

UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Autocratic Legacies and Immunisation Against Extremism: A Rational Choice Approach

---

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics

Catarina Leão

Wolfson College

Michaelmas Term, 2022

Word count: 64,308

Abstract

Why do some post-transitional democracies have extremist parties associated with the former regime, while others have mainstream parties associated with the former regime, and yet others have no parties associated with the former regime?

Using a rational choice theoretical approach, in this dissertation I show that the "self-interested" relationship between the general population and autocratic incumbents, operating through a top-down logic of reception of various kinds of material benefits provided by autocratic policy outputs, are crucial factors in shaping post-transitional attitudes towards the regimes' policies and consequently, voting preferences. Popular support has been shown to be a crucial element for the long-term stability of dictatorships. In order to increase it, autocratic leaders may produce *general policy outputs*, that will benefit virtually all the population, or *particularistic policy outputs*, that will only benefit specific groups. The top-down provision of these two policy outcomes will create distinct relations of self-interested dependence with the population, culminating in two different kinds of support.

But what happens to this stock of popular support after transitions to democracy? Rational voters will have incentives to vote in a way that allows them to keep, or minimise the loss of the material benefits distributed during the former regime, in the new uncertain democratic context. Consequentially, in regimes that created *general support*, newly formed parties will utilise the positive inheritance of the former regime, having incentives to become mainstream in order to maximise their electoral success. This is possible because the majority of the population benefited from general outputs. Conversely, regimes that exclusively created *particularistic support* only benefited a niche segment of the general population, being unfavourable to the great majority. Therefore, unable to become mainstream, in order to utilise this legacy, associated parties are more likely to become extremist.

Acknowledgements

My years at Oxford were the best of my life. The experience of going through a D.Phil was exhilarating, elevating, exhausting, and profoundly inspiring. During these years I met several people to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude. David Rueda and David Doyle — or David and David, as I like to refer to them so that I do not have to place them in any particular order — are unquestionably the ones I would like to thank the most. I cannot conceive how I got so lucky to have them as my supervisors. I am deeply grateful for their unwavering patience, their bounteous availability, and most importantly, for their relentless rigour, and for not letting me get away with the easy solution, when they knew I could find the right solution. David and David made my experience at Oxford richer, and frankly, worth it. And I am forever grateful for their encouragement, guidance and mentorship.

I also have to thank FCT, the Portuguese national funding agency for science, research and technology, for the incredibly generous full scholarship I was awarded. This scholarship allowed me to complete my doctorate thesis without having to excessively worry about time constraints, which is an incredible privilege.

I also would like to thank Spyros Kosmidis and Ben Ansell for their detailed comments on my work during my Confirmation of Status. Their feedback and critical review of an earlier draft of this dissertation unquestionably helped me to steer my thesis into the right direction. And for that I also owe them a large debt of gratitude. Similarly, I would like to thank Jonathan Hopkin, who acted as my discussant during the APSA 2019 Conference, and who also provided feedback on an early version of this thesis. His enlightening comments were extraordinarily important to help me move this dissertation forward, onto a better direction.

My gratitude to Elias Dinas for supervising me during my first year at Oxford also needs to be acknowledged. I am also grateful to Universidade Carlos III de Madrid, for hosting me as a visiting scholar in September 2021. There, I had incredibly fruitful discussions with Pablo Martinelli and Jordi Domènech that were crucial for the development of this dissertation.

For their comments, discussions, and advice, I am also indebted to Nancy Bermeo, Leigh Payne, Jane Gingrich, Leando Pradros de la Escosura, Nelson Ruiz, Jose Miguel Martínez Carrión, Javier Puche Gil and Carlos Varea.

I am forever grateful to João Carlos Espada, my Master's thesis supervisor, who has acted as an important mentor and friend since the beginning of my academic adventures in the field of Political Science. I also have to thank Inês Domingos and André Azevedo Alves, for kindly recommending me in my D.Phil application.

Unrelated to my academic work, but very related to my memorable academic experience, are the Wolfson College friends I made along the way. Our adventures, infamous nights at the Wolfson College Bar, formals, and pizza nights, lifted my spirits and made my years at Oxford truly unforgettable. Thank you for the best years of my life. Wolfson College was, for me, the gift that keeps on giving. There, I also met my now husband Valerio Letizia, who encourages me every day to pursue my academic dreams. I thank him for always being there when I needed in order to complete this project, and for being my everlasting source of inspiration.

Last but not least, I want to thank my mother Alzira Leão and my sister Mariana Leão. These two are my fuel, my steadfast source of support. Merely saying that I am grateful to them, would not make them justice.

Contents

Abstract **ii**

Acknowledgements **iii**

1 Introduction **2**

1.1 Legacies of Autocratic Regimes 3

1.2 A Rational Choice Argument 7

1.3 Empirical Strategy 11

1.4 Overview of the Dissertation 14

2 The Argument **17**

2.1 Managing Threats from the General Population 19

2.2 The Nature of Support and Policy Outputs: Provision and Self-Interest 22

2.2.1 Popular Support and Self-Interest 30

2.3 Types of Policy Outcomes and Autocratic Strategies 32

2.4 Two Types of Popular Support: General and Particularistic 36

2.4.1 General and Particularistic Repression 41

2.5 Combinations of Policy Outcomes and Autocratic Types 44

2.6 Popular Support After Transitions to Democracy 46

2.7 The Argument 48

2.8 The Demand-Side 53

2.9 The Supply-Side 55

2.10 Extremism or Moderation? 57

2.10.1 Local Level Implications 60

2.10.2 Repression over Benefits 61

3 General Support and Mainstream Parties 63

3.1 Expansion or Stagnation: General Output Creation during Autocratic Periods . . . 67

3.1.1 Contraction: Autarky and "The Hunger Years" . . . 67

3.1.2 Expansion: Modernisation and "The Economic Miracle" . . . 72

3.2 Land Reform as a Source of Particularistic Outputs in Autocratic Regimes . . . 77

3.2.1 Land Inequality in Spain . . . 77

3.3 Landowning Elites and General Outputs . . . 81

3.4 After Transitions to Democracy: Parties Associated to the Former Regime . . . 89

3.5 Empirical Analysis: The Post-Transitional Effects of General Outputs 91

3.5.1 Dependent Variables . . . 93

3.5.2 Independent Variables . . . 94

3.5.3 Control Variables . . . 98

3.5.4 Empirical Model . . . 100

3.5.5 Heterogeneous Effects . . . 105

4 General Support and Mainstream Parties — A Qualitative Approach 108

4.1 Case Selection . . . 109

4.2 A. Galicia . . . 111

4.3 B. Canary Islands and Extremadura (Cáceres) . . . 117

4.3.1 Canary Islands . . . 118

4.3.2 Extremadura (Cáceres) . . . 121

4.4 C. Extremadura (Badajoz) and Andalusia . . . 123

4.4.1 Extremadura (Badajoz) . . . 123

4.4.2 Andalusia . . . 125

4.5 D. Catalonia and Madrid . . . 132

5 Particularistic Support and Extremist Parties 135

5.1 Expansion or Stagnation: General Output Creation during Autocratic Periods . . . 138

5.1.1 Contraction: Lack of Economic Growth during the Fascist Regime . . . 138
5.2 Particularistic Repression . . . 142
5.3 Land Reform as a Source of Particularistic Outputs in Autocratic Regimes . . . 144
5.3.1 Land Inequality in Italy . . . 144
5.4 Empirical Analyses: The Post-Transitional Effects of Particularistic Outputs . . . 149
5.5 Empirical Analysis I: Vote for the MSI in Clientelistic Areas . . . 153
5.5.1 Dependent Variables . . . 153
5.5.2 Independent Variables . . . 154
5.5.3 Control Variables . . . 156
5.5.4 Empirical Model I . . . 157
5.6 Empirical Analysis II: Vote for the MSI by Population Sectors . . . 159
5.6.1 Independent Variables . . . 160
5.6.2 Empirical Model II . . . 162

6 Discussion **165**

7 Bibliography **172**

8 Appendices **201**

List of Figures

2.1 The Structure of the Theoretical Argument 51

3.1 "Per Capita GDP and Private Consumption Growth in Spain. 1850-2000 (annual average rate %)" 75
3.2 "Poverty Headcount in Spain (%) (Poverty Line 1985 $ G-K 4 a day per person)" 76
3.3 Industrial sector's gross value added (GVA) per capita by GDP per capita (1955-1975) by Spanish province 92

4.1 Vote Share in Associated Parties in Galicia since Democratisation . . 117
4.2 Vote Share in Associated Parties in the Canary Islands since Democratisation 120
4.3 Vote Share in Associated Parties in Extremadura since Democratisation 125
4.4 Vote Share in Associated Parties in the Andalusian province of Huelva since Democratisation 131
4.5 Vote Share in Associated Parties in the Andalusian province of Almeria since Democratisation 131

5.1 Left: Per Capita GDP in Italy 1950-2001. Right: Williamson and Theil Inequality Indexes 139
5.2 GDP per capita in Italian Macro-Regions 140
5.3 Mainstream Right Vote Distribution before and after the Fascist regime 141

8.1 Industrial sector's gross value added (GVA) per capita by gross disposable household income per capita (1955-1975) 201
8.2 Agricultural Credit in Italy from 1928 to 1938 for Land Running and Maintenance Expenses 202

8.3 Number of Agricultural Lands by Region According to Tax Categories in 1924 203

List of Tables

2.1 Combinations of Policy Outputs 45

3.1 Policy Outputs and the Case of Spain 66
3.2 GDP per Capita by Spanish Region (in constant pesetas of 1995) . . . 75
3.3 Value of Agricultural and Fishery Production (in million of pesetas) between 1930 and 1975 *(Alcaide 2003)* 83
3.4 Determinants of Vote on the Aligned Mainstream Right in the Spanish General Elections of 1977 and 1979 102
3.5 Marginal Analysis: Vote on the Aligned Mainstream Right in the Spanish General Elections of 1977 and 1979 according to General Outputs' Levels 106

4.1 Policy Outputs and the Case of Spain 110

5.1 Policy Outputs and the Case of Spain 136
5.2 Impact of Particularistic Outputs, measured by Clientelistic Hegemony, on MSI Vote Share in the 1948 and 1953 General Elections in Italy 158
5.3 MSI Vote Share in the 1948 and 1953 General Elections in Italy by Social Strata 163

To my mother,
Valerio, and Mariana

Chapter 1

Introduction

Only three years after the end of the Second World War, that supposedly represented the defeat of the most primary nationalisms and heinous totalitarianisms, in one of the countries that suffered the most at the hands of the Fascist ideology, a brand-new neo-Fascist party was born: the Italian Social Movement (MSI[1]). The MSI amassed so much popular support that it became "the reference for the European extreme-right from the end of the war until the late eighties" (Ignazi 2003). If by its second democratic election it had accumulated 5.8% of the votes[2], by 1972 this figure had risen to 8.7% of the national vote. A similar dynamics happened in Germany. Between 1946 and 1952, "several extreme-right parties were founded and allowed in the three zones of the Western part of Germany" (Mudde 2000). Although these parties were suppressed whenever they became too successful[3], being the promising rise of the extreme-right in Germany rapidly contained (Ignazi 2003), the success of this kind of parties in another country similarly devastated by the Fascist ideology is equally puzzling. More puzzling so considering that after a transition to democracy, societies usually come to terms with the the legacy of their autocratic experience. War crimes are punished via transitional justice measures (Barahona de Brito 2010), and a process of breaking with the past takes place (Ishiyama 1995; Pridham 2000; Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020). But this phenomenon of autocratic revivalism after democratic transitions is not exclusive to the extreme-right. In many post-Soviet countries — such as in Russia, Ukraine,

[1] Translated from Italian as "Movimento Sociale Italiano".
[2] In the 1953 Italian General Election.
[3] Such as the case of the Socialist Reich party, or "Sozialistische Reichspartei" (SRP).

Moldova, and others — it is also possible to encounter revived Communist Parties with substantial levels of popular support (Grzymala-Busse 2018). This phenomenon is also not restricted to extremist parties associated to the former autocratic regime. After having endured brutal dictatorships, some countries — such as Spain, Bolivia, Brazil, or South Korea — not only experienced the emergence of parties associated to the former regime[4], but have actually produced extremely successful mainstream parties linked to the previous dictatorship.

Why is it then, that while some post-transitional democracies have extremist parties associated to the past regime, others do not? And why is it that some new democracies experience the rise of successful mainstream parties associated with the former autocracy, while others do not even engage with the past? Ramifications of these questions would also lead us to inquire why is it that right-wing extremism does not reach certain countries such as Portugal — and until very recently — Spain and Greece, while it thrives in countries that have already been threatened in the past by this kind of ideology? And lastly, why is it that some countries are fertile ground for the emergence of parties associated with the former regime that are able to go mainstream and win national elections? Condensing all these questions in a single formulation, one would be lead to inquire: *Why do some post-transitional democracies have extremist parties associated with the former regime, while others have mainstream parties associated with the former regime, and yet others have no parties associated with the former regime?*

1.1 Legacies of Autocratic Regimes

Much of the literature on democratisation studies has focused on the crucial economic (Geddes 1999; Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski 2009) and institutional (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2009; Diamond 2016) factors that can lead to successful or failing democratic transitions. The available research on autocratic legacies has therefore been mainly

[4]These parties are referred to as "successor parties". Throughout this dissertation, I will refer to all different kinds of successor parties (Loxton and Mainwarring 2018) as "associated parties". In addition to successor parties, I will also include in the definition of "associated parties" all parties that visibly claim to align themselves with the former autocratic regime. Parties can do so, for example, by claiming to provide the continuation of policies enacted during the dictatorship.

looked at as a sub-genre of democratisation studies, to the extent that legacies are able to impact the experience of democratic transitions, culminating — or not — into full-fledged democracies. Autocratic legacies have also been analysed from the perspective of what happens during the very short period right after the fall of a regime, in which elites are punished and transitional justice measures are applied (Barahona de Brito 2010; Pridham 2000). More recently, a growing body of literature has examined legacies of autocratic regimes from the perspective of undemocratic elites — the supply-side. These studies show that autocratic elites can affect democratic outcomes (Albertus and Menaldo 2013), and even ensure their continuity into democracy (Slater and Wong 2013; Ziblatt 2017; Albertus 2019; Riedl *et al.* 2020). When they are able to get a slice of the democratic cake, continuing into democracy, former elites will form what is called an "authoritarian successor party" (ASP) (Gryzmala-Busse 2002; Loxton 2015). Because it is not necessarily the case that all parties that choose to associate themselves with the former regime contain elites from the former dictatorship[5], I will refer to these parties as "associated parties". These parties will take advantage of the positive parts of the autocratic legacy in order to maximise their electoral prospects in a democratic context. The issue of why parties chose to associate themselves with a former autocratic regime, and how they may gain electoral advantages from this strategy has been explained at length by Loxton and Mainwaring (2018). However, the questions of why are not all legacies likely to produce associated parties, what exactly are the characteristics of autocratic regimes that are motivate the emergence of associated parties — and how —, why are some associated parties are more successful than others, and why do some associated parties become extremist while others become mainstream, have not been significantly addressed by the existing literature. In order to investigate these questions in depth, one has to dive deep into what is it that certain autocratic regimes have, that will motivate the emergence of different kinds of parties associated with the former dictatorship.

However, very little is known about the impact different characteristics of

[5]Or that all parties that choose to associate themselves with the former regime are recycled autocratic parties.

previous undemocratic regimes have on post-transitional democracies. The field of legacies of autocracies has not yet been significantly approached from a stand alone perspective, going beyond its impact on democratisation. There is however reason to believe that this tendency is being slowly countered. Heavily focused on the demand-side, few recent studies on autocratic legacies have been making a timid attempt at understanding the impact of past undemocratic legacies on people's political attitudes (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Neundorf 2010). Within this very limited literature, most studies have highlighted the role of autocratic ideology in shaping these post-transitional political attitudes, by investigating how the ideological identity of autocratic regimes — either classified as left or right-wing — can affect the ideological positioning of voters in the left-right continuum (Neundorf 2009; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020; Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020). Particularly, some of these studies have looked at how the penetration of the state in autocracies is associated with "left-authoritarian attitudes" (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020), how the experience of authoritarianism creates "biases" against the ideological side of the dictator (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020), and how different political discourses in West and East Germany shaped the understanding of the "left" and the "right" in both sides of the country (Neundorf 2009). If the ideological exposure to a regime — within the L-R spectrum — seems to condition post-transitional political attitudes towards these labels, do all types of "left-wing" and "right-wing" regimes imprint the same kinds of political attitudes after democratic transitions? Throughout this dissertation, I will show that such is not the case. The first problem with this approach is that when we classify a regime single-handedly as "right-wing" or as "left-wing", looking at a regime's legacy as a homogeneous whole, we lose important nuances that are fundamental to explain how the legacy can affect what happens after transitions to democracy. A second relevant problem has to do with the fact that the very own concept of "legacy" is a very abstract one. This abstraction will get in the way of its measurement, which may not be fully accurate. Taking this into account, very little is still understood about how specific autocratic policies and their outcomes, can shape post-transitional political attitudes and voting behaviour. Unlike the concept of legacy as a whole, or

ideological legacy, that are abstract enough for their measurement to become an herculean task, autocratic policy outcomes implemented during a former autocratic regime are relatively straightforward to measure. However, the study of legacies as the combinations of policies that autocrats effectively implemented, and that have concrete outcomes for the population, have been greatly overlooked by the existing literature.

It is known that autocratic incumbents will be interested in establishing policies whose outcomes allow them to protect themselves from threats coming from the elites, and from the general population (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Albertus, Fenner and Slater 2018). And there is a broad consensus in the literature that, in order to manage these threats and to keep in power, an autocratic incumbent has three main tools at her disposal: repression, elite co-optation, and popular legitimation (Wintrobe 1990; Gerschewski 2013). While the goal of repression is to channel the incumbent's demands through fear and violence against any group, legitimacy and co-optation are tools that respectively aim at "building support" towards the regime from within the population, and "maintaining steering capacity" by keeping rival elites on the side of the regime (Gerschewski 2013). Hence, dictators have to strike a balance between repression, on the one hand, and the compliance of the elites and the population, on the other hand (Wintrobe 1990). During the length of the regime, the autocrat will produce a mix of policy outputs. Some will be more positively viewed by the population, and others will be viewed negatively by the population — usually those related to repression. According to Loxton and Mainwaring (2018), after transitions to democracy, autocratic regimes will have produced a combination of autocratic inheritance and baggage. While the former constitutes the inheritance of "valuable resources" from autocratic regimes, the latter are "the liabilities" of an autocratic past. Taking this into account, could it be that the extent of popular acceptance of certain policy outputs introduced during an autocratic regime for stabilisation purposes, could also transit to democracy, affecting voting behaviour? In this dissertation, using a parsimonious theoretical mechanism that combines supply and demand-side explanations, I will demonstrate such is the case. The support-building policy outcomes produced during the length of an

autocratic regime will effectively transit into democracy, shaping voting behaviour in a new political context.

1.2 A Rational Choice Argument

The central argument presented in this dissertation suggests that by being able to create popular support during a regime's lifetime, certain policy outcomes will be particularly relevant in shaping the general population's political preferences after the regime comes to an end. After transitions to democracy, the accumulated stock of popular support will influence the kind of political parties that will emerge in the newly formed party system, and their electoral success. At this point, I would like to highlight that while the few available studies on the impact of autocratic legacies on political preferences have tried to explain voting behaviour from an ideological standpoint (e.g. how ideology shapes attitudes towards the past, and towards policy preferences), in this dissertation, I present an innovative rational choice approach to undemocratic legacies. Instead of focusing on ideology, I show that the "self-interested" relationship between the general population and the autocratic incumbent, operating through a top-down logic of reception of various kinds of material benefits provided by autocratic policy outputs, is a crucial factor in shaping post-transitional attitudes towards the regime, policies, and voting preferences.

The theoretical mechanism outlined in this dissertation follows a two-stage approach. The first stage of the argument explains what happens before transitions to democracy. It focuses on the top-down relationship between the autocratic elites and the general population. More specifically, it addresses how can autocratic incumbents build popular support in order to stabilise and perpetuate their rule, using different combinations of policy outcomes[6]. I argue that these different combinations of policy outcomes will result in the creation of various kinds of popular support. It is relevant to note that the concept of "support" as used throughout this dissertation is understood here as the compliance of the general population in exchange for the reception of positive

[6]The terms "policy outputs", "policy outcomes" will be used interchangeably throughout this dissertation.

policy outcomes. Accordingly, it is grounded on the rational choice literature, in the sense that it is intimately linked to a material self-interest logic (Gelissen 2000; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019). If economic theory has robustly shown that the recipients of benefits are interested in the continual reception of those benefits (Hasenfeld and Refferty 1989; Gelissen 2000; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003), then the general population "supports" the regime to the extent that it provides the continuation of positive policy outcomes. It is important to also consider that the creation of popular support is only possible when the exposure to policy outputs that increase one's wellbeing — positive policy outputs — are greater than outputs that decrease ones' wellbeing — negative policy outputs, or repression. While the former will positively contribute for the creation of support, the latter will have a negative effect on its production. Therefore, when using the concept of popular support, I am assuming that each individual living under an autocratic regime is rational and will only comply with the regime based on reasonable expectations set by the ruler. This will happen whenever, despite the existence of repression, a citizen can still benefit from the regime's positive policy outputs enough to increase her levels of wellbeing.

An important point addressed in this first stage of the argument is that different regimes will produce different kinds of policy outputs. And different policy outputs will be associated to different types of support. Positive outputs can be characterised either as general or particularistic. While general outputs will create *general support*, particularistic outputs will create *particularistic support*. Negative policy outputs, another name for repression — will act as a source of "anti-support", to the extent that it has a negative effect on the creation of support —, can also be characterised as general or particularistic.

In brief, **general support** is created when well-being increases at the individual-level are brought about by policy outputs that benefit all members of a society in a simultaneous and non-exclusive way. The chief example of general support is the one resulting from individual benefits brought about by economic growth outcomes. Although general support targets virtually the whole population living under an autocratic regime, even if an individual does not directly benefit from

general policy outputs, she is not likely to punish the incumbent[7] if her social group is better off, due to the sociotropic element of general support (Mutz and Monak 1997). Because most social social groups will have benefited from general outputs, the number of individuals likely to punish the regime is very reduced.

Also concisely, **particularistic support** is created when policy outputs are conceded to a particular segment of the general population at the expense of other segments. The key characteristic of particularistic outputs — that create this kind of support —, is exactly that they benefit a certain group at the expense of other groups. Hence, for a group to benefit from them, there will have to be another group that will lose. Particularistic support is created though well-being increases of the 'particularistic group', that received the particularistic policy outputs, and that corresponds to a relatively small segment of the general population. An example of particularistic policy outputs that create particularistic support are the privileges attributed to regime elites, such as those distributed to the Soviet Union's *nomenklatura*, or to wealthy landlords in the Spanish and Italian autocratic regimes.

Finally, **negative policy outputs, or repression**, are created either when the regime targets specific elements of the general population though violence, corresponding this to the most common definition of repression (Gerschewski 2013) — to which I call *particularistic repression* —, or when through the attribution of particularistic benefits to a smaller group, the regime harms a larger group — to which I call *general repression*.

Although the many possible combinations between different policy outputs will contribute to a larger or lesser extent to the stability of the regime, in this dissertation, I remain agnostic about the strategies that are most successful in helping perpetuate a dictatorship. Furthermore, I also put aside issues about the extent of the autocrat's responsibility regarding the enactment of the policies, and focus instead on the actual effects of their outcomes (Campello and Zucco 2020). In the second stage of the theoretical argument, I investigate what happens to the stock of popular support created during an autocratic regime, after transitions to democracy.

[7] By not supporting the regime.

The central part of the argument presented in this dissertation occurs in this second stage. It begins with the idea that when an autocratic regime has a usable legacy[8], or in other words, that when the positive outputs that fomented the creation of support during the regime's lifetime are higher than negative outputs, then, new political parties will have incentives to take advantage of this "autocratic inheritance", as suggested by Loxton and Mainwaring (2018). However, as it was already discussed, not all regimes will have the same combinations of general and particularistic support, and of repression. Different regimes will have gathered different kinds of support, which will be translated into different kinds of autocratic "inheritances". The central point is that, in regimes that have accumulated general support, newly formed parties attempting to take advantage of the "positive legacy" created during the regime, will have incentives to become mainstream in order to gather the maximum number of votes. This is possible because when a regime has amassed general support, the large majority of the population will have benefited from this kind of outputs. Hence, the majority of the population will have incentives to vote for a party that promises the continuation of the general policy outputs from which virtually everyone benefited from, in order to maintain their levels of wellbeing in the uncertain context of a post-democratic transition. As seen, the recipients of benefits are interested in the continual reception of those benefits (Hasenfeld and Refferty, 1989; Gelissen, 2000; Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003), particularly in a situation in which exposure to risk — and uncertainty — increases (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019).

On the other hand, if a regime was not able to create general support, having only gathered particularistic support, then, the majority of the population will have either not have benefited from these positive policy outputs, or will have inclusively been harmed by their attribution to the particularistic group — to which I called general repression. In this case, only a small group will have benefited from policy outputs, and would therefore be motivated to vote for parties that would promise their continuation. These parties, however, when taking advantage of the regime's autocratic "inheritance", would not be able to

[8]Which an be also be referred to as "positive legacy", or as "autocratic inheritance".

become mainstream since the majority of the population would not want to seek the continuation of the particularistic policies, and would therefore not have incentives to vote for them. It is in this context that post-transitional parties associated with the former regime become extremist to appeal to the niche group that benefited from particularistic policies.

1.3 Empirical Strategy

The empirical test of the argument presented above poses several challenges. First, it involves the identification of the policy outputs that create the various kinds of support. Because the success of this task cannot be dissociated from an in-depth analysis of the different autocratic regimes — involving a strong historical analysis component —, in practice, a superficial multi-country analysis would not realistically be able to capture the level of detail required by the identification of the components of this mechanism. A second challenge in testing the argument presented above is that even if one is able to correctly identify all the policy outputs that create the various kinds of support, it is possible that more than a single general policy output is able to produce general support, and that more than a single particularistic policy output is able to produce particularistic support. This requires the serious evaluation of the level of salience of each policy output in each regime.

In order to circumvent these two issues, a comparative case-study approach was chosen in order to test the aforementioned argument. The biggest advantage of this methodology is that it allows the inclusion a much more fine-grained level of detail on each regime (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). This not only helps to make sure that policy outputs are correctly identified, but that the policy outputs created on each case-study are salient and comparable. The chosen empirical strategy therefore includes a large component of historical and archival data analysis, crucial to tease out the intricacies of the desired level of detail. I chose two archetypal case-studies: one in which general support and particularistic support were simultaneously created, and one in which only particularistic support was created. The objective of this decision was to test the two major

aspects of the argument, one in each of the two crucial case-studies (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). While in the first case-study the regime produced associated mainstream parties, being immunised against extremism associated with the former regime through the creation of general support; in the second case-study the regime produced extremism associated with the former regime due to the exclusive presence of particularistic support. Because autocratic legacies and the production of popular support are not homogeneously distributed within a single regime, the theoretical implications of the argument were tested in each of the case-studies at the local level. These local level implications subsequently informed what happened at the national level.

The first aspect of the theoretical argument, reflected on the first case-study, was empirically tested using the case of Francoist Spain, the autocratic regime that ruled the country between 1939-1975. The second aspect was tested using the case of Fascist Italy, the dictatorship that ruled Italy between 1922 and 1945. Of course many other regimes could have been chosen to illustrate the argument developed here, namely, communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the more ideologically unique Asian autocratic regimes, or even "right-wing" Latin American regimes. The choice of Spain and Italy has not only to do with the fact that these two regimes co-existed for a long period of time, but more importantly, that these regimes were very similar in terms of their major characteristics. Following King, Keohane and Verba (1994), but also George and McKeown (1985), this choice was therefore mainly motivated by what these authors refer to as "the congruence procedure". These authors "stress the need for a systematic collection of the same information—the same variables—across carefully selected units" (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 45). The dependent variables at stake would always be imperatively the same, regardless of the kind of analysis and cases chosen[9]. However, the advantage of choosing Spain and Italy is that these regimes were very similar in the majority of their most important policy outputs — the independent variables. Effectively, these two regimes only differ in the factor that I am actually interested in contrasting: the creation of general support. Hence, by analysing these two case studies, one is evaluating two regimes that displayed a

[9] As they would correspond to the vote shares of associated parties in the first democratic elections.

similar "right-wing" nationalist ideology— or one could say, Fascist — (Linz 2000), that had a predominantly rural population, and that applied the same stance on similar agricultural policies. In both regimes, agricultural policies constituted the most salient and important kinds of policies. Their outcomes were, in both cases, crucial to the creation of particularistic support. Although it is true that other minor policy outcomes could have contributed to the creation of particularistic support to a much smaller extent, because no other particularistic policy outputs were as salient as agricultural outputs in both Spain and in Italy, I chose to exclusively focus on the effects of this kind of outputs. This allows me to streamline my theory and disregard other minor contributions to the creation of particularistic support that can be regarded as generally irrelevant to explain the theoretical mechanism.

The agricultural policy outputs created in Spain and Italy produced very similar results. Both predominately favoured large landowners, a smaller segment of the population, while greatly neglecting the larger part of the rural population that was predominantly landless, or that owned very small plots of land used for self-subsistence purposes. The particularistic group, the one that benefited from particularistic policy outcomes, corresponded in both regimes to medium and large landowners. Furthermore, both Spain and Italy took a similar stance regarding the poor landless population, and therefore, the creation of general repression was also identical in the two cases. The main substantial difference between the two autocratic regimes is that, while Italy was only able to produce particularistic support, Spain was also able to produce general support during the second half of the regime. In a way, one could say that the Italian Fascist regime resembles the early Spanish regime — as both had unfortunate experiments with autarky and the same nefarious outcomes. However, while the Italian regime ended after the Second World War, in 1945, the Spanish dictatorship continued on, lasting thirty more years until 1975, the year in which Francisco Franco — the autocrat — died. It was during this second phase of the Francoist dictatorship that the regime was able to produce general outputs as it experienced unmatched rates of economic growth — the Spanish "economic miracle".

A third challenge of testing the aforementioned theoretical argument is that

the choice of the comparative case-study methodology also poses challenges beyond its focus on depth, while sacrificing a more comprehensive analysis. The data available for these regimes, particularly regarding the relevant variables of interest, requires a great deal of archival research and historical analysis. Often, the level in which data is collected in official records is not excessively finely grained, resulting in relatively small to medium N quantitative analyses. To circumvent this obstacle, I will be using mixed-methods: I will combine a quantitative with a qualitative analysis. This allows me to complement the causal relationships established in the quantitative models with qualitative evidence. To this regard, the Spanish case is divided in two chapters: a first one in which I present qualitative and quantitative evidence, and a second one focusing exclusively on qualitative evidence. In the Italian chapter, I combine the two approaches in a single chapter. Transversal to all methods used, the data gathered involved a substantial deal of archival work, review of primary sources (e.g. national and local newspapers), and comparative historical analysis.

1.4 Overview of the Dissertation

The following chapters of this dissertation are organised as follows: in **Chapter 2**, I develop the theoretical argument briefly described above. I start by highlighting the most relevant previous literature related to the argument advanced in this dissertation. After establishing linkages between previous related works and the departing point of my argument, I describe in detail the two stages of the theoretical argument developed in this dissertation. This Chapter therefore replaces a more traditional literature review chapter, by including references and arguments developed by other authors, whenever necessary, to explicate the theoretical mechanism developed in this dissertation. After this Chapter, I proceed to empirically test the theoretical implications defined previously. In **Chapter 3**, I focus on the case-study of the Spanish Francoist regime. I provide significant evidence that this regime was able to create high levels of general support in all Spanish regions, and that, consequently, the two parties that chose to associate themselves with the former regime became mainstream. I also qualitatively

establish a relationship between these two mainstream associated parties and the Francoist regime, and show that these parties exactly appealed to the mainstream electorate by exploiting the general support legacy created. Furthermore, in Chapter 3, I also use quantitative methods to demonstrate that the creation of general support leads to a greater electoral success of the mainstream parties associated with the former regime in the areas in which general support was more prevalent. Similarly, I also quantitatively show that negative policy outputs are related to a decrease in the vote for the mainstream associated parties. Then, in **Chapter 4**, I complement this analysis with a strictly qualitative study of selected Spanish regions that enable me to illustrate the isolated effects of the different positive and negative outputs created during the autocratic regime. In this Chapter, I further corroborate the expectations of the first hypothesis of the theoretical argument, and emphasise the ways in which the associated parties took advantage of the positive legacy of general outputs to appeal to the mainstream public.

At this point, after having investigated a case in which both general and particularistic support were sources of autocratic inheritance, I investigate a case in which particularistic support was the only source of autocratic inheritance. In **Chapter 5**, I explore this scenario by analysing the Italian Fascist Regime led by Mussolini between 1922 and 1945. This was a regime that exclusively produced particularistic support. I begin by thoroughly discussing the inexistence of general support during the length of the regime. Then, I show that this former autocratic regime, benefiting only from particularistic support, exclusively produced an extremist party associated to the former regime. To this regard, I provide qualitative evidence that the relationship between the particularistic group and Fascism subsisted after transitions to democracy. Moreover, I show that the extremist associated party was financially and electorally supported by this group that aimed at maintaining its particularistic benefits after transitions to democracy. In this Chapter, I also quantitatively demonstrate that the electoral success of the associated extremist party was more prevalent in areas in which particularistic outputs were more intensely created. And finally, that areas with a higher incidence of negative particularistic outputs — important in this regime — tended

to vote less for the associated extremist party. Lastly, in **Chapter 6** of this dissertation, I conclude by discussing the importance of the results obtained, what they mean in the context of the existing literature, and what they represent for contemporary Spain and Italy. In this last Chapter I also highlight the limitations of the results obtained, and I explore possible avenues for future research.

Chapter 2

The Argument

Building on the previous literature, this chapter presents the theoretical framework used as the basis for the argument put forward in the present dissertation. Hopefully, by the end of this chapter, the mechanisms that describe the relationship between past dictatorships and present day political parties will be relatively straightforward. In order to do so, while aiming at keeping things simple, a two-stage argument approach will be employed. The first stage of the argument explains what happens before transitions to democracy. It focuses on the top-down relationship between the autocratic elites and the general population. More specifically, it addresses how can autocratic incumbents build popular support in order to stabilise and perpetuate their rule, using different combinations of material policy outcomes. The second stage of the argument looks into what happens to this top-down relationship after transitions to democracy. Particularly, it examines how the mechanisms that create popular support in a former autocratic regime[1] will continue to operate in a democratic context, shaping contemporary party systems and the landscape of extremism.

With this argument, in the present dissertation, I seek to contribute to the existing studies on autocracies and their legacies in three different ways. My first contribution is empirical — I attempt to provide the first systematic empirical study of how autocratic legacies affect political extremism after transitions to democracy, an innovative approach both from a demand and supply perspective. I show that different kinds of material policy outputs offered by autocratic regimes

[1]The terms "autocratic regimes", "undemocratic regimes" or "dictatorships" will be used interchangeably throughout this second chapter. Similarly, the concepts of "autocratic leader", "autocratic incumbent" or "dictator" will also be used interchangeably.

will either contribute to the promotion or immunisation against extremism aligned with the past, after transitions to democracy have occurred. While I demonstrate that some countries will be fully immune to extremism associated with the past autocratic regime, others will not. This explains why countries like Portugal or Spain did not have, until very recently, extremist right-wing parties since they democratised, while countries like Germany or Italy have always had. I believe this contribution to be of utter importance. If one can understand the mechanisms through which popular support is produced during a regime's lifetime, one can more easily predict the patterns of extremism a country will have after democratisation. This can be an extremely useful tool to analyse what will geopolitically happen to contemporary autocracies — such as North Korea, China, or radical Islamic dictatorships — if they democratise, since extremism will be materialised in different but relatively predictable ways. My second contribution is an attempt to expand the legacies of autocratic regimes' literature by including an innovative rational-choice theoretical approach, in the context of this area of study, particularly when looking at demand-side explanations. If undemocratic legacies have been extensively studied from an ideological standpoint (e.g. how ideology shapes attitudes towards the past and towards policy preferences), I show that the "self-interested" relationship between the general population and autocratic incumbents, operating through a top-down logic of reception of various kinds of benefits provided by autocratic policies, is crucial in shaping post-transitional attitudes towards the regime, policies and voting preferences. Hence, instead of looking at how ideological legacies shape political preferences and voting behaviour, after transitions to democracy, I will instead analyse how the link between a self-interested general population and autocratic policy outcomes influences political attitudes and voting preferences. Finally, my last contribution is an attempt to highlight the importance of two different kinds of policy outputs that can be produced in an autocratic regime, as each of them will be associated to the creation of a different kind of post-transitional party. I specifically draw attention to how general policy outputs (e.g. socio-economic performance) and particularistic policy outputs (e.g. the distribution goods and services to particular groups) in autocratic regimes can shape the popular support

for such regimes. While the former is linked to the emergence of post-transitional mainstream parties associated to the former regime, the later is associated to the emergence of post-transitional extremist parties associated to the former regime. This effort has to do with the fact that only few studies have addressed the real impact of the outcomes produced by autocratic policies on popular support, from a demand perspective, as opposed to an institutional one. I show that the creation of general policy outputs and particularistic policy outputs is a crucial factor in the understanding of how autocratic incumbents build their stock of popular support – an essential tool to stabilise and perpetuate their rule, even in regimes that are highly ideological –, and that the existence of this stock of support has consequences after transitions to democracy.

Stage I — Before Transitions to Democracy

2.1 Managing Threats from the General Population

Autocratic incumbents face two types of threats to their rule — those coming from the elites and those coming from the general population (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Albertus, Fenner and Slater 2018). There is a broad consensus in the literature that, in order to manage these threats and to ensure the stability of the regime, the autocratic incumbent has three main tools at her disposal: repression, elite co-optation and popular legitimation (Wintrobe 1990; Gerschewski 2013). While the goal of repression is to channel the incumbent's demands through fear and violence against any group, legitimacy and co-optation are tools that respectively aim at "building support" towards the regime from within the population, and "maintaining steering capacity" by keeping rival elites on the side of the regime (Gerschewski 2013). Hence, dictators have to strike a balance between repression, on the one hand, and the compliance of the elites and the population, on the other hand (Wintrobe 1990). The study of how undemocratic regimes have used repression in order to stabilise their rule is fully established and possibly the most fertile. Indeed, "repression is undoubtedly one of the backbones of autocracies and is sometimes even referred to as a defining feature of

autocracies" (Gerschewski 2013). It is also an easier concept to define, corresponding to the violence and human rights abuses (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018) carried out by the regime against individuals or organisations, in the form of actual or threatened physical sanctions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Davenport 2007). The literature concerning the ways in which autocratic incumbents co-opt[2] rival elites in order to secure their place in power has been also greatly expanding, and is probably the one that has been attracting the most attention (Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* 2003; Smith 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; 2007; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008; Slater and Fenner 2011; Svolik 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013; Albertus, Fenner and Slater 2018; Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar 2019).

With the advent of the third wave of democratisation, research on social and civil society revolutions gained a new momentum. According to Bernhard and Edgell (2019), during this period, "the role of civil society was conceptualised as essential to defeating incumbent efforts to shore up authoritarianism by pushing for democracy and the convoking of free and fair founding elections." These authors argue that whenever the general population remained passive, authoritarian rulers were more successful at keeping in power. Conversely, democratisation was often made possible in the cases where the general population actively pushed for regime change (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 1996; della Porta 2014; Brancati 2016). More recently, scholars have rediscovered a newfound interest in the study of the threats coming from the general population faced by autocratic regimes, particularly focusing their efforts on the importance of legitimation strategies that can help authoritarian leaders to sustain and maintain their rule (Burnell 2006; Gerschewski 2013; Kailitz 2013; Cassani 2017; Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017; Kailitz and Stockemer 2017; Mazepus 2017; von Soest and Grauvogel 2017; von Haldenwang 2017; Teorell and Lindberg 2019). Crucially, some of these more recent studies have confirmed the importance of popular support for the stability of autocratic regimes. Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017) argue that "no political regime can endure only on repression and co-optation" and in the long run, any autocratic leader will have to

[2]Gerschewski (2013) defines elite co-optation as "the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite".

legitimate her rule, regardless of the regime type. Cassani (2017) empirically provides evidence of this by showing the importance of popular support in different autocratic regime types by comparing social services' performance, as well as von Soest and Grauvogel (2017), who show how different popular support building strategies influences regimes' duration. Throughout history, Gerschewski (2018) explains, many were the attempts made by dictators to try to understand how supportive the population was towards the regime:

> "Folkloric tales of Oriental and Chinese emperors mingling with the people to learn what they think indicate that it has been a known unknown throughout history. Nazi Germany invested large sums and actually revolutionised survey research in order to ascertain what the people really think. So even the most brutish regime wants to know what its citizens believe. Today, we have case-based evidence on a range of countries with China and Russia at the forefront and among the most active in fostering a legitimacy belief." (Gerschewski 2018)

Today, a growing set of studies show how autocratic leaders can use online tools in order to gather information about how successful their popular support-building efforts really are (Lynch 2011; Greitens 2013; Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017). At their disposal, dictators now have tools such as the social media (Gunitsky 2015), and soon, in a dystopian scenario — that will hopefully remain a mere nightmare —, the use of Artificial Intelligence (Zeng 2020). As the historian Yuval Noah Harari alerted, "imagine North Korea in 2030, when every citizen has to wear a biometric bracelet 24 hours a day. If you listen to a speech by the Great Leader and the bracelet picks up the tell-tale signs of anger, you are done for." (Harari 2020). This remark perfectly illustrates the nefarious consequences of an autocratic leader who has perfect information about those who may view their rule as undesirable. Such a tool could be of help to ameliorate the effectiveness of support-building strategies, on the one hand, and to eliminate those to whom these strategies are ineffective, on the other hand.

