TITLE: JAPAN AND THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATIES WITH MOSCOW AND PEKING

In August of 1978, Japanese and Chinese officials reached agreement on a Peace and Friendship Treaty which had been the subject of sporadic negotiations since the two sides normalised relations in 1972. But Japan also signed a Joint Declaration in 1956 with the Soviet Union, a bilateral agreement which also called for a future Peace and Friendship Treaty, which still has not been signed.

The first section of the thesis deals with domestic historical, political, economic and cultural factors which affect foreign policy in each of the three countries and which have particular bearing on the treaty negotiations. Major emphasis is placed on those developments which have affected national security, or which have a bearing on collective perceptions of national security, including the strength of the armed forces.

The second and longer portion of the thesis deals with Japan's bilateral relations with each of its two neighbours historically, and in more recent times in economic, political, military and cultural terms, and with key issues and developments in bilateral negotiations on the treaties. Throughout this section the primary focus is on Japan, its political parties and factions and the positions these have taken on the treaties and issues related to the treaties throughout the years. It also deals with the key issues dividing Japan and its negotiating partners on the two treaties, as well as Japan's 'equidistance policy' and its 'special relationship' with the United States.

Conclusions at the end of part one in Section Two include points about the special constraints imposed upon the USSR in its negotiations, the importance of fishing rights in the Russo-Japanese relationship, the impact of the Ussuri River incidents of 1969 on the policies of Moscow and Peking and the phenomenon of two separate foreign policy goals working at cross-purposes on both sides in the bilateral relations between Moscow and Tokyo.

Conclusions at the end of the thesis deal with the trilateral relationship and with such questions as why one treaty was signed and why the other has not been at this writing, whether there is any real substance to the new treaty, whether its signing is a setback to Soviet foreign policy and a threat to Soviet security and finally, what prompted Japan to abandon its 'equidistance policy'. The role of the White House and the State Department, and the question of how Japan came to be in the uncomfortable position of pawn or 'prize' in the Sino-Soviet rivalry are also examined.
JAPAN AND THE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATIES WITH MOSCOW AND PEKING

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This thesis is partly a case study of foreign policy formulation and execution, but it focuses on more than just the Japanese foreign policy process because political, strategic, economic, and historical factors and even key personalities will be considered. Moreover, it cannot unreservedly be considered as a pure case study with wider implications because Japanese society, culture, history and tradition are unique, and therefore generalities or generalizations presented as a series of axioms on foreign policy formulation become a dubious preposition.

As the title indicates, the primary focus throughout most of this essay is on Japan, as various aspects of the Peace and Friendship Treaties with Moscow and Peking have affected, and been perceived by, the Japanese. In general, Chinese and Soviet attitudes have been taken into account chiefly insofar as the Japanese have been influenced by them.

Certain advantages of this approach are obvious: the policy-making and decision-making process in Japan is one of the most open and public, and the consensus building in some ways unique to that country makes reactions from various sectors in the society quite readily apparent to the day-to-day observer. That much the opposite can be said for the decision-
making process in Moscow and Peking was not the chief deterrent to further pursuit of that aspect of the equation. Instead it was the need to limit the length of this thesis, and to attempt always to retain a primary focus on Japan which limited the amount of emphasis given to China and the USSR. Attempts to elicit official position papers or other documents which would allow either of these governments to "tell their side" in more detail met with no response.

Much of the information summarized in this thesis covers relatively new ground, since at this writing (mid-1979) only one scholarly book has been published in English on Sino-Japanese relations since the two normalized relations in 1972, ¹ and it covers only limited aspects of that relationship since normalization of relations; published research on Japan's relations with the Soviet Union since World War II is even more limited.

The main emphasis in this thesis is on the problems Japan has faced in attempting to formalize or alter its policies vis-a-vis its two large and powerful communist neighbours, particularly in light of its determination to avoid involvement in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. The focus is therefore on information pertinent to these separate but interrelated problems: the

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promulgation by Japan of the two peace and friendship treaties. Emphasis will be on significant developments from the time the respective treaties were proposed until late August, 1978, so as to include reactions from the three capitals in the immediate aftermath of the Japan-China treaty on the 12th of that month.

A note on sources: as some of the information was available only in Japan, the attempt was to cite the more widely available sources, even when these consisted of newspaper reports, news magazines and Western scholarly periodicals. English versions and translations of Chinese, Japanese and Soviet documents were used in all cases. Often these consisted of books, articles and pamphlets published by the Japanese government.

Peking and Moscow broadcast a series of international radio programs daily in English, and in addition their Mandarin and Russian language broadcasts are translated each day by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS); the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo also translates and distributes key articles from Japanese language newspapers such as the "Gist of Remarks" used in the Appendices of this thesis.

In addition to numerous interviews and widely published information dealing with U.S. influence on Japan as it negotiated the treaties, documents were requested from the U.S. State Department under the
Freedom of Information Act. As is further explained in the concluding section of this thesis, the 34 documents found by researchers were not released to the author. Nonetheless, useful insights were provided by the head of the research team, (Thomas W. Ainsworth), who took the unusual step of receiving permission to make an "out of channels" telephone call to the author summarising the documents. Without that, some of the author's conclusions would have been entirely different.

In many instances information and assessments referred to in this thesis came from several sources. Although many insights were provided in personal interviews with Japanese political and business leaders, and with a number of senior U.S. State Department representatives in Japan and Washington, reference to these interviews has been avoided unless the information was not available in print, or the personal assessments provided an added dimension due to the position the man occupied at the time of the interview.

In compliance with the customary practice of Japanese translators, family names have been used first for historical Japanese figures, while names since the Meiji Restoration have been presented in Western style.

Japanese words which should be italicized for emphasis have been underlined in lieu of italic type. The Japanese spelling Kurile, as opposed to the Russian Kuril has been used throughout, except when referring to the book by John J. Stephen.

Chinese proper nouns are spelled in the way commonly used before the recent change to Pinyin.

* * * *
The author would like to express his gratitude to a number of people for their great help: Nobuyuki Komiyama and Haruko Nobechi of the Voice of America News office in Tokyo who provided invaluable documents and information; Professor Hedley Bull of Balliol College, Oxford, who helped put this work into much sharper focus and proper perspective; Professor Michael Howard of All Souls College, Oxford, whose remarkable knowledge of strategic and military affairs put much of this work in proper historical context; and Geoffrey Jukes of Australian National University, whose editing efforts were superb, and whose comments and suggestions on portions involving the Soviet Union were extremely invaluable. Finally, it is to Wilfrid Knapp of St. Catherine's College, Oxford, whose continuous encouragement, thoughtful suggestions and remarkable insights sharpened every aspect of the work as it progressed, that the author owes a very special debt of gratitude — and one which far transcends his very able efforts on this thesis.
INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1950's there has been a Treaty of Peace and Friendship pending between Japan and the USSR. Japan has insisted on the return of the four Kurile Islands which were seized by the Soviet Union in the closing days of World War II before proceeding with treaty talks. The position of the Soviet Union has varied, but in recent years has consisted of proposals to move forward on the treaty talks and deal separately with the territorial issue later.

The need for a Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty was spelled out in the 1972 Joint Communique, but progress on the treaty was delayed for several years, due chiefly to Chinese insistence on the controversial "anti-hegemony clause" which Peking's leaders have made clear is aimed at the Soviet Union — (thus ensuring, among other things, that the treaty does not affect Japan's relations with the U.S.A.).

Various attempts by Japanese leaders to "clarify" the clause via public statements on "how it is to be interpreted" — thus making it diplomatically palatable to all concerned, and particularly to Moscow — were met with rebuffs from Peking until weeks before the treaty was finally signed. One U.S. diplomat who speaks both languages and has served in both Peking and Tokyo, interpreted the Chinese position during
the long stalemate in this way: "The Chinese already have everything they want from Tokyo and the Peace and Friendship Treaty is not really all that worthwhile to the Chinese unless it provides them with another opportunity to tweak Russian noses a bit."¹

The thesis is in two sections, the first of which deals with domestic historical, political, economic and even cultural factors which effect foreign policy in each of the three countries, and which may have particular bearing on the treaty negotiations. The importance of security considerations is stressed.

The second, and longer, section focuses on Japan's bilateral relations with those two neighbors in economic, political, military and cultural terms, and on the key issues and developments in bilateral negotiations on the treaties. Particular attention is paid to political parties, factions and other pressure groups within Japanese society which have taken positions on the treaty negotiations, and to factors within Japanese society which make it, in some senses, unique among the major states. Japan's "equidistance policy," its defense policy, its fragility or vulnerability as an

¹ Nicholas Platt, Chief Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, in an interview in April, 1977. Mr. Platt became head of the Japan Desk at State soon after, went from there to the National Security Council, and became Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific in late 1979.
economic superpower, and its special relationship with the United States — as well as the U.S. presence in Asia as a factor in the negotiations — are all areas examined by the thesis.

The thesis also explores possible motives on the part of all three countries for delaying — and for desiring the proposed treaties.

Conclusions:

During the research for this thesis a number of theoretical and historical points of interest became apparent, and with further research to test their validity, these led to several conclusions which are presented in passing in "summary" form within the body of the thesis, particularly in Section One. Overall conclusions on the major questions examined by the thesis are presented at the end of parts One and Two in Section Two; at the end of Part One these include points about the special constraints imposed on the USSR in attempting to reach a treaty agreement with Japan, Soviet responses to Sino-Japanese rapprochement, the importance of fishing rights in the Russo-Japanese relationship, the impact of the Ussuri River incidents on the policies of Moscow and Peking, and the curious phenomenon of two separate foreign policy goals working at cross-purposes on both sides within the framework of bilateral relations between Moscow and Tokyo.
The overriding questions in the tri-lateral relationship and in the context of the two treaties have been reserved to the end of this thesis. As the questions arose, the major task thus became to provide explanations for such things as why one treaty was signed and why the other was still deadlocked at this writing; whether there is any substance in the new Sino-Japanese Treaty and whether its promulgation was a setback for Soviet foreign policy or a security threat to the Soviet Far East. And finally, answers as to what prompted Japan to abandon its long standing policy of equidistance, and how it came to be in the uncomfortable position of pawn or "prize" in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. One possible explanation is also provided for the overriding cause of this setback — however temporary — to the Soviet Union.
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Agency France Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press (USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>B.A.M.</td>
<td>Baikal-Amur Magistral (rail line - USSR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>E.E.C.</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
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<td>FEER</td>
<td>The Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong)</td>
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<td>F.Y.</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>G.N.P.</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GPCR</td>
<td>Great Proleterian Cultural Revolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hsinhua</td>
<td>(NCNA) New China News Agency (Peking)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHT</td>
<td>International Herald Tribune</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
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<td>JDA</td>
<td>(JSDA) Japanese (Self) Defense Agency</td>
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<td>JSDA</td>
<td>(JDA) Japanese Self Defense Agency</td>
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<td>JSP</td>
<td>Japan Socialist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LA Times</td>
<td>The Los Angeles Times</td>
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<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)</td>
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<td>NCNA</td>
<td>(Hsinhua) The New China News Agency (Peking)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLC</td>
<td>New Liberal Club (Japan)</td>
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<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Party Congress (China)</td>
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<td>NY Times</td>
<td>The New York Times</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic and Cultural Development</td>
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<td>OUP</td>
<td>Oxford University Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army (China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>(JSDF) (Japanese) Self Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.N.</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPI</td>
<td>United Press International (USA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTOL</td>
<td>Vertical Takeoff or Landing</td>
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"Possession of defense capabilities is a public declaration of national will and responsibility to protect and maintain the freedom, independence, security, peace, development and prosperity of the nation. The contemporary world has not approached the stage of precluding requirements for defense capabilities, and therefore, no nation can ignore the necessity of individual or collective self defense measures. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter affirms the inherent right of national self defense."


"... Land, Sea and Air Forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

- From Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
PART ONE - JAPAN

It is Japan's neighbor, Korea, which is called "The Hermit Kingdom," and yet for much of its history, and due in large part to its distance from the Asian mainland, it is Japan which has developed in both accidental and contrived isolation throughout much of its existence. Until the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the predominant cultural, social and intellectual influences on Japan were from China, with some significant secondary influences from Korea.¹

THE EARLY PERIOD

Over 1700 years of recorded history point to a number of singular developments and resultant tendencies in Japan. Among these are a history of almost unparalleled isolation in comparison with most countries, maintained by conscious effort and policy. Japan has been remarkably free from foreign conquests or domination and from the vagaries of mass migration, which have so altered demographic and ethnic distribution for much of the rest of the world.

There has nonetheless been a tendency to maintain a close "weather eye" on developments elsewhere despite continued isolation. This one-way communication is exemplified by appreciation within top levels of the Shogunate and among subsequent Meiji restoration leaders of what was

happening in China during the age of Western Imperialism. Moreover, awareness that Japan was in an inferior military position was a crucial factor in deciding to agree to Perry's demands to "open" Japan. Through "Dutch Learning" acquired at the Institute for the Investigation of Barbarian Books, (estab. 1811), and pre-disposed to attitudes very different from China's leaders because of all they had learned over the ages from China and even from Korea and India, Japan's leaders could see there was much of worth to be learned from the West.¹

Japan also has a long tradition of adopting and adapting foreign things deemed useful to the improvement or survival of the nation while simultaneously retaining an almost entirely homogeneous nation, a remarkably ethnocentric culture and a generally selective response to the outside world. This has caused the assimilation of much to take on uniquely Japanese characteristics, and Reischauer explains why:

Accustomed to thinking of China as far larger, much older and more advanced than Japan, (the leaders of the Meiji restoration) had no sublime fear of inferiority. Thus when menaced by the West, they did not react with disdain but rather with that combination of fear, resentment and narrow pride that one associates with nationalism.²

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2. Ibid. p. 490.
Historically, Japan's reaction to outside challenges and threats has been prompted by strong motivations to ensure both the security of Japan and the respect of other nations; the extraordinary and rapid wholesale adoption of Western systems of education, economic distribution, militarization, armament, etc. was not chiefly motivated by great love and admiration of the West; the slogan "Honor the Emperor and expel the barbarian" remained a guiding principle for many key figures of the Meiji Restoration in their drive to modernize Japan. ¹

Finally, its history lends considerable credence to Japanese and foreign writers and apologists who speak of the Japanese having a strong self image of uniqueness, an awareness of the need for security in what is an extremely precarious environment,² considerable national self consciousness about the difficulty in understanding foreigners and foreign developments, and, especially since World War II, of being hesitant to take leadership roles commensurate with the country's economic status — chiefly on the grounds of "inexperience in foreign affairs."

¹ Hirobumi Ito, who became perhaps the most important architect of the Meiji government was first a gun-wielding member of the kiheitai (Irregular Troops Unit) which attempted to expel all barbarians by force and was instrumental in bringing down the Tokugawa Shogunate. Their battle cry remained his guiding principle until his death in 1909.

² In addition to the "Nixon Shoku" and Lockheed "shoku" the people of Japan have consistently been faced with an additional factor of instability: over 10,000 earthquakes are recorded annually plus typhoons which cause huge seasonal tidal waves.
SECURITY AND DEFENSE

Japan is known worldwide as the nation which has renounced war as a solution to international disputes, prohibited by its constitution from maintaining armed forces. But if security considerations have historically occupied at least the same position of importance as has been the case for almost any state, and if through the vagaries of geography and history Japan has been more successful than most in defending the home islands through the centuries, how does it defend itself today? What is current defense policy, what priority do the Japanese give to defense considerations, and what is the capability of the Japanese Self-Defense Force?

As with so much else in Japan, images and realities are widely divergent. For example, the constitution written in considerable degree by the American Occupation staff under General Douglas MacArthur, which was promulgated November 3, 1946 and went into effect on May 3, 1947, says in Article 9:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the proceeding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. (emphasis added).

1. Two invasion attempts by Khubilai Kahn in 1274 and 1281 A.D. were successfully thwarted at Hakata Bay in Kyushu, where a kamikaze, or "divine wind" destroyed over half the invading fleet, and marked the last serious threat to Japan till 1945.

2. Official translation from the Office of the Prime Minister, Tokyo.
Yet Japan maintains armed forces comprised of Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces which until 1978\(^1\) ranked as the 13th largest armed force in the world; annual defense spending ranks among the top ten in the world and nearly six percent of the annual government budget is earmarked for defense.

**HISTORY OF THE SDF**

This apparent violation of the constitution began shortly after Japanese disarmament when what was later to be the Maritime Defense Force was ordered into being by General MacArthur. He ordered a special and secret\(^2\) minesweeping unit of about 15,000 former navy men and 350 vessels which had survived the war to clear the estimated 12,000 mines which had been dropped around Japan by B-29s in the closing days of the war.

On July 8, 1950, just two weeks after the outbreak of the Korean war, General MacArthur ordered the formulation of a National Police Reserve of 75,000 men to maintain domestic order while U.S. Occupation Forces were transferred to Korea. The new police reserve was trained by U.S. military instructors and the drill manual was a verbatim translation

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2. The minesweeping unit technically contravened the provisions of the Hague Treaty which banned the use of lethal weapons by former combatants after cessation of hostilities. All news of the 75 casualties was therefore supressed. For more detail see Pacific Rivals, compiled by the staff of *Asahi Shinbun* (Tokyo: Weatherhill/Asahi, 1972), pp. 193-96.
of the basic text for U.S. military — not police — training.¹

Nor was gradual rearmament solely due to U.S. impetus or desire. In January, 1951, a group of ex-Japanese naval officers, headed by former Vice Admiral Zanshiro Hoshina, presented the U.S. Far East Naval Command, and later U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, with a plan to rebuild the Japanese Navy — a plan the group had been working on quietly since the end of the war. The U.S. responded with an offer of 68 naval vessels.²

BASIC DEFENSE POLICY

On September 8, 1951, the same day it signed the Peace Treaty in San Francisco, Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security with the U.S. Both treaties went into effect in April, 1952. In December, 1956, Japan was admitted to the United Nations. In May, 1957, Japan adopted the following "Basic Policies for National Defense" which remain in effect to this day:

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded on democratic principles.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international co-operation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

¹ Pacific Rivals, op. cit. p. 196. After meeting with General MacArthur to clarify the "Police Reserve" order two cabinet members recall remarking that it looked to them like "an army that can't go overseas."

2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love for country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.

3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for the self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation. (emphasis added).

4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future of deterring and repelling such aggression.

It is worth noting that the document on defense policies makes no mention of the Constitution, that Article 2 could justify government-sponsored resurgent nationalism, and that Article 3 leaves gigantic loopholes provided a.) Japan can afford rearmament, and b.) the people of Japan accept it.

As to the Mutual Security Treaty with the U.S., little about it is mutual; since 1951 the United States has promised to defend Japan if it is attacked and the so-called "nuclear umbrella" which the U.S. protects Japan is well known and well publicized worldwide. Unlike the NATO treaty, there is no built-in reciprocity in the event of attack upon the United States. The treaty is aimed, in part, at preventing any large scale rearmament by Japan. The geopolitical rationale behind such an arrangement was articulated by an official at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo who said: "There are some simple and basic reasons why Japan will not rearm; we don't want it, the Chinese don't want it, the Soviet Union doesn't want it, and except for a handful of right wing extremists,

the Japanese don't want it either."¹

Despite this statement, there is real ambiguity and inconsistency in post-war U.S. policies on Japanese Armed Forces. The same General MacArthur chiefly responsible for Japan's "peace constitution" created -- with full support from the U.S. government -- the ground self-defense force with the euphemistic title "National Police Reserve." There is considerable evidence to suggest that with the outbreak of the Cold War, and especially after the start of the Korean conflict, U.S. fears of Japanese military revival turned to hopes for a potent alliance.²

Moreover, when the new Mutual Security Agreement was signed in January, 1960, it provided for what can only be interpreted as tacit understanding and support for the efforts and responsibilities in defense of Japan in the event of hostilities. Thus, there is a "mythical" aspect to the diplomat's statement, with regard to the U.S., and, as we shall examine, in Japan as well.

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1. VOA Broadcast, 14 November 1975. These sentiments were underscored by Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, who said at a news conference while hosting the 1976 World Bank-IMF Conference in Manila that he and other regional leaders have great fear of resurgent Japanese militarism. Moreover, Chinese Vice Premier Chi Ping-Fei, in July 1977, told visiting retired military members of the Japanese Defense Advisory Council that in his government's view, Japan's best policy for the immediate future is to retain its close military relationship with the United States.

2. In November 1953, visiting Vice-President Richard Nixon made the first official statement by a U.S. official, at least publicly, when he said in Tokyo that "the renunciation of war might be an error in the Japanese Constitution."
RATIONALE BEHIND THE JSDF

The document which best articulates government defense of the present day Armed Forces is the White Paper on Defense of Japan, published in June, 1976. It is one of only two comprehensive documents issued on defense of Japan since WWII, (the other being the 1957 document) and as Defense Agency Secretary General Michita Sakata says in the introduction, it is "specifically aimed at prompting serious discussions by the Japanese public."¹ The first justification for defense forces is that:

Possession of defense capabilities is a public declaration of national will and responsibility to protect and maintain the freedom, independence, security, peace, development and prosperity of the nation. The contemporary world has not approached the stage of precluding requirements for defense capabilities, and therefore, no nation can ignore the necessity of individual or collective self defense measures. Article 51 of the United Nations charter affirms the inherent right of national self defense.²

Apropos of Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution the White Paper says:

While it is recognized by everyone that Article 9 does not deny Japan's right to self defense, some opine that this nation has no right to maintain defense power as the means to exercise his self defense. However, when self defense capabilities are the only

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2. Ibid. p. 32.
effective and final resource of national defense, we are forced to interpret this Article as non-prohibitive of possession of the minimum necessary self defense power. Of course, in line with the spirit of this stipulation, Japan's military forces must be strictly defensive in nature. The possession of long or medium range ballistic missiles (ICBMs or IRBMs), attack carriers or long range bombers, for example, or the dispatch of armed forces, with the intent of exercising military power to foreign territory, must certainly be regarded as exceeding the limits of self defense recognized by the Constitution.

It also reiterates Japan's three-point nuclear policy — better known as the non-nuclear principles — which specifies Japan will neither possess, manufacture, nor allow storage of nuclear weapons in the country.  

The government further takes the position that excessive defense expansion must be avoided to preclude distrust or tension vis-a-vis neighboring countries, while at the same time avoiding the possibility of what the Paper calls a "power vacuum in this area of global importance" through insufficient defense power, which would lead to "fear and worry by both the major powers and Asian nations, and reduce the stability of international relations."  

Yet for all its attempts to "prompt serious discussion" and for all of its explanations and justifications for the present day Self-Defense Forces, several points should be noted.

It was, for example, difficult if not impossible until late 1978 to find

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
serious analysis of defense issues in Japan; as late as 1977, only Japanese authors writing outside Japan, at places like the International Institute for Strategic Studies, or authors writing for foreign publications such as Foreign Affairs, found the environment sufficiently hospitable to discussions on strategic and defense issues. In this sense, the White Paper is an almost unique document.

On the other hand, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, which conducted Pacific naval exercises in 1975 and combined exercises in and near the Kurile Islands in May, 1978, (interpreted in Japan as pressure against the signing of a treaty with Peking) there is no obvious immediate threat to Japan. Nonetheless, the desire to prevent a "power vacuum in this area" (as the White Paper puts it) could easily justify far larger and more potent military capabilities, first because there is no strategic thinker today who does not recognize the defensive and deterrent nature of, for example, nuclear weapons. Second, because the immediacy of potential threat via ICBMs and Nuclear strike aircraft, (e.g. the Backfire Bomber) is believed best deterred by retaliatory capabilities -such as ICBMs — which make potential attack "too high a price." The evolution in military capabilities has been immense since the Defense Policies were enunciated in 1957, and France provides a worthwhile model for any Japanese government uncertain of U.S. reliability. Finally, Japan could
justify markedly increased military strength because virtually every
government today refers to its armed forces a "defensive"; here the
Chinese nuclear policy — which promises never to strike first — provides
a model. Given the potential threat in the world today, the question "how
much defense is adequate?" must be answered, and certainly the U.S.
"Defense Department" comes up with answers very different from those
agreed upon so far within the Japanese establishment.

With respect to terminology and armament as it affects Japanese
defense, it should also be pointed out that it is difficult to determine
exactly what is a "defensive weapon," and debate on this is illustrated in
the complexity of the SALT talks.

Japan's home manufactured submarines and its F-4J aircraft could
easily be regarded as offensive. . . the F-4 for example is capable of
nuclear strike missions.

POPULAR REACTION TO THE JSDF

Public reaction to the 1960 Joint Mutual Co-operation and Security
Treaty with the U.S. (and to Japanese armed forces) has changed with
time and varied depending on political views. Two months after the
treaty with the U.S. was signed, President Eisenhower had to cancel his
scheduled trip to Japan due to violent nationwide opposition.\(^1\) Members
of the armed forces of Japan were often treated as virtual pariahs.

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1. Even before treaty renewal, in March, 1959, Inejiro Asanuma of the
JSP delivered a speech in Peking entitled "American Imperialism is the
Enemy of both China and Japan." The same month, Tokyo District Court
acquitted several defendants accused of attempted mayhem on a U.S.
military base on the grounds U.S. bases in Japan were unconstitutional.
Pacific Rivals op. cit. pp. 413-4.
By 1978, the attitudes were in sharp contrast to those 18 years ago, and this was reflected in positions taken by the opposition parties. The Socialists, Japan's second largest party, propose a three-stage programme without specific timetable which would lead to the scrapping of the treaty. The Communist Party, aware of shifting public attitudes, dropped the treaty issue; the moderate Komei Party, which previously wanted the treaty immediately abolished, calls for "scrapping the treaty after consensus through diplomatic settlement." The Democratic Socialists in mid-1976 switched from "gradual scale down of the treaty" to calls for "work toward improvement in the operation of the security treaty, giving due recognition to its functions for the time being."¹

There have also been sharp shifts in public opinion on the continuance of the Self Defense Forces in only seven years. In a poll in 1969, amid reports of Sino-Soviet border clashes, just over 54% of those polled said the JSDF should be maintained; the rest favoured its abolition or registered no opinion. But newspaper polls in 1972 showed 73% in favour of maintaining the JSDF, 12% said they should be abolished and 15% had no opinion. By October, 1975, following the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, the continued Sino-Soviet border tensions, the Arab Oil Crisis and heightened tensions on the Korean DMZ, six percent more... 79% altogether... favoured maintaining the JSDF, while strong opponents had dropped from 12% to 8% and those undecided had dropped to only 13%.²

1. Defense of Japan (White Paper), pp. 52-3 for this paragraph.
2. Ibid. p. 53.
COSTS AND THE SDF

General consensus which emerged from opinion samplings in recent years showed support for maintaining the annual defense budget at just under 1% of G.N.P. Given Japan's economic growth that sum is not inconsiderable. Japan spent $6,090 million in FY 1978. (India $3,445 m., Israel, using 35.3% of GNP, $4,268 m.). But Japan did not get comparable value -- 55% went to salaries and benefits aimed at making the services an attractive career — only about 17% of the budget went to equipment, (U.K. and France 42%, W. Germany 33%, USA 38%). Post-oil crisis inflation cut one third from planned total tonnage during the five-year plan ended in April, 1977. Only one percent of each budget is devoted to research and development, (U.K. and USA 10%, France 17%) and defense officials say this is what makes so much of the military equipment obsolete.

PRESENT STRENGTH

On 1 January 1979, the army consisted of 155,000 men and women1 with an authorized ceiling of 180,000; the navy had 40,000 and ceiling authorization of 41,300, while the air force had 43,000 and was authorized up to 44,5000. Thus the armed forces numbered 238,000 and could go as high as 266,046 under current authorizations if necessary.

There is a four-year national defense academy with full university curricula and after graduation the officer candidates join their civilian counterparts in one of three officer candidate schools.

1. Women first joined the army medical corps, since 1968 have been allowed in certain other fields and in 1974 were allowed into the navy and air force.
QUALITY ASSESSMENT

But without quality analysis and a focus on problems, the above numbers are meaningless. Russell Spurr, military affairs writer for the Far East Economic Review, spoke to numerous military attaches in Japan and summed up: "The Japanese armed forces are under-strength, patchily equipped and, technically speaking, at least ten years behind other major industrial powers."¹

In September 1976, the then U.S. Defense Secretary, James Schlesinger, publicly told his hosts in Tokyo that Japan was woefully incapable of defending its home islands, particularly on the sea or in the air. Michita Sakata, then Director-General of the JSDA, was fully aware of these deficiencies,² and under a programme given new impetus during his tenure, the emphasis was, and continues to be, on quality rather than quantity improvements.

Most foreign analysts say that the navy's largest problems derive from obsolescence and inadequate logistics. Anti-sub warning and warfare — the navy's prime mission — is being done by units inferior to modern submarines.³


2. See "Introductory Remarks by the Director General" in Defense of Japan.

3. Japan's plans to buy the Lockheed P3C Orion were scuttled by the Lockheed payoff scandal, and though it is still the best plane, the political climate in Japan was not sufficiently receptive to a Lockheed purchase no matter how "clean" the deal until the JDA submitted its FY 1979 budget which included purchases of P3C's, F-15s, E-2C radar warning planes and money to construct all naval vessels including five destroyers and a submarine. IHT., 24 Aug. 1978, p. 3.
The Army has many problems: Japan's topography and urbanization makes its mission almost impossible; training and deployment is highly restricted and thus chiefly unrealistic, sharp increases in unit firepower capability are desperately needed and the communications network, including the present all-civilian telephone system, needs complete overhaul.

For the air force, as for the navy, replacement of equipment is costly and yet vital. Phantom F-4EJs (first operational in the U.S. in 1959) are the mainstay of the inventory. Meanwhile delays on a purchase decision for new F-15 interceptors resulted in a 1.8 million dollar increase in per unit cost. The F-15 would give Japan formidable air defense capability -- provided there were considerable improvements elsewhere.

The MiG-25 incident of 6 September 1976 underscores the need for these "improvements elsewhere." When the defecting Soviet pilot was headed toward the northernmost island of Hokkaido, Japanese radar picked him up and the alarmed controller and his supervisor tried unsuccessfully to reach the Prime Minister for instructions. The Director-General of the SDA is not empowered to give operational orders, nor are the Joint Chiefs. Finally, a civilian air traffic controller telephoned the nearest U.S. Air Force unit, by which time Soviet Flight Lieutenant Viktor Belenko was in the landing pattern at Hakodate Airport. Interceptors had been scrambled to intercept the incoming MiG-25, but when it flew in low during the last portion of the flight, radar lost it and the interceptors, having no look-down radar, never made contact.
Air defense weaknesses, which were widely publicized in Japan's newspapers, include insufficient radar for low altitude detection, outdated fighter-interceptors, and a command and control system which is virtually non-existent in any operational terms.¹

U.S. Embassy and U.S. military officials readily admit that the 45,000 U.S. personnel stationed in Japan are not capable of taking up the slack, and although the U.S. 7th Fleet roams the western Pacific with about 22 ships and over 200 aircraft, it now has additional tasking to maintain occasional presence in the Indian Ocean and is therefore a very thin red line in a large amount of blue water. (The U.S. 3rd Fleet, based in California, does provide formidable potential back-up.)

There is also a problem in co-operation with U.S. forces in defending the home islands. Until 1977 there had never been a mechanism for even discussing the issues involved. Beginning in late 1976, after the visit by Dr. Schlesinger, a Joint Co-ordinating Sub-Committee involving U.S. Embassy political officers (plus the DCM) and members of the Defense Agency and the Prime Minister's Office began holding meetings scheduled for at least twice a year. By July 1977, according to Sub-Committee co-chairman Thomas Shoesmith, (DCM, U.S. Emb. Tokyo), the subject of

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¹. While civilian control rightly insures against resurgent militarism, the current restrictions also reduce exercises to meaningless form; the navy is specifically prohibited from searching for the many Soviet nuclear subs regularly transiting the Sea of Japan and officers are not permitted to refer to any "potential enemy." Most important there is no system for command co-ordination between military and civilians so that split-second decisions required in modern warfare can be made and transmitted. The chairman of Japan's Joint Staff Council, Four Star General Hiroomi Kirisu, was forced to resign in July, 1978 after criticising Japan's readiness and declaring that front line forces might have to act without orders in the case of surprise attack.
areas of responsibility had been raised only once in general terms, and there had never been any operational meeting between military officials to determine areas of responsibility, types of responses, chains of command, possible areas of redundancy and overlap in present tasking, nor a determination as to who is in charge of what in times of emergency. In sum, the left hand has only the faintest notion of what the right is doing and Embassy officials are avoiding initiative or pressure, since they are fully aware of the political sensitivity of defense issues in Japan.¹

**DEFENSE, SECURITY AND THE INTANGIBLES**

Analysis of Japan's military capacities and potentials must also take into account a number of additional factors:

First, with the world's third largest economy, Japan produces the most steel and the second largest number of automobiles each year; its semi-dormant shipyards are capable of turning out more ship tonnage than any other country; it annually produces much of the world's most advanced technological products.

Moreover, while current policy restrictions prohibit the export of arms and limit the domestic production of weapons, there is considerable pressure from manufacturers to lift export restrictions and allow Japan to enter the arms-sales market; Japan already manufactures its own submarines, its own jet trainer and jet fighter, the T-2, with 1.6 mach speed and excellent fighter-bomber capabilities; the McDonnell-Douglas F-4J and the soon-to-be purchased Northrop F-15 are manufactured in Japan under license.

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¹. Based on an interview with Thomas Shoesmith, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo on 29 June 1977 granted specifically for work on this thesis.
Third, Japan's ability to build ICBMs and IRBMs is obvious; it launched a number of satellites in recent years, several with totally home-manufactured components; its mid-1977 satellite demonstrated a technical skill in stationary orbit technique previously possessed exclusively by the U.S. There have been nuclear reactors in Japan since the early 1970s and expertise in nuclear physics necessary to develop nuclear warheads has been available for years.

Finally, international events in recent years have prompted a considerable shift in Japanese public opinion and attitudes toward the JSDF, and this increased support for continuance of the armed forces has allowed the Defense Agency to initiate campaigns clearly aimed at stirring public discussion and increasing support.

But restrictions and deficiencies are also present: aside from the constitutional prohibition and popular opinion that the defense budget should remain below 1% of the GNP, the Commander-in-Chief of the JSDF summed up present capabilities shortly after the MiG-25 incident by saying "Our navy would last two minutes, our air force two hours, and our army about two days in the event of attack."  

1. The MiG-25 incident and tough Soviet attitudes during fishing talks for example.
2. See Defense of Japan, op. cit.
3. Stated during an interview to the author and to David Smeeton of the BBC and later quoted in BBC and VOA broadcasts of late September 1976.
As events in the past one hundred years underscore, the Japanese are easily as emotional in their responses to events as the people of any country, and given the increased public concern about the reliability of the U.S. and the threatening statements and actions of the Soviet Union during 1977 and 1978, public support for eliminating defense deficiencies should grow as the 1978 LDP elections showed. That is to say that Japan, which already is rearmed, can be expected to continue to improve its defense capability without changing its constitution; only a massive increase in the perceived threat would be likely to provoke a demand for constitutional amendment.


2. See Bruce Intersoll, "Japan stepping up arms development," Daily Missoulian, (Mont.), 12 Dec. 1978. "Last February Takeo Fukuda became the first Prime Minister since WWII to discuss defense policy in his annual address to the opening of parliament." (Chicago Sun-Times Service.)

3. William Chapman, "Fukuda Is Likely to Win Lackluster Vote in Japan," IHT., 20 Nov. 1978, (NY Times Service). "... Mr. Nakasone favours higher defense spending and speaks his mind on issues long taboo, including revision of the constitution..." Note: Nakasone was considered by many heir apparent, whenever Mr. Ohira relinquished power.
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE "FRAGILE SUPERPOWER"

In titling his book Fragile Superpower, Frank Gibney struck at the heart of a matter discussed often by Japanese and foreigners; it is a bit of a dogma, which is recited with the familiarity of a litany by those explaining Japan. The dogma, part of Japan's self-image and its version of history, states that because 113 million people must live on impoverished islands no larger than the State of Montana in the U.S. (pop. about 940,000), the Japanese rely on imported foodstuffs and natural resources in order to survive, and must acquire them by force or by maintaining excellent foreign relations. Force was tried for nearly 50 years (1895-1945) and found to be a "bankrupt policy."

Those who answer in the negative to the often-asked question about "resurgent militarism in Japan now or in the future," can point to this bit of dogma, upon which there is consensus in both the Western and Japanese sense of that term. In sum, Japan is in the difficult position of arranging vital priorities: any natural national instinct to develop a truly viable Self-Defense Force must be weighed against the possibility of alarming one's neighbours and protectors to the point where they might cut off the life-blood natural resources in retaliation or out of fear, thus defeating Japan's first priority of survival -- the continued sustenance of 113 million unable to continue without imports.¹

¹. Despite intensive farming for example, Japan is only 72% self sufficient with shortages in meat, wheat, feed grains, edible oil and fats to cite a few. Other shortages include fossil fuels and virtually all industrial raw materials. National Basic Intelligence Factbook, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Jan. 1977), pp. 107-8.
The intensity of this survival instinct has led some Japanese critics to talk of a "hunger mentality," of voracious devouring at the expense of other nations: "We're a nation without morality," laments Shintaro Ishihara, who recalls that General de Gaulle once said "Who was that transistor radio salesman?" just after visiting Prime Minister Ikeda left the room.¹ To camera makers in Germany or motorcycle manufacturers in Britain who abandoned the field to Japan, the Japanese appear too single-minded, too ruthless, and somehow, "unfair." And in Asia, as Professor Kazuji Nagasu writes, after his visit to Singapore, Japan also has image problems:

Thirty-five years ago the Japanese came in warships loaded with tanks and soldiers. Imperial soldiers swarmed ashore with the Mutaguchi Division or the Yamashita Division. Now Japan steams into port on mercant ships loaded with automobiles and television sets. Businessmen compete with each other in gross displays of corporate cliquishness and loyalty as if they were latter-day cadres of the Sumitomo Division and the Mitsubishi Division.² The times have changed, but the behaviour of the Japanese has not.

But while foreigners may accuse Japan of being "Japan Incorporated" — a nation without ethical or moral essence or a sense of responsibility commensurate with its economic position, might accuse it of having as its only foreign policy goal the ensuring that the way is made

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smooth for the Japanese businessman overseas, it must be said that the miracle economy rose from the literal ashes of WWII in 25 years. It rose with little outside aid (in the direct sense of foreign aid as we know it) and Japan today is in the remarkable position of having sufficiently good relations with virtually every country to assure continued import of vital materials, and with the exception of trade barriers to some specific items, the continued export of Japanese products worldwide.

POLICY IN A HIERARCHICAL SOCIETY

At first glance, it would thus seem that there is immense pressure on the Japanese Foreign Ministry to ensure national survival, and it is true that the role of the government ministries is recognized and respected. The government has many of the brightest and best educated men in Japan, especially in choice agencies such as the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry.

