The Structure and Doctrine of the Path of Praxis (*Muʿāmala*) of the *Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn*: The Integration of reason and revelation in al-Ghazālī's revival project

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Thesis Abstract 8

Conventions 12

Abbreviations for Works Cited 15

CHAPTER 1

Two Notions of Religion: Integrating the Sharia, Praxis, and Higher Theology

Chapter Abstract 17

I. Introduction: Framing the Study of the Structure of the *Iḥyā'* 21

A. Assessing al-Ghazālī's Thought: From Influence to Appropriation 21

B. The Study of the *Iḥyā'* 23

C. Advancing the Study of the *Iḥyā'* 32

D. The Contribution of the Present Thesis 34

II. The Bridge from the *Mīzān* to the Religious Revival: *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, Q. XX 38

A. The Status of the *Tahāfut*: A Positive Work? 38

B. Fundamental Doctrines of the *Iḥyā'* in the *Tahāfut* 42

1. Dualist afterlife: Affirming the philosophical and scriptural notions 44

2. Scriptural hermeneutics particularized by topic: al-Ghazālī's response to *al-Aḍḥawiyya*'s search for a rule of interpretation 47

3. The sharia as the path to praxis 49

4. Dual layered praxis: Imitative sharia practice and the science of praxis 52

C. Bases of the *Iḥyā'* not Present in the *Mīzān* 54

1. Classifying the knowledge which causes felicity 54

2. Pleasures of the intellect; pleasures of the afterlife 55

3. Virtues reconceived: Attachment to pleasures of the afterlife 57

D. Summary Reflections on the *Tahāfut* and its Relation to the Religious Revival 58

III. Integration of Reason and Revelation: The Framework of Divisions and Levels 60

A. Analysis of the Primary Taxonomy: Practical and Speculative Sciences 60

B. The Contents of the Sciences of the Path of Praxis and Speculative Unveiling 63
C. Limiting the Scope of the Prophetic Mission to the Practical 65
IV. Two Meanings and Levels of Religion in the Revival of the Religious Sciences 68
V. The Levels of the Sciences and Implication for the Notion of Religion 80
A. The *Falāsifa*'s Concept of Religion: Two Levels of its Practical and Speculative Aspects 80
B. Precedents and the Intellectual Context of al-Ghazālī's Philosophy of Religion 84
1. Two levels in the theoretical sciences in al-Iṣfahānī and Avicenna 84
2. Two levels within the practical sciences: Avicennian precedents 85
C. Precedents in the *Mīzān*: Levels within the Speculative Sciences 89
D. Levels within the Practical Sciences Understood by the Inheritors 90
E. Use of al-Fārābī's notion of Religion in the *Iḥyāʾ*: Assessing the Evidence 93
Concluding Reflections 95

CHAPTER 2

Two Parallel Levels of Religious Discourse: Similitudes, True Realities, and a Hermeneutic

Chapter Abstract 98
I. A Philosophical Notion of Scriptural Interpretation 99
A. Al-Ghazālī's Use of the Philosophical Doctrines of Prophecy and his Development of Related Scriptural Hermeneutics 99
B. Interpretation in the *Iḥyāʾ*: Moderation and a Discourse for the Masses and the Elite 103
C. Scriptural Interpretation as Dream Interpretation 108
D. Similitudes and Abstract Knowledge of Theology 121
E. Treading the Path as Prerequisite for Scriptural Interpretation 123
II. Topics of Revelation: Divine Attributes, the Afterlife, and Commands and Prohibitions 126
A. The Divine Attributes and the Corporeal–Incorporeal Dichotomy 127
B. The Afterlife: Corporeal and Incorporeal Elements 133
C. Rituals, Divine Commands, and Prohibitions: Inner and Outer Aspects and the Hermeneutic of the Inheritors 137
1. The inner and outer aspects of the sharia 138

2. Insight and the autobiographical allusion to the role of inheritor of the prophets 139
3. The basis of the hermeneutic: A philosophy of prophetic acts 141
4. Applying the hermeneutic: Interpreting acts 142
III. The Status of Scriptural Similitudes 148
A. The Complementarity of Outward and Inward Levels of Discourse 148
B. The Efficacy of Similitudes for Conveying True Knowledge 150
C. The Role of Scripture in Producing Practical and Speculative Knowledge 152
D. Al-Ghazālī's Response to Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya*: Assessing the evidence 155
Concluding Reflections: The Nature of Religion in the Religious Revival 164

CHAPTER 3

The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife: The Corporeal–Incorporeal dichotomy, Corporeal and Intellectual Pleasures, and Related Eschatological Ranks

Chapter Abstract 167
I. Two Fundamental Doctrines of the Praxis of the Afterlife: True Religion as Perfection of the Eternal Soul 170
A. The Philosophical Doctrine of Felicity and al-Ghazālī's Afterlife Criterion 171
B. The Eternality of the Soul 175
II. Al-Ghazālī's Bipartite Cosmology and Avicenna's Body–Soul Dualism 178
III. Intellectual Pleasures and Love of God and the Afterlife 186
A. *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*: The Backbone of the Link between Intellectual Pleasure and the Afterlife 187
B. Two Ranks in the Afterlife: Corporeal and Incorporeal Pleasures 196
IV. Praxis and the Two Poles of Corporeal Pleasures and Intellectual Pleasures 200
A. Competition between the Corporeal and Incorporeal Faculties: Incorporating the Dualism into Praxis 200
B. Misconceptions of Unveiling and the Beatific Vision 207
Concluding Reflections 210

CHAPTER 4

The Imitation–Demonstration Dichotomy and its Role in the Structure of the *Iḥyā'*

Chapter Abstract 214

I. The Basic Meanings of the Dichotomous Terms 216

A. Origin and Specific Context of Imitation in al-Ghazālī 217

B. The Basic Meaning of Imitation and Belief without True Knowledge 220

C. Demonstrative Knowledge and the Three Types of Belief 222

II. The Cosmology Underpinning the Dichotomy 227

A. The Cosmological Nature of the Corporeal and Incorporeal Worlds 227

B. The Corporeal World as a Veil 229

C. The Corporeal World as a Mercy and Ladder to the Incorporeal World 231

D. The Four Levels of Existence and the Cosmology Underpinning Mercy 233

E. Sub-Layers and Further Veils which Resolve to the Corporeal–Incorporeal Dichotomy 236

1. *Iḥyā'*, Book VIII, The Etiquette of Koranic Recitation 237

2. *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā* (and the levels of belief) 238

III. The Two Eschatological Ranks Accorded to Imitation and Demonstration 242

IV. The Structure of the Religious Stations and their Relation to Eschatological Ranks 249

A. Demonstration as the Fount of the Salvific Virtues (*Munjiyyāt*) in the *Iḥyā'* 250

1. Integration of demonstration in the 4th Quarter 250

2. Three meanings of belief (*īmān*) in Book II, *Kitāb Qawā'id al-'aqā'id* 253

B. Two Aspects of Certainty in Book I, *Kitāb al-'Ilm*: Sufi and Philosophical 255

C. Demonstration in the *Iḥyā'* and the *Mi'yār* 260

1. The *Mi'yār*'s context theory informing the levels of belief in the *Kitāb al-'Ilm* 260

2. Demonstration, context theory, and a source of the *Iḥyā'*s cosmology 263

3. Defence of demonstration: Against the *kalām* scholars 268

V. The Primacy of the Two Levels and the Nature of the Third Level 271

A. Treiger's Triad 272

B. Clarification of the Second Level 274
C. Clarification of the Third Level 280
1. The third level and how it relates to the second level (of true knowledge) 283
2. The variable nature of witnessing (*mushāhada*) in the *Iḥyā'* 287
Concluding Reflections 294
Appendix I: Witnessing as Transcendence of Vice (by Praxis) and Imagination 296

CHAPTER 5

Praxis: The Bridge between the Two Worlds

Chapter Abstract 299
I. The Metaphysicalization of Praxis: Bridging from the Corporeal to the Incorporeal 301
A. Core Doctrines of Metaphysicalized Praxis Originating in the *Mīzān* 302
B. The Transfer of the Core Doctrines of Metaphysicalized Praxis to the *Iḥyā'* 309
C. From the Praxis of the *Mīzān* to the 'Path of Praxis' 311
D. Linguistic Integration of Praxis 317
1. Praxis as travel between the *mulk* and *malakūt* 317
2. Praxis as the straight path of orthodoxy (*ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā'a*) 318
II. The Mechanism of Praxis: The Mutual Influence of Body and Soul 320
A. The Mechanism of the Path of Praxis: Habituation Framed between the Corporeal and Incorporeal 320
B. The Mutual Influence between the Body and Soul 326
C. Sources of the Mutual Influence of Body and Soul 327
D. The Medications of the Soul: An Ointment of Knowledge and Acts 329
III. Expansion of Praxis into a Path of Praxis: Stairway to the Incorporeal World 337
A. The Notion of a Path 337
B. The *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* and the Path of Purification 338
C. Incorporating Imitative Beliefs Made to Grow through Worship 343
D. Incorporating the Higher Levels of the Path 345

1. The exterior and interior of the heart 345
2. The two sides of the fourth level of purity 347
3. Invocation as imitative and contemplation as demonstrative: *Kitāb al-Tafakkur* 348
4. Invocation and contemplation: The causes of intimacy and love 352
5. The eschatological value of invocation and contemplation 354
Concluding Reflections 357
Appendix I: Theoretical and Practical Remedies for the Destructive Vices 360

CHAPTER 6
The Salvific Virtues: States Emanating from True Knowledge and Intellectual Pleasure

Chapter Abstract 367
I. The Salvific Virtues as State (*Ḥāl*) and Station (*Maqām*) 369
II. The Virtues as Attachments to the Incorporeal 372
A. The Division between the *Iḥyā'*s Vices and Virtues 372
B. The Virtues as Attachments 377
C. The Fount of the Virtues: Love Flowing from Knowledge and Pleasure 379
III. The Virtues as Flowing Down from Knowledge 381
A. How the Virtues Flow from Each Other 381
B. Signs of Scholars of the Afterlife: The Rhetorical Structure for Making the *Iḥyā'* a Proof (*Ḥujja*) against Scholars of the Here-Below 386
C. Particular Virtues as Logical Prerequisites for Others 389
D. Two Founts for the Virtues: Imitation and Demonstration 393
Concluding Reflections 397
Appendix I: The Sources of Book XXIII from the *Akhlāq* Tradition, Sufi Manuals, and Scripture 398
Conclusion 403
Works Cited 413

Thesis Abstract

Ghazālī studies has undergone a revision that has undermined the myth of al-Ghazālī as the destroyer of philosophy and rational thought in Islam. One manner of imagining al-Ghazālī that has emerged is as a crypto-philosopher, covertly deploying philosophical doctrines, including those rejected in the *Tahāfut*. Another stance in the revision taken by Fazlur Rahman already in the 1950's tends to see that al-Ghazālī's use of philosophical texts and doctrines involves modifications and produces an intermediate position reflecting aspects of philosophy and the pre-existing orthodoxy, akin to the famous example of the doctrine of causality. Showing how, even at his most philosophical, that al-Ghazālī is not only waxing rhetorical, but synthesising and accommodating, requires discipline and an ear for more than one subject or discourse. The more nuanced position requires moving from *that* he used philosophical texts to *how*, but the structure of his most important work in this regard remains unstudied, his monumental *Iḥyā' ʿulūm al-dīn* (the Revivification of the Religious Sciences). This work turns out to be singularly informative regarding his nature as a thinker, and a central case-study of inter-cultural interaction between Islamic and Hellenic currents. The Iḥyā', from one perspective, is a veritable summa. From another perspective, it is an extensive treatise written by an author upholding and negotiating several epistemological sources or cultural systems: scripture, orthodoxy, Sufism, and the philosophical inquiry of the intellect, provided it avoids logical fallacies. These sources are appropriated to produce theological doctrine, worship, virtue, invocation, and contemplation deployed to the author's overriding aim: an eschatological telos. The structure of the product in the form of the *Iḥyā'* must be determined before its implications may be analysed, and the current study is the first to gather al-Ghazālī's statements about structure and systematically study the practices comprising the books to determine their common features, and their inconsistencies with each other and the said statements. The results of this research may be viewed through comparison of the *Iḥyā'* with what has been determined its blueprint—the *Mīzān al-ʿamal*—asking how they treat the subject, praxis, yet have an entirely different presentation. The findings are that the *Iḥyā'* contains a consistent two-layered structure which absorbs the added elements not found in *al-Mīzān*. Through this structure, the philosophical praxis of the *Mīzān* is stretched into what is termed here the path of praxis (*muʿāmala*) and the philosophical discourse is expanded into two levels: abstract discourse and truth versus corporeal similitudes of scripture, the reality

being implicit in scripture, but requiring interpretation. A crucial finding is that the two-fold structure built on al-Ghazālī's cosmological terms *mulk* and *malakūt* is itself partially borrowed from philosophers holding that religion is a corporeal imitation of the abstract philosophical truth (whose use is interpreted below). These epistemological levels, achieved both through philosophical and sharia praxis, are applied to eschatology. The Ghazālīan solution claiming that the incorporeal felicity of the philosophers and the corporeal salvation of scripture are both possible and are both prepared for by the two said forms of praxis is shown to be already predicted in the *Tahāfut* and, strangely, placed on the tongues of the *falāsifa* in the final section. The sources of *Tahāfut* Q. XX which include Avicenna themselves uphold the trans-political benefits of religion (contra al-Fārābī), but al-Ghazālī takes this potentiality and constructs a path of praxis which takes as its telos the two forms of salvation in the afterlife (*maʿād*): corporeal and incorporeal.

Chapter 1 investigates the basis for uniting reason and revelation into two epistemological and eschatological levels: the corporeal and incorporeal. It then shows how the *Iḥyāʾ* adopts the related notion that religion is the corporeal similitude of the incorporeal (and abstract) higher truth. These notions then assist in interpreting the misunderstood classification of the sciences in the *Iḥyāʾ*, 3rd Quarter. In this classification, the two levels are present as religious sciences, termed imitative, and the abstrusely termed 'intellectual sciences of the afterlife' (*al-ʿulūm al-ʿaqliyya al-ukhrawiyya*). Here, the two levels manifest and it becomes clear that religion (part of the title of his work) has two meanings: higher and lower, kernel and shell. However, al-Ghazālī renders the higher truth the science of unveiling incorporating religious insights, so careful interpretation is engaged with.

Chapter 2 establishes that between the two levels is a hermeneutic connecting them. Al-Ghazālī is shown to effectively respond to Avicenna's *al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya* which claims that *kalām* scholars are alternatively literal or figurative when it suits them and without minding any consistent rule (*qānūn*). While in several works al-Ghazālī is known to address valid and invalid hermeneutical methods, here he deploys a hermeneutic to speak simultaneously on two levels regarding the major topics of theology in the *Iḥyāʾ*: the divine attributes, eschatology, and the divine law (including ritual worship). Producing the two consistent levels of discourse woven into the *Iḥyāʾ*—the outward similitude and the reality known secondarily by the light of reason after being revealed to prophets—require constant

interpretation, and show him, not Avicenna, to be the inheritor of the prophets, able to interpret all (or most) of scripture.

Chapter 3 elucidates a doctrine that is termed here on as the 'afterlife criterion'. It studies the 3rd Quarter passage drawn from the *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm* which sets out in technical terms the divide between the eternally true demonstrative knowledge fit to cause felicity to the human soul and that which changes, which are objects of desire in the here-below (*dunyā*). This true, eternal knowledge is thus associated with true religion, the religion of the afterlife. The psyche must detach from corporeal objects of the here-below before it may apprehend and enjoy the pleasure of incorporeal objects, al-Ghazālī here drawing on Avicenna's arguments for intellectual pleasures.

Chapter 4 shows this dichotomy to be fundamental to the epistemology of the *Iḥyā'*, expressed as imitation versus true knowledge (i.e. demonstration). *Kalām* is placed nearer to the level of the masses. Direct beholding and annihilation are for the state produced by knowledge to dominate the heart. This domination of the heart by a state or attribute effects perception such that, for instance, instead of mere rational acknowledgement of the theological doctrine that God is one, the heart only sees God, even seeing itself and the objects of knowledge as the acts of God expressing His attributes.

Chapter 5 shows some of the key steps and levels by which praxis is extended to a path of praxis, serving as a bridge from the *mulk* to the *malakūt*. The eschatological aim of the *Iḥyā'* is framed terms a path from the corporeal to the incorporeal world, treating the philosophical problem of how the two separate worlds interact. This is termed a metaphysicalisation of praxis and this chapter sets out the levels of the psyche and shows how they map onto stages of the *Iḥyā'*s path of praxis.

Chapter 6 proves that the dichotomy is fundamental to the structure of the *Iḥyā'* by studying its presence in each virtue and how the two teleological and eschatological ends of the *Iḥyā'* are related to the virtues. While the philosophical virtues inherited from Greek ethics are merely character traits, the *Iḥyā'*s virtues are layered. They have a root, branches, and fruits which are belief, states of the heart, and acts of the limbs, respectively. Al-Ghazālī caters for two audiences, allowing that this root may be imitative knowledge, not demonstrative knowledge, though imitative knowledge is shakeable and must be reinforced. While imitative knowledge is not true knowledge (and hence is corporeal), it is, as shown in Chapter 2 on

interpretation, complementary (*muwāfiq*) to the higher reality because it is the product of revelation. So, even those unable to produce true knowledge through the syllogistic method explained in the penultimate *Kītāb al-Tafakkur* may gain the religious traits by which their heart inclines towards the afterlife and its eschatological consequences outlined in detail. Al-Ghazālī's virtues (and the psyche expressed in it) are integral: knowledge necessarily causes states which necessarily cause acts. In this manner, he makes the virtues signs that one has true religious knowledge and inclines towards it with the heart to protect religion from worldly scholars who use religion for material benefit. Additionally, higher virtues have progressively more conditions, so by possessing the higher, such as love, one necessarily possesses the lower, such as patience. Thus, he has constructed the virtues to be a proof of (true) Islam by logically valid structural argument: where the states (and their acts) described in the 4th Quarter are not present, there is no religious knowledge and states (i.e. where there is no smoke, there is no fire, a valid hypothetical mood termed the *modus tollens* shared with and described in al-Ghazālī's *Miʿyār*). This proof also works against philosophers who neglect ethics, by whom al-Ghazālī would likely have Avicenna and his followers in mind.

Many of the above findings are abstract structures. However, these structures relate important matters such as knowledge, ethical traits, and speculative knowledge with enormous implications. The conclusion turns to interpret these findings. Of special interest is Chapter 1 that found that imitation and intellectual inquiry are related to each other as shell and kernel. This implies that intellectual inquiry is the cause of felicity and hence above religion. However, the fact that al-Ghazālī terms the higher level the kernel of *religion* and the *religion* of the afterlife complicates this, as does the fact that previous Ashʿarī and even Muʿtazilī theology also founded the branches of religion on speculative inquiry (*naẓar*). A second central concern is the so-called audience question. The *Iḥyāʾ*'s two primary levels—imitation and demonstration—cater for two separate audiences, leaving the door open to the argument that what has been termed the *Maḍnūn* syllabus is not out of step with structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*. Thirdly, al-Ghazālī insists on a notion of direct witnessing and annihilation which is above reason, without undermining it, but rather through seeing the same intelligible forms as manifestations. Al-Ghazālī conceives of reason and revelation as two sources sent by God. This notion obliges the endless task of drawing out the mutual implications of reason and revelation and the need to master both before speaking. This road he chooses is difficult to

interpret and outside easy and comfortable assessment by theologians and philosophers alike. There are further interpretive engagements needed, but the most salient feature of the *Iḥyā'* is a two-level structure in which various terms are used, but which encompasses a) corporeal / incorporeal, b) imitation / demonstration, c) corporeal salvation / incorporeal felicity, and d) outward practice / inward attributes of the heart and intellect. This invokes the theme of development in al-Ghazālī's syllabus, for this dichotomy changes as early as *al-'Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn* in which intellectual knowledge is lumped with imitation below spiritual tasting.

Conventions

All Arabic transliteration is according to the conventions of the Library of Congress, with one exception: the closed *tā'* (*tā' marbūṭa*) is romanized '*a*' instead of '*ah*'.

Koranic translations are those of Marmaduke Pickthall, replacing the term 'Allah' with 'God'.

Some Arabic terms, such as *bāṭin* (inner aspect) will remain in Arabic due to either to the difficulty of translation or the awkwardness of the resulting phrases. In such cases, the initial mention will be glossed with an approximate English translation. The term *falāsifa* will be maintained to refer to those who referred to themselves as such. The term *sharīʿa* (religious code) has entered English and will be sharia.

The Arabic term *bayān*, when it refers to a part of the *Iḥyā' ʿulūm al-dīn* or *Mīzān al-ʿamal*, will be glossed on its first occurrence, then replaced throughout with 'chapter'. Other such terms of demarcation such as '*faṣl*' (sometimes translatable as 'section') will not be replaced, including the term '*bayān*' when it refers to a part of another work.

The full titles of primary cited works are found in the 'Abbreviations for Works Cited'. When titles are first introduced, the commonly used titles will appear. Thereafter, the single word title appearing in the abbreviations list will be used. Books of the *Iḥyā'* are referred to in English to be more widely meaningful. The books of Imam al-Ghazālī are referred to by their Arabic name to avoid confusion. In those cases in which the identity or title of the book is significant in the context of this paper, a translation will follow the commonly used title. I have prefixed 'T1,', 'T2,' etc. to the title of each block quote (they restart at 'T1' at each new chapter). Cross-references to these quotes in the main text simply read (within the same chapter) 'see T1 above', or when referencing a block quote from another chapter 'see Chapter 2, T1'.

Notes on the Translation of Terms

ʿAql-ʿAqliyya: *ʿAql* is translated as intellect, except when mentioned vis-à-vis transmission of knowledge (*naql*), in which case it is translated as 'reason'. *ʿAqliyya* is translated as 'intellectual' rather than rational, as rational has misleading baggage. This is especially so as the cogitative faculty in the psychology al-Ghazālī deploys is a corporeal faculty set off against the intellect

which is incorporeal and distinguishes the human being from the brute animals. Rational proofs are one exception allowed due to rational proofs being far more idiomatic than intellectual proofs.

The *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* provides a long list of synonyms or near synonyms which indicate that intellect, heart, insight, divine light, and expansion of the breast signify the subtle matter that is responsible for willing (including sinning and obedience) and apprehension (see Chapter 2). In all cases and by whatever name, it is insight which perceives the universal realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) of things which is contrasted with the sight of animals which perceives only the sensible and imaginative.

Naẓar: speculative inquiry. In his somewhat religious preface to the *Miʿyār*, al-Ghazālī sets out that *naẓar* is the method for producing true knowledge whose faculty is exclusively the intellect and whose arbiter is demonstration. To translate this word merely as inquiry or investigation contravenes al-Ghazālī's insistence in the *Miʿyār* carried over in the *Iḥyāʾ* that to be sound it requires the correct application of the cannons of logic, except in illuminated individuals (the insistence on logic is found in two parts of the *ʿAjāʾib* and in a crucial passage defining *naẓar* in the *Kītāb al-Tafakkur*, the latter being noted just below). To translate the word as theoretical involves baggage to do with the split between fact and theory and the debates about whether there are facts which are not theory laden and so on. The Aristotelian distinction is between the speculative and practical, and this is the most correct way to translate the word here, in the context that it sources of the *Miʿyār* have been studied and are known.

In the *Iḥyāʾ*, *naẓar* is made synonymous with a list of terms which are themselves synonyms or near synonyms: contemplation (*fikr* and *tafakkur*), reflection (*istibṣār*), and *tadabbur*. This list is individually defined, all being different aspects of syllogistic reasoning, in the *Kītāb al-Tafakkur*.

Mukāshafa and *muʿāmala*: Speculative unveiling and the path of praxis. The transfer of these terms from knowledge (*ʿilm*) and praxis (*ʿamal*) in the *Mīzān* has been studied by Avner Gilʿadi. I have translated the terms here to show their continuity, but also their change in the *Iḥyāʾ*. Speculative unveiling is used here to capture the dual aspect of this term. It is speculative because it retains the nature of true knowledge obtained by speculative inquiry and largely

maintained from the *Mīzān*. It is termed unveiling because in *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, al-Ghazālī makes it clear that the locus of knowledge is one, the heart, but in addition to acquisition through contemplation and learning, such knowledge may be obtained by inspiration. The term I have chosen preserves both meanings and sets it apart from the *Mīzān*'s knowledge, but also from something like speculative knowledge. To term it the science of unveiling, as per the author of one of the most important publications on al-Ghazāli in recent years, Alexander Treiger, reveals only one aspect of the meaning. If the sole meaning were unveiling whose mode of acquisition is solely to push aside the veil, it would not make sense or perhaps even be possible to write it discursively. Nonetheless, the books of the Iḥyāʾ contain treatment of topics fulling under the heading of unveiling, and al-Ghazālī states that some such material is contained in the *Iḥyāʾ*—in spite of his reservations—both inside and outside the *Iḥyāʾ*.

Mulk: Corporeal realm. While the term might be translated as the 'seen' or 'visible' world or realm, corporeal is more fundamental. Being seen is a relative, not its ontological status, and is only one relative attribute. It could equally be called the visible or sensible world, in opposition to the intelligible or spiritual world. Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife: The Corporeal–Incorporeal Dichotomy, Corporeal and Intellectual Pleasures, and Related Eschatological Ranks', collects the passages which establish the characteristics of the *mulk* and *malakūt* and establish their relationship. The *mulk* flows from the *malakūt* according to the microcosm–macrocosm analogy, just as the celestial bodies emanate from the celestial souls. This and the point above indicate that it is awkward and misleading to translate these terms as dominion, and so on, because being corporeal and incorporeal is the fundamental meaning of the terms.

Malakūt: Incorporeal realm. (See '*Mulk*'.)

Abbreviations for Works Cited

(See 'Works Cited' for full entries.)

Abbreviations for Works by al-Ghazālī

ʿAjāʾib	*Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* (Book XXI of the *Iḥyāʾ*)
Fayṣal	*Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayn al-Islām wa-l-zandaqa*
al-Fuṣūl	*al-Fuṣūl fī l-asʾila wa ajwibatihā*
Iḥyāʾ	*Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*
Iljām	*Iljām al-ʿawāmm ʿan ʿilm al-kalām*
Alal-Iqtiṣād	*al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād*
Jawāhir	*Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruh*
Kīmiyā-yi	*Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat*
Maʿārij	*Maʿārij al-quds fī madārij maʿrifat al-nufūs*
Maqāṣid	*Maqāṣid al-falāsifa*
Miḥakk	*Miḥakk al-naẓar*
Mishkāt	*Mishkāt al-anwār*
Miʿyār	*Miʿyār al-ʿilm*
Mīzān	*Mīzān al-ʿamal*
al-Qisṭās	*al-Qisṭās al-mustaqīm*
Riyāḍa	*Riyāḍat al-nafs wa-tahdhīb al-akhlāq wa-muʿālajat amrāḍ al-qalb* (Book XXII of the *Iḥyāʾ*)
Tahāfut	*Tahāfut al-falāsifa*

Abbreviations for Works by other Authors

al-Aḍḥawiyya	*al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī-l-maʿād* byAvicenna
Aḥwāl	*Aḥwāl al-nafs* by Avicenna
al-Akhlāq	*Risālat al-Akhlāq* by Avicenna
al-Dharīʿa	*al-Dharīʿa fī makārim al-sharīʿa* by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī
al-Duʿāʾ	*al-Duʿāʾ wa-l-ziyāra* by Avicenna

Fī al-ʿahd	*Risāla fī l-ʿahd* by Avicenna
ʿIlm al-akhlāq	*Risāla fī ʿilm al-akhlāq* by Avicenna
al-Ishārāt	*al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* by Avicenna
Itḥāf	*Itḥāf al-sāda al-muttaqīn bi-sharḥ Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* by Murṭaḍā al-Zabīdī
al-Mubāḥathāt	*al-Mubāḥathāt* by Avicenna
Muqaddima	*Muqaddimat jJāmiʿ al-tafāsīr* by al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī
al-Najāt	*Kitāb al-Najāt fī-l-ḥikma al-manṭiqiyya wa-l-ṭabīʾiyya wa-l-ilāhiyya* by Avicenna
Qūt	*Qūt al-qulūb fī muʿāmalat al-Maḥbūb wa-wasf tarīq al-murīd ilā maqām al-tawḥīd* by Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī
Rasāʾil	*Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafā* by Ikhwān al-Ṣafā
al-Riʿāya	*al-Riʿāya li-huqūq Allāh* by al-Hārith al-Muḥāsibī
al-Risāla	*al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya* by Abū l-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Qushayrī
Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma	*Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī
Shifāʾ	*Ilāhiyyāt*: *al-Shifāʾ* by Avicenna
al-Taʿarruf	*al-Taʿarruf li-madhhab ahl al-taṣawwuf* by Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī
Tahdhīb	*Tahdhīb al-akhlāq* by Aḥmad Miskawayḥ
ʿUyūn al-ḥikma	*ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* by Avicenna

Chapter 1

Two Notions of Religion: Integrating the Sharia, Praxis, and Higher Theology

Chapter Abstract

This first chapter introduces the state of Ghazālī scholarship regarding the *Iḥyā'*. It indicates that, in spite of the *Iḥyā'* being one of the most important works in Islamic thought, scholarship has not yet properly succeeded in moving from noting that al-Ghazālī uses one of two or more disparate sources—namely, Sufism of al-Makkī (and al-Muḥāsibī) and *falsafa* (largely of Avicenna)—towards identifying how these sources are appropriated. This is to move from *that* he uses these source to *how*. The current philological study offers what is hopes its reader find to be a significant advance through performing a thorough study of the books of the *Iḥyā'*, collecting al-Ghazālī's statements strewn across largely the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Quarters and then testing these claims against the actually structure and doctrine of the *Iḥyā'*. A cosmological dichotomy of the corporeal and incorporeal which has rigorous philosophical roots and includes Avicenna's body–soul dualism is shown to run through and underpin nearly all discussions from sharia practice, credal belief, character traits/Sufi stations, and true knowledge. The present thesis provides an evidence-based and cross-checked investigation into the *Iḥyā'* needed to feed into discussions of al-Ghazālī's nature as a thinker and unsolved debates such as his so-called reserved (*maḍnūn*) corpus and the claim that he is a crypto-philosopher. The structure and composition of the *Iḥyā'* themselves tell us how al-Ghazālī deploys or joins between Sufism and *falsafa*, and indeed between reason and revelation as sources of knowledge. Nearly all of the structure revealed appears to be new and previous claims regarding its structure are shown based on isolated statements, often misunderstood because the groundwork present in this thesis had not been undertaken.

As noted below, Richard Frank claimed that the *Mīzān* serves as the blueprint for the *Iḥyā'*. However, Section II introduces the claim to Ghazālī scholarship that the *Tahāfut* contains the blueprint particularly for how the *Iḥyā'* joins between reason and revelation. Question XX of the *Tahāfut* has been shown to be based on Avicenna's *al-Shifā'* and *al-*

Aḍḥawiyya. In Question XX, al-Ghazālī not only collects Avicenna's solutions for how to join between the sharia and practical and speculative *falsafa* to reach felicity, but also makes numerous connections between these pieces that are not in Avicenna. Thus, we are faced with a growing list of positive reworkings of *falsafa* in the *Tahāfut*, but also numerous doctrines appear in which it can be clearly shown that Avicenna has sharia-friendly positions that are not mentioned by al-Ghazālī, but that al-Ghazālī deploys in his other works. This accords with the role he claims for himself in the *Munqidh*: that of the snake-handler; the poison lies so close to the serum that the snake should never be handled in the open lest those without the ability to separate them be fatally bitten. Al-Ghazālī openly states in the *Tahāfut* that the philosophical positions of a) the soul's survival of bodily death and b) a higher afterlife consisting of intellectual pleasure accords with scripture. This intellectual pleasure has a prerequisite which is to tread the path of philosophical praxis which is linked to the sharia as explained below. Fulfilment of this prerequisite resultants enables the operation of the intellect which itself results in its perfection through receiving the incorporeal intelligibles. Al-Ghazālī asserts that the best approach is to join between this and the scriptural depiction of corporeal pleasures that are promised for those who merely believe, but are unable to obtain true knowledge. The *Tahāfut* is also shown to contain an allusion to a response with which al-Ghazālī replies to a challenge contained in Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya*; namely, the charge that theologians are inconsistent, treating scriptural topics in contradictory ways: figurative regarding anthropomorphic divine attributes and literal regarding the afterlife. One may begin to see a set of fundamental issues in al-Aḍḥawiyya addressed in the *Tahāfut* which then play a role in crossing the enormous gap between the *Mīzān* and the *Iḥyā'*. While the *Mīzān* offers no developed solutions for how to join between sharia and philosophical praxis (via Sufism), Question XX contains this as well as a significant part of a hermeneutic deployed in the Iḥyā' and studied in this chapter and the next. In this light, the *Tahāfut* becomes a crucial text to al-Ghazālī's revival project and the *Iḥyā'*, indicating that this project has significant continuity with texts and solutions produced before his departure. (For, the manner in which al-Ghazālī adopts a more consistent scriptural hermeneutic than Avicenna, see Chapter 2.)

Section III shows a fundamental matrix for joining between *falsafa* and sharia. Al-Ghazālī accepts the philosophical doctrine of the scope of the prophetic mission being largely limited to the practical. He also accepts that the Aristotelian division of the practical and

speculative, building the *Iḥyā'* on this divide. Within the division of the practical and speculative, al-Ghazālī introduces two levels in a manner performed by al-Fārābī: both sides of the division include a lower level, imitation associated with the sharia, and a higher level: true knowledge associated with reason. This makes sense of the heretofore misunderstood of the intellectual sciences into those of the here-below and afterlife which makes the sciences of the afterlife, counterintuitively, intellectual sciences.

The chapter closes by analysing what proceeded: al-Ghazālī has developed a notion of religion in the pejorative sense associated with its abuse by scholars of the here-below and a positive sense associated with the afterlife. The dichotomy is built on the cosmological dichotomy and the notion of levels found in al-Fārābī. The two levels are not contradictory truths, but are connected through a hermeneutic and al-Ghazālī is the inheritor of the prophets who alone possesses the ability to interpret the lower level (pure scripture) through the light of the intellect.

I. Introduction: Framing the Study of the Structure of the *Iḥyā'*

"I found that this al-Ghazālī relies on [Avicenna] in most of what he alludes to concerning the sciences of philosophy; so much so that, at some moments, he textually quotes his words, without change, whereas, at other moments, he changes them and links them more to questions pertaining to the sharia than Avicenna had done, as he is more knowledgeable of the secrets of the sharia than him."

Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Māzarī (d. 510/1116)
—A contemporary Mālikī *faqīh* and ʿAsharī *kalām* scholar—

A. Assessing al-Ghazālī's Thought: From Influence to Appropriation

Richard Frank's seminal studies convincingly undermined the myth of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111)—arguably Islam's most notable theologian—as the destroyer of rational thought in Islam.[1] A number of studies collectively confirmed the presence of Avicennian doctrines and textual borrowings in al-Ghazālī's non-philosophical works, producing the conclusion that he was a crypto-philosopher, clandestinely endorsing doctrines he himself condemned in the *Tahāfut al-falāsifa*.[2] A response was spearheaded by Michael Marmura emphasizing the continuing presence of Ashʿarī positions clearly stated in many of al-Ghazālī's core works.[3] A significant intermediate position emerged which is to find in al-Ghazālī's positions an acceptance of a philosophical framework reconciled with a sensitivity to Ashʿarī orthodoxy. A key example is the intermediate position on causality advanced by Jon

[1] Richard Frank, *Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazâlî & Avicenna* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992), and his *Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School* (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1994). Cf., Frank Griffel, *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 10–11.
[2] Shlomo Pinès, 'Quelques notes sur les rapports de l'Iḥyâ' 'Ulûm al-dîn d'al-Ghazâlî avec la pensée D'Ibn Sînâ', in Hamès Constant (ed.), *Ghazâlî, la raison et le miracle* (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1987); Avner Gilʿadi, 'On the Origin of Two Key-Terms in al-Ġazzālī's Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn', *Arabica: Revue d' Etudes Arabes* (1989): 81–92; Binyamin Abrahamov, 'Ibn Sīnā's Influence on al-Ghazālī's Non-Philosophical Works', *Abr-Nahrain,* XXIX (1991); Jules Janssens, 'Al-Ġazzālī, and His Use of Avicennian Texts', in Miklos Maroth (ed.), *Problems in Arabic Philosophy* (Pilicsaba: Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 37–49.
[3] The writings, actors, arguments, and responses involved are well summarized in Frank Griffel, 'The Dispute over al-Ghazālī's Cosmology', in *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 179–82.

McGinnis.[4] More broadly, one may see through passages in this thesis that a hierarchical universe resembling an emanative scheme exists in the *Iḥyā'*, XXXV (*Kītāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*); yet when al-Ghazālī states in *Iḥyā'*, XXXI (*Kītāb al-Tawba*) that—in the human psyche which flows from the mind to the states of the heart to the acts of the limbs—the flow of the *mulk* from the *malakūt* is necessary, he tempers it, saying this is due to the consistent practice (*sunna*) of God. Exploring intermediate positions may be seen as part of the development of the field from studying *that* al-Ghazālī uses philosophical courses, to investigating *how* he uses them. A number of fruitful paradigms have emerged since this discussion has become more critical and left early paradigms such as the so-called philosophical criterion for accepting the validity of al-Ghazālī's works based on whether or not they included positively stated philosophical positions. One of these paradigms relevant to an intermediate stance between the stance of Marmura and the crypto-philosopher claim is to see layers in al-Ghazālī's speech and syllabus, the latter described in *J̌awāhir al-Qur'ān*. Herbert Davidson showed evidence as early as 1992 that al-Ghazālī referred to philosophical ideas through varying terms that could be easily discerned. Afifi al-Akiti cites al-Ghazālī's own term for this: allusion (*talwīḥ*), and he argues that al-Ghazālī's theological syllabus is written at four levels. The current thesis advances study of the *Iḥyā'* through philologically studying the two consistent layers found to run through the structure and doctrine of the *Iḥyā'*: the corporeal (*mulk*) and incorporeal (*malakūt*) that figure at nearly every turn of thought in this *summa*. Amongst the most central matters built on this is the dichotomy of mere (imitative) belief and true knowledge, shown to lead to salvation and felicity, respectively. It is against this cosmological and doctrinal background that one my grasp the details of the role al-Ghazālī casts for himself: that of the inheritor of the prophets, capable of interpreting scriptural similitudes in light of the incorporeal knowledge to form the hermeneutic bridge between the two cosmological layers. It studies cases of al-Ghazālī replacing technical terms with scriptural terms as they are transferred from *Mīzān al-ʿamal* into the *Iḥyā'*, this process effectively involving what he terms an interpretation of 'all or most of scripture'.[5]

[4] Jon McGinnis, 'Occasionalism, Natural Causation and Science in al-Ghazālī', in James E. Montgomery (ed.), *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One. Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank* (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 441–63. Cf., *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology*, 182.
[5] See discussion of the role of the inheritor later in this chapter.

Pointing out more usages or so-called contradictions, endorsing positions condemned in the *Tahāfut*, only adds examples to an existing scholarly paradigm.[6] Exploring the appropriation of sources and the interactions between disciplines according to various paradigms is arduous and requires sensitivity to multiple disciplines, but it appears currently to be the only method for advancement of scholarship: developing and exploring the said intermediate paradigm.

B. The Study of the *Iḥyā*

While the transition from showing *that* al-Ghazālī used philosophical sources to *how* he used them has to some degree advanced the scholarship regarding his thought in general, the *Iḥyā'* remains a special case. Scholarship on the *Iḥyā'* is still unable to move with surety beyond the impasse framed by Taneli Kukkonen in the workshop hosted by Frank Griffel at Yale on the occasion of al-Ghazālī's 900th anniversary. In paraphrase, Kukkonen stated that we now know without doubt that, in the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī draws on large swathes of the Sufi work *Qūt al-qulūb* and at the same time draws significantly on the works of Avicenna. But we do not know how he drew on these two disparate traditions (and brought them together into a single work).

Much of the post-revision work has either continued to show the presence of Avicennian texts or concepts or, if they addressed the *Iḥyā'*, have focused on *mukāshafa*. There has been to date no thorough study of al-Ghazālī's path of praxis. Further, much of the arguments and studies done on praxis repeat isolated statements of al-Ghazālī or describe particular sections, but are not representative of the structure he actually produced in the forty books of the *Iḥyā'*. Their contributions, however, need to be brought to light here. In this section, I present key aspects of previous studies which are important to note before proceeding to the contribution of this thesis. I start by discussing what previous authors did and did not uncover concerning the structure of the *Iḥyā'*s praxis, and the Ghazālīan views/works in general. I then note the degree to which they investigated al-Ghazālī's use of Sufi

[6] One example of this is Alexander Treiger's monograph which turns from epistemology in the first four chapters to the claim that al-Ghazālī negates a corporeal resurrection in its conclusion. (See, Alexander Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*: *Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Mystical Cognition and its Avicennian Foundation* (Oxford: Routledge, 2012)). The current thesis shows that, as far as the *Iḥyā'* is concerned, dualist resurrection is not only upheld, but is fundamental to the structure of the *Iḥyā'* (see Chapter 2 on the two eschatological levels and Chapter 4 on the related epistemological levels which determine those eschatological outcomes).

Also, the status of the *Tahāfut* as a pure refutation has been seriously undermined (see Section II below).

and philosophical sources in the *Iḥyā'*. Finally, I argue that the key to uncovering the nature of the *Iḥyā'* and al-Ghazālī as a thinker is moving from merely showing *that* al-Ghazālī uses Sufi and philosophical sources to showing *how* he uses, incorporates, and appropriates such sources.

There are some obvious lacunae in the pre-revision writings as they tend to be descriptive and the analysis they provided labours under inaccurate assumptions. Most importantly, the criterion for determining the authenticity of al-Ghazālī's works, a criterion which rules out the possibility of holding philosophical doctrines in an authentic work such as the *Iḥyā'*. There are, however, major works that are worthy of taking into consideration here. For example, the work on the vices and virtues (which comprise one half of al-Ghazālī four-quarter treatment of praxis in the *Iḥyā'*) acknowledges the numerous philosophical sources: Mohammed Sherif's *Ghazali's Theory of Virtue*. However, the philosophical sources are merely listed, analysis of their integration, especially in the *Iḥyā'*, being cursory. Claims are commonly evidenced with a list of sources including al-Fārābī, Avicenna, and both the *Iḥyā'* and the *Mīzān*, thus glossing over the huge difference between the two works. (The current research into the structure of the *Iḥyā'* has found this difference to be the best method for achieving a clear approach to and presentation of the complicated structure of the *Iḥyā'*. They share the aims of praxis, and the *Mīzān* has a known structure whose sources have been studied.) Sherif also expresses Montgomery Watt's same emotionalist assumption: Sherif says, 'the highest virtue is not a more genuine form of knowledge, as is the case with Aristotle, but "emotion" produced by such knowledge, namely, "love of God".'[7] The present thesis shows through al-Ghazālī's statements and the structure he constructs that both removing vice and obtaining the virtues of the 4th Quarter, including love, is merely a purification and prerequisite for the ultimate end of the *Iḥyā'*: obtaining the knowledge of God. This indicates the author did not pay attention to the fundamental order of the *Iḥyā'* in which al-Ghazālī makes it very clear that felicity is caused by true knowledge, itself caused by contemplation, whose prerequisite is removing the vices and gaining the virtues. The same is the case for Sherif's highly disputable claim, which he based on Koranic exegesis, that what he calls 'Theological Virtues' are not virtues in the same sense as philosophical virtues; theological

[7] Mohammed Sherif, *Ghazali's Theory of Virtue* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1975), 74.

virtues are 'opposed to them',[8] and (yet) philosophical virtues, 'are conditioned by theological virtues'.[9] In the case of the *Iḥyā'*, what Sherif terms the 'theological virtues' play little role in its structure.

Yet, Sherif has well discovered and expressed a key to understanding how al-Ghazālī put together the various sources of the *Iḥyā'* (studied primarily in Chapters 1, 2, and 5 of the present thesis). He notes an example of how al-Ghazālī maintains notions but changes the term referring to them in the *Iḥyā'* thus, '…(I)n the *Revival* Ghazali calls them [i.e. the animal faculties] the "soldiers of the heart" (*junūd al-qalb*), because in this work he was generally unwilling to use philosophical terms, whereas in the *Criterion* [i.e. the *Mīzān*] the two faculties of the human soul, namely, the theoretical and practical faculties, are called knowledge (*'ilm*) and will (*irādah*) respectively. Yet the "content" of the *Revival* on this point agrees with that of the *Criterion*, and both agree with Avicenna's description of the faculties.'[10] However, Sherif comments on this matter as a single instance and moves on, and so the matter of using this key to unlock the discourse (and thereby the doctrine and structure) of the *Iḥyā'* was left to later scholars.

Three authors have particularly contributed to developing our understanding of al-Ghazālī's discourse: Herbert Davidson, Richard Frank, and Afifi al-Akiti. Herbert Davidson does not focus on the *Iḥyā'*, but studies al-Ghazālī's use of terms in helpful ways, gathering 'clues [to] slice through the cloud of verbiage'.[11] He cites passages where al-Ghazālī himself alludes to the possibility of expressing the same concept through different terms. For example, the *falāsifa* had the practice of referring to a part of their cosmology, the celestial intellects, through the scriptural term angels. Al-Ghazālī himself is shown to refer to the *falsafa* doctrine of the celestial intellects and use the phrase 'expressed by the term' (*yu'abbar 'anhā*) indicating his use of practice of deploying various terms to refer to the same reality. Davidson notes that the pattern of using religious nomenclature was already present in Avicenna's own writings. Ibn Taymiyya had already noted this coded discourse and claimed that the very practice of such coding was itself picked up by al-Ghazālī from the *falāsifa* (see Chapters 1 and 2). Nonetheless, Davidson's documentation and analysis were required to understand and

[8] Ibid., 84.
[9] Ibid., 85.
[10] Ibid., 27.
[11] Herbert A. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 134.

corroborate Ibn Taymiyya's hardly impartial testimony. The present study shows a repeated practice of not only of alternating terms for a single meaning, but of replacing technical or abstract terms drawn largely from *falsafa* and specifically noting that that the sharia expresses the same idea with a different term. It makes the further contribution of analysing al-Ghazālī's statements in the context of his philosophy of prophecy to show that the sharia—and therefore the inheritors of the prophets—generally speak in concrete similitudes when referring to abstract matters.

Our second author, Richard Frank, made seminal efforts to capture important features of al-Ghazālī's discourse. He notes how the register of discourse may be governed either by the nature of the work as a whole, or by the context of an individual passage. Frank's assessment which refers directly to the *Iḥyā'* is worth quoting at length:

T1, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School*, 86–7

> In many places, however, one or another [element of the basic, integrated theoretical system that underlies logical and theological writings] may be deliberately suppressed or obscured or held scarcely discernible just beneath the articulated surface of the text. This occurs sometimes—most conspicuously in *Iḥyā'*—even when the particular thesis may be quite clearly presented elsewhere in the same work. The form, cast, and scope of the particular work or passage determine in almost all cases the language, formal or figurative, technical or religious, in which any given theological thesis is presented, the mode and level, in short, in which al-Ghazālī states or alludes to or hints at his understanding of it or may simply dodge the issue altogether. Where he presents his thought in unambiguous conceptual terms, the basic character and structure of the system is clear to see and once grasped is readily discerned as governing what is said and, occasionally, what is not said when, though operatively present, it is not so presented.

While such analysis is undoubtedly based on Frank's wide-ranging familiarity with al-Ghazālī's syllabus, documentation is required to establish such practices and categories of works and registers. This includes his assessment, for instance, that *al-Qisṭās* is a popular work, while the *Mishkāt* is a more advanced work in which al-Ghazālī makes his unique positions more explicit. However, because these particular conclusions are not fortified with sufficient examples and citations, they merit further investigation but require those working on Ghazālīan studies to provide such evidence.

Afifi al-Akiti's unpublished thesis outlines al-Ghazālī's systematic practice known as

allusion (*talwīḥ*).[12] Al-Akiti argues for two stages of editing occurring in al-Ghazālī's use of sources: appropriation and naturalisation. In appropriation occurring in what al-Akiti terms the *Maḍnūn* syllabus, he describes al-Ghazālī's editing as subtle, but crucial; systematic but minimal. Naturalisation, he states, occurs in the *Iḥyā'* and other public works in which, 'adaption results in complete rewriting…usually involving transformed terminology and original prose'.[13] The keywords he derives from al-Ghazālī himself are *mabthūtha* and *talwīḥ*: such philosophical material is scattered (*mabthūtha*) throughout or within a various works and replaced with allusion (*talwīḥ*). These two terms express the core of the integration process. The current thesis engages with his notions and description of the integration process largely in Chapters 1 and 2 which explore al-Ghazālī's hermeneutic by which he relates two levels of discourse. With specific regard to the *Iḥyā'*, the present thesis establishes that al-Ghazālī develops a discourse composed of two layers, one of abstract notions, the other of concrete similitudes often drawn from scripture. Further, it emphasises that this hermeneutic involves a two-way process. From one viewpoint, when beginning with the abstract, aligning it with religious nomenclature necessarily involves a degree of scriptural interpretation (*ta'wīl*), a matter al-Ghazālī is shown to be perfectly aware of. When scriptural terms do not exist for a certain notion, what al-Akiti refers to as allusion, I show involves the active process of coining concrete similitudes (*ḍarb amthāl*) for abstract notions. The latter is stated by al-Ghazālī to be following the practice of the prophets of speaking to people according to the level of their intellect. However, he particularly views their level as though limited to conceiving things through the faculties below the intellect which have a corporeal element in the faculty psychology he uses: namely imagination, sense, and estimation. The prior he views as the ability of the rare proper inheritors of the prophets who are able to interpret all or nearly all scripture through the light of reason. Establishing that such practices are consistently deployed and analysing how they are built into the manner he structures the books of the *Iḥyā'* allows one to begin to answer the question of the manner in which al-Ghazālī uses or deploys his sources. His sources include his own philosophical writings which, to use al-Akiti's term, he filters into his public writings.

[12] See M. Afifi al-Akiti, 'The *Maḍnūn* of al-Ghazālī: A Critical Edition of the Unpublished *Major Maḍnūn* with Discussion of His Restricted Philosophical Corpus' (DPhil diss., 3 vols, University of Oxford, 2008), 1:39-44. Cf. his, 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly', in Y. Tzvi Langermann (ed.), *Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 85n71.
[13] Ibid.

In the study accompanying his translation *Discipling the Soul & Breaking the Two Desires*, Tim Winter shows a nuanced view of al-Ghazālī's use of concepts and sources of philosophy, noting that Ghazālī does so without mentioning their names lest he alienate his readers.[14] Winter also tracks a number of al-Ghazālī's Sufi sources, which will be useful towards elucidating Ghazālī's influences as we proceed. Taneli Kukkonen terms Winter's study of Ghazālīan and pre-Ghazālīan Sufism 'superb', and uses the study to conclude that the utter lack of connective tissue between the two aspects of the study indicates how al-Ghazālī's Sufism makes a leap into philosophical ethics and psychology. The present thesis examines this connective tissue in the following manner. We may define connective tissues for our purposes as whatever it is that allows a link between two (or three) discourses in the praxis of the *Iḥyā'*: Greek-origin faculty psychology and Sufism, though the thesis indicates the material complementing the Greek-origin material is replete with sharia and scripture. The connective tissue is effectively a form and a matter. The form is the hermeneutic for translating, as it were, between the two discourses. The matter is the specific doctrines and structures of the *Iḥyā'* which emerge from this engagement, and the technical reworking of his Sufi sources and identifying where and why al-Ghazālī draws on them where he does. This constitutes much of the 'connective tissue' which is not referred to in Winter's study, more being said in Section C. and D. below.

Even before the watershed of Richard Frank's writings on al-Ghazālī, Avner Gil'adi claimed that a deep philosophical structure of the sciences was adopted in the *Iḥyā'*.[15] In a paper of enduring importance, he claims that al-Ghazālī adopts a specifically Aristotelian division between the practical and speculative, and tracks some of the manners in which the *Iḥyā'* makes changes to the basic structure present in the *Mīzān*. His work shows that, in spite of its massive amount of Sufi and other materials, the practical and speculative division of the *Iḥyā'* may be discovered behind even the key terms which may be assumed to be Sufi: *mu'āmala* and *mukāshafa*. However, like Alexander Treiger's later work, his analysis of *mukāshafa* far outweighs *mu'āmala*. Gil'adi concludes that knowledge and praxis are traceable even in the *Mīzān* itself to a full Aristotelian classification of the theoretical and practical sciences—as they would be in *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* representing Avicenna's thought. He notes that the *Mīzān*

[14] Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī and T. J. Winter, *Al-Ghazālī On Disciplining the Soul & Breaking the Two Desires: Books XXII and XXIII of the Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihya' 'ulūm al-dīn)* (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1997), LIV.
[15] Gil'adi, 'The Origin of Two Key-Terms', 81–92. More on this work is said in Section III below.

mentions all the three branches of the practical sciences, but emphasizes economics while the *Iḥyā'* entirely omits economics and politics.[16] The widening gap he identifies between the science of praxis outlined in the the *Iḥyā'*, *Kītāb al-ʿIlm*, and the broader practical knowledge (*al-ʿIlm al-ʿamalī*) is already present in the *Tahāfut*: referring to praxis and intending thereby practical ethics without reference to politics and economics.[17] Gilʿadi is content to draw two conclusions. First, though the philosophical language of the *Mīzān* is absent from the *Iḥyā'*, the 'essentially Aristotelian dichotomy between the two main branches of knowledge by dividing the' religious sciences into the path of praxis and the science of unveiling are well represented in the *Iḥyā'*. Second, which he states is the central point for him, the terminology of the *Iḥyā'*, which is 'the most comprehensive and detailed presentation of the theories of orthodox Sufism',[18] is effected by the Islamic philosophical elaboration of the Aristotelian system. Thus, Gilʿadi's paper performs necessary groundwork, but stops short of the exploration of how al-Ghazālī expands on the Aristotelian framework in the *Iḥyā'* and how he develops a terminology which is both 'Islamic' and philosophical. Further, the paper does not address matters this thesis shows to be central to the *Iḥyā'*, such as al-Ghazālī's adoption of philosophical praxis, how his notion of the path of praxis allows him to gather ritual worship, vice, virtue, and invocation, nor such as how al-Ghazālī's 3rd and 4th Quarters resemble Sufi stations in name, but incorporate the science of unveiling as their font in fact (see Chapter 6).

Writing within the recent revision of Ghazālī studies, Alexander Treiger devoted his thesis and subsequent monograph to *mukāshafa*.[19] While some of his analysis of *mukāshafa* has a bearing on the structure of the *Iḥyā'*,[20] his brief statements regarding praxis offer less analysis. Treiger remarks that the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* is essentially a religious ethics.[21] He concludes after listing the books and practices of the *Iḥyā'* that it is essentially a religious ethics and summarizes this praxis as focussing on 'the ethical aspects of religious and social life (vols. 1–2), combating one's vices, cultivating the virtues, and developing proper religious attitudes, such as renunciation of the world, patience and thankfulness to God, reliance on God, and

[16] Ibid., 88.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid., 87.
[19] His findings indicate that this science is a true amalgamation or synthesis of not only *falsafa*, but also Sufism and the sharia. He states that it must be described as effectively a new science which did not previously exist.
[20] Section III.B of the present chapter discusses recent scholarship, including that of Alexander Treiger, on the pair of complementary terms: praxis and speculative unveiling (*mukāshafa*).
[21] Alexander Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*, 40.

mindfulness of death and the afterlife (vols. 3–4)'.[22] These remarks do not well represent the present thesis' findings from these quarters which reveal a metaphysicalised ethics, virtues that must be rooted on knowledge of a given theological topic, and a build up to contemplation in the pen-ultimate book. Yet, Treiger touches on a number of topics which proved useful to reconstruct the structure of the *Iḥyā'* in spite of his emphasis being clearly set on *mukāshafa*. These topics include the relation of *mukāshafa* to *muʿāmala*, the symbolic nature of prophecy, the four levels of *tawḥīd*, and the two natures of *yaqīn*. Several of these topics are not included in the subsequent monograph, and thus they are not developed, though they feature centrally in the current thesis.

Treiger's subsequent discussion of the legal status of the science of praxis comes closer to the contextual analysis of how al-Ghazālī uses ethics in the religious path of the *Iḥyā'*, showing that he argues for the legal obligation of applying the 3rd Quarter of the *Iḥyā'* adopting a sharia discourse.[23] Treiger shows that al-Ghazālī states that he disagrees with Sufis who say their knowledge is the obligatory knowledge mentioned in a prophetic command to seek knowledge, as this unduly restricts the meaning of the term 'knowledge'. However, al-Ghazālī holds forth that the majority of what he has placed in the 3rd Quarter is obligatory, which Treiger interprets correctly as implying that *fiqh* scholars have limited religion to outward acts while he addresses the obligations pertaining to the heart. This analysis is helpful, but the current thesis argues that this rhetorical engagement is best understood by stepping back and globally studying the structure of the *Iḥyā'* after which we may be more confident how al-Ghazālī relates *fiqh*, *kalām*, praxis, unveiling, and the resultant felicity. Thereafter there remains little need to analyse the pages of rhetoric other than as an example of how he speaks with a sharia hat on. This thesis cites al-Ghazālī himself stating that the first half of the *Iḥyā'* is devoted to outward things (and hence the sharia). Joining this to his discourse of striking similitudes, we would expect him to speak of higher realities in the veil of ethical, sharia language, and this is what Treiger finds him doing.

The present thesis engages extensively with Treiger's so-called epistemological triad. In Chapter 4, I argue that, in his monograph, Treiger presents a triad of imitation-intellect (and *kalām*)-direct witnessing while in the *Iḥyā' kalām* has a demoted rank associated with imitation and the intellect is disassociated with *kalām* and honoured by being linked to felicity.

[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.

The whole of the *Iḥyā'* turns out to be primarily based on an imitation–demonstration dichotomy. This reality is often clouded by expectations linked to Sufism. Several investigations are undertaken towards the end of making this clarification. Firstly, passages are studied in which al-Ghazālī uses terms such as expansion of the chest, divine light, and so on, for the intellect, explicitly stating that they refer to the same reality. Further, two passages are presented in which he associates *kalām* with mere dialectic and disputation, noting that some Sufis thereby err and demote the value of the intellect which is a precious jewel. Thirdly, it is shown that felicity and the virtues including love are achieved through the intellect, even if referred to by various names. Finally, it is shown that, in the *Iḥyā'*, the locus of the knowledge obtained through unveiling (*kashf*) remains the intellect.

An important monograph also written within the revision in Ghazālī studies, is Kenneth Garden's *The First Islamic Reformer*. The importance of Garden's work lies in the critical framework it develops and the production of a careful and coherent historical narrative. While the narrative centres round the *Iḥyā'*, we do not actually learn enough about the *Iḥyā'* to fulfill the need in Ghazālī studies for a critical study of the crucial work. Garden describes the *Iḥyā'*'s praxis as an 'amalgamation of law, philosophy, and Sufism'[24] which 'while playing the same role as Practical Science plays in philosophy's pursuit of felicity, is very different in terms of its content'. While this is true and helps paint a picture for the reader, it is not new, as this level of analysis was present as early as Gilʿadi. 'Neither', he adds '…is it the same as practice in the Sufi tradition'.[25] Garden claims that al-Ghazālī himself distinguishes between his method, especially in the 3rd Quarter, and that of the Sufis; al-Ghazālī says his own vices are individually obligatory (*farḍ ʿayn*) for all to remove, while the Sufi science of treatment of inner promptings (*khawāṭir*) is obligatory only for Sufis. Although this subtle distancing from certain forms of Sufism is again true, the manner in which al-Ghazālī both criticizes and uses Sufi writings throughout the *Iḥyā'* is not dealt with by Garden in this work. For instance, Chapter 2 of this study presents al-Ghazālī's criticisms of Sufism, where he claims they lack speculative inquiry (*naẓar*), which is very important even to understanding his praxis; he criticizes their statements as falling short of the standards of his own science of the afterlife. Chapter 5 of this thesis shows that Sufism is used largely to produce remedies designed as medicines of the heart. The same chapter shows that al-

[24] Kenneth Garden, *The First Islamic Reviver* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 76.
[25] Ibid.

Ghazālī formulates his claim contra some Sufis that his (Aristotelian) mean (*wasaṭ*) represents Islam's 'straight path' and orthodoxy's way of '*ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa*'. Sufis, on the other hand, commonly call wrongly to the removal of fundamental psychological faculties which leads to insanity, death, or doubts in religion. Chapter 6 shows they are deployed within the structure of al-Ghazālī's reworked vices and virtues. These largely overlooked elements in al-Ghazālī's views on Sufi sciences are required if we wish to make significant progress in our understanding and analysis of al-Ghazālī's praxis.

To conclude, the above is but a brief, representative glimpse of the state of the field, a note on major contributions within the said revision, and an identification of some of the lacunae this thesis contributes towards filling. There are indeed valuable contributions upon which this thesis draws to uncover the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ* and al-Ghazālī's theory of praxis. However, the field of Ghazālīan studies still requires huge efforts to offer a better grasp of this critical figure and his magnum opus and its placement within Islamic intellectual history. This thesis contributes towards the field by shifting the focus from mere identification of Avicennian influence to a comprehensive study of the *Iḥyāʾ*'s structure, especially its praxis, and how various sources are appropriated into its structure. It does so by first analysing the practices across the *Iḥyāʾ*, providing evidence of a dichotomous structure running through these practices, and documenting how al-Ghazālī attempted to produce a technical and defensible foundation into which to draw selectively from Sufi practice. However, because he systematically offers his own investigation of scripture, philosophical reasoning, and only then draws on Sufi practice, one may view the more central project as reconciling reason and revelation. The most accessible example is the highly repetitive book structure in which al-Ghazālī starts each topic of the second, so-called inner half of the *Iḥyāʾ* with a *bayān* drawing on scripture, followed by a separate *bayān* on the technical reality of the topic in which he draws on the *falāsifa*, but does not follow them blindly. (A similar but different structure determines the bulk of the 1st Quarter, as discussed in the body of this thesis.)

C. Advancing the Study of the *Iḥyāʾ*

Previous studies of the *Iḥyāʾ* lacked a thorough study of the commonalities and differences between the practices and quarters making up the *Iḥyāʾ*. This results in insufficiently grounded generalizations and assumptions serving as red herrings in Ghazālī studies. For example, the structure uncovered in the present thesis is requisite to answer important historical questions

related to the development of Islamic theology such as how Greek thought was reconciled and whether speculative contemplation became more important than scriptural and Sufi invocation. Due to not having the framework excavated from the *Iḥyā'*, the important scholar Kojiro Nakamura claimed invocation to be more important, basing this conclusion on individual statements in the *Iḥyā'*.[26]

The need for this investigation became clear to me via initial attempts to resolve certain problems surrounding understanding the rich material in the first half of *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb*, Book XXI, through thoroughly studying its sources, but also attempting to arrive at a clear picture of how Sufi texts such as al-Makkī's were modified or systematised to accord with a technical faculty psychology. In the same book of the *Iḥyā'*, it became clear that al-Ghazālī's classification of the sciences was based on a fundamental dichotomy between the corporeal and incorporeal which he alludes to in the passages leading up to this classification, but leaves implicit in explaining why the sharia sciences are imitative and sciences of the afterlife are termed 'intellectual sciences of the afterlife' (*ʿulūm ʿaqliyya ukhrāwiyya*), a term hard to swallow for those approaching the *Iḥyā'* through a notion of Sufism in which certainty is only produced by the heart or mystical states (see Section IV of the present chapter). I found confirmation of this structure in Book XXI, *Bayān* 8 where al-Ghazālī alludes to having treated the same topic at two levels: mere belief (or what we might call pure faith) and true knowledge. Much later, I found that Book XXII speaks of two levels of discourse, but refers to the dichotomy as mere belief *and imitation* versus true knowledge. After further attempts to study the sources of the 3rd Quarter's books turned up application of these ideas, a thorough study of the structure of the books of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Quarters revealed the largely but not entirely consistent application of a dichotomy going back to the *Miʿyār* and deploying the tools of logic and *falsafa*, including discourse theory holding that all non-demonstrative discourse involves incorporeal psychological faculties. Much of the discourse of the *Iḥyā'* becomes clear once one sees that in spite of numerous different terms, there is a consistent link between the corporeal world as a veil, and forms of knowledge that are not what Avicenna were term incorporeal are veils over the *malakūt*, including imitation and mere belief. The thorough study of the said quarters provided countless other passages confirming the technical nature of concepts such as religion and the *mulk* and *malakūt*. This careful study

[26] Kōjirō Nakamura, 'A Structural Analysis of *Dhikr* and *Nembutsu*', *Orient* (1971): 81, 85.

of the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ* offers the prospect of firmer grounding than arguments often constructed in Ghazālī studies based on, for instance, theories of development.[27] Indeed, Chapter 4 indicates that a fundamental notion of epistemological levels in the *Iḥyāʾ* is at odds with al-Ghazālī's own summary of the *Iḥyāʾ*: *al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*.

D. The Contribution of the Present Thesis

This thesis argues that the *Iḥyāʾ* does not merely add worship and Sufism to the *Mīzān*. Rather, al-Ghazālī produces a primarily bi-level structure which runs across language, psychology, epistemology, and eschatology. This structure allows him to incorporate insights from the disparate traditions referred to Taneli Kukkonen. The *Mīzān* opens with the famous but bold claim that philosophers, Sufis and the followers of sharia agree that knowledge and praxis are the path to felicity, but then proceeds to set out philosophical praxis, only slightly tempered with scriptural and Sufi notions. The *Iḥyāʾ*, on the other hand, is a work which involves a collision between these traditions[28] and, this thesis claims, produces a sophisticated doctrine[29] and structure to do this. As such, it is perhaps the best text by which to advance the study of *how* al-Ghazālī uses sources and weaves (or produces a mosaic of) various traditions with enormous implications for the ongoing discussion about his nature as a thinker.

Thus, the current study is a philological study of the structure of the path of praxis of the *Iḥyāʾ*. It claims that a dichotomy fundamental to almost every aspect of the *Iḥyāʾ* is the corporeal *mulk* and incorporeal *malakūt* cosmology according with the manner in which these levels of existence were already developed in the *Miʿyār al-ʿilm*. This manifests in the epistemology and eschatology shown to frame the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*. The basic epistemology of the *Iḥyāʾ* involves the corporeal being a veil over the incorporeal. However, one complicating matter is that in a sense introduced by al-Ghazālī, the corporeal or concrete may under certain circumstances be a sign, reference or means to incorporeal. This

[27] Even al-Ghazālī's distinction between state and station derives from his logical discussion of attributes which disappear quickly (such as coldness) versus those which are difficult (or impossible) to remove (such as the colour of gold). (See Chapter 6 on the virtues.)

[28] The importance of the direct engagement of religion and *falsafa* in the *Iḥyāʾ* may be seen in that it classifies all the sciences in two different locations in two different manners. And it puts forward two higher sciences of the afterlife, a practical and a speculative science of unveiling, but also works out their relationship with two related but lower sciences: tenets of belief (*ʿaqīda*; and also *kalām*) and the practical fiqh. This hierarchical alignment of practical and theoretical sciences, respectively, is made in the only partially understood 3rd Quarter classification studied in Section III below.

[29] As also noted by Richard Frank, the *Iḥyāʾ* is a work which does not treat a single science largely within the dictates of a given tradition, but is one of the works in which al-Ghazālī puts forth his original positions.

introduces a notion of complementarity between the levels. Prophecy itself involves coining abstract truths into corporeal and concrete similitudes (and imitative, rote transmitted beliefs) which, through their complementarity to the truth, contain a higher status than mere falsehood which would otherwise be natural to anything corporeal if conceived of strictly as a veil. Nonetheless, much of the epistemological dichotomy shown in the coming chapters is between imitation and true knowledge (whose arbiter is demonstration). While worship has a secondary effect on eschatological outcome, the primary outcome is determined by epistemology: imitative belief leads to corporeal pleasures and salvation, while demonstrative, true knowledge leads to incorporeal felicity through intellectual and spiritual pleasure. Ethical praxis (*ʿamal*) is a prerequisite for true knowledge, the higher level. Praxis is thus the means for moving between the *mulk* and *malakūt*, just as is stated in the *Mīzān* in a passage drawn from Avicenna's *Aḥwāl al-nafs* said in Chapter 5 to contain a metaphysicalization of ethics. The epistemological dichotomy requires clarifying that in the *Iḥyāʾ*, *kalām* is associated with the lower level of the masses while the intellect (which al-Ghazālī links to a host of other terms) is associated with the higher level. This point requires extensive engagement with the work of Alexander Treiger who produces a conflicting triad in which intellect is a mediate position on the way to, but not achieving certainty and true knowledge. This requires showing that his position is built on statements subsequent to the *Iḥyāʾ*.

An important finding regarding al-Ghazālī's eschatological doctrine is that believers that are incapable of contemplation are directed towards invocation as opposed to contemplation. Al-Ghazālī affords this group felicity if they manage through invocation to break the souls intimacy with the corporeal here-below to establish in its place intimacy with the incorporeal and God. However, instead of this felicity occurring immediately after death as is the case for those of contemplation, this felicity occurs only after the resurrection. This is effectively a modification of what is otherwise a very clean dichotomy determining the telos of the praxis of the *Iḥyāʾ* and it has a great bearing on the audience question. Without this 'concession', there were two outcomes, salvation and felicity, and a set of practices leading to them. With this amendment, al-Ghazālī flies in the face of Avicennian elitist notions of the afterlife by offering felicity itself to those incapable of formal contemplation. Al-Ghazālī might have in mind great Sufis past and present, but he might also have in mind early religious figures.

The said dichotomy is incorporated deeply into the virtues. From one point of view, al-Ghazālī's virtues resemble those of the long-standing *akhlāq* tradition in that they contain a (character) disposition of the soul, produced through repeated actions which congeal into a habit or disposition. However, by way of contrast to the said tradition, they are composed of three integral parts: knowledge, states, and acts. These are likened to a tree, knowledge serving at the roots. Knowledge can be either demonstrative and true or imitative, but imitative knowledge requires support through external inspiration or practices. Book XXXIX is a practice (not a state) producing true knowledge through syllogism and—if done after traversing the ethics laid out in the vices and virtues of the *Iḥyā'*—also produces intellectual pleasure initiating the second direction of the virtues: a downward flow back down from love to reliance and patience, and so on, entailed by love. Thus, aside from the caveat regarding invocation (mentioned in a single passage), the said dichotomy dominates the structure and telos of the *Iḥyā'*, being integrated into the virtues, rather than their order and ranking determining the ultimate ranks of the *Iḥyā'*. A higher rank is present, direct witnessing, but is shown not to be accorded a separate eschatological rank. This is shown (contra Treiger) to be the domination of a state over the heart, for example, the divine unity, and the domination of the state over the heart renders the realities perceived by the purified intellect to be further purified from other than God such that they are seen as the acts of the attributes and ultimately the essence of God. Thus, he brings Sufism back in supra-rationally, not denying that the intellect produced true knowledge nor certainty, in spite of this denial being commonly attributed him.

Throughout the *Iḥyā'*, two or even three distinct meanings of religion appear: (merely) worldly religion, (merely) imitative religion accompanied with desire for corporeal pleasures in the afterlife, and proper incorporeal religion which persists forever and is thus associated with the afterlife. The Fārābīan paradigm that holds that religion is the imitation of philosophy must be interpreted with great care to determine the meaning it takes on based on the context into which al-Ghazālī naturalizes it. Al-Ghazālī places abstract and demonstrative discourse at the pinnacle of the sciences by making the science of unveiling to be the main 'intellectual science of the afterlife' above the imitative sharia sciences. Through this, it could be argued that he accomplishes the subversion of fiqh and *kalām*, but also religion in general by placing *falsafa* at the top. The matter may also be interpreted by seeing that al-Ghazālī has instead

naturalized the scientific theology of the *falāsifa* into religion. Also, Book XXXV, *Kītāb al-Tawḥīd wa al-tawakkul*, states that the science of unveiling is itself two levels: true knowledge of realities and subsequently seeing those realities as nothing more that God's acts. Holding that his higher science naturalizes philosophy to form a scientific theology accords with the interpretation of Alexander Treiger who concluded his study of the science of unveiling by stating that it is a genuine amalgamation of *falsafa*, Sufism, and other religious materials that did not previously exist as such. Secondly, as noted by Richard Frank, previous Ashʿarīs and Muʿtazilīs distinguished between the branches and roots of religion, building the branches on the roots in the sense that providing them with rational proofs supported their truth. Thus, an interpretation of al-Ghazālī's work is that took existing structures and performed an upgrade or update, just as he took an existing form argumentation and proof and replaced it with logic. We may notice that his speculative theologians (*nuẓẓār*) whose method he pits against the Sufis in Book XXI are referred to through a vague term for which contemporary scholarship is unable to identify a known social group. The term indicates they are merely a group who apply speculative inquiry (*naẓar*), namely, logic, to theological questions. One manner of interpreting this is that he is introducing the tool of logic naturalized from the *falāsifa*, claiming it is a universal tool and allowing it to be adopted as a general method of inquiry without the genetic associations of its origin nor the positions of those in whose hands it was first found.

This example is one indication that structure itself is important for assessing al-Ghazālī's religious revival and his nature as a thinker. Whats more, this structure takes on directly—even if implicitly and practically—the relationship between law, Sufism, and *falsafa*. A central finding of this thesis is revealing the extent to which al-Ghazālī has produced a structure based on his bipartite cosmology running through the diverse doctrines and practices and levels of the *Iḥyā'*, offering a far better possibility of interpreting them correctly. This framework for relating the sciences of the afterlife with the other sciences and relating the levels of discourse is crucial for taking Ghazālī studies forward because it shows how he systematically tangles with and relates the two truth claims: scripture and *falsafa*.

The summary findings in the conclusion of this thesis indicate some of the many implications of this structure for existing debates such as the so-called *Maḍnūn* corpus[30] and al-Ghazālī's defence against the Ismaili claim that certitude is only through imitating the imam.

A subordinate claim of this thesis is that several doctrines such as the eternality of the soul once created were produced in the *Tahāfut*. Al-Ghazālī there joins between reason largely as represented by the *falāsifa* and the outward purport of revelation to affirm two eschatological states: the intellectual pleasures of the *falāsifa* and the bodily pleasures described in scripture. As shown in the next section, al-Ghazālī is almost surely responding to the challenge in Avicenna's *al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya* to interpret scripture consistently.

II. The Bridge from the *Mīzān* to the Religious Revival: *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*, Q. XX

A. The Status of the *Tahāfut*: A Positive Work?

While the *Tahāfut* is famously known as a deconstrive work, al-Ghazālī uses at least parts of the work to put forward several of his own doctrines. Notable in this regard is Question XX, ostensibly devoted to the purported denial of physical resurrection by the *falāsifa*. Jules Janssens has already questioned the nature of the *Tahāfut* as a rejection of Avicennian philosophy. Janssens had stated that, in general, *Tahāfut* passages from the *Shifā'* are highly interpolated, but generally still recognizable from a given source in the *Shifā'*.[31] Importantly, he has found its paraphrasing of its source to indeed be further from Avicennian sources even than al-Ghazālī's other works in which he uses Avicennian passages and attributes the work to himself as his own doctrine, including the *Mīzān*, *Miʿyār*, and *Maʿārij,* setting aside the discussion of the latter's authenticity. This led him and others such as Michael Marmura to doubt whether he represents Avicenna's thought accurately. Regarding *Tahāfut* Questions V and XVII, Janssens states that Marmura, 'rightly insists that in the former case the interpretation given is debatable, even doubtful, and that the latter affirmation does not

[30] See al-Akiti, 'The *Maḍnūn* of al-Ghazālī', 1:127. Al-Akiti argues that the various works circulated as *Maḍnūn* (restricted) bear consistent marks that al-Ghazālī viewed them as a level of writing and a collective corpus.
[31] Jules Janssens, 'Al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut*: Is it Really a Rejection of Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy', *Journal of Islamic Studies* 12:1 (2001): 1–17.

correctly reflect Ibn Sīnā's...theory'.[32] However, the example in the current section point further. They provides a strong example confirming Janssens' hunch which he states as follows: 'But even discounting these rather problematic interpretations, one has the impression that al-Ghazzālī is presenting a kind of personal synthesis, the core of which consists in a few literal, or near-literal, citations.'[33] This statement seems to apply to *Tahāfut*, Questions V and XVII, but unfortunately Janssens does not extensively explore this hunch in his paper which admittedly attempts to summarize the case for the large work of the *Tahāfut*. But if the current example fulfils his hunch that al-Ghazālī presents a personal synthesis first referred to by Michael Marmura, then at the very least Question XX confirms a pattern in which al-Ghazālī allows himself in various places in this deconstructive work to put forth his own synthesis as a positive position.

Al-Ghazālī has been known to insert his own solutions in the *Maqāṣid*, for instance by including will (*irāda*) amongst the concomitants obtaining for the Divine, or what would be called in other contexts the divine attributes.[34] However, the first part of Question XX must be said to stand out for being exceptionally creative not only in textual presentation but in doctrines. It is reasonable to hypothesize that this section is special for him in that the doctrine of felicity and its practical and speculative causes are the base doctrine of the practical part of his religious revival: the *Iḥyā'*.

One aspect of the creative changes wrought by al-Ghazālī forces us to add to the list of Janssens' sources of the *Tahāfut* another part of the *Shifā'*; namely, the *Ilāhiyyāt* ('The Benefit

[32] Ibid., 11. The example involves causal theory and Janssens comments that the doubt as to the validity of the interpretation is because 'Ibn Sīnā surely does not say that all particular events are caused by the active intellect' (ibid.).
[33] Ibid.
[34] In the *Maqāṣid*, al-Ghazālī defends the attribute of the divine 'will' (*irāda*), an attribute more appropriate for a *kalām* manual and not defended as such in the source text, the *Danesh-nNameh*. The editor Sulayman Dunyā objects to al-Ghazālī's phrase, 'according to their opinion', mentioned in the context of defending the divine will, stating there is no need because according to the introductory remarks *everything said* should be their opinion. However, it seems that al-Ghazālī states this because it is indeed his own addition and in the process of his defence he refers to a controversial position from which he wishes to distance himself: the eternality of the world. (See *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa,* 239n1). As al-Ghazālī turns to the next attribute, divine power (*qudra*), he continues to defend the divine will such that his arguments result in several pages of his own material. (This material is found at *Maqāṣid*, 235–40.) This case accords with Marmura's findings that al-Ghazālī sometimes inserts his own synthesis. Whether he forgets his original purpose of composition, is using the work as a notepad to explore ideas, or whether these works were originally written with a different purpose is not clear.

of Worship in the Here-Below and Afterlife').[35] Having compared the first part of Question XX to what have been termed the two versions of the *Maqāṣid*, I may also add the following.[36] The two versions of the *Maqāṣid* differ fundamentally in how they organize the philosophical doctrines of resurrection.[37] In spite of this, they their source text more faithfully than the *Tahāfut* follows its on on this topic. Importantly, they do not represent even a fraction of the doctrinal originality al-Ghazālī introduces into the *Tahāfut*. The *Tahāfut* remains an anomaly, and it shown below how he operates as a snake handler inside the *Tahāfut* in a manner portending the solution presented in the *Iḥyā'*. Regarding the changes rendered to the text and doctrine of Avicenna in the first part of Question XX, Janssens did note that al-Ghazālī avoids mention either of imaginal resurrection (in *al-Aḍḥawiyya*) or the affirmation of corporeal pains and pleasures in the parallel *Shifā'* passage.[38] It is particularly odd that al-Ghazālī paraphrases a text and avoids mentioning a those doctrines that are defensible in front of orthodoxy, especially in light of what is to follow which shows that he asserts his own solution at the close of part one of Question XX. Namely, this is that the scriptural depiction be upheld while a higher form of pleasure is affirmed. By virtue of having just described their doctrine, he thus prima facie accepts it as it is in the hands of the *falāsifa*, namely, intellectual

[35] Jules Janssens lists the sources of Question XX as the *Shifā': Ilāhiyyāt*, 9:7 (*Ma'ād*) and *al-Aḍḥawiyya* (*Faṣl* 3). Question XX may be seen as divided into two parts. The first is a summary of the philosophical position on the resurrection, but it in fact treats their doctrine of felicity in the afterlife and the role of praxis and knowledge in obtaining certain ranks. The part ends with a response by al-Ghazālī in which he proposes that persistence of the soul after bodily death and corporeal and incorporeal pains and pleasures in the afterlife are all possible and in accordance with scripture. The second part responds to three arguments for the absurdity of corporeal resurrection. This second part is more clearly drawn from *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, but the particularities of these arguments do not deal with general matters of felicity and its causes and therefore do not concern us.

It is possible that some of this material is in *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, this first part therefore comprising a mixture. However, in the *Shifā'*, the impact of ethics on the eschatological state is separated. That which refers to philosophical practical ethics (and its manuals) is addressed in the *Ma'ād* section while what refers to the religious and ritual worship impacting the practical aspect of the soul is in the section 'The Benefit of Worship in the Here-Below and Afterlife'.

[36] Afifi al-Akiti has termed the *Maqāṣid* (DN: *Danesh-nameh*) the 1st *Maqāṣid* and the *Maqāṣid* (*Shifā'*) the 2nd. See his 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly', in Y. Tzvi Langermann (ed.), *Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 53n6.

[37] The *Maqāṣid* (DN) closely follows the *Danesh-nameh*. It treats felicity and damnation as two parts of human psychology in terms of what emanates unto the human soul from the active intellect. The two passages show only occasional change to their source. (Note that Afifi al-Akiti refers to the *Maqāṣid* as the mother text of the *Major Maḍnūn* published in his thesis. See 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly', 52. He has carefully studied the relation of this material which is reproduced in the *Major Maḍnūn* to the Persian origin in Avicenna's *Danesh Nameh Ila'i* and the Latin translations of the *Maqāṣid*.)

The *Maqāṣid* (*Shifā'*) very clearly follows the text and order of the *Shifā': Ilāhiyyāt* (*Ma'ād*). (See British Library, Or. 3126, fols. 255-263, '*Al-Bāb al-sābi': Fī al-bahja wa-l-sa'āda*'.) The *Maqāṣid* (*Shifā'*) is easily recognizable as a paraphrase which is neither heavily reworked in terms nor in doctrines.

Thus, neither *Maqāṣid*'s treatment resembles the changes made to the *Tahāfut* studied below.

[38] Janssens, 'Al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut*', 12–13.

pleasure of the soul. This is to effectively uphold a doctrine of the *falāsifa*, which there are grounds to interpret as upholding the intellect as a source of knowledge alongside revelation.

Chapter 2 shows that this doctrine is adopted and incorporated into the *Iḥyā'*. It could be that because this is an important foundation for the eschatological telos of his revival, al-Ghazālī wishes to present the solution as his own and purify it as much as possible from association with the *falāsifa*. Alexander Treiger holds that al-Ghazālī is committed to one of two forms of imaginal resurrection, and would likely therefore interpret al-Ghazālī's silence as an effort to discredit the *falāsifa* and distance himself from controversial doctrines he himself holds.[39] As seen below in translation, he clearly states that there is no impossibility in bodily resurrection and thus the literal purport should be upheld. As to Treiger's evidence from outside the *Tahāfut*, Chapter 2 shows that it only establishes that al-Ghazālī lists it as a possibility, this occuring in works such as the *Mīzān* and the summary of the *Iḥyā'*: *al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*.[40] Also, Chapter 2 includes discussion of the two levels applied to the topic of the afterlife, showing that in two places in the *Iḥyā'* al-Ghazālī expressly upholds that there are two levels in the afterlife: a corporeal and incorporeal level.[41] It is thus more reasonable to interpret his creative handling of the text along the lines Jules Janssens has proposed for why al-Ghazālī avoids mentioning defensible doctrines he knows to be stated by Avicenna in other works: he wishes to distance himself from Avicenna (or the *falāsifa* more generally) and save up the positive positions to present as his own.[42] Al-Akiti uses the terms 'the good', 'the bad', and 'the ugly' to signal the positions produced through a filtering process. These filtered positions are presented in the public works such as the *Iḥyā'*, but also in his reserved works such as the *Major Maḍnūn* which al-Akiti argues in some cases makes significant alterations to the *Maqāṣid*. The 'bad' positions are found in the *Tahāfut*, and the ugly positions in the *Maqāṣid*. This form of being economical with the truth, we may add, would be consistent with the role al-Akiti says that al-Ghazālī takes on in this filtering process: to handle the snake of philosophy and to separate the serum from the venom in private. This thesis demonstrates

[39] Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*, 86–93.
[40] Namely, its discussion of the possible interpretations of eschatological verses.
[41] These statements are not found in a simple credal context such as Book II in which one might claim that al-Ghazālī is simply rehearsing an Ashʿarī doctrine to which he is not himself committed in every detail.
[42] Forced to speculate as to why al-Ghazālī avoids mention of these doctrines, Janssens states that al-Ghazālī may want to discredit Avicenna, he may merely aim to represent stock positions of a tradition of philosophers, or he may wish to present the positive positions and possibilities in his own works, distancing himself from Avicenna. (See Janssens, 'Al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut*', 12–13.)

that in the *Iḥyā'* al-Ghazālī refers to his role in interpreting scripture in the light of reason as being a necessary condition for being an inheritor of the prophets.[43] Al-Ghazālī wrote the *Tahāfut* before the *Iḥyā'*. This and other historical and textual links give reason to suspect that al-Ghazālī's emphasis on practice has Avicenna in mind. Chapter 1 and 2 in the present thesis aim to further establish that a set of positions and doctrines important to the *Iḥyā'* emerge through what we may term a *Shifā'–Aḍḥawiyya–Tahāfut–Iḥyā'* exchange. While al-Ghazālī shows respect for Avicenna's ability to duly represent reason and even sometimes make room for revelation, his own role goes further and claims as shown in Chapter 2 that the inheritor must be able to interpret all or most of scripture in this light, presumably thereby ruling out Avicenna.[44]

B. Fundamental Doctrines of the *Iḥyā'* in the *Tahāfut*

The unique, two-level structure of praxis in the *Iḥyā'* that we have had recourse to refer to above is not found in the *akhlāq* tradition nor in the *Mīzān*, raising the question of its origin. The present section shows that the structure itself involves a number of doctrines which emerge from the *Tahāfut*, Question XX, and its creative engagement with *falsafa*. To that end, it shows a selection of doctrines present in the *Tahāfut* to support the claim that the *Tahāfut* is the most significant pre-departure text—aside from perhaps the contested *Maʿārij*—for expressing the doctrines by which the *Iḥyā'* adds a non-existent structure to the praxis of the *Mīzān* through joining between reason and revelation.[45] This claim may be clarified by seeing from the outset that the *Mīzān* thought to be the basis of the *Iḥyā'*, and therefore a likely candidate for containing these doctrines, does not. This claim does not deny that much of the basic ethics of the *Mīzān* already represents a partial synthesis of reason and revelation. The synthesis in the *Mīzān*'s ethics is well summarized by Majid Fakhry. It is an ethics based on the Neoplatonic faculty psychology. In this ethics, felicity is achieved through the speculative

[43] See Chapter 2.

[44] Note the similarity between this position and that of Abū ʿAbd Allāh al-Māzarī (d. 510/1116) who said: 'I found that this al-Ghazālī relies on [Avicenna] in most of what he alludes to concerning the sciences of philosophy; so much so that, at some moments, he textually quotes his words, without change, whereas, at other moments, he changes them and links them more to questions pertaining to the sharia than Avicenna had done, as he is more knowledgeable of the secrets of the sharia than him.'

[45] There are literally dozens of departures or significant twists on Avicennian doctrine which are found in *Tahāfut*, Question XX, which point to solutions presented in the *Iḥyā'* for joining between reason and revelation. To enumerate even the majority of them requires something of a running commentary, so the following selections will have to suffice for the context of a thesis.

faculty and this divine illumination is always available, and the sole duty of the human being is to keep the soul in constant readiness.[46] This and other core doctrines such as the natural disposition (*fiṭra*) of the soul, the virtues being laid out in the sharia, and the difficulty of finding the (Aristotelian) mean are present already in the *Mīzān*.[47] However, many of these elements are already present in Avicenna who is no slouch in terms of having a sophisticated notion of the relation of reason and revelation. For instance, the key doctrines cited from Fakhry above and their scriptural support are already in the *Aḥwāl al-nafs* which al-Ghazālī himself draws on for these doctrines in the *Mīzān*.[48] However, the unique doctrines referred to presently are specifically those which allow al-Ghazālī to build a praxis that takes *falsafa* and scripture seriously and weaves the implications into one work, often through constructing a parallel discourse and parallel structures which accomplish the ends of each *alongside each other in a single text often bringing out complementarity between the sources*.

Nonetheless, in this section and that which follows it, al-Ghazālī presents what are recognizably seeds of the ultimate doctrine in the *Iḥyā'*, not explicit and fully developed statements of the ultimate doctrine. So, for example, while he here counsels his reader to achieve the aim of praxis through following the sharia in a manner which he describes as imitative, it is only in the *Iḥyā'* that he works out the details of how the sharia is an imitative version of the science of praxis, which like a medicine may cure one even if one does not know the science of medicine. And, here in the *Tahāfut*, he indicates that scriptural hermeneutics must take into account the individual ontological status of the topic before determining if the outward purport may be taken literally, while in the *Iḥyā'* he works out the details of the outward and inward purports for the core topics of scripture (see Chapter 2).

Alexander Treiger also found Question XX at odds with the pure aim of a refutation, finding it worthy to remark that al-Ghazālī showed no objection to the philosophical doctrine of felicity in the afterlife.[49] As seen in the examples above and the more extensive summary to

[46] Majid Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 1991), 196–7.
[47] Ibid., 198–9.
[48] See Chapter 5 which cites Janssens' study of the sources of the *Mīzān*. Also, Chapters 3 and 4 examine the cosmology by which the intelligibles are always ready to emanate, but for the ethical impurity of the human. This is drawn on not only in the *Mīzān*, but also in the *Iḥyā'*.
[49] Treiger notes that al-Ghazālī's assertion that those who lack knowledge of God will fall short of felicity and reach only salvation is highly uncharacteristic of the early Muslim tradition including Sufism. (Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge*, p. 47.) The first part of the claim supports the present thesis. The second part is a negative claim, and therefore not supported by Treiger. It thus warrants further investigation.

In Chapter 5 of Treiger's work, he returns to the topic of the afterlife and simultaneously to the nature of the *Tahāfut* in a section titled, '*Tahāfut*: A pseudo-refutation?' He refers to the *Tahāfut* as a pseudo-refutation

follow, al-Ghazālī not only approves of their doctrines but generates his own synthesis as Marmura found he did elsewhere in the *Tahāfut*. In this case, the doctrines that are generated form a model of the structure needed to explain the transition from the praxis of the *Mīzān* to the sophisticated dual-level structure of the *Iḥyā'*.

1. Dualist afterlife: Affirming the philosophical and scriptural notions

The chapters of this thesis elucidate how the Avicennian dichotomy structures al-Ghazālī's religious revival as its goal or telos. In the first passage below, not only does al-Ghazālī not condemn the philosopher's doctrine of felicity, he defends it, stating that joining between it and the more predominant scriptural notion of the afterlife is superior. Additionally, it is important to note that he effectively interprets each through accepting them as *falsafa* describes them: one is incorporeal in a philosophical sense and one is corporeal. While the scriptural account of the afterlife certainly refers to bodies and corporeal objects and pleasures and pains as they exist in this world, it is not necessarily the case that they should be deemed corporeal in the exact manner set out in Avicenna's body–soul dualism. Deeming them so effectively interprets them. Al-Ghazālī does not challenge whether either the corporeal or the incorporeal are proper interpretations of scripture. (While al-Ghazālī accepts that pictorial representations in scripture refer to corporeal matters and what has never crossed human minds refers to intellectual pleasures, it is equally possible that the pictorial matters themselves are qualified by being unlike their equivalents in the here-below and that they themselves are or involve pleasures unlike what has occurred to human minds.)

that in fact prepares the ground, overtly and covertly, for an acceptance of philosophical beliefs. When al-Ghazālī judges that certain doctrines of the *falāsifa* are religiously acceptable, Treiger terms this laundering beliefs for use in the *Mīzān* and *Iḥyā'*. (See, ibid., p. 93 and 99.) Again, parts of the statement accord with the present thesis. What Treiger terms laundering appears to be a) explicitly judging the doctrine religiously acceptable and then b) using the doctrine in a subsequent work. The author himself describes his own role in handling philosophical doctrines as snake handling. The metaphor of laundering clearly implies an act is undertaken solely to cover another act. While I agree that al-Ghazālī uses Question XX put forward his own views, I would not know where to even begin to prove that every page of the *Tahāfut* was written to cover this action. Also, my own attention was drawn to these passages after completing my research teasing out the positions al-Ghazālī develops in the *Iḥyā'* for weaving together *falsafa* and scripture. After making a thorough comparison between the *Iḥyā'*, *al-Aḍḥawiyya* and other Avicennian sources, it became entirely clear that, as explained in the present chapter, al-Ghazālī's deviates exceptionally from his source material by entering his own solutions. To deem the al-Ghazālī as accepting is itself inaccurate as is clear by lining up the texts. Is al-Ghazālī laundering money that he has partially earned, telling us in the *Tahāfut* itself his methodology of earning it? As seen below, he states that where possible he retains both the outward purport of scripture and the results of sound reason. This difficulty in the account of Treiger indicates the limitations of the paradigm of citing *that* sources exist without analysing *how* material is appropriated.

Al-Ghazālī states that the *falāsifa* claim that the eschatological images of scripture are merely similitudes (*amthila*) coined for the masses because the (intellectual) pleasures are beyond what can be described to them.[50] As noted by Jules Janssens, al-Ghazālī's account of the philosophers' eschatology leaves off mention of two matters in Avicenna's works with which he was well familiar. In the *Shifāʾ*, Avicenna states that the corporeal pleasures are known through revelation, particularly that of the Prophet Muhammad, and cannot be established through demonstrative proof.[51] Janssens notes that while in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* Avicenna denies bodily resurrection (in one place), he states in the same work that he will limit himself to matters susceptible to apodictic demonstrations. Thus, there is a possibility for reconciling between the position of the two texts, but al-Ghazālī remains silent regarding these texts and positions of which he was well aware.[52] Note we may add that in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* Avicenna also refers to imaginal resurrection, regarding which al-Ghazālī is also silent in this context.[53] He then proceeds to assert his own manner of positive joining between reason and revelation, allowing scripture to be interpreted through their notion of intellectual felicity as follows:

T2, *Tahāfut*, 354.5–355.5

> And we say, most of these matters do not contradict the sharia because we do not deny types of pleasures in the afterlife which are greater than (the pleasure attached to) objects of sense (*maḥsūsāt*). Nor do we deny the subsistence of the soul after departing the body. However, we know this via the sharia because the sharia brought the word return (*maʿād*) which is not comprehensible without the soul subsisting. We only reproached them in as far as their claim to know this through pure intellect. That which disagrees with the sharia is to deny the resurrection of bodies and to deny bodily pleasure in heaven and bodily pain in the fire and denial of the existence of heaven and the fire as described in the Koran. What is the objection of bringing about a synthesis (*jamʿ*) between the two felicities (*saʿādatayn*), the spiritual (*rūḥāniyya*) and bodily, and similarly for perdition? His statement (i.e. God's) {No soul knows what has been hidden for them} (Koran, 32:17) means, 'They don't know all of that (which has been hidden from them)'.

This foundational passage shows the defence of what is identified in this thesis as a doctrine which underpins the praxis of the *Iḥyāʾ*. This particular doctrine is the eternality of the soul, once created. In particular, it means that the soul outlives bodily death and awaits the full

[50] *Tahāfut*, 354.2–3.
[51] *Shifāʾ: Ilāhiyyāt* (IX, 7), 347.18-348.5.
[52] Janssens, 'Al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut*', 12–13.
[53] *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 223.4–224.2.

resurrection, in distinction to the claim that the soul is recreated at the resurrection. The same passage from the *Tahāfut* later explains how the prophetic saying also affirms the unimaginable, but does not negate (*nafī*) the other pleasure (i.e. the corporeal). Al-Ghazālī expresses his preference of upholding both pleasures in the afterlife thus, 'Rather, joining between the two matters is more perfect and the promise (of God conveyed in the Koran is thereby) more perfect. This (joining) is possible (*mumkin*; i.e. is not logically impossible), so it is obligatory to believe in it in accordance with the sharia' (ibid., 355.3–5). Firstly, we may note that there is a clear difference between the proposition that a) the existence of pleasures in the afterlife which are greater than the pleasures attached to sense objects does not contradict the sharia and b) the intellectual pleasures of the afterlife as described by the *falāsifa* are true and what are referred to by the sharia. He also upholds one aspect of their psychology: the soul does not cease to exist after death. Al-Ghazālī also actively defends this doctrine, shown in Chapter 3 to be upheld in the *Iḥyā'*. Secondly, he appears to take the authority of intellect very seriously, for he states that it is obligatory to believe in this joining which is to uphold both forms of pleasure in the afterlife.

The authority of the intellect is supported in this case by its accord with the position taken in scripture. However this support here is only partial because it involves an interpretation: the pleasures of the afterlife and the return of the soul advanced here are scripture understood in the light of reason, reason specifically supplied by *falsafa* in this case. This accords with al-Ghazālī's statement studied in Section II below where he criticises pure transmission of scripture without intellect and pure intellect without scripture. He counsels the reader to join between them and he provides some examples of how this is to be done. We may justifiably say it is more likely that al-Ghazālī knew there were other possible ways to interpret this verse. If so, then there is a rhetorical element in which he is trying to convince his reader that this position is acceptable, and indeed he upholds this position in the *Iḥyā'*. This would indicate that he is grooming his reader to accept his particular version of joining between reason and revelation through accepting the position of the *falāsifa* as representative of intellect, so far as it is actually able to demonstrably prove what it claims. Note here that he does not grant that they have proven that there are spiritual pleasures beyond physical pleasures in the afterlife.

Part of the significance of this is that accepting the philosophical notion of felicity indicates an acceptance of the means of obtaining it which is speculative knowledge, and the *Tahāfut* passage cited above indicates al-Ghazālī accepts felicity as scriptural. Chapter 3 confirms that this carries over into the *Iḥyā'*. The *Iḥyā'* states that true perfection fit for an eternal soul is through eternal and unchanging knowledge, and al-Ghazālī enumerates this category of knowledge in terms drawn from his own description in the *Miʿyār* of the demonstrative knowledge the philosophers state is the cause of eternal felicity in the afterlife.[54]

2. Scriptural hermeneutics particularized by topic: al-Ghazālī's response to *al-Aḍḥawiyya*'s search for a rule of interpretation

After advocating joining in a dualist manner between two types of resurrection indicated by reason and scripture, respectively, al-Ghazālī justifies his solution by analysing the mode of interpretation it involves. He attempts to establish that it is still rule based and consistent for such a rule to operate differently according to different topics *because the topics themselves demand different treatment*. Al-Ghazālī's rule of interpretation has been shown to subtly differ from the Ashʿarī position put forward in his *Fayṣal al-tafriqa*.[55] And while Ibn Taymiyya traced the so-called 'rule of interpretation' of the Ashʿarī theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, he also traced the term 'rule' back to Avicenna.[56] Al-Ghazālī begins by asserting that the *falāsifa* claim that the topics of the divine attributes and the afterlife share in being mere similitudes as follows:

T3, *Tahāfut*, 355.6–356.10

> If it is said, 'That which came in the sharia is similitudes (*amthāl*) struck to accord with the limits of people's understanding just as the verses and (prophetic) reports presenting anthropomorphism (*tashbīḥ*) are similitudes according to people's understanding and the divine attributes are transcendently holy (*muqaddasa*) above what is imagined by the masses of people', the answer is: Making the two to be the same is a judgement without any proof. Rather, they differ in two manners.

[54] In Avicenna, the soul's survival of death, its specific perfection, intellectual pleasures, the relation of the soul to the body, and the nature of the afterlife are all highly related doctrines. For Avicenna, the ultimate aim of *falsafa* occurs completely in the afterlife. (See Jon McGinnis, *Avicenna* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 'The Afterlife (*Maʿād*)', 217–21.) Though we must be cautious, the first three chapters of this thesis reveal that these doctrines and likely their interconnectedness are accepted as early as the *Tahāfut* and built on in the *Mīzān* and *Iḥyā'*.

[55] Frank Griffel, 'Al-Ghazālī at His Most Rationalist', in George Tamer (ed.), *Islam and Rationality*: *The Impact of al-Ghazālī*, *Papers Collected at His 900th Anniversary*, *Vol. 1* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 118–19.

[56] Yahya Michot, 'A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary on Avicenna's *al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya*: Being a Translation of a Part of the *Darʿ al-Taʿarrud* of Ibn Taymiyya, with Introduction, Annotation, and Appendices, Part I', *Journal of Islamic Studies* 14:2 (2003): 149–203, esp. 158.

In other words, there is no proof that scripture regarding the divine attributes and the afterlife must be interpreted identically. In *al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya*, a known source for a major part of Question XX of the *Tahāfut*, Avicenna claims that all scripture, whether referring to God or the afterlife, should be interpreted according to one rule. He states that the primary rule (*qānūn*) for interpreting scripture is that it is for the masses; and the sharia and religion (*milla*) which comes on the tongues of the prophets aims to address the masses, one and all (*al-jumhūr kaffa*).[57] He implies that the *kalām* theologians do not have a consistent rule of interpretation like his and rather interpret where it suits them and uphold the literal purport of scripture where it suits their desired doctrine. Al-Ghazālī's attempt to justify adopting more than one stance is almost surely a response to this line of attack in *al-Aḍḥawiyya*.

Additionally, Chapter 2 shows that al-Ghazālī goes further and accepts that prophets necessarily speak in similitudes. However, while Avicenna indicates that this is because the souls of the masses are overcome with sense and imagination and have not undergone ethical purification, al-Ghazālī alludes to the same position in his cosmological terms, stating prophets must speak thus because the masses are asleep in the corporeal world (*al-mulk*).[58] Thus, the significance of the *Tahāfut* is shown in Chapter 2 to lie not only it being a response to *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, but that it indicates a line of thought regarding how to join between reason and revelation coming to fruition in his religious revival. This line of thought is shown in Chapter 2 to accept the *falsafī* doctrine that the prophets must speak in similitudes, but to adhere to the literal meaning of bodily resurrection which he upholds throughout the *Iḥyā'*. Al-Ghazālī's unique method of applying the rule of interpretation in the *Iḥyā'* is the topic of Chapter 2, but for now we may see him accepting his own counsel to join between the two sources: reason and revelation. The devil is in the details.

[57] *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 43.3–4. He defends this rule by arguing that were the prophets to throw proper treatment of the divine unity before the Arabs and Hebrews, they would have rushed to declare (an abstract) God non-existent. (Ibid., 43.5–44.4.) On this basis, Avicenna maintains that most of the scripture is anthropomorphic. There are occasional references to abstract theology in scripture, but if the anthropomorphic matters should be interpreted in an abstract matter, scripture itself gives no systematic indication of how this is to be done.

Ibn Taymiyya comments on this rule of Avicenna in his *Darʿ al-taʿarruḍ*, a work otherwise largely devoted to refuting the 'rationalist objection' (*al-muʿāriḍ al-ʿaqlī*) by which he means the claim that in matters of religion, precedence should always be given to rational evidence in cases of conflict between reason and revelation. He traces this back to the rule of interpretation in al-Rāzī and ultimately to al-Ghazālī. In the *Darʿ*, Ibn Taymiyya comments on this rule (*qānūn*) in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* that the philosophers deny that the revelation has anything to say regarding God and the afterlife, and that this is (by unnamed persons or groups) transferred to (revealed) commands to ritual worship which they say are (also) directed at the masses. (See Michot, 'A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary on Avicenna's *al-Risāla Aḍḥawiyya*', 158.)

[58] Chapter 3 shows that *al-mulk* is to be identified with the philosophical notion of the corporeal.

Al-Ghazālī makes it clear he wishes to condemn his opponent. He states in the same passage, 'Thus, no option remains but to interpret this speech as seditious deception through making [the masses] imagine the contradictory of the truth for the benefit of people. This is a matter above which the position of prophecy is elevated' (ibid., 356.1–3). However, the charge he makes here—lying for the benefit of the people—only applies to those philosophers who claim that prophetic commands and injunctions have no benefit in the afterlife and are merely to achieve political order and the like, and thus involve lying. However, Avicenna states in the *Shifāʾ* that revealed worship is of 'great benefit in the afterlife inasmuch as their souls will be purifies in the manner you have known', referring the reader back to his discussion of the purification performed by ethical praxis.[59] Al-Ghazālī uses this passage, so he is obviously aware that Avicenna states this. So, this aspect of the charge does not apply to Avicenna (see the following subsection). Regarding the charge of denying bodily resurrection, in spite of the sources for Question XX being Avicennian, this charge also does not apply straightforwardly to him as in the *Shifāʾ* he upholds bodily resurrection and the eschatological benefit of the sharia, and even in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* where he denies bodily resurrection he states that imaginal resurrection involving scriptural eschatological scenes may be true. Thus, al-Ghazālī's adoption of certain doctrines (such as the philosophical view of the higher aspect of resurrection and his use of scriptural similitudes) may be interpreted as disingenuous, but it may also be interpreted as snake-handling. Al-Ghazālī is snake handling in that he uses his theological skills to separate the venom from the serum, standing firm behind one aspect of Ashʿarī doctrine against Avicenna's call for a universal rule: scripture is only figuratively interpreted when there is a need and physical resurrection is possible.[60] He snake handles through making the snake appear fearsome and by hiding that he has taken the serum as his own doctrine. Snake-handling appears to be the entailment of his decision to take the steep path of reconciling and joining between reason and revelation.

3. The sharia as the path to praxis

[59] *Shifāʾ*: *Ilāhiyyāt* (X, 3), 368.17-8. Avicenna next states that the benefit of the elite from this worship is mostly in the afterlife (i.e. not merely for the sake of political order, but related to altering the soul's character traits in a manner effecting the afterlife). (See ibid., 368.18-9.)

Later in the same section, Avicenna summarises the mechanism by which ethics leads to felicity through acts of the limbs, and to link this to worship. (See ibid., 369.1-5.)

[60] *Tahāfut*, 356.5–10.

Al-Ghazālī states that the sharia is the means to praxis, which is of course a striking statement considering his overt claim to be presenting the view of the philosophers. However, in line with the methodology of this thesis—to advance from *that* al-Ghazālī uses sources to *how* he uses them—we should reflect on the implications of his adoption of the sharia as the means to praxis. It implies that he has profoundly redefined the practical aspect of religion. He is shown below to effectively equate philosophical praxis and the practical aspect of religion. The implications of this link in the *Tahāfut* has further implications in light of the remaining sections of this chapter which show that he constructs two levels of praxis that are built into the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*: a) imitative practice of the sharia and b) a proper science of praxis.

Al-Ghazali puts forth his claim that the sharia is the best or only means for praxis in the form of an argument as follows:

T4, *Tahāfut*, 352.6–353.1

> Because it is impossible to remove all these attributes (i.e. vices), the sharia came with the mean (*wasaṭ*) regarding character traits. … It is impossible to remove and erase all these attributes from the soul entirely because the bodily necessities draw towards them. However, it is possible to weaken that attachment. This is why He, most high, said, {There is not one of you but shall approach it.} (Koran, 19:71). … [One seeks the mean] and so is the matter regarding all character traits (*akhlāq*). The science of ethics is long. The sharia has gone to exaggerated lengths in detailing them.

Al-Ghazālī argues not only that the sharia can contribute to praxis, but that it is the best method due to the challenges involved in achieving the mean. (An even clearer statement is found in the next subsection.) Al-Ghazālī's claim is not as wild as it would seem at first. In the *Shifāʾ* (*Maʿād*), Avicenna directs the reader to the books of ethics (*akhlāq*) and does not mention the sharia. However, in *Shifāʾ*: *Ilāhiyyāt*, X.13, 'The Benefits of Worship in the Here-Below and Afterlife', Avicenna states much as does al-Ghazālī that the sharia rituals perform the role of praxis of driving the soul towards the mean and obtaining the condition of felicity which is to correct the practical part of the soul. And, while Avicenna concedes that the sharia has this potential, it should be noted that the *Tahāfut* explicitly states that there was no way or manner of accomplishing praxis but the sharia.

Nonetheless, he alters Avicenna's position which is that the sharia is a possible alternative to praxis, and presumably one for the masses not engaged in nor having the ability for philosophy. Al-Ghazālī has shifted the discourse, but he is also shifting the doctrines

further towards a synthesis of sharia and *falsafa* in which the role of sharia is necessary, rather than possible in Avicenna's mere acknowledgement that the sharia may play the same role as ethical purification.

Even regarding making the sharia the necessary means of ethical purification, it is possible that al-Ghazālī is also cherry-picking rather than changing Avicenna. In his commentary on *Surat al-A'lā* from the Koran, Avicenna does indeed state that purification of the practical aspect is necessarily through what sounds like religious notions of obedience and righteous works, stated as follows, 'It is necessary to draw help in perfecting the practical faculty from correct (*sā'iba*) actions and comely vestiges (appearing on one's character). This is the third level referred to in his statement, {And prayeth} (Koran 87:11),[61] because the chief of righteous works is obedience and devotion to God.'[62] It is difficult to assess the status of this opinion in Avicenna's thought or consideration of his possible audiences, but knowing this is not crucial for assessing al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyā'*.[63] While al-Ghazālī's opinion of Avicenna is relevant, the ultimate reality of Avicenna's thought is only of historical or comparative value in assessing al-Ghazālī's thought. Al-Ghazālī's use of Avicenna's text involves upholding the sharia while simultaneously conceiving of praxis as a science and thus blurring the line between *falsafa* and religion.

Al-Ghazālī's insistence that the sharia is a set of medicines to be taken to cure the soul indicates he is no crypto-philosopher. But, as we will see, al-Ghazālī is still operating in accord with Avicenna's own statements from the *Shifā'* that the practicing the sharia brings about the same effect as philosophical praxis: rectifying the practical part of the soul. Does it make sense to call him a crypto-philosopher if he follows Avicenna in the latter's advocacy of following the sharia? If it does make sense, what sense is it? What is most confusing is that al-Ghazālī puts these positions on the tongue of the *falāsifa* which appears to contradict his role as snake-handler. Not only does this instance not place fear of the snake in the heart, it actually makes the snake look to those reaching this final question of the *Tahāfut* like a friend and fellow travelling. Ostensibly, the product is a philosophy which upholds prophecy rather

[61] Marmaduke Pickthall, generally followed in Koranic translation, has 'So prayeth' here. However, the present tense has been chosen here because the context is the praise of an exemplary person and thus translating the verb as a command requires proof.
[62] *al-Tafsīr al-Qur'ānī fī al-taṣawwuf*, 101.
[63] Chapter 5 shows strong evidence that al-Ghazālī used the levels presented in this commentary to inform or inspire his own levels of purification from the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* (the Book of Purity) from the *Iḥyā'*.

than a competing truth claim. It is also a prophecy that upholds philosophy. This much cultural-penetration in which one the Islamic is seen through the Greek and the Greek is seen through the Islamic, each with modifications, was seen by Fazlur Rahman in the 1950's.[64] Finding more Greek texts used by al-Ghazālī and resting the discussion of his identity by concluding that he is a crypto-philosopher would seem to be to regress.

4. Dual layered praxis: Imitative sharia practice and the science of praxis

The *Tahāfut* contains a seed of al-Ghazālī's Fārābīan-like *Iḥyā'* position studied in the rest of this chapter in which blind following in beliefs and practice is an shell or imitation of the respective higher sciences: practical and theoretical philosophy. Section V shows that al-Fārābī himself held that religion was an imitation of philosophy, including the practical aspect of religion in which its law (sharia) and ritual worship stand as a non-technical imitation of praxis as a philosophical science. In the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī presents sharia practice as the only manner of effecting praxis, but he also refers to this practice of the sharia as imitation. It is highly improbable that al-Ghazālī does so merely by accident and that it has no relation to the levels of sharia and praxis this chapter shows to be more developed in the *Iḥyā'*.

Emphasizing his position on the need for the sharia, al-Ghazālī refers to imitation thus, 'There is no way to purify character (*tahdhīb al-akhlāq*) but minding the law (*qānūn*) of the sharia in praxis (*'amal*) till the human being no longer follows their caprice, taking their caprice as the god they worship. Rather, one follows the sharia through imitation (*yuqallid*) and advances and charges according to its mere indication, not one's own choice. Thus, one's character will be refined' (*Tahāfut*, 353.1–4). Again, even if Avicenna was seen to broadly agree that the sharia can effect praxis: this statement a) raises the status of practice of the sharia and b) specifies the manner of its practice to be imitative, as opposed to gaining demonstrative knowledge of the science of praxis.

The position that the sharia is the imitation of praxis in the *Tahāfut* is arguably also implicit in another statement. Al-Ghazālī comments on the need for the sharia as follows, 'Because it is impossible to remove all these attributes, the sharia came with the mean

[64] Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam*, particularly. pp. 55-64.

regarding character traits'.[65] Michael Marmura saw in al-Ghazālī's attributing the Aristotelian mean to the sharia a notion implicit in al-Fārābī and Avicenna for whom the law is a copy, the 'imitation' of philosophy.[66] In other words, the law is a set of prescriptions, prohibitions, and rituals which imitate the higher science of praxis. The present chapter goes on to show that al-Ghazālī did indeed conceive of two layers of praxis, and in this case he alludes to this as early as the *Mīzān*.[67]

The following section shows that in the *Iḥyā'* imitation and demonstration are developed by al-Ghazālī into consistent levels, these levels found both in praxis (*mu'āmala*) and speculative unveiling (*mukāshafa*). That section shows that in the *Iḥyā'* al-Ghazālī states it is a prerequisite to follow the sharia and take its medicines to remove vice before one can benefit from the intellectual sciences which are like nutrition for the soul.[68] This is implicitly to give the sharia the same prerequisite function which Avicenna (and other *falāsifa*) gives to praxis. Praxis must remove the corporeal influence of the bodily faculties on the soul before it can become open to the incorporeal influence of the intelligibles.[69] Because he makes these connections explicit in the *Iḥyā'*, it is reasonable to believe his reference to the sharia as imitation here is an allusion to the notion that the sharia is an imitation of philosophical praxis. It is also likely an allusion to the doctrine that before undergoing praxis, one is incapable of perception of the intelligibles and therefore necessarily an imitator. This line of argument will become clear in this chapter and also in Chapter 4 which shows how distinctly al-Ghazālī etches out the dichotomy of imitation and demonstration. This entails that al-Ghazālī re-conceives of practical religion and its role of purification in terms according with philosophy. However, he upholds the outward praxis of the sharia and makes it the prerequisite by which felicity is obtained.

[65] Ibid., 352.6–7.
[66] See Michael Marmura, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers* (London: Brigham Young University Press, 2002), 244n2.
[67] Chapter 2 also studies how the scriptural topic of divine commands and prohibitions is itself treated at two levels corresponding to imitation and true, demonstrative knowledge.
[68] He also refers to the intelligibles as the nutrition (*ghidhā'*) of the soul in Question XX of the *Tahāfut*, 345.7.
[69] Note that the bodily dispositions deviating from the mean are said in Question XX to be responsible for preventing the human soul from its particular pleasure which is in conjunction with the angels (*Tahāfut*, 350.1–7, i.e. it prevents one from receiving true, incorporeal knowledge).

This doctrine is stated technically in what is termed the metaphysicalization of ethics in Avicenna in *Aḥwāl al-nafs*. Chapter 5 on praxis shows the transfer of this passage to the *Mīzān* and the passage of its doctrine to the *Iḥyā'*.

C. Bases of the *Iḥyā'* not Present in the *Mīzān*

A number of other statements in the *Tahāfut* establish that al-Ghazālī's summary of the philosophical doctrine of felicity in Question XX deviates from the position of Avicenna, and contains a unique map of how to get from the praxis of the *Mīzān* to the sophisticated structure of the *Iḥyā'* which joins between reason and revelation and incorporates numerous religious practices. This will show that al-Ghazālī arrived at many of his positions in the *Iḥyā'* through engagement with Avicenna, accepting many positions (as though they represent the source of knowledge, the intellect), and snake-handling to separate the venom from the serum by giving a greater role to scripture than Avicenna.

