“Muslim Communities in England, 1962-92: Multiculturalism and Political Identity”

Jed Fazakarley, Balliol College

D. Phil submission, HT 2014.

“Muslim Communities in England, 1962-92: Multiculturalism and Political Identity”

Short Abstract

Since the conflicts in the Gulf and Bosnia in the 1990s, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, a large sociological and political literature on British Muslims has appeared. It is often a contention of these works that Muslims in Britain did not identify, and were not seen in terms of, their religion prior to the time of the Rushdie affair. This thesis contends that, contrary to these arguments, religion has been a significant referent for the claims-making of Muslim communities in England since essentially the time that those communities settled (the early 1960s). This is demonstrated through the consideration of Muslim claims-making and elite practice and policy in a number of thematic areas, including education, employment, social services, and party politics. Building on these insights, it is suggested that such misconceptions about English Muslim social and political mobilisations are attributable to the absence of an historical perspective upon British multiculturalism. This thesis, particularly in two concluding chapters, attempts to correct this absence, offering a broader consideration of British multiculturalism in the studied period. It suggests that – rather than a relatively coherent ideology or policy approach – British multiculturalism has been an institution, produced in an ad hoc manner through the largely uncoordinated actions of a large number of actors, often lacking shared aims, at both local and national level. Although subject to changes over time, this institution has observed a number of consistent ‘rules’ in the form of concepts shared by actors involved in it (such as the ‘ethnic group,’ ‘community leadership’ and ‘special needs’). Finally, it is suggested that multiculturalism in Britain has endured primarily due to a process of ‘path dependence’ through which many actors have ‘learned’ how to operate within the rules of the institution, and may owe their existence of prestige to it.
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Long Abstract (History Faculty)

Since the conflicts in the Gulf and Bosnia in the 1990s, and the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, a large sociological and political literature on Muslim communities in Britain has appeared. It is often a contention of these works that Muslims in Britain did not identify, and were not seen in terms of, their religion prior to the time of the Rushdie affair. This thesis contends that, contrary to these arguments, religion has been a significant referent for the claims-making of Muslim communities in England since essentially the time that those communities settled (the early 1960s). However, it is also stressed that the religious aspects of English Muslim identities have always intersected with other aspects, including class, gender, nationality, and language. It also suggests that these misconceptions about British Muslim social and political mobilisations arise from the lack of an historical treatment of British multiculturalism in general to date. Historians have left the study of multiculturalism to social scientists, political philosophers and cultural studies scholars. This perhaps reflected, in an earlier time, a lack of available sources to work with. In more recent times, it is possible that historians see debates about ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘anti-racism’ as belonging inevitably to ‘current affairs’ – as being unresolved. However, it is the contention of this thesis that multiculturalism’s reconstruction since the late 1980s, in response to demographic, political, social and governmental changes, has meant that an earlier version of multiculturalism – a ‘postcolonial’ multiculturalism in which a limited number of specified ethnic groups are favoured with resources and recognition – is now an historical formation.

Following an introduction that provides a descriptive background and summarises the historiographical issues to be addressed, this contention is supported through the consideration of a number of policy and discursive fields. Firstly, education policy and practice is considered, at both a local and national level, and an attempt is made to fit specifically Muslim claims-making into this history. It is noted that English Muslims from an early date made demands for religious and linguistic instruction, both of a statutory and voluntary nature, and that this was recognised by local and national authorities. The ad hoc and localised nature of multiculturalism’s advancement is also considered, and the suggestion is made that sharp distinctions between periods of ‘assimilation’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘anti-racism’ in educational policy and practice are overdrawn.

Building on the last chapter, it is then observed that English Muslim communities often, and from an early time, made claims arising from a desire to meet the demands of purdah. These related to issues of school uniform, segregated PE and other lessons, and single-sex education. It is also noted that, apart from offering or refusing concessions in light of these demands, local authorities often based their approach to Muslim communities on the assumption of the inaccessibility of Muslim women. This encouraged a ‘community approach’ in which specific workers dealt with Muslim families and communities as a whole, developing a key aspect of institutional multiculturalism.

Moving into the area of employment, the following chapter illustrates early claims by English Muslim workers for prayer breaks and facilities, religious holidays and the recognition of Ramadan fasting. The desire of elites to localise and defuse these demands, and often to make
concessions, is emphasised here as in other chapters. It is also noted that Muslim demands were often mediated through organisations – such as the Commission for Racial Equality and its local Community Relations Councils and the Department of Employment Advisory Group on Race Relations – explicitly established to deal with questions of ethnic diversity. It is also demonstrated that elites at times regarded Islam as a religion that was especially demanding of its adherents, and therefore problematic for integration work, even as other minority religions made claims in the workplace.

In the following chapter, on party politics, the substantive element of Muslim claims is left aside in favour of an analysis of organisations and institutions through which these claims have been pressed. It is noted that, particularly in the early period covered by this study, the party affiliation of English Muslims was highly dependent upon local campaigning and link-formation. The shift towards a mass British Muslim politics, almost entirely in support of the Labour Party, is noted and accounted for. It is also demonstrated that all three major parties in Britain sought to make special arrangements for ethnic minority voters and members, with new bodies being created, and special literature being drawn up in non-English languages – though here again there are local differences. It is also acknowledged that British Asians have sometimes been stigmatised for their involvement in ‘patronage’ politics, and suggested that such suspicions have, especially in more recent times, often fallen on Muslims specifically.

Chapter six turns to the Rushdie affair, offering a novel presentation of its events by inserting them into a longer history of Muslim claims-making in Britain and a wider narrative of the pre-existing institution of multiculturalism. Claims that the affair led to a transformation of multiculturalism in Britain are heavily qualified, and the sense in which Muslim campaigning and responses to it can be regards as ‘business as usual’ are highlighted, as are the ways in which Muslim campaigning can be regarded as illustrative of integration. This chapter also calls into question those accounts that see the affair as engendering a conservative and coerced ‘unity’ within Muslim communities in England.

Having offered an account of Muslim claims-making in a number of areas, and sketched elements of the multiculturalism institution that are relative to this argument, the thesis then turns to address British multiculturalism in a broader sense more directly. It suggests that – rather than a relatively coherent ideology or policy approach – British multiculturalism has been an institution, produced in an ad hoc manner through the largely uncoordinated actions of a large number of actors, often lacking shared aims, at both local and national level. Although subject to changes over time, this institution has observed a number of consistent ‘rules’ in the form of concepts shared by actors involved in it (such as the ‘ethnic group, ‘community leadership’ and ‘special needs’). The parameters set by national actors in the production of multiculturalism are described, as are local responses. It is emphasised that the ‘thin’ and generally non-coercive nature of these parameters have enabled a great variety of responses at local level in light of political, demographic and other factors. The relationships of ethnic minority organisations to multiculturalism – variously taking over aspects of it, being supported by it, or resisting it – are also considered. The common criticism of multiculturalism as privileging ethnicity over other aspects of identity and disadvantage; encouraging divisive competition between ethnic groups; and endangering ‘minorities within minorities’ by relying upon and bolstering conservative patriarchal community ‘leaders’ are described, and the institutional aspect of these dynamics is highlighted and stressed. The process of multiculturalism’s contraction and restricting from the late 1980s is described and explained, though analyses suggesting a death or abandonment of multiculturalism are resisted. Finally, it is suggested that multiculturalism has endured despite these many, often persuasive, criticisms primarily due to a process of ‘path dependence’ through which many actors have
‘learned’ how to operate within the rules of the institution, and may owe their existence of prestige to it.

A concluding chapter then summarises these insights and considers more recent developments. It is suggested that rather than charting ‘peaks and troughs’ as regards the salience and force of the religious aspect of Muslim identities in Britain in this period, it is significant to note the change in the relationship between religion and other aspects of identity. In particular, more young British Muslims are now resisting the close articulation of religion with ‘culture’ that made religion such a broadly-accepted touchstone for Muslim claims in an earlier period. There is now a greater self-consciousness about the distinction between ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ claims. However, it is also stressed that, whatever the basis of these claims, multiculturalism remains an enduring institution. Although the riots of 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks may have led to repeated elite rebukes of the multiculturalism of previous decades, paradigms such as ‘community cohesion’ do not signify as great a change as is sometimes presumed.
### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AACS</td>
<td>Anglo-Asian Conservative Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMA</td>
<td>Association of Municipal Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Association of Municipal Corporations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANL</td>
<td>Anti-Nazi League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCM</td>
<td>Bradford Council of Mosques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BENTH</td>
<td>Bangladeshi Educational Needs in Tower Hamlets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHAG</td>
<td>Bengali Housing Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHRU</td>
<td>Bradford Heritage Recording Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMAF</td>
<td>British Muslim Action Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPA</td>
<td>Black People’s Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSS</td>
<td>Black Socialist Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>BWA</td>
<td>Bangladesh Welfare Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARD</td>
<td>Campaign Against Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Commonwealth Immigration/Immigrants Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIAC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIC</td>
<td>Committee on Integration and Cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPGB</td>
<td>Communist Party of Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Community Relations Commission [national body]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRCs</td>
<td>Community Relations Councils [local bodies]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRE</td>
<td>Commission for Racial Equality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRO</td>
<td>Community Relations Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCC</td>
<td>Caribbean Social and Cricket Club</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEAGRR</td>
<td>Department of Employment Advisory Group on Race Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES</td>
<td>Department of Education and Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPAC</td>
<td>Drummond Parents Action Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDM</td>
<td>Early Day Motion</td>
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<tr>
<td>EHRC</td>
<td>Equality and Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMO</td>
<td>Labour Party Ethnic Minorities Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Federation of Bangladeshi Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBYO</td>
<td>Federation of Bangladeshi Youth Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMO</td>
<td>Federation of Muslim Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLC</td>
<td>Greater London Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLCEMU</td>
<td>Greater London Council Ethnic Minorities Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMS</td>
<td>Grant-Maintained School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HILC</td>
<td>Huddersfield International Liaison Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMSI</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Schools Inspectorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVA</td>
<td>Health Visitors Associations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Islamic Cultural Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>Inner London Education Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>Islamic Party of Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>IST</td>
<td>Islamia Schools Trust</td>
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</tbody>
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**Muslim Communities in England, 1962-92: Multiculturalism and Political Identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IWA</td>
<td>Indian Workers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCAR</td>
<td>Joint Campaign Against Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCRC</td>
<td>Keighley Community Relations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBTH</td>
<td>London Borough of Tower Hamlets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCSS</td>
<td>London Council of Social Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOP</td>
<td>League of Overseas Pakistanis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPRAG</td>
<td>Labour Party Race Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPRD</td>
<td>Labour Party Research Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPSGI</td>
<td>Labour Party Study Group on Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPYS</td>
<td>Labour Party Young Socialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCB</td>
<td>Muslim Council of Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCCR</td>
<td>Manchester Committee for Community Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MET</td>
<td>Muslim Educational Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECC</td>
<td>Muslim Education Coordinating Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEECC</td>
<td>Manchester Committee for Community Relations Consultative Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLC</td>
<td>Muslim Liaison Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoL</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Muslim Parents Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPGB</td>
<td>Muslim Parliament of Great Britain</td>
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<tr>
<td>MYM</td>
<td>Muslim Youth Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MWC</td>
<td>Muslim Welfare Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAAY</td>
<td>National Association of Asian Youths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>National Association for Multiracial Education (later the National Anti-racist Movement in Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NES</td>
<td>Non-English-Speaking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF</td>
<td>National Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFER</td>
<td>National Foundation for Educational Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFPA</td>
<td>National Federation of Pakistani Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILTC</td>
<td>National Industrial Language Training Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMHSG</td>
<td>North Manchester High School for Girls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCRI</td>
<td>Oxford Committee for Racial Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>Political and Economic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISG</td>
<td>Pakistani Immigrant Socialist Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMA</td>
<td>Pakistani Muslim Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>Pakistani People’s Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistani People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB</td>
<td>Pakistan Society of Bradford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWA</td>
<td>Pakistani Welfare Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWoA</td>
<td>Pakistani Workers Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PYO</td>
<td>Progressive Youth Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRB</td>
<td>Race Relations Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S11</td>
<td>Section 11 (of the 1966 Local Government Act)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S71</td>
<td>Section 71 (of the 1976 Race Relations Act)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Muslim Communities in England, 1962-92: Multiculturalism and Political Identity”

**SACRE**: Standing Advisory Conference on Religious Education

**SBS**: Southall Black Sisters

**SCCR**: Sheffield Committee for Community Relations

**SDP**: Social Democratic Party

**SLIC**: South London Islamic Centre

**TUCERC**: Trades Union Congress Equal Rights Committee

**UBYL**: United Black Youth League

**UKACIA**: UK Advisory Council on Islamic Affairs

**UKIAS**: United Kingdom Immigrant Advisory Service

**UKIM**: UK Islamic Mission

**UMO**: Union of Muslim Organisations

**SYM**: Southall Youth Movement

**THASP**: Tower Hamlets Alternative Strategy Partnership

**THISG**: Tower Hamlets Initiative Steering Group

**TUC**: Trades Union Congress

**UP**: Urban Programme

**VLC**: Voluntary Liaison Committee

**WAF**: Women Against Fundamentalism

**WISC**: West Indian Standing Conference

**YCCR**: Yorkshire Committee for Community Relations

**YMO**: Young Muslims Organisations

**YMUK**: Young Muslims UK
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Multiculturalism and Political Identity"

Contents:

1. Introduction
   9

   38

3. Home Bodies: *Purdah* and the Integration of Muslim Women in England
   91

   121

5. English Muslim Political Participation and Integration, 1962-97
   153

6. Butting Fundaments: Responses to the Rushdie Affair
   205

7. British Multiculturalism: Policies and Paths
   240

8. Conclusion: Multiculturalism and Political Identity
   294

9. Bibliography
   315
1. Introduction

There were ‘ethnic minorities’ in Britain long before that term came into use and, indeed, from the time of Roman settlement there.¹ Standing at 30,000 in 1945, the ethnic minority population of Britain reached almost 3,000,000 by the end of the twentieth century.² This ethnic diversification occurred initially through a rapid movement of people from British colonies and former colonies, in particular the British Caribbean, India and Pakistan. Unlike other imperial powers, Britain did not, before 1971, distinguish legally between those born in the metropole and those born in British territories abroad, including both the ‘Old’ Dominions such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa, and the ‘New’ Commonwealth, including the West Indies, India, Pakistan, and parts of northern and central Africa. Immigrants from these colonies arrived in Britain, until 1962, with, ostensibly, full employment, welfare and political rights. This relationship was formalised in the 1948 British Nationality Act. The same year, the *Empire Windrush* set sail from Kingston, Jamaica, to Tilbury, Essex, bringing 492 Jamaican immigrants to Britain.³ Whilst this event is now commemorated as the genesis of post-war migration from the ‘new’ Empire to Britain, this migration did not become significant in size until the early 1950s. Even in 1954, only 11,000 people moved from the ‘new Commonwealth’ to Britain.⁴ The primary motivation for these new immigrants was the availability of work in a Britain concerned about its declining birth rate and needing additional manpower to assist in post-war reconstruction.⁵ First-generation immigrants often emphasised the well-paid work, high-quality education, and political rights that Britain offered as explaining their migrants.⁶

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number of black and Asian migrants therefore initially intended to work in Britain temporarily before returning to their countries of birth with the money they had saved. This “myth of return” gradually eroded under the pressures of low wages and unemployment. Not only did few ‘new Commonwealth’ immigrants return to their countries of origin, the rate of migration from these countries increased rapidly in the mid-1950s. In 1955, immigration to Britain from south Asia began in significant numbers. From that year until the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act (CIA) came into effect, 472,300 people migrated to the United Kingdom. British elite reaction even to the small number of black migrants arriving on Windrush had been at best sceptical and at worst hostile. Concerns about the increasing volume of black and Asian immigration led to legislation in 1962 introducing a voucher system, a reduction of these vouchers in 1965, and then further legislation in 1968 denying entry to Kenyan Asians fleeing ‘Africanisation’. In 1971, more radical legislation essentially ended primary immigration into Britain from the West Indies and south Asia through the introduction of the ‘patriality’ clause, though dependants of those already granted citizenship could still enter and stay. The vast majority of primary migration from the ‘new Commonwealth’ to Britain therefore occurred during a short period. This is particularly true of immigration from Pakistan. 67,330 Pakistani people moved to Britain between 1955 and the passage of the 1962 CIA. These migrants were not the first Muslims to come to Britain. A ‘few score’ Muslims lived in London in the 17th century, and by the middle of the 19th century there was a significant population of Indian students in Britain, including many Muslims. The number of south Asian Muslims coming to Britain for study increased in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and

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7 Ibid., 13.
8 Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 57.
1. Introduction

some stayed on and settled in Britain after graduating.\textsuperscript{11} Pre-war settler migration of Muslims to Britain, meanwhile, was primarily associated with the British merchant navy. Many of the Muslims who came to Britain in this way were not from the subcontinent, but rather Aden, the Malay States and British Somaliland. The recruitment of Muslim seamen onto British ships led to the formation of small Muslim communities in a number of shipping centres, including London, Cardiff, South Shields and Glasgow.\textsuperscript{12} These communities were faced with both governmental and popular hostility, especially once depression set in during the late 1910s. Muslims in Cardiff were the victims of racial violence in 1919, and a series of legislative actions in 1919-25, not fully repealed until 1943, greatly restricted the employment rights of non-subject seamen. Since many ‘subjects’ were not issued with passports, they were forced to register as aliens instead.\textsuperscript{13} These restrictions and the general economic context of the depression led to a diversification of employment amongst Muslims in Britain, with many becoming peddlers or establishing their own restaurants and cafes. Some migrants who did not succeed in self-employment returned to their homelands.\textsuperscript{14} During the Second World War, Britain’s need for lascars (south Asian seamen employed by the British navy) led to intensive recruitment of such workers in coastal regions of India. Most lascars returned to their homelands following the war, but there was still a British Asian population of some 5-10,000 people by 1945.\textsuperscript{15} In the post-war period, many immigrants from Sylhet, East Bengal, came to Britain through this process of coming ashore.\textsuperscript{16} The upheaval caused by partition in 1947 also encouraged some pre-war ‘pioneer’ migrants to bring their families to Britain.\textsuperscript{17} Plans for legislation to restrict immigration in the early 1960s, and fear that tighter controls would

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 46
\textsuperscript{12} ibid., 25, 40-1.
\textsuperscript{14} Ansari, Infidel Within, 47-9.
\textsuperscript{15} Rozina Visram, Asians in Britain: 400 Years of History (London : Pluto Press, 2002), 245.
\textsuperscript{17} Pnina Werbner, The Migration Process: Capital, Gifts and Offerings among British Pakistanis (Oxford : Berg, 1990), 17.
follow, led to a large ‘beat the ban’ migration in the early sixties through which many Asian families were reconstituted in Britain.\textsuperscript{18} Since no total ban on the migration of dependants was effected the reconstitution of families actually occurred over a long period, and for many Bangladeshis the decision to settle permanently in Britain was made perhaps only in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{19} The decision of Muslim immigrants to stay in Britain was therefore processual, gradual and uneven across and within communities, as was elite recognition of that decision. However, it is significant that already in 1965 the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council (CIAC) was suggesting that housing provision for ‘Commonwealth immigrants’ should reflect the intention of many migrants to settle permanently in Britain.\textsuperscript{20} Though it was a ‘fuzzy’ one, this realisation amongst elites that Commonwealth migration was, at least to a significant extent, permanent rather than temporary provides the starting point for this thesis.

This post-war settler migration was part of a global, multifarious movement of labour from poorer countries to richer countries motivated by the need of war-ravaged Western nations for workers and enabled by colonial links between the global South and the global North and by the increased availability of intercontinental transport.\textsuperscript{21} Local factors influenced specific migrations. Migrants from Sylhet drew on a long history of internal labour mobility.\textsuperscript{22} Around 100,000 migrants from Mirpur, Azad Kashmir, were displaced by construction of the Mangla Dam in 1960.\textsuperscript{23} Muslim migrants came from various areas, including Sylhet and Chittagong in East Pakistan, Azad Kashmir (especially Mirpur), the Punjab, and parts of the North Western Frontier in West Pakistan; parts of India; Cyprus; and Yemen. Many who

\textsuperscript{18} Muhammad Anwar, \textit{The Myth Of Return: Pakistanis in Britain} (London : Heinemann, 1979), 4.
\textsuperscript{20} West Yorkshire Archives Service Bradford (WYASB), Bradford, UK, Town Clerk’s (TC) papers, BBD 1/7/T9771, CIAC, “Fourth Report by the CIAC”, 10/65.
\textsuperscript{21} Ansari, \textit{Infidel Within}, 145.
\textsuperscript{22} Katy Gardner and Abdus Shukur, “‘I’m Asian, I’m Bengali and I’m Living here’: the Changing Identity of British Bengalis” in Roger Ballard ed., \textit{Desh Pardesh: the South Asian Experience in Britain} (London : Hurst and Company, 1994), 146.
\textsuperscript{23} Ansari, \textit{Infidel Within}, 152.
1. Introduction

migrated from urban areas of Pakistan came from rural origins and had prior experience of internal migration. As noted, the 1962 CIA made entry into Britain conditional on possession of a work voucher. Initially, 20,000 of these were available, and over 80% went to people from south Asia. In 1965, the number of vouchers available was reduced to just 8,500. After the legislation of 1971 was passed, Muslim migration to Britain became primarily one of dependants. The definition of ‘dependent’ also shifted so that, by 1968, only those under the age of sixteen intending to join both of their parents qualified.

Political factors had always motivated some Muslim migration to Britain. Palestinians were perhaps the first Muslim political immigrants to Britain. Later, the Greek dominance of Cyprus encouraged many people of Turkish origins to flee. Asian expatriates also escaped ‘Africanisation’ policies in East Africa during the 1960s and 1970s, though only around one quarter of these were Muslims. From the 1970s, Muslim refugees arrived in Britain from Lebanon, Iran, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and elsewhere. These migrants were of mixed political composition. Whilst those leaving Egypt and Algeria, for example, were mostly Islamists escaping hostile regimes, partisans from both sides of the Iranian civil unrest came to Britain in the late 1970s. Immigrants were sometimes members of persecuted or marginalised ethnic minorities within their homelands – Iraqi Kurds being perhaps the most numerous example. The general impact of these various migrations was to compound the internal diversity of the Muslim population in Britain along national, ethnic, religious and class lines. Many political migrants were middle-class and educated, distinct from the earlier working class and peasant migrations primarily from south Asia. In the 1960s, the

24 Werbner, Migration Process, 2.
27 Ansari, Infidel Within, 160.
28 Ibid., 153.
29 Ibid., 160.
30 Ibid., 160-4.
31 Ibid., 161.
1. Introduction

Muslim population of Britain was almost entirely south Asian, with small communities of Arabs, Somalis and ethnic Turks in a handful of cities. By the turn of the 21st century, less than two thirds of British Muslims were of south Asian origin.32

Just as colonial migrants came from specific regions of their home nations, they also settled in specific areas of Britain. As mentioned, those who came to Britain through the merchant navy settled initially in coastal areas, though many moved elsewhere later. In general, the availability of jobs and housing determined these settlement patterns. For Asian migrants, including Muslims, settlement came in the form of chain migration. By this process, ‘pioneer’ migrants, usually young men, settled in Britain, with kin joining them thereafter. This migration therefore was primarily one of single men initially, many of whom shared rooms in large, privately-rented multi-occupancy houses. It was not until later into the 1960s that families were re-settled in Britain – this was motivated by concerns about the moral quality of the lives being led by single men in Britain; fear of further restrictive immigration legislation after 1962; and new regulations introduced in 1965 that allowed young people into Britain only where they were to join both parents.33 The decision to reunify families in Britain was not taken lightly – the move dealt a serious blow to the ‘myth of return’, whilst many Muslims also had concerns about the appropriateness of Britain for raising a family.34 The reunification process was also a slow one – even by 1966, for example, women comprised just 10% of the Pakistani population in Dewsbury and 5% in Batley.35 By 1981, Bangladeshi men still

34 Ballard, ibid., 16.
35 West Yorkshire Archives Service Bradford (WYASB), Bradford, UK, Yorkshire Committee for Community Relations (YCCR) papers, 49D79/2/2/1, Dewsbury Town Council, “Preliminary Report to the Members of the Commonwealth Immigrants Sub-Committee”, 1966.
1. Introduction

outnumbered women in Birmingham by two to one. Migration from East Pakistan was also made difficult by the reluctance of the West Pakistan government to issue vouchers to these migrants, and the long journeys to Dhaka from Sylhet (over 100 miles) required for administrative purposes prior to migration. These Muslim families settled primarily in a limited number of areas in England: Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester and surrounding towns in the North and Midlands, and the London boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham, Brent and Hackney. In some of these areas, particularly East London and West Yorkshire, Muslims were the largest and most visible ethnic minority group. In many towns and boroughs, such as Birmingham, Manchester, Brent, Hackney, Wolverhampton, Leicester and others, Muslim communities were smaller than or similar in size to other minority groups, whether defined on an ethnic or religious basis. In these areas, different ethnic minority communities, though concentrated in the poorest housing, often lived in different neighbourhoods. In Bradford, for instance, East and West Pakistaniis rarely shared neighbourhoods. The regions in which these south Asian Muslim migrants reside have remained fairly constant throughout the period under study, though there has been some migration to suburbs. As noted, there has also been an increase in the number of Muslim migrants from places outside of south Asia. These populations have a more complex class structure, and many of the middle-class and professional Saudis, Egyptians, Moroccans, Iranians, etc., amongst them reside in more affluent areas, often in London.

The majority of south Asian Muslims who came to Britain during this period, however, were from the peasant class. In England, most found manual work and became part of the

37 Adams, Across Seven Seas, 58.
39 Bradford Heritage Recording Unit, Here to Stay, 12, 79.
40 Ansari, Infidel Within, 178; Ballard, “Introduction”, 8.
41 Ansari, ibid. 175.
working class. In both the North West and West Yorkshire, the textiles industry was by far the largest employer of Muslim immigrants. In the Midlands, light engineering work was a common source of jobs. In all of these areas, public transport employed a significant minority of Muslim workers. In East London, many former seamen used experience they had gained as cooks on British ships to establish cafes and restaurants, employing kin and friends. Muslim workers also began to move into the garment industry in East London, a traditional employer of immigrants in the area. In Sheffield and Birmingham, Adenese men found employment primarily in the steel industry. Aside from manual trades, the need in Muslim communities for services, especially food products, helped to promote the creation of a small class of entrepreneurs. Small-scale entrepreneurs also made up a significant proportion of the Turkish Cypriot community in North London. East African Asians later became stereotypically the owners of ‘Asian corner shops’. Many members of these communities had been skilled craftsmen, professionals or businesspeople in Africa. Arab political migrants arriving from the mid-1970s were more likely to be middle-class. The vast majority of Saudi Arabians in England are still businesspeople and white-collar workers, whilst there has also been a sizable middle-class element amongst North African migrations. The working class component of these later migrations has generally found its way into the service industries rather than into manual

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43 Ibid., Town Clerk’s papers, BBD 1/7/T9644, City of Birmingham, “Answers Supplied by the City of Birmingham in Response to a Questionnaire Submitted by the AMC.”
1. Introduction

labour, reflecting general changes in Britain’s employment profile. There was a middle-class element to the initial generation of south Asian Muslim migrants also. These were mostly urban professionals – there were 1,000 Asian doctors in Britain by 1949. Although relatively small in number, these middle-class south Asians established significant political and religious institutions. The south Asian Muslim middle class in Britain has grown only slowly. Professionals accounted for 14% of Pakistani employees in 1994, an increase of just 4% from 1982. The decline of the northern textiles industry led many south Asians into precarious existences in service sectors.

The trajectory of Muslim women’s employment and class position must be considered separately. The 1976 Political and Economic Planning (PEP) survey suggested that fewer than 20% of Muslim women in Britain were working, although with significant differences depending on language skills, and so class. Many women who did seek employment found work in the same industries as Muslim men, whilst others moved into service and domestic sectors. This level of economic activity represented an increase in employment amongst Muslim women as compared to the 1960s, as the decline in manufacturing, especially textiles, during the 1970s forced women into work. However, over twenty years later, a subsequent PEP report found just 25% of Pakistani and 15% of Bangladeshi women either in work or looking for employment. Both of these studies probably underestimated the proportion of

51 Lewis, ibid.
53 Ansari, Infidel Within, 346, 349.
57 Modern Records Centre (MRC), Coventry, UK, Trades Union Congress (TUC) papers, MSS.292D/805.9/3, Manchester Committee for Community Relations (MCCR), “Memorandum on Employment”, 7/73.
58 Modood, Berthoud, et al., Ethnic Minorities in Britain, 86.
1. Introduction

Muslim women actually working, as many took up casual forms of homeworking that allowed them to combine domestic and employment duties. A recent study suggested that Muslim women still have low levels of economic activity, though with significant differences between classes, and that unwillingness to seek employment relates primarily to the primacy of household responsibilities.

As will be shown in chapter four, these working patterns have often been influenced by the religion of Muslim migrants. Engagement with their religious faith was often encouraged for Muslims by reconstitution of their families in Britain. This was partly because the decision to resettle families reflected the decision to settle in a non-Muslim society, and also because families acted as a moral and religious check on male pioneer migrants who might have lapsed from their faith to a degree when unaccompanied. The arrival of dependents also required families to seek education for their children that would sustain Islam. Broadly, the Muslim population of England is overwhelmingly Sunni. The schools of Islam most prominent in England during the post-war period were all parts of, developments of, or reactions to the various revivalist and reformist movements present in Indian Islam under British colonial rule. Many of these movements focused upon education as a means of empowering Muslims in an environment that denied them political power. The Deobandi school, significant amongst middle-class Sunnis in England, is a textual form of Islam stressing the supremacy of the Koran and *hadith* and counselling a strict application of Islamic personal

1. Introduction

law (sharia). Contrary to this reformist tendency is the Barelwi movement, which attained great popularity amongst the peasant classes in south Asia. The movement is populist and devotionalist in its attitude to the Prophet Muhammad, encouraging followers to pursue ‘the light of Muhammad’ in their own daily lives.\textsuperscript{64} For Barelwis, Islam can often be tightly entwined with local culture. Barelwis also practise Sufism, a mystical form of Islam criticised as intercessionist by Deobandis.\textsuperscript{65} The Barelwi movement is the largest in British Islam.\textsuperscript{66} More modern Islamic reform movements have also developed a significant following in England. The Tabligh-i-Jamaat, a movement focused on proselytising by laypersons, has established a seminary in Dewsbury, which trained its first alim in 1989.\textsuperscript{67} The Jamaat-e-Islami, the major south Asian organ of the wider ‘Islamic Movement’ that also includes Arab organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, has also had significant impact in England. The Jamaat, influenced by major thinkers such as Abul Al’a Maududi and Syed Qutb, is Islamist in the sense that its ultimate goal is the creation of an Islamic state. The Jamaatis self-consciously seek political power and a fusion of Islam with the nation state.\textsuperscript{68} Its members and followers are critical of the close association between ‘particularist’ cultures and Islam in the Barelwi movement, and stress a ‘pure’, textual form of the faith. Most of these movements, except for the Jamaat, have had no particular political programme in Britain. Deobandis have been interested in the state only when it can further, or threatens to obstruct, their religious goals.\textsuperscript{69} The Tabligh-i-Jamaat has been described as ‘invisible’ to non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{70} English Barelwis have been extremely politically active, and have accounted for many of the working-class Labour councillors in cities like Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester, but have no inherent, shared

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{66} Modood, ibid., 268.
\textsuperscript{67} Robinson, South Asian Islam, 11-2; Lewis, Islamic Britain, 38, 56.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 12-5.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., 6-7.
\textsuperscript{70} Ron Geaves, Sectarian Influence within Islam in Britain (Leeds : University of Leeds, 1996), 169.
1. Introduction

‘programme’ of a politico-religious nature.\(^{71}\) With the exception of small Islamist groups that have articulated a more radical programme – such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun – the Jamaat is the only Muslim organization with a constitutive religious-political programme.

All of these organizations have at least been active in community and religious organization in England, however, in most cases from an early period. Deobandis formed the Muslim Association in Bradford in 1959, and were often first to establish mosques in English cities.\(^{72}\) Even in 1989, Deobandis controlled 13 of Bradford’s 30 mosques.\(^{73}\) Nationally, the first two secretaries of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) – Iqbal Sacranie and Yousef Bhaliko – were rather traditionalist Deobandis despite the Jamaati influences upon the organisation.\(^{74}\)

The major Barelwi organization in Britain, the Jamiat Tabligh-ul-Islam, was formed in Bradford following the visit of influential pir (Sufist spiritual guide) Maroof Hussain Shah.\(^{75}\) It established its first mosque, also in Bradford, in 1966, and Barelwis controlled twelve of Bradford’s mosques by 1989.\(^{76}\) Many Barelwis in Britain are most visible to non-Muslim society through involvement with mosque councils and similar organizations.\(^{77}\) The Jamiat Tabligh-ul-Islam is not to be confused with the Tabligh-i-Jamaat, which was also active in Britain from the 1960s.

As mentioned, the Tabligh-i-Jamaat was not extensively involved in activities perceptible outside of Muslim communities themselves, but has been involved in the management of a

\(^{71}\) Moiuddin, “British Asian Muslims”, 267; Robinson, South Asian Islam, 8.
\(^{73}\) Lewis, Islamic Britain, 57.
\(^{75}\) Lewis, Islamic Britain, 81.
\(^{76}\) Ibid., 57.
1. Introduction

number of mosques. In some ways, the work of the Tabligh complemented that of Jamaat-influenced organizations – the Tabligh translated Islamic material into English for the consumption of those educated in Britain, but, unlike the Jamaati youth groups, was not open to women. Britain’s major Jamaati organization, the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), was established by a small number of activists at East London Mosque in 1962. The organization catered mostly to middle-class professionals initially. Growing more quickly in the 1970s and 1980s, the UKIM had over fifty branches by 1992, as well as 450 members and perhaps 5,000 ‘sympathisers’ and a separate women’s section. Despite its origin in London, the organization has been more successful in the North West and West Midlands. Jamaati youth organizations have been successful in East London, however, particularly the Young Muslims Organization (YMO). YMO, when formed in the early 1980s, was perhaps the first British Muslim organization that addressed itself specifically to those raised in Britain, and its use of English material and openness to female members made it an accessible organization. In the late 1980s, many young activists formerly involved with secular community organizations joined the YMO. More recently, organizations like the YMO have sometimes been seen by young activists as the last remaining alternative to neo-liberalism. The UKIM, which is not formally related to the YMO, developed its own youth work through the Young Muslims UK (YMUK), with strongholds in Bradford, Leicester and elsewhere. Other significant Jamaati organizations in Britain include the Leicester-based Islamic Foundation, an educational and research body, and the Muslim Educational Trust (MET) which has established a high profile by

80 Ansari, Infidel Within, 346, 349.
81 Geaves, Sectarian Influences, 199.
82 Jorgen Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh : Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 47.
84 Independent, 28/2/89.
86 Ansari, Infidel Within, 349; Geaves, Sectarian Influences, 3; Lewis, Islamic Britain, 110-11.
offering religious education to Muslim children in state schools and campaigning on educational matters. Jamaat-influenced organisations in Britain do not necessarily operate in lock-step – in Bradford, for example, the YMUK leadership has progressively distanced itself from UKIM. There was also, in the mid-1980s, serious conflict between the UKIM and YMO and the Dawat-ul-Islam, the organization that had originally founded the YMO. Jamaati organizations have been eager to influence British governmental, political and educational institutions. The MET has lobbied and/or been consulted by LEAs in various parts of the country as well as providing tuition in state schools; the YMO has received funding and assistance from Tower Hamlets borough council; and the UKIM was represented on the steering committee of a legal body designed to assist immigrants to Britain, the UK Immigrants Advisory Service (UKIAS).

Whilst conflicts within and between Sunni tendencies are given some attention in the literature on British Islam, Shia Muslims have been less studied. Their numbers are smaller, and Shia imams are also more likely than Sunni imams to have been raised and/or trained in the West, perhaps promoting an additional degree of integration. ‘Twelver’ Shias in Britain are primarily migrants from south Asia with roots in Iran, whilst Ismaili Shia Muslims include a great many East African Asians, and are often amongst the most affluent sections of that population. Outside the bounds of Sunni and Shia Islam are followers of the Ahmadiyya

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87 Ansari, ibid., 359.
88 Lewis, Islamic Britain, 110.
91 Ansari, Infidel Within, 380.
92 Ibid., 385.
93 Robinson, South Asian Islam, 16-7.
movement. Ahmadis are not regarded as Muslims by most of those within the mainstream of the faith, due to the acceptance by at least some Ahmadiyya tendencies of the movement’s founder, Ghulam Ahmad, as a prophet subsequent to Muhammad and/or as Jesus Christ.\textsuperscript{94}

Due to persecution in Pakistan, the Ahmadiyya movement moved its headquarters to London in 1984. Even before this, Ahmadiyya organizations enjoyed some recognition in Britain, with the movement having, for example, a seat on Ealing International Friendship Council in the 1960s and 70s.\textsuperscript{95}

II

The very notion of religion as prime element of identity within English Muslim communities during the 1960s and 1970s sits uneasily with a large body of recent scholarship. It is now a commonplace to suggest that British Muslims did not organise on the basis of, and were not seen by external actors in terms of, their religion until at least the time of the Honeyford affair. Philip Lewis has noted that Bradford’s Muslim community became ‘a centre of media interest and comment’ during the campaign against Honeyford.\textsuperscript{96} Humayun Ansari describes the affair as a ‘key moment’ in which ‘British Muslims... came under severe scrutiny’.\textsuperscript{97} For most scholars advancing such an analysis, however, the Rushdie affair was the event through which British Muslim identities were solidified and recognised. Lewis, for example, suggests that

\textit{[i]n 1985, the majority of those concerned with race relations in Britain... still thought of the religious identity of the country’s ethnic minorities as a somewhat marginal issue... Yet within five years Bradford had become known... as a city of Islam.}\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Ibid.}, 11.
\textsuperscript{96} Lewis, \textit{Islamic Britain}, 2.
\textsuperscript{97} Ansari, \textit{Infidel Within}, 1.
\textsuperscript{98} Lewis, \textit{Islamic Britain}, 2.
1. Introduction

In a very recent study, it was suggested that the Rushdie affair ‘marked the beginning of Muslim self-determination as a distinctive group’.\textsuperscript{99} These developments have been maligned by those who regard increased emphasis on religion identities as a non-consensual and regressive development, encouraged by conservative, male, ‘community leaders’ to the detriment of women, young people, secularists and others.\textsuperscript{100} Analyses in this vein sometimes bemoan the sectarian erosion of political movements of the 1970s and 1980s that formed wide links through identificatory labels such as ‘Asian’ or ‘black’.\textsuperscript{101}

This thesis will argue that these presentations are variously overstated, generalised and inaccurate. Clearly, it would be impossible to suggest that the Honeyford and Rushdie affairs, as well as the British Muslim mobilisations against the Gulf War, did not have great significance upon both the identities claimed by and ascribed to English Muslim communities. The Rushdie affair and Gulf war introduced an international element to the representation of British Muslims, and this foregrounding of ‘national allegiance’ questions has sharpened since the terrorist attacks of 2001 and 2005. However, this thesis will demonstrate that Muslim communities in England did accord considerable significance to their religion as an element of their social and political identity essentially from the moment they settled in Britain, and that this was recognised, and often given great attention, by local and national governments, community relations organizations, political parties, trade unions, employers, etc.. The religiosity of Muslim communities was often regarded as creating ‘problems’ for institutions concerned with governance and integration, and in greater volumes than those relating to other minority faiths. Moreover, these ideas had significance in a number of areas of policy and life – in education, in social service provision, in both the policies of employers and trade unions and the everyday experiences of work, and in party politics. Scholars of British

\textsuperscript{99} Akhtar, British Muslim Politics, 78.
1. Introduction

Ethnopolitics have to date been relatively uninterested in taking a broad perspective that would uncover these continuities.

Nevertheless, the aim of this thesis is not to make the argument that religious aspects of English Muslim identity ‘trumped’ non-religious aspects in these earlier periods. Rather, it must be acknowledged that the identities of English Muslims have, throughout the period of their settlement in Britain, been multifaceted and contextual. Likewise, mainstream institutions have fitted English Muslims into a variety of categories – ‘immigrant’, ‘coloured / Commonwealth immigrant’, ‘Asian’, Pakistani/Bangladeshi/Arab/Somali/Turkish Cypriot, ‘black’ and Muslim – at various times and in various contexts. It must be stressed that biological identities have also been ascribed to ethnic minority communities in Britain. Literature has suggested that a ‘new’ or cultural racism emerged in post-war Britain to ‘do the work’ of crude, biological notions about ‘race’ discredited by emerging scientific and anthropological consensus and by the association of these notions with Britain’s wartime enemy, Nazi Germany. This has sometimes led to the implication that biological ideas about ethnic minority communities in post-war Britain were simply inactive or suppressed. Chapter four of this thesis will suggest that not only did such presentations survive, they were not antithetical to cultural presentations, but could be rhetorically tied to them. Like other forms of ascribed identity, they are contextual and appear in certain discourses. In education policy, for example, a community may have been ‘Asian’ or ‘immigrant’ when problems of language were being discussed, but ‘Muslim’ when the issue at hand was that of uniforms or coeducation. The idea of the ‘problems’ presented by a Muslim woman made, as will be shown, considerable reference to purdah, whilst Muslim maleness cannot have this association in the same way. In terms of self-ascribed identities, one could not approach the 1971 war for independence in East Bengal, for example, without appreciating the regional and linguistic

1. Introduction

significance of the term ‘Bengali’, but this does not mean that religious factors were not
significantly ‘in play’ during that conflict. Moreover, categories used cannot be taken at face
value. The high proportion of practising Muslims within British Pakistani and Bangladeshi
populations means that a ‘Pakistani’ was also often presumptively a Muslim. Local factors are
also important. In Bradford, where Pakistanis are by far the largest ethnic minority community,
an ‘Asian’ may be presumptively a Pakistani, whereas in a borough, like Brent or Hackney, with
many sizable ethnic minority communities, ‘Asian’ is more likely to be used self-consciously as
an umbrella term.

In addition, and related, to its arguments about Muslim identity in post-war England,
this thesis also aims to sketch an original, historical, presentation of British multiculturalism.
Though they may have overstated the novelty of religious mobilisations within, and
understandings of, Muslim communities in England, recent social scientific analysts of those
communities are clearly correct that the close association between Muslims and the problems
of multiculturalism in general is a recent phenomenon. This association has been developed
primarily in the aftermath of the riots in northern England in 2001 and the terrorist attacks of
the early 2000s, and is articulated through the discourse of ‘community cohesion’ and through
the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ programme.\footnote{Derek McGhee, *The End of Multiculturalism? Terrorism, Integration and Human Rights* (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2008), 73.} However, it is not the case that, as many
commentators suggested, British multiculturalism had no concept of religion prior to the
Rushdie affair. Such conclusions are enabled, again, by the lack of an historical perspective in
the existing scholarship on British multiculturalism.

Early sociological analyses of ethnic diversity were often anthropological in character.
By the 1970s, the emerging paradigm of cultural studies was shifting focus onto popular, police
and state racism, and tending to stress the autonomy of ‘race’ relative to class. Neither of these tendencies deployed the concept of ‘multiculturalism’, the literature on which developed initially in societies with histories as white settler colonies, such as Canada and Australia. Canadian political philosophers have been prime producers of their discipline’s literature on multiculturalism, and the influence of this work in Britain can be felt in Bhikhu Parekh’s 2002 *Rethinking Multiculturalism*. This philosophical literature tends to conceive of multiculturalism as a comprehensive normative doctrine regarding both substantive ethical matters and the meta-ethics of how competing cultural demands are mediated. In sociology, too, multiculturalism is generally understood as a coherent ideology or policy approach. One recent alternative understanding proposed identifies multiculturalism as ‘the ground on which the contemporary politics of race takes place’ rather than as a ‘thick’ ideology. All of these varieties of scholarship, even where they are primarily descriptive, tend to be concerned with short periods of time, and are therefore open to presentism in their analyses. Some social scientific literature on multiculturalism is also microcosmic, concerned with events in a limited number of locales and/or with a limited thematic scope, using a restricted source base. The misconceptions outlined above as well as others arise from the absence of an historical perspective focused on continuities and changes over a broader period.

This is not to suggest that historians have been entirely uninterested in Britain’s ethnic diversity. Long-range histories of ethnic minorities, or specific ethnic communities, in Britain

have been written, including a wide-ranging work on British Muslims. Comprehensive studies have been written of post-war immigration to Britain, and the process of, and justifications for, its restriction. Historians influenced by the concept of the postcolonial have produced a fruitful body of work focused upon the effects of imperialism and decolonisation upon post-war Britain, and upon enduring links between the metropole and its former colonies. Unsurprisingly, these historians have turned their attentions to some degree to post-war immigration to Britain, and have produced illuminating work. However, such studies have sometimes dealt more with the abstract than with empirical narratives and analysis. Furthermore, more empirical studies often aim to cover only the immediate post-migration period.

This perhaps betrays an assumption within academic History that the discussion of multiculturalism still belongs to ‘current affairs’. Debates related to multiculturalism remain contentious, and it is not clear where the line between ‘present’ and ‘past’ should be drawn. However, the study of British multiculturalism is now increasingly open for historians. In terms of source work, many oral history projects provide a rich and varied picture of the political activism and quotidian experiences of ethnic minority Britons. As will be explored below, local authorities have often been the drivers of multiculturalism in Britain, and their minutes

and other papers are matters of public record. Even at the centre, governmental sources from late into the relevant period are now available, and published primary material provides valuable snapshots of attitudes on various matters at key junctures. The divide between ‘past’ and ‘present’ may remain difficult to perceive, as is the case for modern historians in most areas, but the restructuring and contraction of British multicultural governance from the late 1980s provides an obvious potential terminus. Demographically, it has been argued convincingly that Britain now experiences ‘superdiversity’. Immigration into Britain began to increase again in the 1990s, and there has been a net inflow since 1994. 25 distinctive ethnic minority communities can account for at least 1% each of Britain’s population. These new migrants often face basic political struggles – for citizenship, the right to work, state benefits, etc. – that Commonwealth migrants, at least theoretically, did not. More recent migrant groups therefore have distinctive political concerns. Relations between this increasingly varied group of communities are also characterised by a great degree of inter-mixing, hybridity and code-switching, not only blurring boundaries between communities, but also calling into question the concept of a bounded ethnic community. The postcolonial formation of multiculturalism, in which a relatively small number of specifically demarcated ethnic minority groups are governed through specific structures, has therefore become an historical formation, which, though clearly linked with existing pluralisms (at one end) and contemporary, somewhat reconstructed, versions of multiculturalism (at the other) has a distinctive character and can be studied in its entirety by historians.

What does British multiculturalism look like when viewed through an historical lens? As the argument to follow demonstrates, an historical study of ethnic diversity’s socio-political impact in Britain shows multiculturalism to be an ad hoc and unevenly-developed

112 Ibid., 1035.
113 Ibid., 1046.
phenomenon, built up gradually by a variety of actors in various spheres that were not always coordinated and did not necessarily share values or aims. Such a view of multiculturalism is not entirely unprecedented—a brief 1999 article by Stuart Hall spoke of ‘multicultural “drift”’—the increasingly visible presence of black and Asian people in all aspects of British social life... This is not the outcome of deliberate and planned policy but of undirected sociological processes...”

This understanding of multiculturalism has gained some purchase—the phrase ‘multicultural drift’ was invoked by the 2000 *Future of Multi-ethnic Britain* report, which drew attention to the ‘unplanned, incremental process’ of multiculturalism. Clearly, however, Hall does not attempt a long-range historical narrative. His focus is, as he admits, on issues of policing and violence. This focus engenders not only incompleteness, but also leads to an unqualified pessimism about Britain’s approach. This may befit an analysis of policing, crime and ‘race’—in which recognition of ethnic diversity and promotion of racial equality has been especially lacking—but may not apply equally elsewhere. Although the issue of police harassment has become extremely significant to Asians since the mid-1980s, this has not always been so, and it is suggestive that the dynamics Hall refers to concern Afro-Caribbeans primarily. Moreover, there is a large body of practices—day-to-day government, individual legislation, government funding programmes, etc.—that fit between ‘deliberate and planned policy’ and ‘undirected sociological processes’ through which multiculturalism has been advanced. Nevertheless, it is clear that the understanding of multiculturalism to be worked with below contradicts portrayals within both the social sciences and political philosophy of multiculturalism as a relatively robust and coherent policy approach or philosophy/ideology. Rather, this thesis will

116 Hall, “From Scarman”, 189.
present multiculturalism as an institution through which specific ethnic communities are posited into existence, and approached with specific provisions relevant to their ostensible ‘special’ needs. It is therefore ‘larger’ and more multifarious than a policy and, through being so complex and subject to multiple pressures, may not be coherent. Most basically, institutions can be understood as ‘the rules of the game’ that ‘constrain and refract politics’. The institution of multiculturalism in this period has comprised and entangled individuals, organisations, policies and legislation, and intellectual concepts. In the final two chapters, some consideration will be given to the endurance of this institution over a broad span, despite heavy and often convincing criticisms from a variety of actors. This will be explained through reference to ‘path dependency’, a sociological theory emphasising the tendency for complex institutions to become ‘locked in’, and so ‘expensive’ to reform or abandon, even where they are flawed.

Hall’s portrait of an ‘uneven’ multiculturalism has perhaps been influential for scholars such as Pnina Werbner, who views British multiculturalism as ‘a rather messy local political and bureaucratic negotiated order’. Whilst there is much to recommend a focus on the ‘localness’ of British multiculturalism throughout much of its history, it must be acknowledged that responses to ethnic diversity have been determined by interaction between local and national actors. Central government has served many functions in the history of multiculturalism – facilitator, inhibitor, and, perhaps above all, establisher of parameters. Whilst, particularly in the early part of this period, actively declining to act on certain matters, central government has also, inevitably, had primary responsibility in areas such as legislation and funding.


That it has been an entirely local phenomenon – or, as for another scholar, an entirely national one\(^\text{120}\) -- is just one of the broad theses about British multiculturalism that can be tested through an historical study. Analyses of multiculturalism, even where they have not dealt directly with large periods, have sometimes been concerned to divide British approaches to ethnic diversity into phases.\(^\text{121}\) Broadly, these treatments have traced a movement from approaches characterised by assimilation towards ‘multiculturalism’ (i.e. recognition of ethnic minority cultures) and then, perhaps to a more radical approach named ‘anti-racism’. However, as will be seen, these approaches co-existed and were sometimes mutually reinforcing.\(^\text{122}\) During the early phase of multiculturalism, specific provisions intended to account for the ‘distinctive cultures’ of ethnic minority communities were often made in an attempt to further long-term integration or assimilation.

For some scholars of multiculturalism, approaches taken by the state seem secondary to the processes of dialogue entailed in any particular approach. Parekh, for instance, presents intercultural dialogue as a good-in-itself, emphasising that intercultural disputes are ‘best settled by discussion, negotiation and compromise’.\(^\text{123}\) In light of this emphasis on dialogue, Tariq Modood has wondered to what extent Parekh has clear substantive proposals at all.\(^\text{124}\) Given that Parekh devotes much of his work to judgements on the admissibility of certain cultural dialogue proves ineffective.\(^\text{125}\) It is perhaps telling that Rumy Hasan, whilst making normative

\(^{120}\) Pitcher, *Politics of Multiculturalism*, 23.
\(^{125}\) Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, 255-6, 273-335.
injunctions about multiculturalism that are opposite to Parekh’s, also speaks warmly about the benefits of inter-cultural dialogue.\footnote{Rumy Hasan, \textit{Multiculturalism: Some Inconvenient Truths} (London : Politico’s, 2010), 31, 51, 183.}

This thesis, particularly in chapter six on the Rushdie affair, will consider some forms of inter-cultural dialogue that have actually occurred in multicultural Britain, and will make the point that dialogue is never between ‘cultures’ but between individuals, which has impact for which sorts of claims have been heard within the multiculturalism institution. Many of multiculturalism’s critics have insisted that actually-existing intercultural dialogue has tended to harm ‘minorities within minorities’ – ethnic minority women, youths and LGBT people, or members of unrecognized religious, ethnic or linguistic subgroups within recognised communities. Such critics have suggested that multiculturalism contains ‘a simplistic view of ethnic cultures as homogenous and having static, core, essential characteristics’.\footnote{Ali Rattansi, \textit{Multiculturalism: a Very Short Introduction} (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2011).} The empirical evidence mobilised in support for such claims is often rather thin. There is validity to these concerns, but reification of ethnic communities arises from institutional arrangements in which multicultural structures may not be concerned with non-ethnic forms of disadvantage, and due to the bureaucratic convenience of recognising a limited array of ethnic groups, rather than from any coherent metaphysics of ethnicity shared by elites. Furthermore, ethnic identity has certainly not been regarded as a static property by British elites – if this were so, then policies and practices designed to promote assimilation would not be pursued. Wide concerns expressed in the 1970s and 1980s about Asian youths caught ‘between two cultures’ evidence an understanding (albeit a simplistic one) that members of ‘cultural minorities’ are not closed off to the influence of the mainstream.\footnote{Community Relations Commission, \textit{Between two Cultures: a Study of Relationships between Generations in the Asian Community in Britain} (London : CRC, 1976).} Likewise, concern about the rising expectations of the second generation was a common theme in elite material on the future of an ethnically
diverse Britain in the 1960s. Attempting to square a belief in the ‘essentialising’ state with this clear fixation amongst elites upon ethnic change has been difficult, with Ramamurthy, for instance, claiming that Asian cultures have been regarded as ‘unchanging traditions’, but Asian youth as a ‘symbol of change and crisis’. Still, it is true that elite conceptions of ethnic minority communities have often been unsubtle and generalised, and it is significant that change within ethnic minority communities has been associated with crisis and trauma rather than new cultural possibilities.

Whilst historically broader than many existing treatments, it must be allowed that the present thesis is not a comprehensive treatment of the institution of British multiculturalism, instead operating largely by way of case study. Specifically, this thesis deals primarily with Muslims in England in the period 1962-92 (though chapter seven is more expansive). The decision to focus on England, and so leave aside Scotland and Wales, relates chiefly to Scotland’s distinctive religious history, which may impact significantly upon the experiences of religious minorities there, but would be hard to treat adequately in a thesis concerned with Britain as a whole. Wales, meanwhile, lacks a Muslim community in any of its towns or cities of the same size and visibility as certain areas of England and so, since Scotland has been left aside and the communities under study are almost entirely English, it seems most accurate to describe this as a thesis concerned with England. The phrase ‘British multiculturalism’ will be used below, reflecting, mundanely, that England is a part of Britain, and also that a significant portion of multiculturalism’s infrastructure is shared between British countries. A focus on Muslim communities has been inspired by three factors: a desire, as described above, to address issues of specific interest within the literature on those communities; a belief that

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Muslims in England are so diverse that a study focused only on Muslims, and not other ethnic minority groups, will still convey rich internal variation, whilst providing a theme sufficiently confined for comprehensive study; and because of the prominence of Muslims within discussions of multiculturalism in Britain, and indeed Europe, today. It is correct to speak of ‘English Muslim communities’ rather than ‘the English Muslim community’ because of the variations – in terms of ethnic and national identity, gender composition, class, language, sectarian affiliation, political engagement, etc. – between these communities, and because of the weak nature of national leadership within British Islam for much of this period. This is to say nothing of the *internal* diversity within Muslim communities. The term ‘Muslim’ has been used in its most natural, i.e. religious, sense, and not with ‘ethnic’ connotations, although the descriptor is applied on the basis of the types of claims made or behaviours exhibited by a person or group in the public sphere, and does not imply any degree of private commitment to faith or self-identification on a religious basis. Chapters with a more general remit, especially chapter seven, cannot hope to offer a comprehensive treatment of the socio-political experiences of non-Muslim ethnic minority communities in Britain, or of their relationship to the institution of multiculturalism, but it is hoped that the most important differences have been brought out. Likewise, certain accommodations sought by and offered to Muslim communities – for example, the right to specific burial plots and the recognition of distinctive burial practices – are left aside here, but have been well covered by other scholars.\(^{132}\)

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1. Introduction

The narratives and analyses to follow are based on study of a variety of sources. Nationally, published primary reports of bodies tasked with ‘race’ issues – the Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration (SCRRI), House of Commissions Home Affairs Sub-committee on Race Relations, Race Relations Board (RRB), Community Relations Commission (CRC) and Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) – have been indispensable. Key pieces of legislation – the Race Relations Acts, for example, and the Local Government Act of 1966 – have been consulted. In some fields, Hansard has been a useful source in elaborating parliamentary opinion. Elite reactions are perhaps best captured through newspaper work, and there has been a focus on broadsheets, especially the Guardian and Observer, The Times, and, when available, the Independent. The responses of the centre-left, in opposition for the majority of the period studied, and the labour movement have been captured through extensive work at the People’s History Museum, particularly on the memoranda of the Labour Party Research Department (LPRD), and at the Modern Records Centre, particularly on the papers of the Trades Union Congress’ (TUC) Race Relations Advisory Committee. An emphasis on multiculturalism’s local dynamics naturally necessitates a large amount of work on local sources. The areas discussed most often below include London (including the large areas covered by the strategic local authorities and with especial attention to the borough of Tower Hamlets), West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester, and Birmingham. This reflects primarily the pattern of settlement of Muslims in England and, to a lesser degree, the availability and usefulness of sources in different areas. Records of local authorities are of chief importance, whilst local newspapers have also provided illumination of events not covered by the national press. In some locales, thematically-arranged collections of published primary material and/or correspondence have bolstered committee records. In a number of areas, political party branch correspondence and minutes are available and contain discussion of ‘race relations’
1. Introduction

matters or procedural matters related to ethnic minority members. The papers of a number of local Community Relations Councils (CRCs) have been studied. Elsewhere in the voluntary sector, the papers of the Indian Workers Association (IWA) have been useful both in relation to that organization and with respect to ethnic minority community mobilisation in general. Finally, a number of collections of oral interview transcripts and recordings have been utilised.

These sources have been utilised for the production of six substantive chapters. Each of the first five of these demonstrates the specificity given to English Muslims in a certain area of policy or discourse. The first concerns education, a major area of contestation about the future of an ethnically plural Britain. The second concerns purdah and the reaction to this practice of elite actors. The fourth chapter overall considers presentations and experiences of English Muslims in the sphere of employment. It is concerned both to demonstrate the (heretofore neglected) significance of religion in English Muslim claims-making about employment, but also to highlight the intersection of various facets of English Muslim identity in the ideas formed about them by employers, colleagues and trades unions. The fifth chapter considers ethnic minority, and especially Muslim, political engagement in Britain. It shows that whilst the history of this engagement for Muslims mirrors that of other ethnic minority groups, there have also been specific, and significant, ideas about Muslim political participation in particular. The sixth chapter offers an analysis of elite reactions to the Rushdie affair, furthering the argument of the thesis by presenting the affair as one event within a longer history of Muslim claims-making and political incorporation, and not as a self-contained seismic shock. Chapter seven takes a broader approach and develops some of the insights sketched above regarding the development of the institution of British multiculturalism between the 1950s and 1990s. Following this, a concluding chapter ties together these insights whilst giving some attention to more recent developments.
Education has been the policy area most central to British multiculturalism, and the school has been the arena in which actors have felt most able to make the institution in their desired image. For ethnic minority parents, British schooling has been a source of anxiety. The specific concerns of parents have varied between ethnic groups and across periods, but have often emanated from a fear that children will not be accorded equality of opportunity in British schools; will be educated ‘out of’ their cultural origins; and may exit schools unable to compete in the British jobs market and with their self-confidence shattered by denigration of their heritage. Likewise, for elite actors, the general salience accorded to education was joined to differing, and changing, ideas about correct practice. The long-term aim of integration remained essentially constant, though willingness to make concessions to ethnic minority communities increased over the decades as ideas about good educational practice shifted and those communities became more powerful.

Muslim parents generally regarded British education as highly valuable. Prior to migration, colonial subjects were often led to idealise the educational system of the metropole.\textsuperscript{133} The low status jobs endured by many first generation Pakistani immigrants encouraged them to promote education amongst their children. As one interviewee of the Bradford Heritage Recording Unit (BHRU) recalled in the 1980s, ‘[m]y parents said to us, “[w]ork hard at school, get yourself an education, or else you’ll end up in the mill like us”’.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{133} Alison Shaw, \textit{A Pakistani Community}, 140.
\textsuperscript{134} Bradford Heritage Recording Unit ed., \textit{Here to Stay}, 144.

However, this belief about the value of British education was joined to ambivalence about its cultural content.\textsuperscript{135} This often related to the education of girls in particular, as will be discussed in chapter three, but was also apparent generally. English Muslim parents and voluntary organizations have frequently suggested that the education system places their religious identity under threat. As Shaw noted, educational demands often ‘relate to a more general concern for the maintenance of Muslim identity and the perceived threat to it posed by Western influence’.\textsuperscript{136} Despite the value that British Muslim parents place upon educational achievement, they have also sought to combine high achievement in mainstream education with retention of cultural origins. Potential tensions between these two aims have been apparent both in the demanding supplementary education often arranged for Muslim children, and by holidays to countries of origin in term time.\textsuperscript{137}

The demands of Muslims and responses to these are, however, just one part of a broader narrative regarding education and ethnic diversity. Systematic approaches to identifying the number and location of ethnic minority children in Britain were deployed from the early sixties. Bradford began to collect statistics on the ethnic and linguistic composition of its schools in 1963-4, at which time there were around 250,000 ‘coloured’ children in British schools.\textsuperscript{138} In 1965, the Department of Education and Science (DES) began to collect statistics on the number of ‘immigrant’ children in schools. However, the definition of ‘immigrant children’ used was eccentric, and became the subject of much dispute. DES’ Form 7(i) counted children who had either been born in the New Commonwealth (later including Pakistan) or


\textsuperscript{138} WYASB, Barkerend Immigrant Education Centre (BIEC) papers, 42D92/56, City of Bradford Education Department to BIEC, 1963.
whose parents had immigrated from one of those nations within the previous ten years. This definition was both misleading (since not all children included were immigrants) and failed to accurately assess the size of need (since many ethnic minority children did not qualify). The continued immigration of dependants and somewhat larger family sizes amongst Asian families meant that the proportion of Asian children, and especially Bangladeshis, in British schools continued to grow through the 1960s and 1970s. In 1978-82, there was an increase of 82% in the number of children speaking Bengali in the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA) area. There were around 300,000 Muslim children on British school rolls by 1992.

Elite responses to this diversity have taken a variety of forms. As noted, academic treatments of this process tend to divide policy into ‘epochs’. These narratives are oversimplistic and imply that there has been some primary driver of British educational policy in this period and area, presumably central government. In fact, as will be described below, the policies of, and reports commissioned by, central government have often reacted to local policies and pressures rather than determining or foreshadowing them. In its 1973 document *The Education of Immigrants*, the DES claimed that its ‘object throughout has been to shape a coherent central policy’. However, much of the report’s substance is given over to considering the failure of the centre to engender such coherence. Likewise, the Swann Report, often regarded as the apotheosis of ‘liberal optimism’, primarily endorsed practices already adopted by a wide range of local authorities.

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139 People’s History Museum, Manchester (UK), Labour Party Research Department (LPRD) memoranda, RE1041, 3/77, 4-5.
140 Guardian, 2/6/82.
141 Independent, 19/3/92.
143 Ali Rattansi, “Changing the Subject”, 11.
The historiography of British education policy, whatever its conception of agency, has broadly agreed about a slow shift from ‘assimilationism’ towards ‘multiculturalism’, beginning in the late 1960s and declining by the late 1980s. The relationship between, and distinctiveness of, ‘multicultural’ and ‘anti-racist’ approaches to education has been more controversial. Some associated with the Left pledged explicit support for anti-racism, regarding multiculturalism as entirely inadequate. In this scheme, multiculturalism was often criticised as a ‘liberal’ perspective, conceiving of racism as an individual attitude that can be ‘educated away’ via the introduction of more curriculum material on the non-European world, etc. Anti-racism, according to its proponents, instead emphasised structural drivers of racial disadvantage. Swann was roundly criticised by anti-racists for failing to stress the role of institutional racism. This debate is clouded further by the fact that the 1989 MacDonald Inquiry, launched in response to the stabbing of a Bengali boy by a white peer at Burnage High School in Manchester, criticised the ‘anti-racist’ approach of the school in question in terms usually used by ‘anti-racist’ critics of ‘multiculturalism’. This was largely misinterpreted as a damning critique of ‘anti-racist’ education in general and caused a great deal of scepticism about anti-racism even within the Left. In the same period, the autonomy of LEAs, including those promoting multiculturalism or anti-racism, was greatly reduced by the Educational Reform Act of 1988, with its introduction of a national curriculum and promotion of voluntary schooling outside local authority control. In 1990, the disbanding of ILEA eliminated a major promoter of multicultural and anti-racist work.

The specific position of Muslim educational demands within this framework has sometimes been difficult to establish. An analysis focusing on religious identity unsurprisingly fits best into a paradigm based upon cultural pluralism, but the denial of cultural

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144 Ibid.
accommodation can be presented as a result of racism, whilst the campaign against Honeyford was clearly consonant with anti-racist ends.

This chapter will therefore situate the specific experiences of Muslim parents, schools and educational groups, and the reactions to these of various groups within the mainstream, within the broader narrative of the British educational system’s development of multiculturalism. The second section will deal with approaches that combined a rhetorical commitment to assimilation with special provisions aimed at long-term integration. The third will consider approaches that promoted ethnic diversity and anti-racism in schools, and the degree to which these form distinct paradigms. The fourth will consider concessions made to Muslims within the mainstream, whilst the fifth deals with the campaign for Muslim schools. A sixth and final section offers concluding remarks and relates the chapter to the general concerns of the thesis.

II

Although the 1960s have generally been identified as a time of support for assimilation and ‘colour-blindness’ in education, the decade witnessed a notable initiative concerning minorities’ specific needs, in Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966. This offered local authorities grants towards the salaries of staff teaching those ‘whose language and customs differ from those of the community’. This recognised the importance of such differences, using statistics on ethnic minority pupils collected since 1965. This demonstrated the Labour Government’s belief (Conservatives were opposed to S11) that ethnic minorities had special needs, requiring specific provisions, arrived at despite the appeal of universalism to many Labour activists.\footnote{Feldman, “Why the English Like Turbans”, 286.} However, such provisions still aroused criticism in the 1960s. In 1962, the
CIAC stressed that what ethnic minorities in British schools needed most was ‘the assurance of a kindly and unprejudiced welcome...’\(^{147}\) The TUC, a major proponent of ‘colour-blindness’ in this period, criticised the 1969 Select Committee on Race Relations Immigration (SCRRI) report _The Problems of Coloured School Leavers_ for ‘assum[ing] the division of the workforce... into groups’\(^{148}\). Opposition to separate provision was apparent within many local authorities. For example, Manchester’s Education Department declared in 1963-4 that its aim ‘should be to integrate immigrant children into the school community as quickly and as fully as possible, and to avoid any suggestion that they are different in any way except language...’\(^{149}\) As late as 1970, ILEA was determined ‘not to single out immigrant children apart from those needing language tuition.’\(^{150}\) Evidence submitted to the 1973 SCRRI report on _Education_ suggests that policy-makers had shed this attitude by the mid-1970s, but a belief in ‘colour-blindness’ persisted amongst those implementing policy into the 1980s.\(^{151}\) In 1985 the Swann Report found a teacher at a school with an Asian population declaring proudly that his school did not distinguish between pupils: ‘if all the Asians ... evaporated tomorrow, it would not make a scrap of difference’.\(^{152}\) The Conservative government, nevertheless, did little to act upon the more pluralist recommendations of the SCRRI report.\(^{153}\) Even in the 1980s, the zenith of the ‘liberal’ hour, elite responses were unlikely to see schools as having a duty to maintain minority cultures. Swann insisted that ‘we do not see schools as having a responsibility for cultural preservation...’\(^{154}\)

\(^{147}\) MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/1, CIAC, “Evidence from Government Departments...”, 6/12/62.


