

Democracy is “a system in which parties lose elections.”¹ Even in a country where elections are free and fair, the same party sometimes wins for decades, making perpetual losers out of its rivals. Why do such instances of single-party dominance endure longer in some places than others? Understanding the conditions under which single-party dominance ends is important not only because competition is a defining element of democracy but also because the emergence of viable opposition is linked to a country’s growth and development.²

Most research explaining single-party dominance and its demise focuses on the dominant party’s strategies and resources,³ even though many dominant parties—including those in Israel, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and more—rarely, if ever, win crushing popular majorities. Rather, such dominant parties stay in power because the opposition typically consists of multiple, fractious and ideologically disparate parties.⁴ When votes are spread across many opposition parties, the translation of votes into seats is often less efficient and the formation of an opposition government requires coordination amongst many parties. If the opposition instead consists of a single major party, displacing the dominant party becomes easier because opposition votes are consolidated behind one party that can form a stable single-party government in the event of an election victory.

Yet, little scholarly work has investigated the conditions under which oppositions in dominant-party systems eventually consolidate behind one large party. To address this omission in the literature, we argue that two conditions facilitate the emergence of a major opposition party capable of challenging a dominant party: first, the presence of a political organization inherited from the pre-democratic period and second, the presence of a single, salient two-sided social cleavage. When opposition parties (or other political associations) pre-date democratization and have experience with mass mobilization, they typically have considerable advantages over newer opposition forces. They often possess organizing capacities that allow them to more quickly

mobilize discontent and better understand what types of appeals will resonate with voters. When no longstanding political organization exists from the pre-democratic period, a single two-sided social cleavage can also facilitate the emergence of a major opposition party. The opposition is more likely to successfully consolidate behind a single party when the dominant party is identified with one side of a salient social cleavage and the opposition can draw upon symbols and grievances associated with the other side of that social cleavage.

We develop these arguments by examining subnational variation in the emergence of effective challengers to single-party dominance in India, one of the oldest developing-world democracies. We define a political party as initially achieving dominance if it governs continuously for a minimum of twenty years.⁵ Once dominance is achieved, we do not consider it to have truly ended until a viable opposition emerges, which occurs when an opposition-led government serves a full term in office.⁶ We therefore date the end of single-party dominance to the beginning of the opposition's first full term in office. In India, the duration of single-party dominance varied considerably across states, first ending in 1967 in Tamil Nadu but not until 2003 in Madhya Pradesh. Our argument about the role of pre-democratic political organization and social cleavages sheds light on this puzzling subnational variation.

In addition to explaining variation in dominant-party demise across India, our argument makes three scholarly contributions. First, we contribute to a growing literature on how opposition parties sustain single-party dominance.⁷ Existing research largely focuses on factors that increase the likelihood that a fragmented opposition will effectively coordinate against a dominant party. Our argument, in contrast, helps clarify the circumstances under which opposition forces are more likely to consolidate into a single political party, a largely ignored question. Second, though researchers have noted the importance of historical legacies in shaping party system

institutionalization,⁸ historical legacies are largely absent from scholarly debates on single-party dominance. We complement existing work by identifying mechanisms through which legacies from pre-democratic periods help explain the duration of single-party dominance.

Finally, whereas an influential literature contends that polarized social cleavages undermine democracy,⁹ we suggest that polarized social cleavages can actually buttress democracy when channeled into competitive party systems. In this regard, we concur with Rustow's observation that in nascent democracies, "hot family feuds" promote democratic consolidation, assuming an acceptance of democratic rules.¹⁰ When elections draw disaffected groups into the political process, their participation can entrench exactly the kind of vibrant party competition that defines democratic consolidation.

Argument

Dominant-party systems almost always feature one large party competing against many much smaller parties. Where the opposition is fragmented, displacing the dominant party is difficult for three reasons. First, a fragmented opposition is unlikely to maximize its legislative representation. In proportional representation systems, small parties might fail to cross electoral thresholds, while majoritarian electoral systems typically award small parties seat shares far smaller than their vote shares. Second, a fragmented opposition may not be able to form a government without the dominant party if the opposition consists of ideologically diverse parties that view each other as rivals. A divided opposition may allow the dominant party to form a minority government or form its own coalition by picking off opposition parties locked into bitter rivalry with one another. Third, an opposition composed of many coalition partners is vulnerable to collapse, whether through internal dissension or through defections engineered by the dominant

party. Overcoming these challenges is, of course, possible. Multiple opposition parties can coordinate to effectively translate their votes into seats, form a government, and remain in power. But, if the opposition consolidates behind a single party, that party can efficiently translate its popular support into legislative seats (particularly in majoritarian electoral systems); form a government without extensive inter-party bargaining; and, assuming a legislative majority, more likely survive in office by governing alone.

Inherited opposition and the end of single-party dominance

To explain why some oppositions in dominant-party systems consolidate behind a single opposition challenger and ultimately end single-party dominance, we focus on two variables. The first is the presence of a pre-democratic political organization previously engaged in mass mobilization. Dominant parties often emerge during democratic transitions or decolonization. Indeed, they are frequently the first parties to hold office in a new regime.¹¹ Examples include the BDP in Botswana, UMNO in Malaysia, and Mapai in Israel. Parties challenging the dominant party in a new democracy are also often new. Consequently, they often lack the organizational infrastructure necessary for identifying high-quality candidates who can attract votes, deterring rivals from entering a race, and mobilizing voters to the polls. When all of a dominant party's challengers are new, they will all tend to be equally ill-equipped to consolidate the opposition. But, when one party was previously engaged in mass mobilization prior to the democratic transition, this party may possess a considerable organizational advantage over other opposition parties, a kind of first-mover advantage that enables it to expand at the expense of its rivals.