1. Classifying the knowledge which causes felicity

Al-Ghazālī picks out the knowledge that causes felicity from other sciences in a manner matching his other works, not Avicenna's *Shifā'*.[70] In this particular case, the *Mīzān* already offers a similar list and also distinguishes this knowledge causing felicity in two different places.[71] Avner Gilʿadi correctly describes this list as aspects of metaphysics represented in pure Islamic (or religious) terms.[72] The *Tahāfut* presents this knowledge as follows:

T5, *Tahāfut*, 349.4–8

> From amongst all types of knowledge in general, that which is beneficial is the pure intellectual sciences (*ʿulūm ʿaqliyya maḥḍa*). These are the knowledge of God, His attributes, His angels, His books, and how things are existentiated by Him. What is beyond this is beneficial extrinsically if it is a means to it. If it is not a means to it like grammar, lexicon, poetry, and the different types of special sciences (*ʿulūm mutafarriqa*), it is an art or trade like the rest of the arts.

Al-Ghazāʿī tells us 'Sciences' are this pure, intellectual science, *and* what is a means to it, this latter being extrinsically beneficial. Anything other than these two is a mere art. The science seemingly standing in for metaphysics is, as noted by Gilʿadi, stated in religious terms. The most likely candidate for being a means to this knowledge is praxis. The sense of 'intellectual'

[70] Avicenna describes the knowledge causing felicity by saying that the perfection proper to the rational soul is 'that it become an imprint of the universe and the rational order beginning from the First Cause and flowing to the completely spiritual substances, to those with a partial connection to bodies, then the celestial bodies, and so on till the form of all is comprehended by his or her soul…woven into his or her fabric' (*Shifāʾ: Ilāhiyyāt*, 350.7–14). In particular, we may note a causal descent from God to the world via various intermediaries. It should be minded that angels are referred to by both al-Ghazālī and Avicenna as being celestial souls and intellects. (See Chapters 3 and 4 treat the cosmology in *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, which spells this out, and Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, 119–21 for Avicenna, and 133–4 for al-Ghazālī's position in a number of works.)

[71] *Mīzān*, 53.16–54.2 and 160.12–161.4.

[72] Gilʿadi, 'The Origin of Two Key-Terms', 81–92, esp. 86.

here may be interpreted as purely Avicennian and philosophical—not coinciding with al-Ghazālī's own position. However, the following section of this chapter shows that al-Ghazālī's division of the sciences in the 3rd Quarter describes the sciences of the afterlife as intellectual, using the same term. The sciences are two, and thus match the emphasis on two sciences in the *Tahāfut*: knowledge and praxis. The *Mīzān* also talks about the eternal knowledge which causes felicity through perfecting the human soul and it lists God, His attributes, and most of the rest of the list with some changes.[73] This list of contents is al-Ghazālī's own synthesis.

Al-Ghazālī's list of sciences contextualized them differently from Avicenna's in the *Shifā'*. While the context of the *Shifā'* is the philosophical disciplines, al-Ghazālī contextualizes praxis and knowledge in the *Tahāfut* amongst the sharia and belles-lettres (*adab*) studies, referring to grammar, lexicon, poetry, and so on. Such a list is a stepping-stone, moving away from merely listing the praxis and speculative knowledge needed to obtain felicity towards the more thorough ranking and classification presented in the *Iḥyā',* as well as the *Jawāhir*.[74] While the nuances require further investigation, it is clear that al-Ghazālī is altering Avicenna in a manner attempting to drive his reader towards seeing a synthesis, likely his own which he is already developing as glimpsed here and finally presented in the *Iḥyā'*.

The *Tahāfut* thus includes a list of intellectual sciences incorporating al-Ghazālī's own synthesis. It contextualizes this list relative to other sciences in a manner that is his own, doing so in a section still summarizing the view of the *falāsifa* regarding the afterlife.

2. Pleasures of the intellect; pleasures of the afterlife

In addition to accepting the philosophical corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy in the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī builds another link on top of this dichotomy which is to associate each with another element: the corporeal with the here-below and the incorporeal with the afterlife.[75] Leading up to T5 above, al-Ghazālī first rehearses typical Avicennian arguments that, in spite of the fact that they are unknown by most people, intellectual pleasures exist and are even superior to bodily and sensible pleasures.[76] However, unlike most of Avicenna's descriptions, rather

[73] *Mīzān*, 53.6–9.
[74] See Alexander Treiger, 'Al-Ghazālī's Classifications of the Sciences and Descriptions of the Highest Theoretical Science', *Dîvân Disciplinerarasi Çalişmalar Dergisi* 16:30 (2011/1): 1–32, esp. 10–12.
[75] See Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife', which demonstrates this matter regarding the *Iḥyā'*.
[76] *Tahāfut*, 346.1–9.

than merely term these pleasures intellectual, al-Ghazālī uses the more palatable term 'spiritual intellectual' (*rūḥāniyya ʿaqliyya*).[77] Within a few sentences of linking the intellectual and spiritual, al-Ghazālī contrasts bodily pleasures (*ladhdhāt jismiyya*) with intellectual pleasures (*ʿaqliyya*) (ibid., 347.6–7) and contrasts what he calls 'intellectual afterlife pleasures' (*ladhdhāt ʿaqliyya ukhrāwiyya*) with 'sensible worldly pleasures' (*ladhdhāt ḥissiyya dunyāwiyya*) (ibid., 348.10–349.1). This aligns two sets of related terms: a) the bodily, sensible, and the here-below as near synonyms in a dichotomy with b) the intellectual, spiritual, and the afterlife. The first half are clearly ontologically corporeal, the latter incorporeal (see also Chapter 3 and 4). A similar link is already found in Avicenna, though in simpler terms.[78] The result is that al-Ghazālī imbibes the philosophical terms with religious meanings, but the link also has the effect of imbibing the religious terms with the philosophical meanings. This link allows the philosophically developed tension between the two—and, importantly, the competition between bodily and intellectual pleasures studied in Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife', and Chapter 6 on the religious virtues—to underpin al-Ghazālī's reasoning on the tension between the here-below and the afterlife.

Immediately leading up to the statement that the purely rational sciences are the only beneficial sciences, al-Ghazālī makes it clear that the intellectual pleasures are those pleasures of the afterlife thus:

T6, *Tahāfut*, 349.1–8

> Were it not for this (superiority), the Messenger of God, God bless him and send peace on him, would not have said, (speaking in the tongue of the Divine) {I have prepared for My righteous servant what no eye has seen nor ear heard nor has it occurred to the hearts of men} and God, most high, would not have said, {No soul knoweth what is kept hid for them of joy, as a reward for what they used to do} (Koran 32:17). So, this is the need for knowledge (*ʿilm*).

[77] *Tahāfut*, 346.12-347.1. In *al-Aḍḥawiyya* (191.1–199.3), Avicenna does say the composition of the incorporeal world is spiritual (*rūḥānī*) and contrasts intellectual pleasures with the bodily, but never refers to the pleasures themselves as spiritual. Nonetheless, making such a link is not a great leap as he has lined up all the dots which then only needed to be connected.

[78] See Avicenna's commentary on Surat al-Aʿlā in Ḥasan al-ʿAṣī, *al-Tafsīr al-Qurʾānī fī al-Ṣūfiyya fī falsafat Ibn Sīnā* (Beirut: al-Muʾassasat al-Jāmiʿa Dirāsāt Nashr Tawzīʿ, 1982), 102. He refers to a dichotomy between pleasures of the here-below and the pleasures of the afterlife (*ladhdhāt ukhrāwiyya*), only the latter helping one apprehend the felicities of the afterlife. In the ensuing discussion of the superiority of the pleasures of the afterlife, he switches to the terms spiritual pleasures and bodily pleasures. The terms refer to the same realities, the only difference seeming to be that in this more religious discourse, Avicenna does not refrain from admixing more religious terms. This indicates that the basis for this fundamental link of two disparate traditions is present in Avicenna. While it is likely that in some manner this notion was transferred from Avicenna to al-Ghazālī, it is not entirely clear that al-Ghazālī read this treatise. More evidence is produced later in this chapter which makes it highly likely that in spite of the small size and that we cannot be entirely sure he read it, that al-Ghazālī borrowed the fundamental structure of the *Iḥyāʾ* from this treatise which matches elements of the *Iḥyāʾ* in an uncanny manner.

Thus, al-Ghazālī links the distinction between the bodily and the superiour intellectual pleasures to notions of the here-below and afterlife. Further, he ties these links to the specific scriptural references to the higher pleasures available in the afterlife. Even if he states the knowledge of the *falāsifa* is not achieved by reason alone, but requires praxis and purification, this amounts to a form of exegesis involving a great deal of trust of the *falāsifa*. As shown several times, al-Ghazālī walks a fine line in that he handles scripture in Avicennian and philosophical categories, but scans Avicenna's text taking the option that affords the greatest place and role for scripture and its practice, and sometimes goes beyond this, but without disdain for reason represented conditionally by Avicenna. This exemplifies the claim that his snake-handling involves handling scripture and *falsafa* as reason and revelation each taken seriously as sources of knowledge, but also studied in light of each other.

3. Virtues re-conceived: Attachment to pleasures of the afterlife

The bulk of the path of praxis in the *Iḥyā'* is alluded to tersely in the *Tahāfut*. This is al-Ghazālī's reconception of the virtues as attachments to the intellectual pleasures linked above with the afterlife:

T7, *Tahāfut*, 351.5–9

> Nothing will save one from being smeared with these attributes but restraining the soul from caprice and turning from the here-below through applying oneself with complete seriousness to knowledge and God-fearingness until attachments (*ʿalāʾiq*) to worldly matters (*umūr dunyāwiyya*) are dissevered, even while in this here-below, and its attachment (*ʿilāqa*) to other-worldly matters (*umūr ukhrāwiyya*) takes firm root. Thus, if one dies it is like being freed from prison, for the one reaching all one desires is in one's heaven.

Having shown that the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy was imbibed into the tension between the here-below and the afterlife, this passage indicates how the tension between corporeal and incorporeal pleasures is woven into the notions of vice and virtue (and it indeed matches what is done in the *Iḥyāʾ*).[79] While Avicenna conceives of vice as the result of repeatedly acting according to what is entailed by the desire of the corporeal faculties, he merely conceives of virtue as the mean. At this mean, vice drops away, and the intellect becomes operative, but virtue is in no way seen as the effect of intellectual pleasures. This important innovation developed in the *Iḥyā'* is again inserted into the *Tahāfut* in a passage still

[79] See Chapters 3 and 6.

explicitly attributed to the *falāsifa*. In fact, it presents yet one more important manner in which al-Ghazālī redefines religion by building its notions on philosophical concepts, the afterlife and virtue being linked to intellectual objects and pleasures. The passage also speaks of the removal of vice and thus refers to some objects which form the path of the entire second half of the *Iḥyā'*. The only resemblance it has to Avicenna's writings is a vague similarity to the stations of the knowers (*maqāmāt al-ʿārifīn*) in which the stations following conjunction (*wuṣūl*) are the product of knowledge.[80] In other words, the stations listed are states undergone by the knower and are caused by their having achieved true knowledge and the impact this has on their soul.

D. Summary Reflections on the *Tahāfut* and its Relation to the Religious Revival

What was presented was only a summary of a few salient elements of the change rendered to the two Avicennian sources. The entire first part of Question XX reads like a rewriting of Avicenna to present al-Ghazālī's own solution for joining between reason and revelation regarding praxis and the knowledge required for felicity. As shown, it includes many structures used to construct the two-level framework by which al-Ghazālī moves from the praxis of the *Mīzān* to the *Iḥyā'*. It also lays much of the ground for the conception of religion the present chapter claims to be used in the *Iḥyā'*: that religion has two levels, the imitative shell and the true kernel. Further, it works towards developing the same dichotomy to be applied to scripture. Some of the main uses to which al-Ghazālī puts the two-level framework are already there in seed form in the *Tahāfut*. These include conceiving of praxis as the means of obtaining the higher of the two levels through turning from the corporeal to the incorporeal. They indicate that al-Ghazālī had prepared a framework for expanding the *Mīzān* to a more integrated model before he departed Baghdad.

A crucial question is, 'Why does he present this highly modified synthesis on the tongues of the *falāsifa* in the *Tahāfut*?' Part of the answer would be that he wishes to prepare scholars who have gone through the *Tahāfut* to accept a synthesis rather than blindly attack *falsafa* and reject all its claims on ad hominem or genealogical fallacies. Whether the *Tahāfut* is a refutation of *falsafa* has already been called into question in part because of the way it hides positions of Avicenna and advances others. But while in some cases it appears to attempt to

[80] *al-Ishārāt*, 4:101-6.

smear the reputation of the *falāsifa*, in this case their positions are both defended and altered, seemingly in direct opposition to attempts to discredit them. This is an apparent contradiction, but is this not just another case of an area such as logic or ethics where al-Ghazālī deems aspects of the philosophical syllabus acceptable or merely true? It may be, but as seen, it involves not only accepting aspects of their view of the afterlife. It involves accepting their speculative and practical sciences, in general, which are the cause of felicity in the afterlife. It also involves making changes, including a) selecting the most amenable doctrines of Avicenna from across his works, b) altering others, and c) combining those positions with scripture in a manner which better asserts the authenticity of scripture.

This appears to accord with his role as snake-handler. Snakes are not handled in public, but by the end of one's reading of the *Tahāfut*, it may be that he believes that by the final topic of this technical work this advanced reader is ready to see the snake being handled, if not ready to handle it themselves. In the *Iḥyā'*, only the serum is presented and snake handling does not occur openly in this public work. The serum is the doctrines undergirding the praxis which is implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, built on the doctrines emerging from the engagement with *falsafa* and reason in the *Tahāfut*.

While al-Ghazālī uses a philosophical source to do this, this concurs with his faith in philosophy: philosophy, when valid, is a technical statement of the truth inhering in the incorporeal world and Preserved Tablet. And, while al-Ghazālī drew religion closer to *falsafa* and reason, Avicenna paved the way for drawing *falsafa* closer to religion, striving to extend the Neo-Platonized Aristotelian system to account for all phenomena, including religious phenomena.[81] This blurs the line between philosophy and religion and the remainder of this chapter will aim to reveal al-Ghazālī's model for integrating religion and *falsafa* which is a prerequisite for analysing this model.[82]

[81] See Dimitri Gutas, 'Avicenna's Philosophical Project', in *Interpreting Avicenna*: *Critical Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 28–47, esp. 33–5 where he gives an outline for how Avicenna extended an Aristotelian system to account for religious phenomena.

[82] It begins to have the hallmarks of an Islamic philosophy or even the Illuminationist school founded by Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash al-Suhrawardī (al-Maqtūl; d. 587/1191) in that religion (and even Sufism) are approached within a philosophical framework. For one recent summary of previous attempts to define Illuminationism, see Hossein Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination*: *A Study of Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, Brown Judaic Studies vol. 97 (Atlanta, GA: University Scholars Press, 1990), 9–12.

III. Integration of Reason and Revelation: The Framework of Divisions and Levels

The current studies the most fundamental frameworks for organising knowledge and sciences, especially those which cut across philosophy and religion, used to build the *Iḥyā'*. This set of what we may term lenses shed light on how the doctrines studied in the previous section are used, and they allow us to understand the further doctrines Section IV shows are used to integrate reason and revelation in the *Iḥyā'*. Section III.A contextualizes the first element of the framework: the division of sciences in general into the practical and speculative. Section III.B reflects on the contexts of the sciences in these divisions, including summarizing previous scholarship on the contents within these divisions (and revealing that contemporary scholarship has more to say about the speculative than the practical in al-Ghazālī). Section III.C studies the religious handling of these contents in front of various audiences, showing the origins of al-Ghazālī limiting the prophetic mission primarily to the practical (with allusions to the speculative). In many cases, these aspects of the structure found to operate in the *Iḥyā'* are not made explicit, but are presented as brute fact, sometimes with clues for their discovery. Together, these lenses allow one to see the implicit background explaining the gap between the *Mīzān* and the product often presented as brute fact: the structure of the *Iḥyā'*. Section III.A is particularly important to allow us to properly interpreting al-Ghazālī's adoption of a means of structuring revelation and revelation: revelation is cast as an imitative mode, and while reason, often coming from *falsafa*, is cast as true knowledge. It places this structure in the context of the history of *kalām* to show the precedents of the division, suggesting that al-Ghazālī's structuring of the practical and speculative in the *Iḥyā'* may be seen as a renewal of previous attempts in *kalām* to found belief and practice on reason.

A. Analysis of the Primary Taxonomy: Practical and Speculative Sciences

Ken Garden cites approvingly that Avner Gil'adi and Alexander Treiger emphasize the philosophical origin of the basic division into the practical and speculative found in the *Iḥyā'*.[83] As early as the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī positively upholds that the sharia performs the prerequisite for felicity: praxis. It listed what is effectively the other side of our said division and the cause of felicity: knowledge (representing speculative knowledge). This felicity was shown to be

[83] Garden, *The First Islamic Reviver*, 73.

based on philosophical notions: that this knowledge is apprehended by the intellect proper, that it is demonstrative, and that it is eternal. Yet the contents he listed for this knowledge were highly religious. This indicates that he is adopting forms of the *falāsifa* without restricting himself to their content. It also indicates that he is applying the division into praxis and knowledge across all forms of knowledge, religious and philosophical, and effectively integrating them and bringing them onto one playing field. However, in the mere sense of identifying knowledge and praxis in religious matters, an equivalent split was identifiable in a religious context in or before the time of al-Ghazālī.[84] That the practical aspect of religion (including its law and ritual worship) rests on a speculative foundation arrived at by universal human reason was something widely agreed on by Baṣran Muʿtazilīs, *falāsifa* such as al-Fārābī, and early Ashʿarīs.[85]

The context of this integration is, in general, obviously the framework of Avicenna including the psychology and ontology which provides the notions of knowledges, sciences, and character traits handled even in the *Tahāfut* passage (T7 above). Such reflection is necessary because, both in the *Mīzān* and the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī uses this division and other related conceptual frameworks studied in this chapter, introducing them by brute force or even with an element of being economical with the truth. In the *Mīzān*, they are introduced as being the dual path to felicity accepted by three groups: the Sufis, metaphysical philosophers, and followers of the sharia.[86] This is a simplification to generate acceptance or downplay differences to what he will put forward in the *Mīzān*, and it is not related to his introduction in the *Iḥyā'* of his two religious sciences: the path of praxis and speculative unveiling. In the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī introduces the two sciences the prophets brought as follows:

T8, *Iḥyā'*, 1:4.34–5.5

> The knowledge by which one directs oneself towards the afterlife is divided into the science of the path of praxis and the science of speculative unveiling. I mean by the science of speculative unveiling that from which is sought unveiling of the knowable, only. I mean by the science of the path of praxis that from which is sought, in addition to unveiling, implementing it in works.

[84] Cf., L. Gardet, '*ʿAmal*' ('that which is practised', being the second of three entries), in P. Bearman, et al. (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. 12 vols (Leiden: Brill, 1960), 1:427b.
[85] Richard Frank, 'Reason and Revealed Law: A Sample of Parallels and Divergences in *Kalâm* and *Falsafa*', in *Philosophy, Theology and Mysticism in Medieval Islam.* Vol. 1, Texts and studies Studies on the development Development and history History of *Kalām* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 123–38, esp. 132–5 and 137.
[86] The praxis he presents in the *Mīzān* has been shown by Jules Janssens to be largely transferred from two Avicennian treatises. Chapter 4 of this thesis shows this and that the core doctrines of praxis all make their way into the *Iḥyā'*.

They are introduced here in the context of his revival of the religious sciences, indicating now that they are religious sciences. The same division is present, and here the logical basis for the split is spelled out and obvious without tracing it back to Avicenna or Aristotle: sciences must indeed logically be divided into those which are merely speculative and those which also aim to inform action. Avner Gil'adi has traced what he describes as an Aristotelian division between the practical and speculative. He concludes that knowledge and praxis are traceable even in the *Mīzān* itself to a full Aristotelian classification of the theoretical and practical sciences—as they would be in *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* representing Avicenna's thought.[87] The widening gap he identifies between the science of praxis outlined in the *Kītāb al-ʿIlm*, in the *Iḥyāʾ*, and the broader practical knowledge (*al-ʿilm al-ʿamalī*) is already present in the *Tahāfut*: referring to praxis and intending thereby practical ethics without reference to politics and economics.[88] Gil'adi is content to draw two conclusions. First, though the philosophical language of the *Mīzān* is absent from the *Iḥyāʾ*, the 'essentially Aristotelian dichotomy between the two main branches of knowledge by dividing' the religious sciences into the path of praxis and the science of unveiling are well represented in the *Iḥyāʾ*.[89] Second, which he states is his central point, the terminology of the *Iḥyāʾ*, which is, 'the most comprehensive and detailed presentation of the theories of orthodox Sufism',[90] is effected by the Islamic philosophical elaboration of the Aristotelian system.

Gil'adi's research allows us to affirm the deeper origins of the division, but as noted, even in the *Iḥyāʾ* the logical basis is obvious.[91] What requires further reflection is how al-Ghazālī silently shifts his use of the term 'religious', sometimes using it for sharia practice, and sometimes for those sciences which are termed philosophical in other contexts such as the *Tahāfut*: namely, his sciences of praxis and speculative unveiling. And let us not forget that the *Mīzān* began with the bold claim that knowledge and praxis were agreed on by all. For the current stage of the argument, it is posited that he intends two meanings of religion: one imitative and the reality or kernel of religion. It is the aim of this section and the subsequent sections of this chapter to explain this shift through showing that there is what we call for lack

[87] He notes that the *Mīzān* mentions all the (three) branches of the practical sciences, but emphasizes economics while the *Iḥyāʾ* entirely omits economics and politics. (See Gil'adi, 'The Origin of Two Key-Terms', 88.)
[88] Ibid., 88.
[89] He directs the reader to nn3 and 4 for more evidence.
[90] Gil'adi, 'The Origin of Two Key-Terms', 87.
[91] The logical basis of the division is simply that some knowledge is known only to be known while other knowledge is known to be known *and* to be practised.

of better term a dual duplex at play. This is doctrine of dividing knowledge into two parts—the practical and speculative—and each of these into two levels—imitation and true knowledge. While al-Ghazālī adopts or appropriates a philosophical notion of religion as imitation, in his case, he also terms the higher level religion, but in the specific sense of its reality or kernel. Again, interpretation of the implications of adopting this structure requires remembering that for al-Ghazālī all knowledge is present in the *malakūt* and is accessed by all including prophets, *falāsifa*, and religious scholars.[92]

B. The Contents of the Sciences of the Path of Praxis and Speculative Unveiling

As stated above, careful interpretation is required regarding linking sharia to imitation and aligning it with higher sciences and determining whether this entails that true religion has been replaced with *falsafa* and also that imitative sharia has been subordinated to *falsafa*. In order to avoid this assumption, a few important writings from existing scholarship on the topic are discussed here to contribute towards the required interpretation.

Regarding the speculative sciences, Alexander Treiger's study of the *Iḥyā'* focuses on the science of unveiling, but is still helpful for understanding what is claimed here to be in the *Iḥyā'* an interpretation or reconception of religion. He cites Richard Frank who finds Avicennian sources by which al-Ghazālī raises the science of unveiling to true knowledge,[93] but adds Robert Wysnovsky's analysis that the higher theology al-Ghazālī produces is indeed on a template of topics covered in the subject of theology and which is set by Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī's (d. 333/944) *Kītāb al-tawḥīd*.[94] In his conclusion, he disagrees with Binyamin Abrahamov, who sees al-Ghazālī's system as 'philosophical…(but which) sometimes appears in Sufi disguise'.[95] Rather, he is more inclined to Kenneth Garden's ecumenical position: seeing that al-Ghazālī develops overlap between different approaches to theology and holding that the science of the afterlife is not a pre-existing science. Treiger concludes that his thesis has shown specifically the speculative branch to be a unique synthesis of Sufism and philosophy.[96] While Treiger shows carefully that the content is shifted from pure Avicennism

[92] See Chapter 3 for a study of the epistemological implications of the *mulk-malakūt* cosmology.
[93] Alexander Treiger, 'The Science of DivineDivine Disclosure: Ġazālī's Underpinnings' (PhD diss., Yale University, 2008), 190.
[94] Ibid., 87.
[95] Ibid., 334.
[96] Ibid.

to theology, he holds that al-Ghazālī's notions of what constitutes knowledge adopt much of Avicennian epistemology and psychology and agrees with Jules Janssens that, 'seen from a philosophical perspective',[97] al-Ghazālī's aim was to produce a real Islamic philosophy. A clearer way to state this is that the methodology is philosophical while the content is a blend of theology and philosophy. This thesis will crucially show that al-Ghazālī produces levels and that the level arriving at felicity is the intellectual (and Avicennian) level, while al-Ghazālī constructs a supra-rational level which builds on knowledge of the realities of things through annihilation in divine unity.[98]

Tanneli Kukkonen has studied the origins of al-Ghazālī's praxis in philosophy and his attempts to provide an authoritative origin for it in prophecy itself.[99] While Kukkonen notes that lending it authority may help his contemporaries accept his project, he also notes that for Avicenna and al-Fārābī, ritual acts such as prayer display congruity between the limbs and heart.[100] In particular, al-Fārābī's view of religion as imitation resembles a Middle Platonist model of the relationship between reason and revelation,[101] one already noted by Walzer, he adds. Al-Ghazālī on the other hand sees the prayer as containing mysteries which can be known is as much as one strives to experience the prayer through effort and purity, something related to but surpassing their views.[102]

To make more headway, Chapters 3 and 4 are essentially focused on showing the carry-over of the doctrine of praxis from the *Mīzān* and its expansion to accommodate sharia and Sufi practices. Al-Ghazālī is shown to integrate the sharia as the imitative level of the science of ethics, such that worship becomes part of the path of praxis. However, he also changes the nature of the vices, but more especially virtues, to make them, as alluded to in the *Tahāfut*, expressions of attachment to matters of the afterlife (i.e. eternal intelligibles). Thus, the matter becomes much like Treiger's findings in the speculative realm: al-Ghazālī uses the forms and raises the sciences to a demonstrative status, but alters the contents beyond the limits of identity. Thus, the new science must be described and named on its own terms as a new science.

[97] Ibid., 335.
[98] See Chapter 4, Section V.
[99] Taneli Kukkonen, 'Al-Ghazālī on the Origins of Ethics', *Numen* 63 (2016): 271–98.
[100] Ibid., 290.
[101] He names in particular the first-century (BCE) Platonists Numenius and Varro.
[102] Kukkonen, 'Al-Ghazālī on the Origins of Ethics', 289–90.

C. Limiting the Scope of the Prophetic Mission to the Practical

An important structural form not noted by existing scholarship is a secondary part of al-Ghazālī's dual duplex and philosophy of religion: to adopt some form of the limiting of the scope and mission of the prophetic mission. This refers to Avicenna's statements which occur in at least two places: a) the *Shifāʾ: Ilāhiyyāt*, X.13 on the benefits of worship in the here-below and afterlife[103] which was added above to Janssens' sources of the *Tahāfut*, Question XX and b) *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, *Faṣl* 3.[104] As noted in the introductory statements of this section, Avicenna argues it is necessary that the prophetic mission be limited to the practical with mere allusions to abstract theology, to accommodate the limited understanding of the masses. This thesis shows that a similar form or structure is behind al-Ghazālī's directing the masses incapable of speculative inquiry and contemplation to imitate and avoid interpretation (and also *kalām* proofs). This structuring element is crucial for understanding the audience question in the *Iḥyāʾ*: al-Ghazālī consistently provides scripture and Sufi reports for those incapable of contemplation, and provides a means thereby to achieve salvation, religious states, and the felicity who perform copious invocation and obtain intimacy with God and the incorporeal.

Al-Ghazālī's statements dividing people into different classes and practices are presented in Chapter 2, in discussion of the theoretical aspects of scripture. But the basic statements are already found in the introduction of the *Iḥyāʾ* which immediately follow from the above translation (T8):

T9, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:4.34–5.5

> The aim of this book is only the science of the path of praxis, not the science of speculative unveiling for which there is no permission to place it in books, even if it is the ultimate aim of seekers and the object of desire of the inquiry of the veracious, while the science of the path of praxis is the path to it. However, the prophets, God's blessing be upon them, did not speak with people except about the science of the path and guiding to it. As for the science of speculative unveiling, they only spoke of it in symbols and allusions, through striking similitudes (*tamthīl*), and in general, due to their knowledge that the understanding of people lacks such potential. The scholars are the inheritors of the prophets. So, they do not have the choice of diverting from the method of taking (the prophets) as exemplars and following.

[103] *Shifāʾ: Ilāhiyyāt*, 365.13-9.
[104] *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 85.8-89.4.

The same structuring notion—that religion is limited to the practical, with mere allusions to a higher theology—is put in religious terms, and scholars are said to necessarily imitate prophets in this. However, the notion of prophecy seems imbued with some philosophical notions which are part and parcel of the forms he is using such as the divisions and levels of the sciences and the reference to higher levels via allusion.[105]

As noted above, while the *falāsifa* were said in the *Tahāfut* and by Ibn Taymiyya afterwards to hold that ritual religion motivated via scriptural depictions of heaven and hell were political expediences, Avicenna held that these rituals worked on the soul in a manner similar to ethics and were beneficial in the afterlife. In *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, he adds a related doctrine, stating that the primary aim (*aʿẓam qaṣd*) of the sharia is (to perfect) the practical part (of the soul; *al-juzʾ al-ʿamalī*).[106] This occurs after stating that the masses are dominated by the lower faculties from which they have not ethically purified themselves, and because of which scripture must be interpreted by Avicenna's central rule: it must speak to the masses as they understand, namely, in terms amenable to sense experience and imagination. Thus, the implicit argument is that prophets intend to benefit people, but the masses cannot grasp abstract theology. Thus, the benefit they convey must be limited to the practical part of the soul. He spells this out, stating that were they to speak of abstract theology in a manner resembling philosophy, the masses would deny the existence of such a God. In this context in the *Shifāʾ*, he concludes by stating that not everyone is cut out for philosophical wisdom (*ḥikma*).

Al-Ghazālī himself offers a more detailed statement on the scope and limits of the prophetic mission than his brief statement from the outset of the *Iḥyāʾ*. In the context of explaining the secrets of annihilation, he invokes his famous device of lifting his pen from speculative unveiling and returning to praxis, thus:

T10, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:85.23–5

[105] It is clear that he does speak of a good deal of the higher sciences in the *Iḥyāʾ*. Later chapters quote al-Ghazālī stating that the fundamentals of the science of unveiling are included in various chapters, and even that praxis crawls all over the science of unveiling, so there is no doubt that substantial aspects of the higher science are included in the *Iḥyāʾ*.

Murtaḍā al-Zabīdī in his commentary on the *Iḥyāʾ*, the *Itḥāf al-saʿāda* (1:63), mentions that this method of striking similitudes and speaking only generally is because it (i.e. the science of unveiling) is an ecstatic matter (*wajdāniyya*; of immediately known). As shown in Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife', this commentary does not reflect al-Ghazālī's notion of unveiling which is knowledge apprehended by the intellect, whether obtained via speculative inquiry or inspiration.

[106] *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 86–7.

> The prophets, upon them peace, were sent forth to call mankind to a (notion of) divine unity which is complete, like that which we have composed [though he does not say where]. However, between them (i.e. mankind) and reaching this (notion of divine unity) is a great distance and difficult mountain passes (*ʿaqabāt*; a term used in both the 3rd and 4th Quarters for attributes of the heart, particularly vices). The sharia in its entirety is only (*innamā al-sharʿ kulluhu*) an explanation (*taʿrīf*) of the path of wayfaring (*ṭarīq sulūk*) over that distance and crossing those passes. Thereafter, one's view (of such theoretical topics) will be from a different vantage point and station.

The aim of praxis is crossing those passes. So, the passage indicates that the sharia focuses on producing the practical prerequisites to theoretical knowledge. Al-Ghazālī does not offer evidence of his claim that this division is ascribable to the prophets, and its resemblance to Avicenna's treatment of religion and the scope of the prophetic mission is uncanny.

This adoption could be interpreted as dressing Avicennian philosophy in religious clothing. However, it likely expresses al-Ghazālī's attempt to join between two sources of reason and revelation. This involves finding a method and structure for joining them which is itself based on demonstration and al-Ghazālī finding only the *falāsifa* living up to, or attempting to live up to, the standards of demonstration.[107] Section III.A indicated that in terms of building theology on reason, al-Ghazālī's model is not exceptional in the history of *kalām*; rather, it is quite typical, expressing merely an update of sorts to new canons of reason. However, Section III.C indicates that he uses many of the details of *falsafa* which do indicate snake-handling in that he is very comfortable with many detailed positions of the *falāsifa* and feels justified to hide this snake-handling from the public.

[107] This is of course to leave aside for the moment that Avicenna strove to understand, interpret, and accommodate religion far more so than is shown in the writings we have of al-Fārābī. See Gutas, 'Avicenna's Philosophical Project', 12–13, which argues that Avicenna expanded existing materials far beyond the inheritance he received.

IV. Two Meanings and Levels of Religion in the Revival of the Religious Sciences

This section turns from the organisational structures treated above to a conceptual structure: the use of 'religion' (*dīn*) with two different meanings. It focusses on an *Iḥyā'*, 3rd Quarter, classification of knowledge that has received some scholarly attention.[108] We argue that the two layers this thesis demonstrates run throughout the *Iḥyā'* imply a dual duplex. This may be seen by recognizing the following. First, the said classification divides knowledge fundamentally into practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. Then, each of these divisions is divided into two levels: imitation and true knowledge. Thus, the whole of practical and theoretical knowledge have an outward, corporeal shell and inward, incorporeal kernel. The result is, on the practical side, an imitative practical knowledge and true science of praxis, and, on the theoretical side, imitative theoretical knowledge (such as the tenets of belief) and true theoretical knowledge, or what may be termed a science of theology. Reflection on the passages below show that 'religion' is used in two senses. In one sense, it is the shell or imitation and is associated with the body. In another, it is true religion, the kernel, and incorporeal knowledge apt to be the cause of felicity for the eternal soul affirmed in the *Tahāfut*. Section A presents the key passages with brief comments to elucidate the dual duplex classification and indicate the allusions to the two senses of religion. Section B reflects on how al-Ghazālī makes the sharia a necessary prerequisite for the rational sciences of the afterlife. Section C argues that the levels present are not merely epistemological, as noted by Alexander Treiger, but ontological. In other words, the imitative shell represents the corporeal. The core, pith or true knowledge represents the incorporeal: that knowledge fulfilling the prerequisites of knowledge causing eternal felicity, as set out already in the *Tahāfut*.

[108] See e.g. Frank, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School*, 22–4, and Treiger, *The Science of Divine Disclosure*, 115–19, and an article devoted to classification: 'Al-Ghazālī's Classifications of the Sciences'.

Several matters appear that are already present in the *Tahāfut*. These include the term 'sustenance', this time under the label intellectual sciences, the term 'imitation' of sharia by performing its acts that have healing properties, and the declaring of sciences other than praxis and speculative unveiling to be mere trades or arts, rather than sciences.

I avoid the term rational sciences for several reasons. First, al-Ghazālī's notion includes knowledge which is received by the means of inspiration (*ilhām*). Second, it includes a higher degree of knowing which he terms unveiling or direct witnessing, even if he insists the substrate of all knowledge is one. Third, his discussion is not merely of an epistemological method of reasoning and inference, but of a grasping with the intellect of the (incorporeal) realities of things. Al-Ghazālī holds that true knowledge is timeless, universal, and incorporeal and therefore the soul alone, with its attribute of the intellect, is capable of grasping true knowledge. As we have seen, he exonerates his view of the intellect from what he indicates are valid criticisms of the Sufis by distancing his view from *kalām* dialectics—even though they use what they would deem as a rational method.

A. The Dual Duplex of the *Iḥyā'*

The dual duplex structure forming the core of the *Iḥyā'* is alluded to in *Bayān* 7 of Book XXI, *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb*. Alexander Treiger noted that it presents a classification differing from that found in Book I which orders the sciences based on their legal category.[109] Here, instead, sciences are ordered epistemologically. I will argue in Section C that there is good reason to believe the ordering is also ontological: based on the different ontological status of knowledge memorised by rote and that comprehended by the intellect. The two levels of knowledge represent opposite sides of the body-soul dualism Chapter 3 shows to be deployed in the *Iḥyā'*, one inhering in corporeal faculties humans shared with animals, the other inhering in the incorporeal soul. It is not a surprise that al-Ghazālī offers a more revealing classification here in the 3rd Quarter. He himself states that the 1st Half of the *Iḥyā'* is devoted to the outer, while the 2nd Half is devoted to the inner (see Chapters 3 and 4).

In the present classification, sciences are divided into sharia and intellectual sciences. The intellectual sciences are themselves divided, perhaps counter-intuitively, into sciences of the here-below and sciences of the afterlife. A notion of Sufism antagonistic towards the intellect might imagine intellectual or rational sciences as harmful to religion. However, we saw in the *Tahāfut* that the higher, incorporeal pleasures linked to the higher state of felicity were related to both the terms spiritual and intellectual. The present *bayān* is named 'The State of the Heart in Relation to the Divisions of the Intellectual, Religious, Worldly, and Otherworldly Sciences', its name itself referring to four types of knowledge: a) *dīniyya*, b) *ʿaqliyya*, c) *dunyāwiyya*, and d) *ukhrāwiyya*. The primary division is seen below to be between the religious and intellectual. The most obvious problem with this is dispelled immediately, as we know that al-Ghazālī will then divide the intellectual sciences themselves into the worldly and those of the afterlife. So his aim is not to dismiss the intellectual. This then raises a first problem: that it appears to make religion opposed to the afterlife, or even to use religion in two incompatible senses of the word. Alexander Treiger notes correctly that religion is used in two different senses.[110] However, this does not give complete clarity to the 3rd Quarter classification because the two meanings he refers to are deployed in different quarters. In the

[109]Treiger, 'Al-Ghazālī's Classification of the Sciences', 14.
[110]Ibid.

3rd Quarter, the imitative sciences are termed religious in the lower sense.[111] In the 1st Quarter, the sciences of the afterlife are classified under the religious sciences in a different, more open sense, merely as 'having something to do with religion'.[112] We wish to argue that this classification reflect a wider truth in the *Iḥyā'*: that religion has two senses. One, in spite of clearly having something to do with religion, is linked to the here-below. The second is linked to the afterlife, even though it is said to be intellectual. Without mustering the evidence spread across this thesis, or even that in this sub-section, it may be helpful to note that the intellectual sciences of the afterlife he lists here are the sciences of the path of the afterlife he wishes to revive in his revival of religious sciences. This is the obvious purport of the title of his revival. If, in the rich historical reading of Kenneth Garden, these sciences he wants to give triumph over fiqh and *kalām* are not religious in any sense of the word, the whole purpose of the *Iḥyā'* could be nothing but deception or, at best, highly radical rhetoric, as it would not be reviving religious sciences.[113] (It would still leave the possibility open that he holds religion is the necessary entrance way to philosophical sciences that cause the higher level of eternal felicity.) What I propose is that the higher sciences are religious. This in itself is not new, as Richard Frank already termed them a higher theology. What is new is to work out how the two levels are modelled in terms of corporeal imitation and incorporeal demonstration, and to study in later chapters that the interpretive and practical dynamic of the *Iḥyā'* regard almost solely how to move from one level to the next.

Garden studied al-Ghazālī's references to sharia sciences as sciences of the here-below, or, in al-Ghazālī's terms, 'nearly so', as al-Ghazālī admits that though their science deals with the body, it does so in relation to rites of worship which may be used to draw close to God. Chapter 2 indicates that the story of how al-Ghazālī handles sharia practices and the science of ethics in practice is even more complicated: he treats the topic of incorporation of acts of

[111]See ibid. Treiger notes that in the 3rd Quarter classification, religion merely means acquired from religious sources alone and thus epistemologically "on authority".
[112]Ibid.
[113] See Garden, *The First Islamic Reformer*, Chapter 4, 'The Rhetoric of Revival: Authorizing Strategies and the Presentation of the Science of the Hereafter.'

the limbs into the science of ethics; al-Ghazālī's treatment of the rites includes secrets or etiquettes which bring out the healing powers concealed inside these revealed acts.[114]

I want to go beyond the terms to the meaning, and ultimately to the claim here in Section A that intellectual sciences of the afterlife are the kernel of religion, and thus that al-Ghazālī uses the term religious in two senses. Section C will complete this meaning by indicating the ontological purport of the classification.

Al-Ghazālī opens this *bayān* by stating the first divisions of what is argued here to be a classification built on his two fundamental layers as follows:

T11, *Iḥyā'*, 3:15.29–31

> Know that the heart is prepared through an innate propensity to receive the realities of things, as proceeded. However, the sciences which inhere in it are divided into the intellectual sciences and the sharia (*shar'iyya*) sciences. The intellectual (sciences) are divisible into immediately known (*ḍarūriyya*) and acquired. The acquired (are divisible into) those of the here-below and those of the afterlife (*ukhrāwiyya*). As to the intellectual sciences, we mean by them that whose judgement arises

[114] The epistemology and ontology underpinning the two notions of religion are separate points, but are often drawn on in a related manner in al-Ghazālī's writing. The case that such as technical ontology underpins al-Ghazālī's notions of religion (as well as the here-below and afterlife), is made in Chapter 3, Section I.A, 'The Philosophical Doctrine of Felicity and al-Ghazālī's Afterlife Criterion'. The soul is also said there to be from the incorporeal world and the cause of its felicity is eternal, unchanging knowledge. The criterion between what lasts forever and what does not is shown there to underpin various discussions in the *Iḥyā'* of the here-below and afterlife.

Al-Ghazālī's application of this division in the practical manual of the *Iḥyā'*, which incorporates sharia, is seen in discussions related to those Ken Garden was above said to discuss. This is that al-Ghazālī refers to the corporeal world (and the relevant part of it; namely, acts of the corporeal limbs) as the only aspect over which sultans and *faqīh*s have jurisdiction. In opposition to this are treatment of the heart and its acts, the scholars of this realm being referred to as scholars of the afterlife (see reference below).

In spite of drawing a division between acts of the limbs and body (and the here-below and afterlife), in the end, the acts of the limbs are related to the acts of heart and afterlife. This may be seen in two ways, both of which inform us of his notion of the possible relationship between religion as religion of the here-below and religion as religion of the afterlife. One is the theme mentioned in discussion of prayer: that the outward act of, for instance, prostration, causes the state of the heart which is awe before the Divine to enter the heart. The second is implicit in the very inclusion of inner acts of the heart in the Quarter on Worship. This is that one may render a bodily act into and an act of the afterlife (*'amal al-ākhira*) through minding such preconditions of acceptability such as presence of heart. (See *Iḥyā'*, 1:19.14, where the limited jurisdiction of the *faqīh* is contrasted to bringing in presence of heart in prayer which renders it an act of the afterlife. See also al-Ghazālī's discussion of how the inner acts such as presence of heart are known by the scholars of the afterlife, and his contrasting this while referring back to passages discussed by Ken Garden on the limited role of the *faqīh* in *Kitāb al-'Ilm* in *Kitāb Ādāb al-ṣalāt*, *Iḥyā'*, 1:161.1–3 and 1:161.9–12.)

T17 and T18 below show that bodily sharia acts and attributes of the heart are linked. This is because while acts affect states of the heart, it is—on the metaphor of medicine—the states of the heart (of the individual) which determine which acts they need to perform in order to move towards balance and therefore health (though in this case, health of the heart). So, sharia acts of the limbs translate, as it were, into states of the heart (linked to the afterlife) through the principle of habituation. The two levels are thus not only linked ontologically, but epistemologically. This is seen even more in the *Iḥyā'* where, as seen in Chapter 2 in discussion of revealed acts, al-Ghazālī's philosophy of prophetic acts is shown.

> from the intellect, and is not generated through imitation nor rote memorization (*samāʿ*).

The first division is into the sharia sciences—not the religious sciences!—and the intellectual sciences. Al-Ghazālī offers are relatively comprehensive division of the intellectual sciences, including those which are not sought, but accrue necessarily.[115] Those which are sought are then divided into those of the here-below and those of the afterlife, so not all intellectual sciences cause felicity. This is important but need not be pursued here. Intellectual sciences require judgement of the intellect, and hence proof, or at least a proper understanding. If we are looking for his higher theoretical and practical sciences here, it is helpful to note that Chapter 2 discusses Book II, *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* in which al-Ghazālī treats credal belief and its levels. Therein, al-Ghazālī refers to two levels, the sharia and ultimate reality termed *al-ḥaqīqa* and insists they must not contradict each other.

We learn more about the nature of the lower sciences and how they are obtained as follows:

T12, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:16.23–17.1

> As to the religious sciences, they are taken by means of imitation (*taqlīd*) from the prophets, the blessings and peace of God be upon them. This occurs through learning the book of God, most high, and the practice of His messenger, God bless him and send him peace, and then understanding (*fahm*) its meanings (*maʿānihā*) after learning it by rote (*samāʿ*).

This statement echoes the *Tahāfut* recommendation to begin by throwing oneself into imitative practice of the sharia. Somewhat confusingly, while in T11 al-Ghazālī used the term sharia, he now uses the more general term religious sciences. The passage refers to understanding meanings occurring after learning by rote, but does not explain how this occurs. Chapter 2 shows that in other parts of the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī states that what has been brought by the prophets is divided into words and acts and other evidence indicating that this

[115] Previous scholarship has argued that the immediately known knowledge is axiomatic knowledge of necessary truths traceable back to al-Ghazālī's *Maqāṣid*. In Alexander Treiger's analysis of this classification, he notes, 'in *Maqāṣid*, Logic, p. 47 this type of knowledge is called *awwaliyyāt* and a definition is provided' ('Al-Ghazali's Classification of the Sciences', 1–32, esp. 13n34). However, we may go somewhat further and state that this passage presents the basic Avicennian division of material and acquired intellect, while simultaneously resembling to pre-Ghazālīan *kalām*. An example of a *kalām* work that distinguishes in the context of discussing the sources of knowledge between knowledge known directly by the intellect is al-Ghazālī's own *al-Iqtiṣād*. He refers to knowledge known directly by the intellect in one place as self-evident (*badīhī*), and presents knowledge known through reasoning with the intellect on other sources of knowledge as a separate category (*al-Iqtiṣād fī al-iʿtiqād*, 21–2). Cf. *al-Irshād* in which al-Juwaynī distinguishes between speculative knowledge (*ʿulūm nazariyya*) and immediate knowledge (*ʿulūm ḍarūriyya*), the latter including the law of non-contradiction (*istiḥālat jamʿ al-ḍāddayn*) as an example of impossibilities known immediately by the intellect. (See '*Faṣl*: *al-ʿAql ʿulūm ḍarūriyya*', in *al-Irshād*, ed. Muḥammad Mūsā and ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khānijī, 1950), 15–16.)

imitative aspect brought by the prophets and learned initially by imitation applies to both theoretical and practical knowledge. This point is important for the argument that a dual duplex is presented here: two levels cutting across two divisions of knowledge.

The higher sciences are not religious in the sense of being their source nor their method: being taken on authority. Alexander Treiger says the two higher sciences are clearly religious in the sense that—like the sciences al-Ghazālī says are praiseworthy in the 1st Quarter classification—they 'have to do with religion'.[116] It seems that in the 1st Quarter classification we can safely say 'has to do with religion' means something is connected with the scripture of a given religion. In that classification, fiqh was said to be a science of the here-below, though al-Ghazālī still granted that fiqh had a relation to the afterlife. To avoid rehearsing the rest of present thesis, suffice at this juncture to say that the second sense of religion here is: linked to the afterlife through causing eternal felicity. In the discourse by which al-Ghazālī attempts to put the jurists in their place, religion has two senses: worldly and related to the afterlife. Here, the higher level sciences are religious in the latter sense. The dual duplex resembles al-Fārābī's treatment of religion as the imitation of philosophy, but them it seems that the philosophy here has become a sort of philosophical religion: a science of praxis and a science of *theoria* or speculative theology. Section C addresses how the two are levels not only epistemologically, but ontologically by being linked to this world and the afterlife. Chapter 3 makes it copiously clear that al-Ghazālī all but makes the here-below synonymous with the corporeal and the afterlife all but synonymous with the incorporeal.

B. The Prerequisite of the Rational Sciences: The Sharia

Something of the relation between the two levels and the need for the sharia is addressed next in this 3rd Quarter classification:

T13, *Iḥyā'*, 3:16.23–17.1

> Through this (learning by rote and practice), the perfection of the attribute (*ṣifa*) of the heart and its soundness from maladies (*adwā'*) and sickness (*amrāḍ*) comes about. Thus, the intellectual sciences do not suffice regarding the soundness of the heart, even though they are needed, just as the intellect does not suffice in knowing the causes of remaining healthy. Rather, the intellect needs to know (*ma'rifa*) the special properties (*khawāṣṣ*) of remedies and solves (*'aqāqīr*) through learning from physicians because the mere intellect cannot reach this (knowledge). However, it is impossible to understand it after hearing it (*samā'ihi*) except with the intellect. Thus, the intellect is not free of need

[116]Treiger, 'Al-Ghazali's Classification of the Sciences', p. 14.

> for rote transmission (*samāʿ*) and rote transmission is not free of need for the intellect. Thus, the one calling to pure imitation alongside total withdrawal from the intellect is ignorant. And, the one holding that pure intellect is sufficient without the lights of the Koran and prophetic example (*sunna*) is deluded (*maghrūr*). Beware lest you become one of these two groups, and be of those who join between the two sources (*aṣlayn*). For the intellectual sciences are like forms of nutrition (*aghdhiyāʾ*) and the sharia sciences (*ʿulūm sharʿiyya*) are like medicines. The sick individual is harmed by sustenance (*ghidhāʾ*) if they miss their medicine. Similarly, it is impossible to cure (*ʿilāj*) the sicknesses of the heart except through the medicines provided by the sharia. They are the routine worship and acts (*wazāʾif al-ʿibādāt wa al-aʿmāl*) concocted by the prophets, the blessings of God be on them, to repair (*iṣlāḥ*) hearts. Whoever does not medicate their sick heart with the cure of sharia worship and suffices with the intellectual sciences is harmed by them just as the infirm is harmed by ingesting sustenance.

This crucial passage contains a general methodology: join between reason and revelation. This also echoes the *Tahāfut* where it was said with regarding to truth claims: attempt to join between the results of reason and revelation. A number of other crucial points are here. First, it indicates the same methodology of the *falāsifa* used in the *Tahāfut*, but in this case also found in the *Mīzān*: the practical intellect must be purified from vice before the intellectual sciences can be acquired. Second, al-Ghazālī goes further and states that the intellectual sciences will actually be harmful. Third, this passage is shown in Chapter 2 to refer to layers within what the prophets have brought: the acts and words of prophets are aligned to higher meanings and have properties effecting the soul. Use of the terms 'sustenance' and 'nutrition' echoes the *Tahāfut*, *but these terms are not found in the Mīzān nor al-Aḍḥawiyya*. In themselves, the appearance of these terms and the making the sharia a necessary step in the path of praxis being found in the *Tahāfut* and not the *Mīzān* indicates, not conclusively of course, that this creative solution for how to join between the two sources occurred while working on the *Tahāfut*. This and other 'solutions' being found in the *Tahāfut* indicate integration found in the *Iḥyāʾ*, but not in the *Mīzān*, was a project being developed by al-Ghazālī's before his departure from Baghdad.

Finally, the notion that the sharia and what was brought by the prophets contains special healing properties is shown via an *Iḥyāʾ*, Book III passage to refer to the fact that those of insight (read: intellect)[117] know the science—i.e. ethics or the science praxis—by which the universal rules are discerned which work with the particular properties of ritual acts, on a

[117] See Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife'.

metaphor of the universal science of medicine and knowledge of the particular properties of various remedies.

Al-Ghazālī follows the T13 by cajoling the listener for whom joining between reason and revelation is problematic, then turns to the intellectual sciences and divides them into those of the here-below and afterlife, listing as examples of the intellectual sciences of the here-below medicine, reckoning, geometry, astronomy, 'and the rest of the trades (*ḥiraf*) and productive arts (*ṣinā'āt*)' (ibid., 3:17.9). This distinction between true knowledge and mere vocational or productive as opposed to either speculative or practical knowledge reminds us of the *Tahāfut* cited in Section II in which only knowledge of God was considered true knowledge in the strictest sense. The intellectual sciences of the afterlife are described as '… knowledge of the states of the heart, the flaws of works, and the knowledge of God, most high, His attributes, and His acts as we have detailed in the *Kītāb al-'Ilm*' (ibid., 3:17.9–10), which Alexander Treiger and others take unproblematically to refer to the sciences of praxis and unveiling, respectively.[118]

Because we wish to assess al-Ghazālī in relation to the other characters with which he was engaging, it is important to that for Avicenna—and in this case other philosophers—praxis is a prerequisite for acquiring the theoretical sciences. In the case of Avicenna, sharia practice contributes towards praxis and the purification it brings about to the soul. Thus, the position in the passage above only exceeds Avicenna in making the sharia required to approach the intellectual sciences. Even on this point, in a text commonly ascribed to Avicenna along with other commentaries on parts of the Koran, he appears to indicate that the sharia itself is a requirement as follows, 'Then, it is necessary to draw help in perfecting the practical faculty from correct actions and comely vestiges (appearing on one's character). This is the third level referred to in His statement, {Then pray} because the chief of righteous works is obedience and service to God'.[119] This text states clearly that good acts are needed, and that sharia acts are good acts. It is far less clear that sharia acts are the only manner of perfecting the practical faculty.

C. An Ontological Classification

[118] Cf. Treiger, 'Al-Ghazālī's Classification of the Sciences', 13.
[119] See, 'Aṣī, *al-Tafsīr al-Qur'ānī*, 101.8-11. This is the statement from his commentary on *Surat al-A'lā* cited in the following section.

Part of the claim that imitation and the intellectual sciences of the afterlife constitute an ontological classification depends on evidence analysed in Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife'. Summarised here for the sake of argument, Chapter 3 first establishes that Avicenna developed a body-soul dichotomy applied to the psychological faculties and which sets the parameters for how praxis works: removing the influence of the corporeal so that the incorporeal soul may receive incorporeal influence. The dichotomy also determines for Avicenna what benefits one in the afterlife. The *Mīzān* is know to incorporate large section of Avicenna's *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, sections including many of the metaphors and tropes he uses later to refer to the dichotomy, such as distinguishing between the faculties shared with animals and the intellect particular to humans. So, it is only left to carefully trace the transfer of this material from the *Mīzān* into the *Iḥyā'*, the *Mīzān* being a known source of the *Iḥyā'*. In the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī also links praxis to removing the influence of the corporeal, refers to knowledge as universal and therefore incorporeal on Avicenna's terms. Finally, the *mulk* and *malakūt* are used for what are termed the corporeal and incorporeal world by Avicenna himself. In fact, Avicenna made this link before him. Al-Ghazālī also uses the specific tension expressed by Avicenna between the corporeal and incorporeal faculties to underpin the reasoning regarding tensions between the here-below and the afterlife. With all this established, the current point almost seems a fait accompli. However, what Avicenna does not appear to do is to use al-Fārābī's notion that religion is the imitation of philosophy, a point is explored in Section V below. What is important here is to assemble evidence from the said *bayān* and a nearby *bayān* that indicate an ontological division lies between the notion of imitation and intellectual knowledge.

We first find a statement in our present *bayān* which mirrors other statements in Chapter 3 playing off the dichotomy between sight and insight, invoking thereby the corporeal / incorporeal dichotomy. Here, al-Ghazālī invokes the dichotomy linked to another trope appearing in several places in the *Iḥyā'*: that the various visions had by the prophets were visions of the heart. Echoing the dichotomy, al-Ghazālī states: 'Due to the complementarity of the inner insight (*al-baṣīra al-bāṭina*) to the outer sight (*al-baṣar al-ẓāhir*), God, most high, named it by the same name', (*Iḥyā'*, 3:16.18). In spite of this discussion happening as a veritable aside in the middle of the classification passage, al-Ghazālī's aim is to state that the vision the Prophet Abraham had of the incorporeal aspect of the heavens

was a vision of the heart and insight, not sight. It is remarkable that, as seen in the Section V below, the passage which made Richard Frank suspect al-Ghazālī was using al-Fārābī's view of religion as the imitation and similitude of philosophy also works towards establishing that certain visions of the prophets and their true understanding of religion comes from the heart, not the eyes. If we remember that for al-Ghazālī the heart refers to the inner subtlety whose faculty of apprehension is the intellect—which is often so hard for so many people to do—we see that for him even spiritual phenomena, knowledge of the afterlife and visions are received by the intellect. There is much more on this in Chapter 3, but it is stated very clearly three different times in the opening lines of the present *bayān* devoted to the classification.[120] All this aligns with the Avicennian dichotomy shown to be adopted by al-Ghazālī, all knowledge or perception accruing to human faculties shared with animals is corporeal. Intellectual knowledge is alone incorporeal. This claim would accord with the *Tahāfut* doctrine—included in the *Iḥyā'* itself, according to Chapter 3—that the incorporeal intellectual knowledge is that which is fit to cause eternal felicity.

The clearest evidence of the ontological nature of the classification is in a nearby said *bayān* where al-Ghazālī speaks on what is specific to the human being. He first notes that all animals share with the human in anger, desire, and the inner and outer senses.[121] The two items which make mankind special and deserving of closeness to God are will and knowledge, the latter are said to be, '…knowledge of matters of the here-below and afterlife (*al-umūr al-dunyāwiyya wa-l-ukhrāwiyya*) and intelligible realities (*ḥaqā'iq ʿaqliyya*) because these are matters which are beyond the sensibles (*maḥsūsat*) and animals do not share in them. Rather, universal and necessary knowledges (*al-ʿulūm al-kulliyya al-ḍarūriyya*) are proper (*khawāṣṣ*; only) to the intellect'.[122] Were there any doubt that the body-soul dichotomy shown in Chapter 3 to be used in many parts of the *Iḥyā'* were at play in Book XXI, this passage dispels it by setting out the core parts of the dichotomy such as discussion of inner and outer faculties of humans and animals. Further, the logical terms associated with the incorporeal in the *Miʿyār* such as intellectual, universal and necessary are all invoked in a religious setting here, and these terms resonate with the *Tahāfut* regarding what causes felicity in the afterlife. Any doubts that the intellect is performing an otherwise religious role should be dispelled by his further statements

[120]*Iḥyā'*, 3:15.29-16.6.
[121]Ibid., 3:7.17–18.
[122]Ibid., 3:7.20–1.

that ʿAlī was told by the Prophet Muḥammad to draw close to God through his intellect, which al-Ghazālī says is the intellect which acquires knowledge, not that which is the natural disposition nor that which grasps self-evident knowledge.

This passage offers a fundamental interpretation of reason and revelation, but as the evidence for it is dispersed and allusive, it may only be mentioned here in passing. We say above the order to join between the two sources of knowledge: reason and revelation. But here the upshot of the following appears to be that the two in some sense are necessary for any knowledge. Discussions from the likes of *Kitāb al-Shukr wa-l-ṣabr* seem to frame the discussions of human perfection in character and knowledge in cosmological terms: mankind was created imperfect and God has woven the means for this perfection into the cosmos. Part of this unapologetic anthropocentrism is the claim that reason and revelation are two means entailed by God's mercy, lest man be created without a means for perfection. It is important to mention this here to be sensitive to al-Ghazālī's own reasoning regarding the fundamental structure uniting reason and revelation studied in this thesis. Unfortunately, he merely seems to hint, but to a degree the hint has implications for the classification and for the whole *Iḥyāʾ*. The passage occurs prior to outlining the role of the sharia in obtaining the nutrition of the intellectual sciences cited above. Al-Ghazālī mentions a notion of different aspects of the intellect which must work together for apprehension and insight. Even if we may not be certain, the notion highly resembles the relationship between reason and revelation as stated in the still contested *Maʿārij*: the sharia and intellect are unified in that they require each other in the way vision requires light and eyesight. In the *Iḥyāʾ*, before his classification stating the said role of sharia, he cites the prophetic companion ʿAlī that the intellect is indeed two intellects: one which is (merely) heard and another which is imprinted, i.e. in one's nature.[123] He explains that the rote intellect does not benefit without the imprinted intellect, just like sunlight does not benefit the light of the eye. In the *Maʿārij*, a more detailed passage which may possibly contain the ultimate doctrine alluded to in the *Iḥyāʾ* explicates the relationship of the sharia and intellect from several angles: a) the sharia requires the intellect to explicate it (cf. T16 below), b) the sharia is light from outside without which the intellect cannot operate, and c) the intellect knows general matters such as that true words and good actions are good,

[123] Ibid., 3:16.1–2.

but it needs the sharia for knowing the truth and goodness of particular matters.[124] This would make sense of another obscure passage in the *Iḥyā'* that those who have insight (i.e. intellect, as shown in Chapter 3) do not need to be guided by scripture at every step as opposed to imitators who falter even if having scripture at every step. In this passage, al-Ghazālī cites the scripture referring to his noetics only explained in questionable works or post-*Iḥyā'* works (such as the *Mishkāt*): {Whose oil would almost glow forth (of itself) though no fire touched it}.[125] It would also explain the notion of reason and revelation behind some of the precedents in the *Mīzān* cited below. If this is his ultimate doctrine, for which there is at least some indication as seen, then the term religious having two different meanings makes sense: imitative knowledge needed to achieve perfection and demonstrative knowledge which is the goal of religion (and causes felicity in the afterlife). In the latter sense, theology is a science which takes God, and possibly religion, as the subject it studies.

[124] The author of the highly Ghazālīan *Maʿārij* explains these relationships more philosophically and explicitly as follows:

T14, *Maʿārij*, 60.7–61.13

The sharia is like an intellect coming from outside one, while the intellect is a *sharʿ* (which includes the sense of path) from inside oneself. They support each other, rather they are one (lit. united with each other). … Due to the intellect being an internal sharia, God, most high, said, describing the intellect, {The nature (framed) of God, in which He hath created man. There is no altering (the laws of) God's creation. That is the right religion} (Koran 30:30). Thus, He called the intellect religion (*dīn*) due to them being unified. He said, {Light upon light} (Koran 24:35). … In general, the intellect does not arrive at the details of the *sharʿī* matters. The sharia sometimes brings affirmation of that which the intellect settled on, at others it apprises the heedless (intellect) and reveals a proof such that it become aware of the realities of knowledge. At times, it reminds the intelligent such that it remember what it lacks and at others it teaches it (that). That regards the sharia matters and the details of the states of the destiny (*maʿād*). Thus the sharia is a system of valid beliefs, upright acts, and a guide to the benefits of this world and the afterlife.

[125] Koran 24:35. See *Iḥyā'*, 4:4.7–16.

Mind that some of this noetics is explained in T15. Also, in a nearby passage, al-Ghazālī explains that olive oil means to obtain the intelligibles through intuition (*ḥads*) and for it to nearly shine means it is even stronger than that. (See *Maʿārij*, 59.2–3.)

V. The Levels of the Sciences and Implication for the Notion of Religion

A. The *Falāsifa*'s Concept of Religion: Two levels of its Practical and Speculative Aspects

Al-Ghazālī's classification presented in the previous section resembles a culmination of a synthesis between reason and revelation begun in the *Tahāfut*. We found that it appears to use, or adopt for his own purposes, a philosophical notion of religion as imitation or similitude. It did indeed deem the sharia sciences as coextensive with the imitative sciences: all imitative sciences are sharia and all sharia sciences are imitative. Further, the passages forming the context of this classification clearly framed it in an ontological dichotomy of the corporeal and incorporeal. Deeming the intellectual sciences of the afterlife as adhering in the intellect and the sharia sciences as imitative is to deem the sharia sciences corporeal in character. Chapter 2 of this thesis cites *Iḥyā'* passages stating that everything brought by the prophets is formed into similitudes because mankind is asleep, being limited to the corporeal world. In spite of using the terms *mulk* and *malakūt* and the afterlife, the latter already used in the *Tahāfut* to refer to knowledge leading to felicity on the philosopher's beliefs, a dichotomy of true knowledge vis-à-vis imitation and similitude is almost surely at play. However, the characteristics of a Fārābīan notion and a number of other likely precedents must be honed in on to determine what are their defining characteristics, which, if any, of these characteristics did al-Ghazālī use, and what was the intellectual context within which he put forward his own solution to the relationship between reason and revelation.

At the end of Richard Frank's immensely valuable article surveying al-Ghazālī's clear statements on *taqlīd*, he noted a different notion of *taqlīd* alluded to obscurely by al-Ghazālī: a notion in which public religion (*al-milla*) teaches 'theoretical and practical matters brought to light (and demonstratively proven) by philosophy' in 'metaphorical images (*mithālāt*)' and 'rationally persuasive terms or through appeal to the imagination'.[126] It is shown below that, in a text not mentioned by Frank, al-Fārābī uses the term *taqlīd*, describing it as an imitative form suitable to those who, due to circumstances or ability, cannot achieve demonstrative knowledge. However, this does not amount to a hermeneutic between the two levels which al-Ghazālī is shown in Chapter 2 to hold, and which is therefore one of his alterations to al-

[126] Frank, 'Al-Ghazālī on *Taqlīd*', 250n80.

Fārābī's paradigm. The passage which caused Frank to suspect that al-Ghazālī was using this notion of religion is important for revealing two layers of religion as follows:

T15, *Iḥyā'*, 1:87.7–8

> Due to the resemblance between the inner insight and outer sight, {The heart lied not (in seeing) what it saw} (Koran 53:11) … {For indeed it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts, which are within the bosoms, that grow blind} (Koran 22:46). … And some of these matters unveiled for the prophets were through eyesight and some were through insight, yet each was called sight (*ruʾyā*). In general, whoever's inner insight is not piercing, only the shells and similitudes of religion stick with him, not its kernel and realities.

The passage mentions the dichotomy of sight and insight examined in Chapter 3 studying the related corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy, and links them to the outward and inward of religion, respectively. This is further evidence of the corporeal–incorporeal basis of the previous section's imitative–intellectual dichotomy, but it further links them to a notion that scripture has the two levels as does religion in general. Religion is said to have a kernel or reality, and, in the context of the previous classification, this may be safely said to be the higher, intellectual sciences of the afterlife. This indicates that both the theoretical and speculative have two levels. As said above, this is corroborated in the *Mīzān* (see Section V.C below), in Chapter 2 on interpretation,[127] and Chapter 6.

In the *Iḥyā'*, each of the practical and speculative sciences has these two levels, the reality or kernel of religion itself being the higher sciences. However, the passage does not solve the matter of whether they are ultimately religious, nor in what sense they might be religious. Such a perceived tension between reason and revelation has Greek precedents which were transferred to Islam. The earliest Greek philosophers felt the requirement to explain the relationship between their philosophy and existing Greek religion and each of the major subsequent ancient schools advanced their own answer to this question.[128] The notion that prophets speak to the masses in concrete similitudes goes back at least to Plato[129] and it is

[127] Frank notes that al-Fārābī holds that people discredit philosophy because they take scripture literally rather than seeing how certain images represent 'the truth' and are 'themselves theoretical matters'. He laments that al-Fārābī does not give examples of his *taʾwīl*. Frank does not even discuss what the nature of this *taʾwīl* might be. (See ibid., 250–1n80.) This matter is taken up in Chapter 2, but it may be that al-Ghazālī was the first Muslim theologian to go beyond al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's theory of prophecy and to engage with the details of a theory of how the scriptural similitude relates to the reality and to work out more than a few stock examples.

[128] See Richard Walzer's authoritative commentary in Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, *On the Perfect State* (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1998), 472.

[129] For Plato's views and their possible influence on al-Fārābī, see ibid., 55–6, and Muhsin Mahdi, *Alfārābī and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), p. 235.

with regards to ancient notions of mimesis by which existing religions imitate universal truths through the activity of *phantasia* that al-Fārābī advanced his own broad philosophy of prophecy and notion of symbolic prophecy, in awareness of many writings of Late Antiquity on related topics such as dream theory.[130] The theory of imaginal prophecy was developed by al-Fārābī,[131] who in several of his works explored the related issue of the relationship between religion and philosophy and the degree to which similitudes are adequate to philosophical truths.[132] He held in many of his well-known works that religion was a mere imitation of philosophy,[133] and he holds that *phantasia* cannot absorb the intelligibles emanated by the Active Intellect except by reproducing them as sensibles.[134] Richard Walzer comments that al-Fārābī's notion of prophecy and its relation to divinatory powers follows a more classical line as opposed to Avicenna who is on the whole more akin to the Athenian trend in Neoplatonism giving priority to theurgic experiences such as those of Proclus, such that al-Fārābī does not give the highest rank to the prophets.[135]

In al-Fārābī, the term similitude is linked to the corporeal and concrete and can never cause true knowledge in the one hearing it.[136] Chapter 2 of this thesis shows how at least the first part of this is adopted by al-Ghazālī and imbues his notion of imitation. While it was noted that Richard Frank identified a parallel to al-Ghazālī's notion of two levels, one being insight and the other being limited to similitude and shell, a further parallel not cited by him indicates al-Fārābī uses the specific imitation–demonstration dichotomy in this conceptual context. While al-Fārābī assents that prophets know the ultimate truth, he holds that scriptural similitudes are insufficient in themselves to cause true knowledge in the soul of the listener without a process of seeking demonstrations (*barāhīn*) and he acknowledges a role for

[130] Walzer, *On the Perfect State*, 413–22 and 474–80.
[131] See Fazlur Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam*–1. While al-Fārābī holds that prophets have an imaginal perfection accompanying their intellectual perfection, he deems religion to be an imitation of philosophy and appears to hold that imaginative presentation is distinct from truth content (see Miriam Galston, *Politics and Excellence* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), –7).
[132] Important contributions on this topic are found in *Mabādi' ārā' ahl al-madīna al-faḍīla* (esp. *Bāb*s 14 and 17), *Tanbīh al-Sa'āda*, and *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* (the latter being a known source for sections of al-Ghazālī's *Miʿyār* (see Jules Janssens, 'Al-Ghazālī's *Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-mantiq*, Source Avicenniennes Et Fārābīennes', *AHDLMA* 69 (2002): 39–66)).
[133] (Mere) image and the realities arrived at through demonstration are (in a sense) antithetical, which Galston says is brought out most clearly in *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*'s hypothetical discussion of the interaction between true philosophy and a religion whose images were based on true philosophy (see ibid., 45–6).
[134] *Mabādi' ārā' ahl al-madīna al-faḍīla*, 219–21.
[135] Ibid., 421 (commentary).
[136] Galston notes that her final analysis of *Tanbīh al-Sa'āda* where the integrity of religious imagery is most clearly proclaimed indicates that, 'the gulf separating the corporeal from the incorporeal epitomizes the limits of imaginative fidelity' (ibid., 45).

imitation in the sense of blind following (*taqlīd*).[137] Blind following allows one to pursue demonstrations, as opposed to rejection (*ʿinād*) by which some groups of people turn away from pursuing the truth of religious symbols.[138] Thus, al-Fārābī already contains the notions of religion being a corporeal similitude which includes the specific notion of imitation, which is somehow complementary to the higher level of incorporeal demonstrative knowledge, even if he believes that the symbol can never convey true knowledge on its own. While the precedents studied in the remainder of this chapter show that Avicenna comes close to expressing this notion, he does not refer to the lower level as a consistent discourse of imitation nor similitudes, and it is al-Fārābī who is most open about the corporeal–incorporeal ontological basis which applies to all parts of religion (and hence scripture). And, while later chapters show that al-Fārābī the philosopher did tackle certain detailed religious matters such as the (non-demonstrative and dialectic) nature of the religious representations of the theoretical and speculative, namely fiqh and *kalām* theology, respectively, yet as Frank noted he did not offer particular examples of interpretation (*taʾwīl*) of scriptural references to speculative matters as does al-Ghazālī as seen in Chapter 2. The best surmise in light of the precedents below is that the Avicenna–*Tahāfut* exchange was the spur of particularizing interpretation of scripture by topic. It included a basic notion of sharia according to a mode of imitation, but it seemed to indicate sharia was only about practice, and that it only performed the role of practical ethics. However, the best surmise based on what exists of evidence indicates a wider vision of a thorough-going set of levels in the dual duplex with an ontological corporeal–incorporeal basis being inspired by al-Fārābī. In this sense, religion imitates philosophy in both its aspects: practical and theoretical. We will see below that al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī used the terms remedy and nutrition in reference to the sharia and intellectual science, a fact almost surely known to al-Ghazālī and likely encouraging him that such a view of religion was acceptable. But al-Ghazālī seems to have relied on the philosophers themselves plus his own creativity as outlined above to produce his own solution in the classification and his handling of scripture studied in Chapter 2. Returning directly to the *falāsifa* is likely because, more clearly than al-Iṣfahānī, they give the second 'source'

[137] *Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-faḍīla*, 278–81. This thesis discussion of imitation in the sense of blind following will attempt to assess the similarity between al-Fārābī's view and that of al-Ghazālī. It will be noted that Richard Frank concluded in his comparison of speculative reasoning in theology amongst the Muʿtazalī al-Fārābī, and the Ashʿarīs that the dialectic theology underpinning the religious law in al-Fārābī was modeled on the Ashʿarīs of his time and their notion of the principles of religion (*uṣūl al-dīn*).
[138] Ibid., 281–5.

alongside religion, namely, intellect its due, even though he sometimes corrects their failed attempts to meet their own ideal standards: producing demonstrative knowledge of all topics.

B. Precedents and the Intellectual Context of al-Ghazālī's Philosophy of Religion

The present section notes precedents beyond al-Fārābī himself of a philosophy of religion resembling the one al-Ghazālī adopts. Deployment of such notions by Avicenna, but also al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, indicate the need to research whether it is possible to link al-Ghazālī's own use with currents such as al-Kindī's circle.[139] The precedents of the *Iḥyā'* include and begin with al-Ghazālī *Mīzān* itself which already contains a notion of two levels of discourse: scripture and an intellectual parallel discourse. We will observe these precedents, noting their simplicity relative to the *Iḥyā'*, before turning to precedents of other thinkers.

1. Two levels in the theoretical sciences in al-Iṣfahānī and Avicenna

To avoid over-emphasising any influence of Avicenna or al-Fārābī, it should be noted that philosophy of religion similar to al-Ghazālī's in terms of relating scripture and abstract sciences are found in al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī. Al-Iṣfahānī's *al-Dharī'a* speaks of two levels of discourse, advising not to speak in an abstract discourse of the realities of the sciences (*ḥaqā'iq al-'ulūm*) to those not capable of understanding,[140] but to coin similitudes graspable to the imagination and senses. (Chapter 7 demonstrates that al-Ghazālī also views the higher level to be an abstract, intellectual one, even if he finds his own manner of including Sufism in the *Iḥyā'*.) Al-Iṣfahānī cites the Prophet Muhammad's exhortation to follow the way of the prophets which is to speak to people according to the level of their intellect and Jesus' prohibition of disseminating wisdom to those not fit for it, but rather to be like a clever physician who gives him remedy when he knows it will be of benefit.[141]

A notion of two discursive levels, one imitative and one being true knowledge, is thus adopted by these scholars who are encountering Greek notions of science and attempting to reconcile their place with scripture. While there is a wider trend of some sort, details of the

[139] Much of the machinery deployed by al-Ghazālī has a distant precedent in al-Kindī himself, including the following: a strictly dualist ontology of the sensible and intelligible attributed by al-Kindī himself to Plato, dreams being expressed in symbols needing interpretation, and the link between dreams and prophecy. See, *The Philosophical Works of al-Kindī*, pp. 128-30, 209-11.
[140] *al-Dharī'a*, 247.1–2.
[141] Ibid., 237.3–4 and 237.12–238.2.

particular mould that al-Ghazālī's practice takes are most pronounced in the works of Avicenna himself who, for instance, uses the term imitation in *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, distinguishing two levels: imitative and intellectual. Describing the knowledge coming from inspiration (*ilhām*), he states as follows, 'It is possible, then, for the intuition (*ḥads*) of an individual person…to ignite, by which I mean receiving inspiration (*ilhām*)…of everything…such that the forms…impress in them…in an intellectual manner, not in an imitative manner (*ʿaqliyyan lā taqlīdiyyan*), in a manner ordered such as to include middle terms (of the syllogism). Imitative knowledge regarding matters that may only known through their causes is not certain, intellectual knowledge.'[142] Avicenna refers to two levels of discourse in the specific manner Chapter 4 shows to set out the most fundamental parameters of the *Iḥyāʾ*: imitation and knowledge truly obtained by the intellect, a character which makes it incorporeal according to Avicenna's strict body-soul dichotomy (see Chapter 3). This occurring in Avicenna's *Aḥwāl* leaves no doubt that al-Ghazālī at least read it, as al-Ghazālī's *Mīzān* is known to depend on the *Aḥwāl* for sections treating psychology.[143]

2. Two levels within the practical sciences: Avicennian precedents

In *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, Avicenna does more than acknowledge the need for rectification of the practical aspect of the soul and grant the sharia a role in this rectification. He speaks about the nature of religion and states that the primary aim (*aʿẓam qaṣd*) of the sharia is just that: rectification of the practical aspect. He also states that the prophetic mission with regards to speculative theology is highly limited to a few statements about God, the angels, and the afterlife. If we reflect on Avicenna speaking of religion from the lenses of *falsafa*, one implication of this is religion and philosophy concur on the aim of perfecting the human being. This refigures religion as that which is intrinsically addressing practical and speculative matters in *falsafa* terms that include the division of the soul into the theoretical and practical intellect. While the *falsafa* might argue these elements are universal, one might also interpret such a translation as bring in conceptual 'baggage': redefining concepts in ways we cannot assume accord with religion. Al-Ghazālī was already shown to speak in the *Tahāfut* in a similar manner of praxis and knowledge (*ʿilm*), and this carries over into the *Mīzān*. Gilʿadi has traced

[142] *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, 123.4–9.
[143] This passage of Avicenna has strong implications for his epistemology of religious phenomena. This matter is taken up at the end of Chapter 4 and in the Conclusion.

both elements into the *Iḥyā'* where the two terms become what I have translated as 'the path of praxis' (*muʿāmala*) and 'speculative unveiling' (*mukāshafa*).

The short epistle commenting on *Surat al-Aʿlā* of the Koran is an intriguing writing. If the attribution to Avicenna is valid, it represents a unique position, stating that religion advocates or directs towards knowledge of God. An elitist position very clearly set out in the *Shifāʾ: Ilāhiyyāt* holds that religion focusses on the practical and, because it is directed to the widest audience, merely offers allusions to anything that might be termed theology (see Section II above). This treatise would thus be the one work which indicates not only that religion is needed either merely for practical purification or for a conversion to *falsafa* to complete the speculative perfection, but that religion itself directs to knowledge of God. Scripture, he says, calls to this and lays out a method for achieving it which involves purification from false beliefs and vice and adornment with true beliefs, virtues, and ultimately knowledge of the Divine.[144] The fact that this knowledge is contrasted with (mere) belief indicates that it is something beyond it and which justifies the term he uses: 'knowledge'. This text thus indicates at least the possibility of Avicenna holding that religion itself calls to both ethical purification and proper knowledge.

In another text, Avicenna presents what we might term an integration between the two levels of religion. Religion offers the bases or principles which may be unfolded through rational inquiry and rendered into a science. This position resembles that of al-Ghazālī alluded to in the classification passage in which rote religious science was said to be subsequently understood through reflection, arriving at a higher science in both the practical and speculative realms. This passage at hand has received extensive commentary by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. It states that the principles of both the practical and theoretical philosophy (*ḥikma*) come from the divine sharia as follows:[145]

T16, *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, 16–17

> Each of the two (divisions of) philosophy are (themselves) limited to three divisions. Practical philosophy is divided into politics, home economics, and ethics. The principle (or source) of these three is derived from the divine sharia. The perfection of its (legal) limits (*ḥudūd*)[146] is shown through the divine sharia and thereafter the human theoretical intellect through their knowledge of practical laws and

[144] *al-Tafsīr al-Qurʾānī fi al-taṣawwuf*, 101.
[145] *Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, 2:12–21.
[146] Al-Rāzī states that limits means amounts, because the amounts in worship, transactions, and punishments is known only from divine sharias. (See ibid., 2:14.)

> through using those laws in (the context of) particular (situations). … The principles of (the) three divisions of speculative philosophy are derived from the scholars of divine religion (*milla ilāhiyya*) in the manner of providing general awareness (*tanbīh*)[147] or in the manner of proofs, procuring them perfectly via the intellectual faculty operating on them.

In both cases, namely, the practical and speculative, the pre-scientific knowledge comes from the sharia and detailed, intellectual knowledge comes from *falsafa*. The two levels resemble al-Ghazālī's notion of a higher and lower aspect to both the practical and theoretical shown in the next chapter with that caveat that, as stated by Alexander Treiger later in this section, the subject al-Ghazālī presents is not necessarily pure philosophy. Avicenna himself opens the door to replace 'first philosophy' with theology when he states: 'The higher of the three sciences treating that which is free of involvement with what changes is called first philosophy. Theology (*falsafa ilāhiyya*) is part of it which is called the knowledge of Lordship (*maʿrifat al-rububiyya*)' (ibid., 17). Following this, Avicenna closes the discussion with a Koranic reference that ostensibly indicates that the two primary divisions of theology are the wisdom referred to by scripture. He cites the verse, {He giveth wisdom unto whom He will, and he unto whom wisdom is given, he truly hath received abundant good} (Koran 2: 269), in a modified manner to explain how the two work together: each contribute to the soul's perfection. However, one, in addition to being known, must be acted upon: namely, practical wisdom.[148]

Several terms that al-Ghazālī uses for his philosophy of religion appear in al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, again a known source for large swathes of the *Mīzān*. Al-Iṣfahānī refers to the intelligibles as remedies (*adwiyāʾ*) and the sharia sciences (*sharʿiyyāt*) as nutrition (*aghdhiyāʾ*). He explains that one cannot benefit from the Koran without first having refined oneself through the rational sciences.[149] This seems to mean that one will misunderstand what is intended

[147] *Tanbīh* may rightly be translated as exhortation. In *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, Avicenna says that due to the masses associating their identity with their body, those who laid down the religions (i.e. the prophets) were forced to exhort to good for rewards of bodily pleasure and admonish from evil to avoid punishment through bodily pains. (See *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 147–9.) In the section on prophecy in his commentary on Surat al-Aʿlā, he says prophecy is accepted by the masses due to fear (*khawf*) and dread (*khashiya*). (See *al-Tafsīr al-Qurʾānī*, 101).

Al-Razi comments on the term *tanbīh* by citing *al-Aḍḥawiyya* itself saying that scripture should advocate general transcendence and unity, but not enter into precise (*daqīqa*) matters suitable to the clever (*adhkiyāʾ*). (See *Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, 2:21.)

[148] See *Sharḥ ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*, 2:21.

[149] The metaphor of medicine and nutrition for the sharia and rational sciences has a source, albeit an altered one, in al-Iṣfahānī. Before relating this evidence, we should be reminded that Avicenna referred to a general notion encompassing the practical sciences: that they have general rules known by the intellect and particular aspects not known by the intellect. This does not explain the origin of the terms themselves, yet al-Ghazālī seeing the same notion in Avicenna and al-Iṣfahānī may have encouraged his ecumenical concern to adopt the doctrine itself.

The metaphor in full appears to be from pre-modern medicine in which certain treatments required an

unless one has trained the intellect to operate properly.[150] He explains that ignorance of the intelligibles is like a covering over the heart, the realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) of the Koran and the sharia sciences (*sharʿiyyāt*) being imperceptible without lifting this covering (*kashf ghiṭāʾihi*).[151] Analysis of the classification of knowledge in *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* above indicated that al-Ghazālī himself holds that the two higher religious sciences are apprehended by the intellect alone, and he holds that ethical purification is prerequisite for this. However, it appears that, from at least one perspective, he has chosen to use medicine as a metaphor for the said prerequisite at an earlier stage in the process of purification and perfection.

Al-Iṣfahānī refers to something similar to the point from Avicenna's *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma*: that the sharia has epistemological principles needed for the two sciences.[152] This is one

order of regimen, remedy, and a gradual return to ordinary nutrition. (This order is likely most particular to stomach and bowel upset in which ingesting food fuels the fire, as it were.) The order by which al-Ghazālī ties the sharia into his praxis and knowledge in the *Iḥyāʾ* uses, but reverses, such a scheme he seems to find in al-Iṣfahānī. The topic occurs inside *Faṣl* 2 of *al-Dharīʿa* on the intellect. After treating the intellect itself, al-Iṣfahānī turns to the relation between intellect and prophecy, the same topic to which al-Ghazālī's statements in the *Iḥyāʾ* apply. Al-Iṣfahānī discusses the sub-topics of a) the necessity for prophets to be sent to mankind, b) the two manners of knowing the truth of the prophets, and c) the prophets and intellect both being guides to the truth. (Note that al-Ghazālī makes references to the same non-Ashʿarī approach to proving the authenticity of a prophet's message in Books I and II of the *Iḥyāʾ*. See the following two chapters.) In this context—which is not a purely Ashʿarī approach to the intellect and prophecy—al-Iṣfahānī turns to the relationship between what we might call prophecy and philosophy, the title of the subsection being 'The impossibility of perceiving the prophetic sciences by one who has not refined himself through the rational sciences'. Al-Iṣfahānī starts with the relevant statement, 'The rational sciences (*al-maʿqūlat*) are like remedies which bring about health while the sharia sciences (*al-sharʿiyyāt*) are like nutrition (*aghdhiyāʾ*) which preserve health. Just as when the body is sick it doesn't benefit from nutrition and doesn't use it, but rather it is harmed by it, so is it with the one whose soul is sick, just as He, most high, said, {In their hearts is a sickness}: they did not benefit from hearing the Koran which is the subject of the sharia sciences' (*al-Dharīʿa*, 208.3–7). The principle that the Koran may not lead to guidance if there is a sickness in the heart is taken from the Koran itself, as the context of the remainder of the Koranic verse indicates: {And whenever a sura is revealed there are some of them who say: Which one of you hath thus increased in faith? As for those who believe, it hath increased them in faith and they rejoice (therefor). But as for those in whose hearts is disease, it only addeth wickedness to their wickedness, and they die while they are disbelievers} (Koran 9:124–5). However, identifying what removes the disease of the heart as the rational sciences is clearly a controversial exegesis. Al-Ghazālī uses the terms remedy and sustenance, but inverts the meaning such that it is the sharia sciences *and particularly their application* which provide the prerequisite remedy and the rational sciences which are then the nutrition or sustenance. While this nutrition is necessary for upholding health, it is yet harmful if ingested before curing the soul.

[150] Determining whether or not he intends the same ethical training needed for the intellect to operate involves conjecture, as he does not provide further detail of what is meant by the 'intelligibles'.

[151] *al-Dharīʿa*, 209.3–8.

[152] Also, in his notion of spiritual medicine, al-Ghazālī makes this the knowledge of special properties of the acts of worship studied in Chapter 2. In the same discussion of the intellect in *al-Dharīʿa* cited above, this notion is referred to by al-Iṣfahānī under the banner of claiming that sending forth prophets is a necessity. He argues for this as follows, 'This is because most people are incapable of knowing both the particulars (*juzʾiyyāt*) and universals (*kulliyyāt*) of what benefits and harms them in the afterlife. Even if some manage to know the universals of that in a general manner, they still have no means to know the particulars of this. Also, they are unable to know what manner (what benefits them in the afterlife) should be, what time it should be, and what quantity it should be' (*al-Dharīʿa*, 204.3–7). Presumably the particulars of when one is ignorant are the quantities and times of alms, ritual prayers, fasting, and the like. At any rate, Sections V.B and D of this chapter show how this notion of universal and particular is used for al-Ghazālī on a medical metaphor as indicated to distinguish

manner of relating reason and revelation epistemologically in terms of analysing competing or supporting truth claims; however, it is another to analyse the practical order by which religious practice necessarily precedes obtaining knowledge by reason. While Avicenna has this notion implicitly in seeing praxis as prerequisite for speculation and linking praxis to revelation, al-Ghazālī makes the connection to the sharia explicit. Because of the similarity of the terms and al-Ghazālī's strong relationship with al-Iṣfahānī, it would be unwise to dismiss this possible source.

C. Precedents in the *Mīzān*: Levels within the Speculative Sciences

The *Mīzān* contains a strikingly elitist notion that speculative matters are related to religion in terms of levels. It states that the outward form is anthropomorphic while the reality may only be grasped by those practised in the philosophical or intellectual sciences. Its passages cumulatively assert not only that scripture has two levels, but that a scientific level is required for it to be understood at all. The said elitism is present in the first passage which resembles Avicenna's in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* and the *Shifāʾ*: X.2 ('On the proof of prophecy; the manner of the prophet's call to God, exalted be He, and the "return" to Him'). It states that the masses cannot understand abstract theology, so the sharia should provide a simple creed and should direct people to acts of worship. Al-Ghazālī encourages telling the masses that God will enter them into the Garden (*al-Ǧanna*) through their worship, while closeness to God is in reality obtained through altering the attributes of one's soul.[153] A second passage puts forward a position resembling Avicenna's position that the sharia focuses on the practical. Al-Ghazālī recommends limiting the masses to outer works (*aʿmāl ẓāhira*) and not opening the door of figurative interpretation (*taʾwīl*) of scripture, lest the knot of their religious restrictions unravel and they descend into licentiousness.[154]

A third passage in a nearby chapter of the *Mīzān* offers insight into al-Ghazālī's view of the need of scripture for interpretation, strongly implying that the outward is inherently anthropomorphic. He states that sharia terms require interpretation which the masses not trained in the sciences (*al-ʿulūm*) are not capable of.[155] Using a scriptural similitude (Koran 64: 51), he likens the masses (*ʿawwāmm*) untrained in the sciences to swine fleeing from a spear

between the universal laws of medicine and particular properties of the elements used to produce remedies.

[153] *Mīzān*, 214.5–7.

[154] Ibid., 175.15–176.5.

[155] Ibid., 211.19–212.1.

because they understand nothing more of scripture than one of two levels of anthropomorphism: a) attributing physical form and location to God or b) attributing states such as anger and good pleasure to God.[156] Al-Ghazālī explains his position on scripture as follows, 'These terms are only used figuratively. It is through figurative interpretation (*taʾwīl*) that those who understand them understand them, and those who deny them deny them. And were people to be equal in understanding, his words, upon him be peace (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad), would be invalidated, {It often occurs that one transmits fiqh to one with greater understanding (*afqah*) and it often occurs that the one transmitting fiqh is not one of understanding (*faqīh*)}.'[157] The position al-Ghazālī expresses here is that the words of revealed text may be transmitted without understanding, while the understanding required is the ability to interpret texts whose literal purport is often or always anthropomorphic. The doctrine of the *Mīzān* is thus highly similar to *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, but it does not describe the revealed text itself in terms of being an allegory, similitude, or outward (concrete) purport of the (true, abstract) meaning. These passages contain a two-layered discourse and philosophy of religion found in the *Iḥyāʾ*. The next section adds a notion of a hermeneutic for relating the levels.

D. Levels within the Practical Sciences Understood by the Inheritors

This section presents two important passages referring to two levels in the practical realm and containing the basic notions of how to join between them: the science of praxis must a technical science capable of grasping how the sharia and other acts effect the soul. Only in the *Iḥyāʾ* is a system builds thorough treatment of religious belief and praxis on these principles.

In the *Mīzān*, al-Ghazālī offers a significant rule of interpretation (*miʿyār*) or what we might call a hermeneutic by which bodily acts of the sharia are judged according to—or one might say translated into—the incorporeal attributes of the soul. The crucial notion of the inheritor of the prophets studied in the *Iḥyāʾ* (see Chapter 2, Section II), is shown to be found in the *Mīzān*, and is said to be needed to perform the interpretation. In the *Iḥyāʾ*, the application of this notion is developed, and that which the prophets brought is said to be divided into the practical, i.e. acts (*aʿmāl*) and rituals (*waẓāʾif al-ʿibādāt*), and the speculative,

[156] Ibid., 211.7–14.
[157] Ibid., 211.14–15.

consisting of statements (*aqwāl*) and beliefs. The notion of two levels—acts of the body and attributes of the soul—with a significant relationship between them is already present in the *Mīzān* passage; however, in the *Iḥyā'*, the element of acts is additionally associated with imitation as shown above.[158]

We saw above that Avicenna acknowledged that prophetic rituals might also benefit the practical part of the soul, performing the ethical purification from vice and domination of the corporeal. Chapter 3 traces is termed 'the rectification (*tarbiya*) doctrine' from Avicenna's *Aḥwāl al-nafs* to the *Mīzān* to the *Iḥyā'*. This tracing shows that the core elements of the doctrine including the body–soul dichotomy and the role of praxis in removing domination of the corporeal is maintained in the *Iḥyā'* as the basis of its method of rectification. In this transplant or what al-Akiti has called naturalization (see Chapter 2), the context changes to one in which praxis is spoken of from a sharia point of view. While Chapter 3 shows that this doctrine is used, here the aim is to reveal the shift in discourse. This may be seen through how in the *Mīzān* the primary topic is praxis and is, as stated, drawn from Avicenna's philosophical works. After the *Mīzān*'s description of the general role of habituation, al-Ghazālī directs the reader for details to scriptural collections as follows, 'Good and evil character traits are detailed in the sharia and are encompassed by what has been written on the topic of the etiquettes (*adab*) of the Prophet (Muhammad), upon him be peace. They are well known and we will refer to a resume (*jumal*) of them.'[159] Good character is that the mean be achieved, which is that one find it easy to perform whatever action is entailed by the sharia and the intellect. This is the manner in which acts resolve to attributes. This passage which gives the pillars of a hermeneutic for joining between the sharia and the science of the path of ethics is as follows:

T17, *Mīzān*, 82.2–6

> If you have understood that the criterion by which acts are judged (*miʿyār al-aʿmāl*) is taken from weighing up (*miqdār*) the attributes (*ṣifāt*; of the heart) and character traits, then it will not be hidden from you that the path in this matter differs according to the individual. Rather, it even differs regarding one person according to their state. Whoever has been given insight (*baṣīra*) investigates the disease (*ʿilla*) and remedies it according to the path fit for it.

[158] For this, see Chapter 2, Section II. For how praxis (*ʿamal*) is extended into what may be termed a path of praxis (*muʿāmala*) which includes both prophetic or sharia worship and ethical praxis, see Chapter 5, Section III.
[159] *Mīzān*, 81.11–12.

This passage shows that seeds of a doctrine are *not* found in Avicenna—a particular notion of inheritor of the prophets—and establishes that at least the seed of this particular notion was already conceived by al-Ghazālī before composing the *Iḥyāʾ*.

In this weighty, three-sentence passage, the first sentence establishes two levels—acts of the body and attributes of the heart. It introduces a hermeneutic between the two levels manifesting through the fact that acts are interpreted according to their impact on attributes of the heart. This is the basis upon which al-Ghazālī makes two levels of praxis in the *Iḥyāʾ*, the two levels of the previous section which are expounded upon in the next chapter. Sentences one and two refer to the possibility that acts be individualized. Individualinzing the prescription of acts requires insight (*baṣīra*) which Chapter 3, Section III showed to be one of a set of terms along with the intellect which arrives at true knowledge. The theoretical knowledge of the science of praxis resembles that referred to in the *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* passage (T16 above). Together with sentence three, the passage establishes that the person with such theoretical knowledge of praxis is capable of individualizing application of the acts of worship. The reference to sickness indicates that the person with insight should be able to assess the disease, the latter being an imbalance in character traits in the heart rather than humours of the body. This imbalance manifests as vice. Subsequently, the passage details the role of the inheritor, arguing for their need through a form of rational necessity resembling the arguments for the rule of interpretation of scripture (*qānūn al-taʾwīl*) as follows:

T18, *Mīzān*, 82.6–15

> However, because most people are incapable of this—it being difficult for the sharia to detail in a manner giving each person in each (different) age their due—the details of the sharia were limited to general rules whose benefit encompasses all, such as in acts of worship and (prohibiting) licit acts of disobedience. Then, it discouraged (merely) permissible matters by which are intended taking pleasure in pleasant matters, such as his (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad's) words {Love of the here-below is the cause of every mistake} and its like. Those of insight (*baṣīra*) understand the end which is sought and the path to it and the result which is to be avoided and the path to (avoiding) it. Through this, they understand the details (of the path)[160] and they guide to (these details) whoever has the divinely given success to follow them. Thus, they became the representatives (*nuwwāb*) for the prophets, detailing that which (the prophets) left in summary form and explaining that which they merely introduced. For this reason, he (i.e.

[160] The title of the chapter in which this passage occurs is itself titled, 'The Details of the Path of Disciplining the Soul' (*Tafṣīl ṭarīq riyāḍat al-nafs*).

> the Prophet Muhammad), upon him peace, said, {The scholars are the inheritors of the prophets}.[161]

The first line of reasoning is that the majority lack insight. They being incapable, al-Ghazālī says the sharia must simplify matters by a logic similar to the *al-Aḍḥawiyya* that says beliefs must be simplified to concrete matters understood by the masses. Understanding is a remit he grants to the scholar, but the science which gives the universal rules is clearly identifiable in the *Mīzān* as the science of ethics. This would seem to imply that the religious scholar must know ethics, in the sense of a science of praxis.

E. Use of al-Fārābī's Notion of Religion in the *Iḥyā'*: Assessing the Evidence

The argument for the use of al-Fārābī's notion of religion as imitation requires first qualifying the claim by acknowledging that al-Ghazālī replaces philosophy with his higher theology or sciences of the afterlife. While these two sciences are the religious sciences advanced in al-Ghazālī's revival, contemporary scholarship holds that these two sciences are each an amalgamation of religion, *falsafa*, and Sufism. These two sciences accept a taxonomy and many of the structures of proof and organization necessary to form a science. Saying more requires going far afield into interpretation, some of which is alluded to in the concluding remarks below.

Limiting the claim to the use of a structure, we may first observe that the existence of two primary levels is well known. Al-Ghazālī himself argues in *Iḥyā'*, Book II, for the validity of the inward and outward and the sharia and ultimate reality (*ḥaqīqa*; see Chapter 2.) To claim more specifically that this structure comes from al-Fārābī, we may identify the characteristics of al-Fārābī's paradigm as follows. It posits the same subject, be it practical or speculative, exists at two levels. One level is imitation and the other is demonstration. Importantly, al-Fārābī also holds that the lower level is a corporeal similitude while the higher level is incorporeal, demonstrative knowledge which causes felicity to the human soul. These elements are all visible in the 3rd Quarter classification, though appearing under different terms. The lower sciences are termed sharia sciences and the higher sciences, including a taxonomy into the speculative and practical, are termed intellectual and are known by human

[161] Chapter 2 shows how the *Mīzān* develops the theory of how acts of the limbs effect the heart (through the mutual influence of the body and soul). The matter is much more complicated in the *Iḥyā'*. This mechanism of change of the attributes of the soul via mutual influence or what is more commonly called habituation (see Chapter 5) is used to incorporate the acts of worship into a path of praxis.

intellect. Al-Ghazālī modifies the paradigm by limiting the speculative sciences causing felicity to exclude maths and natural science. Nonetheless, the structural and its core paradigms are recognizably present. This does not rule out a coincidence, of course.

It is important to note supporting evidence that the paradigm comes from al-Fārābī. Firstly, it is known that al-Ghazālī read *al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* which details the said paradigm as part of the *Tahāfut* project.[162] Secondly, he systematically used al-Fārābī's logical works for the *Miʿyār*, including sections in which al-Fārābī classifies the relationship between the dialectic discourses of *kalām* and fiqh and the demonstrative discourse of *falsafa*. In the *Miʿyār*, al-Ghazālī expands these discussions. Importantly, he notes that the modes of reasoning in fiqh and *kalām* fail to be universal which precludes them from being demonstrative sciences. This shows awareness, but also agreement with viewing religion from the perspective of *falsafa*. An important line of reasoning which takes us further afield is that, in the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī shows awareness that referring to the faculties through the similitudes of animals, demons, and angels is an ancient philosophical praxis, yet he actively engages in this coining in the *Iḥyā'*.[163] In the *Mīzān*, al-Ghazālī claims that the meaning of scripture in the hands of the masses is not understood unless interpreted via reason. This unabashed support of an elitist discourse in the *Mīzān* passages cited above indicates support of the general inclination towards a dualist discourse of imitation and similitude vis-à-vis true science.

The precedents in Aviccenna studied above showed several possible influences, but likely not the structural paradigm itself. The *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* passage referred to revealed principles and a proper science worked out through applying rational tools to them. But this is not quite the same as al-Fārābī's complex notion of imitation and true knowledge or demonstration. Also, *al-Aḍḥawiyya* links the similitudes of scripture to the lower faculties of estimation and imagination, stating the masses are overcome by them and thus have no access to intelligibles and abstract theology. While al-Ghazālī may have found corroboration of his dualist approach in this, it is too sparse a reference to be termed the cause of his structure. It seems to resonate so closely with his epistemological integration of the two levels of discourse that it is hard to imagine him not drawing conceptually from the passage.

[162] Janssens, 'Al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut*: Is it Really a Rejection of Ibn Sīnā's Philosophy?', 10.
[163] Jules Janssens notes that al-Ghazālī follows a broadly (Platonic-)Galenic tradition in this coining, but associates desire with the pig. (See, Jules Janssens, 'Al-Ghazālī between philosophy (*falsafa*) and Sufism (*Tasawwuf*)', *The Muslim World*, 101 (2011) 614-32.) Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī note the practice of referring to the base attributes as animals, and himself links greed (*sharh*) with the pig. (See, *al-Dharīʿa*, 166.)

Chapter 2 provides further evidence, indicating that two levels—the corporeal and incorporeal—exist, and that they are applied in the practical realm in more detail than the *Mīzān* passage related above indicated. In the speculative realm, core scriptural topics are also shown to be developed at a corporeal and incorporeal level.

Based on the cumulative evidence, the similarities between al-Ghazālī's mode of structuring the science and al-Fārābī's paradigm are so significant that for practical purposes they are the same. The general elitist notion asserting that scripture consists in similitudes above which is true knowledge of realities is already present in al-Iṣfahānī and the *Mīzān*. This elitist notion is only part of this paradigm, being closer to a philosophical notion of prophecy. Still, it is not possible to support the claim of direct influence, in part because there is a gap between the discourse of al-Ghazālī's technical works such as the *Mīzān* and *Miʿyār* and the more public work of the *Iḥyā'*. What is claimed is that al-Ghazālī deploys a notion of two levels in the *Iḥyā'*, and draws on the philosophical tools relating the two levels when he wishes, and that this paradigm is so close to al-Fārābī's as to be, in doctrine, identical, with the caveats mentioned above. However, al-Ghazālī does not refer to the said paradigm in the *Iḥyā'* itself, much less in terms which associate it with al-Fārābī. It is also claimed that the content and name of the higher level are changed to a philosophical religion, so the implications of the adoption require interpretation, a degree of which is found below in the Concluding Reflections.

Concluding Reflections

Al-Fārābī's notion of religion as imitation is already prefigured in the *Tahāfut*, Question XX which advises that the sharia be practised through imitation or blind following. Because this matches no known Avicennian statement, it is effectively a positive statement, in spite of the *Tahāfut*'s deconstructive role. In the midst of passages claiming to summarize the position of the *falāsifa,* the sharia is said to be *the sole* manner of performing praxis. This is thus a second indication that the *Tahāfut* accepts a paradigm which links religion to philosophy, while deeming the sharia as imitation of a higher knowledge. However, in the *Iḥyā'*, this higher knowledge is renamed and reworked as the science of the afterlife and referred to as the

kernel of religion such that it would be simplification or error to say that al-Ghazālī deems religion to be the imitation of *falsafa* simpliciter.

Study of the *Tahāfut* reveals that al-Ghazālī arrives early at a commitment to the doctrinal bases of the praxis of the *Iḥyāʾ*: such as the eternality of the soul and acceptance of the *falāsifa*'s notion of felicity as intellectual pleasure. It also reveals a commitment to a more fundamental interpretation of revelation in the light of reason: the two sources work together not merely to produce parallel truth claims, but come together like light and eyesight to produce knowledge. This method is exemplified in the details of the *Tahāfut*'s handling of the topic of felicity in the afterlife. Al-Ghazālī interprets the higher level as the intellectual pleasure of the *falāsifa*. However, he interprets the afterlife with scriptural principles, insisting that bodily resurrection is not impossible and that, therefore, the scriptural claim should be upheld and added to the truth claims regarding the subject of eschatology. This method is referred to later in his *Iḥyāʾ*, 3rd Quarter classification, in which he counsels the reader to join between the two sources, but also explains this method in a nearby passage through a metaphor indicating they are two different aspects of knowing: the eye and light need each other to produce sight of a given object.

Bringing al-Fārābī's structural paradigm for relating imitative and demonstrative science to light fills a gap in scholarship's interpretation of the 3rd Quarter classification. This use of the paradigm in the classification is more worked out in more detail than in the *Tahāfut* through being applied in the context of a broader classification of sciences. It also underpins al-Ghazālī's project of promoting the two sciences advanced in his religious revival and demoting *kalām* and fiqh. It provides a framework for drawing on demonstrative tools in his religious sciences while effectively rendering *kalām* and fiqh merely dialectic and containing an imitative element in that their premises include those accepted on authority.

The paradigm also allows his project—including praxis, which is the ostensive subject of the *Iḥyāʾ*—to centre around the bipartite ontology which applies to cosmology and psychology. The Fārābīan notion that imitative sciences are corporeal while demonstrative knowledge is incorporeal is alluded to in the 3rd Quarter classification itself. It sets out a dichotomy between imitation and rote learning and the true sciences apprehended by the unique organ which sets humanity off from animals and which is incorporeal: the intellect. Later chapters cite passages which clarify the two forms of knowledge and their respective

corporeal and incorporeal dichotomous base. Further evidence is found outside this chapter: Chapter 2 shows he is committed to a related form of symbolic prophecy in which scripture, and hence lower religion, is incorporeal truths cast into corporeal similitudes; Chapter 4 indicates that the bipartite cosmology of the corporeal and incorporeal realms is extended to epistemology, i.e. imitation and demonstration, respectively, and eschatology, i.e. salvation and felicity. Seen within the cumulative full picture produced by the evidence from disparate parts of the structure and doctrine of the *Iḥyā'*, the Fārābīan paradigm becomes a lynchpin holding the discourse and praxis and difference sciences and levels together.

Interpreting the Fārābīan structure to entail a tacit endorsement of *falsafa* is not supported by reflecting on interpretation of the paradigm and its use. Taneli Kukkonen is right to note that al-Ghazālī's introduction of philosophical ethics into the heart of the religion would be noticed and require a flourish of rhetorical tools and appeals to authority to gain its acceptance, such as by claiming that this ethics itself was first transmitted to philosophers or early Sufis by prophets. However, there is a danger here of underestimating al-Ghazālī's belief in the truth of philosophical ethics, revelation, and even Avicenna's notions of how their claims are to be reconciled as seen in the structural precedents from his works studied in this chapter. One must mind, firstly, that Avicenna's own notion of reason and revelation mentioned above is complex enough to blur the line between *falsafa* and religion. Secondly, being a related point: rather than mere rhetorical presentation, al-Ghazālī's noetics, famously stated in *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb*, asserts that truth is in the incorporeal realm or Preserved Tablet and may be accessed by *falāsifa*, scholars, saints, or prophets, in which case they see the angel delivering it.[164] His position is that to for insight and the intellect to 'see' properly, one must follow the high road of leaving imitation both in religion and reason. This applying the canons of epistemology and demonstration to all and sunder (if not achieved through inspiration), a feat all the more difficult while refraining from handling the snake of reason, more or less represented by *falsafa*, in public.

[164] Chapters 3 and 4 cite a passage from *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb* which states that that the template of corporeal being is recorded in the *malakūt* and may be accessed either through speculative inquiry or by inspiration, two methods he says differ only in how the veil is drawn.

Chapter 2:

Two Parallel Levels of Religious Discourse: Similitudes, True Realities, and a Hermeneutic

Chapter Abstract

While the *Mīzān* and the *Iḥyā'* each address praxis, the *Iḥyā'* alone presents praxis in an integrated discourse through developing two parallel levels of discourse which are related to each other through a hermeneutic. Al-Ghazālī produces such a structure through accepting and modifying a broadly philosophical notion of prophecy in the *Iḥyā'*. Previous scholarship had only studied this notion in the *Mishkāt*. The present chapter studies advances a subtle but important point regarding al-Ghazālī's individualization of the treatment of topics. In treating each topic at two levels, he examines the ontological status of each core topic of scripture on an individual basis. Chapter 1 showed that he engaged in hermeneutics in the *Tahāfut*, upholding that so long as a corporeal afterlife is not impossible, then scriptural references to both the corporeal and incorporeal afterlife should be upheld in their literal sense. The resultant approach is a new rule of interpretation in which—before determining whether interpretation requires 'interpreting away' the literal meaning—one must examine whether the ontological status of the object referred to by scripture is corporeal, incorporeal, or whether the item exists in some sense at both levels. Only through this insight into the reality of the object is one's interpretation rule-based, i.e. according to a *qānūn*, and moderate: expressing (*iqtiṣād*). He makes this insight into all or most of scripture a prerequisite for being an inheritor of the prophets and makes an autobiographical allusion to fulfilling this prerequisite, likely in opposition to Avicenna. It is argued that this constitutes a response to Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya* which is devoted to the nature of the afterlife, but spends considerable time dealing with the related matter of how to interpret scriptural in general and, in particular, regarding the afterlife.

The importance of two levels related through a hermeneutic is not merely theoretical, i.e. speculative. Rather, ethics aims at felicity; felicity is obtained through true knowledge; true knowledge is eternal, and hence associated with the afterlife, and this pertains only to eternal topics. Scripture speaks of these topics, but in an concrete manner. Determining whether scriptural metaphors are literal or figurative requires knowing whether the reality referred to by scripture is corporeal, incorporeal, or, as in the example of the afterlife according to al-Ghazālī, both. Only then can the nature of true knowledge of the topic be identified. Praxis, as explained in Chapter 5, but also Chapter 3, is a precondition for true, incorporeal knowledge. In the case of the afterlife, al-Ghazālī hints that its intellectual pleasures may be tasted after praxis and one can thus incline towards the pleasures of the afterlife. The duplex he generates as early as the *Tahāfut* runs through other topics, as gathering passages dispersed across the *Iḥyā'* indicates. Finally, the weighty implications of these structures for a number of topics are discussed.

I. A Philosophical Notion of Scriptural Interpretation

A. Al-Ghazālī's Use of the Philosophical Doctrines of Prophecy and his Development of a Related Scriptural Hermeneutics

Chapter 1 concluded by asserting that a philosophical notion of religion as an imitation of a higher science, if not philosophy itself, was compatible with the relation al-Ghazālī drew between the sharia and intellectual sciences. It analysed how a notion of imitation involving the two levels of the corporeal and incorporeal was found in al-Fārābī which highly resembled his own structures. Chapter 2 builds on this, though this claim differs in that there is general agreement amongst Ghazālīan scholarship that he uses a philosophical notion of prophecy, particularly in the *Mishkāt*. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 cumulatively show that the core elements of this notion are deployed in the *Iḥyā'*. In addition to showing that al-Ghazālī thus finds the two levels of a philosophical notion of religion in the various religious topics, this investigation supports the claim of Chapter 1 in that the two are tightly related to each other. The two doctrines, as discussed above and presently, share with each other in involving a dichotomous ontology and a particular discourse theory that contemporary scholarship has termed context theory. This theory, expounded by al-Ghazālī himself in the *Miʿyār*, has its origins in the various books of Aristotle's Organon.[165] However, as inherited and interpreted in the hands of Arab commentators, the various books represent levels of discourse. The same truth claim may be stated in differently, either in terms which are poetic, rhetorical, demonstrative, etc. In light of this dichotomy and context theory, prophecy according to this notion includes not only receiving higher truths, but also faithfully coining them into concrete symbols which populate the sub-demonstrative forms of discourse.

Recent scholarship, summarized in this subsection, has much to say regarding al-Ghazālī's naturalization of the philosophical doctrines of prophecy and his scriptural hermeneutic which is related to them. Regarding its application in the *Iḥyā'*, the studies of Whittingham and Treiger are important, but they do not advance the position taken in the *Iḥyā'* regarding the middle way to arrive at proper interpretation of scripture, nor how this is woven in the complex of praxis and speculative knowledge which lead to felicity in the afterlife.

[165] See Sections II and III, and particularly Chapter 4, Section IV.C, for this theory and al-Ghazālī's modifications of it already in the *Miʿyār*.

Fazlur Rahman's account of prophecy in al-Ghazālī focuses on the still contested work *Maʿārij al-quds*, finding it divided into two aspects. First, it attempts to compromise between the naturalistic philosophical doctrine and the supernatural Ashʿarī doctrine and, second, it offers an account of the three levels at which prophecy works: imagination, intellect, and miracle-working power.[166] The technical appropriation and naturalization of Avicenna's properties of prophethood into public works such as the *Iḥyāʾ* and *Munqidh* has been studied and traced by Afifi al-Akiti.[167] His study shows first how Avicenna refers to these doctrines across various works and how al-Ghazālī consolidates them and refers to them consistently as the special properties (*khāṣṣiyāt*) of prophethood. Second, it compares their appearance across a number of al-Ghazālī's works, including his public works.

As to the use of these doctrines in his works, it has been asserted that al-Ghazālī utilizes a philosophical view of prophecy in some of his works and that it informs—in some works more than others—his view of interpretation (*taʾwīl*) of revelation.[168] Martin Whittingham and Herbert Davidson before him conclude that al-Ghazālī's notion of interpretation (*taʾwīl*) in the *Mishkāt* has an Avicennian background.[169] The basis of this claim is that al-Ghazālī's general statement regarding the Koran and how its similitudes should be understood indicates the use of imaginative and intellectual prophecy. Al-Ghazālī's asserts in the *Mishkāt* that, for the prophets, the imaginal world becomes a ladder to the higher world based on their knowing that the outward similitude is true and has a mystery lying behind it. This resembles Avicenna's claim that intellectual prophecy is framed in figurative images through imaginative prophecy.

The *Mishkāt* also links scriptural interpretation to dream interpretation, but brings out the dualist cosmology underpinning this more clearly than in the *Iḥyāʾ*. The *Mishkāt* refers directly to the two levels as *mulk* and *malakūt*, corporeal and spiritual worlds, everything in the *mulk* being a similitude of something in the *malakūt* due to a mercy placed between them.[170]

[166] Fazlur Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958), 95–6.
[167] See his, 'The Three Properties of Prophethood', 189–212 (esp. 195–9, which cite their appearance in the *Iḥyāʾ* and compare their expression to appearances in other texts, public and reserved) in *Interpreting Avicenna*.
[168] Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'ān*: *One Book, Many Meanings* 43–55; Davidson, *Alfārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 139–41; and Frank, *Ashʿarite School*, 82–4.
[169] Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'ān*, 52. Whittingham cites Davidson's argument who argues extensively for the use and applications of Avicenna's views on prophecy in the al-Ghazālī's *Mishkāt* (See his, *Alfārābī, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect*, 139–41.)
[170] Ibid., p. 50.

Al-Ghazālī refers to the 'straight path' as climbing the ladder between the worlds.[171] While imagination is dense and generally veils from the meanings, it may become purified such that one know that the outward similitude is true.[172] Al-Ghazālī does not explain the nature of this purification—e.g. whether it is ethical or epistemological[173], nor mention the prerequisites the present section shows to be in the *Iḥyā'*.

It is important immediately to problematize the relation between the philosophical doctrines of prophecy and a hermeneutic as such. While Avicenna holds a notion of what we may call symbolic prophecy, it was shown in Chapter 1 that he is highly reticent in such works as *al-Aḍḥawiyya* regarding the possibility of scriptural similitudes conveying anything other than 'some meaning' to the understandings of the masses. It also appears that in his principal treatments of the types of prophecy, he does not offer a hermeneutic as such. What is at stake here is the issue going back to al-Fārābī of whether the concrete similitude itself may convey true knowledge which is demonstrative. Avicenna does state that dreams may come from the Active Intellect (and thus be true)[174] but are usually effected by the imagination and thus need interpretation (*ʿibāra*).[175] This appears to entail the possibility that revelation coming from prophets also be interpreted to reproduce the true meaning and reverse the effect of imagination through interpretation. While Avicenna writes in his treatise on dreams that the message of dreams from the *malakut* may be decoded, he does not appear to offer the same possibility for scripture.[176] Thus, al-Ghazālī's firm advocation of a scriptural hermeneutic—particularly one in the *Iḥyā'* incorporating the notion of dream interpretation as shown in this section—should be seen as a development, even if it takes its cue from Avicenna that it is possible to allude to higher truths via similitudes and that the true meaning of dreams may be reproduced through interpretation. Al-Ghazālī appears again to be creative in joining these two separate but related doctrines into one.