This dissertation broadly aims at contributing to the literature above on the importance, for autocratic stability and survival, of containing threats from the

general population. Using a combined supply and demand-side approach, it aims at identifying the policy outcomes that, by fostering support from the general population, will allow the autocratic incumbent to keep in power. These outcomes will then be looked at retrospectively, after transitions to democracy, and their impact on the new political system will be measured, particularly when looking at party system extremism. In the following section, I will describe the nature of policy outcomes created by an autocratic regime, and how they contribute to the creation of popular support.

2.2 The Nature of Support and Policy Outputs: Provision and Self-Interest

Understanding what the general population really thinks about an autocratic regime can be an herculean task. First, those who live under autocratic regimes would have obvious reservations in divulging how they really feel about the regime with fear of repercussions, due to the action of repression. Second, even if this data was available, as it is in some rare cases — such as in the public opinion surveys carried out between 1972 and 1982 in Brazil during the military dictatorship (Converse *et al.* 2006) —, autocratic elites would not be inclined to share and divulge this kind of information, specially if the responses showed little popular support for the regime. However these two issues can be resolved with access to micro-level post-transitional surveys on legacies of undemocratic regimes, that only look at the past retrospectively, and where citizens can often express freely what they really think about the former regime. A third, and in my view, much more crucial issue, has to do with the fact that general popular perceptions towards an autocratic regime tells us very little about the context of the affinity or disregard for the regime. In other words, asking people to identify how they feel about a current, or former, autocratic regime erases all the nuances of the negative, but also of the positive aspects of the regime, collapsing a multitude of different considerations into a 0 to 10 scale. The same thing would happen if one asks the general population to identify how they feel about the

ideology of the regime[3]. Ideology has the aggravating issue of being a concept abstract enough to mean a vast range of different things to different people, being always associated with a lack of concept clarity no matter how one tries to handle this notion. By binarising ideology into a left *versus* right scale — or extreme-left *versus* extreme-right scale —, one will inevitably lose the various nuances that ideology encompasses, which might be a good thing in a democratic party system context, as a way to help parties to pack and divulge their policy positions (Lupu 2013), but that when applied to autocratic regimes, it can only offer shorthanded if not misleading pieces of information. Dictatorships often have multiple contradictory ideological positions in different stances, which would make our job to place them under a single left-right binary scale very hard, if not impossible. Additionally, another challenge is that while some people may be more sensitive to the economic axis of ideology (adepts of *laissez-faire versus* socialists), other people may be more sensitive to the social axis of ideology (liberals *versus* conservatives), or to any other binary axis that we may choose to divide ideology into. But even if one exhaustively breaks down ideology[4] to a molecular level and considers all of its different meanings, one would end up with something that is not necessarily tangible. Ideological aspirations do not always materialise in practice. For example, some scholars argue that Franco's Spain or Mussolini's Italy were not really totalitarian regimes despite these regimes' totalitarian ideological aspirations. Due to implementation failures[5], autocratic regimes' official ideological stances may not always correspond to what the people living under such regimes experienced in practice.

For the reasons described above, in order to understand the notion of popular support for an autocratic regime, I will go down the ladder of abstraction and instead of looking at whether citizens generally support the regime, the dictator, or the ideology of the regime, as those considerations can be too complex to be

[3]For example, when asking how close one feels to the ideology of the former regime, or how positively they view the ideology of the former regime.

[4]Here I am talking about ideology broadly, and not only about what Linz (2000) defined as ideology — usually only present in totalitarian regimes — but about the 'ideology' of any regime: military, personalistic, hybrid, etc. The set of beliefs or principles that organise a society under an undemocratic regime.

[5]Or simply because the autocrat decides not to pair the ideological story with corresponding policies.

fairly captured, I will focus on something much more tangible: the popular support for material policy outcomes experienced under an autocratic regime. I argue that the citizenry's experience of the policies implemented by the regime gives us a much more unequivocal picture of what the regime really encompassed, leaving aside ideological aspirations or citizens' personal abstract considerations. Although imperfect, the rationale behind this decision is that good and bad policy outcomes are harder to dispute, in the sense that they are less liable to being subjectively interpreted when measuring if they contribute to an increase or decrease in one's wellbeing. To this regard, I will highlight three important considerations — the material nature of outputs, the distinction between actual performance and subjective perceptions, and the level and timing at which outputs affect popular support.

Material Nature of Outputs

The first important consideration in regard to the policy outputs addressed in this dissertation is that these are material policy outputs, as opposed to ideological. This is not to say that ideology is not relevant to the stabilisation of autocratic regimes, nor that it does not impact democratic transitions and newly formed party systems. In fact, much has been written about the effects of ideological indoctrination on regime stabilisation, and on its long-lasting effects after transitions to democracy. Notably, studies on totalitarianism (Linz 2000) have highlighted the role of ideological indoctrination in justifying brutal regimes. Arendt (1951) has "argued that ideology and terror are the two essential features of these regimes". Similarly, Friedrich and Brzezinski (1968) and Linz (2000) also regard an "all-encompassing ideology with strong chiliastic and utopian fervour" (Gerschewski 2013) as an important tool for autocratic control over the population. According to Easton (1975), ideological indoctrination provides the citizens with a sense of attachment, a sense of belonging to the regime, despite its brutality. In order to create this sense of belonging, the regime often has to restructure society "so that the prevailing class, religious and sectional loyalties would be replaced by a new heightened national awareness" (Welch 1993). According to many scholars, ideological indoctrination policies allow the creation of this unified national

awareness (Gerschewski 2013; Linz 2000). Recent studies have empirically focused on the importance of indoctrination policies in former autocratic regimes and their effects on contemporary party systems, namely when it comes to shaping citizens' attitudes and political preferences after transitions to democracy (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020). However, other authors have raised questions about how much we can trust ideology as a tool to "reform human consciousness" (Kirkpatrick 1982; Wintrobe 1990), for being a relatively ambiguous concept, difficult to measure, and to causally pin down. For example, how can we be sure that it was the indoctrination policy of a particular government that influenced our political preferences and not a family member, or a book found in the black market that one has read? If indoctrination effects can indeed be hard to measure, recent works have, for this reason, focused instead on a slightly less ambiguous concept: ideological socialisation. These studies contend that socialisation efforts in undemocratic regimes can deeply shape the citizens' political attitudes, prevailing for many years after the regime has ended (Neundorf 2010; Voigtländera and Vothc 2015; Neundorf and Smets 2017; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches 2020). While these works cannot speak for a dictator's ability to successfully "brainwash" its citizens, or erasing all previously held beliefs to create a *tabula rasa* upon which the regime can "control" its subjects, it has been shown that socialisation efforts, particularly at an early age and through schooling, allow a contextual attachment to the regime, the "sense of belonging" to a nation (Velikonja 2009; Prusik and Lewicka 2016). So instead of arguing that the mechanism through which indoctrination operates makes a direct connection between an indoctrinating policy and the change in one's political attitudes, these authors argue that the contextual sociological exposure provided by the regime's ideological policies and the "sense of belonging" that such context provides, is what triggers the support for the regime. A successful socialisation policy outcome is one in which the general population as a whole becomes more permeable to the regime due to a heightened sense of attachment and belonging, which will ultimately contribute to the citizens' wellbeing. As it was mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, these perceptions are, however, still ambiguous. The problem is aggravated by the combined — certainly negative, but also

positive — nature of autocratic legacies, and the many confounders for which one cannot control. For example, distinguishing nostalgia for the former regime from nostalgia for one's childhood — a common sociological feature — can constitute an obstacle to the isolation of the socialisation (or indoctrination) phenomenon in an empirical context. Because autocratic legacies are nuanced, it can be hard to isolate the positive effects of socialisation, as it was suggested at the beginning of this section. Hence, in order to circumvent these issues, in this dissertation I will exclusively deal with policy outputs that are material in nature, and not sociological or ideological. The case studies selected for the empirical evaluation of this theory in the coming chapters also reflects this choice. These correspond to regimes in which the ideological or sociological aspect was not particularly relevant for the stabilisation of the regime (Linz 2000).

Actual Performance *versus* Popular Perceptions

Second, there are important similarities between how citizens under a dictatorial regime experience autocratic policy outcomes, and how policy outcomes in democratic contexts motivate economic voting. If in an autocratic regime the incumbent can stabilise the regime through certain policy outcomes that will promote the creation of popular support — through a mechanism that will be described in more detail at the end of this section —, the way in which democratic incumbents seek re-election though the introduction of successful economic policy outcomes constitutes an uncanny parallel. After establishing this analogy, I will ground myself on economic voting theories to contend that although one could concentrate on the popular perceptions regarding the performance of an autocratic regime, as it was already noted, those are nearly impossible to extract with precision. Popular perceptions towards an autocratic regime are still ambiguous even when extracted retrospectively, after the regime has ended. Because in autocratic regimes positive outcomes are always inevitably linked to the negative outcomes of repression, it becomes problematic to disentangle perception from performance. The available literature on economic voting has also challenged how objective popular perceptions towards performance are in democratic contexts, being clouded by partisan allegiances and inclinations

(Bartels 2002; Erikson 2004; Anderson, Mendes and Tverdova 2004; Evans and Andersen 2006; Campello and Zucco 2020). Ultimately, as written by Campello and Zucco (2020), if "citizens create welfare-enhancing incentives for governments by judging them with their pockets", then, the concept of accountability is defined "as the incentive to engage in actual maximisation of voter welfare and not that of maximising voters' perceptions of welfare". For these reasons, I will focus on policy outcomes instead of policy perceptions to establish a relationship between material performance and incumbent support (Kramer 1971), but in an autocratic context. Following the insightful recent work by Campello and Zucco (2020), I will also assume that the population in an autocratic regime will judge the autocrat on the grounds of policy outputs performance, even if a good performance is determined by factors external to the dictator. These authors have provided substantial empirical evidence that policy outputs influence incumbent support "even when it is largely driven by factors beyond government control".

The question of policy outcomes *versus* policy perceptions raises another important issue. And that is the issue of accountability. Although accountability is crucial for the underlying mechanism of economic voting in a democratic context, the notion of accountability in an autocratic context is indeed a very foreign one. Because autocrats are not exclusively dependent on the population's support to keep in power[6], although they are interested in fostering it to the extent that it allows the stabilisation of the regime, the notion of accountability loses importance when thinking about the relationship between policy outputs and popular support, in an autocratic context. Instead of accountability, I suggest that other mechanism drives the relationship between policy outputs and popular support: self-interest. This mechanism will be explored at the end of this section.

The Level and Timing of Outputs

Another important consideration is the level at which policy outputs influence popular support, and how this support, operating at a particular level, can subsequently influence post-transitional voting behaviour[7]. Studies evaluating

[6]Unlike a democratic incumbent that is entirely dependent on votes to seek re-election and keep in power.

[7]This latter connection will be made in the second part of this argument.

how performance shapes voting behaviour — either from an egotropic or sociotropic perspective — have debated whether one should focus on aggregate performance measures or individual-based measures of improvement. Both have very important shortcomings. At the individual-level, the problem remains the same: endogeneity. As mentioned, at the individual-level one has to deal with the subjective perceptions of how one perceives not only the state of the national economy, but also their own personal finances. As argued by Hansford an Gomez (2015), in addition to partisan-based bias in perception, at the individual-level one "may subconsciously alter their economic evaluations to make them consistent with their vote choice in an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance" (see also Anderson, Mendes and Tverdova 2004). This means that even "objective" individual measures can become subjective. Kramer (1983) has notoriously suggested that economic voting should be studied at the macro-level rather than at the micro-level. However, this approach can also be problematic. Hansford and Gomez (2015) highlight the fact that at the aggregate level, there is no variation among voters because the national state of the economy varies to the same extent for everyone. An option could be to pooling national elections together, however this is not a viable solution when studying transitions to democracy, as there are simply not enough elections available. I believe that the problem with aggregate measures is a slightly different one. The issue is that they completely disregard local variation of autocratic policy outputs. This local variation is extremely important for the analysis developed here because autocrats will naturally privilege some areas more, while overlooking, or even repressing other areas. Aggregate measures would completely erase this local variation that is crucial for how, after transitions to democracy, local legacies are translated into the vote for a party — that is certainly national — but that will have different degrees of support among different areas within the same country. Hence, in this analysis, I will focus on how policy outputs vary at the local level, to try to capture as much information as possible about the heterogeneity of support created in an autocratic regime. While in some areas policy outputs will have fared better in building support, in other areas — possibly where repression was used more intensely — policy outcomes will have not been translated into support. This has

consequences for the stability of the regime, while the dictatorship still exists, and for post-transitional voting patterns. However, this also raises the question of how can local level policy outputs motivate the vote for particular parties in a democratic context, that operate under a national-level logic. As empirically shown by Hansford an Gomez (2015), I similarly suggest that objective local level policy outputs can be informative about what happens at the aggregate national level. In fact, also Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg (2014) have noted that individuals use "signals about aggregate economic performance they get in their daily life to make inferences about the state of the aggregate economy" (see also Weatherford 1983). Taking this into account, I suggest that the support for autocratic policies created at the local level will shape what happens at the national level, in an aggregate way, following the described mechanism of using information gathered at the local level to make illations about the national level. This information will shape the type of political parties that will emerge in a newly formed party system. Although thee parties will inevitably operate at a national-scale, they will have different levels of support in different areas, dependent on the policy outcomes' good or bad performance at the local level.

A last point that is necessary to take into account before moving on to the mechanism that drives the relationship between outcomes and support is the timing of the outputs. In other words, how far in time can policy outputs shape support in an autocracy? Retrospective voting theories suggest that this window is relatively short, and is usually restricted to the year before an election takes place (Kiewiet 1983; Achen and Bartels 2004). According to findings by Healy and Lenz (2014), voters actually have the intention of judging incumbents based on cumulative performance. However, these authors find that such information is not readily accessible to them, and therefore, "voters inadvertently substitute [it by] election-year performance because it is more easily accessible". Similarly, it makes sense to think that this "end-heuristic" explanation, as the authors call it, can also be applied to the population living under an autocratic regime when evaluating the performance of local policy outputs and translating it — or not — into support. Also in this case, it makes sense to think that individuals would have the tendency to simplify retrospective performance over a long period of time into

what happened in the previous year, or previous few years. Hence, the general population would "simplify retrospective assessments by substituting conditions at the end for the whole" (Healy and Lenz 2014).

All in all, after discussing the three key characteristics of policy outputs, in the next section I will describe the mechanism through which they relate to popular support.

2.2.1 Popular Support and Self-Interest

Previously, I stressed the importance for undemocratic incumbents to cultivate the support of the general population as a means to ensure the stability and durability of the regime. But in order to manage these bottom-up threats, the autocrat needs to strike a balance between investing support-building policies, on the one hand, and repression against the population, on the other hand. In his article, "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship", Wintrobe (1990) shows that the available supply of political loyalty gives the dictator power over the population when combined with repression. Because both political loyalty and repression cost resources and can, for this reason, be seen as "alternative" inputs into the creation of political power, "the dictator who wishes to remain in office therefore faces a trade-off between these two alternatives." Even though Wintrobe (1990; 2000) has referred to this compliance as loyalty, generally, the concept of 'loyalty' usually includes a persistent emotional attachment to the regime even in a non-rational context of non-benefiting from the regime (Gerschewski 2018; Bensman 1979). This brings me to a very important point considering the nature of the theoretical argument developed in this chapter. Here, instead of adopting the more ambiguous concept of 'loyalty'[8], I will refer to the compliance of the general population as 'popular support'. When using this term, I am assuming that each individual living under an autocratic regime is rational and will only comply with the regime based on reasonable expectations set by the ruler. This will happen whenever, despite the existence of repression, a citizen can still benefit from the regime's policy outputs enough to increase her wellbeing, as suggested by the rational choice literature (Downs 1957; Meltzer and

[8]Even though Wintrobe's unique concept of 'loyalty' also operates under this rational choice logic.

Richard 1981; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019). I will, therefore, exclude from my theoretical model any unreasonable support demonstrations that are not justified from a cost-benefit basis and rational choice logic. The concept of 'popular support' operationalised here is therefore intimately linked to a material self-interest logic when determining the support for an autocratic policy outcome (Gelissen 2000; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019).

Adopting Wintrobe's (1990) model, from the autocrat's perspective, the output (power over the population) is a function of the policy outcomes that will generate wellbeing in the population (P) and that are what will actually create popular support, corresponding to Wintrobe's "loyalty", and the effects of repression (R). Hence, the relationship between the inputs can be represented by the following production function:

$$\pi = \pi(P, R) \tag{2.1}$$

From the citizens' perspective, I consider that popular support S_i is a final balance that includes the positive support-boosting policy outputs P_i, and the effects of negative policy outputs, to which I will refer to as repression R_i. It seems reasonable to assume that when judging the total combination of policy outputs implemented by a given autocratic incumbent aimed at building popular support, and considering that repression is inevitably necessary to this mix, a rational citizen will take into account not only the policy outcomes that benefit her, but also the policy outcomes that harm her. Therefore, popular support S_i for each individual (i) equals the positive effects of wellbeing creating policy outputs (P_i), minus the negative effects of repression (R_i):

$$S_i = P_i - R_i \tag{2.2}$$

With this, I assume that the creation of popular support[9] is the result of the exposure to policy outputs that increase ones wellbeing, minus the effects of repression, that will have a negative effect on the production of support. When

[9]For the policy outcome, and indirectly, for the regime to the extent that it promotes its continuation.

they exist, positive policy outputs are therefore only translated into popular support if the effects of repression are not also substantial. Hence, despite of not contributing to the creation of popular support when used single-handedly, as seen, repression is nevertheless necessary to counterbalance any positive policy outputs. Without positive policy outputs, and in a context of high repression, a regime would fall, since the population would revolt against too much repression and no positive benefits (Wintrobe 1990; 2000). But without repression, too much of any positive outputs could also be potentially a risk for the regime's survival, since in order to achieve better political and individual liberties, the population could press the dictator to democratise.

Accordingly, in this first stage of this argument, I argue that autocratic incumbents are able to ensure the stability and durability of their regime through the implementation of certain policy combinations that promote different kinds of popular support via their outcomes. Later, in the second stage of the argument, I will show that these different policy outcome combinations will have implications either on the promotion or on the immunisation against extremism aligned with the former regime, after transitions to democracy have occurred. But in order to develop the first stage of this argument, the following question arises: What kinds of policy outcomes do autocratic incumbents have at their disposal in order to cultivate popular support?

2.3 Types of Policy Outcomes and Autocratic Strategies

In this section, I will review all of the policy outcomes at the disposal of the autocrat that will allow her to create popular support through the outputs of those policy instruments. A first important note is that the reasons that might lead the autocrat to choose a specific combination of policies may vary according to the resources she has available, or to her strategy of power maximisation or minimisation over the population. Wintrobe (1990; 2000) has argued that, actually, it is not always the case that an autocrat will want to maximise her power over the population. This author considers two extreme cases of regime types: authoritarian regimes, "in which the dictator wishes only to minimise the costs of

remaining in power in order to collect the fruits of office (palaces, Mercedes-Benzes, Swiss bank accounts)", and totalitarian regimes, in which the leader wishes to maximise her power over the population. In other words, authoritarian leaders do not care about loyalty as their goal is merely to extract rents to get financial goods from office, and totalitarian leaders, who on the other hand want loyalty in order to maximise their power and regime stability, and are willing to exchange the provision of "goods and services to the citizenry" for political support. However, in this dissertation, I will remain agnostic about the reasons that might lead an autocrat to pick a given combination of policy instruments, and focus on the outcomes that such selection that will originate. Another important point worth highlighting is that, as previously mentioned, it will not always be the case the outcomes of these policy instruments will always be necessarily related to the autocrat's doing. As shown by Campello and Zucco (2020), policy outputs can still influence incumbent support even when they are caused by factors external to the dictator. Hence, I emphasise once again that despite the autocrat's policy intentions, I will be focusing on policy outcomes. Taking this into account, I suggest that a dictator has two kinds of material policy outcomes at her disposal:

i) Socio-Economic Performance: "The Pie Getting Bigger"

The first policy outcome that can help a dictator cultivate popular support is the promotion of economic growth (Cheng and Huang 2018; Overland, Simons and Spagat 2005; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Assuming that economic growth will improve the life of the citizens living under an autocratic regime, it makes sense to also believe that the general population will favour economic growth if it can benefit from the growth outputs (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). In the words of Gill (2000):

> "Breakdown has often been associated with a failure of regime performance, usually in the economic sphere. As economic growth slows, or even stops, the regime is confronted with a policy dilemma about how to respond to the economic difficulties. Within society at

> large, the slowing of economic growth creates hardship for many sectors of the population, often including those upon which the regime relies for support." (Gill 2000)

Further empirical evidence has shown that "broad segments of the population might accept or even support non-democratic rule if it is perceived as performing well" (Geddes and Zaller 1989). And finally, that autocratic regimes' performance matters for popular support regardless of the autocratic regime type (Cassani 2017). A successful economic growth strategy would ameliorate the life of the general population and therefore, increase their support for such policy and, consequently, *ceteris paribus*, for the regime.

ii) Distribution of Particular Goods and Services

The second policy output that can foster the creation of popular support in an autocratic context is the distribution of particular goods or services[10] to specific segments of the population in exchange for their support. Wintrobe (1990) has famously drawn his attention to how different types of undemocratic regimes use economic rents in order remain in power by 'buying' the support of the population. Similarly, Albertus, Fenner and Slater (2018) highlight the importance of what they called 'coercive distribution measures' from autocratic elites towards their citizens, in order to remain in power. These authors claim that distribution programs (e.g., housing, education, basic services, jobs and land) warrant regime stability and duration. Regional studies have also demonstrated how distributive benefits can promote the support of the citizenry for autocratic regimes and their subsequent stability. Using the example of the Chinese central government, Lü (2014) has shown that autocratic governments can benefit from social policy initiatives that increase popular support. Studies of post-Soviet countries have found that the economic security provided by the communist welfare system is one of the major causes of popular 'soviet nostalgia'. In fact, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) have argued that former East Germans are more likely to favour state intervention not only because of possible indoctrinating effects of

[10]When addressing this policy instrument, I will often refer to distributive "goods" but mean "goods and services" for abridging reasons.

communism, but also because of their material dependence on it. As these authors explain, by "simply becoming accustomed to an all-encompassing state may make people think of it as necessary and preferable despite the suffocating aspects of the East German regime". Okulicz-Kozaryn (2014) also showed that even after transitions to democracy, "East Europeans continue to believe that it is the responsibility of the state to provide for the poor, and hence, they prefer redistribution." Additionally, I maintain that the promotion of law and order can also be included in this category. It constitutes a distributive service provided by the regime, and through which it can increase its popular support. Although while some are repressed — and in a way, law and order can be thought of as the other side of the coin of repression —, others are offered protection and security, being this latter segment of the population the one benefiting from this service. In Brazil, recent accounts show that one of the main factors motivating the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 was the nostalgia for the "law and order part" of the brutal regime, when crime rates were much lower (Lopes 2018). Wang (2020) has also shown that campaign-style anti-crime law enforcement in contemporary China strengthens the support for the regime when economic performance declines. This author contends that in authoritarian regimes, "problems of corruption, poverty and organised crime provide political opportunities for authoritarian leaders to demonstrate their exceptional ability to govern the country by employing campaign-style law enforcement." Hence, the promotion of socio-economic and security distributive benefits to certain segments of the population will create a material dependence on the regime for those benefits, and the support for the continuation of these kind of policies. As explained by Albertus, Fenner and Slater (2018), "extending benefits and services renders ordinary citizens legible, enmeshes them in relationships of material dependence, and inoculates them against rivals' material inducements by establishing the central state as the indispensable purveyor of life's necessities." Therefore, not only will these top-down policy outcomes increase the general population's wellbeing, but will, in fact, render them dependent on the autocratic regime for such wellbeing.

2.4 Two Types of Popular Support: General and Particularistic

After having investigated what types of policy outputs an autocrat has at her disposal in order to increase popular support, I will move on to a central point of this argument: is this support homogeneous among the general population or do different policy outputs create different types of popular support? Central to this thesis is the argument that different policy outputs generate different kinds of support, and that different kinds of support created by each policy will have profound consequences on the formation of new party-systems after transitions to democracy. Hence, while I suggest that some policy outputs produce a *general* kind of popular support, other policy outputs will create a *particularistic* kind of support. In the remainder of this subsection I will define these two fundamental concepts.

General Support

General support for the regime is created when wellbeing increases at the individual level are brought about by a policy that benefits all members of a society in a simultaneous and non-exclusive way. I will call 'general outcomes' to the policy outcomes that generate general support. Due to its majoritarian nature, general support includes most — if not all — members of different social groups, synchronously. General support is non-exclusive in the sense that, despite having the power to enact the general policy, the autocratic incumbent does not have the power to exclude any member or group from benefiting from it without enacting additional exclusion policies. The chief example of general support is the one resulting from individual benefits brought about by economic growth. Policies that promote wellbeing increases as a consequence of economic expansion benefit virtually all members of a society (majoritarian), sensibly at the same time (simultaneous), and the incumbent does not have the power to discriminate against specific social groups without further action (non-exclusive). Other examples of policies that can increase general support when they foment individual wellbeing are: decreases in inflation rates, increases in total

productivity rates, policies oriented towards promoting universal welfare benefits, at providing better public administration services for everyone.

It is relevant to highlight that general policies have a combination of sociotropic and pocketbook elements[11] (Campello and Zucco 2020). While the individual is interested in improving her economic situation (pocketbook or egotropic), I argue that the improvement of the national situation also advances her own wellbeing (sociotropic). As previously argued, I will not be looking at the 'nation' as a whole to measure the sociotropic side of general outputs, but to the objective information that the local level gives individuals about aggregate performance. Sociotropic support, leading to sociotropic vote in democracies, has been characterised as the general public's concern with "the economic wellbeing of the nation as a whole and not simply their personal financial situation" (Hansford and Gomez 2015). This motivation has been regarded by some authors as an altruistic one (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Edlin *et al.* 2007; Kiewiet and Lewis-Beck 2011), since according to it individuals would put the needs of the nation ahead of their own needs. To this regard, I would like to draw an important point. The sociotropic element of general support considers that a particular policy outcome is beneficial to the 'aggregate' to the concrete extent that it is the result of the reception of majoritarian benefits, therefore benefiting the majority of the individuals that constitute the 'aggregate'. However, I will follow a rational choice approach and assume that individual self-interest, rather than altruism, is enough a motivation for a person to vouch for the success of the collective. Wang (2017) has empirically shown that this is the case particularly in the medium to long-term. This author argues that sociotropic support is the combination of self-interest plus time, or "patience". Therefore, general support only deals with a self-interested relationship to outputs: to the extent that those outputs can benefit the individual by improving her own wellbeing, and to the extent that an individual is self-interested in the success of a greater collective "aggregate", to the extent that it benefits the individual. While the egotropic logic is responsible for a higher level of support from the individual to the autocratic policy, the

[11] As suggested by some authors like Campello and Zucco (2020), I will also move away from a monolithic perception general benefits as a strictly sociotropic or pocketbook phenomenon. Instead, I will consider that general outputs can include both a sociotropic side and an egotropic side.

sociotropic logic is responsible for the non-punishing of the autocrat — in the present moment, at least — as there is the expectation that the individual might benefit from the general policy output in the future.

This means that even if an individual under an autocratic regime does not individually[12] benefit from general outputs, she will still have the expectation of benefiting in the future if the collective "aggregate" she belongs to is better off (Wang 2017). Of course this raises a very important point: for a sociotropic logic to apply, the relationship between a single individual and the sense of belonging to a group needs to exist (Conover 1988). This information about how well — or how badly — social groups are doing is taken from the local level and used to infer what happens at the national level. Mutz and Monak (1997) have exactly shown that social groups offer accurate information about the national economy. At this point, it is important to mention that I am not trying to suggest that if an individual does not benefit from general policy outcomes, she will still support those outcomes to the same extent as an individual who did benefit from them. Instead, I am arguing that the extent to which a person individually benefits from a general policy will be translated into more or less support for that policy, and consequently, for the regime, as to get the continuation of those policy benefits. However, if a person does not individually benefit from a general policy but if her social group has benefited from such policy, then, she will not immediately punish the incumbent as there is the sociotropic expectation that she might benefit from it in the future. According to Mutz and Monak (1997) incumbent punishment does not happen, for example, when "the rich are perceived to have gotten richer". Instead, incumbents are punished only if a particular social group has improved its situation while other groups in society became worse off. These authors call this "sociotropic fairness". But because general outputs do not, in principle, involve the improvement of a group at the expense of another group, and because general outputs comprise the improvement of most groups in a society, then, it is reasonable to assume that sociotropic "punishment" would only be applied to a very small segment of the population.

It is worth noting at this point that it may be difficult to identify all social

[12] Or egotropically.

groups at the local level, and to pinpoint exactly how well off those groups were after being exposed to general policy outputs. Local level averages may hide cases of sociotropic "punishment", and while general support is 'majoritarian' there will always be groups in a society — not captured by local level data — that will have not benefitted from general policies from either a pocketbook or sociotropic manner. However, I will still show in the empirical chapters of this dissertation that despite of this — arguably useful — simplification of reality, the conceptualisation of general outputs is extremely effective in predicting the type of political parties that will be formed in new post-transitional democratic party systems.

After having defined general support and general outcomes, I will now proceed to defining particularistic support.

Particularistic Support

Unlike its general counterpart, *particularistic support* is created by the benefits conceded to a specific segment of the general population at the expense of other segments. It is exclusive, minoritarian, homogeneous, and mutually exclusive. Particularistic support is created through the enjoyment of the benefits that come from particularistic policy outputs, and that aim at benefiting an homogeneous particular group of the general population, but not others (exclusive). This group corresponds to a relatively small group in the context of the remaining general population (minoritarian). Particularistic benefits are also more homogeneously distributed within the benefited group (homogeneous). For example, the privileges attributed to regime elites, such as those distributed to the Soviet Union's *nomenklatura*, or to wealthy landlords in the Spanish and Italian autocratic regimes. The key characteristic of particularistic outputs, however, is that they benefit a certain group at the expense of other groups (mutually exclusive). While general outputs were non-exclusive, in the sense that virtually everyone could benefit from them without harming one another, particularistic outputs are mutually exclusive: for a group to benefit from them, there will have to be another group that will lose. Only the individuals that are part of the "particular" group will benefit from particularistic outputs. For this reason, particularistic support is

also strictly egotropic, as the remaining general population, by not receiving those benefits, will perceive that it does not belong to the particularistic group due to the difference in treatment by the autocrat. Therefore, by not belonging to the particularistic group, it will not feel like it sociotropically benefited from these policy outputs. The sociotropic dimension of particularistic support is reserved to the elements that belong to the particularistic group, therefore coinciding with the egotropic element. For this reason, I will ignore the sociotropic aspect of particularistic support. The remaining majority of the general population — that does not belong to the particularistic group — will fall within two categories: the one that merely does not benefit from particularistic outputs; and the one that is actually harmed so that the particularistic group can benefit from the outputs. According to Mutz and Monak's (1997) concept of "sociotropic fairness" described above, incumbents are punished if a particular social group has improved its situation while other groups in society became worse off. From this, it is derived that while the support for the particularistic output is indifferent to the former category — as empirically shown by these authors —, the support for the particularistic output is negative for the latter category. Therefore, the part of the general population that is harmed by a particularistic policy will punish the autocrat due to fact that the enactment of such policy reduces its welfare while other group benefits from it. This "punishment" corresponds to the harbouring of anti-regime sentiments, or "anti-support" for the autocrat that introduced the policy that had welfare-decreasing effects.

Policy Outcomes and Support Creation

I believe the distinction between general and particularistic support to be quite important in the sense that while some policy outcomes will generate the first kind of support, others will generate the second kind of support. Taking into account the policy outputs described in *Section 2.3*, I contend that socio-economic performance is a source of general support for the reasons described above, when considering for example the case of economic growth, rises in productivity, or decreases in the inflation rate. Second, distributive goods and services can either create general or particularistic support. If they are majoritarian, simultaneous,

and non-exclusive, they will create general support. Otherwise, they will create particularistic support, since a specific group of people will benefit more than the rest of the population, part of which will inclusively be harmed by the attribution of those benefits. When I refer to "policy outcomes" from now on, I will be exclusively referring to policy outcomes that produce general support (general policy outcomes) and policy outcomes that produce particularistic support (particularistic policy outcomes). Although I pinpointed that socio-economic performance and the distribution of particular goods and services constitute policy outcomes, they are only important in the sense that they can either be classified as general or particularistic, depending on how they manifest themselves in autocratic regimes.

Finally, I will also classify repression as a source of general *and* particularistic "anti-support" in the next subsection, while clarifying both of these concepts.

2.4.1 General and Particularistic Repression

As seen before, repression is used in order to counterbalance the effects of positive policy outcomes. It is characterised by being an essential element for the emergence of popular support in the sense that it stabilises the regime, making the two other two policy outcomes viable, but it is negative in nature, and unlike the other outcomes, it decreases peoples' individual wellbeing. Hence, while repression is not a source of support in itself, without it, as argued above, the other policy outcomes would create an unstable regime situation in which the general population could easily mobilise in order to overthrow the regime. In this argument, I will treat repression as a complementary aspect of general and particularistic support. With this I suggest that while repression cannot in itself create support, it can decrease the importance of the existing positive policy outputs. Consequently, as argued in *Section 2.2.1.*, popular support is the result of individual considerations between the effects of positive policy outputs that improve one's wellbeing, minus the negative effects of repression that decrease one's wellbeing. It could be said that repression acts as a negative source of support, or "anti-support".

But repression is also a very broad concept. Taking the present argument into account, I will classify repression according to the type of negative contribution to popular support it produces — or, as I will call it, negative support. I argue repression has two dimensions: one is general, and the other is particularistic[13]. I will start clarifying the latter.

Repression, in the form that is most often portrayed and described in the literature is indeed a *particularistic negative output*. Here we are talking about violence against the population, human rights violations, ostracism, and censorship. In this sense, repression by an autocratic incumbent directly targets particular individuals, or groups of individuals — often the ones that do not comply with the regime —, decreasing their individual wellbeing. From this perspective, repression is not majoritarian, not simultaneous, and definitely exclusive. However, although only a few people are actually the targets of regime violence, the definition of this kind of repression is slightly more complex. This complexity is best captured by Ebner's (2011) passage on the Italian Fascist regime:

> "Finally, in word and deed, the Fascist regime constantly reminded Italians that although it did not engage in physical or lethal violence on a mass scale, it claimed the right to beat, torture, and kill select enemies with impunity. For the intended audience, this threat meant that one truly never knew what to expect from a knock on the door. The fear of punishment unfettered by the rule of law was, for many Italians, a form of terror." (Ebner 2011: 4)

As explained by this author, although repression actually only targeted "select enemies with impunity", the threat of repression meant that anyone could be a target of this kind of repression. This fear of punishment was, in itself "a form of terror". Therefore, although particularistic repression only actually targets a particular group of individuals, this form of repression is a function of two things: the severity of the punishment, and the uncertainty of its distribution. If these two

[13] I will use the terms "negative particularistic outputs" and "particularistic repression" interchangeably throughout this dissertation. Similarly, I will also use the terms "negative general outputs" and "general repression" and interchangeable terms.

characteristics of repression are both quite high, then, as mentioned, although repression will only target localised individuals, the fear of punishment will outpour to the general population. This will mean that if repression does not comprise severe and uncertain forms of punishment, then, only the actual particularistic group that suffered from repression will view repression as a negative particular output. Conversely, if the punishment is severe and uncertain, then, a larger group in society will suffer from the effects of repression, in addition to the group that was effectively punished. A final note on particularistic repression is that if the severity and uncertainty of punishment are not high in a regime, this kind of repression will only affect the small group — in comparison to the remaining general population — that was actually targeted. In this case, it is possible that the remaining general population sees this kind of repression as a law and order benefit. This idea that law and order benefits can be thought of as the other side of the coin of repression has already been previously suggested. Since the remaining general population is not harmed by repression, it is possible that the repressed group is seen as causing trouble or destabilising peace. Its repression can therefore be seen as a service of protection and security, and therefore as a benefit (Lopes 2018; Wang 2020).

However, repression can be also be a source of *negative general outputs*. As seen, when particularistic policies are implemented, there will always be a relatively large group of the general population that will lose with the benefits distributed to the particularistic group. I suggest that this loss is also a kind of repression to which I will call general repression, as it affects a relatively large group. Therefore negative general outputs — or general repression — is the other side of the coin of the distribution of benefits to the particularistic group. For example, as I will explore in more depth in the following chapters of this dissertation, while in the Spanish and Italian dictatorships the large landowning class benefited from particularistic benefits, the poor landless or small land-owning segments of the population — a much larger group in those highly rural societies — was harmed by the attribution of those benefits. So that large landowners could keep their lands through the lack of a consistent land redistribution program, also associated to other material benefits that actually helped them to increase the size of their

lands, the poor landless population was prevented from getting a small parcel of land, and small landowners were prevented from increasing the size of their lands. The poor rural population suffered general repression, so that large landowners could benefit from particularistic outputs.

In this argument, in line with what was previously suggested, I will assume that negative outputs — general or particularistic — will decrease the effect of positive outputs on support — general or particularistic. If, in theory, negative general outputs affected the whole population, and if a regime also created positive general benefits, it is likely that support for positive outputs would be neutralised. A limitation of this implication is that it is not empirically possible to establish the threshold from which the existence of negative outputs will "erase" the effects of positive outputs. However, because positive general outputs benefit the majority of the general population and general repression will be, in principle, concentrated in areas or segments of the population that lost the most with the distribution of particularistic benefits, in practice, the positive legacy will tend to be broader than the negative legacy.

Taking these considerations into account, the concept of repression can be conceptualised as the combination between general repression and particularistic repression, being the latter a function of the severity of punishment and of the uncertainty of its distribution. Popular support is therefore defined by the difference between positive — general and particularistic — and negative outputs — general and particularistic repression.

2.5 Combinations of Policy Outcomes and Autocratic Types

Up to now, I have described the policy outcomes autocratic incumbents have at their disposal in order to increase popular support. I have argued that the creation of support is achieved through the exposure of the population to these policy outcomes that, when combined in certain ways, will increase the wellbeing of the citizenry, and therefore, produce high levels of support for those policies, and indirectly, one could say, for the regime. I have also shown that the kind of support each of these outcomes produces is distinctive. While some policies create

general support, others create a particularistic kind of support. Accordingly, depending on the combination of policy outcomes a dictator subjects its general population to, she will end up with different kinds of support. Even though I will not characterise regime types according to their support-building strategies, it would be possible to undertake such classification.

The different combinations of policy outputs can be visualised on **Table 2.1**. All regimes will have, in principle, a higher or lesser extent of particularistic repression — the characterising element of autocracies. Then, regimes can exclusively have positive general outputs; a combination between positive general and particularistic outputs; or only particularistic outputs. It is worth noting that general repression is always associated to positive particularistic outputs. So whenever this kind of outputs exists in a regime, it always brings with it general repression as the other side of the coin.

TABLE 2.1: Combinations of Policy Outputs

	General	**Particularistic**
Positive	*Positive General Outputs:* when exists it virtually benefits all members of the general population. Heterogeneous in how it benefits different individuals.	*Positive Particularistic Outputs:* when exists only benefits a small group and brings with it negative particularistic outputs.
Negative	*Negative General Outputs (General Repression)*: it is necessarily associated to positive particularistic outputs that affect a relatively large group of the general population.	*Negative Particularistic Outputs (Particularistic Repression)*: defining characteristic of autocracies. Essential in any regime. Can be more or less severe and uncertain.

The many possible combinations of these outcomes will therefore produce different kinds of support, contributing to a larger or lesser extent to the stability of the regime. But the aim of this dissertation is not to identify the strategies that are more successful in helping perpetuate the regime. Instead, I will investigate what happens to this stock of popular support after transitions to democracy. I will show that the kinds of support a regime accumulated during its length constitutes an essential element in shaping the formation of new democratic party systems. In the final stage of this argument, I will argue that the levels of popular support — general and particularistic — produced during the lifetime of an

autocratic regime are crucial elements in shaping how extremism will manifest itself in the new democratic party system. I will show that while some combinations of policy instruments will be fertile soil for extremist parties aligned with the former regime, others will immunise the newly formed democratic party system against extremism aligned with the past, and produce mainstream parties instead.

Stage II — After Transitions to Democracy

2.6 Popular Support After Transitions to Democracy

While a sizeable body of literature has been established surrounding theories of democratisation, very little is known about the impact different characteristics of previous undemocratic regimes have on post-transitional democracies. Most studies have either investigated the crucial economic (Geddes 1999; Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski 2009) and institutional (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Hadenius and Teorell 2007; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2009; Diamond 2016) factors that are responsible for the success or failure of democratic transition, or what happened during the short period right after the fall of the regime (e.g. transitional justice measures). However, a relatively new body of research has examined how elites in undemocratic regimes may affect democratic outcomes (Albertus and Menaldo 2013), and even ensure their continuity into democracy. Ziblatt (2017) elaborates on the recent idea, also presented by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), that "incumbent elites 'must feel secure' and 'buy-in' to democracy for it be created and to endure". He shows how Europe's nineteenth-century conservative parties, dominant under authoritarian rule, reinvented themselves after transitions to democracy, "building party organisation" and accommodating "themselves to democratic political competition", while the parties that failed to change were unable to survive in the new context. Albertus (2019) demonstrates that when undemocratic elites successfully impose a constitution on the new democratic regime, they are more likely to win back economic or political power after transition, and are less likely

to face punishment for crimes they committed in office. Similarly, Slater and Wong (2013) argue that when facing what they called an "ominous setback", a tense situation signalling that the ruling elites have passed their pinnacle of power — and that can be constituted by an economic, geopolitical or electoral shock —, undemocratic elites may willingly choose to democratise. This strategy, denominated "conceding-to-thrive", will only be put in motion if the undemocratic elite knows beforehand that they are likely to win a democratic election and can ensure political stability. Similarly, Riedl *et al.* (2020) have shown that authoritarian regimes are more likely to democratise when elites either "when they face little choice or little risk".

