Citizenship Abroad, Capital at Home: How Global Inequalities Affect the Value of Dual Citizenship

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Abstract

Citizenship and global inequalities are intrinsically interwoven. This thesis concerns one particular case in which this plays out: voluntary return migration from the Global North back to the Global South. Most studies examining the impact of citizenship and naturalisation on people's socio-economic trajectories do not consider what impact acquired Northern citizenship might have on life after return to the Global South. At the same time, studies of return migration do not focus on voluntary return migration but tend to examine involuntary return—and if they do study voluntary return migration, they tend to disregard the impact that acquired citizenship may have on the return experience. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Ghanaian return migrants, this thesis examines if and how voluntary return migrants in Ghana value dual citizenship for their everyday life after return. Drawing on legislative documents and Hansards, it embeds the analysis of returnees into an analysis of the political history of dual citizenship in Ghana. There are three main findings. First, most returnees—regardless of whether they returned as dual citizens or not—saw in dual citizenship a Bourdieusian economic, social, and cultural capital that helped with upward mobility in Ghana. Second, one group of returnees stood out by not seeing any additional value in dual citizenship for life in Ghana: these were members of politically well-connected families of Ghana's elite who distanced themselves from upwardly mobile dual citizens. With their example, I show that dual citizenship signals upper middle-class status, but remains irrelevant to the elite of the country. Third, the analysis of Ghana's political history on citizenship shows that for dual citizenship to work as a form of capital and a class marker in the country of return, there needs to be a political atmosphere which is generally positive towards liberal democracy and welcoming towards diasporans.

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CONTENTS

1. Inextricably Intertwined: Citizenship and Global Inequalities

Imagine a world in which all states are equal and offer their citizens the same access to opportunities through the same bundles of political and social rights. In such a world of equality between states, state membership—citizenship—would have no practical significance because there would be neither advantages nor disadvantages attached to it. But this is not the world we live in. And so, citizenship matters. But for whom and how? There are many ways to answer this question. This thesis looks at one scenario which has so far not drawn much attention: the way that citizenship from the Global North has value outside the Global North for return migrants' everyday life in the Global South. The puzzle at the heart of this study can be summarised as follows: we know from existing academic literature that, on the one hand, acquiring citizenship in the Global North has tangible benefits particularly for immigrants from the Global South and, on the other hand, that migration is not a one-way street as many people return. This raises the question whether, and in what ways, Northern citizenship also has practical benefits for life back in the Global South after return. That is the overarching question that I explore in this thesis, which I argue will contribute to a better understanding of the role of citizenship in a world of between-country inequality.

To underline the scale of how much citizenship matters, consider the words of one prominent commentator: former lead economist of the World Bank's research department, Branko Milanović. Milanović famously broke down global inequality into two forms: internal inequality within a given country, and inequality between

countries. Inequality between countries, he showed, is today far greater than internal inequality within any state of the world, and with a powerful example he illustrated how extreme the between-state inequality can be (Milanović 2019, 6; 2016). Milanović compared the mean income level of a citizen from the world's poorest country, the Democratic Republic of Congo, with the mean income level of a citizen from the world's richest country, the United States. Statistically, he wrote, "just by being born in the United States rather than in Congo, a person would multiply her income by 93 times" (Milanović 2016, 133; see also Milanović 2019). He concluded that citizenship from a rich country like the US or Sweden creates a form of rent, a premium received for a non-produced asset (Milanović 2016, 131).

One way to overcome this citizenship-based inequality is to migrate and subsequently acquire citizenship in a country of the Global North. This is a form of global upward mobility, moving into the circle of people who can profit from the asset of Northern citizenship. It has been facilitated by states' increased acceptance of dual citizenship, which no longer forces people to give up their first citizenship for naturalisation abroad. My study looks at what happens *afterwards*, when migrants have returned to their country of origin. It reveals the ways in which the international upward mobility of naturalisation in the Global North affects the socio-economic position of returnees and facilitates a second form of upward mobility: one within the society of the Southern country of origin. By doing so, this thesis' ultimate aim is to show that the impact of citizenship is even greater than previously thought and that citizenship matters in ways so far overlooked.

1.1 The Puzzle: Return Migration with Dual Citizenship

This thesis contributes to a growing body of literature that studies the linkages between global inequalities and citizenship. Two books in particular have pursued this research agenda and have been important in shaping my own research question: Ayelet Shachar's *Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Inequality* (Shachar 2009) and Yossi Harpaz' *Citizenship 2.0. Dual Nationality as a Global Asset* (Harpaz 2020).

Shachar makes the observation that citizenship is a hereditary entitlement that creates and reinforces unjust inequality on a world scale.[1] Announcing her book as nothing less than "iconoclastic" (Shachar 2009, xi) Shachar urged citizenship scholars to "expand[…] our understanding of citizenship by adding a thus far missing aspect: thinking about birthright access to citizenship as a distributor, or denier, of security and opportunity on a global scale" (Shachar 2018, 5). This thesis follows that call, focusing less on birth citizenship as on acquired second citizenship. To find a new way of thinking about citizenship in a world of stark inequalities between countries, Shachar draws a comparison between the citizenship that one receives at birth and inherited property. Building on that analogy (between inherited citizenship and inherited property), Shachar then proposes that global inequalities can be mitigated through an inheritance tax on citizenship from the Global North which should be redistributed to countries of the Global South.[2] The lens that I use has been inspired by Shachar, but is distinctive because I propose that it is fruitful to

[1] Shachar builds on an earlier paper by Joseph Carens in which he famously states: "Citizenship in Western liberal democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances." (Carens 1987, 252)
[2] Shachar does not use the terms Global South and Global North, but in a nutshell, this is what she means.

study citizenship as a form of Bourdieusian capital. In this concept of capital, property is just one among many forms that capital can take (property is a form of economic capital to Bourdieu). Such a lens helps us to capture the benefits of citizenship in a more multifaceted way—which I will come to in a moment when I discuss my analytical lens in more detail.

While *Birthright Citizenship* deals with the entanglement of citizenship and inequality on a conceptual level from the viewpoint of a legal scholar, Harpaz' *Citizenship 2.0* studies how people navigate such inequality through dual citizenship acquisition. Since the 1990s, states have increasingly reformed their citizenship policies to allow for dual citizenship. Throughout the 18th and 19th and much of the 20th century, dual citizenship has been mostly seen as a threat to sovereignty, framed in terms of amorality, disloyalty, and betrayal—as in the case of the famous and often-cited words attributed to American statesman George Bancroft that one would "as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two countries." (Spiro 2017). A central argument against dual citizenship was the allegiance of conscripted soldiers who would have to fulfil military service in two countries. This issue became particularly problematic with the European waves of emigration towards the newly founded United States in the 19th century; for example, in 1812, when the UK tried to enforce military duties onto British-American dual citizens (Spiro 2017; van der Baaren 2020). There are many factors that lead to more lenient political approaches to dual citizenship. Among others, the transformation of conscript armies into professional armies, and the consolidation of human rights in the second half of the 20th century have changed states' approaches to dual citizenship. Since the end of the bipolar world of the Cold War, the number of countries allowing for multiple

citizenship has quickly grown (Harpaz 2019). Today over 80 percent of states allow for dual citizenship: 81 states (46.3 percent) allow dual citizenship for both emigrants and immigrants, 31 states (17.8 percent) allow it only for immigrants, and 30 states (17,5 percent) only for emigrants, while just 33 states (18.9 percent) do not accept dual citizenship in any form (Globalcit 2016).

Harpaz examines how affluent people in Serbia, Mexico, and Israel overcome the socio-economic disadvantages of their birth-citizenship by acquiring second citizenship from the United States or the European Union. They do so without migrating, but by asserting their European ancestry or by giving birth on US territory. The global policy shift towards dual citizenship, Harpaz argues, changes people's relation to citizenship. Once forsaking one's birth citizenship is no longer required, people develop instrumental approaches towards naturalisation. Harpaz calls this new form of second citizenship "compensatory citizenship" as it compensates and makes up for the socio-economic disadvantages people may have because of their birth citizenship. The right to travel the world, Harpaz observes, is a key reason why people in his study acquired second citizenship. The right to travel is used to seek employment and education abroad and as an exit strategy in case of political turmoil. Gaining second citizenship from the Global North, Harpaz concludes, changes people's "global class position" as it makes them part of a cosmopolitan elite with vast travel rights (Harpaz 2020, 138 - 140; 2019).

This thesis heeds Shachar's call to think about citizenship in terms of global inequality. Like Harpaz, it studies how people navigate inequalities by acquiring citizenship in the Global North. My angle, however, is different. My focus is less on the benefits that people from the Global South might gain *in* the Global North through a

second citizenship, and more on the value that people ascribe to these benefits *outside* the context of the Global North.

Upward Mobility through Citizenship Acquisition

When citizenship acquisition has been studied as a means to overcome global inequalities, the focus has been on benefits in the Global North. Shachar, for instance, describes citizenship as a sorting mechanism that "distributes voice and opportunity" (Shachar 2009, 11) on a global scale; de facto associating voice and opportunity with the Global North. By acquiring citizenship in the Global North, migrants gain voice because they become members in a democratic state, and gain a life of relative economic comfort in a high-income country (Shachar 2009, 11-12).

With a similar thrust, some research has argued that citizenship in the Global North is acquired strategically by people of the Global South to become part of the Global North and access its benefits. Through paying large amounts of money (so-called golden passport schemes) or by proving ancestry from Europe, it is possible to become a citizen of the Global North without ever having to migrate (Harpaz 2015, 2019, 2020; Harpaz and Mateos 2018; Kochenov and Surak 2023; Shachar 2017, 2018). But these are rather exceptional cases, and they are not the cases that come to mind when we think of global citizenship inequality. Most people who are disenfranchised through their citizenship, at best, have the option to migrate and naturalise after years of residence abroad.

For such naturalised immigrants, a number of quantitative studies have pointed out what is sometimes referred to as the "citizenship premium" (for

example by: Peters, Vink, and Schmeets 2018). The term describes the observation that naturalised immigrants in countries of the Global North fare better economically than those that do not adopt citizenship. That means that naturalisation can serve upward mobility in the country of immigration. Case countries for the citizenship premium have been Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the US (Bevelander and DeVoretz 2008; Fougère and Safi 2009; Helgertz, Bevelander, and Tegunimataka 2014; Steinhardt 2012); in other words, the citizenship premium has only been studied in countries of North America and Europe. These studies suggest that there is a strong correlation between upward mobility and naturalisation. But it seems that no study has yet examined what benefits a migrant's citizenship premium might have *outside* the countries of the Global North.

Benefits of Northern Citizenship after Voluntary Return Migration

While it is important to investigate the benefits of Northern citizenship where they are conferred and most directly apply, far from all migrants settle permanently in the North. Many migrants move on, return, or circulate between countries. Indeed, return migration is estimated to make up between a quarter to a third of all global migration flows (Azose and Raftery 2019). Moreover, voluntary return migration to the Global South is common, even though media debates may sometimes paint a picture in which it seems that return only happens when people are deported (Beauchemin 2018).

This raises an important question: Does Northern citizenship also have practical benefits for life back in the Global South after return. If acquired citizenship is

such a socio-economic determinant for those living in states of the Global North, it could well be that these benefits are portable to the Global South with return migration. And if that is the case, it could also be that these benefits play a role in how states of the Global South value dual citizenship as a matter of policy (which undoubtedly makes it easier to acquire citizenship from the Global North because one does not have to forsake one's first citizenship).

Surprisingly, however, although a quarter to a third of all global migration flows is estimated to be return migration (Azose and Raftery 2019), the two research fields "return migration" and "dual citizenship" have so far had very little interaction. The citizenship literature has focussed primarily on benefits in the Global North and paid little attention to the possibility of people returning with an acquired citizenship from the North. And the return migration literature has focussed on the differences between voluntary and involuntary return. It has shown that voluntary return has the potential to increase people's social status after return. But it has not examined what impact people's passport situation might have on their return experience.[3] It is this gap between research on the asset of citizenship and research on the return experience that this thesis explores, and it does so by studying the effects of Northern citizenship on return experiences and the political discussions surrounding (dual) citizenship in my case country, Ghana.

[3] Shachar et al. (2017b) and King and Kuschminder (2022a) give a good overview of the two respective research fields.

1.2 The Case: Social and Political Dimension of Dual Citizenship in Ghana

In order to approach this thesis' overarching question—what value has Northern citizenship in a Southern context for return migrants?—I consider the case of return migration to Ghana through two interlocking questions: (1) What value has Northern citizenship for returnees' everyday lives in Ghana? and (2) How does the political history of dual citizenship in Ghana help explain the value that Ghanaian return migrants see in a second, Northern citizenship? The first question concerns the social dimension of return migration and dual citizenship, drawing on interviews to understand the lived experience of return migration with and without Northern citizenship. The second question concerns the political dimension of dual citizenship and return migration, drawing on archival research at the Ghanaian parliament, other archival sources, and recent Ghanaian media debates to provide important contextual information on politics of citizenship in Ghana. It not only contributes to the literature on drivers of dual citizenship laws but also—and that is its main function in this thesis—helps to critically engage with the findings on the first question because it reveals the political attitudes and the political climate that underpin returnees' views on citizenship.

Ghana is an ideal case to investigate these questions and study the role of Northern citizenship after return migration for three main reasons. First, Ghanaian citizenship has been seen to come with only limited benefits: the Quality of Nationality Index by Kochenov and Lindeboom[4] puts Ghana in the Low Quality group of

[4] The Quality of Nationality Index ranks citizenship by its travel freedom and settlement freedom, as well as by the country's human development potential, economic strength and peace and stability (Kochenov and Lindeboom 2020).

citizenship, a group that mainly consists of the majority of African countries and large parts of Asia (Kochenov and Lindeboom 2020). Ghanaian citizens are thus among those who are severely affected by the global inequalities tied to citizenship. Ghana, however, introduced dual citizenship in the 1990s and thereby made it easier for Ghanaian citizens to acquire "high value" citizenship to overcome citizenship inequalities. This makes it an appropriate case study for a project like mine that is interested in the ways people overcome citizenship-based inequality through citizenship acquisition.

Second, over the last decades, dual citizenship seems to have been positively connotated in Ghana. Dual citizenship was introduced in Ghana over the course of the 1990s and since then policy debates have rather pointed towards potential further liberalisations of Ghanaian dual citizenship regulations than restrictions (I discuss this in great detail in chapter 6). A case in point are the "Year of Return"-commemorations. A year before I embarked on my doctoral project, the Ghanaian government launched a year-long initiative to commemorate 400 years since enslaved Africans first reached North America (Government of Ghana 2019). As part of the commemoration programme, the Ghanaian government also advertised dual US-Ghanaian citizenship to African Americans (Azar 2019) and in February 2023, the Ghanaian government conferred Ghanaian citizenship to two of three living survivors of the Tulsa Race Massacre[5] in a televised ceremony at the Ghanaian embassy in Washington (Brown 2023). The Ghanaian state thus exhibits a positive attitude

[5] The 1921 Tulsa Race Massacre is one of the worst incidents of racist mass murder in the US. Over the course of two days, a white mob destroyed the entire black neighbourhood of Tulsa, Oklahoma, killed hundreds of its residents and left thousands homeless.

towards dual citizenship and tries to attract dual citizens. Third, there are indications that voluntary return migration is common in Ghana. Statistical evidence on return movements is very limited because countries of immigration do not keep records of onward migration or return and because countries of the Global South have limited capacities to survey return. Nevertheless, for the Ghanaian case, there is one household survey that tries to assess the scale of return migration, the *Migration between Africa and Europe* project lead by Beauchemin (2018). It finds that while "fewer than 20% of [Ghanaian] migrants to Europe returned between 1990 and 1999, that percentage has increased to more than 50% [between 2000 and 2008]" (Schans et al. 2018, 272). The same survey also finds that highly educated Ghanaians are most likely to return, suggesting that the increase in return is indeed an increase in voluntary return as highly educated migrants are less likely to overstay their visas (ibid, 272-274). These findings do not give us absolute numbers, but they do show that we have grounds to assume that voluntary return migration to Ghana is fairly common. Moreover, these return movements have been well documented by qualitative studies. This thesis thus builds on a substantial body of examples and contributes to an ongoing and lively debate (for example: Adzei and Sakyi 2014; Ammassari 2004; Asiedu 2010; Kleist 2011; E. Kyeremeh 2020; J. Mensah and Owusu Ansah 2022; Wong 2014; Setrana and Tonah 2014, 2016; Teye, Setrana, and Acheampong 2015). Four, the main countries of destination for Ghanaian citizens, the UK and the US (Beauchemin 2018), also both allow for dual citizenship.

The Social Dimension of Return Migration and Dual Citizenship

When starting this research, my primary interest was on the lived experience of voluntary returnees. I wanted to understand what effect returning with a different/second passport would have on everyday life. For several mainly practical reasons, I decided to interview both returnees with and without a second citizenship. The main reason for including non-naturalised returnees was that I had no concrete information about the prevalence of Ghanaian return migration of dual citizens as no previous study had previously looked into this topic. I did however have grounds to assume that voluntary return migration with dual citizenship was fairly common, because the return migration literature suggested this (Schans et al. 2018) and because there are no major disincentives not to naturalise abroad, if one can retain one's first citizenship (as in the Ghanaian case). I assumed that all voluntary return migrants would have thought about the question of how useful and valuable an acquired second citizenship might be after return. Both returnees who naturalised, and those who did not, would thus be able to share their reasoning and reflect on how their citizenship status (dual, solely Ghanaian, or solely Northern) affected their everyday life in Ghana.

My interview methods started from the idea that biographical questions are particularly well suited for understanding how people's views come about. This is because they allow interviewees to both reflect how their citizenship status affect their everyday lives in Ghana, and trace what life events influenced their thinking about citizenship. I conducted 49 semi-structured interviews with Ghanaian return migrants for this thesis, between September 2021 and April 2023. The majority of my respondents had at least one additional citizenship from the Global North.

Before proceeding, I should clarify some terminology that I will be using. While I am interested in the impact of Northern citizenship, my focus lies on Northern citizenship *in connection with* Ghanaian citizenship. The key difference between returnees and any migrants moving to Ghana is that returnees are not foreigners in Ghana. They are different from, for example, white expatriates, who might also benefit from Northern citizenship while living in Ghana but cannot claim any belonging to Ghanaian society. Returnees with second Northern citizenship thus have a unique position because they are simultaneously members of Ghanaian society and of the society of their second citizenship, but "return migrants with second Northern citizenship" is a very inelegant term. Terminologically, things are further complicated by the fact that some interviewees had not only a second, but also third citizenship; one person even held four passports. To make things simpler, I will mostly speak of dual citizenship and dual citizens, implying that people hold at least one Northern citizenship in addition to Ghanaian citizenship.

There is another piece of terminology that needs clarification. "Global South" and "Global North" are problematic concepts as they imply that both the Global North and the Global South are coherent entities. Dividing the world into two categories of countries of course does gross injustice to nuance. It also, as critics hold, reproduces the 19th century's colonial division of the world, and barely disguise the deeply rooted hierarchical thinking underlying the terms (see for instance: Kothari 2019; Smith 2021). A reply to this critique holds that structural inequalities and power imbalances, still persist from colonial times. And as long as they do, we need terms to reflect them (Sud and Sanchez-Ancochea 2022). There are thus analytical merits in using these terms, particularly when describing global inequalities, like

this thesis does. The enormous inequality between countries that Milanović describes correlates with what are commonly termed Global South and North. Moreover, a focus on the so-called Global South is also productive in citizenship and migration studies because it points to a crucial imbalance in the literature: Most empirical scholarship on citizenship and migration builds on case studies in Europe and North America (Chung 2017). As a result, it is not only the concept of citizenship that is based on political thought from the Global North, but also the empirical bases of citizenship studies that revolve around Northern states. A comprehensive understanding of citizenship needs to consider the lived realities of citizenship in the Global South, too—particularly because this is where the inequalities of citizenship are felt the most.

Another question relating to the terminology concerns the words North and South themselves. Large parts of the Global South are in the Northern hemisphere while Australia and New Zealand are considered Global North, although in the southern hemisphere. This is indeed nonsensical. But alternative terminologies, such as "West" and "non-West" (terminology chosen e.g. by Chung 2017) or "West" and "postcolonial world" (terminology chosen e.g. by Sadiq 2008), or most developed and less/least developed countries (used to some extend by Shachar 2009) are no solution, either. They equally brush over nuances and stylistically they are even less elegant than “Global South” and “Global North”: “West” and “non-West” fails to find a term for half of the word and defines it merely as the inversion of the West. “West” and “postcolonial world” reduces one part of the world to their colonial history while invoking cold-war terminology for the other part of the world. And “developed” and “less developed” or “least developed” paints a rather hierarchical

image of the world. So, for lack of a better terminology, and because they are the terms commonly used, I will use Global South and Global North.

The Political Dimension of Return Migration and Dual Citizenship

I embed the sociological analysis of how returnees think of and use their dual citizenship into a political analysis of how Ghanaian lawmakers have been interpreting the value of citizenship, particularly dual citizenship. In the mid-1990s, Ghana amended its citizenship legislation to allow for dual citizenship. Through the use of archival material, I trace the discussions that eventually led to the introduction of dual citizenship and uncover how policymakers conceptualised dual citizenship at the time.

From this analysis of parliamentary discussions, it became clear that Ghana's introduction of dual citizenship emerged, among other reasons, out of a critical reflection on Ghana's previous citizenship legislation, notably its denationalisation policies prior to democratisation in the 1990s. In order to understand Ghana's introduction of dual citizenship in the 1990s, therefore, it was necessary to also understand Ghana's legislation from before the 1990s. To gain a more holistic view of citizenship legislation in Ghana, I combined the analysis of the parliamentary debates with an analysis of legal documents on citizenship, accessed through the online archive "Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative". In order to link this analysis to more recent history, I added an analysis of news articles and recent attempts to further amend the dual citizenship law. This combination of archival sources allowed me to trace the history of (dual) citizenship legislation in Ghana from independence to today. The attitudes and values towards (dual) citizenship

expressed in these documents have helped me draw a picture of the political climate regarding dual citizenship, the roots of this political climate, and its longevity.

I mainly use this analysis to evaluate the findings on the benefits of dual citizenship for everyday life in Ghana, adding the context of a wider political climate in Ghana. This is important because the value that people see in a social construct such as state membership is shaped, at least to some degree, by broader societal attitudes towards that social construct. The analysis of the political context regarding dual citizenship helps explain why Ghanaian returnees express certain views on the benefits of dual citizenship for return that may not be shared by returnees in other countries. This combination—studying the value of dual citizenship expressed by returnees as well as the value expressed by lawmakers—allows a more holistic picture of the value of dual citizenship in Ghana.

1.3 The Lens: A Focus on Capital

This thesis studies Northern citizenship in terms of benefit and uses an analytical approach that builds on Bourdieu's concept of capital. To understand this analytical lens, it is helpful to relate it to the discursive backdrop against which the growing body of research into the interlinkages of citizenship and inequality has evolved. A classic definition of citizenship emphasises the inclusionary and equalising effects of citizenship. It posits that citizenship is as a form of membership in a political and territorial community, and that this membership encompasses four elements: legal

status, rights, belonging, and participation. (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Joppke 2010)[6].

The first element, legal status, captures how citizenship is a juridical relation between citizen and state, a legally recognised title objectified in official documents like the passport: "The most basic aspect of citizenship is that of a status designating formal state membership. This is citizenship as passport-holding," as Joppke (2010, 28) puts it. Citizenship status is either conveyed at birth or through naturalisation. States use two main principles for attributing citizenship at birth: *jus soli*—the principle of granting citizenship to any person born on a state's territory—and *jus sanguinis*, granting citizenship based on the new-born's parentage.

The second element, rights, concerns the relationship between citizens and their state as this relationship entails rights and obligations for citizens which formally enshrine equality before the law for all members of a state (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008, 156). The question of which rights citizenship ought to entail has been the classic focus of citizenship studies since T.H. Marshall's essays on citizenship and class (Joppke 2010, 29). In *Citizenship and Social Class* (1992 [1950]), Marshall develops an ideal-typical trajectory for how comprehensive citizenship rights evolve by studying the history of rights in England. He identifies three successive historic steps*. Civil rights* emerged during the 18th century with the end of the feudal system and, in Marshall's analysis, gave rise to the "principle of the equality of citizens to set against the principle of the inequality of class" (Marshall 1992 [1950] 8). These rights centre around the individual freedom of the person

[6] Though Joppke does not count participation as an independent element of citizenship.

and comprise freedom of speech, freedom of faith, property rights, and equality before the law. *Political rights*, the rights of participation in the exercise of political power through active and passive suffrage, followed in the course of the 19th century (ibid.). Finally, *social rights*, encompass rights of access to the educational system and social welfare services and developed mainly during the 20th century.

The third element of a classic definition of citizenship is participation and concerns citizenship in democratic states particularly. Citizenship is a participatory concept that rests on the self-government of people within a territory. Such participation is backed by political rights and takes two forms: political participation and civic participation. Political participation includes membership in a political organisation, voting or standing for political office. Civic participation includes any involvement in civil society, such as participating in a non-profit organisation, joining a trade union or demonstrating. (Bloemraad 2006). While non-citizens can engage in civic participation their political participation in the country of migration is usually restricted by limited political rights. They can, for example, participate in demonstrations or become union members, but they usually cannot run for office or vote in national elections.[7]

A final aspect of classic definitions of citizenship lies in a shared feeling of belonging that creates an emotional bond between the individual citizens and the political community; in other words a form of shared identification with that state. In this fourth element of citizenship, the emotional bond, definitions of citizenship

[7] The EU constitutes a slight exception to the exclusiveness of political participation by extending active and passive voting rights on municipal level to EU-non-citizens (see for instance: Bellamy 2019).

overlap with definitions of nationhood and nationality—which in turn describe cultural and/or ethnic collectives (Joppke 2010; Gans 2017).

The Workings of Citizenship: Inclusion and Exclusion

What should have become clear from the above is that a classic definition of citizenship focusses on the democratic state and the relationship that exists within its territory. From such a perspective, citizenship works in an equalising way, as T.H. Marshall (1992 [1950]) argued in his essay collection *Citizenship and Social Class*. Marshall viewed citizenship as a tool of societal integration in what could be understood as a liberal answer to the Marxist dismissal of citizenship as disguise of capitalist class inequalities (Marx 1978 [1843], 33-34). In Marshall's view, citizenship embodies the "basic human equality associated with the concept of full membership" (Marshall 1992 [1950] 6). Citizenship in its comprehensive form (encompassing civil, political, and social rights) serves to create social cohesion, because it reduces inequalities between its members and instils a shared feeling of responsibility for the welfare of the overall community (ibid.). His argument is certainly compelling. The end of feudalism and the formulation of citizenship rights which granted all citizens, not just the elites, rights of political participation, made the UK (his case country) a more equal society.

However, if we zoom out from the formal, domestic workings of citizenship to study citizenship from an international perspective, the double-edged nature of citizenship becomes clear. Citizenship, while internally inclusive, is exclusive in relation to non-members. This exclusion stems from the centrality of the nation state for the political order: citizenship is defined by the jurisdiction of the state and

many of the rights a state grants its citizens end at its border. In a world in which the scope of one's socio-political rights, one's economic prospects, and the extent of one's international mobility (Mau et al. 2015) differ greatly depending on one's country of citizenship, the exclusionary effect of citizenship entrenches and creates socio-economic inequalities between citizens of different countries (Milanović 2016; Shachar 2009). It is this field of research, the study of citizenship as an asset, in which my thesis is situated and to which I strive to contribute.

Analytical Lens: Bourdieusian Capital

Given significant socio-economic inequalities across countries, it makes sense to analyse state membership in economic terms. Milanović's economic model of between-country inequality, introduced at the beginning of this chapter, does this when it describes citizenship as a rent. But Milanović paints in broad strokes. He does not derive his claim about the changing role of citizenship from sociological analysis but deduces from large-scale economic data on global income levels. In this thesis, I propose a different analytical approach. I argue that Bourdieu's notion of capital offers a thicker understanding of the ways in which socio-economic inequalities are engrained in citizenship. This is, I believe, an original approach to examining this issue with many analytical benefits that will become clear throughout the thesis.

Social struggles encompass more than money and financial benefits: this is one of the central ideas in Bourdieu's work. His notions of capital and class reflect this insight, especially in his theory that there are three main forms of capital: economic capital (e.g., money, rents, land titles), social capital (group membership, families,

networks) and cultural capital (education, educational titles, cultural artefacts). These three forms of capital hinge on a society which associates them with prestige and can be transformed into each other. We can, for example, use money to buy cultural artefacts. Education and educational titles can give us access to social networks and help us accumulate money, while other economic capital stays within families through inheritance. Bourdieu's notion of class builds on this. It widens the lens from a mere distinction of income levels and conditions of ownership to a multi-layered concept that integrates an analysis of distinctions through lifestyle and taste with an analysis of the three forms of capital (Bourdieu 1989a).

Bourdieu's notion of capital allows for a detailed sociological approach to inequality. It helps shine a light on the subtle differences between people and is therefore well suited to forming a holistic view of how citizenship-based inequality plays out in everyday life. Bourdieu's theory also offers a deeper understanding of what it means for citizenship to become an asset. In this thesis, I pay particular attention to the ways in which citizenship from the Global North becomes a form of capital within the return society. This allows me to look at the many ways that Northern citizenship can make a difference for returnees' lives and under what conditions Northern citizenship can help with upward mobility in the Southern country of return.

I am not the first to use Bourdieu's concepts of capital and class in relation to citizenship. While working on this thesis, Altan-Olcay and Balta published a book on US citizenship in Turkey which has a similar approach. The authors studied different groups of people in Turkey who had dual citizenship or strived for it: US citizens who moved to Turkey, Turkish returnees who naturalised in the US, and Turkish

mothers who travelled to the US to give birth there so their children would become US citizens. They found that US Americans who moved to Turkey would use their foreignness as a means to cultural capital and upward mobility. Because in certain Turkish circles the US had an aura of prestige, and because of their English language proficiency, US citizens had an easy time finding well-paid employment in Turkey. The primary focus of Altan-Olcay and Balta is, however, on transnationalism and the main impact of US citizenship is located outside of Turkey, not within the Turkish society. For Turkish citizens who had acquired US citizenship for themselves or their children, the main purpose of the US passport was to have an exit strategy in case Turkey became unstable (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2020).

My approach is different because I focus on return experiences and do not, unlike Altan-Olcay and Balta, compare the experience of different groups—lifestyle migrants, returnees, and parents who travelled for so-called "birth tourism". I thereby avoid introducing possibly confounding variables that make it difficult to pinpoint the effects of the Northern citizenship itself. Regardless of these differences, Altan-Olcay and Balta make clear how strongly the benefits that returnees see in Northern second citizenship depend on the political context in the country of return. The Turkish context is dominated by a conservative-religious backlash against Kemalist secular, Western-oriented elites. In such a political climate, dual Turkish-US citizens did not, as the book showed, think of their second citizenship as beneficial for everyday life in Turkey. That does, however, not mean, that under different political circumstances, dual citizenship is not an asset for everyday life in the country of return.

There is another more empirical argument in favour of a focus on capital. Not all voluntary return migrants succeed in reintegrating into the labour market or founding prosperous businesses after return. Moreover, failure to do so negatively impacts on returnees' social status. Returning with capital (i.e. not empty-handed) is enormously important for successful return migration to the Global South, as numerous studies have shown (Ammassari and Black 2001; Kleist 2017, 2020; Mazzucato 2008; J. Mensah, Teye, and Setrana 2022; Setrana and Tonah 2016). There are many reasons for this. Families might have saved money to send one member abroad, with the expectation that this member would bring back some of the wealth of the Global North upon return. Migration can thus be a livelihood decision not only for the person who gets to migrate, but for an entire network of people behind that person. The social pressure not to return empty-handed can therefore weigh heavily on migrants. Misinformation by those who stay behind about life in the Global North can further increase the pressure. Return migration to the Global South is also economically risky and demanding: as labour markets tend to be tight in countries of the Global South, returnees often opt for self-employment, which hinges on start-up capital (Setrana and Tonah 2016). Being able to fulfil the various social pressures and succeed economically after returning, however, can boost returnees' social status (Kleist 2011, 2015; Mazzucato 2008).

Notably, however, the literature on return migration has not looked at what citizenship may add to the picture. This is surprising, given that citizenship researchers have been increasingly pointing at how citizenship is linked with upward mobility, albeit within the Global North. This research bridges the gap between the

two research fields of citizenship studies and return migration and it does so with a focus on citizenship as a Bourdieusian capital.

1.4 Central Arguments

This thesis makes three interlocking arguments, in parallel with its three empirical chapters (chapter four, five, and six). The first argument concerns citizenship as a source of capital that impacts the return experience. The second argument concerns upward mobility and dual citizenship as a class marker within Ghanaian society. The third argument concerns the politics of dual citizenship in Ghana and the implications of my findings.

Dual Citizenship, Capital, and the Return Experience

My first claim is that dual citizenship is a form of social, economic, and cultural capital. Most participants, no matter whether they returned as dual citizen or with only Ghanaian citizenship, saw dual citizenship in a way that can best be described in terms of Bourdieusian capital. Northern citizenship—in combination with Ghanaian citizenship—was a form of economic capital that boosted people's position on the Ghanaian job market and strengthened entrepreneurial business competitiveness. At the same time, it also worked as a social capital that played out in various situations: be it through an invitation to a reception at the British embassy, or through the privilege of not having to rely on the overburdened Ghanaian health care system, the social benefits of dual citizenship inevitably set dual citizens apart from

"ordinary" Ghanaians. Dual citizenship also constituted a form of cultural capital in three different ways: it facilitated access to international educational titles, it facilitated access to consumer goods that were otherwise hard to get in Ghana, and a foreign passport itself was also seen as a form of educational title in itself which signalled knowledge of the Global North. Returnees with dual citizenship could therefore continue to lead a lifestyle in Ghana similar to that they had abroad.

These findings have implications for the study of return migration. This is because they show how dual citizenship has a role to play in understanding the dynamics of the so-called migration-development nexus. In policy discourses, return migrants are often celebrated as development agents who "bring back economic capital, knowledge and skills as well as social connections, values and attitudes gained in a 'developed North'" (Åkesson and Baaz 2015b, 3). This celebratory story is, however, often far from the reality of return. As an increasing body of literature shows, even highly skilled voluntary returnees often do not succeed in transforming their migration background into successful and durable professional careers after return. (Black and Castaldo 2009; Kleist 2015; Setrana 2017; see beyond the Ghanaian case: Åkesson and Baaz 2015b; Sinatti 2019, 2015). Although research on return migration has shown that capital and transnational ties are important for a successful reintegration after return, it has not looked at what role dual citizenship may play. As I show in this thesis, dual citizenship is a source of capital, even after return to the Global South. Dual citizenship, moreover, puts return migrants' access to the Global North on the most secure possible footing. It makes it easier to maintain transnational ties and thereby makes a successful return experience more likely.

Dual Citizenship, Upward Mobility, and Class

My second claim is that the possession of dual citizenship is a source of upward mobility and a class marker within Ghanaian society. Most participants saw in dual citizenship a form of capital that was beneficial for life. For these people, dual citizenship seems to help with upward mobility after return. Eight participants, however, stood out, both for their family background and their views on dual citizenship: they were relatives and/or descendants of highly influential Ghanaian political figures such as independence fighters, ministers, or presidents. This small group of elite returnees did not share the view of citizenship as capital. None of them actively sought dual citizenship; some of them had inherited their parents' dual citizenship while others had had the option to become a dual citizen but decided against it. They were all strikingly unaware, uninterested, or dismissive of the value that Northern citizenship had for the other participants. I show that there are three reasons for their points of view which all are connected to their elite status within Ghanaian society. The fact that those at the very top of the Ghanaian social ladder did not much value dual citizenship, while "normal" Ghanaians saw it as a form of capital, suggests that dual citizenship is a means of upward mobility after return, however limited.

Elite returnees did not only have no need for dual citizenship as a tool of upward mobility. There was also a sense of distinction from those who relied on dual citizenship to improve their socio-economic standing after return; with one elite returnee even calling upwardly mobile dual citizens "nouveaux-riches". At the same time, upwardly mobile non-elite returnees with dual citizenship also expressed a

sense of distinction from Ghanaians who did not have a Northern passport. This suggests that in Ghanaian society, dual citizenship is not only a form of capital but also fulfils the requirements of a class marker in Bourdieu's sense. Returning with dual citizenship can help with upward mobility into what one could call the upper middle class or professional class. But this social mobility seems limited as the elite of the country does not see the same relevance in dual citizenship. This elite, similar to aristocracies in other countries, defines itself through family names and history, and dual citizenship does not help the upwardly mobile to penetrate it.

These findings have implications for the study of the interlinkages between citizenship and global inequality. So far, citizenship studies have mainly focussed on the benefits that naturalisation has for life in the Global North. As a consequence, citizenship has sometimes been discussed as a new sorting mechanism that replaces class as a marker of social standing. Since between-country inequalities are today much wider than within-country inequalities, the argument goes that class—the social sorting mechanism within countries—loses its importance (Faist 2018; Harpaz 2019). My findings point in a different direction. They suggest that citizenship is not replacing class as a social delineator. At least in the Ghanaian case, where returning with dual citizenship can be used for upward mobility and to signal upper middle-class status, citizenship is incorporated into class structures.

Politics of (Dual) Citizenship in Ghana

My third claim is that the political climate that allowed dual citizenship to become so beneficial to everyday life in Ghana is driven by an orientation towards liberal democracy and a sustained diaspora-friendly political attitude since the 1990s. These findings nuance debates about drivers of dual citizenship policies. They show

that in the Ghanaian case, dual citizenship was introduced as a way of overcoming previous restrictive practices of denationalisation and embracing a more liberal policy towards citizenship. Economic calculations also played a role in the adoption of dual citizenship. The economic aim of policymakers was not just to attract remittances but also to encourage return migration, which they hoped would benefit the economy.

Moreover, I show that the findings from the interviews fit well with the picture we gain from the political-historical analysis: members of parliament discussed Northern citizenship in economic terms, and hoped, among other things, that granting dual citizenship would lead to return migration. While members of the Ghanaian parliament in the 1990s hoped that dual citizenship would work in these ways, the findings from my interviews show that return migrants indeed thought that dual citizenship helped with successful economic reintegration in Ghana.

Against the backdrop of recent political history, the Ghanaian case does not look much like an outlier. Ghana transitioned into liberal democracy in the 1990s and introduced dual citizenship in the process, as did many other countries of the Global South. It did that primarily out of broadly liberal considerations, and in order to forge closer links with its diaspora, two reasons that have also been emphasised for other countries in the literature on dual citizenship. It is sensible to assume that in countries with similar trajectories, similar stances on return migration, and similarly unanimous consent on diaspora engagement, dual citizenship could assume the role it appears to have assumed in Ghana.

The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two introduces my case country, Ghana, and maps the research gap that this thesis addresses. It situates my research question within a nexus of citizenship acquisition, return migration, and capital in migration. It engages particularly, but not exclusively, with literature on Ghana. The main argument of this chapter is that research on citizenship and research on return migration have barely interacted. By bringing these two strands of research together, I show that we have grounds to assume that dual citizenship brings vast benefits for returnees.

Chapter three lays out my methodological approach and research methods. Firstly, it makes the case for a Bourdieusian lens. It reviews and summarises Bourdieu's notions of class and capital and argues that Bourdieu provides useful tools for an analysis that pays attention to the socioeconomic dimension of citizenship. It does so in comparison to a theoretical framework often used in citizenship and migration studies, namely transnationalism, and explains why I decided against the latter. Secondly, the chapter explains the interview methods I chose to find out about the social dimension of citizenship after return and gives an overview of the interviewees. Here I explain why I decided against comparing dual citizen returnees with Ghanaian returnees without second citizenship and instead chose to compare those returnees who saw benefits in dual citizenship with those who did not see benefit in dual citizenship for life after return. In a third step, the chapter explains why I also decided to find out about the political dimension of citizenship and return migration. It gives an overview of the archival material that I collected to sketch out a history of citizenship in Ghana and how I use that historical background to evaluate the findings from the interviews.

At the heart of this thesis are three empirical chapters. The first two concern the social dimension of citizenship and return (chapters four and five). These two chapters build on the interview material. Chapter four engages with the views held by those returnees who saw dual citizenship as an asset that had benefits for their everyday life after return. These include returnees with and without dual citizenship. The chapter is organised along Bourdieu's three forms of capital. The chapter shows how returnees' views on the benefits of dual citizenship in Ghana fits Bourdieu's definition of social capital, and then shows how these views also fit Bourdieu definition of economic capital and cultural capital. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how dual citizenship is a means of upward mobility within Ghanaian society and comes with practices of distinction.

Chapter five engages with the views held by those who did not see dual citizenship as beneficial for life in Ghana (and again, among them were both people who returned as dual citizens and those who did not). The chapter starts by giving some background information on the special socio-economic status held by all interviewees in this group. All participants in this group belonged to what I call the Ghanaian elite: they were all members of politically well-connected families which had produced highly influential figures of Ghanaian politics, such as independence fighters, presidents, or ministers. The chapter is then organised according to the reasons that this group of returnees gave for their view: first, the respect and power they drew from their family names and networks, second, the sense of political agency and civic duty they drew from knowing about their famous ancestors and relatives, and third, their social status at the very top of Ghanaian society. The chapter underlines that dual citizenship is indeed a means of upward mobility, but that there is a limit

to the mobility that one can gain from dual citizenship. It shows that the elite needs no further mobility because they are already at the very top of the social ladder and that its members also distinguish themselves from those who make use of their dual citizenship for upward mobility. It concludes that dual citizenship is a class marker in Ghanaian society: it facilitates an upper-middle class life after return but does not make people part of the elite of the country.

Chapter six is the third empirical chapter, and it addresses the political dimension of citizenship and return. It builds on the archival material and reconstructs the political history of citizenship in Ghana. It shows that Ghana's dual citizenship amendment was driven by (1) democratisation and a wish to rectify Ghana's history of denationalisation and (2) return migration and remittances. The non-Ghanaian Northern citizenship was unanimously discussed in instrumental terms, similarly to the way it is framed by returnees themselves. The chapter is organised chronologically: a first section analyses Ghana's citizenship legislation prior to democratisation. A second section analyses the two key parliamentary debates that led to the introduction of dual citizenship in the 1990s. A third section discusses how dual citizenship is seen today, particularly in light of the upcoming presidential elections. The chapter advances our knowledge of the drivers of dual citizenship legislation and at the same time contextualises the findings from chapter four and five. Chapter seven concludes the thesis: it summarises the arguments made and discusses their implications for the study of return migration, of citizenship-based inequalities, and of dual citizenship legislation.

Citizenship matters because it is a marker of global inequality. Over the course of this thesis and with the steps just explained, I will examine how dual citizenship matters for life after return migration to the Global South.

2. Ghana in a Globalised World

My research interest can be visualised by a Venn diagram consisting of three overlapping areas: citizenship (in the form of acquired second citizenship from the Global North), return migration (back to the Global South) and attention how this citizenship can become capital (in Bourdieu's sense) in the case of return migration (figure 1). My research question sits at the heart of this Venn diagram where all three areas overlap.

Figure 1. Research Question: Citizenship, return migration, and capital



This chapter examines current research in citizenship studies and return migration studies, mostly in relation to the case country of Ghana. I show that the return migration literature has studied the role of capital in the return experience (the blue-green area in the Venn diagram) but not the role that citizenship might play for the return experience (the blue-yellow area in the Venn diagram). An apparent puzzle in the overlapping areas of return migration and capital—namely difficulties with economic success even of planned voluntary return migration—may be illuminated by adding the citizenship status of returnees as a third research dimension. This

chapter also shows that while the citizenship literature, in turn, has studied the role of citizenship in migrants' socio-economic position (broadly speaking, we can situate this research in the yellow-green area of the Venn diagram), it has not engaged much with the return migration literature. This means the blue-yellow area has barely been studied, neither in migration studies nor in citizenship studies. My research brings together the two research areas of return migration and citizenship and builds on their insights regarding the importance of capital in each domain. Studying the space where these three areas of citizenship, return migration, and capital overlap can teach us about the ways in which global inequalities play out in societies of the Global South.

I will make this argument in four steps: In the first section, I give an overview of Ghanaian migration patterns and show that voluntary return migration to Ghana seems to be fairly common. In a second step, I review the return migration literature on Ghana and other countries of return, which shows that lack of access to capital is a main reason for unsuccessful voluntary return. In a third step, I demonstrate that, so far, very little research has been undertaken at the intersection of citizenship and return migration studies. And finally, I argue that research into the socio-economic importance of citizenship gives grounds to hypothesise that naturalisation in the Global North may also impact return experiences.