As stated, al-Ghazālī's statements that scripture be interpreted through dream interpretation have been noted with regards to the *Mishkāt*, but are shown below clearly deployed in the *Iḥyā'*. Martin Whittingham has devoted the most attention to hermeneutics in

[171] Ibid.
[172] Ibid., 51–2.
[173] Namely, through purifying the mind from vain imaginings avoided through logic.
[174] *al-Mubāḥathāt*, 306, §858.
[175] Ibid., 113, §264. This text appears in the *Maʿārij*, 70, where al-Ghazālī renders the term *ʿibāra* as *taʿbīr* and makes other alterations to render the text clearer than Avicenna.
[176] Avicenna's *al-Manāmiyya* on dream interpretation and its close relationship to al-Ghazālī's unpublished *al-Taḥbīr fī ʿilm al-taʿbīr* are discussed below.

the *Iḥyā'*, but due to al-Ghazālī's elusive writing, was only able to arrive at a hunch that al-Ghazālī's cryptic statements allude to his doctrines held in the *Mishkāt* and the *Jawāhir*.[177] Whittingham's analysis of these allusions is built upon here in this section which establishes that dream interpretation is clearly deployed in the *Iḥyā'*, that al-Ghazālī introduces several practical and theoretical prerequisites for scriptural interpretation which are not heretofore studied, and importantly shows how al-Ghazālī uses them to technically underpin his notion of two speculative theological discourses, one for the masses engrossed in the incorporeal and one for the elite obtaining felicity through abstract and incorporeal knowledge of the given topics. And while Alexander Treiger cites the long passage on dream interpretation in the *Iḥyā'* itself, he is shown below to interpret it according to an unproven assumption and in a manner incompatible with surrounding passages he does not quote.

As such, the aim here is neither to compare nor contrast the doctrines of the philosophers and al-Ghazālī, but rather to show how he appropriates technical doctrines to build a scientific religious discourse in the *Iḥyā'*. This line of exploration more directly related to disclosing the structure of the *Iḥyā'* is still comparatively undeveloped, amounting to isolated insights such as Richard Frank observing that al-Ghazālī holds that interpretation is possible for those firmly grounded in knowledge (*rāsikhūn fī-l-ʿilm*), namely, those who engage in al-Ghazālī's 'higher theology' and seeming therefore to exclude the *mutakallimūn*.[178] It is claimed that the doctrines studied in this section will make the discourse of the *Iḥyā'* which is often coded in religious terminology more intelligible. This coding involves consistently forming two parallel layers—one of realities and one of similitudes—as shown in Chapter 1.[179] In order to advance beyond Whittingham's accurate hunches and find the doctrines of interpretation which show the levels used and how they relate to felicity in the *Iḥyā'*, two thrusts are needed. The rest of this section analyzes the statements regarding interpretation in the *Iḥyā'* to show how al-Ghazālī joins between dream interpretation and Ashʿarī interpretation with a philosophical twist. Then, in Section II below, analysis of al-Ghazālī's

[177] For instance, Martin Whittingham shows connections between interpretation (*taʾwīl*), imaginal prophecy, and al-Ghazālī's bipartite cosmology. (See Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'ān*, 43–55.) He notes that al-Ghazālī refers to the doctrine of imaginal prophecy as misguided in *al-Iqtiṣād* yet clearly uses it in the *Mishkāt*. This indicates that the *Iqtiṣād* statement cannot be assumed to be the last word on his position.

[178] Frank, *Ashʿarite School*, 82–4. Frank notes there that the topic of interpretation recurs in the *Fayṣal* and *Iljām*.

[179] As noted in Chapter 1, Afifi al-Akiti studied the importance of the terms dissemination (*mabthūth*) and allusion (*talwīḥ*) for al-Ghazālī. The present chapter claims that al-Ghazālī's construction of two layers is in fact an active application going beyond allusion through a hermeneutic by which a higher meaning may be obtained from scripture, to claiming that al-Ghazālī takes the added step of producing his own allusions to bring abstract ideas closer to the understanding of the masses.

application of this hermeneutic to core scriptural topics shows that his approach is flexible, which actually confirms my stance regarding how to interpret his statement in the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, mentioned presently.

B. Interpretation in the *Iḥyāʾ*: Moderation and a Discourse for the Masses and the Elite

The course of moderation in interpretation al-Ghazālī applies in the *Iḥyāʾ* is shown below to be a practical matter of first gaining unveiling and then examining its relation to the apparent meaning, preserving it where possible, but discarding it when it does not agree with it (presumably when this is necessary). This notion set out obliquely in *Iḥyāʾ*, Book II, *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, but evidenced through al-Ghazālī's actual practice discussed in Section II, challenges Alexander Treiger's conclusion that al-Ghazālī holds a symbolist view (though also possibly an imaginalist view) of scripture and the afterlife in which the outward purport of scripture is discarded and false. A core claim of the present dissertation is that there are two levels of discourse which guide to two eschatological states, so responding to Treiger's claim is crucial. Al-Ghazālī does advocate a notion in that scriptural interpretation is somehow similar to dream interpretation, but his practice both confirms and unpacks his oblique statement in *Iḥyāʾ*, Book II. Additionally, Martin Whittingham's study of the modes of interpretation in the other statements of *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* shows a complex picture in which no one mode of interpretation applies to all scriptural statements. Because the passage on dream interpretation and that from the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* need to be understood together to see al-Ghazālī's nuanced approach to moderation in interpretation, this section will treat them both in order to arrive at a variable method of interpretation with several prerequisites not mentioned either by Treiger or Whittingham. Towards the ends of this dissertation, together with Section II, this section will show a pattern in which speculative topics are presented at two levels, this being shown to be related to the two levels between which dream interpretation negotiates.

Alexander Treiger cites a passage from the 4th Quarter which might be assumed to contain al-Ghazālī's ultimate position on the nature of scripture and its interpretation. However, after the parts cited by Treiger, the passage itself directs the reader to '*Qawāʿid al-*

ʿaqāʾid of the Quarter on Worship', for explanation of the wisdom and divine grace (*lutf*)[180] in the use of similitudes related to their impact on the heart.[181] Additionally, the passage states that its purpose is to explain the array of ranks in the afterlife, which cannot be understood except by striking similitudes. The specific reason it cannot be understood is because it refers to the afterlife, as we will see shortly. Al-Ghazālī states his hope that through the knowledge of dream interpretation his reader will understand the meaning behind his similitudes and not stop with its form (*ṣūratihi*), meaning here its outward form.[182] Thus, the method of interpretation is ostensibly presented with al-Ghazālī's own similitudes in mind which, though he not be a prophet, may yet be hoped to resemble them by virtue of al-Ghazālī's claim to be an inheritor of the prophets (see Chapter 1, Section V.D, and Chapter 2, Section II.C). Nonetheless, our aim at present is to question whether the extensive passage on dream interpretation is necessarily the ultimate word on al-Ghazālī's view of scriptural interpretation.

What is argued here to be al-Ghazālī's ultimate position on scriptural interpretation is found in the *Iḥyāʾ*, Book II: that unveiling occur to one and one subsequently looks back at scripture, in which case alone one arrives at its ultimate meaning. This statement is highly oblique, does not explain what exactly is intended by unveiling, and also seems highly latitudinarian.[183] The notions of divine light and unveiling is treated in Chapter 3, Sections III and IV. The divine light is shown to be part of a group of synonyms which each express the special faculty of perception which sets humans apart from animals and includes intellect and insight. Unveiling is shown to be increased clarity (*ziyādat wuḍūḥ*) in true knowledge, but not to fall outside of what is apprehended by the faculty of the intellect. There is no evidence that either it or the divine light refer to something non-discursive nor utterly distinct from the true knowledge shown in Chapter 4, Section II to inhere in the *malakūt* and souls of the angels as stated in the *Iḥyāʾ*, *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*. To interpret it as such is thus a red herring that, if followed, makes finding the real trail next to impossible.

[180] This term is important, because it links this discussion to statements shown above in the *Jawāhir* to refer to the divine mercy by which the *mulk* leads like a ladder to the *malakūt*. In the case of similitudes, this is, as stated in the *Mishkāt* passage cited earlier in this chapter, that they may lead to the meaning which lies behind them.
[181] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:24.5–9.
[182] Ibid., 4:24.11.
[183] Ibn Taymiyya cites this passage in full then declares that it contains two sources of heresy (*ilḥād*). First, it implies that no matters of knowledge may be obtained from reports of the Apostle (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad) and that each person apprehends such matters through what occurs for them of direct witnessing (*mushāhada*), light (*nūr*), and unveiling (*mukāshafa*). (See, *Darʿ al-Taʿarruḍ*, 3:447–8.)

The said passage in *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* occurs near the end of a list of five 'secrets' which al-Ghazālī presents with the stated aim of proving that the inner and outer meanings—and sharia and ultimate reality—do not differ, as this would invalidate the sharia. In his careful study of al-Ghazālī's scriptural hermeneutics in this passage, Martin Whittingham terms a lack of contradiction between its outward and inward meanings as 'complementary'. Whittingham analyses the five categories of secrets listed by al-Ghazālī in *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* with the aim of establishing the said lack of contradiction. Whittingham rightly shows that two of the five categories do *not* involve a complementarity. This is because they require invoking the Ashʿarī rule that the outward purport is only interpreted figuratively when a conclusive proof (or demonstration) is found that this is necessary. Even the examples he provides whose interpretation invoke dream interpretation—such as the two fingers of the Merciful or the head of the supplicator turning to a donkey's head if failing to follow the prayer leader themselves—do involve a negation of the outward meaning. While the section avowedly aims to establish complementarity of the apparent and inner meaning, it appears to support the position emphasized by Treiger: that al-Ghazālī's ultimate position is to discard the outer. However, in al-Ghazālī's analysis there is a degree to which they do not contradict each other which he explains as follows: 'This type (of secret in which there is no harm but which has a stronger impact if expressed in metaphor or symbol) is based on expressing (*al-taʿbīr*)[184] the meaning (*maʿnā*) through a form (*ṣūra*) which contains the same meaning or its like. And, (after relating two examples) that does not at all exist regarding the form, but with regards to the meaning it does exist…not in the reality of its being or shape, but through a special property (*khāṣṣiyya*) which is intended rather than the shape which is the container (*qālab*) of the meaning' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 1:101.25–102.3). Al-Ghazālī has found a manner in which there is not an absolute contradiction and as seen below, when he treats dream interpretation at length in the *Iḥyāʾ*, he states the form may be true (if interpreted properly) but Treiger cites only the negative statement found there.

Whittingham searches for the reality of the complementarity which runs through all five categories, but finds that there is no consistent notion binding the examples, a finding on which Section II below throws much light. Al-Ghazālī implies that his notion of

[184] This passage has what is likely an allusion to the science of dream interpretation. The phrase resembles his statement in the 4th Quarter studied below where such similitudes are said to be based on the science of dream interpretation (*ʿilm al-taʿbīr*).

interpretation is Sufi, but Whittingham shows that most of the examples utilize principles from rhetoric (analysing metaphors and similes) and Ashʿarī interpretation (*taʾwīl*), aside from the said examples invoking dream interpretation. The matter changes near the end of the passage when al-Ghazālī completes a doxology, attempting to locate a middle way between the rigid adherence to the apparent meaning by the Ḥanbalīs on one hand and the Muʿtazilīs and philosophers on the other. After initially stating that the Ashʿarīs took the middle way by figuratively interpreting the attributes but not the afterlife, al-Ghazālī indicates that the middle way is not necessarily the Ashʿarī position as follows:[185]

T1, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:104.4–7

> The limits of moderation (*iqtiṣād*) between this coming completely undone and between the rigidity of the Ḥanbalīs is fine and obscure, not perceived save by those given divine success to apprehend matters by divine light, not by rote transmission. Then, the secrets of things as they are unveiled to them, they inspect rote transmission and terms coming down (from scripture). Then, they affirm whatever accords with what they beheld through the light of certitude and they interpret (allegorically; *awwalu*) what differs with it.

Whittingham rightly found this summary statement of al-Ghazālī's method obscure, believing it was a reference to al-Ghazālī's more philosophical notion of interpretation mentioned in the *J̌awāhir* and *Mishkāt* and deploying some notion of symbolic prophecy. Al-Ghazālī himself indicates at the close of this passage[186] that his approach to moderation is part of the science of unveiling as follows: 'for now, the limits of moderation in these matters is part of the science of unveiling, and discussing it requires great length, and we will not wade into it' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 1:104.8–9).

Whittingham also importantly noted an obscurity in the term 'divine light', which could refer in a coded manner to the Ashʿarī requirement for demonstration before figurative interpretation. Chapter 1 showed indeed that 'divine light' (*nūr ilāhiyy*) is part of a list of metaphors for intellect and also showed through passages in the *Miʿyār* that demonstration is used by al-Ghazālī as a synonym for intellect. Stating that demonstration is needed to interpret brings us back near to the Ashʿarī principle that figurative interpretation may only be deployed when a demonstration is presented that such interpretation is needed. One way

[185] Whittingham speaks of a subtle distancing of himself from the Ashʿarī position. If al-Ghazālī introduces a notion of interpretation related to dream interpretation and states as he did in the *J̌awāhir* that exegesis without this is limited to the shell, it would be obvious that he has introduced a notion not identical to the Ashʿarī position.

[186] He closes by stating that those who rely on rote transmission have no firm footing. But, for those limited to pure rote learning, the Ḥanbalī approach is best.

of looking for further implications of this statement is to say that one must understand the matter at the level of true intellect and demonstration after which one will know if the scriptural statement contradicts this; contradiction of the necessary knowledge produced by demonstrative (and certain) proof is itself an impossibility and requires figurative interpretation of scripture to avoid this.

The reference to a process of illumination followed by turning back to assess the scripture will be seen to be best explained only through reflecting on al-Ghazālī's own said practice. The first prerequisite, receiving illumination, is shown to refer to treading the path of praxis (see Section E, below, for the link between illumination, praxis and interpretation, though Chapters 3 and 5 further explore praxis and its effect on the perception).[187] Without praxis and illumination the intellect and the *malakūt* are not accessible to one. In this manner, one has the divine light which is intellect, or, at the very least, al-Ghazālī indicates that after praxis, the possibility exists for the intellect-proper to function, and therefore one has fulfilled on of the major prerequisites for knowing the truth referred to by scripture. Second, just as Chapter 1 and the present chapter show that al-Ghazālī engaged with the reality of matters such as the nature of the afterlife, presumably one must come to know the given topic in a demonstrative manner. Demonstrative knowledge constitutes what it is to have intellect in general, though he also speaks as though one may have a specific divine light or insight regarding a specific topic or knowledge, through demonstration. Third, one turns back to scripture and determines whether it requires interpretation or not. Purification, divine light, and demonstration are not contradictory methods, but parts and conditions of each other. Unlike Ibn Taymiyya's assessment of this argument (see n18), it does not mean one has a purely personal illumination which is not susceptible to assessment through canons of demonstration and logic which allow public scrutiny of knowledge.[188]

[187] Chapter 3 shows that because there is a competition between the faculties, superseded in development by the intellect, then the intellect does not operate. Chapter 5 studies the transfer of the doctrines of praxis from the *Mīzān* to the *Iḥyā'*. Central to these doctrines is the notion that vice is a passive disposition regarding corporeal impressions and pleasures and most are to be removed before the intellect becomes receptive to the incorporeal intelligibles which are its proper object.

[188] The relation between inspiration and syllogistic proof has been studied by Dimitri Gutas (see Dimitri Gutas, 'Evolving Substructure of Avicenna's Epistemology', in Robert Wisnovsky (ed.), *Aspects of Avicenna* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), 1–38) and Peter Adamson (see, Peter Adamson, 'Non-Discursive Thought in Avicenna's Commentary on the Theology of Aristotle', in Jon McGinnis (ed.) with David Reisman, *Interpretting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam* edited by Jon McGinnis with David Reisman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 87–111).

Al-Ghazālī's use of this element of Avicennian epistemology has received treatment by Jules Janssens (see Jules Janssens, 'L'âme-miroir: al-Ghazâlî entre philosophie et mysticisme'," in Daniel De Smet, Meryem

C. Scriptural Interpretation as Dream Interpretation

This subsection will focus on assessing an important but obscure 4th Quarter passage which refers to dream interpretation. It will argue that al-Ghazālī's use of dream interpretation does not entail discarding the literal purport of scripture as mere symbol. Instead, dream interpretation is one part of the process of interpretation adopted by al-Ghazālī for more than one reason, including attempting to preserve the outward and to prevent premature judgement that the outward involves a contradiction or is anthropomorphic. While dream interpretation is compatible with al-Ghazālī's bipartite cosmology and invokes it, as seen below, it aims—as did the *Fayṣal*—to preserve at least a partial correspondence between the outward and inward. This is shown to be compatible with the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage in that it entails that one know the inward meaning and is shown to be compatible with al-Ghazālī's own practice (see Section IV) as he in fact finds the correspondence between corporeal and incorporeal levels variably, depending on the topic. This matter is crucial for this thesis in that al-Ghazālī must work out these levels in his revival project which is an attempt to drive people based on their capacity either to true, demonstrative science (and ideally also realization) of these theological matters, or at least belief, if they are not capable.

There are several good reasons to be cautious in assuming that dream interpretation is the overriding or ultimate doctrine of scriptural interpretation for al-Ghazālī. However, in the end it seems to be compatible with the method from *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* just studied, so long as one avoids the assumption of Treiger that al-Ghazālī's overriding doctrine is a symbolist view which involves discarding the outward as *just a symbol* and inadequate for the meaning it symbolizes. We will see that while he adopts dream interpretation as a method, he wishes for it to train the reader in a very specific task. This is to learn to see that the outward meaning is not false, but, once interpreted correctly, is true in spirit in as much as the outward similitude captures some aspect or part of the intended meaning. In the examples al-Ghazālī provides, the outward purport is indeed impossible or leads to gross anthropomorphism, so there is a parallel with the Ashʿarī prohibition to interpret without a conclusive proof or demonstration that a given figurative interpretation is necessary. However, al-Ghazālī's appeals to different partial overlaps is so similar to the *Fayṣal* method of introducing levels that

Sebti, and Godefroid de Callatay (eds), *Miroir et savoir* edited by Daniel De Smet, Meryem Sebti and Godefroid de Callatay, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2008), 203–17) and Alexander Treiger (see Alexander Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*, Chapters 3 and 4).

Whittingham is correct to see the method of dream interpretation in the *Iḥyāʾ* as a proto-*Fayṣal* method. The *Fayṣal* method may be summarized for our purposes as positing levels of existence of a thing or concept and requiring demonstration to descend each level from complete existence of what is outwardly referred to in scripture to descending partial levels shared between the reality and the outward purport. Throughout the following analysis of the crucial dream interpretation passage, the notion that dream interpretation and the *Fayṣal* method assume that one know the reality in order to assess scripture will be understood as a strong form of compatibility with the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage which still seems the predominant method as it explains the whole process, even if summarily, of which dream interpretation is but one part. Dream interpretation itself seems to require, as stated, that one somehow arrive at knowledge of reality through the symbol. Thus, dream interpretation performs one role: it prevents one from stopping with the literal, but also from completely discarding the outward. Again, as the last section of this chapter shows that al-Ghazālī finds the two levels of his cosmology applied to the different topics in variable manners, it is ultimately his own practice which shows us that different topics require different handling of the relationship between the corporeal similitude and abstract reality. But even this variable nature is referred to in the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage which strengthens the argument that it is dominant in the *Iḥyāʾ*.

As stated above, it is not sound to assume that al-Ghazālī's adoption of aspects of dream interpretation entails that he adopts a symbolist view in which scriptural references are mere inadequate symbols. This position is at odds with many passages shown in the remainder of this chapter to contain nuances not accounted for by the pure symbolist claim.[189] An illustrative example of the incompatibility of Treiger's symbolist view occurs in the central 4th Quarter passage itself. Treiger emphasises that the outward form is false. This is contrary to our assessment of dream interpretation and how it comes together with to form the full picture of scriptural interpretation in the *Iḥyāʾ*.

It is crucial to determine from the beginning whether al-Ghazālī is stating here that scripture should be interpreted exactly as dreams are interpreted and, if so, what is the significance of this. Dream interpretation was already used in the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passages to attempt to join between the inner and outer meanings, this being the example

[189] These include the closing statement of this section from al-Ghazālī's summary of the science of unveiling from near the beginning of the *Iḥyāʾ*, but also several affirmations of a corporeal afterlife in Section IV.

cited above in which al-Ghazālī stated that there was a certain amount of truth shared between the outward and inward. As stated above, dream interpretation is used for certain secrets in which it was said that a similitude would have more impact. This is similar to the current case in which al-Ghazālī himself states his purpose is to inform his reader how to understand the meaning of similitudes for the ranks of the afterlife which he (not a prophet) will strike and he guides his reader to return to the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage where the wisdom of similitudes is explained. In addition to this, two matters indicate that dream interpretation is not necessarily the overriding, universal method of scriptural interpretation: a) *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* pointed to several different hermeneutic techniques and b) in Whittingham's analysis of them, he found that some preserved the outward but some did not. Dream interpretation does not accord with a mode of interpretation preserving the outward because dream interpretation always involves retracing the changes and associations the origin of the dream undergoes in all but the prophets.

While al-Ghazālī does indeed say, as cited by Treiger, that the outward form is false and the inner meaning is true, it should be understood that this is because Treiger specifically cites al-Ghazālī's statement on the nature of similitudes as follows: 'We mean by similitude to convey a (given) meaning through a form (*ṣūra*) which one finds truthful if one looks to its meaning, but if one looks to its form, one finds it false'.[190] This passage does indeed say the form is false. However, a nearby passage not cited by Treiger explains that after interpretation this form is not false, as follows:

T2, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:24.1–9

> So, the dream interpreter is truthful in his interpretation and his dream is truthful. And the reality of it returns to the fact that the angel given the responsibility for dreams—which is the one who apprises spirits (*arwāḥ*) during sleep of what is in the Preserved Tablet—made him (i.e. the dreamer) to know what is in the Preserved Tablet through a similitude which it coined for him. This is because the one who is asleep can only handle similitudes. So, the similitude is truthful and its meaning (*maʿnāhu*) is truthful. Prophets also only speak to people in the here-below, which is sleep in relation to the afterlife, so they convey meanings (*al-maʿānī*) to their understanding in similitudes. [This is according to] God's wisdom and grace (*lutf*) for His servants and a way of easing the understanding of what they are incapable of understanding without striking similitudes.

[190] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:23.14–15.

The arbiter of truth is thus due to the origin being the *malakūt*, which is the source of true knowledge, but also the angel referred to as being made (by God) to be the agent of dreams who both coins the truth as a similitude and conveys it to its receiver. Nonetheless, the dream and dream interpretation would seem to only be truthful if interpreted correctly which seems to entail already knowing the truth.[191] While the dream is now said to be true, Treiger's emphasis on the form being false has some basis because it is said to be true on the prerequisite that it is interpreted correctly. But this insight is not the end of the discussion, because in al-Ghazālī's examples again we find that he refers to a shared aspect between the similitude and the ultimate reality. Al-Ghazālī's statement on the nature of the similitude had occurred in the context of discussing a dream in which a man saw himself placing seals on the groins of women (when announcing the entrance of the fast in Ramadan). Immediately after stating the nature of the similitude, he returns to the dream and states as follows: 'If the believer looks at the form of the one sealing through whom the groins are sealed, he finds it false because nothing in the slightest was sealed by him. But if he looks at its meaning, he finds it true because the spirit (*rūḥ*) and meaning of sealing came from him which is "preventing something" which is intended by "sealing"' (*Iḥyā'*, 4:23.15–16). 'Preventing' is thus a meaning found to be shared between the similitude and the intended reality or meaning in a manner similar to the *Fayṣal* which stipulates that there are different levels in which the scriptural statement is considered to be true. However, in case of both dreams and scripture, it is obvious that the interpreter must already know the meaning to which scripture refers, partially or wholly. This is in line with the interpretation of the central statement from the *Kitāb Qawā'id al-ʿaqā'id* discussion: one knows through the divine light, then determines the nature of the relation to scripture.

What is clearly introduced is a notion of two levels—the *mulk* and the *malakūt*—which are not found in an Ashʿarī notion of interpretation. It does seem clear that al-Ghazālī takes the bipartite cosmology as universal, i.e. applying to all beings, aside perhaps from God. As such, the two levels, the *mulk* and *malakūt*, run through everything including the universe and our representation of it, the latter being either true, incorporeal knowledge, or corporeal impressions. While the *Jawāhir* is a work subsequent to the *Iḥyā'*, it refers to the same impossibility to speak to those who are asleep, but brings out the dualist cosmology more

[191] This is except for the possibility that a similitude for some individuals might cause their minds to arrive at the true knowledge.

clearly that dream interpretation (of scripture) is necessary because this world is a form of sleep, death being an awakening, before which it is impossible to know realities except as moulded in imaginative symbols (*amthāl khayyāliyya*).[192] As the next section indicates, several passages in the *Iḥyā'* speak of both a corporeal and incorporeal afterlife, this itself being an application of the bipartite cosmology. However, rather than the similitude only referring partially to an incomparable reality, it is a different application in that both a spiritual and bodily reality may be literally referred to by two different discourses, even if it is forbidden to refer openly to the incorporeal pleasures. This also challenges Treiger's assumption that matters of the afterlife are incomparable, one and all. It is precisely because they are incomparable and therefore incomprehensible to the masses that, in Treiger's assessment, al-Ghazālī did not believe that saying scriptural depictions of the afterlife are only symbols gives the lie to the prophets. Importantly, al-Ghazālī himself raises and explains this possibility: scripture might refer to some realities as they are. Surprisingly, this explanation occurs very early in the *Iḥyā'* in his description of the science of unveiling that is translated at the end of the current section (T3 below).

In the passage currently under investigation, al-Ghazālī opens by stating that the afterlife is of or part of the *malakūt*.[193] Firstly, Chapter 3 establishes that the *malakūt* is not only the incorporeal worlds, but true knowledge. Secondly, al-Ghazālī clearly believes that intellectual and incorporeal pleasures can be spoken of, because he does so in several places, rehearsing Avicenna's argument for the existence and superiority of intellectual pleasures over bodily pleasures. Thus, the reference to the *malakūt* would include, but not be limited to, the incorporeal intellectual pleasures, referred to summarily by scripture as those which have not 'occurred to the hearts of mankind'. However, the current passage does not explain what is meant by the *malakūt* except to link it to the afterlife and say the prophets are 'in it'. If he intends by the *malakūt* true knowledge and intellectual pleasures, both of which are incorporeal, then, if joined to the findings of Chapters 1 and 4, this indicates that those who have undergone praxis—those referred to in earlier sections of this chapter as having insight—would also have access to this level. In that case, the impossibility to convey it would not be absolute, and people would come to mean 'most people' or the masses in al-Ghazālī's well-known elite–masses dichotomy. Then, the impossibility becomes tantamount to the

[192] Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'ān*, 47–8.
[193] *Iḥyā'*, 1:22.32–23.3.

prophetic injunction to speak to people according to the level of their intellect, but the prohibition here is underpinned with the philosophical principle that abstract, speculative inquiry is impossible without the practical aspect of the soul being rectified through ethical praxis.

Seen in this light, there is an unmistakable echo of *al-Aḍḥawiyya*'s primary rule (*qānūn*) that the sharia is addressed to the masses for whom abstract theology is incomprehensible in al-Ghazālī's own rule, stated in our passage as follows: 'It is impossible to conceive of explaining the incorporeal world in the corporeal world except through striking similitudes'.[194] In spite of the incomparability between the *mulk* and *malakūt* indicated in al-Ghazālī's rule, the partial shared meaning shown below to exist in al-Ghazālī's examples of dream interpretation indicates some kind of relation between them. As said earlier, al-Ghazālī refers to a grace (*lutf*) which links them, referred to as a mercy (*raḥma*) between the two worlds in both the *Iḥyā'*[195] and the *Mishkāt*.[196] Though al-Ghazālī does not say there is at least such a partial reference between the outward similitude and the meaning from the *malakūt* in all cases—in the sense of being a cosmological principle based on the relation of the *mulk* and *malakūt*—it might be implied by his saying that dream interpretation is a prerequisite for understanding scripture, which implies the two levels exist universally in scripture and that through dream interpretation the meaning can always be reached via the similitude. That this is the only manner to understand the ultimate meaning is supported clearly by a statement in *Jawāhir*. It mentions that because the normal exegete lacks dream interpretation, exegesis (*tafsīr*) is only concerned with the shell, i.e. outward meaning.[197]

In this 4th Quarter *Iḥyā'* passage, dream interpretation is referred to in a manner which indicates that it is the most important of prerequisites for understanding the similitude, overshadowing the notion that one must reach a divine light or unveiling. This is seen in the

[194] *Iḥyā'*, 4:22.32–23.7.
[195] Ibid., 1:270.21–3. There, in the Book on the Hajj Pilgrimage, al-Ghazālī states that the Kaaba is an outward similitude (*mithālan ẓāhiran*) of the Lordly presence (*al-Haḍra al-Rubūbiyya*) in the same way that the human body is a similitude (*mithāl*) from the visible world (*shahāda*) of the heart from the unseen world (*ghayb*). The physical world (*mulk*) is said to be a road or way (*madraja*) to the incorporeal world (*malakūt).*
[196] The *Mishkāt* refers directly to the two levels as *mulk* and *malakūt*, corporeal and spiritual worlds, everything in the *mulk* being a similitude of something in the *malakūt* and leading to the *malakūt* due to a mercy placed between them. (See, *Mishkāt*, 67.3–6 and cf., Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'ān*, p. 50. The same notion is referred to in the *Jawāhir*, 34.14–35.8.) He refers to the 'straight path' as climbing the ladder between the worlds. (See, *Mishkāt*, 67.3–6). While imagination is dense and generally veils from the meanings, it may become purified such that one know that the outward similitude is true. (See ibid., 51–2.).
[197] Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'an*, 47–8.

manner al-Ghazālī explains the following verse: {And We struck those similitudes for the people, and none understand them but those who know} (Koran 29:43).[198] Al-Ghazālī does indeed seem to interpret those who know as scholars, but he means scholar in a specific sense which indicates another prerequisite for interpretation. He gives an example which relates to divine attributes, not the afterlife, and says as follows, 'This is of the similitudes which are not understood except by scholars. As for the ignorant (*jāhil*), his ability does not exceed the apparent meaning (*ẓāhir*) of the similitude due to his ignorance of exegesis (*tafsīr*) called figurative interpretation (*taʾwīl*) similar to the way exegesis of the similitudes seen in sleep is called dream interpretation' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 4:23.20–1). This passage emphasizes the importance of the prerequisite of being well practised at dream interpretation in order to avoid literalism in scriptural interpretation. However, it still refers to exegesis needed not literally as dream interpretation (*taʿbīr*) but as interpretation (*taʾwīl*), a term for interpretation which is not necessarily associated with an inner, esoteric, or reserved method because it is also used by Ashʿarīs and in standard classical Sunni discussions of exegesis.[199] This raises the question of whether this method *is* literally dream interpretation or merely uses some form of interpretation which benefits *from* dream interpretation. This manner in which it benefits from dream interpretation involves avoiding stopping with the literal purport, especially when the outer purport seems to entail contradictions, and learning to look for the manner in which the inner and outer accord with each other.[200] And, while it might appear that al-Ghazālī's references to dreams coming from the *malakūt* and being coined into similitudes shows that he

[198] It is not clear that the verse means that one knows the reality it refers to. Al-Ghazālī explains after citing the verse that the reason none understands is because they are asleep. In spite of being asleep, one may learn what is in wakefulness through the science of dream interpretation, which is through practising with copious examples .

[199] Cf., Andrew Rippin (ed.), *The Qurʾan*: *Formative Interpretation* (Brookfield, VT : Ashgate, 1999) and Walid Salih, *Formation of the Classical Tafsīr Tradition*: *The Qurʾān Commentary of al-Thaʿlabī (d. 427/1035)*, (Leiden : Brill, 2004).

[200] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:23.25–6. Al-Ghazālī's intention here veers into addressing apostasy (*ilḥād*). It is caused by stopping with the outward purport, which causes the apostate to believe the verse contradicts what he or she holds to be true.

This passage appears to point to the same matter explained in the *Jawāhir* in greater detail. There, al-Ghazālī says that those whose awareness is limited to outward, imaginal forms and who does not know the equivalence (*muwāzana*) between the visible world and the *malakūt* may come to see an outward contradiction to the questions they ask. They neither apprehend the world of spirits nor believe in the unseen as the masses do, and so they are deprived of both stations. Ignorance (of the masses) is closer to salvation than cleverness adjoined with inadequacy. Al-Ghazālī mentions that through misfortune he had such bad company and was lucky to be saved from such ideas. (See, *Jawāhir*, 45.10–46.4.) This is an important autobiographical indication of why the matter of the outward scripture and inward meaning is important to al-Ghazālī and also an indication of his approach which is to reconand so on. His discussions of the relations between the scriptural and philosophical are addressed not only in the *Tahāfut*, but importantly as a core topic of *al-Munqidh*.

is committed to dream interpretation, these notions are also part of imaginal or symbolic prophecy.

That scriptural interpretation benefits from dream interpretation in this manner but not *be* dream interpretation as such is fitting for two reasons. First, according to a notion of dreams expressed by Avicenna in several works, dreams generally involve a shift through association (*intiqāl*).[201] In at least one text, he states that the dreams of stronger souls do not require interpretation, presumably because there is no shift requiring reversal.[202] According to this statement transferred nearly verbatim to the *Maʿārij*, dream interpretation would seem not to be needed for scripture as it is received via prophets which are the strongest human souls.

Two recent studies have observed that the *Aḥwāl*'s treatment of prophecy is distinct from its treatment in other Avicennian texts and that it is drawn on heavily for the entire treatment of the special properties of prophecy in the *Maʿārij*. Unfortunately, neither study discusses the relation between dream interpretation and scriptural interpretation.[203] The *Aḥwāl* and *Maʿārij* each link dreams and prophecy, seeing veridical dreams as a stage on the way towards prophecy. The fact that each text discusses interpretation of the different levels indicates that dreams and prophecy for both authors share in being coined but the levels differ in whether they need interpretation. It will appear in the end that prophecy is actively coined by the strong imagination of prophets rather than needing to be interpreted due to one of the three typical shifts caused by the imaginal faculty. Both texts are addressed to

[201] See *Ahwāl al-nafs*, 117.12–118.6, and*Kītāb al-Nafs*, 168–70; and his *al-Manāmiyya*.

More may be said regarding possible sources of the specific identification of interpretation with dream interpretation. The still unpublished work, *al-Taḥbīr fī ʿilm al-taʿbīr*, was studied by al-Akiti (see his unpublished DPhil thesis titled, 'The *Maḍnūn* of al-Ghazālī', 199–207.) and subsequently transcribed and translated in an Oxford MPhil thesis. (The thesis is titled, '*Kītāb al-Taḥbīr fī ʿilm al-taʿbīr*: A Ghazālīan Text on Dreams', submitted in 2011 to the Oriental Institute. Many thanks are due to Sazan Meran for supplying the present author with a copy of this thesis.) Al-Akiti and Sazan Meran both indicate that in this work, al-Ghazālī follows in some places closer than other Avicenna's *al-Manāmiyya*, appropriating his theory and avowedly stripping it of 'reprehensible' matters (such as the Active Intellect). The treatise discusses how meanings are reached by the soul from the incorporeal realms while the veils of the senses are dormant. These meanings are then coined into images which are more or less faithful to the original, depending on the soul of the receiver.

[202] *Aḥwāl*, 118.8–9.

[203] These studies are Rahman's *Prophecy in Islam* and al-Akiti's 'The Three Properties of Prophecy'. Aside from the last point found uniquely in the *Maʿārij* and mentioned below, this material is almost all, especially the levels of strength in terms of requiring interpretation, uniquely in the *Aḥwāl*. (See Afifi al-Akiti, 'The Properties of Prophethood in Certain Works of Avicenna and al-Ġazālī', in *Interpretting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval Islam* 189–212.)

Rahman makes various notes on the *Maʿārij*'s differences to Avicenna's system in spite of heavy reliance, but he says nothing of dream interpretation.

Al-Akiti traces the sources of the *Maʿārij* passage, mostly to Avicenna's *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, but does not discuss the link to dream interpretation in the first (imaginal) property of prophecy or other Avicennian sources.

establishing the existence and need for prophecy. They present in the following order a cosmology explaining how different types of knowledge a prophet might obtain are present in different manners and descend through the celestial souls and intellects. Then, when addressing knowledge of particulars (rather than universals), the texts discuss how particular knowledge is related to the imaginal faculty and subject on receipt by the soul to three different shifts and how the initial meaning may be retrieved by reversing the shifts through analysis (*taḥlīl*) and insightful guessing (*takhmīn*).[204]

Then the two texts discuss the levels of dreams before turning to discussion of prophecy as such. This discussion, which links dream interpretation and scriptural interpretation, occurs at the bridge between the two latter topics. Some souls are said to have no propensity for true dreams, some dream but the meanings are irretrievably lost, while others may know the three manners in which imagination alters the original meaning and work back through to the original.[205] Still others have dreams which do not need interpretation (*taʿbīr*).[206] But the first rank he refers to as prophets are those for whom the retentive imagination (*mutakhayyila*) performs similarly to how it performs with regards to dreams which do need interpretation. This is to take the states inspired and represent them accurately and dominate over sense perception. In this manner, what is imagined effects it and the forms occurring in it imprint in the imagination (*banṭaṣiyya*) such that divine, strange forms are seen and divine statements are heard.[207] The *Maʿārij* states that this is the lowest rank of prophecy.[208] Lest there be any doubt that the author of the *Maʿārij* himself is referring to scripture, he adds a passage, not found in the *Aḥwāl*, as follows, 'These are the levels of prophecy related to the intellectual, practical, and imaginal faculties. Look at the stories of the Koran how their particulars were related as though he (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad) witnessed and attended them and as though they were seen and heard by the Prophet'.[209] This passage indicates that the dreams of stronger souls, even non-prophets, do not need dream interpretation, but it also states that at a higher stage revelation is imprinted in imaginal forms. If this is al-Ghazālī's ultimate doctrine, it would mean that revelation does not need

[204] Neither text discusses intuition (*ḥads*) here, but in the *Aḥwāl* it is discussed in the following section.
[205] See *Aḥwāl* and *Maʿārij*, 154–5.
[206] See *Aḥwāl* and *Maʿārij*, 155.
[207] See *Aḥwāl* and *Maʿārij*, 154–5.
[208] The printed text of the *Aḥwāl* states, '*Fa-hādhihi idhan darajāt al-maʿnā al-musamma bi-l-nubuwwa*'. While the editor lists no variations, the difference between the *adnā* and *idhan* is so minimal in terms of script that it is entirely possible this is only a scribal error.
[209] *Maʿārij*, 156.8–10.

dream interpretation in the manner dreams generally need which is to reverse the transfer (*intiqāl*) of the original meaning. Importantly, al-Ghazālī's three examples which he says were mentioned to Ibn Sīrīn, a famous early compiler of dream interpretations, do not explain any of the three typical shifts by association listed both by Avicenna and al-Ghazālī, described in the two texts as follows: 'The imaginative faculty—due to the propensity it contains for representing (*muḥākiya*) and transferring (*muntaqila*) from one thing to another—leaves behind (the form) it took and provides (in its place) what resembles it, is opposite to it, or corresponds to it'.[210] Even if prophetic souls do not transfer in an uncontrolled or unconscious manner which loses the meaning, the similitude is necessarily a representation and—except for the possibility of concrete representing some realities—seems to require at least use of the first and third, namely, resemblance or correspondence. Thus, they may be intended to represent dreams of strong souls or prophets. There are thus several reasons to believe that dream interpretation is important to avoid rigid adherence to the apparent meaning, but is not identical to the interpretation (*taʾwīl*) needed for scriptural interpretation. Also, just as the three special properties of prophecy include imaginal and intellectual prophecy which indicate there are types of prophecy which convey particular historical and abstract truths, so it may be fit that different aspects of scripture require different methods.

The second reason it is fitting that this method be like dream interpretation rather than identical with it is that both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī liken the two without saying they are identical. While Avicenna was shown above in *al-Mubāhathāt* to refer to dreams from the *malakūt* effected by imagination as needing interpretation, he comes much closer to the manner in which al-Ghazālī links scriptural interpretation to dream interpretation in *Kītāb al-nafs*. There, he states that if the soul connects to the supernal region (*malakūt*), if it is firm and nothing overwhelms it, it is firmly remembered, 'according to its proper manner and form such that it does not require, remembrance (*tadhakkur*) if had in wakefulness, dream interpretation (*taʿbīr*) if had in sleep, and figurative interpretation (*taʾwīl*) if revelation (*waḥy*). Dream interpretation and figurative interpretation are here like remembrance'.[211] Remembrance is explained to be working backwards if a matter is forgotten and the mind

[210] *Aḥwāl*, 117.
[211] *Kītāb al-nafs*, 170.5–7.

moves away from it through what we may call association.[212] This passage indicates a link, but still does not say as much as that revelation *is* interpreted through dream interpretation.

It is more clear from this 4th Quarter passage that it is an application of the bipartite cosmology expressed in terms of al-Ghazālī's commitments as following: a) The bipartite cosmology of *mulk* and *malakūt* applies to discourse in which similitudes are associated with the concrete *mulk* and true meanings (especially those associated with the true nature of the afterlife, but also the divine attributes) are part of the *malakūt*. (It is not clear that all aspects of the afterlife are incomprehensible in the *mulk*, but at least the incomparable aspects alluded to through the verse including 'nor occurred to the heart of man'. The *malakūt* refers to these incomparable aspects but also any inner or abstract meaning—as these are either technical in nature or require opening up the intellect and intellectual pleasures to understand.) b) In general, the prophets are obliged to speak to the vast majority of mankind in similitudes which are graspable because they are asleep and limited to the *mulk*. (This almost surely refers to the Avicennian notion from *al-Aḍḥawiyya* that understanding abstract theology requires freeing the soul and intellect from vices.) c) Similitudes in themselves cannot convey the true meaning.

In addition to its compatibility with a) a general notion of symbolic prophecy and b) a dualist cosmology (and related discourse), aspects of dream interpretation were said to be adopted in order to attempt to preserve the outer meaning. The desire to preserve the outer meaning has at least three motivations important for understanding the doctrines according to which al-Ghazālī handles the outer meaning or lower level of his theological discourse. The most obvious would be the Bāṭinī challenge in which defence of the outer meaning is part of responding to that challenge. In *Iḥyā'*, the *Kitāb Qawa'id al-'aqa'id* passage seeks to find a middle way not with regards the Bāṭinīs, but between the rigid literalists and the overly free *falāsifa* and Mu'tazilīs who figuratively interpret matters of the afterlife. However, his statement on the middle way in the *Mishkāt* differs in the names of the groups and the emphasis that leaving the outward is leaving practice. Those who look only at the outward are referred to as literalists, those who explain away the apparent meaning are referred to as Bāṭinīs, and those who join between them are called the perfect.[213] Shortly thereafter, al-Ghazālī states that the perfect do not allow themselves to leave aside a single prescription of

[212] See ibid., 168–9.
[213] *Mishkāt*, 50.

the sharia, even if they have perfect insight.[214] Thus, one motivation for the search for a middle way that preserves the apparent meaning, often through finding a partial complementarity between the inward and outward, is to counter the Bāṭinīs (and is sometimes accomplished by not explaining away scriptural appeals to practising certain rites or acts).[215] Again, the search to preserve the outward through such a middle way is compatible with the *Qawāʿid* passage.

A second motivation is the related Ashʿarī principle of not departing from the outer meaning without conclusive proof or demonstration. Dream interpretation allows this principle to be expanded to interpretation which maintains *part* or an aspect of the apparent meaning as seen above to exemplify a proto-*Fayṣal* approach introducing levels in which something may be said to exist or be true.

Finally, the flexibility of a middle way open to using insights from dream interpretation is appealed to in order to avoid heresy or disbelief (*ilḥād*). In the present 4th Quarter passage,[216] al-Ghazālī indicates—regarding similitudes struck for matters of the afterlife—an apparent contradiction appears to a heretic due to being rigidly fixed on the outward purport.[217] Al-Ghazālī explains that this rigidity is due to lack of the knowledge of dream interpretation referred to in the scripture cited above. In this case, the scripture is a prophetic tradition stating that death will come on Resurrection Day in the form of a ram. The person mentioned reasons that it is impossible for a substance to become an accident, which entails that the prophets are liars.[218] Al-Ghazālī explains how such a dream might be interpreted by a dream interpreter in which case the dream and the interpreter are truthful.[219] Again, though, interpretation seems to require knowing that the ram represents calamity descending on a polity and hence either entails that one knows the reality or it entails a great optimism al-Ghazālī holds for allusions to apprise certain people of the reality at hand.

Another form of mistake al-Ghazālī wishes to avoid through dream interpretation is attributing anthropomorphic attributes to God. In the examples he provides of Adam being

[214] Ibid.
[215] In the *Iḥyāʾ*, an important part of praxis is that practicing practising the sharia causes it to expand and produce certain meanings (epistemological), and attributes in the heart (ethical virtues). Thus, preserving the sharia itself leads to the ultimate reality, preparing the one to receive it or even leading to it directly in some cases.
[216] The same notions are spelled out in greater detail in *Jawāhir*, 44.
[217] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:23.25–6.
[218] Ibid., 4:23.27–9.
[219] Ibid., 4:23.29–31. After this passage, he states as translated above that the truth comes from an angel who sent the dream and who coined it into a (true) similitude.

created in God's form and the hearts of humans being between two fingers of God, he makes an allusion to the distinction made in Chapter 3 between sensible forms and intelligible forms.[220] In Section II of the present chapter, as in his explanation here, having no concept of intelligible forms leads to interpreting concrete matters literally and falling into anthropomorphism, but al-Ghazālī is clearly underpinning his notions of immanence (or anthropomorphism) and transcendence with his dualist cosmology in a manner not performed by previous Ashʿarīs. This matter is treated in further detail in the following section which looks at particular topics of scripture, including the attributes and afterlife, but it suffices here to mention that *al-Aḍḥawiyya* makes a highly similar application of the dualism to the masses unable to know the abstract theology of the attributes due to predomination of the corporeal in their minds.

How then does al-Ghazālī also preserve the more philosophical notion that the masses must be spoken to in similitudes, especially regarding matters of the *malakūt*? He is either inconsistent or he believes some scripture speaks about matters as they are.[221] This is precisely the possibility al-Ghazālī speaks of in his listing of the topics of the science of unveiling at the beginning of the *Iḥyā'* as follows:

T3, *Iḥyā'*, 1:20.32–21.7

> And knowledge of the afterlife (*ākhira*) and paradise and the hell-fire (and several individual occurrences of the afterlife are listed) and the meaning of levels of the people of the gardens such that some see each other like a beaming celestial body (*kawkab*) in the middle of the sky. And (there are) more whose details require very long treatment because people have disparate ranks regarding (their understanding of) the meaning of these matters after first believing in their bases. Some see all of these as similitudes (*amthila*) and that that which God prepared for His righteous servants is that which no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it occurred to the heart of man and people have no (knowledge of) the garden except (mere) attributes and names. But some (others) deem

[220] This point is explored in the following section which investigates al-Ghazālī's application of his discourse to particular theological topics.
[221] This could be in two ways. First, scriptural textmay infrequently speak of matters of the *malakūt*, for example stating abstract Second, the matters spoken of may indeed have the characteristics of the *mulk* such that they be spoken of correction in concrete terms which literally describe the matter if it, itself, has a concrete nature.

> that some of these are (mere) similitudes, whereas some of these matters accord with the realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) understood through their terms (*alfāẓ*).

This passage from early in the *Iḥyāʾ* leaves the matter of whether some realities might be spoken of according to their true nature open. These aspects of dream interpretation indicate that al-Ghazālī's search for a middle way is in part a search to preserve the outward and where possible to find correspondence between the outward and inward. Dream interpretation thus accords with this middle way rather than indicating the outward is a mere symbol which is discarded. This is not to say that al-Ghazālī believes that concrete discourse can convey abstract meanings in and of itself. However, he indicates that it may partially correspond to the given reality. Further, in some cases, it may convey it in an adequate matter which would seem to be in the case of believing in a corporeal (or imaginalist) afterlife.[222] And for the several reasons stated above, this dream interpretation is compatible with the notion that one gains the true knowledge and only then is able to assess scripture. This is because in dream interpretation, in order to assess to what degree the similitude is adequate to the reality, one must know the reality.

D. Similitudes and Abstract Knowledge of Theology

A crucial passage from *al-Imlāʾ* serves as a key to unlock the passage on dream interpretation. While it is a methodological decision of this thesis not to base understanding of the *Iḥyāʾ* on books written subsequently, *al-Imlāʾ* is a text which al-Ghazālī himself devoted ostensibly to explaining the *Iḥyāʾ*. In it, al-Ghazālī reveals in more detail than elsewhere the inability of those drowned in the corporeal to grasp the abstract, a theme that runs across the core topics of theology and defines the ranks who learn it at various levels. The passage comes in the context of a discussion of the divine unity and people's ranks regarding it. One such rank is 'those brought nigh'. After mention of this rank, the passage speaks of which matters of the afterlife are knowable and under what conditions, as follows:

T4, *al-Imlāʾ*, 286.4–17

> Informing…the generality of people…who are not of this rank (*maqām*; i.e. those brought nigh (*muqarrabīn*))…(regarding the divine unity) is a great tribulation…due to…its distance in general and in details from all that they are accustomed to of the seen, corporeal world (*ʿālam al-mulk*

[222] This conclusion holds regardless of whether al-Ghazālī believes in a full resurrection of the body or only a resurrection of the imagination. Both are, in a philosophical sense, corporeal and particular rather than incorporeal.

> *wa-l-shahāda*)…and its being unlike anything they were surrounded by while growing up. They did not behold anything other than sensibilia such as either intelligibilia, immediate knowledges, and speculative knowledges. Because they could not apprehend any of that via analogy, and it could not be conceived of via (mere) terms (of language), and no similitude could be interpreted to mean it, just as He, mighty and majestic, said, {No soul knows what pleasures have been hidden away for it} and it is reported that Ibn ʿAbbās said: 'The people have no part of knowledge of the afterlife but (mere) names'. (Ibn ʿAbbās) meant thereby those for whom no knowledge and nothing of its realities had been unveiled in the here-below. Also, were it permissible to mention to those not fit for it, they would have no means to conceive it except differently than it really is, i.e. through mere imitation and in a manner obtainable by the heedless who have fallen short (*quṣūr*).

This passage clarifies many crucial issues, including those in the 4th Quarter discussion of interpretation.[223] It is a relief to find al-Ghazālī put his cards on the table. However, this example of the *Iḥyā'* text requiring external clues to be understood confirms that one is right to feel there is often more than he is saying in other *Iḥyā'* passages. Be that as it may, in this passage al-Ghazālī states a) the reason true descriptions of the afterlife must be withheld is because they would be a trial for people's faith, b) the reason they cannot understand them is due to dominance of corporeal faculties from the time of youth, and, crucially, c) being limited to the *mulk* is not absolute, but even in the here-below some knowledge of matters of the afterlife is possible. Thus, again, if joined to the passages from Chapter 3, Section IV addressing the competition of the corporeal and incorporeal faculties and also the doctrines of praxis entering the *Iḥyā'* from the *Mīzān*, the implication is that travelling the path of praxis is required before one can come to know the higher realities. This passage comes in the context of explaining the declaration of unity (*tawḥīd*) of those brought nigh (*muqarrabīn*). Inside this passage we see two of the three ranks governing the *Iḥyā'* through their parameters and producing its ranks: a) the inadequate (*qāṣir*) or (merely) saved (*nājī*) whose belief is via imitation and b) those drawn close whose belief is via true (incorporeal) knowledge. The rank of the veracious, those who add annihilation of multiplicity to incorporeal knowledge, is not mentioned here. It is a general finding of this thesis that al-Ghazālī occasionally speaks of a station above those brought nigh, but he does not develop a separate eschatological reality for this level. The possibility that those brought nigh—i.e. those who underwent praxis and

[223] Linking imitation to falling short (*quṣūr*) adds to the evidence of Chapter 1 that in al-Ghazālī's dichotomy, falling short indicates anyone who is not a person of in whom the heart or intellect operate (referred to as possessors of heart in the religious context of the *Iḥyā'*).

received incorporeal knowledge—may know incorporeal realities and the inner meaning of scripture while in this world has major implications for many aspects of the *Iḥyāʾ*. It means that abstract matters such as the Divine Unity and incorporeal matters such as the higher levels of the afterlife can be known to some degree in this world. Thus, those who have undertaken the prerequisites may claim to have the knowledge required to interpret scripture on its major topics, and to have the unveiling required to subsequently examine scripture and understand how the literal and higher purports are related.

E. Treading the Path as Prerequisite for Scriptural Interpretation

It has been shown in this chapter that al-Ghazālī applies the philosophical rule that ethical rectification must precede obtaining knowledge (i.e. the speculative perfection) and it was said earlier that Chapter 4 shows that this is the role of praxis of the *Mīzān*, which is converted into the path of praxis in the *Iḥyāʾ* (while maintaining the doctrines of praxis). It has been claimed that this explains the statement that proper interpretation has a prerequisite of obtaining the divine light. Divine light was said to be the intellect according to the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* and the *Miʿyār*. However, the matter is stated in brief but clear terms that this divine light requires treading the path and that it makes inner meanings of scripture come out.

In Book II, *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, al-Ghazālī states that the realities of the said tenets are unveiled through a divine light (*nūr ilāhiyy*) cast into the chest for those treading the path of the afterlife (*sāliki tarīq al-ākhira*).[224] Showing that this is related, like layers, to the original tenets of belief, he states as follows, 'This leads to apprehending the secrets conveyed by (*tarjamat-hā*) the outward purport (*ẓāhir*) of this statement of the tenets of belief'.[225] Al-Ghazālī makes it clear that *kalām* theology, including that written in the *Iqtiṣād* with detailed but non-demonstrative proofs, is not fit to convey these realities.[226] Rather, he indicates that it serves in

[224] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:94.14–6.
[225] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:99.4–5.
[226] Ibid., 1:97.8–9. Here, al-Ghazālī states that while some may believe that the benefit of *kalām* is to unveil the realities of things, this is not the case.

a therapeutic fashion[227] to tighten the knot of the heart which is belief without true knowledge.[228]

The following section analyses a number of ways al-Ghazālī handles the matter of theology. It confirms that he holds that the afterlife is composed of two levels, one being the corporeal reality referred to by scripture. These passages will indicate that the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage is still the central passage on interpretation. Without assessing that a corporeal resurrection is rationally possible through the intellect, demonstration, or divine light, as he variously terms it (see Chapter 3), al-Ghazālī could not interpret scripture as each of its core topics demands. In some cases it demands preserving the outward purport, in some cases interpreting it, and in some cases demands the third possibility of joining between them when this is not a priori impossible. Whatever the case of the individual text being interpreted, a universal is that apprehending the higher level requires apprehending intellectual realities which itself requires the intellect (as it is variously called) to overcome the attachment to corporeal perception and its pleasures. How this is incorporated into the *Iḥyāʾ* and the sharia was indicated in Chapter 1, Section III.C, 'Limiting the Scope of the Prophetic Mission to the Practical', which included the translation of *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:4.34–5.5. This section showed how notion of the limited scope allowed the insight from Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya* to be incorporated into the *Iḥyāʾ*'s reconciliation of reason and revelation. This passage stated that while the aim of the sharia is the higher pure unity, it is almost entirely devoted to explaining how to tread the path because, after treading the path, one's viewpoint is entirely different. When added to the study of this path, which involves a tension between corporeal and incorporeal pleasures and faculties (see Chapter 3) and the shift from the corporeal to the incorporeal (see Chapter 5), then we see that a prerequisite for interpreting scripture is to at least have access to the higher meanings through the intellect. This only happens via ethical purification through treading the path. This gives strong reason to believe that al-Ghazālī's notion of interpretation requires a) operation of the intellect to perceive the

[227] In Book II, *Faṣl* II, *Masʾala* I, al-Ghazālī states his famous therapeutic view of *kalām*. This section begins at *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:94.22.

[228] If *kalām*'s limited role is joined to establishing, in Section IV of Chapter 4, that the *Iḥyāʾ* uses demonstration in its science of unveiling, the conclusion begins to become clear: that the replacement to *kalām* is not an ineffable light, but that light means abstract, demonstrative science. This should be tempered with the findings from Appendix I of Chapter 4 of this thesis, that the science of speculative unveiling opens up to annihilation in which the realities of things it studies are seen to be only perspectively distinct from the Divine and perspective multiplicity.

higher meaning and b) the ethical prerequisite of purification in order for this operation to occur.

II. Topics of Revelation: Divine Attributes, the Afterlife, and Commands and Prohibitions

This section aims to show how al-Ghazālī has woven the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy into the theoretical topics of theology addressed in the *Iḥyā'*. Here, al-Ghazālī is seen to emphasize that understanding incorporeal (or abstract) matters requires purifying the soul of attachment to corporeal pleasures in order that intellectual perception and pleasures may occur. Because he assigns levels of felicity to these levels of perception, his use of this dichotomy here shows that he is defining what sort of perceptions each person needs—i.e. those of the corporeal perceptive faculties of the masses or the incorporeal intelligibles—and how this relates to how different levels of people understand scripture. In this case, the development put forward by al-Ghazālī has the marks of a creative response to *al-Aḍḥawiyya* which was studied below.[229] Specifically, *al-Aḍḥawiyya* systematically studies interpretation and its application to specific topics aiming for a consistent 'rule' (*qānūn*). Further, its reference to corporeal and incorporeal pleasures of the afterlife, but also to the inability of the masses to understand the latter are specifically said to be due to being engrossed in sense pleasures and the vices which arise thereby. These doctrines were said to draw on specific Avicennian doctrines such as his metaphyicallized ethics related to what Dimitri Gutas terms the metaphysics of the rational soul. Without understanding this uncanny overlap and its implications, al-Ghazālī's comments on hermeneutics in the *Iḥyā'* are largely incomprehensible, as is the two-levelled discourse shown in the following chapter to run through the whole of the *Iḥyā'*.[230] The statements below will indicate al-Ghazālī's application of the rule, specifically that abstract discourse is impossible due to drowning in the corporeal, in a manner consistent with the rule of dream interpretation that the *malakūt* cannot be explained to those asleep in the *mulk*.[231] These will also be seen consistent with the middle way of attempting to preserve the outward, but to analyse scripture variably through assessing it in light of what opens to one of the ultimate truth (*ḥaqīqa*).

[229] The *Iḥyā'* constitutes a response to al-*Aḍḥawiyya* in as much as al-*Aḍḥawiyya* calls for a consistent rule (*qānūn*) of interpretation regarding all topics of scripture. But rather than adopt this, showing linear influence, the *Iḥyā'* responds by a) confidently holding forth for both a corporeal and incorporeal afterlife and b) insisting that a consistency of a rule of interpretation involves not mere identical outcome, but assessing each topic on its own merits. In the case of the afterlife, the result is maintaining both a corporeal and an abstract reality.

[230] The remainder of the present chapter indicates that all speculative and practical topics have these two levels. Chapter 6 indicates that there are two levels running through the virtues, making their inculcation accessible to two levels of itinerant.

[231] This inability is as above not absolute, for al-Ghazālī upholds both a corporeal and incorporeal afterlife was we will see below.

A. The Divine Attributes and the Corporeal–Incorporeal Dichotomy

Al-Ghazālī's discourse by which he discusses the divine attributes invokes the Avicennian body–soul dualism seemingly, but also uses the specific notion from *al-Aḍḥawiyya* that abstract understanding, even in theological and scriptural topics, requires freeing the soul from vice and the corporeal through ethical praxis. Al-Ghazālī develops this notion in a new direction, linking it to such topics as the transcendence–immanence dichotomy, and uses it again to underpin the type of knowledge by which groups achieve or do not achieve felicity with the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy.

At the close of the passage discussing dream interpretation, al-Ghazālī turns to the topic of the divine attributes. He explains the requirement for interpretation, specifying that the form of exegesis needed is the interpretation he is developing, as follows:

T5, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4.23.19–22

> The prophets know that people are asleep and cannot understand the afterlife. For this reason, the Prophet upon him be peace said, {The heart of the believer is between two fingers of the Most Merciful}. This is one of the similitudes not understood except by scholars. As for the ignorant one, his ability does not exceed the outward purport (*ẓāhir al-mithāl*) due to his ignorance of a type of exegesis called interpretation (*taʾwīl*) just as exegesis of the similitudes seen in dreams is called dream interpretation (*taʿbīr*). Thus, he affirms a hand and finger to God, may God be greatly exalted above that!

While it is may be disconcerting that al-Ghazālī explains the inability to understand the afterlife with an example regarding the Divine, this is in line with the assessment in this section that al-Ghazālī sees both topics as underpinned by the same corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy. For this reason, he shifts between examples which in his mind exemplify and defend his insight in scriptural terms. His point here is that scripture requires this figurative interpretation lest one fall into anthropomorphization with respect to God, particularly because one fails to mark the corporeal–incorporeal distinction which we see al-Ghazālī has made to underpin his notion of anthropomorphization and transcendence. He continues, stating the matter as a principle and citing one of his favourite prophetic traditions as follows:

T6, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:23.21–4

> The issue is similar with his words, God bless him and send him peace, {Verily God created Adam according to His form (*ṣūratihi*)}. (The ignorant) only understands of form colour, shape, and exterior appearance. Thereby, they affirm the like of this to God, may God be greatly exalted above that! This is the place where those who have

> slipped regarding the divine attributes have slipped, even regards God's speech, and they made it sounds and letters, and so it is with other attributes, and explaining (each) requires long exposition.

The distinction between sleep in the *mulk* and *malakūt* is drawn on lines of the dichotomy between corporeal and incorporeal perceptions explained in great detail in the Chapter 3 passages, largely from the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*.

While the important theological topic of transcendence and immanence based on the said dichotomy is merely alluded to here, the reader who has read Book XXXV will know it is spelled out more there and that al-Ghazālī is merely hinting here. There, in *Kītāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*, he offers the most direct treatment of the *mulk* and *malakūt* in the *Iḥyā'*, then states that the pen and hand and attributes of God, such as knowledge and power, are not like other pens and hands, but are divine matters (*umūr ilāhiyya*) from the world of the *malakūt*. To be firm in declaring transcendence (*tanzīh*) and not hesitate between it and anthropomorphism, one must declare transcendent God's '...essence, most high, and His attributes above bodies and their attributes' (ibid., 4:245.23–5). He links this to one of his pet traditions as follows, 'If you understand…"Verily God created Adam according to His form" as the outward form apprehended by eyesight, then be an absolute anthropomorphist. …If you understand from it the inner form (*ṣūra bāṭina*) apprehended by insights, not eyesights, then be a pure declarer of transcendence' (ibid., 4:245.26–31). If joined to his dichotomy of corporeal and incorporeal faculties from the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* and how they each cause their own competing pleasures and attachments, the passage indicates that one must remove corporeal pleasures and vice to avoid anthropomorphism and understand God's transcendence.

Later in the 4th Quarter, understanding this transcendence is shown to be crucial to obtain real religion rather than its mere shell. The following passage shows how crucial the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy is for al-Ghazālī's religious revival as follows:

T7, *Iḥyā'*, 4:330.27–34

> Some *kalām* scholars have denied intimacy (*uns*), longing (*shawq*), and love (*ḥubb*) because they think this indicates anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*) and because of their ignorance that beauty perceived by insight (*jamāl al-mudrakāt bi-l-baṣā'ir*) is more perfect (*akmal*) than the beauty of visible objects (*jamāl al-mubṣarāt*) and (their ignorance that) the pleasure

> obtained through gnosis is what dominates the possessors of hearts (*ladhdhat maʿrifatihā aghlab ʿala dhāwiyy-l-qulūb*). Amongst them is Aḥmad ibn Ghālib known as Ghulām al-Khalīl. He rebuked al-Junayd and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Nūrī and (another) group for discussions of love, longing, and passionate love (*ʿishq*). Some even denied the station of good pleasure (*riḍā*), saying, 'It is nothing but patience. As to contentedness it is inconceivable (*ghayr mutaṣawwar*).' All of this is the speech of one who is deficient (*nāqiṣ*) and inadequate (*qāṣir*), having achieved no awareness of the stations of religion except for (their) shells (*qushūr*). Thus, he thought nothing exists but the shell, because the sensibilia (*maḥsūsāt*) and all that enters into imagination (is) in the way of religion pure shell. Beyond it is the kernel which is sought. So, one who does not reach of the walnut except to its shell deems that the walnut is completely wood. Thus, it necessarily becomes impossible for him to remove the oil. He is excused, but his excuse is not acceptable.

In the context of the *Iḥyāʾ*, this passage refers back tersely to competition between corporeal faculties studied in Chapter 3. The 'possessors of hearts' indicates those who have removed attachment to the corporeal and whose faculties of incorporeal apprehension function. In Chapter 3, *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* is seen to apply this similarly to the passage cited earlier in this section to knowledge of and love for God's form and beauty. Thus, this passage expounds the profound implications implicit in *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* which is that becoming characterized by the kernel of the religious stations (and therefore becoming a religious scholar) requires the transformation from corporeal attachments and apprehensions and obtaining incorporeal pleasure and apprehensions. While the discussion revolves around love, what is being said is that the pleasure which is associated with religion is the pleasure coming from apprehensions of the incorporeal, not what is apprehended by corporeal faculties, whether by the masses or *kalām* scholars.

The ostensive topic, love of God, is effectively said to be impossible without the abstract, incorporeal knowledge. The same point was made in the previous passage regarding knowledge of God's transcendence which was the root of the religious station of reliance. Also, we may remember from earlier in the chapter that traversing the passes laid out in the

path of the sharia was said to allow the theoretical topic of God's unity to be seen from a drastically different vantage point, i.e. after removing corporeal attachments. Through the examples provided in this section, one sees al-Ghazālī drawing on the same dichotomy to make different points, indicating that for al-Ghazālī the dichotomy is universal (or a cosmological principle) which he is applying in different realms to underpin distinctions fundamental to the *Iḥyāʾ*'s path of the afterlife such as a choice between the here-below and afterlife or between God and the world.[232] Though al-Ghazālī shifts theological discussions of the attributes towards topics which are part of his higher theology or reserved syllabus (e.g. the divine pen and Adam being on God's form), the previous two passages indicate that rising above corporeal perceptions is the starting point for having true knowledge of God (even if it is not the endpoint) and, as shown in Chapter 3, true knowledge is the cause of incorporeal pleasure. His highest practical station in the *Iḥyāʾ*, love, is thus predicated on this abstract knowledge (which was itself clearly spelled out in the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* passages cited in Chapter 3). This itself requires turning from love of the corporeal to the incorporeal based on the arguments of intellectual pleasure rehearsed in Chapter 1. While the Book XXXI passage on dream interpretation hinted at the need to awake from the corporeal to the incorporeal to avoid anthropomorphism, these passages go further and link his notions of inner (scriptural literalism and the resultant anthropomorphism) and outer theology to his notions of the corporeal and incorporeal. One cannot rise up to incorporeal intellect without the practical aspect of purifying oneself through the path of praxis from domination by corporeal attachments.

When al-Ghazālī prohibits interpretation regarding the divine attributes, he invokes authority, but offers an argument based again on the dichotomy. Martin Whittingham's study of *Iḥyāʾ*, Book II (*Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*), stated that George Makdisi had brought attention to al-Ghazālī's approval of the Ḥanbalī prohibition, assessing that this was on practical grounds. Here in the 4th Quarter, we see that the prohibition is indeed for those not able to engage with interpretation, but we see that the reason is similar again to the line of reasoning from *al-Aḍḥawiyya*.

In this passage, al-Ghazālī first recites his understanding of the early fathers (*salaf*): that general belief in apparent meanings (*ẓawāhir*) was advised *along with* the general negation

[232] Note that the path is said in the introduction to the *Kīmiyā-yi* to depend on knowledge of four matters nearly overlapping with these: the self and God and the here-below and afterlife (see *Kīmiyā-yi*, 1:11–115).

of anthropomorphism (*tashbīḥ*). This last element is not found in Avicenna's discussion in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* of scripture which instead of citing early fathers merely refers to scripture itself which is said to contain general statements regarding transcendence, but does not explain how to join between these and the countless anthropomorphic references to body parts and directions.[233] Al-Ghazālī explains the prohibition of interpretation (*ta'wīl*) in his own terms as follows: 'They forbade interpretation because there is great danger in investigating the attributes. Its passes are difficult and its pathways treacherous. Intellects fall short (*qāṣira*) of apprehending the majesty of God, most high. God's guidance (*hidāya*) through the light of certitude (*yaqīn*) is veiled from hearts due to their original formation being love of the here-below' (ibid., 4:172.30–2). This allusion to the original formation (*fiṭra*) is expounded in the passage cited in Chapter 3, Section IV explaining that because the faculty of the sense of touch develops first in the soul, the soul after birth is initially attached to corporeal pleasures. The allusion to the intellect falling short and demonstrative certainty being veiled is due to the original state man is born in. It is thus tantamount to stating that those who have not undergone ethical praxis are limited in the corporeal and their intellects are inoperable. Al-Ghazālī has replaced reference to the corporeal with the more scriptural here-below, but the notion from Chapter 1 (and expanded in Chapter 4) still stands that attachments to corporeal pleasures and vice render the intellect inoperable. In other parts of the *Iḥyā'* where al-Ghazālī explains further part of his path, the prohibition to investigation does not stand for those capable of speculative inquiry and use of the intellect.[234] Thus, the *Iḥyā'* applies the dichotomy to the treatment of theological topics, but does so aiming to negotiate between the needs and limitations of the masses, who might lose salvation if their belief unravels into doubt, and those capable of speculative inquiry, who might advance to true knowledge and hence felicity.

This resembles a reading which may be derived from a much later *Iljām* passage where he says that true understanding of scripture requires demonstrative proof, understanding the manner in which scripture is a proof (*wajh al-dalāla*), and understanding the premises upon which one's arguments rest—including furthest matters of the study of the intelligibles—such that one properly move from imitation to knowledge.

[233] If al-Ghazālī is indeed adopting a framework or methodology influenced by his reading of *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, this added important detail shows him altering the individual findings of Avicenna. Al-Ghazālī would likely consider these 'corrections' as coming from his superiour knowledge of theology.

[234] In at least two places in the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī offers two paths, one for those capable of contemplation and one for those not. (See discussion of *Iḥyā'*, Book XXII, Chapter 11, 'The Detailed Path', and Book XXXIX discussed in Chapter 5 which also shows that contemplation is a synonym for speculative inquiry.)

This has the force of an implicit statement that *kalam*, as al-Ghazālī inherited it, existed in a merely dialectic form that would not produce true knowledge. Later in the same *faṣl*, he classifies levels of belief, including strict demonstration, imitation, and *kalām* whose proofs he describes as 'Delusive imaginal *kalām* proofs built on (mere) admitted (*musallamāt*) matters believed due to being famous amongst great scholars, the disgrace involved in denying them, and repelling people from opening up debate of them'.[235] So, al-Ghazālī had no confidence that it could remove from imitation (or adhering to literal interpretations) and take one to knowledge (and interpretation (*taʾwīl*)). Thus, his motivation for not directing people towards speculative inquiry (*naẓar*) and *kalām* alike was not that reason itself was incapable of producing knowledge, but that *kalām* itself would encourage one to leave one's chair, and engage in interpretation and proofs, but never to make it safely to the next chair: demonstrative knowledge. Chapter 4 studies the critiques of the modes of *kalām* proofs presented in the *Miʿyār al-ʿilm*, al-Ghazālī concluding that certain of them are not universally valid, and thus do not produce conclusive, demonstrative knowledge. While he discusses his attempts to improve *kalām* proofs in the introduction to *al-Iqtiṣād*, there simply was no conclusive and demonstrative *kalām* at his time, according to his assessment. This is one sense in which his revival was to make a science of the afterlife: one capable of producing timeless, incorporeal knowledge leading to knowledge of scripture and eternal felicity in the afterlife. We may remember that al-Ghazālī termed both *kalām* and fiqh sciences of the here-below, a claim that makes sense on his terms, whether or not one agrees with it.

[235] See *Iljām* (in *Majmūʿat rasāʾil*), 351.18–19.

B. The Afterlife: Corporeal and Incorporeal Elements

The afterlife is the second core scriptural topic to which al-Ghazālī applies his hermeneutic. In this case, he finds a different manner of joining between the apparent and inner meaning than he does regarding the divine attributes. The passages cited in this section refer to bodily and spiritual pleasures, but they imply the related notions of resurrection of the body and soul. Alexander Treiger has argued that al-Ghazālī denies bodily resurrection.[236] To study the discourse of the *Iḥyā'*, the focus of this chapter, requires examining not only the hermeneutic itself, but also the resultant two levels as applied to various topics, and how the structure and its application make the structure of the *Iḥyā'* possible. This section cites passages in which al-Ghazālī affirms both forms of pleasure, referring to their existence in two separate levels in paradise. As there is no text in the *Iḥyā'* which denies bodily resurrection, our analysis of al-Ghazālī's statements in scriptural interpretation in *Kītāb Qawā'id al-'aqā'id* challenges Treiger's argument that al-Ghazālī adopts the 'symbolist position' in which scriptural depictions of the afterlife are mere or 'dissimilar symbols'. The findings of this section demonstrate al-Ghazālī's general approach to theoretical topics in the *Tahāfut* and *Iḥyā'* is to aim to join between reason and revelation through joining between the apparent and inner meaning and that this is accomplished variably depending on the topic. (Thus, he accomplishes it one way for the attributes and another for the afterlife.)

Alexander Treiger has aimed to show that the *Tahāfut* is a pseudo-refutation through highlighting two positions rejected in the *Tahāfut* but adopted in later works, including the *Iḥyā'*.[237] The second position concerns us in Chapter 1 and here, because it is a claim that al-

[236] Treiger concludes that al-Ghazālī holds merely a corporeal afterlife, but he does not seem to engage with how to understand statements in the *Iḥyā'* and *Kīmiyā-yi* (and even the *Tahāfut*) which Chapter 1 showed to refer to a dualist resurrection on the grounds that resurrection of the body does not entail impossibility.

[237] Regarding Chapter 5 of Treiger's invaluable contribution, it makes the claim that the *Tahāfut* is a pseudo-refutation of Avicenna because al-Ghazālī later adopts positions apparently refuted in it. To this end, the first five pages offer one example of a position denied in the *Tahāfut* and adopted in later Ghazālīan works. However, the notion that the *Tahāfut* is not a straight-forward refutation of Avicenna was studied across many parts of the *Tahāfut* by Jules Janssens in 2001. (See his, 'Al-Ghazzālī's *Tahāfut*: Is it Really Rejection of Ibn Sina's Philosophy?', 1–17.) Regarding the much stronger claim that al-Ghazālī denies physical resurrection, the argument for it does invoke a text in which al-Ghazālī himself denies physical resurrection and the discussion fails to discuss passages in the *Iḥyā'* and *Kīmīyā-yi* where al-Ghazālī proposes joining between pleasures of the body and soul in the afterlife. It partially revolves around the claim that al-Ghazālī believes that the all prophetic symbols are 'dissimilar', meaning the outward purport is simply false. Above, this thesis addressed Treiger's claim by showing that al-Ghazālī says the opposite: in many cases they not false. Because there is a not a general argument based on his hermeneutic, one must look at how he treats individual topics. As stated, in the case of resurrection, he states very clearly in the *Tahāfut* that both are possible and in the *Iḥyā'*, as noted, he upholds both bodily and spiritual outcomes in the afterlife. It is logically possible that al-Ghazālī ultimately believes that what appears physical, even to the person experiencing it, is actually imaginal, but without textual proof, this remains a mere hypothesis which contradicts the outward purport of his statements in the two said works.

Ghazālī endorses a specifically symbolist position regarding the afterlife, a position that Treiger indicates entails the denial of bodily resurrection. This position is also relevant more widely to this chapter because his argument centres around the interpretation of scripture.

The examination of the hermeneutic itself is part of Treiger's argument, but these arguments must stand in the face of explicit statements referring to the occurrence of bodily pleasures, as such. In other words, he does not merely list physical occurrences, he refers to them in terms of corporeal versus incorporeal. The examination of the hermeneutic under way in this chapter has so far cited *Iḥyāʾ*, Book II, stating that the outward descriptions of the afterlife in the Koran entail no impossibility (*muḥāl*). This is important because even though al-Ghazālī's notion of receiving divine light and then interpreting scripture seems to distance him from Ashʿarī forms of interpretation, the method in the *Qawāʿid* states that one then assesses the relation between one's unveiling and scripture. Here we have seen al-Ghazālī bring back in the Ashʿarī attempt to preserve the outward unless there is a conclusive proof that this is impossible. As shown in Chapter 1, the *Tahāfut* already begins to examine how literal, figurative, and other positions might actively be joined to scripture.[238] The present chapter indicates what better matches the passages from across the *Iḥyāʾ*: examining how one's unveiling matches scripture and attempting to join between the apparent and inner meaning produces different results in different topics. Regarding the attributes, the previous section's denial of anthropomorphism indicates the apparent meaning is unacceptable (and hence false), but regarding eschatology, it is possible to claim that both outward purport and inner meaning are true.[239]

In the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī refers to a dualist resurrection immediately after the *Iḥyāʾ* passage on dream interpretation, that passage in fact being a preamble to al-Ghazālī's discussion of ranks in the afterlife and how they may be referred to. In his discussion of those who will be punished, he states as follows: 'With every deficiency, there are two fires: the fire of separation from the perfection (*kamāl*) lost through deficiency and the fire of hell (*jahannam*) as it is described in the Koran' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 4:26.15). Thereafter, he explains the duration of

[238] The method of obtaining divine light (*nūr ilāhiyy*, one of the synonyms shown in Chapter 1 to refer to intellect and demonstration and insight) before then turning to scripture, to see what may be joined to one's vision and what must be interpreted figuratively, matches al-Ghazālī's own practice. This may be seen in that undergoing praxis is represented in his *Mīzān* and possibly *Iḥyāʾ*, learning logic is said to be part of gaining divine light in his *Miʿyār*, and examining whether individual philosophical positions are demonstrative is represented in the *Tahāfut*.
[239] Thus, Treiger is right that determining al-Ghazālī's position on the afterlife and his hermeneutics are related arguments.

remaining in the hell-fire, in terms resembling those of Avicenna in his several accounts of punishment or misery in the afterlife. However, he explicitly cites scriptural accounts of what will occur and be said, offering extensive interpretation of them using his notions such as the two levels studied in this thesis as the basis of his discussion of salvation and felicity: belief through imitation and belief through true knowledge, the latter causing one to become one of those brought nigh.[240] Possible doubts that al-Ghazālī is merely giving lip-service to a conservative credal tenet may be quelled by noting that a) this passage is not stated in the context of rehearsing creedal points, such as found in Book II which presents several creeds, and b) the two modes of the afterlife are compatible with his known philosophical positions such as the soul surviving bodily death and his explicit affirmation of a dualist resurrection in the *Tahāfut*.

While subsequent passages will show al-Ghazālī's disdain for corporeal pleasures and even fear of corporeal pains in the afterlife, yet his attitude resembles his attitude expressed towards imitation: many are not capable of the higher level, so his path of praxis accounts for both imitators and believers in general who do not obtain the incorporeal knowledge and pleasures. The careful study of imitation in Chapter 4 of the present thesis in fact shows that it is linked to salvation through corporeal pleasure in the afterlife, so imitation and corporeal pleasure in fact share in a single rank. Without generating these two levels, he would not be an inheritor of the prophets, a role shown to be built on his notion of two levels of discourse studied in Section II.C of this chapter.

A second, more detailed passage found in *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* offers yet clearer evidence regarding corporeal resurrection. This important passage occurs at the end of a technical *bayān* studied in Chapter 3, Section III. The *bayān* itself defines pleasure following Avicenna: that it is for a human faculty of apprehension to perceive sense-data suitable to that faculty, such as music, opposed to a nearly lightning crash. The *bayān* lists the different types of pleasures occurring through each faculty, rehearses Avicennian arguments regarding why intellectual pleasures are superior yet unknown to most people, and, in conclusion, al-Ghazālī tells the reader that he has unveiled the criterion for judging the superiority of the different types of pleasure.[241] This includes contrasting the intellect (and its synonyms) with sense pleasures including, but not limited to, the five senses. As shown in Chapter 3, Section III, al-

[240] *Iḥyāʾ*, 426.7–30.24.
[241] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:300.26–7.

Ghazālī Al-Ghazālī next shifts from this technical discussion to citing a maxim and then poetry attributed to the Sufi Rābiʿa in which she effectively declares her sincere love of God through explaining that her worship is not due to fear of the hellfire and in which she advances that there are two distinct modes of love for the divine; the second type of love is the raising of the veil. Al-Ghazālī links this second love to the pleasure (*ladhdha*) of beholding the beauty of Lordship (*jamāl al-rubūbiyya*) and cites the prophetic saying, familiar from the *Tahāfut* and discussions in Chapter 1, which refers to the higher pleasure by stating that God has prepared what has not occurred to the heart of man for his righteous servants. This immediate shift has the force of claiming that the superiority of the pleasure of knowing God over and beyond love of sensibles (*ḥubb al-maḥsūsāt*) with the conclusions from the preceding discussion of the superiority of intellectual pleasures over sense pleasures.[242] He makes the link most clear as follows: 'They (i.e. the poets he quotes) did not mean anything by this except preference of the pleasure of the heart (*qalb*) in knowing (*maʿrifa*) God, most high, over the pleasure of food, drink, and intercourse. This is because paradise (*janna*) is the source of the enjoyment of the senses (*maʿdan tamattuʿ al-ḥawāss*). As to the heart, its pleasure is only in the encounter (*liqāʾ*) with God, most high'.[243] This resembles the *Mīzān* passage key to Treiger's argument,[244] but here disdain is joined with very clear affirmation of bodily pleasures. If adjoined with the preceding passage, these are clear statements regarding both pains and pleasures in Janna and Jahannam, respectively, and specifically stating that the pains are as the Koran describes them. This indicates that al-Ghazālī joins between scriptural corporeal afterlife and the philosophical notion of pains and pleasures of the soul. This further indicates that his hermeneutic aims to find agreement between the apparent and inner meanings after exploring what the intellect affirms or holds possible and then joining it with scripture or figuratively interpreting if necessary.

Further affirmation of the two ontological levels of afterlife and their two ranks is found near the end of the 4th Quarter. In Book XXXVII, al-Ghazālī examines intentions which are said to underly the stations, dividing between what is effectively those seeking corporeal pleasures in Janna and those seeking to worship God because He deserves worship, for which the reward is beholding His countenance. Fear and hope are said to be valid

[242] Ibid., 4:303.5–6. This is the position the *Mīzān* attributed to the masses of not understanding anything more than sensibles.
[243] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:303.5–6.
[244] Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge*, p. 87.

intentions for stations because they are inclinations (*mayl*) regarding what is in the afterlife, even if they are low in relation to worshipping God for God's sake. This is because the pleasures sought are of the type (*jins*) of those of the here-below and the strongest of motivations are the groin and stomach, and the place their desire is fulfilled is Janna. Thus, the one working for Janna is working for their groin and stomach and is a bad worker whose rank is that of the fools (*balh*), most of those of Janna being (such) fools. The other side of the equation is described as follows: 'As for the worship of the possessors of hearts (read: intellects or insight), it does not exceed the invocation and contemplation of God, most high, out of love for His beauty and majesty and other works—or worship as in the first half of the *Iḥyā'*—are merely for strengthening and support. They are of a higher rank than to even turn to the objects of intercourse or food in Janna, because they do not intend (to obtain) them (through their worship)'.[245] While al-Ghazālī is dismissive of corporeal pleasures in the afterlife as it is described by scripture, he nonetheless affirms corporeal pleasures again and even incorporates them as a level in his virtues and hence into one of the most important aspects of the structure of the *Iḥyā'*. Upholding the corporeal and incorporeal pleasures in the afterlife is contiguous with the *Tahāfut* position that was concerned with using a hermeneutic to join between reason and revelation. Yes, al-Ghazālī seems to imbibe certain what we may term rational emotions from the *falāsifa*, such as a disdain for corporeal pleasures. But this is concordant with his role as a snake-handler and as one who advocates upholding reason and revelation, as stated most vividly classification passage studied in Chapter I, Section IV, and more concordant than a pure crypto-philosopher. The following section elucidates the role of the inheritor of the prophets, a role the context indicates is formulated in opposition to Avicenna.

C. Rituals, Divine Commands, and Prohibitions: Inner and Outer Aspects and the Hermeneutic of the Inheritors

The third core scriptural topic shown to display two parallel levels is divine injunctions, including revealed rituals. In the case of this third topic, it manifests in two different manners in the *Iḥyā'*. From one perspective, the two ontological levels as pertains to this topic are the act itself, which is deemed outer and corporeal in as much as it is an act of the body. The corresponding inner element is the character state and or knowledge and meaning produced

[245] *Iḥyā'*, 4:363.25–7.

by correctly performing the act. The second manner in which the two levels manifest regarding this third topic regards the knowledge itself of these practical matters. One may know them at the outward level of imitation or the inward level of true knowledge of meanings and the healing properties inherent in these revealed acts and apprehended by the insight of true scholars. Though he never states as much, the inner knowledge he sets out is almost surely the science of praxis which explains the inner effect and workings on the soul of practicing a given act, such as an act of worship. The inheritor of the prophets is the one who has the insight which allows understanding the inner meanings inherent in the outward shell. In an autobiographical allusion, al-Ghazālī ties his notion of the inheritor specifically to this ability to interpret all, or nearly all, of scripture. The context indicates that the nature of the interpretative ability of the inheritor is just this ability to understand the inner and how it relates to the outer shell and outer meaning. Al-Ghazālī offers something of a hermeneutic in several places and this seems to be based on what we may term a philosophy of prophetic acts: because prophets have obtained insight, the attributes of their heart and acts of their bodies are not willy-nilly. Rather, their limbs operate under their control and thus express the secrets and meanings to prophecy gives them epistemological access.

1. The inner and outer aspects of the sharia

Chapter 1, Section V.C spoke of scriptural anthropomorphism, finding the theoretical aspect of the sharia had an inner and outer aspect. Similarly, we presently address the relation of the inner and outer aspects of the practical side of the sharia. The precocious *Mīzān* passage cited in Chapter 1 already alludes to insight which is a condition of being an inheritor of the prophets and which allows sharia acts to be individualized according to how acts effect attributes of the heart. That passage as early as the *Mīzān* refers to attributes of the heart being the scales in which acts are measured, giving a hermeneutic principle for translating, as it were, between the layers of outer, bodily acts and inner attributes of the heart. However, it is only in the *Iḥyā'* in which two levels of imitation and an inner level linked to intellect are explained as follows:

T8, *Iḥyā'*, 1:78.7–15

> And another (sign of the scholars of the afterlife) is that, regarding whatever science they know, they depend on their own insight and perception through the purity of their heart, not on paper, books, nor blind imitation (*taqlīd*) of that which they hear (i.e. what is conveyed to

> them via rote transmission). The only one who is to be imitated is the legislator (*ṣāhib al-sharʿ*), upon him be the blessings and peace of God, in what he commanded or said. The companions, God be well pleased with them, only follow through imitation (*yuqallid*) in as much as their act (*fiʿl*) indicates that they heard it from the messenger of God, God bless him and send him peace. Then (regarding the scholar of the afterlife), if they blindly imitate the representative of the sharia, God bless him and send him peace, through receiving (*talaqqī*) and accepting his statements and acts, they should be avid to understand its secrets. This is because the blind imitator only performs acts because the representative of the sharia, God bless him and send him peace, performed that act and his act must be due to a secret it contains. Thus, (the scholar of the afterlife) should search intensely for the secrets of (revealed) acts and statements (*al-aʿmāl wa-l-aqwāl*). For if one suffices with memorizing what he said he is a (mere) container of knowledge rather than a scholar. For this reason, it is said that such and such a person is one of the containers of knowledge, not (being properly) called a scholar (*ʿālim*) as his matter is (limited to) memorizing without being aware of the ruling or the secrets (of an act or statement). (On the other hand,) whoever's heart has achieved unveiling and has received the light of guidance has himself become followed and blindly imitated. Thus, he should not blindly follow others.

This passage indicates that acts themselves are knowable at two levels of knowledge. Unveiling, light, and guidance were shown in Chapter 3 to be synonyms for intellect. This passage thus indicates that if the act is performed without understanding its inner dimension, it is imitative, in the same sense the *Tahāfut* and *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* referred to engaging with the sharia via imitation. This passage does not explain what is meant by the secrets, but several other passages cited presently confirm that the notion that revealed works contain properties which heal the soul, i.e. notion expressed in the *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* classification passage studied in Chapter 1, Section IV, .[246]

2. Insight and the autobiographical allusion to the role of inheritor of the prophets

It is the inheritor of the prophets who may negotiate and interpret between these two layers: outer imitation and inner, secret meanings. This structure of interpretation of acts resembles the notion of interpretation of scripture whereby one determines the inner reality of a text through moving from the concrete similitude to the inner meaning for which the similitude

[246] Cf., *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:31.19–33 and the *Iḥyāʾ* passages below explaining the inheritor of the prophets. It is also shown that such commands and prohibitions aim at the mean, while non-scholars understand they aim at removing desires completely.

was coined through the strength of the prophetic psychological faculties (see Chapter 1). Al-Ghazālī discusses a prophetic tradition at length, first addressing the authenticity of the text itself, implicitly fortifying the premise that it is indeed a revealed text. In this textual prophetic tradition, it is reported that the Prophet Muhammad would inveterately follow a certain pattern with each hand when clipping his fingernails. Al-Ghazālī indicates that the outer aspect of this prophetic practice was revealed in such a way that only the light of prophecy could determine it. He says, 'And when I reflected (*ta'ammaltu*) on this, the meaning (*al-ma'nā*) occurred to me which indicates that the transmitted words (*riwāya*) are valid (*saḥīḥa*) because the likes of this meaning are not unveiled initially (*ibtidā'an*) except through the light of prophecy. As for the scholar possessing insight (*'ālim dhū baṣīra*), the utmost (he can reach) is to derive it (*yastanbituhu*; secondarily) from intelligence (*al-'aql*) after the action has been transmitted (*naql al-fi'l*) to him' (*Iḥyā'*, 1:140.22–3). Al-Ghazālī offers his interpretation involving the perfection of the shape of the circle, then refers to the revelation process as follows:

T9, *Iḥyā'*, 1:141.12–20

> The fine-points regarding the (said) order are unveiled through the light of prophethood in a single instant. It is only for us that a long tiring (effort is required). Further, were we asked about this order from the very beginning, it is likely that it would not occur to us. But if his act and its order are mentioned to us, it might be that—through what he, God bless him and send him peace, beheld and by witnessing the ruling and his alerting us to a meaning—it is made easy for us to derive the meaning.

Al-Ghazālī then offers the most important autobiographical allusion in the *Iḥyā'* to his being of the rank of the scholars who are heirs of the prophets as follows:

T10, *Iḥyā'*, 1:141.31–142.6

> This report was transmitted from amongst the sound prophetic narrations, which is befitting (to its meaning which is itself true). And were I to exhaust the fine-points observed in his motions, upon him be God's blessings and peace, it would be a long affair. Thus, make analogy by what you have heard for what you have not heard.
>
> Know that a scholar (*'ālim*) is not an inheritor of the Prophet, God bless him and send him peace, unless he is aware of all the meanings of the sharia such that there is only a single rank (*daraja*) between him and the Prophet, God bless him and send him peace, which is the rank of prophethood (*nubuwwa*). It is the rank which distinguishes the inheritor from the inherited: the one who is inherited from is the one who obtained wealth himself, busied himself producing it, and proved capable of this. The inheritor neither obtained it nor conquered wealth,

> but rather it was transferred to him and transmitted from (the inherited) to him after being obtained by (the one inherited from). So, the likes (*amthāl*) of these meanings—in spite of their easiness compared to the (ultimate) profundities (*aghwār*) and secrets (*asrār*)—cannot be independently and originally apprehended except by the prophets. And only those scholars that are inheritors of the prophets, upon them be peace, can independently derive these meanings transmitted to them after being alerted to them by the prophets.

The conditions of this inheritor are the ability to interpret all of scripture—presumably ruling out the likes of Avicenna—and require knowing the secrets of worship—ruling out the scholars of fiqh and *kalām* as well according to the *Iḥyā'*.[247] This passage confirms many of the same meanings in the long *Mīzān* passage, but includes more of what we may call a philosophy of prophetic acts. The crucial condition is that of interpretation, confirming the need to determine how to handle scripture regarding various topics and to affirm two levels of the corporeal and incorporeal or to know where the outward purport must be interpreted figuratively. His notion of interpretation is built on a notion of corporeal similitudes understood by the incorporeal intellect and insight. He clearly claims for himself this insight as well and all that it entails of having overcome his attachment to the incorporeal pleasures.

3. The basis of the hermeneutic: A philosophy of prophetic acts

In a single passage, al-Ghazālī provides the hermeneutic tool justifying the claim that acts have a meaning: they emanate from an integral (and healthy) psyche of a prophet.[248] In other words, if we claim that a prophet's psychological faculties are strong, healthy and integral, this underpins the argument that their acts reflect a meaning in their mind and their limbs do not move randomly or in a disorderly fashion disconnected from their mind. Later chapters show that after one has undergone ethical purification, a natural downward flow of the psyche results, in which knowledge emanates states onto the lower locus of the heart, and states of the heart emanate as acts onto the lower locus of the limbs. The inherent but implicit meaning of revealed acts is explained as follows:

T11, *Iḥyā'*, 1:141.15–22

> Do not deem that any movement in his acts, God bless him and send

[247] This is arguably the central thesis of Kenneth Garden's monograph which claims the revival of two religious sciences, praxis and unveiling, was at the expense of the reigning scholars. (See Garden, *The First Islamic Reviver*, esp.y Part II, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*.)
[248] This is highly related to what al-Ghazālī calls the watercourses of certitude (*majārī al-yaqīn*) summarised in Chapter 4.

him peace, lack measure, rule, and order. Rather, in all the voluntary actions (*umūr ikhtiyāriyya*) we mentioned, in which the agent (*fāʿil*) falls between two or more (choices), (that agent does) not advance towards one in particular randomly, but rather through a meaning entailing (that they) proceed and choose one over the other. This is because neglectfully giving free reign accords with the natural disposition of pack animals, while control over motions through the weighing pans (*mawāzin*) of meanings accords with the natural disposition of the friends of God, most high. The closer a person's motions and inner impulses (*khaṭṭarāt*) are to control, and the further they are from carelessness and being left ungoverned, the closer is that person's rank to that of the prophets and saints and the more manifest (*aẓhar*) is their closeness to God, mighty and majestic. This is because the one who is close to the Prophet (Muhammad), on him peace and blessings, is close to God, mighty and majestic. … ... Those who are close to God must be close (to each other) because those one who are is close are close (to each other)[249] in relation to those who are not to one is (him or herself) close. So, we take refuge in God from our the reigns of actions and stillnesses being in the hands of Satan through the intermediary of caprice (*hawā*).

Voluntary acts are governed by the intellect in those who are perfected. The argument appears to be that the Prophet Muhammad is the most perfected and thus his actions all possess a measure, order, or rule detectable by those who understand through insight. Their acts do not proceed willy-nilly as do the acts of pack animals. Rather, their acts flow from the intellect which renders them ordered in a manner which, in the example of even clipping the fingernails, gives them a meaning which other believers should follow or imitate as a revealed act.

4. Applying the hermeneutic: Interpreting acts

In a number of passages studied presently, al-Ghazālī refers to an inner meaning of prophetic acts and sharia injunctions which are perceptible to those possessing insight. This section will

[249] Alternatively, this phrase may be translated as or 'relatives or relatives are relatives'.

show the primary meaning to be that certain principles, recognizable from the science of praxis, are implicit in these acts. Though al-Ghazālī is characteristically terse and never spells out that 'the inner secrets and healing properties are based on the science of praxis', the reason for this is relatively safely believed to be motivated at least in part by his concern shown in the *Munqidh* to both distance himself from *falsafa* and yet to try to reclaim ethics as having been originally taken from the prophets.[250] As seen in Chapter 1, a) in the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī advised following the sharia via imitation to bring about the requisite purification of praxis and, b) in the *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, sharia associated with imitation was the lower parallel level of a higher science of praxis, which was one of the two intellectual sciences of the afterlife. The passages below provide further evidence that these two levels are consciously developed by al-Ghazālī. They indicate how he views the relation between acts and the science of states (or praxis), and that they correspond to the two levels of corporeal–incorporeal and the related imitation–demonstration dichotomy.

The notion that sharia injunctions may be both understood and practically benefitted from at two levels is set out most clearly in the *Iḥyāʾ* as follows:

T12, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:63.22–4

> Know that if you consider (*taʾammalta*; what we have mentioned) with the eye of reflection (*iʿtibār*) your insight (*baṣīratuka*) will have opened. The ailments of hearts and their diseases and cures will have been unveiled by the light of (true) knowledge and certainty (*yaqīn*). If you prove unable, you should nonetheless not miss out on assent and belief (*taṣdīq wa-īmān*) by way of transmission and blind following (*taqlīd*), (which is) for those for whom blind following is appropriate. This is because belief (*īmān*) has a rank (*daraja*), just as knowledge has a rank which occurs after belief and is beyond it (*warāʾahu*). God, exalted is He, said, {God raises those amongst you who believe and those who are given knowledge (are risen) ranks} (Koran 58:11). So, whoever assents to resisting desires being the path to God, glorious and mighty, without being aware of its cause and secret, is of those who believe. But, if he is aware of what we mentioned of its profound depths (*aghwārih*) and the secrets of desires, then he is of those given knowledge.

This passage indicates that the path to purifying the heart is opposing base desires, and that the knowledge that opposing the desires is the path to purifying the heart may be had at two levels. Al-Ghazālī invokes scripture as further evidence, though on his own standards, scripture itself provides only imitative knowledge. Characteristically, al-Ghazālī circulates a

[250] The *Munqidh*'s arguments for the prophetic origins of philosophical ethics are studied in Taneli Kukkonen, 'Al-Ghazālī on the Origins of Ethics', *Numen* 63 (2016): 271–98.

number of terms for the two levels, this exemplifying the coining of terms the present chapter argues is a conscious, developed practice of al-Ghazālī.

The T12 originates in the second book of the 3rd Quarter, Book XXII. It and Book XXI are something of a theoretical preface to the 2nd Half of the *Iḥyā'*, and are largely theoretical. As such, Book XXIII is the first largely practical book, and the passage below is drawn from its first practice, which is thus the first practice presented in the 2nd Half of the Iḥyā' after their theoretical prefaces. Al-Ghazālī lays out how the two layers he claims exist are actually present, and demonstrates his own manner for smoothing the connections between the two levels and sources in what follows:

T13, *Iḥyā'*, 3:81.22–30

> The messenger of God, God bless him and send him peace, said, {Struggle against yourselves through hunger and thirst, for the reward lies therein}. You might say, 'From where does this great virtue of hunger come? What is the cause for this, as there is nothing in it but pain for the stomach and enduring harm?' If the matter were thus, reward should be great for every harm a human being undergoes such as hitting or cutting oneself, and eating unpleasant things, and whatever else resembles this. Know that these are like the words of one who drinks a cure and benefits thereby and thus believes that its benefit is due to the bitterness and unpleasantness of the medicine. He then begins to ingest everything unpleasant in taste, which is a mistake. Rather, its benefit lies in a special property (*khāṣṣa*) of the medicine, not in its being bitter. None understands this special property but a physician. Likewise, none understands the cause (*ʿilla*) of the benefit of hunger except scholars given to critical examination (*samāsirat al-ʿulamā'*). But one who undergoes hunger due to (mere) belief (*muṣaddiqan*) in what has come in the sharia of praise of hunger benefits thereby even if he does not know the cause of the benefit. Similarly, one who drinks a medicine benefits even if one doesn't know the cause (*wajh*) of its being beneficial. However, we will explain that (cause), in case you to were to desire to ascend (*tartaqī*) above the rank (*daraja*) of belief (*īmān*) to the rank of knowledge. He, most high, has said, {God raises those of you who believe, and those who are given knowledge, whole ranks}.

The imitator does not need to know the principles of praxis, the medicine of the heart, nor the striking interpretation by which al-Ghazālī reconciles his two sources, reason and revelation. In spite of the imitator not requiring this, al-Ghazālī informs them how he arrives at two levels: outward act via imitation and inward secrets of perceiving how the act effects a cure based on true knowledge.

From another point of view, one may remember this chapter's study of al-Ghazālī's general statements from Book XXXI that the words of the prophets come from the incorporeal world, but are necessarily coined in corporeal similitudes. As such, these two levels of praxis are present in scripture, whether or not al-Ghazālī brings them out. In line with the position that scripture contains two levels, he closes the present chapter on the benefits of hunger, and restates the method. He ties it in with imitation, as follows, 'Through understanding the details of these benefits (of hunger), one apprehends the meanings (*maʿānī*) of those reports (*akhbār*) with knowledge (*ʿilm*) and insight (*baṣīra*). If you do not know this but you believe in the virtue of hunger, you have the rank of the imitator (*muqallid*) in belief (*īmān*)'.[251] This expresses in the clearest of terms that scripture related to praxis may be potentially understood at the levels of imitation and true knowledge or insight.

Al-Ghazālī delineates how the mean, historically known as the Aristotelian mean, is the hidden aim behind the sharia injunctions. In what follows, he extends this hermeneutic into several related areas or lines of reasoning to cover the nuances of various prophetic traditions and Sufi practices. As the *Tahāfut* indicated was the aim of praxis in general, here al-Ghazālī claims that, in spite of appearances, the mean is what is sought by scriptural injunctions. His manner of argument is to aim to justify this as a necessary interpretation, because, after all, fully uprooting desire is impossible, and scripture could not call to the impossible. This third passage showing the presence and application of the two levels to praxis is as follows:

T14, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:93.6–11

> (The sharia does this) in a manner indicating to the ignorant that the goal is opposition—to the furthest degree possible—of what human nature entails. The scholar (*ālim*) perceives that the goal (*maqṣūd*) is the mean. (This is) because if human nature seeks the furthest degree of satiation, the sharia should praise the furthest degree of hunger. As such, human nature would be the motivation (*bāʿith*) and the sharia would be a (countering) preventative. Thus, the two would oppose each other, producing moderation (*iʿtidāl*). Also, it is far-fetched that one be able to quell (*qamʿ*) human nature completely, so it is known that one will not reach the furthest degree (*ghāya*). Were one to be immoderate (*muṣrif*) in opposing human nature, the sharia also contains (statements) indicating the error in this. An example is the case in which the sharia exaggerated in praise of standing in prayer by night and fasting by day. For when the Prophet, God bless him and send him peace, learned that

[251] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:86.12–13.

> some (of his companions) were fasting every day and standing the whole night in prayer, he forbade them from doing this.

The mode of reasoning here highly resembles the Ashʿarī law of interpretation: the outward purport of scripture may be overturned through an opposing demonstration or because it entails an logical impossibility. Also, here we have two principles: a) that the path to purification is through opposing desires and b) that the Aristotelian mean is the proper way to do so and the what is truly sought from the actions constituting praxis. The final chapter on virtue explains that in the 4th Quarter, the virtue of patience is a state of equilibrium derived from the balance of religious motivation and capricious motivation. So, this interpretation runs deep into the structure of the *Iḥyā'*, and al-Ghazālī is producing for us what look like principles that underpin his whole enterprise of praxis, and he is also indicating how this may be understood in accord with scriptural texts devoted to praxis.

Al-Ghazālī further explains how to apply praxis to include the Sufi master-aspirant relationship as follows:

T15, *Iḥyā'*, 3:95.9–13

> It is not permissible for the sheikh to reveal these secrets to the aspirant. Rather, he confines himself only to praising hunger and does not call to moderation (*iʿtidāl*). This is because he (i.e. the aspirant) will necessarily fall short of that to which he is called. Therefore, he should be called to the utmost extreme of hunger, such that moderation is facilitated for him. It should not be mentioned to him that the perfect gnostic is free of need from discipline, because Satan will find something to cling to in his heart. He will call to him from time to time, 'You are a perfect gnostic. What is there you lack of gnosis and perfection?'

Al-Ghazālī's hermeneutic thus manage to bridge from textual matters and to application with living aspirants. The passage is open to interpretation as constituting instructions for actual masters to deploy in their practice as a spiritual guide. As such, the inner meanings and higher level of discourse alluded to in the *Iḥyā'* indicate that informing such guides is one of the aims of the *Iḥyā'*. This is partially supported by the wider finding of this thesis that the two layers running through at least the 3rd and 4th Quarters of the *Iḥyā'* show that the Iḥyā' aims at two audiences, not one: those capable of knowledge and imitators. These applications of the said hermeneutic serve to cement the claim that praxis is developed at two levels in the *Iḥyā'*. In the previous three chapters, the two levels specifically regard the knowledge of scriptural practices and their inner secrets. These secret effects of prophetic acts being utilised in the practical books of the 3rd Quarter indicates that al-Ghazālī applies the theory that

prophetic acts have inner healing qualities, the theory presented in the important Book XXI classification passage.

III. The Status of Scriptural Similitudes

The present thesis claims that the *Tahāfut* and *Iḥyā'* implicitly respond to Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, but *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is particularly reticent regarding the possibility that scriptural similitudes might convey true knowledge or a true meaning. There are at least two passages in the *Iḥyā'* in which al-Ghazālī indicates that similitudes might, by contrast, convey such knowledge or meaning. In the first of the two passages, al-Ghazālī asserts that scripture may serve a role for the speculative theologians (*nuẓẓār*). The second passage is a forthcoming statement regarding the nature of prophetic speech and its relation to ultimate truth. Together, they have a strong bearing on the question of whether al-Ghazālī is committed to the doctrine that *all* scripture requires interpretation, and they help fill in our conception of how similitudes serve in the path towards true knowledge and felicity.

A. The Complementarity of Outward and Inward Levels of Discourse

The problem of the different types of discourse and how they do or do not produce knowledge clearly preoccupied al-Ghazālī as may be seen in the *Miʿyār* written before his departure from Baghdad. While eloquently redrafting Fārābīan and Avicennian logic, he simultaneously shows a sensitivity to topics that involve the bipartite cosmology. Avicenna himself has a penchant for replacing his terms related to the bipartite cosmology with terms that ring with cosmology or Sufism. In the *Miʿyār*, al-Ghazālī identifies many such topics and often tweaks the language to bring this out, leaving an indelible Ghazālīan mark on the *Miʿyār*.

In a section studied in Chapter 4, Section IV.C, al-Ghazālī recounts five levels of discourse in what has been called context theory, demonstration itself being linked to pure gold while other layers were closer and closer to pure counterfeit. Additionally, he states that material logic only figuratively refers to written or spoken predicates, while literally material logic is the knowledge impressed in the soul which is adequate to the object of knowledge.[252] This level is the kernel which is only reached through three levels of shell which are writing,

[252] *Miʿyār*, 182.21–183.11. These levels map nearly onto the four levels of existence: a) written, b) spoken, c) in the mind, and d) extra-mentally explained in a section titled, 'The level of terms within the levels of being (*marātib al-wujūd*)'. (See *Miʿyār*, 75–7.) Following Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*, each of the four levels is linked through reference: the written signifies the spoken, which signifies the mental form, which signifies the extra-mental. (See Chapter 1 which studies this section.)

speech, and internal speech.[253] There is a signification between the layers which could be used to indicate how prophetic similitudes refer to higher meanings, but exactly how al-Ghazālī uses this is not clear.

The second section relevant to al-Ghazālī's vision of discourse treats poetry, a part of the levels of discourse not studied in Chapter 4, Section IV.C which was devoted to demonstration. The discussion of poetry here in the *Miʿyār* bears a strong resemblance to al-Ghazālī's statements on similitudes in the *Iḥyā'* gathered in the following section. This is highly important, as it shows the background of this notion in context theory and indicates that it is part of al-Ghazālī's thought on epistemology from the books he wrote shortly before his departure from Baghdad. However, and again, this passage alone does not make al-Ghazālī's position entirely clear.[254]

Poetry is the fifth level of discourse mentioned, studied in terms of being poetic syllogism, included in study of logic due to the specific manner of appropriation in Arabic logic of Aristotle's *Organon*. Al-Ghazālī states immediately that poetry does not produce true knowledge as follows: 'It is not mentioned to convey knowledge or even opinion (*ẓann*). Rather, the one addressed (by poetry) may know the reality (of the subject spoken on), so it is mentioned in order to make one desirous or repulsed (and nine effects in total are mentioned).'[255] After dismissing its ability to produce knowledge, al-Ghazālī qualifies this, stating its value as follows: 'It should not be thought that all poetry is invalid, for some poetry is wisdom and some discourse is magic. Further, it is possible to put truth into the form of poetic metre without it ceasing to be truth (*ḥaqq*). … (He provides two examples.) These words are true, and have impact on the soul. A subtle metre and gentle poetic rendering stir the soul (*yurawwijuhu*) and increase the impact (of truth) on the soul (*yazīd waqʿahu fī al-nafs*)'.[256] This resembles discussions of scriptural similitudes which are true without necessarily conveying true knowledge to the soul. In a manner resembling the *Mishkāt*'s discussions of how the soul with purified imagination may move to the meaning, he concludes by exhorting the reader, 'Do not look at the form (*ṣūra*) of poetry. Rather, notice the meanings (*maʿānī*) in all matters

[253] *Miʿyār*, 183.4–18.
[254] The *Miʿyār* also discusses the signification of terms (*dalālat al-alfāẓ*), each level signifying that which comes after it. The first three levels are corporeal and signify the higher abstract meaning, but al-Ghazālī does not link this topic with imaginal prophecy.
[255] *Miʿyār*, 185.9–11.
[256] Ibid., 186.11–19.

such that you be upon the straight path (*al-ṣirāt al-mustaqīm*)'.[257] The passage is clear that no knowledge is conveyed, save only emotional motivation, but the exhortation to notice meanings is more obscure. In the same passage, al-Ghazālī states that in some cases the one addressed already knows the meaning, but may benefit through the motivation generated by poetry. This may indicate that one should judge poetry by its meaning, not its form (which is the lowest discourse), but one should not expect to properly learn a topic merely through hearing poetry. The emotional states generated through poetry highly resemble the states produced through imitation. For instance, al-Ghazālī differentiates between the fear of a snake of a man and his small child, for the man knows the danger. The child does not understand the danger and thus, like worshippers, the state of fear produced in them through imitation is subject to ceasing and needs to be supported unlike fear produced through true knowledge and demonstration. This notion becomes a core part of the structure of the *Iḥyā'* by which all but true scholars benefit from deriving religious states through the *Iḥyā'* such that they become characterized by religious states and achieve salvation.

B. The Efficacy of Similitudes for Conveying True Knowledge

The present and following sections ask the question of whether and how scriptural similitudes might be effective in conveying true knowledge or somehow assist in conveying it. They frame the remainder of the thesis in the following sense. If al-Ghazālī's holds that the two primary eschatological states he promotes in the *Iḥyā'*, bodily salvation and incorporeal felicity, are distributed based on whether one is an imitator or has true knowledge, then any value scripture has must be in terms of producing true knowledge. The value established so far in this thesis for scripture is that imitative practice of the sharia performs the same function as philosophical praxis: to cure the soul from vice, and prepare it for intellectual sciences that would harm it if not preceded by praxis. Were someone to object, 'Then reading scripture serves no purpose', one could reply, 'Part of scripture advocates acts that contain inner cures. These are beneficial to practice. Also, if one is successful thereby at bringing about purification, one may then benefit from the similitudes, as one would have fulfilled a major prerequisite for one's insight to operate'. If scripture did not have this benefit, and scriptural similitudes did not themselves lead to knowledge, then one reading it would end where they

[257] Ibid., 186.20–1

began: an imitator obtaining bodily salvation through being a believer. If, on the other hand, scripture alone lead to true knowledge, then there would be no need to logic, demonstration, or any other elements associated with religion and al-Ghazālī would completely discard and fly in the face of the value of not only Avicenna and his mode of thinking, but of any form of philosophical theology. We will see though that even an imitator gains a state or attribute of the heart through imitative belief in a matter. Establishing al-Ghazālī's notion of the effectiveness of striking similitudes in scripture is shown presently to allow us to see his thinking on the topic. Striking similitudes at the level of people's intellect, most of whom are ruled by sensation, is itself shown to be a mode of following the prophetic practice of striking similitudes.

In the passages from the *Iḥyāʾ* discussing similitudes, it is said that similitudes convey meanings, but as we will see the term is obscure. It seems reasonable that the lack of firm statement that they convey true knowledge is due to their conveying an emotional state like the one referred to above. In that case, just as true knowledge produces fear as a state in the heart, so would a similitude produce fear. It is argued below that when al-Ghazālī refers to fear as a 'meaning', this is in a loose sense of the word, and it is more of a state of the heart than a meaning, meaning more properly referring to the knowledge, true or imitative, causing the fear.

In the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage said earlier to refer to five types of secrets, one of the types al-Ghazālī analyzes is said to be used in the sharia because its impact (*waqʿ*) is greater and its benefit is said to be that the matter is rendered more important in the heart.[258] Some of al-Ghazālī's examples resemble his treatment of dream interpretation in that he analyses the relationship between the form and meaning finding a partial overlap in spirit just as mentioned in dream interpretation, discussed above. Of his other examples—the two fingers of the All-Merciful and God's order to things, 'Be!'—he says, it is impossible for them to be literal and the figurative (*kināya*) is used because that has 'greater impact on souls in terms of making them understand (*tafhīm*)',[259] but he does not explain whether this is the full meaning of complete power, or merely something of it, such as a feeling of veneration. In his discussion of dream interpretation, we found that only by adding the passage from *al-Imlāʿ* was it made clear that such similitudes are directed to most people who are drowned in the

[258] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:101.19.
[259] Ibid., 1:102.12.

corporeal, so it seems likely we should assume this passage refers to the masses and therefore the understanding conveyed is not true knowledge (which requires demonstrative discourse after all).

In the 4th Quarter passage studied above in analysis of dream interpretation, similitudes were said to be a natural means for making meanings firm in the heart as follows, 'Thus, they convey meanings to their understanding via similitudes. This is out of God's wisdom, His gentleness (*lutf*) for His servants, and to facilitate the apperception (*idrāk*) of that of which they would, without the striking of similitudes, be incapable. … Indeed, hearts are naturally formed (*jubilat*) to be (receptive to the) impact (*taʾthīr*) of similitudes and for meanings (*maʿānī*) to be made firm (*thubūt*) in them via their means (*bi-wāsiṭatihā*). For this reason, the Koran expressed the extremity of God's power through (the statement) {Be! and it is} (Koran 36:82)'.[260] Also in light of the passages from *al-Imlāʿ*, hearts seems to refer to the unenlightened masses which would indicate that the meanings conveyed by grace are merely emotional states or other impressions falling short of being true knowledge. The word meaning (*maʿnā*) appears to be used equivocally here just as it is in the passage regarding the meaning of fear being obtainable in the boy through imitation of his father. The occurrence of the two levels by which virtues are generated is studied through many of the virtues in Chapter 6 devoted to them.

C. The Role of Scripture in Producing Practical and Speculative Knowledge

Two passages indicate that al-Ghazālī's holds that scripture refers to the two higher sciences through allusions which are understood by scholars. This seems compatible with the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage in which judging scripture required obtaining the divine light of intellect and unveiling. However, these two passages seem distinct from the above passages on dream interpretation and the five secrets studied in *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*. The dream interpretation passage merely opened the possibility of a partial reference of the similitude to the ultimate meaning, but also indicated that conveying the meaning from the *malakūt* was impossible. The *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*'s study of the five secrets contained no global statements on the ability of scripture to refer to higher meanings and convey them, but, as with the dream interpretation passage, merely opened the possibility that similitudes have an

[260] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:27.4–7.

unspecified impact on the heart or convey an unspecified meaning. In the two passages studied presently, all knowledge is said to be contained in scripture. Further, these passages complement earlier sections in which it was shown that al-Ghazālī held there were two sciences at two levels in the *Iḥyāʾ*: the practical and the speculative, at the levels of imitation and demonstration, respectively. The passages indicate that al-Ghazālī's doctrine of discourse is that each of these sciences is contained in full in scripture, but only referred to through allusion and in general.