\(^{150}\) London Metropolitan Archives, London, UK, ILEA Policy Co-ordinating Committee (ILEAPCC) presented papers, ILEA/CL/PRE/24/1, P11, “Survey of Immigrants in Primary Schools”, 29/5/70.


\(^{152}\) _Swann Report_, 107.

\(^{153}\) _Ibid_, 214.

\(^{154}\) _Ibid_, 22.
Nevertheless, specific structures for dealing with ethnic minority communities were established in local authorities from an early date. There were two Pakistani ‘immigrant liaison officers’ attached to Bradford’s Education Department by 1963. In Manchester, only three years after the Department pledged to ‘avoid any suggestion that [ethnic minority children] are different in any way except language...’ an inspector was given special responsibility for ‘problems concerning the education of immigrant children’. By 1968, Manchester also had a full-time adviser specializing in ‘immigrant education’. Despite its own stated concerns about specific provisions for ethnic minority children, the CIAC believed that Bradford’s ‘immigrant liaison officers’ had achieved ‘excellent results’. Even as local authorities and community relations group pledged support for identical provision, therefore, the institutional artifice of multiculturalism in England was being constructed.

Regardless of their rhetorical emphases, few were prepared to argue that children who entered schools unable to speak English should simply be approached as part of the general population. As early as 1963, the NUT identified language as the key concern for integration. Central government also endorsed this view in producing the 1963 guidelines *English for Immigrants*. The persistence of these ideas is reflected in Labour’s 1977 ‘Race and Education’, which placed much emphasis on language. The continuing primacy of English teaching was ensured by a growing realization that substantial numbers of British-born ethnic minority children would still arrive in schools as non-English-speakers.

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155 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/5, CIAC, “Minutes of a Meeting... on 22nd February, 1963”.
156 GMCRO, MCC papers, Education Committee (EC) minutes, 1966-7, 865.
158 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.93/1, TUC, “CIAC: Progress Report”, 17/2/64
161 PHM, LPRD memoranda, RE1041, 3/77
The approaches adopted to impart English fluency varied greatly over time and between localities, however. Three main approaches can be identified: ‘reception centres’ in which non-English speaking (NES) children were educated full-time for up to a year; the withdrawal of NES children into special classes within mainstream schools for part of each day; and the use of peripatetic teachers who travelled between schools giving less intensive tuition. The approaches were often combined. Reception centres illustrate the degree to which local authorities were willing to abandon holistic provision due to language needs, and their use was promoted in *English for Immigrants*. Bradford introduced its first centre in 1964, catering to those aged ten and over, and had eight centres by 1970, serving almost 1,000 students.

Although early provision was for the oldest children, eventually, as authorities accepted that even British-born ethnic minority children may enter school without English fluency, the entire age range of pupils was covered. At least six other authorities had established reception centres by 1965, including ILEA, Batley, Huddersfield, Walsall, Bolton, and Slough. Birmingham, Sheffield, Brent, Rochdale, Stretford and Bristol also did so by 1973. It will be noted that most of these authorities governed large Asian populations, illustrating that it was primarily, but not entirely, children of Asian origin that were regarded as needing intensive ESL instruction. The reception centres were always a controversial mechanism due to concerns about segregation. Criticism of reception centres as racist, meanwhile, did not appear until the mid-1980s when Swann described them as ‘an example of institutional racism which... denies an individual child access to the full range of educational opportunities’. In 1986, an inquiry by the CRE into Calderdale’s centres judged that this type of provision constituted indirect

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162 DES, *Education of Immigrants*, 16.
163 WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/T15401, “…Education of Commonwealth Immigrants”, 20/10/70; BBD 1/7/16, “The Education of Children of Commonwealth Immigrants…”, 6/73.
164 Ibid., “Extract from the Minutes of the ESC”, 26/2/74.
165 LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/PRE/24/1, P11, “Survey of Immigrants in Primary Schools”, 29/5/70; PHM, 331.6/Box 232, Young Fabians, “Strangers Within”, 17, 10/65.
166 SCRRRI, *Education*, vol. 1, 8 and vol. 2, 67, 664, 666, 674, and 682.
167 Swann Report, 389.
discrimination, following the reasoning of Swann. This led to the abandonment of remaining centres.\footnote{Halstead, \textit{Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity}, 40.}

Despite the perceived advantages of reception centres in enabling a concentration of resources, some authorities combined them with ESL classes within mainstream schools, offering NES children some opportunity for inter-ethnic socialization. Bradford did so, having thirteen classes in place by 1969, accommodating 260 children.\footnote{WYASB, TC’s papers, 42D92/56, City of Bradford ESC, “The Education of Commonwealth Immigrants...”, 6/69.} A number of authorities, including Bolton, Birmingham, Manchester and Ealing, operated classes by 1963.\footnote{SCRRI, \textit{Education}, vol. 2, 316.} An approach based upon withdrawal classes was promoted by the Labour government’s White Paper of 1965, which offered limited support for segregation so long as this occurred for as little time as possible.\footnote{PHM, 331 6/Box 232, HMSO, ‘Immigration from the Commonwealth’, 1965, 11.} Like reception centres, withdrawal classes were deprecated by Swann, and a number of authorities thereafter ended such provision.\footnote{GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1985-6, 1600.} Unlike reception centres, withdrawal classes did not attempt to provide elements of the broader curriculum in simplified English, though both were expected to act as an environment in which ‘British culture’ was imparted. It is notable that, in Bradford at least, the readiness of children to pass into mainstream schooling from the centres was judged in relation to ‘other educational and social skills’ besides English ability.\footnote{WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/16, City of Bradford ESC, “The Education of Children of Commonwealth Immigrants”, 9/10/72.}

Other authorities – such as Wolverhampton, Dudley, Barking, and Rotherham – relied largely or entirely on peripatetic teachers rather than withdrawal. Birmingham also made use of such teachers alongside more segregative approaches.\footnote{SCRRI, \textit{Education}, vol. 2, 686.} Peripatetic arrangements were
more acceptable to ethnic minority organizations, but were less intensive and required low pupil-to-teacher ratios.\textsuperscript{175}

Language needs were also central to the justifications for dispersal schemes applied to ethnic minority children. Discussion of a dispersal policy can be traced to 1963. The topic was considered at the first meeting of the CIAC in January 1963, and at subsequent meetings.\textsuperscript{176} The NUT’s 1962-3 report from Birmingham provided detailed support for capping the proportions of ethnic minority children in British schools.\textsuperscript{177} In October, the Education Minister Lord Boyle visited Southall and recommended that the proportion of ethnic minority children in schools not exceed one third.\textsuperscript{178} In 1964, both Ealing and Bradford introduced dispersal systems. Boyle’s recommendation was primarily a means of supporting policies already under consideration in certain areas, particularly Ealing.\textsuperscript{179} The initial quotas introduced in Bradford placed a 25% cap on ‘immigrant’ children in primary schools, and a lower cap for secondary schools. A limit of 30% was introduced for individual classes, though this was reduced to 15% where a large proportion of children were NES.\textsuperscript{180} By 1967, Bradford’s system of bussing included seven busloads of mostly Asian children bring transported daily. In 1965, the DES produced its circular that recommended dispersal to local authorities.\textsuperscript{181} Other authorities that introduced bussing included Leicester, Luton, Bristol, Blackburn, Wolverhampton and Rochdale. A total of eleven authorities were using the system in 1973. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the size of ethnic minority communities was in many areas making limits unworkable. In 1971, Bradford began allowing schools to exceed the cap, and the DES also

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\item \textsuperscript{175} Birmingham Post, 14/1/64; SCRRRI, Education, vol. 2, 686.
\item \textsuperscript{176} MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/5, CIAC, “Minutes of a Meeting... on 25th January, 1963”
\item \textsuperscript{177} Ibid., MSS.292B/805.94/2, NUT, “Memorandum of Evidence for the CIAC”, [1963]
\item \textsuperscript{178} PHM, LPRD memoranda, RE1041, 3/77.
\item \textsuperscript{180} WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/T9644, City of Bradford ESC, “The Education of Commonwealth Immigrant Children”, 23/11/64.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Ibid., YCCR papers, 49D79/1/2/4, DES, “The Education of Immigrants”, 14/6/65.
\end{itemize}
suggested that a limit of 33% upon ethnic minority children in individual schools was no longer realistic.\textsuperscript{182} Nevertheless, bussing systems continued to expand. 17 buses were in use by Bradford in 1972, and in 1973 Ealing was bussing 3,700 children daily.\textsuperscript{183} Pressures on these systems were therefore great by the 1970s and, by 1974, the RRB was undertaking an investigation in Ealing to explore the legality of the system.\textsuperscript{184}

Bussing was initially justified primarily in relation to language tuition, which some felt would be easier if the proportion of ethnic minority children in a school were controlled. Boyle’s speech in Southall suggested an additional motivation related to the assuaging of white concerns. Bradford expressed concern about the difficulties faced by NES and ‘unassimilated’ children.\textsuperscript{185} These justifications were also central to the argument of the DES circular of 1965. Despite the statement of the DES therein that ‘acceptable’ concentrations should be determined at a local level based on need, the suggestion ultimately of blunt limits invited criticisms charging a lack of subtlety. Both the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) and the \textit{Guardian} argued that the issue was ultimately linguistic.\textsuperscript{186} As the Labour Party’s Study Group on Immigration (LPSGI) noted in 1969, the importance of ‘social’ justifications for dispersal were by then becoming increasingly salient. From 1970, Bradford justified its policy repeatedly as beneficial in ‘educational and social’ terms.\textsuperscript{187} This flowed from progress made with ESL and subsequent reduction in the urgency of linguistic teaching.\textsuperscript{188} However, a document released by the DES in the same year suggested that dispersal should not be pursued for social reasons alone since the general work of integration was more properly

\textsuperscript{182} WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/T15401, City of Bradford ECS, “The Education of Children of Commonwealth Immigrants...”, 3/71.
\textsuperscript{184} Killian, “School Busing”, 199.
\textsuperscript{185} MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.945/S, CIAC, “Minutes of a Meeting... on 22nd February, 1963”
\textsuperscript{187} WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/T15401, “... Education of Commonwealth Immigrants”, 20/10/70.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Ibid.}, 42D92/56, “The Education of Children of Commonwealth Immigrants”, 9/10/72
carried out by specialized mechanisms such as legislation and CRCs. Nevertheless, social justifications remained salient throughout this period. Indeed, even the RRB allowed that the policy had social and educational benefits. In any case, desire to limit the number of NES children in a classroom came not only from a desire to impart English speedily to those children, but also from a fear that their specific needs would take time and attention in classes away from white children. The NUT’s report on Birmingham observed this dynamic. A Gallup poll of 1968 suggested that 80% of white parents would be concerned about the presence of a single non-white child in their child’s classroom. Another 1968 survey, of educational performance in inner London by ILEA, suggested, however, that arguments about large concentrations of ethnic minorities in schools negatively affecting the performance of white children were greatly overstated.

Arguments against dispersal were both ideological and practical. Many LEAs may have objected to the promotion of dispersal by central government simply because it was a complex, expensive and controversial policy promoted by the DES without assistance or guidelines. Two large authorities with considerable ethnic minority populations, Birmingham and ILEA, quickly rejected bussing as unfeasible. A major, more principled, objection, referred to the benefit of ‘community schools’ in which the school intake was drawn from the local area. These ideas were promoted by the 1967 Plowden Report on primary education, and even local authorities practising dispersal recognized the existence of this problem. In areas with large Asian populations, the pre-existing anxiety that Asian parents were disconnected from the British educational process was exacerbated by dispersal, which increased the distance

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190 Killian, “School Busing in Britain”, 169.
193 LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/PRE/24/1, P3, “Survey of Immigrants in Primary Schools”.
between parents’ homes and their children’s schools.\textsuperscript{194} The journeys could also put further pressures on the time of children, especially Muslim children, expected to attend supplementary classes after the mainstream school day. There was also worry that bussing stigmatized ethnic minority children, identifying them as ‘different’ and bringing them into hostile white environments.\textsuperscript{195} These problems with dispersal meant that ethnic minority parents and community groups were often opposed to it. In Bradford, growing parental opposition was sensed from 1967.\textsuperscript{196}

Behind many of these criticisms of bussing was an implication that it was a racist policy. Some, like the West Middlesex District Communist Party, argued this explicitly.\textsuperscript{197} Much agonizing occurred across a broader range of institutions about the fact that, in most authorities that utilized the system, bussing applied only to non-white children. The difficulties involved in this had been recognized at an early stage – ILEA’s rejection of bussing was determined in part by the consideration that applying the system either solely to ethnic minority pupils or to any white children would be politically difficult, and that a system applying only to ethnic minority children was unlikely to provide the extent of dispersal demanded by central government.\textsuperscript{198} Responding to the circular, the TUC expressed apparent support for bussing, but suggested that this policy should be expanded across ethnicities to ensure the integration of schools across \textit{class} lines.\textsuperscript{199} The Department’s 1973 document \textit{The Education of Immigrant Children} stated that to disperse only ethnic minority children ‘is not

\textsuperscript{194} For example, SCRRRI, \textit{Education}, vol. 2, 317.
\textsuperscript{195} BHRU ed., \textit{Here to Stay}, 144.
\textsuperscript{196} WYASB, TC’s papers, City of Bradford ESC, “Children of Commonwealth Immigrant Parents...”, 2/67.
\textsuperscript{197} SCRRRI, \textit{Education}, vol. 2, 403.
\textsuperscript{198} LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/PRE/24/1, P11, “Survey of Immigrants in Primary Schools”, 29/5/70.
\textsuperscript{199} MRC, TUC papers, M55.292B/805.91/2, TUC to Anthony Crosland, 2/8/65.
necessarily wrong’ and that ‘indigenous children need [not] also be dispersed as a kind of “quid pro quo” to demonstrate racial equality’. 200

Under these various pressures, bussing eventually broke down in the 1970s. By the late 1960s, parents and community groups in Bradford and Ealing were beginning to organize more seriously against bussing. Local authorities also began to accept that the growth of ethnic minority populations was rendering dispersal impractical. 201 Growing concern about racism, reflected in and promoted by the 1968 RRA, invited a closer inspection of dispersal, especially in areas in which this applied only to non-whites. In 1974, the RRB determined that the denial of parental choice, the long journeys involved, and the importance of community schooling meant that bussing was not beneficial overall. The first legal challenge to bussing, however, had been initiated, in 1973, by a white parent who objected to non-white children being dispersed to his child’s school in Blackburn. Blackburn’s dispersal system was ruled illegal by a tribunal owing to its apparent lack of a language test as a non-racial basis for determining which children to bus. The borough’s dispersal system was eliminated in that year as the Labour group returned to power. 202 At the outset of the Board’s investigation into Ealing’s system, the authority argued that its bussing system was not ‘racial’, but aimed at NES children and those who lacked ‘British lore and culture’. It was ultimately judged that Ealing’s test of language fluency was unsatisfactory and that no test regarding ‘British lore and culture’ had been applied. By 1975, Ealing had agreed to abandon bussing ‘as soon as practical’. 203 Despite this, Bradford was still determined to continue the policy. However, the passage of the new RRA in 1976, with its provisions against indirect discrimination, removed the need for the CRE

200 DES, Education of Immigrants, 21.
201 WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD/1/7/16, “Extract from the Minutes of the ESC”, 26/2/74.
203 Ibid., 291.
to prove that dispersal in Bradford was indeed conducted on a ‘racial’ rather than educational basis. Bradford eliminated the practice.\textsuperscript{204}

\section*{III}

As suggested, broad statements of opposition to special provision jarred with an emerging institutionalisation of ethnically plural areas as educational ‘communities of communities’ in which certain policies and provisions were applied only to certain ethnic groups. This practice was extended in the 1970s and ‘80s. In its 1973 paper \textit{The Education of Immigrants}, the DES acknowledged the development of this institutional multiculturalism in authorities such as Bradford, Oxford, Slough and Huddersfield.\textsuperscript{205} In the sixties, this infrastructure went alongside a belief that ethnic minority children had certain special needs, defined primarily in relation to language and culture, which needed to be addressed for the benefit of all children. Policies such as dispersal and reception centres suggest that, in many localities, ethnic minority families were expected to carry the burden of integration.

This rather negative and instrumental multiculturalism was altered from the late 1970s through more positive developments. A number of factors influenced this. Perhaps first was the 1976 RRA, including Section 71 (S71) of the legislation, which obliged local authorities to ‘eliminate unlawful racial discrimination’ – including indirect discrimination – and ‘promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial groups’. Reference to this duty became common in local authority statements regarding ‘equality of

\textsuperscript{204} Kirp, “Vagaries of Discrimination”, 285-6.

\textsuperscript{205} DES, \textit{Education of Immigrants}, 38.
opportunity’. An early treatment of the issue came in the 1977 CRE document *Local Authorities and Section 71*, which argued that ethnic minority children have ‘needs arising from their special difficulties and experience’. In the same year, the Labour Party’s ‘Race and Education’ document lamented that although ‘it is not difficult’ to identify the specific needs of ethnic minority children, most LEAs (‘often, unfortunately, Labour-controlled ones’) had not done so. By the late 1970s, the growing significance of the urban new left within local Labour Parties was also encouraging a more proactive embrace of pluralism. Meanwhile, universalist forces within the party were declining in influence. Whilst these elite organizations were significant in promoting multicultural education – and, as the legal actions of the RRB/CRE demonstrate, had effective weapons available to do so – the abandonment of bussing and dispersal policies also demonstrate the importance of ethnic minority communities growing in size and political clout. Educationalists also supported multicultural initiatives in this period. The 1975 Bullock Report on language education promoted the ability of mother tongues to assist with English and general learning. In 1981, the Rampton report, the interim version of Swann dealing specifically with Afro-Caribbeans, emphasized the effects of racism in disadvantaging Afro-Caribbean children in British schools. Rampton, along with the riots of 1981 and 1985, foregrounded the effects of institutional racism in British schools. Anti-racism did not simply ‘replace’ multiculturalism, however. Both the Scarman Report and Swann downplayed the significance of institutional racism, whilst the latter’s stress on curriculum development caused some to associate the report with a ‘liberal’ multicultural perspective in which understanding of minority cultures would erode prejudices amongst children. However, despite complacency about its institutional forms, Swann clearly

206 PHM, 331.6/Box 230, CRE, “Local Authorities and Section 71…”
207 PHM, LPRD memoranda, RE1041, 3/77.
208 Feldman, "Why the British Like Turbans", 298.
acknowledged the significance of racism, quoting Rampton about forms of ‘unintentional’ (i.e. indirect) racism and advising schools to ‘adopt clear policies to combat racism’.\textsuperscript{210}

Conceptualizations of multicultural or anti-racist approaches held by local authorities can be determined from the relevant policy statements many authorities passed. In 1977, ILEA produced the document ‘Multi-ethnic Education’, stressing a commitment to equal opportunities, though making no reference to racism.\textsuperscript{211} In 1983, ILEA created an Ethnic Minorities Section within its Equal Opportunities Committee. A statement similar to ILEA’s, entitled ‘Multi-cultural Education in Schools’, was produced by Manchester in 1978. It also avoided the issue of racism, instead echoing the 1976 Act’s exhortation to ‘promote racial harmony’. Like ILEA, Manchester expressed an initial intention to review policies, though expressing this negatively in terms of a need to ensure the authority was not contravening the RRA.\textsuperscript{212} By 1983, 36 LEAs had made statements on multicultural education. However, these often bore a questionable relationship to policy, were frequently drawn up by a small number of officers without consultation, and often deployed terms, such as ‘equal opportunities’ or ‘positive action’, without definition.\textsuperscript{213} The homogeneity of local authority statements on multicultural education, and their divorce from practice, is perhaps best considered through a comparison of Bradford to authorities such as ILEA and Manchester. Bradford’s statements on multicultural education in 1981 and 1982 featured much familiar content – increased focus on the needs of ethnic minorities, support for equality of opportunity, recognition of differences between ethnic groups, and the need for increased consultation.\textsuperscript{214} Despite this similar rhetoric, the variety of actually-existing multiculturalism in Bradford was highly reflective of local context, with a high degree of salience accorded to Muslim demands and bipartisan

\textsuperscript{210} Swann Report, 234.
\textsuperscript{211} LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/PRE/24/11, P787, “Multi-Ethnic Education: Progress Report”.
\textsuperscript{212} GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1977-8, 3190.
\textsuperscript{214} Halstead, Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity, 27, 49.

formulation in the local council. A comparison of policy statements alone however would do little to illuminate these differences.

Whilst early statements of local policy tended to bypass racism, later documents attempted to address it. Rather than presenting multiculturalism and anti-racism as opposed alternatives, however, local authorities often suggested their coincidence. For example, in its 1979 ‘Multi-ethnic Education Progress Report’, ILEA included amongst its aims both ‘to build upon the strengths of cultural diversity in that society’ and to combat racism. In 1981, ILEA produced a separate statement on racism, though this displayed a sanguine attitude to its institutional forms. It described covert or indirect racism as ‘less easy to perceive’ than overt variants, and referred only to a ‘belief’ amongst ethnic minority groups that institutional procedures could create racial disadvantage. In 1982, ILEA called for all schools to adopt policies on racial incidents and ‘give a lead in pointing to the goal of a society free from racism’. However, the typology of such incidents focused on physical and verbal abuse and racist campaigning – i.e. on overt racism. Manchester exhibited a similar attitude, recommending in 1981 that schools address both overt and covert forms of racism, but offered a similar typology of racist incidents to ILEA’s. Whilst ILEA did acknowledge in 1983 that ‘practices and customs are maintained by relations and structures of power from which black people have been and are excluded’, tackling institutional racism usually fell to organizations outside local government. Most obviously, the RRB/CRE launched investigations into dispersal in Ealing, the ‘reception centre’ system in Calderdale, and into the

218 GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1981-2, 1078.
number of Afro-Caribbean children suspended and excluded in Birmingham.\textsuperscript{220} It was suggested at a 1987 Association of London Authorities conference that authorities struggled to develop anti-racist approaches because funding streams focused on meeting ‘special needs’ and had uncertain application to tackling racism.\textsuperscript{221} The general failure to address institutional forms of racism within local authorities, however, was usually interpreted by ethnic minority organizations as squeamishness. Abdul Rashid, former chair of the Bradford Asian Youth Movement, has recalled that ‘we never asked for multi-cultural education... what we were demanding was anti-racist education...’\textsuperscript{222}

Although policy documents on multiculturalism and anti-racism often stressed the need for consultation, LEAs often acted unilaterally in producing these documents. In 1980, Manchester consulted approximately 200 groups, including the Muslim Parents Association (MPA), MET, UKIM and four Pakistani or Bangladeshi welfare organizations.\textsuperscript{223} This reflects the fractured nature of Muslim, and indeed Asian, civic society in Manchester – the city was typical in this regard. In Inner London, an ILEA/CRC Consultative Committee was established by the 1970s. However, increased focus on multicultural education led to concern that this committee was unrepresentative. In this period, local authorities became less willing to rely on CRCs, which represented local ethnic communities indirectly at best. In 1979, ILEA created a Multi-ethnic Education Consultative Committee (MEECC), with direct representation of ethnic minority organizations on a localized basis. Nevertheless, ILEA sometimes struggled to secure a representative array of organizations to sit on the divisional committees – for example, divisional officers in Southwark complained that no Asian women’s group could be identified in

\textsuperscript{221} LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/10, ALA, “An Alternative to Section 11...”, 1987.
\textsuperscript{223} GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1979-80, 3351.
the borough. Organizations gaining representation in London varied greatly across areas, and betrayed diverse foci. Long-standing welfare organizations often represented the Pakistani community, whilst Tower Hamlets’ Bengalis were represented by Bangladeshi Educational Needs in Tower Hamlets (BENTH), a broad front of second-generation community workers. Some organizations represented smaller national groupings -- such as Moroccans or Turkish Cypriots -- whilst some served women specifically. Muslim groups were well-represented across divisions. Notably, a listing of Asian sub-groups represented on the central committee was broken down by religion. By 1983, the existence of the EMS, ILEA/CRC consultative committee and MEECC created a complex structure for the representation and consultation of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, ILEA developed an especially close relationship with BENTH, through the Tower Hamlets Initiative Steering Groups (THISG), formed in 1983 to vet community group projects seeking funding. BENTH was a broad group formed specifically to provide members for THISG, giving it considerable influence. Its representativeness was in question, however – female members did sit on its executive, but it remained male-dominated and was criticized as such by local Bengali women’s groups. Personal and ideological conflicts were also a common source of friction within the organization. In 1985, BENTH collapsed in a dispute about the appointment of a full-time organizer. BENTH’s creation tackled the questionable representativeness of ethnic minority community groups through establishment of a broad umbrella organization – but questions about its representative capabilities remained and its breadth also exacerbated factionalism. Outside London, other groups also worked closely on education matters with local authorities in an ad hoc manner. The Bradford Council for Mosques (BCM) formed in 1981 and campaigned vigorously on educational issues.

224 LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/9, Southwark Divisional MEECC to ILEA, 11/10/83
226 LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/PRE/24/20, P228, “Tower Hamlets Initiative: BENTH”, 7/4/85
The Muslim Liaison Committee (MLC) in Birmingham produced policy papers on the issue of education, and was consulted by the city.  

Given the disconnect between these policy statements and the actual practices developed in classrooms, it is necessary to consider the level of practice also. Language remained a central consideration, and the 1973 SCRII report offers a snapshot of practices at that time. The National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) denied that any schools desired to ‘eradicatethe mother tongues, but suggested they were ‘not helping to reinforce the school influence’. This attitude was not common to all actors, however. In 1971, ILEA established its Unified Language Teaching Service (ULTS), providing peripatetic teachers of various mother tongues. Encouragement was given to such provisions by the 1975 Bullock Report and the 1977 European Union Directive of the Council of the European Communities. The directive was cited in ILEA’s call later in the year for ‘modest experiments’ in mother tongue teaching, and also in Labour’s ‘Race and Education’ paper, which encouraged establishment of mother tongue classes with local authority funding. By the mid-1980s, many authorities were conducting mother tongue work, including Manchester, ILEA, Bradford, Barking, Nottingham, Sheffield, Leeds and elsewhere. This provision took place both through mainstream schooling and through grants to community groups concerned with education. ILEA funded 46 voluntary language classes by 1983. By 1987, ULTS featured 90 peripatetic mother tongue and 83 ‘bilingual development’ teachers. Other authorities operated primarily through voluntary sector grants. Manchester, for example, had by 1985 the

229 PHM, LPRD memoranda, RE1041, 3/77.
equivalent of just five full-time teachers attached to its Community Language Team, teaching only Urdu, whilst over 3,000 local children received education in mother tongues from local community groups. Swann’s main recommendation as regards community languages was that schools treat these as modern foreign languages equal to French and German. The subordination of Asian languages within school curricula was nevertheless still observed in Manchester by the 1988 MacDonald inquiry. Mother tongues were not promoted out of any sense of duty to sustain minority cultures, however – rather, it was felt that ethnic minority children needed ability in their mother tongues to enable communication with, and assistance of, elders, particularly women made difficult to access by the observance of purdah (see chapter three). Fostering mother tongue classes was a further element of this integrative work aimed at families holistically, which shows that even apparently ‘positive’ cultural concessions were often pragmatic in character.

Debates about the language in which education occurred were joined to discussions about its substantive content. Wide support existed from an early time for the introduction of curriculum material on ethnic minority cultures. In its 1965 circular, the DES suggested that the histories of Commonwealth nations could be taught. The 1973 SCRRI report suggested broad support for curriculum change and encouraged the Schools Council and Her Majesty’s Schools Inspectorate (HMSI) to produce a curriculum that would ‘broaden the horizons’ of all children. However, the SCRRI’s specific proposals were limited, focusing on the eradication of racist stereotypes in textbooks. Support for curriculum development was less equivocal amongst community relations groups, though they were divided about the form this should

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234 Swann Report, 399.
235 MacDonald ed., Murder in the Playground, 239.
236 CRC, Between two Cultures, 60; LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/22, “Issues in Race and Education No. 35 -- Mother Tongue...”, 1982, 5.
237 DES, “Education of Immigrants”, 3.
238 SCRRI, Education, vol. 1, 57.
239 Ibid., 27.
take. Some were supportive of specific modules or subjects concerned with ethnic diversity; others saw the theme as needing reference across the curriculum.\textsuperscript{240} Later, anti-racists often criticized ‘multiculturalism’ for focusing upon curriculum development and suggesting that such work could eliminate racism. However, anti-racists also had their own approach to curriculum development, often focused upon the teaching of material about racism directly.

The DES document \textit{The Education of Immigrants} had already in 1973 made the vague exhortation that ethnic minority children should not be ‘shielded’ from racist attitudes.\textsuperscript{241} Support for such education developed in the 1980s as anti-racism won supporters, and was promoted extensively in the CRE’s \textit{Educational Journal} and in a 1982 National Anti-racist Movement in Education (NAME) pamphlet calling for political education on racism and race relations.\textsuperscript{242} The Swann Report, despite its association with liberal perspectives, did call for curricular treatment of racism’s ‘individual and institutional’ aspects.\textsuperscript{243} Swann also evidenced wide support amongst teachers for the development of a culturally plural curriculum.\textsuperscript{244} Three years later, the Conservative government introduced a national curriculum. In discussion of this initiative, the Labour Party stressed that any such curriculum should be conscious of Britain’s status as a multicultural society.\textsuperscript{245} Anti-racists and multiculturalists often expressed reservations about the National Curriculum, concerned that its reduction of autonomy amongst LEAs, schools and teachers would stifle innovations to which they were sympathetic.\textsuperscript{246} The National Curriculum Council (NCC) established a Multicultural Task Group (MTG) with a majority of ethnic minority members, but produced little material on ethnic

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., vol. 2, 684, 691.
\item DES, \textit{Education of Immigrants}, 12.
\item LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/20, El Harris, “Perspectives on Multi-Cultural Education”, 11/82.
\item \textit{Swann Report}, 551.
\item Ibid., 180.
\item PHM, LPRD papers, LP/RD/35/1, “Education in a Multicultural Society”, [1988], 3.
\item Maud Blair and Madeleine Arnot, “Black and Anti-racist Perspectives on the National Curriculum and Government Educational Policy” in Anna S. King and Michael J. Reiss eds., \textit{The Multicultural Dimension of the National Curriculum} (London ; Bristol, Penn. : The Falmer Press, 1993), 271.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
diversity itself. Nevertheless, guidelines for History teaching suggested that children learn ‘about the cultural and ethnic diversity of past societies... [and] acquire understanding and respect for other cultures and values’, whilst material on the English curriculum emphasized that non-British Anglophone literature should feature. In reality, the breadth of National Curriculum guidelines still left teachers with many alternatives in terms of both content and delivery.

Already by that time, however, a number of controversies had shaken the faith of some in anti-racist or multicultural education. In 1984-5 in Bradford, Ray Honeyford, headmaster at Drummond, a local primary with a large Asian majority, drew attention after publishing articles critical of local attempts to accommodate cultural diversity. Published in the Times Higher Education Supplement and anti-immigration journal The Salisbury Review, the articles attacked long holidays taken in countries of origin by Asian children; suggested educational underachievement of white children in Asian majority schools; and presented Pakistan as the corrupt ‘heroin capital of the world’. Parents responded by forming a Drummond Parents Action Committee (DPAC) and boycotting the school. After a protracted series of court actions and investigations, Honeyford ultimately accepted a £250,000 settlement to resign. For Honeyford’s opponents, campaigning over the affair was a significant experience. The BCM was extensively quoted throughout, and its pro-integration remarks helped to establish it as a ‘moderate’ voice in the city. By taking a strong stand on an area of broad interest, it was also able to do more than other religious organisations controlled by the

250 Daily Telegraph, 27/8/06; reprinted from Salisbury Review, 3/84.
251 Observer, 15/9/85.
first generation to appeal to Muslim youths. DPAC’s leader, a white middle-class woman, was able to work with the local Pakistani community in establishing the strike school. Less contentious than issues relating to separatism and the education of girls, the Honeyford affair promoted unity across ethnic, religious and gender lines in Bradford. Nevertheless, the salience of the BCM during the protests, and its work with mainstream organisations, enabled a greater degree of religious mobilisation than elsewhere during the *Satanic Verses* affair.

By 1986, however, anti-racist education was faced with a new controversy that was less conducive to unity amongst its proponents. At Burnage High School in Manchester, a thirteen-year old boy of Bangladeshi origin, Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, was stabbed to death by a white student, Darren Coulburn. The report into the murder commissioned by Manchester City Council, completed in 1989, was conducted by a panel with an evident commitment to multicultural or anti-racist work. Nevertheless, the panel’s analysis focused heavily upon deficiencies in the school’s anti-racist policies, portraying them as divisive. The head’s approach was described as a ‘symbolic’, regarding racism as a matter of individual attitudes amongst white people. For example, the report criticised a document issued by the school that presented the murder as an ‘extension’ of racist name-calling and suggested that this cast all white children as potentially violent racists. MacDonald offered the opinion that effective ‘anti-racism involves a respect for the integrity of all persons, black and white, irrespective of their colour, race or ethnic origin’. The school’s decision to prevent white children from attending Ullah’s funeral was also condemned. The panel suggested that the creation of

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256 Ibid., 112.
257 Ibid., 51.
separate groups for both Afro-Caribbean and Asian parents to air their grievances to the school exacerbated divisions.\textsuperscript{258} Anti-racism as applied at Burnage, the panel suggested effectively excludes white students and parents from the process of anti-racism and absolves them of responsibility for anti-racist education, but encourages them to perceive of black students as seeking and being given ‘special treatment’.\textsuperscript{259}

Most broadly, the inquiry suggested that ‘race’ at Burnage had been presented in a vacuum, divorced from, and privileged over class and gender.\textsuperscript{260}

In many ways, these criticisms of anti-racism were familiar. At a 1984 conference on the role of London’s S11 workers, for example, many speakers complained of being marginalised in schools.\textsuperscript{261} Moreover, the MacDonald inquiry entered debates about anti-racism that had already occurred within Manchester. In 1986, the council’s Equal Opportunities Working Party (EOWP) submitted a ‘Draft Policy Statement on Equal Opportunities’ that referenced many sources of disadvantage, including class and age. At an October meeting of the Policy Sub-committee, however, it was determined that these factors were ‘outside the scope’ of the EOWP’s original remit.\textsuperscript{262} The final version of the statement therefore made reference to sex, sexuality, ‘race’ and disability, but not to class (or age). The significance of the MacDonald report came only partially from its substantive criticisms -- also important were its association of bad anti-racist practice with pupil violence; its details about the actual delivery of anti-racist policy; and the erstwhile allegiances of its authors. Nevertheless, the degree to which the report actually influenced education is difficult to determine. Rhodes Boyson, Conservative MP for Brent North, suggested that the report should

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., 179.
\textsuperscript{259} Ibid., 402-3.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., 636.
\textsuperscript{261} LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/36, GLC, “The Role of Section 11 Workers...”, 27/1/84.
\textsuperscript{262} GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1986-7, 384.3.
encourage Brent to review its policies, and the report clearly had considerable effect upon the thinking of the Left regarding anti-racism. Following its publication, the National Conference of Labour Women called on Labour to use MacDonald’s findings ‘to combat racism’.\textsuperscript{263}

Determining the precise nature of the inquiry’s effects is difficult because most of its recommendations were directed to schools, since Manchester council was commended for having ‘moved further...in dealing with racism...’ than many other authorities, and the panel felt that ‘the experience already gained has to be kept hold of and built on...’\textsuperscript{264} But MacDonald’s report surely invited a serious rethinking of anti-racist approaches in a variety of authorities, and institutional developments for which it was partly responsible will be discussed in chapter seven.

IV

The previous section considered the development of multicultural and anti-racist education in Britain. The specific place of Muslim children, parents, and organizations within this process will now be sketched. In some regards, Muslim concerns ran parallel to general themes in multicultural education. Language was one such area: the first World Conference on Muslim Education in 1977 passed a resolution calling for more Arabic tuition outside the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{265} The situation of Arabic within mother tongue policy was precarious, however. Classes in Arabic were a primary concern for Muslim community organizations, taking place in mosques alongside religious instruction. In cities where the Muslim population was large, these classes were developed quickly and became large in scope. By the 1980s this provision was extensive even in smaller towns – classes in Preston served 920 students. Many young

\textsuperscript{264} MacDonald ed., Murder in the Playground, 403.
\textsuperscript{265} Muhammad Iqbal, “First World Conference on Muslim Education and its Possible Implications for British Muslims”, Learning for Living 17: 3 (1978), 123.
Muslims attended Arabic classes three times per week. These classes were sometimes funded by local authorities, including in London and Manchester. However, guidelines issued in 1984 regarding use of S11 suggested that living languages should be prioritized over those with a purely religious or literary function. It is perhaps significant that, in that year, many of ILEA’s S11-funded Arabic classes were located in parts of West London home to growing Arab communities, rather than in East London. Similarly, ULTS undertook bilingual development work with Arabic speakers, but not Arabic mother tongue education. In a number of authorities, including ILEA, the funding of community groups offering Arabic classes continued into the 1980s, but provisions were often insufficient to satisfy Muslim educational organizations. The MET was concerned in the late 1980s about the extent and quality of voluntary Arabic provision in various localities. Elite doubts about funding Arabic classes jarred with the justification of mother tongue classes as providing links between ethnic minority children and their cultures of origin. For example, Labour argued in its 1988 paper ‘Education in a Multicultural Society’ that the ‘self-confidence’ of non-white children could be improved by access to mother tongues. Such arguments were in fact made by the MET, but apparently did not convince local and national authorities. Whilst local authorities were happy to promote ethnic minority ‘culture’ in general, they – and central government – baulked at the work of perpetuating religious affiliation.

With regards to curriculum development, Muslim educational groups focused on RE, but were also interested in Islam’s portrayal in secular subjects. The MET’s 1991 pamphlet *British Muslims in Schools* called for an ‘Islamic perspective’ in all subjects, to be provided

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267 LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/9, ILEA, “Posts which no Longer Qualify…”, 20/6/84
271 PHM, LPRD papers, LP/RD/35/1, LP, “Education in a Multicultural Society”, [1988].
through the use of ‘authentic’ books on Islam. The Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (MPGB) in a 1992 document criticized the national curriculum as ‘Eurocentric’ and, whilst accepting that British schools could never be ‘wholly sympathetic to Islam’, called for more material on the religion in schools. With regards to religious education, Muslim educational groups offered religious instruction in addition to, and sometimes alongside, Arabic classes. The organization of supplementary religious instruction by Muslim groups can be traced back at least as far as 1962, when the UKIM was organizing tuition in key cities and towns. Other groups, with perhaps less national coherence, such as the Pakistani Muslim Association (PMA), Pakistani Welfare Association (PWA) and Pakistani People’s Movement (PPM) were also involved in this work, to various degrees of salience in different areas. Some of these organizations operated within specific ethnic, sectarian or geographic sub-communities within a local area. For instance, the Bradford Twaquila Islamic Society served exclusively the local Bengali Muslim population. The 1963 DES document English for Immigrants made note of the high volume of Islamic supplementary schools. In 1969, some children in Bradford were receiving up to fifteen hours per week of religious instruction. Concern was expressed in the CRC’s 1969 document Religious Education in a Multi-Religious Society and the 1973 SCRII report about the number of hours Muslim children spent on religious instruction.

In later decades, local authorities did more to bring this instruction into the mainstream. Religious education was mandated in England by the 1944 Education Act, though

272 Ghulam Sarwar, British Muslims and Schools (London : MET, 1991), 19
274 Nielsen, Muslims in Western Europe, 234.
275 GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1968-9, 824
278 Sunday Times, 13/7/69
parents were permitted to withdraw their children from RE. These children could be given alternative education, including Islamic instruction, by a peripatetic teacher or at a place of worship. Muslim parents availed themselves of this option only rarely prior to the 1970s. This may reflect a lack of concern about the issue amongst parents – even in the 1990s, organizations like the MET had to encourage Muslim parents to withdraw their children from mainstream RE classes. This does not necessarily suggest a lack of religious feeling amongst parents, but could reflect satisfaction with supplementary instruction. Muslim parents in this period, due to language difficulties, the system of dispersal, long working hours, and the ‘myth of return’ may also have been simply unaware of their legal rights. Only in 1971 did the MET begin its campaign promoting awareness amongst Muslim parents of the potential for alternative RE arrangements. By 1972, the MET was giving Muslim children in Bradford schools and reception centres one hour per week of religious education, stressing that this was ‘non-dogmatic’ in character. Where Muslim communities were smaller, classes were slow to be organized. Evidence to the 1973 SCRRRI report from Liverpool suggested that Muslim parents were unlikely to withdraw their children from RE since there was a lack of alternative provision. Nevertheless, Muslims in the city were more likely to withdraw their children than were members of any other faith. Some schools, authorities and political organizations were opposed to any Islamic instruction in mainstream schools. Even by 1985, as demonstrated in Swann, very few teachers were supportive of separate RE classes for different religious groups. Political support for supplementary schooling was apparent, however, as evinced in Labour’s 1977 document ‘Race and Education’. Perhaps more surprisingly, generally secular organizations such as the Black and Asian Advisory Council, the mainstream successor to the

281 Sarwar, Muslims in Education, 9.
282 Ansari, Infidel Within, 350.
283 WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD/1/7/16, “... Religious Education for Muslim Pupils in Schools”, 4/12/73.
285 GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1979-80, 3335.
286 Swann Report, 180.
287 PHM, LPRD memoranda, RE1041, 3/77, 7.
Labour black sections campaign, and the Sheffield AYM were insistent upon the right of ethnic
minority parents to determine the religious education given to their children. Women
Against Fundamentalism (WAF), an off-shoot of the largely Asian feminist group Southall Black
Sisters (SBS), however, was alarmed at any link between Muslim educational groups and local
authorities. No doubt some authorities supported such provision primarily for pragmatic
reasons. Working with Muslim educational groups and providing them with facilities may have
been attractive as a means of influencing the nature, length and frequency of classes. For
example, funding was withheld from a Bradford Muslim educational group in 1983 following
repeated planning violations. Withdrawal classes held in schools were not necessarily reliant
on local authority funding, however. Funded primarily by Saudi Arabia, as well as parental
donations, the MET had established classes in fifty schools, using nineteen peripatetic
the MET suggested that public funds should be used to support Islamic instruction, since it
replaced the otherwise statutory provision of mainstream RE. Whilst supplementary
religious education continued to be a popular provision into the 1990s, concerns also
appeared, amongst educational groups and within Muslim communities, about the suitability
of Asian-educated *ulema* for tutoring and mentoring youths raised mostly in Britain.

Religious instruction on a supplementary or ‘withdrawal’ basis, with or without local
authority support, was provided by Muslim groups alongside their involvement in reform of
mainstream RE. The 1944 Education Act simultaneously required that Christianity be the main

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Tandana Internet Archive (TIA), Sheffield AYM, “Kala Mazdoor 2”, n.d., http://www.tandana.org,
289 Southall Black Sisters, *Against the Grain: a Celebration of Struggle and Survival* (Southall : Southall
Black Sisters, 1990), 7.
291 The Times, 5/7/76.
reference point for RE and that this education be non-dogmatic. Growing demands for separate instruction may have increased the desire of some secularists simply to dispense with RE, but, legally required to provide religious education, local authorities focused upon reform. These reports were partly intended to obviate the demands of Muslims, in particular, for separate instruction. In some areas, the Education Act’s demand for a Christian focus was strongly reflected. For example, Birmingham City Council in 1962 declared that the primary purpose of RE ‘is quite simply to confront our children with Jesus Christ’. This may have been atypical, however. Manchester’s 1957 syllabus demonstrated an early desire ‘to encourage the development of mutual toleration and understanding amongst the children from different faith communities’. ILEA’s syllabus ‘Learning for Life’, agreed in 1967, was insistent on portraying Islam as a living faith rather than an historical curiosity. The 1973 SCRII report evinced wide support for multifaith syllabuses – for example in Ealing, Birmingham, Barking, Bolton and Leicester. The justifications for these were sometimes instrumental and referred to children of all faiths -- Leicester suggested that providing broader horizons ‘could help produce better citizens of tomorrow...’ An important document in advancing multifaith RE was Birmingham’s agreed syllabus, adopted in 1975. The syllabus called for a ‘consistently multifaith’ approach that would also expose students to secular ideologies such as Marxism and humanism, and attracted controversy because of this. Hampshire later adopted a version of the syllabus shorn of its references to secular ideologies, and this gained wider acceptance – 13 LEAs had adopted it, or similar syllabuses, by 1981. Some large authorities that were otherwise pioneers in multicultural education were slow to reconsider their RE syllabuses. Bradford did not introduce a new document until 1983, with ILEA following suit the

295 GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1985-6, 1015.
296 Swann Report, 295.
298 Ibid., 508.
299 Nielsen, “Muslims in English Schools”, 229.
300 Ibid.
next year. In Manchester, starting, as mentioned, from a more pluralist base, a new syllabus was first discussed in 1979, but was not completed until 1987. The ILEA and Manchester syllabuses offer insight into the character of such documents in the mid-1980s. ILEA regretted the ‘strong Christian emphasis’ of the 1967 syllabus did not ‘take account’ of Britain’s multifaith nature. Manchester referred to the ‘many changes’ that had occurred in Britain since 1957. Both syllabi named a group of religions -- Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and Buddhism – for schools to consider teaching. Swann evinced sweeping victory for this paradigm of multifaith education, even in areas not usually regarded as centres of multicultural innovation. Owing to its marginal status in the curriculum and the desire to avoid any hint of religious dogmatism, RE was a natural home for multicultural curriculum development.

Muslim involvement in reforming RE was perhaps more extensive than that of any other minority faith. The 1944 Act required each LEA to establish a Standing Advisory Conference on Religious Education (SACRE) composed of Anglican representatives, representatives of other faiths regarded as locally significant, councillors and teaching associations. In 1965, ILEA’s SACRE had a Muslim representative, but no Sikhs or Hindus. When the Authority reformed its syllabus in the 1980s, the Conference featured four Muslims compared to two Hindus and Jews, and one Sikh, Buddhist and Bahai. In the same period, Manchester’s SACRE included seven Muslim members, four Sikhs, three Hindus, two Jewish

\[\text{301 Lewis, Islamic Britain, 70; LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/PRE/24/17, P119, “Religious Education for Our Children”, [1984].}\
\[\text{302 MCRO, MCC EC minutes, 1983-4, 1920; 1985-6, 1016.}\
\[\text{303 LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA2254, “Agreed Syllabus of Religious Education -- Reconsideration”, 27/5/82.}\
\[\text{304 MCRO, MCC EC minutes, 1983-4, 1920.}\
\[\text{306 Swann Report, 254, 279-80.}\
\[\text{307 LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA2254, “Agreed Syllabus of Religious Education -- Reconsideration”, 27/5/82.}\
\[\text{308 LMA, ILEA Equal Opportunities Committee (ILEAEOC) minutes, ILEA/CL/MIN/10/1, 43-4.}\

members and one Rastafarian, Buddhist and Bahai.\footnote{MCRO, MCC EC minutes, 1984-5, 613, 1736.} This may have reflected greater Muslim lobbying on the issue, or the association between religious separatism and Islam. The number of Muslim organizations consulted in this process also reflects the fractured nature of Muslim civil society in the 1980s. The eleven combined members of Inner London and Manchester SACREs in the mid-1980s represented a total of seven organizations, whilst in Birmingham, another association, the localised MLC, was most prominent.\footnote{Ibid., 622; LMA, ILEAEOC minutes, ILEA/CL/MIN/10/1, 43-4; Nielsen, “Muslims in English Schools”, 238.} These divisions do not necessarily imply conflict – they can also suggest geographical, demographic and functional differences – but, when combined with the Education Act’s requirement that non-Christian SACRE members be ‘representative of that interest’, may have acted to increase Muslim membership on Conferences. Evidence from the 1973 SCRII report suggests that although Muslim spokespersons on RE were not hard to come by, there remained uncertainty about the demands of Muslim parents.\footnote{Ibid., 632-3, 694.} One of the SCRII’s member MPs also suggested that a comparative approach may ‘confuse [the] minds’ of those raised in Asian religions.\footnote{Ibid., 503.}

RE was central to the curricular demands of Muslims, but demands related to other subjects could be equally contentious. Some of these will be covered in the next chapter, which discusses purdah. However, Muslim objections to sex education were particularly controversial politically. Evidence from BHRU interviewees suggests that many Muslim parents withdrew their children, especially daughters, from sex education classes.\footnote{Bradford Local Studies Library (BLSL), BHRU interviews, ACC C0070.} Material produced by Muslim educational groups also sometimes expressed the belief that sex education should condemn extra-marital sex.\footnote{Ghulam Sarwar, \textit{Sex Education: the Muslim Perspective} (London : MET, 1989), 27.} More controversially, a number of Muslim organizations, including the MET, MPGB and Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO), welcomed
Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988, which prevented local authorities from ‘promot[ing] homosexuality’.  

A key non-curricular Muslim demand was for halal meat in school lunches. Local authorities addressed religious difference in diet from an early date. In 1965, Bradford suggested that religious dietary demands should be respected – whereas purely ‘cultural’ aversion to British food should be overcome through ‘encouragement’. Encouragement may have been applied even where dietary objections were religious– Abdul Rashid recalled the ‘traumatic experience’ of being force-fed a pork sausage at school. Such attitudes reflect widespread criticisms of Asian diets, which will also be discussed in chapter four. The 1973 SCCRRI report evidences very little accommodation of religious diets. At best, schools ensured the presence of a vegetarian option on menus. In 1979, ILEA produced a paper on foods suitable for ethnic minority groups, established a special catering advisory team, and introduced an experiment in Tower Hamlets to provide ‘national dishes’ for Bengali pupils, although no halal meat was involved in this. In 1980, Manchester noted that a number of parents had complained about the lack of halal meat or varied vegetarian options in schools. In 1983, ILEA trialed halal meat in two Tower Hamlets schools. Difficulties obtaining the meat and objections of non-Muslim staff required to prepare and eat it prevented the trial’s extension. A 1984 Surrey University study of ILEA meals suggested that many Muslim parents simply ‘distrust[ed]’ school meals since ‘they sense the majority do not take their religious beliefs seriously’. ILEA’s response to these findings did not concern halal meat, however, but

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317 Rashid in Ramamurthy ed., Kala Tara, 10-11.
319 LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/10, ILEA, “School Meals Seminar”, 16/1/85.
320 GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1979-80, 3336.
instead focused on the provision of more varied vegetarian dishes.\textsuperscript{322} In 1986, ILEA suggested that food posed ‘no problem at all’.\textsuperscript{323} Most authorities replicated ILEA’s approach, though Bradford was an exception. Shortly after its creation in 1982, the BCM led a strong campaign for \textit{halal} meat in schools, and, in the following year, it was made available in a limited number of schools, covering a total of 1,400 Muslim children. However, following this initial step, campaigning against the decision amongst animal rights activists, as well as the far right, called the provision into question. Reflecting the politics of Bradford’s multiculturalism in general, attitudes to the provision of \textit{halal} meat did not divide along party lines. The Labour Mayor, Norman Free, was a high-profile opponent, whilst Peter Gilmour, the Conservative education committee chair, was a prominent supporter.\textsuperscript{324} The Bradford AYM, despite its notionally secular character, supported the provision of \textit{halal} meat, since Muslim children ‘have a right as much as any other young person in education to have a balanced diet’.\textsuperscript{325} The vote to decide the future of \textit{halal} meat in Bradford, held in March 1986, occasioned vigorous Muslim campaigning – a petition with 7,000 signatories was submitted to the council, a 3,000-strong march to the Town Hall arranged, and perhaps 10,000 Muslim children in Bradford (around two thirds of the total) were kept off school on the day of the vote. Ultimately, the proposal to extend the provision of \textit{halal} meat was passed by fifty-nine votes to fifteen.\textsuperscript{326} By 1987, the meat was being provided twice per week in all Bradford schools with at least ten Muslim pupils on roll.\textsuperscript{327} The Bradford \textit{halal} meat campaign was therefore a significant example of the strength and, potentially, cohesiveness of English Muslim communities where important religious issues were concerned.

\textsuperscript{322} LMA, ILEAEOC minutes, ILEA/CL/MIN/10/1, 49, 167.
\textsuperscript{325} BLSL, BHRU interviews, ACC C0055.
\textsuperscript{326} Halstead, \textit{Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity}, 46.
\textsuperscript{327} \textit{The Times}, 18/8/87.
So far, this chapter has considered accommodation of Muslim demands within mainstream schooling. However, some Muslims remained supportive of separate education. The creation of independent Muslim girls’ schools was first discussed in the mid-1970s in Bradford. The leader of the MPA, Riaz Shahid, stood in the 1973 local elections on a platform that promoted Muslim schools, finishing second in his ward. Thereafter, in 1979, Abdullah Patel, who gained attention after withdrawing his daughter Kulsambanu from state education (see chapter three), suggested funding was being sought to help create Muslim independent schools. The MET was also then seeking to establish a Muslim girls’ school. The first independent Muslim school was established in Britain in 1979. In 1983, Yusuf Islam through his Islamia Schools Trust (IST) established a primary for Muslim girls in Brent. In May of that year, the Bradford MPA unveiled plans to take over five struggling local schools with combined Asian populations of over two thirds, with the cost, roughly £1,200,000, to be met by Gulf states. The plan was widely rejected in Bradford. The BCM passed a resolution against the proposals, which were also rejected at a vote of Bradford’s education committee and by the local CRC. Parents at the schools concerned also expressed opposition, with many teachers stating that they would resign if the purchase occurred. By 1987, Islamia Primary School in Brent was attempting to gain voluntary-aided status so that the Trust could maintain control of the school whilst drawing on state funding. The Council accepted the application in principle, but denied the school’s plan to expand to the minimum size required of a state-funded school.

In 1988, another Muslim independent girls’ school, Zakaria High in Kirklees, also sought

329 Ibid., 5/7/76.
330 Ibid., 5/7/76.
332 Guardian, 7/9/83.
333 Ibid., 18/6/83.
voluntary-aided status. The Council eventually deferred its decision in December, and the Muslim Educational Services responded by threatening a lawsuit. The passage of the ERA 1988 created Grant Maintained Schools (GMS), which would ‘opt out’ of LEA control whilst retaining central government funding. The importance of this new pathway to state funding was ensured by the continued denial of voluntary-aided status to Muslim schools at local level.

In February 1989 Muslims boycotted schools in Kirklees in response to the local authority’s delay in making a decision about Zakaria’s status. Shortly thereafter, the application was rejected. In 1990, a second attempt by Islamia of Brent to attain voluntary-aided status failed when Education Secretary John McGregor refused to ratify the change in status. In 1991, there was a campaign at Willowbank School in Glasgow, which had a Muslim majority, to ‘opt out’ as a GMS, which was eventually rejected by a vote of parents. Although these various campaigns were ultimately unsuccessful, Muslim independent schools continued to be established. There were 21 in Britain by 1992. An Education Act was introduced in 1993 allowing independent schools to attain GMS status. It was by this mechanism that the first state-funded Muslim schools were established, though this did not occur until 1998 under a Labour government.

In the mid-1970s, however, Labour was exploring ways of extending state influence over religious schools. Local Labour groups were opposed to both the MPA proposals of 1983 and to Islamia’s application for voluntary status in Brent in 1985. In Brent, it was observed that Labour councillors were torn between satisfying ethnic minority demands – both for principled and political reasons – and an opposition to the substantive slant of

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334 *The Times*, 15/12/88
335 *Ibid.; Guardian*, 22/2/89, 16/3/89;
336 *Independent*, 1/7/91, 28/8/91; *Guardian*, 9/7/91.
337 *Guardian*, 2/8/92.
Islamia’s ethos. Nevertheless, Labour’s frontbench supported Muslim voluntary-aided schools from 1988. Jack Straw, shadow Education Secretary, and one of the co-convenors of the Labour “Consumers and the Community” policy review group, announced that the group’s report would include support for state-funded Muslim schools. Many Labour MPs, even those who represented significant Muslim populations, such as Anne Taylor of Dewsbury, remained opposed not only to Muslim voluntary schools but to religious schooling in general. Some Muslim groups were also unconvinced by this apparent change of heart – Nazar Mustafa, chair of the Muslim Education Coordinating Council (MECC), accused the party of ‘paying lip service to get the Muslim vote’. Later in 1989, strong grassroots disagreement with the frontbench’s new line became apparent. In March, the Labour-controlled Association of Municipal Authorities (AMA) passed a resolution arguing that no further religious voluntary schools should be created. AMA’s education secretary, and ILEA leader, Neil Fletcher, claimed that state-funded Muslim schools would be ‘an unprecedented betrayal’ of Labour principles, promoting ‘apartheid in British education…’ He associated support for Muslim schools with ‘blatant votes-at-any-cost capitulation’. Fletcher’s criticisms were by no means singular, and, reflecting the stance of many Labour members, councillors and council groups. In the face of this opposition, Straw stressed that the party’s policy ‘continues to be developed’. The “Consumers and the Community” document was soon passed by the NEC, however. The issue of state-funded Muslim schools was thereafter debated at Labour Conference in 1989 -- many Labour councillors remained opposed.

339 Ibid., 18/10/85, 9/11/85.
340 Ibid., 13/9/87.
341 Ibid., 31/1/89.
342 Independent, 17/3/89.
343 Ibid., 4/5/89.
344 The Times, 17/3/89.
345 Independent, 5/10/89.
The Conservative Party was by no means united on the issue of Muslim schools, but its internal divisions attracted less attention. This was since disagreements over Muslim schools amongst Conservatives were not regarded as involving dispute over any foundational party principles, and the Conservatives, unlike Labour, did not have a significant body of Muslim voters. In many ways, the demand for Muslim schools meshed well with general Conservative aims in this period. Muslim schools generally desired the freedom from LEA control that Conservatives prioritised, whilst the rubric of ‘parental choice’, advanced pro-actively by the government, was seen by many as requiring support for Muslim schools. Indeed, the governments’ policies theoretically did much to assist Muslim schools. First, the 1988 ERA created the category of GMS and increased the degree of parental choice over their children’s school placement. The Education Act of 1993 then enabled independent schools to achieve grant-maintained status. However, supporting Muslim schools was only an incidental result of this legislation, and many government actions inhibited them in practice. Introducing the 1988 ERA, Kenneth Baker acknowledged that the legislation encouraged religious schooling, and stressed that there could be no discrimination between faiths.\footnote{Ibid., 28/5/87.} However, his successor as Education Secretary, John McGregor, rejected Islamia’s application for voluntary status in 1992, and Baker himself was known to regard religious schools as divisive.\footnote{Guardian, 16/7/89.} Likewise, the attitudes of Conservative council groups were diverse. The MPA plan in Bradford was rejected by the Conservative administration, with education chair Peter Gilmour associating it with ‘a small, fundamentalist minority’.\footnote{Ibid., 24/4/83.} Brent’s Conservative group supported Islamia against the local Labour Party, with the Tory education chair Arthur Steel remarking that ‘fundamentally we believe in competition’.\footnote{Ibid., 18/10/85.} By contrast, the AMA resolution of 1989 against the establishment of further religious schools had cross-party support.\footnote{The Times, 17/3/89.}
For most Muslim supporters of voluntary-aided schools, the main concern was to arrest the ‘losing’ of Muslim children through multi-faith/secular schooling.\textsuperscript{351} In considering the arguments it had received in favour of Muslim schools, the Swann Report concluded that the aim of Muslim schools would be ‘educating children to be first and foremost “good Muslims”…’ and declared its opposition to such schools.\textsuperscript{352} The Islamic Academy responded that ‘[t]he Muslim community cannot accept the secular philosophical basis of the [Swann] report’.\textsuperscript{353} Accepting the validity of this claim to represent ‘the Muslim community’, \textit{The Times} warned in a 1989 editorial that ‘[t]hese are not the demands of Muslim fundamentalists but of the ordinary Muslim leadership... whose dream is to create pockets of pure Islamic culture...’\textsuperscript{354} Dissatisfaction with existing attempts to accommodate Muslim demands within the mainstream was often prominent in the rhetoric of those campaigning for Muslim schools. Iftikhar Ahmed described this process of concession as ‘a fraud right from the beginning. Muslim children learn nothing but to question the fundamentals of our religion.’\textsuperscript{355} Some Muslim observers felt that existing accommodations were indeed sufficient to ensure such positive self-concepts, however. The Bradford AYM shared with supporters of Muslim schools, and indeed with many anti-racists, a belief that ‘[t]he child’s culture and identity must be recognised as valid and important…’, but regarded integrated state schooling as the process through which this should be ensured.\textsuperscript{356} Taking a different approach, the BCM argued that the maintenance of the Islamic faith in young British Muslims was being achieved through supplementary mosque schools.\textsuperscript{357}

\textsuperscript{351} \textit{Guardian}, 24/4/83.
\textsuperscript{352} \textit{Swann Report}, 504.
\textsuperscript{353} Gilles Kepel, \textit{Allah in the West} (Cambridge : Polity, 1997), 120.
\textsuperscript{354} \textit{The Times}, 18/5/89.
\textsuperscript{355} \textit{Guardian}, 5/11/91.
\textsuperscript{356} \textit{Ibid.}, 24/4/83.
\textsuperscript{357} \textit{Independent on Sunday}, 15/7/90.
All actors, regardless of their religious and political affiliations, felt a need to address the issue of existing state-funded religious schools when discussing Muslim claims. Allowing various religions, including minority faiths and denominations, to establish their own schools had long been central to the artifice of British religious pluralism.\(^{358}\) As mentioned, some within the Labour Party were generally opposed to state-funded religious schooling. More uncompromisingly secular groups, such as WAF, also took this position. In 1988, WAF suggested that ‘[a]ll schools have a deeply conformist idea of the role of women’ and should therefore not receive state-funding.\(^{359}\) Regardless of their principles, most commentators stressed that the abolition of existing religious schools would be impractical, which made denying Muslim claims difficult. It was sometimes suggested that, even if state-funded religious schools could or should not be eliminated, it could be accepted that no more would be established. The Bradford AYM took this position in 1983, as did the 1989 AMA resolution.\(^{360}\) Many in Labour circles may have supported this notion, but to publicly make the argument that expansion of religious schools should be halted at this point without creating the appearance that one regarded the prospect of state-funded Muslim schools with horror was tricky. Recognising this, Muslim educationalists often made arguments referring to equality. Islamia’s headmaster, Azam Baig, suggested that Muslims could not take seriously the suggestion that Britain required full integration of its ethnic minorities when Jews, in particular, were permitted to run their own state-funded schools.\(^{361}\) Many non-Muslim actors shared this attitude. As Kirklees considered Zakaria’s application for voluntary status, the *Guardian* suggested that the council faced a choice between ‘giving equal treatment to Muslims and promoting integration’.\(^{362}\)

\(^{360}\) *Guardian*, 13/4/83; *Independent*, 17/3/89.
\(^{361}\) *The Times*, 9/7/87.
\(^{362}\) *Guardian*, 14/3/89.
Opponents of Muslim schools also sometimes argued in terms of equality – specifically, equality for girls. Muslim independent schools, especially secondaries, were usually girls’ schools. For some English Muslims, single-sex Muslim schools were an acceptable compromise, preferable to girls being kept off school by protective parents or returned to south Asia for their education. The BCM, despite its opposition to the MPA plan, reasoned that the creation of state-funded Muslim schools was the only long-term solution to enforced absenteeism amongst Muslim girls. The idea that education in Muslim schools would be bad for girls was, however, broadly accepted by non-Muslims. Feminist groups such as WAF were particularly prominent in outlining these concerns, suggesting that Muslim schools would act as a mechanism by which male ‘community leaders’ could exercise control over young women. Condemnations of the Islamic attitude to the education of girls were often rather summary. A 1989 Guardian article flatly referred to ‘fundamental Islam, with its belief in the superiority of men’. Neil Fletcher placed much emphasis on this issue, warning that state-funded Muslim schools would ‘set back the struggle of British Muslim women for equal rights’. Dealing with such concerns became a key task for Labour representatives sympathetic to Muslim schools. Speaking at a 1989 conference on education organised by the ICC, Straw claimed that concerns about the position of girls in Muslim schools betrayed ‘almost complete ignorance of the role of women in the theology and history of Islam’ and bordered upon racism. Straw’s position echoed that of some Muslim groups – the MPGB suggested that suspicions of sexist educational practices seemed to fall exclusively on Muslims. Miss M. Sherriff of the IST claimed that many women supported Muslim schools, and that ‘by going to

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363 BLSL, BHRU interviews, ACC C0070.
364 Independent on Sunday, 15/7/90.
365 Guardian, 16/3/89.
366 Independent, 4/5/89.
367 Ibid., 7/7/89.
368 MPGB, White Paper, 27.
a good Muslim school Muslim girls would become more aware of the rights that they have as a birthright in Islam’.\textsuperscript{369}

Concerns about the quality of education that Muslim schools would provide for girls were related to general worries about the schools’ curricula. Such fears were not based merely on assumptions, but reflected criticisms of existing independent schools often made by inspectors. In 1984, a HMSI report on Zakaria described the buildings as ‘dilapidated’. The school suffered from a textbook shortage and continuous staff turnover, entered few girls for examinations, and provided an ‘intellectually unchallenging and aesthetically unstimulating’ curriculum. After the report was completed, however, the school moved to a new site and established a more permanent teaching staff.\textsuperscript{370} In the following year, the Guardian reported that several Muslim schools had attracted HMSI attention for their ‘narrow’ curriculum, which some felt was designed simply to train young Muslim women as housewives.\textsuperscript{371} Reports on Islamia schools in both Huddersfield and Sheffield in 1987 were extremely pessimistic.\textsuperscript{372} Shortly thereafter, a report on the Muslim Girls Community School in Bradford criticized the school’s unchallenging curriculum and poor finances.\textsuperscript{373} Despite having opened in 1984, it did not enter girls for O-Levels/GCSEs until 1989.\textsuperscript{374} The application of the Zakaria school in Huddersfield for voluntary-aided status was rejected by the council for educational reasons.\textsuperscript{375} Concerns about the educational prospects of children in Muslim schools were also aired by Muslim observers. Responding to the MPA, Johnny Rashid, then chair of Bradford AYM, suggested that attendees could be subject to a ‘racist backlash’ based on assumptions about the quality of Muslim schools. A wrinkle was added to these discussions by the introduction of

\textsuperscript{369} Independent, 5/5/89.
\textsuperscript{370} Guardian, 26/10/84.
\textsuperscript{371} Ibid., 16/9/85.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 20/5/87.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 7/11/87.
\textsuperscript{375} Guardian., 16/7/89.
a national curriculum in 1988, which some felt would provide a safeguard against intellectual narrowness in state-funded Muslim schools. The Labour Party made this claim in 1989, arguing that Muslim voluntary-aided schools were preferable to Muslim independent schools, which were harder for government to influence.\(^\text{376}\) The party also suggested that all Muslim voluntary-aided schools should accept ‘some degree of secular control over the admissions policy and ethos’.\(^\text{377}\) In considering the Zakaria applications, Kirklees Council suggested that the national curriculum nullified the ‘traditional argument’ about the curricular deficiencies of Muslim schools.\(^\text{378}\) Not all were convinced by such claims, however. The \textit{Guardian} still wondered in 1989 whether ‘state-funded Islamic schools [would] serve to encourage Islamic fundamentalism’.\(^\text{379}\) For others, the demands of the national curriculum simply meant that no state-funded Muslim schools could be established. Neil Fletcher inferred that requiring ‘Muslim schools [to] follow the national curriculum is a circle that you cannot square.’\(^\text{380}\) Such attitudes crossed party lines, as junior Education Minister Angela Rumbold suggested in 1992 that ‘[s]ome of the things that are being taught within the national curriculum are not necessarily acceptable to the Muslims…’\(^\text{381}\) Muslim groups were generally dismissive of this idea.\(^\text{382}\)

Campaigners for Muslim schools often met negative reports with the suggestion that resources could be improved if state-funding were provided. The extensive funding from Muslim states expected by English groups frequently failed to emerge. A 1992 MPGB document on education suggested that many Muslim independent schools were experiencing

\(^{376}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 9/5/89; \textit{The Times}, 24/7/89.  
\(^{377}\) \textit{Independent}, 14/7/89.  
\(^{378}\) \textit{Guardian}, 14/3/89.  
\(^{379}\) \textit{Ibid.}  
\(^{380}\) \textit{Independent}, 14/7/89.  
\(^{381}\) \textit{The Times}, 6/1/92.  
\(^{382}\) \textit{Guardian}, 16/7/89.
serious struggles financially and needed state funding. The small size of the schools was often used as a reason to reject their applications for voluntary-aided status, for example when Brent rejected Islamia’s initial application for state-funding and when McGregor rejected its second. Jack Straw insisted that this was not a sufficient reason to deny applications.