2.1 Ghanaian Migration Patterns

In order to understand the case of Ghanaian return migration, a brief summary of Ghanaian migration patterns is helpful. In 1957, Ghana was the first sub-Saharan

African country to become independent from colonial rule, and in the subsequent years, Ghana attracted immigrants from both West African neighbours and from the US. Ghana's first Prime Minster and President, Kwameh Nkrumah, was himself a returnee who had lived in the US for ten years, where he studied and taught at the historically Black Lincoln University and came in close contact with the civil rights movement (Davidson 1973). Ghanaian emigration was low during that time and consisted mainly of students and professionals leaving for the UK and other English-speaking countries. With the political unrest of the 1970s and the 1980s economic crisis, Ghanaian emigration increased drastically. Since the political consolidation of the early 1990s and economic growth particularly following the discovery of oil along the Ghanaian coast, economic and political reasons for migration have decreased while education has again gained in importance as a main driver for emigration (Akyeampong 2000; Schans et al. 2018; Wong 2014).[8]

When thinking of return migration to the Global South, what usually comes to mind is forced return. This is because deportation is particularly topical in Europe and the US. Current sociological and anthropological research has largely been interested in the return experience of deported Ghanaians, using these findings to critique Northern, particularly EU, migration policies. This research generally shows how empty-handed and unplanned return is stigmatised as a failure and comes with great shame for returnees. Forcefully returned Ghanaians often struggle to reintegrate into the job market and society at large and, as a result, have a high propensity

[8] This means that recent second-generation return migrants are children of those emigrants who migrated for economic and political reasons during Ghana's crisis years, whereas first-generation returnees migrated for educational purposes since Ghana's upswing (see for discussion of first- and second-generation returnees: chapter three).

to remigrate irregularly (see for example: Akyeampong 2000; Awumbila et al. 2019; Kandilige and Adiku 2020; Kandilige, Yeboah, and Abutima 2022; Kleist 2017, 2020; E.A. Mensah 2016).

While there is a clear need to shed light on practices and consequences of forced return, a discourse that focuses too much on involuntary return to the Global South risks overlooking other, planned, and voluntary return migration to the Global South as well. What perhaps is also implicit in this focus on forced return is the belief that once a secure status in the Global North has been attained, there would be no reason to return; studying voluntary return migration to the Global South thus just does not come to mind. Indeed, during my preparations for fieldwork a common concern I heard from interlocutors was that I might not easily find any dual-citizen returnees in Ghana. Would I really be able to find enough people who acquired citizenship, the most secure status from the Global North, and then return again?

Attempts at Measuring Voluntary Return Migration to Ghana

I did not have much difficulty finding such people (see chapter three for more information on sampling). It was, however, harder to gauge the full extent of voluntary return movement to Ghana as representative statistical data on return migration is scarce and in the case of Ghana non-existent; countries of the Global South often lack well-funded statistics offices, while countries of the Global North tend to observe immigration not emigration (Black and Castaldo 2009). Unlike other statistics offices, the UK's Office for National Statistics does collect data on emigration from the UK by country of next residence, but it does not differentiate between voluntary and

involuntary return, nor does it indicate which citizenship emigrants have. Moreover, it puts all destination countries of sub-Saharan Africa into one category so that it remains unclear to which countries on the continent people return (Office of National Office for National Statistics 2020). This makes the ONS emigration statistic by country of next residence very limited as a source of data on return migration to Ghana. Without a clear sample frame of the total returnee population, conducting a representative survey moreover becomes a near-impossible task outside of a few well-documented repatriation schemes (Beauchemin 2018; Black and Castaldo 2009).

Although not representative either, the largest and most insightful survey data on return migration to Ghana is offered by the MAFE (Migration between Africa and Europe) project. This project ran from 2005 to 2012, conducted multi-sited, comparative, longitudinal surveys on migration pattern between three African countries (DRC, Ghana, Senegal) and six European countries (France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, UK, Netherlands) and included return migration, circulation, and transnational practices. The survey compares migration patterns between Ghana and the UK and between Ghana and the Netherlands (Beauchemin 2018). Citizenship status after return, however, was not recorded by the study. This study shows that Ghana's pattern of return migration differs from the Congolese and Senegalese. Ghana is the only country in the survey where voluntary return migration had increased, with the highly educated being most likely to return. Moreover, with the UK attracting more highly educated Ghanaians migrating for work or studies, return from the UK is more likely than return from the Netherlands which attracts more low-skilled Ghanaian migrants and where it is more difficult to find work commensurate with

one's educational status (so-called "brain loss") due to language barriers. Ghana is also the only country in the survey where voluntary returnees can expect successful economic reintegration. The survey interprets these findings as an indication that Ghana's political and economic stability encourages return (Schans et al. 2018).

The survey's findings also match the results of Marie-Laurence Flahaux's survey on intention and realisation of return to Senegal and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Flahaux 2015). Flahaux finds that at the time of arrival in Europe, over 40 percent of Senegalese and nearly 50 percent of Congolese migrants in Europe intended to return (Flahaux 2015, 109). The intention to return depends not only the migrants' reason for leaving—people migrating for work, education, and improvement of living conditions have higher rates of return intention than those migrating for political reasons or family reasons—but also on the economic and political situation in the country of origin. Flahaux showed that the intention rate fluctuated depending on the situation in the country of origin at the point of migration (Flahaux 2015, 109-110). For the case of Ghana, this implies that people who emigrated since the mid-1990s are more likely to return than people who emigrated during the economically dire years of military rule of the 1980s.

Expressing an intention to return, however, is not the same as doing so. Nevertheless, Flahaux finds that the initial intention to return is a "strong determinant of actual return" (Flahaux 2015, 103), despite some people cancelling or delaying the return because of restrictive immigration regulations in the countries of destination or deterioration of the situation in the country of origin (Flahaux 2015, 103). Considering Ghana's economic strength and political stability, Flahaux's findings indirectly confirm those of the Migration Between Africa and Europe project that

political and economic stability in Ghana is a major pull factor for return migration. Such a stable situation, argues Wong, has now existed for roughly twenty years: "Increased political and economic stability associated with the election of President John Kufour in 2000—whose administration included many skilled return migrants and which people perceived as more open to business—made the option of investments and return more attractive to emigrants." (Wong 2014, 442). Citizenship status at return, however, was not captured by any of these studies.

While the argument is compelling that the economic and political situation in the country of origin have an effect on migrants' return decisions, there might be more to the story. Citizenship, certainly, is likely to be a confounding variable. Research on migration patterns of refugees who naturalised in the Netherlands suggests that acquiring citizenship increases the likelihood of subsequent migration, both onward migration and return migration (Hoon, Vink, and Schmeets 2020). With the US and the UK being the main destinations of Ghanaian migration (Anarfi et al. 2003), as well as being two countries with relatively easy naturalisation processes, it seems likely that Ghanaian-US and Ghanaian-British dual citizens would frequently choose to return.

Reasons for Voluntary Return to Ghana

In addition to quantitative attempts to measure voluntary return movements in Ghana, there are a number of qualitative studies on the voluntary return of Ghanaians. These focus more on the reasons for return. As we have seen, education is one of the main drivers of Ghanaian emigration. It therefore does not come as a surprise

that most voluntary return movement is of skilled people. Indeed, most work on drivers of voluntary return to Ghana accordingly deals with highly skilled returnees who move back in their "prime productive years" (Wong 2014, 439).

They return for all kinds of intersecting reasons. These include personal reasons like being closer to family and friends, to marry, or to care for elderly relatives. They also move back for professional reasons: for concrete or anticipated job opportunities, in the hope of giving back and contributing to the development of Ghana, or to assume leadership positions in the Ghanaian chieftaincy system.[9] Xenophobia and racism which inhibit integration abroad are another reason that features in the literature, however, pull-factors, rather than push-factors nevertheless seem to dominate the decision to return (Adzei and Sakyi 2014; Ammassari 2004; Asiedu 2010; Kleist 2011; E. Kyeremeh 2020; J. Mensah and Owusu Ansah 2022; Wong 2014). In short, a whole spectrum of life-course events, aspirations, and disappointments feed into the decision-making of voluntary returnees.

2.2 Return Migration with Capital: Migration-Development Nexus?

A third question explored in scholarship on Ghanaian return migration concerns the return experience. While the extent of and reasons for Ghanaian voluntary return movements are important background information that give context to this study, return experience directly speaks to my research question on the impact of dual

[9] The Ghanaian political system provides for monarchical elements in form of "chieftaincy" with largely ceremonial roles (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992).

citizenship on life after return. This literature demonstrates the importance of capital and transnational networks for successful reintegration into the Ghanaian labour market and entrepreneurial world. In Bourdieu's terms, we could call this a form of economic and social capital. The literature on Ghanaian voluntary returnees, however, pose a puzzle related to one of the most-debated questions in migration studies: the nature of the so-called migration-development nexus. Taking into account people's citizenship status (Ghanaian citizens, or dual Ghanaian-Northern citizens), I argue, helps to shed light on that puzzle.

Return Experiences: The Importance of Money

Unplanned, forced return often means that returnees have to face the disappointment of their families who might have invested their savings into sending their relative abroad in the first place and may have relied on remittances or expected the returnee to bring back consumer goods that are otherwise not available/overpriced in Ghana. Therefore, forced, empty-handed return is often stigmatised as shameful in the home society, while voluntary return is more likely to bring prestige, social standing, and upward mobility (Kleist 2011, 2017; E. Kyeremeh 2020; Mazzucato 2008; Nieswand 2014). This is because voluntary returnees not only can plan their return and bring back the kind of consumer goods that are expected of them, but they also have the freedom to move back once they have saved up enough capital to invest after return, into a business, a house, or into status symbols to signal upward mobility, such as cars (Nieswand 2014).

One group of voluntary returnees in particular has been studied for their post-return investment behaviour: the so-called *Burgers*. The name derives from the city

of Hamburg, which in the late-seventies and eighties was a major destination for low-skilled Ghanaian immigrants (Nieswand 2014). Around the early 2000s, *Burger* became a Ghanaian vernacular name for returnees of low education and low social background who had spent some time working low-paid jobs in the Global North and claimed social mobility into the Ghanaian middle class through conspicuous consumption upon return (Martin 2005; Nieswand 2014).

We may expect that the ability to bring back material evidence of having been abroad is less important the more comfortable the economic situation of the returnee prior to emigration. Nevertheless, the pressure to come back wealthier than before emigration, and to also let friends and family participate in your wealth, is an aspect of the return experience that many studies highlight, not only for the Ghanaian context and not only for migrants with low socio-economic background (see for example: Nieswand 2014; Setrana and Tonah 2014). Failure to acquire enough money to be able to do so can also hamper people's desire to return in the first place (de Haas, Fokkema, and Fihri 2015; González-Ferrer et al. 2014).

Although capital has been shown to be important for migrants' return experiences, few studies have examined return migration from a class perspective (a notable exception is Altan-Olcay and Balta (2016)). This is in contrast to out-migration, which has been studied quite widely in terms of class, both with regard to labour market integration in the country of immigration (Boyd, Cohen, and Gutkind 1987; Castles and Kosack 1973) and as a determinant of emigrants' migration paths (Arthur 2014; Van Hear 2014a). For the Ghanaian case, however, John A. Arthur's *Class Formations and Inequality Structures in Contemporary African Migration* encourages future research into return migration and class and predicts:

"Class and inequality relationships formed prior to migration abroad, fine-tuned transnationally within global migration circuits, and then relived or replayed back home in Africa will provide a fertile area of research […] for a long time to come" (Arthur 2014, 4). I will discuss in chapter three how my analytical lens allows to draw connections between the role of capital for the return experience and social class.

Return Experience: The Importance of Transnational Ties

Linked with this pressure to produce relative wealth upon return is the usefulness of transnational ties. Studies of transnationalism underscore that keeping links to the host country helps returnees better their position in the home country after return. Being able to invest capital at the moment of returning surely is a good first step into entrepreneurship, but that does not secure the establishment of the business. Being able to leverage networks in the host country after return, however, increases people's entrepreneurial success (Ammassari and Black 2001; Mazzucato 2008; J. Mensah, Teye, and Setrana 2022; Setrana and Tonah 2016). Being able to keep commercial ties is important both for unskilled and skilled returnees and crucial particularly for import businesses (Setrana and Tonah 2016; Wong 2014). The importance of such ties is increased by poor prospects on the Ghanaian labour market which pushes people into self-employment, as J. Mensah, Teye, and Setrana (2022) astutely point out:

> "Keenly aware of the acute dearth of job opportunities that 'pushed' them out of their homeland in the first place, many returnees enter into self-employment, relying on their resources and networks at both ends of the migration cycle. Perhaps nothing puts returnees to the path of transnational connectivity more than the need

> to make a sustainable living at home upon their return." (J. Mensah, Teye, and Setrana 2022, 253).

Not only self-employed returnees but also employed professionals such as doctors, lecturers and engineers have been reported using transnational networks gained while living abroad to circle back and forth and spend their summer breaks or sabbaticals abroad gaining extra money in hard currencies (Setrana and Tonah 2016). It is well established that such transnational ties improve the economic situation of return migrants, but there is a lack of research on how return migrants build and sustain these networks over time. Again, this point is aptly captured by J. Mensah, Teye, and Setrana, who write that "only few studies have examined how return migrants create and sustain transnational connectivity with their countries of destination upon their return to the homeland, and fewer still have analyzed how these dynamics play out in the context of West African migrants" (J. Mensah, Teye, and Setrana 2022, 237).

Moreover, most voluntary return to Ghana seems to be permanent, not circular (Setrana and Tonah 2016). Considering that the main destination countries for Ghanaian migrants outside the African continent are the United States and the United Kingdom, circular migration between Ghana and the US/UK is difficult due to geography alone. It requires expensive flights to overcome entire seas, a geographical hurdle that migration between the US and Mexico, to give just one example, does not face. This raises the question, how lasting the effect of the returnees' transnational ties really is over time, if most people return permanently, and how those who manage to keep their ties over distance and over time do so.

Directly or indirectly, studies on returnees' transnational monetary and social capital after return speak to a central debate in migration studies, namely the debate on the nexus between migration and development. Indeed, it is difficult to discuss one question without the other as both have often been treated in conjunction, as Turner and Kleist (2013) argue. The connections between 'development' and 'migration' are as manifold as both terms are broad. For decades, they have been interpreted and proclaimed in various ways by researchers and policymakers, depending on their political stance and the overall zeitgeist (de Haas 2010, 2012; Godin et al. 2022). When it comes to return migration, one common interpretation of the nexus with development broadly posits that (voluntary) returnees have a positive impact on their home society because of the many assets they supposedly bring back home: money, networks, knowledge, and skills. Enriched with different material and immaterial goods from the Global North, the argument goes, returnees could reverse the "brain drain", strengthen the economy of the home country, and also bring back democratisation to the undemocratic Global South (Åkesson and Baaz 2015b).

This interpretation of the return migration-development nexus has gained popularity in policy circles since the 2010s (Åkesson and Baaz 2015b; de Haas 2010, 2012). For instance, we can find appraisals of returnees as agents of development in the EU's 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (European Commission 2011, 9-10). The UN's Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (2018), to give a second example, makes similarly formulated claims that return migration is inherently good for the socioeconomic development of countries of origin:

> "We commit to facilitate […] the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants into community life […] in order to fully build upon their entrepreneurship, skills and human capital as active members of society and contributors to sustainable development in the country of origin upon return." (UN 2018, 29–30)

The narrative of returnees as development agents has been widely criticised on a conceptual level on a number of grounds: as justification for European migration-hostile politics (Sinatti and Horst 2015); for its underlying colonial idea that the quintessence of the Global South is lack and deficiency (McEwan 2019); for its neoliberal understanding of development (Turner and Kleist 2013); for its assumption all returnees automatically "nurtured a desire to contribute to their country of origin" (Åkesson and Baaz 2015b, 8-9); and for the gross underestimation of strucutral constraints on returnees' ability to transfer their skills and capital to the country of origin (de Haas 2010).

On a less conceptual and more empirical level, studies on how voluntary returnees fare economically after their return paint a mixed picture. As we have seen, Ghanaians who migrated for education and job opportunities are most likely to return to Ghana. Ghanaian returnees thus come back with acquired 'knowledge and skills' in the language of policymakers. Voluntary returnees do bring back savings that they invest into businesses and/or consumption after return. They also try to leverage their contacts in the Global North to strengthen their economic position after return, as shown earlier. Nevertheless, a growing body of research shows that savings and transnational ties do not necessarily facilitate successful reintegration into the economy after return. Some Ghanaian voluntary returnees succeed economically after return but some struggle financially, despite their planning and their savings—irrespective of their skills level: "Unsuccessful reintegration is not only

limited to refugees or involuntary returnees but also found among voluntary and skilled returnees" (Setrana 2017, 27).

The struggles of everyday life in Ghana that returnees report are typically of a social and economic nature. Several studies attest that returnees struggled at work because their Ghanaian co-workers were hostile and treated them badly out of an assumption the returnee would feel superior to them (Adzei and Sakyi 2014; Ammassari 2004; Setrana and Tonah 2014). There is also evidence of "brain loss" after return with returnees being unable to find employment that matches their skill-level on the tense Ghanaian labour market (Setrana and Tonah 2016). Self-employed returnees also face difficulties after return which can inhibit their economic stability. A common theme of entrepreneurial returnees is the risks involved in relying on business partners on a long-distance basis: without the ability to monitor the work of business partners, one has very few tools at hand to prevent mismanagement and fraud (E. Kyeremeh 2020). Transnational businesses thus require an enormous amount of trust on all sides—or the owner's ability to circulate back and forth regularly to make sure that business partners neither cheat them nor back out for fear of being cheated. Slow bureaucracy in both Ghanaian banking and public institutions (Black and Castaldo 2009) as well as lack of access to finance and appropriate technological equipment (Kleist 2015; Adom, Abdul-Rahaman, and Duah-Agyemang 2018) are other problems entrepreneurs in Ghana face.

2.3 The Missing Piece: Citizenship at Return

Strikingly, none of the studies I could find on return experiences looked systematically at returnees' citizenship.[10] Åkesson and Baaz mention in passing that dual citizenship is a prerequisite for circular return movements to the African continent (Åkesson and Baaz 2015b), and Black and Castaldo mention that returnees' businesses are most likely to survive in returnees circulate between their country of origin and country of emigration (Black and Castaldo 2009). Adom et al. mention that some of their respondents had acquired a second Northern citizenship (Adom, Abdul-Rahaman, and Duah-Agyemang 2018). However, none of the studies consider the impact that returnees' citizenship may have on their socioeconomic success after return.

This is surprising. After all, acquiring dual citizenship is the most secure and most comfortable guarantor of circular return, which both Åkesson and Baaz as well as Black and Castaldo recognised positively affects returnees' economic life in the home country. Dual citizenship has also been seen as the pinnacle of transnationalism: Bauböck's famously defined transnationalism as "overlapping boundaries of membership" (Bauböck 2003, 703) and citizenship as its legal expression. If the need to maintain transnational ties is crucial for the return experience—as seems clear from the literature—it seems odd that the acquisition of dual citizenship has not featured prominently in studies on return migration. My thesis addresses this gap. The seemingly puzzling situation that 'unsuccessful reintegration' is not

[10] See for similar accounts beyond the Ghanaian case also the edited volume by Åkesson and Baaz (2015a) and the work by Diatta and Mbow (1999) and Sinatti (2015); (2019).

necessary avoided by planned, voluntary return with capital, skills, and networks, I argue, can be better understood if we pay attention to returnees' citizenship.

Bringing Together Two Fields of Research

To gauge the extent of the gap between research on dual citizenship and return migration, it is insightful to compare the recent major handbooks in the two fields. The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Shachar, Bauböck, Bloemraad and Vink 2017) strives to "synthesize the key debates and questions" and point out "silences or missing questions" in citizenship studies (Shachar et al. 2017a, 5), as does the Handbook of Return Migration (King and Kuschminder 2022), which has set out to "map the general field of return migration" (King and Kuschminder 2022b, 1). Reviewing the instances where each handbook discusses the other field gives us an impression of the ways in which dual citizenship and return migration have been understood and discussed in conjunction, so far. They indicate a surprising unawareness of each other's fields.

The *Handbook of Return Migration* addresses dual citizenship in just seven instances scattered across four book chapters. Four instances stem from a chapter on reintegration strategies (Kuschminder 2022). Here, the citizenship of the country of *return*—so Ghana in the case of my study—is deemed the important citizenship for a dual citizen's reintegration into the country of origin. Being "able to acquire certain rights in the country of return" through citizenship (Kuschminder 2022, 202) is discussed as a key strategy for return. Northern citizenship, on the other hand, is only portrayed as a limitation to returnees' rights, should the country of origin not allow for dual citizenship and should the returnee prefer to keep the acquired Northern

citizenship instead of the first citizenship (ibid.). The underlying assumption thus seems to be that citizenship from abroad ceases to affect migrants' life upon return.[11] Access to the labour market of the country of return, Kuschminder posits, should be unaffected by the citizenship question and depend on returnees' skills and adaptability only: "In terms of access to the labour market, the reintegrated returnees should have strong access due to their skills and adaptability" (ibid.).

Three other chapters each briefly mention with one sentence that dual citizenship can foster transnationalism after return (Bilgili 2022; Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2022; Bolzman 2022). They do, however, not discuss if and how that might have far-reaching importance for returnees. To have dual citizenship or not to have dual citizenship is not a defining issue in their accounts. Crucially, the handbook chapters exploring return migrants' socioeconomic reintegration—"Exploring the Return Migration and Development Nexus" (King 2022) and "Return Migration, Entrepreneurship and Development" (Sinatti 2022)—do not mention citizenship in any way although, as we had seen earlier, some literature on return migrants' transnationalism suggests that dual citizenship might be important for life after return because it facilitates transnationalism. My research bridges the gap between research into return migration and into dual citizenship. Through the empirical work presented in this thesis, my research scrutinises the view seemingly held in return

[11] Unprecise and blurry language when it comes to citizenship also suggests that the topic of citizenship was not particularly high on the list of either the author or the editors of the Handbook of Return Migration. For example, Kuschminder writes: "For instance, if the country allows dual citizenship, then the return migrant will have the same rights as citizens" (Kuschminder 2022, 202). It is unclear from the context, which country she means. Dual citizens also do not just have "the same rights as citizens" they *are* citizens.

migration studies that an acquired second citizenship is of little to no importance once returnees settle back into their country of origin.

The *Oxford Handbook of Citizenship Studies* (Shachar et al. 2017b) mentions "return migration" eight times. The chapter that mentions it most frequently (four times) discusses the economic costs and benefits of citizenship acquisition in both the country of origin and of destination (DeVoretz and Irastorza 2017). Not all four instances in this chapter, however, pertain to dual citizenship and return. It thus also only briefly touches on the issue. DeVoretz and Irastorza only indirectly discuss they potential benefits of return migration with dual citizenship by evaluating the impact of naturalisation on the country of emigration. The authors portray return migration of dual citizens as a potential burden for countries of naturalisation, as returnees do not pay income taxes in the country of naturalisation but nevertheless can claim allowances for their retirement:

> "Substantial return migration to the sending country immediately after citizenship ascension implies potentially substantial postretirement liabilities to the host country. This outcome arises if naturalized citizens leave their host country soon after citizenship ascension then proceed to work outside the host country for their labour market years and are not subject to host country income taxes and then return to the host country upon retirement." (DeVoretz and Irastorza 2017, 214–215)

This argument contains the embedded assumption that the migrant will be in a position to use dual citizenship to take advantage of more generous provision in the host country. However, the scenario that DeVoretz and Irastorza sketch out does not take into account the literature on return migration. Indeed, a vast body of work in this area shows that retirees prefer to migrate the other way around: from the country of emigration back to the country of origin. Because migrants in the Global North often only find low-paid labour, many migrants do not earn enough to live a decent

life from their pension and return to retire in the country of origin where living costs are lower (see for example: Bolzman 2022; Duci, Dhembo, and Vathi 2019; Klinthäll 2006; Nieswand 2014). DeVoretz and Irastorza's scenario that migrants naturalise abroad, return to work in their country of origin, and then remigrate back to their country of naturalisation for retirement, seems rather implausible. None of my participants discussed their pension payments. Nevertheless, my study can help evaluate whether access to pensions of the country of second citizenship really is a determining feature of dual citizenship for return migrants in the Ghanaian context.

Return migration in the Citizenship Handbook is otherwise discussed to highlight that "the comparative citizenship literature has largely overlooked the mobility effects of naturalization" (Vink 2017, 238). As Vink points out, we therefore do not know enough about how citizenship regimes affect migrants' mobility decisions. With this thesis, I aim to contribute to that question by studying the value of dual citizenship for the return experience back to Ghana. The thesis strives to bring both fields of research—return migration and dual citizenship—into conversation.

Two notable exceptions to the disconnect between citizenship studies and return migration studies are Leblang (2017) and Altan-Olcay and Balta (2020), though neither of these studies focusses on Ghana. Through migrant survey and panel data, Leblang investigates whether dual citizenship encourages migrants to remit and/or return. He finds that migrants are 10 percent more likely to remit and 3 percent more likely to return if their country of origin offers the possibility of dual citizenship and concludes that dual citizenship should play an important role in diaspora engagement politics (Leblang 2017, 77). Altan-Olcay and Balta's book *The American Passport in Turkey* studies the meaning of US citizenship for US passport holders

living in Turkey. Among its participants are also returnees with dual citizenship. Yet the study equally looks at US citizens who emigrated to Turkey and Turkish mothers who travel to the US for the birth of their children so they would become US citizens. While the book treats each of these three groups separately, it does not find substantial differences between their views on the US passport, namely primarily as a status symbol and exit strategy. Although return migration is not at the heart of the book, Altan-Olcay and Balta's analysis confirms that dual citizenship has an impact on returnees' lives. I will come back to Altan-Olcay and Balta's book at various points over the course of this thesis.

Ghanaian Citizenship

Even though it does not engage with return migration, there is finally a small body of literature on Ghanaian citizenship which is relevant to this study. So far, this chapter has addressed (i) the topic of Ghanaian voluntary return migration, (ii) the apparent importance of economic and social capital for return experiences in Ghana, indications that dual citizenship might improve returnees' access to such capital, and (iii) the mutual unawareness of return migration studies and citizenship studies. I shall now also address the citizenship literature that focusses on the case of Ghana and how my research speaks to it.

In 1996, four years after transitioning towards democracy, Ghana set in motion the process to introduce dual citizenship. The constitution was amended to allow for dual citizenship in 1996 and three years later, in 1999–2000, the Citizenship Act was debated and passed to harmonise citizenship legislation with the

amended constitution. Many other states have had a similar trajectory to Ghana as the adoption of dual citizenship has increased since the 1990s, particularly in the Global South (Brøndsted Sejersen 2008; Whitaker 2011).

What are the drivers of dual citizenship adoption? This is an ongoing question in citizenship studies. In a seminal article, Whitaker (2011) finds that changes of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy correlate with the acceptance of dual citizenship in Africa. She argues that since under authoritarian rule citizenship does not guarantee political rights, diasporans start advocating for dual citizenship with democratisation. Ghana is one of the case countries where dual citizenship correlates with democratisation, and she uses it to underscore her argument that democratic political institutions, not remittances or emigration numbers, can account for a wave of dual citizenship legislation in African and other countries of the Global South since the 1990s: "debates about dual citizenship in Africa have been spurred on by the process of democratization. This is most obvious in the cases of Ghana and Kenya, where the 1990s shift toward multiparty politics prompted emigrants to lobby for political rights" (Whitaker 2011, 777). Though they do not engage with Whitaker's paper, Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar (2014) argue against that view, building on "a number of interviews and ad hoc conversations with senior politicians and policymakers in Accra" (Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2014, 131) seem to suggest that remittances and Pan-Africanist ideals are the driving force behind Ghana's dual citizenship reform.

Contrary to Whitaker's claim, Vink et al. (2019) also did not find that regime type can explain variation in dual citizenship regulations. Building on a data set that captured "expatriate dual citizenship regulation in nearly all independent states

since 1960" (Vink et al. 2019, 363), they argue that it is the proximity to countries which already introduced dual citizenship that puts pressure on states to do so as well. Moreover, introduction of dual citizenship correlates with other liberal diaspora politics and with receiving remittances: "[we] find that states are more likely to move to a tolerant policy if neighbouring states have done so and that they tend to do so in conjunction with extending voting rights to citizens residing abroad and receiving remittances from abroad" (Vink et al. 2019, 362). To my knowledge, no analysis of the actual parliamentary debate on introducing dual citizenship in Ghana has been done. In chapter six, I will do exactly this. As I will explain in more detail when I discuss my methodology, I collected material from the Ghanaian Hansard on the Ghanaian dual citizenship amendment. Additionally, I studied the rather turbulent Ghanaian citizenship legislation that led to the introduction of dual citizenship.

Apart from the debate over the drivers of dual citizenship legislation, a considerable body of literature on Ghanaian citizenship stems from democratisation and education studies. This body of work is interested in citizenship education and how such education can transform Ghanaians into model citizens who participate in the democratic political process (Angyagre and Quainoo 2019; Gebbels 2013; Howard et al. 2018; Quaynor et al. 2020; Quaynor 2018, 2015). These studies all examine Ghanaian citizenship through the lens of standard definitions of citizenship—a form of political membership that entails formal status, political and civic rights, and participation—to evaluate how democratic Ghana is. What they cannot do when using citizenship as a template, is find out about people's own understanding of their citizenship or about potential linkages between Ghanaian citizenship and inequalities.

2.4 Citizenship Matters

Over the course of this chapter, I have so far argued why we have grounds to assume that citizenship matters for return migrants in the Global South and why it is worth studying how and under what circumstances this may occur. There are, however, sceptical voices in citizenship and migration studies which might counter my approach by arguing that citizenship's importance is overstated and dwindling. Before concluding this chapter, I will engage with these arguments to show that, although their observations have merit, it would be too hasty to conclude that citizenship is unimportant. The design of my study, as presented in this chapter, as well as literature on the socio-economic effects of naturalisation, give us reason to believe that the ability to naturalise in the Global North matters to migrants.

Arguments against Citizenship's Importance

Does citizenship matter? This is a question raised by Irene Bloemraad in a book chapter of the Oxford Handbook of Citizenship (Bloemraad 2017), as well as in a separate article written with Alicia Sheares (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017). With that question, the authors point out that there is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the importance of citizenship for an immigrant's life experiences, picking up on a methodological problem of citizenship studies, also noted by Alex Street (2017). Too many studies, Street argues, concentrate on comparing those who acquire citizenship with those who do not, and thereby confound the factors that promote or facilitate naturalisation with the effects of citizenship status itself (Street 2017, 324). In other words, they risk taking the reasons for citizenship acquisition as a

proxy for the answer to why citizenship may be impactful for people's lives on the long run.

Research on the reasons for citizenship acquisition has been quite extensive and can be broadly classified into three types: a) frameworks attributing immigrants' propensity to acquire a new citizenship to individual characteristics (like age, marital status, education level, and years of residence); b) frameworks focussing on institutional structures in the country of origin (like socio-economic factors, political properties, or laws on dual citizenship), and c) frameworks emphasising the contexts of reception in the country of destination (like naturalisation laws, integration policies, and general attitudes towards immigration).

Studies on individual characteristics have reached several conclusions. They indicate that migrating at young age (Peters, Vink, and Schmeets 2016), being married to a naturalised immigrant (Helgertz and Bevelander 2017; Peters, Vink, and Schmeets 2016), speaking the language (Dronkers and Vink 2012), and planning to permanently settle in a country (Evans 1988; Aptekar 2015), are all factors that correlate with increased citizenship acquisition. Education, moreover, seems to be in a curvilinear relation to naturalisation with the most disadvantaged and the most highly educated being less likely to acquire citizenship than the well-educated (Aptekar 2014; Chiswick, Le, and Miller 2008).

Studies focusing on the country of origin point out that migrating from a less wealthy or less democratic country than the one of destination increases the propensity to acquire citizenship (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers 2013). They also show that migrants from countries that allow for dual citizenship are more likely to naturalise because acquisition of new citizenship does

not come at the cost of forfeiting one's first citizenship (Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Mazzolari 2009; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers 2013).

Finally, studies on the context of reception underscore that citizenship acquisition depends moreover on the overall societal environment in the country of destination. Relatively non-restrictive naturalisation regulations (Janoski 2010; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Peters, Vink, and Schmeets 2016), robust integration policies (Bloemraad 2006), positive attitudes towards immigration within the native population (Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Peters, Vink, and Schmeets 2016; Kahanec and Tosun 2009), and the concentration of naturalised co-ethnics all correlate with higher acquisition rates (Abascal 2017; Liang 1994; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012). So called "defensive naturalisation" occurs when migration-hostile policies or hostile social contexts push immigrants to secure their residency by obtaining citizenship. The extent of defensive naturalisation tends to rise in the direct aftermath of anti-immigration policies. In the long run, however, naturalisation rates fall with such policies (see for example: Aptekar 2015; Bloemraad and Sheares 2017).

Bloemraad and Shears as well as Street argue that it is not enough to simply identify the factors that correlate with citizenship acquisition. Indeed, listing such factors is not a sufficient explanation of why and how citizenship may matter to immigrants and how it impacts upon their lives on the long run. The question of how a certain status matters to its bearers has so far mainly been raised for other statuses other than citizenship. Indeed, much research has asked how precarious legal status, such as being undocumented or stateless, impacts peoples' lives (see for example: Villegas 2019; Chang 2018; Bernhard et al. 2007). For citizenship status, however, it is far less clear if and how being a citizen impacts immigrants' lives, when it is not

a matter of gaining a secure legal status. Bloemraad in 2017 therefore urged further research to "investigate not just whether citizenship matters, but for whom, in what contexts, and why" (Bloemraad 2017, 544).

Regarding the context in which citizenship may matter, Bloemraad and Sheares assume that acquiring citizenship has only very limited effects in non-democratic countries of the Global South with "weak governmental structures, limited resources and political indifference to rights" (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017, 824). That seems intuitive. However, there are well-known cases in the context of the Global South where being a citizen (or not) suddenly gained relevance for people's lives because governments had managed to denationalise parts of their population despite their rather "weak governmental structures". One example is the "ivoirité"-legislation that Ivory Coast introduced in the 1990s and which became one of the main factors in the build-up to the Ivorian civil war. The ivoirité-legislation involved a number of administrative policies and registration protocols that stripped certain Ivorian-born citizens and naturalised immigrants of their citizenship on the basis of an autochthony-argument that they were not "true" Ivorians (Babo 2017; Cheeseman, Bertrand, and Husaini 2019). A more recent example is the new citizenship registry in Assam, India, which is designed to denationalise Assam's Muslim population (Birnie and Bauböck 2020). Bloemraad and Sheares' assumption of the irrelevance of citizenship in the Global South is thus too general and at odds with Bloemraad's own call (in a separate, single-authored book chapter on the same topic) for a closer examination of the question "for whom, in what contexts, and why" citizenship matters. Bloemraad and Sheares do, however, acknowledge that

not enough research has been done on citizenship in the Global South and that their focus lies on citizenship in the Global North (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017).

A similar argument to Bloemraad and Sheares' argument that citizenship matters little in a country with weak governmental structures, has been made by Sadiq in his book *Paper Citizens*. Sadiq studies South-South migration and citizenship acquisition in India, Pakistan and Malaysia and points out two trends: while large parts of the poor population have no access to documentation and thus live a life of statelessness without ever migrating, irregular immigrants can bypass legal ways to citizenship with bribery and fraudulent papers. He calls this pathway to citizenship "documentary citizenship" (Sadiq 2008, 200). The result, Sadiq concludes, is that both the bounded nature of citizenship and the link between citizenship and national identity erode, and, moreover, that citizenship is devalued and ceases to be a privilege: "[I]nasmuch as documentary citizenship brings to bear no obligations or sense of duty and is disconnected from national identity, it does tend to devalue citizenship. The assumed privilege of citizenship no longer exists in the traditional sense." (Sadiq 2008, 198).

I would, however, interpret Sadiq's findings differently and disagree on the point that citizenship ceases to be a privilege in the countries of his study. Instead, to me his study suggests that there is a shift in the parameters of who can access the privilege of being a citizenship and who cannot: from identity and place of birth towards access to monetary and social resources: monetary resources in the form of bribery and social resources in the form of access to what Sadiq calls "networks of complicity" within the bureaucratic apparatus. Sadiq also seems to locate the value of citizenship in its civic obligations and territory-bound identity. It is because these

are undermined by instrumental, fraudulent acquisition of citizenship by irregular immigrants, Sadiq argues, that citizenship no longer has value and ceases to be a privilege. But it is not obvious that citizenship's value lies of all things in civic obligations, nor that a "devaluation of obligations and identity" undercuts the value and privileges of citizenship altogether. Clearly, the immigrants in his study who acquired documentary citizenship see value in it.

Bloemraad and Sheares are not only sceptical about the significance of citizenship for people of the Global South, but also for immigrants in the Global North. They argue that liberal democracies restrict very few rights and duties exclusively to their citizens. The difference between being a legal resident and being a citizen is thus small and may not impact much on people's lives (Bloemraad and Sheares 2017). This line of argumentation has a long tradition. The post-nationalist or cosmopolitan tradition of thought assumes that citizenship has been losing its relevance (see among others: Soysal 1994; Habermas 2008; Benhabib 2006). Its most prominent theorists, Yasemin Soysal (post-nationalism) and Seyla Benhabib (cosmopolitanism), claim that national boundaries are crumbling, and that in consequence the inclusion-exclusion dichotomy of citizenship is gradually being undone and citizenship made redundant.

If we apply the sceptical view to my study of Ghanaian return migrants, we would have to hypothesise that Ghanaian migrants would have a low propensity to naturalise in their country of destination because it would not have substantial impacts on their lives there. We would also have to assume that their citizenship would not be relevant after return the Ghana because formal titles such as citizenship were of low relevance in countries with weak bureaucracies. The literature that I have

reviewed in this chapter, however, suggests otherwise: acquired Northern citizenship may have importance for returnees lives in the Global South. By studying the meaning return migrants give to dual citizenship, I adhere to Bloemraad and Sheares' call not to confound the reasons for citizenship acquisition with the long-term effects it has on people's lives.

Rebutting Scepticism about the Importance Citizenship

Beyond the case that I have been making in this chapter, there is evidence that scepticism about the importance of citizenship is unwarranted. This is largely because of the socio-economic impact that naturalisation in the Global North has for immigrants particularly from the Global South. Quantitative studies on the benefits of naturalisation indicate that naturalisation correlates with economic upward mobility in the society of immigration. A number of quantitative studies have shown that naturalised immigrants fare better on the labour market of their country of immigration than non-naturalised immigrants (for example: Helgertz, Bevelander, and Tegunimataka 2014; Peters, Vink, and Schmeets 2018).

The causality, however, is not entirely clear: do naturalised immigrants fare better *because* of their citizenship or are people who generally do well on the labour market more likely to naturalise? Peters, Vink, and Schmeets (2018) suggest that it is both: migrants who intend to naturalise invest more in their human capital and are therefore more likely to perform better on the labour market. At the same time, naturalisation is a positive signal to employers and enhances the changes on the labour market. One way out of the chicken-or-egg question of citizenship acquisition and upward mobility is to trace qualitatively the causalities that the people in

question identify. This is exactly what my research aims to do when it asks returnees about the value and benefits that they see in dual citizenship. My focus, however, is not on potential socioeconomic upward mobility in the country of naturalisation but in the country of origin after return.

When it comes to the importance of citizenship in the Global South, a small body of qualitative research into the strategic acquisition of citizenship by affluent people in emerging economies suggest that at least the Northern component of dual citizenship is of importance to people in the Global South[12]. A comprehensive understanding of citizenship needs to consider the lived realities of citizenship. Research into strategic citizenship tries to do exactly this. It investigates how people from the Global South strategically acquire and use a second citizenship from the Global North, focussing "bottom-up" on practices and understandings (Harpaz and Mateos 2018) of the people who seek strategic citizenship. Harpaz and Mateos, the editors of the special issue *Strategic Citizenship – Negotiating Membership in the Age of Dual Citizenship* (JEMS 2018) define strategic citizenship as "the worldwide rise of instrumental practices pertaining to the acquisition and use of citizenship, along with a concomitant instrumental-strategic attitude to nationality" (Harpaz and Mateos 2018).

Research into 'strategic citizenship' seeks to answer Bloemraad's question whether citizenship actually matters by showcasing examples of affluent people in emerging economies the Global South who—through various strategies *other than migration*—acquire a second citizenship from a Northern country. Among these

[12] And Israel, which is in many ways a unique case.

strategies are claiming one's European ancestry or buying a passport with large sums of money. My research can add to the study of 'strategic citizenship' by two shifts of focus.

My research shifts the focus from strategic acquisition to strategic use. So far, research has focussed on cases of strategic acquisition, suggesting that the phenomenon of strategic usage of citizenship is preceded by a strategy of citizenship acquisition (see for example: Harpaz 2020). This runs the risk of mischaracterising the people in question as opportunistic cost-benefit maximisers. But strategic usage is distinct from strategic acquisition. A strategy of acquisition will certainly be followed by strategic usage. But not everybody who strategically uses their citizenship needs to have a well laid out plan for how to acquire it in the first place.

The past focus on strategic *acquisition* is best understood if one traces the evolution of research into strategic citizenship. This was initiated by Bauböck and Shachar in 2014 in their Working Paper titled "Should Citizenship be for Sale?" (Bauböck and Shachar (ed.) (2014)—a forum for 13 articles discussing the title's question. The event that motivated the question was Malta's amendment of its Citizenship Act in 2013, which added the so-called Individual Investor Programme. This amendment allows for the immediate granting of citizenship to foreign individuals and their family members if they "contribute to the economic development of Malta", i.e. paid a minimum amount of 1.15 million Euros.[13] Though a half-hearted

[13] Those 1.15 million Euro should comprise at minimum a donation of 650.000 Euros for the applicant plus additional substantive donations between 5.000 and 25.000 Euros for each family member

additional residency requirement was added later, the investor citizenship is basically detached from any bonds that traditional concepts of citizenship conceive: the new citizens do not have to have lived in Malta or intend to move to Malta, and the investor's reasons for citizenship acquisition have nothing to do with a shared Maltese identity or an urge to participate in Maltese democratic processes.

There are broadly two poles around which the debate formed, most forcefully advanced by Shachar and Kochenov, respectively. Shachar's argument holds that "golden passport schemes" like the Maltese hollow out the meaning and value of citizenship, a central institution for the functioning of democracy (Shachar 2014, 2017). Kochenov counters that the political dimension of citizenship is grossly overstated. We should either acknowledge that citizenship is granted in many utterly random ways—by birthplace, by descent, by talent (as in the case of expedited citizenship for athletes, (Shachar and Hirschl 2013)), and therefore also legitimately by investment—or, even better, abolish citizenship as it merely disguises postcolonial global passport inequalities (Kochenov 2014, 2019). The study of strategic citizenship acquisition, it seems to me, has evolved against the backdrop of this debate on the most extreme form of strategic citizenship acquisition.

The approach that I use in this study is that, no matter the method of acquisition, it is worthwhile to study under which conditions and why people might start utilising their Northern citizenship in an unsentimental, strategic manner. Instead

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of the applicant, investments of 150.000 Euros in Maltese stocks and bonds, as well as investment in Maltese property of at least 350.000 Euros. When the EU Commission threatened to start legal actions against the Maltese government, the Maltese government agreed to include a residency requirement of 12 months, which can be easily bypassed (Carrera 2014).

of focussing on a purportedly strategic mindset, we should strive to better understand the circumstances that lead to strategic usage.

My research also shifts the focus from rather exceptional pathways to the most common one: migration. While investor citizenship may have started researchers' interest in strategic citizenship, citizenship by investment is not the only, and by far not the most common pathway to strategic citizenship. Yossi Harpaz, for instance, studies heritage-based citizenship acquisition and birth tourism (Harpaz 2020, 12-13). These ways of acquiring dual citizenship are arguably less exceptional than golden passport schemes. But the most common way to obtain citizenship in a different country is migration.

Heritage-based citizenship acquisition is offered on the premise of a shared history background. Prominent cases of heritage-based citizenship acquisition are Latin Americans claiming descendance from Italian emigrants to acquire Italian citizenship, Israeli descendants of German Jews acquiring German citizenship, and members of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Serbia acquiring Hungarian citizenship (Harpaz 2020). As investor-citizenship, heritage-based citizenship does not require migrating to the country of naturalisation. While heritage-based citizenship acquisition does not require financial investments, the people who can claim it, do often have higher social status in their country of origin exactly because they have European heritage (for ethnic and racialised stratification in Brazil see Bailey 2019 and in Israel see Haim and Semyonov 2015).

"Birth-tourism" is a form of strategic citizenship acquisition where pregnant women travel to give birth in *jus soli* countries, such as the US, in order for their child to benefit from the US-American birthright to citizenship. Travelling to give birth in

the US is a costly investment, and parents-to-be pay tens of thousands of dollars for private clinics and specialised travel agencies (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2016). While the mother will need to travel at least once, this type of strategic citizenship again does not require long-term migration, and can only be afforded by rather affluent people (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2016; Harpaz 2020).

These are not the people that typically come to mind when thinking of global inequalities between countries. This is because most people who lack citizenship rights do not have the possibility of acquiring a strategic second citizenship through investment, through heritage, or through birth tourism. Most only have the option to naturalise in the Global North after years-long migration.