The first statement regards the speculative and makes very strong claims that every theory is referred to in the Koran. However, these allusions are perceptible for those scholars engaging in theoretical investigation, al-Ghazālī using the same term from the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* speculative theologians, as follows:

T16, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:290.25–30

> Ibn Masʿūd has said, 'Whoever wants the knowledge of the first and last should reflect on the Koran.' That does not occur through mere exoteric exegesis (*tafsīrihi al-ẓāhir*). In general (*bi al-jumla*), all sciences are part of (the knowledge of) God's acts and the Koran contains the explanation of His essence, attributes, and acts. These sciences are infinite, but in the Koran is an allusion (*ishāra*) to their core topics (*majāmiʿihā*). And the levels (*maqāmāt*) of depth in their details is ultimately a matter of understanding (*fahm*) the Koran, but mere outward exegesis (*mujarrad ẓāhir al-tafsīr*) of its meaning does not point to that. Indeed, in every issue recognized as problematic by the speculative theologians (*nuẓẓār*) and in every theory (*naẓariyyāt*) and intelligible (*maʿqūlāt*) regarding which there is difference of opinion amongst people, the Koran contains symbols (*rumūz*) and subtle indications (*dalālāt*) which can only be perceived by the people of understanding (*ahl al-fahm*). If the matter is thus, how could a literal exegesis possibly suffice?

While exoteric exegesis falls short of conveying the knowledge of the Koran, how to obtain understanding (*fahm*) is not explained. The fact that speculative theologians are capable of understanding the allusions indicates that this knowledge is, like the unveiling referred to in

the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage, obtained through pursuing this knowledge through speculative contemplation (necessarily preceded by practical purification as established in Chapter 1). The passage is more optimistic than Avicenna's statements in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* that scripture only refers to the most basic elements of speculative theology, stating that there are allusions to all knowledge (though briefly) and every disputed intelligible and theory. However, the passage is still reserved regarding the ability to actually learn this material merely by reading scripture implying instead that scripture is understood by those who are scholars already. This resembles al-Ghazālī's own practice in the *Iḥyāʾ* in such instances as his study of the gnat and elephant in which he takes a matter referred to in the Koran, explains the topic in details, and notes how knowing God's creatures reveals His attributes in detail whereas the one who merely believes only knows Him in general.[261] In other words, the scholar or person with insight or unveiling is providing the knowledge.

The second passage making a universal statement on the nature of scripture refers to the practical realm. Al-Ghazālī explains that the practical is also divided into allusions and details known by scholars as follows:

T17, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:108.23–6

> Whoever knows the fine points of the calamities of the tongue according to what we will elucidate knows conclusively that what he mentioned, God bless him and send him peace, is the last word (*faṣl al-khitāb*). He said, {Whoever is silent is saved}. By God, he (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad) was definitely given the jewels of wisdom and the succinctness of speech (*jawāmiʿ al-kalim*). None knows of the seas of meaning that lie beneath his individual words except the elite (*khawwāṣṣ*) of the scholars. What we will elucidate of the harms and difficulty of avoiding them will convince you of the reality of that.

The one knowing these seas (or part of them) is one who is already a scholar, particularly an elite one (likely excluding mere scholars of fiqh and *kalām*), so the passage further supports this thesis's reading of the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage on the middle way of interpretation

[261] This optimism regarding the degree to which scripture conveys abstract or ultimate meanings seems to exceed that expressed in al-Ghazālī's in Chapter 1 regarding the sharia (and hence scripture, according to his notion of revelation) being limited to the practical as stated earlier in this chapter. There may be a conflict here or it may be that, as in his example of the gnat, the Koran makes only a brief allusion to such theoretical matters.

which requires 'unveiling', according to a particular reading of the term.[262] The current passage and all the tools al-Ghazālī develops for reconciling scripture and the science of praxis were studied in Section II.C of this chapter. These tools might all be said to be implicit in the *Mīzān* passage cited in Chapter 1, which stated that attributes of the heart are the scales by which sharia acts are weighed.

Together with the previous passage, these passages show the doctrine al-Ghazālī holds for scripture whose similitudes of practical and speculative matters allude for those capable to a higher level such that the structure of knowledge and discourse is produced in the *Iḥyā'* with two levels, imitation and demonstration, and two realms: the practical (i.e. the path of praxis (*muʿāmala*)) and the speculative (i.e. speculative unveiling (*mukāshafa*)). To know these matters as a science, unless one is fortunate enough to receive them through inspiration (*ilhām*), one must engage in speculative inquiry or contemplation through an unspecified method (though al-Ghazālī does offer the method of contemplation in the *Kītāb al-Tafakkur* and particularly the syllogistic method for moving beyond mere belief to true knowledge).[263]

D. Al-Ghazālī's Response to Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya*: Assessing the evidence

A challenge of assessing the evidence regarding whether al-Ghazālī is responding to Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is that is implicit, and never mentioned by al-Ghazālī. Our argument is that it forms an invisible thread connecting the much of the material in Chapters 1 and 2. It requires reflecting on the implications or each item on the other, and seeing each in light of the whole. Just as al-Ghazālī never states that he uses Avicenna in the composition of the *Iḥyā'*, though countless uses have now been found, similarly he never speaks of use of *al-Aḍḥawiyya*. Thus, it is necessary to look for indirect and sometimes circumstantial evidence to make the case preponderate that *al-Aḍḥawiyya* has a significant, albiet indirect impact on the *Iḥyā'*.

[262] Another passage states the same principles towards the end of *Kītāb Āfāt al-lisān* (Book of the Harms of the Tongue). Al-Ghazālī returns to the tradition, 'Whoever is silent is saved' and refers to the secret (*sirr*) behind the words. The secret behind these brief words is returned to towards the end of Book XXIV. (See *Iḥyā'*, 3:159.3–8.) Again, the ones who knows what is beyond the indications of scripture (including prophetic traditions in this case) are those who already know them: elite scholars.

[263] Regarding the contents of speculative inquiry, Alexander Treiger has studied the contents of speculative inquiry and the locations it is treated in the *Iḥyā'*. The contents of the path of praxis are studied at the beginning of the following chapter which tracks the continuity in the doctrines of praxis from the *Mīzān* to the *Iḥyā'* and therefore serves as a summary of the science of praxis in the *Iḥyā'*.

The following assesses the evidence for al-Ghazālī's use of or response to Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya* in the *Iḥyā'*, beginning with an attempt to identify the doctrines unique to *al-Aḍḥawiyya* which appear in the *Iḥyā'*. It then notes several arguments which are admittedly circumstantial but which are nonetheless important and interesting. Beginning with noting previous discussion on this topic, we may say that al-Ghazālī's awareness and response to aspects of Avicenna's *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is known, but only, as shown in Chapter 1, as a source of the *Tahāfut*. Because the *Tahāfut* is presumed to be a refutation, this fact in itself is of little importance. Of more importance is the claim of Yahya Michot that *al-Aḍḥawiyya* supplies the primary material of Ghazālīan text containing a positive statement of doctrine: one of the several texts which circulated under the title *al-Maḍnūn*.[264] The text containing the parallels he refers to as the Cairo edition of *al-Maḍnūn*, noting that the part corresponding to *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is *not* found in the *al-Maḍnūn* text in the Marāgha codex nor in what was published as al-Ghazālī's *al-Masā'il al-ukhrāwiyya*.[265] Thus, this has no clear implications for al-Ghazālī's use of the *al-Aḍḥawiyya*. While Michot notes an allusion to imaginal resurrection in the *Iḥyā'*,[266] the same doctrine is referred to in *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, a known source of al-Ghazālī's *Mīzān*, so the mere appearance of a related doctrine does not show the positive impact of *al-Aḍḥawiyya*.

Yahya Michot depicts the challenge which Avicenna marshals against the *mutakallimūn*, ultimately leading to the charge that they have no scriptural basis for their scholastic theology, and even the claim that they are inconsistent.[267] In the context of the findings of this chapter, particularly the discussion of interpretation and the search for two ontological levels in core scriptural topics, Avicenna's challenge takes on a new light. While Michot does not make this point, it is the most reasonable backdrop for al-Ghazālī's scriptural hermeneutics which looks, as stated in Chapter 1, with insight (*baṣīra*) into each topic, striving for moderation through finding the middle approach between competing positions. This makes sense of why al-Ghazālī subtly distanced himself from the *Ash'arī*s, inclining towards what he calls unveiling (*kashf*); for which Ibn Taymiyya condemned him, as seen in Chapter 1.

[264] Yahya Michot, 'Avicenne et le *Kītāb al-Madnūn* d'al-Ghazālī', in *Bulletin de Philosophie médiévale*, 18 (Louvain: SIEPM, 1976), 51-9.
[265] Yahya Michot, 'A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary on Avicenna's *Risāla Aḍḥawiyya*, Part I', *Journal of Islamic Studies*, 14:2 (2003), 149-204, particularly 153n16 which provides important statements regarding the various *Maḍnūn* texts not found in source cited in the previous footnote.
[266] Yahya Michot, 'Avicenne et le *Kītāb al-Madnūn* d'al-Ghazālī', 58n21.
[267] Yahya Michot, 'A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary on Avicenna's *Risāla Aḍḥawiyya*, Part I', 155.

Our claim regarding the relationship of the *Iḥyā'* and *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is that, although al-Ghazālī is implicitly responding to Avicenna in the *Iḥyā'*, the *Iḥyā'*s doctrines of felicity are themselves framed by the rational treatment of al-Sheikh al-Ra'īs. Though al-Ghazālī's epistemology remains unspoken, evidence indicates that he accepts two source, reason and revelation, and that Avicenna is his favoured source honoured with representing intellect so long as a mistake is not found undermining Avicenna's claim to valid, demonstrative argument. As such, Avicenna's doctrines are effectively admitted as representing one of al-Ghazālī's two favoured sources: reason and revelation. There are places that exhibit that al-Ghazālī is not blindly imitating Avicenna as the representative of reason, or that he manages to synthesize the positions of both reason and revelation. An example from Chapter 1 is his argument that if bodily resurrection is not rationally impossible, scripture's claims should be upheld. The result is what is termed in this thesis the doctrinal basis of praxis. The most important doctrines are those that explain how praxis effects the soul to bring about felicity, as felicity is the higher goal of the *Iḥyā'*.[268]

The primary and original claim regarding *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is that it contains a discussion of a set of nested doctrines, and that the line of reasoning in these doctrines is repeated in epitome in the *Tahāfut*.[269] These related doctrines are a) a rule of interpretation, b) an assessment of lack of ability of the masses to understand abstract discourse *due to considerations of practical ethics*, and c) a dualist cosmology, and ontology. Practical ethics in the hands of Avicenna determines that those who do not overcome the lower faculties are dominated by them. As such, their intellect does not operate, but only the corporeal faculties. As discussed in Chapter 3, Avicenna is noted to develop the dualist psychology in a manner far exceeding his predecessors. Avicenna develops and applies a distinction between concepts that are concrete and can be understood by the masses whose intellect is dominated by the corporeal and concepts for incorporeal objects such as abstract universals.[270] He brings this distinction to bear on the issue of theology. Anthropomorphic attributes are concrete and graspable by the masses. Attributes produced by theology are abstract, and require subordination of the lower faculties through praxis.

[268] These doctrines are summarised in the thesis abstract.
[269] Chapter 1 showed how the *Tahāfut* engaged with scriptural interpretation, arguing that what is effectively the lower ontological level of eschatology, i.e. the corporeal, should be upheld.
[270] The manner Avicenna applies this to scripture is discussed below. There, 'hand' is an example of the concrete whereas the attributes deployed by the theologians such as 'all-powerful' are abstract, not having a sensible reference.

The key insight regarding faculties of perception is that in *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, Avicenna does not merely use the ethical notions used by Miskawayḥ and others in which the intellect cannot operate without praxis because the lower motive faculties of the soul, anger and desire, dominate. Rather, develops the notion of a discourse graspable by persons in which the corporeal perceptive faculties dominate, these being primarily estimation (*wahm*) and sense (*ḥiss*). Al-Ghazālī was seen in the present chapter do the same thing, linking the poles of theological transcendence and anthropomorphism to domination of corporeal and incorporeal pleasures. The most reasonable picture which emerges is that the *Iḥyā'* is a text extending praxis beyond the contours of the *Mīzān*. To accommodate a wider set of practices and build a religious discourse on sound reason, al-Ghazālī develops a two-layered discourse and incorporates a response to the perceived challenge posed by Avicenna. This threat may be thought of as follows. Were the religious writings and interpretations of scripture gathered, they would form a formidable statement, and Avicenna would appear as an authority both in reason and revelation. Al-Ghazālī might object to this for various reasons we do not need to address here, but the point is that the *Iḥyā'* appears to contain, or even to be, a response.

Let us begin by summarising the core nest of three doctrines of interpretation coming out of the *al-Aḍḥawiyya*. Even in this summary, many of the topics covered in this chapter will already appear uniquely related to the discussion of hermeneutics in *al-Aḍḥawiyya*. A doctrine of scriptural interpretation related to his ontology: Avicenna holds that the primary rule (*qānūn*) for interpreting scripture is that it is for the masses, the same masses who are unable to understand abstract intellectual discourse. The sharia and religion (*milla*) which comes on the tongues of the prophets aims to address the masses, one and all (*al-jumhūr kāffa*).[271] He defends this rule by arguing that were the prophets to throw proper treatment of the Divine unity before the Arabs and Hebrews, they would have rushed to declare (an abstract) God non-existent.[272] Were the sharia not to use similitudes and symbols (*tamthīlāt wa-rumūz*) to bring

[271] *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, ed. Lucchetta, 43.3-4. Ibn Taymiya comments on this rule of Avicenna in his *Darʿ al-taʿarruḍ*, a work otherwise largely devoted to refuting the 'rationalist objection' (*al- muʿāriḍ al-ʿaqlī*) by which he means the claim that in matters of religion, precedence should always be given to rational evidence in cases of conflict between reason and revelation. He traces this back to the rule of interpretation in al-Razi and ultimately to al-Ghazālī. In the *Darʿ*, Ibn Taymiya comments on this the rule (*qānūn*) in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* that the philosophers deny that the revelation has anything to say regarding God and the afterlife, and that this is (by unnamed persons or groups) transferred to (revealed) commands to ritual worship which they say are (also) directed at the masses. (See, Yahya Michot, 'A Mamlūk Theologian's Commentary on Avicenna's *Risāla Aḍḥawiyya*, Part I', 157.)
[272] Ibid., 43.5-44.4.

abstract realities closer to the minds of people, they would deny them.[273] This division of people into the masses and the elite and respective discourses is based, in *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, on the masses' inability due to the said dominance of the corporeal apprehensions (not in inherent lack of intellectual ability). On this basis, Avicenna maintains that most of the scripture is anthropomorphic. There are occasional references to abstract theology in scripture, but if the anthropomorphic matters should be interpreted in an abstract matter, scripture itself gives no systematic indication of how this is to be done. ii) Avicenna states that Arabic does use figurative language (*majāz*).[274] However, while he may state the possibility of language being an allusion to the abstract meaning, he says next to nothing regarding such language constituting similitudes which should be interpreted in a systematic manner as allusions.[275] (Al-Ghazālī on the other hand borders on interpreting the philosophy of prophecy to entail that *all* scripture contains an allusion to a higher reality, as seen in this chapter.) Also, Avicenna makes countless references to corporeal depictions of the afterlife aiming to motivate people, because resurrection of the corporeal body is impossible (though he later offers that imaginal resurrection in which the same events are experienced may be possible.)[276]

The unique basis of this inability to understand abstract discourse is referred to in more than one passage of *al-Aḍḥawiyya*. Just as the philosophers (*ḥukamā'*) speak of vices through concrete similitudes such as linking greed to swine, so would it be impossible were the prophets to be responsible for transmitting the realities of these matters to the masses whose nature is course and whose imaginings (*awhām*) are absolutely connected to sensibles.[277] Note that al-Ghazālī uses these symbols himself in *Kītāb 'Aja'ib al-qalb*, *Bayān* 5 indicates in its title,

[273] *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 61-3.
[274] He discusses at length scriptural phrases such 'God's hand is above their hand' (when they strike a pact), stating that this involves figurative speech which involves the meaning of a whole statement (*majāz isti'āriyya*; as opposed to an individual word such as 'lion' used to refer to a courageous person). See, *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 49-63.
[275] In the *Shifā': Ilāhiyyāt* in the chapter on the benefit of worship in the here-below and afterlife, Avicenna states in his description of what prophets should convey to the masses that there is no harm in a prophet's address including symbols and pointers (*rumūz* and *ishārāt*) calling to philosophical research (*bahth ḥikmī*) for those fit by natural disposition. See, Dimitry Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, p. 300-1. Note that Avicenna refers to this as an allegorical method, but *al-Aḍḥawiyya* does not accord an allegorical status to either anthropomorphic references to God nor to eschatological depiction. There is definitely no truth value referred to in scenes of the afterlife nor in the eschatological depictions, even if the latter are said to be included in scripture for a reason or moral, which is to inspire the masses with states such as fear which they need.
[276] I interpret this on the reading developed in this thesis primarily across Chapters 1 and 2 to mean that Avicenna comes closer to saying that these are merely motivational elements whereas al-Ghazālī holds that because it is not impossible they do refer to realities. Al-Ghazālī first affirms both the corporeal and incorporeal pleasures as early as the *Tahāfut*, and in the *Iḥyā'* he is less reticent than Avicenna regarding scripture consistently alluding to abstract meanings or true realities. He appears to cull the positive possibilities from Avicenna, the master of one source of truth: the intellect.
[277] *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 57.

'The Cardinal attributes of the heart and their similitudes'. Having read *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, al-Ghazālī would have known that such practice was the practice.[278] This chapter has shown his own coining of similitudes for the masses as part of the role of the inheritors of the prophets. While the (ultimate) reality of the human being is abstracted from the concomitants of the body, estimation and imagination have overcome the masses such that they identify with the body.[279] Because of this, the legislators of the sharia, i.e. the prophets, were forced to engage in encouragement and causing fear in this manner.[280] Note how this passage throws light on al-Ghazālī's discussion of the necessity for prophets to speak to people in similitudes of the mulk (read: corporeal world) because they are asleep in it.

In at least one passage, Avicenna links the domination particularly of faculties of sensation, not motion, to pleasure, and hence to discussion of intellectual pleasures and the tension between them and corporeal pleasures. In this context, Avicenna also links the corporeal to the here-below (*dunyā*) and the incorporeal to the afterlife (*ākhira*) (preceding al-Ghazālī in this) as follows:

T18, *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 195-201

> The rational soul has perception (*idrāk*). It substance is superior to the substance of the other faculties because it is absolutely simple and completely abstracted from matter, whereas they are connected to matter, susceptible to composition and division due to (their) matter.
>
> Further, its perception is superior to the perception of the senses because the perception of the intellect is certain, necessary, universal, and eternal, whereas sense perception is superficial, particular, and ephemeral.
>
> Further, the objects of perception which are agreeable to it are superior because they are unchanging meanings and spiritual forms and the First Cause of all existence, majestic is He and His matter be magnified! and the governing angels and the realities (and natures (*ḥaqāʾiq*)) of the celestial bodies and the elements and their nature.
>
> Whats more, its perfections are superiour than the those of the sensible faculties because its perfection is to become a world unblemished by change and multiplicity in which there is a form of every existent, but abstracted from matter. Thus, it is a world parallel and commensurate to this world, except that its construction is spiritual, divine, ethereal and holy, whereas the construction of the corporeal world (*al-jismānī*) is

[278] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:10. Below, Avicenna's use of these symbols in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is discussed.
[279] Ibid., 147.
[280] Ibid., 149.

> sensible, admixed with baseness. That which is potential and non-existent is coarse and filthy. What comparison is there between these four meanings regarding the human soul and between their like regarding the animal soul? So, it is clear that the pleasure specific to the human substance, i.e. its soul, in the afterlife—on the condition that it is perfected—is nothing which can be compared to any pleasure which exists in our world. And, oh my God!, is the good and pleasure specific to the substances of angels comparable to the substance of predatory and grazing beasts? On the condition that it is perfected, the human soul is undoubtedly an angelic substance because it is a separate, intelligible form which is identical to an angelic form. However, we do not sense this pleasure while embodied because the bodily faculties are predominant over the rational soul to the point that the soul has forgotten its own pleasures and the matter is in the hand and rule of sense, estimation, anger and desire.

Avicenna then rehearses several arguments for the existence of intellectual pleasures in spite of their not being sensed, such as ignorance of sexual pleasures in the prepubescent.[281] Avicenna then explains how people vary in corporeal and incorporeal pleasures based both on natural ability and their ethical efforts (i.e. nature and nurture), using the terms here-below and afterlife, as follows:

T19, *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 203-7

> Also, sense and feeling of that pleasure (i.e. intellectual pleasure) accords with the degree of domination of the human and animal faculties (stated above to include the senses, imagination and estimation). Whoever's rational soul has power in this world over the power of their animal faculties becomes able to sense and feel something of that pleasure, but in varying degrees. And those who's nature is gifted with that and they aid this through domination of the rational faculties over the animal, and the inner over the outer, such that their animal and outer do not dominate them, it may be that, while in this here-below (*dunyā*), they have a portion of that pleasure in a considerable amount. As to in an unrestricted sense, there is no way to obtain this except in the afterlife. Thus, the felicity of the afterlife occurs only after the soul gets rid of the body and the effects caused by nature, and its being abstracted, perfected in itself, beholding through an intellectual vision the One Who possesses the greatest dominion (i.e. God or the Necessarily Existent). … One matter which purifies the soul from the slaps (*laṭakhāt*) of nature is worship of the Divine (*ʿibāda ilāhiyya*) and practicing that which is called to in the prophetic sharia (*sharīʿa nabawiyya*). It is a protective fortress and shield for the soul against these harms (i.e. vices).

[281] Ibid., 201-5.

The previous passages more directly indicate al-Ghazālī's use of and response to *al-Aḍḥawiyya* through showing how the masses-elite dichotomy is based on a very specific notion of how the prerequisite of ethics for speculative enquiry includes the perceptive faculties and how mass theological discourse therefore must be of forms perceived by the lower, corporeal faculties shared with animals. However, these two block quotes indicate how the whole religious and philosophical discourses were already deployed by Avicenna in parallel, leaving little to be done other than for al-Ghazālī to a) remove the most offensive passages to religious orthodoxy and b) to go further in weaving the two levels into religious discourse. Avicenna links a number of concepts shown to underpin the arguments of Chapters 1 and 3 (and also 6 on the virtues) that al-Ghazālī builds his notions of the here-below and afterlife and the spiritual tension between them on the tension between corporeal and incorporeal pleasures. This includes the major notion of the incorporeal world being commensurate and parallel to the corporeal world and referring to the corporeal as the here-below, and linking the afterlife to the incorporeal world. Also of note is setting the ethical poles of the human being between the incorporeal and corporeal deploying the similitude of angels and animals. But while this matter is famously found in al-Iṣfahānī and even Miskawayḥ, Avicenna goes beyond their discussion of the motive faculties of anger and desire and adds all faculties which—according to his highly developed psychological body-soul dichotomy—includes the perceptive faculties of sense and estimation.

While al-Ghazālī could (and did) derive many notions such as the dichotomy between corporeal and incorporeal faculties, *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is uniquely concerned with matters which the *Iḥyā'* is explicitly devoted to (such as how ethical purification leads from inclination and attachment to the here-below to inclination towards the afterlife) and those which this thesis shows that it implicitly deals with in order to integrate philosophical and scriptural discourses, such as developing two parallel discourses suited for those who have have and have not undergone the purification required in order to understand abstract discourse. The stark similarities between its discussions are far closer than the vague similarities in other known sources al-Ghazālī such as al-Iṣfahānī (examples of which were seen in Chapter 1). These include both general and specific matters. The general similarities include the manner in the *Iḥyā'* that the two said levels are coined on specific lines. The particular similarities include the link between corporeal / here-below and incorporeal / afterlife. However, the more indirect

yet stronger evidence remains the implicit challenge posed by Avicenna to Islamic theologians and shown in this chapter to be answered by al-Ghazālī: to attempt to produce a consistent interpretation of scripture in three core topics: the Divine attributes, the sacred law (including worship) and, most relevant here, the afterlife.

Other important evidence is admittedly circumstantial. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 1, *al-Aḍḥawiyya* has one statement regarding the purpose and limit of the prophetic mission that is closer to al-Ghazālī's position than anything found in *al-Shifā'*. The key statement in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* is as follows, 'The primary focus of the sharia is the practical part (of the soul), including human acts, so that all (people) act well towards those who share in their species and genus'.[282] Chapter 1 established that—while contemporary scholarship is aware that al-Ghazālī structures the *Iḥyā'* with a focus on the practical—in the 4th Quarter he states this principles in very similar terms.

A second and more circumstantial point is an attack launched by Avicenna on the *kalām* notion of the nature of resurrection. Circumstantial though it is, it is remains important as it otherwise hard to explain al-Ghazālī's departure from the prevailing *kalām* doctrine that there is no survival of the soul after bodily death and acceptance of the philosophical view that death is only death of the body, and that the the soul survives bodily death and awaits resurrection. As shown in Chapter 1, this doctrine itself is fundamental to his praxis. Avicenna's attack that al-Ghazālī surely read is stated as a challenge, as he argues it is not only absurd , but he goes so far as to say that this doctrine is highly harmful to the religion brought by Muḥammad. He gives those who hold this position the belittling term Arab dialecticians (*ahl al-jadal min al-'Arab*), by which he means those theologians who operate at the level of dialectics rather than demonstration. He describes the position of the Arab dialecticians as follows:

T20, *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, 21-3

> The body alone is the animal (aspect), and it (only) becomes a human being through life and humanness (*insāniyya*) created in (the body). They are both accidents, and death is the lack of these two accidents or their opposite existing in it. In the second creation (i.e. in the afterlife), life and humanness are created in that body after it returns to dust and disintegrates and that human itself become alive (again).

Avicenna then works out all the variants and implications of this doctrine, finding that they all involve impossibilities, such as, for instance, when a person eats an apple grown from a tree

[282] Ibid., 85-7.

which consumed the corpse of another person. While it is possible to read al-Ghazālī's doctrine of the soul surviving bodily death as emerging purely from the *Tahāfut*'s engagement with the *Shifā'* and scripture, it is in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* alone that Avicenna aggressively addresses the position of some theologians, finding them absurd. Chapter 1 referred to the *Tahāfut*'s engagement with this doctrine and Chapter 3 studies the statements in the *Iḥyā'* in which al-Ghazālī argues for the subsistence of the soul after bodily death. But knowing that al-Ghazālī worked with *al-Aḍḥawiyya*, it is hard not to imagine that he did not feel impelled in his religious revival to produce an Islamic praxis not built on logical absurdities. This is the same form of reasoning which impelled him to accept the findings of logic and mathematics, stating that nothing is more harmful to religion than religious scholars rejecting these matters because of their Greek origins, and thereby committing the genetic fallacy. The harm is that those who had learned Greek sciences and seen their truth would be repelled by religious condemnation from religion.

Concluding Reflections: The Nature of Religion in the Religious Revival

This chapter has aimed to show the doctrines of al-Ghazālī's discourse by which he reconciles reason and religion and moves from a philosophical discourse in the *Mīzān* to a religious discourse in the *Iḥyā'*. It argued that he did so through adopting many doctrines by which the philosopher Avicenna viewed religion, likely because this would establish religion on a basis of scientific and demonstrative reasoning, even if he disagrees in some particular doctrines. Al-Ghazālī avoids claiming that scriptural similitudes in themselves may convey true knowledge, though he produces a structure which actualizes the mere potentiality Avicenna offers in *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* that scripture provide the bases of both the speculative and theoretical aspects of the path to felicity.

The following chapter provides more detail and evidence that the science of praxis is developed along the lines referred to in the *Mīzān* and *ʿUyūn al-ḥikma* passages; two ranks are shown to be associated with knowledge of matters of praxis: mere believers and scholars who have true knowledge. This accords with the present chapter that both established that al-Ghazālī treats core speculative topics at two levels and also summarized how in the chapter on the virtues, states of the heart, in al-Ghazālī's example of fear of a snake, are said to be obtained in two manners, each associated with a level of either imitation or demonstration. In this light, these chapters contribute to seeing how al-Ghazālī's philosophical cosmology

underpins his treatment of religious praxis. His praxis is designed to be fit for a demonstrative science of theology and yet to consistently offer a second level of salvation for those of imitation.

This chapter works towards answering the question 'What is religion in the *Revival of the Religious Sciences*?' A partial answer is stated by al-Ghazālī in the introduction where he states that two sciences are concerned with the afterlife: the sciences of praxis and speculative unveiling. However, this cannot be the end of the story. Al-Ghazālī uses religion as a pejorative term in Book I, in which sense it means acts of the body under the jurisdiction of sultans.[283] However, in the 3rd Quarter, he continues to refer to sciences whose *source* is revelation as the religious sciences. The careful study of his classification of the sciences demonstrated that 'religious' here means the mode of knowing: imitation (including a corporeal element, as it is not intellectual, abstract, and eternal knowledge). The result is that religion is used in more than one sense. But before viewing those senses, the highly relevant results of the classification may be presented in Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.

1st Aspect	Knowledge which inheres in the heart	
	a) Sharia	b) Intellectual
2nd Aspect	Intellectual knowledge	
	a) Immediately known	b) Acquired
3rd Aspect	Acquired intellectual knowledge	
	a) Worldly	b) Ascribed to the hereafter

Table 2.1 Ontological taxonomy of knowledge

Sphere	**Manner of knowing**	**Practical**	**Speculative**
Religious sciences (*ʿulūm dīniyya*)	Imitation (*taqlīd*)	practice of sharia acts	Belief of credal tenets
Rational science of the afterlife (*ʿulūm ʿaqliyya ukhrāwiyya*)	True knowledge or demonstration (*burhān*)	The science of praxis (and the states of the heart)	The science of speculative unveiling

Table 2.2 Taxonomy of speculative and practical knowledge

[283] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:18.8-27.

It appears we are forced to accept three different meanings of religion (see Table 2.3).

Three types of religion	***Dīn* as politics**	***Dīn* in hands of the inheritor of the prophets**	**Rational science of the afterlife (*ʿulūm ʿaqliyya ukhrāwiyya*)**
Practical aspect	Acts of the body acceptable to sultans of the here-below (*fiqh*)	Acts practised, while bearing in mind the secrets of those acts (this making them acts of the afterlife)	The ethical science of how acts affect the attributes of the soul (the pre-condition of felicity)
Speculative aspect	Belief pronounced only on the tongue (*nifāq*; enforced via *kalām*)	Beliefs complementary to higher realities (and open to unveiling)	The speculative science of eternal truths (felicity itself)
Ontological status	Corporeal	Corporeal, but open to causing meanings (through efficacy of similitudes on the heart) and intimacy with the incorporeal (through invocation; producing a religious scholar obtaining the encounter with God)	Incorporeal (except for aspects of practical knowledge taken on imitation)

Table 2.3 Three meanings of 'religion'

It is hard not to see that al-Ghazālī is applying his cosmology to the term religion, just as he produced four levels of purity, unity, and so on. While he nowhere states that there are four levels, an important statement was shown in this chapter where he spoke of similitudes and imitation as the shell of religion and alternatively of a kernel. Several 4th Quarter statements equated the kernel of religion with apprehending the intellectual element of religious matters and its pleasures, such as realizing, as stated in *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*, that God's beauty is not a corporeal or imaginal beauty.

Chapter 3

The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife: The Corporeal–Incorporeal Dichotomy, Corporeal and Intellectual Pleasures, and Related Eschatological Ranks

Chapter Abstract

A problem carrying over from the previous chapter is how al-Ghazālī uses the term religion in his revival of the religious sciences. It was claimed that, as early as the *Tahāfut*, al-Ghazālī accepted the philosophical notion of felicity, but added the scriptural, corporeal notion (of salvation). This was underpinned by the doctrines of a) the soul's eternal survival of bodily death and b) felicity as perfection of the soul through 'intellectual' (*ʿaqliyy*) and incorporeal knowledge fit to cause eternal felicity (in the afterlife) due to being eternally unchanging. It was claimed that these doctrines are shown in this thesis to be the ends to which the praxis of the revival is ordered and that while these two ends make much sense of the structural features of the *Iḥyāʾ*, the notions of religion and interpretation studied in Chapter 1 were unspoken changes introduced to work out the relationships between the layers and reason and revelation. In this chapter, the two said doctrines are shown to be embodied in the *Iḥyāʾ*. Building on this, the implications for what is effectively a second notion of religion (i.e. true religion as the incorporeal linked to the afterlife) are analysed. Finally, the general manner in which this notion of religion and the afterlife informs al-Ghazālī's practice in the *Iḥyāʾ*, distinct from the *Mīzān*, is shown through key passages.

Section I shows that 'intellectual', eternal, incorporeal knowledge is naturalized into the *Iḥyāʾ* and becomes what is termed here 'the afterlife criterion' for distinguishing virtue from vice. This chapter shows that the nature of this knowledge is demonstrative and that al-Ghazālī revisits in the *Iḥyāʾ* what categories of knowledge are demonstrative such that he has a criterion for determining what is true perfection (*kamāl ḥaqīqī*) and is fit for the afterlife (and religion). (The full role of demonstrative knowledge is studied in subsequent chapters.) Other

objects and pleasures not fulfilling this criterion are either used as means or are part of the here-below, purely contrasted with religion.

Section II analyses passages establishing how al-Ghazālī fleshes out these claims, not only working out the body–soul dualism, but evoking the tension between corporeal and incorporeal faculties and their pleasures in a manner drawing on Avicenna's proofs for the philosophical notion of felicity and the related superiority of intellectual pleasures to bodily pleasures. In *Kītāb al-Maḥabba,* al-Ghazālī rehearses the arguments for intellectual pleasures associated with the philosophical notion of felicity. These are shown to mirror Avicenna's own body–soul dualism applied not only to faculties of anger and desire but to the perceptive faculties. The intellectual and its pleasures is thus shown to be coextensive with the incorporeal. Chapter 1 cited important passages which evoked a higher notion of religion, but did not explain it. Specifically, the term 'intellectual sciences of the afterlife' was traced to intellectual pleasures seemingly accepted in the *Tahāfut*. It was shown that Avicenna himself had linked the terms intellectual, spiritual, and 'afterlife' (and also bodily, animal, and here-below), and that al-Ghazālī's terms contained the same link. This implies that the term afterlife means eternal and incorporeal, and that this side of the dichotomy informs his higher notion of religion, and conversely his notion of the here-below. This confirms the *Iḥyā'*s reference cited in Chapter 1 to the reality and kernel to religion, sitting above its shell and similitudes. In *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*, al-Ghazālī defends the intellect, claiming that Sufi condemnations of it refer only to dialectical and *kalām* reasoning, not the demonstrative reasoning he associates with eternity, the incorporeal, and felicity. Thus, this chapter undertakes a highly careful analysis of al-Ghazālī's terminology to avoid reading scholarly presuppositions into them. Crucially in this regard, al-Ghazālī is found to explain unveiling (*kashf*) as increased clarity of intelligibles. This implies that it should not be assumed that his epistemological categories are a dichotomy of imitation and a non-discursive, mystical mode of knowing. Rather, the higher category is a specific notion of intellectual knowledge which is incorporeal, inheres in the incorporeal heart and, as such, requires ethical purification and demonstration or inspiration. Chapter 3 cited *Iḥyā'*, Book XXI that, in both inspiration and speculative inquiry, the knowledge itself if the same and locus is the same: the heart. The search for a yet higher state requires examination of a second level of unveiling (*mukāshafa*), examined at the end of Chapter 4 and in the Conclusion to the thesis.

What we may term a developmental psychology is also shown to extend this dichotomy to corporeal objects of pleasure such as toys, wealth, prestige, and arrogance. These loves and attachments develop progressively in mankind, and each must be overcome to move to the next stage. He describes what we may term a competition between corporeal and incorporeal faculties based on *al-Aḍḥawiyya* and his own expansions and applied in his 3rd Quarter on vices.

Section III shows that al-Ghazālī develops a competition of faculties which is an application of *al-Aḍḥawiyya*'s notion that praxis does not only remove vice, but also gives victory to the incorporeal objects of perception over the corporeal objects of perception, which include not only imagination and estimation, but also objects of play (toys), and later wealth, prestige, and leadership.

I. Two Fundamental Doctrines of the Praxis of the Afterlife: True Religion as Perfection of the Eternal Soul

This chapter takes up the problem from the previous chapter, which is determining how al-Ghazālī uses the term 'religion' in his revival of the religious sciences. Here, further aspects of the dualism will be fleshed out and established. The details of this dualism are needed to evidence the claim that the philosophical notion of incorporeality informs the higher meaning of religion and the afterlife in the key structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*, and several of the statements al-Ghazālī makes in the context of these technical explanations here, as well as in Sections II and III, are needed for further arguments in later chapters regarding the *Iḥyāʾ*'s structure and their implications.[284]

This section will establish that two related doctrines upheld in the *Tahāfut* are also upheld in the *Iḥyāʾ*: the philosophical notion of felicity and the soul's survival of bodily death, treated in I.A and I.B, respectively. Not only is the philosophical notion of felicity upheld, the textual transmission from the *Miʿyār* shows independently of the *Tahāfut* that al-Ghazālī is aware it is the doctrine of the *falāsifa*. The passages in Section I.A are important for this and for specifying the knowledge causing this felicity as demonstrative, including the characteristics of demonstrative knowledge: that it is universal and eternally unchanging. Further, al-Ghazālī is shown to use the firm distinction between demonstrative and non-demonstrative knowledge as what is termed here an afterlife criterion which is shown to inform his notion of 'true' religion, as opposed to imitative or that which aims to obtain the here-below. It becomes the dividing line between what is a true perfection to be aimed at by praxis and between such matters of the here-below as wealth and prestige which are false perfections that many people mistakenly take as their ends. This sets up Section II to add another element of the higher meaning of religion by finding the same ontology and body–soul dualism in psychological faculties and objects of perception. Therein, al-Ghazālī applies the afterlife criterion, weaving the said polarity into the element of inclination to competing pleasures and faculties. Religion is framed in terms of inclining towards the afterlife (read: intellectual, incorporeal, and eternal) as opposed to the here-below (read: animal, corporeal, and changing or evanescent).

[284] These include his defense of the intellect against Sufi critiques and use of unveiling to mean 'increased clarity' regarding intelligibles. These points help us avoid the red herring of assuming that al-Ghazālī's higher syllabus is always non-discursive or mystical in its fundamental nature (not just in one of its possible modes of acquisition: inspiration).

A. The Philosophical Doctrine of Felicity and al-Ghazālī's Afterlife Criterion

In Book XXVIII, which falls within the 3rd Quarter of the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī addresses the notion of the true perfection sought via his praxis, but effectively indicates to his careful reader his adherence to a philosophically conceived notion of felicity. This doctrine thus becomes the end to which his religious revival is primarily directed.[285] This also entails an interpretation of religion: religion itself takes as its aim this felicity obtained through demonstrative knowledge, this knowledge being fit for eternal felicity due to being changeless. The previous chapter referred to the same two doctrines already upheld in the *Tahāfut* which underpin the praxis of the *Iḥyāʾ*: a) the soul is eternal and hence the afterlife is eternal and b) demonstrative, unchanging knowledge is therefore the only fit cause for its felicity.[286] The 3rd Quarter passage translated below establishes that the doctrine is upheld in the *Iḥyāʾ*, while in a related *Miʿyār* passage, al-Ghazālī himself states that that this is the philosophical doctrine of felicity.

The context of the passage is that al-Ghazālī attempts to distinguish carefully between true perfection (*kamāl ḥaqīqī*) which a proper ethical path to felicity should seek, from vainly imagined perfection (*kamāl wahmī*), with which he says people often confuse it, but the wider context is to establish what is truly worth seeking and what is for the eternal, and suited for the afterlife.[287] Al-Ghazālī argues by proffering that the perfection of God's knowledge is due to three attributes: i) quantity, ii) the degree it discloses its object, and iii) duration, i.e. that God's knowledge subsists forever.[288] He first examines which of these are obtainable by human beings, determining this to be knowledge. Then, he examines which type of knowledge remains after death (*baʿd al-mawt*) as a perfection (*kamāl*) of the soul, which accords with his statements elsewhere that the only true good worthy of being sought is felicity in the afterlife.[289]

[285] It is shown below that he also makes room for salvation via imitation.
[286] As noted in Chapter 1, bodily resurrection to arrive at a dualist resurrection which accepts the philosophical position but adds the scriptural position to it.
[287] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:276.10–11. It is evident through reflection that true perfection maps onto goods of the soul which we already know to subsist after death and to be incorporeal.
[288] Ibid., 3:276.11–17.
[289] Ibid., 3.277.13.

The focus of this section is to divide knowledge into two types in terms of duration: that which does not persist forever and that which does.[290] The first category of knowledge—that which does not persist forever—is 'objects of knowledge that change' (*al-mutaghayyirāt*). Al-Ghazālī gives an example he says applies to all examples of this category: belief that Zayd is in the house may turn into ignorance (*jahl*) because it is conceivable (*yutaṣawwar*) that Zayd leave the house; thereby an apparent perfection turns into a deficiency.[291] Thus, this type of belief is not true perfection. This includes geographical 'facts' like the height of a mountain which may change, and linguistic and cultural facts, which we might call contingent facts.[292]

The second division of knowledge in terms of duration is 'eternal objects of knowledge'.[293] This list will be shown to be nearly identical with the eternal and demonstrative knowledge that al-Ghazālī himself in the *Miʿyār* says that the *falāsifa* hold to be the cause of felicity. The first example of such objects listed by al-Ghazālī is (rational) rulings which are judgements that state that the mode of existence of a given object is either necessary existence, impossible existence, or contingent existence.[294] Al-Ghazālī states that none of these categories ever change, giving the example that something which is (rationally) impossible can never become possible or necessary.[295] Al-Ghazālī offers a unique explanation not in the *Miʿyār*, but still according with its list, as follows:

T1, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:276.27–9

> These divisions are included in the knowledge of God and what is necessary and impossible for His attributes and possible for His actions. So, knowledge of God, most high, and His attributes and actions and wisdom in the incorporeal aspect (*malakūt*) of the heavens and earth and the ordering of the here-below and the afterlife (*tartīb al-dunyā wa al-ākhira*) and what is connected to it are included in (that which constitutes) true perfection. (It is that) by which the one who is attributed by it draws close to God, most high, and it remains a perfection of his soul after death.

In spite of the eternality of the objects being based on the divine attributes, the list in the *Miʿyār* is nearly the same. Also, knowledge remaining a perfection of the soul after death entails the existence of the soul after death and enduring bodily death.[296]

[290] Ibid., 3:276.17–18.
[291] Ibid., 3:276.19–21.
[292] Ibid., 3:276.18–24.
[293] Ibid., 3:276.25.
[294] Ibid., 3:276.25–6.
[295] Ibid., 3:276.26–7.
[296] This is corroborated by a 1st Quarter text in Section I.B.

Were we to doubt that al-Ghazālī is aware that the doctrine originates with the *falāsifa* or that he accepts it, the following passage from the *Miʿyār* makes this clear. This telling passage reveals the *Iḥyāʾ*'s foundations from al-Ghazālī's pre-departure career and, importantly, his thought process regarding *falsafa* and felicity. In the midst of a discussion of demonstration, he alludes to its importance as follows:

T2, *Miʿyār*, 257.7–258.7

> The logicians use demonstration (*burhān*) specifically as a technical term for that which generates certainty which is universal, eternal, and necessary. If you do not agree with their coining of this technical terms, you may (still) call all true sciences demonstrative (*burhāniyya*) if the conditions mentioned are conjoined in them. If you do agree with them, then the demonstrative knowledges are the knowledge of God; His attributes; all eternal matters such as, 'two is more than one', for this is eternally true *a parte ante* and *a parte post* (*fī al-azal wa al-abad*); and the astronomical knowledge of the heavens and the planets and their distances, sizes, and how they move—according to those who hold that they are eternal and do not change. (The latter) would not be demonstrative for the people of truth (*ahl al-ḥaqq*) who hold that the celestial (realm) is like the terrestrial in being susceptible to change.
>
> As for what differs according to location and clime such as the sciences of language and politics—which change according to time and nation—and such as conventions of jurisprudence and sharia in terms of the details of (what is) permissible and illicit, it is not hidden that these are not demonstrative according to this terminological use.
>
> The philosophers deem that felicity (*saʿāda*) in the afterlife has no meaning except the soul reaching the perfection which is possible for it to have and that perfection is found in knowledge, not in desires. Because the soul lasts forever, its salvation and felicity is found in the knowledges which are true forever such as the knowledge of God, His attributes, His angels, the order of (the levels of) beings, and chains of cause and effect. As to the sciences which are not certain and permanent (*dāʾima*), if they are sought, they are not sought intrinsically (*li-dhātihā*), but as a means to other knowledge. This topic cannot be unveiled except through long speculative investigation which this book cannot exhaust. Rather, the place for its explanation is in the specific sciences (*ʿulūm mufaṣṣala*).

This passage indicates that al-Ghazālī is aware of the philosophical origins of the doctrine he has integrated into the *Iḥyāʾ* and which serves as the proper end or aim of praxis.[297] Once it is read, the full discussion of felicity of the soul after death and division of which knowledges

[297] Chapter 4 shows al-Ghazālī defends demonstration against claims that *kalām* occasionalism entails that there is no surety between cause and effect, which is dismissed by al-Ghazālī as whisperings of the Devil (*wasāwis*). Michael Marmura's study of the topic makes no reference to this passage, though the passage indicates that he upholds demonstration in the important post-departure work, the *Iḥyāʾ*.

are true perfections is seen in a new light, underpinned by the notion of demonstration. In the *Miʿyār*, al-Ghazālī alerts the reader that one has the option of discarding the term demonstration and focusing on the meaning. This accords with his own version of the passage in the *Iḥyāʾ* in which the term demonstration is dropped, but the meaning is maintained.

While he accepts the doctrine of felicity via demonstrative knowledge, the content is not necessarily accepted. In the *Miʿyār*, the people of truth which likely refers to the *kalām* scholars are said to hold that the celestial realm is susceptible to change and in the *Iḥyāʾ* the spheres are not listed as an unchanging object of knowledge. It is not possible here to engage with how this should be interpreted. One aspect is clarified in Section II of this chapter and in the following chapter: 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife'. There, it is indicated that the *malakūt* is incorporeal and unchanging.[298]

Al-Ghazālī indicates that these metaphysical doctrines underpinning his ethics of the afterlife are woven into the other books of the *Iḥyāʾ*, as follows:

T3, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:277.10–13

> Regarding power (*qudra*), the servant has no share of true perfection coming from it. Rather, the servant has true knowledge (*ʿilm ḥaqīqī*) and no true power (*qudra ḥaqīqiyya*). Only God has real power and that which occurs immediately following the servant's will and power and movement happens through God making it happen as we have established in the *Kitāb al-Ṣabr wa-l-shukr* and *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* and in various places in the Quarter on the Salvific Virtues (*munjiyyāt*). The perfection of knowledge remains with one after death and makes one reach God, most high. As for the perfection of power, no.

This passage indicates that a number of doctrines are woven into the very structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*, and are not merely lip service. These include that reaching God is via knowledge and that this perfection remaining after death is due to the eternal, unchanging nature of the knowledge. Al-Ghazālī establishes the metaphysical attributes for the goal that is worthy of pursuit because it leads to eternal felicity of the soul which outlives bodily death. Hence, it is part of his technical redefinition of religion which is part of his project argued for in later chapters of raising religion itself to obtain the status of demonstrative science.

The fundamental end of al-Ghazālī's praxis is thus built on a philosophical doctrine of felicity. However, the following chapter shows that the *Miʿyār*'s discussion and defence of

[298] Whether this necessarily entails that all celestial bodies are unchanging, etc. is beyond the scope of the current research.

the cause of felicity, demonstration, refers the reader for more details to the *Tahāfut*. Al-Ghazālī may be seen pushing the borders of both reason and revelation. One one hand, the pre-departure *Miʿyār* passage removes from the list one of the eternal objects of knowledge which are arrived at by reason, namely the celestial spheres. On the other hand, Chapter 1 showed that al-Ghazālī insisted on adding a matter from revelation, namely corporeal resurrection. The fundamental doctrines accord with the reason of the philosophers. This is more evidence that the revival of the religious sciences is effected by and connected to the engagement between reason and revelation from the pre-departure phase.

Thus we see what is termed the afterlife criterion. It is a criterion in that it is a very logically defined and precise division for what counts as being for the afterlife and what is not. The sense of afterlife in this criterion is that which lasts forever, because that is what befits the eternal human soul and the matching felicity. This criterion is mentioned in the *Iḥyāʾ* at a juncture in which al-Ghazālī is working to argue for a division capable of withstanding counter-arguments. Later chapters indicate that he deploys the afterlife criterion, and this division becomes the basis for what is a vice and what is a virtue, attachment to the incorporeal constituting a virtue. In defining virtues as such, he innovates with regards to the *akhlāq* tradition, aside from *al-Ishārāt* which may contain an oblique reference to some virtues or stations being caused by the joys and pleasures occurring after arriving at knowledge.

B. The Eternality of the Soul

The second doctrine mentioned in the *Tahāfut* and upon which the *Iḥyāʾ*'s praxis is constructed is the subsistence of the soul after death. Chapter 1 showed that the *Tahāfut* cleared the way for this doctrine, stating that there is no sharia objection to subsistence to the soul. Rather, al-Ghazālī argues, the scriptural term 'return' (*maʿād*) only makes sense through such subsistence. In the same passage, al-Ghazālī also clears the way for the philosophical notion of felicity and intellectual pleasures, but argues that because scripture refers to bodily pleasures, it is superior to join between the bodily and spiritual felicities (*saʿādatayn*).

The key *Iḥyāʾ* passage arguing for the subsistence of the soul does so in scriptural terms. Al-Ghazālī justifies this incursion into the science of speculative unveiling as necessary to show the merit of a practical matter: invocation. Showing the inveterate concern of the *Iḥyāʾ* for what remains after death, he states:

T4, *Iḥyā'*, 1:303.7–305.6

That which is other (*siwā*) than God, mighty and majestic, is that from which one is separated at death. Neither family, wealth, children, nor power remain with one in the grave. Nothing remains but invocation of God. … If one had become intimate with Him, one enjoys Him and takes pleasure in the end of obstacles hindering one because the necessities (*ḍarūrāt al-hājāt*) of earthly life deter one from invoking God, mighty and majestic. After death, there is no obstacle, so it is as though one were turned lose with one's beloved and great bliss overcomes one and one is freed from the prison in which one was prevented from one's source of intimacy. … (Y)ou will be separated from…everything related to the here-below, because in one's regard, it passes away through (one's) death. … In death, the here-below only passes away in relation to one, until it passes away in itself when the book (of destiny) reaches its appointed time. The servant takes pleasure in this intimacy after his death until he comes to dwell in proximity to God…and he ascends…to the encountering (*al-liqā'*; with God) which occurs after what is in the graves is scattered forth. … None should deny that invocation of God… remains with one after death, saying that one will have been caused to cease to exist, so how should invocation of God, mighty and majestic, remain with one. After all, one does not cease to exist in a manner preventing invocation. Rather, one ceases to exist with regard to the here-below and corporeal (*mulk*) and sensible (*al-shahāda*) worlds, not regarding the incorporeal world (*ʿālam al-malakūt*).

There is an allusion to what we have said in his words, God bless him and send him peace, {The grave is either a pit of the hell-fire or a garden of the gardens of Janna}…and his saying…to the dead polytheists of the Battle of Badr, {O so and so, O so and so…have you found what your Lord promised you to be true}. … This prophetic tradition has a sound chain of narration. … This state (i.e. of bodily death) and what is alluded to by these words do not preclude the invocation of God, mighty and majestic.

In this rich passage, al-Ghazālī speaks of the results of dying in a state of intimacy in the invocation of God. He argues for the endurance of the soul after bodily death through citing scripture. In this case, the scripture he cites so clearly indicates some form of subsistence between bodily death and resurrection that one wonders how any *kalām* scholar such as those addressed by *al-Aḍḥawiyya* would insist that the soul ceases to exist at bodily death. In this regard, al-Ghazālī reconciles the positions of the philosophers with scripture. One may also notice, more subtly, that the passage effectively interprets religious phenomena. The here-below and its items are part of the *mulk* which are departed when one's related aspect ceased to exist; namely, one's body. The world of the graves and one's soul are part of the incorporeal world. Thus, this passage serves as evidence of building his praxis on the doctrine

of the soul's survival of bodily death, but it also exemplifies the manner of speaking of abstract doctrines in similitudes, using his bipartite ontology to underpin religious phenomena with causal reasoning.

Nearby passages of the *Iḥyā'* studied in Chapter 5 provide more detail regarding the competition which occurs in the heart which either inclines by force of habit to the here-below or towards God and the afterlife. This is a pillar of al-Ghazālī's praxis and is returned to in Section III.

II. Al-Ghazālī's Bipartite Cosmology and Avicenna's Body–Soul Dualism

The aim of this section is to clarify the outlines of Avicenna's body-soul dualism and reflect on the manner in which it is deployed by al-Ghazālī. This accords with the wider aim of this thesis to move from listing sources *that* al-Ghazālī used to sources to *how* he used them. At the heart of the how question is the discussion of the manner al-Ghazālī sees himself in handling text and theological opinions, or what we may call a conscious role. Chapters 1 and 2 emphasised the snake-handler role, but also inheritor of the prophets. Importantly, it showed him commanding to join between reason and revelation. The bipartite cosmology and psychology are seen to play a part in forming these roles. Also, establishing that al-Ghazālī deploys the particulars of the said psychology is an important contribution to our knowledge of the doctrine of the *Iḥyā'*, and helps make sense of his otherwise bewildering discourse.

Before examining new material, reviewing the presence and use of the body-soul dualism in the preceding chapters will help us see how it and the bipartite cosmology run like an invisible thread through the *Iḥyā'*. Chapter 1 showed that al-Ghazālī's imitative and intellectual sciences mapped onto what he called sight, shared with animals, and insight (or intellect,) unique to mankind. It traced back to Avicenna the notion that the intellectual pleasures and bodily were referred to as the pleasures of the afterlife and here-below, respectively. Thus, levels of the sciences and the distinction between the pleasures of the afterlife and here-below appear built on the dualism. Section III indicates that beyond a mere bipartite cosmology, that the al-Ghazālī theoretizes the relationship between the two, developing manners of speaking of the tensions between the corporeal and incorporeal faculties. This tension is already well but tersely expressed in Avicenna's arguments for the existence of intellectual pleasures. Because of these fundamental uses explaining the structure of the *Iḥyā'*, the present section and chapter are crucial to determine the source of al-Ghazālī's body–soul dualism and to indicate how similar it is to Avicenna's, and to found the further argument that the dualism is used to explain both the incorporeal nature of the higher or true religious phenomena, but also the tension between the here-below and afterlife. To do this, this section identifies the key features of Avicenna's body–soul dualism and shows that al-Ghazālī's own cosmology is not merely a mystical or vaguely conceived one, especially regarding the *malakūt*. Rather, al-Ghazālī's bipartite cosmology is conceived as the corporeal and incorporeal in philosophical and scientific terms not differing from Avicenna's. Then,

Section III will be in position to build on this, analyze al-Ghazālī's own treatment of faculties, objects, and pleasures and establish that shares in the details of Avicenna's dualism. One of the implications of this will be that Avicenna's accompanying notion of intellectual pleasures and the tensions between them is deployed by al-Ghazālī to form a reasoned basis for the tension between religious and worldly acts and object that motivates much of the *Iḥyā'*.

While al-Ghazālī's bipartite cosmology has received much scholarly attention,[299] it is further argued here that this cosmology itself expresses a corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy in which each is conceived of in technical terms not differing with those of Avicenna, and agreeing to a lesser degree with certain *falāsifa* such as al-Fārābī and Miskawayḥ. While one aware of their writings may infer that al-Ghazālī's division of the faculties, bodily pleasures, and intellectual pleasures associated with 'divine matters' is invoking the said technical dichotomy, the point becomes much clearer through collecting statements from disparate parts of the *Iḥyā'*. The dichotomy was also seen in Section I's discussion of eternal, unchanging knowledge, Avicenna's arguments based on the dichotomy for intellectual pleasures. Further, their superiority is rehearsed in the *Iḥyā'*, Book XXII, and in the *Mīzān*.[300] This may make the presence of the dichotomy obvious to some, but another passage in the *Iḥyā'* cited below spells out the technical nature in terms matching those of the philosophers.[301] Collectively, this will indicate that the array of terms al-Ghazālī deployed for the human reality—whether termed intellect, heart, insight, etc.—all share the characteristics of the incorporeal.

Avicenna's syllabus provides a broadly Aristotelian framework attempting to account for all phenomena under a broadly speaking Aristotelian scientific framework, and greatly expands the explanation of religious phenomena through the same causal framework.[302] One

[299] See Chapter 2, Section I, for a partial bibliography.
[300] See Chapter 5.
[301] Additionally, Chapter 4 contains passages from *Kītāb Sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb* indicating that this incorporeal or the incorporeal realm is identical with the crucial term '*malakūt*'.
[302] Al-Akiti claims that one reason Avicenna becomes al-Ghazālī's favourite *falsafī* author is that 'Ibn Sina's writings did present the best-unified general system of scientific thought that included psychology, citing "the best survey of Ibn Sina's philosophical synthesis combining the classical materials as well as current Muslim one's"', by which he intends R. E. Hall, 'Intellect, Soul and Body in Ibn Sìnà', in *Interpreting Avicenna*. Al-Akiti explains that Hall shows just how deep the thorough-going integration of psychology is in virtually all aspects of Avicenna's thought, and that that success 'sets the standards and prepares the way for later systematic thinkers of the Islamic and Jewish middle ages' (64). Al-Ghazālī's role and how this informs the *Iḥyā'* al-Akiti explains as follows:

T5, al-Akiti, 'The Good, the Bad and the Ugly', 56–7n15

> Indeed, al-Ghazālī was himself one such systematizer, and probably the first from the religious community to recognize and attend to this successful synthesis. He…

of the most notable changes Avicenna wrought to the *falsafa* tradition he inherited was to rework it to accord with the doctrine that the soul survives bodily death to accord with Islamic beliefs. Jon McGinnis explains this point with reference to the Aristotelian tradition, saying, '...one of the characteristics that distinguishes Avicenna's psychology from that of most other medieval thinkers working within the Aristotelian tradition is his advocacy of a substance dualism in the case of the human soul or intellect…(in the sense that) for Avicenna the human body and soul are two distinct substances, one material the other immaterial.'[303] This included, as summarized by McGinnis, arguing that 'the human intellect (is) essentially immaterial and so capable of existing separate from the body, but also that only in a disembodied state can the intellect fully and completely perform that action most proper to it—namely, contemplation and particularly contemplation of the Necessary Existent'.[304] To this end, he distinguished very carefully between psychological phenomena such as the stages of thought, memory, and abstraction which involve corporeal and those that involve incorporeal psychological faculties.[305] The intellect itself perceives the intelligible species abstracted from material concomitants, 'such as having a certain quantity, quality, or even having spatial and temporal locations—that are the hallmarks of natural bodies studied by both general physics and psychology'.[306] The perception, on the other hand of natural embodied particulars things are 'in a very real sense…the proper objects of animal perception'[307] in the sense that they are perceived by faculties shared with animals. Thus, for Avicenna, the philosophical distinctions between the corporeal and incorporeal divide and cut across all beings. The soul is incorporeal and while corporeal faculties may play a role in certain types of perception, the nature of the soul after death and whatever felicity is

> integrated Avicennian psychological theory fully into a religious framework and, indeed, crowned it there. It is thus not surprising that we find the *De anima* tradition transmitted effectively through *kitāb* XXI of the *Iḥyā'*, the *Kītāb Sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb* (Explaining the Wonders of the Heart), which, in turn, not only prefaces the *akhlāq* books of the *Iḥyā'*, but forms the theoretical basis for the philosophical ethics embedded in those books.

Dimitri Gutas claims that Avicenna was more effective and complete than his Greek and Arabic predecessors who had explained the psychology of religious phenomena. In the process, Avicenna did this within the theory of Aristotelian psychology, though greatly expanding its application to accommodate the demands of the new subject and in the process producing a veritable metaphysics of the rational soul. (See Dimitri Gutas, 'Avicenna's Philosophical Project', 33–4.)

[303] McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 94.

[304] Ibid., 217.

[305] The passages from several of Avicenna's works in which he delineates the objects and pleasures of the various corporeal faculties of perception and locomotion are gathered in the following section.

[306] McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 217.22–5.

[307] Ibid., 217.25–7.

proportioned for it have been crafted by Avicenna to be independent of matter.[308] Discussion of the *Tahāfut* in Chapter 1 showed that al-Ghazālī accepts Avicenna's technical doctrine of the incorporeality of the soul and its afterlife, merely adding the doctrine of bodily pleasure to what is derived from *al-Aḍḥawiyya*. While Sections I and III confirm related doctrines in the *Iḥyā'*, this section aims a) to show that the cosmology (and ontology) of the corporeal and incorporeal itself is adopted by al-Ghazālī and b) to show how it runs through a gamut of terms he invokes but draws on in a manner which may prevent seeing how the meanings of the bipartite cosmology lie behind those terms.

While al-Ghazālī often invokes his dualist cosmology, he less commonly reveals its philosophical nature. The dualism built on the philosophical division into the corporeal and incorporeal is most clearly stated in the *Iḥyā'* as follows:

T6, *Iḥyā'*, 3:371.1–3

> The world is in fact composed of two worlds (*ʿālamān*): the world of command (*al-amr*) and the world of creation (*ʿālam al-khalq*). Both the command and creation belong to God. Bodies (*ajsām*) which possess quantity (*al-kammiyya*) and measurement (*maqādīr*) are from the world of creation because creation (*khalq*) means measurement (*taqdīr*) by linguistic convention. On the other hand, every existent which transcends quantity and measurement is of the world of command (*ʿālam al-amr*).

The ontology is exhaustive, covering 'the world', which means that everything is either corporeal or incorporeal. The corporeal world is all which has the characteristics of quantity, presumably meaning extension, and measurability. In the 4th Quarter, al-Ghazālī makes it clear that the incorporeal reality is termed the world of command, at least in part, because it is the commander over the corporeal world and dictates what occurs and manifests in it.[309] As we will see, whether or not the terms have specific connotations based on their Arabic

[308] This is to set aside for the moment the issue of Avicenna's position on the nature of the lower aspect of the afterlife, imaginal or otherwise.

[309] T7, *Iḥyā'*, 4:25.28–33, *Kitāb al-Tawba*:

> I don't mean by the heart this which is covered by the bones of the chest (ribs), rather I mean the secret (*sirr*) which is from the world of command (*ʿālam al-amr*) and it (i.e. the physical heart) is the flesh which is its throne (*ʿarsh*) from the world of creation (*ʿālam al-khalq*) and the chest is its pedestal (*kursī*) and the rest of its limbs (*aʿḍā*) are its world. That secret is the one about which God has said, 'Say, the spirit is of the affair of my Lord' ('*Qul al-rūḥ min amri Rabbī*'), is the commander (*amīr*) and king because between the world of command and the world of creation is an ordering (or rank). The world of command (*amr)* is commander (*amīr*) over the world of creation and it is the subtlety which if sound the rest of the body is sound (*ṣaluḥa*).

While the passages refers to the human soul (strongly indicating it is incorporeal), the passage uses general terms which invoke the same bipartite cosmology and ontology in our present passage.

etymology, they are all used by al-Ghazālī to refer to two worlds, the only two worlds this passage says exist.[310] This has countless implications for wherever al-Ghazālī invokes a dichotomy of sight and insight, animal and human (or angel), *mulk* and *malakūt*, seen and unseen, or creation and command. In these cases, he is surely referring to elements which fall on one or other side of the dichotomy and thus have the very specific sets of attributes which the corporeal and incorporeal, respectively, possess. With some caution, the following chapter will show this is also the case for the additional terms: inner–outer, kernel–shell, and sharia–ultimate reality.

Al-Ghazālī deploys several pairs of terms aligning with the world of creation and command. The set referring to the corporeal includes: the corporeal world (*mulk*), the world of bodies (*ajsām*), the seen (*shahāda*), and the outer (*ẓāhir*). The here-below is said to be a state of the soul while in the corporeal world. The set of terms referring to the incorporeal will be seen to include: the incorporeal world (*malakūt*), lordly matters (*umūr rabbānī*), the unseen (*ghayb*), and the inner (*bāṭin*). Finally, al-Ghazālī says that the afterlife (*ākhira*) is a state of the soul while in the *malakūt* after death of the body.

We now turn to the evidence for the dichotomous list just provided. The majority of the terms are spelled out in a 1st Quarter passage where al-Ghazālī states:

T8, *Iḥyā'*, 1:120.7–11

> This (mutual effect between body and soul) will come in the Quarters on the Destructive Vices and Salvific Virtues where the manner of connection of the outer and inner and of works (of the limbs) to beliefs and the heart are explained, because that is one type of the connection between the corporeal world (*mulk*) and incorporeal world (*malakūt*). By corporeal world, I mean the seen world (*'ālam al-shahāda*) perceived by the senses and by the incorporeal world the unseen world perceived by the light of insight (*nūr al-baṣīra*). The heart is of the incorporeal world while the organs (*a'ḍā'*) and their works are from the corporeal world.

In addition to adding several terms to our list presented above, this passage also adds to *the attributes* of two worlds which lie behind the terms. One of the worlds is perceived by sight, the other by insight. The passage also states that the heart is from the incorporeal world while the body is from the corporeal. While there are other important matters raised by this passage, what is directly necessary for the argument pursued in this chapter is to show the philosophical incorporeality imbibing al-Ghazālī's notion of religion in his religious revival.

[310] While al-Ghazālī has a notion of a third level referred to as the *jabarūt*, it plays almost no explicit role in the *Iḥyā'* and appears only in Book XXXVI of the 4th Quarter.

Two final terms are found by returning to our 3rd Quarter passage as follows, 'If one knows himself and Lord, one knows that it (i.e. the self) is intrinsically (*bi-ṭabʿihi*) a lordly matter (*amr rabbānī*) through its natural disposition (*fiṭratihi*) and that it is foreign (*gharīb*) in the corporeal world (*al-ʿālam al-jismānī*)'.[311] The phrase divine matter (*amr ilāhī*) is used at least once in a similar sense to distinguish the soul from visible bodies.[312]

Al-Ghazālī later confirms that the lower or corporeal world proceeds from the higher or incorporeal world in a law-like manner as follows: 'Know that repentance (*tawba*) is a meaning composed of three ordered things: knowledge (*ʿilm*), state (*ḥāl*), and action (*fiʿl*). The first necessitates the second and the second necessitates the third. This necessitation is caused by a necessity which is [itself] entailed by the consistency (*ittiraḍ*) of God's inveterate practice (*sunnat Allāh*) in the *mulk* and *malakūt*'.[313] Earlier in this chapter, another additional term was discussed: the human spirit (*rūḥ*). It was said to be not only a lordly matter, but a celestial matter (*samāwī*). We have previous reason to believe that the soul is incorporeal; linking the soul to lordly and celestial matters not only corroborates this, but indicates that al-Ghazālī views the two as sharing in some relation to the incorporeal (*malakūt*). The evidence takes in a wider scope once we observe that the dichotomous terms, across the topics of psychology and cosmology, are deployed to refer to two sets of terms that all share in being corporeal or incorporeal. (See Table 3.1.) While none are pure synonyms, terms like the visible, seen, corporeal, and here-below all have the same referent. They refer to the same two realities: a) an incorporeal world perceived only by the incorporeal human organ and b) a corporeal world known by the five senses shared with animals.

Mulk	Seen	Bodies	Creation	Inner	(Here-below)
Malakūt	Unseen	Lordly / Divine Matters	Command	Outer	(Afterlife)

Table 3.1 Various terms in the *Iḥyā'* for the two worlds

[311] *Iḥyā'*, *Kitāb Dhamm al-gharūr*, 3:371.4–7.
[312] *Iḥyā'*, 1:54.24–9. There, al-Ghazālī says that every created thing has a relation (*nisba*) to God, but that its relation is more noble (*ashraf*) than the relation of the rest of the limbs. Al-Ghazālī explains this with the cryptic statements that God possesses the creation (*khalq*) and command (*amr*), the world of command just shown to be the incorporeal world dictating the corporeal world. This thus seems an allusion to the human soul having a special relation to God because it is also incorporeal and commands corporeal matters.
[313] *Iḥyā'*, 4:3.14–16.

The citations made here suffice to establish that al-Ghazālī uses the terms as synonyms or at least terms which share the same object of reference. The passages cited above are the clearest statements of a dichotomy and that it is a thorough ontology, but Chapter 4 contains passages that define (rather than describe) the *mulk* and *malakūt*.[314] In summary, they explain that the *malakūt* is the world in which knowledge of all realities and events is stored, and the world of the hearts of the angels which contain this knowledge. If we notice that the incorporeal world of Avicenna is the world of incorporeal substances and the knowledge which inheres in them, we notice that al-Ghazālī's *malakūt* does not contradict this philosophically construed world. The importance of this alignment is that in the *Iḥyā'* al-Ghazālī often makes mere allusions or explicitly raises his pen from the science of speculative unveiling, being less explicit about philosophical matters than, for instance, in the *Mīzān*. Thus, analysing the passages in which he discusses his cosmology helps avoid facile tendencies either to assume an Avicennian ontology or Sufi cosmology and to better found reasoning on his application of this dichotomy in his reconstruction of the religious sciences.

Much supporting evidence for the list summarized in Table 3.1 comes from outside the present chapter. An example of the technical dichotomy running behind appearances is found in the following section in which a scholar who cannot conceive of a human loving of God necessarily only has knowledge of the shell of religion, not its kernel. When al-Ghazālī explains that this is because such as scholar limits the notion of beauty to physical form, not to incorporeal form, it is clear he is drawing on the explanatory power of the dichotomy address subtle theological topics.[315] Another example preceded: Chapter 2, Section III, explained that theological topics, including the divine attributes, eschatology, and praxis, had two levels. This included theological discourse ranging from the poles of anthropomorphism to transcendence, poles argued there to be taken from *al-Aḍḥawiyya* and its notion of corporeal faculties of perception and their determination whether a discourse is anthropomorphic or an

[314] Chapter 4 argues the ontological dichotomy of imitation and demonstration explain why al-Ghazālī permits of literalism and *kalām* theology in spite of both failing to obtain knowledge of the realities of things. While his higher science does so and conveys what is incorporeal and eternal to the human soul, it cannot be reached by most people who should nonetheless adhere to the imitative and dialectic discourses of the respective sciences because while they are imitative and similitudinous and corporeal, they are aligned to the higher truth by virtue of being coined by prophets.

[315] While Chapter 2 showed that a scholar failing to understand incorporeal beauty and love (i.e. intellectual pleasure) perceived by the incorporeal faculty only obtained the shell rather than the kernel of religion, the following section displays the full context in which the dichotomous distinction gives a specific sense to the term religion in his religious revival in which the kernel of religion means the philosophically defined incorporeal afterlife.

abstract discourse. The nuance and importance of this usage lends importance to the efforts undertaken in the present section to establish, rather than take for granted, that a sharp, ontological dichotomy underpinned this theological reasoning.

III. Intellectual Pleasures and Love of God and the Afterlife

This section will cite a passage indicating the theoretical link between the intellectual pleasures of the philosophers and religious pleasures and inclinations. Once established, the passages indicate again that al-Ghazālī has theoretized and given a causal basis to a religious topic. The key passage studied here indicates that the pleasure obtained in love, the primary character virtue of the path of the afterlife, is based on Avicenna's notion of intellectual pleasures and takes for granted his body–soul dualism. This dualism and the tension between corporeal and intellectual pleasures is important to explain the key virtue of the *Iḥyā'* and this section and the next are important for avoiding red herrings in Ghazālī scholarship. This section shows the host of terms al-Ghazālī deploys for intellect, including insight and divine light, while the next section shows that unveiling means intellectual knowledge inhering in the soul, whether obtained through ethical purification followed by intellectual demonstration or directly by inspiration. It also supports the following section, Section IV, in explaining how al-Ghazālī expands this into a notion of the competition between corporeal and incorporeal faculties built on the list of Avicennian corporeal objects of apprehension enumerated in the present section. That list goes on to form the backbone of the 3rd Quarter and the rectification of the soul (*tarbiya*) of the *Iḥyā'*.

In the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*, al-Ghazālī describes clearly and affirms both an afterlife of pleasures of the body and soul, and elsewhere he states that the bodily accord with the Koranic depictions of the afterlife. The full implications of this passage may only be seen in the context of the crucial passages surrounding it. They show that al-Ghazālī adopts a very clear distinction between the abstract intellectual faculties and the corporeal bodily pleasures. We will see that he rehearses the competition between the superior intellectual pleasures and the inferior corporeal pleasures and their associated faculties which are then shown in Section IV.A to be the basis for the distinction between his own creatively rejigged vices and virtues. For the present, the current section explains how the competition between these two disparate sets of faculties underpins al-Ghazālī's notion of the path of the afterlife. Section IV.B will also challenge whether unveiling in the *Iḥyā'* is a radically different phenomena from true intellection which is incorporeal and perfects what is distinct of the human soul, by whatever name one might call it, such as insight, intellect, or heart. Together, this will allow us to see how the dichotomy is fundamental for al-Ghazālī's praxis and his redefined path of religion,

and that unveiling fits into the higher, incorporeal level rather than being the ultimate and mystical outcome of the *Iḥyā'*. This itself is important due to several passages in the *Iḥyā'* that serve as red herrings for researchers, referring to a dichotomy between imitation and unveiling, leading to the assumption that the path of praxis is solely aimed at traversing from imitation to an ineffable, mystical realisation.

A. The *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*: The Backbone of the Link between Intellectual Pleasure and the Afterlife

The *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* is one of the most theoretically significant books of the *Iḥyā'*, containing passages which frame the whole trajectory and meaning of the *Iḥyā'* and its path of praxis. The current string of passages stretching across this section and Section IV indicate: a) that the intellect, insight, and light of belief are synonyms in the *Iḥyā'*; b) that there are two levels of paradise (*janna*): i) one of bodily pleasures for those who fall short of (developing) intellectual pleasure and ii) one for intellectual pleasures; and further, c) that unveiling (*kashf*) in the *Iḥyā'* is a deepening of intellectual knowledge, rather than a necessarily non-discursive experience. This might seem to give an exaggerated importance to the intellect. However, al-Ghazālī explains that the notion of intellect he has in mind is far from that associated with debate and dialectics, a *kalām* view that he indicates the Sufis are right for criticizing. The notion of the intellect offered by al-Ghazālī is abstract and incorporeal. This is why it is fit for eternal felicity. However, rather than presuming that this indicates it is not spiritual, we should mind that in the *Tahāfut* al-Ghazālī uses the term intellectual to mean incorporeal and to distinguish a given entity from being sensible and corporeal and that he uses spiritual (*rūḥānī*) as a synonym for intellectual.[316] Perhaps this upholding of the integrity of the intellect aims at offering a rationally defensible alternative to imitation of Bāṭinī imams or the following of Sufi sheikhs he indicates lead to spending twenty years in vain imaginings as he states.

The passages by which al-Ghazālī weaves the body–soul dichotomy into the heart of the *Iḥyā'* fall within the lengthily titled, 'Explanation that the greatest and highest pleasure is the gnosis (*maʿrifa*) of God and the gazing (*naẓar*) upon His noble Countenance and that it is inconceivable that another pleasure be preferred over it save by one debarred from it

[316] See the closing reflections of this chapter for a study of the crossover of terms used for the intellectual and spiritual.

pleasure'. A good Avicennian introduction to pleasure should begin with a definition relating it to perception. Fulfilling this particular expectation, al-Ghazālī states:

T9, *Iḥyā'*, 4:299.18–20

> Know that the (kinds of) pleasure depend on the (kinds of) apprehension (*idrākāt*). The human being conjoins a group of faculties and propensities (*gharā'iz*) and each faculty and propensity has a pleasure. Its pleasure is for it to obtain that which is entailed by (*muqtaḍā*) its nature (*tab'iha*) for which it was created. This is because these faculties were not created frivolously nor in jest, but rather each faculty and propensity (was created) for a matter which is entailed by its nature.

This passage repeats the doctrine that the human being comprises different faculties, stated more technically than the *Kitāb Sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb* summary, scriptural, and highly metaphorical rendition of the *De Anima*. The current passage also refers to the doctrine that every organ was created for a purpose. This doctrine is used in Book XXII on the doctrine of rectification (*tarbiya*). Chapter 5 devoted to the topic of the core elements of the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* shows that al-Ghazālī uses the purpose for which a faculty was created to determine whether one is engaging within the limits of necessity, or else exceeding them for the sake of pleasure, which generates attachment to corporeal pleasures and vice. However, the clear distinction he makes between the corporeal and incorporeal technically in the present passage paves the way for him to go beyond existing manuals of practical ethics and outline a set of vices as he does in the 3rd Quarter, as shown in Section IV. Those vices are built on the various corporeal objects and attachments rather than on extremes occurring in the three central faculties of the soul.

Al-Ghazālī proceeds to offer a list of faculties and their pleasures—again, being more thorough than that found in *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs*—as follows:

T10, *Iḥyā'*, 4:299.20–3

> Thus, the propensity of anger was created for gratifying one's thirst for revenge and reprisal (*intiqām*). Therefore, its pleasure is necessarily in victory and reprisal which is the entailment of its nature. And, the propensity of the lust (*shahwa*) for food, for example, was created to obtain nutrition which brings about subsistence. Therefore, its pleasure is necessarily in obtaining nutrition which is the entailment of its nature. Similarly, the pleasure of the senses of hearing, sight, and smell is in listening, seeing, and smelling. Thus, each of these propensities has a pain and pleasure in relation to its objects of perception (*mudrakāt*).

This is followed by a crucial clarification of terms that are often used in the *Iḥyā'*, but not explained. These terms are gathered around a single meaning, as follows:

T11, *Iḥyā'*, 4:299.23–299.32

Similarly, in the heart is a propensity (*gharīza*) called the divine light (*al-nūr al-ilāhiyya*) due to His saying, most high, {Is he whose bosom Allah hath expanded for al-Islam, so that he followeth a light from his Lord, (as he who disbelieveth) ?} (Koran 39:22) and it may be called the intellect (*al-ʿaql*) and it may be called inner insight (*al-baṣīra al-bāṭina*) and the light of belief (*nūr al-imān*) and certainty (*al-yaqīn*). There is no meaning to busying oneself with names (*asāmī*) because nomenclature (*iṣṭilaḥāt*) differs (from one group to another) and the weak deems that the difference is in the meanings (*maʿānī*). (This is) because the weak one seeks meaning from terms which is the opposite of what should be the case.

The heart is separate (*mufāriq*) from the rest of the parts of the body due to an attribute by which it apprehends meanings (*maʿānī*) which are neither imaginable (*mutakhayyila*) nor sensible (*maḥsūsa*). An example (of what it apprehends which is neither imaginable nor sensible) is its apprehension that the world is created and has an impoverished neediness for a beginninglessly eternal creator and wise manager of affairs (who is) characterized by divine attributes. Thus, let us term this propensity (*gharīza*) 'intellect' (*ʿaqlan*) on the condition that what is understood by the term intellect is not that by which one apprehends the methods of dialectic (*mujādala*) and debate (*munāẓara*), for the name intellect has become widely known for this (meaning). For this reason, some of the Sufis disparaged it. Otherwise, the attribute by which human beings are separated from pack animals and by which gnosis (*maʿrifa*) of God is apprehended is the mightiest of attributes. Thus, it should not be blamed. This propensity was created to know the true natures (*ḥaqāʾiq*) of everything. Gnosis and knowledge are what are entailed by its nature (*muqtaḍā ṭabʿihā*) and (they are) its pleasure just as what is entailed by other propensities is (that in which lies) their pleasure.

In this telling passage, al-Ghazālī weaves several arguments together: a) the Avicennian arguments of the nature of perception, the resultant pleasure, the superiority of the intellect, and b) his own non-Avicennian socially contextualized defence of the intellect against the Sufis and, implicitly, against the *kalām* scholars. The terms he lists for intellect all refer to the one, unique human faculty, and thus have the same reference even if they are not strictly synonymous. This allows us to, as Herbert Davidson said in a similar context, 'cut through the verbiage', and see that in spite of a dazzling display of multifarious and seemingly mystical terms, al-Ghazālī has a very specific and technical notion of the soul and intellect. The claim of the presence of Avicennian psychology in al-Ghazālī's works including the *Iḥyā'* is not new, and has been put forward by the penetrating study of Alexander Treiger. However, in the

context of an intense study of the *Iḥyā'*, one must take account of the many terms which appear to refer to Sufi psychology or, in general, to faculties or even experiences not addressed in the philosophical psychology of Avicenna, including light, insight, expansion of the breast, and so on. In this passage, al-Ghazālī makes it clear that these terms refer to one matter that is the human reality which apprehends the incorporeal realities of the things of the world and which distinguishes man from beast. While the notion that the real human is not the body, but the subtle reality responsible for actions, is a trope, Chapter IV, Section II contains a passage in which al-Ghazālī leaves little doubt that all phenomena, mental and 'mystical', occur in the same locus. He particularly addresses the difference between learning and inspiration, saying they that not only is the locus of these two types of knowledge the same, but the knowledge itself is the same. The difference between the two is the manner in which the veil is pushed aside. If we examine them, we may note that the dichotomy of sensible and intellectual aligns with 'the afterlife criterion' studied in Section I which divided all goods (including knowledge) into the changing corporeal and unchanging incorporeal. The afterlife criterion itself invokes a hard and fast corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy as set out in Section II. Further, we may note al-Ghazālī's use of this dichotomy. In discussion of the afterlife criterion and in the *Iḥyā'* passage on the persistence of the soul after bodily death, al-Ghazālī's technical apparatus offers him the criterion of a division: that which changes or is part of the *mulk* is associated with the here-below and what is eternal and unchanging is associated with the afterlife.[317] In the small sample of passages in this chapter alone, al-Ghazālī makes weaves this rational into numerous religious topics, such as the eschatological outcome of the soul, based on whether its intimacy is with the corporeal or incorporeal.

After drawing a technical line between the types of faculties, al-Ghazālī rehearses a set of arguments for the superiority of the intellectual pleasures shown in Section III.B to underpin a dichotomy of ranks in the afterlife: one of bodily pleasures and one of intellectual pleasures. The same set of arguments is treated in more than one work of Avicenna, used to argue for a particular nature of the afterlife (*maʿād*). The textual manner in which Avicenna treats the same topic is highly consistent with al-Ghazālī's. Al-Ghazālī is all too aware of this

[317] Below it is made clear that al-Ghazālī forges two ranks in the afterlife, the higher rank of felicity being based on developing intellectual perception (leaving the corporeal paradise of houris for the commoners). The division between the corporeal and intellectual pleasures is used to underpin the religious choice the love of bodily pleasures and love of knowledge of God and closeness to Him. This is seen in the manner in which al-Ghazālī lays out the technical doctrine, then ties it into his reasoning regarding these religious discussions and distinctions.

theory from his engagement in the *Tahāfut*. There, after a characteristically clear summary of the faculties of motion and perception,[318] he relates the proof of the *falāsifa* for the incorporeality of the soul.[319] Avicenna argues that felicity in the afterlife is for the incorporeal rational soul to achieve its specific perfection (*kamāl khāṣṣ*) which is to become imprinted with knowledge.[320] He argues elsewhere that this knowledge is incorporeal and therefore fit to perfect the human intellect which is itself immaterial and therefore capable of existing separate from the body.[321] This is only partially possible in this life, and Avicenna shows awareness that this matter may seem far-fetched as the majority of mankind does not experience even what is possible of this intellectual pleasure. Thus, in more than one work, he deploys an argument for the existence and superiority of intellectual pleasures based on the nature of pleasure: each faculty has a specific object and pleasure which is for that faculty to apprehend suitable and appropriate objects of perception. Several independent lines of argument are put forward for intellectual pleasures being superior to bodily pleasures, and also for the preventatives which explain why they are not experienced (or even conceivable) by all people.[322] In the case of the *Shifāʾ*, Avicenna presents a list of objects which are proper to and cause pleasure for each specific faculty of perception. His list is similar to the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* passage above in that they each exceed the faculties of anger and desire (i.e. the concupiscent and irascible faculties), referring to other senses.[323] These perceptions and pleasures are then made subject to a set of criteria for establishing the superiority of

[318] *Tahāfut*, 297.1–303.9.
[319] Ibid., 82.4–85.9.
[320] McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 219.
[321] Ibid., 217.
[322] For example, a child is unable to conceive why an adult would leave play and undergo great hardship to preserve a leadership role and, in Avicenna's example, a eunuch is unable to conceive of sexual pleasures.
[323] *Shifāʾ*: *Ilāhiyyāt*, 348.9–14 (IX.7). Avicenna's list more thoroughly covers the inner senses as follows:

T12, *Shifāʾ*: *Ilāhiyyāt*, 348.17–23 (IX.7)

> Thus we say: One must know that each faculty of the soul has a pleasure and a good specific to it, and also a pain and evil specific to it. For example, the pleasure and good of the faculty of desire (*al-shahwa*) is for a sensuous quality which accords (*mulāʾima*) with it to reach it. The pleasure of the faculty of anger is vanquishing (one's foe). The pleasure of the estimative faculty is entertaining one's hopes. The pleasure of the retentive faculty (*ḥifẓ*) is recollecting agreeable matters of the past.

Cf. McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 218, which discusses Avicenna's listing of objects particular to the faculties.

intellectual pleasures[324] and Avicenna claims the only reason we do not experience intellectual pleasures and their superiority now is that the body impedes or distracts us from them.[325]

Al-Ghazālī continues in the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* to follow the general topography of Avicennian arguments for intellectual pleasure and felicity in the afterlife, serving to confirm how the incorporeal and the incorporeal, whether it be termed intellectual or spiritual, inform al-Ghazālī's notion of religion. He turns to a set of arguments that knowledge is the greatest of pleasures.[326] He further speaks of its nobility which he says depends on the object of knowledge: the more noble an object of knowledge, the more pleasurable.[327] The noblest object of knowledge is the creator and sustainer of all other objects: God.[328] One who believes this, he says, should not doubt that the most pleasurable knowledge is awareness of the secrets of Lordship (*asrār al-rubūbiyya*) and knowledge of the hierarchy of divine matters (*umūr ilāhiyya*) which encompass all existing things, seemingly a reference to celestial beings.[329] There is an unmistakable resemblance between this knowledge and the knowledge which is the specific perfection of the rational soul in the *Maʿād* section of the *Shifāʾ* and the knowledge causing perfection of the intellect in the *Ishārāt* (*Namaṭ* 8, *Maqāmāt al-ʿarifīn*).[330] It is significant that al-

[324] Ibid., 218–19. In the *Ishārāt*, Avicenna takes a line of reasoning which attempts to show that the features of faculties are universal, but there he focusses on the notion of a given perception being a perfection of its faculty, arguing more briefly as follows: he lists the different types of corporeal apprehension after discussing how the sense of an organ might be impeded (by anaesthesia, sickness, or being undeveloped) and that a mode of apprehension might certainly exist, yet longing (*shawq*) for it will not be present if direct experience (*dhawq*) has not occurred for one. (See *al-Ishārāt*, 4:19). He then discusses the respective perfections (*kamālāat*) of several faculties, each being that the soul (itself) be qualified by a quality related to that faculty. (See ibid., 4:21.). This, he states, applies to all the rest of the faculties (having also referred to the senses of touch and smell). (See ibid.)

[325] Ibid., 220.

[326] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:299.32–300.2.

[327] Ibid., 4:300.3–12.

[328] Ibid., 4:300.12–15.

[329] Ibid., 4:300.15–17.

[330] See *Shifāʾ*: *Ilāhiyyāt*, 350.7–14 (IX.7) and *al-Ishārāt*, 4:22–3.

In Section IV below treating the dualist cosmology, we will see that the term '*amr ilāhī*' is used alongside the *malakūt* to refer to matters which are incorporeal. While Avicenna does not say the incorporeal beings encompass corporeal things, it is not a great stretch from saying corporeal things that have come from incorporeal beings are represented incorporeally in them, seen in McGinnis' translation of the knowledge which perfects the soul through imprinting in it, as follows, '...there is impressed on the rational soul the form of the cosmos, the cosmos' intelligible order…starting from the First Cause of the cosmos, followed by the high ranking absolutely immaterial substances and then the immaterial substances associated with bodies through the celestial bodies (and) their configurations', (McGinnis, *Avicenna*, 219). This highly resembles al-Ghazālī's reference here in *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* to knowledge of God's management of His kingdom from throne down to the subterranean spheres (*Iḥyāʾ*, 4:300.19). (In the passages from the *Shifāʾ* and *Ishārāt* cited above, Avicenna indicates that the accurate representation of the form of existence means the interconnectivity of the levels from which the corporeal manifests.)

Also, al-Ghazālī's *mukāshafa* leading to felicity has been studied by Alexander Treiger who shows its origins to partly be in Avicenna. We may see how al-Ghazālī's notion of the divine matters encompassing the existents of the world is a translation as it were of Avicenna's notions Section IV which summarizes the cosmology of the *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* in which the *malakūt* surrounding corporeal things are the hearts (read:

Ghazālī's treatment of the superiority of incorporeal pleasures includes mention of a this knowledge which causes 'the most pleasure', but unlike Avicenna, al-Ghazālī does not say this is the cause of felicity in the afterlife. But, the similarities are undeniably supported from other texts in the *Iḥyā'*. Al-Ghazālī states that it is the knowledge obtained by contemplation which, in his words, 'leads to felicity; rather, it is felicity itself'. Also, Section II.B below shows that this knowledge is linked to the higher level of pleasures in the afterlife, the pleasures of those who know God.

The immediate context of this gnosis is shown by al-Ghazālī to sit clearly within the dualist faculty psychology set out already in this section. He explains, commenting on this gnosis, as follows:

T13, *Iḥyā'*, 4:300.19–21

> It should be known that the pleasure of gnosis (*maʿrifa*) is stronger than the other pleasures, by which I mean the pleasure of the concupiscent and irascible faculties (*al-shahwa wa-l-ghaḍab*) and the pleasure of the rest of the five senses. This is because pleasures differ firstly in type, like the difference between the pleasure of copulation and the pleasure of hearing (pleasant sounds), or the difference between the pleasure of gnosis and the pleasure of leadership. Then, (secondly) they differ in weakness and strength.

The strength of a given pleasure may increase under particular circumstances, for instance food eaten when one is hungry or seeing a beautiful face, if the face is strikingly beautiful.[331] It is possible to determine which faculty predominates in one by noting which pleasure is stronger; this may be seen by one who is given food while playing chess and keeps playing, leaving the food.[332] Al-Ghazālī derives from this a rule (later used to set apart his list of vices) stated as follows:

T14, *Iḥyā'*, 4:300.26–9

> This is a true criterion (*miʿyār ṣādiq*). This criterion is true in revealing the predomination of pleasures. Thus, we repeat, 'Pleasures are divided into the outer—such as the pleasure of the five senses—and the inner—such as the pleasure of leadership, domination, honour, and knowledge, etc., because these are not pleasures of the eye, nose, ear, touch, nor taste. Inner meanings (*maʿānī bāṭina*) predominate over outward pleasures in people who have reached perfection.'

souls) of the angels and the Preserved Tablet. There, a blueprint of the world is contained, this blueprint being an intelligible and incorporeal representation of things before they are created. (For details of the development and sources of al-Ghazālī's notions, see Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge*, pp. 68-72 and 79-80.) One may note that even in the *Ishārāt* passage cited in this footnote, Avicenna refers to one of the incorporeal realms through which existents manifest as 'celestial spirits' (*rūḥāniyya samāwiyya*).

[331] *Iḥyā'*, 4:300.22–4.

[332] Ibid., 4:300.25–6.

Al-Ghazālī details what he terms inner pleasures here in a manner which prefigures his own developed list of the competition of faculties shown in Section VI to include the bases of the corporeal objects of desire assailed in the 3rd Quarter practices. The current list shows need for careful minding of context in assessing the meanings intended by al-Ghazālī, as he here calls 'inner' (*bāṭin*) what belongs to the inner senses, rather than what is incorporeal.[333] The list he produces is found nowhere as developed in Avicenna, though it is not utterly without precedent.[334]

Another element of Avicenna's idea of intellectual pleasures put to use to lend meaning to religious phenomena is al-Ghazālī's statement that the one who has developed inner pleasures may go without outer pleasures.[335] His example is that while one with high aspiration (*himma*) finds it insignificant to have patience and go without food to vanquish foes when necessary, the one with base (*khasīs*) aspiration and a dead heart (*qalb mayyit*) would prefer eating sweets and meat.[336] However, those who gain gnosis prefer devotion, seclusion, invocation, and contemplation over the leadership which dominates most people.[337]

In the culmination of this long *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* passage or string of passages, al-Ghazālī ties these matters in with their eschatological result. Linking the ontological division of intellectual and bodily pleasures to a religious division of what is for this world and what lasts in the afterlife, he states that the superiority of gnosis is because both leadership and those who are led pass away, ending with death, while gnosis is expansive and eternal, not ending with death.[338] Al-Ghazālī invokes the afterlife criterion in which true perfection remains unchanging and eternally with the soul, which we may take as a mark of consistency in applying philosophical ideas to understand religious matters. He then confirms the

[333] Though no such source is known, it is highly possible this classification is taken from al-Iṣfahānī, who is the source for the classification of pleasures in the *Mīzān*. (See Jules Janssens, 'Al-Ghazālī's *Mīzān al-ʿamal*: An Ethical Summa Based on Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī', in Anna Akasoy and Wim Raven (eds), *Islamic Thought in the Middle Ages: Studies in Text, Transmission and Translation in Honour of Hans Daiber* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 131.)
[334] Even were his treatment of honour and related meanings to indicate that it was related to the human rational soul, a precedence for this exists in the *Maqāmāt al-ʿārifīn* section of Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt* (see *al-Ishārāt*, 4:14.5–9). In discussion of the good and perfection of each faculty, he says of the intellect, 'The good for the intellect is at times and from one perspective the true (*al-ḥaqq*) and at (other) times and from (another) perspective the beautiful (*al-jamīl*). And the intelligibles (*ʿaqliyyāt*) include obtaining gratitude and abundant acclaim (*madḥ*), praise (*ḥamd*), and honour (*karāma*).'
[335] Also, in *al-Ishārāt*, *Namat* 10, Avicenna lists many paranormal phenomena explained by the states of the soul of the knower. These include such well-known phenomena which some rush to deny, unwisely according to Avicenna, such as going without food for extended periods (see *al-Ishārāt*, 4:111–5).
[336] Ibid., 4:300.29–33.
[337] Ibid., 4:300.34–301.3.
[338] Ibid., 4:301.3–11.

interpretation of scripture according to the philosophical notion of felicity made in the *Tahāfut*, stating this gnosis (outlined in the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* passages) is referred to in the words of scripture, 'He has prepared for them that which not eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor has it occurred the heart of a human being.'[339] Chapter 1 argued that al-Ghazālī's interpretation of revelation according to this element of reasoning came with another doctrine underpinning praxis, namely, subsistence of the soul after death. Here in the *Iḥyā'*, he makes the link in scriptural terms, linking eternal knowledge with felicity after death, stating that the gnostic continues to peruse their meanings in Janna, grazing on their gardens, picking their fruits, and drinking from their pools. Their fruits yet remain unpicked and he is not prevented from them (*ghayr mamnū'a*). This is because 'death does not destroy the substrate of gnosis of God, most high. Its substrate is the spirit (*al-rūḥ*) which is a divine, celestial matter (*amr rabbānī samāwī*). Death merely changes its states and dissevers it from what occupies and prevents it and (death) releases it from its prison' (*Iḥyā'*, 4:301.11–13).[340] The same complex of doctrines already prefigured in the *Tahāfut* emerge in religious terms, including the nature of felicity, the eternality of knowledge, and the subsistence of the soul.

The second aspect of the dualist resurrection is indeed found in the *Iḥyā'*, as outlined in Chapter 2. Passages there from three separate books of the 4th Quarter, including the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*, make it entirely clear that the same ontological dualism carefully set out here in terms of faculties and pleasure dualism forms the telos towards which the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* is ordered. These passages confirm the product of reason and revelation al-Ghazālī presents in the *Tahāfut*, joining between the intellectual pleasures, representing reason—even if they might be alluded to in scripture—and uphold corporeal pleasures, representing the literal purport of revelation. Chapter 1 carefully argued—in spite of Alexander Treiger's claims that al-Ghazālī's references to the afterlife are 'dissimilar allegorical interpretations' or 'nothing but pointers'—that al-Ghazālī upholds both afterlifes. Additionally, the structure studied in subsequent chapters shows that he produces a praxis ordered to generating both types of positive eschatological outcome: bodily salvation and intellectual felicity. Also, as noted, he weaves Sufi piety into the discussions, effectively equating Avicenna's statement that the God-like philosophers give no regard to corporeal pleasures with the sincerity of Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya who wishes for paradise only because it allows her to be close to her Beloved.

[339] Ibid., 4:301.2–9.
[340] The *Tahāfut* passages cited in Chapter 1 also referred to death as release from prison.

B. Two Ranks in the Afterlife: Corporeal and Incorporeal Pleasures

What follows in the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* is effectively the application of the dualist cosmology and the competition between bodily and intellectual pleasures to the subject of the afterlife. This passage and two other similar passages in the *Iḥyā'* establish that there exist in the afterlife two stations matching the said qualities of the corporeal and incorporeal realms, one being a place where sensual pleasures are fulfilled and one being a place of pleasures of knowledge and of the heart. Forming the backdrop for his dualist ranks of eschatology and pleasure, the passages which follow demonstrate: a) that the philosophically stated ontological dichotomy pertains to the stations of the afterlife, b) that al-Ghazālī arrives at his notion of these levels while considering scripture and its proper interpretation, and c) that the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* passages comprise a discourse of two distinct layers in amalgamation: the said technical notions and religious phenomena (generally being scriptural and Sufic), the latter being supported by technical reasoning based on the said dualist and technical ontology.

The *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* passage on the two eschatological ranks studied presently is prefaced with the lists of pleasures and a rehearsal of Avicennian arguments regarding the superiority and rarity of intellectual pleasures, which preceded in Section II.A. Al-Ghazālī presents his conclusion of these crucial passages by way of a claim to have unveiled the scales for determining which pleasures are superior.[341] He follows this with the two eschatological levels that were the subject of the Chapter 1 study of the two levels in the afterlife and al-Ghazālī's application of his scriptural hermeneutic to this specific topic. As seen there, al-Ghazālī invokes the same technical terms from his ontological dichotomy, linking the Sufi statements of the female mystic Rābiʿa to his own ontological concerns as though they referred to identical realities. The intellectual pleasures are referred to as pleasures of the heart, being easily identifiable in this context with intellectual pleasures or pleasures of the soul. They are linked to Rābiʿa's showing disdain for paradise, except to be close to God, indicating her sincerity in her worship of God. This attitude was shown to be shared by Avicenna in the *al-Shifā'* who said that the *falāsifa* do not even deign to glance at the corporeal pleasures described in scripture. As seen in Chapter 1, in spite of the disdain which al-Ghazālī shows to corporeal paradise by transmitting this and other statements, he upholds both levels.

[341] *Iḥyā'*, 8:413.

Thus, the position echoes the *Tahāfut* which stated it is superior to uphold both levels because scripture is clear in affirming bodily resurrection and it is not in itself impossible. The *Iḥyā'* is more integrated with Sufi and sharia practices, but upholds the *Tahāfut*'s positions which effectively define that higher religion for al-Ghazālī is the intellectual and its potentially eternal pleasures, whether in this life or the next.

A second passage was also studied in Chapter 1 in which al-Ghazālī not only refers to two eschatological ranks, but develops a link between topics such as sincerity and the tension between corporeal and incorporeal pleasures. Here, he constructs a different set of Sufi topics related to sincerity on the said ontological foundations. He states that fear and hope regarding hell and paradise are only sincere compared to motives purely directed to the here-below. Paradise is merely a place where the same pleasures of the here-below are fulfilled. While Avicenna states in *al-Ishārāt* cited in Chapter 1 that the one trading this world for the next is merely performing a transaction (seemingly with God), al-Ghazālī states that the pleasures sought are of the type (*jins*) of those of the here-below and the strongest of motivations are the groin and stomach and the place their desire is fulfilled is Janna. Thus, the one working for Janna is working for their groin and stomach and is a bad worker, using the same term for transaction as used by Avicenna. *Al-Ishārāt* specifically distinguishes between those who worship out of fear and hope for the pleasures of food, drink, and intercourse and those who worship God (*al-Awwal al-Ḥaqq*) for His beauty and because He deserves worship.[342]

Chapter 4, Section III, 'The Two Eschatological Ranks Accorded to Imitation and Demonstration,' studies a third reference to two states in the afterlife that we summarise here for the sake of the present argument. In the rich chapter of the *Kītāb al-Tawba*, 'The Manner of Distribution of Ranks and Pits (of Hell) in the Afterlife According to Good and Bad Deeds in the Here-Below,' the context of the topics treated is itself significant, as it resembles the set of related topics from the *Tahāfut*. There is thus in this an indication that these doctrines fundamental to praxis and the felicity it aims for must be coherently worked out due to the implications they have for each other. It also indicates the two levels of discourse which bind the shell and inner reality of religion, or reason and revelation, as indicated in the previous chapter. He will will summarise the matters studied in Chapter 1 to elucidate the said connections:

[342] *al-Ishārāt*, 4:68–76.

1. In the opening of this chapter,[343] al-Ghazālī states he is explaining his notion of scriptural interpretation specifically as an introduction to his own investigation into interpreting scripture regarding the ranks in the afterlife. The fact that his discussion of interpretation there takes up examples from the major themes of scripture was said in Chapter 1 to indicate the search for a general and principled method and to echo both the *Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* discussion of interpretation as well as the earlier *Tahāfut*. The topics he addresses in the *Kitāb al-Tawba* indicate a similar general method, one which includes pervasive use of the dichotomy.

2. After the general discussion of interpretation of scriptural similitudes, al-Ghazālī applies the hermeneutic he produces to the major themes of scripture: the divine attributes, eschatology, and divine commands and ritual worship.[344] This material studied in Chapter 2 showed that Book II, *Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, develops the application of scriptural application in more detail than the *Tahāfut*'s individualization of interpretation to particular topics, but does not reveal al-Ghazālī's ultimate position, as stated in Chapter 2.[345] Chapter 2 then proceeds to reveal his ultimate position: that one must have speculative unveiling of the topic but also know dream interpretation to know how the similitude is adequate or true to this meaning. Whereas the *Tahāfut* merely affirms two forms of the afterlife, the *Iḥyāʾ* puts forward a general hermeneutic framework for justifying whether a matter exists at two ontological levels and whether, on this basis, scripture regarding a particular topic such as eschatology may be interpreted literally, figuratively, or both.

3. Al-Ghazālī then turns to the aim of the chapter: determining how the ranks, in paradise, and pits, in hell, accord with the good and bad deeds committed in the here-below. The main body of the chapter contains two references to two ranks in the afterlife: a fire of the mind (*fuʾād*; whose meaning in this context is close to heart: the locus of consciousness) and fire of the body which he states is as described in the Koran. The two cosmological levels run through all the topics of this chapter. As studied in Chapter 4, on imitation and

[343] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:22.33–23.19.
[344] Ibid., 4:23.19–24.9.
[345] This application to scriptural themes ends by al-Ghazālī reminding the reader that Book II, *Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, explained that the wisdom in the Koran using such similitudes is that the heart is naturally disposed to be effected by them. This indicates the connection between the two passages which is that they both treat scriptural interpretation. It seems they treat with regards to how to determine what is true and how to interpret scripture through something of a give and take in that knowledge of how to interpret scripture is sometimes based on attempting to join between what reason says is possible and the different literal or figurative purports of scripture.

demonstration, belief is said to be two, that through imitation and that through unveiling (shown above to be intellectual knowledge obtained through learning or inspiration, both having purification as a prerequisite). Imitation is aligned with salvation whereas true knowledge obtained through demonstration is the cause of felicity. Just as in the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*, sincere desire for the pleasure of beholding God's countenance, not turning even to the desires of paradise, is attributed to Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya.[346]

In all cases, the eternal incorporeal level set out in 'the afterlife criterion' (Chapter 3, Section I.A) and the corporeal level generally associated with sense and imagination is worked out as a cosmology running through the topics of the *Iḥyāʾ*. From one perspective, this exemplifies al-Ghazālī working out the two levels of felicity that he promoted as early as the *Tahāfut*. From another, it shows him going further, taking on the role of the inheritor of the prophets which Chapter 1, Section V.D, and Chapter 2, Section II.C, show he defines as the one who is able to interpret all or most of scripture through insight. Knowing from the current section that insight means intellect, the inheritor is the one able to interpret through careful joining of reason and revelation as exemplified by al-Ghazālī in the *Tahāfut*: to interpret by attempting to affirm both sources when possible and to interpret scripture or question reason when necessary. Al-Ghazālī's inheritor determines true religion to be the philosophically incorporeal, but also caters for imitators and attempts to preserve the value of the outward purport of religion, whether it be imitation or the scriptural similitude.

[346] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:31.12–32.1.

IV. Praxis and the Two Poles of Corporeal Pleasures and Intellectual Pleasures

Establishing that al-Ghazālī uses a philosophically conceived cosmology which is ontologically bipartite serves as evidence for several core aspects of the structure of the *Iḥyā'* claimed in this thesis. Alongside the instances cited in this chapter of underpinning his notion of religious phenomena with the said dichotomy, adoption of the cosmology indicates that religion is associated with the incorporeal and its pleasures, and that the path of religion lies in preferring and turning towards the incorporeal and away from corporeal pleasures. Section IV.A will first show how al-Ghazālī develops the notion of intellectual pleasures to explain the said turn from corporeal pleasures. The list al-Ghazālī produces through expanding on the Avicennian notion is crucial to the praxis of the afterlife as it forms the list of corporeal pleasures removed by the practices of the 3rd Quarter. Section IV.B studies important passages near the end of the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*'s treatment of epistemology which clarify that unveiling falls within his corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy. Without clarifying this aspect of al-Ghazālī's thought, previous claims that the higher eschatological level is obtained by unveiling (rather than imitative belief) obscures the structure this thesis attempts to reveal.

A. Competition between the Corporeal and Incorporeal Faculties: Incorporating the Dualism into Praxis

A dichotomy in the *Iḥyā'* has been demonstrated regarding corporeal and incorporeal pleasures—outlining the faculties involved—as has the cosmology which underpins it, the latter being shown to be philosophically conceived. In addition to this, al-Ghazālī is shown presently to incorporate this tension into his praxis. There are two senses to this incorporation. One is that he expands the list to include corporeal pleasures not found completely in Avicenna and his list is highly similar to the vices removed via the practices of the 3rd Quarter. Secondly, his discussion of the tension between the corporeal and incorporeal provides more instances of using the dichotomy and the tension involved to underpin religious discussions. Whether these tensions are linked to notions of sincerity or detachment, they build on the said dichotomy and entail an interpretation of the notion of religion studied in Chapter 1 and expanded in this chapter.

Based on this philosophically conceived dichotomy and existing elements of psychology, al-Ghazālī makes a significant innovation which allows him to develop Avicennian

doctrines and to perform what may be viewed as incorporating Sufi insights. Incorporating them also has the effect of systematizing them as they are effectively translated into the system of Avicennian psychology, including the various faculties of apprehension and locomotion and the acts, pleasures, and dispositions which accrue to them. The elements involved in the change wrought by al-Ghazālī may be viewed as follows. Al-Ghazālī's arguments for intellectual pleasures themselves were shown to be nearly identical to Avicenna's. Avicenna was himself shown to expand on faculties shared with animals from the *akhlāq* tradition from anger and desire to include the internal and external senses. However, the ethical treatises of Avicenna which have come down to us are brief and largely recount an existing ethics tradition. Having read them, including the recently discovered *Risāla fī al-akhlāq*, I found that the theory of intellectual pleasure does not play any explicit part in them. He summarizes certain principles of ethics alongside his arguments for the existence and superiority of intellectual pleasures (in spite of being unknown to most people) in several writings which argue for the nature of the philosophical felicity in the return (*maʿād*). Al-Ghazālī develops this tradition beyond Avicenna's writings to include matters such as love of ownership and prestige, and to string these matters together in the order they emerge in the psyche. He thus produces a theory of psychological development underpinning his praxis. The most expansive list produced below covers many of the topics in the manuals of al-Muḥāsibī, giving them a philosophical basis on the dichotomy and its tension built on the notion of intellectual pleasures. Chapter 5 on praxis shows that the list of vices in the *Iḥyāʾ* expands by adding two elements of pleasures shared between animals and humans from al-Iṣfahānī's *al-Dharīʿa*, but below it is shown that the notion of love of honour, and prestige, may have a source in Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt*. From the list produced in the *Mīzān* and in the *Iḥyāʾ*'s *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*, al-Ghazālī has only to smooth over small cracks to complete the incorporation of such topics as love of prestige and ostentation in al-Muḥāsibī. Vices are refigured generally to be attachments to the corporeal, the corporeal being at odds with the afterlife and hence with religion. This is an important part of answering how al-Ghazālī joins materials from the philosophical and Sufi traditions. From the point of view of the philosophical tradition, it is a large part of explaining how al-Ghazālī's vices as well as virtues differ from the ethics tradition. He synthesizes the following elements into an ordered path: a) a set of vices and virtues covering many Sufi stations of al-Makkī and al-Muḥāsibī, b) numerous scriptural

terms often neglected in common treatises, and c) the implicit notion of Avicenna—that the attachments to corporeal pleasures compete with intellectual pleasures.

The actual presentation of the developmental psychology is brief, though conceals what we have just described. T15 below should be seen in conjunction with the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* shown above to refer to three ranks of pleasures: purely sensible, leadership, and (true) knowledge. Before transitioning into his complete description of the order of psychological development, he ties in intellectual pleasure and its objects—shown above to be linked with the incorporeal and religion—as follows:

T15, *Iḥyā'*, 4:301.22–5

> It has become clear that the pleasure of leadership, which is an inward (*bāṭina*) [pleasure], is stronger in people who have obtained completion (*dhawī al-kamāl*) than the sense pleasures, one and all. And, this (inner) pleasure is not experienced by pack animals, children, nor the feeble-minded. Complete people apprehend sensibles and lusts along with the pleasure of leadership, but they give precedence to leadership. As to gnosis of God and His attributes, acts, the incorporeal aspect of His heavens, and the secrets of His kingdom (*mulk*) being greater in pleasure than leadership, knowing this is specific to those who have obtained gnosis and tasted it. It is not possible to affirm for one who has no heart (*man lā qalba lahu*) because the heart is the source (*ma'dan*) of this faculty.

The pleasures are ordered and though each higher level is intrinsically stronger and more pleasurable, it must overcome the lower pleasures which effectively prevent it. If it comes into operation, its pleasure may be tasted and it has the potential to become dominant. What he refers to here as gnosis of God perceived by the one who possesses a heart is easily recognizable as one in whom the incorporeal and specifically human faculty is operational. This brings with it intellectual pleasure which is the higher pole studied in this chapter and associated with the higher of his two notions of religion, i.e. one associated with the afterlife, being incorporeal, as he was shown to define it in Section I. He then confirms this reading of 'those possessing hearts', tying in the two stations in the afterlife studied in Chapter 1, referring to those who possess a heart as those who will experience the higher pleasures in the afterlife.

The full list of the chronological development of the psychological faculties then follows as al-Ghazālī closes this long section of the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* which explains the dichotomy underpinning his notions of love and religion. This section will conclude with one other important list, but that which follows is the most complete in the *Iḥyā'*:

T16, *Iḥyā'*, 4:303.6–14

We will mention (now) a similitude (*mithāl*) for the stages of pleasures through which people pass (*aṭwār al-khalq*). From the first movements and (appearance of) discernment (*tamyīz*) of a child, the propensity appears in them by which they find play and diversion pleasurable. That is to the point that it is more pleasurable than anything else. Afterwards, the pleasure of adornment and dressing up appears in [the child] and travelling on riding animals. [The child] then deems the pleasure of play paltry in comparison with it. Thereafter, the pleasure of intercourse and desire (*shahwa*) for women appears. Thus, [the adolescent] leaves all that precedes to reach this pleasure. Thereafter, the pleasure of leadership and ascendency (*al-ʿulūw*) and gathering wealth appears. They are the last pleasures, the highest, and the strongest as God, most high, said, {Know that the life of the world is only play, and idle talk, and pageantry, and boasting among you, and rivalry in respect of wealth} (Koran 57:20), and the rest of the verse. Thereafter, another propensity appears by which the pleasure of gnosis of God, most high, and His acts is apprehended. In comparison, all that which preceded it is deemed paltry. All that which comes later is stronger. It is the last to appear, as it follows love of play in the age of distinction (*tamyīz*) and the love of women and adornment in the age of puberty (*bulūgh*) and the love of leadership after (the age of) twenty. The love of a knowledge (*al-ʿulūm*) (occurs at) approximately forty, and it is the ultimate aim.

Having not found a pre-existing list of such pleasures and ages, the list appears al-Ghazālī's own production and crafting, largely from existing materials. The extensive set of levels presented does not entirely match the corporeal faculties and pleasures set out in the practices and books of the 3rd Quarter. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that there is no relation.

Certain elements such as the stages of emergence of animal, shared, and human pleasures are only made explicit in a second important passage, this time from outside the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*. This second passage is found in Book XXXII, *Kitāb al-Ṣabr wa-l-shukr*, in a long section devoted to outlining the blessings for which to show gratitude. The elements and stages listed here that are not in the first passage include leadership, but also honour and finally nobility. The passage ostensibly treats pleasures and their types, but al-Ghazālī's treatment is in fact an important repository for his views on the levels of ethical development with regards to how certain pleasures predominate in one over time. The order resembles that found in the *Mīzān*, and studied in Chapter 5 on praxis. Al-Ghazālī states here that the pleasures are three: a) intellectual (*ʿaqliyya*), b) bodily (*badaniyya*), shared with *some* animals, and

c) bodily, shared with *all* animals.[347] Chapter 5 shows that the *Mīzān*'s list of pleasures follows al-Iṣfahānī's *al-Dharīʿa*, and that the same division is found there. However, al-Ghazālī's use of it here is based on the psychology of the philosophers and the theory of intellectual pleasure. Supporting the argument of this chapter, the dichotomy between corporeal and incorporeal pleasures is maintained and applied. He states that intellectual pleasure is not perceived through hearing, sight, stomach, groin, but rather by the heart due to its specific status (*ikhtiṣāṣ*) by virtue of an attribute (*ṣifa*) called the intellect (*al-ʿaql*).[348] This is why its pleasure is rarest and most noble.[349] Echoing his statement of the afterlife criterion from *Kītāb Dhamm al-jāh*, but not *al-Dharīʿa*, he says its nobility is due to being necessary (*lāzima*), not fading ever either in the here-below or afterlife.[350] As noted in study of the fundamental doctrines of the *Iḥyāʾ*, it is this eternality once created that fits it for felicity in the afterlife.

Without the remainder of the list, the passage gives the impression that this development happens naturally as one matures. The list itself gives no indication of what a praxis based on it and the said dichotomy should look like. As if al-Ghazālī arrived at a similar observation, he states that those who fall short of developing and apprehending intellectual pleasure, which are the majority of people, are three groups who fall short for three reasons.[351] First he states that there are three causes for not apprehending the pleasure of knowledge: a) lack of direct taste (*dhawq*) of it—and therefore lacking desire (*shawq*) for it, b) corruption of the humours and sickness of the heart caused by acting on lust (*shahawāt*), c) lack of perspicacity, due to the human attribute by which knowledge is apprehended not yet being created in them.[352] Second, those who fall short are said to be of three types: a) one whose inner aspect did not have sufficient time to live—for example a child who is still growing, b) one who died after its life, but in a state of following one's lusts, and c) one whose heart fell ill from following lusts.[353] Together, the lists indicate that maturity and cognitive potential are needed to advance through the early stages. If this maturity is followed with praxis to remove lusts and disease of the heart, intellectual pleasures may be obtained. Thus,

[347] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:98.23–4.
[348] Ibid, 4:98.25.
[349] Ibid., 4:98.25–6.
[350] Ibid., 4:98.27–8. In *Kītāb Dhamm al-jāh*, he referred to it being a real perfection in the sense that it remained with the soul forever, notably after death.
[351] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:98.35–99.6.
[352] Ibid., 4:99.1–4.
[353] Ibid., 4:99.6–7. Al-Ghazālī states that words of the Koran {In their hearts is a sickness} (2:9) are an allusion (*ishāra*) to sickness of the intellect (*ʿuqūl*).

the list of faculties and stages of psychological development requires praxis and in fact is designed with it in mind. Were it not for a list of such preventatives, we might assume that al-Ghazālī intends that this development of the faculties is purely natural and associated roughly with ages, and that all humans naturally reach perfection.