Regardless of the curriculum, ethos and resourcing of Muslim schools, many remained strongly opposed to them owing to their implications for integration. The question of segregation was often foregrounded in press treatments of Muslim schools. In 1983, Bradford suggested that Muslim schools would violate the ‘shared educational experience in a common school curriculum’ that underpinned multi-ethnic education. Associations of Muslim schools with segregation were difficult for their supporters, especially in the Labour Party, to overcome. This is reflected in the party’s 1988 document on “Education in a Multicultural Society”, which expressed commitment to the right of minority faiths to establish separate schools, but also asserted mysteriously that ‘this is in no way inconsistent with our stated aim of resisting any moves towards separate development’. The 1985 Swann Report unsurprisingly concluded that its ‘education for all’ philosophy could not countenance any “solution”… which tacitly seems to accept that these “problems” are beyond the capacity and imagination of existing schools…” Pursuing an analogy with class, Neil Fletcher suggested in the Guardian that religious schools are ‘divisive… just as we consider fee-paying schools to be divisive’. A number of commentators, including Fletcher, tainted Muslim schools by association with apartheid. For local authorities that had pursued ‘multicultural’ policies and made concessions to Muslim demands within the state sector, such as Brent, permitting

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384 The Times, 9/7/87.
385 Independent, 17/7/89.
386 Guardian, 7/9/83.
388 Swann Report, 510.
389 Ibid., 17/6/89.
390 Independent, 4/5/89.
separate Muslim schools could amount to an admission of failure. Muslim actors sometimes shared concerns about integration. In 1987, BCM under-secretary Faqir Mohammad commented that ‘[i]t is easier for people to get on well together if they are educated here’, and the organization re-affirmed its opposition to segregated schooling in 1990. \(^{391}\) Johnny Rashid described the 1983 MPA plan as a potentially ‘irreversible’ step towards segregation. \(^{392}\)

Supporters of Muslim schools responded to these fears in various ways. For some, steps towards segregation were justified, as reception centres had been by local and national governments in the 1960s and 70s, as a temporary means towards an admirable end. Yusuf Islam suggested that parents would be willing to accept integrated education at secondary level, once children had ‘had a Muslim education to withstand some of the pressures they’re likely to meet.’ \(^{393}\) The MPGB’s 1992 document on education made the suggestion that, although Muslim schools may exhibit a rather narrow religious focus at first, they would permit ‘tolerant exploration of other cultures…’ once ‘security’ was established. \(^{394}\) Drawing on the discourse of multiculturalism, a number of campaigners for Muslim schools suggested that the schools would have no bearing upon ‘race relations’ since they would be multi-ethnic even if mono-religious. Making this point, Ibrahim Hewitt, assistant director of the MET, described Muslim schools as ‘integrated’. \(^{395}\) These Muslim attempts to counter the argument that separate religious schools created disharmony were assisted to an extent by Jewish commentators. Michael Cohen of the United Synagogue Board of Education denied that Jewish schools had been divisive. \(^{396}\) For some, demanding integration from Muslims was hypocritical when the Conservative emphasis on parental choice had allowed white parents to take their

\(^{391}\) Guardian, 13/9/87.
\(^{392}\) Ibid., 13/4/83.
\(^{393}\) Ibid., 18/10/85.
\(^{394}\) MPGB, White Paper, 28.
\(^{395}\) Guardian, 21/2/89.
\(^{396}\) Ibid., 16/7/89.
children out of Asian-majority schools, as happened in the late 1980s in both Dewsbury and Cleveland.  

Rejections of integration by Muslim campaigners, where they occurred, must be partly understood as attempts to promote dissatisfaction amongst parents with the mainstream accommodations that might undercut separatism. Unsurprisingly, supporters of Muslim schools insisted that they represented parents’ wishes, especially due to the emphasis of government policy on ‘parental choice’ and the rising importance of this principle in Labour thinking. Moeen Yaseen of the IST spoke in 1991 of an ‘overwhelming demand’ arising from the fact that ‘the majority of Muslim parents are not satisfied with the kind of state schooling their children are receiving’. An examination of the situation at Islamia in 1990 further suggests parental interest in Muslim schools – the school then had 95 students on its roll, with a waiting list of 1,000. In 1989, Zakaria school in Huddersfield had 300 children on its waiting list compared to a student body of 127. The Newham Campaign for Muslim Schools’ petition in favour of converting five local schools with Muslim majorities into Muslim grant-maintained schools achieved 2,500 signatories. However, the legitimacy of such claims to parental representation suffered a serious blow in 1991 during the campaign to turn Willowbank School in Glasgow into a Muslim GMS. It emerged that some parents who signed a petition in favour of the ‘opt out’ had done so in the mistaken belief that they were registering support merely for more Bengali classes or Islamic instruction. A counter-petition was organised by opponents of the campaign, and a subsequent vote on the opt-out was heavily defeated. Moeen Yaseen, meanwhile, argued that the government’s passive opposition to Muslim

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397 *Sunday Times*, 6/9/87; *The Times*, 24/4/90.  
398 *Independent*, 7/2/981.  
399 *Independent on Sunday*, 15/7/90.  
400 *Guardian*, 31/1/89.  
401 *ibid.*, 5/11/91.  
402 *Independent*, 1/7/91; *Guardian*, 9/7/91.  
schools constituted a denial of parental choice. In a 1987 editorial, *The Times* assumed that the government’s emphasis on parental choice would require it to support Muslim schools. In general, however, non-Muslim commentators voiced scepticism about the degree of parental support for Muslim schools. In 1983, Bradford Council expressed its uncertainty about the representativeness of the MPA, whilst the *Guardian* believed local opinion to be ‘divided’. Empirical studies also suggested the divided nature of Muslim opinion. A study of Manchester suggested that only half of Muslim parents supported separate religious schools. Perhaps more significantly, only 26% of young Muslim girls did so, inviting the question of how student choice, rarely considered by commentators on the issue of Muslim schools other than feminist groups such as WAF, should be weighed against parental preference. Campaigners for Muslim schools were not disinterested advancers of popular will; they also had a distinct personal stake in the cause – many were staff members at these institutions, were part of educational organizations that produced Islamic syllabuses and teaching materials, or were part of the educational trusts that supported these schools. By contrast, the BCM, a chief proponent of separatism, was composed of representatives of the mosques that received funding for, and prestige from, the provision of supplementary education.

VI

Education policy has been a chief area through which the multiculturalism institution has been expanded and, later, restructured and eroded. It has been shown that, despite uncertainties about ‘separate development’, specific provisions were made – including S11, dispersal, the establishment of various arrangements for NES children, the appointment of special workers, etc. – for ethnic minority children from an early time. These were motivated by the ostensible

404 *Independent, 7/2/91.*
405 *The Times, 9/7/87.*
‘special needs’ of ethnic minorities, which were held to relate to both language and ‘customs’.

In the initial phase, however, these special provisions were not justified in reference to the rights of cultural minorities, but were made instrumentally, with a view to long-term integration. Policies promoting integration were envisioned as a means of improving education for children in general. At a later time, beginning in the late 1970s, special provisions were often, though not always, motivated more by ethnic minority demands and changing theories of cultural minorities’ rights and best educational practices. This shift reflected a range of uncoordinated and often gradual developments: the increasing political mobilisation and significance of ethnic minority communities; the provisions of the 1976 RRA; the emergence of the municipal new left; and the violence of 1981 and 1985. Ethnic minority organizations had lobbied on educational issues since the 1960s, but, by this later period, segments of the multiculturalism institution were also passed into the hands of ethnic minority communities through the appointment of ethnic minorities, many of whom had been involved in ethnic community organizations, as special workers; the development of more formal structures for consultation with ethnic minorities; and the funding of community groups to perform specific educational work. Because of this process, organization that was in a sense separatist – that sought accommodations or provisions for a specific ethnic or religious group – was also incorporated into a larger, mainstream institution. Ethnically-specific mobilisation could potentially have an integrative function. The creation of state-funded Muslim schools was perhaps the apotheosis of this. However, as will be explored more in chapter seven, this process of consultation and incorporation drew criticism from those who felt it relied on unrepresentative ‘leaders’ and endangered ‘minorities within minorities’. Some authorities that worked with ‘progressive’ organizations – such as ILEA with BENTH – also experienced difficulties, due to the fractured and localised nature of ethnic minority community groups and the potential for conflict within them to be heightened by contact with local authorities. In the
late 1980s, criticisms of multiculturalism also dwelt on its insularity and advancement through structures that had little interest in non-ethnic forms of disadvantage and discrimination.

These structures were produced through both local and national actions. Furthermore, local and national actors bore shifting, variable relationships to one another. The centre variously acted as a follower (for example when legitimating local practices such as dispersal and the appointment of special workers), facilitator (for example in passing S11), inhibitor (especially under the Conservative governments of the 1980s, with their strictures on LEA autonomy), watchdog (through the provisions against racism in the RRAs), and persuader (through circulars and reports). The centre set parameters and limits, but rarely placed obligations upon local authorities. Indeed, any instinct it had to act as a leader may have been suppressed after the wide dismissal by major LEAs of the 1965 circular on dispersal.\footnote{David L. Kirp, \textit{Doing Good by Doing Little: Race and Schooling in Britain} (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1979), 56.}

The breadth of these parameters enabled great local variations, even if this was sometimes belied by the (often homogenous and flaccid) nature of LEA statements about multicultural education. Variations occurred in terms of the approaches taken to NES children; dispersal; use of S11 and appointment of special workers; mother tongue accommodations; curriculum content; and cultural concessions made or rejected, and were influenced by local political and demographic factors. Despite the wide array of approaches available to local authorities, genuinely autonomous local variations – such as appointment of special workers or dispersal and collection of statistics in the very early period – were rare, since central consent and, often, funding were usually required. Furthermore, variations did not occur merely between localities, but also between individual schools. This reflects the generalised nature of both local and central exhortations about multicultural education and extremely wide variations in opinion amongst practitioners. The Burnage report in particular highlighted at one institution a
An historical analysis of multiculturalism in British education therefore suggests a stability and simultaneity of approaches that resists periodisation. It is simplistic, if not inaccurate, to refer to the 1950s and 1960s as a time of ‘assimilation’ or colour-blindness in education policy. Distinctions between multiculturalist and anti-racist phases or approaches also seem difficult to sustain. It is true that, in the late 1970s especially, local authorities feeling their way towards ‘multicultural’ education often had little to say about racism in schools. Moreover, even after indirect racism was outlawed through the 1976 RRA, local authorities remained uncertain about the concept of ‘institutional racism’ and how it could be addressed.\footnote{Ken Young and Naomi Connolly, \textit{Policy and Practice in the Multi-racial City} (London : PSI, 1981), 165.} Whilst lip service was paid by many authorities to the seriousness of a phenomenon they called ‘covert racism’, lists of racist practices to be stamped out were usually limited to crude forms of overt racism. Nevertheless, many local authorities were ‘anti-racist’ in the sense that they made genuine attempts to eliminate these practices, whilst the CRE’s action against subtler forms of institutional racism were hamstrung not primarily by a lack of willpower or understanding, but by a lack, and reduction, of resources, especially under Thatcher’s hostile governments.

In some areas – such as Birmingham, Bradford, Brent, and Manchester – responses foregrounding cultural concessions were especially prominent, in part due to a desire to meet Muslim demands. Contrary to a common thesis, Muslims did make claims on the basis of their religion, and were recognised to do so, in the 1960s and ‘70s. Indeed, Islam was widely recognised as the minority religion most likely to inspire special claims. These representations often concerned accommodations for Muslim girls with reference to \textit{purdah}, religious
instruction in schools, Arabic tuition, and changes to curricula. The campaign for Muslim schools can also be traced to the 1970s. Certain Muslim demands – for example, reform of religious education – fitted easily with the general concerns of multicultural education whilst others – such as for Arabic classes – presented difficulties for the paradigm. Muslim demands could tessellate not only with general pluralist but also anti-racist concerns. Ray Honeyford’s excoriation of ‘purdah mentality’ went alongside more general comments attacking anti-racist and multicultural education and denigrating other minority groups.\textsuperscript{410} This enabled alliances between Muslim organizations, such as the BCM, somewhat more secular organizations like the Bradford AYM, and the white left. This should call into question attempts by recent critics of multiculturalism and of politico-religious mobilisation to associate religious identification in general with narrowness and sectarianism.\textsuperscript{411} Links between Muslim organizations and secular groups, as well as the white left, could also develop around less obviously unifying issues such as Muslim schools and provision of halal meat. This reflected both the importance of Muslim voters and activists to, in particular, the Labour Party, as well as the malleability of the value of ‘equality’ and its potentially wide invocation in claims made by ethnic minority groups. The late 1980s and 1990s, however, also witnessed increasing doubt about the efficacy of existing consultative arrangements and awareness about internal divisions within ethnic minority communities along gender, generational and sectarian lines. In the debates about Muslim schools, for instance, mainstream institutions could hardly ignore opposition not only from white feminists and socialists, but also from ‘moderate’, mostly Bareliwi, organizations like the BCM and from Asian feminists. This anxiety about privileging certain sub-groups within ethnic communities reflected wider concerns about multiculturalism at this time, and occurred in a discursive context characterised by uncertainty about the desires of the vast majority of Muslims, who were left outside the infrastructure of multiculturalism.

\textsuperscript{410} Daily Telegraph, 27/8/06; reprinted from Salisbury Review, 3/84.
3. Home Bodies: *Purdah* and the Integration of Muslim Women in England

The previous chapter sought to highlight the distinctive, and long-lived, place of Muslims within larger discussions about ethnic pluralism in British education. This is one sort of analysis that can overturn the oft-rehearsed argument that the religious identities of British Muslims were not mobilised politically, or regarded as having socio-political significance, before the late 1980s. This chapter will deploy another strategy, analysing elite responses to a Muslim practice, *purdah*, that is rarely considered in socio-political histories of British Islam or British multiculturalism. It will focus on ideas about *purdah* held by British elites, and the impact of *purdah* upon Muslim claims-making, especially in education. In keeping with this thesis’ interest in the inter-relationship between different facets of identity and representation, it will be allowed that presentations of Muslim women subject to *purdah* shaded into those of Asian women in general. However, it will stress that Muslim women and families, largely due to *purdah*, were given a specific position within these presentations.

*Purdah*, from the Farsi word for ‘veil’, refers to a package of regulations governing relations between the sexes. *Purdah* is not a practice exclusive to Muslims – it can be found in rural parts of Northern and Central India, and some of its effects as regards the segregation of the sexes are mirrored in orthodox Judaism and some forms of Christianity. However, as will be shown, *purdah* in Britain has been associated ultimately with Muslims. Essentially, *purdah* acts to limit contact between women and unrelated men. Verity Saifullah Khan’s 1976 article “*Purdah* in the British Situation” suggested that the practice can be considered to have four elements: limitation of contact between men and women who are not kin; segregation of the sexes after puberty; division of labour within the family; and modest dress amongst women,
3. Home Bodies: Purdah and the Integration of Muslim Women in England

particularly in the presence of unrelated men. It should be noted that *purdah* was, and is, by no means practised uniformly across social and geographical lines in the Muslim world. In ethnic terms, the Pathans have been associated with especially conservative religious and social attitudes where women are concerned. The largest Pathan community in Britain in the mid-20th century was to be found in Manningham, north Bradford. Mirpuri immigrants, who constitute one of the largest groups of Pakistani immigrants into Britain, are also sometimes regarded as conservative in this way. This may suggest a more general division in practices between conservative rural areas and ‘Westernising’ urban areas. This is dubious, however.

The ability of a family to keep women in the home can reflect high status (since it demonstrates a level of material comfort that enables women to abstain from work). The testimony of the Syrian writer Rana Kabbani suggests that challenges to veiling and *purdah* do not arise simply by a family rising to the middle class, but also depend upon the political attitudes of the family. More recent studies of Muslim women, both in and outside Britain, who choose to veil often suggest that this choice is most common amongst educated, professional women. In any case, the Muslim population of Britain during the period under study was largely drawn from the south Asian peasantry.

The scholarship concerning *purdah* in Britain is not extensive, but has taken a few different forms. Early work, including that by Zaynab Dahya and Saifullah Khan, was essentially anthropological in character. It focussed upon the religio-social purposes and effects of

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3. Home Bodies: Purdah and the Integration of Muslim Women in England

*purdah*, as well the changes to it after migration. Saifullah Khan, in particular, emphasised that the demographic conditions in Britain would lead to *purdah* being more strictly applied. In Pakistani villages, one’s neighbours were also often one’s kin, whereas in Britain space was much more likely to be shared with unrelated, and non-Muslim, men.\(^{418}\) Saifullah Khan also noted that these demographics could lead to a greater degree of loneliness amongst Pakistani women in Britain.\(^{419}\) This picture of loneliness, an aside for Saifullah Khan, was foregrounded by Amrit Wilson’s still-influential *Finding a Voice*, which, using oral testimony, provided a bleak picture of isolated Asian women in England. Her work suggested that this isolation was at least partially the result of policies pursued by local authorities and community groups – the lack of services provided specifically for Asian women further circumscribed the role they could play outside of the home.\(^{420}\) Wilson’s work was subsequently criticised from some perspectives for playing into the hands of racists by presenting an undifferentiated picture of Asian women as submissive and ineffectual.\(^{421}\) The well-publicised strikes at Mansfield Hosiery (1972), Imperial Typewriters (1974), Grunwick (1976-78) and Chix bubblegum factory (1979) made a portrayal of Asian women as submissive hard to sustain into the 1970s and ‘80s, even if those active prominent in these strikes were mostly non-Muslim East African Asians. Recent literature has addressed itself to British, and indeed European, controversies about veiling, often using ethnographic methodology to investigate the importance placed on veiling by Muslim women themselves.\(^{422}\) Very little literature exists on the social and political significance given to *purdah*, of which veiling is only one aspect, in the period prior to France’s *l’affaire du foulard* (1989) and the later discourse about Islam and integration for which terrorism is a persistent referent. This chapter will correct this, demonstrating that *purdah* in general was regarded by

\(^{418}\) Saifullah Khan, “*Purdah* in the British Situation”, 232.

\(^{419}\) Saifullah Khan, “*Pakistani Wives in Britain*”, 103.

\(^{420}\) Wilson, *Finding a Voice*, 24-6.

\(^{421}\) Pratibha Parmar, “Gender, Race and Class: Asian Women in Resistance” in Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies ed., *Empire Strikes Back*, 252

English elites as a problematic practice linked to a number of social and governmental difficulties already in the 1960s and ‘70s, in a way that sometimes foreshadow, but are clearly distinct from, more recent discourses.

Having provided a short definition of *purdah* and an outline of the scholarship on the practice in Britain, this chapter will move to discuss its role in influencing Muslim claims in the British public sphere. The third section will then consider the problems that *purdah* was taken to pose for local and national authorities and community relations organizations, and steps taken to address these problems. The fourth section will then broaden this analysis, describing the ways in which the difficulties created by *purdah* were felt to necessitate specific responses to Muslim *families*, not merely women. It will be demonstrated that responses to *purdah* were an important part of the multiculturalism institution’s development in the 1960s and ‘70s, entailing a ‘community approach’, addressed to specific communities rather than specific issues. A final section will bring these various insights together and further consider the significance of discourses about *purdah* for an analysis of multiculturalism and socio-political identity in England in the period under study.

II

In some ways, the impact of *purdah* can be fitted into the process of religious accommodation in education described in the previous chapter. Among school-aged, adolescent Muslim girls, *purdah* brought specific challenges for LEAs, schools, and Muslim parents and organizations. The desire of many parents that their children dress modestly, and resultant demands, generated attention from schools and LEAs from an early date. Sometimes these claims related specifically to dress for certain activities. In 1963, Middlesex County Council reported that Asian girls often ‘appear in costumes ill-fitting to gymnastic classes or
the netball court’, but regarded parents as amenable to ‘reason’ in this regard. By the late 1960s, however, accommodation regarding dress was more common, seemingly because protests from Asian parents had not abated. Guidelines issued by Bradford’s Education Department in 1966 permitted both the shalwar kameez and the chador, though only where parents were not responsive to arguments for observing uniform first from the head teacher and then from the LEA. It was recommended however that ‘national dress’ adopted by Muslim girls be in school colours. These guidelines were prepared with the cooperation of a local middle-class women’s organization, the Pakistani Women’s Association. This suggests that, although little consultation of ethnic minority organizations occurred in this period, such groups could be utilized on a more ad hoc basis for their cultural knowledge and ability to communicate decisions to communities. Despite the largely working-class nature of Muslim families in the city, this liaison work was tasked to a middle-class group, primarily because organization in Muslim communities, especially amongst women, was dominated by the middle classes in this period. Manchester also relaxed its uniform guidelines in the late 1960s, permitting the shalwar kameez. Agreements between individual schools and parents seem to have been the primary means of regulating Muslim girls’ dress in most localities, however – this was certainly the case in Sheffield, for example, where the local Committee for Community Relations (SCCR) was able to intervene ‘from time to time’ but differences of opinion remained ‘a constant problem’. Evidence in Finding a Voice also adds to this picture of accommodations made, or not made, at local level. Whilst Wilson presents Muslim girls as essentially supportive of demands for more modest forms of dress in schools, the activist Hannana Siddiqui, later a leading member of SBS, remembers praying (to ‘the Christian god’)

423 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/2, Middlesex County Council, “… Immigrant Problem”, [1963]
424 WYASB, BIEC papers, 42D92/56, City of Bradford Education Department to Barkerend, 17/11/67.
426 Ibid., YCCR papers, 49D79/2/18, MCCR, “Annual Report, 1968-9”.
428 Wilson, Finding a Voice, 98.
that her father would be forced to send her to school in a skirt.\footnote{Hannana Siddiqui, “Review Essay: Winning Freedoms”, \textit{Feminist Review} 37 (Spring, 1991), 78.} Despite the accommodations made – or perhaps because of their piecemeal, localized nature -- concessions as regards school uniform were amongst the chief demands of Muslim groups in both Birmingham and Lancashire even in the early eighties.\footnote{Ansari, \textit{Infidel Within}, 316; Anwar, \textit{Myth of Return}, 162.} Bradford’s comprehensive new policies on multicultural education, issued in 1983, included the recommendation that schools permit Asian girls to wear tracksuits for PE lessons.\footnote{\textit{Guardian}, 19/2/83.} The Swann Report gave extensive consideration to these issues in 1985, highlighting the tendency of schools to dismiss Muslim demands about dress as ‘awkward’ and ‘petty’.\footnote{\textit{Swann Report}, 341.} Whilst allowing that some Muslim girls may choose their preferred mode of dress through ‘adherence to their faith and their allegiance to their community’, it was also stressed that it was no ‘function of schools to seek to impose a particular cultural identity on any pupil’ and individual choice should prevail.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 342-3.} In the same year as the Swann Report was published, Brent, faced with increased lobbying on a religious basis by Muslim organizations and seeking to offset demands for separate Muslim schools in the borough, outlined a series of concessions including new accommodations regarding uniform.\footnote{\textit{Guardian}, 18/10/85.} In Birmingham, the lobbying of the MLC, as well, perhaps, as Swann’s recommendations, led in 1986 to concessions on uniform being made as part of guidelines issued by the city’s LEA regarding Muslim demands.\footnote{Nielsen, “Muslims in English Schools”, 238.} Concessions in this area in the late 1980s occurred at a time when schools and LEAs were increasingly abandoning school uniforms and relaxing restrictions regarding the dress of girls in general.\footnote{Nielsen, “Muslims in Britain”, 68.} As demonstrated in Altrincham in 1988, controversies could still occur in the late 1980s as regards more explicitly ‘religious’ items of dress, in that case the \textit{hijab}. However, the high-profile nature of the dispute in Altrincham, occasioned by the suspension of two Muslim girls who insisted on wearing...
3. Home Bodies: Purdah and the Integration of Muslim Women in England

headscarves, in part reflected the extent to which concessions had been made by LEAs at that time, and the potential for conflict when schools opted out of LEA control and began to set new rules for themselves.  

As mentioned, some demands regarding dress applied only to particular school subjects. The requirement during swimming classes for at least some of the body to be exposed sometimes generated demands from Muslim parents and organizations for these classes to be segregated. These demands were discussed at a London Council of Social Service (LCSS) conference in 1963. Representing HMSI, a Mr Tudhope suggested, rather gravely, that requiring Asian girls to ‘expose their bodies’ for PE or swimming lessons ‘might cut right across their whole cultural pattern and thus possibly cause psychological problems’.

Although this may seem like a relatively trivial matter, the wild ambivalence about ethnic ‘segregation’ exhibited by elites at this time made the separation of children along ethnic lines for any length of time seem like the first step down an extremely slippery slope. Furthermore, in authorities that used reception centres or withdrawal classes for NES children, swimming and PE classes were one of the few environments in which Asian and white children mixed.

Nevertheless, Bradford’s 1966 guidelines on uniform also provided for exemption from swimming classes for Asian girls if this was requested by parents and if the objections could not be settled through discussion. They also allowed for Asian girls to wear ‘a species of tights... and long-sleeved blouses...’ during PE.

Although these formulations linked objections to swimming classes and PE generally with Asian families, an issue of the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI) newsletter from 1968 was clearer in suggesting that ‘for Muslim girls at least swimming runs counter to the traditions of modesty

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437 Guardian, 23/1/90
438 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/5, CIAC, “Minutes of a Meeting... on 27th September, 1963”.
439 Ibid., MSS.292B/805.94/6, Hayes & Southall Trades Council, “Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council”, 31/7/63.
440 WYASB, BIEC papers, 42D92/56, City of Bradford Education Department to BIEC, 17/11/67.
and the very deeply rooted religious abhorrence of showing any part of the female body in public’. It seems that, by the 1970s at least, such demands caused little controversy. However, the Swann Report gave publicity to an ongoing case in which a Muslim girl at an unnamed school had been suspended due to her refusal to take part in swimming lessons. The head teacher reasoned that swimming was ‘a vital and integral part of the school’s curricula’ and that ‘[i]t’s the thin end of the wedge... [t]hese people have got to be shown that they can’t have everything to their convenience’. In this area, as in many others, Swann revealed a diverse array of attitudes at the level of practice including, amongst some, a still-active horror at any degree of ‘segregation’. Swann itself focused on the need to ‘take... very seriously’ the claims of Muslim parents, and to ‘alay their fears’ so that they might ‘regain confidence’ in the school system. This suggests a continuity of attitude with Bradford’s directives of twenty years earlier – forming relationships with Muslim parents through displays of good faith might obviate the need for concessions, but accommodation should be made if persuasion failed. Guidelines regarding Muslim demands issued in the mid-1980s by Brent and Birmingham both recommended that Muslim girls be allowed to excuse themselves from mixed swimming and PE lessons. Nevertheless, some Muslim parents did want their daughters to take part in school swimming lessons, and supported the provision of single-sex classes within coeducational schools. In Hackney, the Asian Women’s Centre put on single-sex classes for Asian girls with local authority support.

From the 1970s, however, deeper-rooted problems were perceived. Evidence from 1970 from both Manchester and Bradford suggests a concern that Asian, or in the case of Bradford

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441 NCCI, Liaison 10 (1968).
443 Swann Report, 342.
444 Ibid., 513.
445 Guardian, 18/10/85; Nielsen, “Muslims in English Schools”, 238.
446 Ibid., vol. 2, 50; Ansari, Infidel Within, 319; Hiro, Black British, 188.
447 Ellis, Meeting Community Needs, 138.
specifically Muslim, girls were being kept off school by their parents for fear of the negative effects of sexual mixing in British schools. In Bradford, this issue was thrown into sharp relief in 1974 by the case of Kulsambanu Patel, who was withdrawn from school over questions of sexual modesty. Her father Abdullah said that “I’ll not let Kulsumbanu wear gymslips in the PT class – it’s obscene. She’ll not go to dancing lessons either, either. It’s all against the sacred teachings of Islam.” The following year, responding to this incident and another similar case, the Yorkshire Committee for Community Relations (YCCR) offered an analysis that strikingly framed the issue as a fundamental value conflict. The YCCR warned that

[p]ermission for Muslim girls to wear shalwar instead of skirts or... the avoidance of mixed PE, exemption from swimming lessons or allowing girls to wear track suits or shalwar for games or PE will not remove Muslim anxieties entirely. The great issues are the danger of developing sexual relationships in co-educational schools and, to a lesser degree, exposure of Muslim girls to current educational and social developments in Britain.

Interestingly, a worry about how Muslim girls who were kept off school would perform as mothers was also featured in this report. The YCCR warned that Muslim girls who

are secretly withdrawn from school... cause another particular problem. They may become the semi-literate mothers of the next generation of Muslim Britons, lacking English themselves and unfitted for life in Britain. This has never happened with any other second generation of a British minority. If it happens to Muslims, it will be harmful both to them and to society as a whole.  

448 Ibid., Town Clerk’s papers, BBD 1/7/T15401, “Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration...”, 1970; GMCRO, Manchester and Salford Council of Social Services (MSCSS) papers, GB127.M184, 1970-1, “Minutes of meeting... held on November 16th 1970”.
449 Guardian, 3/1/74
450 WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/1/3/2, YCCR, “The Education of Muslim Girls...”, 9/75.
In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising that, in its 1976 report on *Further Education in Multiracial Areas*, the CRE described Muslim girls and women as a ‘well-defined group with special needs’.  

Whilst Patel himself supported separate Muslim schools (see chapter two), many Muslim parents were satisfied by single-sex provisions within the mainstream. Demands for the retention and creation of such schools were also controversial, however. The number of single-sex schools in Britain quickly diminished from the 1970s as part of a general reorganization of British secondary education in which the promotion of comprehensive education went along with the creation of many large, co-educational state schools. Particularly within Labour LEAs, coeducation became an almost undisputed orthodoxy. In Bradford, for example, Muslim parents were often denied transfers to the few remaining single-sex schools for their daughters. By 1975, there was only one girls’ school in the city (Belle Vue) and, following the attention given to the withdrawal of Patel, the issue of Muslim demands for single-sex schooling was regarded as increasingly serious. In that year, YCCR produced a report in which it described the retention and expansion of single-sex schools as an ‘acceptable solution’ that would prevent Muslim girls being sent back to south Asia for their education. It was suggested that demand for single-sex schools, which was not confined to Muslim parents, was not a ‘passing concern’, whereas support for coeducation may be a ‘temporary educational doctrine’. It was therefore stressed that demands for single-sex schooling raised ‘issues which have deep and long term implications for a multi-cultural Britain...’ It should be noted, however, that there was no consensus within Muslim  

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452 *Swann Report*, 508.  
communities about single-sex schooling. In Oxford, Shaw observed that local Muslim parents chose the area’s (better-performing) coeducational school over the local girls’ school, but were reluctant to support coeducation in public.\textsuperscript{456} This public support for single-sex schooling is further evidenced by polls that have suggested 80% or 90% of Muslim parents supported these schools.\textsuperscript{457} LEAs often felt that parental choice required the retention of at least some girls’ schools. Birmingham retained such schools in large part to satisfy assumed Muslim preferences.\textsuperscript{458} In 1980, the new Education Act extended parental choice, and so increased the ability of Muslim parents to place their daughters in the few girls’ schools that still existed. In Bradford, for instance, the Muslim population of Belle Vue quickly increased, with Muslim girls accounting for two thirds of the school roll by 1984.\textsuperscript{459} Labour council groups, meanwhile, still pursued the goal of coeducation – the MPA plan of 1983 to take over struggling local schools was inspired by a Labour proposal to merge Belle Vue with a local boys’ school.\textsuperscript{460}

The number of parents seeking places in single-sex schools, and the requirement that LEAs prioritise parental requests, meant that demand for places at girls’ schools sometimes outpaced the declining supply. In 1980, ILEA considered, but ultimately rejected, the possibility of giving preference to Asian parents seeking places at single-sex schools in Greenwich, where only three girls’ schools remained.\textsuperscript{461} Similar discussions were provoked in Manchester by the closure of the largest girls’ school in the north of the city, which had a large Muslim population. Some parents accepted coeducation for their daughters. Some of the girls were

\textsuperscript{456} Shaw, \textit{Kinship and Continuity}, 269.
\textsuperscript{459} Halstead, \textit{Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity}, 35.
\textsuperscript{460} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{461} LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/20, ILEA, “... Meeting of the Local Consultative Committee on Multi-Ethnic Education (Division 6)...7th May, 1980”; \textit{Ibid.}, ILEA, “... Meeting of the Local Consultative Committee on Multi-Ethnic Education (Division 6)...22nd October, 1980”
transferred to the North Manchester High School for Girls (NMHSG), but there were few places at this school, which was in the process of being reduced. Most of the Muslim girls were therefore placed in a girls’ school across the city. However, this led to absenteeism as parents refused to send their daughters on such long journeys. Manchester ultimately decided to give many of these girls places at NMHSG, reasoning that this did not constitute discrimination against non-Muslims on the waiting list because, if there had been further places, non-Muslims would have received these.462 Girls who remained at the school in Whalley Range were offered free transport to the school.463 These concessions reflected, as ILEA put it, the belief that Muslim demands for single-sex schooling, unlike those of non-Muslims, arose from ‘cultures and religious beliefs’.464 In Manchester, it was considered that the concessions were in line with ‘the spirit of Manchester’s policy for “education for our multicultural society” by recognising the special needs of this disadvantaged group’.465 Some local Labour figures felt invoking the city’s multicultural education policies in support of the concession was misguided, prefiguring later objections, enshrined especially in the MacDonald report, that the city’s approach did not do enough to consider the intersection of forms of disadvantage.466 More pragmatically, the accommodations surely reflected a fear that Muslim girls would be sent back to their countries of origin if they could not be educated in a single-sex environment in Britain.467 In Manchester, the issue of single-sex provision had significant political import. Local mosques, alongside organizations like the MPA, were disappointed with the response of the Muslim local Labour councillor, Nilofer Siddiqui. Siddiqui was aware that failure to promote single-sex schooling could cost her Muslim votes, but was confident that a lack of organization of the Muslim vote, as well as of viable alternative recipients of it, would contain the effects of

462 Ibid., 668-9.
463 Ellis, Breaking New Ground, 168.
464 LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/20, ILEA, “... Meeting of the Local Consultative Committee on Multi-Ethnic Education (Division 6)...7th May, 1980”.
465 MCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1983-4, 693.
466 Ellis, Breaking New Ground, 98-103.
this. Local feminist, including Asian, groups, supported this stance. Nevertheless, the retention of some single-sex provision was widely supported. In 1985, Swann recommended that local authorities ‘consider carefully the value of retaining an option of single sex education as part of their secondary school provision’. In the same year, the ILEA EMS recommended that ‘parental choice’ be honoured in requests for single-sex places. Some local Labour groups, not only in Manchester, prioritised Muslim requests for access to girls’ schools. A Guardian report on this development suggested that Labour had a ‘clouded conscience’ over this. However, by 1988, Labour had also expressed some support in general for single-sex schooling. In a 1989 Independent article, Gerald Kaufman, then shadow foreign secretary, suggested that he disliked single-sex schools personally, but he would support them whilst they were ‘required’ by Asians. In Manchester, the MPA had explicitly warned that if its demands regarding single-sex schooling were not met, it would seek to establish separate Muslim schools. Wider support for single-sex schools was reflected during debates in Manchester, as some feminists, including Asians, sought to express support for girls’ schools out of a belief that these could provide the best learning environment for girls and prevent gender discrimination. Similarly, the 1985 report of ILEA’s Working Party on Single-Sex / Co-Education noted increasing support for girls’ schools even within the ILEA EOC, and a decoupling of single-sex education from the broader issue of comprehensive education. Muslim activists often made much of the fact that many non-Muslims supported single-sex schools, but this shared goal, of course, often obscured great differences of opinion about the functions and advantages of girls’ schools.

468 Ramamurthy, Black Star, 92.
469 Swann Report, 512.
470 Ibid., Ethnic Minorities Section (EMS) minutes, ILEA/CL/MIN/12/1, 76.
471 Guardian, 18/10/85.
473 Independent, 1/3/89.
474 Ellis, Breaking New Ground, 103.
475 Ibid., 100-1.
Ideas about *purdah*’s effects on multicultural governance were not confined to its impact in education, however. In the post-migration context, *purdah*, when combined with encirclement by unrelated men, could create the impression that adult Muslim women were housebound. In 1963, a report by LG Smith from HMSI entitled “Immigration in Birmingham”, referring generally to Asian women, said that due to language problems ‘and through custom, any contact with the mothers is extremely difficult, and both adults and children tend to stay in national groups’. The idea that Asian women were extremely hard to reach was also apparent at local level. In his/her annual report for 1969, Manchester’s Medical Officer of Health wrote that ‘Indian and Pakistani mothers seem to be housebound and insular by nature and it is hard to break down barriers of reticence and shyness’. At other times, Pakistanis could be singled out specifically. At the 1963 LCSS conference, HMSI’s Tudhope commented that Pakistani women were ‘traditionally retiring’, and contact should therefore be made with fathers. Bodies concerned specifically with contacting new immigrants observed similar dynamics. The 1968 annual report of the Keighley Community Relations Council (KCRC), considering an initiative intended to create relationships Muslim women and draw their children into local youth clubs, commented tersely that ‘making contact with Pakistani mothers... as expected ... proved difficult and not rewarding’. In 1970, Bradford’s Director of Education commented in evidence to the SCRRI that one of the primary problems in the area was ‘[t]he socially isolated Pakistani woman who is a “prisoner of her own home” because of the operation of some degree of *purdah*’. In the same report, the teacher-in-charge at St

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477 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/2, L.G. Smith, “Immigration in Birmingham”, [1963].
478 Manchester City Library (MCL), Manchester, UK, Manchester Medical Officer of Health, “Report... for 1969”.
479 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/5, CIAC, “Minutes of a Meeting... on 27th September, 1963”
Jude’s reception centre added that ‘men often have no time to deal with school problems... yet mothers often will not even open the door’.\textsuperscript{481} The long shifts worked by many Muslim men made gaining access to women particularly important for the integration of Muslim families. The idea that women undercut this integration was enduring.\textsuperscript{482}

Muslim women, therefore, were regarded as confined to their potentially inaccessible homes due to restrictions on their contact with unrelated men. This created difficulties in accessing women for whom certain special provision – especially ESL classes – were regarded as vital to integration. English classes established for Asian women by local authorities were often poorly attended. Initiatives were either abandoned or struggled in Leeds, Halifax, Manchester, Wolverhampton and elsewhere.\textsuperscript{483} This was quickly noticed at national level. The Health Visitors Association (HVA), in its 1963 evidence to the CIAC, observed that ‘not only do the majority of [Asian] women have little desire to learn but, in addition, they are discouraged from doing so by their husbands, who wish to keep them at home’.\textsuperscript{484} In a 1965 speech in Nottingham, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department with responsibility for ‘race relations’ and immigration, Maurice Foley, urged that a ‘very special effort must be made to teach English, not only to the children, but to their parents, and especially to their mothers’.\textsuperscript{485} Furthermore, in their reports on visits in 1966 around Yorkshire and Tyneside, representatives of the RRB commented that Indian women were much more likely to be active in learning English than were Pakistanis.\textsuperscript{486} The government also recognized this. In a 1967

\textsuperscript{481} WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/T15401, “Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration...”, 4/70.
\textsuperscript{482} HCHAC, Bangladeshi in Britain, vol. 1, 107.
\textsuperscript{484} MRC, TUC papers, M55.292B/805.94/6, HVA, “Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council”, [1963].
\textsuperscript{485} Yorkshire Post, 5/4/65.
\textsuperscript{486} GMCRO, MCCR papers, GB127.M784/7/9, RRB, “Immigrants on Tyneside”, 15/3/66; GB127.M784/7/9, RRB, “Yorkshire Visit, 28-29\textsuperscript{7} July, 1966”.

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speech, Foley’s successor, David Ennals, suggested that CRCs would be judged on their results with Muslims since ‘[t]o have found an opportunity and a place where Muslim women are prepared to come together to learn English... is more important than any publicity meeting’.

By the 1970s, this problem was felt to have eased somewhat, but by no means entirely. The 1973 Russell Report on adult education, the Yorkshire Council of Social Services suggested that despite some progress, many Asian men felt ‘that their wives and elder daughters may lose... their cultural background and are therefore loath to allow them to be taught English’.

Even where women did make an effort to learn English, they could still be open to criticism. A 1977 Guardian article felt that ‘Asian women, particularly Moslems who may observe purdah, are likely to learn the language for purely practical, day-to-day motives’. As can be seen, attempting to teach English to Asian women was one of the primary concerns of those charged with the task of integration. It was, in a sense, prior to attempts at integration: Asian women could only take up a full role in employment, in social mixing, or as mothers if they had knowledge of English.

The relative absence, especially before the 1970s, of Muslim women from the workplace cut off another potential channel of integration. In 1963, the Association of Municipal Corporations (AMC) felt, with regards to immigrants generally, that women ‘do not have the same opportunity of mixing with others as have their husbands, who are at work all day’.

Most observations of this sort focused on Muslim women, however. The academic Eric Butterworth in a 1966 paper on Bradford, whilst observing that Asian women were in general underrepresented in the local workforce, further suggested that ‘[m]any Pakistani girls are not

487 NCCI, Liaison 10 (January, 1968).
489 Guardian, 21/5/77.
490 TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/1, AMC, “CIAC...”, 11/2/63.
allowed to go out to work because of the social restrictions of purdah..." The suggestion that Muslim women were especially unlikely to work was also made by a SCCR report in 1969, which argued that ‘[a] Pakistani or Arab who is a Muslim... may not allow his wife to go to work because it is undignified... Today some Pakistani women go out to work and this is so due to the local influence.’ The cultural register of this comment suggests that these ‘local factors’ consisted in an attitudinal shift amongst Pakistani men exposed to a new Western lifestyle. Most observers of Muslim communities in England, however, are more likely to see any shift in this regard during the 1970s as a result of economic necessity.

Bringing Muslim women into employment did not always involve bringing them out of the home, however – exploitative homework systems often attracted Muslim women by enabling the combination of paid employment and domestic duties. Purdah thus did much to condition the employment profile of Muslim women. Muhammad Anwar, in his 1979 study of Rochdale, suggested that most economically active Muslim women in the town were homeworkers, forming the “backbone” of the local ethnic enclave economy. In the late 1960s, the government usually suggested that the existing Wage Councils were sufficient to ensure fair pay for homeworkers. In the 1970s, three major pieces of legislation – the Employment Protection Act of 1973, the Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 – extended protections for workers. However, homeworkers were often unaffected by this due to their lack of unionisation and legal status as ‘self-employed’, whilst provisions relating to the extension of Wage Councils and registration of homeworkers were insufficient to stem exploitation. In 1978, the TUC issued a statement on homeworking

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492 ibid., 49D79/2/218, SCCR, “Report of the Course Held for Personnel Officers... 23rd April 1969”.
495 Hansard, HC Deb, 2/5/69, 284-5W.
496 ibid., HC Deb 21/12/76 cc418-9; 26/6/77 c534W.
that encouraged unionisation of homeworkers; removal of their status as ‘self-employed’; extension of Wage Councils; and more rigorous registration.\textsuperscript{497} A report by the Low Pay Unit into homeworking highlighted continuing underpayment and unsafe conditions.\textsuperscript{498} Following the arrival of a Conservative government, and subsequent steps such as the limitation of Wage Councils in 1979, initiatives supporting homeworkers were primarily local.\textsuperscript{499} In 1980, the London Borough of Tower Hamlets (LBTH) created a clothing skills workshop designed to retrain homeworkers.\textsuperscript{500} In 1983, the borough also used S11 funding to appoint a homeworking officer in support of this work.\textsuperscript{501} In the early 1980s, increased attention was given to the issue of homeworking as a result of a number of fires in East London that killed or injured homeworkers. A GLC / Tower Hamlets Alternative Strategy Partnership (THASP) report suggested there were ‘hundreds of dangerous and unregistered clothing factories in East London’. LBTH’s initiatives were compared unfavourably to Hackney and Islington’s work in this area – it was felt that in Tower Hamlets the focus was on expanding the ailing garments trade rather than protecting workers. Both LBTH and the Greater London Enterprise Board, however, did attempt to ensure that firms supported through regeneration efforts complied with equal opportunities regulations.\textsuperscript{502} Whilst at a national level there was little ethnic content to discussion of homeworking, at local level, especially in London, retraining homeworkers was often an ethnically specific task. THTF’s workshop was bilingual, whilst the GLC/THASP project sought to open up to Bengalis other forms of employment, including public sector work, blocked off due to linguistic difficulties and discrimination.\textsuperscript{503} By 1985, there were homeworking projects in Greenwich, Hackney, Haringey, Lambeth and Southwark, as well as a

\textsuperscript{497} THLSL, PC minutes, L/THL/A//32/1/2/3, TUC, “Statement on Homeworking”, 6/78
\textsuperscript{498} PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD570, 10/80.
\textsuperscript{499} UOR, Eade papers, Tower Hamlets Alternative Strategy Project (THASP) / GLC, “Silk, Satin, Muslin, Rags...”, [1980s], 33.
\textsuperscript{500} The Local, 8/80.
\textsuperscript{501} LMA, GLC Ethnic Minorities Committee (GLCEMC) presented papers, GLC/DG/PRE/49/8, GLC, “S11 of the Local Government Act...”, 16/5/83
\textsuperscript{502} UOR, Eade papers, THASP / GLC, “Silk, Satin, Muslin, Rags...”.
\textsuperscript{503} GLC Ethnic Minorities Unit, \textit{Good Job There’s the GLC} (London : GLC, 1984), 13.
London-wide project, focused on both conditions and retraining. Ethnic minority organizations were also active in campaigns supporting homeworkers – this included both groups focusing on employment issues, such as the Bengali Workers’ Action Group, and women’s organizations such as SBS and the Asian Women’s Resource Centre. Voluntary projects also made an impact outside of London – in Manchester, the Longsight and Moss Side Community Project established a workshop for ex-homeworkers in 1979, funded through the Inner Area Programme. From 1985-6, Wolverhampton council also funded a homeworkers’ resource centre. Ongoing concerns about homeworking, with an ethnic inflection, are evidenced by the 1986 *Bangladeshis in Britain* report’s suggestion that homeworking remained one of the few employment options for Bangladeshi women. Although the decline in Britain’s garment trade may have concomitantly reduced the number of female homeworkers in East London, there were still hundreds of thousands of such workers across the UK in the mid-1990s. The 1991 Homeworkers Act did however tighten registration procedures and facilitated union and local authority action on behalf of homeworkers.

Muslim women who did not leave their homes for work or formal education could nevertheless be integrated into communities in other ways. CRCs in particular actively encouraged women from different ethnic groups to mix socially. The loneliness of Asian women was recognised at an early time. In 1963, the Family Service Unit’s evidence to the CIAC stated that female migrants ‘seem to be in particular danger of becoming isolated, lonely and depressed, especially where they have left children behind in their country of origin’.

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505 *Guardian*, 19/10/79.
507 HCHAH, *Bangladeshis in Britain*, vol. 2, 55.
509 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/1, Family Service Units, “Memorandum… to the CIAC”, January 1963.
Once more, this extremely broad category was most likely to be broken down at local level. In the same year, Middlesex County Council observed that ‘[u]nlike the West Indian women... the Indians and Pakistanis tend to remain isolated and lonely and cut off from any sort of intimate contact with the local population...’\(^510\). Attempting to combat this loneliness, many local CRCs featured social affairs committees that dealt essentially with Asian women. In 1969, six of the seven members of the KCRC’s social activities committee were women.\(^511\) Activities organised by the committee are typified by the 1970 Christmas and Eid party – the presence of even a handful of Asian women at this event was regarded as a great success.\(^512\) Conversely, the women’s committees of such organizations were heavily concerned with social mixing. The women’s group of the YCCR published a quarterly newsletter that printed information on ‘forthcoming events and recipes’.\(^513\) In 1970, the Pakistan Society of Bradford (PSB) proposed a social scheme ‘[t]o get to know people and to affect [sic] an understanding of the others’ culture and way of life’.\(^514\) This foundered quickly however. The local press suggested that this was due to opposition from local Muslim leaders who feared that the scheme would involve breaking purdah.\(^515\) This explanation for the failure of the scheme may be incomplete. Opinion polling of white Britons during this period often suggest that, whilst they had little objection to, or even approve of, non-white co-workers, they did not want to mix with ethnic minorities in their homes.\(^516\) In 1963, the Halifax Council of Social Service noted the lack of inter-ethnic friendships and put this down largely to a fear of miscegenation on the part of whites.\(^517\)
So far, this chapter has considered the ideas about *purdah* and integration that applied both to Muslim schoolgirls and to adult Muslim women. These discourses were linked to broader ideas about the operation and integration of Muslim families. *Purdah* was felt to be a central obstacle to the integration of Muslim families, and was often addressed via an holistic ‘community approach’. Again, an examination of Bradford is useful here. Reporting in 1967 on responses to its policy of bussing Asian children, the city’s Education Committee observed that although dispersal was usually ‘accepted willingly’, some objections were made ‘based on claims that mothers by custom do not leave their homes and cannot travel with their children or even take them to the special buses...’\(^{518}\) Tying this explicitly to *purdah* in 1970, the Director of Education complained that ‘[t]he mothers’ restriction of movement prevents them from properly caring for their children and from introducing them at a pre-school age to the western society in which they live’. The adherence of mothers to *purdah* also required children that were ‘too young to manage safely on [their] own’ to walk long distances through the city.\(^{519}\)

Concerns about the effects upon Muslim children of unintegrated mothers were also more general in character and expressed with a national frame of reference. Writing in the journal of the HVA in 1970, M.F. Weller argued that Asian women were tending to stay in the house, often speaking only the native tongue and the child himself is torn between what appears to be unlimited freedom enjoyed by his school-fellows, and the discipline of the family culture to which he belongs, with the added difficulty of being expected to learn the language of the ‘host’ country.\(^{520}\)

The practice of *purdah* by Muslim women was therefore regarded as exacerbating potentially destructive generational changes within Asian families. Muslim mothers were regarded as


primarily responsible for child-rearing but as having, due to purdah, little knowledge of British life that they could impart to their children. These children would, it was suggested, find themselves unequipped for educational life in the metropole and caught ‘between two cultures’.

For some authorities, including Bradford, the surest way to ensure the integration of Muslim families would have been to effect their dispersal across areas of the city. This drastic course of action was recognised as impractical and perhaps unethical. In the late 1950s, such dispersal had been regarded as a more practicable solution by some. In the late 1950s, with opposition to immigration restriction still an official Labour policy, a number of local parties in areas with large ethnic minority populations – such as North Kensington CLP – saw dispersal as a way to square open borders with an alleviation of the strain apparently placed on certain local authorities by large, concentrated waves of migration. By the 1970s, residential dispersal was not a feasible option in general (it was attempted in regards to East African Asians in the mid-1970s), but was still looked upon with some wistfulness. In a document written in 1971 by the city’s Director of Education, the economic benefits of residential dispersal were first laid out: such a scheme would make the city’s costly bussing policy unnecessary, and, it was felt, lessen the need for ESL schemes, as Asian immigrants would be more likely to mix with English-speakers socially. It was suggested that residential dispersal would also lead to immigrants feeling freer to abandon their cultures of origin. Muslim women would become more involved in the life of the city, ‘if only because their husbands would not be under the same pressures from their community to keep them in purdah’. Muslim mothers would therefore, it was predicted, have been more likely to introduce their children to Western society in pre- and extra-educational contexts meaning that ‘the gap could probably have been bridged before the children’s infant years were over so that, both educationally and

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3. Home Bodies: Purdah and the Integration of Muslim Women in England

socially, the children of immigrants would have been on equal terms with English children by the age of seven or eight. The attractiveness of such an alternative reality is reflected by the Director’s closing lament that

many women are acutely unhappy and disorientated. They do not know how to feed their families in the British climate, they do not in some cases know how to manage their homes. Their unhappiness and inability to adapt to life in this country have emotional and physical effects on their children. 522

It is hard to assess how widely this attitude existed, but, in any case, most local authorities and community groups busied themselves with practical solutions to the confinement of Asian women. Many initiated home ESL tuition schemes. The first were organised in Yorkshire at the end of the 1960s – voluntary organizations in Huddersfield and Keighley established schemes in 1969, as had the YCCR. 523 Keighley’s scheme encompassed thirty-five volunteer tutors by 1973, serving roughly the same number of women and sometimes their children. 524 Leeds CRC introduced a scheme in 1970. 525 Bradford also had a scheme operating from 1973 at the latest. 526 Although these schemes were usually described as being for the benefit of Asian, or even ‘immigrant’, women generally, in Keighley, for example, the needs of specifically Pakistani women were referred to. 527 It seems likely that the tutors were mostly, or perhaps wholly, women. 528 The YCCR also desired that as many tutors

522 WYASB, Town Clerk's papers, BBD 1/7/T15401, Director of Education to Clerk, 28/1/71.
525 Guardian, 22/4/71
526 WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/2/1/3, Springboard, “Secretary’s Report since 1971”, 10/1/74.
as possible be Asians, and called for the training of more Asian girls in relevant teaching skills.\textsuperscript{529}

Aside from its linguistic remit, home tutoring provided valuable access into English Asian homes. Classes outside the home had already been organised for Asian mothers on topics such as British cuisine, dressmaking, family planning, health, and other subjects sometimes collected under the rubric of ‘British ways’. These had an implicit, and sometimes explicit, language element – Bradford council launched in 1970 a scheme to teach Asian mothers English once a week ‘through the medium of cookery’.\textsuperscript{530} Likewise, SCCR organised a group of volunteers who put on classes for Pakistani women in ‘English and domestic science’.\textsuperscript{531} Such classes offered tuition in both English and the cookery skills necessary to prepare meals felt to be more suited to an English climate, combining two aspects of social integration. This multifariousness was a quality of home tutoring too. The YCCR emphasised that its tutors ‘would be a friend going once a week to the immigrant’s home’ who ‘visited Asian ladies to teach English, etc.’ One member of the YCCR, a Mr Akram from Huddersfield, felt that home tuition was preferable to outside classes because Asian women ‘were able to make real social contacts through this method’.\textsuperscript{532} Conversely, Birmingham’s voluntary Primary Aid Playgroups scheme, launched in 1974, began as a scheme to benefit Asian children that grew to take on home tuition responsibilities for women. The scheme’s coordinator saw his volunteer tutors as able to perform the functions of social workers precisely because they were not establishment figures, and had slowly gained families’ trust.\textsuperscript{533} A 1977 piece in the \textit{Guardian} suggested that educationalists were split over whether home tutors should take on a

\textsuperscript{530} \textit{Ibid.}, Town Clerk’s papers, BBD 1/7/T15401, “Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration…”, 4/70.
\textsuperscript{531} SCCR, Harmony 2, 12/68.
\textsuperscript{533} \textit{Guardian}, 4/3/75.
narrow remit concerning only linguistic education, or should provide a general contact for families. The article also suggested that home tutoring had recently been re-conceived as a means of gaining trust and building confidence, with the aim of ultimately encouraging women to attend language and other classes outside the home. In any case, home tutoring was still seen as having an important role to play in the late 1970s. New schemes were still being launched, such as one in Bolton in 1977. More generally, the Labour Government’s 1978 document on plans to reform S11 suggesting that home tutoring might be one use for the funds. The tension between the establishment of special classes for ethnic minority women and rhetorical commitment to integrated provision did not go unnoticed – Bradford’s Director of Education remarked in 1971 that the local CRC’s plans to initiate dressmaking classes specifically for Asian girls gave him ‘some cause for anxiety’. That such anxieties existed reflects the depth of concerns about separate development, whilst the fact that the classes continued reflects that these concerns were often overcome.

Other workers were also utilised by both local authorities and voluntary groups to gain access to ethnic minority communities. In 1967, the SCCR posited the need for a part-time community worker to ‘promote activities for Asian and Arab women and children’. The woman, a Miss Butt, was recruited in the following year and began organising visits to the homes of women to offer advice, setting up language classes, establishing a mothers’ club, and doing translation work. Around the same time, the need for social workers from Asian backgrounds who could serve their own communities was being discussed at a national level. A report produced jointly by the NCCI and the London Boroughs Training Committee in 1968

534 Ibid., 21/3/77.
537 WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/16150, City of Bradford Director of Education to Clerk, 2/3/71
539 SCCR, Harmony 1, (November, 1968), 15.
encouraged the establishment of courses for Asian women who were interested in voluntary work. The Home Office also endorsed schemes to train Asian women in social work, and these proposals were considered by Bradford council in 1971. The city’s treasurer, however, reflected that, due to purdah, young women were unlikely to be given permission by their families to attended residential courses. The qualifications sought from paid workers were sometimes revealing about the way in which ethnic minority communities were conceived. In 1970, Manchester’s Education Welfare Officer, a Mr Chilton, highlighted the problem of Asian girls being kept off school by their parents and called for the appointment of a new, specially-qualified officer ‘as Asian mothers presented particular difficulties’. Although it was desired that this worker serve Asian women generally, Chilton stated that the worker should be ‘Urdu-speaking’. ‘Teacher/social workers’ of this sort were also attached to Bradford’s reception centres to provide a ‘link between home and school’. Workers charged by Bradford with younger children were ‘concerned with forming clubs for mothers and play-groups for toddlers, whilst those working with older children may find themselves involved with youth employment matters...’ Mothers were organised into classes for ESL, dressmaking and embroidery classes that functioned simultaneously with mixed-age playgroups. The playgroups were intended to allow older Asian children to transmit their knowledge of English to younger peers. The workers spent much of the rest of their time visiting homes. Their employment was by 1973 regarded as ‘a fruitful policy’, and Bradford acquired money under the Urban Programme (UP) in that year for the employment of further teacher/social workers in infant schools. Apart from the provision of facilities with which these workers were charged, they also performed a knowledge-gathering role. Manchester employed an adult tutor who, apart from establishing language classes for Asian mothers and improving relationships between

541 Ibid., TC’s papers, Treasurer to Clerk, 31/3/71.
542 GMCRO, MSCSS papers, GB127.M184, MCCR Education Sub-Committee, “Minutes of meeting... held on November 16th 1970”.
543 WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/T16150, “Home and School...”, 9/72.
Asian families and local schools, ‘enabled contacts to be created with the Asian community’ and established ‘what that community would like to see provided’ and determined ‘the areas in which difficulty has been experienced’. The specific problems regarded as inhibiting the integration of Asian or Muslim families, therefore, created a perceived need for specific solutions to be carried out by specific workers. Rather than working thematically across ethnic lines, these workers were made responsible for particular groups of families linked by a posited shared ethnicity.

This chapter has demonstrated that English Muslim communities made demands in religious terms from as early as the 1960s, and that this was recognised by elites. Some aspects of English Muslim communities – including purdah – were regarded as having great significance for integration. This was an uneven process, however – issues relating to integration arising from purdah and the isolation of Muslim women were seemingly publicised most widely in areas, like Bradford, where Muslims were most visible. Responses to the prevalence of homeworking amongst Muslim women were seemingly most extensive in London, where ethnic minority participation in the garment trade was greatest. Elite conceptions of purdah also provide evidence that ethnic categorisations cannot necessarily be taken at face value. There was much slippage between discussion of ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’ communities, whilst the descriptor ‘Asian’ took on connotations with Islam in cities like Bradford. Erosion of categories such as ‘Asian’ and ‘immigrant’ was therefore gradual and uneven in elite discourse. It must also be recognised that ideas about the isolation of Muslim women subject to purdah and their subservience to controlling husbands related to general ideas about Asian women as weak, demure and inaccessible. Presentations of Muslim women in England in this vein were

544 GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1975-6 (vol. 1), 402.
compounded and fleshed-out by ideas about purdah’s significance. The significance given to purdah in determining the experiences and accessibility of Muslim young and adult women – and indeed upon the Muslim family as a unit – was sometimes grave by the 1970s, and prefigured more modern ideas about not only the unique challenges faced in integration Muslims, but also the potential for Muslim communities to be especially hard to integrate.

From an early date, schools and LEAs showed a willingness to make concessions on issues of uniform and PE/swimming classes, and to approach adult Asian women through both special classes and home tutoring. This was despite enduring rhetorical concerns about such special provisions, which were expressed both at school and LEA level. These concerns did not gradually disappear, but were unevenly eroded – the 1985 Swann Report showed enduring opposition to concessions for Muslim, often expressed caustically due to a sense amongst many opponents of multiculturalism that they were embattled. Where they were made, however, special provisions for Muslim women designed to manage the effects of purdah were often linked to other aims – increasing social contacts, teaching English, providing information about British diet, and stimulating home-school relationships. These points of contact were often made or facilitated by workers with a specific remit to work with Muslim or Asian Britons. A frontline element of the multiculturalism institution, these workers took a ‘community approach’, concerned to integrate families in general. These concessions and special provisions were therefore not made primarily due to any commitment to cultural rights, but pragmatically, guided towards integration. Retention and extension of single-sex schooling, for example, was clearly made to a large degree in the hope of stifling the development of independent Muslim schools.

The role of ethnic minority organizations in relation to special provisions also shifted. One example of a Pakistani women’s organization in Bradford being utilised by the LEA to
assist with communicating decisions to the wider community has been mentioned above. Concessions were also demanded at times by Muslim organizations through lobbying and campaigning. However, contact between ethnic minority groups and local authorities were ad hoc in this period. Later, by the 1970s and ‘80s, ethnic minority organizations were, in addition to this lobbying role, becoming engaged in more formalised consultation processes and also receiving local authority support for adult education and cultural projects. In this way, ethnic minority groups became tied into, and possessors of, aspects of the multicultural institution.

Elite concerns about these special provisions in part reflected concern that permitting the sustenance of ethnic minority cultures in the private sphere would exacerbate contrasts between the pluralistic, ‘liberal’ environments of British institutions and the closed, conservative unit of the Muslim family, negatively affecting the development of second-generation British Muslims. These anxieties were heightened by a belief that Muslim women, given primary responsibility for child-rearing, were unfit mothers in Britain due to their cultural and social isolation. Such ‘between two cultures’ schemes suggest that elite understanding of ethnic minority cultures did not position these as ‘static’—rather, there was great concern about internal ruptures within Muslim families as the second generation was exposed to ‘Western’ norms. This focus on rupture and incommensurability does, however, suggest that British elites overstated inter-generational conflict and overlooked the prospect of peaceful, elective and situational hybridisation of cultures.

There was little attempt in this period, however, to access the reactions of Muslim girls to such potential cultural transformations and interchanges. The paradigm of ‘community leadership’ led to only specific individuals and groups – usually male and, where aimed at women, usually middle-class – being incorporated into any dialogue that did occur. Only later, in the 1980s, as criticism of multiculturalism’s use of ‘community leaders’ and its exclusive
emphasis on ethnicity became commonplace were feminist reactions to multiculturalism publicised and sought. In the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, organizations like SBS have been involved with national initiatives against ‘honour’ crimes and forced marriage.\textsuperscript{545} This incorporation of minority feminist perspectives has not always been smooth, but, in this earlier period, projects designed to combat \textit{purdah} were directed by definition at a constituency regarded as disempowered and inaccessible, and so as a passive group to be ‘integrated’ rather than consulted.

\textsuperscript{545} Moira Dustin and Anne Phillips, “Whose Agenda is it? Abuses of Women and Abuses of ‘Culture’ in Britain”, \textit{Ethnicities} 8 (2008), 412, 419-20.
Despite the centrality of employment as a ‘pull’ factor for Muslim immigrants to Britain in the post-war period, the history of British Muslims at work has been little considered. This is not to say that such workers have been ignored entirely; rather it has been presumed that they operated and were understood as ‘blacks’, Asians, or members of national groupings, and not on the basis of their faith. In particular, a body of writing has grown up around so-called ‘black’ or ‘ethnic’ strikes. With regards to specifically Asian strikes, focus has been placed upon a series of actions that took place in the 1970-80s at Mansfield Hosiery (1972), Imperial Typewriters (1974), Grunwick (1976-8), and Chix bubblegum factory (1980). It is difficult to overstate the importance of these strikes, both in terms of the political development of specific ethnic minority communities in England, and also due to their influence upon elite responses to racism. By evincing the dubious ability and willingness of white trade union leaders to represent ethnic minority workers, as well as the capacity for such workers to self-organise in response to this, the strikes played a role in effecting the volte-face of the TUC and various national unions in the area of ‘race relations’ policy in the mid-1970s. However, the degree to which at least certain of these strikes (most especially Grunwick, by far the best-publicised of the four) were in fact ‘racial’ in the sense of arising from racial discrimination or advancing ethnically-specific ends is questionable. It has been argued more generally that media interpretations of strikes tend to stress their ‘ethnic’ character even where ethnic

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minority workers are making demands that have little to do with their religious, national or ethnic backgrounds. For the present study, it is also significant that the above-mentioned strikes involved mostly non-Muslim East African Asian women. The focus of this chapter on the religion of Muslim workers, therefore, requires a more expansive approach not necessarily focussed upon industrial action.

Muslim workers have been conceived of with reference to a number of facets – their religion, their ‘Asian’ or ‘Arab’-ness, their rural origins, their diet, their habits and their bodies amongst others. The appearance of a discourse about the physical appearance of Muslim workers surely reflects the employment pattern, focused on manual labour, outlined in the introductory chapter. In the textiles industry, which employed many English Asians in the North, Asian workers were most likely to perform manual jobs ancillary to the production of finished materials. These workers were often concentrated on night shifts, with some night shifts at Bradford mills becoming almost entirely staffed by Pakistani immigrants. Although not all Muslims workers were manual labours – a significant minority of working-class Muslims in the North and Midlands found work in public transport and there were always entrepreneurial and professional cohorts within Muslim populations – their concentration in specific roles and shifts made them more conspicuous and added to distinctive conceptions of them.