But management in Japan can be easier than in most countries, partly due to the unique historical development of social values and relationships. In Japan they are founded on paternalism, the Confucian canon and repression of individuality, with emphasis on harmonious relations and loyalty as the supreme virtues. Inequality is unquestioningly accepted as the natural order of things and has been the rule of organized

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1. Relations with Israel deteriorated after Japan expelled the Israeli Ambassador within days of the Arab Oil embargo in 1973, and in late 1976 relations with the Soviet Union were strained again by a number of developments, as we shall examine in Section II.

2. Fear of increasing trade barriers is of vital concern, not only for the reasons outlined above; Prime Minister Fukuda told the Tokyo Foreign Correspondent's Club on 10 March 1977 the conditions which pushed Japan into WWII are in danger of being repeated.
social life throughout Japanese history. Overwhelming respect and extreme deference are shown to persons deemed superior by virtue of age, rank, occupation or social status; strangers are, as Jack Seward points out in *The Japanese*, "treated arrogantly or utterly ignored." Even today, Japanese society, upon close inspection, appears formed as an incredible pyramid of interlocked personal obligations and dependencies. Ostracism from the group is a dreaded punishment and a mother's ultimate threat to a misbehaving child is that "people will laugh and have nothing to do with you."

Moreover, in no sense is the Gaimusho — the Foreign Ministry — vested with sole responsibility for the foreign relations of Japan and its continued survival, as scholar-journalist Richard Halloran of the *New York Times* says:

> ... The Establishment, the elder brothers of the nation-family, are given the responsibility for governing and seeing to the welfare of the people, who are the children of the nation family. ... It is obliged to be benevolent and paternal. The people in turn are obliged to show respect and to be obedient. ... Despite all the changes on the surface of industrial, modern Japan, ... Today's Establishment is the direct descendent of the governing class of premodern Japan and the Meiji obligarchy. It is the result of a slow widening of the elite to include the bureaucracy, military, business executives, and politicians. The Occupation eliminated the military. ... and helped elevate the politicians to full membership in the Establishment.


Certain members of the intellectual community, including selected journalists and social critics are also part of "the Establishment", who are used to build consensus nationally and to quiet opposition once a decision becomes known.

Since the "tyranny of the majority" must be avoided, the arguments of the opposition — the main outsiders — must be heard. The main outsiders are left-wing party leaders, labour union leaders, leftist intellectuals and occasional specialists. Collectively they can delay, but seldom if ever succeed in stopping, the Establishment from implementing a collectively arrived at decision. Occasionally the opposition can force compromises but its chief use is by the Establishment itself, which uses the opposition's public pressure to move in directions it prefers, but cannot publicly endorse, or as an excuse for inactivity.

Entry into the Establishment may be fairly described as the most equitable competition into meritocracy anywhere in the non-communist world; membership is a function of merit based on examination entry scores which enable the student to enter the "right" universities, and of age. Few members of the establishment are younger than fifty, while the most prominent are chiefly beyond sixty years of age. By the time a man reaches the Establishment, he will have had twenty-five or thirty years of personal relationships with others who entered important organizations at the time he did, were promoted when he was, and arrived as fellow classmates all across the bureaucracy, business, and politics at about the

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1. The universities number about six, the most prestigious of which is Todai — formerly known as Tokyo Imperial University. Its top graduate each year wins a silver watch for excellence. Prime Ministers Sato and Fukuda both won such watches.
same time, having survived a gradual weeding-out process\(^1\) which allows him to know — and often have "obligations" toward — most of the others since the early days.

Bureaucrats in Japan wield more power than most of their counterparts elsewhere;\(^2\) their expertise, gained over a lifetime of work in one area, far transcends that of the cabinet minister and the strength of their positions can be seen in this incident recorded by Halloran, but experienced by many others:

I once had a long, on-the-record news interview with a Japanese foreign minister. After the session, the direct quotes that would be attributed to the minister were submitted, as previously agreed to the ministry's press officer to check for accuracy. He broke them apart by subject matter and took each quote around to the appropriate bureaucrat for approval before releasing them for print. The foreign minister did not see them. He thus could not speak with authority on Japan's foreign policy without first having his words cleared with his supposed underlings...\(^3\)

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1. "Face" is saved in this process and many who fall by the wayside earn equal salaries and have important sounding titles despite their lack of power.

2. For amplification see Akio Watanabe, "Foreign Policy Making, Japanese Style," *International Affairs*, January, 1978, pp. 75-88, who covers various aspects in great detail and who maintains the down-to-up process in government bureaus in Japan is almost the reverse of "top-to-downward" policy dictates in the U.S.

Thus, politicians — in their roles as ministers of state — are not necessarily the most powerful group. Moreover, decisions or positions are rarely taken alone. The process of building consensus involves considerable co-ordination with departments in and out of government when new policies are being initiated, in a manner quite similar to the co-ordination process within the establishment almost anywhere. But there are fundamental differences, including the extremes of effort to avoid loss of face all around; middle men using an oblique approach, and form of expression (in what can be an extraordinarily subtle language), are often used in the almost constant round of informal discussions when snags arise. The need for other-directedness — for keeping antennae up in all directions — is vital if one is to succeed in Japanese society in almost any field. And if communications is the "oil" in this machinery, loyalty is the glue which holds it all together. The roughly 3,000 men and very few women who comprise the establishment at any one time are inextricably tied through a web of family relationships, obligations and loyalties as firm as the samurai to their daimyos.

1. Prime Minister Yoshida was nicknamed "wan man" (one man) due to his penchant for steamrolling decisions. Premier Tanaka was called the "computerized bulldozer" for the same reason, but these men were extreme exceptions.

2. For amplified illustration of this entire process see Halloran, op. cit. p. 95.

3. The October, 1967 edition of Bungei Shinju magazine dealt with one portion of The Establishment in an article entitled "A Hundred Men of Culture Who Move Japan." There are mutual obligations involved with the loyalty relationship; when a young man enters an organization he pledges fealty, expects to work at the same organization for a lifetime, and in turn can assume he will not be fired.
But these fierce loyalties are limited to groups, cliques and factions much smaller than 3,000, and they play inordinately powerful roles compared to most of their counterparts elsewhere.

THE L.D.P. AND OTHER PLAYERS

The role of factions and cliques can be illustrated by the nature of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has ruled Japan for over twenty-four years. While the party, on paper, is organized much like parliamentary political parties in the West, it is in reality a coalition of political clans called factions, which are run by powerful leaders who help pay for faction members' political campaigns. Faction members are almost never freed to "vote their conscience" and infighting is downright vicious. The party has three elements: the Secretariat, under the Secretary-General, who is chief party administrator, a Policy Board and a Research Council with sections paralleling government ministries. There is immense overlap and striking parallel with the relationship between party and government in the Soviet Union. Members of the LDP consistently chose a faction leader as Foreign Minister; another consistently heads the lower house Foreign Affairs Committee, and often both are simultaneously members of the Party Foreign Affairs Research Council and will occupy important posts on the Party Policy Board. The most important point to be drawn from this is that it is the LDP, and not the foreign ministry, which is central to any key foreign policy decisions.

1. The political infighting which brought down Premier Takeo Miki is an example.
CHARACTERISTICS, PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS

Briefly summarizing the above process, plus some of the characteristics which make Japan's foreign policy process unique or distinctive, there emerge several points — including some made by Japan's leading writers and thinkers on the nation's identity and world role — among which are some of the problems which tend to limit, constrain and inhibit Japan in the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation. Among these are Japan's long history of isolation coupled with what Professor Tadao Umesao calls a "black hole" tendency feverishly to gather vast amounts of information about foreign countries\(^1\) while sending almost no meaningful information to the outside world.\(^2\)

Also, Japan has a post-war history of "silent trade" which has become lopsided in Japan's favour economically, culturally and socially with limited exchange.\(^3\)

Further, Japan has linguistic and cultural barriers which make mutual understanding, at present, nearly impossible. Myriad examples of this problem exist.

\(^1\) The people of Japan read more books, magazines and newspapers per capita each year than do people in any other country. Japanese are very well informed on world affairs.


\(^3\) For further amplification see Tadao Umesao, op. cit., pp. 19-23.
The Japanese also claim a lack of experience in international diplomacy; one resultant effect being the recurring "shockus", another being a tendency toward what Zbigniew Brzezinski describes in *The Fragile Blossom* as a tender "hothouse flower culture" which has never developed resistance to the vicissitudes of the international environment. Both in government and industry in Japan there is also a tendency to work with few long range policy goals, what Professor Yonosuke Nagai calls "response to faits accomplis,"\(^1\) and "long range" goals tending toward eighteen months to two years.\(^2\)

Foreign policy development and implementation in Japan is also hampered by a domestic working environment in which inter and intra-party rivalries delay and sometimes subvert the policy process; domestic factors sometimes distort the foreign issues. After serving as foreign minister, Takeo Miki said:

Too many post war cabinets put first emphasis on home affairs... The result has been the Foreign Ministry, inexperienced in home affairs, has been led around by the nose so long that it has ceased to see its role in proper perspective.\(^3\)

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2. Revealed during several interviews in Tokyo and restated by Thomas Shoesmith, (DCM, U.S. Emb. Tokyo, op. cit.), who found this to be true on a wide range of subjects and at every level. This helps explain why virtually all new products from Japan are replaced within two years, whether watches or computers.

Moreover, the consensus making process tends to be a long and arduous one, and makes secrecy virtually impossible. In addition, the lack of expertise at ministerial level makes new foreign policy initiatives vulnerable to the vagaries of political maneuvering, particularly if the Foreign Minister is not a strong faction leader.\(^1\) Further, lack of sufficient personnel results in an overworked bureaucracy constantly stretched between planning and response to current crises.\(^2\)

It should also be noted that because of the strength of the bureaucracy, the factions and cliques within the Establishment, and the strong sense of loyalty and fealty within an extremely hierarchical society, factional and clique politics play a much larger role than mere bureau politics so familiar in the West.\(^3\)

In addition to domestic factors, "image problems" and Japanese tendencies since 1939 in international affairs also affect the Foreign policy process; among these, residual resentments from WWII, which continue to prompt suspicions, bitterness, jealousy and even fear in other countries. Japan has also exhibited considerable tendencies towards "followership" in the international community — despite economic

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2. Ibid. p. 132.

3. Inter and intra-bureau rivalries in the U.S. or British foreign office for example.
prominence and membership in vast numbers of world bodies\(^1\) — prompted in part by language barriers and cultural inhibitions,\(^2\) and in part from fear of alienating potential trade partners. This results in "economic animal" charges, criticisms about foreign aid donations and in another unique aspect of Japanese foreign policy: unlike other major powers Japan has since WWII done virtually nothing to shape the world as it would have it; in this sense Japan is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the U.S., or Britain at the height of the British Empire.

Japan also has an international image summarized as "Japan Incorporated," which is prompted by the process of consensus — a process whereby disagreement, conflict and debate is kept behind a "black curtain"\(^3\) — which thus presents the world with an apparent united national front difficult to understand — a barrier which prompts suspicion and even fear. Economic variations on the "yellow peril" theme abound in the U.S. and the E.E.C.,\(^4\) partially as a result of this lack of understanding.

1. Japan, at last count by the U.S. State Dept. (Jan. 1980), held membership in 35 international organizations such as the U.N., WHO, OECD, etc.

2. A classic picture of this appeared worldwide showing leaders at the London Summit in May, 1977 laughing together at some bon mot while Premier Fukuda sat solemnly listening with great concentration to his interpreter's explanation.

3. A Japanese cliche borrowed from Kabuki theatre, where the black curtain covers all the off-stage maneuvering and scheming relevant to the plot.

Also counterproductive in many instances is Japan's international image as an economic superpower with a high level of employment\(^1\) and a healthy GNP growth rate, plus a balance of payments surplus which burdens the world economy — all factors which belie self-images, and perhaps realistic assessments of Japan's fragile, or at least vulnerable economy. Thus Japanese officials find themselves often flying to Europe or the U.S. to "seek understanding" on subjects as varied as whale quotas, television set or automobile "dumping," and measures to cut the Japanese trade surplus.

**CURRENT ADVANTAGES**

Despite the problems, constraints and unique characteristics outlined above, Japan has certain distinct advantages in formulating and implementing foreign policy and in maintaining its relations with other nations. Among these, an apparent absence of unrealistic aspirations or goals: Japan and Japanese products are *persona grata* virtually everywhere.\(^2\)

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1. At a time when most industrialized countries suffered 6% to 9% unemployment in the three and a half year recovery from the energy crisis, Japan's official unemployment pushed 2% — but these figures were very deceptive, since the Japanese Bureau of Statistics starts with a seasonally adjusted base figure of nearly 6% unemployment; this is not included, nor is the unemployment of part-time workers such as the growing number of housewives who do work in prosperous times; finally those employees who are laid-off and go to the small family-owned shop are also excluded.

2. During 1977, a year marked by considerable conflict with the Soviet Union, overall trade figures with that country nearly doubled the figures for the previous year.
Secondly, Japan has consistently called its relations with the United States "the cornerstone of our foreign policy," and while many of the "client states" of the U.S. have taken considerable political, military and economic advantage of this relationship, Japan has not exploited or manipulated this position to any great extent. (The disadvantage here is that there is truth in the saying that "the squaking wheel gets the oil," and U.S.-Japanese understanding is mostly a one-sided affair.)

Third, Japan does not export ideology — at least since 1945 — nor has it been involved in a single military confrontation since the war; it is therefore no threat to any rival social/political/economic system in its dealings abroad. Thus, if it is an economic giant, the fact that it is simultaneously a political and military dwarf, in the view of neighbors, works to its economic advantage.

Finally, over 20 years of continual LDP rule has meant that a certain limited number of people are "locked in" to the normal foreign policy development process and that the party/ministry relationship has been continuous for so long that attitudes and positions have become congruent on virtually every issue.

**PERSPECTIVES ON JAPAN**

It is possible to view Japan from several perspectives: for example it could be viewed as a "prize" whose technology and technical sophistication are especially attractive to two major rivals for its favours — China and the Soviet Union — both of whom need partners for their

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1. Israel, South Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korean on many occasions, to name a few.
national goals of accelerated economic development. In March, 1972, C.L. Sulzberger of the New York Times wrote: "As a consequence of the implied shift in Asian relationships featured by President Nixon's Peking visit, Japan now finds itself in the delightful position of being simultaneously courted by all three Superpowers, the U.S., Russia and China." And in August, 1977, Asahi Evening News exulted over Japan's growing prestige; quoting foreign ministry sources it reported that "it is unprecedented that there is such a lineup of ambassadors of such caliber at the same time." Asahi was referring to former Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, former Politburo member Dmitrii Polyansky and Chinese Central Committee member Fu Hao.

A less favourable view was taken by visiting British Trade Secretary Edmund Dell who told a gathering of foreign correspondents in Tokyo in April, 1977, that Japan was an unaffordable burden to the rest of the world in light of the other debts industrialized nations were accruing due to the oil crisis. And he bluntly underscored the European view of the "closed" Japanese market which inflates the price of foreign goods in Japan so that they cannot compete fairly, and thus cannot help alleviate the mounting deficit trade balances and U.S. and E.E.C. countries have with Japan.


Finally, there is the view of some critics, among them Japanese writers, who decry what they see as the immorality and expediency of Japanese foreign policies and business practices.¹

Whether Japan's role as potential "prize" in the Sino-Soviet rivalry is the most valid perception in helping to explain the motivations behind the treaty "contest" between those two powers will be explored more fully in Section II.

PART TWO

CHINA

The establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 has prompted continuing controversy and scholarly debate, with numerous and varied interpretations of its politics, ideology, economics, plans, present situation and future prospects. Yet it remains possible to extract from this thicket of history and interpretation a number of military, political, economic and socio-cultural/ideological factors which operate domestically to drive, direct, and constrain the foreign policy process, and the People's Republic of China in general. Most of the focus will be on China post-1949.

TENDENCIES IN THE EARLY AND MIDDLE PERIOD

The early history of China points to a number of developments of continuing relevance. For example, it can be said that China has no real tradition of democratic process, nationwide voting, (in the formal sense), or widespread sharing in the policy-making process. Further, there are ample recent and historical examples of a marked Chinese tendency toward ethnocentricity, and occasional xenophobia — prompted in considerable degree by Chinese encounters with the West and with Japan from the beginning of the Nineteenth Century and as late as the Sino-Soviet rift of the early 1960s.
History also shows that new Chinese Dynasties have tended to try to discredit their predecessors, and that there is a long-standing tradition of upward mobility, due in large part to the open civil service examination, which has in turn engendered a respect for education and scholarship.

From earliest days to the present, the predominant portion of the economy has been agrarian, the ebb and flow of state-craft has been a cyclic tug between regionalism and central government control, and control of the water and of floods has been a persistent problem and a subject of considerable concern for each administration in the constant struggle to feed... and control... China's vast population.

Many of China's past rulers have maintained effective domestic intelligence networks to ensure stability and control; China's literature is rich in stories and textbooks on statecraft, warfare, and administration.

And finally, certain periods in Chinese history provide examples of successful and unsuccessful defense of the realm from "barbarian" invaders — most often groups occupying the hinterlands to the north and northwest of China — the very regions now so heavily occupied by Soviet troops.

CHINA AFTER 1949

After nearly 150 years of almost constant civil war and exploitation by Western powers and Japan, China enjoyed a period of relative peace from 1952 until 1966, and again, from 1969 until the present, with the
political, cultural and social scene overwhelmingly dominated by the Chinese Communist Party.

In contrast to the pre-Communist period, it can be said that the masses of China are perhaps more politicized, generally more informed and aware of the wishes of the central government, and more literate than at any other time in Chinese history. This does not mean that under communist administration China has necessarily enjoyed steady or even progress, unified leadership, tranquil politics — nor even progress without problems toward modernization, national unity or secure defense of the realm. To examine the reasons for this uneven progress, a number of developments and aspects of the Chinese situation since 1949 must be taken into account.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The period from 1966 to 1969, during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), was characterized by chaos, factional fighting and destruction\(^1\) which isolated the People's Republic diplomatically,\(^2\) left it

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2. The excesses of the GPCR chilled China's relations with much of the Third World.
bereft of newly educated youth\textsuperscript{1} and experienced civil administrators,\textsuperscript{2} divided the nation and the leadership on key issues including defense,\textsuperscript{3} education, economic development, modernization and diplomatic strategies,\textsuperscript{4} and brought the PLA back into civil administrative roles for the first time since 1954.\textsuperscript{5}

**THE POWER STRUGGLE**

In the aftermath of the GPCR, the period from 1969 until September 1976, was characterized by a power struggle which bitterly divided the

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\textsuperscript{1} Universities in China did not re-open until 1972 and did not reach world standards until massive reorganization began in 1978, leaving a decade of "lost youth."

\textsuperscript{2} Tens of thousands of party cadre at every level were purged, and occasionally died, during and after the GPCR; many names reappeared only after the llth NPC.


\textsuperscript{4} A. Doak Barnett, "Round One in China's Succession: The Shift Toward Pragmatism," *Current Scene*, Jan. 1977, pp. 1-10 is but one of a great number of articles discussing the issues in the GPCR and during its aftermath.

\textsuperscript{5} Ellis Joffe, op. cit. p. 2.
leadership, 1 slowed economic progress, 2 vitiated the regular armed forces defense capabilities, 3 emasculated numerous national development programmes, 4 engendered caution and even fear in cadres at every level 5 and forced the top leaders of the PLA to entrench themselves in key positions. 6

THE LEGACY OF MAO AND CHIANG CHING

In the period from October, 1976, following the death of Mao, until late 1977, national leaders were preoccupied with consolidating power, 7 millions of (predominantly young) radicals were disenfranchised, 8 at least

1. The real bitterness could be seen in the campaigns and posters 1966-1977.


4. A. Doak Barnett, op. cit. pp. 2-4. Also, accusations against The Gang of Four in 1977 which were widely covered by Chinese media.

5. From 1973-76 many were victims of "Big Character Poster Campaigns" as interpretations on new national campaigns and projects varied from week to week. See Fred Coleman, "China Alters Course," Newsweek, 30 October 1978, p. 50 for cadre quotes.


8. For eg. the sincere followers of Madame Mao and recidivist Red Guards.
40 million people were forced into labor camps,\(^1\) as many as 10 million youths were stranded in the countryside;\(^2\) a "final installment" of once-purged moderates occurred, putting them into places vacated by the GPCR\(^3\) beneficiaries, and pragmatic economic and foreign trade policies were re-adopted.\(^4\) During that period, China also formally adopted a new constitution, leadership lineup\(^5\) and agenda of national goals and priorities oriented toward order and modernization.\(^6\)

**THE TENG-HUA ERA**

The period beginning circa January 1978 showed strong indications of an increasingly confident Chairman Huo Kuo-feng and the strong influence of the pragmatic Teng Hsiao-ping.\(^7\) It was characterized by bold new initiatives in foreign relations,\(^8\) compromises in ideology and

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international disputes, stress on law and order, practical steps toward rapid modernization in education, defense, industry, science and labour, plus public admission of problems in various sectors and subtle moves to discredit certain aspects of the "Mao Dynasty."

THE STRATEGIC EQUATION

One of the most important and often overlooked facts of the Chinese political situation is that the PLA maneuvered top officers into the top policy making bodies in the past decade; 9 of 12 members of the post-Mao Politburo (1976-7) were current or former PLA officers, as were 13 of 23 in the next one. A look at China's strategic and geopolitical situation provides insights into the probable motives for PLA reinvolveinent in politics, for many of the policies promulgated since Mao's death, and for the opposition to, and ouster of, the radicals.


6. While the term "radicals" is a journalistic shorthand which has come into general use, it is worth noting that Chou En-Lai apparently used the same phrase in 1949. See "Chou Made U.S. Plea in 1949, Cables Say," IHT., 14 August 1978, p. 5.
Nearly 85% of China's 920 to 950 million work the land, and only about 13% of the landmass is suitable for agriculture; the vast majority of the population is concentrated in the fertile regions, predominantly in the eastern portion of the country.

By almost any economic measuring device, China is a poor, backward country — a phrase often used by Chinese officials in discussions with foreigners. It faces huge problems in terms of food supply, transportation, communications, distributions, and technological infrastructure. Industrialization is best described as a thin and often outdated veneer over a basically agrarian Asian economy.

The People's Liberation Army is the world's largest — about 3,950,000 men and women. Chinese officials say the PLA is supplemented by one hundred million militia.¹ But the militia has been trained and equipped only for "People's War," which the radicals stressed over regular force improvement.

The order of battle in the vicinity of China is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SIZE OF FORCE</th>
<th>WORLD RANK</th>
<th>CURRENT STATUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>3.65 million$^1$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Anti-Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.09 million</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Relations Cool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Korea</td>
<td>635,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pro-U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>615,000</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pro-Soviet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Korea</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Relations Vary$^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>460,000</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Pro-U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>428,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Relations Vary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There were at least 2,000 Soviet advisors in Vietnam in late 1978,$^3$ and Vietnamese troops and officials have reportedly assumed total civil and military control in Laos.$^4$

As of mid-1978, the United States had over 1,200 troops stationed in Taiwan, 45,000 in Japan and another 39,000 in South Korea. In addition to the 22 warships and 214 warplanes of the 7th Fleet there were U.S. ground and air forces within striking distance at Guam and in the Philippines.$^5$ U.S. force strengths rank number three.

1. Excludes some 750,000 uniformed civilians.

2. Relations between N. Korea and the PRC have warmed in the period since Kim Il-Sung's Peking visit in early 1975 after 11 years of excellent relations between North Korea and the USSR. BBC World Service, 16 August 1978, 1645 GMT. "Korea."


Thus, when viewed from a Chinese perspective, the strategic situation in the immediate vicinity is fraught with danger: the Korean peninsula is potentially explosive, Taiwan's forces are sworn to retake the mainland,\(^1\) Vietnam has a long history of antipathy toward China and relations by mid-1978 were strained to breaking point. Moreover, of the 12 largest armed forces in the world, only France, Germany and Turkey did not have viable forces within striking distance of China.

Of these forces, however, none begins to compare with the armed array of Soviet troops facing China across the world's largest common border, nor does any perceived threat compare with this one -- which most experts agree is a predominant factor in virtually all aspects of planning and preparation among the top leaders of China.\(^2\)

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Nor is perception of the threat unjustified: the Vice-Chairman of the Sinkiang Revolutionary Committee at Urumchi, a considerable distance from the site of the well-publicized 1969 border conflicts, reported that "Nearly every day we have border problems with the USSR at some point or another in our territory."¹

Ranged in various concentrations along nearly 2,000 miles of common border are Soviet troops estimated by China at one million strong — by others at as low as 686,000.² At least half of China's regular armed are deployed against them. Since three-hour border talks at Peking airport in 1969 between Chou en-Lai and his Soviet counterpart, Alexei Kosygin, both groups have eased into in-depth positions deployed as far back as 200 miles from the border region, but as indicated above, daily border patrols make potentially explosive contact on far too many occasions to be of comfort to any but the most bellicose members of either Politburo.³

1. Rene Filipo, "Journalists Tour Forbidden Sinkiang," Japan Times 21/6/77, p. 3.

2. According to Military Balance (1978-79, half of the 44 divisions are in category one (75-100% manned) or category two (50-75%) with the other half in category three (about 25% of war effectiveness). As Geoffrey Jukes points out, three tank divisions at 75% and three at 25% equals a maximum of 66,000, while 19 Motor rifle divisions at 75% and 19 at 25% equals 247,000; total ground forces therefore 313,000. By adding in a quarter of the Soviet Navy (108,000) and Air Force (114,000), plus one-third of the Border Troops (67,000) and MVD Internal Security Troops (84,000) the total comes to 686,000. Given the size of most ships in the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the high probability that less than a full-third of the Soviet Air Forces is in Asia, even this total is probably too high.

3. Angus M. Fraser, "Use of the PLA in Foreign Affairs," Problems of Communism, Nov-Dec. 1975, p. 24 has been corroborated by numerous sources including members of Dr. Schlesinger's party and Col. James Garrand, (U.S. Army), Chief, Defense Intelligence Analysis Section, U.S. Consulate, Hong Kong.
It is also important to note that experts estimate that a Soviet division has four to five times the maneuverability and ten times the firepower of its Chinese counterpart\(^1\) — a fact which would not escape the notice of Peking's top military leaders. Anxieties over defense issues — defense of the realm has been every emperor's first mandate — are thus a vital factor and provide a major motivation when explaining political developments in recent years such as the arrests of the Chinese "Gang of Four" and the overwhelming preponderance of active and former PLA men in the Politburo when Hua Kuo-feng was named Party Chairman on October 6, 1976, one day after the arrests.

**THE FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUUM**

Despite the upheavals on the domestic scene from 1966 to 1977, there was remarkable continuity in most aspects of Chinese foreign policy.\(^2\) Three factors continued to most shape foreign policy: traditionalism, nationalism, and ideology. In a manner reminiscent of Japan's Meijii leaders, ("rich nation — strong soldiery,"\(^3\)) national interests and nationalism predominated; security was a first concern and relations with the USSR, which continued bad throughout the decade,\(^3\) remained

\(^1\) Garrand, op. cit.


the decisive factor in shaping foreign policy in 1978. ¹ Much of Chinese foreign policy and its overall directions after 1969 could be explained by assuming that China was motivated by desires to avoid Soviet encirclement, and by taking at face value the statement by Chinese leaders that "We are in a race against time."² By 1978, it was clear that pragmatic leaders like Teng Hsiao-ping had opted for foreign technology and massive transfers of industrial expertise, (best implemented by good relations with the U.S. and the "Second World," ) to assist in that race. Clearly also, after 1970, ideology most often came second for men like Teng; as he once put it, "I don't care whether a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice." In the view of Mr. Teng and his many followers back in power by 1978, the race against time and the Soviet threat was made doubly difficult by the GPCR; "Before the smashing of the Gang of Four," a trade official told U.S. reporters in October 1978, "we were attacked as 'capitalist roaders.' We could do nothing. I wanted to resign. Now we are back in the forefront, making up for ten years of lost time."³

¹ Coleman, "The View From Peking," op. cit.

² The statement was made in a speech by Defense Minister Yeh Chien-ying, (May 1977) on the manufacture of modern weapons, but despite the different context the sense of urgency appears to be shared by leaders in many sectors of Chinese society.

³ Fred Coleman, "China Alters Course," op. cit.
But as with any nation's foreign policy, paradoxes and inconsistencies do exist; with China, two recur: the conflict between nationalism and internationalism, and the problems arising from the fact that China is the pre-eminent regional power, but still an emerging nation, which can maintain global presence but would not thus achieve superpower status. As Professor Robert Scalapino summarises:

... its foreign policies, ... particularly ... toward the Pacific-Asian area, reflect ... two diverse conditions. Toward the states on its periphery, The People's Republic of China can exhibit power, as it has done repeatedly in its ... history ... Yet China clearly does not want to provoke a confrontation with either of the two superpowers, nor can it afford a foreign policy that takes priority in attention and costs from its pressing domestic needs.

... Preoccupation for the foreseeable future will be with the Soviet Union, how to ... nullify its containment policies, ... compete with it for influence. ... (and) avoid conflict with a vastly superior power while upholding its own interest.

Conflicts between nationalism and internationalism engender, as James Hsiung puts it, many examples of Peking's willingness to "play brute power politics at the expense of ideological consistency."² His research and that of others³ also points up a strong positive correlation between foreign aid and strategic considerations — and also to strong concerns about India. Hsiung concludes:


... statistics point to India as a dominant focal point of China's attention and suggest a possibly conscious policy on Peking's part to "contain" India and to counteract Soviet influence in the South Asian region. Indeed, Peking's apparent overriding concern with India and the fact that the PRC's four leading aid recipient countries are at opposite sides of the Indian Ocean may evidence a Chinese appreciation of the strategic value of the lands bordering these waters which dates further back in time than we usually recognize.

While the term "overriding concern" (with India) must be sharply questioned, his general conclusions tally remarkably with most assessments of Chinese foreign policy as generally far-sighted, and consistent within the overall framework of national objectives.

CHARACTERISTICS, PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS

Briefly summarizing relevant aspects of the above synopsis, plus additional points made by China scholars, it is possible to point to a number of other tendencies which characterize Chinese foreign policy, plus a number of factors which have tended to limit, constrain, and present problems for the Chinese in formulating and implementing that policy in recent years. Among these are a general historical tendency to practice regional hegemony with almost a priori assumptions, while simultaneously avoiding expansionism, except when reinforcing territorial claims, and in the rather singular case of Tibet, sometimes rather tenuous claims.

Secondly, there is a continuum in Chinese military doctrine, which treats the PLA, both in potential and actual uses, in a way which suggests

1. Hsiung, op. cit. p. 60, is referring to statistics which show fully one-fourth of all Chinese aid between 1957 and 1974 went to Pakistan, 11.3%, Tanzania, 1.5%, Zambia, 8%, and Sri Lanka, 4.5%.
a highly controversial and traditional approach to the use of armed forces in the international arena. PLA potential for other than domestic defense is extremely limited.

Moreover, more than a decade of domestic political and economic turmoil has forced Chinese leaders to focus a great deal on power consolidation, party reorganization, and problems in the economy, plus modernization of the economy, the PLA, education, research and development.

Additionally, the continuing Soviet threat plus setbacks to Chinese diplomacy in the region have tended to force relatively rapid reaction to immediate circumstance, thus limiting the flexibility of initiatives and hampering longer range policies.

Restrictions on foreign policy and relations with capitalist countries imposed by certain aspects of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology also have had to be taken into account and justified to domestic and foreign Communist constituencies. Rhetorical palliatives with sufficient references to doctrine and ideology have had to be provided as rationale to a significant percentage of the masses in order to justify pragmatic concessions or temporary compromises, yet publication of these justifications could be viewed as counterproductive to bilateral foreign relations.

1. For amplification, see Angus M. Fraser, op. cit., pp. 13-25. Moreover, research by Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1960), and The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), indicates China reacts to threats along the borders "rationally and with restraint," and has signalled intentions with an initial military reaction followed by a pause of a week or more, allowing adversaries to reconsider.
It should also be noted (although not overstated) that attempts by Peking to act with other states' governments in world affairs must be hampered to some degree by the fact that as a Communist state, which therefore subscribes to long range policies aimed at the overthrow of many other states' governments, its attitudes and motives will be viewed by some with distrust, fear and even hatred.

Also, Chinese attempts to implement policies must constantly take into account the country's technological, military and economic limitations; at present there is too much to be gained from cooperation with states whose political and social systems are antithetical to China's own. As a result, China continually emphasizes that "revolution is not for export," and doctrinal emphasis on self-reliance means that revolutionary/liberation movements can expect little in the way of material help from China until they have established sovereignty in a territory. Chinese desires to expand aid programmes (to exert foreign influence and counter Soviet influence) are mitigated by the fact that foreign currency reserves are quite limited due to the need for foreign purchases of food and technology. Moreover, any Chinese desires to engage in subversion or sub rosa political activity in foreign countries must be weighed against the possible advantages which accrue from trade and purchases of foreign items it so desperately needs for its own immediate and longer-range purposes of defense and modernization.

It should also be noted that China's possible desire to aid revolutionary/liberation movements is restrained increasingly by its acceptance as a responsible actor on the world stage and by growing diplomatic ties with many governments currently in power.
Conclusions from one specific study also point to another factor affecting Chinese foreign policy: while many Third World countries are flattered by Peking's advocacy (in the U.N. and elsewhere) of some of their own favorite causes, and have come to regard China as a useful ally in redressing the world power and economic balance, it is most unlikely that such a heterogeneous group will ever accept Chinese leadership unequivocally.¹

PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA

In a period of only seven years, beginning with entry into the U.N. in 1971, the People's Republic moved from a situation of extreme isolation, burdened with residual reputations for fanatical rhetoric and revolutionary adventurism,² through a phase of worldwide fascination and curiosity (characterized by traditional Chinese diplomacy — "barbarians" bearing gifts to the Gate of Heaven were an almost daily occurrence for six years) and into a phase of outgoing, assertive, worldwide diplomacy. Mao's only foreign visit in 27 years as Chairman was to Moscow; Hua was in power less than 20 months before he visited Pyongyang, and visits to Yugoslavia, Romania and Iran followed soon after, with visits to Western Europe in 1979.


² Opponents felt China's entry into the U.N., for example, would subvert and ruin the organization. See Feeney, op. cit. p. 1.
In economic terms, experts on China have also witnessed a very different kind of "Great Leap Forward" in the 1970s: hidebound for years by the doctrine of self-reliance, China began to demonstrate a confidence in longer term economic relationships, (and less fear of "hidden attached strings" — a fear developed from lessons of the abrupt departure of Soviet technical assistance and aid), first indicating in 1973 a willingness to establish indirect credit, with contracts on a "deferred payment basis." But that was a modest step indeed compared to more recent developments. Early in 1978, Chinese leaders opened talks with Japanese bankers for a one thousand million dollar loan; shortly after mid-year, a stream of international bankers from Europe and the United States returned from Peking with the word that China planned to raise capital directly on the international market. In November 1978, United Nations officials reported that China's leaders were arranging for aid from the U.N. Development Programme and had contacted the World Health Organization and UNESCO for aid and assistance as well.¹

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PART THREE
THE SOVIET UNION

While it has often been said that there are as many views of the Soviet Union as there are "Kremlinologists," most experts generally agree that there are a number of significant Soviet characteristics and tendencies which are virtually identical to those of the Tsarist regime overthrown just over six decades ago. Experts also tend to focus on the Soviet military, on policies and strategies, problems and constraints, and on both domestic and foreign affairs aspects of each as vital to an understanding of Soviet actions.

BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION

Among those characteristics and tendencies generally unchanged since the revolution, most experts agree on a number of points:

First, a preoccupation with defense of the motherland which is manifest in part by military "over-insurance," and which has traditionally been translated into extremely large numbers of troops.

Secondly, an almost paranoid sense of vulnerability, reinforced by the lessons of history — Russia was subject to the traumatic Mongol invasion from the Far East and to threats by numerous would-be conquerors from the West. Both regimes have therefore persistently maintained hegemonic ambitions in the Balkans despite the ebb and flow of isolationism and expansionist tendencies.
Third, a continuous swing throughout the past several centuries between openings to the West and rejection of it. As Edward Crankshaw puts it:

... invariably the dynamic of withdrawal (for there is nothing passive about it; it is active and defiant) springs from an unmanageable sense of insecurity. It is a sense of insecurity which may be induced no less by a hopeless feeling of inability to cope with a too complicated world, by the fear of ideas, as by the fear of attack from the outside. The withdrawal itself, of course, is usually accompanied, or covered, by menacing attitudes and noisy vituperation.

Fourth, an awareness of the potentials of the Soviet Far East, and of threats from neighboring Far Eastern countries, which is sporadically accompanied by major efforts to exploit the region's economic potentials and neutralize its political dangers. But policies on the Far East have historically tended to be of secondary importance, as indicated by the speed with which such policies have been relegated to lower priority whenever developments to the South or West required attention.

Finally, there is the Russian/Soviet historical tendency toward a fairly rigid hierarchy; final policy decisions have been made at the highest levels, rule has been by directive and domestic security has been maintained by reliance on secret police.

In addition, more than 60 years of Communist rule points to a number of conclusions; among these are the fact that the leadership question has never been resolved without considerable political maneuvering and the eventual elimination from the ruling circle of rivals who did not succeed in grasping power.

Secondly, at the top of the Soviet bureaucracy, the persistent rival groups have been the economic ministries and Gosplan as main rivals to the Party apparatchiki, with both the Army and the Secret Police also competing for available resources and influences.

Third, it should be noted that the Kremlin's penchant for secrecy is not only well known, but often counterproductive; for example, Soviet scientists have difficulty in learning about developments in related fields which might help their own research, since such developments are classified information.

Fourth, foreign policy decisions come as a result of information and suggestions from not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also from the Foreign Department of the Party Central and the Foreign Directorate of the KGB. Major decisions are the exclusive domain of the Politburo; limitations on the foreign ministry are underscored by the fact that only two foreign ministers — Molotov and Gromyko — have reached Politburo rank.¹ Military advice, per se, is still largely the monopoly of the Ministry of Defense.²


In recent years the status of certain institute directors (e.g. Georgii Arbatov, Director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada) has greatly increased, and with it, their influence on foreign policy. As Arthur Alexander reports:

Institutions analyzing international affairs blossomed in the late 1960s, apparently under the guidance of the International Department of the Central Committee. (their) growth ... was motivated ... (by a desire) to acquire broader data and analyses, and to correlate military issues with political, economic, and sociological considerations ... The status of Institute directors ... (and their close relationship with politburo leaders) enable them to make an independent contribution to the cumbersome decision-making process.

Finally, since World War II, which provided the USSR with its best opportunity to establish buffer states to the West and, temporarily, to the East, most manifestations of policy indicate that Soviet leaders have pursued four main goals:

First, stability at home, hegemony in Eastern Europe, geopolitical opportunities elsewhere, and recognition by the rest of the world of Soviet rights as a superpower.