Al-Ghazālī returns to his list of types of pleasures, linking it to religious states and giving examples of pleasures sometimes matching the books of the 3rd Quarter. Pleasures shared with some animals include that of leadership, vanquishing foes (*ghalaba*), and domination (*istilā'*); found in the likes of the tiger and leopard.[354] Pleasures in which all animals share are those of the stomach and groin; found even in the likes of worms and insects.[355] These pleasures are then linked with praxis and the religious ranks as follows:

T17, *Iḥyā'*, 4:99.12–18

> For the one who raises above this rank, the pleasure of domination (*ghalaba*) clings to them. It is the most severe of that which adheres to rational people. If one surpasses that, one rises to the third, and the pleasure of knowledge (*ladhdhat ʿilm*) and wisdom (*ḥikma*) become the predominant pleasures, especially pleasure of the gnosis (*maʿrifa*) of God and His attributes (*ṣifāt*) and acts, which is the rank (*rutba*) of the veracious (*ṣiddīqīn*). Its completion (*tamāmuhā*) is not reached until the domination by love of leadership (*riʾāsa*) leaves the heart, as that is the last matter to leave from the heads of the veracious. As for breaking (*kasr*) the desires of stomach and groin (*farj*), the righteous (*ṣāliḥīn*) are able to do that, whereas overcoming the desire (*shahwa*) for leadership is something only the veracious are able to do. As for uprooting it entirely such that one never senses it in any state…this is nearly beyond what is possible for human beings.

Three ranks are presented. While they are not identical to the ranks that Chapter 4 argues are primary to the *Iḥyā'*, they do at least relate to the order of the *Iḥyā'* itself. This may be seen as follows. The second rank, 'the righteous', is for those able to break the two desires, echoing the title of *Iḥyā'*, Book XXIII. The third rank, 'the veracious', is for those able to overcome even the bodily desires shared only with some animals, though only love of leadership is mentioned here. One of the important defining elements of the station of the veracious studied in Chapter 4, Section IV, is that a given attribute, such as fear or awareness of divine unity, dominate the heart. The present passage serves as evidence of the actual *Iḥyā'* being in accordance with his own claims and theoretical frameworks. This case is particularly important as it indicates the higher level above the intellect that readers expect to find in al-

[354] Ibid., 4:99.9–11.
[355] Ibid., 4:99.11–12.

Ghazālī, and the present thesis claims that inspiration and unveiling are not the right place to look *in the Iḥyā'*. Rather, it is argued that careful examination of the evidence in the *Iḥyā'* indicates the level is that—in addition to obtaining incorporeal knowledge, via education or inspiration—a given attribute dominate the heart. (See the end of Chapter IV and the Conclusion).

In a nearby passage, al-Ghazālī returns from the above-mentioned three-fold division of the levels of pleasure to a dichotomy of a) the pleasure of love of God and gnosis and b) the pleasures of 'prestige (*jāh*), leadership, wealth (*māl*), and the rest of the bodily pleasures'.[356] When the lists are combined, one begins to approach a catalogue of the topics of the 3rd Quarter vices as corporeal loves to be rooted out.[357]

These statements indicate the presence of a division into intellectual pleasures and an ascending set of corporeal pleasures which emerge according to progressive psychological development. Considering the findings of the sections of this chapter in light of each other produces the conclusion that only those who reach the intellectual pleasures have true religion in terms of intellectual pleasures, love of God, and the higher level of sincerity and higher rank in the afterlife. Section I established the criterion for determining what was for felicity in the afterlife, and the corporeal pleasures which compete with them effectively define the path by which the afterlife is sought: assisting development such that corporeal pleasures are traversed. If the 3rd Quarter in fact maps out these corporeal pleasures, this would confirm that a full quarter of al-Ghazālī's religious revival is formed by a) his application of the divide produced in Avicennian discussions of intellectual pleasures and the associated felicity and b) al-Ghazālī's development of those faculties falling on the corporeal side. Avicenna nowhere seems to produce such a complete list nor order, so without further research, the matter appears to be a development of al-Ghazālī, which may be viewed as completing or surpassing Avicenna's project. It might be said that al-Iṣfahānī contributes to al-Ghazālī's list while Avicenna provides, as it were, the body–soul dualism. However, while al-Iṣfahānī may contribute elements used in al-Ghazālī's list, he does not theoretize them in the same manner, as types of pleasures traversed developmentally. Thus, al-Ghazālī's contribution to the *akhlāq*

[356] *Iḥyā'*, 4:99.22–3.
[357] See Chapter 6 on the virtues. Note that in many cases, a short line of reasoning is required to see the catalogue. For instance, al-Ghazālī defines prestige as owning the hearts of humans through esteem which effectively conceives of it as a belonging associated with the here-below. Further, he makes prestige one of the causes of ostentation, the second topic of Book XXVIII alongside prestige itself.

tradition itself based on the faculties of intellect, anger, and desire is original, even if some of its elements are borrowed.

B. Misconceptions of Unveiling and the Beatific Vision

To this point of the thesis, al-Ghazālī has divided knowledge into two levels: imitative and true knowledge, the latter leading to eternal felicity. (See Chapter 1, Section IV discussing the classification of knowledge.) The latter is associated with the gamut of terms referring to the higher level of a dichotomy: incorporeal, intellectual, spiritual and related to the afterlife. (See the previous sections of the present chapter. These sections also link this knowledge with intellectual pleasures which constitute the felicity in the afterlife.) At the end of the previous sub-section, we noted that there is indeed something of a higher level: it is that, above and beyond knowledge, a given attribute dominate the heart. Chapter 4 addresses the epistemological dichotomy head on, and shows that, confusingly, more than one passage in the *Iḥyā'* refer to an epistemological dichotomy of imitation and unveiling. It is crucial that these elements we might assume to be above and beyond knowledge and intellect are tied to texts and analysed to reveal specific doctrines, lest they cloud the structure of the *Iḥyā'*. To that end, Section V and Appendix I of Chapter 4 and the Conclusion to the thesis will gather the terms that Ghazālī scholarship is trained to expect: tasting, direct witnessing, unveiling, inspiration, and annihilation. Presently, we take on one related term: unveiling. The term is obviously related to the higher theology of the *Iḥyā'*, *mukāshafa*, a term we have carefully translated as 'speculative unveiling' for reasons explained in this thesis. We aim here to rule out the notion that unveiling is a higher level beyond discursive knowledge, veering into the ineffable like the notion of a spiritual experience conceived of specifically as contrary to knowledge of the realities of things. The present chapter has shown a host of terms that are nearly synonymous with intellect, and previous chapters cited al-Ghazālī stating that inspiration and learning are the same in terms of the knowledge itself and the substrate in which it inheres.

The current chapter offered much evidence confirming that the levels are solely two. Chapter 4 also argues against what is termed 'Treiger's triad' that in the *Iḥyā'*, the intellect or heart is the locus of all knowledge, including inspired knowledge. In the same sequence of passages from the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* is found an important statement on the nature of

witnessing and unveiling. It indicates they fall within the second, higher level presented throughout this chapter. It is significant that this statement falls within the line of passages shown above to apply al-Ghazālī's cosmology to new religious topics. This indicates he is developing his tools or at the very least it shows a pattern. In the context of the thesis, it is crucial to keep the dichotomy clear and remove any doubts that it is important for al-Ghazālī in developing his notions of religion and how they may be reconciled with reason in his religious revival.

The *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* statement studied in the present sub-section is crucial for understanding the structure of al-Ghazālī's religious revival as it keeps the higher level clear. In addition to the terms presumed to refer to a higher level mentioned above, Chapter 4 shows that in later texts such as al-*Munqidh*, there is a higher level beyond the intellect where certitude is obtained, and that scholars such as Alexander Treiger have read this back into the *Iḥyā'* and interpreted statements in the *Iḥyā'* as indicating a non-discursive, ineffable experience perhaps occurring through a separate faculty dormant in all but the saints. Chapter 4 shows that the *Iḥyā'* itself does not warrant this. We will see that in the *Iḥyā'* unveiling builds on rational knowledge rather than being an ineffable departure from it or even contradiction of it. In the historical context of his writing, the insistence on a logical structure is reasonably linked to one sense of the religious revival explored in the present thesis: the claim that al-Ghazālī attempts to raise religion to a demonstrative science and to defend theology against *bāṭinī* sceptical arguments aimed at bolstering imitation of the *imām*. As stated just above, there is a higher level, but it is not inspiration, but the domination (over the soul or mind) by an attribute of the heart. Presently, we will examine the term unveiling, but also a set of related terms such as vision, beholding and encounter.

The passage under investigation occurs in a new chapter immediately after the conclusion of the previous passage from the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*. It sets out to explain the sense of three important terms for al-Ghazālī: beholding (*mushāhada*), vision (*ruʾyā*), and the encounter (*liqā'*). Almost the entire chapter concords with the text of the first half of a long chapter from the *Maʿārij*.[358] Although the *Maʿārij* is still contested, this concord follows a pattern in which the *Iḥyā'*'s passages on psychology are found in the *Maʿārij*, often with more

[358] *Maʿārij*, 180.14–188.10, matches this chapter of the *Iḥyā'* with only a few significant changes.

technical terms appearing to be replaced in the *Iḥyā'*.[359] Because the *Maʿārij* is a contested work, the most significance which we will draw from citing it is to note the examples studied by Fazlur Rahman and Jules Janssens who have noted that the *Maʿārij* often sets out positions which are more or less in Avicennian terms, but which are adjusted to mind Ashʿarī sympathies, a fact which makes both authors incline towards advocating its authenticity.

To turn to the key passage on unveiling, al-Ghazālī first explains that vision is a true name for beholding God, even though God has no form, because vision means the furthest degree (*ghāya*) of unveiling (*kashf*). One may understand this in relation to knowable (*maʿlūmāt*), he says, by understanding it in relation to objects of imagination (*mutakhayyilāt*). This statement leaves no doubt that unveiling refers to intelligibles.[360] If one sees a person, then closes one's eyes, al-Ghazālī explains, the person is the same but there is a difference due to an increase in clarity and unveiling (*mazīd al-wuḍūḥ wa-l-kashf*).[361] Knowables also have two levels (*darajatān*): a beginning and a completion (*istikmāl*) which varies according to an increase in unveiling and clarity, so the second is called—with regards to the first—beholding, encounter, and vision (*ruʾyā*).[362] We will remember that Section II referred to the encounter being the cause of felicity in the afterlife, this term being explained only here in the 4th Quarter. Al-Ghazālī expounds his metaphor for beholding and unveiling, saying that just as the inveterate practice (*sunna*) of God is that there be eyelids which veil from vision, so the accidents of the body and what is entailed by desires (*muqtaḍā al-shahawāt*) veil the soul (*nafs*) so long as the 'all too human attributes' (*ṣifāt bashariyya*) dominate.[363] In such a state, the soul does not reach beholding nor encounter regarding knowables outside of imagination; rather, this life is necessarily a veil over them just as the eyelids are a veil over the eyes.[364] Al-Ghazālī's statement that intelligibles are not experienced at the higher level of clarity may not be an absolute

[359] However, in this case, even the similitudes for the vices such as scorpions and wasps are found in the *Maʿārij* (See *Maʿārij*, 187.2–3 and 187.10).
[360] *Iḥyā'*, 4:303.23.
[361] Ibid., 4:303.23–4.
[362] Ibid., 4:303.29–31.
[363] Ibid., 4:303.34–304.1. This passage is referred to below (in the next section), where the meaning of foreign accident arising from the body is explored.
[364] Ibid., 4:303.35–304.2.

statement, but merely express the norm. He may hold that there are exceptions such as what he refers to as experiences which for most only last as long as lightning strikes (*barq khāṭif*).[365]

This important passage also from *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* indicates that several terms, possibly having a mystical connotation, all merely indicate increased clarity of intelligibles: beholding, encounter, and vision. This is bolstered by the following chapter which argues that al-Ghazālī is committed to a two-level notion of perception and felicity. It shows that though he often inserts the terms unveiling, insight, or even witnessing (*mushāhada*), into a dichotomy with imitation, the reader should avoid assuming the existence of a level which is beyond the intellect.[366]

Concluding Reflections

Section I of this chapter showed that al-Ghazālī develops what is here termed the 'afterlife criterion' which is a sharp line for dividing true perfection from what does not constitute true perfection and what is fit to cause eternal felicity to the human soul in the afterlife. It was shown that this is unchanging knowledge characterised in the *Miʿyār* and carrying over in the the *Iḥyā'* as being demonstrative. (Details of this claim are found in the Conclusion.) Section I.B showed that the doctrine of the eternality of the soul already upheld in the *Tahāfut* is transferred into the *Iḥyā'*. This becomes a foundational doctrine of the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* in

[365] Al-Ghazālī then turns to the eschatological consequences of his doctrine based on distinguishing corporeal and incorporeal objects of apprehension. None reach this increase in unveiling of the vision except those who were gnostics (*ʿārifūn*) in the here-below because gnosis (*maʿrifa*) is the seed which turns into beholding in the hereafter just as a date-stone turns into a tree. Later, al-Ghazālī links knowledge of God through lower faculties than the intellect with anthropomorphism (*tashbīh*), its proponents being unable to conceive of a God without a body in a given direction and location and human-like parts. Here, he alludes to this, showing how his theological doctrine is based on the dualist division between the corporeal and incorporeal, saying this vision is the truth so long as one does not mean by it the perfection of imagination such that God be in a specific direction and location. Rather, he says:

T18, *Iḥyā'*, 4:304.20–4

> Just as you know Him completely and truly (*maʿrifa ḥaqīqiyya tāmma*) in the here-below without imagination, apprehending a form (*taṣawwur*; not in its logical sense), quantification, shape, and form, so you will see Him in the hereafter. Rather, I say that it is the gnosis (*maʿrifa*) obtained in the here-below itself which is perfected such that it reaches perfection in unveiling and clarity and turns into beholding. And, there will be no difference between the beholding in the hereafter and the known (*al-maʿlūm*) in the here-below except with regards to an increase in unveiling and clarity just as we struck (earlier) a similitude in imagination being perfected in vision.

The statement that it is the gnosis itself which changes into vision seems to be based on the previous statement that the heart is the locus of knowledge and it merely changes states at death, being released from the prison of the body.

[366] It also shows that witnessing sometimes refers to the domination of an attribute (such as love) over the heart and sometimes refers to some like a transcendence of time or bodily states, none of which definitely take it outside of his notion of the intelligible and incorporeal.

that the *Iḥyā'* aims for higher felicity which is predicated on a) an eternal soul and b) eternal, unchanging knowledge causing intellectual pleasure in the afterlife. The *Iḥyā'* passages in Sections I.A and B showed that al-Ghazālī applies this sharp division in his religious revival. Put into religious terms, only what lasts with one in the grave is for the afterlife while what changes and is corporeal is for the here-below. This includes those acts which cause purification of the soul or bring about knowledge and intimacy with the incorporeal.

Section II established that Avicenna constructed the most developed body–soul dualism of the era and that al-Ghazālī's bipartite cosmology is not an anti-intellectual mysticism, but itself involves a philosophically based ontological dualism between the corporeal and incorporeal worlds. Establishing this provided a basis for Section III to show that al-Ghazālī naturalizes this dichotomy into a religious context by conceiving of his notion of the afterlife based on fundamental characteristics of the incorporeal realm. The passages cited from *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* invoke the psychological elements built on the firm ontological dualism as well as Avicennna's notion of intellectual pleasures and their competition in the soul with corporeal pleasures. The incorporeal intellection and the pleasure it brings are, as in the *Tahāfut* studied in Chapter 1, the cause of the higher felicity. Section III.B built on this, showing al-Ghazālī to uphold the doctrines of the *Tahāfut*, but to apply to them to sophisticated theological contexts such as the tension between the pleasures and faculties. While he allows that bodily pleasures as they are depicted by scripture indeed occur and bring about the specific eschatological state of salvation (*najāt*), his 'true religion' is carefully and unabashedly aligned with the intellectual, eternal, and incorporeal as defined by the philosophers in their ontology and notion of eternal knowledge, which is said to be demonstrative knowledge.

Section IV shows that the notion of the competition between the corporeal and incorporeal faculties of the soul and their respective pleasures is worked into al-Ghazālī's notion of praxis which is based on but modifies that of the *akhlāq* tradition, the evidence for this being marshalled in Chapter 5 on praxis. This modified praxis forms the backbone of the 3rd Quarter and its integration of Sufi notions, whose most recognizable source is al-Muḥāsibī, notably his *al-Riʿāya li-ḥuqūq Allāh*.[367] The structure that al-Ghazālī builds on Avicennian divisions thus represents a new approach to praxis and vice and virtue. This

[367] See Chapter 6 where the details of the structure of the vices and virtues is summarized.

unique approach has heretofore merely been termed mystical virtues and the like, its basis remaining unstudied or merely commented on in highly piecemeal manners based on individual books of the *Iḥyā'* or isolated statements.

The present chapter closes with al-Ghazālī's own description of the ultimate knowledge and vision causing felicity, making it clear that this is an intellectual vision occurring in the heart or soul, shown in Section III to be two terms for one faculty and substrate. The vision and the related encounter with God settle that al-Ghazālī's dichotomy reigns supreme in his praxis as they and unveiling are defined as increased clarity of knowledge. This knowledge is 'of intelligibles' and is associated with the knowledge of God. This confirms the dichotomy and also that the doctrine which determines the ends of the praxis of the afterlife is that higher eschatological state, felicity, is obtaining the eternal and incorporeal truly intellectual knowledge. This is the same knowledge termed the 'intellectual sciences of the afterlife' in *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb* as studied in Chapter 1. Through the archaeology performed by this philological investigation, the symbolic verbiage of the *Iḥyā'* is patiently deciphered. In its place, the consistent philosophical doctrines which underpin his praxis of the afterlife and two notions of religion are revealed: a) religion as imitation and b) true religion as the incorporeal. Subsequent chapters confirm this in showing the dichotomy of belief via imitation and demonstration which lead to salvation and felicity, respectively. They build on this chapter, which clarified that the meaning of witnessing is not a third level which alone produces certitude and felicity.

The notion that this knowledge is had in seed in this world and is only purified from imagination in the afterlife opens a number of interpretive questions. These questions are addressed in Chapter 4, Section V and its appendix as other text in the *Iḥyā'* must be borne in mind in order to ensure these questions are answered in their full context set out in the *Iḥyā'*.

Building on Chapter 1, this chapter shows that al-Ghazālī effectively interprets the here-below and afterlife to be the corporeal and incorporeal and interprets the vision of and encounter with God into philosophical concepts. The said interpretation of the here-below and afterlife provide a dichotomous basis for producing a praxis which is part of raising religion to the level of a demonstrative science in which causes and effects of religious phenomena are worked out. This is contiguous with the claim of Chapter 1 that al-Ghazālī's religious revival in the *Iḥyā'* is contiguous with the process of reconciling reason and revelation

in the *Tahāfut* and that his synthesis involves not only being the inheritor but also the snake-handler who handles Avicennian philosophy privately. However, as may be seen by the technical passages and re-workings shown in this chapter, the previous, and others, there is evidence for snake-handling.

Chapter 4

The Imitation-Demonstration Dichotomy and its Role in the Structure of the *Iḥyā'*

Chapter Abstract

Having shown in Chapter 1 and 2 that the corporeal-incorporeal dichotomy rests behind the lower and higher notions of religion, this chapter begins in Section I with clarifying the meanings of imitation and true knowledge. The involves seeing how three types of belief resolve to these two fundamental levels, themselves representing cosmological levels. Section II studies the complex nature and interaction of the two cosmological levels. It shows that the interaction of the levels of belief reflect the interaction of the cosmological levels. Particularly, while the lower level is generally a veil over the incorporeal level, under certain conditions it may act as a ladder. As such, the two levels are primary in the *Iḥyā'*. By contrast, triads such as *īmān–ʿilm–dhawq* which entail a denial that the intellect produces certitude may represent works written subsequently to the *Iḥyā'*, but they do not represent the *Iḥyā'*. Failure to distinguish between that doctrine and the doctrine in the *Iḥyā'* merely serves to cloud vision of the structure of the *Iḥyā'*. Towards making the argument for the primacy of the dichotomy in the *Iḥyā'*, this chapter studies the cosmology underpinning imitation, showing it is part of a wider notion: the outward purport (*ẓāhir*) of religion.

Section III indicates how the cosmology and levels of belief are tightly tied to the eschatological outcomes. It is found that the ranks are two: salvation and felicity, according with the two types of knowledge. There is a third rank described for the veracious, but there is no description of a distinct type of afterlife for this rank.

Section IV studies the two notions of certainty set out in the *Iḥyā'*. One is philosophical, merely meaning lack of doubt and is textually linked to discussions of logical demonstration in the *Miʿyār*. The 'Sufi' mode of certainty is domination over the heart of a given attribute. Al-Ghazālī is shown to join between the two, rather than emphasise a tension or contradiction between knowledge and Sufism, or what we might cautiously term mysticism. This section spells elucidates how al-Ghazālī incorporates demonstration as the

fount of the virtues by which one becomes realised realized in true religion. These passages are shown to derive from the *Miʿyār* which defends demonstration against *kalām*-occasionalism. The *Miʿyār* passage itself refers back to the *Tahāfut*. This becomes further evidence that the positions in the *Iḥyā'* are developed in the *Tahāfut* and other pre-departure works appropriating philosophy and naturalising naturalizing it through efforts to join between reason and revelation (a joining commanded by al-Ghazālī in the *Iḥyā'* as seen in the previous chapter.)

Section V defends the fundamentality of demonstration and the two levels, showing the triad referred to in recent scholarship does not apply to the *Iḥyā'*. Rather, the witnessing studied there does not accord with that in the *Iḥyā'*. The *Iḥyā'* is shown to refer to several notions of witnessing, none of which, however, match the Avicennian notion of an added familiarity and habititude to the intelligibles.[368] Al-Ghazālī brings Sufism back in through a different means than in his later works: namely, the said domination of the heart of a given attribute. This domination of an attribute renders a person one of the veracious (*ṣiddīqīn*), though it is shown that al-Ghazālī does not mention a specific eschatological state for the level of the veracious.

Collectively, these arguments establish that the fundamental eschatological ranks are based on imitation and demonstration, especially if joined to the previous chapter's discussion showing that unveiling is merely increased clarity of the knowledge of intelligibles. The imitation–demonstration dichotomy link to the two fundamental ranks in the afterlife, salvation and felicity, and the progression of stations of the 4th Quarter are not the fundamental ranks in the afterlife, as a superficial glance might indicate. Rather, the two ranks are woven into the stations. This clarifies how the *Iḥyā'*s structure embodies the dichotomy of imitation and demonstration, and the dichotomy remains fundamental to the structure, doctrine and actual practice of the *Iḥyā'*.

[368] There is a resemblance between al-Ghazālī's increased clarity regarding intelligibles (*ziyādat al-wuḍūḥ*) and witnessing explored in the final section of this chapter.

I. The Basic Meanings of the Dichotomous Terms

This chapter builds on Chapter 2 which established the existence of a strict dichotomy informing the religious revival in that the here-below and its tension with the afterlife were constructed on the tension between the corporeal and incorporeal in Avicenna's body–soul dualism. Chapter 1 provided important evidence that Richard Frank's hunch regarding the nature of imitation as shell, or rather of religion itself as imitation, was deployed and rendered into two levels in core theological and scriptural topics in the *Iḥyā'*. The two chapters showed that true felicity is via the incorporeal knowledge sometimes referred to as the intellectual sciences of the afterlife. The present chapter will show that, in a manner similar to how al-Ghazālī conceived of two parallel levels of a corporeal shell and incorporeal kernel, he conceives of imitation and demonstration as two parallel levels of belief which may refer to the same truth, but at different levels of expression. The initial section relays al-Ghazālī's basic statements regarding the nature of imitation. Later sections show the cosmological layers as they relate to belief and knowledge and, crucially, how in spite of the practices and virtues laid out in the *Iḥyā'*, imitation and demonstration are fundamental for determining the eschatological outcome of the *Iḥyā'*'s praxis: either bodily salvation via belief through imitation or felicity of the soul via knowledge through demonstration. This will place the final two chapters to indicate how the discourse and practices of the *Iḥyā'* embody a corporeal and abstract level which al-Ghazālī ties together through his role of inheritor of the prophets.

Chapter 1 indicated that the intellectual sciences were indeed apprehended exclusively by the intellect unlike rote and imitative sciences, indicating the latter are perceived by a corporeal faculty regarding whose identity we are left to speculate, perhaps being estimation or the imagination. Also, the question of how imitation and demonstration are incorporated into the *Iḥyā'* is a question not studied by Richard Frank or others, and it is crucial to see how al-Ghazālī builds on his cosmology to conceive of imitation and demonstration and how this is reflected in the structure of the *Iḥyā'*. Thus, his basic statements on this point are studied before turning to application in structure, and then further analysis such as how the dichotomy is woven into eschatological ranks and the religious stations in Sections IV and V below in this chapter.[369]

[369] To establish the primacy of these levels as expressed here, the final sections are required to challenge certain conceptions of the levels in the *Iḥyā'* in recent scholarship.

A. Origin and Specific Context of Imitation in al-Ghazālī

For a reader not aware of the scholarly context al-Ghazālī drew on through his own reading, his dichotomy of imitation and demonstration and the cosmology underpinning it appears to come out of nowhere as if he were a magician. His reader may be mesmerized and fail to analyse the doctrines he commits to. This chapter shows that in the *Iḥyā'*, he sometimes disguises the dichotomy by presenting it as imitation and unveiling. Imitation in the thought of Ghazālī has been studied,[370] but the intellectual context of his division and the degree he relied on, or did not rely on others, has not been properly studied.

Dimitri Gutas has shown that before al-Ghazālī Avicenna utilized a distinction between verification and imitation as a means of distinguishing his approach from that of others.[371] The means of verification is a demonstration in which one discovers the middle term of a demonstrative syllogism.[372] Imitation is to take knowledge on authority or in a manner lacking the middle term.[373] Thus, effectively the same dichotomy is produced which is shown in this chapter: imitation and demonstration.

Imitation is a term widely used in Islamic culture[374] and with an important role across the Islamic sciences.[375] However, hypothesizing that al-Ghazālī uses it specifically in an imitation–demonstration dichotomy related to Avicenna's would have many doctrinal implications, and many of these implications seem fulfilled. The claim here is not that he uses Avicenna's dichotomy. Rather, the claim is that by using a broadly philosophical or logical notion of demonstration, his dichotomy takes on certain said implications which distinguish it from earlier theological discussions involving moving from imitation to proof, because in this case there is a very specific notion of proof: logical demonstration such as that shown in this chapter to be set out in the *Miʿyār*. For instance, accepting demonstration as one's standard renders two other levels of discourse imitative. These are dialectic (*jadal*), which al-Ghazālī is

[370] The most important contribution, which is Richard Frank's chapter on the *taqlīd* in al-Ghazālī, was cited in Chapter 1. Alexander Treiger's discussions of imitation are in the context of his study of the levels of knowledge and are cited heavily in this chapter. Early groundwork on this topic was also performed by Hava-Lazarus. (See, Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies in al-Ghazzālī*, Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1975, pp. 488-99, Appendix B: 'Some Notes on the Term "Taqlīd" in the Writings of al-Ghazzālī', and p. 509, which refers to imitation in the context of the bipartite cosmology.)

[371] Dimitri Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (Brill: Leiden, 1988), 188–93.

[372] Ibid., 188.

[373] Ibid. It is the middle term which proves the knowledge involved and explains it through revealing its causes which enter the syllogism as its terms.

[374] Dimitri Gutas provides a short bibliography (see ibid., 191n104).

[375] N. Calder, '*Taḳlīd*', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. X, T-U (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 137a–138b.

shown in this chapter to associate with *kalam*, and rhetorical discourse (*khiṭāb*). While the division itself into imitation and demonstration indicates that they would be imitative, these forms of discourse fail to be demonstrative and one may notice that their premises may be those which are widely accepted (*mashhūr*) or accepted (*musallam*) without being proved in a given context. Thus, they may reasonably be linked to imitation. Secondly, demonstration is shown also in this chapter to be linked to the incorporeal while other forms of discourse have a corporeal element, not being perceived exclusively by the intellect but by faculties shared with animals. These elements make al-Ghazālī's dichotomy fit for taking forward the doctrine of religion which Chapter 1 claimed he held: that there are fundamentally two forms of discourse which include a true kernel achieving the realities of things and true knowledge and a shell which achieves imitation and similitudes.

Chapter 1 showed that Avicenna also spoke of imitation in a dichotomy with true knowledge.[376] However, we should not assume that Avicenna is his only influence. Al-Iṣfahānī is shown to hold a doctrine which is strikingly close to a philosophical doctrine in which the knowledge by which one leaves imitation is a type of knowledge or proof resembling philosophical knowledge.

Al-Iṣfahānī's importance for al-Ghazālī is oft-cited, and for al-Ghazālī to find such doctrines in a Sunni theologian preceding him must have had an impact. If that is the case, it goes a long way towards explaining al-Ghazālī's approach to imitation and demonstration.[377] Al-Iṣfahānī's language and thought often help reveal the subtle lines of thought in al-Ghazālī. Al-Iṣfahānī is committed to the notion of an abstract discourse which seeks the ultimate, intelligible realities of things. In a section outlining the types of people, he states as follows:

T1, *al-Dharī'a*, 163.2–6

> People are of two types, the elite and the masses. As for the elite, they are those who, regarding knowledge, are concerned exclusively with realities (*ḥaqā'iq*) rather than imitations (*al-taqlīdāt*) and (those who), regarding works, (are concerned exclusively) with that by which they will reach the final abode of *Janna*, rather than what is limited to the life of this world. And the masses in this regard are those content with imitations regarding knowledge and in most of their works with what conveys a worldly benefit.

[376] See Chapter I, Section VB Precedents and the Intellectual Context of al-Ghazālī's Philosophy of Religion.
[377] As shown in this chapter, al-Ghazālī not only upholds this dichotomy, but he makes it clear that *kalām* (at least as he inherited it or slightly improved it in *al-Iqtiṣād*) was not the science capable of producing demonstrative knowledge of the realities of things.

Imitations (*taqlīdāt*) here clearly means imitative beliefs. However, this is not necessarily religious beliefs and may mean all sorts of ideas which circulate in a society without being proven. At any rate, whether or not this is an influence on al-Ghazālī's notion of the levels of discourse (and bearing in mind the immense general influence of al-Iṣfahānī on him), this notion is the same as shown in Chapter 2 to be adopted by al-Ghazālī.[378] Elsewhere, al-Iṣfahānī holds forth that the masses who are incapable of understanding the realities of things should not be exposed to wisdom (*ḥikma*; which he defines as the realities of things apprehended by the intellect) and says is likened to throwing pearls before swine by the prophet Jesus.[379] When he provides details of interaction with religion, his doctrine comes yet closer to details used in al-Ghazālī's solutions to synthesizing reason and revelation. The masses who restrict themselves to the sharia should not be diverted from it as their own restrictions (or fetters) will come undone.[380] Because they will prove unable to restrict themselves with the restrictions of the elite, the barrier between them and evil people will be lifted.[381]

He goes further and shows his own scorn (possibly brought forth by grief) for blind religious scholars as follows: 'This verse indicates that investigation leading to the knowledge of the realities of existents which contain (as part of their knowledge) the knowledge of God, most high, is of the noble sciences (*ʿulūm*). This differs with the position of the deaf, dumb, and blind, for whom God made no light, in as much as they declare anyone busy with the knowledge of that to be a blameworthy innovator' (ibid., 203.14–16). Presumably, this declaration would come from a religious discourse which sees no place for discussion of the 'species of beings, their substances, and accidents, be they sensible or intelligible' (ibid., 202.2–3) which constitute, for al-Iṣfahānī, 'the furthest reach of mankind's knowledge of his Lord' (ibid., 202.2), but condone only belief in known tenets and apparent scriptural meanings. While there are differences with al-Ghazālī's approach, such as his concern to develop means for the masses and giving *kalām* a therapeutic role, the elitist dual discourse is the same approach adopted by al-Ghazālī. Another important difference is that al-Ghazālī takes as his project in the *Iḥyāʾ* to vindicate religion by working out how it is to perform various roles in the practical and speculative process by which mankind seeks perfection and

[378] More nuance regarding the similarity with al-Ghazālī is provided at the close of this subsection.
[379] *al-Dharīʿa*, 247.1–2.
[380] Ibid., 249.14–15.
[381] Ibid., 249.15–16.

knowledge of God. Nonetheless, it is important that such a striking similarity be found, in that both al-Ghazālī and al-Iṣfahānī present two poles regarding knowledge: a) imitation of scripture regarding truths and b) the (true) nature of things.

These passages are crucial to bare in mind when drawing conclusions regarding the influence on al-Ghazālī. The least to be drawn from this is that it is a mistake to declare categorically that Avicenna is the only influence on his epistemology.

B. The Basic Meaning of Imitation and Belief without True Knowledge

Across this thesis, the imitation–demonstration dichotomy appears in different contexts. In some cases, the dichotomy is split such that the imitative part appears in one quarter and the demonstrative part in another. For example, invocation appears in the 1st Quarter (Book IX) while its demonstrative counterpart, say, contemplation, appears in the 4th Quarter (Book XXXIX).[382] Before analysing what al-Ghazālī says about imitation and the outward purport, we may look ahead to see where he places the phenomena of mere belief and true knowledge in the levels of the human psyche, as this will help us understand his statements on imitation. Chapter 5, 'Praxis: The Bridge between the Two Worlds', shows that al-Ghazālī conceives of the human being as four levels: the body (or limbs), acts, the outer aspect of the heart, and the inner aspect of the heart. Each level requires divestment (*takhliya*) of the blameworthy before it may be adorned (*taḥliya*) with the praiseworthy. Belief occupies only the third level, the outer aspect of the heart. Specifically, in an important discussion of the levels of purification in *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra*, he refers to beliefs and character traits as occupying one level of the heart. In this passage, the third level (*rutba*) of purification is said to take as a final aim 'to populate the heart with praiseworthy character traits and beliefs that accord with the sharia (*ʿaqāʾid mashrūʿa*) with which the heart cannot become attributed so long as the heart is not cleaned of their contradictories: corrupt beliefs (*ʿaqāʾid fāsida*) and loathed vices'.[383] The full importance of this passage will become partly clear in this chapter and partly in Chapter 5. In *Iḥyāʾ*, Book

[382] As explained in the final chapter of this thesis, al-Ghazālī informs the reader in the penultimate book on contemplation that invocation is a form of affirming a meaning taken by imitation while contemplation produces new, true knowledge which alone removes one from the yoke of imitation. His examples are meanings taken from scripture which form some part of broadly conceived religious belief.

Chapter 3 will show that the 1st Quarter and 2nd Half of the *Iḥyāʾ* are linked. The 1st Quarter treats acts revealed by the prophets while the 3rd and 4th Quarters address directly the attributes of the heart which are produced by practising those acts. For example, the principles of fasting and its secrets are spelled out in Book XXIII, *Kitāb Kasr al-shahwatayn*. Fasting is treated as a sharia act revealed to the prophets in the 1st Quarter.

[383] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:125.12–14.

II, al-Ghazālī explains that these beliefs do not populate all aspects of the heart, but only the outer aspect.[384] He justifies treating belief via imitation in the first half of the *Iḥyā'* which is devoted to the outward and hence the acts of the limbs. It is appropriate, he avers, to discuss beliefs in his book devoted to praxis for the following reasons:

T2, *Iḥyā'*, 1:100.8–11

> The beliefs we have mentioned are of the works (*aʿmāl*) of the hearts and we were made to worship through receiving their transmission with acceptance and assent (*taṣdīq*) through the heart being bound fast (*ʿaqd al-qalb ʿalayhā*), not through reaching the point that their realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) are unveiled to us (*yankashif lanā*). Not all of mankind is made religiously responsible (*mukallaf*) for that. Were it not a work, we would not have put it forth in this book (the *Iḥyā'*). Were it not an act of the outer aspect (*ẓāhir*) of the heart, rather than an act of its inner aspect (*bāṭinihi*), we would not have put it forth in the first half of this book (i.e. that devoted to the outward). True unveiling (*kashf ḥaqīqī*) is the attribute of the secret of the heart and its inner aspect (*ṣifāt sirr al-qalb wa-bāṭinihi*).

This passage indicates that the heart itself has an outward and an inward aspect. This indicates that it is not the case that the outward first half of the *Iḥyā'* is devoted to the limbs while the second half is devoted to the heart, *simpliciter*. Mere belief inheres in the outward aspect of the heart. The reference to the realities of things unveiled from the Preserved Tablet and *malakūt*—as studied in the cosmology of Section I.B below—is surrounded by highly mystical terms. Yet the true knowledge referred to in the copious passages from the *Iḥyā'* cited in Chapter 3 is not assigned a place to inhere in the heart, unless it be those realities. Again the passage from the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* on the nature of unveiling and witnessing clarifies that this level is not necessarily a mystical 'experience', even if the terms suggest it is. If joined with Section II of the current chapter on cosmology, the distinct substrates of imitation and true knowledge leave no alternative in al-Ghazālī's cosmology but that it be corporeal and in a corporeal organ, which matches the other lines of evidence stated here in analysis of this passage.[385]

[384] See Chapter 5 of this thesis.

[385] It seems highly likely that the outer aspect of the heart refers to matters such as imagination and sense experience that were the perceptibles contrasted with intelligibles (and which were said in the final section of the previous chapter to be specific to the intellect).

Though he forces us to pull the passages together from across the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* and the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*, it is clear that al-Ghazālī has accepted the general features of the technical psychology of Avicenna including its substance dichotomy developed by Avicenna as part of his metaphysics of the rational soul and philosophy of religion. (See Gutas, 'Avicenna's Philosophical Project', 28–47, 'Avicenna: The Metaphysics of the Rational Soul', *Muslim World* 102 (July–October 2012): 417–25, and the sections of Jon McGinnis' monograph cited in the previous chapter.)

C. Demonstrative Knowledge and the Three Types of Belief

Imitation is treated with the levels of belief in three key books of the *Iḥyāʾ*: a) *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, b) *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, and c) *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*, but also *al-Iqtiṣād* which predates the *Iḥyāʾ*.[386] *Al-Iqtiṣād* introduces three meanings of belief in order to wade into a longstanding theological debate regarding whether belief is subject to increase, or whether it is merely a matter of possessing or lacking it.[387] Al-Ghazālī gives the same examples and scriptural citations which are recycled in the *Iḥyāʾ*, including the notion based on the principle of habituation from the *akhlāq* (ethics) tradition that dispositions of the soul, or states of the heart, are obtained via repetitive acts.[388] Al-Ghazālī may be the first theologian to explain matters of religious belief with reference to Aristotelian ethics and its core principles such as habituation.

The *Iqtiṣād* passage is significant for showing the layers of development of the *Iḥyāʾ*, which themselves clarify the nature of the position taken in the *Iḥyāʾ*. His drawing on the *akhlāq* tradition in *al-Iqtiṣād* indicates a) that he introduces philosophical notions (beyond mere logic) into *kalām* and b) that he is engaging in this prior to his departure from Baghdad, which is itself evidence adding to Chapter 1 of this thesis that his revival project was continuous to some degree with his pre-departure works. As in the *Iḥyāʾ*, though with significant differences, al-Ghazālī distinguishes between three meanings of belief in order to advance the debate of whether belief is subject to increase: a) certain, demonstrative assent (*taṣdīq yaqīnī burhānī*), b) assent through imitation (*taṣdīq taqlīdī*), and c) belief including acting (on one's belief).[389] It is inconceivable that the first of these increase or decrease, 'because if certainty occurs completely it cannot increase. If it is not complete, then it is not certainty (in the first place)… unless one means increased clarity, namely, that the soul be more tranquil regarding it'.[390] The latter two do increase and decrease, explained as follows:

T3, *al-Iqtiṣād*, 227.6–228.12

[386] It is treated with three levels of certitude in Book I, 'The Section on Certitude'.
[387] L. Gardet, '*Imān*', in Menage Lewis and Schacht Pellat (ed.), *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. III, H-Iram (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 1173a–b.
[388] The passage below is prefaced with scriptural statements that belief is lacking in the fornicator *when* they fornicate, and that belief is seventy branches, the least being to remove harmful things from the path, both of which are discussed in this chapter. His example in this passage of increasing mercy through patting the head of orphans is used in the Book II passage below.
[389] *al-Iqtiṣād*, 225.11–228.3.
[390] Ibid., 226.10–13.

> If it is used to mean imitative belief…we perceive this variance through direct witnessing (*mushāhada*) of the state of Jewish…Christian, and Muslim believers. … In spite of one of them being sure in his belief, his soul (is sometimes) more receptive to certainty because belief in regards to the heart is similar to a knot. It lacks expansion and the (coolness) of certitude. The knot varies in its strength and weakness. So, no honest person can deny this variance. … As to if it is used according to the third meaning, which is works and belief, then it is clear that works themselves are susceptible to variance. But is belief itself susceptible to variance due to steadfastness in works? This matter is open to speculative inquiry. … So, I say, persistence in acts of obedience has an effect (*athar*) in assuring (*taʾkīd*) belief through imitation (*iʿtiqād taqlīdī*) and its firmness in the soul. … The believer who has had longstanding steadfastness in performing such works as are entailed by their belief is more defiant to one attempting to change them or make them doubt than the one who has not been steadfast for a long time. Even habits and customs (*ʿādāt*) attest to this, for one who proceeds to show mercy to an orphan and inspects himself finds an increased assurance (*taʾkīd*) of that mercy (in this heart) when he practises works entailed by [the attribute of] mercy. Also, whoever has humbly lowered themselves to another in their heart and then works according to that, prostrating to them and kissing their hand, the veneration and humility in their heart increases.

As seen in Chapter 5 on praxis, habituation is made the basis of the praxis of the *Iḥyāʾ*. His inclusion of habits here in a manual on *kalām* is not a mere rhetorical example, but an indication of his own method. Even here, it is clear that he views worship from the lens of ethical theory, as impacting on belief rather than merely being a means of accruing good deeds. Imitation and demonstration are presented as a dichotomy, imitative belief alone being alterable through acts of worship. We will see below that the terms shift from imitation and demonstration to imitation and unveiling and expansion of the breast. Chapter 1 showed these terms to be synonymous with the intellect, which is the substrate of demonstrative knowledge.[391] Thus, the continuity of ideas accompanied by the changing of terms indicates that the *Iḥyāʾ* is using allusions or euphemisms to introduce the technical or philosophical notion of demonstration.

Building on but altering *al-Iqtiṣād*, *Iḥyāʾ*, Book II, *Kitāb Qawaʿid al-ʾaqaʾid*, distinguishes three different meanings of belief (*īmān*), the first being essentially imitative explained as follows: 'The first is used to refer to assent (*taṣdīq*) of the heart by way of belief (*iʿtiqād*) and

[391] The intellect was seen to be the substrative of true, necessary, and universal knowledge in the previous chapter's treatment of the division of knowledge in the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*.

imitation without unveiling (*kashf*) or expansion of the breast. It is the belief (*īmān*) of the masses (*ʿawwāmm*). Actually, it is the belief of all people except the elite (*khawwāṣṣ*). This belief (*iʿtiqād*) is a knot in the heart which is sometimes tight and at others is loose, like a knot in a string'.[392] Al-Ghazālī here presents a dichotomy in which the higher level is referred to in mystical terms 'unveiling' and 'expansion of the breast'. However, the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* passages cited in Chapter 3 showed both that expansion of the breast refers to true knowledge apprehended by the intellect and that unveiling refers to increased clarity of perception of intelligibles. Thus, this higher level is easily recognizable as the demonstration and true knowledge studied in Chapter 3,[393] referred to in the *Iqtiṣād* passage above, and more directly studied in this chapter.[394]

We may cite al-Ghazālī from *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* to confirm several elements from *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*. First, he speaks of belief as three levels, rather than three meanings of belief, and provides more concrete descriptions of the modes of imitative belief. The important confirmations provided by this passage are the notion of a masses–elite dichotomy and assigning them the same eschatological stations as seen in the *Kitāb al-Tawba* studied below in the present chapter.[395] All three are termed belief, the first said to be, 'the belief of the masses which is pure imitative belief'.[396] This level is explained in more detail as follows:

T4, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:15.4–9

> (It is) that one be informed by someone known through experience to be truthful and not known to lie, and one therefore has no reason to be suspicious regarding their words. One's heart finds peace and repose in their report through merely hearing (*samāʿ*; the term itself sometimes indicating rote transmission). This is belief via pure imitation and is like the belief of the masses. When they (i.e. the masses) reach the age of distinction (*tamyīz*), they hear from their fathers and mothers…(basic beliefs) and they accept it as they hear it. They remain firm on it and have repose towards it and nothing which differs with it ever occurs to

[392] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:119.27–9.

[393] In Chapter 3, the knowledge causing felicity was shown in what was termed the afterlife criterion to be the unchanging knowledge fit to cause eternal felicity to the eternal soul. Chapter 1 also discussed the true knowledge causing felicity in the *Tahāfut* and that chapter began the process of showing how al-Ghazālī adopted this doctrine in the *Iḥyāʾ*, notably in the division of sciences in *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*.

[394] This is further confirmed by tracing the composition of the stations which is performed in Section III of the present chapter.

Al-Ghazālī directs the reader to follow the passages necessary to understand how demonstration and Sufism are brought together in the *Iḥyāʾ*, directing the reader in discussion of the third meaning of belief to the section on certitude from *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* in the section 'Signs of the Scholars of the Afterlife'. See, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:120.8. The discussion of how the body affects the soul is discussed in Chapter 5.

[395] This passage was also summarized in reference to the two states in the afterlife at the final section of the previous chapter.

[396] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:15.1–2.

> their minds due to giving their fathers, mothers, and teachers the benefit of the doubt. This belief is the cause (*sabab*) of salvation (*najāt*) in the afterlife. Its people are the first ranks of those at the right hand (*aṣḥāb al-yamīn*) but they are not of those drawn nigh.

Imitative belief here is shown to be rote transmission which is believed through giving the benefit of the doubt to the one transmitting it or merely through hearing it and not having a reason to doubt it. This shares with imitation studied in Chapter 3 in that, rather than being true knowledge apprehended by the intellect, it is a belief held without true knowledge. Both this and the *Kitāb Qawā'id al-'aqā'id* passage refer to imitation as a type of belief and both passages associate it with the rank of the masses, the first passage contrasting it with the rank of the elite. These passages confirm the consistent levels agreeing with the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* passage below, summed up in Table 4.1. They all indicate that al-Ghazālī aligns a number of meanings and aspects of the *Iḥyā'* to the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy.

A third passage on imitation is important for confirming certain aspects of the nature and level of imitative belief, but also for linking the levels to cosmological levels. This passage from the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* lists four levels of the declaration of unity,[397] the second being the shell (*qishr*), as follows: '(It) is for one's heart to assent to the meaning of the term (*lafẓ*) just as the masses of Muslims have assented to it, this being the belief (*i'tiqād*) of the masses'.[398] The passage does not use the term imitation (*taqlīd*), but it does refer to this second level of belief as 'mere belief lacking unveiling' and contrasts it to 'expansion of the breast' shown in Chapter 3 to be synonymous to intellect. In other words, it is belief without knowledge, upholding the dichotomy of imitation and knowledge found in Chapters 1 and 2. However, in this passage al-Ghazālī uniquely refers to imitation as shell and knowledge as the kernel, though not the kernel of the kernel as explained in a subsequent section returning to the levels produced here. This of course concurs with the argument of Chapters 1 and 2 that al-Ghazālī utilizes the philosophical view of religion as imitation of true, demonstrative knowledge.

The text of all three books—*Qawa'id*, *'Ajā'ib*, and *Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*—use assent and two terms for belief (*īmān* and *i'tiqād*) to mean belief in the most general sense. Within this

[397] These levels are studied by Alexander Treiger in the final chapter of his doctoral dissertation on the science of unveiling. (See Treiger, *The Science of Divine Disclosure*, Ch. 6, 284–307.) And Kenneth Garden notes the general philosophical origin of the term felicity in the *Iḥyā'* (see Garden, *The First Islamic Reviver*, 36–9 and 67–8). However, he does not study the passage from the perspective studied here: how true knowledge relates consistently to a lower and a higher level.
[398] *Iḥyā'*, 4:240.6–7.

general sense, these books distinguish different types of belief through qualifications such as whether or not this belief is based on proof. This indicates that these texts present a set of levels of belief and they consistently advance belief through imitation as the lowest type of belief.[399] Imitation is held in place intentionally, through effort. One makes this effort in order to uphold religious obligation. When we turn to the ranks associated with these levels below, including looking at the rank of *kalām* and annihilation in Section IV on clarifying the two levels, we will see that he also describes the level of *kalām* as a knot, with the sole difference that the *kalām* scholar knows the dialectical arguments needed to repel certain doubts. This is in contrast to demonstration in which belief is firmly established and does not require being held through an effort to fulfil one's religious obligation.[400]

The four levels of the declaration of unity are associated with four cosmological levels. These levels are laid out philosophically in the *Miʿyār*, but the *Iḥyāʾ* goes to more lengths to explain how the levels interact, or how the mind may pass from the form of things to their meaning. As this *Iḥyāʾ* passage from the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* will assist us in understanding how imitation conceived of as a knot without expansion is linked to the corporeal and fits al-Ghazālī's bipartite cosmology, it will be studied in the following section.[401] When joined to this cosmology, the consistent association of imitation with the masses and true knowledge with the elite may be seen to be underpinned by the corporeal and incorporeal, respectively.[402]

[399] *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* speaks of a lower level of the declaration of unity, but this is not belief, but rather disbelief: hypocrisy (*nifāq*) (see *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:420.21–2).

[400] In this passage from the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*, al-Ghazālī also speaks of four levels of the existence of belief, which accords with his discussions in the *Miʿyār* regarding the four levels of existence of the knowledge of a matter. In these levels, only the highest is said to be true knowledge by al-Ghazālī.

[401] See *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:20.3–7, below which sets out to explain a cosmology with reference to four levels of existence. This is related to the statement above that is was limited to the outward aspect of the heart, not the inward aspect.

[402] In addition, this chapter's aim, to establish that the two levels are fundamental to the *Iḥyāʾ*, the position of *kalām*, will be addressed below. Al-Ghazālī will be shown to associate it with the masses and the knot in the heart, not the intellect and true knowledge of the realities of things as stated in recent scholarship discussed in Section IV.

II. The Cosmology Underpinning the Dichotomy

A. The Cosmological Nature of the Corporeal and Incorporeal Worlds

The previous section along with the previous two chapters have set out a cumulative case for the existence of a dichotomy which includes knowledge and belief: belief not based on demonstrative proof is corporeal (or perceived by a corporeal organ), while true knowledge is incorporeal and inheres in the intellect (sometimes termed heart or insight, etc). It is argued that while al-Ghazālī may not systematically spell out how his cosmology (and ontology) underpin his epistemology, he does develop a cosmology which explains many subtle elements of his epistemology. For instance, while this section's discussion of his cosmology shows that the corporeal is in some sense a veil, this is not necessarily the case, and under the right conditions the soul may pass through the corporeal and see its incorporeal form and meaning. This line of argument is itself important for two reasons. First, it shows how imitation and similitude—which Richard Frank saw as resembling al-Fārābī's notion of religion as imitation—are more valuable than mere ignorance. In other words, if they are not true knowledge inhering in the intellect, then the difference between them and ignorance becomes unclear. Secondly, it explains how certain phenomena such as *kalām* may have a form of reasoning, yet still resolve to the corporeal level. This will be important for subsequent arguments that in spite of sub-levels—especially regarding the level below knowledge—all notions of outer shell, inner shell, kernel, and kernel of the kernel and other terms such as sharia and ultimate reality (*ḥaqīqa*) ultimately resolve to a dichotomy of corporeal and incorporeal, even if some elements such as imagination are closer to the incorporeal. And regarding the notion of religion in the *Iḥyā'*, it is claimed that al-Ghazālī maintains a lower version which is imitative and a similitude and a higher level associated with the afterlife. This section shows the value of the lower level and how it differs from mere ignorance and it shows how al-Ghazālī draws on and stretches the four levels (*marātib*) of existence to govern the interaction of these four levels which he draws on in his epistemological discussions.[403]

The 3rd Quarter classification passage (T11) studied in Chapter 1 showed that al-Ghazālī divided sciences into intellectual (*'aqlī*) and religious (*shar'ī*) and said that the intellectual sciences are those arrived at through judgement of the intellect and are not

[403] These discussions include the nature of *kalām* and the interpretation of symbols, as seen in this section and in Chapter 1's discussion of interpretation based on the passages from the *Kitāb al-Tawba*.

produced through imitation and mere hearing. This indicates a dichotomy, but before gathering references to such a dichotomy, the important cosmological element argued to underpin it requires study. Keeping the principles of his cosmology in mind is important, as al-Ghazālī often deploys his thought implicitly rather than spelling out matters in the *Iḥyā'* which is not his most technical of works. Several passages will be shown to indicate that imitation is a form of veil, but it is part of a group of veils preventing the soul's natural propensity for reflecting the incorporeal realities of things. The following passages thus indicate how the dichotomy between the intelligible and sensible made so clearly in the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* apply in al-Ghazālī's discussions of belief, knowledge, and below will explain how they figure into the resultant ranks. The *mulk* is shown not to be an absolute veil which explains the cosmology behind why *imitation* is not an absolute veil.[404]

Before presenting evidence from the *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb* that the corporeal may be a veil, nearby passages will be summarized, indicating that all true knowledge belongs to the incorporeal world which inheres in the heart by which humans are distinguished from pack animals. This may be seen by reflecting on the following statements which define the corporeal world (*mulk*) and incorporeal world (*malakūt*) and fill out the philosophical description of them as two levels in the previous chapter. We will remember that in Chapter 3, Section II, 'Al-Ghazālī's Bipartite Cosmology and Avicenna's Body–Soul Dualism', it was shown that there are two worlds and that al-Ghazālī uses several terms to apply to each.[405] The corporeal is said in *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb* to be the heavens (*samāwāt*) and earth which is the seen, finite world.[406] Al-Ghazālī clarifies his use of the term heavens to mean the corporeal heavens by stating that he means the heavens without the *malakūt* and Janna. The incorporeal world is said to be, by contrast, the world of secrets not seen by the eyes, whose apprehension is limited to insight, and is in itself infinite, even if the amount revealed to the heart is limited.[407] This accords with Chapter 2 which showed that the corporeal world and incorporeal world were described in philosophical terms as that which possesses quantity and that which transcends quantity and location, respectively. Later in *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb*, the

[404] Mind that the eschatology behind imitation is indicated in *Kītāb al-Tawba*: when one wakes up in *malakūt*, one realizes that the similitude was correct (whether this occurs in this life or the next). For Avicenna, in imaginal resurrection, one experiences what one believes.
[405] These findings are summarized in Chapter 3, Table 3.1, 'Various terms in the *Iḥyā'* for the two worlds'.
[406] *Iḥyā'*, 3:14.18–19.
[407] Ibid., 3:14.19–20.

incorporeal (*malakūt*) is said to be the Preserved Tablet (*al-lawḥ al-maḥfūẓ*) and the world of the angels. The realities of things are stored in the Preserved Tablet and the hearts (read: souls) of the angels drawn nigh (*qulūb al-malā'ika al-muqarrabīn*), just as an architect has a copy of a home before building .[408] Al-Ghazālī is here setting forth an ontology of the beings which populate the *malakūt*, these being (here): the Preserved Tablet, the hearts (read: souls) of the angels, and the knowledge which inheres in them. Al-Ghazālī informs us that there is a relation between the two worlds, stating that the corporeal and seen world resembles (*yuḥāki*) the *malakūt* to some degree.[409] Elsewhere, he explains this resemblance by stating that the corporeal world is the manifestation of the incorporeal world[410] in the sense that corporeal beings are built according to plan existing in the incorporeal world. In laying out this ontology, al-Ghazālī is providing an epistemology which explains how knowledge can be obtained via created things or directly through inspiration.[411] In both cases, it is adequate to the eternal blueprint in the incorporeal world and in both cases, it comes to inhere in the human heart.

B. The Corporeal World as a Veil

From one perspective, in spite of the corporeal world resembling the incorporeal world and reflecting its plans, it is often a veil over the incorporeal world. Al-Ghazālī states that the heart has the propensity or preparedness (*musta'idd*) for the reality of the truth in all things to be

[408] Ibid., 3:19.27–8. Cf. Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*. Davidson studies the link between the *malakūt* in Avicenna and al-Ghazālī. He notes that Avicenna had employed the Koranic term *malakūt* 'to designate the segment of the universe which includes the souls of the celestial spheres, although not the spheres themselves…Ghazālī's *Miskhāt* asserts that the "world of *malakūt*", also "called the supernal world, the spiritual world, or the light-world", transcends the "heavens". It is the "intellectual [*'aqlī*]…world". As for its contents, "the totality of the world of *malakūt*" is "the angels", "the upper world is filled with…the intellectual, nonphysical [*ma'nāwiyya*] lights, which are the angelic substances", the "world of *malakūt* contains lightlike substances known as angels [*yu'abbar 'anha bi-l-malā'ika*]". Equating the souls of the spheres and undoubtedly also the incorporeal intelligences with the *angels* of religious nomenclature, as Ghazālī does here in the *Miskhāt*, was commonplace. Among others, Avicenna drew the equation, and Ghazālī himself remarked in his summary of Avicenna's philosophy that "the souls [of the spheres] and the intelligences…are known as celestial spiritual angels [*yu'abbar 'anhā bil-malāika*…]'" (See Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, 133–4).

[409] *Iḥyā'*, 3:20.20.

[410] *Kitāb al-Tawba* explains that the acts manifest the attributes of the heart based on the (overriding) cosmology which is that the corporeal world manifests what is in the incorporeal world due to the consistency of God's practice regarding the two worlds. (See *Iḥyā'*, 4:3.15–16.)

[411] Also, this is a cosmological principle which likely underpins al-Ghazālī's thinking regarding imitative belief. Imitative belief resembles the truths of the *malakūt* without being identical. The evidence for this is that he uses such terms as similitude (*mithāl*) and outward purport (*zāhir*) in a manner indicating they are below true knowledge, which itself indicates according to his psychology studied in Chapter 1 and cosmology studied in this chapter that they are corporeal and perceived by corporeal organs. In addition, the study of the *Mi'yār* in this chapter shows that he infuses his discussion of its levels of discourse with cosmological terms (including the kernel and shell) which carry over into the *Iḥyā'*.

revealed to it.[412] All occurrences till the end of time plus the realities of the sciences (*ḥaqāʾiq al-ʿulūm*) would be reflected in the mirror of the heart were a veil not hung in front of it, which al-Ghazālī states is due to five causes.[413] Inspiration and learning do not differ either in terms of the knowledge itself nor in terms of its substrate (which is the heart),[414] but only regarding the method of the veil being lifted varies.[415] The five causes are also said to be a veil between the heart and the *malakūt*.[416] These five veils which have been studied by previous scholarship,[417] may be summarized as follows: a) a deficiency in the heart, b) the filth of sins and desires, c) the righteous and obedient being busy with the likes of bodily worship or earning a livelihood, d) the imitation associated with the masses and the zeal of *kalām* scholars, and e) ignorance of logic.[418] They are veils in the sense that they prevent true knowledge from being obtained from the incorporeal world. Imitation is not alone, but is one of a group of veils. As they are not part of the incorporeal world, but veils over it, the bipartite cosmology entails that they are part of the corporeal world.

As shown later, in *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, al-Ghazālī states that (in spite of the corporeal world representing the incorporeal world in a certain manner), when one addresses oneself purely to the imaginal forms (*khayyālāt*) derived from sensibles, that becomes a veil over the knowledge contained in the Preserved Tablet.[419] He does not say absolutely that imaginables and sensibles veil the Preserved Tablet and the knowledge it contains, but only if one focusses on and addresses oneself to them. As we will see below, if this is joined to the passage on abstraction which precedes it in *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, it indicates that if one

[412] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:18.1–4.
[413] Ibid., 3:18.3–4.
[414] Ibid., 3:12.13.
[415] Ibid., 3:18.9–10.
[416] Ibid., 3:14.11–12.
[417] See Janssens, 'L'Âme-Miroir: Al-Ġazālī Entre Philosophie Et Mysticisme', 209–10. Janssens notes that some of the veils (or obstacles) reflect Avicennian notions of the need to perfect the practical and theoretical aspects of the soul. If this is added to the note below that the veils resemble a development of a passage from *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, we may be relatively certain about the origins of the veils, partly attested by the *Aḥwāl* being a known source for the *Mīzān* (see Chapter 5). Additionally, Chapter 3 of the present thesis studies al-Ghazālī's use of the two aspects (or faces of the soul) and the notion that praxis is to remove obstacles to apprehension through removing vice. This doctrine of praxis is most clearly expressed in the *Mīzān* but shown in Chapter 5 to carry over into the *Iḥyāʾ*.
[418] One may notice that there is something of a social classing in the order presented, the veils being more refined as one ascends. It would seem that al-Ghazālī holds that knowledge of logic is needed to produce true knowledge and to become a proper scholar capable of speculative inquiry. Evidence for this is seen in the order here, but more firmly in his claim in *Kitāb al-Tafakkur* that true knowledge, as opposed to mere belief, is only produced (save in the prophets) by syllogistic joining of knowables, this alone qualifying as contemplation or speculative inquiry.
[419] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:20.16–17. Another indication of the *mulk* being a veil is at ibid., 3:29.18–19, but this includes reference to a dichotomy of Satanic insinuations and inspiration of angels.

passes from the sensible form to imagination and then to the intelligible form, the senses are not a veil. In this sense, imagination and sense may be a ladder to the *malakūt* as seen in the next subsection.

C. The Corporeal World as a Mercy and Ladder to the Incorporeal World

Al-Ghazālī alludes to the consequences of the corporeal world and incorporeal world for the afterlife. He notes that the tongue is from the corporeal world, so stating the testification of faith (*tawḥīd*) with the tongue only benefits one in the corporeal world; not in the afterlife.[420] However, to determine his position on the matter, we must examine his cosmology in general and then link this to his statements on the ranks in the afterlife studied in Section III below. The present subsection examines the cosmology of how the corporeal world might open up to the incorporeal world. While the corporeal world is not true knowledge and stopping with it may be a veil, in several places al-Ghazālī speaks of a mercy by which one may arrive at the incorporeal world which, as noted in this section, is the location of true knowledge and hence the cause of felicity.[421] As a general rule, but without explanation, this is stated as follows: 'The world of the visible and corporeal world is a road to the world of the unseen and incorporeal world for the one for whom God has opened the door'.[422] He goes on to speak of a parallelism (*muwāzana*) between these worlds referred to in scripture.[423] This notion is explained in more detail in *Jawāhir al-Qur'ān* where it refers specifically to scriptural similitudes,[424] an application shown below to be found in the *Iḥyā'* at the end of this treatment of cosmology.

This parallelism is subtly linked to the matter of imitation and demonstration in the 4th Quarter. In discussion of the ranks in the afterlife studied in the following section, the expanse in the next life for those who are knowers (*'ārifūn*) and contemplators (*mustabṣirūn*) is said to be ten times the size of the here-below. However, al-Ghazālī states that understanding

[420] Ibid., 4:29.21–3. This statement seems to conflict with the fact that in the same passage, he states that belief through imitation leads to salvation in spite of our argument that imitation is part of the *mulk*. It seems that al-Ghazālī holds that the similitudes of scripture (and imitative belief) are true if they are interpreted truly. The truths of the *malakūt* cannot be expressed in the *mulk*, but scriptural similitudes are known to be true when those sleeping in the *mulk* 'awaken' after death in the afterlife (see, *Iḥyā'*, 4:79–81). Thus, he holds that the belief of the *mulk* by being founded on revealed similitudes has an inner meaning to which it points and for which it is coined (*ḍarb*) and which may benefit one in the afterlife due to this revealed special property in spite of being of the *mulk*.

[421] Allusion to this principle is found in Book XXXI in discussion of similitudes and their efficacy (see below). The principle is unpacked in one place in *Kītāb Sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb* discussed shortly.

[422] *Iḥyā'*, 1:270.23.

[423] Ibid., 1:270.23–4.

[424] The cosmology presented in the *Jawāhir* was summarized in Chapter 2 on interpretation.

this scriptural statement requires knowing a) the manner in which similitudes are struck and b) the nature of the parallelism between bodies and their spirits (*muwāzanāt maʿānī al-ajsām wa-arwāḥihā*).[425] The knower is the one who is also able to understand this parallelism, while the immature, but also the Bedouin and villager who lack this light beyond eyesight (i.e. intellect), cannot understand it.[426] It is a justified interpolation to say that this would include those who possess imitation rather than true knowledge and demonstration. Lacking intellect has the entailment in al-Ghazālī's overarching dichotomous cosmology of determining their epistemological level: they are left with the shell.

Another element of the mercy connecting the two worlds, rather than dividing them, is found in al-Ghazālī's explanation of his statement that this knowledge causing felicity is available to all. He states that this knowledge is not reserved from anyone (*maḍnūn bihā ʿalā aḥad*), but as explained above (i.e. in the five veils) this mercy is for those who expose themselves to the breaths or puffs of God's mercy through purifying the soul from the murkiness of blameworthy traits (i.e. vices).[427] After citing scriptural evidence, al-Ghazālī comments, 'All of that indicates the lights of the sciences are not veiled from hearts due to miserliness or a preventative from the side of the Bestower of Blessings (*al-Munʿim*; i.e. God). … Rather, they are veiled due to filth, murkiness, and being preoccupied on the side of the hearts (themselves)'.[428] This is a cosmological and psychological principle found in Avicenna who states it as follows: 'The intelligible forms which are in the abstract substances are not intrinsically veiled from their side whatsoever. The veil is in our faculties, either due to their weakness or due to their being preoccupied in a different direction from that through which they are reached'.[429] The five veils listed by al-Ghazālī (and studied above) read like a development of Avicenna's brief statement. They include purification of the heart from vice and sin and thus show that al-Ghazālī's praxis which centres on removing vice to prepare the heart to receive the intelligibles and felicity falls within and is even conceived for him within the rules of an overarching cosmology. The cosmology is still primarily a corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy in which the intelligibles are in the incorporeal world, both for al-

[425] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:28.5 and 4:28.7–8.
[426] Ibid., 4:28.12–17.
[427] Ibid., 3:8.17–22. This knowledge is further linked to knowledge of God and the self which is to know that neither are of the world of the five sense (*ḥawāss khamsa*). (See *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:29.5–11.)
[428] Ibid., 3:8.25–7.
[429] *Aḥwāl*, 116.14–117.1. There is a clear resemblance between al-Ghazālī's statement made previously that knowledge was in the hearts of the angels brought nigh.

Ghazālī and Avicenna, and the human being begins in the corporeal world; the worlds are not separate and there is mercy between them, but praxis is needed to remove to one of the five preventatives. Without penetrating to the incorporeal world, one does not obtain the intelligibles and as stated remains an imitator. This statement confirms the dichotomy found in Chapter 1 between true, intellectual knowledge and imitation, but reveals the cosmological dichotomous framework underpinning it in al-Ghazālī's thought. As stated in this chapter and Chapter 1, while al-Ghazālī deploys a dichotomy between imitation and demonstration, the ultimate dichotomy is really the corporeal and incorporeal worlds. The imitation–demonstration dichotomy is specifically epistemological as seen in his division of the sciences in Chapter 1. It was noted that this division of all sciences into imitation and intellectual was somewhat strange, but made sense when seen to represent the corporeal–incorporeal split or a Fārābīan notion of religion, even if creatively utilized by al-Ghazālī and therefore not identical with it. The fact that he was shown in Chapter 2 to use a similar split of corporeal and incorporeal worlds to refer to the similitude and meaning of scripture, respectively, he was said to indicate that the split was more general than merely imitation–demonstration. Additionally, in Chapter 1, Richard Frank's study of imitation cited al-Ghazālī presenting a general dichotomy of outward purport and inner realities, those who fall short of inner insight (read: intellect) being limited to the shell and mere similitudes. More evidence that there is a general cosmology linking these apparently disparate phenomena is seen in the following subsection. There, the four levels of existence studied show that more than two levels exist, but that they ultimately resolve to a dichotomy of corporeal and incorporeal between which there is interaction allowing penetration and ascent or return to the incorporeal and true felicity.

D. The Four Levels of Existence and the Cosmology Underpinning Mercy

Al-Ghazālī is shown in this subsection to possess a notion of four levels of existence which resolve to his primarily dichotomous cosmology as well as his notion of the interaction between the levels claimed in this thesis to effect his notions of imitation, *kalām* (which is still merely a knot in the heart), and higher theology. As stated above, were he not to have a notion of how the soul moves from corporeal form to meaning, his core notions of imitation and similitude would be no different than pure ignorance: they would simply not be knowledge.

When compared to his other writings on the four levels of existence, the following may be seen. Firstly, the levels have a philosophical origin as early as Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* transmitted ultimately by al-Ghazālī's known sources of the *Miʿyār*, primarily Avicenna and al-Fārābī. More significant than the transmission is the fact that deploying philosophically based levels allows al-Ghazālī to draw on the related tools of the philosophers to systematize his praxis and Sufism. It will be shown in a later section that al-Ghazālī already in the *Miʿyār* uses mystical terms to refer to the levels of this otherwise philosophical cosmology. Secondly, al-Ghazālī presents many details in the *Iḥyā'* which are not in the *Jawāhir* and *Mishkāt*. This is important because it is often assumed that those works have a more sophisticated cosmology but also because they are written subsequently. This makes using them as evidence in the *Iḥyā'* methodologically problematic, so showing the developed notions in the *Iḥyā'* of the levels of existence and how imagination may operate to penetrate the veils is important groundwork.

The *Iḥyā'*s treatment of the four levels, which includes and supersedes the *Jawāhir* and *Mishkāt*, is found in the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* and explains the cosmology behind the said mercy between the *mulk* and *malakūt*. While the *Jawāhir* states that the *mulk* is a road to the *malakūt*, the *Mishkāt* explains one manner of this: the imagination may be purified such that one move from the sensible form of a thing in the *mulk* to its intelligible form.[430] The *Mishkāt* refers to the two levels as the corporeal world and incorporeal world, and states that everything in the corporeal world is a similitude of something in the incorporeal world and leads to the incorporeal world due to a mercy placed between them.[431] He refers to the 'straight path' as climbing the ladder between the worlds.[432] While imagination is dense and generally veils from the meanings, it may become purified such that one know that the outward similitude is true.[433]

[430] That passage was said to state that knowledge has four layers, the kernel (*lubb*) being true knowledge which is incorporeal.

See *Mishkāt*, 67.3–6 and cf. Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'an*, 50. The same notion is referred to in the *Jawāhir*, 34.14–35.8.

[431] *Mishkāt*, 67.3–6 and cf. Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'an*, 50. The same notion is referred to in the *Jawāhir*, 34.14–35.8.

[432] Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'an*, 50 Cf. Section IV.C.1 below which cites the *Miʿyār* stating that while poetry does not convey knowledge, one may be on the straight path and notice meanings rather than forms.

[433] See Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'an,* 51–2. The reference to one thing being more spiritual than another likely has a particular sense, which is the notion that imagination is more spiritual than real sense experience because it is not a body but still differs from the *malakūt* in that it is a concrete form and occurs in corporeal organs unlike true knowledge, and sense experience is more spiritual than physical bodies.

Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb's discussion of knowledge and inspiration studied above indicates that sense and imagination are veils, but, as stated, only when one directs oneself to them. Al-Ghazālī leaves it to the present passage to show why this is not necessarily the case. An impression (*athar*) is said to be conveyed to the heart by seeing things and then imagining them in such a manner that were they to cease to exist, they would remain in the imagination.[434] Through this, the reality of things occur in the heart, which al-Ghazālī explains, saying, 'Thus, there occur in the heart the realities of things (*ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ*) which entered sense and imagination. That which occurs in the heart concurs with the world occurring in the imagination. That which occurs in the imagination concurs with the world which exists independently, outside of the imagination and heart of mankind. The world which exists concurs with the copy (*nuskha*) existing in the Preserved Tablet'.[435] Al-Ghazālī has gone to pains to explain how this might happen and that there is a correspondence in the levels between knowledge and the known and between that acquired by abstraction (or learning) and that acquired by inspiration.[436] A specific type of four-level ontology is referred to as follows:

T5, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:20.3–7

> It is as though the world has four levels of existence: a) Its existence in the Preserved Tablet which precedes its bodily (*jismānī*) existence, followed by b) its real (*ḥaqīqī*) existence, followed by c) its imaginal (*khayyālī*) existence—i.e. the existence of its form (*ṣūra*) in the imagination—followed by d) its intellectual (*ʿaqlī*) existence—i.e. the existence of its form in the heart. Some of these types of existence are spiritual (*rūḥāniyya*) and some of them are bodily (*jismāniyya*), and some are more spiritual than others. This grace (*lutf*) is from the divine wisdom.

Al-Ghazālī explains this divine wisdom and grace as allowing knowledge of the world without which one could otherwise not reach. He explains that this includes the expanses of mountains and the heavens, which enter the small eye and convey an imprint of its form to the imagination and then to the heart.[437] We should not assume that in every case, the heart moves from sense and imagination to a reality adequate to the things themselves and their copy in the Preserved Tablet, as otherwise there would be no need for purification, such as

[434] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:19.32.
[435] Ibid., 3:20.1–3.
[436] This is likely linked to al-Ghazālī's search for agreement or complementarity between the outward purport and inward meaning of scripture in the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* discussion of the nature of secrets. (See *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:107.)
[437] Ibid., 3:20.7–11.

that referred to in the *Mishkāt*, in order to reach the incorporeal world. In spite of the possible prerequisite of purification, it is clear that sense and imagination are not necessarily veils, but only if one fails to move from form to meaning. Rather, they are a mercy or type of opportunity to achieve knowledge of the realities of things. This cosmology found in the *Iḥyā'* itself—not just the *Jawāhir* and *Mishkāt*—provides the cosmological mechanism by which imitation and similitudes may convey knowledge under the right circumstances, such as purifying the imagination and removing the veil of vice via praxis. In spite of al-Ghazālī not connecting the dots for the reader, this cosmology provides a model for how al-Fārābī's notion of religion would operate. It indicates that the Divine provides as many access points as possible to the knowledge in the incorporeal world and Preserved Tablet which causes felicity. Creation of real, bodily existence offers a window through which knowledge of realities may be obtained through various means, including purified imagination and those set forth earlier in the five veils: praxis, transcending imitation and sectarian zeal, and logic. Further, for al-Fārābī, one function of imitation (*taqlīd*) is to allow one unable understand at t1 to understand later at t2 without being in a state of denial between t1 and t2. The role of imitation in al-Ghazālī is more positive: the similitude is true as such, even if corporeal, as studied in Chapter 2.

E. Sub-Layers and Further Veils which Resolve to the Corporeal–Incorporeal Dichotomy

In addition to the cosmology explaining the relation of corporeal similitudes and imitation to incorporeal knowledge just presented, al-Ghazālī explains how imitation has different types and how they operate partially as a veil. These statements form important links between the epistemological and cosmological aspects of his imitation–demonstration dichotomy.

The reference to a dichotomy in this chapter is not meant to assert that there are no sub-levels. However, because recent scholarship such as that of Alexander Treiger has argued for three fundamental levels, it is important to clarify these sub-levels and to gather evidence that they resolve to the dichotomy, at least as presented in the *Iḥyā'*.[438]

[438] Section IV takes up the argument regarding Treiger's triad directly.

In addition to three levels, there is the famous four-fold division into the aspects of the kernel and shell, but also the matter of the *jabarūt* as a third level. The four-fold division is taken up in Chapter 3 where the kernel and kernel of the kernel are shown to pertain to two aspects of the soul. The *jabarūt* is not addressed here, but as spelled out in the *Imlā'*, it is an intermediate realm linked sometimes to imagination (and at others with impulses

1. *Iḥyāʾ*, Book VIII, The Etiquette of Koranic Recitation

In the *Iḥyāʾ*, Book VIII, al-Ghazālī offers an important list of matters which may prevent a reciter from understanding the Koran. In this passage, al-Ghazālī confirms the thesis that imitation shares with similitudes in being a lower level corresponding to a higher truth (and hence providing more evidence that he utilizes a Fārābīan notion of religion as imitation in a wide sense including the epistemological levels of sciences and the levels of scripture). His reference in this passage to the dichotomy between the corporeal and incorporeal worlds indicates that the cosmology elucidated so far in this section is part and parcel of his reflections here. Also, in addition to the two levels of imitation and demonstration, al-Ghazālī refers to more nuanced levels such as rote learning, *kalām* proofs, and, by contrast, deviations in belief (*bidʿa*) all sharing in being veils.

Al-Ghazālī begins by stating that the meanings of the Koran are part of the incorporeal world which is perceived by insight, not the senses.[439] Most people lack understanding due to causes presumably like the five previously mentioned and veils over the heart.[440] He lists four veils, starting with one's concern being directed towards correct pronunciation of the letters. One may notice the parallel to the previous subsection's statement in a wider cosmological context that sense and imagination are veils specifically when one's concern is directed towards them.

The second veil is said to be imitation (*taqlīd*). Al-Ghazālī's important statements here in *Iḥyāʾ*, Book VII, accord with the cosmology set out in which the corporeal claimed to underpin his notion of religion may be a veil and may be a window. He states importantly that even imitation which is true may be a veil because the truth that believers were made responsible to believe in is composed of levels; it has a starting point, which is its outward aspect, and it has an inward secret, which is the meaning in the incorporeal world.[441] In the light of a strict dichotomy shown in Chapter 2 to operate in the *Iḥyāʾ*, this statement crucially confirms that belief and knowledge operate on the same principles as scripture set out in Chapter 1, Section II: each have an outward and corporeal shell and an inward and

conveyed between the soul and body) and is therefore corporeal, even if less dense than corporeal objects. It is thus not unlike imagination treated in the subsequent subsection.

[439] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:285.7–10.

[440] Ibid., 1:285.7–8.

[441] Ibid., 1:285.24–7.

incorporeal reality or meaning. This also confirms the findings of Chapter 3, Table 3.1, which collected the various terms for the two levels, showing that inward and outward are generally used to refer to the corporeal and incorporeal aspect of a thing. Al-Ghazālī informs the reader that this matter, i.e. the truth believers are responsible for believing having layers, is explained in *Kitāb Qawā'id al-'aqā'id*, Book II. His statement here in Book VIII regarding the outward vs the inward incorporeal meaning does indeed confirm Book II statements that different levels of belief in a single truth correspond to each other or are 'complementary' to each other. However, there he did not spell out that the lower level included imitation. So, this is an important confirmation that the same notions of corporeal outer vis-à-vis the incorporeal inner truth apply both to scripture and belief in general, the latter manifesting as the imitation–demonstration dichotomy.[442]

The conditional element of imitation is explained by al-Ghazālī here, in that one must not adhere to imitation when unveiling and insight occurs. This would be to allow the 'Satan of imitation' to convince one that one's unveiling contradicts what one believed via imitation. The cosmology here is that one must allow oneself to transcend the form to its meaning in a manner resembling how, rather than being veiled by the corporeal, one may move from sense to imagination to true meaning. Cumulatively, this indicates that while al-Ghazālī was keen to establish true religion on a strict corporeal dichotomy set out in Chapters 1 and 3, his notion of imitation is cast within a notion of the corporeal as a possible window to the incorporeal realities and truth.

2. *Al-Maqṣad al-asnā* (and the levels of belief)

Though *al-Maqṣad al-asnā* is a work written subsequently to the *Iḥyā'*, it provides important details from which study of the *Iḥyā'* may draw illumination, even while being cautious regarding attributing doctrines to the *Iḥyā'* period. In an attempt to specify the share of human beings in the divine names, al-Ghazālī first distinguishes three types of understanding possible for the masses, breaking it down into parts or levels. First is oral transmission or mere hearing of terms, requiring only the sound sense of hearing by which sounds are heard, this level being shared with pack animals.[443] Al-Ghazālī is invoking the same corporeal–

[442] This also confirms findings from this chapter that imitation and the outward (corporeal) purport serve a purpose (and are not merely, for instance, ignorance nor falsity).
[443] *al-Maqṣad*, 42.4–8.

incorporeal dichotomy of perceptions set out in the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* passages studied in Chapter 2. Second is to understand the conventional assignment of meanings to terms in the Arabic language which even an 'obtuse Bedouin lexicographer' could understand.[444] Just as the reference to the Bedouin (and child) earlier in this chapter, the point is a person who in al-Ghazālī's estimation falls short of the higher level of true intellect and insight.

Third is to assent to the ascription of those meanings to God without unveiling (*kashf*).[445] If these meanings are passed to one, one believes them resolutely with the heart.[446] This is the level of most scholars, let alone others; presumably others lack even this.[447] And while they are virtues compared to those not possessing (even) them, yet they are below the peak of perfection.

The first share of the Divine which is considerable or 'counts' is said to be 'knowledge of these meanings by way of unveiling (*al-mukāshafa*) and witnessing (*al-mushāhada*) until their realities become clear through a demonstration (*burhān*) in which it is impossible to be mistaken. … How great is the difference between this and between the belief (*iʿtiqād*) that is taken from one's parents and teachers by imitation…even if accompanied by dialectical *kalām* proofs'.[448] We will see below that *kalām* is associated with linguistics in a manner similar to how it is here associated with the mere linguist and the level of 'most scholars'.[449] But it is clear immediately that unveiling and demonstration are on one side of a dichotomy while imitation and even *kalām* proofs, described pejoratively as dialectic, are on the other. This passage breaks down the level below true knowledge into several sub-levels. Additionally, the passage makes it clear that true knowledge obtained by properly demonstrative proofs. Dialectic proofs not produce the unveiling and true knowledge sought. In fact, this is the first share (*ḥaẓẓ*) of the divine names, explained as follows, 'Knowledge of these meanings through unveiling and witnessing (*mushāhada*) such that their realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) become clear (*taṭṭaḍiḥ*) to them through demonstration in which mistake is impossible'.[450] This reference to demonstration admixed with mystical terms such as not only unveiling, but witnessing would

[444] Ibid., 42.8–10.
[445] Ibid., 42.10–13.
[446] Ibid., 42.13.
[447] Ibid., 42.14.
[448] *al-Maqṣad al-asnā*, 43.1–2.
[449] It will also be shown that al-Ghazālī's use of the term dialectic may link to context theory in which dialectic is a form below demonstration.
[450] Ibid., 43.1-2. Further details of this passage are referred to in Section IV of this chapter.

be confusing without the study of unveiling in Chapter 3, showing it to be increased clarity regarding intelligibles. Al-Ghazālī himself emphasizes a clear dichotomy between demonstration and unveiling and the other layers as follows: 'How great is the difference between this and belief (*iʿtiqād*) taken from parents and teachers through imitation and having resolve regarding it, even if it is accompanied with dialectical (*jadaliyya*) *kalām* proofs'.[451] Thus, through the layers and revolving door of terms, the fundamental dichotomy studied in Section I is found to underpin the distinction between true, demonstrative knowledge and imitation.[452] However, it appears that imitation is part of a spectrum of those matters below true knowledge: a) oral transmission-rote learning, b) linguistic understanding of terms, c) assent to the meaning of terms through imitation and without true knowledge or unveiling.[453]

Together, the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* and the *Kitāb Ādāb tilāwat al-Qurʾān* (and *al-Maqṣad*) indicate that all besides the incorporeal, true knowledge apprehended by insight is a veil. However, the corporeal may serve as a means to true knowledge due to a mercy placed in it by which the human soul may ascend through it to meaning, under certain conditions. Al-Ghazālī works creatively with multifarious theological topics in a manner in which he finds or produces links and insights based on his bipartite cosmology such that their workings are explained to accord to it. The evidence indicates he believes that the world itself is composed of these layers and that they interpenetrate everything including the human psyche and human sciences.

Seeing this cosmology as pervading the universe aids in seeing that imitation is only one aspect of what is effectively a level termed by al-Ghazālī as 'the outward' (*al-ẓāhir*). In other words, in the levels al-Ghazālī utilizes, imitation (*taqlīd*) and similitudes (*amthila*), including all or most of scripture, are outward, while the inner meaning is through true knowledge, including the higher levels of unveiling as seen in Chapter 2. Imitation as a lower version of true knowledge is a single manifestation of how the corporeal world is generally a veil, but may be a window under the right conditions. This confirms Richard Frank's hunch that behind al-Ghazālī's notion of religion, imitation, and the inner and outer layers is a Fārābīan notion of religion as imitation, at least in its structural forms. Frank indicates that, while the details differ, al-Ghazālī's method is not entirely foreign to Ashʿarism as follows, 'As

[451] Ibid., 43.5.6
[452] The term witnessing is studied in Section IV.
[453] *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* studied below adds another level which is the one who believes in blameworthy innovations (*bidʿa*).

is clear from the passage of the *Iḥyā'* just cited, al-Ghazālī (like earlier Ashʿarites) also holds that the arguments found in the Qur'an and the Traditions are not "scientific" in form and language and that the texts contain much metaphorical language that is not to be taken literally but is subject to rational analysis into other, formally precise terms'.[454] In other words, for Ashʿarīs, proofs are not necessarily found in scripture, but the science of theology produces them *for* scripture.

Regarding scripture, Chapter 1 showed that prophets must speak in similitudes because of the degree of the intellect of most people. These similitudes are only understood by scholars, whereas the ignorant do not have the ability to move beyond the outward purport of the similitude (*ẓāhir al-mithāl*).[455] Whether the imitation–demonstration dichotomy is expressed, or the outer–inner dichotomy, it is the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy which provides a ultimate basis and is a cosmology seen to override other considerations, and is thus more fit as a candidate for the more fundamental basis in al-Ghazālī's thought. Another application of this dichotomy which pervades the psychology, ethics, and logic of Avicenna is context theory, shown to be adopted by al-Ghazālī as one tool needed in his toolkit to address the many theological topics of the *Iḥyā'*. Context theory, or discourse theory, is also shown in Section IV to underpin al-Ghazālī's specific notion of imitation and demonstration, as demonstration is the highest level of discourse and he draws on descriptions of the other levels to describe the non-demonstrative levels.

[454] Frank, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School*, 250n80.
[455] *Iḥyā'*, 4:23.20–1.

III. The Two Eschatological Ranks Accorded to Imitation and Demonstration

Chapter 2 established that true demonstrative, knowledge was the cause of felicity.[456] This section establishes that the two fundamental ranks are accorded to imitation and demonstration, while Section VI shows that demonstration is the proper fount of the virtues. This puts Chapter 6 on the virtues in place to show that the two levels of knowledge, imitation and demonstration, run through the 4th Quarter and hence through the structure of the *Iḥyā'*. We will see below (and in more detail in the chapter on the virtues) that al-Ghazālī generates a way to obtain the religious virtues through belief via imitation. He weaves this in parallel with the scriptural citations needed to obtain the state via imitation. This parallel of the two layers reveals not only the structure, but also intimates the composition of the *Iḥyā'*.[457] Determining the relation of the stations to the ultimate ranks shows the ultimate end to which the structure of the *Iḥyā'* is ordered. The current section will show that the two ranks produced by imitation and demonstration—salvation and felicity, respectively—remain fundamental ends of the *Iḥyā'*. While there is an advancement which takes place by traversing the stations of the 4th Quarter, it remains the case that the one obtaining true knowledge obtains felicity. The chapter on the virtues shows that al-Ghazālī states that the virtues of the 4th Quarter, one and all, are merely a means to purification in order to obtain true knowledge.[458]

Kitāb al-Tawba contains al-Ghazālī's primary treatment of the eschatological ranks in the *Iḥyā'*. In discussion of how to obtain repentance itself, al-Ghazālī explains how both levels of knowledge suffice to cause the state of repentance: the one who gains the state of repentance through insight and true knowledge obtains felicity, while the one who obtains the state through imitative belief merely obtains salvation. This is explained as follows. Repentance is said to be composed of three elements: knowledge (that sins cause remoteness from God), regret, and resolve not to return to the sin.[459] Al-Ghazālī states that while the fact that sins cause remoteness is made apparent (*ẓāhir*) in Koranic verses and prophetic traditions,

[456] However, the link between true knowledge and the religious stations, a central matter for analysis of the structure of the *Iḥyā'*, generally goes unmentioned as it is not addressed in such studies of the *Iḥyā'* as those of Sherif and Garden.
[457] Chapter 2 referred to the topics of the 4th Quarter being first treated through pure scripture, followed by a treatment of the reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of the given topic.
[458] There is a further role for those capable of treading the path of all the virtues, including love and its cause, contemplation, but this matter must wait for the chapter on the virtues.
[459] *Iḥyā'*, 4:4.29–30.

'it is clear through the light of insight for the one whose insight is open and whose breast God expands through the light of belief (*īmān*).'[460] People in the path of religion (*ṭarīq al-dīn*) are divided into two: a) those who fall short (*qāṣir*), not exceeding imitation (*taqlīd*) who without scriptural text in every step fall into confusion and b) the felicitous (*saʿīd*), whose breast has been expanded to accept Islam, who are guided by the slightest allusion, and do not need scripture at every step.[461] From Chapter 3's study of the afterlife criterion we know that felicity is caused by true knowledge. Chapter 3's study of the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* passages showed that the light referred to here is a synonym for true knowledge, as the terms light and expansion were shown there to occupy the list of synonyms for intellect and insight. It must also be noted that this statement seems to have implications for his notion of the relation between reason (not necessarily *falsafa*) and revelation. It indicates that, after illumination, one no longer needs scripture at every step. This is different from saying there is no need for scripture (and religion), but it makes it like a stage which is not needed once complete.[462] Mind that he is here classifying people 'on the path of religion', and thus this illumined person is illumined in a religious sense. However, in what manner this illumination is 'religious' is not specified here. The statement in some manner blurs the line between religion and natural reason by linking them. It is highly possible that the sense of religion here should be interpreted according to his notion that true religion is as studied in Chapter 3: incorporeal, demonstrative, and timeless knowledge. His statement here thus accords with that stated more boldly in the *Maʿārij* passage cited in Chapter 1: that reason and revelation are one.[463] Of course, this is only one sense of religion, not all forms. After explaining the nature of belief through expansion of the breast and insight (i.e. intellect), al-Ghazālī clarifies the rank associated with imitation as follows: 'As for one who is not suited for the like of this station whose peak is too high for most people, there is a magnanimous space made for them and by which they may reach salvation (*najāt*) in imitation and following'.[464] His expression makes it clear that his insistence on adding a place for imitation and salvation, alongside the philosophical notion of felicity via demonstrative knowledge, is with the intention to be

[460] Ibid., 4:4.7–8.
[461] *Ibid.*, 4:4.13–16.
[462] The *Iḥyāʾ* has many passages which bare on this topic. Most important is what is termed the watercourses of certitude. Through this psychological notion, al-Ghazālī claims that the psyche is integral and that certain insights necessarily manifest on the limbs, including rituals, acts of obedience, and praiseworthy acts.
[463] Chapter 1 showed that the *Iḥyāʾ* had a similar but less bold statement linking intellect and reason.
[464] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:4.31–5.1.

merciful to the masses. The notion of mercy being woven into that which falls short of the incorporeal and is thus corporeal accords with the cosmology in the previous section. He then relates verses and prophetic reports stating the same matter, following a pattern studied later in this chapter in which scripture addresses believers while true knowledge addresses scholars. Thus, the two levels each produce the given religious virtue, but the one who obtains it through imitation is said by al-Ghazālī to reach salvation while the one obtaining it through insight, true abstract knowledge, and demonstration is said to obtain felicity. As stated above, Chapter 2 stated that the consistent treatment of the same topic at two levels results in a compositional feature: that all the vices and virtues each treat topics through scripture and reports and then study its reality (*ḥaqīqa*). The chapter on the virtues then confirms this through showing that all or most of the virtues exemplify this two-fold pattern.

Al-Ghazālī then turns to a more in-depth discussion of eschatological states. The levels of knowledge remain the primary cause of ranks in the afterlife. Al-Ghazālī's scholarly audience would clearly be shocked were acts to have consequences for determining people's eschatological states, and in this more detailed treatment, acts do indeed figure into the eschatological rank, but in a manner which does not entirely compromise the preeminent role of the level of knowledge and belief. Summarizing a long discussion of the ranks based on reasoning and scripture, al-Ghazālī states, 'Thus, these general matters linking the ranks to good and bad deeds are known both through conclusive proofs from scripture and through the light of knowledge (*maʿrifa*). As to the details, they are only known through opinion (*ẓannan*) depending on the outward purport of traditions and a type of intuition (*ḥads*) deriving from the lights of contemplation (*istibṣār*) and the eye of reflection (*iʿtibār*)'.[465] After this explanation that his method itself combines between reason and revelation, he practises this combination in his own method. He states that those who perform obligatory worship and avoid sins, save minor sins that they fall into, will have their scales predominate; thus, he states, is the matter explained in a prophetic tradition that praying and fasting expiate the matters which fall between them.[466] The reckoning this rank receives will itself atone enough sins for their good deeds to preponderate in the scale pans and they will become either of

[465] Ibid., 4:27.5–7.
[466] Ibid., 4:27.7–10.

those of the right (*aṣḥāb al-yamīn*) or of those drawn close.[467] The determining factor, the level of belief, is explained as follows:

T6, *Iḥyā'*, 4:27.13–29

> One's being adjoined to the people of the right or those drawn nigh and one's settling in the eternal garden or in the highest of paradise also follows the type (*ṣinf*) of belief. This is because there are two types of belief: a) imitative belief such as the belief of the masses (*'awwāmm*) who believe what they hear and continue upon it and b) the belief of unveiling (*īmān kashfī*) occurring through expansion of the breast through God's light such that all existence is unveiled as it is…as there is nothing in existence but God, most high, His attributes, and His acts. This type (of people) is those drawn close…and it is also (composed) of types. Some of them are those who out-strip (others; *al-sābiqīn*) while others are below them. Their variation is according to their knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of God. … As to the one who believes through imitative belief, they are the companions of the right (*aṣḥāb al-yamīn*). … As to the one who dies before repenting, their matter is in jeopardy as their death upon persistence in sin might cause their belief to unravel such that they have a bad final outcome. This is especially the case if their belief is imitative, because even though imitation is a form of resolution (*jazm*), it is susceptible to unravelling through the slightest doubt or imagining. The gnostic possessing insight (*'ārif baṣīr*) is beyond being feared for regarding a negative final outcome.

In the clearest of terms, this passage asserts that the two eschatological ranks are obtained based on the two prime levels of belief. While the level of unveiling described is presented in mystical terms, these terms are easily recognizable as the same terms the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* passage showed by synonyms for al-Ghazālī's notion of intellect and heart. And, while his previous discussion attempts to account for a number of other phenomena such as the impact of sins and repentance, the level or type of belief remains preeminent in determining the state of the soul in the afterlife. Al-Ghazālī goes on to refer to imitators as simpletons (*bulh*) and the gnostic as the reflective (*mustabṣir*), a term the final chapter shows explained in the *Kitāb al-Tafakkur* to be a synonym for one engaging with the syllogism to found their belief on true knowledge. Thus, a wide array of terms and notions may be seen to be built on this dichotomy (see Table 4.1).

	Title	**Scriptural title**	**Rank in knowledge**	**Social rank**	**Method of belief**	**Eschatological result**

[467] Ibid., 4:27.10–13.

The rank of knowledge	Those who fall short	Companions of the right	The simpleton	The masses	Imitation and following	Salvation
The rank of imitation	The Felicitous	Those drawn nigh	The gnostic	The elite	Reflection/ contemplation	Felicity

Table 4.1 Eschatological ranks based on type of belief

Al-Ghazālī states that those brought nigh include sub-ranks, but he only mentions the out-strippers (*sābiqūn*).[468] Very little is said of this higher sub-rank of those brought nigh. We are only informed that the various sub-ranks of those brought nigh are based on their various levels of knowledge of God.[469]

Another rank is conspicuously absent. In Book I's three levels of certitude, the highest rank was reserved for the veracious in whom domination of the heart by a state is added to the true knowledge which produces this state.

It thus does not appear that al-Ghazālī works out the relation of the out-strippers and the veracious in the *Iḥyā'*. The chapter on the virtues shows that the first two ranks are present in the practices constituting the virtues of the 4th Quarter, but many of them also refer to a higher rank in which the attribute sought utterly dominates the heart, and in some cases in which direct beholding (*mushāhada*) occurs. Bearing in mind the ambiguity regarding a third rank or possible sub-ranks, the eschatological ranks map onto the aspects of certitude explained below from the section on certitude in *Iḥyā'*, Book II, as expressed in Table 4.2.

Eschatological ranks	a) Those of the right hand	b) Those brought nigh	c) (The out-strippers (*sābiqūn*))

[468] *Ibid.*, 4:27.18.
[469] Ibid., 4:27.18–19. See also ibid., 4:31.5, which uses the compound *al-muqarrabūn al-sābiqūn* who are those who know (*ʿārifūn*) rather than the imitators.

Aspects of certitude from Book II	a) Imitative belief	b) True knowledge lacking doubt (demonstration)	c) Lack of doubt and domination of state produced by knowledge (associated there with 'the veracious')

Table 4.2 Three ranks of eschatology and belief

As stated, the relation of the out-strippers and veracious does not seem to be explained, but the chapter on virtues shows that the structure of the *Iḥyā'* itself offers a partial answer. The level of the veracious appears throughout the religious stations of the 4th Quarter. Also, it is the fourth and final level of the four levels of declaration of the divine unity (*tawḥīd*), as seen in Section IV.[470]

Seeing how this dichotomy operates in general gives a great insight into the structure of the *Iḥyā'*.[471] However, to see how this is applied and permeates the virtues and the wider structure and also effects the features of composition in the *Iḥyā'* requires the remaining sections of this chapter, starting with Section III studying how demonstration and imitation,

[470] Ibid., 4:29.24–5. Al-Ghazālī is shown there to refer to *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* in the second level, those who are punished, to define who it is that escapes (eventually) from the hell-fire. This is those who profess unity, but not merely with their tongue as the tongue is part of the corporeal world (*mulk*). Perfect unification (*kamāl al-tawḥīd*) is not to see any matters except as from God (*illā min Allāh*).

[471] One complicating reality is that the differentiator between imitation and demonstration is often not only proof, but understanding the existence of the abstract and intelligible theological matters. For instance, there are several examples in which al-Ghazālī only accords the higher level to the one who is able to understand a theological topic regarding the afterlife or divine attributes in a matter more like how that matter is in itself. (Chapter 2 showed that theological topics such as the afterlife could only be properly understood if a person actually obtained intellectual pleasures in this life. Only in that case, regarding that topic, would they deserve the higher level associated with felicity.) Chapter 2 related al-Ghazālī's condemnation of a *kalām* scholar who argued against Junayd and other Sufis that love of the Divine was impossible and only patience with His decree was conceivable. In this case and other passages related in the following chapter, al-Ghazālī draws on the division presented in this chapter between the corporeal and incorporeal to determine who is capable of the knowledge producing religious states. The point al-Ghazālī seems to be pressing for is that he is interested both in abstract concepts and in proof because he's interested in religious felicity in the afterlife which is through intellectual apprehension and pleasure (at the highest level, i.e. third, this entails knowing things properly which is as acts of God). With regards to the divine attributes, concrete similitudes inevitably lead to anthropomorphism. With regards to the afterlife, accepting the higher level beyond scriptural depictions described as 'what no eye has seen…nor has occurred to the heart of man' is seen to require, again, praxis to obtain intellectual pleasures in this life (which happens only rarely).

This matter is highly relevant to praxis because achieving the higher level requires understanding and tasting intellectual matters which itself requires (as per Chapter 1) weaning off corporeal attachments. So, if felicity is via intellectual matters, then a praxis such as his which takes one from pleasures of the here-below to intellectual pleasures must be undergone. (Avicenna also states in *al-Aḍḥawiyya* that the masses cannot understand abstract theology regarding the Divine due to their mind being engrossed in the corporeal.)

the causes of the eschatological ranks, are integrated into the virtues and hence into the structure of the *Iḥyā'*.

IV. The Structure of the Religious Stations and their Relation to Eschatological Ranks

The *Iqtiṣād* passage above identified three meanings of belief. In the first subsection below, I shall demonstrate that these levels of belief carry over into the *Iḥyā'*. However, they are changed in a manner without which the structure of the *Iḥyā'* is inconceivable, particularly through adding a second 'Sufi' aspect of certitude. In spite of adding this Sufi aspect, the two levels of belief—imitation and demonstration—remain linked to the two fundamental eschatological ranks. Thus, in spite of the addition of a Sufi element of certitude, demonstration remains the cause of the highest eschatological rank towards which the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* is ordered. It is further integrated into the religious revival in that demonstration and the Sufi aspect are joined as related psychological elements, explained in this section.[472] The structure shown to be produced allows for the science of unveiling to have the status of a true, demonstrative science and for religious praxis (*muʿāmala*) to be integrated within such a science.[473]

Section IV.A shows that al-Ghazālī's discussion of demonstrative knowledge is not an isolated occurrence, but rather that it is integrated into the structure of the *Iḥyā'* as the causal source and root of the virtues. It traces al-Ghazālī's references from the 4th Quarter back to Book II and from Book II to Book I where two said aspects of certitude are explained. Seeing how al-Ghazālī himself reveals information regarding the structure of the *Iḥyā'* is methodologically important. It is shown that he does so in a manner requiring the reader to forensically gather clues to see the structure produced.

Section IV.B analyses the two aspects of certitude. It shows how that, in spite of an addition to the two levels of belief in *al-Iqtiṣād*, the two eschatological ranks remain unchanged.

Section IV.C shows that the *Iḥyā'* incorporates the *Miʿyār*'s discussion of context theory into its discussion of the levels of belief. Demonstration is the level which produces true knowledge. This textual link to the context theory of the *Miʿyār* is an indication that the

[472] While al-Ghazālī gives a name to the one possessing the Sufi aspect of certitude, he does not assign it a separate eschatological rank.

[473] This is particularly in the sense that the praxis serves as the scaffolding, as it were, which latches onto and attempts to ascend (through removing veils, and altering the character traits and acts) so as to rise up to and prepare one to be realized in a particular epistemological and eschatological level as outlined in the previous tables.

Miʿyār's defence of demonstration against *kalām* occasionalism carries over into the *Iḥyāʾ*, which itself also upholds demonstration (and actually makes it the cause of eternal felicity).[474] The *Miʿyār* passage refers back to the *Tahāfut* whence the full discussion is found, showing more evidence that the doctrines of the *Iḥyāʾ* return in many cases to the *Tahāfut*'s engagement with *falsafa*, but also to other pre-departure books written near the time of al-Ghazālī's departure.[475] This will set up Section V to confirm the findings of the previous section and this section that the ranks and levels fundamental to the *Iḥyāʾ* are imitation and demonstration (but also the level of the veracious, involving domination of an attribute), not imitation, ratiocination (*istidlāl* or *qiyās*), and direct tasting.[476]

A. Demonstration as the Fount of the Salvific Virtues (*Munjiyyāt*) in the *Iḥyāʾ*

This section shows the integration of demonstration into the salvific virtues of the *Iḥyāʾ*. While the focus is to bring out the structural significance of this move, it results in a remarkable transformation of virtues into something different but related to the virtues as al-Ghazālī inherited them in the *Mīzān*. The *Mīzān*'s treatment of the virtues is mostly borrowed from Avicenna's *Risāla fī al-akhlāq*.[477] The virtues presented are thus dispositions of the soul, accruing to it through the practical intellect. In the *Iḥyāʾ*, the virtues are not just dispositions, but are composed of four elements arranged in levels. The disposition (or, as al-Ghazālī sometimes terms it, state or station) of the soul is but one part, knowledge being integrated as the highest element as shown presently.

1. Integration of demonstration in the 4th Quarter

At the very outset of the 4th Quarter of the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī reveals to the reader the integration of knowledge into the salvific virtues, saying: 'Know that repentance (*tawba*) is a

[474] As shown in this chapter, the defence of demonstration occurs in the discussion of context theory in the *Miʿyār*, and the *Iḥyāʾ*'s discussion of the levels of belief draws on the *Miʿyār*'s discussion of context theory. Al-Ghazālī's upholding and integrating demonstration in the *Iḥyāʾ* is a further indication of continuity. He even goes so far as to make it the arbiter of the knowledge causing eternal felicity as shown in Chapter 1.

[475] Again, this complexity is lacking in the *Mīzān* which merely presents *akhlāq* theory with relatively minor 'Islamization' (e.g. adding scriptural citations). Rather, the complexity drawing on several pre-departure books comes in with the writing of the *Iḥyāʾ*, presumably because it tangles with a wider array of religious or Islamic phenomena such as tenets of belief, worship, and invocation.

[476] Annihilation will be seen to be largely understood from within the framework of faculty psychology, specifically for the state produced by knowledge to dominate the heart (as al-Ghazālī explains as early as Book I).

[477] See Chapter 5 for discussion of *Risāla fī al-akhlāq*, its edition, and its use in the *Mīzān* and *Iḥyāʾ*.

meaning composed of three ordered things: knowledge (*ʿilm*), state (*ḥāl*), and action (*fiʿl*). The first necessitates the second, the second necessitates the third through a necessity entailed by the consistency (*iṭṭirāḍ*) of God's inveterate practice (*sunnat Allāh*) in the *mulk* and *malakut*' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 4:3.14–16). The knowledge, the resultant state, and the subsequent act are all thus causally integrated. This is God's practice in the sense that the cosmological level of the incorporeal world necessarily manifests in the corporeal or physical world. State and act falling under *mulk* and *malakūt* mean his religious virtues are governed by a cosmological principle which applies to everything in the universe and that the *mulk* necessarily obeys whatever is in the *malakūt*. The type of knowledge here is not explained, but we may reasonably suppose it is part of the incorporeal world which supports that it concurs with what has been said about knowledge being intellectual, incorporeal, and demonstrative in Chapters 1 and 2. Further evidence that it is demonstrative will follow.

In al-Ghazālī's anthropology, the human is part of this cosmos.[478] This passage at the outset of the 4th Quarter goes on to explain how each of these levels relates to repentance, but his explanation has a general purport, explaining his anthropology and his view of the virtues and demonstration therein. The knowledge particular to repentance is said to be knowing (*maʿrifa*) that sins are harmful and that they cause a veil (*ḥijāb*) between one and what one loves (in this context meaning God and true knowledge).[479] This knowledge, ideally, is certitude (*yaqīn*) and—though he explains further in the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* passage below—certitude is composed of two elements explained as follows:

T7, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:3.17–24, *Kitāb al-Tawba*[480]

> If this knowledge is realized (*muḥaqqaqa*) through a certitude (*yaqīn*) dominating the heart, a pain (*taʿallum*) of the heart is aroused due to loss of what is beloved because whenever the heart feels loss of its beloved it feels pain. … If this pain dominates and takes over the heart, a state (*ḥāla*) is triggered by this pain of the heart which is called volition (*irāda*) and the aim (*qaṣd*) to perform an act…
>
> Knowledge is first, and it is the starting point of these goods (*al-khayrāt*). By this knowledge, I mean belief (*īmān*) and certainty (*yaqīn*). Belief is an expression meaning assent (*taṣdīq*) that sins are a poison destructive (*muhlika*) (in the afterlife). Certainty is an expression meaning a)

[478] We saw in Chapter 2's cosmology section that Book II of the *Iḥyāʾ* stated that the *mulk* is the visible world and that the limbs and their acts are part of the *mulk*. Correspondingly, we learned that the *malakūt* is the unseen world beheld only by the light of insight (*baṣīra*) and that the heart is from this world.

[479] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:3.16–19.

[480] Book titles are often not included in block quotation sources, but have been included here and elsewhere to give the reader an indication where certain topics related to the argument of this thesis are found in the *Iḥyāʾ*.

> assurance of this assent and lack of doubt regarding it and b) it dominating the heart.

Certainty (*yaqīn*) is said, just as it will be in Section B below, to have two aspects: a) a lack of doubt and b) a dominance of a state or attribute over the heart. These two qualities will be stated in the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* to pertain to a) *kalām* scholars and b) *fuqahāʾ*, Sufis, and 'most scholars', respectively. These aspects of certainty were not mentioned in the passages on the three meanings of belief including the pre-*Iḥyāʾ* work, *al-Iqtiṣād*. Al-Ghazālī is producing a structure in which he incorporates the states of the Sufis and the knowledge of *kalām*, though he defends the use of the philosophical tool: demonstration.

The first clue pointing towards the texts in which al-Ghazālī explains the two aspects of certainty, including demonstration, is found in the second book of the 4th Quarter: *Kitāb al-Ṣabr wa-l-shukr*. This passage, which links al-Ghazālī's theory of religious virtues to the Koranic terms 'the tree of belief', is as follows:

T8, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:61.20–4

> Knowledge is the root and gives rise to states and states give fruition to works. So, knowledge is like a tree, states are like branches, and works are like fruits. This is consistent (*muṭṭariḍ*) in all of the stations of the wayfarers (*manāzil al-sālikīn*) to God, most high. The term belief (*īmān*) sometimes refers specifically to knowledge and at other times it refers to the whole, just as we discussed the difference between belief (*īmān*) and Islam in the Book (of the *Iḥyāʾ*) The Bases of Belief (*Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*).

This passage speaks universally about the stations, asserting that they all have the integrated layers and al-Ghazālī alerts the reader that the different core meanings of belief[481] are first explained in *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, effectively directing his reader there for more details.[482]

[481] Elsewhere in the 4th Quarter, al-Ghazālī explicitly says the sharia term *īmān* means knowledge as follows: 'The basis of all felicities (*saʿādāt*) is gnosis which the sharia expressed as belief (*al-īmān*)' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 4:305.248.427.11 (Dar al-Minhaj)).

[482] Before turning to the passage in the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, note that in *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*, the metaphor for the tree of belief and its sharia basis is explained in more detail as follows:

T9, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:308.15–18, *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*

> …(T)he tree of love and knowledge is the goodly word (*kalima ṭayyiba*) by which God struck a similitude, saying, {Seest thou not how Allah coineth a similitude: A goodly saying, as a goodly tree, its root set firm, its branches reaching into heaven} (Koran 14:24). And there is an allusion to it in His words, most high, {Unto Him good words ascend}, which is gnosis (*maʿrifa*), {And the pious deed doth He exalt} (Koran 35:10). So, the righteous deed is like a carrier (*ḥammāl*) for this knowledge and a servant (to it). The purpose of all righteous deeds is to first cleanse the heart from the here-below then to preserve that cleanliness. So, works are only sought for this knowledge.

This passage talks of the conditions under which knowledge spreads out, grows, and, as it were, dominates the heart, but it also importantly places al-Ghazālī's psychological theory in the full scriptural context of the relevant verses and prophetic sayings. Here, he adds the elements of the two types of knowledge—the theoretical and practical—to which we must assume for the time being that his other statements about knowledge apply. It shows that whatever his sophisticated conception of belief, knowledge, certainty (*yaqīn*), and, ultimately,

He obliges his reader to follow these leads in order to show the incorporation of demonstration, and also how room is made for imitation (just as room was made for salvation in the eschatological states of Section III).

2. Three meanings of belief (īmān) in Book II, Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid

Having been told that the two meanings of belief (*īmān*)—i.e. knowledge and 'the whole'—were treated in *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, we now turn to that passage. Upon doing so, we find a discussion of three meanings of the term belief (*īmān*). In that respect, this passage is similar to the *Iqtiṣād* passage, but it differs in that it analyses certitude into two parts. Al-Ghazālī says that the word belief (*īmān*) is equivocal (*mushtarak*; or homonymous). The first meaning is [mere] assent (*taṣdīq*) through opining (*iʿtiqād*) and imitation (*taqlīd*).[483] If this belief of the masses is not accompanied by expansion (*sharḥ*) of the chest through unveiling, it is a (mere) knot (*ʿuqda*) in the heart.[484] When firm, he says, this knot cannot be removed through threatening nor warning, nor through (poetic) imagery (*takhyīl*), admonition (*waʿẓ*; i.e. public sermons and rhetorical speeches (*khiṭāba*)), nor through critical assessment (*taḥqīq*) nor apodictic proof (*burhān*).[485] It does not seem an accident that al-Ghazālī's list of manners of addressing the possessor of this knot rehearses nearly the full gamut of levels of discourse from the Arab version of Aristotle's logical *Organon* shown below to inform his levels of belief.

In explanation of how this knot tightens and loosens, al-Ghazālī speaks of a key principle of the method of the *Iḥyāʾ*: how acts effect belief and the states of the heart.[486] Using the same lines of thought and even examples as he had done in the *Iqtiṣād* passage, he effectively incorporates the insights of faculty psychology related to the soul and what effects it into scriptural notions and theological debates regarding belief (*īmān*).[487] By discussing both

demonstration (*burhān*), that he has striven to integrate his theories of reason with the terms and concepts of revelation.

At *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:320.26, al-Ghazālī also refers to love as a goodly tree with a firm root and branches reaching towards the heavens. He says its fruit appears on the heart, tongue, and limbs and these effects emanating from it on the heart and limbs indicate (*tadullu ʿalā*) love just as smoke indicates fire (reasoning from effect to cause).

[483] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:119.27–8.

[484] Ibid., 1:119.26–8.

485 Ibid., 1:119.30. The significance of the use of demonstration (*burhān*) will be argued for below.

[486] This topic is addressed in Chapter 5, Section II.

[487] Section I showed how his examples used the notion of habituation and what Chapter 5 on praxis and habituation terms the mutual influence between the body and soul. The examples he gives exemplify this principle and he recycles the examples across a range of texts, some pre-dating his departure and some such as the *Iḥyāʾ* post-dating it.

See analysis of the above passage from *al-Iqtiṣād* for reference to the theological debates surrounding the

worship (the topic of the1st Quarter) and vices and virtues (the topics of the 3rd and 4th Quarters, respectively), this *Iḥyā'* passage indicates an important unity of this method throughout the quarters.

Upon introducing the second sense of belief (*īmān*), al-Ghazālī says it is a combination of assent (*taṣdīq*) and acts. He provides scriptural evidence for this usage, citing the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, 'Belief is seventy-some doors', and, 'The fornicator does not fornicate while in a state of belief'.[488] In this (second) sense, al-Ghazālī says, works enter into what is meant by the term 'belief'.[489]

The third sense of belief is certain assent (*taṣdīq yaqīnī*), which more specifically concerns us because one aspect of this certain assent is demonstrative knowledge while the second is the aspect of certitude this chapter claims he adds to *al-Iqtiṣād* in the *Iḥyā'* to represent what might be termed Sufism. Though the term 'certain assent' would be natural in a *kalām*, logic (*manṭiq*), or *falsafa* text of his time, al-Ghazālī explains it in terms with a mystical connotation as being a type of belief occurring through expansion of the chest by the light of insight (*nūr al-baṣīra*).[490] As studied in Section I above, these terms should not be understood to be outside of the broad notion of intellect used in the *Iḥyā'*. He will be shown to confirm this reading as one aspect of this term is explained effectively as demonstration. Here, he makes the subtle point that even though this (would appear) to be the furthest category from undergoing increase and decrease, there is indeed variance in the heart's assurance (*tuma'nīna*), even regarding knowledge which is intrinsically certain (*yaqīniyyāt*).[491] He gives the overtly clear example of one plus one being two.[492] Through his example, he alerts the reader to the distinction between the intrinsic strength of a proof and what we may call subjective psychological states affecting acceptance of a proof. He thereby alludes to the two aspects of certainty from the *Kitāb al-'Ilm*: a) lack of doubt through demonstration and b) the dominance of this knowledge over the heart.[493]

Al-Ghazālī reminds the reader that the difference in level of acceptance of a proof was explained in the section (*bāb*) 'The Signs of the Scholars of the Afterlife', in *Kitāb al-'Ilm*,

susceptibility of belief to increase.

[488] *Iḥyā'*:2.

[489] Ibid., 1:120.22.

[490] Ibid., 1:120.23–4.

[491] Ibid., 1:120.27–8.

[492] Ibid., 1:120.26.

[493] Al-Ghazālī provides a clearer example of the two aspects of certitude in the 4th Quarter. People may know that death is inevitable and certain, but not everyone's actions equally reflect this.

saying there is no need to repeat it.[494] The connections between the passage is that the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage repeats much of *al-Iqtiṣād*'s discussion of the three meanings of belief, including acceptance of demonstration as the highest level. However, the *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* passage intimates that there are two aspects of certitude, but directs the reader back to Book I, the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* for this discussion. It is important to note that al-Ghazālī builds on the technical doctrine of *al-Iqtiṣād* and modifies it in a manner which complements it rather than contradicts it. Domination of the heart by an attribute accompanies intellectual clarity and demonstrative knowledge. It does not undermine it by, for instance, claiming that certitude is only had through a mystical experience which contradicts demonstrative truths and is strictly ineffable, immediate, or 'mystical' in some other sense. Secondly, it is important to note both that al-Ghazālī's doctrine and structure in the *Iḥyāʾ* clearly has a technical underbelly and that he reveals is sparingly, spreading it around the *Iḥyāʾ* and often replacing its terms with mystical terms as seen in this and previous discussions (particularly Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife'). The aim of this thesis to reveal the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ* requires seeing all the use of these notions in context. While it argues that there are primarily two levels of knowledge leading to two eschatological levels and that these levels are integrated into the virtues, understanding his notion of the two aspects of certitude and confirming that he adopts demonstration in the *Iḥyāʾ* are prerequisites for engaging with the scholarship of Alexander Treiger on the nature of the levels in Section V.