Regarding the demand side, recent studies on autocratic legacies have been making a timid attempt at understanding the impact of past undemocratic legacies on people's political attitudes (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Neundorf 2010). Within this very limited literature, most studies have looked at how ideology can shape political attitudes after transitions to democracy, looking at how the ideological left—right (L-R) legacies affects post-transitional L-R positioning (Neundorf 2009; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020; Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020). Particularly, these studies have analysed how state penetration of society is associated to "left-authoritarian attitudes" (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020), how regimes' ideological "biases" shape L-R positioning (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020), and how different political discourses in West and East Germany shaped the understanding of the "left" and the "right" in both sides of the country (Neundorf 2009). If the ideological exposure to a regime — within the L-R spectrum — seems to condition post-transitional political attitudes towards these labels, do all types of "left-wing" and "right-wing" regimes imprint the same kinds of political attitudes after democratic transitions? In this dissertation I will show that that is not the case. First, looking at a regime's legacy as a whole can be problematic. When we consider a legacy as an homogeneous phenomenon, we lose important nuances that may be fundamental to explain what happens after transitions to democracy. Second, the concept of 'legacy' is abstract enough so that we may lose ourselves in its abstractedness, and fail to employ the right empirical tools to capture it accurately, while adding unnecessary noise to the

analysis. Hence, I propose that instead of looking at a regime's legacy as a whole and trying to define it in those terms, in order to measure how it affects post-transitional attitudes, one should look at the specific policy outcomes implemented by the former autocratic regime. But very little is still understood about how particular autocratic policies can shape post-transitional political attitudes, particularly if one looks at support-building policies. In the subsequent sections of this second part of the argument, I will argue that by being able to create popular support during the regime's lifetime, certain policy outcomes will be specially relevant in shaping the general population's political preferences after the regime comes to an end. This will affect the type of political parties that will emerge in the newly formed party system. Lastly, the available research on autocratic legacies has also greatly neglected its impact on shaping post-transitional political extremism. In fact, no studies have yet systematically analysed how different types of autocratic legacies can shape popular attitudes regarding political extremism after transitions to democracy. This dissertation also seeks to address this gap in the autocratic legacies' literature. In the next section I will present the central thesis of the main argument. Then, throughout the following sections until the end of the chapter, I will deconstruct it in order to explain each part of its theoretical mechanism.

2.7 The Argument

The central argument presented in this dissertation suggests that when an autocratic regime has a usable legacy, or in other words, that the positive outputs that fomented the creation of support during the regime's lifetime are higher than negative outputs, then, new political parties will have incentives to take advantage of this "autocratic inheritance", as conceptualised by Loxton and Mainwaring (2018). However, as it was already suggested, different regimes will have different kinds of autocratic inheritances: some will include general support, others will include both general and particularistic support, and yet others will include only particularistic support. This inheritance will vary at the local level

and will not be homogeneous throughout the whole country[14]. However, because political parties' electoral appeals operate through a national logic — in the sense that parties will appeal to the whole population existing in a country during a general or presidential election —, the local level objective information gathered by political elites will be informative about what happens at the aggregate national level (Weatherford 1983; Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg 2014; Hansford an Gomez 2015).

At the core of this argument lies the idea that in regimes that have gathered enough general support, newly formed parties attempting to take advantage of the positive "inheritance"[15] created during the dictatorship, will have incentives to become mainstream in order to gather the maximum number of votes. This is possible when a regime has created general support because, in this case, most of the general population will have benefited from general policy outputs and will be interested in voting for a party that promises the continuation of those outputs. On the opposite pole are autocratic regimes that have only created particularistic support. In this case, the majority of the population either did not benefit from support-building particularistic outputs, or was actually harmed by them through general repression. Only a small group — the particularistic group — will have benefited from regime policy outputs, and would therefore be motivated to vote for parties that would promise their continuation. These parties, however, when taking advantage of the regime's autocratic "inheritance", would not be able to become mainstream since the majority of the population would not want to seek the continuation of the particularistic policies, and would therefore not want to vote for them. It is in this context that post-transitional parties associated with the former regime can become extremist to appeal to the niche group that benefited from particularistic policies.

Figure 2.1 illustrates a decision-tree representing all the possible outcomes when considering the theoretical argument presented in this dissertation. The first possible outcome after a democratic transition (*O1*) is a situation in which parties would not be motivated to associate themselves with the former regime because

[14]When it comes to political parties, this heterogeneity of support in different regions will shape the support they will have in each area of the same country.


[15]Or legacy.

the degree of "autocratic inheritance" — the positive legacy — is lower than the "autocratic baggage" (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018). In this case, no parties would have motivation to associate themselves with the former regime since there would be no positive legacy to exploit. The second scenario is one that has already been described, and in which the former regime has only created particularistic support (*O2*). As seen, this will create fertile ground for the emergence of extremism associated with the former regime.

If a regime created general support, it is possible that this general support stands alone or that the regime also created particularistic support. I believe the the first case to be quite hypothetical, since autocratic regimes always tend to gather the support of particular key groups of the general population to stabilise the regime. Therefore, although theoretical, this scenario is one in which the regime exclusively has general support (*O3*). This scenario has also already been described above: the exclusive presence of general support will immunise the regime against post-transitional extremism, as associated parties will have incentives to become mainstream for vote maximisation purposes. Then, most common are the cases in which a former autocratic regimes will have produced a combination of general and particularistic support. In this context, one of two things can happen: either the particularistic group has also benefited from general outputs (*O4*), or it has not (*O5*). If the particularistic group has benefited from general outputs, then, it makes sense that associated parties would choose to only engage with the general outputs' legacy. If these parties tried to also offer the continuation of particularistic outputs, then they would also have to engage with the negative support — or autocratic "baggage" — created by general repression, that as seen, is the other side of the coin of particularistic support. In order to avoid this, and to maximise their voting prospects, it makes more sense for associated parties to appeal to all voters using the general outputs' legacy[16]. The second scenario comprises a case in which the particularistic group has not benefited from general outputs. In this case, some associated parties could become mainstream, in order to take advantage of the general support legacy, and other

[16]Since the group harmed by general repression will also have benefited from positive general outputs.

FIGURE 2.1: The Structure of the Theoretical Argument



associated parties could become extremist, to take advantage of the political space not occupied by the mainstream associated party, and to appeal to the particularistic group. However, two important things should be taken into account. First, the existence of general outputs implies that virtually all segments

of the population improved their wellbeing without any group being excluded by the autocrat. Therefore, it would be unlikely that the particularistic group was specifically excluded from receiving these benefits without further direct action from the autocrat. Second, if a group has received particularistic outputs, then it is also likely that such group was key for the stabilisation of the regime since it was chosen over the group that was harmed by the introduction of the particularistic policy (general repression), in terms of benefits' reception. Therefore, it would not make sense that the regime would not want to make sure that this group was also benefiting from the general outputs. For this reason, I will consider the fifth post-transitional scenario (*O5*) as merely theoretical and without grounds for a practical materialisation.

If scenarios *3* and *5* are merely theoretical, and if scenario *1* does not involve the creation of a usable legacy that can be used by parties that choose to associate themselves with the former regime (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018), then, the conclusions that can be deduced from this decision-tree will provide the theoretical hypotheses to be tested in the empirical chapters of this dissertation:

Hypothesis 1: Former autocratic regimes benefiting from general support will not have extremism associated with the former regime if all groups benefit from general policy outputs, having mainstream associated parties instead;

Hypothesis 2: Former autocratic regimes benefiting only from particularistic support will have extremism associated with the former regime.

After having exposed the central argument of this dissertation, I will now explore each of its constituting pieces: the demand-side component, the supply-side component, the choice between going mainstream or extremist, and finally, the local level implications of the theoretical hypotheses delineated above.

2.8 The Demand-Side

As previously discussed, during the length of their rule autocratic incumbents have different policy outcomes at their disposal to create popular support. Wintrobean models show that these outcomes allow the dictator to exert power over the population, extending the duration and stability of the regime. But once the regime ends, the question of what happens to this stock of popular support becomes extremely relevant. What happens to the top-down link between the benefits-receiving[17] general population and the autocratic policy outputs' provider, once the regime comes to an end? First, economic theory has robustly shown that the recipients of benefits are interested in the continual reception of those benefits (Hasenfeld and Refferty 1989; Gelissen 2000; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). Therefore, it makes sense to infer that if before transitions to democracy certain policy outcomes provided a high amount of benefits to the population — increasing their wellbeing —, the preference for the continual reception of those benefits should subsist even after transitions to democracy. In fact, the preference for a democracy where an individual is left worse off than during the dictatorial period would be unusual, and possibly irrational. It could, however, be conceivable to argue that such would be the price to pay for the freedom of democracy, but if it subsists after the old regime has ended, the deterioration of wellbeing in the new democratic context could inclusively be damaging for the newly institutionalised political system. Individual-level studies have exactly shown that "the better off people are, the more supportive they are of the political system" (Neundorf 2010), and that the particular explanation of 'nostalgia for communism' is "closely related to dissatisfaction with the present system's ability to produce output" when compared to the previous regime (Ekman and Linde 2005). Second, a novel approach to self-interest by Rueda and Stegmueller (2019) has shown that expectations about future income, in addition to present income, are also important for people's redistribution preferences[18].

[17] When I use the concept of benefits in this and following sections, I am referring to the positive outcomes that come from all of the referred policies used by the autocrat to increase popular support, regardless of generating general or particularistic support.

[18] Redistribution in this context does not refer only to "redistribution of income through taxes and transfers" (Rueda and Stegmueller 2019). Instead of income, I am referring more generally to whatever top-down policies that may increase one's wellbeing. Considering that redistribution in this

According to these authors, the expectation of future income is intimately related to considerations about insurance and risk. In a situation of deep crisis, such as a transition to democracy, where the whole political framework is rethought and reformulated, it is expected that the exposure to risk increases, as well as the preference for insurance (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019). I therefore expect that the preference for the continual reception of benefits is aggravated in the first years or decades after democratic transition, assuming that citizens have some degree of risk aversion, but remaining agnostic regarding its intensity[19]. Taking these considerations into account, after transitions to democracy, there is the expectation of continuation, by the general population, of the reception of the same kind of benefits received during the dictatorship in order maintain or improve their level of welfare.

But what can the general population do in order to maintain the same kinds of benefits? I suggest that in the new democratic context, rational voters would seek to vote for parties that promise to re-establish the same kinds of benefits they lost with the change of political system. According to Loxton and Mainwaring (2018), after transitions to democracy, autocratic regimes will have produced a mix of autocratic inheritance and baggage. While the former constitutes the inheritance of "valuable resources" from autocratic regimes, the latter are "the liabilities" of an autocratic past. While repression falls into this latter category, being a sort of legacy that produces negative perspectives towards the past — a "negative legacy" —, the policy outcomes aimed at increasing popular support, used to counter-balance the effects of repression, constitute a "positive legacy". These authors have explained that some of the political parties that associate themselves[20] with the former regime thrive under democracy "because they inherit valuable resources from the previous authoritarian regime." As asserted by Quinn and Woolley (2001), "voters, like investors, use the past to make predictions about the future and prefer certainty to uncertainty". Thus, if the former regime has proved to be efficient in distributing benefits, as high levels of popular

context is being applied in an autocratic context, it would not necessarily be carried out exclusively through taxes and transfers, but also through other means of extraction of the autocratic incumbent.

[19]Only because it would be extremely hard to empirically measure these preferences for risk.

[20]Or that directly derive from the autocratic regime, such as authoritarian successor parties (ASPs).

support for the policies would suggest, rational voters would be motivated to vote for parties that, by aligning themselves with the past regime in order to exploit its competence, would offer to maintain the benefits delivered during the regime. In the following section, I will look at the supply-side in order to explain the incentives a new political party in a recently formed democratic system has to associate, or distance itself from the autocratic regime.

2.9 The Supply-Side

Some studies, mostly on post-communist societies, have shown that after transitions to democracy, political parties avoid identifying themselves with the past regime, inclusively changing their names and ideology, in order to become electorally attractive (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020). Why then, are there post-transitional democracies with extremist political parties associated with the former dictatorship, that not only are legitimate enough to enter the political arena, but also to obtain significant vote shares? And why does this happen only in certain countries, while in others it does not?

The probability of receiving electoral support is a relevant factor that conditions the decision of elites to enter the electoral arena as a new contestant (Cox 1997). Tavits (2006) has shown that "new parties are more frequent when the institutional structures are permissive (i.e. the cost of entry is low), the corporatist arrangements are weak or non-existent (i.e. the benefit of entry is high) and the electoral histories of the incumbents are short (i.e. the probability of attracting votes is high)." Accordingly, no party will enter the political contest if the costs of entry (c) are greater than the "benefit of holding office (b) times the probability of getting elected (p)" $bp \geq c$. (Tavits 2006). The probability of electoral success therefore, involves the complicated task of inferring the electorate's preferences in advance. However, Tavits (2008) also argues that "if it is clear at the time of entry which parties are viable, then non-viable parties should not enter. Viability is determined by electoral histories. When there is very little or no electoral history, as in elections in new democracies, it is not clear at the time of entry which parties will be viable on election day." Therefore, if the new democratic elites, operating

under a national logic, have incentives to maximise their chance of getting elected, and if the viability of the party is determined by the past histories — in the case of newly formed party systems —, new elites will have incentives to manage their distance to the past regime in a way that does not harm their chances of becoming a viable party.

Assuming that autocratic regimes can be broadly be classified as either left or right-wing[21] (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020), the elites' decision to enter the political arena, as well as the left-right political orientation choice they inevitably have to make in where to position themselves in the newly formed political spectrum (Lupu 2013), will be based on their understanding of people's judgement of the past regime. In this context, the information gathered regarding the top-down relationship between the autocratic ruler and the creation of support within the general population will be a crucial element in order to make this decision[22]. This is true both in the case of new parties created by former civilians, but also in parties created by former autocratic elites. When former elites decide to create a new political party in the new democratic context, or to reform an old autocratic party, it is not necessarily the case that they will have incentives to align their authoritarian successor party (ASP) with the former regime. The existing literature on autocratic-led democratisation shows that the elites' choice of maintaining or distancing themselves from the past seems to be based on whatever maximises their chances of staying in power (Slater and Wong 2013; Albertus and Menaldo 2018; Albertus 2019). In Loxton and Mainwaring's (2018) words: "if they wish to succeed, party leaders must craft strategies for dealing with the past that allow them to minimise the costs of their authoritarian baggage while maximising the benefits of their authoritarian inheritance." For this reason, simply because former elites decide to form an ASP, that does not necessarily mean it will still be associated with the past dictatorship, as Gryzmala-Busse (2002) has extensively argued.

I suggest that having a usable past — meaning that the autocracy did produce

[21]Many undemocratic regimes have been widely classified as left and right-wing. Most notably, Nazism and Fascism are often labeled as extreme-right, and Communism, Maoism and Leninism as extreme-left.

[22]Decision which will me made using objective local level data to make inferences about the aggregate national level.

some degree of popular support —, is the first pre-requisite for the emergence of parties associated to the former regime after transitions to democracy. In this context, the role of repression becomes a crucial element since it will determine if the autocratic legacy is or not usable by the new democratic elites. We can talk about a positive, or usable, legacy when general and particularistic repression is lower than the positive effects of general and particularistic support. If repression is higher than the created positive policy outcomes, then there is no usable legacy and the leader of the new prospective party is better off by dissociating herself from the regime. Whenever new democratic elites — constituted by civilians or former elites — choose to not distance themselves from the past, they decide, before entering the political arena, that the regime's autocratic inheritance can be instrumentalised in order to form a new political party. This would mean that because the positive outputs created are higher than repression, then, using the label of the past regime would not be a bad strategic choice since it would capture the support of a part — or all — of the population that benefited from certain regime policies, and who would be favourable to their continuation in the new democratic context. Hence, instead of starting from zero in the recently formed democratic party system, a usable positive legacy would give the new elites a competitive advantage (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018). After deciding to associate itself with the former regime, in order to capitalise upon its positive legacy, another crucial decision arises for the newly formed party: should it go extremist or mainstream?

2.10 Extremism or Moderation?

After a transition to democracy, while rational voters have incentives to vote for parties that offer them the same kinds of benefits they were enjoying during the autocratic regime — in order to at least maintain their former levels of wellbeing —, the new democratic elites will have incentives to act in ways that will maximise their electoral support (Tavits 2006). Assuming that there is a usable legacy, the new democratic elites have two options: to continue being associated with the past regime through an old (or newly formed) extremist party, or instead,

to moderate their stance and become (or form a new) 'mainstream' party. Examples of the former are the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Germany, the Italian Social Movement (MSI) in Italy, or the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), in Russia. Examples of the latter are, the Popular Party (PP) in Spain, the Saenuri Party in South Korea, or the Social Democratic Party (PDS)/Progressive Party (PP) in Brazil.

Thus, the question of what will determine if a party turns to extremism in the new democratic context becomes greatly relevant. The answer to this puzzle has to do with the nature of popular support created by autocratic policy outcomes. Having reached the core of this argument, here lie two fundamental ideas. The first one is that policies that created general support during the regime's lifetime can be easily integrated into moderate or mainstream parties aligned with the former regime. Because the policies that create general support are widely and uniformly supported by the most, if not all the general population, they can, for that reason, be more easily integrated into a mainstream party's political agenda. If the majority of the population favours the continuation of these general policies after transitions to democracy, then, mainstream parties, aiming to satisfy the greater number of voters, would easily integrate these policies into their political agenda. In this context, if the usable legacy from the past regime is one of general support, a new party would not have incentives to only appeal to a more niche and extremist audience, locating itself more to the extreme edges of L-R spectrum, but to became mainstream, appealing to the centre, and offering the continuation of the policies supported by the majority of the population. Examples of parties that capitalised on their general support are South Korea's Saenuri Party, Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT, or the Nationalist Party), and many of the Latin American successor parties that have seen extremely high rates of economic growth, or that have introduced universal welfare systems. The former two are examples of conservative parties directly linked to the previous autocratic regime that capitalised on the high levels of economic growth that took place during the dictatorship. Both parties were able to remain big players in the democratic party system (Cheng and Huang, 2018) and are considered by some authors as some of the "world's most successful authoritarian successor parties" (Loxton and

Mainwaring 2018). This first idea will lead to the first theoretical hypothesis to be empirically tested in this dissertation, laid out at the start of this section. Of course, as discussed earlier, considerations about who benefits from general policy outputs are relevant to determine the nature of the post-transitional associated party. The first hypothesis will reasonably assume that all groups will have to benefit from these kind of policy outputs, since in practice, as previously justified, this is the most likely scenario.

The second fundamental idea at the core of this argument is that regimes that only produced particularistic support, that only benefited a very specific group, will have a positive legacy concentrated in a much smaller — or niche — segment of the population. In this case, the majority of the people living under the autocracy would have not benefited from the regime's positive legacy at all, while part of the population would have inclusively been negatively impacted by this legacy. An example of this are the welfare distortions caused by the clientelistic distribution of goods to key actors[23]. Hence, the majority of the general population would not have incentives to vote for a party that perpetuated a legacy that only benefited some while harming others by creating hefty social distortions. When tapping into particularistic support to take advantage of the positive legacy, the new political party would only be able to turn to a very niche group of the population that did benefit from those policies. In this case, new parties would not be able to present themselves as mainstream in order to cater to the majority of the population, since they would not have enough support to succeed in those conditions. Their best option would be to cater to the niche group that benefited from particularistic policies and turn to extremism in order to succeed. It has been shown that when parties face electoral difficulties, they tend to adopt more radical strategies as to reaffirm their political position (Stewart 1991; Breuning and Ishiyama 1998; Ishiyama and Shafqat 2000). Contrarily, parties with more electoral success are more likely to become more moderate, as they are "coopted into the existing political structure" (Ishiyama and Shafqat 2000). Consequently, it makes sense to think that while electoral success pushes mainstream parties further into

[23] An example of this is how the privileges given to the Soviet *nomenklatura* ended up destroying the Soviet Union's regime stability.

the mainstream, and lack of electoral success pushes extremist parties more into the extremes. Hence, when a former regime only produces particularistic support, two different groups of people arise. A majority, that did not benefit from the support-boosting policy outcomes and for that reason, that did not lose — and only gained — with the transition to democracy. And a small segment of the population that did benefit from those policy outcomes during the regime's lifetime, and that after transitions to democracy, would directly be very impacted by the loss of those benefits. This is the group that would have incentives to vote for an associated extremist party. The second central idea of this argument can therefore be translated into the second theoretical hypothesis.

2.10.1 Local Level Implications

Although different regimes will create different combinations of general and particularistic support, the distribution of the various kinds of support within a single regime is not homogeneous. The way in which support is created varies at the local level, according to the extent to which policy outputs affect a certain area to a greater or lesser extent. Consequently, after transitions to democracy, different areas will have gathered different levels of the various kinds of support — and "anti-support"[24] — which will have a different impact on the vote-share for each associated party. It makes sense to think that if a certain area within a single regime benefited more from either general or particular benefits, then, this area will have accumulated a greater level of support than an area that enjoyed less benefits. As discussed earlier, individuals use local level objective information to make inferences about what happens at the national level in aggregate terms (Weatherford 1983; Ansolabehere, Meredith and Snowberg 2014; Hansford an Gomez 2015). Through this mechanism, the support created at the local level in different areas of a single regime will reflect different local preferences for the continuation of autocratic policy outputs, after transitions to democracy. Because associated political parties operate through a national-level electoral logic, and because local level objective outputs allow voters to make inferences about the national level, then, the vote cast at the national level reflects higher or lower

[24]Corresponding to general and particularistic repression.

levels of the support created at the local level. From the supply-side, parties' decision to — or not to — associate themselves with the former regime will also be based on their understanding of people's judgement of the past regime that is formed at the local level[25]. This will prompt elites, before making the decision to associate themselves with the past, to evaluate what how much popular support was created at the local level, and if, taking that assessment into account, it would be a good strategy to become an associated party. The kind of popular support created is another relevant consideration new parties need to take into account, and that will condition their choice of becoming a mainstream associated party, or an extremist associated party. From this, I derive the first theoretical implications of the first and second hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1.1. Areas in which the level of general outputs is higher will tend to vote more for mainstream associated parties after transitions to democracy;

Hypothesis 2.1. Areas in which the level of particularistic outputs is higher will tend to vote more for extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy.

2.10.2 Repression over Benefits

Finally, it is also important to take into account how repression affects the positive effects of policy outcomes created during the length of a regime, and its implications after transitions to democracy. Considering the first theoretical hypothesis, if an area benefited from general outputs but also had general repression, it is likely that the incentives to vote for the associated party are lower than an area that exclusively has positive general outputs. That is because the weight of the autocratic baggage will decrease the attractiveness of voting for such party. The rationale here is that parties will not fully be able to dissociate themselves from the autocratic baggage that negative outputs create, when they associate themselves with positive legacies for competitive advantage reasons. As

[25]Because the distribution of positive and negative policy outputs is not homogeneously distributed in a single regime.

previously argued, repression decreases the importance of benefits for the creation of popular support, which leads me to a second implication of the first theoretical hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1.2. Areas that simultaneously experience general outputs and negative outputs[26] will tend to vote less for mainstream associated parties after transitions to democracy.

Finally, the second theoretical hypothesis also has similar implications dealing with the effects of repression. It is important to note however, that although a regime that exclusively created particularistic outputs will also have to deal with general repression, the impact of general repression on the vote for associated extremist parties is irrelevant. That is because only those that did not benefit from particularistic outputs will be targeted by general repression. Therefore:

Hypothesis 2.2. Areas that experience negative particularistic outputs will tend to vote less for the extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy;

The following chapters will empirically investigate the validity of these implications, using the cases of the Spanish and Italian autocratic regimes.

[26]These negative outputs include general repression and particularistic repression but only when its severity of punishment and uncertainty of distribution are both high.

Chapter 3

General Support and Mainstream Parties

In the previous chapter of this dissertation it was argued that autocratic regimes that are able to create general support are likely to be immune to extremism associated to the former dictatorship. After transitions to democracy, general outputs constitute part of the positive legacy of an autocracy, or what Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) called "autocratic inheritance". Once a transition to democracy occurs, as the whole political framework is rethought and reformulated, it is expected that the exposure to risk increases, as well as the preference for insurance (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019). If the former regime has proved to be efficient in producing positive outputs, rational voters would be motivated to vote for parties that, by aligning themselves with the past regime in order to exploit its competence, would offer to maintain the benefits delivered during the regime. Simultaneously, on the supply side, newly formed party elites are likely to utilise the "positive legacy" of a former autocracy — when there is one — to win a competitive advantage over their competition (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018). This decision to — or not to — associate themselves with the former regime, and through what kind of party, is based on their understanding of people's judgement of the past regime, that is formed at the local level.

Then, if a regime produced enough general support at the local-level, newly formed parties would have incentives to create a mainstream party aligned with the

former regime[1]. Mainstream parties, aiming to satisfy the greater number of voters while appealing to the centre, would allow new elites to maximise its vote share as the majority of the general population would have benefited from the regime's former legacy, being likely to support the new associated party's claims to recover or reproduce the lost general outputs. The incentives to use this legacy to create niche extremist parties would be, in this case, nearly inexistent, as the majority of the population would tend to support a new mainstream "associated party". Upon the existence of general support, newly formed parties have incentives to become mainstream, as argued in *Hypothesis 1* of this dissertation.

In this Chapter, I will proceed to test this first theoretical hypothesis using the case of Francoist Spain's autocratic regime by taking advantage of this autocracy's production of general outputs. These kind of outputs were produced during the second half of the regime, through the modernisation process that occurred in Spain, and that created high levels of economic growth in all Spanish regions[2]. I will argue, while providing quantitative and qualitative evidence, that the high levels of general outputs created in most areas of the regime produced a usable legacy to be utilised by new political parties[3]. This usable legacy was indeed taken advantage of by newly formed parties that chose to associate themselves with the former regime and that had incentives to become mainstream.

As mentioned in the Argument Chapter, economic growth is the prime example of general outputs, in the sense that it collectively increases individual wellbeing levels among most segments of the general population. As the first implication of the first theoretical hypothesis suggests, these increases in individual wellbeing will differ at the local-level, which will be translated into higher and lower levels of support for mainstream associated parties in different areas. This first theoretical expectation of the first hypothesis will be validated in

[1]It is important to also highlight that, if a regime created general outputs, a mainstream party has incentives to take advantage of this legacy even if does not have the full support of all groups, particularly in areas where negative outputs were more prevalent, or that did not benefit as much from positive outputs. Then, when general support exists among the general population, a mainstream party can utilise its legacy and associate itself with the former regime even if at the local-level this variation in support is heterogeneous.

[2]In the case of Spain, policies producing general outputs were only implemented in the second part of the regime (from the mid-1950s), after a period of famine and hunger (1939 to early 1950s) in which the creation of general outputs was very scarce or inexistent.

[3]Also the particularistic group also benefited from these general outputs.

the case of Francoist Spain. Furthermore, according to what the second implication of the first hypothesis suggests, areas that simultaneously experienced general outputs and negative outputs will tend to vote less for the mainstream associated parties. This expectation will also be empirically corroborated. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the Spanish autocratic regime produced a combination of general and particularistic outputs. The particularistic group — that received particularistic benefits — corresponded to wealthy large landowners mostly located in the Southern regions of the country. Following the theoretical mechanism, so that this group was able to benefit from particularistic outputs, other groups — larger in size — were harmed by the distribution of these particularistic benefits. These harmed groups corresponded to the landless population and small landowners also located in the South of Spain. The prevailing kind of negative outputs in Spain, during the second half of the regime, corresponded to general repression, since the extent of particularistic repression was very limited during this period. In the late Francoist regime, particularistic repression was characterised by not being very severe and not very uncertain. It mostly corresponded to arrests carried out in student protests and workers' movements protests. Finally, it is important to mention that the particularistic group also benefited from general policies, as the theory developed in this dissertation suggests.

In the next section, I will explore the trajectory of economic growth in Spain during the Francoist dictatorship, and I will show that general outputs were created during the second phase of the regime, upon the modernisation of the Spanish economy. I suggest that these general outputs were created in all Spanish regions and benefited virtually all social groups. Then, in *Section 3.2*, I will demonstrate that while the Francoist regime also produced particularistic benefits by protecting the estates of Spanish large landowners, it did so at the expense of the creation of negative general outputs for the rural population living in those areas. This protection of large landowners was carried out through the reversal of the land redistribution policies implemented in 1932, and by the lack of implementation of a land redistribution reform to tackle the grave problem of land inequality in Spain that was, according to some authors, one of the causes that

lead to the Spanish Civil War (Domènech 2015). In *Section 3.3*, I will show that, nevertheless, these landowning elites also benefited from the economic modernisation that lead to growth in the second part of the Francoist dictatorship. After transitions to democracy, the landowning elites established self-interested linkages with the mainstream associated parties as they promised to protect their interests in the new democratic context by engaging with their enjoyment of general benefits[4]. Furthermore, in *Section 3.4*, I will identify all the Spanish parties that chose to associate themselves with the former dictatorship. I will describe their linkages to the regime and how they appealed to the mainstream public by taking advantage of the creation of general support. I note that no associated party opted to become extremist, as it would make sense in this case, considering the theoretical argument. Finally, in *Section 3.5*, I will empirically show that the two theoretical implications of the first hypothesis hold. As suggested in the Argument Chapter, these implications will be tested at the local-level that correspond to the provincial-level in the case of Spain.

Table 3.1 summarises the most important policy outputs created during the Spanish dictatorship. Economic growth corresponds to general outputs. The lack of a land reform in order to tackle the problem of land inequality in Spain is a particularistic benefit from the perspective of large landowners, which corresponds to a small segment of the population. However, on the other side of the coin, it constitutes a source of general repression from the perspective of the rural population. Finally, arrests to students and workers engaging in anti-regime protests corresponds to particularistic repression (non-severe and non-uncertain).

TABLE 3.1: Policy Outputs and the Case of Spain

	General Outputs	**Particularistic Outputs**
Positive	Economic Growth	Land Inequality: Landowners
Negative	Land Inequality: Rural Population	Repression (arrests)

[4]And not by engagement with their enjoyment of particularistic benefits, which would force the newly formed associated parties to also deal with the autocratic "baggage" created by the general repression associated to these kinds of benefits among the rural population of the South.

3.1 Expansion or Stagnation: General Output Creation during Autocratic Periods

As a consequence of the nationalist victory in the notoriously brutal Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the autocratic regime lead by Francisco Franco in Spain lasting between 1939 and 1976, can be divided into two very distinctive moments. Each of these two moments produced antithetical kinds of policies. While in the first moment the country's economy was oriented towards autarky, in second moment it was oriented towards modernisation and growth. During the first autarkic period, that lasted between 1939 and 1950, Franco's dictatorship was characterised by a stagnant economy in all Spanish regions. The double whammy of autarkic policies — that neglected economic development —, on the one hand, and the country's recovery from the Spanish Civil War, on the other hand, are the most frequent explanations for an anaemic economy during this period (Cuadrado-Roura 2010). Nevertheless, in the second phase of the regime, Spanish economic prospects took a one hundred and eighty degree turn. From the mid-fifties, Spain experienced the so-called "economic miracle" which saw soaring economic growth rates, and a complete change in the structural organisation of the Spanish economy — while the agricultural sector shrunk, the industrial and services sector expanded in size. This modernisation process was triggered by a change of policy trajectory aimed at solving the serious unbalances faced by the Spanish economy, and that included high inflation rates, foreign deficit, and economic lethargy. This turnaround started in 1953, when Spain first received economic aid from the United States, and culminated in the creation of the Stabilisation Plan supported by international organisations like the OECD and the IMF. In the next two sub-sections, I will explore in more detail these two periods that characterise the Francoist dictatorship, and investigate how each of them contributed to the creation of general outputs.

3.1.1 Contraction: Autarky and "The Hunger Years"

When Franco rose to power, as noted by Cuadrado-Roura (2010), the Civil War "left the country in a very sorry state". Infrastructures had been destroyed, there

was a shortage of human resources, industrial facilities had been severely damaged or abandoned, and, by the end of the Second World War, the Allies had imposed an economic and political embargo on Spain, which aggravated the already difficult situation (Cuadrado-Roura 2010). It was in this context that Franco, inspired by Mussolini's self-sufficiency agricultural policies, implemented similar 'inward-looking' policies in Spain, thus setting off the autarkic period of the regime. However, the two regimes had very different goals. In the Italian regime, Mussolini's goal was to increase wheat productivity as a means to self-sufficiency, which ended up benefiting medium and large landowners who were given production concessions on the cereal (D'Attoma 2016). Franco, on the other hand, in order to avoid food shortages in an already devastated economy, fixed wheat retail prices at a low level. But instead of achieving self-sufficiency, this policy backfired and shortages followed. Hence, in order to avoid selling wheat at the low official prices, "farmers started sowing other crops that they could sell freely. The SNT[5] then tried to gain control over new products in order to prevent farmers from evading the agency's control" (Tortella and Houpt 2020). These were so-called "the hunger years" (*'los años del hambre'*) in Spain.

In a recent book, González de Molina *et al.* (2021) argue that "despite being known as 'the hunger years' in the popular imagination, the depth, severity and duration of the crisis are often overlooked and treated as the logical consequence of the Civil War". These authors contend that this was the official explanation given by the regime to justify the famine, blaming it particularly on the destruction caused by the Republican faction in the Spanish Civil War. The authors demonstrate instead that the food crisis was a consequence of the agrarian policies implemented during the first half of the regime, and "cannot thus be interpreted as an outcome of the war, of an inefficient agrarian sector that was not yet industrialised, or the logical starting point of an agrarian sector that would achieve a stable and abundant food supply a few years later". They show that high levels of food supply had already been achieved in the first decades of the twentieth century, thus invalidating the explanation to the famine propagated by the regime. In another recent study, Arco Blanco and Anderson (2021) go one step

[5]SNT is the acronym for "Servicio Nacional del Trigo", or in english, the National Wheat Agency.

further and establish a direct causal relationship between Franco's autarkic policies and the emergence of the famine period. These authors claim that the "myth" that the famine cannot be traced down to Franco's autarkic policies still lives in the collective memory of Spanish's intellectuals and general population alike. Their work's aim is to deconstruct the reality that the "Francoist collective memory continues to exert a hold over the population" in the sense that "Spain's democracy is yet to challenge this benign interpretation of the past", particularly referring to the famine period. Despite the plausibility of these arguments, it is important to note that these two studies are very recent, showing that the attempts to deeply understand the relationship of causality between the famine and the regime's policies during the first stage of the regime still at the outset. In any case, at this point, I will make two important observations. The first one is that the notions of guilt and accountability between an autocrat's policy implementation and any kind of output — positive or negative — are not relevant to the argument established in this dissertation, as justified in the previous chapter. Following the work by Campello and Zucco (2020), I contend that the population living under an autocratic regime judges the autocrat based on policy outputs and not intention. Furthermore, these policy outputs would influence the support for the incumbent even when they are largely driven by external factors to the dictator. Hence, more than guilt and blame, it can be said that policy outcomes in the autocratic context analysed here are actually more related to chance and to the ability to make the most out of internal and external conditions. Therefore, the evaluation of whether Franco is — which is likely — or is not responsible for the the hunger years of the first stage of the regime is irrelevant to the argument developed in this dissertation. What truly matters is that the Spanish population suffered the negative effects of the difficult economic situation during this period, and as Campello and Zucco (2020) show, this is enough to be reflected into autocratic support or lack thereof. The second important point is that, the timing in which the policy outputs occur also matters to this argument[6]. Similarly to what happens in retrospective voting theories, although voters have the intention of judging the whole electoral period to make an informed decision about how to

[6] As also justified in the Argument Chapter of this dissertation.

cast their vote, compiling that kind of information is often not possible (Healy and Lenz 2014). For this reason, in order to have more easily accessible information, voters condense this retrospective judgement period into the very last moments, usually one year, before an election takes place (Kiewiet 1983; Achen and Bartels 2004). This phenomenon, referred to as the "end-heuristic" explanation, is one in which "voters inadvertently substitute [cumulative performance by] election-year performance because it is more easily accessible" (Healy and Lenz 2014). I contend that this "end-heuristic" explanation can also be applied to the population living under an autocratic regime, when after transitions to democracy, it is faced with the possibility of voting for parties associated with the former regime. However, instead of basing their electoral decisions on the performance of a previous electoral year, voters in newly formed democracies would decide to vote for associated parties based on the objective information they have from the end-of-regime performance. This process of substituting the "end for the whole" would also help to simplify the assessment of the cumulative performance of an autocratic regime. It would be hard to establish exactly how long the performance "judgment" period would last in an autocratic regime. However, I will assume for now — and will later show empirically — that the famine period during the Francoist regime is not included in this time-frame, as it ended around twenty years before the regime has ended, which would be too distant to be included in "end-heuristic" considerations.

Nevertheless, no matter how one looks at the autarkic agricultural policy outcomes of the early Franco's dictatorship, it is safe to say that the policies that led to the famine in Spain were not a source of general benefits. Yet, if the majority did not benefit from these policy outcomes, it becomes relevant to ask who — if anyone at all — benefited from them.

Unlike in Italy, the goal of self-sufficiency agricultural policies in Spain was not to increase the support of a predominantly rural population. In the Italian case, ruralisation policies were designed with the particular intent to appeal to the rural population at a time where Fascism was still growing and gathering support before becoming a full-fledged dictatorship. It ended up benefiting the richer members of this sector. In Spain, these policies were introduced as a contingency plan in order

to avoid famine — despite of their failure to do so —, at a time when the regime was already consolidated with the Nationalists and Franco's victory in the Civil War. They were not, like in the Italian case, designed with the goal of boosting popular support, but of avoiding a hunger catastrophe. But regardless of their intention to increase popular support, were there any real benefactors from these policies? It could be argued that those who were able to make profits in the black market that emerged during this period (Tortella and Houpt 2020) could have benefited from the self-sufficiency policies. However, this is problematic in two different ways. First, these profits were extremely ephemeral. According to Tortella and Houpt (2020), until the mid-1950s, wheat and corn production remained below their prewar levels. The shortages and the black market remained active until the 1950s. It makes therefore sense to assume that some, if not most, of the people who benefited from selling in the black market did not maintain a high level of benefits for such a long period of time that would lead them to vote for an associated party after 1975, the year in which the Spanish transition to democracy began. Second, even those who benefited from black market sales were much more likely to have benefited more from the generalised economic growth that occurred after the mid-1950s, which would render the profits during the famine as insignificant.

Considering the above, I argue that in terms of creating positive outputs, the first phase of the regime is generally irrelevant when considered isolated, and even more so when compared with the second phase of the dictatorship, when the levels of economic growth soared and allowed for a generalised improvement of wellbeing amongst most segments of the general population. Nevertheless, it could make sense to hypothesise that the autarkic policies would therefore produce negative outputs. While arguing that that is the case, however, one could apply the same "end-heuristic" considerations to repression. The hunger years were too far way in time — approximately twenty years — to be considered by post-transitional voters that that take the end for the whole (Healy and Lenz 2014; Bailey 2021). Another consideration that might be relevant is that these negative outputs created during the first part of the regime were replaced, in the second part, by a period in which the creation of general benefits was unprecedented in Spain — hence, the "economic miracle". According to Prados de la Escosura

(2008), the economic decline experienced during the early stage of the regime was modest when compared with the growth that followed during the second phase of the dictatorship. Since those who lived through the famine were much better off by the end of the regime, it makes sense to consider that the economic improvements brought about by a substantially larger level of growth would minimise the negative effects of the famine period. For these reasons, I will discount the importance of the famine period as a negative output on the post-transitional vote in associated parties.

3.1.2 Expansion: Modernisation and "The Economic Miracle"

After the regime's decision to liberalise its economy in the mid-1950s, "Spain quickly transformed into a modern manufacturing and service-based economy. It experienced unprecedented levels of prosperity, massive urbanisation, and a growing middle class." (Boix 2008: 217). This modernisation process encompassed the contraction of the agricultural sector in Spain, and the expansion of the industrial and services sectors of activity (García Delgado, Muñoz Cidad and Abad Balboa 1994; Collantes Gutiérrez 2007). The phenomenon of modernisation has been associated to rapid economic growth, and linked to "an improved quality of life for most people in most historical periods" (Inkeles 1993). There are certain processes that allow the improvement in the quality of life of societies that go though an economic modernisation process. In Spain, particularly, the modernisation of the economy that revolved around industrialisation and urbanisation, fostered social mobility (Pérez Rubio 2017), and generated a "strong middle class beyond the existing bourgeois strata in Catalonia and the Basque country" (Boix 2008). This "shift in employment from low-productivity sectors (agriculture) to high-productivity sectors (industry)" was also linked to an increase in literacy levels that would allow workers to operate in a more technological-based environment (Boix 2008). Literacy has been shown to be strongly associated to better life conditions since "it increases access to non-alienated paid work and economic resources", as well as "stable social relationships" that increase social support (Ross and Van Willigen 1997). Additionally, it has also been shown that in Spain, the high levels of

industrialisation in different Spanish provinces was linked to an increase in entrepreneurial initiative (De la Torre and García-Zúñiga 2014). The emergence of new businesses brought about by this process propelled an increase in employment levels and a decrease in unemployment (Argandoña 1999; Prados de la Escosura 2017). Furthermore, some authors have also established a connection between economic growth in Spain and the exposure to international markets during the expansion period of the second phase of the regime (Jackson 1976; Prados de la Escosura 2017). Finally, according to Boix (2008), "the rapid economic transformation of Spain, which revolved around industrialisation and urbanisation, had deflated past conflicts around the distribution of land". The shrinking of the agricultural sector decreased the importance of land ownership as workers shifted to other sectors of activity, consequentially reducing the importance of the land inequality-based conflicts that had been salient in Spain since before the Spanish Civil War. Additionally, according to this author, "the very experience of sustained growth defused social conflict with the credible promise of higher incomes and more social mobility in the future." (Boix 2008: 230).