Research into strategic citizenship is a recent trend in citizenship studies that refutes the claim that citizenship does not matter. My research contributes to this by proposing to shift the focus from strategic acquisition to strategic long-term use of citizenship, from exceptional pathways to second citizenship to the most common one, namely migration, and of course—and this is the third shift I propose—from benefits abroad to benefits after return migration.

2.5 Conclusion

Through a review of the literature on return migration to Ghana, returnees' capital, and (dual) citizenship in Ghana, this chapter has argued that dual citizenship may have an important role to play in the return experience of returning Ghanaians. Over the course of this chapter, I have shown that all we know about Ghanaian migration patterns suggest that voluntary return of dual citizens is not uncommon. I have also

shown that returnees benefit from economic and social capital to re-establish in Ghana and that literature on Ghanaian voluntary return points to a seemingly puzzling situation: failure to re-establish economically after return is not limited to forced return, even voluntary, planned return with monetary capital and transnational ties often does not lead to the expected "brain gain" and developmental effects. Since citizenship acquisition in the Global North puts people's access to economic and social capital in the Global North on secure footing, I have proposed that we might better understand return outcomes if we take returnees' citizenship status (Ghanaian-Northern dual citizens or solely Ghanaian citizens) into account. Surprisingly, however, researchers of return migration and of (dual) citizenship have so far not taken much interest in each other. Moreover, sceptical voices in citizenship and migration studies still exist which doubt that citizenship really has an impact on people's lives on the long run and tend to assume that citizenship is of diminishing importance. The case of return migration to Ghana, backed by a growing body of literature on the socio-economic impact of naturalisation in the Global North, suggests otherwise. This thesis begins from the view that it is worth studying whether and how dual citizenship has an impact on return migrants in the Global South, because this has the potential to illuminate how global citizenship inequalities intersect with internal inequalities in states of the Global South, and how citizens of the Global South might try to circumvent both kinds of inequality.

3. Theory and Methods

I opened this thesis with Milanović's observation that in-between country inequality is today much larger than within-country inequality in any country of the world. Milanović concluded from this observation that citizenship has become a kind of rent—a source of income that does not require any form of labour—and I had argued in the following for my study's research focus. My focus, which I discussed by highlighting the research gap that exists at the intersection of return migration, citizenship, and capital, is attentive both to in-between and within-state inequality. By studying the meaning of dual citizenship for returnees' everyday lives in Ghana, my research ultimately contributes to a thicker understanding of how between-country inequalities and within-country inequalities interlink.

In this chapter, I argue for the approach that I have taken to tackle my research question. In short, this approach consists of a Bourdieusian analytical lens and the combination of two types of methods and data. The main method that I used were biographical interviews with voluntary returnees that ask about their migration experience and the value of dual citizenship for their return. With the interviews, I strived to find out about the social dimension of dual citizenship and return migration. In other words, I used the interviews to shed light on the attitudes of returnees towards dual citizenship, the value they ascribed to it and the impact that dual citizenship had on returnees' socio-economic lives after return. The second method is a reconstruction of the political history of (dual) citizenship in Ghana with the help of archival documents—transcripts of parliamentary debates, as well as decrees,

laws, constitutions, and news articles. The aim of this second method is to embed the findings about the *social dimension* of dual citizenship in Ghana in the *political dimension* of Ghanaian citizenship politics. Such a contextualisation deepens our understanding of the interviews and is crucial for a comprehensive study of how linkages between global inequalities and citizenship play out in the Ghanaian context.

In three steps, this chapter will go from the broad to the specific—from the analytical lens, to the methodological approach, to the collected material. In a first step, I justify my attention to citizenship as capital. Here, I make the case for a Bourdieusian lens that is attentive to the impact of dual citizenship on returnees social, cultural, and economic capital. In a second step, this chapter looks at my methodological decisions, from the interview methods to the definitions used to delineate whom I would count as voluntary returnee and whom I would not. This section also gives an overview of the people who participated in the interviews. In the third part of this chapter, I discuss the archival methods and material I used to find out about the political history of Ghanaian dual citizenship.

3.1 Theory: Citizenship, Capital, and Class

In order to go beyond a purely economic analysis, I propose to look at the role of citizenship in global inequality by using a Bourdieusian lens. As mentioned above, the analysis of inequality was always central to Bourdieu's work. As a sociologist, his approach, however, was more holistic than that of economists such as Milanović. If we can identify one central leitmotiv across Bourdieu's work, it is that he wants to

show how more is at stake in social struggles than simply financial benefits and economic capital (Joas and Knöbl 2004). To do so, Bourdieu developed a concept of class that combines an analysis of economic, social, and cultural capital with an analysis of social practices of distinction. Because of its broad sociological approach to inequality, Bourdieu's theories of capital and class are well suited to gain a holistic view on how citizenship-based inequality plays out when migrants return from the Global South to the Global North. It offers a way to gain a deeper understanding of what it means for citizenship to become an asset.[14]

There are, of course, reasons for caution. One should be wary, in particular, of superimposing categories developed in a different context. The African continent has a long history of being talked about in other people's terms, and one can indeed be sceptical about why a French theory, developed between the nineteen sixties to eighties, should have any explanatory power to better understand the situation of return migrants in Ghana today. I do not disagree with the general impetus of this scepticism. I do believe, however, that in the case of this study, using Bourdieu is defensible and useful for three main reasons.

The first, and most obvious reason relates to my participants themselves. The notion of citizenship as capital emerged from my interviews and was brought up by interviewees directly. One interviewee answered my questions regarding dual citizenship by pointing to Bourdieu's theories—"How familiar are you with Bourdieu?

[14] Bourdieu's concepts of capital and class are also better suited to my research than a Marxist approach. This is because it allows for a gradient analysis of class, whereas Marxist class analysis, with its focus on the juxtaposition of the working class and the bourgeoisie, remains analytically vague when it comes to people between these two poles.

So, I'm a big Bourdieu fan" (Interview 43). To him, it seemed clear that Bourdieu's theory could make sense of the functioning of dual citizenship. This interviewee, who has a doctoral degree in social sciences, was the only one who actually mentioned Bourdieu, but the answers of other interviewees, who never had any training in social theory, also fit the Bourdieusian lens, making connections between dual citizenship and economic benefit, social status, and education.

Second, although most famously applied to his analysis of the French class system in *Distinction* (Bourdieu 1989a [first published in 1979]), Bourdieu started developing his class terminology during his earlier research in Kabyle, Algeria (Bourdieu 1958; 1977 [first published in 1972]). Bourdieu had already, therefore, fruitfully imposed terminology developed in rural Algeria onto the French society, and arguably he had designed it for broad sociological use. Since then, his terminology has been deployed across the social sciences, with topics ranging from the history of the Italian opera (Johnson, Fulcher, and Ertman 2007) to pilgrimage in Ethiopia (Geda 2016), Irish heritage in the US (Sullivan 2016), and Malaysian landscape architectural consulting (Zahari, Ariffin, and Othman 2018). This shows that Bourdieu's concept of class is general enough to be applied to a wide range of phenomena.

Third, this is also true for migration and citizenship studies. Indeed, I am not the first to propose a Bourdieusian lens on such topics. A number of articles on migrants' social class affiliation in the country of immigration have made use of Bourdieu's concepts, pointing out both migrants' loss and restructuring of capital (Åkesson and Baaz 2015b; Erel 2010; Joy, Game, and Toshniwal 2020; Kim 2018). Nicholas Van Hear (2014a) has further added to this debate, arguing that social class

affiliation in the country of origin shapes migration in the first place and that the socio-economic situation in the country of origin predetermines the resources that migrants can mobilise. These, in turn, affect migration paths—regular or irregular, by plane or by feet—as well as destinations. Van Hear offers Pierre Bourdieu's notion of capital as a useful instrument for the analysis of who is able to move, where, and how. Indeed, Bourdieu's notion of capital can shed light on how not only economic resources shape migration paths and outcomes, but also other forms of capital, like networks. In citizenship studies, moreover, Altan-Olcay and Balta conclude from their study of Turkish-Americans in Turkey that dual citizenship acquisition is an accumulation strategy to gain social and cultural capital abroad (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2016, 2020). The analysis of this study is thus not done in a vacuum, but engages with, supports, and nuances related research in citizenship and migration studies that likewise work with Bourdieu's notions of capital and class.

Economic, Cultural, and Social Capital

Though widely known, let me briefly give an overview of Bourdieu's ideas of capital and how they feed into his broader ideas of class. Bourdieu was an empirical sociologist and developed his terminology along with his empirical work. His terminology therefore underwent changes over the course of his academic career. As a result, it makes sense to introduce his notion of capital in the way in gradually took shape. Over the course of his empirical research, Bourdieu successively developed a multidimensional notion of capital, entailing economic, symbolic, social, and cultural capital. In his early work based on ethnographic fieldwork in Kabylia—*Outline of a Theory of Practice*, first published 1972—Bourdieu had not coined the terms social

and cultural capital, yet, but only differentiated between economic and symbolic capital. In this early and later overthrown definition of capital, everything that was not monetary capital was subsumed under the term symbolic capital:

> "In fact, in a universe characterised by the more or less perfect interconvertibility of economic capital (in the narrow sense) and symbolic capital, the economic calculation directing the agents' strategies takes indissociably into account profits and losses which the narrow definition of economy unconsciously rejects as unthinkable and unnamable, i.e. as economically irrational." (Bourdieu 1977, 177).

Economic calculations, he argued, go beyond economic capital and extend to everything that is "rare and worth of being sought after in a particular social formation" (Bourdieu 1977, 178). A prestigious status, a famous family name, or flaunted opulence, in his early work, were manifestations of *symbolic* capital interconvertible with economic capital. Arguing particularly against Max Weber's idea that status was an irrational, pre-modern, and pre-capitalist way of stratifying society, Bourdieu thereby alleviated non-monetary manifestations of stratification, such as status symbols, to the rank of monetary capital (ibid.).

In his later work, Bourdieu specified and changed the meaning of "symbolic capital" by differentiating three primal forms of capital which all fall under the umbrella of symbolic capital: economic capital, social capital, and cultural capital. All capital, he wrote in his later work, is symbolic insofar as "symbolic capital […] is the form the different types of capital take once they are perceived and recognised as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1987, 4). Symbolic capital thus became an overarching term for all kinds of capital. The idea that all capital is symbolic and hinging of societal recognition, becomes clearer if we think of the example of the Russian revolution. Pre-1917, owning large amounts of money and land (in other words: economic capital) guaranteed social standing (i.e., social capital) and a comfortable life. The

Russian Revolution not only turned society upside down, but for a short period even abolished money as a means of payment. Money and ownership were then suddenly a vice that was no longer socially valued and rewarded. It was no longer capitalizable while membership in a worker's union (in other words social capital) suddenly was something that could be capitalised. Because it is convincing that all capital is symbolic in some sense, I will not use the term "symbolic capital" in this thesis. As an overarching term for all forms of capital, it loses its analytical power when dealing with instances of capital. My study's focus is thus on economic, cultural, and social capital.

These three main forms of capital are defined as follows. *Economic capital* is institutionalised in property rights and manifests in the form of property, estate, income, and all other kinds of revenue that are directly monetizable, such as for example rents (Bourdieu 1983). *Cultural capital* appears in three forms. It is incorporated through education, objectivated in cultural artefacts, and institutionalised in educational levels and professional titles (Bourdieu 1983). *Social capital* encompasses all potential resources that are linked to a network of more or less institutionalised relationships of reciprocal respect. The total capital of individual group members determines the overall "creditworthiness" of a group. Thus, the amount of social capital that individuals possess depends not only on the extension of the network that they are able to mobilise, but also on the amount of economic and cultural capital of the group members (Bourdieu 1983). In short, social capital comprehends all "resources based on connections and group membership" (Bourdieu 1987, 4).

In Bourdieu's terminology, Milanović's description of citizenship as a rent would fall into the category "economic capital" because rents are a form of monetary revenue. Milanović's focus on monetary revenues of citizenship turns a blind eye to other forms of capital that citizenship might be linked to. I had discussed in the previous chapter how, beyond financial resources, networks and education also seem important for returnees' successful re-integration into the socio-economic life of their country of origin. We should therefore be attentive to other ways beyond money in which dual citizenship may impact returnees' everyday life after return. Bourdieu's notion of capital is so particularly useful because it offers a way to combine both an analysis of monetary revenues linked to citizenship and potential other forms of capital, such as networks (social capital) and education (cultural capital). For this study, I suggest that in order to grasp the role of dual citizenship for return migrants in Ghana, we can move Bourdieu's notion of capital to a transnational level. As Bourdieu diagnosed for the French aristocracy, with their titles and exclusive clubs, I will show over the course of the following chapters (particularly chapter four and five) how membership in the exclusive club of certain state's citizenry can also signal a high social status that comes with economic, social, and cultural capital and impacts people's upward mobility upon return.

Class and Distinction

On a societal level, differences in means of access to economic, cultural, and social capital lead to inequalities. Bourdieu's concept of capital therefore does not stand alone but is part of a larger theory of social class. In this theory, social classes form around three characteristics. First, people's class position depends on capital, both

on the sheer amount and on its composition. Composition here means the proportions of the three forms of capital in relation to each other. Second, people's class position depends on their social mobility—their "trajectories in social space" (Bourdieu 1987, 4). For Bourdieu, a newly rich person might own a lot of capital, but the fact that this person has experienced upward mobility, has been brought up and educated under conditions of less capital puts that person in a different social class than someone who owns as much capital but comes from a family that has held this position of wealth for generations.

The third characteristic of class are practices of distinction. With his theory of capital and class, Bourdieu wanted to move away from, on the one hand, a purely economic understanding of class (where researchers define classes by arbitrarily drawing lines between income levels), and on the other hand, from Marxist theories which can be analytically blurry when it comes to the description of those who do not easily fall into either the working class or the bourgeoisie (Bourdieu 1987). Bourdieu was also sceptical of the Marxist idea of a self-conscious "class for itself", a class that forms because people (proletarians) recognise their shared socio-political struggle. Against both views, Bourdieu argued that people with similar amounts and compositions of capital unconsciously develop certain practices of distinction, particularly through their taste, and thereby themselves unwittingly draw the lines between classes (for example, he illustrates how the upper class distinguish themselves through their taste in music: Bourdieu 1989a, 8–11).

As I have shown in chapter two, both return migration (Nieswand 2014) and citizenship (Peters 2018) are at times associated with upward mobility. For that reason, and because Bourdieu's notion of capital is so closely linked to his notion of

class, I am in this study attentive not only to citizenship as a Bourdieusian capital, but also to what that capital does to returnees' socio-economic standing within Ghanaian society.

The Advantages of a Bourdieusian Approach over Transnationalism

Return migration as well as dual citizenship have often been studied through a transnational lens and that focus has been important for our understanding of how globalisation has changed the nature of migration. Scholarship on transnationalism demonstrated that migration in the 21st century differs substantially from public imaginations of migration, which still often rely on ideas stemming from 19th century European emigration. Boarding a ship to the US or Brazil in the 19th century meant having to start life anew in the country of destination. Today, migrants can easily stay in touch with the people they leave behind because of high-speed internet. Migration is thus no longer as disruptive to people's social lives as it used to be.[15] That makes it possible for people to have networks that span multiple countries. It also makes it possible to be engaged in the public life of the country of origin while living in the diaspora, and vice versa. That connectedness in turn has changed how migrants make use of their political rights and engage with the state (see for instance: Bauböck 2003; Betts and Jones 2016). Since transnationalism has been such a dominant concept for the study of return migration and of dual citizenship, I

[15] In fact, broadband internet has been around since the early 2000s and in about a year, people will reach adulthood who have not lived in a world without smartphones. And even though in the Global South these developments took place with some delay, transnational linkages are no longer a recent phenomenon.

should briefly discuss why I decided against making transnationalism the centre of my analytical framework and chose Bourdieu's theory of capital instead.

A closer look at the transnationalism literature reveals that there broadly are two strands of transnationalism—and each defines "transnationalism" differently. The first strand is sociological/anthropological in nature. It is prevalent in return migration studies and, at its core, is wary of the state as a category of analysis for the social sciences. The second one, quite diametrically opposed, seeks to better understand how transnationalism changes statehood and state membership. This trend stems from political science and is prevalent in citizenship studies (and in the study of diasporas which is however not relevant to this study's research question). Both, in their own ways, are unsuited for carving out what my study is interested in (inequalities linked to dual citizenship in case of return migration).

One foundational argument often cited by transnational migration scholars—those I just called the first strand of transnationalism—is Nina Glick Schiller's critique of methodological nationalism. Together with her co-authors, she urged researchers to be wary of using the state as a unit of study and instead to focus on people's—particularly migrants'—transnational practices as well as their embeddedness in local communities rather than in entire countries (Delgado Wise et al. 2010; Glick Schiller 2009; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003). Since then, numerous publications have illustrated how migrants overcome national boundaries with their networks and stay connected in several localities at the same time.

Mobility today has also become quicker and easier, another aspect that this strand of transnationalism studies have been emphasising particularly for the diaspora's ability to stay in touch with their homeland (Van Hear 2014a, 2014b)—

although without always critically asking for whom, how, and to which destinations (an argument also made by: Van Hear 2014a). Mobility has only become easier for those with the right kind of passport: Visa-free mobility has grown over the past 40 years, although mainly for citizens of the Global South and a few Southern OECD members, such as South Korea and Chile (Mau et al. 2015). In parallel, Mau et al. show, "mobility rights for other regions have stagnated or even diminished, in particular for citizens from African countries" (Mau et al. 2015, 1192). That means Africans' mobility is further restricted at the point in time when information about the rest of the world is easily accessible and the world seemingly becomes transnational, which must intensify the experience of exclusion and immobility.

It is not the case that Migration Studies has not acknowledged immobility. On the contrary, studies of immobility have accompanied our thinking about migration for decades (Carling 2022; Hammar et al. 1997; Van Hear 1998). Nevertheless, when it comes to mobility, my impression is that research which apply a transnational lens to the study of return migration has at times been driven more by wishful thinking than by evidence. This is the case when return migrants are automatically declared transnational agents, such as in the case of the Ghanaian "Burgers"[16] which Nieswand nimbly declared an "emergent transnational socioeconomic class" (Nieswand 2014, 404). People certainly make contacts while they live abroad, contacts which they will probably hope to keep after return. But how likely is it really to keep those transnational ties after return, especially when visa applications are lengthy and do not even guarantee a positive outcome; when airfares are high? Yes,

[16] Ghanaians who had migrated to Germany and other European destinations in the eighties as some form of guest workers, see discussion in chapter 2.2.

some returnees are able to stay in touch and live a life between different places of the world, but simply having been abroad does not automatically make a returnee's life transnational. That is because the ability to stay mobile is crucial for transnational connection on the long run.

To give a highly anecdotal example: When I lived in Ghana in 2011-12, I rented a room from a Ghanaian who perfectly fits the criteria of a "Burger". In the eighties, he had migrated to Hamburg, where he toiled in a factory for a few years of hard work. After return, he had invested his savings into the dowry for his wife, into a luxurious car which had long broken down but of which he kept yellowed photographs in his living room, and he had founded three small businesses (a shop, a restaurant, and a potable water business) of which all but the water business had failed. In 2021, when I returned to do fieldwork for this research and visited him, the water business had also closed: the pickup truck he had used to distribute water sachets had broken down and he neither had the funds to buy a new car nor access to spare parts to repair the old one. He had never returned to Germany and spoke the language only rudimentarily. His life in Ghana is not and has never really been transnational. Yet, he is exactly the kind of returnee that scholars of transnationalism would call transnational migrants.[17]

[17] I find the term "transnational" useful to describe networks that cross national boundaries. However, I do not see the benefits in calling international migration transnational migration. The prefix "trans" means across and the prefix "inter" means between. Unless one specifically refers to migrants traversing countries, migration, particularly regular migration, remains a movement between countries for which hence international migration is the accurate term. What seems to be usually meant by "transnational migration" is international migration of people with transnational ties.

While I cannot use his story as hard evidence (for various reasons I was unfortunately not able to interview him), witnessing his struggles, and his at maximum moderate upward mobility after return, has made me attentive to how returnees' lives unfold on the long run. As I argued in the last chapter, we have grounds to assume that returnees' citizenship status has an impact on returnee's ability to stay transnational after return. Wariness towards the state is ingrained into a lot of transnational return migration studies, so returnee's citizenship—their membership in nation states—has been a blind spot within transnational return migration studies for some time.

Citizenship studies have been discussing transnationalism differently. In what I had called the second strand of transnationalism, the interest is less purely sociological/ethnographical but lies instead on how people's transnational practices affect and change statehood and democracy. Rainer Bauböck developed an intriguing definition of political transnationalism, namely as "overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities" (Bauböck 2003, 700; see also Bauböck 1994). This political research perspective on transnationalism brings dual citizenship into focus. From his definition of transnationalism follows that dual citizenship is the formal recognition of transnational belonging and the "instrument for transnational practices" (Bauböck 2003, 703). This approach is intriguing because it allows us to examine how dual citizenship affects notions of citizenship in both the country of origin and the country of immigration—an endeavour that at first sight does not look to be far from mine. At the centre of Bauböck's approach, however, is the overlap of polities. In other words, the point is to study how national boundaries are undone or at least made porous by transnational citizenship. This

focus is useful if the phenomenon that is to be explained is democracy—which undoubtfully changes with overlapping memberships. This is also how Bauböck motivates his examination of transnationalism: "Such a focus on 'transnational citizenship' takes us beyond merely descriptive analyses towards questions raised by normative theories of democracy" (Bauböck 2003, 700). Focussing on the unmaking of boundaries, however, helps very little when we want to understand inequalities, as inequalities exist where there are boundaries between people.

Mau has formulated a critique of this strand of transnationalism that resonates with my research project.[18] He argues that the social sciences' focus on transnationalism has "overemphasized the debordering character of globalization and produced a one-sided image" (Mau 2022, 3). He reminds us to be attentive to the flipside of the transnationalisation of some people's lives, which is the exclusion and immobility of the largest part of the world's population. Instead of focussing too much on the unmaking of geographical borders, we should instead pay attention to the new cleavages that open as a result of globalisation:

> "The question to ask about globalization is not just how 'old borders' are opening or disappearing, but how borders are changing, and what 'logic of sorting' is in operation at the 'new borders' [...] The border of globalisation is not the same as that of the nation state container, or of the twentieth-century territorial model of national societies. Today we face an ensemble of places, technologies and structures of control, which can facilitate, channel or prevent mobility" (Mau 2022, 5-8)

Citizenship, he concludes, is one of the structures of control through which borders are erected. The observation that migration and dual citizenship create

[18] Indeed, I am not the only one who finds his approach fruitful for the study of citizenship inequalities: Harpaz (2020) builds large parts of his theoretical framework for "compensatory citizenship" on Mau's argument about the changing nature of borders (Mau 2012, 2022).

overlaps of memberships that cut across the borders of nation states, should not distract us from the fact that citizenship creates borders between people (ibid). A Bourdieusian approach is a suitable respond to Mau's call to study citizenship. Bourdieu does the opposite of brushing over differences in access. Instead, Bourdieu's analysis of capital and class is meticulously attentive to the subtle and not always immediately visible barriers between people. (In fact, "subtle differences" is the German translation of Bourdieu's "distinctions"). By studying how and when dual citizenship can turn into an economic, social, and/ or cultural capital, I contribute to an understanding of the differences that having certain citizenship can make.

In their own ways, both strands of transnationalism are ill-fitted to fully capture what this study is interested in teasing out. The first strand because of its oversight of state membership as a potentially relevant aspect to returnees' lives. The second because its focus on the overlap of state membership implies a focus on the unmaking of boundaries through citizenship. The unmaking of boundaries, however, can create new boundaries. This is exactly the focus of my study when I try to understand how global inequalities linked to citizenship affect local inequalities once returnees reintegrate into their country of origin.

Working with Bourdieu not on Bourdieu

Bourdieu's theories of capital and class have influenced my thinking on citizenship, and I have applied Bourdieu to the extent that his theories are useful to make sense of the case of Ghanaian return migration. However, I want to ultimately explain how dual citizenship intersects with inequalities, not how Bourdieu's theory fits to

today's world. Bourdieu thus remains a *toolkit* for this thesis, not an entire new language to adopt. Beyond capital and distinction, there are more terms that Bourdieu coined, and which do not feature at all or only very little in my thesis. These are habitus, field, and Bourdieu's notion of the state.

I use the term "habitus" very little and prefer to speak of habits, a sense of distinction, or practices of distinctions. This is partially because I do not find the sidelining of people's agency convincing, which is implied in the term habitus. Partially, it is also because this thesis is not interested in returnees' social behaviour generally, but in the way dual citizenship impacts their social lives. I can analyse habits that are linked with dual citizenship or comments that returnees made in which they distinguished themselves from others (example from Ghanaians without a second passport). However, I cannot claim to be able to have a holistic view on the entirety of people's dispositions. I also do not think that this would be necessary. Bourdieu's theory of class combines capital, social mobility, and distinctions. By discussing habits and expressions of distinction that are linked to citizenship, I can speak to Bourdieu's theory of class and do not need an analysis of "the habitus of the returnee".

Field, in turn, is a term that Bourdieu developed to tackle an epistemological problem, namely the question of the objectivity (or subjectivity) of our knowledge:

> "social science, be it anthropology, sociology or history, oscillates between two seemingly incompatible points of view, two apparently irreconcilable perspectives: objectivism and subjectivism. […] If I have somewhat belabored this opposition […] it is because the most steadfast (and, my eyes, the most important) intention guiding my work has been to overcome it." (Bourdieu 1989b, 14-15)

Bourdieu proposes that we can overcome this epistemological problem if we take into consideration the contexts through which people's world views are constructed. The researcher, instead of trying to find objective truth, should aim to keep in mind that people's views "are views taken from a certain point, that is, form a determinate position within social space"[19] (ibid.). The field (in the beginning also translated as "social space" as in the just cited quote) is a metaphor for the context through which people make sense of the social world: a space populated by people, organisations, and institutions. Social scientists themselves, by defining the boundaries of the social field that they investigate and by interacting with people in this social field, are not outsiders, but part of the study (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Using the term social field is particularly important if one is to analyse an organisation, such as a parliament or a university. Here, the metaphor of a delimited social space in which people and institutional entities interact makes intuitive sense.

For the case of my study, however, defining the social field of it is far less straightforward as returnees' views on dual citizenship did not only evolve through experiences in the home country's society, but were inevitably also shaped by experiences of emigration, such as border crossings, or job applications while on a precarious visa. With the absence of a clearly defined organisational framework, or common occupation (e.g. being a civil servant in Ghana), the term social field loses its analytical pungency. Beyond that, there is a second reason why an analysis of the social field of return migration does not quite work for my research. When analysing social fields, Bourdieu wanted to understand the genesis and structure of a

[19] This text translates the French "champ" to space, not to field. Nevertheless, the text is cited as one of the foundational texts of Bourdieu's theory of social fields (see for instance: Kauppi 2018).

particular social field, such as the French Grandes Écoles or the professional world of literature. He took for granted that his French readership already has an idea of the views that people in these fields have. Nobody would be surprised to hear that people at the famous École Nationale d'Administration (ENA)—the French training ground for civil servants and politicians—had a high opinion of the French state. Bourdieu is less interested in these people's view of the state, and more in how everything about the école moulds people and imprints that view of the state on everybody who goes through its education. My study is different. It is interested in the views that return migrations have on dual citizenship because these views have been scarcely heard and might reveal something new about dual citizenship. Of course, my study is attentive to the context in which these views can come about—indeed one entire chapter (chapter six) examines the historical and political context of dual citizenship in Ghana—but at the heart of my study are people's views (chapter four and five) rather than institutional structures.[20]

Lastly, I also do not engage with Bourdieu's theory of the state. Citizenship is a status granted by states, so it might seem that thesis speaks to this. However, what I want to shed light on are the links between citizenship and inequality, not the nature of statehood. I do discuss the role of the Ghanaian state in my study, but I do so to provide a historically grounded political context to the role dual citizenship seems to assume in Ghana. Moreover, Bourdieu's work on the state itself is scarce and unfinished (Arnholz 2018), despite Bourdieu's otherwise strong interest in topics linked to statehood (such as bureaucracy, education, power). What Bourdieu had to

[20] See also on the difficulties of using Bourdieu's field theory in international and transnational settings Kauppi (2018) and Sapiro (2018).

say on the state mainly consists of posthumously published lecture notes (Bourdieu 2020). One central idea within Bourdieu's thinking about the state seems to be that the state is "almost unthinkable" (ibid., 3) because social scientist see the world in categories which are themselves "the product of the state" (ibid.). It seems obvious that I do not use a concept that Bourdieu himself was sceptical about.

3.2 Methods and Sources (1): The Social Dimension of Dual Citizenship and Return

Let me summarise this chapter's argument so far: Bourdieu's concept of capital lends itself to fresh examination of the connections between citizenship and inequality (with my specific question of how dual citizenship affects the lives of return migrants). It suits the analysis of inequalities because it draws attention to subtle differences between people's social positions and thereby offers insights into class structures that go beyond purely economic analyses of income levels. At the same time, it suits the analysis of citizenship because memberships and statuses always played an important role in Bourdieu's concept of capital. Bourdieu's work has therefore shaped my thinking and my research approach, even if this thesis is not a classical and comprehensive Bourdieusian analysis. It is an analysis of return migration and dual citizenship, approached with the conceptual toolkit that Bourdieu's ideas can provide—drawing particularly on the notion of capital.

Having explained how I conceptually approached my research question, I will now turn to the concrete methodological steps I took to conduct this research. I start by laying out the methodological decision I took to investigate the social dimension

of return migration with dual citizenship. I will briefly touch on the limitations that the Covid-19 pandemic imposed on my research design. I then discuss two definitional decisions I had to take: first, whether I should only include dual citizen returnees in this research or if there were benefits in also studying how returnees without dual citizenship think of dual citizenship. And second, how I should define voluntary return and where I should draw the line between potential interviewees who do and who do not fit into my study. Towards the end of the section, I discuss the merits of the interview methods I chose.

Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic

All findings depend on the methodological decisions of the research project. The Covid-19 pandemic probably wielded the most severe influence on my methodological decision-making. I had started my doctorate degree in mid-January 2020—just a few weeks before the world went into lockdown. This meant I had to drop my initial idea of comparing return migration to Ghana and return migration to Cote d'Ivoire. This was not only because the Covid-19 outbreak for some time looked worse in Cote d'Ivoire than it did in Ghana, with travelling having become enormously difficult; it was also because it made sense to just concentrate on one country. The pandemic similarly put an end to my original plan of travelling for an entire year of classic fieldwork, combining participant observation and interviews. I therefore dropped the participant observation and concentrated on interview—which I could also conduct remotely.

Eventually, I had two periods of data collection: a first period of online interviews from September 2021 – February 2022, and a second period of in-person data

collection in Accra in March and April 2022, during which I conducted interviews and explored the archives of the Ghanaian parliament. Over the summer 2022, I conducted a few additional online interviews. This combination of online and in-person interviewing proved beneficial. Because of the online interviews, I already had contacts in place and an easier time finding additional participants once I went to Ghana. This made it possible to carry out a large number of interviews in a relatively short period of time. Indeed, I conducted more than half of the interviews during the two months I spent in person in Accra.

I contacted potential interviewees through various means. I snowballed a few interviews through my own contacts, and LinkedIn also proved helpful with finding interviewees remotely. I also contacted potential participants with the help of returnee organisations and snowballed from there. Early on in the remote data collection, I had learned from Leander Kandilige, a migration scholar at the Centre for Migration Studies at the University of Ghana, that there are several returnee organisations in Ghana, both organisations addressing returnees generally and groups specifically for returnees from certain countries or returnees in specific occupations. There is no survey of these organisations, so it is hard to tell how many there are, how many members they have, or how much their member groups overlap (some seemed better established and have websites while others seem to rather be large WhatsApp groups). With the help from the Centre for Migration Studies in Accra, I got in touch with one general returnee organisation that seemed to be the most established and biggest. The threshold for joining this organisation seemed low, which meant that it did not seem to be an exclusive club. The organisation agreed to send my call for participation through their newsletter, moreover, it organised a

major event during my in-person data collection time in Accra, which I was able to attend. Most participants were therefore members of that returnee organisation (or interested enough to have subscribed to their newsletter and attend their event), or contacts of these people. Later, I also contacted two other returnee organisations through which, however, I only managed to do one interview each. Moreover, my call for participation was also shared with a British returnees' professional network without my knowledge (I never found out who shared it) and this yielded one more interview.

My call for participation was framed as a general interest in the experience of voluntary return migration to Ghana and did not mention that I was particularly interested in understanding the role of citizenship for the return experience. I chose such a frame in order to prevent a selection bias where only those with an interest in citizenship issues would participate in my study. My recruitment materials (call for participation for newsletter/e-mails and LinkedIn invitation to participate) can be found in the Annex, section 9.2.

Nevertheless, to some degree, relying heavily on returnee organisations for accessing participants will have had an influence on my findings. Most people that I accessed through return organisations were those at the beginning or middle of their professional career who were evidently interested in networking with other returnees. Another common age group of returnees, retirees, were not reached with that sampling method. Through snowballing, I did get in contact with two retirees, but they also had returned in the middle of their career and not for retirement. The research findings thus can explain the views on dual citizenship that early and mid-career returnees have, even if other age groups might have had other viewpoints

which this research cannot capture. Moreover, the returnee organisations seemed to particularly attract people who had been to the US and UK—with the majority of people holding dual or multiple citizenship after naturalising in one of the two countries. That also to a certain degree limits my claim regarding Northern citizenship and more studies will be needed to evaluate the findings from this study, extending research to other Northern states. It is, nevertheless, a reasonable assumption that citizenship in countries of the Global North function similarly to what I found for dual Ghanaian-US and Ghanaian-UK citizenship since they all also perform similarly in the citizenship strength index "Quality of Nationality" (Kochenov and Lindeboom 2020). The problem with voluntary returnees is that they return to live among the general population and are therefore difficult to identify. Therefore, although it inevitably limits the findings of my study, snowballing through returnee organisations was the most viable way of recruiting participants.

Single and Multiple Citizens—Who does this Study Address?

Another question was further complicated by the pandemic: how many returnees would actually have dual citizenship, and crucially, would I be able to find them? I was nervous about this question because there is no reliable data on the prevalence of return migration with dual citizenship. Moreover, classic citizenship theory (see chapter one) holds that naturalisation is an integration in the political community of the country of immigration, suggesting that people who naturalised would stay. Basing my assumption on the strategic citizenship literature, I had hypothesised that since citizenship is often acquired for strategic reasons, dual citizenship should not hinder people from returning after naturalisation. That turned out to be correct.

However, without any security that this assumption of mine was correct, I decided to interview voluntary returnees on their views of dual citizenship, regardless of their actual citizenship status. I was interested in the value of Northern citizenship in a Southern context, and so I thought it would be useful to hear from both people who did have dual citizenship and people who decided against naturalisation abroad. Most likely, their migration planning would have involved thinking about how long to stay abroad and whether to naturalise abroad. Both returnees who decided to naturalise abroad and those who did not would be able to share their reasoning and how it affected their everyday life in Ghana.

I had also thought that naturalised and non-naturalised returnees could potentially differ in their views on dual citizenship and that they would therefore be good cases for comparison, since I had decided against a comparative approach that studied dual citizenship in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. I turned out that whether or not returnees had naturalised abroad was not a delineating feature, but their social status before migration. I will come to that later. In order not to introduce too many levels of comparison, I refrained from examining a third group which could have potentially also yielded interesting results: Ghanaians who never migrated could have shed light on the external perception of returnees with dual citizenship.

Voluntariness and Return – Definitions

The next question I had to decide was whom I would include into my study of voluntary return migration. "Voluntary return migration" includes two contested concepts: voluntariness and return. Voluntariness suggests that people returned by

their own measures because they wish to do so, while "return" suggests that the move back is a definitive and irrevocable decision to become sedentary in the country of origin. There are, however, many cases that do not neatly fit these two categories. For example, people might return because their visa expired but would have stayed longer if they had a visa extension. Or, they might return in a circular way, spending significant time in both places. Moreover, "voluntary return" has been used in European policy as a bureaucratically neutral euphemism for the deportation of unwanted migrants, further complicating and confusing the situation. Interviewing voluntary return migrants automatically means having to decide which cases that lie somewhat in a grey zone should be counted and which should not be included in the study.

Bivand Erdal and Oeppen (2022) suggest that voluntariness can also lie in people's decision to return if this is "the least-worse option from a limited range," depending on how one assesses the returnee's agency in that situation (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2022, 71). They conclude that contextualising and explaining the usage of the term voluntariness is therefore key for return migration research. I found that a practical guidance for where to draw the line between people who would fit my call for participation and people whose return experience would not.

In the case of my study, *dual citizens'* decision to return was obviously not determined by any visa policies but based on their own wish to relocate to Ghana. The majority of the participants who did only have Ghanaian citizenship also returned freely, without visa policies pushing them to do so. A few participants' return, however, was not as univocally voluntary. Two people who had left Ghana for studies—one had studied in Belgium, one in Belgium and France—reported that they would

have potentially stayed longer if it had been easier to get a follow-up visa after their student visa. Two other participants had unstable visa situations before returning. One had left the UK to return and care for a family member in Ghana while his application for UK citizenship was under review and has since then been denied re-entry into the UK. One other participant spent most of his childhood undocumented in the US. His parents were legal immigrants in the US. When they migrated to the US, they had at first left him behind with relatives in Ghana while establishing their new lives in the US. At one point, however, they had decided to no longer wait for the approval of their family reunification with their son and just brought him over to the US irregularly. He was discovered during his final year in college and decided to comply with the US's "voluntary" return programme although he would probably have had a case for the legalisation of his status in the US. Particularly in the last two cases, the voluntariness was compromised. I decided to include them nevertheless, for three reasons. First, by replying to my call for participation, they had self-labelled themselves as voluntary returnees; second, all fit Erdal-Bivand and Oeppen's criterion that they had some degree of agency in their decision to return, and third; in their assessment of the value of dual citizenship in Ghana—my research interest—they did not substantially differ from the other interviewees.

Like "voluntariness", "return" is also not black-and-white; nor is it easily distinguishable from staying. Here again, I had to decide how I would define return migration and where I would draw the line. Research into transnationalism has taught us that migration is not necessarily a one-way street. Returnees do not simply draw a line under their life abroad, just as they did not draw a line under their lives in their home countries while living abroad. If people have the means to do so, they

travel regularly between their home in the country of origin and their home in the country of emigration and live a life between the two, sometimes spending substantive amounts of time in each location in a circular way.[21] That, however, makes it hard to decide where to draw the line between emigrants and return migrants.

The Handbook of Return Migration (King and Kuschminder 2022a) counts a wide range of mobility patterns as "return migration," such as student migrants returning after the completion of their higher education degrees abroad (Alves 2022) and even people coming for short-term holidays to meet family and friends (Miah 2022). I decided *not* to include cases of return for holidays, primarily because this thesis' interest lies in the effects that dual citizenship may have on life in Ghanaian society. The return experience must therefore be one in which the returnee is somewhat part of Ghanaian society by having some everyday life routines in Ghana. For my study, it thus makes little sense to count holiday visits—a time that is meant to be the opposite of everyday life routines—as return migration. Six people participated in my study with whom it turned out in the course of the interview that their return consisted of nothing more than spending holidays in Ghana. Predictably, none of these interviews revealed anything with regards to my research questions, as none of these six people had any thoughts on the impact of dual citizenship on life after return to Ghana. I therefore excluded these interviews from the analysis.

I did, however, define students as migrants and their return as return migration. Alves (2022) observed that "students from Eastern Europe, Turkey, Northern and Western Africa, the Commonwealth of Independent States, China and South-

[21] People might also migrate onwards to another destination, but that is a different topic.

East Asia were more likely to remain overseas" (Alves 2022, 265) after finishing their studies than students from countries with strong passports (OECD countries in Alves observation). Alves concludes from this situation that studying abroad must be a more serious decision for people from non-OECD countries and should therefore properly be called emigration. By implication, then, turning home after graduation is return migration. This makes sense if we take into consideration that students from the Global South tend to have an onerous and challenging path to certify their previous educational degrees, get a student visa and find funding to study abroad. Compared with, for example, students who participate in the EU's Erasmus programme, it is fair to assume that their moves involve much more planning and weighing.

I also included second-generation return migrants. My call for participation clearly stated that I was looking for return migrants. Second-generation migrants who replied to that call thus obviously felt their move to Ghana was a form of return. Overall, the definition for voluntary return that I used in this study can be summarised in the following way: Returned migration includes all cases of return to Ghana that exceeded personal visits. In borderline cases, voluntariness depends on the self-definition of the respective person. That means, if participants saw themselves as voluntary return migrants, then I also counted them. Such a definition excludes cases that are unlikely to reveal anything relevant with regards to my research. It still accounts for transnational and circular mobility by not only including people who permanently relocated to Ghana, but also people whose employer and main residency is in the Global North who nevertheless spend extended periods in Ghana

working remotely or preparing a more permanent move back by building a house or setting up a business.

Biographical Semi-Structured Interviews with Return Migrants

This study strives to understand how and why dual citizenship matters to people. In order to uncover these lived experiences, the vast bulk of my primary research involved semi-structured biographical interviews with Ghanaian return migrants. These interviews form the main empirical basis of my research and I discuss them in chapter four and five. In this section I briefly outline what I mean by semi-structured biographical interviews and why I opted for them.

The first reason was practical. As is well known – and as the name suggests – this interview technique operates with a set of broad open questions that address a number of predefined topics. The interviewer thus has some guidelines but, due to the open character of the questions, has to react to the interviewee and remain open to unanticipated turns. The strength of such qualitative interviews lies in getting detailed accounts of experiences, both internal and external (Weiss 1994) while being relatively compact and concise. Hindered by the Covid-19 lockdown, I first did not have the option (and later no longer had the time) to spend days in a row chatting with interlocutors and getting my information through unstructured ethnographic interviews. Nevertheless, my semi-structured interviews varied in length, from about 40 minutes to about 2.5 hours. The majority, however, were about one hour long and thus fitted well into people's calendars.

I opted for largely biographical interviews mostly for methodological reasons, though there was a practical aspect to it as well: I had conducted biographical interviews for my Master's thesis which I had enjoyed and with which I was thus already acquainted. Methodologically, I found that biographical questions are particularly well suited to understanding how people's views come about because they give space for people to recount their lived experiences and contextualise how life events impacted their views and subsequent choices. I wanted to find out the views of returnees towards dual citizenship and how having (or not having) a second, Northern passport impacts their everyday life after return. Since I could not just go and witness the impact on their everyday life through participant observation, it made sense to ask people to tell me about their lives and the biographies that had led to these lives. In order not to get lost in detailed descriptions of life events that might be irrelevant to my research, I structured my interviews through questions that asked for people's migration history. Understanding that context (how lived experience led people to think in certain ways about their citizenship) in turn helped me to compare interviews and begin to generalise from the individual story.

Being a good interviewer depends on many things, such as being well prepared and having thought through the interview guidelines. But probably most important is establishing what Weiss calls a "research partnership" with the respondent. A research partnership can only be established when there is an agreement that the interview is no interrogation, but a cooperation between the respondent and the interviewer (Weiss 1994, 65) and such an agreement can only be established if interviewees can at all times trust that their candour and openness will be handled by the interviewer with respect and gratitude, as well as in an anonymous and ethical

manner. It does not need a breach of ethical codes to ruin a research partnership. Disregarding the flow of the interlocuter's account and changing topics abruptly may make the interviewee feel interrogated and uneasy. Likewise, interrupting the respondent's elaborations not only gives off an air of ingratitude and disregard but also undermines the respondent's power to determine what features are important in order to understand a certain topic and thus undermines the whole purpose of a qualitative interview (Atkinson 2012; Weiss 1994).

The difficult task of a semi-structured interview is thus to guide the conversation without intervening too strongly and abruptly to ensure that the conversation flows smoothly without undue influence. Herein, I believe, lies the second methodological strength of biographical questions. They are probably the least interrogative and intimidating form of interview. That is because biographies are a common form of narrative that people are familiar with. Interviewees will have only vague ideas about what a qualitative interview is unless they studied social sciences themselves. But by telling them that I am interested in hearing about their migration biography and their insights that they got along the way, people have a clear idea of the interview. This helps reduce the discomfort that people might feel when interacting with the researcher, a complete stranger to them. Biographical interviews thus offer relatively natural conversations. They also allow for the collection of background data, such as age group and educational level, in a non-interrogative way.

I structured my interview guide (set out below, in table 1) into four parts. The first part tried to elicit pre-migration life and the family background of the participant. With that, I hoped to get a sense of people's socio-economic backgrounds and the expectations and ideas that interviewees had in mind when leaving: where they

the first in their family to have migrated? Was it a big deal in their Ghanaian social circles that they got into university abroad? How did the idea of leaving Ghana come about? et cetera. This was followed by a second part that asked for an account of the participants' emigration story. Emigration can differ greatly, depending (for example) on the type of visa that people leave with (none of my interviewees left without a visa). Here, I tried to be attentive to difficult experiences people might have gone through during their visa application processes or when crossing borders, which might have influenced their wish to naturalise abroad. The questions about emigration naturally led to the third part, which asked about people's return story. Here again, I tried to get background information that would help me better understand their views on dual citizenship. This involved questions such as: What were the interviewees' motives for returning? What preparatory measures did they take? How did the return fit into their career plans? Did they return for good, or do they circulate? The last part then asked specifically for their citizenship status. Had they naturalised abroad or not? What was their reasoning behind that decision? What impact did this have on their lives, and specifically, on their lives after return? For people who did not naturalise abroad, either because they had not been eligible to or because they decided against it—I was interested in knowing if they thought their lives after return would look different if they had received dual citizenship? How did other people in their social circles think about their citizenship? The below figure is the interview guide that I used.