B. Two Aspects of Certainty in Book I, The Kitāb al-ʿIlm: Sufi and *Philosophical*

If the reader of the *Iḥyāʾ* follows the trail revealing the place of demonstration in the virtues, they arrive to a part of the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* devoted to distinguishing between the scholars of the afterlife (*ʿulamāʾ al-ākhira*) and corrupt scholars (*ʿulamāʾ al-sūʾ*). The treatment of certainty (*yaqīn*) here gives the most detailed presentation of its two aspects, Sufi and philosophical demonstration. However, following the said trail is required to understand the relationship between this certitude, the three meanings of belief, and—most importantly for study of the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*—the two levels of knowledge: imitation and demonstration. (The philosophical aspect of certitude requires a detailed textual comparison with its source

[494] Ibid., 1:120.28–9.

passage in *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm* to establish that it is a philosophical notion of demonstration referred to here in the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm*. This case is made in Section IV.C which compares the text of the *Miʿyār* and *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* in tabular format.)

Just as with belief, certainty (*yaqīn*) is said to be a homonymous term (*lafẓ mustarak*). Importantly for showing how al-Ghazālī's *Iḥyāʾ* combines Sufism and philosophical insights related to psychology, he states that certainty is used for two different meanings by two different groups.[495] He explains that the *kalām* scholars (*mutakallimīn*) and speculative thinkers (*nuẓẓār*) use the term for a lack of doubt (*shakk*), his examples indicating that he is explaining how the soul inclines to assent (*taṣdīq*) regarding a given proposition. The four cases are a) doubt (*shakk*), b) opinion (*ẓann*; inclination to assent while feeling the contradictory (*naqīḍ*) is possible), c) belief approximating certainty (*iʿtiqād muqāriban li-l-yaqīn*—the belief of the masses in all the sharia sciences, lacking verified knowledge (*maʿrifa muḥaqqaqa*)—and d) certainty (*yaqīn*) occurring through demonstration (*burhān*). This passage is analysed below in Section IV.C, comparing it to its source passage in the *Miʿyār*.

The *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* turns to the second part of certainty: domination of the heart (*istilāʾ ʿalā al-qalb*).[496] Section V will argue that in spite of this aspect not blurring the two said levels, it is crucial for understanding the relation between the two levels of knowledge, imitation and demonstration, and the structure of the virtues in which knowledge is acquired in order to obtain a state of the heart. Al-Ghazālī introduces the second aspect of certitude, domination of the heart, by locating it in social and scholarly groups as an aspect that is 'according to the technical vernacular (*iṣṭilāḥ*) of the jurists (*fuqahāʾ*), Sufis (*al-mutaṣawwifa*), and most scholars (*akthar al-ʿulamāʾ*)' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 1:73.15). While he does not explain, it does not seem far-fetched that many jurists, Sufis, and other scholars hold that certitude is for a state (such as fear of God) to dominate the heart rather than to view it as a theologian inspecting the strength of one's proofs. He describes the second aspect as the overcoming or domination of the heart by that certainty until it rules and controls it, determining what actions are forbidden and allowed.[497] His lucid example of the difference between the two aspects, the latter upheld by jurists, Sufis, and most scholars is that (in their parlance) one may say a given person's certainty in death is

[495] The citations of this passage summarized here are found in the full analysis of the passage below.
[496] It will be shown in Section IV.C.3, 'Defence of demonstration: Against the *kalām* scholars', that in the parallel part of the *Miʿyār* passage, the *Miʿyār* makes an important defence of demonstration.
[497] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:73.17–18.

weak, even though he has no doubt in death.[498] It is the way of the scholars of the hereafter, he adds, to devote their attention to strengthening both meanings of certainty—removing doubt and then giving certainty sovereignty over the soul—until it becomes like a heedless one, ruled and dominated by it.[499] Because he has forged his own technical conception and combination of aspects of certainty, it seems most likely that this statement amounts to al-Ghazālī expressing his own notion of the path of the afterlife (and true religion) rather than describing existing Sufis or other existing groups.[500] His statement indicates that the true scholar of the afterlife is concerned with both demonstrative knowledge and dominant states, an important notion for assessing the *Iḥyā'* and seeming to indicate that some form of Sufism and philosophy (or at least logic) are required to tread the Path of the Afterlife. He ties in the virtues, stating that the 'doors' of certitude (*yaqīn*) enumerated in the 4th Quarter are the root of character traits from which come the fruits of works and worship.[501] Together, the first and second aspects of certitude accord with the two meanings of certitude in the *Kitāb al-Tawba* passage (T7) above. However, the current passage is al-Ghazālī's primary and most detailed treatment of the topic.

Al-Ghazālī then introduces the related notion of the watercourses of certitude (*majārī al-yaqīn*). While the notion of the doors of certitude indicate that character traits are produced from the epistemological aspect of certitude, 'watercourse' of certitude is a term indicating that the knowledge is intrinsically integral; merely knowing it produces related attributes of the heart and acts. This notion is crucial because its integration of the elements of body and soul—the intellect, character traits, and acts—involves the claim that this integrated nature is implicit in all knowledge, character traits, and acts brought by the prophets (and hence it is a model al-Ghazālī uses for integration of reason and revelation). This structure of the watercourses entail that whether a belief, act, or character trait, they each have the potential to expand or unfold in the psyche. Part of the picture was expressed in the four layers themselves said above to flow from each other (and another part was seen in the *Iqtiṣād* passage where worship and acting on beliefs were said to fortify them: acts have the power in

[498] Ibid., 1:73.15–16.
[499] Ibid., 1:73.23–4.
[500] This is not to say that the aspects of certitude and the groups to which he assigns them are not to a certain degree true. For instance, *kalām* scholars can be said to be concerned with epistemological certitude, but they cannot before al-Ghazālī be said to be concerned with all the conditions of producing a logical demonstration because their logic properly enters *kalām* only with him.
[501] *Iḥyā'*, 1:74.33–4.

reverse to generate belief and character traits). Al-Ghazālī states that every element of the sharia has this integral nature, likely due to what was termed the 'philosophy of prophetic acts' studied in Chapter 2, as follows:

T10, *Iḥyā'*, 1:74.4–12

> Know that everything brought by the prophets, God bless them and give them peace, from its first to its last, is of the watercourses of certainty. This is because certainty is a manner of saying a specific gnosis (*ma'rifa*). And its object (*muta'alliq*) is knowledge (*ma'lūmāt*) which came with the (various aspects) of revelation (*sharā'i'*). So, it is hopeless to list them exhaustively, but I will indicate some of their main types (*umuhāt*).

To refer to this integral nature, al-Ghazālī uses the term 'watercourse of certitude', a term I have been unable to locate in any of his known sources. Al-Ghazālī states that a watercourse—in as much as it manifests or expands in the psyche—is a certitude regarding a topic or 'knowable' that is brought as part of the sharia such that, when known with certainty, causes a state and acts to flow over the limbs. Al-Ghazālī makes the categorical statement that everything which the prophets have brought is a watercourse of certitude. Explaining how the watercourse of certitude unfolds in the psyche, al-Ghazālī says:

T11, *Iḥyā'*,1:74.22-75.1

> Certainty according to the first meaning may be present in the masses of the believers (*'umūm al-mu'minīn*). As to the second meaning, it is specific to those drawn nigh (*al-muqarrabīn*). ... Another [water-course is] certainty that Allah is aware of one in every moment, beholding the inner thoughts of one's heart.... This certainty, according to the first meaning, is had by every believer, this meaning being a lack of doubt. As to the second meaning, which is what is sought (*al-maqṣūd*), it is rare, being specific to the veracious ones (*siddiqīn*). Its fruit is...that one's inner reflections be like one's outward works, as one is realised (in the reality) that God, Most High, is aware of one's inner life just as people are aware of one's outward. So, one's utmost efforts go into making the inward thrive (*'imarat baṭinihi*) and purifying and adorning it under God's watchful eye to a greater extent than one's efforts in adorning one's outward for people. This state (*maqām*) of certainty gives fruit to shame (*ḥayā'*), fear, ... and a host of praiseworthy character traits. These character traits give rise to different types of elevated acts of worship. So, certainty in each of these doors (*bāb*) is like a tree. These character traits in the heart are like limbs branching from it. These works and acts of worship emanating (*ṣadira*) from the character traits are like fruits and lights branching from the branches. So, certainty is the root and basis and it has more water-courses and doors than we have enumerated, but that will come in the salvific virtues, God willing. This amount is enough to explain the term (i.e. certainty) for now.

Because al-Ghazālī alternates the terms door, tree and watercourse, we may glean that he is merely using different metaphors for the psyche and its levels. This integral nature differentiates al-Ghazālī's virtues from those of Avicenna and the *falāsifa*, as discussed in Chapter 6 on the virtues and in the present chapter's discussion of demonstration as the root of virtue. It thus explains why in the 4th Quarter, virtues are treated in terms of knowledge, states of the heart and acts of the limbs. This passage also shows how the two aspects of certitude sit with the classification of eschatological ranks in Section III, confirming the primary levels of believers: a) the masses who believe via imitation and b) those brought nigh (*muqarrab*) who believe via certainty, which he says is obtained through immediate knowledge or demonstration. Like the Section III passage on the ranks, it adds a third rank: c) the veracious in whom certainty in belief leads to the fruit of domination of this reality over the heart such that it manifests in the attributes of the heart and acts of the limbs. His treatment of the eschatological ranks dubbed the third level 'the out-strippers', and it was conceived only in terms of knowledge and clarity in it. While the first two levels of certitude align with the eschatological ranks and their corresponding level of belief from Section II, the passage does not refer directly to eschatological ranks. It remains the case that there is no reference to the veracious as an eschatological rank. Thus, the second aspect of certitude is associated with the third rank of the veracious and is an added element above and beyond demonstrative knowledge and which complements certitude rather than being the only means of obtaining it.

These passages from the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* give great insight into how al-Ghazālī's conception of certainty explains the topics spread throughout the 4th Quarter. These topics, such as repentance, patience, and reliance on the God are revealed topics which (potentially) lead to the resultant outgrowth of a specific aspect of states and acts. As described, the specific knowledge and its related state and acts are integral, necessarily flowing from each other. This integrated element differentiates his stations from the virtues of the *akhlāq* tradition which are not constructed in the manner of what he calls 'watercourses'. Rather, strictly speaking, they are a disposition (*hayʾa*) of the soul while his stations are three levels and there is a reasoned connectedness to them which is an expression of the prophetic state in

which certainty is obtained and it rains down on the heart and limbs.[502] In spite of this change significant for determining the role of religion in ethics, by placing demonstration as the fount of his virtues, he both integrates a philosophical epistemological methodology into his virtues and makes his path of praxis take as its end arrival at demonstration.

C. Demonstration in the Iḥyā' and the Miʿyār

1. The Miʿyār's context theory informing the levels of belief in the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm*

In the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm*'s treatment of certitude, al-Ghazālī sets out levels of belief which are textually linked to a passage on context theory in the *Miʿyār*. Section IV C.2 shows that al-Ghazālī's practice of using a philosophical cosmology and replacing its terms with the quasi-mystical terms for his dichotomy such as kernel and shell goes back to the *Miʿyār* where true, demonstrative knowledge is the kernel and 'pure gold', and so on. This serves as further evidence for the adoption of demonstration in the *Iḥyā'* and shows that it is the true, eternal, and incorporeal level of knowledge and ultimate reality or essence of things. Additionally, it supports other evidence that al-Ghazālī views religion as in some manner an imitation of a higher reality and shows some of the tools he uses which cut across imitation and scriptural similitudes. By way of example, in the *Miʿyār* passage I claim to be the source of the *Iḥyā'*'s levels of belief, al-Ghazālī notes that poetry, while not having the force of evidence, nonetheless can be true and the straight path is to move from the form to the meaning. This is the same sentiment expressed in his cosmology discussed in Section II above: under certain conditions, one may move from the corporeal and sub-demonstrative elements to their realities.

Context theory itself claims more than one non-demonstrative level, not merely imitation (and not merely concrete similitudes). The ultimate significance of his adoption of context theory would be to support that al-Ghazālī is ultimately committed to a cosmology as

[502] See Fakhry, *Ethical Theories in Islam*, 61–87 (including p. 81, al-Fārābī, where Fakhry translates *hay'a* as habitus rather than my disposition) and 100–47. In general, Fakhry's thesis laid out therein is that ethics in general from the time of al-Kindī and al-Fārābī to late thinkers such as al-Dawwānī (d. 908/1501) and including importantly Miskawayh and Avicenna followed core views of the soul, its three faculties, and how the virtues inhered in them and then branched from each other.

described above in which all but the eternal and incorporeal level constitutes a veil which, under certain conditions, may serve as a window or mercy to the incorporeal reality.[503]

The levels of belief in the *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* treatment of certitude include demonstration and imitation and are a reworking of the *Miʿyār*'s presentation of demonstration which is included in its treatment of material logic. This inclusion is no surprise, because material logic studies the different levels of strength of premises used in syllogisms. The levels of strength range from demonstrative proof to poetical and sophistical premises which have no proof value. In total, the levels referred to there cover the arts of the Arabic organon: demonstration, dialectics, rhetoric, poetics, and sophistry. What is somewhat but not entirely surprising is that al-Ghazālī draws up his levels of belief by reworking aspects of this, and especially his treatment of and examples for demonstration.

The first evidence that he makes use of context theory was seen in a previous section where he ran through the gamut of the levels of the theory in discussion of what would not loosen the knot of belief in a believer's heart. Secondly, the description of the levels in the *Iḥyāʾ* has such textual correspondence that some form of link must obtain, even if via an intermediary text. Some of the phrases in the corresponding levels seen in Table 4.3 below are verbatim (even drawn from distinct traditions, al-Ghazālī's terms coming from *kalām* before being fully interpenetrated with logic).[504]

[503] This significance is that al-Ghazālī appears in his pre-departure works to have a keen interest in collecting philosophical notions which presuppose or are built on a cosmology. Some of these we have seen, such as the four levels of existence in *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*. These levels are applied to topics from different quarters of the *Iḥyāʾ*. This includes the levels of purification in the 1st Quarter, the levels of goods, determining what is for the afterlife and what is for this life in the 3rd Quarter on the vices, and the levels of testification of unity in the 4th Quarter. The four levels of goods expressed in the 3rd Quarter are: two of the soul, true knowledge and character virtues, and two progressively distant corporeal goods, bodily health and external goods such as wealth and clansmen). The levels of existence have a long pedigree, returning to Aristotle's *De Intertpretatione* and the goods of the soul returns previously at least to Plato, but al-Ghazālī culls them generally from al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī and Avicenna. To be responsive to al-Ghazālī in the *Iḥyāʾ*, it is necessary to speak of a pattern of constructing a cosmology which allows philosophical insights to inform matters of psychology, ethics, and epistemology. In many cases seen in Chapter 1, the division and levels are used to inform a notion of what is for the afterlife and religion and what is for this world.

[504] Al-Fārābī in his *Kitāb al-Qiyās al-ṣaghīr* is said to be the first to apply syllogistic forms to theological and juristic reasoning. (see, Tony Street, 'Logic', in Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (eds), *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)). In Jules Janssens's study of the sources of the *Miʿyār*, he notes that al-Ghazālī draws on this work, but in many places he notes that al-Ghazālī significantly develops what he loosely uses as a source. (See, Janssens, 'Al-Ghazālī's *Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-mantiq*, Source Avicenniennes Et Fārābīennes', *AHDLMA* 69 (2002): 39–66). In the epistemological terms of the *Miʿyār*, Janssens shows al-Ghazālī also drawing on Avicenna's *al-Ishārāt* for how mass transmission (*tawātur*) produces epistemological certainty (*yaqīn*) and treatments of the levels of belief and assessment of the status of imitation (*taqlīd*). It remains to my knowledge unstudied to trace how al-Ghazālī made use of theological investigations in logical texts of the *falāsifa*, developed them, and then passed them on to future generations such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and his students. The commentaries on *al-Ishārāt*, including that of al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-

Levels of belief (*īman*), *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:72.14–29, *Kitāb al-ʿIlm*	**Levels of the material of logic from the organon, *Miʿyār al-ʿilm*, 184.13–186.22**
Doubt (*shakk*): The soul does not incline to judge, but the possibility of two matters are equal.	
Opinion (*ẓann*): The soul inclines to one of two matters while being aware of the possibility of its contradictory (*naqīḍ*), with preponderance (*tarjīḥ*) of one of the possibilities.	Rhetorical (*khiṭābī*): Belief (*iʿtiqād*) without firm (*jāzim*) assent, but with **one opinion predominating (*ghalabat al-ẓann*) in which the contradictory still occurs to the mind**. Syllogisms composed of this type of premise are termed rhetorical (*khiṭābī*).
Near-certain belief (*iʿtqād muqāriban li-l-yaqīn*): The soul inclines to something in such a way that it preponderates over one. Nothing else occurs to the mind and were it to occur, the soul would reject it, but not owing to realizsed knowledge (*maʿrifa muḥhaqqaqa*).	Dialectic (*jadalī*): **Near-certain belief (*iʿtqād muqāriban li-l-yaqīn*)**, ostensibly (*fī al-ẓāhir*) accepted by (nearly) everyone (*kāffat al-khalq*). The mind is not immediately aware of the possibility of its contradictory, but only after careful reflection (*daqīq al-fikr*). [Syllogisms] composed of this form of premise are termed dialectic because they are appropriate for debating (*munāẓara*) an opponent.

Rāzī would be key in such a study.

Certainty (*yaqīn*): True knowledge (*maʿrifa ḥaqīqiyya*) occurring through demonstration (*tarīq al-burhān*)…...in which doubt is inconceivable and doubt is prevented and impossible.	True and **certain** premises (*muqaddimāt… yaqīniyyāt ṣādiqa*): which it is necessary to accept.

Table 4.3 Textual evidence of use of context theory in the *Iḥyā'*[505]

In addition to resemblance in flow[506] and important identical phraseology, doubt is untenable in that both passages then carry on to describe the level of certitude itself using the same examples[507] to a degree impossible without al-Ghazālī paraphrasing another logic text treating the same matter. The significance of this is that while the *Iḥyā'* uses a *kalām* division of types of belief into doubt, opinion (*ẓann*), belief through imitation, and certainty, one can see that al-Ghazālī's understanding of the four levels of discourse coming from the Arabic logic organon, or what are called context theory, inform his treatment of the levels of belief in the *Iḥyā'*.

2. Demonstration, context theory, and a source of the *Iḥyā'*s cosmology

[505] The order presented is based on the *Iḥyā'*. In the order of the *Miʿyār*, dialectic occurs before the rhetorical.
[506] Each text studies four levels of certitude, then turns to a long discussion of certitude itself.
[507] The *Iḥyā'* and *Miʿyār* turn from the levels of belief and context theory to a detailed description of the level of certainty. The examples used in the *Iḥyā'* concur almost entirely with the *Miʿyār*, including examples of premises yielding certitude mentioning the sun and moon, the operation of laxatives, mass transmission (*tawātur*), and the pre-eternal (*qadīm*) and temporally created (*ḥādith*). (See *Iḥyā'*, 1:73.12–14 and *Miʿyār*, 186.23–190.4.)

This correspondence may be seen in more detail as follows. In the *Iḥyā'*, certainty is initially described as true knowledge (*maʿrifa ḥaqīqiyya*) occurring through demonstration (*burhān*) in which, not only is there no doubt, but doubt is inconceivable (*lā yutaṣawwar al-shakk*), forbidden (*imtanāʿa*), and impossible (see *Iḥyā'*, 1:78.28–9.). Seeming to elucidate the implications of context theory, i.e. that truth is shared but levels of expression differ, he says that some people arrive at firm belief merely through oral transmission (*samāʿ*) while others believe through a demonstrative proof (*burhān*), again invoking the imitation–demonstration dichotomy (see ibid., 1:73.5–6). Al-Ghazālī then provides an argument which is syllogistic in nature and only uses statements which are known necessarily to be true (*ḍarūrī*) (see ibid., 1:73.7–11). After providing his own demonstration, he describes the propositions in which there is no doubt, including experience (*tajruba*) and mass transmission (*tawātur*), both of which are part of the larger list found in the *Miʿyār* (ibid., 1:73.12–14 and *Miʿyār*, 186.23–190.4). He concludes that any such proof in which there is no doubt is referred to by the said group as certain (*yaqīn*), this being conclusive and therefore not involving an assessment of how its proof might vary in shades of strength (*Iḥyā'*, 1:73.14–15).

As mentioned above, nearly all these examples are drawn from the *Miʿyār*, though in many cases the *Iḥyā'* is less thorough and leaves off certain technical aspects. This is likely either due to the *Iḥyā'*s a) audience—it not being written as the highest level of technical work—b) its subject matter: praxis, or c) the contentiousness and apparent heterodoxy of drawing on even the logic of the *falāsifa*. (For instance, the *Miʿyār* itself indicates that the use of logic is problematic. It states that it is a poetic premise to associate logic with the atheist philosophers (*falāsifa mulḥidīn*). If heard in this manner, the people of religion will naturally be repelled by it.) (See, *Miʿyār*, 200.20–4.)

The following subsection relates passages in which al-Ghazālī weaves terms from his four-level cosmology[508] into the *Miʿyār*'s treatment of context theory, indicating this cosmology was in place before composition of the *Iḥyāʾ*.[509] This passage is the source of the demonstration passage shown above to inform the highest level of the virtues, knowledge (*ʿilm*), and seeing it in the context of the organon indicates for us how the higher level is linked to the lower levels which are shells. A logic manual is not the place that one would expect to find the first known reference to al-Ghazālī's Sufi cosmology. The deployment of this cosmology seems to indicate that he saw the possibility that logic and parts of philosophy could be utilized or altered to produce a Sufism or spirituality compatible with or even underpinned by rational principles.[510]

The said cosmology appears as four levels (shown in this chapter to also appear in an important passage in the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*) and in the *Miʿyār* is referred to through two different metaphors, each woven into the *Miʿyār*'s treatment of material logic (*māddat al-qiyās*). As described in more detail below, the first metaphor likens true knowledge inhering in the soul to the kernel and the layers of linguistic terms and internal dialogue to shells surrounding the kernel. The second metaphor likens the material fed into syllogisms to the gold stamped into the coin, certain premises being likened to pure gold, the levels of context theory in the Arabic organon are then introduced.

Importantly for this thesis, al-Ghazālī indirectly says that demonstration is the kernel (*lubb*). He does this by establishing that when the material logic[511] is referred to, one should understand two elements. First, material logic (*māddat al-qiyās*) is propositional knowledge regarding the relation of (singular) realities one to another (*ʿilm taṣdīqī bi-nisbat dhawāt ḥaqāʾiq*)[512] which is true (*ṣādiq*), certain (*yaqīnī*), both intrinsically and according to the given thinker

508 This term was defined, for my purposes, above.

509 This was also before composing *Mīzān al-ʿamal.* Al-Ghazālī indicates in the *Mīzān* itself that, having finished with the *Miʿyār*, he is now turning to compose the *Mīzān.* See *Mīzān,* 2.5–6.

510 This is broadly similar to al-Suhrawardī's approach which incorporated a modified version of logic. See Hossein Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination: A Study of Suhrawardi's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq* (Altanta, GA: University Scholars Press, 1990), esp. 41–76 on the position of logic in the Philosophy of Illumination.

511 Al-Ghazālī himself distinguishes between the form of syllogism (*ṣūrat al-qiyās*), i.e. formal logic, and the material of logic (*māddat al-qiyās*), i.e. material logic.

512 This phrase may be translated more technically but less idiomatically as 'knowledge which is the assent to the relation of (singular) realities one to another'. This phrase indicates propositional knowledge (or knowledge by assent) which is compound in that it predicates one concept of another (e.g. 'humans are mortal') as opposed to conceptual knowledge which is to know the quiddity of (or define) a singular concept (e.g. 'humans are rational animals').

Al-Ghazālī distinguishes between and defines conceptual knowledge (*ʿilm taṣawwurī*) and propositional knowledge (*ʿilm taṣdīqī*; or knowledge by assent) at *Miʿyār*, 182.13–15.

(*nāẓir*), and universal (*kullī*) meaning that it is certain in every state (*ḥāl*; and time).[513] Second, while the material of syllogism is said to be premises (*muqaddimāt*), this is only metaphorical (*majāz*).[514] What is really meant is the knowledge subsisting in the soul which the terms of the premises refer to.

To explain this, he introduces terms which may appear to have a Sufi connotation and which he will go on to use in the cosmology he develops in the *Iḥyāʾ*: the kernel and its attendant shells. Al-Ghazālī states that all propositions—the matter (*madda*) of logic—consist of four levels.[515] The proposition itself is the kernel (*lubb*) which is knowledge subsisting in the soul whose reality is ultimately an inscription in the soul of a similitude (*mithāl*) corresponding (*muṭābiq*) to the known (*al-maʿlūm*).[516] The other layers which he refers to as three shells (sing: *qishr*) are a) the form (*ṣūra*) inscribed (*marqūma*) through writing, b) ordered speech to which the writing refers, and c) internal dialogue to which the speech refers.

This is a modified version of the four levels of existence elsewhere in the *Miʿyār* and which has its origin in Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*: script refers to speech which refers to concepts which refer to extra-mental beings. The four levels al-Ghazālī presents here take knowledge as the kernel having shells rather than an extra-mental being. In this four-level cosmology, the kernel (*lubb*) is knowledge itself, specifically, true propositional knowledge (*al-ʿulūm al-ḥaqīqīyya al-taṣdiqiyya*)[517] in contradistinction to its substitutes (for which he provides several examples) that often pass by those not trained in logic.[518] His discussion indicates that this level of knowledge is abstract (al-Ghazālī refers to as having abstraction (*tajrīd*)) while the other levels (such as the spoken or written elements) are mere forms (*ṣuwar*). The passage thus accords with the ontological dichotomy in which the incorporeal is real knowledge shown to be deployed now in Books I, II, XXI (containing the division of the sciences and direct explanation of al-Ghazālī's cosmology), XXIIX (containing the afterlife criterion studied in Chapter 2), XXXIV (the four levels of unity), and XXXV (*Kitāb al-Maḥabba*) of the *Iḥyāʾ*. This cosmology has its origin in al-Ghazālī's syllabus at least as early as the *Miʿyār*, a pre-departure work. And it is specifically a cosmology deploying the philosopher's notion of the incorporeal as an immaterial quality of true knowledge, the *Miʿyār* using the term *lubb* to indicate a) an

[513] *Miʿyār*, 182.14-20.
[514] Ibid., 182.25–6.
[515] Ibid., 183.3–4.
[516] Ibid., 183.10–11.
[517] Ibid., 183.22.
[518] Ibid., 183.15–19.

ultimate reality (*ḥaqīqa*), b) the quality of immateriality, and c) true knowledge (*ʿilm haqīqī*). The implications of the adoption of these terms and concepts in the pre-departure *Miʿyār* are discussed cumulatively after discussion of another similar example.

The same passage introduces another set of non-technical or religious terms to contrast true knowledge with lesser versions. In what he refers to himself as a similitude (*mithāl*), logic (or literally syllogism (*qiyās*)) is said to be like minted gold in which the matter is 'pure gold' (*ibrīz*) which is separate from the roundness of the stamping (representing the form).[519] As is the case with beliefs (*iʿtiqādāt*) which are the material of syllogisms, some coins are pure gold while some coins are mixed and others are complete counterfeit.[520] According to the level of certainty of these beliefs, the syllogism formed from them may be either dialectic, rhetorical, sophistical, poetic, or certain (*yaqīnī*).[521] By equating certain belief (or demonstration) with the true gold which uses certain premises for its matter and previously equating the kernel with true knowledge which is certain and universally true, it is clear that he has linked demonstration to true knowledge and the kernel.[522] Both are true knowledge as opposed to counterfeit or admixed. This confirms previous findings that the incorporeal and demonstrative is consistently referred to by various pairs of terms expressing a dualist cosmology. Further, it shows the cosmology to be present in a pre-departure work of logic expressing the matter in technical terms which carry over into the *Iḥyāʾ* independently shown to preserve an ontological dichotomy into the corporeal and incorporeal, one shown to draw on Avicenna's highly developed body–soul dualism.

The significance of the use of a) the cosmological terms kernel and shell and b) the similitude of pure gold and counterfeit which are both open to being construed as Sufi terms but which refer to philosophical categories is multiple. Firstly, the context of al-Ghazālī's use of the terms kernel and shell should be investigated. While no direct source for the *Miʿyār*'s

[519] Ibid., 184.4–8.
[520] Ibid., 184.7–13.
[521] Ibid., 184.14–186.22. Intriguingly, al-Ghazālī mentions the technical terms for all other levels of context theory and the Arabic organon, but replaces the term 'demonstrative' (*burhānī*) with 'certain' (*yaqīnī*), refraining from using the word *burhān*, perhaps because it is contentious as seen in the following subsection, 'Defence of demonstration'. This is in spite of the fact that elsewhere he uses the term demonstration in the *Miʿyār*, specifically in a passage drawn on for the said important passage from the *Kitāb Dhamm al-kibr wa-l-riʾā'* examined in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, by using the other levels of the Arabic organon and then providing a description of the demonstration, it is clear that demonstration is what is composed of the certain premises he describes.
[522] Either the kernel is demonstrative knowledge or the kernel and true knowledge are the only proper premises of demonstration.

use of the terms has currently been identified,[523] the least which may be said is that the use of these terms predates him and they are used to refer to levels of being, but also levels of knowledge and religion. Usage of the terms kernel and shell has precedents by philosophers, including the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā,[524] theologians,[525] and Sufis, or what we may call theosophers, such as al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī.[526] Both the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā and al-Tirmidhī, and even al-Iṣfahānī, defy categories. They are borderline cases or synthesisers, eclectics, and so on. Al-Ghazālī would be aware that his terms might be interpreted as Sufic, and in light of his support of Sufism as the correct path he treads in *al-Munqidh*, even hoped they would be. He refers to the *Iḥyā'* in its introduction as being a work which reworks the writings of previous Sufis and knows that these terms are open to interpretation as Sufic. However, in light of Chapter 1, what seems most likely is that he is replacing technical terms with non-technical terms, and thereby engaging in the philosophical practice of striking concrete similitudes for abstract concepts. As studied in Chapter 1, this practice goes all the way back to Plato and in the context of Islamic philosophers such as al-Fārābī, it involves the claim that religion is a level of discourse consisting of such coinings which serve to align those not capable of grasping the higher truth with the truth. In the second passage studied above, al-Ghazālī himself refers to his handling of the terms and concepts as striking a similitude.

Attempting to answer the question of why al-Ghazālī uses terms which have a wide resonance for concepts of a philosophical origin yields a number of reasonable answers. Al-Akiti has studied many uses of al-Ghazālī's language, finding that in some cases his intention

[523] Jules Janssens has explored the sources of the *Miʿyār*, finding sources for the overwhelming majority of the work, but this passage is not in the corresponding section of the logic of the *Maqāṣid al-falāsifa* nor does Janssens find any other source for it. See Jules Janssens, 'Al-Ghazzālī's *Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq*. Sources Avicenniennes et Farabiennes', *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen âge* 69 (2002): 33–69, esp. 51.

[524] In the *Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Ṣafā*, one finds, for instance, the use of similitudes to refer to truths is mentioned at 3:181.9. That the human faculties are similitudes of the higher world is mentioned at 3:176.18-21. For the concept that every existent in this world has an inner and outer aspect (*ẓāhir* and *bāṭin*) and a husk and kernel (*qishr* and *lubb*), see 1:311.6–10. 4:11.11 and .21–2 refer to all religions having similitudes and allusions (*ishārāt*) to a higher reality which is known by gnostics (*ʿārifūn*).

[525] Al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, another likely source, speaks of four levels of existence but a) his conception is different and b) he does not use the terms *lubb* or *qishr* in this context. *Al-Dharīʿa*, 194.13–195.3, could be a vague inspiration as it discusses the relationship between knowledge in the heart and that on the tongue. *Al-Iʿtiqādāt*, 274.10–14, is a discussion of four levels of existence, but does not appear as a direct inspiration for al-Ghazālī's sentiments.

[526] In *Bayān al-farq bayn al-ṣadr wa al-qalb wa al-fuʿād wa al-lubb* attributed to al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, the terms kernel (*lubb*) and shell (*qishr*) also appear. (For a discussion of the texts attribution, and possible attribution to Abū l-Ḥasan al-Nūrī, see, Heer, et al, *Three Early Sufi Texts* (Louisville: Fons Vitae), 57, n. 5.) In this text, entities in the world are said to have four levels, their essences and inner realities being referred to as their kernel. (See, al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, *Bayān al-farq bayn al-ṣadr wa-l-qalb wa-l-fuʾād wa-l-lubb* (*A Treatise on the Heart*), edited by Nicolas Heer, Cairo: Dār al-'Arab, n.d., 34.7-9.) The layers of a thing co-constitute each other and resemble each other. (See, *Treatise on the Heart*, 38.8-13.)

for introducing non-technical terms is to ingratiate an orthodox audience and at others to make an abstract discourse accessible to those who are not proper scholars.[527] I would add by way of interpreting the implications of main argument of this thesis that al-Ghazālī wishes to build a praxis accessible to a wide audience on a rigorous framework raising praxis and religion in general to the rank of a demonstrative science. This requires using rigorous materials but making their presentation accessible, and ingratiates an orthodox audience at the same time. Also, in addition to purely rhetorical purposes, the practice of coining similitudes between two levels was discussed in Chapter 2 in several sections, establishing that coining of two levels of discourse involves interpretation of religious similitudes and is part and parcel of the role of inheritor of the prophets which al-Ghazālī subtly claims and embodies in the *Iḥyā'*. Thus, the use of similitudes in the *Miʿyār* shows that al-Ghazālī is developing a repertoire of coined concepts in a technical work, and in the *Iḥyā'* written for a wider audience the two levels are put forward to the public as a whole with the marks of production, or if one will, stitches, taken out, such that the coining is largely implicit. This process of developing two layers is contiguous with his technical writings and presupposes the parallelism of the corporeal and incorporeal worlds flowing through all things, a parallelism which is conveniently present in context theory as handled by Avicenna and al-Fārābī as they are each committed to dualist cosmology, Avicenna being acknowledged by contemporary scholarship as having developed the body–soul dichotomy to a far higher level than his predecessors.

3. Defence of demonstration: Contra the *kalām* scholars

The *Miʿyār* passage shown to be the source of the levels of belief (including demonstration) in the *Iḥyā'* culminates in the *Miʿyār* in a telling discussion of the status of demonstration. In this section, al-Ghazālī will be shown to defend demonstration against *kalām* scholars. It might be said that the *Miʿyār* is a pre-*Iḥyā'* work. It might also be supposed that it is a work in which al-Ghazālī is not be speaking in his own tongue, because it is a preliminary work for reading the *Tahāfut*. A couple points of response are in order. Firstly, al-Ghazālī states in the *Miʿyār*'s introduction that the wider and more important aim of the book is to explicate speculative inquiry (*naẓar*). Speculative inquiry is the process for obtaining knowledge which the *Mīzān*

[527] See Chapter 1 which discusses Afifi al-Akiti's study of al-Ghazālī's appropriation and naturalisation.

said, along with praxis, is needed to obtain felicity. So, it must be recognized that al-Ghazālī is setting forth a science and not speaking purely in the tongue of the philosophers. Secondly, he takes a stand in a manner odd for a logic manual and asserts a position much in the same way he defended aspects of philosophical doctrine in the *Tahāfut*. In this case, as seen presently, he defends demonstration which he has been shown to use in the *Iḥyā'*. So, it is as though he establishes his position in a technical work outside the *Iḥyā'* and implicitly builds the *Iḥyā'* on this doctrine without mentioning the defence, in this case against the *kalām* scholars. Thus, the following defence of demonstration is an additional example of what he was seen in Chapter 1 to do in the *Tahāfut*: to adopt or defend philosophical positions in a work it is assumed is not putting forth his own position.

This discussion has been studied by Michael Marmura, who analyses al-Ghazālī's commitment to causality.[528] The topic of demonstration sparks a fascinating discussion in al-Ghazālī. Pre-empting the doubt of hypothetic *kalām* theologians to his statements on the sources of demonstrative knowledge, he voices their hypothetical question and offers his reply as follows:

T12, *Miʿyār*, 190.5–191.5

> If someone were to ask, 'How do you believe this (necessary connection between cause and effect that underpins demonstrative knowledge) with certainty while the *kalām* scholars doubt this matter, saying, ''Cutting the neck is not the cause of death, nor is eating the cause of satiety, nor is fire the cause of burning.'' Rather, God, most high, creates burning, death, and satiety at the place these matters come about, not by them?'
> We would say: We alerted to the obscurity (*ghawr*) of this topic (*faṣl*) and its reality in the book *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa*. The amount required now (is to say that) if the *kalām* scholar were informed that his son's neck were severed, he would have no doubt in the occurrence of his death.

Al-Ghazālī states that investigating whether the link between the two events is necessary or through God's will and inveterate practice (*sunna*) is not a question about whether there is a correlation between the two events. Rather, it is investigating *the manner* (*wajh*) of the correlation.[529] What al-Ghazālī appears to be saying is that the existence of a necessary

[528] See Michael Marmura, *Probing in Islamic Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sīnā, al-Ghazālī, and Other Major Muslim Thinkers* (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Pub., Binghamton University, 2005), 'Al-Ghazālī and Demonstrative Science', 245–6. Marmura concludes that this important passage establishes that causal premises are uniform and certain, but not necessary.

Note that Marmura does not mention the incorporation of demonstration and the philosophical notion of felicity. This matter studied in Chapter 1 establishes that the status of demonstration and its role in obtaining felicity carries over into al-Ghazālī's revivification project.

[529] *Miʿyār*, 191.9–10.

correlation is not what is being doubted; rather, what they are properly questioning is whether this correlation is through causal necessity or whether it is contingent, its apparent uniformity of causal connections returning to God's practice and will in an occasionalistic manner. Continuing with his explanation, he states that doubting the death of one whose head has been dissevered is pure misgivings (*wasāwis*). In this manner, al-Ghazālī safeguards demonstration from occasionalism; the doctrine in no way reduces certainty arrived at through demonstration. Marmura interprets al-Ghazālī as meaning that in spite of nature's uniformity not being due to any causal qualities inherent in natural things, nature yet proceeds in an orderly fashion.[530] If Marmura's interpretation is correct, then al-Ghazālī also safeguards theology from attributing necessity to events without reference to God's will. The preservation of uniformity allows for drawing certain knowledge from observation, Marmura adding that 'the uniformity is decreed by the divine will "that can undergo neither substitution nor change"'.[531]

Al-Ghazālī defends demonstration and he was seen above in this chapter to clearly continue to uphold it in his philosophical Sufism. Thus, his addition of domination of the heart alongside demonstration complements or completes intellect and science rather than challenges or refutes them. Demonstration is defended, drawing on the pre-departure preparations al-Ghazālī appears to make for his revival. Then, in the *Iḥyā'* he implicitly draws on these materials and doctrines to produce a religious science composed of two primary levels with a hermeneutic between the levels (of which context theory is a part). Contrary to simplistic narratives that he is the destroyer of intellect (as a source of certainty, even in his Sufism), the Proof of Islam (*Ḥujjat al-Islām*) al-Ghazālī adopts demonstration, defends it against *kalām* occasionalism, and gives it pride of place in bringing about felicity in a religious context. It assists his revivification in raising the religious sciences to the status of demonstrative science.

[530] Marmura, *Probing in Islamic Philosophy*, 246.
[531] Ibid.

V. The Primacy of the Two Levels and the Nature of the Third Level

Demonstration was shown to be central in the *Iḥyā'*, being the root of the religious virtues and the cause of the higher of two eschatological ranks to which the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* is ordered. It was also shown to be underpinned by a wider dichotomy of the corporeal and incorporeal and inner and outer.

However, such authorities in Ghazālī studies as Richard Frank and Alexander Treiger have presented a triad which differs significantly.[532] Frank notes cases where the second level is granted the status of true knowledge and others where it is not.[533] This observation is helpful, but he does not offer an explanation for the change and he says little about the third level shown in this thesis to be predominant in the *Iḥyā'*: the domination of the heart by an attribute.

Treiger on the other hand argues for three consistent levels termed 'Treiger's triad' throughout this section. His triad begins with imitation, but refers consistently—in a manner this section argues conflicts with the *Iḥyā'*—to a second level demoted below the status of true, demonstrative knowledge. Further, Treiger presents a third level which is granted the status of true knowledge: a tasting caused by witnessing which he explains according to a specific Avicennian notion not found in the *Iḥyā'* and shown in this section to differ with the third level the *Iḥyā'* actually does put forward. The levels argued in this thesis to be primary in the *Iḥyā'* will be clarified in this final section, attempting to identify the specific levels deployed in the *Iḥyā'* and the specific conception of each. The result is that the second level of true knowledge established above is not compromised and a third level is somewhat variable, but generally involves a super-added state (as opposed to a tasting which itself constitutes true knowledge).

[532] See Richard Frank, 'Al-Ghazālī on *Taqlīd*', esp. 214–20. In this discussion, Frank first notes the dichotomy from *al-Iqtiṣād* into imitation and demonstration. He notes instances where al-Ghazālī refers to a tripartite division, including in the *Mishkāt* and one text in the *Iḥyā'* where the second level is demoted below certain, demonstrative knowledge. It will be argued below that the text from the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* seeming to demote the second level merely introduces a sub-level of imitation in which *kalām* reasoning is not considered certain, but rather is a form very close to imitation of the masses. It is also argued that the notion in the *Mishkāt* differs with that in the *Iḥyā'*. Frank then cites *al-Munqidh* in which a third level, tasting, sits again above true, demonstrative knowledge. This indicates that the position of the *Iḥyā'* is returned to at the stage of the *Iḥyā'*. Frank further distinguishes two notions of witnessing (*mushāhada*) sitting atop the second level. It is important that he notes multiple forms of witnessing, as this agrees with the findings from the *Iḥyā'* presented in this section. It will be shown that Alexander Treiger presents one form of witnessing from the works of Avicenna as the source of al-Ghazālī's notion of witnessing (which causes tasting). The forms of a third level in the *Iḥyā'* are shown to be irresolvable to a single form of tasting and it is shown that there is no evidence in the *Iḥyā'* that the notion from Avicenna is used in the *Iḥyā'*. The predominant notion of a third level in the *Iḥyā'* is that an attribute produced by a given knowledge dominate the heart, and this element is little studied in both of our authors.

[533] See previous footnote.

This finding clarifies the *Iḥyā'* and indicates that its doctrine differs from al-Ghazālī's subsequent works cited by Treiger as evidence for his triad.

A. Treiger's Triad

In his study of al-Ghazālī's mystical cognition, Alexander Treiger attempts to establish the relation of the different epistemological levels including imitative belief, knowledge, and tasting or witnessing. When his study turns from the science of unveiling to tasting he introduces what he terms the 'famous triad articulated in al-Ghazālī's major works, starting from…the Book of Forty (*Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*)'.[534] He subsequently limits this to al-Ghazālī's later works, indicating that starting with the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī develops and generalizes tasting.[535] While he states that this triad is merely anticipated in the *Iḥyā'*, Treiger's analysis does not inform us of al-Ghazālī's position in the *Iḥyā'*, arguably al-Ghazālī's most important work. Thus, a lacuna remains.

The triad conflicts with the position specific to the *Iḥyā'* in two manners. Firstly, it produces a second level which Treiger says indicates that both *kalām* and philosophy produce knowledge (*ʿilm*).[536] It will be argued here that a) *kalām* does not produce knowledge and b) that the notion of knowledge in the *Iḥyā'* is specifically demonstrative knowledge (i.e. that obtained via proper speculative inquiry (*naẓar*)). This argument will primarily be made through passages from the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* which are relevant to understanding the imitation–demonstration dyad spoken of so far. However, the two passages in the *Iḥyā'* cited by Treiger from Books II and XXI, respectively, also require analysis to show that they fit into the *Iḥyā'*s own triad. Secondly, the third level, direct tasting, requires further analysis without which the red herring of a simplistic conception of al-Ghazālī's mysticism will continue to cloud the structure of the *Iḥyā'*. Specifically, it is shown that the most central treatment of the higher level in the *Iḥyā'* is the said addition of domination by a given attribute over the heart. This element is a second aspect of certitude, indicating that in the *Iḥyā'* al-Ghazālī grants that

[534] Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*, 51.1–3.
[535] Ibid., 49.
[536] Ibid., 51. As discussed below, this is indicated by the fact that the second level of the triad includes both demonstration and analogy (*qiyās*), the latter being a tool of *kalām* scholars which does not in al-Ghazālī's estimation produce certitude.

demonstration produces certain knowledge.[537] While it is argued that this third level is woven into the structure of the *Iḥyā'*, it is acknowledged that in such passages as Book II's discussion of the relation of the inner and outer and five different types of secrets, that some of these secrets involve different notions of a level beyond demonstrative knowledge *while some of them merely refer to demonstrative knowledge itself as this form of knowledge is already beyond the outward for al-Ghazālī*.[538] Without these nuances, al-Ghazālī's position unique to the *Iḥyā'* will be lost on the reader and Ghazālī scholarship will struggle to hone in on the exact positions of the *Iḥyā'* itself. An important part of the question at hand here is to ask whether demonstrative knowledge brings the reality into direct contact. If a reality is purely intelligible—e.g. knowledge that two plus two is four or the principle of non-contradiction—then it is possible that demonstration bring this intelligible directly into contact with the intellect. Previous chapters established that al-Ghazālī holds the intellect to the specifically human organ capable of apprehending intelligibles which accord with the realities of things and their imprint in the incorporeal world.[539]

Treiger presents two triads: a) *īmān–ʿilm–dhawq* and the related b) *taqlīd–qiyās* (or *burhān*)*–mushāhada*.[540] The elements of the first triad are the cause or instrument for the latter. He states that the intermediate levels 'seem to refer not only to the dogmatic theologians, with their dialectic reasoning, but also to the philosophers, as the inclusion of *burhān*, apodeictic demonstration, as a method of 'ilm indicates'.[541] This chapter and the previous make clear the importance of demonstration for producing certitude (and felicity) in the afterlife, so it is perfectly clear that Treiger's assessment that knowledge (*ʿilm*) includes both the level of *kalām*

[537] While *al-Munqidh* speaks in several places of a level beyond the intellect, it does not deny that certitude may be obtained through the intellect. (See, for instance, *al-Munqidh*, 66 and 124.) While it states that *kalām* involves dialectic methods which are not certain, it does not rule out the possibility of arriving at certainty through logic in the matters of religious belief. (See *al-Munqidh*, 72–4. *Kalām* is thus said to involve imitation (*taqlīd*).)

[538] Al-Ghazālī's notion of tasting in the *Iḥyā'* will also be shown compatible with the notion of two aspects of certitude. The perfection of knowledge of love or sickness through having love or sickness is similar to this added element of the domination of an attribute. By way of example, one may read the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* and why God is deserving of love and obtain demonstrative knowledge of this, but to be dominated by the attribute is to have, experience, and taste love. Thus, the notions are compatible and this is why the five secrets of Book II must be handled carefully to avoid assuming similarities *or differences*. Treiger will also be shown to assume that tasting has a number of attributes generally associated with the mysticism but which are not proven to hold with regards to al-Ghazālī, this being especially the case in the *Iḥyā'*.

[539] Section IV.C established via the *Miʿyār* that demonstration achieves true knowledge and the kernel of things. However, Section II (especially if adjoined to discussions in Chapter 1 of al-Ghazālī's statements surrounding his classification of knowledge) establish that the true intelligible knowledge in the incorporeal world is the higher layer and is accessible to the particularly human faculty.

[540] Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*, 51.

[541] Ibid., 51.29–31.

scholars and the philosophers is mistaken. It is also clear that knowledge (including demonstration as part of knowledge) is demoted below certitude. However, more contextual evidence from al-Ghazālī's writings on the levels in the *Iḥyā'* is needed to show that the claimed levels are deployed in numerous places across the *Iḥyā'* (in addition to being fundamental to its eschatological levels which are the ultimate end and aim of its practice).

B. Clarification of the second level

This subsection aims to establish that the second level of knowledge in the *Iḥyā'* is consistently true knowledge producing certitude via demonstration (and thus leading to felicity). The passage from *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn* that is critical for Treiger's triad which demotes knowledge to mere analogy places a gap between demonstration and true knowledge through tasting which does not represent the position expressed in al-Ghazālī's epistemological passages from the *Iḥyā'* such as those from Books II and XXI (each studied below). In *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*, he uses an example of the knowledge of sexual pleasure by one who is impotent. Such a one may believe through testimony, or have knowledge through demonstration (*burhān*). However, even though this passage states that such a one thus has knowledge, it further adds that this knowledge is based on analogy to their knowledge of the pleasures of food. While this passage still terms demonstrative knowledge as knowledge (*ʿilm*), it does introduce a gap between knowledge and tasting which is significantly wider than that found in the *Iḥyā'*. By holding that knowledge at the second level is mere analogy, it ceases to be true knowledge.

Book XXI contains a discussion of three levels of belief and is one of the two passages from *Iḥyā'* cited by Treiger for his triad and discussion of tasting and witnessing. Upon analysis, the passage turns out to support the levels presented in this thesis, and with the additional evidence that it concurs with the related eschatological levels outlined in Section I. After the treatment of the five veils discussed earlier in this chapter, al-Ghazālī turns to the levels of the knowledge or belief which accrue when these veils do not intervene. The first level, imitation, was described in Section I.A of the present chapter, stating this level of belief was the cause of salvation and that its people were not of those brought nigh. While al-Ghazālī refers to a second level here, there is very good reason to believe that a) the division presented throughout this chapter stands and b) he does not grant *kalām* the rank of true knowledge. Firstly, it may be noted that while al-Ghazālī explicitly denies that those of

imitation are of those brought nigh,[542] he also does not grant *kalām* scholars the rank of those brought nigh. Those of imitation, he says, lack unveiling (*kashf*), insight (*baṣīra*), and expansion of the breast (*inshirāḥ al-ṣadr*), which Chapter 1 showed to be synonyms for intellect.[543] Regarding the second level in this particular division, he states: 'The second is the belief of the *kalām* scholars. It is admixed with a type of inferential reasoning (or ratiocination; *naw' istidlāl*). Its level is close to the level of the masses (i.e. imitation).'[544] The second eschatological level is only granted to the third level of belief. Thus, it appears that the first level here is the same as that in his predominant division (i.e. imitation), but that there *kalām* is considered only a degree of this first level. Here, his third level refers to what is there the second level: true knowledge affording one the rank of those brought nigh.[545] Here, he states that there is variation in levels of knowledge, which accords to achieving the sub-rank of the out-strippers within the second rank in Table 4.2 above.[546]

Another passage important for analysing the second level of belief is found in 4th Quarter. The passage also refers to a fundamental structuring element of the *Iḥyā'*: though it is devoted to praxis, its treatment of character traits is not separate from knowledge, but rather takes knowledge as its root. The result of this reworking of the the *akhlāq* tradition's notion of character traits is that knowledge must be included in the *Iḥyā'*. This point is made in Book XXXV, where the declaration of unity (*tawḥīd*) is the basis of the religious station reliance (*tawakkul*). The declaration of divine unity is said to be part of the science of unveiling, but al-Ghazālī concedes that some of the knowledge (*'ulūm*) of unveiling is connected to (*muta'alliq*) to works (*a'māl*) via the intermediary states.[547] In other words, good works are the product of good states and those states are only produced with the correct knowledge, so the science of unveiling is required to produce good works. The science of

[542] *Iḥyā'*, 3:15.9–10.
[543] Ibid.
[544] Ibid., 3:15.2–3.
[545] Ibid., 3:15.20.
[546] Ibid., 3:15.22–5. He refers to levels of unveiling here which may again be a sub-level within the second level, though this is not spelled out (see ibid., 3:15.22).

Thus, the only difference is the perspectival matter of this division: whether *kalām* is considered a level unto itself or a sub-division of the first level. It definitely does not indicate that *kalām* should be added to a level conceived of as true knowledge leading to felicity. Al-Ghazālī avowedly accords *kalām* the same rank, that of the masses, and his phrase 'a type of inferential reasoning' indicates it is not real reasoning. Placing *kalām* closer to the first level is also seen in the following passage studied.
[547] Ibid., 4:240.11–12.

praxis is said therefore to be incomplete without this knowledge,[548] and on this basis al-Ghazālī says he will investigate that amount of it which is connected with the path of praxis (*muʿāmala*). He presents four levels linked to the kernel and shell shown above to be found first in the *Miʿyār*. The first level is that of the hypocrite (*munāfiq*) whose declaration of unity appears merely on the tongue and has ramifications only for their body in the here-below.[549] His heart is either in a state of denial or heedlessness regarding the meaning of the declaration of unity.[550] These remarks are clearly in line with the levels of existence surrounding true knowledge just as the shell surrounds the kernel in the *Miʿyār*: a semblance exists in a corporeal organ and that semblance corresponds to, but does not achieve, the meaning. The second level is also associated with the corporeal and strikingly includes both the masses and the *kalām* scholars. This level is said to be to believe in the meaning which is in the heart just as the belief (*iʿtiqād*) of the masses.[551] He explains this level in terms consistent with the notion of imitation in Chapter 2 as follows: '…his heart believes (*muʿtaqid*; literally 'is knotted upon') the concept (*mafhūm*) of the speech (that there is no god but God). Additionally, the heart lacks denial (*takdhīb*) of what the heart believes (*inʿaqada ʿalayhi*).'[552] He shows both its relation to *kalām* and to the level of true knowledge[553] as follows:

T13, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:240.23–8

> This (belief) is a knot (*ʿaqda*) in the heart in which there is no expansion nor dilation, but it protects its possessor from the punishment of the afterlife so long as one dies upon this belief and its knot does not become weak through sins. There are tricks which aim at weakening and untying this knot (*ʿaqd*) called a (blameworthy) innovation (*bidʿa*). It has (other) tricks which aim to repel the tricks which aim to untie and weaken (the knot). They also aim to strengthen and tighten this knot on the heart. They are called *kalām* and the one who knows them is called a *kalām* scholar which is the opposite of the innovator. The aim (of the *kalām* scholar) is to defend against the innovator untying this knot from the hearts of the masses.

Although *kalām* scholars are contrasted with (*fī muqābala*) innovators, they are still in the same level as imitators.[554] Al-Ghazālī thus explicitly assigns a single level to the masses and *kalām*

[548] Ibid., 4:240.12.
[549] Ibid., 4:240.21–2.
[550] Ibid., 4:240.15–16.
[551] Ibid., 4:240.16–17.
[552] Ibid., 4:240.22–3. He is using the term belief in a manner bringing out its etymology which is to tie or bind.
[553] This was also seen in discussion of the waterways of certitude to be related to an expansion of the chest and seen in the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* to be related to a number of terms.
[554] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:240.24–6.

scholars. We might describe what al-Ghazālī has afforded to *kalām* as a sub-level, resembling how the passage above from Book II stated that *kalām* was a rank near that of the masses. Here, he says this belief without expansion is the belief of the *kalām* scholar and there is no difference between them and the masses except their craft of inventing *kalām* (*ṣunʿat talfīq kalām*).[555] This second level is the inner shell[556] and is belief without expansion of the chest and without a light from the one's Lord.[557] (Note that these two scriptural citations regarding expansion and light were also cited in the passages on the intellect and insight in the *Kītāb al-ʾIlm* as seen in Chapter 1.) This second level is called opinion (*iʿtiqād*) which is reinforced (*taʾkīd*) by *kalām*.[558] Defences against the tricks of the innovator are mentioned in the science of *kalām* and those which are important, al-Ghazālī says, are mentioned in (his book) *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-iʿtiqād*.[559]

Al-Ghazālī's description of the third level of the declaration of unity confirms that *kalām* is the not expansion of the breast associated with intellect (and insight and unveiling). He states that while the rank of the masses and *kalām* scholars is to force their hearts to adhere (*yaʿqid*) to the concept of the term of a reality (*mafhūm lafẓ al-ḥaqīqa*), the reality is unveiled to those of the third level as it is.[560] They behold (*yushāhid*) that there is only one Actor and they see that in reality (*bi-l-ḥaqīqa*) as it is in itself that this is the case.[561] Later, he returns to compare the levels, stating that just as the second level, imitation, which is like a shell, is beneficial for protecting the third level, 'so is mere belief without unveiling (*kashf*) highly beneficial in relation to mere speech (*nuṭq*) of the tongue, yet it is deficient in relation to unveiling (*kashf*) and direct beholding (*mushāhada*) which occur through expansion and dilation of the chest and the dawning of the light of truth in it'.[562] He explains that this expansion is that which is mentioned in two Koranic verses, using the same two verses seen in the previous

[555] Ibid., 4:240.30–1.
[556] Ibid., 4:240.33–5.
[557] Ibid., 4:241.9–11.
[558] Ibid., 4:241.34–5.
[559] Ibid., 4:242.1.
[560] Ibid., 4:240.9–10.
[561] Ibid., 4:240.28–9. The witnessing al-Ghazālī describes is associated with the encounter and vision of God in the afterlife. Unveiling is discussed most clearly in the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* (see Chapter 3) in which context al-Ghazālī gives the impression that this only occurs in the afterlife, though in other places he indicates that it may rarely occur in this life.

In light of the text cited in Chapter 1, which states that imagination accompanies all apprehension so long as the human being exists in the body, this impression becomes even stronger.
[562] Ibid., 4:241.7–9.

chapter's discussion of intellect and its synonyms.[563]

While this third level of the declaration of unity is never referred to as intellect nor true knowledge, it has all the hallmarks which have been associated with them in the passages referred to throughout the previous chapter and this chapter (such as the unveiling, expansion, and light referred to above).[564] Further, the ranks in the afterlife strengthen the case that the dyad remains primary here in Book XXXV (just as it did in Book XXI). Al-Ghazālī indeed states that the third level which we argue is true knowledge is the station of those drawn nigh[565] and he states that the fourth level of the declaration is the witnessing of the veracious.[566]

That *kalām* does not produce true knowledge and is not the second level is thus clear and is a matter attested to in many texts outside Books II, XXI, and XXXV cited above.[567] However, understanding its nature and limited role requires reference to other texts in the *Iḥyā'*. Under certain conditions as seen above, it is referred to as a veil, though so long as it protects belief through imitation it serves a limited sharia purpose.[568] Even in *al-Iqtiṣād* itself, al-Ghazālī declares it incapable of obtaining knowledge of the realities of things (*ḥaqā'iq al-ashyā'*).[569] In Book 2, *Kitāb Qawā'id al-ʿaqā'id*, he puts forth his famous position that the purpose of *kalām* is to, using his metaphor, guard the pilgrims on the path on Hajj. The height of his disdain is reached when he says that increasing the belief of the imitator (*muqallid*) through *kalām* and dialectic (*jadal*) is like strengthening a sapling through striking it with an iron hammer.[570] Of course, as a logician, al-Ghazālī states in the introduction of *al-Iqtiṣād* that he attempted to improve the nature of *kalām* proofs in this manual (but was only able up to a certain level within the confines of the level set by the (inherited) discipline). In this passage of the *Iḥyā'*, he refers to the discipline of dialectic (*ṣunʿat al-jadal*), indicating it is a discipline (rather than a method), and he actually uses dialectic alongside *kalām* several times, treating

[563] This includes the passages from the previous chapter on the synonyms for intellect.
[564] And, while its terms already appear to refer to annihilation, we will see in his treatment of the fourth level that annihilation is clearly only for the fourth level.
[565] Ibid., 4:240.18.
[566] Ibid., 4:240.19.
[567] See, for instance, the passages from *al-Imlā'* and even *al-Iqtiṣād* below.
[568] The cosmological basis for this was discussed above.
[569] *al-Iqtiṣād*, 221.5–6.
[570] *Iḥyā'*, 1:94.4–6.
The *kalām* scholar guards his beliefs with divisions (*taqsīmāt*; possibly referring to proof through *ṣabr* and *taqsīm*, a form of proof deploying division and reduction ad absurdum (lit. reduce to the absurd) used by pre-Ghazālīan *kalām* scholars). Cf.'The Logical Structure of *Kalām*', in Gustave von Grunebaum (ed.), *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture* (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1970), 21–50.

them as synonyms.[571]

In *al-Imlā'*, al-Ghazālī refers to his statements in the *Iḥyā'*, saying they are correct, that the *kalām* scholars differ from the masses (only) in excelling in guarding their knots (in their heart).[572] They guard them from disturbance only through (mere) dialectic (*al-jadal*).[573] He contrasts *kalām* as a dialectic science with the possibility of being a science concerned with metaphysics and spiritual states as follows:

> T14, *Iḥyā'* (*al-Imlā' ʿalā mushkil al-Iḥyā'*), *al-Muqaddimāt*, 291.8–292.2
>
> *Kalām* or dialectic (*al-jadal*) is a linguistic science (*ʿilm lafẓī*). Most of it is illusory trickery (*iḥtiyāl wahmī*)…which is widespread in the dispute (*niḍāl*) itself, because (one finds both) conclusive proofs (*al-qaṭʿī*) and what passes for it of (mere) preponderance of opinion (*ghalabat al-ẓann*), what appears correct, and attempts to prove the opponent wrong (*ilzām*) (rather than seeking the truth). That (proper science of theology) which…stands in opposition to this, (and for which it is confused) is the science of ontology (*ʿilm al-wujūd*), understanding (spiritual) states (*al-aḥwāl*), and gnosis of it (*maʿrifatuh*) with complete certainty (*yaqīn tāmm*). And, (it is) the knowledge resembling immediate knowledge (*ḍarūrī*) that there is no god but Allah, as there is no agent (*fāʿil*) other than Him, and no arbiter (*ḥākim*) in the two worlds besides Him…

Thus, he assesses that the *kalām* of his day is dialectic and falls short of conclusiveness, rather than being characterized by certainty, having the ability to assess spiritual states, and in some cases being immediate knowledge. His full position expressed in the *Iḥyā'* is that *kalām* as it is remains a communal obligation as a sharia science, but its pseudo-proofs should not be widely taught, but only therapeutically, used like medicine when needed. There is also a similarity to al-Ghazālī's position on figurative interpretation: those who lack insight and the ability for speculative inquiry (*naẓar*) should adhere to the outward purport and not seek figurative interpretation nor *kalām* proofs.[574] George Makdisi assessed correctly al-Ghazālī's limited support of the Ḥanbalī censure of figurative interpretation. Martin Whittingham cites

[571] *Iḥyā'*, 1:93.17, 1:94.4, 1:94.4–5, and 1:94.8–9.
[572] *Iḥyā'* (*al-Imlā' ʿalā mushkil al-Iḥyā'*), *al-Muqaddimāt*, 291.3–4.
[573] Ibid., 291.8.
[574] Al-Ghazālī cites the authority of the early fathers (*salaf*) to support prohibition of figurative interpretation. However, at the same time he introduces a notion that interpretation requires the light of insight as follows: 'They forbade interpretation because there is great danger in investigating the attributes. Its passes are difficult and its pathways treacherous. Intellects fall short (*qāṣira*) of apprehending the majesty of God, most high. God's guidance (*hidāya*) through the light of certitude (*yaqīn*) is veiled from hearts due to their original formation being love of the here- below' (*Iḥyā'*, 4:172.30–2).

Regarding the ability to interpret, it is based on the light of certitude which al-Ghazālī believes is missing for most people. This is reflected in at least two places in the *Iḥyā'*, where al-Ghazālī offers two paths, one for those capable of contemplation and one for those not. (See Chapter 5 for the said passages and the same chapter which establishes that al-Ghazālī uses contemplation (*fikr*) as a synonym for speculative inquiry (*naẓar*).)

Makdisi's observation that al-Ghazālī agrees in principle with the Ḥanbalī prohibition of figurative interpretation.[575] However, he then provides evidence from *Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid* that this agreement is purely on practical grounds and that al-Ghazālī has the following motives for accepting it: Ḥanbalī rigidity is only advisable for the masses who lack the ability to interpret properly and thus interpretation for them will only serve to loosen their foothold in the outward meaning.[576] The big picture emerging behind these positions is that a) imitation and similitudes have a shared cosmological basis as shells complementary to a higher truth and b) the higher truth is demonstrative knowledge which, if not reached through ability and proper tools, believers should remain with the shell. This shows how al-Ghazālī deploys his cosmology and philosophical tools to handle pure imitation, *kalām*, and demonstrative, true knowledge. Ultimately, his revival deploys a cosmology containing two notions of religion—the imitative shell and the demonstrative, incorporeal kernel—and a sophisticated manner of negotiating the relation between the two.

C. Clarification of the third level

Here it is argued that al-Ghazālī's third level is primarily the domination of the heart by an attribute caused by knowledge.[577] This will be contrasted with the third level of the triad of Alexander Treiger. However, in the end, it is argued that al-Ghazālī introduces several notions of a third level which do not appear resolvable to each other, including the notions of witnessing and tasting which Treiger claims are the heart of the third level. The notion of witnessing central to Treiger's argument is used in multiple manners in the *Iḥyāʾ*, none of them explicitly referring to the Avicennian notions Treiger claims are central to the witnessing.[578]

Al-Ghazālī explains the distinction between the second and third level of certitude through his own example: all may have intellectual certainty that death is coming, yet this attribute has more or less dominance in various hearts, seen by how much people prepare for

[575] See Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'an*, 60–1, for a discussion of interpretation and Makdisi on al-Ghazālī's support of their position. The discussion refers to Book II of the *Iḥyāʾ* where the five secrets exemplifying the relation between the outward and inward are discussed.
[576] Ibid., 61.
[577] It will turn out that the religious stations of the 4th Quarter may be produced either by mere belief or true knowledge, but in either case, utter domination of the heart by the attribute is an added perfection.
[578] The *Iḥyāʾ*, it turns out, must be studied on its own merits. Its various statements indicate various meanings or conditions for witnessing or a third level.

death. As described in the 'Section on Certitude', this is an added element to the second aspect of certitude, which is lack of doubt. Alexander Treiger's triad differs in two manners. Firstly, while his second level is termed knowledge (*ʿilm*), he does not mean a knowledge characterized by certitude. This may be seen based on the second level of Treiger's triads which indicate that knowledge is produced by *either* analogy or demonstration.[579] Analogy is a form of reasoning which Treiger grants is not true knowledge, but is a type of belief admixed with a form of inferential reasoning (*istidlāl*).[580] Thus, knowledge here does not mean true, demonstrative knowledge. This is in clear contrast to the *Iḥyāʾ* in which, as seen in Chapter 3 and the early sections of Chapter 4, demonstrative knowledge was seen to be woven into its core. Secondly, in addition to the second level being conceived differently, Treiger's notion of the relation between the second and third levels (i.e. knowledge and tasting) differs. As he explains it, using examples such as love, intercourse, or sickness, one's knowledge of them at the second level is itself only analogical because they are only properly known through experience. This again means that the second level is not proper knowledge. To use al-Ghazālī's example, intercourse may be compared by analogy to the pleasure of food, but it cannot be properly conveyed to the prepubescent or impotent (*innīn*).[581] Treiger refers to this tasting by commenting on a passage itself from the *Iḥyāʾ* as a perfection of the previous knowledge, emphasizing that it completes it and 'is not opposed to, or essentially different from, that which it perfects'.[582] However, as described initially in 'The Section on Certitude', the *Iḥyāʾ* presents the third level as being an added state (*ṣifa*), the same term al-Ghazālī uses for the religious stations, virtues, and character traits of the 4th Quarter. It is far-fetched that a state in the sense of a character disposition may constitute the witnessing of al-Ghazālī. After all, a character trait is a disposition or habit accruing to the practical intellect and is not at all a perceptible, let alone a perceptible of the theoretical intellect or even something above and beyond it which would accord to this notion of witnessing. While it may very well be an added insight, passion, or feeling that is experienced, it seems that the passages subsequent to the *Iḥyāʾ* by which Treiger argues merely mean this as an analogy. The question of the third level in the *Iḥyāʾ* is intertwined with al-Ghazālī's exploration of the religious stations. As seen

[579] One crucial statement of his own cited at the end of Section IV.A above makes this highly clear.
[580] In the main passage from *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn* on which Treiger relies, Treiger cites al-Ghazālī stating, 'knowledge *is* analogy (*qiyās*)' (51; emphasis is mine).
[581] Treiger refers to this as al-Ghazālī's stock example. (See his *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*, 51).
[582] Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought,* 49–50.

below, witnessing is specifically said to be beyond all the stations, including those of the 4th Quarter. Also, it is said to be beyond time, and is thus interfered with by the religious stations such as fear, hope, and longing because they necessarily involve a psychological reference to the past or future. Thus, the dominant discussions of a third level in the *Iḥyā'* do not fit with Treiger's findings.[583]

Additionally, al-Ghazālī's third level requires further analysis, for it rapidly becomes clear that a) witnessing in the *Iḥyā'* does not invoke the notions described by Treiger (and which originate in Avicenna) and b) the *Iḥyā'* itself does not appear to have a unitary treatment of witnessing. Without observing these nuances, it is not possible to speak properly of either the third level or the witnessing as presented in the *Iḥyā'*. Once this is shown to be the case, it becomes clear that the notions of belief and knowledge in the *Iḥyā'* must be studied on their own merits because witnessing is fundamental to Treiger's triad. Even if al-Ghazālī does sometimes speak of witnessing as a third level above true knowledge, in many other cases he does not, so the evidence will indicate that his third level does not necessarily involve either tasting or witnessing.

This section will begin by relating the passages from the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* which will show that *kalām* is utterly separate from the second level of true knowledge. Further passages will show that annihilation in unity, which is referred to by al-Ghazālī as witnessing, is compatible with the notion of a third level as domination over the heart of an attribute produced by knowledge. (While true knowledge of unity produces reliance, domination of this attribute leads to annihilation from all multiplicity, including oneself.)[584] Al-Ghazālī's own

[583] The final paragraph of p. 51 of Treiger's monograph is highly important for its statements that inclusion of demonstration means al-Ghazālī refers to the knowledge of the philosophers, and that tasting is a level beyond their knowledge.

However, there is evidence that his observations are not limited to states and stations. So, while in many cases such as unity and reliance, he speaks of an individual knowledge (or door of belief (*bāb al-īmān*)) producing an individual state (such as reliance), in other cases he speaks generally about true knowledge produced through contemplation causing a state of love—this is in *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* where the theory of intellectual pleasure was shown in Chapter 1 to be explained based on the theory of perception, and in another key place he speaks of it causing witnessing and the encounter (*liqā'*) with the Beloved. (True knowledge produced by contemplation is discussed in the penultimate book studied in the final chapter of this thesis. The particular passage discussing this refers to a lover encountering (*liqā'*) their beloved only to find they are highly distracted by snakes and scorpions representing vices which they have not removed from their garments.)

[584] This draws into question whether tasting (of love, specifically) in the Book II passage cited by Treiger is properly interpreted as evidence for his triad in which knowledge includes both analogy (*qiyās*) and demonstration, each of which fall short of certitude. Rather, love is a good example of something which may be known by the mind but which has another aspect known when the attribute produced through the knowledge of love comes to dominate the heart. Thus, one not only knows of love, but experiences it. This is part and parcel of the religious stations in which al-Ghazālī first shows that the meaning (such as love or patience) is possible and

explanations of the relation of knowledge, states, and witnessing will answer important questions of the structure of the *Iḥyā'* to do with nature of the science of unveiling to praxis which go unmentioned for much of the *Iḥyā'*.[585]

1. The third level and how it relates to the second level (of true knowledge)

The *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* makes several important statements which are unique to the *Iḥyā'* regarding the relation between the second and third level of knowledge. The relation is said to apply across the salvific virtues or religious stations in general (and also to the relation of praxis and speculative unveiling).[586] The second level will be shown to be the lower part of the science of unveiling and it is related to the third level as its cause. In other words, part of the science of unveiling is a knowledge and when this knowledge is had, a state of the heart results (for example, fear resulting from knowing that an object is worthy of fear).

Al-Ghazālī introduces and himself distinguishes the second and third levels of the declaration of unity as follows, 'The third is to witness that (unity) by way of unveiling by means of the light of the Real. This is the station of those drawn nigh. That is to see a multiplicity of things, but to see them in spite of their multiplicity as emerging from the One, the Overmastering. The fourth is to see nothing in existence but One. This is the witnessing of the veracious (*mushāhadat al-siddīqīn*). The Sufis call this the annihilation in (divine) unity (*al-tawḥīd*) because one also does not see oneself. If one does not see oneself due to being drowned in the One, one is annihilated from oneself in His unity according to the meaning that one is annihilated from seeing oneself or people.'[587] The second level above was said to be belief via imitation; here, the third level is referred to as the level of those brought nigh which concurs with the level of true knowledge seen in the study of the eschatological levels in Section II. This shows a stability of these levels across a number of books in the *Iḥyā'*. Al-Ghazālī describes the level linked here to those brought nigh in a manner matching his notion of true knowledge being an expansion (of the breast; *inshirāḥ*). He distinguishes this level from annihilation by saying that this expansion (*inshirāḥ*) is not yet the pure vision of the unity of

coherent, after which he further hopes that one become realized in it. (This is explained in Chapter 6 on the virtues.)

[585] Thus, the *Iḥyā'* is shown to be compatible with these rare explicit statements.

[586] It will not be assumed that this statement applies universally throughout the *Iḥyā'*.

[587] *Iḥyā'*, 4:240.12–16.

existence.[588] This, he says, is because this kernel (*lubb*) is also deficient compared to the oil extracted from the kernel. Compared to the one who does not witness (*yushāhid*) any other than God, this kernel and expansion still has the drosses of being aware of others and noticing multiplicity (*kathra*).[589] The levels which emerge may be summarized as seen in Table 4.4.[590]

Level of knowledge (from previous sections)	**Level of declaration of unity (*tawḥīd*)**	**Rank or eschatological level in Book XXXV**
1-Imitation	2-Shell (belief as a knot in heart without expansion)	The masses
2-True knowledge via intellect and demonstration	3-Kernel (unveiling through light of the Real and expansion of breast)	Those brought nigh
3-Variable (but generally either a) witnessing or b) domination of heart by attribute produced by true knowledge)	4-Kernel of the kernel (annihilation in unity)	The veracious

Table 4.4 The levels of knowledge and the levels of the declaration of unity

Regarding the level above true knowledge as found in the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*, the core of what is said there is that in addition to the knowledge that all multiplicity comes from unity, one's awareness of others also drops away. In *al-Imla'*, al-Ghazālī provides a valuable clarification, boiling down to the statement that unity is a reality, not mere delusion.[591] Al-Ghazālī argues for this by saying that were unity a mere delusion while multiplicity is the real

[588] Ibid., 4:241.13.
[589] Ibid., 4:241.11–13.
[590] Note that in Table 4.4, the left column is a general description of the levels arrived at through the early sections of this chapter. The other two columns are the elements from the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* which match these levels. The ranks and eschatological levels match perfectly, while the second column is a near match, especially if annihilation in unity is interpreted as domination over the heart of the attribute produced by the knowledge of unity.
[591] *al-Imlā'* (in *Iḥyā', al-Muqaddimāt*), 299.

state of affairs, seeing unity would be a deficiency, rather than (a meritorious matter suited to be) the cause of sainthood.[592]

To move beyond these brief descriptions of annihilation towards an understanding of the relation of this annihilation to other aspects of the psyche and certitude, indirect lines of reasoning must be pursued. It appears that al-Ghazālī provides just enough information in the surrounding *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* passages to understand the structure he has produced. As explained above in this section, and according with the structure of the stations examined in Section III, there are various forms of knowledge that serve as the basis for the states. In this case, knowledge of unity is the basis for the state of reliance on God (*tawakkul*). Al-Ghazālī explains the relation obtaining between knowledge and states in the context of asserting that belief being perfected is for the (given) meaning (*maʿnā*) of a statement to become a concomitant state (*wasfan lāziman*) of the heart, dominating it.[593] What al-Ghazālī says next must be carefully considered: 'The declaration of unity is the basis (of reliance), and it (i.e. the knowledge of the declaration of unity) is a large topic. While it is part of the science of unveiling (*ʿilm al-mukāshafa*), some of the sciences of unveiling are connected to works by means of states (because knowledge, states, and acts flow from each other in the human psyche). The science of praxis is not complete without them. Thus, we will only approach the amount connected to praxis.'[594] This important statement is one of two statements in the *Iḥyāʾ* on the relation between the sciences of unveiling and praxis which indicate that al-Ghazālī is committed to including in the text of the *Iḥyāʾ* at least enough of the science of unveiling to produce the states of praxis—owing to the form of the virtues in the *Iḥyāʾ* (which differs from the *Mīzān*).[595] The question arises: which level of the declaration of unity is from the science of unveiling—the third level, the fourth level, or both? The materials needed for the answer, and for other answers to do with the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*, are given as follows:

T15, *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:241.28–242

> If it is said, 'This requires explanation sufficient for one to understand how reliance is built upon it,' I would say, 'As for the fourth (level of the declaration of unity), it is impermissible to wade into explaining it. Also, reliance is not built upon it. Rather, the state of reliance occurs through the third (level of the declaration of) unity. As to the first, it is hypocrisy, so this is obvious. As to the second, which is (mere) belief, it is present in

[592] Ibid.
[593] Ibid, 4:240.10–11.
[594] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:420.11–13.
[595] See Chapter 6 on the virtues.

> the commonality of the Muslims. The way to strengthen it is *kalām*, and the refutation of the strategies of innovators regarding it is mentioned in the science of *kalām*. We have mentioned the important portion of it in the book *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-iʿtiqād*. As for the third (level), it is the one upon which reliance is built, because mere (*mujarrad*) belief (*iʿtiqād*) in unity does not produce the state of reliance. Thus, we will mention the amount of it to which reliance is connected rather than (mentioning) its details which are not possible to include in the like of this book.'

By referring back both to (mere) belief and *kalām* and making a single, shared category for both of them, al-Ghazālī confirms that they do indeed both occupy the first level described in Chapter 1 and the current chapter: imitation.[596] Even if *kalām* has dialectical or apologetic proofs, it still falls into this level. The third unity is true knowledge and demonstration, and it produces the state of reliance in a manner which is in agreement with the explanation provided above in Section IV.A.2 which summarized 'The Section on Certitude' (*faṣl al-yaqīn*).[597] Importantly, the fourth level does not produce the desired state. Al-Ghazālī's refraining from explaining the fourth level cannot be merely because it is part of the science of unveiling; after all, he has already said that the third level itself is part of the science of unveiling and yet he has mentioned it. Also, he indicates that he refrains from mentioning the fourth level not because it is ineffable, but because it is impermissible. Thus, both levels three and four are part of the science of unveiling.

It is not easy to join all these statements together. However, it is clear that the third level of unity is the level of intellectual knowledge discussed Chapter 1 and intellect and insight from Chapter 3. This is evidenced by al-Ghazālī referring to it as the proper root of the state of reliance as opposed to mere belief and *kalām*.[598] Though al-Ghazālī does not state here that annihilation is identical to domination of the heart by the state produced by the knowledge of unity, it is argued in the following subsections that annihilation may be seen as compatible with the notion of a higher level as domination of an attribute over the heart. One may nonetheless see that annihilation is a further degree of the same realization: that

[596] Mere belief, even if strengthened by *kalām*, does not produce the state of reliance.

Note that it is shown in the other stations that they may be produced through imitation and mere belief, though they are weak. It is not clear why this statement contrasts with the majority of al-Ghazālī's other statements.

[597] This includes the books of the 4th Quarter studied at the opening of this chapter.

[598] A level of true knowledge bringing about a state would concur with the three levels in 'The Section on Certitude'.

there is only one actor or being in the world.[599] Thus, the existing state of Ghazālī scholarship does not explain how to understand these two levels, it seems clear that the third level is true (demonstrative) knowledge and the fourth level is true knowledge plus the perfection of dominance of an attribute of the heart. This important passage confirms how true knowledge and imitation run through the structure of the *Iḥyā'*, and it describes how this is worked out with reference to a particular virtue and any higher levels of perfection.[600]

2. The variable nature of witnessing (*mushāhada*) in the *Iḥyā'*

The passage from the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* in isolation gives a sense of being a complete treatment of the levels of belief and knowledge in which a third level higher than knowledge has a single sense or unitary nature: annihilation in unity or the witnessing of the veracious. It was suggested that this notion of annihilation is compatible in some sense with al-Ghazālī's statements from Book I that a higher level of certitude is for the state produced by knowledge to dominate the heart, at least in the case of the knowledge of unity. However, other problems remain for studying the nature of this higher level. To make progress, various statements from across the *Iḥyā'* are gathered here.[601] While a level above knowledge is often referred to as witnessing (*mushāhada*), below it is shown that it is difficult to find a single, coherent meaning of witnessing encompassing al-Ghazālī's many statements in the *Iḥyā'*. Further, there are clear cases in which the term is used in different senses. It appears, rather, that al-Ghazālī develops several different notions of a third level above true knowledge. It will be shown that witnessing is more complicated than suggested by Treiger's work, and that its meanings and usages cannot be limited to the meanings he accords it.

The various meanings of a level beyond true knowledge found to exist in the *Iḥyā'* are: a) as a synonym for true knowledge such as vision and the encounter with intelligibles, b) transcendence of time and the states of the heart, and c) an increased clarity or unveiling of intelligibles through transcendence of imagination and or the physical (by removing vice). Before turning to the important passages from the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*, it is first necessary to summarize a number of expressions for the level beyond the second level which

[599] It may be that al-Ghazālī has in mind that one needs further knowledge to be at the root of the fourth level of unity. This might be, as explored in the Conclusion, that all beings are the acts of God and are only perspectivally distinct from God and His attributes.
[600] We will presently return to the fourth level of unity.
[601] The difficulty of finding a single sense or unitary nature is especially the case regarding a third level which resides above true knowledge.

is true knowledge. The topic of a level beyond the intellect or true knowledge requires further research beyond what is possible within the present study, but an analysis of key passages will classify them in order to assess their implication for the argument put forth in this thesis regarding the dichotomy and added perfection of domination of an attribute sometimes termed the level of the veracious. To ascertain the nature of the third level, it is important to ask if every matter exceeding true knowledge and its associated eschatological rank, felicity, is tied to the rank of the veracious. This would indicate—even if al-Ghazālī has various conceptions of the level beyond demonstrative knowledge—he accords this level a single rank.[602] He terms those who have this variously conceived perfection beyond demonstrative knowledge 'the veracious'. The veracious is a rank beyond those brought nigh, but as noted there is no indication that it is an independent eschatological rank.

Al-Ghazālī was seen above to use the term 'witnessing' (*mushāhada*) in his descriptions of both levels three and four of the testification of divine unity. This is problematic, but may merely indicate that the term is at times used loosely for more than one meaning. While this usage was not mentioned by Treiger, it does not necessarily mean that the third level should be added to al-Ghazālī's uses of direct beholding. Rather, it alerts us to the need to question whether direct beholding has only one meaning and even to ask whether it is not a term al-Ghazālī uses loosely to apply to a number of phenomena involving strength, clarity, directness, and instantaneousness of the apprehension of intelligibles. Be that as it may, let us offer a list only intended to show that Treiger's list is not exhaustive, to work towards an assessment of al-Ghazālī's treatment of the topic in the *Iḥyā'*, and to attempt a catalogue in order to safeguard the claim of this thesis regarding the primacy of two levels imitation and demonstration (and the importance of the third).

In Book II, *Kitāb Qawā'id al-'aqā'id*, al-Ghazālī directly treats the topic of inner and outer knowledge, providing his own catalogue of five different types of secrets (*asrār*) exemplifying how the two relate. One would expect the nature of a third level beyond true knowledge to be explained in detail here. However, the passage is not as helpful as expected because some of the secrets refer to true knowledge itself. It is helpful though in supporting the claim of this section that Treiger's analysis of witnessing is not representative of the *Iḥyā'*, for the tasting presented here is not linked to witnessing, but rather concurs with the notion

[602] One way of looking at this is that he assigns several manners of obtaining the level of the veracious. This would indicate one manner of unity for the state or knowledge beyond true knowledge and felicity.

that the higher level is for an attribute to dominate the heart.

Most of the five secrets are actually examples of different manners in which a symbol and similitude may stand in place of another secretive or obscure matter. They are not objects of knowledge themselves being justifiably termed a secret due to being intrinsically accessible only through a different or rare type of knowledge.[603] Only the first type of secret refers to points which are intrinsically fine (*daqīq*)—being beyond the understanding of most people—al-Ghazālī's examples being the nature of the soul and the divine attributes.[604] Al-Ghazālī states that this category refers to matters (the understanding) of most intellects are inadequate.[605] Further, this matter is not said to involve either witnessing or tasting. It thus resembles matters requiring the second level of knowledge (i.e. true, demonstrative knowledge).

While none of the secrets invokes witnessing, the fourth category of secret is related to tasting. In Treiger's triad, tasting is the only cause for witnessing, and thus is inextricably linked to it. Regarding this fourth type of secret, al-Ghazālī states it is that one may at first apprehend a matter in general, but then further apprehend in detail (*tafṣīl*) through realization (*taḥqīq*) and tasting (*dhawq*).[606] The reference to increased clarity resembles the increased clarity of unveiling studied in Chapter 3. This fourth secret is described through a metaphor of seeing someone at a distance or at dusk, then seeing them well in a noticeably improved manner not contradicting, but completing this type of knowledge (*nawʿ ʿilm*). However, when he explains further, rather than mere increased knowledge, the notion of another type of knowledge enters. His description seems to include Treiger's notion of an added taste. However, while in Treiger's triad the second level is reduced to mere analogical knowledge of a given matter, here this added taste completes true knowledge without rendering it mere analogy (to an untasted matter). As he expounds this type of secret, he adds a third level which refers to the domination of an attribute just as mentioned in the levels of certitude, but in different terms as follows:

T16, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:102.20–7

> Similarly (to completing the knowledge of a person partially seen) is (the matter in general of) knowledge, belief (*īmān*), and assent (*taṣdīq*). A

[603] See Whittingham, *Al-Ghazālī and the Qur'an*, 55–63 (Chapter 3 'The activities of the hereafter': four texts defending Sufi approaches to the Qur'an', '*Taʾwīl* in *Qawāʿid*'). Whittingham analyses the five secrets, finding that they are not reducible to any one category, in some cases merely being metaphorical language, etc.
[604] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:100.14–101.6.
[605] Ibid., 1:100.15.
[606] Ibid., 1:102.19.

> person may believe in the existence of amorous love and sickness, and death before they befall one. However, one's being realized in them when they occur is more complete than one's being realized in them before they befall. Actually, with regards to desire, amorous love, and all other states (*aḥwāl*), a human being has three distinct perceptibles (*mudrakāt thalātha*) and varying states. The first is belief in its existence before it befalls (one). The second is when it befalls one. The third is when it wanes. One's being realized in hunger after it fades away differs from one's realization before it passes away. Similarly, some of the religious sciences (*ʿulūm al-dīn*) become direct tasting (*dhawqan*) and are completed. That is then like the inner (aspect; *bāṭin*) in relation to what proceeded it. Thus, there is a difference between the knowledge of a sick person of health and the knowledge of it by a healthy person.[607]

A number of points are in order to digest this important passage. In the end the passage resolves to accord with the notion of taste as perfection of knowledge by an added state as described in the three levels of certitude in 'The Section on Certitude' from Book 1 rather than Treiger's triad in which taste provides true knowledge and certitude.

Firstly, al-Ghazālī seems concerned with the states produced by religious knowledge. We will remember that near 'The Section on Certitude' from Book 1 he spoke of watercourses of certitude, encompassing all the knowledge brought by the prophets. Watercourses all have a set of intrinsic states of heart and acts that flow from them, once they are understood. In the present passage, al-Ghazālī refers not to knowledge *simpliciter*, but religious knowledge. Thus, here, and in the *Iḥyā'* in general, his focus may reasonably be more on working out the psychology of knowing in a religious context and specifically how knowledge leads to the states which may be thought of as being sought in religion, such as hope, fear, and love, and which he terms the religious stations (*maqāmāt al-dīn*).

Secondly, and related to the first point, the phrasing of the statement that *some* religious sciences or knowledges become taste indicates that not all knowledge is structured in such a manner that belief in it produces a state.[608] This would accord with al-Ghazālī's structuring of the *Iḥyā'* in which he includes only 'intellectual sciences of the afterlife' as his religious science and excludes matters such as mathematics. One may imagine certain affective states accompanying knowledge of mathematics such a feeling of awe before its

[607] He states that in this, and all the categories which proceeded, people vary.
[608] We saw in Section I that al-Ghazālī states that all the religious stations are structured in such a manner that a particular knowledge causes a state and act to emanate. It was said that everything brought by the prophets is a watercourse of certitude, having such an implicit structure.

crystaline beauty, but al-Ghazālī does not try to make the case that these other 'arts', as he terms them, bring about any religious perfection sought in his path of praxis.

Thirdly, the division here only superficially differs from the three levels presented in the levels from 'The Section on Certitude'. The latter includes belief through imitation, while the prior begins from true knowledge and merely adds the observation that in addition to experience, a higher level within experience itself is to be having that experience at this very moment, such as one currently suffering from pain or a cold. Thus, the division resolves to that in Book 1's 'The Section on Certitude', which is for knowledge to be accompanied by an attendant state as opposed to an Treiger's triad and an Avicennian notion of tasting and witnessing as increased familiarity and habitude for intelligibles. The notion here also resolves to al-Ghazālī's notions of the structure of religious stations set on in Section I in which knowledge is the higher aspect from the incorporeal world from which the lower matters of states and acts flow downward by a cosmological rule. This would seem to be at odds with Treiger's placing of tasting above knowledge.

Tasting (*dhawq*) in the above passage is thus an immediately known state such as love or sickness which is distinct from syllogistic knowledge of love or sickness and which resolves to the notion of an added state which is a perfection of true knowledge, not itself the source of certitude. Of the other four of the five types of secrets summarized above—and hence the inner aspect of knowledge covered in *Iḥyā'* Book II, none refer to witnessing. This is a strong but preliminary indication that the notions of witnessing set out by Treiger are not found in the *Iḥyā'*. This further indicates the importance of rooting a study of witnessing and other matters in the *Iḥyā'* itself to determine the position held in the intrinsically important work.

Some of Alexander Treiger's evidence for his triad comes from the *Iḥyā'* itself and it is necessary to review the conclusions he draws from these passages. His investigation of witnessing includes only two passages from the *Iḥyā'*, both of which were studied earlier in this thesis. The first was studied above to introduce the basic meaning of imitation. It does not refer to tasting. Witnessing is merely used in that passage to describe the third level as follows, '(It is) to enter the home and look at him (i.e. Zayd) with your eyes and to witness him. This is true knowledge (*al-maʿrifa al-ḥaqīqiyya*) and certain witnessing (*al-mushāhada al-yaqīniyya*). It resembles the knowledge of those brought nigh and the veracious because they believe based

on direct beholding.'[609] Before assuming that witnessing is a notion undermining certain knowledge obtained by the intellect, let us remember from *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*, that al-Ghazālī refers to certain knowledge as witnessing because the intelligible form occurs in the intellect through demonstrative proof which is impossible to be wrong. Also, he often refers to the mind as insight, comparing it favourably to sight, stating that it is actually stronger. Further, al-Ghazālī was seen in Chapter 1 to use terms such as unveiling alongside true knowledge as shown above, not meaning inspiration (*ilhām*), but only increased clarity.[610]

The second passage cited by Treiger was studied in the string of passages from the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*, where witnessing was a synonym for vision (*ruʾyā*) and encounter (*liqāʾ*) understood as increased clarity and unveiling of intelligibles. It thus seems that caution is required before specifying a meaning for witnessing, especially linking it in the *Iḥyāʾ* to tasting or a level beyond certain knowledge.

Iḥyāʾ passages not cited by Treiger indicate the witnessing he evokes has several identifiable attributes, but not the two identified by Treiger whose citations reflect Avicennian notions not apparent in the *Iḥyāʾ*. The attributes and circumstances of witnessing found in the *Iḥyāʾ* involve the following: a) vision and the encounter with intelligibles which seems the same as true knowledge, b) transcendence of time, c) transcendence of the physical (through removing vice), and d) transcendence of imagination. a) Witnessing in the sense of vision and the encounter with intelligibles was dealt with at the end of Chapter 3, which concluded that this was a perfection of knowledge of intelligibles and al-Ghazālī's position was not clear regarding whether this only occurs in the afterlife or whether it might occur in this life under certain circumstances, such as those which follow. b) Transcendence of time: the passages linking witnessing to the transcendence of time indicate that certain religious virtues require a

[609] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:15.20–1.

[610] One may also notice that this level is referred to as the level of those brought nigh, indicating its link to the second epistemological level: true knowledge.

We must beware of assuming that direct witnessing is mystical for al-Ghazālī. After all, in the epistemology presented from *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, it was said that knowledge was the inherence of intelligibles in the intellect which is their proper organ. This knowledge is of the intelligible form itself and if this knowledge is demonstrative, it is beyond doubt. This would match references to direct beholding of Zayd in a house, while opinion might be not demonstrative forms of reasoning or perception which are not certain and do not obtain the intelligible, but rather an imaginal, estimative, or sense form which is a distant representation of the intelligible form.

time element such as fear (of the future) or regret (regarding the past).[611] It expresses that when the knowledge and awareness of God has already obtained, these states become only a distraction. In the end, Chapter 6 on the virtues shows that al-Ghazālī has constructed the states such that their potential to veil from witnessing is 'folded up', as it were, into each other (as when fear and hope balance each other out) or, ultimately, into knowledge and the love knowledge produces. Another long set of passages in Appendix I refer to witnessing occurring when vice and imagination are transcended.

The impact of all these passages for the third level and its relationship to imitation and demonstration may be summarized in the following points. Witnessing itself is used ambiguously, sometimes merely for knowledge of the intelligibles and others for an additional clarity or unveiling of them. Whether this additional clarity can happen in this life or not is also unclear, some passages indicating it may happen under certain circumstances and others indicating strictly that imagination is a barrier lifted only by bodily death. Vice is treated just like imagination, as a barrier to witnessing. This is still problematic because even in the *Mīzān* built on Avicennian ethical theory—and being part of the *akhlāq* tradition in general—purification via praxis is a prerequisite for obtaining the intelligibles. This would mean the

[611] A key passage not referred to by Treiger indicates that witnessing is a phenomenon which occurs outside of a psychological framework related to time. Witnessing somehow transcends the other stations which all relate to time, explained as follows:

T17, *Iḥyā'*, 4:152.11–17

> 'Explanation of the Reality of Fear'. Know that fear is a way of referring to a pain and burning of the heart caused by expecting something disliked to occur in the future, as became clear (also) in the explanation of hope. In whomever is intimate with God and whose heart is possessed by the Real and has become the child of the moment and continually beholding (*mushāhidan*) the beauty of the Real, there remains no turning to glance at the future. Thus, such a one cannot have either fear nor hope. Rather, one's state becomes higher than fear and hope. This is because they are two times (*zamanayn*) which prevent the soul from departing from its foolishness. … In general, if the lover busies his heart with fear of separation while beholding the Beloved, that would be a decrease in witnessing. Continual witnessing (*mushāhada*) is the final goal of the stations. However, here we are speaking regarding the early stations.

Traversing the stations leads to witnessing, however even the highest stations busy one from witnessing and are merely part of the path. The chapter on virtues includes statements that the whole path of removing vice and obtaining virtue is a preparation for true knowledge. However, the current passage makes witnessing, and not just knowledge, the final goal. As mentioned above, witnessing in this passage could either merely mean cognizance of the intelligibles, or it might refer to a higher level of knowledge without distractions and preventatives. The stations are, as stated in the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* passages in this section, part of the path of praxis (*muʿāmala*), i.e. they are merely preparatory for the science of unveiling. Together, this is supported by and makes sense of a cryptic passage from the opening lines of the *Iḥyā'* where al-Ghazālī names the content of the quarters. He says that both the vices and virtues are passes to be traversed and are effectively veils over the *malakūt* (*bi-ḥukm ḥijāb ʿan al-malakūt*). (See, *Iḥyā'*, 1:5.7–8.) A reader first opening the *Iḥyā'* might expect the virtues, especially love and contemplation, to be the end of the path. However, the end and goal is in fact the knowledge for which they are nothing but a means.

requirements for witnessing (at least on some of its uses) are no different from the requirements for obtaining the intelligibles in general, itself indicating there is no difference between witnessing and obtaining the intelligibles and supporting that in some of its uses witnessing does not means any added level or perfection beyond knowing the intelligibles. Where there is a sense of increased clarity or unveiling of intelligibles, it is possible that this is the subtle difference noted between the Chinese and Romans who arrive at the same knowledge, except that the knowledge of the Chinese possesses glowing aspect added via illumination.

Al-Ghazālī's statements about annihilation appear to indicate it is something higher than true knowledge of the intelligibles. Several statements in the *Iḥyā'* indicate that references to annihilation are compatible with the notion of domination of an attribute, especially knowledge of divine unity. Chapter 6 on the virtues shows ample evidence that this dominating attribute is consistently referred to as the level of the veracious. Alexander Treiger gathers several Avicennian passages indicating they are the source of al-Ghazālī's notions of witnessing as familiarity (*ilf*) with and habituation (*tahayyu'*) with the intelligibles, but his study of these notions does not cite texts from the *Iḥyā'* in support, nor have other supporting texts appeared in the present research spanning the *Iḥyā'*.[612]

Concluding Reflections

Analysis of the third level and notions of witnessing indicate that the two core levels of belief remain imitation and demonstrative knowledge and that a significant, but ambiguous third level exists. This third level is primarily the added perfection of domination of the heart by a given attribute. Also, some of the cases in which al-Ghazālī speaks of annihilation clearly involve domination of the heart by a given attribute, such awareness of the divine unity. It is

[612] His triad indicated that witnessing was linked to tasting as its cause. He notes that Avicenna himself refers to two methods: that of research-oriented philosophy and the method of philosophy via tasting (or more idiomatically, experiential philosophy). Treiger states this distinction underlies al-Ghazālī's distinction between knowledge and tasting. However, he offers very little proof for this statement. First, he notes that al-Ghazālī replaces Avicenna's word 'research' with 'knowledge' (*'ilm*). Second, it would seem that he is reasoning on the basis of his triad of imitation-knowledge (by analogy or demonstration)-tasting, but this has been shown above not to apply to the *Iḥyā'*. In the context of the *Iḥyā'*, this is not necessarily correct, for as explained earlier in this chapter based on *Iḥyā'*, Book I, 'The Section on Certitude', tasting is not necessarily a different means to knowledge. Rather, as explained there, it is an added element (if we associate it with the addition of an attribute dominating the heart). In the *Iḥyā'*, if we speak correctly of two methods of obtaining (*iktisāb*) knowledge, they are knowledge via learning and knowledge via inspiration. (It was said earlier that the locus of knowledge is one and the difference between these two is only the means of raising the veil.)

consistently associated with the level of the veracious, but this level is not accorded a separate eschatological level or state. Imitation is linked with salvation and corporeal pleasures and demonstration is linked with felicity and incorporeal pleasures in the afterlife. Thus, they align with the two levels of pleasure in the afterlife starting in the *Tahāfut* and carrying on in the *Iḥyā'*. The imitative and corporeal is associated with the shell of religion, but is religion nonetheless, as opposed to disbelief or ignorance. Demonstration as presented here is in line with the intellectual sciences of the afterlife of Chapter 1 and higher religion delineated by the afterlife criterion in Chapter 2. Structurally, the *Iḥyā'* manages to combine between the two levels themselves leading to the primary eschatological ranks of salvation and felicity, respectively, and virtues shown in this chapter to differ from those of the *akhlāq* tradition through al-Ghazālī's making knowledge their root. This structure itself builds on the doctrines already accepted in the *Tahāfut* (see Chapter 1) but is designed to be a religious praxis producing intellectual pleasures in the afterlife through the highest level of human science, demonstration, but to simultaneously cater for salvation through imitation.

Appendix I: Witnessing as Transcendence of Vice (by Praxis) and Imagination

Several passages are important for determining what prevents direct witnessing, but the most technical passage remains that translated in Chapter 3, drawn from Chapter 5, of the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*. Even it has some obscurity. It stated that a) 'so long as the soul is veiled by bodily accidents, the entailments of desires, and is controlled by all-too-human qualities (*ṣifāt bashariyya*)',[613] the soul would not obtain the witnessing (*mushāhada*) of and encounter (*liqā'*) with knowables outside the imagination (*al-ma'lūmāt al-khārija 'an al-khayyāl*). It closed by saying that b), rather, this life (itself) was necessarily a veil. The first statement offers hope that one might overcome the domination of the said matters, but the latter statement closes the door of hope. Elsewhere, in discussing the forth level of unity which is said to be the witnessing of the veracious, al-Ghazālī states that witnessing very rarely lasts, and generally appears like a flash of lightening.[614] While the two passages may merely be inconsistent, it seems that al-Ghazālī holds that witnessing does occur in this life, but that it rarely remains.[615] In either case, the reference to all-too-human qualities—a term also appearing in the *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs* as a synonym or near synonym for the vices[616]—indicates that this passage is in line with the above: what prevents witnessing is vice and the corporeal influence on the soul caused by it.

Such reference to a veil which may be removed by praxis makes this notion of what is required for witnessing resemble the third veil of *Kitāb Sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb*, Chapter 5. This resemblance raises another problem, because the veils listed in *Kitāb Sharḥ 'ajā'ib al-qalb* were for knowledge in an unrestricted sense, whereas the discussion from the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* regards how the added level of unveiling and clarity of knowables might occur. It thus appears that the two passages are inconsistent, only the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* referring to witnessing as a higher level of knowledge of intelligibles.

It was said above that both removing the vices and gaining the virtues are part of praxis and are only a means to gaining the knowledge of unveiling. Perhaps the clearest statement of this in the *Iḥyā'* is in the *Kitāb al-Tafakkur* studied in the final chapter. Al-Ghazālī

[613] *Iḥyā'*, 4:303.34–304.2.
[614] Ibid., 4:241.23–4.
[615] Though al-Ghazālī's authorship is contested, the *Ma'ārij* states that for the prophets, their life in this world (*mabda'*) is like their eschatological state (*ma'ād*), explained as meaning that they are not veiled from the incorporeal intelligibles by bodily states even while in this world. (See *Ma'ārij*, 183.4–5.)
[616] Note that the passage from Book II below also refers to the all-too-human traits, indicating it is a freedom from states.

states that contemplating, even if it does produce true knowledge,[617] and lead to witnessing and the encounter with the Beloved, will be of no avail without having undergone the 3rd and 4th Quarters. He emphasizes that even the 4th Quarter itself is only a means to arrive at witnessing, true knowledge, and the encounter with the Beloved. He invokes the image of the lover finally being set free for the tryst with the beloved, only to be tormentedly distracted by snakes and scorpions inside his clothes. This is evidence that the preventative from beholding is the vices and requirement to obtain the virtues. However, it also shows al-Ghazālī linking true knowledge via contemplation to the encounter itself associated with direct beholding; thus, it is evidence of a blurred line between obtaining the intelligibles via true knowledge and via beholding.

In the *Kītāb Ādāb al-samāʿ wa-l-wajd* ('Book of Etiquettes of Mystical Audition and Ecstasy'), al-Ghazālī speaks of a fourth state of mystical audition (*samāʿ*) in which one transcends all states and stations. One is said to be isolated from the understanding of all but God, as follows, 'One is like the perplexed diver in the sea of 'beholding' itself (*baḥr ʿayn al-shuhūd*). … The like of this state is called annihilation by the Sufis, because one is annihilated from oneself. Whenever one is annihilated from themselves, they are necessarily more annihilated from other than their self. Thus, it is as if one is annihilated from all other than the One, the Beheld (*al-Wāḥid al-Mashhūd*).'[618] Al-Ghazālī describes this fourth level of audition similarly to the description of the fourth level of unity, and gives it the same rank, namely the level of the veracious, saying:

T18, *Iḥyāʾ*, 2:288.21–35

> This is the level (*daraja*) of the veracious (*ṣiddiqīn*)…and it is the highest of levels because audition according to states is below the level of perfection as it is admixed with the all-too-human attributes (*ṣifāt bashariyya*) which is a type of inadequacy. Perfection is to be annihilated entirely from oneself and one's states…such that one audit for God, through God, in God, and from God. This rank is for the one who has waded the sea of realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) and crossed the shore of states and works and been joined with the purity of unity (*ṣafāʾ al-tawḥīd*) and become realized in pure unity. Thus, there remains nothing in him from him at all. Rather, his humanness has completely abated and he is annihilated from (even) noticing the all too human traits whatsoever. … This is one of the stations of the science of unveiling.

[617] This is seen at the outset of *Kītāb al-Tafakkur* studied in the final chapter. Al-Ghazālī states that what is effectively the syllogism is the mode of moving from mere belief in religious matters to knowledge. His example is that the afterlife is superior to the here-below.
[618] *Iḥyāʾ*, 2:288.8–10.

The final statement in light of what preceded it of this passage indicates that this station is beyond the pale of praxis. Judging from the passages of the section, beyond praxis there is only true knowledge (Ar.: *maʿrifa* (as in *Kitāb al-Tafakkur*) of *maʿlūmāt* or *ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ*), unveiling, and annihilation in unity, of which the latter is fit. In addition to transcending praxis, this station is said to be for one who has waded the sea of realities and then added a sea of purity. Thus, similarly to unveiling—and also beholding and the vision—this is a station which is built on or perfects the true knowledge of the realities of things. It is something added to knowledge, not an ignorance or absence from objects of knowledge, which are after all the acts and vestiges of the divine attributes.[619] The *Kitāb Ādāb al-samāʿ wa-l-wajd* passage is the second passage in which al-Ghazālī refers to stations (*maqāmāt*) of unveiling, the first referring to witnessing itself, and this second referring to annihilation, specifically annihilation in unity.

The notion that praxis is required for the science of unveiling is already stated in al-Ghazālī's treatment of praxis (*ʿamal*) in the *Mīzān*. This is that vices cause passive disposition relative to the corporeal in the soul, which prevents receptivity to the incorporeal. In this sense, we must not assume that something is added that was not already present in the *akhlāq* tradition. This also falls within the notion of the five veils section of Book XXI, *ʿAjāʾib* in which all the causes preventing unveiling are joined together and generalized. Again, all of this makes the role of a higher level of unveiling obscure in the *Iḥyāʾ*. The *Kitāb Ādāb al-samāʿ wa-l-wajd* passage above again refers to the station of the veracious, so there seems little doubt that annihilation itself is granted a clearly defined higher rank than mere unveiling and true knowledge. Annihilation itself, as studied previously, is reducible to being a type of domination of the heart by an attribute, such as fear or divine unity.

[619] This understanding of annihilation from all other than God is explained in *al-Imlāʾ*, though also in other places in the *Iḥyāʾ* itself.

Chapter 5

Praxis: The Bridge between the Two Worlds

Chapter Abstract

This chapter carries on the project of showing that the *Iḥyā'*s fundamental categories of knowledge and eschatology and its approach to praxis are built on doctrines of a dualist afterlife and eternal soul found already in the *Tahāfut*. In the *Iḥyā'*, these doctrines are further infused with the doctrine that religion is coined as an imitation of higher sciences, including praxis, the subject of this chapter. Praxis is the proclaimed topic of the *Iḥyā'* and this chapter posits that al-Ghazālī's project located between the *Mīzān* and the final product of the *Iḥyā'* is, in a sense, always under construction: in each new topic of the *Iḥyā'*, he stretches praxis to accommodate and apply its basic principles to that new topic. Due to the copious nuances introduced by al-Ghazālī, this chapter focusses on the core elements that exemplify how the expanded praxis of the *Iḥyā'* retains the centrality of the method of detaching the soul from the corporeal realm and attaching it to the incorporeal, and now this relates to advancing from imitation to demonstration. It shows that there is a basis for this stretching in the *Mīzān* which begins to produce an anthropology in which the human being composed of various substrates occupied variously by blameworthy or praiseworthy occupants. In the *Iḥyā'*, this is expanded to a general notion of four levels in each of which divestment (*takhliya*) of the blameworthy must proceed adornment (*taḥliya*) of the praiseworthy. The term for the subject of the *Iḥyā'*, the path of praxis (*muʿāmala*), is shown to be contiguous with the core principles of praxis (*ʿamal*) in the *Mīzān*, but expanded to include lower levels allowing the inclusion of ritual purity and worship and higher levels treating thoughts and knowledge allowing inclusion of invocation and contemplation. Throughout this expansion, what is called metaphysicalized praxis, in which praxis is the removal of corporeal influence from the soul to free it to receive its incorporeal perfection, transfers from the *Mīzān* to the *Iḥyā'*. However, the *Iḥyā'* coins this metaphysicalized praxis a 'journey from the corporeal to the incorporeal realm'.

The eschatological levels from the earlier study of imitation and demonstration are shown to be modified in at least one *Iḥyā'* passage. Al-Ghazālī is shown to link invocation with

its effect, intimacy, and contemplation with the higher state of love and felicity. And while he links invocation with imitation and contemplation with true knowledge, which is the cause of love, he importantly allows that a person in whom a state of invocation predominates may achieve the encounter (*liqā'*) with God and resultant felicity. This will, however, happen after the resurrection of bodies rather than immediately after death as with those who achieve knowledge and love. This has important implications for the audience of the *Iḥyā'*. It shows that while al-Ghazālī favours contemplation over imitation, he nonetheless argues that those of his audience who are incapable of syllogistic contemplation may achieve felicity through invocation, even if not immediately after death.

I. The Metaphysicalization of Praxis: Bridging from the Corporeal to the Incorporeal

This thesis claims that the *Iḥyā'* adopts two fundamental levels which allow it to build on the doctrines of the soul upheld by al-Ghazālī as early as the *Tahāfut*. It does this while simultaneously joining between the claims of reason and revelation, especially regarding pleasure in the afterlife in which both a salvation of the bodily and an intellectual felicity are upheld. This chapter argues that the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* allows the soul to move from the lower, corporeal level to felicity which is the higher, incorporeal level. A subordinate argument important for making sense of the development of the sophisticated structure of the *Iḥyā'* is that the *Mīzān* contains this core elements of this praxis—termed in this thesis 'metaphysicalized praxis'—and that the core elements of this praxis transfer to the *Iḥyā'*. However, the *Iḥyā'* expands praxis into a path of praxis. To make the argument of this chapter, Section I.A identifies the core doctrines of this metaphysicalized praxis in the *Mīzān* which, as it were, causes the soul to jump the gap between two metaphysical levels: the corporeal and the incorporeal. Section I.B establishes that these particular doctrines make their way to the *Iḥyā'*, largely in *Kītāb Riyāḍat al-nafs*. It will be noticed that while these doctrines are clearly philosophical and go beyond merely removing vice to include aspects of Avicenna's metaphysicalized praxis, viewing them in light of the *Mīzān* allows an additional level of their clarity regarding their technical nature. Yet, while the *Iḥyā'* often invokes religious language, there is no doubt that it is speaking of the same specific doctrines, and, in fact, this offers an important glimpse into al-Ghazālī's handling of philosophical doctrines in religious language regarding the central topic of the *Iḥyā'*: praxis. Section I.C then shows how praxis is incorporated into the *Iḥyā'*, but extended into what is justifiably translated as a 'path of praxis' (*muʿāmala*). The related claims which stand behind the choice to translate *muʿāmala* as the 'path of praxis' are that a) the technical notion of praxis is the removal of corporeal influence from the soul, b) this is maintained in the *Iḥyā'* (relative to the *Mīzān*), but c) in the *Iḥyā'* praxis is said to occur through a series of steps which include belief, worship, invocation, and other steps outlined in later sections of this chapter. Section I.C does not enumerate these steps, but rather studies the passages mostly from Book I of the *Iḥyā'* in which al-Ghazālī a) weaves praxis into the structure of the *Iḥyā'* based on religious arguments and b) indicates some of the conceptual framework needed for the extension and expansion performed in the

Iḥyā' as a whole. Finally, the brief subsection I.D studies some of the verbiage al-Ghazālī uses to refer to these doctrines into Islamic orthodoxy or Sufism, including reference to travelling from the *mulk* to the *malakūt*. This complements Section I.B in showing how the technical doctrines appear often unchanged but under different terms than in the *Mīzān* or its philosophical sources. It also takes us further—and beyond *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs*—in seeing how praxis and its doctrines are integrated into the *Iḥyā'*. This is an important part of the claim of this chapter, because an isolated statement in a work the size of the *Iḥyā'* is insufficient to establish al-Ghazālī's position. Later sections of this chapter work in other ways to exemplify some of the important steps by which al-Ghazālī constructs the path of praxis which we may then see as an extension of the praxis of the *Mīzān* and which maintains the core aim of removing corporeal influence and enabling the soul to receive incorporeal influence which is the cause of its felicity (or felicity itself) and bridging between the corporeal and incorporeal levels fundamental to the argument of this thesis.

A. Core Doctrines of Metaphysicalized Praxis Originating in the *Mīzān*

The technical notion of praxis stated in the *Mīzān* does not merely use metaphors such as purification, but includes a causal mechanism grounded in natural science and metaphysics by which the soul is altered to remove corporeal influence and receive incorporeal influence. The metaphysical grounding is the philosophically determined natures of the corporeal and incorporeal worlds studied in Chapters 3 and 4 and which this section shows are the two poles between which the praxis of the *Mīzān* moves. Chapter 3 in particular studies the introduction of body–soul dualism into discussions of love and tension between corporeal and intellectual pleasure in the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*. It is on this basis that this notion may be justly termed a metaphysicalization of praxis in the sense that praxis is a causal mechanism for integrating two metaphysical realities which are its poles.

The key *Mīzān* passages which provide the technical and metaphysical statements of praxis are taken nearly verbatim from Avicenna's *Aḥwāl al-nafs*.[620] The *Mīzān* was originally believed to be an altered version Miskawayḥ's *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, but later scholarship found the changes were largely already in al-Iṣfahānī and Avicenna, and Jules Janssens gave the final

[620] Janssens, 'Al-Ghazālī's *Mīzān al-'amal*', 123–37, esp. 125. Janssens notes that, previously, the scholarly community had come to accept the findings of Wilfred Madelung and M. A. Sherif that al-Ghazālī had used the *Najāt* to compose the *Mīzān*, but stresses that in his own chapter on the sources of the *Mīzān* that the real source is not the *Mīzān*, but *Aḥwāl al-nafs* (see ibid., 123).

statement of exactly which Avicennian texts were used and broadly identified the changes al-Ghazālī made to these texts.[621]

In Chapter 3, scholarship is cited indicating that Avicenna developed the doctrine of body–soul dualism well beyond any of his predecessors, including al-Fārābī, to establish the persistence of the soul after bodily death. This scholarship establishing the originality of Avicenna was said to be largely that of Dimitri Gutas and Robert Hall. While I am terming al-Ghazālī's praxis 'metphysicalized', Gutas already refers to Avicenna's advancements in psychology as the development of a 'metaphysics of the rational soul'. Gutas refers in this context to the change of character needed to obtain felicity and states that for Avicenna this is outlined in the books of ethics and the duties and exercises in the religious law laid down by the Prophet which Gutas explains as follows, 'Virtuous conduct, prayer, fasting, pilgrimages, and the like, are all intended to balance the temperament and give a person an excellent character and thereby make the bodily faculties of the soul, the appetitive and the irascible, subservient to the rational soul'.[622] While Gutas indicates here what is the basis of the term metaphysicalization—the general nature of ethics and the role of religion in the tension between the rational and bodily—the current use of the term metaphysicalization adds a core and a supplementary meaning. The core meaning is identifying the corporeal and incorporeal poles between which praxis operates addressed in this section. It is this dualism which underpins the technical statement of ethics in the *Mīzān*.