This claim about the importance of political organizations inherited from the non-democratic era builds upon, but differs from, recent arguments from scholars who emphasize that

authoritarian-era governing parties bring an array of resources with them into the democratic period. Doorenspleet and Nijzink as well as Riedl highlight how struggles for democratic liberation and the nature of elite linkages in place during the democratic transition condition dominant party durability.¹² Grzymała-Busse emphasizes that the variation in “portable skills” that elites bring to democratic politics allow them to differentially “respond to electoral concerns via programs and campaigns,”¹³ while Loxton notes that territorial organization (useful for recruiting candidates and running campaigns), clientelist networks (useful for winning votes), and sources of party finance (useful for attracting candidates and running campaigns) aid authoritarian-era ruling parties as they transition into the democratic period.¹⁴ We concur with these arguments about the utility of pre-democratic resources in the democratic era but emphasize that these same arguments are as important for the opposition as they are for dominant parties. We thus depart from the existing literature by examining the inherited resources of non-ruling parties.

Social cleavages and the end of single-party dominance

Where there is no opposition party with a pre-existing organizational base on which to build, a second-best resource for consolidating the opposition is a single salient two-sided social cleavage. Bartolini and Mair define a cleavage as exhibiting three elements: 1) an empirical element defined “in social-structural terms,” such as class or ethnicity; 2) a normative element, consisting of a shared “set of values and beliefs...which reflect the self-consciousness of the social group(s) involved;” and 3) an organizational element comprising the “interactions, institutions, and organisations, such as political parties, which develop as part of the cleavage.”¹⁵ Because we are interested in the process through which cleavages become the basis for political parties, our understanding of social cleavages includes only Bartolini and Mair’s first and second elements—

social characteristics and a shared recognition of their importance. Whereas a social cleavage is the line of division in society (e.g., class or religion), cleavage groups are the groups into which a cleavage divides all or some of population (e.g., middle class and working class; Christian and Muslim).

A consolidated opposition to a dominant party is more likely to emerge when there is a single salient two-sided social cleavage.¹⁶ A single two-sided social cleavage can provide the opposition with the mobilizing material to consolidate by (imperfectly) substituting, in three ways, for what organizational resources provide. First, because members of a vibrant party organization regularly engage with voters, a party with a strong organizational infrastructure, even if developed in a different historical context for a different purpose, can better tailor its messages to resonate and potentially persuade undecided voters or those who previously supported other parties. Social cleavages can equip an opposition with similarly resonant messages. Since cleavage groups involve shared interests or a common identity, politicians can invoke these shared interests or couch messages in terms of shared symbols to mobilize electoral support. Second, a robust organization provides a party with personnel who can identify high-quality candidates who will appeal to voters. Along similar lines, parties built around a cleavage group can make use of comparatively dense social networks.¹⁷ Cleavage groups, by definition, refer to groups with a shared “objective” characteristic to which group members attribute some importance. Party activists can rely on social ties within their cleavage group to identify and recruit high-quality candidates. Third, a strong party organization provides a network of activists who can turn out a party’s core supporters to vote. A similar logic applies to cleavage groups because their relatively dense social networks can be deployed in service of voter mobilization.

The advantages of mobilizing a cleavage group should not be overstated. Cleavage groups are large, and many members may have either tenuous ties to other group members or strong cross-cutting ties to non-members. Additionally, some members may place little weight on their membership in these groups. Moreover, not all identities or groups qualify as cleavage groups; only widely recognized social categories qualify as social cleavages. However, for these groups, mobilizing around a group identity can achieve some of the network functions and provide some of the resonant appeals to which parties would ideally turn to a vibrant organization.

Political entrepreneurs seeking to consolidate opposition to a dominant party using group-based strategies face three potential scenarios: one in which there is a single salient two-sided cleavage, a second in which there is a multi-sided cleavage (or, equivalently, multiple cross-cutting cleavages), and a third in which there are no salient polity-wide social cleavages. The first scenario is the most likely to lead to effective opposition consolidation. When there is a multi-sided cleavage—such as a religious cleavage involving three or four religious groups, or a class cleavage that divides farmers from the middle class from urban workers—mobilizing around a social cleavage may not readily produce a consolidated opposition. Rather, it may produce multiple opposition groups that view each other with as much suspicion as the dominant party. The same logic applies to the case of cross-cutting cleavages. For instance, assume a polity possesses two cross-cutting cleavages—religion and class—which produce four distinct groups. In such a setting, consolidating the opposition behind one side of one cleavage may be difficult because the dominant party could undercut such an attempt by invoking a different line of cleavage.¹⁸ In contrast, when there is only one two-sided cleavage, consolidating the opposition is likely to be easier. Though a cleavage group may start out politically fractured, uniting a group that shares common interests or a shared identity is easier than unifying groups that lack a pre-existing set of

interests or identities. Moreover, when the cleavage is two-sided, by mobilizing one side of that cleavage, a potential opposition party has a built-in opponent in the dominant party, which presumably draws support largely from the other side of the cleavage.

Where there is no salient polity-wide cleavage, an opposition party will face a more difficult time consolidating the opposition vote. A polity may lack a salient polity-wide cleavage for different reasons. Salient cleavages may be highly localized, forcing a party to knit together various cleavage groups to consolidate the opposition and therefore increasing the likelihood that the opposition remains fragmented. Alternatively, there may be no salient social cleavages at all, in which case opposition parties will have to form around charismatic leaders or distributional coalitions promising members the spoils of political power. Though both charisma and spoils constitute possible bases for a party, they are unreliable—depending on a leader’s continued appeal and the promises of spoils that may not materialize in the event of repeated electoral losses. In short, when there is a single two-sided social cleavage around which an opposition party can mobilize, its likelihood of consolidating the opposition vote behind it are much greater than under other cleavage configurations.

Finally, it is important to say a word about the origins of social cleavages. Cleavage structures are frequently a function of politics, whether the action of the colonial state¹⁹ or institutions that privilege mobilization along some identity dimension but not others.²⁰ Nevertheless, these cleavages often precede the onset of mass politics, as in the case of ancestral cities in Nigeria or language groups in Zambia.²¹ In such cases, social cleavages predate party mobilization, and parties can decide whether and how to use such cleavages. Of course, parties can themselves engineer or reinforce social cleavages.²² However, we find little evidence of opposition parties in India successfully employing this strategy to consolidate the opposition vote.

