokusei Tozen 独勢東漸 (the gradual expansion of the German power eastwards [through Russian Siberia])" by historians unless this area is their precise field of study. As T. Hara states, "it was a natural consequence that the Masatake Terauchi 寺内正毅 Cabinet, which wished to keep stable relations with Russia, felt a strong fear of the possibility of the third country's advance to the Far East since Russia fell into an uncontrolled state, or even a catastrophic condition [due to the start of the Communist Revolution]".[15] The term "third country" in this context naturally meant Russia's enemy, Germany. The policy of the new Lenin government, which aimed at reaching a cease-fire with Germany, consequently exaggerated Japan's fear of Germany because Japan saw the possibility that Germany could more easily advance to the Far East through Siberia.

Professor T. Hara recognises that this general sense of fear was used by some Japanese expansionists, but he also emphasises that "The relevant point here is not a question of whether the somewhat uniquely perverted sense of fear was reasonable or not, but what political effect on decision-making resulted from the image [of international circumstances] deriving from this sense of fear".[16] In

retrospect, it was of course an unrealistic fear, but it should be recognised that an accurate judgement of the circumstances was not an easy task in that a similar phenomenon also existed in the United States at the time. In fact U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing, for example, changed the Western purpose of interventions in Siberia in May 1918. Originally, the plan for dispatching Western allied forces was aimed at rescuing the Czechs from a threat posed by the Bolsheviks, but after the change, the Western forces were sent to counter a threat posed by troops consisting of the former German and Austrian prisoners of war in Russia, after they were freed by the Bolshevik government after the Revolution.[17]

It is interesting to read a memorandum entitled "Shiberia Shuppei Ron 西比利亜出兵論" (A Theory [about the necessity] of the Dispatch of Troops to Siberia) written by Japanese Prime Minister Terauchi around March 5th, 1917. Comparing it with one of Wilson's primary purposes summed up by Bailey, "... to promote self-government by stable anti-Bolshevik groups", Terauchi's memorandum reveals a very similar idea to that of Wilson's as one of the aims of the Japanese plan "Kanshokoku Yoritsu Koso 緩衝国擁立構想" (A Plan of Promotion of the Buffer State), which was to be established because "the promotion of self-government of Siberia would guarantee the stable peace conditions in the Far East" against the threat of Dokusei Tozen, i.e. Germany's gradual advance to the Far East through Siberia.[18]

On the other hand, the term "third country" could also mean "the United States". It did not necessarily mean only "Germany" among the Japanese leaders at that time. In this sense, it is interesting to read a document, an inner circular entitled "Toho-roryo ni taisuru Sochi 東方露領ニ対スル措置" (The [Japan's] Policy towards the Russian Eastern Territory), probably prepared by the Japanese Foreign Office in December 1917, which includes the item that Japan "should restrain a dangerous outcome, such as the American dispatch of troops to the Russian Eastern Territory [Siberia] and North Manchuria".[19] If the term "American" were replaced by the term "Japanese", this concept was again very

similar to another of Wilson's aims, summed up by Bailey: "... to restrain Japanese imperialists from seizing territory in Siberia and North Manchuria".

In other words, the suspicions of both sides about the opposition's aggressive intentions were not entirely wrong since each country obviously sought a position more advantageous than that of its adversaries, but it was also true that the leaders of the two countries acted under a pressure which was caused by their own exaggerated feelings of suspicion. As Butow notes, "In international relations, as in all enterprises governed by man, the alleged case, the case that is believed to exist, can be as important as the actual case. And at times more important. Nor are there only the extremes of true and false; unlimited subjectivity plays its role. Partly true and partly false, a combination of the two, is often at the heart of the matter".[20] In any event, U.S.-Japan relations at that time could have been more stable had better communications been maintained.

"The muddled Siberian venture turned out badly. The Bolsheviks, reacting angrily against foreign interventions, took a considerable toll of American lives. The Japanese commander, who resented American chaperoning, was in constant hot water with General Graves, the head of the United States forces. When the last American contingent finally sailed from Siberia in 1920, leaving the field to Nippon, a Japanese band broke out with Stephen Foster's *Hard Times, Come Again No More*. This evacuation was the signal for a renewed outburst in the Hearst press against alleged Nipponese treachery".[21]

Again, when one historian observes the events as quoted above, it becomes quite clear that a significant perception gap between the U.S. and Japan existed at this stage. While the Americans generally expected that the "Japanese imperialists" would have been pleased and would have benefited from the American military withdrawal, the Japanese in reality strongly resented the American policy of withdrawal from Siberia.

In fact, Japanese foreign policy under the Kei Hara 原敬 Cabinet had previously been regulated, until the American notification dated January 9th,

1920, by the Cabinet's definition of August 1919, whereby to restrain the Bolsheviks' advance to the Russian territory in the Far East, Japan should keep her troops in Siberia without increasing their scale or withdrawing them unless the U.S. agreed to any plan to change the scale of troops. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington handed a memorandum to Secretary of State Lansing on December 8th, 1919, to re-confirm the policy of U.S.-Japan co-operation with regard to Russia and the necessity for agreement with the U.S. when increasing the number of Japanese troops in Siberia. However, the Japanese government, which had been waiting for the American reply to the memorandum for about a month, suddenly received unofficial information about the American decision to withdraw from Siberia. This unofficial information was leaked by General Graves, who was staying in Vladivostok, to Tokyo through the Japanese Army, but not directly to the government. The subsequent formal American reply was handed to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, and noted that the American forces would start to withdraw on January 10th [the day following the reply to Japan].

In the Japanese view, the American "surprise notification" to Tokyo, or the American "arbitrary military withdrawal" from Siberia was, as Professor Hara notes, recognised by the Japanese as an American "noten kara no ichigeki 脳天からの一撃" (a fatal head blow) for the Hara Cabinet. The government faced serious difficulties in defining a new policy towards Russia for Japan to adopt. The Cabinet was criticised by the general public as well as in the Diet, and even by the spokesman for the Army dispatched to Vladivostok.[22]

Japan's policy in Siberia has naturally been seen as a failure, partly because the consequence was that "Japan was left on her own in the Russian Far East",[23] and suffered 2,000 death casualties. As pointed out by Professor Ian Nish, however: "At one level, it succeeded in preventing the spread of Bolshevism ... Japan had a positive interest in the results of bolshevik expansion which was not shared by other participants in the Siberian intervention".[24]

Mutual suspicions were growing. As stated by Bailey "Wilson's increasing distrust of Japanese ambitions in eastern Asia was revealed in yet another way" in the arrangement of the four-power bankers' consortium: "Seeking to loosen Japan's growing economic foothold in China, he [Wilson] undertook, in November, 1917, to create a new four-power bankers' consortium ... The Japanese, who were sorely displeased by the ill-disguised attempt of Wilson to thwart them, consented to join only after obtaining recognition of their "special position" in China's South Manchuria. The new consortium was formally signed on October 15, 1920".[25]

Meanwhile Bailey has observed, "Ugly developments at the Paris peace table in 1919 further increased tension between Japan and the United States".[26] The history of the relations between the two countries is well summed up by Bailey:

> The Japanese, who resented American discriminations against their emigrants, fought tenaciously for the inclusion of a statement favoring racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Wilson favored this proposal, but London frowned upon it. Fearing its effect on their millions of restless subjects in India and elsewhere, British spokesmen threatened to stir up the yellow press in America against such a concession. Wilson thereupon used his influence to defeat racial equality when the final vote was taken. The more violent Japanese journals attacked him viciously as a 'hypocrite' and a 'transformed Kaiser.'
>
> Then came the Shantung controversy. The purposeful Japanese, having lost out on race equality, forced Wilson to compromise on Chinese self-determination. The Hearst newspapers berated 'wily, tricky, fight-thirsty Japan,' while the conservative Boston Transcript decried this 'insolent and Hun-like spoliation.' Tempers were further inflamed when, during these same months, the Japanese showed their distaste for self-determination by ruthlessly crushing a revolt in Korea ...[27]

In fact, when Japan condemned Wilson as a "hypocrite" after demanding and being refused racial equality by Britain and America, she should at least have recognised Korean self-determination, but she did not. When America resented Japan's distaste for Korean self-determination, and criticised Japan as "wily, tricky ... Japan", America herself should have adopted the Open Door in the Philippines, but she did not. In short, the hostile atmosphere between the countries was increased simply because neither side could show a convincing justification for their demands to the other side. It was more than just a typical

example of an international discord caused by political propaganda. The leaders and citizens of each country in general perhaps seriously believed in their own sense of justification. Again, as Professor Butow states: "the case that is believed to exist, can be as important as the actual case ... at times more important".[28]

The question of Yap also contributed to create a deep sense of distrust between the two countries across the Pacific:

> To add fuel to the flames, a disagreeable controversy flared up with Japan over the former German Pacific islet of Yap. As a key cable center, this tiny outpost was of importance to the United States in maintaining communications with China and other points in the Far East. At the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson had insisted that Yap be internationalized, and evidently believed that his views had prevailed. But Yap, together with Germany's other Pacific islands north of the equator, was awarded to Japan as a League of Nations mandate. Washington subsequently made vigorous representations to Tokyo in support of its claims. Many Americans ... refused to take the dispute seriously ... But neither Washington nor Tokyo joked about Yap.[29]

Japan eventually accepted the American claim on Yap in 1922. In the next year, 1923, Japan also consented to retreat from her previous position with regard to her "special interests" in "China's Manchuria"[30] based on the Open Door principle which was agreed in the Nine-Power Treaty. It did not mean, however, that all Japanese were convinced and satisfied by the outcome of the negotiations in Washington, and this outcome, together with subsequent international events, indeed helped to cause anti-American sentiment. Serious suspicions naturally remained regarding the incompatibility between the American "special cable rights"[31] on the island of Yap and the American concept of the Open Door, if any, on the Pacific islet of Yap. Even such an apparently small issue became a serious source of international dispute in the highly tense atmosphere which followed the First World War.

After the war a fresh attempt was made, unsuccessfully as it turned out, to bring the Kwantung Army under effective control from Tokyo. In spite of the growth of mutual popular antagonism in the U.S. and Japan, Japanese politics entered a phase of liberal democracy, under, as noted by A. M. Craig, the "new influence from the West where liberal tendencies were in the ascendant during

the twenties", and this helped initiate the period known as "Taisho [大正] Democracy".[32]

The new political mood in the world also gave rise to Korean self-determination movements, culminating in riots in 1919. Newly liberal Japan was led to reconsider the system of governing its "Gaichi 外地" (External Territories), including Korea and southern Manchuria. In 1919, the Foreign Office manoeuvred a reorganisation by strongly criticising the existing system of the Government-General of Kwantung: "It tends to be suspected [by foreign countries] that Japan could have an aggressive territorial ambition toward China since the 'Kanto Totoku Fu' has held, on the one hand, the rights of military affairs, and on the other hand, the rights which make it possible to control the administration of the Consul General. In addition to this problem, the 'Kanto Totoku Fu' has often intervened in the [national] foreign policy ..."[33] On April 12th in the same year, under the Kei Hara Cabinet, a new law called the "Kwantung Agency Governing System (Kanto Cho Kansei 関東庁官制)" was issued. This was the law which abolished the "Kanto Totoku Fu" and established the new Kwantung Agency (Kanto Cho 関東庁).

The following characteristics of the Kwantung Agency are significant. Firstly, the Governors of the Kwantung Agency were civilian leaders. Secondly, the Governor of the Kwantung Agency was given the rights to control the police authorities of both territories in the "Province of Kwantung" and in the territories attached to the railways in southern Manchuria. The rights which were given to the Governor were, however, limited to only those of police authorities in the territories. Thirdly, public relations for the Agency were under the control of the Foreign Minister. Fourth, the post of Chief of the Foreign Policy Department at the Agency was shared with the Consul General of Fengtien. Fifth, the system of sharing positions between the military police and the police authorities was abolished. Sixth, the system of the South Manchuria Railway

Company prior to the previous reorganisation of 1917 was restored. As a result of this restoration, the Governor did not share the Presidency of the Company.

The relations between the Governor and the President of the Company were, however, made more stable since the Governor was given the right to control the Company's administration at the same time as the President shared the position as adviser to the Governor on the policy of traffic matters. Seventh, the army previously attached to the former "Kanto Totoku Fu" was separated from the Agency. The status given to the new regional military body, formally named the "Kwantung Army" in 1919, was merely to be "the guard" for the protection of the "Province of Kwantung" and the South Manchuria Railway. Thus, the new system of the Kwantung Agency literally became the ruling system of civilian control, which Hirobumi Ito 伊藤博文 originally wished to establish as early as 1906.[34]

However, although the reorganisation had positive aspects, particularly in terms of the successful establishment of civilian control in the region, the new Headquarters of the Kwantung Army, which was separated from the Agency, later began to move independently of the control of the policies coming from the Tokyo government. Since the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army was under the control of the Army Chief of Staff, who was not constitutionally under the control of the cabinet, the Kwantung Army could claim its "right of autonomous command" and acted in the manner of "running alone" (dokuso 独走) from 1924 on, although this problem was not revealed immediately after the reorganisation.

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1 Shimada, Toshihiko 島田俊彦. *Kanto-gun 関東軍* (The Kwantung Army), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1965, p. 15.

Members of the History Departments of Futan University and Shanghai Teachers' University, *The Revolution of 1911*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1976, p. 35.

2 There were many civil wars among several nations including the Turkic Uighurs, The Han-Hui 漢回 and the Chinese (Han) armies. Eto, Shinkichi 衛藤瀋吉. "Nankin Kokumin Seifu to Tanaka Gaiko 南京国民政府と田中外交" (The Nanking Nationalist Government and the Tanaka Diplomacy), in Murase, Okio 村瀬興雄, *Sekai no Rekishi 15 — Fashizumu to Dai-*

ni-ji-taisen 世界の歴史 15 — ファシズムと第二次大戦 (World History (Series 15) — Fascism and the Second World War), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1975, pp. 262-4.

3 T. Shimada, op. cit., pp. 50-2.

4 Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, The American Library of World Literature, Inc., New York, 1951, p. 40.

5 Hane, Mikiso. *Modern Japan — A Historical Survey*, Westview Press, Inc., Boulder, Colorado, 1992, p. 199.

6 Although in the West it is generally reckoned to be fifteen, one item in group 5, regarding the military facilities in Fuchien 福建 Province was accepted in addition to the fifteen demands from the first four groups. See T. Shimada, op. cit., p. 29.

7 Hane, op. cit., p. 199.

8 T. Shimada, op. cit., p. 24.

9 Hirama, Yoichi 平間洋一. "Kaigai Hahei Mondai — Dai-ichi-ji Taisen Ji no Kyokun 海外派兵問題 — 第一次大戦時の教訓" (The Question of the Dispatch of Troops Overseas — Lessons from the First World War), in *The Chuokoron 中央公論* November 1990, Vol. 1264, Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 144-50.

10 Ibid., p. 146.

11 Hara, Teruyuki 原暉之. *Shiberia Shuppei — Kakumei to Kansho 1917-1922 シベリア出兵 — 革命と干渉 1917-1922* (The Dispatch of Troops to Siberia — The Revolution and Intervention 1917-1922), Chikuma Shobo 筑摩書房, Tokyo, 1989, p. 216.

12 Bailey, Thomas A. *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (Tenth Edition), Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980, pp. 636-7.

13 T. Hara, op. cit., p. 291.

14 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Taisho-7-nen Dai-ichi-satsu 日本外交文書 — 大正七年第一冊* (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — Taisho 7 Vol. 1), Gaimu-sho 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1968, pp. 800-1.

15 T. Hara, op. cit., p. 162.

16 Ibid., p. 163.

17 Ibid., p. 346.

18 Ibid., p. 289.

19 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Taisho-6-nen Dai-ichi-satsu 日本外交文書 — 大正六年第一冊* (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — Taisho 6 Vol. 1), Gaimu-sho 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1967, pp. 667-9.

20 Butow, Robert J. C. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961, pp. 26-7.

21 T. Bailey, op. cit., p. 637.

22 T. Hara, op. cit., pp. 508-10.

23 Nish, Ian. "Japanese Intelligence 1894-1922", in Andrew, Christopher and Noakes, Jeremy. *Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945*, Exeter University Publications, Exeter, 1987, p. 141.

Ikuta, Makoto 生田惇. *Nihon Rikugun-shi 日本陸軍史* (A History of the Japanese Army), Kyoiku-sha 教育社, Tokyo, 1980, pp. 106-7.

24 Nish, "Japanese Intelligence", op. cit., p. 141.

25 T. Bailey, op. cit., p. 637.

26 Ibid., p. 636.

27 Ibid., p. 636.

28 R. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, op. cit., p. 27.

29 T. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 637-8.

30 Ibid., p. 646.

31 Ibid., p. 646.

32 Reischauer, Edwin O. and Craig, Albert M. *Japan — Tradition and Transformation*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1978, p. 234.

33 T. Shimada, op. cit., pp. 37-8.

34 Ito manoeuvred the reformation of the military governing system called "Sotoku-Fu 総督府" into the new "Totoku-Fu 都督府" in Kwantung, and the rights of political decision-making came under civilian control. However, the same English term is used for both titles. For definitions in English of the Japanese terms Sotoku (governor-general), Sotoku-Fu (government-general) and Totoku, see Masuda, Koh 増田綱, *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary* (Fourth Edition), Kenkyusha 研究社, Tokyo, 1974, p. 1659, p. 1856.

Chapter 4: Disarmament and the Manchurian Incident

The Politics of Naval Disarmament

The Senate of the United States failed to ratify the Versailles Treaty of June 1919. The Harding Administration then sought to establish a new order in Asia, based on the Nine-Power Treaty guaranteeing the integrity of China and on naval disarmament as agreed at the Washington Conference. This was what A. Whitney Griswold, writing in 1938, called "the apotheosis of the traditional Far Eastern Policy of the United States".[1] But for Japan it meant major sacrifices: the acceptance of the Open Door and the suspension of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the ending of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, the withdrawal from the Shantung Peninsula, and an inferior naval status. As Thomas Bailey comments, "Japan was induced or forced to retreat all along the line – to the acute dissatisfaction of her more vocal newspapers and politicians".[2]

It was inevitable that perceptions of naval strength should differ sharply between the two countries. The United States saw itself as a country with a seaboard on each of the great oceans, and the notion that the United States should be able to deploy naval force anywhere in the world had already taken root. In simple terms this meant that the Navy should be strong enough to outweigh the local advantage which Japan enjoyed in its own waters. Japan in contrast was in the process of building up its Navy and the Japanese saw the United States as a superior power with an ability to deploy its Navy from one ocean to another with far greater capacity than the Russians had achieved in 1904. The need to accommodate British, French and Italian interests in a single agreement complicated the issue further.

Any hope that the regulation of naval armaments would automatically breed a greater sense of trust was therefore entirely illusory. From the American perspective Japanese naval building, especially as the Japanese tried to build up

to the limits which the treaties allowed, was seen as a continuation of the expansionism of the Twenty-one Demands and of Japanese action in Siberia at the end of the First World War. In Japan the constraints placed on Japan's provision for its own security (as the treaties were seen) were the cause of increasing nationalist feeling and a major factor contributing to the chauvinism of the 1930s.

The Briand-Kellogg Pact did nothing to diminish these differences. The treaty originated from the attempt of Aristide Briand, as French Foreign Minister, to bring the United States back into Europe as a guarantor of the Versailles settlement. His proposal was given an entirely different scope by Frank Billings Kellogg, who was able to win world-wide support for a treaty for the renunciation of war. Greeted with a fair degree of cynicism as an outstanding example of American commitment to principle it was none the less signed, and eventually served as the legal basis for the prosecution at the Nuremberg Trial.

Real differences of strategic interest were thus complicated by differences of perception. At the beginning of the disarmament negotiations, some Americans even feared the possibility of war between the United States and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

> Looming ominously in the background was the bugbear of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ... Big-navy zealots in America were insisting that the Alliance was now directed solely at the United States, and that in certain contingencies America would have to fight both Britain and Japan in the Far East. In December, 1920, London revealed that it would not consider the Alliance binding in the event of a war between America and Japan, but the Hearst press and other anti-Japanese spokesmen refused to trust this announcement.[3]

In fact, Britain and Japan avoided listing the United States as a hypothetical enemy of the Alliance in its renewal of 1911, and Britain's obligation to the Alliance for her participation in the event of the outbreak of a U.S.-Japan war was consciously deleted. However, the U.S. contingency war plan of October 25th, 1920, "The Naval Operations of Red-Orange [Anglo-Japanese] Campaign", took the defence of Dutch Harbor in the island of Unalaska seriously, maintaining the

assumption that Japan would occupy Alaska in the event of the outbreak of an Anglo-American war.[4]

On the Japanese side, R. J. C. Butow has introduced the experiences of a certain Captain Malcolm Kennedy of the Cameronians, who spent several years with the Japanese Army, and "... found military opinion returning again and again to the 'threat' posed by the United States".[5] For example, during the early months of 1920, it was observed that the members of the Japanese Army

> were not particularly concerned about the Germans ... or the British ... but they were 'strongly opposed' to any attempt by the United States to bind America, Alaska, and Asia [the so-called three A's] by means of a much talked-about tunnel under the Bering Strait ... [which] ... they declared, would be as much of a threat as the establishment of American bases on Guam and in the Philippines, since it would bring the American enemy to Japan's very gates.[6]

Butow, who described the rumour of the tunnel as "mental gymnastics", has said that "Japanese fear of such a tunnel" made them "psychologically alert and ready for action by creating imaginary enemies where none actually existed".[7] But the tunnel was no less plausible than the American Navy's assumption of an Anglo-American war.

According to various post-war studies including this essay, however, the fact must be recognised that Japan, unlike the U.S. as a continental country without any neighbouring threat, but like most other countries in the world, has faced real threats, not only "imaginary enemies", and has lived in international circumstances far different from the situation in which "none actually existed".

Under those highly tense circumstances, the American efforts for implementing international disarmament were "started ... in high gear" at that time.

> The Republicans, who had blocked adherence to the League of Nations on Wilson's terms, suffered from guilty consciences when they viewed the ominous naval race. The League was designed to reduce armaments, yet its efforts were being crippled by the non membership of the most powerful nation in the world. A clear moral obligation rested on the new Harding administration to do something effective. In December, 1920, the month after Harding's election, Senator Borah introduced a resolution in the Senate designed to bring about a tri-power disarmament conference.[8]

With this domestic background in the United States, the Washington Conference opened on November 12th, 1921, under the new Harding Administration. It ended with the signature, on February 6th, 1922, of the Five-Power Naval Treaty of Washington, which fixed the ratio of capital ships at 5 to both America and Britain, 3 to Japan and 1.7 to both France and Italy. The U.S. agreed not to fortify further her Pacific islands except Hawaii, particularly the Philippines, Guam, Wake and the Aleutians. The British agreed not to add to the fortifications on important island outposts, including Hong Kong.

Meanwhile Britain, the U.S., France and Japan signed the Four-Power Treaty of December 13th, 1921, agreeing to respect each others' rights in the Pacific. It was significant that the Four-Power Pact specifically terminated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. While the Tokyo Foreign Office recognised the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as inevitable, some members of the Japanese Navy expressed a sense of deep concern[9] and one Japanese diplomat summed up their reaction in the words: "We have discarded whisky and accepted Water".[10]

Any agreement in Washington that ignored the explosive tensions in the Far East was completely unrealistic. The delegates, under the leadership of Secretary Hughes, turned their attention to China. The most significant result of their efforts was the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6th, 1922. The signatories agreed to respect the "sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China" and "the principles of the Open Door".[11] Historians have recognised, however, that the Treaty was "toothless" because "the signatories did not bind themselves to defend the Open Door by force ... In no effective way, as events were to prove, did the treaty loosen Japan's favorable foothold in China's Manchuria".[12] The Senate, ever cautious, tacked on a reservation declaring that "there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense"[13]. Consequently, there was a certain dissatisfaction in the Unites States that America "had scrapped battleships while

the others were scrapping blueprints" and the Conference was criticised as "an ominous triumph for British diplomacy".[14]

In Japan, the Tokyo government's acceptance of a smaller naval power ratio of 60% of those of the United States and Britain created an "Anglo-America phobia" among members of the Japanese Navy, since many expected 70% of that of the American Navy. Although the figure of 70% was smaller than that of the U.S., the American "intransigent" refusal of 70% naturally caused a deep suspicion about American intentions among members of the Japanese Navy. The seriousness of this "phobia" has been described by Professor Kiyoshi Ikeda 池田清 as the "neurosis caused by the figure of 60%".[15] Thus, the disputes between the figures of "60%" and "70%" became a crucial issue for the Japanese Navy.[16]

The outcome of the Washington Conference was an important turning-point, because the anti-Anglo-American groups within the Japanese Navy appeared after the Conference, and started to struggle with the pro-Anglo-American groups which had been traditionally the dominant power in the Navy.[17] On the other hand, the American series of contingency plans called War Plan Orange, of which the "clearly stated objective ... from [its] inception in 1906 through the early 1930s, was the complete subjugation of Japan",[18] had, as stated by a lecturer at the Pentagon and the Naval War College, Edward Miller, the "geopolitical premises ... in spite of historically friendly relations, [that] a war would erupt someday between the United States and Japan".[19]

Thus, the Americans did not accept 70% because they were suspicious of the Japanese Navy's intentions, and this American refusal caused Japanese suspicion of American intentions. Then, the Japanese Navy's reaction, including explicit criticism by Vice-Admiral Kanji Kato 加藤寛治 of the Anglo-American stance, was naturally perceived by the Americans as validation of their suspicions about Japanese intentions. In other words, both countries thought that the other had dangerous ambitions, but they were not sufficiently aware of the possibility that

their own attitude could have caused the suspicions on the other side which would motivate subsequent actions.

In Japan, the "neurosis" about the figure of 60% became quite a serious issue nearly eight years later when the London Disarmament Conference was held in 1930. The Japanese demand for the figure of 70% was again refused. Indeed, as just one example of the profound difficulties in agreeing on 70%, the ratio of auxiliary vessels for Japan was only agreed at 69.7% after a bitter dispute between the countries. Consequently, the outcome of the London Conference was widely perceived by contemporary members of the Japanese Navy as validation of their suspicions about Anglo-American intentions. On the other hand, the motivation for the American refusal of the figure of 70% was, of course, based on their suspicions about Japanese intentions. This vicious circle created by mutual distrust was obviously a factor which accelerated the development of a hostile atmosphere between the navies across the Pacific.

The event has been called the "tragedy of the London Conference".[20] Although the Tokyo government again consented to accept the smaller ratio at the London Conference and was supported by the Japanese Foreign Office, the Genro, the Jushin and the media, the General Staff of the Navy in particular strongly resented the outcome. The decision of Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara 幣原喜重郎 to accept the ratio without consulting the Navy also served to worsen the relations between the government and the Navy.

Two points in particular should be noted. Firstly, the Navy's reaction was used by the opposition party in the Diet during the session which began on April 21st, 1930. The opposition party, Seiyu-Kai 政友会, criticised the government formed by Minsei-To 民政党, the Minsei Party, for usurping the Emperor's right to decide the budget for the Navy, i.e. the size of the Navy, at the London Conference. Although the Navy, which "had never been interested in the disputes of the Constitution and never studied it",[21] originally intended to accept the decision of the government, it began to study the terms of the Meiji Constitution,

and began to resist the government. Thus, the ill-defined division of responsibility between the government and the armed forces for their command and administration, which had not previously been brought into public debate, became for the first time an official issue in Japanese politics. This dispute undermined the government's position with regard to the control of the military up to the outbreak of the Pacific War, because of the government's inability to resist the concept of the "right of autonomous command". In fact, when the Manchurian Incident began in the following year, 1931, the command which used the argument of "right of autonomous command" was not at that time the Navy against the Tokyo government but the Kwantung Army against the General Staff of the Army and the Tokyo government.

Secondly, although the Navy, in contrast with the Army, had been effectively controlled until that year, it was for the first time split into two main factions as a result of the London Conference. While Joyaku-ha 条約派, the faction of the supporters of the London Treaty and the pro-Anglo-American groups rapidly declined, Kantai-ha 艦隊派, the faction supporting the maintenance of a strong fleet, developed as a pro-German group.

In any case, Japan's strong fear and suspicion of foreign threats significantly contributed to the rise of nationalistic sentiment against the United States in the Navy after the two disarmament conferences. Thus, the Navy, which had been expected to exert a powerful opposition to the Army's aggressive involvement in the international conflicts and to be a stronghold of pro-Anglo-American power in Japan, eventually failed to play that role in the late 1930s. This was a very significant period because, as Ikeda notes,[22] the Army, which again suffered heavy casualties in the Nomonhan Incident of 1939 fighting the Russians, lost confidence in its ability to defend Japan against the threat from the North (See Chapter 5). Because of this, the Army began to consider establishing an alliance with Germany in order to create a potential second front against Russia. Thus, the possibility of some sympathy between certain members of the

Army, i.e. pro-German against Russia, and some members of the Navy, i.e. pro-German because of their suspicions regarding the Anglo-Americans, began to appear, although relations between the Army and the Navy in Japan had been traditionally unco-operative.

The Assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928

As we have seen, the Kwantung Army's involvement in Manchuria was very complex. This can be seen most clearly in the events surrounding the assassination of the warlord Chang Tso-lin 張作霖. This took place on June 4th, 1928, plotted by some officers of the Kwantung Army, and it typifies the lack of central political control in Japan. What is now known about this incident, on the basis of precise analysis and reconciliation of the contemporary records, is as follows. First, the plan was approved neither by the Kwantung Army nor by the Tokyo General Staff of the Army, but exercised arbitrarily by some officers led by Colonel Daisaku Komoto 河本大作. Second, the plotters did, however, have sympathisers among their superiors. These sympathisers had known in advance about the existence of an assassination plan although not the details, and they did not prevent the plotters' activities until the plan had been carried out.

The main materials which lead to the conclusion mentioned above are the information delivered by former Navy Minister Keisuke Okada 岡田啓介 and Major Ryukichi Tanaka 田中隆吉 at the Tokyo Trial, the materials recorded by Kumao Harada 原田熊雄, the secretary to former Prime Minister Kinmochi Saionji 西園寺公望, the memoir of a diplomat, Morito Morishima 森島守人, as well as other materials. Thanks to these records, Motoei Sato 佐藤元英 of the Public Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concludes that "most of the truth in the Incident is now [1990] clearly known".[23] The chronological background of the Incident is as follows.

The series of events which led up to the assassination began with the conflict between two Chinese factional armies of the Peiyang 北洋 military clique. The first Chihli-Fengtien War in 1922 was a conflict between Chang Tso-lin's Fengtien 奉天 (Mukden in the Manchu language) Army and the Chihli 直隸 Army of Wu Pei-fu 吳佩孚 in which the Fengtien Army was defeated. The Kwantung Army supported Chang Tso-lin, but was still not strong enough to defy Tokyo's non-intervention policy. The second Chihli-Fengtien War started in 1924 when the Fengtien faction attempted to strike back at the Chihli faction. This time the Chihli faction was eventually defeated because Feng Yu-hsiang 馮玉祥, Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army of the Chihli faction, suddenly changed sides. Despite a shortage of details, it is believed by historians that, unlike in the first war, the Kwantung Army did intervene in the second by encouraging Feng to desert the Chihli faction. A later conflict known as the Kuo Sung-ling 郭松齡 Incident of 1925 was a clearer example of the Kwantung Army acting in the manner of "dokuso 独走" (running alone) with its intervention in the wars between Chinese military factions.

The war between the rival forces brought opposite responses in Kwantung and Tokyo. While the Kwantung Agency under civilian control insisted on supporting Chang Tso-lin, just as the Kwantung Army also insisted, the stance of the General Staff of the Army in Tokyo did not change from its original non-intervention policy. In fact, not only Foreign Minister K. Shidehara but also General Kazushige Ugaki 宇垣一成, Army Minister, were opposed to any change to this "non-intervention policy". However, the consulate general of Fengtien led by Consul General Shigeru Yoshida 吉田茂 (later post-war Prime Minister) insisted on a policy supporting Chang Tso-lin, even though the Consul General was under the control of the Foreign Minister. On December 13th and 14th, the Kwantung Army began to intervene in the conflict in the region, "prohibiting" Kuo Sung-ling's Army from entering Yingkow 営口, located in the east region of the Liao He 遼河 (the Liao River).

Their action was decisive in bringing Chang Tso-lin to the height of his power in 1926, and the commanding General of the Kwantung Army, Yoshinori Shirakawa 白川義則, became known as the first man of "dokudan 独断" (independent decision),[24] accelerating the "dokuso" (running alone) of the Kwantung Army from 1919. Although Chang Tso-lin formed a coalition government in Peking his forces were no match for the Nationalist Army, now under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.

As the Nationalists moved north, the Japanese leaders were undecided about their foreign policy towards the situation in the region. Prime Minister Giichi Tanaka 田中義一 did not intend to support Chang Tso-lin in 1926, but later changed his mind in 1928, beginning to support Chang.

According to a document adopted at the cabinet meeting of May 16th,[25] the Tokyo government decided to keep its "strictly neutral position" in a possible conflict between Chang Tso-lin's forces and the Nationalist forces, but in practice also decided to refuse the Nationalist forces' entry into Manchuria. Tokyo aimed at preserving Chang Tso-lin's power in Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of influence separated from China. According to the record of a message sent from the Kwantung Army to Tokyo on April 20th,[26] the Kwantung Army wished to declare its "strictly neutral position" and to demand the disarmament of any incoming forces in Manchuria including the Fengtien Army, i.e. it aimed at forcing Chang Tso-lin to retreat. Thus, although the policies of both Tokyo and the Kwantung Army were apparently similar in being strictly neutral, in reality they were quite incompatible because while Tokyo aimed at preserving the position of Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, the Kwantung Army aimed at removing him from his position.

The Tanaka Cabinet twice sent troops to Chinan 済南 (known as Sainan in Japanese) in Shantung Province in 1927 and 1928, as the Nationalist forces moved north. In 1927 there were no major clashes, and in 1928 the intervention merely created political problems at home and abroad. In contrast, the action of certain

Kwantung Army officers was more decisive. Led by Colonel Daisaku Komoto, they made a plan to attack railroad lines with bombs in order to assassinate Chang Tso-lin, who, on the 23rd, had finally accepted Japanese pressure to withdraw from Peking to Fengtien in Manchuria. Although the highest-ranking officers of the Kwantung Army decided to follow Tokyo's policy,[27] Colonel Komoto's group succeeded in assassinating Chang Tso-lin because they had sympathisers among their superiors in the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, the General Staff of the Army attempted to conceal the truth of the Incident immediately after it broke out.[28] Tanaka's China policy died with Chang Tso-lin and his cabinet naturally suffered criticism over the Incident from both inside and outside Japan as well as opposition attacks on the government in the Diet.

Tanaka and his cabinet eventually resigned in July 1929, taking responsibility for the Incident. Thus, the Kwantung Army, which arbitrarily moved to support Chang Tso-lin up to the end of the Kuo Sung-ling Incident of 1925, then assassinated him in 1928. These actions might seem contradictory, but they had in common one aspect, i.e. both of them were caused by the regional Kwantung Army's "dokuso" (running alone), ignoring Tokyo's authority. It was an obvious prelude to the next "running alone", which came in 1931.

The Manchurian Incident of 1931

The period between Chang Tso-lin's assassination in 1928 and the Manchurian Incident of 1931 saw a baffling succession of events which further tested Japan's divided and uncontrolled foreign policy. Rather than a smooth escalation of confrontations, each event was distinct, involved different protagonists, and demanded a different policy.

The first event came just after the assassination, when Chang Tso-lin's son Chang Hsueh-liang 張学良 offered an alliance with Japan, in rivalry with candidates for succeeding his father. The Kwantung Army was willing, but Tokyo

was not, and Chang in the meantime switched to the side of the Nationalists in December 1928. Then he became involved in a dispute with the Russians over a railway concession. This turned into a war in August 1929 in which his forces were defeated. In 1930, there were Chinese Communist-inspired riots by Korean residents in Chientao 間島 against the Japanese. Consequently, the Japanese became involved, but the riots were eventually suppressed by local Chinese authorities who feared the possibility of influence on the stronger movements of the Communist force in China.

The next year, in Wanpaoshan 万宝山 just outside the Korean border, a separate uprising, this time of Korean nationalism, was directed toward the Chinese, although the Japanese authorities inevitably became involved. In 1931, the Nakamura 中村 Incident involved the capture and killing of two Japanese officers by a regional Chinese army. These conflicts remained largely unresolved by the time of the Manchurian Incident.

The actual opening of the Incident itself was well understood by Richard Storry as early as 1957. He then wrote:

> Several weeks before the first shots were fired the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo had reports from its consular officers that the Kwantung Army, or a section of it, was getting ready for war with the Chinese ... The first specific information actually mentioning the date on which hostilities might begin seems to have reached the Foreign Ministry on 15th September. Hayashi [Kyujiro Hayashi 林久治郎], the Consul-General, reported that a company commander near Mukden had stated that an important Incident might "break out" on the evening of 18th September ... Shidehara [Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara] at once protested vigorously to the Minister of War [Army Minister Jiro Minami 南次郎]. Now only a few days previously Minami had been warned personally by the Emperor "to take extra precautions regarding the actions of the army in Manchuria and Mongolia" ... Without delay he addressed an urgent and confidential letter to Lieutenant-General Shigeru Honjo [本庄繁], the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, instructing him to cancel any plans that might have been made for a coup d'etat. Minami decided to send the letter by hand of a special envoy. For this extremely important role Minami chose none other than Tatekawa [Yoshitsugu Tatekawa 建川美次]. The latter was informed of the purport of the letter, and was told that any "Incident" must be stopped at all costs. [However] Tatekawa failed to carry out his mission ... "It seems to me," wrote Harada [Kumao Harada] at the time, "that it was Tatekawa's plan to have the scheme [the Mukden coup] carried out before the Commander-in-Chief saw the confidential letter from the Minister of War".[29]

Shigeru Honjo's position in the Incident was very similar to that of Lieutenant-General Chotaro Muraoka 村岡長太郎, the former Commander-in-

Chief of the Kwantung Army, when Chang Tso-lin was assassinated in 1928. Although the volume of information is not enough to judge conclusively how much he knew about the plotters' plan in advance, as far as the author is aware, Honjo perhaps was able to predict what was going on even if he had had no details of it. Although he was transferred to the Kwantung Army only about one month before the Incident, his speeches on September 1st in Port Arthur (Lushun 旅順) and 13th in Changchun 長春 include implicit indications suggesting that he was to some extent aware of it.[30]

Thus, the authorities eventually failed to stop the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident despite certain information being available to the government in advance.[31] The plot itself was carried out by several plotters of the Kwantung Army, but they had some sympathisers both in the highest ranks of the Kwantung Army and also in the Army General Staff, where a group was formed under the name "Sakura-kai 桜会" (literally "Cherry Society").

Over the next two months the Tokyo government made repeated efforts to stop hostilities and bring the Kwantung Army under its effective command. But even the strongest orders of the Army Chief of Staff, transferred from the Emperor, were consistently ignored. The General Staff of the Army had to send this ultimate order to cease action four times within one day between November 27th and 28th,[32] bringing only a temporary halt.

The assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the Manchurian Incident of 1931 had several main points in common, as well as some dissimilarities. To begin with, in both cases it is clear from several sources of evidence that the Incidents were the results of plots by a small number of officers of the Kwantung Army. Both plots went ahead without any actual official approval, but the plotters had sympathisers both in the highest ranks of the Kwantung Army as well as in some groups in the middle and higher levels at the Army Headquarters in Tokyo.

In contrast, there is no evidence in the case of the China Incident starting in 1937 that Japanese officers were directly involved in the origins of the

Incident, although the internal discord and distrust which existed among them may be seen as factors which exacerbated the situation. The two previous Incidents had clearly defined aims in terms of both territory and time, and so were self-limiting. The China Incident, on the other hand, began with no clear purpose or driving force to guide and limit the conflict, with the result that it developed into the full-scale Pacific War lasting eight years.[33]

Similarly, the events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor were not complicated by the free-riding of an army in the field. However, the importance of the Kwantung Army's "dokuso" as a prelude to subsequent events was that it was possible because of the divisions in military and political circles in Tokyo. Although the Manchurian Incident had a profound effect on the government, it did not bring to power a dictator or an oligarchy exercising absolute authority. The Kwantung Army's activities can be seen as the trigger for some of the terrorist attacks in Japan from the early 1930s, including the February Rebellion of 1936 (known as the 2.26 Uprising), but these failed to change drastically the structure of the government. Rather, as Sakura-kai member Lieutenant-Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto 橋本欣五郎 recorded, the Kwantung Army and its sympathisers actually prepared a draft declaration of independence from Japan: "The Kwantung Army hereby declares to break the history of the honourable Imperial Army and declares its independence from the Empire".[34] This was, in fact, what the Ministry of the Army in Tokyo was seriously worried about.[35] As analysed later in Chapter 6, the important historical effect of the Manchurian Incident on the U.S.-Japan talks in 1941 was that the major decision makers, including Secretaries Stimson and Morgenthau, formed an image of Japan's foreign policy mainly through the events of the Incident in the early 1930s, and maintained them up to the early 1940s.

The outcome of the Manchurian crisis is well known. In Japan, despite the decision of "nonexpansion of hostilities" policy by the government and the Army immediately after the outbreak of the Incident, and despite the orders of the

General Staff of the Army sent from Tokyo to the Kwantung Army repeatedly to end the military confrontation in the region, the Kwantung Army continued aggressive activities to expand its territories. Consequently, Prime Minister Reijiro Wakatsuki 若槻礼次郎 and his cabinet decided to resign, since Tokyo had lost control over the Kwantung Army. The "Co-operation Policy", known as "Shidehara Gaiko 幣原外交" (Shidehara Diplomacy), also ended. Foreign Minister Kijuro Shidehara was in fact the leading non-interventionist who had adopted the Washington Conference System and the Pact of Paris. Through an intermittent succession of five cabinets, he had managed to maintain a non-interventionist policy in China, but he had to leave office with the Wakatsuki Cabinet and did not return to public office until after the end of the Pacific War.

Under the subsequent cabinet, which was formed in December 1931 by Tsuyoshi Inukai 犬養毅, the Japanese Foreign Office, the Army and the Navy agreed to accept the existing new situation in the region in January 1932. As Akira Irie 入江昭 notes, the significant point was that even Foreign Minister Shidehara "towards the end of his tenure in office ... had begun to realize that a return to the status quo in Manchuria was untenable". Shidehara told Japanese emissaries overseas in November that "to suppress unnecessarily radical national opinion could play into the hands of the extremists, and bring about an explosion of anti-Chinese sentiment at home, inviting a dangerous situation".[36] In fact, one indication of the people's fanatic support for the activities of the Kwantung Army in the Incident was that the Kwantung Army possessed no proper aircraft in Manchuria when the Incident broke out, but 32 planes were later supplied entirely from people's donations between January and May 1932.[37] These facts represent a part of the difficulties in withdrawing from the territories in the North of the Asian continent once Japan was involved in the region.

On March 1st, 1932, Manchukuo, with "Chief Executive" (shissei 執政) Pu Yi Aisin-Gioro 愛新覚羅溥儀, former Emperor of the Manchu Ch'ing Dynasty Hsuan Tung 宣統, declared the "independence" of Manchukuo under Japanese

control. In the same year Japan formally recognised the independent kingdom of Manchukuo on September 15th. Japan, completely isolated when the League of Nations accepted the Lytton Commission report, walked out of the League in March 1933. In March 1934 Pu Yi Aisin-Gioro acceded as Emperor of Manchukuo.

In the United States, the invasion of Manchuria brought a reaffirmation of American principles at the same time as it showed the divisions in U.S. government and the weaknesses of the American position. The main responsibility for foreign policy was in the hands of Henry Stimson, but the final decision was, as always, with the President, Herbert Hoover, who was also most exposed to domestic public opinion. Their approach to international politics differed and "where Hoover was cerebral and cautious, Stimson was emotional and impulsive"; Stimson's origins were "mainly East coast, Hoover's mid-West and West".[38] For Stimson the Manchurian "Incident" was a double shock. It threatened the whole construction of Pacific security built up in the Nine-Power Treaty and the naval disarmament agreements, and it undermined the assumptions he had made about relations with Japan. On taking office he had inherited the Department's assumption that a modus vivendi with Japan was possible. He studied Japanese political developments carefully and was aware of the conflict between those whom he regarded as moderates and extremists. His initial reaction to the crisis was therefore cautious and he even calculated his speeches, in their timing and their content, in order to strengthen moderates against extremist factions.

The "non-recognition" doctrine symbolised a profound difference of views about Manchuria which fuelled U.S.-Japanese misunderstanding and would have been an ultimate stumbling block in any negotiations. In his memoir *The Far Eastern Crisis*, Stimson wrote:

> For four thousand years China had continuously and tenaciously developed and maintained her entity and peculiar culture. Often assailed and sometimes conquered by enemies, she had in the end outlasted or absorbed her conquerors and had succeeded in maintaining a civilisation ... Nearly thirty millions of people are said to have poured north-eastward from the crowded Chinese provinces of Shantung and Hopei and have occupied Manchuria. "Manchuria is now unalterably Chinese", was the verdict of the Lytton Commission in 1932.[39]

He also pointed out that

> the American government had been the first of the nations to return to the people of China for educational purposes the indemnity payments which America had received for the injury done to its citizens in the Boxer Rebellion. And ... China had witnessed for thirty years close to its shores in the Philippine Islands, the successful efforts of the American government to educate an Oriental people ... All of these things had combined to give to America a standing in Chinese eyes which was different from that held by any other country.[40]

The Japanese perspective was different. As already mentioned, certain powerful leaders in pre-war Japan, such as former Chairman of the Planning Board Naoki Hoshino 星野直樹 and Lieutenant-Colonel Kanji Ishihara 石原莞爾, believed that the Japanese were culturally and ethnically closer to the Tungusic Manchus than to the Han 漢 Chinese. In other words, they felt a certain amount of ethnic sympathy, particularly with the Manchus. Hoshino's enthusiastic pro-Manchurian view was revealed again at the Tokyo Trial immediately after the end of the Pacific War.[41]

This perception gap can also be found in the post-war period. Professor Ryoen Minamoto 源了圓, for instance, notes that one of the principal reasons why the modernisation of "China" failed in the late nineteenth century was that the "Chinese" were ruled by the "foreigners", the Manchus,[42] while Professor Butow notes that "Manchuria was Chinese ..."[43]

It is interesting to compare British and Chinese views on this issue with those of the Japanese and Americans. The British view seemed to have been different from that of the American one; for example, Sir Harold Parlett, C.M.G., a diplomat, lectured in 1929 that "The original Manchu race has now almost disappeared ... The fact, however, remains that Manchuria never was an integral part of China in the same sense as the eighteen provinces, and it might almost with justice be said that the Chinese have no more right to be there than they have to be in Mongolia".[44] In retrospect, this is not a precisely accurate view. The definition "the original Manchu race" is itself vague. The term "Manchu" was originally given by Abahai, a leader of the Aisin-Gioro clan of Chien-chou Jurchen, to the people of a confederation state consisting of various ethnic

groups in the North-East of the Asian continent.[45] Taking into account the fact that the official population of the Manchus was registered in 1990 as being nearly 10 million,[46] it is far from accurate to state that they have now almost disappeared. Nevertheless, the British view of the state of the region was better informed than that of the Americans in the pre-war period, presumably because the British experience in Asia, India and China was far longer than that of the Americans, and they were therefore more accustomed to the problems of regional conflict.

On the other hand, the Chinese view on this issue has rapidly changed since the early years of the twentieth century. The Chinese rebellions, which had frequently occurred since the middle of the nineteenth century up to the Revolution of 1911, consistently made use of the slogan "Drive out the Tartars (Manchus)! Revive the Chinese nation!" There was, thus, certainly a clear distinction between the "Han Chinese" and the "Manchus" when the former declared "We do not hate all Manchus but only those who have harmed the Han people"[47] in the Revolution. Taiwanese Professor Huang Chao-t'ang 黃昭堂, however, points out that the Chinese revolutionary government, which rose up in order to seek Chinese self-determination, failed to recognise Manchu self-determination in their homeland "Manchuria", and regarded Manchuria as part of China immediately after it came to power in 1912.[48] A work compiled by members of the history departments of Futan University and Shanghai Teachers' University and published in Peking in 1976 maintains that the issue of complicated relations between the Han Chinese and the Manchus was solved because of the nature of the Revolution of 1911, which was ideological rather than ethnic.[49]

In any case, most of the views which have denied the justification of Manchuria as a separate nation from mainland China seem to be motivated by the strong fear of the possibility of a revival of the attempt to justify the history of the puppet state of Manchukuo. Professor W. J. F. Jenner, for example, states that:

The status of the Northeast was and is a sensitive issue in China ... This did not prevent the Japanese from claiming that the region had a special and separate Manchurian identity and using this to justify the setting up of the puppet state of Manchukuo ("Manchu State") in the spring of 1932.[50]

As the Manchurian crisis proceeded, Stimson looked for means to contain Japan and to force the evacuation of Manchuria. But diplomatically the United States was outside the League of Nations and co-operation with the League quickly aroused domestic opposition. Militarily the United States lacked the naval power to resist or to deter Japan. The fleet was under-strength, vital fleet training elements had not been developed and air power had been neglected.[51]

Stimson's solution was to propose economic sanctions against Japan. But Hoover was sceptical of their efficacy ("my Secretary of State thinks that sanctions would cure chilblains" he once said). He was practical enough to consult the Navy about the imposition of sanctions and received the expected reply that it would be years before the Navy would be strong enough. Not only that but he was approaching the end of a term of office which had disappointed all those who had hoped that he would lead his country out of recession. His main preoccupation was with domestic affairs and domestic public opinion, but he would not allow his Secretary of State to pursue policies which required greater strength than the United States could command.

The outcome was the famous non-recognition doctrine enunciated in January 1932. Pressure was brought on other governments to follow, but none did so. The British government, although it opposed Japanese action when it threatened its interests in Shanghai, scarcely concealed its sense of shared interest with Japan in Manchuria and soon began to look for business opportunities in Manchukuo. But, as Professor Ian Nish points out, Britain was more concerned to maintain friendly relations with Japan than to pursue her not particularly important commercial interests in Manchuria.[52] The Soviet Union did not resist the Japanese advance into northern Manchuria and sold her

northern Manchuria railway to Manchukuo in 1934, thereby effectively recognising the new state.

Inevitably the Manchurian Incident was of historic importance in relations not only between Japan and the United States but also between Japan and China. Many Japanese, possibly because of a sense of cultural isolation, were fascinated by the idea of cultural similarity between Manchus and themselves – an emotion which supported the Kwantung Army, even though its aim had been to secure its own interests in the region. Only four days after the start of the Incident it changed its declared aim to that of an "independent state".[53] In the Navy, by contrast, there was little sympathy for the Manchus or the Mongols. The Navy's sense of a clear distinction between China and Manchuria was the same as the Army's, but the conclusion was different – the Navy should not be involved with "non-proper China".[54] Meanwhile, in China the nationalist atmosphere strengthened in reaction to the Japanese invasion. When the common front between Nationalists and Communists was formed in 1936 it was with the slogan: "Win back the lost land, Manchuria!"[55]

Regional Independence Movements and Japanese Involvement

In February 1933, the League Council accepted the conclusion of the Lytton Commission's report, which correctly condemned the aggressive actions of the Kwantung Army, while denying the persistent occurrence of independence movements among the non-Han minorities: "the present regime [of Manchukuo] cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement". It is not surprising that, even after the Pacific War, the view of Manchuria seen in the Lytton report has consistently been emphasised for the purpose of condemning the unjustifiable pre-war activities of the Kwantung Army. Consequently, the existence of a Manchu national identity has generally been ignored by Western observers.[56]

Taking into account the situation mentioned above, it is worth analysing the history of those independence movements of the regional nationalities, often in alliance with the Japanese activists, before the Manchurian Incident of 1931. It is particularly interesting to find that there are noticeable similarities in the historical development of some of those movements and that of the subsequent establishment of Manchukuo.

The many independence movements were known as the "Man-Mo Dokuritsu Keikaku 満蒙独立計画" (Independence Plans of Manchuria and [Inner] Mongolia). Two main movements before the Manchurian Incident of 1931 are particularly well known: the first "Man-Mo" Independence Plan of 1912 and the second "Man-Mo" Independence Plan of 1915-16. A private group of Japanese together with retired Army officers led by Naniwa Kawashima 川島浪速 were mainly involved in both movements, as well as several serving Army officers, acting unofficially.

There is not enough evidence to judge conclusively how much the Japanese Army General Staff itself was involved in the first case, but several officers from the Army, including Colonel Kimimichi Takayama 高山公通, who was sent to Peking and Inner Mongolia with "tokumei 特命" (a special order), were known for their involvement in it. The Government-General of Kwantung, "Kanto Totoku Fu 関東都督府", was also in favour of encouraging the movement. In 1912, immediately after Outer Mongolia, led by Bogd Khan, declared its independence from China, the movement began when Kawashima encouraged uprisings by the Manchu Prince Su 粛 in Manchuria and the leaders of the Harqin 喀喇沁 and the Bairin 巴林, two Mongol tribes in Inner Mongolia.

On the side of local nationalities, Manchu Prince Su and Papuchapu 巴布札布, leader of a Mongol mounted party in Inner Mongolia, were among the most active during this period. Several months after the Manchu Ch'ing government was overthrown in Peking, Prince Su prepared a "Deposition" of July 23rd, 1912, establishing his political party. He emphasised that the party wished to

establish an independent Manchuria and Mongolia, and to develop especially close relations between the "Ch'ing state" and Japan for maintaining the welfare of both countries.[57]

Papuchapu fought against Russia during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, then against China for Inner Mongolian independence from 1911 onwards. In June 1915, immediately after the announcement of the Kyakhta agreement between Russia, China and Bogd Khan of Outer Mongolia, Papuchapu, who was deeply disappointed by the outcome of the conference, sent two representatives to Japan to request support for an Inner Mongolian indepence movement.[58]

The first "Man-Mo" Independence Plan of 1912 was put into operation when Prince Su, with the help of Kawashima's group and in co-operation with the Kanto Totoku Fu, secretly left Peking on the 2nd, and reached Port Arthur on the 6th February, 1912, just as Aisin Gioro Pu Yi was helped, two decades later in 1931, to move secretly from Tientsin to the house of the son of former Prince Su in Port Arthur. The plan supported by the Army was, however, interrupted by the Tokyo Foreign Office, again in rivalry with the Army. Consequently, the Army General Staff gave up the plan in Manchuria immediately after Kawashima and his colleagues were called up to Tokyo and strictly ordered by the Foreign Minister to stop their activities. From then on, the plan was limited to Mongol uprisings, in alliance with the Harqin and the Bairin, but was eventually stopped on June 8th when Mongol troops, transporting arms and ammunition, accidentally met Chinese troops and exchanged fire. Thirteen Japanese, 9 Mongols and 30 Chinese were killed in this battle.

In the second Plan, from 1915 onwards, the Army General Staff sent Major Kuniaki Koiso 小磯国昭 (nearly three decades later Prime Minister during the Pacific War), and then Colonel Ichinoshin Doi 土井市之進 to Manchuria to support the Independence Plan. This plan was made by Kawashima in 1915 when Yuan Shih-kai 袁世凱 attempted to become the "Emperor of China", and the subsequent Third Revolution against Yuan began in China. At the same time an anti-Yuan

stance became prevalent among the Army and Navy General Staffs and several civilian leaders in Japan. It was decided at the Cabinet meeting on March 7th, 1916, that anybody as leader of China would be better for Japanese national interests than Yuan Shih-kai. Thus, Kawashima's second Independence Plan was at the beginning eased by the timely anti-Yuan attitude spreading among the Japanese leaders, although the Tokyo government officially refused to co-operate with him. At this time, Kawashima established an alliance with Papuchapu, as well as once again encouraging the former Manchu Prince Su.

In June 1916, when Yuan Shih-kai died, the Tokyo authorities dramatically changed their foreign policy, deciding to support the new Chinese government led by Li Yuan-hung 黎元洪 (known as Rei Genko in Japan) since he had come to terms with the Chinese anti-Yuan revolutionary powers. Consequently, although the Mongolian troops led by Papuchapu had already advanced to Kuochiatien 郭家店 in China, Tokyo decided to stop the second Plan on 23rd June, only 17 days after the death of Yuan Shih-kai. On September 2nd, Papuchapu finally agreed to withdraw from Kuochiatien to Khalkhin Gol (the Khalkhin River) as Japan acknowledged Inner Mongolian rights to continue their independence movements, although Japan would not support Papuchapu directly. About 30 Japanese, including Army officers ranked Captain and Lieutenant, however, marched with the Mongol troops westwards. On October 7th the returning Mongol troops began to fight against the Chinese troops, but Papuchapu was killed in this combat. The second Plan finally ended, in fact, in early December, 1916, when the Mongol troops arrived at Khalkhin Gol, their homeland.

As regards both of the Independence Plans, while several leaders of the Army General Staff and the Kanto Totoku Fu supported Kawashima's activities, the Tokyo government never officially decided to support the plans, because of inner discords. The Foreign Office was the driving force in stopping the first Plan, and the second Plan had already been criticised by the Foreign Office before Yuan Shih-kai's death, as well as by Lieutenant-General Fusataro Hongo 本郷房太郎,

Commander of the Seventeenth Division under the control of the Kanto Totoku Fu, and other high-ranking officers in the region.

Nonetheless, some Japanese who stayed in the region retained their enthusiasm for the movements of the minorities, and continually attempted to use these movements to strengthen the Japanese position, right up to the foundation of Manchukuo. On the other hand, there were minority groups which attempted to establish alliances with foreign countries in order to use powerful foreign support for their own resistance against the threat of China and other surrounding countries. There were pro-Russian and pro-Japanese groups among the leaders of Outer Mongolia in the 1910s, while the Tarkut (Torgut), an Oirat tribe, remained a pro-Chinese power. Thus, the roles of these ethnic movements were significant in the regions of Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria.

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5 Butow, Robert J. C. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961, p. 19.

6 Ibid., p. 20.

7 Ibid., p. 20.

8 T. Bailey, op. cit., pp. 638-40.

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Ikeda, Kiyoshi 池田清. *Kaigun to Nihon 海軍と日本* (The Navy and Japan), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 66-9.

10 T. Bailey, op. cit., p. 644.

11 Ferrell, Robert H. *America as a World Power, 1872-1945*, University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina, 1971, pp. 204-5.

12 T. Bailey, op. cit., p. 645.

13 Ibid., p. 646.

14 Ibid., p. 647.

15 K. Ikeda, op. cit., p. 68.

16 Many nervous Americans believed that in certain circumstances the naval strength of both Britain and Japan might be massed against the United States in the ratio of 8 to 5. On the other hand, should the Anglo-Japanese Alliance be abrogated, the navies of Britain and America could theoretically "gang up" on Japan in a ratio of 10 to 3. See T. Bailey, op. cit., p. 643. It is thus understandable that Japan, and particularly her Navy, should have been worried about the danger of an "Anglo-American alliance".

17 K. Ikeda, op. cit., pp. 68-9.

18 Miller, Edward S. *War Plan Orange — The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945*, Airlife Publishing Ltd., Shrewsbury, England, 1991, p. 313.

19 Ibid., p. 3.

20 K. Ikeda, op. cit., p. 67.

21 Ibid., p. 74.

22 Ibid., p. 65.

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24 Although the literal translation is "independent decision", Kenkyusha's dictionary defines it as "arbitrary decision", which is a more precisely accurate rendering of the original word. The word "arbitrary", however, has for some the further connotation of a decision taken on a non-rational basis, and thus could be misleading. This is another example of the danger of translation equivalents, as discussed in Chapter 9. See Masuda, Koh 増田綱, *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary* (Fourth Edition), Kenkyusha 研究社, Tokyo, 1974, p. 212.

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28 M. Sato, op. cit., pp. 330-5.

29 Storry, Richard. *The Double Patriots — A Study of Japanese Nationalism*, Chatto and Windus Ltd., London, 1957, pp. 74-6.

30 T. Shimada, op. cit., p. 102.

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36 Iriye, Akira. *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, Longman Group UK Ltd., London, 1987, p. 15.

37 Ikuta, Makoto 生田惇. *Nihon Rikugun-shi 日本陸軍史* (A History of the Japanese Army), Kyoiku-sha 教育社, Tokyo, 1980, p. 136.

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46 Dreyer, June Teufel. *China's Political System – Modernization and Tradition*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., Basingstoke, Hampshire, 1993, p. 363, p. 382.

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52 Nish, Ian. "Britain's View of the Japanese Economy in the Early Showa Period", in Dore, Ronald and Sinha, Radha, *Japan and World Depression – Then and Now*, Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., London, 1987, p. 141.

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56 The conclusion of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East confirmed the same view of Manchuria as the one which appeared in the Lytton Commission's report.

As recently as 1994 Colin Mackerras, for instance, states in his work that "During the occupation of the Manchu homeland ... Although they [the Japanese] had in theory sponsored the establishment of an independent Manchurian empire, there was no revival of Manchurian culture there. The aim of detaching Manchuria from China was to benefit the Japanese, not the Manchus". See Mackerras, Colin. *China's Minorities: Integration and*

Modernization in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press (Hong Kong) Ltd., Hong Kong, 1994, p. 262.

57 While explicitly recognising that the new party did not have sufficient power to pursue its aspirations, Prince Su requested Japan's support to strengthen his party, in exchange for recognition of Japan's special interests in the region. Refer to the content of the Deposition in Somura, Yasunobu 曾村保信. "Shingai Kakumei to Nihon 辛亥革命と日本" (The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and Japan), in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations). *Kikan Kokusai Seiji — Nihon Gaikoshi Kenkyu — Nitchu Kankei no Tenkai 季刊国際政治 — 日本外交史研究 — 日中関係の展開* (Quarterly International Politics — Studies on the Diplomatic History of Japan — The Development of Sino-Japanese Relations), Yuhikaku 有斐閣, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 50-1.

58 The tripartite agreement of Kyakhta denied the Mongolian demand for complete independence, and recognised only Outer Mongolia's gain of autonomous status in China. Although the Tokyo government, worried about the possibility of isolation in international society, refused Papuchapu's request, Kawashima's group and its sympathisers in the Army decided to act in the area. See Isono, Fujiko 磯野富士子. *Mongoru Kakumei モンゴル革命* (The Mongol Revolution), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1974, pp. 77-80.

Chapter 5: The China Incident

In retrospect the China Incident, later known as the Sino-Japanese War, has come to be seen as a midway point between the invasion of Manchuria and the attack on Pearl Harbor which opened the Pacific War. The popular perception is of a simple aggressive march forward and often the general literature on the pre-war years does little to disturb this view. It is true, moreover, that the problems which Japan faced in extricating itself from China were a major stumbling block to a negotiated agreement. None the less the conflict in and around China and Japan's international position was more complex and it forms the main subject of this chapter.

The Northern Threat

The creation of Manchukuo established an ill-defined frontier with the Soviet Union and Mongolia, with the result that military conflicts were frequently reported from the early 1930s onwards.[1] In June 1934 the Soviet Far Eastern troops matched the whole Japanese Army in number, and the total number of Japanese troops on the Russian front was less than 30% of that of the Russians.[2] The Japanese Army judged that the possibility of a Russian attack on Japan was growing, as the number of Russian troops increased year by year.[3] Primary sources show that the Kwantung Army felt pressure and a strong sense of responsibility for defending the border with powerful neighbours.[4]

From 1935 there was an increase in the number and scale of border incidents.[5] The most serious battles, from 1937-38, were on Kanch'atzu 乾岔子 Island (Kanchazu in Japanese) in the Amur river and Changkufeng 張鼓峰 Hill (Chokoho). The Tokyo government wanted to prevent Japanese forces being drawn into conflict with Russia. But the General Staff was divided and first gave, then withdrew, support. The Japanese Nineteenth Division suffered a disastrous

defeat which inevitably led to bitter recrimination against Tokyo.[6] At the same time Major-General Kanji Ishihara 石原莞爾, Chief of the First Department of the General Staff, said in June 1937: "We must concern ourselves only with defending ourselves against the Russian Army in the North, so I will never agree to sending even one Japanese soldier against China".[7]

The China Incident

The conflict which came to be known as the Sino-Japanese war began with a skirmish between the Chinese and Japanese armies at Marco Polo bridge, in the area of Lukouchiao 蘆溝橋 (known as Rokokyo in Japanese) near Peking 北京 on July 7th, 1937. Even now it is not clear how the Incident started, but the evidence shows that there was no Japanese plot.[8] General Ishihara immediately saw the danger of an escalation into full-scale war: "if that happens we will be sucked into quicksand, just as when Napoleon invaded Spain he began a course of action that would inevitably bring his defeat".[9] He was supported by Lieutenant-General Kan'ichiro Tashiro 田代皖一郎, Commander-in-Chief of the Army in China, and most of the leading Army officials.[10]

On July 8th the Army General Staff and the Ministry of the Army agreed that further confrontation should be avoided, and the Japanese Cabinet Council ratified this decision the next day. Although there were casualties and the situation remained tense, a cease-fire agreement known as the Matsui-Chang 松井-張[11] agreement was signed on July 11th. On the same day, however, the Cabinet decided to send more troops "if necessary" to China and on July 12th Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe 近衛文麿, who usually had the support and trust of both the Army and the Emperor, announced that his government was committed with a "strong will" to the protection of Japanese citizens.

Immediately afterwards two telegrams from the Chief of Staff in China, Major-General Gun Hashimoto 橋本群 (later promoted to Lieutenant-General in

March 1939), reported that there was no need for reinforcements, as a cease-fire was imminent. This enabled Ishihara to postpone the sending of troops, on the basis that they were needed only "if necessary".[12] However, the Cabinet's decision and Konoe's speech had an inflammatory effect on the Chinese which Konoe had not foreseen.[13]

Ishihara kept up his efforts to consolidate the cease-fire and began to urge Konoe to go to Nanking 南京 to meet Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石. His first initiative won Konoe's interest but was prevented by bureaucratic infighting.[14] On July 20th, on a proposal from Army Minister Hajime Sugiyama 杉山元, the Cabinet once again decided to send more troops to China. Two days later, on the basis of reports from China, the General Staff once again decided not to send troops.

The intentions of Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters at this stage have been analysed by Shigeharu Matsumoto 松本重治 on the basis of interviews he carried out on July 13th, 1937.[15] The Nationalists did not want a full-scale war against the Japanese since they wanted to defeat their domestic enemies and gain control of the whole of China. But they recognised that they would have to fight if the Japanese continued to invade China, even though this would increase Communist power. In spite of the strong tone of Chiang's rhetoric, therefore, there was a slight possibility of averting the escalation of hostilities. But although Cabinet agreements on reinforcements were cancelled twice, the announcement of Japan's "strong will" created a more hostile atmosphere in China.

In retrospect, the majority of contemporary Japanese leaders completely failed to understand the atmosphere in China. In the case of the hawks, including Captain Masanobu Tsuji 辻政信 of the Kwantung Army (later promoted to Major in March 1938), they perceived the event as a great opportunity to expand hostilities and occupy wider areas and "solve" the "China issue", but even those hawks did not intend, as Professor Ryoichi Tobe 戸部良一 notes, to expand the hostilities outside North China. Thus, on the 11th when the Tokyo government announced the Cabinet decision to send troops, the conflict was formally named

the "Hoku-Shi Jihen 北支事変" literally the "North China Incident".[16] The hard-liners expected to engineer concessions from China, thus preventing an escalation of hostilities, by sending troops from Japan, and even carrying out a quick and effective military attack on Chinese troops if necessary. This policy of the hawks, conceived in response to the Marco Polo Incident, has been called "Tai-Shi Ichigeki-ron 対支一撃論", which means the theory of the effectiveness of "one blow" on China, similar to the notion of the "short sharp shock". They were preoccupied by suspicion towards the policy of Chiang Kai-shek's authorities and underestimated the abilities of the Chinese Army to continue fighting.

In contrast, Konoe and his supporters, who were relative soft-liners, did not favour any extreme policy such as sending troops. As noted by many historians, however, they expected to entice a compromise from China by announcing Japan's "strong will", although not necessarily by actually sending troops. Thus, the main difference between the hard-liners and soft-liners was on whether troops should actually be sent to China, while they shared the belief that concessions could be won by adopting a coercive posture. But in reality coercive postures caused stronger resentment in China. In fact Konoe's position at this stage seemed even more coercive than that of some military leaders, who maintained a cautious posture.[17]

Nevertheless, Prime Minister Konoe was still trying to arrange a summit meeting with Chiang Kai-shek by sending agents to China. Konoe notified Army Minister Sugiyama that he had decided to send Ryusuke Miyazaki 宮崎龍介, a former member of the Central Committee of the Shakai-Taishu-To 社会大衆党 (the Society and the Masses Party), to Nanking, and, following Konoe's suggestion, Miyazaki left Tokyo on the 23rd. He was, however, arrested by the military police in Kobe 神戸 on the 24th after he was already on board. As a result of wasting a week in detention in Tokyo, he eventually missed travelling to China. S. Matsumoto, for one, introduces a theory that Chiang Kai-shek's telegram requesting the name of Miyazaki's ship was intercepted by a group in the

Army.[18] In any case, although it is natural to assume that some opponents in the Army interrupted his trip to China, details of this event are still not known to historians.

On July 25th, a major battle occurred between the Japanese and Chinese. Although he was still firmly opposed to the idea of escalation, Ishihara reluctantly accepted the inevitability of sending more troops, to prevent the situation deteriorating further, and telephoned the Ministry of the Army at one o'clock in the morning of the 26th with the request to send more troops to the battle area. As a result of this, on July 27th, the Cabinet Council agreed to this request and on the 28th the Japanese Army engaged battle in earnest in an attempt to deliver a decisive "one blow" against the Chinese. One day later, on July 29th, a group of Chinese militia, officially under Japanese control, killed a group of their Japanese officers at Tungchow 通州, a rural area, and then massacred more than 180 (out of a total population of 338) Japanese civilians as well as a number of Korean civilians of both sexes. This incident caused Japanese public opinion to turn violently against the Chinese.

Kinkazu Saionji 西園寺公一, a grandson of Genro 元老 Kinmochi Saionji 西園寺公望, was requested to go to China by both Konoe and Yukichi Iwanaga 岩永裕吉, the President of the Domei 同盟 News Agency and Konoe's close friend. Saionji was assisted by S. Matsumoto, who was head of the Shanghai 上海 Branch of the Domei News Agency and Hall Patch, an official of the British Embassy in China, and succeeded in meeting some Chinese leaders including Sung Tzu-wen 宋子文 (known as So Shibun in Japan) in Shanghai. According to Japanese records, the Saionji plan failed because of the outbreak of a new military clash in North China. This despite the fact that, just before the new clash, Saionji had received from Chiang Kai-shek through Sung Tzu-wen a positive reply to a plan to hold a summit meeting. According to British records, however, the situation was not as hopeful as Saionji judged at that time. After meeting with Saionji on the 26th, Sung Tzu-wen flew to Nanking to see Chiang Kai-shek on the 27th, and he

reported to Hall Patch later that Chiang Kai-shek thought Konoe's proposal for a peaceful adjustment contained unacceptable conditions, but that Chiang Kai-shek wished to give a vague reply to Konoe rather than refuse the proposal outright.[19]

Konoe's continuing efforts to achieve a cease-fire followed this escalation of the conflict. The Japanese Foreign Ministry sent Tatsuichiro Funatsu 船津辰一郎, the Japanese President of Textile Commerce in China who was regarded as an expert on China, secretly to meet Kao Tsung-wu 高宗武 (known as "Ko Sobu" in Japan), Chief of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Asia Bureau in Shanghai. After this meeting, Kao Tsung-wu planned to meet with the Japanese ambassador to China, Shigeru Kawagoe 川越茂, but they were unable to secure a cease-fire agreement because news of conflict in Shanghai reached them. Then on August 9th, a navy lieutenant, Lieutenant Isao Oyama 大山勇夫, and an accompanying rating, Yozo Saito 斉藤與蔵, were shot dead by Chinese militia in Shanghai. As a result of this the Japanese Navy joined the conflict and on August 13th the Cabinet Council decided to send more troops to Shanghai, so that the "China Incident" spread from North to Central and South China. Peace, which had seemed so close, receded into the distance again.

The Funatsu plan was initially considered by Itaro Ishii 石射猪太郎 of the Foreign Office on July 31st when Kenshiro Shibayama 柴山兼四郎 of the Ministry of the Army visited him to discuss a new measure to reach a cease-fire in North China. It has been perceived that the Ministry of the Army was then influenced by the Emperor, who told Konoe his preference for a diplomatic solution for a peaceful adjustment in China. One day before, on the 30th, Ishihara of the General Staff of the Army had presented a draft proposal for a cease-fire to the Navy Vice-Chief of Staff and had requested the Navy's support for the plan. Navy Minister, Mitsumasa Yonai 米内光政, at the Cabinet meeting of August 2nd, urged consideration of diplomatic means to solve the crisis and this resulted in Funatsu being sent to Shanghai with the proposal, which had been composed by members of the Ministries of the Foreign Office, the Army and the Navy. Thus,

Funatsu's activities began after Japanese troops had occupied the regions by July 30th. In other words, Funatsu started to move after the successful implementation of the policy of "one blow" on China, and still failed to prevent the subsequent escalation of hostilities.

With regard to the factors which caused the failure of Funatsu's activities, Itaro Ishii was upset by Ambassador Kawagoe's action of "dokuso 独走", running alone, which made the intentions of Tokyo very vague when Funatsu and Kawagoe met Kao Tsung-wu. According to Japanese records, Kawagoe ignored several telegrams sent by the Foreign Minister after the Gosho Kaigi 五相会議 (the meeting of five Ministers) of July 17th and stayed in Tientsin 天津, although he was repeatedly ordered to return to Shanghai immediately. In fact, Kawagoe himself intended to contact Kao Tsung-wu to reach a cease-fire in Tientsin. After the initial meeting with Kao Tsung-wu in Tientsin, the Ambassador eventually returned to Shanghai on August 7th. Kawagoe then intervened in Funatsu's activities by prohibiting him from presenting the proposal from Tokyo to China, although the Foreign Office in Tokyo sent a telegram to the Japanese Consul General in Shanghai suggesting that no local official should intervene in Funatsu's activities. As a consequence, Funatsu failed to hand over the proposal from Tokyo to Kao Tsung-wu at the meeting of the 9th.

When one analyses these examples of the failure to reach a peaceful adjustment during the early stages of the China Incident, one can recognise several characteristic points. Firstly, one of the most serious problems of contemporary Japanese politics, the lack of central control over national decisions, could be clearly seen as a factor which contributed to the failure. As noted by historians, although the aims of both the hawks and doves were, in a wider sense, united in wishing to prevent full-scale war with China,[20] there was rivalry among the groups with different and even incompatible ideas on the means of achieving that aim. None of the individuals or groups could act effectively, partly because of the various interruptions caused by their

opponents. Thus, the issue of the disorderly and parochial nature of much Japanese decision-making can be observed within the Army, within the Navy and even within the Foreign Office at the lower level, as well as between the ministries within the government at the higher level.

Secondly, most of their strategies for achieving the aims were based on misunderstandings of the mentality of their adversaries. As noted above, both the relative soft-liners led by Konoe and the hard-liners shared the belief that a coercive posture taken by Japan could help to end the conflict, whereas the reality was very different. Thirdly, there was the lack of serious consideration of what would happen if their strategies did not produce a quick result. The first implementation of the "one blow" policy eventually caused escalation of hostilities rather than ending the conflicts, and this policy merely created a pattern of piece-meal encroachment throughout the war in China, although no plan of conquering the whole of China existed on the side of Japan. The same mistake was repeated several months later when Tokyo took the deliberate decision to put in enough troops to seize Nanking, hoping to put a quick end to the fighting. The result was again that Japan was dragged into a larger scale of conflicts there.

Ishihara also did not foresee realistically what would happen if his policy of giving up Inner Mongolia and North China failed. When the hard-liners pointed out the possibility of Chinese collaboration with the Russians in the event of a Russo-Japanese war following a Japanese withdrawal, he was not able to defend his argument effectively.

However, Ishihara continued his attempts to negotiate a cease-fire by a different route, with a military attachē to the German Embassy in Tokyo, Major-General Eugen Ott. These negotiations were later supported officially by Oskar P. Trautmann, the German Ambassador in China. Japanese conditions for the cease-fire were seen as both too extreme and too open-ended by the Chinese, who demanded more specific conditions on January 14th, 1938. The Japanese Cabinet

Council interpreted this demand by the Chinese as the Chinese government's "intention and will" to continue fighting. Although the Japanese Army General Staff, knowing the army was close to exhaustion, wanted very much to continue negotiations, the Ministry of the Army insisted on blocking this negotiation route because they wanted to try a rival but more promising route through Wang Ching-wei 汪精衛, a colleague of Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙 and a rival of Chiang Kai-shek.

On January 16th the Japanese Cabinet Council, acting on the advice of the Ministry of the Army, issued a statement, later called the First Konoe Announcement, that there would be no further dealings of any kind with Chiang Kai-shek's official government. Negotiations continued through 1938 and were dominated by the Army. In May Konoe appointed General Kazushige Ugaki 宇垣一成 as Foreign Minister, accepting his condition that he should have sole charge over foreign policy, but his authority was successfully challenged by the Army, which created a new department (the "Developing Asia Section" Koa-in 興亜院) with the express purpose of excluding the Foreign Ministry from negotiations with China. In September, General Ugaki offered his resignation, disappointed in his failure to control the Army. The Army's negotiations made progress and on November 20th the Wang Ching-wei group signed a Chinese-Japanese agreement for a cease-fire, which is known as the "Record of Negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese (Nikka Kyogi Roku 日華協議録)".

Chiang Kai-shek, however, refused to honour the agreement and continued fighting, even though the Japanese government had issued the Second Konoe Announcement, reversing its previous boycott of Chiang Kai-shek's government in agreement with, and supported by, the rest of the government. Thus, the strong desire of the Japanese, including the exhausted Army, for a cease-fire in China was frustrated by the difficulties of being forced to negotiate, sometimes openly, sometimes in secret, with two separate rival factions within the Chinese

Nationalist Party and several warlords, regional military groups who acted independently.

The American Response

The Americans were of course aware in general terms of developments in the China Incident, but the Germans and British were more directly involved, and even the French and the Italians attempted to play a mediating role. The Americans remained neutral and distant from the peace-feeler activities.

The China Incident began when the primary foreign policy concerns of the European powers, and the United States, were still situated in Europe. Germany had occupied the Rhineland, Italy had attacked Abyssinia and civil war was being waged in Spain. President Roosevelt was concerned with domestic affairs, including economic policy and the struggle with the Supreme Court.

Roosevelt inherited the non-recognition doctrine from the Hoover Administration and there was no reason to change it. Equally, Japanese action in China did not threaten any major American interests. The dangers from Germany and Italy were more immediate, but Roosevelt's view of the importance of Europe for the United States was not shared by the general public or by Congress. His major foreign policy concern was therefore to combat isolationism in Congress. Isolationism, and the neutrality legislation which it produced, originated from a view of the way that the United States had been drawn into the First World War in Europe. But it obviously constrained any American action in the Far East as well. Roosevelt simply accepted the China Incident as an "Incident" because, as long as there was no war, the neutrality legislation did not apply.

In the Americans' view, Japanese military action in China was seen as a continuation of the invasion of Manchuria, and qualified as aggression. But quite apart from isolationist opposition, the United States still lacked the means and the will to counter it. In any case there were some, like Stanley Hornbeck, who

welcomed the fact that Japan was occupied in China. The League of Nations had proved too weak to restrain Italy against Abyssinia, and America was still not a member of the League. For Britain and France the danger to south-east Asia was still distant. The Roosevelt Administration had recognised the Communist government in Russia, but the Soviet Union was in no sense a diplomatic ally.

Roosevelt chose Chicago, the heart of isolationism, to give a major foreign policy speech on the occasion of the dedication of the Outer Link Bridge. Using an image and words suggested to him by Harold Ickes, he said:

> It is unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease.

However, having hinted at a policy of collective security, "the speaker seemed now to shrink or back away".[21] Cardinal Mundelein, who lunched with the President the next day, recorded Roosevelt as saying that the speech did not "involve 'sanctions' as generally understood, but rather a policy of isolation, severance of ordinary communications in a united manner by all the governments in the pact", while at his press conference he said "'sanctions' is a terrible word to use. They are out the window".[22] It is now clear that Roosevelt was in fact revolving in his own mind the possibility of drastic action should the Japanese go much further — in December he put to the British the idea of a joint cruiser blockade of Japan.[23] Such thinking was later to bring consequences of the utmost importance; but, at the time, the "Quarantine Speech" appeared to have been only a damp squib.

By contrast, the extent of isolationist opinion was amply demonstrated in December, at the time when the Japanese launched their offensive against Nanking. Congressman Louis Ludlow revived a resolution, which he had tried unsuccessfully before, supporting a constitutional amendment to the power of Congress to declare war.[24] His proposal was that the power of Congress should be limited to the event of the United States suffering an enemy invasion, otherwise its declaration of war would have to be supported by a national referendum. The

Gallup poll showed overwhelming public support and in the end the referendum was only narrowly defeated. To add to the President's frustration the votes needed for its defeat came from the Southern Congressmen who were opposed to his New Deal programme.[25]

On December 11th Japanese naval aircraft attacked and sank a U.S. naval vessel, the *Panay*, stationed in the Yangtze River 楊子江, and also attacked three Standard Oil Company river steamers. To the relief of the President the Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota 広田弘毅 called on Ambassador Grew to deliver an apology to him personally. The attack resulted, he said, from the fact that the planes flew too high to see the U.S. flags on the deck of the *Panay*. Soon afterwards Roosevelt was made aware of the emptiness of the apology; a newsreel cameraman on the deck of the *Panay* had filmed the attack, which was at low level. Nonetheless he accepted the Japanese government's formal written apology when it arrived on December 24th. More than that, he persuaded Universal News to eliminate the relevant frames when their newsreel was shown, so that public opinion should not be inflamed.[26] But the event may have had further significance: post-war memoirs show no evidence that Hirota was acting in bad faith, so that Roosevelt's view of Japanese duplicity was probably not justified.[27]

The *Panay* incident embodies some similar elements of misinterpretation and misconception to those that were eventually to affect the U.S.-Japan negotiations in 1941. For example, Secretary of State Cordell Hull obtained decoded intercepts of messages sent between the Japanese Navy and the Tokyo Foreign Office, and some of this information caused the American decision-makers to doubt Japan's explanation of the event, partly because it gave the impression that the Army was involved, thus making it seem a deliberate co-ordinated Japanese attack. The conflicting Navy and Army reports on the incidents, reflecting their deep mutual distrust, further raised American suspicions. In the end, the true origins of the incident are "completely unknown, just as in the case of the Marco

Polo Bridge Incident".[28] The incident generally intensified the negative image of Japan both with the American leaders and the general public.[29]

As the European crisis gathered momentum in 1938 there was a natural tendency to assimilate the Far-Eastern crisis to that in Europe. Although the predominant mood in Britain and France was still one of appeasement, German action increasingly appeared as the determined aggressive action of a dictatorship and this mode of thought was transferred to perceptions of Japan's role in China. It is for this reason that the signature of the Tripartite Pact was of such importance, so that one recent historian has described it as "the point of no return" in the approach to war.[30] But while Germany was establishing its dominion over Czechoslovakia following the invasion of Prague in March 1939, Japanese forces were engaged in battle with the Russians and the Tripartite Pact differed profoundly, in Japanese calculations, from the character it was given in Western perception.

The Nomonhan Incident

The series of Russo-Japanese military conflicts throughout the 1930s and early 1940s had a significantly adverse effect on attempts to reach a U.S.-Japan agreement in 1941. The defeat of the Kwantung Army in the Nomonhan Incident resulted in the Japanese Army's consideration of an alliance with Germany. The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was, however, regarded by Western decision-makers as merely the creation of an anti-Western front, while Japanese decision-makers failed to understand the importance, for their own foreign policy, of Western hostility against Nazi Germany.

In late 1940, in the aftermath of the Nomonhan Incident and other military clashes, the Japanese Army began to prepare a military plan, known as the Kan-Toku-En 関特演 Manoeuvres, against the Soviet Far Eastern Army. The massive mobilisation of troops and ammunition towards the northern front started in the

summer of 1941. The high tension between Russia and Japan was, however, not fully recognised by the Western decision-makers throughout the period of the U.S.-Japan talks. The possibility of a full-scale war between Russia and Japan existed at that time, but under the strict embargoes maintained by the West from the summer of 1941 onwards, Japan eventually decided to open hostilities against the West in order to gain natural resources in the southern areas.

Despite the important role of the events mentioned above, however, the development of the northern conflicts has generally been little known in the West, and has often been regarded as marginal by historians. From this point of view, it is worth analysing the history of the contemporary Russo-Japanese military clashes in this thesis.

The details of the Nomonhan Incident are not yet very clear for the following reasons. First, the records of the Nomonhan Incident were kept strictly secret, because the Japanese Army was reluctant to make public the record of its losses in the battle of Nomonhan until the end of the Pacific War. Second, although some records have been published in post-war Japan, they are rather fragmented and not sufficient in volume to make a fair reconstruction of what actually happened in the summer of 1939. In addition, few Russian records have been made available. There is no commonly accepted definition of even the date of the beginning of the conflict. According to the records of Lieutenant-Colonel Takushiro Hattori 服部卓四郎 and of Major M. Tsuji, both officers of the Kwantung Army at that time, the first exchange of fire between the Mongolian and Manchukuoan armies was on May 12th, but it began on the 11th according to the Russian records. Lieutenant-General Michitaro Komatsubara 小松原道太郎, Commander-in-Chief of the Twenty-third Division stationed near Nomonhan around Khalkhin Gol (the Khalkhin River), sent the first telegram reporting the "invasion" of 700 Mongolian soldiers. This telegram reached the Kwantung Army Headquarters in the afternoon on the 13th.[31]

The conflict developed into a large-scale battle from the 28th, which later became known as the first Nomonhan Incident. While the telegram reported that the Mongolian troops and the Manchukuoan troops were fighting, and that Lieutenant-General Komatsubara requested the Kwantung Army to approve action by the Twenty-third Division to support the Manchukuoan Army, the Kwantung Army Headquarters wished to wait and see how the situation would develop. In the circumstances, however, the Divisional Commander of the Twenty-third Division, Komatsubara, immediately ordered his troops to open fire on the Mongolian troops which had "attacked the Manchukuoan troops". The event demonstrates one significant effect of the new April policy. Although Mongolian soldiers had previously "invaded" the same area several times before the establishment of the new policy, those "invasions" did not cause serious military conflicts at the time. This suggests that the strong reaction of the Twenty-third Division seen in May was presumably motivated by a heavy sense of responsibility for showing loyalty to the new April policy.

The Japanese-Manchukuoan allied forces successfully drove the Mongolian Army from Nomonhan at first, but part of the Japanese Twenty-third Division was seriously defeated by the Russo-Mongolian forces which came back to the area. The first Nomonhan Incident ended on the 31st when the Twenty-third Division "under the control of the Kwantung Army" withdrew from the area, because the Kwantung Army Headquarters confirmed its non-escalation policy.

On June 19th, a telegram from the Twenty-third Division reached Kwantung Army Headquarters reporting that the Manchukuoan Army was being bombed by Russian aircraft and driven off by the Russian troops in the region. The Kwantung Army was split into groups of supporters of the non-escalation policy and sympathisers with the Twenty-third Division. On the 20th, however, after much discussion, the Kwantung Army decided to assemble its troops in the region. The Army General Staff in Tokyo did not immediately oppose this plan. However, when the Army General Staff accidentally found out that the Kwantung

Army had deliberately not reported its plan to make air raids on Mongolian territory, the General Staff of the Army sent a telegram to the Kwantung Army to prevent the plan. In addition, Tokyo sent Lieutenant-Colonel Yadoru Arisue 有末次 to the region to prevent the air raids, but the Kwantung Army had already carried out a bombing raid with more than 130 aircraft just a few hours before Arisue's arrival. This event naturally resulted in a fundamental disagreement between the Kwantung Army and Tokyo.

When Lieutenant-Colonel Tadasumi Inada 稲田正純 of the Army General Staff received a telephone call from an officer of the Kwantung Army about the "successful bombing", Inada shouted at the officer "Idiot! What success!"[32] While the Army General Staff considered punishing the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, the Kwantung Army's reaction was to unify itself in the face of heavy pressure from Tokyo. Thus, eventually 56,000 officers and men took part in the battle without any co-operation from the Army General Staff in Tokyo. Considering the fact that much larger Russian forces were deployed under the control of Moscow, the defeat of the Kwantung Army was, as Shimada notes, "clear from the beginning of the combat".[33] This full-scale battle became known as the Second Nomonhan Incident.

The Army General Staff, which was aware that there was no possibility of victory, attempted to end the conflict with the Russians by a Japanese compromise. It presented a document to the Kwantung Army entitled the "Guideline for Ending the Nomonhan Incident (Nomonhan Jiken Shori Yoko ノモンハン事件処理要綱)", an attempt at a diplomatic solution, but the Kwantung Army Headquarters decided to ignore the "Guideline" from Tokyo. The heavy Russian attack on the Kwantung Army began on August 20th. Only three days later, on the 23rd, the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was announced. This establishment of the Russo-German Pact made possible the increase of the Russian troops facing the Kwantung Army, while the Kwantung Army still had no support from the Army General Staff in Tokyo. Consequently, by the 29th the Kwantung

Army had been defeated by the Russian forces. The number of casualties of the Twenty-third Division reached more than 70% of its total strength of 11,000. A large number of its officers were killed in the battle, and most of the surviving officers committed suicide, as a sign of their responsibility, immediately after the defeat. The Divisional Commander Komatsubara returned to Tokyo to report the defeat and died soon afterwards. Thus, the Twenty-third Division was almost entirely destroyed.

The deep distrust which existed between the regional armies and the Army General Staff in Tokyo, which is revealed in this example, constituted a continuing problem. Indeed, even within the regional armies themselves, including the Kwantung Army, in certain circumstances the separate divisions tended to operate independently of one another without combined planning to achieve joint objectives. The problem of inner distrust within the Army itself was never solved and in fact it became increasingly serious.

To return to the subject of the northern border dispute, however, one should accept that the ultimate purposes of the Kwantung Army and the General Staff of the Army in Tokyo were not really different, although in the short term their decisions can be seen as incompatible. It is true that the Army General Staff maintained its non-escalation policy during the Nomonhan Incident, because of worries about the development of the China Incident in the South, but this does not mean that its policy was "friendly" towards the presence of the Russian forces in the North. The strong sense of crisis with regard to the Russian threat among the members of the Army General Staff was clearly revealed in its subsequent plans. Among them was its plan to deploy troops on a large scale on the northern "border" with Russia in the summer of 1941, the "Kan-Toku-En" manoeuvres.

The Chinese-Japanese Basic Treaty

In March 1940, when Wang Ching-wei declared Nanking the new capital, Japan sent an ambassador, Nobuyuki Abe 阿部信行 (who later became Prime Minister), there with the intention of establishing full diplomatic relations. On August 28th, after 15 meetings, agreement was reached in a document entitled "The Chinese-Japanese Basic Treaty" (Nikka Kihon Joyaku 日華基本条約). All that remained to be done was the official signing of the treaty. While these events were unfolding other groups within the Japanese government expressed concern that involvement with Wang Ching-wei would destroy the chances of real peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party government and continued their efforts to establish peace through other routes. It is said that in July 1940 when the second Konoe Cabinet was formed there were 17 active negotiation channels between the Chinese Nationalist Party government and Japan.

When Yosuke Matsuoka 松岡洋右 became Foreign Minister he accepted the position on the condition that the Foreign Ministry, under the new cabinet, should have sole responsibility for peace negotiations with China. At the "Gozen-Kaigi 御前会議" (which is generally rendered as "Imperial Conference" but which means literally "conference in the presence of the Emperor", i.e. the Emperor's presence as symbolic head of state confers legitimacy on the proceedings) on October 13th, Matsuoka's policy of negotiation was accepted as official government policy, but as a concession to the groups negotiating with Wang Ching-wei the deadline of November 1940 was retained. This conference also agreed that if negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party government were not successful within this time-limit the Japanese government would give official recognition to Wang Ching-wei's government. Foreign Minister Matsuoka sent Akiyoshi Tajiri 田尻愛義 of the East Asia Bureau of the Foreign Office to Hong Kong in a "crucial attempt" to succeed in reaching a peace agreement. Towards the end of November a reply was received from Chiang Kai-

shek's Nationalist Party government with the following conditions: first, the Japanese government should delay signing the agreement with Wang Ching-wei; second, as a first step, both sides should withdraw their armies completely; third, after this withdrawal both sides should begin new negotiations.

The Army Minister, Hideki Tojo 東條英機 (later Prime Minister when the Pacific War broke out), afraid that this negotiation channel would be lost, asked Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Party government for a definite reply in time to allow Chinese representatives to attend a meeting on December 5th. However, on the deadline of November 30th, Foreign Minister Matsuoka signed the agreement with Wang Ching-wei in spite of Tojo's wishes, because he suspected that Chiang Kai-shek's insistence that the treaty be delayed was just a plot to subvert Japanese peace efforts. The treaty was criticised by Mamoru Shigemitsu 重光葵, who later became Foreign Minister during the Pacific War, on the grounds that Japan's demands were too extensive and too complex.[34] After the treaty was signed with Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese Nationalist Party government's attitude hardened and they made the decision to continue war against Japan.

While there were serious efforts towards a cease-fire, different groups of leaders of the Japanese Army consistently made aggressive military plans with total miscalculations. Their attacks on China were mainly aimed at ending the Chinese will to fight against the Japanese, and so eventually to end the war. The Chinese, however, never gave up their tough resistance against the violent Japanese aggression. In this context, Professor J. Hall accurately summarises the history of Japanese military miscalculations:

> The course of war in China proceeded in three distinct stages. Between July and December, 1937, the Japanese army moved rapidly to occupy major portions of North China, capturing Chiang Kai-shek's capital of Nanking. The fall of Nanking was expected to end China's will to resist, and the Japanese army, perhaps as punishment for the "anti-Japanese" activities of the Nanking regime, engaged in an orgy of rape and murder. In two days 12,000 non-combatant Chinese were killed in what has gone down in history as "the rape of Nanking". Yet Chiang Kai-shek moved his capital inland to Hankow from which he directed further resistance. The second stage of Japanese operations was consequently concerned with the capture of Hankow and Canton. The latter city fell in October 1938. But

Chiang again moved his capital inland above the Yangtze Gorges to Chungking. In the third phase of fighting which ensued, the Japanese bogged down into an amorphous stalemate in which the Chinese, resorting to guerrilla fighting, exchanged geography for time. After 1938 Japan controlled China's major cities and railroad lines but was constantly harassed by Chinese guerrillas who occupied the countryside. By 1940 the China Incident was costing the equivalent of $4 million daily and over 1.5 million Japanese had been sent overseas.[35]

Thus, one important cause of the deteriorating situation in China was this piece-meal encroachment, without contemplation of the consequences of a failure to produce a quick end to the fighting. In addition, relations between Japan and the United States became more and more unstable when the majority of the American leaders interpreted the developments in China as part of a Japanese plan to conquer the whole of the country. This assumption was, as analysed in this thesis later, strengthened when they accepted uncritically the content of several forgeries such as the Japanese "one-hundred-year plan of 1889" and the "Tanaka Memorial of 1927", and finally the Magic misconceptions in the last stages of the U.S.-Japan peace talks.

In the end, the Japanese leaders repeated their "one blow" policy at Pearl Harbor in 1941, again without serious consideration of what would happen if it did not produce a quick result, but rather they hoped, without any firm basis, that the Americans would fight a limited war and would agree to a settlement. This strategic stance was symbolised by a statement made by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 山本五十六, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet; "I will show you [Konoe] an uninterrupted succession of victories; I must also tell you that, should the war be prolonged for two or three years, I have no confidence in our ultimate victory".[36]

On the other hand, it is interesting to note that Konoe considered holding a summit meeting with Chiang Kai-shek, at the early stage of the China Incident, just as he later planned a meeting with Roosevelt in the summer of 1941. The evaluation of his posture towards the idea of 1937 in the historical context is not yet commonly agreed by observers. Although S. Matsumoto, for example, has recognised that Konoe seriously misunderstood the atmosphere in China, he

perceives that Konoe made a great effort to arrange a summit meeting, hoping to prevent the escalation of hostilities. In the eyes of S. Matsumoto, the Funatsu plan was partly a product of Konoe's enthusiasm for this idea, and therefore he notes the importance of the influence of Iwanaga's attempts to encourage Konoe and other Cabinet members to try to arrange a summit meeting.[37] In contrast, Shinkichi Eto has perceived that Konoe's lack of initial recognition of the seriousness of the event contributed to his failure to fly to Nanking, and thus he failed to prevent the escalation of the conflict at the early stages.[38]

One should recognise, however, the differences between Konoe's failure to hold a summit meeting with Chiang Kai-shek in 1937 and his failure to hold one with Roosevelt in 1941. While Konoe himself very markedly and directly moved towards the idea of a summit meeting in 1941, in 1937 he moved only through his secret agents and maintained rather a passive posture. While his plan to meet Roosevelt was, according to the primary source analysed later in this thesis, widely supported by other leaders including those of the Army and the Navy in 1941, he faced explicit opposition to the idea in 1937. This was partly a reflection of the fact that the idea of 1941 was, in contrast with that of 1937, proposed before the outbreak of the military clash and therefore emotional resentment between the two sides was not as high as it had been in the previous case. Thus, the possibility of a successful outcome of a summit meeting in 1937, which was considered after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, was far smaller than in the case of 1941.

The Tripartite Pact

The Tripartite Pact was of major importance in reinforcing the Western view that Germany, Italy and Japan were united in a "fascist conspiracy" and that Japanese expansion was driven by the same calculation and control as that of Hitler. The argument against isolationism and appeasement was strengthened by the assertion that small events were part of a co-ordinated world-wide threat. As one

example President Roosevelt, addressing the Senate on January 31st, 1939, urged that the United States faced a "definite" threat of world domination by Germany, Italy and Japan — a threat that had begun "with the first anti-Comintern Pact" three years previously and had increased as that pact "was strengthened almost every month" into what amounted to "an offensive and defensive alliance".[39]

In fact, Japan's primary intention in joining the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27th, 1940, was not to support the German and Italian forces against the Allied forces in the war in Europe but to strengthen Japan's security against the northern threat posed by the Soviet Union. As Gerhard Krebs of Freiburg University notes, the negotiations establishing the Pact lasted for more than two years because Japan was ready to support German and Italian forces only if they fought against the Soviet Union, not if they fought against other European powers.[40]

In 1936, the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact was established, which led eventually to the military alliance known as the Tripartite Pact of 1940. As noted by Masao Inaba 稲葉正夫, one secret political agreement, but not yet a military one at this stage, was attached to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact: if one of the signatories were attacked by the Soviet forces, the other signatory should not act in a way that would increase the Soviet forces' capability. In other words, Japan's intention to become a signatory of the Pact was to maintain her security against the traditional northern threat posed by Russia.[41]

While Japan originally insisted on limiting the hypothetical enemy of the military alliance to only one country,[42] the Soviet Union, Germany wished to list Britain and France in addition to the Soviet Union. After lengthy discussions, although the Japanese Navy finally agreed to Germany's demand listing Britain and France, it insisted on maintaining a condition that Japan's decision to commence hostilities against Britain and France should be made "independently" in the event of a war between Germany and the Western allied countries, while Germany demanded it "automatically". The Army, which considered that the

priority in the negotiations was to reach an agreement with Germany (sacrificing if necessary the Navy's demand),[43] inevitably came into serious disagreement with the Navy and the Foreign Office.[44]

The subsequent history illustrates Japan's pre-war indecisiveness in policy-making as a political weak point. The first Konoe Cabinet, which failed to define its foreign policy towards the negotiations, was consequently dissolved in January 1939. The subsequent Kiichiro Hiranuma 平沼騏一郎 Cabinet also failed to define its stance at the Gosho Kaigi, the meeting of five ministers, namely the Prime Minister and the Ministers of the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy and the Finance Ministry, although the Gosho Kaigi was held more than 70 times. While the Army was potentially responsible for a war against Russia but not America, the Navy had no confidence in its ability to defeat the American Navy.[45]

On August 23rd, 1939, Germany signed the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia. Prime Minister Hiranuma eventually resigned without any final decision being made with regard to the negotiations with Germany, saying that "Japan's foreign policy is in a state of having been practically betrayed".[46] This was because, as observed by Professor A. Craig, "Japan had wanted an alliance as protection against Russia".[47] In fact, the Kwantung Army had been under heavy attack by the Russian forces in Nomonhan since the 20th, three days before the official announcement of the Russo-German Pact. Thus, the secret agreement previously attached to the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact was clearly violated by the Germans.

These events made Japan's political situation even more complicated. On the one hand, the Army, which suffered heavy casualties in the Nomonhan Incident, lost confidence in its ability to face the threat posed by the Russian forces and began seriously to consider establishing an alliance with Germany in order to create a potential second front against Russia.[48] On the other hand, Hiranuma was succeeded as prime minister first by General Abe and then by Admiral Yonai. The

Abe Cabinet was weaker than the former Hiranuma Cabinet, and was dissolved in January 1940.