Secondly, security from foreign threats, with particular emphasis on solutions to security problems in relations with Washington and Peking.

Third, development and improvement of the economy; over-riding emphasis has nonetheless persisted since WWII on military modernization and heavy industry, due both to security needs and the role of military spending in the Soviet economy. In the West, in contrast, such expenditure is a "social overhead cost."


2. For amplification on this concept, see William E. Odom, "Who Controls Moscow," Foreign Policy, #19, (Summer) 1975, pp. 109-23.
Fourth, opportunities in the Third World for developing pro-Soviet
governments, and to find new sources of raw materials and potential
military bases.

THE SOVIET MILITARY

By a process of incremental, evolutionary development the USSR has developed conventional land and air forces which are extremely well equipped; the Soviet armed forces are the world's second largest. Nuclear capability is expected to be unrivalled by the early 1980s; developments such as the new SS missile series, the Backfire bomber, expanded airlift capabilities (demonstrated in 1977-78 in Vietnam and Ethiopia), and the growth in worldwide capability of the naval and commercial fleets place the Soviet Union in the superpower class — at least in military terms.

Soviet military capacity is a point of controversy: some experts point to ideological motives and the see the steady build-up as part of Moscow's drive to dominate the world; others see it as a manifestation of historical and traditional Russian insecurity and trust in massive size and numbers. There are also those who combine both arguments but stress that from Moscow's perspective, the Soviet Union is virtually surrounded by hostile, armed states.


3. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Which Five-Year Shipbuilding Program?", USN Institute Proceedings, Feb. 1977, pp. 18-25, is one of many discussions.
Finally, there are those experts who say the continued Soviet military build-up is the result of factors built into the Soviet economic and bureaucratic system; that a combination of momentum, a centralized demand economy and the "lowest common denominator" nature of Soviet decision-making result in the incrementalism only indirectly related to outside stimuli.¹

In addition to perceptions of 360° encirclement, Soviet military planners and strategists have other problems as well: rapid naval expansion in the 1960s has resulted in block obselecence in the surface and submarine fleets;² morale, particularly in the Far Eastern forces, is quite low,³ and poor transportation, supply and maintenance persist. Moreover, secrecy in military research and development has resulted in immense redundancy. Finally, the estimated 11% of GNP expenditure on defense has, despite traditional Russian willingness to sacrifice for security, made for difficult decisions in resource allocation in the face of rising consumer demands.

¹ See Dennis Ross, "Rethinking Soviet Strategic Policy: Inputs and Implications," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 1, Issue 1, May 1978, for one.


STRATEGIES AND POLICIES

In the past decade there has been little or no change in overall Soviet priorities, strategies and policies. These could be summed up as security, considerable attention to the bilateral superpower relationship, and cautious adventurism when and where the opportunity has arisen. In addition to its military manifestation, emphasis on security considerations in the years since the 1969 Sino-Soviet border incidents could be seen in a number of Soviet actions. Among them is the aid provided in the immediate region: Turkey is Moscow's largest aid recipient, (29%), and Afghanistan has received great attention since 1973.¹

It could also be seen in the attempted encirclement of China: this involved hardening of military sites and bases, the establishment of military installations in Laos, the steady build-up of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, stress on good relations with India,² sporadic and chiefly unsuccessful attempts to "tilt" North Korea against Peking, and (perhaps most significant in both economic and strategic terms) the initiation (in 1974) of an 1,800 mile railroad line from Ust-Kut (North of Lake Baikal) to a point on the Pacific near Komskolsk-on-Amur.³

It could further be seen in the use of the Soviet Navy as a political force; "gunboat diplomacy" was manifest in sea exercises north and west of Japan in June, 1978 while Soviet diplomats tried to dissuade Japanese leaders from signing the treaty with Peking. Soviet Naval action near the Horn of Africa was also significant in 1978.

It could also be seen in moves characterized by cautious opportunism wherever the risks appeared worth the reward: in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, a post-Vietnam American government locked in the malaise of "Watergate" was unlikely to initiate substantive response to Soviet assistance in Angola, where the reward, according to CIA estimates, involved very large titanium deposits. Initiatives in 1978 on the Horn of Africa brought mixed results: the loss of one warm-water port and the gain of another along the Indian Ocean. Mixed signals from Washington -- the result of an open foreign policy debate on U.S. priorities -- enhanced Soviet opportunities.

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1. Subsequent congressional testimony revealed the CIA was involved in Angola, but Dr. Kissinger's attempts to expand U.S. involvement were rejected by Congress.
PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS

Unlike the reactions of a good number of visitors to China in recent years, few, if any, who visit the Soviet Union now come away inspired. Robert Wesson stated the case at perhaps its most extreme when he wrote: "Instead of lighting the way to the future, (the USSR) lags technologically. Its official culture is deadly dull, its rhetoric stupefying stale. Crime and alcoholism, far from disappearing, seem to characterize the 'developed socialist state'." 1

A more balanced, and more embracing view of Soviet problems was presented by Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who wrote on the 60th anniversary of the Russian Revolution:

... the international communist movement was increasingly manifesting the pluralistic tendencies which Soviet leaders, with their penchant for monopolistic power, find it so painful to adjust to ... Soviet influence was ... largely based on power and on expedient or opportunistic political alliances rather than on the relevance or attractions of ideology or the accomplishments of the domestic Soviet system ... (The) Soviet economy, in part because of its concentration on military exertions and the rigidities of Soviet society has developed unevenly and Soviet leaders have for many years sought relationships with the outside world designed to alleviate economic shortfalls ... The Soviet Union today is no longer immune to fluctuations in the international economy and Soviet economic decision-making no longer enjoys the autonomy it once did. In other respects, too, Soviet isolation has lessened ... Soviet leaders must now consider the external costs of internal repression.

In general ... it is hard to envisage the USSR as the leader of the major international movements, institutions and structures. Even, or particularly, the Communist movement, in spite of the rise of individual Western Communist parties to great political strength and the threshold of Governmental power ... 2


One aspect of Soviet decision-making which has implications for foreign policy making involves the enormous demands in scope and detail on Politburo members, who have final authority over all decisions of a national importance, but as Alexander says, "also find (themselves) involved in relatively minor matters." He also describes the process:

A ruling style that combines individuality with collegiality can be unwieldy when revisions to previously accepted positions are considered, especially new and divisive proposals. This seems to be avoided generally through a time-consuming process of prior consultation and careful consensus building, through subgroup specializations, and also by sidestepping particularly troublesome issues...

As in its dealings with Japan, where efforts to prevent the China Treaty failed, the Soviet Union has failed more often than it has succeeded in its attempts to convert military power into diplomatic or economic leverage outside the Warsaw Pact periphery. Although its superpower status is undeniable in terms of pure military potential, (and even here some experts place considerable caveats on much of the conventional wisdom,) the apparent inability to convert that potential

2. Ibid.
3. Geoffrey Jukes, former British defense analyst and now Senior Fellow at the Department of International Relations, Australian National University, points out for example that a) thorough analysis of supposed total Soviet manpower indicates the strong possibility that persistent overestimates occur in the West; b) that analysis of Soviet military quality, efficiency and states of readiness too often ascribes abilities which are not at all consistent with Soviet society or economy, and which presume much higher levels of manpower and states of readiness in many Soviet divisions than warranted by the evidence. Put another way, it is possible that Western "worst case projections" have been adopted to such a degree that they are now presumed as Soviet "Standard Operating Procedure."
has often imposed restraints on Soviet foreign policy. And as was demonstrated in the "Camp David Summit" attempts at a Middle East settlement, has left it -- often -- in the paradoxical position of being a superpower without real participation in key regional issues.

In discussing the Soviet "superpower" role, Robin Edmonds wrote:

It is this armoury, combined with the expanded Soviet conventional military forces, both at sea and in the air, that has at last entitled the Soviet Union to its global role. Yet in the process of achieving this goal, the Soviet Union, like the United States, has become in many ways the prisoner of its power, which it must control, and of its responsibility, which it must seek to define.

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The sub-title to this section is "the search for security," for it seems clear that security considerations have been, and continue to be, an extremely strong factor in all three states. The Soviet response to the need for security has been a traditional one -- on occasion, bluster, and continuous reliance upon, and economic apportionment for, the military as the ultimate source of insurance and of its foreign policy. The People's Republic of China has, in recent years, shifted abruptly and extensively in its policies and in its domestic ideology in attempts to upgrade the economy and thus support a modernized military establishment in the face

1. Edmonds, op. cit., p. 5.
of a perceived Soviet threat. Since WWII, Japan's response to similar problems of security has been heavy reliance on the United States, (at no small sacrifice to its independence,) and reliance also on a "friends with everyone, trade with everyone" policy to ensure worldwide markets. That its fears have largely focussed on its economic vulnerability, rather than on potential military confrontation, has in no way diminished the intensity of its "search for security."
SECTION TWO

The Search for Two Treaties

As far as this expansionism is concerned, there is no difference between the Tsarist regime and the present regime. Therefore, even if a country concludes a neutrality treaty or a nonaggression treaty with Russia, it could not rest easy because Russia does not observe such a treaty faithfully as do the United States and Great Britain.

— Morinosuke Kajima
Modern Japan's Foreign Policy (1969)

The people of our country and of China, countries separated by only a narrow strip of water, are of the same racial stock and share a common script. As our relations have been inseparably linked from time immemorial, politically, economically, and culturally, it is unnatural and intolerable not to recognize Communist China permanently.

— Morinosuke Kajima, former Chairman, LDP Foreign Relations Research Council. (From Policy)
PART ONE
The Deadlocked Japan-USSR Treaty

The importance of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union can be placed in better perspective if, at the outset, they are understood in the context of certain general propositions. The first is that unlike other powers, the Soviet Union is both a European and an Asian country; as Geoffrey Jukes points out, the USSR is the largest country in Asia in terms of territory, even after excluding the European portion of the country, and populations in the Asian regions make it the fifth most populous country in Asia.\(^1\) Therefore, as Jukes says, "... it is not Soviet interest in Asia which is 'unnatural' but the almost complete lack of interest in it during the years of Stalin's rule, and the Soviet role in Asia may be more usefully interpreted as arising from these conditions than as an intrusion from outside."\(^2\)

In terms of bilateral relations, two other propositions are important: the first is that for Japan, the Soviet Union is its closest Asian neighbor, (in geographic terms), and at the same time its most distant, (national capitals are almost half a world apart, cultural differences are vast and exchanges very limited; political relations have run the narrow gumut from measured distance and distrust to outright war).\(^3\)

3. For amplification, see the brief historical summary which follows.
Secondly, relations between Japan and the USSR since World War II have been hampered by a number of factors; in addition to POW issues, fishing disputes and folk memories of aggression and trickery, there was the "Cold War" within the context of Japan's special relationship with the United States, and in recent years, the 'policy of equidistance' of the Japanese government and the conservative ruling party, the Liberal Democrats.

RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS -- PRE-1917

To understand the more recent state of relations between the two countries it is necessary to examine, at least briefly, the history of bilateral relations since the late 1700s.

In the period between the initiation of Japan's "closed door policy" (1639) and its reopening to the outside world, it was Russia which first exerted pressure on Japan's closed doors. Explorers and traders made occasional contact in the Kuriles and Sakhalin; Russian representatives' attempts to open official relations (Hokkaido, 1792, and Nagasaki, 1804) were rebuffed. The Russians, in pique, raided Japanese outposts in the Kuriles in 1806 and 1807 and Japan retaliated in 1811 by capturing some Russian cartographers and holding them for two years. ¹

¹ Reischauer, op. cit., pp. 484-5. There is considerable evidence to indicate that the Dutch first sparked anti-Russian attitudes in Japan by misrepresenting Russian intentions in the Kuriles to maintain their trade monopoly versus potential competitors. See, for example, John J. Stephan, The Kuril Islands, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 63. He also points out that while some Japanese historians view this as the "first Russo-Japanese war," and symptomatic of Russian aggression, it was in reality the result of impetuosity by two Russians. (p. 76).
Close on the heels of U.S. Naval Commodore Perry, Russian Admiral Evfimii Putiatin concluded a bilateral treaty at Shimoda on 7 February 1855, extracting added concessions of extraterritoriality and establishment of an open port at Nagasaki. In October 1857, Russian and Dutch negotiators made partial trade agreements and in 1859 Russia quickly took advantage of the Most Favored Nation clause to gain full trade advantages won by U.S. Ambassador Townsend Harris from the reluctant Japanese. 1

By the mid 1860s, Japan's only unexploited frontier was Hokkaido and the lands further north, which Meiji leaders viewed as important for economic and strategic reasons. They thus ordered surveys and maps made of the islands and waters north of Hokkaido and began exploiting the fishing grounds of that region. Reischauer explains that:

Because of the opening of Hakodate to foreign ships through the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854, the shogunate took over direct control of Hokkaido from the Matsumae daimyo, as it had on certain previous occasions. It also agreed in 1855 to Russian demands for rough delimitation of the northern boundary, with Kunashiri and Etorofu, the two large southern islands in the Kuriles, assigned to Japan and the two countries continuing their joint occupation of Sakhalin. A clearer settlement of the northern boundary was reached in 1875 (the Treaty of St. Petersburg), when Japan ceded its interests in Sakhalin in return for Russia's relinquishment of its claims to the central and northern Kuriles. 2


2. Ibid., p. 518.
The period from 1874 to 1910, commencing with the Taiwan expedition and ending with the annexation of Korea was one of a consistent and coherent Japanese foreign policy of expansion and consolidation. Policy aims were autonomy, big-power status and security. Autonomy was achieved with the revision of the unequal treaties in 1898 (the Aoki-Kimberly Treaty of 1894 abolishing extraterritoriality, which took effect four years later). Big-power status came with the victories over China in 1895 and Russia (1905). Security was achieved via industrial development, military modernization, and by a series of bilateral agreements with other imperialist powers: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, (renewed in 1906 and 1911), Japan-U.S. agreements in 1905 and 1917, and four agreements with Tsarist Russia. These agreements, reached between 1907 and 1916, delineated spheres of influence on the Asian mainland and acknowledged Japan's status first as protectorate over Korea (1907), and then its annexation of Korea (Russo-Japanese Treaty of 1910). The four treaties also acknowledge Japan's "special position" in Manchuria.¹

But Japan's attempt to join an exclusively European imperial thrust into China and Manchuria brought it into conflict with the "other Asia power" —Imperial Russia — whose long history of expansion had tended toward gradual eastern and southern settlement during the previous two centuries.²


² The extent of the eastward thrust of Russian exploration and expansion is underscored by the fact that Alaska was a U.S. purchase from Russia in bygone, friendlier days.
It is worth noting that in April, 1895, it was Russia which spearheaded the Triple Intervention which "persuaded" Japan to give up the Kwangtung Peninsula, and Russian annexation of a major portion of the peninsula under a 25-year lease only three years later sparked strong and bitter public reactions in Japan.\(^1\) By 1902, the majority view in the Japanese cabinet was that war with Russia was inevitable, and thus Japanese aims in the 1902 Anglo-Japanese alliance were to ensure that if war did come, there would be no repeat of the European (Triple) intervention which occurred in 1895.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, was also noteworthy for several reasons: it was initiated by surprise attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur on the night of 8 February 1904, although Japan did not declare war for two more days... an act regarded in Europe at that time as a violation of the custom among "civilized" states. For Japan the war underscored as nothing else could its arrival as a great power ("arrival" first achieved with the addition of "honorary white" status in the 1902 Anglo-British Alliance) although the war exhausted Japan's war-making potential and was halted before a reversal of fortune occurred.

Nonetheless, the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth left both sides dissatisfied; the Russians were embittered by territorial concessions which as we shall see, remained in folk memory to the end of WWII, as did the sneak attack and the humiliation before all of Europe through defeat at the hands of "little" Japan. Japan was unhappy with its failure to

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1. Reischauer, op. cit., p. 554.
extract an indemnity, settling instead for the southern half of Sakhalin, and this sparked widespread anti-American and anti-Russian public sentiment.

The 1904-5 war marked a sharp turning point in Russian involvement in Asia, since leaders were preoccupied with domestic unrest and developments closer to home in Western Europe. It was many years before developments in Asia rose to a position of high priority in the minds of Russian/Soviet leaders.¹

JAPAN-SOVIET RELATIONS TO 1945

On 8 August 1918, the Japanese began landing in the Soviet Far East, ostensibly to help in the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Legion, but Soviet public reaction to the Japanese intervention was much stronger than it was to that of the French and British intervention in Europe, since the Japanese move was seen as a raw territorial grab.²

In the four years that followed, Lenin conceived two strategies aimed at countering the westward Japanese thrust: concessions to the United States, which set "American Imperialism against the Japanese bourgeoisie," and the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic in

¹ David J. Dallin, in The Rise of Russia in Asia, (London: Hollis and Carter, 1950), makes it clear that the partially secret agreements of 1907, 10, 12 and 1916 were, on the one hand a cooperative effort to divide up China and Manchuria, while on the other approached with great cynicism on both sides; each was openly preparing for a new war with Korea, parts of China, and Manchuria as the prize. See especially his account, pp. 87-91, 103-122.

² See for example, Dallin, op. cit., p. 159.
February 1921, as a buffer against the perceived eastern threat -- Japan.¹

By 1925, a weakened and increasingly isolated Japan found rapprochement with the Soviet Union to its advantage -- and to the advantage of the USSR as well² -- and extensive negotiations in Peking resulted in the establishment of full diplomatic relations and settlement of economic and territorial issues related to Sakhalin. The treaty was signed 20 January 1925, and led, briefly, to increased trade³ and to the fishing convention of 1928. Nonetheless, the relationship was something less than one of glowing warmth, for Stalin "used" Japan much the way Lenin had; as Dallin puts it:

The rapprochement advocated by Stalin was not a rapprochement in the usual sense of that word. It involved more watchfulness than friendship, more apprehension than mutuality. The great design behind this Soviet attitude toward Japan was to divert Japan's dynamism against Britain and the United States while securing Japan's rear on the continent. There was no intention in Moscow of concluding a military alliance with Japan. Stalin's policy consisted rather of a series of shrewd maneuvers. The result was a series of conflicts which, however, never reached the stage of war.⁴

¹ The new "Republic" had all the trappings of state, a constitution, parliament and Legation in Moscow, but it was a contrivance in every sense. See Dallin, op. cit., pp. 163-71. The "fiction" worked long enough to get Japanese troops out of Soviet territory, and the "Republic" was dissolved immediately after the Japanese departure, (p. 176).

² Japan felt itself weakened by both the Washington Naval agreements and the disastrous earthquake of 1923; the USSR's relations with Washington and London were deteriorating and Japanese support on the Bessarabia question was helpful.

³ As Dallin shows in bilateral trade tables from 1913 to 1935, the period from 1924 to 1931 was bright, but trade dropped sharply after that until after 1956. See Dallin, op. cit., p. 245.

⁴ Ibid. p. 236.
Several Soviet attempts during 1926 for a mutual non-aggression treaty were rebuffed by Japan, and although there were private clashes between fishermen in the waters north of Japan, bilateral relations were, in retrospect, comparatively smooth. Also in 1926, the continuous rivalry for control of Manchuria resulted in Sino-Japanese cooperation on new railroads which threatened Soviet regional interests. Moscow proposed to Japan a revival of the agreements delineating spheres of influence in China, but Japan declined, saying spheres of interest in China were done away with at the Washington conference.¹

The Soviet Union renewed efforts to obtain a non-aggression pact several times in the early 1930s² and indicated it was willing to recognize Manchukuo as a sign of good faith. During the 1930s the military leaders of Japan frequently reiterated their policies toward the USSR as "friendship toward the Soviet Union in matters of trade and commerce, and hostility toward communism, the basic principle of the Soviet state, ... is (our) dual aim."³ Thus there was a certain continuity in the process which resulted in the German-Japanese anti-Communist Pact of 25 November 1936; nonetheless geopolitical considerations of a less ideological nature could also be seen in Japanese actions. In March of that same year the USSR had signed a mutual assistance protocol with Outer Mongolia, and from Japan's perspective the combination of alliance

² See Quigley and Blakeslee, op. cit., pp. 212-14.
³ Ibid., p. 212.
the immense Soviet military and economic build-up in the Far East, coupled with the completion of double tracking on the Trans-Siberian railroad months later provided ample proof of Soviet plans to capture Manchukuo. Indeed, when reading contemporary descriptions of the tense and explosive general situation along the border between Soviet-controlled and Japanese-controlled areas, one is struck by how closely these parallel descriptions of developments along the Sino-Soviet border from 1965 to 1978.

Fear of Soviet intentions, at the time of the pact with Germany, was articulated by Japanese nationalist Reiji Kuroda, Berlin correspondent for the Japanese magazine *Diamond*, who wrote in 1936:

> War with the Soviet Union is our destiny. To carry out our policy Japan must defeat 300,000 Russians in the Far East, and we must reach an understanding with the nation that holds Russia as its mortal enemy and is powerful enough to crush it. That nation is Germany.

In 1936, the USSR was about to renew the fishing concessions for another eight years when news of the German-Japanese pact prompted the Soviet Foreign Office to reduce the terms to one year. It was renewed again in late 1937, despite the sharp increase of tension, mutual suspicion and acrimony which characterized that period and has so often

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2. The descriptions by Quigley and Blakeslee, written in 1938, were particularly striking in this regard. See also Reischauer, op. cit., p. 713-4, and John J. Stephan, op. cit., p. 130-1 who details the sudden development of a small but effective Soviet Pacific Fleet from 1931 and the arrests of many Japanese fishermen.

characterized bilateral relations from the very beginning.\(^1\) And while manifest military aggressiveness was an undoubted characteristic of the Japanese military governments of the 1930s, there is no doubt that several Soviet maneuvers also increased tensions.\(^2\) Thus it was not until April 1941 that Japan got its neutrality pact with the USSR which had been a Japanese policy goal since late 1938. It was aimed at defusing the military confrontations in Manchukuo, isolating the USA and giving Japan a free hand in Asia.\(^3\)

But it was an agreement based on calculated opportunism: from the Japanese point of view it was decided as Reischauer writes: "At an Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941... to fight Russia if the German armies proved victorious in the west. By September the German armies had been stopped short of Moscow. Japan therefore decided to honor its neutrality pact with Russia and ignore the German request (to invade the USSR from the east)."\(^4\)

That the fragility of that agreement was also inherent as a result of Soviet attitudes can be seen in both the transcripts of Stalin's conversations with Churchill and Roosevelt as early as 1943, and in

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1. It should be noted that sabre rattling Japanese tactics vis-a-vis the USSR were not very popular at first, but Diet opposition quietened in the face of possible dissolution of opposition parties by the time of the agreement with Germany and Italy.


4. Ibid., p. 219.
subsequent events when the USSR stunned the Japanese by entering the war against them six days before it ended.

In his exhaustive study on the history of the Kurile Islands, John J. Stephan comments:

... Japan and the Soviet Union passed all but three weeks of 1941-5 in what has appropriately been described as a 'strange neutrality.' Allied to each other's foes and at war with each other's allies, their anomalous disengagement sprang from mutual opportunism. Despite pious protestations, neither side felt bound to honor the Neutrality Pact one moment longer than it served strategic needs. Japan stopped short of invading the Soviet Far East in 1941 only because of doubts about Germany's sanguine time-table and because of her own commitments to the south. Similarly, the USSR felt no compunction about scrapping neutrality after Germany's collapse. In the meantime, both sides indulged in shadow boxing in accordance with subtle shifts in the balance of power. The northern Kuriles provided an arena for these charades.

RELATIONS FROM AUGUST 1945 TO OCTOBER 1956

Soviet entry into the war in the Pacific — and its attack on the Kuriles two days after cessation of hostilities — yielded substantial territories previously occupied by Japanese. But its relations with Japan from that time until mid-1954 were quite hostile; blocked from participation in the Occupation, Moscow resorted to an attitude "cast in terms of Stalin's rigid concept of the Cold War." Moscow made no contact with the Japanese government, and instead sought influence among "the people" via contacts with left wing groups in Japan. In 1950,


the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was aimed specifically at Japan as a potential aggressor, and at the San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951 the Soviet Union demanded neutralization of Japan, recognition of Peking's new government, further demilitarization measures and settlement of territorial questions related to the Kuriles and elsewhere.\(^1\) Rebuffed on these and other modifications to the proposed treaty, the USSR refused to sign and thus technically remained at war with Japan until the interim agreement of 1956.

International developments plus a more flexible post-Stalin leadership prompted Soviet initiatives in September 1954. In December the new Hatoyama government made the question a political issue. But warm response from Japan was difficult for any Japanese government: the Soviet Union has seized the Kuriles two days after the war ended, it was extremely slow in responding to requests for the return of tens and thousands of POWs, and the anti-Japanese wording in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 was as blatant as any in diplomatic history.

**SUMMARY ON PRE-NORMALIZATION RELATIONS**

Before turning briefly to the developments and issues relating to eventual normalization of relations and the deadlock on the Peace and Friendship Treaty, it would be useful to make the following points about nearly 200 years of Russo-Japanese contacts and relations:

The first is that a persistent rivalry for the control of a weakened China and Korea (and a relatively desolate Manchuria through much of the period), has deeply affected — and often has been counterproductive to — any possible good relations between Japan and both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union.

Secondly, Despite a series of treaties, a comparatively long history of formal diplomatic relations and reasonably extensive trade, the overall relationship has been persistently marked by mutual distrust, cynicism, and opportunism — and by mutual perceptions of potential military threat which have prompted fear. This has often forced both sides into alliances with potential countervailing states.¹

Third, there have been almost no cultural exchanges or cultural transference between the two countries; nor is there evidence of any mutual cultural appreciation, understanding or affection.

And finally, until after normalization of relations in 1956, bilateral trade has been most often subject to the vicissitudes of political relations, and in no case did it amount to much over 5% of total annual trade for either country.

BACKGROUND TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

By the mid-1950s, Japan had shaken off the inertia infused by Occupation prohibitions against diplomatic activities; it began to reach

¹ Yakhontoff, op. cit., provides heavy documentation and rose-colored conclusions throughout, but is at least partly correct when he writes: "The history of Russo-Japanese relations ... was born in suspicion, developed among intrigues, passed through a 'purgatory' of war, and only gradually reached the stage of mutual understanding, growing confidence and hopes for sincere friendship in the future." Yakhontoff was a former Tsarist diplomat.
agreements on reparations in order to re-establish diplomatic and trading relations with non-communist countries on the Asian periphery and followed these with aid, credits and loans. Japan also invested heavily in these countries, more often than not as a means of securing raw materials such as oil, ore and timber.

Additional factors (mentioned above) further impeded similar initiatives toward the USSR; moreover Japanese perceptions of the USSR as chief protagonist of the Cold War, as chief instigator of the Korean War and as historical chief threat, potential aggressor and violator of the non-aggression pact all loomed large. Thus, each Japanese opinion poll in the 1950s consistently listed the USSR as the "most disliked country," and the 1952 Security Treaty with the U.S., renewed in 1960, was signed with the USSR in mind.

Nonetheless, the thaw in the Cold War, change in leadership in Moscow, and demise of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida — a staunch and faithful follower of U.S. policy throughout his tenure — all combined at the right time for a first step toward normalization of relations.1 The impact of worldwide "peaceful coexistence" was evident in Asia: the Geneva Conference temporarily halted the war in Indochina and the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference briefly cosseted many diverse political bedfellows. At about the time Soviet representatives initiated "feelers," Japanese "unofficial" contacts were made with the new government in Peking. Meanwhile, settlement of war reparations with the Philippines

1. For amplification see Hellman, Politics, op. cit., pp. 1-40.
figured prominently in the domestic media and even more prominently in Japanese foreign policy.

Developments in Japanese domestic politics at the time have been well documented and examined, as have those which led to the signing of the Joint Declaration by Prime Ministers Ichiro Hatoyama and Nikolai Bulganin in Moscow on 19 October 1956.

What is significant in that signing, which came at a never-to-be-repeated time in the history of post-war Japanese politics, was the way it sparked domestic debate, the number of newly emergent politicians attracted to the debate, and, as Hellman shows, the remarkable way in which the "battle" was waged with little concern fore the central question of national policy. It was, instead, a battle with political attractions and with party and factional power the main prize.1

In his conclusions, Hellman remarks that the timing and content of changes in the Japanese bargaining position came about almost totally independent of the bargaining at the negotiations, and seemingly, of the issues involved. He notes that (conservative) intraparty problems produced "a kind of immobility" in Japanese decision making, because:

... the peace talks occurred during a period of extreme fluidity, at a time when the new political institutions were undergoing their first major test after the Occupation. In established states ... the duties of officials in policy formulation are carefully defined, placing inexorable restraints on their actions. No such limitations were operative during the Soviet negotiations. Conservative leaders consistently circumvented the Foreign Office and the formal diplomatic channels; the official party institutions and policies were ignored or bypassed; even leaders in the fishing industry dealt directly with the Soviet representative ... foreign policy making came to depend on the actions of, and rivalries between, politically powerful individuals and groups.

Hellmann points out that all but the ruling LDP members were barred from the decisions on the USSR in 1956.

He also concludes that "... barring a major political or economic upheaval, a recurrence of the turbulence of 1955 and 1956 seems quite remote." It is nonetheless remarkable to any observer of Japanese domestic politics 1) just how pre-eminent the conservative ruling party (LDP) is in formulating foreign policy, 2) just how important factional and individual loyalties are in determining the results of that formulation, and 3) just how crucial the role of dynamic, powerful individuals has been during major shifts or initiatives in Japanese foreign policy.

2. Ibid., p. 155.
3. Hellmann himself notes the role of consensus within a narrowly restricted group — in this case key members of the conservative parties. It is instructive, here, to remember that Prime Minister Yoshida's forcefulness earned him the nickname "wan man" (one man), that Hatoyama restricted consensus during his initiatives in this period, that there was considerable conservative opposition in the LDP to Tanaka's visit to Peking, (which he ignored because he had a party majority due to factional bargaining), and that even on the domestic scene, Mr. Miki's decision to have Mr. Tanaka arrested was made as a result of a consensus which comprised a distinct minority in the party, but within that minority there was a consensus nonetheless.
THE LEGACY OF THE 1956 JOINT DECLARATION

In order to understand the subsequent deadlock in negotiations for a Russo-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, it is necessary to examine what was agreed to, and briefly, what happened in the talks which preceded normalization of relations in October 1956. After two public declarations of willingness to negotiate, the Soviet Union on 25 January 1955 requested talks aimed at normalization of relations. Japan's position was far more definitive,\(^1\) but agreement was reached, after months of bilateral and intraparty bickering, to meet in London.

When talks opened on 1 June, the Soviet Union presented a draft treaty which demanded military neutralization of Japan.\(^2\) On the other hand, portions of Japan's memorandum (treaty draft) called for return of all northern territories occupied by the USSR as a result of WWII. This was both illegal\(^3\) and, from Moscow's viewpoint, unacceptable.

By early August, Moscow dropped demands for neutralization, offered to return Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, and tentative agreement was reached on all other issues.

But in Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Ministry chose this time to issue a pamphlet which asserted that for legal and historical reasons, the southernmost islands in the Kurile chain — Etorofu and Kunashiri — also

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2. This was a shift in position since Foreign Minister Molotov had implicitly renounced this stipulation in his public call for talks on 12 Sept. 1954.

3. Article 2, para. c. of the San Francisco Treaty states that Japan renounces all rights to the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin Island.
belonged to Japan. The Foreign Ministry then produced a draft treaty which demanded return of the two additional islands and proposed settlement of the South Sakhalin and "Northern" Kuriles question at an international conference. The Soviet Union, taken aback by the sudden Japanese about face, flatly rejected the claim and talks were broken off.

In its November 1955 convention the newly merged Liberal Democratic Party endorsed the official government (i.e. the Foreign Ministry) policy.

Meanwhile, on 14 September 1955 the Soviet Union signed a provisional agreement with West Germany which restored diplomatic relations, agreed to POW repatriation, and postponed the territorial problem. In early December, Moscow's representatives again vetoed Japan's admission to the U.N. Both messages were clear to Japan; the USSR had already agreed at the London talks to a solution of identical problems plus support for Japanese entry into the U.N. after a peace treaty.

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1. The Northern Islands, published by the Japanese Foreign Ministry circa August 1955. The pamphlet is virtually identical to Northern Territories of Japan, a monograph reproduced from Japan in World Politics (Jan. 1972), pp. 21-39 by the "Association on Northern Territories Problem."

2. The Foreign Ministry pamphlet differentiated between the "South" Kuriles which were claimed as a historical part of Japan, and the "Northern" Kuriles — all the Kuriles except Etorofu and Kunashiri — ceded to Japan in the 1875 Treaty of St. Petersburg. The "South" Kuriles were bilaterally agreed on as Japanese territory in the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda.

3. The merger was forced upon both conservative parties as a matter of expediency: the two wings of the increasingly popular Socialist Party had merged the month before.
When bilateral talks re-opened in London on 17 January 1956, the Soviet Union informally proposed the "Adenauer solution" -- shelving of the territorial question — but this was rejected. All other points were agreed to but with the territorial question again at impasse, the talks were suspended indefinitely on 20 March 1956.

The next day, the USSR announced fishing restrictions on Japanese vessels in the northern Pacific and the Bering Sea from the beginning of the fishing season on 15 May. Japan called for an emergency fishery conference aimed at reaching temporary agreements. The April talks were expanded in scope when Moscow's representatives tied fishing concessions to diplomatic relations. Agricultural and Fisheries Minister Ichiro Kono\(^1\) agreed to this stipulation and thus the pact signed on 15 May was contingent upon reopening of general negotiations on 31 July 1956.\(^2\)

The third round of talks opened 31 July in Moscow. Delegation leader (and Foreign Minister) Mamoru Shigemitsu offered to drop Japan's demands for international settlement of sovereignty over Sakhalin and the Northern Kuriles, but insisted on return of the "South Kuriles" — which meant Etorofu and Kunashiri plus Shikotan and the small group known as

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1. Kono was one of the most influential, powerful and respected men in the party; his son, the third generation in Japanese politics, is the founder of the recently formed New Democratic Party. His departure from the LDP sent shock waves through the party.

2. Kono's acquiescence split the party: the Yoshida and Shigemitsu factions wanted the South Kuriles returned while factions backing Prime Minister Hatoyama, a slight majority, wanted the "Adenauer solution."
the Habomai Islands which Japan considers "part of Hokkaido." The proposal was rejected.

On 10 August, Shigemitsu met Khruschev and Bulgannin who informed him that return of the Habomais and Shikotan was their final offer. Shigemitsu, one of the LDP's "hardliners," then wired Tokyo that he had no alternative but to accept Moscow's offer. He was ordered to break off talks and attend an international conference in London on the Suez question. On 17 August, when he was still in London, he was instructed by the cabinet to return to Tokyo — Prime Minister Hatoyama had decided to go to Moscow himself and break the stalemate. 2

After brief preliminary negotiations in Moscow, conducted by subordinates (and complicated by public U.S. statements, 3) Hatoyama and Fisheries Minister Kono flew confidently to Moscow . . . confident because previous party agreement (on 6 September in Tokyo) on the "Adenauer formula" virtually assured smooth negotiations. In just four days the Joint Declaration was signed on 19 October in Moscow. Diet ratification was achieved on 15 November and the instruments of ratification

1. See for example p. 9 of the pamphlet Northern Territories of Japan, op. cit.

2. He had also announced, on 10 August, that he would resign as Prime Minister as soon as Japan-Soviet relations were settled and his successor was chosen. This prompted a public display of intraparty bickering and maneuvering which brought party popularity to an all-time low and alienated the business community. Thus the main issue was again subordinated to domestic political power struggles unrelated to Japan-Soviet relations.

3. In an attempt to strengthen the Japanese bargaining position, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles, in late August, threatened permanent occupation of Okinawa if Japan ceded Etorofu and Kunashiri.
were formally exchanged on 11 December 1956.

On 18 December 1956, Japan was unanimously voted into the United Nations.

**KEY ELEMENTS IN THE JOINT DECLARATION**

Articles one and two of the Declaration terminated the state of war and established diplomatic and consular representatives. A separate trade protocol providing for MFN status was also signed, and the 15 May fisheries agreement was made effective on the day the Declaration was ratified.

The Declaration also specified Soviet support for Japan's U.N. application, the Japanese right to Self-Defense Force under U.N. article 51, the repatriation of Japanese POWs, renunciation of Soviet reparations claims, and future negotiations on "treaties or agreements" on trade, navigation and other commercial relations.

Of the ten articles, it is article 9 which is crucial. It reads:

> The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between . . . (the two countries) . . ., negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

In this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. (emphasis added.)

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1. As late as 1951 independent commissions and U.S. Occupation representatives at joint U.S.-Soviet talks estimated as many as 200,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians remained in detention in Soviet hands. Also, see Beloff, Policy, 1944-51, Op. cit., pp. 143-5. According to his calculations, by 12 June 1950, there were still 370,000 Japanese POWs in Soviet captivity, a far cry from Moscow's figure of 1,487 'War Criminals' plus 971 who were being tried for "crimes against the Chinese people."
THE SOVIET POSITION

While the exact time and tone of the Politburo debate in Moscow may never be known, it seems clear that initiatives toward Tokyo came as a result of major decisions on broad foreign policy shifts arrived at a short time before the Malenkov statements: the same day the note requesting negotiations was handed to the Japan government, the Kremlin unilaterally ended the state of war between the USSR and East and West Germany. It is doubtful whether at this stage Soviet leaders saw the need to counter Peking's growing regional influence. Instead, it must have been obvious by 1954 that blatant anti-Japanese and anti-U.S. propaganda was counterproductive to any Soviet policies aimed at neutralizing Japan and at breaking up the U.S.-Japan "special relationship" — including the Security Treaty of April 1952. Indeed, persistent Soviet flirtations with the Japan Communist Party and other Left Wing groups coupled with stubborn refusal to deal formally with the Japanese government, was the surest way of driving Japan further and further into the U.S. "camp."

THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES DISPUTE

After 1956, there was little change in the positions taken on the territorial issue and virtually no progress resulted from Soviet-Japanese talks on the Peace and Friendship Treaty called for in the 1956 Declarations.

Japanese officials, backed by a number of organized irredentist groups, repeatedly called for return of the "inalienable" (koyu) four islands: the Habomais, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunahsiri, (see map on next page).
The Kurile Islands
and Sakhalin

Kurile Islands
Nabomai and Shikotan Islands
(Japanese possessions since the earliest days)

Sakhalin
(Kurilsko)

Ceded to Russia in exchange for the Kuriles in 1875, restored to Japan by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905.

Ceded to Japan in exchange for Sakhalin by the Treaty of St. Petersburg in 1875.

Kamchatka

Sea of Okhotsk

Hokkaido
(Japan)

Etorofu Is.

Kunashiri Is.

Unippo Is.