The economic modernisation of the Spanish economy happened after the implementation of the Stabilisation Plan supported by the OEEC (as the OECD was previously known), the IMF, and other international organisations (Cuadrado-Roura 2010). Spain reverted all self-sufficiency policies and gave way to the so-called "economic miracle", that as mentioned, was a period of unprecedentedly high levels of economic growth. Overall, the "government made use of a number of measures that included direct subsidies, tax advantages, tariff reductions" and access to funds, in order to stimulate economic development and trigger a change of course (Martín Aceña and Martínez Ruiz 2007). It has also been shown that the areas in which the regime intervened the most produced far better results than in those in which "the presence of the State was negligible" (Martín Aceña and Martínez Ruiz 2007). There is a debate to be had on whether the outputs of this economic miracle can solely be attributed to Franco's policy shift, considering the importance of the involvement of foreign institutions. However, following the logic of the theoretical mechanism, I will ignore the attribution of

responsibility for the outputs' creation and will exclusively focus on the fact that they were created, and that the population's desire for their continuation helped to stabilise the regime (Chuliá 2007; Martín Aceña and Martínez Ruiz 2007). It is also relevant to highlight that according to some relevant studies, the regime used these material developments as a popular legitimation mechanism for stabilisation purposes (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988; Prada Rodríguez 2017; Márquez Quevedo 2018). According to Townson (2007), the "economic development in the 1960s helped to put the emphasis of the legitimisation discourse on substantive rather than symbolic arguments", highlighting the role of material improvements in the regime's legitimising discourse. This author explains that:

> "The regime could count on numerous resources to disseminate this culture; some were a monopoly (such as the NO-DO news reports and later television, the only media to broadcast moving pictures of public events) and others were subject to rigorous State controls (for example radio, press, cinema, theatre and books). In the 1960s the political culture of the regime showed a clear predilection for publications, programmes, films and plays which expressed the idea that Spain had modernised unrecognisably". (Townson 2007: 172-173).

This economic improvement measured by the GDP per capita, from the mid-fifties until the end of the regime, is depicted on **Table 3.2**. Here it is possible to see that from 1950 until the end of the regime, in 1975, all Spanish regions grew exponentially — without exception. In **Figure 3.1** it is also possible to observe the same growth pattern when considering private consumption growth, from 1850 until 2000. It is clear that during the first autarkic phase both indicators — GDP per capita and private consumption per capita — plummeted in relation to 1920s levels, showing a steep decrease in the quality of life of Spaniards when compared to the period before the Civil War. However, in the second phase of the regime, portrayed in the graph from 1952 to 1958 and from 1958 until 1974, quality of life levels soared to unprecedented levels.


However, economic growth is not an automatic mechanism, nor its it always applicable to all social groups. Because averages can hide decreases in wellbeing

TABLE 3.2: GDP per Capita by Spanish Region (in constant pesetas of 1995)

	1930	**1940**	**1950**	**1960**	**1975**	**1950-1975** (Δ)
Andalusia	338.253	273.906	280.466	434.438	977.074	696.608
Aragón	459.897	383.437	377.198	633.998	1305.342	928.144
Asturias	509.572	430.376	386.436	631.868	1312.091	925.655
Balearic Islands	733.058	622.887	539.109	932.548	2057.221	1518.112
Canary Islands	484.835	389.773	359.348	585.391	1278.825	919.477
Basque Country	750.190	636.511	661.453	948.962	1672.533	1011.080
Cantabria	434.152	364.387	375.950	626.406	1320.881	944.931
Castilla – La Mancha	272.554	235.765	256.108	454.835	976.359	720.251
Castile and Leon	326.097	280.004	289.020	486.883	1083.825	794.805
Catalonia	723.456	617.794	605.658	894.134	1639.458	1033.800
Extremadura	247.269	213.228	214.886	340.876	762.524	547.638
Galicia	334.898	277.660	283.379	460.766	1026.368	742.989
La Rioja	474.108	435.351	404.375	631.909	1338.479	934.104
Madrid	918.234	736.762	732.617	1138.494	1891.228	1158.611
Murcia	348.442	289.513	299.693	523.530	1088.827	789.134
Navarre	471.618	399.805	419.774	671.413	1499.011	1079.237
Valencia	461.077	400.883	408.769	629.591	1343.661	934.892

Source: Alcaide (2003)


FIGURE 3.1: "Per Capita GDP and Private Consumption Growth. 1850-2000 (annual average rate %)"



Source: Prados de la Escosura (2006)

in some groups, and because it is not possible to investigate how the economic miracle affected every single segment of the Spanish population, I will focus my attention in inspecting how this economic expansion affected the most materially vulnerable. According to Prados de la Escosura (2006), the early years of the Franco's dictatorship "offers a clear link between isolation, sluggish growth, and inequality, while poverty levels remained high and, conversely, an association between openness, growth acceleration, and falling inequality that led to a reduction in absolute poverty is observed in the late Francoism." Although there is no data for the 1940s, when the autarkic period took place, by looking at **Figure 3.2**, it is possible to observe that the poverty headcount (%) in Spain followed a decreasing trajectory up to 1935, a year before the Civil War began. By 1950, the poverty headcount had substantially increased. Then, from the mid 1950s until the end of the regime, poverty significantly declined to unprecedented levels, being nearly eradicated by the end of the dictatorship in 1974.

FIGURE 3.2: "Poverty Headcount in Spain (%) (Poverty Line 1985 $ G-K 4 a day per person)"



Source: Prados de la Escosura (2006)

Based on the data and on the accounts present in the literature, I suggest that this improvement in the quality of life of the Spanish population in the second

phase of the regime happened to a large extent in all Spanish regions, generally penetrating through all social strata. Although there is not enough quantitative evidence to substantiate that the "economic miracle" years left everyone better off by the end of the regime, qualitative accounts suggest that the majority of the general population did improve their quality of life regardless of their social status. Following Townson (2007), for example, although the relative income differences between social groups did not decrease, "it must be stressed that all the social layers registered a clear gain in their incomes" during the second half of the regime. According to the theoretical mechanism put forward in this dissertation, it can be therefore assumed that the general outputs were created during this period, as a result of the new economic approach that boosted the standards of living of the Spanish.

3.2 Land Reform as a Source of Particularistic Outputs in Autocratic Regimes

After having provided considerable evidence that general outputs were created during the second half of the Francoist dictatorship, I will now analyse the extent to which particularistic outputs were also created in Spain.

3.2.1 Land Inequality in Spain

Particularistic policy outputs were previously characterised by exclusively benefiting a small segment of the general population, while harming a substantially larger group. Although particularistic outputs can take up many forms, a significant way through which they are created in autocratic regimes is through the implementation of land reforms. Land reforms have the potential to produce this kind of outputs because they can either restructure the distribution of inequality, benefiting small landowners through targeted land redistribution or colonisation programmes — while harming medium and large landowners —, or because they can encompass the distribution of landowning related benefits, such as financial stimuli, protection of large landownership rights, or of labour-market

laws that can benefit larger landowning groups[7] — while harming the landless or small landowning rural population.

Authors like Albertus (2015) have shown that "the most redistributive variety of land reform occurs under autocratic rule, not under democracy." At heart, the objective of land redistribution is to change land inequality levels, and particularly, to decrease land inequality. Autocrats may promote or effectively implement land redistribution measures to boost the support of their rural population, such as in the case of some Latin American dictatorships (Albertus 2015). It is important to highlight that the issue of land inequality in Spain was extremely salient before and during the dictatorship. In fact, a link between land inequality and the outset of the Spanish Civil War is established by some authors (Domènech 2015; Simpson and Carmona 2020). According to the available literature, during Franco's regime, however, no major land redistribution program was put in motion. According to Malefakis (1970), "the Franco government feared to revive the agrarian question", since the issue of land inequality had been a particularly sensitive one in the period preceding the Spanish Civil War. Albertus (2015) contends that the "failed attempt at land redistribution during the Second Republic led to the persistence of the agrarian aristocracy among the 'Grandes de España'". Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that land inequality levels in Spain did not significantly change during the dictatorship due to regime imposed land redistribution policies — as it happened in Italy, for example[8].

But a regime can also change the structure of land inequality through the application of another kind of land reform that does not encompass redistribution, but colonisation. These are the "land colonisation" programs (Albertus 2015). While trying to emulate his Italian peer, Franco attempted his own version of the Italian 'Bonifica Integrale', that is, the colonisation of land for agriculture.

[7]Sometimes, instead of reducing inequality, a land reform can in fact, promote more inequality. This outcome is particularly likely when the regime leans on the financial support of large estate owners to survive. By applying a rational choice logic to this relationship between the autocratic government and medium and large estate owners, it is derived that the support of the latter comes at a cost for the regime. It is this cost-benefit analysis at both ends that I will explore when I approach the case of Italy, in *Chapter 5* of this dissertation.

[8]I am relying on the available literature due to the scarcity of land distribution data. Malefakis (1970) wrote that: "Data are especially scarce for the post-Civil War period, when, possibly because the Franco government feared to revive the agrarian question, only the number of owners or holdings in each Cadastral category has been reported. Statistics on the total income or total area controlled by each type of owner or holding have been suppressed."

Nonetheless, according to Mangas Navas and Barciela Lopez (1990), the efforts at bringing any kind of long-lasting benefits with the land colonisation program also ended up failing. These authors argue that, not only did these projects come to an end by the time the Stabilisation Plan was implemented in the 1950s, but also, that the change of economic trajectory of the regime during its second phase prompted workers that participated in land colonisation projects to completely change their professional activity from agriculture to the industry, the services sector, or even to emigrate (Mangas Navas 1990: xxxvi). Any benefits acquired during this period were therefore lost after the 1950s. In terms of production, this author also considers the little that was achieved was "negligible". Hence, it can be concluded that the land colonisation program also did not contribute to changing the pattern of land inequality in Francoist Spain. Up to now, I wrote about two different types of land reform and their potential — unsuccessful, in the case of Francoist Spain — to restructure the distribution of land inequality. It is important to highlight at this stage, using Domènech and Herreros' (2018) words when referring to Spain that:

> "Land reforms are ambitious processes of large-scale redistribution that generate identifiable groups of winners and losers. In contexts of high inequality, such as in agrarian societies with a very unequal distribution of land, the few who benefit from the status quo are resourceful, and can often block reform."

If neither land redistribution of colonisation programs in Spain contributed to the decline of the high levels of land inequality that subsisted throughout the Spanish Second Republic[9], it can be inferred that the landless and small landowners did not benefit from land reform policies in Spain. In fact, Prados de la Escosura (2008) has shown that inequality and land inequality levels in Spain increased from the start of the autocratic regime until the mid-1950s. But what about medium and large landowners? This author suggests that "while inequality was falling within both labour and capital returns, polarisation between property and labour caused a rise of total inequality". Despite the fact that capital returns did not increase during this period (Prados de la Escosura and Rosés 2009), the

[9] That preceded the Spanish Civil War.

lack of a land reform to tackle the great problem of land inequality in Spain did benefit larger landowners.

As mentioned, during the Spanish Second Republic, land inequality was a central problem causing great conflict in rural areas (Malefakis 1970). According to Domènech (2015), this period was characterised by "unprecedented levels of violence, with anarchist rural riots in 1931, 1932, or 1933, episodes of land seizures in 1933 and 1936 and tragic clashes between rebels and the police". In order to mitigate the revolutionary threat of landless labourers, the left-leaning Second Republic government approved the 1932 Land Reform Law (Domènech 2015). This law attempted at introducing a major land reform which "promised to settle large numbers of landless workers through compulsory land purchases by the state" (Roses 2015). Although these goals were only partially achieved, the Land Reform Law created a deep fracture in the Spanish society. During this period and the throughout the Civil War, large landowners saw their lands occupied or seized by Republican working-class organisations (Malefakis 1970), leading large landowners to side with the Fascist movement (Schatz 2001; Arco Blanco and Anderson 2017). Once the Nationalists won the Civil War, the Francoist regime proceeded to reverse the property occupations to large landowners. García Sanz and Sanz Fernandez (1996) use the term "agrarian counterrevolution" and contend that the regime went beyond the reversal of land occupations, allowing large landowners to not only re-occupy the lands previously belonging to them, but also to seize other means of production that did not belong to them. These authors provide substantial evidence that the Francoist dictatorship benefited large landowners by returning their lands, and by reversing of the entire land redistribution process started during the Spanish Second Republic, while protecting the properties of large landowners. During Francoism, large landowners also supported the regime as they benefited from the protection of their lands (Djurfeldt 1993). Taking this into account, I suggest that the land redistribution reversal, the lack of a substantial land reform during the dictatorship, and the protection of large estates, constituted a source of particularistic benefits to the large landowning segment of the population. On the other hand, these benefits were also a source of general repression to the poor and

to the landless rural population, who attempted to push for but was unsuccessful at pressuring the regime to lower land inequality levels through a land redistribution programme. Hence, the maintenance of land inequality simultaneously produced particularistic benefits to large landowners and created negative general outputs — or general repression — to the poor rural population, particularly to those living in highly unequal areas.

Consequentially, according to the theoretical mechanism of this dissertation, it is expected that after transitions to democracy, the vote for mainstream associated parties is lower in the areas most affected by general repression when compared to non-affected areas. Because I also argue that upon the existence of general benefits to the whole population, mainstream associated parties have incentives to electorally appeal to all groups among the general population[10] utilising the positive legacy of general benefits — including to the particularistic group —, in the next section of this chapter I will show that the particularistic group also benefited from general outputs.

3.3 Landowning Elites and General Outputs

In this section, I will demonstrate that in addition to having benefited from particularistic outputs, the Spanish landowning elites – more prevalent in the South of the country – also benefited from the modernisation and economic growth created during the second half of the Francoist regime. The goal of this section is to provide evidence that the groups that benefited from particularistic outputs also benefited from general outputs. As previously suggested, when this is the case — as it should be in most cases —, it is likely that a regime will be immunised against post-transitional extremism of the same ideological colour as the dictatorship.

According to Bernal (1987), the economic unbalances between the *latifundia*[11] of the South and the rural population remained the same during the Francoist regime, even by the late 1980s. In fact, a considerable number of authors (Bernal

[10] This issue is discussed in depth in the Argument Chapter of this dissertation. In practice, it would hardly be the case that a particularistic group would have not also benefited from general outputs.

[11] A *latifundio* corresponds to a very large parcel of privately owned agrarian land. In Spain they were found with more prevalence in the South of the country.

1987; Mata Olmo 1997; Artola Blanco 2013) suggests that despite the changes throughout the years, the owners of large lands remain the stable protagonists of the economy in the South, particularly in Andalusia. To Bernal (1987), despite some fluctuations in profitability in particular given moments, particularly "depending on the technological level and market conditions", the business of owning a large estate "always produces money". The same author suggests that upon the mechanisation of the agriculture that occurred in the South from the 1960s, the "traditional *latifundio* was transformed into an agrarian business" (Bernal 1984). According to the series calculated by Alcaide (2003), the value of agricultural and fishery production exponentially rose between 1955 and 1975 (see **Table 3.3**), period in which the agricultural sector began incorporating new technologies that lead to a more efficient production (Pérez Yruela 1995; Prados de la Escosura 2006). The region in which the production grew the most was Andalusia, also one of the provinces with the highest levels of land inequality (Malefakis 1970).

TABLE 3.3: Value of Agricultural and Fishery Production (in million of pesetas) between 1930 and 1975 *(Alcaide 2003)*

	1935	**1940**	**1945**	**1950**	**1955**	**1960**	**1965**	**1970**	**1975**	**1955-1975** (Δ)
Andalusia	2,676	4,024	7,631	13,797	20,637	35,733	60,241	83,037	173,845	153,208
Castile and Leon	2,215	2,848	6,579	12,722	15,925	25,792	42,640	54,563	101,866	85,941
Galicia	1,806	2,435	5,131	9,444	11,467	20,505	33,548	47,463	92,676	81,209
Catalonia	1,765	2,496	4,725	7,328	8,695	18,153	28,785	41,614	88,693	79,998
Castilla—La Mancha	1,216	1,639	3,555	7,013	10,082	18,755	26,396	35,646	80,497	70,415
Valencia	1,488	2,159	4,027	6,887	10,645	22,266	30,914	39,273	76,504	65,859
Aragón	733	1,047	2,104	3,462	4,571	11,054	14,738	21,437	43,316	38,745
Extremadura	790	1,039	2,342	4,411	6,433	12,163	15,595	19,273	36,427	29,994
Basque Country	493	679	1,574	2,804	3,656	6,190	10,367	17,010	27,140	23,484
Canary Islands	326	428	1,014	2,026	3,122	6,472	9,521	13,649	25,690	22,568
Murcia	268	372	806	1,538	2,498	4,910	6,876	9,425	23,895	21,397
Asturias	507	726	1,462	2,300	2,735	5,958	7,506	10,242	20,970	18,235
Navarre	384	522	1,062	1,900	2,564	4,407	7,148	8,451	17,034	14,470
Cantabria	157	223	497	999	1,444	3,054	5,298	7,310	13,056	11,612
Madrid	182	230	500	886	1,618	3,081	5,117	6,894	12,852	11,234
La Rioja	207	291	598	971	1,320	2,667	4,905	5,087	10,901	9,581
Balearic Islands	275	367	733	1,077	1,335	3,054	4,509	6,806	10,647	9,312
SPAIN	15,492	21,530	44,349	79,583	108,775	204,254	314,175	427,296	856,241	747,466

Source: Alcaide (2003)

According to Mata Olmo (1997), "the large property of today is born and settles, in most of the known cases, on the large properties of the past". If the landowning structure went through significant changes during the 19th century, the group that was strengthened after these changes were the landowners that at the time enjoyed the possibility of accumulating lands thanks to their economic power and political and social influence in local societies. Following Mata Olmo (1997), considering that the structure of landowning elites remained stable, this was the group that also effectively benefited from the modernisation of the agricultural sector that occurred in the second half of the regime. Muñoz Sánchez (2007) also suggests that with the modernisation of the agriculture during this period, the only thing that changed was the usage of the land because "the property continued to fall into the same hands." After the mid-1950s, the economic situation of these large landowning groups was benefited by two parallel tendencies. The first one was the replacement of workers by machinery that, seems to point to a very substantial increase in productivity after 1960 (see **Table 3.3**). Of course, the consequence of this was the aggravation of the problem of rural unemployment (Bernal 1987), and the emigration to urban centres and to other countries. The second tendency is one that had already been set in motion since the beginning of the Francoist regime. It encompassed the decreasing propensity of large landowners to rent their lands to sharecroppers, and in order to enjoy economies of scale, to exploiting the lands on their own instead of relying on rents (Mata Olmo 1997). Also Alvaredo and Saez (2009) suggest that the importance of rents — measured by their weight on the tax revenue structure — decreased from 0.48 in 1958 to 0.28 in 1975, while entrepreneurial income increased from 0.32 to 0.42.

Alvaredo and Saez (2009) make the very interesting observation that "at the beginning of the Franco regime, only a minority of top income earners were passive landowners deriving all their income from rents (the traditional image of the agrarian aristocracy of the 'Grandes de España', mainly concentrated in the central and southern areas of the country)." These authors argue that these top income earner elites "were much more likely to be also owners of financial assets and non-farm businesses". If business and financial activities experienced

significant growth during the second half of the regime, it makes sense to hypothesise that non-farming businesses of the landowning elite also experienced an increase during this period. This is particularly sound if one takes into account the fact that during the second half of the regime, the "possibilities of accessing a position increased if one belonged to one of the great economic, industrial or landowning families" (Toboso Sánchez 2007). Many authors have established self-interested linkages between the landowning elite and the Francoist regime (Toboso Sánchez 2007; Ramiro and González 2019; Sánchez Soler 2020). These linkages protected the elites and further contributed to their enrichment during the "economic miracle" period, in exchange for their political loyalty.

Following the literature referred to above, if the large landowners in Spain were able to retain their lands and economic power during the second half of the regime (Aguilar 31 March. 1979), the question of what happened after the Spanish transition to democracy becomes relevant. As argued by Pérez Yruela (1995), "neither the Franco agrarian policy, nor the successive democratic governments from 1977 onwards, have had the intention of tackling the questions of large-scale land ownership." In fact, in April 1976, the *New York Times* published an article proclaiming that "Spain's Big Landowners Still Live a Gracious Life" (Howe 20 April. 1976, 4). The article muses about the fact that Spanish large landowners, one year after the death of Franco and in the early stages of the democratic transition, were able to keep their large estates while living a comfortable life in Sevilla (in Andalusia):

> "Most of the landowners, who are still called *señorita* or master by their workers, live in Seville while foremen run the farms. The owners generally spend their profits on good living; if they invest them, they send them abroad or to industrialised northern Spain." (Howe 20 April. 1976, 4)

This article also points out that "before Franco, landowners were feudal lords and now they are business managers", as also suggested by other previously mentioned authors. As it was already pointed out, the interconnectedness between the Francoist political and economic elites allowed landowning elites to

prosper during the "economic miracle". According to Toboso Sánchez (2007), these linkages were perpetuated after transitions to democracy by the post-transitional associated mainstream parties that carried out the early transition phase.

In an article published in March 1979 by the Spanish newspaper *El País* (Aguilar 31 March. 1979), in addition to being similarly argued that the "golden age" for the landowning elite was during Franco's regime since it allowed them to extract material gains from the regime, the article also contended that the landowning elite was able to conserve its economic power in the new democratic system despite having lost their access to the political power. This article additionally stated that these elites voted for both political parties associated with the former regime, suggesting that the vote between the two parties changed according to the extent to which one and the other were better able to protect their interests, a capability that varied with their electoral strength and winning prospects.

At this point it is relevant to investigate how exactly did the associated parties appeal to the landowning elites. It was previously argued that these elites benefited from particularistic outputs, since this group benefited from the lack of a substantial land reform in Spain that would encompass land redistribution of their lands the poorer segments of the population; and from general outputs brought about by the modernisation of the agriculture that increased the profitability of their estates. According to the theoretical argument presented in this dissertation, newly formed parties associated with the former regime can either choose to appeal to this smaller group with the promise of continuation of particularistic outputs, having, in this case, to necessarily engage with the negative general outputs created among the group that was harmed by their distribution (i.e. the agrarian peasants that were in favour of a land reform that included redistribution); or to appeal to this group promising the continuation of the general benefits that they also took advantage of. I contend that there is significant evidence to suggest that not only did the associated parties not promise the continuation of particularistic benefits to this group, but that they tried instead to earn the votes of the larger group that was harmed by the negative general

outputs. The associated parties — the People's Alliance (AP) and the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) —, that effectively had the vote of the large landowning groups (Aguilar 31 March. 1979; Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988), only made claims about the continuation of the positive general benefits when appealing to these elites.

In the aforementioned *El País* article, (Aguilar 31 March. 1979) it is written that in the first democratic election in June 1977, Spanish large landowners voted mostly for the People's Alliance[12]. However, in the second democratic election of March 1979, these groups "put sentimentality aside and usefully voted for UCD[13], whom they did not fully trust". And the reason why they did not fully trust the UCD was because of the "ambiguity of the Leasing Law and that of Improvable Farms" (Aguilar 31 March. 1979). This law, drafted by the UCD during the Moncloa pacts[14], encompassed the possibility of expropriation of lands under certain conditions (*El País* 21 June. 1978). The article therefore suggests that despite the danger that the UCD could in fact implement a law that would allow for the expropriation of lands, it was still worth it for landowners to vote for this party instead of the AP, as the UCD would likely win the second democratic election as well. The reason why this would be a better strategy from the landowners' perspective is not directly disclosed in this article. However, it suggests that landowners were happy with the continuation of a UCD government, having this party won the first election in 1977.

If the UCD planned to introduce a law that encompassed the expropriation of lands, in order to appeal to those harmed by the previous general repression, also the AP, the most conservative of both parties, predominantly appealed to those subject to this kind of repression. On its first electoral program of 1977, in the subsection denominated "Agrarian and livestock policy" the party writes that such policy had three major goals. The first one was exactly to increase the wellbeing of the population harmed by the distribution of particularistic outputs during the regime: "to raise the income of farmers and stockbreeders to the

[12]One of the parties associated to the Francoist regime. It's Spanish name is "Alianza Popular".

[13]The other associated party.

[14]The pacts that encompassed the Spanish transition to democracy, which was a transition by negotiation (or pact).

average of other economic sectors, in order to remove the existing unfair imbalances". The second goal was economic in nature and comprised the achievement of an "adequate domestic supply and contributing to the improvement of our trade balance". Broadly, it could be said that this reflected the party's commitment to the improvement of agricultural production in order to produce an adequate internal supply and to increase exports. The maintenance or the increase of agricultural outputs would allow the continuation of general benefits to large landowners. Therefore, the only policy intention stated by this party that would benefit large landowners promised the continuation of general benefits — and not of particularistic benefits. The third and last goal is not important to this argument: "To pay attention to the necessary conservation of nature."

In order to achieve the first goal, the party suggests it would inclusively carry out "a realistic reform of agricultural structures", taking into account "the diversities existing in the country, intensifying the creation of new irrigated land and pastures and improving existing ones". It is fair to suggest that the AP seemed to understand that appealing to accomplish an agrarian reform was important to win over the group harmed by the general repression. In addition to this, the party also promised to "improve the quality of life in rural areas with economic stimuli so that the beneficiaries themselves are encouraged to be the real protagonists of social and economic development. In this context, equal social security for all sectors will also be established." All in all, no direct appeals to landowners' particularistic benefits were made by the AP in their electoral program. This suggests that this party chose not to engage with the continuation of particularistic benefits to large landowners, not engaging also with the negative legacy of general repression. Instead, this party opted to try to win over those harmed by the particularistic policy outputs: the poor rural population.

In the next section I will describe how the associated parties relate to the former regime in more detail, and how they used the regime's positive legacy to appeal to a mainstream audience.

3.4 After Transitions to Democracy: Parties Associated to the Former Regime

Upon the creation of general support in Spain, following the theoretical argument, the two parties that chose to associate themselves with the former regime decided to become mainstream: the People's Alliance (AP), and the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD). As expected, by having general support to exploit as a source of electoral advantage, both parties that became associated to Francoism opted to become mainstream instead of extremist, which would have reduced their electoral appeal. In this section, I will proceed to highlight the relationship between these two parties and the former regime, and how they instrumentalised the creation of general support to appeal to a mainstream audience. This latter point will now only briefly be described, and further developed in Chapter 4.

In a speech that occurred two days before the first democratic General Election of June 1977, in the state-owned public television channel Spanish Radio and Television Corporation, known as '*Radiotelevisión Española*' or RTVE, Manuel Fraga, the leader of the party People's Alliance (AP), told Spaniards that the party wanted "a free and dynamic economy, capable of creating, like it did in the past years ... of more wealth and more freedom", clearly alluding to the economic growth period of the last decades of Francoism. The links between the right-wing conservative party AP — that later on became the well-known contemporary Popular Party (PP) — and the former regime are evident. The party was founded by seven of Franco's ministers, known as the "magnificent seven", including its leader Manuel Fraga, Franco's former minister of Information and Tourism between 1962 and 1969. Fraga's ambition was to create a mainstream conservative party akin to the British Conservative Party or the American Republican Party, by forging an alliance among groups of the "centre and centre-right", he claimed in an interview (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988). This was to be "a great, modern, liberal-conservative party — that is, a *sui-generis* centrism, ... clearly reformist in social matters, and clearly democratic". These efforts were somehow frustrated by his angry temperament, the authoritarian language used by many of the candidates, and by the negative connection made between his ministers and the

former regime. Although the AP and the centrist party Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) had virtually the same electorate (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988), the AP ended up being perceived as a much more right-wing party than the UCD, appealing primarily to more conservative voters. But the UCD also had links to the former regime, although it managed to deal with this connection in a more subtle way. Hopkin (1999) explains that the great success of the UCD in the early democratic elections was it capacity to bring together those demanding a break with the former regime, and those insisting on its continuity in a new democratic context. Also the UCD had candidates who held official positions within the Francoist regime. In fact, to authors such as Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1988), the existence of Francoists within the party was not a liability. Because the party had also included persons from the Francoist reformist sectors, it was not perceived as a nostalgic Francoist party, despite its known connections to the former regime. The ideology of the UCD was purposely ambiguous and vague, allowing the party to appeal to different social segments and ideologies. According to Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1988), this ideological "vagueness" fitted well with the belief that "most voters were not particularly interested in political ideologies of any kind", being more concerned with their access to "welfare consumerism" as mentioned by a former UCD secretary general in a 1983 interview:

> "You must not forget that at that time the Spanish people had a very limited political culture and were not ideological. There were persons who regarded themselves as of the left, and knew that historically the left was identified with the Socialist and Communist parties. But aside from them, for most persons of the centre, it was very difficult to explain the differences between Christian democracy, or a liberal party, or moderate social democracy ... [Under the Francoist regime] the average citizen had been converted to consumerism; as long as he didn't get mixed up in politics nobody could bother him. There had been no politicisation of the country. A welfare consumerism had been created. Faced with this lack of political awareness, it was very difficult to launch an undertaking of ideological parties." (Gunther, Sani and

Shabad 1988: 106)

Also Townson (2007) confirms this preference by explaining that, by the end of the dictatorship, "the overwhelming bulk of Spaniards were more concerned with their personal economic welfare ... than with the uncertain rewards of political militancy". Therefore, by not committing to any particular ideology and by occupying the "central" space at the ideological continuum, the UCD could fully exploit the popular concern with personal economic welfare without alienating any segment of the electorate. As it shall be seen in more detail in the next chapter, the UCD made clear efforts to appeal to the mainstream public by promising the implementation of policies that would allow the continuation of economic prosperity (Prada Rodríguez 2017). The party also re-implemented the same agrarian benefits program introduced by Franco in regions that had an extremely large share of agrarian population — Extremadura and Andalusia — (Watson 2015; Groves *et al.* 2017). The exact way in which these associated parties appealed to a mainstream audience will be explored in more detail in the qualitative analysis carried out in the next Chapter 4.


In the following section, I will quantitatively show that the creation of general outputs during the growth phase of the dictatorship boosted the support for these parties aligned with the former regime, as *Hypothesis 1* suggests. The empirical model will quantify these effects taking also into account the influence of general repression associated to the lack of a land reform, and the more limited effects of negative particularistic outputs carried out by the Francoist regime.

3.5 Empirical Analysis: The Post-Transitional Effects of General Outputs

As it was previously discussed, the liberalisation of the economy in the mid-1950s transformed Spain into a modern manufacturing and service-based economy with unprecedented levels of prosperity (Boix 2008). By looking at **Figure 3.3** it is possible to observe that there is a very strong positive correlation[15] between GDP

[15]The correlation coefficient is 0.854.

FIGURE 3.3: Industrial sector's gross value added (GVA) per capita by GDP per capita (1955-1975) by province



per capita between 1955 and 1975[16] (Díez, Martinez and Tirado 2018) and the per capita industrial sector's gross value added (GVA) during the same period (Alcaide 2003). The relationship between the industrial GVA per capita and gross disposable household income per capita is also a strong one (**Figure 8.1, Appendix A**). This means that, generally, the provinces that industrialised the most also saw higher increases in their quality of life, reflected by a higher GDP per capita and household income per capita.

In the following empirical model, I will show that the Spanish provinces that during the second half of the Francoist regime had a higher increase in their level of GDP per capita, associated to increases in the quality of life of the general population, tended to vote more for the parties associated to the former regime, thus confirming the first theoretical implication of *Hypothesis 1*. Furthermore, I will also empirically show that the experience of general repression will have a negative effect on the vote for the associated parties, according to the second theoretical implication of *Hypothesis 1*. I will highlight that general repression was the most relevant negative output contributing to the decrease in the vote for

[16] Being the total for Spain equal to 1.

associated parties, since the presence of particularistic repression during the second half of the Francoist regime was very limited.

3.5.1 Dependent Variables

Vote on aligned mainstream right in the first democratic election

The support for the mainstream right aligned with the former autocratic regime after transitions to democracy is captured by the combined vote share of these parties in the first democratic election after the end of the autocratic regime. The first free general election in Spain to elect the Congress of Deputies took place on the 15th of June 1977. This variable was collected at the provincial level from the data archive of the Spanish *'Ministerio del Interior'* that includes all data collected by the Spanish electoral office (*'Oficina del Censo Electoral (OCE)'*). The dataset combines the vote share on two parties that can be traced back to the Francoist regime (Hopkin 1999) — People's Alliance (AP) and Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD). The vote shares were calculated, by province, by dividing the sum of the votes in the AP and the UCD by the total number of valid votes.

Vote on aligned mainstream right in the second democratic election

The support for the mainstream right aligned with the former autocratic regime after transitions to democracy is also captured by the combined vote share of these parties in the second democratic election after the end of the autocratic regime. The goal of including this variable is to check for time-elapsing effects. The further one distances itself from the regime, less strong should the effects be captured by the subsequent vote share on the aligned mainstream right due. The second free general election in Spain to elect the Congress of Deputies took place on the 1st of March 1979. This variable was collected at the provincial level from the data archive of the Spanish *'Ministerio del Interior'* that includes all data collected by the Spanish electoral office (*'Oficina del Censo Electoral (OCE)'*). The dataset combines the vote share on two parties that can be traced back to the Francoist regime (Hopkin 1999) — People's Alliance (AP) and Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD). The vote

shares were calculated, by province, by dividing the sum of the votes in the AP and the UCD by the total number of valid votes.

3.5.2 Independent Variables

GDP Capita Variation (Δ) during the "economic miracle"

The modernisation of the Spanish economy during the second phase of the Francoist regime encompassed an important process of economic industrialisation and tertiarisation that was strongly associated to an improvement in the quality of life of the population (Boix 2008; De la Torre and García-Zúñiga 2014; Pérez Rubio 2017). In order to capture this increase in quality of life during the second half of the regime, the main variable of interest corresponds to the difference between the GDP per capita of the Spanish population between 1955 and 1975[17], at the provincial-level. The year of 1955 corresponds to the closest year with available data to the year of 1953, the moment in which the regime shifted its economic policy from autarky to growth. The year of 1975 marks the end of the regime. This data was retrieved from the series calculated by Díez, Martinez and Tirado (2018).

GDP Capita Variation (Δ) during the autarkic period

An independent variable was also included in order to account for the effects of the autarkic period during the first phase of the regime between 1940 and 1955. This variable corresponds to the difference between the GDP per capita of the Spanish population between 1940 and 1955[18], at the provincial-level. The sign was inverted for interpretation purposes (a negative sign was included before the difference so that this variable recorded the increase in the decline of the output). As mentioned, due to "end-heuristic" theories, it is expected that this variable is not statistically significant, despite representing a source of negative outputs. This data was retrieved from the series calculated by Díez, Martinez and Tirado (2018).

[17] *Ibid.*
[18] *Ibid.*

Right Coalition 1933

In order to include the effects of the change in the electoral support for the mainstream right before and after the regime, I added a variable that corresponds to the share of seats' distribution of the moderate right, in the last general election before the year in which the Civil War began. The general election took place on the 19th of November 1933. This variable is crucial in order to isolate the changes that happened as a consequence of being exposed the regime, since it captures the pre-dictatorial distribution of votes for the moderate right in Spain. It is expected that the voting pattern for the moderate right remains unchanged to a certain extent, even after exposition to the dictatorship. In terms of availability of data, the vote share by party was not registered in any official record. Instead, it was possible to retrieve the number of seats in the Spanish Congress of Deputies by party. The moderate right ran as a coalition[19] formed before the election took place. In total, the right coalition got 197 seats distributed by all Spanish provinces. The results are available at the provincial level — the lowest level available — and were retrieved from the online archive *'Historia Electoral'*. This independent variable was calculated by dividing the number of seats attributed to the right coalition in each province, by the total number of seats (471)[20]. It therefore corresponds to the proportion of seats earned by the right coalition in the 1933 general election by province.

Land Inequality

An independent variable was included in order to account for the level of land inequality in Spain. The aim of this variable is to capture the level of dissatisfaction with the lack of a land reform during the Francoist regime — general repression —, assuming that the regions with higher levels of land inequality would suffer more from the lack of a reform, as the mentioned studies on the subject suggest. The way in which land inequality is captured follows the

[19]The coalition included the following parties: the 'Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas' (CEDA), the 'Agrarios (Minoría Agraria) independientes de derecha (A), the 'Comunión Tradicionalista (Carlista)' (CTC), the 'Renovación Española' (RE), the 'Monárquicos independientes', and the 'Partido Nacionalista Español' (PNE).

[20]Only excluding the two seats of the provinces of Ceuta (1 seat), and Melilla (1 seat).

same methodology used by Domènch and Sánchez-Cuenca (2021). Using data from Garcia-Badel (1960), following these authors methodology, I "use the percentage share of total taxable agricultural income in the municipality corresponding to owners with a taxable income above 5,000 pesetas" (Domènch and Sánchez-Cuenca 2021), to refer to "large lands". I sum the number of landowners in each province with lands that have a taxable income above 5,000 pesetas, and divide it by the total number of landowners in each province. No data is available for the Navarra province. There is also no data available for the Alava province, however, due to provincial similarities with the provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya in the Basque Country (Malefakis 1970), I assumed the value for the Alava province is the average between these two provinces.

Republican Area

Although a variable was included in order to account for provinces with high levels of land inequality, as it was already discussed, according to some authors (Domènech 2015), the Spanish Civil War was intimately related to the agrarian unrest caused by land inequality disputes. Because the effects of this repression left long-lasting marks that shaped the identities of these regions and that cannot be ignored (Thomas 2017; Ramsay and Morris 2021), this variable differs from the previous *Land Inequality* variable as it aims to capture the violence side of general repression, instead of the economic side. Repression was more violently carried out in areas demanding a land reform that would resolve the land inequality problem. In fact, while there are areas with high levels of land inequality that never experienced Civil War repression, the opposite is not true: Civil War repression was always associated to high levels of land inequality. As it shall be seen in more detail in the next Chapter 4, if in some cases the high levels of land inequality got resolved by the improvement of economic conditions and by the decrease of land dependency (Boix 2008), the repression component of this land inequality dispute is much more long-lasting and still shapes voting preferences up to today (Tur-Prats and Caicedo 2020). Because the extent of the damage committed in republican areas is only being accounted for recently (Thomas 2017; Tur-Prats and Caicedo 2020), there is not yet a systematic way to measure exactly

how much repression was carried out at the province-level. Knowing that republican areas were particularly repressed during the Spanish Civil War (Thomas 2017), this variable is represented dichotomously and switches to one if the province belongs to a republican territory by the beginning of the Spanish Civil War (Tur-Prats and Caicedo 2020).

Regime Repression

This independent variable captures the effects of particularistic regime repression during the "State of Exception" (*'Estado de Excepción'*) in Spain, enacted in January of 1969. This repression was carried out in the form of public arrests. The preamble of the decree itself (Preamble of the Law Decree 1/1969 of 24 January 1969, declaring the "State of Exception") reads[21]:

> "Minority actions, but systematically aimed at disturbing the peace of Spain and of its public order, have been taking place in recent months, clearly related to an international strategy that has reached many countries. (...) The defence of peace and progress in Spain and the exercise of the rights of Spaniards, as well as the unanimous wish of all social sectors, oblige the Government, in compliance with its duty, to put into practice effective and urgent that they cut these outbreaks and anomalies in a final way".[22]

According to some authors, such as Carrillo-Linares (2006), the "State of Exception" was in fact implemented as a consequence of the unrest caused by university students by the end of the sixties. It is worth mentioning that this kind of regime repression can be categorised as particularistic repression, mostly targeting working-class workers[23] (43,90% of all arrests), and students (39,12%), according to Carrillo-Linares (2006). This variable corresponds to the number of

[21] Direct translation. In Spanish (original): *"Acciones minoritarias, pero sistemáticamente dirigidas a turbar la paz de España y su orden público, han venido produciendose en los últimos meses, claramente en relación con una estrategia internacional que ha llegado a numerosos paises. (...) La defensa de la paz y el progresso de España y del ejercicio de los derechos de los españoles, deseo unánime de todos los sectores sociales, obligan al Gobierno, en cumplimiento de su deber, a poner en práctica medios eficaces y urgentes que corten esos brotes y anomalías de modo terminante"."*

[22] This excerpt was freely translated by me from Spanish (original) to English.

[23] *'Obreros'* in Spanish.

arrests by Spanish province during the “State of Exception” divided by the total number of arrests. The data was retrieved from an official document of the Spanish governmental institution for public security, the "General Directorate for Security" (Boletín Informativo Extraordinario 1969), that provided the statistics on number of arrests during this period.