As observed by historians, Admiral Yonai was in particular "noted for his pro-British and pro-American leanings",[49] but the American appreciation of the "principles" in U.S. foreign policy played a significant role in U.S.-Japan relations at this stage. Craig notes that:

> During this period (August 1939-July 1940) German diplomatic advances were repelled by the Japanese, and many leaders attempted to improve relations with the United States and Britain. China remained the stumbling block. The United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was not willing to countenance aggression by abandoning China; hence negotiations in this direction came to nothing.[50]

In fact, the United States clearly showed its deep suspicions about Japan's intentions by implementing new policies in 1940, even though Cordell Hull sent a telegram on May 30th to Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo suggesting that he start a series of meetings with Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita 有田八郎. On May 7th the American government announced its decision to station the main battleships of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii instead of in San Pedro on the Pacific coast where they had previously been based. Subsequently on June 4th it announced the establishment of a machine-tool export-licensing system to Japan. The American fleet left for Hawaii on April 2nd, before the Germans opened their offensive on the Western Front in Europe on April 9th, and the machine-tool export-licensing announcement was made before the series of meetings between Foreign Minister Arita and Ambassador Grew began on June 10th. As recognised by Grew, these policies, newly implemented by the U.S. government, and especially the relocation of the U.S. battle fleet to Hawaii, seriously damaged Arita's efforts.[51]

The situation changed in the late spring of 1940 when Japan was surprised by the German victories in Europe. Voices were again raised in favour of an alliance with Germany. In July 1940, Prime Minister Yonai eventually resigned.[52] The subsequent second Konoe Cabinet, however, decided to go further to establish the alliance with Germany because it judged that there was no alternative if the

Cabinet wished to avert the same fate, to resign owing to its indecision, which the first Konoe Cabinet had actually faced. Thus, Foreign Minister Matsuoka prepared a draft of a military alliance with Germany listing the United States as the primary hypothetical enemy. The Navy originally opposed it, but eventually compromised with Matsuoka, maintaining a condition of Japan's right of "independent" decision-making with regard to her participation in the war in Europe in the event of the outbreak of war between Germany and the United States.

For instance, the Japanese Navy Chief of Staff Fushiminomiya 伏見宮 (Prince Fushimi) pointed out at the Gozen Kaigi of September 19th, 1940, eight days before Japan signed the Pact, that "I foresee that as a result of this alliance [with Germany] our trade with Great Britain and the United States will undergo a change; and that if worst come to worst, it will become increasingly difficult to import vital materials. Moreover, it is quite likely that a Japanese-American war will be a protracted one ..."[53] In this context, it was quite natural that the announcement of the Pact caused more serious American suspicions about Japan's intentions in her foreign policy. Thus, Herbert Feis observes that "In the recesses of thought, it was known that the pact marked a dark turn in the prospect. War with Japan came plainly into sight"[54].

However, Matsuoka's intentions were different. But he obviously underrated the seriousness and complexities in contemporary international relations in the West. As Nobutaka Ike イケ ノブタカ states, "The notes of the Conference [of the 19th] ... reveal that the Foreign Minister [Matsuoka] used the same argument the Germans had used on him, namely that the Pact would prevent the United States from entering the war".[55] This position was questioned by President of the Privy Council Yoshimichi Hara 原嘉道: "this Pact is a treaty of alliance with the United States as its target. Germany and Italy hope to prevent American entry into the European war by making this Pact public ... But when Japan's position becomes clear with the announcement of this Pact, the United

States will greatly increase her pressure on us ..."[56] Matsuoka, however, insisted that "Only a firm stand on our part will prevent a war",[57] This stance, maintaining "a firm stance" on one's own part and underestimating the strength of will of the other party, was remarkably similar to that of Stanley Hornbeck who later (see Chapter 7), played an important role during the U.S.-Japan peace talks by prohibiting a summit meeting in the summer of 1941. Matsuoka continued thus: "Of course, we should firmly suppress any useless anti-Britain and anti-American activities [in Japan]".[58] This piece of evidence would indicate that he had no intention of leading Japan into an actual war with the United States, and as introduced in a subsequent chapter, he was later deeply depressed by the news of the Pearl Harbor attack in spite of the ebullient atmosphere then prevailing throughout Japan.

Matsuoka's intention was revealed in his speech before becoming Foreign Minister:[59]

> Even with a country which Japan needs to keep as a stable ally, it might be necessary to suffer painful relations with that country before reaching an agreement to establish the necessary alliance ... In contrast with this, even with a country which Japan should eventually defeat as an enemy by any means, it would sometimes be inevitable to show our friendship with that country, and moreover possibly to establish a temporary alliance with it, from a pragmatic standpoint in certain international conditions.

As Yoshiyuki Miyazaki 宮崎慶之 of Sophia University (Jochi University 上智大学) points out, it is quite clear in the context that "a country which Japan needs to keep as a stable ally" meant the United States, while the "temporary alliance" meant the Tripartite Pact with Germany and the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union, and "a country which Japan should eventually defeat as an enemy by any means" meant the Soviet Union. Matsuoka stated that "This [friendship or alliance with the enemies] should be regarded as a variation of war with the enemies since this is a way to eventually defeat them [the enemies]". As analysed later in detail in this thesis, Matsuoka shared the view with most leaders of the Japanese Army that Russia would be the most threatening enemy for Japan. However, he intended to make Russia, although temporarily, an ally of the

Tripartite Pact, and then put international pressure on the Anglo-American powers to encourage their consideration of co-operation with Japan.[60] Then, after establishing better relations with the Anglo-American powers, Japan should eventually attempt to defeat Russia. In contrast with Matsuoka, the pro-Tripartite Pact group of the Army wanted to define Russia as the most threatening enemy for the Tripartite Pact itself. In other words, although both Matsuoka and the pro-Tripartite Pact group of the Army supported joining the Pact in the autumn of 1940, and they shared the view of Russia as the most threatening enemy for Japan, their motivations for supporting the Pact were quite different.

However, he seriously misjudged the international situation. Firstly, he failed to foresee the real German intention of later opening hostilities against the Soviet Union and requesting Japan's participation in the war with Russia in June 1941. Thus, Craig observes, "In June 1941 Japan again found itself betrayed by Germany ... Germany attacked Russia, giving its ally Japan little advance notice".[61] Matsuoka, as quoted by Feis, had previously insisted that Japan "should at this time ally itself with Germany and Italy, and adjust its relations with the Soviet Union, to bring about an international situation favourable to us, and thereby do our utmost to avoid the outbreak of war between Japan and America".[62] Matsuoka's position in trying to involve the Soviet Union in the Tripartite side, and by this means prevent the American decision to participate in the War in Europe, was completely undermined by the outbreak of the Russo-German War.

When the Russo-German war broke out in June 1941, and Matsuoka realised that his plan to make Russia an ally of the Tripartite Pact was ruined by this new circumstance, he quickly changed his stance and insisted on the necessity of Japan's immediate declaration of war against Russia to the North, while he opposed the move to the South, warning of the danger of Japan's involvement in a war with Britain and the U.S. Some Army leaders did share Matsuoka's position. The Army, however, later suffered difficulties in their decision to walk out of the

Tripartite Pact when the U.S. strongly requested it during the peace talks, since, as studied in this thesis, some in the Army still considered that being a member of the Tripartite Pact would be vitally important for preparations for a possible conflict with Russia in the future.

Secondly, he also underrated the British sense of national crisis in the face of German aggression in Europe and Roosevelt's "firm" decision to stand on the British side despite the lack of support from Congress. This misjudgement was not made only by Matsuoka, but by other Japanese leaders even as late as the last stage of the U.S.-Japan peace talks in the latter part of 1941. In fact, Japan had a serious fear of the possibility of an Anglo-German agreement being established leaving Japan fighting alone in the world war, and on November 29th, 1941, nine days before Pearl Harbor, she decided to offer an agreement to Germany and Italy not to make peace separately with the United States and Great Britain (see Chapter 10).

There was in addition an important disagreement between Matsuoka and Konoe. As is well known, although Konoe was sympathetic to Matsuoka's plan to establish a powerful alliance with the members of the Tripartite Pact and Russia,[63] he did not relish risking bad relations with Britain and the U.S., even if they were only temporary.[64] It is also known that Matsuoka intended to be the successor to Konoe, and to form a "Matsuoka Cabinet", and this is what both Konoe and U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew were afraid of at that time.[65]

Thus, it is clear that Matsuoka's misjudgement of the situation eventually took Japan down the road to the Pacific War, but it is also clear that it was not his real intention to lead Japan into an actual war with the United States.

Matsuoka, however, correctly warned of the danger of the policy of advancing to the South. While he obviously underestimated the Anglo-American leaders' deep hatred of Nazi Germany, he precisely predicted the consequence of the advance to the South and strongly resisted it. The interesting point is that although Japanese policies apparently seemed to have been carried out along one continuous line, in reality the policies were not under control. Japan joined the

Tripartite Pact, a pact between the aggressors, and then Japan committed aggression in southern Indo-China. This was obviously the background to the attempt, during the Tokyo Trial, to prove the existence of a continuous "plot" (a kind of conspiracy theory) by certain Japanese leaders to conquer the regions, whereas in fact, Matsuoka, who previously led Japan into the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, later failed to control Japan's foreign policy, and the advance to the South took place despite his opposition. This is a similar phenomenon to the event in the 1930s which was analysed in Part I.

Hitler's aims, after he came to power, were originally to reach an agreement to establish an alliance with Britain, and by this means to conquer Europe and the Soviet Union. However, Germany failed in her foreign policy towards Britain, and on September 1st, 1939, started to invade Poland. This developed into the Second World War in Europe when Britain and France consequently declared war on Germany two days later. After France surrendered, Hitler decided to defeat the Soviet Union when he realised that Britain had then no intention of compromising with Germany. At that stage, Hitler judged that Britain continued to resist Germany because Britain expected that the Russian forces would be capable of resisting German military actions in Europe.[66]

The Kan-Toku-En of 1941

The "Kan-Toku-En", originally defined in late 1940, was part of a plan to prepare the Japanese Army for a possible war against Russia in the North. This deployment to the North in preference to the alternative strategy of preparing for war in the South, i.e. against the Anglo-American forces, was decided after much discussion within the General Staff of the Army. In fact it was a natural decision for the Army because the Army had traditionally perceived Russia as its most threatening hypothetical enemy throughout the period from the late nineteenth century up to the end of the Pacific War, in contrast with the Navy which had seen the U.S. as the most threatening hypothetical enemy since the

early part of the twentieth century. After the outbreak of the Russo-German War on June 22nd, 1941, however, even the Navy agreed to make a plan against Russia, since with Russia at its weakest, the Navy saw a realistic chance of winning in the North, and restoring "stable security" in the region. Consequently, the Navy established the Fifth Fleet in July in preparation for hostilities in the North.

According to the plan made by the General Staff of the Army, the final decision for mobilisation would be made by June 28th, the mobilisation order would be issued on July 5th, the decision to open hostilities against the Russian forces would be made on August 10th, hostilities would begin on August 29th, and the war would be over by the middle of October.[67] About July 10th the Army General Staff made a plan to deploy 1.2 million of its total strength of troops and 300,000 horses in the North.[68] While the Army General Staff understood that the mobilisation of troops could be ordered without the final decision of the Tokyo government to open hostilities, since the term "mobilisation" would be contained in the meaning of the term "preparation" in case of emergency, the Ministry of the Army disagreed.

On June 29th Lieutenant-General Shin'ichi Tanaka 田中新一, Chief of the First Section of the Army General Staff responsible for military strategy, strongly requested the Ministry of the Army to order the mobilisation, but the Ministry of the Army refused to do so. On June 30th and July 2nd, the German government requested the Japanese to attack Russia. The decision of the Japanese government at a meeting held in the presence of the Emperor, Gozen Kaigi, on July 2nd, however, was for non-participation in the war between Germany and Russia, although preparation for war against Russia was allowed to continue.

In the circumstances, the mobilisation of interception forces within Japan "for training" was ordered on July 1st on the basis of a compromise plan drawn up between the General Staff of the Army and the Ministry of the Army. Subsequently, the mobilisation order for anti-aircraft troops "for training" was issued on the 3rd, and then between the 5th and the 8th orders were issued for

preparation for war in North Korea and the northern Kurile Islands. On the 5th a General Headquarters was established in order to direct the activities of the interception forces and anti-aircraft troops against possible Russian air raids. These orders show that the Army General Staff was particularly worried about the possibility of Russian air raids on Japanese cities. In fact, it perceived that the most serious danger for the Japanese was an attack by Russian bombers from the area near Vladivostok. The section responsible for air protection in the General Staff of the Army concluded at that time that Tokyo could be entirely destroyed by about 15 Russian bombers in a night attack, and 20 or 30 bombers in an attack by day.[69]

It was a very sensitive period since the effort to continue the U.S.-Japan peace talks was being maintained. American Secretary of State Hull assessed the Japanese decision at the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd, on the basis of Magic intercepts: "We [the Americans] had, in fact, very definite knowledge of what Japan was planning. On the surface, an Imperial Conference [Gozen Kaigi] was held in Tokyo on July 2, following which military steps of an alarming nature began to be taken. Between one and two million men were called to the armed forces ... The various steps taken were indicative of preparations for a major war. Under the surface, our intercepts of Japanese Government messages gave us equally alarming information".[70] The information that "Between one and two million men were called to the armed forces" indicates that the American government successfully monitored the Japanese movements of the "Kan-Toku-En", but it has not yet been made clear whether the Americans recognised the fact that this Kan-Toku-En constituted "preparations for a major war" against the Russian forces to the North but not, at least at this stage, preparations for war in the South.

In this context, the following Russian record of meetings between the Russian ambassador to Washington, Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky, and American leaders must be quite significant. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated at the meeting of July 3rd with Umansky that the Americans had

"reliable information" which indicated that Japan would probably enter the war against Russia in the near future. On July 10th President Roosevelt secretly encouraged the Russians at a meeting with Umansky by stating that he expected that the Soviet Air Force might use incendiary bombs against some Japanese cities which had relatively weak air cover. Roosevelt also added that he recognised the Russian air superiority over the Japanese.[71] Although there have been, up to the present, insufficient records available regarding the original source of the information which reached the American authorities, one should be aware of the unusually accurate timing and content of what the U.S. government knew at that time. The U.S., in fact, attempted to establish a strategy towards Japan based on the assumption that Japan would attack to the North.[72] This forms a distinct contrast to the different information which the British gave to the Russians, which denied the possibility of a Japanese attack to the North.[73]

On the other hand, the Emperor warned General Sugiyama, Chief of Staff of the Army, about the possibility of "dokuso (running alone)" by the Army, pointing out the forthcoming dangerous consequences of such large-scale preparations for war. Sugiyama said to Lieutenant-General Shin'ichi Tanaka immediately after this meeting with the Emperor of July 3rd that he recognised the Emperor's serious distrust of the Army, which had worsened since the 2.26 Uprising of 1936.[74]

Lieutenant-General Shin'ichi Tanaka, however, successfully reached an agreement with Army Minister Tojo (who was the most sympathetic of the members of the Ministry of the Army to the plan to prepare for war against Russia) to mobilise troops for the North. The Emperor again warned against the danger of the mobilisation plan but did not veto it on July 7th when Chief of Staff of the Army Sugiyama and Army Minister Tojo met the Emperor and requested his approval for the preparation plan for the North. Thus, the plan was formally approved as the government policy. On July 13th more than 300 units were mobilised, which is known as the first mobilisation. The second mobilisation order

which mobilised more than 450 units, both Army and Air Force, was issued on the 16th. On the 22nd the transportation of the mobilised forces began.

On July 31st when Sugiyama met the Emperor, the Emperor repeated his warning about the dangerous consequences of war preparations and said that it would be better to abolish the preparation plan, but the Army General Staff ignored it and continued the preparations. The Navy also resisted the Army's plan for the North. Lieutenant-General Shin'ichi Tanaka of the Army General Staff was upset by the resistance from the Navy and stated that "The Army will go on alone [ignoring the Navy] ...",[75] but the Navy finally agreed with the Army to prepare for war against Russia with the proviso that military action would be limited to self-defence. Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda 豊田貞次郎, a retired Admiral, successfully convinced the members who attended the conference of the Liaison Council consisting of high military and civil officials, Seifu Daihon'ei Renraku Kaigi 政府大本営連絡会議, of August 6th that Japan should not attack Russia as long as Russia respected the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13th, 1941. Regarding the atmosphere at the conference of the 6th one Lieutenant-Colonel recorded:

> Konoe [Prime Minister], Hiranuma [former Prime Minister] and Toyoda [Foreign Minister and retired admiral] opposed [the plan] on the basis of "pure logic" [junri 純理]. The Chief of Staff of the Army [Sugiyama] became red faced with embarrassment [because of the tough opposition], but the plan itself was eventually adopted [at the conference].[76]

Thus, the formal order "to retaliate" against possible Russian attack was finally issued as central government policy after receiving the Emperor's approval on August 6th, although the original plan of the Army General Staff had largely been changed by its opponents and strictly limited to action in "retaliation" against Russia, not to "attack" Russia.

As will be seen, the nature of decision-making in Japan's national policy at that time, i.e. "evasion" of an actual decision by pretending to have reached a firm agreement on the basis of a compromise between opposing groups which in reality were making mutually incompatible requests, should be precisely

analysed (see Chapter 6). Consequently, the pattern of these "decisions" was often to agree for preparations for a "possible war" but to evade making the decision to actually go to war. The same pattern appears in both the decisions of July 2nd and August 6th. Consequently, each group could prevent other groups from going too far, while interpreting the meaning of the sentences in the "decisions" to suit its own purpose. In this sense, Tokyo decided to open hostilities neither in the North nor in the South at this stage during July and August, although it decided to prepare for war.

Whatever Japan's true intentions were, however, these actions of "preparing" for war could naturally give rise to serious foreign suspicions. This was why some contemporary leaders and the Emperor persistently warned against the possible dangerous consequences of such actions. In any case, not only the decision to open hostilities but also the preparation for war in itself could cause unusually high military tension in the region and even an actual war. The very fact that Japan decided at the conferences during July and August to prepare for war in both directions, North and South, in itself increased the possibility of the outbreak of war in either or both directions, even though it was accepted at these conferences that war on two fronts simultaneously was impossible. In this sense, it is indeed difficult to speculate whether war was more likely in the North or in the South in the summer of 1941.

Thus, the author is aware of the provocative aspect of the issue, but he is inclined to believe, on the basis of his chronological analysis in this essay, that the high possibility of any outbreak of war at this stage would have been rather in the North between Japan and Russia, and not necessarily between Japan and the Anglo-American forces in the Pacific. In any case, whatever the true intentions of the Americans and Japanese were, these records clearly indicate the serious distrust, and to a certain extent, misunderstanding which existed between the U.S. and Japan, and which contributed significantly to the outbreak of the Pacific War despite their efforts to reach an agreement in the peace talks.

Germany, Japan and the United States

The German sources of information about the United States were weakened as U.S.-German relations became unstable in the late 1930s. The German authorities had only limited information, mainly through two channels, after the American government recalled her ambassador to Germany and the German government recalled her ambassador, Hans H. Dieckhoff, to the United States in 1938. One channel was via the German deputy ambassador, Hans Thomsen, who maintained the German diplomatic link with the United States. Hans Thomsen and Robert Vitthoeft-Emden, the Naval attache to the U.S., alarmed Berlin by observing the strong will of the American Administration to intervene in the war in Europe, but their status was not high enough to influence German decision-making.

The other source was Lieutenant-General Friedrich von Boetticher, the Army and Air Force attache to the United States. Boetticher was trusted by the German government because he had close relations with some leaders of the American Army including General MacArthur, but his reports tended to underrate both the hostile attitude of the American Administration towards Germany and the American military ability to participate in the war. Thus, the German government had relatively poor and inaccurate information about the United States.

German information about Japan, in contrast to her information about the United States, could reasonably have been expected to be much more reliable. The German government, however, inevitably realised that the reports received from these sources were at times quite incompatible. This was mainly because the content of these reports often reflected serious disagreements in Japan's decision-making between various elements in her contemporary political system. As a result Germany became increasingly confused and suspicious when it came to judge Japan's intentions.

This became particularly true after Japan began the semi-formal U.S.-Japan peace talks in April 1941 in spite of repeated demands by Germany that Japan should attack Britain's Singapore. In fact, as German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop recognised, Japan's decision whether or not to attack Singapore was a very important question for Germany at this stage. This was because Germany considered that, in the event of a Japanese attack on Singapore, Britain would be willing to compromise with Germany before America's participation in the war in Europe which Germany wished to prevent. Ribbentrop demanded that Japan should attack Singapore at the meeting with Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima 大島浩 on February 23rd, 1941, and then sent a telegram on the 27th to German Ambassador Eugen Ott in Tokyo suggesting that he should put pressure on Japan to occupy Singapore immediately. German Vice Foreign Minister Ernst von Weizsacker prepared a memorandum dated March 24th, which expected Japan to participate in the war against Britain. Subsequently, Hitler himself demanded that Japan should open hostilities against Britain when he met Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on the 27th.

Furthermore, Erich Raeder, Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, asked the Japanese Navy about the possibility of Japan attacking Singapore in April. In the circumstances, it was quite natural for Germany to become deeply suspicious about Japan's intentions when Japan started to talk with the United States immediately after Matsuoka returned to Japan. Ambassador Ott reported to Berlin on May 5th that Japan's new policy of trying to reach an agreement with the U.S. constituted an attempt to destroy the effectiveness of the Tripartite Pact.[77]

For example, a report dated May 23rd which the German government received from a source code named "Akita" through Alfred Kretschmer, a military attache to Japan, gave various and conflicting statements of what Japan would regard as being her obligations under the Tripartite Pact in the event of American participation in the war in Europe. Should America participate in the War in Europe Japan would prepare to attack Singapore and Manila, but she had

no intention of engaging in hostilities with America and Britain. This was clearly an illogical position since it was impossible both to attack and at the same time to remain uninvolved. In a similar manner, this report also included the information that Japan would prepare to attack Vladivostok and Blagoveshchensk in the event of the outbreak of a Russo-German war, but the priority issue for the Japanese Army was to resolve the exhausting China Incident rather than to address these new issues in the West.[78] The contradictions in the report, reflecting the influence exercised by the various elements in Japan's policy-making, resulted in confusing the German leaders. Thus, on May 22nd when Erich Raeder of the Navy inquired about the situation with regard to Japan, Hitler replied that no clear picture could be drawn.[79]

Germany started to make every effort to find out Japan's true intentions towards the war. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin was secretly wire-tapped by the German intelligence services. At Ribbentrop's suggestion, the German Foreign Office attempted to decode the Japanese high-level code messages exchanged between Ambassador Oshima and the Tokyo Foreign Office but only succeeded in decoding the messages between the Japanese legations (koshikan 公使館) and Tokyo and not the ones between the Embassy and Tokyo. As shown in the report sent from Tokyo to Berlin by Ambassador Ott as late as October 28th, 1941, only some 40 days before Pearl Harbor, the German leaders were still deeply suspicious about Japanese intentions.[80]

On the other hand, by the summer of 1941 Japan had already been, from a Japanese standpoint, bitterly betrayed twice by Germany in foreign politics, once in August 1939 when the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was announced and once in June 1941 when Germany invaded the Soviet Union. This was one of the reasons why the Japanese leaders had naturally become suspicious by that time about German intentions. In fact, Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka said that "No nation can be more untrustworthy than the Germans are",[81] and the Army Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama wrote as late as October 25th, 1941, only 43

days before Pearl Harbor, that "There are many people who believe that Germany cannot be trusted".[82]

Even after the establishment of the Tripartite Pact, therefore, the relationship between Germany and Japan was not as strong and cordial as the American leaders, including Secretary of State Hull, so firmly believed. On the contrary, that relationship was remarkably unstable, sometimes unfriendly, and sometimes even potentially hostile. In such circumstances, and despite America's firm belief in Japan's close links with Germany, the possibility of Japan reaching some agreement with the United States right up to the time of Pearl Harbor cannot be entirely ruled out. The view expressed by some historians, and stressed by Professor Ikuhiko Hata 秦郁彦 in his work, that "In my view, the point of no return regarding war in the Pacific came with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in the fall of 1940"[83] is therefore open to question. More probably, "the point of no return" was not the Tripartite Pact of 1940 but the outcome of the U.S.-Japan peace talks more than a year later.

Conclusion

The miscalculation of the Japanese Army was clearly pointed out by the Emperor on September 5th, 1941, three months before Pearl Harbor, according to works based on a reconciliation of the materials. The materials include the notes of Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, the diaries of Army Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama and of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido 木戸幸一. Konoe recorded the Emperor's frustrated conversation at the meeting with Sugiyama on September 5th as follows: When Sugiyama mentioned to the Emperor that "As far as the southern [Pacific] areas are concerned the [Japanese] Army could defeat [the Allied forces] within around three months", the Emperor said "I remember that when the China Incident broke out, you as Army Minister at the time said Chiang Kai-shek would be defeated within around one month, but [you] still have

not been able to do it although such a long time, four years, have passed [since then]". So Sugiyama replied, being chagrined, "The interior of China is so vast", but the Emperor said in frustration, "If the vastness of the interior of China is the cause of difficulties [in ending the war], the Pacific Ocean is much wider. How can you possibly say you can end the war in three months?"[84]

As the situation worsened in China, the American government's attitude towards Japan became more and more hostile. Although many leaders in Japan and China attempted to make a great effort towards a cease-fire through various routes, the situation continued to deteriorate partly because of misinformation, misunderstandings, miscalculations, and many unlucky accidents.

Neither Japan nor China declared war on each other until after Pearl Harbor in December 1941. This was one characteristic of the war indicating that both sides persistently attempted to secure a cease-fire. The attitude of the government, hesitating to call the conflict a war, was in this sense significant. Despite the hesitation, the government needed to encourage its own people to remain highly motivated for war, since the war would continue until the final cease-fire. For this reason, the government's official attitude was more aggressive in comparison with their energetic but secret peace-feeler activities. This is one of the reasons why the recorded information has been less accessible since the end of the war. This does not mean, however, that the attempt to analyse the origins of the failure of peace activities in the past is unimportant.[85] As far as Tobe's recently published works are concerned, he is obliged to use many British sources to compensate for the lack of Chinese records, as he sees that the British kept relatively detailed records of Chinese internal events during this period.

The China Incident caused conflict between the United States and Japan which ultimately resulted in the Pacific War of 1941. Focusing on the peace activities, the chain of events which led to conflict between the U.S. and Japan, culminating in the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8th (Tokyo time), 1941, shows a very similar pattern to the Chinese-Japanese situation. In the eight-

month period before Pearl Harbor there had been over fifty meetings between the Japanese and American governments. Although almost all leaders in both the U.S. and Japan wanted peace and made strenuous and repeated efforts to avoid conflict, war broke out, caused again by misinformation, misunderstandings, miscalculations and a series of unlucky accidents. It, again, does not mean at all that these misunderstandings were the only origins of the war, but they doubtless played quite an important role at that time.

In short, in accordance with the analysis detailed in this thesis, the author wishes to support the views of Professor A. Craig of Harvard University, expressed in his summary of the issues perceived by Japanese leaders:

> Japan's concerns were Asian, not European. From the end of 1938, Japan's main problem was how to settle the mess in China. Each new cabinet proclaimed its intention to extricate Japan from China. Obviously this was to happen on terms favorable to Japan. Much of Japan's diplomatic and military strategy during the late 1930's was directed towards bringing about a situation in which the Chinese government would give in to Japan. A second problem was relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet potential for action in Asia was in inverse proportion to its involvement in Europe. The threat to Russia in Europe was Germany. This made relations with Germany extremely important to Japan. A third problem was the American Pacific fleet. The Japanese navy viewed this as its most dangerous potential enemy, hence the navy was disposed not to antagonize the United States, if this could be accomplished without weakening the navy. A fourth concern was Southeast Asia, rich in the raw materials needed by Japan for the formation of an autarkic economy. Here Japan was faced by the colonies of France, Holland, and Britain. Throughout the early part of 1939 Japan sought to strengthen its position against the Soviet Union and to bring pressure to bear on the Chinese government by establishing an alliance either with Germany and Italy or with Britain. Most of the army and many civilian bureaucrats, including Hiranuma (Prime Minister January-August 1939), leaned towards Germany. But Germany was not willing to ally itself with Japan against Russia alone and insisted that Japan commit itself against Britain and the United States as well. The Foreign and Naval Ministries resisted an alliance based on these terms.[86]

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1 The Mongolian-Manchukuoan border resulted from a series of eleven vague and complex treaties between Russia and the Manchu Ch'ing Dynasty, starting with the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689. See Shimada, Toshihiko 島田俊彦. *Kanto-gun 関東軍* (The Kwantung Army), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 125-6. See also Parlett, Harold, C.M.G. *A Brief Account of Diplomatic Events in Manchuria,* Oxford University Press, London, 1929, pp. 4-5.

There were 152 conflicts along the border between 1931 and 1934. See T. Shimada, op. cit., p. 126.

Western historians in general tend to overlook the existence of a number of northern border disputes during this period. Harold Vinacke, in one example, states that "The first of these [border disputes] came in January, 1935". See Vinacke, Harold M. *A History of the Far East in Modern Times*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1960, p. 545.

2 Boei-cho Boei Kenkyu-sho Senshi-shitsu 防衛庁防衛研究所戦史室 (Military History Department of the National Institute for Defence Studies of the Defence Agency) *Dai-hon-ei Rikugun bu 大本営陸軍部 <1>* (The Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters (Vol. 1)), Asakumo Shimbun-sha 朝雲新聞社, Tokyo, 1967, p. 352.

3 During the late 1930s, while the number of Russian troops stationed on the western border in Europe was virtually equal to that of Poland and other countries, the size of the Soviet Far Eastern Army was consistently over double that of the Japanese troops on the eastern front. See Boei-cho Boei Kenkyu-sho Senshi-shitsu 防衛庁防衛研究所戦史室 (Military History Department of the National Institute for Defence Studies of the Defence Agency) *Kanto-gun 関東軍 <1>* (The Kwantung Army, (Vol. 1)), Asakumo Shimbun-sha 朝雲新聞社, Tokyo, 1969, p. 237.

4 Ibid., pp. 147-8, pp. 236-46.

5 There were 136 conflicts within one year, 1935, then 203 in 1936, and more than 1,600 up to the end of the Pacific War. See T. Shimada, op. cit., p. 126.

6 As T. Shimada notes, "The Kwantung Army was an 'army which looked northward', consistently regarding Russia as the potential enemy, and tended to judge that Tokyo underestimated the seriousness of the Russian threat". See ibid., p. vi, p. 123.

7 Eto, Shinkichi, 衛藤瀋吉. "Nikka Jihen 日華事変 (The China Incident)", in Murase, Okio 村瀬興雄, *Sekai no Rekishi 15 — Fashizumu to Dai-ni-ji-taisen 世界の歴史 15 — ファシズムと第二次大戦* (World History (Series 15) — Fascism and the Second World War), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1975, p. 308.

8 "The common assumption that the revolt by the First Division was part of a direct chain of events which pushed Japan into calculated war with China has been brought into question by later research. The outbreak of hostilities with China in July 1937 was predictable, perhaps, but it did not result, as did the Manchurian Incident, from any preconceived plot on the part of the army's field officers. Japan blundered into the war with China". In Hall, John Whitney, *Japan — From Prehistory to Modern Times*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1971, p. 338.

9 S. Eto, "The China Incident", op. cit., pp. 309-10.

10 Some junior officers, notably Colonel Akira Muto 武藤章 and Colonel Shin'ichi Tanaka 田中新一, were more aggressive. See Hayashi, Shigeru 林茂, *Nihon no Rekishi — Taiheiyo Senso (19-han) 日本の歴史 — 太平洋戦争 (19版)* (A History of Japan — The Pacific War (19th Edition)), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1989, p. 48, and Eto Shinkichi, "The China Incident", op. cit., p. 309.

11 This was Chang Tzu-chung 張自忠, representing Chiang Kai-shek's regional army, not warlord Chang Hsueh-liang 張学良.

12 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations), *Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi — Dai 4-kan — Nitchu Senso (ge)*

太平洋戦争への道—第四巻 — 日中戦争 (下) — (The Road to the Pacific War — Vol. 4 — The Sino-Japanese War (Vol. 2)), Asahi Shimbun-sha 朝日新聞社, Tokyo, 1963 (hereafter *TSM, Vol. 4*), p. 10.

13 Konoe's failure to foresee the provocative effect of his speech of July 11th is clearly revealed in the record of a later conversation with Sumihisa Ikeda 池田純久, a staff officer of the Army in North China. See S. Ikeda's record in S. Eto, "The China Incident", op. cit., p. 313.

14 Konoe's proposed visit was turned down on the 16th, mainly because the Navy maintained suspicions towards this proposal of the General Staff of the Army, insisting that re-building of the central control of the Army was necessary before implementing this plan. See Tobe, Ryoichi 戸部良一. *Peace Feelers*, Ronso-sha 論創社 Tokyo, 1991, p. 28.

15 Matsumoto, Shigeharu 松本重治. *Shanhai Jidai — Janarisuto no Kaiso (Ge) 上海時代-ジャーナリストの回想 (下)* (The Shanghai Period — Memoirs of a Journalist Vol. 3), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1975, pp.138-42, pp. 148-54.

16 On September 2nd, after the escalation of the conflict in Shanghai, the name changed to "Shina Jihen 支那事変" (The China Incident). See *TSM, Vol. 4*, op. cit., p. 10.

17 Major-General G. Hashimoto, for instance, told Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army Hitoshi Imamura 今村均 that the policy of the Japanese Army in China was different from that of the Kwantung Army, and that it wished to maintain the principle of territorial integrity of China in co-operation with the Chinese. See S. Matsumoto, *The Shanghai Period, Vol. 3*, op. cit., p. 144.

Major-General Ishihara went further, insisting that Japan should give up the beneficial status quo in North China and Inner Mongolia, thus keeping stable relations with China and concentrating on preparing for a possible crisis with Russia. See Tobe, *Peace Feelers*, op. cit., p. 18.

18 S. Matsumoto, *The Shanghai Period, Vol. 3*, op. cit., p. 159.

19 Tobe, *Peace Feelers*, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

20 As primary sources, such as "Hoku-Shi Sakusen ni Kansuru Kai-Riku-gun Kyotei 北支作戦に関する海陸軍協定" (The Navy-Army Agreement on North China Military Planning) of July 11th, 1937, and "Chuo-Tosui-bu no Tai-Shi Sakusen Keikaku 中央統帥部の対支作戦計画" (The Military Planning of the Central Supreme Command towards China) of July 29th, 1938, clearly show, the area of Japanese military action was always limited in intention at that time. Ibid., pp. 35-6.

21 Davis, Kenneth S. *FDR, Into the Storm 1937-1940: A History*. Random House, Inc., New York, 1993, p. 131.

22 Dallek, Robert. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1979, pp. 148-9.

Davis, op. cit., p. 134.

23 Dallek. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy*, op. cit., p. 154.

Leutze, James R. *Bargaining for Supremacy — Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941*, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1977, pp. 19ff.

Borg, Dorothy and Okamoto, Shumpei, eds. *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1973, p. 212 (cf. also p. 219).

24 Davis, op. cit., pp.155-6.

25 Ibid., p. 201.

26 Ibid., pp. 154-8

27 Okumiya, Masatake 奥宮正武. *Saraba Kaigun Kokutai さらば海軍航空隊* (Adieu to the Naval Air Force), Asahi Sonorama 朝日ソノラマ, Tokyo, 1993, pp. 190-229. See also Tolley, Kemp. Nagano, Yoko 長野洋子, trans. *Choko Patororu — Chugoku ni okeru Amerika Kaigun 長江パトロール — 中国におけるアメリカ海軍*, (Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China), Shuppan Kyodo-sha 出版協同社, Tokyo, 1988, pp. 361-72.

Lieutenant Okumiya of the Japanese Navy (later Lieutenant-General of the Air Self-Defence Force) commanded one of the four flights which bombed the *Panay*. Kemp Tolley (later Rear-Admiral) was a U.S. Navy officer in the Yangtze River at that time. Tolley gives an account which differs in detail. However, both agree that the Japanese Army, waving Japanese flags, was also bombed, with several killed and wounded. This raises the question of why the attack was made. This question is not addressed by Western historians, possibly because of a stereotypical view of Japan as an aggressor.

28 Takai, Susumu 高井晉, professor at the National Institute for Defence Studies, Tokyo, private correspondence.

29 Dingman, Roger. Takahashi, Hisashi 高橋久志, trans. "Yosu-ko no Kiki 楊子江の危機" (The Yangtze River Crisis), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan), *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Hassei to Kakudai 第二次世界大戦 — 発生と拡大* (World War II: Outbreak and Expansion), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 95-124.

30 Hata, Ikuhiko. "Continental Expansion — 1905-1941", in Duus, Peter, ed. *The Cambridge History of Japan (Vol. 6) — The Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 312.

31 T. Shimada, op. cit., pp. 136-9.

32 Ibid., p. 144.

33 Ibid., p. 144.

34 S. Eto, "The China Incident", op. cit., p. 320.

35 J. Hall, op. cit., p. 340.

36 Quoted in Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor — Warning and Decision*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1962, p. 350.

37 S. Matsumoto, *The Shanghai Period, Vol. 3*, op. cit., pp. 159-60.

38 S. Eto, "The China Incident", op. cit., p. 314.

39 Davis, op. cit., p. 404.

40 Krebs, Gerhard. "Doitsu-Polando Kiki (1938-1939 nen) ni taisuru Nippon no Chotei ドイツ・ポーランド危機 (1938-1939年) に対する日本の調停" (Japanese Mediation Attempts During the German-Polish Crisis, 1938-1939), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan), *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Hassei to Kakudai 第二次世界大戦 — 発生と拡大* (World War II: Outbreak and Expansion), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1990, pp. 217-18.

41 Inaba, Masao 稲葉正夫. "Shiryo Kaisetsu 資料解説" (Explanation of Materials), in Sanbo Honbu 参謀本部 (General Staff of the Army), *Sugiyama Memo (Jo) 杉山メモ (上)* (Sugiyama Memorandum (Vol. 1)), Hara Shobo 原書房, Tokyo, 1989 (hereafter *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*), p. 25.

42 The strategic plan prepared by the General Staff of the Army in August 1936 emphasised limiting the hypothetical enemy to Russia alone, and keeping Britain and the U.S. neutral, and avoiding a war against China. See Tsunoda, Jun 角田順, Shimada, Toshihiko 島田俊彦, and Inaba, Masao 稲葉正夫. *Gendai-shi Shiryo 8 — Nitchu Senso 1 現代史資料8 — 日中戦争1* (Source Materials on Contemporary History 8 — Sino-Japanese War 1), Misuzu Shobo みすず書房, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 686-90.

43 In fact, as revealed at the Tokyo Trial, the Army urged acceptance of the German demands to add the Western powers as targets of the treaty at that time. However, it clearly mentioned at the meeting with the Navy in November 1938 that the members of the Army unanimously agreed that Japan would "have to fight the Soviet Union within the next few years" while the possibility of "a war with Great Britain must be considered 100 years later or 200 years later in the future". The Army was not seriously considering any possibility of a war with the Western powers at this stage. See Tobe, Ryoichi 戸部良一. Rikugun to Ji-ki Taisen 陸軍と次期大戦 (The Army and the Next Great War), in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations), Kokusai Seiji 91 — Nitchu Senso kara Nichi-Ei-Bei Senso e 国際政治91 — 日中戦争から日英米戦争へ (International Politics Vol. 91 — From the Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese-Anglo-American War), Yuhikaku 有斐閣, Tokyo, 1989, pp. 76-8.

44 Around the spring of 1938, when the China Incident had continued for several months and developed into a full-scale war, the Japanese General Staff of the Army began to consider establishing a military alliance with Germany. The primary aim of the plan for the Army was, however, not yet to prepare for war with the Western allied countries, and as Inaba notes not even for war with Russia, but to help Japan, whose political position had already become isolated, to seek a resolution of the exhausting China Incident. Thus, the General Staff of the Army at this stage still did not intend to create an anti-Western military alliance with Germany. See Inaba, in *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 25.

45 At the Gosho Kaigi of August 8th, 1939, for example, when the Finance Minister questioned the Navy Minister about whether the navies of Japan, Germany and Italy could defeat the Western allied navies in the event of the outbreak of a war, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai 米内光政 explicitly replied that "there is no such possibility of successfully defeating the allied navies. To begin with, the Japanese Navy was not originally developed with an expectation to fight against [such powerful] Anglo-American allied navies. The abilities of the German and Italian navies are beyond question [totally inadequate]". See Ikeda, Kiyoshi 池田清, *Kaigun to Nihon 海軍と日本* (The Navy and Japan), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1981, pp. 65-6.

46 Reischauer, Edwin O. and Craig, Albert M. *Japan — Tradition and Transformation*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1978, p. 258.

47 Ibid., p. 258.

48 K. Ikeda, op. cit., p. 65.

Although the General Staff of the Army judged that it needed 100 divisions, 300 aircraft units and a large amount of ammunition to defend the northern border with the Soviet Union, it could only make a plan to prepare no more than 65 divisions and 162 aircraft units because of the shortage of resources and of man-power. Thus, in December 1939, it concluded that there was no way to defend the border in the event of a Russian attack on Japan. The Army naturally began to expect the role of the German Army to tie up Russian forces in Europe. See Boei-cho Boei Kenkyu-sho Senshi-shitsu 防衛庁防衛研究所戦史室 (Military History Department of the National Institute for Defence Studies of the Defence Agency), *Kanto-gun 関東軍<1>* (The Kwantung Army (Vol. 1)), Asakumo Shimbun-sha 朝雲新聞社, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 147-8.

49 Reischauer and Craig, op. cit., p. 259.

50 Ibid., p. 259.

51 Through the efforts of, among others, Captain Yoshimasa Nakahara 中原義正 (who was promoted to Rear-Admiral in November 1940) of the Japanese General Staff of the Navy, the largest Navy war game in the period prior to Pearl Harbor took place between the 15th and 21st of June, 1940, to examine the possibility of occupying the Dutch East Indies "to maintain their neutrality" from the Western allies and from Germany, which had already occupied the Netherlands. The game was motivated by the Navy's fear of the possibility of American oil sanctions in the future, and the aim of the game in practice was, of course, to gain access to the natural resources of the region, including oil and nickel. The outcome of the war game, however, proved quite negative for Nakahara, and the report to the Navy Minister concluded that Japan could not continue to fight in view of the inevitable participation of the American forces unless she began to move within four months of any American decision to impose oil sanctions; even if Japan moved in time, she could only fight for a year, and with no possibility of ultimate victory. Navy Minister Zengo Yoshida 吉田善吾 dismissed the report, saying that the strategy to occupy the region was in itself meaningless, because the Navy could not take the natural resources back to Japan. See Tsunoda, Jun 角田順, in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会(The Japan Association of International Relations), *Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi — Dai 7-kan — Nichibei Kaisen 太平洋戦争への道 — 第七巻 — 日米開戦* (The Road to the Pacific War — Vol. 7 — The Outbreak of the U.S.-Japan War), Asahi Shimbun-sha 朝日新聞社, Tokyo, 1963 (hereafter *TSM, Vol. 7*), pp. 19-20.

52 The Army prepared a document entitled "Sekai-josei no Sui-i ni Tomonau Jikyoku Shori Yoko 世界情勢ノ推移ニ伴フ時局処理要綱" (Guidelines for Managing the Current Situation in Reaction to the Changing Conditions of the World) immediately after Yonai's resignation in July, but the term used in the document meant the necessity to strengthen merely "a political co-operation" with Germany and Italy, and, as noted by Inaba, the term "military alliance" was still taboo at this stage. See Inaba, in *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 10-16 and p. 26.

53 Ike, Nobutaka. *Japan's Decision for War — Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1967, p. 5.

54 Feis, Herbert, *The Road to Pearl Harbor — The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1950, p. 122.

55 Ike, op. cit., p. 4.

56 Ibid., p. 9.

57 Ibid., p. 10.

58 Ibid., p. 10.

59 Miyazaki, Yoshiyuki 宮崎慶之. "Saiko Matsuoka Gaiko — Sono Kokunai-seiji-teki Yoin 再考松岡外交 — その国内政治的要因" (Matsuoka Diplomacy Reconsidered: A "Remedy" for National Consensus), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan). *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Shinju-wan Zengo 第二次世界大戦 — 真珠湾前後* (World War II: Toward Pearl Harbor), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1991, p. 33.

60 Kase, Toshikazu 加瀬俊一. *Nihon Gaiko-shi 23 - Nichi-Bei Kosho 日本外交史23 — 日米交渉* (A History of Japan's Foreign Policy Vol. 23 — U.S.-Japan Negotiations), Kashima Kenkyusho Shuppan-kai 鹿島研究所出版会, Tokyo, 1970, pp. 3-4.

Y. Miyazaki, op. cit., pp. 34, 38-9.

61 Reischauer and Craig, op. cit., p. 261.

62 Feis, op. cit., p. 119.

63 T. Kase, op. cit., pp. 5, 10.

64 Grew, Joseph C. *Ten Years in Japan — United States Ambassador to Japan 1932-1942*, Hammond, Hammond & Company Limited, London, 1944, p. 333.

65 Ibid., p. 359.

Y. Miyazaki, op. cit., pp. 36, 43.

66 Summarised from Ohki, Takeshi 大木毅. "Doitsu no Tai-Bei Kaisen e (1941 nen) — Sono Seiji Katei o Chushin ni ドイツの対米開戦 (1941年) — その政治過程を中心に" (Political Process of the German Decision to Open the War against the United States in 1941), in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations), Kokusai Seiji 91 — *Nitchu Senso kara Nichi-Ei-Bei Senso e 国際政治91 —日中戦争から日英米戦争へ* (International Politics Vol. 91 — From the Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese-Anglo-American War), Yuhikaku 有斐閣, Tokyo, 1989, p. 104.

67 T. Shimada, op. cit., p. 158.

68 Ibid., p. 165.

69 Ibid., p. 161.

70 Hull, Cordell *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2*, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., Norwich, 1948, pp. 1012-13.

71 This information is based on a report from Ambassador K. A .Umansky to Vyacheslav M. Molotov in Moscow. See Ozawa, Haruko 小澤治子. "'Shinju-wan' to Soren Gaiko — 1941-nen

Nippon o meguru Bei-So Kankei 「真珠湾」とソ連外交
1941年日本をめぐる米ソ関係" (Pearl Harbor and Soviet Diplomacy: Japan-Soviet-U.S. Relations in 1941), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan). *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Shinju-wan Zengo 第二次世界大戦 — 真珠湾前後* (World War II: Toward Pearl Harbor), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 164-6.

72 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., pp. 393-6.

73 H. Ozawa, op. cit., p. 165.

74 T. Shimada, op. cit., pp. 161-2 .

75 Ibid., p. 171.

76 Ibid., pp. 171-2.

77 T. Ohki, op. cit., p. 110.

78 Ibid., p. 110.

79 Ibid., p. 110.

80 Yoshii, Midori 義井みどり. "Nichi-Doku-I Kyodo Kodo Kyotei no Teiketsu to Doitsu no Tai-Bei Sensen Fukoku 日独伊共同行動協定の締結とドイツの対米宣戦布告" (The Conclusion of No-Separate-Peace Treaty and Germany's Declaration of War on the United States), in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations), *Kokusai Seiji 91 — Nitchu Senso kara Nichi-Ei-Bei Senso e 国際政治91 — 日中戦争から日英米戦争へ* (International Politics Vol. 91 — From the Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese-Anglo-American War), Yuhikaku 有斐閣, Tokyo, 1989, p. 89.

81 Sudo, Shinji 須藤眞志. *Nichi-Bei Kaisen Gaiko no Kenkyu 日米開戦外交の研究* (A Study of U.S.-Japan Diplomacy leading up to the Outbreak of War), Keio Tsushin 慶應通信, Tokyo, 1986, p. 141.

82 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 356.

Ike, op. cit., p. 190.

83 I. Hata, op. cit., p. 312.

84 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 252.

85 Some excellent works on the peace-feeler activities were published around the 1960s, such as the work of Shinkichi Eto entitled *The History of the Peace Activities towards China* (Taika Wahei Kosaku Shi 対華和平工作史) in 1958 and Ikuhiko Hata's *The China Incident* (Nikka Jihen 日華事変) in 1960. It has taken nearly thirty years up to the early 1990s to find enough facts for the next works including Tobe's. Summarised from R. Tobe. Ibid., pp. 2 -13.

86 Reischauer and Craig, op. cit., p. 258.

Part II

Turning Points in the Negotiations I

Chapter 6: Policy-Making and Decision-Making: Japan and the United States

As an introduction to the chronological analysis of the U.S.-Japan talks prior to Pearl Harbor, this chapter examines divisional discords within both the U.S. and Japanese authorities, and the further development of mutual suspicion between the two countries.

In the case of Japan's pre-war government, it might be tempting to analyse the confusing situation in terms of "bureaucratic politics", a model which has been applied to the structure of the U.S. Government. Graham Allison describes it thus: "what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence".[1] He also describes the President as "a 'superpower' among many lesser but considerable powers",[2] and this is where the model ceases to apply in the case of Japan. In the formal American system, the Constitution gives power to the President, implying a unity within which, in practice, competing bureaucracies fight for decisive influence. In Japan, however, no such unity existed in the legal and formal structure of the system. The Army was separate from the Navy, both were separate from the civilian power, and the "Prime Minister" had no final responsibility. Furthermore, despite a prevalent view in the West, authority was not given to the Emperor, whose powers were modelled in part on the Prussian and in practice on the British systems, so that Japan's Constitution actually contradicted itself (see Chapters 1 and 9). It is very significant that Japanese scholars, even when they are familiar with the concept of "bureaucratic politics", hardly ever analyse the Japanese system in this way.

In contrast to Roosevelt's position as President, the problem which Fumimaro Konoe 近衛文麿 faced as Prime Minister resulted in the first place from the structure of government established by the Meiji Constitution of 1889. As studied in Chapter 9, this constitution was modelled on two different, incompatible constitutional structures imported from Europe: one was Prussian and the other was British in practice. This was placed on a foundation of traditional Japanese political systems developed during Japan's long history. In other words, although the Meiji Constitution was modelled partly on the Prussian one, the position of Emperor itself was modelled on the British monarch, which excluded any actual political power.

The political rights of the so-called "Prime Minister" to control the country were far from strong enough to do so. Since the Genro 元老 (elder statesmen), who in practice had assumed authority over both the cabinet and military command, had disappeared because of old age, both Konoe and Hideki Tojo 東條英機 were brought into politics by the Jushin 重臣, the former prime ministers who apparently took over the role of the Genro, but whose ability to control the country was in reality far less than that of the Genro.

Both Konoe and Tojo were "Shuhan" 首班 but not "Shusho" 首相 (See Chapter 9), therefore their political powers were very limited. In other words, the problems that developed in the 1930s and early 1940s in Japan were not due to a strong personal leadership leading to dictatorship, in the Western sense, but rather to a lack of control.

The Taisei Yokusan Kai 大政翼賛会 (established October 12th, 1940) was formed as an attempt to establish a unified leadership in view of the problems described above (See Chapter 9). Konoe, who made the plan to establish the Taisei Yokusan Kai, originally aimed to strengthen his leadership. The consequence was, however, that the Taisei Yokusan Kai was criticised by many groups from various

points of view, for instance, by the Kodo faction (Kodo-ha 皇道派) of the Army and former Prime Minister Kiichiro Hiranuma 平沼騏一郎 as a system of "a kind of [re-establishment of] the Tokugawa Shogunate [with dual ruling system]", by the industrial leaders and some Jushin as a "Communist system", and by the House of Peers as a "copy of the Nazi system" or a type of "Soviet Union" system, while the Emperor Showa warned Prime Minister Konoe that it could be against the Meiji Constitution.[3]

In short, Konoe organised the Taisei Yokusan Kai to strengthen his political support and solve the problem of lack of control, but failed. This, as analysed in detail in this part, resulted in the serious situation of indecision in Japanese policy-making.

In addition, the evaluation of some of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's policies has been a controversial issue among writers in the post-war period. Matsuoka was a driving force in the movement to join the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Italy in September 1940, and the Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941, and, as analysed in detail in this chapter, he opposed Japan's quick acceptance of the original Draft Understanding Proposal of April 1941. In this sense, he has been quite seriously criticised for his mishandling of Japan's foreign policy in that crisis. For instance, an essay by Professor Ikuhiko Hata 秦郁彦 in *The Cambridge History of Japan* perceives that "In my view, the point of no return regarding war in the Pacific came with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact in the fall of 1940 ... I stress the importance of the Tripartite Pact in particular because it determined finally the lines of allegiance and belligerence that governed World War II".[4] It is, as already mentioned, an over-simplified statement in that it overlooks the fact that in comparison with the Allied countries' relations at that time, the relations between Germany and Japan up to Pearl Harbor were always very unstable, and sometimes considered almost inimical.[5] Thus, as analysed in Chapter 5, the author cannot easily accept the

terms "determined finally" at the stage of the autumn of 1940, but it is right to say that this is typical of the criticism which has been levelled at Matsuoka.

As already mentioned, Matsuoka led Japan into the Tripartite Pact, then in 1941 failed to prevent Japan's occupation of southern French Indo-China, thus losing control of Japan's foreign policy. Similarly, while Lieutenant Colonel Kanji Ishihara 石原完爾 of the Kwantung Army was fully involved in the Manchurian Incident of 1931, he was later one of the strongest opponents of Japan's involvement in the China Incident of 1937, by which time he had been promoted to Major-General and Chief of the Army General Staff Headquarters First Department (responsible for military strategy). He also attempted to avert the conflict with the United States in the early 1940s, although he eventually failed on both occasions. In other words, Ishihara, who previously had led Japan into the Manchurian Incident, later could not control the movement towards hostilities.[6] Thus, the cases of Matsuoka and Ishihara represent outstanding examples of the problem of lack of control in Japan's politics at that time.

Indecision in Japanese government inevitably resulted in the development of a situation in which national control was lost in the difficult crises of those times. The fundamental problem of pre-war Japan was thus lack of control of her national decision-making rather than a problem of totalitarian control.

As many historians including Atsushi Moriyama 森山優 of Kyushu University in his detailed thesis entitled "Evasion of Decision-Making"[7] and Michael Blaker of Columbia University in his publication entitled *Japanese International Negotiating Style* pointed out, although the Japanese leaders approved several "National Policies (Kokusaku 国策)" during the period between the formation of the second Konoe Cabinet in July 1940 and Pearl Harbor in December 1941, in reality they made no decisions, since those "National Policies" were merely the result of compromise between groups which were making incompatible demands upon each other. It is important to note that Japan's foreign policy at that time often seemed like actual decision-making in favour of

aggression carried out in accordance with those "National Policies", whereas in fact those "National Policies" were deliberately misleading documents which purported to reflect, but which in fact did not reflect, the actual compromise reached and were indeed typical examples of the result of the evasion of decision-making. Thus, the problems recognised as the issues of Sakubun and Ryoron-heiki became acute during this period. To demonstrate the character of Japanese decision-making, it is worth examining in close detail the events around the "National Policy" of July 2nd.

Sakubun and Ryoron-heiki in Japan

There are two traditional terms used to describe this type of negotiating tactic in Japanese. "Sakubun 作文", literally "essay", is used to indicate a plan which is in reality merely an exercise on paper. "Ryoron-heiki 両論併記" means specifically to record in a formal agreement two opposing opinions, just as they stand, without any mutual accommodation. In more general terms, Dr. Michael Blaker describes the negotiating tactics thus:

> Japanese prewar negotiatory behavior was also molded by domestic political factors, particularly decision-making and government/negotiator communication practices ... The process of decision-making that evolved under this constitutional instrument was one of "dis-sensus" — a word that expresses the pluralistic competition, bureaucratic cumbersomeness, and policy accountability of the system ... The bargaining methods that the Japanese political system produced were on occasion not even targeted on the opposing side, although the adversary might have perceived them as deliberate and purposeful.[8]

The legal background to the necessity of preparing Sakubun in the Ryoron-heiki style has also been analysed by historians. Although the Western type of voting system was introduced and developed in Japanese society from the Meiji period, Japan's pre-war policy-making on the cabinet level was, unlike that of their Western counterparts, effected neither by personal leadership on the basis of the right of the "Prime Minister (Shuhan 首班)", nor by the result of votes by cabinet members. As many observers including Shiro Hara 原四郎[9] have pointed out, it was effective only by reaching an agreement unanimously (zen-in

itchi 全員一致) within the cabinet on the basis of the Regulations for Governing the Cabinet (Naikaku-Kansei 内閣官制) of 1889.[10] In practice, the Emperor could put his veto on a document of "National Policy" only if he could find someone who refused to sign the document, so that he could point to the lack of unanimous agreement. This was the main reason why the contemporary Japanese leaders had to try to prepare such documents, i.e. Ryoron-heiki Sakubun, since all the members could sign a document which recorded all their opinions.[11] In fact, the primary purpose of some conferences was to prepare Sakubun which were deliberately misleading, purporting to reflect an apparent agreement. This became a particular problem when the U.S. authorities intercepted and decoded only the part of the Japanese secret coded messages which described the content of the "National Policies".

During the period covered by this chapter, one such "National Policy" was adopted in July. Although this is not a main part of the thesis, it is worth analysing the document approved in July in detail as an example showing the characteristics of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun. This document consisted of two parts, the "Policy" with three items and the "Summary" with seven items and was formally called "Josei no Sui-i ni tomonau Teikoku Kokusaku Yoko 情勢の推移に伴う帝国国策要綱" (Guideline for Implementing National Policy in Line with Changing Circumstances)[12] and issued on July 2nd. This document presented Japan's national policy towards the new international circumstances created by the outbreak of the Russo-German war (June 22nd), since Japan, as a member of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, had to decide whether or not to enter the conflict.

The Japanese leaders at that time were divided into three groups, each making incompatible requests. They were a group including Foreign Minister Matsuoka and the General Staff of the Army, in favour of immediate declaration of war against the Soviet Union in the North, a group including most of the Navy leaders, in favour of advancing to the southern regions, and a group including

the Emperor, opposed to both ideas. When one reads the whole of this document and studies the domestic situation at that time in Japan, one can very clearly identify the characteristic that each item in the document contains no real practical decision, although some scholars, including Nobutaka Ike, who published *Japan's Decision for War* in 1967, completely overlooked the obviously indecisive nature of the document.

In the "Summary" part, Item One declared that "Pressure applied in the southern regions will be increased in order to force the capitulation of the Chiang regime. At the appropriate time, depending on future developments, the rights of a belligerent will be exercised against the Chungking regime, and hostile Foreign Settlements will be taken over." When Ike, for instance, interprets it as "It was now time to give formal approval to the far-reaching policy decisions ... As a result of this Conference, the Army and the Navy were given the green light to acquire bases in southern French Indo-China and to take over the Foreign Settlements in China ... at an appropriate time",[13] he does not note the fact that there was no definition of the meaning of "at an appropriate time" at the Conference. As is carefully mentioned in the original document — "at the appropriate time, depending on future developments" — the final decision was in reality avoided since nobody could then foresee such "future developments". And since one cannot find a clear time-frame as a condition for the policies of "the rights of a belligerent", the "green light" itself could not be effective since it was declared that Japan "will continue all necessary diplomatic negotiations with reference to the southern regions" in Item Two. This is a good example of the "Ryoron-heiki" style, since two opposing opinions, Item One and Item Two, were both written in the same "National Policy" document. Japan, in a practical sense, made no decision either to open hostilities in the South or to abandon that option.

In Item Three, while the Japanese "attitude with reference to the German-Soviet war will be based on the spirit of the Tripartite Pact [with Germany and Italy]", Japan "will deal with this matter [whether Japan will enter the conflict or

not] independently"; in other words, Japan would not be restricted in her decision-making on this matter by the Tripartite Pact but rather do it "independently", and "In the meantime, we [Japan] will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great care". In the same item, it was also declared that "We will secretly strengthen our [Japanese] military preparedness against the Soviet Union ..." Although Ike interprets this as "... that they had permission to get ready for military action in the meantime, and that depending on changes in the international situation, war against Russia would be reconsidered at a later date", he emphasises that "they had permission to get ready for military action in the meantime", introducing an opinion of one of the leaders, amongst various existing opinions, "It is interesting that Hara [President of the Privy Council Yoshimichi Hara 原嘉道] strongly urged that Japan take this opportunity to attack the Soviets", but he does not emphasise the significant point that the final decision on the matter was postponed as to "be reconsidered at a later date".

On the one hand the view of a group which wished to maintain Japan's membership of the Tripartite Pact was respected by the statement that the Japanese "attitude ... will be based on the spirit of the Tripartite Pact", on the other hand the view of another group which was strongly opposed to involvement in the conflicts with Russia arising from membership was also respected by the other statement that "Japan will deal with this independently [not automatically]". This is another example of the Ryoron-heiki style. In this manner, the view of a group which insisted on the necessity of preparing for the northern conflicts with the Russian forces was respected by the statement that "We will secretly strengthen our military preparedness against the Soviet Union", while the view of the other group which was strongly opposed to the idea was also respected by the other statement that "we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great care". The nature of the document is, as more deeply analysed later, a "Sakubun" in the "Ryoron-heiki" style which was moulded by domestic pluralistic competition, although, quite naturally, the adversary, the Western and Russian

observers, "might have perceived them as deliberate and purposeful" policy-making to maintain diplomatic negotiations with Russia until Japan was ready to attack on the northern front. Regarding her position at the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, Japan eventually decided neither to walk out of the Tripartite Pact nor to be restricted by the Pact, and neither to attack the Soviets nor to give up the option in the future.

Similarly, Item Five stated that "if the United States should enter the war [in Europe], Japan will act in accordance with the Tripartite Pact. However, we will decide independently ..." On the one hand, Item Two was put in very strong terms: "First of all, on the basis of ... 'Matters Relating to Promotion of Policy Towards the Southern Area (Nanpo Shisaku Sokushin ni Kansuru Ken 南方施策促進に関する件) [June 25th] ... Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States". On the other hand, as analysed in detail later in this chapter, the primary sources show that the Army and Navy Departments of the Imperial Headquarters had already agreed in secret on June 23rd that the plan to occupy southern French Indo-China would serve to resolve the Sino-Japanese conflict, thus preventing a war against Britain and the U.S.[14] Although Item Seven, the final item, noted that "Concrete plans covering this programme will be drawn up separately", in fact, such "separated" concrete plans were not adopted.

Professor Robert Butow explains the background to the adoption of this document:

> Japan's admirals had no intention of fighting Britain and the United States, but they wanted a greater share of the budget and a larger allocation of war materiel. By insisting upon the inclusion of positively worded phrases in the July 2nd policy, they automatically created a situation in which their demands for money and materiel became more meaningful and more imperative.[15]

Considering the competitive tradition between the Army and the Navy on budget, the author believes that this might well be an important factor, but not enough to explain the indecisive nature of Japan's decision-making which produced this document. If any final decision had clearly been made, it would

eventually have caused an extremely strong reaction from the opposing groups, which could easily have resulted in the loss of national control at that time, and this was the reason why they could not make any real decisions, and needed rather to make this kind of document to demonstrate an agreement reached, but in reality without reaching any actual agreement or final decision.

In this sense, the following statement by the Army Vice-Chief Osamu Tsukada 塚田攻 at the conference of the Liaison Council of June 26th, six days before the final adoption of the document, might well illustrate the background to this indecisiveness.

> I will state it more clearly. There is no difference in importance between north and south. The order and method will depend on the situation. We cannot do both simultaneously. At the present time we cannot decide which it will be, north or south ... We will go ahead if we perceive that conditions are extremely advantageous and not go ahead if they are disadvantageous. That is why we wrote "extremely advantageous" ...[16]

As Blaker points out,[17] the formal title of the document itself was "... National Policy in Line with Changing Circumstances". Moreover, the record of their conversations at the conferences in a well-known document entitled the "Sugiyama Memorandum" reveals two important points characteristically seen in the contemporary Japanese decision-making style. First, a form of Ryoron-heiki can be found not only in the sentences written in the Sakubun but also in their conversations at the meetings. Second, it was not unusual that the same person expressed incompatible opinions, depending on the development of the discussions, within quite a short period or even at the same conference. This was inevitable since each person represented his group in competition with other groups. This was the result of domestic power games. The following examples among many are worth analysing:

At the Liaison Conference of June 11th, 1941, when Matsuoka said aggressively on the policy towards the southern region that "I would say the Netherlands East Indies have insulted the Imperial Government [or more accurately 'the Empire of Japan']. Therefore, it seems necessary for Japan to take

a stronger attitude in putting an end to the negotiations" and asked that "In particular, I would like to know the attitudes of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff", the Army Chief of Staff replied in a less aggressive tone that " ... since Britain and the United States support the Netherlands East Indies, we will have problems if we take a strong attitude toward the East Indies ... It is desirable that we do not give up the matter completely, but leave room to resume the negotiations later".[18] In contrast, their positions were reversed at the Liaison Conference of the 30th of the same month, less than three weeks later. While the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff insisted on the necessity to immediately send troops to the southern region as "the occupation [of southern French Indo-China] must be carried out", Matsuoka was opposed, since the Russo-German War had broken out on the 22nd, saying "Why don't we stop building a fire in the South? ... and instead proceed northward?".[19] Matsuoka went further, declaring that "A great man [Matsuoka himself] changes his mind.[20] The other day [senpan 先般] I advocated going south, but now favour the North". Thus, when one attempts to find the contemporary leaders' intentions in their conversations, one cannot take one commitment expressed by an individual, neglecting the whole of the context or other commitments expressed by the same leader.

Another similar example is Sugiyama's opinion expressed at the Meeting of the Supreme War Council (Gunji-sangi-kan Kaigi 軍事参議官会議) on June 30th. When one finds the phrase "we are thinking of going as far as the Netherlands East Indies",[21] one can naturally regard this as clear evidence of the Japanese Army's intention to expand its territory to the Dutch East Indies, and its determination to take the risk of being involved in a war with the Western allies. In fact, as studied in detail later in this chapter, the Army had already prepared a sentence to be attached to a draft document of National Policy, "Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States" while the Army knew that the risk of U.S. involvement in a war with Japan was high if Japan attacked and occupied the Dutch East Indies.

Sugiyama's phrase was, however, immediately followed by: "however, territory is not our objective". The paradoxical term, "however (shikashi 而シ)", was omitted from the English version translated by Ike.[22] The word gives a clear indication that these phrases were tightly and paradoxically connected. Consequently, the latter phrase eroded the meaning of the former one, since it meant that although the Army was thinking of going to the Dutch East Indies, i.e. intended to occupy them, the territory was not its objective, i.e. it did not intend to occupy. Thus, Sugiyama's phrases were virtually, as a pair of connected sentences, mutually countervailing. This example indicates that Sugiyama, on the one hand, had to express his opinion in a more aggressive way than his real intention warranted, and on the other hand that he had to deny any intention of taking the risk of being involved in a war with the Western allies, particularly with the U.S. We can see here that the phrases were in the Ryoron-heiki style, and as such were not a clear indication of the Army's firm intention to expand its territory to the Dutch East Indies undeterred by the possibility of being involved in a war.

Some historians including Jun Tsunoda 角田順 of the National Diet Library have traced the development of the domestic negotiations which eventually produced the document of "National Policy" of July 2nd, using various primary sources including some at the Military History Department of the National Institute for Defence Studies. The process of domestic negotiations can be summarised as follows.[23]

By June 2nd, after more than a month of negotiations, a plan to acquire bases in southern French Indo-China and Thailand was provisionally agreed between the Army Ministry, the Army General Staff, the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff. However, Foreign Minister Matsuoka strongly opposed it on the 5th when it was presented to him by the Army and Navy, pointing out that there was a high risk for Japan of being involved in a conflict with the Western allies if the plan was actually executed, and insisting that he would never accept it

unless the Army and the Navy were ready to attack Singapore. This was probably because Matsuoka was aware that the military leaders were at that time not ready to be involved in a war with such powerful Western forces since he had previously seen their hesitation in April. At that time, Matsuoka had urged, immediately after coming back from his trip to Berlin, that Japan should prepare to attack British Singapore. In fact, according to the memoirs of Colonel Suketaka Tanemura 種村佐孝, some members of the Army thought that Matsuoka was mad when he urged the necessity of preparation for attacking Singapore.[24]

Consequently, the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army General Staff decided to withdraw the plan to "acquire bases" in the region since it could cause Western suspicions, but instead of this, it made a new plan to send in troops "shinchu 進駐", which literally meant "advance and be stationed" there. The Army General Staff also decided to prepare a "Sakubun" which declared that "Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war" with the Western allies "merely as a means to force Matsuoka to accept the new plan".[25] The priority of the Army's order was, thus, to force Matsuoka to accept the plan since a unanimous agreement for policy-making could never be reached as long as Matsuoka disagreed. This was the origin of the provocative phrase which became well known later. Tsunoda observes that "Kokusaku no Sakubun-ka 国策の作文化 [converting a serious National Policy document to merely a Sakubun] was their most extreme case of Sakubun, going so far as to use the phrase 'a war against the U.S.' as 'shuji 修辞' [rhetoric]".[26]

On the 10th when the Army presented the new Sakubun to the Navy, the Twentieth Office (in charge of war guidance) of the Army General Staff predicted little possibility of the Navy's agreement since the Twentieth Office had understood the document "Guideline of Policy Towards the Southern Area" of April 17th, which was prepared only less than two months before, as the Navy's strategy to maintain its opposition to the ideas of advancing to the southern area and taking the risk of involvement in a war with the U.S. On the same day,

however, the Navy immediately decided to accept it. Although its acceptance without resistance was surprising to the Army, the Navy had already established its new policy of checking the Army's movement towards the North by emphasising the importance of the southern issues. In fact, the movement towards the North within the Army became increasingly active in early June since several telegrams arrived from the Japanese Embassy in Berlin indicating a high possibility of outbreak of a Russo-German war.

At the Liaison Conference which was held on the next day, the 11th, the Chief of Staff of the Navy Osami Nagano 永野修身 strongly emphasised the Navy's determination expressed by the new phrase "Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war", but the Liaison Council did not adopt it since the Chief of Staff of the Army Hajime Sugiyama 杉山元 wondered to what extent the Navy recognised it as a Sakubun when he listened to Nagano's aggressive speech.[27] Thus, at this time, the Army did not support the plan. Although the Liaison Council provisionally adopted the plan on the next day, the 12th, with three additional conditions which were proposed by Matsuoka, the Twentieth Office of the Army General Staff still foresaw a lack of serious recognition of the phrase by both the Navy and the Army itself.[28] Nonetheless, a new document was prepared by the cabinet and three ministries of the Foreign Office, the Navy and the Army during the next two days, following the decision of the 12th.

A point which reveals the nature of Sakubun was the almost meaningless disputes on the definition of the terms. Over the term "shinchu (advance and be stationed)", for instance, Matsuoka argued quite normally at the conference of the 12th that "... the term shinchu has newly come up ... my thoughts ... are these. This term shinchu ['sending in troops' or more literally 'advance and be stationed'] should be regarded as a military occupation ... Even though we do not regard this [shinchu] as a military occupation, Great Britain and the United States, who are hostile to us, will regard it as such ... Taking these points into consideration, I

think we will have no success in the negotiations if we add the entry of troops to items being negotiated". Furthermore, when Matsuoka provoked a dispute saying that "Therefore, how about negotiating to build bases for the Air Force and the Navy as the first step? I think it will be difficult to reach an agreement if we bring up the sending in of troops [shinchu] from the beginning", this despite the fact that the Army and Navy had previously withdrawn the plan to "acquire bases" when they faced Matsuoka's strong opposition only a few days previously. Although the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs replied that "Air bases cannot be built without military force", the Army Chief of Staff mentioned that "The entrance of troops this time is not for building airfields" when Matsuoka deliberately offered: "How about limiting the troops to the number necessary for that purpose [building airfields]".[29]

Two days later, on the 14th, when the new document was presented to Matsuoka by the cabinet and three ministries, he opposed the plan to advance to southern French Indo-China again. At the Liaison Conference of the 16th, Matsuoka persistently opposed the plan of sending in troops (shinchu) to southern French Indo-China, insisting again that "acquire bases" was more acceptable than "sending in troops". This was, of course, an impossible idea since, as the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs mentioned on the 12th, " ... bases cannot be built without military force [sent there]". Matsuoka also spent time arguing paradoxically against the new plan of the Army and Navy: "If we [Japan] undertake an occupation, the Arsene-Henry-Matsuoka agreement of August 31 of last year would become null and void. Accordingly, stationing troops [even] in northern Indochina would become illegal".[30] Consequently, the Navy and the Army attempted to make many changes to the sentences presented in the Sakubun between the 16th and 22th, and on the 23rd, the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Navy and of the Army reached a new agreement.[31] As Colonel S. Tanemura recorded, however, the agreement was merely Ryoron-heiki Sakubun. The Army's traditional policy to prepare for the North and that of the Navy's to prepare for

the South were both recorded in the agreement although the policies were incompatible.[32]

As a product of domestic negotiations the new Sakubun was formally agreed at the Liaison Conference held on the 25th, but the phrase "Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war" was deleted from the document in exchange for deleting Matsuoka's three conditions which were attached on the 12th.[33] At the Liaison Conference of the 26th when the Army Chief of Staff stated that "There is no difference in importance [between the South and the North]" while the Navy Vice-Chief of Staff mentioned after hesitation that Item Two under "Policy" referred "to the southern part of French Indochina", Matsuoka strongly pointed out that "If that is the case, the Army and Navy differ in their views".[34] This was an effective argument in this context since it meant that the unanimous agreement for policy-making could not be reached, despite the fact that a "formal agreement" had been reached at the Conference one day before.

On the 27th, some conditions of the document were changed at the meeting between the Military Affairs Bureaus of the Navy and of the Army, and the next day, they were changed once more at the meeting between Matsuoka and the Navy and the Army. The phrase "Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war" was once more attached to the Sakubun. Later, on the same day, the Liaison Council provisionally adopted the new document again. This is the document of "National Policy" which was finally adopted at the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd. Nonetheless Matsuoka opposed the plan again at the Liaison Conference of the 30th. His attitude was considered by the Army on the same day as: "Thus the most urgent decision concerning national policy had to be postponed until the next day meaninglessly [imi naku 意味ナク] due to the Foreign Minister's [Matsuoka's] revival of the Indochina occupation issue which had already secured Imperial sanction".[35]

After the Liaison Conference of the 30th, the Army Chief of Staff felt strong anxiety about its nature as an extreme case of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun: "there will be considerable difficulty in carrying out the occupation of French Indochina because of the Foreign Minister's hesitation and the idea of postponing the occupation proposed by Navy Minister Oikawa and Navy Vice Chief of Staff Kondo. Also, in view of the atmosphere at today's meeting and the attitude of the Navy ... one can expect a great deal of controversy if a good opportunity to go North presents itself and we follow through. I am worried".[36]

Because of the developments summarised above, Tsunoda states that "Item Two [which contains the provocative phrase "will not be deterred ..."] was attached to this document merely for dressing up the Sakubun to be 'National Policy', but the main purpose [of the new document] was to keep their balance of power stable between one group which wished to prepare for the North and another one which wished to prepare for the South".[37] While the Army Ministry was divided into two groups, the faction for "advancing to the North" and the faction for "advancing to the South", the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army Ministry tried to check the movement to advance to the North and to prevent a risk of being involved in a war with the Western allies in the southern region. The Twentieth Office of the Army General Staff kept its position neutral since it regarded that Japan's power was not strong enough to survive in such international conflicts if involved.[38] The Navy, opposed to the Army, was on the side of the faction "to the South", and Matsuoka stood on the side of the faction "to the North". Tsunoda concludes that "The phrase 'Japan will not be deterred ...' was, although it was a fatally important phrase, left free how it should be interpreted since the 'Guideline' [National Policy of July 2nd] itself was merely a compromised document between them as a Sakubun".[39]

Among the records of domestic negotiations analysed above, one can find only the conversations recorded at the Liaison Conferences and the Gozen Kaigi in the Sugiyama Memorandum. This is where some scholastic works including the

ones which have been published by Tsunoda since the early 1960s can be recognised as valuable, since those works have revealed the nature of the conversations and policy-makings appearing in the Sugiyama Memorandum by precisely clarifying the process developing at each step in the domestic negotiations before those policies were presented and discussed at the conferences. Studying several documents adopted between July 1940 and September 1941, Moriyama has found that those characteristics of pre-war Japan's problems in decision-making, such as evasion of decision, frequent adoption of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun at the conferences, often occurred. Dr. Blaker, who has mainly studied the pre-war Japanese diplomats' negotiating style, using nearly twenty cases between the late nineteenth century and 1941, reached a similar conclusion derived from the pattern in diplomats' attitudes:

> Japanese repetition of bargaining positions arose mainly from domestic political impasse and disagreement ... Evasive, indirect, or ambiguous statements by Japanese negotiators were the inevitable by-product of domestic disagreements, imprecise boundaries of discretionary authority, lack of clear bargaining policies, and the paucity of contingency plans.[40]

As far as the new policy towards the South is concerned, one should refer to the record of an agreement between the Army General Staff and the Navy General Staff reached on June 23rd. This is because the contemporary intentions of the Army and Navy are quite clearly mentioned in it:

> Recently, [the policy of] the United States increasingly tends to lead the Netherlands, Great Britain and China to strengthen their strategic preparations and to form their united front against Japan ... the attitude of the Chungking regime of depending on [the support of] Britain and the U.S. is becoming clearer ... [Consequently] the resolution of the China Incident should be more delayed ... If we [Japan] were to leave [the situation] as it is currently going on and postpone [the plan to send in troops to southern French Indo-China], then as we would be delayed [to do so] the more, we should face more difficulties in resolving [the current issues] and the higher risk of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States ... [In contrast], if our country [Japan] were to carry out decisively a containment strategy at this time ... gaining a foothold in southern French Indo-China and keeping Thailand under our banner, we would be able to make them [Britain and the U.S.] give up their anti-Japanese strategies realising that they could not expect any possibility of defeating us. This is the better strategy which would lead us to victory without any cost of fighting [with them rather than hesitating to carry out the plan and doing nothing].[41]

This was their view revealed in the agreement between the Army and the Navy at the meeting from which Matsuoka was excluded, despite the fact that, at the meetings which Matsuoka attended, they presented such strong phraseology as: "Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with Great Britain and the United States".

Thus, in reality, while Matsuoka correctly warned of the danger of sending in troops to southern French Indo-China: "I predict that if we [Japan] get involved in the South, it will become a serious matter [causing a war with the Western allies]"[42], the Army and Navy had the opposite view that Japan would face "the higher risk of being involved in a war" if she did not send troops there.

At the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd, the President of the Privy Council Yoshimichi Hara clearly stated his opposition to the phrase of Item Two of the Summary that "... it will be difficult if we rely only on diplomatic negotiations. But military action is a serious matter. I regard a war against Great Britain and the United States, which is mentioned in Section 2 of the Summary, as a very serious matter ... The Foreign Minister says that he wishes to avoid military action ... I do not think it wise for Japan to resort to direct and unilateral military action and be called an aggressor. I offer my opinion to all of you". The more interesting statement is, however, the one which was made by Hara after he listened to both opinions of the Chiefs of Staff of the Navy, Nagano, and of the Army, Sugiyama, who supported the phrase in Item Two. Despite Nagano's statement that "As the first step, it will be necessary for us to carry out our policy with respect to French Indochina and Thailand ... and thereby increase our ability to move southward"[43], and despite Sugiyama's saying "Our occupation of Indochina will certainly provoke Great Britain and the United States, however ... Japan must resolutely carry out the policy she now has in mind ..."[44], Hara did not oppose them but said: "I understand. I agree with you fully", and immediately afterwards, he gave a totally opposite conclusion: "I think that the Government and the Supreme Command are in agreement on this point: that is, we will try to avoid a clash with

Great Britain and the United States. I believe that Japan should avoid taking belligerent action against the United States ..."[45]

Tsunoda observes that the manner taken by Hara in this conversation can be regarded as "evidence that both the Government and the Supreme Command did not understand the phrase [of Item Two] as more serious than a Sakubun".[46] After all, the concept in this "agreement" of July 2nd was that the Japanese troops could be sent to southern French Indo-China if they could clearly see no possibility of being involved in a war with the Western allies despite the attachment of the strong phrase of Item Two. In reality, Japan at this stage was deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with the Western allies, although this was contrary to the phrase of Item Two "Japan will not be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war".

As analysed later in this thesis, the problem of Ryoron-heiki noticeably appeared after the "agreement" of the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd was issued. While the Army started to assemble a quite large number of troops towards the North against the Soviet Union, the Foreign Office began to negotiate with the French authorities which were then weakened due to the German occupation. The domestic competition between the groups which wanted to go to the North and those to the South became harder since they shared the view that they could not go in both directions simultaneously. The movement towards the South became stronger particularly after Matsuoka left office as a result of the dissolution of the Second Konoe Cabinet in the middle of the same month. The Japanese troops finally landed in southern Indo-China on July 28th, five days after the Japanese government and the French authorities of Indo-China reached an agreement, while the tension in the North against Russia was increasing to its peak.

As studied in detail later, the decision to occupy southern French Indo-China was made because the Japanese leaders judged that the Western countries would not strongly react against the occupation and therefore saw little possibility of causing a war by their action, in other words, it is not the case that

they were undeterred by the possibility of being involved in a war. In retrospect, they made an obvious misjudgement about the Western strategy, which was revealed by the Americans' immediate action announcing strict sanctions, but, in fact, this does not mean that the Japanese who made the decision to send in troops to the southern region were ready to go to war against the U.S.

On the other hand, it was of course impossible to expect the American leaders to notice this complicated situation in Japan when Magic intercepted and decoded a Japanese message which described only part of the adopted documents. As Butow observed: "The United States intercepted a two-part circular (No.1390) sent from Tokyo on July 2, 1941, giving the gist but not the full text of the decision reached ... on that day".[47]

General Hobun Yamashita 山下奉文 recommended that "Japan should exercise patience in avoiding the outbreak of war, meanwhile concentrating all her strength on the modernisation of her military material", and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 山本五十六 adopted this position. J. W. M. Chapman notes:

> but despite this the Japanese government was stampeded into the decision of 2 July 1941 to occupy southern Indochina, acting on the premise revealed in the British COS report that Japan could proceed to occupy Thailand or French Indochina without precipitating war. By this date, however, this piece of documentary intelligence was no longer the benchmark by which to judge the reactions in Washington, to which the initiative in responding to Japanese expansionism had already shifted. This error of judgement was probably compounded by miscalculation in Washington of the time it was likely to take before economic sanctions would begin to bite hard.[48]

Before starting the chronological analysis of Japan's decision-making, the nature of one important primary source, the Sugiyama Memorandum, should be clarified. In 1967 when Nobutaka Ike translated documents which are now included in a source material called the Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ (Sugiyama Memorandum), as *Japan's Decision for War — Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, he stated that:

> It is often difficult for an investigator to get reliable information that throws light on the decision-making process ... In this sense, the documents here translated are probably unique. I was eventually persuaded that there would be merit in making them available to those who could not read them in their original form. The documents were found in the Military History Archives (Senshi-shitsu

[戦史室]) of the Japanese Defense Agency by a committee of scholars working under the chairmanship of Dr. Tsunoda Jun of the National Diet Library. This committee, organized by the Japan International Politics Association, was also allowed to see a large body of unpublished material held by the families of Japan's wartime leaders, and committee members interviewed many leaders who are still alive. Its findings were subsequently published by the Asahi Newspaper Publishing Company in a seven-volume work, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi [太平洋戦争への道] (The Road to the Pacific War).[49]

Accordingly, the author refers to the *Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi* and other materials at the Military History Archives (Senshi-shitsu) in addition to the Sugiyama Memorandum in this thesis to provide important sources not included in the Sugiyama Memorandum. One notable point here is that some of the documents in the *Sugiyama Memorandum* were already opened to the public by former members of the Army General Staff as early as the beginning of the 1950s, immediately after the end of the Allied Occupation, although, as with many other documents on both sides, they were not known at the time of the Tokyo Trial. In fact, as Ike notes, those documents in the Sugiyama Memorandum had already been used and frequently quoted in the publication entitled *Dai To-A Senso Zenshi* 大東亜戦争全史 (History of the Greater-East Asian War), [50] compiled at the Hattori Institute of Historical Research (Hattori Shijitsu Kenkyu-sho 服部史実研究所),[51] whose members included Colonel Takushiro Hattori 服部卓四郎, Chief of the Operations (War Planning) Section of the Army General Staff, Colonel S. Tanemura and Lieutenant-Colonel Shiro Hara, both of whom were members of the Twentieth Office of the Army General Staff. A copy of those documents was preserved in the Military History Archives when they were founded in 1956, and the original papers were finally transferred from the Hattori Institute to the Military History Archives in 1960. Thus, there has been little effort to classify them by the former military leaders, in sharp contrast with other materials such as the large volume of the Diaries of the Twentieth Office and of the Fifteenth Section, still classified up to the present.[52] Thus, when one analyses contemporary Japanese decision-making, it is not enough to depend mainly on the Sugiyama Memorandum alone.

Furthermore, there are specific linguistic problems, as faced by Ike himself: "No two persons will translate a document in precisely the same way. My own philosophy of translation ... is to try to keep the translation as close as possible to the Japanese text and yet reasonably readable in English".[53] In analysing the Sugiyama Memorandum more deeply, the author became more aware that the difficulty in translating goes beyond the problems described by Ike. This is partly because the languages, to some extent, reflect their particular cultural factors, such as certain ways of thinking which often appear within a cultural or social context but which are not necessarily easily and correctly understood by observers who are not involved in the same context. In this sense, one should be aware that there are some parts which cannot be translated from the original language fluently enough to be "reasonably readable" when the translation is kept "as close as possible" to its original text. This is a particularly serious problem in the case of very different languages such as Japanese and English.

A significant example of this problem, affecting the understanding of contemporary Japanese decision-making, is the characteristic factor of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun. This factor can clearly be seen in those Japanese primary sources, but when one attempts to translate them so as to keep the original nuance of the Japanese text, one cannot do it in reasonably readable English unless one attaches a number of explanations about Ryoron-heiki Sakubun itself.

In the case of Ike's work, it is fluent enough to be readable in English although such explanations are not attached, partly because the factor of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun in those original texts is ignored in the translated version. This is despite the fact that the nature of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun has been recognised as an important theme in a number of works published by many historians in Japanese academic circles, including Jun Tsunoda, and despite Ike's statement that "Dr. Jun Tsunoda of the National Diet Library and Professor Chihiro Hosoya ... were most generous with their ... help".[54]

In this thesis, the author attempts to attach a reasonable amount of explanation about Ryoron-heiki Sakubun and to maintain his translation close enough to the original text to show the existence of this factor even to the extent of, on some occasions and to a certain degree, sacrificing English fluency. The author also attempts to clarify, when he judges it necessary, the following points in particular: which sources used in this thesis are not included in the Sugiyama Memorandum; which are included in the Sugiyama Memorandum but not included in the English version by Ike; which phrases translated by Ike the author believes may have significantly changed the original meaning. This is because the author has found, as also mentioned in relevant parts of the thesis, that several English historians have been misled in their understanding of Japanese historical decision-making as a result of overlooking the significant factor of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun.

Cautious and coercive policies in the United States

While the Ryoron-heiki Sakubun problem caused by domestic divisions within the Japanese authorities resulted in the development of an indecisive foreign policy towards the crisis, difficulties in the U.S.'s decision-making also partly originated from the nature of U.S. government. The deepening crisis in Japan and the outbreak of the Pacific War occurred during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was first elected in 1932 and is the only President to have served for as long as twelve years. But in spite of the length of his political career "Roosevelt's actions, as many others have observed, are not easy to explain".[55] His biographer Ted Morgan has said that he "knew how to govern the way Casals knew how to play the cello" partly because, by 1940, "he had been practising for thirty years".[56] In a more colloquial mode Professor Robert Butow has commented that Roosevelt "drove by the seat of his pants".[57]

That said, there is general agreement amongst his biographers about his political style. Like Proteus in Greek mythology he "would change into other shapes to escape and avoid having to tell the truth"; he would "hold contradictory views simultaneously ... until the time was ripe for a decision".[58] Herman Kahn, Director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, has said that the Roosevelt technique was "to permit each opposing side to believe that he agreed with it".[59] Rexford G. Tugwell, one of his advisors, noted that he "deliberately concealed the processes of his mind".[60] Finally, Roosevelt said of himself at a meeting in May 1941: "I may be entirely inconsistent, and furthermore I am perfectly willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help win the war".[61]

Political ability of this kind was undoubtedly necessary for a man of Roosevelt's world outlook in the decade leading up to the Second World War. Within certain important limits he was an interventionist while the dominant political mood of the United States was isolationist. World events made him more interventionist as time went by. When he was elected his domestic programme was of overwhelming importance and the New Deal remained his prime objective. Re-elected in 1936 his main concern was his battle over the Supreme Court. But as the crisis deepened in Europe he came to believe that American interests were at risk in the face of Nazi expansion. When the war in Europe began he continued to think, until a date which cannot easily be determined, that those interests could be protected by support given to Britain and France.

In consequence he was always moving ahead of an isolationist public. Isolationism was more than a function of the distance between the centre of the United States and Europe or Japan. It has been analysed by Robert Dallek, who argues that "domestic crosscurrents largely determined U.S. actions abroad during the twenties and the thirties".[62] He sees American foreign policy "as a product of emotional displacement, of the impulse to make overseas affairs a vehicle for expressing unresolved internal tensions".[63]

After Theodore Roosevelt assumed the presidency in 1901, "a coherent progressive mood dominated American public life" during the first two decades of the twentieth century. With this social mood "Greater democracy, law, justice ... were national articles of faith".[64] On the other hand, as noted by Waldo Heinrichs, "The World War of 1914-18 was supposed to be the war to end all wars" and to the Americans "The dominant values of international relations remained those advanced by President Woodrow Wilson ... Universalism and multilateralism, conciliation and consultation, diplomacy, not force ... were the predominant motifs of those years".[65] However, one can see that some significant changes began in American society during these years. Dallek observes that "By 1920-21 ... In place of a lofty vision of selfless Americans ... the country embraced special-interest politics" as "Cities vied with small towns, Protestants with Catholics ... laborers with corporations ... and government with private enterprise".

In addition, as the population of Southern and Eastern European immigrants had rapidly increased between 1900 and 1920, "the country struggled with fears that traditional habits were in jeopardy from alien influences" such as "anarchism and bolshevism".[66] The consequence was that "the mass movement of European immigrants ... and the growth of imported radical ideas" were seen by "traditional America" as "compelling reasons to close itself off from peoples and events abroad".[67] At the same time, "group antagonisms in America gave rise to cynical nationalism in foreign affairs. The turn toward special-interest politics at home encouraged the belief ... [that] the country [America] had been duped into the war by self-serving Europeans, international bankers, and munition makers". The result was, again, that the "Americans now warmly endorsed economic nationalism and political isolation".[68]

Following the Great Depression of 1929, the isolationists' influence in the United States increased remarkably. In Heinrichs's words, "Three attitudes dominated American world policy in the mid-thirties: isolationism, preoccupation with internal affairs, and complacency". During the period, "What did seem

critical to the American people was the devastating economic depression of the early thirties, followed by slow recovery and a sharp recession".[69]

As he became more interventionist Roosevelt's concern continued to be Europe before the Pacific. This was important not only for the conduct of policy but because he underwent little learning about Japan to modify his generally stereotypical view of the country. As Heinrichs comments, "Franklin Roosevelt had not really found any answer to Japanese aggression. He was a Europeanist ... He believed he understood Europeans. Of Asia he had no direct experience".[70]

Partly against the background mentioned above, Roosevelt naturally inherited a non-recognition doctrine towards the Manchurian crisis. On the other hand, as Henry Stimson remarked, he also inherited the view insisted on by Theodore Roosevelt that "American interests in the Orient" were "not worth a war".[71] In fact, Paul Schroeder observes that "There was no indication in the early years of the Roosevelt administration that this conviction [of "not worth a war in the Orient"] would be abandoned".[72] Thus, in the aftermath of the Manchurian Incident, Roosevelt's foreign policy in the Far East was "to continue to oppose Japan's course of militant expansion" but "would not go beyond moral sanctions in enforcing its principles".[73] Even after his re-election of late 1940 "Roosevelt ... still thought collision [in the Pacific] was avoidable" and he "wanted peace in the Pacific in order to pursue bolder policies in the European war". Roosevelt therefore "appeased the Japanese in order to concentrate on helping the British".[74] Thus, Roosevelt's position was Europe-first, while he was in general less interested in Far Eastern affairs, and the "inherited" non-recognition doctrine was, in practice, not of primary importance to him.

For most of the time the actual conduct of foreign policy was in the hands of Cordell Hull. Roosevelt did not like Hull, not as much as Sumner Welles. But Hull should not be underestimated. He was a sober unimaginative man and an intelligent idealist of the Wilsonian school, but his tenacity brought results. He did not give up easily and with a "feuding Tennessee mountaineer's ability" strove

to get his own way. Hull was "far from being as powerless within the administration". As a former representative and senator from Tennessee, he also carried weight in Congress.[75]

Given the importance of Hull, Abraham Ben-Zvi probably exaggerates when he says:

> American policy toward Japan on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack was not the product of a rational, value-maximizing decisional process. Rather it constituted the cumulative, aggregate outcome of several "bargaining games" in which various individuals – who differed from one another in terms of their respective power, resolve ... and world view – strove to build a "majority coalition" ... which would enable them to carry out their preferred Pacific strategy. Thus, far from being "a calculated solution to a strategic problem" ... reached by a unitary actor on the basis of a scrupulous comparative assessment of the expected outcome ... the process by which the American posture in the Pacific was actually shaped was ... closely patterned on the premises of the "bureaucratic politics" theory [developed by the works of Graham T. Allison in 1971 and of Morton Halperin in 1974].[76]

Ben-Zvi is nearer the truth when he says, on the next page, that there were "various political actors" who were "arranged hierarchically in the national decision-making unit" under Roosevelt's presidency. He observes that "Certain members of the State Department, headed by Cordell Hull, played a significant role in the formation of U.S. policy toward Japan. In addition to his deep involvement in the negotiations with the Japanese representatives (the Hull-Nomura conversations) ... Hull contributed personally to the formation of some of the most crucial decisions concerning Japan in 1941".[77]

Several officials of the State Department, including Under-secretary Sumner Welles, advisor Stanley K. Hornbeck, Maxwell U. Hamilton as Chief of the Far Eastern Division, and his assistant, Joseph W. Ballantine, were also involved in shaping U.S. policy towards Japan. On the other hand, Ambassador Joseph Grew's role "was, in general, limited, and it became even more so in the wake of Hull's decision [on the oil embargo], late in July 1941" although "The American Embassy in Tokyo, headed by the experienced diplomat Joseph C. Grew ... was occasionally involved in policy consultations".[78] In fact, John K. Emmerson, who started his foreign service career "in a minor post" in the Tokyo Embassy in 1937, stated in

1969 that "Sad as it is to contemplate over the perspective of the intervening years, the Embassy did not play a crucial role in the unfolding Japanese-American drama".[79] On the occasions of Konoe's proposal for a summit meeting with Roosevelt in August 1941 and of the Japanese proposals presented to the U.S. in November of the same year, "Grew ... was severely constrained, and ultimately totally unsuccessful, in his drive to redirect American diplomacy".[80] Grew himself pointed out in his telegram of November 3rd, 1941 that he was "out of touch with the intentions and thoughts of the Administration".[81]

Outside the State Department there were influential members who put various pressures on the Department, such as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. as well as Congress and various pressure groups. Ben-Zvi points out that Stimson was "a highly respected Republican senior statesman" and "was persuaded by Roosevelt to join the administration in an attempt to broaden the margin of public support for its increasingly interventionist posture in Europe". Secretary Stimson himself was, therefore, "fully aware of his unique bargaining position". Thus, he became "one of the most powerful members of the Roosevelt entourage".[82]

In the case of Morgenthau, he could maintain "a special status within the cabinet" as "a close friend of President Roosevelt".[83] Anthony Kubek observes that the Treasury Department played "an increasingly formative role in the development of American Far Eastern policy".[84] In fact, Secretary of State Hull explicitly stated in his memoirs that "Morgenthau's personal relations with the President being very close, he occasionally induced the President to grant him jurisdiction which infringed on that of the State, War, or Navy Departments".[85] It is worth quoting the following statements recorded in Hull's memoirs since these statements clearly indicate that serious inner discords among the ministers within the Roosevelt Administration existed in the formation of American foreign policy:

[Morgenthau] often acted as if he were clothed with authority to project himself into the field of foreign affairs and inaugurate efforts to shape the course of

foreign policy in given instances ... Despite the fact that he was not at all fully or accurately informed on a number of questions of foreign policy with which he undertook to interfere ... he seldom lost an opportunity to take long steps across the line of State Department jurisdiction ... We found him conducting negotiations with foreign Governments which were the function of the State Department ... Morgenthau's interference at times seriously impeded the orderly conduct of our foreign policy. I mentioned this habit to the President from time to time; but Mr. Roosevelt had a way of quietly easing by such complaints relating to his intimates.[86]

Furthermore, other domestic difficulties in controlling U.S. foreign policy existed, as pointed out by Jonathan Utley, "But it was not Morgenthau who would cause Hull most of the trouble, it was a growing number of administrators scattered through the ever-expanding Washington bureaucracy. As a result, a gap developed between policy articulated at the top and actions taken at lower levels".[87]

As for Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, he "was not always successful in wielding his administrative and bargaining power to achieve the economic-political goals he desired". However, "Ickes's influence increased considerably, and ... more forcefully in the debate on the imposition of a total oil embargo on Japan" following his appointment as petroleum co-ordinator for national defence on May 28th, 1941. In addition, three presidential advisors, Norman H. Davies, Harry Hopkins and Lauchlin Currie were also "occasionally involved in questions pertaining to American-Japanese relations".[88] On the military side, "a number of military planners, strategists, and intelligence officers also explored American-Japanese relations in numerous memoranda and intelligence reports".[89]

In the case of Bishop James E. Walsh and Father James M. Drought – members of the John Doe Associates, and Postmaster General Frank C. Walker, their political roles have been described by Ben-Zvi: they "appeared only briefly in the foreground of the American-Japanese scene".[90] There remains the provocative question, however, of how their roles should be interpreted in the historical context, and, as analysed in detail in this thesis, there still seem to exist some significant disagreements among the observers.

While President Roosevelt maintained a stance of deliberate changeability and "kept his distance from the competing factions" as a "central decision maker"[91], there were naturally the members of the hawks and doves, both of whom contributed to the formation of U.S. foreign policy towards Japan. While it has widely been recognised that, as stated by Morgan, "The hawks in the cabinet" were "Stimson, Morgenthau, and Ickes"[92], Ben-Zvi distinguishes between the former two, and Ickes as "the more militant"[93] by noting the important point that "Other prominent cabinet members, such as Secretaries Stimson and Morgenthau, were convinced that Japan, when confronted by American firmness, would yield to the pressures exerted upon her and consequently adopt a much more conciliatory policy. Ickes, in contrast, hoped that the maintaining of a coercive posture by the United States would be a prelude to war".[94]

In other words, "While many decision makers believed that war with Germany was inevitable, only Ickes insisted that war against Japan was the preferable course of action in order to restore the global balance of power". Consequently, Ickes was "the only member of the cabinet who advocated launching an attack upon Japan" during the period before the end of November 1941. In this sense he was alone, although "Ickes was not unique among American policy makers in viewing the Pacific theater as but one facet of a menacing, rapidly developing global crisis".[95]

Ickes himself explicitly stated in his diary as early as December 18th, 1937, four years before the outbreak of the Pacific War, that "America and Japan will be at war, and if that ever is to happen ... If we should strike now, could not we put Japan in her place at a smaller cost ... than might be possible at any time hereafter? ... Whatever decision is made will necessarily be a grave and eventful one".[96] On October 18th, 1941, nearly four years later, he stated again that "For a long time I have believed that our best entrance into the war would be by way of Japan. Undoubtedly we are nearer this eventuality than ever before ... And, of course, if we go to war against Japan, it will inevitably lead us to war against

Germany".[97] The stance maintained by Ickes made a sharp contrast with that of Stimson who stated in his letter of April 4th, 1940, to Chauncey J. Hamlin "I do not think ... that the Japanese would attack the Philippines even if we put an embargo on raw materials for arms. All the evidence which I have indicates that they are more afraid of war with us than anything else".[98]

Nonetheless, it would be wrong to interpret Ickes' political intentions as simply "warlike" in the general sense, although an adversary might have perceived them as such. Rather, as observed by Ben-Zvi, Ickes was still "committed to a liberal philosophy", and he was "a leading member of the progressive wing of President Roosevelt's coalition and a staunch supporter of the New Deal".[99] In fact, Ickes defined himself in his diary as a "pacifist" on the same day that he wrote "If we should strike now ..."[100] It is another example of the possibility of being misled if one conclusively defines a decision maker's intentions by taking only a part of statements while neglecting the whole of their context, just as could be seen in the case of the commitments of Foreign Minister Matsuoka and of the Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama in the record of the Sugiyama Memorandum. It can be said at least, however, that Ickes together with Stimson and Morgenthau were the "hard-liners" in their attitude towards Japan in 1940 and 1941.