Pacific Ocean
Soviet officials said the territorial question is a pseudo-issue concocted by reactionaries and militarists, and that sovereignty of the Kuriles is rooted in history, was decided at Yalta, confirmed at Potsdam and finalized at San Francisco. ¹

Successive Japanese prime ministers (Kishi, Ikeda, Sato, Tanaka, Miki and Fukuda) solemnly pledged their determination to recover "The Northern Territories" and virtually every foreign minister after 1957 undertook a "mission to Moscow" with the territorial issue at the top of his agenda. Twice Japan has used the U.N. General Assembly to present its appeal.

While there were slight shifts in position on both sides, over the years the positions, if anything, hardened.² Since the territorial issue is the crucial item of contention which prevents progress on Peace and Friendship Treaty negotiations, it deserves closer examination.

SUMMARY OF THE SOVIET POSITION

While the Soviet view — and case — begins with the argument that the Kuriles belong to it by right of prior discovery and prior settlement, pre-revolution writers readily acknowledged Japanese sovereignty in the southern Kuriles and their own country's pre-eminence in the north; moreover a book published as late as 1945 — but with the appropriate passage deleted in the 1947 edition — conceded Japan had discovered

¹. For amplification see Stephan, op. cit., p. 202-8.
². Ibid., p. 203.
Kunahsiri, Shikotan and Habomais. As the Soviet argument goes, the treaties of 1855 and 1875 lost their validity at Portsmouth in 1905. By reneging on its promises to develop north Sakhalin, and aiding Germany in an aggressive war against the Soviet Union, Japan forfeited all assurances contained in the 1941 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact. Therefore, the argument continues, the Soviet Union acted in accordance with the principles of the Cairo Declaration, fulfilled the obligations agreed upon at Yalta, and repossessed the Kuriles. In accepting the Potsdam Declaration and by signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan acknowledged this territorial transfer.

SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE POSITION

Contrary to Soviet analysis of the situation, in Japan there is, with the exception of a small Pro-Soviet faction, virtually total consensus that the Kuriles, (or at least the four islands confirmed in 1855 by the Treaty of Shimoda,) are historically Japanese and should be returned. Japan bases its case on historical maps, points of law, and interpretations of events which counter Soviet versions of events since 1941. As Japan's argument runs, the Soviet Union not only did not question its title to the four islands from 1855 until 1945, but these rights are reinforced by the

1. Stephan, op. cit. p. 204.

2. Official Soviet views were articulated in a series of letters in Nov. and Dec. 1961 between Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and Nikita Khruschev. Variations on this theme can be found in numerous Soviet broadcasts, statements and publications, and in museum exhibits, and are amplified by Stephan, op. cit. pp. 197-208, and in Northern Territories of Japan, op. cit., pp. 3-9.

3. The Soviets divide Japan into progressive and reactionary camps, which will be examined in more detail shortly. See for e.g. opinion polls issued in Hellmann, Politics, op. cit., pp. 78-83.
Cairo Declaration, since Japan did not take them "by violence and greed."
In Japan's view, the Yalta Agreement is not binding, since it was
concluded without Japan's knowledge or participation. Moreover, by
attacking and annexing the Kuriles the Soviet Union violated not only the
1941 Neutrality Pact but the principle of "non-aggrandisement" in the
Atlantic Charter to which the USSR had subscribed. Japan points out that
the Potsdam Declaration limiting Japan to the four main islands also says
"such minor islands as we determine." In a refinement of an argument
which was absent from the Japanese position until about 1955, Japan also
says Kunashiri and Etorofu are legally not part of the Kuriles as defined in
the Treaties of 1855 and 1875, and that Japanese representatives did not
know they were giving up these two islands when they renounced the
Kuriles at San Francisco in 1951. Finally, the Japanese contend, the final
status of the Kurile Islands (from Uruppu to Kamchatka -- see map), has
yet to be determined under international law, since the Soviet Union was
not named as beneficiary when Japan renounced them at San Francisco.
As to the Habomais and Shikotan; the USSR agreed in the 1956 Joint
Declaration to hand these over when a Peace Treaty is signed.1

In analyzing both of the cases, in his extensive research on the
Kurile Islands, Stephan finds inaccuracies, distortions, omissions and
specious argument on both sides. Commenting on the Japanese case he
writes:

perspective.
Convincing at face value, the above arguments... ignore early Russian associations with the southern Kuriles. They avoid mentioning that until 1798 the Tokugawa shogunate and many scholars... considered the Kuriles to be outside Japan. Russia did claim Kunahsiri and Etorofu before 1855 but agreed to concede sovereignty over the two islands... during the hectic months of the Crimean War. The Soviet Union subscribed to the Atlantic Charter with reservations that left the door open for territorial acquisitions. ... When Japan renounced all rights to the 'Kurile Islands' at San Francisco, 'Kurile' was universally understood to include Kunahsiri and Etorofu.1

While Japan's legal case is considered weak in the view of experts who have studied the issue, its historical claim to the disputed territory is strong.2 The Soviet Union is not specified as the new sovereign with control over the Kuriles, and indeed refused to sign the 1951 Peace Treaty in San Francisco partly because it demanded this modification of the treaty.3 Soviet forces did not move into the Kuriles until two days after "V-J" day, so that ex-post facto argumentation on the grounds of possession must be considered, but must take into account the bloody fighting which was required to gain that possession.4 It also must take into account the Japanese point that more than 90% of all inhabitants of the chain of islands in 1945 lived in the "Southern Kuriles" — an area which the USSR had never ruled. Nor did Japan take the Kuriles by "conquests and annexation" after its imperialist phase began in 1895. It is

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now fairly well documented that in accepting the Potsdam Declaration on 4 August 1945, Japanese leaders did envision loss of territories gained since 1895 — but most probably not the Kuriles as well.¹

Initial Japanese claims and appeals for return of the Kuriles date as early as 1 December 1945;² but there were inconsistencies and various alterations in the Japanese position before and during the 1956 Joint Declaration negotiations which have already been noted.

During the period from 1956 to the Tanaka Moscow Summit of 1973, the Soviet Union also vacillated on several occasions: shortly after the revision/renewal of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced (27 January 1960) that the Habomai and Shikotan islands would be held until all U.S. troops left Japan. During the July 1967 Moscow visit by then Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin conceded that perhaps "some intermediate" arrangement could be made on issues blocking a peace treaty. In December of 1969, however, when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato called for the adoption of an "Okinawa formula" (following U.S. agreement in principle to the return of the island several years hence) by obtaining Soviet recognition of Japan's residual sovereignty in the "southern

¹ Stephan, op. cit., p. 198.
² Ibid. p. 199.
Kuriles" as a first step towards reversion, Moscow did not respond to his bid.¹

OTHER FACTORS IN THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE

It takes no more than cursory examination of the literature and commentary on both sides to make it clear that the dispute involves far more than mere history and legal charge and counter-charge. Among other factors, the issue has emotional, economic, strategic, geopolitical and domestic political implications; these make the "Northern Territories" problem all the more complex, and the prospects for imminent conclusion of the proposed Peace and Friendship Treaty all the more doubtful.

In terms of emotion, there is little doubt the issue strikes a deeper and more universal chord in Japan than it does in the Soviet Union. But that is not to say emotional considerations are absent from the Soviet viewpoint: as early as 2 September 1945, during his oft-quoted speech, Josef Stalin made it clear that "Soviet territorial gains at Japanese expense at the end of the war were just retribution for the 1904-5 Japanese defeat of Imperial Russian Forces"² and that it was retribution the Soviet peoples had been wanting "for two generation."

¹. For more on the shifting proposals see Stephan, op. cit., pp. 206-7. When Mr. Sato used the U.N. General Assembly as a forum on 21 October 1970 to plead return of the "Southern Kuriles" it prompted vindictive propaganda from Moscow which did not subside for three months. (Ibid., p. 207.)

In economic terms, the fishing grounds around the Kuriles are considered relatively rich. Over the past 30 years the fishing industry in both countries has grown considerably, and the USSR ranks number two behind Japan in both total annual catch and in annual per capita fish consumption, so the fishermen on both sides are aware that in economic terms Japan's loss is a Soviet gain. While the added irritant to bilateral relations has not been widely noted, Japanese "poaching" and Soviet retaliation have been a persistent problem since WWII. More than 1,200 Japanese fishing boats and over 12,000 fishermen were taken and held by the USSR after it first began to clamp down hard in late 1950. It is also worth noting that the Japanese government's vulnerability to political pressures from fishing interests was exploited on several occasions from as early as 1931 by Soviet governments.

Strategic and geopolitical factors have long influenced both sides' desire for the Kuriles. In 1746, the leader of the second Bering Expedition recommended establishment of a naval base in the Kuriles; in 1898, Ryunosuke Okamoto wrote that "By guarding the doors between the

1. Max Beloff notes (in Policy-1944-51, op. cit., p. 117), that "By 1951, nine of ten boats and crews were being detained instead of allowed to return home." Japanese Maritime Agency official figures for 1946-70 show 1,336 boats and 11,316 men and the figures continued to rise throughout the 1970s. See Northern Territories of Japan, op. cit., p. 24.

2. This leverage was used in 1931 (Beloff, Policies, 1929-36, op. cit., p. 77) to arrive at a subsequent export credits agreement, again on 21 March 1956 to pressure resumption of the treaty talks, and most recently in 1977 after the infamous MiG-25 incident and expansion of Soviet fishing to 200 nmi. On the Soviet side, Stephan (op. cit., p. 175) notes that the 9th Soviet five-year plan called for 50% growth in the Far Eastern fisheries industry.
Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kurile Islands control the northern approaches to Japan.\textsuperscript{1} The "stepping stone aspect" has also been noted on both sides; in the same 2 September 1945 speech referred to earlier, Stalin said:

Henceforth the Kurile Islands shall not serve as a means to cut off the Soviet Union from the Ocean or as a base for the Japanese attack on our Far East, but as a means to link the Soviet Union with the ocean and as a defensive base against Japanese aggression.\textsuperscript{2}

The Soviet leader wasted no time in turning his words into actions, for he ordered fortifications built in 1945, plus airfields on Etorofu and Paramushiri islands which were enlarged after the outbreak of the Korean War. In recent years, intelligence reports indicate Tu-16 and Tu-95 (NATO designators "Badger" and "Bear") bombers plus MiG-21s and 23s have been stationed there in small numbers. Extensive radar networks have been erected, and a small refit and supply base for ships is in full operation at Simushiru Island.\textsuperscript{3} There is also some K.G.B. intelligence gathering, with assistance from a few Japanese fishermen who trade information for fishing rights.\textsuperscript{4}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} This quote appears in Stephan, op. cit., p. 132, while extensive discourse on strategic importance is examined in pp. 194-194.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Ibid., p. 170.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Information received from Capt. Marvin Duke, U.S.N., Chief, Defense Intelligence Agency Branch, and Chief, Military attache's office, U.S. Embassy Tokyo, during a series of conversations in the summer of 1977 in Tokyo. This corresponds with information given Stephan, op. cit., pp. 186-7, for e.g.
\item \textsuperscript{4} For amplification, see Stephan, op. cit., p. 191.
\end{itemize}
Ever since Stalin first tried to arouse public enthusiasm for the far-off islands, Soviet commentators have described them as "the screen of steel," the "1,000-kilometre cossak sabre," and as the "foreposts of socialism on the Pacific." Despite these proletarian platitudes, however, it is open to question whether the issue of the Kuriles, per se, stirs the hearts and minds of Soviet citizens — 70% of whom live in the European Soviet Union.

More recent strategic implications vis-a-vis the Kuriles have not been lost on Japanese military planners: one-third of Japan's ground forces and its most advanced and modern fighter squadrons are stationed on the northernmost Japanese Island of Hokkaido with a new naval base at Yoichi, early warning radars at Hakodate and elsewhere and sonar monitor stations in undisclosed locations.

While there can be little doubt that the Northern Territories Issue, as it is called in Japan, stirs strong and widespread emotion, it does not "get out the vote" or prompt any of the demonstrations which are so much a part of the Tokyo street scene during the annual Spring and Fall Labor Offensives. In terms of sheer irredentist claims and emotions, the Okinawa reversion issue was bigger: over one million Japanese live in Okinawa; of the 16,500 former residents of the Kuriles, many have died or

1. In 1969, the Liberal Democrats used as a campaign slogan "Okinawa has come back! Now for the North!", but response to this was less widespread than was voter response to domestic issues and proposals.
moved away from the villages of Nemuro on Hokkaido, within rowing distance of Soviet-claimed territory. Moreover, the members of the four most active and organized groups formed specifically for the return of the islands suffer from close affiliation with the LDP and are divided on whether all the Kuriles should be returned, how the return is to be timed and how it is to be achieved. As Stephan notes of attitudes in Japan up to late 1973:

Although opinion polls indicate that a majority of Japanese feel concern about the northern territories and desire their return, efforts to generate a national movement have thus far met no success. Public confusion on the scope of the claims . . . disaffection of fisheries and business interests who seek immediate practical cooperation with the Soviet Union . . . and Soviet intransigence have combined to emasculate mass action.

Yet it would be misleading to assume that Japanese feel indifferent to the north. Awareness . . . is widespread but without direction . . . Convictions are deeply held but not shrilly expressed. . .

Given the attitudes on both sides on the Northern Territories Issue throughout the period since late 1945 until Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Moscow in early October of 1973 — a period carefully analysed by John J. Stephan (and to 1956 by Donald Hellmann) — it is easy to conclude that rather than being "stepping stones" in either direction, the Kuriles

1. Stephan, op. cit., p. 223-6. For amplification on the four groups founded for the purpose of gaining return of the islands, see Stephan's findings on pp. 226-229.

have instead been stumbling blocks on the road toward normalization of bilateral relations, toward "mutual understanding between peoples" and toward an eventual Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the USSR.

THE TANAKA VISIT AND PROGRESS SINCE 1956

Before dealing in detail with the attitudes of the various Japanese political parties and other important groups on the proposed treaty, it is worthwhile to examine the implications of Mr. Tanaka's Moscow visit, and other major bilateral developments from 1957 to mid-1978. Following the 1956 Joint Declaration, the two countries held their first joint foreign ministerial conference in 1957 and signed a five-year trade agreement the same year. (For amplification on all bilateral developments 1957-1978, see Appendix).

But when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was revised and signed in January 1960, the Soviet media warned that Japan was in danger of nuclear attack with foreign troops on its soil; on 25 February and 22 April 1960 two Soviet memoranda put new conditions on the northern territories saying "the territorial question is settled due to a series of international agreements and the area is now part of Soviet territory." The memoranda also said the two islands specified in the joint declaration would not be returned until the last U.S. troops have withdrawn from Japan "even if the Peace Treaty is signed."¹ In 1961, Mr. Khruschev reiterated the Soviet position in letters of 29 September and 8 December to Prime Minister Ikeda.

Not until 10 June 1963 was a fishing agreement finally reached, and that was a private agreement between Soviet Fisheries officials and the Japanese Maritime Industries Society. After the protracted fishing talks, a new three-year trade agreement was signed.

In 1964, came Mao Tse-tung's surprise endorsement of the Japanese island claims and more Moscow-Tokyo exchanges without progress on the question. On 22 April the Soviet Union established quotas of 110,000 tons of salmon for the year, the lowest quota allowed till then. In February 1965, the two sides signed a new trade agreement dealing with the third of the three original years and in the months that followed, Japan reversed the previous trend with a trade surplus for the first time. On 7 May the new fish quota agreement expressed apparent Soviet pleasure: the salmon limit was raised to 174,000 tons for the year.

In the January 1966 meeting in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told his counterpart Etsasaburo Shiina "there is no change" in the Soviet territorial position. In the first Joint Economic Committee meeting held from 14-23 March 1966 Soviet delegates made the first proposal on production sharing in Siberia. In July, in Tokyo,

1. For amplification see Stephan, op. cit., p. 222. Pravda, on 2 September 1964 responded to the move by denouncing "revanchist Sino-Japanese collusion."

2. In 1963 and 1964, Japan had a net trade deficit with the USSR but in 1965 it exported $189 m. and imported $169 m. in Soviet goods. A 55% export increase and 12% import increase from the previous year.
Gromyko and Prime Minister Sato agreed to resumption of annual Foreign Ministerial conferences. At the first of these, held in Moscow the following July, Kosygin proposed to Foreign Minister Miki an "interim accord" enroute to the Peace Treaty.

On 22 May 1969, in the midst of prolonged and difficult bilateral fishing negotiations, the Japanese Diet unanimously passed a law establishing the Association on Northern Territories Problems, and in September in Moscow Kosygin gave Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi a new reason for the Soviet territorial position: "National boundaries formulated after WWII can no longer be changed, since even a change in one part would adversely affect other territorial issues."¹

On 21 October 1970, Prime Minister Sato sparked a barrage of Soviet media propaganda when he called for reversion of the four islands during his General Assembly address on the U.N.'s 25th Anniversary.

The following year, a five-year trade agreement was signed but there was no real movement on the political front.

On 21 January 1972, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, with his usual gift for timing, told Japanese newsmen in Peking, on the eve of the Gromyko visit to Tokyo, that Japan had a valid claim to the entire Kurile chain. In his two days in Tokyo, Mr. Gromyko agreed to resume Peace Treaty talks in Moscow in October, and while that itself may have reflected the shift in Soviet concerns in the 22 years since the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the rest of his "package" revealed even more; as Joseph Ha reports:

¹ Northern Territories pamphlet, op. cit., p. 20.
During his 1972 visit, Gromyko offered the Japanese a compromise on the issue of the northern islands; access to Siberian resources; an expanding Siberian market; verbal support against the PRC; and political co-operation where possible on East Asian issues, preferably with Japan as an independent power, but even with Japan as an American ally if Japan so desired. In return, Gromyko asked for a pledge that Japan would not develop a relationship with China that was detrimental to Soviet interests. (Emphasis added.)

If the meeting was a watershed, marking a bilateral shift from "mutual neglect" to "mutual awareness," (and another shift on the Soviet territorial position) developments in October and December, 1972, served only to confuse Japanese perceptions, and Mr. Tanaka's Moscow Summit in October 1973 indicated that on the political front the status quo was more likely to be "mutual irritation."

Bolstered by a unanimous Diet resolution and public Chinese support, and undaunted by Soviet insistence that Asian collective security would top the agenda, Tanaka continually pressed the territorial issue, resulting in two days of exchanges which enraged Brezhnev. The


2. Two seemingly accurate phrases used by Ha, ibid., p. 62, in his assessment.

3. In October in Moscow, Gromyko told Ohira during peace treaty talks that the two islands would not be returned until U.S. troops withdrew. On 21 Dec. 1972, Mr. Brezhnev told the CPSU Central Committee that a summit "would try to solve questions remaining from . . .WWII, (and that the USSR would seek) a mutually acceptable accord on the entire range of questions under discussion." This was interpreted in Tokyo as a new, flexible Soviet position.

4. Chou's call for the Kuriles was repeated at the 10th Party Congress, and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua reiterated it in his UNGA address of 3 Oct. 1973.

5. Ha., op. cit., p. 63.
resulting Joint Communique\(^1\) referred to "unresolved problems" and sparked unwarranted optimism in Tokyo. Soviet leaders did receive assurances of Japanese assistance in Siberia, but their hopes for cooperation on Asian collective security were dashed shortly after Tanaka's return home when the Foreign Ministry announced postponement of all such discussions pending a settlement of the northern territories issue and inclusion of China in the discussions.\(^2\)

Other than a tentative trilateral agreement between Japan, the USSR and the U.S. on Siberian development, (which later fell through), there were no significant bilateral exchanges in 1974 despite repeated invitations from Japanese leaders urging Brezhnev, Kosygin or Gromyko to come to Tokyo.

In Moscow from 15 to 17 January 1975, Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa tried to resolve territorial and treaty disputes based on the "key phrase" in the 1973 Joint Communique. Soviet leaders countered with vague references to a "good neighbor treaty." The deadlock continued.

In Tokyo there was widespread optimism over progress in Peace and Friendship Treaty talks with Peking (Nov. 1974 and Jan. 1975). The USSR responded with a letter from Brezhnev to Prime Minister Takeo Miki proposing a "Treaty on Good Neighborly Ties and Co-operation," which was turned down by Japan on 14 February. In early March, treaty talks with Peking resumed in Tokyo.


\(^2\) Ha., op. cit., p. 71.
Viet tactics, in addition to the treaty proposal, were remarkable during this period; they included harassment of Japanese fishermen in Japanese waters, naval exercises along Japan's three busiest shipping routes, and warnings by both the Soviet ambassador to Japan and the Soviet official media, (including an unusual "Formal Statement to the Government of Japan" published by Tass on 18 June 1975)."1

Despite the announcement on 19 September 1975, however, that the Japanese cabinet still insisted on return of the four islands as part of any treaty package with the USSR, Soviet leaders appear to have taken comfort in the fact that talks with Peking became deadlocked over the "anti-hegemony clause"2 and in the fact that Japanese leaders said Japan would continue to pursue a policy of "equidistance" vis-a-vis its two communist neighbors.3

But an announcement by Miki in late 1975, elaborated upon in the Diet by Miyazawa, indicated Japanese willingness to allow a "mutually agreeable" anti-hegemony clause in the Peking Treaty.4 This apparent shift in Japanese policy prompted Gromyko to return to Tokyo for talks from 8 to 13 January 1976 which only made matters worse, although not as bad as they were destined to become before the end of the year.

1. For amplification, see Appendix: "Chronology of Events: Japan and the USSR."

2. To be dealt with in detail shortly.

3. The equidistance policy was articulated in various ways by several Japanese prime ministers but the phrase came into particular fashion under Mr. Tanaka, especially after he normalized relations with Peking in late 1972.

4. For amplification, see Ha, op. cit., p. 64.
Gromyko's most generous territorial offer in years — to return Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, "provided Japan is no party to the anti-hegemony clause," — prompted Japanese officials to repeat a phrase they had used often in the preceding year: "this is a bilateral matter and does not affect relations with the Soviet Union." Mr. Gromyko's departure press conference reportedly irritated Miki even more than the talks had, and within two hours of his departure Miki told over 300 members of the Japan Foreign Correspondents' Club that "the policy of equidistance is a myth," and that Japan would sign a Treaty with Peking as soon as possible.

On February 24, Brezhnev told the 25th Soviet Party Congress that demands by "certain quarters in Japan are groundless and unlawful." This prompted an official Japanese government protest to Moscow, and with the arrest of a Soviet spy in Tokyo in mid-year and the famous MiG-25 incident only weeks later, relations between Moscow and Tokyo reached their lowest point in 20 years.

1. John Saar, "Tokyo Rejects Soviet Plea," Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1976, p. 2, points out that a Miki aide told newsmen that the Prime Minister's talks with Mr. Gromyko left him "with a sense of irritation and displeasure" over the way Mr. Gromyko conducted himself. (Quote also carried in the Baltimore Sun and Christian Science Monitor versions appearing the same day.)

2. Saar, ibid.

3. See Moscow dateline Reuter dispatch with worldwide press reprints on that day and the following day.

4. For complete details on both incidents and the strong statements on both sides, see Appendix, op. cit.
Soviet retaliation included establishment of a 200 mile exclusive fishing zone in late 1976, (no doubt more a protection against an earlier U.S. expansion than retaliation against Japan), and in 1977, protracted and bitter Fish Treaty and Fish Quota Talks, plus petty humiliation of Fukuda's special envoy to Moscow, Sunao Sonoda, who was tasked with unsnarling the deadlocked negotiations. Sonoda was first told "no visa on holidays," and when he finally got to Moscow waited three days in a hotel.¹

Soviet negotiators to the fishing talks also proposed clauses in their drafts on 15 March and 19 May 1977 which would have signified Japanese acquiescence to Soviet sovereignty over the entire Kurile chain.² On 8 March, Ambassador Polyansky had made it even clearer that Moscow was using fishing as a form of leverage on territory.³

The Japanese public was generally preoccupied with matters of higher priority throughout most of the previous 21 years, and the Lockheed Payoff Scandal through much of 1976. But Soviet behavior during the MiG incident, and throughout the fishing talks, did more to develop public

¹. For amplification, see Appendix; op. cit.


³. The ambassador relayed a message from Moscow to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo which said the territorial issue was "artificial" and that if it was raised in the fishing talks "such an attitude will make a fishing agreement difficult to reach." Japan was forced to raise it when the draft was presented. For amplification see p. 1 of Mainichi, Yomiuri or Asahi Evening News for English-language versions of the message and Japanese reaction, 9 Mar. 1977.
solidarity and support for the government's territorial/treaty position than any events up till then.¹

By 1978, it was apparent to even the casual Japanese observer that Soviet positions on the territorial issue — and thus on a Peace and Friendship Treaty — and on the proposed Sino-Japanese Treaty, had hardened considerably. Soviet statements after Mr. Brezhnev's speech to the Party Congress on 24 February 1976 indicated that even the commitment to return the two islands specified in the 1956 Joint Declaration would not be honored, (despite Gromyko's offer only five weeks before).

At the meetings in Moscow in January 1978, with Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda, (the same man the Soviet Union publicly humiliated when, as special envoy and Cabinet Secretary, he was ignored for three days in Moscow nine months before,) Soviet leaders threatened "strong actions" if Japan signed a treaty with the Chinese. They also attempted a diversionary tactic aimed at "staying abreast" of Peking: Mr. Sonoda was given the complete draft of the previously proposed "Good Neighbor Treaty," which he refused to "officially accept."²

¹. For reactions in the Diet and by Fishermen's Association delegations, see Appendix, Ibid. Over 19% of all Japan's annual catch came from waters affected by the new 200 mi. Soviet limits; many boats stayed in harbor for over 40 days, yet the fishermen supported the government's stand on the four islands and the insistence that the "territorial issue" be kept separate.

². Mr. Sonoda's foreign ministry spokesman told newsmen later the draft had been put in a safe, in consideration of "good manners" but would not be studied. For reports on the Moscow talks see Japan Times editorial 13 Jan., 1978.
When, on 2 February 1978, Japan announced its willingness to resume Treaty talks with Peking, and followed that on the 17th with a huge new bilateral trade agreement, Brezhnev responded quickly with a letter to Fukuda which again proposed the "Good Neighbor Treaty" and invited the Japanese leader to Moscow for talks. The letter was presented by Soviet Ambassador (and former Politburo member) Dmitrii Polyansky, together with the draft of the treaty already sitting in a Foreign Ministry safe. Japanese officials "leaked" the "gist of remarks" which followed between the two men, and within hours Izvestia, in apparent retaliation published the full text of the proposed new treaty.

The "gist of remarks" is perhaps the clearest document on record of the inflexibility of the two sides in the treaty deadlock. Yet despite the foreign ministry announcement on 24 February that it had "no intention at all of studying" the proposed treaty, nor any plan to conclude any pacts which "might impair Japan's demand" for return of the four islands, subsequent events indicate this did not prevent either side from pursuing what they apparently regarded as very important policies.


2. The complete text of the proposed treaty and the "Gist of Remarks" appear in the Appendix.

For the Soviet Union, those policies included prevention of a Sino-Japanese alliance or de-facto alliance with economic and military implications: commencing 20 May 1978 the Soviet Navy again conducted operations near Japan which, combined with continued Soviet threats in the media, and the mid-year departure of Mr. Polyansky from Tokyo "indefinitely" made it clear further Sino-Japanese rapprochement would in their view, impair Soviet-Japanese relations.

For Japan, despite the previous statements by Prime Minister Miki in the midst of his tenure, and despite adamant Soviet positions in five sets of negotiations from 1973-1978, it appeared that to many powerful leaders within the ruling party, a continued "policy of equidistance" was far more comfortable than the apparent tilt toward Peking which would be indicated by signing a Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty. Fukuda had to make several public statements concerning "co-ordination" and "consensus" within the party between 18 February and 26 May, 1978 before consensus was achieved.1 Moreover, Japan's new ambassador to Moscow, Tokichiro Uomoto, flew to Moscow within hours of the return of Foreign Minister Sonoda from the signature ceremony in Peking. In his airport statement Sonoda said "Japan wishes to enlarge relations with the Soviet Union," and he added that the new ambassador to Moscow would be instructed to "explain" the new pact with China to Soviet leaders.2

1. For amplification see Appendix: "Chronology: Japan-China Treaty, 1949 to 1978."

TREATY ATTITUDES AND POSITIONS IN JAPAN

As Hellmann points out, the most important component of the Japanese foreign policy-formulation process is the political party system.\(^1\) During those negotiations, the "most striking feature" was the "extent to which control of policy was concentrated within the LDP."\(^2\) Given the fact that since 1955 the Liberal Democrats have continuously held power with an absolute majority in the Diet Lower House, it is not surprising that it is difficult to distinguish "party policy" from "government" or "bureaucratic" or "ministry" policy, or that this is particularly true of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^3\) Most studies indicate that on major issues, Foreign Ministry positions and attitudes, when distinguishable from "official" or "public" government policy, tend, if anything, to be more conservative than "mainstream" party policy, i.e. resemble positions taken by the LDP's most conservative factions.\(^4\)

Since foreign ministry officials are generally subordinate to the party faction leaders (in their roles as cabinet ministers), and since their views are predominately indistinguishable from those held within the LDP political spectrum, it can be said that in general the position of the LDP, the government, and the Foreign Ministry of Japan are congruent on the treaty with the Soviet Union. It could be summarised (see footnote) as follows:

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2. Ibid., p. 149.
4. Eto, op. cit., pp. 119-139 is only one of a number of analysts who have noted this over the years. Hellmann makes similar points in his work on the treaty negotiations, Policy, op. cit.
THE GOVERNMENT, RULING PARTY, AND MEDIA

In negotiations with the Soviet Union for a Peace and Friendship Treaty, the four islands must be demanded as a group, since they are "inherent Japanese territory" and not part of the Kuriles, which were given up at San Francisco. The Yalta Agreement on the Kuriles was a secret one, to which Japan was not a party, therefore the status of the Kuriles must be determined by a joint conference of the U.S., USSR and Japan in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty. The special relationship with the United States is the cornerstone of our foreign policy, and thus with friendly ties with the U.S. as a basis, we should proceed with negotiations for a Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union; no other agreements with Moscow may be entered into which compromise our position on the Northern Territories.¹

Japanese newspapers and journals, generally critical of the government, have tended to reflect official views and attitudes on the Treaty and the Northern Territories issue, although some have had reservations about the continuance of the Security Treaty with the U.S. as an element in the formula.

In addition to the overlapping consensus of the LDP, the bureaucracy, and the media, consensus extends to the Hokkaido Prefectural offices, municipal councils and to the several groups organized for return of the Northern Territories.  

THE OPPOSITION PARTY

At the time of the 1956 Joint Declaration, three of the five major opposition parties did not exist; the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was only recently reunited after a split over adherence to Moscow's ideologies, and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) still adhered to Moscow's negotiating positions. For these reasons, effective opposition to the newly formed Liberal Democratic Party was extremely limited during the Soviet treaty negotiations.

Since that time, the increasingly strong attitudes of Japanese voters, beginning in 1973, and particularly since the MiG-25 incident of 1976 and the prolonged fishing negotiations of 1977, have forced major shifts on the part of the older opposition parties (and at least minor shifts by all of them) with regard to self-defense forces, the Japan-U.S. Treaty and the proposed treaty with the Soviet Union.

1. For comments and examination of the media, see Stephan, op. cit., pp. 202-34, for e.g. He also has extensive information on the organized Northern Territory Groups.

2. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) was "born" in 1960, the Komei-to (Komeito) in 1964, and the New Liberal Club (NLC) in 1976. Considerable information on party histories, policies, leadership structures, etc., can be found in official party literature and in the publications listed in footnote 1 on the previous page.

JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

Although both the left and right wings of the Socialist Party (JSP) have advocated normalized relations with the Soviet Union since 1945, it was not until after January 1972 that hollow election slogans were replaced by concrete policies. The JSP has persistently called for early conclusion of a Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union and the ways in which it differed from the LDP/government approach could be summarised (see footnote 1 on next page) as follows:

The JSP considered all Kuriles "inherent Japanese territory," and wanted an immediate treaty on the condition that Habomai and the Shikotans be returned immediately. It said the other islands should be returned "through peaceful talks" with Moscow. It attacked the LDP for giving up inalienable Japanese territory, (the northern Kuriles), said the LDP had interpreted the San Francisco Treaty incorrectly, and that the Treaty "contradicts the Cairo Declaration and is not based on the free will of the people of Japan." The party also called for immediate abrogation of the Security Treaty with the U.S., unarmed neutrality, and a non-aggression treaty with the USSR and others as additional aids to negotiations for favourable Peace Treaty terms. These positions softened, however, in January 1974, and while the JSP continued to call for an immediate Treaty, it wanted return of the two islands as a

1. Ibid., p. 113. The JSP differs from its European counterparts because it is dominated by a Marxist fraction. It is heavily financed by the 17-union-strong General Council of Trade Unions, and bitter factional fighting between the two wings is a persistent characteristic of the party and a major factor in its history.

2. See Stephan, op. cit., p. 213.
"definite precondition," and it urged "efforts toward" abrogation of the U.S. Security Treaty and a minimum territorial defense force.\(^1\)

**JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY**

After earlier rigid adherence to, and support for, Moscow's position in the Treaty talks,\(^2\) the JSP expelled its pro-Moscow element in 1964, its pro-Peking element in 1966 and that same year adopted an independent line. But it was not until 6 March 1969 that the Party news organ *Akahata* announced a major policy position on the treaty and territorial issue. Since then the JCP position has been virtually identical with that of the Socialists with two exceptions:

The JCP calls for abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty **before** commencing Treaty negotiations with the USSR. It also believes "a note should be sent to all countries concerned announcing abrogation of that part of article 2(c) of the Peace Treaty (of San Francisco) under which Japan is to renounce rights, title and claims to the Kuriles."\(^3\)

\(^1\) See *Northern Territories of Japan*, op. cit., pp. 28-9. The summary is again a composite based on sources previously listed.

\(^2\) Hellmann, op. cit., p. 99.

\(^3\) *Northern Territories*, op. cit., p. 28.
DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY

Born in 1960 from two breakaway factions of the JSP, this non-Marxist "Social Democratic" party (in the European sense) first called for "a fundamental re-examination aimed at phased dissolution of the U.S. Security Treaty, withdrawal of U.S. troops, and elimination of the JSDF."

But in late 1975, the DSP shifted to "improvement of the working of the present U.S. Security Treaty while acknowledging its functions" and by 1976 advocated "safeguarding the treaty" and preservation of the Self Defense Forces.

The DSP agrees with the negotiating stance of the LDP/government in demanding the return of the four southernmost islands as part of the treaty package with Moscow. But the DSP says "the four islands plus the Kuriles should "naturally be included under Japanese sovereignty." After signing a treaty which ensures return of the southernmost four, it calls for further negotiations in which "early and full return of the Northern Territories (i.e., the North Kuriles) must be demanded from the Soviet Union." The DSP thus draws the same distinction now made by the LDP in calling the Habomais, Shikotan, Etorofu and Kunashiri the "Chishima Islands" — and therefore not covered in San Francisco. It differs from the ruling party in wanting all the Kuriles returned.¹

¹. The summary is again a composite based on sources previously cited, (see p. 108 of this thesis).
THE KOMEI PARTY

Originally the political arm of Soka Gakkai, a lay organization of the Nichiren Shoshu sect of Buddhism, the Komei party declared separation of politics and religion in 1970, and the rift following the Soka Gakkai's secret "agreement of views for co-existence" with the Communists in 1974 widened the gap further. Despite a gradual shift to the left in the 1970s, the Komeito steadfastly refused to join any coalition which included the JCP, and has consistently supported the ruling party's basic position on treaty negotiations. Where the Komeito differs from the LDP can be summarized as follows:

The Komeito advocates "equidistant and perfect neutrality;" it advocates "early abrogation of the U.S. Security Treaty but does believe in a "minimum required capacity for territorial preservation as permitted under our Peace Constitution,""¹ (a euphemism indicating support for the JSDF). It also believes the northern Kuriles (Uruppu and the islands to the north), should be put under U.N. trusteeship with Japanese administration, or should be given directly to Japan following a conference with representatives from Japan, the U.S. and the USSR.²

The Komeito sent a delegation to Moscow in July 1971, but differences with Soviet leaders were so great during meetings that no joint communique was issued, and Soviet officials accused the delegation

¹. Statements by Yoshikatsu Takeiri, Komeito Chairman, in Look Japan, 10 July 1977, p. 5.
². The above is again a composite from the sources previously cited, (p. 108 of this thesis).
ing "anti-Soviet" for bringing up the "settled issue" of the northern territories.¹

NEW LIBERAL CLUB

Newest of the opposition parties, and the first break-away group of significance since the founding of the LDP in 1955, the NLC adheres to the line taken by the LDP/government on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the proposed treaty with the Soviet Union. In the party magazine of December 1976, a portion of the party platform was listed as:

The promotion of negotiations with the Soviet Union for return of the Northern Territories and the strengthening off mutual policies and agreements in existence. The NLC will demand return (of the four islands listed by the LDP). The party will promote and encourage joint participation in development projects for mutual profitability which will contribute to the progress in friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.²

POPULAR ATTITUDES IN JAPAN

Every Japanese opinion poll since WWII has shown the Soviet Union topping the list of "most disliked countries." While Japanese leaders have been less responsive to public opinion than in most "democratic" countries, due to traditions and public expectations,³ it is clear that the steadfast positions of the LDP in Soviet Treaty negotiations have been

¹. From the letter to the Komei Party information offices, responding to author's request for information on the Moscow visit.


³. See Hellmann, op. cit., pp. 8-23 for variations on the theme in Section 1.
bolstered by public response. Gromyko's rather blatant threats in January of 1976, Soviet responses to the MiG-25 incident that September, and the crudeness of Soviet "linkage" in the 1977 fishing talks appeared to contribute significantly to the increased intensity of Japanese feelings and hardening of public attitudes on the proposed treaty and the territorial issue. As a result, public support was virtually universal when, in 1978, the government of Takeo Fukuda rejected an interim "Good Neighbor" treaty — a proposal which, if taken up, might have done much to preserve the generally preferred Japanese position of "equidistance."

CONCLUSIONS

Many of the conclusions and observations regarding bilateral relations and the proposed Japan-Soviet treaty can be better understood if they are placed in the context of Soviet post-war goals and more recent Asian developments.

Most experts agree that in 1950, Soviet foreign policy and long range goals in the Far East could be summed up as:

Containment of a perceived Japan-U.S. threat to the Soviet Far East,

Gradual neutralization and continued disarmament of Japan, and,

The establishment of Soviet power and regional influence commensurate with its growing self-perception as a superpower.

In contrast, by 1978 Moscow's leaders had to contend with a situation which placed the Far East far higher in its list of priorities, conceivably second only to its continued over-riding focus on issues related to the United States, including:

1. Including SALT, NATO issues and etc., but probably ahead of "Eurocommunism" to name but one issue less critical than current relations with China and Japan.
Containment of Chinese power and influence, and, with the advent of Chinese IRBM's (circa 1970) additional efforts to defuse potential conflicts.