Table 1. Interview Guide

Topic	**Questions**

Pre-migration experience and socio-economic Background	Before coming to your migration story, I'd like to start with asking some background questions to better understand your life in Ghana before leaving. o What was your life in Ghana like? - Educational level and or occupation - private or public schooling o At what point in life your life did you start planning to go abroad? o Can you recall the moment when the idea of emigrating occurred to you for the first time?
Emigration process	Could I please ask you to recount your emigration process? o Could you please recount step by step your emigration path? o Why did you leave Ghana? o Why did you choose to move to country X? o What expectations did you have? o What was your life in destination country X like? o Looking back, what would you tell your younger self about migrating?
Return	Could you please tell me more about your return to Ghana? o In what kind of situation did the thought of returning occur to you for the first time? o How did your return come about? o What was your reasoning behind returning? o What has been your experience since returning? o Where would you say is home for you? Why?
Citizenship Acquisition	Are you a dual citizen? Yes: Could you please recall the process of how you acquired your second citizenship? o What made you want to become a citizen of country X? o How important was the possibility to be a dual citizen for your decision? o Could you please try to describe the day of your naturalization? o Has your life changed since acquiring your second citizenship? How? o What does it mean to you to be a British/US/ etc. citizen now? o What do other people around you think of your second citizenship? o How does your second citizenship impact your life in Ghana compared to someone who returned without citizenship from abroad? o Some said it would give then better job opportunities, different treatment, an easier time getting goods from abroad to Ghana—what do you think about that? No: o Did you not have the option to naturalise abroad, or did you decide against it, and why? o Would your everyday life in Ghana look different if you were a dual citizen? What would be the major differences?

Although every interview was unique, and I did not use the exact wording each time, I nevertheless followed this structure and tried to probe for the sub-questions detailed in the interview guide. If people were second generation returnees, this would be clear from the first question onwards ('Could you tell me about your life in Ghana before leaving?'). In these cases, since they had no pre-emigration experience, I instead asked about their family's emigration story, their family's life in

Ghana before leaving, and their lives growing up. The last part of the interview, the one on acquiring dual citizenship, concerned the core of my research. However, the biographical underpinning was almost as crucial, as it helped me contextualise what people said about why and how they valued (or did not value) having a second northern citizenship in Ghana.

Beyond the interview guide, I asked follow-up questions with which I strived to yield detailed recounts of my participants migration biographies. First, I asked for specifics that keep the respondents in the situation they recount. Helpful questions that ask for detail are for example: "What led to that?" or "What happened next?". Another follow up question asked for actors; with for example a question like "Who else was there and what did they do?" In order to understand an event, it was always useful to also understand by what inner events—perceptions, preconceptions, thoughts, beliefs, emotions—it was accompanied. Those can be discovered through questions like, "When that was happening, what thoughts did you have?" (Merrill and West 2009; Weiss 1994).

Who Participated in the Interviews?

In total, my analysis of the social dimension of return migration relies on 49 interviews with voluntary return migrants.[22] Out of these, 18 were women and 31 men.[23]

[22] The total amount of interviews that I conducted with returnees is 56, however, I excluded seven interviews from the analysis because it turned out in the course of the interview that the participants did not fit the criteria for participation: either they were not returnees by this study's definition, or they had not lived in countries of the Global North.
[23] Though not specifically asked, nobody suggested that they did not identify as cisgender.

One person had a mixed-race background. The age at the point of interview ranged from mid-twenties to post-retirement; however, the majority returned during their early and mid-career and were in their thirties and forties. This demographic feature reflects a common finding in other research on Ghanaian return migration: namely that most Ghanaian voluntary returnees move back to Ghana in their "prime productive years" (Wong 2014, 439).

Citizenship Status: Out of the 49 interviewees, the majority (33 people) had some form of multiple citizenship. 15 were single-Ghanaian citizens, and one person had given up her Ghanaian citizenship for Dutch citizenship. Out of the returnees with multiple citizenship 19 were dual Ghanaian-British citizens, 7 were dual Ghanaian-US citizen, one was dual Ghanaian-Italian, and one dual Ghanaian-Irish. A few people moreover had more than two citizenships: three were triple Ghanaian-British-US citizens, one was triple Ghanaian-British-Barbadian, and one even was quadruple Ghanaian-Togolese-French-Canadian. Among the people who had only Ghanaian citizenship were two returnees from countries with strict naturalisation laws: one who had returned from Denmark, and one from Sweden. The others had returned either from the UK or the US.

Migration generation: The majority of participants were first generation migrants. Out of the first-generation migrants, two spent parts of their childhood abroad and four were born outside of Ghana but grew up largely in Ghana before migrating for their adult life. For example, one person was born in Ireland, where his parents studied, but, as his parents returned to Ghana when he was of very young age, he spent most of his childhood in Ghana. He later moved to the US for his university degree. Two people were generation 1.5, meaning that their parents had

migrated during their childhood. Eight second-generation migrants also participated in the study. They had answered my call for participation, which clearly stated that the study was interested in return migration, because they themselves self-identified as return migrants. One second-generation returnee commented on that saying: *"It's funny, isn't it? All of us we say we return, even if we were born outside the country it does feel like a return"* (Interview 2). Because of this self-labelling as returnees, there were no reason not to include them.

Reasons for emigration: Two of the research participants had migrated to join their partners, otherwise, all first-generation migrants in the study left Ghana for educational purposes. For many, education meant not only completing a degree, but also getting a few years of work experience, and just general self-growth and satisfying curiosity. *"It was mainly to educate and not to find a quote unquote better life and send money back."* (Interview 45); "*it is part of almost every student's plan in Ghana that at some point, they will leave the country and do some advanced courses" (Interview 7). "My expectation was to get good education, meet diverse people from all over the world, being exposed to ideas, opportunities, and networks" (Interview 3).* Apart from the two that migrated for their partners, all first-generation migrants gave me similar answer when I asked for their migration paths. While some returned directly after their studies, most continued to live abroad, either working or doing further studies. While looking for a better life had not been a reason for any first-generation migrant returnees, second-generation returnees often reported that their parents had left Ghana during the tumultuous times of political unrest and economic instability in the nineteen-eighties to find a better life abroad.

Reasons for Returning: Reasons for voluntary return migration are diverse and often intersect. In my study, the main reasons for return were 'having completed education abroad', 'family and home', 'peace of mind and safety', 'the Covid-19 pandemic', as well as 'job opportunities'. These reasons are typical for voluntary return migration to Ghana. Apart from the pandemic, all other reasons have also been also mentioned by other studies on Ghanaian voluntary return (see for example: Adzei and Sakyi 2014, Kyeremeh 2020; Mensah and Ansah 2021; Sinatti 2019; Wong 2014).[24]

Timing of return migration: The time that had passed since return varied a lot. At the moment of interview, one had returned for less than half a year while another had returned already in the early nineties. Most people, however, had returned several years ago. Two were in the process of returning but still living in the UK. The time spent abroad also ranged from just over one year to several decades. Apart from the one person who had returned just a few months before the interview and did not have much to say on citizenship, none of these timing differences had an effect on the quality of the interviews.

[24] Several typologies have tried to give an order to the diversity of the motivations and circumstances of return. Cerase's typology (1974) suggests a correlation of time abroad and reason for return: "return of failure" is a return after a short period abroad. "Return of conservatism" happens after a few years abroad and is meant to conserve the resources, mainly savings, one has acquired abroad. "Return of innovation" happens after at least ten years abroad and is meant not only as a conservative return of savings but uses those savings as a business investment upon return. The economistic undertone of this model is very limited, however, as it brushes over all reasons other than cost-benefit calculations, and indeed it did not prove very useful in making sense my interviewees' responses. Another typology of return motivations differentiates between "return of achievement", "return of completion", return of setback", and "return of crisis" (Battistella 2018). Here as well, I struggled to place the interview responses in this typology, because reasons overlapped and a feeling of having completed what one had migrated for can coexist with a personal crisis or setback. I therefore chose to go by the reasons that the participants gave themselves and lay out the main topics that came out from the research.

Socio-economic background—the main line of comparison: I had started conducting the interviews thinking that dual citizens and single-Ghanaian citizens might differ in their thinking about dual citizenship and that these two groups might provide for an interesting comparison. That was not the case. Whether or not people had dual citizenship did not seem to affect the way they viewed dual citizenship. In fact, none of the other characteristic that I just described—age, gender, reason for emigration, reason for return migration, migration generation, or timing of the return—seemed to be related to people's views on dual citizenship. The one clear delineator for people's views on dual citizenship was their socio-economic background.

At first sight, my participants might seem rather homogeneous in terms of their socio-economic situation in Ghana. During the biographical interviews, I tried to tease out my participants' educational and occupational paths and their parents' occupations because that felt less intrusive and sensitive than asking for income levels or housing standards. Since the interview was biographical, many told me about all of this without me specifically probing for it. Most were economically successful and worked as lawyers, entrepreneurs, civil servants, researchers or were employed by large multinational companies or international non-profit organisations. The vast majority had also attended university, setting them apart from the rest of the Ghanaian population, 22 per cent of whom still do not attend school beyond primary school (as of 2021, see: World Bank 2023). From a Ghanaian perspective, where until 2017 secondary school education was not free and roughly a third of pupils could not attend anything higher than middle school (Nir 2019), all had a relatively privileged background and none of them grew up in such poverty that their

formal education would have severely suffered. Despite this seeming homogeneity in terms of education and profession, there was a crucial divide between their socio-economic backgrounds, a divide that biographical interviews were most apt to pick up.

Most interviewees had a middle-class background. Many were the first in their family to have gone to university and some, both first and second-generation returnees, recalled growing up in rather modest circumstances. They all shared the view that dual citizenship was to some degree beneficial for life after return, no matter if they had acquired dual citizenship or not. The extent to which they emphasised the benefits of dual citizenship differed, nevertheless, there was general awareness among them that returning with dual citizenship has socio-economic benefits for the life in Ghana after return. Eight participants, however, stood out. They came from very well-known and politically influential families and among their close relatives were former independence fighters, presidents, or ministers. These people from affluent, politically well-connected elites had an approach to dual citizenship that differed from the rest of the participants. They did not have this awareness of the benefits of dual citizenship or thought it beneath themselves to make use of them. For this reason, I analyse these two groups of interviewees separately. Chapter four will discuss my analysis how returnees with unremarkable family backgrounds viewed dual citizenship, and chapter five will discuss my analysis of the views of those returnees who belonged to the very top of the Ghanaian elite.

Research Ethics and my Position in the Field

Lastly, before moving on to discuss the methods and materials that I used to analyse the political history of Ghanaian dual citizenship, let me discuss ethical considerations and reflect on what I myself brought into the research. As a matter of course, this project underwent a research ethics review before I was given permission to start collecting data; the letter of approval from the Research Ethics Committee of the University of Oxford can be found in the Appendix, in section 9.1. I asked participants for consent to the interview through an oral consent script which I read to participants at the beginning of the interview. The oral consent script built on a template that the Ethics Committee provided and can be found in the Appendix, in section 9.3. The main point of the script was to ensure that participants formed a clear understanding of the implications of their participation in my study and to ask if, knowing about these implications, they agreed to be interviewed. The oral consent script opened with a description of the aims of my research project and the structure of the interview. It then touched on various aspects of data protection: data sharing, data storage, contact details, audio recording/notes, and anonymisation. The consent script then moved on to inform participants about their rights – the right to choose not to answer any questions they would not want to answer, the right to take a break during the interview or withdraw from the interview at any point without giving a reasons, as well as the right to withdraw information retrospectively, and lastly the right to enquire about the project's ethics review details and to make a formal complaint with the university of Oxford's ethics committee. Two participants declined to give their consent to an audio recording, preferring that I take handwritten notes. Otherwise, all agreed to the conditions as laid out in the consent script (Annex 9.3).

In addition to the measures described in the verbal consent script, I took further privacy and data protection measures by (1) ensuring that I only conducted interviews from locations where no one could overhear the interview; (2) ensuring that my LinkedIn privacy settings made it impossible for other users to see a list of my LinkedIn contacts; (3) conducting online interviews only through Microsoft Teams, which at the time of the interviews was the only platform for online conversations approved by the university.

Conducting research in Ghana as a white scholar from a world-famous university that is not only renowned for its research but also known for its role in reproducing the British upper class bears the potential to create power imbalances with participants which can hamper the research and affect its outcomes. Generally, I did get the impression that people felt rather flattered that someone at the University of Oxford was interested in their story and that this generally helped with finding people interested in participating. One participant, a doctoral student, seemed to have been motivated, at least to some extent, by the hope of networking with Oxford researchers.

Despite my impression that the "brand" of Oxford University helped with recruiting interviewees, I believe that my participants educational backgrounds and professional lives mitigated power imbalances during research. Most had completed at least parts of their university education abroad and the vast majority had high-paying jobs, for example as lawyers, CEOs, expats, civil servants, consultants, researchers—or used to work in such jobs before they started their own business in Ghana. And obviously, all had lived abroad, sometimes for decades, and did thus not have any illusions about life in the Global North nor about the income level of a

doctoral student, so they often offered to give me a ride or pay the bill when we met in cafés. Moreover, several people came from very influential Ghanaian families; families with long pedigrees that produced many public figures. Particularly for this last group, I do not think that my identity and background had much of an impression. Unlike them, I do not have an impressive pedigree to boast about and I think that if I had done this study at less known university, they would have been less inclined to grant me their attention. One person declined participation on grounds of my whiteness. Other than that, I generally received positive feedback from participants who often seemed to enjoy the opportunity to reflect upon their own biographies and appreciated the emphasis that my study puts on voluntary return, a topic that many felt was underdiscussed in the Global North.

3.3 Methods and Sources (2): The Political Dimension of Dual Citizenship and Return

The aim of the interviews with voluntary returnees was to find out about attitudes towards dual citizenship. By trying to understand their migration biographies, I aimed to contextualise their views with reference to their broader experiences. But personal experiences alone cannot fully explain how certain attitudes come about. That is because these attitudes are also influenced by the political climate in Ghana and the stances towards dual citizenship that Ghanaian society collectively has taken. To approximate the Ghanaian political climate when it comes to dual citizenship, and gain a holistic picture of the role of dual citizenship for life after return migration, I combined the analysis of the *social dimension* of dual citizenship in

Ghana (through the interviews) with an analysis of the *political dimension* of dual citizenship in Ghana (primarily through archives). I did this by asking the question: What is the political history of dual citizenship in Ghana and how can this history add to an explanation of the value that Ghanaian return migrants attribute (or do not attribute) to dual citizenship? Answering this question involved a different method: the analysis of documents and archival sources.

Reconstructing the Political History of Dual Citizenship in Ghana: From Independence to Today

In chapter six of this thesis, I embed my findings on how returnees value dual citizenship in an analysis of how Ghanaian lawmakers valued dual citizenship. To do this, I reconstruct a political history of dual citizenship in Ghana with the help of three types of documents. The first and most important type of document comes from the Ghanaian parliamentary debates that led to the introduction of dual citizenship in the 1990s. In 1995, Ghana decided to amend its constitution to allow for dual citizenship, kickstarting a lengthy legislative process that ended in 2000 with the formulation of a new citizenship law. This political decision to introduce dual citizenship made it possible for Ghanaian migrants to no longer have to decide between their Ghanaian citizenship and an acquired citizenship. I sought to find out the reasons for this amendment and whether any of these reasons were in any way related to return migration. Methodologically, I tackled the question by collecting archival data at the Ghanaian parliament's Hansard to trace the parliamentary debate of that policy change towards dual citizenship.

To my knowledge, these sources from the Ghanaian Hansard have so far not been academically studied—although the Ghanaian dual citizenship amendment has featured in several publications on the drivers of dual citizenship (Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar 2014; Whitaker 2011). A reason for the disregard of the actual Ghanaian parliamentary debates on dual citizenship might be that they are relatively difficult to access. In 1999, during the second debate of the Citizenship Amendment Act which would introduce dual citizenship, one member of parliament complained about exactly this inaccessibility of Ghanaian parliamentary proceedings: "A gazette it published for public knowledge. But Mr. Speaker, even those in the legal profession, those, who are practitioners of the law find it very difficult to have access to documents that are gazetted" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1487).

Today, over two decades later, the relative inaccessibility of gazetted documents has not changed. Although the Ghanaian Hansard is in principle public (and copies of parliamentary debates should be available for very little money), it was nevertheless a difficult endeavour to actually get access to the right documents. Not only does the Hansard not have a public entrance beyond the parliament's general guests' entrance. To access the documents, I thus needed a contact within the parliament who would invite me and pick me up from the guests waiting room. The archive had also, as I was told, moved at least once and several documents went missing in the process. Finding relevant documents was therefore a complicated effort that involved my contacts at the parliament, the archivist, and me.[25]

[25] For documents from 2005 onwards, the Ghanaian Hansard is digitally available online on the parliament's website. Older documents are only available in hard copy from the parliament's archive.

Below is a list of the documents debating the Ghanaian dual citizenship amendment that I collected at the Ghanaian Hansard. Of these, the two most detailed and insightful parliamentary debates are the second reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Bill from 1996 and the second reading of the Citizenship Bill from 1999.

Table 2. Documents Consulted on Dual Citizenship

1996	First Reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Bill
1996	Second Reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Bill
1996	Consideration Stage of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Bill
1996	Third Reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Bill
1999	First Reading of the Citizenship Bill
1999	Second Reading of the Citizenship Bill
1999	Second Consideration Stage of the Citizenship Bill
2021	First Reading Citizenship (Amendment) Bill

Two things became clear from the parliamentary debates. First, before the introduction of dual citizenship, Ghana had a long and turbulent history of citizenship legislation, and this history formed an important backdrop to the decision to allow for dual citizenship. In order to better understand the parliamentary debates on dual citizenship, I therefore consulted a second set of documents, namely Ghanaian citizenship legislations. Consulting these documents was possible because, fortunately, the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (by Bronwen Manby and Djibril Balde) has created a very useful online database "on nationality and statelessness in Africa featuring national law and subsidiary legislation" (citizenshiprightsafrica.org 2022). This resource allowed me to reconstruct the legislative history of citizenship in Ghana since independence, and the acts, decrees, and constitutions from the Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative database are set out in the following table:

Table 3. Legal Documents on Citizenship, 1957 – 2000

YEAR	TITLE	LEGISLATURE	NR.
1957	Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act	1st Republic, The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana	Act 1
1961	Ghana Nationality Act	1st Republic, The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana	Act 62
1967	Ghana Nationality Decree	National Liberation Council, Chairman Lt.-Gen. J. A. Ankrah	NLCD 191
1969	Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree	National Liberation Council, Deputy Chairman J. W. K. Harlley	NLCD 333
1969	Constitution of the Republic of Ghana	2nd Republic, The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana	
1971	Ghana Nationality Act	2nd Republic, The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana	Act 361
1972	Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree	National Redemption Council, Chairman Colonel I. K. Acheampong	
1978	Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree	Supreme Military Council, Chairman Lt-General F. W. K Akuffo	SMCD 172
1979	Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, Chairman Fl.t Lt. Jerry J. Rawlings	(AFRCD 42)
1979	Constitution of the Republic of Ghana	3rd Republic, The Parliament of the Republic of Ghana	
1992	Constitution of the Republic of Ghana		
1996	Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act		Act 527
2000	Citizenship Act		Act 591

Secondly, it became apparent from my research in the archives of the Ghanaian Hansard that today, over two decades after the dual citizenship amendment, dual citizenship was again politically debated: in 2021, a policy had been brought to parliament to again discuss amendments to Ghanaian dual citizenship. I therefore added a third set of data to understand the political dimension of dual citizenship in Ghana: recent Ghanaian news articles about potential further amendments to the dual citizenship regulations.

Based on these three sets of data—parliamentary debates, legislations, and news articles—I reconstructed the political history of citizenship in Ghana since independence. I use this political history to discuss and contextualise the findings from the interviews with voluntary returnees. Since this thesis is based on one single case country, evaluating the findings from the interviews in their historical

context is an important methodological step. Because there is variation across time in the Ghanaian state's attitude towards dual citizenship, the historical review reveals important political factors that paved the way for dual citizenship to function in the way described in the interviews.[26]

Finally, I conducted a small number of expert interviews (five in total). I interviewed three current or former civil servants at Ghanaian offices that deal with return migration: the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, the Diaspora Affairs Office of the President, and the Ghana Enterprise Agency. The idea was to find out about how much these administrative bodies had dual citizenship on their radar. I also interviewed a former consultant who had participated in the drafting of the current government's "Diaspora Engagement Policy", again to see how much dual citizenship featured in internal debates about return migration. And lastly, I interviewed one former staff member of the parliament's legal department who was working there during the drafting of the dual citizenship amendment in order to better understand the political climate at the parliament at the time of the amendment. Because of their different professional backgrounds, the questions that I asked each of the five experts, varied greatly. Generally, it seemed from the interviews that dual citizenship was not very much a topic in the Ghanaian public sector. Unfortunately, I faced difficulties finding people who would agree to participate in my expert interviews. I therefore did not get enough material to be able to formulate any hypotheses strong enough to include systematic analysis of expert interviews

[26] Betts (2021) is a good example of a similar methodological approach. He reconstructs a historical review to find out about within-case variation.

into this thesis. My analysis of the political history of Ghanaian dual citizenship therefore is based only on textual material.

3.4 Conclusions

This chapter has laid out how I approached my central research question, which asks for the impact that dual citizenship has on life after return migration. I have argued that Bourdieu's theories of capital (and class) offer a useful lens to study the subtle differences that returnees' citizenship status may make in their everyday lives. Milanović argues that with global inequalities citizenship becomes a form of rent; yet a Bourdieusian perspective, I have argued, allows for a more holistic analysis of the links between global inequalities and citizenship. This is because Bourdieu's theory combines an analysis of economic benefits with an analysis of other forms of capital, namely social capital and cultural capital. I further outlined my methodological approach, which consisted of two types of analyses: one that sheds light on the social dimension of return migration with/without dual citizenship, and one that sheds light on the political dimension of dual citizenship in Ghana and mainly aims to contextualise the social dimension.

I studied the social dimension of dual citizenship and return migration with the help of biographical interviews with voluntary return migrants and defined them as anybody who returned or circulated for other reasons than leisure and self-described as voluntary returnees. My interview participants were diverse in many ways, but their attitudes towards dual citizenship correlated with one particular characteristic, namely their family backgrounds. In particular, those people who

belonged to elite families differed from the rest of the participants in their views on dual citizenship.

I studied the political dimension of dual citizenship by reconstructing the political history of Ghanaian citizenship politics from independence to the present. To do so, I examined the parliamentary debates that led to the amendments of Ghanaian law that introduced dual citizenship. These debates suggested that Ghana's legislative history prior to the introduction of dual citizenship formed an important backdrop. I also studied Ghanaian citizenship legislations from before dual citizenship, and because dual citizenship today seems to again be subject to reforms, I also studied a recent parliamentary proposal as well as news articles that discuss possible amendments dual citizenship in Ghana. Together, these documents paint a holistic picture of dual citizenship politics in Ghana, from its historical roots to today's political debates.

In the next three chapters, I will discuss the findings that result from these methods. Chapter four discusses the dominant view of dual citizenship that emerged in the interviews. Chapter five discusses the attitudes towards dual citizenship expressed by members of elite families. A brief conclusion compares these two views. Chapter six then outlines the political history of dual citizenship in Ghana.

4. Benefits of Dual Citizenship in Ghana

> "How familiar are you with Bourdieu? So, I'm a big Bourdieu fan. If I was to take out a page of Bourdieu's book, I would say that it [US citizenship] endows you with significant symbolic, cultural, and social capital. […]" (Interview 43)

Interviewee 43 grew up in the Ghanaian periphery: in the rural northern part of Ghana, far away from the economic strongholds in the south of the country—the coast and the former capital Kumasi. His dad became the first in the family to have received university education and worked as a medical doctor. He himself won a scholarship to study in the US, where he spent around 15 years, matriculating from a renowned university, working on Wall Street, and developing his own business ideas. He acquired US citizenship towards the end of his time in the US, when he was already making plans to move back to Ghana. After resettling to Ghana and while building a company in parallel, he continued his studies and did a PhD in the social sciences. Today, he is a highly successful owner of an African-centred international business and is an outspoken public intellectual. While his return to Ghana has been particularly successful, he is nevertheless quite emblematic for the first-generation returnees that saw dual citizenship as a socio-economic status booster: brought up neither in poverty nor in high-society circles, and with a strong emphasis on education. His answer to my question regarding the effects of dual citizenship, after return, was the observation that citizenship from the US endows the returnees with capital in the Bourdieusian sense. This reflected my own thoughts and became the clearest way to analyse the interview material as a whole.

This chapter is the first of two chapters that discuss my research findings from the interviews. It analyses the view of those participants that *did see* benefits of dual citizenship for everyday life in Ghana. Those who held such a view were both people with and without dual citizenship and both people who had been first- and second-generation migrants (or in between). Crucially, none of them came from the Ghanaian elite, instead their family background can be broadly said to be middle-class. Their parents typically were teachers, nurses, small-business owners, or civil servants. Education was important in their families and seen as a mechanism of upward mobility. Many of them had received a bachelor's degree in Ghana and then received a scholarship for postgraduate education abroad. Most of them had university degrees, often they were the first in their families to have received tertiary education. To different extents, all of them thought of dual citizenship as a status that was beneficial for their socio-economic lives after return. In this chapter, I will analyse what kinds of benefits they saw in dual citizenship. I will argue that for Ghanaian returnees of non-elite backgrounds, dual citizenship functions like a Bourdieusian capital and helps with upward mobility. I will make this argument along the three types of capital: economic, cultural, and social capital.

Disentangling the Effects of Migration from the Effects of Dual Citizenship

Before I dive into my analysis of the value and benefits of dual citizenship for life after return, I should clarify what I mean by "benefits of dual citizenship" and defend my argument from one objection that could be raised. Given that the returnees spent years abroad, studied and worked abroad, could it not well be that the upward

mobility after turn to Ghana is not an effect of the citizenship status, but an effect of the time spent, and the skills acquired abroad?

There are of course effects of migration that are independent of a returnee's citizenship status, particularly if one has spent extended periods abroad. Education and work from abroad are factors that can positively impact employability after return and do not directly depend on a second citizenship, although a second citizenship from the Global North makes it easier to get foreign educational titles and employment opportunities in the first place. Moreover, returning on one's own terms means having the time to prepare for the return, by, for example, setting aside savings or building a house so that one does not return with empty hands. Nauja Kleist argues that "bringing something back" is the most important determinant for a forced returnee's successful reintegration because not being able to ameliorate the life of family members after return is linked to shame and leads to social isolation (Kleist 2020). Voluntary return on one's own terms, arguably, prevents this social stigma and is therefore likely to increase a returnee's social status and respect within their community. Nevertheless, the literature on voluntary return to Ghana indicates that education, preparedness, and voluntariness alone cannot explain successful socio-economic reintegration into the country of origin (Setrana 2017; Setrana and Tonah 2014; 2016, see also discussion in chapter 2).

Another way by which having spent substantial time abroad can influence the return experience is the accent in English. Ghana's only official language is English. Without necessarily having to have citizenship from abroad, returnees can signal through their US or UK accent that they must have lived abroad for a long time and suggest that they are full members of society abroad. This can have both positive

and negative effects. The positive effect, as one returnee without a second citizenship explained, consists in being taken more seriously when talking with a US or UK accent, a beneficial effect in work settings. As one Ghanaian-British businessman explained: "whoever you're speaking with, they take you a bit more serious which is a bit sad. But it is just the way this country has developed. Yeah, it has definitely opened so many opportunities for me because they assume because you have a British accent, you probably know more." (Interview 4). A returnee from the US who did not have US citizenship reported the same—"my accent will open up doors" (Interview 27)—and added that he tried to code-switch, depending on the situation. I witnessed this kind of code switching in several in-person interviews when the conversation was interrupted by waiters, employees, or bypassing merchants. Not all, however, were able to switch between accents, particularly second-generation returnees struggled speaking with a Ghanaian English accent and also might not speak any of the indigenous Ghanaian languages. They reported the downside of inadvertently signalling one's migration background, which lies in being perceived as foreign. In a society where consumer goods often do not have fixed prices and small-scale corruption is an everyday life reality, being perceived as foreign often meant having to pay more and being asked for higher bribes. As one participant put it: "you pay with your accent" (Interview 13).

Education, work experience, and ways of speaking are all effects of migration. We can, however, disentangle such effects of having lived abroad from the effects of formal membership in a country of the Global North—or, in other words, the effects of owning a second passport from a country of the Global North. It is these effects of formal membership which this chapter will be interested in.

4.1 Dual Citizenship as Social Capital

Membership in a group of people can be described as social capital if the membership symbolises prestige (Bourdieu 1987, 4). Many goods and services can be simply bought with economic capital, that is, with money. Others, however, can be only, or more easily, accessed because of social obligations and social relations, in other words, with social capital. For example, careers, power, and wealth depend not only on individual achievements, but also on group affiliations and advantageous connections. The French aristocracy is a classic example that Bourdieu gives to explain social capital. Being aristocratic means being a member of a prestigious and exclusive circle of people. Its members (at least in the French society of the 1970s that Bourdieu had in mind) enjoy privileges based on their membership in the aristocracy. That membership itself is also not purchasable but hereditary, non-members thus have no way of becoming part of that illustrious group (except for marriage).

The parallel between citizenship and the social capital of an aristocratic title is obvious. In the first chapter, I introduced Ayelet Shachar as one of the first citizenship scholars to have studied how global socio-economic inequalities are tied to citizenship. Shachar (2009) compared citizenship in the Global North to aristocratic titles: Citizenship, as is an aristocratic title, signals one's membership in an exclusive group that entails socio-economic power. Access to membership is based on heredity and this, in turn, precludes large parts of the world's population from the social and political benefits of the membership. Shachar does not work with Bourdieu's terminology and does not call citizenship a form of social capital. However, her

description of Northern citizenship is perfectly in line with the definition of social capital.[27]

In this section, I investigate the ways in which dual citizenship—Northern citizenship in combination with Ghanaian citizenship—entails social capital for life after return. In a first step, I will show what standing dual citizen returnees have in Ghanaian society. In a second step, I will show what exclusive benefits dual citizens have compared with Ghanaian society. I will focus on (a) health care services and (b) embassy services because these were the two benefits that emerged most clearly from the data.

Prestige and Respect through Dual Citizenship

One story captured the sense of citizenship as a respect-inducing achievement particularly well. The participant had left Ghana for a master's degree in Belgium and returned to Ghana after having completed his studies but could not find adequate employment in Ghana. His description of his return, although voluntary, resembled the ones that studies on forced return describe:[28] He felt it was shameful that he had not managed to improve his and his family's economic situation after return. Although he had not returned emptyhanded, he had received a master's degree while abroad, he had not been able to make a living out of his education. The shame of his unsuccessful return drove him to migrate again, this time to Canada, where he was

[27] Shachar is a legal scholar, so her focus is on the parallels between citizenship law and inheritance law. That is probably the reason why the "capital"-language is less important to her analysis.
[28] See for example Kleist (2020) on Ghanaians' forced return experience.

pursuing a doctoral degree at the time of the interview. He did not have Canadian citizenship (yet) but expressed a strong wish to acquire dual citizenship because it would earn his family's respect and prove to them that his emigration has been fruitful and successful:

> "Those in Ghana and in other developing countries, they have a lot of respect for countries like Canada, Australia, UK, US, you know. Most people dream of being there. […] So, when people travel and they are able to make it, I mean, they get the respect from their family and their circles: 'you've done well. You've tried and you've been able to go through the process to get a permanent residency and also the citizenship. That's great, you've done a good job'. They see this as a form of development. You have developed yourself." (Interview 3)

He was far from the only one to make the connection between being a dual citizen and being a respected member of Ghanaian society. Other returnees who had also not had the possibility to acquire dual citizenship similarly equated returning as dual citizenship with being respected in Ghana: "Oh, respect. I would be respected" was the prompt and emphatic answer of interviewee 22 when I asked him how his life would have looked differently if he had returned as a dual citizen. He had specialised in renewable energy with an engineering master's degree from Denmark and, despite his promising education and his international experience, still struggled to establish himself in Accra.

Among those who had returned as dual citizens, many painted a similar picture. They recounted everyday experiences in which disclosing their dual status resulted in attention and better treatment. One Ghanaian-US returnee, for example, recounted his experience of opening a Ghanaian bank account. When he went to his bank's branch for the first time, he did not disclose that he was not "just" a Ghanaian citizen but also a US citizen. He recalled receiving bad service and being left alone with a confusing mountain of paperwork. Frustrated, he left without having

completed the administrative tasks to open the bank account. When he returned for the second time, he mentioned in his paperwork that he was also a US citizen. That, he believed, changed the way the bank clerks treated him: they were more attentive and helpful than the first time, when he unsuccessfully tried to open a Ghanaian bank account as a Ghanaian citizen. He was aware that, beyond wielding respect and awe, there were other benefits of dual citizenship, such as embassy services, which he had not "explored" yet. But the way others treated him was the one effect most important to his everyday life:

> "So I think there are some benefits [of dual citizenship for life in Ghana]. But have I explored them truly? I don't think I have. But having a US passport makes people treat you a bit differently: so when you try to open a bank account, you fill this in as part of your paperwork, the fact that you are a US citizen gives you a special kind of treatment." (Interview 47)

Other dual citizens reported that they felt people tried to be closer to them because of their dual citizenship. One second-generation returnee, for instance, described how being a dual citizen had been unremarkable for her before moving back to Ghana, where she realised from the reactions of other's how precious her status was from a Ghanaian perspective: "I think I take it for granted that I have a British passport, but those that don't have it know what value it carries. And some people want to get closer to you because you have that passport." (Interview 30). Another woman described how frustrating it was for her to date in Ghana because she often felt that people admired her not for who she was but for her second passport (Interview 42).

Only two interviewees spoke of potential downsides of the high social status attached to being a dual citizen in Ghana. Both cautioned that revealing one's dual citizenship at work could lead to frictions with colleagues who might think the

returnee felt superior to them. Colleagues might also feel threatened in their career progression by a returnee:

> "They [colleagues] know that you went to the US and you came back. I don't think there is too much attention paid to that [citizenship]. When they pay attention to that then it's sometimes a means of excluding you from something. They might at the height of the discussion want to bring up that you're a US citizen and you've come back. For what purpose? Just to say without saying it explicitly that you don't get it, that you don't have the local understanding to contribute at that level of the discussion. […] They may be afraid of you. They were doing quite well, heading for the top position before you showed up. You were not a part of their calculations." (Interview 7)

I will later discuss in more detail what impact dual citizenship can have on returnees' professional live (see section 4.2). For now, the point I want to make is that returning with dual citizenship is generally met with respect and admiration by Ghanaian society—at least in the perception of Ghanaian returnees who are not part of the countries' elite. In their social circles, there seem to be only very limited counterexamples of dual citizenship being perceived as something negative.

Embassy Services

> "There are certain engagements that you only get invited to if you have this [citizenship from abroad]. So, I am on the British citizens list, so when Prince Charles came to Ghana, I got to go. […] So, you have access to this network of people as well. […] When they [the embassy] have business meetings, when their investors are coming to do things in Ghana, then they also invite people over. Even with Covid, I think they sent out notifications that if you were having a hard time getting the vaccine, come here. I know the US did that. You know things like that. And protection. If anything happens in Ghana, God forbid, I'd have a way out even though I wouldn't really want to go anywhere else." (Interview 20)

Altan-Olcay and Balta (2016) offer an interesting analysis of US citizenship as a form of social capital in Turkey. They showed that with President Erdoğan's increasingly anti-Western and conservative-religious course the Turkish political

elite—which rose with Kemalist secular, pro-Western politics and have been distinguishing themselves through Western consumption patterns—now use the acquisition of second Northern citizenship as exit strategies. Altan-Olcay and Balta argued that the social capital of second citizenship in Turkey's current political situation manifests in the opportunity to leave Turkey towards a place where one is already a member and where one shares cultural practices (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2020). Harpaz and Mateos (2018) and Harpaz (2020) similarly argued that having travel rights and the possibility to leave is the main reason for people in the Global South to acquire a second passport.

The evacuation guarantee that embassies provide is one way in which dual citizens are privileged, and interviewees brought up this safe route out of Ghana in the conversations. But the Ghanaian political climate differs from the Turkish. Because Ghanaian returnees did not feel any imminent threat to their rights or safety in Ghana, having an exit plan was generally not a major concern. There are, however, particular embassy services which return migrants with dual citizenship are eligible for and these services do not have anything to do with leaving Ghana. They are benefits that dual citizens can enjoy in Ghana because of their Northern citizenship, benefits that their fellow Ghanaian citizens are excluded from.

For instance, as the participant in the above quote pointed out, at least some Western embassies offered Covid-19 vaccines for their citizens at a time when the

average Ghanaian had almost no access to vaccination.[29] The interviewee also reported that she was invited to the UK embassy when delegations visited Ghana, which gave her access to networks that other Ghanaians would not be able to reach. Moreover, embassies can use their status to showcase projects: another Ghanaian-British returnee reported that the British High Commissioner in Ghana—quite a high-rank diplomat[30]—came to open her small business in the hospitality industry, which gave the launch a huge publicity boost. "The British High Commissioner actually came and opened it [her business] which was fantastic for us. It definitely gained publicity, we were on their Instagram page, so it brought a lot of publicity from that" (Interview 27).

The UK embassy of course is not the only one that offers these kinds of services. The US embassy, for instance, also seems to regularly organise events for and with their citizens. In 2019, for example, it hosted an event for Black History Month together with the African American Association of Ghana, a returnee organisation. The press release of the event makes clear that the US embassy had dual citizen Ghanaian Americans on their radar:

> "Several dignitaries spoke including the [Ghanaian] Director of Diaspora Affairs from the Office of the President who talked about the importance of Ghanaian Americans and diasporas worldwide of Ghanaian heritage returning to Ghana and

[29] Ghana Covid-19 vaccination rollout was hailed by WHO as "exemplary for its planning, speed and high-level leadership" (World Health Organisation 2021). Nevertheless, due to lack of supply, Ghana's population had for long only limited access to vaccinees: "To date, Ghana has fully vaccinated around 2.7% of its population. Vaccination rates across Africa remain low due to supply constraints: just 1.6% of the continent's population has been fully vaccinated so far" (ibid.).

[30] British High Commissions are specific British diplomatic missions in Commonwealth countries that maintain diplomatic relations, and provide travel information, passports, dual citizenship information and other Commonwealth-related services.

> contributing to intellectual and financial investment in the country." (US Embassy in Ghana 2019)

With so called "Town Halls", the US embassy, moreover, regularly offers their citizens an opportunity to meet, get assistance from the consular section, and learn about resources from representatives of US services. The most recent town hall was held to introduce the new ambassador and offered participants the chance to speak with important staff members of the embassy:

> "The U.S. Embassy in Accra is hosting a virtual Town Hall to introduce U.S. citizens in Ghana to our newly arrived Ambassador […]. Participants will also hear from the Regional Security Office, the Consular Section, and the Peace Corps Country Director. Representatives of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service, and the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service will be on hand to answer questions." (US Embassy in Ghana 2022)

In pre-Covid-19 times, the US embassy in Ghana held these events in person at the US embassy and even travelled around the country to offer such town hall events and consular services to US citizens living outside of Accra. Now, town halls seem to have been moved online (US Embassy in Ghana 2018, 2019, 2022). Nevertheless, the amount of service provided is in stark contrast to what normal Ghanaians experience when they apply for US visas: One interviewee recounted that the waiting room at the US embassy seems insufficient for the number of applicants so that there regularly is a long queue of applicants standing for hours exposed to the dust and burning sun (Interview 40). In a country that is not in political or economic turmoil, such services have a much bigger impact on dual citizens' everyday life than the abstract knowledge that they could be flown out of the country in case of a major disaster.

Health Care Services

The right to travel freely that a Northern passport entails does not only make it possible to leave the Global South. The mobility, coupled with the right to claim access to services in the Global North qua membership, opens up the possibility of living in the Global South and travelling for medical services in the Global North. Dual citizen returnees can thus live their lives in Ghana but enjoy better, non-Ghanaian, health care that their Ghanaian neighbours who do not have the social capital of dual citizenship will never be able to access.

There are much worse health care facilities than those available in Ghana. Ghana ranks 8 out of 54 in Africa and 104 out of 195 globally, according to the Global Health Security Index (Global Health Security Index 2021). While Ghana's capital, Accra, arguably has the most modern health care facilities in the country, the city is also rapidly growing, so fast that it is outgrowing its own infrastructure. Corruption among medical personnel, as one interviewee claimed, is therefore high (Interview 29). Dual citizens could not claim to be treated better than other patients at Ghanaian medical facilities, but they could avoid having to rely on them. "I get all my check-ups done in the US" (Interview 43), said one interviewee matter-of-factly—and why would he not? With their mobility rights and eligibility for medical care in the country of second citizenship, dual citizens could receive routine medical examinations in the Global North. This meant that they did not have to go through the humiliating process of having to use bribes in hope of better and faster care (Interview 43).

Making use of one's second citizenship for better medical care seems also to be socially expected in Ghana. That would explain the example of two participants who had to defend their decision to give birth in Ghana and not in the country of

their second citizenship: “A lot of people have asked me why I wouldn’t give birth abroad” (Interview 25). Interviewees, quite rightly, pointed out that they did not feel inclined to travel long distances nine months pregnant to give birth away from home and family. But such a decision is apparently not so self-explanatory in the Ghanaian context. The medical care situation in Ghana shows that the social capital of being a dual citizen in Ghana also entails medical services that can only be accessed based on membership in the Global North and therefore unreachable and prestigious in the Ghanaian context. Here, the dual citizenship contributes to a two-class system of those who must make do with the local medical system and those who have the privilege not to.

Bourdieu polemically described those with social capital as “separated by a difference in kind from the commoners” (Bourdieu 1989a, 15–16). This seems to be also true for Ghanaian return migrants with dual citizenship: they are respected for their achievement in having obtained Northern citizenship. Without having to become foreigners in their own country, they can transform their membership in the Global North into services that other Ghanaians have no way to access. Some of these services entail international travelling, but they all impact the life of dual citizens living in the Global South.

4.2 Dual Citizenship as Economic Capital

The social capital of formal membership in the Global North is also convertible into both economic capital and cultural capital. Let us look first at economic capital. Both employees and entrepreneurs expressed views on the benefits of dual citizenship

that can be interpreted in such a way that dual citizenship is a form of economic capital that helps with economic success after return. Depending on whether one is employed or self-employed, dual citizenship, however, works slightly differently, as I will show over the course of this section.

The Economic Capital of Dual Citizenship for Entrepreneurs

Dual Citizenship has three major economic benefits for entrepreneurial returnees, giving them a head start compared with their Ghanaian counterparts who do not have a second Northern citizenship. These benefits are financial assistance, planning security, and easier management of business partner relationships. Opening a business in Ghana is a risky endeavour and does not come with much support from the Ghanaian state. The Ghanaian state does not have the means to attract businesses with start-up funding. At the same time, it is fair to assume that public requests for tenders will involve higher degrees of corruption in Ghana than in countries of the Global North with higher transparency ratings.

Ghanaian business-owners with dual citizenship, however, did not need to rely on the Ghanaian side only, but were also eligible for start-up funding or public tendering in the country of their second citizenship. Such financial opportunities were out of reach for Ghanaian competitors and thus gave the dual citizen returnee competitive advantage. A returnee who had founded two international companies that work across the African continent explained this to me. He had started founding his companies before he had applied for US citizenship but had soon realised how crucial being a US-citizen would be for the success of his businesses:

> "There is just a whole bunch of things that you become eligible for. For example, we just saw an RFP [Request for Proposal] for some project from the US department of trade. Which is an opportunity for my company. You have to be a US person to get that million-dollar opportunity. If I didn't have it [the citizenship] we wouldn't qualify." (Interview 43)

Moreover, due to the instability of the Ghanaian currency (Cedi), interest rates for Cedi loans and mortgages are high. Being a citizen in a country with a strong, stable currency allows the returnee to raise their credit with advantageous conditions. It is possible to get a loan without being a citizen of the country in which one applies for the loan. In the UK, for instance, permanent residents, and even non-permanent residents are, in principle, eligible for a mortgage. But, because banks deem them higher risk customers than UK citizens, the process is much more difficult, and the conditions of the mortgage are worse. That means that returnees with dual citizenship can benefit from higher creditworthiness in the Global North. They need to accumulate fewer funds before being able to set up a business if they have a second Northern citizenship because that citizenship itself is an asset.