Hornbeck can also be distinguished from the other hard-liners, since he was "the strongest" of the "Asia-firsters", in contrast with Stimson and Morgenthau who "supported a major emphasis on Europe". Hornbeck perceived that "the revisionist powers could most successfully be deterred" by the firmness of the U.S. foreign policy in the Pacific. However, his view of "the Pacific as merely one manifestation of the global conflict between 'three aggressor nations' and the status quo powers" was shared by Stimson and Morgenthau. His preference for a coercive posture towards Japan was also shared by the other hard-liners.[101]

In contrast, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles and Hamilton "initially supported a cautious posture toward Japan". In this sense, the officials of the State Department

involved in the process of forming foreign policy "were a heterogeneous group".[102] It is interesting to find that some of those members' perspectives towards Far Eastern affairs were, as pointed out by many historians, influenced by their very personal involvement in the events. Hornbeck, for instance, had stayed in China for four years from 1909 for "a teaching job at Chekiang Provincial College in Hangchou ... and in 1913 went to Manchuria for a further year of teaching at Fengtien Law College in Mukden". In addition, as remarked by James Thomson, Hornbeck in his youth at the University of Wisconsin came "under the influence of Professor Paul S. Reinsch, who was eventually to become Wilson's minister to China".[103] Decades later, he maintained a pro-Chinese attitude against Japan when the U.S.-Japan peace talks of 1941 were held.

As early as 1916 Hornbeck published "his major study of East Asia, 'Contemporary Politics in the Far East'", and in it he clearly revealed a view that America and China shared their national interests in "Both a moral and a business asset" against Japan, and against the Europeans. Based on such perspectives, he noted special "moral obligations" on the part of the U.S. in the shaping of China's future.[104] It is worth being aware that its publication was in the year during the First World War in which Japan was involved as a member of the Allies against Germany. It is also interesting to find Hornbeck's logic expressed in his own words at that time: Japan's so-called "Monroe Doctrine for Asia", the Twenty-One Demands, posed a serious threat to the United States, since the closing of the Far East, i.e. "China [which] presents the greatest industrial and commercial opportunity", to European traders "will inevitably drive them [European traders] to seek other markets ... logically, in South America. Thus, inevitably, the two leading principles in the foreign policy of the United States, that of the Monroe Doctrine in Application to American continents, and that of the open door in application to China" were jeopardized by Japan's Asian moves.[105] In other words, in the eyes of Hornbeck, the U.S.'s exclusion policy towards European traders in South America and the open door policy to all nationalities in China were not

paradoxical, but rather consistent and justified on the basis of the idea of America's "moral obligations".

On the other hand, the cautious posture of Welles towards Japan in the early 1940s was, as noted by Ben-Zvi, "derived, at least partially, from his exposure to Japanese culture when he served in the American embassy in Tokyo from 1915 to 1917"[106], again during the First World War. In the case of Ambassador Grew, he "reveals markedly different images of Japan [from the stereotyped images of Roosevelt]" and those of Hornbeck. Grew "was always careful to distinguish between the various factions that operated on the Japanese political scene". As a personal background to his perspectives, Grew "had a very deep affection for that country [Japan], her culture and life style".[107] Although "Grew did not uncritically accept the Japanese point of view"[108], he continued to argue even as late as 1942, after Pearl Harbor and when hatred and hostility dominated the American sentiment, that "the average Japanese is a gentle, courteous, friendly, beauty-loving person" and that "The very qualities that made Japan formidable as an enemy were qualities which, in other circumstances, could not only be respected but admired".[109] As noted by Heinrichs, Grew "did not use the word 'Jap' except in quotations".[110] Thus, "his background images of Japan were correspondingly sympathetic".[111] Grew's attitudes made a sharp contrast with those maintained by some other leaders in the same period, for instance, the one found in the report of "the popular American hero and war correspondent" Ernie Pyle; "In Europe we felt that our enemies ... were still people. But ... the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman"[112], and in Admiral William Halsey's famous call: "Kill Japs, kill Japs, kill more Japs".[113]

In the case of Stimson, his biographer Elting Morison states that Stimson's advocacy of an uncompromising policy towards Japan in 1940-1 "arose from ... belief that Japan had yielded to a firm policy ... He remembered ... from 1931 onwards, where it had been impossible to construct firm consistent policies, the Japanese had not yielded".[114] In the same context, Ben-Zvi also notes that "his

specific attitudes toward Japan in 1940 and 1941 ... were affected by his personal involvement in the Manchurian crisis of 1931-1932, when he was serving as secretary of state in President Herbert Hoover's cabinet".[115]

In fact, his attitudes towards Japan before the Manchurian Incident and after it were quite different. Nearly one year before the Incident, Stimson spoke of Japan as "our good neighbors across the Pacific" and as the "great nation toward whom we have grown to look for stability and progress in the Far East" at the close of the London Naval Conference of 1930.[116] As Armin Rappaport notes, even after the assault on Mukden on September 18th, 1931, "The Secretary [Stimson] realized the complexities of the situation". Stimson's initial posture towards the crisis was, as introduced in the work of Rappaport, that "Both sides had grievances, both had cause for complaint ... It was ... difficult to determine the true aggressor".[117] Stimson himself reaffirmed his official attitude during late September and early October, 1931, that "We have not attempted to go into the question of right or wrong ... we are not taking sides ... we are 'playing no favorites' ..."[118] This was partly because, as noted by Justus Doenecke, "He was confident that Japan's civilian ministry would stop army operations".[119] Stimson's attitudes, like those of Grew, made a sharp contrast with those of Hornbeck, who had already noted "the threat of Japanese imperialism"[120] fifteen years before the beginning of the crisis.

As observed by Richard Current, however, "Stimson's thinking and American policy reached the first turning point. The change was precipitated by news that Japanese planes were bombing the city of Chinchou, in southern Manchuria, far from the railroad zone" on October 8th, 1931.[121] Ben-Zvi observes that Stimson "was becoming increasingly frustrated with the apparent failure of his initially accommodative strategy ... he further consolidated his revised image of Japan, which was now juxtaposed with his romantic image of China". As a result, he radically changed his attitudes towards Japan during the crisis. "Thus, incensed by the Japanese attack on Tsitsihor and the renewed onslaught on

Chinchou ... Stimson now expressed a growing willingness to completely abandon his original vision of Japanese modus operandi and to pursue instead a posture which was predicated upon an indiscriminate perception of Japan as an inherently aggressive entity".[122] After the event, as Robert Osgood notes, "Stimson's convictions about the immorality of Japan's actions gained poignancy by virtue of his strong sympathy for the Chinese people and China's ancient culture, which he regarded as the only firm basis in the Orient for the development of the ideals of Christian civilization".[123] Thus, within a few years, he had reached a negative image of Japan which was quite different from his previous views.

More importantly, as Ben-Zvi points out, "One can note a basic similarity, if not a total congruency, between Stimson of 1931 and 1932, and Stimson of a decade later".[124] Stimson's negative images of Japan, together with his belief that Japan had yielded to a firm policy of the United States, consequently formed his attitudes in favour of deterrent policy. As early as November 27th, 1931, for example, Stimson pointed out in a conversation with President Hoover that "an embargo, if joined in by all the world against Japan" meant "She would have to surrender very quickly".[125]

Furthermore, although Ben-Zvi states that "Eight years later, this belief ... remained unchanged",[126] in reality his revised image and his belief in the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy towards Japan were not simply unchanged, but were even strengthened afterwards. As observed by Elting Morison, his belief in the later years was based on the outcome of American firm diplomacies carried out in the past, including the ones "at Shantung in 1919, at the Washington Conference in 1922 and at London in 1930".[127] In his letter published in the New York Times on January 11th, 1940, he chose an example to explain his view by tracing back to the period before the First World War, "the Japanese-American commercial treaty of 1911", as "the clearest demonstration [of Japan's restraint in the light of American firmness]".[128] In this manner, when Stimson interpreted

several episodes in American diplomacy as the "evidence" to justify his revised perspectives, he found ones experienced by the American authorities during the period even before he abandoned the initial accommodative strategy.

Thus, while Stimson in 1932 attempted "to invoke moral sanctions upon aggressors [the Japanese in Manchuria]"[129] in his open letter of February 22nd to Senator William Borah of Idaho, Stimson in 1940 desired more coercive policy beyond "moral sanctions" by stating at the British Embassy on July 19th that "the only way to treat Japan is not to give in to her on anything", which made British Ambassador Lord Lothian "quite upset, because Cordell Hull and the State Department were not taking that line at all".[130]

Stimson's increasingly stiff posture towards Japan was, of course, not merely a private inclination based on his personal experiences. Rather it was deeply linked with the international conditions and the domestic mood in the United States. As noted by Osgood, "almost from the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis there were always a few small but vocal groups calling for sanctions and embargoes".[131] Under the circumstances, there was a specific reason why he brought up the commercial treaty of 1911. As pointed out by William Neumann, "The expiration in January of the 1911 Commercial Treaty also made it possible to take further punitive economic action. In December of 1939 the State Department had asked American businesses to stop all deliveries on planes, manufacturing rights ... to 'certain countries' bombing civilian populations. By this date the 'moral embargo' had already stopped the sale of planes and aviation equipment to Japan".[132]

In 1940 and 1941, however, both the domestic and international circumstances surrounding Japan were quite different from those of the early 1930s. Heinrichs, for instance, observes that "A decade earlier, during the Manchurian crisis, the Japanese could not have imagined their foreign minister settling accounts in Moscow, or seeking Berlin's help in the matter".[133] At the same time, whether or not the true intentions recognised by the Americans

themselves were defensive, the threat posed by the Americans had, at least to the Japanese eyes, potentially increased since "Toward Japan the United States showed ever increasing firmness" and "Throughout the thirties Roosevelt built up the United States Navy, first to treaty strength and afterwards well beyond it".[134] This meant that Japan's next actions in the early forties under the quite different circumstances could be very different from those, for example, of 1911 and of the early thirties. Nonetheless, Stimson often expressed his revised views of Japan in his statements by opening "Japan has historically shown that ..."

As pointed out by Robert Jervis, "This means that images become overgeneralized as expectations established from behavior in one set of circumstances are carried out into quite different situations".[135] Jervis argues that "As a result of this kind of overgeneralized learning" such as the initial success or in reaction to the policies which have failed in the past, "the style might be maintained even after the variables that were the immediate cause of its being chosen ceased to operate".[136] In fact, while deeply frustrated with the apparent failure of his own initially accommodative strategy during the Manchurian crisis, "Secretary of State Stimson believed he was largely responsible for preventing a Russo-Japanese war over Manchuria in 1929, and in 1931 he attributed Japanese concessions to 'the stiff tone which I [Stimson] have taken'".[137] Consequently, as has widely been recognised by historians, Stimson became a hard-liner together with Morgenthau and Hornbeck within the U.S. authorities, while even in 1940 and 1941 there were a number of groups which maintained more cautious attitudes. In this sense, the Manchurian crisis has been seen as the "trigger event" in Stimson's formation of the later posture in foreign affairs.[138]

Morgenthau was also an influential decision maker who persistently urged effective embargoes on Japan. His sense of crisis towards Far Eastern affairs mainly derived, again, from the Manchurian Incident of 1931. He naturally perceived that the Japanese expansion in Manchuria might "threaten the peace

of the Orient and of the world". As early as 1934, he observed that "the United States would lose all influence in the Orient, leaving the area entirely to Japan and Great Britain".[139] Thus, he advocated a policy of American monetary aid to China in order "to cultivate the Chinese will to resist Japan".[140] Here, one can find some similarities between the views of Morgenthau and those of Hornbeck. On the one hand, both of them emphasised the American selfless role or moral obligation to save the universal interests under "the worldwide threat to liberal democracy", on the other hand, both of them were aware of American national interests in rivalry not only against Japan but also against Great Britain or the Europeans in the Far East. At the same time, both of them perceived that "Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan consisted an inseparable unit". Therefore, Hornbeck clearly stated that "there is at present going on in the world one war, in two theaters"[141] in his thesis of June 1940, nearly a year and a half before the outbreak of the Pacific War.

As a consequence, they were aware of, in Schroeder's words, "an often-expressed fear of a Far Eastern Munich".[142] Shortly after the conclusion of the Munich Conference of September 1938, Morgenthau stated in a memorandum of October 17th to the President that "Japan at first wanted only Manchuria, then North China; now she will not be content with less than the whole of China".[143] Over a year later, Hornbeck recommended in his memorandum of February 24th, 1940, that "the U.S. in no way bend itself to processes of compromise (any "Munich agreement") in or with regard to the Far East".[144] In the case of Morgenthau, he had already emphasised such a view more strongly on an earlier occasion, at his staff meeting of December 17th, 1937, that unless the United States took vigorous and determined action it would have to confront the Japanese challenge "in the Philippines, then Hawaii, and then Panama".[145] Thus, while Stimson, Morgenthau and Hornbeck formed the hard-line posture towards Japan, Ickes was categorised as the "ultra-hard-liner" by Ben-Zvi.[146]

On the other hand, the high-ranking military leaders maintained a cautious posture in foreign policy towards the Pacific. It does not necessarily mean, of course, that most of them were pacifists or "correspondingly sympathetic" towards Japan. However, their posture was strategically Europe-first, and defensive in the Pacific. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, for instance, was convinced that "every effort must be made to avoid [a Pacific] war". The strategic plan, Rainbow Four, which called for "a purely defensive position in the Pacific", was drafted by the War Plans Division and approved by General Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark in June 1940.[147] One year later, Director of the War Plans Division of the Navy Department, Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, stated in his memorandum of July 21st, 1941, that "speaking from the standpoint of self defense, the greatest danger to the United States in the future lies in the continued military success of Germany".[148] Even as late as November 1941, as noted by Russell Weigley, the Chief of the War Plans Division reasserted on the 3rd that "the principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war". On the 5th, General Marshall and Admiral Stark "restated to the President that Germany was more dangerous than Japan and must be defeated first, that the United States should avoid war with Japan if possible".[149]

Roosevelt "had maintained a stereotyped vision of Japan" that the Japanese were the "Prussians of the East, and just as drunk with their dreams of domination". He maintained such a stereotyped vision partly because he in general did not have enough knowledge about Japan. At the same time, his "initial image of Japan was formed as an antithesis of his romantic and idealistic image of China". As pointed out by his observers including Sumner Welles, his "deep-rooted sympathy toward China" came from, again, his personal and family connections with the Chinese people and their culture since his childhood. As Ben-Zvi notes, Roosevelt himself "later readily recognised [it] ... on various occasions". For example, he stated in his letter of December 16th, 1937, to Rhoda Hinkley, an

acquaintance from Dutchess County that "I happened to know a very nice Chinese family ... For years they have said that China wanted peace at any price ... The other day most of the family was wiped out by some Japanese bombing planes which wrecked their community and killed one thousand people. I got a message from one of the survivors which read: 'We are no longer for peace at any price'". In addition, his grandfather, Warren Delano, had served in China, and Roosevelt inherited from his mother's side of the family a "deep feeling of friendship for China".[150]

In contrast, his background image of Japan was, as observed by Willard Range, "evils ... deeply rooted in both Germany and Japan, if not Italy".[151] His conversation on a "one-hundred-year Japanese plan" to conquer Asia and the Pacific, for example, has often been quoted by historians as an episode which formed his initial images of Japan. This was, in the words of Stimson, "an extraordinary but impressive tale of the long-term ambitions of the Japanese as they had been explained to young Franklin Roosevelt by a Japanese friend at Harvard in 1902".[152] After the meeting with President Roosevelt on May 17th, 1934, thirty-two years after the conversation had been held at Harvard, Stimson described in his diary that the President recalled the details of the conversation about the "plan" which "involved the following steps in the following order". The "plan" for the establishment of a "Japanese dynasty" consisted of ten consecutive steps, including Step One: "An official war with China ..." and Step Nine: "Eventually the acquisition of Australia and New Zealand" to "have a definite point of threat against Europe".[153]

Roosevelt at that time "commented in how many particulars this plan revealed to him by the young Jap, who was a high-class member of the Samurai caste in Japan, had been confirmed by subsequent events".[154] Later, Stimson wrote that "at this meeting ... [Stimson] discovered how closely Mr. Roosevelt's view of Japan coincided" with his own,[155] and he felt that "This talk with Mr. Roosevelt covered many phases of American policy, foreign and domestic".[156]

This image, in some sense, resembled the concepts of two books which appeared after the year 1902, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, published between 1903 and 1905, and the "Tanaka Memorial" of 1927.

As Ben-Ami Shillony observes, "The suspicion with which large segments of Western society viewed Jews and Japanese after World War I was reinforced by the appearance of two forged documents that gained wide credence and popularity at that time". While the Protocols indicates that the "Jewish leaders from various countries worked out a secret plot to control the world", it is stated in the Tanaka Memorial of 1927, which was "first published in China in 1929", that "we [Japanese] must conquer China" in order "to conquer the world" and then "Having China's entire resources at our disposal, we shall proceed to conquer India ... and even Europe". While the former was used by the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s in their anti-Semitic propaganda and "despite the repeated proof of its forgery, [it] attests to the willingness of many people to believe in the existence of a universal Jewish conspiracy", the Tanaka Memorial "received wide publicity and was often quoted to prove Japan's sinister motives ... although such a grand design had never existed".[157] Nonetheless, to Roosevelt it was a relatively serious episode as often noted by historians. Ben-Zvi states, for instance, that "Even more striking is the fact that in 1934 he apparently re-examined the scheme in all seriousness" and concluded that "there might be some grain of truth in it" in light of "such developments as Japan's expansion to Manchuria".[158] At a later stage, as pointed out by Range, "This plan of conquest was revealed to the whole world" when Roosevelt "told Congress shortly after Pearl Harbor" about it by tracing the historical events back to the year as early as "Japan's 1894 attack on China".[159]

Another such private experience of Roosevelt's which formed his background image was his connection with the Navy, which "depicted Japan as a highly dangerous adversary". Sumner Welles observed that Roosevelt "had then become imbued with the Navy's conviction that Japan was America's number-one antagonist".[160] In fact, as early as 1913, Roosevelt "reflected the teachings of

Mahan and the attitude of the Navy by taking a bellicose stand, insisting that Japan was the most powerful potential enemy of the United States and the Navy should be kept prepared for trouble with her".[161] Thus, he had similar images of Japan to those of Stimson and Hornbeck, and his images were maintained for as long as those of Hornbeck were.

However, the important difference between the attitudes of Roosevelt and those of the hard-liners was that "Roosevelt did not allow his preliminary visions of Japan to automatically dictate his actual behavior during the period preceding the Pearl Harbor attack". Rather, by maintaining a pragmatic attitude Roosevelt kept a certain distance from those hard-liners. "Fearing, like Grew, that the uncompromising posture vehemently recommended by the hard-liners might provoke Japan rather than deter her, the president ... was willing to set aside ideological considerations". According to Ben-Zvi, his posture was labelled by Herbert Feis as a "happy-go-lucky opportunism" when Feis was an official in the Treasury Department in 1937.[162]

In July 1940, for example, Morgenthau's proposal was turned down by Roosevelt when Morgenthau proposed "a total embargo on all American oil exports [to Japan]" and predicted that "this thing might give us peace in three to six months". This was because, as noted by Dallek, Roosevelt considered that "A conflict with Japan would not only reduce Anglo-American power to defeat Berlin, it would also jeopardize the President's political future".[163] Similarly, in October 1940 Roosevelt objected to Morgenthau's pleas for a strong policy against Japan, reminding him that the president and the secretary of state alone were "handling foreign affairs".[164] In June 1941 Roosevelt opposed Secretary Ickes's attempt to impose "a de facto embargo on oil shipments to Japan" by explaining that "it is terribly important for the control of the Atlantic for us to help keep peace in the Pacific".[165]

Cordell Hull was, as observed by Thomson, "A Southern Democrat and Wilsonian, [who] revered high principles in personal and international

conduct".[166] Ben-Zvi perceives that "Hull's basic images of Japan were closely patterned on his legal-idealistic vision of the international system".[167] In the same context, Dallek sees him as "a Wilsonian internationalist".[168] Hull himself later stated in his memoirs that: "I never lost an opportunity, in fact, to state and restate these principles in public speeches, statements, diplomatic notes, and conversations with foreign diplomats and visiting statesmen ... To me these doctrines were as vital in international relations as the Ten Commandments in personal relations ... day after day millions of ministers of God throughout the world are preaching these formulae, and I believe there is untold value in this preaching".[169]

As Thomson states, "The crux of the problem was, of course, the appropriateness or efficacy of preachments by the American secretary of state ... as frustrating to foreign diplomats as to some of Hull's cabinet colleagues". In fact, Morgenthau was, for example, frustrated and said to Roosevelt in September 1938 that "Mr. Hull, as represented to the public, is about 100 percent different from the real Mr. Hull" and Roosevelt agreed with the view of Morgenthau.[170]

Hull's attitude towards Japan was, as stated by James Burns, "ambivalence" since "He had both a devil theory of Japanese politics and an aversion to a showdown".[171] In fact, the negative images of Japan were, as analysed in this thesis, repeatedly expressed by Hull himself. Nonetheless, as Ben-Zvi notes, "Hull's sharply delineated, pre-existing vision of Japan and of the international system did not always impel him into a coercive posture in the Pacific".[172] As early as 1937 "The dangers inherent in a policy of harsh economic sanctions against Japan were recognized by Hull".[173] Three years later, Hull clearly told the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on December 2nd, 1940, that "The question of whether or not to impose a total embargo on exports to Japan was a very delicate matter, and we had been maneuvering as carefully as possible without getting directly into trouble".[174] Hull's persistent objections to supporting drastic economic sanctions were repeatedly criticised by Stimson.

Secretary of State Hull maintained this position although the more coercive posture towards Japan was urged by several State Department officials, such as Herbert Feis, chief of the Economic Affairs Division, Joseph Green, chief of the Division of Controls and his assistant chief, Charles Yost. Utley notes that "Hull was not opposed to denying Japan huge stockpiles of critical materials. But there was a vast difference between the way Hull approached that desired goal and the way Yost, Hornbeck, Feis and other hawks did".[175] In the spring of 1941, during the months of the early stage of the U.S.-Japan talks, Hull "had no intention of imposing economic sanctions against Japan" although "those in the State Department ... had been urging economic action against Japan (Green, Yost, and Feis in particular)".[176] Thus, Secretary Hull originally maintained, like President Roosevelt, a cautious posture towards Japan.

In conclusion, during the early 1940s up to the Pearl Harbor attack, while the hard-liners such as the Secretaries Stimson and Morgenthau and advisor Hornbeck persistently urged the necessity of a U.S. coercive posture towards Japan believing that only American resoluteness could guarantee the preservation of peace, President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Grew initially maintained a more cautious posture by warning of the danger of provoking Japan. With the exception of very few members of the Administration such as the ultra-hard-liner Secretary Ickes, however, it is clear that both the hard-liners and their opponents, civilian and military leaders alike, equally desired to avoid a war against Japan until the very eve of the outbreak of the Pacific War. The only difference between them could be found in the ways they chose to approach this goal. In this sense, Utley observes that "No one during the fall of 1941 wanted war with Japan. Navy preferred to concentrate on the Atlantic. Army said it needed a few more months before it would be ready in the Philippines. Hull had made the search for peace his primary concern for months. Roosevelt could see nothing to be gained by a war with Japan. Hawks ... argued that their strong policies would avoid war, not provoke one".[177]

On the other hand, the influence of a certain image of Japan which the decision makers had was another important factor in the formation of U.S. policy towards Japan. With the exception of a small number of members such as Grew and Welles, even those members who maintained a cautious posture, such as Roosevelt and Hull, shared a kind of "devil theory" with the hard-liners. Thus, while, as observed by Utley, "He [Hull] held to his policy of not confronting Japan and Roosevelt backed him up"[178] despite the existence of the hawks such as Hornbeck, Feis, Green and Yost within the State Department, American policy towards Japan was, as observed by Ben-Zvi, "As indicated ... rooted in and motivated by a deep feeling of suspicion toward that nation [Japan]".[179] Particularly from the summer of 1941 onwards, such negative background images of Japan shared by the majority of decision makers played an increasingly significant role. This is one of the reasons why American images towards Japan have come to be considered an important theme by scholars. It is worth studying how accurate in reality those images were.

First, as stated by Ben-Zvi, "The typical hard-liner views the opponent [Japan] as 'systematically expansionist, with unlimited aims', and tends to advocate 'firm deterrence [as] the only appropriate strategy'. It was precisely this intransigent policy which was implemented by the United States on the eve of Pearl Harbor".[180] Second, they saw, as already introduced by the words of Hornbeck, that there was "going on in the world one war, in two theaters". Such a view that "the East Asian situation was not an isolated phenomenon but part of a menacing world crisis" became "more pronounced following the conclusion ... of the Tripartite Pact".[181]

The image of the Japanese as "systematically expansionist, with unlimited aims" was enhanced by the interpretation of Japanese policy from the late 1930s onwards. Heinrichs, for instance, observes that "In November 1938, Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro of Japan, encouraged by Hitler's challenge to the status quo, issued a statement proclaiming a 'New Order in East Asia' under Japan's

leadership, directly contradicting America's traditional Open Door policy for China and dismissing the Washington treaty system".[182] The announcement of "the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" was also interpreted by them as the Japanese nationalists' ideological base for establishing an expansionist empire with unlimited aims. Even after the end of the Pacific War, this image has been preserved by some historians, including Wohlstetter, as analysed in this thesis.

This interpretation contrasts sharply with the view of contemporary Japanese. Akira Irie, for example, describes the Japanese view in a domestic context: "There was something appealing in the idea of a new Asian order ... Such an image of Japan's mission was shared by a whole range of Japanese writers, from traditional ultra-nationalists to Marxist intellectuals". In fact, as Irie notes, even an avowed Marxist such as Hotsumi Ozaki 尾崎秀実 "was justifying Japanese policy while advocating internal reform" by insisting that "There must be genuine co-operation among the member states, although it would be justifiable for Japan to assert its special status within the combination" and "The new order seemed economically inevitable" in his publication of 1939 entitled "The Idea of the 'East Asian Co-operative System' and the Objective Basis of its Formation". On the other hand, Japanese writers, from ultra-nationalists to Marxist intellectuals, also "had come to interpret the history of modern Asia as a story of Western capitalist exploitation", and so they noted, as Ozaki did, that "Their liberation and welfare would be promoted by economic co-operation within the East Asian bloc". Of course, the problem which arose from the idea that "Japan was leading a crusade to free Asia" was that "the establishment of a new order necessarily meant rejection of America's role in Asia".[183] Thus, the contemporary Japanese view of a "New Order in East Asia" and "the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" was quite different from the American hard-liners' interpretation of it (See Chapter 7), while the Japanese on their part interpreted Western intentions towards East Asia as more negative than they actually were.

As far as the long-term origins are concerned, the hard-liners shared a negative image of Japan going back several decades. They were also, as pointed out by Ben-Zvi, "doctrinaire in their conviction, and were unwilling to consider new evidence or any view that differed from their own".[184] Hornbeck's image of Japan was, for instance, described in his letter of February 26th, 1934, to Cordell Hull: "As a matter of fact neither China nor Japan behave at all well in international relations. Both cause other countries a great deal of unusual and unpleasant bother. But the Chinese delinquencies are comparatively petty and are for the most part those of inefficiency and ineptitude, whereas the Japanese delinquencies are on a large scale and involve important consequences and are deliberately planned and efficiently carried out".[185] As for Stimson, he "further enlarged upon this historical perspective" by stating in April 1940 that "I do not think Russia is potentially such a dangerous neighbor to us as Japan. While Japan has for five or six centuries been a thoroughly militarized nation with ideals just opposite of ours, with long-standing plans of aggression against the whole of the Pacific area, the Russian people themselves ... have been essentially a rather ... peaceful people".[186] As already analysed, not only the hard-liners but also Roosevelt, for instance, had shared the negative image of Japan, the "devil theory", from decades before the beginning of the U.S.-Japan crisis.

In retrospect, the American hard-liners' idea of a "firm deterrence [as] the only appropriate strategy" was also rather provocative. On October 2nd, 1940, for example, Stimson insisted that "Japan has historically shown that she can misinterpret a pacifistic policy of the United States for weakness. She has also historically shown that when the United States indicates by clear language and bold actions that she intends to carry out a clear and affirmative policy in the Far East, Japan will yield to that [American] policy even though it conflicts with her own Asiatic policy and conceived interests".[187] This was in the context that Stimson "was buoyed by an article in the August issue of Amerasia Magazine that examined the time in 1918 when Japan moved seventy-two thousand troops into

Siberia and did not back down until the United States threatened to stop silk imports from and cotton exports to Japan".[188] However, contemporary Japanese intentions in the Siberian Expedition were, in the domestic context, quite different from what was interpreted by the Americans.

Whatever the accuracy of Stimson's assumption that there were examples which had "historically shown" a certain pattern of Japanese diplomacy in the past, a "firm deterrence" policy by the U.S. was not actually effective during the early 1940s, when Japan supported the same concept of "firm deterrence" towards its adversary. For example, Matsuoka, who served as Foreign Minister in 1940 and 1941, repeatedly urged the necessity of Japan's deterrence policy, which was interestingly similar to that of Stimson. On September 19th, 1940, for instance, Matsuoka stated that "I rather fear such a weak attitude on Japan's part may only aggravate things ... Only a firm attitude on our part can prevent war with the United States".[189] In this context, Chihiro Hosoya notes that "There is no doubt that both Matsuoka and Konoe desired strongly to avoid an armed clash with the United States. At the same time, it was their common conviction that only by strengthening Japan's international power position [through an alliance with Germany and Italy] would it be possible to mitigate the United States' strong attitude toward Japan and avoid the prospect of war with that country".[190] Hosoya also regards that "from the beginning there were serious differences in the intent of the two governments [of Japan and of Germany] concerning the tripartite pact".[191] Similarly, Irie observes that "Matsuoka seems to have been completely sincere in stating again and again that the Axis alliance ... [was] designed to prevent war between Japan and the United States" because "only by presenting a determined stand would America be deterred from entering the war against Japan".[192]

As Schroeder states, however, "An alliance with Hitler was simply an international crime which the United States could not condone"[193] and "The doctrine of close Axis cooperation, the picture of Hitler and Tojo jointly planning

to attack the United States, was what people believed at the time".[194] Even after the end of the Pacific War, the indictment of the Tokyo Trial charged that "the Tripartite Pact was concluded as an important step in the Japanese preparation for its military advancement ... This fact implied that Japan had the intention of opening war against the United States".[195]

In conclusion, just as the Americans interpreted Japanese membership of the Tripartite Pact as evidence of her intention to make war on the Americans, although the real intention was "firm deterrence", the Japanese interpreted the American oil embargo in August 1941 and the Hull Note of November 1941 in particular as evidence of aggressive intentions towards Japan, although the American hard-liners' real intention in those policies was also "firm deterrence". As Hosoya emphasises, "The outbreak of the Pacific War proved that his [Matsuoka's] view had been wrong" and therefore Matsuoka himself said that "The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact was the greatest mistake of my life".[196] So in the same way, as noted by Ben-Zvi, "they [the American hard-liners] were motivated by a sincere desire to avoid war in the Pacific. Unfortunately, they were to witness the futility of their policies; and ironically ... the means they had chosen to achieve their objective of maintaining the peace contributed to the outbreak of hostilities".[197]

In this sense, it is interesting to remember that while Ickes, as already mentioned, recognised himself as a "pacifist" on the same day that he wrote in his diary "If we should attack [Japan] now ..." as early as 1937, Matsuoka, who urged the establishment of the Tripartite Pact, was defended in a post-war publication as a "peace-lover" by Yoshie Saito 斉藤良衛, a Foreign Ministry advisor who participated in the alliance negotiations.[198] These episodes indicate how the image of one's own policy can be understood quite differently by one's opponents.

The hard-liners' attitude of ignoring any important difference between Japan and Germany was also shared by Roosevelt and Hull. Roosevelt, for instance, stated in a letter to Ambassador Grew in January 1941 that "The hostilities in

Europe, in Africa and in Asia, are all parts of a single world conflict".[199] This despite the fact, as noted by Johanna Meskill, that "The conclusion of the Tripartite Pact itself and the first fifteen months of the pact (September 1940 to December 1941) proved that in the crucial areas of political and military coordination the alliance was ineffective from the start".[200] Hull later emphasised before the Pearl Harbor Congressional Investigation Committee that "Germany and Japan were linked together, operating together as any two highwaymen operate and as closely as any two could operate"[201], although, in the words of William Neumann, "Postwar examination of German and Japanese records reveals that the political and ideological ties of the two regimes were far weaker than assumed in Washington".[202] On the popular level, Irie points out that "It goes without saying that much ink was spent rationalizing the alliance with Germany and Italy while theoretically rejecting the West".[203] Here one can recognise that the contemporary Japanese were aware of the question of whether Japan could justify its alliance with Germany and Italy, despite the assumption made by Hull that Japan maintained her "military partnership with Hitler for conquest".[204]

Schroeder goes further by stating that "The problem [immediately before Pearl Harbor] was one of selling a war which the administration sincerely believed to be inevitable and necessary to a public which might find it hard to understand and accept. To this end, the Tripartite Pact was an almost perfect means" and "Even after the war was over, the Tripartite Pact still proved useful as a selling point for American policy". However, "This is not to say that American leaders, particularly Hull, meant to deceive the American people. One may support [the view] that Hull really believed that the Pact was all that he said it was. It is very easy to believe the worst of one's enemies, particularly when a conflict seems inevitable or is already under way".[205]

In retrospect, the reality was, as noted by Meskill, that "The outbreak of the Second World War found Japan parading a neutrality distinctly unfriendly to

Germany – or so the Germans thought ... To some German diplomats it even appeared that Japan might ultimately join the Western camp".[206] For example, in 1939 when the Chinese government approached Berlin with a request for mediation in the China Incident, the German Foreign Ministry considered that "The preliminary question is whether ... it is in the interest of Germany to bring about peace between China and Japan" and declined. According to the memorandum of October 8th by Unterstaatssekretar Ernst Woermann, "The present attitude of Japan does not indicate that this [German] objective will be attained in the near future" and "there is a possibility that in the course of a long German-British-French war Japan might also line up on the other side. From this viewpoint, it would be to our interest for Japan to continue to tie up her forces in China".[207] This idea resembled ironically the idea of Hornbeck who, later in September 1941, argued that Japan, which was then a member of the Tripartite Pact, "should be bogged down in a war in China" as analysed in Chapter 7.

Concerning the signing of the Tripartite Pact on September 27th, 1940, not only the member states of the Western camp, but also Germany, were, as studied in detail by Hosoya, deeply confused by Matsuoka's attitude, which maintained incompatible conditions in the style of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun. According to the telegram of September 19th, 1940, sent by the German representatives in Tokyo, Heinrich Stahmer and Eugen Ott, to Ribbentrop, Matsuoka indicated that his draft pact was partly a Sakubun: "Protocol ... should not contain any sort of limitations of the obligation of assistance laid down in the pact, but in the interests of quick handling by the Privy Council it should indicate as clearly as possible the advantages for Japan resulting from the pact". On the same day, the 19th, he maintained the same attitude at the Conference in the presence of the Emperor (Gozen Kaigi), as emphasised by Hosoya; "Matsuoka explained, while on the one hand Japan was formally accepting the obligation 'automatically to enter the war', on the other hand it would be able to choose independently the time and method of fulfilling this obligation". The result was: "At the end of the conference

the two chiefs of staff and Privy Council President Hara gave their consent to the draft pact". Hara, who warned at the conference that "America is a proud nation ... a firm attitude on our part [a deterrence policy of Japan towards the United States through a pact with Germany] may produce an adverse result", finally accepted the draft pact since Matsuoka's latter phrase eroded the former one as a Sakubun, and Hara understood that Japan would be in reality free from the obligation of the pact. Thus, "With the affixing of signatures and the granting of imperial approval, the internal process for deciding on the substance of the pact to be sought was concluded".[208]

Although Matsuoka did not use the term "Sakubun" explicitly, the fact that he called Ott on that day and explained to him the nature of Sakubun contained in his draft pact indicates that he naturally believed that Sakubun was a universal procedure in decision making. He therefore automatically assumed that the Germans would understand it. However, it is obvious that such a Sakubun can hardly be understood by the Germans or by the Americans. Thus, as noted by Hosoya: "Consequently, from the very beginning there was a grave divergence in understanding between the two countries concentrating the basic issue of the pact. The Japanese government thought Germany had acceded fully to Japan's right to decide independently whether or not it would go to war, while the German government assumed that Japan was committed automatically to fight if Germany were attacked".[209] In fact, Ribbentrop himself admitted in his memoirs in 1946 that "Cooperation with Japan was very difficult. There was no close strategic cooperation or planning of any kind [between Germany and Japan]", and he concluded that "Japan was in no way a safe ally".[210] Similarly, on the American side, as noted by Schroeder, "From the signing of the Tripartite Pact dates a marked hardening of American requirements for peace".[211] Thus, Hara's prediction of September proved correct.

Even after the end of the Pacific War, a number of English works have been published which fail to understand the events by not recognising the

importance of the Sakubun procedure in the process of Japan's decision making. While some might pick up only the statement by Matsuoka at the Gozen Kaigi of September 1940: "It is clear that Japan is obligated automatically to enter the war"[212] and conclude, as the judgement of the Tokyo Trial does, that the Tripartite Pact implied "Japan's willingness to wage war against the United States"[213], others might take seriously another statement made by Matsuoka at the same conference: "However ... the final decision will be made ... independently"[214] and conclude, as Schroeder does, "None of those ... who took in the conference on the Pact ever recognised or believed that the Pact would commit Japan to waging war against anyone".[215] The latter does not take into account seriously enough another factor, which has been observed by Hosoya, that "The record of the Japanese government's deliberations upon the question of the pact ... shows ... [that] as the American attitude toward Japan hardened, Japanese government leaders decided to conclude the pact to block American intervention in Japan's southward move".[216] In a practical sense, Japan did not conclusively decide whether or not to go to war even after the establishment of the Tripartite Pact until the very eve of Pearl Harbor. This was a natural result of the Sakubun procedure which was originally developed for the very purpose of avoiding any practical decision. Thus, the final decision of Japan was, as on most occasions, "depending on the changes of the circumstances". While Matsuoka and his supporters failed to understand that Western people could hardly recognise the idea of Sakubun, the American leaders failed to understand the Japanese attitude in Sakubun and to take the opportunity to use positively the split between Japan and Germany by redirecting American diplomacy based on suspicion.

Under the circumstances, on July 10th, 1941, the German Ambassador to Japan, Eugen Ott, observed that the German national interest could be served by the suspicious American posture towards Japan in the U.S.-Japan peace talks, stating that "The attempts of the Anglophiles [in Tokyo] to find a compromise are, I think, doomed to failure in view of the American attitude". On August 22nd Ott

reported again that "In view of America's unwillingness to compromise ... which has always prevented an understanding heretofore ... such attempts [of the Japanese friends of America and Anglophile circles] cannot succeed".[217] Thus, it is to witnesses ironic that Hull, as well as the American hard-liners, who intended to resist the Germans and maintained a suspicious posture towards the Japanese as the "allies of Hitler",[218] consequently contributed in a certain sense to the national interests recognised by the Germans.

Thus, a coercive posture towards Japan persistently urged by the hard-liners was, just as was the one maintained by some Japanese leaders including Matsuoka, based on mutual inaccurate images, and therefore it was in retrospect inadequate and always potentially dangerous. In contrast, the cautious posture towards the Pacific initially held by Roosevelt and Hull, fearing the possibility that such a coercive posture could provoke Japan rather than deter her from entering a war against the United States, was more realistic.

This had already been proved a few times in the past. In the summer of 1940, for example, Norman Graebner observes that: "under increased insistence from Stimson, Knox and Morgenthau, Roosevelt ignored Sumner Welles' warning that further pressure would provoke a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia and on July 25, 1940 signed an order to include oil and scrap iron in the export license system ... but it seemed clear that further economic pressure on Japan would encourage not submission but a more rapid advance to the South and possibly war with the United States. Grew's prediction of July proved correct".[219] Japan occupied northern French Indo-China in the autumn, and as Schroeder notes, "it was not due to German help, as many Americans supposed at the time".[220] Nonetheless, Morgenthau, for instance, did not realise it and interpreted the event as supporting his view by stating that "My own opinion is that the time to put pressure on Japan was before she went into Indo-China and not after and I think it's too late and I think the Japanese and the rest of the dictators are just going to laugh at us. The time to have done it was months ago". This view was later

criticised by Feis: "after study of the Japanese records ... My own best surmise is that stronger and earlier action would not have caused Japan to slow up ... More probably ... it would have caused it to move farther and faster".[221] In this sense, Ben-Zvi states that "Committed to their fixed world views, the hard-liners tended to interpret developments involving Japan in a manner reinforcing their belief system and convictions".[222]

In addition, there were some difficulties in controlling national policy owing to the inner discords in the United States, although the degree of seriousness was of course different from those of Japan. As noted by Utley, "In the War Department, Secretary Stimson urged a hardline against Japan, while the General Staff favored withdrawal from the Philippines ... The conflict between the ends of national policy and the means of military strategy was even more pronounced within the Navy Department".[223] Furthermore, on some occasions: "Though official policy said there would be no confrontation with Japan, the army of administrators charged with overseeing the defense preparedness program was eager to impose the type of economic sanctions against Japan that would lead to war".[224] In the words of Utley:

> The problem was jurisdictional. Roosevelt and Hull were in charge of the foreign policy of the United States ... But when they moved from the diplomatic arena of grand strategy into the arena of naval strategy and even tactics they ventured on a domain naval officers jealously guarded ... Roosevelt was at his worst when he had to coordinate conflicting views of foreign policy. That was apparent as early as 1937, when he gave his Quarantine Speech ... Since then, the conflicts had only increased ... he [Roosevelt] did nothing to bring the two into balance. Issuing conflicting orders, telling different people different things, Roosevelt permitted the nation to move along in two mutually exclusive directions.[225]

In fact, for instance, Roosevelt approved the Plan Dog strategy of January 16th, 1941, which assured Stark that the Navy would stand on the defensive in the Pacific, and at the same time, the President authorised the commander of the Asiatic Fleet to withdraw from the Philippines at his discretion and move either east towards the United States or west towards Singapore. As Utley notes, "Moving the Asiatic Fleet to Singapore was totally out of keeping with the Plan Dog".[226] Roosevelt's attitude is, however, not necessarily always criticised by historians.

Dallek, for instance, states that "Historians generally give Roosevelt high marks for his direction of wartime strategy".[227] As already mentioned, certain observers have noted this "Roosevelt technique", which was necessary under the difficult and complex circumstances. In this sense, it might be seen as the American version of "Ryoron-heiki" developed from the necessity of keeping inner stability in the United States. Of course, the great difference between the Japanese procedure and that of the United States was that, while in the case of Japan the term "Ryoron-heiki" and "Sakubun" have existed up to the present and the decision makers in general clearly recognised such a procedure as one of the major methods for keeping the inner balance of power stable, this was not the case in the United States but rather a technique used by Roosevelt personally. The similarity between them was, however, that this technique used for domestic reasons in Japan and in the U.S. often caused great confusion in the international theatre.

In addition, the social mood tended to be more hostile towards Japan. As noted by Schroeder, again, "The reason for this change was obviously the course of the war in Europe. When the European war began in September 1939, there were indeed many who believed that the Asiatic and European wars were really parts of one global conflict" although "It would have been difficult ... to demonstrate that this was true, except insofar as one saw an ideological link between the aggressors and an affinity in the methods they used".[228] Consequently, "As early as February 1941, according to a Gallup poll, a majority of the American people believed that the United States was endangered by the Japanese advance southward ... In August ... a solid majority of those interviewed in a similar poll favored 'additional steps to keep Japan from becoming more powerful', even if it entailed the risk of war".[229]

This situation created a significant issue, as stated by Dallek: "The struggle against fascism in American minds was indelibly linked with China's fight against Japan ... to gain a national consensus for fighting fascism overseas,

Roosevelt could not discriminate between Germany and Japan; both had to be opposed at the same time".[230] Thus, as noted by Graebner, "No more than Japan did the United States want war. But Roosevelt and his advisors preferred war to recognition of any successful assault on the treaty structure of the Far East. They would fight, not for China, but for the principle of peaceful change and ultimately for the East Asian balance of power".[231] Although Roosevelt felt a deep sympathy for the Chinese people, he did not see the Far Eastern issue as worth a war as the European issue was and he did not intend to fight sacrificing American lives for China, but he could lead the Americans involved in the war in the Pacific as far as he saw an existence of a strong link between Japan and Germany. After all, American policy towards Japan during the peace talks was in general, as already mentioned, "rooted in and motivated by a deep feeling of suspicion" towards Japan despite the initially maintained cautious posture. Thus, there were many dangerous factors which could cause a U.S.-Japan crisis at any time.

Under the circumstances, as observed by Ben-Zvi, "an examination of his [Roosevelt's] actions up to the very eve of Pearl Harbor indicates clearly that he was primarily interested in Europe and was concerned with the Far East only insofar as it affected the European war. In general, because of his preoccupation with Europe, President Roosevelt did not play a leading role in formulating United States policy toward Japan".[232] In this sense, Utley notes that "As long as Hull remained vigilant and was able to outmaneuver the militants, the United States would not force Japan into a choice between surrender and war. But one slip, one oversight on Hull's part and a small group of eager administrators, ignorant of the consequences of their actions, might ram through an economic sanction that could push Japan into a decision for war".[233]

Ben-Zvi observes that "Toward the end of the period, however, Hull's idealism proved to be the decisive factor determining his actual behavior"[234] and "Finally, Hull let the American-Japanese conversations drag on, his inflexibility stifling the imagination and openmindedness necessary to break the deadlock

caused by hostility and misunderstanding",[235] and "Thus, Hull, as well as the president, ultimately decided to set aside his reservations and to give support to the maximalistic strategy of the globalist-realists [Secretaries Stimson and Morgenthau as well as advisor Hornbeck]".[236]

Although the warnings of the dangerous outcome which might come from a coercive posture were repeatedly expressed by the military side up to as late as November 1941, the influence of such warnings was eventually limited. In fact, on July 19th, 1941, Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark insisted, from a naval point of view, that "An embargo would probably result in a fairly early attack by Japan ... and possibly would involve the United States in early war in the Pacific",[237] but the "de facto oil embargo" started in August. As observed by Weigley, "From first to last, the leaders of the U.S. army hoped to avoid a Pacific war",[238] and as observed by Schroeder, "The military strategists continued to insist to the end that the primary objections of American policy should remain the defeat of Germany and the exclusion of Japan from the war".[239]

Nonetheless, as Weigley states, "Yet the war came. It came in part because the civil departments of the U.S. government formulated policy toward Japan with little regard for the military capacities and limitations of the United States in the western Pacific".[240] A symbolic episode is introduced by Morgan in a conversation of December 1st, 1941 when Hornbeck attempted to persuade Hull to use force to stop Japan: "Hull pointed out that the Army said it would not be ready for another three weeks and the Navy wanted another three months. Hornbeck said the Navy had asked for six months in February, which Hull had obtained through negotiations. Now they wanted three more".[241]

It is interesting to find that Hornbeck, who in the same conversation with Hull condemned Japan as the country "which had taken Formosa, taken Korea, taken Manchuria, taken Peking and Shanghai and Nanking and Hankow and Canton ...", could insist on a different occasion, as observed by Schroeder, that "The American acquisitions of Hawaii, Guam, and even the Philippines, Mr.

Hornbeck is careful to point out, are also in reality clear evidences of a peaceful, liberal attitude".[242] Just as the thinking of Matsuoka was hardly understood by the Americans and the Germans, so Hornbeck's thinking was difficult for the Japanese to understand or regard as reasonable at that time.

After rejecting the Japanese proposals of November 1941, the Hull Note, drawn up on the basis of Morgenthau's hard-line posture, was finally presented by the U.S. government to the Japanese ambassadors, and whatever the Americans' true intentions were with regard to deterrence, the Tokyo authorities regarded the Hull Note as an American ultimatum. This was a likely result at that time since Hull, as well as Roosevelt, shared with the hard-liners the image of "devil theory" regarding Japan's behaviour, and were therefore inclined to easily accept any negative images of their adversary's intentions, including those given by Magic.

In short, when one attempts to categorise the American decision makers by concentrating on the aspect of the kind of posture towards Japan they originally maintained, it has generally been accepted by historians that there were the eminent hard-liners such as Morgenthau, Stimson, Ickes and Hornbeck, and the more cautious members such as Roosevelt, Hull, Welles, Hamilton, Grew and many military leaders of both the Army and the Navy. The U.S. government as a whole had maintained its cautious posture towards Japan up to the time of one important turning point in the summer of 1941 because the cautious members, Roosevelt and Hull, were in charge of foreign policy, and they had persistently rejected a coercive posture repeatedly offered by the hard-liners.

On the other hand, when one attempts to categorise them from the point of view of the kind of images of Japan they had, it is clear, as analysed in this thesis, that even Roosevelt and Hull in addition to the hard-liners shared a quite negative image, and the members including Grew who had a correspondingly sympathetic views towards Japan were in the minority. Furthermore, the latter members and the military leaders who strongly urged the necessity of a cautious posture up to

the very eve of Pearl Harbor did not have enough influence in the formation of U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, the American people in general became increasingly hostile towards Japan. Thus, the majority of the American decision makers were ready to accept easily any information which drew negative images of Japan at that time.

Under the circumstances, Roosevelt's primary concern still remained the domestic issue; his foreign policy was Europe-first, and the Pacific issue was rather marginal. This meant that Hull's influence towards the Pacific increased, and his role in the U.S.-Japan peace talks became particularly important.

Meanwhile, Hull had obtained various information about Japanese movements, including the Magic intercepts at that time. As Hull himself emphasised, certain other members such as Morgenthau were in general less well-informed than Hull. It may be of some significance that while Hull and Roosevelt, who had access to intercepts, were in relative terms doves maintaining a cautious posture towards Japan, Morgenthau, Ickes, Hornbeck and other officials, who did not, were hawks persistently urging a coercive posture. Thus, doubt remains as to whether the intercepts played a negative role in the formation of the U.S. foreign policy towards Japan. It does not mean, however, that such doves became relative soft-liners as a result of access to the intercepts, because the analysis in this section of the thesis clearly reveals the following facts.

Firstly, the majority of the decision makers including Hull together with the hard-liners had had negative images of Japan since long before they began to have access to the Magic information in the early 1940s, and they retained such negative images up to the date of the Hull Note. Secondly, Hull nonetheless maintained a cautious posture with the backing of Roosevelt in the U.S.-Japan peace talks. This was not because Hull was newly given a realistic image of Japan by the intercepts, but because he kept up such a cautious posture for practical reasons. It was the posture, in the words of Utley, on "Hull's day-to-day basis".[243]

In the case of Roosevelt, in the words of Heinrichs, "he knew a great deal about the Japanese navy from his experience in World War I and this inclined him to be distrustful and negative about the nation as a whole".[244] This contrasts sharply with the contemporary Japanese understanding, as analysed in this thesis, that the Japanese naval activities in the First World War had contributed to change the Western image of Japan from negative to positive while the Army had failed to do so. Thus, Roosevelt's initial moderation came, in the words of Ben-Zvi, "solely from a cluster of pragmatic considerations".[245]

This meant that they could change their attitude from rejecting a coercive policy to supporting the plans offered by the hard-liners at any time when they judged it was the time to do so. This is where the importance of analysing Hull's behaviour, which was significantly influenced by the decoded intercepts at the later stage in particular, arose. As Morgan states, "To understand Pearl Harbor you have to understand Magic and how it worked".[246] The American decision makers who had access to the intercepts were, indeed, given a negative impression of Japanese diplomacy; in the words of Secretary Stimson, "the late magics ... gave a very recent example of Japan's duplicity".[247]

As far as the negative function of the Magic intercepts is concerned, two points in particular should be recognised. Firstly, the problem arose from the very simple fact that no diplomats could ever reveal to their adversaries the actual tactics being discussed in private with their colleagues. The American decision makers must have known this aspect of diplomacy, at least in a rational sense, but it would be natural as human beings to be annoyed by knowing that the foreign diplomats in the same room whilst smiling in a friendly way were hiding something. Thus, for example, Hull thought that "It was almost unreal to see these representatives come to my home smiling, courteous, and outwardly friendly. It was a strain to talk to them in the same tone and on the same level, knowing what I did of Japan's nefarious plans from the intercepted messages, and knowing that Nomura and Kurusu had the same information".[248]

Those decision makers, however, did not imagine what sort of impression they would have given to their adversaries if their own private conversations had been intercepted by their adversaries. Hull, for instance, mentioned that "I naturally had to be careful never to give Nomura the slightest impression of this special knowledge [of Magic]", and actually, he many times dissembled in front of the Japanese representatives that he had read none of his adversaries' private communications. As analysed in this thesis, after the meeting between Kurusu and Hull in November, Hull completely distrusted Kurusu and warned his American colleagues of Japan's aggressive intentions, while Kurusu reported to Tokyo a very positive impression regarding the future of the negotiations. Hull nonetheless believed that his own personality in general could not be regarded as deceitful. Such an attitude in Hull's diplomacy was, indeed, not to be criticised, because it is diplomacy. In this sense, Hull's judgement of his own personality was quite correct. In fact, he recognised himself as a judge, stating that "I looked upon them as I would upon a witness who was testifying against his own side of a case".

Hull, however, could have been more rational if he had imagined what Nomura would think about Hull's personality after the end of the war when Nomura found that Hull maintained a friendly attitude towards him and had continued to dissemble perfectly throughout the talks for several months. Nomura was, of course, not in a position to blame Hull's behaviour since it was the nature of diplomacy, and the same applied to Hull. Thus, although it was a natural result, it was an inadequate stance to merely accumulate negative images of one's adversary's personality, without a very critical examination of one's own posture and ostensibly privileged position due to Magic. In fact, Hull even commented negatively about their appearance: "Nomura sometimes giggling, Kurusu often showing his teeth in a grin, while through their minds must have raced again and again the thought that ... their government ... would inevitably bring war with the United States".[249]

Such an inadequate stance could not have been maintained if they had not had access to the intercepts. One interesting fact is that some scholars show that they still fail to recognise this problem even in their post-war publications. Morgan, for instance, simply accepts such a manner of contemporary leaders and states that "The beauty of Magic was that it revealed the gap between what the Japanese were saying and what they were thinking. Their deceit could be tracked on a daily basis".[250]

In addition, it became a far more serious problem when the intercepts gave negative misconceptions to the decision makers. In the cases mentioned above, for example, the post-war examination clearly indicates that Nomura and Kurusu did not receive "the same information" from Tokyo, such as "Japan's nefarious plans", which Hull thought he shared with them. These representatives, therefore, could not have such a "thought that ... their government ... would inevitably bring war".[251] Through the analysis in detail in this thesis, it becomes clear that the negative way of mistranslating and misinterpreting in Magic resulted in worsening Hull's already cumulative negative images of Japan.

There were, of course, some examples of Magic which were mistranslated in a positive way. It is obvious, however, that a solid majority of such mistranslations were made in a negative way. This does not mean that a vast number of the messages were mistranslated, but in a considerable number of cases, as pointed out by Shinji Sudo 須藤眞志, the nuances are negatively exaggerated although, in a grammatical sense, they are not necessarily mistakes.[252] Thus, not only the mistranslations but also the misinterpretations could have a similar function. It is interesting to find some post-war publications which still maintain the image of the Japanese diplomatic messages given by the pre-war Magic record. Again Morgan, for instance, accepts Hull's image of them uncritically by stating that "Hull ... knew from the inflamed tone of the Magic intercepts that Japan was preparing for war",[253] although the declassified documents of the original Japanese version do not show such an "inflamed tone" but rather a very "humble"

tone as they always maintained the traditional writing style. In fact, these messages were not assumed to be read by adversaries, and therefore there was no reason for the Japanese diplomats to keep up such an "inflamed tone" in messages intended to be read by colleagues. Such an "inflamed tone", as both Hull and Morgan described it, was a reflection of the pre-existing negative image of the messages in the translators' minds but was not the reality.

Thus, the inaccurate conception expressed in Magic, particularly at the later crucial stages in the talks, was one of the very important factors which pushed Hull to abandon his initial soft-line posture up to the fatal morning of November 26th, 1941, when he finally decided to choose Morgenthau's plan. In this sense, it is possible to see that the outbreak of the Pacific War was precipitated by the intercepts on the very eve of Pearl Harbor in the situation where the opening of hostilities had already become a great possibility and the leaders of both sides were still desperately making efforts to avert the war.

Unlike Hull and Roosevelt, Grew was "correspondingly sympathetic" in his understanding of the Japanese position in its own cultural context and therefore always remained cautious. He believed, as observed by Ben-Zvi, that "normal and peaceful relations between the United States and Japan could be maintained"[254] up to the end, not just to the eve of the outbreak of the war. This does not mean that Grew was blind and failed to see any negative aspect of Japan's foreign policy. Although Herbert Feis emphasises that "Grew was moved by portents, not by evidence",[255] Grew stayed in Japan, and, as has been revealed by post-war examination, often obtained surprisingly accurate information, including the precise dialogue of the Gozen Kaigi of September 6th, 1941. The source of such information, as noted by Sudo, is not yet known by historians.[256]

The evaluation of Grew's view in the historical context has been controversial. However, even Feis states that "It will be always possible to think that Grew was correct", although, as pointed out by Dallek, Feis's works have been labelled as an "official history" because "of its sympathetic portrayal of the

Roosevelt Administration's politics",[257] and although Feis himself expressed his view that "the records ... do not support the belief that a real chance of maintaining peace in the Pacific ... was missed".[258]

In fact, Grew's insistence on the cautious posture up to the end is significant, when taking into account that, as emphasised by General Marshall in his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor, "if the 90-day truce had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [Pacific] war at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941, into January, 1942, might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941" and that, as Anthony Kubek observes, "A growing conviction existed in Japanese military circles that Germany was in a death struggle in her war with Russia [in the winter of 1941-2]".[259]

However, Grew had, as already mentioned, little influence in the formation of the American foreign policy towards Japan in the most crucial period, and the following episode, which was related by Grew in an interview with Walter Johnson in 1949, symbolises the seriousness of the lack of his influence: Following the outbreak of war, Grew "had talked to Hull and asked why Konoye's proposal of a visit with Roosevelt had not been accepted" since "he felt that such a meeting might have brought peace". Hull replied, "If you thought so strongly, why didn't you board a plane and come to tell us?" Grew reminded Hull "of the daily telegrams which he had sent explaining the situation and his feeling about it" and "It was at this point ... that he wondered whether Mr. Hull had been given and had read all of the despatches from Tokyo".[260]

Magic again played a crucial role in this matter, as observed by Michael Barnhart; "Everyone in Washington believed that it [Magic] provided incontrovertible evidence of the Imperial Conference decisions of 2 July. So Grew's cries for flexibility ... were ignored", and "Magic combined with old but

still-vital preconceptions of the Japanese as beelike, incapable of internal differences, and Grew's constantly discredited predictions ... made little sense" in the effort to avoid war. Barnhart concludes that "In this belief, Magic played a vital and tragic role".[261]

Grew was eventually promoted to Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department in May 1944 and played a very important role in the formation of the U.S. policy towards Japan afterwards, both towards the end of the war and after the war was over, but was not given enough opportunity before the outbreak of the war.[262]

In conclusion, the majority of American decision makers were inclined to accept uncritically the negative image of Japanese intentions. This tendency can also be recognised in the cases of mistranslation and misinterpretation in the intercepts. The American translators of Magic naturally tended to mistranslate or misinterpret the Japanese phrases in a negative way, while far fewer messages were positively mistranslated. Also, the American decision makers, including Cordell Hull who had access to the Magic intercepts, uncritically accepted those misinterpretations and even the distortions, since most of them had originally shared the idea of a "devil theory" with the hard-liners. The consequence was that Roosevelt and Hull, who had initially resisted the coercive posture towards Japan, eventually accepted the hard-liners' position and decided to present the Hull Note. Although the causes of the war and the causes of misunderstanding were multiple and complex, the outbreak of the Pacific War was precipitated by a more negative image of the opponent than was really warranted. In this sense, Ben-Zvi has emphasised that "if there is one central lesson which emerges from this case study, it is the need to recognize the inherently biased and subjective nature of our images and theories".[263]

1 Allison, Graham T. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971, p. 162.

2 Ibid., p. 162.

3 Shigeru Hayashi 林茂, *Nihon no Rekishi — Taiheiyo Senso (19-han)* *日本の歴史—太平洋戦争 (19版)* (A History of Japan — The Pacific War (19th Edition)), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1989, pp. 160-1).

4 Hata, Ikuhiko 秦郁彦. "Continental Expansion — 1905-1941", in Duus, Peter (ed.). *The Cambridge History of Japan (Vol. 6) — The Twentieth Century*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 312.

5 In Japan, for instance, after the conference of the Liaison Council of October 25th, only six weeks before Pearl Harbor, Army Chief of Staff Hajime Sugiyama recorded that "... on co-operation with Germany: in the event that our policies greatly affect German interests, we must be careful of German moves. There are many people who believe that Germany cannot be trusted". As Shinji Sudo noted, Foreign Minister Matsuoka said that "No nation can be more untrustworthy than the Germans are". In Germany, as Gerhard Krebs observed, the leaders were often irritated by Japan's foreign policies after joining the Tripartite Pact. Eugen Ott mentioned later that Matsuoka was not trusted in Germany. See the following works:

Sanbo Honbu 参謀本部 (General Staff of the Army), *Sugiyama Memo (Jo) 杉山メモ (上)* (Sugiyama Memorandum (Vol. 1)), Hara Shobo 原書房, Tokyo, 1989 (hereafter *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1)*, p. 356.

Ike, Nobutaka. *Japan's Decision for War — Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1967, p. 190.

Krebs, Gerhard. "Doitsu no Taiheiyo Senso Sanka ni kansuru Sho-Mondai ドイツの太平洋戦争参加に関する諸問題" (On Germany's Participation in the Pacific War), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan). *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Shinju-wan Zengo 第二次世界大戦 — 真珠湾前後* (World War II: Toward Pearl Harbor), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 147-51.

Sudo, Shinji 須藤眞志. *Nichi-Bei Kaisen Gaiko no Kenkyu 日米開戦外交の研究* (A Study of U.S.-Japan Diplomacy leading up to the Outbreak of War), Keio Tsushin 慶應通信, Tokyo, 1986, pp. 141-2.

Ohki, Takeshi 大木毅. "Doitsu no Tai-Bei Kaisen e (1941 nen) — Sono Seiji Katei o Chushin ni ドイツの対米開戦 (1941年) — その政治過程を中心に" (Political Process of the German Decision to Open War on the United States in 1941), in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations). *Kokusai Seiji 91 — Nitchu Senso kara Nichi-Ei-Bei Senso e 国際政治91 — 日中戦争から日英米戦争へ* (International Politics Vol. 91 — From the Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese-Anglo-American War), Yuhikaku 有斐閣, Tokyo, 1989, pp. 110-14.

6 See Chapter 5 for an analysis of the China Incident in 1937 and the subsequent Sino-Japanese conflict.

7 Moriyama, Atsushi 森山優. "Hi-Kettei no Kozu — Dai-ni-ji, Dai-san-ji Konoe Naikaku no Taigai Seisaku o Chushin ni 「非決定」の構図 — 第二次、

第三次近衛内閣の対外政策を中心に" (Evasion of Decision-Making: The Diplomatic Policy of the Second and the Third Konoe Cabinets), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan). *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Shinju-wan Zengo 第二次世界大戦 — 真珠湾前後* (World War II: Toward Pearl Harbor), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 15-31.

8 Blaker, Michael. *Japanese International Negotiating Style*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, pp. 214-21.

9 Hara was a former staff officer of the Twentieth Office of the Army General Staff in the pre-war period and of the Historical Research Section of the Ministry of Demobilisation after the Pacific War.

10 Refer to all the items of the Regulations for Governing the Cabinet (Naikaku-Kansei) of 1889 in Naikaku Seido Hyakunen-shi Hensan Iinkai 内閣制度百年史編纂委員会 (The Compilation Committee for A Hundred-Year-History of the Cabinet System). ed., *Naikaku Seido Hyakunen-shi (Ge-kan) 内閣制度百年史 (下巻)* (A Hundred-Year-History of the Cabinet System (Vol. 2)), Okura-sho Insatsu-kyoku 大蔵省印刷局 (Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau), 1985, pp. 40-4.

11 A. Moriyama, op. cit., p. 19.

12 The Japanese title is included in ideographs here to distinguish this document from other ones with similar titles. There are also various English translations for the same Japanese document title. This translation is the author's. See the following material for the content of this document:

Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 260-1.

Ike, op. cit., pp. 78-9.

13 Ibid., p. 77.

14 This agreement was entitled:
軍事上経済上政治上ノ見地ヨリ北部仏印ト共ニ南部仏印ニ速
ニ所要兵力ヲ進駐セシムルノ絶対必要ナル理由ニ就テ,
literally: "About the reasons why it is absolutely necessary to send in troops to southern French Indo-China immediately as well as to northern French Indo-China from military, economic and political points of view". The agreement, which has been recorded in the Sugiyama Memorandum, has not been translated into English by Ike.

15 Butow, Robert J. C. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961, p. 221.

16 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 241-2.

Ike, op. cit., pp. 61-3.

17 Blaker, op. cit., p. 21.

18 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1* , op .cit., pp. 220-1.

Ike, op .cit., pp. 49-50.

19 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op .cit., pp. 248-9.

Ike, op .cit., p. 72.

20 While Ike translates this as "Great men will change their minds", the author believes that Ike's translation does not emphasise enough Matsuoka's tone of self-recognition as a hero who keeps his initiative over the other Japanese leaders, including those of the Army and Navy. The Japanese term "senpan" contains the nuance of "as recently as the other day" in this context, rather than merely "previously" as Ike translated it. This is because Matsuoka wished to emphasise how he could quickly change his mind and adapt to the new circumstances, in contrast with the other leaders who lacked flexibility in their way of thinking. See *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op .cit., p. 249, Ike, o p. cit., p. 72.

21 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op .cit., p. 250.

Ike, op .cit., p. 74.

22 Compare the phrases recorded in *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op .cit., p. 250 and in Ike, op. cit., p. 74.

23 See Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations). *Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi – Dai 7-kan – Nichibei Kaisen 太平洋戦争への道 – 第七巻 – 日米開戦* (The Road to the Pacific War – Vol. 7 – The Outbreak of the U.S.-Japan War), (hereafter *TSM, Vol. 7*), Asahi Shimbun-sha 朝日新聞社, Tokyo, 1963, pp. 210-12.

24 Tanemura, Suketaka 種村佐孝. *Daihon'ei Kimitsu Nisshi 大本営機密日誌* (Confidential Diary of the Army General Staff), Daiyamondo-sha ダイヤモンド社, Tokyo, 1952, p. 58.

25 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 210.

26 Ibid., p. 210.

27 S. Tanemura, op. cit., p. 61, *TSM, Vol.7*, op. cit., p. 211.

28 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 211.

29 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 220-1.

Ike, op. cit., pp. 51-2.

30 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 222-3.

Ike, op. cit., p. 54.

31 See *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 231-40. This agreement was approved by the Army and the Navy Departments of the Imperial Headquarters.

32 S. Tanemura, op. cit., p. 64.

33 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., pp. 211-12 and p. 218, Kase, op. cit., p. 142.

34 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 241.

Ike, op. cit., p. 61.

35 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 248.

Ike, op. cit., p. 71.

36 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 250.

Ike, op. cit., p. 73.

37 *TSM Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 218.

38 Ibid., p. 218, S. Tanemura, op. cit., p. 60.

39 *TSM Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 218.

40 Blaker, op. cit., pp. 221-2.

41 The sentences in the original Japanese are:
最近米国ヲ中心トスル英米蘭支ノ戦略態勢強化及対日共同戦線結成ノ傾向増進シツツ....重慶政権ノ英米依存態度ハ益強化シツツ....支那事変ノ解決ハ更ニ遷延スベク....若シ今ノ儘ニシテ荏苒遷延センガ其ノ遅ルルニ従ヒ益困難且対英米瑞戦争惹起ノ危険ニ逢着スベシ....帝国ガ此ノ際断乎戦略先制ノ措置ニ出デ ....
南部仏印ニ地歩ヲ確保シ泰ヲ傘下ニ包容セバ彼等ヲシテ瞭カニ勝算ナキ対日対抗策（戦略上ノ）ヲ断念セシメ....之即戦ハズシテ勝ツノ上策ナリ
See *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 231-2.

42 Sugiyama Memo *杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 249.

Ike, op. cit., p. 72.

43 Sugiyama Memo *杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 262.

Ike, op. cit., p. 82.

44 The word "however (mo モ)" from the original Japanese text was not translated by Ike. See *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 258, Ike, op. cit., p. 88.

45 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 258.

Ike, op. cit., p. 88.

46 *TSM Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 219.

47 Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, op. cit., p. 222.

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49 Ike, op. cit., p. xiii. *TSM* has, in fact, been regarded in academic circles as a standard textbook since its publication in 1963.

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52 *Sugiyama Memo* 杉山メモ, *Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 1-3.

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57 Telephone conversation between the author's supervisor, Wilfrid Knapp of Oxford, and Robert Butow.

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Chapter 7: The Draft Understanding Proposal: November 1940-October 1941

The Political Background

The chronological analysis in this chapter covers the period between around November 1940 when the informal talks between the U.S. and Japan began, and the middle of October 1941 when Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe 近衛文麿 eventually decided to resign. At this period, several important developments have been noted by historians. Informal talks led to the semi-formal talks in April 1941 when the Draft Understanding Proposal was formulated. Although the majority of the Japanese leaders wished to start the negotiations with the U.S. based on the original Draft Understanding Proposal, Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka 松岡洋右 sent a revised draft proposal to the U.S. in May. This constituted the beginning of the long and very complicated talks between the sides which lasted for nearly eight months up to Pearl Harbor, after U.S. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull reluctantly accepted Matsuoka's revised draft proposal as the basis for starting the semi-formal talks.

The Russo-German War broke out on June 22nd. A new "National Policy" was adopted at the conference of the Council of Japanese Supreme Command in the presence of the Emperor (Gozen Kaigi 御前会議) on July 2nd. Following this "National Policy", Japanese troops were assembled at the Northern front between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union and the troops doubled in number from July on, while other troops started to land in southern French Indo-China on July 28th. As the second Konoe Cabinet resigned and the third Konoe Cabinet was formed on July 17th, the Western countries reacted strongly against the Japanese troops' advance to the South, and this resulted in the American enforcement of a total oil embargo on Japan early the following August.

Before analysing the history of the origin of the U.S.-Japan peace talks, it is worth reviewing the background to the events developing throughout the period of both the informal talks and the following semi-formal talks. During the year 1940, important political events developed on both sides and the problems which were caused by domestic divisions in both countries at that time should be recognised as one of the significant factors which greatly confused their foreign policies during the following peace talks. The nature of the problems of internal discord was, however, different in the two countries. In the U.S., although there were important divisions within the Administration the most important problem for the conduct of foreign policy came from isolationism in Congress, while in Japan the most important divisions were in the government itself.

For Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 1940 was the month of his election to his unprecedented third term as President of the U.S., while Fumimaro Konoe came back to power after the resignation of his first cabinet in 1939, and he formed his second cabinet, appointing Yosuke Matsuoka to be Foreign Minister, in July 1940.

Previously in 1939, as is widely known, Roosevelt called Congress into special session to revise the Neutrality Act to allow belligerents — in reality Great Britain and France — to purchase munitions on a cash-and-carry basis. Despite the fact that strong isolationism occupied the U.S. Congress at that time, Roosevelt's foreign policy was to support Great Britain and her allies against Nazi Germany in the war in Europe after Germany invaded Poland in the autumn of 1939. When Roosevelt ran for the third term, public-opinion polls showed that most Americans favoured Britain but wished to stay out of war in Europe. In his election campaign in late 1940, Roosevelt promised that "Your [American] boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars". Therefore, the question for the Americans at that time was how much and what type of additional aid should be given to the Allies, and this became a major issue of both the election of 1940 and of Roosevelt's policy after he returned to office. Roosevelt, after he was re-elected,

moved quickly to aid the Allies. His Lend-Lease Act, which committed the United States to supply the Allies on credit, was passed in March 1941 after much debate. Germany extended its war zone to include Iceland and the Denmark Straits on March 25th, and Roosevelt retaliated by extending the American Neutrality Patrol to Iceland in April. The U.S. then occupied Iceland in July 1941. Lend-Lease was extended to the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the Russo-German war in the summer of 1941. On September 11th, Roosevelt announced orders for the U.S. Navy to shoot German and Italian warships on sight, which in reality made the United States an undeclared participant in the battle of the Atlantic against Germany and Italy.[1]

Despite the opposition of isolationists in Congress and isolationist public opinion, Roosevelt's Administration increasingly gave support to Britain and France, then to Britain after the fall of France in a battle against Nazi Germany in the early summer of 1940. The points of emphasis here are that Roosevelt was carefully moving away from the neutrality to which he had been tied by Congressional legislation before the outbreak of war in Europe, and that the first objective of Roosevelt's foreign policy was the defeat of Nazi Germany. Another important point was that the U.S. had already been involved in reality in the war in Europe, an undeclared naval war against Nazi Germany, before the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941. The importance for Japan-U.S. relations of Roosevelt's and Hull's hostility to Nazi Germany was not always understood in Japan.

From the other side, American foreign policy towards East Asia during this period, with its emphasis on "principles", was one of the important factors which, on certain occasions, caused significant difficulties in reaching an agreement between the sides. This American concept of "principles" was not fully understood by the Japanese leaders, and was regarded by them as well as by some other countries' leaders, as merely an abstract concept, showing no real consideration for the international issues, and was far from useful in offering any solution to

the conflicts. For instance, Japanese former Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo 東郷茂徳 later wrote in his memoirs that:

> It was hard to understand why, while Hull insisted that "equality of commercial opportunity" would soon be applied to the whole world, China's "equality of commercial opportunity" should not be applied at the same time [since the idea of China's application at the same time as for the rest of the world was a Japanese concept rejected by the U.S. when they insisted on the earlier application for China] ... Could it mean nothing more for the Chinese than the status of a colony, with restricted sovereignty, if the "equality of commercial opportunity" had to be applied to China alone, when it was not yet the case for the rest of the world. Should the U.S. not have had to accept the right of the Chinese authorities to sign a preferential tariff treatment and a customs union based on their sovereignty, if the U.S wished to emphasise respect for the sovereignty of China as strongly as she did ...[2]

His comment has been echoed by Professor George F. Kennan, a former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who observed that "our [the Americans'] constant return to these ideas [particularly the principle of 'the preservation of the territorial and administrative integrity of China' and the 'Open Door principle'], though irritating and sometimes puzzling to the other powers, would not serve really to prevent the conflicts of interests in China from living themselves out pretty much in accordance with their own strategic, political, and economic necessities".[3]

While Roosevelt's hostility to Nazi Germany was not fully understood in Japan, traditional Japanese fear of the Russian threat on her northern front was not always appreciated in the United States.[4] As already mentioned, Japan's primary intention in joining the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy was to strengthen Japan's security against the northern threat (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The Informal Talks

The last attempt to avert the war began in November 1940 with the informal talks conducted by "John Doe Associates", a group composed of Bishop James F. Walsh, Father James K. Drought, Colonel Hideo Iwakuro 岩畔豪雄 (Ministry of the Army, "Rikugun-sho" 陸軍省) and Tadao Ikawa 井川忠雄 (Director of the Central

Agricultural and Forestry Bank, "Sangyo-kumiai Chuo Kinko" 産業組合中央金庫). The informal talks are generally accepted to have begun with the arrival of the two priests, Walsh and Drought, at Yokohama on November 25th, 1940, bringing with them a letter addressed for the attention of Tadao Ikawa from Lewis L. Strauss of Kuhn, Loeb & Company of New York. Their letter of introduction enabled the priests to visit Ikawa and to meet Japanese leaders, including Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka on December 5th and 23rd, before returning to the U.S. in late December 1940. Their conversations eventually led to the formulation of the Draft Understanding Proposal (Nichibei Ryokai-an 日米了解案). The Proposal, which included American recognition of Manchukuo (Manshu koku 満州国), offered the "bright light" of hope of a reconciliation. This was followed by the official, semi-formal talks between President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Kichisaburo Nomura 野村吉三郎, Japanese ambassador in Washington.

On April 16th, 1941, when Ambassador Nomura and Secretary of State Hull met to discuss the Draft Understanding Proposal, Hull handed and explained to Nomura his statement on "the four principles" and said that " ... with these four points accepted ... if his Government [the Japanese Government] approved it [the Draft Understanding Proposal drawn up by John Doe Associates] and instructed him [Ambassador Nomura] to propose it to us [the American leaders], it would afford a basis for starting conversations [between the U.S. and Japan]".[5] On the next day, the 17th, Ambassador Nomura proposed to Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, at the time also serving as Foreign Minister, the beginning of Japan-U.S. negotiations based on the Draft Understanding Proposal (Telegram #233).[6] Owing to these events, the date of April 16th is worthy of note as being an important transition from informal talks to semi-formal talks.

The origin of the informal talks, beginning more than four months before the semi-formal talks, remains unclear, and for different reasons neither the United States nor the Japanese government has wanted to examine the question

closely. As Professor Hiroaki Shiozaki 塩崎弘明 has argued[7] the military tribunal following the war chose, for political reasons, to deny the existence of any serious attempt at peace negotiations and to regard such negotiations as only an informal contact between "private individuals". In Shiozaki's words: the Court defined the talks as being a "contact between Japan and the U.S. which took place only at a private non-Government level" and took the view that they did not have sufficient bearing on the case to be taken into serious account.

On the Japanese side, the origin of the informal talks was simply mentioned as "the episode described" in the publication "Brief Explanation of the Circumstances of Japan-U.S. Negotiations prior to the Outbreak of War (Kaisen mae ni okeru Nichibei Kosho Keii Gaisetsu 開戦前に於ける日米交渉経緯概説)", issued in February 1946, by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "At the end of 1940, two priests of the Maryknoll Society, Bishop Walsh and Father Drought, came to Japan from the U.S. to discuss the possibility of establishing relations between Japan and the U.S.", and this became the accepted view of the beginning of those talks.[8] As Professor Toshikazu Kase 加瀬俊一, a former Secretary to the Foreign Minister throughout the period of the peace negotiations, stated in 1970 "It is still covered by a secret veil how the origin of the U.S.-Japan negotiations had come about ... The U.S.-Japan negotiations were, anyway, ill-fated from the origin" since the talks were originally opened by "such a [deceitful] man [Tadao Ikawa]".[9] It is not only the former Western Allied authorities but also the Japanese Foreign Office which have been unwilling to take into account the real origin of the talks, and particularly the informal talks which were mainly conducted between "private individuals" before April 1941.

It is worth quoting at length the questions which Professor Shiozaki has raised in comprehensive criticism of Butow's account:

> For example, although he [Butow] refers to the [Sir William] Wiseman Documents in the Yale University Library, for some reason he ignores the report sent by Wiseman to the United Kingdom intelligence service, before Drought's departure for Japan in November 1940, which states that Drought had been given a secret mission by the U.S. Naval intelligence service. Nor does he address the fact that

Wiseman, who during the First World War was working for the United Kingdom intelligence service in an effort to bring America into the war, and who later became a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Company, drew up a strategy for peace with Japan together with Drought. Whatever the situation, one wonders whether it is fair to characterise a scheme by Wiseman, who had been a member of the U.K. intelligence service and was a partner in the largest investment bank on Wall Street [Kuhn, Loeb & Company], which involved a former colleague L. Strauss, as a minor incident in the propaganda war. If it is taken as a mere incident, how should the following be judged? Behind Wiseman was [William] Stephenson, who during the Second World War was responsible for information supplied to the U.S. once that country had joined the war. Behind Stephenson was Churchill, who maintained a close relationship with Roosevelt through a secret exchange of letters. Furthermore, on Roosevelt's side, [William] Donovan, the Head of the U.S. intelligence service, had a close relationship with Stephenson, and there was also special co-operation on information activities between the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover and Stephenson. Information about Drought's Japanese strategy would have reached Stephenson via Wiseman and the FBI would also have been well aware of this; Drought was not considered by the FBI as a 'subversive', and neither was Colonel Iwakuro.[10]

Like Professor Shiozaki, Professor Chihiro Hosoya 細谷千博 has also argued that the role of the British Government merits serious attention.[11]

Whatever the answers to Professor Shiozaki's questions it is unlikely that talks between American and Japanese persons would have been left by the American government as a purely private venture, although we still do not know who took the initiative in the United States in starting the talks. It is also likely that intelligence agencies would want to take advantage of the Walsh-Drought visit to Japan; but how far they were acting simply on their own authority is again not clear.

The fact remains that the talks led to the Draft Understanding Proposal, and for that reason April 16th, 1941, must be regarded as an important milestone in the negotiations.

Beginning of the Semi-Formal Talks

After Ambassador Nomura sent Telegram #233 to Prime Minister Konoe on the 17th, a serious misunderstanding occurred between the Japanese and the American authorities. The Draft Understanding Proposal was understood and accepted by Tokyo as an official American proposal although, as far as the

Americans were concerned, it was not an officially approved document. The following possible causes of this misunderstanding are as follows.

Firstly, one has to consider whether the communications between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary of State Hull were reasonably satisfactory at the meeting of April 16th. One has to question whether Hull explained his intentions clearly enough to Nomura in their conversation, and whether, as Hull himself actually wondered at their subsequent meetings, Nomura fully understood in English the U.S.'s intentions.

Secondly, one needs to know whether Nomura accurately reported America's intention to Tokyo at that time. Although Professor T. Kase, a former Secretary of the Foreign Minister, points out that Nomura may have deliberately distorted the American intentions in his report to Tokyo,[12] the author is unable to find such a nuance — i.e. that the Draft Understanding Proposal was in fact an official American proposal — in his report. It is true, however, that Nomura did make some mistakes in his report to Tokyo. This was maybe because he wished to give to Tokyo a less harsh impression of the American attitude and of the content of the Draft Understanding Proposal. In other words, he might have been too keen to arrange for the beginning of the U.S.-Japan talks to be sufficiently careful as regards the accuracy of this report. Ambassador Nomura sent the proposal, not in the original English, but in a Japanese translation, which contained some mistranslations and distortions (Telegram #234).[13] Although Nomura tried hard to ascertain to what extent the Draft Understanding Proposal could be considered as an official American proposal, he put little emphasis on Cordell Hull's "four principles", which were never fully explained to Tokyo. Problems with Nomura's mistranslations were found by the Japanese authorities after Foreign Minister Matsuoka requested Nomura to send the Draft Understanding Proposal in the original English (Telegram #187 of April 30th). The problem with regard to Nomura's attitude has been analysed in detail by some historians including Professor C. Hosoya.[14]

Thirdly, one needs to know whether Foreign Vice-Minister Chuichi Ohashi 大橋忠一, who received Nomura's telegram at his office in Tokyo, accurately reported the content of the telegram to Prime Minister Konoe. Ohashi reported the decoded Draft Understanding Proposal twice to Prime Minister Konoe, at 11:00 (part of the telegram) and at 16:30 (the whole of the telegram) on April 18th Tokyo Time.[15]

Unaware of this misunderstanding regarding the official status of the proposal, Konoe called a conference of the Liaison Council consisting of high military and civil officials (Renraku Kaigi 連絡会議) for 20:00, on the 18th, to consider acceptance of the "American proposal" and found that the majority of the members of the Liaison Council, the key cabinet ministers and the members of the Supreme Command, agreed that the conditions of the "official American proposal" were "acceptable" to Japan as a basis for beginning the talks.[16] Emperor Hirohito 裕仁天皇 stated on the 21st that the American position might have been softened as a result of the links between Germany, Italy and Japan. Both the Emperor and Prime Minister Konoe were in favour of accepting the "American proposal".[17]

On the other hand, many observers have emphasised the nature of the Proposal as a private document prepared by a private group. Robert Butow, for instance, notes that "Much room for misunderstanding lay in the erroneous conception of the American negotiating position that had inevitably resulted from the assignment of a false value to the 'draft understanding' of April 18 by the decision-makers in Tokyo".[18] Whatever the causes of Tokyo's misunderstanding about the status of the original draft of April, however, another important question is the real effect of this misunderstanding on the development of U.S.-Japan relations in the later stages of the conversations.

Butow observes that "Although no one knew it at the time, this 'draft understanding' had actually been written by an imperial army colonel [Iwakuro] on temporary duty at the Japanese embassy in Washington"[19] and "From

incorrectly assuming in the spring of 1941 that the American attitude was more favorable than it was, Japan's leaders moved toward the belief, some two months later, that the American mood was stiffening and that the terms then being offered by Washington were far harsher than those 'originally proposed'. This alleged 'change in the American attitude' proved more and more disappointing as time passed". He goes further to emphasise that "A typical method was to attack the sincerity of the United States by pointing to the marked differences between the 'American' offer of mid-April (that is, the 'draft understanding' written by the colonel [Iwakuro of the Army Ministry] who was sent by [Army Minister] Tojo to help Nomura) and a 'second' proposal of June 21 (actually the first American statement of a basis on which conversations might be conducted)".[20]

With regard to the issue of different interpretations of historical events made by writers on both sides, it is interesting to compare such statements of Butow with, for example, that of Shigeharu Matsumoto 松本重治, who often quotes from Butow's works in his post-war publications. As recently as 1987 S. Matsumoto stresses certain points about specific events from a very different point of view, observing that "when Ikawa unexpectedly met Lewis Strauss of Kuhn, Loeb & Company ... he told Strauss that the original draft [the Draft Understanding Proposal] of the U.S.-Japan negotiations had entirely been drawn up by Drought. Strauss immediately reported it to the State Department. Therefore, the State Department knew from the early stages that the Draft Understanding Proposal was not made by the Japanese government".[21] Thus, while some historians including Butow have mainly been concerned with the fact that the Japanese authorities mistook the original draft for an American official proposal, S. Matsumoto concentrates on the aspect that the American authorities were aware of the fact that the draft was not drawn up by the Japanese government.

The fact is that the three members of the John Doe Associates, Drought, Ikawa and Iwakuro, started to write the latest version of the draft on April 2nd, 1941, when they met in Washington. Ikawa, who was a relatively fluent English

speaker, helped with communication between Drought, who did not speak Japanese, and Iwakuro, who had little confidence in his fluency in English. While Drought was still anxious about Ikawa's fluency in English when they were discussing some highly sensitive issues,[22] it was not the case that the draft was made either by Iwakuro alone or by Drought alone.

The precise background of Tokyo's decision to send Colonel Iwakuro of the Army Ministry still remains unclear, as observed by many historians including Butow and Sudo. However, it is clear that the plan to send a member of the Army Ministry was originally requested by Admiral Nomura before his departure for the Washington Embassy, to help him in the future, but not by the members of the Army Ministry themselves. According to Katsuzo Okumura 奥村勝蔵 of the Foreign Office, who actually negotiated with the Army Ministry to send one of its members, the Army Ministry was initially not keen to cooperate with such a plan since it had already sent a military attache to Washington. While Butow is inclined to assume that Army Minister Hideki Tojo 東條英機 and Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau Akira Muto 武藤章 might have had in mind some particular aims towards the negotiations by sending Iwakuro,[23] Sudo notes that no evidence to support such an assumption has been found and it is unlikely to be a correct assumption.[24]

Robert Dallek notes that "Since Nomura had initially misled his government into thinking that the United States would negotiate on far more generous terms than those outlined in the June 21 proposal, the Japanese interpreted this document as a deliberate stiffening of position in response to Berlin's imminent attack on the Soviet Union". However, as analysed in detail later in this thesis, primary sources clearly indicate that a number of contemporary Japanese leaders, including Prime Minister Konoe and the military leaders of the Army and of the Navy, did not take a hostile posture towards the U.S. proposal of June 21st, but rather attempted to maintain a positive stance towards

the U.S.-Japan negotiations after they began serious discussions about the proposal at the Liaison Conference of July 10th.

Of course, it is true that some Foreign Office officials in Tokyo including advisor Yoshie Saito maintained a very suspicious view towards the conditions contained in the proposal of June 21st. It does not necessarily mean, however, that those officials at that time were emphasising the difference between the conditions which were included in the "original draft" of April and those in the "second proposal" of June 21st. Rather, they saw that the content of the latter actually contained items very harsh towards Japan. It is worth being aware that even Herbert Feis recognises the harshness of the conditions of June 21st towards Japan. Foreign Minister Matsuoka was also very upset by the American presentation of June 21st. His hostility was, however, mainly against the oral statement which was presented by Hull on the same day, since it heavily criticised Matsuoka personally, and not against the proposal itself. In this sense, the author would not agree with a view that sees the argument of "pointing to the marked differences" between the conditions of April and those of the proposal of June 21st as "A typical method" of attacking the sincerity of the United States towards the negotiations.[25] The turning point for Japan thus came later when they saw the omission of specific reference to Manchuria in the Hull Note of November as a marked stiffening of the American position.[26]

Moreover, even if Tokyo's initial misapprehension about the status of the Draft Understanding Proposal did cause some confusion in the subsequent stages of the U.S.-Japan talks, historians have tended to overlook the fact that Hull had to some extent committed his prestige by commenting on significant points of the original draft of April. For instance, he had mentioned to Nomura, as early as April 16th, that "my [American] Government could readily agree" if "the Japanese Government has the willingness and ability to go forward with a plan along the lines of the document [of the Draft Understanding Proposal] we have referred to and the points brought up in our conversation in relation to the problems of a

settlement" although "there were others that would require modification ..."[27] This statement made by Hull could only mean that it would afford a basis for beginning U.S.-Japan conversations, while the U.S. proposal of June 21st was also the actual American statement of "a basis" on which conversations might be conducted. Thus, it is hard to claim justifiably that Hull was entirely excluded from the event of the presentation of the draft of April, and therefore that the draft was presented as a purely private product, or that it was made by the Japanese Ambassador and Colonel alone, and therefore constituted a virtual forgery.

Whatever the misunderstanding of the status of the original draft of April, the majority of the members of the Liaison Council under the Konoe Cabinet also regarded it acceptable as "a basis" for starting the talks, but not as a proposal for a final U.S.-Japan agreement. In this sense, no one can conclusively maintain that there would not have been a different outcome had the Konoe Cabinet quickly "accepted" the Draft Understanding Proposal. One should recognise that some questions are left open; for instance, if the Japanese authorities had announced their "willingness" to go forward with the document in April, would the American government have so easily hardened its position on the issue of Manchuria, as it in fact did later in November? Here a significant question towards Matsuoka's attitude at this stage can be raised.

However, although the Liaison Council had provisionally adopted the "official American proposal" at the conference of April 21st, a serious internal disagreement was caused by Foreign Minister Matsuoka's opposition on the 22nd when he returned to Japan from his trip to Europe via Moscow. Matsuoka was unwilling to accept the Draft Understanding Proposal because he was trying to establish contact with the U.S. in his own way. In fact he had previously made secret contact with the American Ambassador, Lawrence Steinhardt, in Moscow. Military leaders, including Army Minister Hideki Tojo, thought Matsuoka should be replaced if necessary, so that the original Draft Understanding Proposal which Matsuoka opposed could be accepted. [28]

Some historians have raised questions about the event relating to this internal disagreement. Firstly, what was the real background to Konoe's evasion of the final adoption of the Draft Understanding Proposal at the conference prior to Matsuoka's return? It has to be recognised that Matsuoka's tough opposition was predictable and that Konoe, who was acting as Foreign Minister during Matsuoka's trip, could have arranged the final adoption without Matsuoka at the conference of the Liaison Council, if he so wished – and, in fact, he undoubtedly wished to do so. More detailed knowledge of the real background would improve our understanding of the process of Japanese decision-making during that period.

Secondly, what diplomatic plan did Matsuoka have in his mind at that time? His policies have been both criticised and supported in the post-war period because of the difficulty in understanding those policies. On the one hand, he has been criticised because he prevented Japan's quick adoption of the original Draft Understanding Proposal and led Japan to miss the first and the best opportunity for Japan to resolve the China Incident and to reach a peace agreement with the U.S. As Konoe wrote in his diary: "acceptance of the American proposal would be the best way to deal with the China War".[29] However, due to the serious misunderstandings which have already been mentioned regarding the true status of the "official American proposal" between Japan and the U.S., it is difficult to define this opportunity conclusively as being "the best way". On the other hand, he later repeatedly warned against the danger of the Japanese military plan to advance into southern French Indo-China in June and July, while both the Navy and the Army leaders obviously underestimated the possibility of a strong American reaction to Japanese aggression in the region.[30]

The Liaison Council eventually endorsed Foreign Minister Matsuoka's revised Draft Understanding Proposal on May 3rd. However, this was not the end of internal conflicts in Japan. Frequent disagreements between Matsuoka and the other leaders were observed during the next few months.

Following Matsuoka's instructions (Telegram #190 of May 3rd) Ambassador Nomura proposed a neutrality treaty to Secretary of State Hull on May 7th, although the majority of the members of the Liaison Council were opposed to this proposal. Matsuoka also prepared an "oral statement" to the American government, but this was withheld by Ambassador Nomura when he met Secretary Hull on the 7th, because Nomura could not see any possibility of a positive American reaction to the "oral statement".[31] Ambassador Nomura insisted on beginning negotiations urgently at the meeting with Hull on the 11th. On the next day, the 12th, Matsuoka telegraphed instructions (Telegrams #204, #205 and #206) to Nomura to begin negotiations on the revised Draft Understanding Proposal and Nomura submitted the revised draft to Secretary of State Hull on the same day.

During the next few weeks, the following significant events caused international repercussions and made Japan's position more difficult. On May 16th, Great Britain banned the export of rubber from Malaya to Japan and to the Yen Bloc. On May 17th, German Ambassador Eugen Ott had talks with Foreign Minister Matsuoka and Ott said that Germany was dissatisfied with the Japan-U.S. negotiations. On May 31st, Joseph W. Ballantine, one of Hull's chief advisors on the Far East, opposed the revised Draft Understanding Proposal and submitted a further revised interim draft. In these circumstances, Prime Minister Konoe faced the dilemma of whether or not to replace Foreign Minister Matsuoka.[32] As some historians including Professor Hosoya have pointed out,[33] Emperor Hirohito concurred with the replacement of Matsuoka.

However, the author does not think that those problems which occurred during the period between April and May can be seen as the decisive origins of the Pacific War. Although Matsuoka underestimated the toughness of American foreign policy, with its concept of "principles", and sent a dramatically revised Draft Understanding Proposal to the U.S., Roosevelt and Hull "decided to go forward on the basis of the Japanese proposals" because "To have rejected it

outright would have meant throwing away the only real chance we had had in many months to enter with Japan into a fundamental discussion of all the questions outstanding between us" and "if there were the slightest possibility of inducing Japan to withdraw from the Axis alliance, we should pursue it" (from Hull's memoirs).[34] In a certain sense, the possibility of an immediate conflict was at least temporarily averted by the American leaders' decision on May 12th.

The Outbreak of the Russo-German War

The Russo-German war broke out after the following events had already occurred. On June 11th, the U.S. applied a licence system for all oil exports. On June 21st Secretary of State Hull handed Ambassador Nomura the revisions to the draft of May 31st, together with the oral statement.

After the outbreak of the Russo-German war, Japan's leaders were in disarray. In considering the question of whether Japan should attack the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Matsuoka told Emperor Hirohito that he considered that Japan should co-operate with Germany in attacking Russia.[35] This view was supported by General Shin'ichi Tanaka 田中新一, Bureau Chief of Military Operations of the Army Staff. General Tanaka and some other military leaders thought there was a possibility of winning in the North because of the outbreak of the Russo-German war. However, as already mentioned, Japan refrained from action against the Soviet Union in line with the new "National Policy" adopted on July 2nd, with in reality no national decision whatsoever.

The conference of the Liaison Council consisting of high military and civil officials was held on June 25th and the Liaison Council adopted "Matters Relating to Promotion of Policy Towards the Southern Area" for Japan's occupation of southern French Indo-China. This document was developed from the previous document called "Guideline of Policy Towards the Southern Area (Tai Nanpo Shisaku Yoko 対南方施策要綱)" of June 6th, 1941. The earlier document was,

however, another typical example of evasion of decision-making.[36] It was originally prepared by the Twentieth Office of the General Staff of the Army. No other section of the General Staff of the Army accepted these arguments but they went along with the Twentieth Office without voicing direct opposition. According to the Twentieth Office, it planned a strategy in case an advantageous situation emerged, i.e. if Great Britain were defeated in Europe or in an emergency case if the United States enforced a total embargo on Japan in the future. Japan should then be ready to open hostilities against Great Britain and Holland, while avoiding the involvement of the U.S. in the military conflict. The Japanese Navy strongly opposed this plan emphasising that Japan's advance to the southern region was equivalent to opening hostilities against the U.S. As a result of the Twentieth Office's plan not being accepted, the document declared the necessity of continuing diplomatic negotiations with Thailand and French Indo-China to establish a stronger relationship in military, political and economic areas, at the same time as declaring the rights of a belligerent for Japan's self-defence. In the event of Britain's defeat in Europe, the document only declared that Japan should strengthen her diplomatic efforts towards the Dutch East Indies. Thus, in Japan the Twentieth Office's plan was not accepted at this stage, and the Army and the Navy approved the document, which declared the necessity of continuing diplomatic negotiations.

When the document of June 6th, which was agreed by the Army and the Navy, developed into the new document "Matters Relating to Promotion of Policy Towards the Southern Area", the tone became much more aggressive as a result of the conflict between the Foreign Minister, the Army and the Navy. As already mentioned, Foreign Minister Matsuoka warned of the danger of advancing to the South and insisted on accepting the policy towards French Indo-China only if the Army and the Navy were ready to attack British Singapore, probably because he (Matsuoka), in favour of preparing for the North, knew that both the Army and the Navy were definitely unprepared to attack Singapore. Matsuoka's challenge to

the Army and the Navy consequently forced the Chief of Staff of the Navy, Osami Nagano 永野修身, to make a speech arguing strongly against being deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with Britain and the U.S. However, the Navy and the Army agreed on the 23rd that a war with Britain and the U.S. could be prevented. Thus, their strong stance was adopted rather for the purpose of defeating Matsuoka.

This example indicates another aspect of Japanese decision-making at that time: a sort of "paper game" in which the tone of the document was exaggerated so as to appear far more aggressive than the real intentions. This was the result of a domestic balance-of-power struggle among the groups in an atmosphere of high competition, and this again resulted in no real decision-making.

Japanese Adoption of "National Policy" of July 2nd

The conferences of the Liaison Council were subsequently held between June 25th and July 1st, to prepare a document for the new national policies.[37] On June 28th, the Liaison Council, taking account of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's objections, adopted the "Guideline for Implementing National Policies in Line with Changing Circumstances".

Based on this document, the Japanese leaders agreed a new policy preparing for war in the South, but they also agreed to continue their preparations secretly for war in the North against the Soviet Union, although they thought that it was impossible to move in both directions simultaneously. At the same time they decided to pursue diplomatic efforts in all directions.

On July 2nd, there was a subsequent meeting held in the presence of the Emperor (Gozen Kaigi) which gave the decisions reached at the previous meetings official status. The "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies" document was formally adopted. However, it is important to recognise the chronological background to the adoption of this document, in addition to the indecisive nature

already analysed. The Army and the Navy seriously thought that the real purpose of the "united front against Japan" formed by the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands and China was probably, as it was expressed literally in Item One and Item Two of the first chapter of the agreement of June 23rd (see Chapter 6), "to put pressure on Japan by military force (tai-nichi buryoku appaku 対日武力圧迫)", although they did not entirely discount the possibility of Western intentions as "merely defensive (tanjun naru boei mokuteki 単純ナル防衛目的)".[38]

The Army and the Navy were greatly concerned by reports of, for instance, the increase in military force throughout the region since the summer of 1940. The document recorded such reports in detail and concluded that the Allies had increased in total by around 500,000 officers and men (almost doubled), 39 warships including aircraft carriers and 686 military airplanes in the Pacific, South-East Asia and British India since July 1940.[39] Thus, the Japanese Army and Navy wondered and were suspicious about the real intentions of the Allies' strategies, but could not yet conclusively define how the Japanese ought to interpret them.

In reality, contemporary British leaders were in fact wondering, as the Japanese were, how they ought to interpret the real Japanese intentions towards the southern region. Defence Chiefs of Staff at that time proposed to prepare for possible attack by the Japanese on British territories including Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, and by this means to put pressure on the Japanese to make them give up their plan of military expansion to the southern areas.[40] However, Churchill's view was distinctive. In "Churchill's Personal Minute" of January 1941, released as recently as 1992, he recognised the possibility of a Japanese attack on British territories, but he also allowed for a different interpretation. He was opposed to the plan of increasing the troops there stating that "Japan will think long before declaring war on the British Empire, and whether there are two or six battalions at Hong Kong will make no difference to her choice" and also that "If Japan goes to war with us there is not the slightest chance of holding

Hong Kong or relieving it. It is most unwise to increase the loss we shall suffer there. Instead of increasing the Garrison it ought to be reduced to a symbolical scale ... I wish we had fewer troops there, but to move any would be noticeable and dangerous".[41] Thus, Churchill foresaw that the allies' military movements could cause Japanese miscalculation about Western intentions, and therefore could worsen relations.