The advent of Japan as an economic superpower with incipient leadership initiatives of its own in the region, (Fukuda's ASEAN trip - 1977).

The prospect of a formal or informal three-way anti-Soviet alliance linking Chinese manpower with Japanese technology and U.S. military might.

Within that framework, a number of observations and conclusions can be made regarding Japan-Soviet relations and the reasons for the treaty deadlock.

First it can be said that while Moscow has been forced to shift to China as the object of its containment policies in the Far East, its other long range goals and policies, aimed first, though not exclusively, at protection of the Soviet Far East, have not changed. In light of this, Soviet post-war behavior toward Japan has appeared, in the diplomatic and political context, to be chiefly counterproductive.

However, another conclusion can be drawn when Soviet views of Japan, plus limitations on Soviet options are taken into account. Thus, from the Soviet perspective, Japan was consistently forced to bargain from the weaker position since, first, it possessed a "dependent" economy which was demonstrably weakened and more vulnerable after 1973.

Secondly, Japan appeared

1. While deflecting Chinese and Japanese territorial demands, Moscow has gone to considerable length to defuse military and political tensions with China in recent years, has discouraged potential instability on the Korean peninsula, has pressed for a series of bilateral friendship treaties and Asian Collective Security, and has attempted through economic inducements and threats to move Japan away from the U.S. and keep it away from China.
increasingly vulnerable militarily, due to uncertainties about the reliability of the U.S. security commitment in the aftermath of Vietnam and with the advent of the Carter Administration and its Korea policies. Third, Japan showed reluctance, with few exceptions until 1978, to abandon its equidistance policy in favor of a tilt toward Peking; indeed, Tokyo appeared to respond "correctly" to Soviet pressure. Finally, Japanese political leaders faced negotiations with Moscow under the added pressures of domestic expectations, opposition party demands, and charges of "leadership weakness" by LDP rivals whenever they failed to make progress toward a treaty.

It is also doubtful that from Moscow's perspective, there were any immediate prospects of a parallel Japan-U.S. rift; efforts were therefore focussed after 1972 on preventing a Sino-Japanese or a three-way anti-Soviet alliance and these appeared to take precedence over progress on a Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan. Thus many Soviet diplomatic actions actually hampered treaty progress.

A second factor to be taken into account was the problem of Soviet limitations which hampered Soviet flexibility. Thus, increasingly inflexible Soviet attitudes on the territorial issue must take into account the problem of precedence, i.e., if the USSR acceded to Japanese demands it would reopen questions of sovereignty over vast amounts of territory seized during and just after WWII and still a bone of contention for many countries. ¹

¹ In addition to China's well-publicized claims, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania have specific historical territorial claims.
Seen in that context the 1972 offer of two islands was generous and risky from a Soviet point of view. Secondly, Soviet economic inducements, such as Joint Siberian Development and Soviet oil and natural gas were hampered by concentrating excessively on projects which potentially involved Japan (unwillingly) in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and which built up the capabilities of a potential future rival. And finally, virtually every single attraction available to Japan in the "Soviet market" was equally present in the lure of the China "market" with the added inducement of four times as many — albeit poorer — potential consumers; moreover Japan's trade and technology was apparently too valuable or too locked up in contracts to use as leverage.

With this combination of Soviet perspectives and limitations in mind, it is possible to better understand why Soviet responses to a potential Japanese tilt so often consisted of "stick" and "harder stick" — with very little "carrot," (Soviet terms in Siberia, for example, were extremely unattractive).¹

The fairly limited range of Soviet responses could thus be outlined as follows: Whenever the USSR wished to go beyond diplomatic entreaties and territorial inducements or formal and informal warnings (via media), or the 'minor irritation' level via naval maneuvers,² intruder flights or

¹ Ha, op. cit., p. 69.

² In April 1975, Soviet task forces maneuvered just southwest of Kamchatka and at a second point 300 miles east of Japan while a third group set up northwest of the Caroline Islands. As Ha points out, (p. 68) these are along Japan's busiest shipping lanes and are not protected by the U.S. Defense Treaty. Nor is such a force a primary threat to China, whose major vulnerability lies in Manchuria; the maneuvers therefore were clearly a message to Tokyo. Similar moves in May 1978, when Japan again moved toward a China treaty, were clearly interpreted in Tokyo as directed against Japan and against any such movement toward Peking. See Robert Whymant, "Soviet war games anger Japan," The Guardian, 8 June 1977, p. 7.
petty harrassment of fishermen or diplomats, it reverted to a form of leverage most consistently related to Japanese fishing rights. The 'tried and true' approaches were: stalled negotiations in fishing agreement talks; new fishing boundaries or conditions of regulation, or, new fishing quotas or limits in Soviet-controlled waters.

There are a number of other conclusions and observations related to the points made above and to other aspects of overall bilateral — and specific treaty -- discussions. Among these, six seem particularly relevant.

First, while the Japanese dilemma may have arisen earlier, by no later than late 1972 Japan found itself drawn into the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and by the mid-1970s, it became increasingly apparent that Japan's equidistance policy vis-a-vis Moscow and Peking was a) Satisfactory to neither power, b) Impossible for Japan to maintain due to domestic pressures as well as pressures from both Communist capitals, and, c) Partially abandoned by Prime Minister Miki by 1975, and completely abandoned (as we shall examine further) by early 1978. . . at least temporarily.

Secondly, from at least October, 1972 until late 1978 — the termination point on this study (and thus not necessarily the end of the pattern) there was a high positive correlation between Soviet perceptions of potential Japanese "tilt" toward Peking and rapid Soviet responses; at the same time, overt expressions of Soviet concern about Japanese
"alliance" with the U.S. have, since 1969, dwindled into insignificance in comparative terms. (And here "comparative" is meant in relation to reactions to Sino-Japanese rapprochement, and in comparison to Soviet reactions to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaties of 1952 and 1960. The 1970 Treaty renewal occurred without a murmur from the USSR or its media.)

Third, despite the use of fishing rights — a form of economic leverage — as a Soviet device in dealings with Japan since as early as the 1930s, it can be said that since the 1956 Joint Declaration there has been little if any traceable correlation between good, bad or indifferent relations and the strength of bilateral trade. While this tendency to separate business and politics is characteristic of post-war Japan, it is noteworthy on the part of the USSR, which is guided, at least in popular "mythology," by ideological considerations.

Fourth, while the Sino-Soviet rift was no longer a new problem by 1969, there is strong evidence to suggest that the 1969 Ussuri River incidents prompted grave concern in Moscow, and even more focus on the Far East — and therefore on relations with Japan — than is generally recognized in the West. Thus, Moscow initiated rumors and diplomatic approaches seeking Western acquiescence to pre-emptive nuclear strikes at Lop Nor. Assuming this was a more Soviet bluff, the seriousness of such a proposal, even as a bluff, was clearly the result of Politburo debates or discussions.

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1. Two-way trade in a "bad" year for bilateral relations — 1977 — reached $3,000 million, and both sides talk now in terms of deals extending to AD 2000.
During this same general period, construction began on a number of permanent military installations; between March and August 1969 Soviet divisions increased from 15 to 44 in the Far East and this construction indicated they were to remain for an extended period. By mid-1970, the steady build-up of the Soviet Far East Fleet, with its long-range capabilities (by then increasingly characteristic of the Soviet Navy), received closer attention throughout the region.

As for Japan, despite the dangerous repercussions such a concession might have elsewhere, the USSR "softened" its territorial position in early 1972, again offering the return of the two southernmost islands as part of a treaty package. Moscow's leaders also initiated proposals aimed at developing a much broader economic relationship with Japan, partially, no doubt, to lure Japan away from any closer ties with China; this included proposals which would have involved Japan in development projects with clear military implications for the Far East, especially the B.A.M. rail project.

Other evidence: within a relatively short period after the border clashes, Soviet leaders reached agreements with Peking aimed at preventing possible clashes, and began pushing its Asian Collective Security Plan heavily in talks with Japan and other Asian states.¹

Fifth, lack of coordination and consensus (the foreign ministry was cut out of the process since its conservative views were known)² caused


the Japanese to acquiesce to a Joint Declaration which specified the
return of only two islands. Since then, it is not only the Soviet position
which has rigidified; indeed, from Moscow's viewpoint, Japan's position
shifted and its demands were untenable, unacceptable and, within the
context of the San Francisco Declaration, illegal. Given that perspective,
the Soviet agreement in 1956 to return two of the islands becomes a
generous one which is not without risks, since it might set precedents vis-
a-vis other post-WWII Soviet territorial acquisitions.

Finally, while it may not be true for all states or in any other
relationships, it can be demonstrated that in the Japan-Soviet post-war
relationship national goals, priorities and policies have all too often
worked at cross purposes. To illustrate: it could be said that Japan has
retained as a goal the desire for equidistance as well as good (at least in
the sense of unthreatening) relations with the USSR, and that this has
been a major policy goal. Yet this is hampered by: a) desires for return
of four islands viewed as part of the homeland, and of fishing grounds in
that area of considerable value, b) by desires to develop and maintain
good relations with China and thereby maintain its safer equidistance
policy in light of the Sino-Soviet rift, c) by desires involving national
economic survival which entail good fishing grounds, including those to
the north, plus trade with China, and d) by desires for security in a
military sense. But for the foreseeable future this requires the
maintenance of good relations with the United States as a protection
against the USSR, when the original goal was friendship and/or at least
lack of threat in that relationship with the USSR.
Nor is the dilemma one-sided: the USSR wants good relations with Japan, wants to draw it out of the U.S. orbit if possible, but wants most of all to keep it out of a coalition or alliance with the Chinese. These goals are hampered by: a) desires to preserve precious fishing grounds as worldwide resources dwindle; (the USSR lost six million tons of fish per year with the advent of 200 mile exclusive fishing grounds around the world); yet in doing this they hit a sensitive point in Japan, and by b) desires to stem any irredentist demands from states which lost territory to the USSR circa 1945, thereby blocking the one possible exit from a stalemate situation in relations with Japan... which was the goal in the first place.

The above portrait of a dilemma only serves to underscore a point made by Mr. Thomas Shoesmith, Deputy Ambassador to Japan and veteran State Department official. Discussing the foreign policy process he said:

One thing with which I lose patience... is the belief (on the part of some people) that all this is a cut and dried, logical and pure process aimed at logical conclusions. It is in fact a political process involving players with more or less clout — players who feel that to lose diminishes their clout. It's a bureaucratic in-fight, and when you add today's incredibly complicated economic factors to the equation, the actual process is so full of so many complex variables and inconstants — is so far removed from a logical process as it is viewed (by some) as happening, as to be totally laughable — if not tragic.

1. During the interview with Mr. Shoesmith on 29 June 1977 in Tokyo. Loc. cit.
Given the long history of persistent and even vicious power struggles within the ruling party of Japan, which are all too well known, and the apparent infighting in the Kremlin, Mr. Shoesmith's point needs no further documentation or amplification, but must certainly be an additional factor of great importance in the bilateral equation.
In contrast to negotiations on the proposed treaty with the Soviet Union, progress towards the eventual Peace and Friendship Treaty between Japan and the People's Republic of China was comparatively rapid and smooth. This was due in part to a willingness on both sides to compromise, but also to such factors as an absence of major disputed issues of substance, far greater cultural affinity, and to certain political, economic and strategic imperatives as they were viewed from a Chinese perspective. Each of these points are worth further examination, along with a closer look at relevant aspects of the history of bilateral relations.

**BILATERAL RELATIONS — THE EARLY PERIOD**

While much of the early history of Japan is laden with myth, the first clear records emerge circa 400 A.D. when scribes from the Korean state of Paekche were installed in Japanese court and began to keep records in Chinese. This coincided with the earliest recorded Japanese experiments with colonization and exploitation of the mainland, (c. 400-562 A.D.) and resulted in a considerable flow of individuals and groups from portions of colonized Korea imbued with Korean traditions and Chinese cultural attainments. This was followed by the introduction of Buddhism into Japan and as Reischauer reports:
Hitherto the cultural flow from the continent had been a slow and unconscious process, but with the adoption of Buddhism the Japanese began to make a conscious attempt to transplant elements of the continental civilization. As a result, the rate of cultural borrowing increased sharply, ushering in a new age in Japanese history.

Beginning with the "embassies" sent to China by the Japanese court in 607-8 A.D. and again in 614 A.D., Japan began a wholesale process of incorporating all that was deemed worthwhile from China, using Buddhist monks, scholars, historians, writers and artists in a process which not only transformed Japan but left it with a "debt" which Japanese are quite aware of even to this day.

Doubtless every schoolchild in Japan is taught that the origins of a significant portion of their writing, as well as the style of architecture in many of Japan's most famous buildings comes from China. It is equally true to say there are few who do not know that Japan was saved by a kamikaze — "divine wind" — which destroyed the invading fleet of Kubilai Khan in 1281 A.D. and in folk memory the idea of a "Chinese" threat to Japan, to whatever degree it might linger, stems from this period in history. By the 14th century, and until the Tokagawa Shogunate eliminated foreign travel, Japanese pirates known as waco were the scourge of the seas and a terror to coastal Chinese and Korean villages. When Japan did close its doors, a handful of Chinese, as well as Korean and Dutch traders were allowed entry each year to special trade points.

1. See Reischauer, op. cit., p. 335; and while numerous accounts of Japan's early history are available his chapter entitled "Early Japan: The Absorption of Chinese Civilization," in East Asia, op. cit., pp. 324-57 is detailed and concise.

2. Included in the prohibition were orders to destroy all vessels capable of open sea travel.
THE BITTER CENTURY

If the versions of history presented by Chinese children and university students in the Canton region of China during a week of extensive interviews can be used as any guide, it can be assumed that since 1949 large numbers in China have learned that the Japanese were major villains in modern Chinese history. While Japanese involvement in China in the late 1800s and the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 was a bit too shrouded in antiquity for most of the students interviewed, there was universality in responses to questions about the period from 1937 to 1945 known to them as the "Japan-China war." Those students were taught that Chairman Mao, the masses of China and the People's Liberation Army, with some slight assistance from the Soviet Union "when it was still a socialist country," and from Dr. Bethune of the Canadian Communist Party, overthrew the "imperialist Japanese invaders who were aided by the Chaing Kai-Chek clique." American, British and Commonwealth assistance was not mentioned.¹

HISTORICAL REMEMBRANCES

Thus the contrast in the "remembrance of things past" is quite considerable; while stories of the "rape of Nanking" and of other Japanese atrocities persist in China, references to that black period in Japanese

¹ While this version was an extract based on interviews during the week of 20 May 1973, with students from eight different schools and from ages 12 to 20 — none of whom knew of any other foreign involvement in battles against Japan, inside or outside of China — more refined versions of this same "remembrance of things past" were mentioned often in Hsinhua and regional Chinese broadcasts to the masses of China until as late as 1975. Moreover special sections have been set up in many museums in China with "atrocity displays." See "Niigatans On Atrocity Tour," Mainichi News, 31 July 1977, p. 1.
history have faded with the passing years and with the passing of a generation imbued with "war guilt" in Japan. What does persist in the writings of many Japanese is an admiration for various aspects of things Chinese. It is far more likely in recent years to find Japanese writers who contrast their own "amoral and materialistic" society with modern, puritanical China, and do so by contrasting the evils of smog-ridden, industrialized Tokyo with rather fuzzy notions of the glories of the "New Mao Man." 

A brief and rather typical sampling of the contrasts as they are viewed (and lamented) by some in Japan, goes like this:

Compared with Japan, the aspirations and directions of the Chinese people and state are infinitely more defined and purposeful. Even though contemporary Chinese society is still economically backward, it has integrity, and is based on an indigenous moral philosophy. What have the Japanese ever had that is genuinely theirs?

1. Extensive interviews with Japanese university students in 1977 revealed that most of the students had never heard of the massacre of Chinese civilians at Nanking in 1937. More to the point, Japanese textbooks used nationwide have virtually whitewashed Japan's role in WWII; actions of Japanese occupation forces are not mentioned, all blame for the war is placed on the military, and the war against Britain and the U.S. is described as the inevitable result of economic pressures brought to bear by the "ABCD Powers," (America, Britain, China and the Dutch). See David Tharp, "What to Tell the Children," Mainichi News, 31 July 1977, p. 5.


3. Ishihara, ibid., p. 77.
While such a view does not predominate within conservative ruling circles in Japan, (and while one wonders at Marxism-Leninism as an "indigenous philosophy") there is nonetheless a hint of it even in the LDP; perhaps more importantly it illustrates the continuation of what Reischauer has called a "one-sided love affair," which tended to emerge after 1945.

Without further amplification on the period from the late 1800s until the end of WWII, including the history of Japanese involvement and exploitation in China throughout that period, the point worth noting is that the concept of a strong and powerful China with lethal military potentials, and of Japan as a militarily weak and passive international entity — in all but economic terms — is a recent one. Beginning with its fearsome pirates of the 14th Century, throughout the imperialism of middle Meiji restoration period, the 21 demands, the establishment of Manchukuo and the 1937-45 war, Japan was the aggressor.

POST-WAR RELATIONS

In the post-war period up until 1954, Japanese foreign policy was either in the hands of the American Occupation administration or the Yoshida government, whose rigid pro-U.S. policies meant that Sino-Japanese relations were conducted within the context of the Cold War. From then until 1971 Japanese from all political parties spoke of greater foreign policy independence and of new initiatives, but in retrospect it appears that for the ruling party much of this was lip service in the face of opposition demands; the continued domination of the conservative LDP
in foreign policy, growing Japanese political and economic ties with Taiwan,¹ and the overriding concern for good relations with the U.S. prevented major initiatives toward Peking.

In the early years after the 1949 Communist takeover of China, many of Japan's leading intellectuals had a favourable view of the Peking government, but the failure of the Great Leap Forward and the excesses of the Cultural Revolution disillusioned all but the staunchest supporters.

After 1954, with ever-increasing frequency, government sanctioned unofficial cultural, trade and political contacts developed. While bilateral trade tended to rise and fall depending on the political mood in Peking, by 1970 it amounted to just over 2% of Japan's total trade and to about 20% of China's.²

But normalization of relations might have come much sooner, and at the hands of the very Prime Minister Yoshida who is remembered for his rigidly pro-U.S. foreign policies. On 29 October 1951, after failing the month before to dissuade U.S. Secretary of State Dulles from his "China containment" policy,³ Mr. Yoshida told a Diet committee "Japan will

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¹. Japan recognized the Nationalist government on Taiwan in 1952 at the insistence of the U.S.; as late as 1971 a combination of strategic fears about a Communist ruled Taiwan, heavy Japanese investment and trade with the island and pressures from the Nationalists acted as brakes on any initiatives toward recognizing Peking. See Craig in East Asia, op. cit., p. 856.

². Ibid. (See also Appendix, "Japan-China Trade.")

³. Because Britain insisted on Peking's presence at San Francisco, Dulles worked out a compromise in London which prevented either Chinese government from going to San Francisco, allowing Tokyo to make the choice on its own later. Yoshida tried to persuade Dulles that the proper course for Tokyo and Washington was to recognize Peking, but with the Korean War going, this was unacceptable to Dulles. See Pacific Rivals, op. cit., pp. 206-7.
have to decide from a position of realistic diplomacy whether or not to recognize . . . China. At the moment, the government is thinking of opening trade relations with that country and of establishing a commercial office in Shanghai."¹ A surprised and upset Dulles flew immediately to Tokyo, together with several pro-Taiwan members of the U.S. Senate. They threatened that if Japan recognized Peking the San Francisco Peace Treaty would "never be ratified by the Senate."² Yoshida so strongly disagreed with U.S. policy that he soon after wrote, but was dissuaded from sending, a letter outlining his views; because his country was still occupied, he reluctantly acquiesced to U.S. China policy instead. It was clear that Dulles went along with the agreements he had reached in London to "let Japan decide for itself on China,"³ only so long as Japan decided his way.

Despite an ever increasing rigidity in the China policies of the ruling LDP throughout the 1950s until as late as 1969, there was nonetheless a consciousness within the party of a need for "equidistance" or equal treatment of two Communist neighbors. Only days after an apparent breakthrough in the 1956 Japan-Soviet talks, the LDP "allowed" Yasuhiro Nakasone, a relatively young but powerful party member, to visit Peking privately. By that time the party elders had delineated a clear distinction


². Ibid., p. 207. Minutes of that meeting remain in the Foreign Ministry's "permanently secret" file.

³. Ibid., p. 208.
between trade and politics, a formula which was not totally reciprocal in its implementation; throughout the period from the Nakasone visit until the end of the Cultural Revolution China trade was subject to the vicissitudes of domestic Chinese politics -- even though the two sides reached formal agreement on the "separation" principle in late 1961.¹

Although the minutes of the Dulles-Yoshida meeting have been permanently classified in Tokyo, members of the Japanese press have been told by the foreign ministry that Mr. Dulles persuaded Mr. Yoshida to recognize the Nationalists as a government of China -- not the government. The point is worth noting since over the years this fine distinction, with its inherent ambiguity, was lost within the ruling party and policy steadily hardened into steadfast recognition of the Nationalist government as the sole legitimate one.²

This can be better appreciated by examining the China policies of the various Japanese cabinets and developments in China after 1956 as well.

Under Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, (Feb. 1957 - July 1960), the economic and cultural ties initiated in the spirit of the April 1952 Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty, (an accomplishment of Mr. Kishi's mentor, Shigeru Yoshida), tended to expand greatly, while formal contact with Peking was restricted to "unofficial" trade agreements which employed de facto separation of politics and business. But relations deteriorated rapidly

following an incident at the Nagasaki Postage Stamp Fair of April 1958 when a young Japanese man pulled down the Chinese Communist flag; Peking retaliated by nullifying the bilateral trade agreement.

With the advent of the Ikeda Cabinet (July 1960) new bilateral contacts were initiated and Peking indicated its approval of Japanese foreign policies with a new trade pact in late 1961 which formally separated trade and politics. When France recognized the Peking government in January of 1964, Mr. Ikeda and his foreign minister, Masayoshi Ohira, "softened" the official China policy, telling the Diet that if "a situation (should) arise in which Communist China becomes a legitimate member of the United Nations... Japan will have to consider normalizing diplomatic relations...".

By this time the Sino-Soviet rift was apparently viewed as irreparable by Peking's leaders and the type of diplomacy which culminated in normalized relations with France also focused on Japan: in addition to continuing its party-to-party contacts with left-wing Japanese political leaders, Peking initiated expanded contacts with the ruling party and a public relations campaign in Japan. Thus, in April of 1964 an LDP delegation led by former finance minister Tokutaro Kitamura met with Chou En-Lai and was told that "Japanese-United States relationship may

1. While closely co-operating with the U.S. in other ways, Ikeda refused to co-operate with U.S. military policy and tried to avoid involvement in Asian political affairs or disputes. For amplification, see Eto, op. cit., p. 50-1.

remain unchanged, while Sino-Japanese relations are gradually normalized through the so-called piling up method.¹ This was interpreted in Tokyo as a significant change in Chinese policy. Further illustrations of a Chinese diplomatic offensive could be seen in the visit of Nan Han-chen as head of an Economic and Goodwill Mission, also in April of 1964. Nan made himself available for separate interviews with the major Japanese newspapers and nationwide television interviews.²

Soon after this, however, domestic developments in both countries ruined the earlier period of tentative courtship: on 9 November 1964 Eisaku Sato became Japanese prime minister. His foreign policies were a considerable departure from the "economy first" doctrines of Hayato Ikeda's cabinet. Sato rigidly adhered to U.S. foreign policies and sought closer collaboration with western democracies. He initiated an era of much closer co-operation with South Korea — a "basic relations" treaty was signed only weeks after he took office -- and also extended economic aid to non-communist countries of Southeast Asia directly and through the Asian Development Bank.³

China reacted strongly to Japan's new initiatives: non-governmental trade relations maintained during Ikeda's tenure declined markedly under Sato while official relations -- already suffering from lack of formal communications of any sort — deteriorated much further from 1966 until early 1969 as China was swept by the xenophobic and rhetorical excesses of the Cultural Revolution.

¹ Kajima, op. cit., p. 41.
2 Ibid., p. 46.
3 For amplification on the Sato era see Eto, op. cit., pp. 50-67.
Poor relations during that period were exacerbated by statements to the Diet in late 1965 by Sato that "judging from the nature of the Peking regime, its possessions of nuclear arms poses a threat to the security of Japan," and "Japan has no intention of kowtowing for the purpose of improving... relations."\(^1\) Bilateral trade, which had grown beginning in 1962, retrogressed to the minimum regulated by a memorandum signed in 1967 and subject to annual renewal. China did nothing to help matters, for in addition to de-emphasizing trade relations, its official media reverted to describing Japan as the "running dog of American imperialism" and to warnings of renewed Japanese militarism.\(^2\) It also ignored repeated official requests for the release of 13 Japanese correspondents and businessmen detained during the GPCR.\(^3\)

Any Chinese suspicions that Japan was being groomed to take over the U.S. role in East Asia were heightened by the 1969 Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué which cited Korea and Taiwan as important to Japan's own security.\(^4\)

But by 1969 there were also political straws in the wind, in addition to markedly improving two-way trade, which helped set the stage for normalization in 1972. During 1968, influential LDP member Tokuma Utsunomiya wrote key members of the U.S. Congress and expressed the view that stability in East Asia depended upon good trilateral relations between Washington, Tokyo, and Peking. Early the following year, he and

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4. For amplification see Scalipino, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
several other important members of the ruling party, including Aiichiro Fujiyama, attended a private two-day conference they helped arrange in Santa Barbara, California, which was also attended by several influential congressmen including Senators J. William Fulbright and Mark Hatfield. The main conclusions of the conference were that the U.S. approach toward Asia was largely military and badly in need of change, and that the policy of shutting China out of the international community should also be replaced by a more positive attitude.  

THE CHINESE INITIATIVES

China, meanwhile began to emerge in 1969 from the chaos of the GPCR, still faced with the same problems vis-a-vis the Soviet Union which were discernable five years earlier. Problems inherent in that relationship for Chinese foreign policy makers were further complicated by Peking's diplomatic isolation due to the excesses of the GPCR. It also appears that following the Ussuri River incidents of 1969, foreign policy initiatives increased in urgency because the incidents underscored the dangers inherent in such isolation. Some in Japan were aware of this: "Live in Peking," wrote Kazuteru Saionji of the Asahi Shimbun Research Council on China, "and one cannot fail to be aware of the Japanese-American encirclement of China."  

2. Ibid. p. 399.
Author and General Sun Tzu had two bits of advice apparently appropriate for his fellow countrymen three millenia later. "Ally yourself with the declining power against the rising one," and, "the enemy of your enemy is your ally." Thus, in early 1971 the Chinese launched its "ping-pong diplomacy," the first public initiative signalling a thaw in Sino-U.S. relations. Within days of the move toward Washington, Peking also set up a visit to Tokyo in April, 1971 by Wang Chiao-yun, deputy manager of the ping-pong team. The same Utsunomiya who had arranged the Santa Barbara meetings on U.S.-Asian policy asked Wang to help him get a Chinese delegation to join a similar conference scheduled to take place in Hakone in August, 1971 as a first step toward implementing his envisioned trilateral rapprochement. Peking never replied.  

JAPAN REACTS

But the Chinese signals were apparently read correctly in Tokyo; early in 1971, shortly after the "ping-pong message," the ruling party dispatched former Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama, to Peking. He met with Premier Chou and upon his return told a news conference, "The Chinese government is not opposed in principle to Japan's participation in a collective security system," a remark interpreted in Tokyo as a further sign that Peking would not require Tokyo to abandon its defense pact with Washington before normalization could take place. Fujiyama also publicly urged early normalization of relations with Peking.

1. In the years preceeding this there had been over 130 private meetings in Warsaw between U.S. and Chinese representatives, with little progress toward rapprochement or the settlement of outstanding long-term issues.


But Prime Minister Sato opted to continue support of the Taiwan government, even though the U.S. was by that time involved in a balancing act at the U.N. — supporting Taiwan's continued presence while letting Peking know it would not oppose a simultaneous seat for it in the General Assembly.

Thus, while the "mainstream" center and rightist factions within the ruling party hardened their pro-Nationalist China policies for reasons outlined above, there were indications of dissent within the party which occasionally showed in public, and which gradually developed into a minority view with respectable backing from men like Fujiyama and Utsunomiya.

THE "NIXON SHOCK"

But while a gradual shift within the LDP was discernible, it is clear that it took the "Nixon Shock" of July 1971 to rapidly transform Japanese policy and move Japan along the road to a Peace Treaty. 1

While polls taken in Japan throughout that year indicated that most Japanese welcomed the U.S. move, and while polls for several years had ranked China as a somewhat distant yet nonetheless second most popular country, 2 the surprise U.S. move also undercut the Sato government. U.S. attempts to assuage the consternation in Japan, including both the San Clemente Summit promise that "no agreements in Peking would prejudice Japan-U.S. relations" and the setting of a specific date (15 May 1972) for reversion of Okinawa, were largely unsuccessful.

1. For amplification on LDP policies see the section on the LDP which follows and the Appendix "Chronology."

2. Asahi polls consistently ranked the U.S. as "most favourite" with at least 40% of those polled, while several years worth of polls prior to the Tanaka visit of Sept. 1972 showed China as number one among 12% of those polled.
And while the "shoku" prompted a series of actions in Japan to preserve "special relations" with Washington, including new scholarships, a chair at Harvard for Japanese Studies and a whole range of cultural and educational exchange programs, the Nixon-Kissinger move nonetheless caused many Japanese to feel their country might become isolated as the only major non-communist power in the western Pacific.¹ Coming as it did on top of hostile U.S. responses in the textiles dispute of 1971, and exacerbated further by the other "Nixon shock" which put a 10% surcharge on all imports, the China announcement was a body blow to the Sato government, whose popularity was already badly eroded.² It also added supporters to a small but growing minority which viewed the U.S. defense commitment as unreliable, as well as those who felt the Japanese non-nuclear defense policy ought to be re-examined;³ and it prompted additional supporters for the Self-Defense Force.

It is very possible that the U.S. rapprochement with China would have been less of a shock if Japan's "Washington watchers" had read certain signs, such as the new U.S. position in the U.N., more clearly.

¹ For amplification see Craig, op. cit., p. 858.

² By 1971 Mr. Sato had the lowest popularity rating in all polls of any post-war Prime Minister.

³ "Should Japan possess nuclear weapons?" was the question asked special groups in Nagasaki by Asahi Shimbun pollsters; in 1957, eight percent said "yes" but positive response grew to 21% in 1968 and to 31% in 1969. What is surprising is that those asked in 1969 were members of a Nagasaki girl school attending a reunion -- they were all at the school the morning the bomb dropped on 6 August 1945. While it is difficult to locate figures which show increases in support for this after 1971, it does show some support was already present, even in a city as strongly anti-nuclear as Nagasaki. Pacific Rivals, op. cit., p. 358.
Whether such signals were read at all is not clear, but it is clear that Mr. Sato's rigid stance on Taiwan drew increasing media criticism — particularly after Taiwan's defeat at the U.N.

Thus, when he stepped down, soon after the ratification of Okinawan reversion on 15 May 1972, Mr. Sato's prestige was so low he was unable to ensure that his job went to his "heir apparent," Takeo Fukuda. The prestige factor, combined with the factional money-politics of the wealthy construction magnate, Kakuei Tanaka, resulted in the election of the remarkable Mr. Tanaka.

TANAKA, CHINA AND THE TREATY CLAUSE

Riding the crest of a nationwide wave of popularity, Tanaka soon announced two bold new policies: remodelling of the Japanese archipelago and rapprochement with Peking. He quickly sent his new Foreign Minister, Masayoshi Ohira to Peking to arrange details for his visit there.

1. Mr. Tanaka was Japan's first premier since the Meijii restoration who was neither a former general nor a university graduate. His was a rags-to-riches story and he emerged in both the highly competitive — and often underworld connected — construction business, and in politics, from the chaos of disintegrated post-war Japan.

2. It was Ohira's decision to back Tanaka with the many votes of the Ohira faction which ensured Mr. Tanaka's victory. In return, Ohira was given the foreign ministry and a promise of all the Tanaka faction votes to make him the next premier.

3. Kozo Sasaki, JSP faction leader and former chairman of the Socialist's Central Executive Committee, also claims credit for arranging the Tanaka visit, but his claim is dubious, given the centralized power of the LDP. See Mitsuru Yamamoto, "An Erosion of Neutralism," in Silent Power, op. cit., p. 158.
The move toward Peking was generally well supported in business circles, (by 1971 Japan had five times as much trade and investment with the mainland as it had with Taiwan,) and in the Diet, where the newly formed sub-committee on Chinese affairs drew so many (over 100) members of the LDP from every political stripe that it was far larger than the party's Foreign Affairs Research Council from which it stemmed.

But the "China boom" was not universally popular, nor was it a move which had achieved previous consensus or even silent, reluctant acquiescence within the ruling party. The rapidity of Tanaka's initiatives toward Peking reinforced his reputation as the "computerized bulldozer," but simultaneously earned him the enmity of more conservative members of the LDP who urged caution and a "2-stage approach" toward normalization. Indeed, subsequent research by International Relations Professor Shinkichi Eto of Tokyo University indicates the moves by the Tanaka cabinet constituted a considerable deviation from the normal pattern of inter-bureau and intra-party co-ordination and consensus building. He reports: "As far as I can ascertain, the only policy decisions since the end of the Occupation which are difficult to explain according to the (above described) model are the Hatoyama cabinet's restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the Tanaka cabinet's normalization of relations with Peking."¹

While in Peking, Tanaka's superficial and perfunctory apology for

¹ Shinkichi Eto, "Foreign Policy Formulation in Japan," Silent Power, op. cit., pp. 125-6. This tallies with Hellmann's findings and all other evidence.
the Japanese devastation of China during the war years, which most closely translates\(^1\) to "I'm afraid we caused you some inconvenience," caused considerable comment and expressions of shame and embarrassment in the media, and in the academic community, which was otherwise enthusiastic about rapprochement.

It is worth noting that prior to their Peking visit in late September of 1972, Tanaka and Ohira met in Hawaii in late August with U.S. President Richard Nixon who had visited Peking in February. Many journalists in Japan subsequently labelled the Sino-Japanese agreements reached in Peking the "Tanaka shock," thus implying that because Tanaka had gone much further than the U.S. that it was an unexpected jolt to Washington. But they did so at the expense of ignoring the implications of the Hawaii talks, where it was simply agreed that Sino-Japanese arrangements would not impinge on the Japan-U.S. relationships; indeed the speed and extent of agreements reached in Peking by Tanaka and Chou En-lai were more of a shock to many in Tokyo than to leaders in Washington, if reactions within certain portions of the LDP are an indication.\(^2\)

Despite any negative repercussions, the Tanaka visit was nonetheless the single most important step in more than 30 years of post-war bilateral relations. In addition to full normalization of relations, the

\(^1\) Shintaro Ishihara, op. cit., p. 84.

\(^2\) For amplification see the discussion which follows on the LDP's position vis-a-vis China and the proposed treaty. A number of prestigious senior members of the party, including former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, former Lower House Speaker Naka Funada, and former Party Executive Council Chairman Hirokichi Nadao privately warned Tanaka before his Peking visit to take a "cautious attitude" and bitterly criticized the "giant step" in bilateral relations. More on these men later.
29 September Joint Communique in Peking called for formal agreements between governments on trade, shipping, civil aviation and fisheries. It recognized Peking's sovereignty over all of China (prompting Taiwan to immediately sever diplomatic links with Tokyo), called for prompt negotiations on a Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and, of considerable significance, said that both sides opposed hegemony in the Asian Pacific region.

MOVEMENT TOWARD A TREATY

In contrast to the relatively rapid progress and completion of the four other arguments called for in the Peking Communique of 1972, and in contrast also to the dramatic rise in bilateral trade from 1972 to 1978¹ (with a dip in 1976 for reasons explained later), progress on the Peace and Friendship Treaty was sporadic, occasionally difficult and even a source of friction on occasion between the two sides.

The first real focus on a possible Treaty of Peace and Friendship did not occur until 13 November 1974 when Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung visited Tokyo to sign the new shipping agreement.

At that time bilateral relations on virtually all fronts provided ample reasons for a genuine mood of optimism which was evident among politicians, journalists and academics alike. The trade, commercial air

¹. In 1971, bilateral trade was under $1,000 million, but by 1975 it had jumped to $8.76 thousand million; after a dramatic fall in 1976 due to domestic Chinese political problems caused by the radical group and economic problems due to the massive earthquakes at Tangshan, trade rose rapidly again in 1977 and was capped by a huge 8-year, $20 thousand million agreement in mid-February of 1978, over and above normal trade. For amplification see Appendix, "Sino-Japanese Trade."
and shipping pacts had progressed smoothly to conclusion and the pending fishing agreement was moving apace.

Thus, when Han and Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura opened discussions in Tokyo on the general shape and content of a Peace and Friendship Treaty there were no signs of disagreement on any major points; talks on the following day clarified matters even further but it was agreed to suspend talks temporarily because of the Japanese domestic political situation.¹ Soon after that Prime Minister Tanaka was forced to resign due to mounting pressure over a financial scandal and in the deadlocked struggle for his job, Takeo Miki emerged as the "pro tem," compromise candidate.

On 25 December, Miki's new foreign minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, told the House of Councillors Foreign Affairs Committee he hoped to resume talks on the Treaty within the month and cabinet spokesmen told journalists the prime minister and foreign minister hoped to have the treaties signed by mid-summer.²

Amid widespread optimism the first working level talks were held in Tokyo on 16 January 1975 between Chinese Ambassador Chen Chu and Vice Foreign Minister Fumihiko Togo. Three days later, following the Fourth National People's Congress, Peking announced a new constitution which proclaimed Chinese opposition to "hegemonism by superpowers." The

¹ Kyodo News Agency dispatches of 13 and 14 Nov. 1974. Full newspaper coverage in Japanese national newspapers as well on 13, 14 and 15 November.

² Kyodo News Agency dispatch, 1 Jan. 1975.
effects of this proclamation did not become evident until the fourth round of talks in Tokyo between Togo and Chen on 14 April, when the two sides exchanged treaty drafts. The soon-to-be controversial anti-hegemony clause was included in the Chinese draft, but was not present in the Japanese version. By 24 April the two sides reached an impasse on the anti-hegemony issue and talks were temporarily suspended.

By that time, the importance of the anti-hegemony issue loomed large: Peking had already expressed a desire to shelve the Senkaku Island issue and had also assured Japanese officials they considered the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty (due to expire in 1980) "ceased to exist in practice." 2

By early 1975 both Soviet and Chinese positions on the anti-hegemony clause were well known to each other and to the Japanese; moreover Japan was sensitive to the Soviet position and to its own equidistance policy vis-a-vis the two of them. Thus the government and the ruling party dispatched LDP Dietman Shigeru Hori to Peking the same day Miyazawa flew to Moscow with hopes of re-opening Peace Treaty talks with Moscow. 3

1. Both sides claim the small group of islands near the Ryuku chain which is believed to be rich in oil.


But just as progress in the January Moscow talks was non-existent on the treaty issue, so too the deadlock on the China treaty persisted. On 11 May 1975 one of China's most powerful leaders, Party Vice Chairman Li Hsien-nien, told visiting JSP Party Chairman Tomomi Narita that "China would never compromise on the anti-hegemony issue."