The Empirical Context: India

Our empirical evidence comes from India. Though India informed some early contributions to the study of dominant parties,²³ it has been largely absent from recent debates on single-party dominance. Yet, the Indian National Congress (hereafter Congress) governed India for 39 of the country's first 42 years after independence. A non-Congress government did not serve a full term in office at the national level until the BJP headed governments from 1998 to 2004.²⁴ We examine variation in the emergence of full-term opposition governments in India's states. Subnational comparison within India is particularly fruitful because states vary considerably in the duration of Congress dominance as well as in their salient social cleavages, party systems, and the linkages between the two. Nevertheless, the common national context—including the uniform use of single-member district plurality electoral rules—allows for controlled comparison across these politically powerful subnational units.

The bulk of our empirical evidence comes from cases studies of three states. The first, Tamil Nadu, is one of the three major states where single-party dominance ended relatively early, in the late 1960s and 1970s. In Tamil Nadu, Congress dominance ended early because the legacy of a colonial-era organization set the foundation for a credible alternative to Congress that quickly consolidated the opposition vote. The second case is Karnataka, one of the three large states where single-party dominance ended somewhat later, in the 1980s. No colonial-era organization existed, but a longstanding social cleavage pitting the state's dominant castes against a coalition of "minority" castes eventually fostered the formation of a large alternative to Congress. Finally, the third case is Uttar Pradesh, one of the nine states where Congress dominance definitively ended in 1990 or later. No colonial-era organizations survived and a variety of social cleavages divided

political elites in Uttar Pradesh. Consequently, the opposition remained divided, and single-party dominance did not end until support for the dominant party collapsed.

Evidence from India's Major States

Since our argument emerged inductively from our research, the cases described in the article's next three sections illustrate, rather than test, our argument. However, the case study states are broadly representative of the other states where Congress dominance ended at roughly the same time. To demonstrate the reach of our argument across India, we briefly discuss patterns across all of India's major states, before turning to a statistical analysis. Further discussion of non-case-study states also appears in the appendix, where we outline the states' experiences with single-party dominance, the presence (or absence) of colonial-era parties, and the cleavage configuration.

Across Indian states, full-term opposition governments tended not to emerge until a single opposition party was large enough to win a (near) legislative majority. As Table 1 shows, Congress dominance ended in nine of fifteen states with an opposition government that won a single-party majority. In two more states, an opposition party was a few seats short of a majority. Among the remaining states, no party was ever truly dominant in Kerala; single-party dominance ended largely through the dominant party's near-complete collapse in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh; and a coalition government displaced a still strong dominant party in Maharashtra. Most often, the key to durably ending single-party dominance was the consolidation of the opposition vote behind one large party.

[Table 1 about here]

What then explains variation in when and where oppositions consolidated behind a single party? First, the presence of pre-democratic political organizations (other than Congress)

influenced the emergence of a full-term opposition government because inherited organizational structures and ideational legacies gave nascent opposition parties a major advantage in consolidating the opposition vote. However, few Indian states actually inherited opposition parties that were active in the colonial area. In some areas, primarily those under princely rule that did not permit organized politics, few political organizations outside of Congress existed. In other areas, the dominant party's main colonial-era competitor—the Muslim League—effectively ceased to operate in India after independence, when much of the Muslim League leadership decamped for Pakistan. Among the few states that inherited parties that engaged in mass mobilization during the colonial era, these parties—the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu and the Communist Party of India (CPI) in Kerala and West Bengal—expanded relatively quickly at the expense of opposition rivals and displaced India's dominant party comparatively early.

Second, the opposition consolidated somewhat more quickly behind a single party where there was a single two-sided social cleavage. In the Indian context, our discussion of social cleavages focuses overwhelmingly on caste (or *jati*), endogamous social groupings historically associated with hereditary professions. Where a single two-sided social cleavage could be found, this cleavage was a convenient vehicle for consolidating political opposition, especially if Congress was associated with one side of that cleavage. States with a single two-sided cleavage varied in the nature of their social cleavages; some were rivalries between demographically small but elite groups who sat atop patronage networks of subordinate social groups (e.g., Andhra Pradesh) while others pitted demographically large groups against one another (e.g., Karnataka). The remaining states—those where there was not a single two-sided cleavage—also varied considerably in their cleavage configurations. In some cases, there was no salient state-wide cleavage because the upper castes were politically hegemonic (e.g., Odisha) or there were multiple

salient cleavages that varied from place to place within the state (e.g., Assam). In other cases, there were multiple salient state-wide cleavages, as when both religion and caste were important (e.g., Punjab, Kerala). The presence of a single two-sided cleavage typically enabled the opposition to consolidate more quickly than in states with multiple cleavages or no salient state-wide cleavage.

Next, we present a simple statistical analysis in which India's fifteen major states are our units of analysis. Our dependent variable, *Dominant party duration*, is the number of years elapsed between India's first state elections (in 1951-52) and the beginning of the first full-term government headed by a party other than Congress. Our two independent variables of interest are *Colonial organization*, a dummy for whether the state had a major party or organization (other than Congress) that was active in politics both before and after independence, and *Two-sided cleavage*, a dummy for whether there was a single two-sided social cleavage (as opposed to multiple cleavages or no single state-wide cleavage) among the political class. Model 1 in Table 2 presents the results of an OLS regression in which *Colonial organization* and *Two-sided cleavage* are the two predictors of *Dominant party duration*. The coefficient on *Colonial organization* is sizeable and statistically significant. The coefficient on *Two-sided cleavage* is smaller and falls short of statistical significance, though the p-value is relatively small ($p = 0.12$).

In model 2, we control for three plausible alternative explanations for the duration of Congress dominance. First, dominance could end earlier in places where the dominant party was less dominant from the start, whether because it appealed to a narrower segment of the population or was organizationally weaker. We thus include *Congress vote*, a measure of Congress' state-level vote share in the 1957 state elections. We use 1957 rather than 1951-52 because state boundaries changed radically in 1956. Second, single-party dominance might end earlier in places where Congress' opposition was initially less fragmented. In other words, levels of opposition

consolidation at the outset of the democratic era might explain later opposition consolidation and the duration of dominance. To account for this, we include *Opposition ENP*, the effective number of opposition parties in 1957.²⁵ Finally, because Congress had less opportunity to organize in areas under princely rule, as opposed to direct British rule, single-party dominance might end earlier in areas that were largely under princely rule. *Princely rule* is a dummy variable indicating whether a sizeable portion of a state was under princely rule before independence.