Britain also aimed at getting American support to protect British territories in the Pacific and South-East Asia.[42] A message of February 15th from Churchill to Roosevelt expressed Churchill's stance at this stage: "Some believe that Japan in her present mood would not hesitate to court an attempt to wage war against Great Britain and the United States. Personally, I think the odds are definitely against that, but no one can tell. Everything that you [Roosevelt] can do to inspire the Japanese with fear of a double war may avert the danger. If however they come in against us [the British] and we are alone, the grave character of the consequences cannot easily be over-stated".[43]

The American stance was, however, careful to avoid provoking the Japanese by any strong action at this stage, and agreed to start the semi-formal talks between the U.S. and Japan. In this context, Hull records that "Halifax ... [suggested on April 22nd] that a declaration be made by the United States, the British, and Netherlands Governments jointly or separately stating that should Japan make any further major move to the South their interest would be jointly and individually affected ... [However, Hull] did not concur in the idea of a joint statement, but would give thought to the possibility of a parallel statement".[44]

Meanwhile, Japanese diplomatic and military attitudes naturally aroused Western suspicions, although they were the product of domestic rivalries, lack of national control and indecision. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, for example, strongly insisted on the necessity of attacking Singapore in late 1940 and early 1941 on the basis of the decision at the Liaison Conference of July 27th 1940.[45] He argued that a war against Great Britain alone, keeping the U.S. out of any military

involvement in such a war, would be possible and successful. On the other hand, he was opposed to the adoption of a new plan to establish military, political and economic agreements with French Indo-China and Thailand in advance of carrying out the attack on Singapore, when the plan was presented by the General Staff of the Army and of the Navy at the meeting of January 28th, 1941. As a result of much discussion at the Liaison Conference of the 30th, Matsuoka accepted the plan, but added incompatible conditions, such as deleting the date of execution and attaching a new phrase: "the plan defined above can be changed depending on changes of circumstances". Thus, Matsuoka successfully converted the new policy of January 30th to merely a Ryoron-heiki Sakubun.[46]

After being deeply confused by Matsuoka, the General Staff of the Army concluded that his idea of attacking Singapore was impossible to follow since it considered that attacking Singapore without sending the troops through Thailand was impractical in the military strategic sense. Consequently, the Army had no intention of accepting Matsuoka's idea of attacking Singapore and regarded his purpose in proposing such a plan as merely to make the position of the Army difficult.[47]

Despite Matsuoka's domestic success in taking initiative over the Army, as Tsunoda points out, he was not necessarily as successful in international relations. Matsuoka failed to remove Western suspicions about Japan's intentions because the Navy carried out its plan of January 19th to send its fleet to the southern areas to show the flag later that month.[48] Churchill, for instance, stated in his message of February 15th to Roosevelt that: "I am not myself convinced that this is not a war of nerves designed to cover Japanese encroachments in Siam and Indo-China. However, I think I ought to let you know that the weight of the Japanese Navy, if thrown against us, would confront us with situations beyond the scope of our naval resources".[49]

Matsuoka created further confusion both in domestic and in international relations afterwards. While he still urged the General Staff of the Army to attack

Singapore on several occasions, he repeatedly promised to the British government that "Japan has no intention to cause any trouble with Britain" in February 1941. In the same manner, in early March, he maintained his aggressive attitude towards Singapore, but refused to discuss a plan to establish a "Thai-Japanese Military Alliance", although the suggestion of the plan came from the side of Prince Wan Waithyakon, the Thai representative plenipotentiary to Japan.[50]

The Chief of Staff of the Army Hajime Sugiyama 杉山元, who refused German Ambassador Ott's request of March 4th to attack Singapore, repeatedly expressed his concern about Matsuoka's "dokuso 独走 (running alone)" on February 3rd and again on March 7th, when a plan for Matsuoka's visit to Berlin was discussed. Sugiyama wondered whether Matsuoka would independently give a pledge to Germany on the issue of Japanese tactics. In fact, Matsuoka reported nothing to his government and the Army during his trip to Germany.[51]

In addition, it is worth pointing out that Sugiyama's statement of March 4th was, to the Germans, not quite clear since he stated that "[The Japanese Army] agrees with Ott [who urged that Japan should attack Singapore as soon as possible", and then added, as he often did, a phrase with the paradoxical word "however [shikaredomo 然レ共]" and gave a negative conclusion.[52] Thus, not only the Allies but also the Germans were deeply confused by Japan's attitude. Nonetheless, there was a plan made by the Army itself to attack British territories, although the plan was extremely "Sakubun" in its nature. In November 1940, while the Section of Military Planning of the Army General Staff made a plan to prepare for attacking British Malaya and Singapore avoiding U.S. involvement in a war, the Twentieth Office of the Army General Staff prepared a typical Sakubun phrase to be attached to the plan: "merely a preparation on the basis of no decision to use military force".[53] As a product of two months' negotiations, the plan was finally agreed between the two sections. While the phrase "no decision to use military force" was replaced by a new phrase "a decision to use military

force" in the agreement, the Twentieth Office quite explicitly recorded at that time: "the concept [of the new phrase] was unchanged [from the original one]. Although [it is written as] 'to use military force', after all, it is a matter of 'Sakubun' ..."[54]

It was the Navy General Staff which eventually made the agreement reached within the Army General Staff less practical. It did this by declaring that a war in the southern areas could only mean a war against the U.S., and by insisting that it would use military force only if the U.S. put military pressure on Japan or carried out a total oil embargo in the future. The Army recorded that: it wondered "... whether [the Navy's statement] is [an expression of the] real determination to fight [against the U.S. in the event of an emergency] or [merely] a political stratagem. It is entirely unclear".[55]

Taking into account that the primary intention expressed in the Sakubun agreement within the Army was to attack British territories while avoiding U.S. involvement in a war, the agreement reached with the Navy General Staff on April 17th inevitably became a more extreme Sakubun. Historians have noted that "the [original] Sakubun agreement [within the Army General Staff] now lost even its meaning as a Sakubun [since a unanimous agreement was not reached when the Navy refused it] ... The original Sakubun was simply replaced by a new Sakubun [of April 17th]".[56] Consequently, it was not presented to the government and Foreign Minister Matsuoka, although it declared that the previous decision at the Liaison Conference of July 27th, 1940, was replaced by the "agreement" of the 17th.[57]

According to the Army's interpretation, the conclusion of the new agreement of the 17th was that Japan would advance to the South only if there was no possibility of causing a war; this despite the facts that the plan was originally prepared as a "war plan" to attack Malaya and Singapore, and military manoeuvres of the Army and the Navy were actually carried out on the basis of the plan in late March and early April, 1941. The manoeuvres naturally aroused

Western suspicions, although the final version of the Sakubun plan implied that a war should be avoided. One can clearly see here the problem in Japan's decision-making caused by the nature of Sakubun.

The U.S. strategies at that time also caused a certain significant confusion. On the one hand, the American political leaders intended to avoid a war with Japan: "Prior to Ambassador Nomura's arrival [in February 1941] ... the President and I [Hull] agreed that we would do whatever we could to bring about a peaceful ... settlement of the whole Pacific question". On the other hand, the military leaders had to develop their war plans against Japan since the U.S. foresaw little possibility of success in settling a peace: "I [Hull] estimated right at the outset that there was not one chance of success [in reaching an agreement with Japan] in twenty or one in fifty or even one in a hundred".[58]

The development of American military plans in the Pacific can be summarised from Edward Miller: In December 1940 Captain (soon Rear Admiral) Richmond Kelly Turner, the Director of the Navy War Plans Division, and his staff completed a plan WPL-44 (Navy Rainbow Three). This plan "bore no resemblance to the 1939 Joint Board directive for a strong push against Japan" and it "adopted the Germany-first and Pacific defensive decisions ... but it ran into trouble with army planners because it was not founded on a joint plan". The convening of the U.S.-British Staff Conference (the ABC-1 Conference) at the end of January 1941 "induced the army and navy to close ranks against the well-rehearsed British". The Joint Planning Committee (J.P.C.) converted the decisions at the Conference, the ABC-1 report of March 27th 1941, into Joint Plan Rainbow Five, which projected an M-Day (the start of mobilisation in Army parlance) of September 1st, 1941. Op-12, the Navy War Plans Division, simultaneously presented WPL-46, a naval supporting plan. The plan, Navy Rainbow Five, was promulgated in the spring of 1941. The Chief of Naval Operations had told the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific and Asia fleets to prepare WPUSF-44, an operating Plan 0-1 for Rainbow Three, and then a few weeks later switched to a demand for WPPac-46, a

Rainbow Five accessory. The Secretary of the Army, Henry Stimson and of the Navy, Frank Knox endorsed Joint Plan Rainbow Five and sent it to Roosevelt on June 2nd, 1941, while Churchill had not yet endorsed the ABC-1 conclusions.[59]

Thus, the Allies' military strategy developed in a confused way, and "Strategy, as always, was the province of uniformed officers who received virtually no guidance from Congress, the State Department, civil agencies, or even the service secretaries. The president was, of course, consulted in those crisis days on large matters of mobilization, alliances, and theater priorities, but he rarely influenced campaign designs". The reflection of those events was a creation of perception gaps between the American self-image of their strategy and the image of American strategy in the eyes of the Japanese who were always nervous about American movements across the Pacific. While Hull issued a press statement in January that "We [the Americans] have threatened no one, invaded no one, and surrounded no one"[60], the Japanese Army and Navy listed the following information in the agreement of June 23rd, 1941: the U.S. Navy assembled the Pacific fleet in Hawaii and increased it by 20 submarines in January 1941, 26 U.S. tanks arrived in Hong Kong and a number of U.S. planes arrived in Malaya in February, the U.S. announced that 54 planes were going to be added in the Philippines in March, 2,000 U.S. soldiers landed and 30 planes arrived in the Philippines in May, and ..."[61]

One exceptional example of a Western offensive plan among the mostly defensive ones was the so-called ADB report made at a conference known as ADB-1, the military staff conference of the U.S., the Netherlands and Britain (ADB), convened in Singapore between April 21st and 27th, 1941. The first day of the conference was coincidentally the 21st, when the Japanese Liaison Council revised the original Draft Understanding Proposal and provisionally adopted it as the basis of the semi-formal "peace talks" between the U.S. and Japan, which had started just a few days before. The ADB conference determined their pre-conditions for war against Japan, and proposed "to attack Japan itself with long-

range bombers, a form of violent economic pressure that would bring about its collapse more surely ... than gradual denial of resources. Since Luzon alone of Allied territories lay within extreme bomber range of a few Japanese cities, they [the planners] urged a commitment to holding it and establishing an offensive air force there".[62] Although the ADB report was later rejected by the Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark and the Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall in early July, the Japanese Army felt a serious threat posed by the explicit "united front", ADB-1 and the hard position of the Dutch East Indies in the negotiations with Japan. Consequently, on May 1st, the Ministry of the Army began to make a plan to advance to the South using military force if necessary. In this context, the plan was, in the Army's view, a means for Japan's national survival in the event of strict Allied sanctions.[63]

Thus, the Japanese felt a threat despite the fact that the Allies' strategies were in reality defensive rather than offensive, with a few exceptions not endorsed by the authorities. As already mentioned, Churchill had in reality no prospect of holding the British territories in the region in the event of Japan's involvement in a war, and the U.S. had already made the Germany-first and Pacific defensive decisions in 1940. The American political decision was consequently a "global strategy that urged accelerated re-armament and avoiding provocations of Japan such as overt alliances, economic sanctions, or sending arms to China".[64] One can clearly recognise in the agreement of June 23rd that the U.S. "global strategy" was in fact creating a very serious sense of national crisis in Japan.

Whatever the current retrospective view, according to those primary sources, most of the members of the Japanese Army and Navy in fact regarded their own plan as "defensive" rather than "offensive" while they thought of the allies' strategy as more offensive, and therefore they felt a serious sense of national crisis at that time. This was exactly the same stance as that seen among most of the contemporary Western leaders who believed their own strategies were

"defensive", while regarding the Japanese strategies as "offensive". Thus, the contemporary leaders of both sides could not get precise information about the intentions of the opposition but got only very limited information and could only interpret from reports of the adversary's actions. This kind of perception gap has occurred very naturally and universally in the history of international relations, particularly under this type of hostile atmosphere. Thus, they understood the same events differently.

Another example of such a perception gap can be seen in Japan's "shinchu 進駐" (advance) to southern French Indo-China in late July. There was in fact a remarkable gap between the contemporary Japanese perception of the plan to advance to the South and the understanding of the plan in the eyes of the Allies. While the Japanese Army and Navy thought, as already analysed, that their shinchu to southern French Indo-China was necessary as a defensive plan to prevent a war with the Allies, the Western leaders understood it as a quite offensive plan. The Western leaders felt that their prediction of Japan's aggressive intention was confirmed by this shinchu, and when the Western announcement of strict sanctions followed it, the Japanese who made the decision for the execution of shinchu were very surprised and thought that their fear of a Western united front as an offensive strategy was justified. As the contemporary Japanese leaders had difficulty in seeing the Western strategies as "merely defensive", the Western leaders found much difficulty in having any sense of trust in Japanese policy at that time. Thus, both sides often understood the oppositions' policies as more negative and more hostile than they actually were.

Even at present, the following views recorded by the contemporary Japanese leaders might be surprising to Western observers and even to the Japanese in retrospect, while those were in fact their way of thinking. According to Colonel Kenryo Sato 佐藤賢了, the reasons why the faction which wanted "to advance towards the South" predicted that "a U.S.-Japanese war would be unlikely to be caused by [Japanese] 'shinchu' to southern French Indo-China" were:

A 'shinchu' would be executed on the basis of the [legal] agreement with the Vichy government, and therefore [the shinchu could] never be [regarded as] either a war or an act of aggression. Also, the territory of the region was neither part of the United States nor part of the American colonies. The Japanese government guaranteed the security of the [American] Philippines ... The threat to Japan posed by the stationing of the American Pacific fleet in Hawaii could be seen as far more serious than the threat which the Americans might feel to their maritime operations between the United States, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies if a small number of Japanese troops should land [shinchu] in southern French Indo-China. Therefore, there would be no reason for the U.S. to attack Japan after a Japanese 'shinchu' to southern French Indo-China.[65]

Tomohiko Ushiba 牛場友彦, the secretary to Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe at that time, explained the reasons why Konoe did not firmly oppose the plan of advancing to the South:

[In Japan] the movement for advancing to the North [against Russia] was strong at that time, and therefore it was essential to check it by accepting the movement towards the South without a moment's delay [toriaezu 取敢えず] ... Konoe hoped that the movement towards the South might be checked by reaching an agreement with the U.S. through the U.S.-Japan talks. That is the reason why Konoe was increasingly keen to reach [a successful outcome in] the talks.

Ushiba went further, commenting:

Taking into account that Roosevelt later proposed his plan to neutralise French Indo-China, there might have been a good chance of resolving the troubles [caused by the plan towards the South] through the U.S.-Japan talks, despite the fact that the advance to the South made the American consensus more hostile ... [Moreover], Roosevelt's request that Japan should not attack Russia reached Tokyo in early July, a factor [which made Konoe think that he had to check the movement towards the North by] accepting the plan towards the South.[66]

In all, a fatal misjudgement was made by the Japanese in July 1941, that is, that a war between Japan and the U.S. was unlikely to be caused by the occupation of southern French Indo-China. This was mainly derived from the following considerations at that time. First, the Japanese military leaders' idea of the occupation as a means of preventing a war with the Western allies. Second, the government and the Navy thought that a war with the Soviet Union would immediately be caused if Japan completely abandoned her option of the occupation, while Prime Minister Konoe hoped that there would still be a possibility of averting a war with the Western Allies through the peace talks with the U.S. even if Japan carried out the occupation. This was because they took into account the factors of both the domestic pressure for movement towards the North

and the condition of Russo-Japanese relations. Third, the Prime Minister thought that Japan's decision to check the movement of the Army towards the North, which was at that time seen to be strong, was also supported by the U.S. demand that Japan not attack the Soviet Union immediately after the outbreak of the Russo-German War. Under these circumstances, leaving aside the retrospective question of Japan's justification for invading the southern regions, an important point here is that the plan of the shinchu to southern French Indo-China cannot be automatically understood as evidence that they had enough confidence in their military ability to make an offensive plan against the Western forces in the southern regions.

The view of contemporary Japanese leaders introduced above made a sharp contrast with that of Western leaders expressed, for example, in a press release by the Department of State on July 24th, 1941:

> There is not apparent to the Government of the United States any valid ground upon which the Japanese Government would be warranted in occupying Indochina or establishing bases in that area as measures of self-defense. There is not the slightest ground for belief on the part of even the most credulous that the Governments of the United States, of Great Britain, or of the Netherlands have any territorial ambitions in Indo-China or have been planning any moves which could have been regarded as threats to Japan. This Government can, therefore, only conclude that the action of Japan is undertaken because of the estimated value to Japan of bases in that region primarily for purpose of further and more obvious movements of conquest in adjacent areas.[67]

Thus, one should recognise the fact, based on the analysis of primary sources, that while the Japanese saw the American view as being that the "[shinchu could] never be [regarded as] ... an act of aggression", the Americans in fact believed that "the action of Japan is undertaken ... primarily for purposes of further and more obvious movements of conquest in adjacent areas". While the Americans felt that the Japanese had not the slightest grounds to imagine "threats to Japan", the Japanese in fact regarded certain movements on the Allied side including "the stationing of the American Pacific fleet in Hawaii" and the ADB-1 Conference as a real threat. While the Japanese guessed at the American view, namely that those threats posed by the West were "far more serious than the

threat which the Americans might feel ... [from] a small number of Japanese troops ... in southern French Indo-China", the Americans in reality viewed that the shinchu to the region was "the vital problem of our [American] national security".[68]

Of course, it is true that the Japanese shinchu in southern French Indo China should not be seen solely in connection with the war with Chiang Kai-shek, since there was a lot of discussion among the Japanese leaders on the Western military and political movements around the region when the Japanese considered sending troops there. However, it was clearly misinterpretation when the majority of the Western leaders regarded it as the "last step" in preparation for a military advance towards the South. The serious effect of this misconception at the later stages has been well observed by Paul Schroeder: "The American reaction to the Japanese move into southern Indo-China ... was clear and forceful ... All the Japanese arguments as to Anglo-American encirclement, fear of a British-De Gaullist advance, and the like were contemptuously swept aside as being too ridiculous for consideration".[69] Instead, "the Japanese move into southern Indo-China is interpreted as being carried out solely to secure bases for a drive southward", and consequently "any promise Japan made to withdraw from this position, including that of November 20, was false and insincere".[70]

A few serious problems were caused immediately after the adoption of the document of July 2nd in Japan. On July 5th, three days after the adoption of the "National Policy", the Chief Staff of the Navy Nagano reported to the Emperor to confirm that "Under the current circumstances, the southern issues should be immediately settled". On the 12th the Navy Vice Chief of Staff Nobutake Kondo 近藤信竹 sent a note to the Army Vice Chief of Staff Osamu Tsukada 塚田攻, confirming several points including: the Navy's operatives (the naval manual labour) should not be involved in the Army's mobilisation [to the North]; the Navy's preparations towards the North would not be completed until the end of

August; the Army's preparations in the area of Manchuria should be carefully carried out ...

Those actions of the Navy have been regarded by historians as evidence that the contemporary leaders of the Navy were not quite sure how they should actually interpret the "decision" at the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd.[71] The Army was naturally annoyed with the Navy for those actions and wondered: "If it is not to check the Army's plan [towards the North], the Kan-Toku-En 関特演, then what else could the Navy's real intention be"; "Was the Navy surprised by the Army's preparations against the Soviet Union?"[72]

Thus, those fatal conflicts over the direction of national policy seen in Japan, coming as they did immediately after the adoption of the document called "National Policy", have revealed the nature of "Sakubun decision", which is that in reality, it is indecision. The record of the Twentieth Office of the Army General Staff dated June 30th reveals its interpretation of the priority of the "National Policy" document as a North-first decision, adding a phrase showing the extreme ambiguity of Ryoron-heiki Sakubun: "Sakubun is Sakubun, but it cannot be helped since [Japan is] a country where the balance of power is even between the Army and the Navy".[73]

Even after the War, significant perception gaps have persisted among historians over the events analysed here. Robert Dallek, for instance, states in his publication of 1979: "Roosevelt did not know that American diplomatic action was discouraging Japan ... Since Nomura had initially misled his government into thinking that the United States would negotiate on far more generous terms than those outlined in the June 21 proposal [a comprehensive statement of America's position on the issues between them], the Japanese interpreted this document as a deliberate stiffening of position in response to Berlin's imminent attack on the Soviet Union. This apparent change in attitude contributed to a high-level Japanese decision of July 2 to proceed with the advance to the South, even if it meant war with Britain and the United States. More specifically, the Japanese now

decided to consolidate their hold on Indochina ... as a prelude to ... dominating the Dutch East Indies".[74]

Nomura's role, in failing on some occasions to maintain accurate communications with Tokyo and with Washington, has often been discussed by historians. However, not only has Dallek overlooked the nature of the decision-making of July 2nd, i.e. Ryoron-heiki Sakubun, but also other important questions can be raised about his understanding of contemporary events. For example, as many observers including Professor Toshikazu Kase 加瀬俊一 and S. Matsumoto[75] have pointed out, a number of Japanese sources clearly indicate that America's presentation of the proposal of June 21st did not significantly contribute to Japan's decision of July 2nd. Owing to the timing, immediately after the outbreak of the Russo-German War, and the importance of the issue of the northern front with Russia, those conferences subsequently held between June 25th, three days after the beginning of the Russo-German War, and July 1st were dominated by the most immediate question to Japan, whether to participate in the Russo-German War against the Soviet forces on the basis of the Tripartite Pact. The document of "National Policy" which was finally adopted on July 2nd was, as already mentioned, also in part a product of complicated domestic negotiations which had started long before the American proposal of June 21st. Thus, two factors affected the making of the document; the fact that it was in preparation over a long period, and the sudden appearance of an urgent time pressure in the form of the outbreak of the Russo-German War.

A precise analysis of the American proposal of June 21st was consequently shelved by the Japanese for the time being, in S. Matsumoto's word "Tana-age 棚上げ" (literally "put up on the shelf"), until after the decision of July 2nd.[76] In fact, one can see little record of discussions on the American proposal of June 21st during the period between June 21st and July 2nd in the sources, including the Sugiyama Memorandum and the Kido Diary.[77] The first discussion begun by Prime Minister Konoe on the American proposal was on July 4th, two days after the

adoption of the document, when he suggested to Matsuoka: "Japan should try to reach an agreement with the U.S. immediately. It cannot be helped even if the relations between Japan and Germany became temporarily worsened [by maintaining better relations between the U.S. and Japan]".[78] This was a positive attitude towards the U.S., not hostile.

The first occasions of high-level Japanese discussion on the American proposal of June 21st were the Liaison Conferences of July 10th and of the 12th, after Ambassador Nomura urged the necessity for Japan's quick response to the American proposal.[79] It is true that the attitude of Foreign Minister Matsuoka was hostile towards the American proposal, and it was particularly so owing to the concept of Hull's Oral Statement attached to the proposal. This is because the Oral Statement personally criticised Matsuoka's attitude towards the talks. In this sense, Matsuoka's discussion at the Liaison Conference of July 12th well expressed his stance: "I am willing to consider anything else, but I cannot accept the 'Oral Statement' ... I propose here and now that we reject the 'Statement,' and that we discontinue negotiations with the United States".[80] In effect, Matsuoka's hostility to the proposal was at the level of a personal reaction rather than at the national diplomacy level.

In contrast, a record at the Japanese Foreign Office reveals that the Navy opposed Matsuoka and opposed the revised proposal presented by the Foreign Office to the Liaison Council. It demanded: "it is appropriate to soften, to some extent, the revised proposal prepared by the Foreign Office" since "the [current] Foreign Office proposal could quite likely end the talks with the U.S. immediately [after its actual presentation to the opposition]".[81] In the same manner, Army Minister Hideki Tojo was opposed to Matsuoka: "Even if there is no hope, I would like to persist to the very end. I know it is difficult; but ..." In the case of Chief of Staff of the Army Sugiyama, although he started: "I myself agree with the Foreign Minister's view", he characteristically continued his statement with a contradiction "However [shikaredomo]" and eventually opposed Matsuoka: "we,

among the military believe it is appropriate on this occasion to leave room for negotiation". The Navy Minister insisted that "According to Navy reports, it appears that Secretary of State Hull and others are not prepared to provoke a Pacific war. Since Japan does not wish to engage in a Pacific war, isn't there room for negotiation?" to which Matsuoka aggressively replied "Is there room?"[82]

That opposition by the military leaders to Matsuoka's aggressive stance took place despite the "decision" of July 2nd; "Japan will not be deterred by a possibility of a war", and despite the harsh conditions presented in the American proposal of June 21st. Consequently, Konoe decided to reform his cabinet to replace Matsuoka, although Hull withdrew his Oral Statement on the 17th.[83] From then on, Konoe was consistently keen to propose his idea of opening a summit meeting with Roosevelt until he decided to resign in October.

Moreover, during the period before the decision of July 2nd, the Japanese leaders seem to have had little idea of interpreting this proposal "as a deliberate stiffening of position in response to Berlin's imminent attack on the Soviet Union", although the conditions contained in the proposal were in fact very severe on Japan, as observed by Herbert Feis: "The offers that were placed before the Japanese contained nothing extra or guaranteed; only a chance to live at peace, and by hard and patient work earn the means of living on their crowded islands".[84] Prime Minister Konoe, for instance, wrote in his diary that the two events, the presentation of the American proposal and the outbreak of the Russo-German War, happened to occur within quite a short period "inopportunely (ori mo ori 折も折) and by chance (guzen nimo 偶然にも)".[85]

The question of whether Hull deliberately chose the date of presentation of the American proposal to be close to the date of the outbreak of the Russo-German War, and whether he stiffened the American position by using the opportunity of Berlin's imminent attack on Russia has been widely discussed in post-war Japanese academic circles rather than among the contemporary leaders who made the decision of July 2nd.[86]

Thus, the reality of Tokyo's "decision" at this stage should be more accurately recognised by historians, as Heinrichs observes: "It [the decision of July 2nd] reflected the opportunism of Japanese policy and its dependence on external developments, as well as the sense of urgency and of momentous departure that prevailed in Tokyo".[87] Heinrichs also notes the negative role of the decoded intercepts, apart from the issue of linguistic mistranslations, "What MAGIC could not capture were the fissures, doubts, crossed purposes, least-worst choices, and misapprehension that shaped the Imperial decision of July 2. The result, even taking into account the North-South ambivalence, was a picture of a more confident and resolute and therefore more fearsome Japan than was really the case".[88]

On July 4th, the U.S. President sent a message to Prime Minister Konoe demanding that Japan should not make war on the Soviet Union. This was, of course, not because the U.S. was sympathetic to Japan's fear of the North, but, rather, because it was sympathetic to the fates of Russia and Britain in the European war.

The underlying motive for sending the President's message may well have been that the U.S. recognised the high possibility of a Japanese attack on the Russian forces in the near future, in contrast to the view held by the British and expressed by them to the Russian authorities that it was not Japan's intention to move north against Russia but to move south, which was towards the British colonies. Should war break out between Russia and Japan, the U.S. was ready to support Russia to a limited extent. In other words, the U.S. position was not necessarily particularly hostile to Japan in a conflict between the Soviet Union and Japan but, as part of the U.S. policy to support Great Britain in the war in Europe, the U.S. would support Russia against Nazi Germany. In this context, the U.S. was ready to enforce a trade embargo against Japan if a war broke out between Russia and Japan but had made no preparations to intervene using U.S. military forces. The following events lend support to this analysis.

As we have seen in Chapter 5, Sumner Welles, acting for U.S. Secretary Hull who was absent from Washington, stated at a meeting with the Russian Ambassador to the U.S. Konstantin Alexandrovich Umansky on June 26th, four days after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, that the U.S. would support Russia in the Russo-German war as part of the American policy to support Britain. Welles also warned Russia at the meeting with Umansky on July 3rd that Japan would probably enter the war against Russia in the near future according to reliable information which had reached the U.S. authorities and Welles stated that the U.S would plan economic sanctions against Japan, including a natural resources embargo on Japan, if she attacked the Russian forces. When Roosevelt had talks lasting fifty minutes with Umansky on July 10th, although Umansky demanded American co-operation with Russia to prevent the Japanese entering the war and requested a clear advance announcement by the U.S. of her firm intention to retaliate against Japan if Japan attacked the Russian forces, the Americans would only repeat their intention to plan economic sanctions against Japan if war broke out between Russia and Japan.

Although Haruko Ozawa 小澤治子 of Hoso University 放送大学 believes that it was Roosevelt's intention to get the Japanese to advance to the North by encouraging Russian air raids on Japanese cities,[89] the author has not yet seen enough information to enable him to reach a conclusion as to whether Roosevelt was seeking the destruction of Russia by the Japanese forces or the destruction of Japan by Russian air raids. But while on the one hand American Secretary of State Hull understood the Japanese intention to be that "the Japanese Government was going ahead with its plans of conquest even while talking of peace with us [the Americans]", on the other hand Roosevelt secretly encouraged the Russians to bomb Japanese cities "even while talking of peace with" the Japanese.[90]

In short, as analysed in detail in this chapter, the Russian authorities were then receiving very different information from the U.S. and Britain on Japan's intentions. One was the American warning of the high possibility of a Japanese

attack to the North against Russia in the near future, and the other was the British denial of this possibility but the high possibility of a Japanese advance towards the South, while Japan herself did not and could not make any real decision at that time.

On July 8th, Magic deciphered the main points of the decisions reached at the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd, but the Americans were inevitably far from recognising the problems caused by Japan's indecisiveness.[91] Since the document was prepared as a result of the complicated procedure needed to reach a compromise agreement between the different groups which were making incompatible demands — but in fact reached no compromise and no decision — each group needed to continue to compete to pursue its own ends in a sensitive domestic balance-of-power situation. In other words, each group had to follow strictly the conditions which were initially included in the document at its own request. In this sense, as Moriyama points out, although the content of the decisions of the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd apparently contained very opportunistic conditions and was named "... National Policies in Line with Changing Circumstances", it was in reality far less flexible in its ability to meet the "Changing Circumstances" than might have been expected.[92]

On July 7th, the first mobilisation plan of the Japanese Army was ordered based on the "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies" of July 2nd. The second mobilisation plan of the Army was subsequently ordered on July 16th.[93] The Japanese Navy and other groups were suspicious about whether or not it was the Japanese Army's intention to reinforce Japan's involvement in a war against Russia. This strong suspicion remained even after the U.S. enforcement of the total oil embargo on Japan on August 1st.[94]

Although the Army gave up a plan to attack the Russian forces secretly when it prepared the "Army Military Strategy Guidelines (Rikugun Sakusen Yoko 陸軍作戦要綱)" of August 9th, it still continued to strengthen its military preparations in the North.[95] In fact, the Kwantung Army only reached the full

peak of its preparations during the autumn of 1942,[96] almost a year after the outbreak of the Pacific War against the U.S. This is an example of the seriousness of the problem of lack of flexibility. Similarly, the Japanese movements to the South became evident after the conference of July 2nd. On July 14th, Sotomatsu Kato 加藤外松, Ambassador to France, sought agreement on several conditions, including the occupation of French Indo-China, from Vice-Prime Minister Darlan. On July 21st, the French (Vichy) Government accepted the majority of the Japanese requests and exchanged notes with Japan on the 22nd.

As an example of the lack of control in Japanese politics at that time, although one group supported the concentration of troops in the North and another group favoured preparations to advance in the South, other Japanese leaders, again both military and civil, continued to make energetic efforts to achieve a diplomatic agreement. On July 12th, the Liaison Council decided upon further revisions to the American counterproposal with revisions of the draft of June 21st. As already mentioned, serious trouble was caused by Matsuoka's extreme reaction to Hull's oral statement accompanying the American counterproposal of June 21st, since Hull stated that "some Japanese leaders in influential official positions are definitely committed to a course that calls for Nazi Germany and its policies of conquest ... so long as such leaders maintain such an attitude ... is it not illusory to expect that adoption of a proposal ... offers a basis for achieving substantial results along the desired lines".[97] This "some Japanese leaders" obviously meant Matsuoka. Matsuoka instructed Nomura (Telegram #364 of July 14th) to demand the retraction of the U.S. oral statement. As Professor C. Hosoya points out, "Prime Minister Konoe found himself standing at a crossroad. One way was to replace Matsuoka with someone else to continue the negotiations with the U.S. Another was to take a counter-offensive action keeping Matsuoka as Foreign Minister".[98]

Although the second Konoe Cabinet resigned on July 16th for the purpose of replacing Matsuoka and continuing the peace talks with the U.S., the

movements in both directions, to the North and to the South, were also continued. This was undoubtedly one of the main problems which caused serious confusion in the talks and American suspicion of Japan's intentions.

While the third Konoe Cabinet was established and [Admiral] Teijiro Toyoda 豊田貞次郎 was appointed Foreign Minister on July 18th, at this stage the U.S. Government, although agreed on economic sanctions against Japan in principle, did not yet confirm a complete oil embargo at the cabinet meeting of the same day, July 18th.

On July 23rd, an agreement was reached on details of the occupation of southern French Indo-China between Major-General Sumida 澄田 and J. Decoux, Governor of French Indo-China. On July 24th, American President Roosevelt urged Ambassador Nomura to cease Japanese occupation of southern French Indo-China and withdraw Japanese troops. Roosevelt also proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China.

The subsequent events during the next few days quickly accelerated the worsening of relations between the two sides. On July 25th, the U.S. announced that a freezing of Japanese assets in the U.S. would be effective on the 26th. On the 26th, the U.S. re-established Far Eastern Military G.H.Q. in Manila and General MacArthur was appointed Commander. Great Britain announced a freezing of Japanese assets in Great Britain, followed by the Dutch East Indies on July 27th.

U.S. Total Oil Embargo on Japan

The next day, the 28th, Japanese troops began to land in southern French Indo-China. Following this, the Dutch East Indies' announcement of the end of the Japan-Netherlands oil agreement was issued. On the 29th, the signing of a joint defence agreement between Japan and French Indo-China was announced. On August 1st, the U.S. enforced a total oil embargo on Japan.

In short, the Japanese moved into southern French Indo-China, and the Americans reacted by freezing Japanese assets in the U.S., and then, together with the British and the Dutch, imposed the ABCD oil embargo on Japan. On the one hand, certain Japanese leaders, who were in favour of moving to the South primarily as an advantageous solution to the Sino-Japanese war, obviously underestimated the consequence of the West's tough reaction, despite other Japanese leaders' warnings, including Matsuoka's, and they were surprised by the American announcement of the total oil embargo on Japan. On the other hand, certain American leaders underestimated the seriousness of the problems which Japan would suffer if she lost her oil supply, and the possibility of a violent Japanese reaction, despite other American leaders' warnings, including their Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew's. In fact, Ambassador Grew expressed despair, warning that the oil embargo could lead to a serious deterioration of the situation and called these events "the vicious circle of reprisals and counter-reprisals".[99]

While "the vicious circle" created an escalation of hostilities, there were a few events which could have provided a hope of stopping it, at least temporarily, if there had been better communications between the two sides. The possibility of such hopes, however, has often been overlooked by historians of the West and of Japan even in the post-war period.

One such event was the American proposal of neutralisation of Indo-China and Japan's "refusal" of the proposal. Another was the American announcement of the "total oil embargo" of August 1st in reaction to the Japanese shinchu to southern French Indo-China. In the former case, the potential hope has been in general overlooked by Western historians, and in the latter case, ignored mainly by Japanese historians.

The process of inner miscommunications among the Japanese leaders, which was initiated by a failure in smooth communication between Roosevelt and Nomura, can be summarised as follows. On July 20th Japanese Ambassador Admiral

Nomura in Washington met Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, the Director of the Navy War Plans Division, and asked him about the American stance towards the Japanese plan to advance to southern French Indo-China, which would be carried out soon.[100]

Subsequently, Roosevelt, who received the information from Turner through Knox and other sources,[101] met Nomura on the 24th, and presented his plan of neutralisation of Indo-China by the U.S., Britain, the Netherlands, China and Japan. Nomura, however, conveyed the American proposal of neutralisation of Indo-China only in a very short sentence when he sent a non-numbered telegram to Tokyo on July 24th.[102]

The Foreign Office in Tokyo could not understand what the short sentence about the proposal actually meant. On the 27th when U.S. Ambassador Joseph Grew met Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda in Tokyo and confirmed the American proposal of neutralisation, Toyoda, who was informed of it for the first time,[103] was very surprised by the important conditions contained in it. Most of the members of the Japanese Embassy in Washington also could not immediately understand the meaning of the American proposal when it was explained by Nomura after the meeting with Roosevelt. Minister Kaname Wakasugi 若杉要 in Washington was later very surprised by the conditions of the proposal when he met Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who attended the Roosevelt-Nomura meeting of July 24th.

Since Japan's primary intention in advancing to the South was, as already analysed, motivated by a desire for a quick resolution of the disastrous Sino-Japanese conflict and fear of the possibility of Western sanctions, S. Matsumoto observes that "In any case, Roosevelt's plan of neutralisation of French Indo-China was a great proposal. It was the plan with which the Japanese could see no reason to hesitate to say 'okay' because it was the best way for them [to remove the fear of isolation, encircled by the united front]".[104]

It was probably true, as Toyoda said to Grew on the 27th, that "Although Japan will carefully consider the proposal later when Tokyo receives a more detailed report from Nomura, it is too late [for Japan] to accept the proposal [if Japan should accept it] immediately ... due to the hostile national sentiment raised after the American announcement of a freeze on assets [of the 26th]".[105] In this context, S. Matsumoto is able to raise the relevant question: "what would have been the outcome of the U.S.-Japan peace talks if the proposal of neutralisation of Indo-China had actually been reported to Tokyo [by Nomura before the announcement of a freeze on assets]".[106]

There seems to be some confusion over the chronological development of the event in Hull's memoirs. He wrote that "Japanese troops on July 21 occupied the southern portions of Indo-China ... Welles telephoned me at White Sulphur Springs on July 23 to talk over with me what he should say to Nomura who had requested an interview with him. We knew that the topic Nomura had in mind was the invasion of Indo-China".[107] The fact is, however, that the Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army began to land in the region on July 28th, one week after the 21st.[108] This means that when Nomura requested the interview with Welles on the 23rd, Japan's "invasion of Indo-China" had not yet begun, and there were still four days left before the actual landing when Roosevelt proposed the plan of the 24th. This is the reason why S. Matsumoto has emphasised that there would have been a hope of averting the conflict over the southern issue if Nomura had properly conveyed to Tokyo Roosevelt's plan of neutralisation of French Indo-China in his telegram of the 24th.

One can recognise, on the basis of contemporary American sources, that Hull was confused about the event when he published his memoirs in 1948, and therefore he overlooked the significant factor mentioned above even in the post-war period. Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs M. M. Hamilton, for instance, records in his memorandum of July 21st that "Secretary Hull talked with me ... that consideration be given to having a further conference with the

Japanese Ambassador in reference to rumors and reports that Japan intended to acquire military and naval bases in French Indo-china".[109] This memorandum indicates that the American leaders at that time still regarded the Japanese plan of shinchu as "rumors" or "intention" of invasion, rather than a plan which had already been carried out.

As a consequence of the following judgements made by American leaders, Nomura had eventually no opportunity to understand fully the importance of the President's proposal of the 24th. After Ambassador Grew sent a report to Washington that "the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs on July 27 told Mr. Grew that he (the Foreign Minister) had not received from the Japanese Ambassador here a report of the President's proposal", Hamilton sent a memorandum to Welles on the 28th, stating that there were

> strong reasons against your [Welles'] making mention of this subject to the Japanese Ambassador [Nomura] ... It seems ... that there is no need for such action. The Japanese Foreign Minister now knows through Mr. Grew of the President's proposal and the Japanese Foreign Minister certainly has his own means of checking with Admiral Nomura in regard to the question of Admiral Nomura's making a report of the President's proposal ... I [Hamilton] fear that mention by you [Welles] of the report we have that the Japanese Foreign Minister had not received a report from Admiral Nomura would be construed by the Japanese as weakness and over-eagerness on our part.[110]

On the same day, Assistant Secretary of State Cecil W. Gray also stated that "My view is that Nomura sent them the President's proposal and the Ministers there have held it".[111]

The U.S. authorities did not confirm with Nomura the importance of the President's proposal of neutralisation during the subsequent several days, and Nomura, who again failed to be aware of the seriousness of this problem, conveyed the President's proposal only in an extremely vague and short sentence when he sent a new telegram dated July 27th (#589) to Tokyo.[112] In addition, although Foreign Minister Toyoda was informed of the proposal by Ambassador Grew, the record of the Foreign Office in Tokyo reveals that Grew emphasised that this proposal was unofficial and an "Off the record conversation between Admiral Nomura and the President".[113] Thus, Tokyo could not get any official proposal

from the U.S. authorities either directly or through Nomura. Consequently, the Japanese government had no way of obtaining detailed knowledge of the President's proposal and inevitably ended the discussion on it afterwards.

On the other hand, the U.S. government, without being aware that Tokyo did not receive a detailed report on the proposal, expressed its perception of the event in its publication of 1943 saying that "The Japanese Government did not reply to the President's proposal of July 24 until August 6. On the latter date the Japanese Ambassador [Nomura] presented a proposal which he said was intended to be responsive to the President's proposal ... [However, the Japanese] proposal of August 6 entirely disregarded the President's suggestion for the neutralization of Indochina".[114] In all, this was not just the simple event described by Dallek as: "Neither of these efforts at appeasement, however, made an impression on the Japanese. They refused to take the President's neutralisation scheme seriously",[115] but it was rather that the Japanese were in reality impressed by the scheme, although they eventually failed to obtain proper information on it.

Another miscommunication followed, but this time initiated by miscommunications among the Americans about the decision on sanctions towards Japan. By the summer of 1941, U.S. trade policies, particularly those regarding oil, began to be influenced by the development of unfortunate conditions, as observed by William L. Neumann: "In mid-June of 1941 oil supplies grew so short on the east coast of the United States that all shipments from east-coast ports were prohibited. Although the reason for this action was a genuine domestic problem, restricting purchases to West Coast ports produced a major cut in Japan's oil shipments".[116]

There could be, of course, little expectation that the Japanese, who were suspicious about U.S. policies, would understand exactly the reason for American actions as being "a genuine domestic problem". Under the circumstances, some American leaders were aware of the dangerous consequences of this action.

While "Secretary Morgenthau, warmly supported by Stimson, continued his fight against the moderates in the Roosevelt cabinet and called for the ending of Japanese trade by freezing of Japanese assets",[117] the moderates maintained a cautious attitude:

> The Navy, and Admiral Stark in particular, argued strongly against cutting off Japanese oil purchases. Little hope was placed by the navy in this method of forcing a reversal in Japanese policy. The shortage of domestic oil supplies was expected to force Japan into war for the Dutch East Indies oil and into war with the United States as well. The Navy, heavily burdened by its operations in the Atlantic in the conveying of arms to Britain, did not consider itself ready for war in the Pacific. Secretary Hull was also for months reluctant to give the approval of the State Department to this drastic move.[118]

While the Japanese leaders were surprised by the "total oil embargo" of August 1st, Dallek observes that the event was much more complicated:

> Yet Roosevelt still had no intention of closing off all oil to Japan. While he wanted a comprehensive order that would allow him to do so at any time, he had no inclination to do it at once ... So as to leave petroleum policy open, the White House announcement of the President's freezing order said nothing about oil. This left the impression both in the United States and Japan that all trade between them, including petroleum exports, had been suspended. Though an announcement of August 1 indicated that applications for petroleum export licenses could be resubmitted if they did not exceed prewar quantities or involve fuels and oils suitable for use in aircraft, the administration's failure to state its policy clearly allowed government agencies to reject these applications and establish a de facto embargo on oil to Japan. Roosevelt, who left on August 3 for a conference with Churchill on board a ship in the Atlantic, did not realize that a full embargo had been introduced until early September.[119]

While there were examples of a hard line towards the talks with Japan in the U.S. government, such as: "The President, Ickes [Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes] complained, 'was still unwilling to draw the noose tight. He [the President] thought that it might be better to slip the noose around Japan's neck'",[120] the President's stance more carefully avoided any immediate provocation of the Japanese. It was, however, again impossible to expect that the contemporary Japanese leaders had any means of knowing the President's stance exactly, and they naturally interpreted the new American policy as a "total oil embargo". In fact, American sources record that a great confusion was caused among the Japanese. For instance, the memoranda by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, by the Acting Secretary of State and by the Assistant

Secretary of State dated between late July and August 1st reveal that the Japanese Ambassador and the Counsellor of the Embassy many times questioned the U.S. authorities about the precise effect of sanctions on Japanese commercial vessels.[121] In any case, one should recognise that there might have been some hope over this particular event if there had been better communications among the American authorities and between the U.S. and Japan.

Even in the post-war period, however, some historians have failed to note the important role of miscommunications experienced in the United States and mentioned above. While Joseph W. Ballantine recorded in 1942 that he was told by Welles regarding the Atlantic Conference of August 1941 that "The president considered that a public warning [a stern warning suggested by Churchill at the Conference] would be likely to precipitate further Japanese aggression rather than to discourage it",[122] Professor Sudo ignores Roosevelt's hesitation in making the decision on a total oil embargo, and states that "However, it cannot be expected that Roosevelt, who froze Japanese assets and even carried out an oil embargo, might have kept in his mind such a thoughtful consideration",[123] and he concludes that "On August 1st, the U.S. carried out in practice the oil embargo, and she seems to have been fully aware of the important meaning of such an action".[124] In the same manner, Professor Kase states that "Japan was a country which could not produce even 10% of its annual oil demand (three million barrel), therefore the oil embargo was the serious issue which threatened the survival of Japan ... Naturally, the main body [of the Navy] demanded that the government maintain its strong attitude towards the U.S. in reaction to the oil embargo. It might be possible to understand that the Americans concluded the inevitability of fighting a war against Japan when they decisively carried out the oil embargo, since the Americans could predict the consequence".[125]

While Colonel Kenryo Sato thought that the Japanese advance to the South would not cause a war since "the Japanese Army was already stationed in the northern part of French Indo-China, and [at this time] the troops would merely

[tada タダ] move to the southern part of French Indo-China",[126] Secretary of State Hull stressed in his conversation with Welles on July 23rd that "there is no theory on which Indochina could be flooded with armed forces ... for the defense of Japan. The only alternative is that this venture into Indochina has a close relation to the South Sea area and its value for offense against that area",[127] and he naturally thought that "the invasion of Southern Indo-China looked like Japan's last step before jumping off for a full-scale attack in the Southwest Pacific".[128]

Even after the American announcement of a freeze on assets of July 26th, the Japanese still misjudged the mood in the West. Colonel Suketaka Tanemura of the Twentieth Office (later the Chief of the same section) of the Army General Staff, for example, records that "The American government finally froze assets of Japanese and Chinese in the United States. However, the majority [of the members of the Twentieth Office] judged [on July 26th] that there would be no total oil embargo as long as the shinchu is limited within southern French Indo-China",[129] and as a result of this misjudgement greatly underestimating the possible consequence, Japanese troops began to land in the region two days after the announcement of the "freeze on assets".

The view of the American leaders, however, formed a sharp contrast with that of the Japanese Army General Staff. Hull commented in a telephone conversation with Welles on August 2nd: "so far as the Japs are concerned ... they are at a point right now where they must either go forward more and more toward Thailand and the Burma Road area, no matter how surreptitiously" and "Nothing will stop them [the Japanese] except force ... we should not figure that they are going to be satisfied to stop where they are".[130] Welles also mentioned later that "Obviously, the occupation of Indo-China was not really, as the Japanese claimed, for strategic operations against China. It could only be regarded as an immediate threat to the British position in Burma and Malaya, and as a thrust at the highly vulnerable position of the United States in the Philippines".[131]

The point here is that the majority of contemporary leaders on both sides made many fatal misjudgements which contributed to the situation worsening at that time, and more seriously, even at present some historians are not aware of it, as a consequence of failing to refer to primary sources. For example, Shin'ichi Sudo, on the basis of precise analysis of primary sources observes, regarding Japan's intentions of advancing to the South, that "It can be said that there was virtually no blue-print of what the Japanese strategy would be next when the troops advanced to southern French Indo-China. It was completely open, without any practical decision as to what would be Japan's strategy towards Thailand, although her policy towards the South was entitled the 'Policy towards French Indo-China and Thailand'. In the same manner, her policy towards the Dutch East Indies ... was left completely unclear as to whether they [the contemporary Japanese leaders] had any intention of using military forces towards the regions".[132] Roberta Wohlstetter gives a very different image of them by adding her explanation on the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", when arguing the issue of the Japanese decision of July 2nd: "This Sphere included all British, Dutch, French and Portuguese possessions in the Far East, and ultimately the Philippines, India and Australia".[133]

It is interesting to refer to the pre-war American view expressed in the "Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-all Production Requirements" of September 11th, 1941, because it records a very similar picture of the Sphere to that stated in the post-war publication by Wohlstetter, although it lists some different territories from her version: "The Japanese objective is the establishment of the 'East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.' It is Japan's ambition ultimately to include within this Sphere Eastern Siberia, Eastern China, Indo-China, Thai, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and possibly Burma".[134] Although the image of the Japanese as quite aggressive expansionists can be seen in both cases, the difference in the territories listed by them probably reflects the fact that the Japanese themselves at that time did not have a

clear picture of it. In fact, it can be questioned whether the contemporary Japanese leaders had such a definite vision of the Sphere since the territories of the Sphere were often vaguely and differently stated on different occasions.

In the case of Wohlstetter, she records the basis of her explanation as "It had been defined as the main national objective in July, 1940".[135] Not only ignoring the nature of the document called the "Guideline for Conducting the State of Affairs in Line with Changing Circumstances" which was, as already analysed, widely known as a Sakubun in Japan, she also ignores that in reality, the document had already been replaced as a Sakubun by another Sakubun, the Army-Navy agreement of April 17th, 1941. In addition, her reading of this document is inadequate. For example, the Portuguese possessions and Thailand were listed (Point Six of Item Two of Summary) together with the Japanese mandated territories in the Pacific (Point Five of the same Item) as areas with which good relations should be maintained.[136] Clearly, current Japanese mandated territories could not be the object, along with the Portuguese possessions, of aggressive occupation in the future. In the case of the terms "India and Australia", one cannot recognise them conclusively as an "ultimate" part of the Sphere, owing to the vagueness of the original expression.

In fact, although the document was formally adopted at the Liaison Conference of July 27th, 1940, the Army and the Navy attached an additional paper entitled "explanation" of how those items ought to be understood[137] because of the vague sentences in the "Guideline". On August 27th of the same year, the Navy submitted a new paper: "Questions and Answers on the Guideline for Conducting the State of Affairs at the Top-Level Meeting of the Navy and the Army"[138] as a "Shiryo 資料" (literally "the materials"). Furthermore, a memorandum jointly by the Army and Navy was prepared on August 28th, declaring that the Army and Navy "recognised the necessity of reconciling the interpretation" of the "Guideline".[139] The term "Dai-To-A Kyo-ei-ken 大東亜共栄圏" translated as the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" itself

was not stated in the Sakubun document of July 27th, 1940,[140] while in the case of the new document of July 2nd, 1941, the term "Dai-To-A Kyo-ei-ken" was stated but the geographic terms such as "the Portuguese possessions" and "India and Australia" were not stated in it. As such its image in the U.S. has been more expansionist than that maintained by the Japanese at that time. Indeed, Professor Ben-Ami Shillony argues that the translation of the original term "Dai-To-A Kyo-ei-ken" by the Japanese authorities was inaccurate, causing Western suspicion, and this should have been translated more literally as the "East Asia Commonwealth".[141]

Thus, there were significant international misunderstandings between the U.S. and Japan, and domestic miscommunications within Japan and within the U.S. at that time. Japanese "intention" was, in the eyes of the contemporary Western leaders and of some post-war historians, geographically obvious as stated by R. E. Sherwood: "on July 23 they [the Japanese] compelled the feeble Vichy Government to yield them bases in Indo-China from which they could launch attacks against the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies or Malaya".[142]

It was, however, not necessarily geographically obvious to the contemporary Japanese leaders. The relations between the two sides which had already developed into a hostile atmosphere, partly as a consequence of those negative and cumulative misconceptions, led to the last stage when the Magic mistranslations made the situation worse. Furthermore, it is unfortunate that the author can only conclude that those misunderstandings have largely been ignored by historians of both countries up to the present.

Ambassador Grew recorded in his diary, dated August 18th, a summary of Foreign Minister Toyoda's remarks and one of the paragraphs is as follows.

> The stationing of Japanese forces in Indo-China, resulting from the protocol for the joint defense of Indo-China, was a peaceful and protective step taken for the purpose of solving the China affair. It was an independent step taken on Japan's own initiative and no German or any other pressure had been exerted.[143]

Ambassador Grew also wrote in his diary, dated July 26th, that:

In my personal opinion Admiral Toyoda [Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda] shared the apparent belief of most Japanese officials that the United States would not resort to measures of retaliation; hence, the action of the United States in freezing Japanese assets in retaliation for the Japanese move into Indo-China caught them unawares. Whether this mistaken view of American policy arises from the inability of Japanese officials in the United States correctly to gauge American public opinion or whether they have been unable in their reports to convince the Japanese Government in this respect, I do not know.[144]

As analysed in detail in this chapter, the author is led to conclude that these paragraphs recorded by Grew expressed Japan's real intentions at the time to move to southern Indo-China as well as being convincing evidence proving the Japanese leaders' misjudgement of the high possibility of the West's tough reaction.

One American counterpart to Japan's serious misjudgement of events can be seen in the view taken by Hull's chief advisor Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, advisor to the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, who argued in a memorandum of September 5th that it was to the United States' advantage that Japan should be bogged down in a war in China,[145] that the crisis between the United States and Japan was exaggerated and that this "crisis" could be permanently maintained without serious damage to the American side.[146]

In fact the Japanese Navy Chief of Staff Nagano reported at the conference of the Liaison Council of September 3rd that "In various respects Japan is losing materials: that is, we are getting weaker. By contrast, the enemy is getting stronger. With the passage of time, we will get increasingly weaker, and we won't be able to survive".[147] Hornbeck thought things could go on as they were, whereas the Japanese felt themselves under very great pressure. Nagano stated at the conference of the Liaison Council of October 23rd that "[the Navy alone] is expending four hundred tons of oil per hour" under the total oil embargo and "The situation is urgent. We want to decide one way or the other quickly".[148]

Following the Indo-China issue and the new American sanctions, Konoe's proposal for a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoe himself was offered on

August 7th, 1941, in circumstances the details of which are analysed in this chapter.

It is interesting to note the following two historical facts. One is that, although around 500,000 men left Japan for the North in the summer of 1941 and the total number of Japanese soldiers assembled at the border with Russia grew to more than 800,000 by November 1941,[149] no Western reaction strong enough to have developed into a war ensued at that time, whereas when less than 200,000 Japanese soldiers in total were sent to the southern region, including southern French Indo-China,[150] their deployment eventually caused the Pacific War in December 1941. In other words, while the Japanese military preparations were far more intensive in the North, ironically, serious Western reaction and the actual war was caused in the South.

The other interesting fact is that American foreign strategy in the Far East has displayed similar tendencies during both the pre-war and the post-war period. In the case of the pre-war period, although the U.S. did not move when Japan occupied northern French Indo-China in September 1940, the U.S. reacted strongly and enforced a total oil embargo on Japan when Japanese troops landed in southern Indo-China from the North, and started to prepare for war with Japan. Similarly, in the case of the post-war period, the U.S. accepted the Communist Hanoi regime when it ruled North Vietnam only, but when North Vietnam forces attacked South Vietnam across the 17th parallel, the U.S. became fully involved in the Vietnam War. Although it is not clear to the author whether or not the U.S. government positively regarded the 17th parallel as a line of defence fundamental to the national security of the U.S., a serious reaction from the U.S. did occur on two occasions once that line was crossed by the opposite side.

A symbolic event was the departure of Iwakuro and Ikawa, the Japanese members of "John Doe Associates", from Washington to Japan on July 31st. After Joseph W. Ballantine, one of Hull's chief advisors, saw them at the last meeting on July 25th, he reported that Colonel Iwakuro and Ikawa seemed to have no hope of

their success in the future.[151] It is now known, however, that they still continued their efforts to avert the conflict in their own way after leaving the U.S. Konoe's proposal for a summit meeting was presented to the U.S. while Iwakuro and Ikawa were on board ship crossing the Pacific.

On August 9th, 1941, the Army General Staff decided internally on a policy of the "Army Military Strategy Guidelines", which suspended further implementation of the Army's intention to advance on the northern border. On the same day the Atlantic Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt, which finished on the 12th, was taking place on the other side of the world. This conference culminated in the announcement of the Atlantic Charter on August 14th.

On August 16th, at a meeting of the Bureau of Military and Naval Affairs of Military Strategy (Riku-Kaigun Kyoku-Bu-Cho Kaigi 陸海軍局部長会議), Naval representatives presented "Directives for Implementing National Policy (Teikoku Kokusaku Suiko Hoshin 帝国国策遂行方針)". On the 17th the U.S. President handed the "warning to Japan" to Ambassador Nomura, simultaneously suggesting the reopening of discussions between Japan and the United States. The Liaison Council approved a reply to the American counterproposal of August 17th and the content of the Konoe message on August 26th. Colonel Hideo Iwakuro had returned from America and Army Minister Hideki Tojo listened enthusiastically for one and a half hours at the Liaison Council conference to his report that a successful agreement in U.S-Japan negotiations was possible.[152] Colonel Iwakuro also pointed out, using information reported by Colonel Kenkichi Shinjo 新庄健吉, the serious difference in military and economic power between Japan and the U.S. He emphasised that the capacity ratio in steel was 20 to 1, oil more than 100 to 1, coal 10 to 1, electric power 6 to 1, cars more than 100 to 1, planes 6 to 1 and labour force 4.5 to 1. Overall, U.S. capacity was twenty times greater than Japan's.[153] The following day, the 27th, Colonel Iwakuro was transferred to French Indo-China, but Ikawa's subsequent activities were supported by the Chief of the Military

Affairs Bureau Akira Muto 武藤章, a former superior of Colonel Iwakuro's in the Ministry of the Army.[154]

Failure of the Roosevelt-Konoe Meeting Plan

In the circumstances, Konoe attempted to arrange a summit meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoe himself. In fact, Konoe and his cabinet members repeatedly offered these meeting plans throughout the summer, between August and October of 1941.

On August 27th Ambassador Nomura handed a message (known as the "Konoe message") to the U.S. President, to which the President replied on September 3rd. Three days earlier, on September 1st, Japanese Naval forces had established their 1941 overall war footing. On September 3rd the Liaison Council adopted the "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies", which had been agreed by the Army and the Navy on August 30th.

Although Roosevelt twice expressed his support for Konoe's meeting plan in late August, Dr. Stanley Hornbeck strongly opposed it from his position as advisor to the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull was also reluctant to accept these offers from Japan. When Konoe's last attempt to open a summit meeting was refused by the U.S. in October, he decided to dissolve his cabinet. Konoe's resignation was followed by the new Tojo Cabinet which eventually failed in its intensive diplomatic efforts to avert the Pacific conflict.

In Japan, Konoe wished to meet President Roosevelt, and thought that such a meeting would, in itself, be important.[155] Konoe seems to have been optimistic and it is thought that the concessions he could have offered would have been supported by Emperor Hirohito.[156] Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda 豊田貞次郎 decided to compromise on all necessary conditions with the U.S. including the Japanese military withdrawal from China, once the meeting was opened.[157]

Similarly, the leaders of the General Staff of the Navy and of the Army judged that the possibility of success in reaching at least a temporary agreement was high. In fact, the General Staff of the Army foresaw "probably no possibility of failure".[158]

The Japanese authorities actually arranged a ship for the U.S., the *Nitta Maru* 新田丸, and started to choose members to accompany Konoe and Toyoda for a summit meeting. The members chosen were: Mamoru Shigemitsu 重光葵, former Ambassador to China, Russia and Britain (later Foreign Minister) and Vice-Foreign Minister Eiji Amo 天羽英二 from the Foreign Office, General Kenji Doihara 土肥原賢二, representing the Army, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (Gunmu Kyoku-cho 軍務局長) Akira Muto 武藤章 (Major-General) from the Ministry of the Army, the Army Vice-Chief Osamu Tsukada 塚田攻 from the General Staff of the Army, Admiral Zengo Yoshida 吉田善吾, representing the Navy, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau Takasumi Oka 岡敬純 from the Ministry of the Navy, the Navy Vice-Chief Nobutake Kondo 近藤信竹 from the General Staff of the Navy, and other leaders.[159]

The important points were that their positive prognoses for the outcome of the plan were similar, despite their daily discords with each other on other matters, and the fact that the chosen representatives were all quite powerful people in Japan at that time.[160]

It is interesting to observe, however, that some adversaries have interpreted this arrangement made by Konoe and his supporters in a very different way, one which Konoe and the other leaders in Tokyo would not have imagined at that time. The former Chief of the Economic Affairs Division of the State Department Herbert Feis, for instance, has emphasised even in his post-war publication that "Konoe stressed ... that senior officials (Vice-Chiefs of Staff) of both branches would accompany him on his mission ... But it seems to me [Feis] far more likely that the Army and Navy had other thoughts in mind ... They would be

there to see that Konoye did not yield to the wish for peace or the will of the President".[161]

Accordingly, it is worth analysing in detail the real intentions of the Japanese leaders towards a summit meeting at this stage. Herbert Feis observes that: "The [Japanese] Navy agreed to his going at once. But Tojo, Minister of War, remained opposed on the score that no matter how the meeting was managed and what was said, relations with Germany would be hurt. But he did not impose an absolute veto. He wrote Konoye that if it was his firm intention to support the basic principles of the existing Japanese plans, and to carry out a war against the United States if the President failed to grasp the true intentions of the Empire [of Japan], then the Army would suspend objection. 'However', Tojo's letter concluded, 'you shall not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against America'".[162] Under the circumstances, as noted by Chihiro Hosoya, "One of the most persistent obstacles to progress in the negotiations was, of course, Japan's obligation under the Tripartite Pact".[163] When one takes into account the following factors, however, one can recognise that Tojo's initial worry about the possibility of hurting relations with Germany was strategically natural, but it does not necessarily mean that he in reality maintained a very aggressive attitude to the United States.

Firstly, the primary motivation of the Japanese Army in its involvement in the Tripartite Pact with Germany was, as already mentioned, to create a potential second front against Russia. Secondly, the Army had not yet abandoned its military plan, the Kan-Toku-En Manoeuvres, to attack the Soviet Far Eastern Army, and therefore it was still earnestly preparing for a possible Russo-Japanese war in the following summer, 1942.[164]

Thirdly, Tojo's position within the Army was known to be that of a strong proponent of implementing the Kan-Toku-En Manoeuvres, and this was in fact known even by the American intelligence services at that time. In the words of

Sherman Miles, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff of the Military Intelligence Division, for example, Tojo was known for his "particular dislike for the Russians" and "as vice Minister of War, he [Tojo] created a sensation in 1938" by predicting that "Japan would have to fight Russia".[165]

Nevertheless, even Tojo "did not impose an absolute veto" on Konoe's trip for a summit meeting. As a consequence, as noted by Hosoya, "Following Konoe's suggestion of a summit conference in August 1941, there was an unmistakable shift in the Japanese position. Konoe seemed to want to avoid war with the United States at any cost, even if it meant virtually nullifying the pact [with Germany] ... Thus, the Japanese proposal of September 6 declared that 'should the United States participate in the European war, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact shall be independently decided [by Japan]'. This was a significant concession that met in large part the American demands".[166]

Of course, it is true as Hull emphasised in his memoirs[167] that part of Tojo's statement seemed to be aggressive: "you [Konoe] shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against America" if Roosevelt failed "to grasp the true intentions" of Japan. At a later stage, however, Tojo himself inherited Konoe's policy of "independent decision" with regard to the Tripartite Pact, when he formed a new cabinet in October. This fact indicates that, in the summer of 1941, Tojo wished to maintain close relations with Germany, but not to the point of risking involvement in a war with the United States.

In addition, although there was the important factor that "One can assume that ... it would have been extremely difficult for Konoe and the other Japanese leaders to state unambiguously to the United States that they expected virtually to abrogate the pact [with Germany]",[168] the Navy resolutely stated its opposition to the Pact in a very explicit tone. According to the Kido Diary, the Navy Chief of Staff Osami Nagano stated at the meeting with the Emperor on July 31st that Japan should try hard to avert a war with the United States, retiring from its alliance with Germany.[169] The significance of this statement made by the representative

of the Navy, however, has not been clearly recognised by some historians. Just as the Magic translators often did, Feis, for instance, mistranslates this statement as "retiring from its alliance with Germany, if need be" and characterises Nagano's statements as a "crossroad marker",[170] although the words "if need be" do not exist in the original Kido Diary.

Nagano's tone was in fact much clearer, stating that he was "strongly opposed to maintaining the Tripartite Pact, since in his view a successful adjustment of U.S.-Japan relations was impossible if Japan kept this [Pact] up". Nagano also stated that he "was doubtful whether Japan would win at all" even though in his view Japan would have to fight against the Americans if the United States continued an oil embargo on Japan as a result of the maintenance of the Tripartite Pact. The latter statement was misunderstood even by the Emperor, who stated to the Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Koichi Kido 木戸幸一, after the meeting with Nagano that the opinion of the Navy Chief of Staff "was very dangerous, urging a reckless war".[171] It is, however, obvious from the context that Nagano's true intention was in fact to warn against the danger of maintaining the Tripartite Pact by pointing out that such a policy could eventually cause a "desperate war", rather than to urge keeping the Pact up and thus enter a "desperate war".

The Emperor's misunderstanding of Nagano was caused by their different perspectives on the effect of maintaining the Pact. The Emperor believed at this stage that a successful adjustment with the U.S. without retiring from the alliance with Germany was still possible. Kido, who shared this view, advised him that "Nagano's opinion is over-simplified". Kido emphasised the view, which the American decision makers would not have imagined at that time, that "Taking into account the fact that the United States is a country which enthusiastically respects international treaties, it is very doubtful that if Japan annulled the Tripartite Pact it would earn American friendship, rather it would earn contempt".[172] In retrospect, Nagano's view was more correct than those of the

Emperor and of Kido, although Feis twists the meaning of Nagano's statement, making it seem far more aggressive against the Americans than it really was.

Despite this initial misunderstanding and discord, however, the Emperor and the Navy eventually developed closer perspectives on the matter. As observed by Feis, "a report made by the Navy to the Emperor ... restated what Admiral Nagano ... had said — that the choice before Japan was among negotiation, collapse, or war; and it favored negotiation. The Emperor, therefore, told Konoye, 'the meeting with the President should take place as soon as possible'".[173] Thus, the survival of the Tripartite Pact seems to have been in question.

Furthermore, Konoe's decision to meet Roosevelt to avoid a war with the United States seems to have been supported by certain middle-ranking officers in addition to the senior officials mentioned above. Colonel Kenryo Sato, the Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Ministry of the Army, for instance, later stated that "Altogether I was very impressed by the strong will of the young noble Prime Minister, Prince Konoe, in his decision [regarding a summit meeting]".[174] The atmosphere observed in Tokyo should not be overlooked by historians. In this connection, if it was the case as stated by Feis that "'Magic' had ended belief in Konoye's power to settle Japanese policies",[175] it is obvious that the decoded intercepts failed to capture accurately the contemporary mood in Tokyo, and contributed to the American refusal of the proposed plan of a summit meeting.

There were also other disputes between the United States and Japan. Firstly, their positions towards the China issue were very different. Hull emphasised that "we could not [cooperate with the Konoe Cabinet] at the expense of our own principles and interests, those of China, and those of the other nations concerned in the Far East".[176] However, the American position in reality was, in Schroeder's words, that "she did not intend to go to war for the sake of China" at this stage, although she would "go to war to defend American territory" if necessary.[177]

F. C. Jones notes that: "It is likely ... that no more agreement over China would have been reached at Juneau or Honolulu than was in fact reached in

Washington. Yet, it does not follow from this that a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would have been devoid of all result or benefit. If there could be no American-Japanese agreement about China there did not necessarily have to be war over the matter".[178]

Secondly, the American leaders were also under pressure from Churchill, who had to worry about the security of the British territories in the Far East and therefore wished the U.S. government to maintain a coercive posture towards Japan. However, as noted by Feis, Roosevelt "suggested [after the meeting with Churchill in August] that it [Churchill's plan of warning Japan] be toned down, and coupled with an offer to go on talking with Japan" fearing that a coercive posture might "arouse Japan to war to save its pride". In addition, "The American people seemed warmly to approve all measures of support for Britain ... But there was a gap between feeling and will which could be ruinous".[179] Thus, it is hard to accept that the United States and Japan at this stage confronted, in the words of Ben-Zvi, "an absolute choice between a comprehensive settlement and an open conflict".[180]

In this connection, Akira Irie sees it as unfortunate that "few of them [in Washington] bothered to refer to Ambassador Grew and his embassy",[181] although Grew sent "solicitous" messages from Tokyo[182] urging American acceptance of a summit meeting plan. Grew in fact commented on it in a telegram of September 29th as the "substantial hope" of avoiding war.[183] While Feis of the State Department later emphasised that "Grew was moved ... not by evidence",[184] Irie observes that "embassy estimates of Japanese politics and military thinking seem to have been more sophisticated and accurate than those in the State Department on which the latter based its politics". Irie notes that "Had the embassy [in Tokyo] been given more leeway ... it is not inconceivable that the Japanese military might have retained some hope that the China War could be settled without inviting open conflict with the United States".[185]

In the case of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, he naturally considered that: "Konoye, Toyoda, and Nomura were insisting that their suggestion for the meeting be kept strictly secret, for the reason that, if premature publicity occurred, the elements in Japan hostile to any such move would defeat it. This indicated to us [the American leaders] ... that a substantial opposition existed in Japan to any efforts to improve relations with the United States. Included in this opposition were powerful military officials and many other Japanese who were being whipped up by the incessant activities of the German Embassy in Tokyo".[186] It is true that there was a "substantial opposition" in Japan, just as there were strong voices opposing any relaxation of the American coercive posture towards "Japan as an ally of Adolf Hitler"[187] in the United States. However, it seems that there is no firm basis for concluding that the behaviour of those elements hostile to a summit meeting plan might not have changed, had Tokyo and Washington successfully reached an agreement for a future adjustment, and thus had inevitably hurt relations with Germany. On his part, what Konoe expected was to influence those elements to behave differently by the sudden announcement of a successful outcome from the talks with the United States.

The American decision makers including Hull, as mentioned, also often overestimated the influence of German activities in Tokyo on the formation of Japanese policy. The reality was, as Schroeder notes, that "because of the tight secrecy imposed by Foreign Minister Toyoda, the Germans were unable to find out what was going on in the Japanese-American negotiations" and "The anniversary of the Tripartite Pact came and went on September 27 with only the most restrained observances in Japan".[188] Two days after the anniversary, Ambassador Grew emphasised in his telegram to Washington, just as the same view was reported to Berlin by German Ambassador Eugen Ott on May 5th (see Chapter 10), that "the Japanese Government ... actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's [Axis] alliance adherence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter formally into negotiations with the United States".[189]

Nonetheless, Hull and other decision makers in Washington exaggerated the role of "many other Japanese" anti-American activities under the influence of the Germans. It is ironic that the aim of German diplomacy sketched by Ribbentrop as early as 1938 was met effectively at this stage. In fact, in a memorandum of January 2nd, 1938, Ribbentrop stated that "To be sure ... England and France must have no reason to doubt that Italy and Japan are supporting us firmly, and that, if necessary, the joint forces of the coalition would be employed in a lightning blow", despite the fact that "the Japanese approached him in June [1938] with a plan for a military alliance against Russia" and that "several months of [German-Japanese] negotiations ... eventually failed in the summer of 1939, primarily because Ribbentrop demanded, and the Japanese refused, an effective military pact against the Western powers".[190]

Irie notes that: "They [Ambassador Grew and his staff] might better have emphasized to their superiors that there existed no strong current of anti-Americanism in Japanese public opinion. Had they done so, the administration in Washington might have been forced to reexamine its assumption that there was an unreconcilable gap between the two countries' policies in East Asia". But what the Embassy in Tokyo actually maintained was a tendency "to dwell on the side of the Japanese mentality that might drive the nation to commit irrational acts out of a sense of isolation, frustration, and desperation", and therefore, the Embassy's reporting and recommendations were not "all that could be desired".[191]

Furthermore, it was quite natural and reasonable that Konoe and his supporters insisted the proposed plan be kept secret, because, in fact, certain media both in Japan and in the United States had frequently interrupted the efforts made by the officials towards the peace talks. One example is the report of the so-called Tojo speech of November 30th, 1941, which was the subject of an official protest by the American authorities to the Japanese representatives in Washington immediately after it had been reported. This information was originally reported by the Japanese Domei 同盟 News Agency and then by the

American media, and has often been quoted even in post-war works as "a saber-rattling speech"[192] or "an aggressive statement to a public rally",[193] although Japanese primary sources show that this speech was not actually made.[194]

In addition, as already shown in Part 1 of this thesis, there was another important factor which suggests the greater possibility of a hopeful outcome of a summit meeting, in comparison with the previous case of the Konoe-Chiang meeting plan of 1937. Various efforts made by Konoe and his supporters to arrange a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek were consistently interrupted by the subsequent occurrence of regional military clashes, because their efforts were made after the outbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The emotional resentment of the members of regional troops was, therefore, barely controlled by the top decision-makers. Not only the Japanese troops, but also the Chinese troops could be, as Fei Fu-heng 斐復恒 of the Chinese National Defence Strategy Committee recognised at that time, uncontrollable.[195] This factor did not exist in the case of the summer of 1941. One should note this important difference since Hull, when he explained the motivation of his rejection of a summit meeting, continued to insist even after the Pacific War was over that "We could not forget that Konoye had been Premier when Japan invaded China in 1937".[196] Although the author agrees with Hull's view that the activities of the "powerful military officials" should not have been underestimated in general, in this specific event they were less relevant.

The author essentially agrees with a statement made by Feis that the primary records "do not confirm ... that Konoye was prepared, without reserve or trickery, to observe the rules set down by Hull" in the summer of 1941.[197] However, the important point here is that Konoe then did not urge the Americans to reach a final agreement by reconciling all conflicting issues immediately, but searched for the possibility of reaching a U.S.-Japan modus vivendi to avert the immediate crisis across the Pacific. In this sense, as Hosoya notes, "Konoe was prepared to make significant concessions at the time ... if Roosevelt would meet

Japan's demands to some extent. But this emphasis on direct, personal communication between the two leaders was not understood by the Americans, who continued to maintain that a top level meeting was in and of itself meaningless" since "the problems had first to be clearly defined and an agreement nearly concluded in preliminary discussions".[198]

In reality, some conflicting issues were not simple enough to be reconciled immediately. A certain perception gap on the China issue, for example, is not yet reconciled between the Americans and the Japanese even at present. The Americans thought that "To talk of an understanding with Japan was to desert China, and so long as the policy was to help the latter there could be no easy compromise with the former while there was conflict between the two".[199]

In Japan, a certain doubt about the Japanese position on the China question was, as studied in Part 1, recognised by a number of leaders at that time, but the "Manchuria" issue was in their eyes very different. Many Japanese leaders recognised in principle that Japanese troops had to withdraw from "China" partly because they themselves could not find any clear aims and justification for involvement in the China War from 1937.

During the periods both before and after the Manchurian Incident, however, there was virtually no traditional view in Japan that Manchuria was part of China, whereas the Americans automatically accepted the view. In Japan, Manchuria had traditionally been seen as a country of the Tungusic Manchus, not as a proper territory of the Han Chinese.[200] The point of the argument was, as Kanji Ishihara of the Kwantung Army strongly emphasised at that time, the denial of justification of any Japanese intention to rule the country of the Manchus, but not the question of whether the Manchus had to return their homeland to the Han Chinese.[201] Thus, the issue of Manchuria was in Japan's eyes not simply a matter of the justification of establishing a Japanese puppet state, but was also an issue similar to that of Tibet.

Of course, the author agrees with the view that the Japanese policy of 1941 was determined in Tokyo, and not by local initiative as a result of the loss of central control from Tokyo. However, the authorities in Tokyo had to consider seriously the reality in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, since, as mentioned in Part 1 the Japanese forces were already heavily involved in the complex local balance of power among the factional groups of Chinese and several ethnic minorities of Tungus and Mongols, in addition to the largest minority, the Manchus and the Khalkhas. This was one of the important factors which made it difficult for the Japanese troops to withdraw from the region immediately. While some historians tend to emphasise only the aspect that popular sentiment saw Manchuria as a compensation for the 100,000 Japanese lives lost in the Russo-Japanese War and as a buffer against Russian power in the North,[202] most observers tend to overlook the other factor, the complex local balance of power mentioned above. It is unlikely that the American decision makers studied this seriously, while the Japanese leaders did not explain it fully to the Americans, presumably because they assumed that the Americans shared this "common knowledge" with the Japanese.

This perception gap became a decisive issue when the American government presented the Hull Note and demanded that Tokyo withdraw its troops from "China", including Manchuria. The Tokyo authorities eventually judged it unacceptable mainly because they could not easily withdraw troops from some areas, particularly from "Manchuria". Partly against this background, the contemporary Japanese sentiment that Japan could not "desert Manchukuo" was common at the time they received the Hull Note, just as Hull felt that he could not desert the Chinese.

Of course, the contemporary Japanese leaders did not intend to fight for the sake of the Manchus, just as the Americans did not fight for the sake of the Chinese. It is true that the Japanese thought that they could not give Manchukuo up in a strategic sense for reasons of their own national security. But there were

strong sentiments and beliefs maintained widely in Japan, both among the decision makers and on the popular level, that they fought partly for the greater good, just as many Americans seriously believed that they fought partly for the sake of the Chinese during the Pacific War. Thus, whatever the content of their war propaganda, these sentiments and beliefs should not be considered marginal or ridiculous by historians.[203]

Furthermore, as studied in this thesis, while virtually no post-war Japanese believes that any attempt at Japanese rule over Manchuria could be justified, many would see Manchuria as a country of the Tungusic Manchus but not part of China proper. Taking into account that there exists little sense in the West of recognition of the historical and sensitive national conflict between the Han Chinese and the Tungusic Manchus, this is still a serious perception gap remaining up to the present. In any case, such a desire stated by Feis that Konoe must have been "prepared without reserve ... to observe the rules set down by Hull" in the summer of 1941 was unrealistic.

Waldo Heinrichs concludes that "The Japanese said the meeting was an essential first step ... The Americans regarded the meeting as a last step".[204] Thus, the serious question considered later in November, whether a policy of reaching a modus vivendi could have been a practical way to avert the immediate clash, had already originated at this stage.

The possibility of success of a meeting with the U.S. is, of course, not definite. However, although the author recognises the serious difficulties in reaching an agreement with the U.S., his analysis in detail has led him to believe that it was more hopeful than is generally realised.

In this sense, the author wishes to emphasise his support for the view of Ben-Zvi, who points out that "Although there is no clear-cut evidence that Konoye could have actually persuaded the leaders of the Japanese army to accept a modus vivendi agreement, it is equally uncertain that a compromise settlement

acceptable to both the Roosevelt administration and the Japanese army was beyond reach".[205]

F. C. Jones argues more clearly that "A personal meeting with Konoye might have convinced the President that Japan would fight ... unless something of the sort were done. Konoye might, also, have been able to indicate that ... if a collision between Japan and America could be averted until the Axis Powers received a decisive check in Europe, much could then be changed in Japan which could not at the moment be altered".[206] It is an important point when taking into account the views emphasised by other observers, such as General Marshall's argument in his testimony.

This opportunity arose again not necessarily because of any sense of pacifism on the part of the military leaders, but at least in part owing to their lack of confidence in the outcome of a military conflict with the Anglo-American powers.

In the United States, although Roosevelt's attitude immediately after the meeting with Churchill in August appeared encouraging for the Japanese leaders when he met Ambassador Nomura on August 17th and suggested a possible place for a summit meeting might be Alaska not Honolulu, Hornbeck repeatedly opposed the meeting plan. When one analyses Hornbeck's memoranda of that period, one can easily identify his serious misjudgement of the situation of the opposition at that time. Hornbeck thought that the crisis between the two sides was exaggerated,[207] and that, as already mentioned, he thought things could go on as they were. At the same time his image of Japan as a country ruled by aggressive military leaders rather than by the moderates within the government[208] made him blind to the possibility of Konoe being able to arrange a successful summit meeting. In this context, he realised neither the danger of the war nor the possibilities of Konoe's offer.

Roberta Wohlstetter sums it up thus: "Hornbeck's enthusiasm for a firm U.S. stand against Japan — to the point of forcing the conflict — was based on two

convictions: (1) that the Japanese wanted desperately to avoid war with the United States and (2) that if Japan did fight, the war would be short and would end in a complete and easy victory for the United States".[209]

In short, it might be seen that the first opportunity, in April 1941, for reaching an agreement between the two sides was mainly prevented by Matsuoka's misjudgement, including his underestimation of the U.S. leaders' hostility towards Nazi Germany, and the next opportunity in the summer was mainly lost through Hornbeck's misjudgement, including his underestimation of the seriousness of the crisis. This happened before the last opportunity in November was significantly interrupted by the Magic mistranslations and distortions. It is also interesting to note the similarity of the beliefs in diplomacy between Matsuoka and Hornbeck; that a country should maintain strong pressure on the opposite side for the purpose of reaching the necessary agreement (see Chapter 5).

The following records may serve to illustrate the serious effect of both Matsuoka's and Hornbeck's misjudgements at that time. Regarding Matsuoka, Toshikazu Kase, the former secretary to Foreign Minister Matsuoka, wrote that:

> In the busy morning of the 8th [the next morning immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941], I [Kase] rushed to Matsuoka's house by car. When I reported the news to him [about Japan's "great victory"' in Hawaii], Matsuoka [who had already left the Foreign Office more than four months before the attack] said that he did wish to avert a war even in the event of the worst outcome [of the talks].

Matsuoka was disappointed by the news, in spite of the ebullient atmosphere which had dominated Japan since the exciting news of the Japanese Navy's "miracle success" in attacking the greatest Navy of the world, i.e. the American Navy. Thus, Kase was surprised by Matsuoka's disappointment in hearing the news, and "I [Kase] have a strong impression of Matsuoka's reaction even up to now [1970]".[210]

With regard to Hornbeck, a memorandum signed by him on November 27th proclaimed his confidence in terms of three admirably precise "wagers":

In the opinion of the undersigned, the Japanese Government does not desire or intend or expect to have forthwith armed conflict with the United States. The Japanese Government, while launching new offensive operations at some point or points in the Far East, will endeavor to avoid attacking or being attacked by the United States. It therefore will not order or encourage action by its agents (foremost among which are its armed forces) which, if taken, would lead toward use by the United States of armed force by way of retaliation or resistance. So far as relations directly between the United States and Japan are concerned there is less reason today than there was a week ago for the United States to be apprehensive lest Japan make "war" on this country. Were it a matter of placing bets, the undersigned would give odds of five to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before December 15 (the date by which General Gerow has affirmed that he would be "in the clear" so far as consummation of certain disposals of our forces is concerned); would wager three to one that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before the 15th of January (i.e., 7 weeks from now); would wager even money that the United States and Japan will not be at "war" on or before March 1 (a date more than 90 days from now, and after the period during which it has been estimated by our strategists that it would be to our advantage for us to have "time" for further preparation and disposals) ... Stated briefly, the undersigned does not believe that this country is now on the immediate verge of "war" in the Pacific.[211]

Subsequent events up to the collapse of the Konoe Cabinet in the middle of October are set out below. On September 6th a meeting of the council of the Japanese Supreme Command in the Presence of the Emperor, 御前会議 (Gozen Kaigi), was held and adopted the "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies in Line with Changing Circumstances (Josei no Sui-i ni tomonau Teikoku Kokusaku Yoko 情勢ノ推移ニ伴フ帝国国策要綱)": preparation for war against the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands in case of failure to avert hostilities, together with continuing peace efforts through negotiations with the U.S. and Britain.[212] Ambassador Nomura handed the proposal of September 4th to Secretary of State Hull. On September 11th President Roosevelt announced his strategy of opening fire on German and Italian ships in the Atlantic to protect American supplies being sent to Britain

Between September 11th and 17th, a simulated attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out at the Japanese Navy College. D-day was assumed to be Sunday, November 16th. The simulation assumed that the Japanese fleet had been sighted by American aircraft on the 15th (one day before D-day), and that two aircraft carriers and 127 planes had been lost.[213] On September 18th the Army General Staff issued the order to prepare for war in the southern region.

On September 20th the Liaison Council approved the final draft of the plan for the improved regulation of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S. On September 24th, the Japanese Navy held a meeting to decide whether or not the plan to attack Pearl Harbor was viable, but no conclusion was reached. The Combined Fleet supported the plan, Navy Command opposed the plan, and the First Aircraft-carrier Unit was cautious but tended more to opposition than to support.[214] Tokyo sent message #83 in diplomatic code J-19, the "Bomb Plot" message, to Honolulu, requesting U.S. ship and harbour information.[215] On September 25th Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, Hajime Sugiyama and Osami Nagano, requested a final decision from the government by the middle of October on whether or not it intended to go to war. The plan for the improved regulation of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S. was approved by the Liaison Council on September 25th and submitted to the U.S. Ambassador.

On September 26th Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto 山本五十六 reported his private view that war against the United States should be avoided because victory would be virtually impossible, based on the result of the simulation exercise held at the Japanese Navy College between the 11th and the 17th. On September 27th Ambassador Nomura handed the plan for the improved regulation of diplomatic relations between Japan and the U.S. to Secretary of State Hull.

On September 29th both the First Aircraft-carrier Unit and the Eleventh Aircraft-carrier Unit jointly opposed the Pearl Harbor attack plan.[216] Consular Assistant Takeo Yoshikawa 吉川猛夫 (a Japanese Navy Sub-Lieutenant) in Hawaii sent message #178 to Tokyo in diplomatic code J-19 in reply to their message #83 of the 24th.[217] On September 30th Major-General Sadaaki Kagesa 影佐禎昭 handed the Konoe Note concerning Japan-U.S. negotiations to the Chairman of the Nanking government 南京国民政府, Wang Ching-wei 汪兆銘.

On October 2nd Secretary of State Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that the proposal to hold talks between Roosevelt and Konoe had been rejected because it was necessary to have reached agreement in principle prior to such a

meeting.[218] He delivered a memorandum relating to the various Japanese proposals. German troops commenced their assault on Moscow. On October 3rd Admiral Yamamoto persuaded the Commanders-in-Chief of the First and Eleventh Aircraft-carrier Units of the need for the Pearl Harbor attack in the case of a war becoming inevitable.[219] On October 4th the Liaison Council broke up without considering the U.S. reply of the 2nd. On October 5th the Japanese Army concluded that there was no hope of successful negotiations, but the Navy wanted an extension of the period of decision-making before commencing hostilities. On October 9th, message #83 was received and decoded in Washington, but Pearl Harbor was not notified. On October 10th message #178 was decoded in Washington, but again no details were sent to Pearl Harbor.[220] Between October 9th and 13th a simulation of the attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out by the Japanese Navy. D-day was assumed to be Sunday, December 8th (Tokyo Time).[221]

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2 Togo, Shigenori 東郷茂徳. *Jidai no Ichimen 時代の一面* (A Dimension of the Times), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1989, p. 371.

3 Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy 1900-1950*, The American Library of World Literature, Inc., New York, 1951, p. 38.

4 In fact, the content of the talks between Japanese Ambassador Nomura and U.S. Secretary of State Hull, which was reported to Tokyo at that time, clearly reveals some significant differences of stance between them. On June 26th Nomura insisted that he believed that the Tripartite Pact with Germany was compatible with the policy of keeping peaceful

relations between the Unted States and Japan, although American leaders consistently requested Japan to break the alliance with Germany. On August 23rd, when Nomura strongly expressed Japan's desire for a reduction of American military aid to Russia through Vladivostok, the Russian military base near Japan, Hull did not accept the need for it, and laughed. See Gaimu-sho 外務省(Ministry of Foreign Affairs). *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichi-bei Kosho 1941, (Jo-kan) 日本外交文書— 日米交渉1941 (上巻)* (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — U.S.-Japan Negotiations in 1941 (Vol. 1)), 1990, pp. 130, 251.

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6 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichi-bei Kosho 1941, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 20.

7 Shiozaki, Hiroaki 塩崎弘明. *Nichi-Ei-Bei Senso no Kiro — Taiheiyo no Yuwa o meguru Sei-Senryaku 日英米戦争の岐路 — 太平洋の宥和をめぐる政戦略* (The Crossroads of the Japanese-Anglo-American War — Appeasement Politics and Strategies in the Pacific), Yamakawa Shuppan-sha 山川出版社, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 150-8.

8 Ibid., pp. 152-3.

9 Kase, Toshikazu 加瀬俊一. *Nihon Gaiko-shi 23 — Nichi-Bei Kosho 日本外交史23 — 日米交渉* (A History of Japan's Foreign Policy Vol. 23 — U.S.-Japan Negotiations), Kashima Kenkyusho Shuppan-kai 鹿島研究所出版会, Tokyo, 1970, op. cit., p. 1, p. 26.

10 This translation is the author's.

H. Shiozaki, op. cit., pp. 160-1.

11 Hosoya, Chihiro 細谷千博. *Nichi-Ei Kankei-shi — 1917-1949 日英関係史—1917-1949* (A History of Anglo-Japanese Relations — 1917-1949), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai 東京大学出版会, Tokyo, 1982, pp. i-ii, 37.

12 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 82.

13 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichi-bei Kosho 1941, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 20-4.

14 Hosoya, Chihiro 細谷千博. Lecture at the International Conference on "The Pacific War: A Reappraisal After Fifty Years", at the Imperial War Museum, London, December 5th-6th, 1991. Although most of the papers of this seminar have just been published, Professor Hosoya's lecture was not included in the publication. See Saki Dockrill, ed., *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima; The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-45*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994.

15 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 67.

16 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations), *Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi — Dai 7-kan — Nichi-bei Kaisen 太平洋戦争への道 — 第七巻 — 日米開戦* (The Road to the Pacific War, Vol. 7, The Outbreak of the U.S.-Japan War), Asahi Shimbun-sha 朝日新聞社, Tokyo, 1963 (hereafter *TSM, Vol. 7*), pp. 165-74.

17 Kido, Koichi 木戸幸一. *Kido Koichi Nikki (Ge-kan) 木戸幸一日記 (下巻)* (Koichi Kido Diary (Vol. 2)), Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai 東京大学出版会, Tokyo, 1966, p. 870.

18 Butow, Robert J. C. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961, p. 241.

19 Ibid., p. 229.

20 Ibid., pp. 241-2.

21 Matsumoto, Shigeharu 松本重治. *Konoe Jidai — Janarisuto no Kaiso (Ge)* *近衛時代—ジャーナリストの回想(下)* (The Konoe Era — The Memoirs of a Journalist (Vol. 2)), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1987, pp. 124-5.

22 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 58.

23 Butow, Robert J. C. *The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1974, pp. 142-3.

24 S. Sudo, p. 38.

25 On this point see Kase, op. cit., pp. 166-7; "This counter-proposal [of June 21st] does not need to be greatly explained since it was an amended proposal of the interim proposal of May 31st" (cf. Konoe's comment quoted below, p. 228).

26 In the words of Hull recorded in his memorandum of April 16th "The Ambassador [Nomura] then remarked that status quo No. 4 [of Hull's Four Principles] would interfere with the Manchurian situation. I [Hull] replied that ... this status quo point would not ... affect 'Manchukuo,' but was intended to apply to the future from the time of the adoption of a general settlement". See *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. II*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943 (hereafter *FRUS, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 2*), p. 409.

The proposal of June 21st included the phrase: "Amicable negotiation in regard to Manchukuo". See *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 117.

In contrast, the Hull Note contained the condition of Japan's withdrawal of "all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China". See *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichi-bei Kosho 1941, (Ge-kan)* *日本外交文書— 日米交渉1941 (下巻)* (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — U.S.-Japan Negotiations in 1941 (Vol. 2)), 1990, p. 196.

27 *FRUS, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 2*, p. 407.

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29 Konoe, Fumimaro 近衛文麿. *Heiwa e no Doryoku — Konoe Fumimaro Shuki* *平和への努力—近衛文麿手記* (The Efforts for Peace — Konoe Fumimaro's Notes), Nihon Denpo Tsushin-sha 日本電報 通信社, Tokyo, 1946, p. 43.

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30 Sanbo Honbu 参謀本部 (General Staff of the Army). *Sugiyama Memo (Jo)* *杉山メモ (上)* (Sugiyama Memorandum (Vol. 1)), Hara Shobo 原書房, Tokyo, 1989 (hereafter *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*), pp. 220-58.

31 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 997.

32 K. Kido, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 883-4.

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34 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1001.

35 H. Terasaki and M. T. Miller, op. cit., p. 57.

36 Moriyama, Atsushi 森山優. "Hi-Kettei no Kozu — Dai-ni-ji, Dai-san-ji Konoe Naikaku no Taigai Seisaku o Chushin ni 「非決定」の構図 — 第二次、第三次近衛内閣の対外政策を中心に" (Evasion of Decision-Making: The Diplomatic Policy of the Second and the Third Konoe Cabinets), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan). *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Shinju-wan Zengo 第二次世界大戦 — 真珠湾前後* (World War II: Toward Pearl Harbor), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 22-3.

37 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 225-53.

38 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 232. As already mentioned, this document is not included in the English version by Ike.

39 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 235-7.

40 *F.O.371/27886*, pp. 129-30.

41 Ibid., p. 142.

42 In this connection, see C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 986-8 and p. 996.

43 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1941, Vol. V (hereafter *FRUS, 1941, Vol. 5*), United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1956, p. 80.

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45 The document adopted at the Conference was entitled "Guideline for Conducting the State of Affairs in Line with Changing International Circumstances (Sekai Josei no Suii ni tomonau Jikyoku Shori Yoko 世界情勢ノ推移ニ伴フ時局処理要綱)". *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 10-16. This document is another example which is not included in the English version by Ike. The document of July 1940 was again, as many

observers have found, a Sakubun. See *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 107. See also S. Matsumoto, *Konoe Jidai, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 62. In April 1941, it was eventually recognised by the General Staff of the Army as no longer effective in practice, although it was formally still in effect. See *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 107.

46 The document adopted on January 30th was entitled "Guideline of Policy Towards French Indo-China and Thailand (Tai Futsu-In, Tai Shisaku Yoko 対仏印、泰施策要綱)". See *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 167-8. Unfortunately, this document is not included in the English version by Ike. This "Guideline" contains several new plans such as to aquire military facilities including air bases in French Indo-China, to mediate the military conflicts caused by the French Indo-China Army's invasion and occupation of part of Thailand, to prevent Thailand from siding with the Allies, together with some items which made the plans mentioned above ineffective as Ryoron-heiki Sakubun in an additional item named by Matsuoka as "Kiroku 記録 (Record)".

47 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 106.

48 Ibid., p. 101.

49 *FRUS, 1941, Vol. 5*, p. 79.

50 Matsuoka's report on this event at the Liaison Conference of March 11th is not included in the English version translated by Ike. See *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., p. 192.

51 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 107.

52 Ibid, p. 106.

53 The phrase in the original Japanese is "武力行使ノ決意ナキ下ニ準備ダケヲ進ムル". See ibid., p. 111.

54 Ibid., p. 112.

55 Ibid., p. 114.

56 Ibid., pp. 114-17.

57 The document was entitled "Guideline of Policy Towards the Southern Area (Tai Nanpo Shisaku Yoko 対南方施策要綱)". Refer to the all items of the "Guideline" in ibid., pp. 465-6. This "Guideline" of April 17th is not included in the Sugiyama Memorandum since it was not reported to the Liaison Council. See ibid., p. 117.

58 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 985-6.

59 Miller, Edward S. *War Plan Orange*, Airlife Publishing Ltd., Shrewsbury, England, 1991, pp. 270-2.

60 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 983.

61 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 235-7.

62 E. Miller, op. cit., p. 61.

63 See ibid., p. 61, and *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 209.

64 E. Miller, op. cit., p. 270.

65 Sato was the Chief of the Military Affairs Section of the Ministry of the Army at the time when the decision to send troops to southern French Indo-China was made. See S. Sudo, op. cit., pp. 170-1.

66 S. Matsumoto, *The Konoe Era, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 130-1.

67 *FRUS, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 2*, p. 316.

68 Ibid., p. 317.

69 Schroeder, Paul W. *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1958, pp. 51-2.

70 Ibid., pp. 223-4.

71 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 219.

72 Ibid., p. 219.

73 The original Japanese phrase is "Sakubun wa Sakubun, Riku-Kai tonton no kunigara yamu o ezu 作文ハ作文、陸海トントン ノ国柄已ムヲ得ズ". See ibid., p. 220.

74 Dallek, Robert. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1979, p. 274.

75 Shigeharu Matsumoto, editor in chief of the Domei 同盟 News Agency, was Konoe's close friend at that time.

76 See the following works: *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 228, S. Matsumoto, *The Konoe Era, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 126, S. Sudo, op. cit., pp. 132-3, T. Kase, op. cit., pp. 138-9.

77 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 225-64.

K. Kido, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 883-7.

78 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 143.

79 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 229.

T. Kase, op. cit., p. 144.

80 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 269-70.

Ike, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

81 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 231. The Navy's statement quoted here is not included in the Sugiyama Memorandum.

82 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 269–72.

Ike, op. cit., pp. 99–102.

83 When the Emperor asked Konoe whether Konoe could replace Matsuoka alone without dissolving the cabinet, Konoe replied that he had to dissolve the cabinet itself, otherwise the lack of unanimous agreement within the cabinet could be questioned. See S. Matsumoto, *The Konoe Era, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 133.

84 Feis, Herbert. *The Road to Pearl Harbor — The Coming of the War Between the United States and Japan*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1950, p. 203.

85 Konoe, *Heiwa e no Doryoku*, op. cit., p. 58, Konoe, *Konoe Nikki*, op. cit., p. 215.

86 See the following works as examples of the post-war view in Japan. *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., pp. 196–7, T. Kase, op. cit., pp. 138–9, S. Sudo, op. cit., pp. 132–3.

87 Heinrichs, Waldo. *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1988, p. 125.

88 Ibid., p. 125.

89 Ozawa, Haruko 小澤治子. "'Shinju-wan' to Soren Gaiko — 1941-nen Nippon o meguru Bei-So Kankei 「真珠湾」とソ連外交 1941年日本をめぐる米ソ関係" (Pearl Harbor and Soviet Diplomacy: Japan-Soviet-U.S. Relations in 1941), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan). *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Shinju-wan Zengo 第二次世界大戦 — 真珠湾前後* (World War II: Toward Pearl Harbor), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1991, p. 166. See also Chapter 5.

90 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 998.

91 Ibid., p. 1013.

92 A. Moriyama, op. cit., p. 25.

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98 C. Hosoya's Lecture (December 5th–6th, 1991), op. cit.

99 Ibid.

100 See Item 8 of Turner's Memorandum of July 21st to Admiral Stark in *FRUS, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 2*, p. 518. See also S. Matsumoto, *The Konoe Era, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 133-4.

101 Ibid., p. 134.

102 *Nihon Gaiko Busho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 1*, pp. 169-70.

103 Ibid., p. 186, S. Matsumoto, *The Konoe Era, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 137.

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104 S. Matsumoto, *The Konoe Era, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 138.

105 *Nihon Gaiko Busho — Nichibei Kosho 1941,Vol. 1*, p. 186.

106 S. Matsumoto, *The Konoe Era, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 138.

107 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1013.

108 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 240.

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113 See ibid., pp. 184-7.

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126 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 170.

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162 Ibid., p. 253.

163 Hosoya, Chihiro. "The Role of Japan's Foreign Ministry and Its Embassy in Washington", in Borg, Dorothy and Okamoto, Shumpei. eds., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1973, p. 161.

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169 K. Kido, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 895.

170 Feis, op. cit., p. 252.

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191 Iriye, "The Role of the United States Embassy", op. cit., p. 126.

192 Morgan, Ted. *FDR: A Biography*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985, p. 612.

193 Wohlstetter, op. cit., pp. 270-1.

194 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 221. See also Chapter 10.

195 Matsumoto, Shigeharu 松本重治. *Shanhai Jidai — Janarisuto no Kaiso (Ge)* *上海時代ージャーナリスト の回想 (下)* (The Shanghai Period — The Memoirs of a Journalist (Vol. 3)), Chuokoron-sha 中央 公論社, Tokyo, 1974-1975, p. 141.

196 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1024.

197 Feis, op. cit., p. 275.

198 Hosoya, "The Role of Japan's Foreign Ministry", op. cit., p. 163. See also *FRUS, Japan: 1931-1941, Vol. 2*, pp. 604-6.