On 24 and again on 27 September at the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York, Miyazawa tried to break the treaty deadlock during talks with his Chinese counterpart Chiao Kuan-hua. At the first meeting the Japanese foreign minister presented the "Four Point Miyazawa Principle," (see below,) but later told reporters he "did not expect an early resumption of the negotiations." At a separate meeting between Miyazawa and Gromyko that same day, the Soviet foreign minister said the Soviet Union did not want to be explicitly referred to, in the treaty, as a country seeking hegemony over Asia.

THE ANTI-HEGEMONY CLAUSE

Although an anti-hegemony clause had been included in the Joint Communique of 1972, such a clause had taken on added significance in the intervening period; not only was it important enough to incorporate into the Chinese constitution, but also treaty negotiations with Japan had given the clause international publicity. Further, it was amply clear from


statements by Chinese officials -- also widely reported -- that the clause was aimed directly, and exclusively, at the Soviet Union. (Given Japan's close ties with the U.S., and the formidable U.S. presence in the Pacific -- not to say hegemonic influence in the region -- such assurances could almost be viewed as mandatory if relations with Japan were to improve.)

The proposed clause or article in the Chinese version of the treaty read:

The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

The so-called "four point Miyazawa interpretation" (worked out with the Japanese Foreign Ministry and presented to Chiao in New York), was Japan's first real attempt to mitigate the anti-Soviet implications of the clause. Miyazawa sought Chinese acquiescence in an interpretation which would allow Japan to sign if it could be said, and hopefully written in, that the clause: 1) was directed against no specific country, 2) directed no specific action, 3) did not conflict with the U.N. Charter, and 4) noted that "anti-hegemony" will be applied not only to Asia and the Pacific, but to the whole world.

China categorically rejected any such interpretations and was particularly adamant on points one and four.

1. Copy of the draft proposal provided to Voice of America News Tokyo Bureau in mid-1977 by the Japanese Foreign Ministry Dept. of Information.

THE LONG DEADLOCK

When Gromyko visited Tokyo for five days in January of 1976, his open threats to the press on the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, plus his apparently obdurate attitude on the Northern Territories Issue, prompted widespread anti-Soviet commentary in the Japanese media and a remarkable speech by Miki at the Foreign Correspondents' Club within hours of the Soviet Foreign Minister's departure. In it he called the equidistance policy "a myth," said a peace treaty with the USSR would come only if the four islands were returned, and announced that he would try to conclude a China Treaty even with the anti-hegemony clause included. He justified this by saying such a clause was in widespread use, implied in the U.S.-USSR agreements of 1972 and specified in the U.S. and Japanese communiques with China that same year.

But progress on Sino-Japanese treaty talks was not forthcoming for a number of reasons: first, Miki's reversal of policy startled the foreign ministry and flew in the face of written warning from Miyazawa urging caution. Public disclosures of that warning, plus news that Miki had privately assured Gromyko Japan would not sign any treaty with Peking which included the controversial clause resulted in negative signals from

1. Privately, Gromyko did propose the return of the two southernmost islands, but his private threats to Miki were considered blunt in the extreme. See "Gromyko Warns Against Amity Pact With China," Mainichi News, 14 Jan. 1976, p. 1.


Peking, but no Chinese response to Miki's January Press Club statements. The negative signals came via private statements from Chinese officials to visiting Japanese Dietmen, (subsequently reported to newsmen for publication), to the effect that China no longer trusted Miki or Miyazawa.¹

Secondly, the impact of Soviet pressures must not be discounted.²

Other, perhaps stronger reasons of a domestic nature also intervened, for throughout 1976 events in both countries of historic magnitude preoccupied leaders: in Peking the death of Chou En-lai was followed by Tienanmin riots, the downfall of Teng Hsiao-ping for a second time, devastating summer earthquakes, the death of Mao, the arrest of the "gang of four" and the rise of Mao's final heir apparent, Hua Kuo-feng. In Tokyo, the Lockheed scandal broke with full force and occupied headlines almost daily from mid-February on. In mid-summer Tanaka was arrested; concerted and widely publicized moves to bring down Miki followed, as did the Soviet spy scandal, the MiG-25 incident, national elections, Miki's downfall and consolidation of power by another one-time heir apparent -- Takeo Fukuda.

PARTY POSITIONS ON THE TREATY

Because of the magnitude of these and other events, there was a natural ebb and flow in public interest in Japan on the treaty with Peking.

¹. See Nakamura, op. cit.

². More on this point in "Conclusions."
Pressure on the government and the ruling party to move forward on the treaty varied accordingly, from its first mention in late 1972 until its actual signing in August 1978. But the positions, if not the pressures, from the various parties, remained fairly constant throughout the period, in contrast to the situation with regard to the USSR treaty.

The various party positions can be summarised as follows:

**THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATS**

Of the six major parties, Japan's ruling LDP maintained the most cautious position with respect to rapprochement with Communist China and toward the anti-hegemony clause. But while this summarises the "mainstream," the party position was at the same time the most complex due to the very nature of the party, which encompasses a vast cross-section of political opinion. Three of its most powerful and influential leaders, Nobushuke Kishi, Naka Funada and Hirokichi Nadao remained staunchly and publicly pro-Taiwan and anti-Communist in the extreme throughout 1972-78.

Rapprochement and normalization was achieved by Mr. Tanaka without regard for traditional party consensus, as has been shown. In effect, it took the party some time to catch up to the political/diplomatic position it had been placed in, willy-nilly, by Tanaka, the most powerful single faction leader at the time.

The January 1976 statements of Mr. Miki again flew in the face of party and government policy with respect to the anti-hegemony clause: the LDP was determined not to become involved in the Sino-Soviet rift and its steadfastness on this point could be seen in 1978 when Peking allowed a compensating clause (more on this point later) in the treaty.
Miki and Miyazawa, (unlike Tanaka and his allies, Ohira and Nakasone in 1972) were not powerful enough to carry out announced plans to accept the anti-hegemony clause, even if they had been united on the point, and if domestic events had not intervened. Moreover, Miki was not only a pro-tem., compromise leader in the eyes of party elders, he was also regarded as "a dreamer" and as "too far left" as well as being a latecomer to the party. He was thus in no position to move without support on an unpopular policy which would require Diet ratification, (which was not needed when he ordered Mr. Tanaka's arrest later).

Sufficient numbers of powerful "mainstream" faction leaders (Tanaka, Ohira, Nakasone and Miki) did advocate further movement toward Peking, however, so that when Fukuda, (one of the most conservative leaders) finally sought formal consensus on a treaty in early 1978, support was present. His continued caution on the anti-hegemony clause, plus his ties to pro-Taiwan "diehards," gained the support needed within the party after several weeks of trying, (see "Chronology"). The burgeoning trade with China, the $20 thousand million trade package signed in February of 1978 and the "victory of the pragmatists" in China also combined to assuage the most conservative members of the party.

1. Miki had the fourth largest faction, Mr. Miyazawa led no faction and was considered too young to lead one, given his lack of funds.

2. Party leaders publicly chastized Mr. Miki in 1967 when, as Foreign Minister, he "went too far" on a position indicating rapprochement with Peking at an ASPAC conference. See Pacific Rivals, op. cit., p. 243.
Nonetheless, the diversity of opinion on China led to some embarrassing moments for the LDP over the years when party members flatly contradicted each other in public on the party's China positions.¹

**THE KOMEITO**²

The Komei (Clean Government) Party (to) sent six delegations to Peking between 1971 and 1978; several of these were used as "messengers" by either side (see Chronology). In the China-Komei Joint Communiqué of 2 July 1971, conditions for Sino-Japanese normalization of relations were spelled out. Mission number five (18-25 January 1977) was the first non-Communist delegation to meet with newly elevated Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. Returning to Tokyo the party delegation issued a statement saying it would pressure the Fukuda government to conclude the Peace Treaty (on China's terms).

The Party took considerable credit (rightly or wrongly) for Japan's two major moves toward Peking (1972 and 1978) because the sixth delegation to visit Peking, 10-17 March 1978, carried Mr. Fukuda's views on the Treaty and received in return a four-point statement which indicated the first Chinese concessions on treaty interpretation. (More on that point later.)


² Komeito positions were compiled on the basis of letters received by the author in response to specific requests, plus a series of party press releases also forwarded, especially Komei Press Release, Serial Number 39, 24 Mar. 1978, first published in the 18 Mar. 1978 issue of Komei Shinbun.
Thus, on both the Taiwan/normalization issue of 1971-2, and on the treaty issue, especially after 1974, the Komei party adhered most closely to Peking's positions. (Curious because the Komeito is regarded as a middle-of-the-road party in Japan and has steadfastly refused to join any coalition government which includes the JCP.)

**THE NEW LIBERAL CLUB**¹

In contrast to the position it took virtually from the moment of its inception as a party in 1976 on the Japan-Soviet Treaty, the NLC fought the government on the ratification of the Japan-South Korea Continental Shelf Agreement — partially on the grounds that the PRC claimed much of the area involved. Party members visited China in Sept. 1977 and clarified the party position in Nov. 1977, saying the two sides could interpret the same anti-hegemony clause differently; and since, in the NLC's view, the treaty was more a matter of symbolism than content, it should be signed immediately.

**THE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY**²

Japan's second largest party had special problems with the Peking treaty because of continuing splits between the right and left wing and between pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions in the predominant, Marxist wing of the JSP. Until the early 1970s the JSP was the standard bearer

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¹. New Liberal Club positions on China are compiled on the basis of letters received by the author in response to specific requests and from the Party magazine's Nov. 1977 Issue, pp. 31 and 43-51 all of which were translated by Haruko Nobechi of the Voice of America News Office in Tokyo.

for neutralism and break-throughs in relations with Moscow and Peking were major goals. As early as 1959 there were party-to-party contacts with Peking (see Chronology).

On 12 May 1975 the JSP-China Japan Friendship Association Joint Communiqué signed in Peking sharply attacked Moscow and forced Prime Minister Miki to delay treaty talks with China because it so clearly tied "anti-hegemony" with Soviet action in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. It also caused a fight within the JSP which resulted in the public announcement of a "new interpretation" of the Communiqué, thus damaging party relations with both Moscow and Peking.

While official policy since the mid-1960s included avoidance of party or national involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the two Marxist and one non-Marxist factions split three ways on the Peking treaty after 1972: the pro-Peking Sasaki faction urged immediate, unconditional signing, the pro-Moscow group urged elimination of the anti-hegemony clause, and the non-Marxist Eda faction followed the LDP and the government calls for "interpretation" of the clause.

JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY

After breaking with Moscow in 1964, Party Chairman Kenji Miyamoto also expelled the pro-Peking faction in 1966. The JCP's relations with Peking have remained severed since March of that year when talks between the two parties were abruptly broken off.

1. Information on the JCP positions was extracted primarily from Politics in Modern Japan, op. cit., pp. 126-33.
As with many other policies since it began to "soften the line" in July 1970, the JCP positions on the China Treaty have been nationalistic and ambiguous. The clearest enunciation in the 1970s consisted of saying the nation should avoid involvement in Sino-Soviet disputes.

The extreme positions of the JCP vis-a-vis independence from Moscow or Peking were underscored in late August, 1978, when visiting Chinese Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping met with leaders of all Japanese parties except the JCP, and invited representatives from all other parties to a reception two days later, excluding the JCP.

THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY

Ever since the 17th party convention of April, 1973, the DSP has stressed "expansion of friendly and harmonious relations with all nations," but throughout the 1970s party policies moved more and more to the right; thus the key DSP pronouncements on the Peking treaty corresponded closely with those of the government and the ruling party until late 1977 when party leaders began to take active and prominent part in activities of the Japan-China Friendship Association; while pressing the government for "speedy resumption of talks" the party avoided clarifying its solution to the problem of the anti-hegemony clause.

1. Information on the DSP positions was extracted primarily from Politics in Modern Japan, op. cit., pp. 115-20.
BREAK IN THE TREATY DEADLOCK

Despite the anti-Soviet reactions throughout Japan which resulted from Soviet Embassy statements during the September 1976 MiG-25 incident, and from Soviet actions in 1977 (on both fisheries talks and to prevent a China Treaty), Soviet losses were no gain for Peking for many months.

Informal Chinese statements to visitors on various occasions during the latter part of 1977 resulted in growing consensus and pressure from the opposition parties for renewed talks. This pressure in turn forced the Foreign Ministry to "clarify" the Japanese position and it provided the government with a formula which would make the treaty acceptable by adding a phrase which said the anti-hegemony clause was not directed at any third country.

With pressure in the Diet questioning sessions continuing, "a source extremely close to the Prime Minister" told newsmen on 12 November 1977 that Mr. Fukuda 1) wanted the clause included in the main text, not in the preamble, 2) wanted a provision that the treaty would not be directed at any third country, and 3) wanted agreement from Peking that the anti-Japanese portion of the Sino-Soviet treaty would be eliminated. The "source" said Fukuda had taken note of the recently "more flexible Chinese attitude," and the recent Chinese remarks that the Sino-Soviet treaty was a "dead letter." 3


Pressed during a news conference on 29 November 1977 for a timetable on renewed talks, Fukuda said they would be resumed "in time," but added "the time was becoming ripe." Fukuda, who opposed normalization in 1972, also displayed his cautious attitudes: "Japan must avoid being involved in the dispute between China and the Soviet Union;" the equidistance policy evidently continued to thrive. But the news conference was called to cover the reshuffling of the Fukuda Cabinet, and although newly appointed Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda had "no comment," he was well known to be an outspoken advocate of the China Treaty, as well as a close ally of the more conservative Fukuda.¹

Although opposition consensus was clearly solidifying, and the new cabinet makeup was clearly advantageous for building LDP consensus, (with Fukuda as a bridge to the ultra-conservatives) the two sides' maneuvers consisted chiefly of unofficial "signals" and messages and there were no substantive discussions² from the time of the Miyazawa-Chiao talks of September, 1975 until late in 1977. The real initiative came from Peking: on 11 December 1977 Japanese Ambassador Shoji Sato returned home and reported China's readiness to resume talks; six days later Fukuda announced plans to accept the proposal.

On 14 February and again on 4 March 1978 Ambassador Sato met with Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Han Nien-lung to discuss

¹. Full accounts in various Japanese newspapers, also see Kyodo News Agency version run at 1844 hrs. on 29 Nov. 1977.

². On 14 October 1977 former cabinet secretary Susumo Nikaido visited Peking and met with several Chinese leaders about the treaty and other bilateral issues, but the talks were informal and covered a range of issues.
arrangements for further, formal negotiations, but the importance of these talks was eclipsed on 17 February by the worldwide news story that the two countries had signed an eight-year trade agreement worth $20 thousand million.

THE 20-BILLION-DOLLAR TRADE AGREEMENT

The agreement was the first long-term commitment China made with an industrialized country in nearly two decades and it underscored the geometric rate of growth in trade from late 1972 onward, with its concomitant cultural exchange implications: from 1973 through mid-1978 over 100,000 Japanese visited China and 10,000 Chinese travelled to Japan. By mid-1978, with treaty problems still partly unresolved, China made three other major moves: it proposed joint exploration of offshore oil, invited Japanese arms manufacturers to talks in Peking, and informed visiting Japanese financiers that China would accept foreign bank loans -- a radical departure from long-standing policies of financial self-reliance.

1. Details of the agreement were filed in numerous reports at the time, see for example Yvonne Preston, "China and Japan sign $20 billion trade agreement," Financial Times, 17 Feb. 1978, p. 1.


3. While not prohibited by the constitution, government policy is to prohibit the export of Japanese arms; since 1973 the policy has come under lobby pressure.

The political implications of such a burgeoning economic relationship did not escape the notice of foreign observers,¹ nor comment from Moscow.²

NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSENSUS BUILDING

On March 14, it was again the Chinese who made concessions which accelerated the progress toward a treaty; on that day Chinese Vice-Premier and Party Vice-Chairman Teng and People's Congress Vice-Chairman Liao Cheng-chih, (who was also president of the China-Japan Friendship Association and a key go-between in the interim between negotiations) presented visiting Komei Party Secretary General Junya Yano with a four-point "view on the treaty," which acceded to all of Miyazawa's earlier interpretations on the anti-hegemony clause except the point about whether it was directed "at any third country;" there was ambiguity on that point, as can be seen in the translated version provided in the Komeito press release of 24 March 1978:

2. The Chinese side feels that the establishment and development of peaceful and friendly relations between China and Japan is not directed against any third nation. Neither China nor Japan will seek hegemony and both will oppose the acts of any other nation or group of nations to seek hegemony. It is not logical to express one's opposition to hegemony and at the same time to say that hegemony is "not directed against anybody." As a matter of fact, hegemonism menaces not only China but Japan as well. (Emphasis added.)

¹. See for example the Matthews and Scott-Stokes articles, op. cit.

². See for example "Japanese renew China link," The Guardian, 22 July 1978, p. 6, "the official newspaper of the Soviet Defense Ministry charged China with trying to turn Japan into an industrial and technological base in its anti-Soviet pursuits."
3. Opposition to hegemony... will not necessitate any joint action...

In Tokyo, Mr. Fukuda quickly began consensus building, using the media in time-tested ways to indicate to the public that he was "seeking co-operation," "seeking co-ordination of views," or "rallying party consensus," and it was clear that from mid-March onward movement towards a treaty began to accelerate.

THE SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE

But on 12 April 1978 the second territorial dispute between Japan and China in less than a year threatened to derail treaty talks once again: on that date several hundred Chinese fishing boats, some armed with machine-guns, entered the 12-mile territorial limits around the Senkaku Islands claimed by both sides and by Taiwan as well. The incident prompted Foreign Minister Sunao Sonada to say he planned to give up plans to resume treaty talks until the Senkaku problems was resolved. On 15 April, after cabinet and LDP consultations, the Japanese government announced that it would demand withdrawal of all Chinese fishing boats

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1. Media reports were numerous and extensive; see Japanese English language newspaper reports for 1978 on: 22 Jan.; 19 Feb.; 23, 31 Mar.; 16, 27 Apr.; 6, 18, 22, 23, 25, 27 May, and 1 and 15 June.

2. These were the oft-repeated phrases quoted in the news reports cited in the previous footnote.

3. Throughout much of 1977 Peking intensified its warnings against Japanese Ratification of the Joint Continental Shelf Development Treaty with South Korea; it was initialed in 1974 but China's claims on part of the area were a major factor in causing the long delay in ratification by the Diet.

from the Senkakus while simultaneously "making efforts for an early conclusion of the peace treaty."¹

That same day in Peking, Chinese Vice-Premier Keng Piao told Hideo Den, visiting head of the Japanese Social Democratic Federation, that the incident was "accidental." On 27 April Fukuda announced plans to re-open treaty negotiations after his 3 May summit talks in Washington with President Carter, and shortly after his return from Washington he announced (on 12 May) that the Senkaku incident was settled.

But the actual resumption of negotiations did not begin for some time after Fukuda announced his intentions on 5, 12 and 21 May, nor after the cabinet and LDP executives announced approval of his plan on the 24th.² A formal proposal for resumption of talks was presented via diplomatic channels on 31 May and Peking responded affirmatively on 14 June.

On 19 June the Soviet Union underscored the attitudes expressed in its official media for many months with an incremental increase in pressure: Soviet Ambassador Dmitrii Polyanski presented an official note warning that Moscow would have to change its policy toward Japan if Tokyo concluded an anti-Soviet Peace Treaty with Peking. Three days later Japan announced its willingness to resume formal talks on 3 July and on the following day the Soviet Union cancelled plans to carry out joint fishing operations with Japan in the northern Pacific.³

¹ Kyodo News Agency reports of 15 April 1978 and their "Chronology" of 14 June.

² See Kyodo reports for each of those days and front page stories in all the Japanese English-language newspapers the following days, i.e. Japan Times, Yomiuri News, Mainichi News and Asahi Evening News.

³ "Joint Fishing Cancelled," IHT, 24 June 78, p. 5. For amplification on the Polyanski note, see "Chronology" in Appendix.
But by that time Japanese "establishment" consensus was solidifying and Soviet pressures were apparently decreasingly effective; *New York Times* Tokyo correspondent Henry Scott-Stokes observed on 23 June:

There has been a marked development in the attitude of Japanese diplomats. Until very recently they were reticent in their comments on the treaty talks, and gave an impression that there was a gap in opinion between Mr. Sonoda, who is deeply and personally committed to the treaty, and career diplomats serving under him.

This is no longer the case.¹

On 30 June the two sides agreed to the resumption of working level talks and they opened on 21 July in Peking after two years and ten months suspension. But it was immediately clear that the same semantical obstacles which frustrated earlier negotiations continued to persist. China insisted on an undiluted anti-hegemony clause while Japan argued for a separate clause removing "most of its sting."²

But again the impasse was broken by the Chinese who not only offered further concessions, but also made the offer public, thus forcing response from Tokyo, which was keeping the Chinese counter-proposal quiet.³


³. Ibid. Chang Hsiang-shan, Vice-President of the China-Japan Friendship Association disclosed the proposal during an interview with a Japanese news agency executive.
The new Chinese draft bore striking similarity to the version finally adopted, and its disclosure prompted a hasty meeting at the resort town of Hakone between Fukuda, Sonoda and Cabinet Secretary and party elder Shintaro Abe on 6 August. Sonoda was dispatched to Peking two days later and on 9 August opened talks with his counterpart, Huang Hua; they settled their differences on the wording of the anti-hegemony clause and all other outstanding issues in less than four days. Any Japanese misgivings were further dispelled on 10 August when Sonoda met with Teng Hsiao-ping who promised China would terminate the Sino-Soviet Treaty effective April 1980, and repeated that the Senkaku Islands incident was accidental.

It is worth noting that while Teng said that such an incident would not be repeated he did not give a clearcut waiver on Chinese claims to the islands -- an issue the two sides had agreed to "shelve" in order not to impede progress on the treaty.

On 12 August 1978 the two foreign ministers signed the treaty, amid applause led by Chairman Hua; although it was still subject to formal ratification on both sides, this was considered pro-forma and the event sparked editorials and headlines worldwide, plus welcoming statements throughout Japan and from regional and world-wide capitals. From

1. Lachica and Tharp, op. cit.
2. Ibid.
3. See for example "Seoul Welcomes Treaty," IHT, 14 Aug. 1978, p. 2 (N.Y. Times Service). Kyodo News Service bureaus throughout Japan and in foreign capitals filed "reaction" stories within hours of the signing of the treaty similar in tone to reactions in the story cited above. Strongly positive reaction was also forthcoming from the LDP and all opposition parties except the JCP which welcomed it in less glowing terms.
Moscow response was swift and bitter: "Japan has capitulated to Peking," was one Tass comment.¹

IN THE AFTERMATH: EXPLANATIONS

The document consists of a preamble and five short articles and is less than 500 words long. The 1972 Peking Joint Communique read in part:

... the normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.²

In contrast, the crucial "Article II" in the new ten-year Treaty read:

The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. (Emphasis added.)

The thrust of this article is mitigated by Article IV which states simply:

The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries.

Immediately after the signing ceremony, Foreign Minister Sonoda in Peking and Premier Fukuda in Tokyo held simultaneous news conferences


² The Joint Communique was published by both governments on 29 Sept. 1972 and is available in FBIS files on Hsinhua for that date and from the files of Kyodo News Agency; this phrase is also available in the article by H. Scott-Stokes, "A Self-Confident Japan Pushes Chinese Treaty," op. cit.

³ See Hsinhua or Kyodo News Agency versions (identical) or Appendix: "Treaty."

⁴ Ibid.
in which both men stressed the implications of the phrase "in any other region" and the importance of Article IV. Relations with the USSR were clearly in their minds. This was underscored at a foreign ministry news conference in the same day where Japanese officials said this made the anti-hegemony clause "universally applicable" and that by including Article IV as a separate article it was "undoubtedly made clear that the Japan-China Treaty is not directed against third countries as a whole."\(^1\)

As mentioned earlier, Japan's new ambassador to Moscow was sent with special instructions given by the foreign minister within hours of his landing from Peking; plans were also announced to send special envoys to ASEAN capitals to "explain" the treaty to regional leaders.

In contrast to all this, the **New China News agency** (Hsinhua) reported in full the People's Daily editorial on the treaty which emphasized the historical significance of the anti-hegemony clause and made no mention of Article IV.\(^2\) And when Vice-Premier Teng was in Tokyo for formal signing ceremonies following Diet ratification on 18 October, he pointedly referred to the USSR in critical terms during his news conference.\(^3\)

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THE U.S. AND JAPAN: "A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP"?

While the influence of the United States in Japanese post-war diplomacy and foreign policy formulation has only been mentioned in passing references throughout this examination, the importance of U.S. influence can scarcely be over-stated. At almost every important juncture in post-war Japanese foreign policy the encouragement or acquiescence of the U.S. has been sought and appears to be a sine qua non of the Japanese process.

Several brief examples will suffice:

In the period immediately after V-J day until the American Occupation in 1952, Japanese foreign policy was conducted directly by the U.S. Within three years of that, the earliest real sign of independent Japanese foreign policy — the desire to quickly normalize relations with newly-formed Communist China — was quickly nipped in the bud by John Foster Dulles.

Before the opening of final Japan-Soviet talks on normalization in October 1956, Foreign Minister Kono first flew to Washington, where he was told by Dulles, "I think you'll be all right. But be careful; the Russians are not above trying to sell you the same horse twice."¹ That same year, before embarking on a trip to Peking, LDP member Yasuhiro Nakasone was warned against it by associates because the U.S. had a law prohibiting such a visit; he got special permission from the U.S. State Department before going.²

¹. Pacific Rivals, op. cit., p. 232.
². Ibid., p. 233.
During his tenure as Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer enjoyed "enormous popularity" — everywhere but at the foreign ministry: officials had a habit of arranging preliminary meetings with him before taking a step on any issue and he irritated them immensely by telling them "That's something you'll have to decide on your own."¹

It was the Nixon rapprochement with Peking which prompted abrupt reversal of previous Japanese government China policies and which led within months of the Nixon visit to the Tanaka visit, yet before going to Peking Tanaka met with the U.S. President in Hawaii in a manner reminiscent of the 1965 Kono visit with Dulles. And when talks with Peking seemed imminent in 1978, Fukuda met with President Carter who opened the meeting with a "prayer for success" on a Treaty.² That same month, in late May, Brzezinski again encouraged Japan during his Tokyo visit.

Thus it is difficult, if not impossible to find a single major Japanese foreign policy since 1945 which can be said to be in conflict with U.S. political/military policy, goals or aims (there are economic disputes). Every Prime Minister except one since 1945 has said, almost verbatim, soon after taking office, "Our relations with the U.S. are the cornerstone of our foreign policy."³

¹. Pacific Rivals, op. cit., p. 233.
³. The latest to make such a statement was newly elected Premier Masayoshi Ohira, at his first press conference after taking office, as have the rest, except Prime Minister Katayama, a Socialist premier during the Occupation.
It must, therefore, be pointed out that despite talks in Japan and the U.S. of a shift from a "big-brother, little-brother relationship" to "co-equal partnership," it is difficult to imagine this in real terms until U.S. military forces leave Japan and a truly Mutual Defense Treaty replaces the Security Treaty in existence. If nothing else, the psychological impact of living under a U.S. defense umbrella must affect foreign policy and the "special relationship."

As to the role of the United States in the specific process which resulted in the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty between Tokyo and Peking, the same general rule noted above applies; research and interviews conducted during a year in Washington, D.C. merely reinforced this notion and require no amplification here. The fact that certain important aspects of this "special relationship" continue to influence the process leads to certain conclusions and observations concerning both the decision to ostensibly end the equidistance policy, and the Japanese foreign policy process itself. These, and the conclusions reached on the basis of research in Washington, form a part of the section entitled "Conclusions," which follows.
CONCLUSIONS

An examination such as this, of a nation-state and its treaty and foreign policy dilemmas, raises a number of questions: Why one treaty and not the other? Was the treaty substantive or merely calculated Chinese maneuvering to "tweak Soviet noses"? Was Japan's decision a setback for Soviet foreign policy, detrimental to its security and Far East policies? How important was U.S. influence in Japan's decision? And finally, how did Japan, which was the seller of goods and technology, end up between buyers -- the victim of their pressures -- and, willy nilly, caught up in the Sino-Soviet rivalry?

We can more clearly understand the answers to these questions by briefly summarizing those factors which impeded, and those which accelerated progress on the China Treaty. Impeding progress were such external factors as the Senkaku Islands dispute and the potentially more difficult Joint Exploration Treaty with South Korea; but the primary problems were the anti-hegemony clause and Soviet military, economic and political pressures related, at least superficially, to that clause. Of these, underlying Soviet opposition to a Sino-Japanese political, as well as economic alliance was far and away the most important external factor.

For anyone who lived in Japan in the mid-1970s there was a certain sense of deja vu in reading headlines in England in late 1978 which reported Soviet pressure was being heavily applied to the British

1. Seoul put extreme and even threatening pressure on Tokyo to ratify the treaty.
government to prevent Harrier jump-jet (VTOL) sales to China. If, in addition to the pressures imposed, Moscow had been able to use considerable economic leverage, as was done with the fishing issue in Japan, the full extent of Soviet pressure, and of British public indignation would have made the picture remarkably complete.

Domestically, Japan's self-induced equidistance policy, the innate conservatism of the ruling party, and the obstinancy of powerful right wing party leaders who threatened to leave the party over the China issue all combined as constraints.

But if these factors combined as a resounding "no!" to the China treaty, countervailing factors pointed to "go!" Among these were apparent additional economic inducements by Peking, innate anti-Soviet attitudes exacerbated by the MiG-25 and fish negotiation incidents, U.S. encouragement, the extraordinary willingness of the Chinese to compromise and, in domestic terms, what could be called unique LDP characteristics and the "monument mentality" of post-war Japanese prime ministers.

The LDP is unique in world politics as a long term ruling power; because it is a loose coalition of powerful factions, more rigidly bound to factional loyalty than is usual in other countries (due to Japanese cultural codes and the economic realities of LDP politics,) major foreign policy issues have often become entangled in faction power struggles. It has been demonstrated in other studies that the issues themselves were often less important per se, than the fact that they were useful as "political

weapons" for getting at a weakened leader. ¹

The "monument mentality" has also appeared with almost universal frequency in the post-war era, and has affected party consensus and foreign policy implementation. It involves the need to "preserve face" while dropping a prime minister, thus allowing him a "lasting monument." While the list can be extended,² three recent examples include Sato: Okinawa reversion; Tanaka: host for the first U.S. presidential visit, and Miki, who attempted to get treaties with both Moscow and Peking. Failing in that, he "got to the bottom" of the Lockheed Scandal... including the arrest of Tanaka.

Thus, faced with a deadlock on the Soviet Treaty, and plagued by increasing universal criticism at home, 73-year-old Takeo Fukuda felt triple³ pressures in negotiating with Peking: with the end of a distinguished career in sight, he too, needed a monument. With rumblings in the party he also needed a "coup" since party elections in November and December would decide whether he continued as Prime Minister. It is therefore possible to interpret his actions in early August 1978 in a different light: he ingored pressures from Moscow and solved the far more immediate problems -- a leadership crisis and the need for a lasting monument. To his surprise, and even to the surprise of the victor and new premier, Fukuda lost those elections, despite widespread remarks on his

¹ Foreign policy issues became "clubs" to beat Yoshida in 1954, and were used in the Security Treaty debates of 1960. Also see Hellmann, Policy, op. cit., pp. 1-73.


³ i.e., pressures from Moscow and Peking, election/party pressures, and the need to leave something substantial as a mark of his administration.
adroitness at handling the problem of keeping the party together while getting the treaty signed.

ONE TREATY — NOT THE OTHER

With these factors in mind, and the pressures on Fukuda in better focus, the question remains: Why did Japan ostensibly abandon its longstanding policy of equidistance and opt for the Peking Treaty? There were no apparent economic advantages, the twenty-billion-dollar trade package was signed months before negotiations resumed. Militarily, the apparent tilt toward Peking was a calculated risk: in "worst case projections" it was possible to envision Soviet fear of a burgeoning military alliance eventually resulting in steps to pre-empt it.

It seems clear the answer lay not in the economic or military sphere, but in international politics and diplomacy: China simply offered better terms, was far more willing to compromise on certain issues, chiefly the anti-hegemony clause, which seemed vital to Japan. Moreover, the two sides were able to "shelve" the two territorial questions because neither had the economic, political, emotional or historical investment in the Senkakus or the continental shelf exploitation (Treaty with South Korea), which Japan had in the Kuriles or which China had in other territorial questions such as Taiwan.

WAS THE TREATY SYMBOLIC OR SUBSTANTIVE?

One factor which delayed the Sino-Japanese treaty, and could have done so indefinitely, was the fact that it filled no obvious practical need: trade between the two was apparently limited only by the size of Peking's treasury and policy limitations in Japan on arms exports -- which China
could buy elsewhere by 1978.¹ Yet the assessment by a U.S. diplomat (Introduction, p. ) that without the anti-hegemony clause it was "not really all that worthwhile to the Chinese unless it provides them with another opportunity to tweak Russian noses a bit," is a bit too facile.

While most of the benefits of the treaty were more symbolic than substantive, symbolism is no small matter to either side.² Moreover, there were messages of importance in such symbolism: some have suggested that in thus officially ending the Sino-Japanese war the Peking government was given added legitimization. That, it could be argued, was fait accompli with respect to Japan when normalization occurred in 1972, or, more generally, with Peking's entry into the U.N. in 1971. For Peking, the treaty was the first bilateral treaty in 13 years and it was the first treaty of its kind with a "second world country" in the context of the Chinese three world theory.

Thus, in addition to "winning a race" with Moscow, the signing of the treaty marked a substantive beginning point for a much more outward looking diplomatic offensive initiated by Peking; within days of its signing Party Chairman Hua embarked on his well publicized trip to countries on the Soviet southern periphery.

In addition, China might well have offered substantive economic incentives to sign: at his news conference in Tokyo, just after the formal signing ceremonies in October, Vice-Chairman Teng said the twenty-

¹ Long before the 1978 treaty, bilateral trade, shipping, fishing and air agreements had been reached, as per the 1972 Joint Communique, and while NATO hesitated, France showed considerable willingness to assist the Chinese military: See for e.g. "Chinese to buy $350M missiles," The Guardian, 20 Oct. 1978, p. 7.

billion-dollar trade agreement could "double or triple." He could have said this at any time, but it is noteworthy that he used the occasion of the treaty ceremony as a stage for such remarks.

In retrospect, it now seems clear as well that the Chinese interpretation of the anti-hegemony clause as a swipe at the Soviet Union came later. In the weeks following the 1972 Joint Communiqué no issue was made about the clause in either capital, nor was there any talk which reached the almost ubiquitous media in Tokyo of any special interpretation. While it is possible that this was simply overlooked in the euphoria of the moment, or in the face of so many agreements with so little warning when normalization occurred in 1972, all evidence points to the fact that Peking found ex post facto opportunity to bring Japan one step closer to an anti-Soviet alliance at a somewhat later date.

**DECISIONS IN PEKING?**

Lastly, and in sharp contrast to progress in Russo-Japanese negotiations, it must be noted that the shifts, the flexibility, and almost all concessions in the process of rapprochement have, in recent years, been by the Chinese. When taken in the context of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, with its blatant anti-Japanese clauses, the Chinese shift can be viewed as truly extraordinary. And in the treaty talks, it was Peking which on three separate occasions made concessions, and which "went the last mile" to reach an agreement. The final wording on the treaty shows this, and it was publicly confirmed by the Japanese Foreign Ministry the day the treaty was signed in Peking. The wording corresponds closely to
the "Miyazawa interpretations" and is almost identical to the Japanese Foreign Ministry plan to insert a clause in Article II which said "or in any other region," plus a separate statement that the treaty "would not affect relations with third countries."

While it was impossible to confirm Chinese Politburo decisions at the time of this writing, it would be difficult to imagine that China's foreign policies in 1978 were something other than the result of Politburo planning on a major worldwide offensive aimed at assisting its "Four Modernizations" programs, and, at the same time, at countering Soviet diplomacy. Within such a master plan, apparently developed in late 1977 or early 1978, concessions to the Japanese would be a small price to pay, and what is more, the full diplomatic relations established with the United States in late 1978 become fully explainable.

A SOVIET FAILURE?

Any conclusions on whether the Sino-Japanese Treaty was a failure of Soviet policies, or a strategic threat, must be considered in light of a combination of factors, including Soviet refusal to budge on the territorial question with Japan, Japanese resentment at Soviet behaviour in 1976-77, and Japan's long affinity for China and disaffinity toward Russia.

On the face of it, if there is any congruence between the views of the Soviet Politburo and the pronouncements of the Soviet media, it would appear that the Japanese decision was viewed as a setback by Moscow. This perception -- for perceptions may be the single most important factor in international relations -- should not be minimized.
But there are other ways of looking at Moscow's Japan policy and its
effectiveness and influence on the Japanese. First, Soviet actions were
effective in delaying the treaty for several years past the point when it
might have been signed; changes in the final wording of the treaty from
that used in the 1972 Communique amounted to hair-splitting legalisms.
Secondly, the treaty which was signed did acquiesce to Soviet demands
that it not be aimed at them. And finally, the longer range effect could
be beneficial to the USSR: the Japanese amply demonstrated a fear of
Soviet repercussions and went to considerable lengths to assuage Moscow.
Moreover, given the innate conservatism of the Japanese — demonstrated
in their voting patterns — the gyroscopic reaction to the treaty might,
rather quickly, be compensatory moves toward Moscow to revert to
equidistance.

At the same time, it must be said that the treaty did lend symbolic
formality — a factor of importance to China and Japan — to a symbiotic
alliance which tends to strengthen a foe perceived by Moscow as its
nearest and bitterest. And with respect to Japan, the possible alternative
reaction must not be dismissed; that of awakening inert feelings of
nationalism in a proud nation which would, instead of overcompensating,
take overweening pride in having stood up to the threats of the Russian
Bear. In overall terms, the treaty underscored a de facto relationship full
of mutual benefits to two of the Soviet's historic foes. And given the
axiom that "power is a zero sum game," the increase in power accruing
from the formalization of the Sino-Japanese relationship came more
directly at the expense of the USSR — because of history and proximity —
than to the detriment of other powers.
While U.S. influences in the foreign policy making and implementation processes of post-war Japan have been discussed, it is worth emphasizing that in contrast to Soviet attitudes, policymakers in Washington clearly encouraged the re-opening of talks with China in 1978, before China made concessions on the anti-hegemony clause which had been the stumbling block. With the U.S. ostensibly drawing back from its Asian commitments in the post-Vietnam era, the role of Japan as supplier in the process of strengthening an increasingly "responsible," clearly more pragmatic, and therefore less unpredictable China, as viewed from Washington, could only lead to regional stability which the U.S. was no longer willing to totally underwrite. And with China strengthened past a certain point, the temptation to Moscow of a pre-emptive strike was inversely proportional to Chinese strength and economic decentralization.