The emergence of these ideas about the biology of English Muslim workers is significant given assumptions about representations of ethnic minorities in the post-war West. It is frequently observed that conflict with, and the defeat of, Hitler’s Germany has led to the

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552 *ibid.*
wide discrediting and de-popularisation of ideologies that conceive of other ‘races’ as inferior for biological reasons. It has been argued by some that, because of this, new forms of racism, less overt but still pernicious, have been developed to ‘do the work’ of biological racism. For example, Martin Barker, in his 1981 book *The New Racism*, identifies a variety of racist thought that argues for the naturalness of national or ethnic formations and, drawing upon socio-biological work that naturalises hostility between these groups, argues that they must be kept separate due to their unbridgeable differentness and to avoid serious conflict.\(^{553}\) Similarly, Solomos and Back have argued that there exists a variety of cultural racism in which ‘race’ is ‘coded within a cultural logic’ and that operates ‘within a pseudo-biologically defined culturalism’\(^{554}\). Although sometimes, following Barker, these analysts of a ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism have associated these ideas purely with the right, Paul Gilroy observed, in 1992, ‘ethnic absolutism’ in the thinking of anti-racists, who he argued came ‘to view [culture] as an impermeable shell, eternally dividing one ‘race’ or ethnic group from another’.\(^{555}\) These theories of a ‘new’ or ‘cultural’ racism have also generated a certain amount of “slippage”, so that the impression is given in some writing that biological features have essentially disappeared as reference points for ideologies concerned with ethnic difference. Tariq Modood, for instance, suggests that, compared to West Indian immigrants at least, there was very little physical stereotyping of Asians in post-war Britain.\(^ {556}\) In a more indirect way, the raft of material published in the last decade or so focussing upon a culturally-defined ‘Islamophobia’ has perhaps served to obscure those historical presentations of Muslims that foregrounded physicality.


\(^{555}\) Gilroy, *Ain't no Black*, 17.

This chapter will attempt to fill these gaps not solely by narrating biological presentations of Muslim workers in post-war Britain, but also by attempting to demonstrate a perceived link between culture and biology. Its first section will lay out various popular ideas about Muslim bodies – about their small and nimble nature, their effeminacy and so on. The second will describe the often-ignored cultural and religious aspects of attempts to integrate Muslim workers. It will be argued that debates about how to accommodate Muslim demands for on-site prayer facilities, prayer breaks, Eid holidays, and leave to take holidays in countries of origin, were indeed regarded as creating significant difficulties for unions, employers, community relations organizations, and other workers. These difficulties were often dealt with through specific machinery, in particular the Department of Employment’s Advisory Group on Race Relations (DEAGRR). The final section will then advance the argument that biology and culture were in fact linked in many presentations of Muslim workers – that the south Asian, rural and Muslim culture of these employees was regarded as in part determining their physical characteristics, and as comprising their ability to carry out manual labour.

II

The emphasis on physical characteristics in presentations of Muslim workers did not begin with migration; these discourses had affected the employment of colonial subjects in institutions such as the British Merchant Navy. Many Asians in the Merchant Navy were given jobs as ‘stokers’ in the engine room out of a belief that they were more accustomed than white sailors to hot temperatures, and inured to their negative effects. This, of course, was incorrect – numerous Indian sailors died of heatstroke and exhaustion. Nevertheless, this fallacy about the ability of south Asian bodies to withstand temperatures that were uncomfortable for white workers did not disappear. In a 1964 episode of the BBC’s South East

557 Adams, Across Seven Seas, 22.
magazine programme, the narrator claimed that Asian workers were first engaged in the rubber factories of Southall because white labourers couldn’t cope with their ‘hot and steamy’ conditions.558

The process of migration itself generated new ideas about the physical characteristics of Asian people. From the 1950s, concerns were expressed that Asian, and especially Pakistani, migrants might be arriving in Britain suffering from tuberculosis. Already in 1956, the Ministry of Labour (MoL) had expressed concern about this issue and it, combined with worries about rising immigrant unemployment, led to an increase in the deposit required of emigrants from Pakistan.559 By the 1960s, numerous local authorities, including Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester, became concerned about tuberculosis amongst Pakistani immigrants specifically.560 Difficulties tracking down highly mobile male pioneer migrants necessitated other means of contact. A leaflet produced by Bradford entitled ‘Services Provided to Commonwealth Immigrants’ informed readers that ‘[a] simple skin test and x-ray is all that is necessary to find those who need the protection of the [tuberculosis] vaccination’.561 Leaflets promoting the vaccine were amongst the types of publicity material most frequently translated by local authorities into Asian languages, including Urdu, Bengali, and Turkish.562

Concerns about tuberculosis being spread by the influx of Pakistani immigrants led to pressure on the government from many quarters, including the TUC, to introduce more stringent health checks. In 1958, the TUC called for more rigorous health checks at Asian ports, though the Ministry of Health rejected this as unlikely to bring benefits commensurate with its

558 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/3, BBC, South East [transcript], 26/2/64.
560 Yorkshire Post, 18/5/62; The Times, 12/12/67; MCL, “Report... for 1968”.
561 WYASB, Bradford City Council papers, 28D94/19/6/15, “Services Provided by the Council...”, [1970].
cost. In considering its response to the 1961 Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, the TUC noted the concern of the labour movement about unemployment, housing shortages, and the effects of immigration upon public health. Sections of the media and the Commons also regarded a minor outbreak of smallpox in Bradford in 1961-2 as another reason for immigration control.

The 1962 CIA provided for the deportation of immigrants who for health reasons might become dependent on the welfare state, or who could pose a medical danger to other British residents. The TUC felt that medical examinations should be given in countries of origin. Carrying tuberculosis, however, was associated exclusively with Asian immigrants, and requiring medical examinations exclusively in Asian ports was regarded as impolitic. Both the TUC and CIAC argued that India and Pakistan would welcome the selective examination of their citizens as a way to ‘prove’ their medical fitness. The TUC reflected that ‘the effect of such measures on public opinion in this country might be not less important than their effect on health’ and the CIAC characterised concern about tuberculosis as ‘exaggerated but... nonetheless understandable’ and a potential ‘barrier against progress in integrating coloured immigrants’. The Labour Government’s White Paper of 1965 proposed that any immigrant entering Britain should undergo a medical check in his/her country of origin. It was recommended that these medical provisions also extend to dependants of those already resident in Britain. This was despite the recognition contained in the paper that most of the health problems associated with new immigrants had environmental, not physical, causes.

These proposals of the White Paper were later implemented in the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act.
Perceptions about the bodies of Asian people therefore had demonstrable political effects in post-war Britain. Imperial notions about the fitness of Asian and Arab bodies for particular types of manual, civilian work also continued into the post-colonial period. Mostly, though not entirely, these ideas about physique portrayed Asian and Arab workers as at best inferior to white workers, and at worst unsuitable in general for manual labour. Peter Wright remarked in a 1968 study that Asians, but especially Arabs, were felt ‘to be incapable of hard work because of [their] physique’. A representative of one firm surveyed by Wright remarked that Arabs ‘are much smaller in stature… not quite suitable for heavy manual work’, whilst another personnel officer commented simply that ‘Arabs don’t fit the bill for heavy industry’. Such impressions extended into government. MoL officials noted the ‘fairly slight’ builds of Asian and Arab workers in Sheffield. In a 1963 report by HCSS, a chief reason cited by local employers for unwillingness to engage non-white labour was ‘insufficient strength or stamina amongst those tried’. Interviews of retired textile workers carried out in Bradford in the mid-1980s by members of the BHRU also exhibit such ideas, with one respondent remarking that ‘I don’t think they’ve a very good physique, but they’re willing and obedient...’ Another white interviewee expressed the belief that the fingers of Pakistanis were simply ‘not spinning fingers’. Similarly, at a meeting of the CIAC in March 1964, a representative of the MoL reported that some employers whose work involved the handling of delicate fabrics found that fewer ‘immigrant’ women had dry enough hands for the trade.

Apart from rendering Asian workers simply less able than others to do satisfactory manual work, physical properties were sometimes regarded as increasing the accident rate amongst ethnic minority workers. Half of the employers surveyed by Wright engaging Asian

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570 WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/2/3/5, HCSS, “Commonwealth Immigrants in Halifax”, 7/63:
571 BSL, BHRU interviews, A0007.
572 ibid., A0008.
573 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/5, CIAC, “Minutes of a Meeting... on 20th March, 1964”
workers regarded this labour as especially accident-prone.\textsuperscript{574} One personnel manager remarked that ‘[i]nitially coloured workers are much slower. With Asiatics it is largely physique. Except on the simplest jobs they never get to full capability.’\textsuperscript{575} This remark links ideas about physical speed to a general conception of Asian ‘slowness’ that combined slowness at tasks, slowness of intellect, and slowness of body. Another personnel manager said of Asian workers that ‘...they are accident prone. They drop things on their toes. They are less quick on the draw than the Englishman... less quick to get out of the way of things’.\textsuperscript{576} A manager interviewed by Wright expressed a similar idea of Asian workers as slow, describing them as ‘more like the tortoise. They are plodders, and plodders always have their place in industry.’\textsuperscript{577} A former textile worker interviewed by the BHRU also blurs the lines between physical and mental ‘slowness’, suggesting that Asians ‘tended to be more slower... whereas the East Europeans would occasionally... think about the job and they appreciated what they were doing...’\textsuperscript{578}

‘Slowness’ was not the only factor felt to increase accident rates amongst Asian workers. Perhaps chief amongst these was the language barrier. The personnel manager quoted by Wright about the slowness of ‘Asiatics’ reflected that for these workers ‘[l]anguage is the first difficulty... and this is just insurmountable I’m afraid’.\textsuperscript{579} Such an analysis was repeated widely. The TUC first raised concerns about linguistic differences as a possible threat to workplace safety in its 1963 evidence to the CIAC. Indeed, in that document, language training was identified as the only area in which separate provision for ‘immigrants’ was

\textsuperscript{574} Wright, Coloured Worker, 96.
\textsuperscript{575} Ibid., 100.
\textsuperscript{576} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{577} Ibid., 118.
\textsuperscript{578} BHRU, A0112.
\textsuperscript{579} Wright, Coloured Worker, 110.
permissible. The issue was also recognised by government. At a meeting of the Yorkshire Working Group on Immigrants in 1965, a MoL representative noted that several firms had tried to combat the accidents by posting health and safety signs in non-English languages. However, the success of this had been limited by the proportion of NES workers who were unable to read their primary spoken languages. In a 1968 speech, Vic Feather, then TUC General Secretary, spoke of his sensitivity to the uneasiness many workers felt about recent immigration, and referred to ‘the change of atmosphere of some places of work when workers have difficulty in understanding each other’s language...’ An interest in changing this atmosphere motivated the TUC’s support for grants to employers by the Industrial Training Board so that workers could receive language tuition in work time. Employers maintained in general that it was not their responsibility to fund language training initiatives, but did make use of voluntary schemes organised by LEAs. The Department of Employment’s third memorandum on race relations, “Language and Communications”, produced in 1970, suggested that language difficulties were the most serious problems facing immigrants in Britain, and that safety problems were the chief danger in multilingual workplaces. The establishment of the National Industrial Language Training Centre (NILTC) in 1974 increased the availability of provisions to increase the competence of NES workers in English. In 1976, the TUC estimated that 200,000 adults in Britain could ‘speak English only slightly or not at all’. This referred to all ethnic groups, but ‘Pakistanis’, especially women, were identified as the group in greatest need. Also in that year, the TUC produced its document *Trade Unions and

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580 MRC, TUC papers, M55.292B/805.91/1, TUC General Council, “Memorandum Submitted to CIAC…”, 1962/3.
582 Ibid., TUC papers, M55.292B/805.9/5, “Extract from Speech…”, 27/4/68.
Race Relations, which encouraged unions to press for employers to make use of NILTC classes.587 Later in the same year, guidelines were also issued for firms themselves about implementing language training for the workplace.588 The issue of language difficulties at work was entwined with that of the disadvantages caused to ethnic minority workers in terms of engagement and promotion as a result of their real or perceived communication deficiencies. By the 1980s, concerns focused on Asian pioneer migrants experiencing chronic unemployment in England’s de-industrialising textile towns. The problems of unemployment amongst this group were compounded significantly by language difficulties, along with the more rigorous, and sometimes questionable, use of language tests by employers.589 The linguistic profile of Asian, and especially Pakistani, workers was therefore much discussed.

Connected to this was an image of Asian workers as rustic. The vast majority of Asian migrants to Britain in the post-war period did in fact come from rural areas. For some employers, the agricultural work histories of Pakistani immigrants apparently presented a significant challenge. One factory owner, writing in the 1968 annual report of the Huddersfield International Liaison Committee (HILC), remembered the establishment of an all-Pakistani night shift at his firm ten years previously:

The most worrying part of training the Pakistanis was their complete ignorance of the basic principles of mechanics and it very soon became apparent that quite a good percentage of them... had never had any connection with anything mechanical.590

One BHRU interviewee remarked that Asians were ‘a lot less efficient... because they hadn’t, well, they hadn’t been used to any industrialisation...’591 In 1964, the MoL offered the similar

587 ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/6, TUC, “Trade Unions and Race Relations”, [1976]
588 ibid., TUC, “Draft [paper on Race Relations]”, 8/76.
590 WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/2/3/5, HILC, “1st Annual Report, 1967-8”.
591 BLSL, BHRU interviews, A0112.
comment that ‘[t]he majority of the Pakistanis now in Britain have come from agricultural communities and have worked on the land. They have little or no industrial experience and knowledge.’ This remark is interesting, as it associates specifically Pakistanis with rural living prior to migration. This association between Pakistani workers and rusticity by national elites had real effects, such as their especial association with workplace accidents or incompetence.

These notions about the unfitness of Asian workers for certain types of labour existed alongside ideas about which sorts of work they were able to do. When interviewed by the BHRU, a former Lady Mayoress of Bradford remarked that Asian workers were valuable in spinning because ‘you need the nimble fingers and... the Asian men, their fingers were certainly more nimble than the fingers of the mid-Europeans.’ This nimbleness made Asian workers fit for specific kinds of mill work – specifically, those jobs that had previously been done primarily by white women. It seems that a stigma was attached to this. One of the BHRU’s interviewees felt that ‘these men will do any job, they’ll do women’s jobs’. Peter Jackson quotes another worker as saying similarly that ‘[t]he Pakistanis had smaller hands than the locals, like the women... You need nimble fingers for spinning and weaving – women and Asians are good at it.’ When white men did find themselves doing the same jobs as Asians, this could create resentment. Another former Bradford textile worker remembers that Asians did jobs that they wasn’t capable of doing....so I was being classed as a worker of a machine... as if anybody could do it... [as if] it’s dead easy [to] put these people in and they’ll turn out the work... there were many mistakes...

593 BLSL, BHRU interviews, A0044.
595 BLSL, BHRU interviews, A0033.
597 BLSL, BHRU interviews, A0012.
The ability of Asian workers to competently perform certain grades of jobs could also be explained with reference to the idea that ‘the machinery has been hotted up, much more than... it was in the old days... all this automation...’. Asian male labour was therefore feminised via the belief that Asian men were especially or even exclusively fitted for “women’s work”, and could only move into higher or alternative grades with some special help. Working alongside Asian labour, therefore, could perhaps be a source of professional insecurity for white male employees.

III

The second section of this chapter investigated biological aspects of the presentation of Muslim workers in post-war Britain, as well as their intersection with certain cultural properties. However, other cultural considerations can be taken in isolation. For example, caste systems were regarded by employers as limiting the work that employees socialised in these systems were willing to perform. In a study of Bradford’s Pakistani community during the early 1970s, Badr Dahya noted that no Pakistani immigrant worked as a toilet cleaner. Dahya also suggested that some firms would ask “troublesome” Pakistani employees to clean lavatories in the knowledge that this worker would refuse and resign. These perceptions extended to Arab workers. A manager interviewed by Wright regretted that ‘you literally couldn’t tell’ Arab employees to clean the floor. When added to impressions about the poor toilet habits of Asian workers (discussed below), this generated resentment amongst white workers. In a 1963 report, HCSS identified three instances of Asian workers refusing to carry out menial tasks because they regarded these as below their caste position. Cases of

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598 Ibid., A0033.
600 Wright, Coloured Worker, 102-3
601 Ibid., 174.
workplace tension between workers of differing castes were also noted.⁶⁰⁲ In the summer of 1970, a Mr Mohammed Ishaw was fired by a company in Birmingham when he refused to do floor cleaning on the grounds that he was a truck driver. He lodged a complaint with the RRB.⁶⁰³ This suggests that opposition amongst ethnic minority workers to requests from their employers to perform menial tasks was probably compounded by suspicions of racism, quite apart from any questions of ‘caste’.

Employers could complain about the ‘awkwardness’ of Asian workers for other reasons. The desire of these employees to make periodic visits, sometimes of long duration, to their countries of origin was regarded as problematic in some instances. One employer interviewed by Wright suggested that, while requests for time off could create resentment in themselves, more tension was created if Asian labourers simply left their jobs to go home. Some of these employees would return to England, perhaps after many months, and react angrily if their jobs had been filled. A 1974 letter from the Sheffield & District Trades Council to the TUC suggests that this issue did not disappear quickly, and that unions had in most cases dealt with it indifferently.⁶⁰⁴ However, the problem was by no means an intractable one. One firm described by Wright established an agreement that Pakistanis could have six month’s leave after three years’ service, and subsequently every five years. This employer experienced a relatively low turnover of Pakistani labour.⁶⁰⁵ Indeed, the desire of Asian labourers to take periodical extended holidays was sometimes used by employers to their own advantage. In one case, a Pakistani charge-hand valued by his employer due to his role as a translator, interpreter, and mediator between management and his compatriot colleagues, was rewarded for undertaking these additional responsibilities with a three-month trip to Pakistan, his airfare

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⁶⁰³ MRC, TUC papers, M55.292B/805.9/10, TUC International Department to Lord Cooper, 20/7/70
⁶⁰⁴ MRC, TUC papers, M55.292D/805.91/3, Sheffield & District Trades Council to TUC, 29/5/74.
⁶⁰⁵ Wright, Coloured Worker, 157.
paid by the firm.⁶⁰⁶ The importance of these mediator figures suggests that such a compensatory system may have had wide application. By the late 1970s, the CRE was publicising the general practice of employers permitting workers with three or four years’ service to take extended leave for up to six weeks.⁶⁰⁷ The existence of this precedent, combined with the generally laissez-faire attitude of the TUC and national unions to other issues affecting Muslim or Asian workers, suggests that established practice, coloured by local variations where considered agitated for, held sway.

More difficult issues often related to the religious beliefs and practices of Muslim workers. An early demand that caused some difficulty for employers was the provision of prayer facilities for Muslims in the workplace. This would also enable the performance of the Friday congregational prayer, *jumu’ah*, on-site where a large number of Muslims worked together. However, the separate issue of Muslim workers wishing to be allowed a short visit to a mosque for *jumu’ah* still arose. In 1964, a MoL document devoted two pages to workplace difficulties that might arise in relation to Islam. It was noted that ‘[a]lmost all Pakistani immigrants... are Muslims and their religious observations may make demands on their time which may cause difficulties with their employers.’⁶⁰⁸ At this time, difficulty was seemingly expected only in relation to *jumu’ah*, which Muslim workers would want to observe together, on-site if required, led by a local imam.⁶⁰⁹ Employers, however, seemed to feel that religious practices need have no bearing upon workplace practices. At an NCCI conference in 1968, the industrialist Sir Kenneth Allen argued that ‘[t]he colour of a man’s skin, his religious beliefs or his politics are in the main of very little concern to employers.’⁶¹⁰ Rhetorical concerns in the

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⁶⁰⁷ CRE, *Employment Report* 1:3 (July 1979)

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1960s about separate provisions for ethnic minorities, especially where these could be construed as ‘favourable’ treatment, extended from local and national government into trades unions and employers’ associations. A survey carried out in 1968 by Sheffield’s Community Relations Officer (CRO) found that few employers had made concessions to Muslims regarding prayer. In 1970, the DEP issued its fifth memorandum on ‘race’ relations, entitled “Religious Observances”. The paper explicitly focused concern upon Islam, since Hinduism, as regards prayer, has ‘no hard and fast rules laid down’, whilst prayers and festivals in Sikhism ‘do not make inroads into work time’. By contrast, for Muslims, religion ‘makes considerable demands on their time, as prayer at regular and set times is laid down in the Quran and is an essential part of their faith’. It was further warned that the commitment of Muslims to their faith was so strong that workers might be expected to give up their jobs rather than miss prayers.

John Hargreaves of the TUC’s International Department reflected curtly that, of the south Asian religions, ‘Islam may cause the most trouble’.

It is unclear how frequently prayer facilities were provided by employers for Muslims in the early 1970s, but in 1976 the list of demands drawn up by the UMO included ‘[p]ermission to make daily prayers in offices or places of work [and] particularly to give time off (if necessary) to make Friday noon prayer in congregation in a Mosque’. In the following year, a Muslim schoolteacher from Newham, Iftikhar Ahmed, lost an appeal in the House of Lords against his dismissal in 1975. Ahmed had insisted that his faith required him to take forty-five minutes’ break each Friday afternoon for *jumu’ah*. Since his school could not timetable a break for him at this time, ILEA warned him that he must either miss the prayer or

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613 Ibid., 2.
614 MRC, TUC papers, M55.292B/805.91/3, Hargreaves to Feather, 18/5/70.
615 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/7, UMO, “Memorandum to British Muslims of Pakistan…”, 8/1/76.
renegotiate his contract as a part-time employee. Akhtar argued that this constituted unfair dismissal, but his claims were rejected at tribunal and at the Lords. Lord Denning argued that it would do the Muslim community... no good if they were to be given preferential treatment over the great majority of people. If it should happen that... they were given special privileges or advantages, it will provoke discontent...

In a dissenting opinion, Lord Scarman found the judgement ‘unacceptable’ considering contemporary Britain’s ‘elaborate statutory protection of the individual from discrimination arising from race, colour, religion, sex’, and given the demands of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Ahmed case therefore brought together opposing views about ‘equal’ treatment – for Denning, the provision of an extra break for Muslim employees was a special concession likely to cause resentment, whilst for Scarman it was a necessary aspect of providing equal opportunities.

It was, perhaps, the UMO’s demands and the Ahmed case that heightened interest in dealing with the religious demands of Muslim employees in the late 1970s. In 1977 John Grant, minister at the Department of Employment, met with the UMO to discuss industrial matters. The UMO also, in 1978, issued the document “Guidelines for Employers in Britain Concerning the Muslim Way of Life”. This paper included three demands: establishment of prayer rooms in any firm with at least ten Muslim employees; breaks for Muslims to coincide with compulsory daytime prayers, with any extra time taken to be made up in lunch hours; and permission for Muslims to perform the jumu’ah together, at a nearby mosque if possible or in prayer rooms if not. DEAGRR members, at a meeting in January 1978, suggested that most of the demands regarding prayer were reasonable, and had been accommodated in some firms. However,

616 Guardian, 23/3/77.
617 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292D/805.9/9, DEAGRR, “Minutes of a Meeting... on Tuesday, 14 February 1978...”
618 Ibid., UMO, “Guidelines for Employers in Britain Concerning Muslim Employees”, [1978]
employers were sometimes unwilling to meet demands due to anticipation of negative reactions from other workers. Grant felt that the most appropriate response would be national guidelines which could serve as a starting point for local negotiations. However, he also regretted that unions were reluctant to get involved, seeing the matter as one to be settled on a case by case basis. A Muslim representative on the DEAGRR suggested that the issue of prayer facilities was a low key one in itself, but could pose problems if seized upon by local imams. A suggestion made by many was that in some quarters, the UMO especially, the flexibility of Islam was being deliberately understated. A further concern was that particularly demanding guidelines would inhibit the employment of Muslims. David Lane, CRE chair, acknowledging that this was ‘a sensitive area’, announced his intention to consult with other Muslim organizations.

By October, the CRE had produced “Religious Observation by Muslim Employees”, written by Commission member Muhammad Khalid. This document reflected consultation with a number of Islamic groups, including the UMO, UKIM, the Islamic Foundation, and smaller, local organizations. Its intention was not to prescribe for employers certain approaches, but rather to describe the demands of Muslim workers. In fact the document stressed that Islam is ‘a complete and perfect code of laws and practices... it provides such flexibility as to allow even the fervent practitioner to participate in normal daily life...’ Indeed, ‘many Muslim employees do not appear to realise fully the flexibility of their religion’. Khalid argued that prayer did not need to be communal other than on Friday afternoons and, even then, the jumu‘ah could be taken in a workplace prayer room rather than at mosque. Two case studies were offered in the document, both from Lancashire. One noted the practice in a textile mill of Muslim workers being allowed out to a mosque for jumu‘ah. The other

619 Ibid., DEAGRR, “Religious Observance by Muslim Employees”, 1/78
620 Ibid., DEAGRR, “Minutes of a Meeting... on Tuesday, 14 February 1978...”
621 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/9, DE AGR, “Minutes of a Meeting... on Tuesday, 14 February 1978...”
registered at another firm ‘concern over the extent of factional differences within the Muslim workforce and the expressed disaffection of other workers over certain concessions’. Khalid also allowed that Muslim organizations ‘remain broadly sceptical of the willingness of many employers to implement even the suggested proposals in the absence of legal enforcement’. This was also reflected in the comments of the UMO in its address to a TUC conference on race relations in July 1979. Concern was expressed that ‘[s]ometimes, employers seem to adopt an unreasonable attitude and that is where we need your help and cooperation’. However, even the document’s mild suggestion that prayer breaks should be accommodated wherever possible within normal break times occasioned within the DEAGRR great scepticism about “special provision”. Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service chair Jim Mortimer argued that ‘special arrangements... for Muslims or any other minority group... could lead to disharmony rather than to improved racial harmony’. Concern was also expressed about the consultation of religious leaders in determining labour policy. Still others charged that the CRE was creating a problem where none existed, ‘since in fact most Muslims conformed to the discipline of the work-place’. Some therefore suggested that secular organizations representing Muslim workers should have been consulted. R.J.V. Dixon of the Confederation of British Industry felt that it was ‘essential to establish what was normal religious practice for the ordinary Muslim as distinct from the ideal recommended by religious leaders’. The TUC’s response to the CRE document continued to stress the need for local solutions, with agreements at factory level being made where possible. Unsurprisingly, the TUC was anxious to ensure that religious leaders did not become involved in labour negotiations. The response of individual unions, however, is more difficult to grasp. One National Union of Mineworkers officer responded to the CRE publication by complaining to the TUC that ‘to

622 Ibid., CRE, “Religious Observation by Muslim Employees... “, 10/78.
623 Ibid., Muhammad Khalid, “Religious Observation by Muslim Employees -- Response by Muslim Organizations”, 10/78.
624 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.91/6, Pasha to Murray, 30/7/79
625 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/11, DEAGRR, “Minutes of a Meeting... on Tuesday 31 October 1978”.
626 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/12, Monks to Sengupta, 2/4/79.
provide facilities for this small number of people in our work places, to carry out there [sic] religious beliefs would be discriminating against the majority of our workers, and would only lead to very poor race relations... In a careful response, it was allowed that separate provisions could provoke a backlash, but stressed that ‘the majority of workers are not being denied something’ because in a Christian-majority country, ‘the organization of work has occurred around (primarily) Protestant religious observance, and that ‘equality also means taking account of difference’. It was also noted that the CRE document was not dogmatic, and that extensive local variation was expected. The degree to which the guidelines actually changed the practices of employers is questionable, however. At its 1981 conference, the UMO still gave much attention to the issue of prayer facilities in workplaces. The CRE paper enjoyed wide circulation, and the DEAGRR felt that this had led to greater accommodation for Muslim prayer in many workplaces by the mid-1980s. However, the Group also regretted that ‘there are still indications in reports from local areas that harmonious agreements have often not been reached...’ Attitudes within the DEAGRR were also unresolved. Some insisted that making allowances for Muslim prayer scheduled inevitably caused dislocation to working practices, whilst others argued that all groups of workers made demands for certain concessions, and that Muslim demands were not especially onerous.

Although significant attention was devoted to it, the issue of prayer was not regarded as equal in seriousness to the problems arising from celebrations of Eid-ul-Fitr. These celebrations were contentious from an early time. In 1963, HCSS reported issues arising from the demands of workers for recognition of minority religious holidays, and suggested that this

627 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/14, Douglas to TUC, 26/3/80
628 Ibid., Monks to Douglas, 3/4/80
629 Guardian, 16/10/81.
630 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292D/805.9/9, DEAGRR, “Religious Observance by Muslim Employees”, 3/83; DEAGRR, “Minutes of a Meeting... Thursday 21 April 1983...”
631 Ibid., DEAGRR, “Religious Observance by Muslim Employees”, 3/83
632 Ibid., DOERRAG, “Minutes of a Meeting... Thursday 21 April 1983...”
issue was not unique to Halifax. The issues of prayer and holidays were entwined, as Muslim workers sometimes took half-days on Eid-ul-Fitr to attend congregational prayers in the morning. After one such incident in Dewsbury in 1965 in which three Pakistani workers were sacked, the National Union of Dyers, Bleachers and Textile Workers (NUDBTW) arranged a meeting with the local Pakistani Muslim Association (PMA) to discuss arrangements for future holidays. In the 1960s, employers seemed generally unsympathetic to Muslims taking holidays for Eid, primarily because these were often taken without request. The manager of a Yorkshire brewery remarked to the YCCR in 1967 that ‘immigrants must conform to the practices and holiday arrangements of the country in which they have voluntarily decided to make their home’. Around the same time, twenty Muslim workers were dismissed from a textile firm in Shipley because they took a half day for Eid-ul-Fitr without any request. The YCCR reminded the secretary of the Pakistani People’s Association that, whatever the demands of Eid celebrations, employees could not absent themselves from the workplace without warning. KCRC’s 1967-8 annual report suggested that employers were essentially unsympathetic to these demands of Muslim workers. CRCs were sometimes active in promoting the allowance of Eid holidays amongst local employers. Frequently, the first task was simply to collect information about the holiday and to organise liaison. Ehsan ul-Haque, the immigrant liaison officer for Rochdale, saw his role as to engender better understanding, and said that he hoped eventually arrangements for Eid would determined well in advance.

In February 1970, two instances of mass dismissals of Pakistani workers who had taken time off for Eid made the need for a workable arrangement appear particularly acute. In

633 WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/2/3/5, HCSS, “Commonwealth Immigrants in Halifax”, [1963]
634 Guardian, 6/3/65
635 WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/2/2/11, J.O.F. Hewlett to Clarke, 26/4/67
636 Ibid., 49D79/2/2/4, Rahman to C.F. Taylor & Co, 25/3/67
637 Ibid., Treacy to Rahman, 11/4/67
639 SCCR, Harmony 2 (December, 1968).
Birmingham, ten Pakistani men were sacked after they took a half day to attend Eid prayers. The League of Overseas Pakistanis (LOP) took up their cause, referring the matter to the CRC and RRB, who in turn then brought the matter to the attention of the DEP. The League argued that the men had been employed at the firm for two or three years in each case, and had taken time off for Eid previously without incident. At the Bowling Mills Combing Company in Bradford, forty Pakistanis were dismissed for taking a full day’s holiday. 100 other Muslim workers threatened to strike if these men were not reinstated. Much attention was thereafter given to Eid. The CBI expressed desire for a national agreement covering religious holidays. The DEP had suggested that days off be arranged either by agreements between employers and local Muslim ‘leaders’ or through mediation by a shop steward. The TUC, meanwhile, felt that the DEP had been wrong to raise the issue at all, noting that arrangements for Jewish holy days were dealt with informally between workers and employers at individual firms. The TUC also noted that historically there had been ‘conscious effort to keep religious issues outside the trade union field…’ Moreover, the TUC argued that ‘integration of immigrant minorities require[s] that they should observe the customs of the country’ and that ‘many immigrants, especially young people, did not wish to be confined by restrictive religious attitudes’. Later in the year, the DEP’s fifth memorandum on ‘race relations’ called for ‘joint consultation and good will on both sides’. It reassured employers that Muslims understood the need to make prior arrangements for days off, and Muslim workers that employers were sympathetic to their demands. Also in 1970, the CBI released a document counselling sympathy for ‘Religious Feast Days’ – ‘primarily for Pakistanis and Muslims’ -- identifying Eid and Ramadan as two primary such occasions. Given this apparent confusions about rather fundamental aspects of Eid and Ramadan, it is perhaps unsurprising that the more vexed question of dating

641 Ibid., 24/2/70.
642 Ibid., M55.292B/805.91/3, TUC International Committee, “Extract from International Committee Minutes... Religious Observances of Immigrants”, 19/5/70.
Eid-ul-Fitr created consternation. In November 1971, as Eid approached, the TUC circulated information about the festival amongst unions, noting that its date was uncertain. The Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC) in London was to be consulted on this matter. The CRC felt that an increasing number of employers were now willing to accommodate requests for holidays, but anticipated difficulty where different groups of Muslim employees wanted holidays on different dates. About 80-90% of British Muslim workers were expected to follow ICC guidelines. This uncertainty often meant that community relations workers stepped in as intermediaries. For example, in Blackburn in 1972, two groups of Muslim workers took two different days off to celebrate Eid. In response, a meeting was set up between local imams and the CRC, leading to ‘hours of theological debate’ before an agreement to give morning shift workers a standardised half-day holiday was reached. In other areas, such as Manchester, lists were submitted to employers each year with standardised dates for religious festivals. Other towns were slower to achieve this standardisation. In 1973, Oldham’s CRO was planning to organise a meeting of local employers, union officials, religious leaders and community relations workers to devise a mutually acceptable arrangement, despite the fact that, as a local union representative pointed out, Muslims had been settled in the town for a number of years. This tendency for variation, and apathy or hostility in some localities, motivated organizations such as the UMO to call for nationally-agreed one-day holidays for both Eid ul-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.

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645 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/2, TUC to unions, 4/11/71
646 Ibid., TUC, “Dating of Moslem Festivals”, 4/11/71
647 Ibid., CRC, “Dating of Moslem Festivals”, [1971]
648 Guardian, 3/2/73
649 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292D/805.9/7, UMO, “Memorandum to British Muslims of Pakistan…”, 8/1/76.
Such calls were still being made in 1978, as the CRE prepared its paper “Religious Observation by Muslim Employees”. The anxiety caused by the issue around this time is reflected in the ‘Minority Group Case Studies’ project, a series of case studies of industrial problems concerning ethnic minority workers prepared by the London Business School. Two of the fourteen case studies dealt with Eid ul-Fitr. Common to both case studies was a willingness amongst employers to allow Muslim workers leave in the morning to attend communal prayer, combined with the expectation that many workers would absent themselves for whole day. In one firm, Dunkerley Textiles, the time was to be made up through overtime the following day. In the event, ten workers missed a whole day’s work, and were docked the day’s pay and issued with written warnings. In the other firm, Eldon Carpets, a more dialogic approach prevailed. Having failed to curb absences via the use of disciplinary warnings in the previous year, the personnel manager at Eldon instead negotiated with a Muslim shop steward, Abbas. Abbas suggested that the firm could not allow only Muslim workers on the morning shift to take a half-day; this must apply to all Muslim workers or to none. He felt that by basing arrangements for time off on the timings of prayers, the firm was failing to appreciate the celebratory aspect of Eid. He also stressed that some Muslim workers would inevitably take the whole day off, but would be willing to make this time up. The firm’s management however insisted that this could not be paid at overtime rates, lest resentments be caused. A sense of impasse therefore seemed to exist in many workplaces.

Discussions within the DEAGGR suggested that disruption could be ‘minimal’ if arrangements were made well in advance, but that the willingness of Muslim employees to take holidays without agreement caused ill-feeling. Reference was also made by the Group to instances of white workers taking ‘retaliatory action’ in cases where Eid holidays were felt to

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650 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/9, UMO, “Guidelines for Employers in Britain Concerning Muslim Employees”, [1978]
have harmed production.\textsuperscript{653} As with prayer, the CRE’s paper stressed the flexibility of Islam. It was noted that nowhere in the Koran or hadiths was it suggested that Eid al-Fitr should be a holiday as such, and that any obligations placed on Muslims to celebrate Eid would be balanced by the obligation to perform one’s duty to one’s employer. Khalid noted that ‘[i]n many workplaces, practice by Muslims has become chaotic and strained’, with some Muslims apparently confining themselves to lower job grades in order to minimise tension between work and religion, whilst others ‘feeling aggrieved and believing that management is insensitive... have unilaterally taken certain privileges’. Khalid accepted the TUC’s position that no national agreement should be made, instead stressing the need for negotiation between employers, trade unions, religious organizations, and community relations workers. Aware of the controversy surrounding their involvement in labour negotiations, Khalid emphasised that religious leaders would function purely as an informational source. It was in this informational role that Muslim organizations primarily served British industrial relations – although it is likely that, as it did in 1979, the ICC usually joined its declaration about the dating of Eid ul-Fitr to a request that employers ‘release their muslim [sic] employees/workers for prayers on that day’.\textsuperscript{654} Following the circulation of the CRE document, and presumably due to the intransigence of many Muslim workers, it appears that more employers did so.\textsuperscript{655}

III

Having considered both biological and cultural facets of the presentation of Muslim workers in post-war Britain, this chapter will now illustrate the connections between these two types of features. Links between the cultures and bodies of Asian workers were frequently made with reference to toilet habits, for instance. One BHRU interviewee suggested that some of the

\textsuperscript{653} Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/9, DEAGRR, “Religious Observance by Muslim Employees”, 1/78
\textsuperscript{654} TUC papers, MSS.292D/805.9/13, ICC circular, 27/7/79
\textsuperscript{655} CRE Employment Report 1:3 (July 1979)
animosity towards Pakistani immigrants in Bradford was brought on by their toilet habits.\textsuperscript{656} Another remembers that, although the hygiene of Eastern European immigrants matched that of white English workers, ‘some of the coloured ones... we daren’t use [the toilets] until someone had been in to clean them out.’\textsuperscript{657} Such attitudes did not escape the notice of local authorities and employers. Bradford’s Town Clerk in 1963 remarked that ‘[i]n industry the toilet and feeding habits of coloured immigrants tend to be criticised.’\textsuperscript{658} The ‘solution’ was sometimes the segregation of facilities. In Bradford, one firm in the early sixties spent around £500 on ‘Pakistani-style’ toilets, only to find that Pakistanis workers preferred to use the normal variety. The firm thus made use of the new facilities a condition for employment amongst the Pakistani workforce.\textsuperscript{659} In Birmingham, the Midlands Motor Company segregated toilet facilities for white and Asian workers in 1965, claiming that Asian workers had requested this.\textsuperscript{660} In 1969, a Pakistani man took a case of wrongful dismissal to the RRB, claiming that he was dismissed for refusing to use the ‘Asian’ toilets at his workplace. His former employer, Cork Insulation in North Yorkshire, also claimed that the segregation of toilets had been requested by Asian employees.\textsuperscript{661} Other employers evaded qualms about segregation by introducing ‘Asian-style’ facilities without making explicit rules requiring workers of specific ethnicities to use specific toilets.\textsuperscript{662} In many, perhaps most, companies, no changes were made.\textsuperscript{663} For many employers, it seems to have been a matter of principle that Asian workers should learn ‘British’ standards of hygiene.\textsuperscript{664} Even if such segregation was not the rule, it is notable that it was somewhat common, especially given the deep suspicion with which separate provisions were regarded.

\textsuperscript{656} BLSL, BHUR interviews, A0054
\textsuperscript{657} Ibid., A117
\textsuperscript{658} WYASB, TC’s papers, BBD 1/7/T964, Clerk to J.C. Swaffield, 12/2/63.
\textsuperscript{659} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{660} Guardian, 9/6/65.
\textsuperscript{661} Ibid., 13/9/69.
\textsuperscript{662} Wright, Coloured Worker, 175.
\textsuperscript{664} Wright, Coloured Worker, 176.
The food eaten by Asian workers could also provide justifications for ethnic segregation in its pre-digested state. Wright’s study of Sheffield suggested that in most workplaces, different ethnic groups would eat different foods in different areas of canteens. Some white steelworkers professed opposition to integrated eating areas – though this was not as strong as some objections to multi-ethnic shower rooms. Anwar’s study of Rochdale observed similar informal segregation of canteens. One BHRU interviewee suggested that this dynamic was created by the reluctance of Pakistani workers to make use of the canteen. This may have sometimes been the case, especially considering the general lack of accommodation for the religious diets of south Asian workers. The UMO, appealing to the need for social integration as well as to the needs of Muslim workers, demanded the provision of halal meat and alternatives to pork in canteens when liaising with the DEP in the late 1970s. However, this mealtime segregation was probably as much a result of the apparent distaste amongst white workers for the aromas of Asian cuisine. In discussing with the TUC the possibility of producing a pamphlet on ‘immigrant workers’, a representative of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and Foundry Workers (AEF) reported that there had been no issues of workplace conflict except ‘when Pakistanis had heated their lunch on the radiators, with the result that the smell of curry permeated the whole place’. As late as 1979, it was noted at a meeting of the DEAGRR that ‘indigenous workers may complain about undesirable odours from exotic food brought from home’.

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665 Ibid., 162.
666 Ibid., 167.
667 Anwar, Myth of Return, 114.
668 BLSL, BHRU interviews, A0054.
669 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292D/805.9/9, UMO, “Guidelines for Employers in Britain Concerning Muslims Employees”, [1978]
670 Ibid., MSS.292B/805.91/3, TUC, “Proposed Pamphlet on Immigrant Workers: Note on Discussion…”, 9/6/70
671 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/12, DEAGRR, “Catering Arrangements for Ethnic Minorities”, 2/79
causes of tensions in multi-ethnic residential areas. The workplace offered a microcosm of this.

Apart from its supposed offensiveness to the white English palette, the Asian diet was regarded as inappropriate for the needs of industry. HCSS in 1963 described it flatly as ‘entirely unsuitable for doing manual work’, and put its content down to ‘[i]gnorance and illiteracy’. At a national level, a CIAC meeting in 1964 featured a claim by one member that industrial efficiency had suffered due to the diets of Muslim workers who, due to their abstention from pork and need for halal meat (which was still difficult to obtain in many areas), were not receiving enough protein to enable them to work properly. Concerns about the ability of Asian mothers to provide their children with a diet properly fitted to Britain perhaps stemmed in part from a desire to ensure that the second generation of British Asians was robust enough for the demands of manual work.

Ideas about Muslim religion, diet, and physical fitness for work often cohered around the practice of Ramadan. As early as 1963, it was suggested in Halifax that ‘[d]uring Ramadan many Pakistanis keep a regular dawn-to-dusk fast, and productivity suffers as a result. Troubles [arise] during Ramadan when a man feeling faint... refused medicine.’ Community relations workers in some areas did attempt to bring Ramadan to the attentions of employers. The DEP’s fifth memorandum on ‘race relations’ assisted with this informational role, warning employers that during Ramadan ‘the restrictions on drinking can be a hardship to those

672 For example, Ibid., MSS.292B/805.94/1, CCA, “CIAC: Questionnaire”, 7/11/62, and Ibid., Mayor of Smethwick to Smethwick Trades Council, MSS.292B/805.94/6, 9/5/63.
674 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/5, CIAC, “Minutes of a Meeting... on 20th March, 1964”
675 WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/2/3/5, HCSS, “Commonwealth Immigrants in Halifax”, 7/63.
676 SCCR, Harmony 2 (December, 1968); GMCRO, MCCR papers, GB127.M184, “Minutes of Employment S-C held on Tuesday, December 9th [1968]"
engaged in hot, heavy work. The UMO campaigned for concessions to help Muslim workers meet the demands of both faith and work during Ramadan. It called for ‘[c]onsideration to be shown during Ramadan... like not to insist on Muslim teachers to serve lunches or giving an early break in consideration of the non-use of lunch and tea breaks’. The UMO later also made the request that fasting workers be allowed to leave early if they worked through breaks. It is unclear to what degree these demands were met by employers, but, as with other issues regarding Muslims in the workplace, significant attention was being given to the challenges posed by Ramadan by the late 1970s. In 1978, the DEAGRR produced a document suggesting that during Ramadan noticeable falling off in efficiency is often apparent among Muslim employees towards the end of a long day without food, and employers have said that there is a greater risk of accidents. There are sometimes requests to be allowed to work through the dinner break and leave early.

The CRE’s paper on “Religious Observation by Muslim Employees” allowed that fasting ‘can impose severe physical constraints’, especially during summer. However, it was noted that Ramadan in a sense provided an opportunity – workers who had taken time off for additional prayers, or for Eid, could make up the time they owed by working through breaks during Ramadan. CRE guidelines therefore created the possibility of a distinctive working pattern for Muslim employees all year round -- though it is hard to say how often employers really implemented all of these suggestions. Actual conditions at firms employing Muslims are hinted at by two cases from the Minority Groups Case Studies Project. At Dunkerley Textiles, the mostly Pakistani night shift was regarded as having worked well ‘except during the month of

676 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/7, UMO, “Memorandum to British Muslims of Pakistan...”, 8/1/76.
677 Ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/9, UMO, “Guidelines for Employers in Britain Concerning Muslim Employees”, [1978]
680 Ibid., DEAGRR, “Religious Observance by Muslim Employees”, 1/78
681 Ibid., CRE, “Religious Observation by Muslim Employees...”, 10/78
Ramadan which... had created considerable chaos for management and workers alike'.

However, this seems to have related at least partially to the extended prayers prompted by the beginning of Ramadan. At Eldon Carpets, the ‘disruption’ caused during Ramadan ‘always annoyed’ management due to unrest and loss of production. Some of this annoyance arose from the need to rearrange breaks so that Muslims could eat at least once during their shifts. At a mill in Bolton, Ramadan apparently prompted a yearly round of jokes about Muslim workers ‘keeling over’ due to fasting. Whilst it is uncertain whether this reflected the presence of a real danger, it suggests that Muslims could face being singled out, and perhaps derided, for carrying out their religious duties in public.

IV

This chapter began by demonstrating the importance of notions about biology to the presentation of Muslim and Asian workers in the 1960s and 70s. This is significant because of wide assumptions, encouraged by scholarship on ‘new’ and ‘cultural’ racisms, that presentations of ethnic minority subjects in post-war Britain excluded physical properties. As demonstrated, this was not so – such ideas had been available, and had affected work patterns, in the colonial period and were resilient in postcolonial Britain. The concentration of English Muslim workers in manual trades surely promoted the appearance of discourses about their physical characteristics. But it should also be stressed that Asian and Muslim workers in post-war Britain were presented with reference to a number of factors – including culture, religion, language, caste and gender as well as biology. These various factors were not only simultaneous but interrelated, with surprising links sometimes posited. The religious determinants of the dietary habits of Muslim communities enabled a link between religion and

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683 Ibid., JD Roberts, “Case Study No. 14: Eldon Carpets”, [1978]
biology, whilst conceptions of Asian ‘slowness’ tied together (pastoral) culture, lack of familiarity with the English language, and ideas about physicality.

Religion generated a number of demands from Muslim workers – for prayer facilities and breaks, holidays at Eid-al-Fitr, and for certain concessions during Ramadan. These remained sharp, if often successfully localised, into the 1990s. The demands of Muslim women for the right to dress modestly at work, sometimes requiring changes to uniforms, echoed claims made by women of other religions and no religion, but had particular authority when tied to supposedly religious requirements. Muslims were not the only ethnic minority group whose religion impacted upon working practices – the demands of Sikhs to wear turbans in the workplace were often vexing to employers, the judiciary, local authorities and community relations groups. However, both government and trade union sources in the sixties and seventies nevertheless remarked upon their impression that the religious demands of Muslim workers were especially hard to accommodate, with material on the significance of Asian religions in the workplace often focusing upon Islam to the near-exclusion of other faiths. These impressions referred to the supposedly more ‘dogmatic’ nature of Islam and entailed a belief that existing Muslim religious organizations were deliberately underplaying the flexibility of Islam. This impression of Muslim specificity has often been overlooked by the literature on ethnic minorities at work in Britain, both due to the dearth of historical treatments and because studies to date have focused on ‘black’ strikes. Yet this religious claims-making, despite its often quotidian nature, is significant because it prefigures much later debates, often thought to be traceable only to the very late 1980s or early 1990s, about the supposed especial resistance of British Muslims to integration.

684 Kalra, Textile Mills to Taxi Ranks, 120
The religious demands of Muslim workers in part appear low-key because of the preference of governments and trade unions that they be settled at a local level. This preference has a number of origins: the general emphasis on collective bargaining in British industrial relations; a desire at the centre to leave the sensitive issue of ethnopolitics to local actors; and the desire amongst elites not to make ‘special’ concessions to religiously- or ethnically-defined groups. This preference to avoid general agreements did not prevent local compromise, however. Neither did rhetorical opposition to special provisions prevent arrangements for on-site prayer facilities and breaks or trips to countries of origin, for instance. This reflected a belief that such concessions could help promote good relations and productivity. Making religious provisions onsite also obviated the need for Muslim workers to make time-consuming trips to mosques for prayer. Concessions were not always granted on a collective basis – some individual Muslim employees could win favours by acting as intermediaries between management and other Muslim workers, becoming informal parts of the multiculturalism institution. Where concessions were determined collectively in the early period, CRCs often played important roles as intermediaries – though sometimes restraining and rearticulating, rather than endorsing, ethnic minority demands. In this period, the most costly (in terms of expenditure) and tangible form of special provision – segregated shower rooms and toilet facilities – related ultimately to biology. Demanded by white workers – and often resented or accepted passively by Asian colleagues – these innovations, despite resembling arrangements in the American South far more than other practices placed under the rubric of ‘special provisions’, do not seem to have been much discussed, let alone criticised.

Even if solutions were generally provided at local level, issues of religious accommodation in the workplace did not escape national attention entirely. In 1965, the MoL issued a document on these issues, and guidelines were again published by the DEP in 1970.
This material, however, encouraged local solutions whilst also affirming the impression of Islam as an especially problematic religion in the workplace. From the 1970s, elements of the multicultural institution operative at the centre – such as the CRE and DEAGGR – became more involved. Whilst some Asian and Muslim workers had registered complaints with the RRB, the passage of the 1976 RRA, with its illegalisation of ‘indirect’ discrimination, invited more active action on behalf of British Asians at work, despite religion not falling under the legislation’s purview. These national bodies also brought Muslim organizations into the multiculturalism institution through consultation. These organizations were specifically religious and were national in scope – including the UMO, ICC, UKIM and Islamic Foundation. Although authoritative in a factual sense as regards Islam, these groups lacked grassroots presence, and had, at best, no more representative capacity than local welfare or workers’ organizations. It is perhaps significant that organizations contacted by Muslim workers with religious grievances were not specifically religious in character. Although many elites – especially those connected to trade unions – expressed concern about consulting these religious organizations, this did not lead to liaison with alternative groups, but simply wariness of the advice offered by the organizations consulted. This no doubt reflects concern about the politics of (leftist) Asian ‘workers’ groups. But, as will be explored in chapter eight, the primacy ceded to religious groups perhaps also reflects the isolation and narrowness of some elements of the multicultural institution, which preferred to consult with organizations that seemed the most ethnically and culturally ‘authentic’, regardless of their class or gender propertie
5. English Muslim Political Participation and Integration, 1962-97

This thesis has so far concentrated upon substantive socio-political issues. Gaining access to political channels in order to address these issues has, however, also been a key concern for Muslim communities. This desire for mainstream political influence has primarily affected the Labour Party. That Muslim immigrants largely came to Britain as low-paid manual workers significantly shaped their class and party affiliation, and this was compounded by their residence in Labour-dominated areas. The Conservative Party’s association with Powellite, and with right-wing pressure groups and journals such as the Monday Club and Salisbury Review; its more undifferentiated hostility towards immigration; and its historical antipathy towards racial discrimination legislation made it an unnatural home for ethnic minority activists. Although Labour leaders shared with the Tories a general belief in the necessity of immigration control – and, in the 1965 White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth and 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act, extended this restriction themselves – central aspects of the multiculturalism institution, including anti-discrimination legislation and key streams of funding, were created by Labour governments.

Naturally, Muslim immigrants did not come to Britain as political blank slates. Some had been involved in the Pakistani independence movement, or were descended from those who had been. Asian political parties, such as the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP), Pakistani Muslim League and Awami League, formed branches in English cities. However, settler migrants sometimes, whether politically active or not in their homeland, placed great
importance on the voting rights they received when arriving in Britain. Later waves of Muslim migrants who left their countries of origin for political reasons came, understandably, with a quietistic or moderate attitude to politics.

The most basic sign of a desire to participate in British politics for ethnic minorities was registration as voters. Registration amongst ethnic minorities was low in the early 1960s. In their study of 1963 Bradford local elections, Le Lohé and Spiers regarded the registration in the city of ‘a substantial number’ of Pakistanis in the elections as a surprising feature. Ahead of the 1966 general election, the *Guardian* suggested that the parties had placed little emphasis on winning ethnic minority votes, as recent immigrants were regarded as in general unlikely to register. Some, like, David Ennals, then Home Office under-secretary, suggested that low levels of registration related primarily to residual focus on the politics of immigrants’ homelands. This may have been a factor but Asians, unlike Afro-Caribbeans, were reluctant to place themselves on the register because their names would stand out and invite interest from immigration officials. Newness and general political disengagement applied to all immigrant groups, but registration was made especially difficult for Asians by the language barrier. Despite these factors, registration amongst ethnic minorities in general grew rapidly in the 1970s. By the October 1974 general election, registration amongst Asian voters approached three quarters and, by 1979, this figure had climbed to 79%, compared with 93% amongst whites.

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This gradual increase in Asian registration was reflected in changing turnout levels. As with registration, turnout amongst Asian communities was variable between localities. In 1963, turnout amongst Asians in Bradford local elections experienced a spike, reaching over 60%, due primarily to the standing of three independent Pakistani candidates. However, by 1966, the effects of this had dissipated, in line with a general expectation amongst political parties that ethnic minority turnout would be low. Certain constituencies may have bucked this trend, at least – Asian turnout increased again in Bradford at the start of the 1970s, and outpaced white turnout in Rochdale in the 1970 and both 1974 general elections. The following general election, in 1979, demonstrated the nationwide expansion of this trend. In areas such as Birmingham, Bradford, Burnley, Ealing and Rochdale, Asian turnout sometimes greatly outpaced white in local and European elections especially. A 1984 GLC study suggested that 30% of British Asians (compared to 26% of whites and 15% of Afro-Caribbeans) regarded voting as the most effective form of political participation.

The high turnout levels within Asian communities have primarily benefited the Labour Party. This pattern took some time to emerge – in 1963, for example, the independent Pakistani candidates in Bradford won over three times as many votes from Pakistanis than did the Labour candidates. By the October 1974 general election, however, 61% of Asians gave their support to Labour, compared to the 12% who voted for the Conservatives and 11% for the Liberals. 1979 witnessed a small increase in support for Labour and a turning away from

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694 Guardian, 8/3/66.
the other parties, with Asian voters in inner-city areas even more likely to prefer Labour. As will be shown, these national trends did not preclude specific Tory and Liberal candidates from forming links with Asian communities and winning their votes in substantial numbers. However, the potential for the Conservative Party to make inroads into even the middle-class ethnic minority vote was limited. The Asian middle class preferred Labour in 1979, and the early years of the Thatcher government – which produced legislation such as the 1981 British Nationality Act – led to a rapid turn away from the Conservatives amongst ethnic minority voters. Support for the Labour Party amongst ethnic minorities, including Asians, therefore held steady during the 1980s even as the party’s other key bases of support collapsed. This fact was frequently publicised by activists who sought increased ethnic minority representation within the party. To date, the 1992 general election represents the zenith of Asian support for Labour. In 1997, as the party swept back to power, its ethnic minority support stayed steady or perhaps declined slightly.

Despite this apparent peaking of Asian support for Labour, predictions that Asian voters would eventually find a new home en masse in the Conservative Party have not yet been realised. The idea that British Asians are ‘natural Conservatives’ who fail to exhibit their ‘expected’ party affiliation – owing to a number of factors, including their temporary status as primarily working-class communities, the Conservative attitude to immigration and racial discrimination into the 1980s, and the failure of the Tories to create political links with Asians – has been aired widely. Asian Conservatives have been especially keen to promote this idea. For instance, Nirj Deva, former Conservative MP for Brentford and Isleworth, has suggested that

699 Anwar, Race and Politics, 75, 79.
700 Ibid., 66-79.
703 Ibid.; Saggar, Race and Representation, 47.
Asians are naturally conservatives, with a capital and a little “c”. They believe in profits, in enterprise, home-ownership, religious education, children and families. Many white Tory leaders have also accepted this, and Conservative attempts to recruit or secure the votes of “ethnic minorities” often focus on Asians. Academics have also promoted versions of this theory. Some Labour Party activists, as discussed below, have drawn upon these ideas when expressing concern that Muslim colleagues are motivated only by a desire for power and are ignorant about leftist politics.

Alongside registering and voting, Asian membership of political parties grew steadily, though unevenly, in this period. In the 1960s, Asian membership of political parties was generally low, and significant in only a small number of Labour branches. For example, the ward party in Manningham, north Bradford, had around forty ‘Pakistani’ members by 1970, a majority. A 1974 study suggested that less than 1% of Asians in Britain were members of political parties, compared with around 2% of whites and 3% of Afro-Caribbeans. By the end of the decade, however, rapid increases appear to have occurred. In the West Midlands by that time, Asian membership was proportionate to the local population – although Asian women were much less likely to enter politics in this way than were Asian men. The slow entry of Asians into the Labour Party must also be seen in the general context of inward-looking party branches in cities like Birmingham, which regarded new entrants of all ethnicities with suspicion. By 1992, the Labour Party could list 97 CLPs with at least ten Asian members. Some cities with large Muslim populations, such as Glasgow and Manchester, had a concentrated but small Asian population in local branches. 16 constituencies had over 100

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704 Sewell, Black Tribunes, 69.
706 Observer, 20/10/70; WYASB, City of Bradford Labour Party (CBLP) papers, 60D84 1/1/4, “Organiser’s Report”, 30/12/70.
707 Anwar, Race and Politics, 115.
709 Andrew Geddes, “Inequality, Political Opportunity and Ethnic Minority Parliamentary Candidacy” in Saggar, Race and British Electoral Politics, 161
Asian members, and the largest Asian memberships in Muslim areas included 254 in Slough, 266 in Birmingham Ladywood, 336 in Bethnal Green and Stepney, 340 in Birmingham Sparkbrook, 400 in Bradford West and 467 in Birmingham Small Heath. These levels were in turn dwarfed, however, by the Asian memberships in largely Indian constituencies. 710 3% of British Asians were members of political parties by 1994, in line with the proportion of Asians in the total British population. 711

The identification of ethnic minorities with the Labour Party has often been regarded simply as a product of class, with commentators observing this dynamic from at least the 1960s. 712 However, in this early period the volatility of Asian voting in response to factors such as Asian candidacies led Le Lohé and Spiers in 1963 to declare that ‘clearly the vast majority of Pakistanis are “working class”, but it is also equally clear that this category is not useful in interpreting their political behaviour’. 713 As more Asian voters and activists became integrated into the British political system, however, the importance of class increased. Lawrence’s 1974 study of Nottingham suggested that Asian voters valued Labour policies on both class and ‘race’. 714 This marrying of class and ‘race’ was also reflected in Labour’s own approach. It declared in 1979 that ‘[b]lack people face similar problems to the indigenous white working class but they also face additional differences related to their colour’. 715 By 1983, a Harris poll suggested that class factors were twice as important to Asian Labour voters as the party’s policies on ‘race’ or immigration. Solomos and Back’s study of Birmingham suggested that all the ethnic minority councillors they interviewed (mostly Pakistanis) stressed class-related

710 PHM, LPRD papers, LP/RD/35/8, Edwards to Gould, 22/6/92
711 Geddes, “Inequality, Political Opportunity”, 153.
712 Guardian, 29/9/64
715 PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD92, 10/79
motivations for joining the party. This may be largely taken at face value, but it must be considered that few ethnic minority politicians wish to be considered ‘one issue’ representatives, and, in the case of Asians, may wish to distance themselves from the patronage politics with which Asians are often associated. Although class may not have functioned in the same way in the formation of ethnic minority political identities as it has for whites, this largely manifests itself in the reluctance of non-white middle-class voters to embrace the Conservatives.

Despite the significance of class in determining the allegiance of ethnic minority voters, ‘ethnic’ issues have also been important to them. A 1974 survey suggested that, for Asian voters, ‘race relations’ was as important an issue as unemployment (though behind inflation and the building of houses and schools). By the end of the 1970s, perhaps as a result of growing concern about racial attacks, ‘race relations’ had become the most important issue for Asian voters. By the 1980s, however, economic recession in the North especially led to unemployment taking over as the issue of most concern for Asians. By 1994, only 13% of ethnic minority voters regarded ‘race and immigration’ issues as important. The existence of an ‘ethnic vote’ has been discussed by both academics and parties, and raises a number of points. Firstly, the salience of issues related to ‘race’ and immigration has naturally ebbed and flowed, as has the willingness of ethnic minority voters to identify with an ethnic group. Secondly, non-white groups do not necessarily share interests and priorities. Asian Britons, and especially Bangladeshis, reconstituted their families in Britain more slowly and later than did West Indians. This is reflected in the greater and longer-lived concern amongst Asian voters.

716 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 134.
717 Anwar, Race and Politics, 30.
718 Ibid., 32.
720 Guardian, 6/8/94.
about immigration laws. Whilst both groups are likely to regard ‘policing’ as a serious issue, this encompassed, in much of the period under study, dissimilar concerns about ‘sus’ laws on the one hand and about ‘paki-bashing’ on the other. Muslims, meanwhile, are likely to experience relative isolation in their concern about issues such as blasphemy laws, religious schooling, and religious discrimination in employment. Thirdly, political issues can become extremely important to specific ethnic groups over a brief period and/or in a restricted locality -- East and West Pakistani political responses to the 1971 Bengal war illustrate this.

This chapter will discuss the experiences of English Muslims within British political culture. This section has offered a factual account of Asian and Muslim participation in British politics, as voters and activists, and has offered broad interpretations of ethnic minority political identity. The next section focuses upon the formation of links between political parties and Muslim communities and organizations, particularly in the early period of settlement. It will be suggested that these informal links were vital to the determination of political affiliations and the encouragement of political participation in this period. The third section goes on to consider the concept of patronage politics as applied to Asians in the Labour Party. The degree to which Muslim ‘leaders’ have ‘delivered the vote’ to the party will be considered, as will the impact of this style of politics upon the achievement of power within the party by Muslims. Ideas about corruption in Asian and Muslim politics will be discussed, as will the relationship of Muslims to the Black Sections movement. A fifth, concluding, section will combine these insights and briefly consider events since 1997.

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721 Fitzgerald, Political Parties, 57.
A number of distinct stages can be identified in the narrative of ethnic minority participation in British politics. In the 1950s and early 1960s, many British Asians were recent migrants who had not yet decided to settle, and who saw their attachment to British society as relatively ephemeral. Initial engagement with British politics reflected the decision to settle.\textsuperscript{722} These engagements were slow to develop and to be perceived, and were also uneven. Whilst Labour Party membership grew rapidly in Bradford, in neighbouring Keighley the Bengali CRO, Salad ud din Mujahid, reacted to the 1970 general election by warning that ‘the situation is pretty bad in Keighley, where about 50 per cent of the 2,350 Asian immigrants do not vote because they don’t understand the importance of the vote’.\textsuperscript{723} Also in the early 1970s, Taylor’s study of Asians in Newcastle-upon-Tyne suggested that ‘[q]uietism and conformity were the rule’ amongst young Muslim men.\textsuperscript{724}

Where Muslim communities did become politically active in the 1960s and early 1970s, the substance of this varied greatly between localities. Early Pakistani candidates, such as those in Bradford in 1963 and Camden in 1964, often ran as independents. But even where links were formed between Muslim communities and mainstream parties, these were often ephemeral and determined by local leaders. In his study of Mohammed Sadiq’s Liberal candidacy in Huddersfield in 1970, Scott remarked upon ‘how few Pakistanis are involved in any regular institutional and personal contact with the majority’ – local politic links were created ‘in essence [by] a meeting of elites’. Within weeks of Sadiq’s defeat, several of his


\textsuperscript{723} \textit{Yorkshire Evening Post}, 23/8/71.

supporters had switched to Labour or become politically inactive. A Muslim candidate also stood for the Liberals in Bradford East in the 1970 general election despite the high level of Pakistani membership in that constituency’s CLP. This political fluidity was exacerbated by the 1971 war in East Bengal, around which both East and West Pakistanis mobilised. The confluence of aims amongst East Pakistani activists and (generally pro-independence) Labour branches invited cooperation between these groups, but entry into local Labour structures, including in major areas of Bengali settlement such as East London and Birmingham, remained closed-off for many ethnic minority activists. The Labour Party’s pro-independence stance and willingness to select Bengali candidates sometimes inhibited West Pakistani support. Munawar Hussain, a Bengali and prominent local supporter of Bangladeshi independence, was rejected by the West Pakistani voters of Manningham ward when standing for Labour in 1971 and 1972. In 1972, Pakistani support for Cyril Smith, Liberal candidate in Rochdale, also partly accounted for by Labour’s support for Bangladeshi independence, was a significant component in Smith’s taking the seat from Labour in a by-election. In the same year, the head of the Rochdale PWA, Karim Dad, stood as a Liberal candidate in local elections.

This weak partisan affiliation amongst English Muslims in the early years of their settlement was perhaps encouraged by the work of non-partisan bodies promoting ethnic minority political engagement as an integrative good-in-itself. Local authorities were prominent in the non-partisan work of registration campaigning, with a number, including Lambeth, Haringey, Birmingham and Bradford, conducting specific drives amongst ethnic

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726 Guardian, 5/6/70
728 Guardian, 19/6/71.
minors. At a national level, the CRC began, from 1974, to stress both the importance and contestability of the ‘ethnic vote’. In 1976, the newly-formed CRE identified 59 ‘ethnic marginal’ seats in which the ethnic minority population outnumbered the sitting MP’s majority. The CRE further claimed that ethnic minority voters had won the previous election for Labour. Local CRCs, whilst constitutionally non-partisan, were almost always closer to Labour in reality, and at times their registration campaigns, for example in Brent, were self-consciously intended to provide voters for Labour and were recognised accordingly.

The CRE’s claims about the significance of the ethnic minority vote were questionable psephologically, but appear to have influenced parties, especially Labour. The party’s Race Relations Working Party, established initially to consider new Race Relations legislation in the mid-1970s, was reformed as the Race Relations Study Group in 1976 with much broader functions, including liaison with ethnic minority groups. In 1975, the Labour Party had already established a Race Action Group (LPRAG), aimed at encouraging the national party and branches to court ethnic minority votes, as reflected in its 1979 pamphlet “Don’t Take the Black Vote for Granted”. These measures also reflected the growing demographic and political importance of ethnic minority Britons, as well as the ascendancy of a ‘liberal’ tendency on race relations within Labour during the mid-seventies (as reflected by the 1976 RRA).

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731 Lawrence, Black Migrants, 134.
732 Anwar, Myth of Return, 149.
733 Guardian, 18/7/76
735 PHM, LPRD memoranda, RE 763, 9/76.
5. English Muslim Political Participation and Integration, 1962-97

Perhaps even more significantly, increasing concerns within Labour about the success of the National Front (NF) encouraged work to ameliorate race relations, counter NF propaganda, and build alliances with ethnic minority voters and organizations. In this period, ethnic minority activists became part of a broader process in which leftist figures adopted the strategy of entry into the Labour Party.\(^{737}\) By the end of the 1980s, official, party-endorsed solutions to the constitutional crisis created by Black Sections appeared --- first the BAAC and then from 1993 the Black Socialist Society (BSS). These undermined the Sections, becoming the primary locus of the liaison, recruiting and lobbying work taken on previously by the LPRAG.