This access to loans can also have an impact on returnees housing situation after return: One interviewee who owned a Ghanaian real estate company reported that his Ghanaian customers paid for their houses at once because mortgages were not viable: "People are paying cash because mortgages are too expensive. And the people that need the mortgages often can't qualify for them" (Interview 11). His returnee-customers, however, did not have this problem. Because the owner of the real estate company himself was a dual Ghanaian-US citizen, they could pay by instalments, in US dollars.

The idea that dual citizenship was beneficial in a financial sense was also shared by returnees who did not have dual citizenship. One returnee, who did not

get the chance to apply for citizenship abroad before returning because he suddenly had to return to care for a parent, reflected on this. He had started a business in Ghana which was successful. However, he said, he would have liked to be more international and keep a foot in the UK as well—to live and work transnationally in other words. This would have made his business more profitable, he reflected. However, because he did not have dual citizenship, he did not have business networks in the UK and his company was not international:

> "Okay so maybe having it [dual citizenship] would have allowed me to dual my perspective in terms of: I can run a business there and I also run a business here. That could give me access to more capital. I would have built my network there." (Interview 39)

Apart from these direct financial benefits of dual citizenship for returnee business-owners, dual citizenship also contributes indirectly to the financial success of a business by offering planning stability. Starting a business in a developing country is associated with high risks, as markets are not transparent and infrastructures often inadequate. The second citizenship makes investments in such high-risk economies easier because it provides a safety net if the business idea proves unsuccessful. For example, one interviewee who had dual Ghanaian-British citizenship returned to Ghana for the first time to start an import business. When that business idea did not work out, he returned to the UK where he picked up again his career there. Years later, he moved back to Ghana for a second time, this time employed at the UK's diplomatic services in Accra. He quit that job after several years but stayed in Ghana to try out another business idea, this time successfully. He explained that this career would not have been possible without the dual citizenship because he knew that he would always be able to find at least a low-paying job to sustain himself in the UK. It is important to note that his backup plan thus did not consist in relying

on the British welfare state (although that could be a potential option) but on his work experience in the UK and on the stability of the British economy with its low unemployment rate:

> "You know, you always have it in your mind: if it doesn't work out, I'll go back to London. I think the advantage of dual citizenship is that it always gives you a backup plan. […] If my business in Ghana collapses, I'm like 'I'll go back and get a job at Tesco's, I should be okay'. I always knew that if it didn't work out in Ghana, I could always come back to London. I had a good career in London before I left, and I'd find work in London. So, it's having that fallback which allowed me to take more risks than perhaps I would take if I hadn't that fallback plan." (Interview 10)

The last way in which dual citizenship becomes an economic asset for entrepreneurial returnees regards the ability to keep up business relations across borders through the mobility rights granted by their Northern passport. Being able to spontaneously jet to another country to meet business partners can at times be crucial for the survival of a company. While the Ghanaian passport offers visa-free travel within the ECOWAS region, the Northern citizenship allows for spontaneous business trips to most other parts of the world. This is how one interviewee described the hassles of starting a Ghana-based international business without Northern citizenship, an experience, as he explains, that was pivotal for his decision to apply for US citizenship:

> "I couldn't travel on short notice for work because you need visas and that takes a while. It was a serious issue. You know I was raising capital, meeting investors and an investor would be like, 'Okay, can you meet me in this place next week?' and I'm just like 'Next week?! Honey, I need three months' notice!' hahaha. So that was a disaster." (Interview 43)

The mobility rights of the Northern citizenship allow for a transnational lifestyle, but the effects of that global mobility are also felt locally. The ability to stay internationally connected can be a dealbreaker for returnees who decide to start a

company in Ghana and gives them an economic advantage compared with competitors who do not hold a passport with high mobility rights. It is the Northern citizenship of the dual citizenship which transfers into financial opportunities, planning security and better business relations with international partners. That does, however, not mean that the Ghanaian citizenship is unimportant. Only in the combination of dual citizenship can Northern citizenship really develop its full potential for returnees, particularly if they are self-employed. That is because the Ghanaian state imposes some protectionist rules on non-Ghanaian business and banking activities: opening a bank account in Ghana, registering a business, or buying land, as several interviewees stressed, involves far higher fees for non-Ghanaians. The Ghanaian passport was therefore crucial to their return experience:

> "It [dual citizenship] helped a lot. If I just had my British passport, it would have stopped a lot of things. And it would have meant that I would have had to pay and incur a lot of fees and charges for things. Like opening up a business—that would have been very difficult—and opening up a bank account, that would have been very difficult. Because if you want to open up a business, if you are a foreign national, you have to have at least half a million in your bank account." (Interview 27)

Another interviewee was convinced that, if he would not have Ghanaian citizenship as well as UK citizenship, he "would pay much more in unofficial fees" (Interview 14). When it came to bribery, being able to pass as a normal Ghanaian at the right moment, he argued, saved him money. In the Ghanaian context, Northern citizenship as economic capital, thus, works best in combination with Ghanaian citizenship.

The Economic Capital of Dual Citizenship for Employees

Returnees who did not venture into own businesses but sought employment also felt that dual citizenship was an economic asset, however, in a different way. The main financial benefit of dual citizenship for employees lies in the opportunity to apply for so-called expatriate positions. Expatriates are mobile professionals who work for UN organisations, foreign governments, international non-governmental organisations, or multinational enterprises. Often modelled after diplomatic service, expatriate contracts are often limited to a period of a few years, pay wages on Global North level in hard currencies, and offer a number of additional benefits to compensate for the perceived dire living conditions of developing countries. Interviewees reported that their current or former employers offered employees on expatriate contracts subsidised housing, allowances for children's private school education, a company car, and even a driver (Interview 10)—benefits that people employed as local employees would not get. Returnees would not necessarily self-identify as expatriates, but they would be eligible for the financial benefits of expatriate jobs:

> "Salary-wise, two people could be doing the same job and one person could be seen as an expat and could be receiving much more than the other person who is seen as a local." – *So you are paid as an expat?* – "I wouldn't term myself an expat, but I know that I'm paid more than those that are employed locally. So yes, there is that difference." (Interview 19)

An expatriate salary makes such a big difference for people's lives after return that it was for many potential returnees a precondition for return, as one founder of a returnee organisation explained to me:

> "People are not willing to go back unless they are offered an expat salary. And I know Ghanaians who moved back to Ghana because they got an expat role. […] They now earn about five times of what they would have earned had they gotten it as a Ghanaian citizen." (Interview 14)

The living standards of expatriates are not only far above those of most Ghanaians, but they are also higher than those of many people in the Global North. Moreover, Ghanaian returnees felt like their career in the Global North had been impeded because of their race: "There always seems to be undertones there in the UK which I don't have to bow about here. It seems like there is some glass ceilings there" (Interview 27). That impression is backed by statistics: in the UK, for instance, black households are most likely to be in the low-level household income group of below 600 GBP per week before tax (UK Government 2022). For Ghanaian returnees, finding an expatriate employment thus boosts their income and socio-economic status in three ways. First, their income is much higher than the average income of the society in which they live. Second, the expatriate job also means more perks and a higher purchasing power compared to similar positions in the Global North. And lastly, the income level is also higher compared to the kind of position they would have been likely to achieve if they had not returned but continued to live in the Global North.

At the same time, there is an expectation among other Ghanaians that a returnee would take such expatriate roles. One interviewee who had read postcolonial studies for her British university degree had refused to take up an expatriate position out of conviction. Her contract as local employee of a Ghanaian non-profit organisation, however, did not pay enough to sustain her life and meet the expectation of family and friends that she would help them financially or pay for rounds at bars and restaurants. After less than two years, she returned, disillusioned, to the UK where her British job allowed her to live a life commuting between London and

Accra and contributing to the Ghanaian development in the way she had envisioned. When I asked her what, looking back, she would tell her younger self, she answered:

> "Everybody advised I should get an expatriate job. But I wanted to get a more authentic experience. So, I didn't want to do that. [Looking back] I would advise to do so just because the expectation is that because you've come from Europe, the UK, America, you have come up to the upper echelon of society and when you don't behave that way, people don't know how to interact with you and treat you. So, the only way to behave that way without depleting your savings is to have that job that is going to pay you dollars and pounds, or other hard currencies." (Interview 2)

Postcolonial studies have pointed out the colonial legacy of the expatriate foreign expert, sent from former colonial states to formerly colonised states where they—by association or by choice—contribute to the upholding of imperial imaginations and racialised hierarchies (Cruise O'Brien 1974; Fechter 2016; Fechter and Walsh 2010). Their everyday lives eerily resemble the ones of their colonial predecessors: expatriates often live a segregated life, residing in separate neighbourhood and frequenting only certain bars and social clubs—'islands of white' as Kennedy called them (Kennedy 1987). It is the second, Northern citizenship that allows returnees to enter that 'island of white'—but without being a foreigner in Ghana. They can belong to both worlds, the expatriate world and normal Ghanaian life.

For returnees on expatriate contracts as well, the Northern citizenship alone did not have the same effect as dual citizenship with Northern and Ghanaian citizenship. The Ghanaian citizenship was crucial to signal belonging to Ghanaian society. One second-generation returnee from the Netherlands had returned as a Dutch citizen. Because of Dutch restrictions on dual citizenship, she no longer was a Ghanaian citizen. She felt that made it difficult for her to fully settle in Ghana and to claim her Ghanaianness. She sometimes pondered renouncing her Dutch citizenship to feel more integrated into Ghanaian society. She did, however, not seem to seriously

entertain the idea, both because of the opportunity costs of giving up her Dutch citizenship, and also because she had a feeling of belonging to the Netherlands as well:

> "When I tell people, they say 'are you crazy' haha. And I'm maybe being nationalistic if I give up my Dutch passport for the Ghanaian one. And if I'm honest, I've lived in the Netherlands for most of my life, so I feel more Dutch. So, I would only have the passport for me to feel Ghanaian. But then I would need to apply for visas and all that and I don't think I would want that." (Interview 19)

Civil servants with their very secure permanent employment, unsurprisingly, saw dual citizenship less in terms of an economic capital that benefitted their professional lives. Nevertheless, one person working in the civil service sector explained that he stated his dual citizenship on his online-CV because that helped him secure consultancy jobs with international organisations, which he took up to eke out his salary (Interview 1). As an academic at a Ghanaian state university, he also highlighted the advantage that his UK citizenship had for international travelling for conferences, a career advantage that his colleagues did not have:

> "So, I have colleagues here who have the chance to attend conferences and they have to apply for visa, pay visa fees, go, and attend interviews and be asked why they are going, and how long and all that. And I sign up for a conference if its anywhere in the EU, I just buy my ticket and I go and don't need a visa. I just take my British passport and I'm off. So those little privileges that you take for granted, my colleagues don't have it that easy." (Interview 1)

So even for employees on non-expatriate contracts, the dual citizenship helped with their careers. It also increased their employability for jobs that require international mobility. Again, the mobility right did not just help such people leave the Global South, but benefitted their everyday life in the Global South, such in the case of the below employees working in the non-profit sector:

> "It's very helpful. It really is. We [the non-profit she works for] are planning a trip to America – I don't need to apply for a visa. I don't need to rely, like other people, on getting a visa and the process is sooo long." (Interview 30)

> "I always used to tease my boss because I used to travel a lot. Partly because that was my role, and partly because it was easier for me to travel than it was for other Ghanaians. I could literally get up and go. So, I used to tell my boss: 'You have a blessing in me. Do you know how much money I have saved the business from just visa fees alone?!'" (Interview 20)

To summarise the argument that this chapter has made so far: dual citizenship is a form of social capital that bestows returnees with prestige and respect. It comes with access to networks and services that Ghanaians without second passports cannot access. It is also transferable into economic capital, both on the job market and in the business world. For business owners, dual citizenship means access to more funding and business opportunities, planning security, and better contact with international business partners. For employees, dual citizenship means better employability and eligibility for expatriate positions. The social and economic capital of dual citizenship thus raises both returnees' social status and financial capabilities and sets them apart from the rest of the society in which they live. Beyond that, the social and economic capital of dual citizenship is also convertible into cultural capital, as I will show in the following section.

4.3 Dual Citizenship as Cultural Capital

> "After five years we went to take the test and then we got the citizenship. One of our best days of our lives because we knew it allowed us the opportunity to really tap into a lot of freedom. Freedom of movement, for example, and different kind of opportunities that we'd get access to. […] The biggest thing for me is travel. Number two is getting access to different funding sources that are only for Americans as opposed to for immigrants. I believe that also getting access to grants and stuff for school, like loans, as a citizen you sometimes get better terms than a resident." (Interview 47)

Bourdieu differentiates three forms of cultural capital: institutionalised cultural capital are education levels and professional titles, incorporated cultural capital is the education that one has received, and objectified cultural capital lies in cultural artefacts. (Bourdieu 1983). The social capital that comes from belonging to the small group of people with near-unlimited international mobility rights and special social and economic capital is transferable into cultural capital in the form of education and educational titles, as in the above quote form a returnee with dual Ghanaian-US citizenship. Over the course of this section, I will analyse how dual citizenship can translate into all forms of cultural capital and how that affects life after return migration.

Access to Education and Educational Titles through Dual Citizenship

Northern citizenship is a means towards cultural capital in the form of education and prestigious educational titles, as Altan-Olcay and Balta have shown for US citizenship in Turkey. US citizenship, they show, facilitates children's admission to Turkish private international schools—a major reason for Turkish parents to strategically acquire US birthright citizenship for their children. If the child has US citizenship, the parents pay lower fees for private international schools, avoid sending their child to increasingly religious state schools, and make sure their child would have a smooth migration path in case the political and economic situation in Turkey worsens (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2020).

In Ghana as well, Northern citizenship can translate into cultural capital in form of education and educational titles, however, at a different level—not at

secondary level, but in tertiary education—and not to the same degree. The political and educational systems in Ghana are quite different from the Turkish case. On the one hand, there is no comparable fear of children's indoctrination and consequent decline of school's educational level. On the other hand, there is a great pride in Ghana's state high schools, such as the 1924-founded Mfantsipim school, a boarding school modelled after the British public schools which six Ghanaian heads of governments attended.

Many participants proudly told me of the state schools they went to or stressed the importance of school alumni networks. One person who had gone to a private international school even told me that he felt that the networks he had accessed through his school were inferior to those of the old famous boarding schools: "school networks are very powerful, like Achimota, Mfantsipim, Wesley Girls. And I must tell you that the Ghana International School is not part of that powerful school network" (Interview 34). The annual televised Ghana National Science and Maths Quiz has been won only by pupils from state schools, and newspapers report at length about the competition and the Ivy League offers of the winners (Graphic Online 2018; F. Kyeremeh 2018, 2021; Lamini 2022).

This is to say that degrees from international secondary schools are less important in Ghana than in the Turkish case described by Altan-Olcay and Balta. They are therefore also less of a means to cultural capital. A foreign university degree, however, was perceived by some as a status symbol and means to better pay, as the two below quotes exemplify:

> "*Would your life be different if you returned as an Australian citizen*?—Yes, my life would be totally different. Even before, when I travelled with my master's there was a change: one jobs, finance, and then social status." (Interview 49)"

> "there's the advantage if you do have university education from the UK and you come to Ghana, they will pay you based on your salary in the UK here." (Interview 27).

A few participants, however, disagreed with that view that university education from abroad was valued more than Ghanaian university education. This sceptical view was particularly held by two returnees who had been to countries which did not offer any path towards dual citizenship. They had returned with master's degrees from these countries but still struggled to get by in Ghana. They emphasised that the right kind of networks in Ghana were more important than a foreign degree:

> "I talked to some friends, and they said they travelled but they are not able to stay [in Ghana] because there isn't much opportunities. It's a whole lot of who you know and who knows you. It depends on people you know in government. They say, 'I've been to the best universities—Oxford, Harvard, Yale, but you don't know. It's a bit difficult.'" (Interview 3)

The picture is thus mixed: some valued educational degrees from the Global North, and others had left Ghana with that same hope but were disillusioned by the dire Ghanaian job market after returning with their education from the Global North. It seems that the cultural capital that a foreign degree can invoke depends on the field in which one hopes to work after return. International employers might be more interested in educational titles from the Global North that Ghanaian employers. For instance, one returnee who had done a law degree in the UK decided to return shortly after her degree because she knew that, in the long run, she would like to live in Ghana, and that she needed to take the Ghanaian bar exam for that, rather than UK's bar exam. She was, however criticised by her family for that decision, because it was a decision against dual citizenship: "It wasn't an attractive thing [to stay in the UK]. But I do have family members who disagreed, who said: you

should have stayed in the UK at least until you've gotten citizenship because it gives some advantages." (Interview 45)

Regardless of how much cultural capital education from the Global North involves, dual citizenship is not only an asset for oneself, but it also ensures that the right to it will stay in the family. With citizenship from countries like the UK or US, children will be eligible to apply for more UK or US scholarships and loans and will also pay lower matriculation fees, a fact that mothers particularly stressed: "On the one hand, you have lower fees, and on the other, you may have more opportunities for scholarships" (Interview 25). Another mother with dual citizenship knew already, although her children were still in primary school, that she would want them to go to British universities:

> "The university lifestyle there is different from here. And it's a good one as well. It's definitely a good life experience and I'd like my children to have it. And again, there's the advantage if you do have university education from the UK and you come to Ghana, they will pay you based on your salary in the UK." (Interview 27)

The ability to confer their citizenship onto their children allows dual citizens to enter the small circle of Ghanaian families that can send their children abroad for university degrees, which was seen by many interviewees as a form of cultural capital. This cultural capital has the potential to be interchanged into advantages on the job market in Ghana. Again, while the experience of going to university in the UK or Us or another Northern country lies outside of Ghana, its benefits were also felt in Ghana.

The Educational Title of Dual Citizenship

One interviewee, interestingly, described dual citizenship as an educational title in itself. He argued that, once one has citizenship abroad, one is perceived as more knowledgeable on certain topics than returnees without the second citizenship. This is because the dual citizen is expected to maintain a transnational life and stay connected to both geographical places while returnees who do not have the second citizenship easily lose their claim to expert knowledge about the Global North because they have a harder time to maintain their connection:

> "If you are someone who is in between the two geographical locations, then it means you have the privilege of knowing what is going on out there as well as what is going on here, the privilege of knowing what is happening in both geographical locations, your second citizenship and your origin country. […] With that, you get some level of respect. People are checking with you if the information they have is accurate because they know you know. You have more knowledge about what is happening in the UK than they have. So, whatever it is, you are called upon to confirm whether this is accurate or not." (Interview 1)

Bourdieu argued that educational titles institutionalise cultural capital because they legally and permanently signal cultural competency without the owners of the title having to prove themselves over and again. This seems to be the argument that the interviewee also tried to make with the quote. Because people around him knew that he had dual citizenship, they assumed that he must be knowledgeable about the UK and took his opinion as truth. Just as educational and professional titles are seen as equalling expert knowledge, so did dual citizenship in his account. He felt that his knowledge on the UK was no longer questioned because of his title of UK citizen attested his expertise. Even though only one person made such an observation, it is quite a compelling observation, particularly if we take into account that for the vast majority of the Ghanaian population, getting first-hand information from

the Global North is close to impossible due to visa restrictions and travel costs. For people who never left Ghana towards the Global North—and that is the vast majority of the population—dual citizenship might indeed symbolise expert knowledge on the Global North.

Access to Rare Goods through Dual Citizenship

When Bourdieu spoke of objectified cultural capital, what he had in mind were artworks, "such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc" (Bourdieu 2007, 50). For my study, I suggest that we can expand Bourdieu's list to include items of daily life in the Global North that are rare and therefore expensive and luxurious in the Global South. Northern citizenship facilitates the accumulation of such cultural capital in the form of rare, and therefore luxurious, goods.

Although Accra's economy is booming, there are still many international retail brands that do not have branches in Ghana. It is difficult to find information about this, but a few eclectic numbers may help get a sense of the situation: essential spare parts for vehicles, for example, are difficult to get, which is a major threat to road safety (see for example: Damsere-Derry et al. 2022). Electronic devices are also often easier to get second-hand than new. In 2009, for example, 70 percent of Ghana's imported electric and electronic devices were second-hand (Amoyaw-Osei et al. 2011). The first official Apple store was accredited in 2013 and is now one of three in the whole country. Ghana is a major importer of lowest grade second-hand clothing (Manieson and Ferrero-Regis 2022) while a simple Google maps search reveals that no European or American fashion brand seems to have stores in Ghana; and in

2021 the opening of a Decathlon sports store in Accra was an event of such magnitude that the French Ambassador and four Ghanaian ministers (Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Sports, Ministry of Information, and Ministry of Tourism) inaugurated the store (Quansah 2017).

My interviewees attested that while online shopping had become easier since the Covid pandemic's boost to online trade, only very few vendors on Amazon shipped products to Ghana and the shipping costs were extremely high.

> "I think now, after Covid is when Amazon really wrapped up their logistics. But when I got here, you couldn't really buy things on Amazon and ship it to Ghana. Now it's open a lot more. But the costs of it! Sometimes the costs are higher than the item itself. But if I'm going back and forth, I can just put it in my luggage. You know, it's easier to move to transport things." (Interview 5)

An experiment of setting Ghana as delivery location on Amazon and then searching for "laptop" or "notebook" quickly reveals two things. First, there are very few results—most results seem to be paper notebooks, handbooks about computers and used laptops. Second, buying a brand-new laptop involved extra costs of several hundred US dollars: a Dell laptop costing 1289 USD, for instance, will require 69 USD in shipping costs plus a deposit of 380 USD for import fees with no security of getting the deposit back. A Ghanaian blog therefore recommends the following for buying on Amazon:

> „1. Use an Acquaintance. If you have a friend or acquaintance residing in the United States, you can forward the item you want to buy on Amazon to the address of your friend. This works perfectly if the friend will be visiting Ghana in a matter of weeks." (Avenuegh.com)

If this method does not work, the blog suggests asking the vendor to ship to Ghana, though admitting that one should be prepared that the vendor may not agree. As a third option, the blog recommends paying for forwarding companies. These

companies are specialised in import-export business and have warehouses both in Ghana and the Global North. One can thus use their warehouse in the Global North as delivery address and then have the items shipped to their warehouse in Ghana. This is normally not done for single items, but one can get a whole box to fill. The company then takes about four weeks to ship the box to the Ghanaian warehouse according to one interviewee (Interview 1). It is therefore necessary to buy in bulk and expect the return period to end before the items have arrived.

In a context such as this, Northern citizenship is a means to cultural capital because the mobility rights of the passport allow one to easily import goods that are otherwise exceedingly difficult and expensive to obtain in Ghana. Participants reported using their dual citizenship to import electronic devices, skin care products, and fittings, but also furniture and washing machines (Interview 1, 5, 26, 41), either for acquaintances or for themselves. One interviewee even bought Western food items so that he would be able to continue his acquired Western eating habits in Ghana. Another participant, who returned from the US without US citizenship, felt that ending the frustration of constantly having to rely on his relatives in the US for online shopping was the most important change the dual citizenship would have made for his life:

> "I think it would have been easier, in the sense that I could have travelled back and forth if I need things, if I want to make business connections or import things, bring things. You know America has a lot of resources that are not here. I have to rely on someone else if I need something. […] Right now, I just bought a computer. I shipped it to my parents' house [in the US]. They can now inspect the computer and make sure it is what I actually bought, before they then ship it to someone who can bring it to me." (Interview 5)

The access to goods is further facilitated by the economic capital of a foreign credit card. One Ghanaian-US participant claimed that as a dual citizen "it's easier to

get things from the US because your credit card works around the world." (Interview 7). He then went on to complain that acquaintances only contacted him when they needed him to pay with his credit card for them: "It's only when they need help, haha. They want to go somewhere but they don't have a credit card so they are struggling with booking the hotel and you can easily do that for them. Those are the times that they appreciate your US citizenship" (Interview 7).

Overall, we can say that dual citizens who return to Ghana can use their membership in a country of the Global North to leverage cultural capital in the form of education, educational titles from that country, and access to rare goods. The importance of such education and titles was debated between returnees and seems to be lower than in the Turkey case as discussed by Altan-Olcay and Balta (2016, 2020). However, there are some indications that dual citizenship itself can also function as an education marker that once and for all confirms its bearer's expertise. Everyday life artefacts of the Global North that are hard to get in Ghana and therefore expensive and precious are another way through which dual citizens have access to cultural capital that other Ghanaians do not have. Because of their mobility, dual citizens have an easier time importing goods into Ghana and other Ghanaians who do not have such travel rights rely on their mobile relatives and acquaintances for access to goods that are otherwise not available in Ghana.

4.4 Upward Mobility within Ghana through Dual Citizenship

Over the course of this chapter, I have shown that dual citizenship is widely seen as something respected and prestigious, and return migrants can translate its

resources into social, economic, and cultural capital. Having access to such capital through dual citizenship, as is evident from the preceding analysis, has a positive impact on life after return migration. Returnees with dual citizenship have access to special embassy services and networks and access to health care in the Global North. Their dual status also has a positive impact on their professional life after return: their businesses have more options and security than businesses of Ghanaians without dual status. If they seek employment, they are eligible for high-paying expatriate contracts and their easy access to banking in the Global North also has an effect on the kind of housing they can afford. Dual citizenship can thus help with upward mobility after return migration. Their upward mobility may even constitute a kind of dual mobility: their socio-economic position after return is better than before migration, and it is also better than during their time as emigrants.

Upward Mobility through Dual Citizenship

To illustrate the magnitude of that upward mobility, I would like to come back to one case that I had already briefly discussed over the course of this chapter, the case of a second-generation returnee with Ghanaian-British citizenship who opened a business in the hospitality sector which the British High Commissioner came to open. She had grown up under circumstances of poverty and violence in a London social housing complex which is infamous for being at the heart of the 2011 London riots:

> "The feeling that I got when I set foot in Ghana, was a different level of peace that I can't even put into words. It was just, it was numbing […] You know, I grew up in a very rough area. […]—*Where is that?*—Broadwater Farm Estate. It was the first estate in London to cause the London riots [Broadwater Farm riots 1985]. It was a

> massive, massive thing and then it happened again [London riots 2011] when a friend of mine was shot by the police, Mark Duggan. I don't know if you've heard of that story?—*Yes. And he was a friend of yours*?—yeah. I grew up with him, literally. I know his whole family, we used to play together. So that was a big thing, I've seen a lot." (Interview 27)

Her traumatic childhood and youth are in stark contrast to the life that she lived after moving to Ghana. Not only had she left a very stressful and violent environment. But socio-economically, her life had also changed drastically. At the time of the interview, she had regular contact with British diplomats and with other returnees who came to her for a Western dining experience that was near impossible to find elsewhere in Ghana. She and her husband had even been interviewed on their return experience by a well-known TV presenter. She generally felt people respected her for her status of being both Ghanaian and British. She described her upward mobility in Ghana in terms of class and was convinced that dual citizens were at the very top of the Ghanaian class system:

> "Ghana has classism as well, I don't know if you noticed. Ghana has classism as well. Like, the British-Ghanaians that come here, they are above the, how can I say, the high society Ghanaians. And the high society Ghanaians are over the working-class Ghanaians and then the working-class Ghanaians are over the local Ghanaians." (Interview 27)

Members of the Ghanaian high society would have certainly debated her idea of how class was structured in Ghana, and I will show in chapter five that the Ghanaian elite saw the order differently. They saw themselves at the very top of the Ghanaian social structure and returnees with dual citizenship as 'nouveaux-riches' who tried to leverage their dual status to be part of their circle. This debate notwithstanding, the above quotation illustrates the perception that returnees had of how their dual citizenship affected their socio-economic position after return. One could say, the interviewee had a clear sense of her place in Ghanaian society where she

belonged because of her dual status. Dual citizenship was an aid to upward mobility after return, not only in terms of capital, also in the self-perceived social standing.

Distinction through Dual Citizenship in Ghana

"This sense of one's place is at the same time a sense of the place of others"
(Bourdieu 1987, 5)

For Bourdieu, it is not only capital that determines one's class position. People with a similar class position (similar amount and composition of capital and similar social mobility patterns) are also shaped by that to the degree that they develop similar lifestyles, similar tastes, and similar outlooks onto the world. They distinguish themselves through that from people with other class positions. In *Distinctions*, Bourdieu studies at length how people of different social classes differ and distinguish themselves through their tastes and lifestyles. My study set out to understand the impact of dual citizenship on people's lives in Ghana and not the lifestyle of dual citizens in Ghana. Nevertheless, there are numerous hints in the interviews that dual citizenship not only sets returnees apart in their access to capital, but that returnees distinguished themselves through their practices and their lifestyles from other Ghanaians, both from those Ghanaians who had never left, and those who had returned without dual citizenship.

Distinction and upward mobility are apparent in the numerous times that both returnees with and without dual citizenship said that returnees with dual citizenship were respected more by society (see section 4.1). We can also infer that dual citizenship lends itself to a lifestyle that differs from that of average Ghanaians from the way dual citizenship was linked with expatriate jobs and buying consumer goods

that were otherwise sheer impossible to get in Ghana (note the returnee who imported British food stuff to continue his acquired British eating habits while in Ghana) (sections 4.2 and 4.3). We can also infer a sense of distinction from two interviews who described the world of returnees as "cliquey" (Interview 6, Interview 10) though both described successful returnees in Accra, not dual citizenship as such.

Of course, a sense of distinction was most obvious when returnees talked about Ghanaian society in class terms or differentiated between themselves and other groups, such as in the case of the returnee who said that she believed her dual status put her at the very top of the Ghanaian social ladder. Or in the case of the following interviewee who expressed a sense of upward mobility and distinction through his dual citizenship:

> "You can tell that your second citizenship makes you blend better with a certain class of people. And at an official function, you can take part in some conversations while your colleagues are kind of constrained. There are some locals who are also well-travelled, and they can engage in these kinds of conversations." (Interview 1)

He was a Ghanaian-British returnee who worked in Ghana but regularly commuted back to the UK and he explained that his irrevocable mobility rights made him part of a the globally mobile cosmopolitans. He had acquired his dual citizenship through a lengthy process of emigration, and he was also aware of the upward mobility that lies in being able to "blend in with a certain class of people": he did not fail to see that his colleagues, who pursued the same job as he did, would feel excluded from these circles that he felt comfortable interacting with.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I have discussed the views of those interviewees who valued dual citizenship and thought it beneficial for everyday life after return migration. I demonstrated that these returnees, regardless of their own citizenship status, described dual citizenship as a social, economic, and cultural capital that bestowed its bearer with prestige. I also showed that access to the capital of dual citizenship was a means of upward mobility: dual citizen returnees not only had an advantage because of their access to social networks, financial resources, and education that was unreachable for Ghanaians without second citizenship. They also thought themselves set apart through their practices from other Ghanaians. The fact that this view was shared by both returnees who are dual citizens and returnees who are not, strengthens this finding. It suggests that the impact of dual citizenship is felt both positively by those who possess a second Northern passport and negatively by those who do not.

There are three conclusions that we can draw from these findings. The first concerns the literature on strategic citizenship and the citizenship premium. I do not want to imply that the interviewees who benefitted from dual citizenship after return migration acquired dual citizenship *in order to* access these benefits. Irrespective of their initial reasons for dual citizenship acquisition, we can nevertheless see that such acquisition is more than just a ticket out of Global South. The literature on strategic citizenship has so far focussed on the benefits that the acquisition of dual citizenship has for people because it allows them to leave the Global South and become part of the Global North (see chapter two). My findings show that Northern

citizenship also has benefits outside the Global North, for everyday life in the Global South.

The second conclusion concerns the literature on the migration-development nexus. This literature is puzzled by the fact that voluntary return migration does not necessarily correlate with successful economic re-integration in the country of return. My findings help address this puzzle: some voluntary returnees move back with dual citizenship while others do not. Those who move back as dual citizens have more capital to draw on when they return than those who move back without a second passport and therefore have more chances to succeed after return.

The third conclusion concerns the nature of citizenship in a world of stark global inequalities. For the interviewees cited in this chapter, dual citizenship seems to fulfil all three prerequisites for a class marker in Bourdieu's terms: it is describable as a Bourdieusian capital, it seems to invoke forms of distinction, and it has an impact on people's "trajectory in social space", i.e., their social mobility. It seems that, because of the inequalities between the Global North and the Global South, becoming a member of the Global North is a class marker that puts dual citizens somewhere in the upper-middle class of Ghanaian society.[31] This is, however, not the whole picture. The following chapter turns its eye to the Ghanaian elite and is dedicated to a more granular understanding of how dual citizenship and class interlink in Ghana.

[31] Arthur calls this class of people "highly skilled and well-educated professionals" (Arthur 2014, 222).

5. Dual Citizenship Among the Ghanaian Political Elite

Having analysed in Chapter four the ways in which dual citizenship can be seen as a benefit to life in Ghana, this chapter analyses the views of those participants who *did not* see any benefit to everyday life in Ghana. These participants all belonged to politically well-connected families, with relatives who hold or held some of the highest political offices in Ghana, such as presidents or ministers. As with the participants whose responses are discussed in chapter four, these people included both dual citizens and non-dual citizens. None of them, however, had actively acquired dual citizenship. Seven out of nine were dual citizens by birth because their parents had studied or worked abroad at the time of their birth (of these, only three had actually grown up abroad and returned as second generation). Two did not have dual citizenship and, although at a point in their migration they both would have had the option to apply for a green card and subsequent US citizenship, both had decided against it. I will argue in this chapter that their shared socio-economic position within Ghanaian society explains this divergent assessment of dual citizenship as unimportant for life in Ghana.

The chapter starts with context information about the social group that these interviewees belonged to—the Ghanaian politically-connected elite. The chapter is then organised according to the three reasons for this group's view that dual citizenship does not impact life in Ghana. The first reason is the significance of family names and family networks. The second is the group's strong political ambitions and feelings of both civic duty and political agency, stemming from the knowledge of

their families' role in shaping the Ghanaian state. Dual citizenship can be unimportant, even obstructive, to a life of societal and political engagement in Ghana. The third reason I discuss is that this elite does not have a strong need for upward mobility. Dual citizenship, therefore, is less important for them than for the returnees who do not have an elite family background. The last section of the chapter compares the reasoning of the elite with the reasoning of Ghanaians from middle-class background and does so along the Bourdieusian categories of capital and class. It concludes that dual citizenship can be particularly advantageous for life in Ghana if one is in a situation of upward mobility.

5.1 Who are the Political Elite?

Compared to the majority of the Ghanaian population, it might seem that *all* the people who participated in my study were part of the Ghanaian elite. This is because most of them held at least a bachelor's degree and studied abroad, while the vast majority of the Ghanaian population do not hold secondary school degrees, and might therefore not even have a good grasp of English (the only official language and language of education in Ghana); many also work in the informal sector (Amuzu 2019). But a closer look revealed that my interviewees were far from a homogenous group. As outlined earlier (see chapters 3), I found during my research that the greatest divide in how dual citizenship was perceived to affect life in Ghana correlated with access to political power circles through family ties. Before I address how participants with such family connections viewed dual citizenship, I will give some background on the emergence and persistence of the Ghanaian ruling class. This will

help give a sense of who these participants are and explain the power of their family backgrounds.

A Very Short History of Ghanaian Politics since Independence

"Ghana's political history is the history of Dynasties [sic] Families have bossed politics in our country since the nationalist struggle began in earnest in 1947" (Heyford 2007). This quote from an opinion piece by Kofi Heyford published 2007 in the Ghanaian online magazine "Modern Ghana" points to an important feature of politics in Ghana: despite decades of stable democratic rule since 1992 and despite its tumultuous political history pre-1992, Ghanaian political life seems to have been dominated by a close-knit network of a few families since the run-up to the independence in 1957.

Ghana's political history since independence 1957 can be very broadly classified into three periods: i) the rule of the first president, Kwame Nkrumah, which gradually turned more and more authoritarian and ended with a coup against him in 1966. ii) a period of coups and successive military and civil regimes that ended with formulation of the 1992 constitution. iii) The stabilisation of democracy since 1992, a period that has seen several peaceful changes of government (Ayanoore 2018; Fage et al. 2023; Nugent 1995).

Despite the tumultuous years between 1966 and 1992, two political traditions have dominated the Ghanaian political landscape throughout this period and are today reflected in the two major political parties: NPP (New Patriotic Party) and NDC (New Democratic Congress). The NPP has its roots in the pre-independence party

United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) which was founded in 1947 soon after a split from Kwame Nkrumah over his revolutionary course. This turned into the main opposition against him. The NDC, meanwhile, was founded in 1992 by Jerry Rawlings—military dictator turned democratic reformer and first democratically elected president. Though Rawlings presented himself as anti-establishment, the NDC became the political home for Nkrumahists. "In the advent of the 1992 elections Rawlings […] co-opted key Nkrumahist wings to strengthen his coalition. The NDC formed an alliance with one of the Nkrumahist parties, the National Convention Party (NCP) and incorporated key supports of Nkrumah […] into leadership positions." (Ayanoore 2018, 83; see also: Nugent 1995). To put it simply, the two parties that dominate politics today are thus continuations of the movements that brought about independence: the moderate reformers of the UGCC and the pan-Africanist socialist-leaning Nkrumahists.

These two political traditions have given rise to families who have for generations now been involved in Ghanaian politics. To date, no historical account of the formation of Ghanaian political dynasties seems to have been written. That might partly be due to Ghana's relatively strong democratic procedures—unlike more obvious examples of political dynasties, such as Ghana's neighbouring country Togo, where just one family, the Gnassingbés, have been ruling for over four decades (though not historical, see on the difference between Ghanaian and Togolese political elites Osei 2018). The two dominating Ghanaian parties NPP and the NDC have "at least minimal ideological programmes" and are less ethnic and patronage-based than political parties in other similarly sized African economies, as for example Nigeria or Kenya (Elischer 2008, 197). Moreover, since 1992, both political parties

have not only adhered to democratic elections, but have also demonstrated internal democratic procedures, with cases of underdogs winning elections to party offices against the recommendation of the party leadership (Elischer 2008). Ghana is therefore rightly held up as an example of democracy in Africa. That does, however, not mean that political circles are easily penetrable. A social network analysis of Ghanaian members of parliament conducted in 2013 shows not only that "MPs in Ghana form a dense and strongly interconnected network", regardless of MPs party affiliations (Osei 2015, 529). It also shows that nearly a quarter (24.89 percent) of Ghanaian parliamentarians in 2013 had relatives who held or hold similar high positions (Osei 2018, 34).

The fact that these "dynasties" exist is widely understood by the Ghanaian public, as the above cited op-eds and other publications in Ghanaian media outlets can show. However, the main debate in the media is not whether they exist, but whether they are an anti-democratic sign of nepotism or a sign of the establishment of democracy (see for example: Heyford 2007; NewsWatch GH 2022). Which families exactly constitute the circle of most powerful dynasties also seems to be a contentious issue. One article published in The Ghana Report, for example, claims that "Dynasties in politics are not rare, and Ghana has six of such families producing legislators in the current parliament" (Apinga 2021). The article continues by comparing them to the British upper class, claiming that the existence of political dynasties is "widespread in older democratic jurisdictions" and that the UK "has over 150 such families" (Apinga 2021). Another article in Pulse.com.gh claims that there are five most influential political families in Ghana, though only three overlapped with the six families that the previous article names (Pulse Ghana 2017). One

of the families that both articles name, is the family of the current Ghanaian president, Nana Akufo-Addo.

None of my interviewees was running for or held a political office at the time of the interview. Although they were not in the public limelight, it is, nevertheless, very difficult to say anything about their backgrounds without exposing their personal information, simply because of their publicly well-known relatives. To offer a sense of the evolution of Ghana's political dynasties and the social realities of my interviewees without breaching their anonymity, I will briefly discuss the example of Ghana's current president, Nana Akufo-Addo. I did not interview him, but his family's history mirrors many of my interviewees' family histories, and therefore is useful for illustrating the central dynamics.

Akufo-Addo does not conceal his family background, on the contrary, he proudly names his ancestors and his wife's family background in biographies, such as the short biography on the website of the Ghanaian embassy in Washington D.C. Here, his own professional and political achievements feature only after this first section clarifies his family background:

> "Born March 29, 1944, in Swalaba, Accra, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo was raised in Accra, Ghana's capital. His father's residence in Accra was effectively the headquarters of the country's first political party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), after it was formed at Saltpond on August 4, 1947. Three of the Big Six (founding fathers of Ghana) were Nana's blood relatives: J.B Danquah (grand uncle), William Ofori Atta (uncle), and Edward Akufo-Addo, who became the third Chief Justice and later ceremonial President of the Republic from 1970-72, was his father. […] He is married to Rebecca, daughter of the Speaker of the Parliament of the Third Republic of Ghana, the late Mr. Justice Griffiths-Randolph." (Embassy of Ghana 2020)

Rumours have it that Akufo-Addo's maternal grandfather was Sir Nana Ofori Atta I.—at least, Afuko-Addo's Wikipedia page claims this connection, however,

without providing any proof. Sir Nana Ofori Atta I. was a Ghanaian regional king who lived from 1881 to 1943 and was described as "the most influential traditional ruler in the affairs of the colonial Gold Coast" (Owusu-Ansah 2005, 192-193). If this is true, the political influence of the president's family goes back much further than the brief biography on the Ghanaian embassy website suggests. This would not be surprising, as there is a lot of evidence of personnel continuities between colonial indirect rule and postcolonial states (Müller-Crepon 2020).

Without exposing personal information of the interviewees discussed in this chapter, this overview of the Ghanaian president's family history should have given an impression of the social circles that the interviewees operate in and the kind of pedigrees they have. Such a contextualisation is important for the understanding of the following sections of this chapter which discuss how this group's divergent view on dual citizenship is explained by their and their families social standing in Ghanaian society.

5.2 Power and Respect: Family Names and Family Networks

"Your network is your net worth" (Interview 24)

What was striking about the interviewees from the political elite was their scepticism of dual citizenship's potential benefits for everyday life in Ghana. Instead, they argued that their families' well-known names and their families' networks had much more bearing than their formal citizenship status as single or dual citizens. I explore this view by discussing their observations of how a famous name and long-established family networks impact everyday life interactions. I will show that with these

assets dual citizenship indeed does not seem to add any extra benefits that their family background would not already cover.

Famous Names and Influential Ancestors

One of the largest migration flows from Ghana to Europe occurred between the 1970s and 1980s, after the 1966 coup ended Nkrumah's one-party socialist rule and ushered in more than a decade of political unrest. The grandfather of interviewee 2 was one of the people who had to flee. He had been an industrialist and ended up receiving political asylum in the UK, together with his daughter—the mother of interviewee 2—who had to drop out of her university degree in Ghana and instead had to take up odd jobs in London's hospitality industry. When interviewee 2 moved to Ghana as a second-generation returnee, she soon realised that mentioning her mother's maiden name made a difference in how she was seen and treated in Ghana:

> "My mother's father was an industrialist in the 70s. So, the people you might call 'old money' know of him. I obviously don't have that name but if I was to introduce myself people would go, 'oh that's not a Ghanaian name.' And then I would say that my mum's family name was XY', and then they'd say, 'oh as in *that* guy'—and then suddenly they are more open to talking to me." (Interview 2)

Interviewee 2 is an interesting case because her experience lies at the border between the political elite and the normal Ghanaians that the previous chapter had discussed. She and her family were no longer really part of elite Ghanaian networks due to several factors: the socio-economic decline caused by her family's sudden political refuge, the fact that she did not bear her mother's maiden name but her father's Nigerian name, as well as the fact that neither her grandfather, nor her mother had returned to Ghana. Nevertheless, her grandfather had been famous, and

his family name still struck a chord in Ghana. Probably it is this position at the outskirts of the elite that made her particularly attentive to the impact of a famous name—not only her grandfather's, but also of those people who by chance have names that resemble the names of politicians:

> "I have friends who have surnames who are similar to the current president's or his mother's side and when you lead with that, people just assume that you are part of the president's clan. So obviously they're treated a certain way because you never know, they might be the niece, the nephew, so you don't want to upset them." (Interview 2)

In her observation, a name associated with power can itself instil some respect in people—as a means of precaution in case the bearer of that name really does belong to the family that the name is famous for. If one does not actually belong to that famous family, the benefit that one can retrieve from the name are probably rather limited. But it is another case in point for her argument that names, not dual citizenship, determine the return experience. She concludes that people from famous families, including herself, much rather benefit from the fact that they are part of the long-established elite than from a second Northern passport: "It's because of their ties to the old elite more so than because they are British that they are able to enjoy that [better treatment]" (Interview 2).

As a consequence, if having a famous name or famous relative influences the treatment one can enjoy in Ghana, knowing one's family history and being able to flag it can be beneficial. At least, many elite persons seemed to know their pedigrees in great detail. Interviewee 15, for instance, traced his family back to the mid-18th century on one side and 19th century on the other side. On both sides, the family's written history begins with a European settler who married into costal Ghanaian royal families. These two quotes summarise well the story of his family:

> "In the mid-seventeen hundreds, […] [name of ancestor] went to the Danish king because he got into trouble somewhere in [Europe]. The king offered him a position in a Danish costal settlement in Osu [today a district of Accra], he came to Ghana, married a Ghanaian woman, and he settled. He had three sons, named [names of three sons]." (Interview 15).