[Table 2 about here]

With the addition of controls, *Colonial organization* remains statistically significant, though the coefficient is slightly smaller. The size of the coefficient on *Two-sided cleavage* is larger and statistically significant. The coefficients on the control variables are rather small and not statistically significant, though the coefficients on *Congress vote* and *Opposition ENP* are in the expected directions and have relatively small p-values of around 0.15. The weak findings with respect to *Opposition ENP* should allay concerns that the same set of factors that shape a state's cleavage structure also directly account for where the opposition was most likely to consolidate. If the same factor explained both the cleavage structure (which we observe around the time of independence) and the duration of single-party dominance (but not through the cleavage structure), then we should presumably observe both the cleavage structure taking root and the beginnings of opposition consolidation at the same time, shortly after independence. Yet, although our coding of *Two-sided cleavage* reflects the cleavage structures in the late colonial and immediate post-colonial period, we do not find evidence that states with more consolidated oppositions in the early post-independence period (that is, higher values of *Opposition ENP*) have significantly shorter periods of single-party dominance. In other words, by the early post-independence period, the cleavage structure was evident but oppositions remained highly

fragmented in all states, even in the places where oppositions would soon consolidate. Opposition consolidation occurred well after the salient social cleavages emerged. For the same factor (or factors) to shape both cleavages and single-party dominance, those factors would need to shape social cleavages in the late 1940s and early 1950s but not influence opposition consolidation and the end of single-party dominance until decades later. Though such a scenario is possible, our findings are more consistent with the conjecture that a variety of antecedent factors shaped the cleavage structure across India's states at independence, when the opposition in most states was highly fragmented. In those places where politicians could build on a single two-sided cleavage, they more quickly fashioned parties that crowded out other opposition parties and successfully challenged the dominant party.

Given the small number of observations and our relatively blunt measures, we conduct a series of robustness tests, which are presented in the appendix. First, we re-ran the models, each time dropping a different state from the analysis to ensure that no one state drives the statistical results. Second, because *Two-sided cleavage* requires qualitative coding, and some might disagree with any individual coding, we re-ran the analyses changing the coding for *Two-sided cleavage* for each state one by one. For the most part, our results do not change. Third, we included a variety of economic indicators as controls. Having shown that our argument applies broadly across India, we now turn to our cases.

Tamil Nadu's Early Opposition: Colonial-Era Organization

In Tamil Nadu, a viable opposition government emerged early. In 1967, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) decisively defeated Congress in state elections and came to power with a single-party majority, becoming the first Indian state where a non-Congress government

served a full term. The DMK's deep organizational roots in the colonial era enabled the early emergence of a viable opposition in Tamil Nadu. Although the DMK was not founded until 1949, its organizational roots dated back more than thirty years earlier to both the Justice Party and the Self-Respect Association. Thanks to these roots, the DMK inherited organizational and ideational resources that provided it with a robust organization and a unique "subculture" from which to draw high-quality candidates and dedicated activists.²⁶ These resources enabled the DMK to effectively challenge Congress dominance earlier than in most other states.

By the early twentieth century, the British had recruited primarily Brahmins into the colonial bureaucracy in the Madras Presidency, which today contains Tamil Nadu and parts of several other states. In response, disaffected landowning non-Brahmin elites established the Justice Party in 1916 to mobilize for non-Brahmin quotas in the colonial bureaucracy. In the context of a highly restricted franchise, the Justice Party quickly gained traction as an electoral force, governing the Madras Presidency from 1920 to 1926 and then again from 1930 to 1937. But, by the late 1930s, the Justice Party's fortunes began to wane. As the franchise expanded, the Justice Party declined electorally because the tiny elite that dominated its ranks evinced little interest in establishing a broader base of support.

Meanwhile, a social movement called the Self-Respect Association began operating in parallel to the Justice Party, drawing upon and ultimately radicalizing the Justice Party's anti-Brahminical ideology. The Self Respect Association was founded in 1926 by a former Congressman, E.V. Ramaswami Naicker (known as Periyar), who was disillusioned with Brahmin dominance in Congress. By advocating atheism and the abandonment of Hindu ritual, Periyar took radical aim at the Hindu social order. The Association demonized North Indians, who were accused of imposing Brahminical Hinduism on South India. The Self-Respect Association fused

the Justice Party's anti-Brahminical ideology with an ethnic Tamil nationalism, nurturing what would become known as the Dravidian ideology that the DMK would eventually espouse. In 1937, the Self-Respect Association merged into the Justice Party. To make a clean break with the Justice Party's elite past, the Justice Party rebranded itself as the Dravidar Kazhagam (DK) in 1944 and formally withdrew from electoral politics to focus on social transformation. One of the DK's leaders, C.N. Annadurai, later gained prominence within the movement by projecting a less radical image that would appeal to a wider audience. He embraced independence, tilted the blend of Dravidian ideology towards issues of language and culture, and softened the organization's opposition to religion.²⁷ In 1949, Annadurai split from the DK to launch the DMK, taking with him a majority of the DK's supporters.²⁸ Unlike the DK, however, the DMK explicitly aimed to win power through elections.

Across India at this time, most opposition parties were newly formed and organizationally weak, often having emerged out of factional fights within Congress. The DMK was, instead, a party with a dedicated cadre of workers schooled in the Dravidian movement and Periyar's social reform agenda. In service of that agenda, the DMK used its organizational might to launch frequent mass agitations throughout the 1950s, often in protest of central government plans to impose the use of Hindi.²⁹ It also led a major campaign against a craft education scheme seen as reinforcing traditional caste occupations. The DMK engaged with the electorate through a variety of media, "through films, books, pamphlets, speeches, dramas, poems, songs, or newspapers. Committed young people often went to the remotest corners of the state to spread DMK ideas and to establish reading rooms and DMK branches."³⁰ The party's routinized and democratic internal structures allowed the DMK to incorporate leaders from the state's many caste groups.³¹ Consequently, the DMK developed a highly committed set of activists possessing a genuine commitment to social

reform. Drawing on its well-developed organization, the DMK's rise to power in Tamil Nadu was meteoric. Its vote share increased from 13% in 1957, when it first contested state elections, to 27% in 1962 and 41% in 1967, when it came to power and brought Congress dominance to an end. By 1967, the DMK had established itself as the state's premier opposition party, marginalizing its opposition rivals. As part of the opposition election alliance that it headed in 1967, the DMK contested 74% of the state's seats, leaving only a quarter of the seats to the state's other opposition parties.