These new organisational approaches to ethnic minority communities and voters also had echoes and effects at local level. A key task of the LPRAG was to assess the local situation and, in 1980, it embarked upon a survey of CLPs to establish how many were taking action to represent, recruit and serve ethnic minorities.\(^{738}\) Local parties frequently established sub-committees and officer positions dedicated to considering ethnic minority needs, in some cases predating national initiatives. The Greater London Labour Party introduced an anti-racist sub-committee in the early 1970s, though this only became active in the later part of the decade.\(^{739}\) In Birmingham, an Ethnic Minority Liaison Committee was formed in 1982.\(^{740}\) In 1985, the Bethnal Green and Stepney CLP established a Working Party on Racism. The minutes of this committee suggest that it attracted few attendees, and that those who were involved were primarily white leftists.\(^{741}\) The Working Party competed in a sense with the Ethnic Minorities Committee, discussed in more detail below, a more organic organization created to provide a forum for Bangladeshi activists. This structure was also evident at ward level –

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\(^{738}\) PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD623, 12/80

\(^{739}\) Fitzgerald, *Party Politics and Black People*, 34.

\(^{740}\) Solomos and Back, *Social Change*, 76.

\(^{741}\) LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/18/28, Bethnal Green and Stepney Labour Party (BGSLP) Anti-Racism Working Party, “Minutes of Meeting 15/2/85”.
Shadwell Labour Party had both a Race Awareness Officer and Ethnic Minorities Officer by 1985.\textsuperscript{742}

The primary concern of these structures was to recruit, electioneer amongst, and mobilise ethnic minorities. Already in the late 1950s, the London Labour Party, anticipating later national concerns, was encouraging local parties to recruit within ethnic minority communities and to recognise the ‘difference’ in these communities in so doing. Such recognition was contrary to the strong currents of universalism in the party, and the fact that a number of parties were suspected of placing bars upon non-white membership into the early 1960s suggests that these early efforts made little impact.\textsuperscript{743} In the mid-1970s, the Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS) undertook much recruitment work amongst ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{744}

The targeted recruitment of ethnic minorities was also a primary concern of non-white organizations within the party. Black sections, for example, foregrounded recruitment, especially when emphasising their potential usefulness to party leaders.\textsuperscript{745} White activists acknowledged that mainstream work with ethnic minorities was inadequate. The 1980 survey of CLPs conducted by the LPRAG received responses from only 136 constituencies, with only 8% having taken special steps to recruit ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{746} A more palatable form of special provisions aimed at ethnic minority recruitment was the use by CLPs of leaflets in Asian languages, as occurred in East London.\textsuperscript{747} By 1988, the agent for Bow & Poplar CLP was happy that ‘special interest groups... could be targeted’ in canvassing, including Bangladeshis, pensioners, and ‘right-to-buys’.\textsuperscript{748}

\textsuperscript{742} THLSL, Bow and Poplar Labour Party (BPLP) papers, S/LAB/D/1/1, B&PLP to members, 3/85.
\textsuperscript{743} Fielding, “Brotherhood”, 92-3.
\textsuperscript{744} Fitzgerald, Political Parties, 32-4.
\textsuperscript{745} PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD2990, 5/84.
\textsuperscript{746} PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD623, 12/80.
\textsuperscript{747} LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/18/26 BGSLP, “Motions for the January Meeting of the GMC…”, [1984]
\textsuperscript{748} THLH, BPLP papers, S/LAB/D/1/2, B&PLP, “… Lansbury By-Election”, 1988
Targeting ethnic minorities specifically as voters, rather than potential members, was less controversial. Already in 1961, a councillor in East Bradford was recommending that a leaflet be produced in ‘the Pakistani language’. A ‘Pakistani meeting’ was also arranged to forge links with voters. In a similar vein, Exchange ward party arranged the production of an election leaflet in Urdu for the 1961 local elections with the assistance of the local Pakistani Fellowship. In 1970, City Labour Party members met with a Mr U.H. Waraich, who ‘advise[d] on publicity for immigrants’. Waraich suggested that translated material should address a variety of ‘ethnic’ issues -- the RRAs, the adoption of Pakistani candidates, and Labour’s history as the ‘liberator’ of India and Pakistan – alongside class-related matters regarding employment and housing. The leaflet was translated into Urdu, Bengali, Punjabi and Gujarati. References to both ethnicity and class in material aimed at Asian voters are also evinced in Eade’s study of the East End during a later period. In Bradford, ‘[a]fter consulting with a number of immigrants’, it was decided that an English-language version of material aimed at Asians would also be produced. The following year, C.M. Khan, a future president of the BCM and Labour member, counselled a similar approach when asked ‘to advise on immigrant matters’. Translated leaflets often contained simple English text as well. A leaflet produced in 1970 for Peter Mahon, Labour candidate in Preston South, contained text in Urdu and Gujarati alongside the simple question, ‘[w]hen it comes down to it aren’t Labour’s ideals yours as well?’ Contrasting approaches were taken in the two Preston CLPs ahead of the 1979 general election. The North CLP produced a leaflet with both simple English text and an Urdu translation, whilst the South CLP produced a separate leaflet in Urdu and Gujarati adorned in English with the rather loaded exhortation to ‘vote Labour and prove you are a good citizen’.

749 WYASB, East Bradford CLP (EBCLP) minutes, 60D84/3/1.
750 WYASB, CBLP papers, 60D84 1/1/4.
752 WYASB, CBLP papers, 60D84 1/1/4.
753 Lancashire Record Office, Preston (UK), Preston Trades and Labour Council (PTLC) papers, LAB/acc6750/6 “Vote for Peter Mahon...”, 1970.
One third of CLPs that responded to the 1980 LPRAG survey claimed to distribute material in Asian languages.\textsuperscript{754} This method of communication seems to have been primarily a local enterprise. In 1987, Labour’s Director of Communications regretted that he would have ‘no time’ to produce an election leaflet aimed specifically at ethnic minorities, and organizations like the BAAC and BSS, although they produced recruitment material in various languages, did not claim substantive communication with non-English-speakers as an aim.\textsuperscript{755} Nevertheless, a Labour document from the mid-1980s on the printing of election material encouraged local parties to consider the ‘racial’ makeup of their area when producing literature.\textsuperscript{756}

Aside from principled objections, creating and distributing Asian-language material could present purely logistical difficulties. East London priest and community activist Kenneth Leech remembers that:

\begin{quote}
[the] Labour Party got in a panic, and decided they really have to print their literature in an Asian language, or they would lose their Bengali votes and... they got the wrong language, and printed it upside down.\textsuperscript{757}
\end{quote}

There are reasons to doubt the veracity of this story – an Observer piece from 1983 suggests that the incident pertains to a Gujurati, not Bengali, leaflet.\textsuperscript{758} However, these stories reflect real anxieties. The examples from Bradford above show a concern amongst all-white Executive Committees to select the right languages, not to make assumptions about illiteracy in English, and to print material only after consultation. This could not solve every problem however – a 1978 meeting of East London MPs and agents shows palpable confusion, as canvassers were instructed to ‘[b]e very careful of the language poster... Make sure that there is one in Urdu

\textsuperscript{754} PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD623, 12/80.
\textsuperscript{755} PHM, Gwyneth Dunwoody to Larry Whitty, 30/3/87.
\textsuperscript{756} THLSL, Shadwell Labour Party (SLP) papers, S/LAB/G/2/10, Labour Party, “Words into Print”, n.d.
\textsuperscript{758} Observer, 22/5/83.
and one in Bengali [sic]... Don’t put the wrong one through the door, though how is the person delivering the poster to know?\textsuperscript{759} The appointment by Labour of an Ethnic Minorities Officer (EMO) in the late 1980s and the creation of the BAAC/BSS enabled some central oversight of translated material. For instance, a leaflet produced in 1991 for Indian voters in Erith and Crayford was criticised by then-EMO Patrick Edwards as ‘patronising’ and lacking in subtlety, as well as focusing on issues felt to be unimportant to Indians, such as Europe.\textsuperscript{760} Potentially more damaging than quiet internal criticism of such material was the manipulation of it by other parties for electoral ends. In 1993, an Urdu leaflet produced by Labour in Rochdale outlining 21 achievements of the local party was translated into English with a header asking ‘[t]hink deeply... is the Labour Party worth your support?’ Labour claimed that the leaflet was distributed only in white areas and was an attempt to tap into a racist vote through the implication that Pakistanis in the town had been unfairly favoured.\textsuperscript{761}

Apart from reforming internal practices, Labour was also able to form links with ethnic minority groups. The IWA-Southall was particularly important in securing Indian votes for Labour in Ealing in the early sixties.\textsuperscript{762} Despite the presence of a radical wing in CARD, key figures in the controlling ‘moderate’ faction were Labour members (like David Pitt) or sympathisers (like the Marxist Hamza Alavi). This relationship suffered a serious blow following Labour’s introduction of the 1965 white paper on immigration, over which Pitt resigned from the EC of the London Labour Party.\textsuperscript{763} Alavi had in any case been eager to establish links with Labour through other organizations alongside CARD. In 1964, he formed the Pakistani Immigrant Socialist Group (PISG) with the prominent Bengali activist Tassaduq Ahmed. The aims of the organization, according to its constitution, were promoting integration of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[759] LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/18/55, W. Harris, “... Meeting of Co-ordinators for the General Election 1979”, 23/9/78.
\item[760] PHM, LPRD papers, LP/RD/35/7, Edwards to Hobday, 7/6/91
\item[761] Guardian, 22/9/93
\item[762] Shukra, Changing Pattern, 17-8.
\item[763] Observer, 8/8/65.
\end{footnotes}
Pakistanis in Britain; ‘amelioration of special difficulties’ faced by Pakistanis; opposing racism; and promoting political education. Membership was restricted to Labour members. It is unclear to what degree MPs became involved with this group, despite Alavi’s pleas. It is, however, certain that Peter Shore, a Labour MP in East London where the group was based, was eager to create links with Pakistani representatives in the mid-1960s. In 1965, he met twice with the leader of the local PWA, Luftur Rahman Shahjahan, requesting that Shahjahan report on the number of Pakistanis in Bethnal Green and Stepney. In 1967, Shore also met with a delegation of Pakistani student and youth ‘leaders’ to discuss how to ‘effectively organise Pakistani and Indian votes along with Labour Party lines in a manner so that hostile reactions may not grow in the mind of the local population’. The potential for ‘hostile reactions’ meant that formation of links with ethnic minority organizations was not always an open activity. A Guardian article regarding the 1964 general election whispered that Labour sent ‘secret delegations’ to meet with ethnic minority organizations. Despite these potential difficulties, ethnic minority organizations in many areas became important in promoting Labour and in mediating between Labour and ethnic minority communities. The Pakistani Welfare and Information Centre supported the party in Manchester. The IWA and PWA in Nottingham assisted with translation of material and signed statements of support for Labour. The Pakistani Immigrant Welfare Association supported Labour in Bradford during the 1969 local elections even as the Liberals stood a Pakistani candidate. Growing concerns about far right groups and an increased appreciation for the political significance of ethnic minority communities led in the late 1970s to more substantive links between Labour and

764 LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/19/31, PISG, “Constitution”.
765 Ibid., Alavi to Shore, 5/11/64, 25/11/64.
766 LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/19/16, Shahjahan to Shore, 22/10/65, 28/9/65.
767 Ibid., Akhtar Ahad, “The Discussion with Mr Peter Shore...”, 7/67
768 Guardian, 29/9/64.
769 GMCRO, Ardwick CLP (ACLP) papers, “Ardwick Div. GMC... 16th March 1972”.
770 Lawrence, Black Migrants, 134.
ethnic minority organizations. Some of this was initiated by the party itself. For example, a 1976 demonstration against the National Party in the North West included representatives of both the IWA and Pakistani Workers Association (PWoA).\footnote{Lancashire Evening Telegraph, 11/5/76.} Interviews by the Swadhinata Oral History Project contain much material about the role of anti-racist campaigning in forging links between Labour and the East End Bengali community.\footnote{Swadhinata Trust, “Rev. Alok Biswas”, \url{http://www.swadhinata.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154&Itemid=186}, accessed 6/3/14.} Although the Anti-Nazi League (ANL) gave the SWP a prominence in these campaigns, East London activist Nikhilesh Chakraborty suggests that the SWP ‘had their own agenda’, whereas with the Labour left ‘we were firm into what we wanted and showing the movement towards its right direction’.\footnote{Ibid., “Nikhilesh Chakraborty”, \url{http://www.swadhinata.org.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=144&Itemid=174}, accessed 6/3/14.} The ANL’s founding statement was signed by representatives of the Labour Party, SCOPO, IWA-GB and PWoA.\footnote{THLSL, St Katherine’s Labour Party (SKLP) papers, S/LAB/K/2/10 77, ANL, “Founding Statement”.} Labour, and other parties, also became involved with anti-racist initiatives established by ethnic minority organization, including the Campaign Against Racist Laws (CARL), which was established by the IWA-GB and IWA-S in 1979.\footnote{PHM, LPRD papers, RD1122, “Labour Party: CARL”, 11/81} However, still in 1980, the LPRAG survey suggested that only six CLPs held meetings with ethnic minority organizations. The vast majority preferred to use ‘intermediate’ organizations, usually CRCs.\footnote{Ibid., RD623, “… Labour and the Black Electorate”, 12/80.} However, the importance of developing some links with ethnic minority civic society was enhanced by the growing Black Sections movement. In a 1985 letter to Jo Richardson, chair of the Working Party on black sections, party leader Neil Kinnock expressed opposition to the sections whilst emphasising his support for greater liaison with ethnic minority groups.\footnote{LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/18/31, Kinnock to Richardson, 23/5/85.}
The organizations approached for liaison largely reflected the politics and demography of local areas. Muslim representatives were not sought out specifically in this period – to do so may have been regarded with great reservation by a party with a self-conception as secular and non-sectarian – but entered into mainstream local politics through their general welfare and representational roles. This could occur on an individual basis – as mentioned above, CM Khan, president of the BCM in the mid-1980s, had joined Labour long before he took up that office. The BCM was a vocal supporter of Labour MPs in the area, even as pressure for a Muslim representative in Bradford West grew.\textsuperscript{779} Taylor, in his work on Newcastle in the mid-1970s, recalls that encouragement to vote Labour was one of the few social messages delivered by the city’s imam to the congregation.\textsuperscript{780}

Although these links between the Labour Party and ethnic minority organizations were growing in significance from the late 1970s, this did not occur without difficulty. In 1976, for example, in considering the joint TUC/Labour demonstration against racism, it was stressed that to invite only certain groups would be difficult, and that ethnic minority campaigners should also not be ‘hived off’ into separate sections.\textsuperscript{781} Concerns about the unrepresentativeness of chosen ‘representatives’ were also expressed by ethnic minority organizations. Shaukat Khan, leader of the National Association of Asian Youths (NAAY), complained to the LPRAG that young ethnic minority activists ‘had become increasingly alienated from the Labour Party whose commitment, they believed, had stopped short at tokenism and horse-trading with unrepresentative elders...’\textsuperscript{782} A 1985 day seminar on anti-racism held by Labour in East London highlighted the difficulties involved in dealing with

\textsuperscript{779} Guardian, 16/8/90  
\textsuperscript{780} Taylor, \textit{Half-way Generation}, 54.  
\textsuperscript{781} MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292D/805.9/6, TUCERC, “Campaign on Racialism”, 25/8/76.  
\textsuperscript{782} MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292D/805.9/14, LPRRSG, “Press Release”, 1980.
differing positions amongst ethnic minority organizations. In practice, questions of convenience often determined which communities and organizations were consulted. Denis Howell, Labour MP for Birmingham Small Heath in 1961-92, remarked in 1990 that ‘you never find out who the leaders are’ in the Afro-Caribbean community, whereas he got to ‘know all the Mosques’ very quickly. By the late 1980s and 1990s, the BAAC/BSS and its local affiliates were significant drivers of consultation with ethnic minority organizations, channelling a significant portion of this consultation through specific structures once more, though this time a structure controlled primarily by ethnic minority activists.

Certain ethnic minority organisations were also in general opposed to the Labour Party, either because of its acceptance and extension of immigration law, its general policies and internal procedures as regards ‘race’ or its general politics. The IWA-GB, more radical than the IWA-Southall and having links to Indian Communist Party factions, was an influential organisation that was for a long time strongly opposed to Labour, threatening to stand candidates in Ealing local elections in 1963 in order to protest against the first CIA. However, the IWA-GB’s waning influence in the 1980s did encourage it to develop a closer relationship with Labour to bolster its local profile. The relationship of Asian youth organisations to Labour was also complex. Bradford’s AYM initially banned members from party political activity in keeping with its ideology of community autonomy, though its chair, Marsha Singh, was secretly a Labour member for many years. Less radical young groups, such as the Progressive Youth Organisation (PYO) in East London, were strongly partisan, supporting

783 LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/18/26, BGSLP, “Day Seminar to Develop a Labour Party Anti-Racism Policy”, [1985].
784 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 106
785 PHM, LPRD papers, LP/RD/35/7 “Model Constitution of a Local Society”, [1991].
786 Shukra, Changing Pattern, 18.
787 Ramamurthy, Black Star, 159.
788 Ibid., 43.
Labour and strongly criticising the locally burgeoning Liberal Democrats.789 As the AYMs became tied into institutional multiculturalism and so less politically radical, some of their activists also became members of Labour.790

In general, ethnic minority activists and organizations have formed by far the strongest links with the Labour Party, but the responses of other parties to ethnic diversity should not be overlooked. Institutionally, the experience of the Conservative Party has been somewhat similar to that of Labour. In 1976, the party established a Community Affairs Department, which sought to extend the party’s profile amongst certain groups, including women and ethnic minorities.791 In the same year, both the Anglo-Asian and West Indian Conservative Societies (AACS and AWICS) were established, modelled on the older Anglo-Polish Conservative Society.792 These developments occurred simultaneously with the establishment of the LPRAG and LPRRSG. As with the BSS, AACS members did not have to be members of the Tory Party, but most in fact were.793 The AACS was more successful than the AWICS, and had over twenty local branches at its peak. However, by 1986, a faction of Sikh members in the Society had diverted its energies towards the campaign for an independent Khalistan. The AACS and AWICS were wound up in response to this, and the One Nation Forum (ONF), more tightly controlled by the Central Office and ethnically broader than the Societies, was established.794 Since being introduced it has largely restricted itself to a social function.795 Tory candidates translated material into Asian language from at least 1964, when a leaflet in Bradford added to the Urdu text the comment that ‘[y]ou came to England from your Country.

790 Ramamurthy, *Black Star*, 162.
791 Fitzgerald, *Political Parties*, 21
792 *Ibid.*, 72
793 *Ibid.*, 60
We welcome you. You have lived here under a Conservative Government. It is a good Government.\textsuperscript{796} Translation of material became more common by the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{797}

The Tories’ attempts to harness ethnic minority, and especially working-class ethnic minority, support were frustrated by various factors outlined above. Thatcher’s comment in 1978 about a Britain ‘swamped by people with a different culture’ concretised the impression that the Conservatives would face the NF not by marginalising it but by cutting away its popular support. The party’s participation in the Joint Campaign Against Racism (JCAR), a short-lived initiative designed to bring together the major parties and national ethnic minority organizations, came only despite her objections.\textsuperscript{798} In 1992, the experiences of black candidate John Taylor, selected to fight Cheltenham by the Tories despite reservations amongst some local party members about being represented by a ‘bloody nigger’ in parliament highlighted vicious racism in some areas of the local Tory infrastructure.\textsuperscript{799} The ‘pseudo-evolutionary’ language sometimes adopted by white Conservative members even when endorsing black candidates has been remarked upon.\textsuperscript{800} Therefore, although the Conservatives have made special institutional arrangements in approaching ethnic minority activists and voters, racism inhibited involvement with the party amongst even middle-class ethnic minority actors.

The Liberal Party and its successors have a somewhat complex history of engagement with ethnic minority communities. In the 1960s and 70s, the Liberals had the most unsullied record on immigration restriction and racial equality legislation of the three major parties. As described, they proved perhaps the most willing of the three parties to use Asian candidates in areas with large Asian populations in this period, fielding Pakistanis in Bradford in 1968,

\textsuperscript{796} Yorkshire Post, 1/9/64
\textsuperscript{797} Fitzgerald, Political Parties, 72.
\textsuperscript{799} Geddes, “Inequality, Political Opportunity”, 155, 167.
\textsuperscript{800} Solomos and Back, Social Change, 116.
Huddersfield and Bradford in 1970, and Rochdale in 1972. It might be suggested that these characteristics of the Liberal Party arose from its weaknesses as a vehicle for ethnic minority support, however – unlikely to be in government, it need pay little heed to popular calls for immigration restriction. Furthermore, until the late 1970s, the party had little urban presence, and this may help to explain its use of inexperienced Asian candidates in northern towns.\textsuperscript{801} The Social Democratic Party (SDP), created in 1981, was stronger in urban areas, and did more institutionally to address ethnic pluralism. The party provided two seats on its EC to ethnic minority representatives, and established the SDP Campaign for Racial Justice. However, it did not introduce mandatory shortlisting of ethnic minorities despite the endorsement of this provision for women.\textsuperscript{802} As with many white activists, some ethnic minority communities were attracted to the SDP by its formlessness and status as an alternative to Labour. In East London, those Bengali members who were at odds with other Bengalis and the white left often jumped to the SDP.\textsuperscript{803} The party stood two Bengali candidates in Tower Hamlets in 1982, and then five in 1985.\textsuperscript{804} The SDP was often attractive to ethnic groups that were less visible within a particular locality – Muslims in Southall, West Africans in West Indian areas, and East African Asians in areas where south Asians predominated.\textsuperscript{805} However, some Asian members, for example in Brent South, felt that their communities were ‘used’ by the party, which selected Asian candidates incapable of winning merely to split the local Asian vote.\textsuperscript{806} Aside from fears of exploitation, the SDP’s domination in some localities – including Ealing -- by the white, working-class ex-Labour right inhibited its links with non-white communities.\textsuperscript{807} Following the SDP-Liberal merger, the Alliance adopted the Liberal demand for generalised anti-
discrimination legislation covering both ethnicity and gender, and added to this the call for a Bill of Rights. In other areas, there was no agreement. The SDP objected to the work of the Liberals’ Community Affairs Department which, amongst other things, was responsible for engagement with ethnic minorities. The Liberals’ proposal for an Alliance panel to discuss the implications of the 1985 riots was rejected by the SDP.\(^{808}\) The decentralised nature of Alliance politics, however, meant that local approaches varied greatly. In Tower Hamlets, the Alliance/Liberal Democrat group in control from 1986-9 quickly gained a reputation for racism based on its redefinition of ‘homelessness’ to avoid an obligation to re-house recent immigrants, its heavy cuts in funding to ethnic minority organizations, and the visit of one Liberal councillor to Bangladesh during which he exhorted Bengalis not to emigrate to Britain. This culminated in an investigation by the party leadership into local campaigning.\(^{809}\) The Liberal Democrats would shortly thereafter be implicated in a controversy about racist campaigning in Rochdale.\(^{810}\) This was despite the introduction, in 1991, of the Asian Liberal Democrats, described by Ashdown as intending to help Asians ‘take their rightful place at the heart of British political life’.\(^{811}\)

Certain smaller parties have also developed relationships with Asian and Muslim groups. In the early period, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) was particularly notable in this regard. Ethnic minority activists entered the CPGB on an individual basis from an early time, beginning in the 1950s.\(^{812}\) The CPGB had especially close links with the IWA, especially after the turn away from Labour in the IWA-GB following the party’s acceptance of

\(^{808}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 120.  
\(^{810}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 22/9/93  
\(^{812}\) Sewell, \textit{Black Tribunes}, 20.
immigration restriction. However, the CPGB was also suspicious of ‘black power’ tendencies amongst ethnic minority organisations, as reflected by its report from the 1968 conference at which the Black People’s Alliance (BPA) was formed. The CPGB representative expressed concern that the BPA would ‘embark on the dangerous path of “all blacks against all whites” and could lead to serious consequences’. The CPGB did take a prominent role in the campaign for Bangladeshi independence in East London. However, links formed through campaigning did not necessarily promote Asian involvement in the party itself. Membership lists from both Hackney and Wandsworth, dating from the early 1970s, show 25 and five ‘immigrant’ members in these two areas respectively. These lists of ‘immigrant’ members appear to arise from an attempt, from 1971, to increase ethnic minority involvement with the CPGB. These attempts seem to have been more successful amongst Indians than Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Only one Muslim sat on the party’s national Race Relations Committee. By contrast, Vishnu Sharma, president of one IWA faction in Southall, estimated that there were 250 Indian members of the CPGB by 1976. The CPGB was often on the sidelines of anti-racist work, opposed to forms of campaigning that foregrounded ethnicity. Other leftist groups, such as the SWP, International Marxist Group and Revolutionary Communist Party, were more likely to be involved in the anti-racist campaigning of the late 1970s. However, even links between these parties and ethnic minority communities were troubled – a common justification for self-organization within Asian communities in the late 1970s and early 1980s was failure in the white left. Tariq Mehmood, a member of Bradford AYM, remembers that during anti-fascist

812 Shukra, Changing Pattern, 19
813 PHM, CPGB papers, CP/LON/RAC/1/12, CPGB Information Department, “Racialism and ‘Black Power’”, 10/5/68
814 Swadhinata, “Nikhilesh Chakraborty”.
816 Ibid., CP/LON/RAC/2/6, Beauchamp to Gerry Cohen, 23/12/71
817 Ibid., London District CPGB Race Relations Committee, “National Race Relations Committee Meeting”, 31/5/1980
818 Ibid., CP/LON/RAC/2/8, LDCPGB, “Minutes of Race Relations Committee Meeting on January 19th 1976”.

177
campaigning in the city, ‘white comrades... didn’t turn up and others were in the wrong places’.\textsuperscript{820} The SWP often dismissed AYM activists as ‘black nationalists’.\textsuperscript{821} Involvement with the mainstream left could be personally significant for some ethnic minority activists, however.

In Birmingham, Raghib Ahsan, later a Labour councillor in the city, stood for Socialist Unity in the 1977 Birmingham Ladywood by-election.\textsuperscript{822}

Candidacies such as Ahsan’s might be understood within a larger history of ethnic minority candidates standing as independents. Such candidates often sought to protest against legislation that disadvantaged ethnic minorities, and/or at the failure by mainstream parties to adopt ethnic minority candidates. Independent Asian candidates could have significant electoral effects. In 1963, three Pakistanis stood in Bradford – Razul and Qureshi in Exchange and Aslam in Listerhills. Qureshi had canvassed previously for the local Labour Party, whilst Aslam had links to the Tories. However, Qureshi and Aslam produced similar election literature, focusing on service provision. The two came from different ethnic communities – Aslam was, like most Bradford Muslims, Mirpuri, whilst Qureshi was Indian – and were locked in struggle over community leadership. The council candidacies added a further dimension to this struggle.\textsuperscript{823} These candidates combined to take over 80% of Pakistani votes.\textsuperscript{824} Some middle-class Pakistanis saw this level of support for independent candidacies as demonstrating a need for political education. Hamza Alavi, through the PISG, heavily protested against Mohammed Ali Abbas’ 1964 candidacy in Holborn and St Pancras South in opposition to immigration restriction. In 1963, Alavi welcomed the desire of many Pakistanis for ‘some form of participation in local affairs’, but condemned the ‘racialist Pakistani ticket’ on which some

\textsuperscript{820} Ramamurthy, “Asian Youth Movements”, 43-4.
\textsuperscript{821} Ramamurthy, \textit{Black Star}, 76, 130.
\textsuperscript{822} Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 221.
\textsuperscript{823} \textit{Ibid.}, 87-8.
\textsuperscript{824} \textit{Ibid.}, 90.
candidates were standing. Later, Alavi released a campaign leaflet in the constituency suggesting that Abbas’ candidacy would ‘further isolate the Pakistani community from the local community and sow seeds of distrust against us’, calling on voters to instead ‘work through the local institutions’, suggesting that a Labour government would outlaw racial discrimination. Later, these protest candidacies were sometimes aimed at Labour itself. In 1978, Mohammed Sabir Mirza, a member of Little Horton ward party in Bradford, was disciplined along with five supporters (at least four of whom were his family members) for his intention to stand as an independent candidate in upcoming local elections. In 1979, Syed Ala-ud Din, a Labour member since 1956, stood as an independent candidate in the Manchester Central by-election in order to ‘open the eyes’ of Labour to its dependency on ‘coloured’ votes, and to encourage the use of ethnic minority candidates. Besides publicising the issues with which these candidates were concerned, protest candidacies could have real political effects. In 1983, Ravi Ganatra, an Indian, stood in Leicester East as an ‘Ethnic Minority Candidate’ to protest at the adoption of a white middle-class candidate, Patricia Hewitt, as candidate for the ethnically diverse constituency. Ganatra won 2% of the vote, more than the margin of the Conservative victory over Hewitt. In 1985, Muhammad Idrish, a Labour member threatened with deportation, stood as an independent candidate in Birmingham’s local elections after he failed to win his party’s endorsement. Although he did not garner a substantial number of votes, Idrish’s candidacy encouraged Labour to deselect their existing white candidate and instead endorse a Pakistani in an attempt to minimise Idrish’s impact.

Where ethnic minority populations were highly concentrated and frustrated with the local Labour movement, ethnic minority independent candidates could have sustained

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826 Ibid., “An Appeal to all Pakistanis in Holborn and St. Pancras”, [1964].
827 WYASB, Little Horton Labour Party (LHLP) papers, 60D84/6.
828 Guardian, 21/9/79
829 Ibid., 22/5/83, 7/6/83.
830 Ibid., 13/6/85; Ramamurthy, Black Star, 113.
electoral impacts. This was the case in Tower Hamlets in the 1980s. In 1982, six independent Bengali candidates stood in the borough under the aegis of the People’s Democratic Alliance (PDA), which sought to protest the neglect of Bengalis by the local Labour Party, enjoying the support of an array of community groups. Three of the PDA candidates, including Nurul Huque, who won Spitalfields ward, were former Labour members. The PDA’s candidates outflanked Labour’s controlling group to the left and focused explicitly on issues of concern to the Bengali community. In 1985, a Bengali candidate, Muhammad Hannan, endorsed by the Bangladesh Welfare Association (BWA) and tacitly by the Alliance, stood in a Spitalfields by-election. His campaign literature spoke very differently to whites and to NES Bengalis. The Bengali leaflet played up his personal experience, education and respectability, as well as his past as a campaigner against homelessness. Labour’s Bangladeshi candidate, on the other hand, simply translated his message to English-speakers in a Bengali leaflet. The independent candidate was more willing to mobilise ethnic links in establishing electoral support than was Labour. In any case, Hannan was defeated by nine votes and thereafter expelled from the Labour Party along with five supporters. In the borough’s full elections of 1986, Labour put up seven Bengali candidates in all (out of a total 47), including two in Spitalfields. This increase reflected both the influence of the PDA on Labour politics and the rise of the local white left.

Even when it did not generate independent candidacies, the dearth of ethnic minority candidates in mainstream parties was a major issue in this period. The defeat of the first ethnic minority parliamentary candidate in post-war Britain, David Pitt, whilst fighting Clapham for

833 Eade, “Political Construction”, 98.
834 Eade, Politics of Community, 62.
836 LSE Library, Shore papers, SHORE/1/18/32, BGSLP, “Minutes of the General Committee Meeting on 22 August 1985”.

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Labour in 1959 provided an initial justification for rejecting non-white candidates. Although Pitt was elected to London County Council in 1961, he was defeated again whilst running for parliament in the same seat in 1970. The *Guardian* suggested that this ‘provided ample evidence’ that ethnic minority candidates were an ‘electoral liability’. Although demographic and local political factors would later encourage ethnic minority candidacies at ward level, into the 1970s there was still great apprehension about non-white candidates in local elections. The selection of Pakistani candidates by the Liberals in Rochdale in 1968 and Huddersfield in 1970 came despite vehement and open public objections from white party members. Some white figures did publicly oppose these attitudes – Brian Rhodes of Bradford Labour Party accused his white colleagues in 1971 of ‘scraping the barrel of white candidates to avoid choosing a coloured man’. By the 1970s, opposition to ethnic minority candidates was less public, and was more likely to reflect fear of a ‘white backlash’ rather than simple dislike of ethnic minorities. Reflecting on the poor performance of its Sikh candidate P.S. Singh in 1972 local elections, Rochdale Trades and Labour Council considered that whilst ‘it would be advantageous to have an immigrant representative on the Council’ there would need to be ‘much more tolerance and understanding... among the electorate before this becomes possible’. Dhani Prem, who had been a Labour councillor in Birmingham in 1945-50, suggested that this backlash also reflected distaste for parties that overtly courted ethnic minority votes. This fear had some grounding in this period – data from 1974 suggests that many voters would have abandoned their preferred party if it selected an ethnic minority candidate. By the early 1980s, however, this ‘backlash’ had broken down to a significant

838 *Guardian*, 19/6/70.
840 *Guardian*, 19/6/71.
841 LRO, PTLC papers, LAB/acc6750/6, “Voting Report 1972”
842 *Birmingham Post*, 19/7/68.
degree. Paul Boateng’s high-profile defeat in Hertfordshire West in 1983 was interpreted by some as evidence of a ‘white backlash’, whilst others stressed general discord within the CLP. One analyst suggested that continued invocations of a ‘white backlash’ were intended to deny future candidacies to ethnic minorities. Into the mid-1980s, some subtleties were added to the idea of a ‘backlash’ – some suggested that ethnic minorities should not be stood in areas with large white majorities or that ethnic minority candidates needed far better qualifications than white alternatives to make themselves attractive. Syd Bidwell, the longtime MP for Southall, still claimed in 1985 that there would be ‘disaffection’ if the new Labour candidate ‘wears a turban on his head’. The CRE’s analysis of the 1992 general election suggested that ethnic minority candidates, with the exception of Taylor, no longer received a ‘penalty’ from white voters. However, as of 2013, only 4% of British MPs, compared to about 8% of British people, are from ethnic minority backgrounds. At the local level, Muslim councillors still rely on Muslim voters and colleagues to win election.

III

The distinctiveness of Asian, and Muslim, engagement with British political parties has been considered in the above section. This chapter will now move to consider the experiences of Asians and Muslims within those parties. These experiences have primarily been coloured by the importance of kinship within British Asian communities and conceptions about the significance of this. As will be described, many within the Labour Party – upon which this section concentrates – have accepted at face value the notion of monolithic Asian

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843 Anwar, Race and Politics, 100-6
844 Fitzgerald, Political Parties, 94.
845 Ibid., 40, 93.
846 Guardian, 11/2/85.
847 Ibid., 6/8/94.
communities controlled by ‘leaders’ capable of mobilising large numbers of activists or voters through patronage networks. Asian and Muslim activists, meanwhile, have reacted to this in varied ways – sometimes seeking to play up their influential roles as patrons and sometimes criticising this simplistic portrayal of Asian communities. Underpinning these concerns amongst non-Asian Labour members is the common belief that Asians or specifically Muslims cannot be ‘good socialists’, and so therefore must be motivated by non-ideological considerations, such as desire for power or obligation to kin and patrons. Unsurprisingly, Asian and Muslim activists have protested, with considerable justification, at these aspersions. However, patronage, in Asian communities as elsewhere, has sometimes had real effect on Labour politics, whilst internal ideological differences have variously occurred along and cut across ethnic lines.

An underlying belief governing negative conceptions of Asian political participation is that these communities are politically motivated primarily by ethnic and kin considerations. This had not always necessarily been a common belief. In 1961, representatives of the Bradford PPP branch met with local Labour figures and told them that ‘Pakistanis were against being influenced to join any political party in a body, opinions were left to individuals’. Likewise, a 1964 Observer article about ‘immigrant’ political participation predicted that there would never be a ‘coloured political machine’ as in America. Solomos and Back’s study of Birmingham, however, shows deep concern amongst white Labour activists about the primacy in the politics of local Pakistanis of factors such as caste and kin emerging from the 1980s. In East London, Eade has suggested that the local Labour movement regarded the Bengali community as controlled politically by ‘godfather-like’ figures composing a ‘mafia’. Alison Shaw has suggested that Labour leaders in Oxford regarded Asian ‘community leaders’ as

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849 WYASB, EBCLP minutes, 60D84/3/1.  
850 Observer, 23/2/64  
‘controlling extensive mafia-like kinship groups which operate as political units’.

There is certainly evidence to support theories about the significance of Asian block votes. Lawrence’s 1974 study of Nottingham suggests that 45% of Pakistanis were supportive of ‘block votes’ as a conscious strategy, more than for any other groups. As will be discussed below, however, the relationship of communities and activists to these kinship mobilisations has been varied and ambiguous, and has shifted over time.

As will be shown, stigmatisation of Asian political engagement focused upon Muslim communities. This became more overt, and more directly related to religion, after the Rushdie affair. Kenan Malik, for example, describes this form of politics as having cloistered, in particular, Muslims. Commenting on the machinations involved as various factions supported different prospective successors to Max Madden as Labour candidate for Bradford West in the 1997 general election, one member of the CLP remarked that ‘it’s all about clans, castes and religion’.

At the head of these posited networks were ‘community leaders’, sought out by the local party and given a prime role in mediating between it and their ethnic group. In 1968, Munir Ahmed Akhtar stood for the Liberals in Rochdale. He was essentially left to his own devices as a campaigner, using his friends as canvassers and concentrating upon the Pakistani community. Meanwhile, a parallel, smaller campaign of white Liberals was aimed mostly at whites. Akhtar was relied upon simply to ‘deliver the vote’ of local Pakistanis. Similarly, in Huddersfield in 1970, Mohammed Sadiq’s adoption meeting was attended by just one Liberal

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855 Malik, *Fatwa to Jihad*, 76.
856 Guardian, 27/1/97
857 Le Lohé and Goldman, “Race in Local Politics”, 441.
councillor in the town, whilst the other twelve attended a different meeting.\footnote{Scott, “West Pakistanis in Huddersfield”, 42.} Duncan Scott that this demonstrates ‘how few Pakistanis [were] involved in any regular institutional and personal contact with the majority’.\footnote{Ibid., 43.} The media also picked up on these dynamics, with a 1972 \textit{Guardian} article suggesting that ‘it is known that the Pakistani community normally accepts the advice of its local leader’ in electoral terms.\footnote{\textit{Guardian}, 23/10/72} Jill Cove, secretary of Tower Hamlets Labour Party in the 1980s, has suggested that her branch sought contact with ‘community leaders’ who could deliver twenty or more votes rather than knocking on every door.\footnote{Glynn, “East End Bengalis”, 71.} ‘Community leaders’ could also have impact in factional disputes within parties. Solomos and Back depicted a dynamic in which early Pakistani entrants into the Birmingham Labour Party delivered votes for the city’s moderate MPs and recruited members who would help ensure the continued ascendancy of the local party’s right-wing faction. In exchange for this, Pakistani leaders received access to and favours from those MPs – influence which in turn cemented their own position within the community. One Labour activist in the city remarked that

‘they have a Godfather figure who comes along to meetings, who does all the dealings... [a]fter a period of time you begin to live with things that are way below your principles’.\footnote{Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 98.}

Some Pakistani activists bragged about their ability to deliver votes and members, using this openly as a bargaining chip.\footnote{\textit{Guardian}, 11/2/85} Mohammed Rafique, regarded as Roy Hattersley’s ‘right-hand man’ and an intermediary between him and local Pakistanis, as well as a county councillor, bragged in 1985 that ‘[t]here are people who join to please me... If I give the word at night, I can get a thousand people by morning’.\footnote{Ibid., 27/9/85}
The degree to which this dynamic has been inevitable and unchallenged, however, is more uncertain. Though kin was clearly important to political mobilisation in the mid-1980s in Tower Hamlets, were multiple poles of attraction were visible. Younger figures seeking candidacies and offices publicised the community work and anti-racist activism through which they had built their political reputations. Moreover, kinship could also be a cause of division. As Labour formed links with particular kinship groups in certain areas, other kin groups excluded from this dynamic were sometimes courted by other parties. White members often failed to appreciate the competition that could occur between kinship groups and the effects of political engagement and alliances with elites upon those competitions. Work with older political leaders who operated primarily through patronage links could also alienate younger activists who were not situated within such links, or prioritised other forms of identification in their politics. This was a significant dynamic in Ealing. White members recognised that the patronage system was not an absolute – one Labour activist in Birmingham remarked that

not all Asians or black people are part of this patronage system. There are many Asians who stand up honourably and argue against the things in the Labour Party that are wrong. What happens is that people on the right and the left justify what is going on by saying that every Asian member is a part of this patronage system...

A New Statesman article of 1995 significantly described in the past tense ‘a mutual relationship’ in which ‘community leaders delivered the vote, the councils delivered the money and the Labour party won a new layer of support’. In line with this, Purdam concludes from his recent work on English Muslim councillors that an ‘independent and diverse’ group of

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865 Jubo Barta, 4/86.  
867 Akhtar, British Muslim Politics, 63.  
868 Fitzgerald, Political Parties, 79.  
869 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 112.  
870 Geddes, “Inequality, Political Opportunity”, 160.
representatives is now appearing.\footnote{Purdam, “Democracy in Practice”, 152} Patronage networks, by ensuring the dominance of first-generation leaders often lacking the political and civic skills to enter national politics, have also been criticised for their inability to produce Muslim MPs.\footnote{Kingsley Purdam, “Settler Political Participation: Muslim Local Councillors” in W.A.R. Shadid and P.S. van Koningsveld eds., \textit{Political Participation and Identities of Muslims in Non-Muslim States} (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1997), 141.}

As well as potentially being a weapon in factional party disputes, the influence of leaders could help parties pursue general goals of ethnic minority recruitment. When the first Pakistani applied for membership to East Bradford CLP in the early 1960s, he was asked to reassure local party leaders that he would not be followed by a raft of further Pakistani applicants.\footnote{Fielding, “Brotherhood”, 92.} Whilst no doubt partly motivated by significant levels of xenophobia within white party leaderships, such concerns reflected real possibilities. In 1972, Bengali Bradford Labour figure Munawar Hussain was able to bring seventeen completed membership forms along with him to a meeting of West Bradford CLP.\footnote{WYASB, Little Horton Labour Party (LHLP) papers, 60D84/6.} Block membership of this sort was regarded as a ‘vexed question’ by the City party, with the West CLP’s willingness to accept such applications controversial. Labour’s national agent, H.R. Underhill, ultimately suggested that each CLP must decide for itself on the matter, but emphasised that applicants should not attend meetings until vetted.\footnote{Ibid.} Cove suggests that in Tower Hamlets it was common for influential Bengali members to bring one hundred or more completed memberships to party meetings.\footnote{Glynn, “East End Bengalis”, 72} This phenomenon occurred in other parties, though not on the same scale. In 1981, the Liberals in Ealing combined its five Southall ward branches into one organization, and Asian membership quadrupled in the next two years (roughly from 20 to 80), encouraging the party to revive the branches thereafter.\footnote{Fitzgerald, \textit{Political Parties}, 81.} Between 1984 and 1985, the size of the Labour branch in Spitalfields,
East London, doubled, with most new members being Bengalis. Although concern about mass recruitment campaigns often focused upon Muslim communities, Indians in Southall entered Labour at unprecedented rates in the mid-1980s. Even when there was no intimation that these new memberships were invalid, their sheer number, along with the sense that these members were unquestioning servants of ‘godfather’ figures, created anxiety. Sparkbrook’s membership secretary, Kevin Scally, claimed during the 1985 Bandung File episode that Sparkhill ward membership had climbed from 140 to 200 members in 1983-5.

In the early 1990s, Asian membership in Birmingham rose rapidly as the community took advantage of the offer of cut-price memberships for the unemployed. Muslim activists have tended to be open about mass recruitment, providing there is no suggestion of wrongdoing. One Muslim councillor interviewed by Purdam acknowledged that ‘Muslims believe in block membership’ and that this created suspicion.

Muslim members were less likely, however, to accept that these mass memberships featured irregularities. Nevertheless, allegations of such misdeeds were aired on a number of occasions. Nine of the 32 applications made by Muslims to join West Bradford CLP in 1978 were rejected for various reasons. Kevin Scally in 1985 spoke of a ‘phantom brigade’ of Pakistanis on membership lists, and referred to instances of ‘members’ being recruited without their knowledge. Cove suggests that in Tower Hamlets in the mid-1980s, many Bangladeshis’ applications betrayed discrepancies with the electoral roll, had not been completed by named people, or referred to people who had returned to Bangladesh or even

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878 Eade, Politics of Community, 72.
879 Guardian, 11/2/85
880 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 87.
881 Guardian, 8/6/96
883 WYASB, Little Horton Labour Party (LHLP) papers, 60D84/6, minute files.
884 Guardian, 27/9/85; Solomos and Back, Social Change, 87.
passed away. Concerns about the proprieties of Muslim memberships led to a number of investigations. 600 new applications made by Pakistanis in Manchester Gorton between September 1992 and May 1993, related by party officers to a campaign to unseat local MP Gerald Kaufman, were investigated in 1993. Asian members complained that the slow process of vetting their applications was intended to prevent their participation in selection meetings. An investigation by the North West Regional Organiser found no wrongdoing. Thereafter, two members, Iftikhar Ahmed and Mohammed Javed, threatened legal action against the CLP under the RRA. One Pakistani member said that ‘[w]e joined the Labour Party to support it, not to damage it. We have done all we can to obtain our rights but we have not been allowed to exercise them...’ In response, a group of eight Muslim members, headed by councillor Nilofer Siddiqui, wrote to the Guardian dismissing claims of racism in the party and highlighting Kaufman’s record on ‘race’ and immigration. In 1995, four CLPs in Birmingham – Ladywood, Perry Barr, Small Heath and Sparkbrook – were suspended, initially due to allegations of misuse of housing improvement grants in the area. However, the inquiry grew to encompass membership irregularities. It was alleged that as many as 400 Asian ‘members’ in the city did not match records on the electoral roll. Hattersley suggested that the investigation betrayed ‘no understanding of life in a constituency in which a majority of residents... come from the ethnic minorities. A large number of complaints amount to complaints that Muslims have behaved like Muslims.’ Two ward parties in Bradford, University and Toller, were also suspended, in 1994 and 1995 respectively, due to factional fighting, financial and membership irregularities, and the suggestion that, in Toller, some Pakistani members had actively campaigned for the Tories in local elections. Concerns about membership irregularities and mass entry prompted a national Membership Abuse Committee, with members including Clare

885 Glynn, “East End Bengalis”, 72
886 Guardian, 22/8/94
887 Ibid., 30/8/94
888 Ibid., 10/9/94
889 Ibid., 14/8/95; 1/2/96.
890 Ibid., 1/2/96
Short and Harriet Harman, to issue in 1995 a new ‘code of conduct’ for vetting membership. This aired fears that ‘the old trade union block vote has been replaced by an unofficial Asian block vote’. The document recommended that teams sent to vet members should be ‘women-friendly’ and ‘non-threatening’ and should contain ‘members who understand the languages and culture of the communities involved’. These guidelines apparently did little to obviate controversies, as evidenced by the protracted and confrontational selection battle in Glasgow Govan ahead of the 1997 general election in which Muhammad Sarwar was accused of receiving votes from ineligible members. Muslim representatives, recognising that Muslim applications ‘set alarm bells ringing’ for branches, have tended to deny the perpetration of illegal practices and to clearly state their opposition to these.

As in Glasgow and Manchester, mass entry has often been linked to support for certain candidacies. When 45 new Asian members joined the party in Brent shortly before candidate selections in 1981, this was regarded as an exploitative ploy by left-wing members to use this ‘voting fodder’ for an attempted takeover of the party. This was unsuccessful – moderate candidates were largely retained and 35 Asian applications were rejected. It has been suggested that this controversy in Brent was partly responsible for the ruling of the National Executive that only those who had been members in good standing for one year were eligible to vote at selection meetings. The Southall recruitment campaigns mentioned above occurred following Syd Bidwell’s decision to stand again in the 1987 general election despite his advancing age. Competing factions rallied for and against the incumbent. In response to this, Bidwell accused his long-time ally and Southall’s first Indian councillor, Sardul Gill, of

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891 Ibid., 2/4/95
892 Ibid., 15/12/95; 20/6/96; 22/6/96; 25/6/96.
893 Ibid., 147, 150.
894 Observer, 15/3/81
895 Fitzgerald, Political Parties, 37.
‘serpent-like activities’. In other contexts, left-wing activists accused moderate incumbents of using membership drives to shore up their position. During the membership controversy in Manchester Gorton described above, one Asian member suggested that ‘[m]any people would vote for Mr Kaufman but have been prevented from participating’. Scally, in an issue of Birmingham Labour Briefing, suggested that the ‘right-wing of the party [was] making a concerted effort to oust active, mostly left-wing, members from the branch’ and protect Hattersley. By 1990, however, in the neighbouring constituency of Small Heath, the moderate MP Denis Howell was bemoaning Pakistanis who ‘mysteriously appeared as members’ of the party two days before its AGM with intent to ‘take control’ of the branch. Mass recruitment to support Muslims seeking candidacies and offices also occurred. One Bengali activist in Tower Hamlets has suggested that Bengalis ‘got some money together and asked all the village people, all the people that they know, to become Labour Party member of... a particular [ward]’ and thereafter could become ‘whatever... in that particular party’. In 1997, Rajan Jalal was suspended from membership in Bethnal Green and Bow for orchestrating a mass recruitment campaign in support of his attempt to become PPC. Deselected councillors and MPs of all political stripes frequently complained about ‘Muslim mafias’ and selection meetings packed with members unable to speak English. For example in Birmingham, one white activist complained that, after voting procedures were explained in English, the ‘translation’ of this would consist of “vote for...” and then a list of names’. Interestingly, this activist suggests that objections to this ‘translation’ often came from Asian members. Similar allegations were made in Brent and Bradford. Even in 2001, this issue of

896 Guardian, 11/2/85
897 Ibid., 22/8/94; 10/9/94
898 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 87.
899 Guardian, 24/2/90
900 Glynn, “East End Bengalis”, 72
901 Geddes, “Inequality, Political Opportunity”, 164.
903 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 74.
904 Le Lohe, “Ethnic Minority Participation”, 81-2; Guardian, 15/3/81
kinship politics remained salient, and was raised in the report into the ‘riots’ in Oldham. In the report, it was suggested that *biraderi* politics was a ‘difficult area’ due to the problems involved in disentangling legitimate from illegal and unethical practices. It was, however, suggested that instances of ‘packing’ selection meetings, and resultant violence, still occurred and should be addressed.  

Justifications of mass recruitment and the use of these recruits as ‘voting fodder’ have been varied, and are not issued only by Muslim activists. As in Hattersley’s remarks above, the impression is sometimes created that this form of politics is simply inevitable for Muslims. White members in Birmingham have made comments about ‘people from the subcontinent who have a very different view about how politics is’ and suggested that such members ‘have operated exactly the same system that is operated in Pakistan’. A black councillor suggested that south Asian members ‘still think they are back in India’. More generously, Pakistani mass entry and block voting could be normalised by comparison with the trade union block vote, a constitutional feature of Labour politics for most of this period. At the time of the controversy in Birmingham, one anonymous MP remarked that ‘[t]he people who once complained about trade unions packing selection conferences are now complaining about some electors joining the Party’. Muslims also made this argument, with one young activist in Birmingham suggesting that ‘it’s a bit much Labour people talking about Asian factionalism given the record of the trade unions’. Despite obvious differences between these phenomena, the comparison was given force by incidents such as Roger Godsiff’s receipt of ‘votes’ from phantom union delegates during selection meetings in Birmingham Small Heath ahead of the 1992 general election. The fact that Godsiff was found guilty of this but allowed  

906 Solomos and Back, *Social Change*, 97-8, 156.  
907 *Guardian*, 8/6/96  
908 *Observer*, 23/2/97
to continue as candidate was regarded as reflecting a culture that permitted (illegal) practices amongst trade union delegates whilst condemning (technically/mostly legal) Asian block votes.\textsuperscript{909} More generally, it was often observed that white activists and candidates countenanced block votes when they benefited from them and opposed them when they did not.\textsuperscript{910} One activist in Birmingham, for instance, remarked that white representatives were ‘happy to have the votes if they go on the right side, but... have felt most aggrieved when their... ward has actually turned round and said “we’re sorry but we think Mohammed should represent us rather than you”’.\textsuperscript{911} Most positively, mass recruitment and block voting were justified as a way of enabling Muslims to achieve selection as candidates. Beginning as a resource by which Asian ‘leaders’ could increase their leverage by making themselves indispensible to white candidates, Asian activists later became determined to use their power bases for themselves.\textsuperscript{912} Muslim councillors have often made this point forcefully, suggesting that the use of block voting has been an efficient means of winning candidacies in a party that disadvantages Muslim members. One councillor interviewed by Purdam remarked that ‘[t]he Labour party has failed to nominate Muslims for “safe” “white” Labour seats, and so the Muslim community... recruited members from wards where they were strong’.\textsuperscript{913}

For Muslim Labour activists of the 1980s and 1990s, then, the tactics of mass recruitment and block voting have served as an alternative of sorts to initiatives like the black sections movement. Although the sections movement always had a current within it promoting grassroots mobilisation, its main successes were in increasing ethnic minority candidacies.\textsuperscript{914} Mass recruitment and block voting were individualistic alternatives to the sections, unconcerned with constitutional change. This is not to suggest that no Muslims were

\textsuperscript{909} Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 110.
\textsuperscript{910} Glynn, “East End Bengalis”, 72
\textsuperscript{911} Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 102
\textsuperscript{912} \textit{Ibid.}, 75
\textsuperscript{913} Purdam, “Democracy in Practice”, 150
\textsuperscript{914} Shukra, \textit{Changing Pattern}, 72.
involved in the Black Sections. Hassan Ahmed, for instance, a prominent figure in the party in Nottingham, was involved at a national level.\footnote{Observer, 3/5/87} But Muslims generally remained on the periphery of the movement.\footnote{Kingsley Purdam, “The Political Identities of Muslim Local Councillors in Britain”, Local Government Studies 26: 1 (2000), 60.} This degree of disengagement from black sections also reflected concerns about the role of Asians in a ‘Black’ movement. Clearly, Asians in Britain had the capacity to identify as ‘Black’, even if this was a contingent and instrumental identification that existed alongside other identities.\footnote{Solomos and Back, Social Change, 139} However, even where the tactics and logic of the black sections movement were embraced, the term ‘Black’ was sometimes avoided. An ‘Ethnic Minorities Section’ was formed in Bethnal Green and Stepney CLP in 1986, becoming a locus for the work of second generation Bengali Labour activists.\footnote{Jubo Barta, 4/86.} A Birmingham Muslim councillor suggested that dialogue between ethnic minority groups has in fact highlighted divisions due to ‘the caste system’ as well as ‘the divisions by religion [which] are very strong and apparent [when] there is some sort of misunderstanding between Afro-Caribbean and Asian’.\footnote{Solomos and Back, Social Change, 139.} The initial meeting of a black section in Hackney, attended by two Asians and three Afro-Caribbeans, witnessed a speech in which Asians were described as better achievers educationally, as more likely to benefit from ‘race relations initiatives’, as usually obtaining the ‘cushy jobs’ in community relations, and as in any case having ‘small businesses to fall back on’.

Asian dissatisfaction with the lack of specificity accorded to them by black sections was solidified in a suggestion made by some that the BSS should be named the Black and Asian Socialist Society. This campaign was supported by prominent figures such as the MPs Piara Khabra and Keith Vaz, and Paul Sharma, a founding member of the black sections movement. Jatin Haria, the Indian chair of the movement, dismissed the campaign as a ‘manufactured’

attempt to ensure that Asians would receive their own seats on Labour’s NEC. It is interesting to note in any case that all four of these figures were Indians and non-Muslims, suggesting that whatever their positions on political ‘Blackness’, Muslim activists were simply marginal in the black sections movement. The uncertain attitudes of the black sections movement towards religiously-motivated claims is emphasised by its reactions to the Rushdie affair. These were diverse -- Bernie Grant, for instance, called for solidarity with Muslim protestors, although the sections’ National Executive ultimately voted against any extension of blasphemy laws. Mike Wongsam, then a member of the Executive, remembers that disagreements about Rushdie were paralysing, as the sections ‘agreed that we would take a very low profile on the matter because we were trying to promote the unity of black people’. This reflects not a reluctance to support Muslims specifically but to endorse religion as an aspect of identity in general. In 1994, Cllr Bashirul Hafeez of Newham wrote to EMO Patrick Edwards to suggest that the national BSS should ensure representation for a wide range of groups, including Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims. Edwards responded that the BSS was indeed intended to be broad, but ‘the groups you list are not ethnic but religious groupings. I believe that provision specifically for candidates on this basis would be a very wrong step to take...’

At root, much of the concern about Muslim participation in the Labour Party was informed by a belief that Muslims could not be socialists. Ethnic minority activists in general have sometimes been regarded as concerned only with advancement of their ethnic communities and with ‘race’ and immigration issues. However, support for Labour amongst Asians, and sometimes Muslims specifically, has been exposed to especial scrutiny due to widespread belief that these communities are especially conservative, acquisitive and family-

921 Shukra, Changing Pattern, 84-5.
922 Jeffers, “Black Sections”, 75
923 Shukra, Changing Pattern, 79-80
924 PHM, LPRD papers, LPRD/35/7, Edwards to Bashirul Hafeez, 94.
oriented. In a few cases, Muslim activists in the Labour Party freely admit that they have little in common ideologically with the party. This is especially likely to be the case where the party is, or has been, the only route to local power – for example one Bengali in Tower Hamlets remarks that ‘we thought, OK, the fastest way to get in... will be through the Labour Party because that’s the party in control... it wasn’t for any political ideals... because all of them were just as bad’.\textsuperscript{925} This concern with power, taken to be evinced by the tactics of mass recruitment and block voting, has often been used to suggest that Muslims are not even ‘natural Tories’, but essentially apolitical. The \textit{Labour Herald}, for instance, suggested that the ‘community leaders’ with which local parties brokered deals were rarely socialists.\textsuperscript{926} Labour activists have sometimes made very general arguments about the lack of interest amongst Muslims in socialism. In Birmingham, one white activist suggested that ‘I would say that I’ve yet to meet the Asian who is a natural socialist, an ideological socialist... even the Asians who support us really aren’t in any way different from the Asians who support the Right’.\textsuperscript{927} Interestingly, these attitudes are sometimes mirrored in the Conservative Party. One Tory suggested that many Asian Conservatives in Birmingham are former Labour members and ‘are not Conservatives as such, their ideas are not conservative, they never have been and never will be, and they are slowly infiltrating the political groups...’\textsuperscript{928} Amongst Labour members, at least, there was an impression that Pakistani members could be educated into ideological sympathy with the party. Dennis Howell suggested that ‘[n]one of our immigrants are left-wing people, they’re inclined to be very right wing and one of the things over the years I’ve had to do is try to counsel them and talk to them about liberal/socialist values’.\textsuperscript{929} The association of Asians with small business ownership has also at times worked against them when seeking approval from fellow Labour members. Mike Watson’s campaign against Sarwar in Glasgow focused not

\textsuperscript{925} Glynn, “East End Bengalis”, 70.
\textsuperscript{926} Eade, “Political Construction”, 103.
\textsuperscript{927} Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 99.
\textsuperscript{928} \textit{Ibid.}, 167.
\textsuperscript{929} \textit{Ibid.}, 107.
only upon the latter’s alleged improprieties in recruiting members, but also his successful wholesale business and decision to educate his children privately.\footnote{Guardian, 12/12/95} Despite these persistent innuendos about Asian acquisitiveness, it is probably on issues of material need that Muslim Labour members have found most in common with activists from the white left.

As noted, academics as well as activists have upheld the dissociation of Muslim Britons from socialism. Philip Lewis, in a study of Bradford, declared it ‘questionable whether any Muslim group, even the determinedly secular AYM, can provide a home for radical politics’.\footnote{Lewis, “Being Muslim and Being British”, 85.} It is clear that many Muslims activists, and not just radicals, have identified as socialists. Indeed, many have been hurt by the reluctance of white colleagues to take them seriously as such. One community activist in Bradford complained that ‘it’s a pity that the Asian councillors... are perceived... to be representing the community, whe[n] a number of them have read about socialism... and they know why they’re standing for the Labour Party’.\footnote{BHRU, Here to Stay, 88.} A Muslim councillor interviewed by Purdam states that ‘I was labelled by “white” councillors as some sort of a fundamentalist but my own community thinks I am a socialist, which I am’ and adds that many white activists wonder “what do these men with beards and their women understand about socialism?”\footnote{Purdam, “Democracy in Practice”, 148.} Disputes between groups of Asian activists within parties have often had an ideological dimension, even if these ideological differences have sometimes been intersected with generational and demographic differences. Events in Southall, although a CLP in which most Asian members are non-Muslim Indians, illustrate this well. By the mid-1980s, vigorous activism by local white leftists left just one Asian member on the party’s GMC. This member remarked that the leftists were ‘very critical of some of the Asian councillors...’ and sympathised with these criticisms for ideological reasons, feeling that many Asians locally ‘are extremely reactionary – they’re supposed to be socialists but a lot of them won’t even
take a cup of tea in another Asian’s house if he belongs to the wrong caste’. Madhav Patil, secretary in Glebe ward, described himself as a ‘radical socialist’ working against the ‘traditionalist caste-oriented leaders of the community’ alongside other second-generation activists. However, Patil also criticised the ‘Trots’ in the party, whom he regarded as ‘the most confused faction’. In Tower Hamlets and Birmingham too, Muslims members constituted an element of the party distinct from local left and right factions. In East London, Bengali Labour members and their white colleagues have often been united by common opposition to Jamaati-influenced and Islamist youth organisations.

It is fair to suggest, however, that Muslim, Asian or ethnic minority Labour activists have sometimes clashed with other constituencies within the movement. Purdam has suggested that most Muslim councillors are ‘centrists’ within the Labour Party, though likely to be conservative on matters of family and education. Additionally, conflicts have related to the malleability of the ‘equal opportunities’ paradigm – male activists from ethnic minorities have sometimes chafed at the ability of white, middle-class women to appeal to this value for their own furtherance. Bengali activists in East London, for instance, displayed little proactive interest in gender equality issues. Both Labour and the SDP promoted all-women, but not all-ethnic minority shortlists, inviting resentment from non-white male activists. Opposition to Hewitt’s candidacy in Leicester reflected both frustration at the failure of Labour to pick an ethnic minority candidate, and upon the selection of a middle-class woman being seen as a victory for equal opportunities. These tensions, therefore, were enabled by the relative absence of ethnic minority, and especially Asian, women from mainstream politics. One

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934 Fitzgerald, Political Parties, 80.
935 Guardian, 11/2/85
939 Eade, Politics of Community, 82.
Pakistani councillor in Birmingham claimed that the promotion of women’s rights in candidate selection was a way of ‘trying to exclude us’. He further asked

[w]hy can’t we turn around and say, “[w]e’re interested in equality, if you don’t support us then we look at right-wing politics”? Why should we say that we have to support women, we have to support homosexuals... If you’re a black woman fair enough.  

A white female activist, meanwhile, suggested that ‘[i]t is like Muslim women are not involved at all in politics... so as left-wingers we turn a blind eye... we don’t do any dealings through women...’ Such impressions were not confined to white women – Cherry Mosteshar, a Labour member in Oxford, averred in 1995 that ‘[n]ot until our men join in the struggle to create a new feminist interpretation of the Koran can they expect to represent a party devoted to equality, justice and fairness’. It is likely, therefore, that the attitudes of some male Muslim members towards female colleagues did more to mark them out as ‘moderates’ within the party than their economic status. However, this scepticism towards feminism and gay rights was hardly the sole preserve of ethnic minorities within Labour, whilst the increased entry of Asian women into mainstream politics in the 21st century has broken down the binary between ‘Asian’ and ‘female’ activists.

IV

This chapter has provided a narrative of Asian and Muslim political participation in Britain. At the start of the 1960s, political engagement in these communities was low, reflecting uncertainties about settlement in Britain and adjustment to the political context of the new homeland. In this period, registration and turnout were both low. However, by the late 1970s,
various indicators – registration, turnout, party membership and candidacies – showed a rapid increase in British Asian political participation. These shifts were uneven between Asian communities and also context-dependent – the 1971 war in Bengal, for example, increased mobilisation amongst both East and West Pakistanis in England, and this was partly played out through party politics. Certain MPs, such as Cyril Smith in Rochdale, emphasised contacts with Asian organizations and so accelerated the increase in Asian political participation. There was from the mid-1970s an increased interest amongst parties in general in ethnic minority mobilisation. This both reflected and strengthened decisions by Asian migrants to settle in Britain, and later facilitated the creation of second-generation Asian political activists.

Registration and turnout increased quickly amongst British Asians, and outpaced that of whites in certain localities and elections by the mid-1970s. Party membership was slower to increase, meanwhile, although some ethnic minority community activists were involved, during the late 1970s, in the general entry of left-wingers into Labour. This process of increased mobilisation occurred primarily through the Labour Party, this link being facilitated by class, ‘ethnic’ and strategic factors.

This increased political mobilisation of Asian communities generated various responses from political parties. From the early 1960s, parties were eager to make contact with local Asian organizations that could provide advice about how to approach these communities, and were willing to make special provisions, particularly Asian-language material, to this end. These practices, however, were inhibited by procedural difficulties, political concerns about a ‘white backlash’ against the targeting of ethnic minorities, and generalised reservations about special provisions. These difficulties were approached in a number of ways – parties often produced exact translations of English-language material to avoid any suggestion that specific promises were being made to Asian voters. Although this may have provided transparency, it also meant that mainstream parties could be outflanked by independent candidates who were willing to
address Asian communities directly, in Asian languages, about their specific concerns. Structural changes were generally less controversial due to the low profile of groups such as the LPRAG and LPRRSG, the Conservative Societies and ONF, and the various bodies established by the Liberals/SDP/Liberal Democrats. However, the collapse of the AACS demonstrates the embarrassment that could occur when even marginal organizations devoted to ethnic minority politics turned their attentions away from internal party matters and towards sensitive substantive issues. For Labour, meanwhile, internal matters regarding the political integration of ethnic minorities have been most sensitive. Whilst top-down initiatives like the LPRAG entailed relatively little controversy, the black sections movement, being a bottom-up initiative directed at constitutional reform, was more divisive. Labour benefited from ethnic minority support, but this created expectations of reward within ethnic minority communities. Attempts at creating new structures for ethnic minority engagement with political parties, including the black sections but also ‘race relations’ committees and similar initiatives, have generally been established in particular localities as ad hoc responses to local difficulties. National initiatives such as the LPRAG and, later, BSS have functioned mostly by gathering information about the relevant work of CLPs and encouraging the adoption of certain procedures. This has permitted great variation between localities.

As shown, Muslim involvement in the black sections movement was marginal. This may be partly explained by the fact that some Muslim activists seeking candidacies and officer positions had alternative routes to advancement, including the ability to recruit and leverage the support of large numbers of branch members. White party colleagues were aware of this process, but overstated the simplicity with which it operated. In reality, kinship and patronage obligations could be a source of division as well as unity, whilst these factors always intersected with other aspects of political identity. Their conception of Asian political activity often gave white activists an ambivalent regard for that politics – it was viewed as a potentially
powerful source of support, but also as consisting in morally dubious, if not illegal, practices. There was also awareness amongst white actors that they might eventually be opposed by previously supportive power-bases of influential ‘leaders’. Despite this ambivalence, community ‘leaders’ became influential mediators between community and party and therefore an important, if informal, part of the multiculturalism institution. Whilst ‘bossism’ and group votes were hardly unknown to white political activity, Asian patronage politics drew especial attention due to the potential for opacity (Asian activists may conduct business in non-English languages), the feeling that newcomers to Britain may easily fall victim to political exploitation and/or be less willing to conform to unwritten rules, and because community leaders themselves were often suspected of being ‘natural Tories’. As illustrated above, this form of politics was, especially later in the period, often associated with Muslim communities specifically. One remarkable result of this was the request made by Birmingham Perry Barr CLP during a candidate selection in the late 1980s that Muslim members swear on the Koran that they were submitting a ‘legitimate’ vote. Apart from appearing incongruous, this request suggests the limited capacities that CLPs possessed to prevent block votes. Evidence from Bradford in the mid-1970s suggests that the national Labour Party was eager to contain controversies about block memberships and to leave ultimate decisions down to branches. Investigations by local parties into this behaviour had varied results, but in general suggest a limited degree of actual wrongdoing. In any case, actual rule-breaking was perhaps less threatening in general than the legal utilisation of block votes. However, the importance of Asian patronage politics appears to have declined. In the second- and third-generation, a sizable group of local Muslim politicians who do not rely on such dynamics has appeared. Regardless, both non-Muslim activists and some academics appear to have understated the degree to which ideological confluence drives Muslim attachment to Labour.