> "Then the other side, was a guy who worked for the British company [name of company], arrived here in the 18-hundreds. The story goes, those days, when a white man came to do business, he was introduced to the local chiefs. […] As they got along well, he [the local chief] sent his daughter, she was called [name], to look after him, and next thing we know they got married. […] [Their son] was my father's grandfather, who then became one of the first Ghanaians working as [high rank employee in the British colonial administration]." (Interview 15).

Aristocratic family names are, of course, the prime example that Bourdieu gives for social capital. Just as in Bourdieu's French examples, Ghanaian aristocratic names and pedigrees are important and instil a sense of prestige and respect. Having a famous family name or a famous ancestor thus impacts on the return experience if people recognise the name or know the ancestor—treating the returnee with more caution and awe as a result. As a descendant of a Ghanaian elite family, one has the option of capitalising on a detailed knowledge of one's family tree. It seems that this social capital of a family name is one of the reasons why dual citizenship was less important for elite's return experience.

Family Networks

The impact of famous family names and famous relatives is closely intertwined with is the impact of the network that one can access as a member of the elite. Deciding to tap into these networks can make it easier to get the amenities that Ghanaians without those networks might access with the help of their dual citizenship: a well-paid job, travel rights, and first-class healthcare.

The case of interviewee 4 illustrates well the impact on employment prospects. Interviewee 4 grew up in London and moved as second-generation returnee to Ghana when his uncle became president of Ghana: "my uncle was a former president. Funnily, that's actually one of the reasons that I moved here" (Interview 4). After moving to Ghana, he recounts that, "It was amazing that life could be so easy." His experiences after return made him realise that there is a barrier as to how far an educational degree from abroad could bring a Ghanaian, a barrier that he did not have to worry about as the nephew of a president: "Fair enough, the curriculum and the education in the UK allows you to be an elite in many ways but it doesn't actually determine your path of success in anyway." (Interview 4).

What made him understand the difference between an educational degree and a family network was the story of his Ghanaian cousin. When interviewee 4 was growing up as a teenager in London, he had spent some time with his cousin who had grown up in Ghana and who "actually got sent to the UK for bad behaviour" (Interview 4). He recalls being very intrigued by his cousin's stories of endless beach parties and fast cars. But only when he himself moved to Ghana, he realised that his cousin had not exaggerated:

> "So, and when I came to Ghana, what he said was actually true. He was partying every day and even when he goes to work, he doesn't actually do anything. He's done by like 1 pm and then he runs back to a party or a bar to, you know, enjoy the rest of the week." (Interview 4)

The reason that such a lifestyle was possible, he added, was the family's networks in Ghana, which his cousin had used to find his job: "His] mum got him a job at her friend's company. […] The thing in Ghana is, when you are of a certain class, you get a job by connection rather than by your competence level." (Interview 4).

While the story of this cousin seems to be a story of classic nepotism, I would by no means want to suggest that the people I interviewed were not hardworking or did not deserve the job position they held—unlike that interviewee's cousin, they had all received university degrees, often from very prestigious universities—and could all list impressive work experiences. It nevertheless seemed as if they were aware that they had an easier time than most Ghanaians with asking for amenities, if they wanted to. None of them thought of this in terms of nepotism, but simply networking.

Interviewee 31 for example told me that he would not make use of his right to access the NHS (National Health Service) because he was getting better treatment in Ghana than in the UK through his network. He had befriended the head physician at a private clinic in Accra and was now able to access a kind of premium treatment that went beyond the service he would receive through the NHS: "Now if you're home you call the doctor, who will send his nurse, and she comes to check you out at home. Now can the NHS ever give you home service? I don't think so." (Interview 31). Interviewee 31 is from the same family as interviewee 15 and can thus also trace his family's history back to the 18th century. He seemed very aware that it was not the case that he was an extraordinarily dear friend of that physician, but that he, as a member of a well-off and well-known family, had an easier time networking than the average Ghanaian. This became particularly clear by the following discussion we had.

Interviewee 31 was very gracious with his time and met me for about three hours on a weekday. He was also very curious about my findings: when I was finished with my interview questions, he started interviewing me about my findings in

return, asking, “what was the most shocking story you’ve heard so far?” This “reversed” interview proved extremely helpful, because it gave me the opportunity to share and discuss one particular conversation I had had a few days earlier and that had struck me for it’s unusual claim: it was a daughter of a former minister who said that if you lead “a good life,” you will not encounter any difficulties with visa applications (Interview 18). To me, this sounded as if she was suggesting that it was people’s own fault if their visa applications were rejected, because they were just not leading a good and righteous life. He interpreted it slightly differently. He explained to me that some foreign embassies in Ghana limit the number of visas issued per year because they receive more visa applications than they can possibly process. With the right social network, however, there is a way to circumvent that problem. He claimed:

> “So, people are trying to find ways around things. So, people gonna call their uncle, saying 'this is the situation, can you help me?'. Then he calls his friend. His friend’s brother is the deputy ambassador’s golf partner. So, when he goes to the golf court, he has this on his agenda. […] and within two weeks, you have a visa for which you would have waited a year for. People don’t know that. No, people know that but don’t know a way in. Everybody wants a way in but not everybody has it cause it’s hard to get.” (Interview 31).

And he added: “Of course, if you have a father who is that high-ranking in society, you get access to who-is-who in Ghana. And that is what the average Ghanaian hates. They don’t have that access.” (Interview 31). So, in his interpretation, the “good life” did not mean being a righteous, law-abiding person, as I had understood, but being from a wealthy and influential background. He supposed that she was not able or willing to disclose more details of what she meant because I had conducted the interview at the wrong place—her office instead of a more private setting. His

interpretation seemed to be informed by experience, since he told me that he went golfing regularly, both for the game and the networking:

> "I mean, if you play 18 holes, that takes five hours. What are you gonna talk about? Whatever you want to talk about you can talk about there. […] This is Ghana. I always say, many of these deals aren't made at the table Monday morning, but at the golf court Friday evening." (Interview 31).

Not only aristocratic names, but social networks are also forms of social capital. With the right social network dual citizenship is less important for life in Ghana: finding employment is easier, treatment from service providers is better, and access to transnational lives is hinging less on a foreign passport because visa applications are less difficult.

Scepticism of Dual Citizenship's Importance beyond Travelling

With such scope of networking, the relevance of dual citizenship is much less obvious and so it is not surprising that people of elite background were sceptical of the importance of dual citizenship (beyond its value in facilitating travel outside of Ghana). Those that had dual citizenship did acknowledge that it was making travelling easier—"I don't know what it's like going for a visa. I have zero idea. And that's a blessing." (Interview 37)—but they were often startled by my question whether it had an impact on their life in Ghana: "In Ghana? No. It doesn't open doors in Ghana because there is no need for a foreign passport in Ghana" (Interview 31).

A second-generation returnee who had grown up in the US, interviewee 11, had only claimed his Ghanaian citizenship when he moved to Ghana after finishing his university degree in the US. His children, who have never been to the US, are dual

citizens for the travelling amenities—"it makes travel very easy" (Interview 11). But when I asked about the impact of his US citizenship on life in Ghana, he instead underscored the strategic importance of claiming his Ghanaian citizenship:

> "None. It [his US citizenship] did have no impact. It was important to get my Ghanaian citizenship because there is some laws around land ownership. […] And even in terms of setting up a company: the minimum capital requirements for non-Ghanaians are much higher than if you are Ghanaian, so that's helpful. And when I used to fly on my US passport, they would give me a three-month visa. So, after three months, you had to return [to the US] and come back, so that was some hassle." (Interview 11)

While some found it hard to imagine any other use beyond travelling, others had heard of the benefits that many returnees see in dual citizenship. But they remained sceptical that it would actually bring palpable benefits. Some even remained sceptical of the travel benefits from having a second Northern citizenship, as in the case of the previous mentioned daughter of a former minister. She had lived in the US long enough to have qualified both for a green card and citizenship but had never applied for them. She explained her reasoning as a lack of need, mixed with scepticism towards its use case:

> "I've never had any visa problems. […] If I wanted to live somewhere, I could get in based on merit: people would need me enough to want me to go there and they'd get me a work visa. So, I don't need to [get dual citizenship], right? What is the benefit of the dual citizenship anyways? […] People don't need it. They say oh but I need it to get access to other countries, but they don't go anywhere. They don't go on vacations, but they want the possibility. They say it's good because of health care—America has the worst health care system so what is that health care that you're talking about? And if you're dying here, nobody is gonna put you on a plane and send you there." (Interview 18)

This is not the reality of life for most Ghanaians. Finding employment abroad without already having the right to work is difficult and convincing a potential employer to file for one's work visa is always tricky. And just recently in my Ghanaian

circle of acquaintances, a dual-citizen returnee was put on a plane back to the US, half-paralysed from a stroke, so he could get treatment in the US. It does not come as a surprise that scepticism about the importance of dual citizenship to life in Ghana was widespread among participants with elite biographies. After all, their reality was that their family's name, fame, and network gave them what non-elite Ghanaians saw as the very benefits of dual citizenship: respect, advantages in the labour market, freedom from visa-issues, and access to better health services.

5.3 National Pride, Civic Duty, and Political Agency

Fame and networks were not the only way in which elite family backgrounds seemed to influence people's judgement of dual citizenship. The knowledge that their family members had been instrumental in shaping Ghanaian politics also impacted their relationship with the Ghanaian state. Many had a strong sense of political agency and civic duty towards Ghana. One person even expressed ambitions to enter politics herself. That, in turn, meant that dual citizenship was less attractive, as dual citizens are not allowed to hold political offices.

A Family's History of "Building this Country"

Several people expressed that their sense of civic duty to contribute to the development of Ghana was rooted in their family's history. Interviewee 24 made that connection most strongly. She had founded a returnee organisation which aimed at both helping returnees to connect and network with each other, as well as to harness

the immaterial remittances of these returnees for development programmes by Ghanaians for Ghanaians. I attended a speech of hers in which she expressed the wish that her returnee organisation would be seen as a role model for citizenship. So, when I met her for an interview, I asked her to explain to me what citizenship meant to her. In her answer, she told me about her family background and how it had shaped her outlook on migration, return, and citizenship:

> "Yes, so this stems from my background, my family background. I had a grandfather, on my mother's side, who was part of the independence movement. Not in the front as in the Big Six that everybody knows, but there were different lines of people who really contributed, and he was one of them. So, while he was alive, he told us a lot of stories. And the reason why I always knew that I would come back home was him. Nobody said, 'child, come home' actually out loud, but it was kind of that, 'go work, go to school, learn about the world, but come back home and make a difference'. So for me, I'm very Ghanaian. While I'm a global citizen, because I'm very well-travelled, Ghana is home and the question always is, how can I contribute towards our development. So that's citizenship for me, it's playing your role in your corner." (Interview 24)

It was this strong sense of civic duty ,conveyed by her family, that made her rule out the option of naturalising in the US, although she had spent over a decade there. She did, however, qualify this statement by adding that she had never encountered visa problems with her Ghanaian passport. Had she encountered such problems, she admitted, the passport benefits would have trumped her national pride:

> "This is why I'm Ghanaian only—it comes from them [her parents]. They never really made it look like an option to explore. It was always, 'we are Ghanaian citizens who travel the world. You don't take another citizenship because you are deeming it useful.' Not for any minute or for any reason this question was on the table. And I also didn't struggle much with a Ghanaian passport. And I think if I did, I would have wanted to switch or add one." (Interview 24)

There was a clear sense of national pride in many people of this group that fused with pride in the relative's role in shaping the history of Ghana. Some

straightforwardly expressed that pride—"I love this country—I have no intention to live anywhere else." (Interview 18)—while others were more subtle, but a sense of pride was still sensible from how they described themselves and their relatives as people who "own" and "built" Ghana. For example, one second-generation returnee had purposefully never brought his dual-citizen children to the US. The main reason, he explained, was that he wanted his children to grow up as self-confident "country owners" instead of having to learn how to navigate life as a racial minority in the US:

> "Actually, my children have never been to the states. I definitely have a Ghanaian and American identity. […]. But the skillset for a country owner is different from being a racial minority in the US. Which is one of the reasons why I don't bring my children there as kids." (Interview 11)

Another interviewee even expressed disgust of people who use their dual citizenship for anything more than travel benefits. He was a dual citizen because his parents had studied abroad, in Ireland, where he was born. But to him, making use of any other amenities than travelling was below him because his family, including himself, "built" Ghana:

> "So I have an Irish passport, it's like a gift. You know, I didn't grow up in Ireland, I don't feel Irish. […] My forefathers did not build Ireland. I don't think I have the right to use their medical systems because we didn't build them. Ghana, that's what we've built. So, I've always thought it's not fair to be a leech, to be a parasite. It's good enough that I don't need a visa to go to most places." (Interview 15)

From that close connection to the country, he seemed to suggest, stems the responsibility to return and to contribute to the development of Ghana. Staying in the country of second citizenship, conversely, was despicable to him, a behaviour he assumed to be equally loathsome to the country of naturalisation: "Africans have to develop Africa. We have a lot of work to do and shouldn't waste time. It's not

dignified to be chilling out in Germany or other countries. What would Germans even think about us sticking around instead of getting our shit done?" (Interview 15).

Knowing about the important role that one's relatives played in shaping the politics of Ghana filled people with pride and a sense of duty to engage in Ghanaian society. Acquiring dual citizenship, or making use of it for more than just travelling, was, from this perspective, something odd, if not unethical. What also transpired from the above quotes of "building the country" and "contributing to the development of the country" was a strong sense of political agency—a feeling that non-elite returnees did not necessarily share.

Political Agency and Political Ambitions

Underlying the sense of duty to engage in Ghanaian society is a sense of political agency. This sense of agency was evident in the choice of language used when talking about Ghanaian or African development: phrases full of active voice and activism—"we have a lot of work to do and shouldn't waste time" (Interview 11, see quote above). It sounds easy and straightforward when return migration is described as "com[ing] home and mak[ing] a difference" (Interview 24, see quote above). Of course, other non-elite interviewees also expressed a deep sense of belonging to Ghana and a wish to contribute to the development of the country. However, they did not express that same sense of agency and did not necessarily have the same success stories to tell.

The case of interviewee 3 is illustrative here again (we encountered him already in chapter four). He had gone to Europe for a degree in Development Studies, and subsequently struggled to find a decently paid job upon return to Ghana. He had re-migrated to Canada, although he would have preferred to stay in Ghana, and studied for a doctoral degree, hoping that he would be able to apply for Canadian citizenship and that the doctoral title would help him on the Ghanaian job market. He described his urge to "serve" the country with the knowledge that he had gained through his degree and the sense of lack of agency as someone who does not have access to the right networks:

> "I was happy returning home to serve with my experience and the knowledge I got. […] But I struggled getting a job and some of the jobs were not even permanent but contracts for projects, you know. So, I wasn't sure about my future, about how my stay would be like. So, I asked myself, did I make a good decision returning? […] I wanted to serve in a better capacity but didn't get the opportunities that I wanted. I realised that I was underutilised, that I was underutilising my skills. […] there isn't much opportunities. It's a whole lot of who you know and who knows you. It depends on people you know in government" (Interview 3)

Meanwhile, the previously mentioned daughter of a former minister was already planning her future political career: "J: Are you a dual citizen? —Interviewee 18: Never. I want to be president. I have great ambitions." (Interview 18). She seemed absolutely serious when she said that she was planning to run for the presidential office one day. Because of her political ambitions, it seems at first sight reasonable not to acquire dual citizenship. The reason is that the Ghanaian Citizenship Act does not allow dual citizenship for important public positions like members of parliament, ministers, or the presidency. So, her goal to hold such an office one day had, as she had made clear in her above statement, at least partially motivated her decision to wave her right to apply for the US green card and subsequent citizenship.

Apart from her, one other interviewee had also expressed interest in a political career. He did not have an elite family background and a totally different approach to naturalisation. He had actually done some research on the Citizenship Act and figured out that there was no strict rule against dual citizenship acquisition for public office holders: only at the point of candidacy, he would have to renounce his second citizenship. Since he deemed dual citizenship useful both for international travels and for his life after return, he had therefore decided to acquire US citizenship.

> "If they [the elite] say they don't need to, they're lying. They specifically do so because of politics. And the reason they say that is: I was eligible for citizenship [in the US] for the longest time, and I didn't do it, similarly, because I have political ambitions. And I erroneously thought that that by getting another citizenship it would be precluding me from participating in the political processes back home here in Ghana. But that was erroneous, because: I spoke to the dean of the faculty of law school in Ghana, and he explained the provision in the constitution that actually at the *time* of when you decide to run and when you're sworn in and all of that, at that time, you cannot have any other citizenship. But prior to that you can." (Interview 43)

Interviewee 18, the daughter of a former minister, had never experienced visa issues and had a prestigious job at least partially through family connections. "I asked my uncle to write my recommendation" (Interview 18), she said. This interviewee did not have the material needs to actually consider going the dual citizen route; it is likely that she never looked up the regulations and never realised that she was mistaken in thinking that she could not at all naturalise. That deep knowledge that she wanted to get into Ghanaian politics had not only informed her decision not to apply for dual citizenship, despite the opportunity to do so, but also influenced her whole migration experience:

> "Of course, I was to come back. I never had the option. What was I staying for? Right? I had always wanted to come and do a bit of politics. I wanted to do

> governance. Leadership and governance. And I also wanted to be an entrepreneur and I had all these plans for businesses that I wanted to set up." (Interview 18)

At the moment of the interview, she was the head of a governmental agency and ran a business on the side. She had thus achieved everything that she had planned for her return career-wise, except running for a political office. With her family background, a political career was however far from unimaginable for her. It seemed just like another plannable career step.

This section has so far shown that the politically well-connected elite has a special relationship with the Ghanaian state. The knowledge of their legacies not only led to a particularly strong civic and political awareness; it also led to much more confidence in their own agency—and rightly so, because with their family background, there were far fewer obstacles in the way of their attempts to make a difference than for the average Ghanaian. That does not mean that the *non*-elite were apolitical or had no attachment to Ghana. Their migration paths alone clearly indicate a strong attachment with Ghana; after all, they had decided to voluntarily return. However, they did not necessarily experience the same kind of agency and did not necessarily feel as empowered to get involved in Ghanaian politics. Their experiences of Ghanaian politics thus differ from the elite's experience of being "country owners" and "country builders" capable of taking action in the civic or political realm. Thus, while non-elite respondents did not see dual citizenship as an obstacle to political life in Ghana, weighing up Ghanaian political life against dual citizenship was a valuable consideration for the elite.

5.4 No Need for Upward Mobility

This chapter has so far made two arguments. First, it has shown that elite returnees with connections to famous politicians can rely on the social capital of their family name and family networks after return. The social capital of an elite family helped to get treated with respect and reverence. It also facilitated access to jobs, visas, or services such as health care. Dual citizenship as a means to social capital was therefore less important to the elite than to other returnees who did not have influential family backgrounds. Second, the knowledge of one's relatives' vital role in shaping Ghana's politics changed the elite's outlook on politics. They did not only feel national pride and a duty to contribute to the future of the country, but they also exhibited a strong sense of agency and confidence in their ability to make a difference. Therefore, the thought of using second citizenship for anything other than visa benefits appeared implausible or undignified. This is not to say that second citizenship was renounced. Those who had received their dual citizenship through birth did not renounce it but continued using it for travelling. However, those who had not grown up as dual citizens did not apply for dual citizenship despite the possibility of doing so. In one of these cases, the plan to go into politics meant that dual citizenship would not only have been irrelevant to her life, but downright obstructive to her career plans.

The third argument for the elite returnees' verdict that dual citizenship was unimportant for life in Ghana is their lack of upward mobility. While participants from non-elite background saw dual citizenship as a form of capital that helped with their upward mobility in Ghana after return, the politically well-connected elite participants were already in the upmost social class of Ghana. In this section, I argue

that these families' established position at the top of Ghanaian society can help explain why they did not see the benefits of dual citizenship in Ghana. Once one is no longer in a position of upward mobility, there are less reasons to see either migration or dual citizenship acquisition as a social mobility booster. I will first discuss the impact of wealth, and then turn to distinctions of the elite from what one interviewee called the "nouveaux-riches."

Wealth

Coming from an elite family did not only correlate with fame, networks, and political agency but also with wealth: one interviewee described that people—quite rightly so, as he happily admitted—take his family name as an indication for wealth: "if you hear that name around in the news and whatnot, you know this person comes from a well-off family, he's probably had the best opportunities and whatnot." (Interview 37). Generally, wealth affected the whole migration process. With a wealthy background, there was less pressure to use the time abroad to accumulate money or to provide for one's community after return. Often, there was even a sense of being better off in Ghana than abroad. This is best illustrated by the following quote. Here, the interviewee differentiated between himself, for whom neither emigration nor return had anything to do with economic or other constrains, and others who leave Ghana for economic reasons:

> "I went there for education. Deep down there was always that I'm coming home. But it was a matter of when. […] And luckily, I am very comfortable in Ghana. I don't need to move for economic means. I don't need to come back here for visa issues. You have people who are here [in Ghana] simply because they can't get a visa to go back and they're desperate to get one, and luckily that's not my reality." (Interview 31)

There were two particular ways in which wealth impacted the return experience in such a manner that dual citizenship became less crucial to everyday life in Ghana. One simple and very straightforward way in which wealth impacted the return migration experience was purchasing power. Like the middle-class returnees, elite returnees noted that they generally found it easier to maintain their lifestyle in Ghana than abroad: "The level of comfort that I have here will cost me so much more in the UK, far far much more." (Interview 31). I interviewed most people outside their homes, and most were also rather discrete about their living standards. While I am sure that there is variability within the group of elite interviewees, I can nevertheless give a limited sense of the living standards my interviewees had. During one online interview, a nephew of a former president turned his camera to emphasise how much better his life had been since return to Ghana and showed me a vast lush garden, as well as a carport with a very expensive looking sports car while saying, "again, you can't have that in London" (Interview 4).

While it is true that, for instance, land and labour are less expensive in Accra than in other cities such as London, other things are more expensive, such as quality electronic devises, non-African food stuff or branded luxury articles, to name only a few. Unlike the returnees of middle-class background, however, the elite had an easier time purchasing those products. Middle-class returnees found that it was advantageous for them to have dual citizenship or to know someone who had dual citizenship, as this facilitated the purchase of goods that were difficult to obtain in Ghana—and therefore overpriced (see chapter 4.3). The elite, meanwhile, did not know this kind of worry because it was far easier for them to purchase anything: *"everything you need, you can have it in Ghana. It may be twice or three times the price*

but it's available." (Interview 4). With the ability to spend "twice or three times the price" for purchases, dual citizenship, or intricate delivery deals (buying online and shipping to acquaintances or relatives abroad who then bring the purchase upon their next travel to Ghana, see chapter 4.3) were redundant for this group of people. This is another way in which having an elite background can make dual citizenship irrelevant for life in Ghana.

The second domain in which wealth makes having dual citizenship less necessary are visa applications. Many countries require a proof of certain amounts of funds for a positive visa decision. For example, for a UK student visa, a Ghanaian would have to show that they have "enough money to pay for [the] course for one academic year" (UK Government 2023). On top of that, they would need to also prove that they have the funds to support life in the UK for a period of at least nine months, which would amount to 11,007 GBP (9 x 1,223 GBP) for a degree in London and 9,207 GBP for a degree outside London (ibid.). Similarly, the Canadian temporary resident visa requires the provision of bank statements from the applicant's personal account for the last six months prior to application, as well as pay slips from the last six months as proof of sufficient funds (Immigration Canada 2018). That means, dual citizenship is less important for mobility if one is wealthy, as one dual citizen from elite background explained:

> "For people who are in the upper tier of society, getting a visa is not a big deal. Because the requirements, once you match them, they'll give you the visa. Chances are, if you are in the upper society, you can match them: because they look for your three-month bank statements, they look for your family history, they look at what you gonna do. So, what you find is they may give somebody lower maybe a one- or two-year visa and somebody higher five or six years. Because they know that they don't *need* to be there." (Interview 31)

Dual citizenship puts transnational ties on a permanent and secure footing. In the case of returnees from middle-class backgrounds, this can have positive effects on life after return because it gives access to different forms of capital. With a wealthy background, however, it is easier to maintain these transnational ties without the need for dual citizenship. This is because monetary assets are valued in the visa application process, and because strong purchasing power allows one to buy overpriced products that others would import into Ghana using their dual citizenship.

Social Class and Distinction

Monetary wealth alone does not explain an individual's social class position, as we know from Bourdieu. One interviewee perfectly captured this when he expressed disappointment with his lower income and living standards in the US, comparing it not to his income in Ghana but to his family's *class* in Ghana: "From the first minute I arrived in America, I knew I wouldn't stay. […] I was hard-working, and my salary wasn't even that great. In Ghana we had more class than I had in America." (Interview 15). This section will discuss what modes of distinctions the elite participants saw between themselves and upwardly mobile Ghanaians. While the focus of the previous sections was on how the elite's social and economic capital made dual citizenship unimportant for their lives in Ghana, this section looks at interviewees' assessments of which capitals and what practices distinguished them from new, upwardly mobile Ghanaians.

There were three features of his pedigree that this interviewee was particularly keen to convey to me. First, he underscored his family's long history of power, which went back to the 18th Century. *"So, many many sides of my family are either local royalties or beneficiaries of the colonial past."* (Interview 15), he said—and long-established networks was a result of that history. Second, it seemed important to him that, in his family, it was normal to travel internationally and migrate a longer period of time for studying and working abroad. Indeed, that was a shared feature of all elite interviewees: none of them had been the first in their family to have migrated or studied. Third, it was very important to him to convey to me not only his relatives' international educational laurels but also the long history of formal education in his family:

> "Everyone in my family until recently spoke Twi, Ga, Danish, German, and English. Yes, in the 17-hundreds, 18-hundreds that was standard. They were all very well educated, both women and men. Some of the first educators in Ghana come from my family. Women especially, they were teachers." (Interview 15)

He did not only take pride in how long-established his family was and what networks and education they have had. For him that was also a form of distinction from people who did not have a similar family background and therefore, he seemed to hold, should not be seen as belonging to his social class, even if they were well-off and educated. This point of view on class distinctions becomes very clear by a conversation he recalled having had in the US:

> "So when I was in America, I remember, I used to argue with my white friends: 'it's really interesting, in America, I'm a second-class citizen whereas your grandfather, where's he from?'—'eu, he came from Germany, was a coalminer, they were very poor, they had no shoes, they had no shirts, he was illiterate', and so on. This America is really screwed up. My grandmother's grandmother's mother was educated. She even played piano. I said, 'In any decent country, you and I would not be in the same room. But here in America, it's not me who's looking down on you, but you who are looking down on me. This is weird. […] You guys are really lucky. Going out

> into the world with all your handicaps and being put at the top—I can see the appeal of the American dream'. So yeah, on many sides of my family, there is a lot of old education, it's not necessarily wealth, it's just old education, old networks, a lot of exposure." (Interview 15)

He described the people he had this conversation with as "handicapped" by not coming from a grand old family but from a background of poverty and illiteracy, who, however, had been upwardly mobile because of what he perceived as an anti-classist attitude in the US (the American dream). At the same time, there is a clear sense of frustration with the US society where racism and the unimportance of his family background degraded his position. While his elite Ghanaian family background is less impactful outside of Ghana, he suggested that Ghana is a country "decent" enough to keep his social class separate from upwardly mobile new elites or generally people with less glamorous backgrounds.

Of course, not everybody in this group of interviewees had such a long family tree. Other families had "only" risen with the independence movement, such as the family of interviewee 11: "It's two generations [before himself since independence]. I'm the elite now, but my father, not even my grandfather, my father—again there are two sides to my family—but my father didn't have any shoes." (Interview 11) Still, this interviewee also expressed a sense of distinction from newly rich, upwardly mobile people:

> "They [the establishment in Ghana] are not necessarily impressed by money. I'm not articulating it properly. Obviously, you can move in circles, and you can do things. If you have more money, then you can. But establishment in Ghana, they don't give a shit. They're not moved by that, you know what I mean? It's relational. For example: there's nothing that gets you any purchase into the alumni association of Achimota [one of the oldest and best Ghanaian boarding schools]. They know who they are, they know who their friends are. In the States, you get the sense that if you just pay for the membership in the right country club, you're in. This [the US] is the country of the great Gatsby. Where you can just invent yourself, make a lot of

> money, buy your house in the right location, nobody is gonna ask you any questions." (Interview 11)

Here too, the interviewee expressed the view that networks and education—with a degree from the right educational institution—distinguished established Ghanaian elites from the rest of the population. And he as well compared the US with Ghanian society and highlighted the portrayal of the US as the country of self-made men—as seen in the Great Gatsby—who, as long as they are rich, would not have to answer any questions regarding who they are and where they were coming from. By contrast, he held, money would not give anybody an entry into the Ghanaian established elite because being part of an established network counted more in Ghana.

Style and taste seemed to be another way in which class divides in Ghana form, as one interviewee observed, and the recognition of the subtle differences between classes are bidirectional, as he recounted. On the one hand, he felt, people would be able to class him and judged him based on his demeanour, his clothing, his way of speaking, and his interests:

> "You know, Ghana is very classist. So, people see me, my cousins, and my cohorts, and they can tell that clearly there's a level of wealth here that many others don't have. So maybe the way I carry myself, what I wear, it's not flashy, but you can tell that there's a certain level of wealth. Yeah, the way I carry myself, the way I speak, topics that I talk about, people will be able to tell. They won't know but they will guess that I probably have several passports. But people'd never ask, oh by the way, do you have five passports?" (Interview 3)

And he added: "Straight away they will be like 'ah, he thinks he's this and that. He doesn't want to talk to us peasants, that kind of rhetoric', people think that I think like that. […] People feel inferior to me. I don't know why, it's hard to articulate, but people do." (Interview 31). So on the one hand, he felt people judged him from his

appearance. On the other hand, he as well maintained that he could spot the difference between "nouveaux riches" and people with "old money" like him:

> "Remember when I said Ghana is really classist? There's a real class divide even if you have some passports whatever. If you come to a setting of people who are used to travelling, who are used to being in and out of the country, you can clearly tell, who's new here, who's old money. You know there's a clear (-) not who-is-who, but you can just tell."
> J: What do you mean with 'who's new'? Who is up-
> "Yes, nouveaux-riches. You'll be able to tell. You can tell who's old money and who just ten years ago put their kids to international school. You can tell. And in Ghana people look after these things." (Interview 31)

Remarkably, possession of upward mobility and newly gained access to a transnational life is quite an adequate description for the participants in my study who did not come from elite backgrounds and who had returned with dual citizenship. Among them were people who had made the same kind of distinction between 'old money' and 'nouveau riche'. Interviewee 6 for example had grown up mostly in the UK, returned as a Ghanaian-British citizen, and had founded a business that operated in Ghana and Nigeria. She felt that her return had propelled her into the Ghanaian upper middle-class, but that there was no way for her to penetrate the countries' elite:

> "By function of how I speak, my background, and education et cetera, I was put in this higher class. But there is an elite class as well. So, the elite class, it's all about […] that very preppy kind of 'So what school did you go to? Who do you know? Whose parents are friends with whose parents? How long have you known that person? Do you speak the language?' […] What qualifies you to be in this circle kind of thing. It's very cliquey." (Interview 6)

As someone who grew up in British social housing, she did not feel she had the right educational titles and networks to be part of the Ghanaian elite. Moreover, she did not speak an indigenous Ghanaian language and felt that excluded her further from the Ghanaian elite. Among the elite interviewees were also people who spoke

only English and had not learned an indigenous language. But unlike her, they had the right family names and networks to outdo this shortcoming.

In the account of the elite interviewee who saw people like her as “nouveau riche”, there are subtle differences even among Ghanaians who have international travelling rights, namely between those whose families have been in that position for some time, and newly rich newcomers to transnationalism who, regardless of their dual citizenship, were below his social class. The pejorative term "nouveau riches", which he used for people with upward mobility, also illuminates the hierarchical order he perceived. Making use of dual citizenship to climb up the Ghanaian social ladder and tapping into the capital of dual citizenship was something vulgar to him. The actual Ghanaian elite were people like him: people whose social rank had been established for generations, people who did not need to have to make use of the capital of dual citizenship.

It seems from these accounts that upward mobility and a life of international mobility are interlinked. At the same time, dual citizenship and the ability to be internationally mobile cannot conceal if one has been moving up from a lower class and just recently reached the stage of an international lifestyle. It seems clear from this distinction between, on the one hand, upwardly mobile newcomers to an “environment of people who are used to travelling” and, on the other hand, people who take their position in that environment for granted that the lack of need for upward mobility is another reason why dual citizenship is insignificant for the lives of elites in Ghana. Vice versa, upward mobility explains its significance for the lives of non-elites.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the reasons why participants with elite social status have a different understanding of the meaning and value of dual citizenship in Ghana than participants with more average social backgrounds. I identified three reasons. First, people felt that their family names and networks opened more doors and induced more awe and reverence in their everyday life interactions than their passports. Second, people had a strong connection to the Ghanaian state due to their families' histories and that gave them a sense of national pride, civic duty, and political agency. As a consequence, dual citizenship was irrelevant or even obstructive to a publicly engaged life in Ghana. Third, people were at the very top of Ghanaian society, both in terms of wealth and in terms of social status, so they had no further to 'rise'. While their wealth made life in Ghana and keeping transnational ties easier, people distinguished themselves particularly from the upcoming socially mobile Ghanaians through their even greater social and cultural capital. The social capital through which they distinguished themselves with centred around the aristocracy and cosmopolitanism of their families—the long tradition of their families, their families' proximity to power, and their effortlessness with which they lived transnationally. The cultural capital included both cultural capital in terms of educational degrees and long traditions of education, as well as incorporated cultural capital, such as demeanour. Having access to this kind of capital made it unnecessary—and even vulgar—to use dual citizenship as a means to leverage capital in Ghana.

There is nothing fundamentally surprising or typically African about the fact that influential families can and do use their name, reputation, networks, and money for their benefits. It is also not surprising that people who have grown up with

relatives in public roles have more confidence in their own political capacity and in the success of their own public activities. The point that this chapter has made concerns the role of dual citizenship in Ghana. While returnees from non-elite middle-class background saw in dual citizenship a form of social capital that allowed for upward mobility, the elite instead relied on the social capital of their famous family names and their established social networks. They consequently saw little additional value in dual citizenship. While returnees from non-elite background saw in dual citizenship a form of economic capital that allowed them to earn more upon return to Ghana or access start-up funding and safety-nets that made their Ghanaian companies more robust and competitive, people from elite families instead highlighted the social capital of their network to succeed professionally in Ghana as well as their sheer economic capital that made striving for upward mobility unnecessary. Finally, while people from non-elite backgrounds saw in dual citizenship forms of cultural capital (easier access to foreign educational titles, easier access to goods that are difficult to get in Ghana (and therefore luxurious), and the "educational title" of the foreign passport itself which signals lifelong access to and knowledgeability of the Global North), the elite instead distinguished itself from such people by highlighting the cultural capital of their families long history of higher education and their aristocratic demeanour.

Whether or not dual citizenship is seen as a form of capital that is relevant to life in Ghana thus seems to be a matter of class affiliation. For returnees with non-elite backgrounds, dual citizenship fulfils the prerequisites for a marker of upper middle-class membership: it is seen as entailing social, economic, and cultural capital, it is linked to upward mobility, and there is a sense of distinction both from

returnees without dual citizenship and from "the elite". For elite returnees, dual citizenship was similarly seen as a being linked to capital and upward mobility, and there was equally a sense of distinction from the upward moving dual citizens. Elite returnees did not need upward mobility, nor did they need to make use of citizenship capital because they had other sources of capital, such as the social capital of their family's status. When they expressed a sense of distinction from non-elite returnees, then by stressing the superiority and grandeur of their social status. The relation between class and dual citizenship in Ghana thus seems to be curvilinear: the more potential for upward mobility, the more dual citizenship can come in handy.

This observation has consequences for the broader debate on global inequality and the role of citizenship that I introduced at the beginning of the thesis (see chapters 1 and 2). Milanović pointed out that inequality between countries is far bigger than inequality within countries. His argument has been used by scholars of citizenship and transnationalism to question the importance of class as a sorting mechanism: if internal inequality is less pertinent than inequality between society then internal class structures are trumped by international citizenship-based inequality, the argument goes (Faist 2018; Harpaz 2020). My findings point to a different direction. They suggest that citizenship becomes enmeshed with internal inequality class structures. I will come back to this in more detail in chapter seven.

Before moving to my conclusion, and a detailed discussion of the implications of these findings, the next chapter takes a step back and asks why it is that citizenship works this way in Ghana. In order to better understand the links between dual citizenship, capital, and class, the following chapter will examine the history of dual

citizenship in Ghana from independence to the present. This analysis helps us understand the Ghanaian political climate when it comes to dual citizenship and the political conditions under which citizenship can assume the role it appears to have assumed in Ghana. This, in turn, helps understand the conditions under which citizenship might work in a similar way in other countries too.

6. Dual Citizenship and the Ghanaian State

Let me start the chapter by recalling this study's findings so far. Dual citizenship has an impact on returnees in Ghana because it functions as a monetary, social, and cultural capital. It thereby helps with successful reintegration into the Ghanaian labour market and society at large—and is therefore closely linked with upward mobility. Returnees, however, who have an elite family background and thus do not have the same upwardly mobile trajectory as other returnees, do not see dual citizenship in the same light, no matter whether they are dual citizens or not. Because of their extraordinary family backgrounds, they do not need the same access to social, cultural, or economic capital and therefore do not see the need to leverage second citizenship to access goods and services in Ghana. The benefits of dual citizenship for life after return to Ghana seem thus to be in a curvilinear relation to people's social class in Ghana. The more room for upward mobility there is, the higher the impact of dual citizenship on life after return. Because of its transferability into different forms of capital, dual citizenship is a marker and enabler of upper middle-class membership and upward mobility for return migrants, except for those who retrieve their elite status from their prestigious family names.

The ability to benefit from dual citizenship after returning to Ghana not only reveals something about the nature of dual citizenship, but also about Ghana as a country of return. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine returnees with dual citizenship being confronted with nationalist claims that they are no longer truly Ghanaian, or post-colonialist resentments that defame them as traitors. But none of the

interviewees reported that their citizenship status evoked such maltreatment. Indeed, to the extent my interviews experienced *any* maltreatment due to their dual citizenship, it was because their dual citizenship was regarded as valuable and generated resentments or snobbery. For instance, the elite distinguished themselves from returnees who use their dual citizenship to their benefits, looking down at them as 'nouveaux-riches,' which at once denigrates and extols the high class that is attained via dual citizenship. And as I explained in chapter four, the only two interviewees who recounted a negative side effect of their dual status, spoke of navigating jealousy and malicious gossip as work. These were the only negative accounts of dual citizenship that came up in my study, which together with the absence of further negative reports, suggests that there is generally a positive—or at the very least neutral—attitude in Ghana towards dual citizenship.

This is a somewhat surprising response because historically, African states have often portrayed skilled emigrants as profit-seeking traitors (Iheduru 2011, 79-80). Moreover, two studies with similar set-ups to mine—as mentioned in the introduction—have come to quite different conclusions. One of these two also looks at dual citizenship as a Bourdieusian capital (Altan-Olcay and Balta in *The American Passport in Turkey* 2020) while the other also looks at dual citizenship in West Africa with a case study on Liberia (Pailey (2020) *Development, Dual Citizenship and its Discontents in Africa)*.

Altan-Olcay and Balta study American passport holders living in Turkey—both Turkish citizens who acquired dual American citizenship, and American citizens who moved to Turkey. They find that the American passport is a form of social and cultural capital; however, in their account the value of US citizenship lies mainly in

providing an exit strategy to leave Turkey in the event the volatile economic and political situation there rapidly turns for the worse. Thus, the value of the passport is less about improving the holders' lives in Turkey. As such, the cultural capital of US citizenship, the authors conclude, lies in enabling its holders to integrate into the US or other Western countries upon emigration (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2020).[32] This outward orientation of American passport holders in Turkey, the authors hold, is due to the political and economic situation in Turkey. While the economy struggles, they argue, anti-Western and religious conservative political movements gain ground in Turkey. This alienates the upper class, which had established itself with Turkey's pro-Western political "aspirations of becoming the 'Little America'" in the 1950s and 1960s. As a consequence of the political climate and the economic situation in Turkey, this pro-Western upper class have seen US citizenship as a social and cultural capital that helps them leave Turkey, if necessary (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2020, 45, 50). Pailey's *Development, Dual Citizenship and its Discontents in Africa* studies the backlash of Liberian "homelanders" against the diaspora-lobbied advocacy for dual citizenship amendment (Pailey 2021, 108-109). Pailey finds that the Liberian gridlock between strong rejection and advocacy for dual citizenship was deeply rooted in Liberia's history—both its history of colonisation through resettled freed African American slaves, and the recent history of ethnicised civil war (see

[32] Altan-Olcay and Balta do speak of upward social mobility in Turkey through American citizenship, however, they do that mainly for Americans who moved to Turkey after the 2008 financial crises and less so for Turkish citizens who naturalized in the US. Moreover, when speaking of upward mobility through citizenship, the authors blur other factors such as English language capacity and US work experience with the effects of the legal status of US citizenship. This is for example the case when they cite an interviewee saying: "It was my fluency in English that helped be find a job" (Altan-Olcay and Balta 2020, 112-125, 146).

also on the Liberian case: Manby 2016; Adebajo 2002; Manby 2021; Quaynor et al. 2020).

This chapter sets out to explain why there seems to be little to no resentment against dual citizens or against dual citizenship in Ghana. Attempting to answer this question is important because it can help us gauge the scope of this thesis' results: that dual citizenship functions as capital and an enabler of upper middle-class life-style for returnees (as long as they do not already belong to the country's very top elite). By better understanding why and under which conditions dual citizenship in Ghana functions the way it does, we can better form an idea of how common or un-usual the Ghanaian case may be. Indeed, the two aforementioned studies on dual citizenship in Liberia and US citizenship in Turkey remind us that the role and mean-ing of dual citizenship is not a given, but results from historically-rooted political debates and the general political climate. This chapter therefore looks historically at citizenship in Ghana. It explores the Ghanaian political debate on citizenship by tracing Ghana's citizenship legislation and—where existing—its legislative history from independence to 2023.

The chapter is structured in three parts. In section 6.1, the chapter examines the history of citizenship in Ghana prior to the democratic transition in 1992. This is realised through an analysis of legal texts—acts and proclamations on citizen-ship—and secondary literature. In section 6.2, the chapter looks closely at the parliamentary debates surrounding the introduction of dual citizenship – including both the debate that led to the 1996 Constitutional Amendment Act, which amended the Constitution to allow dual citizenship, and the debate that led to the 2000 Citi-zenship Act, which fleshed out how the Constitutional Amendment Act should be

understood. One focus of this discussion will be on the second reading of the Citizenship Act in 1999—a rich parliamentary debate that lasted several hours. In section 6.3, the chapter links these debates with the present. It focuses on two recent attempts at further expanding dual citizens' rights: the 2020 Diaspora Engagement Policy and the Citizenship Amendment Bill of 2021. These proposed reforms would expand the political rights of dual citizens in Ghana by allowing them to run for political and high-level administrative offices. These offices, as I will explain, are currently restricted to solely Ghanaian citizens—an issue on the agenda of current presidential election campaigns.

The chapter finds that political (parliamentary) debates on dual citizenship have, since democratisation in 1992, been marked in two ways. First, there has been a reckoning with Ghana's past of denationalisation and expulsion of immigrants from 1957 to 1979, followed by a wish to rectify this past through a welcoming attitude towards diasporans and immigrants. Second, there has been a set of economic calculations regarding the benefits of granting dual citizenship to diasporans (and to a lesser degree immigrants), mixed with moral arguments for the reintegration of diasporans and their belonging to Ghana. In this regard, second foreign citizenship, as opposed to Ghanaian citizenship, was discussed in parliamentary debates in instrumental terms, echoing the views of respondents who saw their dual citizenship as an economic capital. Though not conclusive, these findings offer an explanation for why this thesis' research barely came across accounts of negative reactions to dual citizenship; by identifying factors that contribute to a political climate under which citizenship can assume the role it appears to have assumed in Ghana.

6.1 Post-Independence: Hostility and Denationalisation (1957 – 1979)

At the beginning of the most extensive parliamentary discussion on dual citizenship in Ghana, the second reading of the Citizenship Bill in November 1999, the chairman of the committee made one thing very clear: the committee thoroughly studied and debated the history of citizenship legislation in Ghana to evaluate the Citizenship Bill. The chairman did so by starting his speech with a long list of all legal documents dealing with citizenship/nationality that the committee studied in its deliberations. The list includes all five Ghanaian constitutions and its amendments and ten acts, decrees, as well as regulations spanning a period from independence in 1957 to 1979, when the last authoritarian regime before democratisation, Jerry Rawlings' Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, seized power (Hansard Vol. 23 No. 19, Col. 1408-1409).