Without an existing organizational base upon which to build, the DMK could not have expanded nearly as quickly as it did.³² Neither of Tamil Nadu's other opposition parties—Swatantra and the two communist parties—could match the DMK in terms of organizational development. Swatantra was poorly organized, and its activities outside of elections were limited. The communists were better organized, but active in just a few pockets of the state. Where both the DMK and the communists were active, the DMK quickly edged out the communists, in part thanks to the resonance of the DMK's Dravidian appeals. Whereas the communists' upper caste leaders and class-based appeals often fell flat, the DMK's appeals to caste grievances and linguistic pride—honed over the previous decades—successfully mobilized many voters.³³ The DMK's organizational roots, both as an electoral force and as part of social movement that engaged deeply with the public, gave it an organizational advantage with the electorate that its rivals did not possess.

Karnataka's Middling Opposition: A Dominant Cleavage

In Karnataka, a viable opposition government emerged at a middling stage—later than in Tamil Nadu but earlier than in Uttar Pradesh. Although the opposition did not have an

organizational inheritance from the colonial period on which to build, it benefited from the presence of a single two-sided social cleavage around which it could mobilize, one that pitted the state's dominant castes against a coalition of so-called "minority" castes.

Present-day Karnataka took shape in 1956, created from the princely state of Mysore and parts of the princely state of Hyderabad as well as parts of the direct-rule provinces of Bombay, Madras and Coorg. The largest part of Karnataka came from the princely state of Mysore, whose politics largely defined post-independence Karnataka. Although Mysore permitted a greater degree of representative government than most other colonial-era princely states, it allowed little popular mobilization or organization building that could later provide incipient opposition parties with an independent organizational base. Upon independence, the princely house of Mysore acceded to the Union of India and a Congress cabinet took power. In 1956, the present-day state of Karnataka was formed as a result of the linguistic reorganization of India's states. Unlike Tamil Nadu, Karnataka came into being in 1956 without any history of serious Congress opposition and few ideological or organizational resources with which the opposition could mobilize voters.

However, during the colonial period, an important cleavage emerged between the state's smaller, subordinate castes and its dominant castes, the Vokkaligas and Lingayats, who constituted nearly a third of the population and represented the state's wealthier landowning communities.³⁴ This cleavage originated well before the advent of mass politics in Mysore. Under the British, Brahmins dominated the civil administration in Mysore's urban areas, while the Vokkaliga and Lingayat castes were socially dominant in rural areas.³⁵ In most parts of rural Mysore, these two castes were historically powerful, holding the influential positions of hereditary village headships since at least the early nineteenth century.³⁶ M.N. Srinivas, in his celebrated study of the village

of Rampura in Mysore, notes the numerical and social dominance of the Vokkaligas as well as the ritual dominance of the Lingayats and the remaining Brahmins who had not departed for the city.³⁷

The Karnataka Provincial Congress Committee (KPCC) emerged in 1910 but forged only tenuous links with the wider nationalist movement because Congress leadership deliberately eschewed mobilization in princely states. In Mysore's first election in 1937, based on a limited franchise, non-Brahmin notables won a commanding victory. The Brahmin-dominated KPCC subsequently sought a rapprochement with the Vokkaligas and Lingayats, who were encouraged to lead both the KPCC and the representative assembly. Once this alliance had been struck, Brahmins, Vokkaligas, and Lingayats united in the task of demanding more representative government. Throughout the remaining colonial era, no political competition emerged because the Mysore royal house was unwilling to devolve substantial governing powers, Congress leaders lacked interest in promoting political mobilization in princely states, and the alliance between Brahmins, Vokkaligas, and Lingayats created a united front among dominant castes.

The visibility of Vokkaliga-Lingayat dominance in rural areas—where most people lived—created a clear focal point for discontent among non-dominant groups who often felt that, in village settings, “they have no protection against the bullying and exploitation on the part of men of the dominant caste.”³⁸ Throughout the 1950s, Congress cemented its linkages with the dominant Lingayat and Vokkaliga castes in rural areas, and these castes progressively dominated state politics, particularly as the importance of the numerically small, increasingly urban Brahmins faded.

The strategy of mobilizing the non-dominant castes against Vokkaliga-Lingayat domination first took shape following a major split in Congress. Before that, opposition to Congress was fragmented and poorly organized. In the 1960s, Congress' chief rival was the Praja

Socialist Party (PSP), which drew some support from Vokkaligas dissatisfied with the Lingayats' place within Congress.³⁹ But the PSP never won more than 15% of the vote. Then, in 1969, Congress split into two factions, one led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi—Congress (R)—and the other dominated by Congress state party bosses, Congress (O). Many Lingayats and Vokkaligas sided with Congress (O). Within the state legislature, Congress (O) retained enough support to remain in power in Karnataka, essentially becoming an opposition government. Following the split, Devraj Urs, a second-rank cabinet member from a numerically small caste, was the first politician of any stature to support Indira Gandhi. When Congress (R) won national elections in 1971, a flood of Congress (O) leaders defected to Congress (R), bringing down the short-lived opposition government and strengthening Congress (R)'s hand ahead of fresh state elections.⁴⁰

Upon Congress (R)'s victory in the 1972 state elections, Gandhi appointed Urs to the position of Chief Minister. Urs sought to exploit the division between the dominant and non-dominant castes by mobilizing the state's traditionally subordinate castes against a Congress (O) that was visibly associated with Vokkaliga and Lingayat dominance. Urs targeted non-dominant castes with political appointments and focused on policies related to housing and land reform that appealed to the poorer segments of the dominant castes. By the late 1970s, this strategy bore fruit; Urs' main vote bank was the socio-economically disadvantaged majority, while the Vokkaligas and Lingayats were sidelined within Congress (R).⁴¹