3.5.3 Control Variables

Foreign Population 1977

The issue of immigration became salient in agendas of political parties throughout Western Europe in the mid 1970s (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2011). While many studies have established a positive relationship between the presence of immigrants and the vote for the extreme-right (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Mudde 2000; Ignazi 2003), the relationship between mainstream right vote and immigration has been comparatively less studied. Some works have shown that in the absence of extreme-right parties, the issues of immigration have been appropriated by the mainstream right (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2011), and that when extreme-right parties do exist in party systems, centre-right parties can successfully compete on issues related to immigration, limiting the success of their extremist peers (Pardos-Prado 2015). Because of this positive relationship between the mainstream right and immigration, particularly, when extreme-right parties are absent, as they are in the case of Spain, a foreign population variable at the year of the first democratic election was included. Data on the number of foreigners residing in Spain in 1977 was collected from the 1978 Spanish Statistical Yearbook. This variable was collected at the province-level and was then divided by the Spanish population in 1975. The same control variable was used for both dependent variables, due to their time proximity with the collected data.

Unemployment 1977

The unemployment rate in the year of the first democratic election was also added as a control variable. Periods characterised by high rates of unemployment are linked to an increase in voting for left-wing parties (Carlsen 2000), particularly

among the groups with lower income levels (Yong Kwon 2008). This variable corresponds to the unemployment rate in Spain, by province, on 4º trimester of 1977 as a percentage of the active population. The data was retrieved from the 1978 Spanish Statistical Yearbook. The same control variable was used for both dependent variables, due to their time proximity with the collected data.

Religion

A variable accounting for the number of practising Catholics was included due to the relationship between the mainstream-right, conservatism, and Christianity. This variable corresponds to the regional responses to the question "How do you consider yourself in religious matters?"[24] from *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)* Survey nº 1472, carried out in September 1985. This is the earliest data found with answers regarding religiosity in all regions. The answers to this question were used as an estimate of religiosity measured by the proportion of practising Catholics by region. The possible answers to this question were: 1. practising catholic; 2. non-practising catholic; 3. other religion; 4. non-believer; 5. indifferent; 6. no answer. After having removed the 51 people that did not provide an answer to this question, the sample size corresponded to 2,511 respondents. A new variable was coded, taking up the value of 1 if the answer was practising catholic, and 0 otherwise. Then, I estimated the average level of practising Catholics by region, and this was the variable used to estimate religiosity. Furthermore, because there was not regional data on the Canary Islands region, I used the (*CIS*) Survey nº 1320, carried out in July 1982, which asked exactly the same question and offered data for some, but not all, Spanish provinces. Coding the same variable, and estimating the average now at the provincial level, I retrieved the averages of the provinces of Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, that are the two provinces of the Canary Islands. Finally, I calculated the average value between these two provinces and filled in the missing regional value for the Canary Islands.

[24]Free translation from Spanish: *"¿ Como se considera vo. en materia religiosa?"*. This corresponds to the survey question nº29.

GDP Capita

The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was included as a control variable to account for the economic effects at the time of the first and second democratic elections, by each resident in Spain. In the models using the dependent variable corresponding to the vote on aligned mainstream right in the first democratic election, the value for the GDP per Capita for the same year of 1977 was included. In the models using the dependent variable corresponding to the vote on aligned mainstream right in the second democratic election, the GDP per Capita in 1979 was used. Data for both years was collected at the province-level, and was retrieved from Alcaide (2003).

Population

Finally, the natural logarithm of the number of residents in each Spanish municipality was added as a control. The data was retrieved from the online archive *'Historia Electoral'*. The number of residents in 1977 was added as a control variable for the first dependent variable, and number of residents in 1979 was added as a control variable for the second dependent variable.

3.5.4 Empirical Model

In the empirical analysis that follows, I will show that the high levels of economic growth brought about by the modernisation process that took place in Spain during the second half of the Francoist regime translates into a higher vote share in right-wing parties associated to the former regime, after transitions to democracy. The areas that experienced higher increases in the levels of GDP per capita, and therefore, in which there was a higher degree of improvement in the quality of life of the general population, saw a higher increase in the vote for these parties. This empirical finding confirms the first implication of *Hypothesis 1*. As postulated in the theoretical mechanism of this dissertation, this result confirms that the creation of positive policy outcomes — translated into popular support — produced during a dictatorship still affects the post-transitional vote in parties associated to the former regime. Furthermore, following the second implication of

the first theoretical hypothesis, I also empirically demonstrate that the experience of general repression will have a negative effect on the vote for the associated parties. Because of the small extent of particularistic repression during the Francoist regime, including its low severity of punishment and non-uncertainty of its application, this kind of repression will not reflect on a lower vote in the associated parties. As the theory suggests, this kind of repression will instead be considered a law and order benefit to the general population, which will actually help the vote share of associated parties. This implies that only the particularly repressed group suffered from the negative effects of repression.

The data is analysed at the provincial-level and constitutes data on the whole population, including all provinces in Spain[25]. For this reason, while the sample is small, it describes population data and not sample-based data, allowing for a more flexible interpretation of the p-values[26]. Due to the nature of the data — cross-sectional data — of all provinces and the [0,1] proportional structure of the dependent variable, I will use Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model with robust standard errors. Evidence mounts that there are models more efficient than ordinary least squares (OLS) when the variable of interest is continuous and restricted to the interval [0,1], since OLS assumes that the dependent variable is unbounded (Douma and Weedon 2019; Chan 2006; Ferrari and Cribari-Neto 2004; Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg 2002). Another good alternative would be the beta regression, however, the (SUR) model allows for an easier interpretation of results and has shown to produce good results when used in a context of vote shares as the output (Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg 2002). The results of the empirical analysis are presented on **Table 3.4**. *Models 1* and *2* refer to the first dependent variable, while *Models 3* and *4* refer to the second dependent variable. *Models 1* and *3* are base-models.

Looking at the first variable of interest, the *GDP Capita Variation 1955-1975 (Δ)*, it is possible to confirm the first theoretical implication of *Hypothesis 1*. The increase in the quality of life of Spaniards during the second phase of the Francoist

[25]With the exception of the province of Navarre since there was no land inequality data available for this province.

[26]Which, however, will not be undertaken in order to preserve the conservativeness of the results. The interpretation of the results will take into account the importance of the p-values first and foremost, like in any sample-based analysis.

TABLE 3.4: Determinants of Vote on the Aligned Mainstream Right in the Spanish General Elections of 1977 and 1979

	1977		1979	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
GDP Capita 1955-1975 (Δ)	0.355***	0.273***	0.221***	0.162**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
GDP Capita 1940-1955 (-Δ)	-0.157	-0.113	-0.020	0.002
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07))
Right Coalition 1933	0.047	0.093**	0.065*	0.136***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Land Inequality	-1.704***	-1.148***	-1.751***	-1.116***
	(0.47)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.26)
Republican Area	-0.127***	-0.089***	-0.133***	-0.098***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Regime Repression		0.645***		0.399*
		(0.16)		(0.23)
Foreign Population 1977		0.082**		0.095***
		(0.04)		(0.03)
Unemployment 1977		-0.002		-0.007**
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Religion		0.224**		-0.062
		(0.10)		(0.10)
GDP Capita		-0.294***		-0.287***
		(0.05)		(0.06)
Population (ln)		-0.039***		-0.031**
		(0.02)		(0.01)
Constant	0.649***	1.239***	0.613***	1.234***
	(0.04)	(0.21)	(0.03)	(0.18)
N	49	49	49	49
R^2	0.749	0.888	0.825	0.897

P-values: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.

regime (1955-1975) greatly and significantly explains the vote for the right-wing mainstream parties associated to the former regime. The provinces that experienced a higher increase in GDP per capita locally, tend to vote more for the mainstream associated parties. Also as expected, this effect is slightly smaller in 1979 than in 1977. As time passes by, due to the effects of generational replacement, it makes sense that the effect of regime policies on post-transitional voting fades away until it ultimately disappears. Looking at the second variable of interest, the change in GDP per capita during the first autarkic stage of the regime (1940-1955) does not seem to affect the vote in associated parties. As predicted, the "end-heuristic" theories render this variable as statistically insignificant.

The areas in which there was a higher concentration of votes for the moderate or mainstream right before the regime took power, in 1933, also tend to vote more for the right-wing associated parties. This variable encompasses factors exogenous to the regime that remained stable despite the action of time. Also as predicted, following the theoretical mechanism of this dissertation, the provinces that had higher levels of land inequality tend to significantly vote less for the associated parties. Similarly, the Republican areas that suffered more violence due to the civil unrest related to the problem of land inequality, also voted less for the associated parties. As postulated, general repression has a negative effect on the vote for the parties associated with the former regime. These two variables, both associated to different elements of general repression, confirm the second implication of *Hypothesis 1*. It is also interesting to note that while the "economic" aspect of general repression captured by the *Land Inequality* variable tends to lose importance over time, being its effects smaller in 1979 than in 1977, as the issue of land inequality as an economic problem becomes less salient in Spain (Boix 2008), the marks left by the violence carried out in Republican territories — that historically had higher levels of land inequality — does not so easily fade away over time (Tur-Prats and Caicedo 2020).

Looking now at particularistic repression, the arrests carried out from the late 1960s by the Francoist regime, had a positive effect on the associated parties' vote share. As suggested in the Argument Chapter of this dissertation, this result can be explained from a law and order perspective. Because the strength and

uncertainty of particularistic repression in Spain was very low, being repressed groups mostly students and working-class workers that engaged in anti-regime protests (Carrillo-Linares 2006), those who were effectively targeted by negative particularistic outputs constituted a very small number. Although for those who were arrested this particularistic repression was indeed a negative output, the number of those who benefited from the arrests necessary to control the civil unrest was in this case superior. A survey conducted by the Spanish *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)* in January of 1968 seems to confirm these expectations. When inquired about the anti-regime student protests that occurred in the last years of the regime: "Do you think that the University and university students should or should not deal with political problems within the University?", from an heterogeneous sample of 1,814 respondents, only 10% answered that Universities and university students should deal with political problems. Taking this survey into account, it is likely that the positive and significant particularistic repression variable may be associated to the perceived reinstitution of peace and public order, since in this case the number of arrests during this period was indeed quite small. If the consequences of repression had been more severe and its application had been more indiscriminate, then, it would make sense to assume that this variable would have yielded small but negative effects on the vote for the associated parties. Such an example will be explored in Chapter 5, when looking at the case of the Italian Fascist regime.

The areas with a higher proportion of foreign population also tend to vote more for the associated mainstream-right parties, specially in a context of absence of extremist-right parties, as the available literature suggests. Unemployment levels are only significant in the 1979 election but these results conform to the existing literature, in the sense that provinces with a higher rate of unemployment vote less for the associated parties. In regards to religion, while it predicts a higher vote for the associated parties in 1977, it loses its significance in 1979, probably due to factors exogenous to this analysis. Finally, provinces with a higher GDP per capita tend to vote less for the associated parties, as well as more populated areas. As it shall be approached in the next Chapter, it could be that this has to do with the fact that the effects of economic modernisation on the vote for associated

parties happens with more strength in poorer regions that still have a significant economic catch up to do, rather than in richer regions in which the modernisation effects are not so significant when looked at marginally. Hence, it is possible that due to the fact that these areas were already more developed, the modernisation process did not yield significant changes that would reflect substantially on the Francoist regime.

3.5.5 Heterogeneous Effects

In order to understand exactly the effects of positive general outputs and negative general outputs in particular areas in which these autocratic policy outputs were high and low, I ran a complementary heterogeneous effects analysis. A dichotomous variable to account for high and low levels of positive general outputs was included. This variable takes up the value of 1 when the continuous variable *GDP Capita Variation 1955-1975 (Δ)* is above its mean value for all provinces, and zero otherwise. A similar dichotomous variable was created for high and low values of land inequality. This variable takes up the value of 1 if the *Land Inequality* continuous variable is above its mean value for all provinces. In order to avoid fuzzy results, due to the small sample size and number of variables in the previous empirical analysis, the marginal effects were run on the base models of **Table 3.4**. These marginal effects include the interaction between high and low levels of positive general outputs and of negative general outputs measured by high and low land inequality; and in a second analysis, of negative general outputs measured by a dichotomous variable of the continuous variable *Republican Area*, operationalised using the same methodology. The results can be viewed on **Table 3.5**.

The results of the heterogeneous effects analysis for both elections further provide evidence to the theoretical argument. In areas where general repression is high, the vote for associated parties is lower. In this case, the negative legacy of the former regime will decrease the attractiveness of associated parties. However, it is still true that even in highly repressed areas, when positive general outputs are high, then the vote for associated parties will be higher than in areas where positive general outputs are low. In areas that did not suffer from general

TABLE 3.5: Marginal Analysis: Vote on the Aligned Mainstream Right in the Spanish General Elections of 1977 and 1979 according to General Outputs' Levels

	1977	1979
High Economic Growth * High Inequality	0.475***	0.429***
	(0.03)	(0.02)
Low Economic Growth * High Inequality	0.345***	0.351***
	(0.05)	(0.04)
High Economic Growth * Low Inequality	0.590***	0.536***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Low Economic Growth * Low Inequality	0.522***	0.526***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
N	50	50

	1977	1979
High Economic Growth * Republican Area	0.505***	0.044***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Low Economic Growth * Republican Area	0.396***	0.414***
	(0.03)	(0.02)
High Economic Growth * Not Republican Area	0.599***	0.560***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Low Economic Growth * Not Republican Area	0.564***	0.549***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	49	49

P-values: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.

repression, it is also true that where economic growth in the second half of the regime is higher, will tend to vote more for parties associated with the former regime.

The qualitative and quantitative evidence presented in this chapter substantiate the first part of the argument developed in this dissertation: former autocratic regimes benefiting from general support will not have extremism associated with the former regime if all groups benefit from general policy outputs, having mainstream associated parties instead. Despite the fact that, at the local level, some areas grew more than others — having higher levels of general outputs —, and that the existence of general repression in certain areas also reduces the extent of support for associated parties[27], because the great majority of the population still benefited from a widespread increase in wellbeing brought about by the economic growth, newly formed parties had incentives to associate themselves with the former regime. Most importantly, in order to exploit this positive legacy, these parties became mainstream as a response to the widespread general support created during the regime. The existence of general support means that new-coming parties associated with the former autocracy would electorally gain by appealing to the centre in order to capture the votes from the great majority of the population that indeed benefited from general outputs during the dictatorship. This majority of the population would be inclined to vote in favour of the continuation of those benefits.

In the **Chapter 4** of this dissertation, I will complement these findings with a qualitative analysis of selected Spanish regions that enable me to illustrate the isolated effects of different positive and negative outputs created during the autocratic regime. In this complementary analysis, I will confirm the empirical results presented in this chapter, further corroborating the expectations of the theoretical argument. In the following chapter, I will also highlight how different combinations of outputs interact with time effects in the cases selected, in order to demonstrate for how long the policies enacted during the Francoist regime can affect the post-transitional vote in associated parties.

[27] Being these, respectively, the first and second theoretical implications of the first hypothesis.

Chapter 4

General Support and Mainstream Parties — A Qualitative Approach

The aim of this chapter is to provide qualitative evidence that the modernisation process that occurred in Spain during the second phase of the Francoist dictatorship was able to improve the quality of life of the general population, producing higher levels of support for parties associated to the former regime after transitions to democracy (implication *i.* of *H1*). I will also highlight the ways in which associated parties appealed to the general population through the instrumentalisation of this legacy of general outputs. Furthermore, I will show that both components of general repression: the violence and economic effects of land inequality — to a lesser extent — contribute to a decrease in the vote for associated right parties (implication *ii.* of *H1*). Still regarding negative outputs, as shown in Chapter 3, particularistic repression had a limited importance in most Spanish regions. However, in Catalonia and Madrid, this kind of repression had a special prevalence not only during the last years of the regime (Boletín Informativo Extraordinario 1969), but also during the early days of the dictatorship. I will lastly discuss the effects of particularistic repression in these regions, and the importance of their previous levels of development[1].

In order to carry out this qualitative analysis, I will focus on regions that correspond to archetypical cases of general support, general repression — both in terms of land inequality levels and violence associated to land struggles —, and finally, particularistic repression. Each of the selected cases correspond to the best

[1] Pre-Franco levels of economic development.

examples of regions in Spain that exclusively display each of these characteristics. This design follows the "pure single-observation" approach by King, Keohane and Verba (1994), as I attempt to select a single most relevant observation for all the relevant variables. The aim of this analysis is to qualitatively evaluate how the population of each region electorally reacts to the associated parties, after transitions to democracy, how the associated parties appeal to the electorate in each of these regions, and the time-effects associated to the length of this legacy.

4.1 Case Selection

In the first case (*A*), I will be looking at what happens, in terms of post-transitional electoral results, when a region experiences high levels of economic growth, and low levels of general repression. This first analysis will allow me to untangle the effects of economic modernisation — general outputs — when all negative outputs are low. Galicia is the Spanish region that experienced the lowest levels of land inequality in the whole country, while registering high levels of economic growth during the second half of the regime[2], and low levels of violence related to land struggles[3]. Second, I will look at cases that have high levels of growth but also high levels of land inequality, the economic aspect of general repression (*B*). This will allow me to test the effect of land inequality on growth without considering the violent component of general repression. The Canary Islands (and also the Balearic Islands) are one of the only regions in which land inequality levels are high while violence is low[4]. Third, I will focus on cases in which the violent component of general repression was high (*C*). Because in Spain this violence is a consequence of pro-land redistribution movements[5] that were inevitably linked to high levels of land inequality, no single Spanish region

[2]High and low levels of the variables were calculated based on the independent variables used in the empirical analysis of Chapter 3. Regions with high levels of economic growth are those for which the GDP Capita Variation 1955-1975 (Δ) is above the mean level for all regions. Regions with high levels of land inequality are similarly those for which the Land Inequality variable is above the mean level for all regions. Regions with high levels of violence related to land struggles are considered to be those belonging to the Republican areas.

[3]In addition to not belonging to a Republican area, according to Tur-Prats and Caicedo (2020) that measure violence levels in Spain by counting the number of mass graves resulting from the Spanish Civil War, Galicia has indeed very low levels of violence.

[4]Aragon is also such an example that behaves similarly to these regions in terms of characteristics and in terms of electoral outcomes.

[5]Also associated to the Spanish Civil War.

displays high levels of the violent component of general repression and low levels of its economic component[6]. In this context, I will also analyse the unique case of Extremadura. This case is particularly interesting considering that this region is only composed by two provinces that behave very differently: Cáceres in the North, and Badajoz in the South. Both provinces had relatively high levels of growth[7] and land inequality[8]. However, while Cáceres had low levels of violence related to land struggles, Badajoz had high levels of violence (Tur-Prats and Caicedo 2020). Therefore, while Cáceres belongs to the cases in group (*B*), Badajoz belongs to cases in group (*C*). The case of Extremadura allows the unique comparison between two provinces that belong to two different quadrants of characteristics, while keeping regional effects constant. Also in group (*C*) is Andalusia, one of the regions that have historically suffered the most at the hands of land inequality and violence related to land struggles. For this reason, this region is a key example of general repression — and consequently, of positive particularistic outputs. Finally, I will analyse the two Spanish regions with the highest levels of particularistic repression: Catalonia and Madrid (*D*). The case selection is portrayed in **Table 4.1**.

TABLE 4.1: Policy Outputs and the Case of Spain

	General Outputs	**Particularistic Outputs**
Positive Outputs	A: Galicia	Andalusia
Negative Outputs	B: Canary Islands, Extremadura (Cáceres)	D: Catalonia, Madrid
	C: Andalusia, Extremadura (Badajoz)	

Before jumping into the analysis, I would like to highlight an additional important point. It has been suggested in previous chapters that after transitions to democracy, rational voters would seek to vote for parties that promise to re-establish the same kinds of benefits they lost with the change of political system, or the continuation of policies that would allow them to continue to

[6] While keeping economic growth at high levels.

[7] It is important to note that the growth experienced by these two provinces is lower than the growth experienced in the provinces belonging to the Canary Islands region. This difference between different levels of positive general outputs between these two cases will allow the qualitative analysis of the first theoretical implication of the first hypothesis.

[8] On the latter, see Malefakis (1970: 30).

benefit from the same level of welfare. However, due to the action of the passage of time, it makes sense to think that the effects of autocratic inheritance and baggage are progressively lost, as their effects fade away due to the replacement of the people that lived through the dictatorship by younger generations. Furthermore, as time goes by, it similarly makes sense that electors will retrospectively focus on more recent democratic performance than on policy outputs distributed during an autocracy (Kiewiet 1983; Achen and Bartels 2004). This means that the effects of autocratic legacies on post-transitional voting will be finite time-wise, only lasting for a limited period of time. Taking this into account, at the end of each case, I will also show the effects of the passage of time on the vote for associated parties. Ultimately, I will conclude that regions that experienced a higher increase in their quality of life due to the modernisation of the Spanish economy — either in the industrial and services sectors of activity — will keep their positive legacy for longer than regions that also experienced growth but also had significant levels of repression. Or in other words, higher levels of general support subsist for longer.

4.2 A. Galicia

Located in the Northwestern coast of Spain, the region of Galicia, one of the poorest regions in Spain in 1959, registered the one of the fastest GDP per capita growth rates between 1960 and 1975 (Domínguez Martín 2002; Townson 2007). The four Galician provinces — La Coruña and Pontevedra (by the coastline) and Lugo and Ourense (in the interior) — were not highly industrialised by the mid-20th century (Parejo 2001) and, in fact, constituted one of the country's "most backward areas" (O'Flanagan 1978; Cuadrado-Roura 2010). In order to tackle this systemic underdevelopment of Galicia and other similarly lagging regions, the regime introduced in 1964–1967, the First Development Plan, a regional development plan aiming at creating "polos de desarrollo" (development poles) in the most underdeveloped areas of the country with the aim of "increasing the standard of living in regions or areas with low per capita income" (Cuadrado-Roura, 2010). These industrial development plans were part of the

group of policies implemented by the regime that helped foster economic growth as an outcome.

The development plan was accomplished through different channels. First, it operated through poles that aimed at promoting industrial development; second, through the distribution of incentives' programmes to local corporations aiming at fostering business activity; third, through the promotion of irrigation policies and concentration of land aimed at increasing agricultural production; and finally, through the stimulation of domestic immigration. Two development poles were created in Galicia: one in La Coruña and another one in Vigo (Pontevedra). Townson (2007) explains that the poles that were able to attract investment in the automobile sector, such as the case of Vigo, underwent "remarkable" and "lasting" development changes. Furthermore, according to Colino Suerias (1984), since the late 1960s, Lugo and La Coruña have entered the group of provinces that "made a greater effort in modernisation". This modernisation of Galicia corresponded to a double phenomenon. On the one hand, the primary sector shrunk in size, as traditional rural means of production were replaced by modern and industrial machinery (Colino Suerias 1984; Alonso Álvarez 2010). On the other hand, this meant that workers moved from the agricultural to the industrial and services sector (Alonso Álvarez 2010). De la Torre and García-Zúñiga (2014) establish a "very powerful path dependence" between the poles policy and the complete restructuring of "territorial distribution of Spanish industry, thanks to direct public intervention, incentives for the growth poles and foreign investment".

Although some authors (such as Cuadrado Roura 2010) argue that the Galician development poles did not fare as well as the regions that were already highly industrialised, such as Catalonia, Madrid or the Basque Country, these same authors also admit that the regional pole policy produced significant results in poorer areas, in the sense that the expansion of the Spanish economy significantly "generated wealth, jobs, and a significant growth of the production activity" (Cuadrado-Roura 2010). In fact, activity levels in Galicia were among the highest in Spain and unemployment between 1964 and 1991 only corresponded to half of the country's average (Keating 2000). Galicia was the Spanish region in which the real disposable family income grew the most between 1960 and 1975, being way

above the country's growth average (Alcaide 2003). The areas in which the modernisation of the Galician economy was felt with more intensity also experienced an increase in the quality of life, and attracted internal within-regional migration (Rodríguez 1997; Cardesin Diaz 2006; Balsa-Barreiro and Landsperger 2012). According to evidence drawn from a newspaper article published in 1977, not only had "rural Galicia developed itself considerably in the latest decades", but also, "the people from the villages have gone to the towns, which have prospered" (Marsal 24 September. 1977, 4).

According to a survey conducted in January of 1968 by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)*, Galicia and the Spanish Islands were by far the regions[9] that most favoured government policies associated to economic growth — in this case, the question was related to the devaluation of the peseta (Serrano, Gadea, and Sabaté 2017). When asked if the government's devaluation of the Spanish currency was a good or a bad thing, in the region of Galicia (aggregated with the region of Asturias), 51% of the respondents agreed that the policy was a good thing. In the Islands — as it shall be discussed later — the answer to this question was also overwhelmingly positive: 54% of respondents also gave a positive answer. On average, for comparison purposes, only 37% of respondents agreed that the devaluation was good. It makes sense that the regions that benefited the most from the economic growth policies were the ones that reacted more positively towards them, considering that the respondents who reacted positively were aware that the policy's objective was to stimulate the national economy (Question 7.a. of the survey). More interesting is the answer to a question specific to the economic performance as a result of the implementation of the Development Plans in the mid 1950s: "If you had to rate the results of the Development Plan that is now coming to an end, how would you rate them?". By descending order, the regions that most overwhelmingly classified the results as good or very good, were: Eastern Andalucia and Extremadura, Western Andalucia, Galicia (and Asturias), and the Islands, followed by the six remaining regions included in the survey with lower scores. The aforementioned

[9] In this survey Spanish regions were divided as follows (original language): 1. Andalucia Oriental; 2. Andalucia Ocidental y Extremadura; 3. Levante; 4. Cataluña; 5. Aragonesa; 6. Vasco-Navarra; 7. Castellano-Leonesa; 8. Asturiano-Galaica; 9. Centro (Anillo de Madrid); 10. Insular.

high-scoring regions located themselves above the country average. The respondents answered in a similar way when asked: "Do you think that the current situation of the Spanish economy is due to the Development Plan, or that, on the contrary, it would have been more or less the same without the Plan?". By descending order, the regions with the highest proportion of responses saying that it was due to the Development Plan were: Eastern Andalucia and Extremadura, the Islands, and Galicia (and Asturias), followed by the seven remaining regions included in the survey with lower scores. The positive views of the population regarding the economic growth policy outcomes in Eastern Andalusia (where the development pole of Huelva is located) and Extremadura will be thoroughly analysed in the following sections of this article.

Placing the results of this survey into context, the unmatched rates of economic growth experienced in Galicia during the second half of the Francoist regime produced a public discourse related to this successful development and to the increase in the quality of life of Galicians. According to Prada Rodríguez (2017): "In the best years of Franco's development period, expressions such as 'healthy regionalism, 'well understood regionalism' or 'practical regionalism' appeared more and more frequently in the media." This discourse was later recycled by the newly formed democratic elites in order to attract support in Galicia:

> "A part of the political class of the Regime did not take long to realise that the regionalist discourse could also offer an interesting way of recycling for those who occupied positions of power or authority and aspired to maintain or increase them in the new situation that would necessarily take place with the physical decline of the Caudillo." (Prada Rodríguez, 2017: 104[10])

According to the political elites, this "new regionalism" should serve to achieve "a greater efficiency in the establishment of living conditions and the provision of services demanded by the times", as well as a more "authentic and profound democratic game". This discourse of continuity used in Galicia to attract votes after transitions to democracy, oriented towards the further development of

[10] All citations from this author correspond to free translations from Spanish.

the region, yielded results. The vote for the right-wing parties associated to the former regime was very high in all provinces of this region[11]. In fact, Galicia was the region in which the vote for the associated parties was the highest, followed the Canary Islands and Castile and Leon[12]. The success of the "regional development" discourse was successful at appealing to the voters, that according to Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1988), had in the whole country been "converted to consumerism" under the Francoist regime, and in Townson's (2007) words, "were more concerned with their personal economic welfare" than with the ambivalent payoffs of political militancy. Taking this into account, it is therefore not surprising that the continuity of the old political elites into the new democratic system in Galicia, belonging to two associated right parties — UCD and AP — was extremely high (Marquez Cruz 1993). In an article from the Galician newspaper *La Voz de Galicia* (Quiroga 25 June. 1977, 35), that commented the first democratic electoral results, the author suggested that the success of the UCD in 1977 in Galicia had to do with the fact that during the modernisation period, the rural population in Galicia became used to certain material benefits. The article contends that because the rural population associated the distribution of those benefits to the bureaucrats that actually distributed them, in order to preserve those benefits, the rural population voted for the same people in a new democratic context. There is a substantial body of qualitative evidence that the victory of UCD in Galicia, in the first democratic election of 1977, had to do with the fact that while the this associated party represented the continuation of economic development in Galicia, particularly of industrialisation, the opposition posed itself as a brake for this development (Caparros 19 June. 1977, 24-25). Even the leader of the socialist party, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), made an association between the past economic policies carried out in Spain and the UCD

[11] At this point, it is necessary to take into account that Galicia was the birthplace of Franco, which could have been associated to this region's bend towards the right. However, an important consideration is that several newspapers from 1977 suggest that the electoral results in Galicia were uncertain (Caparrós 1 May. 1977, 20), particularly in the rural areas (Freijanes 13 June. 1977, 10), and the victory of the mainstream right was surprising (Caparros 19 June. 1977, 24-25; Marsal 24 September. 1977, 4). Furthermore, according to this anecdotal evidence, the fact that Franco was born in Galicia was not a factor ever taken into account when making electoral predictions regarding the first General Election of 1977 in that region. Taking this into account, it is relatively safe to assume that the importance of this fact for the electoral outcomes is limited.

[12] Also two regions with very high levels of growth during this period.


and AP. In a speech in Galicia, a few weeks before the first Spanish General Election, Felipe González claimed that the "financial oligarchies" prevalent in the region "turned Galicia into a colony". The leader of the PSOE also stated that: "our economy is bankrupt, but the responsibility lies with the right-wing parties, that have been exercising the power" (Pueblo 28 May. 1977, 11), referring to the period of the autocracy, before transitions to democracy. Considering the crushing victory of the right in the first democratic elections in this region, it seems like Galicians still preferred the continuity of a 'right-wing rule', now in its democratic form. The linkages between the associated parties in Galicia and the Francoist regime also seemed to be very clear. According to a newspaper chronicle by Marsal (24 September. 1977, 4), on the day of the election, there were still voters who still asked: "who should we vote for, Franco or "the others?". While "Franco" was a reference to the UCD and the AP, "the others" were a reference to the left-wing and regionalist parties.

This was also a region characterised by low levels of general repression both during the Spanish Civil War and aftermath (Tur-Prats and Caicedo 2020), and even during the turbulent late 1960s (Boletín Informativo Extraordinario 1969). The low levels of violence and Galicia's low levels of land inequality (Garcia-Badel 1960; Malefakis 1970) did not reflect themselves into a lower vote for the associated parties in Galicia due to their limited prevalence.

Lastly, I draw attention to **Figure 4.1** that compares the vote share for the associated parties in Galicia and in Spain (country's average) from the first democratic election in 1977 until the Spanish General Election of 2011[13]. It is possible to observe that, in this region, the positive general outputs created during the Francoist regime paired with low negative outputs created a stronghold for the mainstream right in Galicia that lasted for at least 30 years after the first free Spanish General Election of 1977.

[13]In the democratic elections of 1977, 1979 1982 the relevant vote shares are those of AP and UCD. In the 1986 election the UCD disappeared from the political scene, and for this reason only the votes of the AP were included. In the 1989 election the AP changed its name to the Popular Party (PP). After this election up to the 2011 election only the vote share of PP was included.

FIGURE 4.1: Vote Share in Associated Parties in Galicia since Democratisation



4.3 B. Canary Islands and Extremadura (Cáceres)

In this second group of cases, I will focus on the region of the Canary Islands and in Extremadura's province of Cáceres, that combined high levels of economic growth with high levels of land inequality. While it has been shown that economic growth was linked to a higher vote in associated parties, these cases will shed light on what happens if high levels of land inequality are introduced, while keeping the violent aspect of general repression at a low level. I will start by analysing the Canary Islands, moving on to Extremadura afterwards.

4.3.1 Canary Islands

During the second half of the Spanish dictatorship, the Canary Islands[14] saw their tourism sector soar. In only over ten years, the number of tourists grew from 70 thousand in 1960, to over 2 million in 1970 (Castro et al. 2015; Márquez Quevedo 2018). The Canary Islands was the second region that grew the most when looking at the services sector — being topped only by the Balearic Islands that experienced a very similar tourism boom during this period. Consequentially, from 1950 to 1975, the the real disposable income of Canary Islands' families grew way above the Spanish average (Alcaide 2003). Although tourism was arguably the most important source of economic growth in this region, the Canary Islands were also inserted into a broader regional development plan from the mid-1960s. Following Cuadrado-Roura (2010), "the specific Plan for the Canary Islands focused on the agrarian sector, tourism and fishing and included different infrastructure improvements which were less specifically defined". In fact, with the Stabilisation Plan and investments in tourism, Franco's technocracy attempted to bridge the modernisation of this region to a "consumer society that created depoliticised middle classes", that had been able to improve their quality of life, since the "dictatorship favoured the material development of the country to legitimise itself", argues Márquez Quevedo (2018), in an article about the economic development of the Canary Islands during the second Francoism. In the aforementioned survey from the *CIS*, respondents from the Canary Islands (as well as from the Balearic Islands, a region that had a similar development pattern during the late Francoism and in the electoral results post-transition), systematically provided answers in favour of the Development Plans, and its contribution to the development of the economy, as well as to the economic policies designed in the late-Francoist period. A recent article from the Canaries' newspaper *Canarias Ahora* remembers how the region's coastal towns began to

[14] And also in the Balearic Islands that although is not one of the cases included in this qualitative analysis, also displayed an extremely high vote for the associated parties. The Balearic Islands were not included because of their similarity with the Canary Islands (Prados de la Escosura 2017). Also in the Balearic Islands there was a link between the UCD and the continuation of Francoism. When commenting the electoral results of the first democratic election, Josep Meliá, the leader of the opposition party Unió Autonomista that suffered a big electoral loss, claimed that: "we will have a younger Franco in Suárez [the leader of UCD]" (Rodríguez 17 June. 1977, 20).

change in the 1960s when the "tourist boom" took place and the Canary Islands saw an "explosion of new visitors". This tourist boom was linked to an "improvement in the quality of life, the decline of the Franco dictatorship and the expansion of charter flights" (Estévez 5 October. 2021).

Thanks to the material development that happened in this region, similarly to what had happened in Galicia, the regime was also successful in perpetuating its presence in the Canary Islands. After transitions to democracy, the vote in the associated parties was also extremely high in the two economically successful provinces of Las Palmas and Santa Cruz de Tenerife. According to Utrera (1996), the results of the first election in the Canary Islands were not surprising. The victory from the UCD represented a continuity, while the left-wing parties represented a rupture which was not favourably viewed by the electorate.


However, unlike Galicia, the Canary Islands displayed high levels of land inequality in Las Palmas, and medium levels in Tenerife (Garcia-Badel 1960; Malefakis 1970)[15]. As described by Guerra Palmero (2007), ownership and exploitation of land in the Canary Islands was characterised by "the great inequality in the distribution of property, motivated by the concentration of ownership in a few hands, which as a counterpart presents a large volume of small land-owners". It is interesting to notice that the high to medium levels of land inequality in this region had no implication on the high vote for the associated parties in the first democratic elections. A plausible explanation for this phenomenon advanced in the literature, is that it is possible that economic growth, together with a decrease in inequality and virtual suppression of absolute poverty experienced after the mid 1950s, lead to social consensus and stability (Prados de la Escosura 2008). This also makes sense considering that the percentage of the population reliant on agriculture suffered a significant decrease with the modernisation and tertiarisation of the Spanish economy. In the Canary Islands, from 1955 to 1975, the percentage of the active population working in agriculture decreased by 55.7%, whereas the active population working in industry and in the services sector, respectively increased 28.2% and 147.4%

[15]The levels of Civil War and 1960s repression was also low in this region, similarly to what happened in Galicia (Boletín Informativo Extraordinario 1969; Tur-Prats and Caicedo 2020).

(Bosque Maurel 1979). The low level of unemployment in the Canary Islands — unlike what happened in Andalusia, for example — probably contributed to the settling of the agrarian question in the second half of the dictatorship.

Another relevant final observation is that in the Canary Islands, as **Figure 4.2** illustrates, the effects of the creation of positive general benefits on the associated parties' vote share lasted for approximately 7 years. This effect is shorter than the one experienced in Galicia, possibly having to do with the decrease in the importance of the agricultural sector in this region, as it was previously explained. The strong electoral results of the associated parties in the first democratic elections are enough however, to give these parties an important head start in terms of their electoral visibility in a newly formed democratic system (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988).

FIGURE 4.2: Vote Share in Associated Parties in the Canary Islands since Democratisation



4.3.2 Extremadura (Cáceres)

Like Galicia, Extremadura corresponds to one of the poorest regions in Spain. In a similar fashion, I suggest that the modernisation of Extremadura's economy — the increase in size of the industrial and mainly, the services sector, and decrease on agricultural dependence — produced significant structural changes that led to a significantly better quality of life in this region. According to an article by the newspaper *La Voz de Galicia*, in comparison to Galicia, Extremadura was more developed in terms of agrarian modernisation, with agrarian workers being more likely to adopt the latest technologies, which had a "significant impact" on productivity (*La Voz de Galicia* 17 July. 1965, 21). As suggested by Pérez Rubio (2017), after the 1950s, Extremadura underwent a process of "disintegration of the rural population". Rural communities were "emptied", according to this author, by a double whammy of high immigration fluxes to Europe, Latin America and other Spanish big cities (like Madrid or Catalonia), and the rural exodus associated to the tertiarisation of the economy. However, according to Prados de la Escosura (2006), "migration to towns and cities usually represent an improvement in standards of living both for those who leave and for those who stay in rural areas". The process of tertiarisation of the economy "propitiated social mobility of a tertiary nature" and a better quality of life. The percentage of the active population working in the agricultural sector decreased massively by 49% between 1955 and 1975, whereas the services sector increased by 69.8%. The shrinking of the agricultural sector was also caused by an increase of jobs in public administration, due to a growing process of bureaucratisation (Barrientos Alfageme 1980). Despite the challenges of the tertiarisation of the economy, the real disposable income of families in Extremadura grew way above the country's average between 1960 and 1975, particularly in Cáceres, although Badajoz also significantly topped Spain's average (Alcaide 2003).

According to the survey carried out in January of 1968 by the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, Extremadura (coupled with Eastern Andalusia) was the Spanish region that answered more favourably regarding the performance of the Development Plans implemented by the regime. If on average, only 56.2% of

respondents of all regions thought the results of the plan were good or very good, Extremadura (and Eastern Andalusia) scored the highest in all regions: 77% of respondents thought the results had been good or very good. Respondents in Extremadura also scored the highest, when compared to all the Spanish regions, when asked if the Development Plans contributed to the current (positive) state of the economy. While it is true that the development pole of Huelva was located in Eastern Andalusia, that was accounted together with Extremadura in the survey, the proportion of respondents from Extremadura could have driven the average down if they were not satisfied with the Development Plans — which did not happen.

While the economic modernisation process happened in both of Extremadura's provinces, the province of Cáceres has a similar pattern to Galicia and the Canary Islands: economic growth, medium to high levels of land inequality, and low levels of violence. The results after transitions to democracy were also similar: in Cáceres there was a very high vote for right-wing associated parties. In Badajoz, however, the vote for the associated parties were not as high as in these three other cases, having these parties achieved only medium levels of vote share when compared to the rest of all other Spanish provinces. In an article from the Spanish newspaper *Diario 16*, in a subsection named "Cáceres, rightist" the author reports that a local newspaper from Cáceres only featured "publicity from the parties of the centre and of the right". In the province, it was said that such newspaper had "refused to include advertisements for left-wing political parties" (*Diario 16* 2 June. 1977, 21). In another article, from the Spanish newspaper *Informaciones*, it was written that during the electoral campaign for the first democratic election in 1977 in Extremadura, the Alianza Popular, the most conservative of the associated parties, accused the other associated party — the UCD — of "having made their [electoral] program four days ago" and of having "copying it" from them. The AP candidate also remarked that: "what differentiates us from the Center is that we are not ashamed from the past" (García Moreno 13 June. 1977, 10). While this strategy was successful in Cáceres, in which the AP had a very high electoral result, in Badajoz the same did not occur. The vote for this associated party in the southern Extremadura province was very shy, having the UCD been more

successful in this province, although less successful than in Cáceres.

4.4 C. Extremadura (Badajoz) and Andalusia

4.4.1 Extremadura (Badajoz)

A possible explanation for the lower associated parties' vote share in Badajoz than in the other cases analysed so far in this chapter, is that if the other cases experienced very low levels of violence[16], Badajoz experienced higher levels of violence. According to Tur-Prats and Ciacedo (2020) while during the Spanish Civil War the province of Cáceres belonged to the Nationalist faction, a great portion of the province of Badajoz actually belonged to the Republican faction, being subsequently occupied — from September 1936 to October 1937 — by the Nationalists led by Franco, with the violence that this occupation encompassed. Being this a province that simultaneously sustained medium-high levels of violence, and high levels of land inequality, it is difficult to dissociate the two considering that violence was the result of civil unrest, and the major cause of civil unrest in Spain, particularly until the 1950s was land inequality. Therefore, unlike the Canary Islands, that also experienced high to medium levels of land inequality but no violence, in Badajoz it is reasonable to assume that the experience of violence, inevitably linked to its high levels of land inequality, is the likely explanation for the lower post-transitional vote in associated parties in this province. Nevertheless, Badajoz's vote on the associated parties middle-table when compared with the rest of other Spanish provinces.