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943 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 104.
In the early 21st century, this attachment was tested to an unprecedented degree by the tensions arising from the ‘war on terror’ and the appearance of an alternative pole of political attraction for English Muslims, the Respect Party. Whilst previous armed conflicts, particularly the First Gulf War, created divisions between Muslims and Labour elites, the ‘war on terror’ greatly extended these fissures, whilst Respect, at least in 2005-7, offered a legitimate alternative addressing itself specifically to Muslims where none had existed previously. The appearance of this alternative coincided with the rise of Muslim activists who drew their independence from community rather than biraderi links. During major previous controversies involving Islam in the national British political sphere, such as the Muslim schools campaign and Rushdie affair, Muslim voters and activists had been faced with ambivalence from Labour and, in general, neglect or disdain from Conservatives. Unlike the two major parties, Respect was willing to foreground Muslim concerns about the Iraq war (and about Kashmir and Palestine), and to address Muslim communities directly and self-consciously with a distinct message. This helps to explain the rapid success of Respect – winning the Commons seat of Bethnal Green and Bow in 2005, fifteen council seats in 2006, including twelve in Tower Hamlets, and three more council seats in 2007 before the party’s split later in that year. Aside from this movement to Respect, Muslim support may well have assisted the anti-war Liberal Democrats in making at least three of its 2005 gains from Labour (Rochdale, Birmingham Yardley and Brent East). Simultaneously, it is clear that opportunities for Muslim activists who have remained in the Labour Party have increased. Since Sarwar’s election in 1997, nine different Muslim MPs have served in the Commons, and seven were returned at the 2010 general election. Amongst these are three women. At the local level, the number of Muslim councillors has also increased. These representatives are still predominantly male, but this reflects an inequality in the distribution of councillors across ethnic groups. This increase in opportunities for Muslim activists surely reflects in part a greater appreciation within Labour

for the Muslim vote, as this vote became larger, better-mobilised, and more contestable. This highlights another paradox of ethnic mobilisation demonstrated elsewhere in analyses of British multiculturalism – ethically-specific mobilisation, in this case through Respect, could foster integration in some respects as mainstream organizations, in this case Labour, sought to harness this potentially powerful mobilisation for their own ends.
The Rushdie affair has, since the beginning of 1989, been regarded as a central moment in the history of Muslim communities in Britain. More recent events, both in Britain and abroad, have provided more explosive images of violence and an even more urgent discourse focussed upon national security, but the controversy over *The Satanic Verses* still looms large in scholarship on British Muslims. Disagreement about the precise character of the affair’s significance exists, but there is broad agreement about the general developments it stimulated. It is usually agreed that the affair created in Britain a considerable interest in, and concern about, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, a social movement and political ideology that until then had been seen as an alien phenomenon confined to the Persian and Arab world. This was not a matter purely of significance for British international relations, since British Muslims were frequently regarded as a dangerous ‘fifth column’. However, treatments of the affair focussed upon domestic developments have usually stressed the challenges that newly-assertive Muslims were taken to pose for the logic of British anti-racism and multiculturalism. ‘Anti-racism’, the argument runs, had been based upon tackling racism experienced by ‘Black’ (i.e. non-white) communities. In this scheme, recognition of the cultural specificities and needs of ethnic minority communities was of relatively little importance, amounting perhaps to acknowledgement of the unique barriers faced by immigrants attempting to access equal educational, employment, and welfare opportunities. Simultaneously, it is argued that concessions made in the name of multiculturalism or good ‘race relations’ primarily related to language and ‘culture’, and relegated religion to the private sphere. The Rushdie affair, it is often claimed, overturned these orthodoxies by highlighting the potential for ethnic minorities to organise along religious lines, breaking up conventional categories of analysis (such as

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‘Black’ and ‘Asian’) and demanding religious concessions in the public sphere. Such arguments depend upon establishing that claims-making by ethnic minorities along religious lines was essentially unknown in Britain prior to the affair. Many studies making just such a contention were identified in the introductory chapter, whilst the preceding chapters of this thesis have questioned this presentation.

Unlike those analyses that present the Rushdie affair as creating a sudden sea change in relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in Britain, this chapter will focus on the affair’s moulding of existing relationships between Muslim communities and British elites. The remainder of the chapter will consist of three sections. The first will provide a brief of narrative the affair itself alongside a more substantial detailing of, particularly, left-leaning responses to it. The second will consider these responses in a more analytical fashion, focussing upon the challenges the affair posed to understandings of key concepts such as free speech, secularism, equality, and multiculturalism. It will be argued that reactions to the affair often attempted to fit the events into long-established frames. The third section will offer concluding remarks focussed upon two issues: firstly, the need to situate the affair both in a longer history of religio-political mobilisation by British Muslims and in the contemporaneous context of ongoing ‘community relations’ issues, and, secondly, the suggestiveness of the Satanic Verses controversy about the limits of inter-cultural dialogue when fundamental values are at stake.

II

The Satanic Verses was a controversial novel even before it was published. An Indian reviewer of the book, Khushwant Singh, described the book as ‘lethal’, predicting that it would cause ‘a lot of trouble’.948 Nevertheless, publication by Viking-Penguin went ahead on September 28th

948 The Times, 20/2/89.
1988. The potential sources of offence to Muslims identified by Singh were numerous. Most seriously, in two of the book’s chapters, both dream sequences, the life of the prophet Mohammed is re-imagined. Specifically, Rushdie explores the historical narrative of the ‘satanic verses’, a series of lines supporting polytheism supposedly included in the Koran by the Prophet under the temptation of Satan but later removed. Although the original sources supporting the historicity of the ‘satanic verses’ incident are themselves Muslim, its veracity is generally denied by Koranic scholars. Throughout Rushdie’s novel, Mohammed appears as ‘Mahound’ – a medieval name for the Prophet used by Christian anti-Islamic propagandists. ‘Mahound’ is portrayed by Rushdie as altering various important aspects of Allah’s revelations when writing the Koran. Elsewhere in the book, ‘Mahound’ and his companions are referred to in abusive terms by other characters. In a later chapter, the sceptical satirist Baal takes refuge in a brothel named ‘The Veil’ – a reference to the hijab and purdah. The prostitutes at The Veil – the architecture of which materialises the ‘Five Pillars’ of Islam – are named after Mohammed’s wives. Much of this material was likely to be especially offensive to Barelwi Muslims, given their emphasis upon veneration and imitation of the Prophet. In explaining the significance of the novel for Muslim believers to Westerners, therefore, observers sometimes argued that the book was best understood not as an assault on beliefs or an historical person, but as an insult to the millions of Muslims who regarded the Prophet as a model for their own lives.

Extracts of passages from the book potentially offensive to Muslims first circulated around Britain in October 1988, with mosques and other organizations receiving excerpts from

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There was then a flurry of activity amongst these organizations, with material about the book being exchanged, and letters and phone-calls of protest being organised. On October 11th, the United Kingdom Action Committee on International Affairs (UKACIA) was launched. This was a broad group featuring representatives from over fifty organizations, primarily Jamaat-influenced groups, headed by a fourteen-man steering committee. The organization was chaired and co-convened by Dr Mughram al Ghamdi, a Saudi diplomat and chair of the ICC. The other co-convenor was Iqbal Sacranie, who later became known as general secretary of the MCB, and who was then chair of Balham Mosque’s management committee. Other significant organizations represented on UKACIA included the UMO, led by Dr Syed Pasha, the British Muslim Action Front (BMAF), which would become notable for organising the largest anti-Rushdie demonstration, in London in May 1989, and for making a legal case against *The Satanic Verses* under British blasphemy laws, and the mostly Barelwi BCM. UKACIA therefore, formally at least, made alliances across national, ethnic, sectarian and class divides, bringing together Arabs, South Asians and East African Asians, professionals (like Al Ghamdi) with small businessmen and labourers (such as the BCM leaders), and Barelwis and Deobandis.

UKACIA and its various member organizations quickly established themselves as the mainstream of Muslim anti-Rushdie activists. This was despite their influence being unevenly spread across Britain – in particular, the Committee lacked prominent members from East London’s Bangladeshi community, and protests against Rushdie in the East End remained

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952 Ahsan and Kidwai, *ibid.*, 9; *Guardian*, 16/2/89.
953 Ahsan and Kidwai, *ibid.*, 337.
954 *ibid.*, 363-5.
955 *Bradford Telegraph & Argus*, 17/2/89.
‘muted and fragmented’. This reflects firstly the strain of moderate secularism present amongst many first-generation migrants influenced by the cultural nationalism of the campaign for Bangladeshi independence. The British-educated second generation of this community also emphasised secular factors, such as anti-racism, representation and recognition for a ‘culture’ of which religion was only one part, in local political campaigning. Shorter-range factors, such as the prestige gained by the BCM through campaigning against Honeyford, meant that religious organisations had greater capacity to mobilise in parts of the North than in East London. Furthermore, the Islamist youth organisations gathering momentum in East London during that period do not seem to have been moved to defend Mohammed in the same manner as devotionalist Barelwis did.

Aside from its geographical unevenness, UKACIA also weathered intellectual challenges – for example from Dr Kalim Siddiqui, a former Guardian sub-editor whose Muslim Institute had once been funded by Saudi Arabia, but was now financed by Khomeini’s Iran. Siddiqui was a steadfastly pro-Iran figure who repeatedly criticised UKACIA as meek and pro-Western. In late October, the UKACIA and, separately, the UMO, wrote to Penguin Books about their concern, asking for the book to be withdrawn. The demands were dismissed. In December, a copy of The Satanic Verses was burned in Bolton, though little press attention was given to this. On January 14th, however, a second book-burning, in Bradford, attracted

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959 Kalim Siddiqui, The Implications of the Rushdie Affair for Muslims in Britain (London : The Muslim Institute, [1989]).
960 Ahsan and Kidwai, Sacrilege Versus Civility, 337-9; Sunday Times, 19/2/90.
far greater coverage. Public outcry was predictable, with a number of commentators comparing Bradford Muslims to members of the Nazi Party.962

Leading articles on the issue were, especially after the book-burning, strongly admonitory in tone even before Khomeini issued on February 14th his fatwa, or judgement, that Rushdie was an apostate who by Islamic law must be killed. On March 7th, Iran cut diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. These events unsurprisingly gave an hysterical tone to treatments of the affair, as well as internationalising its scope. On May 27th, the largest anti-Rushdie demonstration was held, in Hyde Park. Over 15,000 protestors were estimated to be in attendance, with 38 arrests made.963 The government’s most comprehensive response to these protests came in July, as Home Office Minister John Patten addressed an open letter to British Muslims ‘about what it means to be British, and particularly what it means to be a British Muslim’. The letter stressed that ‘greater integration in the sense of a fuller participation in British life does not mean forfeiting your faith or forgetting your roots’, since there is ‘plenty of room for diversity and variety’. However, the need for ‘full participation’ was firmly laid out, since there ‘cannot be room for separation or segregation’.964 In a reply, Sacranie assured Patten that British Muslims did aim at ‘full participation’, but, in turning to the *The Satanic Verses*, he regretted the lack of ‘willingness on the part of government to take effective action’.965 This lack of a resolution was not redressed by Rushdie’s rejoinder to his critics, printed as ‘In Good Faith’ by the *Independent on Sunday* on February 4th 1990. Rushdie at the close of his piece claimed that he had intended to address ‘that great mass of ordinary, decent, fair-minded Muslims’, but in fact most of the text was an uncompromising and self-exculpatory broadside at his critics.966

962 *Independent*, 16/1/89; *Times*, 17/1/89; *Sunday Times*, 22/1/89; *Guardian*, 17/2/89.
964 *The Times*, 5/7/89.
966 *Independent on Sunday*, 4/2/90.
witnessed five further book burnings in Britain, which ensured a tense backdrop to the wider debate. In December, the world learned of Rushdie’s bizarre conversion to Islam, apparently conducted in Egypt and engineered by the Anglo-Egyptian dentist and leading (and perhaps only) member of the Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance, Hesham el Essawy. This conversion came along with a promise from Rushdie that he would not permit the publication of a paperback or further translations of his novel. However, Rushdie’s became increasing distant from his new faith through 1991, describing himself as a ‘secular Muslim’ in a September interview.67 On December 12th, he restated his commitment to the publication of *The Satanic Verses* in paperback, essentially withdrawing the only significant concessions that could be offered to Muslims.68 Despite Rushdie’s renewed defiance, Iran resolved in 1998, as part of its attempts to improve relations with the West, not to make or encourage attempts on Rushdie’s life.69

Like the affair itself, reactions to it passed through a number of stages. The first reference to *The Satanic Verses* in the House of Commons came on December 1st 1988 in an Early Day Motion (EDM) tabled by Conservative MP Ken Hargreaves, the member for Hyndburn, a Lancashire town with a significant Muslim population. The motion simply noted the distress caused by the book, and reminded authors that ‘freedom of speech goes hand in hand with responsibility to ensure the accuracy of what is written’. By the end of February, 36 MPs had signed the motion, including six Labour representatives.70 On December 9th, Max Madden, Labour MP for Bradford West, probably the constituency with the highest proportion of Muslim residents, called for a parliamentary debate about freedom of expression and religious values.71 The book-burning in Bradford stimulated a flurry of activity. Bradford’s

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67 *Guardian*, 21/9/91.
66 *Independent*, 13/12/91.
70 Parliamentary Archives (PA), London, UK, private correspondence.
71 *Bradford Telegraph & Argus*, 9/1/89.
Labour Lord Mayor Mohammed Ajeeb suggested that the book should be withdrawn from public libraries in the city and from W.H. Smith stores.\textsuperscript{972} His fellow Muslim Labour councillor Ashiq Hussain called for the book to be banned. Madden, for his part, supported the insertion of a ‘health warning’ into copies of the book, which would stress its fictional nature and note the offence it had caused to Muslims.\textsuperscript{973} He also, along with three other Labour MPs (Bernie Grant, Brian Sedgemore, and Harry Cohen), introduced an EDM in the Commons on January 17th, calling for a parliamentary debate on the issue; a televised debate featuring Rushdie and British Muslim leaders; the adoption of the ‘health warning’ in remaining hardback and forthcoming paperback copies of the book; and, most interestingly, \textit{either} the abolition of Britain’s blasphemy laws (which then protected only Christian beliefs) or their extension to cover Islam.\textsuperscript{974} 13 MPs, all Labour backbenchers, signed the motion. In February 1991, Madden offered an alternative solution to inequality of the blasphemy laws, suggesting their replacement with a law prohibiting incitement to religious hatred.\textsuperscript{975} Around the same time, at a public rally against \textit{The Satanic Verses}, Labour’s Yorkshire West MEP Barry Seal pledged to the crowd that he would work for the book’s banning. With Khomeini’s death sentence already having been issued by this point, the silence of the party’s leadership seemed curious, if not distasteful, to some observers.\textsuperscript{976} This caution was also observable in the CRE’s declaration that it had ‘no position’ on religious issues and in Bradford CRC’s decision to eliminate discussion of the issue from the agenda of its March meeting.\textsuperscript{977} On February 21st, Labour’s leadership finally addressed the affair. Neil Kinnock stated that Labour condemned the \textit{fatwa} but noted that the vast majority of Muslims in Britain were ‘law-abiding citizens who are opposed to any illegal act…’, whilst also arguing that Rushdie was ‘free, under the law of this

\textsuperscript{972} \textit{Ibid.}, 14/1/89; \textit{Independent}, 16/1/89.  
\textsuperscript{973} \textit{Bradford Telegraph & Argus}, 16/1/89.  
\textsuperscript{974} PA, private correspondence.  
\textsuperscript{975} \textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{976} \textit{New Statesmen}, 17/1/89.  
\textsuperscript{977} \textit{Independent}, 21/1/89; \textit{Bradford Telegraph & Argus}, 8/3/89.
free country, to publish...’ Shadow Home Secretary Gerald Kaufman and Rushdie’s own MP Chris Smith echoed these remarks.  

At the end of February, Bradford’s Tory council took the decision to remove the book from the shelves of public libraries (though it remained available on request). This decision divided councillors across party lines. Barry Thorne, a Labour councillor and chair of the city’s recreation committee, strongly condemned the decision and announced that he would contest its legality. Simultaneously, Ajeeb welcomed the move, but described it as ‘a small gesture’. Madden’s reactions to these events is unclear, but in this period he tabled a further Early Day Motion calling for the publication of The Satanic Verses to be stopped. The motion was also signed by Grant, Cook, Tom Cox and Keith Vaz. Madden’s CLP passed a motion calling for withdrawal of the book. Madden also demanded, on a number of occasions, more parliamentary discussion of the matter. At this time, increasing attention was being given to Vaz’s involvement in the anti-Rushdie protests. At a 3,000-strong march in Leicester in March, Vaz appeared carrying a banner depicting Rushdie’s head, complete with horns and fangs, superimposed on a dog’s body. Vaz also appeared, though seemingly without his colourful placard, at the large London demonstration in May, where he called for the withdrawal of Rushdie’s novel. His behaviour during the Leicester protest and support for withdrawal led to rumours that the Labour leadership would deselect him before the 1993 general election. Reacting to this, Mohammad Butt, the president of the Leicester Pakistani Muslim Welfare Association threatened that ‘[i]f Vaz is touched, we will take revenge on Roy

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978 Hansard, HC Deb, 21/2/89, c834.
979 Guardian, 23/2/89; Bradford Telegraph & Argus, 23/3/89.
980 Guardian, ibid.
981 PA, private correspondence.
982 Bradford Telegraph & Argus, 24/4/89.
983 For example, ibid., 9/1/89.
984 Guardian, 12/3/89.
985 Sunday Times, 28/5/89.

Hattersley in Birmingham Sparkbrook... In July, Vaz complained in a Tribune editorial that ‘we are the party that will support every black issue anywhere in the world except those sitting on our doorstep’. In response, Kinnock, while clarifying that Labour had no party line on the affair, strongly rebuked Vaz’s position. From late 1989, and into 1990, discussion focussed upon publication of The Satanic Verses in paperback. Despite the seeming arbitrariness of this question, it generated much debate, and Labour figures were ranged on both sides. Supporters of a paperback version included Kinnock, Michael Foot, Bob Cryer, MP for Bradford North, and Clare Short of Birmingham Ladywood. Some of the opponents of a paperback were predictable – Madden and Vaz, for example – but others, including Alistair Darling, Michael Meacher and George Galloway had not previously been prominent in the affair. Roy Hattersley, the party’s deputy leader, distanced himself, albeit in a rather tortuous way that was widely mocked in the media, from colleagues such as Vaz and Madden by stressing that he hoped Rushdie would voluntarily withhold a paperback.

Hanging over Labour responses to the affair was the persistent suggestion – in the media, primarily, rather than by representatives of other parties – that any criticism of Rushdie was motivated solely by desire for Muslim votes. The media implied a ‘correct’ Labour response to the affair – one that stressed the primacy of freedom of expression and, while permitting acknowledgement of the hurt caused to Muslims by The Satanic Verses, essentially backed Rushdie. This position could be regarded either as an objectively ‘right’ position, or the one most consonant with Labour or socialist principles. Addressing the criticisms in October 1990, Hattersley pointed out that he did not ‘recall The Times... drawing attention to the fact

986 Ibid., 26/3/89.
987 Independent, 22/7/89.
988 Ibid., 21/7/89, 22/7/89, 4/2/90; Hansard, HC Deb, 3/7/90, c886.
990 Sunday Times, ibid.
991 New Statesman, 24/2/89, 23/3/89, 2/6/89; The Times, 25/6/89; Guardian, 5/2/90.
992 New Statesman, ibid.; The Times, 24/2/89, 12/3/89; Sunday Times, 23/7/89.
that Tory MPs who call for tax cuts represent families with high incomes. Many of the Labour MPs most willing to countenance actual concessions to Muslims offended by Rushdie’s work did indeed represent large Muslim populations. Madden and Hattersley both did. Vaz had a large Asian population in his constituency, and a Guardian article suggested that this, along with his narrow majority (just under 2,000 votes) could explain his stance on the affair. As, Vaz himself noted, only about 5% of his constituents were Muslims. MPs with large Muslim populations in their constituencies were the most likely to express public opinions about the issue, whatever their substance. Bob Cryer and Pat Wall, the Militant MP for Bradford North, all spoke in essentially unqualified support of Rushdie. Representatives who involved themselves in the affair brought a variety of interests to bear upon it. Mark Fisher, one of Rushdie’s most strident supporters, had a special interest in the matter due to his arts-related post. Smith likewise had a personal reason for defending Rushdie. A perhaps surprising number of MPs representing Scotland, five in all, signed Madden’s motion calling for Rushdie to apologise and for blasphemy laws to be ‘equalised’. It might be suggested that these MPs, given Scotland’s history of sectarian conflict, were particularly sensitive to the combustibility of religious conflict. Finally, a group of MPs including Vaz, Grant, and perhaps others, saw the issue as (in the words of Vaz) one of ‘race and power’. For them, despite the obviously central nature of religious affiliation to the affair, it could still be understood in terms of the cultural marginalisation of a ‘racial’ minority group. For Labour representatives, questions of political expediency were no doubt considered when formulating responses to the controversy, but there was no ‘natural’ determination of the significance of foundational concepts such as free speech, cultural pluralism, secularism, and equality. Rather, the meanings of these concepts were constantly up for debate.

993 Guardian, 11/10/90.
994 Ibid., 22/2/90.
995 Ibid., 14/2/90.
996 Ibid.
The area of minimal agreement for elites during the affair was that Khomeini’s death sentence must be opposed. It is worth noting, however, that this consensus did not uniformly extend to Muslim groups. Some British Muslim figures, such as Hesham el Essawy and the self-styled fundamentalist intellectual Shabbir Akhtar, who was close to the BCM, expressed outright opposition to the fatwa, with Essawy even travelling to Iran to promote its abrogation.997 This should not be taken to suggest that only ‘educated’ Muslims opposed the sentence – a Harris poll in October 1989 suggested that only around 30% of Muslims supported it.998 Moreover, it has been suggested that many Muslims who were privately disconcerted by the death sentence may have found this difficult to communicate in public.999 However, a common position among British Muslim leaders was that the death sentence was valid, but should not be carried out in Britain due to the need to respect local laws. In February 1989, two members of the BCM, Syed Abdul Quddus and Faqir Mohammed, were reported by the Bradford Telegraph & Argus to have supported the death sentence. After a two hour emergency meeting, the BCM’s leading members, Sher Azam and Liaqat Hussain, claimed that the two had been ‘misquoted’ and that there was no question of them breaking British laws, or encouraging others to do so.1000 Young Muslims in Bradford pressed the BCM to support the fatwa, storming a meeting of the organisation to push for this, but to no avail. Quddus, after leaving the BCM over the controversy, formed Al-Mujaheed, a more radical organisation, and its youth wing, the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM) became somewhat prominent locally in organising protests against Rushdie.1001 For their part, Hussain and Azam regarded the death sentence breezily in general, taking the position simply that Rushdie had invited threats on his

998 Ibid., 20/10/89.
999 Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, 300.
1000 Ibid., 16/2/89.
1001 Samad, “Politics of Islamic Identity”, 96.
life by writing *The Satanic Verses*.*¹⁰⁰²* Similarly ambiguous was the response of Sacranie, who said of Rushdie that ‘[d]eath, perhaps, is a bit too easy for him. His mind must be tormented for the rest of his life unless he asks for forgiveness to Almighty Allah...’¹⁰⁰³ *Impact International*, the journal of the Islamic Foundation, also argued that the death sentence, while valid in jurisprudential terms, could not be carried out in Britain.¹⁰⁰⁴ The claim by some English Muslims that, in legal terms at least, Khomeini’s *fatwa* was unassailable for Muslims is belied by the *fatwa* of Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Grand Mufti of Egypt, that no Muslim could be sentenced to death without a fair trial.¹⁰⁰⁵ It has been suggested that the silence of many other Islamic scholars on Khomeini’s sentence probably indicated disapproval also.¹⁰⁰⁶ Regardless, the assertiveness of Khomeini in taking a strident stance against Rushdie – something which Saudi Arabia was seen as having failed to do – made criticising the judgement impolitic for many Muslim leaders. The ambiguity required to save face both with the Western media and the Muslim intellectual *ummah* is perhaps best evidenced by the stance of Abdal Chowdhury, leader of the BMAF, who declined to comment on Khomeini’s *fatwa* since it was a ‘separate issue’ from the British campaign against the book.¹⁰⁰⁷

Muslim leaders were not, however, reticent about calling for the book to be banned and withdrawn from sale. It has been noted above that both Sacranie and Pasha wrote to Penguin calling for the book to be withdrawn. Al Ghamdi also wrote to Thatcher calling for the book’s banning.¹⁰⁰⁸ An early call for a ban came from Sher Azam, and he was soon joined by Kalim Siddiqui.¹⁰⁰⁹ Aban on *The Satanic Verses* was rarely given serious consideration by

¹⁰⁰² *The Times*, 20/2/89.
¹⁰⁰³ *Guardian*, 18/2/89.
¹⁰⁰⁷ *Guardian*, 28/5/89.
¹⁰⁰⁸ *Independent*, 30/1/89.
¹⁰⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 16/1/89; *Guardian*, 15/5/89.
representatives of the white left. Many left-wing politicians simply stated their commitment to free speech without qualification. In a letter to the *Guardian*, Diane Abbott wrote flatly that ‘censorship is wrong’.\footnote{Guardian, 16/2/89.} The leader of the Labour group in Bradford, Phil Beeley, commented similarly that the party was opposed to censorship.\footnote{Bradford Telegraph & Argus, 24/4/89.} Perhaps unsurprisingly given his post within the shadow cabinet, Fisher referred to the need for the ‘absolute principle of freedom of speech’ to be defended.\footnote{Hansard, HC Deb, 13/3/89, c112.} For these figures, ‘freedom of speech’ was apparently an absolute and indivisible principle, needing to be defended with action rather than argumentation. Others, taking a more instrumentalist approach, argued that Britain’s status as an open society would be in jeopardy if the book were banned – Smith, for instance, related Rushdie’s plight to the need to be able to ‘write... peacefully’ in a ‘democratic society’.\footnote{Ibid., 21/2/89, c842.} Michael Foot felt that attacking certain instances of speech through any means other than more speech could work to ‘suppress the truth’.\footnote{PHM, Michael Foot papers, MFB6, Foot to Dr & Mrs Qureshi, 3/11/88.}

Other left-wing representatives took more qualified, or contingent, attitudes towards free expression. Bob Cryer, taking a legalistic perspective, noted that if *The Satanic Verses* had libelled or defamed a living person, or promoted racial hatred or discrimination, then it would be actionable, but, as it did not, it fell into the bounds of permissible speech.\footnote{Bradford Telegraph & Argus, 20/7/89.} This at least served as an acknowledgement that freedom of speech was not in reality treated as indivisible. An interestingly qualified statement of support for the principle of free expression came from Roy Hattersley, who asserted that ‘[a] free society does not ban books’.\footnote{Independent, 21/7/89.} This may appear to be, and may have been intended as, a comment identical in substance to those of Abbott, Fisher, and others. However, the reference specifically to ‘books’ may have been intended to suggest, as then-vice chair of the CRE Bhikhu Parekh has, that ‘serious literary work’ should be
subject to minimum constraints. Likewise, Michael Foot’s defence of Rushdie hinged at least partially on the belief that *The Satanic Verses* was an excellent work. Figures associated with Labour were perhaps motivated to extend absolute protection only to certain types of speech acts because of their party’s recent history of establishing legal restrictions upon some forms of speech. In particular, the 1976 RRA bore heavily upon discussions of *The Satanic Verses*, having made incitement to racial hatred a criminal offence in Great Britain. Protection under this law was denied to Muslims directly, though it was offered to certain religious groups, namely Jews and Sikhs, considered to have a significant ‘ethnic’ character. David Caute’s comment in the *New Statesman* that many Labour MPs had suddenly ‘discovered’ that free speech had limits, then, appears to be the opposite of the truth. Labour MPs who had voted for, or at least expressed no public opposition to, the 1976 RRA, now felt not only that Rushdie’s book deserved to be distributed without restriction (a position in no way in tension with support for the criminalisation of racist incitement), but declared the principle of free expression to be inviolable. It seems clear then, that Labour MPs, all non-Muslims, mostly secularists if not agnostics or atheists and all surely opponents of overt racism, regarded types of speech to which they were substantively unsympathetic as far better candidates for restriction than those which they admired, sympathised with, or regarded as non-threatening.

Given this, it is unsurprising that actors sensitive to the Muslim protests attempted to insert the issue into frames in which the legitimacy of speech restrictions was generally accepted. Attempts to present attacks on Mohammed as instances of group defamation have been noted above. A different argument suggested that the book was libellous. Said Bustami, imam of the Great Mosque in Edinburgh, commented that ‘[f]or us, the Prophet is a

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1017 Parekh, *Rethinking Multiculturalism*, 320.
1018 PHM, Foot papers, MFB6, Foot to Farooqi, 23/12/88.
1019 *New Statesman*, 2/6/89.
1020 *Independent*, 21/1/89.
living being, and he has been libelled...

1021 Such argumentation was not limited to Muslim figures -- The Times’ Clifford Longley suggested that non-Muslims could best understand Rushdie’s comments about Mohammed as libel against a deceased person held in extremely high regard by a group of living persons. 1022

From a radically different perspective, Keith Vaz, whilst arguing that the affair ‘has... less to do with religion than it has to do with race and power...’, wrote that ‘[t]here is no such thing as absolute freedom of speech. Society invokes laws to protect those who may be attacked because of their sex and colour’. 1023 In softer terms, in an EDM tabled in February 1991, Madden suggested that ‘unfettered freedom of speech is impossible in a multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-faith society such as the United Kingdom’. 1024

As mentioned above, discussion of the affair began, by late 1989, to fixate upon the possibility of The Satanic Verses appearing in paperback. Despite the fact that the work was already widely available in libraries and shops in hardback form, some of those who supported a paperback framed the matter as one of free expression. Roy Jenkins, a chief architect of the 1976 RRA, argued that to oppose a paperback was to begin descent ‘down a very slippery slope’. 1025 Likewise, Fisher viewed the publication of a paperback as essential for the defence of free speech. 1026 Considering these strident justifications, it is perhaps unsurprising that a number of figures opposed to the paperback exhibited some squeamishness about expressing their position. Hattersley expressed the belief that ‘it would be better’ if no paperback were published, but evidently believed that self-censorship should be the means of realising this. 1027

Michael Meacher similarly communicated ‘hope’ that Rushdie would not publish a

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1021 Sunday Times, 4/2/90.
1022 The Times, 25/2/89.
1023 Independent, 14/10/90.
1024 PA, private correspondence.
1025 Independent, 4/2/90.
1026 Ibid., 6/2/90.
1027 Ibid., 6/2/90.
paperback. Hattersley also viewed the withholding of a paperback as a way to avoid further hurt being caused, to signify ‘regret’ at its publication, and an expression that there ‘can now be no doubt’ that the book was offensive and inflammatory. Placing responsibility with Rushdie for such expression of regret was odd, however. The novelist had already expressed ‘regret’ and had made it clear he would countenance no further concessions. Any limitation of Muslim hurt would therefore require action from some other source, such as publishers, retailers or government.

Questions of free speech raised by the affair often intersected with discussions about British blasphemy laws. Addressing the existing inequality of those laws, Madden in January 1989 tabled an early day motion ‘to draw attention to the need to reform the law to permit all religious faiths to seek legal redress for blasphemy or to repeal the law of blasphemy’. This motion, rather oddly, seemed to suggest that its signatories had no particular stance about protecting religious beliefs in legislation, but simply valued the principle of legal equality between faiths. That the signatories could apparently find such widely divergent legal arrangements equally palatable led to misunderstandings – sometimes, perhaps, deliberate ones – in the press. The Times, the Independent and the Guardian all published articles suggesting that the motion called specifically for the extension of blasphemy laws. The Guardian piece, written by Ian Aitken, was deeply uncomplimentary about three of the four signatories (Harry Cohen escaped mention) – Bernie Grant was described as ‘supporting religious obscurantism’, Madden as ‘the supposedly leftwing Tribunite MP... [who] represents the book burners of Bradford in Parliament’, and Brian Sedgemore as having abandoned his ‘devotion to the ideal of free speech...’ Sedgemore claimed in response that he had been intending to express his support for the abolition of the blasphemy laws, and communicated to

1028 Ibid., 22/7/89.
1029 Sunday Times, 21/5/89; Independent, 21/7/89.
1030 PA, private correspondence.
1031 Independent, 18/1/89; Guardian, 20/1/89; The Times, 27/1/89.
Muslims in his constituency his opposition to censorship.\textsuperscript{1032} By February, Madden had clarified his own support for the abolition of blasphemy laws, and signed a motion introduced by Sedgemore to this end.\textsuperscript{1033} Madden wrote to both the \textit{Guardian} and \textit{Tribune} to deny that his motion had ever ‘demand[ed] the extension of the blasphemy law.’\textsuperscript{1034}

Labour activity in relation to blasphemy law after Madden’s motion largely focussed upon the abolition of the legislation. Ajeeb supported an extension of the laws to cover other faiths, though even he was circumspect, calling in one public statement for Muslims to have ‘equal protection under the law’, and only later clarifying his position.\textsuperscript{1035} Ajeeb was in a clear minority, however. Other than Sedgemore’s motion mentioned above, Tony Benn introduced an unsuccessful bill to repeal the blasphemy laws in April 1989, and Bob Cryer tabled an EDM with the intention of, amongst other things, abolishing the blasphemy laws in February 1991.\textsuperscript{1036} Cryer’s motion eventually received twelve signatures, including that of Harry Cohen, one of the four Labour members who introduced the controversial motion in January 1989. ‘Black’ anti-racist groups and figures also supported the abolition of blasphemy laws. Both the Black Sections movement and SBS took this stance.\textsuperscript{1037} Support for the abolition of the laws came from a number of figures who were generally sympathetic to the Muslim protests. Madden, Sedgemore and Cohen have been mentioned above, and Galloway and Hattersley also supported repeal.\textsuperscript{1038} Those that opposed the blasphemy laws used three main justifications, often combined: that they constituted an unjustifiable restriction of free expression; that the formal problems created by attempts to extend them made doing so impractical, either due to the difficulties in defining ‘religion’ or deciding which religious to

\textsuperscript{1032} \textit{Guardian}, 25/1/89.
\textsuperscript{1033} \textit{Ibid}, 1/2/89.
\textsuperscript{1034} \textit{Ibid.}, 9/1/89; \textit{Tribune}, 10/1/89.
\textsuperscript{1035} \textit{Bradford Telegraph and Argus}, 5/4/91, 21/4/89.
\textsuperscript{1036} \textit{Independent}, 12/4/89.
\textsuperscript{1038} \textit{Independent}, 11/2/90, 6/10/90.
protect, or because the necessary doctrines of some faiths may qualify as blasphemous to others; and that the present situation was inequitable, and therefore the status quo was not tenable.\textsuperscript{1039}

Many who argued for abolition therefore couched their position in terms of equality. This principle, as mentioned, informed the proposals of the ambiguous motion submitted by Labour members in 1989. Two years later, Cryer’s own motion stated that abolition of the blasphemy laws ‘would place all religions on a fair basis’.\textsuperscript{1040} Hattersley made the baldest claims that abolition of the blasphemy laws was in some sense satisfying a Muslim demand. In July 1989, he boasted that Muslims ‘wanted, for instance, for us to take a view on the law of blasphemy which treated their religion in the same way that it treats the Christian religion. We have promised them that...’\textsuperscript{1041} At Labour conference of the following year, he made the probable nature of this equality clearer by promising that ‘[t]he next Labour government will make the opportunity for a free vote... and I shall be voting for abolition to bring a little more racial equality to this country’.\textsuperscript{1042} It is true that Muslim commentators sometimes framed their demands regarding blasphemy legislation in terms of ‘equality’. In an early press release on \textit{The Satanic Verses}, the BCM described the current legislation as ‘a hangover from the now vanished era when Britain was not a multicultural society and... now anomalous’.\textsuperscript{1043} M.H. Faruqi, in the March 1989 edition of \textit{Impact International}, claimed that Muslims ‘believe that their right to “equal dignity”... needs to be provided for within the broader context of human rights in Britain’.\textsuperscript{1044} Framing their demand this way may have made it more palatable for secularist observers, but most Muslims did not have a general desire for just any solution that would achieve legal equality. Both Faruqi and Sacranie at some point tartly described the

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\item\textsuperscript{1039} \textit{Ibid.}, 4/2/90; \textit{Guardian}, 7/4/89.
\item\textsuperscript{1040} PA, private correspondence.
\item\textsuperscript{1041} \textit{Independent}, 22/7/89.
\item\textsuperscript{1042} \textit{Ibid.}, 6/10/90.
\item\textsuperscript{1043} BLSL, Rushdie affair press clippings.
\item\textsuperscript{1044} \textit{Impact International}, 10/3/89.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
proposals to repeal the blasphemy laws as ‘equality of indignity’, while Shabbir Akhtar’s claimed that this “solution” would provide ‘cold comfort’ to Muslims.\(^{1045}\) What most Muslim commentators wanted was legislation to protect their most cherished beliefs. Many believed that this could be best effected through an extension of the British blasphemy laws to cover Islam. The BCM not only adopted this position, but argued vehemently that ‘[t]he Government, by refusing to amend the blasphemy law to accommodate other religions... is forcing Muslims into a position of extra-legality vis-a-vis the State as they cannot now seek redress by law’.\(^ {1046}\) The MYM also supported extension of the laws to cover Islam.\(^{1047}\) This concession was taken off the table after Patten met with UKACIA and declared that blasphemy laws would not be changed.\(^{1048}\) Nevertheless, the UMO in particular remained vocal in its support for their extension.\(^{1049}\) It had passed a resolution supported a ‘strengthening’ of the blasphemy laws, as well as their extension to cover non-Christian faiths, in 1987, prior to the publication of Rushdie’s book.\(^ {1050}\) Uniquely, Pasha of the UMO suggested that protection for Islam under British blasphemy legislation would open the door for negotiations to lift Iran’s death sentence on Rushdie, allowing the author to be prosecuted for blasphemy in the United Kingdom rather than for apostasy in a Muslim nation.\(^ {1051}\)

With the extension of blasphemy laws ruled out, attention soon moved to the possibility of legislation prohibiting incitement to religious hatred. A number of Labour figures promoted this step, the first being Jeff Rooker.\(^ {1052}\) As noted, Madden’s motion of 1991 also recommended such laws. It was, however, signed by only one other MP.\(^ {1053}\) From an early stage, some Muslim groups had stressed that the type of legislation was unimportant, so long

\(^{1045}\) Ibid. 5/6/89; Ahsan and Kidwai, Sacrilege and Civility, 349; Shabbir Akhtar, Be Careful with Muhammad: the Salman Rushdie Affair (London : Bellew, 1989), 120.
\(^{1046}\) Bradford Telegraph and Argus, 3/3/89.
\(^{1047}\) Ibid., 26/3/90.
\(^{1048}\) Independent, 28/2/89.
\(^{1049}\) The Times, 8/7/89.
\(^{1051}\) Ibid., 4/2/90.
\(^{1052}\) The Times, 28/2/89.
\(^{1053}\) PA, private correspondence.
as it delivered protection against material like *The Satanic Verses*. In a letter to Patten, Sacranie stressed that Muslim demands were ‘object-specific’.\(^{1054}\) Similarly, in *Impact International* in June 1989, Faruqi suggested that ‘[t]he form and specifics are less important than the recognition of the principle that it is not civilised to insult people’s religious sanctities...’\(^{1055}\) However, the ‘object-specific’ nature of Muslim lobbying perhaps inhibited attempts to mobilise support for a specific demand. The BCM did not give much public attention to laws against the incitement of religious hatred. Rather, Shabbir Akhtar, who represented it in the role of public intellectual, called for Muslims to be protected under the RRA.\(^{1056}\) Against this, however, Kalim Siddiqui was emphatic that ‘Muslims are not a racial group... [w]e want the blasphemy law not only extended but applied by the community as a whole...’ By this he meant that blasphemy cases concerning Islam should be tried by Muslim juries.\(^{1057}\) The UMO, having long supported extension of the blasphemy laws, re-focussed its attention onto incitement of religious hatred only in 1993 once the campaign had lost its momentum.\(^{1058}\)

During the affair, these debates about legal protection for Islam and freedom of expression were clearly woven into broader discussions about multiculturalism. Actors from across the political spectrum agreed that the affair was greatly significant for both the future character and the historical reputation of Britian’s responses to ethnic pluralism, but there was much disagreement about the precise nature of this significance.

It was rather uncontroversial that the affair had harmed ‘race relations’.\(^{1059}\) Some, however, feared that it would stoke political separatism. Pat Wall, noting the BCM’s campaign for Muslims to withdraw support from political candidates who did not take sympathetic

\(^{1054}\) Ahsan and Kidwai eds., *Sacrilege Versus Civility*, 349.  
\(^{1055}\) *ibid.*, 234.  
\(^{1056}\) Akhtar, *Be Careful with Muhammad!*, 123.  
\(^{1057}\) *Guardian*, 23/3/90.  
\(^{1058}\) Lewis, *Islamic Britain*, 26.  
\(^{1059}\) *Yorkshire Post*, 3/4/89.
stances regarding *The Satanic Verses*, felt that difficulties would be created because, in most areas, neither Labour nor Conservative representatives would support the Muslim campaign. Noting that independent Muslim candidates had already stood in local elections elsewhere, Wall warned that a ‘string of separatist candidates would inflame racial tensions in the city’.1060 Fears about a separatist political movement amongst English Muslims were aggravated by the formation of the Islamic Party of Britain (IPB) in 1989. A leading article in the *Independent* in January 1990 cautioned that ‘Muslims would be foolish to be tempted by the separatist style in politics. It raises consciousness. It sometimes raises money. But it also raises hackles and provokes backlash’, whilst also suggesting that the IPB would be electorally ineffective.1061 The fact that the IPB was given public attention at all is perhaps instructive about the anxiety that existed about the prospects of independent Muslim political organization. In truth, the IPB was a party consisting entirely of white European converts to Islam who had little grounding within Muslim communities. Ultimately, it stood just six candidates – four in Bolton, and one each in Blackburn and Derby. Even in Bolton, where mosques had apparently given support to the IPB and Muslim participation in the Labour Party was weak, the IPB’s candidates could not exceed 4% of the vote.1062 In November 1990, the IPB’s leader, David Musa Pidcock, stood in the Bradford North by-election occasioned by the death of Wall. He polled only 800 votes (2.2%) in a constituency that was perhaps 20% Muslim.1063 Even for many Muslims actively involved in anti-Rushdie protests, the Labour Party’s essentially unsympathetic response was not enough to upset party allegiance. A letter of protest sent by a Muslim man to Kinnock, though largely reproducing a typed form letter apparently produced by the Islamic Foundation, finished with the appended handwritten line ‘I have My faith in you to become next Prime Minister’.1064

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1061 *Independent*, 9/1/90.
1064 PHM, Foot papers, MFB6, Mr & Mrs Varaina to Kinnock.
Aside from observations about the fragility of ‘race relations’, more thoroughgoing critiques of multiculturalism were engendered by the affair. Amongst the most reactionary responses in this vein came, significantly, from Jenkins, who mused that ‘we might have been more cautious about allowing the creation in the 1950s of substantial Muslim communities here’. Labour peer George Thomas warned that Britain was facing a ‘clash with another faith within our own shores because we have been a tolerant and broad-minded people in opening our doors’. Other observers, while not regretting non-white immigration, took aim at the management by local and national authorities of ethnic pluralism. Some called for more integration or assimilation. Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, in a speech at Birmingham in February 1989, spoke of the difficulties experienced both by a previously homogenous society accepting large numbers of immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds, and of those immigrants in adjusting ‘to a way of life very different from the one which they have left behind’. He stressed that Muslim communities, whilst welcome to retain their religion and languages, must learn English. On the day of Hurd’s speech, the New Statesman weighed in with an editorial arguing that ‘[t]here has been little time in Britain for... melting-pot attitudes...’, since ‘[m]ulti-cultural, mother-tongue teaching has been considered almost self-evidently good...’ Such reactions evidence a mainstream consensus about the need for greater integration, however defined. A leading article in The Times suggested of Muslims that ‘some of their beliefs... are not compatible with a plural society: Islam does not know how to exist as a minority culture...’

Most commentary, particularly on the left, was more specific. Yasmin Ali in a March 1989 New Statesman article condemned ‘multiculturalism... that dismal, convenient fiction which enables white politicians, authorities and agencies to abdicate responsibility for any

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1065 Independent, 4/3/89.
1066 Hansard, HL Deb, 18/7/1990, c966.
1067 New Statesman, 25/2/89.
1068 The Times, 8/7/89.
section of the community with darker pigmentation’. She attacked community leaders who, whilst shoring up their position through ‘patronage politics’ and the bureaucratic representation of individuals, ensured ‘the maintenance of “traditional” structures of power and authority’ that operated to patriarchal and conservative ends. In an earlier article, Aziz Al-Azmeh described the vast majority of Muslim ‘community leaders’ in Britain as Islamists and therefore ‘fascists’, who had only a ‘spurious’ claim to lead their co-religionists. He later added that British multiculturalists took this ‘Islamist’ position as ‘singularly appropriate for [Muslims], reflecting their “culture”, and were happy to devolve responsibility for a community they did not understand. Picking up on these themes, Stuart Weir, editor of the New Statesman, commented that Britain ‘neglects the Muslim communities in its midst, the unseeing multiculturalism of the liberals being almost as wounding as the parent society’s hostilities and racism’. Whatever the validity of these claims, and there was clearly some (as will be discussed in the next chapter), little empirical evidence was marshalled to support them.

Many commentators also suggested that the Rushdie affair had exposed multiculturalism as committing category mistakes. It was often claimed that the affair had highlighted the heretofore ignored importance of religion in British ethnopolitics. In a Times leading article from July 1989, for example, it was argued that ‘[t]he Rushdie affair has introduced as a primary factor in community relations -- one which has so far been absent on the British mainland: religion’. In the middle of 1990, also in The Times, religious correspondent Clifford Longley observed that

[o]nly recently and thanks largely... to Salman Rushdie have people recognized the absurdity of treating British Muslims as if their primary characteristic were the similarity of their skin-colour to that of West Indians (a similarity apparent only to

\[1069\] New Statesman, 17/3/89.  
\[1070\] Ibid., 20/1/90.  
\[1071\] Ibid., 9/3/90.  
\[1072\] Ibid., 15/2/91  
\[1073\] The Times, 25/7/89.
those with white skins), when British Muslims themselves insist that their determining characteristic is their faith...

Muslim commentators, including Akhtar, Sacranie and Rana Kabbani, made much the same observation. Akhtar argued that the organization of Muslims around religion in response to the affair took them out of the ‘good books’ of ‘liberal anti-racists’. Significantly, in a November 1989 Commons debate Sikh about workers who wished to wear turbans instead of hard hats on construction sites, Labour MP Harry Barnes suggested that this wish and Muslim protests against *The Satanic Verses* were evidence that the demands of ethnic minorities should not always be acceded to.

The previous four chapters of this thesis have tried to demonstrate that claims by Muslims on a religious basis were hardly unknown prior to the Rushdie affair and, in many cases, received national attention. It is true that many demands made by Muslim individuals and groups prior to the affair were settled, partly as a general tendency at the centre to defer sensitive ethnopolitical issues, at a local level if not always quietly. It is also the case that a key legislative element of the multiculturalism institution, the 1976 RRA, did not grant direct protection from discrimination to British Muslims. However, the enormous public attention received by the Rushdie affair was not due generally to its foregrounding of religion, but due to its international intrigue; the *fatwa* against a prominent literary figure by a world leader; the striking protests it sparked; and the uncertain and contested response it produced from the British establishment.

Indeed, differences of opinion about the significance of the affair were so great that not all actors could even agree that it demonstrated the existence of flaws in multiculturalism. Some Muslim observers argued that the main lesson of the affair was that multiculturalism needed to be bolstered. Faruqi argued that during the affair, Muslims began ‘to realise that all

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1077 *Hansard*, HC Deb, 10/11/89, c1110
talk of multiculturalism had been hollow. The secular liberal milieu had not been as open and as receptive to the feelings of others as they have propagandized to believe... The British Muslim intellectual Ziaddun Sardar wrote that recent events had suggested that there was much still to be done before a ‘modus vivendi’ was created. He and his collaborator Merryl Wyn-Davies also argued that the affair suggested that the West had not yet realised that pluralism was about ‘acknowledging the existence of other axioms and values that cherish freedom, justice, equity’. Although many Labour figures accepted the substance of Hurd’s speech calling for greater integration and assimilation, some suggested that anti-Rushdie protests were a normal part of multicultural procedures. Shadow foreign secretary Gerald Kaufman, for instance, attacked ‘the implication that it is somehow anti-democratic and un-British for Mr Rushdie’s writings to be the object of criticism on religious, as distinct from literary, grounds’. Later in the year, addressing himself to Fay Weldon, Hattersley condemned the ‘refusal to accept that in a multiracial society Muslims must be allowed to live according to Muslim traditions’, intentionally conflating religion and ‘race’ as part of a call for the broadening of multiculturalism’s remit. Taking a rather different approach, Vaz, referring to the letter-writing, editorials, lobbying and peaceful protests that had constituted the main tactics of the British Muslim campaign, felt that the affair had in fact highlighted the political ‘Britishness’ of Muslim communities. For some, the problems of multiculturalism were simply ones of willingness and ability to listen. Many would have assented to Gerald Priestland’s claim in The Times that the affair offered ‘a lesson in multicultural incomprehension’. This reading of the affair has also been advanced in academic responses

1078 Impact International, 9/6/89.
1079 Sarwar and Wyn-Davies, Distorted Imagination, 2, 253.
1080 Independent, 1/3/89.
1081 Guardian, 14/2/90.
1082 The Times, 9/4/89.

– the relevant section of Dilip Hiro’s history of ethnic relations in Britain, *Black British, White British*, is entitled ‘Dialogue of the Deaf’.  

Less likely to see the affair as produced by ‘misunderstanding’, British feminists engaged in a distinctive and varied discussion about its relationship to multiculturalism. Feminists did not offer a unified response to the affair, but disputed its significance and contested the relationship between feminism and ethnicity. During the affair, Weldon, writing from a ‘liberal’ perspective, emerged as one of the British media’s most uncompromising critics of Islam. Some of her commentary was familiar – she condemned the ‘race relations people’ who became ‘confused when the ones who have been declared victims in our society start behaving like the persecutors’ and flatly judged that ‘[o]ur attempt at multiculturalism has failed’. More unusually, she took aim directly at Islam, claiming to find ‘the Koran deeply offensive - an incitement to murder, suicide, the oppression of women and by implication profoundly anti-Christian.’ In her pamphlet *Sacred Cows*, released in 1989, she added that

> [t]he Bible, in its entirety, is at least food for thought. The Koran is food for no-thought. It is not a poem on which a society can be safely or sensibly based. It forbids change, interpretation, self-knowledge or even art...

Describing herself as a ‘liberal humanist feminist’, she linked this critique of Islam to a stance on the position of women within Muslim communities. She further condemned white feminists for their supposed blindness to ‘the fate of the Muslim women in our midst, with their arranged marriages, their children in care, their high divorce rate, the wife-beatings, the intimidation, the penalties for recalcitrance, the unregulated work in Dickensian sweatshops...’ Apparently not content with having attacked those involved with community relations, white

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1083 Hiro, *Black British*, 182.
1085 *Independent*, 21/1/89.
1086 Weldon, *Sacred Cows*, 12.
feminists, and a major world religion, Weldon condemned ‘the black feminists, too put-upon by the black brothers, who insist that any white interference is by definition racist, the imposing of white middle-class standards upon ethnic working-class people...’

Weldon’s comments were unusual for their unqualified condemnation of Islam and presentation of Christianity as a more enlightened religion, but her remarks about the impact of multiculturalism upon Muslim, and other ethnic minority, women were not unique. Ali’s *New Statesman* article described above placed particular stress upon the way in which ‘community leaders’, with the connivance of multiculturalists, ensured the maintenance of an ‘authentic’ version of their native culture that was in general patriarchal. This analysis was also repeated by SBS and its offshoot, WAF. In May 1989, WAF organised a counter-demonstration to the main anti-Rushdie protest. This counter-demonstration served three functions: to ensure that the National Front ‘pro-Rushdie’ march did not command the field in terms of dissent to the Muslim protest; to highlight the specific place of women in an affair that had largely been played out between male actors; and to arrest an apparent feeling that, if Rushdie could be silenced, then Muslim women ‘would be next’. The last point reflected a belief within SBS, WAF, and other feminist organizations that the campaign against Rushdie was creating a consensus, at least partially coerced, within Muslim communities that stressed conservatism, closure, and control of vulnerable ‘minorities within minorities’ in the name of cultural defence. Members of the WAF, a number of whom were raised as Muslims, attempted to negate the accusation that their protests served to demonise Islam by stressing that, in their view, the control of women was the aim of *all* religions. WAF member Clara Connolly’s dismissal of Weldon’s ‘revitalised crusader attitude’ can therefore be best

1088 *New Statesman*, 17/3/89.
1090 *Ibid*.
1092 *The Times*, 29/1/90; *Independent*, 16/5/90.
understood as secularist distaste for Weldon’s benign presentation of Anglicanism, rather than as a defence of Islam *per se*.

Although the appearance of editorials by WAF members in mainstream broadsheets probably owed much to the status of Muslim members like Hannana Siddiqui as diverting ‘informants’ into the cloistered world of female Islam, the attention given to feminist voices from ethnic minorities during the affair is one of its significant representational features. Although much of the SBS/WAF analysis was at least salutary to a discussion that lacked such perspectives, it did not address the opposition to Rushdie that existed amongst Muslim women. In Bradford, for example, the women’s organization Al-Nisa had been significant to the campaign against *The Satanic Verses*. The affair therefore threw up different readings of what feminism entailed; problematised the relationship of feminist (and especially non-white) actors to the (primarily male) governmental left that was primarily responsible for accretions to the institution of British multiculturalism; and emphasised that some groups of politically and socially active Muslim women lay outside the scope of public discourse.

IV

The strongest claims about the Rushdie affair as a moment in which the British Muslim community, as an entity defined primarily by its religion, burst fully-formed onto the political scene are clearly overstated. As we have seen in previous chapters, Muslim claims-making on a religious basis, at both a local and national level, was an element of British social and political life from the 1960s. The religious identities of British Muslims were already in that earlier period regarded as of great significance for their governance and integration by a variety of actors, including local and national authorities, trade unions, employers, community relations bodies and political parties. The Rushdie affair was an event of great significance, but discourse

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1093 Connolly, “Washing our Linen”, 73.

1094 *Bradford Telegraph & Argus*, 13/3/89.
surrounding it bled into both previous Muslim campaigns (especially for separate Muslim schools) and subsequent events (especially the Gulf war of 1990-91). The international dimension of the Rushdie affair and concerns about Muslim ‘fundamentalism’ gave the campaign against *The Satanic Verses* a then-distinctive quality that foreshadowed later concerns about Muslim integration, but this former element was present also during the Gulf war, whilst concerns abounded that separate Muslim schools would become incubators of ‘fundamentalism’. The national public attention given to the Rushdie affair was clearly far greater than that of any previous issue concerning the religious claims of British Muslims, but assertions about its effects upon Muslim community organization and elite ideas about multiculturalism, as well as about the novelty of certain elements of discourse, are open to serious challenge.

A common, related, claim about the effects of the affair concerns unity within the Muslim community. Some have suggested, in a neutral sense, that the Rushdie affair showed the capacity for concerted action amongst Muslim organizations at a national level. Others, more negatively, have argued that the affair provided an opportunity for conservative ‘leaders’ to tighten their grip upon their communities by presenting them as under threat by a hostile establishment.

These analyses too are overplayed. Firstly, the diversity of reactions amongst British Muslims should be noted. Opinion polling suggested that perhaps less than a third of British Muslims supported Khomeini’s death sentence, although 80% supported ‘further action’ against Rushdie. 77% supported more demonstrations, and nearly two-thirds desired further book-burnings.\(^{1095}\) As mentioned, these statements must be considered alongside possible concern amongst respondents about deviating from what they felt was the ‘proper’ community line. If community ‘leaders’ sought consensus through the affair, then they did not truly succeed,

\(^{1095}\) *Guardian*, 20/10/89; *Independent*, 20/10/89; *The Times*, 20/10/89.
even on matters relating narrowly to the affair itself. Organizationally, the affair prompted a scramble for leadership roles within British Muslim communities. The creation of UKACIA suggested a broad unity covering a large number of groups – though mostly ones with Jamaati leanings. However, this formal unity hid both sectarian and demographic divergences and operational separatism. Middle-class figures within UKACIA, such as Sacranie and Pasha, were most likely to undertake lobbying efforts and to be invited to meet with ministers, whilst more working-class groups like the BCM had more success in promoting local protests. Pasha’s UMO, despite involvement in UKACIA, lobbied government and made public pronouncements as a separate entity. Even in this period, the Muslim organizations with the most presence in working-class communities were small and localised, as evidence by the multitude of smaller organizations that arranged demonstrations in different towns and cities. In some areas with large Muslim populations, especially East London, none of the UKACIA affiliates had significant organisational impact. Besides this, not every Muslim organization of significance belonged to UKACIA. In Bradford, the MYM became more heavily involved in organising protests against Rushdie in the early 1990s, drawing criticism from the BCM for prolonging the issue. Apart from youth organizations, the Iran-funded Muslim Institute presented a distinctive, and widely publicised, analysis of the affair, uncompromisingly supporting Khomeini’s fatwa. Siddiqui was sharply critical of UKACIA and its member organizations, and set about thereafter creating an alternative constellation of British Muslim institutions including the MPGB. Whilst the Rushdie affair provided ammunition for those within British Muslim communities that stressed the hostility of Britain, it is less certain that increased unity flowed from this. Moreover, the affair generated interest in and facilitated expression of feminist critiques of multiculturalism that, at least before the campaign for Muslim schools, had usually been sidelined.

Whether more unified or not by the Rushdie affair, English Muslims were already considered to be a potentially powerful political constituency. This relates to the association,

particularly in the Labour Party, of Muslims with patronage politics and with block votes delivered by (and increasingly for) powerful ‘community leaders’ (as described in the previous chapter). Indeed, the affair stimulated national discussion of this issue which had previously gained wide attention only fitfully. Even without presenting a united front in the public sphere in general, therefore, English Muslims could encourage local representatives to take their demands seriously. Whilst the suggestion made at the time by many commentators that representatives of Muslims acted solely and without exception to placate their Muslim constituents is clearly incorrect, the knowledge that most British Muslims ‘leaders’ took exception to Rushdie’s novel, combined with fear that these leaders could easily induce many ‘followers’ to do their political binding, encouraged at least sensitivity when faced with demands regarding *The Satanic Verses*. However, the unwillingness of Labour to offer real concessions to Muslim voters was ensured by three factors: substantive opposition to Muslim demands; knowledge that all major political parties were essentially united in this opposition; and awareness that the allegiance of many British Muslims to Labour would outlast the affair. This absence of real concessions highlighted the limited powers of even the influential Muslim ‘leaders’ who enjoyed access to national government, and the fractured nature of Muslim organisation at a national level.  

This encouraged not organisational conservatism within British Muslim communities, but eagerness amongst younger Muslims to pursue new modes of politics, less reliant on kinship networks, and forms of organisation.

Those Labour representatives who were sympathetic to Muslim demands, such as Vaz and Grant, often presented Muslim campaigners as beleaguered ‘black’ Britons who suffered from political marginalisation and a lack of respect for their culture. This highlights the potential for some anti-racists to slip from supporting non-whites in attacking racism to supporting ethnic minorities on any, including a religious, basis because of their relatively

1097 Akhtar, *ibid.*, 170.
disempowered status. The salient categories for anti-racists were not always obvious or consistent. In elite discourse, as insinuations about Vaz’s support being the product of electoral concerns evidence, there was still potential for slippage between the categories of ‘Asian’ and ‘Muslim’. Both of these lingering tendencies demonstrate that the appearance of religion as the primary facet of identity in the discussion of British Muslims not only did not begin with the Rushdie affair, but did not culminate there either. Whilst there was widespread concern – albeit joined to varied normative ends – about British multiculturalism’s ‘failure’ to incorporate the religious aspects of ethnic minority identities, Douglas Hurd’s widely-welcomed speech, as well as Patten’s open letter, offered a familiar formula. Both Hurd and Patten suggested that Muslims must meet certain minimal criteria of integration – for Hurd the emphasis was on language – sometimes related to criteria, such as language, not obviously relevant to the affair – whilst permitting Muslims to retain their culture in the private sphere. Neither made any more specific criticism of the multiculturalism institution, since neither’s statement was out of line with its workings. The observation made by Vaz that the methods of protest chosen by most Muslim organizations suggested a marked degree of political integration has much validity. There is now wide consensus about this amongst both those who welcome Muslim protests that ‘utilised and extended previously existing arguments and policies’ and critics of multiculturalism who see anti-Rushdie protestors as conservative authoritarian patriarchs ‘clothed in the rhetoric of anti-racism’.1098 This ‘racially-’ or religiously-specific Muslim mobilisation consisted largely of peaceful demands made of mainstream British authorities and bodies. Although the Rushdie affair moved Muslims to the foreground of discussions about British multiculturalism, it did not situate them solely as religious actors, nor did it invite sustained criticisms of institutional multiculturalism from elite quarters.

Nevertheless, an alternative analysis of the affair – as simply a misunderstanding – overstates the degree to which multicultural deliberations can entail significant value conflicts. As mentioned, a number of contemporary figures focused in their responses upon the need for more dialogue and understanding during the affair. More generally, as discussed in the introductory chapter, certain recent theoretical studies of multiculturalism have placed great emphasis on inter-communal dialogue as a good-in-itself. The Rushdie affair suggests, perhaps, that rather than being an inevitable good, inter-ethnic dialogue’s effects are highly sensitive to the issues being discussed, the values involved, and the participants in the discussion. Firstly, it should be obvious that dialogue can never occur between ‘communities’ or ‘ethnicities’, but only between individuals or organizations. Not every constituency within an ethnic or religious community will be equally able to access popular conduits of dialogue, and governments are likely to consult with only the most visible ‘representatives’ of a given interest. Muslim women, in particular, were given little opportunity to speak during the Rushdie affair (particularly those who were not middle-class), whilst young Muslims primarily provided brief touches of local colour to newspaper pieces. Individuals with little capacity to ‘represent’ are likely to be given ample attention if they are articulate, accessible, and can be established as reflective of some easily reducible (but not necessarily widespread) perspective – thus the considerable attention given to the ‘moderate’ dentist Hesham el-Essawy and the uncompromising supporter of Iran Kalim Siddiqui. Since dialogue occurs in many venues – newspapers, television, council meetings, at the Home Office – it is as ad hoc and undirected as many other aspects of institutional multiculturalism. British Muslim organisations still criticise the media for selecting extremist and unrepresentative Muslim spokespersons, and have developed strategies for media management that have enjoyed uneven levels of success.\footnote{Marta Bolognani and Paul Statham, “The Changing Public Face of Muslim Associations in Britain”, \textit{Ethnicities} 13: 2 (2013), 229-49.} In the case of the Rushdie affair, difficulties arose not from any misunderstanding, but from the opposition of British elites to the substantive demands of Muslim protestors and
to their invocation of generally cherished values (such as ‘equality’, ‘human rights’, anti-defamation and ‘race relations’) in advancing these. Given this, there is something to commend Talal Asad’s view that the ‘frightening thing about the Rushdie affair for the British liberal elite is the existence of political activity by a small population that seeks authority for its difference... in a discourse and through institutions that the liberal middle class has itself consecrated’. However, for some, the demands arrived at by Muslim protestors from apparent adoption of these values were more absurd than ‘frightening’. This is illustrated for example in an interview by Hugo Young for the Guardian with Siddiqui in which he latter’s claims to be a ‘liberal’ and even a ‘Guardian man’ were laughed off and brushed aside.

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Thus far, this thesis’ engagement with the history of British multiculturalism has been through case studies, analysing the engagement of English Muslim communities with different sorts of institutions in the latter part of the 20th century. This chapter seeks to place these smaller studies within a more general history of British multiculturalism.

This concept of ‘multiculturalism’ has had a fairly short but complex life. The term itself was rarely used in Britain during the early part of the period under study. ‘Multiracialism’ was accepted as an aim in some quarters, or at least as preferable to the segregation of the American south and South Africa. Use of that term demonstrates the close association in Britain, as elsewhere, at this time of ‘race’ with black and white people and relations between them. Whilst most British commentators denied the degree of similarity between Britain and America in terms of ‘the racial question’ in the 1950s and 60s, America, and to a lesser extent South Africa, were regarded as warnings about the possible future for Britain if certain steps were not taken – right-wingers tended to focus on the perils of failing to control immigration, liberals on the likely backlash if discrimination were not addressed. In the late 1970s, as ethnic minorities gained more power and visibility in British cities, many authorities introduced what they termed ‘multi-cultural’ or ‘multi-ethnic’ policies. This approach focused on enabling, or at least tolerating, the sustenance of minority cultures. As well as being criticised by conservatives who would prefer a monocultural state, this form of ‘multiculturalism’ was ‘outbid’ by self-proclaimed anti-racists focused upon the elimination of structural, rather than individual, racism, and having a more ambiguous attitude to the retention of minority cultures. Since its heyday in the 1980s, anti-racism has waned as a self-conscious approach. However, especially since the 2001 riots in Northern English cities and the incidents of Islamist terrorism
later in that year and in 2005, governmental articulations of multiculturalism in the 1970s-80s have increasingly been pilloried.

The introductory chapter of this thesis briefly sketched a conception of British multiculturalism as an institution that provides ‘the rules of the game’. This chapter will now trace and analyse the development of this institution. Its next section will consider the nationally-defined parameters in which the institution has been developed. The centre has at times been a leader and, more often, a follower but, in all cases, it has set limits. The third section will move to consider the changing responses made by local authorities. The fourth section will allow that multiculturalism is not an entirely top-down phenomenon, and will consider the impact of ethnic minority activism and lobbying upon the multicultural institution. The final section summarises conclusions and applies the sociological concept of ‘path dependency’ to explain the endurance of Britain’s institution of multiculturalism despite wide objections to certain of its aspects or even to the entire artifice.