The Lingayat and Vokkaliga shift away from Congress—that is, the ruling Indira Gandhi faction—precipitated the emergence of a sizeable opposition party in Karnataka for the first time. By winning more than a quarter of the vote in the 1972 state election, Congress (O) emerged as Congress' first real rival. Then, in 1977, Congress (O) and several other parties merged to form

the Janata Party and went on to win about a third of the vote in 1978. In 1983, Congress lost power to the Janata Party after its new Chief Minister, Gunda Rao, tried unsuccessfully to appeal simultaneously to both dominant and non-dominant groups.⁴² Congress lost more than a hundred seats, while the Janata Party swept the Mysore region of Karnataka, where the Vokkaligas and Lingayats were dominant. Despite superficial efforts to appeal to the coalition of minorities that sustained Congress, the Janata Party's "policies and approach were generally molded by the Lingayat-Vokkaliga combine."⁴³ After a poor showing in the 1985 parliamentary election, the Janata Chief Minister sought a fresh mandate. In the ensuing 1985 state election, the Janata Party won power again and remained there until 1989, marking more than six continuous years in power (1983-89) and ushering in an era of genuinely competitive politics.

Karnataka's political trajectory illustrates how a pronounced social cleavage facilitated the consolidation of the opposition behind a single party in the absence of any usable organizational resources. After Congress' split in 1969, Indira Gandhi's Congress (R) quickly moved to mobilize the state's non-dominant castes around the grievances associated with Vokkaliga-Lingayat dominance. Though Congress remained in power and in control of valuable patronage resources through the 1970s and early 1980s, opposition to the party consolidated behind the other side of this social cleavage, producing two parties of relatively equal size. One unusual—though, not unprecedented—aspect of this rivalry was the movement of the dominant castes from Congress to the opposition, which could hardly have been predicted. The presence of a single two-sided social cleavage ensured that the opposition was closely identified with a particular section of society, retaining support from those groups and growing in size. Had no such cleavage existed, the movement of the dominant castes out of Congress might well have resulted in a fragmented

opposition divided between separate Vokkaliga- and Lingayat-dominated parties still unable to challenge Congress rule.

Uttar Pradesh's Late Opposition: No Organizational Legacy and Multiple Social Cleavages

In Uttar Pradesh (UP), a viable opposition did not emerge until the 1990s. Congress opposition failed to consolidate behind a single, large opposition party because potential opposition forces lacked both longstanding organizational resources upon which to build and a single two-sided social cleavage upon which to capitalize. Because no opposition party enjoyed an organizational advantage over its rivals and there was no single two-sided social cleavage, the opposition remained highly fragmented. Consequently, Congress dominated UP politics until the 1990s, when its support collapsed.

Under colonial rule, electoral opposition to Congress in UP (then known as the United Provinces) sprung mainly from two parties: the National Agriculturalist Party, which primarily represented large-scale landlords, and the Muslim League, representing Muslims landlords and civil servants. Neither party remained functional in UP after independence when most key League leaders migrated to Pakistan, gutting its organizational leadership virtually overnight. Since opposition forces had no prior organizational or ideational bases upon which to draw, they had to construct parties anew. Of the three major opposition parties that contested the first state elections in UP—the Socialist Party, Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP), and Bharatiya Jana Sangh—none was more than a few years old, and two were comprised mainly of Congress defectors (the Socialists and KMPP). The Jana Sangh was comparatively well organized, relying on the organizational infrastructure of the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), a Hindu nationalist organization. However, since the RSS's organization was limited mainly to towns in an

overwhelmingly rural state and lacked experience in actually contesting elections, the Jana Sangh had limited ability to expand quickly.

Potential opposition forces in UP were further hampered by the absence of a state-wide cleavage upon which political grievances could be overlaid. At independence, religion—and the rivalry between Hindus and Muslims—was the primarily social cleavage. With the departure of the Muslim League and the horrors of Partition, religion effectively disappeared as a cleavage along which elections were fought. Congress aggregated urban and rural notables from across the state’s major castes whose social and economic influence over lower social groups (often lower castes) helped them deliver votes to Congress. While UP’s caste structure was not necessarily any more fragmented than in other states, no single caste rivalry dominated state politics or polarized political elites into two rival camps that could then map onto a dominant party/opposition divide.

In the early post-independence decades, factional rivalries among a range of upper castes animated electoral politics, both within and between parties. As some of the major agrarian castes (e.g., Jats and Yadavs) became more politically assertive, they were increasingly dissatisfied with their subordinate position in Congress and attempted to challenge Congress hegemony. However, they were often divided amongst themselves. Whereas the various incarnations of the socialist parties were more closely associated with the so-called “backward castes” (such as Yadavs), the prosperous agriculturalists in Western Uttar Pradesh (namely, Jats) were closely associated with the peasant leader Charan Singh, a former Congressman who founded the Bharatiya Kranti Dal.

The virtual disappearance of Congress’ erstwhile electoral competitors and the multiple lines of social cleavage in the state helped Congress to form successive state governments, even as its electoral position weakened. Congress’ vote share in the first three state elections declined (48% in 1952, 42% in 1957, and 36% in 1962) as factional rivalry became more pronounced and

many of the intermediate and upwardly mobile backward caste leaders exited Congress. Yet, this dissatisfaction did not translate into a serious challenge to Congress because the middle-caste cultivators dispersed their votes across independents and small parties.

Over the next three decades, Congress retained its dominant position because of the opposition's continued fragmentation. In 1967, Congress lost power in UP to an opposition coalition that included communists, socialists, economic conservatives, Hindu nationalists, and Congress defectors. By this point, when Congress failed to win a legislative majority, the party's electoral support had declined to only 32%—far lower than in either Tamil Nadu or Karnataka at the time when opposition governments first took office in those states. The opposition comprised not only a number of mutually antagonistic parties but also many disaffected Congressmen who were especially susceptible to inducements to abandon the opposition and rejoin Congress.⁴⁴ Consequently, a series of unstable opposition governments held power over the next several years, interspersed with periods of Congress government. Congress returned to power in 1974 with single-party majority.