199 Iriye, "The Role of the United States Embassy", op. cit., p. 126.

200 Naoki Hoshino 星野直樹, the head of the Planning Board in 1940, for example, said "Manchuria has historically not been occupied by the Hans [the Chinese]. The people who originated in this land [Manchuria] are the Tungus nations who speak the Ural-Altaic languages, such as Kokuryo 高句麗 (Kokuri in Japanese), Pohai 渤海 (Bokkai), the Ch'in Empire 金 (Kin) and Liao 遼 (Ryo). See Muto, Tomio 武藤富男. Watashi to Manshukoku 満州国 (My Involvement in Manchukuo), Bungeishunju 文藝春秋 Ltd., Tokyo, 1988, p. 9.

201 Naturally, the question of justification of Japanese rule in Manchuria also arose from the Manchus. Manchu Major-General Aisin-Gioro Hsien Yuan 愛新覚羅憲原 of the Manchukuoan Army, for example, said in 1938 to a Manchukuo government official, Tomio Muto 武藤富男, sent from Japan to Manchuria: "Do not forget that we [the Manchus] have our suzerainty in this land". Muto was deeply impressed by this statement. See ibid., p. 7.

202 Reischauer, Edwin O. and Craig, Albert M. *Japan — Tradition and Transformation*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1978, p. 247.

203 While Robert Osgood, for example, sees aspects of American foreign relations "in terms of the relation between universal ideals and national self-interest" (See Osgood, Robert

Endicott. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations — The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, p. 2), in a sense, a similar sensitive combination of ideals and national self-interest can be found in the Japanese idea of "Go-zoku Kyowa 五族共和", literally the "harmony of five ethnic groups", which developed as the ideology of Manchukuo. "Five ethnic groups" in Manchuria contained Japanese and Chinese together with Manchus and other nations.

204 Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, op. cit., p. 185.

205 Ben-Zvi, Abraham. *The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, p. 96.

206 F. C. Jones, *Japan's New Order in East Asia*, p. 459.

207 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 212.

208 Ibid., p. 209.

209 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 264.

210 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 344.

211 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 264.

212 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 306-9, 312.

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213 Sanematsu, Yuzuru 実松譲. *Shinju-wan made no 365 nichi 真珠湾までの365日* (365 Days up to Pearl Harbor), Kojin-sha 光人社, Tokyo, 1982, pp. 145-7.

214 Ibid., p. 147.

215 Yoshikawa, Takeo 吉川猛夫. *Shinjuwan-Spy no Kaiso 真珠湾スパイの回想* (The Memoirs of a Spy in Pearl Harbor), Asahi Sonorama 朝日ソノラマ, Tokyo, 1985, pp. 98-100.

Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., p. 148.

Wohlstetter, op. cit., pp. 211-12.

216 Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., pp. 151-2.

217 T. Yoshikawa, op. cit., p. 101.

218 Feis considers that "This, the note of October 2, rather than the one of November 26 on which controversy has centered, ended the era of talk". Feis, op. cit., p. 277.

219 Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., pp. 152-3.

220 Rusbridger, James and Nave, Eric. *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor*, Michael O'Mara Books, London, 1991, pp. 130-2.

221 Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., pp. 155–6.

Part III

"Magic" as a Cause of U.S.-Japan Misunderstanding

Chapter 8: Technical Problems of Coding and Decoding

The negotiations between Japan and the United States immediately leading up to the Pacific War are a specific example of misunderstanding in international politics. It is known that the U.S.-Japan negotiations to avert the war took place over about eight months from April to November 1941, but they eventually failed because of several factors. Although many factors for this failure have been found and studied in scholarly works, the effect of poor translation from Japanese secret codes into English has been underestimated in this case. Analysis of the public records shows a number of serious mistranslations or distortions in Magic, the information obtained from the breaking of secret Japanese diplomatic codes by the Allies during the period of the negotiations. Considering the significant influence of Magic on U.S. decision-making in those days, it must be realised that an analysis of the technical background to those mistranslations is necessary.

One of the factors which can create misunderstanding as well as mistranslation is found in the area of linguistics; there exist serious inaccuracies in the existing standard translation equivalents. Together with the fact that few Western people are fluent in Japanese even today, these inaccurate translation equivalents can lead to significant misunderstandings. Although some difficulty in defining perfectly accurate translation equivalents must be recognised because of the nature of the languages, each inaccurate translation equivalent is to be examined and reconsidered as increasing the risk of causing international friction.

Moreover, the discrepancy between the historical and world views of all parties concerned can also lead to the type of misunderstanding mentioned above. An analysis of the background to those mistranslations and inaccurate translation equivalents is needed from this cultural point of view. Also, the current gap in the way the Second World War and the Pacific War are perceived, for example, should not be underestimated. Concerning the origin of the relation between

cultural misconception and the frequent occurrence of these linguistic mistakes, as "cause and effect", examination on this cultural level must be inevitable.

In addition to this, although a considerable number of original Japanese materials have newly been found since immediately after the end of the war, and various scholarly works based on those materials have been further developed throughout post-war Japan, the majority of these original materials and scholarly works written in Japanese have not been translated into English. As a result, with the exception of a few experts, most Western people have inevitably been limited to some extent in their knowledge of the issue, since only the materials written in Western languages have been available. In other words, a serious linguistic barrier still exists, and this barrier can perpetuate misconceptions on both sides. In this sense, the introduction of Japanese academic texts by translating them into English in itself must be valuable. This attempt will also be seen in the following analysis.

Before proceeding to a detailed examination it is worth reviewing briefly the changes in Japanese and American academic views of U.S.-Japanese peace talks over the eight months before Pearl Harbor. The following summary is based on scholarly work by Professor Hiroaki Shiozaki 塩崎弘明[1], who examined the new materials, "The Drought Papers" and "Ikawa Tadao Nichi-Bei Kosho Shiryo 井川忠雄・日米交渉史料" (Tadao Ikawa's Historical Record of U.S.-Japan Negotiations).[2]

On the subject of the causes of the Pacific War, each side has emphasised the sincerity and importance of its own peace negotiations, while distrusting and misinterpreting the efforts of the other side. So, for example, Japanese could interpret the "Hull Note" as an incitement to war, and the U.S. viewed Japan's negotiations as a cover for war preparations. Each side also wants to hide the fact that there was considerable internal discord over the negotiations, for example between the Foreign Ministry and the Embassy in Washington in the case of

Japan. In the effort to smooth over this discord after the war, the role of Tadao Ikawa 井川忠雄, for example, was denied.

In addition, the history of the negotiations was in a sense rewritten by the military tribunal following the war. The term "negotiation" itself was banned, and the Court took the view that there actually was no serious attempt at peace negotiation, only a kind of informal contact between private individuals. As a result of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo (IMTFE, known as the Tokyo Trial), this view extended even to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura 野村吉三郎 and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo 東郷茂徳. This revision is particularly strong in the case of the negotiation activities of "John Doe Associates".

Ikawa's role in particular was both criticised and downplayed by his contacts in the Government and the Military. On the U.S. side, Father Drought's efforts at peace negotiation were similarly dismissed. At the military tribunal, the diaries of Koichi Kido 木戸幸一 and of Kumao Harada 原田熊雄 gave a slightly different view from the official line, but through the 1950s the serious accounts of the negotiations mostly follow the line of the tribunal's conclusions. These works include *Taiheiyo Senso Gen'in-ron* *太平洋戦争原因論* (Theories of the Origins of the Pacific War), ed. Society for the Study of Japanese Diplomacy 1953, and *Taiheiyo Senso-shi* *太平洋戦争史* (History of the Pacific War), ed. Historical Research Association, 1953-54.

Through the 1960s and 1970s, the interpretations changed slowly to a reappraisal of Yosuke Matsuoka 松岡洋右, and a consequent lessening of Nomura's importance. With changes in attitude resulting from the war in Viet Nam, the Watergate scandal, and Japan's growing economic power, the range of acceptable interpretations of the Pacific War continued to expand away from the narrow military tribunal view. Robert Butow had the opportunity to stress the importance of John Doe Associates, but, perhaps because of his U.S. military background, he was unable to overcome his "Pearl Harbor Shock", and overlooked

the strong connections that Drought had with both the American and British leaders. Most other accounts through this era were written, on the U.S. side, by former military intelligence people, and on the Japanese side by a demoralised apologetic group.

Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, "New Revisionists" appeared in the U.S., and in Japan the work of Akira Irie 入江昭 took a much broader approach, but this was still mostly a process of re-thinking, not based on any new material. For the future, the discussion should be widened to include the context of Showa 昭和 history, as well as post-war developments, and should include consideration of other participants such as Canada and Australia.

The Problems of Translation, Distribution and Use of Magic

The term "Magic" was used to describe the work as well as the personnel involved in this brilliantly successful decoding activity.[3] The word Magic is used here in its familiar usage to indicate the actual decoded and translated material itself. The existence of Magic was not generally known until it was revealed after the end of the Pacific War. The questions about the accuracy of the translations were first raised at the Tokyo Trial.[4]

Interest in breaking Japan's secret communication codes started in earnest around 1920, shortly after the brilliant American codebreaker Herbert Osborne Yardley had set up MI-8, America's first codebreaking agency, and Britain had established its own Government Code and Cipher School (G.C.C.S.). By June 12th, 1920, two decades before the Pacific War, the U.S. had made the first complete translation of a coded Japanese diplomatic message.[5] The following year, a burglary at the offices of the Japanese Consul in New York, carried out with the help of the F.B.I. and the New York Police, yielded the new Navy codes. Thanks to this and other codebreaking efforts, by the time of the Washington Conference on November 12th, 1921, Japan's position was relatively well known to the other side,

and Japan was not able to negotiate effectively. As Yardley said: "With this information in its hands, the American government ... could not lose. All it need do was to mark time. Stud poker is not a very difficult game after you see your opponent's hole card".[6] Ten years later, Yardley published his experiences in *The American Black Chamber*, and Japan learned that she was tricked at the Conference.[7] He had decided to tell his story because of his frustration at the break-up of his team by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, who was concerned about the illegality of the codebreaking activities.[8] In fact. Stimson was rather outraged, saying: "gentlemen do not read each other's mail".[9] Codebreaking was resumed shortly, however, under the Signal Intelligence Service (S.I.S.) of the Army, headed by William F. Friedman. The U.S. Navy's codebreaking operation was known as OP-20-G, headed by Laurence E. Safford.

From the mid-1920s onwards, both the British and the Americans had broken and could read Japan's diplomatic and Naval codes, and it was just a matter of keeping up with the changing code books: first the so-called "red book", which changed in 1930 to the "blue book" and so on, as the Japanese continued to develop new code systems, each of which in turn was broken by the Allies. From the early 1930s, the Dutch in the Far East were also able to decode Japan's secret diplomatic messages. In September 1940, Japan's new "Purple" code was broken, and the Magic information was considered important enough to be given to President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and two code-breaking "Purple machines" were given to Britain.

It is well known that the American decoding of secret Japanese communications played an important part in the negotiating process before Pearl Harbor.[10] The technical linguistic difficulties involved in translating the decoded intercepts are, therefore, analysed in detail in this chapter. There were also considerable problems presented by other factors such as the organisation and training of the translators, and the selection and distribution of the final Magic material itself.

The Navy's translation unit consisted of only six translators, three of them actually training on the job. The Army, with whom the task of translating was shared, had a similar number of personnel.[11] These small numbers were due to the fact that most of the linguistically able personnel were on active duty. Documents which were considered relevant or important were selected by the head of the translating unit for distribution to a very small number of approved military and political leaders,[12] which, at one point, did not even include the President.[13] The approved people were only allowed to see the selected material for a short time before it had to be returned, for reasons of security.[14]

Several intelligence sections of the Allied countries had also successfully broken JN-25, the Japanese naval top secret code, prior to Pearl Harbor. This has been known since 1991 with the publication of a work co-written by an Australian, Eric Nave, who was in charge at the time of the British Navy's code-breaking section, and James Rusbridger.[15] An interesting question is whether any of the American and British translators in charge of the decodes of secret Japanese diplomatic and naval messages, particularly those who were working during the year 1941 were of Japanese origin, i.e. native speakers, or not.

As far as the United States is concerned, Professor R. J. C.. Butow has written:

> I am not sure that answers can be found. For instance, to the best of my memory I have never seen a list of translators ... My impression is that the early translators were drawn from the ranks of people who had lived and worked in Japan during the 1930s (missionaries, teachers, perhaps some businessmen). I rather doubt that any Japanese-Americans were involved in this work, at least in 1941. But I really have no basis of knowing one way or the other because I do not think anything has been released in this regard ... You could try writing directly to the National Security Agency in Washington D.C. If information about "Magic" translators exists, it may still be classified. If not, NSA might be able to suggest where to look. Before you write to NSA, you might send an inquiry to Mr. John Taylor, Military Reference Branch, National Archives, Washington D.C.[16]

Following his suggestion the author's supervisor, Wilfrid Knapp at Oxford, spent several hours with John Taylor, head of the Modern Military Section of the U.S. National Archives, in search and discussion. J. Taylor was no better able than

Professor Butow to point to lists of translators or to any studies of the subject; nor did he provide any suggestions with regard to the National Security Agency.

In the case of the British forces, Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, who has published recently both *British Intelligence in the Second World War* in 1990 with C. A. G. Simkins[17] and *Codebreakers* in 1993 with Alan Stripp[18] has written that "I know nothing about Japanese translations in the War".[19] In reply to the inquiry sent by the author following Professor Hinsley's suggestion, Alan Stripp, who spent time on the 6633 system of the Japanese Army Air Force (JAAF) high-grade reciphered code during the Pacific War, has written that "Given some 15-20 people on 6633 alone at BP, and 15-20 more at Delhi, and adding the JAAF and (at Colombo) JN traffic, and multiplying up by all the other systems (including 25 diplomatic, consular, espionage, police, commercial, etc.) we easily reach about 800-1200 translators.",[20] but as far as Stripp knows no list of translators has been made.[21] He also has added :

> It is important to note that in Britain the very few native speakers of Japanese were, logically, used at SOAS with a view to helping to train interrogators, both the colloquial language and the need for really good pronunciation being as necessary ... I should also like to stress that the British penetration of Japanese codes and ciphers was by no means restricted to naval and diplomatic traffic.[22]

Thus, it is virtually impossible to access lists of translators at the present. It is possible to say, however, that probably no native speaker of Japanese could have been involved in translating the intercepts in the U.S. and in Great Britain prior to Pearl Harbor.

Regarding the standard quality of translations, it is not easy to compare the American and British since, while the U.S. authorities have declassified a large amount of texts including Magic materials, far fewer decoded intercepts have been opened to the public by the British authorities up to the present.

For reasons still unknown, the attitude of the British authorities towards the intercepts of pre-war Japanese messages is in sharp contrast with that towards the already largely declassified German messages known as "Enigma". Naturally, in the work of Hinsley and Simkins there is much analysis of the events

surrounding the decoding of the German secret messages, but understandably little information about the Japanese messages. In the publication of Hinsley and Stripp, there are four researchers, including Stripp himself, who have contributed to the material focusing on the activities of breaking Japanese codes during the period after Pearl Harbor but not in the pre-war period. It is worth noting, however, that the British interpreters were in general aware of the importance of making translator's notes in the reports for marking unclear and uncertain words.[23] In the case of the war-time Japanese courses for intelligence services at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, the teaching staff emphasised: "We believe ... that a student should understand exactly what is being said by every specimen of Japanese presented to him. Because of the subtlety of Japanese sentence forms, we favour the provision of very careful idiomatic English translations of early material".[24] In contrast, there is to a surprising degree a dearth of translator's notes in the Magic version.

The effect of the Magic material on the negotiations has been the subject of much debate. Professor Robert Butow states that "Such distortions as did occur through mistranslation are genuinely assailable as such, but ... the distortions did not essentially do violence to the reality of Japan's intentions".[25] Foreign Minister Togo himself, immediately after the war, was not sure of the effect of Magic; as he said, "I do not believe, however, that this leakage of private communications did substantial damage to the negotiations in my time ..."[26] On the other hand, with reference to Japan's Proposal A, he also wrote " ... it seems regrettable that this telegram was intercepted by the United States authorities and translated by them in an extremely malicious way, which did much to complicate the subsequent development of things".[27]

Cordell Hull's memoirs amply demonstrate the critical importance of the Magic translations in the turn of events:[28]

> Actually, we already knew the contents of the message [Telegram #191 from Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Ambassador Nomura in the U.S., May 3rd, 1941] ... We knew this because of the fact that our Navy and Army cipher experts, with remarkable ingenuity, had broken the Japanese code and were deciphering

Government messages from Tokyo to Washington and other capitals, translating them and sending them to the State Department for our information.

These intercepts, bearing our code name "Magic", played little part in our early negotiations, but were of great importance during the final phases. They enabled us to know many of the instructions the Japanese Foreign Minister was sending to Nomura and to other Japanese representatives; they gave us a check on what Nomura was reporting to Tokyo concerning the conversations he was holding with me; and they showed that the Japanese Government was going ahead with its plans of conquest even while talking of peace with us. I looked upon them as I would upon a witness who was testifying against his own side of a case.

I naturally had to be careful never to give Nomura the slightest impression of this special knowledge. [p. 998]

From the tone of the intercepts, from the inflamed statements made in Tokyo, from the unyielding and drastic nature of the Japanese demands ... On November 7 I therefore delivered at a regular Cabinet meeting a solemn warning of the dangers ahead. [p. 1057]

Then on November 20 — Thanksgiving Day — Nomura and Kurusu handed me a new set of proposals [Proposal B] from their Government which on their face were extreme. The intercepted message had apprised us of the fact that this was Japan's final proposition. It was an ultimatum. [p. 1068]

Soon after the end of the Pacific War, American officials quickly became aware of, but concealed, the problems of translation which existed.[29] Translation problems first came to light at the Tokyo Trial which opened on May 3rd, 1946, and again in October of the same year, when part of the Magic translations was published by the Pearl Harbor Joint Committee of the United States Congress. The messages, which were then declassified and released for publication, were very limited both in quantity and quality alike. On one occasion, the Prosecution at the Tokyo Trial presented some Japanese versions of telegrams which were not the same as the original Japanese telegrams from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but which were re-translations back into Japanese of the English translations which Magic had arrived at by intercepting, decoding and translating the Japanese originals.[30] Some English versions of telegrams were not Magic translations, but had been carefully translated by the Prosecution from the original Japanese telegrams without the Court being informed that these were the Prosecution's own translations.[31] And in one case, an incorrect translation, which was the Magic translation, was corrected by the Prosecution on an important point, but without the Court being informed.[32] On another occasion,

the Pearl Harbor Congressional Hearings were openly informed that the Magic translations submitted were only selected items taken from the complete file.[33]

Beyond the specific problems of translation, distribution and use of the Magic material, however, there is a wider issue, as stated by Roberta Wohlstetter: "Even Magic was not magical in its properties; its interpretation required subtlety and political good sense".[34]

Wohlstetter's work is possibly the most prestigious in its field and is widely accepted as authoritative.[35] But she has no knowledge of Japanese and did not examine the decoding and translation of Japanese diplomatic traffic. She is not, therefore, checking the accuracy of translation and then applying "subtlety and political good sense". Rather she starts with a preconception of Japanese intentions and then approaches the intercepts from a point of view which has already been formed. She attaches great importance to the "tone" of the diplomatic messages, emphasising for instance that "Nor did any such reader ever have the time or the opportunity to read the Tokyo messages alone, to see how they differed in tone from the messages coming out of the Japanese embassy in Washington".[36]

As a more specific example she quotes telegram #725 of November 4th, 1941, from Tokyo to its Embassy in Washington: "Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our [Japanese] people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them". She comments on telegram #725 in general terms that: "There is no doubt about the meaning of this cable"[37] while she is not aware of the fact that, as pointed out by John Toland, "Such pessimism was not in the original". In fact, the original phrase should read correctly: "Strenuous efforts are being made day and night to adjust Japanese-American relations, which are on the verge of rupture".[38]

Rather than recognising the inaccuracy of the translation, she picks up the "repeated" assertion of Alwin D. Kramer, chief of the section of Naval Intelligence in charge of decoding Japanese messages, that "the Japanese tended

to describe desperate situations in a milder way than they were really thinking".[39] There is no evidence for such a statement, but it led Kramer in the early 1940s, and Wohlstetter some twenty years later, to believe that the translation rendered should be harder than the literal translation. Thus, Wohlstetter goes further, stating on the general nature of the Magic intercepts that "our own MAGIC translation was milder than the original".[40] Others, however, such as Jay Rubin, Professor at the University of Washington, point out that this is just an assumption which is part of the myth of Japanese "uniqueness". He states that "Japanese is not the language of the infinite. Japanese is not even vague ... The Japanese speak and write to each other as other literate peoples do ..."[41]

A year after the publication of Wohlstetter's work Jackson Huddleston, who studied the original texts in Japanese, expressed a judgement in an unpublished paper, saying that his analysis led him "to conclude tentatively that Ambassador Nomura followed Foreign Minister Togo's instructions quite closely and was a good representative of his country's policy", although in general "it is felt, he [Ambassador Nomura] was more a hindrance than a help to successful negotiations".[42] While Huddleston noted in his unpublished work of 1963 that "this, however, is a purely tentative judgement since a conclusive one would have to be based upon translations of telegrams sent from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo" and other records of telegrams which he had not yet fully studied at that time, in 1977, Michael Blaker, who has extended his study of original Japanese texts covering eighteen cases of pre-war Japanese diplomacy,[43] reaches a more confident conclusion in his publication: "The materials examined for this study do not support an image of Japanese diplomats as devious and underhanded. This popular stereotype seems both unwarranted and undeserved. Japanese statements made during decision-making meetings in Tokyo closely resembled those made both in public and to the other side during bargaining ... even if they may not have been believable to outside observers".[44]

Later, Richard Lewin, without any critical examination, wrote in 1983: "Whatever its vagueness and sometimes its obscurities – the usual aspects of a Rooseveltian policy ... are all consistent with the picture of Japan painted by Magic: a country engaged with ruthless and devouring energy in pursuing its own interests, and not to be deflected from that pursuit"[45] and "If Magic did nothing else, it never ceased to warn about Japan's hard, incessant and (for all her cosmetic tricks of diplomacy) inflexible drive toward an act of aggression ... somewhere".[46]

Later still, Ted Morgan, writing a biography of Roosevelt without (understandably) any knowledge of Japanese, said in 1985: "Hull, who saw Nomura almost daily, was shocked by the contrast between his protestation of peaceful intentions and the contents of the Magic messages ... Hull ... knew from the inflamed tone of the Magic intercepts that Japan was preparing for war".[47]

Finally, in 1988, in a commentary attached to the translation of Lewin's work, Takao Tokuoka 徳岡孝夫 notes that "With regard to the episode of decoded intercepts prior to the outbreak of the Japanese-American War, another factor which should not be forgotten might be the issue of mistranslation [of Magic] ... Most of the mistranslations twisted the intentions of the Japanese government [making them] more war-like than they were". Tokuoka goes further, saying that "Hull read in advance the intercepts which contained a number of mistranslations, and resented Japan's duplicity. Such a resentment therefore could not have been caused if such intercepts had not existed".[48] The contrast between two lines of historical study, the one based on an expert and scholarly examination of the texts and the other proceeding from received ideas without any such study, is sharply obvious.

Technical Problems of Coding and Decoding

As already discussed, American decoding of Japanese communications played an important part in the negotiating process before Pearl Harbor. Because of the technical and linguistic problems of putting Japanese into code, of decoding and then translating into English, it was an important source of misunderstanding. The attempt here is to examine the role of Magic in detail by looking at the process of decoding, translating, and interpreting. First we must look at the procedure of transformation from secret code to final English translation.

Step 1

The secret message in Morse Code is decoded, giving a Japanese text in the Roman alphabet (ローマ字 Roma-ji). The text is then rewritten using Japanese phonetic "kana" 仮名 letters,[49] although in some cases the first step was omitted and the code typed directly in kana.[50] This step represents the remarkable work done by the British, American and Dutch code-breakers, and it is this part which has received the most attention.

Step 2

The real difficulty in translation begins at this stage. The kana letters must be recognised and grouped into separate words (words are not separated by spaces in Japanese writing). Punctuation also has to be guessed at from the sense of the words, as punctuation marks are entirely optional, particularly in the short style used in telegrams. Based on the parts of speech, some of the kana letters must be converted to the appropriate kanji 漢字 ideograph for the meaning of the text to become clear, and this is where the problem of homonyms occurs. This is the step that requires the highest level of competence in the Japanese language.[51]

Step 3

In the final step, the text, now in proper Japanese, can be translated into any language, once the crucial Step 2 has been completed. The work that remains is that of any professional translator, with the help of a dictionary and a sound knowledge of Japanese grammar. Of course, at this stage, there are still many potential problems to be overcome, such as homonyms and delicacies of nuance, but if the work of Step 2, recognising the sentence structure and choosing the correct kanji ideographs, is not carried out properly, then there is no possibility of correcting it at stage 3.

Although there are many problems arising from the enormous difficulty of the Japanese writing system, the following are particularly relevant to the translation of Magic. Japanese diplomatic messages are written in traditional literary style (Bungo-tai 文語体), as opposed to colloquial written style.[52] A further complication was introduced by the Japanese code-senders who deliberately added a third style, spoken colloquial style, in order to confuse the code-breakers, but this problem was relatively easily solved. The real problem, however, remained when messages were sent in Bungo-tai. Bungo-tai originated from the Japanese colloquial spoken style of the 10th century (Heian 平安 period), so that it is very different from the present colloquial written style.[53]

Japanese is composed of the following three styles:[54]



Four differences in principle between Japanese Bungo-tai 文語体 (traditional literary style) and kogo-tai 口語体 (colloquial style) are as follows:

1) the grammar is different in each style;
2) some words are used only in Bungo-tai;
3) in some cases, the same words have completely different meanings and concepts depending on which style is being used;
4) the way of using kana letters is different in each style.

Although Bungo-tai was officially abandoned after the war, in fact it remains in use today because it is relatively concise.[55] This style uses both Japanese and Chinese word order (which are quite different), depending on the terms being used. In addition to this, individual Japanese kanji characters have several different pronunciations, unlike Chinese. In China, although there are different pronunciations based on regional dialects, each regional speaker recognises only one pronunciation for each character, but Japan imported several different dialects at different periods, so that it acquired three different Chinese pronunciations. Most Confucian texts were read in the Han 漢 pronunciation, Buddhist texts in the Wu 呉 pronunciation, Japanese texts in a mixture of both, and some other books in T'ang 唐 and Sung 宋, between the 8th and 18th centuries. Even after they were mixed in the 19th century, they continued to be used until the present.[56] Consequently, only Japanese with a high level of education can read this telegraphed diplomatic language properly, and in addition, the translator needs to know Latin and French terms used by diplomats.

Specific examples will be given of misinterpretation which arose from decoding and faults of translation. The basic materials for this analysis are from U.S. government publications, *The Magic Background of Pearl Harbor*, 5 vols., Dept. of Defense, Washington D.C., 1978, and *Collection of Japanese Diplomatic Messages 12 July '38-21 January '42*, Department. of the Army Intelligence Files, 1976; from official Japanese government publications: *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho* —

Nichibei Kosho 1941 日本外交文書－日米交渉 *1941* (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — U.S.-Japan Negotiations in 1941), 2 vols., Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990.[57]

The translator from Japanese to English is particularly free to make his or her own interpretation, due to the nature of the Japanese language itself. Japanese makes use of rather fewer grammatical structures than English; articles, for example are not used, and adjectives can function as verbs. In addition, pronouns, although they exist, are not often used, and the distinction between singular and plural is rarely made. Instead of using precisely interacting clauses, a long string of phrases often modifies a single, vague noun such as "thing", "situation" or "condition". Direct statements are usually avoided, often by using the passive voice. None of these features is unique to Japanese; German often uses the same "subject-object-verb" word order, Russian does not have articles, and many other languages use inflected word-endings to indicate case. Punctuation is optional, and one sentence can easily fill one whole paragraph. The difficulty faced by an experienced translator, let alone one who is training on the job, can be seen in the following example of a diplomatic message. A part of the Magic version of the notoriously mistranslated telegram #725 sent on November 4th, 1941, was as follows:

Magic Translation[58]

No. 22
From: Tokyo November 4, 1941
To: Washington #725.
(Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 3.)
Concerning my #722.

1. ...
2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last

effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

Trans.11-4-41

A literal word-for-word translation would be as follows (it will help to realise that a particle often follows a word or phrase, indicating its case, i.e. whether it is a subject, possessive, direct object and so on):

2. Empire-country inside-outside's situation as-for extremely tension to-that even one day wasting situation is not allowed but empire-country government as-for Japan-U.S.-between's peace relation to-that maintain attempt sincerity from deliberation's result negotiation to-that continuation doing matter is but this negotiation as-for last attempt being and our counter proposal as-for name reality both final proposal draft is which recognition is wished to-this with using doing even now still fast speed agreement reach not as-to regret even though catastrophe reaching's otherwise exist not this result both country relation as-to eventually crisis suffer's inevitable even not being namely this time negotiation's success not as-to empire country nation fate to enormous influence being indeed imperial nation safety/danger related matter being.

Literal translation between any languages can naturally be difficult — often impossible — to understand, but what should be clear in this example of Japanese is how much the translator has to "add" in order to make it intelligible in English. It is within these "additions" that the subtle bias of the translator can easily be discerned.

There is a very remarkable degree of variation in the style of the Magic transcript translations. These range from a casual, conversational tone with highly idiomatic phrases, to a stilted, rather old-fashioned style, even for that period. An example of the former can be found in the translation of Nomura's telegram #1077,[59] which is rendered "[they] figure that we are about worn out. They also figure that we are weak ... and optimize over how quickly we would be to come to our knees". This contrasts sharply with a translation of another telegram,

#725,[60] of about the same time, which reads in part: "our government ... has gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them ... Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor ... ", and later," ... there is not a whit of use in broaching the talks". These extreme differences in style do not reflect any equivalent differences in the style of the original Japanese documents. These examples are given here to show that not only the meaning of some messages was distorted or changed, but also that the tone could be seriously misrepresented by the personal style of the translator.

Samples of Magic Mistranslations and Distorted Translations

The following samples, 1 and 2, represent cases of mistranslation. In Sample 3, although there is no mistranslation of individual terms, the overall structure and intention of the passages is changed, and this resulted in a different message.

Sample 1

The following telegram was sent from Ambassador Nomura to Navy Minister Shigetaro Shimada 嶋田繁太郎 on October 20th, 1941, just two days after Shimada's appointment under the new Tojo Cabinet.

Original Japanese Telegram[61]

十月二十日在米国野村大使より東郷（茂徳）外務大臣宛（電報）
貴大臣限り御含ノ上外相ニ御伝エ請フ
海軍大臣殿
御親任慶祝、偖小生、就任ノ際前海相ノ熱烈ナル支援ヲ賜ハリタル処着任以来万事志ト違ヒ何ノ為ス所ナク慙愧ニ堪ヘス此上将来ニ対シテモ何等成算アルニアラスシテ依然尸位素餐ヲ許ササルコトト信ス小生ハ米国ハ一面欧州戦争他面太平洋問題ニ直面シアルモ未タ軍事的ニハ可ナリ弱点アリ故ニ時局ノ進展ニ伴ヒ日本ニ対シ多少協調的ニ転向スルナラントモ考エオリシカ予期ニ反シ今迄ノ所米側ハ終始極力自国ノ政策ヲ固守シ何等右匡正〔妥協性〕ヲ認メ難シ。コレハ畢竟スルニ中国余リ深入リシアル結果ナルヘシ。
故ニ中国問題ヲ離レ極東ノ「モデュス・ヴィヴェンディ」ヲモ小生限リニテ考慮シタルコトアリ。国務長官ニモ一寸話シテ見タルコトアレドモ、長官ハ中国問題ハ太平洋ノ安定ト不可分ナリト強ク主張ス。数日前ニハリファックス卿トモ時余ニ亘リ懇談シ、イギリス帝国モ太平洋ノ危機ニハ大ナル関心ヲ有スルヘク、何トカ危機回避ノ為ニ日米ノ間ニ「モデュス・ヴィヴェンディ」テモ発見シ、以テ時

局保全ヲ計ルコトニツイテ話シタルトコロ、氏ハハルトモ話シテ見タイト申シタルモ、ソノ後何ノ挨拶モナシ。次ニ小生出発前ニ当時ノ閣僚等トモ懇談ヲ重ネ充分政府ノ動向ヲ承知シタル上着任シタルモ、ソノ後二回ノ政変アリテ小生ハ今ヤ暗黒裡ニアリ。コレニテハ如何トモシ難ク、サリトテ国務長官トハ従来数十回ニ亘リ折衝ヲナシアルコト故、コノ際、更ニ新タナル角度ヨリ話ヲ再開スル場合ニハ、小生ノ存在ハ我方ニ不利ヲ招クコト疑イナシ。　右ノ如キ考エヲモッテ至急一時帰朝ヲ一昨日付電話シタルコトニツキ、外相ヨリ若シ何ラカ御話シアルガ如キ場合ニハ是非トモ小生ノ願意ヲ貫徹スルヨウ御高配切望ス。

Author's Translation

For your own information, and then please transmit to Foreign Minister.

Attention of Navy Minister.

Congratulations on your new appointment. When I was appointed, I was given fervent support by the former Navy Minister, but since I arrived here everything has developed differently from my expectation, and there is nothing I can do, so that I am very ashamed. In addition to this, I believe that it is intolerable to still be "doing nothing and receiving a salary" with no hope of being successful. It seems to me that the U.S. is facing, on one hand the European War, and on the other hand problems in the Pacific, while her considerable military weak points have still remained so that [it seems] the U.S. might have been somewhat co-operative with Japan. Until now, however, the U.S. has unexpectedly stood firm on her own policies the whole time so that finding any indication in her stance of the possibility of compromise is hopeless. I suppose that this must be the result of the United States' too numerous interests in China.

In the light of this situation, I have my personal proposal for producing a Far Eastern "modus vivendi" apart from the Chinese question. When I tentatively discussed this idea with the Secretary of State one day, however, he insisted that it was impossible to keep the question of Pacific stability apart from the Chinese question. I had another opportunity to discuss it with Lord Halifax for more than an hour, since the British Empire ought to have great interest in the Pacific crisis. After I expressed my idea of trying to find any possible draft U.S.-Japan "modus vivendi" for averting the crisis and keeping a stable situation, Lord Halifax replied that he wanted to discuss it with Hull, although there has been no report from him about the result of his attempt since then. In addition, although I had understood the Japanese government's intention through many conversations with cabinet ministers and other people, I am in the dark because of the political changes of government twice since then. Under this sort of situation, there is nothing for me to do. Since I have negotiated with the Secretary of State tens of times up to now, my involvement in the recommencement of talks from a different view-point would undoubtedly be to Japan's disadvantage.

I telephoned the Foreign Minister the day before yesterday to express my desire [to resign from the position], so that in case he talks to you about it, I would like to strongly ask you to support me in my desire [to resign].

Magic Translation[62]

No. 2

From: Washington (Nomura) October 20, 1941

To: Tokyo No Number.

(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY)

Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such lack of coordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more or less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis that is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some modus vivendi between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some modus vivendi worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explore the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an

unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.

Trans. 10-22-41

Analysis

The text of this telegram is known in Japan as the expression of Ambassador Nomura's attempt to resign from his position. He was also a Navy Reserve Admiral, so that he felt he had strong connections in the Navy, including Admiral Shimada, and could ask him for support. However, this telegram was described even in the post-war period by the U.S. Department of Defense as Nomura's complaint about the Navy's lack of co-operation (*The Magic Background of Pearl Harbor*, Vol. IV, p. 1)[63]. The reason this completely different interpretation could be made is that, as Professor Shinji Sudo 須藤眞志 has pointed out,[64] there were several mistakes in the translation of Japanese terms. Even an analysis of the first few lines is sufficient to indicate the problem.

Mistake 1.

The Japanese term "zen Kai-sho" 前海相 (former Minister of the Navy) is misread as "zen Kai-sho" 全海省 (the whole Navy Department). By far the most common problem with Japanese text that has been put into kana form for telegraph (or telex) transmission is that of homonyms. Spoken Japanese is limited to a relatively small number of syllables (only 112 syllables calculated by Professor Haruhiko Kindaichi 金田一春彦).[65] Taking English as an example, though several different conclusions are available depending on the definition of an English syllable, it has been calculated by researchers that there are as many as 86,165 syllables and at least over 30,000 syllables. Since Japanese is written using several thousand Chinese characters — i.e. the 1,945 basic characters (called the "Joyo Kanji" 常用漢字, a minimised number set by the Ministry of Education after the end of the Pacific War), some 2,000 characters for reading daily newspapers, and 20,000 characters (from a total of around 50,000 characters in the *Great Kanji-Japanese*

Dictionary 大漢和辞典 by Tetsuji Morohashi 諸橋轍次) which may be known by an expert — compared to only 26 letters in the Roman alphabet,[66] this results in a very large number of different characters all having exactly the same pronunciation (homonyms). The syllable "ko", for example, seen in its telegraphic form and without any context, might represent any one of over two hundred different possible words (in *A. Nelson's The Modern Reader's Japanese-English Character Dictionary*).[67] The context of the syllable will usually give enough of a clue to determine which Chinese character is intended, but this is not always the case.

Ambassador Nomura's telegram provides a typical example. In the phrase "zen Kai-sho", the syllable "zen" can be read either as "whole" or as "former", depending on which Chinese character it is thought to represent (in fact, "zen" could theoretically be any one of a dozen other words, but the context narrows it down to two likely possibilities). The translator chose to interpret it as "whole", making the phrase "the whole Navy Department". In fact, what was intended was the meaning "former", which makes the correct translation "the former Navy Minister". Although the term "Kai-sho", following "zen", was read by the translator as an abbreviation of the term "Kai-gun-sho" 海軍省 (Ministry of the Navy), in fact no such abbreviation exists. "Kai-sho" could only be the abbreviation of "Kai-gun Daijin" 海軍大臣 (the Navy Minister), so that the only possible translation for "zen" is "former", because "the whole Navy Minister" would make no sense. Starting from this simple misreading, the translator then goes on to completely distort the rest of the message, in order to make it fit the initial mistranslation.

Mistake 2

In addition to this, the phrase "shi-i-so-san" 尸位素餐 in the next sentence was not recognised by the translator as a four-character idiom in the Chinese style. The phrase "shi-i-so-san" comes from a classical Chinese history text "Han Shu" 漢書

(Kan-jo) and means "doing nothing and receiving a salary".[68] The word order for these idioms usually follows the Chinese word order, not the Japanese word order. Only well-educated Japanese can recognise these fixed traditional Chinese expressions. This also resulted in a distorted translation.

Effect of Magic Mistranslation on the Talks

The result of this mistranslation was that the disagreements between the Foreign Office and the Navy Ministry were greatly exaggerated. Although lack of control over the military was a serious problem in Japan at that time, this was not the case in these particular peace talks. In fact, Nomura himself was a reserve admiral, and Iwakuro, a member of "John Doe Associates", was an acting colonel sent by the Army Ministry. Together with other factors, such as Prime Minister Konoe's relatively successful arrangement with the Navy and the Army leaders for a proposal of a summit meeting in the summer,[69] this indicates that the mood of the talks was more hopeful than is generally recognised.

In this sense, this telegram should be noted as evidence of Nomura's sense of co-operation with the Navy leaders. The Magic translation gave the impression to the U.S. that Nomura himself suffered from a lack of co-operation with the Navy. Some American scholars continued to believe, even after the war, in this lack of co-operation.[70]

Sample 2

The following telegram (#1180) had been sent from ambassadors Nomura and Saburo Kurusu 来栖三郎 to Foreign Minister Togo the morning of November 26th, 1941, just hours before Secretary of State Hull presented the "Hull Note", which was understood as the U.S. ultimatum by the Japanese government at the Conference of Liaison Council, consisting of high military and civil officials 連絡会議 (Renraku Kaigi), of the 27th.[71]

Original Japanese Telegram[72]

十一月二十六日野村大使発東郷大臣宛電報第1180号
（野村、来栖打開策具申ノ件）
野村来栖ヨリ
累次往電ノ通リ乙案全部ヲ容認セシムル見込殆ト無ク一方時日ハ切迫此ノ儘ニテ
ハ遺憾乍ラ交渉打切リノ外ナク微力慙愧ニ堪ヘス此ノ際唯一ノ打開策トシテハ
甚タ恐懼ニ堪ヘサルモ先ツ「ル」大統領ヨリ、至尊ニ対シ奉リ太平洋平和維持
ヲ目的トスル日米両国協力ノ希望ヲ電信セシメ（御内意ヲ俟チテ極力交渉ス）之
ニ対シ御親電ヲ仰キ奉リ以テ空気ヲ一新スルト同時ニ今少シク時機ノ御猶予ヲ得、
英米側カ蘭印保護占領ニ出テ来ル可能性ヲモ考慮シ我方ヨリ先手ヲ打チ仏印、蘭印
「タイ」国ヲ包含スル中立国設立（本年九月「ル」大統領カ仏印、「タイ」国中立
ヲ提議セルハ御承知ノ通リナリ）ヲ提議スルコト可然ト思考ス

Author's Translation

"As we have explained in our exchanged telegrams, it is hard to expect that the United States might agree with all the conditions of [our] Proposal B while time is pressing, so that there would be no way but shamefully to break off the negotiations if it continues like this. And we are quite ashamed of ourselves for being so unskilful. Under these circumstances, although our making overtures is presumptuous, we propose the following idea as the only way to break the deadlock. To begin by asking President Roosevelt to send a telegram to the Emperor in which Roosevelt's desire for U.S.-Japan co-operation over peace-keeping in the Pacific is presented (we will make every effort to negotiate for this arrangement after receiving your opinion on it), while asking the Emperor for his decision to send the Emperor's [own] telegram in response, for clearing the air and gaining a little more time. In respect of the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to occupy the Dutch Indies for military protection, we should propose, in order to forestall this, the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, the Dutch Indies and Thailand (as you know, last September President Roosevelt proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thailand)."

Magic Translation[73]

No. 170
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
(Extremely urgent.)
(Part 1 of 2.)

November 26, 1941
#1180.

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

Trans.11-28-41

Analysis

The Japanese ambassadors' idea of exchanging messages between both Heads of State, President Roosevelt and the Emperor, is translated in Magic as a very insulting idea for the U.S. — exchanging messages between President Roosevelt (the American Head of State) and the Japanese Foreign Minister (only one of the members of the Japanese cabinet).

Mistake 1

The most serious mistake here is caused by the problem of homonyms in Japanese telegram form (as also happened in the case of Sample 1) — a confusion between two Japanese terms: "Shison" 至尊 (Majesty) and "Shison" 子孫 (descendants, posterity). Although the term "Shison" 至尊 (Majesty) is not usually used in daily conversation, it is a traditional term from a classical Chinese text, "Kuo Ch'in Lun" 過秦論 (Ka-shin-ron) in the second century B.C., and means "the most noble (この上なく尊い)" as an honorific term.[74] It does not always necessarily mean

the Japanese Emperor, but it should have been understood as such from the context in the case of the Japanese ambassadors' telegram.

Mistake 2

As in the case of Sample 1, starting from this misreading, the translator then goes on to completely distort the rest of the message, in order to make it fit the initial mistranslation. The humble idiomatic phrase, used by a subordinate to a superior, "although our making overtures is presumptuous" was literally translated as "although we have grave misgivings" and lost the original sense. Thus another humble term "the Emperor's [own] telegram" 御親電 "go Shin-den" was also literally translated as "cordial message".

Effect of Magic Mistranslation on the Talks

The idea contained in the telegram of November 26th must be noted as a very important proposal for both countries, the U.S. and Japan, when considering the fact that Roosevelt's message was actually sent to the Emperor later, December 6th at 18:00 Washington time,[75] only 19 hours before the beginning of the Pearl Harbor attack, and reached the Emperor on the 7th at 13:00 (the 8th at 03:00[76] Tokyo time), only 25 minutes before the beginning of the Pearl Harbor attack. According to Ambassador Kurusu's subsequent report to the government, in June, 1942, President Roosevelt's message to the Emperor of the 6th December was the U.S. government's idea, developed completely independently of the Japanese ambassadors' idea.[77] In other words, the same idea of exchanging telegrams between the U.S. and Japanese Heads, to avert the war, was considered by both governments coincidentally, but nobody noticed it at that time simply because they had to depend on the Magic mistranslations.

Before Tokyo's decision on this proposal by the ambassadors, the "Hull Note" reached Tokyo.[78]

Sample 3

The following telegram (#698) was sent from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura on October 21st, 1941. According to *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, when he read the Magic translation of this telegram, he believed that the Tojo Cabinet had decided to open hostilities [against the U.S.] if no agreement came.[79] In this sense, the role of this Magic translation in the peace talks was important.

Original Japanese Telegram[80]

十月二十一日東郷大臣より在米野村大使宛（電報）
第 698号　（緊急、館長符号、機会）
・・・・・
貴大使ハ適宜貴大使自身又ハ若杉ヲシテ我方トシテハ本交渉ニ之レ以上長時
日ヲ費スヲ許ササル事情ニアルコトヲソレトナク仄メカシ九月二十五日我方
案ニ対スル米側ノ対案ヲ至急求メラルルコトニ重点ヲ置キ話ヲ続行セラレ度シ

Author's Translation

...
Please choose an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi, to indicate casually to the United States that we are not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter and continue the talks. Please keep in mind that our desire for getting a formal United States counterproposal to our proposal of 25 September is urgent.

Magic Translation[81]

...
We urge, therefore that choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counterproposal to our proposal of 25 (?) September.

Analysis

There are basic mistakes. One is that a break was inserted incorrectly between "discussing this matter" and "continue the talks". Therefore the emphasis in the English translation is more threatening, while the original Japanese emphasises "to continue the talks". As a result, the Japanese term "juten" 重点 (literally "an important point") is translated as "emphasizing", but the meaning in this case is to emphasise in your own mind, i.e. "keep in mind".

This problem caused Hull's serious complaint against the Japanese government on the 22nd. Even after the war, Kurusu believed that this was one of the four principal reasons for the breakdown of U.S.-Japan talks.[82]

Effect of Nuances in the Magic Translation of Telegram #698 on the Talks

The new Tojo Cabinet started to discuss the new national policies including the continuation of diplomatic efforts at the subsequent Liaison Council conferences (Renraku Kaigi) eight times from October 23rd, two days after this telegram was sent, up to November 2nd,[83] and as a result the new Japanese proposals A and B were sent to Nomura on November 4th. Following the decision on the new policies, Ambassador Kurusu was sent to Washington to support Ambassador Nomura in reaching an agreement with the U.S. because the deadline for the talks had been set by the Japanese government. In fact, the serious problem at the conferences, for which the Japanese government could not find any solution, was the lack of oil supplies, since a total oil embargo had been enforced by the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands.

The plan to send Ambassador Kurusu to the U.S. was originally based on Foreign Minister Togo's private idea on the 3rd and was officially decided on by the government on the 4th. Kurusu immediately left for Washington on the 5th and arrived there on the 15th.[84] According to Hull's memoirs, however, he believed Kurusu's purpose in joining the talks was fatally suspect in that he [Hull]

felt from the start that he [Kurusu] had been deceitful,[85] while on the other hand Kurusu sent a report to Tokyo (telegram #1133 on November 18th) recognising that President Roosevelt had been zealous in reaching agreement with Japan.[86] Considering the chronological development, after telegram #698 was sent, Hull's very negative impression of Kurusu given by this Magic translation was one of the serious factors which made the U.S. stance more hopeless in the peace talks.[87]

Sample 4

There are, of course, a few examples of mistranslations milder than the original, although there are far fewer of these than of the harsher ones. Wohlstetter, for instance, introduces a message in the "hidden word" which was intercepted in the morning of December 7th, 1941, only a few hours before Pearl Harbor, as an example which shows that the American interpreters mistranslated it in a way that was "too mild". She observes that "It read: 'Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation' ... The original Navy translation of the code had been too mild; it should have read 'are on the brink of catastrophe'". In fact, it was a case of Magic misconception in a milder way, since the Japanese term "kitai 危殆", literally meaning "a crisis", was misunderstood as "kitai 期待", literally "an expectation". As Wohlstetter notes, this message was "in the 'hidden word,' or 'Ingo Denpo' [隠語電報]", and therefore, the original phrase "kitai ni hinsu 危殆に瀕す" should have been interpreted in a stronger tone. In this sense, the literal translation of the original phrase; "facing a crisis" is not strong enough but should more realistically have been: "a war is coming". However, Wohlstetter misinterprets the matter when she emphasises that "In Japanese this was serious ... [because] ... Japanese custom tended to polite restraint in describing desperate situations".[88]

Although the phrase in this particular case should have been interpreted in a stronger tone of menacing urgency, it is not for reasons of Japanese

linguistic custom, but because the phrase itself was "Ingo", i.e. "coded words". It was a matter of decoding the coded phrase but not of translating the Japanese phrase into English. In this sense, it is certainly not evidence showing that the interpreters in general tended to mistranslate the messages in a "milder" way than the real meaning of the original texts.

Thus, it should be noted, that the translation difficulties arise only from these important grammatical differences, and not from any so-called "vagueness" in the Japanese language itself. Many Western scholars have traditionally believed that Japanese is relatively open to the translator's interpretation, because of the problems of unstated subject, lack of articles and prepositions, and other contrasts with Western languages. Again, Rubin implies that the image of Japanese as a "vague" language often allows students and translators to feel more free to "interpret" rather than to translate accurately, particularly in the case of assigning a specific subject to a verb.[89]

It would be possible to examine many more of the Magic documents, but the above analysis demonstrates most if not all of the kinds of mistakes which were made in decoding and translation. The mistakes referred to in Part IV were in many cases more important in influencing the course of events but since they have the same characteristics they are not discussed in unnecessary detail in the chronological account.

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1 Shiozaki, Hiroaki 塩崎弘明. *Nichi-Ei-Bei Senso no Kiro — Taiheiyo no Yuwa o meguru Sei-Senryaku 日英米戦争の岐路－太平洋の宥和をめぐる政戦略* (The Crossroads of the Japanese-Anglo-American War — Appeasement Policies and Strategies in the Pacific), Yamakawa Shuppan-sha 山川出版社, Tokyo, 1984, pp. 150–70.

2 Ito, Takashi 伊藤隆 and Shiozaki, Hiroaki 塩崎弘明. *Ikawa Tadao Nichibei Kosho Shiryo 井川忠雄・日米交渉史料* (Tadao Ikawa's Historical Record of U.S.-Japan Negotiations), Yamakawa Shuppan-sha 山川出版社, Tokyo, 1982.

3 Rusbridger, James and Nave, Eric. *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor*, Michael O'Mara Books Ltd., London, 1991, p. 80.

4 *Kyokuto Kokusai Gunji Saiban Sokki-roku* 極東国際軍事裁判速記録, (Japanese Record of Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East), Vol. 9, Court House of the Tribunal War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, Yushodo Shoten 雄松堂書店, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 595-617.

5 Lewin, Ronald. *The American Magic — Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan*, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1983, pp. 19-48. Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., pp. 46-88.

6 Ibid., p. 54.

7 R. Lewin, *The American Magic*, op. cit., p. 33.

8 "For over a decade they [Yardley's team] had ignored the legislation enacted after the International Radio-Telegraph Convention of 8 July 1912, which, unlike Britain, the American government had ratified and which guaranteed absolute secrecy of American domestic and international communications". Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., p. 56.

9 Ibid., p. 56.

10 Wohlstetter states that "To the layman, by far the best-known and most fascinating intelligence work done just before Pearl Harbor is the detective activity that resulted from mastery of the Japanese codes and ciphers known as MAGIC". Wohlstetter, Roberta, *Pearl Harbor — Warning and Decision*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1962, p. 170.

11 Ibid., pp. 170-86.

See also Worth, Roland H. *Pearl Harbor: Selected Testimonies, Fully Indexed, from the Congressional Hearings (1945-1946) and Prior Investigations of the Events Leading Up to the Attack*, McFarland & Company, Inc., Jefferson, North Carolina, 1993, p. 131.

12 Jackson Noyes Huddleston observes that "When one is selecting telegrams to be translated, and then from among those the ones to be distributed, it is not reasonable to say that evaluation is not at issue. That mere selection is not such an uncomplicated affair can be seen clearly when one considers the preconceived notions that the men who were concerned with MAGIC had about Japanese-American relations. Safford testified that for three months prior to Pearl Harbor he regarded a war with Japan as certain within some reasonably early time, and also that the whole tone and purpose of the Japanese in the negotiations was to isolate the Far East and to persuade the United States to give Japan a free hand in the Far East. He also stated that the Japanese, in their language, are accustomed to understatement. Bratton testified at the Clarke Investigation that he 'had felt for some time ... that is over a period of several years ... that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable.' It would be understandable and even expected that such views might make themselves apparent in the process of selection and translation". Jackson Noyes Huddleston Jr., unpublished essay entitled *Aspects of Japanese-American Negotiations, November 1 — November 25, 1941*, pp. 9-10.

13 Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., p. 119.

14 Wohlstetter, op. cit., pp. 179-80. Wohlstetter observes that "the zealous guarding of MAGIC had the following results: First, very few people were privileged to see MAGIC at all. Those who saw it had it in hand only momentarily, and the brevity of their examination naturally limited their analysis and influence. They were also generally wrong in their assumptions about who else saw it ... Those who did not see MAGIC were generally wrong in their assumptions about who did see it and how much information it contained". Ibid., p. 186. See also Worth, op. cit., p. 136.

15 Rusbridger, James and Nave, Eric. *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor*, Michael O'Mara Books Ltd., London, 1991.

16 Personal correspondence, Robert J. C. Butow.

17 Hinsley, F. H. and Simkins, C. A. G. *British Intelligence in the the Second World War*, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1990.

18 Hinsley, F. H. and Stripp, Alan, eds. *Code Breakers; The Inside Story of Bletchley Park*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993.

19 Personal correspondence, Sir Harry Hinsley.

20 Personal correspondence, Alan Stripp.

21 Telephone conversation, Alan Stripp.

22 Personal correspondence, Alan Stripp.

23 Telephone conversation, Alan Stripp.

24 *S.O.A.S. Japanese Language Courses*, unpublished teaching material of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, p. 3.

25 Butow, Robert J. C. *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961, p. 335, fn. 38.

26 Togo, Shigenori 東郷茂徳. *Jidai no Ichimen 時代の一面* (A Dimension of the Times), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1989 (originally published in 1952), pp. 236-7.

27 Ibid., p. 314.

28 Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2*, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., Norwich, 1948, pp. 998, 1057, 1068.

29 For instance, Huddleston notes that "Joseph W. Ballantine, who was a ranking member of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department in 1941, the liaison between the State Department and Congress during the Pearl Harbor Investigation, and the representative of the State Department to the IMTFE [Tokyo Trial], wrote: 'I strongly suspected ... that the intercepted telegrams ... were poorly translated.' But he says nothing about their failure to represent Japanese intentions ... However, Joseph Ballantine at the IMTFE testified: 'We had to read all their explanations [Japan's] in the light of the instruction that was sent to Ambassador Nomura'". Huddleston, op. cit., p. 4.

30 Telegrams contemporarily numbered, by the Tokyo Foreign Office, 725, 726, 735, 736, 764 and others. Ibid.

31 Telegrams numbered 722 and 730, ibid.

32 Telegram numbered 800, ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 169.

35 Long after the publication of Wohlstetter's work in 1962, selected testimonies at the Congressional Hearings were compiled and published by Roland Worth in 1993, op. cit. Worth's work has eased access to the record of testimonies, although it is selective.

36 Ibid., p. 347.

37 Ibid., pp. 193-4.

38 Toland, John. *The Rising Sun – The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945*, Random House, New York, 1970, p. 168.

39 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 225.

40 Ibid., p. 347.

41 Rubin, Jay. *Gone Fishin': New Angles on Perennial Problems*, Kodansha International, Tokyo, 1992, pp. 15-16.

42 Huddleston, op. cit., p. 49.

43 These texts contain the cases dating from "Sino-Japanese negotiations, 1895" up to "U.S.-Japanese pre-Pearl Harbor negotiations, 1941".

44 Blaker, Michael. *Japanese International Negotiating Style*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, pp. 223-4.

45 R. Lewin, *The American Magic*, op. cit., p. 57.

46 Ibid., p. 60.

47 Morgan, Ted. *FDR: A Biography*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1985, p. 608.

48 Lewin, Ronald. Shirasu, Eiko 白須英子, trans. *Nihon no Ango o Kaidoku seyo* *日本の暗号を解読せよ* (Decipher the Japanese Codes!), Soshi-sha 草思社, Tokyo, 1988, p. 275.

49 Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit. pp. 50-1.

50 Ibid., pp. 60-1.

51 Captain Arthur H. McCollum testified that "you understand that these things come out in the form of syllables, it is how you group your syllables that you make your words. There is no punctuation". See the testimony of McCollum, chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, in Worth, op. cit., p. 124.

52 Kindaichi, Haruhiko 金田一春彦. *Nihon-go (Shinpan) Jo 日本語 (新版) 上* (Japanese Language (New Edition) Vol. 1), Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1988, p. 43.

53 Fujiwara, Yoichi 藤原与一 and Hashimoto, Takeshi 橋本威. *Bungo no Bunpo 文語の文法* (Grammar of Bungo), Chuo Tosho Shuppan-sha 中央図書出版社, Kyoto, 1970, pp. 2-3. Kindaichi, op. cit., p. 41.

54 Fujiwara and Hashimoto, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

55 Kindaichi, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 44.

56 Hida, Yoshifumi 飛田良文. "Kango no Yomi to Do-on Go 漢語の読みと同音語" (The Way of Reading Chinese Words and Homonyms), in Bunka-cho 文化庁 (Agency for Cultural Affairs), *Wago · Kango 和語 · 漢語* (Japanese Words and Chinese Words), Tokyo, 1978, pp. 48-60.

57 U.S. Government Documents:

The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, 5 vols., Department of Defense, Washington D.C., 1978.

Collection of Japanese Diplomatic Messages 12 July '38-21 January '42, Department of the Army Intelligence Files, 1976.

Japanese Government Publications:

Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941 日本外交文書－日米交渉1941 (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — U.S.-Japan Negotiations in 1941), 2 vols., Gaimu-sho 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1990.

58 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. IV*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-12.

59 Ibid., Appendix, pp. A42-A45.

60 Ibid., Appendix, pp. A12-A13.

61 Quoted by Professor Sudo from *Gaiko Shiryo — Nichibei Kosho Kiroku no Bu 外交資料 — 日米交渉記録ノ部* (Records of Foreign Affairs — Section on U.S.-Japan Negotiations' Records), Gaimu-sho 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1946. Sudo, Shinji 須藤眞志, *Nichi-Bei Kaisen Gaiko no Kenkyu 日米開戦外交の研究* (A Study of U.S.-Japan Diplomacy leading up to the Outbreak of War), Keio Tsushin 慶應通信, Tokyo, 1986, pp. 299-300.

With regard to the record of this Telegram, there is a difference between the *Gaiko Shiryo* (1946), and the *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941* (1990), *Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 59-60. The former contains the address "Navy Minister", while the latter contains "Foreign Minister".

Nihon Gaiko Bunsho —Nichibei Kosho 1941 日本外交文書－日米交渉1941下巻 (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — U.S.-Japan Negotiations in 1941), Vol. 2, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990, pp. 59-60.

62 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. IV*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-1.

63 Ibid., p. 1.

64 S. Sudo, op. cit., pp. 299-308.

65 Kindaichi, Haruhiko, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 104.

66 Kindaichi, Haruhiko 金田一春彦. *Nihon-go (Shinpan) Ge 日本語 (新版) 下* (The Japanese Language (New Edition)), Vol. 2, Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1988, p. 21.

67 Nelson, Andrew. *The Modern Reader's Japanese-English Character Dictionary*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1962, pp. 1072-3.

68 Shinto, Kenshiro 真藤建志郎. *Yoji Juku-go no Jiten 四字熟語の辞典* (Dictionary of Four-character Idioms), Nihon Jitsugyo Shuppan-sha 日本実業出版社, Tokyo, 1985, p. 240.

69 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 209.

70 The American authorities give the subtitle "1. Ambassador Nomura Complains of Lack of Coordination Between Japanese Foreign Office and Navy (October 18, 1941)" for the telegram in Sample 1, published as recently as 1978. See *The"Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor*, op. cit., p. 1.

71 Renraku Kaigi 連絡会議: Conference of the Liaison Council consisting of high military and civil officials.

1) The Renraku Kaigi 連絡会議 at the Imperial Palace was established for keeping smooth communications between the government and military command in case of national emergency.
2) The Second Konoe Cabinet established the Renraku Kondankai 連絡懇談会 (November 28th, 1940) at the Prime Minister's residence, replacing the more complicated Renraku Kaigi.
3) The Renraku Kaigi was re-established at the Imperial Palace (July 21st, 1941) without significant changes to the procedure.

See Moriyama, Atsushi 森山優, "Hi-Kettei no Kozu — Dai-ni-ji, Dai-san-ji Konoe Naikaku no Taigai Seisaku o Chushin ni 「非決定」の構図－第二次、第三次近衛内閣の対外政策を中心に" (Evasion of Decision-Making: The Diplomatic Policy of the Second and the Third Konoe Cabinets), in Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会 (The Military History Society of Japan), *Dai-ni-ji Sekai Taisen — Shinju-wan Zengo 第二次世界大戦－真珠湾前後* (World War II: Toward Pearl Harbor), Kinsei-sha 錦正社, Tokyo, 1991, pp. 18-19.

72 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 304.

Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei kosho 1941, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 185-6.

73 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. IV*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-93.

74 Kaizuka, Shigeki 貝塚茂樹. *Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten 角川漢和中辞典* (Kadokawa's Dictionary of Classical Chinese Explained in Japanese (113th Edition)), Kadokawa Shoten 角川書店, Tokyo, 1971, p. 906, p. 1042.

75 S. Togo, op. cit., p. 410.

76 Ibid., p. 412.

Kido, Koichi 木戸幸一, *Kido Koichi Nikki (Ge-kan) 木戸幸一日記 (下巻)* (Koichi Kido Diary), Vol. 2, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-kai 東京大学出版会, Tokyo, 1966, p. 932.

Asahi Shimbun Hotei Kisha-dan 朝日新聞法廷記者団 (The Asahi Shimbun Correspondents at the Tribunal), *Tokyo Saiban (Chu-kan) 東京裁判 (中巻)* (The Tokyo Trial) Vol. 2, Tokyo Saiban Kanko-kai 東京裁判刊行会, Tokyo, 1962, p. 763.

77 S. Togo, op. cit., p. 408.

78 Ibid., pp. 350-1, p. 408.

Telegram #844 from Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomura dated November 28th, 1941, in *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 205-6.

79 C. Hull, op. cit., p. 1055.

80 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 307.

Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941. Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 60.

81 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. IV*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-3.

82 Kurusu, Saburo 来栖三郎. *Homatsu no 35 nen — Nichibei Kosho Hi-shi 泡沫の35年－日米交渉秘史* (35 Years in Vain — The Hidden History of U.S-Japan Negotiations), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1986 (originally published in 1948), pp. 99-103.

83 Sanbo Honbu 参謀本部 (General Staff of the Army). *Sugiyama Memo (Jo) 杉山メモ (上)* (Sugiyama Memorandum (Vol. 1)), Hara Shobo 原書房, Tokyo, 1989 , pp. 353-87.

84 S. Togo, op. cit., pp. 336-9.

Kurusu, op. cit., pp. 17-30, p. 81.

85 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1062.

86 Ibid., p. 1062.

87 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 156-8.

88 Wohlstetter, op. cit., pp. 225—6.

89 Rubin, op. cit., p. 63.

Chapter 9: Linguistic Factors and Problems of Translation

Most of the commonly accepted translations of Japanese terms and titles into English were established during and since the Meiji 明治 Restoration in the middle of the 19th century. When Japan decided to end its strict 250-year isolation, and dramatically accelerated its importation of Western culture, it was natural that some important terms were not properly translated. Unfortunately, some examples remained until the Pacific War, and up to the present, and this became another factor causing mutual misconception. Several important political terms must be examined here.

(a) Meiji Restoration

The term "Restoration" itself differs significantly from the Japanese term "ishin" 維新. The word "ishin", originally from Chinese, means literally that everything is reformed and made new, looking to a new system in the future.[1] This nuance is clear, not only from the meaning of the kanji, but also from the historical origin of the Chinese expression in the Confucian text, "the Shi-King" 詩経 (Shikyo). The English term "Restoration" implies a return to an old form of government, in other words almost the opposite meaning.[2] Although the opposition to the Tokugawa 徳川 Shogunate had the slogan "Osei Fukko" 王政復古 (Return to monarchy), it is inaccurate to say that this represented the whole concept of the Meiji Ishin. Not only the literal meaning of ishin, but also the following factors indicate that the image of the Meiji Ishin cannot be represented by the term "Restoration".

Firstly, the Ishin movement's target was rapid modernisation and Westernisation, while restoration of the Emperor as actual ruler meant going back over a thousand years. In fact, as Professor Go Nakagawa 中川剛 pointed out,[3] one of the five items of the Charter Oath issued by the government in 1868

(first year of Meiji), did not assume the Emperor as political ruler. It stated: "Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters decided by public discussion".[4] Secondly, there were several other significant aspects to the Meiji Ishin, which cover other areas such as economic reform, education reform, industrialisation, etc. Consequently the self-image of the Japanese "Meiji Ishin" and that of the Western "Meiji Restoration" cannot be reconciled.

In this sense, Professor Richard Sims points out, "Meiji Ishin is traditionally translated as Meiji Restoration, a term which lays stress on the formal return of power to the Emperor ... This translation, however, reflects the bias of pre-1945 official historiography, and is both less accurate and less appropriate than Meiji Renovation".[5]

(b) God

Although the Japanese term "kami" 神 is usually translated as "God" or "gods", this is an inaccurate translation. The development of the concept of kami was quite different from the development of the Western concept of God.

Because of the historical background to kami development,[6] the clear distinction between kami and human beings and objects in nature does not exist in current Shintoism, the traditional Japanese religion. Professor Sokyo Ono defines kami as follows: "What is meant by 'kami'? Fundamentally, the term is an honorific for noble, sacred spirits, which implies a sense of adoration for their virtues and authority. All beings have such spirits, so in a sense all beings can be called kami or be regarded as potential kami".[7] "In Shinto there is no absolute deity that is the creator and ruler of all. The creative function of the world is realized through the harmonious co-operation of the kami in the performance of their respective missions".[8]

According to the pre-war circular notices issued by the Ministry of Education in 1937,[9] nine years before the Emperor denied his divinity (in 1946) immediately after the end of the Pacific War, it was clearly defined that:

> the [Japanese] terms such as "Akitsu-kami" 現御神 (明神) [literally "the Living Kami", usually introduced in English as "the Living God"] or "Ara-hito-gami" 現人神 [usually translated as "the Living God"] have a different meaning from the so-called "Zettai-shin" 絶対神, [literally "absolute deity"] or "Zenchi-zenno no kami" 全知全能の神 [literally "Almighty God"]. The meaning of these terms ["Akitsu-kami" and "Ara-hito-gami"] is that "Koso-koshu" 皇祖皇宗 ["our Imperial Ancestors" in the standard English translation,[10] but more accurately "our Tenno's Ancestors"] are with the "Tenno" 天皇 [the Emperor] who is descended from kami, so that the "Tenno" [the Emperor] is one with "Koso-koshu" [our Imperial Ancestors] ...

Taking the example of the term "Ara-hito-gami" 現人神, for examination, this term has usually been translated as "the Living God", but this ignores the part in the middle, "hito 人", which literally means a "person" or "human beings", and has resulted in an inaccurate translation. The first part "Ara" 現 literally means "living" in this context, so that "Ara-hito", "Ara" modifying the next part "hito", means "a living person". The last part, "gami" 神, means "kami" 神 because the "ga" (of "gami") is a voiced syllable of "ka" (of "kami"). As the term "kami" is an honorific for nobles, it is naturally attached to the term "a living person" out of respect for the Emperor since he occupied such a high position in society. This makes the correct translation of the humble term "Ara-hito-gami" literally "the Honourable Living Person" in pre-war Japan, but not "the Living God" in the English meaning of the term.

As a result, the English interpretation, with confusion between "kami" and "the God", gives the impression that the concept of the authority of "Almighty God" of the emperors was in reality recognised in Japan traditionally, although in fact the concept of "Almighty God" was denied by the Ministry of Education. Without overlooking the serious problems caused by the so-called "National Shintoism" in the inter-war period, the general usage of this inaccuracy in the standard translation equivalents should be carefully reconsidered, since the traditional religion of Japan called "Shinto" is quite different from the extreme

political ideology called "National Shintoism", which had only a short-run influence in inter-war Japan.

(c) Emperor

The Japanese term "Tenno" 天皇 is very different from another Japanese term "Kotei" 皇帝, which is also regarded as the equivalent of Emperor.[10] Kotei is a very general term which can be used to describe, for instance, the Roman Emperors, Napoleon III, the Kaiser of Germany, the Chinese Emperors, the Russian Tsars, the Iranian Shahs, Emperor Haile Selassie etc.[11] In the case of Tenno, this term can only be used for the Japanese monarch.[12] The term Tenno literally means "Kotei in Heaven" (Emperor in Heaven), or "Divine Kotei" (Divine Emperor),[13] and originally came from the Chinese "T'ien Ti" 天帝 (Ten-Tei in Japanese), which was derived from Taoism and has the same literal meaning.[14] The problem is that while both the Western term "Divine Emperor" and the Chinese Ten-Tei are based on a clear distinction between Heaven above and the world below, divinity and non-divinity, God and human beings, the Japanese term Tenno does not contain such a clear distinction between them.[15] Although the term Tenno is said originally to be based on Taoism, the distinct and separate Japanese concept of Tenno is actually based on Shintoism. In other words, although both the words Tenno and Shinto were borrowed from Chinese terminology, they are used in Japan to describe specific Japanese concepts.

The concept of Tenno is thus an extension of the concept of Kami. Thus, if Kotei is the proper equivalent for the term Emperor, then some other term must be found for Tenno. The literal translation "Divine Emperor" is not appropriate because the word "divine" itself cannot convey the actual concept of Kami, as discussed above. It should be noted that the term Tenno has been naturally used throughout Japan even after the Tenno denied his divinity in 1946. Even the present constitution uses the term Tenno.

(d) Prime Minister

There are two different terms in Japanese whose usual English equivalents are both "Prime Minister". Unlike the present position of Shusho 首相 (literally "Head Minister"), the original position created in the Meiji Period was Shuhan 首班 (literally "Head Position [in a group]"). In practice, this group was the Cabinet, although neither term was defined in the Meiji Constitution. As Professor Shoichi Watanabe 渡部昇一 notes, Hirobumi Ito 伊藤博文, who produced the draft of the Constitution, was afraid of the possibility of a revival of the Shogunate.[17] Since the Tokugawa 徳川 Shogunate had been a dual ruling system, including the Imperial Court, Ito feared that the new Cabinet might take the place of the old Shogunate. In addition, while the Meiji Constitution was modelled on the Prussian one, the position of Tenno itself was modelled on the British monarch's, which excluded any actual political power. In order to solve the problem of lack of control by the Cabinet over the military command, the Genro 元老 (elder statesmen) assumed authority over both the Cabinet and military command, although again their position was not mentioned in the Constitution. The Prussian Constitution expected the Kaiser to control the military commands in place of the Cabinet, whereas in England the Cabinet had this control in place of the monarchy. In Japan, while the Tenno was only nominally in command of the military like the British monarch, the Cabinet could not take over this responsibility in practice, because it did not have that constitutional power. Thus a vacuum existed which was filled by the position of the Genro.

When most of the Genro members disappeared because of old age in 1924, and only one, Kinmochi Saionji 西園寺公望, was left, there was no system for replacing them.[18] According to Article 2 of the Regulations for Governing the Cabinet 内閣官制二条 [Naikaku-Kansei 2-jo] of 1889 (although these regulations were not part of the Constitution), the responsibility of the Cabinet was "to keep

coordination among administrative sections" [行政各部ノ統一ヲ保持ス],[18] therefore lack of consensus was the primary reason for the Cabinet's resignation.[19]

This problem became acute after the conclusion of the London Disarmament Conference in 1930 and when the Manchurian Incident occurred in the following year.[20] By 1941 Tojo 東條英機 had accumulated the positions of "Prime Minister", Army Minister and Home Minister, and was still a serving Army commander. But as "Prime Minister" he was still merely Shuhan and he did not have real effective control of the country. Because of his multiple position there was a perception in the West that this was a War Cabinet headed by a dictator.[21] In contrast, according to the record of Shigenori Togo 東郷茂徳, a former Foreign Minister of the Tojo Cabinet, written in Sugamo 巣鴨 prison for the military tribunal, Tojo was not informed by the Navy until after the opening of the Tokyo Tribunal that the first secret order for war to the combined forces had already been issued on November 10th, 1941, and the Combined Fleet left Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands for Pearl Harbor on the 26th.[22] Amongst other things this problem did great harm to Ambassador Kurusu's relations with the United States government. It is the background against which Cordell Hull's memoirs should be read, for example, when he thought that Ambassador Kurusu would try "to lull us with talk until the moment Japan got ready to strike" when Kurusu was sent to Washington in the middle of November 1941, and Hull believed that the new Tojo Cabinet had decided to open hostilities against the U.S.[23]

In short, Tojo was Prime Minister, but not in the English meaning of the term. His political powers were very limited. He was "Shuhan" 首班 but not "Shusho" 首相. As such, he could not himself appoint a Navy Minister as a member of his cabinet. Only the Navy itself could appoint a recommended candidate, and if the Navy Minister resigned and if the Navy refused to appoint a successor, then the Prime Minister himself had to resign. It should be noted that a former Prime Minister, Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai 米内光政, had to resign in 1940

because the Army Minister, Shunroku Hata 畑俊六, resigned and the Army refused to appoint a successor. Due to the traditional conflict in Japan between the Army and the Navy, Tojo's control of the nation as Prime Minister was much less, not only than that of the European dictators (Hitler and Mussolini), but also less than that of the other Allied leaders (Churchill and Roosevelt).

The important distinction between "unanimous" agreement (zen-in itchi 全員一致) and "majority" agreement (ta-su ketsu 多数決) has often been overlooked by Western observers, although they were, in fact, serious technical terms, based on the Regulations for Governing the Cabinet, and as such were taken quite literally. An observer, for example, states that "A 'unanimous' decision by this body [a pre-war Liaison Conference known as Renraku Kaigi 連絡会議] was simply the current euphemism for majority agreement", and thus has failed to recognise the special meaning of "lack of unity" because of which the Admiral Yonai Cabinet had to resign, and dismisses Yonai's phrase as "tautological finality"; "If they [the leaders of the Army and of the Navy] can't obtain an agreement ... it means there is a lack of unity".[25]

In fact, Tojo had to resign in July 1944, more than a year before the end of the Second World War. In other words, the problems that developed in the 1930s and early 1940s were not due to a strong personal dictatorship in the Western sense, but rather to a lack of control. This problem cannot be effectively explained without a clear understanding of the terms Shusho and Shuhan.

(e) The Imperial Rule Assistance Association

The Imperial Rule Assistance Association (I.R.A.A.) is the English translation of Taisei Yokusan Kai 大政翼賛会 (established October 12th, 1940). This association was formed as an attempt to establish a unified leadership in view of the problems described above. In the early stages, many idealists such as socialists, communists, and liberals, in addition to right-wing groups joined its membership,[26] although

later they withdrew in disappointment with the government's ban on the I.R.A.A.'s political activities. In fact, there is no such term "imperial" in the Japanese name "Taisei Yokusan Kai". This situation cannot be properly examined without taking into account a more literal translation "the Great Policies Coalition Association".[27] For example, Professor John Hall describes the I.R.A.A. as an association "Based on the single-party concept, which was to bring about the unification of all Japan's bureaucratic and political effort in support of 'imperial objectives'".[28]

Effect of the Inaccurate Translation Equivalents on the Historical Perception Gap

Through the examination of these translation equivalents, it becomes clear that the use of certain English expressions in Japanese historical, political and religious fields conveys a nuance which emphasises Japan's imperialistic nature, such as "the Emperor" and "the I.R.A.A.", and dictatorial social system with absolute authority as opposed to modern democratic developments, such as "restoration" and "divinity of the Emperor" etc., while the self-image of the Japanese terms does not carry the clear intention of these nuances.

While the emergence of a particular ideology, so-called "National Shintoism" (Kokka Shindo 国家神道), which was developed particularly from the 1930s up to the end of the war in contrast with the traditional religion "Shinto", helped to emphasise the nuance of these English terms in the West, the influence of "National Shintoism" over Japanese society covered in reality only a very short period.[29] Consequently, the frequent use of these English terms for describing the whole of modern Japanese history has given a different impression to Western people from Japan's own perception of the historical events.

While few Western people speak Japanese fluently, few Japanese also seem to be fluent enough in English to note the significant difference in these terminological nuances across different languages. The underestimation of this

problem in general can be confirmed by the quite common use of these "standard translation equivalents" even in academic works by both Western and Japanese historians and scholars in social studies up to now. Considering the role of these terms as "key words" for any analysis in the field of social studies, such as modern history, international relations etc., together with their use on frequent occasions in political dispute between countries, this terminological gap must be one of the most serious causes of mutual misconception leading to international friction.

It should also be questioned to what extent "the Emperor of Japan was unique",[30] in the sense emphasised by Professor Richard Storry of Oxford: the Emperor was "Heaven descended".[31] In fact, many scholars have found that the idea and detailed stories of the legend of the "Heaven descended" Emperor and the Emperor as the "Akitsu-mi-kami" were widely shared by Shinto mythology as well as other Asian ethnic religious mythologies among the Tunghu nations, such as Fuyu 夫余, Kokuryo 高句麗 (up to 668 A.D.), Liao 遼 (916-1124), established by the Khitans 契丹, and Turkic nations such as Kirghiz (now independent Kirghistan), Tu-chueh 突厥 (the ancient Turkish Empire (552-744), established by the Ashihnas 阿史那), the Keraits, belonging to the Mongol nation but perhaps of Turkic origin, and several other nations. Some Mongolian scholars also note that more than 90% of religious mythologies are common between Japan and Mongolia.[32]

Regarding the American image of the Japanese Emperor, Hull, for instance, wrote after the end of the War that "I ... was not in favor of the [President's] message to the Emperor ... I felt that the Emperor, in any event, was a figurehead under the control of the military Cabinet".[33] Thus, in contrast with the popular view in the West, Hull claimed that he did not over-estimate the power of the Emperor. Thus, the effect of a single individual translation inaccuracy may be regarded as limited. Nevertheless, their collective and cumulative effect in distorting the image is rather more significant.

The vexed question of why certain specific English political terms have been chosen to denote the original Japanese ones has no clear unequivocal answer. Although many of the most common terms used in sociology have been studied in depth (for instance "kojin 個人" – the individual, or "shakai 社会" – society),[34] as far as the author is aware there has been no systematic study of the translation equivalents for political titles. Generally speaking, the translations of Japanese political terms seem to have been arrived at by mutual but unspecified agreement between Japan and the West. In the particular case of "Emperor", former British Ambassador Sir Hugh Cortazzi has pointed out that "the Latin 'imperator' is a person who conducts an army, and this is not the case for Japan's Tenno".[35] One of the few theories that can be found says that Napoleon III's representative to Japan, Leon Roches, advised the Shogun that he should use the title of Emperor, just as Napoleon III himself had changed his title from that of President. As a result, the Tokugawa Shogun officially took the title of Emperor in English, although not of course in Japanese. Later, in the period of the Meiji Restoration, the Tenno could not adopt a lower English title than Emperor,[36] since his position had always been technically superior to that of the Shogun, even during the Tokugawa period. The Meiji Restoration itself resulted from the aim of restoring the Tenno to an actual position of supreme authority, in other words the abolition of the dual ruling system. Hugh Cortazzi also points out the irony that the only figure in the world in 1991 who had the imposing title of Emperor was the Japanese Tenno,[37] who in fact neither has political power nor occupies the position of head of the nation (Genshu 元首).

In any case, however, it would be unreasonable to criticise whoever invented these inaccurate translation equivalents, since there were virtually no fluent translators on either side at that time. The problem that remains today is that there have been very few attempts from either side in the century since then to correct these inaccuracies.

1 Kaizuka, Shigeki 貝塚茂樹. *Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten 角川漢和中辞典* (Kadokawa's Dictionary of Classical Chinese Explained in Japanese (113th Edition)), Kadokawa Shoten 角川書店, Tokyo, 1971, p. 847.

2 The definition of the Japanese term "ishin" 維新 in Japanese is:

1) everything is reformed and made new (万事が改まって新しくなる), 2) the political systems are reformed and made new (政治の体制が一新されて改まること), based on *Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten* op. cit., p. 847.

The definition of the Japanese term "ishin" 維新 in English is:

1) the (Imperial) Restoration, 2) renovation, 3) Meiji Ishin as "the Meiji 明治 Restoration" based on Koh Masuda 増田綱, *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary* (Fourth Edition), Kenkyusha 研究社, Tokyo, 1974, p. 556.

The definition of the English term "restoration" in English is:

1) return of something lost to its owner, 2) restoring or being restored to a former place or condition, 3) reintroduction of something after it has lapsed or been withdrawn, ... 7) the Restoration as "(period following) the re-establishment of the monarchy in Britain in 1660, when Charles II became King" based on A. S. Hornby, *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (Fourth Edition), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, pp. 1078-9. Thus, "ishin" in the general sense means "everything is reformed and made new", while "restoration" means "being restored to a former condition". "Ishin" in the political sense means "the political systems are reformed and made new", while "restoration" means "the re-establishment of the monarchy". Clearly, there is virtually no meaning in common between the two terms, although one has been translated as the other in dictionaries and history text books.

3 Nakagawa, Go 中川剛. *Kenpo o Yomu 憲法を読む* (Understanding the Constitution), Kodansha 講談社, Tokyo, 1985, p. 71.

4 Tsunoda, Ryusaku, de Bary, Wm. Theodore, Keene, Donald. *Sources of Japanese Tradition*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1958, p. 136.

5 Sims, Richard L. *A Political History of Modern Japan 1868-1952*, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., New Delhi, 1991, p. 318.

6 See the details of this development in Minamoto, Ryoen 源了圓, *Bunka to Ningen Keisei 文化と人間形成* (Culture and the Formation of Character), Dai-ichi Hoki Shuppan 第一法規出版, Tokyo, 1982, pp. 68-71.

7 Ono, Sokyo. *Shinto : The Kami Way*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1962, p. 6.

8 Ibid., p. 8.

Refer also to the scholar of Kokugaku 国学 (National Study) Norinaga Moto'ori 本居宣長 (17301801), who discussed the definition of "kami" in his essay *Kojiki-den 古事記伝* in the Tokugawa period, quoted and analysed in Koyasu, Nobukuni 子安宣邦. *Moto'ori Norinaga 本居宣長*, Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1992, pp. 134-49. See also Yamamoto,

Shichihei 山本七平, *Nihonjin towa Nanika 日本人とは何か (上)* (What are the Japanese? Vol. 1), PHP Kenkyusho, Kyoto, 1992, p. 128.

Also the Confucian scholar of the Chu Hsi school 朱子学 (Shushi-gaku or Shushi school), Hakuseki Arai 新井白石 (1657-1725), who noted a wider definition of "kami" in his essay "Toga" 東雅 in the Tokugawa period, quoted in ibid., p. 127.

9 Quoted in Magota, Hideharu 孫田秀春, Hara, Fusataka 原房孝. *Kokutai no Hongi Kaisetsu Taisei 國體の本義解説大成* (Compilation of Commentaries on the Basic Principle of National Polity), Daimeido Shoten 大明堂書店, Tokyo, 1940, p. 101. See also S. Yamamoto, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 126.

10 *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary*, op. cit., p. 946.

11 The definition of the Japanese term "Kotei" 皇帝 in English is: "an emperor", "a crowned head", in ibid., p. 950.

The definition of the Japanese term "Tenno" 天皇 in English is: "a tenno", "an emperor", in ibid., p. 1785.

The definition of the English term "emperor" in Japanese is: "Kotei" 皇帝, "Teio" 帝王, "Tenno" 天皇, in Iwasaki, Tamihei 岩崎民平 and Kawamura, Jujiro 河村重治郎, *Kenkyusha's New English-Japanese Dictionary* (Fourth Edition), Kenkyusha 研究社, Tokyo, 1960, p. 566. Thus, the two Japanese terms, "Tenno" and "Kotei", are not clearly distinguished in English in dictionaries.

12 The definition of the Japanese term "Kotei" 皇帝 in Japanese is: "a head of the Empire (帝国の君主)", "a title of an emperor since the period of Ch'in (秦) dynasty [in China, 221-206 B.C.] (秦以後、天使の称、みかど 帝)", in *Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten*, op. cit., p 747. In other words, the meaning of the term "Kotei" is originally "title of a head of the (Chinese) Empire".

13 Only one Chinese Emperor, Kao-Tsung 高宗 (reigned 649-683) of the T'ang era (618-906 A.D.), was called "Tenno", but all the other Chinese emperors were traditionally called "Kotei" (*Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten*, op. cit., p. 247).

14 The definition of the Japanese term "ten" 天 of "Tenno" 天皇 in English is: "the sky", "the air", "the heavens", "firmament", "the upper region", "the celestial sphere", based on *Kenkyusha's New Japanese-English Dictionary*, op. cit., p. 1777. On the other hand, the Japanese term "o" 皇 of "Tenno" 天皇 and another term, "ko" 皇 of "Kotei" 皇帝, "a head of the (Chinese) Empire" mentioned above, are the same, because "o" is in the Wu (呉) pronunciation of the Kanji and "ko" is in the Han (漢) pronunciation of the same Kanji (*Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten*, op. cit., p. 747). Eventually, the term "Tenno", "ten" (the heavens) modifying the next "o" (a head of the Empire), was understood as "Kotei (Emperor) in Heaven", which has quite often been interpreted in English as "the Divine Emperor", or simply "the Emperor".

15 S. Yamamoto, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 158-60.

16 A Japanese dictionary, which defines the term "Ten-Tei" 天帝 as "the ruler (kami) of "ten" [the heavens] (天を支配する神)", "the creator (造物主)", explains the origin of the term as follows (*Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten*, op. cit., p. 247): The Chinese people in the ancient period [in the period of Taoism] respected "ten" and referred to the ruler of "ten" as "ti" 帝 ["tei" in the Japanese Han pronunciation (*Kadokawa Kanwa Chu-Jiten*, op. cit.,

p. 326)]. They thought that this "Ten-Tei" [or "ti" in "ten"] created all things in the world. Thus, the ancient Chinese Taoist terms, "Ten-Tei" or "Tenno", and the Western term "the Emperor in Heaven" have, to a degree, their meanings in common.

17 Watanabe, Shoichi 渡部昇一. "Higeki no Shocho — Showa Tenno 悲劇の象徴－昭和天皇 (A Tragic Symbol — Showa Tenno)", in The Shokun 諸君 Vol. 23, February 1991, *Bungeishunju 文藝春秋* Ltd., Tokyo, 1991, pp. 26-40.

18 Sims, Richard L. *A Political History of Modern Japan 1868-1952*, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., New Delhi, 1991, pp. 150-1, p. 324.

19 Naikaku Seido Hyakunen-shi Hensan Iinkai 内閣制度百年史編纂委員会 (The Compilation Committee for A Hundred-Year-History of the Cabinet System), ed. Naikaku Seido *Hyakunen-shi (Ge-kan) 内閣制度百年史 (下巻)* (A Hundred-Year-History of the Cabinet System (Vol. 2)), Okura-sho Insatsu-kyoku 大蔵省印刷局 (Ministry of Finance Printing Bureau), 1985, p. 40.

20 Hasegawa, Masayasu 長谷川正安. *Nihon no Kenpo (Dai-ni-han) 日本の憲法 (第二版)* (The Japanese Constitution (Second Edition)), Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1977, p. 119.

21 Togo, Shigenori 東郷茂徳. *Jidai no Ichimen 時代の一面* (A Dimension of the Times), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1989 (originally published in 1952), p. 297.

22 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1054-5.

23 S. Togo, op. cit., p. 299.

24 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1063.

25 Wohlstetter, Roberta. *Pearl Harbor — Warning and Decision*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1962, pp. 343-6.

26 The following people, for example, were members involved in the movement to establish the Taisei Yokusan Kai: A journalist, Hozumi Ozaki 尾崎秀美, who was later (October 18th, 1941) arrested for his activities as a member of the Soviet Union agents' organisation; Shintaro Ryu 笠信太郎, who was an Asahi Shimbun 朝日新聞 correspondent in Berlin (from November 1940), and had to move to Bern, Switzerland, because of Nazi pressure later (1943); Kiyoshi Miki 三木清, a professor of Hosei 法政 University, who was known as an opinion leader of "Showa no Komyunizumu 昭和のコミュニズム (Communism in the Showa era)" and was accused of "anti-war activities" late in the war (March 28th, 1945); Kazuo Okochi 大河内一男, who was a post-war president of Tokyo University.

Shintaro Ryu 笠信太郎 was reputed by American intelligence to be "a liberalist" in a "Magic" expository comment during the war (see *The Bungeishunju 文藝春秋* Vol. 70, May 1992, Bungeishunju Ltd., Tokyo, 1992, p. 316).

Kiyoshi Miki 三木清, who died in prison immediately after the end of the war (September 26th, 1945), has been called a "Shinko Marukusu Shugisha 新興マルクス主義者 (Neo-Marxist)" (in Miki, Kiyoshi 三木清, *Katararezaru Tetsugaku 語られざる哲学* (Unspoken Philosophy), Kodan-sha 講談社, Tokyo, 1977, pp. 117-18, and Kuno, Osamu 久野収, *Gendai Nihon Shiso Taikei (Dai-33-kan) — Miki Kiyoshi 現代日本思想体系*

(第33巻) —三木清 (The Great Series of Modern Japanese Thought (Vol. 33) — Kiyoshi Miki), Chikuma Shobo 筑摩書房, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 11-14).

27 Shigeru Hayashi 林茂, *Nihon no Rekishi — Taiheiyo Senso (19-han)* *日本の歴史—太平洋戦争 (19版)* (A History of Japan — The Pacific War (19th Edition)), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1989, pp. 148-70.

28 Hall, John Whitney. *Japan — From Prehistory to Modern Times*, Charles E. Tuttle, Tokyo, 1971, p. 342.

29 National Shintoism was one of the main strands of "ultra-nationalism" in pre-war Japan. Professor Masao Maruyama 丸山真男 concludes that it is not possible to define the beginning of the period of the development of ultra-nationalism, because it had gradually been developed from previous eras, and this continuity of gradual development is one of the characteristics which distinguishes it from its European counterparts, German Nazism and Italian Fascism. Professor Bunso Hashikawa 橋川文三, however, has questioned Maruyama's view and clearly distinguishes between the terms "ultra-nationalism" and "nationalism" in the general meaning of the terms. Hashikawa believes that the beginning of the Japanese ultra-nationalists' terrorism could be found in the early 1920s when Heigo Asahi 朝日平吾 assassinated Zenjiro Yasuda 安田善次郎 in 1921, but the organised terrorism which was based on political or religious ideologies, and which had significant social influence, started a decade later when the Ketsumeidan 血盟団 Incident and the 5.15 uprising occurred in 1932 (from Hashikawa, Bunso 橋川文三, *Gendai Nihon Shiso Taikei (Dai-31-kan) — Cho Kokka shugi 現代日本思想体系 (第31巻)—超国家主義* (The Great Series of Modern Japanese Thought (Vol. 31) — Ultra-Nationalism), Chikuma Shobo 筑摩書房, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 7-19).

30 Ibid., p. 2.

31 Ibid., p. 2.

32 Mori, Masao 護雅夫. *Yuboku Kiba-minzoku Kokka 遊牧騎馬民族国家* (The Nomadic Horse-Riding Tribe States), Kodan-sha 講談社, Tokyo, 1967.

Egami, Namio 江上波夫, *Kiba-minzoku Kokka — Nihon Kodai-shi e no Apurochi (50-pan)* *騎馬民族国家 — 日本古代史へのアプローチ (50版)* (A Horse-Riding Tribe State — An Academic Approach to the History of Ancient Japan (50th Edition)), Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1989.

33 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1092.

34 Yanabu, Akira 柳父章. *Honyaku-go Seiritsu Jijo 翻訳語成立事情* (Considerations of the Development of the Translation Equivalents), Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1982.

35 Cortazzi, Hugh G.C.M.G. "Eikoku no Keiken · Nihon no Chie 英国の経験 · 日本の知恵" (Britain's Experience and Japan's Wisdom), in *The Chuokoron 中央公論* April 1991, Vol. 1269, Chuokoron-sha 中央公論社, Tokyo, 1991, p. 274.

36 Ibid., p. 274.

37 Ibid., p. 274.

Part IV

Turning Points in the Negotiations II

Chapter 10: Proposal B and the Hull Note: October 1941-December 1941

In spite of the number of historians who take the opposite view, the thesis argues that the efforts made by the participants on both sides to achieve a successful outcome and avert the conflict, or at least to delay the outbreak of the war until the following March of 1942, might have been much closer to achieving success than is generally believed up to now. This is also the point at which serious misinformation, including the repeated Magic mistranslations and distortions, may have played an important role in contributing to the war.

In late November 1941, only two weeks before Pearl Harbor, neither the Japanese Navy nor the Army could foresee any possibility of final victory if war broke out with the U.S.,[1] while the American Navy and the Army both requested the government "to delay matters" for three months until March 1942 to enable them to prepare for war with Japan.[2] This was the background to the consideration which was being given by both sides to the modus vivendi during the last stage of the talks. The probability has to be recognised that Japan would have lost the opportunity to choose a suitable time to open hostilities against the U.S. if the Pearl Harbor plan had been postponed until March 1942, because of the following reasons.

Firstly, the Japanese pro-German group might have lost their influence, since by that time the German forces were obviously losing against the Red Army on the Moscow front. Secondly, Japan would have used up nearly half of her six month stock of oil during the period from December to the following March. Thirdly, Japan's motivation for opening hostilities would have been removed if the modus vivendi had been offered by the U.S. to Japan, since a version of the American modus vivendi consisted of conditions which were more or less acceptable to Japan, as may be seen from the fact that Japan was actually pleased with those conditions when she intercepted them[3] before the American decision

to remove them from the "Hull Note". Again Japan's Proposal B, which was offered by the Japanese government in November, could also be taken as a "modus vivendi" in its original Japanese version, although the inadequate Magic, which had already quite often negatively mistranslated or distorted Japanese diplomatic secret code messages, clearly defined it as an "ultimatum". This is where the significant role played by Magic mistranslations should be noted.

Proposal B and the Hull Note

The remainder of this chapter is central to the main argument of the thesis. It analyses the events relating to the U.S.-Japan peace talks during the period of the Tojo Cabinet (formed October 18th) up to Pearl Harbor on a day-by-day basis. The sequence of events is set out below.

On October 16th the third Konoe Cabinet resigned. The U.S. President showed the Secretary of State a rough draft of his "Message to the Emperor". On the same day, the U.S. Navy entered stage one of its War Plan of the Pacific Fleet (WPPac 46). This plan was based on the older WPL46, the War Plan of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations known as Rainbow Five, which was the war plan for an attack on Japan; stage one to start before the opening of hostilities, stage two just after the beginning of a war, and stage three from then on. As a part of stage one, the Eighth Fleet led by Vice-Admiral Halsey and the Twelfth Fleet left Pearl Harbor, sending planes out to the Pacific islands.[4]

On October 17th the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido 木戸幸一 proposed Hideki Tojo 東條英機 as the next Head of the Cabinet (Shuhan 首班), and his proposal was adopted by the conference of the former prime ministers, Jushin Kaigi 重臣会議 (literally the conference of the "senior statesmen"). On the basis of several materials, including the Kido Diary written at that time, the proposal of Tojo as Shuhan had the following aims.[5] First, Tojo was regarded as a capable leader who could effectively conduct both the Army and Navy, which had

previously tended to act independently of each other. Second, Tojo was expected to be capable of leading the government's reconsideration of the already adopted policy, based on the document titled the "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies", at the Gozen Kaigi of September 6th: preparation for war against the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands in case of failure to reach a diplomatic agreement within the period up to the middle of October. This reconsideration is called in Japanese the new policy of "Hakushi Kangen 白紙還元", which literally means "Going Back to Blank Paper" from the adopted document. It was also decided at the Jushin Kaigi that the new Shuhan Tojo should take on the position of Army Minister, being still a serving Army commander, to solve the previous political problem of lack of control. These two purposes for the formation of the new cabinet mentioned above were conveyed to Tojo from the Emperor through Kido on the same day. On the 17th, the U.S. State Department submitted a revised Message to the Emperor. On the 18th the Tojo Cabinet was formed, and Shigenori Togo 東郷茂徳 was appointed Foreign Minister.

Whatever the American perception of the formation of the new Tojo Cabinet was, the Japanese leaders' intention in forming it was, thus, to abolish the policy of opening hostilities in late October and to continue peace efforts through negotiations with the U.S. and Britain.[6] In fact, some Americans, including Ambassador Grew, who accurately reported to Washington on the 20th about Japanese intentions in the formation of the new cabinet, realised the true meaning of the appearance of Tojo.[7] While some American leaders, for instance Brigadier General Sherman Miles of the Army in his memorandum of the 17th, regarded Tojo as a very aggressive pro-German militarist, other leaders including William Langton in his memorandum of the 17th and Maxwell Hamilton in his memorandum of the 18th, both of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, predicted the possibility of success under the new Tojo Cabinet in reaching an agreement for peace.[8] One should recognise here that when the Tojo Cabinet began its operation there were leaders, on both sides, who were still attempting to

solve the U.S.-Japan conflicts through diplomatic means and who predicted a possibility of success.

One significant point is that many American leaders including Langton and Hamilton at this stage regarded the Tojo Cabinet as being pro-German and pro-Tripartite Alliance by pointing out that Tojo was the former attaché to Germany, that Foreign Minister Togo was the former ambassador to Germany and his wife was German. As is noted by Professor Shinji Sudo 須藤眞志, however, the Japanese leaders could not imagine such a strong impression would be given to the Americans from these profiles.[9] The Japanese thus underestimated the American authorities' hostility to Nazi Germany, while to some extent the Americans overestimated the link between Japan and Germany.

In fact, Secretary of State Hull, for example, states even in his work published after the end of the Pacific War: "We knew from our intercepts of Japanese Government messages how strong was the German pressure being applied in Tokyo. One such message, of October 16, from Toyoda to Nomura, stated that the German authorities were demanding that the Japanese Government submit a note of warning to the United States. The Germans were aroused over the President's 'shoot on sight' order of September 11, the incidents that had already occurred between German and American vessels, and the possibility that the Neutrality Act would be amended".[10] However, Eugen Ott, German ambassador to Tokyo, sent a report to Berlin on the 28th, 12 days after the message of the 16th from Toyoda to Nomura, saying that the Japanese government had not yet submitted such a note of warning to the United States, after Ott met new Foreign Minister Togo.[11]

As we have seen in Chapter 5, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had already requested Japan to attack British Singapore at a meeting with Hiroshi Oshima 大島浩, Ambassador to Germany, on February 23rd, 1941. On March 27th Hitler again requested Japan to attack Singapore when he met Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka 松岡洋右 on his visit to Germany, but Japan, instead of

attacking Singapore, began the U.S.-Japan peace talks in April. Consequently, the U.S.-Japan Draft Understanding Proposal of April 16th itself was reported by Ott on May 5th as an attempt to end the effectiveness of the Tripartite Pact. After the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the German government requested the Japanese government, on June 30th and July 2nd, to attack Russia, but the Japanese government decided on its non-participation policy in the Russo-German War at the Gozen Kaigi of July 2nd. Thus, the persistent requests from the German government to the Japanese government do not necessarily mean that the Japanese government was constrained in its decision-making towards the U.S.-Japan peace negotiations under German pressure at that time. While the Japanese did not fully understand that the Americans had already been involved in reality in the undeclared naval war against Germany in the Atlantic, the Americans over-emphasised the link between Japan's decision-making and Germany's pressure on Japan. The same type of perception gap between the two sides was to be seen in November, when Ambassador Saburo Kurusu 来栖三郎, the former ambassador to Germany, was sent to Washington to support Nomura's efforts in the peace talks.

In addition, it is important to remember that the vital question of whether Japan might have fought against the Russians in the North instead of opening hostilities against the Western Allies in the southern and eastern regions was still open at this stage. As noted by Waldo Heinrichs, "[Prime Minister] General Tojo Hideki, previously war minister ... was known for his 'particular dislike of the Russians' and his prediction in 1938 that Japan would have to fight the Soviet Union". As late as October the American officials still thought that there was more likelihood of the Japanese Army's attack against the Soviet Far Eastern Army in the North.

On October 17th high Chinese military officers predicted an attack by the Kwantung Army against the Soviet Siberian Army "in a few days". On the 21st, U.S. Army intelligence judged the Kwantung Army and the Siberian Army as roughly

matched as a result of a reduction in Soviet Far Eastern military forces and Japanese military movements towards the North, but a further reduction of the Soviet forces would lead to a Japanese attack. The U.S. Navy under the influence of Admiral Turner warned that hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Union were now a "strong possibility".