Considering this example, it could be suggested the economic aspect of general repression alone, without the violence aspect, does not yield the same effects as the combination of the two. While the former tends to get eased by the high rates of economic growth brought about by the modernisation process, that decrease the importance of land inequality problems, as land dependency is reduced (Pérez Rubio 2017), the latter penetrates deeper within the social fabric, that is not so easily erased by economic growth alone. Boix (2008) has made such an argument by claiming that the "rapid and massive economic growth" that

[16] Either during the Civil War and in the early years of the regime.

happened in Spain during this period, "dissolved most of the social tensions that had blocked the introduction of democracy in the past." He contended that:


> "The rapid economic transformation of Spain, which revolved around industrialisation and urbanisation, had deflated past conflicts around the distribution of land. The extension of literacy and the adoption of advanced industrial technologies (with the correlated increase in productivity and incomes) had generated a strong middle class beyond the existing bourgeois strata in Catalonia and the Basque country. The very experience of sustained growth defused social conflict with the credible promise of higher incomes and more social mobility in the future." (Boix 2008: 230)

Figure 4.3 highlights the effects of the passage of time on vote share of the associated parties since the first General democratic election in Extremadura. According to the data series collected by Díez, Martinez and Tirado (2018), when compared to the Canary Islands[17], the province of Cáceres grew much less than the provinces belonging to that region[18]. Therefore, following the first theoretical implication of the first hypothesis, it makes sense that the extent of general support created was also smaller. These results are reflected on **Figure 4.3** — in Extremadura, the effects of general support on the vote for the associated parties are smaller and only last for two democratic elections. In Cáceres, the province with low levels of the violent aspect of general repression, the vote for the associated parties is much higher than in Badajoz — although for a short period of time —, which makes sense, considering that higher levels of negative outputs reduce the level of support (second theoretical implication of *H1*). Upon the exposure to higher levels of general repression, the effects of the positive outputs become more reduced.

[17] The main independent variables GDP Capita Variation (Δ) during the "economic miracle" and GDP Capita Variation (Δ) during the autarkic period used in the empirical analysis of Chapter 3 were constructed using these data series.

[18] Provinces were considered individually in order to make this comparison. Cáceres grew much less than Las Palmas and than Tenerife, individually.

FIGURE 4.3: Vote Share in Associated Parties in Extremadura since Democratisation



4.4.2 Andalusia

Andalusia is a region that has historically been deeply marked by civil unrest related to land inequality (Entrena 2001; Beltrán Tapia et al. 2021), and by violence during the Civil War and aftermath (Cobo Romero, Arco Blanco and Ortega Lópes 2011). By the time of Franco's death, it was along with Extremadura, and Galicia, one of the poorest regions in Spain (Townson 2007). Due to the social structure similarities between Andalusia and Extremadura, when the modernisation process took place in Spain in the mid 1950s, both regions followed a very similar trajectory. Being also a predominantly agrarian region, 56.69% of Andalusia's active population worked in agriculture in 1955. Due to the impact of industrialisation and tertiarisation processes, this figure was reduced to 30.41% by 1975, which constitutes a decrease of almost 50% (Bosque Maurel 1979). The services sector on the other hand grew almost 80% between this period. The industrial sector was also particularly important in certain provinces of Andalusia. The industrial pole of Huelva, considered by some authors as one of the most successful development poles created during the second half of the

regime (Cuadrado Roura 2010), was particularly relevant to the industrial development of the region, unlike the pole of Sevilla that was considered unsuccessful. The first interesting comparison in Andalusia is between these two provinces. While both experienced high levels of land inequality and violence, after transitions to democracy, Huelva is the Andalusian province with the highest vote share in right-wing associated parties in the first democratic elections[19]. This is probably due to the fact that the industrial pole was successful in creating positive general outputs though increases in the quality of life of the citizens of this province. According to articles published in Spanish newspapers in 1964, upon the creation of the industrial pole in Huelva, the population reacted with "popular demonstrations of jubilance ... and numerous telegrams of gratitude have been sent to the Head of State [Franco], the Vice President of the Government, the Minister Undersecretary of the Presidency of the Government and other personalities, by the governors civilians and other authorities" of the province (*ABC* 26 January. 1964 61-62). Upon a visit from Gregorio López-Bravo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Laureano López Rodó, the Minister for Development Planning[20] to the province of Huelva, in another article it is reported that:

> "The people of Huelva have today expressed their gratitude to the Caudillo and the Government for the creation in this capital of one of the two Poles for the Promotion of the Economic and Social Development Plan. At one in the afternoon, the large crowd gathered in front of the Civil Government building gave a warm welcome to Messrs. Lopes Bravo and Lopes Rodó, who had just arrived in our city." (Mora 25 February. 1964, 43).

Taking the aforementioned *CIS* survey into account, as already mentioned, respondents from Eastern Andalusia, where Huelva is located, and Extremadura, were the ones viewing the Development Plans more favourably, and the ones that considered that they had the most positive impact on the economy. If Huelva is an

[19] This was tested for the first two democratic elections. Time effects will be explored in the last section of this Chapter.

[20] Both Franco's ministers later integrated the party AP.

extraordinary case in Andalusia, due to the success of its industrial pole, Sevilla, the other province in which an industrial development pole was created, was not so successful[21]. The lack of success of this pole was reflected on much lower levels of economic growth, and a much lower post-transitional vote in the associated parties in this province.

Another interesting case in Andalusia is the province of Almeria. When compared to the remaining provinces in the region, this province had — by far — the highest increase in agriculture production output between 1960 and 1975 (Alcaide 2003), due to the modernisation of the sector that also occurred in this region (Groves *et al.* 2017). This province – along with Huelva – had the highest rates of economic growth in Andalusia between 1955 and 1975. Not only the newspapers at the time, but even in articles published after transitions to democracy, referred to this steep increase in agricultural output as the "Almeria's agricultural miracle" (Angulo and González 21 May. 1982 16-17). In an article denominated "Franco receives the gratitude of the people of Almeria for the transformation of forty thousand thirsty hectares into irrigated land" (*ABC* 2 May. 1961, 5, 31-33), the Spanish newspaper *ABC* describes the great enthusiasm, jubilation, and "patriotic frenzy", with which the people of Almeria received the Caudillo upon his visit to the province:

> "In this visit of Franco, the enthusiasm, faith and unwavering support for the person and work of the Head of State have had resonances of singular proportions. In his tour of the province, and in the capital itself, the people waited for him for hours and hours on the road and on the sidewalks without a hint of fatigue and with cheers on their lips. Applause and acclamations have marked his passage through the villages, and through his stay in Almeria. The first stop was Huércal-Overa, where bows and garlands, flags and hangings adorned the road and the buildings that line both sides of it. And, further on, seven kilometres away, in the region of Salvador, thousands of people from the town of Almanzora had gathered. The jubilation and the shouts of the peasant families acquired the character of patriotic frenzy.

[21] Both provinces had high levels of land inequality and violence.

> Large dry land extensions, with the chastening of their infertility for centuries, have become irrigated. Today they are fertilised by wide, murmuring irrigation ditches; eight wells with a flow of more than 600 litres per second open their mouths to the insatiable thirst of the region. Abundant water, where it was never thought there could be ... in Almería, the cry was the same: 'Franco, Franco, Franco!' Applause and acclamations of affection and veneration punctuated the slow march of the Caudillo through the narrow area left free by men and women of all social classes ... the public has uninterruptedly projected its deep and fervent devotion to the Caudillo." (ABC 2 May. 1961, 5, 31-33).

But this province has another distinctive characteristic. Almeria was the only province in Andalusia that had low levels of violence and low levels of land inequality. According to the theory developed in this dissertation, when economic growth is high and the two elements of general repression are low, it makes sense that the vote for parties associated with the former regime are also high. This reasoning explains exactly why the vote share of the associated parties in Almeria was the highest in the whole Andalusia[22].

Similarly to what happened in Extremadura, however, the modernisation and mechanisation of the agrarian sector in Andalusia also created new social issues. Groves et al. (2017) explain that:

> "The tertiary sector continued to grow in relative terms, but its capacity to generate employment was not sufficient to absorb a growing active population looking for work. The immediate consequence was a considerable increase in unemployment in agriculture. ... The regions of Andalusia and Extremadura, where the majority of agrarian assets were concentrated, were worst hit. Agrarian unemployment became a major problem." (Groves et al., 2017: 101)

[22] Of course that it is important to note that the low levels of land inequality and violence in this province have to be looked at from the region's perspective. A low value of these outputs in Andalusia would not mean the same as a low value of these outputs in regions with no violence at all, or for example, with a strong historical presence of the right.

In fact, in 1975, the unemployment rate in Andalusia was 13.54%, a number way above the country's average of 5.57% (Bosque Maurel 1979). These high levels of unemployment in the region, particularly agrarian unemployment, are flagged by newspapers even after democratisation, as one of the most important problems of Andalusia (Sáez 25 April. 1982, 34-36), being Huelva and Almeria the two provinces regarded with the lowest levels of unemployment in 1975. In order to tackle the high rates of rural unemployment and the general problem of those left behind by the industrialisation and tertiarisation of the Spanish economy, the governing associated party UCD relied heavily on the distribution of agrarian subsidies in Andalusia that were first introduced during Francoist regime (Watson 2015; Groves *et al.* 2017). Articles from the Spanish newspaper *ABC* (*ABC* 1 May. 1981) and *El País* (Ballestero 6 August. 1980) confirm the importance of agrarian subsidies and of the '*empleo communitario*' for the survival of the unemployed rural population. Despite arguing that although "farm labourers, day labourers or workers, still numerous in the South, form a social group that will tend to disappear", they "could hardly resist unemployment" if it wasn't for the community employment (Ballestero 6 August. 1980). It is important to note at this point that with the exceptions of Huelva and Almeria, in which economic growth policy outputs had some positive effects that lead to the vote in associated parties, after transitions to democracy, the same did not happen in the rest of Andalusia. This region continued to be one of the poorest ones in Spain and the vote for the associated parties in the remaining provinces was lower than in the rest of the country (as it shall be shown at the end of this sub-section). Regarding the creation of particularistic benefits in this region, as discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation, it is known that the biggest landowners of Spain were located in Andalusia and that these groups were given particularistic benefits by the regime (Malefakis 1970). This prevalence of particularistic outputs explains the prevalence of general repression in Andalusia.

Finally, regarding the effects of the passage of time on the vote for the associated parties, it is interesting to observe that the high levels of industrial growth in Huelva combined with high levels of land inequality and violence, only prompted the vote for these parties to be substantially higher than the Spanish

average for one democratic election (see **Figure 4.4**). Similarly, in this province, the vote for the associated parties was only higher than the region's average[23] for two democratic elections. Furthermore, when looking at the case of Almeria, although this province did not grow as much as Huelva, the fact that it had low levels of land inequality and violence gave this province a temporal advantage and a slightly higher vote share (see **Figure 4.5**). In Almeria, it took two democratic elections for the vote for in the associated parties to be below the Spanish average. However, this province kept scoring above the region's average on the vote for the associated parties. Both **Figures 4.4** and **4.5** show that in the six remaining Andalusian provinces, in which high levels of land inequality and violence prevailed, the vote for the associated parties was consistently much lower than the country's average. In most areas of this Southern region the deep effects of general repression pushed the electorate away from the associated parties.

[23] This average does not include the provinces of Huelva and Almeria.

FIGURE 4.4: Vote Share in Associated Parties in the Andalusian province of Huelva since Democratisation





FIGURE 4.5: Vote Share in Associated Parties in the Andalusian province of Almeria since Democratisation



4.5 D. Catalonia and Madrid

Lastly, I will analyse the cases of Catalonia and Madrid, two regions in which the levels of particularistic repression the early days of the regime, and during the last stage of the dictatorship were some of the highest in Spain (Boletín Informativo Extraordinario 1969). In both of these regions, the vote for the associated parties was extremely low. First, I would like to note that in Spain, the regions with the highest levels of particularistic repression (Madrid, Basque Country and Catalonia) were also some of the most developed (Townson 2007). For this reason, it is difficult to untangle with precision what exactly explains the weak performance of the associated parties in these regions. Two explanations arise. First, it could be that particularistic repression was indeed responsible for driving the low results. Second, it could also be that, in addition to the poor performance of these regions during the second half of the regime, because Catalonia and Madrid were already developed before the start of the regime, the effects of the economic growth that occurred during the "economic miracle" did not produce a substantial effect in improving the welfare of the population.

Unlike other Spanish regions — with the exception of the Basque Country —, the unique identity of Catalonia has been systematically repressed throughout the Francoist regime. One could therefore affirm that this region endured a much harsher particularistic repression when compared to other Spanish regions, with a higher severity of punishment, and higher uncertainty of its distribution. This violence was translated into the banning of the cultural expression and identity of Catalonia during Franco's dictatorship. Dowling (2018) asserts that "the programme of the full incorporation of Catalonia into the Spanish fatherland began with the prohibition of all that marked out Catalonia as culturally and politically distinct from the rest of the Spanish state, in particular a public erasure of Catalan culture and language in the immediate post-1939 period. This was the language then used by over 80 per cent of the population."

However, Madrid — with no identitary separatist intentions — also had very high levels of particularistic repression during the second half of the regime. This was, in fact, the region where particularistic repression was the highest in the

whole Spain (Boletín Informativo Extraordinario 1969). But unlike Catalonia, where it could be argued that this repression was both more violent and indiscriminate, as it consisted on the complete suppression of a regional identity, according to Casanellas (2022), in Madrid, particularistic repression was still almost exclusively being applied to student movements. There is also evidence that in Madrid, the remaining non-repressed population was not necessarily in favour of the destabilisation caused by the anti-regime protests. When asked: "Do you think that the University and university students should or should not deal with political problems within the University?", on the survey conducted by the *CIS* in January of 1968, more than half of the respondents from the Madrid ring — 57% of respondents — replied that students should not deal with political problems. Only 11% answered "yes". Similarly, when asked in the same survey if they agreed or disagreed that "the public order is more important than political freedom"[24], 69% of respondents in the Madrid ring answered positively, versus only 8% that answered negatively. Taking the answers to this survey into account, it seems like in Madrid, particularistic repression was seen as a law and order benefit, similarly to what happened in the rest of the country[25].

In this context, the second explanation offered to justify Catalonia and Madrid's low votes for the associated parties seems slightly more plausible. It is true that none of these regions experienced a strong increase in quality of life during the second phase of the Francoist regime, despite being some of the most economically developed regions in Spain (Townson 2007). This low production of general support could very well explain why in Catalonia and Madrid the votes for the associated parties were quite low. On average, the real disposable family income between 1960 and 1975 grew around 4.95 in Spain, and in these two regions it grew way below this average — respectively 2.38 in Madrid, and 3.34 in Catalonia (Alcaide 2003). However, it is important to take into account that modernisation improvements occurred in the whole country, and these regions also benefited from those improvements (Cuadrado-Roura 2010). However, because Catalonia and Madrid have always been highly developed when

[24]Translated from the original in Spanish: "Es más importante el orden público que la liberdad política".

[25]Which is congruent with the results of the empirical analysis carried out on Chapter 3.

compared with the rest of the country, it could also be that the incremental improvement in the quality of life brought about by the economic modernisation of the late 1950s was felt in a more subtle way in these regions. Previous high levels of development could lead to lower marginal welfare improvements in richer regions than in poorer regions. The evidence gathered here to establish this as a finding is of course very limited, and would require a much more substantial evaluation. Nevertheless, it is a point that is worthy of attention.

The evolution of the vote on the associated parties in each general election was not included in the cases of Catalonia and Madrid due to the low levels of general outputs created in these regions during the second phase of the regime. Catalonia registers a much lower vote share for the associated parties than the Spanish average in all the democratic elections from 1977 to 2011. The effects in Madrid were less intense — probably because Catalonia experienced more repression than Madrid. In this region, the vote for the associated parties was below the Spanish average in the first three democratic elections, eventually catching up after that due to reasons exogenous to this analysis.

In this chapter, I provided qualitative evidence for the theoretical implications of the first hypothesis laid out in this dissertation. In the next chapter I will empirically provide evidence for second hypothesis, using the Italian Fascist regime as a case-study.

Chapter 5

Particularistic Support and Extremist Parties

Up to now, this dissertation has investigated the case in which general support was the only source of autocratic inheritance. As seen, such circumstances will immunise the regime from the emergence of post-transitional extremism, and produce instead mainstream parties aligned with the former regime. But what happens, after democratisation, in regimes that have only produced particularistic support? The objective of this Chapter is to test the second theoretical hypothesis of this dissertation: former autocratic regimes benefiting only from particularistic support will have extremism associated with the former regime. In brief, particularistic support is created when autocratic policy outcomes singularly benefit a specific segment of the general population while harming other — usually larger — groups. According to the theory developed in this dissertation, upon the absence of general outputs, a regime that has exclusively created particularistic support is subject to the emergence of extremist parties associated with the former dictatorship, after transitions to democracy. This scenario will be explored in this Chapter, using the case of Italy's Fascist Regime led by Mussolini between 1922 and 1945. This regime represents a case in which general outputs were not created during the length of the dictatorship, somewhat resembling the first stage of the Francoist dictatorship. However, while general outputs arose in the second part of the Spanish dictatorship, in Italy such did not happen. Another similarity with the case of Spain is that, also during the Fascist regime in Italy, particularistic support was created among the landowning elites. Having a

particularistic group that exclusively benefited from particularistic outputs is a necessary pre-requisite for testing the second theoretical hypothesis. Hence, due to this exclusive creation of particularistic support in Mussolini's Italy, I will show that the only post-transitional party that chose to associate itself with the former regime became extremist, in order to appeal to the particularistic group. Moreover, I will provide evidence that this party directly appealed to the landowning segment of the population. The test of the two implications of the second theoretical hypothesis will also be carried out in this chapter: *(i)* areas in which the level of particularistic outputs is higher will tend to vote more for extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy; and *(ii)* areas that experience negative particularistic outputs will tend to vote less for the extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy.

TABLE 5.1: Policy Outputs and the Case of Spain

	General Outputs	**Particularistic Outputs**
Positive		Land Inequality: Landowners
Negative	Land Inequality: Rural Population	Repression

Table 5.1 describes the most important policy outputs created during the Italian Fascist regime. Although in this case there was no economic growth (positive general outputs), the importance of the land inequality issue, as it shall be discussed, makes a clear parallel with the Spanish case. Land inequality was also an extremely salient problem the Italian Fascist regime had to manage. However, while in the case of Spain, Franco did not carry out any land reform during the length of his regime, Mussolini attempted at gaining popular support by publicising a land reform that, instead of benefiting the rural population that demanded the reform, ended up benefiting landowning elites. The results of these policies correspond to particularistic outputs. The general population that longed for a land distribution reform — the landless rural population and small-landowners —, was at a loss with the outcome of Mussolini's rural policies. It could be therefore said that the results of the land reform carried out during the Fascist regime were mutually exclusive, in the sense that they benefited one

group, while harming another. So that medium and large landowners could benefit from the particularistic outputs arising from Mussolini's land reform, and that allowed them to improve the productivity and size of their lands, the poorer rural population was harmed by the distribution of those benefits to landowning elites. This harmful outcome to the landless and small landowning segments of the population constitutes a form of general repression, as theorised in this dissertation.

In the next section, I will show that general outputs were not created during the Fascist dictatorship in Italy, and therefore, that no mainstream party had incentives to associate itself with the former regime. Then, in *Section 5.2*, I describe the nature of particularistic repression during the Italian dictatorship. In *Section 5.3*, I suggest that Fascism benefited the areas in which clientelistic linkages between large landowners and the rural population were stronger, and that allowed the Fascist movement to increase its level of importance and gather more support (Elazar 2000). In *Section 5.4*, I start by describing how the relationship between large landowners and Fascism subsisted after transitions to democracy, and how the associated extremist party was financially and electorally supported by this group, that aimed at maintaining its particularistic benefits after transitions to democracy. Then, I quantitatively show that the areas in which Italian landowners had a higher level of hegemony over the rural population during Fascism — in which higher levels of particularistic benefits were accumulated — were also those in which the neo-fascist party Italian Social Movement (MSI) had a higher level of electoral success. Similarly, in a second empirical analysis, I quantitatively show that large landowners were the ones that tended to vote more for the associated extremist party, when compared to other rural social groups. In this last *Section 5.4* I provide compelling evidence that the two theoretical implications of the second hypothesis can be validated.

5.1 Expansion or Stagnation: General Output Creation during Autocratic Periods


5.1.1 Contraction: Lack of Economic Growth during the Fascist Regime

It is widely accepted in the economic literature on the Fascist regime that ruled Italy between 1922 and 1945, that economic growth was not a priority, nor an ultimate goal. Rossi and Toniolo (1992) suggest that particularly after 1926[1], Fascism "produced economic retardation through inept economic policies and, more generally, through the freezing of the country's social transformation which had had such promising beginnings in the 'Giolittian era'[2]". Cohen (1988) also reported that "Mussolini and his fascist cronies were not opposed to development but it was not the dominant goal of the regime." If in the first years of the regime, before Mussolini assumed total dictatorial control over Italy, the reminiscent liberal policies of the Giolittian period still lingered and produced rapid growth, after 1926, Mussolini implemented economic policies that turned the nation into an autarky, aiming at self-sufficiency. Most notably, the import duty on corn abolished 10 years earlier was reintroduced, and wheat self-sufficiency was proclaimed — the "Battle for Wheat" ('*La Battaglia del Grano*'). Moreover, banks and large industries were nationalised, wage bargaining was regulated, and exchange controls were introduced from 1934 (Rossi and Toniolo 1992). As shown in **Figure 5.1**, the overall result was stagnant growth rates and high inequality levels. Prosperity only came after 1945, once the regime and the World War II (WWII) came to an end.

[1] Mussolini fully established himself as the autocrat in 1925.

[2] Under the premiership Giovanni Giolitti, Prime Minister of Italy between 1892 and 1921 for five mandates, this period was characterised by economic liberalism and industrial modernisation.

FIGURE 5.1: Left: Per Capita GDP in Italy 1950-2001. Right: Williamson and Theil Inequality Indexes



Source: Malanima and Zamagni (2010)

Hence, throughout the Fascist regime, Italy did not experience significant levels of economic growth. With the exception of the Northwestern Italian macro-region, the so-called "industrial triangle" — including the regions of Piedmont, Liguria, and Lombardy — that experienced a short period of growth from 1931 to 1938 (Felice and Vecchi 2015), GDP per capita growth rates in Italy decreased from 2,16% between 1900-13 to only 0,73% from 1913-50. Once the regime came to an end, economic growth soared to 4,80% from 1950 to 1973 (Rossi and Toniolo 1992). While during Fascism the macro-regions of the Northeast and Centre remained stagnant, the South and Islands saw their growth rates plummeting (**Figure 5.2**[3]).


In addition to the available literature, **Figures 5.1** and **5.2** suggest that Italy did not experience a generalised economic growth during the regime that could have led to the creation of general outputs. It is important to reiterate at this point that post-transitional associated parties operate under a logic of national elections, so the growth experienced during the regime by the areas included in the "industrial triangle" would not be enough to produce a mainstream right-wing associated party at the national scale. But even if we isolated this macro-region and disregarded the rest of the country, it would be unlikely that a mainstream associated party could succeed. That is because the Northwest[4] corresponds to the Italian macro-region in which regime repression[5] — or negative particularistic outputs — was the highest (Official Italian State records *Casellario Politico Centrale*). This would potentially decrease the positive impact of any existing general

[3]Considering the years for which data is available, the period between 1911 and 1938 comprise most of the dictatorship period (see red lines in **Figure 5.2**).

[4]Followed by the Northeastern, Centre, Islands and South.

[5]Measured by the number of prosecutions carried out by the regime.

FIGURE 5.2: GDP per capita in Italian Macro-Regions




Source: Felice and Vecchi (2015)

benefits, curbing the importance of the positive legacy. It is relevant to highlight that, unlike what occurred during the Spanish dictatorship, the levels of particularistic repression in Italy were much more severe in terms of punishment, and the uncertainty of its distribution was much higher (Ebner 2011). This kind of repression will be described in the following section.

Hence, when considering the country as a whole, it can be said that economic growth was not abundantly produced during the Fascist regime. An additional point that is important to take into account is that general outputs could have also been created, as argued on Chapter 2, through the implementation of generalised welfare policies to all the population. But that was not the case. During the Fascist regime, the general population was not regarded as an equitable whole. Some groups had preferential treatment by the authorities and for that reason, improvements in welfare, when they existed, were fragmented and targeted these preferential groups (Dunnage 2002). Accordingly, during Mussolini's rule, the welfare of the majority of the general population did not improve, resulting in an absence of general outputs.

If one observes the concentration of votes for the mainstream right in Italy, in the general elections that took place before[6] and after the dictatorship started and ended, it is possible to attest that the mainstream right-wing party that emerged after the fall of the regime gained support in areas where it already had support before Fascism (see **Figure 5.3**). The main mainstream-right party in 1924 corresponds to the People's Party (PP). After transitions to democracy, the 1953 election corresponds to the third democratic election. This election was the first one re-incorporating the northern province of Trento, in the region of Trentino-Alto Adige, important for this visualisation. The main mainstream-right party in 1953 corresponds to the Christian Democrats (DC).

FIGURE 5.3: Mainstream Right Vote Distribution before and after the Fascist regime



PP (1924) DC (1953)

Source: Corbetta and Piretti (2008) (left); Migliorini (2018) (right)

In both cases, the votes for the mainstream right were located in the North of the country, where most of the industry is based, and which constitutes the richest part of Italy (Malanima and Zamagni 2010). By looking at **Figure 5.3**, it can be said that Fascism did not significantly change the distribution of votes for the mainstream right, that remained concentrated in the areas where it was previously

[6]The election that took place in 1924 was already considered autocratic, but Mussolini only fully established himself as the dictator in 1925.

concentrated. It is also relevant to point out that this post-transitional mainstream right party did not associate itself to the former regime. The Christian Democrats are a successor of the People's Party, and did not establish any linkages with the dictatorship. It is not, for this reason, an "associated party". This makes sense considering the theory developed in this dissertation. Upon the absence of general outputs, after transitions to democracy, the general population would not have incentives to vote for an associated mainstream right party. Therefore, the mainstream right would also not have incentives to "align" itself with the former regime and to provide policy continuation claims, taking advantage of the regime's legacy. Consequentially, as observed, once democracy was implemented, the Christian Democrats simply stuck to its previous electorate without associating itself to the former regime.

Considering the above, after removing the existence of general outputs from the equation, I will now focus on the creation of particularistic outputs during the Fascist regime in Italy. I will begin by describing the nature of negative particularistic outputs.

5.2 Particularistic Repression

As it was previously suggested, if during the second half of the Spanish Francoist regime particularistic repression was fairly scarce, this kind of repression was abundant in Italy under Mussolini's rule, and was characterised by its high levels of violence and by the uncertainty of its distribution. Following the theory developed in this dissertation, this means that despite the fact that repression only targeted particular individuals, because the severity of punishment and the level of uncertainty in its distribution were both quite high, the fear of punishment outpoured to the general population. This mechanism is exactly described by Ebner (2011) in the following passage:

> "Constant police harassment, surveillance, arbitrary arrests, and discrimination put anti-Fascists in a position where they could barely earn a living, much less conduct anti-Fascist activity. These systematic police actions and other coercive measures ultimately achieved what

> Fascist terror could not: the complete destruction or neutralisation of anti-Fascist forces. The regime achieved this not by indiscriminately terrorising Italians but by inflicting massive, low-level, localised repression. For the select communities, families, and individuals subjected to this repression, the regime's control over their lives was truly totalitarian. In working-class neighbourhoods, where everyone knew too well the economic and social consequences of prison and *confino*[7], an ordinary knock on the door late at night was terrifying." (Ebner 2011: 102).

If Mussolini was initially more focused on targeting enemies of the regime — the anti-Fascists —, once the regime became more established, it began "turning state violence against broad sections of the Italian people, rather than just avowed anti-Fascists" (Ebner 2011). Hence, as the dictatorship became more consolidated and its grip on power grew, particularistic repression seized to exclusively target anti-Fascists, and it began to indiscriminately include other groups. This author also explains that:

> "With the introduction of the police code in November 1926, the Fascist police immediately exercised its expanded powers in order to restore "law and order" and "clean up the streets" rather than to merely suppress anti-Fascism. Furthermore, the social consequences of Mussolini's deflationary economic policies and the great economic crisis that began in 1929 led the regime to rely even more on arbitrary arrest and confinement as a strategy for maintaining public order." (Ebner 2011: 109).

Dunnage (2002) also elaborates on this idea that repression did not exclusively target anti-Fascist activists. This author similarly highlights the widening of the spectrum of repressive action towards those who committed crimes against "morality" or "public order", as vague as those definitions were. This vagueness, that allowed the regime to target whoever it saw fit, in a relatively indiscriminate

[7] According to this author, "the regime sentenced 15,000 Italians to confino politico (political confinement) and between 25,000 and 50,000 to "common" confino."

manner, is deeply related to the ambiguity of distribution of violence in the Fascist regime.

> "Anti-Fascist militants were not the only victims of Fascist persecution. A far wider range of citizens was affected, as the definition of anti-Fascist or anti-national practices was broadened to include abortion and homosexuality, for example. The fact that the number of 'crimes against public morality' increased by over a third during the Fascist period is an indication of the far broader interpretation that the regime allowed in defining this kind of crime. Existential forms of dissent not directly linked to political anti-Fascism, such as an open expression of dissatisfaction with Mussolini on account of hunger or wage cuts, could also be punished, though amnesties and acts of clemency on the part of Mussolini were often granted to the benefit of the most 'harmless' of the regime's enemies." (Dunnage 2002: 85).

In addition to these authors, several others have consensually written about the high levels of repression carried out by the Italian Fascist regime (Gentile 1986; Linz 2000; Albanese and Pergher 2012). Hence, after having suggested that the regime was able to create negative particularistic outputs with high levels of violence and uncertainty, I will now focus on the creation of positive particularistic outputs. In the next section, I will show that Mussolini's regime fostered particularistic support through the distribution of benefits to certain social groups — medium and large landowners.

5.3 Land Reform as a Source of Particularistic Outputs in Autocratic Regimes

5.3.1 Land Inequality in Italy

The socio-economic policies that defined the Italian economy during the Fascist period can be summarised in one word: ruralisation. It can be said that two most iconic Fascist policies were "the Battle For Wheat" (*'Battaglia del Grano'*), aiming at self-sufficiency in wheat production and that had to be fought to "free Italy from

the slavery of foreign bread", as described by Cohen (1979); and the "Integrated Land Reclamation" programme (*'Bonifica Integrale'*), consisting on the transformation of inhospitable lands into cultivation-prone territories, and which the Duce claimed, "would bring substantial economic and social benefits to the nation". However, instead of decreasing the levels of land inequality levels in Italy, these policies aggravated the unbalances in land ownership during the Fascist period (Schmidt 1937; Cohen 1979; D'Attoma 2016).

According to the "VIII General Population Census" of 1936, 47.7% of the active Italian population worked in agriculture. Since the eve of the Great War, the peasant rural population in Italy has made strong appeals for the expropriation of lands owned by large landowners and the wealthy middle class (Martinelli 2012; Percoco 2021). The War intensified this pressure, and the demand from these classes "for outright possession of the land became more and more insistent" (Schmidt 1937). During this period, left-wing politicians and labour unions encouraged this movement with the cry: "The land to the peasants!". Although some land redistribution happened at that time, most of these efforts were halted by the time Mussolini's Blackshirts marched through Rome in October 1922, invalidating a bill enacted by the Chamber of Deputies on August 1922, "that would have provided for expropriation of poorly cultivated estates, subject to the payment of compensation to the owners, and for their final transference to small peasant cultivators" (Schmidt 1937). However, during the consolidation period of the regime, these ongoing protests and the hefty concentration of the working population in the agriculture sector prompted Mussolini to take advantage of the situation in order to consolidate his incumbency. In the early 1920s, Mussolini joined forces with the left-wing parties and promised to distribute expropriated land among the peasants. On the Fascist program published in October 1920, Mussolini called for the confiscation land in the interests of the peasants (Schmidt 1937). In March 1921, he promised to complete "the agrarian revolution" and give back the land "to those that work on it" (Mussolini 1931). However, as put forward by Schmidt (1937), once the regime was consolidated, the Fascists quickly abandoned these appeals to the redistribution of land to peasants. This change of strategy was mostly motivated by the necessity to form alliances with medium

and large landowners that constituted key actors in helping the regime to fight the rise of left-wing parties in the countryside (Acemoglu *et al.* 2022). The support of these groups was therefore key for the stabilisation of the regime (Cohen 1979), or in the words of Schmidt (1937):

> "Once in power, the Fascist leaders were not slow in recognising their debt to the landlords and rich farmers whose money and arms had helped them to victory over the left-wing movement in the countryside. Within three months after the "March on Rome", the various decrees providing for cession of land to cooperatives were repealed and steps were taken to oust the peasants from estates that they had occupied, the proposed law for division of the latifondi was withdrawn, and the measures limiting rises in land rents and eviction of tenants were revoked … the agricultural policy of Fascism, both in the first years when it reflected the spirit of laissez-faire and later when it required extensive government intervention, has continually been directed in the interests of landed property, commercialised agriculture and finance capital." (Schmidt 1937: 331-332)

Accordingly, Fascism's programmatic emphasis on ruralisation, was therefore not an attempt to benefit the rural population, but rather, the fulfilment of an agenda that prioritised agricultural self-sufficiency given the overwhelmingly rural nature of Italian economy — an outcome that came to characterise Fascism, being later on emulated by other Fascist regimes such as the Spanish and the Portuguese one —, and that also came to benefit the interests of medium and large landowners, who helped stabilise the regime (Schmidt 1937; Cohen 1979; Dunnage 2002). Moore (1966) also argued that "essentially fascism protected big agriculture … at the expense of the agricultural labourer, small peasant, and consumer". This author writes that:

> "Only later [than 1921] did Italian fascist leaders begin to declare that fascism was 'ruralising' Italy, championing the cause of the peasants, or that it was primarily a 'rural phenomenon'. These claims were nonsense. The number of owner operators dropped by 500,000

> between 1921 and 1931; that of cash-and-share tenants rose by about 400,000." (Moore 1966: 451-452)

In fact, the relationship between large landowners and Fascism can be traced back to the early days of the movement. Several studies on the emergence of Fascism in Italy highlight the role of the landowning elite for the success of the movement (Brustein 1991; Elazar 2000; Acemoglu *et al.* 2022). In a very recent study, Acemoglu *et al.* (2022) empirically show that "the support of large landholders for the fascist cause" was "critical for the rise of the Fascist Party in the countryside". While these authors emphasise the threat of a socialist revolution in the countryside, other authors such as Brustein (1991) make a similar argument but adding instead that the "red menace" explanation was incomplete for it ignored the fact that in rural areas "many individuals chose the Fascists because the Fascist program most closely represented their material interests". Speaking to this argument, also Elazar (2000) showed that the clientelistic linkages in areas where the landowning groups dominated economic and political relationships though a system of patronage over the rural population — namely, in the South and Islands — were more prone to becoming Fascist, facilitating the emergence of the movement.

As Schmidt (1937), Cohen (1979), Elazar (2000), and Acemoglu *et al.* (2022) argue, the contribution of large landowners to the stabilisation of the regime was crucial. In exchange for facilitating the penetration of the Fascist movement, it would make sense that the regime was compelled to distribute benefits to the owners of large lands that contributed to the promotion of the regime in rural areas. To this account, I highlight three important regime policies whose outputs allowed landowning elites to further increase the size and productivity of their estates during the Fascist regime, being regarded as benefits. The first one has to do with the dismantlement of labour unions during the Fascist rule. According to Martinelli (2012), free unionism was banned by Mussolini in the 1920s which increased the market power of larger landowners and therefore, improved their ability to increase the size of their lands. Second, the increases in land size and productivity during the Fascist regime can also be explained by the structure of

access to governmental agencies' agricultural credit (Cohen 1979). Access to credit was primarily conceded to medium and large landowners, who were able to associate in groups more easily[8], and had more resources to provide better guarantees. This author also suggests that one of the main objectives of the *Bonifica* was exactly to provide insurance to medium and large landowners during the Great Depression, in order to keep them from bankruptcy, and through this consolidate the support for the regime coming from these key groups.

> "The Bonifica Integrale tended to direct funds for the most part to large landowners because of the way in which projects were initiated and financed. Landowners had to form groups and request government guaranteed loans from the banks. Even if no bias existed on the part of the government in favour of large landowners, group formation would have been easier among few than among many individuals. And, other things being equal, a few large estates were more likely to be able to internalise external economies associated with land reclamation than many small farms. Loans were easier to come by for large than for small operators in spite of government guarantees". (Cohen 1979: 86).

Lack of access to agricultural credit not only barred small landowners and labourers working on rented lands — like sharecroppers and tenant farmers — from improving their economic situation during the serious crises brought about by Great Depression in combination with the harsh self-sufficiency policies, but it also denied them the possibility of acquiring new lands. The difficulties in accessing credit during these periods of severe economic hardship also contributed to an increase in morality rates that were higher among small landowners, further increasing land inequality (Cohen 1979). At this point, it is relevant to note that agricultural credit increased exponentially during the dictatorship (Farolfi and Fornasari 2011). If in 1928 the value of agricultural credit attributed during that year was 702 million of Lire, in 1938, that value rose to 3.260 million (see **Figure 8.2, Appendix B**), being almost four times higher by the end of the dictatorship.

[8] Arguably, as a consequence of the ban on free unionism.

Third, and finally, the tariffs imposed on wheat by Mussolini under "the Battle For Wheat" ('*Battaglia del Grano*') policy greatly benefited larger landowners who were given production concessions on the cereal. D'Attoma (2016) explains that:

> "In the late 1920s through the early 1930s, Mussolini increased tariffs on wheat, which amounted to a large concession to landowners, who gained the most from the government policies, whereas Southern peasants were hit the hardest." (D'Attoma 2016: 88)

With a few exceptions in the Northern areas of the country (Farolfi and Fornasari 2011), the literature is unanimous in affirming that while the landless and small-landowning population did not improve their economic conditions during the dictatorship, medium and large landowners did. As it was discussed, such is not surprising if one considers the importance of this class for the emergence and maintenance of the Fascist movement. It would consequently make sense that the regime would have been interested in rewarding this group through the distribution of benefits to keep their support. The preferential treatment given to larger landowners during the regime allowed them to increase the productivity and size of their estates, which constitute particularistic policy outcomes.

In the next section of this Chapter, I will quantitatively evaluate the effects of the distribution of these particularistic benefits on the post-transitional vote for the party aligned with the former dictatorship.

5.4 Empirical Analyses: The Post-Transitional Effects of Particularistic Outputs

Up to now, I have argued that the Fascist regime created particularistic outcomes that benefited large landowners — who helped stabilise the dictatorship — at the expense of the landless population and small landowners, who were harmed by these policy outcomes[9]. In this section, I will analyse the first and second

[9]Following the Theory developed in this dissertation, it can be affirmed that particularistic outcomes also constituted a source of negative general outputs from the perspective of the poorer layers of the agrarian population, who did not benefit from a land redistribution programme that allowed them to become small-landowners or to increase the size of their already small estates.

theoretical implications of *Hypothesis 2*. In order to do so, I will carry out two empirical analyses. First, I will show that the areas in which higher levels of particularistic outputs were created, tended to vote more for the extremist associated party, as suggested by the first implication of *Hypothesis 2*. Because due to data constraints it is quite difficult to trace down the areas in which large landowners benefited from particularistic outputs the most, I used clientelistic hegemony as a proxy for the occurrence of high levels of particularistic outputs. I do so under the reasonable assumption, grounded on the existing literature, that the regime benefited landowners due to their ability to stabilise the dictatorship. A significant way in which this was achieved was through the promotion of the Fascist party in rural areas via linkages with the local population. By using this proxy, I am assuming that particularistic benefits were distributed with more intensity in areas in which large landowners had a better ability to help the Fascist movement spread in rural areas. Then, as it will be showed, once democracy was implemented in Italy, large landowners financed the extremist associated party Italian Social Movement (MSI)[10] as a vehicle to maintain the protection of their estates and special access to benefits. Therefore, the areas in which large landowners benefited to a higher extent from particularistic outcomes, voted more for the MSI in order to ensure the continuation of these outputs. In this analysis I will also confirm the second theoretical implication of *Hypothesis 2*, by empirically demonstrating that areas exposed to higher levels of negative outputs, voted less for the extremist associated party, after transitions to democracy.

In a second empirical analysis, I will show who exactly voted for this associated extremist party. In line with the argument developed in this Chapter, I show that large landowners voted for the MSI. I also show that after the third democratic election in 1953, once land expropriation laws were implemented, the vote on the MSI by medium and large landowners increased even more — as the existence of the particularistic policy outcomes they benefited from during the regime was even more threatened. In this second analysis, I will also show once again that particularistic repression had a negative impact on the vote for the associated extremist party.

[10] In Italian: "Movimento Social Italiano" (MSI).

Before delving into the empirical analyses, I will first describe how the relationship between large landowners and Fascism subsisted after transitions to democracy.