This long list of legislative documents on citizenship/nationality also made a second thing clear, namely that the question of legal belonging probably was a politicised and contentious issue, subject to frequent reformulations and amendments. For these two reasons, in order to understand the Ghanaian dual citizenship reform of the 1990s it seems appropriate to examine Ghana's citizenship legislation from exactly that period of politization. Through this exercise, we can get a sense of the backdrop against which the dual citizenship reform took place. In this section, I argue that that backdrop is characterised by hostility against and denationalisation of immigrants. For this argument, this section will study legal documents from 1957 to 1979 and focus on passages regulating denationalisation of citizenship by birth and descent, passages regulating naturalisation and denationalisation of naturalised citizens, and passages defining who counts as a citizen. A full list of all constitutions,

acts, and decrees I examined for this purpose can be found in table 3, *Legal Documents on Citizenship, 1957 – 2000* (page 118).

Deprivation of Citizenship of Citizens by Birth and Decent

Many African countries decided at independence to prohibit dual citizenship. (Manby 2016, 73). Ghana is no exception in this regard: from independence in 1957 to 1996, the country disallowed dual citizenship and permitted depriving people of their Ghanaian citizenship upon getting another one. However, a closer look at the period of politization of citizenship between 1957 and 1979 reveals that the issue of contention was *not* denationalisation of Ghanaian citizens by birth or descent upon naturalisation in another country. Indeed, there is strong continuity in the citizenship legislation constraining the deprivation of citizenship for citizens by birth/descent. Technically speaking, between the 1957 Nationality and Citizenship Act and the democratic constitution of 1992, a Ghanaian citizen's citizenship could be revoked upon acquiring citizenship of a country other than Ghana. Throughout this period, however, loopholes existed that allowed for exceptional cases in which dual citizenship could be granted. The 1957 Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act, for instance formulated the deprivation of citizenship as follows:

> The Ministry [not further clarified which minister] may by order deprive any person of his Ghana citizenship if the Minister is satisfied that that person has at any time while a citizen of Ghana and of full age and capacity acquired the nationality or citizenship of a foreign country by any voluntary and formal act other than marriage and that it is not conducive to the public good that he should continue to be a citizen of Ghana." (Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act 1957 16(1)).

This provision had three backdoors for dual citizenship: it was at the Minister's discretion whether or not to revoke a Ghanaian's citizenship, the Minister had to only revoke citizenship upon deciding that remaining a Ghanian citizenship was contrary to the public good, and second citizenship acquired through marriage was not taken into account. Similar wording can be found in the 1961 Ghana Nationality Act, the 1967 Ghana Nationality Decree, the 1969 Constitution, as well as the 1971 Nationality Act, the 1979 Constitution and the 1992 Constitution, which kept the marriage exemption. In effect, although these laws technically made it possible for people of Ghanian descent to lose their citizenship, this does not seem to have been their aim.

Deprivation of Citizenship of Citizens by Naturalisation

What changed frequently, however, were provisions on naturalization and denationalization of *immigrants*. From 1957 onwards, Ghana's citizenship legislation used separate clauses to deal with denationalisation of citizenship by birth/descent and the deprivation of citizenship by naturalisation. The ladder clauses were the ones subjected to frequent amendments. With the exception of a short period between 1966 and 1968, these amendments became gradually more hostile. Let us first look at the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act of 1957, how it defined citizenship, what it required for naturalisation, and under which conditions it denationalised citizens by naturalisation to then trace chronologically how Ghana's citizenship law became gradually more hostile towards immigrants, culminating in decrees simply listing names of people to denationalise in the late seventies.

In 1957, the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act combined citizenship by birthplace and by descent to define who counts as a Ghanaian citizen. It declared, as citizen by birth, anyone who was born in Ghana, was a Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies prior to independence, and/or had at least one parent or grandparent who was also born in Ghana. It also declared as citizen by descent anybody born outside of Ghana whose mother was a citizen by birth and whose father was a citizen by birth or naturalisation. The criteria for naturalisation in Ghana include being "of full age and capacity", being "of good character" and speaking an indigenous Ghanaian language, having resided in Ghana for at least 5 years, and renouncing any other citizenship.

It further provided a number of reasons to denationalise naturalised citizens: being "disloyal or disaffected" toward the country, "assist[ing] an enemy" in war time through trade or communication, having "been sentenced in any country to imprisonment" within five years after naturalisation, being a "resident in foreign countries" for seven years without annual reregistration with the Ghanaian consulate, and having acquired the citizenship "by means of fraud" (Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act 1957, 17(1) – 17(4)). Although the Act left "the Minister" discretion not to denationalise if he deemed it "conducive to the public good that that person should continue to be a citizen of Ghana," the default for naturalized citizen was denaturalisation—as opposed to citizens by descent, who remained citizens by default unless the Minister decided it was not conducive to the public good (Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act 1957, 17(5)).

Immigrants could thus only become Ghanaian citizens if they were third generation immigrants (since at least one parent had to already have been born in

Ghana), if they or their parents had a specific status under colonial rule (Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies), and if they fulfilled a long list of suspiciously vague criteria for naturalisation, such as being "of good character". Still, they could be denationalised for a range of similarly vague reasons, such as being "disloyal or disaffected".

Who were the people that this legislation was targeting? The largest non-African immigrant group in Ghana at that time were Lebanese and Syrian merchants (see on the Lebanese quest of naturalisation in Ghana: Akyeampong 2006; Kobo 2010; Malki 2018; Manby 2009; Oduro 2009). The first documented arrival of Lebanese immigrants in the Gold Coast dates back to the end of the 19th century. The majority, however, came to West Africa when the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after World War One and the creation of the French protectorate Greater Lebanon led to large emigration movements, including to West Africa where the dominantly French colonial rule facilitated entry into the region and into the British Gold Coast (Malki 2018, 464-467). This group of immigrants numbered around 500 in the 1920s and between 2000 and 3000 in the 1960s (Akyeampong 2006; Malki 2018).

Already under British colonial rule, Lebanese and Syrian immigrants were seen as extra-imperial aliens who posed an economic threat and a potential threat to colonial rule. (Akyeampong 2006, 312). Moreover, as non-Black residents in Ghana, they did not fit the racist ideals of nationhood and indigeneity of that time (Akyeampong 2006, 312). As a consequence, Lebanese attempts at naturalising as British subjects were met with scepticism and only few Lebanese managed to acquire the status of Citizen of the UK and the Colonies—the status required after

independence to be counted as Ghanaian citizen (see discussion of 1957 Nationality and Citizenship Act above) (Malki 2018). Through fascinating research with the Ghanaian National Archives, Malki shows that attempts at controlling and deporting Lebanese and Syrian immigrants dated back to British colonial rule: "deporting individual Lebanese immigrants helped cement the links between nationality, alien status, and legal exclusion that came to shape conceptions of legitimate political belonging in British West Africa" (Malki 2018, 467-468)—and in independent Ghana. Indeed, the language used in passages on naturalisation and denationalisation in the 1957 Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act is clearly inspired by colonial language and adopted phrases such as "conducive to the public good", or being "of good character" (Malki 2018, 467, 471). After independence, Lebanese and Syrian immigrants, who were kept in mercantile middle-man positions during colonial rule, did not cease to be seen as an economic threat. Moreover, they did not easily fit into Nkrumah's pan-Africanist ideas of Blackness. As Mali and Akyeampong argue, this explains the continuation of immigration-hostile provisions after independence (Akyeampong 2006; Malki 2018).

In 1961, just three years after independence, the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act was replaced by the Ghana Nationality Act. The main change introduced by this Act was the removal of the British monarchy from the oath of allegiance after Ghana left the Commonwealth Realm and became a Republic within the Commonwealth. As an aside, however, the Nationality Act also denaturalised all first-generation immigrants who had previously been considered citizens by virtue of their status of Citizen of the UK and the Colonies. That was done by simply deleting

the clause that previously provided that any Citizen of the UK and the Colonies would automatically be a citizen of Ghana (Ghana Nationality Act 1961, art. 1-2).

After the coup d'état against Nkrumah, their status was reinstated for a short period between 1967 and 1969 by the military National Liberation Council (NLC) (Ghana Nationality Decree 1967). As Malki argues, the putschists sought to form new political alliances in this way (Malki 2018). This is however doubtful, as the three-year military rule of the NLC was everything but marked by immigrant-friendly policies. No longer exclusively targeting immigrants of Lebanese/Syrian descent, political tension over immigration and the business activities of non-citizens led to a provision that prohibited non-Ghanaians from operating retail and small wholesale businesses, driving taxis or running other small businesses in 1968. Another decree highly regulated housing rights for non-Ghanaians (Pinkney 1972). The Ghana Nationality Act was also amended again in 1969: the NLC re-restricted the formal right to Ghanaian citizenship of Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies with a descendance clause. Only those who held that status before independence *and* had at least one parent or grandparent who was born in Ghana would qualify for Ghanaian citizenship (Ghana Nationality Amendment Decree 1969, 1(i-ii).

The fate of "aliens" did not improve when the military council transferred power to an elected civilian government in 1969. On the contrary. The government of Prime Minister Busia answered economic decline with nationalist rhetoric and systematically denationalised, dispossessed, and deported non-Ghanaians. After an election campaign that was dominated by the issue of immigration (Kobo 2010, 77-78), the newly elected government quickly rewrote its citizenship laws by again

entirely deleting the clause granting citizenship to those who had held the status of Citizen of the UK and the Colonies (Constitution of Ghana 1969, chapter 3, art. 6). Just a few months after taking office, in November 1969, the government moreover passed the Aliens Compliance Order, "which gave non-indigenous people two weeks to acquire residence permits or to leave the country" (Kobo 2010, 78) while also only issuing a small number of permits. The government justified the expulsion of foreigners by claiming that immigrants were responsible for Ghana's economic and social problems, especially high unemployment and increasing crime in the cities (which rather suffered from internal migration from the countryside after export prices for cash crops had dropped) (Kobo 2010, 79-80).

It is difficult to assess the actual deportation numbers but Peil (1974) finds that, in certain immigrant neighbourhoods, the number of immigrant households declined from 25 to 10 percent (Peil 1974, 374-375).[33] With the Ghanaian Business Promotion Act of 1970, the denationalisation and deportation of naturalised citizens was swiftly followed by the "nationalisation" of businesses held by non-Ghanaians—the Act forced small business owners to sell their business to Ghanaian citizens (ibid). In addition, the government introduced a new Nationality Act in 1971 which added new requirements to be eligible for naturalisation: "making a substantial contribution to the well-being and progress of Ghanaian life" and having "been assimilated into the Ghanaian way of life or […] easily be[ing] so assimilated" (Nationality Act 1971, art. 7(1)). This Act also denationalised anybody of immigrant descent who was born after independence and did not have at least one parent as

[33] Unfortunately, Peil does not name the actual figures.

well as at least one grandparent or great-grandparent who had already been born in Ghana (Nationality Act 1971, article 1(2)).

The civilian government lasted less than three years and was followed by a series of military rulers from 1972 to 1979. Throughout that period, immigration remained highly politicised, and Ghana saw a new wave of denationalisation and deportation. In 1972, Colonel Acheampong seized power. Initially proclaiming a less xenophobic course, he revoked some of the anti-immigrant laws of his predecessor: deportations were suspended and foreigners' right to work re-established (Kobo 2010, 83-84). While he seemed more open to include immigrants economically, his citizenship policy spoke a different language. As all his predecessors, Acheampong quickly redefined who counted as citizen and who did not and quickly published a new Nationality (Amendment) Decree the same year he seized power. Generally, the decree made clear, its purpose was to use existing legislation by the preceding government, namely the Ghana Nationality Act of 1971, to continue the denationalisation of people:

> "[…] the effect of the Ghana Nationality Act, 1971 [by the preceding government] shall be to divest of his citizenship of Ghana any person born before the commencement of that act who does not qualify for citizenship of Ghana under the provisions of that Act." (Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1972, article 1(2)).

The decree, however, qualified the general affirmation of denationalisation by formally restoring Ghanaian citizenship to a very small group of people: not those who had been denationalised and deported in large numbers under his predecessors, but certain people who had been denationalised under the pre-predecessors, the military rulers of the 1967-1969 National Liberation Council (Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1972, article 2(1)). Indeed, the decree is so suspiciously

detailed that it seems to me that it may even have been tailored to a specific person, such as, for example, an ally whose support Acheampong needed:

> "[…] the Commissioner may […] grant a certificate of naturalisation to a person who […] (1) was born in Ghana before the 6th day of March 1957; and (2) was divested of his citizenship of Ghana by the provision of the Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1969 (N.L.C.D. 333); and (3) between the 25th day of July, 1967 and the 15th day of February, 1969 formally renounced any foreign nationality held by him" (Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1972, article 2(1)).

Otherwise, the decree extended and blurred the requirements for naturalisation to the point where it seems just utterly impossible that people would have been able to fulfil them. In addition to assimilation requirements, the decree now also included a long list of moral and economic requirements. For example, applicants would have needed to prove that they are "a person of good character as attested in writing by two Ghanaians of high social standing", produce evidence of making a "substantial contribution to the economy of Ghana", "produce[..] a current Income Tax Clearance Certificate", and "undertake[..] in writing to invest [their] foreign exchange in resources in Ghana" (Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1972, article 2(2)).

The bluntness of denationalisation laws reached its peak with the two short-lived military councils that followed Acheampong. Both simply declared lists of people as denationalised: the 1978 Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree of Lt.-General Akuffo withdrew the Ghanaian citizenship of two recently naturalised Ghanaians of Lebanese descent for alleged "serious trade malpractices" and other activities "constituting economic sabotage and subversion of the economy of Ghana" (Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1978). And the 1979 Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree of Lt. Jerry Rawlings simply declared it was in the public interest to deprive a list of 107 people of their Ghanaian citizenship. Judging from the

names of those people, most were of Lebanese/Syrian descent, among them members of well-known Lebanese entrepreneurial families, such as the Captans and the Takies (Ghana Nationality (Amendment) Decree 1979, see also on Lebanese entrepreneurs: Akyeampong 2006; Malki 2018).

Creating Strangers

From independence to the end of the 1970s, Ghanaian citizenship was a highly politicised issue and citizenship law was under constant amendment and revision. Ghana is not uncommon in that regard for that period of time and region: as Dorman, Hammett and Nugent remind us, the newly independent African states, tasked with forging nations within randomly drawn national borders, inevitably created strangers (Dorman, Hammett, and Nugent 2007). Unlike Ghana's neighbour Ivory Coast, the Ghanaian citizenship law did not reflect cleavages between different Ghanaian ethnic groups (see on citzenship and autochthony in Ivory Coast: Marshall-Fratani 2007). Rather, the Ghanaian issue of contention was the integration of immigrants, particularly those of Middle Eastern descent. That issue did not only have roots going back to colonial rule. It also intersected with questions of racial and religious identity—the main targets of Ghana's denationalisation attempts were Middle Eastern merchants who were—unlike immigrants from neighbouring countries—visibly "foreign". They were also Muslim and thus shared the religion of the Ghanaian north, while the southern half of the country and large parts of Ghana's elite were Christian. Moreover, denationalisation and expulsion, at times, also served nationalist economic goals as businesses of non-Ghanaians were given to Ghanaians without migratory past.

The politicisation of Ghanaian citizenship abated with the end of the 1970s when lieutenant Jerry Rawlings seized power and led Ghana into over a decade of economic instability and political violence. Rawlings is a historic figure who is difficult to box: he did transform Ghana into a parliamentary republic in 1992 and was its first elected president. Most notably, he resigned after two terms in 2001, thereby helping with the consolidation of Ghana's democracy. Before that, however, during his decade as military autocrat between 1979 and 1992, his rule saw unprecedented political violence, expropriation of businesses, and large emigration flows (Abdulai and Crawford 2010; Nugent 1995).[34] It is during this time—when Ghana became primarily a country of emigration (Schans et al. 2018)—that naturalisation of immigrants ceased to be an issue.

No citizenship law amendments seem to exist between 1979 and 1992; neither did I find any, nor did the member of parliament whom I had cited in the beginning mention any legislative documents for that period. It was only with democratisation after 1992 that the issue seemed to gain importance again. This time, however, a new facet was added to the debate, as the discussions were now initiated by a large diaspora that wanted to strengthen its relations with Ghana. The next section will examine this very debate. It will show how both the knowledge of Ghana's inglorious past as a destination of immigration and the diaspora's call to legalise their belonging to Ghana shaped the dual citizenship debate.

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[34] Rawlings seizes power in 1979, executes several high-ranking people from the military and political elite and transfers power to an elected civilian government just few months after. Just two years later, in 1981, he seizes power again with a coup d'état when he deems the elected government's economic performance too weak. He then rules Ghana from 1981 to 1992 as a military autocrat and governs Ghana from 1992 to 2001 as elected president.

6.2 Dual Citizenship: Democratisation and Diaspora (1992 – 2000)

In 1996, four years after transitioning towards democracy, Ghana set in motion the process to introduce dual citizenship. The constitution was amended to allow for dual citizenship in 1996 and three years later, in 1999, the Citizenship Act was debated and passed to harmonise citizenship legislation with the amended constitution. This section examines the parliamentary debates pertaining to these changes to uncover the drivers of dual citizenship in Ghana. Of these, the two most detailed and insightful parliamentary debates are the second reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Bill from 1996, and the second reading of the Citizenship Bill from 1999. Although these are the only sources I cite in this section, I consulted a range of other sources in this and the following section. A list of all these sources can be found in table 2, *Documents Consulted on Dual Citizenship* (page 117).

Many other states have had a similar trajectory as Ghana when it comes to dual citizenship: the adoption of dual citizenship has increased since the 1990s, particularly in the Global South (Brøndsted Sejersen 2008; Whitaker 2011). An ongoing question in citizenship studies therefore explores the drivers of dual citizenship adoption.

For the Ghanaian case, several arguments have been made regarding the drivers of its dual citizenship amendments. Whitaker (2011) argued that the introduction of dual citizenship correlates with Ghana's political regime change from authoritarianism to democracy because democratisation gives diasporans a reason to claim their citizenship: "debates about dual citizenship in Africa have been

spurred on by the process of democratization. This is most obvious in the cases of Ghana and Kenya, where the 1990s shift toward multiparty politics prompted emigrants to lobby for political rights" (Whitaker 2011, 777). The main diver of dual citizenship legislations, she concludes, are thus democratic political institutions, and not remittances or emigration numbers. Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar (2014) argue against that view and hold that remittances are more important. Unlike Whitaker, their study is not quantitative, but builds on informal interviews with politicians and policy makers.

Vink et al. (2019) also find regime type cannot explain variation in dual citizenship regulation. They build on a dataset that covers the regulation of expatriate dual citizenship in almost all independent states since 1960 (Vink et al. 2019, 363) and argue that proximity to countries that have already introduced dual citizenship puts pressure on states to also follow suit. Furthermore, the introduction of dual citizenship is correlated with other liberal diaspora policies and the receipt of remittances (Vink et al. 2019, 362). (For a more detailed discussing see chapter two.) Although the legislative history of said legislation is a key piece of evidence, to my knowledge, no analysis of the actual parliamentary debate on introducing dual citizenship in Ghana has been done. This thesis, by not quantitatively studying correlations, but qualitatively studying the reasoning of the Ghanaian lawmakers themselves contributes to the debate on drivers of dual citizenship legislation.

My research finds that the Ghanaian parliamentary debates on dual citizenship were dominated by both democratisation and diaspora questions. One set of arguments made a link with the transition towards liberal democracy. It looked both back and forward into a better, democratic future: this set of arguments condemned

the undemocratic practice of denationalisation and forced displacement in Ghana's past and in Ghana's neighbouring countries. Against that backdrop, it then painted a positive outlook for a democratic, immigrant-friendly, and Western-oriented future in which Ghana fulfils the same obligations to its citizens as the US or the UK purport themselves to fulfil. The second narrative linked dual citizenship with diasporans. It did so with two arguments, one rational choice argument and one moral argument. The rational choice argument provided economic calculations suggesting that dual citizenship facilitated remittances, investments, and party donations from diasporans. The moral argument held that diasporans had a legitimate claim to Ghanaian citizenship because of their contributions to Ghana's economy and because of the merely instrumental nature of their naturalisation abroad.

In both the debates on the Constitutional Amendment Act and the Citizenship Act, unanimity prevailed across party lines. Thus, neither debate exchanged pros and cons. Instead, the debates were a gathering of arguments for dual citizenship and a mutual, bipartisan affirmation of taking the right steps. Nevertheless, a slight discursive shift took place over the years between the debates on the Constitutional Amendment on dual citizenship in 1996 and the debates on the Citizenship Act in 1999. The debates of the Constitution Amendment Bill mainly featured the economic argument that extending dual citizenship rights to diasporans was beneficial for the development of Ghana's economy. Democratisation arguments for dual citizenship adoption and moral arguments for granting diasporans dual citizenship did not feature in any of the debates on the Constitutional Amendment and only appeared in debates on the Citizenship Bill in 1999. In the following, I will present both sets of arguments, those linking liberal democracy and dual citizenship and those

linking diaspora and dual citizenship. To better link this section with the previous section on citizenship legislation between 1957 and 1979, I will start with the set of arguments linking liberal democracy and dual citizenship.

Democratisation: Learning from History and Looking to the Future

The period of Ghana's dual citizenship amendment overlapped with a political crisis in Ghana's neighbouring country Côte d'Ivoire, a crisis which would turn into civil war in 2002. The events in Côte d'Ivoire had a noticeable effect on the dual citizenship debate in the Ghanaian parliament as it invoked memories of Ghana's own past. In Côte d'Ivoire, President Henri Bédié had used ethnic tensions between the south and north of the country to delegitimise his main opponent, Alassane Ouattara, as not truly Ivorian and excluded him from running for office by alleging that his father had been an immigrant from Burkina Faso. The *ivoirité* regulations introduced over the course of the 1990s further declared large parts of the population from the north of the country, Ouattara's stronghold, as foreigners based on the allegation their ancestors had migrated into the country from northern neighbouring countries and therefore had no claim to be true Ivorian citizens (Babo 2017; Cheeseman, Bertrand, and Husaini 2019). Several Ghanaian members of parliament referred to the events in Côte d'Ivoire, and each time they took the opportunity to also remind the house that Ghana had similarly denationalised citizens deemed immigrants. This is for example the case right in the beginning of the debate with the speech of the chairman

of the parliamentary committee in charge of the bill.[35] As a means of introducing the bill in detail, he reflected on the deliberations of the committee as being guided on the one hand by Ghana's history of citizenship amendments between independence and 1979 (see on that also the previous sub-chapter)—and on the other hand by the political climate in other African states, such as Côte d'Ivoire:

> "Mr. Speaker, in considering the Bill, the Committee was further guided by current events in world politics […] 1. The incidence of decitizenisation that is creeping into African politics. And one can immediately refer to what is happening in la Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia, and sometimes even Ghana." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1412-1413).

Thereafter, Nana Akufo-Addo—back then Ranking Member of the minority party and today President of Ghana—agreed with the chairman of the committee, however adding a much stronger emphasis on Ghana's own past of denationalisation, and bringing an example of a denationalisation case from the time of the military rule of Jerry Rawlings in the 1980s (at the time of the debate, president of Ghana):[36]

> "Mr. Speaker, as the Chairman has stated, […] in some parts of the continent […] persons who have held the highest offices of state […] can be subsequently declared as foreigners […]. And in so saying, one can only say that it remains a pity that our own Supreme Court has seen it fit to approve the forced de-nationalisation of certain Ghanaian citizens like Abel Adusei. That still remains a blot in our view, on our jurisprudence, which this House should take the trouble soon to rectify." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1429-1430).

[35] A joint committee comprising both the Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs and the Committee on Defence and Interior.
[36] The name cited in the quote did not appear in any name lists of the denationalization decrees of the 1970s. I did, however, find an online newspaper article referring to that case which suggests that Abel Adusei was denationalized in 1984 for allegedly spying for the US (GhanaWeb 1998).

Another member of parliament also reminded the house both of the injustice of the 1971 Aliens Compliance Order with which the then government expelled immigrants and of the general lack of transparency and information on naturalisation laws in Ghana, which in turn hindered people from naturalising in Ghana:

> "I am sure that, if in 1971, when the Aliens Compliance Order was made, people were aware that in 1957 they only needed to be born in Ghana with one of their parents or grandparents being born in Ghana, most of the people who were sent to Nigeria would have qualified to be Ghanaian citizens at that point. So Mr. Speaker, with that, I would urge all hon. Members to support this Bill because it is a very useful and very progressive enactment" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1479-1480)

Two members of parliament even brought examples from their hometowns, knowing probably that many others would also know of families who had lived their lives in Ghana but because of their alleged or true migration background struggled to acquire Ghanaian citizenship:

> "Mr Speaker, a very vital issue was raised by hon. Fosu in his submission earlier on the issue of people born before 6th March, 1957. In my own hometown there is this Fulani man who was there long before I was born […] He is quite a prominent man in the town with a huge herd of cattle, in fact the biggest cattle rancher in the region and yet this man's children and his grandchildren were not regarded as Ghanaians even before I was born." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1453)

These are only a few examples. Many contributions discussed wrongful expulsion and denationalisation and concluded that the dual citizenship amendment was the right reaction to prevent any of that from happening in the future and to safeguard "the overall peace, tranquillity and stability of this country" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1450-1451). In a bipartisan effort, the members of the parliament repudiated how easily citizenship had been lost/taken away in the past and painted the future as one under the rule of law, state responsibility, progressive

gender and postcolonial wording, orientation towards US and UK liberalism in the broadest sense, and immigration-positive politics.

In many instances, members of parliament underscored the importance of the rule of law—"We are all equal before the law and therefore we must ensure that no person […] renders another person a second-class citizen or a non-citizen or an alien, or whatever you term it (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1450-1451)—or remined the house of the UN treaties that Ghana signed. One member even cited Hannah Arendt's famous definition of citizenship: "Citizenship, as we all know, is man's basic right. It is the right to have rights and therefore it is one that should be seriously considered by the House." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1409).

This emphasis on the rule of law was coupled with a debate over what rights Ghanaian citizenship should entail. This was one of the few contentious issues in the debate. Some members called on the state to take more responsibility toward its citizens and denounced the lack of diplomatic assistance to Ghanaians accused of crimes abroad. This can be seen clearly in the following quote, in which the minority leader compared Ghanaian and US citizenships and defined the worth of citizenship by the rule of law and the state's readiness to take responsibility for its citizens:

> "Mr. Speaker, finally I would like to appeal to my friends in the Ministry of the Interior, on this issue of Ghanaians in foreign lands. Our citizenship will be valuable to the extent that the State of Ghana recognises it a duty, a responsibility to protect its citizens everywhere and at all times. Those whose citizenships are priced in the world, like the Americans, look after their citizens. If the man is a bastard, he is our own bastard. Let us be with him, let us not leave him to the wolves everywhere around the world. […] Mr Speaker, those people may have smuggled cocaine, they may be criminals; they may be anything, they are Ghanaian citizens, first and above all and I am saying that such entitles them to the protection of the Ghanaian state at all times and everywhere—*[interruptions.]* Yes, otherwise your citizenship is worth nothing. (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1464-1465)

What is striking about this quotation is that the minority leader here made a very similar argument for dual citizenship as Whitaker does in her 2011 article (cited in the beginning of this section)—namely, that expanding citizenship rights must be backed by the guarantee that those rights will be safeguarded. This supports her thesis that regime change has been a driver of dual citizenship amendments. What also contributed to dual citizenship, though, was the idealisation of citizenship regulations in the liberal democracies of the UK and, in particular, the US (despite the historical irony in light of UK's subsequent intensification of denationalisation practices). Not only did the minority leader in the above quote refer to US citizenship as the "high-priced" ideal of citizenship; US citizenship law had also been examined in the drafting of the bill, and arguments with the structure "the US (and to a lesser degree the UK) does x, so Ghana should do that too" featured several times in the debate. For instance, an argument for requiring the knowledge of an indigenous Ghanaian language for naturalisation went: "In America, you need to speak English to be a citizen" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1458). And an argument for welcoming immigrants and granting them dual citizenship referred to the UK's inclusiveness towards Ghanaian immigrants and called for reciprocity:

> "The Queen in her speech the other day estimated that there are about 200,000 Ghanaians in the United Kingdom, registered ones and we know that perhaps the communities in the United States, Canada and Germany and France, the Scandinavia and so on taken together exceed the community in the United Kingdom. Mr. Speaker. this shows that as of now, some people have been quite generous to our people who wanted to find opportunities elsewhere. Are we in this country going to be as generous to the others as they have been to our people?" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1464-1465)

Moreover, part of the idea of creating a better future through dual citizenship was the hope that dual citizenship would help with becoming part of the globalised liberal world. Tropes like the "global village" were frequently mentioned by MPs and

dual citizenship was thought as a tool to make Ghana become part of that global village and thereby also help integrate the Ghanaian economy into globalised markets:

> "We ourselves have committed ourselves in this country, in our economy and so on to liberalization. […] we in this country have embarked on a path of integrating ourselves fully into the international economy. That is what our whole liberalization paradigm is about. I think that citizenship and immigration laws are highly relevant to that economic enterprise. […] So when we come to discuss the details of the Bill, we should apply a criterion of liberalism—a liberalism that makes Ghana a fully integrated unit in what we fashionably call the global village. Unfortunately, we are living in the outskirts of the village—[laughter]. Nevertheless we are supposed to be part of it. (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1459)

While the above quote used liberalisation mainly in the economic meaning of the term, the dual citizenship amendment was also linked to political liberalism. For instance, the dual citizenship amendment used to introduce gender-neutral language and eliminate colonial terminology. Clauses were reworded to replace "a man or a woman" with "a person", as one MP described it:

> "[…] for the first time, there is an attempt by this Committee to put male applicants for registration of citizenship on the same pedestal as women […]. The Committee intends to propose amendment which would make it gender neutral; and this is very, very innovative and I would ask all Member of the House to support it (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1442, see also: 1416-1417)

Since independence, Ghanaian law had alternated between the terms of 'nationality' and 'citizenship'. With the citizenship act of 1999, it was decided that citizenship should be the term to use, the main reason being the colonial legacy of the term 'national'. The debate refers both the US' and the UK's practice of differentiating between 'citizens' and 'nationals'. With the colonial past still being present in the collective memory, MPs associated 'national' with "inferior rights compared with those enjoyed by citizens" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1442), as one MP explained: "There used to be a time when we had British nationals before

independence. But a national of Great Britain did not have citizenship rights. For instance, he could not vote in British elections" (ibid). But behind the agreement on the term citizenship was not only a forward-looking attitude that wanted to leave colonial legacy behind, but also a decidedly republican understanding of citizenship that placed value on commitment to society instead of identity markers, as the following quote exemplifies: "Today I think we are seeking to move to create an identity which is based on commitment to the nation rather than by blood. That is what it is all about, granting of citizenship and so on." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1455. See on republican conceptions of citizenship: Honohan 2017).

Point of Contention: Immigration and Dual Citizenship

It is important to note that the seemingly unanimous agreement on the importance of the rule of law, liberalisation, globalisation, and the shared conviction of positive economic impact of dual citizenship happened at a difficult moment in Ghana's history as a country of immigration. From 1990 onwards, Liberians displaced by civil war had been arriving in Ghana. Their number peaked in 2003 at about 42,000 people (Omata 2017, 19, 28-29). Ghana thus relaxed its citizenship laws at a moment of large-scale refugee immigration. That is noteworthy because there are abundant examples of countries doing the opposite and introducing stricter citizenship regulations after refugee arrivals. To give just one example: in 2020, five years after the Syrian refugee crisis, Germany amended its laws to allow for denationalisation. Ghana did, however, not offer its Liberian refugees the option of long-term integration into Ghanaian society. Instead, refugees were repatriated from 2003 onwards (Omata 2016).

Effects of dual citizenship on immigration were nevertheless a contentious issue in the Ghanaian debates as well. Anti-immigration sentiments were more palpable during the 1996 discussions of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill than during the 1999 discussions of the Citizenship Bill. A case in point was the confusion of the Minister of Justice as to whether the amendment might only apply to Ghanaians who lost their Ghanaian citizenship through nationalisation abroad, or if foreigners without Ghanaian roots could also naturalise in Ghana. At the beginning of the second reading of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, the Minister of Justice introduced the bill claiming that "this proposal relates only to persons who are Ghanaians but who had lost their citizenship for having acquired the citizenship of other countries" (Second Reading Constitution Amendment Bill 1996: 560)."The case of aliens wishing to acquire Ghanaian citizenship", however, was supposed to still be governed by a law from 1971 (ibid). The Minster was then corrected in a matter-of-fact way by the Chairman of the parliamentary Committee on Constitutional, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, who simply announced the repeal of the requirement to renounce any other citizenship upon naturalisation in Ghana, regardless of origin (1996 Second Reading Constitution of Ghana (Amendment) Bill: 586). The minister, clearly ill-prepared, may have believed that he could advertise the law with this falsehood that the proposed law was not aimed at immigrants. It seems, that a discursive shift happened between the more nationalist speech in 1996 and the more pro-democratic and liberal comments of the 1999 debate.

Even in 1999, a few immigration-sceptical members of parliament contemplated about "the danger of inadvertently admitting some persons you would otherwise not want to be citizens of your country" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill

1999: 1413). Most interesting is the following argument against granting immigrants the right to naturalise in Ghana. This speaker complains that immigrants would naturalise only for reasons of convenience —in other words, for instrumental reasons and not because of allegiance to Ghana:

> "[…] most of the people who apply for naturalisation in Ghana apply for naturalisation only for purposes of convenience. And even though they live in Ghana, their lifestyle, their attitudes, their relationship with Ghanaians are relationships founded of the bases of their being foreigners. Some of them do not even want their children to be married to Ghanaians." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1489).

This is a remarkable part of the debate because the idea of naturalising out of convenience rather than allegiance is the exact argument *in favour* of granting Ghanaian diasporans dual citizenship. The fact that people's reason to naturalise may be strategic can thus be used to argue for opposite stances on dual citizenship, depending on who the people are (and if Ghanaian citizenship is the first or the second citizenship). According to this view strategic citizenship acquisition is understandable, in other words, as long as the acquired second citizenship is not Ghanaian. In the end, the Citizenship Act (2000) did not preclude immigrants from naturalising in Ghana, so the arguments against immigrant dual citizenship did not succeed and hopes for positive economic impacts of dual citizenship outweighed anti-immigrant rhetoric. Arguments for granting immigrants dual citizenship not only pointed out the purportedly huge potential for attracting African Americans immigrants[37] but

[37] Ghana had been the first sub-Saharan African country to become independent and Ghana's first president, Nkrumah, had studied in the US where he established strong ties with the civil rights movement. The country had therefore been a destination for African American emigration. W. E. B. Du Bois and Rita Marley are among prominent decedents of enslaved persons who emigrated to Ghana. The Ghanaian parliament had also been consulted on the citizenship bill by the Nation of Islam and the African/American Association of Ghana (among others).

also put immigrants in the same category as return migrants, namely bringers of economic growth, as these two quotes exemplify:

> "Mr. Speaker, the economics of immigrants has been studied […]. And the conclusion based mostly on experience with the Lebanese community and so on was that these communities had a very great propensity to save money and contribute to the development of the economy." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1455)

> "The immigrants who acquire Ghanaian citizenship are potential partners to our own Ghanaian businessmen and we must welcome them here as such." (Citizenship Bill 1999: 1461)

Several members of the parliament also reminded the parliament of their own immigration experience—the then President Rawlings' father had been British, and several members were married to non-Ghanaians: "Mr Speaker, as you said, I have got a vested interest in this case—40 years vested interest. My wife is English so I speak with authority—[*laughter*]" (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1473).

Let me summarise this chapter's analysis, so far made. There are broadly two sets of arguments across the Ghanaian debates of dual citizenship—the 1996 debate to amend the constitution to allow for dual citizenship and the 1999 debate to harmonise citizenship laws with the amended constitution. These two sets of arguments link citizenship a) to democratisation and b) to diasporans. The diaspora arguments were stronger in the 1996 debate and the democratisation arguments were stronger in the 1999 debate. The arguments that linked dual citizenship broadly with ideals of liberal democracy did this in two ways: (1) they recalled Ghana's history of denationalisation and pointed the finger at Ghana's unstable neighbouring country Cote d'Ivoire and its denationalisation regulations. (2) they claimed to be designed to usher in a new era in which Ghana would (a) abide by the rule of law, (b) implement citizenship regulations that follow the example of

countries with "priced" citizenship, such as the US and the UK, (c) be part of an interconnected globalised world which is liberal both in term of liberal market economy and in term of liberal politics, and (d) be a country that is welcoming to immigrants (though that was a debated point). The following section discusses the second set of arguments exchanged in the Ghanaian parliamentary debates: those that that link dual citizenship with the importance of diaspora relations.

Diaspora: Return and Remittances

This second set of arguments pertains to diasporans and economic concerns. As we will see, it can be disaggregated into three arguments: two economic arguments for return migration, and one argument that merges the moral obligation to grand diasporans dual citizenship with economic calculations of remittances. The Ghanaian introduction of dual citizenship was heavily lobbied for by the diaspora from 1992 onwards. Indeed, this lobbying was the initial driving force behind the dual citizenship amendments:

> "Hon. Members will recall that, immediately after the inception of the Fourth Republic, Government was inundated with numerous petitions and calls especially by Ghanaians resident outside Ghana for a review of the law on nationality to accommodate the issue of dual citizenship. In fact it was taken seriously as a national call by Government, and Government particularly took into consideration the fact that our brothers and sisters resident outside Ghana do contribute seriously to the development of this country. Accordingly, government responded positively." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1410)

As the above quote from the chairman of the joint committee in charge of examining the Citizenship Bill makes clear, the argument that convinced the government in 1996 to propose an amendment to the constitution and allow for dual citizenship was perhaps chiefly an economic calculation. There are two aspects

to that economic calculation, both in the 1996 constitution amendment debate and the 1999 dual citizenship debate.

First, there is the economic argument that dual citizenship facilitates the economic reintegration after return. In the 1996 debate, for instance, a member of parliament declared that return migration with dual citizenship is a remedy against unemployment. Strikingly, his argument did not hold that return migration from the Global North *per se* reduces unemployment *but that return migration with dual citizenship does*. This view thus resembles the perspective on return migration with dual citizenship that the non-elitist interviewees in my study also held—namely that dual citizenship facilitates economic success after return:

> "Mr Speaker, whoever is interested in helping to solve the unemployment problem will help this House to approve or to get the dual citizenship go through. I have many constituents in my place who are itching to go abroad, get money, come back and put up buildings. This is another way of solving the unemployment problem." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1472).

Second, another economic argument linking dual citizenship and return migration holds that dual citizenship would also facilitate the return movement itself. This is exemplified by the following statement from the 1999 debate, which, as typical for that debate, also weaves in the obligations to learn from the past and to ensure the rule of law:

> "since we are a progressive people who on the verge of the millennium want to correct the mistakes of the past, want to address problems which are putting impediments in our way, we as a people would stand to benefit by this Bill because people will bring their resources, their investment, their knowledge, their brains all here when they are sure that we have given them every recognition as Ghanaians once they desire it." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1472-1473)

This idea that dual citizenship facilitates return movements again resonates with accounts of my non-elite participants, who spoke of having the "safety net" of

dual citizenship after moving back to Ghana. This was because they knew they could leave again at any point and find a job back in the UK/US. Similarly, there were others who told me about acquaintances who would only move to Ghana if they could find expatriate jobs based on their dual citizenship (see chapter five).

Beyond these two purely economic arguments for diaspora engagement, the third diaspora-related argument for dual citizenship merges a moral argument with an economic argument and pivots around emigrants' continued connection with Ghana. That continued connection is argued for by pointing to the involuntariness of many diasporans' emigration and their continued support through their remittances. It holds that diasporans often did not emigrate out of free will but because Ghana's struggling economy (and, though not openly articulated, passed political turmoil) forced them to do so:

> "I believe that Ghanaians living outside will heave a sigh of relief when they hear about the enactment of this law. Many Ghanaians have left this country for reasons known to everybody. They might have found the economic difficulties unbearable so they have to go away and stay somewhere." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1484)

There was therefore a moral obligation to foster people's return, particularly if they had shown continued support through remittances. Naturalisation abroad had, moreover, often not been done out of a diminished feeling of belonging to Ghana, but for instrumental reasons, the argument holds. Members of Parliament reminded each other of the administrative hurdles of acquiring a permanent right to remain in the Global North. Because of these hurdles, diasporans, one MP urged the house to bear in mind, had to "live in trepidation" over their visa status (Second Reading Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1996: 1451-1552). It was this traumatic reality of living abroad that pushed people into naturalising in order to safeguard their

right to stay and have more planning security. Forcing them to renounce their Ghanaian citizenship would be unjust because, as with emigration, they were pushed by circumstances to leave Ghana and to adopt the foreign citizenship. Foreign citizenship was adopted for instrumental reasons and not for emotional attachment to the country of emigration.

Naturalisation, one MP held, was comparable with adopting one's partner's name at marriage—a formality which did not have any impact on the family bond with the parents whose name one had given up: "Mr. Speaker, I am saying that your child is your child whether he goes to take another name or not. Names *per se* cannot change your child from being your child" (Second Reading Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1996: 1470). Because of the instrumental and bureaucratic reason for naturalisation, a diasporic bond with Ghana was unbroken and undisturbed by naturalisation. For that reason, diasporans should no longer be deprived of their Ghanaian citizenship just for having acquired second citizenship. Moreover, denying dual citizenship would also mean denying diasporans their right to participate in Ghanaian society, which was not only unjust but also economically unwise.

The overall argument is best exemplified by the following quote, in which an MP justified naturalisation abroad by arguing diasporans had been "forced to adopt citizenship", that it was understandable that people wanted to "derive the maximum benefit of their stay abroad" and "have security." This MP concluded that forcing people to renounce their Ghanaian citizenship in case of naturalisation would be tantamount to "denying [them] the input" they could have in Ghana:

> "[...] we know that many of our people have found themselves in other areas, in places other than their own for reasons which are varied. [...] We are finding many Ghanaians who have been *forced to adopt citizenship* from other areas not because

> they love the country less but because circumstances have compelled them to do so. Mr. Speaker, let me give you an example. For instance, a footballer who plays soccer very well goes abroad, he wants to play, enjoy and *derive the maximum benefit*. As a matter of course, he finds that the best way *to have security* in that regard is to adopt citizenship. If you say you are denying him citizenship in his own country because of that adoption, you are also denying the input of that footballer were he to enjoy dual citizenship. […] Most of them [diasporans] find that they would be able to contribute their maximum if they have the benefit of not being estranged in their own country." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1470; own highlighting)

The second way through which diasporans were proven to have maintained a bond with Ghana strong enough to remain citizens despite naturalisation abroad were remittances. Some members of parliament argued that diasporans had been able to remit as much because they had forfeited their Ghanaian citizenship and become citizens of the Global North. One MP during the 1999 debate on the citizenship bill even was of the opinion that many diasporans had strategically naturalised abroad because they knew that they would be more "effective" when contributing to the economy of Ghana if they were citizens of the Global North. Here again, the language the MP used, speaking of "effectiveness" reveals an instrumental approach to naturalisation abroad among members of parliament:

> "I stand to support the Bill before us, particularly the part that deals with dual citizenship for Ghanaians abroad. Mr. Speaker, many Ghanaians take up citizenship of the other countries not because they are disloyal to Ghana. In many instances, they do so because they want to contribute even more effectively to Ghana's development." (Second Reading Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1996: 1481 – 1482)

Because diasporans had proven their continued allegiance to Ghana through their remittances, they should be given dual citizenship, as a recognition of their support and contribution. With that recognition, the argument holds, people would feel encouraged to return one day, or to remit even more:

> "I believe that many of them would want to come back. So this Bill is going to encourage them. It is one of the attractions that will make them know that Ghanaians have given recognition to them […]. But I can assure you that when we come into

> power in the year 2001, we are going to improve the economy such that it will attract them to come home and help to rebuild this country." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1484)

> "I also think that Ghanaians who owe allegiance to counties other than Ghana and yes contribute very meaningfully towards the development of this country [...] will be encouraged to be more committed to the development of this country and more devoted to it." (Second Reading Citizenship Bill 1999: 1452)

So far in this chapter I have argued that the seemingly widespread positive attitude towards dual citizenship found throughout my interviews, can be better understood if we examine the backdrop of the political climate against which dual citizenship has been adopted in Ghana. This is because attitudes towards dual citizenship do not exist in vacuum but have grown historically and are influenced by the political climate in the respective country. That historical and political backdrop is marked in Ghana by a period of anti-dual citizenship stances, denationalisation, and expulsion of immigrants between 1957 and 1979. With democratisation from the mid-1990s onwards, moreover, there was a shift towards allowing dual citizenship that was argued for by pointing to Ghana's inglorious past of denationalisation and calling for a future that embraces rule of law, liberalism, immigration, and globalisation. The dual citizenship debates were also marked by an underscoring of the moral obligation to and the economic benefits of encouraging diasporans to return. A strategic attitude towards naturalisation in the Global North also appears in the debates on dual citizenship amendments. In the 1990s, in other words, there was a discursive shift in Ghana towards embracing dual citizenship and welcoming dual citizens, particularly if that helps with return migration back to Ghana. The following section examines whether this was a relatively short period after democratisation or whether the affirmative political discourses on return migration and dual citizenship persist to this day.