II

‘Commonwealth’ migration was not evenly-distributed across Britain, but was focused on certain urban areas. ‘Race relations’ – in the phrase of the time -- were therefore sometimes conceived of not as national questions, but as ‘problems’ to be addressed by particular local authorities. The unease of national government about how to approach the issue of special provision for Commonwealth immigrants made local confinement of issues related to ‘integration’ attractive. Making specific provisions for non-white immigrants was regarded as sensitive because of the close association in British minds between ‘separateness’ and the racist societies of South Africa and the southern United States, and because of a potential ‘white backlash’ based on the belief that no extra effort should be made in accommodating new migrants. However, as shown above, this did not entirely prevent initiatives directed specifically at ethnic minorities.
Chapter two discussed an early example of ethnically explicit central government guidelines in the form of the circular on dispersal, though, as noted, this affected practice in a limited number of authorities. An early example of ethnically explicit legislation can be found in Section 11 (S11) of the 1966 Local Government Act. S11 provided funding for local authorities ‘required to make special provision’ due to the ‘presence within their areas of substantial numbers of immigrants from the Commonwealth whose language or customs differ from those of the community’. S11 funding was limited to meeting 75% of salaries for staff required to make these special provisions. It is interesting to note that ethnic minorities were again defined by their 'language [and] customs' and were regarded as separate from 'the community'. As suggested by the legislation, local authorities had already been moved, without central direction, to employ such workers using mainstream funding. However, take-up of S11 was slow and variable between authorities. In its first year of operation only £2.5MM was spent on S11, and this rose slowly to £37MM by 1980-1. At the turn of the 1980s, use of the scheme by local authorities was extremely variable. Boroughs like Ealing and Brent claimed close to £2MM per year, whilst inner boroughs such as Tower Hamlets and Hackney, perhaps largely because they were not education authorities, claimed only around £100k per year. Liverpool, meanwhile, did not claim at all until 1983. The riots of the 1980s did much to encourage S11 take-up, and by 1985 national expenditure through it was £90MM. S11 was always criticised, however. Its statutory limits (being confined to the funding of salaries) and its practical shortcomings (being employed primarily in the field of education and often acting simply as a quota of 'general' staff to be used for mainstream work) were well-known. Labour proposals of the 1970s that S11 become applicable to expenditure other than salaries and that it apply to ethnic minorities in general were not enacted before the 1979

1102 LMA, GLC Ethnic Minorities Committee (GLCEMC) presented papers, GLC/DG/PRE/49/1, GLC, “Section 11...”, 7/9/81
1103 Ibid.
1104 Ibid.
1105 LMA, ILEAEOU, ILEA/EOU/01/09, ILEA, “Section 11 Review...”, 28/8/85

general election. Following the riots of 1981, the Tory government widened the scope of S11 to cover advice and liaison work.\textsuperscript{1106} In 1983, a Home Office circular outlined further reforms seeking to ensure that authorities used S11 for specific, well-defined roles that involved work primarily with ethnic minorities. There is evidence from Brent, however, that the new requirements were applied in an overly exacting manner that was intended, above all, to reduce claims and increase Home Office control over the scheme.\textsuperscript{1107} More thoroughgoing criticisms of S11 could not be dealt with through central directives. S11 workers often felt marginalised, lacking influence and not directed by any strategy for racial equality, and this was made known more widely in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{1108} Some authorities had had their S11 claims rejected or reduced following reforms of the early 1980s. Others, such as Brent, replaced their previously Byzantine S11 structures (Brent had 182.5 FTE posts under S11 at its peak) with smaller arrangements funded through the mainstream -- a move motivated, perhaps, by a degree of uncertainty about the efficacy of ‘marginalism’ as well as by the Home Office’s censoriousness.\textsuperscript{1109} S11 was abandoned in the late 1990s, as recommended by the MacPherson report.\textsuperscript{1110}

Two years after the introduction of the 1966 Local Government Act, Harold Wilson, during a speech in Birmingham, announced the establishment of the Urban Programme (UP) for local authorities and community groups. Wilson’s speech insisted that ‘our people, whatever their colour, whatever their creed, must be treated in exactly the same way and on a basis of a real equality of opportunity’, evincing the ease with which identical and equal treatment could be conflated. Wilson suggested that, in some local areas, immigration was ‘pressing against the capacity’ of service provision. Wilson stressed that UP ‘[e]xpenditure

\textsuperscript{1106} Dilip Hiro, \textit{Black British}, 243.
\textsuperscript{1108} LMA, ILEAEOU, ILEA/EOU/1/36, GLC, “The Role of Section 11 Workers...”, 27/1/84.
\textsuperscript{1109} Cross, Brah and McLeod, \textit{Racial Equality}, 81, 98.
\textsuperscript{1110} Commission on the Future of Multi-ethnic Britain, \textit{The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain} (London : Profile, 2000), 149.
must be on the basis of need and the immigrant problem is only one factor, though a very
important factor...’, though the potential gravity of ‘race relations’ issues was made plain via
references to the situation in southern Africa, the ‘agonies of conscience and of conflict’ that
had stricken America, and to the ‘new racialism’ of Enoch Powell.\textsuperscript{1111} Initially providing £22MM
of funding over four years, the UP was expanded in 1970.\textsuperscript{1112} In the early seventies, radical and
moderate commentators welcomed a funding source designed to benefit ethnic minority
communities.\textsuperscript{1113} Later in the decade, the UP became the means through which many ethnic
minority community groups first received local authority funding.\textsuperscript{1114} An LPRD memorandum in
1976 suggested, however, that projects designed specifically to benefit ethnic minorities made
up less than 10% of UP funding awards.\textsuperscript{1115} Of course, ethnic minority residents in many areas
benefited from ethnically inexplicit projects, and it also seems likely that ethnic minority
communities were assisted by the Labour Party’s reform of the scheme in 1978, which sought
to give local authorities more autonomy in determining the focus of the UP locally and to
attract more bids from voluntary organizations.\textsuperscript{1116} Ethnic minority communities may therefore
have been represented roughly proportionately amongst those receiving assistance from the
UP, but the Programme was clearly not one that was targeted primarily at meeting the specific
needs of ethnic minorities, at least in the 1970s. This may have changed somewhat following
the riots of the 1980s. The incoming Conservative government reduced the size of the
Programme in 1979, but, following the 1981 riots, UP funding was increased by £95MM and
repeatedly thereafter, reaching its peak value of £338MM in the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{1117} At least some
local authorities, who were responsible for vetting UP projects, proactively focused the

\textsuperscript{1111} LSE Library, PS collection, SHORE/19/16, Harold Wilson, “The Prime Minister’s Birmingham Speech
on Race Relations”, 5/68.
\textsuperscript{1112} John McCarthy, \textit{Partnership, Collaborative Planning and Urban Regeneration} (Aldershot : Ashgate,
2007), 28; PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD194, 12/71, 40.
\textsuperscript{1113} Hill and Isaacharoff, \textit{Community Action}, 160.
\textsuperscript{1114} Lewis, \textit{Islamic Britain}, 67-8.
\textsuperscript{1115} PHM, LPRD memoranda, RE880, 12/76, 3.
\textsuperscript{1116} McCarthy, \textit{Partnership}, 30.
\textsuperscript{1117} LMA, ILEAEOU, ILEA/EQU/1/37, Runnymede Trust, “...Race and the 1983 Election”, 6/83, 6; Jacobs,
\textit{Black Politics and Urban Crisis}, 156.
Programme on ethnic minority communities in this period. Brent, for example, promoted this focus, and around one third of Bradford’s expenditure through the UP specifically benefited ethnic minorities by the late 1980s. However, these trends were upset at the very end of the decade by the new emphasis placed by the Department of the Environment upon using the UP to funding regeneration and development projects. The UP was discontinued in 1992.

Aside from providing funding, the major initiatives of the centre concerned discrimination. The RRAs of are the major examples of such work. The first of the three acts was a modest piece of legislation, confined to prohibiting discrimination based on ‘colour, race, or ethnic or national origins’ in places of public resort. Discrimination was defined as ‘less favourable’ treatment, though with the qualification that compulsory segregation constituted such treatment. The legislation also established the RRB, which would consider civil cases brought under the Act. The 1968 legislation extended this framework to employment, housing and public services. It retained the processes of the 1965 Act, reliant upon individual cases being brought to conciliation before tribunals, a system drawing upon American precedents that had impressed representatives of the Society of Labour Lawyers. The 1976 Act represented a more radical departure, introducing the concept of ‘indirect discrimination’ – processes that led unknowingly or incidentally to ‘less favourable’ treatment of groups defined by their ‘colour, race, or ethnic or national origins’. This new arrangement constituted a significant development of Britain’s multicultural institution. Attacking discrimination was reconceptualised not as a matter of providing redress for ethnic minority individuals, but as a means of ensuring equal opportunities for an array of groups defined in ethnic terms. In an attempt to promote this equality, the RRB was replaced by the CRE, which also took on the

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1119 Cross Brah and McLeod, Racial Equality, 137; Lewis, Islamic Britain, 124.
1120 Ibid.
functions of the CRC, which was abolished. The CRE was empowered to instigate its own investigations. Section 71 (S71) of the 1976 Act placed a duty upon local authorities to ‘eliminate unlawful racial discrimination’ and ‘promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of different racial groups’. It enabled authorities to undertake ‘positive action’, primarily in the form of training and development projects targeted specifically at ethnic minorities. Significantly, however, S71 contained neither provision of special resources for meeting these ‘obligations’ nor sanctions for authorities that failed to meet them. The CRE did, however, serve at times as a negative check on local authority practices. The role of its predecessor, the RRB, in ending the practice of dispersal was outlined in chapter two. Local authorities were also amongst the prime targets of CRE investigations – at least eleven were subjects of formal investigations between the late 1970s and early 1990s. Many of these led to authorities being served with a non-discrimination notice, which acted as a warning not to continue with discriminatory practices lest court action be taken. In many instances, authorities agreed to comply with the recommendations of the CRE investigation without the need for a formal notice. This happened, for example, in Hackney (1983), Walsall (1985), Tower Hamlets (1988), and Liverpool (1989) – all cases related to housing allocation – and Calderdale, in 1988, in a case related to reception centres for NES pupils. Other investigations, such as one related to school catchment areas in Reading in 1979, and another into the suspension of ethnic minority pupils in Birmingham schools in the early 1980s, seem to have led to voluntary action to ‘correct’ the discrimination, perhaps not entirely satisfactorily. The CRE therefore had a real impact on institutional racism within local authorities despite lacking important powers of investigation; the requirement that it work closely with subjects of investigations; a lack of resources, especially after its funding was

reduced and officers replaced by the Tory governments in the 1980s; and the weak sanctions at its disposal.1124

The rubric of ‘indirect discrimination’ and the methodology employed during CRE investigations made the establishment of ‘ethnic monitoring’ – i.e. the keeping of statistics on an ethnic basis – particularly important. It was only by proving that a certain ethnic group had been under-represented as recipients of certain resources that discrimination could be suggested. However, the centre did little in this area. The history of ethnic monitoring in education was discussed in chapter two. Otherwise, ethnic monitoring was used in this period to ensure compliance with the armed forces’ ethnic quotas and at welfare offices to monitor the unemployed.1125 Even after the riots of 1981, national developments in this area came at glacial pace. A 1982 report by the Labour Party’s NEC Working Party on Race Relations called for the wide adoption of monitoring, covering both employment and service provision.1126 In the following year the TUC’s Equal Rights Committee (TUCERC) allowed, with caution, that monitoring could be a ‘useful tool’.1127 From within the government, the major innovation was, after many years of discussion, the introduction of an ethnic question in the 1991 census. This step required that central government enter the debate about how groups should be classified. Proposals initially forwarded by the RRB, which focused on ethnicity/nationality, were criticised for failing to stress that skin colour was the ultimate determinant of racial discrimination.1128 The 1991 census employed a dual approach, listing groups on the basis of ethnicity/national origins, but using the categories ‘Black African’ and ‘Black Caribbean’.

1126 PHM, LPRD memoranda, RD2126, 2/82, 3.
1128 Compare ibid., MSS.292D/805.9/7, RRB, “Principles and Methods of Monitoring...”; 1/75; CRE, Code of Practice.
The centre has therefore primarily acted by determining the framework in which other actors operate. It has provided funding allowing local authorities to make specific provisions for ethnic minorities, and has even encouraged such special provision explicitly (primarily in S71), but rarely has it demanded such action. Certain practices have sometimes been recommended through departmental circulars. However, as the limited implementation of bussing shows, local authorities have not always agreed that these practices are ‘best’. On the other hand, the central government created quangos that enjoyed some success in encouraging authorities to abandon discriminatory practices. Simultaneously, central departments have also acted as a check upon those ‘radical’ authorities that have done most to promote an anti-racist approach. For example, the Home Office and DE reformed initiatives such as S11 and UP to prevent ‘excessive’ usage or focus on projects from which ethnic minority community organizations are most likely to receive direct and specific benefit. The centre’s role in relation to local authorities in creating multiculturalism has therefore been to cajole the stragglers and constrain the pioneers, whilst, through the RRAs, striking at a limited number of discriminatory practices. This anti-discriminatory infrastructure, comprising the CRC, RRB and CRE, has also taken on a life of its own and become in a sense self-perpetuating. Bleich has convincingly demonstrated the process by which these bodies became important reservoirs of influence and expertise and helped to win an extension of the legislation through which they were created.\footnote{Bleich, Race Politics, 71.} By a similar process, the precise powers of the CRE and the groups it is able to protect have to a significant extent been decided through the courts and not by the (often vague) legislation.

III

Having described the parameters created by national government, this chapter will now describe local authorities’ activity within these parameters. It must first be noted that the
ambivalence about making specific provisions for ethnic minorities, and the conflation of specific provision with both superior treatment and segregation, was observable almost throughout this period at the local level just as it was amongst national actors.\footnote{Gideon Ben-Tovim \textit{et al.}, \textit{The Local Politics of Race} (London : Macmillan, 1976), 157; Graham Thomas, “The Integration of Immigrants: a Note on the Views of Some Local Government Officials”, \textit{Race} 9: 2 (October, 1967), 239-48.} Although it would later advance a particular brand of multiculturalism, in 1973 Bradford council was asking itself questions such as,

how far is there in this area a “race relations problem”... and how far do blacks... simply share the problems of whites...? [D]o blacks create particular problems for, or place disproportionate burdens on, the local authority services... do blacks face special problems, or have special needs...?\footnote{WYASB, TC papers, BBD/1/7/16, “Race Relations: Questions for Discussion”, 10/5/1973. Emphasis in original.}

In general, Labour-controlled authorities were more amenable to making specific provisions for ethnic minorities and, as will be described, urban Conservative groups in the 1980s sometimes came to power partially on pledges to dismantle ‘race relations’ infrastructures. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. Such infrastructures have been bipartisan creations in some authorities, such as Hammersmith and Fulham and Bradford, reflecting both the political importance of ethnic minorities and the characteristics of local Tory groups. On the other hand, ‘old’ Labour groups were more cautious about such specific provisions than the new left groups that succeeded them in various urban areas, and Liverpool, controlled for much of the 1980s by a Militant Labour council, was amongst the authorities least responsive to specific demands made by ethnic minorities.\footnote{Jean Ellis, \textit{Breaking New Ground: Community Development with Asian Communities} (London : Bedford Square, 1989), 102; Liverpool Black Caucus, \textit{The Racial Politics of Militant in Liverpool: Black Community’s Struggle for Participation in Local Politics}, 1980-86 (London : Runnymede Trust, 1986); Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 94.}

Amongst the first local initiatives designed to address non-white immigration to Britain were the voluntary liaison committees (VLCs). First established in the 1950s, these organizations were first formed by whites involved in the local church, social service
organizations, trades councils, etc. VLCs were created in Birmingham in 1950 and Nottingham in 1955.\footnote{Hill and Isaacharoff, Community Action, 2; Solomos and Back, ibid., 45.} Bristol also had a committee in the early fifties.\footnote{Hill and Isaacharoff, ibid.} Evidence from the LCSS in 1957 suggests that these organizations were primarily concerned to ensure that newly-arrived immigrants made use of existing welfare provisions.\footnote{LMA, LCSS papers, ACC1888/115, Standing Conference of Councils of Social Services, “Group on the Welfare of Coloured Workers: Pakistanis”, 6/7/60.} VLCs therefore are a perfect example of instrumental special provision – initiatives aimed solely at ethnic minorities, but designed to ensure that these minorities made use of general services. The committees also attempted to promote inter-ethnic harmony, and this role was regarded urgently after the riots of 1958.\footnote{Hill and Isaacharoff, Community Action, 9.}

Apparently as a delayed response to the violence of 1958, Nottingham City Council became the first authority to grant-aid a VLC in 1960.\footnote{Anthony Messina, Race and Party Competition in Britain (New York: Clarendon Press, 1989), 56.} Recognizing the importance of the developing field of ‘race relations’, local authorities began, in the early 1960s, to promote the creation of VLCs, particularly in London.\footnote{LMA, LCSS papers, ACC1888/123, LCSS, “Commonwealth Immigrants in Greater London”, 1/63, 23.} There were fifteen VLCs nationally by 1964.\footnote{Messina, Race and Party Competition, 55.} In its 1965 White Paper, “Immigration from the Commonwealth”, the Labour government tied together immigration control and integration, further limiting the number of immigration vouchers available to Commonwealth nations whilst encouraging the activities of VLCs. The document encouraged local authorities to support and fund VLCs; stipulated their means and objectives; and created a quango, the NCCI, to coordinate their work. It was stressed that VLCs should be non-political, should have a multi-ethnic composition and should focus on fact-finding, welfare, social mixing and public education directed at ‘both’ communities. The welfare work, it was emphasised, should primarily consist in ‘help[ing] immigrants to use the ordinary facilities of social service provided for the whole community’.\footnote{Immigration from the Commonwealth (London: HMSO, 1965), 16-7.} As part of the move towards standardization, VLCs were referred to generically thereafter as CRCs, and most new
committees created after 1965 reflected this in their names. The number of CRCs grew from 42 in 1966 to 72 by 1968, most of which by then had local authority funding. This burgeoning ‘community relations’ movement provided an alternative, ‘moderate’ pole of attraction to broad anti-racist organizations, including CARD (formed in 1964). As will be described below, ethnic minority organizations were becoming more active and political in the early sixties.

Scholarship on CRCs has tended to stress their role as ‘buffers’ that, as part of a bipartisan strategy of depoliticisation, were given demesne over ethnopolitical issues, but lacked power to make significant representations. There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth to this. Even in 1976, Kenneth Newton’s study of Birmingham suggested that 35% of councillors wished to ‘wash their hands’ of issues related to ethnicity and delegate these to the CRC. The distaste of the NCCI for political ethnic minority organizations was evinced by its remarks in 1967 about groups seeking ‘the emotional satisfaction of constantly exploding with anger...’ Some subtlety in terms of variation over time and between CRCs should be introduced, however. The Manchester Committee for Community Relations (MCCR) had a relationship with the local CARD branch, whilst the Oxford Committee for Racial Integration (OCRI) essentially functioned as the city’s branch of CARD. In 1966, an OCRI campaign, with the support of the local employment exchange, led to the ending of a colour bar at the large local manufacturer Cowley Motors. Nottingham’s committee was soon successful in pressuring the local transport department to employ non-white bus conductors. Few other committees, however, seem even to have attempted such work. Nevertheless, there was

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1145 Hill and Isaacharoff, Community Action, 15.
1147 Lawrence, Black Migrants, 180-1.
something of a growth in politicization amongst CRCs in 1968 as a response to Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech and the passage of the second CIA. Powell’s speech blurred the lines between political activity and public education.\textsuperscript{1148} Most CRCs openly protested against the 1968 CIA whilst some of those whose leadership refused to, such as Bradford, were discredited because of this.\textsuperscript{1149} However, the continued moderation of the CRCs is evinced by the fact that local authorities, including Conservative authorities, continued to support them, and by the fact that most CRCs were apparently satisfied by the modest provisions of the 1968 RRA.\textsuperscript{1150}

The 1968 RRA also created the Community Relations Commission, replacing the NCCI, and the new quango sought greater control over local CRCs. In 1969, it laid out the aims and means of the CROs, the paid officers of CRCs. The CRC also produced a list of activities for local committees to focus on, which proved controversial, as OCRI, in particular, noted the lack of reference in this material to racism.\textsuperscript{1151} CRCs, therefore, were a voluntary, localized, \textit{ad hoc} response to ethnic diversity that soon became appropriated by the centre. Centralization encouraged CRCs to develop a consistent body of work, built around playgroups, language work, home tutoring, referral to mainstream services, and social events.\textsuperscript{1152} Moves towards more ‘radical’ activity were blocked both by local authorities, which could cut funding to committees, and by the CRC/CRE, which could block appointments to paid offices.\textsuperscript{1153} Local authorities availed themselves of this sanction on a number of occasions, and, by the late 1970s, around 10% of CRCs were working without grants.\textsuperscript{1154} In 1977, the CRE took even more control over local CRC affairs.\textsuperscript{1155} Despite this, some CRCs in the late 1970s and 1980s were able to make at least a rhetorical commitment to equal opportunities. Messina’s study of CRCs in 1988 suggested that, by that time, around half regarded themselves as ethnic minority

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
  \item \textsuperscript{1148} Hill and Isaacharoff, \textit{Community Action}, 178.
  \item \textsuperscript{1149} \textit{Ibid.}, 158, 224-5.
  \item \textsuperscript{1150} \textit{Ibid.}, 120-2.
  \item \textsuperscript{1151} \textit{Ibid.}, 259-60.
  \item \textsuperscript{1152} \textit{Ibid.}, 176-7, 180, 196; Lawrence, \textit{Black Migrants}, 180.
  \item \textsuperscript{1153} Jacobs, \textit{Black Politics}, 99.
  \item \textsuperscript{1154} Messina, \textit{Race and Party Competition}, 77.
  \item \textsuperscript{1155} \textit{Ibid.}, 62.
\end{thebibliography}
pressure groups. However, CRCs were by then being pushed out of local decision-making. Following S71 and the riots, local authorities were increasingly eager to make contact with ‘authentic’ ethnic minority leaderships. New guidelines on S11 usage in 1983 mandated that organizations other than CRCs be consulted in deciding how the money should be used. These processes and the establishment of consultative structures (as described below) by local authorities rapidly marginalised CRCs. This dynamic, at work from the late seventies, was part of a general ‘inheritance’ from white-dominated bodies of roles in multicultural institutions by ethnic minority ‘leaders’.

Local authorities were not merely ‘followers’ in creating multicultural institutions, however. One of their earliest independent actions in governing ethnic diversity was the appointment of officers to work specifically with ethnic minority communities. Just as with the creation of CRCs, this development occurred unevenly across areas. Liverpool, perhaps unsurprisingly given its long history of black settlement, was one of the first authorities to employ such a worker, in 1952. Birmingham also appointed a welfare officer for Commonwealth immigrants in 1954. The first appointee to the position was a former member of the Colonial Service and his replacement, appointed in 1956, had been a police inspector in colonial Kenya. In 1955, Hackney appointed an information officer, himself a West Indian, to work with the local Afro-Caribbean community. Such appointments were encouraged by the riots of 1958, and in 1959 Sheffield appointed a West Indian ‘chaplain’ to work in the black community. In the following year, Nottingham appointed Eric Irons, the leader of the Caribbean Social and Cricket Club (CSCC) as ‘Organiser for Educational Work amongst the

1156 Ibid., 73.
1157 Shukra, Changing Pattern, 57.
1158 Andrew Dorn and Paul Hibbert, “A Comedy of Errors: Section 11 Funding and Education” in Troyna ed., Racial Inequality in Education, 70.
1159 Hill and Isaacharoff, Community Action, 3.
1160 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 45-6.
1161 Hill and Isaacharoff, Community Action, 5.
Coloured Communities’.\textsuperscript{1163} Irons’ appointment constituted a very early example of a later-
common process by which leaders or paid workers of ethnic minority organizations were
recruited to the statutory domain of institutional multiculturalism. It is also an example of a
common early arrangement in which workers from a particular ethnic minority community
were given responsibilities related to ‘coloured’ or ‘Commonwealth’ immigrants in general.
Local authorities were motivated to appoint special workers out of a belief that ethnic
minorities were especially hard to deal with, created problems in such volume that a casework
approach could not be applied, and/or should be dealt with by workers that had special
knowledge of their socio-cultural backgrounds. Evidence to the CIAC from Wolverhampton in
1964, for instance, suggested that health visitors in the town ‘find visiting Asian families
frustrating and time consuming’ due to linguistic difficulties and because the ‘homes of Asians
are generally dirty’.\textsuperscript{1164} Summarising the evidence it received from member councils, the
County Councils Association (CCA) in 1962 considered that immigrants often regarded health
visitors as ‘unwarranted intrusions’, and this was compounded by language barriers.\textsuperscript{1165} As in
Nottingham and Hackney, the specific responsibilities given to those working with ethnic
minorities reflected the difficulties associated with specific local communities. In 1961,
Bradford appointed a Pakistani liaison officer in its Health Department, to deal with a smallpox
epidemic and health issues stemming from multi-occupancy.\textsuperscript{1166} Birmingham’s second Liaison
Officer was a Pakistani who also focused on overcrowding and health issues. By 1963,
Birmingham had a third such officer, whilst Smethwick had an officer in its Public Health
Inspectorate who focused on overcrowding in Asian households. Bradford had also appointed
a second Pakistani officer.\textsuperscript{1167} Moreover, the work of these officers was widely commended.
The funding of additional such posts is evidence for this, and in 1963 the CIAC advised local

\textsuperscript{1163} Katznelson, “Politics of Racial Buffering”, 435.
\textsuperscript{1164} MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/3, Wolverhampton City Council to CIAC, 30/1/64.
\textsuperscript{1165} MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.94/1, CCA, “CIAC: Questionnaire”, 7/11/62.
\textsuperscript{1166} Ibid; WYASB, TC papers, BBD 1/7/T13687, Clerk to Blackburn Town Clerk, 25/7/67.
\textsuperscript{1167} WYASB, TC papers, BBD 1/7/T9644, AMC, “Memorandum of Evidence Submitted by the
Association”, 1963.
It seems that staff appointed to work on specific issues with ethnic minority communities soon became regarded simply as specialists on ‘race’/immigration issues generally. In 1969, Manchester’s Medical Officer of Health noted that his/her department’s health visitor for ethnic minority families was being referred a large number of cases unrelated to health but involving such families. The recommendation was that workers abandon casework and instead adopt a ‘community approach’, concerned ‘with the problems of race relations in general’. In Bradford too, the Pakistani immigrant liaison officers began to take on broad responsibilities in ‘their’ communities. CROs also took a ‘community approach’. This represents, in a sense, the apotheosis of multiculturalism’s institutionalisation, as ‘race relations’ became an autonomous sphere, and ethnic minority communities were governed not as part of a general population, but as members of special groups, defined by ‘special needs’. As the 1970s began, the move towards cultural pluralism in education and the availability of S11 salaries led to LEAs appointing a variety of workers with responsibilities relating to both ethnic minority communities and developing multicultural practice. Liaison Officers and Welfare Officers were often appointed, for example in the ILEA area and Bradford, to take over the social work aspect of schools’ roles, which often had a distinct character when ethnic minority communities were involved, with much focus on language and the engagement of parents. This ‘holistic’ approach, in which workers engaged with the entirety of an ethnic minority community on general matters, was in the mid-1970s encouraged by the CRC. Its 1975 report Between two Cultures suggested that policy-makers

1168 MRC, TUC papers, MSS.292B/805.93/1, TUC, “CIAC: Progress Report”, 17/2/64
1169 MCL, Manchester Medical Officer of Health, “Report... for 1968”
1170 WYASB, TC papers, BBD 1/7/16, “Reports on the Problems of Coloured School Leavers and on Housing from the SCRRI”, [1973].
1171 ibid.; LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/CL/PRE/24, P955, “Education in a Multi-ethnic Society...”., 1982, 10.
and practitioners ‘[t]oo often... see problems only in terms of their own specialised profession’ and should address themselves to all issues affecting the communities with which they worked.\footnote{CRC, \textit{Between two Cultures}, 56.}

No element of British multiculturalism was left unchanged by the introduction of S71 and the riots of 1981, and the kinds of local authority appointments described above were not exceptions to this. In this later period, the engagement and usage of such special workers changed in a number of ways: such employees were more often ‘race relations advisers’ and were rarely ‘welfare’ officers; ethnic minority organizations were sometimes consulted over the appointments; appointees were more likely to come from ethnic minority organizations; appointments occurred in a wider range of authorities; and workers were engaged to work specifically with an ever-larger range of ethnic groups. The Bangladeshi community in Britain can be used as a good case study of some of these developments. In the 1960s, British Bangladeshis were, despite their prominence in ‘Pakistani’ political and welfare organizations in Britain, largely subsumed into more general categories – ‘Pakistani’, ‘Asian’, or ‘(coloured / Commonwealth) immigrant’. The specificity of Bangladeshi communities was appreciated to a somewhat greater extent during and following the 1971 war for independence in East Pakistan, reflecting the visibility of British Bangladeshi mobilization and the tendency for British organizations to privilege national over regional origins. The late 1970s saw younger Asian, including Bangladeshi, activists coming to the fore within their communities, growing frustrated with first-generation ‘welfare’ organizations and animated by the growing problem of racial attacks. A primary demand of these new community organizations was the employment by local authorities of Bangladeshi staff to work with Bangladeshi communities.\footnote{THLHLA, LBTH papers, PC minutes, L/THL/A/32/2/9, FBYO to LBTH, 22/5/84; Daniel Silverstone, \textit{The Bengali Community in Tower Hamlets: Final Report} (London : LBTH Social Services Directorate, 1978), 26; \textit{The Asian}, 8/78.} The Federation of Bangladeshi Youth Organizations (FBYO), which
coordinated local youth groups, suggested that failure to employ more Bengali and Sylheti staff would constitute institutional racism.\textsuperscript{1174} The GLC, with its strenuous commitment to anti-racism and large budget, employed many Bangladeshi staff members whilst under Labour control from 1981.\textsuperscript{1175} Tower Hamlets was slower to act, but by 1984 the Labour chair of the borough Social Services committee was willing to admit that the ‘mainstream of Social Services in Tower Hamlets has failed miserably to respond sensitively to the needs of the Bangladeshi community’.\textsuperscript{1176} In the late 1980s Tower Hamlets had an ‘Asian’ liaison officer as well as a Bangladeshi assistant CRO.\textsuperscript{1177} Both the FBYO Development Officer and Ayub Ali, former chair of the PYO, received social services posts.\textsuperscript{1178} Developments in London’s Bangladeshi communities therefore demonstrate some major changes in this period: ‘new’ ethnic groups were found to have specific political and social significance; ethnic minority organizations became central to the lobby for special appointments; and workers from those organizations were often drafted in to the local authority. These developments were not confined to authorities with large and active ethnic minority communities – Cleveland County Council employed a ‘neighbourhood worker’ for work with Asian communities in 1978, and later also appointed a woman of Somali origin to work with Somali families in the region.\textsuperscript{1179}

The appointment of ‘race relations advisers’ was essentially a parallel development to that of social and community workers with ethnically-specific remits. These advisers provided advice on relevant policies and presided over the ‘race relations’ structures described below. Some headed units devoted to ‘race’, whilst others were autonomous middle-managers in mainstream departments. Although race relations adviser posts had predecessors under other

\textsuperscript{1174} TTHLHLA, \textit{ibid.}, Social Services Committee (SSC) minutes, L/THL/A/27/2/10, FBYO, \textit{Annual Report 1983-4}.
\textsuperscript{1175} John Eade, “Bangladeshi Community Organization”, 321.
\textsuperscript{1176} \textit{Spitalfields News}, 5/84.
\textsuperscript{1177} \textit{Asian Times}, 17/7/87; TTHLHLA, LBTH papers, PC minutes, L/THL/A/32/2/8, CRE, “THCRE and THARJ...”, 25/4/83.
\textsuperscript{1178} King, \textit{Three Asian Associations}, 47; \textit{Spitalfields News}, Spring 1983.
\textsuperscript{1179} Ellis, \textit{Breaking New Ground}, 2, 93.

257
titles, the first officer described as such seems to have been appointed to Lambeth’s Housing Department in 1977. Lambeth was also the first council to create a Race Unit, two years later.\footnote{Stuart Lansley, Sue Goss and Christian Wolmar, \textit{Councils in Conflict: the Rise and Fall of the Municipal Left} (Basingstoke : Macmillan Education, 1989), 123.} In 1981, the GLC appointed a Principal Race Relations Adviser (Herman Ouseley) to head its Ethnic Minorities Unit (GLCEMU).\footnote{GLC, \textit{The GLC’s Work to Assist Ethnic Minorities} (London : GLC, 1983), 1.} The GLCEMU became the best-resourced race unit in the country, with a budget reaching £2.5MM in 1983-4.\footnote{GLC, \textit{Ethnic Minorities and the Abolition of the GLC} (London : GLC, 1983), 13.} In 1982, the government suggested that race relations advisory posts could be funded via S11.\footnote{Hiro, \textit{Black British, Wite British}, 243.} By the summer of that year, at least nineteen authorities had race relations advisers in post, including some smaller authorities like Walsall.\footnote{LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/20, MCCR, “MCC and Racial Equality: the Case for Ethnic Record Keeping”, 7/82.} A number of London Boroughs added advisory staff in 1983, with seven having Principal/Senior advisors, and five also having advisers dealing with housing, social services or both.\footnote{LMA, GLCEMU presented papers, GLC/DG/PRE/49/5, GLC, “Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966…”, 4/2/83.} 1983 also saw the creation of a Race and Housing Action Team by the GLC, focused on the issue of racist attacks on council estates, and the establishment of an Equal Opportunities Unit by ILEA.\footnote{Eade, \textit{Politics of Community}, 32.} In 1984, four large authorities – Manchester, Brent, Birmingham and Bradford – created specialized units to deal with ‘race’ issues.\footnote{Mano Candappa and Daniele Joly, \textit{Local Authorities, Ethnic Minorities and ‘Pluralist Integration’: a Study of Five Local Authority Areas} (Coventry : Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations), 48, 85-6; Cross, Brah and McLeod, \textit{Racial Equality}, 41; Mark Halstead, \textit{Education, Justice and Cultural Diversity}, 18.} Two years later, the return of Labour to power in Ealing led to the creation of a Race Equality Unit with a £2.3MM budget.\footnote{Candappa and Joly, \textit{Ibid.}, 109.}

An initial step for advisers or units was encouraging an authority to issue equal opportunities statements concerning service delivery or employment. In some cases, commitment to such values pre-dated the appointment of advisers. For example, the GLC declared in 1975 that it was ‘opposed to any form of discrimination on grounds of race, ethnic
origin or colour’ in employment. Whilst the GLC was a pioneer in the area of equal opportunities in employment, ILEA was perhaps the first to consider ethnic diversity’s implications for service delivery. In 1977, it announced its ‘major initiative’ on multicultural education, preparing pupils to live and work harmoniously in a multicultural society; attempting ‘to build upon the strengths of cultural diversity’; defining and combating racism; and addressing ‘the particular needs of all people’. Statements related to employment were more widely adopted, with ILEA, Haringey, Camden and Lambeth issuing such documents in 1978-9. By 1983, at least 26 further authorities had some form of equal opportunities statement. Employment remained the most common focus, but some statements also referenced aspects of service delivery. In 1982, whilst revising its position on equal opportunities to better reflect the TUC Model Resolution on the issue, the GLC, responding to Scarman, condemned ‘colour-blind’ policies, declaring that ‘the special needs of the ethnic minority groups must be identified and planned [for] to avoid further exacerbation of the problem of racial disadvantage’. Education was the area of service delivery most likely to attract statements. By 1983, a large number of LEAs had made such statements (though the exact number is uncertain – perhaps 20; perhaps over 30). Chapter two’s observation, however, that statements about multicultural or anti-racist education often had limited relation to actual practice, probably applies to other policy areas. Some reasons for this have been considered – the isolation of race relations advisers; the fact that, despite their corporate tone, statements were often the work of one officer with limited support from colleagues;

1189 LMA, GLCEMU presented papers, GLC/DG/PRE/49/1, GLC, “Equal Opportunities in GLC Employment”, 3/11/81
1190 LMA, ILEAPCC presented papers, ILEA/CL/PRE/13, P787, “Multi-Ethnic Education…”
1192 Lansley, Goss and Walmer, Councils in Conflict, 124-5; Ben-Tovim, et al., Local Politics of Race, 113; Ellis, Breaking New Ground, 11; Candappa and Joly, Local Authorities, 75, 87; Garbaye, ibid.; LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/20, MCCR, “MCC and Racial Equality…”, 7/82.
1193 GLC, The GLC’s Work, 9.
uncertainty about how to tackle institutional racism; and a reluctance to accept that a local authority’s workings could be racist in effect, even if not in intent. By 1989, some 80 local authorities had issued anti-racist or equal opportunities statements, but it seems that these documents simply reflect a belief amongst some local government officers that this work should be part of the remit of their authorities rather than (necessarily) significant changes to services.\textsuperscript{1195}

Local authorities seem to have been more successful and comfortable in reforming their practices as employers. The growth of ethnic monitoring systems from the late seventies also provided an objective means of targeting initiatives and measuring their success. In some authorities, informal and covert monitoring of housing allocation was of long standing. Nottingham initiated this practice in 1970, and it was also well-established in Bradford by 1973 and Tower Hamlets by the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{1196} These practices reflected an attempt to monitor a problem, residential segregation, which local authorities often lacked the ability to redress. Apparently the first instance of a local authority implementing formal, self-admitted ethnic monitoring, meanwhile, occurred when Leicester began to monitor its own personnel in 1976.\textsuperscript{1197} An interesting comparison can be made with the GLC, which, having introduced its equal opportunities policy in 1975, discussed ethnic monitoring with trade unions and the Staff Committee in 1977. Monitoring was roundly rejected at that time due to a belief that policy was already working adequately.\textsuperscript{1198} Trade unions were amongst the chief opponents of ethnic monitoring in this period and, where they were strong, often acted to block monitoring initiatives. However, this was not an absolute: ILEA agreed monitoring of personnel in 1977 in

\textsuperscript{1195} The Times, 30/1/89.
\textsuperscript{1197} LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/20, MCCR, “MCC and Racial Equality...”, 7/82.
\textsuperscript{1198} LMA, GLCEMU presented papers, GLC/DG/PRE/49/1, GLC, “Equal Opportunities in GLC Employment”, 3/11/81.
principle, at least.\footnote{LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILE/EOU/1/21, “Ethnic Monitoring in ILEA”, 26/11/82.} In large authorities in particular, however, agreement with the staff-side was only one step in a longer process of implementation that included determining the style of monitoring forms and issuing test surveys – monitoring did not actually begin in ILEA until the mid-1980s.\footnote{LMA, \textit{ibid.}, ILEA/EOU/1/9, ILEA, “Response to S11 Postal Survey”, 6/83 2-3.} Leicester also began ethnic monitoring in its housing department in 1976, although this was patchily implemented.\footnote{LMA, \textit{ibid.}, ILEA/EOU/1/20, MCCR, “MCC and Racial Equality...”, 7/82.} In the same year, Lambeth began monitoring the ethnic composition of its personnel, and set targets with the intention of bringing the proportion of its ethnic minority workforce in line with its ethnic minority population. Monitoring exercises showed that the ethnic minority proportion of Lambeth’s workforce doubled from 8% in 1978 to 16% in 1980.\footnote{Ouseley, “Local Authority Race Relations Initiatives”, 146.} Lambeth received only a 30% response rate to its first monitoring survey, but this also increased quickly.\footnote{Lansley, Goss and Wolmar, \textit{Councils in Conflict}, 150.} The borough also extended its monitoring to housing shortly thereafter, providing evidence of segregation in the area.\footnote{Ouseley, “Local Authority Race Relations Initiatives”, 150.} By the end of 1981, eleven London boroughs, including a majority of those in the inner area, had introduced monitoring in at least one department (most commonly personnel).\footnote{LMA, GLCEMU presented papers, GLC/DG/PRE/49/1, GLC, “Equal Opportunities in GLC Employment”, 3/11/81.} Also in 1981, Bradford became one of the first provincial authorities to utilise monitoring, and the ethnic minority proportion of its staff grew sevenfold in ten years.\footnote{Lewis, “Areas of Ethnic Negotiation”, 133.} In the following year, the GLC finally secured agreement from its Staff Committee regarding the implementation of monitoring, and agreed to the categories appearing on the form.\footnote{GLC, GLCEMC minutes, GLC/DG/MIN/49/1, 25/10/82; Eade, \textit{Politics of Community}, 102.}

The categories used in ethnic monitoring were politically significant. As noted above, categories suggested by the RRB in 1975 were criticised by some as de-emphasising skin colour as a source of discrimination, leading to modifications in the CRE’s 1985 \textit{Code of Practice}. The categories chosen by the GLC – Black Afro-Caribbean, Black Asian, European (White), and
Other -- were clearly motivated by a belief in the primacy of skin colour. In a sense Brent’s categories (simply ‘European’ and ‘non-European’) took this dualism to an extreme, but declined to identify skin colour as the most salient difference between groups. In general, categories were national/regional and broad. The breadth of the categories reflected a sustained belief in the significance of groups like ‘Asian’ (which most monitoring forms did not sub-divide) and presumably a belief that a more general form would receive more responses. Some authorities with large, multi-ethnic Asian populations (such as Hackney) did sub-divide the ‘Asian’ category into national groups. Some smaller communities were listed individually where they were numerous – Greek and Turkish Cypriots in Hackney, for example, Somalis in Tower Hamlets, and Arabs in Birmingham. East African Asians, Chinese, Vietnamese and African groups of any sort were almost never listed. Brent in 1989 became perhaps the only authority to monitor its inhabitants on a religious basis, reflecting campaigning from Muslim organizations locally stressing that Muslims identified, and so should be considered, primarily on a religious basis.

Regardless of the categories used, housing continued to be the area of service to which monitoring was most often applied – smaller authorities like Bolton, Derby and Walsall all monitored housing exclusively by 1982. Larger authorities continued to take a more tortuous path towards monitoring, however. A pilot survey in Brent in 1984 received very low response rates, and was abandoned. In Manchester, the introduction of monitoring, like that of other ‘race relations’ initiatives, was enabled by a shift in power towards the Labour left in the mid-1980s. In Birmingham, it was changing inter-, rather than intra-, party politics that enabled the introduction of monitoring in 1986, two years after Labour returned to

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1208 GMCREO, Margaret Roth papers, GB127.M746/1, MCC Director of Personnel, “Equal Opportunities in Employment”, 11/10/83; THLHLA, LBTH papers, LBTH Joint Housing Management Committee (JHMC) minutes, L/THL/A/36/1/5, “Multi-Committee Report: Ethnic Record Keeping...” 1986.
1209 Cross, Brah and McLeod, Racial Equality, 32, 143.
1210 LMA, ILEAEOU papers, ILEA/EOU/1/20, MCCR, “MCC and Racial Equality...”, 7/82.
1211 Cross, Brah and McLeod, Racial Equality, 48.
1212 Lansley, Goss and Wolmar, Councils in Conflict, 119.
power.\textsuperscript{1213} A number of authorities, in addition to Lambeth, combined ‘positive action’ measures to increase ethnic minority recruitment with statistical targets. In 1986, Birmingham declared that it intended to draw 20\% of its personnel from ethnic minorities by some unspecified time. From 1983 to 1993, this figure rose from 6.1\% to 15.4\%.\textsuperscript{1214} Manchester also set targets, beginning in 1989 and aiming for a 12.5\% proportion of ethnic minority workers by 1996.\textsuperscript{1215} Lambeth, perhaps uniquely, also introduced targets regarding the placement of ethnic minority tenants in higher-quality social housing.\textsuperscript{1216} However, despite their success in increasing ethnic minority engagement, local authorities struggled to ensure a distribution of ethnic minority staff across grades, at least by the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{1217}

Even this qualified success in advancing ethnic minority employment was often not matched in service delivery, however. By 1988, there were 685 race advisers in post across Britain.\textsuperscript{1218} However, the number of advisers in post, and the number of authorities employing advisers, cannot be taken to suggest that a sea change occurred in local authority practices. As Ouseley himself has remarked, many workers were trapped in middle-management positions without the ability to influence higher-ups.\textsuperscript{1219} Brent’s experiences provide lessons about the possible dangers where a Principal Adviser took a combative approach.\textsuperscript{1220} Units themselves could become regarded as corporate ‘busybodies’ within the council structure, and these departments were extremely vulnerable to the popular attacks on anti-racism and, to an even larger degree, the attacks from erstwhile sympathizers, as reflected and stimulated by the Burnage report and the McGoldrick affair in Brent. The accusation of racism against head teacher Maureen McGoldrick in 1986 and the subsequent handling of disciplinary proceedings

\textsuperscript{1213} Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 180.
\textsuperscript{1214} \textit{Ibid.}, 180-1.
\textsuperscript{1215} Candappa and Joly, \textit{Local Authorities}, 53-4.
\textsuperscript{1216} \textit{Ibid.}, 150.
\textsuperscript{1217} \textit{Ibid.}, 51; Solomos & Back, \textit{Social Change}, 181.
\textsuperscript{1218} Cross, Brah and McLeod, \textit{Racial Equality}, 4.
\textsuperscript{1219} Ouseley, “Local Authority Race Relations Initiatives”, 136-7.
\textsuperscript{1220} Cross, Brah and McLeod, \textit{Racial Equality}, 86-7.
against her, combined with the sacking of the borough’s first Principal Race Relations Adviser and the failure to refill this post, left Brent’s unit uncoordinated and unpopular by the late 1980s. Manchester’s unit had long been regarded as ineffectual, and its reputation was hurt by Burnage. Bradford’s Race Relations Action Group (RRAG) was ‘stymied’ by the party political wrangling during the Honeyford affair and growing caution about other policies, especially Racism Awareness Training, which generated resentment in many other areas. Ealing’s REU had always been controversial due its comparatively large budget, and in 1990 the local Conservative Party was able to fulfil a longstanding promise to abolish the Unit once it returned to power.

Declining faith in the theory and practice of anti-racism no doubt helped to justify the contraction of Britain’s multiculturalism institution from the late 1980s. However, this process cannot be understood without references to external factors – most notably the disempowerment and diminution of local government. The effects of the reduction in funding available through S11 as well as of the reorientation of the UP have been described above. More decisively, the abolition of the GLC in 1986 and ILEA in 1990 eliminated two authorities with the most comprehensive multicultural institutions. Chapter two described the process by which Conservative governments of the 1980s reduced LEA influence over education, empowering governors, head teachers and parents through Local Management of Schools and the central state through the National Curriculum. Strictures regarding the finance of local government and a reduction in council housing also reduced the power of local government. This reduction in power and resources, combined with serious questions about whether and how separate ‘race’ structures should continue, led to many authorities restructuring these. In 1987, even before the MacDonald Report had been issued, Birmingham had combined its Race

1221 Ibid., 41.
1222 Candappa and Joly, Local Authorities, 52.
Relations and Equal Opportunity Committee and its Women’s Committee, and no longer gave its Race Relations Unit a direct line to the Chief Executive. This was primarily a response to Labour’s belief that ‘race’ policies were a ‘vote loser’. In 1991, Brent came under effective Conservative control after two black former Labour councillors defected to the Tories. In explaining their decision, the councillors expressed support for Conservative proposals to combine racial and gender equality work under a single Equal Opportunities Unit. In Labour strongholds, too, such as Lambeth, Newham and Manchester, race units were abolished or amalgamated into general ‘equal opportunity’ structures. These steps were attractive to local authorities suffering from depleted resources, answerable to a central government diverting funding away from ‘race’ initiatives, and aware of the increasingly sophisticated criticism of anti-racism, much of which emphasized the approach’s apparent failure to consider the intersection of racism with other forms of disadvantage.

IV

This chapter has so far focused on government. This is advised, since British multiculturalism has been a primarily top-down phenomenon. However, it would be impossible to deny that organizations outside of the state, in particular ethnic minority organizations, have influenced its development. (It must also be noted that one major determinant of the development of multiculturalism in Britain, the riots of 1981 and 1985, do not fit into the categories of action by the state or by ethnic minority organizations.) This section will therefore consider the effects of ethnic minority organizations upon the national and, primarily, local state, and the consultative arrangements pursued by local government in incorporating these organizations.

In the 1950s and early 1960s, consultation with ethnic minority organizations theoretically occurred through the VLCs. However, most of these committees had very little

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1225 Solomos and Back, Social Change, 179.
1226 Guardian, 17/5/91.
1227 The Times, 10/12/90.

ethnic minority representation. VLCs in cities such as Birmingham and Sheffield, for instance, did not even seek such representatives.\textsuperscript{1228} Nottingham only solicited Afro-Caribbean representation in 1958 following the riot in that city.\textsuperscript{1229} More radical ethnic minority organizations unsurprisingly had little interest in VLCs. The IWA’s attitude was more variable, with branches in some areas boycotting the local community relations structures – as in Birmingham, Blackburn, Bradford and Huddersfield – and those in others becoming involved with VLCs.\textsuperscript{1230} Regardless of the specific organizations involved in VLCs, representatives in many areas were chosen not for their ability to ‘represent’ any ethnic community, but because of their integration into local white society. Nottingham’s first representatives, all from the CSCC, were professionals known personally to white EC members.\textsuperscript{1231} A Barbadian member was chosen to ‘represent’ West Indians on Hackney CRC because he was the GP to the borough’s West Indian information officer.\textsuperscript{1232} Many ethnic minority VLC members were therefore not members of any particular organization, but were invited to represent ‘their community’.\textsuperscript{1233} Bradford CRC’s executive committee had ‘individual’ representatives of both the Indian and Pakistani communities, justifying this practice by claiming that ethnic minority ‘leaders’ were hard to find.\textsuperscript{1234} It is true that ethnic minority organizations were for the large part, in this early period, fissiparous and small. Nevertheless, ethnic minority respondents to Hill and Isaacharoff’s comprehensive 1971 study of community relations often criticized both representatives for making specious claims to represent the totality of certain ethnic communities and white members for failing to perceive distinctions between and within these communities.\textsuperscript{1235} That study also demonstrated some surprising lacunae in terms of ethnic

\textsuperscript{1228} Hill and Isaacharoff, \textit{Community Action}, 5-6.
\textsuperscript{1229} Katznelson, “Politics of Racial Buffering”, 434.
\textsuperscript{1230} Katznelson, \textit{ibid.}, 438; Hill and Isaacharoff, \textit{Community Action} 133, 136; \textit{Guardian}, 14/4/71.
\textsuperscript{1231} Katznelson, \textit{ibid.}, 434.
\textsuperscript{1232} Hill and Isaacharoff, \textit{Community Action}, 138-9.
\textsuperscript{1233} Hill and Isaacharoff, \textit{ibid.}, 135; KLSL, KCRC papers BK61/14, KCRC, “Attendance Record... 1972/3”; WYASB, YCCR papers, 49D79/2/2/18, MCCR, \textit{Annual Report}, 1968-9.
\textsuperscript{1234} Hill and Isaacharoff, \textit{ibid.}, 148.
\textsuperscript{1235} \textit{Ibid.}, 88.
groups represented in certain local areas—Ealing had more Afro-Caribbean than Indian representatives; Hackney had no Asian EC members; and Huddersfield and Sheffield both lacked Indian membership.\textsuperscript{1236} This was despite the 1965 White Paper’s promotion of ‘broad’ ethnic minority representation. Of course, membership of a particular ethnic group was not by itself guarantee of an individual’s ability to represent that group, even leaving aside questions about what constituted an ethnic group and which groups required representation. 

Demographically, ethnic minority representatives of CRCs were far more likely to be educated professionals than those they sought to represent. The majority of ethnic minority representatives were non-manual workers (and 46% were professionals) and had tertiary education qualifications.\textsuperscript{1237} Whilst it is difficult to determine the precise significance that these facts have for the concept of representation in this context, a number of commentators have remarked that in Britain’s Pakistani communities cleavages between workers, professionals and students were especially sharp, both socially and organisationally.\textsuperscript{1238}

Contact with the local VLC/CRC was essentially the only form of ‘consultation’ open to ethnic minority organizations in the 1950s-60s. The strategy of ‘buffering’ and depoliticisation followed by the national and local state in this period did not prevent ethnic minority organizations lobbying authorities, but did prevent direct liaison. As noted in chapter two, ethnic minority organizations were, however, sometimes useful to local authorities in mediating between local authorities and their communities. Contrary to a common academic belief, there were many religious Muslim organizations in this period, and some were amongst the most significant organizations in their communities. In his 1957 study of Muslim communities in Tyneside, Collins suggested that the primary local welfare and social...
organizations were religious in nature, including the Muslim League and Alawite Society.\textsuperscript{1239} There was a Muslim Association in Sheffield, represented on the local CRC. Similarly, the Islamic Mission and Mosque Fund had representation on Wycombe and District CRC, and the Huddersfield mosque on that town’s CRC.\textsuperscript{1240} Religious organizations were not therefore entirely insular. In 1962, the UKIM was formed by East Pakistani worshippers at the old East London mosque.\textsuperscript{1241} Although working first in London, the UKIM became most successful in Birmingham, and also had a branch in Bradford by the end of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{1242} The leaders of these groups, like those of both mosque committees and of more secular groups, were likely to be drawn from the middle classes and therefore may have had little in common with the majority of British Muslims. These factors inhibited the attempts of the Regent’s Park Mosque / ICC to transform itself from a learned professional organization into a representative body for the new waves of peasant migrants in the 1960s.\textsuperscript{1243} Ethnic minority organizations attempting to gain a national profile by federating local groups often struggled to gain traction in this period.\textsuperscript{1244} The National Federation of Pakistani Associations (NFPA), formed in 1963, sought to coordinate the activities of local PWAs and similar organizations. It was affiliated to CARD, and to the NCCI until it, along with the West Indian Standing Conference (WISC), boycotted the organization in protest at the 1965 White Paper.\textsuperscript{1245} The NFPA endured a lack of coordination and splits throughout its existence, achieving only loose coordination of affiliates.\textsuperscript{1246} It had two factions of leadership – one composed of more moderate, older

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1240] Hill and Isaacaroff, \textit{Community Action}, 142.
\item[1243] Nielsen, \textit{Muslims in Western Europe}, 48.
\item[1244] Ramdin, \textit{Black Working Class}, 395.
\item[1245] Ramdin, \textit{ibid.}, 418, 423, 431-2; \textit{Guardian}, 6/10/85.
\item[1246] Heinemann, \textit{Powerless}, 93.
\end{footnotes}
middle-class men, and one of more radical, younger activists. The older faction, led by founder Tassaduq Ahmed, had intended the NFPA to serve as a vehicle for increased Pakistani integration, but later came to regard this aim as better pursued through CARD. NFPA was primarily an East Pakistani organization, though it utilised a power-sharing arrangement in which three officers came from each wing of Pakistan. The radical element in the NFPA appeared to hold sway at least until the 1960s, and this is reflected in the involvement of the NFPA with ‘black power’ organizations, particularly the BPA. In 1969, however, disputed elections led to a split in the NFPA, as the ‘radical’ incumbent officers were defeated by ‘moderates’. The mass of Pakistani and Muslim organizations in this period, meanwhile, were concerned with welfare provision, education and the promotion of Islam, were extremely localized, and seemingly had little interaction with national bodies. Many had memberships or constituencies that were determined on ethnic, regional or kinship bases, even where this was not made explicit. Class divides within Pakistani communities in social terms were reflected at an organisational level, and the work of middle-class PWAs was often duplicated by more working-class Pakistani Workers Associations. This localization and sectarianism led to a proliferation of organizations, as did the desire of many educated and professional Pakistanis to become ‘leaders’ in their community. However, it should not be assumed that because of their parochial nature, their distance in some senses from local communities, and their narrowness, that these organizations had no benefit to constituents. They provided basic services such as religious celebrations, translation and interpreting, arrangements for burial,

1247 Birmingham Central Archives, Birmingham, UK, IWA papers, MS2141/A/7/6, Michael Dummett, “Immigrant Organizations”, 20/9/68
1248 Heinemann, Powerless, 91.
1249 Hiro, Black British, 141.
1250 PHM, LDCP papers, CP/LON/RACE/2/1, CPGB Information Department, “Racialism and ‘Black Power’”, 10/5/68; Hiro, Black British, 142.
1251 The Times, 2/1/69.
1252 Lewis, Islamic Britain, 58. Rex and Moore, Race, Community and Conflict, 167; John Rex, Ethnic Identity and Ethnic Mobilisation in Britain, (Coventry : Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, 1991), 102
1254 Shaw, Kinship and Continuity, 117.
education, funding and receiving planning permission for mosques, assistance in dealing with bureaucracy, etc.\textsuperscript{1255}

Even where consultation was not available, however, ethnic minority organizations were by the 1970s more likely to seek and receive funding from local authorities. In Manchester alone, funding was given to religious organizations, women’s groups and traditional and long-established welfare groups.\textsuperscript{1256} Mosques were sometimes funded by local authorities, but generally for language work rather than religious activities.\textsuperscript{1257} Perhaps the Muslim organization growing the fastest in the 1970s was the MET, which was soon providing religious instruction to Muslim children in fifty towns and cities across the country.\textsuperscript{1258} The mid-'70s also saw the development of Jamaati youth organization in Britain, reflecting the creation of a distinctive identity amongst second-generation British Muslims.\textsuperscript{1259} Mosques themselves were also growing in number in this period, and were more frequently the objects of disputes. At the beginning of the 1970s, few cities had more than one or two mosques, and those that did exist were often controlled by a particular faction, defined by theology, ethnicity and/or kinship. Werbner has suggested that by the late seventies most Muslim sects had their own mosques.\textsuperscript{1260} This can perhaps be attributed to three factors: the availability of funding from the enriched Muslim world; the general growth in the significance of religion once pioneer migrants reorganized their families; and the growth in individuals seeking community leadership roles.

\textsuperscript{1255} Rex, \textit{Ethnic Identity}, 102; Werbner, \textit{Migration Process}, 321, 324.
\textsuperscript{1256} GMCRO, Appendix to MCC minutes, MCC Social Services Committee, “Urban Programme Circular 17...”, 1978; Ellis, \textit{Breaking New Ground}, 10.
\textsuperscript{1257} Joly, \textit{Britannia’s Crescent}, 22
\textsuperscript{1258} \textit{The Times}, 5/7/76.
\textsuperscript{1260} Pnina Werbner, “Theorising Complex Diasporas: Purity and Hybridity in the South Asian Public Sphere in Britain”, \textit{Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies} (September, 2004), 905.
The 1971 war in East Pakistan, meanwhile, was significant in changing the character of secular mobilisations. Protests supporting Bangladeshi independence at major landmarks and high profile events, such as cricket matches, attracted wide attention. Women became heavily involved in this activism. A number of ‘Pakistani’ organizations, already dominated in reality by either East or West Pakistanis, split apart, whilst others simply changed their name – the London PWA became the BWA. This was not always a rancorous process, and Pakistani organizations did not always split, but nevertheless these changes heightened awareness amongst observers of a specific Bangladeshi identity. Some of the youngest activists involved in this work would go on to join Bangladeshi youth organizations later in the decade. Such youth organizations were also influenced by black power activity, which was ongoing in the 1970s. In East London, where the issue of racist attacks against Asians was especially salient, the PWoA was from 1970 involved in self-defence organization along with a trio of black power organizations, including the BPA, Black Panthers and Third World Party. This was controversial within the community, with the East London Mosque protesting that black power organizations would ‘use’ Pakistani activists.\textsuperscript{1261} Youth organizations of the late 1970s – including the FBYO and its affiliates, the AYMs, and the Southall Youth Movement (SYM) in Ealing -- built on the work of self-defence organizations like these, inspired by their attempts to form links between communities and oppose sectarianism.\textsuperscript{1262} However, the younger groups also had wider aspirations relating to social deprivation and, as mentioned, provisions by local authorities.\textsuperscript{1263} Therefore, these new organizations also built on the work of organizations like Bengali Housing Action Group (BHAG). But, whereas the intellectual anti-racists that led the Race Today Collective, which formed BHAG, had little in common with the Bangladeshi squatters with whom they worked, the new activists were more native to the communities

\textsuperscript{1261} East London Advertiser, 24/4/70.
\textsuperscript{1262} Ramamurthy, “Asian Youth Movements”, 40.
\textsuperscript{1263} Ramamurthy, \textit{ibid.}, 41; Ellis, \textit{Breaking New Ground}, 41.
the organization they organised and served.\textsuperscript{1264} The primary motivation for forming these organizations was often racist attacks, however. The SYM was formed shortly after the murder of Sikh schoolboy Gurdip Singh Chaggar in 1977, and numerous youth organizations were formed in East London following the murder of Altab Ali in Whitechapel in 1978. The Bradford AYM, the first and largest AYM, was a local response to NF activity in the area.\textsuperscript{1265} The SYM acted as inspiration for these later groups, whilst the creation of an AYM in Bradford begat a movement that included organizations in at least nine other areas.\textsuperscript{1266}

By the mid-1970s, growing concern about such racist violence and political activity encouraged some shift towards direct consultation of ethnic minority organizations and away from the use of CRCs as ‘representative’ bodies. The Labour movement in particular made efforts to consult with ethnic minority organizations on a national basis. In 1976, the Labour Party Home Policy Sub-committee met with thirteen ethnic minority representatives to discuss the issue of racist activity and means of dealing with racism inside the labour movement. Although the ethnic minority representatives apparently tried to steer the discussion to broader issues, including social deprivation, the Labour members responded flatly that social deprivation was a problem for people of all ethnicities.\textsuperscript{1267} The TUC’s ‘United Against Racism’ march of 1976, and some of the difficulties surrounding it, were mentioned in chapter five. These links were formalized in the following year through the establishment of the JCAR, which brought together the three major political parties and national ethnic minority organizations including WISC, the IWA, SCOPO and the Federation of Bangladeshi Associations (FBA). The JCAR, however, was a short-lived organization that did not outlive political concern about the NF.\textsuperscript{1268} The TUC was not directly involved in JCAR but established some \textit{ad hoc} consultation

\textsuperscript{1265} Malik, \textit{From Fatwa to Jihad}, 47.
\textsuperscript{1266} Ramamurthy, “Asian Youth Movements”, 44.
\textsuperscript{1267} PHM, LPRD memoranda, LPRD/94/19, Labour Party Home Policy Sub-Committee, “Meeting Between the NEC and Ethnic Minority Organizations”, 7/7/76.
\textsuperscript{1268} \textit{Ibid.}, MSS.292D/805.9/11, JCAR, “Basic Information”, [1978].
with national ethnic minority organizations in the late seventies. In 1979, a number of organizations – including SCOPO, WISC, FBA, IWA, NAAY and Confederation of Indian Organizations – were invited to a TUC conference entitled ‘Race Relations at Work’. As described in chapter four, the TUC also had some contact with the UMO, which was occasionally consulted by the TUC, CRE and Department of Employment on Muslim demands in the workplace. These seven groups were consulted by the TUC when producing its *Black Workers Charter* in 1980, which aimed to promote greater ethnic minority involvement in unions. The choice of these groups seemingly reflected a CRE recommendation.

But where ethnic minority organizations wished to exert influence on local authorities this came largely on their own initiative for much of the 1970s. Muslim organizations often lobbied on issues such as provision of *halal* food in public institutions, burial, planning permission for mosques, and resources for Muslim education, etc.. The MET, for example, frequently lobbied Wolverhampton council on the issue of education and was consulted on an *ad hoc* basis thereafter. The town’s PWA also had links with the Education Department, although the council’s formal consultation on multicultural education was through a series of working parties that lacked ethnic minority involvement. In Bradford, a few organizations – including the local Pakistan Society, the Bangladesh Association and the Bangladesh Organization – were invited to participate in a policy review concerning race relations in 1973. This general trend towards more frequent, but still informal, consultation of ethnic minority organizations in the largest and most ethnically diverse areas was also reflected in

1272 Saifullah Khan, “Pakistanis in Britain”, 225.
1275 WYASB, TC papers, BBD1/7/16, John Naylor to Clerk, 4/5/73.
In 1977, ILEA added the MEECCs to its complex system of ethnic minority consultation, as described in chapter two. An interesting example of *ad hoc* consultation occurred between the GLC and various Bangladeshi organizations in 1978, when the GLC Housing Department agreed to re-house squatters in East London. Most of those to be re-settled preferred to remain in western Tower Hamlets, due to proximity to services and places of employment, and due to the lessened threat of racist attacks.\(^{1277}\) The BHAG, which had organized the squatters, provided lists of estates on which Bangladeshis would feel safe.\(^{1278}\) This led to the Tory-controlled GLC, with ‘tacit’ Labour support, announcing that it would be willing to set aside certain estates entirely for Bangladeshis, acknowledging that this was a rather sudden departure from a long-standing prejudice against separate development.\(^{1279}\) Bengali youth organizations quickly disassociated themselves from the plans.\(^{1280}\) The chair of the BWA, however, defended the proposals on the basis that Bangladeshis would benefit from proximity to useful services and because Bengali women were ‘afraid to walk the streets’.\(^{1281}\) Despite this uncertainty, Jean Tatham, Tory chair of the Housing Committee, still claimed that the proposals were ‘what the people themselves want’.\(^{1282}\) The GLC understood the individual demands of those to be rehoused (numbering about 300 families) and perhaps placed undue importance on the opinion of the BWA which had waning influence in this period. The plan for separate estates seemed to impute a collective aspect to the sum of individual preferences and to conflate the community in general with one major community organization, reflecting deficiencies in the arrangements for consulting with ethnic minorities in this period.\(^{1283}\)

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1278 Swadhinata Trust, “Rev Kenneth Leech”,
1280 *Daily Telegraph*, 13/6/78; *East Ender*, 15/6/78; *The Local*, 8/78.
1281 *The Times*, 5/6/78.
1282 *Evening News*, 17/6/78.
1283 Swadhinata Trust, “Mr. Rajonuddin Jalal” and “Rev. Kenneth Leech”. 

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The youth organizations that were established in this period have commonly been interpreted as reactions against first-generation ‘welfare’ organizations. An early analysis in this vein by the CRC, dating from 1976, suggested that younger Asians ‘ignored’ and ‘resented’ elders, who were ‘unable to cope with the more subtle problems faced by the community as a whole and by the young people in particular’. There is some truth to this: Muslim welfare groups, as well as the IWA-Southall (though not the IWA-GB), had a quietistic character. Younger activists also disdained the factionalism of older groups. For example, three separate marches were planned in the aftermath of the Altab Ali murder – two by different BWA factions and one by younger activists – until the youth groups took the initiative to combine the marches.

In East London and Ealing, generational splits could also be mapped onto local splits within the Labour Party branches, perhaps deepening hostility. However, all of the new youth organizations recognized the debts they owed to the welfare associations. In East London, the BWA worked with the FBYO over the area’s major issues, such as police harassment and housing.