There is an interesting if slightly peripheral aspect to the presence of U.S. influence in the Japanese tilt toward Peking and apparent abandonment of an Equidistance Policy. The final portions of the research for this thesis were pursued by the author in Washington, D.C., with requests presented to the U.S. State Department under the Freedom of Information Act for copies of all cables between the State Department and its embassies in Moscow, Tokyo and Peking related to the treaties. Those requests were formally initiated in late 1979. As the months went

1. This appeared to be the general view in Washington before China's invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, and may well remain the longer range view due, if nothing else, to the constraint China demonstrated once again, as it did in 1962, by halting its invasion just inside hostile borders.
by, and officials repeatedly informed the author that continued delay was
due to the sensitivity of the request (and to the fact that a number of the
 cables were classified "Secret"), the tentative conclusion was to assume
that U.S. influence on Japan during the process was even more extreme
than first believed — hence the sensitivity of the documents.

But on 29 May 1980 the author received a call from one official
intimately involved in examining and clearing the documents for release
which confounded these earlier assumptions.

The caller asked that his name be protected from publication¹ and
explained that he had received permission to step outside normal channels
because the formal response would come in the form of a letter stating
that the documents in question would not and could not be released for
examination. He explained that he had anticipated the surprise and
frustration such a response would cause, and after checking with his
fellow officials who had served in Japan during the author's period of
assignment there (mid-1974 through mid-1977), he had decided to get
permission to provide the information originally requested, in oral,
summary form, to assist in the research.

The caller said that his research and that of his staff on the 33
pertinent documents indicated that the individuals reporting from
Moscow, Peking and Tokyo restricted themselves to relaying information
on developments in the two sets of treaty negotiations. None of them
expressed opinions or presented recommendations. If that is the case —
and there is no reason at this point to doubt the reliability of the
information — several observations become pertinent:

¹ The identification of the caller, and his position, is provided to the
examiners under separate cover.
First, while clear instances of U.S. influence, in the form of the Brzezinski visit to Tokyo and the Carter "prayer for success," set an unambiguous tone, and certainly provided the "other-directed" Japanese with ample evidence of the Carter Administration's implicit support for a Peking treaty (during a crucial stage of treaty negotiations), the State Department was left out of this process. Were this not the case, documents at State would have included cables from political officers at the Tokyo Embassy presenting recommendations for action and reports on results of actions taken at Washington's behest. Yet researchers at State say no such cables exist.

Secondly, the absence of diplomatic activity by U.S. representatives in Peking, and more notably in Tokyo, (which the caller confirmed as a valid conclusion derived from the absence of such references in any cables) appears on the face of it, a departure from the norm, since the executive branch of the Carter Administration did take at least two known actions. Extensive interviews with officials involved and all public evidence to date, provides unambiguous (but not incontrovertable) evidence that a handful of men, circulating between the Japan Desk in Washington and assignments to the Embassy in Tokyo, have shaped and chiefly implemented post-war U.S. policy. Thorne notes an exception to this during WWII in Rivals of a Kind, where the Defense Department, and most notably the Navy Department, pushed for policies which would provide U.S. naval bases in the Pacific, but as he demonstrates, by 1945 State Department thinking on this chiefly coincided with the Navy's. Thus, with
respect to Japan, and most specifically in the instance of the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty, the Carter Administration by-
passed the State Department to a far greater degree than was the case in
the days of "centralized policy" under Kissinger and Nixon.

Third, the absence of State Department activity, (in contrast to its
remarkably exclusive role in Japan policy normally) also indicates that in
this instance the government of Japan regarded itself as a mature,
independent state capable of formulating its own foreign policy, since
these were bilateral treaties, and that this view was shared by U.S.
Embassy political officers. It might be assumed, therefore, (and the
caller engaged in the research confirmed that he had reached such a
conclusion,) that the Japanese decision was made while engaged in low-
level consultations with U.S. officials in Tokyo to keep them informed,
but comparatively independent of the U.S. government.

Yet that rather idealistic conclusion must take into account the
clear and unambiguous signals coming directly from Washington (plus
whatever positive feedback U.S. diplomats provided during these "low-
level consultations" in Tokyo), and it might be more accurate, if less kind,
to assume that Japan was merely provided with an additional length of
tether as it negotiated with Peking. That is not to say that Japan should
be expected to maintain an "Occupation mentality" indefinitely, and
evidence of increasingly independent foreign policy formulation and
initiatives will surely occur; but evidence available during this study
indicates continued adherence to overall U.S. policy by Japan, despite all
protestations to the contrary by officials on both sides.
U.S. influence on Japan could also be underscored by the fact that there is a certain make-believe in bilateral utterances of "co-equal partnership;" inherent in such a phrase is an understanding of mutually independent foreign policy options, which in turn imply Japanese willingness to take the final consequences of its actions. But this is not the case. In reality, the relationship has all too often involved vastly disproportionate economic dependence on U.S. markets, ambiguous but reflexively deferential attitudes among Japanese diplomats, and, most importantly, ultimate guarantees for Japanese foreign policy and national power based on U.S. — not Japanese — military might.

WHY WAS JAPAN SQUEEZED?

The pressures, therefore, which Japan felt with respect to its equidistance policy -- and the failure of that policy as it was perceived in Moscow in August 1978, resulted from a combination of factors. And in addition to the factors which led to the ultimate decision on the China Treaty, others persist in Japanese policy formulation and implementation — most by no means unique to Japan — but detrimental to a coherent policy process nonetheless. They could be summarized as follows:

First, incompetence in its dealings with the USSR on the pending treaty; there is no apparent public record of Japanese negotiators putting added pressure on the Soviet Union on the territorial reversion question due to the U.S. decision to return Okinawa or other territories. Nor were there any public government statements during 1978 of plans to use the Chinese willingness to compromise on the treaty as leverage in negotiations for a treaty with Moscow.
Secondly, **inexperience**, an excuse often used by Japanese diplomatic representatives for failures in post-war diplomacy. Compared to the U.S. or the USSR such an assessment would appear correct, but few Chinese diplomats have any more experience on the international scene than have the Japanese since 1945.

Third, **impotence**, on the part of the foreign ministry experts to make real impact on important foreign policy decisions. Factors causing this include economics: the foreign ministry is chronically undermanned. In addition, the power of LDP policy bodies and the factional issues make many of the inputs from the foreign ministry, and from other policymakers, subordinate to more powerful groups — notably LDP faction leaders.

Fourth, **inefficiency**, caused by a combination of undermanning in any of the policy-making groups — Diet members have few staff assistants, if any — and the large numbers of people involved in any consensus building process, plus the sheer number of interest groups which make public statements which can influence foreign policy. While not unique in this respect, the Japanese process stands in stark contrast to the secretive process in Moscow or Peking, where decisions appear to result in a Politburo speaking with a single voice, and with pronouncements and implementation restricted to a few people.

Fifth, **internal politics**, which tend to make final decision-making and implementation a diffuse process in which domestic political factors override those relating directly to the issues, problems and goals of the negotiating process.
As mentioned earlier, post-war Japanese foreign policy has nonetheless been a highly effective instrument in ensuring that the country maintained good relations with virtually all other countries; this enabled businessmen to operate, trade to flourish, and the economy to thrive and grow.

In the last analysis it was the Soviet Union which suffered the most serious setback within the context of its own policies and goals in the Far East. The root causes for this may well lie in an analysis written by Soviet expert Max Beloff over a quarter of a century ago:

... the fact that the Soviet Union invariably acts upon the assumption that it is the object of universal hostility tends in its turn to provide actions that can indeed be interpreted as evidence of the hostility that has previously been assumed.

Moscow's actions with respect to Japan and the Peace and Friendship Treaties with itself, and with Peking, would seem to underscore that point.

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APPENDIX A

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN
AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

12 AUGUST 1978

Japan and the People's Republic of China,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China issued a joint communique in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two Governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis,

Confirming that the above-mentioned joint communique constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the principles enunciated in the joint communique should be strictly observed,

Confirming that the principles of the charter of the United Nations should be fully respected,

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world,

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries,

Have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

Japan: Minister for Foreign Affairs
Sunao Sonoda

People's Republic of China: Minister of Foreign Affairs
Huang Hua

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The contracting parties shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.
2. The contracting parties confirm that, in conformity with the foregoing principles and the principles of the charter of the United Nations, they shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force.

ARTICLE II

The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific Region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

ARTICLE III

The contracting parties shall, in the good-neighbourly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavour to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

ARTICLE IV

The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries.

ARTICLE V

1. The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 2.

2. Either contracting party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other contracting party, terminate the present treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and Chinese language, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August, 1978.

Source: Kyodo News Agency relay of unofficial translation released by both governments.
APPENDIX B

JOINT DECLARATION BY THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT
MOSCOW, ON 19 OCTOBER 1956

From 13 to 19 October 1956 negotiations were held at Moscow between the Delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.

The following representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics took part in the negotiations:

N.A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
N.S. Khrushchev, Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,
A.I. Mikoyan, First Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
A.A. Gromyko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, and
N.T. Fedorenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The following representatives of Japan took part in the negotiations:

Prime Minister, Ichiro Hatoyama,
Ichiro Kono, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and
Shunichi Matsumoto, Member of the House of Representatives.

In the course of the negotiations, which were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation, a full and frank exchange of views took place. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan were fully agreed that the restoration of diplomatic relations between them would contribute to the development of mutual understanding and co-operation between the two States in the interests of peace and security in the Far East.

As a result of these negotiations between the Delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, agreement was reached on the following:

1. The state of war between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall cease on the date on which this Declaration enters into force and peace, friendship and good-
neighbourly relations between them shall be restored.

2. Diplomatic and consular relations shall be restored between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan. For this purpose, it is intended that the two States shall proceed forthwith to exchange diplomatic representatives with the rank of Ambassador and that the question of the establishment of consulates in the territories of the USSR and Japan respectively shall be settled through the diplomatic channels.

3. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan affirm that in their relations with each other they will be guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter, in particular the following principles set forth in Article 2 of the said Charter:

(a) To settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(b) To refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

The USSR and Japan affirm that, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, each of the two States has the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.

The USSR and Japan reciprocally undertake not to intervene directly or indirectly with each other's domestic affairs for any economic, political, or ideological reasons.

4. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will support Japan's application for membership in the United Nations.

5. On the entry into force of this Joint Declaration, all Japanese citizens convicted in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be released and repatriated to Japan.

With regard to those Japanese whose fate is unknown, the USSR, at the request of Japan, will continue its efforts to discover what has happened to them.

6. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renounces all reparations claims against Japan.

The USSR and Japan agree to renounce all claims by either State, its institutions or citizens, against the other State, its institutions or citizens, which have arisen as a result of the war since 9 August 1945.

7. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree that they will enter into negotiations as soon as may be possible for the conclusion of treaties or agreements with a view to putting their trade, navigation and other
commercial relations on a firm and friendly basis.

8. The Convention on deep-sea fishing in the north-western sector of the Pacific Ocean between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan and the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan on co-operation in the rescue of persons in distress at sea, both signed at Moscow on 14 May 1956, shall come into effect simultaneously with this Joint Declaration.

Having regard to the interest of both the USSR and Japan in the conservation and rational use of the natural fishery resources and other biological resources of the sea, the USSR and Japan shall, in a spirit of co-operation, take measures to conserve and develop fishery resources, and to regulate and restrict deep-sea fishing.

9. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

In this connexion, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.

10. This Joint Declaration is subject to ratification. It shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange of the instruments of ratification shall take place at Tokyo as soon as may be possible.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the Joint Declaration.

DONE in two copies, each in the Russian and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Moscow, 19 October 1956.

By authorization of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

N. BULGANIN
D. SHEPILOV

By authorization of the Government of Japan:

I. HATOYAMA
I. KONO
S. MATSUMOTO

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY: Japan and China bilateral developments (607-1948 and) 1949-1978

Circa 400 A.D. -- Japan begins to keep court records in Chinese script.

607 -- Japanese court sends embassies to China.

608 -- Second group of Japanese scholars and artists to Chinese court.

614 -- Third and largest group of Japanese to Chinese court.

1274 -- Khubilai Kahn sends invasion force to Japan which is successfully repelled.

1281 -- Kahn's second invasion force, ten times as large, is repelled with major destruction to fleet at Hakata Bay due to Kamakaze wind storms.

1868 -- Meiji Restoration ends Japanese seclusion and commences development and expansion.

1894 -- Japanese war with China commences.


1895-98 -- Development of spheres of interest in China, particularly by Western powers.

1900 -- Climax of Boxer Rebellion, Japanese and other troops enter Peking to free legations after 100 days seige.

1914 -- Japan declares war on Germany, captures Tsingtao.

1915 -- 18 January, Japan presents Twenty-One Demands to China.


1921 -- Birth of Chinese Communist Party.


1923 -- 14 April, Abrogation of Lansing-Ishii Agreement.

1928 -- Japan in Shantung. Tsinanfu incident. 18 May, Memorandum on Japan's interests in Manchuria.

1931 -- 18 September, Mukden incident; Kwangtung army occupies Manchuria. Sino-Japanese hostilities sharply increase, fighting at Shanghai; establishment of Manchukuo.
1932 — Sino-Japanese hostilities continue to increase; fighting at Shanghai. Establishment of Manchukuo.

1933 — Japan withdraws from League of Nations over China issue, invades Jehol with Kwangtung Army; Tangku Truce follows.

1934 — Amau statement on China.

1937 — 7 July, Japanese and Chinese troops clash at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking; beginning of second Sino-Japanese War.

1938 — Sino-Japanese war reaches stalemate.


1949 — 9 October, Establishment of People's Republic of China; reopening of Japan-China private trade.

1952 — April, Peace Treaty and Security Treaty both go into effect; Japan signs separate Peace Treaty with Republic of China (Taiwan).

1953 — U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Pact

1954 — U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Pact

1955 — Private fishing agreement, to be renewed annually, signed between China and Japan.

1956 — Japan-USSR Joint Declaration, (normal diplomatic relations resumed). Also, Yasuhiro Nakasone, LDP faction leader, flies to Peking within days of Joint Declaration; prior to departure gets permission from U.S. State Department.

1957 — Kishi-Eisenhower communique.


1965 — Japan-Korea Basic Treaty (stipulated conditions for normalized relations).

1966 — Manila Declaration (proclaimed four points relevant to Vietnam and the Asian/Pacific region).

1966 — Japan-Soviet Trade Agreement.

1969 — January, First conference on Okinawa and Asia meets in Kyoto. November, Nixon-Sato Joint Communique

1970 — April, Japan-China Memorandum Trade Liaison Council issues communique on commercial co-operation; Peking later attacks revival of Japanese militarism.

1971 — February, Former Japanese Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama sent to Peking by Sato; meets with Chou En-lai. Later tells news conference in Tokyo "Japan should live amicably with both the U.S. and China. The Chinese government is not opposed in principle to Japan's participation in a collective security system." 16 July, President Nixon announces plans to visit China. 15 August, Nixon temporarily suspends exchange of gold for dollars; imposes 10% surcharge on imports. October, People's Republic of China admitted to U.N.

1972 — 6-7 January, Nixon-Sato Summit at San Clemente; date of Okinawa reversion set for 15 May; both sides declare co-operation in solving "Peking recognition" problem. February, Nixon visits Peking. 29 September, in Peking, Premier Kakuei Tanaka and Premier Chou En-lai agree to normalize relations; joint communique calls for fishing, air, trade and shipping agreements plus a treaty of peace and friendship. 8 November, Lower House of the Diet resolution calling for an early conclusion of the treaty. 13 November, Upper House adopts similar resolution.


1974 — 3 January, Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira meets with Mao Tse-tung in Peking, discusses bilateral relations, later signs Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement. 20 April, Sino-Japanese Air Agreement signed, air links with Taiwan severed via national flag carriers. 13 November, visiting Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Han Nien-jung signs Sino-Japanese Shipping Agreement; agrees with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura that time is right to start Peace Treaty talks. 14 November, preliminary talks on a bilateral Peace and Friendship Treaty between Han and his counterpart, Fumihiko Togo. 9 December, Takeo Miki becomes Japanese premier.

1975 — 9 January, China announces new constitution; preamble states that China is opposed to superpower hegemonism. 16 January, in Tokyo, first round of formal treaty talks held between Togo and Chinese Ambassador Chen. 24 January, Miki makes clear his desire to conclude
1975 -- China. 4 March, in third round of treaty talks, differences arise over anti-hegemony issue. 14 April, fourth Togo-Chen meeting; two sides exchange treaty drafts. Chinese version has anti-hegemony clause, Japanese draft does not. 24 April, Togo and Chen fail to find a compromise on the controversial anti-hegemony clause. 11 May, in Peking, Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien tells visiting JSP Chairman Tomomi Narita that China will never compromise on the anti-hegemony clause. 7 June, Miyazawa tells newsmen, Peking support on Kuriles issue is "more a hindrance than a help." 12 June, Premier Chou tells visiting Japanese delegation the clause should be included in the body of the treaty, not in the preamble. 17 June, USSR warns Japan against concluding a treaty with China which includes such a clause; message comes in government official statement. 21 June, Miki announces his intention to include the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty; his message is conveyed to Peking. 9 July, Japan reestablishes air links with Taiwan despite Peking's displeasure. 15 August, Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement, specified in 1972 communique, is signed; replaces private agreements since 1955. 24 September, at U.N., Miyazawa presents to his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, the so-called "Miyazawa principles" on the anti-hegemony clause, particularly the interpretation that it not be directed against any specific third country, especially the USSR. Chiao and Miyazawa agree to meet again on 27 September, and Chiao rejects the Japanese interpretation at that time.

1976 -- 8 January, Chou En-lai dies. 7 April, Hua Kuo-feng replaces Teng Hsiao-ping; also in April, Lockheed Payoff Scandal becomes daily headline story in Japan. May, USSR-Japan spy incident. July, Tanaka is arrested. August, "illegal" LDP convention tries to bring down Premier Miki. 6 September, MiG-25 lands in Japan. 9 September Mao dies. 15 September, Zentaro Kosaka appointed new foreign minister in reshuffled Miki cabinet. 4 October, At U.N., Kosaka and Chiao discuss treaty problems; meeting produces no break in the deadlock over the anti-hegemony clause. 24 October, Hua named party Chairman, arrests of "gang of four" confirmed. 2 December, Huang Hua replaces recently purged Chiao as foreign minister. 24 December, Takeo Fukuda forms cabinet, names Iichiro Hatoyama as Japanese Foreign Minister.

1977 -- 22 January, Komeito Chairman Yoshikatsu Takeiri delivers letter from Premier Fukuda to Chairman Hua in Peking expressing Fukuda's desire for early conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty. 20 February, Japanese Ambassador to Peking Ogawa advises Fukuda to seek resumption of treaty talks. 11 May, Fu Hao, former Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister appointed Ambassador to Tokyo; (arrives 2 August).
22 July, Teng Hsiao-ping rehabilitated. 12 August, Chinese 11th Parth Congress begins in Peking.  
29 September, at U.N., Foreign Minister Hatoyama and his counterpart, Huang discuss bilateral issues and treaty deadlock; no sign of Chinese compromise.  
14 October, in Peking, Susumu Nikaido, former Chief Cabinet Secretary, meets with Teng and presents "unofficial" proposal designed to solve anti-hegemony issue; Teng promises to study the proposal.  
28 October, Fukuda begins to poll LDP leaders on their opinions vis-a-vis the treaty. 28 November, Sunao Sonoda, formerly Chief Cabinet Secretary, named Japanese Foreign Minister. 11 December, Ambassador Sato returns from Peking, reports to Fukuda that China is willing to resume treaty talks. 17 December, Fukuda tells Sato he intends to reopen talks.  

1978 -- 8 January, Ambassador Sato tells Liao Cheng-chih, President of China-Japan Friendship Association, in Peking, that Fukuda is determined to resume treaty talks. 21 January, in Diet speech, Fukuda says time for treaty talks is ripe. 25 January, Sonoda expresses willingness to visit Peking at any time to conclude a China treaty. 14 February, in Peking, consultations begin between Ambassador Sato and Vice-Foreign Minister Han on reopening of talks. 16 February, Japan signs non-governmental 8-year, $20 billion trade pact with Peking. 18 February, Fukuda instructs Ambassador Sato to approach Chinese leaders on reopening of talks; simultaneously sets out to co-ordinate "views" within the LDP. 4 March, Sato and Han again meet. 14 March, Vice Premier Tang presents four-point Chinese "view" on the treaty issue to visiting Komeito Secretary General Junya Yano; (Chinese view is that the clause did not provide for joint action, but Japanese interpretation that the anti-hegemony statement is not directed at anyone is illogical, because of the existence of hegemonic powers in the world which both sides already oppose). 23 March, Fukuda seeks co-operation of Party Secretary General Ohira (LDP) to help build party consensus. 30 March, LDP holds joint meeting of two party committees concerned with diplomatic affairs; group focuses on China treaty issues. 12 April, Chinese fishing boats, many with armed men, enter the waters around the Senkaku Islands, (islands are claimed by Japan, Peking and Taiwan). 13 April, Sonoda says he will give up plans to resume treaty talks with Peking until the Senkaku incident is resolved. 15 April, Japanese government and LDP party leaders decide to demand withdrawal of all Chinese fishing boats from "Japanese territorial waters" (around Senkakus) and announce simultaneous efforts to conclude China treaty. In Peking, also on 15 April, Chinese Vice Premier Keng Piao tells Hideo Den, head of
1978 -- Japanese Social Democratic Party and Federation, that the Senkaku incident was "accidental". 27 April, Fukuda and Ohira agree to reopen treaty talks after Fukuda's summit talks in Washington with Carter on 3 May. In Washington, 3 May, Carter "prayed a success" for conclusion of a Sino-Japanese Treaty. 5 May, in Honolulu, Fukuda tells newsmen he intends to quickly resume treaty talks. 10 May, third Sato-Han meeting; both sides agree to "shelve" the Senkaku issue. 12 May, Fukuda announces Senkaku incident has been settled. 18 May, Fukuda again seeks Ohira's assistance in rallying party consensus on the treaty. 21 May, Fukuda and Sonoda agree to send message to Peking with proposal to reopen formal talks. 22 May, Fukuda meets with party leaders and tells them to work out a party consensus on the treaty. 23 May, Fukuda cabinet agrees to initiate treaty talks as soon as possible. 24 May, LDP leaders approve Fukuda's plan to resume treaty talks. 26 May, ruling LDP executive council also endorses Fukuda's plan. 31 May, Ambassador Sato formally presents Japan's proposal for resumed official talks. 14 June, Wang Hsiao-yun, Deputy Director of Asian Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry conveys China's official acceptance of the Japanese proposal during meeting in Peking with Mitsuro Donowaki, Japan's Minister to Peking. 19 June, Soviet Ambassador Dmitrii Polyansky hands Deputy Foreign Minister Keisuke Arita an official Soviet note warning that Moscow would have to change its policy toward Japan if it concludes an "Anti-Soviet" peace treaty with Peking. 30 June, Japan and China agree to resume treaty talks at working level in Peking on 21 July. 14 July, Soviet Ambassador Polyansky leaves Tokyo "indefinitely;" his departure is widely interpreted in Tokyo as an indication that USSR may break off relations with Japan if it signs a Peace Treaty which incorporates the anti-hegemony clause. 21 July, working level talks begin in Peking after two years and ten months of suspension; Sato represents Japan and Han represents China. Sato explains Japan's basic policy of maintaining friendly relations with all countries around the world. 22 July, Japan presents its new draft of the treaty, made up of five articles, including a clause regarding third countries' in the China-proposed anti-hegemony clause; China opposes the "third country clause." Early August, at working-level meetings, China concedes inclusion of phrase "or any other region" in Article II and the addition of Article IV concerning relations with third countries. Also early August: Chang Hsian-shan, Vice-President of China-Japan Friendship Association discloses new Chinese counterproposals during interview with Japanese news agency executive; reports of this proposal in Japanese newspapers prompts 6 August meeting at Hakone summer resort between Fukuda, Sonoda and Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe.
Trio decides to dispatch Sonoda to Peking. 8 August, Sonoda flies to Peking, 9 August, Sonoda meets with his counterpart, Huang, tells newsmen in Peking he has reached broad agreement on their "political negotiations." 10 August, Sonoda meets Teng, who reassures him that the Senkaku incident "will not be repeated," and reiterates earlier statements to visiting Japanese journalists that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 is a "dead letter" and will be terminated in April of 1980. 12 August, Sonoda meets with Hua, signs Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty at Great Hall of the people in Peking. 14 August, amid a barrage of attacks against the treaty by Soviet media, Sonoda flies to Tokyo, instructs his new ambassador to Moscow to "explain" the treaty to Soviet leaders. Also 14 August, Japan's new ambassador to Moscow departs for his new post. 23-25 October, in Tokyo for formal exchange of Treaty Instruments of Ratification, Chinese Vice-Premier Teng attacks USSR, privately repeats often reiterated Chinese view that the anti-hegemony clause is aimed at Moscow.
APPENDIX D

CHRONOLOGY:  Japan -- Russian/USSR bilateral relations and Treaty Negotiations, 1719-1978

1719 -- First Russian expedition to Japan.

1732 -- Russians under Bering visit Japan.

1746 -- Leader of second Bering Expedition recommends establishing a naval base in Kuriles.

1792 -- Russian officials at Hokkaido attempt to open relations with Japan.

1804-5 -- Russians under Raizanov visit Nagasaki, again try unsuccessfully to open relations.

1806-7 -- Russian parties raid Japanese outposts in Kuriles.

1811 -- Japan retaliates for Kurile raids by capturing Russian cartographers.

1848 -- Nevelskoy (Russia) occupies Sakhalin, discovers it is an island (1849).

1853 -- Russians under Putiatin visit Nagasaki.

1855 -- 7 February. Russian representative Evfimii Putiatin concludes bilateral treaty at Shimoda, similar to one concluded with Admiral Perry; gains added concessions of extraterritoriality and an open port at Nagasaki. Major portions of Kuriles ceded to Russia. Territorial limits defined.

1857 -- October. Russian and Dutch negotiators gain Most Favored Nation status in line with those extracted by U.S.

1862 -- Russian warships attempt to occupy Tsushima.

1863 -- Western powers bombard Shimonoseki.

1875 -- Treaty of St. Petersburg; Sakhalin exchanged for Kuriles. (See text in Yakhontoff's Appendix.)

1891 -- Russia opens Trans-Siberian Railway.

1894 -- Aoki-Kimberley Treaty abolishes extraterritoriality effective in 1898.

1895 -- First Sino-Japanese War. April, Russia spearheads Triple Intervention, pressures Japan to give up claims on Kwangtung Penn Peninsula.

1897 -- Russian Squadron arrives at Port Arthur; Liaotung granted, (1898).
1898 -- Russia gains major portions of Kwangtung Peninsula via 25-year lease.

1899 -- Russia recognizes Japan's "special interests" in Korea.

1902 -- Japan signs alliance with Great Britain.

1904 -- 8 February, Japan attacks Russian ships at Port Arthur in night attack. 10 February, Japan declares war on Russia.

1905 -- July, Taft-Katsura Agreement recognizes Japan's interests in Korea. 5 September, Treaty of Portsmouth ends Russo-Japanese war; demonstrations in Japan opposed to "humiliating treaty. Also in September, Edward H. Harriman visits Tokyo to establish syndicate for joint management of South Manchurian Railway. Also, Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Military clause; recognized Japan's "paramount interests in Korea").

1907 -- Russo-Japanese Conventions on Manchuria. (Yakhontoff: Appendix.)

1908 -- Root-Takahira Agreement (Japan-U.S., reaffirms "open door principles").

1910 -- Russo-Japanese Conventions on Manchuria; Japan annexes Korea. (Yakhontoff: Appendix.)

1912 -- Russo-Japanese treaty on Mongolia. (Yakhontoff: Appendix.)

1916 -- 3 July, Russo-Japanese Conventions. (Yakhontoff: Appendix.)

1918 -- All powers recall representatives from Russia (USSR); (March) Sino-Japanese agreement on military co-operation in Manchuria and Siberia. 8 August, Japanese troops commence landings in Soviet Far East, beginning of Siberian Expedition which does not end until 1922 for Japan, despite withdrawal of British and U.S. forces.

1925 -- 20 January, Treaty of Peking normalizes relations between Japan and USSR.

1926 -- Soviet initiatives aimed at a mutual non-aggression treaty are rebuffed by Japan. Sino-Japanese co-operation on new railroads in Manchuria seen by Moscow as threat to Soviet interests in the Far East.

1928 -- Japan and USSR sign fishing convention renewable annually.
1931 -- Soviet Far East fishing fleet begins development and growth; USSR uses fishing rights as leverage in exacting agreements with Japan on export credits which are subsequently arrived at.

1936 -- March, USSR signs mutual assistance protocol with Outer Mongolia.

25 Nov., Japan signs Anti-Communist Pact with Germany and Russia cancels plans to renew fishing concessions for 8-year term.

1937 -- Clashes and tensions between Japanese and Soviet Far Eastern troops increase in frequency and size.

21 August, USSR signs non-aggression pact with China. Russo-Japanese fishing agreement not renewed until late in the year. November, Japan signs mutual defense pact with Germany and Italy.

1939 -- 12 May, Nomonhan Incident: border clash with Soviet troops on Manchukuo - Outer Mongolian border. 1 Sept­ember, Germany invades Poland, WWII begins in Europe.

1940 -- Japan signs Axis Treaty with Germany and Italy.

1941 -- March, Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka meets in Europe with Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. 23 April, Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact signed in Moscow; 22 June, Germany invades Russia. 2 July, Japanese Imperial Conference secretly decides to fight Russia if Germany wins the battle in the west.

1943 -- November, Cairo Conference, followed by Tehran Conference.

1945 -- February, Yalta Conference; USSR agrees to enter war versus Japan. 11 May, Japanese Supreme Conference for Direction of War decides in secret session to request Soviet mediation in ending Pacific War.

3 June, Koki Hirota, (former premier and head of peace faction) confers in Moscow with Soviet leaders. 13 July, Prince Konoe offers to confer with Stalin on terms for surrender. 26 July, Potsdam Conference lists terms of unconditional surrender. 8 August, USSR enters war against Japan. 9 August, A-bomb falls on Nagasaki; Soviet forces invade Manchuria and Korea. 2 September, Stalin, in oft-quoted speech, calls soviet territorial gains at Japanese expense "just retribution for the 1904-05 Japanese defeat of Imperial Russian Forces (which have been awaited) for two generations (of Russian peoples)." Also calls Kuriles the Soviet Union's defensive base.

1946 -- USSR unsuccessfully tries to have Emperor Hirohit included among Class A War Criminals for Tokyo War Crimes Trials.
1950 -- USSR signs Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance aimed and preventing potential resurgent Japanese militarism and aggression. USSR begins to "clamp down on Japanese poaching;" from then until 1977 more than 1,200 Japanese boats and over 12,000 Japanese fishermen have been seized by the USSR. After 1951, nine out of 10 crews detained and not immediately released as before.

1951 -- June, Soviet Union sends note reiterating demand that Japanese Peace Treaty be drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers from the U.S., Great Britain, Communist China and the USSR. Note also criticizes the Anglo-American Treaty draft on several points, such as no guarantees against revival of Japanese militarism and no limitations on the size of the Japanese armed forces. 8 September, Japanese Peace Treaty signed by 48 Allied and associated nations representatives; USSR, Poland and Czchoslovakia not present at ceremonies; signing of Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between Japan and U.S.

1952 -- April, when Peace Treaty comes into effect, Allied Control Council and Far Eastern Commission in Washington cease to exist; Soviet representatives on both bodies protest strongly, calling the Peace Treaty an "illegal act" on the part of the U.S. Government. June, Soviet representatives withdraw from Tokyo. September, Malik, at U.N. vetoes Japanese application for membership on grounds Japan has not "regained her full independence and sovereignty;" is an "American base and colony" and "an obedient weapon of American aggressive plans and a springboard for aggression in the Far East." Malik also announces plans to continue to oppose Japanese entry to U.N. until it signs peace treaties with Moscow and Peking.

1953 -- November, Vice-President Nixon visits Japan; first public statements by U.S. official that renunciation of war might be a flaw in Japanese constitution.

1954 -- 12 September, Molotov announces USSR is ready to normalize relations if Japan shows a similar willingness. 12 October, Joint Sino-Soviet statement explicitly states desire to co-exist with Japanese government based on principles of "equality and reciprocity." Also in October, Japan rejects Sino-Soviet invitation for "normalization" of relations. Offer rejected by Mr. Ogata, acting as Premier for Yoshida; Ogata describes the communist declaration as a maneuver in the communist peace offensive designed to drive a wedge between Japan and the Western nations; further states Japan has no intention of abandoning its policy of collaboration with the U.S. 11 December, Statement by Japanese Deputy Premier
1954 — and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu agreeing to "restore normal relations with Russia and China on mutually acceptable terms, without prejudice to our basic collaboration with the free nations;" also said Japan would welcome opportunities to expand trade with both countries. 16 December, Molotov replies that normalization of relations is in interest of both countries and all other states interested in strengthening peace in the Far East. 17 December, Premier Hatoyama welcomes Molotov's statement.


1956 — 17 January, USSR proposes Adenauer solution, i.e. shelving of territorial question in return for diplomatic relations, settlement of POW questions and support for Japanese entry to the UN. Japan agrees to all proposal but remains adamant on territorial question. 20 March: talks indefinitely suspended. 21 March USSR announces salmon fishing off Kamchatka threatens the fish "with extermination" and sets restrictions on total catch for all countries combined at 25 million fish per year in the Bering Sea, Pacific Ocean and Sea of Okhotsk pending international agreement on salmon fisheries with the U.S., Canada, and Japan. (Japan alone caught 63 million during 1955). Japan immediately requests negotiations for fisheries agreement; talks open 29 April in Moscow. 12 May, fishing agreement reached on 10 year fishing convention and three-year treaty on air-sea rescue which would come into effect following conclusion of a peace treaty or exchange of ambassadors. Interim agreement reached on fishing rights in Bering Sea, Okhotsk Sea and North Pacific, but when Soviet side suggests it should come into force only when peace talks resume, Japanese side withdraw from talks. Soviets eventually withdraw this stipulation; 15 May agreements signed, with Japanese Agricultural and Fisheries Minister Kono promising in return (for Japanese government) that Peace Talks would resume by 31 July either in Moscow or Tokyo. 31 July, In Moscow, third round of talks open; Foreign Minister Shigemitsu offers to drop demands on international sovereignty over Sakhalin and Northern Kuriles, calls for return of "Southern Kuriles;" USSR refuses. 10 August, Shigemitsu meets with Bulgannin and Krushchev, is told return of two islands is final
1956 -- USSR offer. 10 August, Premier Hatoyama says in Tokyo he will resign as soon as agreements with USSR are reached. 6 September, LDP reaches consensus on Adenauer formula for agreements with USSR. 15 October, Premier Hatoyama flies to Moscow. 19 October: Joint Declaration normalizing relations is signed; separate trade protocol with MFN clause is signed, and 15 May fishing agreements go into effect. USSR ratifies its support for Japan's UN entry, (see text of Declaration elsewhere in Appendices). 15 November. Instruments of Ratification formally exchanged. 27 November, Japanese Lower House approves agreements unanimously. 5 December, Upper House of Diet approves by vote of 224 to 3. (Several ruling party members absented themselves from the debate in protest against omission of proper provisions for further negotiations on portions of Kuriles claimed by Japan. 12 December, Japan unanimously voted full membership in U.N.


1960 -- Revised Japan-U.S. Security Treaty signed in January prompts criticism in Soviet media and a Soviet warning that Japan is in danger of nuclear attack with foreign troops on its soil. 27 January, USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko announces Habomai and Shikotan Islands would be held until all U.S. troops leave Japan. 25 February/22 April USSR sends memoranda to Japan saying the "territorial question is settled due to a series of international agreements and the area is now part of Soviet territory." Memoranda add that the two islands specified for return by the Joint Declaration of 1956 will not be returned until U.S. troops withdraw from Japan, even if a Peace Treaty is signed before then.

1961 -- 14-22 August, Deputy Premier Mikoyan makes "unofficial" visit to Tokyo as guest of Japanese government; delivers letter from Khruschev to Premier Ikeda calling on Japan to close foreign military bases and end alliance with U.S. since these two factors "did not help in deepening mutual trust and normalizing relations ..." Ikeda replies by denying these charges and called for settlement of territorial differences between the two countries and the signing of a peace treaty. 25 September, Khruschev categorically refutes Japanese territorial claims, says status of Kunashiri and Etorofu had been permanently settled "through various international agreements." 15 November, Ikeda
1961 -- sends another letter saying Khruschev's argument is (cont.) "contrary to fact and lacking adequate grounds; adds that Japan could "not remain indifferent" to the fact that the USSR was sending more and more Soviet citizens to Kunashiri and Etorofu, whose final status could only be settled by a peace treaty. Also that Kunashiri and Etorofu are part of Southern Chisima and not part of Kuriles -- are therefore not covered by San Francisco Treaty.

12 December, Khruschev replies to Ikeda letter again rejecting Japanese arguments; declares USSR would not transfer to Japan her rights over south Sakhalin and the Kuriles acquired (he said) under Yalta agreement.

1963 -- 10 June, Japan Maritime Industries Society and Soviet Fisheries officers sign private agreement allowing limited help fishing around Kaigara Island between June and September. Separate bilateral negotiations result in 3-Year Trade Agreement.


1964 -- Japan Communist Party expels its pro-Moscow element from membership. Birth of Komei Party, 5 February P.M. Ikeda formally demands return of Etorofu and Kunishiri; Soviets reply "Japan has no claim on the basis of international agreements at Yalta and International Acts at San Francisco." 22 April, Annual fisheries agreement is worst ever; 110,000 tons of salmon. May, Mikoyan visits Tokyo, discusses Japanese co-operation in developing Siberia in general terms. Moscow opens initiatives toward JSP since Japanese Communist Party has turned pro-Peking. 10 July, in Peking, Mao Tse-tung tells a visiting Socialist delegation China supports Japan's territorial claims. 2 September, Pravda publishes an article denouncing "revanchist Sino-Japanese collusion."

1965 -- 5 February, New Japan Soviet Trade agreement signed for third year of three year agreement: Japanese exports to reach $189m, imports up to $169m. Result is a 55% export increase and 12% import increase, reversing previous trade balances. 7 May, new fisheries agreement reached; USSR increases salmon quotas to 174,000 tons for coming season.