6.3 Further Integration of the Diaspora since 2020

After having looked at Ghana's political history of forbidding and then allowing dual citizenship, this section connects that analysis to the present. My aim here is to evaluate the political climate on dual citizenship during the period in which this research was conducted, i.e., 2020–2021. This is done through an analysis of online news articles, the 2020 Diaspora Engagement Policy, and the 2021 Citizenship (Amendment) Bill. The latter two initiatives are still in rather early stages: the citizenship bill has been read once in parliament while the diaspora engagement policy has not even had its first reading. With the next general elections coming up in 2024, both proposals might not get through the legislative procedure before the current governments' end of term. Nevertheless, they are still insightful and indicative of the current political climate.

The 2000 Citizenship Act – an Act for the Diaspora

The introduction of dual citizenship in Ghana was a lengthy process. After the Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1996 necessitated a new citizenship law, the Citizenship Act finally came into force in 2001. Its major new introduction was, of course, the acceptance of dual citizenship, but it also introduced some decolonialisation of language (citizenship instead of nationality, see above) and some gender-neutral wordings. Otherwise, the act is in many ways a moderate reform of pre-democratisation citizenship legislation. For instance, many provisions for qualification for naturalisation were carried over from pre-democratic legislation with just slight changes. This is, for example, the case with being "of good character"—a

requirement introduced under colonial rule to exclude Lebanese/Syrian immigrants and carried over into many legislative documents on citizenship between 1957 and 1979 (see previous sections). Under the 2000 Citizenship Act, it is still a prerequisite for naturalisation. With the 2000 Citizenship Act, however, it is now more clearly regulated who can attest to such good character (notaries public, lawyers, or senior public officers) (Ghana Citizenship Act 2000: 14(1c). So, apart from the introduction of dual citizenship, the Act is not a ground-breaking new approach to citizenship, but an attempt to put Ghana's citizenship legislation on an orderly footing.

Strikingly, the introduction of dual citizenship is not restricted to diasporans—even if it is primarily addressed at them. Part II of the act, "Acquisition of Ghanaian Citizenship otherwise than by birth" does not restrict naturalisation to people of Ghanaian descent, but part III, the part which lays out the requirements for dual citizenship, is worded in a way that gives the impression that dual citizenship is first and foremost envisioned for Ghanaian emigrants. This is evident from formulations such as: "A citizen of Ghana may hold the citizenship of any other country in addition to his citizenship of Ghana" (Ghana Citizenship Act 2000: 14(1)). Out of a total of six clauses on dual citizenship, two specifically deal with Ghanaian citizens who renounced or lost their Ghanaian citizenship for naturalisation abroad (Ghana Citizenship Act 2000: 14(3), 14(5)). Although embracing immigration was an argument in the parliamentary debates leading to dual citizenship, the dual citizenship clauses of the Citizenship Act thus suggest that diaspora arguments for the introduction of dual citizenship prevailed.

2020 Diaspora Engagement Policy

20 years later, the reforms proposed in the Diaspora Engagement Policy and the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill aim to further liberalise the citizenship rights of diasporans. Already under the presidency of John Mahama (2012-2017, NDC), an attempt at formulating a diaspora engagement policy was undertaken, but the draft policy was not finished before the end of Mahama's term. His successor and current president, Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP), published his party's diaspora engagement policy in 2020. As the name suggests, the policy aims to forge closer links with Ghanaian diasporans, among other things by granting diasporans more citizenship rights. The main issue that the Diaspora Engagement Policy aims to reform, it seems, is a clause from the 2000 Citizenship Act which forbids dual citizens to hold certain political offices. It is this clause which several elite interviewees had cited as the reason for not acquiring a second citizenship (see chapter five). The definition in the policy, however, remains vague and seems to address both dual citizens and former Ghanaians who no longer hold their Ghanaian citizenship, and also both diasporans in the diaspora and returnees:

> "Furthermore, there are other Ghanaians in the diaspora who, by virtue of their dual citizenship or nationality, are ineligible for appointment into certain political offices, including ministerial appointments in spite of the diverse contributions they make to the country's development. In order to sustain the contributions of these categories of people, there is the need to adopt measures to ensure their political participation and rights through their effective integration into the political economy of the country." (Government of Ghana 2020: 16)

The 10-point plan of implementation also remains vague. The policy clearly aims to address the problem of "Ghanaians in the diaspora who […] are ineligible for appointment into certain political offices" (ibid) because of their citizenship status. None of the ten implementation points, however, proposes the most obvious,

namely, to simply remove the clause which forbids dual citizens from holding political offices from the Citizenship Act. Instead, it proposes a multitude of ways to strengthen diasporans voting rights, such as through facilitating voter registration and introducing electronic voting systems which would allow diasporans to participate in elections remotely without having to travel and vote in person in Ghana. Moreover, the implementation points suggest ways in which the diaspora can participate in political deliberation. For example, the policy proposes to institute the Ghanaian Diaspora as a group with observer status in the parliament and wants to task Ghanaian diplomatic missions to create platforms for political information and diasporic feedback (Government of Ghana 2020: 17).

There is thus a clear discrepancy between what the policy defines as the problem to tackle—dual citizens cannot run for certain offices—and the measurements it proposes—improved voting and deliberation rights. The reasons for this discrepancy are unclear, although it seems reasonable to assume that granting dual citizens the right to assume political offices is politically controversial. This assumption seems corroborated by the manner in which the clause was debated in parliament during the second reading of the citizenship bill in 1999. Whilst there were a few disagreements on which offices the ban on dual citizenship should apply to, there was unanimity that high political offices should not be held by dual citizens due to the perceived issue of dual allegiance (Second Reading Citizenship Act 1999).

2021 Citizenship (Amendment) Bill

One member of parliament seemed to have noticed that discrepancy as well: in 2021, MP Kennedy Osei Nyarko proposed a private member's bill to amend the

citizenship act (Asare 2022; GhanaWeb 2023, 2021; Modern Ghana 2021). His Citizenship (Amendment) Bill proposes: "to remove re-strictions imposed on dual citizens from holding certain public offices specified in subsection (2) of section 16 of [the Citizenship Act]" (First Reading Citizenship (Amendment) Bill: 26). So far, the bill has been read once. The first reading, unfortunately, did not reveal any arguments for or against the bill, but simply stated that it had been presented by Osei Narko and referred to the Committee on Constitution, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs. Although Osei Narko is a member of the current ruling party, NPP, it seems unlikely that the bill will ever make it to a second reading during the current legislative period. After all, he presented the bill as an individual member, without the backing of his parliamentary fraction.

Despite the unlikeliness for the bill to go further now, it has made news and brought the topic on the agenda for the upcoming general election in 2024. In May 2023 John Mahama, presidential candidate for the opposition party NDC, announced that he would remove the restrictions on dual citizens so that dual citizens would no longer be excluded from certain public offices. He appealed to the logic of "brain gain" that this amendment could bring:

> "A country's human resource is its best resource, and we happen to have about three million of our citizens abroad, they have acquired experience, they have acquired different talents. And why should we have a law that says that if you going to be an MP in Ghana, you must give up your dual citizenship, meanwhile we have a dual citizenship law." (as cited by: GraphicOnline 2023; see also: Darfah Frimpong 2023)

Mahama made this statement when visiting a constituency whose elected member of parliament (from the opposition party NDC) was banned from holding office when it transpired, after the election, that he had been a dual Ghanaian-

Canadian citizen. Two days before Mahama's speech, the Supreme Court had criticised the whole electoral process of that constituency as unconstitutional. Against that backdrop, Mahama still declared the MP's exclusion as an "injustice and an affront to Ghana's democracy" (GraphicOnline 2023). Just one month later, the current vice president, Mahamudu Bawumia, member of the ruling NPP, was accused of secretly holding dual Ghanaian-British citizenship, an allegation he has so far refuted as a baseless accusation (Zurek 2023). It seems that both parties are in principle willing to reform the citizenship bill so that holders of high public offices can have dual citizenship, but deem it advantageous to use the clause as it is now to disqualify political opponents during election campaigns.

Irrespective of how the general election will unfold and whether Ghana's citizenship act will be amended to allow dual citizens to hold public offices, the developments since 2020 make clear that Ghana has, since the introduction of dual citizenship, been on a political course that leads to further liberalisation rather than to restricting dual citizen's rights. It is therefore safe to say that Ghana is on a 27-year trajectory of using dual citizenship as an incentive for diasporans to return. This helps us understand why returnees describe dual citizenship in positive terms and perceive it as a form of capital that can make a positive impact on their lives after return.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the results from chapter four and five should be understood against the backdrop of Ghana's political history of citizenship. To do so,

I examined changes in citizenship law between 1957 and 1979, a period in which citizenship regulations often hinted at a politicisation of the issue. I then analysed the parliamentary debates of the 1990s which led to the introduction of dual citizenship in 2001. In the last step, I linked those debates with dual citizenship in Ghana today by studying two recent reform proposals: the Diaspora Engagement Policy of 2020, and the Citizenship Amendment Bill of 2021, as well as recent news about potential new amendments to the Citizenship Act.

This chapter argued that, from independence in 1957 to the end of the 1970s, the story of citizenship in Ghana was very much a story of denationalisation and expulsion of immigrants. With the regime change towards democracy in 1992, debates leading to the introduction of dual citizenship featured two central arguments for dual citizenship. One of these arguments reflected on Ghana's past of denationalisation and expulsion while painting a future in which Ghana has learned from its past mistakes to become part of a Western, liberal, and transnational/globalised world. Although the question whether immigrants should be granted dual citizenship still was debated, pro-immigration arguments predominated here. The other argument dealt with diaspora, return migration, and economic benefits. The introduction of dual citizenship had been driven by the regime change towards democracy and economic considerations about integration and return of diasporans. The Citizenship Act that followed from those debates, however, was formulated in such a way that suggests diaspora and return migration arguments were attributed particular weight. With the 2020 diaspora engagement policy and the 2021 Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, Ghana has more recently continued its path of liberalising citizenship law and encouraging diasporans to return to Ghana.

The political history of Ghana's citizenship law helps us to evaluate my findings that dual citizenship can be seen as a form of capital in three ways: first, by confirming previous findings, second, by explaining those findings; and third, by identifying key factors that contribute to citizenship being valued in the way it has been in Ghana, thereby helping to gauge how much of an outlier the Ghanaian case may be. On the first point, we can see that the viewpoints of non-elite returnees are reflected in the parliamentary debates: the Ghanaian parliament discussed the Northern half of dual citizenship in instrumental terms and held that many emigrants had not required Northern citizenship out of emotional reasons but because of bureaucratic hurdles. Moreover, they hailed dual citizenship for its role in facilitating economic success after return, reinforcing the idea that dual citizenship is a form of economic capital that facilitates economic life in Ghana.

On the second point, we can note that the parliamentary debates indeed help understand the role of dual citizenship Ghana. The findings from the interviews match the dominant rhetoric from these debates. Twenty-seven years of diaspora-friendly citizenship legislation attempting to encourage diasporas to return to Ghana, and a decidedly instrumental notion of acquired Northern citizenship among MPs, suggest that the overall discourse in Ghanaian society is favourable to returnees with dual citizenship. As we have seen in this chapter, such discourses, especially more recently, describe dual citizens as resourceful and entrepreneurial. This is further corroborated by the fact that granting dual citizenship to diasporans has not been a controversial issue since 1996. Moreover, Ghana's orientation towards liberal democracies of the Global North, particularly the US and the UK, may also explain the overall positive experience dual citizen returnees reported to have made

after return to Ghana. Crucially, it can also explain why, in the Ghanaian case, dual citizenship works as a form of capital in the country of origin/return, (and not, as in the Turkish example, only outside the country of origin). Overall, the political history of dual citizenship in Ghana suggests that returnees with dual citizenship are highly valued at home.

On the third point, we can tentatively note that Ghana might not be that much of an outlier when compared to other countries of the Global South. Ghana transitioned into a liberal democracy and introduced dual citizenship over the course of the 1990s. Other countries of the Global South had a similar trajectory to dual citizenship, for instance Nigeria and Mexico also introduced dual citizenship in the 1990s during efforts to democratise (see on Nigeria legislative history Manby and Momoh (2020); see on Mexican legislative history Hoyo (2015)). The Kenyan case also resembles the Ghanaian, even though the implementation of the Kenyan dual citizenship policy took until 2010 (Whitaker 2011). Moreover, in Ghana, the dual citizenship amendment occurred primarily in order to forge closer links with the diaspora—two reasons that have been often discussed as drivers of dual citizenship legislation (Escobar 2007; Jones-Correa 2001; Vink et al. 2019; Whitaker 2011). Future comparative research will be able to explore if dual citizenship is similarly valued as a form of capital and a means to upward mobility in other countries as well. Nevertheless, it is sensible to assume that in countries with similar trajectories, similar stances on return migration, and similarly unanimous consent on diaspora engagement, dual citizenship could assume the role it appears to have assumed in Ghana.

7. Conclusion

Over the last six chapters, I have engaged with about 200 publications and cited dozens of primary sources—interviews, legislations, parliamentary debates, and news articles. It is time now to zoom out again, condense the main arguments, and discuss their implications. I introduced this thesis with an observation: Global inequalities and citizenship are deeply connected, so much that between-country inequality exceeds disparities within even the most unequal countries (such as South Africa or India). A growing body of citizenship literature pointed this out, studying how people from the Global South can overcome this inequality by migrating and naturalising, claiming Northern citizenship based on their ancestry, or by giving birth abroad. In parallel, a growing body of literature on return migration has shown that voluntary return migration back to the Global South is fairly common, that access to capital and transnational ties is crucial for a successful return, and that, nevertheless, voluntary, planned return often does not lead to successful economic reintegration.

These insights made me curious. If, on the one hand, citizenship acquisition in the Global North is linked to upward mobility and, on the other hand, the success of voluntary return migration is not entirely explicable by funding, then it raises the question of what role citizenship might play for the return experience. The aim of this research has been to follow this issue. The overarching, guiding question has been: What is the value of Northern citizenship in a Southern context for return migrants? Due to the breadth of that question, I approached it through the case of

Ghana and raised two narrower questions: (1) What value has Northern citizenship for returnees' everyday lives in Ghana, and (2) What is the political history of dual citizenship in Ghana and how can this history further explain the value that Ghanaian return migrants attribute to the possession of a second Northern citizenship. The first question aimed at understanding the return experience itself, while the second question aimed at understanding the political context which allowed for such a return experience.

This is not just a concern within the ivory tower. Global inequalities are enormous, and citizenship appears to be a determinant of where one stands in this world of inequalities. It is therefore important to better understand how citizenship-based inequality plays out in different settings. Over the course of this thesis, I have made three main arguments: one on the role of citizenship for the return experience, one on the role of citizenship for upward mobility and social class affiliation in the Global South, and one on the politics of dual citizenship and the implications of my findings. In the next section I review and recapitulate these three arguments in more detail.

7.1 Dual Citizenship and the Return Experience

My first argument relates to the return experience itself and posits that Northern citizenship has benefits for everyday life in the Global South where it can function as social, economic, and cultural capital and help with upward mobility. Overall, most participants in this study broadly came from middle-class backgrounds. Many of them were among the first generation in their family to have pursued a university degree; many had a university degree from outside Ghana and their parental

background ranged from farmers and small shop owners to administrators, teachers, and medical doctors. None of them grew up in particularly underprivileged circumstances. People who shared this kind of biographical background all viewed dual citizenship/Northern citizenship similarly. This view, I found, can best be described in terms of Bourdieusian capital, and it was independent of people's own citizenship status.

Central to this view is the conviction that dual citizenship is a prestigious status to have within Ghanaian society, a status that can be transformed into concrete benefits for everyday life in Ghana. We can best understand these benefits through the lens of social, economic, and cultural capital. Citizenship itself is a form of membership and citizenship in the Global North therefore describable as a form of social capital. Within Ghanaian society, I found, this social capital plays out in the form of services that are not accessible without that membership. These include embassy services, such as invitations to networking events or vaccination rollouts, and access to routine medical care in the country of second citizenship. For everyday life in Ghana dual citizenship also functions as a form of economic capital, both for employees and for entrepreneurs. With a Northern passport, returnees can apply for expatriate positions. Holding an expatriate job means that they not only make more money than the vast majority of people in Ghanaian society, but their purchasing power is often higher than it was while living in the Global North. Entrepreneurs profit from their dual citizenship in a different way. They have an easier time interacting with international business partners because they can travel visa-free with their second passports. They also have an easier time accessing funding from abroad or making international deals. Finally, they have a safety net in the form of

remigration to the Global North which meant they approach their business ideas differently to their Ghanaian counterparts who lacked such a safety net. When it comes to citizenship as economic capital, having Ghanaian citizenship in combination with the Northern citizenship was crucial, as dual citizens do not need to pay the fees imposed on non-Ghanaian investors (fees for opening a bank account or a business in Ghana). Lastly, Northern citizenship is also a form of cultural capital, it is seen as a title that equals success and knowledgeability of the world. It facilitates access to international educational degrees, and—through its mobility rights— access to consumer goods that are difficult to obtain in Ghana (electronic devices, Western food items, Western brands).

These three forms of citizenship capital were convertible into each other, just as Bourdieu's theory would suggest. The social capital of being a member of Northern state, I learned, could be converted into the economic capital of an expatriate contract, and could also facilitate, through the travel right of the passport, the accumulation of cultural capital in the form of rare consumer goods. At the same time, the economic capital of a well-paid expatriate position in Ghana, I was told, could be again transferable into social capital, as one become a member of the small expatriate circles in Ghana. Likewise, being able to travel abroad and import rare consumer goods into Ghana could be transferable into social capital, as those who do not have a passport that enables them to travel easily often depend on dual citizens to access certain products from the Global North.

Both returnees—with and without dual citizenship—felt the impact of such citizenship benefits and linked it to upward mobility. That does not mean that all returnees who had returned without having naturalised abroad thought of their

return experience in terms of failure. Still, the findings show that there are subtle, but important differences between returnees with and without dual citizenship—differences that the return migration literature has so far overlooked but which a Bourdieusian lens pick up.

These findings have implications for the study of return migration, particularly for the so-called migration development nexus. Studies on return migration have been eager to document the detrimental effects of deportation (or 'forced return' in the policy vernacular) on returnees' socio-economic status. Being forced to return is largely linked to shame, and not only in the Ghanaian context. Social pressure can be high on emigrants, particularly when it comes pressure to remit and bring something back from the wealth of the Global North. Deportation, however, takes someone's chance to plan for their return so that they do not come back empty-handed. Voluntary return, on the contrary, is return on one's own terms and gives returnees the time to plan ahead, save money, and invest into goods or businesses in the country of return. This increases the likelihood of successful return. Indeed, particularly in policy circles, voluntary returnees have been portrayed as drivers of development who bring tangible (money) and intangible (education, business ideas, networks) goods to countries of the Global South. But research into the actual return experience of voluntary return paint a different and seemingly puzzling picture: voluntary return migration does not necessarily correlate with successful economic reintegration in the country of return, nor does being well-educated.

Without claiming that I provide an exhaustive explanation as to why this is the case, my findings offer one significant explanation—namely, returnees' citizenship. The fact is that returnees do not necessarily come back with the same citizenship

status they left with. If there is a chance to do so, many will acquire dual citizenship and return not just as a citizen of their home country, but simultaneously as a certified member of the Global North through their second citizenship. Even though the impact of dual citizenship on life after return might not have been the primary reason for naturalisation, it proves impactful: those who move back as dual citizens have more capital to draw on when they return than those who move back without a second passport and therefore have more chances to succeed after return.

This has various consequences for the return experience and the so-called migration-development nexus. In particular, it means that it is not just the savings, business plans and consumer goods that one returns with which determine whether or not return is a success story. It is also whether one returns as a member of the Global North or merely as a guest of the Global North. A member of the Global North has a lifelong ability to capitalise on that membership. A non-member, of course, may be able to capitalise in a limited way on their period abroad but has much more difficulty in maintaining that connection upon return, not least when access to the Global North is hampered by visa restrictions.

The fact that there has not been any research into the impact of citizenship on the return experience might be due to the framework through with return migration has been commonly studied—a framework that focusses on transnational connection and is wary of emphasising the role of states due to concerns about "methodological nationalism". My findings suggest that the return migration literature has at times overstated the long-term impact of personal experiences gained through migration and thereby overlooked the differences that state membership can make. My findings show that we cannot and should not disregard the state and

state membership. As long as inequalities run primarily between countries, state membership plays a crucial role in everyone's life and needs to be taken into account when we examine return migration.

7.2 Dual Citizenship and Global Inequalities

My second argument builds on this first one, and posits that Northern citizenship can become a class marker of upper middle-class belonging in the Global South. We need to qualify the first argument that citizenship can become a form of capital that benefits life after return and point out for whom this is the case. Returnees of elite background—that is, members of politically influential families from whose ranks we can find independence fighters, ministers and presidents—were remarkably unaware, uninterested, or dismissive of the benefits of dual citizenship in Ghana.

There were three reasons for this, and all were linked to their elite family background. First, while most returnees connected dual citizenship with respect and prestige within Ghanaian society, elite returnees drew respect from their famous family names, their long pedigrees and powerful family networks. Because of the strong social capital of their family names, there was no need for the social capital that dual citizenship could provide. Second, coming from a family which included those who shaped Ghana's politics has an impact on ideas about politics and political agency. Some elite returnees had plans to enter politics in Ghana themselves and expressed confidence this plan would work out. This plan, combined with national pride as well as a sense of political agency unmatched in non-elite returnees, meant that dual citizenship was not only unnecessary, but even a burden. The Ghanaian

constitution does not allow dual citizens to hold political offices, and although technically this means that dual citizens would have to give up their dual citizenship once they start running for an office, some elite returnees who had political ambitions did not apply for dual citizenship when they could have.

Third, elite returnees in the highest echelon of Ghanaian society did not need to leverage dual citizenship to access economic and cultural capital. With wealth, access to goods of luxury (in other words cultural capital) was not a problem, even though they were difficult to get and are overpriced in Ghana. While people from non-elite backgrounds explained how the international travelling rights of dual citizenship came in handy for accessing such goods, people from the wealthy elite reported that they could simply pay the overpriced Ghanaian rate. There were wealthy people among the upwardly mobile returnees who, unlike the elite, were not willing to pay overpriced Ghanaian rates and seemed be more sensitive to considerations of price and other costs. With an elite family background, the likelihood of being denied a visa to the Global North was also reduced since certain visa application processes take wealth as a proxy both for people's willingness to voluntarily return, and for the ability to contribute economically to the country of migration. If one is already wealthy enough to meet these visa thresholds comfortably before migration, dual citizenship is less important for leading a transnational life in Ghana. In short: unlike those who saw benefits in dual citizenship for everyday life in Ghana, elite participants had no need for upward mobility and no need to leverage their passports rather than their family ties.

This difference also showed in the way returnees saw their own position within Ghanaian society. While non-elite returnees thought that dual citizenship

was a source of respect and standing which put them apart from the average Ghanaian, elite returnees looked down on people who tried to leverage their dual citizenship. Elite participants made clear they belonged to the established "high society" of Ghana and distinguished themselves from Ghanaians who had been upwardly mobile with the help of migration and naturalisation: nouveaux-riches, as one elite returnee called them condescendingly.

This suggests that Northern citizenship may not only be a form of capital but also that it could fulfil the requirements of a class marker in Bourdieu's sense. To Bourdieu, people's class position depends, first, on the amount and composition of capital that they own. Second, it depends on people's social mobility (a newly rich person has a different social class that than someone with the same kind of economic capital but no experience of upward mobility). The third characteristic of class are practices of distinction. If we apply this to the case of return migration, dual citizenship is, first, a source of capital, second a source of upward mobility, and third a source of distinction. Non-elite returnees with dual citizenship expressed this particularly clearly: they felt different from Ghanaians without dual citizenship. Elite returnees, similarly, connected to this analysis, stating that they felt superior to returnees who had to leverage their second citizenship to reach their circles. In short, these findings suggest that to people from the Global South, becoming a citizen of the Global North is not just about mobility and economic access to the Global North. Gaining citizenship in the Global North can also be transferred back to the Global South where it becomes a class marker that boosts the socio-economic status in the Global South in various ways. However, it does not enable an upwardly mobile

returnee to enter into the Ghanaian elite which has its own currency based on the social capital of their family networks.

These findings have implications for the study of linkages between citizenship and inequality. A growing body of literature has studied how people navigate their citizenship-based disadvantages through naturalisation in the Global North and how such naturalisation helps with upward mobility in the Global North. Research into the so-called citizenship premium has shown how naturalisation correlates with an increased socio-economic standing in the country of naturalisation. And research into strategic citizenship acquisition has shown how elites from middle-income countries such as Mexico or Brazil strategically acquire a second passport to become part of an internationally mobile cosmopolitan elite. In short, the focus has been on the benefits that dual citizenship acquisition brings because it allows people to leave the Global South. My findings show that second citizenship from the Global North involves more than just integration into the Global North. The benefits of membership in the Global North extends beyond the geographical location of the Global North and applies in Southern countries as well. When taken back to the Global South, this citizenship also bears the potential to improve returnees' socio-economic position, where it can signal social mobility and upper middle class belonging.

My findings that a second citizenship can become a class marker in a society to which that second citizenship does not pertain, also points the study of citizenship in a new direction. I introduced this thesis with Milanović's observation that today between-country inequality is typically greater than within-country inequality. This observation has resonated with citizenship and migration studies. It has helped fuel

a debate of the role of social class as a principle of stratification. Both scholars of citizenship and of migration have recently argued that class as a mode of stratification is losing its significance and giving way to new forms of stratification. Within citizenship studies, Harpaz has argued that instead of class it is increasingly the citizenship that defines one's socio-economic position in the world. Along the same lines, scholarship on transnationalism argues it is one's location in the world that defines one's socio-economic position (Faist 2018; Harpaz 2019).

There is little doubt that citizenship and location play a more important role if inequalities are most profound at the international level. But does it really follow that we are witnessing a "shift from class to location" as Faist (2018, 2) has put it? Or that citizenship today "plays a much larger role" than class, to use the words of Harpaz (2019, 4)? Not necessarily. The results from this thesis point to a different direction, namely, that class is simply changing its face. The inequality between citizenship of the Global North and the Global South creates a cosmopolitan global elite, but that does not mean that class just disappears. Instead, being a member of the Global North, and having the option to lead a cosmopolitan life, can feed into class structures within societies of the Global South.

Scepticism towards class is deeply rooted in citizenship studies. This once again brings to mind T.H. Marshall, the founding father of citizenship studies, who argued that British citizenship acted as an equalising force in the course of its development between the Enlightenment and the introduction of social welfare in the 20th century. This often-cited text, written during the heyday of the Cold War, reads like a liberal response to the Marxist claim that citizenship is merely a disguise for class inequality and unequal ownership of the means of production. I do not want to

revive this Marxist argument; but I think we can revisit and revise Marshall's argument with this studies' findings on the value of dual citizenship: Citizenship is internally inclusive and externally exclusive; that means dual citizens who are both members of the Global South and the Global North can use their inclusion into the Global North as a form of distinction in the Global South. That means, the inclusive and exclusive forces of Northern citizenship can work to undermine the equalising powers of the inclusive aspect of Southern citizenship.

7.3 Politics of Dual Citizenship

My third argument concerns the political conditions that foster a situation where dual citizenship can become a form of capital and class marker in the Global South. It posits that dual citizenship as class marker depends on a favourable political environment that is welcoming towards diasporans and oriented toward liberal democracy. Individual trajectories are never detached from the wider social context. In this thesis, I chose to address the examine the findings from the interviews against the backdrop of Ghana's political history of citizenship. By finding out about how the Ghanaian political climate regarding citizenship changed over time, I was able to highlight political factors that enabled citizenship to function in the way suggested by my interviewees. There are two works that support such an approach: Altan-Olcay and Batla's "The American Passport in Turkey" (2020), and Robtel Pailey's "Development, (Dual) Citizenship and its Discontents in Africa" (2021). These both show that the historical and political context of state membership plays a significant role for how dual citizenship is perceived. Altan-Olcay and Balta's study of dual citizens in Turkey (of which one group are returnees) show that particularly

the Western-oriented Kemalist (former) Turkish upper class that, confronted with Erdoğan's authoritarian-religious agenda, valued dual citizenship as an exit strategy. In their study, dual citizenship is a transnational capital, however, people mainly benefit from it outside the Turkish society, not within because of the political circumstances in Turkey. It is thus the legacy of Atatürk's secularism and today's authoritarian political climate that led to citizenship being valued in this certain form. Meanwhile, Pailey's analysis of the highly contested Liberian dual citizenship act traces the legacy of historical violent conflicts of belonging.

Ghana's historical and political context of dual citizenship differs from the Turkish and Liberian cases in many ways, not least in its relative peaceful recent history since independence, and the transition towards democracy in the early nineties. It is in this period of post-cold war democratisation that Ghana introduced dual citizenship. As I show through the analysis of a parliamentary debate surrounding citizenship, there were two broad sets of arguments for the introduction of dual citizenship. The first set of arguments pointed at Ghana's undemocratic past of anti-migration politics and large-scale citizenship stripping. It proclaimed that it was time to leave this past behind and be part of a democratic, liberal, globalised world. Ghana should therefore no longer prevent its citizens from exercising their right to citizenship abroad. The second set of arguments concerned the Ghanaian diaspora. The dual citizenship amendment was introduced with the hope that this would facilitate the return migration of those who had to leave the country during previous autocratic rule. The biggest lobby group behind this law was the Ghanaian diaspora, who pushed legislators to amend the Citizenship Act to allow dual citizenship.

The way that dual citizenship was discussed by parliamentarians also fit the way that non-elite returnees discussed dual citizenship: Ghanaian policy makers thought of foreign citizenship in economic terms. They stressed how dual citizenship made it easier for returnees and immigrants to bring foreign capital with them to Ghana, and they also spoke of citizenship from the Global North (UK and US) as "priced citizenship", pledging to do the best to also become a country of highly valued citizenship. This matter-of-fact way of thinking about dual citizenship (the Northern part of dual citizenship to be precise) does not seem to have changed since the dual citizenship amendment was discussed in the 1990s. There have been several recent attempts at amending dual citizenship further so that dual citizens would no longer forfeit their second citizenship to run for a political office. Both main political parties, NPP and NDC, have pledged to make such amendments if they are elected in the 2024 presidential elections.

In chapter six I therefore concluded that the political climate that enabled dual citizenship to become so beneficial to everyday life in Ghana relied on (a) an orientation towards liberal democracy and (b) sustained diaspora-friendly politics that made return migration easier. Against this backdrop, I tentatively suggest that citizenship might similarly function as a capital in other countries of the Global South that have a similar political climate. Against this backdrop, I tentatively suggest that citizenship might function as capital in a similar way in other countries of the Global South that share a similar political climate.

Beyond providing important context information for this study, these findings also have implications for research into the drivers of dual citizenship legislation. There has been a stark surge of countries allowing for dual citizenship since the

1990s, particularly of countries of the Global South. When it comes to the Ghanaian case, research has so far relied either on statistical methods or on interviews with policy makers to determine the drivers of this dual citizenship legislation. The statistical study by Whitaker (2011) suggested that Ghana's dual citizenship has been driven by democratisation and diaspora politics. Based on interviews, Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar (2014) find that remittances are the main driver for the acceptance of dual citizenship. Though not specifically on the Ghanaian case, Vink et al. (2019) find that liberalisation puts normative pressure on states to tolerate dual citizenship (see my discussion in chapter six).

Surprisingly, no research has looked at the actual parliamentary debates that have led to Ghana's dual citizenship amendment. My findings provide nuance to the academic debate on drivers of dual citizenship legislation. They show that none of the above drivers stood out as the only force behind Ghana's dual citizenship legislation. Democratisation played an important role linked with ideas of liberalism and a reckoning with Ghana's past. Diasporas also played an important role lobbying for dual citizenship, but the parliamentary debates show how they were seen and discussed by lawmakers, namely as unfortunate souls who were pushed into leaving Ghana and adopting foreign citizenship against their will. Their migration, lawmakers held, was due to Ghana's internal struggles, and their naturalisation was due to bureaucracy. Economic calculations played an important role, but not through remittances alone, but also through return. Parliamentarians assumed—and quite rightfully so, as my interviews showed—that dual citizens would have a greater impact on the Ghanaian economy after return than Ghanaians without second citizenship from the Global South.

My findings also offer a new angle through which to study dual citizenship legislation. Among other things, my analysis of the Ghanaian parliamentary debates revealed that the existence of immigrants in Ghana was used as an argument against dual citizenship reform. It seems, however, that because Ghana was not a major country of immigration at the time of the dual citizenship debates in the mid to late 1990s, the argument did not carry much weight and did not impede dual citizenship reform. Arguably, the largest group of immigrants in Ghana during the time of the debates were Liberian refugees. An interesting route for future research would be to compare the Ghanaian parliamentary debates with other African countries that are major refugee hosts, such as Kenya or Uganda, to see what has shaped these countries' stances on dual citizenship and how hosting refugees influenced state's decisions regarding dual citizenship.

The findings of my research are somewhat limited by the design of this research – the focus on a single case country and the recruitment predominantly through returnee organisations – and future research will have to evaluate, nuance, and strengthen the findings. As a way forward, one potentially fruitful approach could be a comparative study that compares the Ghanaian return experience with return migration to another country with a similar recent history of dual citizenship politics and/or a country with a distinctly different political approach to dual citizenship. Another approach might be to examine attitudes to dual citizenship among the general population of an emigration country, and not just among the subset of returnees. Both approaches would alleviate some of the limitations of the research design that I chose for this study; both would also raise their own methodological issues.

That being said, overall, this research has shown that citizenship matters in more ways than is often acknowledged. Naturalising in the Global North can be more than a way to overcome global citizenship-based inequalities; becoming a member of the Global North can also help with upward social mobility on a local scale, within class structures of the Global South. For citizens of the Global South, in other words, naturalising in the Global North does not only bring benefits abroad: in the Global North. Many naturalised immigrants return, and when they do, their dual citizenship can become a form of capital that impacts everyday life and helps with upward mobility into the upper middle-class of their country of origin. To put it simply, their citizenship abroad becomes a form of capital at home.

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9. Appendix

9.1 Research Ethics Approval Letter

SCHOOL OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND MUSEUM ETHNOGRAPHY
51-53 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PE
Tel: +44(0)1865 274671
Email: information@anthro.ox.ac.uk; www.anthro.ox.ac.uk

From the office of the Head of School

Julia Schweers
School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography

16 July 2021

Dear Julia

Research Ethics Approval

Ref No.: SAME_C1A_21_055

Title: Citizenship Acquisition and Return Migration

The above application has been considered on behalf of the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography Research Ethics Committee (SAME REC) in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University for ethical approval of all research involving human participants.

I am pleased to inform you that, on the basis of the information provided to the SAME REC, the proposed research has been judged as meeting appropriate ethical standards, and accordingly approval has been granted.

This approval is subject to the latest guidance on travel and research issued by the University in response to coronavirus. Any data collection involving in-person interactions with participants must have an up-to-date COVID-19 fieldwork risk assessment in place, in addition to the School's risk assessment. Please refer to the guidance at https://researchsupport.admin.ox.ac.uk/governance/ethics/coronavirus as the University's position on conducting in-person research may change.

Should there be any subsequent changes to the project, which raise ethical issues not covered in the original application, you should submit details to the SAME REC for consideration.

Applicants are reminded that research assistants and translators should be required to sign a confidentiality form and provided with training.

Yours sincerely,

Elizabeth Ewart
Associate Professor in the Anthropology of Lowland South America
Head of the School of Anthropology and Museum Ethnography
University of Oxford

cc Matthew Gibney, Tom Scott-Smith

Email:

Call for Participation in Oxford Study on Return Migration

Have you lived abroad and returned to Ghana? Or do you still live abroad but regularly return for longer periods? Take part in an interview to talk about your experiences and help us understand more about return migration to Ghana.

If interested, contact the researcher, Julia Schweers, doctoral researcher at the University of Oxford's Centre on Migration, Policy and Society: julia.schweers@compas.ox.ac.uk.

What is this research about?

Ghana has high rates of voluntarily return migration from the global north back to Ghana. With my research, I want to shed light on this understudied phenomenon and examine the meaning of citizenship for return.

What will participation involve?

You will be invited to talk about your experiences in an interview with me. You will be asked a range of open questions about your experience of migration and return. The interview will take approximately one hour.

All personal data will be anonymised to protect your privacy. The conversation would take online at a date and time that is convenient for you.

If you are interested in being part of this project, please contact me at: Julia.schweers@compas.ox.ac.uk or linkedin.com/in/julia-schweers-1571a5226

Linked-In:

Invitation to connect:

Dear [name], I'm a researcher at the University of Oxford working on Ghanaian return migration and I'd absolutely love to interview you about your experience. The interview would be online and last 1h. I'm happy to supply more information and looking forward to your reply. Best wishes, Julia

Follow-up message:

Thank you very much for connecting! Please find below some more detailed information:

About myself:

My name is Julia Schweers, and I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Oxford's Migration Studies programme. I am looking for interviewees for my study on return migration to Ghana.

What is this research about?

Ghana experiences high rates of voluntarily return migration from the global north. With my research, I want to shed light on this understudied phenomenon and examine the meaning of citizenship for return.

What will participation involve?

You will be invited to talk about your experiences in an interview with me. You will be asked a range of open questions about your experience of migration and return. The interview will take approximately one hour.

All personal data will be anonymised to protect your privacy. The conversation would take place online at a date and time that is convenient for you.

Please let me know if you have more questions.

- **Interview description**: I will have an (online) conversation (through Microsoft Teams) with you that will last approximately one hour, in a location that provides an adequate level of privacy. I will ask a range of open questions about your pre-migration experiences, your migration process––so your reasons for migration and how you think and feel about your migration––, your citizenship, and your return to Ghana.
- **Data sharing/ access/ confidentiality**: The answers you give will form the basis of my DPhil thesis and may also lead to other publications. On a practical level, only I will have access to personal research data. I will pseudonymise all personal data to be recorded that belongs to you, including the interview notes I will take.
- **Data storage**: I will store your data safely and confidentially on a password protected cloud-based storage platform (Nexus 365 One Drive) and a password protected folder on an external drive and delete the files from all other locations. I will keep my notebook and the external hard drive in a personal drawer alongside my other valuables. I will keep the research data for at least 3 years after publication and will destroy all identifiable data after 10 years. I would like to be able to use your de-identified data in future studies, and to share this data with other researchers.
- **Audio recording/ notes**: With your permission, I would like to make an audio recording of our discussion to make sure I'm getting an accurate record of the interview. Instead of recording you, I can take notes in my notebook. Which would you prefer?
- **Keeping contact details:** I would also like your permission to keep your contact details so that I can re-contact you to clarify information you gave me in your interview.
- **How identifiable you will be**: You will not be identifiable from any publications or other research outputs. Beyond giving you a pseudonym, I will anonymise any data through which you could be identifiable, like e.g. your job or the city you live in.
- **Risks**: The following risks are involved in taking part: the interview could be time-consuming. You might also find aspects of this interview difficult or distressing as I'll be asking for your opinions about your migration paths, which might or might not be linked to unpleasant memories. In order to reduce any potential risks, I will want you to know that you can choose not to answer any questions you don't want to, pause for a break or stop the interview altogether.
- **Rights**: You don't have to take part; you can ask me any questions you want before or throughout; you can also withdraw at any stage of the interview without giving a reason. After the interview, you can withdraw your information/ data until it is anonymised two weeks after the interview.
- **Publication plans**: The project may/ will be published in my dissertation, academic journals, academic books, academic websites. I will also present my research at conferences and might use it for journalistic publications and policy briefs. A copy of my dissertation will be deposited both in print and online in the university archives.

- **Complaints/ concerns procedure**: If you have any complaints or concerns, please feel free to contact me. My phone number is [telephone number]. You can also reach me at: Julia.schweers@compas.ox.ac.uk.
- **Ethics review details**: This research project has been reviewed and approved by an Oxford University ethics committee. The ethics reference is SAME_C1A_21-055. If, after contacting me with any concern, you're still unhappy and wish to make a formal complaint, please contact the ethics committee. Their email address is hod@anthro.ox.ac.uk.
- **Data Protection statement**: The University of Oxford is responsible overall for ensuring the safe and proper use of any personal information you provide, solely for research purposes. Further information about your rights to information you provide is available from the University's data protection website. More information is available here https://compliance.web.ox.ac.uk/individual-rights.
- **Questions/ concerns**: Do you have any questions?
- Do you give your permission for me to interview you?
- Do you give permission for me to re-contact you to clarify information?
- Do you give me permission to quote you directly without identifying you?
- Are you happy to take part?

9.4 Participants

Nr.	Citizenship	Age Group	Gender	Migration Path[38]	Location of Interview	Date of Interview
1	Ghana-UK	40-49	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	11/09/21
2	Ghana-UK	30-39	f	UK → Ghana → UK	Online	26/1021
3	Ghana	30-39	m	Ghana → Belgium → Ghana → Canada	Online	27/10/21
4	Ghana-UK	30-39	m	UK → Ghana	Online	29/10/21
5	Ghana	20-29	m	Ghana → US → Ghana	Online	08/11/21
6	Ghana-UK	40-49	f	UK → Ghana	Online	17/11/21
7	Ghana-US	60-69	m	Ghana → US → Ghana	Online	25/11/21
8	Ghana-UK	30-39	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	30/11/21
9	Ghana-UK	50-59	m	Ghana → Cambodia → Ghana → Kenya → UK →Ghana	Online	10/12/21
10	Ghana-UK	30-39	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	21/01/22
11	Ghana-US	40-49	m	US → Ghana → UK → Ghana	London	23/01/22
12	Ghana-UK	40-49	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	25/01/22
13	Ghana-Italy	20-29	m	Italy → UK → Ghana	Online	25/01/22
14	Ghana-UK	30-39	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	02/02/22
15	Ghana-Ireland	50-59	m	Ireland → Ghana → US → Ghana	Online	08/02/22
16	Ghana-UK	30-39	f	UK → Ghana → US → Ghana	Online	10/02/22
17	Ghana-UK	40-49	m	Ghana → UK → US → Jamaica → Ghana	Online	11/02/22
18	Ghana	30-39	f	Ghana → US → Ghana	Accra	08/03/22
19	Netherlands	30-39	f	Netherlands → Ghana	Accra	09/03/22
20	Ghana-US-UK	40-49	f	UK → Ghana → US → Ghana	Accra	10/03/22
21	Ghana-Togo-Canada-France	50-59	f	Ghana → Togo → France → Canada → Ghana	Accra	11/03/22
22	Ghana	30-39	m	Ghana → Denmark → Ghana	Accra	15/03/22
23	Ghana-US	40-49	m	Ghana → US → Ghana	Accra	15/03/22
24	Ghana	40-49	f	Ghana → US → Ghana	Accra	18/03/22
25	Ghana-US	30-39	f	Ghana → US →Ghana	Online	22/03/22
26	Ghana-UK	60-69	f	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Accra	24/03/22
27	Ghana-UK-Barbados	40-49	f	UK → Ghana	Accra	26/03/22
28	Ghana	30-39	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Accra	28/03/22
29	Ghana	30-39	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana → US → Ghana	Accra	30/03/22

[38] This column gives an overview of the interviewee's migration path over the course of their lifetime. If the migration path starts in another country than Ghana, the interviewee is a second-generation Ghanaian migrant. If the migration path ends outside of Ghana, the interviewee circulated between that location and Ghana at the point of the interview.

30	UK-Ghana	40-49	f	UK → Ghana	Accra	30/03/22
31	Ghana-US-UK	20-29	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Accra	04/04/22
32	Ghana	30-39	m	Ghana → US → Ghana	Cape Coast	05/04/22
33	Ghana	30-39	f	Ghana → US → Ghana	Cape Coast	05/04/22
34	Ghana-UK	30-39	m	Ghana→ UK → Ghana -→ UK → Ghana	Accra	09/04/22
35	Ghana-UK	30-39	f	UK → Ghana → Canada → Ghana	Accra	11/04/22
36	Ghana	40-49	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Accra	11/04/22
37	Ghana-US-UK	20-29	m	US → Ghana → US → Ghana	Accra	12/04/22
38	Ghana	40-49	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	13/04/22
39	Ghana	40-49	m	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	27/04/22
40	Ghana-US	30-39	m	Ghana → US → Ghana	Online	05/05/22
41	Ghana	30-39	f	Sweden → Ghana → Belgium → France → Ghana	Online	12/05/22
42	Ghana-UK	30-39	f	UK → Ghana	Online	07/06/22
43	Ghana-US	30-39	m	Ghana → US → Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	10/06/22
44	Ghana-UK	50-58	f	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	30/08/22
45	Ghana	30-39	f	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	01/09/22
46	Ghana-UK	30-39	f	Ghana → UK → Ghana	Online	02/09/22
47	Ghana-US	30-39	m	Ghana → US → Ghana	Online	02/09/22
48	Ghana-UK	50-59	m	UK → Ghana →UK → US → Ghana	Online	05/09/22
49	Ghana	20-29	m	Ghana → Australia → Ghana	Online	10/11/21