Journal article
Beat 'em or join 'em? Export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets
- Abstract:
-
We compare adversarial with cooperative industrial and trade policies in a dynamic oligopoly game in which a home and foreign firm compete in R&D; and output and, because of spillovers, each firm benefits from the other's R&D.; When the government can commit to an export subsidy, such a policy raises welfare relative to cooperation, except when R&D; is highly effective and spillovers are near-complete. Without commitment, however, subsidisation may yield welfare levels much lower ...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Blackwell Publishing Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Scandinavian Journal of Economics Journal website
- Volume:
- 101
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 577-596
- Publication date:
- 1999-12-01
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1467-9442
- ISSN:
-
0347-0520
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:6274decf-ded3-4d33-a489-ef23cfe53c90
- Local pid:
- ora:2134
- Deposit date:
- 2008-06-27
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Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- The editors of the Scandinavian journal of economics
- Copyright date:
- 1999
- Notes:
- N.B. Professor Neary was based at University College Dublin when this paper was first published. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA. Citation: Neary, J. P. & O'Sullivan, P. (1999). 'Beat 'em or join 'em? Export subsidies versus international research joint ventures in oligopolistic markets', Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101(4), 577-596. [The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com].
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