1966 -- January, In Moscow, Foreign Minister Etsasaburo Shina gets "no change" response from Gromyko on territorial dispute. Joint Communiqué spells out new goal of $400m in bilateral trade. Trade and Air agreements signed.

14-23 March, Joint Economic Committee Meeting held for first time; Soviet side proposes Joint Production Sharing in Siberian development project. July, in Tokyo, Gromyko meets with Sato and reaches agreement...
1966 -- on the commencement of Joint Foreign Ministerial Conference to be held on an annual basis. (First conference held in July, 1967.) Eleven Japanese fishermen killed during the year in a single incident involving struggle with a Soviet patrol boat; incident sparks major controversy throughout Japan.


1968 -- June, Bonin Islands formally returned to Japan (by U.S.).

1969 -- January, Japan-Soviet Civil Aviation Agreement signed. 22 May, Japanese Diet passes unanimous law establishing the Association on Northern Territory Problems. June, Soviet Fisheries Minister Alexander Ishkov, in Tokyo, signs fishing treaty with Japan after prolonged negotiations. July, Consular Treaty signed in Tokyo. September, in Moscow, Kosygin tells Foreign Minister Aichi that "national boundaries formulated after WWII can no longer be changed since even a change in one part would adversely affect other territorial issues."

1970 -- 6 March, JCP announces shift in position, demands return of two islands. April, Chou En-lai tells Japanese trade mission China supports Japanese claims for the whole of the Kuriles. 21 October, at UNGA, Premier Sato calls for the return of the four northern islands during his address on the 25th anniversary of the United Nations. December, JCP delegation presents the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo with a note demanding return of the islands and saying the Soviets are in violation of the Cairo Declaration. Soviet media barrage commences against the JCP, calling them "revanchist panderers to public opinion."

1971 -- February, Chou En-Lai tells Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama that according to legal interpretations of Cairo and Potsdam, all the Kuriles belong to Japan. September, Japan and USSR reach trade agreement calling for increases from $791m. to $1.27 thousand million by 1975. (Actual trade by 1975 equals nearly $2.7 thousand million.) September, JCP Chairman Kenji Miyamoto, back from Moscow, says USSR will hand back Habomais and Shikotan when the Treaty is signed and will give "serious consideration" to the return of the other two if Japan terminates military ties with the U.S. Moscow, in apparent revenge for the 1970
1971 -- Embassy incident, quickly denies all, charges "unwarranted deductions" and says its policy is unchanged. Also advises Miyamoto to consult his own government for elucidation.

1972 -- 21 January, Chou En-lai tells visiting Japanese journalists in Peking that Japanese claims to Kuriles are valid. 22 January, Gromyko visits Tokyo, for second Foreign Minister's Conference (with Fukuda), agrees to resume Treaty talks in Moscow in October, presents economic package in return for pledge Japan will not develop relations with Peking which are harmful to Soviet interests. At 21-24 October meetings in Moscow, Gromyko tells new Foreign Minister Ohira two southernmost islands will not be returned until U.S. troops leave Japan. 21 December, Party Secretary General Brezhnev tells CPSU Central Committee and Supreme Soviet that he plans a Japan-Soviet summit aimed at solving "questions remaining from the time of the Second World War ... (And to) provide a treaty basis for relations between the two countries (the USSR would seek) a mutually acceptable accord on the entire range of questions under discussion." The statement is interpreted in Tokyo as a more flexible Soviet attitude on the territorial question.

1973 -- August, at 10th Party Congress in Peking, Chou En-lai calls for the return of all the Kurile islands to Japan. 3 October, at UNGA in New York, Chinese Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua repeats Chou's message. In Tokyo, Japanese Diet passes unanimous resolution calling for the return of the four Kurile islands as a pre-condition to signing a Peace Treaty with the USSR. 7-10 October, at summit meetings in Moscow: on 9th, Tanaka and Brezhnev exchange heated words on the Northern Territories issue; joint communique at end of summit confirms "unresolved problems" left over from WWII which is interpreted in Japan as a pledge by Brezhnev that territorial problems still need to be resolved. Also at the summit meeting: Tanaka reverses earlier positions and agrees to participate in Siberian development; commits Japn's Export-Import Bank to provide 80% of the credits Japan might supply for development of the Tyumen oil fields* if an agreement is reached. The USSR meanwhile places Asian Collective Security at the top of the summit agenda; Tanaka expresses willingness to discuss it further at later date. Foreign Ministry of Japan subsequently

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*Tyumen oil project envisaged supplies of oil to Japan via 4,500 mile pipeline to Soviet Pacific port of Nakhodka (later changed in March 1974, supply via new trans-Siberian railway (BAM project). The Tyumen oil fields (east of the Urals) were to supply Japan with about 25 million tons of crude oil per year; Japan was to advance about $3,100 millions to help pay for development in return for the repayments in oil.
1973 -- announces postponement of all such discussions pending inclusion of Peking and settlement of the Northern Territories issue. (Following Tanaka's return, Foreign Minister Ohira tells Diet the territorial issue could be settled in the course of development in bilateral relations.

1974 -- March, Soviet negotiators propose that Tyumen oil field development project be linked to construction of a second trans-Siberian railway to carry oil to the coast instead of being pumped through a pipeline. (Japanese fear this has military implications which could impair its relations with Peking, therefore, the entire Tyumen Joint Development project envisaged in 1970 is virtually abandoned by 1975). April, Joint U.S.-Soviet-Japanese Agreement on Siberian Development is signed, pending ratification in Washington and Tokyo. Also in April, bilateral negotiations result in a series of agreements signed in June and in July, 1975 for joint development of Siberia and Soviet Far East. Results were to include large scale supplies of Soviet coal, oil, gas and timber to Japan. Credits agreed to in 22 April protocol provided for $1,050 million in credits to be extended under auspices of Japan's Export-Import Bank; some projects called for joint U.S. co-operation for development. 26 June first loan between Ex-Im Bank of Japan and USSR's Foreign Trade Bank covered $450 million to help finance coal development project with major deliveries of coal to Japan scheduled for period between 1979-98.

30 July 1974: separate agreement on Soviet timber development over five year period: Japan grants $550 million in credits for timber equipment in return for timber deliveries later. September, at U.N., Gromyko invites Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura to Moscow for talks; (throughout the year Japan tries unsuccessfully to get Gromyko or Kosygin to visit Tokyo in a return of the Tanaka visit of 1973). October, Brezhnev, in a letter to Tanaka, repeats the invitation to resume treaty talks and to have Kimura visit Moscow for that purpose. Japan's response: "We will study the matter." 22 November 1974, In Paris, announcement that Japan, USSR and El Paso Natural Gas Company of Houston signed two-year agreement for joint exploration of natural gas deposits in Siberia; Japan Exim Bank agrees to provide credit of $100 million; agreement is subject to U.S. congressional confirmation.

1975 -- 15-17 January, Foreign Minister Miyazawa, in Moscow meets with Gromyko and requests agreement on return of the four islands based on the 1973 Tanaka-Brezhnev joint communiqué; Gromyko says the two sides should

* See footnote on page 138.
1975 -- sign a "Good Neighbor Treaty." Brezhnev letter soon after this to Premier Miki reiterates need for such a treaty. Communique issued on 19 January says two sides agreed to continue talks on conclusion of a peace treaty. No mention made of Japanese territorial demands. 28 January, Japan-Soviet general agreement reached on prospecting for and extracting of oil and gas on shelf of Sakhalin; provides Japan with 50 percent of gas and oil found. (Specific contract initialed 24 July.) 30 January, Miyazawa tells Diet the interim treaty proposal by USSR is "inappropriate" until a peace treaty has been signed. 5 February, before the Diet, Premier Miki reaffirms his intention to conclude a China treaty as soon as possible. 13 February, Soviet Ambassador Oleg Troyanovsky delivers personal letter to Miki from Brezhnev which suggests the two sides should conclude a friendship treaty "while continuing negotiations for a peace treaty." Miki immediately rejects this proposal on the grounds that such a treaty would virtually shelve the territorial claims Japan has in the Kuriles. 14 February, Miki turns down treaty bid from Moscow. Soviet patrols begin cutting Japanese fishing lines, damaging netting, increasing arrests. Also in February, Ambassador Troyanovsky meets separately with LDP Vice-President Etsusaburo Shiiha and other party elders, tells them a Japanese treaty with China would result in "an unfavorable reaction" on Soviet Japanese relations. Also repeat earlier proposal to work on an interim treaty of "friendship and goodwill" proposed by Gromyko to Miyazawa in January. April, Soviet Pacific Fleet begins exercises with task forces stationed along Japan's three busiest shipping routes which supply the nation's food and oil. 12 June, Miki tells Diet Soviet concern over anti-hegemony clause in Peking treaty is "merely a misunderstanding." Also 12 June, the Soviet government presents a note to Ambassador Akira Shigemitsu in Moscow warning against proceeding with a Peking treaty. 18 June, Soviet government publishes a statement formally presented to the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow the previous week; statement cautions Japan against being "drawn, in one form or another; into the orbit of Chinese policy." and expresses the hope Japan will "do nothing that might prejudice the development of relations between the USSR and Japan." Message also says "It is in the joint interest of Japan and the Soviet Union to administer a deserved rebuff to all attempts by third powers ... which see to prevent an improvement in Soviet Japanese relations. 18 June, in response to Soviet message, Miki tells Diet the anti-hegemony clause is not aimed at the USSR. Also 18 June, Soviet News Agency Tass publishes a formal government statement publicly warning Miki not to proceed with the China treaty (text is believed
1975 -- virtually identical to the letter of 12 June). Also in June, meeting of Soviet-Japanese business co-operating committee in Tokyo; discussions involve development of coking coal deposits in Yakutia, natural gas in same region, plus East Siberian forest resources and Sakhalin shelf development; Joint Development of Tyument oilfields abandoned. 15 July, in Tokyo, protocols signed between Japan's Exim Bank and USSR involving credits of ¥100 million for gas exploration in Yakutsk area and another for ¥245 million for purchase of ammonia plants from Japan. However, first of these subject to successful agreements between USSR and U.S. for U.S. credits for ¥100 million for the same project; second contract signed on Japanese side by Mitsui Corporation and Tokyo Engineering Corporation. 19 July, Japanese publish a Foreign Ministry response sent to Gromyko which says proposed China treaty is "not directed against any third country" and that it has been "Japan's persistent policy to promote friendly relations with all countries." Also 19 July, Miki tells Diet "We have no particular country in view, as for instance the Soviet Union, while negotiating with Peking. The anti-hegemony clause is nothing but the expression of a universally accepted principle of peace. Miyazawa adds that Japan did not intend to "complicate her relations with the Soviet Union." 24 July, contract initialled in Tokyo between Japan's Sakhalin Oil Development Co-operation Company and USSR for Japanese credits of ¥100 million to finance oil exploration of Soviet island of Sakhalin in exchange for the supply of crude oil and gas by USSR to Japan. The start of exploration however, was made dependent on final agreement being reached with Gulf Oil of the U.S. as a participant in the project. 16 September, at U.N. Miyazawa is strongly warned by Gromyko against signing China treaty which includes the anti-hegemony clause. 17 September, Japanese Cabinet reconfirms the return of the four islands are part of the package in any treaty with the Soviet Union. 19 September, Miyazawa, at U.N., reconfirms to Gromyko Japan's insistence on return of the four islands, as per the Cabinet resolution. 24 September, at U.N. Miyazawa meets with Chinese counterpart Chiao Kuan-hua; is told China still insists upon inclusion of the clause. Miyazawa presents four point "Miyazawa Plan" to Chiao. 6 November, LDP Vice-President Etsasaburo Shina says he sees no problem with anti-hegemony clause if it means a mutual pledge of non-aggression. 7 November, Miyazawa tells Diet he sees no problem with the anti-hegemony clause. 11 November, Soviet patrol boats seize fishing vessel Koei Maru 13, one crewman drowns. Late December, Miki, at year-end news conference, says he wants to conclude peace treaty with Peking during 1976, if mutually agreeable draft on anti-hegemony
1975 -- clause can be reached; this reverses his earlier (cont.) positions.

1976 -- 8-13 January, Gromyko visits Tokyo, offers return of two islands in return for Japanese rejection of anti-hegemony clause in Peking treaty; privately Gromyko threatens Miki with dire consequences for Japan if it proceeds with treaty. Gromyko is told Japan is not prepared to conclude peace treaty with USSR unless the four Kurile islands are returned. 11 and 12 January, Gromyko indicates willingness of USSR to return two islands specified in Joint Declaration if Japan signs friendship and co-operation (Good Neighbor) treaty with USSR; Miyazawa rejects this and says return of all four islands necessary for peace treaty or any treaty with USSR. 11 January, Gromyko meets the LDP Secretary General Yasuhiro Nakasone and agrees to exchanges of information on harnessing of nuclear fusion power between the two countries. 12 January, Gromyko puts stress on Collective Asian Security Pact; Miki says such a treaty would not be necessary because conditions in Asia are different from those in Europe which necessitated the Helsinki Conference (which Gromyko alluded to in his speech). Miki also raises question of Soviet violations of 1975 fishing according, specifically the damage being done to Japanese fishing gear. Gromyko later informs Miyazawa that 32 fishermen seized previously by Soviet patrol boats will be released soon. They are subsequently released on 19 and 21 January). 12 January, Miyazawa tells newsmen after meeting with Gromyko that Soviet Foreign Minister appeared to be "obsessed" with the proposed Sino-Japanese peace treaty and had not accepted Japan's explanations that the anti-hegemony clause was not directed against the USSR but had a universal application; also reported "no progress" on the territorial dispute with the USSR. 13 January joint communiqué says two sides agreed to begin talks on conclusion of a cultural agreement and expressed satisfaction with development of bilateral relations in recent years. Miyazawa accepted an invitation to go to Moscow to resume treaty talks later in 1976, but Mr. Miki made it clear such a visit would have to be preceeded by a Tokyo visit by Brezhnev, Podgorny or Kosygin, to whom he extended a renewed invitation. 13 January, at a news conference, Gromyko before departure says Japan and China are "improving relations at the sacrifice of the interest and security of our country." Also on 13 January, two hours after Gromyko's departure, Miki tells Foreign Correspondent's Club of Japan his country will proceed with China treaty negotiations; says "policy of equidistance is a myth," and that he will sign the treaty with Peking as soon as possible. That same day, one of Miki's aides tells newsmen the
1976 -- talks with Gromyko left the prime minister with "a sense of irritation and displeasure" over the way Gromyko conducted himself, and the threats he used privately. 27 January, negotiations begin in Moscow on possible sale by Japan of 10 nuclear power plants (up to 1.3 million kilowatts of power each) for about $1,300 million. 24 February, Brezhnev tells 25th Soviet Party Congress that demands "by certain quarters in Japan" are "groundless and unlawful;" Japan responds with "strong official protest." 14 May, Alexandere Machkahine, Novosti Press Soviet correspondent in Tokyo is arrested as spy; later goes on hunger strike and is expelled from Japan. 15 May, Radio Moscow charges Mao with efforts to sow seeds of distrust between Japan and the USSR. 21 August, Japan urges Brezhnev to visit to set up Peace Treaty. Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo says failure to conclude a treaty is putting the brake on smooth progress in relations. Also in August, Toshio Doko, President of the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations meets with Brezhnev at Yalta; Brezhnev proposes government-to-government agreement on atomic energy co-operation. Japan later declines on grounds it has such an agreement already with U.S. 6 September, Flight Lieutenant Viktor Belenko lands his MiG-25 at Hakodate civilian airport in Hokkaido, asks for asylum; USSR demands his return and that of the aircraft. 6-9 September, USSR continued to press its demands; Miyazawa says Soviet representatives "have exceeded the bounds of diplomatic discourse." (USSR accuses Japan of coercing, torturing and intimidating Belenko.) 9 September, Belenko flies to asylum in the U.S. 16 September, Miyazawa flies to Hokkaido in a trip designed to disprove the Russian Soviet claim that only a handful of Japanese incited by "outside influence" were pressing for return of the four islands. 21 October, Ambassador Polyansky, in a speech commemorating 20th anniversary of normalized bilateral relations, obliquely attacks moves within Japanese government to pursue China treaty. 12 November, MiG-25 is turned over to Soviet officials at Hitachi port after undergoing two months of thorough inspection by Japanese and U.S. technical experts. 29 December, Japan informs USSR of its intention to postpone regular annual consultations between foreign ministers, pleading a busy schedule and domestic matters too pressing for new Japanese Foreign Minister Iichiro Hatoyama.

1977 -- 24 January, Japanese Ambassador Shigemetsu, home from Moscow, tells his government the USSR is not going to change its mind on the territorial issue. 25 February, Japan sends strongly worded message to Moscow protesting Soviet attempts to include the territorial issue in upcoming fishing talks;
1977 -- (previously, the USSR had announced new 200 mile fishing limits effective 1 March.). Message also says Japan refuses to recognize Soviet attempts to include the four southernmost Kuriles in Soviet territory, calls these "inherent Japanese territory." Also on 25 February, Agricultural and Forestry Minister Zenko Suzuki says he will not discuss political problems such as the territorial issue when he goes to Moscow for fishing talks, but says he will protest the latest Soviet action including disputed territory in the 200 mile zone. 5 March, at opening of talks on fishing in Moscow, two sides agree to work on agreements based on new Soviet 200 mile exclusive zone. In Tokyo a foreign ministry official comments on the agreement that "We haven't recognized their territorial jurisdiction over the islands. And we'll never recognize it. But we want to catch fish in the Soviet garden." Ambassador Polyansky delivers message to Japanese Foreign Ministry which says there is "no such thing as a territorial dispute" and that if Japan raises such questions and maintains such an attitude, it will make a fishing agreement "difficult to reach." (The new fishing zone affects 1.8 million tons, or one-fifth of Japan's total annual catch.) 15 March, In Moscow, fishing talks begin between Fisheries Minister Alexander Ishkov and Japanese counterpart Suzuki. Suzuki gives note to Soviet side announcing Japanese plans to declare 200 mile fishing zone in near future; Japan orders all salmon and herring fishing boats out of Soviet waters; government subsequently subsidizes idle fishermen throughout protracted fishing negotiations. 15 March and 19 May, Soviet fishing negotiators include clauses in drafts which mean Japanese acquiescence in territorial status quo. Also on 15 March, separate fishing quota talks begin in Tokyo with USSR; Soviet negotiators indicate "drastic change" in quotas will be forthcoming. 17 March, Diet passes unanimous resolution calling for safety of Japanese fishermen in Soviet waters and preservation of traditional fishing catch in Pacific waters. (Second "sense of Parliament" resolution in Japan's post war history.) 18 March, In Diet, Miki refutes recent Soviet claim there is no territorial dispute between the two countries; says he wants fishing issue kept separate. 31 March, Soviet delegation to fishing quota talks in Tokyo flies home after three days of suspended talks and no progress. Deadline passes on time set by USSR for interim accord on fishing; all Japanese fishermen withdraw from Soviet-claimed waters. 1 April, Cabinet Secretary Sunao Sonoda applies for visa at Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, is told visa cannot be given during holidays. 4 April, Soviet Embassy in Tokyo issues visa to Sonoda after protracted weekend talks (an estimated 200,000
1977 -- fishermen and other workers affected by Japanese withdrawals from new Soviet waters.) 5 April, Sonoda, on special mission from Prime Minister Fukuda to break deadlock in fishing talks, flies to Moscow. Also on 5 April, Suzuki tells newsmen Japan will never accept the new Soviet demands that its fishermen be allowed to fish inside Japan's new 12 mile territorial waters: "A 200-mile economic zone is one thing. The right to access of territorial waters is another. It is against all international conventions." 6 April, Tass attacks Japan for its "anti-Soviet stance" in fishing talks. 7 April, Sonoda meets with Kosygin to break fishing deadlock. 15 April, Fukuda announces he is recalling Suzuki from Moscow; all Japanese opposition parties announce full backing of government plans to establish new Japanese 200 mile fishing zone. 19 April, USSR hands $10 million bill to Japan as compensation for loss of military secrets on MiG-25. (On 15 November 1976 Japan had billed the USSR for airport damages and handling charges on the aircraft.) 30 April, USSR abrogates 21-year old bilateral fishing treaty which was basis for annual fishing quota talks and symbol of good relations. 2 May, Japanese Upper House unanimously passes bills extending territorial waters from three to 12 miles, and exclusive fishing zone to 200 miles. 5 May, Suzuki, in Moscow, commences new talks with his Soviet counterpart aimed at breaking the fishing talks deadlock over quotas and an interim treaty. 16 May, Fukuda sends letter to Brezhnev expressing hope fishing problems will soon be resolved. 17 May, fishing talks deadlock broken; working level talks resume in Moscow. 20 May, draft on interim fishing treaty announced. 28 May, Fukuda repeats request to USSR to discuss problems of concluding a Peace Treaty with Japan; USSR remains non-committal. Same day, also on 28 May, Japan Communist Party in open letter to the Soviet Central Committee calls for immediate return of Habomai and Shikotan islands. 1 June, Brezhnev sends letter via Ambassador Polyansky expressing satisfaction over resolution of fishing problems and stressing need for development of relations between the two countries. 6 June, Japanese media gives play to claims by Sapporo historian Norio Tsuchiya that Kuriles belong to Ainu aboriginal peoples who rebelled against Japanese invaders in 1668, repulsed a Russian battleship at Uruppu Island in 1875 and continue to have historical rights to the islands. 11 June, Japanese protest to USSR over Soviet military maneuvers conducted on Etorofu. 13 June, Pravda replies saying JCP has adopted a "chauvanistic, nationalistic attitude ... fostering hostile feelings toward the USSR. 16 June, Brezhnev assures Cabinet Minister Hiroshide Ishida USSR will consider concluding peace treaty with Japan, again
1977 -- proposes "Good Neighbor" Treaty. 17 June Fukuda says Japan will have nothing to do with such a treaty until territorial issue settled; says Japan will not reply to Brezhnev. Also on 17 June, Polyansky says that from Soviet viewpoint "there is no pending territorial issue," (first interview granted by the Soviet Ambassador since his appointment to Tokyo 14 months before). 28 June, Japanese Cabinet announces it will comply with Soviet requests to delay for one month the setting up of new 200 mile exclusive fishing zone, originally scheduled to go into effect on 1 July. 4 August, Japan-Soviet fishing agreements reached; interim accords for 1977 fishing by Soviet fleet in Japanese waters. (USSR allowed 335,000 tons limit. Japan allowed 455,000 from June to December in Soviet waters under agreement reached 27 May 1977; represents 35% decrease in normal amount; results in reduction of total Japanese boats in area of over 1,000). Talks opened in Tokyo 28 July.

1978 -- 11 January, Sunao Sonoda concludes foreign ministerial visit to Moscow without customary communique because of "an accentuated difference over the northern territory issue," (Japan Times editorial of 13 January). Gromyko gives Sonoda draft of "Good Neighbor and Friendship Treaty" which Sonoda takes but refuses to "officially accept." 12 January, Sonoda returns from five days in Moscow saying "no progress" in resolving deadlock on territorial issue or treaty talks; says USSR does not clearly understand Japanese policy separating pursuit of treaty with China from attempts at treaty with Moscow and reports that Soviet leaders threatened "strong actions" if Japan proceeds with China treaty with anti-hegemony. 2 February, Peking notifies Japan it is ready to resume treaty talks, (suspended since September 1975). 17 February, Japan and China sign eight-year $20 billion trade agreement. 20 February, Polyansky presents Soviet note of protest on anti-hegemony clause to Cabinet Secretary Shintaro Abe, who responds by telling USSR it must "mind its own business" and not interfere in Japanese matters. 22 February, Polyansky meets with Fukuda (see Gist of Remarks elsewhere in Appendices) presents letter from Brezhnev and draft of "Good Neighbor Treaty." Also invites Fukuda to Moscow. Peace Treaty not mentioned. 23 February, Nihon Keizai and other Japanese newspapers publish "gist of remarks;" later same day Izvestia publishes draft of proposed "Good Neighbor Treaty." 24 February, Japanese cabinet announces it has "no plans" to study proposed Soviet treaty, nor plans to conclude any treaty which might impair Japanese demands for return of the four islands. 25 February, Japan rejects Soviet Good Neighbor Treaty. 3 March, China attacks the Soviet Union for unilaterally
1978 -- publishing draft of the proposed treaty. 8 April, Prime Minister's office encourages people to visit waters near four disputed Kurile islands because Japanese people should be more aware of the problems involved. 20 May, Soviet Pacific Fleet begins new exercises near Japan. 14 July, Ambassador Dmitrii Polyansky returns to Moscow; Soviet Embassy tells newsmen he will be away "indefinitely." Move is interpreted in Tokyo as more Soviet pressure against conclusion of a China treaty. 12 August, Tass publishes commentary by Mikhail Demchenko attacking Japanese signing of China treaty as capitulation, and "fraught with danger for stability in Asia." Also on 12th Radio Moscow's Tokyo correspondent, broadcast in various languages throughout Asia, calls the treaty with China a "setback for Japanese diplomacy." 14, 21 and 25 August, Soviet media continue attacks on new Treaty. 14 August, Foreign Minister Sonoda returned from signing treaty with China, sends new ambassador to Moscow, Tokichiro Uomoto, with special instructions to explain the pact to Soviet leaders. 23 August, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Firyubin expresses Soviet dissatisfaction with Sino-Japanese Treaty during meeting with new Japanese Ambassador Tokichiro Uomoto. Firyubin reiterates Soviet stand that it will decide whether Japan is genuinely desirous of friendly relations after studying concrete policies to be decided by Japan in the future. Also says Japan failed to dilute the treaty's dangerous character. (This is a repeat of the statements made by Firyubin to the Japanese Minister, Susumu Matsubara, at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow on 14 August.) Also in August, Soviet Union doubles its troop strength at military installations in the Kuriles, bringing total to about 3,000. Construction and modernization begins at Soviet airfields and naval sites in Kuriles. Japanese Government protests the action. September, Sonoda meets at UN with Gromyko, says Japan must maintain friendly ties with all countries; later tells newsmen USSR understands Japan's aim in this regard. October, annual bilateral trade meetings open in Tokyo between Japan and USSR. Japanese express optimism that China treaty has not adversely affected relations.
APPENDIX E

SOVIET DRAFT OF PROPOSED "GOOD NEIGHBOR AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY"

(RELEASED ON 23 FEBRUARY 1978 IN MOSCOW).

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, seeking to promote the consolidation of peace and security in the Far East, in the Pacific basin and throughout the world;

Convinced that peaceful co-operation between both states on the basis of the aims and principles of the UN Charter accord with the aspirations of the Soviet and Japanese peoples, the broad interests of international peace;

Guided by the desire fully to overcome the elements of estrangement and distrust in their mutual relations, engendered in the past;

Prompted by solicitude for creating an atmosphere of good neighborhood and good-will between both countries;

Reaffirming their intention to continue talks on the conclusion of a peace treaty;

Desiring to express in contractual form their resolve to create a firm and long-term foundation for the development of all-round co-operation between them, above all, in the political sphere, and also in the sphere of the economy, science, technology and culture.

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan regard the maintenance of peace, extension and strengthening of relaxation of tension and strengthening of international security as one of the main aims of their policy.

They express a desire to exert efforts for the consolidation of universal peace on the Asian continent, in the Pacific basin and throughout the world.

ARTICLE II

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and under-
take in their mutual relations to refrain from the threat of force or its use.

The high contracting parties shall develop and strengthen relations of good neighborhood and mutually advantageous co-operation on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

ARTICLE III

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan undertake not to allow the use of their territories for any actions which could prejudice the security of the other party.

ARTICLE IV

The high contracting parties undertake to refrain from any actions encouraging any third party to take aggressive actions against either of them.

ARTICLE V

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall maintain and widen regular contacts and consultations on important international issues concerning the interests of both states through meetings and exchanges of views between their leading statesmen and through diplomatic channels.

Should a situation arise which, in the opinion of both sides is dangerous for maintaining peace, or if peace is violated, the sides shall immediately contact each other with the aim of exchanging views on the question of what can be done for improving the situation.

ARTICLE VI

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan declare their determination to continue efforts for ending the arms race, of both nuclear and conventional weapons, and attaining general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

ARTICLE VII

Considering trade relations to be an important and necessary element of strengthening bilateral relations and attaching great significance to economic co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the parties shall
actively promote the growth of such relations, contribute to co-operation between the appropriate organizations and enterprises of both countries and to concluding appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

ARTICLE VIII

Attaching great significance to scientific and technical co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, the parties will promote in every way possible an expansion of mutually beneficial and all-round co-operation in these fields on the basis of the treaties and agreements, which exist or will be concluded between them.

ARTICLE IX

Interested in the preservation and rational use of biological resources of the world ocean, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall continue broadening co-operation this field on the basis of the appropriate agreements and with due regard for the legislation of the parties.

ARTICLE X

The high contracting parties shall encourage the development of relations between government institutions and public organizations in the field of science, arts, education, television, radio and sports, contributing to a mutual enrichment of achievements in these fields, to strengthening the feeling of respect and friendliness of the peoples of those countries for each other.

ARTICLE XI

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan shall strive that the relations and co-operation between them in all the above listed fields and any other fields of mutual interest be built on a durable and long-term basis. With this aim in view, the parties shall establish, where it is deemed advisable, joint commissions, or other joint bodies.

ARTICLE XII

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan do not claim and do not recognize anyone's claims to any special
rights or advantages in world affairs, including claims to domination in Asia and in the area of the Far East.

ARTICLE XIII

This treaty shall not affect the bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements concluded earlier by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, and is not directed against any third country.

ARTICLE XIV

This treaty shall be subject to ratification and enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification to be done in the city of ... done at ... on ... in two copies, each in the Russian and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

For Japan.

Source: Released by Izvestia on 23 February 1978 and reprinted on 24 February 1978 by The Japan Times and Yomiuri.
APPENDIX F

FUKUDA-POLYANSKY GIST OF REMARKS

In connection with the Prime Minister Fukuda - Soviet Ambassador to Japan Polyansky, held yesterday, the Nihon Keizai carried a page-four report, with the caption reading: "Gist of Remarks by Prime Minister Fukuda and Ambassador Polyansky." The Fukuda-Polyansky dialogue was reported as follows on 23 February 1978:

Ambassador:

I want to read aloud the letter of reply. (The Ambassador conveyed the contents of the letter of reply.)

Prime Minister:

1. My visit to the Soviet Union has been requested. Japan is also seeking the Soviet top leaders' visit to Japan. I expect General Secretary Brezhnev and other top leaders to visit Japan, by all means.

2. I want to hold periodic talks between the Japanese and Soviet Foreign Ministers, in the future, too, thus continuing to discuss the Japan-Soviet problems.

3. (The Soviet Union) desires the conclusion of a peace treaty. Japan is also taking quite the same view.

4. The fundamental attitude of our country is to maintain friendship with any other country. Our country is able to have strong military power, but our fundamental stand is to contribute toward world peace, without having it.

5. Even if the position of our country differs from that of the Soviet Union, the two countries share the stand of seeking peace.

6. I hope that a Japan-Soviet peace treaty will be concluded, from this standpoint. That was confirmed in the Japan-Soviet Joint Communiqué of 1973.

7. The letter of reply expresses a desire for the conclusion of a good neighborliness and co-operation treaty. In this connection, I have already received a report to the effect that it was proposed at the time of the Sonoda visit to the USSR.
8. Before receiving it, the Foreign Minister said he would not like to receive it, because the territorial problem has still not been settled. But he received it physically, and it is put in a safe of the Foreign Ministry.

9. The conclusion of a peace treaty will mean settling a long-pending problem between the Soviet Union and Japan. Therefore, it must be realized by all means.

10. I am not thinking of concluding the proposed good neighborliness treaty by shelving the territorial problem. I think that the best way is to settle the territorial problem along the line of the Joint Communique.

11. Mr. Ambassador Polyansky, you should also fully understand the national sentiment as to "islands." You probably can understand what effects the concluding of the proposed good neighborliness treaty as an interim measure will have on the people.

12. In regard to the problem of the "islands," they are as small as the dirt in a fingernail, so to speak, from the Soviet Union's viewpoint. I want [the USSR] to reach a definite decision. I pay my whole-hearted respects for the enthusiasm about Japan-Soviet friendship, which enthusiasm was shown in the letter of reply, but I cannot but say I find it impossible to agree to conclude a concrete good neighborliness treaty.

Ambassador:

1. I am grateful for your letting me hear your concrete views.

2. Mutual visits by the top leaders of the two countries will create various conditions which will be helpful to both countries. I will make efforts.

3. It is the Soviet Union's policy to consolidate the foundation between Japan and the Soviet Union, based on friendship and reciprocity. It is necessary to promote (the consolidation of the foundation) objectively in various fields.

4. I wish to say one word about a good-neighborly treaty. We thought that its conclusion would be meaningful for Japan and the Soviet Union, and (a treaty draft) was handed to the Foreign Minister. We think, even now, that it would be a good thing for the development of relations between the two countries. I ask you to read it carefully and then make a judgment.
5. A good-neighborly treaty does not mean a rejection of the conclusion of a peace treaty. It confirms legally what has been established up until now.

6. As regards the territorial problem, we stated our views at the Foreign Ministers' talks, and therefore, there is nothing further to add.

7. You referred to the Joint Communiqué. However, it does not say that the territorial problem must be settled. Therefore, it is better (for the Japanese side) not to refer to it. Importance should be attached to the good-neighborly treaty.

Prime Minister:

1. I can guess generally the gist of a good-neighborly treaty, but it does not touch upon the territorial problem.

2. It is a small matter for the Soviet Union, concerning just four small islands, is it not? This is the only pending problem remaining between Japan and the Soviet Union.

3. I will state my feelings that the correct way is to pile up discussions like those contained in the Joint Communiqué, and to promote a Japan-Soviet peace treaty, based on the Joint Communiqué.

Ambassador:

1. I do not want to enter into arguments over this problem, but the Soviet position is that the territorial problem has already been settled.

2. However, you have gone to the trouble of stating your view, and I will report it to the Kremlin. I want you to study the good-neighborly treaty.

Prime Minister:

It is simple. It only needs the settlement of the territorial problem.

Ambassador:

That is not simple. The territorial problem has already been settled. I want you to conclude a good-neighborly treaty.
Prime Minister:

One point is missing. I am sincerely grateful for the letter. I sincerely pray for General Secretary Brezhnev's good health and vigorous activities, for the sake of world peace.

Source: Full translation provided by the Political Section U.S. Embassy Tokyo. (Several other newspapers carried similar accounts on the same day.)
### APPENDIX G

**JAPAN-CHINA TRADE FIGURES - 1950 to 1978**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan Exports to PRC</th>
<th>Total Japan Trade</th>
<th>PRC Exports to Japan</th>
<th>Total PRC Trade</th>
<th>Total 2-way Trade</th>
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**Sources:** Japanese Finance Ministry, (February 1979)

**Current Scene** (For Total PRC Trade estimates)
### APPENDIX H


<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan Exports to USSR</th>
<th>Russian/USSR Exports To Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>£2.5m</td>
<td>£0.7m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>1.0m</td>
<td>7.0m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>.6m</td>
<td>5.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1.8m</td>
<td>5.5m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>4.3m</td>
<td>9.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>6.5m</td>
<td>10.2m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>3.8m</td>
<td>4.1m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5.6m</td>
<td>2.8m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: David J. Dallin, The Rise of Russia in Asia, p. 245.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>J-Exports to USSR</th>
<th>USSR Exp. to Japan</th>
<th>Tot. J-Trade/ % with USSR</th>
<th>Tot. USSR Trade/ % with Japan</th>
<th>Total of 2-way trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>£ 20.373m</td>
<td>£ 19.887m</td>
<td>569,122m/.68%</td>
<td>8,648m/.46%</td>
<td>£ 40.250m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>70.897</td>
<td>76.104</td>
<td>8,546/.72</td>
<td>11,192/.61</td>
<td>147.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>97.800</td>
<td>112.989</td>
<td>10,046/.20</td>
<td>11,826/.78</td>
<td>210.789</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>183.710</td>
<td>112.989</td>
<td>10,553/.21</td>
<td>13,486/.22</td>
<td>296.699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>196.199</td>
<td>123.877</td>
<td>12,188/.20</td>
<td>14,331/.23</td>
<td>320.076</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>243.889</td>
<td>164.650</td>
<td>14,611/.21</td>
<td>15,420/.34</td>
<td>408.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>223.574</td>
<td>184.982</td>
<td>16,621/.24</td>
<td>16,233/.25</td>
<td>408.556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>258.641</td>
<td>352.965</td>
<td>22,105/.27</td>
<td>18,189/.36</td>
<td>611.606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>442.675</td>
<td>379.295</td>
<td>38,199/.21</td>
<td>24,539/.34</td>
<td>821.970</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>453.856</td>
<td>419.291</td>
<td>43,731/.19</td>
<td>26,286/.32</td>
<td>873.147</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>637.651</td>
<td>460.434</td>
<td>52,062/.21</td>
<td>31,409/.34</td>
<td>1,098.085</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>725.327</td>
<td>836.584</td>
<td>75,244/.20</td>
<td>42,155/.37</td>
<td>1,561.911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1,316.877</td>
<td>1,196.908</td>
<td>117,646/.21</td>
<td>52,289/.40</td>
<td>2,513.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,869.235</td>
<td>926.583</td>
<td>113,616/.24</td>
<td>70,237/.39</td>
<td>2,795.818</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2,432.598</td>
<td>986.737</td>
<td>132,024/.26</td>
<td>75,269/.45</td>
<td>3,419.335</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,858.889</td>
<td>1,496.863</td>
<td>151,304/.22</td>
<td>111,121/.30</td>
<td>3,355.752</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Japanese Finance Ministry Customs Clearance Figures (Col. 3, 5, 6.), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) (Col. 4).*

Conversion rates for Rouble in relation to US. £1.00 were as follows:

To Aug. 1971 = 0.9 / 1972 = 0.829 / 1973 = 0.7435 / 1974 = 0.7567 / 1975 = 0.7219 / 1976 and 1977 = 0.754.
Mr. John J. Schulz  
10413 Fyfe Court  
Fairfax, Virginia 22032

Dear Mr. Schulz:

I refer to your letter of February 11, 1980 requesting the release of certain Department of State documents under the Freedom of Information Act (Title 5 USC Section 552).

A search of files under the Department's control has resulted in the retrieval of 34 documents which appear relevant to your request. After careful review, we have determined that all of these documents must be withheld from release.

All the denied material has been determined to be properly exempt from release under Paragraph (b) (l) of Section 552 as currently and properly classified under Executive Order 12065 and authorized by that Order to remain protected in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.

With respect to material denied, you have the right to appeal this determination within sixty days. Appeals should be addressed to the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A letter of appeal should refer to the Freedom of Information case number shown above.

Sincerely,

For the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Classification/Declassification

[Signature]

Thomas W. Ainsworth  
Director, Mandatory Review  
Bureau of Administration
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