Roosevelt himself repeatedly stated his worry about the northern front in the Far East. On October 10th he told the British Ambassador Lord Halifax that he feared a Japanese attack on Vladivostok, and on the 15th he wrote to Churchill that the "Jap situation" was "definitely worse" and that the Japanese were "headed North".[12]

Even in the following month, the figures of the military and naval summaries of November 1st, for instance, stressed disposition of Japanese forces for a possible Russian attack: "The Japanese forces in Manchukuo, Korea and Inner Mongolia, disposed for attack upon Russia, are very reliably reported to have been increased to 684,000", while the same source of November 15th reported a further dwindling number of Japanese troops in the southern area; "It is believed that actually there are about 60,000 Japanese troops in Indo-China".[13]

In fact, as observed by Makoto Ikuta 生田惇 of the Military History Department (Senshi-shitsu 戦史室) of the National Institute for Defence Studies of the Defence Agency, the number of Japanese troops in the northern front, both in Manchuria and Korea, under the Kan-Toku-En Manoeuvres was increasing rapidly towards the beginning of November to about 800,000 in total. In contrast, the number of Japanese troops in the southern and eastern areas facing the Western Allied forces was less than 100,000 during the same period, and even by the date of the outbreak of the Pacific War, that number in those areas was increased to only 150,000 troops while 740,000 troops were still stationed on the northern front.[14] In this sense, U.S. military intelligence seems to have successfully obtained accurate information about the shift of the Japanese Army towards the North.[15]

On the basis of such information, an estimate of the U.S. Army of November 2nd consequently reached the conclusion that Japan's "most probable line of action ... will be to continue her efforts to secure a relaxation of American economic pressure, while completing her plans ..." although what "her plans" were was not clearly predicted. By comparing this conclusion with the Japanese primary sources which are examined in detail in this thesis, one can clearly recognise that U.S. military intelligence described contemporary Japanese intentions quite accurately, although some historians including Roberta Wohlstetter emphasise the view of American intelligence as merely unrealistic optimism: "This commitment [of the report of November 2nd] ... was still guided by the optimism that characterized the October predictions of MID [Military Intelligence Division of the U.S. Army]".[16]

Furthermore, the Kan-Toku-En Manoeuvres did not end until the early summer of 1942, several months after Pearl Harbor, and the material published by the Military History Department (Senshi-shitsu) in 1974 clearly proves the existence of quite precise war plans against the Russian Siberian Army, with a number of military maps of the region showing in detail a possible war of the summer of 1942.[17] A significant indication of the extremely high tension in the North is the fact, already mentioned, that more than 1,600 Russo-Japanese military conflicts were reported from 1937 up to the end of the Pacific War although the official Russian war declaration of 1945 was announced only six days before the end of the War. As already mentioned in Chapter 5, a number of historians have overlooked the significant developments throughout the period in the North. Ted Morgan, for instance, over-emphasises the "stability" in the North, making the extraordinary statement that "Never, until August 1945, did a Russian soldier fight a Japanese soldier".[18]

As Toshihiko Shimada 島田俊彦 observes, the volume of ammunition sent to the northern front was so large that a half of it remained when the Pacific War ended, even though much of it was increasingly sent to the southern fronts as the

fight against the Western Allied forces escalated throughout the four-year war in the Pacific.[19]

In this sense, some historians have questioned in retrospect the American coercive posture started by the implementation of embargoes on Japan, particularly the ban on oil shipments towards Japan from August, from a strategic point of view, since as emphasised by Heinrichs, the Japanese Army was eventually "of one mind on the necessity for attack southward including war with the United States" because "Even proponents of an attack northward were converted by the necessity of first securing adequate resources in the South".[20] Similarly, Anthony Kubek notes that "Invasion of Siberia ... offered no material advantage to Japan, other than a purely military one. Japan needed oil, and, with the United States constantly applying economic pressure, it was to [the] Japanese advantage to move in the direction of Southeast Asia, where oil was available. This was the view strongly advocated by the Japanese naval officials, who opposed simultaneous war with the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union".[21]

On October 19th the Japanese Naval Command accepted the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor in the case of war becoming inevitable. On October 20th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time, Ambassador Nomura sent a telegram to Tokyo for the attention of Navy Minister Shigetaro Shimada 嶋田繁太郎, stating his intention to resign from his position and requesting the support of the Navy Minister (see Chapter 8). On October 21st, during the afternoon, Tokyo Time, Tokyo received Nomura's telegram of the previous day, and at 19:40 Foreign Minister Togo sent Telegram #698 to Washington instructing Ambassador Nomura to continue the negotiations.[22] On October 22nd Magic decoded Nomura's telegram of October 20th and mistranslated it as being a complaint from Nomura about the Navy's lack of co-operation (see Chapter 8).

On October 23rd the Liaison Council met to re-examine the National Policies and continued in daily session until the 30th, with the exception of Sunday, the 26th.[23] The theme of the subsequent conferences was, as already mentioned,

"Going Back to Blank Paper". A tense and lengthy session of the Liaison Council took place starting at 09:00 on November 1st and continuing until 01:00 on November 2nd. At the beginning of the conference, the Supreme Command supported a plan to open hostilities because of its fear of losing further oil stocks. Prime Minister Tojo was prepared to consider the resignation of his cabinet until the Supreme Command agreed to a new Japanese strategy: to continue efforts for diplomatic success, but, if necessary, to declare war.[24] As a result the Liaison Council adopted in the early hours of November 2nd the "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies" and the "Plan for Negotiation with the U.S." (Taibei Kosho Yoryo 対米交渉要領). The latter consists of Proposal A (ko-an 甲案) and Proposal B (otsu-an 乙案). The Liaison Council also decided that December 1st should be the deadline for establishing the basis for negotiations.[25]

During the afternoon of November 3rd Foreign Minister Togo considered sending Saburo Kurusu to the U.S.[26] This was a private idea of Togo's to support Ambassador Nomura in Washington in his efforts to reach an agreement.[27] In the early hours of November 4th, Togo invited Kurusu to the official residence of the Foreign Minister.[28] Togo asked Kurusu to accept Togo's plan to transfer him to the U.S., although Togo predicted that it would be dangerous for Kurusu if the negotiations failed and war broke out.[29] After a little hesitation, Kurusu accepted the assignment.[30] Later that morning Tojo approved Togo's plan to send Kurusu to the U.S. and reported it to the Emperor. Togo requested Navy Minister Shimada to facilitate transport for Kurusu's journey from Tokyo to Hong Kong and Toshikazu Kase 加瀬俊一, Secretary to the Foreign Minister, met Ambassador Joseph Grew to request American co-operation for Kurusu's journey from Hong Kong to the U.S. During the afternoon the U.S. agreed to facilitate Kurusu's trip by air passage across the Pacific,[31] and the same afternoon Kurusu met Togo to ask for support for Kurusu's family in case war broke out.[32] That evening, Foreign Minister Togo sent Proposal A and Proposal B, the plans which were likely be adopted at a coming conference, Gozen Kaigi 御前会議, of November 5th to Ambassador

Nomura by Telegrams #725 at 18:00, #726 "Proposal A" at 21:45, and #727 "Proposal B" at 20:30.[33]

Coincidently, as already mentioned, the Chief of the War Plans Division reasserted on the 3rd that "the principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war". Two days later, the 5th, General Marshall and Admiral Stark stated to Roosevelt again that "the United States should avoid war with Japan if possible".

Under the circumstances, the U.S. intercepted Togo's telegrams on the 4th (U.S. Eastern Standard Time),[34] but seriously mistranslated and distorted them. Proposal A in Magic has a meaning which is opposite to that of the original text. The most serious distortion among many others in the Magic version of #726 is the establishment of the fourth item: "(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States ...", as no such item exists in the original Japanese text. This is the result of a mistranslation from the original sentence, "Moreover, concerning the [Hull's] Four Principles, avoid to the utmost including these in a formal agreement ..." As pointed out by the Defence at the Tokyo Trial,

> This paragraph in the intercepted message is given a separate number, (4), thereby making it appear coordinate with (1) Non-discrimination in Trade, (2) Interpretation and Application of the Tripartite Pact, and (3) Withdrawal of Troops. By thus seeming to be one of the main divisions of the message and cognate with the others, and by the omission of the words 'the four principles' and instead referring to anxiety to avoid having 'this' included in the agreement, this clause of course says that the Japanese will try to escape committing themselves to a formal agreement embodying the points which they have proposed above — all of them.[35]

Proposal A is also described as the "final proposal" in the Magic version of #726 although the original Japanese term "saishuteki joho-an 最終的譲歩案" cannot be the equivalent of a "final proposal" in the meaning of the term in English, since, as the subsequent Magic version of #727 itself correctly translated, Proposal B was prepared as a "substitute plan" in the event "If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American view [on Proposal A]". Although the Magic translator accurately translated the part mentioned above, Proposal B in the Magic version of #727 is again exaggerated as "the idea of

making a last effort", while the phrase "a last effort" does not exist in the original Japanese text.

In the case of Telegram #726, the Magic version contains a number of quite serious further mistranslations and misinterpretations, the details of which were much discussed at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the Tokyo Trial), together with #725 and #735.[36] One point which became clear from the testimony of Joseph Ballantine is that "the knowledge gained from this intercept [#726] vitiated the State Department's belief in the sincerity of the Japanese and that, subsequently, the State Department was on its guard".[37]

In addition, the Magic version of #725, which explained the general background and the Japanese intentions in preparation of those proposals, contains several misconceptions. For instance, the original phrase: "As a result of sincere, careful deliberation, we have decided to continue the negotiations" is translated in the Magic version as: "we have decided as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys". Although Japan's sincerity towards the negotiations was emphasised in the whole of the original text, the Magic interpreter gave an image of Japan as a reckless gambler by adding phrases such as "to gamble once more" and "the parleys".

Similarly, another sentence attached to the original text: "the success or failure of the present negotiations will have an enormous influence on ... the fate of our empire [Japan]" is converted by the interpreter to: "In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die". Again, the words "gambled" and "the throw of this die" do not exist in the original text. The original text also states that: "Because we desire to talk over a peaceful adjustment of the situation, as we enter into the last stages of the negotiations, we earnestly hope the United States government will turn about and reconsider seriously from an over-all view of maintaining Japanese-American relations and will use discretion in considering this extremely grave state of affairs". The Magic version, however, translated it in a very different tone: "It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what

may come at the end — at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations — the government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation". It is clear that the sense of earnest sincerity for "a peaceful adjustment of the situation" in the original text was completely missed by the Magic translations. The impression given by the Magic version is that the Japanese were flaunting their strength before the Americans. In this sense, the Magic version could be seen as no less than a threat to the Americans.

As already mentioned, one should be aware of the obvious fact that those messages including Telegram #725 were drawn up by the officials of the Tokyo Foreign Office for their colleagues in Washington as private messages, and were not assumed to be read by the Americans. Therefore, the sense of sincerity in the original message #725 was not part of propaganda. In the same context, to the Japanese foreign officials it certainly did not make any sense to flaunt their strength before their colleagues. Here, the translated version is one example of misinterpretation, amongst a number of others, which was caused by the interpreter's stereotyped image of the Japanese. Thus, the consequence was full of overtones in the decoded version. After carefully examining those distortions and overtones in the English version of #725, Ben Blakeney of the Defence at the Tokyo Trial stated that "it is the whole spirit which is wrong".[38]

It is interesting to observe how effectively the Magic misconceptions could influence the formation of fixed images in readers who already had some pre-conceived images of the pre-war Japanese and their culture. Examples which show such an influence can be found even in the works of post-war scholars. Roberta Wohlstetter, for instance, comments about Telegram #725 that "The manner of saying this — 'a throw of the die,' 'the brink of chaos,' — was also dramatically urgent, even if somewhat alien to the American mode of speech"[39] without realising that both of them were invented by the American interpreter but were not used by the Japanese officials. In fact, the latter phrase: "will ... be

the brink of chaos" should read correctly in the original text: "will face a rupture". It is not surprising that the contemporary American leaders who had access to the intercepts were not sympathetic to the Japanese position.

A specific example can be seen in item Three of Proposal A, regarding "the Japanese troops sent to China during the China Incident"; for example, Tokyo offered to withdraw from the rest of China, except North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan 海南 Island, "simultaneously with the establishment of peace in accordance with arrangements to be made between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will be completed within two years". Regarding North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island, Tokyo stated that the troops "will remain for a necessary period of time after the establishment of peace between Japan and China"[40] and added in the Note of the Item that "in case the United States asks what the 'necessary period of time' will be, we will respond that we have in mind 25 years". However, the Magic version of the Note is: "Should the American authorities question you in regard to 'the suitable period', answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years".[41] As noted by Jackson N. Huddleston, "The implied deceptiveness in the MAGIC translation 'vaguely' does not exist in the 'original'. Such a mistake could only add to Secretary Hull's belief in the insincerity of the Japanese".[42]

Regarding the definition of the "necessary period", there were in fact various opinions in Tokyo, from the hardest, 99 years, to the softest, five years. Foreign Minister Togo judged that the domestic situation was far from reaching a "unanimous agreement" at this stage, although Japan should "satisfy the desire of the United States by making the evacuation of troops a fundamental principle" and "delineate the area and duration" to "dispel their doubt". Thus, he decided to suggest "25 years" at this stage, if the worst came to the worst. He was, of course, fully aware that "25 years" of occupation was too extreme to be accepted by the United States. On November 2nd, therefore, he confirmed with Prime Minister Tojo that "should the U.S. Government respond positively to either Proposal A or

Proposal B, Japan would have to make a further compromise". Togo's goal was "five years", and "25 years" was in his mind a tentative idea.[43] This was why he instructed Ambassador Nomura "at this time to negotiate strictly on the abstract term 'necessary time'" and explained that "if we were to state clearly the necessary period for stationing troops, rather than clarifying the matter, we fear it would confuse the situation".[44]

This part of message #726, which indicated the sensitivity of the issue, was completely omitted by the Magic translator. Instead, the translator added sentences which do not exist in the original text: "On the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemise".[45] None of these terms: "whenever", "pressed", "hitherto", "vague", "indecisive", "yet", "as pleasant as possible", or "euphemise" can be seen in the original text.

Furthermore, when Togo instructed Nomura to "make every effort to impress them with the fact that we do not intend to station troops indefinitely or permanently",[46] this earnest tone was missed in the Magic version. The English version gives the impression of simply playing with words and appears to suggest deceptiveness; "try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation".[47] In the end, Proposal A was, as observed by Herbert Feis, "in truth, dead before it was delivered".[48]

Kurusu met Prime Minister Tojo at 19:00 on the 4th. Tojo encouraged Kurusu and predicted that there was still a 30% possibility of reaching agreement in the U.S.-Japan peace negotiations. Kurusu opposed Tojo's optimistic view of the situation, but promised Tojo that he would make every effort to avert war.[49]

While the sincerity of Kurusu's support for Nomura in peace talks with the U.S. is now widely known, Hull stated in his memoirs even after the war that "Foreign Minister Togo on November 3rd instructed Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to come to Washington ostensibly to assist

Nomura in his conversations with me [Hull]".[50] There is no documentary evidence to indicate that the Japanese leaders were seriously worried that Kurusu's career as the former German ambassador could have negative consequences in the U.S.-Japan talks. Kurusu records in his memoirs that his career as the former German ambassador was considered, after much discussion at the meeting of the 4th, as an advantage in explaining to the Americans about the Japanese stance and obligations under the Tripartite Pact even though some possibility of a "handicap" was also predicted.[51] In the case of Foreign Minister Togo, his work, written after the end of the war, does not even mention the discussion of the issue itself.[52]

Two significant problems among many other points can clearly be recognised here. One point is, as far as Japan's real intention in sending Kurusu to Washington is concerned, Hull's judgement on it was definitely unsound. The other point is that the Japanese failure to take into serious consideration Kurusu's career in Germany in itself indicates that the Japanese leaders obviously underestimated the American leaders' hatred of Nazi Germany.

Meanwhile the Japanese Task Force carried out manoeuvres from November 4th to the 6th, based on the contingency plan to attack Pearl Harbor.[53] Ambassador Kurusu left Japan for the U.S. at 04:00 Tokyo Time on November 5th.[54] The same day the Council of the Japanese Supreme Command in the Presence of the Emperor (Gozen Kaigi) adopted the "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies".[55] Foreign Minister Togo predicted that there was less than a 10% possibility of reaching agreement with the U.S. in the negotiations. Prime Minister Tojo disagreed with Togo's view and insisted that there was about a 40% possibility of agreement.[56] The Naval General Staff transmitted the First Naval Order 大海令第一号 (Dai-kai-rei Dai-ichi-go) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Isoroku Yamamoto 山本五十六,[57] followed by a proviso that the attack would be aborted if the U.S.-Japan negotiations were successful.[58]

Foreign Minister Togo sent Proposal A and Proposal B, which had finally been adopted at the Gozen Kaigi of November 5th, to Ambassador Nomura

(Telegram #735).[59] In the same telegram, Togo instructed Nomura to maintain a friendly attitude for the purpose of making every effort to reach agreement with the U.S., by avoiding giving any impression of a "deadline" or ultimatum. Togo also sent a message which instructed Nomura to keep in mind that Japan needed to sign an agreement with the U.S. by November 25th (Telegram #736).[60]

The Americans intercepted Telegrams #735 and #736 on the 5th (U.S. Eastern Standard Time),[61] and recognised November 25th as being the Japanese "deadline",[62] but seriously mistranslated and distorted #735, and misunderstood #736. The original Japanese term "[presentation of Proposal B] as a means of overcoming final barriers" was mistranslated as "our [Japanese] absolutely final proposal" in the Magic version of #735. The Americans also had no means of knowing that November 25th was never defined as the deadline at the conference in Tokyo but "the 25th" of #736 was deliberately mentioned by Togo as a private tactic to push Nomura to try to reach an agreement more quickly because Nomura, in Togo's view, tended to move too slowly.[63]

Cordell Hull states in his memoirs that:

> For the first time we now saw a deadline stated in the intercepts. In a message to Nomura on November 5, Togo said: "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month"... This, to us, could mean only one thing. Japan had already set in motion the wheels of her war machine, and she had decided not to stop short of war with the United States if by November 25 we had not agreed to her demands.[64]

Although the real deadline was set for December 1st in Tokyo,[65] which was only six days later than November 25th, this difference was quite significant when one considers the following facts. First, Hull eventually decided to remove the modus vivendi from the "Hull Note" by the early hours in the morning of the 26th after much consideration,[66] and clearly indicated to Stimson later the same morning that war had become inevitable because the modus vivendi was removed. Second, one factor which promoted Hull's decision was his belief that Proposal B was the "absolutely final proposal" described in the Magic translation although it

could still be a Japanese proposal of "modus vivendi" in Japanese in the original telegram.[67]

On November 6th the Army General Staff ordered the southern troops to prepare for war. On November 7th Secretary of State Hull argued in the U.S. Cabinet that "from the tone of the intercepts", a Japanese attack on the U.S. was imminent.[68] Ambassador Nomura submitted Proposal A to Secretary of State Hull. Hull judged that "the proposals ... are merely rewordings of the previous Japanese points. They contain nothing basically new, nor do they offer any real concessions".[69]

As Feis observes, "Earnestly he [Nomura] presented Proposal A" to the Secretary of State at the meeting of the 7th. In sharp contrast, Hull did not pay any reasonable attention to it but only "a rapid glance at the contents" since he thought that he "already knew" it through the Magic intercept.[70] The reality was, as noted by T. Kase, that Hull knew the "strikingly misinterpreted content" of Proposal A.[71]

In addition, one should recognise that this event shows another problem of using decoded intercepts for diplomacy, separate from the issue of misinterpretations. Whatever the conditions contained in Proposal A, virtually no diplomat could ever have been interested in considering them sincerely, when one knew in advance that one's adversary had already prepared Proposal B and was going to present the new one in the event of an American refusal of Proposal A. This problem would not have been caused if the American diplomats had not had access to the intercepts. Although Foreign Minister Togo met Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on the 10th in his effort to avoid any miscommunications, and although he presented Grew an English text of Proposal A prepared by the Japanese government,[72] there was little likelihood of Togo being able to bring the American decision-maker's attention to the text, partly because Grew's information itself was, as already analysed, discredited in Washington. In this sense, the Japanese efforts to reach an agreement made for thirteen days between

the date of presentation of Proposal A, the 7th, and that of Proposal B, the 20th, were consequently entirely wasted during this crucial period.

On November 10th a secret operational order was issued to the Japanese Combined Forces confirming that D-day would be December 8th (Tokyo time).[73] As already mentioned, however, Prime Minister Tojo was not informed by the Navy that the order had been issued until after the opening of the Tokyo Trial.

On November 11th the Liaison Council determined the "Criteria for Deciding to Open Hostilities with the U.S. and Great Britain" (Tai-Bei-Ei Kaisen Meimoku Kosshi 対米英開戦名目骨子).[74] The U.S. State Department prepared its first draft of a provisional Japan-U.S. modus vivendi,[75] and President Roosevelt requested the Navy to report Magic information in its entirety instead of only summaries (effective from the 12th).[76]

On the same day, the 11th, Magic decoded Telegram #757 of the 10th sent from Tokyo to Nomura. The Magic version, however, contains several mistranslations. The most important mistake among them was the use of the translated phrase: "the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations" while it should read correctly: "conclude" the negotiations. Consequently, the Magic interpreter gave an impression to the readers that Japan desired to "establish" the negotiations while, in reality, Japan wished to "conclude" them.[77] Taking into account that the American leaders maintained that the talks were still in the preliminary stage and therefore could be regarded as conversations but not as negotiations, it was natural for Hull and others to think that Japan's desire for speed was not as urgent as was presented by Ambassador Nomura. In the same context, the Japanese sense of crisis under the economic sanctions was missed by the Magic translation: "measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat indicate ..." while it should read correctly that "economic pressure of this type ... [will be] a threat more serious than military force".[78]

On the same day, Magic also decoded Telegram #762 of the 11th from Tokyo to Nomura. The Magic version, again, contains important mistranslations which

could have only confused the American decision makers with regard to the status of Proposal A. The phrases of the original text, the "latest proposal" (saigo-an 最後案) and "Proposal A under our latest instruction" (saigo kunrei Ko-an 最後訓令甲案), were translated as "our final proposal" and "our final Proposal A", although the term "saigo 最後" obviously was meant in the sense of "the latest" in the context of the original text.[79] The term "saigo" can indeed mean "last" (hence "final"), but (as is explained more fully on p.338 and p. 349) that sense is not appropriate here. Thus, the Magic version made the same mistake as it had made in Telegram #726, although Proposal B was not yet presented to the United States. Consequently, the interpreter gave an impression to the readers that Japan's sense of crisis under the economic sanctions was less serious than it really was, while exaggerating the aggressive manner of Japan towards their adversaries.

On the next day, the 12th, when Nomura met Hull and asked him what was the American response to Proposal A, Hull avoided talking about it. Telegram #764 of the 12th from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura was also decoded on the same day. The telegram conveyed the gist of a conversation Togo had had with the British Ambassador in Tokyo. There are, however, mistranslations. The most serious one is the translated sentence in the English version: "A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States", while it should read correctly that: "depending on what the attitude of Britain and the United States is, there is a way to swift agreement". Thus, while Togo only expressed the realities of the situation, the Magic interpreter gave an impression, by adding the term "entirely", that Togo tried to place responsibility completely on Britain and the United States. Again, the word "entirely" does not exist in the original version. Togo's sense of sincerity in his effort to avoid a conflict was emphasised in the original text and greatly impressed the British Ambassador, but was missed in the Magic version. Even the original phrase

"kikyoku o kaihi 危局を回避", which means "to avoid a crisis", was missed by the interpreter who translated it as "to ride out the crisis".[80]

Between 09:00 and 15:00 on November 13th the Combined Fleet was briefed on the Pearl Harbor attack plan. Admiral Yamamoto stressed to commanders that all warships had to withdraw if the U.S.-Japan diplomatic negotiations in Washington were successful by one o' clock one day before the attack set for 01:00 on December 7th, Tokyo Time (11:00 on the 6th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time).[81]

On the same occasion, the naval commanders even discussed details of methods and techniques of communications between the fleet and aircraft so as to be able to prevent implementing the attack plan, by calling the planes back to the aircraft carriers, in the event of a successful outcome of diplomatic negotiations. They recognised that radio communication facilities between the fleet and the dive bombers and torpedo bombers were developed effectively enough to be able to call them back at any time after taking off, but those of the fighter planes had some technical weak points. In addition, while each bomber was expected to have a radio operator on board together with a pilot, this was not the case with the fighter planes. Thus, it was thought that such communications could only be really effective as long as the fighter planes were flying together with the dive bombers and torpedo bombers.[82] The same morning the Liaison Council, which met from 10:00 to 12:00, decided on the "Policy re Other Countries Relating to Guidelines for Implementing National Policies (Teikoku Kokusaku Suiko Hoshin ni kanren suru Taigai Sochi 帝国国策遂行方針に関連する対外措置)".[83]

On November 15th, the Army General Staff gave the order to advance in the southern regions.[84] The same day the Liaison Council agreed the "Contingency Plan in Relation to Hastening the End of the War with the U.S., Great Britain and the Netherlands (Tai-Bei-Ei-Ran Senso Shumatsu Sokushin ni kansuru Fuku-an 対米英蘭戦争終末促進に関する腹案)".[85] Tokyo sent message #111 to Honolulu requesting more reports.[86] The German Army commenced the second assault on Moscow.

U.S. Secretary of State Hull made a proposal in response to the Japanese proposal and presented an Oral Statement on one item regarding trade in Japan's Proposal A, whilst ignoring the rest of the items, to Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Saburo Kurusu arrived in Washington, and the two Japanese ambassadors judged that the American reply to Japanese Proposal A would be too slow to enable a peace agreement to be reached in the time available.[87] The two Japanese ambassadors met Secretary of State Hull and President Roosevelt on November 17th. Hull felt "from the start that he [Kurusu] is deceitful. Knowing what I [Hull] did of Japan's intentions from the intercepts ...",[88] while Kurusu felt encouraged by Roosevelt's attitude, according to Telegram #1133 of the 18th.[89]

On November 17th Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., submitted to President Roosevelt his private draft proposals for negotiating with Japan.[90]

On the same day, Telegram #781 of the 15th sent from Tokyo to Washington was decoded by the Magic interpreters. The Magic version, however, contains an important mistake with regard to the status of Proposal A by translating "our latest proposal" as "the final proposal". The original Japanese term "saigo-an 最後案" cannot be the equivalent of a "final proposal" in the meaning of the term in English, since the subsequent sentence in the same telegram clearly notes, as correctly translated by the Magic interpreter, that "we have not as yet presented our 'B' proposal to the United States". Thus, the Magic version made the same mistake as it had previously made in the telegrams #726 and #762, and by this, it gave again an exaggerated impression of Japan's aggressive attitude.[91]

A further meeting between the two Japanese ambassadors and Secretary of State Hull took place on November 18th. Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu discussed proposals for breaking the deadlock with Hull. Nomura presented his private proposal to the United States: Japanese troop withdrawal from southern French Indo-China in exchange for the U.S. unfreezing Japanese assets.[92] Hull emphasised that "Our people do not trust Hitler ... We feel that, if Hitler won out, he

inevitably would get around to the Far East and double-cross Japan".[93] Kurusu was surprised by the strong anti-German tone of Hull's speech and realised that Hull's hatred of Germany was much deeper than the Japanese had expected.[94]

On the 18th Major-General Kiyofuku Okamoto 岡本清福 contacted Colonel Alfred Kretschmer, an attache to the German Embassy in Tokyo, informing him that there was the possibility of a war breaking out between the United States and Japan. Okamoto also informed him that Japan would request Germany to guarantee not to reach a ceasefire with the Allies, leaving Japan alone in the war.[95] Okamoto's action was based on Item 1—(3) of the document titled "National Policies", adopted at the Gozen Kaigi of November 5th: "1—(3). Cooperation with Germany and Italy will be strengthened".[96]

According to a document attached to the "National Policies", Japan would begin to negotiate with Germany and Italy for "German (and Italian) participation in the war against the United States" if the U.S.-Japan war became inevitable. It was, however, also confirmed that Japan would not accept a German request to participate in the Russo-German war, and in the event of a strong demand from Germany for Japan's participation against Russia "Even if this should lead to a situation whereby Germany will delay her entry into the war against the United States, it cannot be helped".[97] In other words, from the point of view of Japan's decision to open hostilities, it was not necessary for Germany to participate against the U.S. This is a very important point.

On November 19th the "Winds" execute message (J-19) was sent: In the event of a serious situation, the following in the form of a weather report would be broadcast: Japanese-American crisis: "East wind rain", Japanese-Russian crisis: "North wind cloudy", Japanese-British crisis: "West wind clear".[98] The British Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) decoded the "Winds" message from the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo to the Japanese Consulate in Melbourne (#2353).[99]

The same morning Father Walsh reported to the Japanese ambassadors that the U.S. might accept Nomura's proposal, and later that day Postmaster General

Frank C. Walker reported the same thing to them.[100] Admiral Harold Stark, the Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, opposed, whilst Brigadier-General Leonard T. Gerow, deputising for General Marshall, supported Morgenthau's draft proposals.[101]

On November 20th Foreign Minister Togo decided to instruct Ambassador Nomura to deliver Proposal B, explaining to him that a breakdown would be inevitable if the U.S. rejected it.[102] The Liaison Council agreed plans for the administration of occupied southern territories (Nanpo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo 南方占領地行政実施要領)".[103] The Japanese ambassadors received Telegram #798 from Tokyo condemning Nomura's private proposal of the 18th and instructing them to present Proposal B to the U.S.,[104] and then Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu met Secretary of State Hull to deliver Proposal B.[105]

On November 21st, the Fifth Naval Order 大海令第五号 (Dai-kai-rei Dai-go-go), "Proceed at sea in readiness for war", was issued,[106] again followed by the instruction to be prepared to abort if diplomatic negotiations were successful.[107] MacArthur received the "Offensive Air Operations", the revised Rainbow Five War Plan,[108] on the same day. Kurusu met Hull but Nomura did not attend the meeting. Kurusu, as a former ambassador who had actually signed the Tripartite Pact, proposed the preparation of a paper, with his signature as an ambassador, to make the following points clear: first, Japan had no secret agreement with Germany; second, Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact were that Japan would act "independently" from Germany, but not participate "automatically" in the European War, in the event of the U.S. entering it against Germany.[109]

Kurusu, as he himself notes in his memoirs, offered this proposal of the 21st under instruction from Tokyo by Telegram #800 sent the day before, the 20th.[110] As far as the Japanese intention to act "independently", i.e. in reality walking out from the Tripartite Pact, is concerned, the instruction was sent twice in Japanese from Tokyo in #773 of the 14th[111] and #800. The term "independently" used in the original Telegram #773 was, however, completely

mistranslated by the Magic interpreter on the 14th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time, as "automatically".[112] The Magic translation of #800 abbreviated the last part of the telegram in which the term "independently" was used in the original Japanese text, and completely failed to explain the important content. Although the U.S. Prosecution presented an English version of #800 at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, this was a version which was corrected by the Prosecution to include the last part containing "independently" from the Japanese original, and not the Magic version.[113] The significant point is that the Prosecution, as already mentioned, did not inform the Court that this #800 and a few other telegrams were their own new translations (see Chapter 8).

This mistranslation was particularly serious in view of the fact that Japan and Germany had struggled for many years over this very issue of "automatic" versus "independent" action. Of course, Hull could not know from the intercepts about this serious mistranslation, which virtually reversed the meaning of the original text. Consequently, he states in his memoirs: "The following day [the 21st] Kurusu came alone to see me and handed me a formula that he said clarified Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Alliance. This merely recited Kurusu's personal interpretation, given from his viewpoint as the man who had signed the treaty for Japan. He declared that Japan herself could interpret her obligations under the Pact ... I said I did not think the paper he had handed me would be of any particular help, and so dismissed".[114]

Thus, it is not surprising that Hull judged it as "merely ... Kurusu's personal interpretation" and therefore it could not be "any particular help" because he had already read the content of the mistranslated Magic versions. In any case, an important chance to take into account the new proposal presented by Tokyo was missed. Professor C. Hosoya observes that "Japanese leaders seem to have taken for granted that their real purpose had been made clear to the United States by the two messages they had sent and by their failure to supply aid to Germany. Therefore Foreign Minister Togo was surprised when Hull insisted in a talk with

Nomura on November 15 that Japan must clearly indicate that if it entered into an agreement with the United States, 'the Tripartite Pact would automatically become a dead letter.' It was evident that the Japanese leaders had failed to communicate their position to the American officials".[115] It was, in any case, impossible "to communicate their position to the American officials" when the Americans had secretly read and uncritically accepted the Magic translations which persistently misled the meaning of the original term "independently" as "automatically".

As Hull wrote later in 1948 about Proposal B, "it required very little scrutiny to see that they were utterly unacceptable" since the conditions "on their face were extreme". He also stated that "The President and I could only conclude that ... no responsible American official could ever have dreamed of accepting them [the conditions of Proposal B]".[116] Even during the post-war period, a number of historians have maintained the same view as Hull towards the nature of the Proposal at that time.

For instance, in his publication of 1965, with "the authorization of Henry Morgenthau",[117] John Blum of Yale University states, without recognising the issue of these mistranslations, that "in the event of American participation in the European war, Japan would 'automatically carry out what she understands to be the obligations' of the Axis Pact" while "It [Japan's Proposal B] obligated the United States to unfreeze Japanese assets, to lift the embargo on oil". Blum emphasises that "MAGIC's window on that development confirmed the distaste of Roosevelt and Hull for any consideration of Plan B".[118] If it is the case that the views of Morgenthau and Blum about the influence of Magic on the thinking of the decision makers are accurate, the confusion between "independently" and "automatically" created by the English version of the intercepts played a fatal role in the formation of U.S. decision-making.

Furthermore, a few points can be seen which clearly indicate the perception gap between the two sides. First, according to Telegram #1160 of the 23rd sent from Washington to Tokyo, and Kurusu's memoirs, Hull replied to

Kurusu that he supported Kurusu's proposal, withdrawal from the Tripartite Pact, as "quite a good idea (sukoburu myo-an 頗ル妙案)"[119] and that there was "one person with whom he wished to consult" about the idea. Although Hull would not say with whom he wished to consult, Kurusu felt that Hull's attitude was nevertheless "quite friendly".[120] Whatever Hull's true intention, his attitude described in Kurusu's reports, recorded both before Pearl Harbor and after the war, was quite different from what Hull recognised himself in his memoirs. Second, while Hull was again suspicious of what Kurusu said in respect of Kurusu's position as "Japanese Ambassador to Berlin ... [who] had signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany",[121] the members of the Foreign Office in Tokyo, as we have seen, considered at the meeting of early November that Kurusu's very position, as signatory of the Tripartite Pact of 1940, would be an advantage in explaining to the U.S. the Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Alliance. Hull's reaction to Kurusu's visit was indeed more serious than Kurusu could imagine at the time: "After this visit from Kurusu and his statement that he had nothing more to offer on the subject of a peaceful settlement, I [Hull] redoubled, in conversations with the individuals in authority in Washington — among them Admiral Stark — my warnings that Japan might attack at any time".[122]

With regard to the suspicion and distrust of Kurusu's role, persistently maintained by Hull as well as by the members of the hard-liners, two important factors among many should be recognised in particular. Firstly, Hull as well as the hard-liners including Stimson, failed to recognise the true nature of Kurusu's mission because, in the words of Abraham Ben-Zvi of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, they "interpreted the mission in a way which reinforced [their] pre-existing images". On the one hand, as already mentioned, they regarded certain Japanese leaders' profiles as evidence of a pro-German stance, such as that Kurusu was the former Japanese Ambassador to Germany and that Togo's wife was German; on the other hand, as pointed out by Ben-Zvi, they "ignored those which might have indicated a different impression, such as that Kurusu had served in

the Japanese consular service in the United States, and that his wife was American".[123]

Secondly, as Hull himself emphasised, the Magic translation actually implied deceit and that there was a covert purpose to Kurusu's trip. An example of such mistranslations in the intercepts can be found in the English version of the Japanese message #739 which was originally sent from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura on November 6th, and was translated by the Magic interpreter on the same day, U.S. Eastern Standard Time. This message is important since "the reason why we [the Japanese] are sending Ambassador Kurusu to you [Nomura in Washington] so quickly" is clearly explained in it.

The Magic translation read: "To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between the two nations". The Defence's translation presented at the Tokyo Trial is, however, much closer to its original text: "It has been explained to the public here that, in view of the necessity of the negotiations being speedily brought to a successful conclusion, Ambassador Kurusu has been hurriedly dispatched to assist you". Thus, it is clear that the Magic version implies deceit by adding some phrases including the one "To make it sound good". It is, in the Defence's category, "insidious distortion". In fact, those phrases such as "To make it sound good" and "the unhappy relations" are not used in its original text.[124]

On November 22nd, Foreign Minister Togo instructed Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu (Telegram #812) to expedite the negotiations.[125] The deadline for completion was extended to November 29th from November 25th, which was the date given in the previous Telegram #736 of November 5th. The date "29th" was, of course, never defined as the deadline at the conference in Tokyo but again was deliberately introduced by Togo as a private tactic to push Nomura and Kurusu to try to reach an agreement with the U.S. more quickly. In this sense, although the "deadline" in the original coded message was strongly expressed and accurately translated in Magic as "the dead line [*sic*] absolutely cannot be changed", Tokyo's

definition of the true deadline was after the 29th, i.e. December 1st. Togo's intention in using such a strong expression was to push his own ambassadors in Washington, but by no means to put pressure on the United States. The Americans, however, had no means of knowing this, and seriously believed "the 29th" to be the deadline when they decoded the message from Tokyo. This is one case which shows the danger of using decoded intercepts for diplomacy, separate from the issue of mistranslations.[126]

Magic decoded Telegram #812 on the 22nd, U.S. Eastern Standard Time,[127] but with more mistranslations which, together with the problem mentioned above, caused further confusion in the U.S.-Japan peace negotiations. One of the original sentences, for example, "While maintaining the prearranged policy, the Japanese government is going to intensively do its best [in our negotiations with the United States] with sincerity and reason [jori 情理] to overcome the current difficult barriers as far as any hope still remains, and by doing so the government wishes to avert the crisis in U.S.-Japan relations" was mistranslated in the Magic version as "Stick to your fixed policy and do your best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire". This distortion was the result of many serious mistakes, including the transposition of the grammatical subjects "ambassadors" and "Japanese government".

Furthermore, the tone of the Magic intercept exaggerated the impression of Japan's aggressive attitude towards the talks. For instance, the date of "the 29th" was mentioned only once in the original text, but there is a repetition of the date in the Magic translation. In addition, the date "25th", which was mentioned in the previous message of November 5th, was also added in the Magic translation, although it was not mentioned in the original text. The English phrase "after that things are automatically going to happen" also gave the impression to the U.S. that Japan had no intention of being sincere with the U.S.

In fact, Professor T. Kase, who actually drew up the message of #812 as secretary to the Foreign Minister, has not agreed with the interpreter's

translation. Kase states that "It is open to say that the interpreter deliberately aimed at breaking down the negotiations".[128] Thus, the concept of "deadline" was over-emphasised in the tone of the Magic translation. In short, the decoding conveyed a meaning which was the opposite of the original meaning. Consequently, Secretary of State Hull later stated in his work:

> An intercepted message from Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on that day, November 22, confirmed my belief. This message extended the deadline from November 25 to 29. After that, war. "Stick to our [sic] fixed policy and do your very best," it said. "Spare no efforts, and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th; but ... you can finish your conversations ... by the 29th (let me write it out for you — twenty-ninth) ... the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen" ... It was in the shadow of that phrase — "after that things are automatically going to happen" — that we labored desperately during the next two weeks, striving to the last for peace or at least more time.[129]

The Combined Fleet 連合艦隊 (Rengo Kantai) assembled in Hitokappu Harbour in readiness for its departure on November 26th.[130] Hull prepared his tentative proposals (the modus vivendi). The U.S. State Department drew up another "Draft U.S.-Japan Provisional Agreement", a revised draft based on Morgenthau's draft, and Secretary of State Hull requested the views of Great Britain, Australia, China and Holland.[131]

When their representatives wired this "Draft U.S.-Japan Provisional Agreement" (the modus vivendi) to their governments Japan intercepted and decoded it (see appendix). Japanese hopes of peace were encouraged by their intercepted messages. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minister Togo expected success in the talks aimed at averting the crisis.[132] At a meeting with the two Japanese ambassadors, however, Hull stated that he was "discouraged" by Japan's aggressively hurrying "demand" for a final American reply to Proposal B. The Japanese ambassadors worried that this might cause a refusal of the Japanese proposal.[133]

On November 23rd, Foreign Minister Togo explained the details of the "true motive" (shin-i 真意) of Proposal B to U.S. Ambassador J. Grew in Tokyo.[134]

Ambassador Nomura sent message #1161 to Tokyo reporting the result of the meeting on the 22nd, and particularly Hull's use of the term "demand".[135]

On November 24th at the conference of the Liaison Council Japan decided on several procedures for the preparation of a trade treaty with the U.S. in the event of a successful result of the talks.[136] The Japanese ambassadors received Telegram #821 from Foreign Minister Togo in response to Nomura's report of the 23rd (#1161). The Japanese "wish" to receive a quick reply to Proposal B from the U.S. was misunderstood by Hull as being an aggressive Japanese "demand".[137] The State Department drew up a "Draft Japan-U.S. Provisional Agreement" (the modus vivendi) and an "Overall Plan of Agreement", and sought the opinions of the representatives of Great Britain, China and the Netherlands.[138]

About this time the authorities on both sides received some information of military movements which gave an aggressive impression of the other side. For example, Hull states:

> On the same day [the 21st] the Dutch Government informed us that a Japanese force had arrived near Palau, the nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands East Indies. We had also received reports from our consuls at Hanoi and Saigon concerning extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indo-China. The zero hour was approaching.[139]

This statement shows that the American authorities successfully monitored Japanese military preparations, shown by, for example, the order to advance in the southern regions given by the Japanese Army General Staff on November 15th. Hull, however, had no means of knowing the important Japanese proviso repeatedly given for those preparations for war, which was to be prepared to abort if diplomatic negotiations were successful. Hull's ignorance is particularly likely since the U.S. could not break the Japanese military codes at that time, as the American authorities have officially maintained up to the present, because these military orders were in military codes and not in the diplomatic codes decoded as Magic information. In other words, although Hull thought that "The zero hour was approaching", these preparations did not necessarily mean that "after that things [opening hostilities] are automatically going to happen". It is

true that the Japanese were seriously preparing for war, but it is also true that they were still very serious about averting the war through diplomatic means if there was any possibility of doing so.

In this sense, Paul Schroeder observes that "There can be little doubt that not only Nomura and Kurusu in Washington, but also Togo and Tojo were earnestly trying to gain acceptance of the Japanese proposition and thus striving, within limits, to reach an agreement with the United States and avert war".[140] The American situation was, in this sense, similar at that time. For instance, the White House announced that the U.S. army had advanced into Dutch Guinea to obtain aluminium resources after an agreement with the Dutch government in exile in London. As will be seen, according to the telegrams exchanged between the embassy in Washington and the Foreign Office in Tokyo, Telegrams #1180 of the 26th[141] and #842 of the 27th,[142] the Japanese were seriously worried about the possibility of an American occupation of the Dutch Indies. The American intention in these actions was, however, war preparations in the event of an emergency, but not necessarily preparations for the opening of hostilities from the American side. In this sense, as already mentioned, Jonathan Utley states that "No one during the fall of 1941 wanted war with Japan", and Norman Graebner emphasises that "No more than Japan did the United States want war" at this stage.

Thus, although both sides recognised that the possibility of diplomatic success for averting war was very slight and war preparations were necessary in reality, both authorities still seriously attempted to reach an agreement. Hull states that "Diplomatically the situation was virtually hopeless. We on our part, however, wanted to exhaust all means to find a peaceful solution and to avert or delay war",[143] while on November 25th, Foreign Minister Togo prepared the drafts of official "reciprocal documents" both with Britain and with the Netherlands, and also a draft announcement for the newspapers in the event of an agreement being reached.[144] It is clear on the basis of documentary evidence that both sides at the time believed that "We on our part ... wanted to exhaust all

means to find a peaceful solution" but considered the other side did not. Thus, to some extent, distorted images of each other were a significant factor which contributed to the eventual failure of the peace talks. At this stage Togo's attitude was, as it was criticised by Kurusu later, over-optimistic towards the talks,[145] while Hull's attitude towards Japan's intentions was over-pessimistic, greatly influenced by the persistent occurrence of the Magic mistranslations.

By this stage, the view of the American decision-makers towards the situation in the Far East significantly changed. Heinrichs observes that "Whereas American officials in October considered a Japanese attack northward the most likely possibility, in November that eventuality seemed farfetched".[146]

On November 25th, at a meeting at 9.30 (U.S. Eastern Standard Time), Hull showed Stimson and Knox "the proposal ... for a three months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow".[147] On the same day, at a meeting in the afternoon called by President Roosevelt, the American leaders agreed that "The question was how we [the Americans] should maneuver them [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves".[148] For reasons which are still not clear, Secretary of War Henry Stimson sent a mistaken report of new information from Army Intelligence (known as G-2) to both Hull and Roosevelt that "Five Divisions have come down from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai and there they had embarked on ships — 30, 40, or 50 ships — and have been sighted south of Formosa",[149] whereas the original Magic report stated "A more or less normal movement of ten to thirty troopships in the Yangtse River below Shanghai".[150] On the next morning in Washington when Stimson called Roosevelt, the President had not yet received the report. He "fairly blew up — jumped up into the air", and said "that that changed the whole situation because it was an evidence of bad faith on the part of the Japanese".[151]

On November 26th the Japanese fleet left Hitokappu in the Kurile Islands at 06:00, Tokyo Time (the 25th at 16:00, U.S. Eastern Standard Time) for Hawaii. The

proviso for aborting the mission was still effective.[152] As already mentioned, Prime Minister Tojo was not informed by the Navy that the fleet had left for Hawaii on the 26th, until after the opening of the Tokyo Trial. Hull called a meeting in the State Department to discuss whether the U.S. must remove the modus vivendi of the new proposals of November 24th or not, but probably no conclusion was reached (in the evening of the 25th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time).[153] A message was sent by Churchill to Roosevelt at 12:20, Tokyo Time (03:20, London Time; 22:20 on the 25th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time).[154]

Secretary of State Hull met President Roosevelt and was given approval by the President to remove the modus vivendi of the new proposals (early on the 26th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time).[155] Churchill's private secretary Anthony Bevin sent by hand to the American Embassy a second message to be transmitted to Roosevelt. It is not yet known how much the second message influenced the American authority's decision to remove the modus vivendi. As Professor Chihiro Hosoya notes, the content of the second message could be important if it reveals how much Churchill or the President, or both of them, had known about the Japanese military plan of the Pearl Harbor attack before it began.[156] In any case, this is one message, of all Churchill's correspondence with Roosevelt during the Second World War, that cannot be read since the file containing it is withheld by the Public Record Office in London.[157]

On the same day, the 26th, Roosevelt's plan to send the President's Message to the Emperor and the Presidential Message to Congress was postponed at the War Council because Hull opposed the plan.[158] In the afternoon of the 26th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time, the Japanese ambassadors sent a telegram (#1180) to Tokyo,[159] setting out their own proposals for an exchange between the President and the Emperor of conciliatory messages and the establishment of neutral nations including Dutch East Indies in order to forestall British and American military occupation in the region (see Chapter 8).

Thus, both sides coincidentally considered[160] very similar plans of exchange of conciliatory messages between the national heads to avert the war, or at least to delay the war, but failed to notice the significant coincidence. While Tokyo could not know that Roosevelt was coincidently considering the plan, Washington was closer to awareness of it, since #1180 had been decoded. The Magic version, however, again failed to perceive it due to the serious mistranslations and distortions caused by the difficulty in recognising the Japanese homonyms "Majesty (Emperor)" and "posterity".

Although Telegram #1180 was translated on the 28th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time,[161] after the presentation of the Hull Note to Japan on the 26th, it would not necessarily have been too late if Magic had been translated accurately because the Japanese side still continued to try to avert the war even after the presentation of the Hull Note and after the Liaison Council of the 28th, Tokyo Time (27th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time), understood the Hull Note (Telegram #1189) to be an ultimatum.[162] For example, on November 30th, Togo sent a message to Nomura to try to request the Americans to reconsider the Hull Note (Telegram #857) following the Liaison Council's decision of the 29th.[163] In fact, the final Japanese decision to open hostilities was not made until the Gozen Kaigi of December 1st, since December 1st was the deadline set at the conference of November 5th. More details will be seen in the following pages.

On November 27th Foreign Minister Togo sent Telegram #842 to Ambassador Nomura at 15:00, Tokyo Time, requesting more detailed information about the possibility of an American occupation of the Dutch East Indies for the purpose of military protection.[164] Secretary of State Hull rejected Japanese Proposal B in a meeting starting at 06:45, Tokyo Time (16:45 on the 26th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time) with Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. Hull handed over the new proposals, but without the modus vivendi, which constituted the so called "Hull Note".[165]

In the morning, Tokyo Time, according to the memoirs of Colonel Suketaka Tanemura 種村佐孝, the majority of the members of the Liaison Council

predicted the success of the U.S.-Japan peace talks.[166] The Hull Note reached Tokyo in the afternoon, Telegram #1189 (a summary of the Hull Note) and then Telegrams #1191 to #1194 (the whole of the Hull Note).[167] The Japanese government was surprised by the conditions of the Hull Note which consisted of the "Overall Plan of Agreement" only, because Japan expected the decoded "Draft U.S.-Japan Provisional Agreement" (the modus vivendi). The Liaison Council, which met from 14:00 to 16:00, Tokyo Time (from 00:00 to 02:00 on the 27th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time) understood the Hull Note (Telegram #1189) to be an ultimatum. On the 27th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time, however, the Japanese ambassadors met Roosevelt and Hull and requested the Americans to reconsider the Hull Note. Hull records in his memoirs that:

> Nomura said that they [the Japanese] were disappointed over the failure of an agreement on a modus vivendi ... The President said that we [the Americans] appreciated the efforts of the peace elements in Japan ... most people in the United States wanted a peaceful solution in the Pacific, and he [the President] did not give up yet, although the situation was serious and this fact should be recognised.[168]

Nomura and Kurusu reported to Tokyo in the afternoon of the 27th (Telegram #1206 arrived in the afternoon of the 28th, Tokyo Time), however, that Roosevelt did not agree with the idea of considering the modus vivendi.[169]

According to Stimson's diary Secretary of State Hull told Secretary of War Stimson on the telephone "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and Navy"[170] (in the morning, U.S. Eastern Standard Time). Stimson took prompt action to confer with Secretary of the Navy Knox and Brigadier General Gerow to try to delay war with Japan. The advice from the Army and Navy (the draft message of General Marshall which became message #472) to delay matters (until March 1942) and get more time for defence preparations and not precipitate the issue[171] evidently did not reach the President or the Secretary of State in time to be considered before the memorandum of the 26th (the Hull Note) was delivered to the Japanese. The U.S. Head of Naval Operations sent a war alert to the Commander-in-Chief of the

Pacific and Asia fleets. The Army Chief of General Staff alerted the Commander in Hawaii.[172]

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Togo discussed Ambassador Nomura's proposals of Telegram #1180, to exchange conciliatory messages between the U.S. and Japanese heads to avert the war, with Prime Minister Tojo, Navy Minister Shimada and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Kido. However, these leaders were pessimistic because of the content of the Hull Note.[173]

As to the exact meaning of a cable sent by Churchill regarding the modus vivendi, a significant perception gap between the British and Americans was exposed. In his publication of 1948 Hull attributed his decision to remove the modus vivendi mainly to the opposition from the British and Chinese authorities, stating that:

During the night [of November 26th] a cable came in for the President from Mr. Churchill, commenting on our modus vivendi. Obviously influenced by Chiang Kai-shek's cable to him, the Prime Minister wondered whether the Generalissimo was not getting "rather meager rations" under the modus vivendi. China, he said, was the cause of his being anxious, and a Chinese collapse would hugely augment our common dangers. After talking this over again with the Far Eastern experts of the State Department, I came to the conclusion that we should cancel out the modus vivendi. Instead, we should present to the Japanese solely the ten-point proposal for a general settlement to which originally the modus vivendi would have been in the nature of an introduction ... Although the modus vivendi proposal contained only a little "chicken feed" ... The Chinese were violently opposed, the other interested governments either unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation would have been essential.[174]

On the other hand, Sumner Welles records in his memorandum of November 27th, 1941 that:

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning urgently at his request. The Ambassador said that Secretary Hull had called him on the telephone last night to inform him of the nature of the document which he had handed the Japanese envoys. The Ambassador said that he was not quite clear in his own mind as to the reasons which prompted this sudden change in presenting the Japanese Government with a document other than the modus vivendi document which had so recently been under discussion. I said that Secretary Hull had requested me to say to the Ambassador in this regard that one of the reasons for the determination reached was the half-hearted support given by the British Government to the earlier proposal which had been under discussion ... Lord Halifax said he could not understand this in as much as he had communicated to Secretary Hull the full support of the British Government.[175]

While Welles replied that "the message sent by Mr. Churchill to the President yesterday could hardly be regarded as 'full support' but on the contrary, very grave questioning of the course then proposed", Ambassador Halifax emphasised that "this message had been intended merely to express the objections on the part of the Chinese Government". Thus, there seems to have been a serious misinterpretation between the British government and the American decision makers on the meaning of Churchill's message of the 26th.

In this connection, F. C. Jones points out that:

> The British Government — and presumably the Chinese and the Netherlands Governments — did not know that it was the American intention to present — together with the modus vivendi — proposals for a comprehensive settlement, which would include the recognition of the Chinese National Government by Japan and the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China. Churchill has indicated in his memoirs that, had the British Government known of this, their fears about China would have been removed ... Roosevelt and Hull, however, did know that the opposition of the British and Chinese and the half-heartedness of the acquiescence of the Dutch were due, at least in part, to an insufficient knowledge of American intentions. It was, therefore, open to them to go ahead: and, while doing this, they could have given discreet assurances to their quasi-allies. But, instead, they decided to drop the whole idea of a modus vivendi.[176]

Concerning the position of the Chinese government, Jones observes that "Whether the knowledge of this American intention would have removed Chiang's opposition, too, is a moot point".[177] This view has been echoed by some other observers. Anthony Kubek, for instance, states that: "The question arises here as to whether the Chinese did reject this proposal. The Chinese Ambassador denied his Government was blocking the putting into effect of a temporary arrangement which might afford a cooling-off spell in the Far Eastern situation ... But it is hardly conceivable that he [Hull] presented the modus vivendi to the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] in a manner designed to gain his acceptance".[178]

In fact, Lord Halifax emphasised at that time, on the 27th, that: "he [Lord Halifax] had ... stated to the Chinese Ambassador that only ten days ago General Chiang Kai-shek was imploring the British and the United States Government to prevent the closing of the Burma Road ... [and] that the Burma Road would in fact

be kept open if the modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated".[179]

Thus, although the American position towards the China issue including her non-recognition policy of Manchukuo became far more hardened against Japan as the U.S.-Japan peace talks continued, it still remains open to question whether one can conclusively state that the American and Japanese approaches to the China question were far apart enough to be worth fighting for on such a large scale as the Pacific War.

In this connection, Akira Irie notes the important point that "Once the conflict in East Asia had been defined in terms of good and evil, it was impossible for the United States to maintain friendly relations with both".[180] This oversimplified view towards the Far Eastern issue partly contributed to blocking the road to a stable adjustment during the U.S-Japan talks. Thus, the final decision to remove the modus vivendi was concluded on the basis of this subjective view, rather than a product of rational thinking about the reality of the situation.

In addition, there is a very significant statement in the last part of the same memorandum by Welles that "I [Welles] told Lord Halifax that information received this morning tended to show that Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already very active and that Japanese forces there were being quickly increased in number ... I said, in conclusion, that ... The gravity of the situation ... could not be exaggerated".[181]

Welles was able to end this bitter protest by the British Ambassador only when he emphasised that the "information received this morning" had shown that "Japanese troop movements in southern Indochina were already active". Concerning the source of the information which Welles received at that time, it is not quite clear whether it was in reality a version derived from the G-2 report which Stimson had mistakenly reported to Roosevelt and Hull one day before. If this was the case, that it was from the G-2 report, one should recognise that Stimson's misinformation may have been literally fatal at the last crucial stage.

On the other hand, if it was a new report sent by observers in southern Indo-China, the important question arises whether these "already active" troop movements were a consequence of the Japanese receiving "the ten-point proposal", the Hull Note. In this view, in retrospect, the explanation given by Welles does not seem entirely convincing.

It is significant that an observer who has examined the American decision to abandon the modus vivendi in close detail notes:

> His [Hull's] decision was evidently precipitated by Roosevelt's reaction to a message from Churchill ... and by news from G-2 on Japanese troop movements. The Churchill message and the G-2 report intensified the general atmosphere of pessimism already provided by Magic and by accusations of "appeasement" in the public press.[182]

In contrast, Ambassador Grew had maintained quite reliable sources of information on Japan's intentions.[183] However, as noted by Heinrichs, "the Tokyo Embassy played no part in the Japanese-American diplomacy of late November. His (Grew's) advice was neither asked nor given. He was not informed of the various modus vivendi proposals until after the Hull note of November 26, and he did not comment on them".[184]

On November 28th, Foreign Minister Togo sent a message (#844) to Ambassador Nomura that his idea of an exchange of messages between the President and the Emperor as proposed in Telegram #1180 was not appropriate since the "Hull Note" was not acceptable and the Japanese government was going to decide to break off the negotiations.[185] The Americans decoded Message #844 on the 28th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time,[186] but again the translation was inaccurate. Consequently, a serious perception gap about the content of #844 can be seen between Togo's "intention" and Hull's "interpretation" derived from the Magic intercept.

On the one hand, Togo records in his memoirs that the primary emphasis in #844 was to instruct the ambassadors to request the U.S. again to reconsider the talks on the basis of the modus vivendi,[187] because he still kept the stance which was very similar to that of Roosevelt later described by Hull: "... that he did not

give up yet, although the situation was serious and this fact should be recognised". On the other hand, Hull was given again an impression of the Japanese stance "to lull us with talk until the moment the Japanese military were ready to strike",[188] which was exactly the same as what Hull had supposed about the aim of Kurusu's journey to Washington in November.[189] Hull naturally notes the primary point of the same telegram, #844, that:

> An ominous indication of what was coming appeared in an intercepted message [#844] from Foreign Minister Togo to Nomura and Kurusu that day. This said that the negotiation with us would be ruptured. "However," it went on, "I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions, and that, the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you".[190]

It is true that the phrase "the negotiation with us would be ruptured" is seen in the original #844, but the proviso, which was obviously given in the original Japanese text although not with explicit expression, that "in the event of a final U.S. rejection to reconsider on the basis of the modus vivendi" was missed in the Magic version by the misleading over-emphasis, without expression of the proviso, in phrases such as "inevitable", "impossible" instead of "very difficult (shinan 至難), and "entirely unsuitable" instead of "not suitable".

In fact, the author thinks that this perception gap can be attributed to neither Togo nor Hull. This is because the author himself is given the same impression of #844 as Togo described from its original Japanese text, and the same impression of #844 as Hull described from its Magic version in English.

The Americans also decoded the Winds execute message #2353 (J-19) of November 19th,[191] although their translation was different from the translation made by the British FECB.[192] The White House Conference meanwhile decided to prepare a draft of the President's Message to the Emperor and the Presidential Message to Congress.[193]

On the same day, the 28th, the U.S. fleet led by Vice-Admiral William Halsey left Pearl Harbor for Wake Island at 07:00, Hawaiian Time (02:30 on the 29th, Tokyo Time).[194] Soon after his departure from Hawaii, Admiral Halsey "individually"

issued his order to shoot any unknown ships and planes if the fleet faced them.[195] On November 29th, Tokyo Time, a meeting was held between the Tojo Cabinet and the former prime ministers, Jushin (or literally the "senior statesmen"), from 09:30 to 13:00. The Emperor did not attend. The views of the "senior statesmen" were presented to the Emperor between 14:00 and 15:00. Two-thirds of the members were reluctant to open hostilities.[196]

The Japanese ambassador to Berlin Hiroshi Oshima 大島浩 wired Tokyo to inform Japan that the German leader Adolf Hitler and Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had expressed an intention to declare war on the U.S. in the event of the outbreak of an American-Japanese war at a meeting on the 28th (Telegrams #1388 and #1393).[197] The Liaison Council at its meeting from 16:00 to 17:00 decided to request Germany and Italy to immediately declare war on the U.S. in the event of the outbreak of war between America and Japan.[198] This message was sent from Togo to Oshima on November 30th (Telegram #985).[199] Hull expressed his and Stimson's opposition to the idea of sending the President's Message to the Emperor.[200]

On November 30th, following the Liaison Council's decision of the 29th, Togo sent a message to Nomura to try to request the Americans to reconsider the "Hull Note" (Telegram #857).[201] Navy Commander Takamatsunomiya 高松宮, a brother of the Emperor, met the Emperor and informed him that the Navy wanted to avoid opening hostilities against the U.S. The Emperor, who took the information from Takamatsunomiya seriously, requested the views of Navy Minister Shimada and Navy Chief of Staff Nagano. Both leaders replied to the Emperor that "satisfactory preparation" for the war had been made by the Navy.[202] Magic decoded #985, but mistranslated it as being very aggressive in its tone.[203]

The original Japanese text of #985 mentioned that "there is a possibility that the time [of the beginning of the war against the United States] might come sooner than expected" but was translated into English by Magic that the time

would come "quicker than anybody can dream".[204] The original Japanese telegram used an expression which very carefully avoided a clear prediction of the outbreak of war against the United States because Togo could not use any phrase of definite prediction until the imminent final decision at the conference of the next day, but this careful nuance was completely lost in the tone of the Magic intercept.

Nomura sent a message to Tokyo to complain that Tojo's speech, saying that the Anglo-Americans' "exploitation" of the Asians "must be purged with vengeance", had caused strong reaction in the U.S. after it had been widely reported by the Japanese and the U.S. media (Telegram #1222).[205]

On December 1st the meeting of the Council of the Japanese Supreme Command in the Presence of the Emperor, Gozen Kaigi, opened at 14:05. Japan's final decision to begin hostilities against the U.S., Great Britain and the Netherlands was taken at 16:00.[206] At 23:59 Togo sent Telegram #866 in reply to Nomura's Telegram #1222, stating that Tojo did not make such a speech on the 30th, although it was mistakenly reported.[207] In the afternoon of December 1st, U.S. Eastern Standard Time, Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu met Secretary of State Hull in accordance with Togo's instructions given in Telegram #857 of the 30th to request American reconsideration of the Hull Note. Hull criticised Tojo's speech of the 30th at the meeting.[208]

U.S. Secretary of State Hull persuaded President Roosevelt to postpone a plan to send the President's Message to the Emperor.[209] The report of the mistaken reporting of the Tojo speech was perhaps caused by a miscommunication within the Japanese administration according to Telegram #866. Whatever the truth, the damage to U.S.-Japan relations from this misinformation was naturally quite serious at this stage.

In the following part, both Tokyo Time and U.S. Eastern Standard Time are given, the latter in brackets unless specified otherwise. Although the author has used various sources, the main ones for establishing the subsequent section are

the most recent works by Professor Ikuhiko Hata 秦郁彦[210] and by Shigehiko Togo 東郷茂彦,[211] the former Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo's grandson, who uses records recently found in files which have been preserved by the Togo family.

On December 2nd the General Staff of the Navy in Tokyo sent out a message that its code would change on December 4th. The "Climb Niitakayama 1208" 「新高山（ニイタカヤマ）登レ1208」message was sent in JN-25 at 17:30 (03:30). D-day was to be December 8th, Tokyo Time.[212] The message was decoded by the British FECB.[213]

Tokyo sent Telegram #123 to Honolulu requesting more reports: "From the point of view of the present situation, the presence of warships, aircraft carriers and cruisers in the harbor is crucially important. Try to send reports every day on the presence of defense balloons over Pearl Harbor, or any indication that there might be in future, advise presence of torpedo protection nets on warships". Japanese Navy Sub-Lieutenant Takeo Yoshikawa 吉川猛夫 and Consul General Nagao Kita 喜多長雄 in Honolulu finally realised Japan's intention to attack Pearl Harbor.[214]

On December 3rd, message #111 of November 15th was decoded in Washington, but Pearl Harbor was not notified.[215] On December 4th the Liaison Council set the time to present the ultimatum to the U.S. for 12:30, December 7th (U.S. Eastern Standard Time).[216] The Twenty-fifth Army advance troops left Sanya Port 三亜港 (San-a ko).[217] The "authentic execute" message of the Winds code was sent.[218] German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop was given approval by Hitler to prepare a draft agreement with Italy and Japan to declare war against the United States in the event of the outbreak of a war between Japan and the United States.[219]

On the 5th the Cabinet Conference agreed on the ultimatum to the U.S.[220] On the same day, when the vice-heads of Army and Navy Command 両統帥部次長 met Foreign Minister Togo the time was postponed for 30 minutes from 12:30 to

13:00, December 7th (U.S. Eastern Standard Time).[221] Meanwhile the Soviet forces defending Moscow succeeded in their counter-offensive of the 5th and 6th.

On the same day Ribbentrop handed to Ambassador Oshima a draft agreement committing Germany and Italy to declaring war on the U.S. in the event of a war breaking out between the U.S. and Japan. This included a promise not to reach any agreement with the Allies before consulting the other Axis powers. This was the formal reply to Togo's offer of November 30th.[222] This guarantee, however, was not instrumental in the decision to attack Pearl Harbor; that decision had been taken on December 1st, several days before the agreement was received from Germany. Thus, although Japan had sought and been given a formal guarantee that Germany would enter the war, it was not a factor to which any importance was given in Japanese decision-making, although it would have been an advantage to have German co-operation.

It is known that Germany was not informed about Japan's plan for the Pearl Harbor attack until the attack began. "Pearl Harbor came as a surprise to Hitler".[223] Before the attack on Pearl Harbor Hitler was increasingly impatient with U.S. support for Britain and "was coming to the conclusion that a virtual state of war already existed with the U.S.A."[224] Moreover, he had his own reasons for deciding to declare war on the United States. He underestimated the strength of the United States and he was determined that the Russian counter-offensive launched on December 5th/6th should be resisted. Throughout this period, then, Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor was influenced mainly by developments in the course of the U.S.-Japan peace talks.

On December 6th, at 20:30, Tokyo Time (06:30), Foreign Minister Togo sent telegram #901 to Ambassador Nomura as a "pilot message" for the final memo on the U.S. Between 20:30 and 00:20 December 7th (06:30-10:20) Foreign Minister Togo sent the final memo on the U.S. to Ambassador Nomura by Telegram #902, Parts 1 to 13 out of 14 parts. On December 7th at 04:00 (14:00 on the 6th), Magic decoded Japan's "pilot message" for the final memo, Telegram #901. At 08:00 (18:00 on the

6th) the U.S. President requested the Secretary of State to send an uncoded message to the Emperor to Ambassador Grew in Japan in spite of Stimson's opposition.[225] The Secretary of State delayed sending it, although Roosevelt requested that it should be sent quickly. By 09:30 (19:30 on the 6th) Magic had decoded Telegram #902, Japan's final memo, up to Part 13. At 09:40 (19:40 on the 6th) the U.S. Government announced to the media its intention to send a President's Message to the Emperor. At 11:00 (21:00 on the 6th) Secretary of State Hull sent the President's Message to the Emperor to Ambassador Grew. Tokyo received the President's Message at 12:00 (22:00 on the 6th). Lieutenant Colonel Morio Tomura 戸村盛雄 of the Army General Staff ordered a delay in delivering the President's Message to Grew, although the Emperor and the Japanese government were waiting to receive it immediately.

Lieutenant Colonel Tomura thought that the President's Message would only cause confusion because of information which indicated that war had already started: Japanese forces near Malaya had shot down an allied plane (probably British) a day earlier. At 14:00 (00:00 on the 7th) Foreign Minister Togo sent a very urgent Telegram, #905, to Ambassador Nomura requesting him to confirm whether the U.S. was actually sending the President's Message to Tokyo or not.[226] It indicates that there would still have been some hope of a different outcome if the President's Message had arrived in time to enable Japan to abandon the attack on Pearl Harbor scheduled for 03:30 (13:30 on the 7th) the next day, although Japan's final decision to begin hostilities against the Allied countries had already been taken at the Gozen Kaigi of December 1st.

At 14:52 (00:52 on the 7th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time, 19:22 on the 6th, Honolulu Time) Yoshikawa sent Telegram #254 from Honolulu to Tokyo stating that "2 aircraft carriers, 10 heavy cruisers which entered the harbor on the evening of the 5th, all left harbor in the afternoon of the 6th. No air reconnaissance seems to be taking place".[227]

At 16:00 (02:00 on the 7th, U.S. Eastern Standard Time) Foreign Minister Togo sent the last part, 14, of Telegram #902 of Japan's final memo to the U.S. to Ambassador Nomura. At 17:30 (03:30 on the 7th) Foreign Minister Togo instructed Ambassador Nomura by Telegram #907 regarding the time to present the ultimatum to the U.S. By 19:00 (05:00) Magic had completed the decoding of Japan's final memo, Telegram #902 Part 14 and Telegram #907, which instructed the Embassy of Japan to hand the declaration of war to the U.S. at 13:00 on the 7th, local time (U.S. Eastern Standard Time). At about 21:00 (07:00) Tokyo received Telegram #254 from Honolulu. Between 21:00 and 23:00 (07:00-09:00) the Japanese secret diplomatic code of the declaration of war (Telegram #902 Part 14) was received by the Embassy of Japan, Washington.

At 22:15 (08:15) U.S. Ambassador Grew called the secretary to the Japanese Foreign Minister to inform him of the arrival of the U.S. President's Message to the Emperor,[228] which was being decoded. Grew visited Togo and delivered the message some two hours later. At 23:12 (09:12) the minesweeper *Condor* reported sighting an unidentified submarine two miles outside Pearl Harbor. At 23:30 (09:30) American intelligence delivered Telegram #902 Part 14 to the Naval Department, and on December 8th at 00:00 (10:00 on the 7th) delivered it to the White House. At 00:30 (10:30 on the 7th) American intelligence delivered the secret Japanese Telegram #907 to the Naval Department. At 00:40 (10:40 on the 7th) the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, read Telegram #902 Part 14 and Telegram #907. At 01:00 (11:00 on the 7th) the Embassy of Japan finished decoding Telegram #907. As a consequence Hull found out the content of the Japanese ultimatum 20 minutes earlier, ironically, than the Embassy of Japan.

At about 01:00 (11:00 on the 7th) Togo visited Prime Minister Tojo, taking with him the U.S. President's Message to the Emperor. Tojo's secretary, Sadao Akamatsu 赤松貞雄, thought that Prime Minister Hideki Tojo considered it to be a good indication of the successful outcome of the diplomatic negotiations.[229] This is not necessarily surprising because Tojo as Prime Minister, though "Shuhan"

not "Shusho", and Army Minister was, according to the record of Foreign Minister Togo, not informed by the Navy until after the opening of the Tokyo Trial that the first secret order for war to the combined forces had already been issued on the 10th and the Combined Fleet had left Hitokappu Bay in the Kurile Islands for Pearl Harbor on November 26th (see Chapter 9). The situation developed, however, towards a war between the two countries.

At 01:30 (11:30 on the 7th) 183 Japanese planes took off for Pearl Harbor. At 02:12 (12:12) the Army Chief of General Staff Marshall sent a war alert to the Commander in Hawaii but without using the direct scrambler telephone: "The Japanese are presenting at 1 P.M. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum ... be on the alert accordingly".[230]

At 02:15 (12:15 on the 7th) a Japanese submarine was sunk by the U.S. warship *Ward*. At 02:15 (12:15) the Japanese Army landed in British Malaya. The Japanese troops in the region had not been notified that the Navy had postponed the start of the Pearl Harbor attack for two hours from its original time 01:30 (11:30) to 03:30 (13:30). The original time was set for 01:30 by the regional middle commanders of the Navy and the Army. The Navy commanders noticed and followed the time set for 03:00, which was again postponed to 03:30, by the later decision of the higher commanders and Foreign Minister Togo. The regional Army was, however, not informed of the new time by the Navy. Thus, the war began in reality more than one hour before the Pearl Harbor attack.

By 02:00-02:20 (12:00-12:20 on the 7th) the Embassy of Japan had finished decoding telegram #902 Part 14. At 02:36 (12:36) American radar detected a large number of unidentified planes 137 miles north of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian islands, but the officer-in-charge did not consider this sufficiently serious to take any action. At 02:42 (12:42) the sinking of the Japanese submarine was reported to Admiral Claude C. Broch, but not to Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, naval commander in Hawaii, because of a transmission fault.

At about 02:50 (12:50 on the 7th) Ambassador Nomura telephoned Hull to postpone the time of their meeting from 13:00 to 14:00 to enable the Japanese Embassy to complete the typing of telegram #902. At 03:00 (13:00) Foreign Minister Togo met the Emperor to inform him that a confidential letter had been received from President Roosevelt (only 25 minutes before the start of the Pearl Harbor attack). Although the Emperor wanted to reply to Ambassador Grew immediately, Togo opposed this because two Japanese submarines had already been sunk by the American Navy near Hawaii. At 03:15 (13:15) Foreign Minister Togo reported to Tojo's secretary Akamatsu the safe delivery of Roosevelt's letter to the Emperor.

At 03:25 (13:25 on the 7th) Japanese Naval aircraft started to attack Pearl Harbor (07:55 on the 7th, Hawaii time). The Pacific War had begun. At 03:30 (13:30) Tojo's Secretary Akamatsu met Naval Captain Maruhei Shikaoka 鹿岡円平 and was surprised to be informed that the attack on Pearl Harbor had already begun.[231] Thus, the arrival of the U.S. President's Message to the Emperor was too late. Although Roosevelt had attempted to send his message earlier, it was deliberately delayed by Secretary of State Hull on the Washington side and by Lieutenant Colonel Morio Tomura on the Tokyo side. Although it has not yet been made precisely clear why they were motivated to delay the message, it is clear that these decisions of both Hull and Tomura were seriously influenced by misconception and misinformation.

At 03:50 (13:50 on the 7th) the Embassy of Japan finished typing the declaration of war. At 04:05 (14:05) the Japanese Ambassadors, Nomura and Kurusu, arrived at Hull's office. At 04:20 (14:20) Nomura and Kurusu met Hull and presented the ultimatum to the U.S.

At 08:00 (18:00 on the 7th) Foreign Minister Togo presented the ultimatum to U.S. Ambassador Grew. At 10:28 (20:28), seven hours after the beginning of the Pearl Harbor attack, General Walter C. Short, commander of the Hawaiian

Department of the Army, received the war alert from Army Chief of General Staff Marshall.

What America's aim was in presenting the Hull Note to Japan at that time, i.e. peace or war, has been a very provocative issue from 1941 up to the present. For example, Professor Akira Irie of Harvard University states: "Japanese officials in Washington and Tokyo took the Hull note as an indication of the wide cleavage between the two countries, and they were of course right. However, they were off the mark when they viewed the note as an ultimatum. It merely restated the position that the United States would stand with China, Britain, and the Dutch, and would invite Japan to join them in re-establishing order in the Asian-Pacific region".[232] In fact, Hull himself states in his memoirs: "The proposal I handed Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu on November 26 was an honest effort to keep our conversations going ... It was Tokyo that intended to attack if the negotiations failed — not Washington. We had no plans for an attack on Japan. Japan was prepared for war in the Pacific, we were not. We wanted peace".[233] However, these statements are not wholly compatible with other statements of his recorded by Stimson.

In the context of the policies established just before and after the presentation of the Hull Note , including "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot" of the 25th, "to kick the whole thing over to tell them that he had no other proposition at all" of the 26th,[234] and "broken the whole matter off" of the 27th,[235] Hull was able to say later that it was Japan's intention to attack, not Washington's. In any case, it is questionable whether Washington "wanted peace" or not at this stage, because the U.S. authorities, through the intercepts, knew Japan's policy was that "It was Tokyo that intended to attack if the negotiations failed", and it was known the negotiations would fail if the modus vivendi was removed. The author remains unconvinced, on the basis of the materials presented in this essay, by Hull's "honest effort" and his intention to "invite Japan to join them" in the Hull Note.

However, it does not mean that Hull's attitude was belligerent, since his decision to remove the modus vivendi was made under quite heavy pressure. One should recognise here the significant role of the Magic intercepts, which contributed to create this pressure and over-emphasised a negative image of Japan's attitude towards the peace talks.

Based on the analysis in this essay the author wishes to emphasise that the expectation for peace at this stage was realistic if an agreement on the basis of the modus vivendi had been reached and the opening hostilities had consequently been delayed, rather than emphasising Hull's honest invitation to Japan in the Hull Note without the modus vivendi.

In conclusion, the Japanese foreign policy "decisions" up to those of July 2nd, 1941, were largely the result of disorderly initiative, while the formation of American policies towards the Far East seem to have been also, although to a different degree, the result of bureaucratic politics. Each side failed to recognise the basis for the decision making of the adversary. Instead, each formed images of a more fearsome and resolute adversary than was really the case. As analysed by some historians, contemporary intelligence reports of the United States and Japan in July 1941 clearly prove that their intentions to build up a "defensive strategy" were often interpreted by the adversary as an "offensive strategy".[236]

As a consequence, both continued to maintain policies with which they, in the words of Schroeder, "unintentionally provoked" each other. Under pressure, Tokyo implemented the plan of the so-called "shinchu" into southern French Indo-China based on a misjudgement of Western thinking, followed by a freezing of assets by the West and a de facto oil embargo on Japan. Japanese primary sources have proved that there were few in Tokyo who could understand fully the reasons for the Western powers' strong resentment of the shinchu, which in Japan's mind was "defensive", and therefore they inevitably interpreted the Western reaction as, again, an "offensive strategy". In the eyes of the Western leaders and a number of post-war writers, however, this was simply a retaliation

against the Japanese "offensive action" in southern Indo-China. In addition, Western historians have widely argued that the American freezing of Japanese funds came to be much more drastic in its effects than the President had intended, while Japanese historians, in contrast with the majority of Western scholars, have not been aware of the importance of this argument, and have often interpreted the event uncritically as a more aggressive intention maintained by Roosevelt.

Tokyo made the "formal decisions" at the Gozen Kaigi of September 6th, 1941, and set the middle of October as the time-limit for continuing peace talks with the U.S. But these decisions were cancelled in October when General Tojo formed his cabinet. This fact indicates that the nature of "decisions of Gozen Kaigi" was not as absolutely decisive and resolute as some observers have regarded, although it was more decisive in a relative sense than that of the Liaison Conferences.

The decisions of the Gozen Kaigi of November 5th were not the result of the disorderly initiative of bureaucratic politics. At this time the Japanese set a new time-limit, December 1st, for continuing negotiations, and decided that they would have to go to war if a U.S.-Japan agreement could not be reached by diplomacy. These decisions were very firm; however, in view of the precedent of the "decisions" of September 6th, one should recognise that the proviso "if an agreement could not be made" was significant and certainly not marginal as often regarded by a number of historians. While some historians have emphasised the firmness of Tokyo's decisions by quoting that the Japanese leaders sought for what they regarded as a "satisfactory solution", the Japanese in reality wanted a modus vivendi,[237] not necessarily a satisfactory solution immediately. Thus, Japanese primary sources clearly prove that, even after receiving the Hull Note, there was still a complicated process before Tokyo reached the final decision to go to war. Herein lies the possibility that the war could have been avoided if communication had been better.

In a psychological sense, it is understandable that some observers have wished to believe that the Pacific War was bound to happen, since it is painful to face the question of whether the War was avoidable and therefore whether such a huge number of lives was wasted. The author in fact shares this unwillingness to consider this possibility. The sources studied in this thesis, however, do not support the theory that it was "bound to happen".

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104 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 161-2.

105 Ibid., pp. 164-5.

106 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., pp. 371-2.

107 The instruction was included in the Fifth Navy Chief of Staff Order 大海指第五号 (Dai-kai-shi Dai-go-go) transmitted by Navy Chief of Staff Osami Nagano 永野修身 to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto. Ibid., p. 372.

108 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 252.

109 S. Kurusu, op. cit., p. 104.

110 Ibid., p. 104.

Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 163-4.

111 Ibid., p. 144.

112 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-82.

113 As far as the author is aware, Telegram #800 is not included in the recently published *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4*, op. cit., although it was presented at the Tokyo Trial.

With regard to the Magic mistranslations of Telegram #800, Huddleston also observes that "there is a great difference between 'Re item 2 of paragraph 3, it is desirable that the required quantity be decided upon by an agreement of both governments before the signatures are affixed to this present agreement', as correctly translated by the Prosecution, and 'Re item 2 or paragraph 3 [noting that the reader would have referred to the wrong telegram]. All the main items shall be considered and settled by the two governments before signatures are affixed to this agreement', as incorrectly translated by Magic. In the original Japanese telegram the 'required quantity' refers to oil. In the MAGIC translation one might easily have assumed 'all the main items' meant all the main items under discussion at the time. This telegram was circulated by MAGIC on November 20, 1941, which was the day that Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu presented Proposal B to Secretary of State Hull. This could make it quite understandable why Secretary of State Hull did not regard Proposal B as a modus vivendi". Unpublished essay: Jackson Noyes Huddleston, op. cit., p. 41.

114 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1071.

115 See Hosoya, Chihiro 細谷千博. "The Role of Japan's Foreign Ministry and Its Embassy in Washington", in Borg, Dorothy and Okamoto, Shumpei, eds. *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1973, pp. 161-2.

116 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1068-70.

117 Blum, John Morton. *From the Morgenthau Diaries (Vol. 2) Years of Urgency 1938-1941*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1965, p. vi.

118 Ibid., p. 383.

119 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 175.

120 S. Kurusu, op. cit., p. 105.

121 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1063.

122 Ibid., p. 1071.

123 Ben-Zvi, Abraham. *The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, p. 63.

124 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 85, *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-17. The Defence's translation and its category of "distortion" are quoted by Jackson Noyes Huddleston in his unpublished essay, pp. 45-6.

125 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 171.

126 Some historians who use only Magic, the English version of the messages, still misunderstand the issue of the "deadline", even in the post-war period. Wohlstetter, for instance, states that "It set the deadline forward to November 25 for the Japanese ambassadors in America to accomplish their task [as a result of the discussions at the Gozen Kaigi of November 5th] ... Later the November 25 deadline was changed to November 29", despite the fact that the primary source, the *Sugiyama Memo* 杉山メモ, records that the deadline was set forward to December 1st at the Gozen Kaigi of the same day. See Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 349.

127 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-89.

128 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 279.

129 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1074.

130 Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

131 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1073-4.

132 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 277.

133 Nomura, Kichisaburo 野村吉三郎. *Beikoku ni Tsukai shite* 米国に使いして (On a Mission to the United States), Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1946, pp. 151-2.

S. Kurusu, op. cit., pp. 99-103.

134 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 282.

135 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho —Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 175-6.

136 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 282.

Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 183.

137 Ibid., p. 177.

138 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1076-81.

139 Ibid., p. 1071.

140 Schroeder, Paul W. *The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations, 1941*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1958, p. 76.

141 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 185-6.

142 Ibid., p. 189.

143 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1071.

144 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 282.

145 S. Kurusu, op. cit., p. 103.

146 Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, op. cit., p. 201.

147 The Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries in the Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven, 1973, Reel Seven, Vol. 36, p. 48.

148 Ibid., pp. 48-9.

149 Ibid., p. 49. Wohlstetter states that "This actually was Admiral Ozawa's expeditionary force against Malay Peninsula", but Jun Tsunoda 角田順 notes that "The truth is that the Army expeditionary force for Malay left Sanya 三亜 in Hainan 海南 Island on December 4th, and the Navy Task Force which left Hitokappu Bay on November 26th was transmitted the instruction that the Force would be prepared to abort the mission for Hawaii and go back to Japan if the diplomatic negotiations were successful". See Wohlstetter, ibid., p. 243 and Tsunoda, Jun, in *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 317.

150 Quoted in Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., p. 143. While Wohlstetter states that "Washington G-2's comment on the information had been that it represented a 'normal' movement, i.e., nothing beyond what the Japanese had announced that they were going to do ... The reaction of these policymakers [Stimson, Hull, and President Roosevelt] was sharply different from that of G-2, where the news became transformed into a 'normal movement'. It is interesting to observe here that this decisive Japanese signal had taken five days ... to reach the chief policymaker", S. Sudo concludes that "The Japanese transports [sighted near Formosa] were, as G-2 commented, nothing unusual but were [in reality] part of the 'normal' movement ... It is hard to understand why Stimson exaggerated the G-2 news when he reported it to Roosevelt and Hull, although it was not an especially significant report ..." See R. Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 243 and S. Sudo, op. cit., pp. 274-6.

151 Stimson Diaries, op. cit., Reel Seven, Vol. 36, p. 50.

152 Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., pp. 199-200.

153 S. Sudo, op. cit., p. 276.

154 Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., p. 141.

155 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1081-2.

156 Hosoya, Chihiro 細谷千博. Lecture at the International Conference on "The Pacific War: A Reappraisal After Fifty Years" at the Imperial War Museum, London, December 5th-6th, 1991. Although most of the papers of this seminar have just been published, Professor Hosoya's lecture was not included in the publication. See Saki Dockrill, ed., *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-45*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994.

157 Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., p. 141.

158 T. Kase, op. cit., p. 323.

159 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 185-6.

160 Ibid., p. 386.

161 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-93.

162 Tanemura, Suketaka 種村佐孝. *Daihon'ei Kimitsu Nisshi 大本営機密日誌* (Confidential Diary of the Army General Staff), Daiyamondo-sha ダイヤモンド社, Tokyo, 1952. p. 105.

163 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 211.

164 Ibid., p. 189.

165 K. Nomura, op. cit., p. 158.

S. Kurusu, op. cit., pp. 107-8.

C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1083-4.

166 S. Tanemura, op. cit., p. 104.

167 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 187-9, 190-201.

168 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1086.

169 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 203-4.

170 Stimson Diaries, op. cit., Reel Seven, Vol. 36, p. 53.

171 Wohlstetter, op. cit., pp. 248-50 and pp. 258-9.

172 Ibid., pp. 246-53.

173 S. Togo, op. cit., pp. 350-1, p. 480.

174 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1081.

175 *FRUS, 1941, Vol. 4*, pp. 666-7.

176 Jones, F. C. "The Tojo Cabinet and the Japanese Decision to go to War", in Toynbee, Arnold and Toynbee, Veronica M., eds. *The Royal Institute of International Affairs: 1939-1946, Vol. 3, The Initial Triumph of the Axis*, Oxford University Press, London, 1958, p. 686.

177 Ibid., p. 686.

178 Kubek, *How the Far East War was Lost*, op. cit., p. 22.

179 *FRUS, 1941, Vol. 4*, p. 667.

180 Iriye, Akira. "The Role of the United States Embassy in Tokyo", in Borg, Dorothy and Okamoto, Shumpei, eds. *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1973, p. 126.

181 *FRUS, 1941, Vol. 4*, p. 667.

182 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 242.

183 Ambassador Grew naturally made every effort to keep the original source secret. In his work entitled *Ten Years in Japan* of 1944, for instance, Grew carefully omitted several Japanese personal names although they had been recorded as sources in his original diary. He even deliberately confused Admiral Zengo Yoshida 吉田善吾 and Shigeru Yoshida 吉田茂 of the Foreign Office by mentioning only the family name in his work. See Nakamura, Masanori 中村政則. *Shocho Tenno-sei e no Michi-Beikoku Taishi Guru to Sono Shuhen 象徴天皇制への道ー米国大使グルーとその周辺* (The Road to the Symbolic Emperor System — American Ambassador Grew and the Surrounding Circumstances, Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店, Tokyo, 1989, pp. 87-99.

184 Heinrichs. Waldo H. Jr. *American Ambassador, Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition*, Little , Brown and Company, Boston, 1966, p. 357.

185 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 205-6.

186 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-118.

187 S. Togo, op. cit., p. 379.

188 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1087-8.

189 Ibid., p. 1063.

190 Ibid., p. 1087.

191 *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor, Vol. 4*, op. cit., Appendix, p. A-81.

192 In Melbourne, message #2353 was sent to the Australian Special Intelligence Operation (SIO) where Eric Nave was chief codebreaker. Refer to the decoded message #2353 intercepted by FECB, quoted in Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., pp. 135-6, pp. 272-3. See in Appendices.

193 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 267.

TSM, Vol. 7, op. cit., p. 456.

194 Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., p. 210.

195 Ibid., pp. 210-11.

N. Kojima, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

196 K. Kido, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 926-7.

197 M. Yoshii, op. cit., p. 91.

198 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 536-8.

199 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., pp. 208-9.

200 Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 269.

201 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 211.

202 K. Kido, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 928.

203 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1092.

204 Ibid., p. 1092.

205 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 211.

206 *Sugiyama Memo 杉山メモ, Vol. 1*, op. cit., pp. 544-63.

207 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 221.

208 Ibid., pp. 222-3.

209 Hull stated that "I also was not in favor of the message to the Emperor ... I knew that the Japanese themselves did not make use of such means as a direct Presidential message. Normally they did not shift from a bold front to one of pleading until the situation with them was desperate. They would therefore regard the message as our last recourse and a sign of weakness" although, as observed by Wohlstetter, "He [Hull] continued to mourn the fate of the modus vivendi" after he handed the Hull Note to the Japanese ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. It is interesting to compare Hull's perspective with that of Togo's expressed in Telegram #844: "the idea of an exchange of messages between the President and the Emperor was not appropriate since the Hull Note [without the modus vivendi] was not acceptable". See C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 1092, Wohlstetter, op. cit., p. 269 and S. Togo, op. cit., pp. 205-6.

210 Hata, Ikuhiko 秦郁彦. "Shinju-wan · Taibei Saigo Tsukoku no Kenkyu 真珠湾・対米最後通告の研究" (Pearl Harbor: A Study of the Ultimatum to the U.S.on the Pearl Harbor Attack), in *The Seiron 正論*, January 1992, Vol. 233, Sankei Shimbun-sha 産経新聞社, Tokyo, 1992, pp. 328-43.

211 Togo, Shigehiko 東郷茂彦. "Togo-ke Bunsho ga kataru Juni-gatsu Yoka 東郷家文書が語る12月8日" (The Documents of the Togo Family Telling about December 8th), in *The Bungeishunju 文藝春秋*, December 1991, Vol. 69; No.13, Bungeishunju 文藝春秋 Ltd., Tokyo, 1991, pp. 196-207.

212 The Military History Department of the Defence Agency, *The Hawaii Action*, op. cit., p. 24.

Professor T. Kase, a former Secretary to the Foreign Minister at that time, notes, however, that the strict order was issued that the Force would be prepared to abort the

mission for Hawaii and go back to Japan if the diplomatic negotiations were successful. T. Kase, op. cit., p. 300.

213 Rusbridger and Nave, op. cit., p. 146.

214 T. Yoshikawa, op. cit., pp. 142-3.

215 Wohlstetter, op. cit., pp. 211-12.

216 S. Togo, op. cit., pp. 387-8.

217 *TSM, Vol. 7*, op. cit., p. 317.

218 Y. Sanematsu, op. cit., p. 231.

219 Ohki, Takeshi 大木毅. "Doitsu no Tai-Bei Kaisen e (1941 nen) — Sono Seiji Katei o Chushin ni ドイツの対米開戦 (1941年) — その政治過程を中心に" (The Political Process of the German Decision to Open the War against the United States in 1941), in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai 日本国際政治学会 (The Japan Association of International Relations). *Kokusai Seiji 91 — Nitchu Senso kara Nichi-Ei-Bei Senso e 国際政治91 — 日中戦争から日英米戦争へ* (International Politics, Vol. 91 — From the Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese-Anglo-American War), Yuhikaku 有斐閣, Tokyo, 1989, p. 115.

M. Yoshii, op. cit., p. 92.

220 S. Togo, op. cit., pp. 388-96.

221 Ibid., pp. 397-8.

222 M. Yoshii, op. cit., pp. 92-3.

223 Bullock, Alan. *Hitler — A Study in Tyranny*, Penguin, 1990, London, p. 661.

224 Ibid., p. 662.

225 S. Togo, op. cit., pp. 409-10.

226 *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichibei Kosho 1941, Vol. 2*, op. cit., p. 257.

227 T. Yoshikawa, op. cit., pp. 152-3.

228 Grew, Joseph C. *Ten Years in Japan — United States Ambassador to Japan 1932-1942*, Hammond, Hammond & Company, London, 1944, p. 420.

S. Togo, op. cit., p. 410.

229 Akamatsu, Sadao 赤松貞雄. *Tojo Hishokan Kimitsu Nikki 東條秘書官機密日記* (Confidential Diary of Tojo's Secretary), Bungeishunju 文藝春秋, Tokyo, 1985, p. 51.

230 Toland, John. *The Rising Sun — The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (1936-1945)*, Vol. 1, Random House, Inc., New York, 1970, pp. 254-5.

231 S. Akamatsu, op. cit., p. 51.

232 Iriye, Akira. *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*, Longman Group UK Ltd., Harlow, 1987, p. 181.

233 C. Hull, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 1083–4.

234 Stimson diaries, op. cit., Reel Seven, Vol. 36, p. 50.

235 Ibid., p. 53.

236 For an example, refer to the work of Heinrichs. In connection with the American fear of Japan's offensive actions, including "Japanese intelligence designated Mexico City as headquarters" and "It suggested ways of tying down American forces ... by fomenting rebellion in Guatemala", see Heinrichs, *Threshold of War*, op. cit., p. 124. In connection with the Japanese fear of America's offensive actions including "a secret Chinese-American understanding" and an "American-British-Dutch-Chinese bloc which could join forces with the Soviet Union in attacking Japan", see ibid., p. 127.

237 Concerning Japanese intentions, Foreign Minister Togo and Prime Minister Tojo agreed that Japan should compromise further, if the American authorities indicated any interest in either Proposal A or B. See *Japanese Record of Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Vol. 9*, op. cit., p. 602. T. Kase, op. cit., p. 260. S. Togo, op. cit., p. 313.

Conclusion

The argument of the thesis is that misunderstanding and misperception were in large part responsible for the outbreak of the Pacific War. "Misunderstanding" is an elastic concept. The thesis demonstrates that it extends from stereotypes developed over centuries, through the cumulative misperceptions associated with twentieth-century international politics to the mistakes in the decoding and translating of Magic. The thesis can therefore be seen as a contribution to the literature on misunderstanding.

Few of the events which form the subject matter of the thesis are unknown to historians; all have been studied in one way or another. The claim made for the present thesis is that, by making a comprehensive, systematic study of both American and Japanese decision-making in close detail, the author has been able to demonstrate how misunderstanding was a contributory factor in the causation of a war which neither side wanted.

The existing literature falls into two categories: general surveys and special studies. In the West, general surveys present Japanese expansion as an escalating aggression of which the attack on Pearl Harbor was the climax. Amongst such surveys one can include works whose main subject-matter is something other than relations with Japan. At best, such works see Japanese politics as a conflict between 'moderates' and 'militarists'. An example is the comment in Kenneth Davis's recent biography of Roosevelt, already quoted in the thesis for its valuable insight into the Roosevelt Administration: "Japan had been torn internally by a political struggle between domestic moderates ... and aggressive militarists".[1] This view of Japan is obscurantist in that it does not ask questions so that, to take a minor example, the attack on the *Panay* is seen as what an aggressive power would do, and the question "Why did Japanese planes gratuitously attack an American vessel?" is not asked.

Literature of a more specialist nature is obviously more valuable than general surveys. However, there still exist issues unconsidered either by Japanese or Western scholarship, which the thesis attempts to illuminate. This gap exists primarily because Japanese is a difficult language for Westerners and because Japanese observers have usually felt no need to refer to Japanese sources in English. It is also because each side, studying its own sources, has a natural tendency to perpetuate rather than eliminate misperceptions. The crucial events surrounding the Japanese move into Indo-China, and the American oil embargo, provide particularly striking examples of the way each side can remain ignorant of the point of view of the other.

Secondly, the thesis adds to recent work published in the West by, for example, Heinrichs and in Japan by C. Hosoya and S. Sudo, by examining the final negotiations between the United States and Japan in close detail and showing the mistakes of decoding and translation. Magic has been a subject of study ever since the Tokyo Trial and most scholars have argued that the mistranslations made no difference to the final outcome. The argument of the thesis is the opposite, namely that mistranslation from Magic was, in fact, of decisive importance. Had the relationship between America and Japan been one of better understanding the mistakes arising from Magic would have been trivial and, if there had simply existed the normal level of mistrust expected between adversaries who were nevertheless able to conduct negotiations without any misconceptions, they might still have reached an accommodation. Instead the mistranslations were built onto a misunderstanding which had become increasingly entrenched over decades. Above all they reinforced a belief on the American side that the Japanese were deceitful, so that no attempted compromise would be worth pursuing.

We also have to recognise that many sources are still classified. In fact, in the case of Japan, when the author visited the libraries of the National Institute for Defence Studies and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as late as 1991 and 1992, he found that many texts had not yet been declassified or published, for various reasons. At the Defence Studies library, around 90% of the information that has been collected there has still not been released to the public. Similarly, in the case of the United States and Britain, although the American N.S.A. (National Security Agency) and the British G.C.H.Q. (Government General Communications Headquarters) have officially admitted for the first time in fifty years, as a result of the publication in late 1991 by the former Royal Navy codebreaker Eric Nave and his co-writer,[2] that the U.S. Naval codebreakers and the British G.C.C.S. (Government Code and Cipher School) broke the Japanese naval top-secret code called JN-25 prior to Pearl Harbor, no texts of any intercepts have yet been declassified by either government, and the British government's refusal to declassify any, announced by former Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe, was for "security reasons for the Commonwealth".

As Professor Chihiro Hosoya emphasised at the seminar entitled "The Pacific War: A Reappraisal After Fifty Years" at the Imperial War Museum, London, December 5th-6th, 1991,[3] these texts could be vitally important, since the American and British authorities' previous stance for nearly fifty years up to the early 1990s had been to maintain that the Western Allies had never broken Japanese Naval code JN-25. This code contained the military planning information regarding Pearl Harbor prior to the attack, including the execution message "Climb Mount Niitaka 1208 (Niitakayama Nobore 1208 新高山登れ 1208)" on December 2nd, 1941. This surprisingly serious lack of information clearly indicates that writers on this subject, even today, are much less well informed than is generally believed. In this context, the author can only touch on these

issues for the purpose of raising historical questions for the future, and does not feel able to reach any justifiable conclusion at the present time, owing to the lack of information.

There is, however, no immediate prospect of the currently classified information being declassified, so it is pointless to wait. At the same time, a number of sources, primary and secondary, have been released. The author believes that he can only try to provide for his reader a relevant historical background of selected events which relate to the argument which he develops in this thesis.

Fifty years after Pearl Harbor, some revision of different historical views is taking place, and much of the publication has been journalistic, owing to the media's interest in the anniversary. Considering that only a very small number of the scholarly works in Japanese have been translated into English,[4] this is a good moment to take advantage, in a critical manner, of the opportunity to combine the Western works and the new Japanese research.

In studying this new work, the author has found many mistranslations and misunderstandings occurring even at the present time. If the thesis is published, it could serve the purpose of pointing out these misunderstandings and, by doing so, limit their negative effect.

What if Pearl Harbor had not Happened

The primary conclusion of this thesis is that there were several points, even in the very late stages of the negotiations, when the outbreak of war might have been averted, had there been fewer misunderstandings. This would not, however, necessarily have led to a stable peace in the Far East, nor to a satisfactory settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, since several serious disputes still remained unresolved.

Firstly, concerning the matter of the Tripartite Pact, Japan's promise not to intervene in the event of U.S. involvement in the War in Europe did not go far enough as far as the United States was concerned. They wanted an official declaration from Japan that she would abandon the Pact immediately. Japan believed that any alliance was better than no alliance, since she perceived the major threat as coming from her great neighbour, Russia, whereas it was Nazi Germany that was seen as the principal danger by the United States. Poor communications meant that each side was unaware of the different perspectives of the other.

Secondly, the Japanese could not extricate themselves from the situation in China for two main reasons. They had stated that they would withdraw from the rest of China, except North China, Inner Mongolia and Hainan Island, "simultaneously with the establishment of peace ... and the withdrawal [would be] completed within two years" (Proposal A).[5] However, they were not prepared to leave the minority population of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia to the fate of immediate occupation by the Chinese, unless the gap in the perception of Manchuria's position, between America and Japan, was narrowed. In addition, Manchuria was seen as a buffer zone against Russia, as well as a vital source of minerals and food for over-populated Japan.

Thirdly, the American Open Door policy, which was seen by Japan as a device for increasing American trade and influence in China, would have resulted in too great an economic penalty for Japan to accept. This view was also held by other nations with an interest in the Far East, such as Britain, France and Russia, and it seems likely that the introduction of such a policy would have had a destabilising effect on the region.

Fourthly, there was not at that time any noticeable pacifist tendency in any of the main protagonist governments, and any peace or compromise reached would have been based on pragmatism in the face of reality rather than on a reluctance to take up the armed struggle. There remained, in addition, Japan's

constitutional indecisiveness in foreign policy matters and divisions between the U.S. Congress and the Administration, both due to inherent structural weaknesses in their political systems.