Congress again lost power following the Emergency, a period from 1975 to 1977 when the central government headed by Congress curtailed many democratic freedoms. In response, India's main opposition parties banded together to form the Janata Party, the one time in UP's history when Congress' opposition was fully united. Facing a consolidated opposition, Congress decisively the 1977 election. However, the Janata Party quickly dissolved amidst the same tensions between the upper castes and the intermediate and upwardly mobile backward castes that had earlier divided the opposition.⁴⁵ Even as Uttar Pradesh appeared on the cusp of a two-party system, neither of the state's two main parties—Congress and the Janata Party—represented one side of a clear social cleavage. Rather, both parties straddled increasingly salient divisions among upper

castes, backward and intermediate castes, and the newly assertive Scheduled Castes, who had long sat at the bottom of the traditional caste hierarchy. By 1980, the Janata Party had split. Congress, continuing to benefit from a fragmented opposition, handily won UP state elections in 1980 and 1985.

Congress dominance in UP finally ended in the 1990s, by which time “the party system was rooted in social cleavages”⁴⁶ formed around broad caste groups. Congress was not explicitly identified with any one of these groupings, allowing opposition groups to cleave off much of its support base. Whereas the intermediate castes had long constituted an important part of the opposition, Congress lost much of its upper caste support to the BJP, its Muslim support to the Samajwadi Party (which was associated with OBCs), and its Scheduled Caste support to the Bahujan Samaj Party. Consequently, by the mid 1990s, Congress was a marginal force in the state, as multiple other parties vied for power.

Unlike most other Indian states, where Congress dominance ended in the face of a consolidated opposition, the opposition in Uttar Pradesh never consolidated. Instead, the end of single-party dominance occurred with the collapse of Congress’ support base.⁴⁷ Congress’ dominance persisted for as long as it did because it faced a divided opposition. No opposition party enjoyed a significant organizational advantage over its rivals, nor was there a single two-sided cleavage around which the opposition could unite.

Conclusion

Democracy does not guarantee genuine political competition; one party can dominate politics even when elections are free and fair. In this article, we have examined the conditions associated with the end of single-party dominance across India’s major states. In particular, we

have focused on the conditions that lead some oppositions to coalesce behind a single major party capable of eventually displacing the dominant party. Our argument suggests three important lessons for the study of single-party dominance.

The first lesson concerns the importance of opposition consolidation, rather than coordination, in ending single-party dominance. In contexts where the dominant party does not usually win the support of most voters, dominance can end for one of several reasons, whether because the dominant party loses electoral support and is no longer much larger than the other parties, because the opposition coordinates during and after elections, or because the opposition consolidates behind a single party. Most existing literature emphasizes the first pathway (declining dominant-party support)⁴⁸ or, more recently, the second (opposition coordination).⁴⁹ The final possibility has received little scholarly attention.⁵⁰ Yet, opposition consolidation, once accomplished, is perhaps the surest way to create a competitive party system because it mitigates concerns about collapsing opposition governments or a fragmented opposition vote. Indeed, single-party dominance durably ended in most of India's states only after the opposition consolidated behind a single party. The consolidation of previously fragmented oppositions behind a large opposition party, such as the Democratic Party of Japan or Likud in Israel, has arguably played an important role in the emergence of competitive party systems in other former dominant-party systems.

The second lesson concerns the conceptualization of single-party dominance. How we pose questions about the end of single-party dominance likely affects the answers we get. Does single-party dominance end with the first time that a dominant party loses power or when a truly viable alternative emerges? In most Indian states, Congress first lost power in the face of a coordinated opposition that deprived Congress of a legislative majority. But, such opposition coalitions quickly

collapsed and paved the way for Congress' return. Truly competitive party systems tended to emerge only when the opposition consolidated, and the opposition did not necessarily consolidate earliest in places where Congress first lost power. Outside of India, parties such as the Swedish Social Democrats, Ireland's Fianna Fáil, and Japan's LDP experienced short periods out of power in what were otherwise prolonged periods of rule. In India and elsewhere, the factors that explain a dominant party's brief ouster from power may not be the same factors explaining the emergence of a truly competitive party system.

The third lesson concerns the continuing relevance of historical legacies for ending single party dominance. Party systems in new democracies seldom arise completely anew. Rather, they often reflect legacies from previous, non-democratic eras. The resources available to opposition forces to contest the grip of a dominant party often hinge on what they, and the dominant party, have inherited from the past. Throughout much of the world, democratization occurred along with decolonization, meaning that the colonial era shaped the resources available to many dominant parties and their rivals. With the rise of competitive authoritarian regimes in the 21st century, democratic transitions in the future are likely to involve gradual transitions from manifestly unfair electoral competition to increasingly level playing fields, as was the case in Mexico and Malaysia. The future ability of opposition parties to challenge these regimes' dominant parties may well rest on the resources bequeathed to the opposition decades earlier during periods of blatantly unfair electoral competition.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Sarah Chartock, Erik Kuhonta, Rachel Beatty Riedl, Prerna Singh, participants at seminars at the University of Oxford (Blavatnik School of Government) and London School of

Economics (Department of Government), and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.

¹ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10.

² Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alistair Smith, "Political Competition and Economic Growth," *Journal of Democracy*, 12 (January 2001), 58-72; Pablo Pinto and Jeffrey Timmons, "The Political Determinants of Economic Performance," *Comparative Political Studies*, 38 (February 2005), 26-50.

³ On dominant-party strategy, see Ariel Levite and Sidney Tarrow, "The Legitimation of Excluded Parties in Dominant Party Systems: A Comparison of Israel and Italy," *Comparative Politics* 15 (April 1983), 295-327; Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Karen E. Ferree, *Framing the Race in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial-Census Elections* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). On dominant-party resources, see Ethan Scheiner, *Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Kenneth Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁴ T.J. Pempel, "Introduction," in T.J. Pempel, ed., *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 1-32; Adam Ziegfeld and Maya Tudor, "How Opposition Parties Sustain Single-Party Dominance: Lessons from India," *Party Politics* 23 (May 2017), 262-273.

