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Journal article

Self-knowledge, belief, ability (and agency?)

Abstract:

Matthew Boyle [(2011). “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 223–241. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x] has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: (A) that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and (B) that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1080/13869795.2018.1426779

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Oxford college:
Exeter College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0001-8778-524X
Publisher:
Routledge
Journal:
Philosophical Explorations More from this journal
Volume:
21
Issue:
3
Pages:
333-349
Publication date:
2018-01-25
Acceptance date:
2017-12-20
DOI:
EISSN:
1741-5918
ISSN:
1386-9795
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:821245
UUID:
uuid:62fab044-4f2c-41e2-8856-6c4642f0d671
Local pid:
pubs:821245
Source identifiers:
821245
Deposit date:
2018-01-25

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