In Bradford and Birmingham, the more radical IWA-GB was closely involved with the establishment of youth organisations. The youth organizations were perhaps more inclusive than their forebears: AYM members, though wholly south Asian, were diverse in religious, ethnic and national terms. SYM had both Asian and Afro-Caribbean members. The issue of gender was perhaps a more complex one for these organizations than was ethnicity, since, though they had female members, they were formed by men. The constitution of AYMs declared their opposition to sexual discrimination, and there was some

1284 CRC, Between two Cultures, 49, 56-7.
1289 Ramamurthy, Black Star, 36, 158.
1291 Ramamurthy ed., ibid., 15.
contact between the Youth Movements and women’s groups, although some of these groups regarded the AYMs as ‘macho’ or even sexist. 1293 There was also a class element to this – male AYM activists often regarded female activists presumptively as members of the middle class. Whilst some were (as were some male activists), many female members of AYMs and Asian feminist organisations were students from relatively modest backgrounds. 1294 Partly in reaction to this, strong, autonomous ethnic minority feminist groups also appeared in this period. SBS was established in 1979 following the death of Blair Peach at an anti-NF march, and in protest at the male-dominated nature of the emerging Asian youth community organizations. It also inspired an offshoot in Birmingham. 1295 Groups such as Awaz and the Organisation of Women of Asian and African Descent were also formed in this period. 1296 The leaders of Jagonari, probably the largest Bangladeshi women’s organization in East London, related the group’s formation to the male-dominated nature of other youth groups. 1297 SBS’ first campaigns were directed at local authorities and focused on domestic violence. 1298 The organization also helped to establish a refuge for Asian victims of domestic violence and similar forms of coercion – such projects also existed in Brent and Southwark. 1299 SBS criticized the SYM for its ‘lumpen posturing and sexual harassment’, but its primary antagonist in the 1980s was the IWA. 1300 Composed of older men and by then a venerable local institution, the IWA, SBS felt, was defensive of its position of community leadership, uninterested in women’s rights, and keen to present an image of internal community homogeneity to local authorities. 1301 The IWA clearly regarded itself as committed to gender equality, organizing a public meeting on the

1294 Ramamurthy, ibid., 90.
1296 Ramamurthy, Black Star, 92.
1298 SBS, Against the Grain, 1.
1300 SBS, Against the Grain, 14.
1301 Ibid., 5.
issue of domestic violence in 1986, suggesting that such violence resulted from ‘reactionary feudal customs’. However, after an uncertain incident at an Asian women’s refuge in 1987, the IWA began to campaign for SBS to lose its funding and relations between the groups became extremely hostile. Less radical organizations run by and for ethnic minority women were also appearing in this period. In East London alone, Nari Samity and Mahila Samity were active and receiving local authority funding. Women’s organizations also came into increased contact with the local state through initiatives like the divisional MEECCs. When Birmingham City Council established five Employment Resource Centres in partnership with various ethnic minority organizations in the 1980s, it chose to work with two Asian women’s groups – the local Bangladeshi Women’s Association and the UK Asian Women’s Council. Ellis has noted that Asian women’s organizations were more likely to bring together activists or workers from a variety of south Asian ethnic, regional and religious backgrounds than were gender-neutral or male-dominated groups.

The attitudes of the male-dominated youth organizations to gender were clearly linked to the issue of religion. Some academic critics of multiculturalism have presented the heyday of the AYMs as the pinnacle of activism that bridged ethno-religious communities prior to these alliances being undermined by sectarianism. Others have more modestly suggested that ‘while the AYMs were secular, secularism was not an identity that they felt the need to express’. The constitution of the AYMs suggested that they were opposed to religious discrimination, and, as chapter two showed, Bradford AYM was a major proponent of halal

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1302 BCA, IWA papers, MS2141/A/5/3, IWA, “Public Meeting on Violence against Asian Women”, 16/3/86.
1303 SBS, Against the Grain, 7, 57.
1305 LMA, ILEAEOU, ILEA/EOU/1/20, “Islington Consultative Committee on Multi-ethnic Education”, [1983].
1307 Ellis, Meeting Community Needs, 82.
1308 Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad, 78-9; Shain, “Uneasy Alliances”, 101.
1309 Ramamurthy, Black Star, 5.
food in schools, and worked alongside the BCM both to promote this and to campaign against Ray Honeyford.\textsuperscript{1310} Ramamurthy has suggested that such concerns reflected a deviation by the AYMs from their original purpose of community self defence.\textsuperscript{1311} However, the two issues could also merge. For example, the Manchester AYM organized a public meeting to protest against the smashing of windows at a mosque in Longsight, attracting a wide array of religious and secular local organizations.\textsuperscript{1312} Luton’s AYM was formed after a pig’s head was left at a local mosque in 1981.\textsuperscript{1313} Mosques could also at times be surprisingly open to political work. When twelve Asian men from Bradford (the ‘Bradford 12’) were arrested for possessing petrol bombs in July 1981, at least one mosque campaigned on behalf of the men.\textsuperscript{1314} In the same year, Manchester AYM worked with the Muslim organization Jamiyat al Muslamin and the local trades council to campaign against the British Nationality Act.\textsuperscript{1315} Religious organisations also got involved with anti-deportation campaigns.\textsuperscript{1316} When the Asian youth organisations began to prioritise service provision over community defence, they frequently sought the sustenance of a communal ‘culture’ that was difficult to separate from religion. Shafiq Islam, secretary of the East London PYO in the late 1980s, noted that the group’s leaders ‘try to be as secular as possible, but there are certain practices we have to respect’ since they could not afford to ‘get into direct confrontation with the parents, who are religious and would lose faith in us’. This applied especially to work with girls and women.\textsuperscript{1317}

Even where the issues of gender, ethnicity and religion were not active, disputes could hamper these community organizations. The many Bangladeshi youth groups in East London from the late seventies were not especially hostile to one another, although ‘competition

\textsuperscript{1310} TIA, Bradford AYM, “Aims & Objectives”.
\textsuperscript{1311} Ramamurthy, \textit{Black Star}, 166.
\textsuperscript{1312} Ramamurthy ed., \textit{Kala Tara}, 17.
\textsuperscript{1313} Ramamurthy, \textit{Black Star}, 58.
\textsuperscript{1316} Ramamurthy, \textit{Black Star}, 110.
\textsuperscript{1317} King, \textit{Three Asian Associations}, 57.
about who is more authentic and who is the more politically aware’ existed. The FBYO, formed in 1980, was not affiliated to by all groups, however. As young activists moved into the Labour Party, the more ambitious amongst them were required to build personal power-bases that may have upset links formed through the FBYO. More thoroughgoing forms of cooperation that did not leave space for autonomous action were also more likely to lead to conflicts. This is perhaps best-evidenced by the eventual failure of BENTH (see chapter two).

The collapse of a large and expensive community centre in East London, the Kobi Nazrul Centre, in 1984 is a further case of this. The FBYO collapsed due to internal disputes in the 1990s. Outside of London, not working in such local proximity to one another and being more varied in strategies and composition, the AYMs were less coordinated. Bradford’s AYM, the first and largest, took on an informal leadership role to a degree, but negotiations to institute a national AYM gathered little momentum. In the early 1980s, Bradford AYM split, as more radical members formed the United Black Youth League (UBYL) in protest at the AYM’s decision to accept state funding. Although members of the two organisations remained privately supportive of each other afterwards, institutional relations between the two groups were frosty. State funding was a controversial issue for many of these organizations given that they were often extremely critical of local authorities and claimed commitment to self-organisation. Even a small grant of £3,000 made by the CRE to the Bradford AYM caused rifts within the group about how the money should be spent and who should determine this. Manchester’s AYM, meanwhile, blamed the provision by the local

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1319 LSE Library, Shore papers, LSE/SHORE/21/27, FBYO, “Annual Report, 1982-3”.
1321 THLHLA, LBTH papers, PC minutes, L/THL/A/32/2/8, “Future of the Kobi Nazrul Centre”, 2/4/84
1322 Samad, “Politics of Islamic Identity”, 95.
1324 Ramamurthy, “Asian Youth Movements”, 53.
1325 Ramamurthy, Black Star, 63-4, 133.
1326 Ibid., 60-1.
authority of minibuses to take activists to anti-deportation campaigns for sapping the vitality from the movement.\textsuperscript{1327} The FBYO, meanwhile, was a frequent recipient of government funding, winning grants from the GLC, Tower Hamlets borough council, and the CRE.\textsuperscript{1328} Splits in groups, changing local politics, and the collapse of projects contributed to the demise of this generation of community groups by the late 1980s. The demise of the GLC and ILEA, the election of an anti-immigration Liberal Democrat regime in Tower Hamlets in 1986, and a general financial contraction of multiculturalism jeopardised many ethnic minority community groups. Many leading ethnic minority activists moved into the mainstream. Johnny Rashid, chair of the Bradford AYM in the mid-1980s, became an ambitious officer of the council’s Personnel Department and was an architect of local government reforms under Tory council leader Eric Pickles.\textsuperscript{1329} Marsha Singh, another Bradford AYM leader, became a Labour MP in the city in 1997. Other former leading AYM members also entered senior local authority posts, becoming further embedded into institutional multiculturalism.\textsuperscript{1330}

Aside from these growing secular mobilisations, religious organizations also proliferated within Muslim communities in the 1980s, developing closer contacts with local authorities. Even at the beginning of the decade, mobilization around Muslim identity was so great that the CRC in Barnet, not a major area of Muslim settlement, claimed that there were ‘nine or ten’ Muslim organizations with which it had consulted.\textsuperscript{1331} Much of this mobilization related to education (see chapter two). Muslim organizations such as the Newham MPA, the South London Islamic Centre (SLIC) and Muslim Welfare Centre (MWC) benefited from newly-available GLCEMC funding.\textsuperscript{1332} In Manchester, the Islamic Youth Movement (IYM) in 1984

\textsuperscript{1327} Ibid., 175.
\textsuperscript{1328} GLC, GLCEMC minutes, GLC/DG/MIN/49/1, 12/7/82; Jacobs, Black Politics, 93; THLHLA, LBTH papers, PC minutes, L/THL/A/32/2/7, “Spitalfields Local Committee Grants”, 28/2/82.
\textsuperscript{1330} Ramamurthy, Black Star, 161, 177.
\textsuperscript{1331} PHM, LDJP papers, CP/LON/RACE/2/6, Barnet CRC, “BCRC into the 80s!!”, 4/80.
\textsuperscript{1332} LMA, GLCEMC minutes, GLC/DG/MIN/49/4, 18/6/84; GLCEMU presented papers, GLC/DG/PRE/49/5, MPA, “Grants...”, 1/83; MWC, “Grants...”, 1/83.
received local authority funding for its projects offering ‘Asian’ youths ‘guidance to overcome stress due to dual culture problems’. Muslim organizations catering to young women specifically also became more common, with organizations run by women, such as the Muslim Girls and Young Women Association in Coventry, winning local authority funding. The reopening of the East London Mosque in 1985 presaged a growth in activity of the YMO, Britain’s most significant Jamaati youth organization. By the later 1980s, Hizb ut-Tahrir, a more radical group, began to pull some activists away from the YMO and similar organizations. In many areas, Muslim organizations also developed closer contacts with each other. The BCM was formed, with council assistance, in 1981 and became an effective and prominent organization, involved in both campaigning and liaison. It was a relative success in terms of the unity it achieved, with 30 affiliated mosques by 1985 and power-sharing of offices between Deobandis and Barelwis. Mosque councils were also created later in the decade in Manchester and Leicester, with the latter city’s Federation of Muslim Organisations (FMO) being formed in 1984 and quickly gaining fifty affiliates. There was also an FMO in Brent by 1987, and the MLC in Birmingham was also influenced by such initiatives. In Brent, the creation of the FMO both reflected and extended growing acceptance by the local authority of Muslim identities as politically significant. The council introduced a ‘charter’ for Muslims in schools in 1986 and in 1987 seemed open to extending such concessions to other areas of policy.

This growth and diversification of ethnic minority civic society had significant implications for the operation of multiculturalism. Populations regarded as ‘communities’ had

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1333 GMCRO, MCC papers, EC minutes, 1983-4, 3801.
1334 Ellis, Meeting Community Needs, 11.
1335 Eade and Garbin, “Competing Visions”, 188.
1336 Husain, The Islamist.
1337 Guardian, 15/8/85; Lewis, Islamic Britain, 145.
always been internally divided but, in the 1980s, autonomous organizations representing
women and young people achieved greater visibility, sometimes underpinned by local
authority funding.\textsuperscript{1340} Previously, local authorities had tended to work with a single
organization or group of organizations, often unwittingly reinforcing systems of patronage.\textsuperscript{1341}
To deal with a consistent and simplistically-defined group of communities was
‘bureaucratically convenient’.\textsuperscript{1342} When faced with a multiplicity of factions and perspectives,
therefore, the response of authorities could often be to counsel groups to resolve their
differences, with internal consensus being regarded as the proper condition for posited ethnic
communities.\textsuperscript{1343} In Coventry, during the 1980s, two factions within the Muslim community
both sought funding for a community centre. The first application was originally accepted but,
after a series of public spats and recriminations, the council rejected both groups’ claims.\textsuperscript{1344}
Knowledge of internal diversity increased in the 1980s, but this did not necessarily lead to an
acceptance of this diversity.\textsuperscript{1345} Local authorities faced an unenviable task – they often lacked
knowledge of the minority communities they needed to work with, and wished to avoid being
embroiled in rancorous public disputes.

Failure to meet the needs of ‘minorities within minorities’ has usually been put down
to complacency about the internal diversity of these communities and the tendency to work
with conservative, male ‘leaders’.\textsuperscript{1346} There is much accuracy to this, but this failure has
institutional underpinnings. To take one example, ethnic minority organizations in Greater
London that sought funding to work with women in the 1980s did so primarily through the
GLCEMC, not the GLC Women’s Committee. In 1982, the SLIC received £5,000 for work with

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{1341} Shaw, \textit{Pakistani Community in Britain}, 116-7.
\bibitem{1342} Ellis, \textit{Breaking New Ground}, 14.
\bibitem{1343} Ellis, \textit{Meeting Community Needs}, 5.
\bibitem{1344} \textit{ibid.}, 3-5.
\bibitem{1345} Ellis, \textit{Breaking New Ground}, 130
\end{thebibliography}
Muslim mothers and toddlers, arguing in its application that ‘[d]ue to the cultural and language difficulties, our children and women do not take part in the activities run by other local organizations’.

In the following year, the MWC, which was also seeking to develop work with women, argued in its successful application that ‘a lack of similar provision’ necessitated the project. Both of these organizations were led by men. This is not to suggest that the GLCEMC did not fund projects by and for women – it is certainly not the case that the Committee worked ‘almost wholly with religious organisations’.

Also in 1982, for example, the Redbridge Asian Women’s Association (RAWA) received support for social and welfare work with Asian women. It was led by two Asian women, and, in outlining its need for funding, complained that ‘religious based organizations tend to maintain the status quo and fail to recognize changing needs of Asian women in Britain’. In 1983, it provided funding to the North Kensington Moroccan Tarbia, a group that argued for its need on a national/ethnic basis, suggesting that Moroccans, ‘as the most recent arrivals, have been slow to attract the attention of statutory authorities’. Accepting the application, the GLCEMC nevertheless noted that there was ‘an undue emphasis in Tarbia on male dominated activities’ and that the officers were all male. Tarbia was therefore apprised of the GLC’s equal opportunities policies, informed about ‘[t]he particular situation of Moslem women, specifically Moroccan women’ and undertook to ‘ensure that the premises and programme do take into account the special needs of women’. The GLCEMC was not blind to gender, but its main concern was to fund any deserving organization that couched its appeal in terms of its ethnic community’s special needs and the inadequacy of mainstream services in meeting these – that is to say in the idiom of multiculturalism as established by elites and learned by the voluntary sector. It sought to ensure that organizations made social provisions for women, but was not, as the Women’s

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1347 LMA, GLCEMU presented papers, GLC/DG/MIN/49/1, SLIC, “Grants to Voluntary and Community Groups...”, 6/82.
1348 Ibid., GLC/DG/PRE/49/5, MPA, “Grants...”;
1350 Ibid., GLC/DG/PRE/49/2, RAWA, “Grants...”, 6/82.
1351 Ibid., GLC/DG/PRE/49/7, GLC, “NKMT -- Grant Application”, 22/4/83.
Committee may have been, so concerned about who delivered these or what their specific content was. There may have been a sense, as there was in Manchester, that voluntary sector provision for ethnic minority women would be most acceptable to the community when it was organized by men with religious credentials. As noted, even more ‘progressive’ male-led organisations felt community pressures to ensure their work with girls and women conformed to religious orthodoxies. Actors and organisations that formed the institution of multiculturalism may have perceived these dynamics, but, as was later suggested by the MacDonald report, anti-racist work often had little especial concern about gender as a source of specific needs that intersected with ethnicity.

Aside from funding a multiplicity of ethnic minority organizations, local authorities, particularly after the riots of the 1980s, were eager to find multiple ‘representatives’ of ethnic minority opinion. A primary aim of this ‘consultation’ was in fact the retention of public order – authorities sought to cooperate with ‘leaders’ in ethnic minority communities who, they hoped, could help prevent further violence. Other points of tension could also make the issue of ethnic minority consultation an urgent one. After the trial of the Bradford 12, Ali Hussein, a member of the Bradford AYM at that time, says that the council ‘were shit-scared... They were staring at the possibilities of widescale riots and they were looking for people to talk to. Anyone, anywhere. More positively, policy advisers in Brent in 1981 were concerned that their borough might experience violence if they did not incorporate ethnic minority representatives focused on ‘positive activities’. In quieter parts of the country, this impetus to consultation was less apparent. In the late 1980s, Warwickshire County Council and Warwick District Council were still largely consulting with the local CRC. Bradford too, self-consciously more ‘moderate’ than the anti-racist authorities of inner London, co-opted

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1352 Ellis, Breaking New Ground, 81.
1353 Jacobs, Black Politics, 26; Malik, From Fatwa to Jihad, 57.
1354 Malik, ibid., 73.
1355 Maxwell, Ethnic Minority Migrants, 121.
1356 Candappa and Joly, Local Authorities, 36.
members to its Race Relations Sub Committee solely from the local CRC. In still other parts of the country, the riots impressed upon local authorities the need to meet their S71 obligations as well as those related to consultation in making S11 appointments, therefore in a sense providing the sanctions, or threat of sanctions, that the government had not tied to its own exhortations.

There was therefore significant local variation to consultation. In many cases, new ‘race’ or ‘race relations’ committees were created and developed consultative functions – CRCs may be incorporated into this system, but were rarely by the mid-1980s the sole point of contact for local authorities. The creation of specialised committees was a particularly common step in London, with fourteen boroughs having done so by 1984. These often included relatively high numbers of co-options from ethnic minority communities. Co-options were a controversial step, especially when made in large numbers. Some of the most formalized systems, like the MEECCs, introduced democratic elements. Manchester’s Race Sub-committee, established in 1985, involved direct elections, though with a specific number of seats for each ethnic community represented. By 1991, the committee had 26 directly elected ethnic minority members – ten Afro-Caribbeans, eight Pakistanis, four Indians, Africans, and Chinese, and two Bangladeshis, Middle Easterners and Vietnamese. There were, at the sub-committee’s creation, four spaces reserved for women, two for the elderly, and two for young people. Direct elections, however, led to public competition over the seats, which could deepen, or at least provide an additional outlet for, factional, ethnic or

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1357 Lewis, “Areas of Ethnic Negotiation”, 134.
1358 Ellis, Meeting Community Needs, 15.
1361 Prashar and Nicholas, Routes or Roadblocks?, 12, 16.
1363 MCRO, Roth papers, GB127.M746/1, MCC Race Sub-Committee, “[M]eeting of the Race Sub-Committee…”, 26/3/85.
sectarian divisions.\textsuperscript{1364} Ethnic minority representatives on the Manchester sub-committee were also rather conservative and tended to come from ‘established’ factions, perhaps reflecting a greater ability amongst elders to leverage the patronage politics described in chapter five.\textsuperscript{1365} A further possible approach can be seen in Birmingham and ILEA, where elections were indirect. In ILEA, representatives to the LEA-wide committee were elected by invited representatives of divisional committees, whilst in Birmingham ethnic minority organizations were affiliated to council-established umbrella organizations and elected representatives from these umbrella groups to the Standing Consultative Forum (SCF). The SCF first sat in 1990, and eight umbrella organizations were involved, representing Black churches, Afro-Caribbeans, Chinese, Hindus, Sikhs, Pakistanis, Irish and Vietnamese.\textsuperscript{1366} Some 300 groups were tied into the SCF through these umbrella organizations.\textsuperscript{1367} In 1992, paid workers were appointed by the RRU to the umbrella groups and became primary points of contact for the authority, leading to a bypassing of the democratic aspect of the SCF.\textsuperscript{1368} This system still had the effect of favouring established community leaders. Reviewing the SCF in 1998, Birmingham regretted that ‘patronage structures’ had greatly determined the selection of representatives, leaving ‘hard to reach’ sub-groups outside of consultation.\textsuperscript{1369} Where specified communities were given quotas of representatives, this also had the effect of barring some ethnic, religious or cultural groups from claims-making through multiculturalism. Even when included in the institution in general, certain ethnic groups in particular localities could feel neglected. Asian councillors sitting on the Race Relations Sub-committee in Brent complained to the local Labour Party that

\textsuperscript{1365} Ellis, \textit{Breaking New Ground}, 103.  
\textsuperscript{1366} Garbaye, “Birmingham”, 100.  
\textsuperscript{1368} Garbaye, “Birmingham”, 101.  
multiculturalism had benefited Afro-Caribbeans to the detriment of Asians.\textsuperscript{1370} This conflict ultimately ‘crippled’ the work of the sub-committee.\textsuperscript{1371} It also led to the defunding of the local CRC after two Afro-Caribbean officers were found guilty by an employment tribunal of discriminating against an Indian applicant for a community relations post on ‘racial’ grounds.\textsuperscript{1372} By contrast, Afro-Caribbeans in Ealing felt that the much larger Indian community dominated the local REU, and identified as ‘Black’ only when it wanted Afro-Caribbean assistance.\textsuperscript{1373} Perhaps due to the risks of such embarrassing conflicts; the difficulties in formulating mechanisms that were fair and produced the ‘right’ kinds of representatives; and to the large area it covered, the GLC never instituted any formalized consultative forum. Instead, it worked through \textit{ad hoc} meetings on specific themes to which, in most cases, many organizations were invited.\textsuperscript{1374}

As the nineties began, these consultative structures fell apart at an even faster rate. Much of this, like the abandonment or restructuring of other ‘race’ infrastructures, was owed to the pressures of resources and criticisms of anti-racist approaches described above. Critics sympathetic to the general aims of ‘race’ committees nevertheless felt that the committees were marginal to the work of authorities and might sideline racial equality initiatives.\textsuperscript{1375} In specific relation to consultative mechanisms, local authorities and other bodies began to endorse the criticisms of community ‘representatives’ that had been propounded by external commentators in earlier times. Birmingham abandoned the SCF in response to increasing protests from ethnic communities that had been excluded, particularly Bangladeshis and Yemenis.\textsuperscript{1376} Hackney’s ‘race’ committee permitted specific representation to Afro-Caribbeans,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1370} Cross, Brah and McLeod, \textit{Racial Inequality}, 141. 
\bibitem{1371} \textit{Ibid.}, 159-60.
\bibitem{1372} Maxwell, \textit{Ethnic Minority Migrants}, 155.
\bibitem{1373} Baumann, \textit{Contesting Culture}, 170.
\bibitem{1375} Prashar and Nicholas, \textit{Routes or Roadblocks?}, 26.
\bibitem{1376} Samad, “Plural Guises”, 254; Smith and Stephenson, “Group Representation”, 331.
\end{thebibliography}
Cypriots, the Irish and Bangladeshi, but not to Pakistanis or Indians.\textsuperscript{1377} Such initiatives were intended to streamline claims from and consultation with ethnic minority groups, but could not possibly include all ethnic groups that might wish to make claims in this way, and also promoted conflict between those groups that were included because their claims competed, in a sense, for attention.\textsuperscript{1378} Birmingham’s SCF was eventually replaced in 1998 by a Race Equality Partnership (REP), which operated through a number of thematically-defined Community Action Forums (CAFs). It was hoped that this approach would refocus provision for ethnic minorities on service matters such as health and education, and would encourage consideration of both ethnically-specific disadvantages and problems faced by all communities. In outlining the new system, Birmingham noted that under the SCF, ‘[c]lass, intra-religious and gender differences within communities mean[t] that many feel under-represented or even misrepresented’, supporting widespread criticisms of multiculturalism’s over-emphasis on ethnicity.\textsuperscript{1379} Despite this significant restructuring, many initiatives lived on in Birmingham. Both Brent and Birmingham responded to the feeling that anti-racism had been a ‘vote-loser’ not by eliminating their multicultural infrastructures entirely, but by reforming them and devoting public relations resources to combating negative attention they received.\textsuperscript{1380} Whilst in 1999 Birmingham’s controlling Labour group admitted that the SCF had been a failure, it also extended practices like employment targets and ‘positive action’ on private sector employment for ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{1381} Even in this period of retrenchment for anti-racist and multicultural schemes, local authorities could direct ‘race’ work to specific areas, and in particular ways, that were still regarded as effective and viable.

\textsuperscript{1377} Prashar and Nicholas, \textit{Routes or Roadblocks?}, 20.
\textsuperscript{1378} Garbaye, \textit{Ethnic Minorities, Cities and Institutions}, 27.
\textsuperscript{1379} Smith and Stephenson, “Group Representation”, 333.
\textsuperscript{1380} Garbaye, \textit{Getting into Local Politics}, 114.
\textsuperscript{1381} \textit{Ibid.}, 108.
This chapter has built from the thematic studies in previous chapters towards a more general analysis of British multiculturalism from the late 1950s to the early 1990s. A key theme has been ideas at national and local level about the permissibility and wisdom of making ‘special’ provisions for ethnic minority communities. It has been shown that despite rhetorical aversion to such provision, often expressed with reference to the southern USA and South Africa, local and national governments were willing to make provisions specifically for ethnic minorities. These were often made with instrumental justifications and motivations – i.e. they were regarded as temporary measures that had the long term goal of integrating minorities. These special provisions constitute the early foundations of Britain’s multicultural institution. However, as the histories of S11 and the UP demonstrate, central government was reluctant to actively require the utilization of these mechanisms by local authorities and did not monitor their effects.

The relationship between local and national authorities in expanding multiculturalism was therefore a complex one, characterized simultaneously by support, constraint, encouragement and mutual influence. Garbaye has noted that local authorities have rarely taken action related to ethnic diversity autonomously, but have almost always received support, in the form of funding, guidance, or legislation, from central government. He adds that local factors ‘have determined whether changes were to happen or not, when they were to happen, at what speed and to what extent’. This formulation correctly reflects the national government’s tendency to guide, encourage (and restrict) rather than to compel, though it also simplifies somewhat – the centre has of course retained control over race relations legislation, and this had a significant, if largely negative, affect on local authority activity, and has also used ‘soft’ forms of influence such as commissioning reports and

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1383 Garbaye, Getting into Local Politics, 56, 59.
circulating examples of best practice. This lack of specificity and compulsion from the centre might reflect, apart from obvious uncertainty about ‘special’ provisions, a desire to localize ethnopolitics due to its sensitivity. The tendency of multiculturalism to be localized is perhaps compounded by the fact that, at its outset at least, ‘race’ politics was refracted largely through policy areas (education and housing, for example) that then had significant local content.

Localisation naturally also enabled a great degree of variation between localities. In many areas, under the pressures of greater ethnic minority activity; changing inter- and intra-party politics; the 1976 RRA; and the riots of the 1980s, multiculturalism expanded quickly. More workers were appointed, with the support of central government, to preside over ‘race relations’, and, particularly after the riots, consultation arrangements were formalised. In this environment, the largely top-down nature of multiculturalism as an institution was tempered to a degree, as community organizations were given more ability to press claims. As ethnic minority organizations appropriated the language of multiculturalism to support their demands for funding and for special workers in and from their communities, the institution of multiculturalism was slowly and partially passed into their hands. However, the obvious difficulty that communities themselves could not function as actors, but could at best be ‘represented’ by ‘leaders’ with questionable credentials, created concern about the effect this had upon ‘minorities within minorities’. As various authorities took steps towards naming, and so limiting, the groups served by institutional multiculturalism, excluded ethnic groups suffered, with access to the route of ethnic claims-making closed off to them. The vocabulary of multiculturalism, which ethnic minority communities were encouraged to learn and adopt when making claims, also entailed an emphasis on ethnic, cultural and religious difference rather than commonality.\footnote{Ramamurthy, \textit{Black Star}, 171.}
Given these criticisms of multiculturalism, notwithstanding more general exceptions to special provisions, it may be surprising that it has endured for so long. This can be explained with reference to the sociological theory of ‘path dependency’. Path dependency states that ‘once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice’.

Path dependency has been applied explicitly, by Hansen, to the history of British immigration policy, and more implicitly, by Bleich, to the history of British race relations legislation. However, the concept of path dependency can be applied much more widely to Britain’s multiculturalism institution. At its outset, ethnic diversity required that authorities, social service agencies, schools, and so on, become acquainted with the experiences and needs of ‘Commonwealth immigrants’. Finding the casework associated with these immigrants voluminous, specific in character and disproportionately time-consuming due to the cultural and linguistic barriers involved, and reacting to the 1958 riots, it aligned this knowledge, in the form of specific employees, into specific structures. S11 and the UP slowly expanded these structures until they accounted for hundreds of personnel and millions of pounds of annual expenditure. Ethnic minority organizations learned how to mobilize their ethnic specificity when making claims, thereby accessing resources that allowed them to expand. The institution of multiculturalism therefore laid out ‘the rules of the game’ and entangled various sorts of actors bound by those rules. Many of these owed their existence as ‘community leaders’, race relations advisers, CROs, etc., to the institution of multiculturalism. Pierson’s observation that policies ‘encourage individuals to develop particular skills, make certain kinds of investments… or devote time and money to certain kinds of organizations’, and so ‘create commitments’ can equally be applied to

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1386 Bleich, Race Politics, 71; Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration, 30-32.
Britain at one stage had clear alternatives to multiculturalism – an approach based on casework and mainstreaming; complete ‘colour-blindness’; or the packing together of ethnicity with other forms of identity as parts of an ‘equal opportunities’ approach. As resources of many kinds became invested in multiculturalism, these alternatives became less viable.

Thelen has observed that explanations reliant on path dependency, by stressing institutional inertia, often explain the erosion or collapse of institutions in terms of ‘exogenous shock’. The restructuring or erosion of British multiculturalism from the late 1980s can be explained partly in terms of internal factors. ‘Race relations’ structures suffered from low morale in this period and were often constrained by their uncertain positions within local authorities, as well as external unpopularity. As discussed, these structures also often suffered from, and perhaps enabled, inter-ethnic conflicts when groups felt that they were not receiving a sufficient portion of the resources made available under the rubric of multiculturalism. However, the stress placed by critics of multiculturalism upon the institution’s ‘divide and rule’ or competitive elements has led to relative neglect of the dissatisfaction with multiculturalism felt by groups excluded from it. Groups no less ‘ethnic’ than those incorporated into multicultural structures became disaffected due to their exclusion from this means of claims-making. This has often been addressed in the last two decades by a move to a thematic approach that does not attempt to demarcate the groups involved in multiculturalism. But, as outlined, the contraction of multiculturalism must also inevitably be seen as a product of the general disempowerment and impoverishment of local authorities, as well as of theoretical and empirical challenges to multiculturalism and anti-racism from outside.

Some critics suggest that path dependency arguments inevitably emphasise continuity over change, or fail to identify subtler shifts that do not existentially threaten an institution. Concern has been expressed that path dependency may overlook the ‘underlying dissensus over policy and programmes’ that exists even within relatively stable institutions. This chapter has indeed self-consciously emphasised stability and continuity within British multiculturalism. This is partly an heuristic emphasis, intended to question the strict periodisations often evident in discussions of British approaches to ethnic diversity and to suggest that changes in language (from ‘race relations’ and ‘assimilation’ to ‘integration’, ‘multiethnic’ and ‘multiculturalism’ and then to ‘community cohesion’) do not always signify as much as is assumed. Nevertheless, it is clear that a number of events and changing dynamics have altered institutional multiculturalism to lesser or greater degrees: changing conceptions and categorisations of ethnic minority communities themselves; changing inter- and intra-party politics; the rise of the ‘new left’ and its critique of universalism; shifting demographics; new legislation; the ‘riots’ of 1981 and 1985, etc.. However, multiculturalism has also squared up to many of these changing circumstances whilst bound by substantially the same institutional ‘rules’ governing the relationships between actors and the concepts they accept. Furthermore, certain apparent broad changes – towards greater concessions to and consultation of ethnic minority communities for example – have been partial and primarily pragmatic rather than principled. As stressed, such changes have also been uneven and precarious given the localness of multiculturalism and the requirement that local actors work within nationally-determined parameters.

8. Conclusion: Multiculturalism and Political Identity

The arguments contained in this thesis can be divided into two groups: those about the political identities of English Muslims in the period 1962-92, and those concerning the operation of multiculturalism in Britain over roughly the same period. The link between these two historiographical concerns comes via the proposition that misconceptions about Muslim identity in this period reflect a broader failure by historians to provide an analysis of British multiculturalism. The stated period is bounded, though in both cases fuzzily, at one end by the settlement of Muslim communities in England on a permanent basis and at the other by declining interest in the Rushdie affair and the restructuring and erosion of the institution of British multiculturalism. These latter two phenomena – the campaign against *The Satanic Verses* and responses to it, and this initial reconsideration of multiculturalism – are temporally proximal but not so directly interrelated as sometimes suggested. Pessimism about both the effects and the future of multiculturalism predated and had sources other than the Rushdie affair, whilst campaigns against *The Satanic Verses* in some senses evidenced multiculturalism-as-usual – ‘community leaders’ were invited to represent ‘their’ communities in an *ad hoc* manner, and political figures and bodies sympathetic to ethnic minority causes could still portray Muslim campaigners in ethnic or ‘racial’ terms as marginalised groups subject to racism. Just as it was not central to this rethinking of multiculturalism, the Rushdie affair, as argued, did not create in a vacuum a politically unified Muslim community or the popular perception of this. Concerns about the especial difficulties posed by Muslim communities for processes of integration were, as demonstrated, expressed in a variety of spheres from much earlier times, whilst emergent ‘Muslim fundamentalism’ was also perceived during the campaign for separate Muslim schools.
In more recent literature on British or European Islam and multiculturalism, the Rushdie affair is often portrayed as the genesis of a new conception of Muslim communities – one that is alarmist, suspicious, homogenizing and motivated ultimately by fear of violence. Yet this more novel conception of Muslim communities, particular in terms of the salience it accords to violence and in its portrayal of European Muslims ‘fifth columnists’, is different again from portrayals that obtained at the time of the Rushdie affair. Campaigns against *The Satanic Verses* did raise the issues of violence and of allegiance, but in narrower terms. Since campaigns against Rushdie were almost entirely peaceful in Britain, the ‘violence’ feared was specifically Rushdie’s murder – an act which, in any case, even the Muslim ‘leaders’ most supportive of Khomeini’s *fatwa* regarded as impossible on British soil. Questions of allegiance during the affair were primarily ideological. They concerned the supposed tensions for British Muslims between supporting actions that their faith might regard as necessary and conforming to the political norms of a secular Western democracy that “did not ban books” and certainly did not put novelists to death for writing them. During the Gulf war, these issues of violence and allegiance appeared in a rather more concrete form. A number of commentators suggested that British Muslims were suffering from a crisis of loyalty. A *Sunday Times* article written around two weeks after the outset of Operation Desert Storm perceived that British Muslims faced ‘an ethical mountain’ and a ‘loyalty test’. Even more contentiously, it suggested that some British citizens were ‘under the thumb’ of Saddam Hussein. The author suggested that they should, ‘for their own sake’ accept that loyalty to Allah ‘is not the only’ loyalty to be observed.\(^{1390}\) Six months later, the theologian Don Cupitt suggested in *The Guardian* that British Muslims faced ‘a crisis of identity and loyalty’.\(^{1391}\) Academics, both contemporaneously and in more recent analyses, offered similar comments. Joppke, in an unusually bald

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\(^{1390}\) *Sunday Times*, 19/8/90.

\(^{1391}\) *Guardian*, 18/2/91.
statement, has suggested that Muslims in Bradford ‘obviously sided’ with Hussein. In a similar vein, John Rex suggested that during the war British Muslims experienced an ‘overriding loyalty’ to the ummah and that ‘their loyalty to Islam’ necessitated support for Hussein.

It is clearly correct that the Gulf war had significant implications for the relationship of British Muslims to the nation and to the mainstream of society. British Muslims also protested against the war itself. Close to the outset of conflict, a group of Muslim organizations met in London and passed a resolution calling for Western troops to pull out of Iraq. Later, the Saudi Arabian embassy was picketed. In Bradford, the BCM responded to the Amiriyah shelter bombing, an attack by the United States Air Force in February 1991 that killed over 400 civilians, by expressing its ‘deep outrage’ and calling for the killings to be ‘avenged in accordance with Islamic law in due course’. The Muslim intellectual and public commentator Zaki Badawi suggested that the incident demonstrated that the West ‘has no qualms about Muslims being massacred’. At the UMO’s 1991 annual conference, Douglas Hogg, then Foreign Secretary, was heckled by speakers, who alleged double standards in the West’s response to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and Israel’s occupation of Palestine. Aside from these criticisms of Western, and sometimes also Saudi, actions in the Gulf, many British Muslims clearly experienced uncertainties about their identity during the conflict. This was partly motivated by the feeling, as during the Rushdie affair, that elite opinion uniformly neglected Muslim concerns. Attacks on British Muslims – both physical and verbal, in

1396 Independent, 5/7/93.
schools and streets and in the media – surely led to Muslim communities thinking seriously about their relationship to the rest of society.\textsuperscript{1399} Numerous observers perceived a ‘closing of ranks’ within those communities, with some regarding deportation or internment as real possibilities.\textsuperscript{1400} The war was much-discussed in British Muslim households, and the British media often criticised, privately and publicly, for its role in exacerbating tensions.\textsuperscript{1401}

Roy Hattersley, meanwhile, speaking about his constituency in Birmingham, perceived young Muslims ‘struggling to find [their] identity’ and ‘eager to express pride’ in their faith.\textsuperscript{1402} However, this ‘struggle’ was not a process of ‘choosing’ between the ummah and ‘Britishness’, or between ‘support’ for Desert Storm or for Hussein. Hussein may have been respected as an opponent of ‘Western imperialism’ and regarded as ‘the lesser of two evils’ when compared with America, but programmatic support for him was rare.\textsuperscript{1403} Rather, ‘crises’ of identity, for those British Muslims who experienced them, occurred not due to uncertainty about whether they were British, but more usually from uncertainty about how a presumptive Britishness was to be reconciled with Muslim identity. This tension did not occur within Muslim communities in an isolated fashion, but depended on willingness by the mainstream, often not forthcoming, to accept that one could be both British and Muslim.\textsuperscript{1404} The belief of some British Muslims that the British state does not ultimately accept their existence within it has reappeared periodically, and was particularly apparent during the Bosnian War of 1992-5.\textsuperscript{1405} The paradox of high, and growing, identification amongst Muslims as ‘British’ alongside a belief that other

\textsuperscript{1399} Independent, 30/1/91, 9/2/91.
\textsuperscript{1400} Guardian, 3/5/91.
\textsuperscript{1401} King, Three Asian Associations, 36-7.
\textsuperscript{1402} Guardian, 10/11/90.
\textsuperscript{1403} Ibid.; McRoy, Rushdie to 7/7, 16-7.
\textsuperscript{1404} Sunday Times, 19/8/90; Guardian, 10/11/90, 18/2/91, 3/5/91.
\textsuperscript{1405} M. Ali Kettani, “Challenges to the Organization of Muslim Communities in Western Europe: The Political Dimension” in Shadid and van Koningsveld eds., Political Participation, 32-3.
Britons do not accept them as such remains apparent at the time of writing.\footnote{1406} Nevertheless, Muslim opinion has been divided over issues such as the Gulf war.\footnote{1407} Muslim politicians, in particular, took mild positions. Bashir Maan, a Labour councillor in Glasgow, criticised the ‘demagogy’ of Hussein and his ‘un-Islamic’ actions.\footnote{1408} Mohammed Riaz, a former Labour councillor and by then a Tory member who later fought Bradford West in 1997 and 2001, suggested that the war was difficult to conceptualise in terms of the \textit{ummah} given that Muslims were fighting on both sides. Mirroring this, Bradford Labour councillor Mohammed Ajeed noted that Muslims were not alone in Britain in opposing the war.\footnote{1409} Whilst this was true, it has been noted that the first Gulf War did not become a driver of political cooperation between Muslims and the white left in the way that the 2003 war in Iraq later did.\footnote{1410}

The 2003 war occurred in a context in which, owing primarily to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 7/7, discourses regarding British Muslims and integration were even more fixated upon allegiance and violence. By that time, the prominence of Muslim communities within discussions of ethnic pluralism in Britain had further increased, almost to the exclusion of other ethnic minority communities. In this period, the link between Muslim communities and terrorism was most clearly drawn through the ‘Prevent’ strand of the government’s CONTEST anti-terrorism strategy. In 2006, a ‘Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund’ was launched, totalling £6MM of funding across 70 local authorities. The ‘Prevent’ strategy cost a total of £140MM in 2008-11.\footnote{1411} The funding available to local authorities has been put to varied uses, including social, recreational and welfare work, educating in ‘capacity-building’ skills for imams, and forums to promote ‘the rejection of violent extremism in the name of’

\footnote{1408} Guardian, 3/5/91.  
\footnote{1409} Lewis, \textit{Islamic Britain}, 168.  
\footnote{1410} Werbner, “Theorising Complex Diasporas”, 908.  
\footnote{1411} Thomas, \textit{Youth, Multiculturalism}, 170.
Attempts by local and national authorities to promote certain readings of Islam and discredit others have been criticised for stigmatising legitimate dissent and for positing a binary between ‘moderate’ and ‘extreme’ Islam. Furthermore, concern about Muslims (particularly young male Muslims) who may criticise aspects of British policy or express sympathy for ‘the wrong’ Islam may manifest itself in close scrutiny of innocent individuals. Local authority employees, including teachers, lecturers and youth workers, have often complained that they are expected to monitor and report on the behaviour of young Muslims with whom, in a professional capacity, they must also build trust. The breadth of Prevent’s scope and its focus on one community has led Arun Kundnani to describe it as ‘an Islam policy’. This close surveillance of young Muslims ‘vulnerable’ to extremist narratives has been combined with an attempt to make allies out of ‘moderates’. This has been reflected at an organisational level, as the government has severed links with organisations such as the MCB – which opposed the 2003 Iraq war – whilst drawing closer to, and attempting to promote, groups like the Quilliam Foundation, the Sufi Muslim Council and the Radical Middle Way. These organisations have been provided with over £1MM through ‘Prevent’, but their popularity and significance within British Muslim communities is questionable.

Despite its focus specifically on Muslim communities, ‘Prevent’ has often been closely related to the paradigm of ‘community cohesion’, which became central to Home Office thinking about ethnic diversity from the time of the 2001 riots. These riots, which took place in northern cities and towns with large Muslim populations – Bradford, Oldham,

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1415 ibid., 8.
Rochdale and Burnley – brought to the surface concerns about ethnic segregation, police-community relations, and the exploitation of inter-ethnic tensions by far right groups. Elite responses to the riot were outlined in a number of local reports and then in a Home Office-commissioned report, headed by sociologist Ted Cantle. Cantle’s report largely mirrored and extended these local reports, decrying residential segregation in these towns and cities, and noting its role in creating segregation in other spheres of life, especially education. It stressed, repeatedly, the need for inter-ethnic contact and dialogue of an ‘open’ sort that would help to prevent ethnic communities developing misconceptions about one another which could be exploited by extremist groups. Reports from local areas, particularly Burnley, suggest that such ‘misconceptions’ related in part to the distribution of local authority funding itself, which some white activists claimed favoured Asian communities. Cantle’s report also called for ‘positive and proactive programmes’ to oppose Islamophobia. More specifically, it recommended that, instead of projects working with a particular ethnic community or a particular neighbourhood, broad ‘thematic’ projects be funded by authorities. It was hoped that this multi-ethnic ethos would, when duplicated or replicated at national level, produce an inclusive British identity articulating both rights and responsibilities and in which ethnic diversity was celebrated. Less certainly, the report called for a reduction in material deprivation and inequalities as a means of obviating inter-ethnic tensions and competition. The report also attempted to address issues of gender inequality, though its focus in this area was on the possibility that in some (unspecified) ethnic communities ‘women and girls suffer added discrimination’. The paradigm of community

1419 Ibid., 11.
1421 IRT, Community Cohesion, 40
1422 Ibid., 27.
1423 Ibid., 18.
1424 Ibid., 13, 17, 28.
1425 Ibid., 21.
cohesion was subsequently developed through a number of documents and initiatives, beginning with the Local Government Association’s *Guidance on Community Cohesion*, published in 2002. This called for local authorities to take a lead in fostering inter-ethnic dialogue, promoting diversity, and tackling misconceptions about local ethnic communities.\(^{1426}\)

As part of the programme to promote community cohesion amongst local authorities, fourteen ‘pathfinder’ authorities were selected and partnered with fourteen ‘shadow’ authorities.\(^{1427}\) Leicester, in particular, accepted for itself the mantle of a ‘beacon’ in the area of community cohesion.\(^{1428}\) Also in 2002, a Community Cohesion Unit was established in the Home Office.\(^{1429}\) Later documents evidencing developments in government thinking about community cohesion include *Strength in Diversity* (2004), *Improving Opportunities, Strengthening Society* (2005) and the final report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, *Our Shared Future* (2007). These later documents attempted to develop the link between material disadvantage and cohesive communities, and repeated the stress placed by Cantle and others on the need for provision on an ethnically inclusive basis.\(^{1430}\) This move away from ethnically specific provisions and structures was also reflected in the creation under the 2006 Equalities Act of the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), which combined the work of the CRE, the Equal Opportunities Commission (which had dealt with sexual discrimination), and the Disability Rights Commission.\(^{1431}\) The EHRC also had responsibility for action against discrimination on the basis of age, religion and sexual orientation.

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\(^{1427}\) Paul Thomas, “Moving on from ‘Anti-Racism’? Understandings of ‘Community Cohesion’ held by Youth Workers”, *Journal of Social Policy* 36: 3 (July, 2007), 436.


\(^{1429}\) Rattansi, *Multiculturalism*, 113.

\(^{1430}\) McGhee, *End of Multiculturalism?*, 91, 104.

Community cohesion has been a controversial concept. It has been suggested that one of its primary propositions – that segregation in British towns and cities is largely due to conscious choices by communities and is unacceptable – understates the degree to which structural factors, including racism, determine the settlement pattern of ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{1432} It has also been suggested that community cohesion’s treatment of segregation ignores ‘white flight’ and presumes, without foundation, that more contact between ethnic groups will improve their relationship.\textsuperscript{1433} This accusation that Cantle and others have failed to consider the importance of racism in determining settlement patterns reflects a broader analysis that community cohesion, by positioning ethnic groups as ethnically-neutral ‘communities’, occludes discussion of racism.\textsuperscript{1434} A number of observers have suggested that material disadvantage and inequality, clearly a significant factor in creating inter-communal tensions, is not seriously addressed by proponents of community cohesion.\textsuperscript{1435} Rattansi has suggested that in its ultimate goal of ‘shared principles of citizenship’ produced through an ‘open debate’, community cohesion may seek more consensus than is feasible, and perhaps healthy, in a plural society.\textsuperscript{1436} However, even critics of community cohesion have accepted that it is not merely a political slogan, but has had genuine impact on modes of government and community organization.\textsuperscript{1437} In some localities, this may reflect the desire of Labour groups regarded as responsible for the increasingly pilloried paradigm of ‘multiculturalism’ to demonstrate that they have embraced new approaches to diversity.\textsuperscript{1438} Thomas’ work suggests that work on national policy discourse neglects the fact that local authority workers in areas where multiculturalism is regarded as having ‘failed’ may consider community cohesion to be a comprehensible and welcome alternative that engages with realities in communities they

\textsuperscript{1433} Ibid., 29, 38.  
\textsuperscript{1434} Rattansi, Multiculturalism, 98.  
\textsuperscript{1435} Ibid., 114; McGhee, Intolerant Britain, 55.  
\textsuperscript{1436} Rattansi, ibid., 161.  
\textsuperscript{1437} Ibid., 6; McGhee, Intolerant Britain, 7.  
\textsuperscript{1438} Singh, “Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain”.

302
serve. This raises questions about how community cohesion has so far affected the multiculturalism institution, and this thesis will conclude by proposing answers to these questions. Before doing so, this chapter will revisit and expand on some of this thesis’ conclusions about that institution’s history and the place of Muslims within it.

II

A primary aim of this thesis has been to interrogate the common academic claim that British Muslims did not identify, and were not seen in terms of, the religious aspect of their identity until the time of the Rushdie affair. Chapters on education, purdah, employment and party politics questioned this orthodoxy in the relevant spheres. In terms of education, it was demonstrated that, from at least the 1960s, Muslim organizations made demands of local authorities relating to religious education and other curriculum reforms, as well as for concessions arising from the need for Muslim girls to observe purdah (including the retention and expansion of single-sex schools). At a later time, Muslim campaigners sought provision of halal meat in school meals and sometimes exemption from sex education and certain artistic classes. Local authorities often met these demands, albeit in an uneven manner, but the concessions offered were not sufficient to prevent demands for separate Muslim schools. Observance of purdah also led to the development of ideas about the specific challenges faced when attempting to integrate Muslim families. Supposedly ‘housebound’ Muslim women needed to be accessed domestically for the purposes of language and other education. Outside the home, special educational programmes for Asian or Muslim women were intended to create a ‘safe’ environment in which these women could receive necessary tutelage regarding language, cookery, hygiene and other aspects of domestic affairs and ‘British culture’. Once certain workers made these contacts, they often developed relationships and

1439 Thomas, “Moving on”, 437-43.
conducted work with Muslim families in general, taking a ‘community approach’. *Purdah*, as evidence from Bradford shows, could be blamed for a wide variety of potential ‘problems’ within Muslim families – including a failure by Muslim children to attain an acceptable level of English and to become sufficiently integrated. Whilst these ideas related primarily to women (though they perhaps entailed some conception of a ‘strict’ or non-permissive Muslim husband), conceptions of Muslims at work primarily concerned men. Indeed, ideas about the slightness of Muslim bodies often functioned as part of a feminisation of their labour. Ideas about the physiques of Muslim workers were joined to a portrayal of their faith as generating problematic demands in the workplace – Ramadan fasting, it was felt, could sometimes leave Muslim workers without the strength needed for manual labour. Muslim religious demands relating to Eid holidays and prayer breaks also created significant consternation amongst employers, and were rarely supported by unions. In the area of party politics, ideas about the homogenous or internally unified nature of Muslim communities and their control by ‘community leaders’ capable of mobilising large kinship networks did much to determine the attitudes of political parties to those communities.

In certain of these areas, Muslim demands, and so identities, were regarded as especially difficult to accommodate. In education, the campaign for separate schools led to Muslim communities being regarded as ‘separatist’ and unwilling to compromise. Even before the campaign for Muslim schools gathered pace in the 1980s, the many supplementary religious and language classes established within Muslim communities attracted some criticism for the demands they placed on children outside of school hours. Concern about Muslim girls being kept off school if demands regarding *purdah* were not met also marked Muslim communities as being especially difficult to integrate, whilst the observance of *purdah* by adult Muslim women was another factor that could lead to the suggestion that Muslim families were especially difficult to integrate. Although Asian women were regarded in general as reticent
and subservient, the dynamics of purdah still singled out Muslim families for those interested in effecting integration. Likewise, in the sphere of employment, Islam was often identified as an especially troublesome religion when compared with other Asian faiths which were felt to place relatively few obligations on their followers. The foregrounding of Muslims and Islam within discussions of integration and multiculturalism became apparent during and following the Rushdie affair. But these ideas had clear antecedents, whilst the themes of loyalty and violence have emerged gradually, though most clearly since the Gulf war and ‘war on terror’.

Despite these claims, this thesis does not intend to argue simplistically that religious aspects of the identities expressed by or ascribed to English Muslims ‘trumped’ others in the period prior to the Rushdie affair. Historically, Muslims and Asians have also often been subsumed into the generalised category of ‘coloured’ or ‘Commonwealth’ immigrant, particularly in certain areas of education policy and practice. Politically, there was some expectation that an ‘ethnic’ or ‘immigrant’ vote may appear, despite the significant differences in interests and affiliations amongst different ethnic minority communities. At times, generalised deployment of the term ‘coloured immigrant’ was ambiguous. In its 1965 circular on dispersal, the DES utilised the category of ‘immigrant’ which, many felt, failed to make the important distinction between NES and English-speaking communities. This distinction would, presumably, have largely duplicated a distinction between immigrants of Asian and of West Indian origins. Muslim communities were indeed often subsumed into the broader category of ‘Asian’, a move which reflected a belief that British Asians faced linguistic and more generally ‘cultural’ difficulties that West Indians largely did not. However, in many localities national signifiers – most usually ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Indian’ – were accorded salience. Furthermore, local actors could use the term ‘Asian’ in an ambiguous manner that reflected local demographics – in Bradford, for instance, local ‘Asians’ were presumptively Pakistani and the two terms could be used without real distinction. Naturally, the specificity of ‘Pakistani’ in comparison with
Indian communities was strongly related to religion even when this was not made explicit. During and after the campaign for Bangladeshi independence, more awareness of the distinctiveness of Bangladeshi communities was exhibited by mainstream actors.

These different understandings of Muslim communities possessed by mainstream actors existed simultaneously, often having different degrees of force in different policy or social spheres and local areas. In terms of the self-ascribed identities of these communities, however, it has often been suggested that a gradual growth in sectarianism occurred – that ‘black’ identities, formed by and to oppose racism, broke down first into national and regional categorisations, and then to insular and conservative socio-political identification on the basis of religious identity. The current thesis naturally suggests that this analysis underplays the degree of simultaneity involved in the mobilisation of these different identities. Claims-making in Muslim communities on a religious basis can be observed from at least the 1960s, whilst the putatively inclusive and secular movements of the 1980s, including the AYMs, supported campaigns for religious concessions, including for halal meat in schools and certain accommodations relating to purdah. Furthermore, this sometimes entailed alliances with more overtly religious organizations, such as the BCM. Religious organizations were not in the period under study opposed to making or unable to make alliances with more secular organizations in the pursuit of shared aims. In the 21st century, this has been reflected in the associations between Muslim and secular organizations in protests against the Iraq war. In any case, the links often made in these narratives of advancing sectarianism between the increasing salience of religion as a point of identification and consensus or closure within communities overstates the uniformity of socio-political responses that reference Islam.

1440 Ramamurthy, “Asian Youth Movements”, 3
Nevertheless, it would not be feasible to suggest that no changes have occurred over
the last two or three decades in the way Islam is practised and incorporated into personal
identities amongst British Muslims. The ‘identity-ranking’ exercises undertaken by some
researchers evidence high levels of identification with Islam amongst British Muslims – though,
for the present study, the lack of an historical baseline invites some caution.\textsuperscript{1441} What is more
important, perhaps, than historical peaks and troughs in the ‘quantity’ of Islam in the identities
of British Muslims is the function of faith in relation to other aspects of identity. Since the
1990s, a textual, ‘de-culturated’ form of Islam has been strongly asserted by many young
British Muslims and explicitly differentiated from the Islam of their parents, which is seen by
many younger Muslims as hopelessly entangled with south Asian secular cultures.\textsuperscript{1442} Indeed,
culture and religion were tightly entwined for the first-generation of Muslim Britons. Appeals
by organisations such as the FBYO for the employment of workers with ‘understanding of the
ethnic communities’ cultural [and] social background and the religious and moral value
systems they operate under’ were therefore almost tautologies – appeals for recognition of
minority cultures in many cases contained appeals for sensitivity to minority religions.\textsuperscript{1443} Such
an elision would now, for many younger Muslims at least, be unsatisfactory.

Over the studied period, the identities expressed by and ascribed to British Muslims,
apart from these religious, ethnic and national elements, have also, naturally, incorporated
class and gender elements. Indeed, class and status factors have done much to determine the
experiences of Muslim immigrants to Britain. Class has, of course, been closely linked to
education and employment profiles within these communities, and to knowledge of English.
Many of those from higher-status backgrounds also sought positions of ‘leadership’ within

\textsuperscript{1443} THLHLA, PC papers, L/THL/A/32/2/9, FBYO to Director of Social Services, 22/5/84.
their communities, despite the often significant social divides between professional and working-class members of Pakistani communities. As part of these attempts to be accepted as ‘leaders’ – attempts often aimed at mainstream or white institutions rather than the communities they sought to ‘represent’ – middle-class Pakistanis often sought social contacts with white peers.\textsuperscript{1444} The faltering of attempts at national organization of British Muslims throughout this period can be explained in large part by the lack of experience of grassroots organization amongst many of those with resources required for leadership – such as education, social capital, English skills, and monetary resources. Like middle-class Muslims of either gender, working-class Muslim women were largely absent from presentations of Muslims that referred to physical characteristics. As mentioned, portrayals of Muslim girls and women often presented them, like other Asian women, as subservient, reticent and minimally integrated. This was felt to be compounded by the observance of purdah in Muslim families.

When Muslim women did enter the workforce in greater numbers, they often undertook exploitative homeworking, which enabled them to combine paid work with domestic duties. 

*Purdah* led to adult Muslim women being presented ambivalently – as ‘victims’ of patriarchal families and exploitative employers but also as potentially dangerous transmitters of their marginal levels of integration to their children – whilst girls were presented more uniformly as passive subjects whose prospects were heavily circumscribed by their families.

III

As argued in the previous chapter, British multiculturalism has, despite this thesis’ reference to ‘path dependency’, been a somewhat dynamic institution. However, certain concepts have been consistently central to it. By constraining and inflecting the behaviour of actors within the institution, they have functioned as institutional ‘rules’. Chief amongst these include ‘special

\textsuperscript{1444} Shaw, “Making of a Pakistani Community Leader”, 117-8.
provisions’, ‘Commonwealth immigrants’ ‘ethnic groups’, and community ‘leaders’ or ‘representatives’. The concept of ‘special’ provisions, i.e. those made specifically for ethnic minority communities, was compared often contrasted to colour-blind or general provision. Elites, particularly in the 1950s-60s, often made rhetorical statements against such ‘special’ provisions. In truth, programmes and initiatives targeted specifically at certain ethnic minority communities existed throughout the period under study. However, in the early period, these were usually aimed at integration over the long-term rather than at satisfying the right of ethnic minority communities to sustain their cultures of origin (since such right was not generally recognised). CRCs, for instance, aimed at encouraging ethnic minority groups to make use of mainstream social and welfare services, whilst immigrant liaison officers sought to reform communities in ways that would promote integration. Elites therefore apparently did not feel that these ‘special’ provisions contradicted the principle of colour-blindness, since they were aimed ultimately at integration. However, by establishing the ‘community approach’ and a layer of professionals and bodies with expertise in the area of serving specific ethnic communities, these early ‘instrumental’ examples of special provision laid the foundations of institutional multiculturalism.

Early approaches often exhibited a belief in the social significance of the category ‘Commonwealth’ or ‘coloured’ immigrant despite the considerable ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural, class and gender differences this obscured. This category was actuated, for example, in the 1965 circular on education and the 1966 Local Government Act. Its salience perhaps evidences British conceptions of the nation prior to this migration as relatively homogenous – as post-war settler migration from the colonies began, what was apparently most significant about these migrants was their difference from ‘the majority’. In later periods, elite actors were more likely to distinguish between ‘Commonwealth immigrants’, often breaking this

mass of people down into ‘ethnic groups’. Whilst the concept of the ‘ethnic group’ had a social reality – in the sense that communities in Britain have identified on the basis of components of ethnicity such as kinship, language, and culture – the socio-political understanding of the ethnic group operative within British multiculturalism has conceptualised these communities primarily in terms of their ‘needs’ or ‘problems’ associated with them. It is these problems, unique in quantity, quality or both, that, it is felt, have necessitated special provisions.

These ethnic groups are taken to possess ‘leaders’ or ‘representatives’ that can influence their community and represent its interests. As we have seen, particularly in the early period, such ‘representatives’ were often simply middle-class people with little grassroots influence, whose experiences were by definition rather unlike those of the majority in ‘their’ community. For a variety of mainstream institutions, belief in the power of ethnic leaders has been bureaucratically convenient, rendering the consultation of communities as relatively unproblematic. The foregrounding of ethnicity, nationality or religion within the determination of who can ‘lead’, and so the sidelining of factors such as gender and class, reflects the discreteness of multiculturalism. As a number of critics – including the authors of the Burnage report – have suggested, multiculturalism’s infrastructure was often almost monomaniacal as regards ethnicity and related categories, overlooking its intersections with other facets of identity, which were often dealt with through alternative structures.

These concepts were not native to British multiculturalism, but had clear antecedents elsewhere. Recent work by Feldman has rightly drawn attention to the vital, long-range sources of British pluralism – pluralism of ‘countries’ within the union and denominational and religious pluralism of much longer standing. This history predisposed Britain towards a particular type of ‘conservative’ pluralist response to non-white immigration.1446 As considered

1446 Ibid., 289-93, 300.
in the previous chapter, British concern about ‘special’ or segregated provisions evidently reflected the salience within ‘race relations’ discourse of the situations in the American south and South Africa. At least as important was the experience of colonial administration in Africa, the Caribbean and the subcontinent. This was surely where, for British elites, the concepts of the ethnic group and the ‘community leader’ were developed, and where the most relevant experiences for the management of British multiculturalism had been had. This link between ethnic pluralism in the British Empire and multiculturalism in post-war Britain is reflected institutionally by the careers of certain colonial officers who became workers with immigrant communities in post-war Britain. The first immigrant liaison officer appointed by Birmingham in 1954 was a former officer in the Colonial Service, and his successor a former police officer in colonial Kenya. Dewsbury’s first CRO had served in the Indian Air Force.\textsuperscript{1447} In 1965, Manchester appointed an immigrant liaison officer to its Health Department who had previously worked on health issues in Canadian Amerindian communities.\textsuperscript{1448} People with a history of colonial service often took on more informal roles as translators and interpreters in many localities.\textsuperscript{1449} In the 1950s, the Colonial Office was also central to welfare provision for recent Commonwealth immigrants nationally, establishing the British Caribbean Welfare Service in 1956 and taking the lead in a multi-agency effort.\textsuperscript{1450} Only in the 1960s did responsibility for ethnic minority Britons shift to the Home Office.\textsuperscript{1451} At an intellectual level, certain sociologists whose thinking about ‘race relations’ was influential during the 1950s and 1960s – such as Kenneth Little and Michael Banton – began their academic careers as anthropologists in West Africa. Philip Mason, director of the Institute of Race Relations in 1952-70, had been a civil servant in India.\textsuperscript{1452} Whilst the institutional and policy shift from a

\textsuperscript{1447} Guardian, 30/6/68; Solomos and Back, \textit{Social Change}, 45.
\textsuperscript{1448} Guardian, 20/10/65.
\textsuperscript{1449} LMA, LCSS papers, ACC/1888/207, Mr B. Sufi, “Summary of a Talk... Held on 2nd November 1960”.
\textsuperscript{1450} Passmore and Thompson, “Multiculturalism, Decolonisation and Immigration”, 247-8.
\textsuperscript{1452} Bailkin, \textit{Afterlife of Empire}, 26, 29, 51.
conception of British ethnic relations as ineluctably post-colonial to more narrowly
metropolitan is therefore identifiable, if gradual and uneven, a more intellectual history of
multiculturalism’s concepts or ‘rules’ may well need to begin with the Empire.

Incoherencies and tensions in these concepts inspired criticisms of multiculturalism
that gathered pace, and became more widely expressed, throughout the studied period. As
demonstrated, this led to significant restructuring and contraction of multiculturalism from the
late 1980s. However, certain aspects of the institution – workers concerned specifically with
certain ethnic groups, race relations legislation and bodies that enforced this, funding to ethnic
minority community organizations, ethnic monitoring, etc. – endured well into the 21st
century. Observing that multiculturalism ‘has endured’ in Britain is now a contentious
proposition. Particularly in view of the ‘community cohesion’ paradigm, many observers have
wondered whether multiculturalism may be dead or dying. The biggest challenge presented
to institutional multiculturalism by the community cohesion approach is a rejection of ‘single
group’ funding. This rejection, it is presumed, will prevent further examples of the ethnically-
specific provisions that in a sense underpin multiculturalism. Similarly, consultative
arrangements are now also intended to be on a far broader, area or thematic basis, rather
than catering to ethnic minority organizations separately. A recent study has suggested that
a number of prominent British Muslim organisations have been motivated to establish inter-
ethnic and inter-denominational work by the new emphasis on community cohesion.
However, it seems that many ethnic- or religiously-specific community organisations continue
to work primarily within their ethnic and religious communities on a day-to-day basis, whilst
the narrow cross-denominational initiatives of some Muslim organisations – such as
denominational power-sharing in the BCM – pre-date ‘cohesion’ policies. Furthermore, certain

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Journal of Sociology* 55: 2 (June, 2004), 237-57; McGhee, *End of Multiculturalism*?
1454 IRT, *Community Cohesion*, 24-5.
practices associated with identifying ethnic groups and their specific needs, especially ethnic monitoring, were encouraged, rather than condemned, in reports outlining ‘community cohesion’.\textsuperscript{1456} Community organisations working with a single ethnic or religious group are still regarded as valuable partners by local and national authorities, even if the relatively high spending on mono-ethnic community projects, a main concern for many ‘anti-racists’ of the 1980s, has been replaced at grassroots level with a significant emphasis on projects that bring communities, defined on various ethnic and non-ethnic bases, together.\textsuperscript{1457} The value placed by the Committee on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) upon ‘expert knowledge about particular local circumstances’ and its call for local authorities to work more closely with faith organisations is in tension with its emphasis on cross-community projects.\textsuperscript{1458} That local authorities have come to rely on mediating organisations that posses special knowledge of ‘their own’ communities is suggested by the Local Government Association’s suggestion in its 2002 Guidance on Community Cohesion that groups ‘providing culturally or religiously sensitive services continue to have an important role to play in many communities’.\textsuperscript{1459} The centrality of this role is highlighted by the presence on the CIC of figures associated with organisations such as YMUK and Vishwa Hindu Parishad. This highlights ‘path dependent’ aspects of multiculturalism: ethnic and religious community organisations have become established as central actors in the management of ‘their’ communities.

Rather than standing in principled opposition to the concept of ‘special needs’, community cohesion’s emphasis on the (neglected) disadvantages suffered by white working-class communities invites the impression that its intent was to incorporate whites into the structures of multiculturalism. Ealing, for example, brought a case against SBS under the 1976

\textsuperscript{1456} Ibid., 36; Clarke, Burnley Task Force, 13.
\textsuperscript{1457} Thomas, Youth, Multiculturalism, 79.
\textsuperscript{1458} Committee on Integration and Cohesion, Our Shared Future (London : CIC, 2007), 49, 86-7, 124-5.
RRA, arguing that the organisation contravened the Act by failing to provide for whites. The authority justified the action with reference to the concepts of both ‘cohesion’ and ‘diversity’. More significant than this concern for the specific disadvantages faced by whites has been the close, and essentially undifferentiated, scrutiny under which British Muslims have been placed through ‘Prevent’. This well-resourced programme, which has funded projects ranging from social and recreational activities to theological debates, has been directed at Muslims in general and only at Muslims. The 2006 legislation outlawing incitement to religious hatred has sometimes been presented as a ‘trade’ with Muslim communities for securing their eternal vigilance in opposition to terrorism. Together with the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) and the ‘community cohesion’ paradigm, this legislation underpins a multiculturalism concerned not only with ensuring equality and promoting cross-community dialogue but with attempting to set the limits of that dialogue.

This emphasis on harmonious inter-ethnic relations has understandably led some to perceive a ‘return’ to the ‘community relations’ approach of the fifties and sixties. Indeed, the emphasis placed by Clarke on the revival of CRCs in Lancashire is suggestive. New approaches, however, cannot, and do not, simply ‘return’ to previous paradigms, but must tackle major criticisms of post-colonial multiculturalism – those relating to questions of representation, to superdiversity, to the relationship between ethnicity and other facets of identity, and to whom multiculturalism serves – unknown in the middle of the twentieth century. It is not yet clear, however, that these new approaches will entail an institutional dismantling, rather than a restructuring, of multiculturalism.

1462 Geaves, “Negotiating British Citizenship” in Abbas ed., Muslim Britain, 94.
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