⁵ This definition comes from Greene.

⁶ An opposition completes a full term if it 1) serves the full duration of its legislative mandate after an election, 2) serves the equivalent of a full term over the course of two legislative mandates, during which time it wins at least one election and does not lose an election, or 3) serves nearly all of its legislative mandate and then voluntarily calls early elections, with no indication that its government's survival is in jeopardy.

⁷ Greene; Leonardo Arriola, *Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Ziegfeld and Tudor.

⁸ Allen Hicken and Erik Martinez Kuhonta, eds., *Party System Institutionalization in Asia: Democracies, Autocracies, and the Shadows of the Past* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁹ Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability* (Columbus, OH: Merrill, 1972); Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

¹⁰ Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics*, (April 1970), 355.

¹¹ Kharis Templeman, "The Origins of Dominant Parties," paper prepared for the Dominant-Party Systems Conference, May 9-10, 2014, University of Michigan.

¹² Renske Doorenspleet and Lia Nijzink, eds., *One-Party Dominance in African Democracies* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013); Rachel Beatty Riedl, *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014),

¹³ Anna Grzymała-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East and Central Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 10.

¹⁴ James Loxton, "Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide: A Framework for Analysis," Kellogg Institute for International Studies Working Paper 411, June 2016.

¹⁵ Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 215.

¹⁶ Our discussion of political cleavages refers primarily to the political elite. In many societies, the political elite is drawn mainly from a subset of groups in society (e.g., certain ethnic groups or social classes). Thus, a cleavage may be multi-sided when viewed from the perspective of society as a whole but only two-sided among the political elite who establish and lead political parties.

¹⁷ For instance, James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphries, Daniel N. Posner, and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?," *American Political Science Review* 101 (November 2007): 709-725 show that co-ethnics have denser social networks than non-co-ethnics. Our argument is not about ethnicity *per se* but applies more broadly to all cleavage groups.

¹⁸ Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability" *Perspectives on Politics* 3 (June 2005): 235-52 makes a similar argument about cross-cutting appeals except that, in her argument, such cycling prevents any party from achieving a permanent majority, thereby sustaining democracy. In contrast, we start from the assumption of a party with a semi-permanent hold on power.

¹⁹ David D. Laitin, *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change among the Yoruba* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Daniel N. Posner, "The Colonial Origins of Ethnic Cleavages: The Case of Linguistic Divisions in Zambia," *Comparative Politics* 35 (January 2003): 127-146.

²⁰ Chandra.

²¹ Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 1-64; Laitin; Posner.

²² Pradeep K. Chhibber, *Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

²³ William Riker, "The Number of Political Parties: A Reexamination of Duverger's Law," *Comparative Politics*, 9 (October 1976), 93-106; Rajni Kothari, "The Congress 'System' in India," *Asian Survey* 4 (December 1964), 1161-73.

²⁴ Non-Congress governments came to power in 1977, 1989, and 1996; all collapsed within less than three years only to be replaced by a government headed by a different party.

²⁵ *Opposition ENP* is an effective number of parties measure using vote shares for parties other than Congress. We use a party's share of the total non-Congress vote, not the party's actual vote share, when calculating this variable. Independents are treated as unique parties.

²⁶ Narendra Subramanian, *Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India*. (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1999).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 124-126. Subramanian argues that the critical feature allowing non-Brahminism to survive in Tamil Nadu was its link to language and cultural nationalism. Elsewhere, Congress easily absorbed non-Brahmin sentiment.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.

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- ²⁹ Ibid., 158.
- ³⁰ Marguerite Ross Barnett, *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 83.
- ³¹ Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 275-81.
- ³² Subramanian, 145.
- ³³ Ibid., 154-55.
- ³⁴ Atul Kohli, *The State and Poverty in India* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 149.
- ³⁵ Aya Ikegame, *Princely India Re-imagined: A Historical Anthropology of Mysore from 1799 to the Present*. (Routledge, 2013), 85-86.
- ³⁶ James Manor, *Political Change in an Indian State: Mysore 1917-1955* (Delhi: Manohar, 1977), 29-32.
- ³⁷ M.N. Srinivas, "The Dominant Caste in Rampura," *American Anthropologist*, 61 (February 1959), 1-16.
- ³⁸ Ibid., 5.
- ³⁹ Lewis P. Fickett, Jr., "The Major Socialist Parties of India in the 1967 Election," *Asian Survey*, 8 (June 1968), 492.
- ⁴⁰ Myron Weiner, "The 1971 Elections and the Indian Party System," *Asian Survey*, 11 (December 1971), 1160, 1163.
- ⁴¹ James Manor, "Structural Changes in Karnataka Politics," *Economic and Political Weekly*, (October 29, 1977), 1869.
- ⁴² James Manor, "Blurring the Lines between Parties and Social Bases: Gundu Rao and Emergence of a Janata Government in Karnataka," *Economic and Political Weekly* (September 15, 1984), 1623-1632.
- ⁴³ R.R., "Caste Factor and Karnataka Poll Outcome," *Economic and Political Weekly* 25 (3) (January 20, 1990), 48.
- ⁴⁴ Subhash C. Kashyap, "The Politics of Defection: The Changing Contours of the Political Power Structure in State Politics in India," *Asian Survey* 10 (March 1970): 195-208; Lewis P. Fickett, Jr., *The Major Socialist Parties of India: A Study of Leftist Fragmentation* (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1976).
- ⁴⁵ Christophe Jaffrelot, *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003).
- ⁴⁶ Chhibber, 139.
- ⁴⁷ In many other states, Congress' support has declined considerably, but more often *after* it lost its dominant position.
- ⁴⁸ Scheiner; Magaloni; Greene.
- ⁴⁹ Greene; Arriola; Ziegfeld and Tudor.
- ⁵⁰ For an exception, see Aditya Dasgupta, "Technological Change and Political Turnover: The Democratizing Effects of the Green Revolution in India," *American Political Science Review*, forthcoming.