For all these reasons, it is likely that further disputes in the region would have led to conflict involving Japan and other nations. Even if the Pacific War had been averted, there remained the likelihood of the outbreak of a northern territorial and ideological war of a greater scale between Japan and Russia. It would be rash to speculate about subsequent Western reactions to such a war.

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1 Davis, Kenneth S. *FDR, Into the Storm 1937-1940: A History*, Random House, Inc., New York, 1993, p. 126.

2 Rusbridger, James and Nave, Eric, *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor*, Michael O'Mara Books, London, 1991.

3 Although most of the papers of this seminar have just been published, Professor Hosoya's lecture was not included in the publication. See Saki Dockrill, ed., *From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-45*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994.

4 For instance, only 4 out of 260 records and essays on the subject of the origins of the Pacific War of 1941-5 were available in English in 1990, according to the list of the relevant records and scholarly works published in 1991 by the Military History Society of Japan (Gunjishi Gakkai 軍事史学会), Tokyo.

5 Sanbo Honbu 参謀本部 (General Staff of the Army). *Sugiyama Memo (Jo) 杉山メモ (上)* (Sugiyama Memorandum (Vol.1)), Hara Shobo 原書房, Tokyo, 1989, p. 379.

Ike, Nobutaka. *Japan's Decision for War — Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1967, pp. 209-10.

Appendices

"Magic" Materials

Telegrams

Japanese Diplomatic Messages

Telegram dated October 20th, 1941 (No Number) App-2
Telegram #698 ..... App-3
Telegram #725 ..... App-4
Telegram #726 ..... App-5
Telegram #727 ..... App-6
Telegram #735 ..... App-7
Telegram #736 ..... App-10
Telegram #739 ..... App-11
Telegram #757 ..... App-12
Telegram #762 ..... App-14
Telegram #764 ..... App-15
Telegram #773 ..... App-17
Telegram #781 ..... App-18
Telegram #800 ..... App-19
Telegram #812 ..... App-21
Telegram #1180 ..... App-22
Telegram #844 ..... App-24
Telegram #985 ..... App-26
The American Modus Vivendi
decoded by the Japanese authorities App-27

The American Records of Magic

Telegram dated October 20th, 1941 (No Number) App-28
Telegram #698 ..... App-31
Telegram #725 ..... App-32
Telegram #726 ..... App-34
Telegram #727 ..... App-36
Telegram #735 ..... App-37
Telegram #736 ..... App-38
Telegram #739 ..... App-39
Telegram #757 ..... App-40
Telegram #762 ..... App-43
Telegram #764 ..... App-44
Telegram #773 ..... App-46
Telegram #781 ..... App-47
Telegram #812 ..... App-48
Telegram #1180 ..... App-49
Telegram #844 ..... App-50
Telegram #985 ..... App-51
Telegram #2353 (Magic version) App-53
Telegram #2353 (translated by Eric Nave) App-54

肯セリ）日支何レヨリ頼マレサルモ最モ便宜ノ地位ニ在ル米国自ラ進ンテ何等カノ努力ヲ為シ然ルヘキニアラスヤト述ヘタル処此ノ問題ハ更ニ考究スヘシト言ヘリ

要スルニ右二問題ニ付テハ米側ニ於テ更ニ双方対案ヲ比較研究ノ上我新内閣ノ政策開示ヲ俟チテ何時ニテモ会談スルコトニ打合セタリ

若杉ヨリ米側ノ諸原則ハ何レモ結構ニテ主義上何人モ異議ヲ唱フル限リニアラサルモ各国各々其ノ生存スル立場ヲ異ニスルニ拘ラス米側ハ何時モ最モ有利ニシテ天恵ニ浴シ居ル自国ノ立場ヨリ自国本位ノ物指ヲ以テ立場ト事情ヲ異ニセル他国ヲ律セントスルノ弊アリ極東ノ一隅ニ在ル日本ノ立場ト殊ニ四年余ノ支那事変ノ為ニ生セル紛糾セル特殊事情ノ下ニ於テ今直ニ総テ米国ノ主張スル理想的原則ニ応セント欲スルモ実行困難ノ事情アルハ例ヘハ支那ニ於ケル幾多ノ組織ヤ施設等モ当面ノ必要上已ムヲ得サルモノニシテ之等ヲ一切米国ノ原則ニ依リ律セントスルモ事実上不可能ノモノモ少ナカラス米側諸原則ノ如キハ戦後世界平和ノ建設ニ当リ世界全般ノ問題トシテ議セラルル場合ニハ実ニ貴重ナル指南ナルモ世界的混乱ノ現状ニ於テ殊ニ紛糾セル極東ノ事態ニ於テ直ニ之ヲ日本ニ強ヒントスルハ無理ニシテ宜シク日本ノ実行可能ナル実際的問題ヲ可能ナル地域ヨリ始メテ協調ノ途ヲ開ク外ナカルヘシト述ヘタル処「ハル」ハ日本ノ事情ハ能ク理解セルモ米国ニモ同様ニ国内的事情アリ支那ニ於ケル米商等カ日本ノ独占的又ハ制限的企業及制度等ニ依リ通商上ノ自由ヲ阻害サレ居ルモノ等ヨリ苦情アル場合米国ノ国柄トシテ之ヲ無視スルヲ得サル次第ニシテ此ノ原則ハ結局ニ於テ日本ニ有利ナルヲ以テ之ヲ太平洋全地域ニ実施センコトヲ希望スル旨ヲ繰返シ何レ此ノ問題モ更ニ両案ヲ比較考究スルコトトセリ

終リニ「ハル」ハ日本ノ情勢如何ト尋ネタルニ付若杉ヨリ民心非常ニ緊張シ居リ政府ハ此ノ際右カ左カ断乎タル措置ニ出ツルノ必要ニ迫ラレ居ル模様ニテ一ニ日米関係ノ打開如何ニ懸レルカ如シ此ノ際何等カノ米側ノ友好的「ゼスチュアー」ハ敏感ナル日本国民ノ緊張味ヲ緩和スルニ資スル所アルヘク主要問題ノ妥結ニハ更ニ時日ヲ要スルトスルモ差当リ些細ナル事項例ヘハ現ニ一ケ月余モ桑港ニ待機中ノ厳島丸、ショウヨウ丸ノ石油代金ノ凍結

解除及今般協定ノ郵船三隻ノ航行用燃料其ノ他ノ資金解除（大蔵省ノ邪魔アリ）ニ至急便宜ヲ与ヘラルルカ如キハ其ノ効果少カラサルヘシト申入レタル処「ウェルズ」ハ即座ニ船名等ヲ書取リ直ニ下僚ニ取計ハスヘキ旨約セリ

278　昭和16年10月20日　在米国野村大使より東郷（茂徳）外務大臣宛（電報）

一時帰朝につき海軍大臣の助言方要請

ワシントン　10月20日後発
本　省　10月21日後着

（極秘、館長符号）

貴大臣限リ御含ノ上海相ニ御伝ヘ請フ

海軍大臣殿

御親任慶祝、偖小生、就任ノ際前海相ノ熱烈ナル支援ヲ賜ハリタル処着任以来万事志ト違ヒ何ノ為ス所ナク慙愧ニ堪ヘス此上将来ニ対シテモ何等成算アルニアラスシテ依然尸位素餐ヲ許ササルコトト信ス小生ハ米国ハ一面欧州戦争他面太平洋問題ニ直面シアルモ未タ軍事的ニハ可ナリ弱点アリ故ニ時局ノ進展ニ伴ヒ日本ニ対シ多少協調的ニ転向スルナラントモ考ヘオリシカ予期ニ反シ今迄ノ所米側ハ終始極力自国ノ政策ヲ固守シ何等右匡正ヲ認メ難シコレ畢竟支那ニ余リ深入リシアル結果ナルヘク故ニ支那問題ヲ離レ極東ノ「モデュス・ビベンディ」ヲモ本使限リニテ考慮シタルコトアリ国務長官ニモ一寸話シテ見タルコトアルカ長官ハ支那問題ハ太平洋ノ安定ト不可分ナリト強ク主張ス数日前「ハリファックス」トモ時余ニ亘リ懇談シ英帝国モ太平洋ノ危機ニハ大ナル関心ヲ有スヘク何トカ危機回避ノ為ニ日米ノ間ニ「モデュス・ビベンディ」テモ発見シ以テ時局保全ヲ計ルコトニ付話合ヒタル処氏ハ「ハル」トモ話シテ見タシト申シタルモ其ノ後何ノ挨拶モナシ

次ニ小生出発前ニハ当時ノ閣僚等トモ懇談ヲ重ネ充分政府ノ動向ヲ承知シタル上着任シタルモ其ノ後二回ノ政変アリ小生ハ今ヤ暗黒裡ニアリコレニテハ如何トモシ難クサリトテ国務長官トハ従来数十回ニ亘リ折衝ヲ為シアルカ故ニ此ノ際更ニ新ナル角度ヨリ話ヲ再開スル場合ニハ小生ノ存在ハ我方ニ不利ヲ来スコト疑ナシ

右ノ如キ考ヲ以テ至急一時帰朝ヲ（編注）一昨日付ヲ以テ稟請シタ

ルニ付外相ヨリ何等カ御話アルカ如キ場合ニハ是非共小生ノ願意ヲ貫徹スル様御高配切望ス

編注 外務大臣宛電報はみあたらない。

279 昭和16年10月21日 東郷外務大臣より 在米国野村大使宛（電報）

内閣の交替にかかわらず交渉継続方訓令

本 省 10月21日後7時40分発

第六九八号（緊急、館長符号、機械）

貴電第九六六号ニ関シ

御来示ノ次第ニ関スル詳細ナル訓令ハ組閣早々ノコトニモアリ追テ電報スヘキモ新内閣ニ於テモ公正ナル基礎ノ下ニ於ケル日米国交調整ニ対スル熱意ハ前内閣ト異ナル所ナシ而シテ我方見解乃至主張ハ既ニ殆ト全部之ヲ明カニシアルヲ以テ寧ロ我方ハ毅然タル態度ヲ以テ米側ノ反省ヲ俟ツ態勢ニ在リ仍而貴大使ハ適宜貴大使自身又ハ若杉ヲシテ我方トシテハ本交渉ニ之レ以上長時日ヲ費スヲ許ササル事情ニアルコトヲソレトナク仄メカシ九月二十五日我方案ニ対スル米側ノ対案ヲ至急求メラルルコトニ重点ヲ置キ話ヲ続行セラレ度シ

（欄外記入） 二十一日正午次官邸ニテ陸海軍務局長東亜長 米長協議スミ 寺崎

280 昭和16年10月24日 在米国野村大使より 東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

新内閣の交渉方針につき通報方要請

ワシントン 10月24日後発

本 省 10月25日前着

第九八九号（緊急、極秘、館長符号）

貴電第六九八号ニ関シ

御来訓ノ趣旨ヲ体シ本二十四日若杉ヲシテ「ウェルズ」ト会見慎重ノ態度ヲ以テ話ヲ続ケシムル筈ナルカ本日参謀次長ヨリ陸軍武官ヘノ極秘電ノ次第モアル処右ハ政府御決定ノ方針ナリヤ追テ委細御訓令アルコトハ存スルモ本件話続行上ノ都合モアルニ付本使限リノ心得迄至急何分ノ儀御回示請フ

281 昭和16年10月24日 在米国野村大使より 東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

若杉・ウェルズ会談において我が方の交渉継続意向表明について

ワシントン 10月24日後発

本 省 10月25日後着

第九九五号（極秘、館長符号）

貴電第六九八号ニ関シ

二十四日午後三時半ヨリ一時間若杉「ウェルズ」ト会見貴電ノ趣旨ニ依リ我新内閣ニ於テモ公正ナル国交調整ノ熱意ニ変リナキ事及我方ノ主張ハ既ニ明カニシアルコト並ニ未タ詳細ノ訓令ニ接セサルモ若杉自身先日帰朝ノ際見聞セル所ニ依ルモ本会談ヲ之レ以上何時迄モ長引カスコトヲ許ササルノ事情アルヲ以テ一日モ速カニ結論ニ到達シタキ旨ヲ述ヘ我方九月二十五日案ニ対スル米側ノ対案提示ヲ求メタル処「ウェルズ」ハ先ツ新内閣ノ本件継続ノ意向ヲ質シ同時ニ最近日本側ニ於テ責任ノ地位ニ在ル者例ヘハ海軍ノ「スポークスマン」カ日本海軍ハ「イッチング・フォア・アクション」等ト好戦的ノ声明ヲ為シ又諸新聞等カ猛烈ニ米国ヲ攻撃セルハ米国朝野ヲ甚タシク刺激シ本件継続ニ有害ナルコトヲ指摘シタルヲ以テ若杉ヨリモ米国側ニ於テモ有力ナル政治家例ヘハ現ニ上院議員タル「ペッパー」ノ如キ猛烈ナル日本攻撃ヲ為スモノ少カラス殊ニ本日「ノックス」海軍長官ノ演説ニ日米戦争避クヘカラス且其ノ衝突旦夕ニ迫セリト云フカ如キ好戦的議論多ク日本朝野ヲ刺激シオルコトオ互様ナリト反駁シタル処「ウ」ハ海軍長官ノ演説ハ左程激シキモノニアラス新聞通信ハ其ノ談片ヲ誇張シ（ママ）タルニ過キス同氏カ米国ニ於ケル最大勢力タル海軍ノ担任者トシテ海軍ヲ激励スル為メ時々強硬論ヲ行フニ過キサルモノナルハ了承セラレ度シト縷々弁解ニ努メ次テ米側ノ対案ニ就キテハ前回会談ノ際モ繰返ヘシタル通リ米側ノ原則ト提案ハ六月二十一日案ニ明カナルカ右米案ト日本案トノ字句ノ調整ヲ計ルコト一案ナルモ過去数ケ月ノ非公式会談ノ経験ニ照ラシ従来ノ「フォームラ」ニ固執シテ其ノ各項ノ審議ヲ為ス丈ニテハ同一議論ヲ繰返ヘスノミニテ進展ヲ期シ難カルヘキヲ以テ前回「ハル」長官同席ニテ話セル如ク重要三問題ノ如キ一般的事項ヲ比較的解決容易ナルモノヨリ逐次ニ合意ヲ見ルニ努ムル新「フォームラ」ニ依リ再

六　「甲案」による交渉

289　昭和16年11月2日　東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛（電報）

日米国交調整に関する方針を五日の御前会議で決定の予定について

本　省　11月2日　発

第七二二号（館長符号）

政府ハ組閣以来連日ニ亘リ大本営連絡会議ヲ開催シ日米国交調整ニ関スル根本方策ヲ慎重審議中ナリシカ右ハ来ル五日御前会議ニ於テ決定ヲ見ル予定ニシテ其ノ結果ハ直ニ貴大使ニ訓電スヘキ処政府ハ右ヲ以テ国交調整ノ最後的試ミヲ行フ次第ニシテ事態頗ル重大ナルモノアリ交渉開始ノ上ハ諸般ノ情勢上極メテ急速ニ妥結ヲ要スル儀ナルニ付右厳ニ貴大使限リ御含ミ置キアリ度シ

尚近ク右折衝ヲ控ヘ居ル際万事ニ慎重ヲ期セラレ度シ

290　昭和16年11月3日　在米国野村大使より東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

日米国交調整に関する新内閣の方針につき請訓

ワシントン　11月3日後発

本　省　11月4日前着

第一〇二一号（至急、極秘、館長符号）

二、三日中ニ「ハル」ニ面談ノ積リナルカ出来得レハ夫レ迄ニ新内閣決定ノ方針御回訓ヲ得度ク若シ右運ヒニ到ラサル場合ハ右会談ニ際シ本使ニ於テ心得ヘキ点御回電ヲ請フ

291　昭和16年11月4日　東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛（電報）

我が方最終案の通報

別　電一　一一月四日付東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛第七二六号

「甲案」

二　一一月四日付東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛第七二七号

「乙案」

本　省　11月4日後6時発

第七二五号（大至急、館長符号）

往電第七二二号ニ関シ

一、破綻ニ瀕セル日米国交ノ調整ニ付テハ日夜腐心シ居ル処内閣ニ於テハ国策ノ根本方針ヲ審議スル為メ連日大本営連絡会議ヲ開催シ熟議ニ熟議ヲ重ネタル結果茲ニ政府大本営一致ノ意見ニ基キ日米交渉対案（別電第七二六号及第七二七号）ヲ決定シ右ハ五日開催ノ予定ナル御前会議ニ於テ帝国ノ爾余根本国策ト共ニ其ノ確認ヲ俟ツノミトナリ居レリ

二、帝国内外ノ事態ハ極テ急迫ヲ告ケ今ヤ一日ヲモ曠クスルヲ許ササル状態ニアルモ帝国政府ハ日米間ノ平和関係ヲ維持セントスル誠意ヨリ熟議ノ結果交渉ヲ継続スルモノナルカ本交渉ハ最後ノ試ミニシテ我対案ハ名実共ニ最終案ナリト御承知アリタク之ヲ以テシテモ猶急速妥結ニ至ラサルニ於テハ遺憾乍ラ決裂ニ至ルノ外ナク其結果両国関係ハ遂ニ破綻ニ直面スルノ已ムナキニ立至ルモノナリ即今次折衝ノ成否ハ帝国国運ニ甚大ノ影響アリテ実ニ皇国安危ニ係ルモノナリ

三、日米交渉ハ開始以来既ニ半歳ヲ超ヘ遷延久シキモノアル処帝国政府ハ之カ急速妥結ヲ計ル為メ従来難キヲ忍ヒテ譲歩ニ譲歩ヲ重ネ来リタルニ拘ラス米国政府ハ之ニ対応スル所ナク終始当初ノ主張ヲ固執シ居ル実状ニシテ我方朝野ニモ其ノ真意ニ疑惑ヲ感スルモノ少ナカラサル義ナリ然ルニモ拘ラス我政府カ飽迄誠意ヲ披瀝シテ更ニ困難ナル譲歩ヲ敢テセル所以ノモノハ一ニ太平洋ノ平和維持ヲ顧念スルニ出ツルモノニシテ我方ノ一方的譲歩ハ動々モスレハ米側一部ニ於テ誤解シ居ルカ如ク我方ニ於テ時艱克服ノ実力ト自信トヲ欠クカ為ニハ断シテアラス」

帝国ノ隠忍ニモ自ラ限度アリ其ノ存立ト権威トハ必要ニ依リテハ犠牲ノ如何ヲ問ハス擁護セサルヘカラサル次第ニシテ米国政府ニシテ此上帝国ノ立場ヲ無視スルノ態度ニ出ツルニ於テハ交渉ノ余地ハ絶無ト言フノ他ナク今ヤ帝国ハ能フ限リノ友誼的精神ヲ発揮シ進ンテ能フ限リノ譲歩ヲ為シ以テ局面ノ平和的収拾ヲ計ラント欲スルモノ

本　省　11月4日後9時45分発

第七二六号（大至急、館長符号）

一、甲案

本案ハ九月二十五日我方提案ヲ既往ノ交渉経過ニヨリ判明セル米側ノ希望ニ出来得ル限リ「ミート」スル趣旨ヲ以テ修正セル最後的譲歩案ニシテ懸案ノ三問題ニ付我方主張ヲ左記ノ通リ緩和セルモノナリ

(一)　通商無差別問題

九月二十五日案ニテ到底妥結ノ見込ナキ際ハ「日本国政府ハ無差別原則カ全世界ニ適用セラルルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋全地域即支那ニ於テモ本原則ノ行ハルルコトヲ承認ス」ト修正ス

(二)　三国条約ノ解釈及履行問題

我方ニ於テ自衛権ノ解釈ヲ濫リニ拡大スル意図ナキコトヲ更ニ明瞭ニスルト共ニ三国条約ノ解釈及履行ニ関シテハ従来屢々説明セル如ク帝国政府ノ自ラ決定スル所ニ依リテ行動スル次第ニシテ此点ハ既ニ米国側ノ了承ヲ得タ

ナルヲ以テ交渉最後ノ段階ニ臨ムニ当リ米国政府ニ於テ日米国交維持ノ大局的見地ヨリ飜然猛省局面ノ極メテ重大ナルニ顧ミ善処センコトヲ要望スルヤ切ナリ

四、如上ノ次第ニテ貴大使ノ使命ハ帝国国運ノ進展ニ極メテ重大ナルモノアリ御苦心ハ深ク諒トスル所ナルカ此上共右諸点篤ト御了承ノ上最前ヲ尽クシテ御努力アラムコトヲ期待スルモノナリ御前会議終了次第其ノ旨追電スヘキニ付其ノ上速カニ「ローズヴェルト」大統領及「ハル」長官ト会見シ我方ノ決意ヲ充分徹底セシメ極力交渉ノ急速妥結ヲ計ラルル様御努力アリ度シ

五、尚交渉ノ重大性ニ鑑ミ貴地ノ折衝ト並行シ本大臣ニ於テモ東京ニ於テ在京米国大使ト会談ヲ行フ予定ナルニ付米政府当局ト会見時日打合セナリタル上ハ右直ニ当方ニ電報アリ度ク今後ノ交渉経過ハ勿論貴方ニ於テ新タナル措置ヲ取ル際ハ逐一報告ノ上連絡ヲ取ラレ度シ又右様関係上手違ヒヲ避ケル為ニモ当方訓令ハ厳守アリ度ク貴方ニ於テ取捨選択ノ余地ナキコトト御承知アリ度シ

ルモノナリト思考スル旨ヲ以テ応酬ス

(三)　撤兵問題

本件ハ左記ノ通リ緩和ス

(A)　支那ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵

支那事変ノ為支那ニ派遣セラレタル日本国軍隊ハ北支及蒙疆ノ一定地域及海南島ニ関シテハ日支間平和成立後所要期間駐屯スヘク爾余ノ軍隊ハ平和成立ト同時ニ日支間ニ別ニ定メラルル所ニ従ヒ撤去ヲ開始シ治安確立ト共ニ二年以内ニ之ヲ完了スヘシ

(註)所要期間ニ付米側ヨリ質問アリタル場合ハ概ネ二十五年ヲ目途トスルモノナル旨ヲ以テ応酬スルモノトス

(B)　仏印ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵

日本国政府ハ仏領印度支那ノ領土主権ヲ尊重ス現ニ仏領印度支那ニ派遣セラレ居ル日本国軍隊ハ支那事変ニシテ解決スルカ又ハ公正ナル極東平和ノ確立スルニ於テハ直ニ之ヲ撤去スヘシ

尚四原則ニ付テハ之ヲ日米間ノ正式妥結事項（了解案タルト又ハ其他声明タルトヲ問ハス）中ニ包含セシムルコトハ極力回避スルモノトス

二、右説明

(一)　通商無差別原則ニ付テハ地理的近接ノ事実ニ依ル緊密関係ニ関スル従来ノ主張ハ之ヲ撤回シ無差別原則ノ全世界適用ヲ条件トセルモノナルカ後者ニ付テハ十月二日付米政府覚書中ニ「日米何レカカ特定地域ニ於テ一ノ政策ヲ取ルニ拘ラス他地域ニ於テ之ト相反スル政策ヲ取ルハ面白カラス」トノ趣旨ノ記述アルニ徴スルモ何等反対ナカルヘク従ツテ本件ニ付テハ之ニテ合意成立スルモノト信ス

(二)　三国条約ノ問題ニ付テハ屢次貴電ニ依レハ米側ハ我方提案ニテ大体満足シ居ルヤノ趣ナルニ付自衛権ノ解釈ヲ濫ニ拡大スル意図ナキコトヲ一層明確ニスルニ於テハ本件モ妥結ヲ見ルヘキモノト信ス

(三)　撤兵問題ハ或ハ依然難点トナルヤモ知レサルモ我方ハ米側カ不確定期間ノ駐兵ニ強ク反対スルニ鑑ミ駐兵地域及期間ヲ示シ以テ其ノ疑惑ヲ解カントスルモノナリ撤兵ヲ建前トシ駐兵ヲ例外トスル方米側ノ希望ニ副フヘキモ右ハ国内的ニ不可能ナリ又駐兵所要期間ヲ明示スルニ

於テハ却テ事態ヲ紛糾セシムル惧アルニ付此ノ際ハ飽ク迄所要期間ナル抽象的字句ニヨリ折衝セラレ無期限永久駐兵ニ非サル旨ヲ印象ツクル様御努力相成度シ要之甲案ハ懸案三問題中二問題ニ関シテハ全面的ニ米側主張ヲ受諾セルモノニテ最後ノ一点タル駐兵及撤兵問題ニ付テモ最大限ノ譲歩ヲ為セル次第ナリ右ハ四年ニ亘ル事変ニ依リ帝国ノ甘受セル甚大ナル犠牲ニ徴シ決シテ過大ノ要求ニアラス寧ロ甚タ小ニ過キタルモノニシテ此ノ点ハ国内政治上モ我方トシテハ此上ノ譲歩ハ到底不可能ナリ依テ米側ヲシテ右ヲ諒解セシメ本案ニ依リ速ヤカニ交渉妥結ニ導ク様切望ス

(別 電二)

本 省 11月4日後8時30分発

第七二七号（大至急、館長符号）

一、乙案

本案ハ甲案ノ代案トモ称スヘク若シ米側ニ於テ甲案ニ著ルシキ難色ヲ示ストキハ事態切迫シ遷延ヲ許ササル情勢ナルニ鑑ミ何等カノ代案ヲ急速成立セシメ以テ事ノ発スルヲ未然ニ防止スル必要アリトノ見地ヨリ案出セル第二次案ニシテ内容左ノ通リ

(一) 日米両国政府ハ孰レモ仏印以外ノ南東亜細亜及南太平洋地域ニ武力的進出ヲ行ハサルコトヲ確約ス

(二) 日米両国政府ハ蘭領印度ニ於テ其必要トスル物資ノ獲得カ保障セラルル様相互ニ協力スルモノトス

(三) 日米両国政府ハ相互ニ通商関係ヲ資産凍結前ノ状態ニ復帰スヘシ

米国政府ハ所要ノ石油ノ対日供給ヲ約ス

(四) 米国政府ハ日支両国ノ和平ニ関スル努力ニ支障ヲ与フルカ如キ行動ニ出テサルヘシ

（備考）

(一) 必要ニ応シ本取極成立セハ日支間和平成立スルカ又ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立スル上ハ日本軍隊ヲ撤退スヘキ旨ヲ約束シ差支ナシ

(二) 必要ニ応シテハ往電第七二六号甲案中ニ包含セラルル通商無差別待遇ニ関スル規定及三国条約ノ解釈及履行ニ関スル規定ヲ追加挿入スルモノトス尚本案ヲ提出スル時期ニ付テハ予メ請訓アリタシ

292 昭和16年11月4日 東郷外務大臣より 在米国野村大使宛（電報）

来栖大使の派遣について

本 省 11月4日 発

第七三〇号（館長符号）

往電第七二五号ニ関シ

今次交渉ノ重大性ニ鑑ミ予テノ貴大使ノ御希望モアリ七日香港発「クリッパア」ニテ（米国政府ノ好意的斡旋ニ依ル）来栖大使ヲ貴地ニ出張セシム尚座席ノ都合付カハ結城書記官随行スヘシ

尚来栖大使ハ交渉ニ当リ貴大使ヲ援助スル為メ派遣スルモノニシテ同大使ハ既ニ貴方ヘ電報セル以外何等新ラシキ訓令等ハ携行シ居ラサル次第ナルカ交渉ノ便ナラシムル為メ同大使着ノ上ハ直ニ大統領ニ面謁シ得ル様御準備置アリタシ為念

尚同大使ノ行動ハ差当リ秘密ニ付シ居レリ

293 昭和16年11月4日 東郷外務大臣より 在米国野村大使宛（電報）

我が方最終案に対する英・蘭両国の了解取付け米国側へ申入れ方訓令

本 省 11月4日後11時20分発

第七三一号（大至急、館長符号）

往電第七二五号ニ関シ

本件交渉ニハ英国モ事実上ノ当事者タリ又同国ハ極東ニ甚大ナル権益ヲ有スル関係等ニ鑑ミ本了解案（甲案、乙案共）ヲ実施スルカ為ニハ英ハ勿論蘭モ亦当事国トシテ当該了解事項ヲ実行スヘキ立場ニ在リ我方トシテハ此点ニ付確タル保障ナクシテハ単ニ米政府トノ了解達成シタルノ故ノミヲ以テ安堵シ難シ就テハ本了解案中英、蘭関係事項ニ付テハ英蘭両国ヲシテ同時調印セシムルコト必要ナルニ付米側ニ於テ右ニ必要ナル措置ヲ予メ取リ置ク様交渉ノ上結果回電アリタシ

294

昭和16年11月5日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

日米合意の形式につき米国側の意向確かめ方訓令

本　省　11月5日後3時35分発

第七三二号（館長符号）

往電第七二五号ニ関シ

本件交渉妥結ニ達シ成果ヲ文書ニ作成スル場合米国側ニ於テ之ヲ Treaty トシテ上院ニ付議スルコトハ交渉妥結ヲ迅速ニ確定的ナラシムル見地ヨリ之ヲ避ケ度ク従来累次ノ米国側提案ニ徴スルニ先方ノ意向モ亦上院付議ノ意ナキモノ如ク察スルニ米国側ハ右文書ヲ以テ将来ニ於ケル協定ノ基礎ヲ確立スル目的ヲ有スル一種ノ executive agreement ト解シ大統領ノ権限ニ依リ締結スル所存ト推察シ従来モ右心組ヲ以テ取扱ヒ来リタル次第ナルカ（Hyde, International Law chiefly as interpreted and applied by the United States 第二巻第三十一頁参照）此ノ点ニ関スル米国側ノ見解適当ノ方法ニヨリ御確メノ上回電アリタシ就テハ右ニセヨ冒頭電申進ノ通リ本交渉ハ極テ急速ニ妥結且調印ヲ終了スルコト諸般ノ情勢上絶対必要ナルニ付右御含ミノ上善処アリタシ

295

昭和16年11月5日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

「甲案」「乙案」の英訳文通報方要請

ワシントン　11月5日後発
本　省　11月6日前着

第一〇三六号（極秘、館長符号）

貴電第七二五号ニ関シ

甲乙両案英訳文ハ勿論当方ニ於テモ早速作成スヘキモ同電(五)ノ次第モアリ貴方ニ於テ「グルー」大使ニ手交セラルヘキ英訳文トノ間ニ用語其ノ他ノ相違ヲ避クル為貴方英訳文出来次第至急御電報請フ

296

昭和16年11月5日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

御前会議の決定に基づきまず「甲案」にて折衝開始方訓令

付　記一　御前会議で決定された「帝国国策遂行要領」

74

二　御前会議における外務大臣説明

本　省　11月5日　発

第七三五号（館長符号）

一、往電第七二五号日米交渉対案ハ本五日ノ御前会議ニ於テ決定ヲ見タリ就テハ貴大使ハ前電訓令ノ趣旨ヲ体シ至急折衝ヲ開始セラレ度シ

二、従来ノ経緯ニモ鑑ミ引続キ六月二十一日案従ツテ我方ヨリ言ヘハ九月二十五日案ヲ基礎トシ交渉ヲ進ムルコト米側ノ期待ニ副フモノト推察セラルルニヨリ話合ノ順序トシテハ先ツ甲案（往電第七二六号）ヲ提示スルコト交渉ヲ急速ニ取纏ムル為メ便宜ナルヘシ（当方トシテハ実ハ従来ノ日米案形式、表現ニ就テモ面白カラスト認ムルモノアルモ便宜上甲案ヲ先ツ提示セントスルモノナリ）就テハ右ノ趣旨ヲ米側ニ対シ説明セラルルトキニ往電第七二五号ノ事情ヲ篤ト先方ニ納得セシメ以テ最短期間内ニ同案ニヨリ妥結方極力御尽力アリ度シ

三、米側ニ於テ甲案ニ対シ著シキ難色アリ右ニテ妥結不可能ナル際ハ最後ノ局面打開策トシテ乙案（往電第七二七号）ヲ提示スル意向ナルニヨリ前段甲案ニ対スル米側態度ヲ大至急急突止メ電報アリタク尚乙案提示ノ際ハ必ス予メ請訓アリ度シ

四、今次訓令ハ帝国政府ノ最後案ナルコト前電ニ縷々申進ノ通リニシテ事態頗ル切迫シ絶対ニ遷延ヲ許ササルニ付其ノ御含ニミテ御努力アリ度ク此点重ネテ申進ス

五、尤モ「タイム・リミット」ヲ付シ若クハ最後通牒的態度ヲ取ルカ如キ印象ハ之ヲ避ケタキニヨリ友好的折衝ヲ以テ出来得ル限リ速カニ交渉成立ヲ期待スルカ如キ態度ヲ持セラルル様致シ度シ

（付　記一）

帝国国策遂行要領

一、帝国ハ現下ノ危局ヲ打開シテ自存自衛ヲ完フシ大東亜ノ新秩序ヲ建設スル為此ノ際英米蘭戦争ヲ決意シ左記措置ヲ採ル

(一)　武力発動ノ時期ヲ十二月初頭ト定メ陸海軍ハ作戦準備ヲ完整ス

(二)　対米交渉ハ別紙要領ニ依リ之ヲ行フ

(三)　独伊トノ提携強化ヲ図ル

75

(四) 武力発動ノ直前泰トノ間ニ軍事的緊密関係ヲ樹立ス

二、対米交渉カ十二月一日午前零時迄ニ成功セハ武力発動ヲ中止ス

別紙

対米交渉要領

対米交渉ハ従来懸案トナレル重要事項ノ表現方式ヲ緩和修正スル

別記甲案或ハ別記乙案ノ如キ局地的緩和案ヲ以テ交渉ニ臨ミ之カ妥結ヲ計ルモノトス

甲案

日米交渉懸案中再重要ナル事項ハ(一)支那及仏印ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵問題(二)支那ニ於ケル通商無差別問題(三)三国条約ノ解釈及履行問題(四)四原則問題ナル処之等諸項ニ付テハ左記ノ程度ニ之ヲ緩和ス

記

(一) 支那ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵問題

本件ニ付テハ米国側ハ駐兵ノ理由ハ暫ク之ヲ別トシ(イ)不確定期間ノ駐兵ヲ重視シ(ロ)平和解決条件中ニ之ヲ包含セシムルコトニ異議ヲ有シ(ハ)撤兵ニ関シ更ニ明確ナル意思表示ヲ要望シ居ルニ鑑ミ次ノ諸案程度ニ緩和ス

日支事変ノ為支那ニ派遣セラレタル日本国軍隊ハ北支及蒙彊ノ一定地域及海南島ニ関シテハ日支間平和成立後所要期間駐屯スヘク爾余ノ軍隊ハ平和成立ト同時ニ日支間ニ別ニ定メラルル所ニ従ヒ撤去ヲ開始シ二年以内ニ之ヲ完了スヘシ

註 所要期間ニ付米側ヨリ質問アリタル場合ハ概ネ二十五年ヲ目途トスルモノナル旨ヲ以テ応酬スルモノトス

(二) 仏印ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵

本件ニ付テハ米側ハ日本ハ仏印ニ対シ領土的野心ヲ有シ且近接地方ニ対スル武力進出ノ基地タラシメントスルモノナリトノ危惧ノ念ヲ有スト認メラルルヲ以テ次ノ案程度ニ緩和ス

日本国政府ハ仏領印度支那ノ領土主権ヲ尊重ス現ニ仏領印度支那ニ派遣セラレ居ル日本国軍隊ハ支那事変ニシテ解決スルカ又ハ公正ナル極東平和ノ確立スルニ於

テハ直ニ之ヲ撤去スヘシ

(三) 支那ニ於ケル通商無差別待遇問題

本件ニ付テハ既提出ノ九月二十五日案ニテ到底妥結ノ見込無キ場合ニハ次ノ案ヲ以テ対処スルモノトス

日本国政府ハ無差別原則カ全世界ニ適用セラルルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋全地域即支那ニ於テモ本原則ノ行ハルルコトヲ承認ス

(四) 三国条約ノ解決及履行問題

本件ニ付テハ我方トシテハ自衛権ノ解釈ヲ濫ニ拡大スル意図ナキコト更ニ明瞭ニスルト共ニ三国条約ノ解釈及履行ニ関シテハ我方ハ従来屢々説明セル如ク日本国政府ノ自ラ決定スル所ニ依リテ行動スル次第ニシテ此点ハ既ニ米国側ノ諒承ヲ得タルモノナリト思考スル旨ヲ以テ応酬ス

(五) 米側ノ所謂四原則ニ付テハ之ヲ日米間ノ正式妥結事項（諒解案タルト又ハ其ノ他ノ声明タルトヲ問ハス）中ニ包含セシムルコトハ極力回避ス

乙案

一、日米両国ハ孰レモ仏印以外ノ南東亜細亜及南太平洋地域ニ武力的進出ヲ行ハサルコトヲ約スヘシ

二、日米両国政府ハ蘭領印度ニ於テ其ノ必要トスル物資ノ獲得カ保障セラルル様相互ニ協力スヘシ

三、日米両国政府ハ相互ニ通商関係ヲ資金凍結前ノ状態ニ復帰セシムヘシ米国ハ所要ノ石油ノ対日供給ヲ約スヘシ

四、米国政府ハ日支両国ノ和平ニ関スル努力ニ支障ヲ与フルカ如キ行動ニ出テサルヘシ

備考

一、必要ニ応シ本取極成立セハ南部仏印駐屯中ノ日本軍ハ仏国政府ノ諒解ヲ得テ北部仏印ニ移駐スルノ用意アルコト並ニ支那事変解決スルカ又ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル公正ナル和平確立ノ上ハ前記日本軍ヲ仏印ヨリ撤退スヘキコトヲ約束シ差支無シ

二、尚必要ニ応シテハ従来ノ提案（最後案）中ニアリタル通商無差別待遇ニ関スル規定及三国条約ノ解釈及履行ニ関スル規定ヲ追加挿入スルモノトス

編注 ――部分は一一月四日付東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛第七二七号（291文書別電二）では省かれている。

る

（付　記二）

御前会議ニ於ケル外務大臣説明

謹ンテ按シマスルニ帝国対外国策ノ要諦ハ正義ト公正トニ立脚スル国際関係ヲ確立シ仍テ以テ世界平和ノ維持増進ニ貢献セントスルモノテアリマス

一、由来日支事変ノ完遂ト大東亜共栄圏ノ確立トハ帝国ノ存立ヲ保障スルト共ニ東亜安定ノ礎石タルモノテアリマシテ帝国ハ之カ遂行ニ当リマシテハ如何ナル障碍ヲモ排除スヘキ覚悟カ必要テアリマス

昨年十一月三十日日支基本条約ノ成立ト共ニ帝国ハ南京政府ヲ承認シ茲ニ支那事変ハ一大段階ヲ画シタノテアリマス爾来同政府ノ育成強化ニ協力シツツ他面蒋介石政権ニ対シマシテハ引続キ武力的圧力ヲ加ヘ其ノ反省ヲ促シタノテアリマスルカ聖戦四年有半今猶抗戦ヲ持続シテ居リマスル所以ノモノハ英米等ノ援助ニ俟ツコト極メテ大ナルハ明カナル事実テアリマス

二、支那事変以来英米両国政府ハ帝国ノ大陸発展ヲ曲解シ一方ニ於テ援蒋ノ行為ニ出ツルト共ニ他面帝国ニ対シマシテハ或ハ現地行動ヲ牽制シ或ハ経済的圧迫ヲ加重スル等ノ措置ニ出テタノテアリマス東亜ニ於テ最モ権益ヲ扶殖シテ居リマシタ英国カ当初ヨリ凡ユル妨碍手段ヲ講シマシタコトハ勿論之ト呼応シテ米国ハ日米間通商条約ノ廃棄、輸出入禁止制限等日ト共ニ対日圧迫ヲ強化スルニ至リマシタカ殊ニ帝国カ独伊ト三国条約ヲ締結致シマシテ以来ハ自カラ英、蘭ヲ誘導シ蒋政権ト協力シテ所謂対日包囲陣ヲ形成スル等ノ手段ニ出テ独蘇戦開始後ニ於キマシテハ帝国政府ノ警告ニモ拘ラス極東ヲ通スル石油其ノ他軍需必要物資ノ対蘇供給ニ依リ帝国ニ対シ非友誼的行為ヲ敢テスルニ至リマシタ帝国カ自衛ト防護ノ為ニ将又支那事変遂行ノ必要ノ為メ友好的商議ニ依リ仏国政府ト条約ヲ締結シテ仏印ニ兵力ヲ進駐セシメマスルヤ米国ノ行動ハ愈々露骨トナリマシテ資金凍結ノ名ノ下ニ事実上中南米ヲモ含ム対日経済断交ノ挙ニ出テマシタノミナラス英、支、蘭等ト提携シテ帝国ノ生存ヲ脅威スルト共ニ我方国策ノ遂行ヲ阻止セントスル態勢ヲ強化スルニ至リマシタノテ東亜安定ノ勢力タル帝国トシテハ毅然タル

態度ト決意トヲ以テ局面打開ニ当ラサルヲ得サルコトトナリマシタ

三、然ルニ「ルーズヴェルト」大統領ハ其ノ国策トシテ其ノ所謂「ヒットラー」主義即チ武力政策ノ排撃ヲ強調シ之カ為メ経済的ニ有利ナル米国ノ立場ヲ利用シツツ殆ト参戦同様ノ援英政策ヲ実施スルト共ニ前述ノ如ク強硬ナル対日圧迫政策ヲ執ルニ至リマシタ偶々本年四月中旬日米国交ノ一般的調整ニ関シ非公式話合カ開始セラレマシタカ帝国政府ハ東亜ノ安定ト世界平和ノ招来ヲ顧念シ最モ真摯且公正ナル態度ヲ以テ交渉ヲ継続致シマシタ爾来今日迄六ケ月有余ノ久シキニ亘リ忍耐ト互譲ノ精神トヲ以テ交渉ノ円満ナル妥結ニ努メ特ニ前内閣ニ於キマシテハ両国首脳者会談ニ依リ局面ノ打開ヲ計ラント凡ユル誠意ヲ披瀝シ努力ヲ傾倒致シ九月下旬国交調整ノ為ノ妥協案ヲ提示致シマシタカ米国政府ハ態度頗ル強硬テアリマシテ殆ト最初ノ原案トモ申スヘキ六月二十一日案ヲ固執シテ一歩モ歩ミ寄リヲ示スニ至ラヌ次第テアリマス最近前内閣成立後ノ話合ニ於キマシテハ米国側ハ相当妥協ノ気持ヲ示シ居ルヤノ観測的報告ハアリマスルカ実質的ニハ何等ノ譲歩ヲ示ササルノミナラス南方軍事施設ノ強化、財政援助、武器供給、軍事使節団ノ派遣等援蒋ノ促進新嘉坡「マニラ」ニ於ケル軍事当局ノ会合ヲ初メトシ「バタヴィア」香港等ニ於テモ頻々トシテ軍事的経済的会談ヲ重ネ対日包囲強化ノ措置行動ハ日ニアマルモノカアリ依然トシテ誠意ノ認ムヘキモノハ殆トナク従ツテ交渉モ遺憾乍ラ此ノ儘テハ急速ニ妥結ノ見込ハ先ツナキモノト断セサルヲ得ナイノテアリマス而シテ六月二十一日案ナルモノヲ仔細ニ検討致シマスルニ中ニハ帝国ニ於テ受諾シ差支ヘ無キ点モナイ訳テハアリマセヌカ之ヲ全般的ニ観察致シマスレハ支那事変ノ目的ヲ阻害シ他方九国条約ノ再確認トナリ実ニ満州事変以来多大ノ犠牲ヲ払ヒ遂行シ来リマシタ帝国ノ政策ヲ逆転セシメ延テハ東亜ニ於ケル新秩序建設ノ針路ヲ遮断シ同地域ニ於ケル帝国ノ指導的地位ニ動揺ヲ来ス懸念大ナルモノカ御座ヒマス

四、之ヲ要シマスルニ現下ノ国際情勢ハ東亜ニ於テハ英米ノ援蒋政策ト所謂英米蘭蒋政権一体ノ対日包囲陣攻勢トハ逐次強化セラレ又蘇連政権モ英米ノ支援ニ依テ漸次極東方面ニ其ノ余勢ヲ張ラントスル可能性モアリマシテ為

ニ帝国ノ意図スル事変ノ解決ト東亜新秩序ノ建設トハ共ニ其ノ根底ヲ脅カサレントスル虞ナシト致シマセヌ尚又欧州ノ戦局ハ独伊カ大陸制覇ヲ為シ遂ケ第一段ノ目的ヲ達成シ得ルトスルモ全局ノ収拾又急速ニ期待シ得ス長期戦ノ様相ヲ呈シマスルト共ニ独伊ノ帝国ニ対スル協力ハ実際ニ於テ多キヲ期待シ得サル実情ニ在リト申サナケレハナリマセヌ

惟フニ形勢ハ逐日急迫ヲ告ケツツアリマスルカ帝国政府ニ於キマシテハ出来得ル限リ米英ト国交調整ヲ希望スルノハ勿論テアリマスル為メ日米交渉ハ之ヲ継続スルコトト致シ度イノテアリマスカ同交渉ハ今後時間的ニモ著シク制約ヲ蒙リ居リ従ツテ遺憾乍ラ其ノ間外交的施策ノ余地ニ乏シイノテアリマス且亦日米了解案成立ノ際ニモ米国側ノ国内手続上ノ問題モアリ交渉妥結ハ焦眉ノ急ヲ要シマスルノテ極メテ困難ナル状況ノ下ニ折衝ヲ致サネハナラス旁々其ノ間満成立ヲ期待シ得ル程度小ナルハ甚タ遺憾テアリマス併シ帝国政府トシマシテハ此ノ際努力ヲ傾注シテ本交渉ノ急速妥結ニ努ムル次第テアリマシテ茲ニ帝国ノ名誉ト自衛トヲ確保シ得ル限度ヲ堅持スル別紙二案（右参考）ヲ以テ交渉ヲ為シタイ

297

昭和16年11月5日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

四囲の状況により二五日迄には調印すべき旨訓令

次第テアリマス即チ第一案ハ九月二十五日案中従来懸案トナツテ居リマシタ(一)支那ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵(二)日独伊三国条約ノ解釈及履行及(三)国際通商ノ無差別原則ニ関シマシテ米側ノ希望ヲ斟酌シ可能ナル限リ之ニ歩ミ寄リタルモノテアリマス又第二案ノ内容ハ大体南西太平洋地域ニ武力的進出ヲ為ササルコト及同地域ニ於ケル物資獲得ニ関スル協力ヲ相互ニ約スルコト米側カ日支和平ヲ妨碍セサルコト資金凍結令ノ相互解除等ヲ取極メタモノテアリマス最後ニ付言致シ度イコトハ本交渉成立ノ際ハ帝国政府カ執リマシタル非常措置ハ何レモ当然之ヲ旧ニ復スヘキモノトノ了解ニ基キマシテ折衝ニ臨マントスルコトテ御座ヒマス

尚不幸ニシテ本交渉妥結ヲ見サル際ハ帝国ハ独伊両国トノ協力関係ヲ益々緊密ナラシメ各種機宜ノ措置ヲ講シ万違算ナキヲ期スル所存テアリマス

298

昭和16年11月5日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国大統領との会見不公表としたき旨請訓

ワシントン　11月5日後発
本　省　11月6日前着

第一〇三七号（極秘、館長符号）

御訓電全部拝受充分検討ノ上微力ノ最善ヲ尽クス所存本日早速「ハル」ヲ通シ大統領ニ会見申込ノ筈（時日決定次第電報ス）ニテ本使トシテハ右会見ノ事実モ出来ル丈ケ極秘トシ置クコト可然ト存スルモ本省側御意向為念御回電相煩度シ若シ公式会見トスルコト可然トノ御意見ナルニ於テハ右発表振ニ付テモ御気付ノ点併セテ御回電ヲ請フ

299

昭和16年11月5日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

新聞指導方要請

ワシントン　11月5日後発
本　省　11月6日前着

第一〇四〇号（極秘、館長符号）

貴電第七三五号(五)ニ関シ

最近ノ東京通信ハ当方面一般ニ日本政府ノ通信機関ト見ラレオル同盟及外務省機関紙トシテ報セラレ居ル「タイムス、アドヴァータイザー」ハ十一月十五日ヲ以テ本交渉ノ「デッドライン」ナリトカ日本側ノ要求ハ斯ク〳〵ノ条件（七ヶ条ヲ掲ケオレリ）ナリトカ盛ンニ宣伝シオル旨伝ヘオル処右ハ本交渉ヲ我方ノ有利ニ導カントスル善意ニ出ツルモノカトモ一応推察セラルルモ右ハ冒頭貴電ノ御趣旨ニ反スルノミナラス時局機微ナル折柄米国民ノ心理ハ右様強カリ又ハ威嚇ニ依リ反発乃至硬化スルモノナルコト御承知ノ通ナルノミナラス反ツテ米側ニ足下ヲ見ラルル惧アリ我方ニ於

relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, provided that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

(別　電二)

ワシントン　11月5日後発
本省　11月6日後着

第一〇四五号（極秘、館長符号）

With regard to term "self-defense" the Japanese Government desires to make it clear that it has no intention of placing too liberal an interpretation on the term that will lead to an abuse of that right.

(別　電三)

ワシントン　11月5日後発
本省　11月6日後着

第一〇四六号（極秘、館長符号）

(A)　Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof :

With regard to the Japanese forces that have been despatched to China in connection with the China Affair, those forces in certain areas in North China and Mengoliang (Inner Mongolia) as well as in Hainan-tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain necessary period of time after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as peace is restored between Japan and China. And the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China, and will be completed within two years after effective maintenance of peace and order is re-established.

(B)　Stationing of Japanese forces in French Indo-China and the withdrawal thereof :

The Japanese Government undertakes to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of French Indo-China. The Japanese forces at present stationed there will be withdrawn as soon as the China Affair is settled or a just

peace is established in East Asia.

六　「甲案」による交渉

解シ居レリ尚陸海軍当局ニ於テモ同大使特派ノ趣旨ヲ了得シ居ラス唯最近ノ当地情勢ヲ貴大使ニ親シク伝達等々交渉進メノ通リ既ニ貴使ヘ電報セル以外ノ新訓令等ハ何等携行セシメス迅速妥結ニ導カシメントスルニ在リ当方ニ於テハ外部ニ対シテハ交渉ノ急速成立ヲ必要トスル ニ鑑ミ貴大使ヲ最後ノ段階ニ於テ貴大使ヲ援助シ以テ難局面ノ打開ニ協力援助セシムル為メ同大使ヲ急派セルモノナルコトヲ説明スルト共ニ右ノ次第ハ在京英米大使ニモ篤ト説明シ（来栖大使モ出発前在京米国大使ト懇談セリ）両大使共充分之ヲ了

303　昭和16年11月6日　在東郷米国野務村大臣より宛（電報）

来栖大使派遣についての事情説明

本省　11月6日後7時発

第七三九号（大至急、館長符号）

往電第七三〇号ニ関シ

来栖大使ヲ特ニ急派セルハ前顕往電所載理由ノ外今次交渉ニ対スル帝国政府ノ誠意ヲ示スモノナルカ同大使ハ前電申進メノ通リ既ニ貴使ヘ電報セル以外ノ新訓令等ハ何等携行シ居ラス唯最近ノ当地情勢ヲ貴大使ニ親シク伝達等々交渉最後ノ段階ニ於テ貴大使ヲ援助シ以テ難局面ノ打開ニ協力部ニ対シテハ交渉ノ急速成立ヲ必要トスル ニ鑑ミ貴大使ヲ援助セシムル為メ同大使ヲ急派セルモノナルコトヲ説明スルト共ニ右ノ次第ハ在京英米大使ニモ篤ト説明シ（来栖大使モ出発前在京米国大使ト懇談セリ）両大使共充分之ヲ了解シ居レリ尚陸海軍当局ニ於テモ同大使特派ノ趣旨ヲ了得シ同大使ノ労ヲ多トシ居ル次第ナリ右御含ミノ上米政府当局新聞其他ニ対シ可然応酬アリ度ク為念

304　昭和16年11月6日　在東郷米国野務村大臣より宛（電報）

米国大統領との会見不公表の旨訓令

本省　11月6日後6時45分発

第七四一号（大至急、館長符号）

貴電第一〇三七号ニ関シ

貴大使大統領会見ニ付テハ情勢機微ヲ極ムル此際右カ新聞ノ憶測的報道ニ依リ不測ノ悪影響ヲ受クルカ如キハ甚タ遺憾ナルニ付御申越ノ通リ会見内容ハ勿論会見セル事実ニ付テモ可成発表ヲ避クルコト可ナリト思考スルニヨリ米側ニ於テ不発表トスルニ於テハ当方モ勿論之ヲ厳秘ニ付スベシ尚今後貴大使ノ米当局トノ接触ニ関シテハ同様ノ理由ニ依リ出来得ル限リ「パブリシティ」ヲ回避スル様致サレ度シ

本提言ヲ為セル以上ハ蔣側ト事前ニ一応ノ話合ヲ遂ケタルヘキハ想像ニ難カラサル所ニシテ従テ米国政府ノ周旋ニ依リテ日支直接交渉開始セラルルニ於テハ米国政府ハ我方ニ対シテモ相当ノ誠意ヲ示スヘク右交渉ニ対シテハ妨碍的態度ニ出テサルヘシト期待セラル従テ我方ハ其当初ヨリノ主張ノ通リ支那事変ヲ米国ノ妨碍ナク日支両国間ノ直接交渉ニ依リ解決スル機会ヲ得ルモノニシテ我方トシテハ頗ル有利ナル情勢トナル次第ナリ

三、米国カ右周旋ヲ行フ際ト雖モ日支交渉ハ我駐兵要求ノ為ニ容易ニ妥結ニ至ラサルヘシトノ観方アリ得ヘキモ米国カ蔣側ニ対シ和平ヲ勧告セルコトニ依リ蔣政権ノ抗日意識ハ相当減退シ其結果駐兵問題等ニ付テモ何等カノ妥協ニ達スルコト必シモ困難ナラサルニ至ル可能性アリ且亦日米間ノ話合如何ニ依リテハ米国ハ表面上ハ兎ニ角裏面ニ於テハ蔣側ニ対シ我和平条件ノ受諾ヲ勧奨スルコトモ絶無トハ云ヒ難カルヘク何レニセヨ帝国政府トシテハ実質的ニハ米国ヲ利用シツツ形式上ニハ外国政府ノ介入ヲ認メスシテ（日米了解案ニ於テハ公然米国政府ノ介入ヲ容認セルモノニシテ此点ハ東亜ノ指導者タル帝国ノ地位ニ面白カラサル影響アリテ国内的ニモ反対ヲ予想セラル）支那事変ヲ独力処理スルノ建前ヲ維持シ得ル次第ナリ

四、試ニ日米交渉開始以前ノ状態ト比較スレハ帝国ノ地位ハ頗ル有利ナリ即一方ニ於テハ日米関係改善セラレ（通商関係恢復、南方資源獲得等ハ我方ノ利益トナルヘシ）他方ニ於テハ米国（従テ英蘇）ノ妨碍ナクシテ日支直接交渉ニ依リ日支和平ヲ恢復セシメ得ル訳合ナリ而シテ大綱的ノ話合ナラハ比較的短時日ノ間ニ成立ノ見込アリ

五、惟フニ「ハル」提案ハ米国トシテモ窮通ノ手段トシテ想到セルモノニシテ之ニ依リ複雑至難ナル支那問題ヲ今次交渉ヨリ一応分離除外シ以テ日米交渉ヲ急速成立セシメントスルニアルヘク我方カ之ヲ応諾セサル場合ハ日米交渉ハ再ヒ支那問題ニテ行詰ル公算甚大ニシテ而モ此ノ行詰リハ打開殆ト不可能ナルヘク其結果ハ必然日米関係ノ破綻ヲ招来スヘシ若シ然ラハ此際ハ一応米国政府ノ誠意ニ信頼シ「ハル」提案ノ「ライン」ニテ日支直接商議ヲ試ミルコト遙ニ得策ナルヘシ

六、「ハル」提案ヲ利用スル際ハ支那問題以外ノ妥結事項ハ日支交渉トハ無関係ニ日米間ニ直ニ調印実施セシムルコト勿論ノ義ナリトス

七、悪意的解釈ヲスレハ米国政府ハ我駐兵要求ニ依リ日支直接交渉カ容易ニ成立セサルヘキヲ見越シ（乃至蔣側ヲ使嗾シテ交渉妥結ヲ故意ニ妨碍シ）支那問題ヲ日支間ノ話合ニ委ヌルコトニ依リ日米交渉ヲ遷延セシメ其決裂ノ責任ヲ日本側ニ転嫁セントスル底意ヲ有スルモノナリト観察スルコトモ不可能ニアラス依テ「ハル」提案ニ応スルニ際シテハ此点ヲ充分警戒シツツ本提案ハ之ヲ日米交渉トハ如何ナル関係ニ於テ処理セントスルモノナリヤ又其具体的手続如何等詳細ヲ明瞭ニスル必要アリ

〰〰〰

為ニ凡有ル努力ヲ傾倒セントスルモノナルコトヲ説明セル後従来ノ交渉経過ヲ研究シ痛感スルハ米国側ノ現実ノ事態ニ対スル認識不充分且不徹底ナルコトナリ「ハル」長官ハ日本ノ安定勢力タル地位ヲ認ムル旨ヲ言明シ居ルモ東亜ノ現実ノ事態及日本カ四年半ニ亘リ支那事変ヲ継続シ来レル事実ヲ充分認識セサレハ安定勢力トシテ認メラルルコトトモ矛盾スヘシ我人口ハ激増ノ一途ヲ辿リ今ヤ一億ニ垂ントスル処其ノ生存ニ必要ナル物資ヲ確保スルハ緊急事ニ属ス他方日米交渉ハ開始以来六ケ月ヲ経タルカ其間我方ハ出来得ル限リ米側主張ニ歩ミ寄リタルニ拘ラス米側ハ当初ノ原案ヲ固執シ一歩モ譲ラス或点ニ於テハ却ツテ逆転シ居リ我方ニ於テハ米国政府ノ誠意ノ程度ヲ疑フモノモアル有様ニテ従ツテ此上ノ遷延ハ国民感情モ之ヲ許ササル所ナルカ議会モ近ク召集セラルヘク事態極メテ切迫シツツアリ一日モ速カニ交渉成立ノ必要ニ迫ラレ居ル次第ナリ米国政府ニ於テモ此点ニ充分考慮ヲ払ハレ大局的見地ヨリ問題ヲ一挙ニ解決スルコトトセラレ度ク本大臣ハ右ノ他ニハ難局打開ノ途ナシト信スルモノナリト述ヘ次テ往電第七二六号甲案英文ヲ提示シ右ハ政府ニ於テ慎重審議ノ結果難キヲ忍ヒテ到達セル最大限ノ譲歩ニシテ此上譲歩ノ余地絶無ナル処(一)欧州戦争ニ対スル両国ノ態度ニ関シテハ我九月二十五日案ニ記載セル所ヲ以テ既ニ妥結シ居ルモノト了解ス又(二)通商無差別待遇ニ関シテハ今次提案ヲ以テ米側ノ希望ハ充分尽サレ居ルモノト考フ(三)従来ノ難関タリシ駐兵撤兵問題ニ付テハ今次提案ハ我方ニ於テ国内的ニ多大ノ困難アリタルニ拘ラス最大限ノ譲歩ヲ敢テセルモノニテ此点ハ米側モ充分了解シ得ル所ナルヘシト確信ストノ趣旨ノ説明ヲ加ヘ之ヲ以テ交渉急速妥結アリ度キ旨ヲ強ク申入レ尚今次交渉ニ包含セラルル事項中ニハ英国ノ利益ニ重大ナル関係アル事項少カラサルニ鑑ミ日米交渉成立ト同時ニ日英間ニモ調印ノ運ヒトナルコト必要ナル処米国政府ニ於テ右ヲ引受ケラルルコトヲ希望スル旨ヲ付言セリ米国大使ハ右ニ対シ本国政府ノ訓令ナキ趣ヲ以テ意ヲ留保シ唯思付トシテ同大使ニ於テモ当方実情ハ詳細電報シ居ルニ付米国政府ハ充分極東事態ノ認識ヲ有スル筈ナルコト安定勢力ノ観念ハ多様ニ解セラルルコト物資補給問題ハ今次交渉ニ於テ現ニ検討シ居ル所ニシテ日本ハ平和的ニ必要物資補給ヲ確保スル方法アルヘキナリトノ趣旨ヲ述ヘタルニ付本大臣ハ同大使ノ努力ハ多トスルモ米国政府ノ認識ハ未タ充分トハ思ハレス安定勢力ノ観念ハ常識的ニハ大体ノ通念アリト思考ス又資源問題ニ付テハ最近ノ事態ヲ例示スレハ米側ノ資源凍結措置ニ依リ対日原料補給杜絶セラレ居ル処此種ノ経済圧迫ハ武力ヲ以テスル脅威ヨリモ猶深刻ナル結果トモナルコトアリ日本国民ハ遂ニハ猛然トシテ自衛的措置ヲ採ルノ已ヲ得サルカ如キ感ヲ受クルモ致シ方ナキ儀トモナリ得ヘキニ付此辺ノ事情ハ米側ニ於テモ篤ト考慮ノ要アリ又支那問題ニ付テハ四年半ニ亘リ敢テセル犠牲ノ成果ヲ無視セラルルカ如キ条件ノ甘受ハ日本トシテハ自殺ニ等シキヲ以テ之又日本国民ハ不可能ト思考スルヘシトノ趣旨ヲ答ヘ置ケリ

右応答ニ際シ、「ド」参事官ハ口ヲ挟ミ侵略ノ成果ヲ認ムル能ハストノ意味合ヲ述ヘタルニ付帝国ハ侵略戦争ヲ行ヒ居レリトハ思考セス従テ侵略ノ成果ナル問題ハ起リ得ス加之自衛権発動ニ依ル軍事行動ハ不戦条約ニモ例外トセラレ居ル筈ナリ実ハ自衛権ノ解釈ニ関シテハ輿論ハ最近ノ事例ニ徴スルモ米側ノ方カ之ヲ不当ニ拡大スル傾向アリト見ルモノアリ従ツテ我方ヨリ米国政府ニ対シ自制方申入然ル可キ筋合ナルカ兎ニ角本日ノ所ハ右ノ議論ニ立入ルコトハ差控フヘシト述ヘ反駁シ置キタリ

325

昭和16年11月10日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

対日戦争に関する米国閣僚の内話について

ワシントン　11月10日後発
本　省　11月11日前着

第一〇六六号（大至急、極秘、館長符号）

一、「ムーア」ヲシテ「トーマス」（上院外交委員「ハル」ト懇意）ニ接近セシメタル処其ノ報告ノ要旨ハ「米国ハ『ブラフ』スルニアラス日本カ更ニ侵略ヲ為スナラハ日本ト戦フヘシ米国民ハ精神的ニ準備成リ海軍ハ準備成レリ（「レディ・フウォア・アクション」）」ト言フニ帰着ス

二、昨日曜晩一閣僚ハ左右ノ者ヲ斥ケ本使ニ対シ真剣ニ申スニハ神ニ誓ヒ懇親ノ間柄ナルカ故君限リニ告クル次第ナリト前置シ米政府ハ日本カ近日発動スル確実ナル情報ヲ握リ居リ月曜本使ノ大統領訪問乃至ハ来栖ノ来米ノ如キ何等大局ニ影響スルモノニアラスト言フカ如ク米政府ハ認メツツアル趣ヲ申スヲ以テ本使ハ日本国民ハ「フ

329　昭和16年11月11日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

事態緊急を要するをもって「甲案」承諾の見込みおよび今後の交渉見通しにつき照会

本　省　11月11日後8時発

第七六二号（大至急、館長符号）
very urgent

貴電第一〇六九号ニ関シ

右会談ノ調子ヨリ観ルニ米国ニ於テハ未タ事態ノ急迫セル事実ヲ充分認識シ居ラサルヤニ認メラルル処往電第七三六号ノ期日ハ現下ノ情勢上絶対ニ動カシ得サル「デッドライン」ニシテ交渉ハ是非共右期日頃迄ニ妥結セシムルコト必要ナリ尚帝国議会モ十五日開会（十七日議事開始）ノ筈ニシテ政府トシテモ議会ニ臨ムニ際シテハ交渉前途ニ付キ一応ノ見透ヲ有セサルヘカラス就テハ情勢逐日緊迫シ余日幾許モナキニ鑑ミ御苦心ノ程ハ深ク諒トスルモ此際国務長官等ニ対シ突込ミタル話合ヲ行ヒ米側態度ヲ最短期間内ニ明確ナラシムルト共ニ我最後案ニ急速同意セシムル様最善ノ努力ヲ尽サレタシ

330　昭和16年11月11日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

駐日独国大使の対米申入れ要望に対する対応について

本　省　11月11日後7時35分発

第七六三号（館長符号）
往電第六七一号ニ関シ

本件対米申入レニ関シテハ其後二回ニ亘リ独逸側ヨリ督促アリタルカ十一月六日本大臣ヨリ在京独逸大使ニ対シ本件ハ日米間ノ一般関係上ヨリモ篤ト考慮ノ必要アル処帝国カ毅然タル態度ヲ採ル場合ニ於テハ本件対米申入レヲ為スヨリモ結果ニ於テ寧ロ強キ場合モアリ得ヘク単ナル申入レハ現在ノ情勢ニ於テハ効果甚タ疑問ナリト考フル旨説明シ置ケリ

尚交渉成否ニ関スル貴大使ノ御見込至急承知シタキ処我最後訓令甲案承諾ノ見込ト共ニ至急回電相成ル様致度シ

331　昭和16年11月11日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

三国同盟問題は未決の旨確認について

ワシントン　11月11日後発

本　省　11月12日前着

第一〇七二号（極秘、館長符号）

貴電第七二六号甲案説明ノ㈡三国条約ノ問題ニ付米側ハ「我方提案ニテ大体満足シ居ルヤノ趣ナルニ付」トアリ又貴電第七五七号米国大使ヘノ御説明中㈠欧州戦争ニ対スル両国ノ態度ニ関シ「我九月二十五日案ニ記載セル所ヲ以テ既ニ妥結シ居ルモノト了解ス」トアル処右ハ殊更ニ当方ノ主張ヲ押付ケントノ駈引ト察セラレ又当方ニテモ其ノ建前ヲ取リ居ル次第ナルカ右ハ未タ妥結ニ達シ居ラサルハ先方十月二日「オーラル・ステートメント」ニテモ明カニシテ当方累次ノ電報中ニハ往電第九九五号若杉「ウェルズ」会談後段ニ三国同盟義務ニ付「此ノ問題ハ米側ニテモ調整ノ可能性アルカ如キ口吻ヲ洩ラシ」トアルノミニテ貴電第七二〇号ノ御質問ニ対シテモ往電第一〇二五号ノ通リ先方ノ交換公文案ニ付テモ対立ノ儘推移シ居ル旨報告シアル次第ニ付此ノ点誤解ナキ様為念申進ス

332　昭和16年11月11日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国国務長官との会談予定について

ワシントン　11月11日後発

本　省　11月12日前着

第一〇七四号（大至急、極秘、館長符号）
貴電第七六二号ニ関シ

当方ニ於テハ大統領トノ会談後直ニ「ハル」ニ対シ時局切迫シ居ルヲ以テ同夜又ハ今朝会見ノ上具体的話ヲ進メタキ旨申入レタルカ先方ニ於テモ我方ニ於テ急ヲ要スルコトハ充分諒承シ居リ現ニ昨日ノ会談後及今十一日休戦記念日ニテ休暇ニモ拘ラス「ハル」ノ許ニ関係者鳩首凝議我方提案ヲ審議シ居ルヲ以テ先方ノ意見固マリタル上明十二日会談スル方却ツテ交渉ヲ促進スルコトトナルヘシト回答アリタル次第ナリ

交渉成否ノ見透シニ付テハ明日会見ノ際突込ミタル先方ノ意向確メタル上申進スヘシ

333

昭和16年11月11日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国は交渉中絶の意向とのタフト上院議員の発言報道について

ワシントン　11月11日後発
本　省　11月12日前着

第一〇七五号

十月ノ「チャーチル」演説ハ太平洋問題ヲ繞リ議会方面ニ多大ノ反響ヲ及ホシタルカAP報ニ依レハ「タフト」上院議員ハ十一日新聞記者ニ対シ秘密情報ニ依ルモノトシ日本カ日米妥協ノ為北支ヲ除ク他ノ地方ヨリノ撤兵ヲ用意セルニモ拘ラス大統領ハ日本カ浦潮ヲ攻撃セストノ誓約ヲ与ヘサルヲ理由ニ東京政府ノ平和提唱ヲ拒絶日米交渉ヲ中絶セシムルニ至レル旨ヲ発表シ太平洋平和確保ニ対スル「ル」ノ誠意無キコトヲ攻撃セリ

334

昭和16年11月12日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

米国は交渉を予備的なものと了承している旨の駐日英国大使の談話について

付記　駐日英国大使より手交のオーラル・ステートメント

本　省　11月12日前1時発

第七六四号（緊急、館長符号）

very urgent

一、十一日他用ヲ以テ来訪ノ際在京英国大使ハ過日ノ貴大臣ノ御話（往電第七二三号ノ二）ヲ本国政府ニ報告セル処政府ヨリ「英国政府ハ華府ニ於ケル話合ノ詳細ヲ承知セサルモ右ノ成功ハ日英ノ利益ナルニ依リ之ヲ熱望ス然レトモ原則樹立ニ付キ何等カノ討議ノ基礎カ先ツ以テ成立セサレハ進ンテ交渉ニ入ルノ必要ヲ認メス其間ノ話合ハ米国政府ニ委ネ差支ナシト考ヘ居レリ尤モ現実ノ交渉可能トナラハ米国政府ハ直ニ英国政府ト協議スルコトトナリ居ルニ付キ其際ハ日米政府ト共ニ共通問題ノ解決ニ欣然協力スヘシ」トノ趣旨ヲ申越セリト述ヘタリ

二、依テ本大臣ハ日米交渉中ニハ英国ニ重大利害関係アル事項アルヲ以テ日米間合意成立ノ際ハ之ト同時ニ英国関係事項ニ付キ日英間ニモ合意成立シ同時調印ノ運ヒトナルコト必要ナルヲ以テ米国政府ニ対シ右様取計ヒ方ヲ希望シ置キタリト述ヘタル処同大使ハ日米交渉ノ真相ハ知ラサルモ今猶予備的会談ノ域ヲ出テサルモノト了解シ居レリト答ヘタルニ付本大臣ハ過去ニ於テハ兎ニ角現在ハ交渉ノ本質ヨリ観ルモ既ニ本格的交渉トナリ居リ而モ今ヤ帝国政府ノ最後的対案提示ヲ以テ最後ノ段階ニ入リタル状態ニシテ右ノ次第ハ過日モ米国側ニ話置ケリト述ヘ英国首相ハ倫敦市長午餐会ノ演説ニテ日米交渉ノ経過ニ付キテハ熟知セサルモ日本ニ対シ警告セムトストテ種々述ヘ居ルモ英国トシテハ警告ヲ為スヨリモ其レ以前ニ斯カル重要交渉ノ内容ヲ詳ニシテ之カ成立ニ協力スル方カ妥当ナラスヤ尤モ英国カ現在ノ段階ニ於テ日米交渉ニ関与スルヤ否ヤハ英米間ノ関係モアリ特ニ本大臣ヨリ何等ノ提議ヲスル意向ナシ帝国政府ハ交渉急速妥結ノ為メ最大限ノ譲歩ヲ敢テシタル最後案ヲ提示セル次第ニテ米側ニモ多分此上ノ反対ナカルヘシト思ヒ居ル処米国政府カ右ヲ受諾セハ一週間乃至十日以内ニモ調印可能ナルヘク又不幸ニシテ之ヲ拒否セハ交渉継続ノ可能性ナキ訳合ナリ我国内情勢ハ交渉此上ノ遷延ヲ絶対ニ許サス本大臣ハ日英、日米関係ノ危局ヲ回避スル為メ目下畢生ノ努力ヲ傾注シ居ルモノニシテ国内一部ニハ交渉無用論サヘアリシニ拘ラス之ヲ制シテ交渉継続ニ決定セシメタル経緯アリ従ツテ此上交渉ヲ遷延セシムルコトハ不可能ニシテ且無意味ノ結果トナルヘシ英米ノ態度如何ニ依リテハ迅速妥結ノ方法モアル次第ナレハ貴国政府ニ於テモ此辺ノ事情ヲ充分ニ考量シ交渉急速成立ニ尽力アリ度シト述ヘテ事態ノ急迫セル所以ヲ縷述シタルニ同大使ハ右ヲ傾聴シ初メテ事態ノ真ニ逼迫セルヲ痛感セルモノノ如ク右ヲ早速政府ニ電報スヘク自分モ局面打開ノ為メ最善ノ努力ヲ試ミルヘシト述ヘ辞去セリ

三、右ノ如ク米国政府ハ今猶英国政府ニ対シ今次交渉ハ未タ予備的意見交換ノ域ヲ出テサルモノナルヤニ説明シ居ルモノト認メラルル処右ハ（貴電第一〇七〇号）「ルーズヴェルト」大統領ノ言（本件予備的会談カ交渉ノ基礎タルヘキ良好ノ結果ヲ挙ケンコトヲ希望ス云々）ニ徴スル

モ明白ニシテ交渉既ニ最後的段階ニ入リ事態逐日緊迫ヲ加ヘツツアル現在米国政府カ依然トシテ斯カル悠長緩慢ナル態度ヲ持スルハ当方トシテ頗ル意外且遺憾トスル所ナリ就テハ貴大使ハ屢次訓令ノ趣旨ヲ体シ更ニ米側ヲ啓蒙シ其猛省ヲ促シ速カニ本件妥結ニ意ヲ決セシムル様御奮闘アランコトヲ切望ス

（付　記）

Oral

Although His Majesty's Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taking place, they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government with a view to a general settlement in the Far East. They believe such a settlement to be in the best interests of Great Britain and of Japan herself and it is their earnest desire that this should be achieved. It cannot be expected, however, that the giving should be all on our side and my Government see no urgency in entering upon negotiations unless some basis of discussion can be agreed upon in advance for establishing the principles on which the agreement will be sought. This part of the proceedings my Government are content to leave in the hands of the United States Government who are well aware of their position. Moreover, the United States Government have assured them (and they believe that they have so informed the Japanese Government) that, should actual negotiations become possible, they will at once consult His Majesty's Government. At that point my Government will be very ready to collaborate with the Japanese Government and the United States Government in seeking a solution of our joint problems.

335

昭和16年11月13日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国国務長官との会談要旨報告

別　電　一一月一三日付在米国野村大使より

東郷外務大臣宛第一〇八三号

我が方方針確認に関する米国側文書

二　一一月一三日付在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛第一〇八四号
日支和平交渉に関する米国側文書

付記一　右別電一訳文

二　右別電二訳文

ワシントン　11月13日前発
本　省　11月13日後着

第一〇八七号（極秘、館長符号）

本十二日午後三時ヨリ約一時間半本使若杉帯同「ハル」長官（「バランタイン」同席）ト会見我方提案ニ対スル回答ヲ求メタル処「ハル」ハ別電甲号第一〇八三号及乙号第一〇八四号ヲ提示シ甲号ニ対シ新内閣モ之ヲ確認スルヤ否ヤヲ問合センコトヲ求メ乙号ハ我方ノ求メニ依リ前回会談ノ際言及セル日支和平ニ関スル「サゼスション」ノ意味ヲ説明セルモノナリトテ支那問題ニモ他ノ諸問題全体ニ通スル原則行ハレハ妥結可能ナルヘク通商無差別問題ノ如キモ之ト関連シ目下研究中ニテ明後日迄ニハ成案ヲ得ヘシト述ヘタルニ付本使ヨリ右「サゼスション」ト本件会談トノ関係ニ付若シ日支間ニ於テ駐兵問題ノ如キ難点ニ関シ合意成立セサル場合ニハ日米交渉ノ全体モ纏マラサル趣旨ナルニ於テハ日米関係ノ鍵モ一ニ支那ノ掌中ニ在ル結果トナリ不都合ナラスヤ夫レトモ日支ノ関係ハ日支ニ委セ其ノ余ノ問題ニ付日米間ニ合意可能ナル趣旨ナリヤト質シタルカ「ハル」ハ漠然ト一般的原則ヲ支那ニモ適用スレハ合意可能ナルヘキ旨ヲ答ヘ尚本会談ニ付テハ支那ニハ未タ内示シ居ラサルモ関係国タル英、蘭ニ対シテハ大体ノ筋ヲ話シ居ルヲ以テ交渉ノ基礎成立セハ米ト同時ニ調印可能ト信スル旨（但シ保障ストハ言ヒ兼ヌル旨付言）ヲ述ヘタルカ傍ヨリ「バランタイン」ハ六月二十一日米案ニモ米国ノ主張シ来レル原則ト反スル条件ヲ他国ニ対シ行フコトニ関与スルヲ得サル旨ヲ掲ケ居ル次第ヲ付言セルカ若杉ヨリ乙号「サゼスション」ノ趣旨ハ大イニ歓迎スル所ナルモ如何シテ支那ヲシテ此ノ趣旨ヲ「プレッジ」セシムル方法ニ付今少シク具体的ニ承知シタク或ハ「ハル」長官ハ之ヲ日支直接交渉ニ委ネントスルノ意ナリヤ又ハ米ニ於テ之ヲ支那ヨリ取付ケ日本ニ取次カントセラルル意向ナリヤ又ハ日米支三国会談ニ依



提出スル案）別電第七七三号ノ通、英文追電ス

（別　電）

本　省　11月14日後8時30分発

第七七三号（館長符号）

一、二、三、四ハ往電第七二七号ノ通リ

五、日本国政府ハ日支間和平成立スルカ又ハ太平洋地域ニ於ケル公正ナル平和確立スル上ハ現ニ仏領印度支那ニ派遣セラレ居ル日本軍隊ヲ撤退スベキ旨約束ス

六、日本国政府ハ国際通商関係ニ於ケル無差別待遇ノ原則カ全世界ニ適用セラルルモノナルニ於テハ太平洋全地域即支那ニ於テモ本原則ノ行ハルルコトヲ承認ス

七、両国政府ハ世界平和ノ招来ヲ共同ノ目標トシテ適当ナル時期至ル時ハ相協力シテ世界平和ノ速ナル克服ニ努力スベシ世界平和完成前ニ於ケル事態ノ諸発展ニ対シテハ日米両国政府ハ防護上自衛ノ見地ヨリ行動スベク又米国ノ欧州戦参入ノ場合ニ於ケル日本国独逸国及伊太利国間ニ三国条約ニ対スル日本国ノ解釈及之ニ伴フ義務履行ハ専ラ自主的ニ行ハルベシ

（七、八九月二十五日我方案第二条ト同様ニテ甲案ニ前段ノ趣旨ハ入リ居ラス右為念）

144

357　昭和16年11月15日　在東米郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛（電報）

「乙案」の英訳文通報

別　電　一一月一五日付東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛第七八〇号

「乙案」英訳文

本　省　11月15日後9時発

第七七九号（館長符号）

往電第七二七号ニ関シ

乙案英訳文別電第七八〇号ノ通リ

（別　電）

本　省　11月15日後9時発

第七八〇号（館長符号）

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific Area.

2. The Governments of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

3. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

6. The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

7. Both Governments maintain it their common aim to bring about the peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of the world peace.

With regard to the developments of the situation prior to the restoration of the world peace, the Governments of Japan and the United States will be guided in their conducts by considerations of protection and self-defense ; and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy,

and would likewise determine what actions mitht be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.

358 昭和16年11月15日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

来栖大使へ交渉督促方訓令

本　省　11月15日後11時20分発

第七八一号（館長符号）

urgent

来栖大使へ

長途ノ飛行旅行ニテ御疲労ノコトト存ス今回挺身難局ニ赴カレタルコト単リ本大臣ノミナラス政府部内全般亦等シク感謝スル所ナリ今次交渉ハ難事中ノ難事トモ申スヘキ処其成否ハ直ニ国運ノ消長ニ影響スルモノナルヲ以テ当方ノ事情ハ野村大使ニ篤ト御話シノ上同大使ニ御協力ノ上交渉ヲ急速妥結ニ導ク様最善ヲ尽サレンコトヲ切望ス

我方最後案提示後ニ於テモ米国政府ノ態度ハ依然頗ル緩慢ヲ極メ居リ或ハ故意ニ遷延ヲ策シ居ルニアラスヤトノ疑惑ヲ有スルモノモ有之次第ナルカ此期ニ及ヒテ交渉局面ノ渋滞ヲ来サハ情勢逐日緊迫ヲ加ヘツツアルヲ以テ単ニ時ノ関係ヨリスルモ危局ノ収拾ハ絶望トナルヘシ就テハ野村大使宛屢次訓電ニ依リ委曲御了承ノ上米側ヲシテ現下ノ事態ニ鑑ミ交渉妥結カ焦眉ノ急ヲ要スル緊喫事ナルコトヲ悟ラシメ以テ太平洋平和確保ノ為我方ト協調セシムル様御努力相煩度シ

尚乙案ハ貴大使出発前ノ御希望モアリ旁々今尚米側ヘ提示方差控ヘ居レルモ其内早目ニ提出スルコト可然ト存シ居ル次第ナリ

359 昭和16年11月16日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

来栖大使交渉参加に関する米国紙記事について

ワシントン　11月16日後発
本　省　11月17日前着

第一一〇九号（館長符号扱）

一、(1)十六日紐育「ヘラルド・トリビューン」ハ日米交渉ニ関スル「フライシャー」ノ長文ノ記事ヲ掲載シ居ル処

「フ」ハ国務省筋ニ能ク連絡ヲ有シ居ルコトハ屢次往電ノ通リニシテ右記事モ大体事実ニ符号シ居ル処（交渉経過ニ関スル記事内容略）特記スヘキ点為念

来栖大使ハ華府ニ於ケル交渉開始ト共ニ日米間ニ於ケル論議ノ中心ハ欧州戦争ニ対スル日本ノ態度如何ニアルコトヲ発見スヘク米国政府ハ又来栖大使ヨリ果シテ日本カ事実上枢軸側ニ立チテ行動スルカ又ハ米国トノ友好関係ヲ復活シ枢軸ヨリ離脱スル決心ヲ有スルカノ点ニ付東条新内閣ノ政策ヲ聴カント欲スヘシ「ロ」大統領ハ日米交渉ノ進展ニ特別ノ関心ヲ払ヒ居リ了解成立不可能ト屢伝ヘラレタルニ拘ラス交渉ヲ継続セシメタル等ノ責任者ナルカ確カナル筋ノ伝フル所ニ依レハ大統領ノ交渉継続ニ対スル強キ希望無カリセハ既ニ交渉ハ決裂セシナリ

(2)「ロ」大統領ハ近衛「メッセーヂ」ノ来タコトニ対シ大イニ嬉ヘリト伝ヘラレタルモ日本カ「ハル」ノ主要原則ナルモノヲ「ナローダウン」シタル為両者ノ交渉成立見込ハ乏シクナリ又国家主義易幟サヘ続キ東条内閣ノ出現ニ依リ協定成立ノ見込ハ事実上消滅スルニ立至レリ

「ハル」ノ目的ハ太平洋ノ平和ヲ図リ日米関係ヲ長ク平常化スルニアリタルモ交渉ノ進行ニ従テ両国間ノ溝益々深クナリ交渉当事者ヲシテ交渉ノ鍵ハ小範囲ノ協定妥結ヲ行ヒ眼前緊張緩和ヲ計ルコト明カニナリタリ

二、「ハル」長官カ本使ニ対シ前後二回三国同盟ト日本トノ関係ニ付執拗ニ語レル経緯ハ往電ヲ以テ御承知ノ通リニシテ又十三日「フライシャー」ハ寺崎ニ対シ国務省ハ来栖大使カ日本ノ三国同盟ニ対スル態度緩和ニ関スル何等カノ土産物ヲ持参セラルルニ非スヤトノ強キ希望的観測ヲ有スル旨語リタル趣ナリ

360 昭和16年11月17日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

国務省は三国同盟と中国問題を交渉の難点としているとの情報について

ワシントン　11月17日後発
本　省　11月18日後着

第一一一四号

ニテ」ナル条件ハ三国条約問題ヲ当然予想シ居ルモノト察セラレ決シテ日本カ南部仏印ヨリ撤兵シ米国ハ凍結令前ノ状態ニ還ルト云フタケノモノニアラス米国側ニ於テハ相当煩雑ナル条件ヲ持出シ来ル余地アリ他方我国内情勢ハ南部仏印撤兵ヲ条件トシテ単ニ凍結前ノ状態ニ復帰スト云フカ如キ保障ノミニテハ到底現下ノ切迫セル局面ヲ収拾シ難ク少クトモ乙案程度ノ解決案ヲ必要トスル次第ナリ情勢右ノ如ク差迫リ居ルヲ以テ貴電私案ノ如キ程度ノ案ヲ以テ情勢緩和ノ手ヲ打チタル上更ニ話合ヲ進ムルカ如キ余裕ハ絶無ナリ旁々貴大使カ当方ト事前ノ打合セナク貴電私案ヲ提示セラレタルハ国内ノ機微ナル事情ニ顧ミ遺憾トスル所ニシテ却ツテ交渉ノ遷延乃至不成立ニ導クモノト云フノ外ナシ仍而貴使ハ此際右私案ニ対シ当方ヨリ修正訓令ニ接シタリトテ往電第七九九号、第八〇〇号及第八〇一号御参照ノ上次回ノ会見ニ於テ乙案御提示相成度ク尚右ハ帝国政府ノ最終案ニシテ絶対ニ此ノ上譲歩ノ余地無ク右ニテ米側ノ応諾ヲ得サル限リ交渉決裂スルモ致シ方ナキ次第ニ付右篤ト御含ミノ上万善ノ御努力ヲ払ハレ度シ

尚貴電第一一三三号及第一一三四号御来示ノ次第ハアルモ本件交渉ハ当方訓令ノ範囲内ニ於テノミ受諾可能ナルニ付右特ニ申進ス

374

昭和16年11月20日　東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛（電報）

「乙案」提示に際し同案の修正方訓令

別　電　一一月二〇日付東郷外務大臣より在米国野村大使宛第八〇〇号

修正「乙案」の説明

本　省　11月20日前0時30分発

第七九九号（大至急、館長符号）

very urgent

貴電第一〇九六号日米共同宣言案ハ帝国政府ニ於テ受諾ヲ困難トスル点多々アルハ既ニ電報セル通リナル処同電中互恵通商条約ニ関スル「ハル」長官ノ提唱ハ同氏多年ノ主張トシテ一応首肯セラルルモ同時ニ国務省支那専門家達ノ意見モ多分ニ織込マレ居ルモノト察ス而シテ余リ細密ニ渉ル案ヲ一々論議スルニ於テハ到底短時日間（往電第七三六号）ニ妥結ニ達スルコト不可能ト断セサルヲ得ス事茲ニ至リテ

ハ大所高所ヨリスル政治的解決ニヨリ最悪ノ場合ヲ回避スル為メ絶対必要ナル数項目ニ付大至急協定ヲ遂ケ先ツ以テ戦争勃発ノ危険ヲ防止スルコト唯一絶対ノ解決法ト思考セラル

就テハ貴大使ハ往電第七八〇号中ヨリ6（通商無差別）及7（三国条約）ヲ削除シ5ノ第二項トシテ往電第八〇一号ヲ追加セルモノヲ「ハル」長官ニ手交セラレ右ハ従来両国間ノ重要懸案タリシ国際通商上ノ無差別待遇問題、三国条約問題ヲ「ドロップ」シ支那駐兵問題ハ米国側ノ意向ニモ顧ミ之ヲ日支間ノ話合トナシ以テ緊迫セル空気ノ緩和ヲ図ラントスルモノナルコト又5ノ第二項南部仏印ヨリ北部ヘノ移駐ハ我方トシテハ急速妥結ノ為メ敢テ提案セントスル極メテ重要ナル譲歩ナルコトヲ強調セラレ破局ヲ救フ為メ急速（右ハ一週間内ト御承知アリタシ）ニ「ル」大統領ノ決裁ヲ経テ調印ヲ了スル様御申入アリ度シ

尚先方カ強テ主張スルニ於テハ往電第七八〇号6及7（通商無差別及三国条約）ヲ挿入方同意セラレ差支ナキモ本二問題ニ対スル我方ノ態度ハ6（無差別原則）ニ関シテハ貴電第一一二九号ノ次第ハアルモ往電第七八四号ハ変更シ得ス（「ハル」モ支那ニ於ケル差当リノ諸問題ハ余リ眼中ニ置キ居ラサル如キヲ以テ on the understanding 以下ヲ削除スルコトヲ固執セサルモノト思考ス）又7（三国条約）ニ関シテハ別電第八〇〇号末項ノ通リナリ

（別　電）

本　省　11月20日　発

第八〇〇号（館長符号）

往電第七九九号ニ関シ

往電第七八〇号ノ

一、ニ関シ南東亜細亜及南太平洋トセルハ蘭領印度、泰ヲ含ムモ支那ハ含マス

三、ノ第二項ニ関シ所要量ハ今次取極調印前ニ両国政府協議決定方希望ス

四、ハ米国ノ援蒋行為停止ヲモ意味スルモノト御含ミ置アリ度シ

五、ニ関シ第二項（往電第八〇一号）ハ協定急速妥結ノ為メ敢テ提議セントスル極メテ重要ナル譲歩ナリ

六、ニ関シ我方ニ於テ独リ支那ノミニ通商無差別ノ原則カ

行ハルルコトヲ容認シ得サルハ往電第七八四号ノ通リナリ

七、ノ第二項末段米国ノ欧州戦参入ノ場合ノ我方態度ヲ「自主的ニ行フコト」ノ説明トシテ右場合攻撃アリタリヤ否ヤニ関シテハ帝国カ三国条約ニ於ケル他締約国ノ解釈ニ拘束セラルルコトナク解釈シ得ルモノナルコト及三国条約中ニハ何等ノ秘密協定モ存在シ居ラサルコトヲ明カニセラレ差支ナシ（但シ本項説明ハ協定成立ノ見込付ク迄ハ之ヲ差控ヘラレ度シ）

375

昭和16年11月20日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

「乙案」に挿入すべき南部仏印撤兵に関する条項について

第八〇一号（大至急、館長符号）

very urgent

The Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

376

昭和16年11月20日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

野村大使の試案拒否について

本　省　11月20日後9時30分発

第八〇六号（大至急、館長符号）

貴電第一一三六号ハ往電第七九八号ト行違ヒタルモノト認メラルル処当方事情ハ右往電記載ノ通リニテ貴方試案ニテハ遺憾乍ラ時局収拾ヲ計ルニ足ラス依テ往電第七九八号末段ノ趣旨ニヨリ至急話ヲ進メラルル他ニハ局面打開ノ途ナキニ付右ニ御承知相成度総理ニ於テモ右ニ全然同意見ナルニ付為念

377

昭和16年11月20日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

「乙案」を米国国務長官に提示について

ワシントン　11月20日後発
本　省　11月21日前着

第一一四四号（極秘、館長符号）

二十日正午本使来栖大使ト同道「ハル」長官ヲ国務省ニ往訪シ約一時間半会談セリ本日ハ貴電第七九八号御訓令ニ基キ各項目ニ付説明ヲ加ヘタル処「ハル」ハ他ノ部分ニ付テハ左シタル意見ヲ挟マサリシモ日支間全面和平ノ努力ヲ妨クルカ如キコトヲ為ササルコトニ対シテハ非常ナル難色ヲ示シ日本ノ政策カ平和ニ向フコト明確ニセラレサル限リ援蒋政策打切ノ困難ナルコト恰モ英国援助ヲ打切ルカ如キモノナリトノ趣旨ヲ述ヘタルカ何レ篤ト研究ノ上何分ノ意見ヲ回示スヘキ旨述ヘタリ不取敢

378

昭和16年11月20日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

北米・中南米各在外公館へ交渉進捗状況通報方依頼

ワシントン　11月20日後発
本　省　11月21日前着

第一一四五号（館長符号扱）

日米国交調整交渉ノ現状ニ関シ在米各館ハ勿論中南米公館ヨリモ当方ニ対シ交渉模様通報方希望アル処当方トシテハ事件ノ性質上屢次御来示ノ次第モアリ従来通報差控ヘ居ルモ事態逼迫ニ伴ヒ米ト密接ナル関係アル諸国大公使殊ニ多数在留民ノ保護ニ任シ居ル在米各領事トシテ一応心得置ク必要アリト認メラルルニ付本省ノ御裁量ニ依リ可然交渉経過通報方御取計相成度シ為念

在北米各公館長、加、墨、伯、智、亜、英へ転電セリ

379

昭和16年11月20日　東郷外務大臣より
在スイス三谷（隆信）公使
在トルコ栗原（正）大使
在ウラジオストック太田（日出雄）総領事　宛（電報）

日米交渉は楽観を許さぬ状況の旨通報

*合第二三六四号（極秘）

本　省　11月20日　発

一、政府ハ組閣以来連日大本営連絡会議ヲ開催シ当面ノ重大時局ニ対処スル国策ノ根本方針ヲ審議シ居リタル処右

Japan and the United States of America.

Accordingly, the Government of Japan desires hereby to state explicitly that in order to achieve more completely the purposes for which the present agreement has been concluded, it is prepared to adopt and apply the understanding set forth in the above-mentioned Articles of the present agreement as a formal understanding between your country and mine and that it confidently expects the concurrence of your Government in this matter.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the instant as follows, as well as a duplicate copy of the agreement concluded on the instant between your Government and the Government of the United States of America concerning their mutual understanding.

(.....)