A supplementary argument could be made that this praxis is metaphysical in the sense that the soul is intrinsically incorporeal. Such an argument, which I do not advance here, would have it that praxis removes the accidental effects of embodiment to return the soul to its original and intrinsic state. This element is present in Avicenna and clearly transfers to the *Mīzān* and the *Iḥyā'*. In *al-Shifā'*, Avicenna states in no unclear terms that vice removed through praxis is a passive disposition whose principle (i.e. cause or explanation) is the body and that these dispositions are contrary to the substance (*jawhar*) of the rational soul.[623] He is even more clear that his notion of praxis involves an intrinsic nature of the soul when he explains the mean which it seeks as follows, 'As to the disposition of the mean, what is meant

[621] See Ibid. Janssens cites *Aḥwāl al-nafs* as a major source of *Bayān*s 4 and 5, *Risāla fī al-ʿahd* for *Bayān* 13, and *al-Akhlāq* (termed 'New Ethical Tract' in publication) for *Bayān*s 15–19 (see ibid., 125–9). Janssens finds that the entirety of *al-Akhlāq* is reproduced in the *Mīzān*, albeit with various kinds of modifications (ibid., 136–7).
[622] Gutas, 'Avicenna: The Metaphysics of the Rational Soul', 423.
[623] *Shifā'*: *Ilāhiyyāt* (IX.7), 354.17, 355.2–3, and 355.8.

by it is transcending passive dispositions and maintaining the rational soul upon its natural disposition (*jibilla*).'[624] Avicenna's praxis which includes a notion of an original nature to which the soul is returned through removing the change caused by embodiment has been well termed by Yahya Michot as disalteration. The doctrine of disalteration is most clearly stated by al-Ghazālī in two places in the *Iḥyā'* studied in the following subsection. This argument supports the choice of the term 'the metaphysicalization of praxis'. Avicenna thus rightly deserves credit for this metaphysicalization while al-Ghazālī deserves credit for naturalizing it into the religious discourse of the *Iḥyā'*. In that religious discourse, the here-below comes to mean the corporeal and the afterlife comes to mean the incorporeal.[625]

Al-Ghazālī defines or characterizes praxis in several statements in the *Mīzān*. Additionally, he states his notion of its relation to knowledge and felicity in such a way as to elucidate his notion of the doctrines which surround praxis. This may be seen as follows. In the first *bayān*, the path to felicity is said to be praxis and knowledge.[626] This echoes Chapter 1 which showed the same doctrines and terms in the *Tahāfut*. The significance of this is that the *Tahāfut* concurs with the rhetorical project stated at the outset of the *Mīzān* of shifting from a more philosophical term for knowledge, such as speculative inquiry or an emanation of intelligibles, to the term knowledge which al-Ghazālī states is a path to felicity agreed upon by philosophers, Sufis, and followers of the sharia.[627]

Mīzān, *Bayān* 7, expounds on this relation of praxis and knowledge as follows: 'The effect of praxis is to remove what should not be and striving for knowledge is striving to obtain what should be. Removing what should not be is a precondition (*sharṭ*) to empty (*tafrīgh*) the substrate (*maḥall*) for that which should (inhere in it).'[628] The most direct statement regarding the definition of praxis then follows:

T1, Mīzān, 40.15–41.4

> Thus, the meaning of praxis (*'amal*) is breaking the desires by diverting the soul from their direction towards the higher, divine side. This is in order to erase filthy dispositions and base attachments (*'alā'iq*) which

[624] Ibid., 471.4–5.
[625] The incorporeal—especially demonstrative, universal, and eternal knowledge—as the meaning of true religion was treated in Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife', while Chapter 1 showed that there are two levels of religion on the *Iḥyā'*: the shell being imitation and similitudes. Section I.A set out what should be ascribed to the here-below and afterlife in terms that resolve back to the meaning of corporeal and incorporeal.
[626] *Mīzān*, 2.3–4 and 3.1.
[627] For this *Mīzān* passage, see Section I.C below.
[628] *Mīzān*, 39.1–3.

> bind it to the lower side (*al-janba al-sāfila*). This is done to the point that those attachments are erased or weakened and the soul is directed towards speculative inquiry (*naẓar*) regarding divine realities such that those noble matters pour (*fāḍat*) upon it from the direction (*jiha*) of God, most high.

The descent of this incorporeal influence on the soul is next said to be felicity itself,[629] a statement shown when we next turn to the *Iḥyā'* to be echoed there. This definition or characterization of praxis already frames it between the poles of a higher and lower world. As explained in more detail in *Bayān* 5 studied below, the higher world is approached through speculative inquiry, but only after praxis is completed. *Bayān* 5 is a close derivation from *Aḥwāl al-nafs*, but this important statement about the nature of praxis is clearly framed in the same technical terms and between the metaphysical poles of the corporeal and incorporeal set out in *Aḥwāl al-nafs* and cited in the *Bayān* 5 passage below.

Another core aspect of the technical and metaphysical doctrine of praxis shared between the *Iḥyā'* and *Mīzān* is that the felicity obtained is the specific perfection inherent to the human soul. The *Mīzān* states this in the context of Avicenna's arguments for intellectual pleasures (studied in Chapter 3 of this thesis) as follows:

T2, Mīzān, 19.6–16

> Further, it is to know that the felicity of each thing and also its pleasure (*ladhdha*) and comfort are (found) in reaching its specific perfection (*kamālihi al-khāṣṣ*). And it is to know that the specific perfection of mankind is apperception of the reality of intelligibles (*ḥaqīqat al-ʿaqliyyāt*) as they are rather than intentiones (*mutawahhimāt*) and sensibles in which animals share with (mankind). And it is to know that the soul intrinsically (*bi-l-dhāt*) thirsts for it and is prepared for it in its primordial nature (*fiṭra*). It is only being busied by the desires of the body and its accidents (*ʿawāriḍ*) which make it deviate from it (i.e. the soul's specific perfection). Whenever it rules (over the body), breaks desire, and dominates it and frees the intellect from slavery to desire and desire forcing it into bondage and dedicates itself to contemplation (*tafakkur*), speculative inquiry (*naẓar*), and perusing the incorporeal aspect of the heavens and earth, or yet even peruses itself and the marvels created in it, then it has arrived at specific perfection. It has become felicitous in the here-below (*al-dunyā*), as felicity has no meaning besides the soul obtaining its specific perfection.

This important passage links felicity to the specific perfection of humanity: obtaining the intelligibles. It is also more explicit than other *Mīzān* passages that these intelligibles come through speculative inquiry. Speculative inquiry is associated with contemplation, just as

[629] *Mīzān*, 41.13–15.

Chapter 6 of this thesis shows that it occurs in the penultimate book of the *Iḥyā'*. (The passage by itself thus indicates how the related doctrines of praxis and speculative inquiry leading to felicity transfer from the *Mīzān* to the *Iḥyā'* and gives one indication of how the technical doctrines of philosophical origin are filtered into religious terms in the *Iḥyā'*.) As with other *Mīzān* passages cited in this section, praxis is the prerequisite, but here this is set out more clearly: that the soul and its felicity are inherently incorporeal and vice is a foreign accident preventing what is inherent to the soul: its incorporeal nature.[630]

In addition to these statements and definitions, *Bayān* 5 sets out the doctrines of praxis more technically and in a metaphysical context framed by the corporeal and incorporeal. In this passage, we may see that he wishes place praxis in a theoretical and technical framework. This is by noticing that he states that the knowledge of praxis requires knowing the soul.[631] Importantly for the claim of this chapter and thesis, it will be shown presently that the focus in the initial passage is on knowing a specific aspect of the soul. Al-Ghazālī concentrates on conveying that the soul is incorporeal and clarifying how to distinguish it from the corporeal. He indicates that this chapter of the *Mīzān* is key for explaining praxis by stating that it is here that he will explain the details of praxis not explained elsewhere and will thereby raise one in knowledge of curing the soul from the lowlands of imitation to the rare level of an independent physician.[632] This is initially said to involve knowledge of the causes, quantities, and qualities behind praxis which indicates that al-Ghazālī is setting out praxis as a science which is demonstrative as he promised in Chapter 1 of the *Mīzān*.[633]

Al-Ghazālī next claims that knowledge of the soul is a logical requirement for obtaining the science of praxis and he sets out this psychology in terms which a) are clearly dichotomous and b) are already filled with scriptural similitudes, setting a precedent for the altering of terms in the *Ihya'* seen in the remainder of this section. The claim put forth is that if scripture orders one to purify something, one cannot go about this without knowing that

[630] The intrinsic nature of the soul and the foreign-ness of corporeal vice is shared with Avicenna as pointed out by Jon McGinnis (see Chapter 3) and Yahya Michot who specifically refers to this as the doctrine of disalteration (see his 'Dés-altération et épiphanie: une lecture avicennienne de la danse mevlevie', in the proceedings of 6. Millî Mevlânâ Kongresi, held by the Selçuk Üniversiti, 24–5 May 1992 (in Konya), 26–7).
[631] Another example of defining praxis in a manner including knowledge of the soul is in the division of the speculative and practical sciences in *Bayān* 10. See *Mīzān*, 54.10–11.
[632] Ibid., 21.5–22.3.
[633] Ibid., 21.5–12.

thing.[634] In his own example, if ordered to clean a garment, one must know what that garment is.[635] He thus sets out to explain how to know the soul as follows:

T3, Mīzān, 22.9–16

> Because knowing the soul is the most important matter, God conveyed the greatness of its matter and ascribed it to Himself to pick it out from other things and to ennoble it, saying, {Lo! I am about to create a mortal out of mire, And when I have fashioned him and breathed into him of My Spirit} (Koran 38:71–2). Thus, He alerted to the fact that mankind (*insān*) is created from a body apprehended by eyesight (*baṣar*) and a soul (*nafs*) apprehended by the intellect (*ʿaql*) and insight (*baṣīra*), not by the senses (*hawāss*). He ascribed his body to clay and his spirit to Himself (*nafsihi*). By spirit, He meant what we mean by soul, alerting those of insight that the human soul is a divine matter (*umūr ilāhiyya*) and that it is nobler and higher than base, terrestrial (*arḍiyya*) bodies.

Al-Ghazālī has presented a clear body–soul dualism and provided it with a scriptural basis. He then states that he will summarize the matter of this soul. He begins outlining what we may posit to be the corporeal aspect, saying the animal soul has in general two faculties, one motive (*muḥarrika*) and the other perceptive (*mudrika*). The motivating (*bāʿitha*) aspect of the motive faculty has two branches: desire (*shahwāniyya*) and anger (*ghaḍabiyya*).[636] The perceptive faculty is said to have two divisions: outward and inner. The outward are the well-known five senses. The inner are the inward senses (of the philosophers). Al-Ghazālī distinguishes those which deal in sensible matters from those which deal in meanings not amenable to the sense (*maʿānī ghayr maḥsūsa*; though occurring in a sensible particular as in the fear apprehended by the sheep in the wolf).[637] He states that all the faculties mentioned so far are shared with animals,[638] an early indication that the division between the corporeal and incorporeal is key to the self-knowledge and praxis he wishes to develop.[639]

The *Mīzān* then indicates how this dualist division is fundamental to his praxis. Praxis centres around the formation dispositions or habits; when animal faculties dominate and corporeal influence manifests in the soul the habit that is formed is a vice (*akhlāq radhīʾa*), while the incorporeal manifests and dominates, the habit or disposition that eventually forms is a

[634] *Mīzān*, 22.3–8.
[635] Ibid., 22.8–9.
[636] Ibid., 24.7–10.
[637] Ibid., 24.11–26.6.
[638] Ibid., 26.6–7.
[639] This highly resembles the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* passages studied in Chapter 3, 'The Ontological Parameters of the Afterlife', but its presence here indicates that the division between the corporeal and incorporeal is key to the praxis he is in the process of laying out.

virtue (*faḍīla wa-khuluq ḥasan*).[640] The corporeal influence is expressed as making a passive disposition in the soul (*hay'a inqiyādiyya*) with regards to desires (*shahawāt*) by dominating the practical intellect.[641] The theoretical intellect should properly be passive with regards to what is above it, which is the angels put in charge of mankind by whom all knowledge is conveyed from God via their mediation.[642] Al-Ghazālī explains the role of this dualist split and the link between the theoretical and practical in his view of felicity as follows:

T4, *Mīzān*, 27.4–11

> Thus, it is as though our soul had two faces. One is towards the body and this face should be dominant, not receptive in the slightest nor passive regarding the accidents and desires of the body. And, it has a face towards the noble, higher direction. This side should be perpetually receptive regarding what is there, receiving its effect. This is because it is the place where the causes of its felicity descend. This perceiving theoretical faculty is that which is suited to receive the universal meanings (*al-ma'ānī*) which have been abstracted (*al-mujarrada*) from the accidents (*'awāriḍ*) which render them sensible and particular (*juz'iya*), just as we have mentioned the meaning of the universal (*al-kullī*) in the book *Mi'yār al-'ilm*.

Although in the works of Avicenna it would be understood that true knowledge descending on the theoretical intellect is incorporeal, al-Ghazālī goes to pains to explicate the attributes of both it and its counterpart: corporeal perceptibles which have not been thoroughly abstracted. He further directs his reader to the *Mi'yār* which contains many examples of spelling out this divide with regards to theoretical topics. Thus, in this passage, al-Ghazālī is concerned to apply the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy both to the speculative realm (i.e. knowledge) and to practical matters pertaining to the soul's movements and pleasures. This is the same division as that which Chapter 3 of this thesis terms 'the afterlife criterion', because the incorporeal is what leads to eternal felicity of the soul which survives bodily death and is thus part of al-Ghazālī's notion of higher or true religion, as opposed to its shell.[643] It indicates that this is the most important aspect of founding praxis as a technical science and it

[640] *Mīzān*, 27.3–7.
[641] Ibid., 26.15–27.4.
[642] Ibid., 27.15–28.4.
[643] The end of this passage may also be an allusion to the role of logic as a propaedeutic. Richard Frank, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School*, 135n15, mentioned that logic is treated as a propaedeutic in the *Iḥyā'*, where it and the *Mi'yār* are mentioned in Book II, and then in Book XXII its importance is argued for in rhetorical and religious terms. It is not clear in what sense it is a propaedeutic, though it seems more a propaedeutic to speculative inquiry (*nazar*) or speculative unveiling (*mukāshafa*) rather than being part of praxis itself. Afifi al-Akiti views al-Ghazālī's path as necessarily having both an ethical and a logical propaedeutic, represented in one sense by the *Mīzān* and *Mi'yār*. See al-Akiti, 'The *Maḍnūn* of al-Ghazālī', 1:127n53 and 1:284, Diagram 2.

shows how the centrality of the dualism and the beginnings of how it may be rendered into a religious discourse.

B. The Transfer of the Core Doctrines of Metaphysicalized Praxis to the *Iḥyā'*

The core technical doctrine of praxis in the *Mīzān* is thus one which moves beyond discussions of removing vice and even obtaining the mean to a metaphysical framework in which vice represents passive bodily influence on the soul. The soul is intrinsically incorporeal and its felicity is determined by its inherent specific perfection which is to receive the incorporeal intelligibles through speculative inquiry (i.e. contemplation) after the prerequisite of praxis is fulfilled through removing passive dispositions caused by embodiment and bodily faculties. This metaphysicalized doctrine of praxis is now shown to make its way into the *Iḥyā'*, though in less technical terms. It should be born in mind that the related doctrine of intellectual pleasure was set out in Chapter 3 and the relation of speculative inquiry (or contemplation as it is termed in the *Iḥyā'*) is explained in Chapter 6. The importance of the core elements of this metaphysicalized ethics entering the *Iḥyā'* lies in that it is the technical explanation of how praxis is a bridge between the two worlds which are the parameters of al-Ghazālī's path of praxis in the *Iḥyā'* and which he alludes to but does not spell out in the same level of detail in the *Iḥyā'*.

The core elements of this metaphysicalized ethics is conveyed in *Bayān*s 3–6 and 8 of *Riyaḍat al-nafs*. Seeing how al-Ghazālī does this in the context of those *bayān*s gives an indication of the manner in which doctrines are maintained while the language is rendered more scriptural and concrete. *Bayān* 3 sets out that the human being must obtain a perfection which it does not possess when initially created.[644] Obtaining this perfection is termed rectification of the soul (*tarbiya*), which is not to extirpate the animal faculties, for the faculties of the soul have the potential to become obedient, not to be extirpated.[645] In *Bayān* 4, al-Ghazālī invokes Avicenna's arguments for intellectual pleasures, including how corporeal pleasures become a second nature,[646] al-Ghazālī then states that the soul's inclination towards desire is an accident foreign to the essence of the soul whose natural inclination is towards

[644] *Iḥyā'*, 3:54.24–9.
[645] Ibid., 3:54.28–31.
[646] Ibid., 3:57.12–30. His examples include gambling and even eating dirt and horrible matters which, if engaged in long enough, become pleasurable in spite of being unnatural (*khārij ʿan al-ṭabʿ*).

wisdom and love of God because it is a lordly matter (*amr rabbānī*).[647] The nutrition of the soul is said to be wisdom, gnosis, and love of God.[648] The supplementary aspect of the doctrine of disalteration is clearly upheld: the soul has an intrinsic nature and dispositions expressing an inclination to corporeal faculties are, by contrast, foreign to its nature.[649]

In *Bayān* 6, al-Ghazālī adds that every organ in the body was created for a proper act (what is termed its *ergon* in Greek).[650] If the heart becomes sick, it become unable to perform its specific act for which it was created, which is knowledge and wisdom and the gnosis and love and worship of God and taking pleasure in remembrancing Him and preferring that to every other desire.[651] The act which alone distinguishes the soul of the Adamic race from pack animals is the ability to know things as they truly are.[652] Al-Ghazālī gives spendthrift as an example of love of the here-below and sickness, showing that it is treated by returning to the mean and moderation.[653] Healing occurs when giving and withholding are equally pleasurable and wealth becomes like water to one.[654] This is how attachments in the heart to wealth—used by al-Ghazālī as an example of the here-below—are cut.[655] When all such sicknesses are removed the heart becomes sound (*salīm*), al-Ghazālī citing the Koranic verse regarding {Whoever comes to God with a sound heart} (26:88–9); the heart must become sound regarding all character traits.[656] The mean by which this is obtained is sharper than a sword, which includes a Koranic reference.[657] This straight path (*ṣirāṭ mustaqīm*), which is likened to the bridge (*ṣirāṭ*) over the hell-fire, is so difficult to achieve that all will be exposed to the hell-fire.[658] This same difficulty and scriptural reference was shown in Chapter 1 to be present already in the *Tahāfut*. What may be seen is that the core of the path to felicity and how to join between it and the sharia are worked out in the *Tahāfut* along with the underpinning doctrines. Then the details of praxis and how its terminology may be

[647] Ibid., 3:58.1–2.
[648] Ibid., 3:58.2–3. This echoes the *Tahāfut* and the *Kītāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* division of knowledge which stated that nutrition must be proceeded by remedy to be of benefit.
[649] Avicenna also refers to inclination of the soul towards the body, the mean by contrast expressing an inclination away from the body. (See *Shifāʾ*: *Ilāhiyyāt* (IX.7), 355.2–3.)
[650] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:61.4.
[651] Ibid., 3:61.6–8.
[652] Ibid., 3:61.9–11.
[653] Ibid., 3:61.21–6.
[654] Ibid., 3:61.26–8.
[655] Ibid., 3:61.32.
[656] Ibid., 3:61.34–5.
[657] Ibid., 3:62.3–4.
[658] Ibid., 3:62.7–8.

reconciled with scripture are worked out in stages, beginning with the *Mīzān* and culminating in the *Iḥyā'* presented to the public (beginning with al-Ghazālī's short stay in Baghdad on his return from the Ḥijāz and Levant). Section I.C indicates some of the connective tissue generated to infuse a metaphysicalized praxis into an ethico-sharia discourse and Section I.D gives some indication of further books of the *Iḥyā'* which infuse this praxis using religious language and even claiming this doctrine of praxis is the orthodoxy of *ahl al-Sunna wa-l-jamāʿa*.

C. From the Praxis of the *Mīzān* to the 'Path of Praxis'

This subsection shows some of the connective tissue which explains the move from praxis to a path of praxis in the *Iḥyā'*. Praxis as removing vice—or, as studied above, removing corporeal influence in preparation for incorporeal influence—is maintained. Kenneth Garden rightly states, while the role of praxis is maintained, its content is greatly expanded.[659] Thus, a third element of praxis is introduced here: the conceptual contours of the science of praxis. Through reviewing the passages from Book I of the *Iḥyā'*, it is shown that al-Ghazālī expands the conceptual contents of the science of praxis in a manner coherently encompassing the added contents and concurring with the second intellectual science of the afterlife which Chapter 1 of this thesis argued stood in place of the science of praxis: states of the heart and the harms which may befall acts of worship (*aʿmāl*). This argument forms a part of the explanative tissue needed to bridge the gap between the role of praxis which is maintained between the *Mīzān* and *Iḥyā'* and the highly expanded list of contents which forms the path of praxis.

The term 'path of praxis' is chosen to translate *muʿāmala* to distinguish it from praxis (*ʿamal*) in the *Mīzān* because the path of praxis is highly expanded.[660] However, *muʿamala* also ceases to refer merely to a general and abstract process of opposing desire or removing vice or corporeal influence. Rather, it comes to refer to a specific order of beliefs, works, vices to be

[659] Garden, *The First Islamic Reviver*, 76. He states that *muʿāmala* plays the same role which the *Mīzān*'s '*al-ʿilm al-ʿamalī*' plays in pursuit of felicity. We may add that it also plays the same role of moving between the corporeal and incorporeal poles.

[660] Ken Garden translates *ʿilm al-muʿāmala* as the science of praxis and *al-ʿilm al-ʿamalī* as the practical science. I prefer in translation to take the simple terms *ʿamal* and *muʿāmala* and translate them as praxis and the path of praxis and maintain the option of adding the term science where al-Ghazālī adds '*ʿilm*'. This has the added benefit that it allows us to focus immediately on praxis in the *Mīzān*, bearing in mind that *al-ʿilm al-ʿamalī* there stands not in place of ethics, but rather the practical sciences as a whole. Also, 'the path of praxis' is a term which indicates some of the shift which occurs between it and praxis as explained presently.

removed, virtues obtained, and invocation and contemplation engaged in (see Section III). Not only does al-Ghazālī sometimes refer to it as a set of passes (*ʿaqabāt*) to be traversed, he often speaks of it almost as a synonym of treading the path of the afterlife (*sulūk ṭarīq al-ākhira*).

While part of the gap between praxis and the path of praxis is addressed by Garden, his emphasis is to show how the introduction of the two sciences of the afterlife—including what is termed here the path of praxis—is designed to authorize them, demote *kalām* and *fiqh*, and also to disguise the entrance of philosophical material. The passages of Book 1 which he studies in detail focus on making an ethico-sharia argument for the inclusion of praxis.[661] Al-Ghazālī does this by re-examining the answers previous scholars have given to the question of what knowledge is intended in the prophetic tradition that seeking knowledge is obligatory.

This is a valuable part of analysis of al-Ghazālī's rhetorical, but another element may be seen through looking at the conceptual contours of the science of the path of praxis he generates. *ʿIlm al-muʿāmala* is referred to as the science of the states of the heart and harms which may befall acts (i.e. acts of praxis, such as worship, etc.). The significance of this is that it does show a conceptual continuity with praxis in that the object is still to remove vice from the heart, but it serves to integrate acts of worship more into ethics beyond merely adding them to the contents of the acts performed in ethics. It also shows a continuity to the contents of the path of praxis in that, for instance, in the 1st Quarter, acts of worship such as prayer and obligatory charity (*zakāt*) study ostentation, which is a harm which commonly befalls those engaging in the act of prayer and giving charity. Inclusion of 'harms befalling acts' is a general subject of knowledge which in a general way links praxis and worship, but it also indicates the aspect of worship which deals with attributes of the heart rather than the aspect covered by *fiqh* which is merely how to perform the act in a manner valid in a legal sense of fulfilling one's duties (and in a mode of imitation without understanding the science of ethics).[662] This also links to Chapter 1 in which one of the two intellectual sciences of the afterlife as described in the classification there was 'the science of states of the heart and

[661] Garden, *The First Islamic Reviver*, 77–9.
[662] This may be seen as evidence for the claim from Chapters 1 and 2 that al-Ghazālī views the sharia as an imitative level of true knowledge or the higher reality.

harms befalling actions'.[663] There is thus a subtle but important continuity and set of links in al-Ghazālī's development of the contents of the path of praxis but also the conceptual contours of what that science is which is required to operationalize praxis. This gives an indication of how, while maintaining the metaphysicalization of praxis in the *Iḥyā'*, he does some of the conceptual work to expand it into a science which concurs with those *falāsifa* who hold that the *sharia* and ritual practice can or must play a role obtaining the aims of praxis (and not merely a political function).

After listing the forty book titles comprising the four quarters of the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī divides the knowledge directed towards the afterlife (*al-ākhira*) into the science of unveiling (*mukāshafa*) which is desired purely to make known (or unveil; *kashf*) the object of knowledge and the science of praxis (*muʿālama*) which is to make an object of knowledge known and to practise (that knowledge; *al-ʿamal bihi*).[664] According to this statement, the path of praxis adds something (i.e. practice) to philosophical praxis, but does not take anything away. So, it is just as much a science as speculative unveiling. Al-Ghazālī describes this path of praxis, saying:

T6, Iḥyā', 1:5.5–8

> (*Muʿāmala*) is divided into knowledge of the outward (*ẓāhir*), i.e. knowledge of the works of the limbs, and the inward (*bāṭin*), i.e. knowledge of the works of the heart. That which occurs on the limbs is either a habit (*ʿāda*) or worship. That which occurs in the hearts is like (*bi-ḥukm*) a veil on the (physical) senses from the incorporeal world (*ʿālam al-malakūt*). (It) is either praiseworthy or blameworthy, so this science is necessarily divided into two halves: the outward and the inward. The outward half is divided into habit and worship and the inward half connected to states of the heart and character traits of the soul (*nafs*) is divided in to blameworthy and praiseworthy. Thus, the total is four divisions. No investigation of the science of praxis (*muʿāmala*) is missed from these four parts.

Like ethical philosophers, al-Ghazālī likens praxis to 'the medicine of the hearts and spirits',.[665] One may observe, therefore, that the path of praxis of the *Iḥyā'* lacks nothing of the praxis of the *akhlāq* tradition as it covers the suppression of vice and inculcation of virtue. It does add something; namely, the outward works of the limbs. The relationship between the

[663] As cited in the previous chapter, the first half of the *Iḥyā'* is devoted to the outward and the second to the inward. Thus, we might expect the classification occurring in the second half to occur in the first half though in sharia terms; al-Ghazālī was also cited in Chapter 3 stating that the sharia is linked to the outer and the ultimate reality to the inner. If this is combined with stating that the first half is devoted to the outer and the second half the inner, it indicates that the first half treats the sharia or addresses matters from the viewpoint of the sharia.
[664] *Iḥyā'*, 1:4.34–5.1.
[665] Ibid., 1:5.17

outward and inward will partly become clear through a central passage from the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* treated in Section III on how the various practices (and quarters) of the *Iḥyā'* form a path taking felicity as its end.

In Book I, as noted above, al-Ghazālī weaves the path of praxis into an ethico-legal discourse. He explains that the knowledge which is individually obligatory is praxis (*muʿāmala*), not the science of unveiling, and such agents are obligated to 'perform' (*ʿamal*) three (matters): beliefs (*iʿtiqād*),[666] acts (to be done, *fiʿl*), and 'leaving off' (acts not performed; *tark*).[667] Confirming the continuity with the *Tahāfut* and *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* passages cited in Chapter 1, al-Ghazālī states that the acts (to be done or not done) and beliefs may be learned at the level of blind following (*taqlīd*) and rote (*samāʿ*) and do not require apodictic proof (*burhān*) nor research (*baḥth*).[668] Later, al-Ghazālī includes removal of the destructive vices[669] and items mentioned in the introduction to the *Iḥyā'* such as their definitions, causes, and knowledge of how to remove them.[670] We thus see how the more technical statements of the praxis and its relation to speculative unveiling are woven into the ethico-legal discourse fit for the *Iḥyā'*, especially its first half.

Further into Book I, al-Ghazālī turns more directly to the topic of the science of praxis. This turn is in the context of a classification of the sciences addressed to answer the question of what knowledge is intended in the prophetic tradition stating that seeking knowledge is incumbent upon every Muslim. This is a window into how al-Ghazālī alters the discourse of the *Mīzān*, recasting the investigation into an ethico-legal framework. He claims the incumbent knowledge is the science of the afterlife (*ʿilm al-ākhira*). The jurist is said to know only the here-below (*dunyā*; the opposite of the afterlife), though al-Ghazālī acknowledges that jurisprudence is superior to medicine because jurisprudence is proximate to the science of the path of the afterlife (*ʿilm ṭarīq al-ākhira*) because it determines which forms of worship are valid, though it cannot determine which are accepted by God, which is what matters in the afterlife.[671] We may note that al-Ghazālī speaks of a path, this being our first

[666] Chapter 4 explains that al-Ghazālī views mere belief as being a knot in the heart which one maintains through effort (rather than expansion of the breast), which helps us understand in this context how he might refer to belief as action.
[667] *Iḥyā'*, 1:15.9–10.
[668] Ibid., 1:15.13–14.
[669] Ibid., 1:16.24.
[670] Ibid., 1:16.22–4. But can such matters be learned at the basic level of imitation (*taqlīd*)? If not, this may indicate a problem of inconsistency or incoherence.
[671] Ibid., 1:20.8–17.

indication in the *Iḥyā'* that praxis has now become a path. Al-Ghazālī explains the science of the afterlife by posing and answering a scholastic question, 'If you say, "Detail the knowledge of the Path of the Afterlife for me in a manner indicating its main topics, if not exhausting it," then know that it is two parts: the science of unveiling (*ʿilm al-mukāshafa*) and the science of praxis (*ʿilm al-muʿāmala*)'.[672] He goes on to explain the science of unveiling in a manner revealing the role of the science of praxis saying, 'The science of unveiling…is a light appearing in the heart when it is cleansed and purified of blameworthy traits'.[673] After listing the contents of the science of unveiling, al-Ghazālī adds:

T7, Iḥyā', 1:20.11–15

> We mean by the science of unveiling that the covering be lifted such that the manifest truth appear as clearly as if one were directly seeing it and without doubt. This is an inherent possibility in the substance of the human being, were it not that rust, dirt, and filth of the here-below (*dunyā*) had collected on the mirror of the heart. We mean by the science of the Path of the Afterlife (*ʿilm ṭarīq al-ākhira*) the knowledge of how to polish the filth off this mirror which is a veil over God…(and) the knowledge of Him, His attributes, and His acts. Purifying and cleansing it only comes about through preventing desires and imitating the prophets…in all their states. Then, to the degree that the (mirror of the) heart appears and that it is directed towards the truth, the realities reflect in it. There is no way to bring this about but through disciplining the soul (*riyāḍa*) which is detailed in its place (of treatment), and through knowledge and teaching.[674]

So far, al-Ghazālī has described the path of praxis in the *Iḥyā'* as a) cleansing and purifying the heart of blameworthy traits, b) polishing the mirror of the heart (referred to as the science of the Path of the Afterlife), and c) disciplining the soul (*riyāḍa*)—all these descriptions demonstrate continuity with the praxis of the *Mīzān*. He adds imitation of the prophets, seeming to include much of the 1st and 2nd Quarters as falling under this science. He then explains the science of praxis (*ʿilm al-muʿāmala*)—the second half of the science of the afterlife thus:

T8, Iḥyā', 1:20.19–23

> As for the second part, which is the science of praxis (*ʿilm al-muʿāmala*), it is the science of the states of the heart (*ʿilm aḥwāl al-qalb*). As for the praiseworthy, examples of them are [numerous virtues listed by al-Ghazālī including patience, gratitude, fear, and hope]. The knowledge of the reality of these states, their definitions, and the causes by which

[672] Ibid., 1:20.17–19.
[673] Ibid., 1:20.25–6.
[674] Note that the science of unveiling is not obtained strictly through discipline, but also through knowledge and teaching and hence appears not to be non-discursive.

> they are acquired, their fruits, the signs by which they are recognized, and the remedy to strengthen those of them which are weak and what has disappeared such that it return, this is of the science of the afterlife. As for the blameworthy, they are [numerous vices listed by al-Ghazālī]. These and their like of attributes of the heart are the buds of foul deeds and the growth beds of forbidden acts (*aʿmāl*). Their opposites which are the praiseworthy character traits are the springs of acts of obedience (*ṭāʿāt*) and acts which draw one close (to God; *qurubāt*). So, the knowledge of these matters, and their realities, and causes and fruits and remedies is of the science of the afterlife and it is individually obligatory according to the *responsa* (*fatwā*) of the scholars of the afterlife. The one who turns away from them is destroyed by the power of the King of Kings in the afterlife just as the one who turns away from outward acts is destroyed by the sword of the rulers of the here-below (*dunyā*) through the ruling of the *responsa* of the jurists of the here-below. So, the concern of the jurists for individual obligations is related to rectifying the here-below whereas this (science) is related to rectifying the afterlife.

This description solely mentions states of the heart, and only mentions acts secondarily as the product of these states. In the context of the previous passage, these states are effectively a precondition for the science of unveiling. This description thus accords with the praxis of the *Mīzān*. We will remember that the intellectual science of the afterlife from the Chapter 1 division of the sciences according to praxis was described as states of the heart and the flaws befalling acts.

These statements may be reconciled through citing the Book IV statement that *fiqh*'s remit is limited to knowledge of the outward validity of acts, not to how to avoid their flaws and gain acceptance.[675] A nearby passage states that if the inner aspects of works known by scholars of the afterlife are minded, the become beneficial in the afterlife, reminding one of what he terms works of the afterlife in Book I.[676] Without this or a similar reconciliation, it becomes difficult to understand the role of the works of worship in the 1st Quarter and *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage studied in Section III of this chapter which makes adorning the limbs with acts of obedience a prerequisite for the next level of purification: removing vice and inculcating virtue.

Praxis' concern for removing vice and corporeal influence in order to obtain incorporeal knowledge is retained, but argued for in ethico-legalist terms resulting in the inclusion of imitative beliefs and acts. *Fiqh* is concerned with the body, but the heart may be

[675] Ibid., 1:158.30-159.20.
[676] For these passage, see ibid., 1:161.1-3 and .9-12 and 1:19:14.

minded during its works in part by expanding the conceptual remit of praxis to address the harms and flaws which may befall acts. Section III will go on to show this includes yet further elements and is stretched four substrates.

D. Linguistic Integration of Praxis

We have already seen that while the core notions of praxis were maintained, al-Ghazālī integrates a number of terms such as worship, ritual practice, breaking the desires, and disciplining the soul, the latter two appearing already in the *Mīzān* and presaging book titles in the *Iḥyā'*. Two further linguistic connections are mentioned below which indicate further elements of how al-Ghazālī imbues religious concepts with his metaphysicalized praxis and makes it contiguous with aspects of the *Iḥyā'* exceeding *Kitāb al-ʿIlm* and *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs*.

1. Praxis as travel between the *mulk* and *malakūt*

Chapter 3 showed that al-Ghazālī holds that the *mulk* in general is a veil over the *malakūt*, but that there is a mercy by which one may move from the *mulk* which is a ladder (*madraja*) to the *malakūt*. *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb* was shown there to list the rust caused by sins and following desires as one veil over the *malakūt* which is removed through praxis. The passage there attempts to exhaustively enumerate the veils, and thus listing praxis there is a fundamental indication that it is one of the central and general means of travelling from the *mulk* to the *malakūt*.

In a 2nd Quarter passage, al-Ghazālī states more boldly that praxis is a means of travel between the *mulk* and *malakūt*, but in this case also a means to move from imitation to the *malakūt* (Chapter 3 having shown the connection between the *malakūt* and eternal, demonstrative knowledge). He states that there are two types of travel: that of the body and that of the heart and the most noble (and true) travel is that of the heart from the lower world to the incorporeal world.[677] One travels from imitation of one's forefathers to the incorporeal world (which in the context of the passages cited in Chapter 3 almost certainly indicates eternal, demonstrative knowledge).[678] The imitator is the rank of the inadequate[679] (which elsewhere in the *Iḥyā'* refers to the one lacking intellect and insight who is therefore unable to

[677] *Iḥyā'*, 2:244.1–3.
[678] Ibid., 2:244.2–4.
[679] Ibid., 2:244.4.

grasp the realities of things).[680] This travel occurs via treading the path of the afterlife,[681] a synonym or near synonym for the path of praxis. This passage indicates not only that al-Ghazālī is integrating the notion of the path of praxis into the religious and quasi-mystical terminology of the *Iḥyā'*, but also importantly that he sees praxis as a means for moving from the corporeal to the incorporeal and that the corporeal includes the notion of imitation which this thesis argues represents one of the two fundamental poles between which the praxis of the *Iḥyā'* moves.

2. Praxis as the straight path of orthodoxy (*ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamā'a*)

Al-Ghazālī links one of the centre pieces of praxis—the (Aristotelian) mean—with orthodox Islam in stark terms, saying it is the way of the one saved group who are on the way of the Prophet's companions and the people of the prophetic tradition and main community (*ahl al-Sunna wa-l-jamā'a*).[682] This tag of orthodoxy is evoked by al-Ghazālī against a group of Sufis that he claims call to extirpating (*qam'*) desire and anger. Al-Ghazālī on the other hand, insists that this is impossible or that it equates with self-destruction or ruining one's balance of humours leading to insanity.[683] While al-Ghazālī evokes certain obvious elements of philosophical praxis, such as felicity coming through opposing the two said faculties, he argues for his position based upon authority in that it is exemplified by the prophetic companions[684] and extirpating the faculties is impossible or absurd as it only leads to insanity or death.[685]

This shows yet another linguistic integration of praxis. In this case, the same praxis which was said to cause travel from the *mulk* to *malakūt* is now termed orthodoxy itself and associated with the practice of the prophetic companions. While there is clearly a rhetorical

[680] Alexander Treiger translates al-Ghazālī's use of this term in the *Iḥyā'* as 'inadequate', borrowing a term from the Patristic tradition. He explains his use of this term in reference to the specific inadequacy of the intellect to understand the divine attributes. He likens the gap between understanding divine and human qualities to the gap between two analogous pleasures: the sweetness of sugar and sexual intercourse. (See Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought*, 52.) The problem with this understanding of inadequacy is that al-Ghazālī's notion of a gap applies also to intelligibles because of the gap between sensual and intellectual pleasures shown to be adopted in the *Iḥyā'* in Chapter 2. In addition, Chapter 3 showed that al-Ghazālī's use of mystical terms was not clearly outside notions of apprehension of the intelligibles or the resultant states which dominate the heart. Thus, care is required to determine the doctrine specific to the *Iḥyā'* and its terms.

[681] The path of praxis is said to be to seek only knowledge and religion (*dīn*), or to see the corporeal world only as a means towards these two and according to strict conditions and etiquettes (*Iḥyā'*, 2:244.18–22).

[682] Ibid., 3:225.4–5. For the origin of this term deployed here by al-Ghazālī, see G. H. A. Juynbull, '*Sunna*', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 9:878–81.

[683] *Iḥyā'*, 3:244.21–5.

[684] Ibid., 3:224.31–2.

[685] Ibid., 3:244.22.

motive in this plea to authority, it also likely expresses al-Ghazālī's belief that behind the outward purport of terms which may come and go there are meanings which prophets, religious scholars, philosophers, and Sufis attempt to access via different means.

II. The Mechanism of Praxis: The Mutual Influence of Body and Soul

The previous section spoke of the metaphysicalization of ethics in the specific sense that ethics placed the discussion of vice, virtue, and the mean in the context of two metaphysical levels: the corporeal and incorporeal worlds which this thesis claims frame and structure the praxis of the *Iḥyā'*. Praxis as defined and described in the *Mīzān* is the means to becoming receptive to the incorporeal world via removing passive influence from the corporeal world in the soul. This section shows the mechanism al-Ghazālī develops to bring about this change—engaging in bodily acts to alter states of the heart. This mechanism is shown in Section II.A to be positioned in the *Iḥyā'* between the *mulk* and *malakūt* in that the limbs are part of the visible world while the heart is from the *malakūt*. Al-Ghazālī is shown to incorporate this mechanism of praxis into his path of praxis, using this mechanism to explain how tenets of belief taken through imitation sprout into true knowledge after the prerequisite of ritual worship and removing the vices. Section II.B shows that this prominent concern to position praxis between the *mulk* and *malakūt* began as a theoretical question: how can the body which is corporeal affect the soul which is on a different plain: the incorporeal. The author of the *Maʿārij* joins two investigations from Avicenna which then filter into the *Mīzān* and ultimately into the praxis of the *Iḥyā'*. The result is an important principle of al-Ghazālī's path of praxis: praxis has two directions. At the beginning, one must imitate and emphasize acts of the body. In the end, after removing vice and the domination of bodily desire, one may obtain knowledge which itself causes states of the heart and acts to manifest on the limbs, just as Chapter 4 said that demonstration is made the root of the virtues in the *Iḥyā'*. Here then is the basic mechanism, along with its theoretical development, which explains how the *Iḥyā'* works and is constructed to bring about felicity and incorporate the details of the sharia. Section III then explains more examples of the elements of the path of praxis such that its basic contours and salient features which form the whole of the *Iḥyā'* may be understood.

A. The Mechanism of the Path of Praxis: Habituation Framed between the Corporeal and Incorporeal

As stated, though at the beginning of the *Iḥyā'* al-Ghazālī speaks in an ethico-legalistic discourse, the fundamental incorporation of the role of praxis is hinted at sufficiently to indicate how two discourses are merged. Praxis is framed between the corporeal body and the

incorporeal body. Early in the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī indicates how this informs the structure of the quarters of the *Iḥyāʾ* as follows:

T9, Iḥyāʾ, 1:17.25–9

> One (type of religious knowledge) is related to the benefits of the here-below. It is contained by the books of jurisprudence and the jurists take responsibility for it and they are the scholars of the here-below. The second is that which is connected with the benefits of the afterlife. It is the states of the heart, praiseworthy and blameworthy character traits, what is pleasing to and disliked by God, *most Highhigh*. The last half of this book, i.e. the collectivity of the *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, contains this. It includes the knowledge of that which percolates (down) from the heart to the limbs (*yatarashshah min al-qalb ʿalā al-jawāriḥ*) as they perform worship and customary dealings (*ʿādatihā*). This is what is contained in the first half of this book.

Al-Ghazālī is here indicating how the link between the body and soul explains the link between the first and second halves of the *Iḥyāʾ*. However, this involves a change to the material: while the basic *fiqh* discussions of worship are included in the *Iḥyāʾ*, this passage indicates that the knowledge of ethics (argued above to include the states of the heart and the harms and flaws which may befall ethical acts) regarding how bodily acts interact with states of the heart is included in the 1st Quarter's discussions of worship. The focus for the current section is to indicate how a specific part of praxis—the notion of how the acts of the limbs interacts with the heart—is incorporated into the *Iḥyāʾ*. This passage shows that it is deeply incorporated into the halves and makes specific reference to the worship of the 1st Quarter and the habits of the 2nd Quarter.

In Book II of the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī intimates how praxis is woven into the elements the previous section showed to be added to praxis to make the path of praxis: credal belief (via imitation) and worship and the cosmological dichotomy behind the praxis is stated in some detail. He explains the same contents argued for from an ethico-legalist perspective, now indicating the role of praxis in these elements of imitative religion as follows:

T10, Iḥyāʾ, 1:119.33–120.10 (*Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*)

> (One's) works effect the growth of (one's) resolution (*taṣmīm*) and its increase just like watering effects the growth of trees. For this reason, He, *most high*, said, {It increased their belief}, and He, *most high*, said, {To add belief to their belief}, and he, *God bless him and send him peace*, said, 'Belief increases and decreases.' This is through the effect (*taʾthīr*) of acts of obedience on the heart. This is only perceived by one who vigilantly compares the states of one's soul during moments of steadfastness in and exclusive devotion to worship with the presence of

> heart during times when one slackens (in such worship). Thus, one notices the difference in reassurance in one's tenets of belief (*ʿaqāʾid al-īmān*) in these conditions and that one's conviction increases in obstinacy in the face of one trying to unravel it by raising doubts.
> Or (even regarding the different example of showing mercy to orphans), if one who believes in the meaning of mercy shown to orphans (*man yaʿtaqid fī al-yatīm maʿnā al-raḥma*) acts on what is necessitated by one's belief (*mūjabihi iʿtiqādihi*) and (one) strokes an orphan's head and shows (him or her) kindness, one perceives in one's inner being (*bāṭinihi*) confirmation of that (meaning of) mercy and its increase due to acting (upon it). Similarly, if one who believes in humility (*muʿtaqid al-tawāduʿ*) acts by what it (i.e. humility) necessitates… and even prostrates, one senses humility in the heart in engaging in (this) service.

Section II contained statements from *Iḥyāʾ* Book I in which al-Ghazālī enumerates the elements of a path of praxis in which one first obtains basic credal believe through imitation which al-Ghazālī contrasted with research and demonstration and speculative inquiry. This passage, however, is necessary in order to explain in more detail how beliefs, as it were, grow or unfold through practising what it entailed by those beliefs.[686] This is an aspect of the writing of the *Iḥyāʾ* that these passages must be culled and analysed from disparate sections to fully understand the structure and doctrine behind them. The principle of acting on what is entailed by a desired belief or attribute is shown below to be the fundamental mechanism of praxis. However, the current passage then reveals the cosmology and states the relation to the 3rd and 4th Quarters of the *Iḥyāʾ* as follows:

T11, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:119.33–120.10

> Likewise it is with all attributes of the heart (*jamīʿ ṣifāt al-qalb*), works of the limbs emanate from them, then the effect of works returns to them and confirms them and increases them. This will come in the quarters on the Salvific Virtues and the Destructive Vices where explanation of the mode of connection of the inner to the outer and works to beliefs and hearts is found, for this is one of the types of connection of the corporeal world (*mulk*) to the incorporeal world (*malakūt*). By corporeal world, I mean the visible world (*ʿālam al-shahāda*) perceived by the senses and by the incorporeal world (I mean) the unseen world perceived by the light of insight (*nūr al-baṣīra*). The heart is of the incorporeal world while the organs (*aʿḍāʾ*) and their works are from the corporeal world.

This passage was cited partially in Chapter 3 as some of the evidence that the notions of the inner and outer are aligned with the philosophical notions of the corporeal and incorporeal.

[686] Chapter 4 studied how *al-Iqtiṣād* extended habituation to the examples of belief, mercy, and humility under the single term 'attribute' (*ṣifa*) of the heart.

And as already seen in Chapter 4, demonstration being the root of the virtues al-Ghazālī states in the *Iḥyā'*s 4th Quarter that knowledge causes states which cause effects to manifest on the limbs according to a cosmology in which what is in the incorporeal world manifests in the corporeal world. The current passage falls within this understanding and the heart represents the incorporeal world and its effects manifest on the limbs which represent the corporeal world. However, this only occurs after an attribute of the heart has been obtained as further passages below indicate. Nonetheless, the two parts of this passage if joined indicate the basic notion that attributes of the heart are strengthened by specific acts of the limb when entailed by a given belief, such as the majesty of God, or a given attribute, such as feeling of mercy towards orphans. This passage indicates the reasoning by which al-Ghazālī adds religious elements to his path: because the beliefs taken by imitation imply acts which generate attributes related to removing vice and inculcating virtue (and purifying the heart via praxis). There is an important further aspect of his path of praxis regarding which he is completely silent. This is that the same beliefs are imitative similitudes for higher truths whose ultimate reality may be understood after the prerequisite of ethical purification. This was also mentioned in the Book I passage in the previous section, but it's full implications are explained in Chapter 2 on interpretation of similitudes and Chapter 4's analysis of what were termed the watercourses of certitude, the notion that all that the prophet's brought contains a connectivity between knowledge, state of heart, and act.

The 3rd Quarter contains more explanation of what is termed habituation and the mechanism by which the body and heart affect each other. Al-Ghazālī uses the terms translatable as habituation in a separate passage of the 1st Quarter where he states the same principle stated in the 3rd Quarter: consistent artificial acts or behaviour bring about attributes in the heart. In the 1st Quarter, he states that eventually another (or second) nature is formed and the soul becomes habituated (*muʿtāda*) and cites the poetry, 'It is the soul; it becomes habituated (*tataʿawwad*) to whatever you artificially make it become accustomed'.[687] The 3rd Quarter introduces the same notion inside a theoretical debate: 'Is character inherent or are character traits susceptible to change?' He opens his reply, stating that character traits may be natural and they may be acquired. Acquisition (*iktisāb*) is through struggle and disciplining the soul which is to 'force the soul (*ḥaml al-nafs*) to perform acts

[687] *Iḥyā'*, 1:303.25–6.

entailed by (*yaqtaḍīhā*) the desired character trait'.[688] The mechanism of praxis is thus performing acts entailed by a desired trait (or belief). Previous passages indicate that what occurs through these carefully selected artificial acts of corporeal limbs is that an incorporeal influence rises up to the heart and becomes an attribute of it.

Later in the 3rd Quarter, al-Ghazālī shows that what we have termed habituation is explained by the relationship between the body and soul. He defines disciplining the soul slightly differently as 'artificially performing the acts which emanate from them initially such that they become natural in the end'.[689] This is explained as follows:

T12, Iḥyā', 3:58.7–27

> This is due to the strange connection (*'ajīb al-'ilāqa*) between the heart and limbs (*al-qalb wa-l-jawāriḥ*), by which I mean the soul and body, because from each attribute which appears in the heart an effect emanates (*yafīḍu*) on the limbs. This is to the point that the limbs never move except necessarily in accordance with (the attributes of the heart). Also, from each act which takes place on the limbs an effect ascends from it to the heart. In this matter is a *circulus vitiosus* (*dawr*).
>
> This can be understood through a similitude. Whoever wants proficiency in writing to become an attribute of their soul such that they become a natural writer has no other way than to undertake with the limb of the hand what a proficient writer him or herself undertook and to remain steadfast in imitating comely calligraphy for a long while.[690] This is because the act of the writer is comely calligraphy, so one imitates a writer artificially. Then, one carries on at it steadfastly until it becomes a firm attribute in one's soul such that in the end comely calligraphy proceeds from one naturally just as it proceeds artificially at the outset. Thus, comely calligraphy is that which rendered one's calligraphy comely. However, the first of them was through forcing oneself (*bi-takalluf*) except that a trace ascended from it to the heart, then descended from the heart to the (given) limb. In this manner, one began to write comely calligraphy naturally. …
>
> (The desired trait or ability) appears gradually…likewise the effect of a single act of obedience (*ṭā'a*) in purifying and cleansing the soul is imperceptible in the moment. … A large amount collected together has an impact and the large amount is nothing but a collection of units. Thus, each unit is effective and every act of obedience has an effect (*athar*) even if hidden and therefore it necessarily has a reward (*thawāb*)

[688] Ibid., 3:56.28.

Cf. Avicenna's *Al-Akhlāq*, a known source for the *Mīzān,* which states that, whether blameworthy or praiseworthy, character traits are obtained 'by accustoming (o.s.) to acts of the trait whose opposite one wishes to leave, if one is characterized by its opposite' (34.20–1).

[689] Ibid., 3:58.6–7.

[690] While Jules Janssens notes that he could not find a source in Avicenna for this example, Tim Winter notes that a similar example occurs in al-Fārābī's *al-Fuṣūl al-madaniyya*. (See al-Ghazālī and Winter, *Al-Ghazālī On Disciplining the Soul & Breaking the Two Desires*, 35nB, and Janssens, 'Al-Ghazālī's *Mīzān al-'amal*', 128, respectively.)

> for verily reward is in proportion (*bi-azā'*) to the effect and so is (every) act of disobedience (*maʿṣiya*).

The necessity of the corporeal limbs manifesting what is in the incorporeal heart is one direction. The heart receiving dispositions from consistent artificial acts is the other, which we may term upward.[691] While the principle which is ultimately cosmological applies to habits such as writing, al-Ghazālī uses it to extend the path of praxis from imitative beliefs and acts above to include sins and obedience here, and he even alludes to its relation to the reward. Thus, yet another religious concept is re-founded on rational (or reasoned) terms. The result is that a path of praxis forms which justifies its elements from both the viewpoint of the sharia and reason or *falsafa*. Praxis removes vice and corporeal influence and, after imitative belief, learning the obligatory aspects of worship, practising this knowledge causes meanings to be confirmed in the heart in a manner maintaining the role *falsafa* sets for praxis: to remove vice, prepare the intellect to receive incorporeal realities, and thereby to achieve felicity in the afterlife. The notion of imitative practice of the sharia found in the *Tahāfut*'s path to felicity and the 3rd Quarter classification studied in Chapter 1 are integrated into a specific and practical path. Even if *falāsifa* such as Avicenna believe in the role of the sharia, they do not work out the path. Al-Ghazālī leaves this role for himself, the inheritor of the prophets, able to interpret all or most of revelation in the light of reason. More elements he includes in his full path of praxis bridging the corporeal to the incorporeal are studied in Section III.

[691] The bi-directionality of praxis is studied in the final chapter on virtue. Certain passages cited strongly indicate that al-Ghazālī has intentionally woven a microcosm–macrocosm analogy into his praxis. Born into a body, humanity must ascend to the incorporeal origin. After this purification, the higher worlds then flow down through the psyche in a manner which resembles how the cosmos flows: intellect, soul, and body.

B. The Mutual Influence between the Body and Soul

As seen in the previous section, in addition to praxis, a second directionality of influence between body and soul was referred to such that it is appropriate to speak of mutual influence between the body and soul and bi-directionality. This doctrine of the mutual influence of body and soul appears to be the full framework of which the body affecting the soul (through habituation) is but a part. Thus, praxis and habituation are a part of the mutual influence, representing but one direction.

Demonstrating that al-Ghazālī derives this doctrine from Avicenna is not merely a study of al-Ghazālī's sources. Knowing the source is important for understanding the *Iḥyā'*. The *Iḥyā'* often alludes to matters developed further or more technically in other works such as the *Mishkāt*. Without examination of his sources, the reader may not know whether a statement is the tip of an iceberg, referring to a known doctrine developed elsewhere. In the present case, knowing the source gives some confirmation that the doctrine of mutual influence is likely original to Avicenna and developed by al-Ghazālī, as it appears in Avicenna and has no other known source in the *akhlāq* texts of the time (such as Miskawayḥ's *Tahbhīb* or even al-Iṣfahānī's *al-Dharī'a*). It also allows us to move from *that* he uses sources to *how*, which is examined below.

In the beginning of the *Mīzān* passage which is the direct source of the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī uses only the terms soul (*nafs*) and body.[692] In the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī's phraseology is as follows: 'The heart and limbs, by which I mean the soul and body.'[693] This phrase is significant because through it al-Ghazālī has linked notions from separate discourses—the philosophical and Sufi. It allows al-Ghazālī to imbue two terms related to Sufi and scriptural practices with a technical underpinning. It produces the ability to use philosophical mechanisms, related in this case to the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy. Examination of the language of the *Mīzān* and the *Ma'ārij* show that there is a pattern of referring to two sets of terms—one scriptural and one philosophical—through various phrases such as 'by which I mean', or 'and in the parlance of the sharia'.[694]

[692] *Mīzān*, 70.15.
[693] *Iḥyā'*, 3:58.7–8.
[694] The mechanism employed here of exposing the reader to both the philosophical and scriptural terms occurs in a number of places in the *Mīzān* and the *Ma'ārij* where al-Ghazālī presents both the scriptural and philosophical terms or the phrases alongside each other or explicitly indicates that they are two terms for the same meaning, saying the like of, 'And in the parlance of the sacred law (*wa-fī lisān al-shar'*)…'. *Mīzān*, 149.3, says knowledge is the worship of the soul (*nafs*) and in the language (*lisān*) of the sacred law, heart (*qalb*), importantly making an explicit link between the soul and heart. *Mīzān*, 211.19–212.1, refers to the terms (*alfāz*) of the sacred

Secondly, while the *Iḥyā'* refers to the relation between the body and soul as a marvelous (*ʿajīb*) connection, the *Mīzān* describes it as an intelligible connection. Examining the expression in the *Mīzān* indicates that what is actually meant is that not all audiences can understand it. Al-Ghazālī indicates this as follows, 'Between the soul and these faculties (*quwā*) is a type of connection (*ʿilāqa*) whose definition is difficult to express in a manner taking (concrete) form in the retentive imagination. This is because the connection is not sensible, but rather intelligible (*maʿqūla*).'[695] A matter which is abstract and not sensible or imaginable is presumably also technical. (Chapters 2 and 3 cite numerous passages indicating that so long as the corporeal faculties dominate in a person, that person cannot understand abstract concepts of theology, etc.) The *Iḥyā'* appears to opt for a non-technical similitude, likely due to its audience.

C. Sources of the Mutual Influence of Body and Soul

The more technical version seen to be distilled into the *Mīzān* (and then the *Iḥyā'*) comes from the still contested *Maʿārij* and ultimately from two Avicennian texts. Regardless of the authorship, the *Maʿārij* addresses the theoretical question of how the body and soul affect each other if they are of different types (or planes) of being. Jules Janssens has studied this aspect of the *Maʿārij*, noting that the *Maʿārij* poses several theoretical questions in a manner which largely textually reproduces a similar section from Avicenna's *al-Mubāḥathāt*.[696] The *Maʿārij* addresses the question of the mutual influence of body and soul in a theoretical manner addressing the two directions of influence and not found in the *Mīzān* as follows:

T13, Maʿārij, 67.12–68.9

> However, it is known that between the body and soul there is an intelligible (*maʿqūl*) connection by which the one affects the other. Due to this (connection of effect), if the soul recalls the holy (*jānib al-quds*), the body gets goosebumps and its hair stands on end.
> Similarly, the soul is affected by the entailments of the body such as anger, desire, sense experience, etc.

law (*sharʿ*) requiring figurative interpretation (*taʿwīl*) and understanding (*fahm*). The *Maʿārij*, in discussion of the first thing created, uses a similar phrase, 'And the language of prophecy might very well express this as…' (124.11–12).

[695] *Mīzān*, 70.11–14.

[696] The link between this section of the *Maʿārij* and *al-Mubāḥathāt* was pointed out by Jules Janssens (see his 'Le *Maʿârij al-Quds fî madârij maʿrifat al-nafs*', 33–5). Al-Ghazālī presents sixteen questions in this section which resemble the style and content of many questions in *al-Mubāḥathāt.*

The *Maʿārij* describes the relationship using the same term from the *Mīzān*, an intelligible relationship. Note that this passage speaks of the effect coming from the soul not as a character trait emanating acts on the limbs, but as recalling a meaning. Chapter 4 showed that al-Ghazālī placed demonstrative knowledge to be the root of the virtues, this knowledge causing states and acts to emanate down on the limbs. As stated above, the notion of acts or traits coming from meanings in the soul is not part of the *akhlāq* tradition, yet it appears in the *Maʿārij* and the *Iḥyāʾ*. It thus appears that this second aspect coming from the soul, remembering meanings, skips over the *Mīzān*, as it were, and manifests in the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*. Further examination of the *Maʿārij* passage shows that its primary source, *al-Mubāḥathāt*, does not include the reference to goosebumps when remembering the Divine. The *Maʿārij* passage is thus a combination including material from *al-Ishārāt*.

The *Ishārāt* passage which offers more substantial information regarding character traits and their relation to the soul and body is as follows:

T14, al-Ishārāt, 2:356.1–358.8

> This substance in you … has branches which are the faculties proceeding forth in your limbs. If you sense something through any of them, or you imagine, desire, or become angry, the connection which is between them and these branches casts a form (*hayʾa*) into it (i.e. the soul), in a way that through repetition makes a type of submission. Rather, it makes a habit and character trait and these two establish within this governing substance (*al-jawhar al-mudabbir*, i.e. the soul) the dispositions. The opposite also occurs. It very often occurs that, in the beginning, a given intelligible (*ʿaqliya*) form (*hayʾa*) inheres in it. The connection transmits a trace (*athar*) from that form to the branches, then to the limbs. Behold! Verily if you bring to consciousness the majesty of God (*jānib Allāh*), mighty and majestic, and you reflect on His dominion (*jabarūtih*), how goosebumps form on your skin and your hair stands on end. These reactions (*infiʿālāt*) and dispositions vary in strength.

This passage gives a theory not only of how the body and soul manage to influence each other, but also of how character traits are formed. Also, the notion expressed in the *Mīzān* and *Iḥyāʾ* in which the heart (read: soul) emanates forms down on the limbs is here explained: a meaning in the heart is recollected, the connection which obtains between the body and soul casts an effect which descends down to the body. Chapter 4 included a passage from *Kitāb al-Khawf* in which al-Ghazālī systematically explained four levels of the human being, the last being states of the body. The body turns yellow from fear. Again, it appears that aspects of this theory appear in the *Mīzān*, but the details manifest fully in the *Iḥyāʾ*. While the mutual

influence of body and soul is stated in more than one place cited in the previous section, the details found in the *Maʿārij* and *al-Ishārāt* are drawn upon by al-Ghazālī to work out the details required by the many topics of the *Iḥyāʾ*.

In building on Avicenna, he may be doing something controversial, but he is also following his own practice exemplified in the *Tahāfut* of accepting the truth claim of the intellect as one source of knowledge provided the knowledge it produces is at the level of demonstration and believing it is compatible with scripture (see Chapter 1). His use of Avicenna indicates his trust that he generally addresses topics by seeking apodictic demonstration or, if one likes, represents the standards of good science, even if committing mistakes. Simultaneously, at the end of the *Maʿārij* passage, the author adds a prophetic tradition. If al-Ghazālī is the author, this could represent his mutual concern for reason and revelation as sources.

The doctrine as stated in the *Iḥyāʾ* passages cited above and as expanded by making demonstration the root of virtue becomes the foundation of his praxis. It places his concern therein for the cosmology at the centre of the *Iḥyāʾ*. A final application which largely explains not only the method but the structure of the 3rd and 4th Quarters is explored in the final part of this section.

D. The Medications of the Soul: An Ointment of Knowledge and Acts

The primary means for accomplishing the aim of the *Iḥyāʾ* is only introduced in the 3rd and 4th Quarters of the *Iḥyāʾ*. The means for removing the vices and inculcating the virtues is a remedy (*dawāʾ*) which is an ointment (*maʃjūn*) composed of knowledge and acts. Because knowledge was already shown to be integrated by al-Ghazālī into praxis and the relation between body and soul, this introduction is not an utter surprise. In other words, knowledge was already shown to be the fount of attributes of the heart. The introduction of this ointment thus indicates that praxis may be enacted through attributes of the heart being produced from above, as it were, rather than from below by (repetitive) action causing an effect to rise up to the heart. Also, the mutual influence of body and soul itself gave a model in which knowledge could be integrated into the psyche at a higher level than character traits and effectively be their cause just as they are the incorporeal cause of the emanation of corporeal acts.

This ointment remedy is a part of praxis or what was termed 'the path of praxis'. From as early as the *Mīzān*, praxis is deemed the removal of vice via opposing the desires. Earlier in this chapter, the definition of the path of praxis in the *Iḥyā'* included removing blameworthy and filthy traits and acquiring the praiseworthy. This was the core of the path of praxis said in *Iḥyā'*, Book I, in the sense that it was said to be the precondition for the science of unveiling being cast into the heart. Secondly, in the *Iḥyā'*, remedies are explicitly mentioned in Book I's description of the science of praxis. This is further supported by al-Ghazālī's statement that it is obligatory to know the remedy (*muʿālaja*) of virtues which have grown weak in order that they be strengthened, and also to know the remedy (*ʿilāj*) for removing vices.[697]

It is important for the methodology of studying the *Iḥyā'* to note that neither these passages, nor Book XXII that is devoted to disciplining the soul and the general path of ethical reformation (*tarbiya*), mention this ointment. Also, as will be seen, there are several other aspects to the remedy which are only found by studying the composition of each remedy which appears across the 3rd and 4th Quarters. This is an example in which al-Ghazālī's statements, especially those at the beginning of the *Iḥyā'*, are simplifications or are inadequate for determining the actual structure and positions taken in the *Iḥyā'*.

The aforementioned remedies are the primary mechanism of the 3rd and 4th Quarters; however, they and their aspects emerge only progressively in the 3rd Quarter. Thereafter, their use wanes in the 4th Quarter which eventually ceases to mention the term ointment and merely provides knowledge in order to bring about virtues.[698]

From the first practical book of the second half of the *Iḥyā'*, two components to praxis begin to appear. In *Kitāb Kasr al-shahwatayn*, al-Ghazālī lists the benefits of hunger in Chapter 2 and (practical) duties related to food in Chapter 3, which are effectively knowledge and practice, respectively. A remedy with both aspects constituting an ointment (*maʿjūn*) first appears in Book XXIV in the first harm, 'speaking about what does not concern one'.[699] There, al-Ghazālī offers two cures, saying the first is by way of knowledge and the latter is by way of praxis. Towards the end of the same book, al-Ghazālī for the first time informs the reader that this is a general matter stating, 'Know that all bad character traits are treated by

[697] See *Iḥyā'*, 1:21.19–22.4. There, he also states that one should know the causes, realities, definitions, and fruits of each.
[698] See Appendix I which states the remedy of each vice of the 3rd Quarter.
[699] *Iḥyā'*, 3:110.31–5.

an ointment of knowledge and praxis and the cure for every ill (*ʿilla*) is opposing its cause. So, we shall examine to find its cause.'[700] The first example in the *Iḥyā'* of a remedy actually composed of knowledge and praxis occurs in Book XXV, Chapter 5, 'Explaining the Cure for Anger after its Arousal'.[701] However, the actions mentioned here are a relatively short list of actions derived directly from prophetic traditions. They advise seeking refuge in God, changing one's (bodily) position (e.g. from standing to sitting), or making ablution with cold water.[702] Al-Ghazālī does add a modicum of interpretative commentary: the causal mechanism behind the traditions is due to anger being related to heat and water being cool such that it dampens anger. He has thus stated that this matter not mentioned at the beginning of the *Iḥyā'* is general: all vices (covering the 3rd Quarter) are treated through the said ointment. And, he begins to offer a practical and theoretical element to his cures, but not in the thorough manner found in later *Iḥyā'* books.

The treatment of envy in Book XXV explains how both knowledge and praxis affect the aim of praxis which is to quell vicious attributes (and later to inculcate virtue).[703] How knowledge affects a cure on the heart is explained thus: 'So, these are the knowledge-based remedies (*adwiyā' ʿilmiyya*), and whenever a human contemplates them with a clear mind and presence of heart, the fire of envy is extinguished in his heart. And he knows that it is a (cause of) destruction to himself, a joy to his enemy, (a cause of) wrath to his Lord, and a disturbance to his (own) life.'[704] Al-Ghazālī introduces the practical aspect of this cure, showing it to be nearly the same as habituation explained in Book XXII (see Section II.A), thus, 'As for its (i.e. envy's) beneficial praxis, it is to control envy. Thus, whatever envy calls for, of word or action, one should artificially force oneself to perform its contradictory (*naqīḍ*). If envy motivates one to criticize one's object of envy, one (should) force one's tongue to praise and extoll him.'[705] The practical matter here represents the mechanism of habituation shown above to be the general method of praxis and character reformation (*tarbiya*) in Book XXII: namely, habituation. However, here it is only a part of a wider process encompassing knowledge and

[700] *Iḥyā'*, 3:145.8–9. This is found in *Kitāb Āfāt al-lisān*, *Āfā* (harmful effect) 15, devoted to backbiting. However, towards the end of his discussion of backbiting, al-Ghazālī tells his reader that the cures he has described involve knowledge alone (ibid., 3:147.11–13).
[701] Ibid., 3:169.1.
[702] Ibid., 3:169.33–170.8.
[703] Ibid., 3:192.15. Envy is the third of the three major topics which comprise Book XXV.
[704] Ibid., 3:194.27–9.
[705] Ibid., 3:194.29–31.

other levels of the psyche spelled out more in an aspect of praxis to follow. Thus, at the midpoint of the 3rd Quarter one begins to see that the praxis of al-Ghazālī is more sophisticated than that mentioned in the treatment of the topic in Book XXII.

An important part of this praxis is removal of the cause of the sickness or vice. While the statement from Book XXIV above mentioned removing causes as part of praxis, this matter is only explained later thus: 'As for the detailed remedy, it is to diligently pursue the causes (*asbāb*) of envy, arrogance, and other (attributes). … The detailing of the remedy of these causes (*asbāb*) will be provided in the same location as their subject (is treated), *God willing*, for they are the material (*mawādd*) of these diseases. These diseases will not be subdued unless their base material is subdued. If…it is not, no result will be brought about through what we have mentioned except a calming and extinguishing. They will continue to return time and time again and the struggle with them will grow long.'[706] In other words, treating the symptoms of the disease without removing its causes is merely palliative. Al-Ghazālī gives the example of lovers of prestige. So long as this love remains in their hearts, they will necessarily, he says, feel envy for others who are singled out to obtain prestige and have a place in other people's hearts.[707] We glean from this that remedies do not necessarily treat causes. We also see that just as countering the act called for quells an attribute of the heart, so does correct knowledge quell an attribute of the heart (though without necessarily removing its cause).[708]

Finally, when al-Ghazālī spells out the link between the levels of the psyche, it becomes clear why acts are not sufficient to remove vice.[709] Rather, the psyche must be

[706] Ibid., 3:195.16–18.
[707] Ibid., 3:195.18–19.
[708] Whether it removes the attribute absolutely or only reduces some, perhaps emotional, aspect of it is a further question not answered here.
[709] In another example of how the layers relate to each other in praxis, al-Ghazālī describes how weakness may open each level to attack by the pleasures of desires, giving examples for knowledge and character traits (see ibid., 3:305.6–8).

fortified through the many levels of the psyche including knowledge,[710] removing love of the here-below, and acts cast in al-Ghazālī's notion of the psyche and its levels thus:[711]

T15, Iḥyā', 3:305.8–20

> A person may remember that the impulse attending one is an impulse of ostentation which exposes one to the wrath of God, but one continues due to the intensity of one's desire, so one's caprice (*hawā*) overcomes one's intellect. … Knowledge does not benefit if (it) lacks dislike…so the aim of dislike is to ward off the (blameworthy) act.
>
> Then (we may say), there is no benefit without the three being conjoined. They are knowledge, dislike, and refusal. Refusal is the product (*thamara*) of dislike. Dislike is the product of knowledge. The strength of knowledge is according to the strength of belief (*īmān*) and the light of knowledge. The weakness of knowledge is according to (the strength of) heedlessness and love of the here-below and forgetting the afterlife and little reflection on that which is with God and little reflection on the harms (*āfāt*) of the life of the here-below and the enormity of the pleasure of the afterlife. Some of these produce others and bring them to fruition. The origin (*aṣl*) of all this is love of the here-below and domination by desires, so it is the source (*ra'ṣ*) of every mistake and the spring of every sin. This is because the sweetness of the love of prestige and status and the pleasure of the here-below inundate the heart and snatch it and come between it and reflecting on the outcome of things and from seeking illumination from the Book (i.e. the Koran) and the (prophetic) way and from the lights of the sciences.

[710] This matter which resembles Aristotelian akrasia. Akrasia is commonly understood as a weakness of rational desire (*boulêsis*) resulting in lack of self-control as in when one knows something to be harmful and does it anyway (such as overeating or indulging in sweets). On this interpretation, desire cancels one's resolution, but not one's knowledge that something is harmful. This thus involves a conflict between two desires. (See Pierre Destrée, 'Aristotle on the Causes of Akrasia', in Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée (eds), *Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From Socrates to Plotinus* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 139–65, esp. 140, which offers a bibliography of recent scholarship on each of two camps regarding this and a second interpretation of akrasia: the intellectualist interpretation in which Aristotle is interpreted to hold in certain texts that one actually lacks knowledge at the moment acting in opposition to ethical knowledge.)

[711] Al-Ghazālī in this regard emphasizes the emanative nature of the integral psyche. On this view, strong knowledge is separate from desire, but is its necessary cause and desire is its effect (or fruit, in his terminology seen in the long passage which follows). When knowledge is strong, the proper desire is strong. On the other hand, when desire for the here-below is strong, it effectively holds the floor, not allowing one to engage in the processes which would produce knowledge such as contemplation. However, heedlessness is a sophisticated concept for al-Ghazālī and thus ultimate judgement of his view is complicated.

Heedlessness as developed outside this passage has two aspects. In respect to what is higher, it is a lack of invocation and also prevents contemplation. In respect to what is lower, heedlessness is a psychological state inhering in the fourth level of the psyche which accords with the domination of vice inhering in the third level. In other words, when acts concomitant with desire for the here-below crystalize as dispositions and character traits in the soul, the door of Satanic whispering, which is heedlessness, dominates. (For the key passages on this topic, see *Iḥyā'*, 3:26.27–27.1, 3:35.24–31, 3:36.19–22, and 3:37.8–9. The scriptural terms Satan and God-fearingness complicate interpretation as well. In brief, Satan may occupy what appears to be the third level of the psyche with desire when God-fearingness is found lacking. Desire appears to mean the crystalization into vice of acting according to desires. God-fearingness appears to mean the opposite crystalization of virtues through removing desires. This interpretation of vice and virtue in scriptural terms is supported by *Iḥyā'*, 3:47.18–22.)

This passage explains how the removal of vice also manifests through the various levels of the psyche in a manner similar to how the virtue of repentance in the 4th Quarter was shown to manifest at three different levels and fear was shown to manifest at all four levels of the psyche (see Chapter 4). Importantly, vice has its origin in love and pleasure of the here-below. This indicates that vice is the mirror opposite of virtue which was shown in Chapter 3, but also Chapter 1's study of the *Tahāfut*, to be the effect of the pleasure of incorporeal knowledge. This indicates that al-Ghazālī's praxis ultimately involves removing all attachment to the pleasures and love of the corporeal and obtaining attachments to the incorporeal knowledge associated with the afterlife, a notion arrived at as early as the *Tahāfut* passage studied in Chapter 1.

Yet later than all these preceding passages, al-Ghazālī finally alerts the reader that the praxis incorporating knowledge and acts is based on the mutual influence of the body and soul. He also provides clear evidence of how the two components of praxis, the practical and speculative, operate. This occurs in Book XXIX, *Kitāb Dhamm al-ʿujb wa-l-kibr*, in which the theoretical remedy for arrogance is said to be knowledge of God and knowledge of the self.[712] Whoever has real knowledge of the self will know it is the lowliest of the low, not desiring other than humility and baseness.[713] Whoever knows their Lord knows that none deserves greatness and grandeur but Him.[714] Of knowledge of God, al-Ghazālī says it is the furthest reach of the science of unveiling and discussing it (*dhikruhu*) requires lengthy (treatment).[715] Of the latter, he states that it is also lengthy, but that he will mention that part of if which is beneficial for rousing humbleness (*tawāḍuʿ*) and lowliness (*madhalla*).[716] In these passages comprising the speculative aspect, al-Ghazālī applies the said concepts by setting out the knowledge needed to produce the attributes of the heart which his praxis seeks.

As to the practical remedy of arrogance, it is to be humble before God and all humanity through steadfastness in the character traits of the humble which he says he has described through the preceding stories (in the previous chapters of this book).[717] Al-Ghazālī mentions that prayer is the pillar of religion due to the humility involved in its actions.[718] In

[712] *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:348.16.
[713] Ibid., 3:348.16–17.
[714] Ibid., 3:348.17.
[715] Ibid., 3:348.18–19.
[716] Ibid., 3:348.19–20.
[717] Ibid., 3:350.24–5.
[718] Ibid., 3:350.28–9.

conclusion to the general practical method, al-Ghazālī offers a number of insights into the general method of inculcation of virtue, saying:

T16, Iḥyāʾ, 3:351.3–6

> And so is the matter with the rest of the character traits. Bowing, prostration, and standing in prayer are practices which entail (*yaqtaḍīhi*) humility. Similarly, let whoever knows their self look at every act entailed by arrogance and let them steadfastly perform the contradictory of it (*naqīḍuhu*) until humility becomes their character trait. Hearts do not become characterized by praiseworthy character traits except through knowledge and praxis together. That is due to the hidden connection between the heart and limbs and the secret connection which exists between the corporeal world and the incorporeal world, and the heart is from the incorporeal world.

This passage makes explicit what might otherwise be assumed: that the ointment of knowledge and praxis builds on the notion of the mutual influence of body and soul. This passage goes further and states that it is impossible to gain virtues without minding both components of the cure. Why either would not suffice on their own is not discussed. Also, by making worship to be what is entailed by virtue, al-Ghazālī forms a missing argument for the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage treated below which merely asserts that acts must be purified before character traits may be purified. Thus the vice of arrogance gives an example of a fully developed ointment which states the knowledge and practice needed to remove a vice.

Because al-Ghazālī here advocates removing arrogance through obtaining humility, we may see for the first time in the order of the *Iḥyāʾ* the knowledge required to produce a virtue. In this case, just as in the example of the states of unity and reliance on God studied in Chapter 4, that knowledge is said to be from the science of unveiling.[719] The importance of this integration of the science of unveiling into the virtues was discussed in Chapter 4.

This passage also confirms that vice is not merely a character trait as we were told in Book XXII, but belief is a core part of vice and must be taken into account when reforming character (*tarbiya*). More examples may be found in the 3rd Quarter in which belief must be strengthened to effect praxis such as in the following statement from the treatment of prestige, ‘One should treat weak insight with this. As for the one whose insight is penetrating and his

[719] The watercourses of certitude were introduced in Chapter 4. Therein all acts brought by the prophets are said to be doors of certitude in which knowledge, character traits, and acts are integral in the sense that the higher bring about the lower and the lower bring about the higher and what is aimed for is a state in which knowledge flows down through character traits and acts.

belief is strong, he does not even look at the here-below.'[720] Importantly for this chapter and the thesis itself, belief being the root of vice and virtue also supports the findings that they are attachment to the corporeal and incorporeal, respectively. Their being attachments to the corporeal and corporeal, in turn, support the findings of Chapters 1 to 3 that al-Ghazālī's notion of religion is forged through associating the here-below, afterlife, and the tension between them on a foundation taken from the philosophical notions of the corporeal and incorporeal.

Thus, praxis is the bridge by which one moves from the corporeal to the incorporeal. The mutual influence of the body and soul not only serves, alongside habituation, as part of the mechanism, it also serves as the manner of integrating knowledge into the psyche as a source of acts. This in turn allows vice and virtue to have belief at their root, which is part and parcel of the praxis by which the *Iḥyā'* surpasses the *Mīzān*. This in turn is part and parcel of the wider claims of this thesis that al-Ghazālī recasts the notion of religion and places his praxis between two dichotomous poles which include application of that dichotomy to the epistemology and eschatological ends the *Iḥyā'* takes for itself.

[720] *Iḥyā'*, 3.281.5–6.

III. Expansion of Praxis into a Path of Praxis: Stairway to the Incorporeal World

Having set out how praxis forms a path from the corporeal to the incorporeal and how habituation is expanded beyond character traits, it now remains to indicate how the path of praxis (*muʿāmala*) in the *Iḥyāʾ* constitutes a path. The core elements of the path of praxis listed in this section serve as the groundwork for future analysis of al-Ghazālī's revival. The structure itself, as opposed to isolated statements of al-Ghazālī, is a crucial part of the answer regarding the nature of his revival and how Sufism, philosophy, and notions of religion are seen to manifest in the actual structure of the *Iḥyāʾ*, as opposed to being cited in isolated statements. In the end it will be seen that just as al-Ghazālī founded his conception of numerous aspects of religion on a notion of praxis incorporating habituation, so his path of praxis weaves a number of elements into a path for the first time on that same basis. These will be seen in this section to include: a) beliefs, b) bodily worship, c) Sufi stations (but conceived of on the lines of removing vice and inculcating virtue), d) invocation, e) contemplation, and f) the resultant knowledge and felicity in the afterlife. Understanding this path and its elements is necessary ground work for answering questions about the revival. It will include attempting to understand how al-Ghazālī conceives of the elements as occupants of various corporeal and incorporeal levels of the human being, as part of the anthropology of his praxis.

A. The Notion of a Path

In line with the argument of this chapter that praxis in the *Iḥyāʾ* is a vehicle for moving from the corporeal to the incorporeal, it is important to recognize that in addition to a list of activities often conceived of a occupants of an anthropological level, al-Ghazālī himself conceives of a complete path of praxis. While the most systematic presentation of the levels traversed on the path towards felicity is in *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra*, certain aspects are spelled out less cryptically or more thoroughly in several texts spread across the *Iḥyāʾ*. It appears that al-Ghazālī dips into these descriptions of the path in order to argue for the path which constitutes the *Iḥyāʾ*. The nature of his arguments indicates that in addition to a necessary sequential order, the elements of the *Iḥyāʾ* are generally arranged in order of value, especially in terms of ends and means. For instance, in his discussion of the relative value of patience

and gratefulness, he puts forward his stance that all acts are a means to states and all states are a means to purification which is a means to knowledge. The closer a state is to ultimate purification, the greater its value. In the *Kitāb Dhamm al-dunyā*, he includes invocation as a means falling in between the purification of character traits and gaining true knowledge (which occurs via contemplation). In this important passage, he presents all goods in terms of a hierarchy of ends and means. After all, even acts of worship necessitate having goods such as sufficient wealth and health without which they become impossible.[721] The argument in this passage is that a person is deemed to be ascribed to the afterlife (and not the here-below) if their acts and expenditure of wealth, time or effort, are used as a means to felicity. Nearby, the path of the afterlife is described as a whole, as such an ordering of means to the ultimate end of felicity.[722] A very noteworthy metaphor in the *Kitāb al-Khawf wa al-rajā'* describes at great length (nearly) all that must be done in order to hope for felicity in the afterlife.[723] The passage uses the metaphor of a plantation. While the metaphor of the plantation of the afterlife (*mazraʿa al-ākhira*) is a trope of the *Iḥyā'*, the more constant line of ethical thought of aligning ends to means indicates that these metaphors are similitudes (*amthila*) for expressing a reasoned reality which is a path leading to felicity. All told, these passages indicate an overriding notion of a path of sequential order and means to ends which inform al-Ghazālī's reasoning which he reveals to various degrees as he structures and composes the text of the *Iḥyā'*.

B. The *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* and the Path of Purification

The full presentation of the path of praxis is presented most systematically in *Kitāb al-ṭahāra*. Praxis is presented as having four levels, each level being a prerequisite for the subsequent level that follows it. While the *Mīzān* is much closer to the standard *akhlāq* tradition, in this case, one may see a degree of continuity of this extended praxis with it. It already contains

[721] Ibid., 3:229.8–21.
[722] Ibid., 3:215.8–16. Al-Ghazālī's explanation may be summarized as follows: Three attributes remain after death—purity of heart, intimacy in the invocation of God, and Love of God—being termed *eudaemonic* virtues (*musʿidāt*; *Iḥyā'*, 3:215.10–11). The three causes of these, respectively, are refraining from desires, copious and steadfast invocation, and continuous contemplation (*ibid.*, 3:215.8–12). Love itself leads to meeting (*liqā'*) and witnessing (*mushāhada*) God and all three occur immediately after death when the barriers (presumably being the body or the here-below) are lifted and fade (*ibid.*, 3:215.8–18). The itinerant on the Path of the Afterlife should steadfastly practise the causes of these three attributes—here, al-Ghazālī says praxis (*ʿamal*) rather than refraining from desires—but this won't occur without health of the body obtained through the three necessities and the means of each, each taken in the necessary amount (*ibid.*, 3:215.22–4).
[723] Ibid., 4:139.21–140.5. The introduction of this passage is translated in the following subsection.

notions of a) levels (inner and outer), b) loci, and c) a notion of the prerequisite of purification necessarily coming before adornment with something praiseworthy. It likens purification of the heart as a prerequisite for prayer of the heart to purification of the body as a prerequisite for the prayer of the body as follows:

T17, Mīzān, 149.1–6

> The first duty (of the learner) is to give first priority to purification of the soul from base character. Just as the worship of the limbs in prayer is invalid without purification of the limbs, knowledge is worship of the soul—or, in the language of the *sharia*, 'worship of the heart'—therefore it is invalid without purification of the heart from ugly (*khabā'ith*) character and filthy attributes. He (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad), may God bless him and send peace on him, said, 'Religion is built upon cleanliness.' This is the case internally (*bāṭinan*) just as it is the case externally (*ẓāhiran*).

Al-Ghazālī then cites scriptural evidence that filth and purity are not limited to the outer (or physical) aspect (*ẓāhir*).[724] Thereafter, he refers to the heart as the place of descent of the angels and the locus (*maḥall*) of their gaze.[725] He thus establishes two levels, the outward and inward, which are the limbs and the heart, respectively. Each has an element of purification which must proceed that locus being occupied by a praiseworthy element. This element which extends beyond the *akhlāq* tradition's concern for removing vice before obtaining knowledge is already present in seed in the *Mīzān*. In the context of the rest of this section, this will be seen to be developed into four detailed levels in the *Iḥyā'*. These levels have an order which must be followed and express a path which systematically extends the praxis of the *Mīzān* (and al-Ghazālī refers to the ordered steps of the *Iḥyā'* as a path on several occasions below).

The element of the *Iḥyā'* which the *Mīzān* lacks is the explicit expression of the human being, and the spiritual path, as a set of four loci (*maḥallāt*) which must be purified in a set order.[726] Of the four levels presented in the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* and studied immediately below, the highest level is the secret (*sirr*),[727] which may be seen as according with knowledge said in the *Mīzān* to be the worship of the heart whose prerequisite is ethical purification.[728] That passage states that, whether the level being discussed is the body, acts, heart, or secret (*sirr*), the

[724] *Mīzān*, 149.6–7.
[725] Ibid.–9.
[726] See Table 5.1.
[727] *Iḥyā'*, 1:125.17–18.
[728] The relation between secret and intellect is discussed later in this chapter. The difficulty of contextualizing al-Ghazālī's specific use of the term amongst his predecessors will become apparent there.

occupier of the locus is referred to as an act (*ʿamal*).[729] This appears to maintain the ethical sense it had in the *Mīzān*.

The most systematic statement of what is termed the path of praxis is revealed in the *Iḥyāʾ*'s *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra*. Beginning with the lowest level as presented in this scheme and in the *Iḥyāʾ*, the body, al-Ghazālī states that filth (*aḥdāth*, *akhbāth,* and *faḍalāt*) must first be removed.[730] Referring to the second level, the limbs, he states that they must be purified from transgression and sin and adorned with acts of obedience.[731] What is effectively the third level, the heart, may then be purified from blameworthy character traits and adorned with the praiseworthy.[732] Then, referring to what is the fourth level, the innermost secret (*sirr*), may be purified from all other than God.[733] Thereafter, one may pursue the act (*ʿamal*) which is its utmost goal (*ghāya al-qaswā*): that the majesty of God, *most high,* and His tremendousness be revealed to it.[734] Seeming to then return back through the levels, al-Ghazālī states that the utmost goal of the heart is to make it flourish with praiseworthy character traits, and al-Ghazālī importantly adds revelatory beliefs (*al-ʿaqāʾid al-mashrūʿa*) to this level.[735] The third level thus has two occupants. Section II.A above indicated how the mechanism of habituation was applied by al-Ghazālī to both beliefs and worship, and placing beliefs on the third level alongside character traits indicates their place in the order of praxis, but also their ontological level as seen below. After describing these four aspects of purity, the levels (*marātib*) are referred to as the *maqāmāt* of belief (*īmān*).[736] In a few other passages throughout the *Iḥyāʾ*, al-Ghazālī clarifies what is meant by aspects of these levels.[737] By gathering these passages, the following summary (Table 5.1) may be produced.

[729] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:125.9–10, 1:125.12, and 1:125.15–16.
[730] Ibid., 1:125.6–7.
[731] Ibid., 1:125.7.
[732] Ibid., 1:125.7–8.
[733] Ibid., 1:125.8.
[734] Ibid., 1:125.9–10.
[735] Ibid., 1:125.12–13.
[736] Ibid., 1:125.16–17. The link between *marātib* and *maqāmāt* and indeed between the virtues and vices is studied in Chapter 6 on the virtues. This is a powerful example of al-Ghazālī synthesizing the philosophical and Sufi traditions.
[737] These passages are referred to in this section.

<table>
<tr><td rowspan="4">(the inner (bāṭin))</td><td rowspan="2">(the inner aspect of the heart (bāṭin al-qalb))</td><td colspan="2">the secret (sirr)</td></tr>
<tr><td>shunning all other than God</td><td>unveiling of the majesty of God</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">(the outer aspect of the heart (ẓāhir al-qalb))</td><td colspan="2">the heart (qalb)</td></tr>
<tr><td>vices and corrupt beliefs</td><td>virtues and creedal beliefs</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="4">(the outer (ẓāhir))</td><td colspan="2">the limbs (jawāriḥ)</td></tr>
<tr><td>disobedience and the prohibited</td><td>obedience</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">the external aspect (i.e. the body; al-ẓāhir)</td></tr>
<tr><td>ritual filth</td><td>ritual purity</td></tr>
</table>

***Table 5.1*: *Four-level psychology of purification (ṭahāra*)**

Though the foundations of these ideas were present in the *Mīzān*, the psychological system presented here includes many additions, not least of which are the two layers of prerequisites: a) those within a level and b) those between levels. For instance, one must first remove sins from the limbs, then occupy the limbs with acts of obedience, and only then address the next level and remove vices, in this order. This extends the notion of purification into a path. They are related to the notion of praxis: a) each matter involves *ʿamal* (as stated above) and b) the notion of removing the blameworthy to gain the praiseworthy—working all the way up to the gaining true knowledge—is present as it was in the praxis of the *Mīzān*. (And as analysed below, one sees that al-Ghazālī maintains a clear notion of which of the four levels are corporeal and which are incorporeal.)

A structure which places religious beliefs and practice into a single path of ethical purification as a prerequisite for gaining knowledge and unveiling is a structure that, obviously, integrates religion and philosophical ethics. Al-Ghazālī had already referred to a notion of integrating the two in the above-mentioned *Mīzān* passage which designates religion

as the outward, concerned with the limbs.

An integration of religion and *falsafa* would presumably offer some philosophical reasoning for levels of the path of praxis al-Ghazālī produces. So, does the Proof of Islam offer any proof or philosophical and causal reasoning as to why these levels are necessarily prerequisites for the higher levels, as he describes them? He states that purification (*ṭahāra*) at each level (*rutba*) is half its praxis (*ʿamal*) and cites the prophetic tradition {Purity is half of belief (*īmān*)} and refers to the levels as stations of belief. In itself, this scriptural statement represents authority and imitation, and does not provide a line of reasoning which constitutes proof in itself. Regarding the highest level, he explains the principle of pre-requisiteness as follows: 'The fourth level (*rutba*) is purifying the secret (*sirr*) from other than God, *most high*. This is the purification of the prophets, *upon them be God's blessings*, and the veracious (*siddīqīn*).'[738] This is because the final end (*ghāya quṣwā*) of praxis regarding the secret is that the majesty and grandeur of God, most high, be revealed to it and the gnosis (*maʿrifa*) of God, most high, will not inhere (*yaḥull*) in reality in the secret so long as 'other than God' has not travelled from it. Again, this is a claim rather than a proof, unless the proof is supposed to be self-evident, such as the impossibility of two opposites inhering in the same substrate. But the matter is more complicated, as is often the case with al-Ghazālī. After all, his fourth level involves knowledge and removing vice as a prerequisite, following the *akhlāq* tradition. Thus, even if he does not state it here, he is building on lines of reasoning stated elsewhere.

Al-Ghazālī then provides something of an answer, invoking principles of pre-requisiteness which are particular to the heart. Here he only invokes them in the briefest and most concrete of terms as follows:

T18, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:125.11–17

> For this reason, God, mighty and majestic, says, {Say, 'God', and leave them wading in idle play} (Koran 6:91) because the two (i.e. God and that waded in by those who are heedless of Him) are not conjoined in the heart and {God hath not assigned unto any man two hearts within his body} (Koran 33:4). As for the heart's praxis, the final end is to populate it with praiseworthy character traits and legislated beliefs (*ʿaqāʾid mashrūʿa*). It will never be attributed with them so long as it is not cleaned of their contradictories (*naqāʾid*): corrupt beliefs and loathed vices. Thus, purification of one of the two halves (*shaṭrayn*)—the first half—is a precondition (*sharṭ*) for the second. Thus, purity (*ṭahāra*) is a precondition for belief (*īmān*) according to this meaning. Similarly,

[738] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:125.8–9.

> purification of the limbs from forbidden acts is one of two halves; and it is the first half which is a prerequisite for the second. Thus, purifying it is one of the two halves—the first half—while populating it (*ʿimāratuhu*) with acts of obedience is the second half. And these are the stations of belief (*maqāmāt al-īmān*).

The designation of each half as a prerequisite for the second and each level as the prerequisite for the higher is stated as a rule governing all the levels. However, the nature of the proof al-Ghazālī offers for why each level is a prerequisite seems to differ from level to level. Thus, regarding the 'occupants' of the heart, he only offers scriptural proof: the verses translated above. If there is any rational proof, it would be something like the principle of non-contradiction applied to the substrates of belief, character traits, and knowledge: two opposites cannot inhere in the same substrate at the same time as something would be itself and its contradictory at the same time.

Even if al-Ghazālī presents a path in which the elements are not reasoned, or for which he reasons elsewhere, he nonetheless presents a path involving clearly organized steps which exceed, but include the notion from the *akhlāq* tradition that ethics is a prerequisite for obtaining knowledge. The dichotomy is not explicit, but a) he includes the elements from the *Mīzān*'s dichotomy and b) in passages studied below he explains the inner and outer, and by extension corporeal and incorporeal, in this scheme. This is presented in the following section.

C. Incorporating Imitative Beliefs Made to Grow through Worship

Belief is first referred to as a seed and the beginning of a path in al-Ghazālī's reply to Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's statement about the exact identify of what knowledge and acts are obligatory acts.[739] Al-Ghazālī states that this first is belief which he explains is via imitation, not speculative inquiry (*naẓar*) nor demonstration which is not possible for most people and for which they were not made religiously responsible. In his subsequent statements regarding the ordered steps of a path of praxis, he generally begins with imitative beliefs referred to as a seed,[740] and does not mention ritual purification.[741]

[739] *Ibid.*, 1:15.9–14.

[740] In terms of order of appearance in the *Iḥyāʾ*, the second statement referring to imitative belief as a seed is found at *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:93.10–94.6, studied immediately below. The third is found in the long passage from Book II, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:119.33–120.10, translated in full in Section I. In its original context, this passage explains how to proceed through the stages of Islam and belief.

Note that Book XXII, Chapter 5 (*Bayān Tafṣīl al-Ṭarīq ilā Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq*), includes a path the sheikh

The second statement regarding belief as a seed is made in the context of incorporating belief into his Path of the Afterlife and it occurs in Book II, *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, in the midst of a polemic denying that *kalām* theology nurtures belief.[742] Al-Ghazālī asserts that the core tenets of Islamic beliefs should be learned or memorized without proofs.[743] These beliefs obtained through blind-following (*taqlīd*) are, in a sense, weak because they a susceptible to contradiction (*naqīḍ*).[744] However, al-Ghazālī stingingly likens seeking to strengthen one's beliefs through engaging in *kalām* theology and its proofs to encouraging the growth of a tree sapling through pounding it with a pestle.[745] Rather, one should recite the Koran and listen to proofs contained in the Koran and prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*) and engage in litanies of worship (*waẓāʾif al-ʿibādāt*).[746] This 1st Quarter statement thus accords with the *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* classification of knowledge passage studied in Chapter 1: the imitative beliefs and worship must effect a cure on the soul before it can proceed on the path (and benefit from the intellectual sciences of the afterlife).

Al-Ghazālī's praxis then offers two separate paths after obtaining the seed of imitative belief. Either the youth (*ṣabiyy*) earns a living, remaining upon this imitative belief or he or she becomes a viator of the Path of the Afterlife through being occupied with praxis (*ʿamal*) and God-fearingness.[747] One engages with disciplining and struggling against the lower soul,[748] terms shown in Section I to refer to removing vice and inculcating virtue. Thereby the doors of guidance open through a divine light (read: intellect) and the realities of this belief are

should set for the itinerant. If they are a beginner and ignorant of the laws of the sharia they should be taught, but there is no mention of tenets of faith (see *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:59.34–5). And Book XXII, Chapter 10 (*Bayān Ṭarīq Riyāḍat al-Ṣibyan*), also lacks mention of the learning of tenets of faith (see *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:69.32–72.18).

[741] Either he takes it for granted or he wishes to cover all conditions including children or those entering religion for this first time in which belief proceeds the need for ritual purity and worship.

[742] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:93.16–18 and 1:94.1.

[743] Ibid., 1:93.10–14 and 1:94.4.

[744] Ibid., 1:93.24–6.

[745] Ibid., 1:94.5–6.

[746] Ibid., 1:93.17–94.1.

Note that al-Ghazālī very likely borrows this metaphor from al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, though he alters the assignment of terms and the doctrine implied. Al-Iṣfahānī produces a similitude of the seed nurtured through watering. However, in his similitude beliefs taken from the Koran are the seed which are watered by the intelligibles (*maʿqūlāt*).

Al-Ghazālī uses the language and structure of the metaphor—the seed being an immature form of knowledge requiring a nurturing cause to bring about its fruition—but rather than the cause being learning the intelligibles, al-Ghazālī's list gives a prominent position to ritual worship. In *Iḥyāʾ*, book 2 Book II, *Kitāb Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid*, al-Ghazālī refrains from saying what it is that the veil is lifted from. (See, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:94.15–20.).

[747] Ibid., 1:94.11–15.

[748] Ibid., 1:94.15.

unveiled.[749] There are various levels to its secrets based on the levels achieved in struggling against oneself.[750] These levels resemble those mentioned in the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage including purity of the inner levels and from other than God.[751] This is evidence that al-Ghazālī's path of praxis is essentially that involving the levels of the human psyche, though he gives limited advice to a second audience, the masses, about how to protect their imitative belief.

These passages are significant not merely for mentioning belief first, but for showing how al-Ghazālī moves from a philosophical context in the *Mīzān* where belief is little mentioned to the *Iḥyā'* where the praxis of the *Mīzān* is naturalized into a context utilizing a sharia discourse. While the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage implicitly states the place of belief in the path, a more detailed and explicit account of nearly the full path is found in the 4th Quarter as follows:

T19, Iḥyā', Kitāb al-Khawf wa-l-rajā', 4:139.21–140.5

> The possessors of hearts know that the here-below is the plantation of the afterlife. The heart is like the earth and belief (*īmān*) is like the seed (planted) in it. Acts of obedience are like ploughing the earth and cleansing it and like digging canals and driving water towards them. The heart which is made heedless by the here-below, drowning in it, is like a salt plane in which no seed can grow. The Day of Resurrection is the like harvest day, and none harvests except what they planted. Crops don't grow except from the seed of belief (*īmān*), and belief rarely benefits if it is accompanied by a filthy heart and bad character, just as a seed will not grow on a salt plane.

Thus, religious beliefs are not only conceived upon the foundations of habituation. Rather, the manner in which they lead through purification and ultimately to true knowledge is developed by al-Ghazālī. This plaster work by which he smooths over the cracks between elements is part and parcel of the means by which he renders disparate elements into a single path of praxis.

D. Incorporating the Higher levels of the Path

1. The exterior and interior of the heart

[749] Ibid., 1:94.15–16.
[750] Ibid., 1:94.19.
[751] Ibid., 1:94.19–20.

The previous statements and passages linked the elements of a path without technical explanation of the natures of the levels. However, upon further inspection, al-Ghazālī is seen to have a very specific notion of the higher levels of purification.

The highest level is termed the secret of the heart. The secret is the fourth level of purification and will be shown to mean true knowledge in the sense studied in this thesis, especially in Chapter 2 (on incorporeal knowledge) and 4 (on demonstration). This may be seen by considering the following passages in light of each other. The first states that the exterior of the heart (*ẓāhir al-qalb*) is where imitative beliefs inhere. The second is the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage from Section III.B above which stated that the third level includes both imitative beliefs and character traits.[752] As indicated by Table 5.1 above, the third level of the human, being the substrate of imitative beliefs and character traits contrasted with a fourth level, entails by a sort of process of elimination that the fourth level is the substrate of true knowledge and is what is termed the secret of the heart. The first passage evidencing this is as follows:

T20, Iḥyā', 1:100.8–11

> The *sSharia* means the outward and the ultimate reality means the inward…and the tenets of belief we have mentioned are of the works (*aʿmāl*) of the hearts. (Humanity's) worship regarding them is through receiving their transmission with acceptance and assent (*taṣdīq*) through knotting the heart into belief of them (*ʿaqd al-qalb ʿalayhā*), not through reaching the point that their realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) are unveiled to [nor are understood by] us (*yankashif lanā*). For not all of humanity was made religiously responsible (*mukallaf*) for that. And, were it not a work (*min al-aʿmāl*), we would not have put it forth in this book (i.e. the *Iḥyā'*). Were it not an act of the outer aspect of the heart (*ẓāhir al-qalb*), rather than an act of its inner aspect (*bāṭinihi*), we would not have put it forth in the first half of this book (i.e. the half which is devoted to the outward). True unveiling (*kashf ḥaqīqī*) is the attribute of the secret of the heart and its inner aspect (*ṣifat sirr al-qalb wa-bāṭinihi*).

This passage clearly distinguishes the secret of the heart from imitative believe. The *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage placed imitative belief (and character traits) as the third level. Thus, the fourth level is termed by al-Ghazālī as the secret of the heart. What he terms the outer heart is what was numbered there as the third level of the human being. Thus, the third and fourth levels are the outer and inner heart, respectively. While the fourth level is said here to be 'true

[752] Al-Ghazālī also states in general that the first half (*shaṭr*) of the *Iḥyā'* only treats outward matters (*ẓawāhir*) (see *Iḥyā'*, 1:127.18–19).

unveiling', were it exclusively unveiled knowledge, this would leave no room for the true, demonstrative knowledge referred to in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 additionally showed that unveiling is used in two senses which distinguish it from imitative knowledge: a) knowledge acquired by the intellect and b) unveiled knowledge received through the lifting of the veil.[753]

This indicates that al-Ghazālī has a specific ontology and consistency running behind his levels which is only uncovered through joining disparate statements in the *Iḥyā'*. Both the third and fourth levels refer to the soul. The matters of the soul are divided into two, the higher being that which is utterly incorporeal as Chapter 3 indicated the intellect is for al-Ghazālī. The lower part is matters which are ascribed to the soul (as opposed to the corporeal body), but which, like dispositions and beliefs are not incorporeal (and resemble the faculties Chapter 3 showed to be shared with animals). While al-Ghazālī uses a revolving array of terms, one may trace these terms and find consistent meanings.[754] For example, the passages in this subsection also entail that the secret and interior of the heart appear to have the same referent. This raises the question of the motivation for producing but hiding a precise philosophical basis for the *Iḥyā'*, but this question need not be addressed now.

2. The two sides of the fourth level of purity

The fourth level differs from the other levels in that it appears its lower side itself has two occupants: invocation and heedlessness. Table 5.1 above showed them to be associated with the divestment which must proceed adornment of its higher side. Certain passages spread out over the 3rd and 4th Quarters spell this matter out as follows.

In *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajā'ib al-qalb* of the 3rd Quarter, al-Ghazālī states that the matters which occur to the heart (*khawāṭir*) are two: thoughts and remembrances.[755] The opposite of remembrance is said to be heedlessness.[756] Avoiding heedlessness is seen to apply not only to remembrance, but also to thoughts, for al-Ghazālī states that the levels which the servant must

[753] This matter was discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 and confirms citations in Chapter 3 of statements that the locus of the heart is the locus of all (true) knowledge: inspired or acquired.
[754] Chapter 3 showed a set of terms produced along the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy.
[755] These two exclusive types of inner prompting are set out as follows:

T21, Iḥyā', 3:25.24–6

> The impressions which are most particular to the heart are inner promptings (*khawāṭir*.) I mean by inner promptings what occurs in it (i.e. the heart) of thoughts (*afkār*) and recollections (*adhkār*). I mean by them its objects of apprehension which are knowledge, either by way of occurring newly or by way of recollection.

[756] *Iḥyā'*, 4:61.32–5. In the context of surrounding passages, this passage explains that heedlessness and remembrance are either good or bad deeds regarding one particular level of the heart.

protect through effort and patience are two: invocation and contemplation.[757] However, in this scriptural context, what occupies the higher substrate when one is not vigilant is referred to as demonic insinuations (rather than, for instance, heedlessness).[758] Nonetheless, the lower aspect of the fourth level of the heart has been shown to itself contain two occupants: heedlessness and invocation. If we analyse what is meant by heedlessness, it is possible that it is merely a privation of invocation. However, al-Ghazālī speaks ostensibly of it as existent and something that is removed by invocation. Further, he speaks of insinuations occupying this level, also indicating something existent. It thus seems clear that the fourth level is more complex than the other levels, as each 'side' of it has the two aspects found at each level: divestment and adornment. Thus, in terms of stages of purification in his praxis, the fourth level itself has four possibilities: a) occupation of the left 'side' with heedlessness (and insinuations), b) occupation of the left side with invocation, c) occupation of the right side with insinuation (after the left side is occupied with invocation), and d) occupation of the right side with contemplation. He has formed the levels such that higher levels flow down onto lower levels and the fourth level is no different. Thus, contemplation is conceived as invocation *plus* an added element (as is spelled out even more in the following subsection). This immense amount of original detail has no precedent in either Sufism or Avicenna, even if this chapter and Chapter 1 showed that many of the elements of these levels are found in Avicenna and al-Iṣfahānī.

3. Invocation as imitative and contemplation as demonstrative: *Kitāb al-Tafakkur*

These levels of the psyche which are effectively levels in al-Ghazālī's original path of praxis are given an added element in the penultimate book of the *Iḥyā'*. This subsection indicates an important part of al-Ghazālī's conception of the praiseworthy occupants of the left and right 'side' of the fourth level: invocation is an imitative remembering while contemplation is use of a syllogism to produce new knowledge with syllogistic proof, and is thus associated with

[757] In at least one place, al-Ghazālī states that heedlessness applies to invocation and contemplation (see *Iḥyā'*, 4:72.25–30). In this passage, insinuations necessarily, when either invocation or contemplation, are absent.
[758] Al-Ghazālī coins the reality of these levels into scriptural terms, indicating that what populates these substrates are the two armies of Satan: those which march and those which fly (seeming to occupy the third and fourth levels, respectively) (see *Iḥyā'*, 4:73.1–2). The armies which march are desire, and the armies which fly are said to be insinuations (see ibid.).

demonstration and true knowledge. This shows yet another application of the imitation–demonstration dichotomy occurring in the levels of al-Ghazālī's praxis and in the most important level of the psyche. In addition to disclosing an important unstudied aspect of the praxis of the *Iḥyā'*, this matter has foundational importance for understanding al-Ghazālī's eschatological ends set for his revival and for understanding the relative value of the indigenous practice of invocation and philosophically conceived practice of contemplation. (These matters are discussed below.)

As we will see, contemplation is the only manner of leaving imitation (*taqlīd*) and achieving true knowledge.[759] In *Bayān* 1 of the *Kītāb al-Tafakkur*, al-Ghazālī quotes scripture, scholars, and Sufis on contemplation, concluding the *bayān* with the statement that none of them set out to mention the reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of contemplation nor to explain the watercourses (*majārī*) in which it flows.[760] Having established the inadequacy on this topic of all previous authorities, in his Chapter 2 named the 'Reality of Contemplation and its Fruits', he turns to the reality of contemplation (*fikr*) defining it as follows: 'Know that contemplation is to bring to mind two knowables (*ma'rifatayn*) to produce from them a third knowable.'[761] There is an unmistakable resemblance between this and syllogistic reasoning.[762] Regarding the particular example of knowledge that the afterlife is more deserving of preference than the here-below, al-Ghazālī says there are two ways we can know:

T22, *Iḥyā'*, 4:412.8–14

> **One [way]** is to hear from another that the afterlife is more deserving of preference than the here-below and to assent to it without insight (*baṣīra*) of the reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of the matter. He thus inclines in his acts to prefer the afterlife depending solely on his words. This is called imitation (*taqlīd*) and is not called knowledge (*ma'rifa*).
>
> The **second way** is that he know that:

[759] Al-Ghazālī does not use the term intellect here, but rather insight (*baṣīra*) which *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* made clear is another name for al-Ghazālī's notion of intellect (*'aql*; see Chapter 3).

Mind also that true knowledge may be obtained by inspiration (*ilhām*) as well, a matter made clear in Chapter 3 on the nature of the veils and mercy in al-Ghazālī's dualist cosmology. There, al-Ghazālī states that knowledge is in the incorporeal world. As such, there is no difference between knowledge obtained by learning or inspiration either in the locus, which is the heart, nor in the knowledge itself, but only in the means by which the curtain is pushed aside between knowledge and the heart.

[760] *Iḥyā'*, 4:412.6.

[761] Ibid., 4:412.8.

[762] Al-Ghazālī's commitment to logic is well known and the rest of the example of passages from *Iḥyā'*, 4:413, serve as evidence for this meaning. Cf. Binyamin Abrahamov, 'Al-Ghazālī and the Rationalization of Sufism', in *Islam and Rationality*, 35–48, who notes that the very topic of invocation (*fikr* or *tafakkur*) were not treated in known lists of Sufi stations. Thus, al-Ghazālī has imported not only a new meaning, but the very practice and the meaning.

> [1] the more enduring is more deserving of preference,
> [2] then to know that the afterlife is more enduring, and there comes from these two knowledges a third knowledge, which is that
> [3] the afterlife is more deserving of preference.
>
> The bringing to mind of the two previous knowledges in the heart to arrive to the third knowledge is called contemplation (*tafakkur*), consideration (*iʿtibār*), recollection (*tadhakkur*) and speculative inquiry (*naẓar*) and reflection (*taʾammul*), and pondering (*tadabbur*).

Before analysing this passage, it is necessary to clarify the group of terms he introduces. Contemplation is a near synonym for speculative inquiry (*naẓar*) and reflection (*iʿtibār*).[763] (This is relevant to discussions of the relative superiority of the speculative theologians and Sufis in the well-studied *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb* passage.) While al-Ghazālī lumps the terms countering imitation, including recollection (*tadhakkur*), together initially, he goes on to explain that they are not strictly synonymous. While they point to one referent, they do so from distinct perspectives. While they are both bringing to mind two knowables, recollection is to bring them to mind without moving from them to a third.[764] Speculative inquiry and contemplation necessarily involve seeking the third knowable, so all contemplation is recollection, but not vice-versa.[765] The benefit, then, of recollection (here using the term *tidhkār*) is said to be repeating knowabilia in the heart such that they become firm and not be erased from the heart.[766] The benefit of contemplation, by contrast, is said to be multiplying knowledge and bringing about that which does not yet exist, this being the difference between contemplation and recollection (which he refers to here, reverting to the term *tadhakkur*).[767] Explaining what resembles the valid forms of syllogism, he states that if two knowables are joined in the heart and wedded in a particular order, they give fruition to new knowledge.[768]

He then returns to make a crucial distinction between the two: contemplation—which produces knowledge—is the key to all good as it leads to goodly states and acts of the limbs.[769] This shows the virtue of contemplation and that it is superior to invocation (*dhikr*).[770] This is

[763] *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:412.14–22.
[764] Ibid., 4:412.19–20.
[765] Ibid., 4:412.21–2.
[766] Ibid., 4:412.22–3. This statement is analysed below.
[767] Ibid., 4:412.23–4.
[768] This is a return to the similitude of animal husbandry used in the *Iḥyāʾ* passage based on the *Maʿārij* passage which openly refers to logic.
[769] Ibid., 4:413.4–6.
[770] Ibid., 4:413.5–6. He uses invocation and recollection (*tadhakkur*) alongside each other, seemingly as synonyms.

because contemplation (*fikr*) is invocation with an additional element.[771] Tying the two into other elements of the path of the afterlife, al-Ghazālī says that invocation of the heart is superior to works (*ʿamal*) of the limbs; nay, the nobility of works is due to what they contain of invocation.[772] Thus, he states, contemplation (*tafakkur*) is better than all works (*jumlat al-aʿmāl*).[773]

Al-Ghazālī has thus made a number of matters clear in themselves and in their relation to other elements of his path of praxis. If we join this to previous subsections, we see that invocation and contemplation occupy the two 'sides' of the fourth level of the psyche. They each relate to meanings, but invocation is to repeat existing meanings, presumably those taken from revelation. Contemplation includes this, but adds the element of wedding meanings such that they produce knowledge, new knowledge. Knowledge is associated with demonstration (see Chapters 3 and 4) and felicity while invocation is associated with imitation. However, in the context of the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ* concerned with praxis, it is important to tie these passages into Chapter 4, which showed that when al-Ghazālī is concerned with the production of states of heart in the psyche, he adds knowledge as a cause (an addition not found in the *akhlāq* tradition) and further distinguishes between imitative knowledge which requires external reinforcement (such as keeping inspiring company) and demonstration which is firm and unfailing in the heart. If we then step back and reflect on the flow of the psyche from top to bottom, we see what is likely intention: al-Ghazālī has structured the psyche and the occupants of its levels such that both occupants of the fourth level are capable of producing what is for the *Iḥyāʾ* the key occupant of the third level: character traits. Chapter 4 also indicated a likely motivation for al-Ghazālī's four-level psyche flowing down from the incorporeal (*malakūt*) to the corporeal (*mulk*): that it make the human psyche (and therefore his praxis which reflects its levels) into a microcosm in which the bodily acts flow from the intellect and heart. Whether or not one finds it persuasive that a microcosm is built into his praxis, it is clear that his path of praxis is built both on levels of the psyche

[771] Ibid., 4:413.6.
[772] Ibid., 4:413.6–7.
[773] Ibid., 4:413.7. This is supported by a 4th Quarter passage explaining how the elements of the Path of the Afterlife are ranked in terms of how either they are felicity itself or else are the proximate or secondary causes: the closer they are to the end which is sought, the nobler are they. (See the final chapter devoted to the virtues.)

Al-Ghazālī then concludes this chapter of *Kitāb al-Tafakkur* stating that the watercourses of knowledge are unending, but he states that he will attempt to specify and determine (*ḍabt*) some important aspects of religious knowledge related to states because these are the stations of the viators (*maqāmāt al-sālikīn*) (see ibid., 4:413.25–6). Detailing this would require explaining all the sciences, and the entirety of these books (seemingly, the books of the 4th Quarter) (see ibid., 4:413.26–7).

(with an ontologically dualist basis) and stages of praxis. Why al-Ghazālī forges his structure on such well-thought-out regularities yet does not spell them out is another matter related to his role (as a snake-handler or rhetorical reviver, etc.).

4. Invocation and contemplation: The causes of intimacy and love

The said occupants of the left and right 'side' of the fourth level of the psyche as stated primarily in the *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage may be seen to cause the two aims of the *Iḥyāʾ*: intimacy and love. In yet another aspect of the *Iḥyāʾ*, imitation and demonstration are represented, as intimacy is the result of imitation while love is the result of the intellectual pleasure caused by true knowledge as shown in Chapter 3. Love was shown to be an inclination of the soul towards the intellectual pleasure resulting from the perception of knowledge in the soul. This is related to the argument of Chapter 3 that religion in its higher sense related to the afterlife is constructed by al-Ghazālī upon the inclination of the human soul towards the incorporeal. It appears that al-Ghazālī has developed his notion of intimacy as an inclination towards imitative knowledge, taking the general notion from Sufi literature and recasting into faculty psychology.

The *Kitāb al-Tafakkur* passage above established that true knowledge is produced by contemplation and imitative knowledge is produced by invocation. The present passage returns to contemplation and invocation, clarifying that they produce love and intimacy, respectively. The passage in no way contradicts what the previous subsection showed of strong evidence, that these two inhered in the two 'sides' of the fourth level of the psyche, so it appears these matters should be assumed to occupy that location and should be assumed that this passage only indicates a further dimension of al-Ghazālī's project of constructing sharia and Sufi practices upon the faculty psychology which is the building blocks of his path of praxis.

T23, Iḥyāʾ, 1:341.11–24

> The *Koran* joins between the virtue of invocation, contemplation, and supplication (*al-duʿāʾ*) whenever it is accompanied with reflection (*tadabbur*) whose virtue and etiquettes we have mentioned in the *Kitāb Adab tilāwat al-Qurʾān*. As for contemplation, this should (also) be of one's litanies. The details of what one should contemplate and how will come in the *Kitāb al-Tafakkur* (Book of Contemplation) of the Quarter of the Salvific Virtues, but its broad divisions fall into two types. One is to

> contemplate…aspects of praxis.[774] … The second type is that which benefits one of the science of unveiling.[775] … Each of these matters has many branches whose contemplation some people, rather than others, will be able to expand. We only convey that in a comprehensive manner in the *Kitāb al-Tafakkur*. Whenever contemplation proceeds, it is the most noble of acts of worship because it includes the meaning invoking God plus two additional matters: one of them is an increase (*ziyāda*) in knowing God because contemplation is the key to knowing God and unveiling. The second is love, because the heart does not love anyone except one for whom it holds veneration. The greatness and majesty of God are not unveiled except through knowing His attributes and His power and the marvels of His acts. Through contemplation, knowledge occurs. From knowledge, veneration occurs and from veneration, love occurs. Invocation also bequeaths intimacy (*uns*) which is a type of love.