The close relationship between the landowning elites and the MSI was established by many authors. Particularly in the South, the neo-fascist party MSI elected candidates that held important positions in the Fascist regime (Ignazi 2018). The first neo-fascist movement — the '*Uomo Qualunque*' or the "Party of the Common Man" — from which the Italian Social Movement (MSI) derived from "had strong financial support from the same economic and social sectors that promoted the success of Mussolini's initial fascism just a few decades previously" (Mammone 2015). These groups, as it was previously discussed in this Chapter, include the Italian landowning class. But also the MSI itself, once it became an established political party, was financially supported by wealthy landowners (Atkins 2004). Interestingly, according to Ignazi (2018), in its formation years, the MSI started off by having a more ideological and "utopic" rhetoric, trying also to appeal to voters in the North where the Republic of Salò was established — which corresponded to a Nazi puppet state ruled by Mussolini but virtually controlled by Germany, in which the ideological rhetoric and regime repression reached its peak. However, the party had no success in the North of the country. Once the extremist party came to terms with the fact that its voter base was exclusively in the Mezzogiorno (South and Islands), it quickly changed its strategy to become more corporatist and less ideological (Ignazi 2018). Not only its financial supporters, but also its voter base predominantly included the large landowners of the South, that were pushed away from the mainstream right party (the DC) due to its reformist aspirations (Robbe 2012). These reformist aspirations culminated into the implementation of the expropriation laws that would place their land ownership rights in peril. The success of the Italian Social Moment in post-transitional Italy is explained by Chiarini (1989) as having a clientelistic nature between the party and its Southern electorate, which also shaped how the party evolved. Also Linz (1976) has argued that this party "depended heavily on the support of the larger landowners", although this group corresponded to a small share of the electorate.

Indeed the democratic transition presented challenges to medium and large landowners. After the fall of Mussolini's rule, in 1945, protests against land inequality and for the redistribution of land reappeared in Italy, after having been made illegal during the dictatorship (Martinelli 2012). Although data on the protests' location is virtually impossible to collect at a national-level, Percoco (2021) has empirically shown that high levels of land inequality statistically significantly explain an increase in land-inequality protests, using municipality-level data available for the Basilicata region. As the situation unfolded, in 1951, in response to these demands, the coalition government led by the Christian Democrats decided to implement land expropriation laws — a long awaited move — that aimed at tackling land inequality that was aggravated by the regime. The laws[11] — the "Gullo Decrees", the "Sila Law" and the "Stralcio Law" — intended to expropriate larger estates and redistributing them to rural labourers and small proprietors (Ginsborg 1984).

According to Meissner's account (1954) regarding landowners' attitudes towards the expropriation laws, "landowners object mainly because the administrators often disregard or rule unfavourably upon exemption requests by owners of well-run and improved estates". If the expropriation laws made provisions from excepting well-run estates from expropriation, "the criteria by which 'model farms' may be exempted are so strict that few holdings are expected to quality". A second and arguably bigger problem was that while the first Sila Law (enacted in May 1950) fixed a property expropriation ceiling at over 300 hectares, the more updated version of the law, the Stralcio, or "extract", Law (enacted in October 1950), "provided for no such limits" (Gazzetta Ufficiale October 1950; Meissner 1954). Following Belotti (1960), the expropriation criteria was much more ambiguous than land size as "the amount of land to be expropriated in each zone was to be arrived at by applying a formula which would take into consideration the income of the land as a whole and the average income per hectare". This meant that the expropriation laws targeted not only large estates but any medium estate that was not productive enough. Taking this

[11]The decrees were initially drafted by Fausto Gullo, the Italian Communist Party minister of agriculture in the Italian Coalition government created in April 1944 and led by the Christian Democrats (Rakopoulos 2014).

into account, Meissner (1954) suggests that "the [Stralcio] law as it now stands on the books has no doubt driven many landowners into the Neo-Fascist" camp.

With the democratic transition, it makes sense to assume that the preference for the continuation of the reception of particularistic outputs not only subsisted, but it was aggravated in a situation of deep uncertainty. Once a transition to democracy occurs, it is expected that the exposure to risk increases, as well as the preference for insurance (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rueda and Stegmueller 2019). In order to protect the continuation of the reception of particularistic benefits, it is reasonable that medium and large landowners had incentives to vote for the aligned extremist party that was against the land redistribution reforms (Tortora 1956), and that was neo-fascist in nature, being favourable to the maintenance of the *status-quo* that favoured the protection of their benefits. In fact, the associated extremist party promised in its political programme to "stop the ruinous policy of expropriation of land" (MSI: Programma per le Elezioni Politiche 1953), clearly siding with medium and large landowners on the land expropriation question.

In the next two subsections, I will present the two empirical analysis that provide substantial evidence for the first and second theoretical implications of *Hypothesis 2*.

5.5 Empirical Analysis I: Vote for the MSI in Clientelistic Areas

5.5.1 Dependent Variables

Vote on aligned extreme right in the second democratic election

The second democratic Italian General Election that occurred in 18-19th of April 1948 constitutes the first dependent variable. This is the first general election in which the Italian Social Movement participated as a fully established political party. The support for the extreme right aligned with the former autocratic regime after transitions to democracy is captured by the vote share of this party in the second democratic election after the end of the autocratic regime. This variable

was collected at the provincial-level from the data archive of the Italian Ministry of the Interior ("*Archivio Storico delle Elezioni*").

Vote on aligned extreme right in the third democratic election

The support for the extreme right aligned with the former autocratic regime after transitions to democracy is also captured by the vote share of the MSI in the third democratic election after the end of the autocratic regime. This was the second time the associated extremist party participated in a democratic election in Italy. The third free general election in Italy to elect the Italian Parliament took place on the 8th of June 1953. The goal of including this second dependent variable is to check for time-elapsing effects. The further one distances itself from the regime, less strong should the effects be captured by the subsequent vote share on the aligned extreme right due, ceteris paribus. However, because the redistribution laws were enacted before this election in 1950, the threat that these laws represented to the maintenance of particularistic outcomes from autocracy to democracy, propelled the support for the associated extremist party to increase instead of decreasing. This variable was collected at the provincial-level from the data archive of the Italian Ministry of the Interior ("*Archivio Storico delle Elezioni*").

5.5.2 Independent Variables

High Clientelism: Particularistic Outputs

A variable measuring high levels of clientelism in Italy was operationalised using the methodology proposed by Elazar (2000). As suggested before, this variable attempts to capture the areas in which particularistic outputs had a greater prevalence. This independent variable allows the test of the first implication of *H2*, that suggests that the "areas in which the level of particularistic outputs is higher will tend to vote more for extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy". The clientelistic linkages this variable attempts to capture correspond to the "patriarchal bonds or seigniorial domination" between large landowners and the rural population during the Fascist regime, more prevalent in the South and Islands, as argued by Elazar (2000). This author contends that this

variable can be operationalised as "the 'electoral balance' between the PSI [Italian Socialist Party] and the Liberal coalition" in the 1919 election. That is because "members of the landed class constituted, almost exclusively, the Liberals' pool of candidates and, through their local hegemony in the provinces, mobilised much of the Liberal electoral base". Following Elazar's (2000) methodology, this variable was operationalised as the "continuous margin between the two parties". In order to ignore the prevalence of the PSI vote in areas with low hegemony and to focus on the importance of the Liberal coalition vote, the areas in which the socialist vote was higher than the liberal vote were coded as zero, being therefore assumed that the landowners' hegemony in these areas was equal to zero. Although Elazar (2000) operationalised this variable using the electoral data for the 1919 local election, due to data constraints, I operationalised this variable using the regional electoral data for the 1919 general election. This data was retrieved from the Italian Official Statistics archive ("*Statistica delle Elezioni Generali Politiche per la XXV Legislatura*").

Regime Repression

Another variable of interest is the one capturing the negative particularistic outputs — or regime repression — that occurred during the regime. This variable includes the number of people prosecuted by the Fascist regime between 1922 until the beginning of the WWII, divided by the regional population in 1936[12]. The data for this variable was retrieved from the official government dataset Casellario Politico Centrale. Being particularistic repression during the Fascist regime classified as violent and indiscriminate (Ebner 2011), it makes sense according to the theoretical expectations of this dissertation that the "areas that experience negative particularistic outputs will tend to vote less for the extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy" (second implication of *H2*). This variable captures negative particularistic outputs.

[12]The last population census carried out during the Fascist regime.

5.5.3 Control Variables

Land Inequality Variation (∆) during the regime

This variable corresponds to the difference between the Gini coefficient of private land inequality between 1940 and 1924. It illustrates how much land inequality changed during the Fascist regime, an important factor taking into account the relevance of land inequality in Italy. The years of 1924 and 1940 roughly correspond to the beginning and end of autocratic period, discounting the years o the Second World War. Mussolini fully established himself as the dictator in 1925. The Gini coefficient refers to property size inequality of private properties. I opted for using the property size inequality instead of economic rent inequality because that is a more appropriate indicator when measuring land redistribution. However, due to the limitations of how the Gini coefficient can be calculated in 1924, as for this year there is only data to calculate property size inequality, I opted for using the same indicator in both years. As referred, the 1924 Gini coefficient for private land inequality in Italy is restricted by the exclusive availability of regional-level data (see **Figure 8.3, Appendix B**). The data was retrieved from the 1927 Italian Yearly Statistics report ("*Annuario Statistico Italiano*"), Series nº3, Volume I. The data for the 1940 Gini coefficient for private land inequality was kindly provided by Pablo Martinelli (Martinelli 2016). This data was collected at the agrarian zone level, which is lower than the province level and higher than municipality.

Share of Agricultural Population

This control variable corresponds to the share of agricultural population in each Italian province. Due to data constraints, this variable corresponds to the share of agricultural population in 1936. The data was retrieved from the IV volume of the 1936 Italian Census ("*VIII Censimento Generale della Popolazione, Volume IV*").

Population

The natural logarithm of the number of residents in each Italian province in 1951 was added as a control. The data was retrieved from the VII volume of the 1951

Italian Census ("*IX Censimento Generale della Popolazione, Volume VII*"). Because of the periodicity of the census, data for the population in 1951 is the closest to the population resident in Italy during the second and third democratic elections. The previous census was ran in 1936 and the following ran in 1961. I considered that the year of 1951 was the closest to both elections and that the population did not significantly change between that year and 1948 and 1953.

GDP Capita

The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was included as a control variable to account for the economic effects at the time of the second and third democratic elections, by each resident in Italy. GDP per capita in Italy was only available at the regional level for the year of 1951, having been retrieved from Daniele and Malanima (2014).

Macro Regions

A dummy variable was also included by each of the Italian macro-regions: North, Centre, South and Islands. The aim of this variable is to include fixed-effects that account for macro-region variation, namely the divisions described by Elazar (2000): the "capitalist North" in which Italian landowners' clientelistic hegemony was low, the "sharecropping Centre" in which relationships were more mixed, and the "latifundist South" in which clientelistic hegemony was the highest. The richest region of the North was used as the reference group.

5.5.4 Empirical Model I

The results of the first empirical analysis can be observed on **Table 5.2**. The areas in which the landowning elites benefited more from particularistic outputs[13] tended to vote more for the associated extremist party in the first General Election in which this party participated in. As expected, the vote for the associated party becomes stronger in 1953, after the land expropriation laws were enacted and the maintenance of particularistic outputs is further threatened. These results provide

[13] Assuming that higher levels of clientelistic hegemony are associated to the distribution of more particularistic outputs.

TABLE 5.2: Impact of Particularistic Outputs, measured by Clientelistic Hegemony, on MSI Vote Share in the 1948 and 1953 General Elections in Italy

	1948 Election		1953 Election	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Particularistic Outputs	0.032***	0.017***	0.062***	0.024**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Regime Repression	-0.000***	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.001***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Land Inequality (Δ)		-0.008*		0.025**
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Agricultural Population		-0.004		-0.045***
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Population (ln)		0.002***		-0.002***
		(0.00)		(0.00)
GDP Capita		0.010***		0.003
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Constant	0.017***	-0.029**	0.055***	0.083***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.02)
Macro Region FE		√		√
N	749	726	749	726
R^2	0.444	0.596	0.401	0.598

P-values: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.

evidence for the first theoretical expectation described by the first implication of the second hypothesis: *(i)* areas in which the level of particularistic outputs are higher will tend to vote more for extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy. The areas in which the regime distributed more particularistic benefits — in this case to the landowning elites during the length of the regime —, do indeed seem to vote more for the extremist associated party MSI after transitions to democracy.

These results also corroborate the second implication of the second theoretical Hypothesis: *(ii)* areas that experience negative particularistic outputs will tend to vote less for the extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy.

Because, as seen, negative particularistic outputs in Italy — or particularistic repression — were severe and distributed relatively indiscriminately (Ebner 2011), it makes sense that the fear of punishment did not remain limited to the small group that was actually repressed. Due to fear of punishment, it is coherent that the effects of repression negatively affected the general population as a whole. Therefore, in areas where negative particularistic outputs were high, the vote for associated extremist party was lower. It is important to mention, however, that it is very unlikely that the repressed groups coincided with the groups that benefited from particularistic outputs.

Of course this analysis is limited in the sense that the data available does not completely immunise it against an ecological fallacy. Therefore, in order to gather more evidence regarding the relationship between the creation of particularistic outputs by the Fascist regime and the vote for the associated extremist party, in a second complementary empirical analysis I will show which segments of the general population voted for the MSI, only to confirm the theoretical expectations laid out previously.

5.6 Empirical Analysis II: Vote for the MSI by Population Sectors

In this second empirical analysis, the dependent and control variables used remain the same[14]. The *Regime Repression* independent variable was also included. However, instead of measuring whether the areas in which particularistic outputs were created with more prevalence during the Fascist regime voted more for the associated extremist party — captured though the proxy of high landowner hegemony —, in this second design, I highlight the importance of each popular segment on the vote for that party. I show that larger landowners predominantly voted for the MSI. In the next subsection, I will describe the independent variables included in this analysis.

[14]In this analysis the macro regions variable was not included, having been included only in the context of clientelism in the previous analysis (Elazar 2000). The *Agricultural Population* variable was not included as a control variable but was part of the operationalisation of the independent variables.

5.6.1 Independent Variables

Absent Landowners

The share of the Italian population corresponding to absent landowners was included as an independent variable in this analysis. I consider that this group corresponds to larger landowners that hire the work on their lands, despite being the owners, since it is common for larger landowners to be absent from their lands. Due to data limitations on the share of the active population corresponding to this social group in 1951, I assume that the number of absent landowners did not significantly change between 1936 — an year already considerably close to the end of the regime in 1945 — and 1951, the year of the population census carried out closer to the early democratic elections analysed. The population corresponding to this segment in 1936 was collected at the province-level, and divided by the active population of 1951. This variable corresponds to the proportion of the absent landowners as a share of the active population close to the time of the general elections analysed. Data was retrieved from the IV volume of the 1936 Italian Census (*"VIII Censimento Generale della Popolazione, Volume IV"*), and from the the VII volume of the 1951 Italian Census (*"IX Censimento Generale della Popolazione, Volume VII"*).

Daily Labourers

An independent variable accounting for the share of agricultural workers hired on a daily basis was also included. These are workers with a precarious working condition. The data for the population corresponding to this segment was collected at the province-level, using a similar method as the one described in the previous variable. This variable corresponds to the proportion of the daily labourers as a share of the active population in 1951.

Worker-Landowners

A variable including the share of landowners working on their own lands was also included. I assume that these are landowners owning much smaller parcels of land than the Absent Landowners class, as they do not hire workers to work on

their lands — possibly because they do not have the financial availability to do so —, opting to work on their lands themselves. The data for the population corresponding to this segment was collected at the province-level, using a similar method as the one described in the previous variable. This independent variable corresponds to the proportion of the worker-landowners as a share of the active population in 1951.

Annual Labourers

This kind of agricultural workers are hired on an annual basis, having a much more stable working situation than Daily Labourers. A variable for the share of this kind of workers was also included in this analysis. The data for the population corresponding to this segment was collected at the province-level, using a similar method as the one described in the previous variable. This independent variable corresponds to the proportion of the annual labourers as a share of the active population in 1951.

Sharecroppers

Finally, I also included an independent variable for the share of agricultural workers who rent and exploit lands that are owned by absent landowners. These workers also have steady working and economic conditions. The data for the population corresponding to this segment was collected at the province-level, using a similar method as the one described in the previous variable. This variable corresponds to the proportion of sharecroppers as a share of the active population in 1951.

Bourgeoisie

The share of the population belonging to the "bourgeoisie" was also included as an independent variable, since some studies suggest that this group was responsible to the resurgence of Fascism after democratisation (Dunnage 2002; Tonelli 2013). Following the operationalisation of this variable as used by Acemoglu *et al.* (2022), the share of "bourgeoisie" was "defined as professional,

white-collar workers, and shopkeepers". This data was retrieved from the IV volume of the 1936 Italian Census ("VIII Censimento Generale della Popolazione, Volume IV"), due to data limitations for 1951. The share of the population belonging to the "bourgeoisie" is a sum of the share of the active population working in commerce (shopkeepers), credit and insurance services, public administration, and private administration (professional and white-collar workers). This data was collected at the province-level.

5.6.2 Empirical Model II

The results of the second empirical analysis can be visualised on **Table 5.3**. Following the first theoretical expectation, large landowners — represented by the *Absent Landowners* variable — tend to vote more for the associated extremist party, while the majority of other agricultural segments tends vote less for this party. Hence, as suggested by the first implication of *Hypothesis 2*, the particularistic group, represented by this variable, votes more for extremist associated parties after transitions to democracy, than the groups that did not benefit from particularistic outputs.

It is also interesting to note that *Daily Labourers*, workers hired on a daily basis, also show some support for the MSI in the first democratic election in which this party participated in, although to a much smaller extent than the *Absent Landowners*. It is possible that the precarious economic situation experienced by this segment played a role in their vote for the MSI in the 1948 General Election. By not having a long-term and stable work contract, it could make sense that these workers voted for the associated extremist party in order to keep their work situation *status quo*, that would allow them to not lose the already precarious work relationships they had established in the past. Voting for the MSI would therefore be a vote on the protection of the landowners that hired them, so that they could keep their work relationships and their jobs. It is interesting to note that in 1953, the direction of the vote for the MSI by the *Daily Labourers* changes and the results stop being significant. It is reasonable that by 1953, these workers would have already adjusted to the new democratic context and would have likely adapted to

TABLE 5.3: MSI Vote Share in the 1948 and 1953 General Elections in Italy by Social Strata

	1948 Election		1953 Election	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Absent Landowners	0.505***	0.255**	3.055***	2.434***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.21)
Daily Labourers	0.072***	0.069***	-0.007	-0.032
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Worker-Landowners	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.040***	-0.063***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Annual Labourers	-0.182***	-0.121***	-0.445***	-0.354***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Sharecroppers	-0.022***	-0.008**	-0.043***	-0.032***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bourgeoisie	-0.040	-0.025	0.000	0.061
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Regime Repression		-0.001***		-0.002***
		(0.00)		(0.00)
Land Inequality (Δ)		-0.011*		0.008
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Population (ln)		0.003**		-0.005***
		(0.00)		(0.00)
GDP Capita		0.004		0.007
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Constant	0.021***	-0.010	0.051***	0.125***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
N	741	725	741	725
R^2	0.339	0.432	0.446	0.507

P-values: * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05, *** significant at 0.01.

the new job market without relying so much on their old work relationships[15].

The present analysis also shows that agricultural workers with more secure work conditions — *Annual Labourers* and *Sharecroppers* — tend to vote less for the associated extremist party. Brustein (1991), who described the support for the

[15]Data shows that in the 1953 General Elections, Daily Labourers mostly voted for the Italian Communist Party.

Fascist party before the regime was established, argues that tenants and sharecroppers had incentives "to buy out their leases and become property owners" themselves, and therefore were interested in voting for parties that would "promised eventual property ownership", namely through a land reform encompassing redistribution. Knowing that the MSI was against land redistribution and was mostly interested in protecting the existing property *status quo*, it becomes clear as to why these two groups would not be interested in voting for the associated extremist party, if their intention was indeed to increase their wages (or tenancy contracts), or to eventually become landowners themselves.

Worker-landowners, arguably smaller landowners who worked on their own lands, also tended to not vote for the associated extremist party. Brustein (1991) also writes that "as a rule, owner-cultivated farms tended to be smaller than sharecropping or tenant farms because of the financial barriers to the purchase of large holdings." It is thus expected that "the greater the farm size and the more wage labourers employed on the farm, the more likely farmers are to oppose high wages, land collectivisation, and the forced hiring of additional labor." Although this argument was similarly put forward regarding small landowners' vote in the 1919 and 1921 General Elections, I suggest that the same rationale can be used to explain the behaviour of this group in the 1948 and 1953 General Elections. Furthermore, it is also interesting to note that the *Bourgeoisie*, a group that has been referred to as pro-Fascist after transitions to democracy, actually does not seem to support the associated extremist party. This result goes against part of the qualitative literature on Fascism that has anecdotally argued that the "petty bourgeoisie" supported the resurgence of Fascism after the Second World War (Dunnage 2002; Tonelli 2013). However, it is also true that no study[16] has yet empirically justified this argument that the bourgeoisie drove the votes for the neo-Fascist party. Finally, the level of regime repression also negatively predicts the vote for the MSI, confirming once again, the second implication of the second theoretical hypothesis.

[16]To date, and to my knowledge.

Chapter 6

Discussion

This dissertation aimed at analysing how legacies of autocratic regimes can shape post-transitional party formation and voting attitudes, from a combined demand and supply-side perspective. It attempted to answer the question of *why do some post-transitional democracies have extremist parties associated with the former regime, while others have mainstream parties associated with the former regime, and yet others have no parties associated with the former regime?*

Using a rational choice theoretical approach, in the argument developed in this dissertation I suggested that the "self-interested" relationship between the general population and autocratic incumbents, operating through a top-down logic of reception of various kinds of material benefits provided by autocratic policy outputs, were crucial factors in shaping post-transitional attitudes towards the regimes' policies and consequently, voting preferences. Popular support has been shown to be a crucial element for the long-term stability of dictatorships (Wintrobe 1990; Gerschewski 2013). In order to increase it, I argued that autocratic leaders may produce general policy outputs, that will benefit virtually all the population, or particularistic policy outputs, that will only benefit specific groups. The top-down provision of these two policy outcomes, minus the negative effect of repression, will create distinct relations of self-interested dependence with the population, culminating in two different kinds of support, respectively: general and particularistic. But what happens to this stock of popular support after transitions to democracy? I contend that rational voters will have incentives to vote in a way that allows them to keep, or minimise the loss of the material benefits distributed during the former regime in the new democratic context.

According to the theoretical mechanism developed in this dissertation, I suggested that in regimes that have gathered general support, newly formed parties would utilise the positive inheritance of the former regime, having incentives to become mainstream in order to gather the maximum number of votes (*Hypothesis 1*). This is possible because the large majority of the population would have benefited from this kind of support. Using the case of the Spanish autocratic regime — the first comparative case-study analysed —, I provided substantial empirical evidence that such is the case. In Chapters 3 and 4, I showed that in Spain, the parties that chose to associate themselves with the former regime decided to go mainstream. Because the levels of general support are not homogeneous in a single regime, I provided significant empirical evidence that the areas in which the level of general outputs was higher, tended to vote more for mainstream associated parties after transitions to democracy, the first implication of *Hypothesis 1*. I also empirically demonstrated that in areas that simultaneously experienced general outputs and negative outputs tended to vote less for mainstream associated parties after transitions to democracy, the second implication of *Hypothesis 1*.

Furthermore, also according to the theoretical mechanism developed in this dissertation, I similarly showed that former autocratic regimes benefiting only from particularistic support would have extremism associated with the former regime (*Hypothesis 2*). Dictatorships that only created particularistic support only benefited a niche segment of the general population, and were unfavourable to the great majority, being for this reason, more likely to be "recycled" by extremist parties associated with the former regime. In Chapter 5, using the case of Fascist Italy — the second comparative case-study —, I demonstrated that such is the case. I showed that the only associated party that emerged after transitions to democracy was extremist, and quantitatively demonstrated that the areas in which the level of particularistic outputs was higher, tended to vote more for the extremist associated party after transitions to democracy, the first implication of *Hypothesis 2*. I also provided empirical evidence that the areas that experienced negative particularistic outputs, would tend to vote less for the extremist associated party after transitions to democracy, the second implication of *Hypothesis 2*.

The results obtained in the analyses carried out in this dissertation are consistent with the theoretical expectations of the argument. In Spain, a regime that produced general support, had mainstream associated parties and no extremism. Italy, a regime that exclusively produced particularistic support, only had an extremist associated party. An higher incidence of support at the local level is translated into a higher vote for the associated parties. And the existence of repression, reduces their electoral success.

When placing these results in the context of the available literature, it is possible to conclude that legacies of autocratic regimes are indeed able to shape what happens beyond the early days of the democratisation process, as other few studies have demonstrated. This work, innovative from the perspective that it focuses on concrete policy outcomes and not on ideology[1], is therefore consistent with the few available studies on the impact of legacies of autocratic regimes beyond the early stages of democratisation. More specifically — and more importantly —, the results obtained shed an important light on explaining why certain countries have extremism of the same colour as the former regime, why other regimes have very successful mainstream parties associated with the former dictatorship, and yet others display no engagement at all with the autocratic past. The results obtained in this dissertation allow us to cautiously extrapolate what kind of associated parties — if any — a regime may have once it transits into democracy. Furthermore, and also crucially, although these legacy effects tend to fade away with time, they will leave long-lasting marks on newly formed party systems. As suggested by Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1988), it takes only few early elections of a particular electoral framework — with the hegemony or presence of certain parties — to shape party systems for a long period of time. It is possible that this explains why the Italian party system is more permeable to the emergence of extreme-right and neo-Fascist parties, while the same does not happen in Spain. Finally, the results obtained in this dissertation also emphasise the importance of the self-interested material linkages between an autocrat and the general population. This is an innovation in the context of the available literature to the extent that this dissertation uses a rational choice mechanism,

[1]Or on a legacy as an undefined, abstract, ideological construction.

with self-interest at its core, to explain how legacies can affect post-transitional voting, thus reducing the role of ideology. While the role of ideology is unquestionably important in some autocratic legacies, this dissertation shows that material benefits — in the form of policy outputs — also have a crucial role, regardless of how ideological a regime was. This role extends itself in shaping voting attitudes and party formation after democratic transitions.

Furthermore, it is important to establish a relationship between the results obtained in this dissertation and contemporary Spain and Italy. As mentioned, Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1988) suggest that the first electoral results have the ability to shape party systems for a long period of time. However, it is important to highlight that when sufficient time has passed, due to the generational replacement of those who lived under the autocratic regime, and because due to the passage of time, it makes sense that electors will retrospectively focus on more recent democratic performance than on policy outputs distributed during the autocracy (Kiewiet 1983; Achen and Bartels 2004), the effects I describe in this dissertation last only for a limited period of time. These time effects were described on Chapter 4 in the case of Spain. In Italy, although the MSI eventually disappeared by the 1990s, it increasingly moderated it stance as time went by. Regarding more long-lasting effects that first elections may imprint in newly formed democratic party systems (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1988), it is interesting to observe that whereas Spain had no right-wing extremism before *VOX* — founded in only 2013, almost 40 years after transitions to democracy — Italy had multiple other extreme-right parties since the moment it democratised until today — such as *Fratelli d'Italia* or *Lega Nord*. Although I consider that the emergence of these parties in both countries constitute an unrelated phenomenon to the one described in the theoretical mechanism of this dissertation, to the extent that they are not parties associated to the former autocratic regime, it is possible that the presence or absence of extremism in the first democratic elections had some impact on their subsequent emergence or absence, shaping the following electoral outcomes, as contended by Gunther, Sani and Shabad (1988). This would, of course, require an additional detailed analysis.

In the following paragraphs, I will draw attention to the limitations of the

present dissertation. First, it is true that economic growth can also, in fact, create distortions that create a feeling of unfairness. Verwiebe and Wegener (2000) show that individual evaluations of income inequality — regarded as just or not — can be attributed to "positional differences of individuals" in society, demonstrating that how rewards are distributed matters to the formation of what they call "perceived income justice gap". However, several studies have also robustly shown that when economic growth promotes an increase in income levels, the distribution of income is proportional to the growth experienced (Roemer and Gugerty 1997; Gallup, Radelet and Warner 1999; Dollar and Kraay 2002), only varying under special circumstances (Foster and Székely 2008). According to Danielson (2001), "the rate of growth of the incomes of the poorest quintile is approximately equal to the rate of growth of per capita incomes: in growth episodes, the poor increase their incomes on average as much as everybody else". I tried to resolve this question by appealing to the sociotropic nature of economic growth, taking into account the evidence that when members of the social group a particular individual belongs to are better off, the individual will not immediately punish the regime — by not offering her support —, waiting instead for the effects to trickle down to her own individual level. As claimed by Wang (2017), this sociotropic element of support is the combination of self-interest plus time, or "patience". Nevertheless, due to its importance for the overall argument, this question could be further explored in further studies. Second, it is also true that the notions of general support and particularistic support can be hard to define, and difficult to operationalise. The application of this theory to more cases would be useful in order to help to refine these concepts. However, this poses its own challenges. As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, operationalising these concepts requires deep historical analysis and archival work that are not easy to carry out under limited time and with resources' constraints. I believe it is however worth attempting, and I will discuss this point further on, when highlighting the avenues for further research. Third, a last point that could benefit from further empirical attention is the one related to the extent to which positive outputs are more effective in areas that were previously more underdeveloped *versus* areas that were more developed. In Chapter 4 this issue became apparent

when looking at the case of the rich regions of Madrid and Catalonia, when comparing them with the poor regions of Extremadura and Andalusia. Although Madrid and Catalonia grew less than Extremadura and Andalusia during the second stage of the regime (Alcaide 2003), could it be that even if these regions had grown more, the effects of general support would always be more reduced in these richer regions because the marginal improvement in well-being would be smaller than in poorer regions? This is a relevant question that would require further clarification in future studies.

It is also relevant to mention that I believe that the findings of this dissertation can be generalisable to any other autocratic regime. As long as one can identify if and where a regime was able to produce general and/or particularistic support, I believe that the theoretical mechanism presented here can be used in any autocratic regime to draw conclusions about the kind of associated parties it may have once it democratises, and how electorally successful they might be. For example, this theory could be easily applied to Soviet Russia. Although this was a regime that grew significantly between 1950 and 1960, it subsequently stagnated until the end of the regime (Harrison 1993). Therefore, it could be said that very little general outputs were produced in the last years of the Soviet Regime in Russia. As known, the Soviet *nomenklatura* greatly benefited from various particularistic benefits distributed to the regime elites (Wintrobe 2000). For this reason, it makes sense that after transitions to democracy, the only associated party that emerged in post-autocratic Russia was the associated extremist party Communist Party of the Russian Federation (Grzymala-Busse 2018). A similar analysis could be carried out in autocratic regimes in Latin America — like Chile — and Southern Asia — such as Postwar Taiwan and South Korea — that similarly to Spain, experienced very high levels of economic growth (Cheng and Huang 2018; Loxton and Mainwaring 2018), and produced very successful associated mainstream parties, once they transited to democracy.

Lastly, I will highlight the avenues for future studies that the results obtained in this dissertation may prompt. The most obvious further work based on this dissertation that would be important to carry out, is, as already mentioned above, a large-N multi-country analysis. Although it is difficult to collect detailed

historical evidence for multiple autocratic regimes, relying on an experts' survey could constitute a good way to contour the in-depth evaluation needed for each regime. This analysis would allow the test of the two hypotheses established in the theoretical chapter, without having to rely so much on a qualitative approach. Additionally, I still believe that it would also be important to include other in-depth case studies in order to establish generability. It would be relevant to include case-studies dealing with former autocratic regimes in the post-Soviet countries, in Latin America, and Asia. Including case-studies from regimes located in other geo-political regions would be specially important to establish this generability.

Overall, much work still needs to be done on the impact of autocratic regimes in post-transitional, and even contemporary party systems, and voting attitudes. Hopefully, this work will contribute to such undertaking, and will motivate other researchers to particularly analyse the impact of self-interest and rational choice as a crucial bridge between the autocratic past and the democratic future.

Chapter 7

Bibliography

ABC. 1961. "Franco Recibe la Gratitud de los Almerienses por la Transformación en Regadío de Cuarenta Mil Hectáreas Sedientas." *ABC*, May 2, 1961. https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-41731/datastreams/OBJ/content

ABC. 1964. "El Establecimiento de Polos y Poligonos Acelerará la Idustrialización Española." *ABC*, January 26, 1964. https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-49584/datastreams/OBJ/content

ABC. 1981. "El empleo comunitario distribuirá cuatro jornales semanales en Andalucía." *ABC*, May 1, 1981. https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-2225/datastreams/OBJ/content

Acemoğlu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2004. "Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability". Paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Chicago, September 1-5, 2004.

Aguilar, José. 1979. "Los Latifundistas Andaluces Abandonan la Escena Política." *El País*, March 31, 1979. https://elpais.com/diario/1979/03/31/espana/291682844_850215.html?rel=buscador_noticias.

Albanese, Giulia and Roberta Pergher. 2012. *In the Society of Fascists. Acclamation, Acquiescence, and Agency in Mussolini's Italy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. 2013. "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44 (3): 575-603.

Albertus, Michael, Sofia Fenner, and Dan Slater. 2018. *Coercive Distribution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Albertus, Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Albertus, Michael. 2019. "The Fate of Former Authoritarian Elites Under Democracy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 63 (3): 727-759.

Alcaide Inchausti, Julio. 2003. *Evolución Económica de las Regiones y Provincias Españolas en el Siglo XX*. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA.

Alesina, Alberto, and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln. 2007. "Good-bye Lenin (or not?): The Effect of Communism of People's Preferences." *American Economic Review*. 97 (04): 2007.

Alonso Álvarez, Luis. 2010. "La Economía de Galicia, una Panorámica, c. 1750-2010." *Historia Contemporánea*. 42: 15-65.

Alonso, Sonia, and Sara Claro da Fonseca. 2011. "Immigration Left and Right." *Party Politics*. 18 (6): 865–84.

Alvaredo, Facundo, and Emmanuel Saez. 2009. "Income and Wealth Concentration in Spain from a Historical and Fiscal Perspective." *Journal of the European Economic Association*. 7 (5): 1140-1167.

Anderson, Christopher J., Silvia M. Mendes, and Yuliya V. Tverdova. 2004. Endogenous Economic Voting: Evidence from the 1997 British Election. *Electoral Studies*. 23 (4): 683-708.

Angulo, Javier, and Alfonso González. 1982. "Huelva, la Vuelta a la Agricultura." *El País*, May 21, 1982. `https://elpais.com/diario/1982/05/21/espana/390780006_850215.html`

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Marc Meredith, and Erik Snowberg. 2014. "Mecro-Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro-Perceptions of the Macro-Economy." *Economics Politics*. 26 (3): 380–410.

Archivio Centrale dello Stato Piazzale degli Archivi. *Casellario Politico Centrale*. Rome, Italy. `http://dati.acs.beniculturali.it/CPC/`

Arco Blanco, Miguel Ángel Del, and Peter Anderson. 2017. "Property, the Forging of Francoism and Collective Memory." *International Journal of Iberian Studies*. 30 (2): 73-92.

Arco Blanco, Miguel Ángel Del, and Peter Anderson. 2021. *Franco's Famine: Malnutrition Disease and Starvation in Post-Civil War Spain*. London: Bloomsbury.

Arendt, Hannah. 1951. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Schocken Books.

Argandoña, Antonio. 1999. *Una Historia del Desempleo En España*. Barcelona: IESE, Universidad de Navarra.

Atkins, Stephen A. 2004. *Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups*. Westport, Conneticut: Greenwood Press.

Bailey, Jack. 2021. "What's the Half-Life of the Economic Vote? (About a Year and a Half)". *Unpublished Manuscript*, May 6 2021, typescript.

Ballestero, Enrique. 1980. "Obreros Agrícolas, Gobierno Civil y Empleo Comunitario." *El País*, August 6, 1980. `https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-20101/datastreams/OBJ/content`

Balsa-Barreiro, José, and Sarah Landsperger. 2012. "Declive Demográfico y Cambio del Modelo de Poblamiento en un Sector de Costa del NW Español: A Costa da Morte (A Coruña, Galicia) y su Evolución desde 1960." *Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa*. 130 (1-12): 105-118.

Barahona de Brito, Alexandra. 2010. "Transitional Justice and Memory: Exploring Perspectives." *South European Society and Politics*. 15 (3): 359-376.

Barrientos Alfageme, Gonzalo. 1980. "La Población Activa en Extremadura." *Norba: Revista de Arte, Geografía e Historia*. 1: 23-130.

Bartels, Larry. 2002. "Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions." *Political Behaviour*. 24 (2): 117-150.

Belotti, Lorenzo M. 1960. "An Analysis of the Italian Agrarian Reform." *Land Economics*. 36 (2): 118-128.

Beltrán Tapia, Francisco J., Alfonso Díez-Minguela, Julio Martinez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado-Fabregat. 2021. "The Roots of Land Inequality in Spain." *Unpublished Manuscript*, January 2021, typescript.

Bensman, J. 1979. "Max Weber's Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation." In *Conflict and Control: Challenge to Legitimacy of Modern Governments*, edited by A. J. Vidich and R. M. Glassman, 17–48. California: Sage.

Bernal, Antonio Miguel. 1984. "Desarrollo Economico y Desequilibrio Regional en Andalucia: La Incidencia el Sector Agricola." *Revista de Estudios Andaluces*. 2: 15-30.

Bernal, Antonio Miguel. 1987. "Latifundios, Jornaleros y Paro Agricola." *Revista de Estudios Andaluces*. 8: 67-86.

Bernhard, Michael, and Amanda B. Edgell. 2019. "Democracy and Social Forces." Paper presented at the *V-Dem Academic Research Conference*, Brastad, Sweden, May 23-24, 2019.

Blanco Artola, Miguel. 2013. "Los Terratenientes Frente al Cambio Agrario 1940-1954." *Historia Agraria*. 59: 125-158.

Blekesaune, Morten, and Jill Quadagno. 2003. "Public Attitudes toward Welfare State Policies." *European Sociological Review*. 19 (5): 415-427.

Boix, Carles, and Milan W. Svolik. (2013). The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. *Journal of Politics*. 75(2): 300–316.

Boix, Carles, and Susan Carol Stokes. 2003. "Endogenous Democratization." *World Politics*. 554: 517-549.

Boix, Carles. 2008. "Spain: Development, Democracy, and Equity." In *Institutional Pathways to Equity: Addressing Inequality Traps*, edited by Anthony J. Bebbington, Anis A. Dani, Arjan de Haan, and Michael Walton, 217-244. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

Bosque Maurel, Joaquín. 1979. "Empleo, Paro y Emigración en Andalucía." *Paralelo 37*. 3: 47-58.

Brancati, Dawn. 2016. *Democracy Protests: Origins, Features and Significance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Breuning, Marijke, and John T. Ishiyama. 1998. "The Rhetoric of Nationalism: Rhetorical Strategies of the Volksunie and Vlaams Blok in Belgium, 1991–1995." *Political Communication*. 15: 5–26.

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. A*uthoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Brustein, William. 1991. "The 'Red Menace' and the Rise of Italian Fascism." *American Sociological Review*. 56 (5): 652-664.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Burnell, Peter J. 2006. "Autocratic Opening to Democracy: Why Legitimacy Matters." *Third World Quarterly*. 274: 545-562.

Campello, Daniela, and Cesar Zucco. 2020. *The Volatility Curse Exogenous Shocks and Representation in Resource-Rich Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Caparrós, Luis. 1977. "Incertidumbre Electoral." *Arriba*, May 5, 1977. `https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-38348/datastreams/OBJ/content`

Caparrós, Luis. 1977. "Sorpresas Electorales." *Arriba*, June 19, 1977. https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-30564/datastreams/OBJ/content

Cardesin Diaz, José María. 2006. "La Sociedad Gallega en el Franquismo." In *Historia Contemporánea de Galicia*, edited by Julio Prada Rodríguez and Jesús de Juana López, 295-322. Spain: Ariel.

Carlsen, Fredrik. 2000. "Unemployment, Inflation and Government Popularity: Are There Partisan Effects?" *Electoral Studies*. 19: 141- 50.

Carrillo-Linares, Alberto. 2006. "Movimiento Estudiantil Antifranquista, Cultura Política y Transición Política a la Democracia." *Pasado y Memoria: Revista de Historia Contemporánea*. 5: 149-170.

Casanellas, Pau. 2022. "Joint Efforts in the Fight against Franco: Protest and Repression during the Spanish Long '68." *Contemporary European History*. 31: 271–285.

Cassani, Andrea. 2017. "Social Services to Claim Legitimacy: Comparing Autocracies' Performance." *Contemporary Politics*. 23 (3): 348-368.

Castro, José J., Esther Divovich, Alicia Delgado de Molina Acevedo, and Antonio Barrera-Luján. 2015. "Over-Looked and Under-Reported: A Catch Reconstruction of Marine Fisheries in the Canary Islands, Spain, 1950 – 2010." *Unpublished Manuscript*, January 2015, typescript.

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). *Barómetro de Julio 1982, Nº 1320*. July 8, 1982. https://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/EN/2_bancodatos/estudios/listaMuestras.jsp?estudio=312

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). *Barómetro de Septiembre 1985, Nº 1472*. September 10, 1985. https://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/EN/2_bancodatos/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=462

Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). *Cuestiones de Actualidad, Nº 1034*. January 1, 1968. https://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/EN/2_bancodatos/estudios/ver.jsp?estudio=33

Chan, Siew-Pang. 2006. "Beta Regression Analysis of Singapore General Election Results." Paper presented at the *2nd IMT-GT Regional Conference on Mathematics, Statistics and Applications*, June 13-15, 2006. Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang.

Cheng, T. J., and Teh-fu Huang. 2018. "Authoritarian Successor Parties in South Korea and Taiwan." In *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*, edited by James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 84-112. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Chiarini, Roberto. 1989. "Profilo Storico-Critico del MSI." *Il Politico*. 54 (3): 369-389.