Under instructions from my Government I have the honour to state in reply that the British Government appreciates the purposes for which the said agreement has been concluded, and that in order to achieve more completely the said purposes it agrees to adopt and apply as a formal understanding between your country and mine the understanding as set forth in the Articles concerned of the said agreement.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

170

382 昭和16年11月21日 在米郷国野村大臣宛（電報）

「乙案」の前文案について

本省 11月21日後8時46分発

第八一一号（館長符号）

乙案取極メノ場合ノ前文トシテ当方ニ於テ作成セル試案左ノ通

大日本帝国政府及「アメリカ」合衆国政府ハ太平洋ノ平和ヲ維持セントスル強固ナル希望ニ促カサレ

両国政府ノ平和ヲ愛好スル真摯ナル決意ヲ率直ニ披瀝スルノ緊要ナルヲ認メ

左ノ相互的了解ニ到達セリ

383 昭和16年11月22日 在東郷国野村大臣宛（電報）

調印を二九日までに完了すべく交渉督促方訓令

本省 11月22日後1時10分発

第八一二号（館長符号）

very urgent

両大使ヘ

往電第七三六号ノ期日ハ変更シ難キモノナルコト御承知ノ通リナルカ貴方ニ於テモ折角御努力中ニモアリ又帝国政府トシテモ既定方針ヲ堅持シツツ最後迄情理ヲ尽クシテ局面収拾ニ最善ノ努力ヲ傾ケ以テ能フ限リ日米国交ノ破局ヲ阻止シ度キヲ以テ御想像ニ余ル絶大ナル困難アリタルニモ拘ラス茲ニ、四日中ニ日米間ノ話合ヲ完了シ二十九日迄ニ調印ヲ了スルノミナラス公文交換等ニ依リ英両国ノ確約ヲ取付ケ以テ一切ノ手続完了ヲ見得ルニ於テハ夫レ迄待ツコトニ取計ラヒタク就テハ右期日ハ此ノ上ノ変更ハ絶対不可能ニシテ其ノ後ノ情勢ハ自動的ニ進展スルノ他ナキニ付キ如上ノ次第篤ト御含ミノ上交渉完結ニ付キ充全ノ御努力相成度シ

右厳ニ両大使限リノ御含ミ迄

384 昭和16年11月22日 在東郷国野村大臣宛（電報）

米国側ヘ提示の「乙案」の内容につき確認

本省 11月22日後11時45分発

第八一七号（大至急、館長符号）

貴電第一一四四号ニ関シ

二十日貴大使ヨリ提示サレタル乙案ハ(五)ノ第二項（仏印南部ヨリ北部ヘノ軍隊移駐）ヲ挿入シ(六)（無差別待遇）及(七)（三国条約）ヲ除キタル案ト認ムル処右ニ相違ナキヤ尚米国側ニ於テハ(六)及(七)カ削除サレ居ルコトニ付特ニ言及セサリシヤ為念折返シ回電アリ度

171

403 昭和16年11月26日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

「乙案」の貫徹につき回答

ワシントン　11月26日後発
本　省　11月27日前着

第一一八三号（大至急、極秘、館長符号）
貴電第八三〇号ニ関シ

貴電冒頭仏印全部撤兵ノ如キハ米国新聞記者ノ憶測ニ過キサルヘク当方ニ於テハ苟且ニモ申シタルコトナク我方ノ主張ハ先方ニ徹底シ居レリ

尚貴電後段ニ関シテハ当方トシテモ現ニ充分利用致シ説得ニ努メ居ル次第ナルカ最近是等ノモノモ漸次「ハル」長官ノ主張ヲ弁護スルノ立場ニ変リツツアル事情ナリ

404 昭和16年11月27日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

「乙案」前文の英文修正方訓令

本　省　11月27日後3時発

第八四一号（館長符号）
貴電第一一七一号ニ関シ
乙案前文英文ハ左ノ通リ修正サレ度シ
the peace in the pacific ノ peace ノ前ノ the（定冠詞）ヲ除キ elucidating ヲ affirming トシ agreed upon ヲ reached トシ mutual understanding ノ mutual ヲ削除ス

八　「ハル・ノート」受領から開戦

405 昭和16年11月26日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

電話連絡に際して使用すべき隠語について

本　省　11月26日　発

第八三六号（館長符号）

情勢ハ逐日急迫シツツアル処電報ハ長時間ヲ要スルヲ以テ今後ハ必要ニ応シ会談等ノ模様ハ簡単ナルモノニ限リ随時電話ヲ以テ山本亜米利加局長ニ御通報相成度其ノ際使用スヘキ隠語左ノ通

三国条約問題　ニューヨーク
無差別待遇問題　シカゴ
支那問題　サンフランシスコ
総理　伊藤君
外務大臣　伊達君
陸軍　徳川君
海軍　前田君
日米交渉　縁談
大統領　君子サン
ハル　梅子サン
国内情勢　商売
譲歩スル　山ヲ売ル
譲歩セス　山ハ売レヌ
形勢急転スル　子供カ生レル

尚為念本省以外ノ電話番号ハ山本局長（世田ケ谷四六一七）加瀬課長（四谷四七九三）大臣官邸（銀座二六一四）次官官邸（銀座一〇二二）ナリ

406 昭和16年11月26日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

状況打開のため大統領と天皇との親電交換につき意見具申

ワシントン　11月26日後発

本　省　11月27日前着

第一一八〇号（極秘、館長符号）

野村来栖ヨリ

累次往電ノ通乙案全部ヲ容認セシムル見込殆ント無ク一方時日ハ切迫此ノ儘ニテハ遺憾乍ラ交渉打切ノ外ナク微力慙愧ニ堪ヘス此ノ際唯一ノ打開策トシテハ甚タ恐懼ニ堪ヘサルモ先「ロ」大統領ヨリ至尊ニ対シ奉リ太平洋平和維持ヲ目的トスル日米両国協力ノ希望ヲ電信セシメ（御内意ヲ俟テ極力交渉ス）之ニ対シ御親電ヲ仰キ奉リ以テ空気ヲ一新スルト同時ニ今少シク時機ノ御猶予ヲ得英米側カ蘭印保護占領ニ出テ来ル可能性ヲモ考慮シ我方ヨリ先手ヲ打チ仏印、蘭印、「タイ」国ヲ包含スル中立圏設立（本年九月「ロ」大統領カ仏印、「タイ」国中立ヲ提議セルハ御承知ノ通リナリ）ヲ提議スルコト可然ト思考ス

今回交渉ノ決裂カ必スシモ日米開戦ヲ意味セサルヤノ観測存スヘキモ決裂後ハ前述ノ如ク英米側ノ蘭印進駐モ予想セラレ結局我方ノ攻撃ニ依ル対英米衝突不可避ナルヘク右ニ対シ独逸カ条約第三条ノ義務発動ヲ肯スルヤハ頗ル疑問ニシテ且日支事変ノ解決ハ少ナクトモ今次世界戦ノ終局迄持チ越スノ外ナキニ至ルヘシ

本電ハ或ハ本使トシテ最後ノ意見具申タルヘキニ付少クトモ木戸内大臣迄御示シノ上至急折返ヘシ何分ノ御回電切望ス

〰〰〰〰〰〰〰〰〰〰

407

昭和16年11月26日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

電話連絡の時間について

ワシントン　11月26日後発
本　省　11月27日前着

第一一八一号（至急、極秘、館長符号）

貴電第八三六号ニ関シ

早速実行スヘキモ日米間電話連絡時間（東京時間午前七時乃至十時及午前十一時乃至午後一時、午後二時乃至午後四時）ニ制限アル為緊急電報ニ依ル方早キ場合ハ電話セサルコトトスヘシ

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408

昭和16年11月26日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国国務長官との会談時間未定について

ワシントン　11月26日後発
本　省　11月27日前着

第一一八四号（極秘、館長符号）

往電第一一七八号ニ関シ

今朝更ニ寺崎ヲシテ「バレンタイン」ヲ往訪セシメ会見ノ予定時間ヲ質サシメタル処「バ」ハ「ハル」長官ハ今日モ早朝ヨリ本件ニ関シ審議研究中ニシテ殆ント他事ヲ顧ミル暇ナキ実状ニテ会見予定時間ハ今尚確定致シ兼ネオル次第ナリト述ヘタルカ更ニ念ノ為長官ト連絡ノ後同趣旨ノ回答ヲ為セルモ大体本日中ニハ会見ノ運ニ至ルヘキ印象ヲ受ケタル趣ナリ為念

〰〰〰〰〰〰〰〰〰〰

409

昭和16年11月26日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国国務長官との会談時間について

ワシントン　11月26日後発

本　省　11月27日前着

第一一八七号（極秘、館長符号）

本使来栖大使同伴本二十六日午後四時四十五分「ハル」長官ト会談ノ予定ナリ

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410

昭和16年11月26日　在米国野村大使より
東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国国務長官との会談の際提示された米国案要旨報告

ワシントン　11月26日後発

本　省　11月27日後着

第一一八九号（極秘、館長符号）

二十六日午後四時四十五分ヨリ約二時間本使及来栖大使「ハル」長官ト会談ス

「ハル」ヨリ茲数日間本月二十日日本側提出ノ暫定協定案（我方乙案）ニ付米国政府ニ於テ各方面ヨリ検討スルト共ニ関係諸国ト慎重協議セルモ遺憾乍ラ之ニ同意出来ス結局米側六月二十一日案ト日本側九月二十五日案ノ懸隔ヲ調節セル左記要領ノ新案ヲ一案（a plan）トシテ（tentative and

ノ原因トナリシコトアリトモ考ヘラルト述ヘタルニ対シ「ハル」ヨリ御趣旨ハ度々ノ御説明ニテ了解シ居ルモ自分ノ聞ク所ニ依レハ現在支那ニハ日本軍隊ニ随伴シテ約二十五万人ノ商人入リ込ミ各種ノ営業ヲ為シ居リ此等ノ人々カ第三国人トノ関係ニ於テ種々ナル問題ヲ惹起シオル模様ナルカ斯カル人々ノ利益ヲモ問題トセラルル御趣旨ナラハ問題ノ解決ハ極メテ困難ナルヘシト言ヒタルヲ以テ来栖ヨリ日本側ノ主張ハ斯カル些々タル問題ニハアラスシテ大ナル主問題ニ関スルモノナリト述ヘ置キタリ更ニ本使等ヨリ大統領ノ「紹介」云々ニ言及セルニ対シ大統領ヨリ自分ハ今猶右ノ考ヘヲ棄テ居ラス但シ右ハ日支双方ヨリ同時ニ希望セラルルコトヲ必要トスト言ヘルヲ以テ斯カルコトハ実際問題トシテ甚タ困難ナルヘシト述ヘタルニ彼ハ自分ハ内政問題等ニ於テ之ト同様ノ種々ナル経験ヲ有スルカ其ノ間自ラ方法ハアルヘシト答ヘタリ

本使ヨリ今回ノ御提案ニ付テハ東京ヨリ未タ何等訓令ニ接セサルモ自分トシテハ三十年来ノ交誼ニ依リ多大ノ尊敬ヲ有シオル貴大統領ノ「ステーツマンシップ」ニ依リ何等カ打開ノ途カ見出サレンコトヲ希望シ居ル旨述ヘタルニ対シ大統領ハ実ハ先週末静養旅行ニ赴ク筈ナリシモ緊急ナル国内問題及来栖大使ノ来米ニ依リ今日迄延期シオリタルモ明金曜日午後出発田舎ニ赴キ静養（過労ノ如ク見受ケタリ）ノ上来週水曜日帰華スルヲ以テ其ノ上ニテ貴使等ト面接ノ機会ヲ得度キ希望ナルカ其ノ間若シ何等局面打開ニ資スルカ如キ事態ノ発生ヲ見ハ結構ナリト述ヘタリ

尚会談途中ニテ「ハル」ヨリ「モダスビベンジ」カ不成功ニ終リタル理由ニ言及シ前記大統領ノ説明ノ外日本カ大兵ヲ仏印ニ増駐シ（不明）国ノ兵力ヲ同方面ニ牽制シ乍ラ更ニ片手ニハ三国同盟条約他ノ片手ニハ防共協定ヲ提ケツツ米国ニ石油ノ供給ヲ求メラルルニ対シ日本ノ希望ニ応スルハ到底米国民衆ヲ承服セシメ得ル所ニアラス前回ノ会談ニ於テモ申上ケタル通リ折角我々カ日米問題ノ平和的解決ヲ論議シオルニ対シ日本側首相外相其他ノ要人ヨリ之カ促進ヲ容易ナラシムルカ如キ言辞ナク却ツテ力ニ依ル所謂新秩序建設ヲ主張セラルルカ如キ言論ノミアリタルハ頗ル遺憾ナリト繰返シ述ヘ居タリ

419

昭和16年11月28日　東郷外務大臣より
各在外公館長宛（電報）

日米交渉の近況につき通報

本　省　11月28日前2時50分発

合第二四一四号（大至急、館長符号）

日米交渉近況

一、野村大使ハ「ハル」国務長官及「ルーズベルト」大統領ニ対シ従来ノ我方案ニ新内閣成立後多少ノ修正ヲ加ヘタル新提案ヲ提出シ交渉ハ本月初旬以来華府ニ於テ「ル」大統領及「ハ」長官ト野村大使間ニ行ハレ（来栖大使モ十七日ヨリ参加セリ）オルノミナラス東京ニ於テモ本大臣ヨリ米英大使ニ対シ急速解決ノ要アル旨力説シツツアル処米側ハ右案ニ対スル諾否ヲ明ニスルニ先立チ帝国政府ノ平和的意図ニ関スル確言ヲ求ムルト共ニ其ノ他ノ原則的問題ニ付テモ予メ我方ノ約諾ヲ取付ケントスル等其態度ハ依然理論的原則論ニ捉ハレ逐日急迫スル事態ニ副ハサル所甚シキニ依リ我方ハ二十日更ニ南西太平洋方面ノ事態ヲ緩和シ以テ目睫ニ迫リツツアル太平洋ノ危機ヲ回避スル為メノ我方最終案ヲ提示シ其後米国側ハ英、豪、蘭及支等ノ関係国トモ協議ヲ行ヒ右ヲ審議セル模様ナルカ近ク何等ノ回答アル手筈トナリ居レリ

二、然レトモ今日迄ノ米側態度等ニ鑑ミ米側カ此際猛省シテ二十日ノ我方最終案ヲ受諾スル見込極メテ少ク然ル場合局面ノ収拾ハ頗ル困難トナル次第ナリ

本電宛先

英、米、河内、泰、蘇、独、伊、「バタビヤ」、豪州、北大、満大、南京、上海、香港

米ヨリ北米各公館長（含「ホノルル」）加、墨、伯、智、亜へ転電アリ度

香港ヨリ新嘉坡、「マニラ」へ電報アリ度

420

昭和16年11月28日　東郷外務大臣より
在米国野村大使宛（電報）

「ハル・ノート」に対する措置につき訓令

本　省　11月28日　発

第八四四号

貴電第一一八九号等接受両大使段々ノ御努力ニモ拘ラス米側カ今次ノ如キ理不尽ナル対案ヲ提示セルハ頗ル意外且遺

憾トスル所ニシテ我方トシテハ到底右ヲ交渉ノ基礎トスル能ハス従ツテ今次交渉ハ右米案ニ対スル帝国政府見解（両三日中ニ追電スヘシ）申入ヲ以テ実質的ニハ打切トスル他ナキ情勢ナルカ先方ニ対シテハ交渉決裂ノ印象ヲ与フルコトヲ避ケルコトトシ度キニ付貴方ニ於テハ目下猶請訓中ニシテ政府ノ意向ヲ詳カニセサル貴使限リノ意見ナリトシテ従来帝国カ公正ナル主張ヲ為シタルコト特ニ帝国カ太平洋平和ノ為ニ屢々難キヲ忍ヒ犠牲ヲ敢テシテ協調的態度ヲ示シタルニ拘ラス米国側ハ之ニ対応セス交渉成立ヲ至難ナラシムルコトヲ御説明アリ度シ

尚右ノ如キ次第ナルニ付貴電第一一八〇号御稟申ノ件御来示ノ方面トモ連絡セルモ何レモ右ハ此ノ際ノ措置トシテ適当ニアラストノ意向ナルニ付右御了承アリ度シ

421　昭和16年11月28日　東郷外務大臣より各大使宛（電報）

「ハル・ノート」に関し通報

本　省　11月28日後8時30分発

合第二四一六号（館長符号）

very urgent

日米交渉ニ関シ二十七日米側ノ提示シ来レル対案ハ帝国ノ立場ヲ無視セルモノナリ

422　昭和16年11月28日　在米国野村大使より東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

我が方タイ進駐の場合米国による蘭印進駐の可能性について

ワシントン　11月28日後発

本　省　11月29日前着

第一二〇九号（極秘、館長符号）

皇軍ノ泰国進駐ノ場合米ヲ始メ英、豪、蘭、支等カ如何ナル行動ニ出テ来ルヘキヤハ帝国トシテ最モ戒心ヲ要スヘキコト勿論ニシテ右ハ直ニ英兵トノ正面衝突ヲ意味セストノ観測或ハ存スヘキモ八月十七日付大統領ノ「オーラル」ニ於テ米側ハ我方カ仏印以外ニ進出シ来ル場合ニハ直ニ適当行動ニ出スヘキ旨予告シ居ル経緯並ニ最近当方面ノ新聞報ニモ鑑ミ仮令英米側カ泰国ニ於テ軍事措置ヲ以テ対抗セストスルモ米国トシテハ関係国ヲ糾合援助シテ南西太平洋地域ノ共同防衛強化ノ方策ニ出テ其ノ一部トシテ例ヘハ往電第一二〇四号申進メノ如ク防衛ヲ理由トスル蘭印進駐ノ如キ手段ニ出テ来ル可能性少ナカラスト観測セラル右ハ既ニ充分御研究ノコトト存スルモ事態ノ重要性ニ鑑ミ重ネテ電報ス

423　昭和16年11月28日　在米国野村大使より東郷外務大臣宛（電報）

米国側による「ハル・ノート」公表およびその反響について

ワシントン　11月28日後発

本　省　11月29日後着

第一二一四号（極秘、館長符号）

往電第一一九〇号ニ関シ

当地ニ於ケル日米会談ニ関シ従来沈黙ヲ守ル癖アリシ国務省カ昨二十六日ノ会談ニ付テハ自ラ進ンテ発表ヲ行ヒ各新聞ハ之ニ応シ『「ハル」日本側ニ「ピースプラン」ヲ手交ス』『米国ハ第二ノ「ミュンヘン」会議案ヲ斥ク』等ノ見出シヲ以テ「ハル」ノ四原則等抽象的ニハ何人ニモ確カナル点ヲ強調シ米国側提案ヲ受入ルルヤ否ヤハ日本ノ勝手ナルカ戦争カ平和カ何レヲ選フヤモ一ニ懸ツテ日本側ニ存リトノ書キ振リナルコトハ注意ヲ要スル点ナリ為念

424　昭和16年11月29日　東郷外務大臣より在中国日高代理大使宛（電報）

中国問題に関する交渉状況汪主席に内報方訓令

本　省　11月29日前0時50分発

第五一〇号（極秘、館長符号扱）

貴電第八二八号ニ関シ

一、日米交渉中支那問題ニ関スル部分ハ汪主席ニモ極秘内報セル九項目ニ関スルモノナルカ我方ニ於テハ右九項目ニ付何等態度ヲ変更セルコトナシ尚最近ノ交渉ニ於テ日支和平問題ニ付テハ米側ハ干渉又ハ調停ニ出スル意思ヲ有セス単ニ日支間ノ橋渡シヲ為サントスル如キ意向ヲ表明シタルコトアルモ他方我方ヨリ米国ハ日支両国ノ和平ニ関スル努力ニ支障ヲ与フルカ如キ行動ニ出テサルコトヲ要求（之ニ依リ我方ハ米国ヲシテ援蒋行為ヲ停止セシメ以テ東亜ノ和平促進ヲ企図セル次第ナリ）シタルニ対

シテハ米側ハ援蔣行為ノ中止ニハ強キ反対ヲ表明シ前記橋渡シノ点トハ全然矛盾スル態度ヲ示シ為ニ和平問題モ解決見込立タス旁日米交渉成立モ困難ナル実状ナリ

二、胡適カ二十二日「ハル」長官ト会見シタルハ日米交渉ノ内容カ英、豪、蘭ト共ニ重慶ニモ関係アル為之等ノ内意ヲ打診シタルモノナルヤニ認メラル

三、以上絶対極秘汪主席限リノ含迄ニ貴官ヨリ内報ノ上今後事態カ如何様ニ展開スルトモ我方ニ信頼協力スヘキ様御申入相成度

425

昭和16年11月30日　東郷外務大臣より在独国大島大使宛（電報）

日米交渉決裂の場合の三国同盟発動につき独国側へ内報方訓令

別　電　一一月三〇日付東郷外務大臣より在独国大島大使宛第九八六号

日米交渉の経緯について

本　省　11月30日　発

第九八五号

一、本年四月前前内閣当時開始セラレタル日米交渉ハ帝国政府ノ誠意アル努力ニ不拘遂ニ決裂必至ノ事態ニ立チ至リタル処（交渉経緯要点別電ノ通リ）帝国トシテハ右事態ニ直面シ重大ナル決意ヲ必要トスルニ至レリ就テハ貴大使ハ大至急「ヒトラー」総統及「リッペン」外相ニ面会セラレ右経過ノ要点ヲ内報セラルルト共ニ最近英米両国カ挑発的態度ニ出テ其ノ兵力カ東亜ノ各地ニ出動ヲ継続シ居ルニ対抗シ我方トシテモ兵力ノ出動ヲ余儀ナクセシメラレ勢ヒノ赴ク所遂ニ武力衝突ヲ来シ我ト英米両国トノ間ニ戦争状態ノ発生ヲ見ルニ至ルノ虞レ極メ虞テ大ナルコトヲ内密通報セラレ且右発生ノ時期ハ意外ニ早ク来ルヤモ知レサル旨付言セラレタシ

二、帝国ト英米トノ間ニ戦争発生ノ場合帝国トシテハ三国条約ノ関係ヨリモ独伊ノ即時対米戦争参加ヲ期待スルモノナルニ付独伊側カ我方期待ニ背カサル様取運ヒ方ニ付最善ノ努力ヲ払ハレタシ

（日英戦争ノ場合ニ関シテハ客年三国条約締結当時在京独大使ノ来翰アリ日米戦争ノ場合ニ関シテハ条約条文ノ外同趣旨ヲ敷衍セル在京独大使来翰ノ一項及貴電ノ次第

アリ）

三、尚帝国トシテハ此ノ際単独不講和ニ関スル協定ヲ日独間及日伊間ニ別々ニ（独伊間ニハ既ニ存在ス）締結シ置クコト諸般ノ考慮ヨリ適当ト認ムル処右ハ独伊トシテモ従来明言セル戦争完遂ノ建前ヨリ云フモ歓迎スヘキ所ナルヘシト思考セラルルニ付右ニ付テモ急速成立ヲ見ル様是亦御尽力相成度

四、右申入ノ際独伊側ヨリ蘇連邦ニ対スル我方ノ態度ニ関シ質問アリタル際ニ於テハ我方ノ対蘇態度ハ嚮ニ独伊側ニ申入ノ通リニシテ今次我方ノ対南方行動ニ依リ対蘇牽制ノ措置ヲ緩和スルカ如キコトナキハ勿論蘇側カ英米ト合作シテ我方ニ対スル敵対行為ニ出テ来ルカ如キ場合ニハ断固之ヲ排撃スルノ用意ヲ有スルモ差当リハ南方ニ重点ヲ置キ北方ニ対シテ我方ヨリ進ンテ積極的行動ニ出ツルコトハ差控ヘ度キ意向ナル旨説明セラレタシ

五、本件ハ作戦上ノ関係モアリ絶対機密ヲ要スルコトハ勿論ノ儀ニシテ右ニ付テハ独伊側ニモ特ニ厳重注意シ置カレ度

六、伊ニ対シテハ在独大使ヨリ独側ニ申入ヲ為シタル直後ニ於テ「ムッソリーニ」首相及「チ」外相ニ申入レラルルコトト致シ度

（別　電）

本　省　11月30日後3時30分発

第九八六号（大至急、極秘、館長符号）

一、日米交渉ハ四月中旬ヨリ開始シ半歳有余ニ亘リ継続セルカ其ノ間帝国政府ハ終始一貫我国策不動ノ基調タル三国条約ヲ堅持シ日米国交調整モ厳密ニ同条約ノ範囲内ニ於テ妥結ヲ期シ常ニ毅然タル態度ヲ以テ交渉ニ臨ミ条約所期ノ目的タル米国ノ参戦牽制ニ努メタル次第ナリ

二、従ツテ現内閣ハ既電ノ通リ帝国ノ権威ト存立トヲ厳ニ擁護シツツ公正ナル基礎ニ於テ従来交渉ヲ継続セル処交渉ノ主タル難点中ニハ撤兵問題（支那及仏印ヨリノ撤兵ヲ要望ス）等ニ関スル彼我見解ノ対立モアリタルモ従来交渉ノ経緯ニ徴スレハ根本ノ難関ハ寧ロ米側ニ於テ国際関係処理ニ関スル其ノ伝統的理念即チ過般ノ英米洋上会談ニ表ハレタルト同様ノ原則的理念ヲ固執セル点ニ在リ要スルニ米側ノ真意ハ日独伊ノ欧亜ニ於ケル新秩序建設

〈資料　第十号〉

6 Months

1. United States to resume economic relations—some oil and rice now—more later.
2. Japan to send no more troops to Indo-China or Manchurian border or any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).
3. Japan to agree not to invoke Tripartite Pact even if the U.S. gets into European war.
4. U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S. to take no part in their conversation.

Later on Pacific agreements.

CHAPTER IV

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

(October 17, 1941 - November 20, 1941)

Advent of the Tojo Cabinet and Redoubling of Japanese Government's Insistence Upon an Early Acceptance of Its Proposals.[1]

1. Ambassador Nomura Complains of Lack of Coordination Between Japanese Foreign Office and Navy (October 18, 1941)

Following the change of government in Japan, Ambassador Nomura on October 18, 1941, offered his congratulations to the new Cabinet. At the same time, however, he pointed out that throughout the term of the former Japanese Cabinet he had been unable to accomplish anything through Japanese-American conversations. According to Ambassador Nomura, certain things which had taken place in spite of his personal recommendations had forced him to question his own value to a future Japanese government.

Since Minister Wakasugi and Mr. Iguchi were capable of handling negotiations, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to return to Japan in order to report personally on the existing Japanese-American situation and to receive instructions regarding future policies.[1a]

Two days later, on October 20, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that, since his appointment to the post in the United States, there had existed a complete lack of coordination between the Japanese Navy Department and the Japanese Foreign Office.[2]

Referring again to Japanese-American problems, Ambassador Nomura emphasized that, although the United States might desire to avoid military action in the Pacific because it was already faced with war on the Atlantic front, America would still refuse to renounce its national policies even to effect a concilation. In Ambassador Nomura's opinion, China was primarily responsible for the present attitude of the United States toward Japan. For that reason, Ambassador Nomura had attempted to bring about a "modus vivendi" between the two countries, leaving out the China question entirely. But Secretary Hull had insisted that China was inseparably concerned with the stability of the Pacific. However, from a conversation with Lord Halifax, Ambassador Nomura learned that Great Britain agreed with Japan that a "modus vivendi" should be worked out in order to avoid a crisis in the Far East.

At the conclusion of his report, Ambassador Nomura re-emphasized his ineffective position as Ambassador from Japan possibly because of his lack of understanding of the principles of the present Japanese government.[3] In fact, Ambassador Nomura frankly stated that he should have been asked to resign along with the members of the former Japanese Cabinet. In spite of the encouragement of Secretary Hull and other American statesmen who trusted his sincerity, Ambassador Nomura recognized that his lack of actual influence in Japan forced him to lead a hypocritical existence as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. Although not anxious "to flee from the field of battle", Ambassador Nomura urged his government to order his recall.[4]

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[1] Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents—*Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941* in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, Volume II, 343. Hereafter referred to as *S.D.*, II.

[1a] Appendix IV, No. 1. Hereafter Appendix IV will be referred to as IV, 1.

[2] IV, 2.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] IV, 3.

APPENDIX IV

(October 18, 1941 - December 6, 1941)

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

No. 1

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

October 18, 1941
No Number.

Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appointment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accomplish much in the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so that I may personally report the situation here to you and incidentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and IGUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objections to leaving matters in their hands after I have left.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 2

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

October 20, 1941
No Number.

(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY)

Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such lack of coordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis that is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some *modus vivendi* between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the

British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some *modus vivendi* worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explore the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.

Trans. 10-22-41

No. 3

FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 4

FROM: Tokyo October 23, 1941
TO: Washington No Number.

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reasons, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 5

FROM: Tokyo — October 21, 1941
TO: Washington — # 698.

Re your # 966*.

What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet was only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed.

The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.

We urge, therefore, that choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 25 (?) September.

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*See III, 284. Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an extensive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination in trade (i.e., the Open Door up-to-date).

Trans. 10-23-41

No. 6

FROM: Washington (Nomura) — October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo — # 973.

Yesterday, the Sabbath day, -----* told me the following:

"Through Finland and Bulgaria, Germany is putting out peace feelers and she stands some chance of succeeding. She will probably embark on a peace offensive offering Great Britain generous terms. Now that Great Britain has taken Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, the LLOYD GEORGE wing may listen to what HITLER has to say. As CHURCHILL's position for some time has been none too safe, ROOSEVELT is upholding the Prime Minister with might and main."

Not long ago the Secretary of State said to me, "Doubtless some 'QUISLINGS' will make their appearance in Great Britain. That's why the United States Government is supporting CHURCHILL so strongly."

Well, the trust of the English people in CHURCHILL seems to me rather real, so I do not put much belief in this story. However, the strange part of it is that -----* has always believed in a German defeat. Nevertheless, he came and told me this story, so it may be worth thinking about.

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*DoD comment: Name withheld.

Trans. 10-21-41

No. 21

FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1021.

I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then. If this is impossible while you please advise me of the points I should bear in mind while talking to the Secretary.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 22

FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 3.)

Concerning my # 722[a].

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter proposal for the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the government and the military High Command (ensuing Nos. 726[b] and 727[b]). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter-proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

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[a] See IV, 20.
[b] See IV, 25 and IV, 29.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 23

FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 3.)

When the Japanese-American meetings began who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone

far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self-same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this—to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one-sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long-suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without reckoning the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 24

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 3.)

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end—at the last day of Japanese-American negotiations—the government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations about how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, as soon as you have got the consensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 25

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 4.)

Proposal "A".

1. This proposal is our revised final proposal made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows:

(1) The question of non-discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non-discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no explanation of our sphere of self defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 26

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 4.)

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.

We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo-China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo-China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some sort of a statement.)

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 27

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 3 of 4.)

2. *Explanation.*

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three-Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self-defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 28

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
726.

(Urgent.)

(Part 4 of 4.)

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, we have fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices we have made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 29

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
727.

(Urgent.)

1. Proposal "B".

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree that neither will militarily invade any area in Southeast Asia and the South Seas with the exception of French Indo-China.

(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate mutually in guaranteeing the obtention of the materials they need in the Netherlands Indies.

(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.

(4) The Government of the United States will engage in no activity which might put an obstacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China.

Addendum:

(1) If necessary, upon the establishment of this understanding, as soon as peace is established between Japan and China, or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops.

(2) If necessary, we will insert an additional stipulation concerning the interpretation and carrying out of the Three-Power Pact and the question of non-discrimination in commerce which were referred to in proposal "A" in my # 726[a].

[a] See IV, 25.

Trans. 11-4-41

No. 30

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
730.

Re my # 725[a]

In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving ----- on the 7th by clipper to assist you. He will be your right-hand man in these parleys. He is carrying with him no additional instructions, so in order to prepare him for the talks, will you please tell him all, and I hope that you can, by all means, arrange for an interview between him and President ROOSEVELT.

By the way, will you please be sure to keep Ambassador KURUSU's activities strictly secret.

[a] See IV, 22.

Trans. 11-4-41

ation" etc. Also in the latter part of the same note the same intent is set forth in the words "mutual understanding and declaration of policy".

Of course the present situation is different from that involved in past agreements of this kind, and they emphasize that from the standpoint of the U.S. government and domestic politics, it would be difficult to keep the matter secret very long, as I have stated in successive messages.

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[a] See IV, 40.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 42

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

5 November 1941
735.

1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations referred to in my message # 725[a] was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions.

2. We assume that it would meet with the U.S. approval, in view of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal—25 September's from our point of view—was used as a basis of these new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained in my message # 726[b]) should be submitted for discussion. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U.S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, therefore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my message # 725[a]. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept that proposal in the shortest possible time.

3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B (contained in my message # 727[c]). Please, therefore, ascertain the U.S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

Although a "1' was placed at the beginning of the body of my message # 727[c], there was no need for it, so please delete it.

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[a] See IV, 22-24.
[b] See IV, 25.
[c] See IV, 29.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 43

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

6 November 1941
740.

Re your # 1025*.

Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear. Now we might say that there exists almost no division between our respective views. At any rate, we have been taking it for granted that this is the case for some time. Our proposal of September 25, which is a counter-proposal to the American Proposal of June 21, makes no reference to any exchange of notes, which means that we are refusing to consider such an exchange. We are taking it for granted that the United States, too, is eliminating this as a matter of course from the negotiations, and we are continuing the negotiations on the assumption that there will be no such exchange of notes. If, by any misadventure, the United States should say that they will not leave out the proposal for exchange of notes, it will be utterly and absolutely impossible for us to agree, so when you negotiate, please be fully aware of this.

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*See IV, 19.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 44

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

5 November 1941
736.

(Of utmost secrecy.)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 45

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

5 November 1941
1037.

I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull. (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite.) I am of the opinion that it would be to our advantage to keep this meeting as secret as possible. I would appreciate being advised of the Foreign Office's view on

No. 31

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 5, 1941
734.

Ambassador KURUSU accompanied by Secretary YUKI left the 5th for *Shanghai* (?).

Trans. 11-5-41

No. 32

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 6, 1941
739.

(Urgent.)

Re my # 730*.

The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you. I wish him, however, to communicate to you at first hand as best he may, the exact situation here in Japan, and now that we are on the last lap of these negotiations, I do hope that he can help you in unravelling this bewildering maze and through cooperation lead to a solution, and that right soon. To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between the two nations. We have explained all this fully to the British and American Ambassadors here in Tokyo, and Ambassador KURUSU himself had a heart-to-heart talk with the American Ambassador before he left, and both Ambassadors fully understand why he is making the trip.

The officials of both the Army and the Navy are pleased with the special dispatch of the Ambassador and are very grateful for the trouble he is taking. After you read this, please go and tell the American officials concerned and wire me back their reply.

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*See IV, 30.

Trans. 11-6-41

No. 33

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 4, 1941
731.

(Urgent.)

Re my # 725*.

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also, as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reach an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

We would like to have you report any material reflecting the international situation especially anything connected with the following items:

1. The extent of the determination of America and Britain to make war on Japan and Germany.
2. America's reciprocal relations with Japan and Germany.
3. The condition of the military, political and economic union between America, Britain, CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Holland and Russia.
4. The present situation regarding the dispatch of additional military strength by America and Britain, especially of planes, marines and (?infantry?) to the Southern Area and to the Aleutians.

(Part 2.)

5. The present situation regarding the non-expansion of bases in the islands scattered in the Pacific.*
6. Movements of American and British troops in China.
7. Movements of ships of American and British registry in the Southwestern Pacific and the Sea of Japan.
8. The influence of the Empire's attitude upon America, Britain and the other countries. Also the influence of Japan and America's negotiations.

Please pay attention to the first item in this list before its timeliness is lost.

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*The test appears to refer to the bases which Japan was not to establish in the Mandated Islands. They probably want to know what the world knows about their activities in those islands. Note the date the message was translated.

Trans. 2-3-45

No. 68

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 10, 1941
757.

(Part 1 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my # 725* and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. I explained that I would bend every effort toward the solution of this difficult situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results of the negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United States does not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secretary HULL says that he recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet unless he realizes sufficiently present conditions in East Asia and that we Japanese have been occupied over a period of four and a half years with the China incident, even though he calls us a stabilizing influence, he contradicts himself. Our population is ever increasing. Already we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain their existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotiations began, and during that time, although we have given in as much as we could, the United States sticks to her first proposals and will not bend an inch. This is a most regrettable circumstance. It would seem that there are not a few Japanese who doubt the sincerity of the American Government. Consequently, a further delay would do great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without the loss of a day, we should establish these negotiations.

I hope that the American Government, too, will fully consider all these points and take the large view, settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly believe that there is any other way to settle this perplexing situation.

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*See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 69

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 10, 1941
757.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my # 726* and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the Government and represents he maximum compromise that we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.

"1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in agreement on this score.

"2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.

"3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included in this document are many matters in which Great Britain' interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government of the United States will undertake this."

The American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true situation in detail, so the American Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner."

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*See IV, 25-28.

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 70

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 10, 1941
757.

(Part 3 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

I answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The

feeling in favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat, indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of carrying this out.

"On this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a course is impossible."

At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: "We cannot accept the results of aggression." I refuted him by saying, "The Imperial Government does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore, make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these."

Trans. 11-10-41

No. 71

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 11, 1941
758.

Re my # 757*.

In these talks, the conferences being conducted in Washington are referred to as being "negotiations". The U.S. Ambassador here states that they should be termed "conversations". I, therefore, replied that I thought they were well within the realm of "negotiations" now. The Ambassador seems to have been satisfied with this.

*See IV, 68.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 72

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 10, 1941
1066.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

1. I sent -----* to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a *modus vivendi* if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as "method of living." Although it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.

The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.

Trans. 11-13-41

No. 80

FROM: Tokyo — 11 November 1941
TO: Washington — # 762.

Re your # 1069[a].

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message # 736[b] is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time.

The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U.S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A.

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[a] See IV, 75.
[b] See IV, 44.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 81

FROM: Tokyo — 11 November 1941
TO: Washington — # 763.

Re my 671[a].

With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambas-

sador in Tokyo that in view of the present general relationship between the United States and Japan, it was essential that this matter be given very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation would bear any fruit.

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*See III, 277.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 82

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

11 November 1941
764.

(In 3 parts complete.)

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message # 723*) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U.S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U.S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realize that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week or ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U.S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message #1070[b] (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations, etc.)

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

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[a] See IV, 16.
[b] See IV, 76-79.

Trans. 11-12-41

No. 83

FROM: Washington (Nomura) 11 November 1941
TO: Tokyo #1072.

In paragraph (2) of your message #726[a], in which you explain our Proposal A, you stated that with regard to the matters involving the Tripartite Pact, the United States was "apparently satisfied in general with our proposal and therefore . . ."

In your message #757[b], in which you give us the gist of your explanations to the U.S. Ambassador, you say under paragraph (1) concerning the attitudes of the respective countries with reference to the European War that "we assume that this matter has already been settled with their acceptance of this phase of our proposal of 25 September".

I presume that you took this position to press our claims on this particular point. We are proceeding under this assumption. Actually, however, no agreement has been reached as may be seen from the contents of their "oral statement" of 2 October.

The only comment I ever made in this respect was in my message #995[c] in reporting Wakasugi's conversations with Welles, when it was noted that regarding the Tripartite Pact,

No. 150

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 14, 1941
772.

(Urgent.)

The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today. We have drawn up this proposal in a formal measure including the addendum. (I mean to say the proposal you are to present to the American officials upon instructions from me.) I am sending to you the English text thereof in ensuing message # 773*.

*See IV, 151.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 151

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 14, 1941
773.

(Urgent.)

Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my # 727*.

5. The Japanese Government agrees to withdraw her army, which is at present stationed in French Indo-China, whenever peace shall have been established between Japan and China or a just peace firmly established in the Pacific area.

6. The Japanese Government (agrees ?) that if the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade is to be applied throughout the world the same principle should also be applied to the entire Pacific area, in other words, in China as well.

7. The two governments shall make world peace their common objective and shall cooperate at a suitable time for speedy realization of world peace. However, in dealing with developments prior to the establishment of world peace, the two governments shall act in accordance with the viewpoint of protection and self defense. Furthermore, in the event of the United States' participation in the European war, Japan shall automatically carry out what she understand to be the obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement existing between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Point 7 is identical with what is given in paragraph 2 of our proposal of ----- of this month and does not contain the purport given in the first part of (2) of our Proposal "A". This is for your information.)

*See IV, 29.

Trans. 11-14-41

No. 152

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 15, 1941
779.

Re my # 727*.

No. 117

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 15, 1941
781.

To Ambassador Kurusu.

I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long trip by air. Not only this Minister, but everyone in government circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the exceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I realize that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decline of our nation.

Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to an early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted.

Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U.S. Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible the surmounting of the crisis.

Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Ambassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.

Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from here, we have not as yet presented our "B" proposal to the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit it to them at an early opportunity.

Trans. 11-17-41

No. 118

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 14, 1941
1094.

(To be handled in Government code.)

My interview of the 14th, with Secretary of State HULL, has been postponed until 9:00 a.m. the 15th, to suit their convenience. Furthermore, I have contacted them and arranged an interview with the President for 11:00 a.m. on the 16th for Ambassador KURUSU and myself. (Prior to this interview we plan to pay our respects to Secretary of State HULL.)

Trans. 11-18-41

No. 119

FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

November 15, 1941
1095.

(In 2 parts complete.)

On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:

Kurusu: "If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 'voted down' by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal."

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*Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.

Trans. 11-26-41

No. 162

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 22, 1941
812.

To both your Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my # 736*. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth), if the pertinent notes can be exchanged, if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

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*See IV, 44, Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

Trans. 11-22-41

No. 163

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 24, 1941
823.

For both Ambassadors.

The time limit set in my message # 812* (in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th) is in Tokyo time.

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*See IV, 162.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 170

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1180.

(Extremely urgent.)

(Part 1 of 2.)

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 171

FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1180.

(Extremely Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 2.)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands Indies is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

Trans. 11-28-41

COM16, 291029, November 1941 to CINCPAC
COM14, CINCAF, OPNAV

No. 213

FROM: Rio de Janeiro
TO: Santiago

November 28, 1941[c]
Circular # 326.

(Message from Tokyo, Circular # 2416.)

(To be handled in Government code.)

Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of course, we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.

---

[c] DoD Comment: Note time of translation.

Trans. 12-9-42

No. 214

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

November 28, 1941
844.

Re your # 1189[a].

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your # 1180[b] and he said that under the present circumstance what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

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[a] See IV, 190-191.
[b] See IV, 170-171.

Trans. 11-28-41

In closing this conference, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop requested that the contents of our talks be kept a strict secret. Please, therefore, exercise particular caution in handling this message.

I have shown copies of this message to the military and naval attaché's, Lt-Gen. (Vice Adm. ?) Nomura, and Maj-Gen. (Rear Adm. ?) Abe. Please show a copy to the Army and Navy authorities in Tokyo, too.

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[a] DoD Comment: This is originator's footnote: (In the last section of the first part of this message, we wrote . . . "the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops" . . . That should have read: "the U.S. would undoubtedly try to avoid war".)

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 823

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

November 26, 1941
1370.

I plan to have an interview with HITLER at 2:00 p.m. on the 27th. Please reply if you have any ideas to be presented.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 824

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 27, 1941
981.

Re your # 1370[a].

(To be handled in government code.)

Please convey to him confidentially and in a suitable way the following.

"Japan is going ahead with the Japanese-American negotiations with a dauntless attitude knowning that there may be many difficulties in the future course of the negotiations. However, Japan is exercising every care to see that these negotiations do not in any way affect the validity of the Tripartite Pact."

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[a] See IV, 823.

Trans. 12-6-41

No. 825

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 30, 1941
985.

Re my Circular # 2387[b].

(Part 1 of 3.)[a]

1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message # 986[c].) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination.

Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

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[a] Part 2 not available.
[b] Not available.
[c] See IV, 828.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 826

FROM: Tokyo
TO: Berlin

November 30, 1941
985.

(Part 3 of 3.)

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

5. This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

Trans. 12-1-41

No. 827

FROM: Berlin
TO: Tokyo

December 1, 1941
1396.

Re your # 985[a].

In parenthesis at the end of paragraph 2 of your message referred to in the heading you make reference to a note from the German Ambassador in Tokyo concerning what is to be done in the event of an Anglo-Japanese and an American-Japanese war.

Of the various notes exchanged between Japan and Germany at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, I have copies of three notes on hand. They are:

(1) The note from the German Ambassador regarding the meaning of Article 3 of the Pact:

(2) The note from the (Japanese) Foreign Minister regarding what to do in the event of an Anglo-Japanese War; and

Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.

The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.

Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message # 1133*. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)

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*Not available.

Trans. 11-24-41

No. 148

FROM: Tokyo — November 19, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 2353.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency, (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U.S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East Wind rain).
(2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations—KITANOKAZE KUMORI-(North Wind cloudy).
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE-(West Wind clear).

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Trans. 11-28-41

No. 149

FROM: Tokyo — November 19, 1941
TO: Washington — Circular # 2354.

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U.S. relations, "HIGASHI".
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.)—"NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Trans. 11-26-41

As a result, on 19 November 1941, the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo sent coded message #2353[14] to the Japanese Consulate in Melbourne. It read:

> Owing to the pressure of the international situation, we must be faced with a generally bad situation. In that event, the communication between Japan and the countries opposing her would be severed immediately. Therefore, should we be on the verge of an international crisis we will broadcast twice during the Japanese news broadcast to overseas and at the end of it, the following in the form of a weather report:
>
> Japanese-American crisis: "East wind rain" *(Higashi no kaze ame)*.
>
> Japanese-Russian crisis: "North wind cloudy" *(Kita no kaze kumori)*.
>
> Japanese-British crisis, including the invasion of Thailand, or an attack on Malaya, or the Netherlands East Indies: "West wind clear" *(Nishi no kaze hare)*.
>
> Action should be taken as regards codes and documents in accordance with the above.

List of Important Magic Misinterpretations

Telegrams

This table lists the most serious misinterpretations which affected the decision-making during November 1941.

Tlgrm No.	Date sent	Date trans.	Original message	MAGIC version
725	Nov 4	Nov 4	sincere, careful deliberation	these deliberations
"				to gamble once more [added]
"				the parleys [added]
"				gambled [added]
"				the throw of this die [added]
"			a peaceful adjustment of the situation	[omitted]
"			will face a rupture	will ... be the brink of chaos
"			Strenuous efforts are being made day and night to adjust Japanese-American relations	our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them
"			However, in spite of the fact that the U.S. has stood firm on her own policies the whole time, our government has persistently expressed its sincerity. Our government again ventures to make difficult concessions	Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them
726	Nov 4	Nov 4	the four principles	(4) As a matter of principle, [meaning reversed]
"			saishuteki joho-an (adverb, not adjective), i.e. "final-type" proposal	final proposal

Tlgrm No.	Date sent	Date trans.	Original message	MAGIC version
726				Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non-discrimination in commerce. [added]
"			This should be done with the understanding that the principle of non-discrimination in commerce will be applied to the whole world	we put the question of non-discrimination on a world-wide basis.
"			the United States government in its note of October 2, made reference to the effect that "it would not be wise for either Japan or the United States to adopt one policy in a particular region while adopting an opposing policy in another region"	American Goverenment, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy.
"			If we were to state clearly the necessary period for stationing troops, rather than clarifying the matter, I fear it would confuse the situation.	[omitted]
"				Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. [added]
"			I want you at this time to negotiate strictly on the abstract term "necessary time"	I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euthemize

Tlgrm No.	Date sent	Date trans.	Original message	MAGIC version
726			we should satisfy the desire of the United States	it would please the United States
"			we will respond that we have in mind 25 years.	answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.
"			make every effort to impress them with the fact that we do not intend to station troops indefinitely or permanently	try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation
727	Nov 4	Nov 4		a last effort [added]
735	Nov 5	Nov 5	as a means of overcoming final barriers	our absolutely final proposal
"			approval has not been obtained on the form and expression of past Japanese-American proposals	there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U.S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval
736	Nov 5	Nov 5	deadline "25th" mentioned by Togo as an internal tactic	[not seen by MAGIC]
739	Nov 6	Nov 6		To make it sound good [added]
"				the unhappy relations [added]
757	Nov 10	Nov 10	conclude the negotiations	the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations
"			economic pressure of this type ... [will be] a threat more serious than military force	economic pressure, in addition to being a threat
762	Nov 11	Nov 12	latest proposal	our final proposal
"			Proposal A under our latest instruction	our final Proposal A

Tlgrm No.	Date sent	Date trans.	Original message	MAGIC version
764	Nov 12	Nov 12	depending on what the attitude of Britain and the United States is	A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States
"			to avoid a crisis	to ride out the crisis
773	Nov 14	Nov 14	independently	automatically
781-1	Nov 15	Nov 17	our latest proposal	the final proposal
800	Nov 20	unavail able	independently	[omitted]
812	Nov 22	Nov 22	deadline "29th" mentioned by Togo as an internal tactic	[not seen by MAGIC]
"			going to intensively do its best with sincerity and reason to overcome the current difficult barriers	Stick to your fixed policy and do your best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire
"			"the 29th" mentioned only once	repeated twice; "let me write it out for you — twenty-ninth" [added]
"				"the 25th" [added]
844	Nov 28	Nov 28	very difficult	inevitable, impossible
"			not suitable	entirely unsuitable
985	Nov 30 Tokyo to Berlin	Dec 1	there is a possibility that the time [of a war] might come sooner than expected	quicker than anybody can dream
1180	Nov 26 From Nomura	Nov 28	Majesty	descendants
"			although our making overtures is presumptuous	although we have grave misgivings
"			the Emperor	you [the Foreign Minister]
"			the Emperor's telegram	cordial message

Historiographic Developments

Appendix: Historiographic Developments

The development of the academic investigation into the origins of the Pacific War can be outlined as follows. The holding of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), known as the Tokyo Trial, in 1946-8 was the first opportunity for scholars and others in both Japan and the West to discover the true facts about the chain of events leading up to the last stages of the war. This is particularly true of Japanese political and military covert activities. On the American side, the attempt to uncover the truth was begun immediately after Pearl Harbor, for example, by the Pearl Harbor Joint Committee of the United States Congress.[1] Thus, these attempts began, in the case of America, immediately after the outbreak of the Pacific War and, in the case of Japan, immediately after the end of the Pacific War.

The first influential analyses consequently had appeared by about 1950. The work of Herbert Feis, entitled *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (1950) was among the most important. A subsequent work by Robert J. C. Butow, entitled *Tojo and the Coming of the War* (1961), was another significant study. On the Japanese side, an academic faction called "Maruyama-gaku-ha 丸山学派 (the Maruyama school)", led by Professor Masao Maruyama 丸山真男 of Tokyo University, became the most influential group amongst Japanese scholars up to the early 1960s. These scholars are all naturally influenced, in their historical perspectives, by the conclusion of the Tokyo Trial.

The importance of Feis's work lies in his global view of the historical background to Japanese aggression in the pre-war period from the Meiji Restoration to Pearl Harbor. His analysis was widely accepted as the standard view and is still of some importance. Butow, on the other hand, concentrates on the historical role of certain individual leaders, including Hideki Tojo 東條英機, in Japanese decision-making leading up to the war. He assumes that Tojo and a group of leaders, who were linked through their previous activities in Manchuria, were

the main protagonists on the road to the war. He states, quoting one nickname attached to them, that:

> Together, these five men [including Tojo] ... became known in certain quarters as the "ni-ki san-suke": "the two ki and the three suke" – a reference to the fact that the first names of [Hideki] Tojo and [Naoki] Hoshino ended in the syllable "ki" while those of the other three [Yosuke Matsuoka, Shinsuke Kishi and Yoshisuke Aikawa] ended with "suke" ... It was this quest for power that dominated the minds of the men responsible for Japan's destiny in 1940 and 1941. The fact that Konoe's ministerial roster included three of the "ni-ki san-suke" from Manchuria ... was in itself indicative of the unity of viewpoint which might be achieved.[2]

Thus, Butow quotes and uses such pejorative terms as "the unpredictable Manchurian gang"[3] to describe the Tojo Cabinet as the main protagonists in the war, clearly demonstrating his perspective by echoing the conclusion of the Tokyo Trial. Butow, says Wilfrid Knapp of Oxford University, always depicts Japan as a dominant aggressive power without any genuine interest in negotiation, although he recognises that Japanese claims before the war, for example regarding its rights in Manchuria, had some justification.[4] Thus, the trend of Butow's argument is indicated by the fact that the penultimate chapter preceding a final chapter on "the fate of the man" concludes with the summing up by the prosecution at the Tokyo Trial.[5]

Maruyama, who also echoes the conclusions of the Tokyo Trial, concentrates on analysing the development of social structure and intellectual thought in pre-war Japan. This included the image of the Emperor, the nature of the Meiji Constitution, the structure of national decision-making, and the relationship between central government and regional authorities. As pointed out by Dr. David Williams, Maruyama has been regarded as a "Marxian", partly because Maruyama has not identified himself as a "Marxist" scholar. However, his theory was clearly established on the basis of a Japanese Marxist political theory[6] developed by a faction of scholars called Koza-ha 講座派, which includes Shigeki Toyama 遠山茂樹 and Kiyoshi Inoue 井上清. The Koza-ha perceives the nature of pre-war Japan's capitalism as one developed on the basis of co-operation

between the alliance of military powers and Zaibatsu 財閥 (the great financial combines) and the parasitic landowners exploiting the peasants.

Maruyama analyses the image of the Emperor as the absolute authority of the state of Japan in his work entitled *Cho-Kokka-shugi no Ronri to Shinri* *超国家主義の論理と心理* (Theory and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism). [7] This image included some unique elements. One element was a religious idea often described by the term the "living god", derived from Shinto. Another element was the image of a family representing the state of Japan. In this sense, the Japanese image of the relation between the Emperor on the one hand and the state of Japan and the Japanese population on the other was understood as an analogy of the relation between a father and his family. Maruyama regards these images as pre-modern and unique concepts.

He goes further in maintaining his assumption that pre-war Japan constituted (and to a certain extent post-war Japan still does) a unique and backward society among the major powers, in contrast with the advanced Western countries, which constitute universal and highly civilised societies. This was because his analysis of the nature and structure of the state of pre-war Japan developed as an extension of his views with regard to the Japanese image of the Emperor mentioned above. Pre-war Japan was a state which, in Maruyama's perspective, can be summarised as follows.

The power of the Imperial Diet, particularly the House of Representatives, was weak in contrast with the equivalent in the West, while the influence of the Emperor and his surrounding bureaucrats, the military leaders, the Genro and some other leaders in decision-making was in practice much stronger than that of the political parties. This state of affairs was possible partly because of the political structure under the Meiji regime in which the power of the House of Peers was much stronger than that of the House of Representatives. The role of the regional authorities was also tightly controlled by the central government. The central government heavily intervened in the individual's life through the

control of education, and maintained powerful authority over the country using the image of the Emperor's absolute authority. The political system which combined those elements resulted in the creation of little room for encouraging effective civilian movements for democracy, and the authorities could relatively easily suppress them if such movements began. This was particularly noticeable after the movement for popular rights (minken undo 民権運動) of the early Meiji period declined and the Meiji Constitution was subsequently promulgated on February 11th, 1889. Thus, Maruyama on the one hand considers that the leaders from the ruling class in pre-war Japan were in reality the group most responsible for leading Japan to the Pacific War, and on the other hand, he has attempted to locate the long-term origins of the Pacific War in Japan's pre-modern type of pre-war social elements. On the basis of his historical perspective, he has suggested the need for Japan's modernisation, modelled on Western societies.

Maruyama's views concentrating particularly on the negative aspects of pre-war Japan are not incompatible with those of some influential leaders of opinion such as Shigeki Toyama, known as a Koza-ha Marxist, and Saburo Ienaga 家永三郎, known as a Marxian. These are among those who support Maruyama's views after the war, although their works have not been widely presented in Western languages, in contrast with a whole volume of Maruyama's works in the West. Maruyama's views on the unique structure of pre-war Japan have naturally been echoed by some important scholars in the West. Thus, Professor Richard Storry of Oxford University, for example, wrote in 1956 that "It should be noted that Japanese never accorded foreign monarchs the title of 'Tenno'. They were known as 'Kotei', a word of the highest respect but lacking the supreme force of Tenno. For the Emperor of Japan was unique".[8] It is clear, in his statement, that he supported Maruyama's opinion that the pre-war Japanese had an image of the Emperor as the absolute authority of the state.

In fact, such images of the Emperor reflected the ideas derived from the political ideology called "Kokka Shinto 国家神道 (National Shintoism)", and were perhaps close to the actual image of the Emperor which could be observed among the Japanese at least during the war years from the 1930s up to the early 1940s. Some scholars go further. For example, Takeshi Ishida 石田雄, one of the scholars of the Maruyama school, extended Maruyama's theory, tracing back the history of pre-war Japan's society not only to the 1930s but to the late Meiji period, in his publication entitled *Meiji Seiji Shiso-shi Kenkyu 明治政治思想史研究* (A Study of the History of Meiji Political Thought)[9] of 1954.

However, it is recognised as a weak point of Maruyama's work that he has not used many primary sources and data. Thus, it was natural that the availability of primary sources since the late 1960s led to a wholesale re-appraisal of earlier analyses including works by the Maruyama school. This re-appraisal of the concepts of the previous studies has, particularly since about 1970, covered various aspects of pre-war Japan.

Some scholars, for example, have questioned the accuracy of the image of the Emperor drawn by the Maruyama school and by its supporters. While they recognise that this image was to some extent similar to the one accepted at the popular level during the period of the China Incident and the subsequent Pacific War (from the late 1930s to the early half of the 1940s), they have found quite a different image in pre-war Japan throughout the period since the Meiji Restoration. Thus, on the basis of quite precise analysis using contemporary documentary evidence such as personal diaries, Carol Gluck concludes, in her work entitled *Japan's Modern Myths* of 1985, that "it is possible to discern the general outlines of the people's view of the Emperor. First ... by the end of the Meiji period virtually all Japanese were conscious of the Emperor's existence for the first time in Japanese history ... they knew what he looked like ... because he had been portrayed in such concrete and visible posture". Gluck also notes that "the popular image of the Meiji Emperor was often quite human and personal ... In

addition, the combination of his constitutional, his ceremonial invocation in the Army, the schools ... and his statesman like image in war conspired to make of him a regal and symbolic figure associated with the Meiji achievement of civilization."[10] Some works of Masaki Hirota and of Masao Tsutsui 筒井正夫 support Gluck's views.[11]

Some scholars have recognised the need to make a clear distinction between National Shintoism and traditional Shinto 神道. While the former is a political ideology developed in the twentieth century, becoming influential particularly after the 1920s and forming a part of pre-war Japan's ultra-nationalistic ideals, the latter is a quite peaceful religion derived from Japan's ancient culture.

For example, while Storry wrote in the 1950s that "The weight of opinion was against the distinction, often drawn by Christians, between spiritual and temporal spheres of life. Fujisawa Chikao, a scholar and writer holding extreme nationalist views, remarked: In contradistinction to Japan ... in the West ... God and man have been separated and the ideal and the real, soul and flesh, the divine and the secular, never harmonise with one another",[12] Professor Ryoen Minamoto 源了圓 concludes in his work in the 1980s, on the basis of his careful study of the history of Japanese intellectual thought, that this monistic conception is not necessarily unique to the ultra-nationalists, but has been part of Japanese thinking for thousands of years. Some scholars including Minamoto have noted the peaceful value of this monistic concept, pointing out its similarity to the newly emerging ideas on ecology. In fact, the discovery of the theory of "niche segregation" was made by an ecologist, Professor Kinji Imanishi 今西錦司, on the basis of traditional monistic thought.[13]

Concerning the role of ideological and religious factors in the society of pre-war Japan, the contemporary situation was quite complicated. Despite Storry's assumption that National Shintoism was the main force encouraging pre-war Japan's nationalistic behaviour, some military leaders of opinion, including Kanji

Ishihara 石原莞爾, the main planner of the Manchurian Incident of 1931, were influenced by the Nichiren 日蓮 sect of Buddhism, and two of the five members of "the 'ni-ki san-suke' from Manchuria", Naoki Hoshino 星野直樹 and Yosuke Matsuoka 松岡洋右, were Christians.

Professor Junji Banno 板野潤治 analysed, in his 1971 work entitled *Meiji-Kenpo Taisei no Kakuritsu 明治憲法体制の確立* (The Establishment of the Meiji Constitutional System),[14] the strength of the rights and the power of the Imperial Diet, including that of the House of Representatives, and the influence of the political parties on decision-making under the Meiji Constitution. Sadao Ariizumi 有泉貞夫 emphasised, in his *Meiji Seiji no Kiso Katei 明治政治の基礎過程* (The Foundation of Meiji Politics),[15] published in 1980, the active role of the regional authorities from the 1890s onwards. The works of Daikichi Irokawa 色川大吉 in 1973[16] and Yoshio Yasumaru 安丸良夫 in 1974[17] are examples of studies of the quite active resistance, through popular movements, to the authorities in pre-war Japan. They have found that the authorities of central government often had to take into account the demands of those popular movements at that time. Thus, these scholarly works of the 1970s and 1980s and many others stress the existence of universal elements in pre-war Japan's social structure rather than the "unique" ones emphasised by the Maruyama school and its supporters.[18]

On this global background of a change in academic thinking, the study of the origins of the Pacific War has also evolved, mainly on the basis of increasingly available sources, including newly discovered primary materials. This has inevitably led to much discussion on the historical perspectives presented at the Tokyo Trial.

For example, the assumption of a similarity between the regimes of Nazi Germany and pre-war Japan began to be questioned. Professor John Whitney Hall of Yale University stated in 1971 that:

> The I.R.A.A. [the Imperial Rule Assistance Association] ... was typically Japanese in its composition and style of activity and differed fundamentally from its European counter part. Not a party used to gain support in taking over the government, it was essentially the reverse, a mechanism by which Japan's leaders sought to

create a facade of national consensus. Thus the Association had no active agents and relied very little on rallies and speech making ... Thus while in Germany the Nazi party first seized control of government, then created a totalitarian state, and then went to war, Japan's "defense state [Kokubo Kokka 国防国家]" resulted from a reaction to an existing war [with China] and growing sense of national insecurity ... the resulting pattern of national regimentation differed greatly from the German and Italian models.[19]

Professor Takashi Ito 伊藤隆 of Tokyo University introduced, in his work published in 1976, the new term "Kakushin-ha 革新派 (the reformist faction)" to refer to the group which came to power after the 2.26 Uprising of 1936. This term, replacing the term "Fascist" or "Fascism", began to be used quite often by historians as an analytical tool to better understand pre-war Japan's political history in contrast with its counterparts in Europe, i.e. German Nazism and Italian Fascism. Some politicians, including Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe 近衛文麿 and the members of the Army faction known as the "Tosei-ha 統制派 (Tosei faction)", competing with the "Kodo-ha 皇道派 (Kodo faction)", were among those who belonged to the reformist faction.

Scholars such as Gerhard Krebs of Freiburg University have used this analytical tool in their works. It became possible for them to analyse various elements within a group defined as reformist, such as the reformist faction of the Foreign Office, the reformist bureaucrats, the Shakai-Taishu-To 社会大衆党 (The Society and the Masses Party) in addition to the Tosei faction of the Army.

John Pritchard has studied the documents of the Tokyo Trial; Peter Calvocoressi commented in 1988 that:

he [Pritchard] amplifies and corrects our picture of Japan which ... becomes historically intelligible rather than simply demoniacal ... he digs deep into the reasons why Japan ran amok in China and exhibited in this century a savagery untypical of Japan in the nineteenth century. He examines relevant features of the Japanese constitution, the nature and consequences of the factional fighting between the Japanese army and navy, and the roots of Japanese extremism. While stressing the importance of the Manchurian Incident and the transformation of Manchukuo into an industrial and colonial powerhouse, he portrays this extraordinary achievement in terms of Japanese creativity ... He brings out the significance for Japan of Russian activities in northern Asia, from the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway a hundred years ago to murderous Russian comeback in Manchuria in 1945.[20]

George F. Kennan stated in 1951 that:

As for Japan, the problem of whether she had also to be ranged against us [the Americans] in war in the early 1940's was of course primarily our problem ... It is a tremendous subject in itself, relatively remote from the causes of the war in Europe ... To discuss this problem at all adequately would be to discuss the entire sequence of American-Japanese relations over the half-century preceding the outbreak of war in the Pacific ... a policy carefully and realistically aimed at the avoidance of a war with Japan and less encumbered with other motives would certainly have produced a line of action considerably different from that which we actually pursued and would presumably have led to quite different results.[21]

Regarding this subject, Robert Butow reaches the same conclusion in his work entitled *The John Doe Associates — Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941* (1974): "War in the Pacific was not inevitable in 1941".[22] Kennan has also commented on Roosevelt's foreign policy that "Had FDR been determined to avoid war with the Japanese if at all possible, he would have conducted American policy quite differently ... than he actually did".[23]

Robert Dallek has given a different view stating that : "This [Kennan's] picture of Roosevelt's options leaves out the domestic context in which he had to operate. The struggle against fascism in American minds was indelibly linked with China's fight against Japan. Though mindful of the advantage of concentrating American power against Berlin, Roosevelt also appreciated that opposition to Japan was an essential part of the moral imperative Americans saw for fighting". Thus, Dallek emphasises that "Roosevelt could not discriminate between Germany and Japan", even if he wished to do so, because of the American social atmosphere.[24] On the other hand, Paul W. Schroeder has stated that the link between Germany and Japan "was revived as an issue by the American diplomats because it was expected to be useful in selling the anticipated war with Japan to the American ... public which might find it hard to understand and accept".[25] Thus, the question of "cause and effect" has remained.

Several works have been published since the Tokyo Trial, attempting to prove that Roosevelt made a political decision to manoeuvre Japan into attacking Pearl Harbor. Among the better known in Japan of the works published by those "revisionists" are *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* by Charles A. Beard, *Design for War* by Frederic R. Samborn, "Back Door to War" by Charles C.

Tansill, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor* by Robert A. Theobald and *Admiral Kimmel's Story* by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel who was Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, no conclusive evidence has been found either to support or deny this theory up to the present.[26]

In the West, however, as observed by Abraham Ben-Zvi of the Hebrew University, "scholars today [1979] agree that all revisionist writers failed to build a solid case for their position" and "most analysts" have generally accepted that "the Roosevelt administration did not intentionally 'goad the enemy into firing the first shot'".[27] In this connection, it is interesting that Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto have regarded the work of Paul Schroeder published in 1958 as "a revisionist study".[28] If the term "revisionists" means, as generally understood by historians including Ben-Zvi, the supporters of the "back door to war" theory, Borg and Okamoto are obviously misled because Schroeder clearly states that "the opinion here to be developed ... is that the American policy from the end of July to December was a grave mistake" but the "'back door to war' theory ... is quite different and quite incredible".[29]

Robert Dallek has commented on Schroeder's work more correctly, comparing it with the works of Feis and Anthony Kubek: "Feis's volume has sometimes been labelled as 'official history'" because of "its sympathetic portrayal of the Roosevelt Administration's politics"[30] while "Kubek [is] an articulate exponent of the revisionist critique of Roosevelt diplomacy",[31] and in contrast, "Paul Schroeder takes a middle ground between Feis and Kubek".[32] The author, however, agrees with another comment made by Borg and Okamoto: Schroeder's study is "a thoroughly scholarly work that has justly received considerable attention" but he "had no particular expertise in the Asian field" and "he dealt chiefly with events in America".[33]

In the case of Kubek, he was well aware of the historical significance of Russo-Japanese conflicts in the North-East frontier. He stated in his work published in 1963 that:

> A vital issue, as far as Japan was concerned, was whether Communism would triumph in China and bring this vast domain with its teeming millions under the dominion of Moscow ... It was apparent to Japanese statesmen that unless bastions of defense were built in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, Communism would spread through all of North China and seriously threaten the security of Japan. To the Japanese, expansion in Manchuria was a national imperative ... But this fact was not recognized by the American Government after the close of World War I.[34]

In one respect, he has accurately understood the strategy of the Japanese Army, whose continuous priority was preparation against the Russian threat, and noted that "The United States had its danger zone in the Caribbean ... So Japan regarded Manchuria". However, he has obviously tended to over-emphasise the seriousness of the Japanese sense of a threat of "Communism". Although it is true that the Japanese tried "to check the flow of the Red tide"[35] after the establishment of the Communist regime in Moscow, the reality is that the Japanese, particularly the members of the Army, have traditionally felt a deep fear of Russian expansion, whatever regime was in power. Consequently, he has overlooked a far more significant factor, Japan's sense of "Russo-phobia", which was inherited from the period much earlier than the emergence of Communist power. Furthermore, partly because of his strong tone of anti-Communism, Kubek's view has often been seen as, to use Dallek's word, "extreme".[36]

It is by more recent studies, such as Ben-Zvi's publications entitled *Prelude to Pearl Harbor* (1979)[37] and *The Illusion of Deterrence* (1987)[38] and Waldo Heinrichs's *Threshold of War* (1988),[39] that the analysis of the causes of the strategic misjudgement in the formation of American decision-making has been remarkably improved. Ben-Zvi, for instance, has reached the conclusion that "the study of American images of Japan before Pearl Harbor is a study of convictions that failed to correspond to reality".[40] but again they have no particular expertise in the field of Japan's decision-making.

In contrast, the work of Jun Tsunoda 角田順 of the National Diet Library is one of the most prestigious in the latter field. He has studied the course of Japan's decisions leading up to Pearl Harbor, and has critically analysed the important factors such as Ryoron-heiki 両論併記 and Sakubun 作文. He has noted from the early 1960s that the attitude of the Japanese leaders in favour of "Sakubun Kokusaku no Sakubun-ka 国策の作文化 [converting a serious National Policy document to merely a Sakubun] became characteristic [in the decision-making] during the Konoe Era".[41]

As noted by Professor Akira Fujiwara 藤原彰, it is true that the onset of the Pacific War , unlike that of previous conflicts, such as the Manchurian Incident and the Sino-Japanese War, was the result of the central authorities' decision to open hostilities. Fujiwara has analysed Japan's decision-making procedures mainly from a legal point of view, and concludes that "the procedure of decision [to go to war] was, at least in form, completed" by the decision-makers prior to Pearl Harbor, although they had "commonly recognised the likelihood of losing a war".[42] Fujiwara's analysis of the "Record of Private Lectures by the Showa Emperor", which was newly discovered in the early 1990s, has not changed this conclusion.

To answer the question of why and how the Japanese eventually reached such a desperate conclusion, Western observers have added little to the statement which had already been made by Ambassador Joseph Grew before the outbreak of the war: "Japanese sanity could not be measured by our standards of logic".[43] Thus, a study of Japanese decision-making, including the factors of Ryoron-heiki and Sakubun in close detail, should be recognised as essential for a better understanding of the events, otherwise Japan's actions will remain merely "alien" to Western observers. Under the circumstances, it is natural that Tsunoda's analysis has been further developed by a number of researchers in Japanese academic circles.

Scholars analysing Japan's politics in the late 1930s and early 1940s have noted the serious political problem of the evasion of decision-making in pre-war Japan. Minami Yoshizawa 吉沢南, for example, has analysed the process of decision-making in respect of the occupation of French Indo-China, and introduced a new term "Ryoron-heiritsu-teki Chitsujo 両論並立的秩序" (the order stabilised by maintaining Ryoron-heiki) in his work published in 1986.[44] Tetsuya Sakai 酒井哲哉 has published a series of works since 1987 analysing pre-war Japan's political decision-making system, and has argued that the increasing influence of the military's power resulted in a lack of national control, rather than the establishment of a totalitarian control system, because the military's power itself had eventually fallen apart into various divisions.[45]

Some scholarly works on Japan's decision-making prior to Pearl Harbor, including those of Shin'ishi Kamata 鎌田伸一 of the National Institute for Defence Studies, entitled "The Garbage Can Analysis of the Japanese-American Crisis, 1940-1941", and of Atsushi Moriyama 森山優 of Kyushu University, entitled "Evasion of Decision Making" (1991), have echoed these views. Kamata studies the pre-war political mechanism which created such remarkable indecisiveness in policy-making, using an American theory on organizational choice.[46] At the same time, some significant analyses of American decision-making prior to Pearl Harbor have also been published, such as *Japan Prepares for Total War — The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* by Michael A. Barnhart, in 1987.[47] Barnhart emphasised the links between Japan's foreign policy of securing a stable economic security and subsequent American political actions. However, the former group, including Tsunoda, Yoshizawa, Sakai, Kamata and others, have not studied American policy-making intensively, while American scholars including Barnhart have no particular expertise in the field of Japan and the Japanese language.

The assumption at the Tokyo Trial that the pre-war peace-feelers were neither serious nor significant has also been questioned by some scholars. As

Professor Hiroaki Shiozaki 塩崎弘明 points out, the investigation was originally studied mainly from the standpoint of why and how the war began, and of who was responsible for causing it, not from the standpoint of why pre-war efforts towards averting it eventually failed. The various scholarly studies written from the latter standpoint appeared relatively recently,[48] particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, thanks again to the recent increasing availability of primary source material. This has accelerated from the end of the Cold War, partly because of the declassification of some important materials by the governments of the major countries which participated in the war, and partly because of a new openness in taboo areas due to dramatic changes in the international environment and the advent of a new generation.

For instance, some remarkable studies about Manchuria and Manchukuo, previously regarded as taboo subjects, have begun to be published using documents recorded by the research section of the South Manchuria Railway Company. As Tetsuo Imura 井村哲郎 of the Institute of Developing Economies[49] states, while the U.S. Library of Congress published *Manchuria: an annotated bibliography* in 1951, Japanese studies on the subject have developed only since the early 1980s.[50]

Serious study of the peace talks, including the activities of John Doe Associates, was also a relatively taboo subject at the Tokyo Trial, because the view that Japan had serious intentions of trying to reach an agreement with the U.S. was not compatible with her aggressive image as presented at the Court.

Robert Dallek, in his 1979 work *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, frankly asserts that manipulative American foreign policy was partly responsible for causing the "surprise" attack on Pearl Harbor. In his work entitled *The Issue of War* (1985), Christopher Thorne points out that racial conflict should be taken into account as an important factor in the Pacific War. Similarly, *War without Mercy* (1986) by John W. Dower points out the

Eurocentric tendencies of Western views towards the issues of the Pacific War, including those of post-war Western studies. Dower states that:

> In the final analysis, it is difficult to deny that the Western Allies in general tended to regard the Japanese as a race — virtually a species — apart ... the brutalization of Caucasian prisoners by the Japanese raised cries for vengeance to fever pitch in both the Commonwealth and the United States; and despite the massive scale of German atrocities, it remained generally argued that the Japanese were by nature unusually callous and cruel ... Against such a treacherous, atrocious, and fanatical enemy, it was argued, the Allies had no recourse but to wage a war without mercy in turn ... Yet ... How, for example, did the Japanese themselves perceive the struggle? The question, although not often asked in the West, is simple ... In Japanese propaganda, it was Westerners who were duplicitous and barbaric — preaching democracy while practicing power politics and imperialist exploitation ... To the chagrin and alarm of the Europeans and Americans, many non-Japanese Asians actively or passively supported Japan's condemnation of the West ... We can never hope to understand the nature of World War Two in Asia, or international and interracial conflict in general, if we fail to constantly work at correcting and re-creating the historical memory ...[51]

This argument in particular was previously regarded as taboo immediately after the end of the war.

On the other hand, many important works have been published examining the origins of the war with regard to international affairs, particularly from the point of view of diplomatic and strategic factors. Sumio Hatano of the University of Tsukuba stated in 1989 that "The basic archival materials relevant to research in the 1930's have progressively been opened to scholars, especially in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany and Japan. In most recent studies relating to the theme of this issue, a notable trend which can be observed lies in the growing tendency to research both the nature of the Anglo-American relations in East Asia and the foreign policy making process of the great powers as deeply as possible".[52] Hatano notes that the outbreak of the Pacific War was not simply an inevitable consequence of the expansion of the China Incident but the result of complicated international relations between Japan, Britain, the United States, Germany and Italy in a global context, including the War in Europe.

Professor Chihiro Hosoya 細谷千博 has argued, particularly since the establishment of Anglo-Japanese joint studies in July 1979, that the origins of the Pacific War could be found in the discord and incompatibility of British and

American foreign policies towards East Asia. In this sense, he has noted that the feasibility of reaching a diplomatic agreement prior to Pearl Harbor lay in practice in Anglo-Japanese relations rather than in U.S.-Japanese relations. *Betrayal at Pearl Harbor — How Churchill Lured Roosevelt into War* was published in 1991 by James Rusbridger and Eric Nave, the latter being directly involved in the work of breaking the Japanese Naval codes.[53] The important historical fact revealed by this book is, as noted by Hosoya, that British intelligence officers successfully decoded the top coded messages of the Japanese Navy called "JN-25" in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack, although the British and American authorities have strongly denied the possibility of this for more than four decades since the war. Concerning the immediate origin of the Pacific War, this is a significant publication, but again Rusbridger and Nave failed to give any evidence to prove their speculation that Churchill "lured Roosevelt into war".

On the other hand, Hosoya believes that, although it has been known that Churchill was pleased by the news of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and by subsequent American participation in the war against Germany,

> Churchill would have wished to avoid a military conflict with Japan, and would have welcomed choosing the better way for the British Empire, if any, to lead American participation in the War in Europe passing through the "front door" rather than through the "back door" [risking the security of the British territories in East Asia] ... The Japanese wished to avert a war with the United States, if it were possible ... The sense of crisis about the threat posed by Ch'ing China had dominated Japanese society just before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War [of 1894-5], then similarly a fear of Russia dominated Japan before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War [of 1904-5], however, no noticeable anti-American popular movements could be seen before the outbreak of the Pacific War.[54]

The author respects the various works previously published since the war and intends to add his academic contribution to them. The purpose of his analysis, using sources such as *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor* and *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho*, which have not been fully compared until recently, is to examine the possibility that the Pacific War could have been averted had better communications been established between the participants. He analyses the

mistranslation and misinterpretation problems, focusing on the role of Magic in the U.S.-Japan peace talks in 1941.

Some writers, such as Ronald Lewin in his work *The American Magic — Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of Japan* (1982), have praised the role of Magic in helping the United States to victory.[55] On the other hand, scholars including Professor Toshikazu Kase 加瀬俊一[56] and Professor Shinji Sudo 須藤眞志 have noted the negative role of the Magic mistranslations in worsening U.S.-Japan relations prior to the outbreak of the conflict.[57] However, the latter have not concentrated on the particular effect of these mistranslations on the peace talks.

Roberta Wohlstetter is aware that several observers have pointed out the issue of misinterpretations in Magic. She states that "They [the Japanese] have pointed out ... how their secret diplomatic messages were incorrectly interpreted because our decoders had not translated them accurately",[58] but she has regarded it as merely "Japanese responses to American criticism" centring "on justification of this particular part of their war plan [Pearl Harbor attack]", and emphasises that "The point of such exchanges [including the argument of misinterpretation] becomes largely irrelevant if the basic Japanese war plan is considered" on "the basis of the Japanese data made available since the close of the war".[59] The same writer, however, asserts in the same work in 1962, sixteen years after the publication of a large part of the original messages in Japanese: "Our decision-makers were dependent on the translations with which they were presented, and the present analysis will be confined to the signals in that form".[60] Thus, it has been acceptable to continue to refuse to examine the original texts and compare them with the translated version, and at the same time to dismiss any argument on the misinterpretation issue as being merely an apologist view. Under the circumstances, on the Japanese side questions are evaded in the general literature partly for this reason, namely the continuing sensitivity with regard to pre-war events in Japanese politics and culture.

The author aims to demonstrate the decisive role played by the Magic information in the last stages of the talks as one of the immediate origins of the Pacific War. In this sense the author does not claim to cover every single message on a word-for-word basis; the primary aim is, rather, to prove that there were specific instances when Magic information decisively blocked the way to an agreement.

The issue of Magic mistranslation was first raised at the Tokyo Trial when the prosecution presented the materials to the Court. The purpose of the prosecution in presenting the materials was to use them as firm evidence to prove that the Japanese intended to open hostilities against the U.S. while using the opportunity of the peace negotiations to conceal their preparations for war. This was the stance of the American authorities, maintained since President Roosevelt announced immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack:

> Yesterday, December 7, 1941 ... the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The United States was at peace with that Nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific ... [it is] obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago [by the Japanese].[61]

Serious mistranslations, however, were recognised at the Court, and the volume of materials presented on this occasion was eventually limited in order to diminish their importance.

Scholarly works on Magic were published after the Tokyo Trial. The work of Roberta Wohlstetter entitled *Pearl Harbor — Warning and Decision*, published in 1962, stands out among them. However, as already mentioned, Wohlstetter used only the Magic materials, i.e. the English versions translated from the Japanese diplomatic messages, not the original messages in Japanese, and thus failed to be fully aware of the mistranslation issue. The following year, a scholar of the University of Washington, Jackson Noyes Huddleston Jr., attempted to analyse the Magic materials in depth, comparing them with the Japanese originals and concentrated on revealing the seriousness of the mistranslations and

misinterpretations in the light of their significance in interrupting the efforts to reach an agreement between the United States and Japan.

However, the unusual difficulties which Huddleston faced at that time were stated in his thesis:

> In order to judge the quality of intercepts and decoding, one would have to have access to the MAGIC file. The location of this file is not exactly known. It is somewhere in an Intelligence library in or near Washington, D.C. Mrs. Roberta Wohlstetter, whose definitive study on Pearl Harbor was published last year, informed me that the MAGIC file exists but added: "What you should know is that access to MAGIC will automatically disqualify you for writing or speaking on the subject. This is a strict rule of Intelligence. It took me about a year to be convinced about this ..."[62]

Under the circumstances, Huddleston eventually decided to give up publishing his work in 1963. Consequently, it has not been made public up to the present. In this context, the author thinks it worthwhile to introduce part of Huddleston's work in this thesis, since some part of his work is still important despite the later publication of *The "Magic" Background of Pearl Harbor* in 1978 by the Department of Defense in Washington, and the subsequent declassification of the original Magic materials.

Although the original Magic documents were finally declassified under Executive Order 12065, authorised by President Carter, and scholarly attention was paid to them immediately afterwards, there are still serious difficulties as stated by Rusbridger and Nave:

> In 1980, the U.S. National Security Agency suddenly declassified over 130,000 pages of wartime Magic decrypts. This was done in a haphazard fashion so that researchers were confronted with marching rows of anonymous gray cardboard boxes on the thirteenth floor of the National Archives in Washington. As these were in no particular order, it was a matter of luck that anyone came across anything of interest.[63]

The author has found that some materials presented at the Tokyo Trial were not included in the new publication of 1978, which indicates that certain materials, not published as yet by the American authorities, still exist. On the other hand, the original Japanese messages were published by the Foreign Office in 1946 and then in 1990. The author has found materials which have not been

published yet and has analysed them at the Public Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in addition to analysing the materials already published.

In his work of 1961, Professor Butow dismissed the Magic mistranslations as having no importance, arguing that the U.S. was guided by Japanese actions, not words.[64] However, the contents of *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* and of many American leaders' testimonies analysed by Huddleston in the light of the role of Magic in contemporary decision-making are incompatible with Butow's statement.

The author wishes to introduce recent, as yet unpublished, works by American scholars John Taylor of the Modern Military Section of the National Archives, Washington D.C., and John Slonaker of the Historical Research Branch of the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Philadelphia, who are now engaged in the detailed investigation of the Magic messages. Professor Butow is also planning to publish a new book on the subject.

The author recognises the need to touch on the historical activities of the members of the John Doe Associates in the U.S.-Japan peace talks. In fact, the peace talks were originally led by these non-official members from both the United States and Japan. Their activities have, however, been both severely criticised and highly valued.

Their activities as peace-feelers were concluded to be insignificant at the Tokyo Trial. This view has been supported by the U.S. State Department, as well as by the Japanese Foreign Office despite many disagreements over events at the time of the negotiations, which still remain between the two sides. The work of Professor Kase, former Secretary to the Foreign Minister during the U.S.-Japan peace negotiations, entitled *Nihon Gaiko-shi 23 — Nichi-Bei Kosho* (A History of Japan's Foreign Policy Vol. 23 — U.S.-Japan Negotiations), published in 1970, can be seen as a representative publication of the contemporary stance of the Foreign Office. The members of the John Doe Associates, in Kase's view, worsened the already unstable U.S.-Japan relations although they themselves perhaps intended

to serve for peace. Kase emphasises that they, particularly Tadao Ikawa 井川忠雄, exaggerated their own status and misled the talks from the outset. Professor Butow published his analysis of the Drought documents, entitled *The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace 1941*, in 1974 and maintains the view vis-a-vis the John Doe Associates that they added great confusion to the already difficult U.S.-Japan relations despite their own serious aspirations to bring about peace.[65] In this sense, Butow's view is similar to that of Kase. Although the author agrees with Butow's conclusion that "War in the Pacific was not inevitable", he does not share the view expressed in a subsequent statement made by Butow: "the backdoor diplomacy of the John Doe Associates made an amicable settlement of the Far Eastern crisis harder to obtain. Drought, Iwakuro, and Wikawa were a distracting and disruptive element".[66] Just as Butow has over-emphasised the role of certain individuals, such as the "ni-ki san-suke", in the run up to the Pacific War, so has he tended to over-emphasise the negative effect of certain individuals, "the John Doe Associates", on the U.S.-Japanese negotiations. The more important factor responsible for causing the war was the cumulative misconceptions which prevailed, both American and Japanese.

Professor Shinji Sudo maintains a relatively cautious view and does not immediately dismiss the positive peace-feeling role of the John Doe Associates, although he recognises that some exaggerations of Ikawa's caused a certain confusion in the talks. In contrast, Professor Takashi Ito and Professor Shiozaki have analysed Ikawa's historical record of the U.S.-Japan negotiations and emphasise in their 1982 publication that Ikawa's activities were in reality quite important and tightly linked with the Japanese top decision-makers, the reformist faction including Prime Minister Konoe and the Tosei faction of the Army.[67]

This was a significant discovery because they could argue that Ikawa's activities were supported by both the Konoe Cabinet and the Tosei faction of the Army, which needed to reach an agreement with the United States for resolving the exhausting China Incident. Shiozaki has also used the Drought Papers and

Walsh Papers at the library of the Maryknoll Society in New York and the Walker Papers at Notre Dame University in addition to Ikawa's record, and has argued that Drought's activities were part of American global foreign policies aiming to support Britain in the War in Europe while maintaining stable relations with Japan in the Pacific. In this context, he emphasises the importance of Sir William Wiseman's activities encouraging closer relations between Britain and America. Thus, Ito and Shiozaki have pointed out that there was definitely a possibility of reaching an agreement between the United States and Japan through the talks originally initiated by the John Doe Associates, including Drought and Ikawa, because of the political needs recognised by both governments.

On the other hand, while the scholarly analyses of the long-term origins of the Pacific War have recently become more refined, it is worthwhile noting that, as Alvin D. Coox states in his 1991 work, both Japanese and American people and scholars express far less interest in the events surrounding Pearl Harbor as compared with the situation immediately after the war. Coox notes that he was the only scholar, among those who received the sponsorship of the Japan Foundation in 1990-91, who studied the subject. This was despite "the total of 73 scholars who were sponsored including 33 Americans, 9 Chinese and Koreans, 7 Australians and Canadians, 5 Britons and Germans, 4 French and one Russian." He also states that "The American government did not express its interest in the subject in the year of the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor ... and few academic studies have been published recently". Coox notes that the most important work is even now the one "published in 1961 — thirty years ago ... *Tojo and the Coming of the War* by Butow".[68] This despite the increasing availability of primary source materials in Japanese published after Butow's work, including the publication of Ikawa's historical record of the U.S.-Japan negotiations and of *Nihon Gaiko Bunsho — Nichi-bei Kosho 1941* (Japanese Foreign Affairs Documents — U.S.-Japan Negotiations in 1941) by the Foreign Ofice in 1990.

Similarly, Ben-Zvi has stated in his work on the origins of the Pacific War that "this heated debate of the late forties and early fifties seems to be almost totally forgotten", but this "should by no means imply that all facets of this subject have been dealt with and are fully explained".[69] Saki Dockrill observes as recently as 1994:

> historians could not even agree on when the war started or what it should be called ... historians are unable to agree on a number of key issues: the impact of Japan's decision to conclude the tripartite pact in September 1940 on her subsequent decision to go to war with the Western allies or the importance to be attached to the proposed and abortive summit conference between Prince Fumimaro Konoe ... and President Roosevelt during the summer and autumn of 1941. Whether in fact the war between Japan and the United States which started in December 1941 was inevitable or when Japan had reached the point of no return remain contentious issues. There are a number of other possible turning points — Japan's invasion of Indo-China in 1940-41, the American imposition of a total oil embargo on Japan on 1 August 1941 and the failure of Japanese-American diplomacy with the despatch of the "Hull Note" of 26 November 1941 [70]

If the views of Coox and Ben-Zvi are correct, it means that the experts' perspectives of the history of the Pacific War have changed little in the West, despite the more recent publications of Heinrichs and others who have added significant scholarly analysis on the subject. This contrasts with the situation in Japan. As already stated above, quite a large volume of important studies have naturally been published in Japan as the availability of primary source material has increased. During his study for this thesis, the author himself has come to realise that quite a large number of recent works published in Japanese have not yet been translated into Western languages. The possibility that linguistic difficulties could cause, in the long-run, another perception gap between Western and Japanese people about historical events should be considered. The author wishes to present his contribution to the study of this perception gap in the hope of minimising its effect.

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Maps

Maps

It goes without saying that political and military developments in the area of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria were very complex, and it would be unwise to try to understand them without taking into account the history of non-Chinese ethnic struggles in the region. What is now thought of as modern China has existed only since the middle of the eighteenth century, when it reached its peak under Manchu rule.

There has been a certain perception gap towards the image of China between East and West. The first three maps which follow are taken from textbooks for Japanese High Schools. These kinds of maps inform the general view that the Japanese have of China. The first map shows China in the thirteenth century, representing the periods when the Chinese continent was ruled by several major ethnic groups, later conquered by non-Han Chinese powers, i.e. the Mongols and then the Manchus.

The second map shows the territories of the Manchu Empire at its peak in the eighteenth century. The third map shows the territory of the People's Republic of China, established after the Second World War. The latter two maps show the Chinese territory inherited from the peak period of the Manchu Empire, except for present independent Mongolia.

The fourth map was published in 1992 by the Japanese publisher Bungeishunju-sha in the magazine *Marcopolo* for young readers. This is a speculation of one scenario which might occur in the near future in China. It predicted the possibility of the break-up of the country into the traditional major ethnic nations. Thus, there still might be some difference in viewpoint between the Japanese who maintain the image of ethnically mixed China and Westerners who naturally think of China as a relatively homogeneous entity.

The fifth map was published in the West in 1828. It shows an area, North and West of present China, simply called "Tartary" on the map. In fact, it contains some politically complex regions. The yellow area is the Manchu empire which occupied a large part of present China, containing the Mongolian empires (Khalkha and Oirat), Turkic Uighur, and Tibet. "Independent Tartary" was established by the Turkic Kirghiz (who recently established independent Kirghistan). Thus, these traditional rivals who fought each other for centuries were all called Tartary in the West, and therefore not clearly distinguished. It is interesting that even Hokkaido, currently part of Japan, is included in "Tartary" (Manchu) territory.

The sixth map, Philip's War Map of the Pacific published in 1944, to some extent depicts the ethnic and political complexity of China by using different

shades of the same colour (yellow) to identify Outer Mongolia and Tibet. Inner Mongolia and Manchuria are depicted in the same shade as China proper.

The seventh map has been used in an article by Gerald Segal in 1994 to argue that "Today one can distinguish between China's inner and outer empires". It shows that both Manchuria and Tibet, together with Uighur (Xinjiang) and Inner Mongolia, are considered part of the "outer empire". This map serves to better understand the complex entity of "China".

女真人の金はまず遼を滅ぼしてこれを西方に追い，ついで華北を占領した。宋室は南遷して臨安に拠り南宋となる。中国は再び南北対立の形成を生んだ。宋代は文運大いに興り，ことに儒学では宋学が大成された。また産業経済活動も盛んであった。インドではガズニ朝についでゴール朝が進出しそのイスラム化が進んだ。アイユーブ朝は英雄サラディンによって興り彼のイェルサレム占領により第3回十字軍が起された。西欧は中世封建社会の成熟期で，諸侯は互に割拠し，フランスやドイツの王権は振わなかった。しかしイギリスはノルマン朝以来君主権が強く，かつフランスに広大な封土を持っていた。このためフランスのカペー朝との間に衝突が起り，ジョン王のときその大半を失い，国内では議会の抵抗が起って，1215年マグナカルタが制定された。

① イギリス プランタジネット朝系図

(1)ヘンリー二世(1154～89) ― (2)リチャード一世(1189～99, 獅子心) / (3)ジョン(1199～1216, 失地王)

(4)ヘンリー三世(1216～72) ― (5)エドワード一世(1272～1307) ― (6)エドワード二世(1307～27) ― (7)エドワード三世(1327～77)

エドワード黒太子 ― (8)リチャード二世(1377～99)

ランカスター公ジョン ― ランカスター家ヘンリー四世

ヨーク公エドマンド …… ヨーク家

② 中国王朝交替表

年代	中国	蒙古・満洲
1000	西夏	遼
1100	宋(北宋)	
1200	南宋	金
	元	

金の興起と遼・宋の滅亡(1115～1127)

1：40,000,000

金興起以前の遼の領域(1114)
金軍の遼攻撃(1115～25)
宋の北伐(1122)
1123年の金の南境
金軍の宋攻撃(1125～27)
宋室の南渡(1127)

③

④ 十二世紀末の世界

1：60,000,000

遼室の西遷と西遼の発展
西遼の最大勢力範囲(1150年ごろ)
1180年ごろにおけるシューリーヴィジャヤの勢力圏
1217年におけるコラズムの最大領土
金の国都と五京
金の長柵

⑤ 十字軍の進路

1：40,000,000

第1回十字軍(1096～99)
第2回十字軍(1147～49)
第3回十字軍(1189～92)
第4回十字軍(1202～04)
第5回十字軍(1228～29)
第6回十字軍(1248～54)
第7回十字軍(1270)

十八世紀中ごろの東アジアは満洲人の王朝である清の全盛時代で，ちょうど乾隆帝の治世に当る。清は明を滅ぼして中国を統一し，明の外患であった内陸アジアの諸国を次々に平定し，さらに周辺の諸国を藩属国として，往時の唐にも匹敵する大帝国を築いた。しかも内治は充実し，財政も豊かで，文芸また大いに興り，当時世界第一の強国と称せられた。その上シベリアを征略して南下しようとしたロシアの勢力に対して，彼と国境を画するに至った。しかし西洋諸国の東洋侵略はようやく激しく，オランダの東インド経略は着々進み，またインドではムガール帝国の栄光が衰えて一地方政権と化していたが，そこへフランスとイギリスとがインド民衆の意志を無視して互に角逐していた。1750年前後フランスが一時デカン地方に勢力を得たが，プラッシーの戦い(1757)以後イギリスが制覇した。これよりイギリスは十九世紀の初めまでの間にインドの大部分を支配下に組み入れていった(左下(3)図)。イランやアフガニスタンなどでは政権の安定がみられない。

④ 清朝系図（愛新覚羅氏）

(1)太祖(ヌルハチ)(1616～26)
- (2)太宗(1626～43)
  - (3)世祖(順治帝)(1643～61)
    - (4)聖祖(康熙帝)(1661～1722)
  - 睿親王ドルゴン
- (5)世宗(雍正帝)(1722～35)
  - (6)高宗(乾隆帝)(1735～96)
    - (7)仁宗(嘉慶帝)(1796～1820)
      - (8)宣宗(道光帝)(1820～50)
        - (9)文宗(咸豊帝)(1850～61)
          - (10)穆宗(同治帝)(1861～74)
            - (11)徳宗(光緒帝)(1874～1908)
              - (12)宣統帝(溥儀)(1908～12)
- 悳親王奕訢
- 醇親王奕譞
  - 醇親王載灃(1908)

① 明清時代の北京城

1：200,000　0　5　km

金代の中都の外壁
元代の大都の外壁(1264)
1652　建造物の建設年代を示す

北京は古代の薊城の地に起り，そこを中軸として遼の南京，金の中都が営まれ，元のときその東北に新しく大都が造られ，明清に受け継がれて発展した。

③ 十八世紀後半のインド

1：40,000,000　0　500　km

ムガール帝国領
マラータ同盟諸国
シーク教国
ニザム領
マイソール王国

イギリスの獲得
1756～1766
1767～1798
1799～1805
1765　イギリスが獲得した年
1800　イギリスの保護下に入った年
フランス領(F)
ポルトガル領(P)
オランダ領(D)

② 十八世紀中ごろのアジア

1：60,000,000　0　1000　2000　km

イギリスの進出方向
ロシアの進出方向
フランスの進出方向
ネルチンスク条約(1689)によるロシアと清国との国境
キャフタ条約(1727)によるロシアと清国との国境
1684～1757年間における清の互市場
聖祖(康熙帝)のガルタン汗親征路
1635　清の征服年代
清初の長柵
大運河

① 第二次大戦後 アジア・アフリカ諸国の独立

1：80,000,000

朝鮮の南北分立

1：16,000,000

イスラエル共和国

1：20,000,000

インドシナ半島

1：27,000,000

ラオス 1948.1

第二次大戦後独立した国ぐにおよび新興政権による諸国家

回　上，独立した年月

共産主義諸国

東南アジア集団防衛条約機構（SEATO，1954.9）参加国

コロンボ・グループ諸国（1954.4）

アラブ連盟加盟国（1945.3）

その後アラブ連盟に加入した国ぐに

中東防衛条約機構（METO，バグダード条約，1955.1）参加国（1958年イラクが脱退し，1959年中央条約機構CENTOと改称した）

アメリカと相互防衛条約を締結している国ぐに

その他のアジアの独立国

その他のアフリカの独立国（1960年までに独立した国ぐに）

1961年以降に独立したアフリカ諸国

ヨーロッパ諸国の海外領土

第二次大戦後の著しい事象として共産圏の成立とそれに伴う東西両陣営の対立があり，いま一つはアジア・アフリカにおける旧植民地が相次いで独立したということがある。大戦の末期に西アジアの委任統治領が独立したのをはじめ，日本の敗戦とともに南アジアの諸国が独立したが，やがて解放の波はアフリカ全土を覆うことになった。しかし東西勢力の接点である朝鮮やヴェトナムの南北対立，信教の相違によるインド・パキスタンの分立や，イスラム諸国に囲まれて誕生したユダヤ人国家イスラエルなどは複雑な問題を含んで常に紛争の種となっている。また新興独立諸国はその殆んどが未開発地域で経済力が弱く，それをカヴァーするために急進的なナショナリズムに走る傾向が強い。ここに米ソをはじめとする援助競争を促すことになったが，同時に後進国開発が世界の大きな問題となっている。なお共産圏内で中ソの対立が表面化した。

3 中国の面積が半減する日

欧州に起こった民族主義の潮流は、アジアをもその渦に巻き込もうとしている。民主化、工業化を急ぐ中国政府は、分離独立を求める周辺諸民族の声にどう応えていくのだろうか？

「中国人民の中心をなすのは92パーセントをしめる漢民族だが、面積でいうと国土の3分の2は漢民族以外の少数民族の居住地である。これらの少数民族がもし独立を果たすと、中国の領土は著しく減少してしまう。新疆ウイグル自治区に住むイスラム教徒たちは、元来おとなしい民族だが、境を接する旧ソ連側での民族運動の動きが伝わり、これに刺激されて独立の機運を示すこともあろう。かつてスターリン時代のソ連が南下政策の一環として、この地域の民族意識を煽ったことがあった。ちょうどそれと同じような状況が生じたのだ。しかし、奥地は資源産出の可能性があり、核関連の基地がある軍事的な要衝でもあるため、北京政府は独立機運を見逃しはしないだろう」（平松）



「中国からの分離独立を志向するチベット自治区では、いぜん反政府デモがさかんである。目下インドにいるチベット民族の精神的支柱、ダライ・ラマは年齢も若く、活動は精力的だ。旺盛な民族意識を持つチベット民族は青海省、四川省の一部にも住んでおり、これらがひとまとまりになって独立すればその面積はかなりの拡がりをもつことになる」（平松）

インドが抱える紛争の火種は数知れない。とりわけ、パキスタンとの国境付近のパンジャブ州、カシミール州、東部のアッサム州では、中央からの分離独立を目指す過激派組織の活動が活発であり、政府も有効な対策を講じることができない状態である。

ノーベル平和賞受賞者、アウン・サン・スー・チー女史らを中心とする民主化運動を弾圧したソウ・マウン軍事政権は、少数民族・カレン族の武装抵抗に対しても激しい攻撃を加えている。国内の反感はもとより国際世論の批判も厳しいが、政府はいぜん、強硬な姿勢を貫いている。





タイ国境付近で抗戦を続けるミャンマーの少数民族・カレン族(Photo:Murray White)



＝民族紛争発生地域

「外蒙（モンゴル人民共和国）と内蒙（中国・内蒙古自治区）が呼応しあって独立を志向するという可能性は、かなり低いが、ある。中国内のモンゴル民族は独立の気概はあまりない。しかし彼らの居住地域に多くの漢民族が移住してきており、民族的な危機感を募らせる要因となっている」（平松）

「経済的繁栄を約束された西太平洋地域に経済成長の活路を求め、中国政府は沿海部志向を強めている。とりわけ、対外開放の拠点、上海・浦東地域の開発にかける意気込みは激しく、次期政権の枢要は江沢民、朱鎔基ら上海系の人脈が占めるようだ。こうした趨勢の中、中国は海軍力を増強しつつ、領海権の拡大をも志向している。今年にはいってから、南シナ海の南沙諸島を「領土」と主張しはじめ、周辺諸国はこれを危惧している。さらに浦東地区建設のために東シナ海の海底油田開発にも乗り出し、日本との間の領海問題が尖鋭化しそうだ。中国のこうした動きには充分注意する必要がある」（平松）



「東南アジアの紛争はいまもなお続いている。しかし、こうした民族独立運動や共産ゲリラ活動は、すべて貧困という問題を背景にして勢いを得ていた。この地域が順調な経済成長を遂げ、革命によって資産を失うことを好まない中産層が形成されていくと、運動は自然と沈静化していくことになるだろう。少なくとも、民族問題が東南アジアにおける主要なテーマになるとは考えにくい。むしろ、問題は工業化が立ち遅れた他の地域との間に生活水準の格差が生じ、新たな南北問題が生まれることだろう」（渡辺）

「周辺諸国を巻き込んで、10年以上争われてきたカンボジア4派の主導権争いは、経済志向を強めるベトナム、タイの間にあって、もはや単なる「国内問題」でしかなくなった。明石康国連特別代表を中心とするPKO（国連平和維持活動）によって、民主的な政権が樹立されたのち、カンボジアもASEANの一員として機能するようになるだろう」（渡辺）



TARTARY.


Temyonka
Kargasok
Narym
Ket
Yeniseisk
Yukhno-Yeniseiski
Kezhma
Kureika
Ust-Ishim
Kolpashevo
Strelka
Up. Tunguska
Dvorets
Taseyevo
Taseyeva
Badarma
Ust-Kut
L. Tunguska
Kirensk
Lena
Tara
Yevgashchino
Asino
Chulym
Tomsk
Tayga
Bogotol
Achinsk
Kansk
Aban
Bratsk
Tyukalinsk
Tatarsk
Barabinsk
Bolotnoe
Anzhero-Sujensk
Krasnoyarsk
Nizhneudinsk
Nizhne-Angarsk
Angara
Ob
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Yeniseisk
Kuznetski
Kemerovo
Topki
Artemovsk
Tulun
Olka
Zima
Konovalovo
Kachug
Baikal Mts.
L. Baikal
Prokopyevsk
Kamen
Tom
Abakan
Minusinsk
Cheremkhovo
Usole
Irkutsk
Barnaul
Stalinsk
Slavgorod
Aleysk
Biysk
Yenisei
Skabeeva
Shalym
Ulan-Ude
Chita
Yablonovy Mts
Onon
Olovyannaya
Sretensk
Nerchinsk
Baley
Argun
Mongolia
Gobi Desert
Vitim
Mts
Baguzin
Romanovskoye
Chernovskie Kopi
Petrovsk
Kyakhta
Selenga
Orkhon
Ulan Bator (Urga)
Tsetsenkian
Bain-Tumen
Kerulen
Manchouli (Lupin)
Hailar
Great Khingan Mts
Little Khingan Mts
Nunkiang
Lunkiang (Tsitsihar)
Aigun
Taiheiho
Blagoveshchensk
Arkhara
Kuibyshevka
Mogocha
Skovorodino
Tynda
Zeya
Tukuringra Jagda Mts
Stanovoi Mts
Chumikan
Ekimchan
Jalinda
Noha
Amur
Sofiyski
Bureya
Swoboday
Semipalatinsk
Ridder
Ust-Kamenogorsk
Karaganda
Karkaralinsk
Uspenski
Akmolinsk
Ekibas-Tuz
Irtysh
Pavlodar
Rubtsovsk
Kyzyl Khota
Munku Sardyk
Koso G.
Khachyl
Gorodok
Tes
Ubsor Nur
Ulankom
Tannu Ola
Tannu Tuva
Shangai Altai
Daichin Vana
Baissakly
Uzhbikhalantu (Uliassutai)
Durga
Dzhargalantu (Kobdo)
Altai
Kara Irtish
Zaysan
L. Zaysan
Kamon-Karagay
Ayaguz
Buluntok
Yancheng
Tansyk
Kounrad
Balkhash
L. Balkhash
L. Ala-Kol
Ebi Nor
Dzungaria
Sain-Usa
Gobi
Inner Mongolia
Manchuria
Solunshan
Pinkiang (Harbin)
Shwangcheng
Kwanchengtsi
Changchun
Kirin
Tsitsihar
Lunkiang
Koshan
Hailun
Stolinsk
Mamusze
Ussuri
Hulin
Iman
Lesozavodsk
Khabarovsk
Birobijan
Birobija
Vyazemski
Soviet Harbor
Voznesenskoye
Komsomolsk
Amur
Nikolayevsk
Okha
Sakhalin B.
C. Yelizavety
Shantarskie Is
Tugur
Okhotsk
Sea of Okhotsk
Kamchatka
Ust-Khayryuzovo
C. Yuzhy
C. Tolstoy
Karaginski I.
Ozernoy C.
Uka
10,820
Sredne-Kamchatsk
Beringa I.
Kolpakovo
Ust-Bolsheretsk
Petropavlovsk
Okhotsk
Tauysk
Ayan
Nelkan
Aldan
Aldan Plateau
Uchur
Chulman Gonam
Tommot
Chagda
Olekma
Vilyui
Mama
Bodaybo
Artemovski
Chara
Yakutsk
Lena
Kolar
Vogdarin
Sredne Nyukzha
Zeya
Tyda
Ekimchan
Jalinda
Noha
Amur
Sofiyski
Bureya
Swoboday
Mogocha
Skovorodino
Tynda
Zeya
Tukuringra Jagda Mts
Stanovoi Mts
Chumikan


KAZAKHSTAN
RUSSIA
KYRGYSTAN
MONGOLIA
HEILONGJIANG
JILIN
MANCHURIA
Sea of Japan
XINJIANG AUTONOMOU REGION
TAJIKISTAN
AFGHANISTAN
INNER MONGOLIA
LIAONING
NORTH KOREA
GANSU
NEI MONGGOL
BEIJING
Beijing
Dalian
Pyongyang
Tokyo
NINGXIA AUTON REGION
HEBEI
Seoul
SOUTH KOREA
OUTER EMPIRE
SHANXI
SHANDONG
XIZANG TIBET AUTONOMOUS REGION
QINGHAI
INNER EMPIRE
JAPAN
SHANXI (SHAANSI)
HENAN
JIANGSU
ANHUI
Suzhou
Shanghai
SHANGHAI
NEPAL
CHINA
HUBEI
Pacific Ocean
SICHUAN
ZHEJIANG
JIANGXI
BHUTAN
INDIA
HUNAN
GUIZHOU
FUJIAN
BANGLA-DESH
Taipei
TAIWAN
(Part of Inner Empire)
YUNNAN
GUANGXI AUTONOMOUS REGION
GUANGDONG
Guangzhou (Canton)
N
VIET-NAM
HONG KONG
(Part of Inner Empire)
BURMA
Hanoi
LAOS
South China Sea
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
0 MILES 500
Ib Ohlsson for FOREIGN AFFAIRS