The knower of God is then distinguished from the invoker (*dhākir*) of God. The knower knows God through reflection, shown earlier to be a synonym for the more philosophical term 'speculative inquiry' (*naẓar*). The invoker hears of the beloved which is like general knowledge while the knower knows the details which is likened to the passionate love (*ʿishq*) coming from seeing the beloved. Al-Ghazālī's unique development of the notion of intimacy is then explained in a manner linked to his imitation–demonstration dichotomy as follows:

T24, Iḥyāʾ, 1:341.27-342.8

> So, the servants who remain steadfast in invoking God with their heart and tongue—who believe in what the prophets have brought through the faith of blind-following (*al-īmān al-taqlīdī*)—have nothing of the beauties (*maḥāsin*) of the attributes of God, *mMost hHigh*, but general (*jumliya*) matters and beliefs obtained through believing in whoever described them to them. The ones who know God (*ʿārifūn*) are those who witnessed that majesty and beauty with the eye of inner insight (*bi-ʿayn al-baṣīra al-bāṭina*) which is stronger than external eyesight as none have attained to the ultimate reality of His majesty and beauty because that is beyond the ability of any human being. … (This knowledge is then linked to God's seventy veils.)[776] We will pass over these meanings because they are outside the science of praxis and their realities (*ḥaqāʾiq*) are not reached except through unveiling following on from pure contemplation. This door rarely opens. What is easy for the majority of

[774] One should order one's litanies for the day ahead of one and deliberate how to avoid distractions and preventatives busying one from performing the good. One should remember one's falling short and works which defects have befallen in order to correct them. One keeps present in the heart righteous intentions for one's works and one's interactions with other Muslims.

[775] That is through contemplating at one time on the blessings of God, m*ost hHigh*, and His constantly coming signs inside and outside one to increase his knowledge of God (*maʿrifa*) through this and such that his gratefulness be plentiful for them. Or, (to contemplate) His punishments and retributions (*niqamātihi*) to increase his knowledge of God's power and His freedom from need and to increase his fear of Him.

[776] *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:341.31–342.6. The veils are linked to knowledge of God.

> people is contemplation which benefits them in the science of praxis. Its benefit is also great.

This passage sets out that intimacy occurs through steadfast invocation. Contemplation is said to perform the role of invocation plus an added element which is to produce true knowledge—echoing the statement from *Kitāb al-Tafakkur*—and to produce love (associated with intellectual pleasure and the encounter with God producing felicity). This bears in an important way on the audience question: the passage indicates that contemplation, especially of speculative matters, is not possible for everyone. Thus, the levels developed here echo Chapter 4 (on imitation and demonstration) where al-Ghazālī linked his imitation–demonstration dichotomy to his eschatological salvation–felicity dichotomy, there speaking of adding imitation alongside demonstration as being a generous allowance (or mercy) for those incapable of true knowledge. (Contemplation, or speculative inquiry, is, of course, the cause of true knowledge.)

These higher levels of the path of praxis occupying the fourth level of the psyche effectively take us from means (such as purifying the limbs and acts of the body) to outcomes. Removing heedlessness and adorning the fourth level with invocation is sought for having an ultimate eschatological outcome (most people not even having the capacity to reach beyond it). At any rate, it shows how al-Ghazālī has extended praxis into a path of praxis to include invocation and contemplation (and how he continues to build his revival of religion and praxis on the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy).

There is a distinction between imitative and knowledge and invocation, of course. After all, we said above that imitative knowledge occupies the third level of the psyche while invocation occupies the left side of the fourth level. This is reflected in a single passage in the *Iḥyā'* related in the following section in which al-Ghazālī states that invocation can also lead to the encounter with God.

5. The eschatological value of invocation and contemplation

It is important to reveal the eschatological value al-Ghazālī assigns to invocation and contemplation, the practices which he integrates into his path of praxis. This is because it is part of his structure and in this thesis, we are interested in its implications for his notion of religion and how its practices are woven into a path integrating the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy. Invocation in particular is assigned an important intermediate eschatological state;

one which differentiates it from imitative knowledge the previous section said it was linked to. So, while Chapter 4 (on imitation and demonstration) made the two modes of knowing to be the causes of salvation and felicity, respectively, in at least one passage, invocation is said to be a cause of an intermediate eschatological state and one which ultimately leads to felicity. As discussed at the end of this subsection, this partially challenges any claim that al-Ghazālī's praxis is elitist or privileges the intellectual. The passage states that invocation may lead to felicity, but unlike contemplation, this requires first remaining in the world of the grave.

In a separate passage, al-Ghazālī sets out a general framework outlining how the elements of the path of praxis result in eschatological states. He sets both invocation and contemplation apart from praxis (*ʿamal*), using the term felicitator (*musʿid*) for them and salvific (*munjī*) for it as follows:

T25, Iḥyāʾ, 3:215.8–30

> Nothing remains with the servant after death except three attributes: a) purity of heart—i.e. cleanliness from filth—b) one's intimacy in the invocation of God, *most high*, and c) one's love for God, *mighty and majestic*. Purity of heart and its cleanliness does not occur except through refraining from desires of the here-below. Intimacy does not occur except through copious invocation of God, *most high*, and remaining steadfast therein. Love does not occur except through knowing God (*maʿrifa*) and knowing God does not occur except through constant contemplation. These three attributes are the salvific felicitators (*munjiyyāt musʿidāt*) after death.
>
> As for cleanliness of the heart from desires of the here-below, it is of the salvific (states; *munjiyyāt*) because it is a shield (*junna*) between the servant and the punishment of God. … As for intimacy and love, they are of the felicitators (*musʿidāt*). The two of them make the servant reach the pleasure of the encounter with God and beholding him (*al-liqāʾ wa-l-mushāhada*). This felicity comes quickly on the heels of death up to the moments of the beatific vision (*al-ruʾya*) in *Janna* and the grave becomes one of the gardens of *Janna*. … Then the viator of the Path of the Afterlife is the one who is steadfast in practising the causes of these three attributes: invocation, contemplation, and praxis (*ʿamal*) which weans one off the desires of the here-below and makes one dislike its pleasures and cuts one off from them.

Invocation and contemplation are lumped together, the two being said to cause felicity immediately after death. Both are referred to as felicitators (as distinct from salvific states), and it is difficult to say more because the passage does not speak of how they relate to each other and whether there is, for instance, an order between them. The eschatological state of salvation, on the other hand, comes from purity of heart from desires which refers to

removing vices and obtaining the salvific virtues. This is clear because al-Ghazālī describes vices in *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs* as dispositions formed by continually acting upon desires (and which entail deviating from the Aristotelian mean).[777] Purification of the heart thus refers to the bulk of the 3rd and 4th Quarters of the *Iḥyā'*.

Though this passage links both love and intimacy with the encounter, an important passage from the 1st Quarter offers a compromise: while the encounter is said here to occur quickly on the heels of death, the following passage indicates that invocation may indeed lead to the encounter, but only after the resurrection. Al-Ghazālī speaks of the benefit of invocation, as follows:

T26, Iḥyā', 1:303.9–305.22

> The servant takes pleasure in this intimacy after his death until he comes to dwell in proximity to God, *mighty and majestic*, and he ascends from invocation to the encounter (*liqā'*; with God) which occurs after what is in the graves is scattered forth and what is in the hearts is made to appear. None should deny that invocation of God, *mighty and majestic*, remains with him after death, saying that he will have been made to cease to exist, so how should invocation of God, *mighty and majestic*, because one does not cease to exist in a manner preventing invocation, but only a non-existence with regard to the here-below and the world of the corporeal and sensible world (*al-shahāda*), not from the incorporeal world. There is an allusion to what we have said in his words, *God bless him and send him peace*, 'The grave is either a pit of the hell-fire or a garden of the gardens of *Janna*'.

This passage placing the two occupants of the fourth level of the psyche, invocation and contemplation, on nearly the same footing has not been studied in current Ghazālī scholarship. The importance of felicity (caused by contemplation) has been studied by Ken Garden, who shows that this philosophical end has been incorporated as the ultimate, yet partially hidden, outcome of the revival. However, the current passage significantly alters the implications of this final end, indicating that to some degree it shares its ultimate status with the indigenous Sufi practice of invocation. And, while the previous passage lumps invocation and contemplation together, indicating they both lead to felicity, the current passage may be read not as conflicting with it, but as offering further detail, and a clearer role for invocation in leading to felicity. Invocation produces intimacy which leads to the encounter with God. It differs only in time of occurrence with contemplation: this encounter occurs after the resurrection of souls from the world of the grave. The link between the encounter with God

[777] *Iḥyā'*, 3:52.18–19.

and felicity is consistent in the *Iḥyā'*: this was seen in the previous passage, and it was studied more thoroughly in Chapter 3 (on the metaphysical parameters of the afterlife) where the encounter and beatific vision were associated with true knowledge.

The argument for how invocation can lead to felicity appears to be only partially produced. Inclining through habituation towards the afterlife via invocation seems to entail a problem to which only one solution appears to be present. If the meanings invoked are imitative they are, as argued in Chapter 4, corporeal. The solution would seem to be that because they are similitudes and meanings revealed through a prophet, they are complementary to the higher truth and similitudes have a power to impact the heart with their meanings, as studied in Chapter 2. Thus, invoking them in a way makes the soul incline towards the afterlife. This is an argument based on statements on the impact of similitudes studied in Chapter 2, but which al-Ghazālī does not spell out as much as we may like.

The said passage has great implications for two further matters. The first is the question of the audience of the *Iḥyā'*. The second is the relative importance of invocation and contemplation and its implications. Regarding the audience question, al-Ghazālī thus attempts to accommodate invocation—and more broadly the imitative knowledge with which he associates it—in key places of the *Iḥyā'*. This gives good reason to believe that, again, he is catering for that aspect of his audience incapable of the essentially related host of terms: contemplation, speculative inquiry, intellect, insight, and knowledge of the realities of things. So, while his praxis favours contemplation over invocation, his pastoral concern encourages him to offer a generous consolation prize: while Chapter 4 showed that he accorded salvation to imitative knowledge, here he offers felicity occurring after the grave to intimacy caused by imitative invocation.

Concluding reflections

The relative importance of invocation and contemplation was a matter of huge significance if one views it from a genealogical viewpoint: a) invocation is an indigenous Sufi practice whereas b) syllogistic contemplation is a Greek matter and philosophical in nature. (Of course al-Ghazālī would balk at such significance as genealogical arguments involve a logical fallacy.) It is important to note in passing that this issue remained an important one to the time of

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī.[778] Al-Ghazālī himself appears to wish to favour contemplation because it alone produces true knowledge. Also, true knowledge alone endures eternally and therefore it alone is fit to produce felicity in the afterlife, *except that he effectively challenges this by granting that invocation may cause eternal felicity*. In many places studied in this thesis, he shows signs of wishing to build his revival on the best reason and the best interpretation of revelation in its light. The compromise he strikes seems to afford a manner for both indigenous and a more scientific and demonstrative method to cause felicity.

Al-Ghazālī's praxis is thus shown to be the means to gain true, incorporeal knowledge and the corresponding eternal felicity. He develops Avicenna's notion of the mutual influence of the body and soul, but further develops its implications within a four–level psychology allowing him to tie worship, imitative, invocation—all three being associated with imitation—and contemplation into a path of praxis. There is present—between the corporeal–incorporeal and imitation–demonstration dichotomies studied in previous chapters—a continuity, as these dichotomies continue to underpin this path of praxis. These dichotomies arise at nearly every juncture as demonstrated in numerous occasions in this chapter. Especially in the study of invocation and its eschatological implications, the doctrines that the soul does not die with bodily death and the dualist eschatological doctrine of salvation and felicity shown in previous chapters to be adopted by al-Ghazālī as early as the *Tahāfut* carry on in the *Iḥyā'*. However, it seems al-Ghazālī slightly blurs this line, wishing to accord to revealed, imitative meanings (and their invocation), aspects of both a corporeal and incorporeal status indicated by their resulting in felicity after resurrection. (This, however, occurs in a single passage, with one broadly supporting passage.)

While the *Mīzān* essentially presents the praxis of the *falāsifa*, the religion revived by al-Ghazālī continues to be one whose end is ordered to the incorporeal felicity of the afterlife—but which accommodates corporeal salvation (and perhaps felicity via intimacy). Praxis becomes a means of travelling from the corporeal world to the incorporeal, incorporating scriptural, Sufi, and philosophical practices.

Al-Ghazālī builds on Avicenna's metaphysicalized ethics and science of the rational soul, but greatly expands its applications in his naturalization in the practices of his religious revival. Habituation remains the mechanism by which the corporeal changes the incorporeal,

[778] Damien Janos, 'Intuition, Intellection, and Mystical Knowledge: Delineating Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Cognitive Theories', in *Islam and Rationality,* 189–228.

but this mechanism is expanded through working out the levels and implications of the mutual influence of the body and soul. Even invocation which he makes into a means of felicity itself is a form of habituating the soul to produce intimacy with the incorporeal.

Appendix I: Theoretical and Practical Remedies for the Destructive Vices

Book #, chapter title(s)	**The practical remedy (*ʿamal*)**	**The theoretical remedy (*ʿilm*)/important note**
XXIII, 'The Benefits of Hunger and Harms of Satiety' *and* 'The Way of Discipline Rgarding Breaking the Desire of the Stomach'	Duties (*waẓāʾif*) of reducing amount of food and types of sauces for bread and increasing time between meals	To know ten benefits of hunger.
XXIV, 'The First Harm: Speaking about What Does not Concern one'	Isolation, putting a stone in one's mouth, to force the soul to be silent regarding some of what *does* concern one to accustom it to leaving what doesn't concern it	To know that death is before one, that one will be questioned regarding every word, that one's breaths are one's capital (in the path), and to know that the tongue is a net able to catch the houris (ranks and pleasures) of *Janna*
XXIV, 'The Remedy by which one Prevents Tongue from Backbiting'	None	To know one is exposing oneself to God's anger and invalidating one's good deeds

XXV, 'The Remedy for Anger after its Arousal'	To seek refuge in God, changing one's (bodily) position (e.g. from standing to sitting), or making ablution with cold water	1-To reflect on traditions about repressing anger, 2-to arouse fear by reminding oneself that unleashing anger may cause God to release His anger on one, 3-to warn one's soul of the calamities of revenge and anger of one's enemy, 4-to reflect on the ugly form of the one in anger, 5-to reflect on the cause of seeking revenge and not accepting to repress anger, 6-to reflect on one's anger being caused by surprise at God's destiny
XXV, 'The Remedy (*Dawāʾ*) which Removes the Sickness of Envy from the Heart'	Countering whatever feeling of envy prompts one to do	To know that envy harms you, doesn't harm your enemy, and that one's enemy actually benefits
XXVII, 'The Remedy for Eager Desire (*Ḥirṣ*) and Covetousness (*ṭamaʿ*) and the Medicine by which Contentedness is Obtained'	Moderate living (*iqtiṣād fī l-maʿīsha*) defined as limiting oneself to necessity	Includes patience (*ṣabr*) as 3rd pillar (*rukn*) of its remedy

XXVII, 'The Remedy for Miserliness (*Bukhl*)'		General: to oppose the causes of love of wealth; 1-love of the desires reached through wealth are treated by a) contentment, b) having little possessions, and c) patience (*ṣabr*); 2-(separate) treatment is needed for a) long hopes and b) concerns for children; 3-one should reflect on a) the stories of the generous, b) the miserly (to encourage disgust at the latter), and c) on the final ends of wealth. (Desired outcome): tTo see with the light of insight (*nūr al-baṣīra*) that spending is better
XXVII, 'The Sum of Duties (*Waẓā ̓if*) Incumbent upon a Worshipper in his or her Wealth'	Five duties (*waẓā ̓if*)	N/A
XXVIII, 'The Remedy for Love of Prestige'	Countering what prestige (*jāh*) calls for by the Malāmatī way	To know prestige is not a true perfection and will not last after death

XXVIII, 'The Means of Remedy for the Love of Praise and Dislike of Blame (*Ḥubb al-Madḥ wa Karāhat al-Dhamm*)'	None	To know the reasons one loves praise and hates blame (and then bear in mind its flaw): 1-feeling perfection due to praise: know it's not a true perfection and if it is, it is God's favour upon one, 2-feeling control over heart of panegyrist: to fear losing one's rank with God, 3-(enjoying) the diffidence and decorum which forced the panegyrist to praise one: to know this (power) over panegyrist is evanescent

XXVIII, 'The Remedy for the Dislike of Blame (*Karāhat al-Dhamm*)'	None	1-To know cause of dislike of blame is opposite of love of praise, so to understand (the latter from the prior). 2a-To know the critic was honest and intended to benefit one. 2b-To know the critic was honest but intending to vex and harm one, so the critic destroys his own religion and you benefit (receiving the critics good deeds as compensation as attested to in scripture) and he is harmed. 2c-To know the critic was merely slandering, so i) one may reflect on other flaws one has, ii) one may know that this slander is an expiation for other flaws, and iii) to know that the wretched slanderer has ruined their own religion.
XXVIII, 'The Medicine (*Dawā'*) for Ostentation (*Riyā'*) and the Path of Remedying (*Mu'ālaja*) the Heart of it'	1-To accustom oneself to worship in private. 2-To resist impulses (*khawāṭir*).	To realize that being held as praiseworthy in the eyes of people is not a perfection (*kamāl*) if the truth and God's knowledge does not agree.

XXIX, 'The Path of Remedying Arrogance (*Kibr*) and Obtaining Humility (*Tawāḍu'*) in its Place', 'The First Station: Plucking out its Root and its Theoretical and Practical Remedy'	1-To actually be humble before God and His creatures, 2-to perform the acts of the humble, 3-to perform the opposite of acts entailed by arrogance. (Practical remedies are provided by al-Ghazālī in spite of arrogance (*kibr*) being an internal (*bāṭin*) character trait; its external acts are termed overweening (*takabbur*).)	To know: 1-knowledge of one's Lord, 2-knowledge of the self, particularly its deficiencies which will bring about humility.
XXIX, 'The Path of Remedying Arrogance (*Kibr*) and Obtaining Humility (*Tawāḍu'*) in its Place', 'The Second Station: What Comes about of Overweening (*Takabbur*) from the Seven Causes Mentioned'	To test oneself by performing the acts of the humble to see if one finds this heavy on oneself	Seven causes of overweening listed and each is shown to be a false reason to be overweening
XXIX, 'The Path of Remedying Arrogance (*Kibr*) and Obtaining Humility (*Tawāḍu'*) in its Place', 'The General Remedy for Conceit ('*Ujab*)'	None	1-Candid reality: to know there is no actor in the universe but God. 2-Charitable version: tTo know that whatever ability one has (even if it belongs to one metaphorically as in reality all is God's) is itself given to us by God.

XXIX, 'The Path of Remedying Arrogance (*Kibr*) and Obtaining Humility (*Tawāḍu'*) in its Place', 'The Categories of that for which one May be Conceited and its Detailed Remedy (*Aqsām mā bihi al-'Ujab wa-Tafṣīl 'Ilājihi*)'	None	To know why one should not be conceited regarding 1-religious attributes: a) knowledge—by knowing true knowledge—and b) praxis, nor two-worldly attributes: a) lineage, b) beauty, c) strength, d) wealth, and e) supporters.

Chapter 6

The Salvific Virtues: States Emanating from True Knowledge and Intellectual Pleasure

Chapter Abstract

Little critical analysis of the features of al-Ghazālī's virtues is currently known to exist in writing, academic or otherwise. Some of the features listed below are listed or described, but not in a manner which assesses their application in his actual practices, nor in a manner reflecting on their implications for his project.[779] This chapter presents previously unstudied features of the virtues. It shows that the virtues are not merely dispositions which fit the bill of praxis in which virtues are posited dispositions towards the corporeal faculties. Rather, it shows that as presaged in the *Tahāfut* they are attachments to incorporeal pleasures and expressions of this pleasure.

Important features include the evidence that the flow of virtues down upon the limbs is an expression of the microcosm analogy. In addition to this cosmological downward flow, there is the opposite flow of purification which must begin with the lowest level and proceed to purify progressive levels. There are thus two directions relevant to the virtues, referred to here as a bi-directionality and which is a technical reworking of the Sufi notions of divestment (*takhliya*) which must precede adornment (*taḥliya*).

In the *Iḥyā'*, al-Ghazālī effectively makes them into signs that one has achieved knowledge, and intimacy or love, with the incorporeal. Because intimacy has the same effect of causing an inclination of the heart from the corporeal to the incorporeal, the same set of states laid out in the 4th Quarter may inhere in one whether or not one obtains true knowledge which is the ideal cause of love and the other states which proceed from it. The audience question is thus at the root of this matter of course because two different levels of people are able to acquire these states associated with the afterlife: those capable of contemplation and true knowledge and those who are not. In both cases they are signs that one has turned the heart from attachment to pleasure of the corporeal towards the incorporeal. Further, by making acts of the limbs the corporeal effects of the incorporeal

[779] This includes the works of Ken Garden, Sherif, Winter, and Abrahamov referred to in Chapter 1, Section I.

heart, he claims that such inclination must manifest on the limbs and therefore be knowable by the public. This allows him to incorporate the doctrines and dichotomies into a notion of the Sufi stations in which both audiences may nonetheless become scholars of the afterlife. This has a crucial social function of making religious scholars (in the true sense of the term) safely distinguishable from those for whom religion is only a means to temporal and worldly power.

This emphasis on inclination to the afterlife tempers but does not override the imitation-–demonstration dichotomy studied in Chapter 4, because the ranks obtained therein still override any notion of a rank obtained by obtaining the virtues listed in the 4th Quarter. Rather, al-Ghazālī produces a praxis which is fit to scaffold around the levels of belief and convey wayfarers of the path to the highest related eschatological state possible.[780] The praxis, or the path of praxis, in the *Iḥyā'* thus maintains the important role of performing the necessary removal of corporeal influence on the soul so it can obtain true knowledge. However, it integrates the lower sense of religion by making a manner for imitators to realise realize an inclination towards the incorporeal. In both cases, this involves conceiving of virtues not merely as a *habitus* of the soul, but as an inclination from one type of pleasure to another, which is the turn from corporeal to incorporeal pleasures inherent in Avicenna's notion of intellectual pleasures and his arguments for why they are generally not present yet are natural.

[780] The knowledge needed to obtain the virtues is shown below to be not only practical nor speculative knowledge, but in some cases one and in some cases the other.

I. The Salvific Virtues as State (*Ḥāl*) and Station (*Maqām*)

This chapter establishes that the salvific virtues developed by al-Ghazālī in the 4th Quarter accord with the claims of this thesis. The claims are that an ontological dichotomy explains the fundamental structure of the *Iḥyā'* and is used by al-Ghazālī to accomplish numerous aims including synthesizing reason and revelation and incorporating revealed and Sufi practices into a framework of faculty psychology in which praxis aims for felicity but makes room for salvation. So, while it was claimed in Chapters 2 and 3 that al-Ghazālī makes obtaining true knowledge fundamental to obtaining felicity and that he does this through reconceiving of true religion, the obtaining of that knowledge, and the subsequent intellectual pleasure in the afterlife, the question arises: are not the stations occurring in the final quarter of the *Iḥyā'* the ultimate goal of the *Iḥyā'*?

The structure of the argument needed to answer this question—and which guides this chapter—is as follows. To see how the virtues figure in the structure of a revival in which true knowledge is privileged requires seeing that al-Ghazālī's virtues are neither Sufi stations nor simply philosophical virtues (and that existing Ghazālī scholarship has not yet described their essential features.). One must understand them as states, then as composites of knowledge, state, and acts (as per *Kitāb al-Tawba* described in Chapter 4), and finally in the surprising manner in which al-Ghazālī makes the virtues to telescope as entailments of knowledge and love. (For instance, as he conceives them, if one has love one necessarily has good -pleasure and patience, but not vice-versa.) While there are many features of his virtues, these three aspects uniquely and logically express how the virtues relate to true knowledge. They express how true (incorporeal) knowledge and the inclination towards it remain the ultimate end towards which the revival is ordered and define the meaning of religion in that religious revival. This shows the ultimate importance of knowledge and shows the importance of the virtues without exaggerating that importance: they are the dispositions and character traits necessarily expressed in the soul whenich it has an inclination towards the incorporeal and coming from perception of it and attachment to it. This explanation will also make it clear how original are his virtues, they being distinct both from their equivalents in the Sufi and *akhlāq* tradition on which al-Ghazālī drew to compose the *Iḥyā'*. It will further argue that the virtues he proposes are built on the presupposition of an integral psyche by which is meant

that al-Ghazālī views the intellect, heart, acts, and states of the body as necessarily flowing down one from another.[781]

Al-Ghazālī's notion of the salvific virtues is as a unique composite which he himself developed as will come below. However, he acknowledges that when most people speak of states and stations, they do intend by them one aspect: the attribute of the heart (*wasf*) or what he calls in the *Kitāb al-Tahāra* section character traits (*khuluq*). He says that it is from this perspective that the (the Prophet Muhammad) said, 'Regret is repentance.'. Nonetheless, he insists that those who define repentance without listing the three, composite elements contained in his definition have not defined the reality of repentance. So, he is insistent that the salvific virtues are composites whose reality includes but exceed character traits.

Kitāb Riyāḍdat al-nafs defines character traits without mentioning the three elements, which shows the danger of studying the *Iḥyā'* based on individual statements as opposed to rooting out its structure.[782] The definition there is the standard definition transferred from the *Mīzān* and the *akhlāq* tradition: a disposition of the soul from which acts proceed without deliberation. This definition gives something of the ontology of a character trait: that it is a disposition inhering in the human soul. This helps introduce the further ontology found in the *Iḥyā'* which switches to the Sufi terms state and station as follows:

T1, *Iḥyā'*, 4:139.5–9

> An attribute (*wasf*) is only called a station (*maqām*) if it is firm and subsists (*idhā thabata wa-aqāma*) and (an attribute; *wasf*) is only called a state (*ḥāl*) because it is an accident which quickly ceases to exist (*ʿāriḍ sarīʿ al-zawāl*). Just as yellow is divided into that which is firm—such as the yellow of gold—and that which quickly ceases to exist—as in the yellow of fear—and into what is between the two—such as the yellow of a sick person; likewise the attributes (*ṣifāt*) of the heart take these divisions. So, that which is not firm (*thābit*) is called a state (*ḥāl*) because it passes quickly (*yaḥūlu ʿalā qurb*), and this applies to all attributes (*awṣāf*) of the heart.

This passage indicates that while Sufi terms are used, al-Ghazālī views them through the lens of a philosophical ontology. Stating they are accidents and dividing accidents is a means—and especially his examples—indicate this, especially when viewed in juxtaposition to the following passage from his major logical work written before the *Iḥyā'*:

T2, *Miʿyār*, 319.13–19

[781] Put negatively, it is impossible to have knowledge without this manifesting as a state of the heart and actions upon the limbs based on the cosmological relation of the *mulk* and *malakūt*, what is in the heart necessarily manifests on the limbs.
[782] *Iḥyā'*, 3:52.17.

> Qualities (*kayfiyāt*) not specific to quantity may be divided into those which are sensuous and those which are non-sensuous.[783] … Those sensuous conditions which are firm (*rāsikh*) are termed passive conditions (*kayfiyāt infiʿāliyya*) such as the yellow of gold and the sweetness of honey. That which passes away quickly is termed quickly passing (*sarīʿ al-zawāl*), such as the redness caused by embarrassment and the yellowness caused by fear, which are termed passions (*infiʿāl*). Those which are non-sensuous are divided into predisposition (*istiʿdād*) for (receiving) another matter and perfection (*kamāl*) which is not a predisposition for (receiving) another matter. …
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> As to perfections not possible to be a predisposition for another perfection and which are intrinsically non-sensuous, such as knowledge and health, those which are quickly passing are termed states (*ḥālāt*), such as the anger of a patient person and the sickness of a healthy person, and that which is firmly fixed (*thābit*) is termed a disposition (*malaka*). I mean by knowledge ([in this case)] that which is made firm through long study as opposed to that obtained through educational lessons which is libel to pass, for knowledge is a non-sensuous condition of the soul (*al-nafs*).

While the states and stations still seem to be character traits in the *Iḥyāʾ*, the *Iḥyāʾ* further draws on the philosophical distinction between accidents which are slow or quick to pass. The shared examples of gold taken from a discussion of the various types of qualities of the soul indicate that al-Ghazālī dips into the philosophical topic of the ten categories (of which qualities are one) to enrich his developing notion of states and stations in the *Iḥyāʾ*. It is surely an example of using Sufi terms but underpinning them with a philosophical ontology and faculty psychology. Being that states and stations are the topic of the entire second half of the *Iḥyāʾ*, it is an extremely important example. The main import of this technical use in the *Iḥyāʾ* is to clarify the notion of salvific virtue and to indicate in general that al-Ghazālī is keen to maintain the canons of speculative inquiry in his religious revival, which he stated as a rule making his science of the afterlife into a science and which he contrasted with Sufis who did not capture universal meanings (see Chapter 2). And the passage indicates that notion states and stations are as character traits which are, ontologically speaking, qualities of the human soul and either quickly or slowly passing accidents. So, while Section II shows that al-Ghazālī insists that the salvific virtues are three composite elements, this section has shown that he is keen to develop the main notion of the character trait in the centre of the three elements.

[783] *Miʿyār*, 319.14–15: 'The sensible condition is that by which (another) sensible (object) is caused (to exist; *yanfaʿil ʿanhu al-maḥsūs*), i.e. effects of sensible (objects) occur in it such as colour, taste, heat, and cold which cause effects (to exist) in the five senses.'

And while character traits will be shown not to be the final aim of the *Iḥyā'*, we will see that they do not fall away like stages of a rocket which fall back to earth after their fuel propels the rocket and runs out of fuel. Rather, they will be seen in Section III to be integrated and necessarily remain as part of the psyche even after the aim of the path has been achieved.

II. The Virtues as Attachments to the Incorporeal

Chapter 1 cited the *Tahāfut* to the effect that virtues were attachments to matters of the afterlife. This is important for the argument made in this thesis, most prominently in Chapter 3 (on the ontological parameters of religion), that true religion is reconceived by al-Ghazālī as the incorporeal due to its eternal nature which fits it to cause felicity to the human soul in the afterlife. The current section aims to present an argument based on passages from the *Iḥyā'* that its virtues are indeed attachments. The virtues are argued to be attachments in the limited sense that the character traits aspect of the stations involves a pleasure and inclination. The three aspects of the salvific virtues were studied in Chapter 4, Section IV, 'The Structure of the Religious Stations and their Relation to Eschatological Ranks'. That section showed that knowledge was the root of the virtues. In some cases, the state or attribute of the heart produced by knowledge was referred to as a pain or desire caused by the realization generated by the knowledge. There are two ways to see the salvific virtues as an attachment. One is to bear in mind that the virtues and vices of the *Iḥyā'* belong to one genus, namely character traits, and thus to cite statements about the vices which likely also apply to the virtues. Another is to see the salvific virtues in their widest context which is fully argued in Section III but may be summarized here for the purpose of this argument in terms of the original basis developed in the *Iḥyā'* for dividing the destructive vices from the salvific virtues.

A. The Division between the *Iḥyā'*s Vices and Virtues

To see the nature of the virtues, it is necessary to see the nature of the vices. This is because their natures are opposites in terms of their object of attachment. The destructive vices include character traits which are attachments to corporeal objects and their pleasures, while the salvific virtues are attachments to corporeal pleasures. Al-Ghazālī nowhere spells out that he has introduced a new basis for the vices and virtues. In fact he does not even modify the presentation of vice and virtue which he himself presents in *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs*, which largely

represent the vices and virtues from the *akhlāq* tradition.[784] Some of the evidence of constructing a new basis was presented in Chapter 3 which studied the tension between the corporeal and incorporeal pleasures which he develops primarily in *Kītāb al-Maḥabba*. There, he carefully divided the objects of apprehension into the corporeal and incorporeal and presented the philosophical theory of pleasure which is for an organ to apprehend objects suitable to it. Without a development in which more mature pleasures replace each other and finally intellectual pleasure overcomes even the desire for leadership, one remains in the grasp of corporeal pleasures.

An important seed of the development of the original basis for the vices is found in the *Mīzān*. The standard version relates the cardinal virtues to each of the faculties when they have a disposition which represents the Aristotelian mean. The mean of the intellect produces wisdom, that of desire produces moderation (*ʿiffa*), and that of anger produces courage (*shujāʿa*). The vices, on the other hand, lie at the two extremes; for instance, at the extremes of moderation lie greed (*sharh*) and apathy (*khamūd*).[785] The *Mizān* takes two steps towards breaking down this organizsation of the vices and building a new one. First, it gathers passages from al-Iṣfahānī which divide goods and pleasures into those particular to humans and those which are shared with animals.[786] He follows this classification of goods with *Bayān* 23, 'What is praised and blamed of the acts of the desire of the stomach, genitals, and anger',[787] which shows that he was looking for a criterion to judge which of the animal pleasures and acts of the lower faculties were praiseworthy and blameworthy.[788] In addition, his addition of anger to this list represents, in the context of his writing, the beginning of the breaking down of the organizsation of vice and virtue according to the faculties. Second, the *Mizān* unites a list of items around the virtue moderation, further breaking down the traditional division of the virtues. This can be seen first in his treatment of the cardinal virtues (*umuhāt al-faḍāʾil*), where al-Ghazālī breaks away from his sources (Avicenna and al-

[784] The fact that this book presents the standard *akhlāq* view of the cardinal virtues from the *Mīzān* indicates it was written before the actual 3rd and 4th Quarter books of the *Iḥyāʾ*, or, this being less likely, that al-Ghazālī wished to conceal the actual nature of his vices and virtues in the 3rd and 4th Quarters or make the reader work it out for themselves.
[785] See, e.g., Avicenna's *al-Akhlāq*, 27.16–17.
[786] *Bayān* 22 presents four different manners of classifying goods or virtues. The first three are from a single location in *al-Dharīʿa*, i, 24, while the fourth which outlines the pleasures specific to each of the three faculties is from *al-Dharīʿa*, iii, 10, in an altogether different section. (Janssens, 'Al-Ghazālī's *Mīzān al-ʿamal*', 131.)
[787] *Mīzān*, 122.14.
[788] *Bayān* 23 is in part named after *al-Dharīʿa*, iii, 11 and 12, though with the addition of anger treated in Section iv of *al-Dharīʿa*.

Iṣfahānī) by listing a broad set of elements which that sound familiar from the *Iḥyāʾ*, 3rd Quarter, as follows, 'Human beings should be vigilant over desire—excess being the usual (case)—especially regarding what is entailed by the genitals and stomach, *and regarding wealth, leadership, and love of praise*. Excess and deficiency in each of these are a flaw and perfection is only (found) in moderation (*iʿtidāl*).'[789]. In the same passage, he introduces the notion that all corporeal goods were created for the purpose of perfecting the human being and that moderation is holding oneself to the limit needed for this purpose rather than engaging for greed.[790] Al-Ghazālī then applies this same lenses to sex.[791] These discussions become an important conceptual source for the first practical book of the 3rd Quarter: *Kitāb Kasr al-shahwatayn*.[792]

Further, al-Ghazālī returns to the topic of moderation within *Bayān* 23. While the topics referred to above, the desire of the stomach and genitals, was drawn from *al-Dharīʿa*, al-Ghazālī himself adds a long section on anger, patience, and then envy in which he talks of the expansive notion of moderation as follows:

T3, *Mīzān*, 135.15–136.12

> Thus, (what has proceeded) is the (complete) statement regarding control of the acts of these attributes (*ṣifāt*). If you ask, 'Does one become temperate who controls all these acts until there occurs in his soul thereby firm character traits by which (other praiseworthy) acts become easy?', then you should know that temperance is not complete unless it conjoins temperance of the hand, tongue, hearing, and sight. Its definition regarding the tongue is withholding it from sarcasm, backbiting, talebearing, lying, defamatory insinuations, and using belittling nicknames. Regarding hearing, it is leaving off listening to foul (words) of the tongue such as backbiting, etc., and to listening to forbidden sounds. The same is the case for the rest of the limbs and faculties. And, the pillar of temperance of all the limbs is to withhold them from whatever (object or act) is specific to them except what is savoury (*yasūghuhu*) according to the intellect and sharia and within the limits they find savoury. Then, it (i.e. temperance) is not complete through that unless one's aim (*qaṣd*) in giving or withholding is pursuing the (relevant) virtue and seeking to draw close to God, mighty and majestic, and His good pleasure.

This passage makes it clear that, unlike al-Iṣfahānī who explicitly limited temperance to the stomach and genitals, al-Ghazālī makes the objects and acts of temperance anything which

[789] *Mīzan*, 88.3–5.
[790] *Mīzān*, 88.5–14.
[791] *Mīzān*, 88.14–89.3.
[792] See Appendix I, 'The Sources of Book XXIII from the *Akhlāq* Tradition, Sufi Manuals, and Scripture'.

contradicts reason and revelation and combines the theoretical concerns of virtue theory with religious concerns of drawing close to God. The contextual significance of *Bayān* 23 following *Bayān* 22 which ordered goods and pleasures is that the objects of *Bayān* 23 are all faculties, organs, and objects shared with animals, and therefore relating more specifically to the concupiscent and irascible faculties. The significance of *Bayān* 23 extending to include a number of objects not treated together by al-Ghazālī's predecessors appears to be that he is endeavouring to craft a general approach to ethics which examines the impact of corporeal/animal goods and pleasures on the soul. Upon this basis, he distinguishes between animal pleasures and intellectual ones, and then allows that the animal pleasures may be a means so long as they are aligned with the wisdom for which they were created, which is to preserve the individual and the species, with the ultimate end that they be used as a riding mount to obtain felicity in the afterlife. This then becomes the platform for the vices of the 3rd Quarter upon which practices from both the Sufi and *akhlāq* tradition (in many cases originated by al-Ghazālī himself) may be built.

In the *Iḥyā'*, the discussion is recast into the tension between the afterlife and the here-below, expressed most thoroughly in terms of objects in the following passage:

T4, *Iḥyā'*, 3:225.19–226.1

> To commence, the trials of the here-below have many branches and angles…but wealth is the greatest of its trials. … In general, it is not free of benefits and harms. Its benefits are from the salvific virtues (*munjiyyāt*) and its harms are of the destructive vices (*muhlikāt*). Distinguishing its good from its evil is of the finer points. None is capable of this but the firmly footed scholars (*'ulamā' rasikhūn*) of religious insight (*dhawū al-baṣā'ir fī al-dīn*), not the deluded scholars of (mere) outward formalities (*mutarassimīn*). Explaining this separately is important because what we mentioned in the book 'Blame of the Here-Below' did not examine wealth specifically. Rather, it was about the here-below in general, because the here-below encompasses every short-term share (*kull ḥazz 'ājil*). Wealth includes (only) some parts of the here-below, prestige some parts, following the desires of the stomach and genitals some parts, relieving anger and envy some parts, and arrogance and seeking to elevate oneself (above others) some parts. It has many parts, but they all share in being a short-term share for the human being.

The topics here highly resemble the topics of the 3rd Quarter. Vices related to the faculty of desire, i.e. the stomach and genitals, and anger—and those elements al-Ghazālī makes as a branch of anger such as arrogance—are all termed part of the here-below. There, here-below

thus follows a division into the incorporeal which was established in the *Mīzān* but is effectively the same as that which Chapter 3 showed was presented by al-Ghazālī in *Kitāb al-Maḥabba*. The same chapter showed that the afterlife, a term standing in opposition to the here-below, is only eternal, incorporeal knowledge. Thus, 'short-term share' here means every corporeal share (or pleasure) which, by contrast, passes away with the body and does not last forever. The importance of this passage is particularly in that it lists these pleasures related to the here-below as a list and this list matches not only the contents of the *Mīzān* passages which broke down the basis for the vices, but also the contents of the 3rd Quarter. Religion in al-Ghazālī's religious revival, especially the 3rd and 4th Quarter, is thus built on this corporeal–incorporeal split. The items of the 3rd Quarter represent the corporeal pleasures or the objects of pleasures and faculties. The terms corporeal and here-below are also linked and this is further linked to the split into what passes with the corporeal body and what is eternal and subsists with the human soul.

That these pleasures and objects of perception cause attachments is made most clear in *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs*. Chapter 5 on praxis showed that from the *Mīzān*, vices were said to be deviations from the mean which allowed the corporeal faculties to be active and make a passive disposition in the incorporeal soul. The *Tahāfut* passage studied in Chapter 1 also stated that the vices such as spend thrift and miserliness were two attributes and that each was removed (or nearly removed) at the mean which he likened to lukewarm water which that is neither hot nor cold. The matter of attachments is only mentioned in one *Tahāfut* passage cited in Chapter 1. That passage refers both to vices and virtues as an attachment (*ʿilāqa*), and in regards to vices it does not explain this attachment, except that immediately after mentioning it the passage turns to steadfastly acting according to what the desires entailed which results in the character traits becoming firm in the soul. The same term (*rusūkh*) occurs in the clearest passage of *Kitāb Riyāḍat al-nafs* which appears to explain the meaning of connection as related to the mean and pleasure as follows:

T6, *Iḥyāʾ*, 3:61.27–34

> If you wish to know the mean, look at the act entailed by the forbidden character trait. If it is easier for you and more pleasurable than what opposes it, then the trait which entails that act predominates in you. For example, if withholding or gathering wealth are more pleasurable and easier for you than spending it where it is deserved, then know that miserliness predominates in you. Therefore, increase in being steadfast in spending. … Thus, you remain vigilant (*turāqib*) of your soul. You

> reason based on the evidence regarding your character in terms of making your acts easy or difficult till you cut the attachment of your heart from taking notice (*iltifāt*) of wealth. Thus, you do not incline towards spending nor towards withholding it. Rather, it becomes like water to you: you do not seek regarding it except withholding it for someone who needs it or withholding it for someone who needs it.[793]

The passage uses the same example from the *Tahāfut*: the extremes which lie at the extremes regarding spending wealth and how to remove these extremes. However, in the context of the *Iḥyā'*, deviation from the mean is related not only to an act which is entailed by a corporeal desire, but an element is added: attachment and taking notice. This is to add the element of perception: one not only acts (through spending) but perceives the object. While this may be most obvious regarding the objects of eating and sex, al-Ghazālī makes the matter general, applying to the formation of all vices. The important element of pleasure occurs at every juncture of this discussion. There is not only an act such as opening the hand or closing it which seems pleasure neutral. Rather, in these acts there is an object whose perception causes pleasure, presumably differing from one object to another, but all being pleasurable in some universal manner. The fact that al-Ghazālī was shown in Chapter 5 in the passages leading up to this rehearses Avicenna's arguments for intellectual pleasures and the tension between them and corporeal pleasures implies that al-Ghazālī is using the notion here. Avicenna posits that the human soul is naturally inclined to the incorporeal, but that vices are a manner in which the soul takes on corporeal pleasures as a second nature. Importantly, there is a fundamental tension between corporeal and intellectual pleasures studied in Chapter 3 on the ontological foundations of the path of the afterlife. From one perspective, al-Ghazālī's reorganizing the vices and virtues solely on the tension between the corporeal and incorporeal (i.e. intellectual) is a manner of applying this matter which Avicenna does not apply in his treatises on ethics. At the same time, it is hard not to see al-Ghazālī's notion of taking notice (*iltifāt*) as anything other than a Sufi influence. It is most likely that he is expanding ethics to incorporate new topics while at the same time using and expanding its basis, as opposed to deviating from a rational basis in the *Iḥyā'* which is often presumed to be a Sufi context.

B. The Virtues as Attachments

[793] This passage was referred to briefly in Chapter 5 in Section I.B, 'The Transfer of the Core Doctrines of Metaphysicalized Praxis to the *Iḥyā'*.

The study of the *Tahāfut* in Chapter 1 cited the statement that praxis includes not only removing attachments to the here-below, but also making very strong the soul's attachment (*ʿilāqatahu*) to matters of the afterlife, meaning eternal knowledge as per Chapter 3.[794] The only virtues caused directly by perception will be seen to be love and intimacy, the rest of the virtues being a cascading down or entailment of either love or intimacy.[795] The element which is easiest to establish is that the virtues relate to a perception, so it will be addressed first.

Chapter 3 spoke of how pleasures are divided into those whose objects are sensible (and imaginal) and intelligible. The intellect was said to be the faculty particular to humans and the faculty responsible for apprehending the intelligibles. Further, those who perfect themselves prefer inner pleasures such as leadership, but the highest pleasure is knowledge. One important expression of the tension between the levels was the statement that the completion of knowledge is not reached until the domination by love of leadership leaves the heart. In the passages cited there, al-Ghazālī spoke of the new emerging pleasure as pushing the lesser one aside or breaking its desire. The person dominated by a given desire was said to be overcome by it. This indicates that for al-Ghazālī a given pleasure dominates one almost exclusively and must be broken to move to the next, higher pleasure. It was said above and in Chapter 3 that the corporeal pleasures he lists begin very quickly to resemble the topics of the 3rd Quarter. This indicates that the 3rd Quarter is a removal of attachments to the corporeal and somehow the 4th Quarter begins the treatment of attachments to the incorporeal. But how the 4th Quarter does this requires explanation provided in the final section of this chapter. First let us provide some indication that virtues are also an inclination or attachment.

The matter of inclination and habituation were mentioned in the previous chapter on praxis. The soul was said to be inclined by nature (*ṭabʿ*) to the here-below, requiring spending over half one's time in invocation or contemplation to 'tip the scales' and accustom it to intimacy and love of the incorporeal. The passage describing the habituation not translated there is as follows:

T7, *Iḥyāʾ*, 1:303.9–305.22

> If (the aspirant) finds success in remaining steadfast in it, he becomes intimate with Him, and the love of the one mentioned is planted in his heart. This should not be found strange, because we witness in ordinary

[794] The manner in which al-Ghazālī produces virtues which are an attachment in the *Iḥyāʾ* is related, but highly different.

[795] This does not include the initial topics of repentance, patience, and fear. This matter is explained in the following section.

> affairs that if you mention someone who is absent in front of someone and you repeatedly mentioned their qualities to them, they will love them or even come to have passionate love for them through description and constant mention. Then, if they come to passionate love through copious invocation which is initially artificial, they will in the end feel compelled to copious invocation such that they cannot stand it stopping. Whoever loves something mentions it frequently and whoever mentions something often, even if artificially, comes to love it. Such is the case with the beginning of invocation artificially until it produces intimacy with the one mentioned and love, followed by inability to bear being separated from it in the end. … This is the same meaning as the saying, 'I endured the Koran for twenty years, then I enjoyed it twenty years.' Pleasure does not come except from intimacy and love. Intimacy does not proceed except from consistency and endurance and forcing oneself for a long time until the artificial … becomes a (second) nature (*ṭab'*).
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> How could one find that far-fetched when a person may force themselves to eat a particular food they find disgusting at first and endure eating it and remain steadfast until it agrees with his (second) nature (*ṭab'*) until one can't bear not having it. The soul becomes accustomed and learning to tolerate what it does artificially.
>
> ******It is the self, whatever you accustom it to, it becomes accustomed to.******
>
> Whatever you force it to do in the beginning becomes a (second) nature (*ṭab'*) in the end. Then, if intimacy in the invocation of God, *exalted is He*, occurs it becomes dissevered from other than God and all others besides God, *Mighty and Majestic*.

Thus, there is a fundamental tension in the soul between inclination to the corporeal and inclination to the incorporeal. Acting artificially is required to generate an inclination towards love of the incorporeal. Inclination is caused by habituation. Inclination is not an instantaneous matter, but rather one which is produced through long pursuit of habits. The residual nature or what we may call inertia seem to be the substance of attachment and not to be entirely different from the notion of character traits being firm (*rāsikh*) mentioned above.

C. The Fount of the Virtues: Love Flowing from Knowledge and Pleasure

Chapter 3 cited *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* which indicated that love is caused by pleasure caused by knowledge. This is not an isolated passage, but rather the basis for the 4th Quarter. Understanding this is the basis for seeing how the virtues are attachments to the incorporeal, but with a very different structure to the vices. The virtues are shown in Section III.A below to flow from love (or, alternatively, intimacy) as entailments, but first let us bring the basic notion of love flowing from knowledge as presented in other books of the *Iḥyā'* into focus.

The first passage also serves to reinforce the claims that love involves an inclination and that there is a fundamental tension between the here-below and the true knowledge sought. The passage which serves to put the parts of the *Iḥyā'* in the context of its ultimate ends, and thus to explain the structure of the *Iḥyā'*, is as follows:

T8, *Iḥyā'*, 4:308.18

> The purpose of all righteous deeds is to cleanse the heart first from the here-below then to preserve that cleanliness. So, works are only sought for this knowledge.
> As to knowledge of how to perform works, it is sought for the deeds. So, knowledge is the first and it is the last. The first is the science of praxis and its aim is deeds and the aim of praxis is purity and cleanliness of heart such that the true state of affairs (*jaliyat al-ḥaqq*) becomes clear in it and it is adorned (*yatazayyan*) with knowledge of gnosis (*'ilm al-ma'rifa*) which is the science of speculative unveiling (*'ilm al-mukāshafa*).
> Whenever this gnosis occurs, love necessarily follows it just as one with balanced humours who sees something beautiful and perceives it with the outward eye loves it and inclines towards it. And when one loves it a pleasure occurs. So, pleasure necessarily follows love and love necessarily follows gnosis. This gnosis is arrived at—after ([first)] cutting preoccupations with the here-below from the heart—only through pure contemplation (*fikr ṣāfī*) and continual invocation (*dhikr dā'im*) and extreme seriousness in seeking and continuous reflection (*naẓar fī*) regarding God, His attributes, and the incorporeal aspect (*malakūt*) of His heavens and the rest of His creatures.

This passage establishes that works of worship are performed as part of praxis: purifying the heart from the influence of the here-below (read: incorporeal). After purification and cutting preoccupation with the here-below, love naturally and necessarily follows on from knowledge. (In less formal terms, we may say that 'to know is to love'). And knowledge is produced by contemplation, and, in this context, invocation. Once knowledge is produced, the passage states on ostensive order: knowledge, love, and pleasure. The passage states that pleasure follows love, but it seems from the *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* cited in Chapter 3 that—according to the Avicennian faculty psychology drawn on—all pleasures are caused by perception. It would make sense that knowledge causes pleasure which causes the feeling or state of love. Further, al-Ghazālī explains the reality of love as being caused by suitable perceptions and a natural inclination towards them.[796] Thus, how it is that love is placed in the middle and causes pleasure seems curious and could simply be a mistake or scribal error.

[796] *Iḥyā'*, 4:288.23–31.

III. The Virtues as Flowing Down from Knowledge

A. How the virtues flow from each other

The 'downward' flow designed into al-Ghazālī's virtues does not stop at love flowing from knowledge, but extends to other virtues, perhaps excluding the first three books on repentance, fear and hope, and patience and gratefulness. This exception aside, the flow of the virtues from love is stated most generally as follows, 'All the goodly religious (attributes; *maḥāsin al-dīn*) and noble character traits (*makārim al-akhlāq*) are the fruits (*thamara*) of love. And, whatever is not produced (*yuthmiruhu*) by love is (rather the mere) following of caprice (*ittibāʿ al-hawā*) and is from the vicious character traits (*radhāʾil al-akhlāq*).'[797] As this *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* passage indicates, both vices and virtues are fruits (or branches) from a single, fundamental cause. The dichotomy set out in here is love and caprice as sources of character. Love as a virtue is said in the introduction to *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* to be specifically love of God.[798] Caprice, on the other hand, is the short-term share of one's soul which serves no purpose for the afterlife.[799] The short-term share was shown above to be linked by al-Ghazālī to the corporeal and its pleasures for their own sake. Thus, the passage confirms Section II.A above which argued that the vices and virtues have a unique basis in the *Iḥyāʾ*, which is a universal split between attachments to the corporeal versus the incorporeal (i.e. true knowledge and matters of the afterlife). However, the passage just cited adds that the virtues branch off not only from incorporeal knowledge, but also from love. But, the manner in which the other virtues flow from love is simply stated here. It is not explained.

Full explanation of the manner in which individual virtues flow from love requires viewing the statements from across several books of the *Iḥyāʾ* collected in the following sub-section in discussion of the signs of the scholars of the afterlife. This is because not only do the virtues necessarily flow from love, but acts are also entailed by each of those states. Because the acts appear on the limbs, they are outward and hence visible to the eye and undeniable, like smoke indicates fire.

Full explanation also requires a proviso: it appears that in spite of al-Ghazālī's statement that all goodly character flows from love, that this only applies to the higher virtues. The full relation of the higher and lower virtues is explained as follows:

[797] Ibid., 4:329.3–4.
[798] Ibid., 4.286.14.
[799] Ibid., 3:217.1–2.

T9, *Iḥyā'*, 4:164.20–3

> This is the order (*tartīb*) of wayfaring through the stations (*manāzil*) of religion (*al-dīn*). After the root (*aṣl*) of certainty, there is no station but fear and hope and no station after them but patience, and through (patience comes) struggling against the self (*mujāhada*) and freeing oneself of all, inwardly and outwardly, for the sake of God. There is no station after struggling against the self—for the one for whom the path opens up—but guidance (*hidāya*) and gnosis. There is no station after gnosis but love and intimacy. And from amongst (those matters that are) necessitated by love are being pleased with the acts of the beloved and trust in the beloved's care which is reliance.

This passage indicates that one achieves certitude which produces fear and hope, patience, and struggling against the self. Struggling against the self involves occupying one's mind and limbs with worship. Another passage not only supports this order, but fills in what is meant by certitude and struggling against the self. Certitude means certainty (whether through imitation or contemplation) that sins are harmful in the afterlife.[800] Struggling against the self is to occupy oneself with invocation and—for those with the ability—contemplation.[801] This passage them makes sense, as Chapter 5 on praxis indicated that love and intimacy (which are mentioned in this passage) are produced by invocation and contemplation, respectively. If repentance, fear, and patience are not produced by love, they appear to be a middle ground between virtues and vices. They are merely states or stations which must be had to resist corporeal desires, not states flowing from incorporeal pleasures.

Some 4th Quarter statements do indicate the general principle that the virtues are, from one point of view, prerequisites and from another entailments (or in less formal language fruits). This is important, for otherwise one might ask how it is that this does not contradict the statements cited in this chapter and in Chapter 4 on imitation and demonstration that the stations (each) branch from knowledge.[802] A key to understanding how the virtues are organizsed thus appears to be that each virtue is acquired initially through striving to obtain the remedy said in the previous chapter on praxis to be a paste of knowledge and acts. However, al-Ghazālī indicates another order for the virtues. Once one has undergone

[800] Ibid., 4:56.21–3.
[801] Ibid.
[802] Note also the concept of the watercourses of certitude (*majārī al-yaqīn*). This notion of the stations according to which al-Ghazālī states that everything brought by the prophets has this flow was summarized in Chapter 4 on imitation and demonstration. This notion is important as it states that the psyche is integral such that what appears in the intellect necessarily manifests in the heart and then on the limbs. In this manner, the limbs are a sign of what is in the heart, as developed in the following subsection on signs of the scholars of the afterlife.

divestment in the order the virtues fall in the 4th Quarter, they then flow naturally or, we may say, cascade, one from another. One of the clearest statements of this is as follows:

T10, *Iḥyā'*, 8:363.12–364.1

> To proceed, love of God is the ultimate end (*ghāyat al-qaṣwā*) of the stations and highest of ranks. There is no station *after* obtaining love except that it is one of its fruits and one of its *consequences* (*tawābi'*) such as longing (*shawq*), intimacy (*uns*), good pleasure (*riḍā*), or one of their sisters and there is no station *before* it except that it is one of its *prerequisites* (*muqaddimātihā*) such as repentance, patience, detachment, and others.

This passage goes on to use the even more technical term concomitants (*lawāzim*) alongside consequences, indicating al-Ghazālī sees all states as logical entailments of love. The passage indicates that these other stations are consequences only after one has trodden a path, inculcating the virtues (after first removing the vices). This is a familiar Sufi theme that adornment must follow divestment, but al-Ghazālī has used a more rational or even logical language. That this logically imbued notion of divestment as a prerequisite is linked to his metaphor of purification presented in *Kītāb al-Ṭahāra* is made clear as follows:

T11, *Iḥyā'*, 4.308.5–12

> The path to uprooting love of the here-below from the heart is treading the path of detachment (*zuhd*) and holding fast to patience and submitting to them through the reigns of fear and hope. What we have mentioned of the stations of repentance, patience, detachment, fear, and hope are *prerequisites* (*muqaddimāt*) through which one acquires one of the pillars of love which is divestment (*takhliya*) of the heart from other than God. The first of (the pillars) is belief in God, the Last Day, the Garden, and the Fire. Thereafter, fear and hope branch off and from these two and repentance and patience *branch off* and this leads to detachment from the here-below regarding wealth, prestige, and every share (*ḥuẓūẓ*) of the here-below until the heart is cleansed of all other than God such that thereafter it has the capacity for knowledge and love of God to settle in it. All this is a prerequisite for cleaning (*taṭ-hīr*) the heart which is one pillar of love and to which there is an allusion in his words, upon him be blessings and peace, 'Cleanliness is half of belief' (*al-ṭahūr shaṭr al-imān*) as we mentioned at the opening of the *Kītāb al-Ṭahāra* (Book of Purification).

Thus, two directionalities appear: a) a direction of purification and treading the path (*sulūk*) and b) the resultant downward flow of fruits, consequences, and entailments. The notion that belief (or knowledge) are the root for the resultant product of the purified person is stated as follow, using another key metaphor for this reality of praxis:

T12, *Iḥyā'*, 4:308.12–17

> The second cause of strength of love: strength of knowledge of God and its expanding over and ruling the heart. That is after cleansing the heart of all preoccupation with and attachments (*ʿalāʾiq*) to the here-below and is like placing the seed in the earth after purifying it of weeds and it is the second part (*shaṭr*) (of the path or pillars of love). Then, from this seed the tree of love and knowledge is given birth and it is the goodly word (*kalima ṭayyiba*) by which God struck a similitude as He said, {God strikes a similitude: a goodly word like a goodly tree; its root is firm, its branches reach towards the heavens} (Koran 14:24).[803] And there is an allusion to it in His words, most high, {Unto Him ascends the goodly word} (35:10) which is gnosis (*maʿrifa*) {And a righteous deed raises it up}. So, the righteous deed is like a carrier (*ḥammāl*) for this knowledge and a servant of it.

This passage provides further evidence that knowledge is the basis from which the virtues flow, but only after purifying the heart. Here the metaphor of the goodly tree refers to the same reality referred to in the *Kitāb al-Tawba* passage in which knowledge was said to necessarily produce a state and a state acts upon the limbs. Though these statements on the two directions are not necessarily al-Ghazālī's last word on how the virtues are ordered from two perspectives,[804] the directions are clearly upheld by him in several passages.

These levels of knowledge, attribute, and act were said in the previous chapter to be worked out one by one. In at least one place, *Kitāb al-Khawf wa-l-rajāʾ*, al-Ghazālī works out all three levels, and even adds a fourth. He states that the knowledge (*maʿrifa*) causing fear emanates (*yafīḍ*) not only states (on the heart) and (acts) on the limbs, but also a fourth level, the body (*badan*), regarding which he lists a number of effects, such as becoming pallor.[805] Though al-Ghazālī does not work this fourth level out for all the virtues, four levels were seen in the important *Kitāb al-Ṭahāra* passage in which the fourth level is the bodily state of ritual purity. The cosmological matter of all existents having four levels is stated in *Kitāb al-Ḥajj* and reflects the statements of the *Mishkāt* and *Jawāhir* cited in Chapter 3 that everything in the

[803] At *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:320.25–6 (translated below in treatment of the virtues as signs of the scholars of the afterlife), al-Ghazālī also refers to love as a goodly tree with a firm root and branches reaching towards the heavens. He says its fruit appears on the heart, tongue, and limbs and these effects emanating from it upon the heart and limbs indicate (*tadull*) love just as smoke indicates fire (reasoning from effect to cause).

[804] See, for example, the *Iḥyāʾ*, 4:164.20–3, translated in full above which indicates that the flow may not be a) all the way up then b) all the way down.

These passages show al-Ghazālī applying the two directions of wayfaring and entailment, though with creativity (and one may note small differences even between the original passage and its explanation).

[805] Al-Ghazālī states this as follows: '*As to the body*, [it brings about] emaciation, pallor, fainting, crying out, weeping, and perhaps a bursting of the gall-bladder leading to death, or it may ascend to the brain and spoil the intellect, or become strong such that it lead to despair or resignation' (*Iḥyāʾ*, 4:153.2–3), making it patently clear he intends to set out the body as a separate level to the other level he mentions: the limbs (*jawāriḥ*).

mulk has a similitude (*mithāl*) in the *malakūut*. It is very hard not to see al-Ghazālī as drawing from the more technical *Maʿārij* passage which describes the psyche as a microcosm as follows:

T13, *Maʿārij*, 90.4–17

> We mean by ethical wisdom a state and virtue of the intellectual soul (*nafs ʿāqila*) through which it governs the irascible and concupiscent faculties and it measures their movements according to the necessary amount regarding advancing (and taking) and retreating (and withholding). It is the knowledge of correct action and the management of worldly states, (that knowledge being) derived from the theoretical intellect and drawing (knowledge of) the universals (*kulliyāt*) from the angels. (Then,) the practical intellect draws (knowledge of) the particulars (*juzʾiyyāt*) from the theoretical intellect (*ʿaql naẓarī*) and governs the body through the (ethical) obligation(s) of the sharia (*wājib al-sharʿ*).
>
> (What has been said all) falls under the similitude (*mithāl*) of the celestial intellect, soul, and bodies. (This is) because the intellect apprehends the universals and it does not have in it that which lies in potential.[806] From them, the soul apprehends the universals. And, by means of the universals it apprehends the particulars and moves the heavens (*samawāt*). Through their movement the elements move and thus from them the compound (entities; *murakkabāt*) are generated. Similarly, our intellect derives the universals from the angels and it pours (*yafīḍ*) the universals down upon the practical intellect. Then, by means of the body and imagination, the practical intellect apprehends the particulars of the world of the body. Thus, it moves them according to the obligation(s) of the sShariīʿa and from them beautiful character traits (i.e. the virtues) are generated.

Kitāb al-Tawba already asserted a cosmology behind the psyche and the levels of intellect, heart, and limbs.[807] Further, in *Kitāb Sharḥ ʿajāʾib al-qalb*, al-Ghazālī already asserts that the human psyche is constructed upon a microcosm–macrocosm analogy. Thus, this passage merely adds a specific type of microcosm analogy which is based upon elements we already know from this thesis that he also upholds: a) a faculty psychology and b) a corporeal–incorporeal body–soul dichotomy, the latter of which Chapter 3 showed to be drawn on Avicennian passages in the *Mīzān*, and elsewhere. Thus, this passage merely connects the dots

[806] The editor Kurdi has '*wa laysa fīhi mā fī al-quwwa*', while Köprülü (Fazil Ahmed), 853, f. 41r has '*wa laysa fīhā mā bi-l-quwwa*'. Neither variation is clear beyond interpretation. Kurdi's text seems to be lacking a word such as 'practical (*al-ʿamalī*)' such that it would read 'there is not in the intellect that which is in the practical faculty'. The Köprülü text might indicate that the potentialities—such as the particulars instantiating the universals and the movements of those particulars—are not actually in the universals themselves. I have favoured the Köprülü reading because it is less likely to be a mistake.

[807] It specifically asserted four levels, the fourth according with the *Kitāb al-Khawf wa-l-rajāʾ* passage above in which the fourth level is the body. In the case of purification, the fourth level refers to ritual purification of the body.

already alluded to in the *Iḥyā'*: that the specific notion of the analogy is that the human soul and its corporeal and incorporeal levels accord with the cosmos and its corporeal and incorporeal levels. This specific notion of the analogy is the main topic of the treatise generally considered authentic: *al-Nafkh wa-l-taswiya*. This treatise states that form of God upon which Adam was created is this resemblance and that the soul is incorporeal in a manner resembling God who rules the corporeal world (here termed the world of creation (*khalq*)) but is incorporeal (here termed (the world of) command (*amr*)). This form of analogy is also referred to in the *Iḥyā'*, so there is no reason to doubt that al-Ghazālī holds the specific form of analogy behind the *Maʿārij* text which only adds a careful working out of how the levels of the psyche interact with each other. The importance of this discussion is that in our assessment of al-Ghazālī's psychology in the *Iḥyā'*, we do not have to guess regarding the doctrine he holds and this has evidential value for assessing the strength of other evidence in this thesis for the four levels of the psyche and the emphasis on the corporeal–incorporeal dichotomy running through the *Iḥyā'*. Nonetheless, the *Maʿārij* is supplemental evidence, there being no doubt as to al-Ghazālī's commitment to the said analogy. There also seems no doubt that the four levels woven into his praxis are designed to accommodate this analogy and its levels.

B. Signs of Scholars of the Afterlife: The Rhetorical Structure for Making the *Iḥyā'* a Proof (*Ḥujja*) against Scholars of the Here-Below

The general claim of this section is that, after purification or divestment has been accomplished, al-Ghazālī holds that the virtues flow down from one another, specifically from love. He has designed this feature such that the subsequent virtues are necessary entailments which serve as signs, as smoke signals the existence of fire. According to a cosmological rule, these virtues must necessarily manifest in the *mulk* represented by the limbs, so the proof is clear for all to see. It will first be argued in what sense this proof works. Thereafter, al-Ghazālī's statements on the topic will be assessed, followed by a further subsection studying his statements of the arrangement of the virtues following love.

The virtues are a proof in the sense that, as per Section II. A above, one's nature is either inclined towards the corporeal or the incorporeal, intellectual, and spiritual pleasures. The incorporeal pleasure is obtained either by achieving intimacy or love. Once this is

obtained—which seems to happen only after traversing the rest of the virtues and then engaging in invocation or contemplation—the virtues flow down, just as the previous section stated that all the religious and goodly attributes flow from love. In the case in which one has tread this full path, the virtues specifically signal that one has knowledge of the incorporeal and the resultant pleasure and inclination towards it. It may be argued, based on the next sub-section, that this also applies to a lesser degree to those who have partially trodeaden the path towards the incorporeal afterlife, having inculcated some of the prerequisites indicating an inclination towards the incorporeal.

Two important passages refer to the states and acts as signs (including use of the metaphor of smoke and fire), one of which speaks of them as signs of religious knowledge. Other passages cited elsewhere, which refer to states asre being entailments or, alternatively, prerequisites, are evidence that al-Ghazālī has worked this matter out and applying it, even if not referring to it explicitly. The first important passage indicates that not only states, but also acts, are signs is as follows:

T14, *Iḥyā'*, 4:320.23–6

> Know, that all might claim love, for how easy is the claim and how rare is the meaning (*ma'nā*). Thus, a person should not be deluded…so long as he does not test it through signs and demand demonstration (*barāhīn*) and proofs (*adilla*) for it. Love is a goodly tree. Its roots are firm (in the ground), its branches (reaching) towards heaven. Its fruits appear in the heart and on the tongue and limbs. These effects flowing (*fā'iḍa*) from it upon the heart and limbs indicate love, like smoke indicates fire and like fruits indicate trees. These signs are many.

The passage speaks of love as a tree, but it seems clear that in the *Iḥyā'* love is caused by true knowledge which is the ultimate root. The surrounding discussion is penetrated with insights into how the heart turns one way or another and the limbs follow, giving outward signs. Note that in the *Kītāb al-Tawba*, al-Ghazālī stated that states necessarily flow from knowledge and acts necessarily flow from states. However, here this ontological entailment is converted into logical terms such that the existence of the latter is a sign and proof producing knowledge of the existence of, in this case, love. In this same *bayān*, al-Ghazālī then lists many fruits which are effectively signs, so this matter is applied to the structure of this part of the *Iḥyā'*. The fourth sign is intimacy with God and being in retreat (*khalwa*) with Him.

The second important passage ties in religious knowledge to the notion of prerequisites and signs. The passage also confirms the notion that (true) knowledge occurs

after the virtues are obtained (presumably also after engaging in contemplation). The states then flow down from this true religious knowledge. The passage occurs in a *bayān* devoted to the stories, sayings, and unveilings of lovers of God. Al-Ghazālī turns to the matter of proof. He cites several prophetic traditions citing characteristics which indicate by presence or lack whether one's belief (*īmān*) is complete, these including asceticism and preferring obscurity and the afterlife over this life. He states that such matters are obvious in the sShari'a, yet they are deemed far-fetched by those who consider themselves scholars of the sShari'a.[808] Al-Ghazālī uses these traditions to bolster his notion of prerequisites. After citing them, he refers to their contents as prerequisites as follows:

T15, *Iḥyā'*, 4:348.13–15

> Thus, these are prerequisites (*shurūṭ*) which were mentioned by the Emissary of God, *God bless him and give him peace*, for those possessing belief (*īmān*). So how strange it is for him to claim to possess religious knowledge (*'ilm al-dīn*) and not to find in himself a speck of these prerequisites. Further, his share coming from his knowledge and intellect is but denial of something that only comes after traversing great and lofty stations that are beyond (mere) belief.

In spite of lacking aspects of basic belief, such a religious scholar denies the existence of something far past, which is absurd as such a scholar has obviously never reached those stations. In spite of this, they claim to be a religious scholar possessing religious knowledge. Tying love back into the discussion, he relates a story and comments that if one is not dominated by love to this extent how should they expect miracles and unveilings which are beyond love which is itself beyond perfect belief (*kamāl al-īmān*).[809] This is a crucial topic for al-Ghazālī's project of revivification of the religious sciences: determining what constitutes religious knowledge and producing signs which are effectively proofs of one possessing this. It serves as a criterion for those claiming religious knowledge and to undermine those that lack these states, including those whose knowledge is exclusively *fiqh* and *kalām* theology. It is an important example of his weaving logical structures into various topics. In this case, it is specifically a logical structure in which more and more specific or restricted notions entail the more general which are logical prerequisites of them. The same organization is described in Section C below where al-Ghazālī explained that being part of the Prophet's family entails

[808] *Iḥyā'*, 4:348.4–6.
[809] *Iḥyā'*, 4:348.17–19.

being Ḥasanī, but also (logically *a fortiori*) Qurayshī, Arab, and human because of the intrinsic relation of the concepts to each other (explained as concentric rings).

As shown below, al-Ghazālī's form of argument that someone is a scholar of the afterlife is built on a valid form of argument: *modus tollens* (denial of the consequent). According to the logic set out in al-Ghazālī's *Miʿyār*, the negation of an entailment (or consequent) does indeed validly entail the negation of the antecedent. For example, if knowledge causes love, then lack of love validly necessitates lack of knowledge. However, were he merely to say that one has love therefore one has knowledge, this would not be valid because there are other possible causes for love, so one does not necessarily have knowledge. Thus, if one fails to possess a lower virtue which is a prerequisite of a higher one, to claim to possess a higher virtue, such as love of God, is absurd. When, as argued in Chapters 2 and 3, al-Ghazālī has reconceived of true or higher religion as inclination towards the incorporeal, lacking love of God (and the incorporeal afterlife) entails a love of the here-below and undermines claims to be a scholar of the afterlife.

C. Particular Virtues as logical Logical prerequisites Prerequisites for Others

The general principle was established above that some virtues are requirements for others, it not being possible to obtain the higher without the lower. Al-Ghazālī was also seen to state that, from the other direction or point of view, some virtues are necessary entailments of others. Knowledge is the root of love, and love is the root of the other virtues. But, it is not clear how this links to other virtues, aside from al-Ghazālī's general claim that the other virtues flow from love. As seen presently, al-Ghazālī constructs the definitions of his virtues to resemble rings of more and more specific classes. In other words, the higher virtues are logically more restrictive, having more and more conditions. Lower virtues, by contrast, have less and less conditions. Thus, if one has the higher virtue one necessarily and a fortiori has the lower; just as all Londoners are British, all British are European, and all Europeans are humans.

Firstly, it appears that even within the 4th Quarter, there are two directions for the virtues. Most of what al-Ghazālī says regards the higher stations of love, good pleasure,. reliance, abstinence, and patience. These flow from knowledge. The lower set flows from belief (*īmān*) to produce hope and fear which bolster patience. This section will focus on the

logical order more clearly present in the higher virtues. The higher virtues branch from knowledge and include love—and also good-pleasure (*riḍā*), reliance, abstinence, and finally patience.

The logical structure is confirmed and tied to the concept of validity as follows, 'Reliance is not valid without asceticism regarding the here-below. … Yes, asceticism is valid without reliance, but not vice versa for reliance is a station beyond asceticism'.[810] Earlier stations referred explicitly to stations having prerequisites.[811] This validity is itself tied to eschatological rank as follows, 'What we mean by our statement, "That one transgressed the limits of the ascetics", is that one not obtain what is promised for the ascetics in the abode of the afterlife of the praiseworthy stations'.[812] Thus, these stations do grant one an eschatological rank, but this is a rank which still falls under the rank of felicity which is obtained through acquiring true knowledge. Al-Ghazālī is keen to define these ranks carefully as they have ultimate consequences and one needs to know whether oneself or one's religious guide possesses them to protect true religion.

The logical structure is made very clear between good -pleasure (treated in *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* alongside love), reliance, abstinence, and patience. The base position of patience in these higher virtues is made clear by the fact that al-Ghazālī states that if one loses patience, then one has lost all religious stations. He uses the example of one who returns home from travel to find that one's belongings have been stolen, resulting in a number of outcomes:. a) iIf one is well-pleased and exultant (*rāḍin fāriḥ*) because God has taken them in order to increase one's sustenance in the afterlife, then one has the station of good pleasure;. b) iIf one's heart pains, one finds the strength of patience (*quwwat al-ṣabr*), then it has become evidentially clear that one was not truthful in one's claim to have the (station of) reliance. This is because reliance is a station beyond asceticism which is itself invalid save for one who is not upset by what they miss of the here-below nor do they exult in what comes to them. The reliant, al-Ghazālī says, might even be exultant at their goods being stolen, so how could he claim to be reliant;. c) iIf one hides one's dissatisfaction and does reveal it by complaining

[810] Ibid., 4:262.5–6.
[811] Al-Ghazālī does continue to refer to prerequisites in this context: he says that one may not enter the marketplace and remain reliant without fulfilling many prerequisites. (See *Iḥyā'*, 4:262.13.) At ibid., 4:259.21–8, he refers to the prerequisites of reliance for wandering in deserted valleys. At ibid., 4:272.20–3, he states that the ability to ride and subjugate lions is a miracle of saintly grace (*karāma*) and is not a prerequisite for reliance.
[812] Ibid., 4:234.29–31.

outwardly, one's patience is valid;.[813] d) iIf one cannot manage that and one's heart is vexed and one reveals one's complaint outwardly on the tongue…...then this theft of belongings increases one's sin in as much as it is reveals one's falling short regarding all the stations (*jamīʿ al-maqāmāt*), so this belies him in all his claims (to being religiously realizsed).[814] In this passage, the stations are formulated logically. Patience is merely to restrain oneself outwardly from complaining at God's action regarding one's possessions. Further stations require that one is inwardly content or even exultant at one's possessions being taken (as one is relieved of the attachment and forced to rely on God alone). The relation of these stations may be expressed as in the Diagramme Figure 6.1.

[813] Ibid., 4:273.10–13.
[814] He later mentions that the lowest level of reliance is not to pray against (i.e. curse) the thief. If one does, it indicates being upset (*ta'assuf*) at what was lost and thus also invalidates asceticism. (See ibid., 4:275.18–20.)




Figure 6.1 Concentric circles of the stations

These statements confirm earlier statements that the virtues branch from love. But they add a further notion of how or why after branching from love that they continue to branch from each other: they are organized logically. Thus, the existence of the higher entails the existence of the lower. And so, if the highest exists, the existence of the others cascades, as it were, from it. One who has good pleasure with all God's acts necessarily has reliance and patience. And, because these states necessarily also manifest on the limbs, one may see by one's acts whether or not one has the given station.[815] The true knowledge which is the fount of love is the

[815] The examples in this section were taken from al-Ghazālī's discussion of the states of abstinence, reliance, and love and longing. They thus represent how he in fact treats these topics and this structure determines his statements therein.

A further example occurs in *Kitāb al-Maḥabba* where he refers back to all the previous stations as conditions. In the practical aspects of this book, the notion of conditions is utilized again, here to discuss good pleasure. What does contradict good pleasure with God's decree (*qaḍā'*) is complaint about poverty, work, the responsibility of family, and criticizing food—regardless of the circumstances. This is because criticism of what is made is criticism of the Maker. (See *Iḥyā'*, 4:343.26–8.) Again, matters are discussed in which al-Ghazālī questions if a matter contradicts good pleasure, whether it also contradicts reliance. A matter which does not contradict good pleasure is carrying a cup (in order drink if water is found). As was exhausted in the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*, this also does not contradict reliance. Al-Ghazālī explains that this also does not contradict

incorporeal, eternal knowledge linked to al-Ghazālī's notion of religion, and thus his structure serves to safeguard religion from those who would claim it, be they scholars of *fiqh* or *kalām* or Ismailites, *falāsifa* who neglect ethical and religious praxis, and *Ibāḥiyya* or Sufis who claim that after achieving knowledge of God, one does not need to be concerned with acts and states. In this sense, arguably his structure is itself a proof, and it builds on the summary statements of his own approach to joining between reason and revelation set out in the *Tahāfut*, building religion on the acceptable aspects of intellect.

D. Two Founts for the Virtues: Imitation and Demonstration

Chapter 4 on imitation and demonstration established that demonstration was, ideally, the fount of the virtues. In other words, the virtues are likened to a goodly tree in which the roots are knowledge. That knowledge was said to be alternatively (true) knowledge or lack of doubt, the latter being shown to be textually linked to al-Ghazālī's notion of demonstration in *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm*, a work he refers to in the *Iḥyāʾ*. This section supports the claim that demonstrative knowledge is fundamental to al-Ghazālī's religious revival, according to the conception of religion outlined in Chapter 1, but most especially in Chapter 2. In addition to supporting the claims in this thesis for the fundamentality of demonstrative knowledge for producing eschatological felicity, it is necessary to know how this knowledge relates to the ultimate quarter in which the reader expects to find the *summum bonum* of the religious path. It is shown presently that true knowledge is indeed the fount of love and the other virtues, but that al-Ghazālī has constructed the *Iḥyāʾ* such that these virtues and the inclination towards the incorporeal afterlife set out above and in previous chapters may occur either through demonstrative knowledge or through imitative knowledge. The significance for this is most directly for the audience question: the *Iḥyāʾ* is constructed such that two groups may tread its path: those capable of speculative inquiry who possess insight, and those who are not capable, even if they are considered religious scholars. The further significance of this is that imitation represents belief in the outward purport of religion and scripture without proof. Though as a

good pleasure because the station of good pleasure is adjoined to and connected to reliance. (See ibid., 4:343.23.) In some cases, he directs the reader back to the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* for treatment of a topic. (See ibid., 4:343.25–6 and 4:344.7.) There, *Bayān* 18 discusses whether fleeing from a township in which there is sin contradicts good pleasure with God's decree. Again, it directs the reader back to the *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*. The last two *bayān*s of Book XXVI turn from good pleasure to stories of lovers. The parts of this material which have import regarding the issue of the structure of the *Iḥyāʾ* are summarized in discussions of how the entailment of states is linked to them being signs of the scholars of the afterlife.

level of discourse, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, this level is not incorporeal, its similitudes and truth claims are 'complementary' to the higher truth, which means its similitudes and statements have been aligned to the higher truth even if they do not meet the canons of logical proof and abstractness needed to be true knowledge. This structure thus allows people to be religious scholars in the sense that they are inclined towards the incorporeal afterlife merely by applying scripture and treading the path of the afterlife. This is a fundamental feature for understanding the second meaning of religious in al-Ghazālī's religious revival. Just as Chapter 1 showed that the two levels fundamental to the epistemological structure of the *Iḥyā'* were 'related' through the hermeneutic of al-Ghazālī's notion of interpretation (*ta'wīl*), this section shows how they are related in terms of producing virtues and generating an inclination towards the incorporeal afterlife and for rendering a scholar a scholar of the afterlife, as opposed to a scholar of the here-below. The implications of this are stated in the previous chapters, especially those associated with intimacy via invocation which is the imitative equivalent of the ultimate goal of the *Iḥyā'*: felicity. This is a feature and element of the *Iḥyā'* which sets it apart from the *akhlāq* tradition, even if Avicenna does acknowledge that religious practice produces the same effect as philosophical ethics of removing the 'slap' to the soul caused by embodiment.

Clear statements that al-Ghazālī's virtues may have as their root two types of knowledge with two effects exist, but they must be sifted from the *Iḥyā'*s four, voluminous volumes. This includes Book XXXVII and Book XXXVIII, not included here. Book XXXVII states that volition (*irāda*), '...is a state (*ḥāla*) or attribute (*waṣfa*) of the heart, surrounded by two matters: knowledge and acts. Knowledge precedes it because it is its origin and prerequisite. Acts follow because it is its fruit and branch. This is because acts, i.e. any movement or rest, is volitional (*ikhtiyārī*) and is thus not completed without three matters: knowledge, volition and power. ……. Knowledge (*'ilm*) and gnosis (*ma'rifa*) or presupposition (*ẓann*) and belief (*i'tiqād*).'[816] Book XXXVIII links these levels of knowledge to the eschatological outcomes studied in Chapter 4 on imitation and demonstration: the stations of those of the right hand, those brought nigh and the veracious. Having reminded his reader of the two meanings of certitude and stated what knowledge is specific to vigilance, he links this knowledge with its station as follows: 'Those who have certitude regarding this knowledge

[816] Ibid., 4:354.13–14.

(*maʿrifa*) are those brought nigh (*muqarrabūn*).'[817] This statement supports those statements from *Kitāb al-Tawḥhīd wa-l-tawakkul* cited in Chapter 4. They spelled out in detail that those possessing imitative knowledge obtain salvation and are given the rank of 'those of the right hand', while those possessing (true) knowledge obtain felicity (*saʿāda*) and are given the rank of 'those brought nigh'. The only difference is that here this knowledge is spoken of directly as the root of a 4th Quarter station while at the same time being linked to the said eschatological state. The term imitation is used in explaining how the station of fear is acquired, thus: 'One does not have fear except due to knowledge. None knows except through insight and contemplation (*iftikār*) or from transmitted belief and imitation.'[818] Though the terms vary slightly, the presence of two levels, true knowledge and a something falling short of this, are consistent. This shows the consistency of at least this element of the structure this thesis claims to run through the *Iḥyā'*.[819]

At least two texts refer to a difference in firmness between the state acquired by imitation and that acquired by demonstration or true knowledge. In the first, from *Kitāb al-Khawf wa-l-rajāʾ*, fear is obtained in two different paths.[820] The fear obtained through true knowledge has a firm basis deriving from insight.[821] However, that which is through imitation via giving the benefit of the doubt to one's parents must be produced involving other means.[822] The latter is termed the fear of the masses and is produced by belief in the hell-fire and paradise and reminding of the Resurrection Day and its scenes, sermons and seeing or hearing of those who are fearful and attending their gatherings.[823] And after it is produced,

[817] Ibid., 4:386.3.
[818] Ibid., 4:56.21–2.
[819] *Bayān* 7, 'The Reason People Vary in Love', explains that knowledge is the basis of love and thus while people share in its basis, they differ in their level. An epistemological division is introduced between those who merely know God by believing in His attributes versus those who know Him in detail through knowing the details of His creation. The first group believe via acceptance (*taslīm*) and (mere) belief. Another group reached the reality of what is God's names and attributes. This group is the knowers of the realities (*ʿārifūn bi-l-ḥaqāʾiq*) and those brought nigh (*muqarrabūn*). (Ibid., 4:311.13–15.) The first group is known as those who are safe (*ahl al-salāma*; seeming to mean those achieving salvation) and those of the right hand, the latter being a term al-Ghazālī uses elsewhere to refer to those obtaining salvation via imitation (see Chapter 4). He later refers to this group as the commoners (*ʿāmmīyy*) who have general knowledge and the other group as the possessor of insight (*baṣīr*) who not only believes that God produced marvels in the world, but knows the details. (Ibid., 4:311.23–7.) These levels align with those studied in Chapter 4 that stated that the masses have mere belief while those brought nigh have true knowledge and insight.
[820] Ibid., 4:164.24.
[821] Ibid., 4:165.6.
[822] Ibid., 4:164.29–30.
[823] Ibid., 4:164.33–165.2.

the belief derived from pure imitation is necessarily weak and fades quickly.[824] He contrasts the strength of imitation and knowledge as follows:

T16, *Iḥyā'*, 4:165.7–10

> Imitative beliefs (*'aqā'id taqlīdiyya*) are usually weak unless they are strengthened through continually seeing that which causes them to be confirmed and through being steadfast in practising that which (those beliefs) entail of copious obedience (to God) and avoiding disobedience continually and over a long period of time. And the one who ascends to the peak of knowledge and knows God, most high, necessarily (*bi-l-ḍarūra*) fears Him. Thus, he does not need a remedy to bring about fear.

The remedy mentioned here is to bring about a state which is lacking, namely, fear. Just as knowledge was said in *Kitāb al-Tawba* (see Chapter 4) to necessarily produce a state for cosmological reasons, so here does true knowledge have a necessary entailment of the state of fear. The second level of imitation, on the other hand, does produce a state, but it is weak and must be supported. It is as though true knowledge has the same nature as demonstrative knowledge itself (see Chapter 3): it is continuous, unchanging, and eternal. Also, it has a necessary modal quality which accords with al-Ghazālī's statements about the necessary flow of the *mulk* from the *malakūt*, *but only so long as it is true knowledge*. Imitative belief is not incorporeal.

The question of whether imitative belief is fit as the basis for states is addressed directly in *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul*. The passage makes a similar point regarding the weakness of the product of knowledge, but focusses on the non-demonstrative manners of protecting the beliefs themselves as follows:

T17, *Iḥyā'*, 4:247.21–4

> If you say, 'Is the like of this belief via (imitative) belief suitable to be the basis and pillar (supporting) reliance?' I would respond, 'Yes, because if belief is strong it performs the same act as unveiling of arousing states, except that they are usually weak (*yā ayyuhā l-nāssu antum al-fuqarā' ilā Allāh*) and are quickly disturbed and shaken. For this reason, the one possessing (imitative belief) needs a *kalām* scholar to protect him through his *kalām* or for him himself to learn *kalām* to guard through it the belief (*'aqīda*) transmitted to him through his teacher, his parents, or the people of his town.

Al-Ghazālī states here that the level of belief said to be below true knowledge serves the same purpose. It is weak just as he said regarding fear, but here its support is through *kalām*. As studied in Chapter 4, *kalām* is a non-demonstrative form of protecting the belief. He likens

[824] Ibid., 4:165.6.

that belief to a knot and there states that, unlike true knowledge, it does not produce expansion of the chest, but merely serves to push aside doubts which would untie the knot of imitative belief. In the current context of studying the relation of knowledge to states, his emphasis is on how the states of the 4th Quarter are protected. In that context, imitative knowledge does serve the same purpose. But unlike fear, the state is reinforced by reinforcing the belief itself.

Concluding Reflections

Al-Ghazālī's virtues are conceived of in the technical terms of faculty psychology. From one perspective, they are states and stations defined in terms of the ten categories of being. From another, they are character traits which are dispositions of the practical intellect. Either way, they are the answer to a praxis called for in the *Tahāfut* which joins between reason and revelation and they specifically answer the call there to produce virtues which are attachments to the incorporeal. From this perspective, al-Ghazālī produces virtues distinct from the *akhlāq* tradition in that they are composed of three levels. This feature allows him to incorporate one of his pet doctrines, the microcosm–macrocosm analogy, as well as to posit that the virtues are integrated: knowledge, states, and acts necessarily flow from each other. This aspect, which al-Ghazālī is aware resembles the early righteous forefathers' statement that belief includes acts, differs in being embedded in Avicennian faculty psychology. This integrality becomes an argument against any group that would claim either the independence of knowledge or the superiority of mere acts of the limbs.

Appendix I: The Sources of Book XXIII from the *Akhlāq* Tradition Manuals and Scripture

***Iḥyā'*, Book XXIII, Chapter 1, 'In Praise of hunger and blame of satiety'**	**Source**
Prophetic traditions, Report 1	[unknown; Zabīdī, 7:386]
' ', Reports 2–7	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 170–1
' ', Report 8	*Qūt*, 1382
' ', Report 9	[unknown; Zabīdī, 7:387]
' ', Report 10	[Ibn 'Uday, *al-Kāmil*; Zabīdī, 7:387]
' ', Report 11	[*Tirmidhī*; Zabīdī, 7:387. This tradition differs slightly from a similar one related in the *Mīzān*, 124.1–2 and 125.3–4, and *Qūt*, 1383.3–21.]
' ', Report 12	*Qūt*, 1378
' ', Reports 13–18	*Qūt*, 1380
' ', Report 19	*Qūt*, 1381
' ', Report 20	[*Muslim*; *Tirmidhī*; Zabīdī, 7:389. This tradition differs slightly from a similar one related in the *Mīzān*, 125.5–6, and there is a figurative interpretation in *Qūt*, 1379.4–8, highly resemblant to the summary in the *Iḥyā'*.]
' ', Reports 21–2	*Qūt*, 1388
' ', Report 23	[al-Dhahabī, *Niʿm al-sahr*; Zabīdī, 7:391]
' ', Report 24	[*al-Risāla al-Qushayriyya*; Zabīdī, 7:391]
' ', Report 25	[*Muslim*; Zabīdī, 7:391]
' ', Report 26	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 170
Sufi maxims, Reports 27–9	[unknown; Zabīdī, 7:391; Zabīdī lists a source for 27 but it differs greatly]
' ', Report 30	[Abū Naʿīm, *Ḥilyat al-awliyā'*; Zabīdī, 7:391]
' ', Reports 31–2	*Qūt* according to Zabīdī, 392
' ', Report 33	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 171 (partial)
' ', Report 34	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 169
' ', Report 35	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 167
' ', Report 36	[unknown; Zabīdī, 7:392]
' ', Report 37	Ibn Abī al-Dunyā, *al-Jūʿ*, 104
' ', Report 38	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 168
' ', Reports 39–50	[*Qūt*; Zabīdī, 7:392–3]
' ', Report 51	[unknown; Zabīdī, 7:393]
' ', Report 52	[*Qūt*; Zabīdī, 7:392–3]
' ', Report 53	*Qūt*, 1394

‘ ’, Report 54	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 170
‘ ’, Reports 55–6	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 172

***Iḥyā’*, Book XXIII, Chapter 2, ‘The Benefits of hunger and calamities arising from satiety’**	**Source**
Theoretical introduction	Original: special property of revealed praxis
Benefit (*fā’ida*) 1	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 167–72 (167, 169, 169, 170, 171, 172; respectively); last 3 unknown
Benefit 2	Approx. 1/3 from *Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 167
Benefit 3	Mostly original, one unknown prophetic tradition; stomach and genitals said to be doors to hell-fire, humility and broken-heartedness doors to *Janna*
Benefit 4	Mostly original with unknown reports
Benefit 5	Mostly original with unknown reports; strength said comes from satiety and gives 7 limbs power to sin
Benefit 6	Mostly original with unknown reports
Benefit 7	Mostly original; 2 reports, 1 from *Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 168
Benefits 8–9	Almost entirely from *Qūt*, 1384–93
Benefit 10	1 long story (unknown) and several short reports, 1 from *Qūt*, 1388

***Iḥyā’*, Book XXIII, Chapter 3, ‘The Path of discipline and breaking the desire of the stomach’**	**Source**
All (3:86.14–93.2)	*Qūt*, 1378–89 (reworking)

***Iḥyā’*, Book XXIII, Chapter 4, ‘Different rulings of hunger, its virtue, and the different states of people regarding it’**	**Source**
3:93.3–94.8	Original theoretical introduction: figurative interpretation of secrets of sharia, Aristotelian mean, and role of guide. The final end (*maqṣūd*) of food (3:93.13) is from the *Mīzān*, 126.7–8

3:94.8–94.25	reworking of *Qūt*, 1401–3
3:94.24–95.20	Original theoretical conclusion with 2 unknown reports: secret of apparent contradiction, guide not to revealing secret of desired mean to aspirant, and taking precaution

***Iḥyā'*, Book XXIII, Chapter 5, 'The Calamity of ostentation that happens to whoever leaves eating what is desired and decreases the intake of food'**	**Source**
All	Reworking of *Qūt*, 1396.6–1401.1 (on ostentation)

***Iḥyā'*, Book XXIII [*Qawl* 2], Chapter 6, 'On Sexual Desire'**	**Source**
3:96.18–21	*Mīzān*, 90.3–10 (*Bayān* 16)
3:96.21–2	Unknown (brief comments)
3:96.22–3	*Qūt*, 1608.12–13
3:96.23–5	*Qūt*, 1608.15–17
3:96.25	*Qūt*, 1608.17–18
3:96.25–6	*Qūt*, 1608.20–1
3:96.26–7	[*Ḥilya*, 1:138]
3:96.27–97.5	Unknown (long story of Moses)
3:97.5–6	[*Ḥilya*, 2:166]
3:97.6–8	Unknown
3:97.8–9	Unknown (brief comments)
3:97.9–11	*Mīzān*, 127.12–16 (*Bayān* 23)
3:97.11–14	*Mīzān*, 127.16–128.2 (*Bayān* 23)
3:97.14–15	*Mīzān*, 121.8–9 (*Bayān* 22 on perception and distinction between intellectual and animal pleasures)
3:97.15–17	[Ṭabarānī, *al-Muʃam al-awsaṭ*; Zabīdī, 7:431, and likely takes vague inspiration from *Mīzān*, 89.4–16]
3:97.18–30	*Mīzān*, 128.11–129.15 (*Bayān* 23)
3:97.30–1	Unknown (brief comment which completes ethical discussion of sexual desire by adding deficiency (*ifrāṭ*))
3:97.31–2	*Mīzān*, 87.14–15 (*Bayān* 16)

3:97.32–98.1	[*Bāb al-Nikāḥ*, Zabīdī, 432]

***Iḥyā'*, Book XXIII, Chapter 7, 'Obligations of the aspirant regarding marrying or abstaining'**	**Source**
3:98.2–3	Unknown (introductory comments)
3:98.3–5	*Mīzān*, 89.4–6 and 89.10–12
3:98.5	*Qūt*, 379
3:98.5–8	Unknown (reports)
3:98.8–19	Unknown (comments vaguely inspired by *Mīzān*, 89.4–6 and 89.10–12)
3:98.19–99.4	Reports and traditions from dispersed sources (none found in *Qūt*, *Tahdhīb al-asrār*, *Ḥilya*, or Ibn Abī al-Dunyā)
3:99.4–18	Unknown (commentary on reports followed by *questione* on discerning desire in gazing on youths)
3:99.18–21	Unknown (3 reports from dispersed sources)
3:99.21–3	Unknown (commentary on reports)
3:99.23–9	*Qūt*, 1387–8
3:99.29–100.1	Unknown (comments, including referring reader to details in his *Kitāb Ādāb al-nikāḥ*)
3:100.1–20	*Tahdhīb al-asrār*, 417–22
3:100.20–4	Unknown (commentary on reports then own comments)
3:100.24–101.12	*Ḥilya*, 2:166–8
3:101.12–13	Unknown (commentary on report)

***Iḥyā'*, Book XXIII, Chapter 8, 'In Praise of opposing the desire of the genitals and eyes'**	**Source**
3:101.14–15	*Mīzān*, 129.4–15 (reworking)
3:101.15–19	Unknown (comments)
3:101.19–20	[Al-Sirāj al-Qārī, *Masāriʿ al-ʿushshāq*; Zabīdī, 7:439–41; Zabīdī offers a long commentary on the famous disputed tradition regarding the martyrdom of the chaste lover]
3:101.20–2	[*Muslim*; *Zabīdī*, 440–1]
3:101.22–4	Unknown (commentary on the tradition)
3:101.24–102.10	*Ḥilya*, 2:190–1

3:102.10–26	[*Bukhārī*; Zabīdī, 7:442]
3:102.26–9	Unknown (commentary on the tradition and another short tradition)
3:102.29–31	*Ḥilya*, 2:244
3:102.31–103.3	Unknown (comments)
3:103.3–12	*Ḥilya*, 2:230
3:103.12–104.5	[Al-Sirāj al-Qārī, *Masāriʿ al-ʿushshāq*; Zabīdī, 7:443–5]

Conclusion

This thesis, devoted to the structure and doctrine of praxis in al-Ghazālī's magnum opus, the *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*, argues that it was written in the context of other thinkers beginning a more sophisticated engagement with the tensions between revealed Islamic religion and Greek thought, including its own philosophy of religion by which thinkers began to interpret Islam. This thesis appears to be the first to systematically investigate the core ordering and compositional structures of this highly influential but, it turns out, little known work, making significant progress to move beyond the impasse in which scholarship stated *that* al-Ghazālī used Sufi and philosophical sources, but very little about *how* such sources were incorporated into a single work devoted to praxis. The findings are expressed in four divisions: a) compositional features, explaining where different sources were deployed, b) the doctrines underpinning the deep integration of the *Iḥyāʾ*, c) the structural features used to unite the *Iḥyāʾ* and its sources, and d) interpretation of al-Ghazālī's appropriation in light of the common assumption that the *Iḥyāʾ* is a work of Sufism. Methodologically, in order to begin with clarity, findings are expressed as changes made to the philosophical praxis of the *Mīzān al-ʿamal*. In the *Mīzān*, al-Ghazālī was free to write primarily within a *falsafa* discourse whose sources can be traced to Avicenna and Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī without challenge. The *Iḥyāʾ* has a complex structure and rhetorical presentation by which it departs from the *Mīzān* as analysed in the following findings.

I. Compositional Features

The complexity of the *Iḥyāʾ*—causing many researchers to claim disorder—opens up most quickly through the following findings. Firstly, the topics addressed in the 3rd and 4th Quarters routinely include two titles shown below to represent sharia and *falsafa* as layers of discourse. They are sometimes termed the virtue or vice (or blame) of a certain topic and the topic's ultimate reality. The prior is clearly organized into Koran, traditions, and authoritative sayings, often of Sufis. The Sufis are shown to consistently fail to encompass the universal meanings, such that their sayings are said not be worthy of the science of the afterlife, while al-Ghazālī politely makes an excuse for them. Such proper definitions are then provided in the ultimate reality section. These chapters are shown to define their topic, and either in the

same chapter or in another, al-Ghazālī draws out the attributes of the soul appropriate to the one realizing the said meaning. Subsequent chapters nearly always include a remedy which is often an 'ointment' composed of knowledge and practice. This form notion of praxis exceeds the *akhlāq* tradition, having no precedent in the technical form developed and deployed in the *Iḥyā'*. Chapter 5 indicates that using both knowledge and praxis to bring about effects in the soul is based on al-Ghazālī's care for the strange relationship between the two seemingly parallel worlds: the corporeal and incorporeal. It is shown that the solution for the mutual effect between them draws on a host of Avicennian texts, but produces a solution not found in Avicenna's texts on praxis. Here Sufi literature is frequently drawn on to inspire a belief or lay out a set of acts which, according to the originally Greek theory of habituation, cause a certain attribute to occur in the soul. These compositional features alone give the surface answer to how al-Ghazālī uses sharia, Sufism, and *falsafa*, but they are built on a complex notion of the soul. How he integrates sharia and *falsafa* is explained in the following sections. Note that something similar occurs particularly in the 1st Quarter in which sharia ritual worship is first explained at a practical level, and then ultimate realities towards which al-Ghazālī claims its practices symbolically point are added. Chapter 5 argues that the manner in which they 'point' to a higher level is largely from the viewpoint of al-Ghazālī's expanded version of praxis and faculty psychology. Acts, such as prostration, contain implicit meanings which come about in the heart, and repetition leads to character traits via habituation, as set out in philosophical ethics.

II. The Doctrines Underpinning the Deep Integration in the *Iḥyā'*

Existing scholarship has tended to assume that al-Ghazālī's use of doctrines condemned in the *Tahāfut* entails that he is a crypto-philosopher. The doctrines he is found to accept show that he is enough of both a philosopher and a religious believer to make an imaginary 'pure' or 'typical' version of either highly uncomfortable. A number of metaphors explain his role in his own words. First is the snake-handler who deliberately avoids handling the snake in front of the masses, while privately extracting the serum from the venom. This is shown to involve some slight of hand which a fan of Avicenna might object to, and to show that the *Tahāfut* includes important positive passages foundational to the oeuvre of al-Ghazālī, indicating it is part of his revivification of religion. Secondly, an seemingly autobiographical reference

indicates he sees himself as the inheritor of the prophets, able to interpret all or most of reason according to insight (read: intellect). Finally, he seems to indicate through the metaphor of the elephant in a dark room that all groups see a part of the truth, aside, perhaps, for himself. This also opens up an ecumenical role of finding explanations that are amenable to the three groups he refers to in a famous passage at the beginning of the *Mīzān*: Sufis, metaphysical philosophers and followers of sharia. Importantly, as cited in Chapter 1, al-Ghazālī himself councils: join between the two sources of reason and revelation, and do not be of either extreme that takes one and rejects the other. The pivotal doctrines that allow him to produce a praxis according with these roles may be expressed as follows:

i. The soul is eternal, and thus only eternal knowledge and its associate pleasure is a proper cause for its eternal felicity. Al-Ghazālī provides scriptural evidence for this in the *Tahāfut* (Chapter 1). A similar argument is made in the *Iḥyā'* (Chapter 3).

ii. Speculative inquiry produces eternal, demonstrative knowledge which is alone fit to bring about eternal felicity for the soul through intellectual pleasure, sometimes called spiritual pleasure, in the afterlife. In this and the previous doctrine, al-Ghazālī is shown to agrees with Avicenna who he is often inaccurately paraphrasing in the *Tahāfut*, seemingly as part of his snake-handling role.

iii. Praxis is a pre-condition for speculative inquiry: Chapter 1 shows that al-Ghazālī puts on the tongue of the *falāasifa*, particularly Avicenna, that the sharia is the best way to perform this praxis. Avicenna, for his part, merely admits, contra-*al-Fārābī*, that the sharia is capable of having the effect of praxis on the soul which is to remove the corporeal influence of the body.

Scripture alludes to this felicity. Its general pictorial representation of bodily pain and pleasure in the afterlife are judged by al-Ghazālī not to be rationally impossible and thus, he reasons, should be accepted as true so as not to give the lie to the prophets. In this doctrine of a dualistic eschatology, al-Ghazālī appears to go directly against the *falāsifa*, and to generously attempt to accept their doctrine while insisting on accepting the doctrine of scripture. This thesis argues that he is aware of Avicenna's statement in *al-Shifā'* in which Avicenna states that the physical aspect of pleasure in the afterlife was amply described in by the prophet Muhammad. It also argues that while appearing to accept scripture, al-Ghazālī effectively interprets the scripture describing corporeal pleasures and the scripture alluding to those

pleasures beyond the corporeal senses on philosophical lines. He does not challenging the philosophical description or framework, for instance by overturning the notion that intellectual pleasure is produced through demonstrative knowledge.

Together Chapters 1 and 2 argue that this dualist ontology in the context of scriptural interpretation is a response to Avicenna's *al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya*, but that the response is creative and worked out primarily in the *Iḥyā'* itself. Chapter 2 finds that in response to Avicenna's challenge that Islamic theologians contradict themselves, arbitrarily interpreting scripture literally regarding the afterlife, but figuratively regarding anthropological attributes, al-Ghazālī goes beyond Avicenna to assess the ontological status of each key theological topic in order to determine how scripture relates to it. It shows that in three central theological topics—the divine attributes, moral theology and law, and eschatology—al-Ghazālī examines whether the topic is ontologically corporeal, incorporeal, or whether it rightly has two separate levels, such as he found in the *Tahāfut* regarding the afterlife. In this way, he responds to one of the major sources of *Tahāfut,* Question XX, which treats the philosophical notion of eternal felicity. This finding indicates that the *Iḥyā'* is contiguous with what turns out to be a positive, revivificatory work, the *Tahāfut*, and that it carries out and applies the doctrines arrived at in the *Tahāfut*. The following findings indicate that it delves even further into how to integrate them with scripture.

III. The Structural Features Uniting the *Iḥyā'* and its Sources

The two cosmological levels mentioned above, the corporeal and incorporeal worlds or realms, manifest in the *Iḥyā'* in a) the nature of the pleasures of the afterlife (i.e. bodily and intellectual pleasure or salvation (*najāt*) and felicity (*sa'āda*)) and b) the correlated epistemological levels of imitation (*taqlīd*) and true knowledge (i.e. demonstration). Chapter 4 establishes that these two levels are the most fundamental in the *Iḥyā'*, including showing that Alexander Treiger's so-called triad only pertains to subsequent Ghazālīan works. His triad begins with (mere) belief associated with imitation, but his conception of the second level refers to *kalām* and *falsafa*, and is associated both with demonstration (*burhān*) and (mere) analogy. In the *Iḥyā'*, *kalām* is not given the rank of intellect or gaining knowledge of realities, while the intellect does. *Kalām* falls in the same category as imitation of the masses. Thus, in

the *Iḥyā'*, the intellect is the specific cause of felicity. Also, his claims regarding the higher level of direct witnessing are shown not to apply in the *Iḥyā'*. Al-Ghazālī does speak of a higher level, but a) he does not develop for it an eschatological rank different in nature from felicity and b) this higher level involves the heart being dominated by a given character trait, such as love or fear. Thus, again, Treiger's description of direct witness does not accord with the *Iḥyā'*.

The *Iḥyā'* stretches faculty psychology, making the human being into four levels, each conceived as a locus. While the *Mīzān* presents the human as such with two levels, the body and soul, each of which may be occupied by either praiseworthy or blameworthy occupants, the *Iḥyā'* expands this to four: the body (itself and its states), acts occupying the limbs, character traits, and the heart/intellect. Chapter 5 shows that, for al-Ghazālī, the top level, i.e. the heart/intellect, may be occupied by a) imitative meanings (repeated invocation (*dhikr*)) or b) truly known meanings: through contemplation (*fikr*) described as syllogistic production of new knowledge. A crucial tension between sharia and Greek thought is engaged with in this regard, al-Ghazālī placing contemplation higher than invocation (contra-Kōjirō Nakamura). Binyamin Abrahamov refers to this as unprecedented 'rationalisation of Sufism.' In an upcoming article, I show that al-Ghazālī's 4th Quarter stations—in name at least—are modelled on a small treatise of al-Muḥāsibī who includes contemplation over two centuries prior to al-Ghazālī. So, while he has a Sufi source for contemplation, the matter is never so simple.

The fact that both imitation and demonstration were shown to be valid founts of the virtues is a partial answer to the audience question: the *Iḥyā'* is made to cater for the true scholars capable of demonstrative speculative inquiry, but makes room for those whose only access to knowledge is imitation of scripture. Chapter 2 showed that the audience question was applied to the topic of scriptural interpretation. Al-Ghazālī diverted the masses from interpretation not because interpretation is intrinsically blameworthy. Rather, interpretation was shown to require achieving the higher level of incorporeal, true knowledge, obtained only through speculative inquiry or, more rarely, through unveiling. The masses are generally incapable of this level, as are many of so-called scholars. So, interpreting scripture involves moving from the chair, so to speak, of the literal purport without the ability to move to the chair of interpretation which requires insight (read: intellect). Regarding how the two levels result in generating character traits and states of the heart, Chapter 4 showed that in Book

XXXV, *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-tawakkul* al-Ghazālī differentiated between two levels of the science of unveiling and there stated that the lower level was suitable for producing states. One may thus see how the levels of knowledge relate to the structure of the virtues. If we leave out the lowest level of belief listed in Book XXXV (i.e. hypocrisy), belief is divided into imitation, true knowledge (also referred to as unveiling at times), and a higher level that Chapter 4 showed to often be associated with witnessing or annihilation. Imitation was shown in this chapter to produce weak states, requiring extrinsic support and thus al-Ghazālī has structured his revival such that those lacking incorporeal knowledge, i.e. the lower part of his audience, can obtain religious, but with an important difference. Further, true knowledge is an incorporeal, eternal fount in which there is no doubt. The higher level is often a transcendence of time, etc., but there was a sense in which al-Ghazālī often gave the same characteristics to true knowledge because of its incorporeal nature. Be that as it may, all but the higher part of the science of unveiling becomes the fount of the virtues. This implies that, whether or not there is a hidden *Maḍnūn* syllabus, that al-Ghazālī has included at least a basic representation of the science of unveiling inside the *Iḥyā'* to serve as the fount for the virtues. He in fact says this himself in Book XXIX, *Kitāb al-Gharūr*.

Chapter 6 on the virtues shows that contemplation also includes two levels. The higher level spoken of in clear syllogistic terms produces the true knowledge causing felicity; the same true knowledge said to do so in the *Tahāfut*. But this contemplation sits at the end of the salvific stations which perform the role of philosophical praxis. Thus, the same philosophical prerequisite—that praxis occur before true contemplation is possible—is incorporated into the *Iḥyā'*. However, once the blameworthy is divested from each level and contemplation occurs, the incorporeal knowledge causes an effect to cascade down on the heart and limbs. Knowledge causes love, love causes contentment, contentment causes patience, etc. But the path must be tread from the bottom up, each salivic virtue being a prerequisite for the next. This is referred to as a bi-directionality in the virtues. We may think of the metaphor of cleaning a rain gutter from the bottom up: only once the highest level is divested of blockage does the water begin to flow through. This downward flow is through a cosmological law that what is in the incorporeal world manifests in the corporeal; more evidence is shown that in the *Iḥyā'* al-Ghazālī has fashioned a practical anthropology based on

the microcosm–macrocosm analogy: the human being and the path of praxis are part of and reflect the levels of the cosmos.

This same necessary flow is used to make the *Iḥyā'* into a proof of true Islam, and true religion of the incorporeal afterlife: if a person has knowledge, it necessarily produces all the states including love (fashioned on the model of *ʿishq* and intellectual pleasure) and detachment, and religious praxis on the limbs. Thus, no one may claim to be a religious scholar (in the true sense of an *ʿālim*) without having certain states and acts. This includes Ismailis, *falāsifa*, and so-called religious scholars who incline towards corporeal pleasures including love of leadership (in service to the sultans of the here-below).

In this manner, the *Mīzān* is stretched into a path of praxis in which sharia and Sufi practices have a well-reasoned place, all translated completely into the ontology of faculty psychology.

IV. Interpretation of al-Ghazālī's Appropriation

Chapter 1 studied the *ʿAjā'ib* classification in which al-Ghazālī confusingly divides sciences into the imitative and intellectual, and divides the intellectual into the this-worldly and those of the afterlife. It argues that the best reading of al-Ghazālī's classification is a Fārābīan structure in which religion is an imitation of true, incorporeal knowledge. Rather than subordinating religion to philosophy, it argues that this should be interpreted as updating theology, by using a philosophical structure which allows religious scholars to use philosophical tools such as discourse theory which relate the various abstract and concrete forms of discourse. After all, the major schools of the Muʿtazilīs, Ashaʿrīs, and *falāsifa* all base religious belief and practice on a rational grounding. Al-Ghazālī expresses the two levels in certain places using the Sufi terms sharia and ultimate reality (*ḥaqīqa*). And while the ultimate reality resembling *falsafa* seems to indicate subordination of sharia, again this is an updating (and revivification) of religion: it is to replace the forms of reasoning he inherited in *al-Iqtiṣād fī al-iʿtiqād* with those he presents in *Miʿyār al-ʿilm*.

Thus, the inclusion of technical tools accompanied by emphasis on cosmological speculation such as the microcosm–macrocosm correspondence show how al-Ghazālī seemingly and intentionally builds his revivification where *falsafa*, Sufism, and sharia hooves fall in existing hoof-prints, to use his metaphor from *al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl*. The acceptance

of Greek 'truths' while emphasizing cosmological and mystical speculations resembles later thinkers such as al-Suhrawardī more than it does mere crypto-*falsafa*. Al-Ghazālī challenges our notions of reason and revelation when he indicates his fundamental belief that both are messages from God and cosmological mercies to help humans achieve their telos and perfection, a doctrine shared with not only the *falāsifa*, but with the Ismailis. Clearly, the proposition that political motives sometimes motivate expression of a theological doctrine does not entail the proposition that all theological doctrine is purely politically motivated. It is closer to the actual text to claim that his implicit display of mastery of Avicennian structures for relating intellect and religion and his production of an actual practical path are made to beat Avicenna at his own game. He claims himself to be the only inheritor of the prophets capable of interpreting all of religion in the light of the intellect, and then makes the *Iḥyā'* a proof that Avicenna is not himself a scholar of the afterlife.

The centrality of demonstration to felicity may raise questions. The thesis notes a textual link to demonstration in the *Miʿyār*. There, a demonstration is valid logical form whose material premises are themselves certain and eternally so. One of the attributes which makes demonstration suitable is its eternality (which often derives by its terms being *per se* attributes of natural types). As noted, in the introduction, al-Ghazālī says the greater and broader aim of the *Miʿyār* is to secure valid speculative inquiry which the *Iḥyā'* shows leads to true knowledge and felicity. The introduction also states that demonstration alone rules out the rulings of the lower (corporeal) faculties—the judgement of sense and vain imagination—and leads to light. The dichotomy seems in place, and al-Ghazālī is content to recommend logic to defend against Satan and effectively purifying or transcending the lower faculties. Convincing or not, al-Ghazālī is clearly prepared to make these connections.

The *Iḥyā'* addresses topics generally falling under Sufism and knowledge of the divine and other topics seemingly not amenable to syllogistic methods, nor demonstration. Let us not for get that Avicenna refers in *Aḥwāl* to inspiration (*ilhām*) as coming with the middle term. Here, and elsewhere, this method is general, and as such applies to all knowledge covered in his syllabus, aside perhaps from matters such as first principles or sense experience which are immediate. For Avicenna, the universe itself is syllogistic in form.[825] Even if al-Ghazālī may reject the notion of the One emanating through necessity, is it clear that he conceives of a

[825] Gutas, *The Aristotelian Tradition*, Chapter 8.

universe of emanating layers, with an angelology, even if contingent, etc. Al-Ghazālī himself says inspiration differs only in terms of how the veil is moved aside, not how the knowledge itself nor its substrate: the human heart. This thesis has found by far the best candidate in 'the domination over the heart of a given attribute', a matter explicitly occurring alongside, over and above knowledge. In fact, they are termed two types of certitude, the technical and Sufi side. The technical or *kalām* aspect is the lack of certainty, textually linked back to al-Ghazālī's discussions of demonstration (*burhān*) in the *Miʿyār*.

The Sufi aspect of domination is the said attribute. So, the final sections of Chapter 4 gathered passages on the higher level. They showed that certain passages were doubtlessly speaking of the said domination, yet invoked terms such as witnessing, vision, and annihilation. To scour the *Iḥyā'* and ensure the answer was not elsewhere, the appendix to Chapter 4 examines various characteristics related to Alexander Treiger's favourite candidate for the level above knowledge: direct witnessing. He linked direct witnessing to increased habititude and familiarity with intelligibles. While these two attributes might clearly appear in post-*Iḥyā'* works, the closest the *Iḥyā'* comes to them in a single passage discussed presently on the increased clarity of intelligibles. (But in the *Iḥyā'*, this is termed unveiling.) Three attributes are found in the *Iḥyā'* passages speaking of witnessing, summarized in the appendix as transcending one of three things: a) time, b) human attributes, or c) imagination. As to the first, knowledge is part of the timeless incorporeal world, so might logically be ruled out by true knowledge itself seemingly part of the second level, not even pertaining particularly to the third. As to the second, again, it seems that completing praxis means nothing more than transcending the human attributes, i.e. vices. Without this, how could one obtain even the second level. As to the third, imagination, it centres in one crucial passage shared between the *Maʿārij* and *Iḥyā'*.

As analysed at the opening of the said appendix, al-Ghazālī states it is impossible to obtain this witnessing before death, while veiled by bodily accidents and all-too-human attributes. After closing the door, he opens a window: it may happen in this like, but lasts no longer than a lightening strike. Should we presume it would last longer in the prophets? Also, if true knowledge requires removing the vices, then what is the difference between it and this witnessing. If the witnessing is a rare increased clarity of intelligibles, this does sound vaguely like Treiger's notion for which there is no evidence in the *Iḥyā'*. Unfortunately, without finding

new passages or putting words on al-Ghazālī's pen, it seems that the questions just raised are open questions. We do not know the nature of this witnessing, unless it is the domination of an attribute. And, we do not know how to resolve the fact that the unveiling al-Ghazālī originally set out to explain in the *Kītāb al-Maḥabba* section seems to require removal of the human attributes which seem identical to the general prerequisite for all true knowledge: praxis. The said domination by an attribute of the heart occupies the core topics where al-Ghazālī theorizes on certitude and stations, and runs through 4th Quarter stations of the *Iḥyā'*.

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