Chuliá, Elisa. 2007. "Cultural Diversity and the Development of a Pre-Democratic Civil Society in Spain." In *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson, 163-181. Basingstoke Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Cobo Romero, Francisco, Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco, and Teresa María Ortega López. 2011. "The Stability and Consolidation of the Francoist Regime. The Case of Eastern Andalusia, 1936–1950." *Contemporary European History*. 20 (1): 37-59.

Cohen, Jon S. 1979. "Fascism and Agriculture in Italy: Policies and Consequences." *The Economic History Review*. 32 (1): 70-87.

Cohen, Jon S. 1988. "Was Italian Fascism a Developmental Dictatorship? Some Evidence to the Contrary." *The Economic History Review*. 41 (1): 95-113.

Colino Sueiras, José. 1984. *La Integración de la Agricultura Gallega en el Capitalismo: El Horizonte de la C.E.E.* Madrid, Spain: Instituto de Estudios Agrarios, Pesqueros y Alimentarios.

Collantes Gutiérrez, Fernando. 2007. "La Desagrarización de la Sociedad Rural Española, 1950-1991." *Historia Agraria*. 42: 251-276.

Conover, Pamela Johnston. 1988. "The Role of Social Groups in Political Thinking." *British Journal of Political Science*. 18: 51-76.

Converse, Philip E., Peter J. McDonough, Amaury G. de Souza, and Youssef Cohen. 2006. *Representation and Development in Brazil, 1972-1973*. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.

Corbetta, Piergiorgio, and Maria Serena Piretti. 2008. *Atlante Storico-Elettorale d'Italia: 1861–2008*. Bologna: Zanichelli.

Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Cuadrado-Roura, Juan R. 2010. *Regional Policy, Economic Growth and Convergence: Lessons from the Spanish Case*. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

D'Attoma, John. 2016. "Divided Nation: The North-South Cleavage in Italian Tax Compliance." *Polity*. 49 (1): 69-99.

Daniele, Vittorio, and Paolo Malanim. 2014. "Falling Disparities and Persisting Dualism: Regional Development and Industrialisation in Italy, 1891–2001." *Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research*. 10: 165–176.

Danielson, Anders. 2001. "When Do the Poor Benefit From Growth, and Why?" Paper presented at the *"Poverty and Growth" Workshop*, August 8, 2001. Lidingö, Sweden.

Darden, Keith, and Anna Grzymala-Busse. 2006. "The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse." *World Politics*. 59 (1): 83-115.

Daron, Acemoglu, Giseppe de Feo, Giacomo de Luca, and Gianluca Russo. 2021. "War, Socialism and the Rise of Fascism: An. Empirical Exploration." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 137 (2): 1233–1296.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. "State Repression and Political Order." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 10: 1-24.

De la Torre, Joseba, and Mario García-Zúñiga. 2014. "Was it a Spanish Miracle? Development Plans and Regional Industrialization, 1950-1975." In *Industrial Policy in Europe after 1945: Wealth, Power and Economic Development in the*

Cold War, edited by Christian Grabas and Alexander Nutzenadel, 162-183. Basingstoke Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan."

Decreto-ley 1/1969, 24 January 1969. *Preamble*. BOE-A-1969-98: 1175. Spanish Government. https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1969/01/25/pdfs/A01175-01175.pdf

Della Porta, Donatella. 2014. *Mobilizing for Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Diamond, Larry. 2016. *In Search of Democracy*. London: Routledge.

Diario 16. 1977. "Línea Cristiana y Apoyo al Centro-Derecha." *Diario 16*, June 2, 1977. https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-44283/datastreams/OBJ/content

Díez, Alfonso Minguela, Julio Martinez-Galarraga, and Daniel A. Tirado-Fabregat. 2018. *Regional Inequality in Spain 1860–2015*. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dinas, Elias, and Ksenia Northmore-Ball. 2020. "The Ideological Shadow of Authoritarianism." *Comparative Political Studies*. 53 (12): 1957-1991.

Dirección General de Seguridad. 1969. *Boletín Extraordinario*. Madrid, May 20 1969. Fascículo XI: 419-483.

Djurfeldt, Goran. 1993. "Classes As Clients of the State: Landlords and Labourers in Andalusia." *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. 159–59.

Dollar, David, and Aart Kraay. 2002. "Growth Is Good for the Poor." *Journal of Economic Growth*. 7 (3): 195-225.

Domènech, Jordi, and Francisco Herreros. 2018. "Land Reform and Conflict before the Civil War: Landowner Response to Tenancy Reform in 1930s Catalonia." *Economic History Review*. 71 (4): 1322–1348.

Domènech, Jordi, and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. 2021. "The Long Shadow of Agrarian Conflict: Agrarian Inequality and Voting in Spain." *British Journal of Political Science*. 52 (4): 1668–88.

Domènech, Jordi. 2015. "Land Tenure Inequality, Harvests, and Rural Conflict: Evidence from Southern Spain during the Second Republic (1931–1934)." *Social Science History*. 39 (2): 253-286.

Domínguez Martín, Rafael. 2002. *La Riqueza de las Naciones. Las Desigualdades Económicas Regionales en España, 1700–2000*. Madrid, Spain: Alianza.

Douma, Jacob C., and James T. Weedon. 2019. "Analysing Continuous Proportions in Ecology and Evolution: A Practical Introduction to Beta and Dirichlet Regression." *Methods in Ecology and Evolution*. 10: 1412-1430.

Dowling, Andrew. 2018. "Prohibition, Tolerance, Co-option: Cultural Appropriation and Francoism in Catalonia, 1939–75." *Contemporary European History*. 27 (3): 370–386.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper Row.

Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. 2017. "What Autocracies say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation." *Contemporary Politics*. 23 (3): 251-268.

Dunnage, Jonathan. 2014. *Twentieth Century Italy: A Social History*. Edinburgh: Pearson Education Limited.

Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science*. 5 (4): 435-457.

Ebner Michael R. 2011. *Ordinary Violence in Mussolini's Italy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Edlin, Aaron, Andrew Gelman, Noah Kaplan. 2007. "Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote to Improve the Well-being of Others." *Rationality and Society*. 19 (3): 293-314.

Ekman, Joakim, and Jonas Linde. 2005. "Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. 21 (3): 354-374.

El País. 1978. "Proyecto de Ley de Expropiación de Fincas Mejorables." *El País*, June 21, 1978. https://elpais.com/diario/1978/06/21/economia/267228015_850215.html

Elazar, Dahlia Sabina. 2000. "Class, State, and Counter-Revolution: The Fascist Seizure of Power in Italy, 1919-1922." *European Sociological Review*. 16 (3): 301-321.

Entrena, Francisco. 2021. "Social Change, Inequalities and Conflicts in Andalusia." *Mediterranean Studies*. 10: 181-207.

Erikson, Robert S. 2004. "Macro vs. Micro-Level Perspectives on Economic Voting: Is the Micro-Level Evidence Endogenously Induced?" Paper presented at the *2004 Political Methodology Meetings*, July 29-31, 2004. Stanford University.

Estévez, Karen. 2021. "De 1960 a 2021: Así ha Cambiado el Paisaje del Sur de Tenerife y Gran Canaria por el Turismo." *Canarias Ahora*, October 5, 2021. https://www.eldiario.es/canariasahora/sociedad/1960-2021-cambiado-paisaje-sur-tenerife-gran-canaria-turismo_1_8368161.html

Evans, Geoffrey, and Robert Andersen. 2006. "The Political Conditioning of Economic Perceptions." *The Journal of Politics*. 68 (1): 194–207.

Farolfi, Bernardino, and Massimo Fornasari. 2011. "Agricoltura e Sviluppo Economico: Il Caso Italiano (secoli XVIII-XX)." *Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche*, Università di Bologna. DSE 756.

Felice, Emanuele, and Giovanni Vecchi. 2015. "Italy's Growth and Decline, 1861–2011." *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*. XLV (4): 507-548.

Ferrari, Silvia, and Francisco Cribari-Neto. 2004. "Beta Regression for Modelling Rates and Proportions." *Journal of Applied Statistics*. 31 (7): 799-815.

Foster, James E., and Miguel Székely. 2008. "Is Economic Growth Good for the Poor? Tracking Low Incomes Using General Means." *International Economic Review*. 49 (4): 1143-1172.

Freijanes, Víctor F. 1977. "La Gran incognita está en el campesinado." *Informaciones*, June 13, 1977. `https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-32377/datastreams/OBJ/content`

Friedrich, Carl Joachim, and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski. 1968. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. New York: Praeger.

Gallup, John Luke, Steven Radelet, and Andrew Warner. 1999. "Economic Growth and the Income of the Poor." *CAER II Discussion Paper No. 36*, Cambridge, United States: Harvard Institute for International Development.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under Dictatorships." *Economics and Politics*. 18 (1): 1–26.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies*. 40 (11): 1279-1301.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*. Cambridge: University Press Cambridge.

García Delgado, José Luis, Cándido Muñoz Cidad, and Carlos Abad Balboa. 1994. "La Agricultura Española en el Último Tercio del Siglo XX: Principales Pautas Evolutivas." In *Modernización y Cambio Estructural en la Agricultura Española*, edited by José María Sumpsi Viñas, 69-126. Madrid, Spain: Ministerio de Agricultura, Alimentación y Medio Ambiente.

García Moreno, Gaspar. 1977. "Extremadura: Felipe González Perdió la Sonrisa." *Informaciones*, June 13, 1977. `https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-32379/datastreams/OBJ/content`

García Sanz, Angel, and Jesús Sanz Fernández. 1996. *Reformas y Políticas Agrarias en la Historia de España (de la Ilustración al Primer Franquismo)*. Madrid, Spain: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación.

García-Badell, Gabriel. 1960. "La Distribución de la Propiedad Agrícola en España en las Diferentes Categorías de Fincas." *Revista de Estudios Agrosociales*. 30: 7-32.

Geddes, Barbara, and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*. 33 (2): 319-347.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2 (1): 115–144.

Gelissen, J. 2000. "Popular Support for Institutionalised Solidarity: A Comparison between European Welfare States." *International Journal of Social Welfare*. 9 (4): 285-300.

Gentile, Emilio. 1986. "Fascism in Italian Historiography: In Search of an Individual Historical Identity." *Journal of Contemporary History*. 21: 179-208."

George, Alexander L., and Timothy J. McKeown. 1985. "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations*. 2: 21–58.

Gerschewski, Johannes. 2013. "The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes." *Democratization*. 20 (1): 13-38.

Gerschewski, Johannes. 2018. "Legitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?" *Perspectives on Politics*. 16 (3): 652-665.

Gill, Graeme J. 2000. *The Dynamics of Democratization: Elites, Civil Society and the Transition Process*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ginsborg, Paul. 1984. "The Communist Party and the Agrarian Question in Southern Italy, 1943-48." *History Workshop Journal*. 17 (1): 81-101.

González de Molina, Manuel, David Soto Fernández, Juan Infante Amate, and Antonio Herrera. 2021. "Agricultural Crisis and Food Crisis in Early Francoism: Hunger Seen Through the Lens of Biophysics." In *Franco's Famine: Malnutrition, Disease and Starvation in Post-Civil War Spain*, edited by Miguel Ángel del Arco Blanco and Peter Anderson, 36-56. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.

Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 2013. "Authoritarianism Online: What Can We Learn from Internet Data in Nondemocracies?" *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 46 (2): 262-270.

Groves, Tamar, Nigel Townson, Inbal Ofer, and Antonio Herrera. 2017. *Social Movements and the Spanish Transition: Building Citizenship in Parishes, Neighbourhoods, Schools and the Countryside*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna M. 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2018 "Victims of Their Own Success: The Paradoxical Fate of the Communist Successor Parties." In *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*, edited by James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring, 145-174. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Guerra Palmero, Ricardo A. 2007. "La Larga Posguerra en Canarias: Notas Socioeconómicas." *Cuadernos del Ateneo*. 23: 53-72.

Gunitsky, S. 2015. "Corrupting the Cyber-Commons: Social Media as a Tool of Autocratic Stability." *Perspectives on Politics*. 13 (1): 42–54.

Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. 1988. *Spain After Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorell. 2007. "Pathways from Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy*. 18 (1): 143–157.

Hansford, Thomas G., and Brad T. Gomez. 2015. "Reevaluating the Sociotropic Economic Voting Hypothesis." *Electoral Studies*. 39: 15-25

Harari, Yuval N. 2020. "The World after Coronavirus." *The Financial Times*, March 20, 2020. `https://www.ft.com/content/19d90308-6858-11ea-a3c9-1fe6fedcca75`

Harrison, Mark. 1993. "Soviet Economic Growth Sinze 1928: The Alternative Statistics of G. I. Khanin." *Europe-Asia Studies*. 45 (1): 141-167.

Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, and Jane A. Rafferty. 1989. "The Determinants of Public Attitudes Toward the Welfare State." *Social Forces*. 67 (4): 1027-1048.

Healy, Andrew, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2014. "Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy." *American Journal of Political Science*. 58 (1): 31-47.

Hopkin, Jonathan. 1999. *Party Formation and Democratic Transition in Spain: The Creation and Collapse of the Union of the Democratic Centre*. Basingstoke Hampshire, England: Macmillan Press.

Howe, Marvine. 1976. "Spain's Big Landowners Still Live a Gracious Life." *The New York Times*, April 20, 1976. `https://www.nytimes.com/1976/04/20/archives/spains-bid-landowners-still-live-a-gracious-life.html`

Ignazi, Piero. 2003. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Ignazi, Piero. 2018. *I Partiti in Italia dal 1945 al 2018*. Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino.

Inkeles, Alex. 1993. "Industrialization, Modernization and the Quality of Life." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*. 1-23.

Ishiyama, John T. 1995. "Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders, and Processes of Democratisation in Eastern Europe." *Comparative Politics*. 27(2): 147-166.

Ishiyama, John T., and Sahar Shafqat. 2000. "Party Identity Change in Post-Communist Politics: The Cases of the Successor Parties in Hungary, Poland and Russia." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 33: 439-455.

Istituto Centrale di Statistica del Regno D'Italia. 1927. "Annuario Statistico Italiano, Anno 1927 - V. Terza Serie, Vol. I." *Stabilimento Poligrafico*

per L'Amministrazione dello Stato. https://ebiblio.istat.it/digibib/Annuario%20Statistico%20Italiano/RAV0040597ASI1927.pdf

Istituto Centrale di Statistica del Regno D'Italia. 1939. "VIII Censimento Generale della Popolazione, 21 Aprile 1936 - XIV. Volume IV: Professioni. Parte Seconda. Agricoltura." https://ebiblio.istat.it/digibib/Censimenti%20popolazione/censpop1936/IST0005815vol4parte1_Relazione/IST0005815_Vol4_Professioni_Parte1_Relazione+OCR_ottimizzato.pdf

Istituto Centrale di Statistica. 1958. "IX Censimento Generale della Popolazione, 4 Novembre 1951. Volume VII: Dati Generali Riassuntivi." https://ebiblio.istat.it/digibib/Censimenti%20popolazione/censpop1951/VECP1951DNVII_IST0005524VolumeVIIDatigenerali+OCRottimizz.pdf

Italy. Gazzetta Ufficiale. 1950. *Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica*. October 17, 857. https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=1950-10-28&atto.codiceRedazionale=050U0841&elenco30giorni=false

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2001. "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preferences." *American Political Science Review*. 95 (4): 875-893.

Jackman, Robert, and Karin Volpert. 1996. "Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe." *British Journal of Political Science*. 26: 501–21.

Jackson, Gabriel. 1976. "The Franco Era in Historical Perspective." *The Centennial Review*. 20 (2): 103-127.

Kailitz, Steffen and Daniel Stockemer. 2017. "Regime Legitimation, Elite Cohesion and the Durability of Autocratic Regime Types." *International Political Science Review*. 38 (3): 332-348.

Kailitz, Steffen. 2013. "Classifying Political Regimes Revisited: Legitimation and Durability." *Democratization*. 20 (1): 39-60.

Keating, Michael. 2000. "Rethinking the Region. Culture, Institutions and Economic Development in Catalonia and Galicia." *Unpublished Manuscript*, October 2000, typescript.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 2011. No Man is an Island: Self-Interest, the Public Interest, and Sociotropic Voting. *Critical Review*. 23 (3): 303-319.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick.1983. *Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kinder, Donald R., and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1981. Sociotropic Politics: The American Case. *British Journal of Political Science*. 11 (2): 129-161.

King, Gary, Robert O, Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Kirkpatrick, Jeane. 1982. *Dictatorship and Double Standards: Rationalism and Realism in Politics*. New York: Simon Schuster.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. "Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964." *American Political Science Review*. 65 (1): 131-143.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1983. "The Ecological Fallacy Revisited: Aggregate Versus Individual Level Findings on Economics and Elections and Sociotropic Voting." *American Political Science Review*. 77 (1): 92-111.

La Voz de Galicia. 1965. "La Feria de Muestras y la Agricultura Regional." *La Voz de Galicia*, July 17, 1965. `https://quiosco.lavozdegalicia.es/historico.htm?fechaNavegacion=17-07-1965&publicacion=La%20Voz%20de%20Galicia&edicion=A%20CORU%D1A`

Linz, Juan J. 1976. "Patterns of Land Tenure, Division of Labor, and Voting Behavior in Europe." *Comparative Politics*. 8 (3): 365-430.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C. Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, Juan José. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Lopes, Marina. 2018. "In Brazil, Nostalgia Grows for the Dictatorship — Not the Brutality, but the Law and Order." *The Washington Post*, March 15, 2018. `https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/in-brazil-nostalgia-grows-for-the-dictatorship--not-the-brutalit/y-but-the-law-and-order/2018/03/14/bc58ded2-1cdd-11e8-98f5-ceec/fa8741b6_story.html`

Loxton, James, and Scott Mainwaring. 2018. *Life After Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Lü, Xiaobo. 2014. "Social Policy and Regime Legitimacy: The Effects of Education Reform in China." *American Political Science Review*. 108 (2): 423-437.

Lupu, Noam. 2013. "Party Brands and Partisanship: Theory with Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Argentina." *American Journal of Political Science*. 57 (1): 49-64.

Lynch, Marc. 2011. "After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State." *Perspectives on Politics*. 9 (2): 301-310.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies*. 41 (4-5): 715–741.

Malanima, Paolo, and Vera Zamagni. 2010. "150 Years of the Italian Economy, 1861–2010." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*. 15 (1): 1-20.

Malefakis, Edward. 1970. *Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Mammone, Andrea. 2015. *Transnational Neofascism in France and Italy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mangas Navas, Manuel J. 1990. "Introducción." In *Política Administrativa y Económica de la Colonización Agraria*, edited by Manuel J. Mangas Navas and Carlos Barciela. Madrid, Spain: Ministerio para las Adiministraciones Públicas, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Urbanismo y Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación.

Mangas Navas, Manuel J., and Carlos Barciela. 1990. *Política Administrativa y Económica de la Colonización Agraria*. Madrid, Spain: Ministerio para las Adiministraciones Públicas, Ministerio de Obras Públicas y Urbanismo y Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación.

Márquez Quevedo, Javier. 2018. "Turistas y Cambio Social Durante el Tardo-Franquismo. Campesinos, Obreros y Extranjeros en los Inicios del Turismo de Masas en las Islas Canarias (1962-1975)." *Diacronie. Studi di Storia Contemporanea*. 36 (4): 50-93.

Marsal, Juan F. 1977. "Votar en Galicia." *Diario de Barcelona*, September 24, 1977. `https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-41566/datastreams/OBJ/content`

Martín Aceña, Pablo, and Elena Martínez Ruiz. 2007. "The Golden Age of Spanish Capitalism: Economic Growth without Political Freedom." In *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*, edited by Nigel Townson, 30-46. Basingstoke Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Martinelli, Pablo. 2012. "Latifundia Revisited. Market Power, Land Inequality and Efficiency in Interwar Italian Agriculture." *European Historical Economics Society (EHES)*. 20.

Martinelli, Pablo. 2016. "Land Inequality in Italy in 1940: The New Picture." *Rivista di Storia Economica*. XXXII (3): 303-350.

Mata Olmo, Rafael. 1997. "Propiedad y Tenencia de la Tierra en España." In *Agricultura y Sociedad en la España Contemporánea*, edited by Cristóbal Gómez

Benito and Juan Jesús González Rodríguez, 455-499. Spain: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación and Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

Mazepus, Honorata. 2017. "What makes Political Authorities Legitimate? Students' Ideas about Legitimacy in Five European Democracies and Hybrid Regimes." *Contemporary Politics.* 23 (3): 306-327.

Meissner, Frank. 1954. "Politics of the Italian Land Reform." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*. 14 (1): 39-54.

Meltzer, Allan Harold, and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *The Journal of Political Economy.* (5): 914-927.

Migliorini, Francesco. 2018. Geographic Distribution of the Votes for Christian Democracy in 1953 Chamber of Deputies Election in Municipalities and Provinces. *Wikimedia*. `https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Camera_1953_Democrazia_Cristiana.svg#/media/File:Camera_1953_Democrazia_Cristiana.svg`

Ministero dell'Interno, Servizi Informatici Elettorali, Contabilità e Contratti. *Eligendo*. Italy. [1948 General Election, Italian Provinces] `https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=18/04/1948&es0=S&tpa=I&lev0=0&levsut0=0&ms=S&tpe=A`

Ministero dell'Interno, Servizi Informatici Elettorali, Contabilità e Contratti. *Eligendo*. Italy. [1953 General Election, Italian Provinces] `https://elezionistorico.interno.gov.it/index.php?tpel=C&dtel=07/06/1953&es0=S&tpa=I&lev0=0&levsut0=0&ms=S&tpe=A`

Moene, K. O. and M. Wallerstein (2001). "Inequality, Social Insurance and Redistribution." *American Political Science Review*. 95(4): 859–874.

Moore JR, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* Boston: Beacon Press.

Mora De, Manuel. 1964. "Los Señores López Bravo y López Rodó Explican en Huelva el Alcance del Polo de Desarrollo de la Provincia." *ABC*,

February 25, 1964. https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-49581/datastreams/OBJ/content

Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI). 1953. *Programma per L'Elezioni Politiche 1953*. Roma, Italy.

Mudde, Cas. 2000. *The Ideology of the Extreme Right.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Muñoz Sánchez, Víctor Manuel. 2007. "Latifundios, Reforma Agraria y Estructurade la Propiedad en los Contextos Arroceros Sevillanos." *ANDULI, Revista Andaluza de Ciencias Sociales*. 7: 143–164.

Mussolini, Benito. 1931. *L'Agricoltura e i Rurali*. Rome, Italy: Libreria del Littorio.

Mutz, Diana C., and Jeffery J. Mondak. 1997. "Dimensions of Sociotropic Behavior: Group-Based Judgements of Fairness and Well-Being." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41 (1): 284-308.

Neundorf, Anja, and Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2020. "Dictators and Their Subjects: Authoritarian Attitudinal Effects and Legacies." *Comparative Political Studies*. 53 (12): 1839-1860.

Neundorf, Anja, Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Roman-Gabriel Olar. 2020. "How Do Inclusionary and Exclusionary Autocracies Affect Ordinary People?" *Comparative Political Studies*. 53 (12): 1890-1925.

Neundorf, Anja. 2009. "Growing up on Different Sides of the Wall - A Quasi-Experimental Test: Applying the Left-Right Dimension to the German Mass Public." *German Politics*. 18 (2): 201-225.

Neundorf, Anja. 2010. "Democracy in Transition: A Micro perspective on System Change in Post-Socialist Societies." *The Journal of Politics*. 72 (4): 1096-1108.

Neundorf, Anja. and Smets, Kaat. 2017. "Political Socialization and the Making of Citizens". *Oxford Handbooks Online*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A., and Guillermo A. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

O'Flanagan, Patrick. 1979. "Growth Poles Regional Growth Axes and Regional Planning in Galicia Spain." *Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie*. 70 (4): 217–25.

Oficina del Censo Electoral. *INFO Electoral*. Spain: Gobierno de España, Ministerio del Interior. `https://infoelectoral.interior.gob.es/opencms/es/elecciones-celebradas/area-de-descargas/`

Okulicz-Kozaryn, Adam. 2014. "Winners and Losers in Transition: Preferences for Redistribution and Nostalgia for Communism in Eastern Europe." *Kyklos*. 67 (3): 447-461.

Overland, Jody, Kenneth L. Simons, and Michael Spagat. 2005. "Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships." *Public Choice*. 125: 445-470.

Pardos-Prado, Sergi. 2015. "How Can Mainstream Parties Prevent Niche Party Success? Center-Right Parties and the Immigration Issue." *The Journal of Politics*. 77 (2): 352–67.

Parejo Barranco, J. Antonio. 2001. "Industrialización, Desindustrialización y Nueva Industrialización de las Regiones Españolas (1950-2000). Un Enfoque desde la Historia Económica." *Revista de Historia Industrial*. 19: 15-75.

Percoco, Marco. 2021. "Land Invasions and Land Reform in Basilicata, Italy: An Evaluation of Place-Based Policies." *Territory, Politics, Governance*. 9 (2): 241-257.

Pérez Rubio, José Antonio. 2017. "Notas Sobre los Cambios Sociales y el Nuevo Modelo de Referencia en Extremadura." *Revista de Estudios Extremeños*. LXXIII (II): 997-1048.

Pérez Yruela, Manuel. 1995. "Spanish Rural Society in Transition." *Sociologia Ruralis*. XXXV: 276- 296.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore, and Joshua A. Tucker. 2020. "Communist Legacies and Left-Authoritarianism." *Comparative Political Studies*. 53 (12): 1861-1889.

Prada Rodríguez, Julio. 2017. "El Discurso Galleguista del Centro y la Derecha entre la Transición a la Democracia y la Consolidación Autonómica (1975–1985)." *Dictatorships Democracies. Journal of History and Culture*. 5: 103–130.

Prados de la Escosura, Leandro, and Joan R. Rosés. 2009. "The Sources of Long-Run Growth in Spain, 1850–2000." *Journal of Economic History*. 69 (4): 1063-1091.

Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. 2006. "Growth, Inequality, and Poverty in Spain, 1850-2000: Evidence and Speculation." *Unpublished Manuscript*, September 2006, typescript."

Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. 2008. "Inequality, Poverty and the Kuznets Curve in Spain, 1850-2000." *European Review of Economic History*. 12 (3): 287-324.

Prados de la Escosura, Leandro. 2017. *Spanish Economic Growth, 1850–2015*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Pridham, Geoffrey. 2000. "Confining Conditions and Breaking with the Past: Historical Legacies and Political Learning in Transitions to Democracy." *Democratization*. 7 (2): 36-64.

Prusik, Monika, and Maria Lewicka. 2016. "Nostalgia for Communist Times and Autobiographical Memory: Negative Present or Positive Past? Nostalgia for Communism." *Political Psychology*. 37 (5): 677-693.

Przeworski, Adam, and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics*. 49 (2): 155-183.

Przeworski, Adam. 2009. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pueblo. 1977. "La Contienda Electoral se Desarrolla con Armas Desiguales." *Pueblo*, May 28, 1977. https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-39781/datastreams/OBJ/content

Quinn, Dennis P., and John T. Woolley. 2001. "Democracy and National Economic Performance: The Preference for Stability." *American Journal of Political Science*. 45 (3): 634-657.

Quiroga, Domingo. 1977. "La Derrota de Galicia." *La Voz de Galicia*, June 25, 1977. https://quiosco.lavozdegalicia.es/historico.htm?fechaNavegacion=25-06-1977&publicacion=La%20Voz%20de%20Galicia&edicion=A%20CORUÃŚA

Rakopoulos, Theodoros. 2020. "The Shared Boundary: Sicilian Mafia and Antimafia Land." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*. 25 (5): 528-544.

Ramiro, Pedro, and Erika González. 2019. *A Dónde va el Capitalismo Español*. Madrid, Spain: Traficantes de Sueños.

Ramsay, Scott, and Liam Morris. 2021. "Introduction: Trajectories of Republican Exiles after the Spanish Civil War." *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*. 27 (1): 3-5.

Riedl, Rachel Beatty, Dan Slater, Joseph Wong, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2020. "Authoritarian-Led Democratization." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 23 (1): 315-332.

Robbe, Federico. 2012. *L'Impossibile Incontro. Gli Stati Uniti e la Destra Italiana Negli Anni Cinquanta*. Milan, Italy: FrancoAngeli.

Rodríguez, González Román. 1997. "Villa y Comarca Funcional en Galicia." *Investigaciones Geográficas*. 18: 115–15.

Rodríguez, José Antonio. 1977. "Fracasó el Carisma de Meliá." *El País*, June 17, 1977. https://elpais.com/diario/1977/06/17/espana/235346418_850215.html

Roemer, Michael, and Mary Kay Gugerty. 1997. "Does Economic Growth Reduce Poverty?" *CAER II Discussion Paper No. 5*, Cambridge, United States: Harvard Institute for International Development.

Rosés, Joan. 2015. "Spanish Land Reform in the 1930s: Economic Necessity or Political Opportunism?". *Unpublished Manuscript*, September 2015, typescript.

Ross, Catherine E., and Marieke Van Willigen. 1997. "Education and the Subjective Quality of Life." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*. 38 (3): 275-297.

Rossi, Nicola, and Gianni Toniolo. 1992. "Catching up or Falling behind? Italy's Economic Growth, 1895-1947." *The Economic History Review*. 45 (3): 537-563.

Rueda, David, and Daniel Stegmueller. 2019. *Who Wants What?: Redistribution Preferences in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sáez, Raúl R. 1982 "El Paro, un Problema Crónico para Andalucía." *ABC*, April 25, 1982. `https://digital.march.es/fedora/objects/linz:R-2057/datastreams/OBJ/content`

Sánchez Soler, Mariano. 2020. *Los Ricos de Franco. Grandes Magnates de la Dictadura, Altos Financieros de la Democracia*. Spain: Rocaeditorial.

Schatz, Sara. 2001. "Democracy's Breakdown and the Rise of Fascism: The Case of the Spanish Second Republic, 1931-6." *Social History*. 26 (2): 145-165.

Schmidt, Carl T. 1937. "Agricultural Property and Enterprise under Italian Fascism." *Science Society*. 1 (3): 326-349.

Serrano, José María, María Dolores Gadea, and Marcela Sabaté. 2017. "Gone with the Euro: A Reappraisal of the Peseta's Adjustment Mechanism (1870-1998)." *Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*. 35 (2): 1-33.

Simpson, James, and Juan Carmona. 2020. *Why Democracy Failed: The Agrarian Origins of the Spanish Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Slater, Dan, and Joseph Wong. 2013. "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia." *Perspectives on Politics*. 11 (3): 717-733.

Slater, Dan, and Sofia Fenner. 2011. "State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability." *Journal of International Affairs*. 65 (1): 15-29.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "Life of the Party :The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence Under Single-Party Rule." *World Politics*. 57 (3): 421–451.

Stewart, Charles J. 1991. "The Internal Rhetoric of the Knights of Labor." *Communication Studies*. 42: 67–82.

Svolik, Milan W. 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science*. 53 (2): 477-494.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.* New York: Cambridge University Press

Tavits, Margit. 2006. "Party System Change: Testing a Model of New Party Entry." *Party Politics*. 12 (1): 99-119.

Tavits, Margit. 2008. "Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science*. 38 (1): 113-133.

Teorell, Jan, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2019. "Beyond Democracy-Dictatorship Measures: A New Framework Capturing Executive Bases of Power, 1789-2016." *Perspectives on Politics*. 17 (1): 66-84.

Thomas, Maria. 2017. "Political Violence in the Republican Zone of Spain during the Spanish Civil War." *Journal of Contemporary History*. 52 (1): 140-147.

Toboso Sánchez, Pilar. 2007. "Empresarios y Política en la Dictadura de Franco." *Ayer*. 66 (2): 143-173.

Tomz, Michael, Joshua A. Tucker, and Jason Wittenberg. 2002. "An Easy and Accurate Regression Model for Multiparty Electoral Data." *Political Analysis*. 10 (1): 66-83.

Tonelli, Anna. 2013. "Fascismo e Classi Medie: Un Dibattito Storico Ancora Aperto." *Società Mutamento Politica*. 4 (7): 115-128.

Tortella, Gabriel, and Stefan Houpt. 2020. "From Autarky to the European Union: Nationalist Economic Policies in Twentieth-Century Spain." In *Economic Change and the National Question in Twentieth-Century Europe*, edited by Alice Teichova, Herbert Matis, and Jaroslav Pátek, 127-149. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Tortora, Vincent R. 1956. "The Italians Reform Their Land Tenure System." *New Mexico Quarterly*. 26 (4): 345-357.

Townson, Nigel. 2007. *Spain Transformed: The Late Franco Dictatorship, 1959–75*. Basingstoke Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Tur-Prats, Ana, and Felipe Valencia Caicedo. 2020. "The Long Shadow of the Spanish Civil War." *Unpublished Manuscript*, July 15 2020, typescript.

Ufficio Centrale di Statistica, Ministero per l'Industria, Il Commercio ed il Lavoro. 1920. "Statistica delle Elezioni Generali Politiche per la XXV Legislatura (16 novembre 1919)." *Stabilimento Poligrafico per L'Amministrazione dello Stato*. `https://ebiblio.istat.it/digibib/Elezioni/IST0003292StatisticadelleElezioniGeneralipolitiche1919+OCRottimizz.pdf`

Utrera, Federico. 1996. *Canarias, Secreto de Estado: Episodios Inéditos de la Transición Política y Militar en las Islas*. Madrid, Spain: Mateos López Editores.

Velikonja, Mitja. 2009. "Lost in Transition: Nostalgia for Socialism in Post-Socialist Countries." *East European Politics Societies*. 23 (4): 535-551.

Verwiebe, Roland, and Bernd Wegener. 2000. "Social Inequality and the Perceived Income Justice Gap." *Social Justice Research*. 13: 123–149.

Voigtländer, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2015. "Nazi Indoctrination and Anti-Semitic Beliefs in Germany." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*. 112 (26): 7931-7936.

von Haldenwang, Christian. 2017. "The Relevance of Legitimation - A New Framework for Analysis." *Contemporary Politics*. 23 (3): 269-286.

von Soest, Christian, and Julia Grauvogel. 2017. "Identity, Procedures and Performance: How Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize their Rule". *Contemporary Politics*. 23 (3): 287-305.

Wang, Austin Horng-En. 2017. "Patience as the Rational Foundation of Sociotropic Voting." *Electoral Studies*. 50: 15-25.

Wang, Peng. 2020. "Politics of Crime Control: How Campaign-Style Law Enforcement Sustains Authoritarian Rule in China." *British Journal of Criminology*. 60 (2): 422-443.

Watson, Sara E. 2015. *The Left Divided: The Development and Transformation of Advanced Welfare States*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Weatherford, M. Stephen. 1983. "Evaluating Economic Policy: A Contextual Model of the Opinion Formation Process." *Journal of Politics*. 45 (4): 866–888.

Welch, David. 2007. *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*. London: Taylor Francis

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. "The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review.* 84 (3): 849-872.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 2000. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Yong Kwon, Hyeok. 2008. "A Dynamic Analysis of Partisan Voting: The Issue Salience Effect of Unemployment in South Korea." *Electoral Studies*. 27 (3): 518-532.

Zellner, Arnold. 1962. "An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias." *Journal of the American Statistical Association*. 57 (298): 348-368.

Zeng, Jinghan. 2020. "Artificial Intelligence and China's Authoritarian Governance." *International Affairs*. 96 (6):1441–1459.


Ziblatt, Daniel. 2017. *Conservative Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 8

Appendices

A - Appendix to Chapter 3

FIGURE 8.1: Industrial sector's gross value added (GVA) per capita by gross disposable household income per capita (1955-1975)



B - Appendix to Chapter 5

FIGURE 8.2: Agricultural Credit in Italy from 1928 to 1938 for Land Running and Maintenance Expenses

Tabella 9 - Il credito agrario di esercizio dal 1928 al 1938 (in milioni di lire correnti)

Anni	*Istituti speciali e Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*	*Istituti autorizzati*	*Totale*
1928	*598*	*103*	*702*
1929	*634*	*248*	*883*
1930	*522*	*218*	*740*
1931	*545*	*191*	*737*
1932	*590*	*263*	*853*
1933	*648*	*290*	*939*
1934	*589*	*314*	*903*
1935	*809*	*408*	*1.218*
1936	*1.142*	*561*	*1.703*
1937	*2.018*	*862*	*2.880*
1938	*2.508*	*751*	*3.260*

Tabella 10 - Il credito agrario di miglioramento dal 1928 al 1938 (in milioni di lire correnti)

Anni	*Istituti speciali e Banca Nazionale del Lavoro*	*Consorzio Nazionale*	*Istituti autorizzati*	*Totale*
1928	*223*	*17*	*7,5*	*248,2*
1929	*392*	*207*	*13,5*	*613,6*
1930	*422*	*313*	*15,2*	*751,0*
1931	*463*	*411*	*16,1*	*891,1*
1932	*522*	*469*	*7,7*	*999,0*
1933	*573*	*560*	*9,0*	*1.142,7*
1934	*587*	*704*	*11,4*	*1.303,6*
1935	*579*	*660*	*13,8*	*1.253,5*
1936	*646*	*680*	*2,0*	*1.328,9*
1937	*691*	*741*	*17,6*	*1.450,8*
1938	*754*	*800*	*17,2*	*1.571,7*

Source: Farolfi and Fornasari 2011

FIGURE 8.3: Number of Agricultural Lands by Region According to Tax Categories in 1924

Articoli di ruolo ed imposta erariale, secondo i ruoli dell'anno 1924 per l'imposta dell'anno stesso, distintamente per quote d'imposta.

Compartimenti	Numero degli articoli inscritti nei ruoli							Imposta							Carico complessivo dei ruoli
	a carico del demanio, asse ecclesiastico, ferrovie, foreste	a carico di altri contribuenti per quota d'imposta					Totale	a carico del demanio, asse ecclesiastico, ferrovie, foreste	a carico di altri contribuenti per quote d'imposta					Totale	
		fino a L. 10	da L. 10,01 a L. 50	da L. 50,01 a L. 300	da L. 300,01 a L. 500	oltre L. 500			fino a L. 10	da L. 10,01 a L. 50	da L. 50,01 a L. 300	da L. 300,01 a L. 500	oltre L. 500		
Piemonte	873	1 058 605	136 736	27 846	1 572	1 666	1 227 298	275 607	2 742 423	3 855 068	3 628 881	827 136	3 096 292	14 149 800	14 425 407
Liguria	207	240 631	21 131	3 462	157	183	265 771	43 772	512 511	493 473	413 980	72 152	150 308	1 642 424	1 686 196
Lombardia	914	626 425	74 771	26 159	3 338	5 704	737 311	61 871	1 301 792	2 328 701	3 230 453	1 397 410	6 672 101	14 930 457	14 992 328
Venezia Tridentina	475	178 853	16 990	3 104	112	70	199 604	13 579	355 087	518 173	346 286	39 660	64 344	1 323 550	1 337 129
Veneto	1 115	589 421	78 267	25 519	2 916	1 826	702 064	97 655	1 296 518	1 908 683	2 904 524	1 000 821	3 471 303	10 581 849	10 679 504
Venezia Giulia e Zara (a)	298	192 131	22 548	2 162	117	190	217 446	53 309	430 270	517 785	248 297	55 614	215 151	1 467 117	1 520 426
Emilia	504	230 745	47 373	30 908	3 391	4 504	317 425	74 403	549 805	2 042 782	4 598 594	1 511 080	5 369 583	14 071 844	14 146 247
Toscana	410	298 021	40 879	17 565	2 096	3 042	362 013	168 938	628 978	1 129 700	2 276 259	794 191	4 003 397	8 832 525	9 001 463
Marche	115	115 406	25 325	12 274	1 095	1 514	155 729	8 611	227 872	834 179	1 530 164	390 381	1 252 559	4 235 155	4 243 766
Umbria	84	87 608	13 917	6 214	800	1 077	109 700	42 509	207 329	496 352	897 336	346 208	1 272 400	3 219 625	3 262 134
Lazio	268	200 569	20 332	6 233	745	1 462	229 609	93 985	443 960	869 250	804 274	309 552	3 641 321	6 068 357	6 162 342
Abruzzi e Molise	567	641 820	31 167	6 360	570	650	681 134	31 252	1 115 473	835 987	734 819	174 857	585 604	3 446 740	3 477 992
Campania	822	646 802	92 546	27 089	2 261	2 549	772 069	144 345	1 585 660	2 352 001	3 286 594	911 658	2 367 903	10 503 816	10 648 161
Puglie	304	501 989	50 869	16 232	1 629	2 394	573 417	91 462	1 193 907	1 207 112	2 158 636	713 483	3 074 558	8 347 696	8 439 158
Basilicata	261	212 576	9 270	3 074	394	444	226 019	23 630	328 117	202 220	298 768	145 896	550 299	1 525 300	1 548 930
Calabrie	683	373 253	26 094	9 061	900	1 610	411 601	103 841	710 998	689 158	1 141 378	341 366	1 602 603	4 485 503	4 589 344
Sicilia	556	950 861	49 927	16 274	1 375	1 755	1 020 748	100 303	1 603 001	1 197 532	2 142 973	638 508	2 477 666	8 059 680	8 159 983
Sardegna	578	283 818	24 965	8 303	520	583	318 767	186 567	554 894	636 729	888 521	151 116	396 526	2 627 786	2 814 353
REGNO	**9 034**	**7 429 534**	**783 107**	**247 839**	**23 988**	**34 223**	**8 527 725**	**1 615 639**	**15 788 595**	**22 114 885**	**31 530 737**	**9 821 089**	**40 263 918**	**119 519 224**	**121 134 863**

(a) Compreso il Friuli Orientale e l'Ampezzano.